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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA "

Fr. INNOCENTIUS APAP., O.P., S.T.M.,

Censor Theol.

EDUS. CANONICUS SURMONT.

ViCARius Generalis.

Westmonasterii.

APPROBATIO ORDINIS.

Fr. VINCENTIUS McNABB, O.P., S.T.B..
Fr. W. LEO MOORE. O.P., S.T.L.

imprimatttt.

Fr. HUMBERTUS EVEREST, O.P.. S.T.B.,

Prior Provincialis Anglic.

In Festo S. p. Dominici,

die 4 Aug., 1914.

THE

"SUMMA THEOLOGICA

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

PART II.
{FIRST PART)

)}

LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY

FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN

PROVINCE

FIRST NUMBER
(QQ. I._XLV1II.)

R. & T. WASHBOURNE, LTD.
PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

AND AT MANCHESTER, BIRMINGHAM, AND GLASGOW
BENZIGER BROTHERS : NEW YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO

I9I4

[All r:ghis reserved]

9?) 45^

2,///

CONTENTS

TREATISE ON THE LAST END

QUESTION PA(;E

I. OF man's last end - - - - - I

II. OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH man's HAPPINESS CONSISTS - 1 7

III. WHAT IS HAPPINESS ? - - - - "34

IV. WHAT THINGS ARE REgUIRED FOR HAPPINESS ? " 5^
V. HOW IS HAPPINESS ATTAINED ? - - - 69

TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS
I. Of those Acts which are Proper to Man

[a) The Nature of Voluntary acts in General

VI. OF VOLUNTARINESS AND INVOLUNTARINESS - - 86

VII. OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS - - IO4

VIII. OF THE OBJECT OF VOLITION - - - - II3

IX. WHAT MOVES THE WILL ? - - - - I20

X. HOW IS THE WILL MOVED ? - - - _ 133

{b) The Nature of Elicited Voluntary Acts

XI. OF ENJOYMENT OR FRUITION - - - - 142

XII. OF INTENTION __---- 15c

XIII. OF CHOICE _._--- 158

XIV. OF COUNSEL - - - - - -1 69

XV. OF CONSENT - - - - - -1 79

XVI. OF USE ------- 186

XVII. OF THE ACTS WHICH ARE COMMANDED BY THE WILL - I93

[d] The Division of Human Acts

XVIIl. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF HUMAN ACTS IN

GENERAL - - - - - -21 ()

XIX. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF

THE WILL - - - - - - -33

vi CONTENTS

QUESTION. PAGE

XX. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF EXTERNAL HUMAN

ACTS _----- 256

XXI. OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN

HUMAN ACTS - _ _ - - 268

2. Of the Passions, which are Acts common to
Man and other Animals

{a) In General

XXII. OF the subject of the soul's passions - - 277

XXIII. OF the different kinds of passions - - 284

,^ XXIV. OF good and evil in the passions of the soul - 293

XXV. OF THE order OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER 3OI

{b) In Particular

XXVI. OF THE CONCUPISCIBLE PASSIONS AND FIRST OF LOVE 3 II

XXVII. OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE - - - "319

XXVIII. OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE - - - - 326

XXIX. OF HATRED -' - - - - " 33^

XXX. OF CONCUPISCENCE OR DESIRE - - - 348

XXXI. OF DELIGHT OR PLEASURE - - - - 356

XXXII. OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE _ - - 372

XXXIII. OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE - - - 387

XXXIV. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES - 395
XXXV. OF SORROW OR PAIN _ - - - 404

XXXVI. OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN - - 424

XXXVII. OF THE EFFECTS OF SORROW OR PAIN - - 432

XXXVIII. OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN - - 44O

XXXIX. OF THE GOODNESS OR MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN 448

XL. OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS AND FIRST OF HOPE

AND DESPAIR ----- 455

XLI. OF FEAR ------ 468

XLII. OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR - - - - 476

XLIII. OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR - - - * " 4^7

XLIV. OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR - - - "491

XLV. OF DARING ------ 499

XLVI. OF ANGER ------ 507

XLVII. OF THE EFFECTIVE CAUSE AND OF THE REMEDIES OF

ANGER ------ 522

XLVIII. OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER - - - - 530

TREATISE ON THE LAST END

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGIGA"

FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART.

PROLOGUE.

Since, as Damascene states [De Fide Orthod. ii.), man is said
to be made to God's image, in so far as the image implies an
intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement :
now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e., God, and of
those things which come forth from the power of God in
accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His
image, i.e., man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his
actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.

QUESTION I.

OF MAN'S LAST END.
{In Eight Articles.)

In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human
life ; and secondly, those things by means of which man may
advance towards this end, or stray from the path: for the
end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And
since the last end of human life is stated to be happiness, we
must consider (i) the last end in general; (2) Happiness.

Concerning the iirst there are eight points of inquiry:
(i) Whether it is fitting for man to act for an end ? (2)
Whether this is proper to the rational nature ? (3) Whether
a man's actions are specified by their end ? (4) Whether
there is any last end of human life ? (5) Whether one man
can have several last ends ? (6) Whether man ordains all

II. I I

2 QUESTION I

to the last end ? (7) Whether all men have the same last
end ? (8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in
that last end ?

First Article,
whether it is fitting for man to act for an end ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems unfitting for man to act for an end.
For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name,
implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a
cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his
action; since this preposition for indicates a relation of
causality. Therefore it is not fitting for man to act for an
end.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is itself the last end is not for
an end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the
Philosopher states {Ethic, i.). Therefore man does not do
everything for an end.

Obj. 3. Further, then does a man seem to act for an end,
when he acts deliberately. But man does many things
without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking of what
he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand,
or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else.
Therefore man does not do everything for an end.

On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are
derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end is
the principle in human operations, as the Philosopher states
[Phys. ii.). Therefore it is fitting for man to do everything
for an end.

/ answer that, Of actions done by man those alone are
properly called human, which are proper to man as man.
Now man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is
master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are
properly called human, of which man is master. Now man
is master of his actions through his reason and will ; whence,
too, the free-will is called the faculty of will and reason.
Therefore those actions are properly called human, which
proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions

MAN'S LAST END 3

befit man, they can be called actions of a man, but not
properly human actions, since they are not proper to man as
man. — Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a
power, are caused by that power in accordance with the nature
of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the
good. Therefore all human actions must be for an end.

Rej)ly Ohj. i. Although the end be last in the order of
execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention.
And it is in this way that it is a cause.

Reply Ohj. 2. If any human action be the last end, it must
be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above.
Now an action is voluntary in one of two ways : first, because
it is commanded by the will, e.g., to walk, or to speak;
secondly, because it is elicited by the will, for instance the
very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act
elicited by the will to be the last end. For the object of
the will is the end, just as the object of sight is colour:
wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing,
because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object;
so the first appetible, i.e., the end, cannot be the very act
of willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action
be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will :
so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing,
is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true
to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that
action in which the last end consists.

Reply Ohj. 3. Such like actions are not properly human
actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the
reason, which is the proper principle of human actions.
Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not one
that is fixed by reason.

QUESTION I

Second Article.

whether it is proper to the rational nature
to act for an end ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that it is proper to the rational nature
to act for an end. For man, whom it befits to act for an end,
never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there
are many things that have no knowledge of an end; either
because they are altogether without knowledge, as insensible
creatures : or because they do not apprehend the idea of an
end as such, as irrational animals. Therefore it seems
proper to the rational nature to act for an end.

Obj. 2. Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to
an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does
not befit things that lack reason.

Obj. 3. Further, the good and the end is the object of the
will. But the will is in the reason {De Anima iii.). There-
fore to act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature.

On the contrary, The Philosopher proves [Phys. ii.) that
not only mind but also nature acts for an end.

I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end.
For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the
first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed
also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The
reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save
in so far as it is moved by an agent ; for nothing reduces itself
from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move
except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were
not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do
one thing rather than another: consequently in order that
it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be
determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an
end. And just as this determination is effected, in the
rational nature, by the rational appetite, which is called the
will ; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclina-
tion, which is called the natural appetite.

MAN'S LAST END 5

Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an
end, by its own action or movement, in two ways : first, as it
were, moving itself to the end, — as man ; secondly, as though
moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a deter-
minate end through being moved by the archer, who directs
his action to the end. Therefore those things that are
possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because
they have dominion over their actions, through their free-
will which is tlie faculty of will and reason. But those things
that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as
though moved by another and not by themselves; since they
do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently
cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be ordained to
an end, only by another. For the entire irrational nature
is in comparison to God as an instrument to the principal
agent, as stated above (L Q. XXII., A. 2 ad ^\ Q. CIIL,
A. I ^i 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature
to tend to an end, as though directing (agens) and leading
itself to the end : whereas it is proper to the irrational nature
to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it
apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do not
apprehend it, as is the case of those which are altogether
void of knowledge.

Reply Obf. i. When man of himself acts for an end, he
knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another,
for instance, when he acts at another's command, or when
he is moved under another's compulsion, it is not necessary
that he should know the end. And it is thus with irrational
creatures.

Reply Ohj. 2. To ordain towards an end belongs to that
which directs itself to an end : whereas to be ordained to an
end belongs to that which is directed by another to an end.
And this can belong to an irrational nature, but owing to
some one possessed of reason.

Reply Ohj. 3. The object of the will is the end and the good
in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those
things that lack reason and intellect, since they cannot
apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite

6 QUESTION I

or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some particular good.
Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a uni-
versal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends the
common good, moves, by his command, all the particular
departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack
reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by
some rational will which extends to the universal good,
namely by the Divine will.

Third Article,
whether human acts are specified by their end ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that human acts are not specified by
their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But every-
thing is specified by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human
acts are not specified by their end.

Ohj. 2. Further, that which gives a thing its species should
exist before it. But the end comes into existence after-
wards. Therefore a human act does not derive its species
from the end.

Ohj. 3. Further, one thing cannot be in more than one
species. But one and the same act may happen to be
ordained to various ends. Therefore the end does not give
the species to human acts.

On the contrary, Augustine says [De Mor. Eccl. et Manich.
ii.) : According as their end is worthy of blame or fraise, so are
our deeds worthy of blame or praise.

I answer that, Each thing receives its species in respect
of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore
things composed of matter and form are established in
their respective species by their own forms. And this is
also to be observed in proper movements. For since move-
ments are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each
of these receives its species from an act ; action indeed from
the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the
act which is the terminus of the movement. Wherefore
heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain move-

MAN'S LAST END 7

ment proceeding from heat, while heating as a passion is
nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the
definition that shows the specific nature. And either way,
human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as
passions, receive their species from the end. For human
acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves him-
self, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above
(A. i) that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed
from a deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the
good and the end. And hence it is clear that the principle
of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In
like manner it is their terminus : for the human act terminates
at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural
agents the form of the thing generated is conformed to the
form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says [Prolog,
super Luc.) morality is said properly of man, moral acts
properly speaking receive their species from the end, for
moral acts are the same as human acts.

Reply Ohj. i. The end is not altogether extrinsic to the
act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus;
and it is just this that is essential to an act, viz., to proceed
from something, considered as action, and to proceed
towards something, considered as passion.

Reply Ohj. 2. The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the
intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A. 1. ad 1).
And it is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral
act.

Reply Ohj. 3. One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds
once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end,
from which it has its species: but it can be ordained to
several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other.
It is possible, however, that an act which is one in respect of
its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the will:
thus this act to kill a man, which is but one act in respect of
its natural species, can be ordained, as to an end, to the safe-
guarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result
being that there would be several acts in different species of
morality : since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in

8 QUESTION I

another, an act of vice. For a movement does not receive
its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but
only from that which is its per se terminus. Now moral ends
are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation
to a natural end is accidental to morality. Consequently
there is no reason why acts which are the same considered
in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered in
their moral species, and conversely.

Fourth Article,
whether there is one last end of human life ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that there is no last end of human
life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially
diffusive, as Dionysius states (Div. Norn. iv.). Conse-
quently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the
latter must needs diffuse some other good: so that the
diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the
nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of
ends.

6b j. 2. Further, things pertaining to the reason can be
multiplied to infinity : thus mathematical quantities have no
Hmit. For the same reason the species of numbers are in-
finite, since, given any number, the reason can think of
one yet greater. But desire of the end is consequent on the
apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there
is also an infinite series of ends.

Obj. 3. Further, the good and the end is the object of the
will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of
times : for I can will something, and will to will it, and so on
indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends
of the human will, and there is no last end of the human will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says [Metaph. ii.) that
to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good.
But the good is that which has the nature of an end. There-
fore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed in-
definitely. Therefore it is necessary to fix one last end.

MAN'S LAST END Q

/ answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to
proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point
of view. For in whatsoever things there is an essential
order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that
are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed also.
Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii.) that we
cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement, because
then there would be no first mover, without which neither
can the others move, since they move only through being
moved by the first mover. Now there is to be observed
a twofold order in ends, — the order of intention, and the
order of execution : and in either of these orders there must
be something first. For that which is first in the order of
intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite;
consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be
nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the
principle in execution is that wherein operation has its
beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will
begin to work. Now the principle in the intention is the
last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the
things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, on
neither side is it possible to go on to infinity; since if there
were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any
action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent
be at rest ; while if there is no first thing among those that
are ordained to the end, none would begin to work at any-
thing, and counsel would have no term, but would con-
tinue indefinitely.

On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being
in things that are ordained to one another not essentially
but accidentally; for accidental causes are indeterminate.
And in this way it happens that there is an accidental
infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the end.

Reply Ohj. i. The very nature of good is that some-
thing flows from it, but not that it flows from something else.
Since, therefore, good has the nature of end, and the first
good is the last end, this argument does not prove that
there is no last end; but that from the end, already sup-

10 QUESTION I

posed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those
things that are ordained to the end. And this would be
true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which
is infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself accord-
ing to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into
its effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that
there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from
the First Good from Which all other goods share the power
of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of good does not
proceed indefinitely, but, as it is written (Wisd. xi. 21),
God disposes all things in number, weight and measure.

Reply Ohj. 2. In things which are of themselves, reason
begins from principles that are known naturally, and
advances to some term. Wherefore the Philosopher proves
[Poster, i.) that there is no infinite process in demonstrations,
because there we find a process of things having an essential,
not an accidental, connection with one another. But in
those things which are accidentally connected, nothing
hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is
accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that
quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in suchlike
things nothing hinders the reason from an indefinite process.

Reply Ohj. 3. This multiplication of acts of the will
reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This
is clear from the fact that in regard to one and the same
end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or several
times.

Fifth Article,
whether one man can have several last ends ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems possible for one man's will to be
directed at the same time to several things, as last ends.
For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei. xix.) that some held man's
last end to consist in four things, viz., in pleasure, repose,
the gifts of nature, and virtue. But these are clearly more
than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end
of his wiU in many things.

MAN'S LAST END ii

Obj. 2. Further, things not in opposition to one another
do not exclude one another. Now there are many things
which are not in opposition to one another. Therefore the
supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does
not exclude others.

Obj. 3. Further, by the fact that it places its last end in
one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it
placed its last end in that thing, e.g., pleasure, it could
place it in something else, e.g., riches. Therefore even after
having placed his last end in pleasure, a man can at the
same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is
possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time
to several things, as last ends.

On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his last
end, is master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his
entire rule of life. Hence of gluttons it is written (Phil,
iii. 19) : Whose god is their belly : viz., because they place
their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now according
to Matth. vi. 24, No man can serve two masters, such, namely,
as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is im-
possible for one man to have several last ends not ordained
to one another.

/ answer that, It is impossible for one man's will to be
directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends.
Three reasons may be assigned for this. First, because, since
everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for
his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect and
crowning good. Hence Augustine says {De Civ. Dei. xix.) :
In sfeaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it passes
away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be
complete. It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill
man's appetite, that nothing is left beside it for man to desire.
Which is not possible, if something else be required for his
perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite
so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.

The second reason is because, just as in the process of
reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so
in the process of the rational appetite, i.e., the will, the

12 QUESTION I

principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now
this must needs be one: since nature tends to one thing
only. But the principle in the process of the rational appe-
tite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends,
as to its last end, is one.

The third reason is because, since voluntary actions
receive their species from the end, as stated above (A. 3),
they must needs receive their genus from the last end, which
is common to them all: just as natural things are placed
in a genus according to a common form. Since, then, all
things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to
one genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the
more because in every genus there is one first principle; and
the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated
above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to
the whole human race, so is the last end of any individual
man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there
is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man
must be fixed on one last end.

Reply Ohj. i. All these several objects were considered as
one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed
in them the last end.

Reply Ohj. 2. Although it is possible to find several things
which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is con-
trary to a thing's perfect good, that anything besides, be
required for that thing's perfection.

Reply Ohj. 3. The power of the will does not extend to
making opposites exist at the same time. Which would
be the case were it to tend to several diverse objects as
last ends, as has been shown above [ad 2) .

Sixth Article.

WHETHER MAN WILLS ALL, WHATSOEVER HE WILLS, FOR THE

LAST END ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Ohjection i. It seems that man does not wih all, what-
soever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the

MAN'S LAST END 13

last end are said to be serious matter, as being useful. But
jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man
does in jest, he ordains not to the last end.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning
of his Metaphysics (ii.) that speculative science is sought
for its own sake. Now it cannot be said that each specu-
lative science is the last end. Therefore man does not
desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end.

Obj. 3. Further, whoever ordains something to an end,
thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the
last end in all that he desires or does. Therefore man
neither desires nor does all for the last end.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Civ. Dei. xix.) : That
is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other
things, whereas we love it for its own sake.

I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatso-
ever he desires, for the last end. This is evident for
two reasons. First, because whatever man desires, he
desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not
as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, of
necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because
the beginning of anything is always ordained to its com-
pletion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and
of art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained
to complete perfection which is achieved through the last
end. Secondly, because the last end stands in the same
relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other
movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving
causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved
by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of
the appetite do not move the appetite, except as
ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the
last end.

Reply Obj. i. Actions done jestingly are not directed to
any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in
so far as they afford him pleasure or relaxation. But man's
consummate good is his last end.

Reply Obj. 2. The same applies to speculative science;

14 QUESTION I

which is desired as the scientist's good, included in com-
plete and perfect good, which is the ultimate end.

Reply Ohj. 3. One need not always be thinking of the
last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the
virtue of the first intention, which was in respect of the
last end, remains in every desire directed to any object
whatever, even though one's thoughts be not actually
directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the
road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step.

Seventh Article,
whether all men have the same last end ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh A rticle : —

Objection i. It seems that all men have not the same
last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems
to be the last end of man. But some turn away from the
unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have
not the same last end.

Ohj. 2. Further, man's entire life is ruled according to
his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end,
they would not have various pursuits in life. Which is
evidently false.

Ohj. 3. Further, the end is the term of action. But actions
are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific
nature, yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals.
Therefore all men have not the same last end.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. xiii.) that all
men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.

/ answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways :
first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly,
considering the thing in which the aspect of last end is
realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree
in desiring the last end: since all desire the fulfilment of
their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which
the last end consists, as stated above (A. 5). But as to the
thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed
as to their last end: since some desire riches, as their con-

MAN'S LAST END 15

summate good; some, pleasure; others, something else.
Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant; but to some,
the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the
sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that
sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in
which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In
like manner that good is most complete which the man
with well-disposed affections desires for his last end.

Rej)ly Ohj. i. Those who sin turn from that in which their
last end really consists: but they do not turn away from
the intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly
seek in other things.

Rej)ly Ohj. 2. Various pursuits in life are found among
men by reason of the various things in which men seek to
find their last end.

Refly Ohj. 3. Although actions are of individuals, yet
their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one
thing, as stated above (A. 5) .

Eighth Article,
whether other creatures concur in that last end ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that all other creatures concur in
man's last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning.
But man's beginning — i.e., God — is also the beginning of all
else. Therefore all other things concur in man's last end.

Ohj. 2. Further, Dionysius says {Div. Nom. iv.) that God
turns all things to Himself as to their last end. But He is
also man's last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by
man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ, i.). Therefore
other things, too, concur in man's last end.

Ohj. 3. Further, man's last end is the object of the will.
But the object of the will is the universal good, which is
the end of all. Therefore all must needs concur in man's
last end.

On the contrary, man's last end is happiness; which all
men desire, as Augustine says {De Trin. xiii.). But happi-

i6 QUESTION I

ness is not possible for animals bereft of reason, as Augustine
says (Qq. 83). Therefore other things do not concur in
man's last end.

/ answer that, As the Philosopher says {Phys. ii. and
Metaph. v.), the end is twofold, — the end /or which and the
end by which ; viz., the thing itself in which is found the
aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing.
Thus we say that the end of the movement of a weighty
body is either a lower place as thing, or to be in a lower
place, as use ; and the end of the miser is money as thing,
or possession of money as use.

If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing
which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last
end, since God is the last end of man and of all other things.
— If^ however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisi-
tion of the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with
man in this end. For man and other rational creatures
attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this
is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last
end, in so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch
as they are, or live, or even know.

Hence it is evident how the objections are. solved: since
happiness means the acquisition of the last end.

.^"Wi»i35!y.g5-'^

QUESTION II.

OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN^S HAPPINESS CONSISTS.

[In Eight Articles.)

We have now to consider happiness: and (i) in what it
consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.

Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(i) Whether happiness consists in wealth ? (2) Whether in
honour ? (3) Whether in fame or glory ? (4) Whether in
power ? (5) Whether in any good of the body ? (6) Whether
in pleasure ? (7) Whether in any good of the soul ?
(8) Whether in any created good ?

First Article.

WHETHER man's HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN WEALTH ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that man's happiness consists in
wealth. For since happiness is man's last end, it must
consist in that which has the greatest hold on man's affec-
tions. Now this is wealth: for it is written (Eccles. x. 19) :
All things obey money. Therefore man's happiness consists
in wealth.

Obj. 2. Further, according to Boethius {De Consol. iii.),
happiness is a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all
good things. Now money seems to be the means of possessing
all things: for, as the Philosopher says {Ethic, v.), money was
invented, that it might be a sort of guarantee for the
acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness
consists in wealth.

Obj. 3. Further, since the desire for the sovereign good

II. I 17 2

i8 QUESTION II

never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with
riches more tlian anything else; since a covetous man shall
not be satisfied with riches (Eccles. v. 9). Therefore happi-
ness consists in wealth.

On the contrary, Man's good consists in retaining happi-
ness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says
{De Consol. ii.), wealth shines in giving rather than in hoarding :
for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is ap-
plauded. Therefore man's happiness does not consist in
wealth.

/ answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to con-
sist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher
says {Polit. i.), viz., natural and artificial. Natural wealth
is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants :
such as food, drink, clothing, cars, dwellings, and such-
like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct
help to nature, as money; but this is invented by the art of
man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of
things saleable.

Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in
natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the
sake of something else, viz., as a support of human nature:
consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it
ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore in the order of
nature, all such things are below man, and made for him,
according to Ps. viii. 8 : Thou hast subjected all things under
his feet.

And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the
sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except
because, by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries
of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the
light of the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happi-
ness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth.

Reply Obj. i. All material things obey money, so far as
the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other
than material goods, which can be obtained for money.
But we should take our estimation of human goods not
from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a person,

IN WHAT MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS 19

whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a
thing is palatable.

Reply Ohj. 2. All things saleable can be had for money:
not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is
written (Prov. xvii. 16) : What doth it avail a fool to have
riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom ?

Reply Ohj. 3. The desire for natural riches is not infinite:
because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But
the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant
of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the
Philosopher makes clear {Polit. i.). Yet this desire for
wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign
good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is pos-
sessed, the more is it loved, and other things despised:
because the more we possess it, the more we know it.
Hence it is written (Ecclus. xxiv. 29) : They that eat me
shall yet hunger. Whereas in the desire for wealth and for
whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is the case: for
when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek
others : which is the sense of Our Lord's words (John iv. 13) :
Whosoever drinketh of this water, by which temporal goods
are signified, shall thirst again. The reason of this is that
we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them:
and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and that
the sovereign good does not consist therein.

Second Article.

WHETHER man's HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN HONOURS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that man's happiness consists in
honours. For happiness or bliss is the reward of virtue, as
the Philosopher says [Ethic, i.). But honour more than
anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv.). Therefore happiness
consists especiaUy in honours.

Ohj. 2. Further, that which belongs to God and to persons
of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which

20 QUESTION II

is the perfect good. But that is honour, as the Philosopher
says [Ethic, iv.). Moreover, the Apostle says (i Tim. i. 17) :
To . . . the only God he honour and glory. Therefore happi-
ness consists in honour.

Ohj. 3. Further, that which man desires above all is
happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than
honour: since man suffers loss in all other things, lest he
should suffer loss of honour. Therefore happiness consists
in honour.

On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honour
is not in the honoured, but rather in him who honours, and
who offers deference to the person honoured, as the Philos-
opher says {Ethic i.). Therefore happiness does not con-
sist in honour.

/ answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist
in honour. For honour is given to a man on account of
some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and
attestation of the excellence that is in the person honoured.
Now a man's excellence is in proportion, especially, to his
happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e.,
those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness.
And therefore honour can result from happiness, but happi-
ness cannot principally consist therein.

Reply Ohj. i. As the Philosopher says {ihid.), honour is not
that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work : but they
receive honour from men by way of reward, as from those
who have nothing greater to offer. But virtue's true reward
is happiness itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if
they worked for honour, it would no longer be virtue, but
ambition.

Reply Ohj. 2. Honour is due to God and to persons of
great exceUence as a sign or attestation of excellence already
existing: not that honour makes them excellent.

Reply Ohj. 3. That man desires honour above all else,
arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which
honour results, as stated above. Wherefore man seeks to
be honoured especially by the wise, on whose judgment he
believes himself to be excellent or happy.

IN WHAT MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS 21
Third Article.

WHETHER man's HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN FAME OR GLORY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that man's happiness consists in
glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is
paid to the saints for the trials they have undergone in the
world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 18)
The sufferings of this time are not worthy to he compared with
the glory to come, that shall he revealed in us. Therefore
happiness consists in glory.

Ohj. 2. Further, good is diffusive, as stated by Dionysius
{Div. Nom. iv.). But man's good is spread abroad in the
knowledge of others by glory more than by anything else:
since, according to Ambrose (Augustine, — Contra Maxim.
Arian. ii.), glory consists in heing well known and praised.
Therefore man's happiness consists in glory.

Ohj. 3. Further, happiness is the most enduring good.
Now this seems to be fame or glory: because by this men
attain to eternity after a fashion. Hence Boethius says
[De Consol. iii.) : You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity,
when you think of your fame in future time. . Therefore man's
happiness consists in fame or glory.

On the contrary. Happiness is man's true good. But it
happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says
{De Consol. iii.), many owe their renown to the lying reports
spread among the people. Can anything he more shamefid?
For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at their
own praise. Therefore man's happiness does not consist
in fame or glory.

/ answer that, Man's happiness cannot consist in human
fame or glory. For glory consists in heing well known and
praised, as Ambrose (Augustine, loc. cit.) says. Now the
thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than
to God's knowledge : for human knowledge is caused by the
things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the
things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good.

22 QUESTION II

which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human
knowledge : but rather human knowledge of another's happi-
ness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human
happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's
happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other
hand, man's good depends on God's knowledge as its cause.
And therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on
the glory which man has with God; according to Ps. xc.
15, 16: / will deliver him, and I will glorify him ; I will fill
him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation.

Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledgs
often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are
human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently
deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory
is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor. x. 18): He is
approved, whom God commends.

Reply Ohj. i. The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory
which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with
His angels. Hence it is written (Mark viii.) : The Son of
Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His
angels.^

Reply Ohj. 2. A man's good which, through fame or glory,
is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true,
must needs be derived from good existing in the man him-
self: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness.
But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with
the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is
looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can
nowise make man happy.

Reply Ohj. 3. Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily
ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is
by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.

* St. Thomas joins Mark viii, 38 with Luke xii. 8, owing to a
possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting
from memory.

IN WHAT MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS 23
Fourth Article.

WHETHER man's HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN POWER ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth A rticle : —

Objection i. It seems that happiness consists in power.
For all things desire to become like to God, as to their
last end and first beginning. But men who are in power,
seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like
to God: hence also in Scripture they are called gods (Exod.
xxii. 8), — Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods. Therefore
happiness consists in power.

Obj. 2. Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the
highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others ; which
belongs to those who are in power. Therefore happiness
consists in power.

Obj. 3. Further, since happiness is supremely desirable,
it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned.
But, more than aught else, men shun servitude, which is
contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power.

On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But
power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says {De Con-
sol, iii.), the power of man cannot relieve the gnawings of
care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety: and further
on: Think you a man is powerful who is surrounded by
attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he
fears still more ? Therefore happiness does not consist in
power.

/ answer that. It is impossible for happiness to consist in
power; and this for two reasons. First because power has
the nature of principle, as is stated in Metaph. v., whereas
happiness has the nature of last end. — Secondly, because
power has relation to good and evil: whereas happiness is
man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness
might consist in the good use of power, which is by virtue,
rather than in power itself.

Now four general reasons may be given to prove that
happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods.

24 QUESTION II

First, because, since happiness is man's supreme good, it is
incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be
found both in good and in evil men. — Secondly, because,
since it is the nature of happiness to satisfy of itself, as
stated in Ethic, i., having gained happiness, man cannot
lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the
foregoing, man may still lack many goods that are necessary
to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and suchlike. —
Thirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no
evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be
said of the foregoing: for it is written (Eccles. v. 12) that
riches are sometimes kej)t to the hurt of, the owner : and the
same may be said of the other three. — Fourthly, because
man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in
him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four
goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes,
and in most cases to fortune; for which reason they are
called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happi-
ness nowise consists in the foregoing.

Reply Ohj. i. God's power is His goodness : hence He
cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not
so with men. Consequently it is not enough for man's
happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he
become like Him in goodness also.

Reply Ohj. 2. Just as it is a very good thing for a man
to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very
bad thing if he makes a bad use of it. And so it is that
power is towards good and evil.

Reply Ohj. 3. Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of
power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not
because man's supreme good consists in power.

Fifth Article.

WHETHER man's HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN ANY BODILY GOOD ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Ohjection i. It seems that man's happiness consists in
bodily goods. For it is written (Ecclus. xxx. 16) : There is

IN WHAT MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS 25

no riches above the riches of the health of the body. But
happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore it
consists in the health of the body.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says [Div. Nom. v.), that to
be is better than to live, and to live is better than all that
follows. But for man's being and living, the health of the
body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is man's
supreme good, it seems that health of the body belongs
more than anything else to happiness.

Obj. 3. Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher
the principle from which it depends; because the higher a
cause is, the greater the scope of its power. Now just as
the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing
into something, so the causality of the end consists in its
drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause
is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that
which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that
which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness
consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such
as the health of the body.

On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals in regard
to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many
animals: for instance, by the elephant in longevity; by
the lion in strength; by the stag in fleetness. Therefore
man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body.

/ answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to
consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons.
First, because, if a thing be ordained to another as to its
end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its
being. Hence a captain does not intend, as a last end,
the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship
is ordained to something else as an end, viz., to navigation.
Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may
steer its course, so man is given over to his will and reason;
according to Ecclus. xv. 14 : God made man from the begin-
ning and left him in the hand of his own counsel. Now it is
evident that man is ordained to something as his end: since
man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of

26 QUESTION II

man's reason and will cannot be the preservation of man's
being.

Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will
and reason be the preservation of man's being, it could
not be said that the end of man is some good of the body.
For man's being consists in soul and body; and though the
being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of the
human soul depends not on the body, as shown above
(I., Q. LXXV., A. 2) ; and the very body is for the soul, as
matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that
puts them into motion, that by their means he may do his
work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to
the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happi-
ness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the
body.

Reply Ohj. i. Just as the body is ordained to the soul,
as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself.
And therefore it is with reason that the good of the body
is preferred to external goods, which are signified by riches,
just as the good of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods.

Reply Ohj. 2. Being taken simply, as including all per-
fection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for
thus being itself includes all these. And in this sense
Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as
participated in this or that thing, which does not possess
the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being,
such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that
being itself together with an additional perfection is more
excellent. Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that
things that live are better than things that exist, and intelli-
gent better than living things.

Reply Ohj. 3. Since the end corresponds to the beginning,
this argument proves that the last end is the first begin-
ning of being, in Whom every perfection of being is : Whose
likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to
being only, some as to living being, some as to being which
is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.

IN WHAT MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS 27
Sixth Article.

WHETHER man's HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN PLEASURE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that man's happiness consists in
pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not
desired for something else, but other things for it. But
this answers to pleasure more than to anything else : for it
is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be
pleased {Ethic, x.). Therefore happiness consists princi-
pally in pleasure and delight.

Obj. 2. Further, the first cause goes more deeply into the
effect than the second cause (De Causis i.). Now the causality
of the end consists in its attracting the appetite. There-
fore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite,
answers to the notion of the last end. Now this is pleasure :
and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will
and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods,
Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness,
consists principally in pleasure.

Obj. 3. Further, since desire is for good, it seems that
what all desire is best. But all desire deHght; both wise
and foolish, and even irrational creatures. Therefore
deHght is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is
the supreme good, consists in pleasure.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii.) : Any one
that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that
pleasures have a sad ending : and if they can render a man
happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the
very beasts are happy too.

I answer that, Because bodily dehghts are more generally
known, the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them
{Ethic, vii.), although other dehghts excel them: and yet
happiness does not consist in them. Because in every
thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from
its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a
mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible

28 QUESTION II

animal. We must therefore consider that every deHght is
a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some
part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted
is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in
hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed
it be the perfect good, is precisely man's happiness: and if
it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate,
or remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident
that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good,
the very essence of happiness, but something resulting
therefrom as its proper accident.

But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good
even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended
by sense, which is a power of the soul, which power makes
use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and
apprehended by sense, cannot be man's perfect good. For
since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter,
that part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal
organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those
parts of the soul which are tied down to the body: just as
immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to
material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted
and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent
of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is
a power of the body, knows the singular, which is deter-
minate through matter: whereas the intellect, which is a
power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is
abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of
singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is
fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through
being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but
is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul.
Hence it is written (Wisd. vii. 9) that all gold in comparison
of her, is as a little sand. And therefore bodily pleasure is
neither happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.

Reply Ohj. i. It comes to the same whether we desire
good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the
appetite's rest in good : thus it is owing to the same natural

IN WHAT MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS 29

force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it
rests there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself,
so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if
the preposition for denote the final cause. But if it denote
the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is
desirable for something else, i.e., for the good, which is the
object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, and
gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is
that it is rest in the thing desired.

Reply Ohj. 2. The vehemence of desire for sensible delight
arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through
being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible.
And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the
majority.

Reply Ohj. 3. All desire delight in the same way as they
desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the
good and not conversely, as stated above [ad i). Conse-
quently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and
essential good, but that every delight results from some
good, and that some delight results from that which is the
essential and supreme good.

Seventh Article.

WHETHER SOME GOOD OF THE SOUL CONSTITUTES MAN's

HAPPINESS ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —

Objection i. It seems that some good of the soul constitutes
man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this
is threefold, external goods, goods of the body, and goods
of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external
goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above (AA. 4, 5).
Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.

Ohj. 2. Further, we love that for which we desire good,
more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a
friend for whom we desire money, more than we love money.
But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself.
Therefore he loves himself more than all other goods. Now

30 QUESTION II

happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from
the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired.
Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself:
not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of
the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, perfection is something belonging to that
which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man.
Therefore happiness is something belonging to man. But
it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above
(A. 5). Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and
thus it consists in goods of the soul.

On the contrary, As Augustine says {De Doctr. Christ, i.),
that which constitutes the life of happiness is to he loved for
its own sake. But man is not to be loved for his own sake,
but whatever is in man is to be loved for God's sake. There-
fore happiness consists in no good of the soul.

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. i, A. 2), the end is
twofold : namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain ;
and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that
thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, as to the thing
itself which we desire as last end, it is impossible for man's
last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it.
Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something exist-
ing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from
being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from
being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for
the sake of act, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot
be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its
own last end.

In like manner neither can anything belonging to it,
whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the
last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now
man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good.
And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good,
and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of
them can be man's last end.

But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment
or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the

IN WHAT MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS 31

thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man,
in respect of his soul, belong to his last end : since man attains
happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which
is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and
makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is
called happiness. Consequently we must say that happi-
ness is something belonging to the soul; but that which
constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.

Refly Ohj. i. Inasmuch as this division includes all goods
that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only
power, habit, or act, but also the object of these, which is
something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us
from saying that what constitutes happiness is a good of
the soul.

Re fly Ohj. 2. As far as the proposed objection is con-
cerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired;
whereas a friend is loved as that to which good is desired;
and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not
the same kind of love in both cases. As to whether man
loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship,
there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.

Reply Ohj. 3. Happiness itself, since it is a perfection of
the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which
constitutes happiness, viz., which makes man happy, is
something outside his soul, as stated above.

Eighth Article.

WHETHER ANY CREATED GOOD CONSTITUTES MAN's

HAPPINESS ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that some created good constitutes
man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Norn, vii.) that
Divine wisdom unites the ends of first things to the beginnings
of second things, from which we may gather that the summit
of a lower nature touches the base of the higher nature. But
man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel
is above man in the order of nature, as stated in the First

32 QUESTION II

Part (Q. CXL, A. i), it seems that man's happiness consists
in man somehow reaching the angel.

Obj. 2. Further, the last end of each thing is that which,
in relation to it, is perfect : hence the part is for the whole,
as for its end. But the universe of creatures which is called
the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the
microcosm [Phys. viii.), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore
man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.

Ohj. 3. Further, man is made happy by that which lulls
his natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach
out to a good surpassing his capacity. Since then man's
capacity does not include that good which surpasses the
limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy
by some created good. Consequently some created good
constitutes man's happiness.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Civ. Dei. xix.) : As
the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happi-
ness : of Whom it is written : ' Happy is that people whose
God is the Lord ' (Ps. cxliii. 15).

/ answer that, It is impossible for any created good to con-
stitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good,
which lulls the appetite altogether ; else it would not be the
last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now
the object of the will, i.e., of man's appetite, is the universal
good; just as the object of the intellect, is the universal
true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will,
save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any
creature, but in God alone; because every creature has
goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy
the will of man, according to the words of Ps. cii. 5: Who
satisfieth thy desire with good things. Therefore God alone
constitutes man's happiness.

Reply Obj. i. The summit of man does indeed touch the
base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man
does not rest there as in his last end, but reaches out to the
universal fount itself of good, which is the common object
of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and
perfect good.

IN WHAT MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS 33

Reply Ohj. 2. If a whole be not the last end, but ordained
to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof, is not
the whole itself, but something else. Now the universe of
creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is
not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its last end.
Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe,
but God Himself.

Reply Ohj. 3. Created good is not less than that good of
which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and in-
herent to him: but it is less than the good of which he is
capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the
participated good which is in an angel, and in the whole
universe, is a finite and restricted good.

II. I

QUESTION III.

WHAT IS HAPPINESS.

{In Eight Articles.)

We have now to consider (i) what happiness is, and (2) what
things are required for it.

Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(i) Whether happiness is something uncreated ? (2) If
it be something created, whether it is an operation ?
(3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of
the intellectual part ? (4) If it be an operation of the
intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect,
or of the will ? (5) If it be an operation of the intellect,
whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the
practical intellect ? (6) If it be an operation of the specula-
tive intellect, whether it consist in the considerations of
speculative sciences ? (7) Whether it consists in the con-
sideration of separate substances, viz., angels ? (8) Whether
it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His
Essence ?

First Article,
whether happiness is something uncreated ?

We proceed thus to the First Article: —

Objection i. It seems that happiness is something un-
created. For Boethius says [De Consol. iii.) : We must needs
confess that God is happiness itself.

Ohj. 2. Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it
belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there
are not several supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the
same as God.

WHAT IS HAPPINESS 35

Obj. 3. Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's
will tends naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing
else as an end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as
Augustine says {De Doctr. Christ, i.). Therefore happiness is
the same as God.

On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But man's
happiness is something made; because according to Augus-
tine (De Doctr. Christ, i.) : Those things are to he enjoyed,
which make us ha-ppy. Therefore happiness is not some-
thing uncreated.

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. I., A. 8; Q. II., A. 7),
our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we
desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money.
Secondly there is the attainment or possession, the use or
enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the
end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end of
the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In
the first sense, then, man's last end is the uncreated good,
namely God, Who alone, of His infinite goodness can per-
fectly satisfy man's will. But in the second way, man's last
end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing
else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end.
Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we
consider man's happiness in its cause or object, then it is
something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very
essence of happiness, then it is something created.

Reply Obj. i. God is happiness by His Essence: for He
is happy not by acquisition or participation, but by His
Essence. On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius
says (loc. cit.) by participation; just as they are called gods,
by participation. And this participation of happiness, in
respect of which man is said to be happy, is something
created.

Reply Obj. 2. Happiness is called man's supreme good,
because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme
good.

Reply Obj. 3. Happiness is said to be the last end, in the
same way as the attainment of the end is called the end.

36 QUESTION III

Second Article,
whether happiness is an operation ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that happiness is not an operation.
For the Apostle says (Rom. vi. 22) : You have your fruit
unto sanctifi cation, and the end, life everlasting. But hfe is
not an operation, but the very being of living things.
Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an
operation.

Obj. 2. Further, Boethius says {De Consol. iii.) that happi-
ness is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.
But state does not indicate operation. Therefore happi-
ness is not an operation.

Obj. 3. Further, happiness signifies something existing in
the happy one : since it is man's final perfection. But the
meaning of operation does not imply anything existing in
the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom.
Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Obj. 4. Further, happiness remains in the happy one.
Now operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore
happiness is not an operation.

Obj. 5. Further, to one man there is one happiness. But
operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an
operation.

Obj. 6. Further, happiness is in the happy one uninter-
ruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for
instance, by sleep, or some other occupation, or by cessa-
tion. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says [Ethic, i.) that
happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue.

I answer that. In so far as man's happiness is something
created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an
operation. For happiness is man's supreme perfection.
Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since
potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently happi-
ness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that
operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the

WHAT IS HAPPINESS 37

Philosopher calls it second act [De Anima ii.) : because that
which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he
who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that
in other things, too, each one is said to be for its operation
{De Coelo ii.). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity
consist in an operation.

Reply Ohj. i. Life is taken in two senses. First for the
very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life : since
it has been shown (Q. II., A. 5) that the being of a man, no
matter in what it may consist, is not that man's happiness;
for of God alone is it true that His Being is His happiness.
Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which
operation the principle of life is made actual : thus we speak
of active and contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure.
And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is
clear from John xvii. 3: This is life everlasting, that they
may know Thee, the only true God.

Reply Ohj. 2. Boethius, in defining happiness, considered
happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect
common good ; and he signified this by saying that happiness
is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things, thus
impl3dng that the state of a happy man consists in possessing
the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the very essence
of happiness, showing by what man is established in this
state, and that it is by some kind of operation. And so it
is that he proves happiness to be the perfect good [Ethic, i.).

Reply Ohj. 3. As stated in Metaph. ix. action is twofold.
One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as
to hum and to cut. And such an operation cannot be happi-
ness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection,
not of the agent, but rather of the patient, as is stated in the
same passage. The other is an action that remains in the
agent, such as to feel, to understand, and to will : and such
an action is a perfection and an act of the agent. And such
an operation can be happiness.

Reply Ohj. 4. Since happiness signifies some final per-
fection; according as various things capable of happiness
can attain to various degrees of perfection, so must there

38 QUESTION III

be various meanings applied to happiness. For in God
there is happiness essentially ; since His very Being is His
operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In
the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect of some
operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good :
and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting.
But in men, according to their present state of life, the final
perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united
to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor,
consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied
by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present
state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man.
Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in
this life [Ethic, i.), says that it is imperfect, and after a long
discussion, concludes: We call men happy, hut only as men.
But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall
be as the angels . . . in heaven (Matth. xxii. 30) .

Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the
objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man's
mind will be united to God by one, continual, everlasting
operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short
of the unity and continuity of that operation, so do we fall
short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participa-
tion of happiness : and so much the greater, as the operation
can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the
active life, which is busy with many things, has less of
happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with
one thing, i.e., the contemplation of truth. And if at any
time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since
he can always easily turn to it, and since he ordains the
very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise,
to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it were,
continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5
and 6 are evident.

WHAT IS HAPPINESS 39

Third Article.

whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive
part, or of the intellective part only ?

V/e proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that happiness consists in an opera-
tion of the senses also. For there is no more excellent
operation in man than that of the senses, except the intel-
lective operation. But in us the intellective operation
depends on the sensitive : since we cannot understand without
a phantasm (De Anima iii.). Therefore happiness consists
in an operation of the senses also.

Ohj . 2. Further, Boethius says [De Consol. iii.) that happi-
ness is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.
But some goods are sensible, which we attain by the opera-
tion of the senses. Therefore it seems that the operation
of the senses is needed for happiness.

Obj. 3. Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find
proved in Ethic, i. : which would not be true, were not man
perfected thereby in all his parts. But some parts of the
soul are perfected by sensitive operations. Therefore sensi-
tive operation is required for happiness.

On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive
operation in common with us : but they have not happiness
in common with us. Therefore happiness does not consist
in a sensitive operation.

I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in three
ways: (i) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently.
Now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness
essentially. For man's happiness consists essentially in his
being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is his last end,
as shown above (A. i) : to Which man cannot be united by
an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because,
as shown above (Q. II., A. 5), man's happiness does not
consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however,
we attain through the operation of the senses.

Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to

40 QUESTION III

happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antece-
dently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can be had
in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a
previous operation of the sense; — consequently, in that
perfect happiness which we await in heaven ; because at the
resurrection, /rom the very happiness of the soul, as Augustine
says [Ep. ad Dioscor.) the body and the bodily senses will
receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their opera-
tions ; a point which will be explained farther on when we
treat of the resurrection (Suppl. QQ. LXXXII.-LXXXV.).
But then the operation whereby man's mind is united to
God will not depend on the senses.

Reply Obj. i. This objection proves that the operation
of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happi-
ness, such as can be had in this life.

Reply Obj. 2. Perfect happiness, such as the angels have,
includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to
the universal source of all good; not that it requires each
individual good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need
the aggregate of those goods that suffice for the most perfect
operation of this life.

Reply Obj. 3. In perfect happiness the entire man is
perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from
the higher. But in the imperfect happiness of this life, it is
otherwise ; we advance from the perfection of the lower part
to the perfection of the higher part.

Fourth Article.

whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it
is an operation of the intellect or of the will ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that happiness consists in an act of
the will. For Augustine says {De Civ. Dei. xix.) , that man's
happiness consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Ps.
cxlvii. 3) : Who hath placed peace in thy end (Douay, — borders) .
But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man's happiness
is in the will.

WHAT IS HAPPINESS 41

Obj. 2. Further, happiness is the supreme good. But
good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists
in an operation of the will.

Obj. 3. Further, the last end corresponds to the first
mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory,
which is the end of the general, who moves all the men. But
the first mover in regard to operations is the wiU : because it
moves the other powers, as we shall state further on (Q. IX.,
AA. I, 3). Therefore happiness regards the will.

Obj. 4. Further, if happiness be an operation, it must
needs be man's most excellent operation. But the love of
God, which is an act of the will, is a more excellent operation
than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the
Apostle declares (i Cor. xiii.). Therefore it seems that
happiness consists in an act of the will.

Obj. 5. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii.) that
haj)j)y is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing
amiss. And a little further on he adds : He is almost happy
who desires well, whatever he desires : for good things make a
man happy, and such a man already possesses some good —
i.e., a good will. Therefore happiness consists in an act of
the will.

On the contrary. Our Lord said (John xvii. 3): This is
eternal life : that they may know Thee, the only true God. Now
eternal life is the last end, as stated above (A. 2 ad i).
Therefore man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God,
which is an act of the intellect.

/ answer that. As stated above (Q. II., A. 6) two things are
needed for happiness : one, which is the essence of happiness :
the other, that is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e., the
delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very
essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist in an
act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said
(AA. I, 2; Q. II., A. 7) that happiness is the attainment of
the last end. But the attainment of the end does not consist
in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the
end, both absent, when it desires it ; and present, when it is
delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the

42 QUESTION III

desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but
is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the
will from the end being present; and not conversely, is a
thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it.
Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it,
must be due to something else than an act of the will.

This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For
if the acquisition of money were through an act of the
will, the covetous man would have it from the very moment
that he wished for it. But at that moment it is far from
him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some
like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And
so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to
attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being
made present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the
delighted will rests in the end when attained.

So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act
of the intellect : but the delight that results from happiness
pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says [Conf. x.)
that happiness is joy in truth, because, to wit, joy itself is the
consummation of happiness.

Reply Ohj. i. Peace pertains to man's last end, not as
though it were the very essence of happiness; but because
it is antecedent and consequent thereto: antecedent, in so
far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder
man in attaining the last end: consequent, inasmuch as,
when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace,
his desire being at rest.

Reply Ohj. 2. The will's first object is not its act: just as
neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible
thing. Wherefore, from the very fact that happiness
belongs to the will, as the will's first object, it follows that
it does not belong to it as its act.

Reply Ohj. 3. The intellect apprehends the end before the
will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will.
And therefore to the will belongs that which last of all follows
the attainment of the end, viz., dehght or enjoyment.

Reply Ohj. 4. Love ranks above knowledge in moving,

WHAT IS HAPPINESS 43

but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for naught is loved
save what is known, as Augustine says {De Trin. x.). Conse-
quently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the
intellect; just as we first attain a sensible end by an act of
sense.

Reply Obj. 5. He who has whatever he desires, is happy,
because he has what he desires : and this indeed is by some-
thing other than the act of his will. But to desire nothing
amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition
thereto. And a good will is reckoned among the good things
which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination
of the will : just as a movement is reduced to the genus of its
terminus, for instance, alteration to the genus quality.

Fifth Article.

whether happiness is an operation of the speculative,
or of the practical intellect ?

V/e proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — ,

Objection i. It seems that happiness is an operation of the
practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists
in becoming like God. But man is like God, by his practical
intellect, which is the cause of things understood, rather than
by his speculative intellect, which derives its knowledge
from things. Therefore man's happiness consists in an
operation of the practical intellect rather than of the
speculative.

Obj. 2. Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But
the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than
the speculative intellect, which is ordained to the true.
Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of
the practical intellect, but not in reference to the perfection
of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said
to be knowing or understanding. Therefore man's happi-
ness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than of
the speculative.

Obj. 3. Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But
the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside

44 QUESTION III

man ; whereas the practical intellect is concerned with things
belonging to man himself, viz., his operations and passions.
Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the
practical intellect rather than of the speculative.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin, i.) that con-
templation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions,
and the everlasting perfection of our joys.

I answer that. Happiness consists in an operation of the
speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is
evident for three reasons. First, because if man's happiness
is an operation, it must needs be man's highest operation.
Now man's highest operation is that of his highest power in
respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the
intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is
the object, not of the practical, but of the speculative
intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in
such an operation, viz., in the contemplation of Divine
things. And since that seems to he each man's self, which is
best in him, according to Ethic, ix. and x., therefore such an
operation is most proper to man a,nd most delightful
to him.

Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation
is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the
practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the
sake of action : and these very actions are ordained to some
end. Consequently it is evident that the last end cannot
consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical
intellect.

Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the
contemplative life man has something in common with things
above him, viz., with God and the angels, to whom he is made
like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active
life, other animals also have something in common with man,
although imperfectly.

Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await
in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But
imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists first
and principally in contemplation, but secondarily, in an

WHAT IS HAPPINESS 45

operation of the practical intellect directing human actions
and passions, as stated in Ethic, x.

Reply Ohj. i. The asserted likeness of the practical intellect
to God is one of proportion ; that is to say, by reason of its
standing in relation to what it knows, as God does to what
He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to
God is one of union and information ; which is a much greater
likeness. — And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the
principal thing known, which is His Essence, God has not
practical but merely speculative knowledge.

Reply Ohj. 2. The practical intellect is ordained to good
which is outside of it : but the speculative intellect has good
within it, viz., the contemplation of truth. And if this
good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good
thereby: such a good the practical intellect has not; but it
directs man thereto.

Reply Ohj. 3. This argument would hold, if man himself
were his own last end ; for then the consideration and direc-
tion of his actions and passions would be his happiness.
But since man's last end is something outside of him, to
wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the
speculative intellect; therefore man's happiness consists in
an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of the
practical intellect.

Sixth Article.

whether happiness consists in the consideration of
speculative sciences ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that man's happiness consists in the
consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher
says (Ethic, i.) that happiness is an operation according to
perfect virtue. And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives
no more than these — knowledge, wisdom and understanding,
which all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences.
Therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration
of speculative sciences.

Ohj. 2. Further, that which all desire for its own sake,

46 QUESTION III

seems to be man's final happiness. Now such is the con-
sideration of speculative sciences; because, as stated in
Metaph. i., all men naturally desire to know ; and, a little
farther on, it is stated that speculative sciences are sought
for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the
consideration of speculative sciences.

Ohj. 3. Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now
everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from
potentiality to act. But the human intellect is reduced to
act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore
it seems that in the consideration of these sciences, man's
final happiness consists.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. ix. 23): Let not the
wise man glory in his wisdom : and this is said in reference
to speculative sciences. Therefore man's final happiness
does not consist in the consideration of these.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 2 ad 4), man's happi-
ness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by
perfect happiness we are to understand that which attains
to the true notion of happiness ; and by imperfect happiness
that which does not attain thereto, but partakes of some
particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is
in man, with whom is the idea of things to be done; while
imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are
possessed of certain particular instincts in respect of works
similar to works of prudence.

Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially
in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this,
we must observe that the consideration of a speculative
science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles
of that science: since the entire science is virtually con-
tained in its principles. Now the first principles of specula-
tive sciences are received through the senses, as the Philo-
sopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics
and at the end of the Posterior Analytics. Wherefore the
entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend
farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's
final happiness, which is his final perfection, cannot consist

WHAT IS HAPPINESS 47

in the knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected
by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes
of something higher. Now it is evident that the form of a
stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently
the intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as such,
but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that
which is above the human intellect, viz., the intelligible
light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by some-
thing else is reduced to that which is of itself. Therefore
man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of
something above the human intellect. But it has been
shown (Part I., Q. LXXXVIIL, A. 2), that man cannot
acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of separate sub-
stances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently
it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the con-
sideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in
sensible forms there is a participation of the higher sub-
stances, so the consideration of speculative sciences is a
certain participation of true and perfect happiness.

Reply Ohj. i. In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats
of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as
stated above (A. 2 ad 4).

Reply Ohj. 2. Not only is perfect happiness naturally
desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof.

Reply Ohj. 3. Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion,
by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its
final and perfect act.

Seventh Article.

whether happiness consists in the knowledge of
separate substances, namely, angels ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —

Objection i. It seems that man's happiness consists in the
knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For
Gregory says in a homily (xxvi.) : It avails nothing to take
part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts
of angels ; by which he means final happiness. But we can

48 QUESTION III

take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them.
Therefore it seems that man's final happiness consists in
contemplating the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, the final perfection of each thing is for
it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to
be a perfect figure, because its beginning and end coincide.
But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels,
by whom men are enlightened, as Dionysius says (Ccel.
Hier. iv.). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect
consists in contemplating the angels.

Obj. 3. Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a
higher nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be
united to the spiritual nature. But above the intellect, in
the natural order, are the angels. Therefore the final per-
fection of the human intellect is to be united to the angels
by contemplation.

On the contrary, It is written (Jerem. ix. 24) : Let him that
glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me.
Therefore man's final glory or happiness, consists only in
the knowledge of God.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 6), man's perfect
happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect
by some participation, but in that which is so by its essence.
Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power
is so in so far as the proper formal object of that power
belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the
true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has par-
ticipated truth, does not perfect the intellect with its final
perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same
in being and in truth {Metaph. ii.) ; whatever are beings by
participation, are true by participation. Now angels have
being by participation: because in God alone is His Being
His Essence, as shown in the First Part (Q. XLIV., A. i).
It follows that God alone is truth by His Essence, and that
contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. How-
ever, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain
imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the angels ; and
higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science.

WHAT IS HAPPINESS 49

Reply Ohj. i. We shall take part in the feasts of the
angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together
with them, also God Himself.

Reply Ohj. 2. According to those that hold human souls
to be created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that
man's happiness should consist in the contemplation of the
angels, in the union, as it were, of man with his beginning.
But this is erroneous, as stated in the First Part (Q. XC,
A. 3). Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect,
is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the
creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the
angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the First Part
(Q. CXL, A. 2 ad 2). Consequently, by his ministration he
helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object
of man's happiness.

Reply Ohj. 3. The lower nature may reach the higher in
two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating
power: and thus man's final perfection will consist in his
attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels.
Secondly, as the object is attained by the power : and thus
the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which
is found the fulness of its formal object.

Eighth Article.

WHETHER man's HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN THE VISION OF
THE DIVINE ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that man's happiness does not con-
sist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius
says (Myst. Theol. i.) that by that which is highest in his
intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether
unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is not
altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the
intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being
seen in His Essence.

Ohj. 2. Further, the higher perfection belongs to the
higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfec-

II. I 4

50 QUESTION III

tion proper to the Divine intellect. Therefore the final
perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this,
but consists in something less.

On the contrary, It is written (i John iii. 2) : When He
shall appear, we shall he like to Rim ; and (Vulg., because)
we shall see Kim as He is.

I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in
nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To
make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that
man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains
for him to desire and seek : secondly, that the perfection of
any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now
the object of the intellect is what a thing is, i.e., the essence
of a thing, according to De Anima iii. Wherefore the in-
tellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence
of a thing. If therefore an intellect know the essence of
some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence
of the cause, i.e., to know of the cause what it is ; that
intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although
it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge that
the cause is. Consequently, when man knows an effect,
and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in
man the desire to know about that cause, what it is. And
this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated
in the beginning of the Metaphysics. For instance, if a
man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must
be due to some cause, and know riot what that cause is,
he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to
inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he arrive at a
knowledge of the essence of the cause.

If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of
some created effect, knows no more of God than that He is ;
the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply
the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire
to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy.
Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to
reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it
will have its perfection through union with God as with

WHAT IS HAPPINESS 51

that object, in which alone man's happiness consists, as
stated above (AA. i, 7; Q. II. , A. 8).

Reply Ohj. i. Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of way-
farers journeying towards happiness.

Reply Ohj. 2. As stated above (Q. L, A. 8), the end has
a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which
is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the end of the
higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things,
as stated above (ibid.). Secondly, as to the attainment of
this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is dif-
ferent from that of the lower, according to their respective
habitudes to that thing. So then the happiness of God,
Who, in understanding His Essence, comprehends It, is
higher than that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but
comprehends It not.

QUESTION IV.

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS.

{In Eight Articles.)

We have now to consider those things that are required for
happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of
inquiry: (i) Whether delight is required for happiness ?
(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, dehght or
vision ? (3) Whether comprehension is required ?
(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required ? (5) Whether
the body is necessary for man's happiness ? (6) Whether
any perfection of the body is necessary ? (7) Whether any
external goods are necessary ? (8) Whether the fellowship
of friends is necessary ?

First Article,
whether delight is required for happiness ?

We froceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that delight is not required for
happiness. For Augustine says {De Trin. i.) that vision is
the entire reward of faith. But the prize or reward of virtue
is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states {Ethic, i.).
Therefore nothing besides vision is required for happiness.

Ohj. 2. Further, happiness is the most self-sufficient of all
goods, as the Philosopher declares {Ethic, i.). But that
which needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since
then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as
stated above (Q. III., A. 8); it seems that delight is not
necessary for happiness.

Obj. 3. Further, the operation of bliss or happiness should

WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS 53

be unhindered {Ethic, vii.). But delight hinders the opera-
tion of the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of pru-
dence {Ethic, vi.). Therefore deHght is not necessary for
happiness.

On the contrary, Augustine says {Conf. x.) that happiness
is joy in truth.

I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in
four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it :
thus instruction is necessary for science. Secondly, as per-
fecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body.
Thirdly, as helping it from without : thus friends are neces-
sary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something atten-
dant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for fire.
And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it
is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained.
Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attain-
ment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without con-
comitant delight.

Refly Ohj. i. From the very fact that a reward is given
to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in
this consists delight. Consequently, delight is included in
the very notion of reward.

Reply Ohj. 2. The very sight of God causes delight. Con-
sequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.

Reply Ohj. 3. Delight that is attendant upon the opera-
tion of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it per-
fect it, as stated in Ethic, x. : since what we do with delight,
we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other
hand, delight which is extraneous to the operation is a
hindrance thereto: — sometimes by distracting the atten-
tion; because, as already observed, we are more attentive
to those things that delight us ; and when we are very atten-
tive to one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another:
— sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual de-
light that is contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of
prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the specula-
tive intellect.

54 QUESTION TV

Second Article,
whether in happiness vision ranks before delight ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that in happiness, vision ranks
before deHght. For delight is the perfection of operation
(Ethic. X.). But perfection ranks before the thing perfected.
Therefore dehght ranks before the operation of the intellect,
i.e., vision.

Obj. 2. Further, that by reason of which a thing is desir-
able, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on
account of the delight they afford: hence, too, nature has
adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary
for the preservation of the individual and of the species,
lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore,
in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the
intellect, which is vision.

Obj. 3. Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight
or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks
before faith, as the Apostle says (i Cor. xiii. 13). Therefore
dehght or enjoyment ranks before vision.

On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But
vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before
delight.

I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question in
the tenth book of Ethics, and leaves it unsolved. But if one
consider the matter carefully, the operation of the intellect
which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight
consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that the will
finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the good-
ness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will
reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the
goodness of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for
the sake of repose ; for thus the very act of the will would be
the end, which has been disproved above (Q. I., A. 1 ad 2;
Q. III., A. 4) : but it seeks to be at rest in the operation,
because that operation -is its good. Consequently it is

WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS 55

evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks
before the resting of the will therein.

Reply Ohj. i. As the Philosopher says [ibid.) delight
perfects operation as vigour perfects youth, because it is a
result of youth. Consequently delight is a perfection
attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision
is made perfect in its own species.

Reply Ohj. 2. The apprehension of the senses does not
attain to the universal good, but to some particular good
which is delightful. And consequently, according to the
sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought
for the sake of delight. But the intellect apprehends the
universal good, the attainment of which results in delight:
wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to
delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the
Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account
of the operations. And we should form our estimate of
things not simply according to the order of the sensitive
appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual
appetite.

Reply Ohj. 3. Charity does not seek the beloved good for
the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it
delights in the good gained which it loves. Thus delight
does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does,
whereb}^ the end is first made present to charity.

Third Article,
whether comprehension is necessary for happiness ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that comprehension is not necessary
for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo
Deum ; — De Verhis Evang., Serm. CXVII.): To reach God
with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible.
Therefore happiness is without comprehension.

Ohj. 2. Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to
his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers
than the intellect and will, as stated in the First Part

56 QUESTION IV

(QQ. LXXIX. and foil.). But the intellect is sufficiently
perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him.
Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.

Ohj. 3. Further, happiness consists in an operation. But
operations are determined by their objects: and there are
two universal objects, the true and the good: of which the
true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore
there is no need for comprehension as a third.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (i Cor. ix. 24) : So run
that you may comprehend (Douay, — obtain). But happi-
ness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says (2 Tim.
iv. y, 8): I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course,
I have kept the faith ; as to the rest there is laid up for me a
crown of justice. Therefore comprehension is necessary for
Happiness.

/ answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last
end, those things that are required for Happiness must be
gathered from the way in which man is ordered to an end.
Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his
intellect, and partly through his will : — through his intellect,
in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-
exists in the intellect : — through the will, first by love which
is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly by a
real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation
may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is
present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for.
Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it :
and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is
possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of
the attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is
the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for,
and this relation alone causes a search for the end. To these
three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself.
For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect
knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation
of hope; but delight in the end now present results from
love, as already stated (A. 2 ad 3). And therefore these
three must concur in Happiness; to wit, vision, which is

WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS 57

perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension,
which implies presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment,
which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.

Reply Ohj. i. Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion
of the comprehended in the comprehensor ; and thus what-
ever is comprehended by the finite, is itself finite. Where-
fore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created
intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the
holding of something already present and possessed: thus
one who runs after another is said to comprehend* him when
he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension is
necessary for Happiness.

Reply Ohj. 2. Just as hope and love pertain to the will,
because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends
towards it while not possessed; so, too, comprehension and
delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses
a thing and reposes therein.

Reply Ohj. 3. Comprehension is not a distinct operation
from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained.
Wherefore even vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as
it is present, is the object of comprehension.

Fourth Article.

whether rectitude of the will is necessary for

happiness ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that rectitude of the will is not
necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially
in an operation of the intellect, as stated above (Q. III.,
A. 4). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are
said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect
operation of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract, i.) :
/ do not approve of what I said in a prayer : 0 God, Who didst
will none hut the clean of heart to know the truth. For it can he
answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths.
Therefore rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness.
* In English we should say ' catch.'

58 QUESTION IV

Obj. 2. Further, what precedes does not depend on what
follows. But the operation of the intellect precedes the
operation of the will. Therefore Happiness, which is the
perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on recti-
tude of the will.

Obj. 3. Further, that which is ordained to another as its
end, is not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a
ship, for instance, after arrival in port. But rectitude of the
will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained to Happiness as
its end. Therefore, Happiness once obtained, rectitude of
the will is no longer necessary.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. v. 8) : Blessed are the
clean of heart ; for they shall see God : and (Heb. xii. 14) :
Follow peace with all men, and holiness ; without which no man
shall see God.

I answer that. Rectitude of the will is necessary for Happi-
ness both antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently,
because rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered
to the last end. Now the end in comparison to what is
ordained to the end is as form compared to matter. Where-
fore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly
disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly
ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happi-
ness, without rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because
as stated above (Q. III.. A. 8), final Happiness consists in
the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence
of goodness. So that the will of him who sees the Essence of
God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination
to God; just as the will of him who sees not God's Essence,
of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under that common
notion of good which he knows. And this is precisely what
makes the will right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness
cannot be without a right will.

Reply Obj. i. Augustine is speaking of the knowledge of
that truth which is not the very Essence of goodness.

Reply Obj. 2. Every act of the will is preceded by an act
of the intellect : but a certain act of the will precedes a certain
act of the intellect. For the will tends to the final act of

WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS 59

the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right
inclination of the will is required antecedently for happiness,
just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike
the target.

Reply Ohj. 3. Not everything that is ordained to the end,
ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which
involves imperfection, such as movement. Hence the
instruments of movement are no longer necessary, when the
end has been gained: but the due order to the end is
necessary.

Fifth Article.

WHETHER THE BODY IS NECESSARY FOR MAN'S HAPPINESS ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — ■

Objection 1 It seems that the body is necessary for Happi-
ness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes
the perfection of nature. But Happiness is the perfection
of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the body, has
not the perfection of nature; since the body is naturally a
part of human nature, and every part is imperfect, while
separated from its whole. Therefore the soul cannot be
happy without the body.

Ohj. 2. Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated
above (Q. III., AA. 2, 5). But perfect operation follows
perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it
is ah actual being. Since, therefore, the soul has not perfect
being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has
a part, while separate from its whole; it seems that the soul
cannot be happy without the body.

Ohj. 3. Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But
the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happi-
ness cannot be in the soul separated from the body.

Ohj. 4. Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, vii.),
the operation of hliss, in which operation happiness consists,
is not hindered. But the operation of the separate soul is
hindered; because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit., xii.), the
soul has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is
that it is held hack, so to speak, from tending with all its might

6o QUESTION IV

to the heavenward journey, i.e., to the vision of the Divine
Essence. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the
body.

Ohj. 5. Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls
desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it
yet desires to be united to the body, as Augustine says [ihid.) .
Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the
body.

Ohj. 6. Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels.
But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels,
as Augustine says {ihid.). Therefore it is not happy.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. xiv. 13): Happy
(Douay, — hlessed) are the dead who die in the Lord.

I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect
and is had in this life ; the other is perfect, consisting in the
vision of God. Now it is evident that the body is necessary
for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life
consists in an operation of the intellect, either speculative
or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life
cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily
organ, as was shown in the First Part (Q. LXXXIV.,
AA. 6, 7). Consequently that happiness which can be had
in this life, depends, in a way, on the body.

But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the vision
of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the
soul separated from the body ; and have said that the souls
of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain
to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, when they
will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to
be false, both by authority and by reason. By authority,
since the Apostle says (2 Cor. v. 6) : While we are in the hody>
we are ahsent from the Lord ; and he points out the reason of
this absence, saying : For we walk hy faith and not hy sight.
Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith
and not by sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence,
we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints,
separated from their bodies, are in God's presence; wherefore
the text continues: But we are confident and have a good will

WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS 6i

to -he absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord.
Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints, separated
from their bodies, walk by sight, seeing the Essence of God,
wherein is true Happiness.

Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect
needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the
phantasms, wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as
stated in the First Part (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). Now it is
evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of
phantasms, as stated in the First Part (Q. XII., A. 3).
Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the
vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the body.
Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.

We must, however, notice that something may belong to
a thing's perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the
essence thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man's per-
fection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-being: thus,
beauty of body and keenness of perception belong to man's
perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in
the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it
does in the second way. For since operation depends on a
thing's nature, the more perfect is the soul in its nature, the
more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happi-
ness consists. Hence Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit.
xii.) whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls
of the dead separated from their bodies, answers that they
cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels
see It ; either for some other more hidden reason, or because
they have a natural desire to rule the body.

Reply Obj. i. Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the
part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends
the organs of the body ; but not according as the soul is the
natural form of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that
natural perfection in respect of which happiness is due to it,
though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect
of which it is the form of the body.

Reply Obj. 2. The relation of the soul to being is not the
same as that of other parts : for the being of the whole is not

62 QUESTION IV

that of any individual part : wherefore, either the part ceases
altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the
parts of an animal, when the animal is destroyed ; or, if they
remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a
line has another being from that of the whole line. But the
human soul retains the being of the composite after the
destruction of the body: and this because the being of the
form is the same as that of its matter, and this is the being
of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being,
as stated in the First Part (Q. LXXV., A. 2). It follows,
therefore, that after being separated from the body it has
perfect being, and that consequently it can have a perfect
operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.

Reply Ohj. 3. Happiness belongs to man in respect of his
intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can
have Happiness. Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect
of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness,
even after extraction.

Reply Ohj. 4. One thing is hindered by another in two
ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the
action of heat: and such a hindrance to operation is
repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind
of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has not all
that is necessary to make it perfect in every way : and such
a hindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness,
but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus
it is that separation from the body is said to hold the soul
back from tending with all its might to the vision of the
Divine Essence. For the soul desires to see God in such a
way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body,
as far as possible. And therefore, as long as it enjoys God,
without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in
that which it has, in such a way, that it would still wish the
body to attain to its share.

Reply Ohj. 5. The desire of the separated soul is entirely
at rest, as regards the thing desired ; since, to wit, it has that
which suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as
regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in

WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS 63

every way that it would wish to possess it. Consequently,
after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in
intensity, but in extent.

Reply Ohj. 6. The passage quoted to the effect that the
souls of the departed see not God as the angels do, is not to be
understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because
even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher
orders of angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the
lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion:
because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection
of Happiness that they ever will have, whereas the separated
souls of the saints have not.

Sixth Article.

whether perfection of the body is necessary
for happiness ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that perfection of the body is not
necessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of
the body is a bodily good. But it has been shown above
(Q. II.) that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods.
Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for
man's Happiness.

Ohj. 2. Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision
of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Q. III., A. 8). But
the body has no part in this operation, as shown above
(A. 5). Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary
for Happiness.

Ohj. 3. Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from
the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness
consists in the most perfect operation of the intellect.
Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in
every way. Therefore, in no way is a disposition of the body
necessary for Happiness.

On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; where-
fore it is written (John xiii. 17) : You shall he hlessed, if you
do them. But the reward promised to the saints, is not only

'h question IV

that they shall see and enjoy God, but also that their bodies
shall be well-disposed ; for it is written (Isa. Ixvi. 14) : You
shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall
flourish like a herb. Therefore good disposition of the body
is necessary for Happiness.

/ answer that, If we speak of that happiness which man
can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed
body is of necessity required for it. For this happiness
consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, i.) in an
operation according to perfect virtue ; and it is clear that man
can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every
operation of virtue.

But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained
that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness;
indeed, that it is necessary for the soul to be entirely sepa-
rated from the body. Hence Augustine {De Civ. Dei. xxvi.)
quotes the words of Porphyry who said that for the soul to be
happy, it must he severed from everything corporeal. But this
is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the soul to be
united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of
the soul to exclude its natural perfection.

Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the
body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for
that Happiness which is in all ways perfect. — ^Antecedently,
because, as Augustine says [Gen. ad lit. xii.), if the body be
such, that the governance thereof is difficult (ind burdensome,
like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul,
the mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven.
Whence he concludes that, when this body will no longer be
* natural, * but ' spiritual, ' then will it be equalled to the
angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden.
— Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul
there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this too will
obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
Dioscor.) that God gave the soul such a powerful nature that
from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigour of incor-
ruption overflows into the lower nature.

Reply Obj. i. Happiness does not consist in bodily good as

WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS 65

its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and
perfection to Happiness.

Reply Ohj. 2. Although the body has no part in that
operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is
seen, yet it might prove a hindrance thereto. Consequently,
perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind
from being lifted up.

Reply Ohj. 3. The perfect operation of the intellect re-
quires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this
corruptible body which weighs upon the soul; but not from
the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the
spirit. On this point we shall treat in the Third Part of this
work (SuppL, Q. LXXXIL).

Seventh Article.

whether any external goods are necessary
for happiness ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh A Hide : —

Objection i. It seems that external goods also are neces-
sary for Happiness. For that which is promised the saints
for reward, belongs to Happiness. But external goods are
promised the saints; for instance, food and drink, wealth,
and a kingdom: for it is said (Luke xxii., 30) : That you may
eat and drink at My tahlein My kingdom : and (Matth. vi. 20) :
Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven : and (Matth. xxv. 34) :
Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom.
Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness.

Obj. 2. Further, according to Boethius {De Consol. iii.),
happiness is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good
things. But some of man's goods are external, although
they be of least account, as Augustine says {De Lib. Arb. ii.).
Therefore they too are necessary for Happiness.

Obj. 3. Further, Our Lord said (Matth. v. 12) : Your reward
is very great in heaven. But to be in heaven implies being in
a place. Therefore at least external place is necessary for
Happiness.

On the contrary. It is written (Ps. Ixxii. 25) : For what have

II. I 5

66 QUESTION IV

/ in heaven ? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth ?
As though to say: ' I desh*e nothing but this/ — It is good
for me to adhere to my God. Therefore nothing further
external is necessary for Happiness.

/ answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can be had
in this hfe, external goods are necessary, not as belonging
to the essence of happiness, but by serving as instruments
to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as
stated in Ethic, i. For man needs, in this life, the neces-
saries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative
virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which
latter he needs also many other things by means of which
to perform its operations.

On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise neces-
sary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God.
The reason of this is that all suchlike external goods are
requisite either for the support of the animal body; or for
certain operations which belong to human life, which we
perform by means of the animal body : whereas that perfect
Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in
the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to
the body then no longer animal but spiritual. Consequently
these external goods are nowise necessary for that Happi-
ness, since they are ordained to the animal life. — And since,
in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more
God-like, approaches nearer than that of action to the like-
ness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less
need of these goods of the body, as stated in Ethic, x.

Reply Ohj. i. All those material promises contained in
Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inas-
much as Scripture is wont to express spiritual things under
the form of things corporeal, in order that from things we
know, we may rise to the desire of things unknown, as Gregory
says in a homily (xi. in Evang.). Thus food and drink
signify the delight of Happiness: wealth, the sufficiency of
God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union
with God.

Reply Ohj. 2. These goods that serve for the animal life,

WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS 67

are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect
Happiness consists. Nevertheless in that Happiness there
will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever
good there be in these things, we shall possess it all in the
Supreme Fount of goodness.

Reply Ohj. 3. According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte i.), it is not a material heaven that is described as
the reward of the saints, but a heaven raised on the height
of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz., the
empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the Blessed, not as a
need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and
adornment.

Eighth Article.

whether the fellowship of friends is necessary for

happiness ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that friends are necessary for Happi-
ness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by
Scripture under the name of glory. But glory consists in
man's good being brought to the notice of many. There-
fore the fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.

Ohj. 2. Further, Boethius says that there is no delight in
possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with
us. But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore
fellowship of friends is also necessary.

Obj. 3. Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But
charity includes the love of God and of our neighbour.
Therefore it seems that fellowship of friends is necessary
for Happiness.

On the contrary, It is written (Wisd. vii. 11) : All good things
came to me together with her, i.e., with wisdom, which consists
in contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is neces-
sary for Happiness.

/ answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this life,
the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says
{Ethic, ix.), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he suf-
fices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses

68 QUESTION IV

perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the pur-
pose of a good operation, viz., that he may do good to them;
that he may dehght in seeing them do good ; and again that
he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order
that man may do well, whether in the works of the active life,
or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship
of friends.

But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in
our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not
essential to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of
his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends con-
duces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. viii.) that the spiritual creatures receive no
other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth, and
charity of the Creator. But if they can he said to he helped
from without, perhaps it is only hy this that they see one
another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship.

Reply Ohj. i. That glory which is essential to Happiness,
is that which man has, not with man but with God.

Reply Ohj. 2. This saying is to be understood of the pos-
session of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not
apply to the question under consideration; because man
possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.

Reply Ohj. 3. Perfection of charity is essential to Happi-
ness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our
neighbour. Wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying
God, it would be happy, though having no neighbour to
love. But supposing one neighbour to be there, love of
him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friend-
ship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness.

QUESTION V.

OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS.

{In Eight Articles.)

We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under
this heading there are eight points of inquiry : (i) Whether
man can attain Happiness ? (2) Whether one man can
be happier than another ? (3) Whether any man can be
happy in this Hfe ? (4) Whether Happiness once had can
be lost ? (5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means
of his natural powers ? (6) Whether man attains Happi-
ness through the action of some higher creature ?
(7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that
man may obtain Happiness of God ? (8) Whether every
man desires Happiness ?

First Article,
whether man can attain happiness ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that man cannot attain happiness.
For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the
intellectual is above the rational, as Dionysius declares
{Div. Nom. iv., vi., vii.) in several passages. But irrational
animals that have the sensitive nature only, cannot attain
the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man,
who is of rational nature, attain the end of the intellectual
creature, which is Happiness.

Obj. 2. Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God,
Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man con-
siders truth in material things: wherefore he understands

70 QUESTION V

the intelligible species in the phantasm (De Anima iii.).
Therefore he cannot attain Happiness.

Ohj. 3. Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sove-
reign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without sur-
mounting the middle. Since, therefore, the angeHc nature
through which man cannot mount is midway between God
and human nature; it seems that he cannot attain Happiness.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xciii. 12) : Blessed is the
man whom Thou shall instruct, 0 Lord.

I answer that, Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect
Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good
can attain Happiness. Now, that man is capable of the
Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can appre-
hend the universal and perfect good, and because his will
can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness. —
This can be proved again from the fact that man is capable
of seeing God, as stated in the First Part (Q. XII., A. i) :
in which vision, as we stated above (Q. III., A. 8) man's
perfect Happiness consists.

Reply Ohj. i. The rational exceeds the sensitive nature,
otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For
the rational exceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the
object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge
whatever of the universal, whereas the reason has know-
ledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational
nature, as to the mode of knowing the same intelligible
truth : for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth
which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason,
as was made clear in the First Part (Q. LVIL, A. 3;
Q. LXXIX., A. 8). Therefore reason arrives by a kind of
movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently
the rational nature can attain Happiness, which is the per-
fection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the
angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith after the
beginning of their creation: whereas man attains it after a
time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.

Reply Ohj. 2. To man in the present state of life the
natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of

THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS 71

phantasms. But after this state of hfe, he has another
natural way, as was stated in the First Part (Q. LXXXIV.,
A. 7; Q. LXXXIX., A. 7).

Reply Ohj. 3. Man cannot surmount the angels in the
degree of nature, so as to be above them naturally. But
he can surmount them by an operation of the intellect, by
understanding that there is above the angels something
that makes men happy; and that when he has attained it,
he will be perfectly happy.

Second Article,
whether one man can be happier than another ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that one man cannot be happier
than another. For Happiness is the reward of virtue, as the
Philosopher says {Ethic, i.). But equal reward is given for
all the works of virtue; because it is written (Matth. xx. 10)
that all who laboured in the vineyard received every man a
penny ; for, as Gregory says [Horn. xix. in Evang), each
was equally rewarded with eternal life. Therefore one man
cannot be happier than another.

Ohj. 2. Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But
nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's
Happiness cannot be surpassed by another's.

Ohj. 3. Further, since Happiness is the perfect and sufficient
good {Ethic, i.) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire
is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got.
And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still
greater good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he
be happy, no other Happiness can be greater.

On the contrary, It is written (John xiv. 2) : In My Father's
house there are many mansions ; which, according to
Augustine {Tract. Ixvii.) signify the diverse dignities of
merits in the one eternal life. But the dignity of eternal life
which is given according to merit, is Happiness itself.
Therefore there are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happi-
ness is not equally in all.

72 . QUESTION V

I answer that, As stated above (Q. I., A. 8; Q. II., A. 7),
Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself,
i.e., the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment
of that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the
object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be
greater than another, since there is but one Sovereign Good,
namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. —
But as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one
man can be happier than another ; because the more a man
enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, that one man
enjoys God more than another, happens through his being
better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And
in this sense one man can be happier than another.

Reply Ohj. i. The one penny signifies that Happiness is one
in its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold
Happiness in the divers degrees of enjoyment.

Reply Ohj. 2. Happiness is said to be the supreme good,
inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the
Supreme Good.

Reply Ohj. 3. None of the Blessed lacks any desirable
good ; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is the
good of all good, as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. cxxxiv.).
But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of
diverse participation of the same good. And the addition
of other goods does not increase Happiness, hence Augustine
says (Conf. v.) : He who knows Thee, and others hesides, is not
the happier for knowing them, hut is happy for knowing Thee
alone.

Third Article,
whether one can be happy in this life ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that Happiness can be had in this
life. For it is written (Ps. cxviii. i) : Blessed are the unde-
filed in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord. But this
happens in this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life.

Ohj. 2. Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign
Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise

THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS 73

one would not be happier than another. But men can
participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing
and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore man can be
happy in this life.

Obj. 3. Further, what is said by many cannot be alto-
gether false : since what is in many, comes, apparently, from
nature; and nature does not fail altogether. Now many say
that Happiness can be had in this life, as appears from
Ps. cxliii. 15: They have called the people happy that hath
these things, to wit, the good things of this life. Therefore
one can be happy in this life.

On the contrary, It is written (Job xiv. i) : Man horn of a
woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries.
But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore man cannot be
happy in this life.

I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness can be
had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be
had in this life. This may be seen from a twofold con-
sideration.

First, from the general notion of happiness. For since
happiness is a perfect and sufficient good, it excludes every
evil, and fulfils every desire. But in this life every evil
cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many
unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect;
to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to
many penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine sets
forth in De Civ. Dei. chap. iv. Likewise neither can the
desire for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally
desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the
goods of the present life pass away; since life itself passes
away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to
hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death.
Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.

Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of
Happiness, viz., the vision of the Divine Essence, which
man cannot obtain in this life, as was shown in the First
Part (Q. XII., A. 2). Hence it is evident that none can
attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.

74 QUESTION V

Reply Ohj, i. Some are said to be happy in this life, either
on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the Hfe
to come, according to Rom. viii. 24: We are saved by hope ;
or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by
reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign Good.

Reply Ohj. 2. The imperfection of participated Happiness
is due to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object
of Happiness, which is not seen in Its Essence: and this
imperfection destroys the nature of true Happiness.
Secondly, the imperfection may be on the part of the par-
ticipator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in
itself, namely, God; imperfectly, however, in comparison
with the way in which God enjoys Himself. This imper-
fection does not destroy the true nature of Happiness;
because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above
(Q. III., A. 2), the true nature of Happiness is taken from
the object, which specifies the act, and not from the
subject.

Reply Ohj. 3. Men esteem that there is some kind of
happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain
likeness to true Happiness. And thus they do not fail
altogether in their estimate.

Fourth Article,
whether happiness once had can be lost ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that Happiness can be lost. For
Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the
thing perfected according to the mode of the latter. Since
then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happi-
ness is participated by man in a changeable manner. And
consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness.

Ohj. 2. Further, Happiness consists in an act of the
intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the
will can be directed to opposites. Therefore it seems that
it can desist from the operation whereby man is made
happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.

THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS 75

Obj. 3. Further, the end corresponds to the beginning.
But man's Happiness has a beginning, since man was not
always happy. Therefore it seems that it has an end.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xxv. 46) of the
righteous that they shall go . . . into life everlasting, which,
as above stated (A. 2), is the Happiness of the saints. Now
what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot
be lost.

/ answer that. If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as
can be had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is
clear of contemplative happiness, which is lost either by
forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge is lost through
sickness; or again by certain occupations, whereby a man
is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.

This is also clear of active happiness : since man's will can
be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act
that happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue
remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb
suchlike happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of
virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether, because
there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man bears these
trials in a praiseworthy manner. — -And since the happiness
of this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be
contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the
Philosopher state (Ethic, i.) that some are happy in this
life, not simply, but as men, whose nature is subject to
change.

But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we
await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri
Archon, ii.), following the error of certain Platonists, held
that man can become unhappy after the final Happiness.

This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First,
from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is
the perfect and sufficient good, it must needs set man's desire
at rest and exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires
to hold to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his
holding : else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear
of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it.

76 QUESTION V

Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that man have
the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses.
If this opinion be true, it follows that he never will lose hap-
piness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should
have a false opinion: because the false is the evil of the
intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in Ethic, vi.
Consequently he will no longer be truly happy, if evil be in
him.

Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific
nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above (Q. III.,
A. 8) that man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of
the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing
the Divine Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every
good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is
either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired
in its stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it,
by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision
of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good things, since
it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is written
(Ps. xvi. 15) : / shall he satisfied when Thy glory shall appear ;
and (Wis. vii. 11): All good things came to me together with
her, i.e., with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner
neither has it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is
written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. viii. 16) :
Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any
tediousness. It is thus evident that the happy man cannot
forsake Happiness of his own accord. — -Moreover, neither can
he lose Happiness, through God taking it away from him.
Because, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment,
it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for
some fault ; and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault, since
rectitude of the will, of necessity, results from that vision
as was shown above (Q. IV., A. 4). — Nor again can it be
withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is
united to God is raised above all other things: and conse-
quently no other agent can sever the mind from that union.
Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man
should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa ; because

THE lATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS ^^

suchlike vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as
are subject to time and movement.

Reply Obj. i. Happiness is consummate perfection, which
excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore who-
ever has happiness has it altogether unchangeably : this is
done by the Divine power, which raises man to the partici-
pation of eternity which transcends all change.

Reply Obj. 2. The will can be directed to opposites, in
things which are ordained to the end ; but it is ordained, of
natural necessity, to the last end. This is evident from the
fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy.

Reply Obj. 3. Happiness has a beginning owing to the
condition of the participator: but it has no end by reason
of the condition of the good, the participation of which
makes man happy. Hence the beginning of happiness is
from one cause, its endlessness is from another.

Fifth Article,
whether man can attain happiness by his natural

POWERS ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that man can attain Happiness by his
natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things.
But nothing is so natural to man than that by which he
attains the last end. Therefore this is not lacking to human
nature. Therefore man can attain Happiness by his natural
powers.

Obj. 2. Further, since man is more noble than irrational
creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than
they. But irrational creatures can attain their end by their
natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain
Happiness by his natural powers.

Obj. 3. Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic, vii.). Now the beginning of a
thing belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof.
Since, therefore, the imperfect operation, which is as the
beginning in human operations, is subject to man's natural

7^ QUESTION V

power, whereby he is master of his own actions ; it seems that
he can attain to perfect operation, i.e., Happiness, by his
natural powers.

On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his
action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness pre-
pared for the saints, surpasses the intellect and will of man ;
for the Apostle says (i Cor. ii. 9) : Eye hath not seen, nor ear
heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things
God hath prepared for them that love Him. Therefore man
cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.

I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in this
life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the
same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists: on this
point we shall speak further on (Q. LXIIL). But man's
perfect Happiness, as stated above (Q. III., A. 8), consists in
the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God's
Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of
every creature, as was shown in the First Part (Q. XII.,
A. 4). For the natural knowledge of every creature is in
keeping with the mode of its substance: thus it is said of the
intelligence (De Causis ; Prop, viii.) that it knows things that
are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode
of its substance. But every knowledge that is according to
the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of
the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created
substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature,
can attain final Happiness by his natural powers.

Reply Obj. i. Just as nature does not fail man in neces-
saries, although it has not provided him with weapons and
clothing, as it provided other animals, because it gave him
reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things
for himself; so neither did it fail man in things necessary,
although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happi-
ness: since this it could not do. But it did give him free-
will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him
happy. For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in
a sense, by ourselves (Ethic, iii.).

Reply Obj. 2. The nature that can attain perfect good,

THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS 79

although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of
more noble condition than a nature which cannot attain
perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it
need no help from without in order to attain it, as the
Philosopher says {De CcbIo ii.). Thus he is better disposed
to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of
medicine; than he who can attain but imperfect health,
without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational
creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness,
but needs the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more
perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of
attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its
natural powers.

Reply Ohj. 3. When imperfect and perfect are of the same
species, they can be caused by the same power. But this
does not follow of necessity, if they be of different species:
for not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter,
can produce the final perfection. Now the imperfect opera-
tion, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the
same species as that perfect operation which is man's happi-
ness: since operation takes its species from its object.
Consequently the argument does not prove.

Sixth Article.

whether man attains happiness through the action
of some higher creature ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that man can be made happy
through the action of some higher creature, viz., an angel.
For since we observe a twofold order in things — one, of the
parts of the universe to one another, the other, of the whole
universe to a good which is outside the universe; the former
order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii.).
Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is dependent
on the order of the whole army to the general. But the
mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the
higher creatures acting on the lower, as stated in the First

8o QUESTION V

Part (Q. CIX., A. 2) : while happiness consists in the order
of man to a good which is outside the universe, i.e., God.
Therefore man is made happy, through a higher creature,
viz., an angel, acting on him.

Ohj. 2. Further, that which is such in potentiality, can
be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus
what is potentially hot, is made actually hot, by something
that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. There-
fore he can be made actually happy by an angel who is
actually happy.

Ohj. 3. Further, Happiness consists in an operation of
the intellect, as stated above (Q. IIL, A. 4). But an angel
can enlighten man's intellect, as shown in the First Part
(Q. CXI., A. i). Therefore an angel can make a man happy.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. Ixxxiii. 12): The Lord
will give grace and glory.

I answer that, Since every creature is subject to the laws
of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are
limited: that which surpasses created nature, cannot be
done by the power of any creature. Consequently if any-
thing need to be done that is above nature, it is done by
God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring
sight to the blind, and suchlike. Now it has been shown
above (A. 5) that Happiness is a good surpassing created
nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed
through the action of any creature: but by God alone is
man made happy, — if we speak of perfect Happiness. If,
however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to
be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it consists.

Reply Ohj. i. It often happens in the case of active powers
ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest
power to reach the last end, while the lower powers con-
tribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a
disposition thereto: thus to the art of sailing, which com-
mands the art of ship-building, it belongs to use a ship for
the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the order of
the universe, man is indeed helped by angels in the attain-
ment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dis-

THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS 8i

positions thereto: whereas he attains the last end itself
through the First Agent, which is God.

Reply Ohj. 2. When a form exists perfectly and naturally
in something, it can be the principle of action on something
else: for instance, a hot thing heats through fire. But if
a form exist in something imperfectly and not naturally,
it cannot be the principle whereby it is communicated to
something else: thus the intention of colour which is in the
pupil, cannot make a thing white; nor indeed can anything
enlightened or heated give heat or light to something else;
for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to
infinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is in
God perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is
imperfectly and by likeness or participation. Consequently
no creature can communicate its Happiness to another.

Reply Ohj. 3. A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a
man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine
works: but not as to the vision of the Divine Essence, as
was stated in the First Part (Q. CVI., A. i) : since in order
to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God.

Seventh Article.

whether any good works are necessary that man may
receive happiness from god ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —

Objection i. It seems that no works of man are necessary
that he may obtain Happiness from God. For since God
is an agent of infinite power, He requires before acting,
neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but can forthwith
produce the whole effect. But man's works, since they are
not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as
stated above (A. 6), can be required only as dispositions
thereto. Therefore God Who does not require dispositions
before acting, bestows Happiness, without any previous works.'

Ohj. 2. Further, just as God is the immediate cause of
Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of nature. But
when God first estabhshed nature, He produced creatures

II. I 6

82 QUESTION V

without any previous disposition or action on the part of
the creature, but made each one perfect forthwith in its
species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on
man without any previous works.

Obj. 3. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. iv. 6) that Happi-
ness is of the man to whom God reputeth justice without works.
Therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining
Happiness.

On the contrary, It is written (John xiii. 17) : If you know
these things, you shall be blessed if you do them. Therefore
Happiness is obtained through works.

/ answer that, Rectitude of the will, as stated above
(Q. IV., A. 4), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing
else than the right order of the will to the last end; which
right order is necessary for obtaining the end, just as the
right disposition of matter, in order to receive the form.
But this does not prove that any work of man need precede
his Happiness: for God could make a will having a right
tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the
end; just as sometimes He disposes matter and at the same
time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom
demands that it should not be thus; for as it is stated in
De Ccelo ii., of those things that have a natural capacity for
the perfect good, one has it without movement, some by one
movement, some by several. Now to possess the perfect good
without movement, belongs to that which has it naturally :
and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone.
Therefore it belongs to God alone not to be moved towards
Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happi-
ness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can
becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of
operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who
is above man in the natural order, obtained it, according
to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a
meritorious work; whereas man obtains it by many move-
ments of works which are called merits. Wherefore also
according to the Philosopher {Ethic, i.), happiness is the
reward of works of virtue.

THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS 83

Reply Ohj. i. Works are necessary to man in order to
gain Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the
Divine power which bestows Happiness, but that the order
in things be observed.

Reply Ohj. 2. God produced the first creatures so that
they were perfect forthwith; without any previous disposi-
tion or operation of the creature; because He instituted the
individuals of the various species, that through them nature
might be propagated to their progeny. In Hke manner,
because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through
Christ, Who is God and Man, Who, according to Heb. ii. 10,
had brought many children into glory ; therefore, from the
very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy,
without any previous meritorious operation. But this is
peculiar to Him: for Christ's merit avails baptized children
for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits
of their own; because by Baptism they are made members
of Christ.

Reply Ohj. 3. The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of
Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, that
is not given on account of previous works. For grace is
not a term of movement, as Happiness is; rather is it the
principle of the movement that tends towards Happiness.

Eighth Article,
whether every man desires happiness ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth A rticle : —

Objection i. It seems that not all desire Happiness. For
no man can desire what he knows not ; since the apprehended
good is the object of the appetite {De Anima iii.). But
many know not what Happiness is. This is evident from
the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii.), sOme
thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the body; some,
in a virtue of the soul; some, in other things. Therefore not
all desire Happiness.

Obj. 2. Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision
of the Divine Essence, as stated above (Q. III., A. 8). But

84 QUESTION V

some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine
Essence; wherefore they desire it not. Therefore all men
do not desire Happiness.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says {De Trin. xiii.) that
happy is he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss.
But all do not desire this; for some desire certain things
amiss, and yet they wish to desire such things. Therefore
all do not desire Happiness.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. xiii.) : // that
actor had said : * You all wish to he happy ; you do not wish
to he unhappy,' he would have said that which none would
have failed to acknowledge in his will. Therefore ever^^one
desires to be happy.

I answer that, Happiness can be considered in two ways.
First according to the general notion of happiness : and thus,
of necessity, every man desires happiness. For the general
notion of happiness consists in the perfect good, as stated
above (AA. 3, 4). But since good is the object of the will,
the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies
his will. Consequently to desire happiness is nothing else
than to desire that one's will be satisfied. And this every-
one desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness accord-
ing to its specific notion, as to that in which it consists.
A And thus all do not know Happiness; because they know
not in what thing the general notion of happiness is found.
And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it. Where-
fore the reply to the first Objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2. Since the will follows the apprehension of
the intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there
is no real distinction, there may be a distinction according
to the consideration of reason; so does it happen that one
and the same thing is desired in one way, and not desired
in another. So that happiness may be considered as the
final and perfect good, which is the general notion of happi-
ness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends
thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under
other special aspects, either on the part of the operation
itself, or on the part of the operating power, or on the part

THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS 85

of the object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of
necessity.

Reply Ohj. 3. This definition of Happiness given by
some, — Happy is the man that has all he desires, or, whose
every wish is fulfilled, is a good and adequate definition, if
it be understood in a certain way ; but an inadequate defini-
tion if understood in another. For if we understand it
simply of all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus
it is true that he who has all that he desires, is happy:
since nothing satisfies man's natural desire, except the
perfect good which is Happiness. But if we understand it
of those things that man desires according to the apprehen-
sion of the reason, thus it does not belong to Happiness, to
have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong
to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such things
hinders man from having all that he desires naturally ; thus
it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things that are
a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through
taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to
include perfect Happiness, — that he desires nothing amiss :
although the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit,
that happy is he who has all he desires.

QUESTION VI.

OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY.

{In Eight Articles.)

Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of
certain acts, we must in due sequence consider human acts,
in order to know by what acts we may obtain Happiness,
and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it. But
because operations and acts are concerned with things
singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete
without it take account of things in detail. The study of
Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should
consider first the general principles; and secondly matters
of detail.

In treating of the general principles, the points that
offer themselves for our consideration are — (i) human acts
themselves; (2) their principles. Now of human acts some
are proper to man; others are common to man and animals.
And since Happiness is man's proper good, those acts which
are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness
than have those which are common to man and the other
animals. First, then, we must consider those acts which
are proper to man; secondly, those acts which are common
to man and the other animals, and are called Passions.
The first of these points offers a twofold consideration:
(i) What makes a human act ? (2) What distinguishes
human acts ?

And since these acts are properly called human, which
are voluntary, because the will is the rational appetite,
which is proper to man; we must consider acts in so far as
they are voluntary.

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY S7

First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involun-
tary in general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary,
as being elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will
immediately; thirdly, those acts which are voluntary, as
being commanded by the will, which issue from the will
through the medium of the other powers.

And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances,
according to which we form our judgment concerning them,
we must first consider the voluntary and the involuntary,
and afterwards, the circumstances of those acts which are
found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under the first
head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether there
is anything voluntary in human acts ? (2) Whether in
irrational animals ? (3) Whether there can be voluntariness
without any action ? (4) Whether violence can be done to
the will ? (5) Whether violence causes involuntariness ?
(6) Whether fear causes involuntariness ? (7) Whether con-
cupiscence causes involuntariness ? (8) Whether ignorance
causes involuntariness ?

First Article,
whether there is anything voluntary in human

ACTS ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that there is nothing voluntary in
human acts. For that is voluntary which has its principle
within itself, as Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura
Horn, xxxii.), Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii.), and
Aristotle (Ethic, iii.) declare. But the principle of human
acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since man's
appetite is moved to act, by the appetible object which is
outside him, and is as a mover unmoved (De Anima iii.).
Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.

Ohj. 2. Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii.) proves that
in animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by
a motion from without. But all human acts are new, since
none is eternal. Consequently, the principle of all human

8S QUESTION VI

acts is from without : and therefore there is nothing volun-
tary in them.

Obj. 3. Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of
himself. But this is not true of man; for it is written
(John XV. 5): Without Me you can do nothing. Therefore
there is nothing voluntary in human acts.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii.)
that the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation.
Now such are human acts. Therefore there is something
voluntary in human acts.

I answer that, There must needs be something voluntary
in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take
note that the principle of some acts or movements is within
the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the principle
of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone
is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside
the stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the prin-
ciple of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things
that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move them-
selves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved,
acts or is moved for an end, as stated above (Q. I., A. 2);
those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle, whose
intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of
movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done
for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. There-
fore, whatever so acts or is so moved by an intrinsic prin-
ciple, that it has some knowledge of the end, has within
itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts
for an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no know-
ledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle
of action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting
or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in some-
thing else, by which the principle of its action towards an
end is imprinted on it. Wherefore sucWike things are not
said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. And
consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to
wit, that they act and that they act for an end, the move-
ments of such things are said to be voluntary : for the word

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 89

voluntary implies that their movements and acts are from
their own indination. Hence it is that, according to the
definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene,*
the voluntary is defined not only as having a principle
within the agent, but also as implying knowledge. There-
fore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and
moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be
found.

Reply Ohj. i. Not every principle is a first principle.
Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that
its principle be within the agent, nevertheless it is not
contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic
principle be caused or moved by an extrinsic principle:
because it is not essential to the voluntary act that its in-
trinsic principle be a first principle. — Yet again it must be
observed that a principle of movement may happen to be
first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of
things subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration
is a heavenly body, which nevertheless is not the first mover
simply, but is moved locally by a higher mover. And so
the intrinsic principle of the voluntary act, i.e., the cogni-
tive and appetitive power, is the first principle in the genus
of appetitive movement, although it is moved by an ex-
trinsic principle according to other species of movement.

Reply Ohj. 2. New movements in animals are indeed pre-
ceded by a motion from without; and this in two respects.
First, in so far as by means of an extrinsic motion an
animal's senses are confronted with something sensible,
which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite. Thus
a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards
him, begins to be moved towards the stag. — Secondly, in so
far as some extrinsic motion produces a physical change in
an animal's body, as in the case of cold or heat; and through
the body being thus affected by the motion of an outward
body, the sensitive appetite which is the power of a bodily
organ, is also moved indirectly ; thus it happens that through
some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to the

* See objection i.

90 QUESTION VI

desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature
of voluntariness, as stated above {ad i), for such movements
caused by an extrinsic principle are of another genus of
movement.

Reply Ohj. 3. God moves man to act, not only by pro-
posing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change
in his body, but also by moving the will itself ; because every
movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God
as the First Mover. And just as it is not incompatible
with nature that. the natural movement be from God as
the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of
God moving it: so it is not contrary to the essence of a
voluntary act, that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the
will is moved by God. Nevertheless both natural and
voluntary movements have this in common, that it is essen-
tial that they should proceed from a principle within the
agent.

Second Article.

whether there is anything voluntary in irrational

ANIMALS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that there is nothing voluntary in
irrational animals. For a thing is called voluntary from
voluntas (will). Now since the will is in the reason (De
Anima iii.), it cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore
neither is there anything voluntary in them.

Ohj. 2. Further, according as human acts are voluntary,
man is said to be master of his actions. But irrational
animals are not masters of their actions ; for they act not ;
rather are they acted upon, as Damascene says [De Fide
Orthod. ii.). Therefore there is no such thing as a volun-
tary act in irrational animals.

Ohj. 3. Further, Damascene says (ihid.) that voluntary
acts lead to praise and blame. But neither praise nor blame
is due to the acts of irrational animals. Therefore such
acts are not voluntary.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii.) that

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 91

both children and irrational animals participate in the volun-
tary. The same is said by Damascene [loc. cit.) and Gregory
of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Horn, xxxii.).

I answer that, As stated above (A. i), it is essential to the
voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together
with some knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the
end is twofold; perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge
of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing
which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of
end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And
such knowledge befits none but the rational nature. — But
imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehen-
sion of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of
end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such know-
ledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through
their senses and their natural estimative power.

Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the
perfect voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the
end, a man can, from deliberating about the end and the
means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. — But
imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect
voluntary; inasmuch as, the agent apprehends the end, but
does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Where-
fore the voluntary in its perfection befits none but the ra-
tional nature: whereas the imperfect voluntary is within
the competency of even irrational animals.

Reply Ohj. i. The will is the name of the rational appetite;
and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason.
But the word voluntary is derived from voluntas {will),
through being applied to those things in which there is
some participation of will, by way of likeness thereto. It
is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational
animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through
some kind of knowledge.

Reply Ohj. 2. The fact that man is master of his actions,
is due to his being able to deliberate about them: for since
the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite
things, the will can be inclined to either. But it is not

92 QUESTION VI

thus that voluntariness is in irrational animals, as stated
above.

Reply Ohj. 3. Praise and blame are the result of the
voluntary act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is
not to be found in irrational animals.

Third Article,
whether there can be voluntariness without

ANY ACT ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that voluntariness cannot be with-
out any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from
the will. But nothing can proceed from the will, except
through some act, at least an act of the will. Therefore
there cannot be voluntariness without act.

Obj. 2. Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of
the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not
to wish. But not to wish implies involuntariness, which is
contrary to voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing
voluntary when the act of the will ceases.

Obj. 3. Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary,
as stated above (AA. i, 2). But knowledge involves an
act. Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act.

On the contrary, The word voluntary is applied to that of
which we are masters. Now we are masters in respect of
to act and not to act, to will and not to will. Therefore
just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to
act and not to will.

/ answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the will.
Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways. First,
directly; in which sense something proceeds from another
inasmuch as this other acts; for instance, heating from heat.
Secondly, indirectly; in which sense something proceeds
from another through this other not acting; thus the sink-
ing of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having
ceased to steer. — But we must take note that the cause of
what follows from want of action is not always the agent

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 93

as not acting ; but only then when the agent can and ought
to act. For if the helmsman were unable to steer the ship,
or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him, the sinking
of the ship would not be set down to him, although it might
be due to his absence from the helm.

Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and some-
times ought, to hinder not- willing and not-acting; this not-
willing and not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding
from, the will. And thus it is that we can have the volun-
tary without an act; sometimes without outward act, but
with an interior act ; for instance, when one wills not to act ;
and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one
does not will to act.

Reply Ohj. i. We apply the word voluntary not only to
that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its
action; but also to that which proceeds from it indirectly
as from its inaction.

Reply Ohj. 2. Not to wish is said in two senses. First, as
though it were one word, and the infinitive of I-do-not-wish.
Consequently just as when I say / do not wish to read, the
sense is, / wish not to read ; so not to wish to read is the
same as to wish not to read, and in this sense not to wish
implies involuntariness. — Secondly it is taken as a sentence:
and then no act of the will is affirmed. And in this sense
not to wish does not imply involuntariness.

Reply Ohj. 3. Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge
in the same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in
order that it be in one's power to consider, to wish and to
act. And then, just as not to wish, and not to act, when it
is time to wish and to act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary
not to consider.

Fourth Article,
whether violence can be done to the will ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Ohjection 1. It seems that violence can be done to the will.
For everything can be compelled by that which is more
powerful. But there is something, namely, God, that is

94 QUESTION VI

more powerful than the human will. Therefore it can be
compelled, at least by Him.

Obj. 2. Further, every passive subject is compelled by
its active principle, when it is changed by it. But the will
is a passive force: for it is a mover moved (De Anima iii.).
Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active prin-
ciple, it seems that sometimes it is compelled.

Ohj. 3. Further, violent movement is that which is con-
trary to nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes
contrary to nature; as is clear of the will's movement to
sin, which is contrary to nature, as Damascene says (De
Fide Orthod. iv.). Therefore the movement of the will can
be compelled.

On the contrary, Augustine says [De Civ. Dei. v.) that
what is done by the will is not done of necessity. Now,
whatever is done under compulsion is done of necessity:
consequently what is done by the will, cannot be compelled.
Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act.

I answer that, The act of the will is twofold: one is its
immediate act; as it were, elicited by it, namely, to wish ;
the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put
into execution by means of some other power, such as to
walk and to speak, which are commanded by the will to be
executed by means of the motive power.

As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the
will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent
the exterior members from executing the will's command.
But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done
to the will.

The reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing
else than an inclination proceeding from the interior prin-
ciple of knowledge: just as the natural appetite is an in-
clination proceeding from an interior principle without
knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from an
exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the
nature of the will's own act, that it should be subject to
compulsion or violence: just as it is also contrary to the
nature of a natural inclination or movement. For a stone

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 95

may have an upward movement from violence, but that
this violent movement be from its natural incUnation is
impossible. In Hke manner a man may be dragged by
force : but it is contrary to the very notion of violence, that
he be thus dragged of his own will.

Reply Obj. i. God Who is more powerful than the human
will, can move the will of man, according to Prov. xxi. i:
The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord ; whithersoever
He will He shall turn it. But if this were by compulsion,
it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the
will itself be moved, but something else against the will.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not always a violent movement, when
a passive subject is moved by its active principle; but only
when this is done against the interior inclination of the
passive subject. Otherwise every alteration and genera-
tion of simple bodies would be unnatural and violent:
whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior
aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In
like manner when the will is moved, according to its own
inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not
violent but voluntary.

Reply Obj. 3. That to which the will tends by sinning,
although in reality, it is evil and contrary to the rational
nature, nevertheless is apprehended as something good and
suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man by reason
of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious habit.

Fifth Article,
whether violence causes involuntariness ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that violence does not cause involun-
tariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntari-
ness in respect of the will. But violence cannot be done to
the will, as shown above (A. 4). Therefore violence cannot
cause involuntariness.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is done involuntarily is done
with grief, as Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii.) and the

96 QUESTION VI

Philosopher {Ethic, hi.) say. But sometimes a man suffers
compulsion without being grieved thereby. Therefore vio-
lence does not cause involuntariness.

Ohj. 3. Further, what is from the will cannot be involun-
tary. But some violent actions proceed from the will: for
instance, when a man with a heavy body goes upwards ; or
when a man contorts his limbs in a way contrary to their
natural flexibility. Therefore violence does not cause in-
voluntariness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher {Ethic, ii.) and Dama-
scene {loc. cit.) say that things done under compulsion are
involuntary.

I answer that, Violence is directly opposed to the volun-
tary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the
natural have this in common, that both are from an intrinsic
principle; whereas violence is from an extrinsic principle.
And for this reason, just as in things devoid of knowledge,
violence effects something against nature; so in things en-
dowed with knowledge, it effects something against the will.
Now that which is against nature is said to be unnatural;
and in like manner that which is against the will is said to
be involuntary. Therefore violence causes involuntariness.

Reply Ohj. i. The involuntary is opposed to the volun-
tary. Now it has been said (A. 4) that not only the act,
which proceeds immediately from the will, is called volun-
tary, but also the act commanded by the will. Conse-
quently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the
will, violence cannot be done the will, as stated above {ibid.) :
wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But
as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence: and
consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.

Reply Ohj. 2. As that is said to be natural, which is
according to the inclination of nature; so that is said to be
voluntary, which is according to the inclination of the will.
Now a thing is said to be natural in two ways. First,
because it is from nature as from an active principle: thus
it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly, according
to a passive principle; because, to wit, there is a natural

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 97

inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle:
thus the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by
reason of the natural aptitude in a heavenly body to receive
such movement; although the cause of that movement is
a voluntary agent. In like manner an act is said to be
voluntary in two ways. First, in regard to action, for
instance, when one wishes to act: secondly, in regard to
passion, as when one wishes to be passive to another.
Hence when action is brought to bear on something, by an
extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action
remains in the passive subject, there is not violence simply:
for although the patient does nothing by way of action, he
does something by being willing to suffer. Consequently
this cannot be called involuntary.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says (Phys. viii.) the
movement of an animal, whereby at times an animal is
moved against the natural inclination of the body, although
it is not natural to the body, is nevertheless somewhat
natural to the animal, to which it is natural to be moved
according to its appetite. Accordingly this is violent, not
simply but in a certain respect. — The same remark applies
in the case of one who contorts his limbs in a way that is
contrary to their natural disposition. For this is violent
in a certain respect, i.e., as to that particular limb; but not
simply, i.e., as to the man himself.

Sixth Article,
whether fear causes involuntariness simply ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that fear causes involuntariness
simply. For just as violence regards that which is con-
trary to the will at the time, so fear regards a future evil
which is repugnant to the will. But violence causes in-
voluntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes involun-
tariness simply.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is such of itself, remains such,
whatever be added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long

II. I 7

98 QUESTION VI

as it remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But
that which is done through fear, is involuntary in itself.
Therefore, even with the addition of fear, it is involuntary.

Ohj. 3. Further, that which is such, subject to a condi-
tion, is such in a certain respect; whereas what is such,
without any condition, is such simply : thus what is neces-
sary, subject to a condition, is necessary in some respect:
but what is necessary absolutely, is necessary simply. But
that which is done through fear, is absolutely involuntary;
and is not voluntary, save under a condition, namely, in
order that the evil feared may be avoided. Therefore that
which is done through fear, is involuntary simply.

On, the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat.
Horn. XXX.) and the Philosopher (Ethic, iii.) say that such
things as are done through fear are voluntary rather than
involuntary.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says {Ethic, iii.) and
likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius,
loc. cit.), such things as are done through fear are of a mixed
character, being partly voluntary and partly involuntary.
For that which is done through fear, considered in itself, is
not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular
case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.

But if the matter be considered aright, such things are
voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary
simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing
is said to be simply, according as it is in act; but according
as it is only in the apprehension, it is not simply, but in a
certain respect. Now that which is done through fear, is
in act in so far as it is done. For, since acts are concerned
with singulars; and the singular, as such, is here and now^,
that which is done is in act, in so far as it is here and now
and under other individuating circumstances. And that
which is done through fear, is voluntary, inasmuch as it
is here and now, that is to say, in so far as, under the cir-
cumstances, it hinders a greater evil which was feared ; thus
the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary
during the storm, through fear of the danger: wherefore it

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 99

is clear that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that
what is done out of fear is essentially voluntary, because its
principle is within. — But if we consider what is done through
fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is
repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the
mind. And consequently what is done through fear is in-
voluntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside
the actual circumstances of the case.

Reply Ohj. i. Things done through fear and compulsion,
differ not only according to present and future time, but
also in this, that the will does not consent, but is moved
entirely counter to that which is done through compulsion:
whereas what is done through fear, becomes voluntary,
because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its own
sake, but on account of something else, that is, in order to
avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a
voluntary act are satisfied, if it be done on account of
something else voluntary: since the voluntary is not only
what we wish, for its own sake, as an end, but also what
we wish for the sake of something else, as an end. It is
clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the
will does nothing inwardly ; whereas in what is done through
fear, the will does something. Accordingly, as Gregory of
Nyssa (Nemesius, loc. cit.) says, in order to exclude things
done through fear, a violent action is defined as not only
one, the principle whereof is from without, but with the addi-
tion, in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all;
because the will of him that is in fear, does concur somewhat
in that which he does through fear.

Reply Ohj. 2. Things that are such absolutely, remain
such, whatever be added to them; for instance, a cold thing,
or a white thing: but things that are such relatively, vary
according as they are compared with different things. For
what is big in comparison with one thing, is small in com-
parison with another. Now a thing is said to be voluntary,
not only for its own sake, as it were absolutely ; but also for
the sake of something else, as it were relatively. Accord-
ingly, nothing prevents a thing which was not voluntary in

100 QUESTION VI

comparison with one thing, from becoming voluntary when
compared with another.

Reply Ohj. 3. That which is done through fear, is volun-
tary without any condition, that is to say, according as it
is actually done : but it is involuntary, under a certain con-
dition, that is to say, if such a fear were not threatening.
Consequently, this argument proves rather the opposite.

Seventh Article,
whether concupiscence causes involuntariness ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —

Objection i. It seems that concupiscence causes involun-
tariness. For just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence.
But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. There-
fore concupiscence does so too.

Ohj. 2. Further, just as the timid man through fear acts
counter to that which he proposed, so does the incontinent,
through concupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to
a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so also.

Ohj. 3. Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness.
But concupiscence impairs knowledge; for the Philosopher
says {Ethic, vi.) that delight, or the lust of pleasure, destroys
the judgment of prudence. Therefore concupiscence causes
involuntariness.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii.):
The involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence, and is done
with regret. But neither of these can be said of that which
is done out of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does
not cause involuntariness.

/ answer that, Concupiscence does not cause involuntari-
ness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary.
For a thing is said to be voluntary, from the fact that the
will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to
desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore the effect of
concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather
than involuntary.

Reply Ohj. i. Fear regards evil, but concupiscence regards

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY loi

good. Now evil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good
harmonizes with the will. Therefore fear has a greater
tendency than concupiscence to cause involuntariness.

Reply Ohj. 2. He who acts from fear retains the repug-
nance of the will to that which he does, considered in itself.
But he that acts from concupiscence, e.g., an incontinent
man, does not retain his former will whereby he repudiated
the object of his concupiscence; for his will is changed, so
that he desires that which previously he repudiated. Ac-
cordingly, that which is done out of fear is involuntary, to
a certain extent, but that which is done from concupiscence
is nowise involuntary. For the man who yields to con-
cupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first,
but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the
timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires
now.

Reply Ohj. 3. If concupiscence were to destroy know-
ledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence
has rendered mad, it would follow that concupiscence would
take away voluntariness. And yet properly speaking it
would not result in the act being involuntary, because in
things bereft of reason, there is neither voluntary nor in-
voluntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done
from concupiscence, knowledge is not completely destroyed,
because the power of knowing is not taken away entirely,
but only the actual consideration in some particular possible
act. Nevertheless, this itself is voluntary, according as by
voluntary we mean that which is in the power of the will,
for example, not to act or 7iot to will, and in like manner not
to consider ; for the will can resist the passion, as we shall
state later on (Q. X., A. 3; Q. LXXVIL, A. 7).

Eighth Article.

whether ignorance causes involuntariness ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth A rticle : —
Objection i. It seems that ignorance does not cause in-
voluntariness. For the involuntary act deserves pardon, as

102 QUESTION VI

Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. ii.). But sometimes that
which is done through ignorance does not deserve pardon,
according to i Cor. xiv. 38 : If any man know not, he shall
not he known. Therefore ignorance does not cause invohm-
tariness.

Ohj. 2. Further, every sin impHes ignorance; according to
Prov. xiv. 22 : They err, that work evil. If, therefore, ignor-
ance causes involuntariness, it would follow that every sin
is involuntary : which is opposed to the saying of Augustine,
that every sin is voluntary (De Vera. Relig. xiv.).

Obj. 3. Further, involuntariness is not without sadness, as
Damascene says [loc. cit.). But some things are done out of
ignorance, but without sadness: for instance, a man may
kill a foe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that
he is killing a stag. Therefore ignorance does not cause
involuntariness.

On the contrary, Damascene (loc. cit.) and the Philosopher
(Ethic, iii.) say that what is done through ignorance is in-
voluntq,ry.

I answer that, If ignorance cause involuntariness, it is in
so far as it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary
condition of voluntariness, as was declared above (A. i).
But it is not every ignorance that deprives one of this
knowledge. Accordingly, we must take note that ignorance
has a threefold relationship to the act of the will: in one
way, concomitantly ; in another, consequently ; in a third
way, antecedently. — Concomitantly , when there is ignorance
of what is done ; but, so that even if it were known, it would
be done. For then, ignorance does not induce one to wish
this to be done, but it just happens that a thing is at the
same time done and not known: thus in the example given
(Oh]. 3) a man did indeed wish to kill his foe, but killed
him in ignorance, thinking to kill a stag. And ignorance of
this kind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic, iii.), does not
cause involuntariness, since it is not the cause of anything
that is repugnant to the will: but it causes non-voluntari-
ness, since that which is unknown cannot be actually willed.
Ignorance is consequent to the act of the will, in so far as

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY 103

ignorance itself is voluntary : and this happens in two ways,
in accordance with the two aforesaid modes of voluntary
(A. 3). First, because the act of the will is brought to
bear on the ignorance: as when a man wishes not to know,
that he may have an excuse for sin, or that he may not be
withheld from sin; according to Job xxi. 14: We desire not
the knowledge of Thy ways. And this is called affected
ignorance. — Secondly, ignorance is said to be voluntary,
when it regards that which one can and ought to know:
for in this sense not to act and not to will are said to be
voluntary, as stated above (A. 3). And ignorance of this
kind happens, either when one does not actually consider
what one can and ought to consider; — this is called ignor-
ance of evil choice, and arises from some passion or
habit: or when one does not take the trouble to acquire
the knowledge which one ought to have; in which sense,
ignorance of the general principles of law, which one
ought to know, is voluntary, as being due to negligence. —
Accordingly if, in either of these ways, ignorance is volun-
tary, it cannot cause involuntariness simply. Nevertheless,
it causes involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it
precedes the movement of the will towards the act, which
movement would not be, if there were knowledge. Ignor-
ance is antecedent to the act of the will, when it is not volun-
tary, and yet is the cause of man's willing what he would
not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of some
circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know,
the result being that he does that which he would not do,
if he knew of that circumstance; for instance, a man, after
taking proper precaution, may not know that someone is
coming along the road, so that he shoots an arrow and slays
a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness simply.
From this may be gathered the solution of the objections.
For the first objection deals with ignorance of what a man
is bound to know. The second, with ignorance of choice,
which is voluntary to a certain extent, as stated above.
The third, of that ignorance which is concomitant with the
act of the will.

QUESTION VII.

OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the circumstances of human acts:
under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) What
is a circumstance ? (2) Whether a theologian should take
note of the circumstances of human acts ? (3) How many
circumstances are there ? (4) Which are the most impor-
tant of them ?

First Article,
whether a circumstance is an accident of a human

ACT ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that a circumstance is not an acci-
dent of a human act. For Tully says [De Invent. Rhetor, i.)
that a circumstance is that from which an orator adds
authority and strength to his argument. But oratorical argu-
ments are derived principally from things pertaining to the
essence of a thing, such as the definition, the genus, the
species, and the like, from which also Tully declares that an
orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a circum-
stance is not an accident of a human act.

Ohj. 2. Further, to he in is proper to an accident. But
that which surrounds (circumstat) is rather out than in.
Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of human
acts.

Obj. 3. Further, an accident has no accident. But
human acts themselves are accidents. Therefore the cir-
cumstances are not accidents of acts.

104

CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS 105

On the contrary, The particular conditions of any singular
thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Philo-
sopher (Ethic, iii.) calls the circumstances particular things
(/cad'e/caaTo), i.e., the particular conditions of each act.
Therefore the circumstances are individual accidents of
human acts.

/ answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher (Peri
Herm. i.), words are the signs of what we understand, it must
needs be that in naming things we follow the process of
intellectual knowledge. Now our intellectual knowledge
proceeds from the better known to the less known. Ac-
cordingly with us, names of more obvious things are trans-
ferred so as to signify things less obvious: and hence it is
that, as stated in Metaph. x., the notion of distance has been
transferred from things that are apart locally, to all kinds of
opposition : and in like manner words that signify local
movement are employed to designate all other movements,
because bodies which are circumscribed by place, are best
known to us. And hence it is that the word circumstance
has passed from located things to human acts.

Now in things located, that is said to surround some-
thing, which is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near
it. Accordingly, whatever conditions are outside the sub-
stance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human
act, are called circumstances. Now what is outside a
thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called
its accident. Wherefore the circumstances of human acts
should be called their accidents.

Reply Ohj. i. The orator gives strength to his argument,
in the first place, from the substance of the act; and,
secondly, from the circumstances of the act. Thus a man
becomes indictable, first, through being guilty of murder;
secondly, through having acted fraudulently, or from
motives of greed, or at a holy time or place, and so
forth. And so in the passage quoted, it is said pointedly
that the orator adds strength to his argument, as though this
were something secondary.

Reply Ohj. 2. A thing is said to be an accident of some-

io6 QUESTION VII

thing in two ways. First, from being in that thing: thus,
whiteness is said to be an accident of Socrates. Secondly,
because it is together with that thing in the same subject:
thus, whiteness is an accident of music, inasmuch as they
meet in the same subject, so as to touch one another, as it
were. And in this sense circumstances are said to be the
accidents of human acts.

Reply Ohj. 3. As stated above {ad 2), an accident is said
to be the accident of an accident, from the fact that they
meet in the same subject. But this happens in two ways.
First, in so far as two accidents are both related to the
same subject, without any relation to one another; as
whiteness and music in Socrates. Secondly, when such
accidents are related to one another; as when the subject
receives one accident by means of the other; for instance,
a body receives colour by means of its surface. And thus
also is one accident said to be in another; for we speak of
colour as being in the surface.

Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both
these ways. For some circumstances that have a relation
to acts, belong to the agent otherwise than through the act ;
as place and condition of person: whereas others belong to
the agent by reason of the act, as the manner in which the
act is done.

Second Article.

whether theologians should take note of the
circumstances of human acts ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that theologians should not take
note of the circumstances of human acts. Because theo-
logians do not consider human acts otherwise than accord-
ing to their quality of good or evil. But it seems that cir-
cumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for a
thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which
is outside it; but by that which is in it. Therefore
theologians should not take note of the circumstances of
acts.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS 107

Ohj. 2. Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts.
But one thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents;
hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi.) that no art or
science considers accidental being, except only the art of
sophistry. Therefore the theologian has not to consider
circumstances.

Ohj. 3. Further, the consideration of circumstances be-
longs to the orator. But oratory is not a part of theology.
Therefore it is not a theologian's business to consider cir-
cumstances.

On the contrary, Ignorance of circumstances causes an act
to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orthod.
ii.) and Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, — De Nat. Horn. xxxi.).
But involuntariness excuses from sin, the consideration of
which iDelongs to the theologian. Therefore circumstances
also should be considered by the theologian.

I answer that, Circumstances come under the considera-
tion of the theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because
the theologian considers human acts, inasmuch as man is
thereby directed to Happiness. Now, everything that is
directed to an end should be proportionate to that end.
But acts are made proportionate to an end by means of a
certain commensurateness, which results from the due cir-
cumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the cir-
cumstances.— Secondly, because the theologian considers
human acts according as they are found to be good or
evil, better or worse: and this diversity depends on circum-
stances, as we shall see further on (Q. XVIII., AA. 10, 11;
Q. LXXIIL, A. 7). — Thirdly, because the theologian con-
siders human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit,
which is proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite
that they be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be
voluntary or involuntary, according to knowledge or ignor-
ance of circumstances, as stated above {cf. Q. VI., A. 8).
Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances.

Reply Ohj. i. Good directed to the end is said to be useful ;
and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philo-
sopher says {Ethic, i.) that good in relation to somethi^ig, is

io8 QUESTION VII

useful. Now, in the genus relation a thing is denominated
not only according to that which is inherent in the thing,
but also according to that which is extrinsic to it : as may
be seen in the expressions right and left, equal and unequal,
and suchlike. Accordingly, since the goodness of acts
consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their
being called good or bad according to their proportion to
extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.

Reply Ohj. 2. Accidents which are altogether accidental
are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty
and infinity. But suchlike accidents cannot be considered
in the light of circumstances; because circumstances,
although, as stated above (A. i), they are extrinsic to the
act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being
related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the
consideration of art.

Reply Ohj. 3. The consideration of circumstances belongs
to the moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the
moralist, in so far as with respect to circumstances we find
or lose the mean of virtue in human acts and passions. To
the politician and to the orator, in so far as circumstances
make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse or
indictment. In different ways, however: because where the
orator persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian
this consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since
to him all the other acts are subservient : for he has to con-
sider virtuous and vicious acts, just as the moralist does;
and with the orator and politician he considers acts accord-
ing as they are deserving of reward or punishment.

Third Article.

whether the circumstances are properly set forth
in the third book of ethics ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the circumstances are not
properly set forth in Ethic, iii. For a circumstance of an
act is described as something outside the act. Now time

CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS 109

and place answer to this description. Therefore there are
only two circumstances, to wit, when and where.

Ohj. 2. Further, we judge from the circumstances whether
a thing is well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of
an act. Therefore all the circumstances are included under
one, which is the mode of acting.

Ohj. 3. Further, circumstances are not part of the sub-
stance of an act. But the causes of an act seem to belong
to its substance. Therefore no circumstance should be
taken from the cause of the act itself. Accordingly, neither
who, nor why, nor about what, are circumstances: since who
refers to the efficient cause, why to the final cause, and
about what to the material cause.

On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in
Ethic, iii.

/ answer that, Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor, i.),
gives seven circumstances, which are contained in this
verse :

Quis, quid, uhi, quihus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando —
Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when.

For in acts we must take note of who did it, by what aids or
instruments he did it, what he did, where he did it, why he
did it, how and when he did it. But Aristotle in Ethic, iii.
added yet another, to wit, about what, which Tully included
in the circumstance what.

The reason of this enumeration may be set down as
follows. For a circumstance is described as something out-
side the substance of the act, and yet in a way touching it.
Now this happens in three ways : first, inasmuch as it touches
the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it touches the cause of
the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect. It
touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as time and
place ; or by qualifying the act, as the mode of acting. It
touches the effect, when we consider what is done. It
touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the
circumstance why ; as to the material cause, or object, in
the circumstance about what ; as to the principal efficient

no QUESTION VII

cause, in the circumstance who ; and as to the instrumental
efficient cause, in the circumstance hy what aids.

Reply Oh], i. Time and place surround (circumstant) the
act by way of measure; but the others surround the act by
touching it in any other way, while they are extrinsic to the
substance of the act.

Reply Obj. 2. This mode well or ill is not a circumstance,
but results from all the circumstances. But the mode which
refers to a quality of the act is a special circumstance; for
instance, that a man walk fast or slowly; that he strike
hard or gently, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 3. A condition of the cause, on which the sub-
stance of the act depends, is not a circumstance; it must be
an additional condition. Thus, in regard to the object, it
is not a circumstance of theft that the object is another's
property, for this belongs to the substance of the act; but
that it be great or small. And the same applies to the
other circumstances which are considered in reference to the
other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a
circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a
valiant man act valiantly for the sake of the good of the
virtue of fortitude, is not a circumstance; but if he act
valiantly for the sake of the delivery of the state, or of
Christendom, or some such purpose. The same is to be
said with regard to the circumstance what : for that a man
by pouring water on someone should happen to wash him,
is not a circumstance of the washing; but that in doing so
he give him a chill, or scald him; heal him or harm him,
these are circumstances.

Fourth Article,
whether the most important circumstances are

"why" and IN "what THE ACT CONSISTS"?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that these are not the most im-
portant circumstances, namely, why and those in which the
act is (iv 069 rj irpd^t^), as stated in Ethic, iii. For those in

CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS iii

which the act is seem to be place and time : and these do
not seem to be the most important of the circumstances,
since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the act.
Therefore those things in which the act is are not the most
important circumstances.

Obj. 2. Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it.
Therefore it is not the most important circumstance.

Obj. 3. Further, that which holds the foremost place in
regard to each thing, is its cause and its form. But the
cause of an act is the person that does it; while the form of
an act is the manner in which it is done. Therefore
these two circumstances seem to be of the greatest
importance.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, — De Nat.
Horn, xxxi.) says that the most important circumstances are
why it is done and what is done.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. L, A. i), acts are
properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary.
Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. Therefore
that circumstance is the most important of all which touches
the act on the part of the end, viz., the circumstance why :
and the second in importance, is that which touches the
very substance of the act, viz., the circumstance what he
did. As to the other circumstances, they are more or less
important, according as they more or less approach to
these.

Reply Obj. i. By those things in which the act is the
Philosopher does not mean time and place, but those cir-
cumstances that are affixed to the act itself. Wherefore
Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, — loc. cit.), as though he were
explaining the dictum of the Philosopher, instead of the
latter's term, — in which the act is, said, what is done.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the end is not part of the sub-
stance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the
act, inasmuch as it moves the agent to act. Wherefore the
moral act is specified chiefly by the end.

Reply Obj. 3. The person that does the act is the cause
of that act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end;

112 QUESTION VII

and it is chiefly in this respect that he is directed to the
act; while other conditions of the person have not such an
important relation to the act. — ^As to the mode, it is not
the substantial form of the act, for in an act the substantial
form depends on the object and term or end; but it is, as
it were, a certain accidental quality of the act.

QUESTION VIII.

OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS.

{In Three Articles.)

We must now consider the different acts of the will; and
in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself
immediately, as being elicited by the will; secondly, those
acts which are commanded by the will.

Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to
the end; we must therefore consider — (i) Those acts of the
will whereby it is moved to the end; and (2) those whereby
it is moved to the means. And since it seems that there
are three acts of the will in reference to the end; viz., voli-
tion, enjoyment, and intention ; we must consider — (i) Voli-
tion; (2) enjoyment; (3) intention. — Concerning the first,
three things must be considered: (i) Of what things is the
will ? (2) By what is the will moved ? (3) How is it
moved ?

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(i) Whether the will is of good only ? (2) Whether it is of
the end only, or also of the means ? (3) If in any way it
be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and to the
means, by the same movement ?

First Article,
whether the will is of good only ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the will is not of good only.
For the same power regards opposites; for instance,
sight regards white and black. But good and evil are

II. I 113 8

114 QUESTION VIII

opposites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but also
of evil.

Obj. 2. Further, rational powers can be directed to oppo-
site purposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii.).
But the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, as
is stated in De Anima iii. Therefore the will can be directed
to opposites; and consequently its volition is not confined
to good, but extends to evil.

Obj. 3. Further, good and being are convertible. But
volition is directed not only to beings, but also to non-
beings. For sometimes we wish not to walk, or not to speak ;
and again at times we wish for future things, which are not
actual beings. Therefore the will is not of good only.

On the contrary, Dionysius says [Div. Nom. iv.) that evil
is outside the scope of the will, and that all things desire good.

I answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now
every appetite is only of something good. The reason of
this is that the appetite is nothing else than an inclination
of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now
every inclination is to something like and suitable to the
thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as
it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that
every inclination is to something good. And hence it is
that the Philosopher says {Ethic, i.) that the good is that
which all desire.

But it must be noted that, since every inclination results
from a form, the natural appetite results from a form
existing in the nature of things : while the sensitive appetite,
as also the intellective or rational appetite, which we call
the will, follows from an apprehended form. Therefore,
just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a
thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good
which is apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will
tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in
very truth, but that it be apprehended as good. Wherefore
the Philosopher says {Phys. ii.) that the end is a good, or an
apparent good.

Reply Obj. i. The same power regards opposites, but it is

THE OBJECT OF VOLITION 115

not referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the
will is referred both to good and to evil: but to good, Ly
desiring it: to evil, by shunning it. Wherefore the actual
desire of good is called volition,'^ meaning thereby the act
of the will; for it is in this sense that we are now speaking
of the will. On the other hand, the shunning of evil is
better described as nolition : wherefore, just as volition is of
good, so nolition is of evil.

Reply Obj. 2. A rational power is not to be directed to
any opposite purposes, but to those which are contained
under its proper object: for no power seeks other than its
proper object. Now, the object of the will is good. Where-
fore the will can be directed to such opposite purposes as are
contained under good, such as to be moved, or to be at rest,
to speak or to be silent, and suchlike: for the will can be
directed to either under the aspect of good.

Reply Obj. 3. That which is not a being in nature^ is con-
sidered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and
privations are said to be beings of reason. In this way, too,
future things, in so far as they are apprehended, are beings.
Accordingly, in so far as suchlike are beings, they are appre-
hended under the aspect of good; and it is thus that the
will is directed to them. Wherefore the Philosopher says
{Ethic. V.) that to lack evil is considered as a good.

Second Article,
whether volition is of the end only, or also of the

MEANS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that volition is not of the means,
but of the end only. For the Philosopher says {Ethic, iii.)
that volition is of the end, while choice is of the means.

Obj. 2. Further, For objects differing in genus there are
corresponding different powers of the soul {Ethic, vi.). Now,

* In Latin, — -voluntas. To avoid confusion with voluntas (the
will) St. Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the transla-
tion may appear superfluous.

ii6 QUESTION VIII

the end and the means are in different genera of good:
because the end, which is a good either of rectitude or of
pleasure, is in the genus quality, either of action or of passion;
whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to an end,
is in the genus relation {Ethic, i.). Therefore, if volition is
of the end, it is not of the means.

Ohj. 3. Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since
they are perfections thereof. But in those habits which are
called practical arts, the end belongs to one, and the means
to another art; thus the use of a ship, which is its end,
belongs to the (art of the) helmsman; whereas the building
of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art
of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of the end,
it is not of the means.

On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power
that a thing passes through the middle space, and arrives
at the terminus. But the means are a kind of middle space,
through which one arrives at the end or terminus. There-
fore, if volition is of the end, it is also of the means.

I answer that, The word voluntas sometimes designates the
power of the will, sometimes its act.* Accordingly, if we
speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the
end and to the means. For every power extends to those
things in which may be considered the aspect of the object
of that power in any way whatever : thus the sight extends
to all things whatsoever that are in any way coloured.
Now the aspect of good, which is the object of the will
power, may be found not only in the end, but also in the
means.

If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then,
properly speaking, voHtion is of the end only. Because
every act denominated from a power, designates the simple
act of that power: thus to understand designates the simple
act of the understanding. Now the simple act of a power
is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power.
But that which is good and willed in itself is the end. Where-
fore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the

* See note on p. 115.

THE OBJECT OF VOLITION 117

other hand, the means are good and willed, not in them-
selves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is
directed to them, only in so far as it is directed to the end :
so that what it wills in them, is the end. Thus, to under-
stand, is properly directed to things that are known in
themselves, i.e., first principles: but we do not speak of
understanding with regard to things known through first
principles, except in so far as we see the principles in
those things. For in morals the end is what principles are
in speculative science {cf. Ethic, vii.).

Reply Ohj. i. The Philosopher is speaking of the will in
reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to
the power of the will.

Reply Ohj. 2. There are different powers for objects that
differ in genus in an equal degree; for instance, sound and
colour are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred
hearing and sight. But the useful and the righteous are
mutually related not in an equal degree, but as that which is
of itself, and that which is in relation to another. Now
suchlike objects are always referred to the same power; for
instance, the power of sight perceives both colour and light
by which colour is seen.

Reply Ohj. 3. Not everything that diversifies habits,
diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determina-
tions of powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every
practical art considers both the end and the means. For the
art of the helmsman does indeed consider the end, as that
which it effects; and the means, as that which it commands.
On the other hand, the ship-building art considers the means
as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the
end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again,
in every practical art there is an end proper to it, and means
that belong properly to that art.

ii8 QUESTION VIII

Third Article.

whether the will is moved by the same act to the end

and to the means ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the will is moved by the same
act, to the end and to the means. Because according to
the Philosopher {Topic, iii.) where one thing is on account of
another there is only one. But the will does not will the
means save on account of the end. Therefore it is moved
to both by the same act.

Ohj. 2. Further, the end is the reason for willing the means,
just as light is the reason of seeing colours. But light and
colours are seen by the same act. Therefore it is the same
movement of the will, whereby it wills the end and the
means.

Ohj. 3. Further, it is one and the same natural movement
which tends through the middle space to the terminus.
But the means are in comparison to the end, as the middle
space is to the terminus. Therefore it is the same move-
ment of the will whereby it is directed to the end and to the
means.

On the contrary, Acts are diversified according to their
objects. But the end is a different species of good from the
means, which are a useful good. Therefore the will is not
moved to both by the same act.

I answer that, Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the
means, as such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that
the will can be moved to the end, without being moved to
the means ; whereas it cannot be moved to the means, as
such, unless it is moved to the end. Accordingly the will
is moved to the end in two ways : first, to the end absolutely
and in itself; secondly, as to the reason for willing the means.
Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the
same movement, — ^to the end, as the reason for willing the
means, — and to the means themselves. But it is another
act whereby the will is moved to the end absolutely. And

THE OBJECT OF VOLITION 119

sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example,
when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards,
deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for
the doctor to heal him. The same happens in regard to the
intellect: for at first a man understands the principles in
themselves; but afterwards he understands them in the
conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the conclusions on
account of the principles.

Reply Ohj. i. This argument holds in respect of the will
being moved to the end as the reason for willing the means.

Reply Ohj. 2. Whenever colour is seen, by the same act
the light is seen; but the light can be seen without the colour
being seen. In like manner whenever a man wills the
means, by the same act he wills the end; but not conversely.

Reply Ohj. 3. In the execution of a work, the means are
as the middle- space, and the end, as the terminus. Where-
fore just as natural movement sometimes stops in the
middle and does not reach the terminus; so sometimes one
is busy with the means, without gaining the end. But in
willing it is the reverse: for the will through (willing) the
end comes to will the means; just as the intellect arrives at
the conclusions through the principles which are called
means. Hence it is that sometimes the intellect under-
stands a mean, and does not proceed thence to the conclusion.
And in like manner the will sometimes wills the end, and yet
does not proceed to will the means.

The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is
clear from what has been said above (A. 2 ad 2). For the
useful and the righteous are not species of good in an equal
degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and that
which is for the sake of something else : wherefore the act
of the will can be directed to one and not to the other; but
not conversely.

QUESTION IX.

OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL.

{In Six Articles.)

We must now consider what moves the will : and under this
head there are six points of inquiry : (i) Whether the will is
moved by the intellect ? (2) Whether it is moved by the
sensitive appetite ? (3) Whether the will moves itself ?

(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle ?

(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body ? (6) Whether
the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle ?

First Article,
whether the will is moved by the intellect ?

We proceed thus to the First A rticle : —

Objection i. It seems that the will is not moved by the
intellect. For Augustine says on Ps. cxviii. 20: My soul
hath coveted to long for Thy justifications : — The intellect flies
ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at all : we know what
is good, hut deeds delight us not. But it would not be so, if
the intellect were moved by the will : because movement of
the movable results from motion of the mover. Therefore
the intellect does not move the will.

Ohj. 2. Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible
object to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagina-
tion in representing the appetible object to the sensitive
appetite. But the imagination, in presenting the appetible
object, does not move the sensitive appetite: indeed, some-
times our imagination affects us no more than what is set

120

WHAT MOVES THE WILL 121

before us in a picture, and moves us not at all {De Anima, iii.) .
Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.

Ohj. 3. Further, the same is not mover and moved in
respect of the same thing. But the will moves the in-
tellect; for we exercise the intellect when we will. There-
fore the intellect does not move the will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says [De Anima iii.) that
the appetihle object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is
a mover moved.

I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something
in so far as it is in potentiality to several things; for that
which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by some-
thing actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of
the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in
two ways : first, with regard to acting and not acting ;
secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the
sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and
sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs
therefore a mover in two respects: viz., as to the exercise
or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act.
The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is
sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is
on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is
specified.

The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent.
And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above
(Q. I., A. 2), the principle of this motion lies in the end.
And hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end,
by its command moves the art which is concerned with the
means: just as the art of sailing commands the art of ship-
building (Phys. ii.). Now good in general, which has the
nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently,
in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul
to their acts : for we make use of the other powers when we
will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is
included under the object of the will as some particular
good: and always the act or power to which the universal
end belongs, moves to their acts the acts or powers to which

122 QUESTION IX

belong the particular ends included in that universal end.
Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good —
i.e., the order of the whole army — by his command moves
one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.

On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the
act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in
natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat.
Now the first formal principle is universal being and truth,
which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this
kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its
object to it.

Reply Ohj. i. The passage quoted proves, not that the
intellect does not move, but that it does not move of
necessity.

Reply Ohj. 2. Just as the imagination of a form without
estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the
sensitive appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the
true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence
it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the prac-
tical intellect {De Anima iii.).

Reply Ohj. 3. The will moves the intellect as to the exer-
cise of its act; since even the true itself which is the per-
fection of the intellect, is included in the universal good,
as a particular good. But as to the determination of the
act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect
moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under
a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is
therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved
in the same respect.

Second Article.

whether the will is moved by the sensitive

appetite ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that the will cannot be moved by
the sensitive appetite. For to move and to act is more ex-
cellent than to he passive, as Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. xii.).

WHAT MOVES THE WILL 123

But the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will
which is the intellectual appetite; just as sense is less ex-
cellent than intellect. Therefore the sensitive appetite
does not move the will.

Obj. 2. Further, no particular power can produce a uni-
versal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular
power, because it follows the particular apprehension of
sense. Therefore it cannot cause the movement of the will,
which movement is universal, as following the universal
apprehension of the intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, as is proved in Phys. viii., the mover is
not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there
be reciprocal motion. But the will moves the sensitive
appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the
reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move
the will.

On the contrary, It is written (James i. 14) : Every man is
tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and
allured. But man would not be drawn away by his con-
cupiscence, unless his will were moved by the sensitive
appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the
sensitive appetite moves the will.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. i), that which is appre-
hended as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object.
Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, happens
from two causes : namely, from the condition, either of the
thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. But
fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on
both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as
it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways,
as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philoso-
pher says {Ethic, iii.) : According as a man is, such does the
end seem to him.

Now it is evident that according to the sensitive appetite
man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore accord-
ing as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him
fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected :
thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does

124 QUESTION IX

not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the sensi-
tive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.

Reply Ohj. i. Nothing hinders that which is better simply
and in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect.
Accordingly the will is simply more excellent than the
sensitive appetite: but in respect of the man in whom a
passion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that
passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.

Reply Ohj. 2. Men's acts and choices are in reference to
singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive
appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in
disposing man so that something seems to him such or other-
wise, in particular cases.

Reply Ohj. 3. As the Philosopher says {Polit. i.), the reason,
in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the
irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, hy a despotic
sovereignty, as a slave is moved by his master, but by a royal
and politic sovereignty, as free men are ruled by their gover-
nor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands.
Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to
the will : and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being
moved by them at times.

Third Article,
whether the will moves itself ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the will does not move itself.
For every mover, as such, is in act : whereas what is moved,
is in potentiality ; since movement is the act of that which is in
potentiality, as such (Aristotle, — -Phys. iii.). Now the same
is not in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same.
Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the
will move itself.

Ohj. 2. Further, the movable is moved on the mover being
present. But the will is always present to itself. If, there-
fore, it moved itself, it would always be moving itself: which
is clearly false.

WHAT MOVES THE WILL 125

Obj. 3. Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as
stated above (A. i). If, therefore, the will move itself, it
would follow that the same thing is at once moved imme-
diately by two movers; which seems unreasonable. There-
fore the will does not move itself.

On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to
it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be
so, had it not the power to move itself to will. Therefore it
moves itself.

I answer that, As stated above (A. i), it belongs to the will
to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the
will's object. Now, as stated above (Q. VIIL, A. 2), the
end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things
intelligible. But it is evident that the intellect, through
its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from poten-
tiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and
thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through
its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.

Reply Obj. i. It is not in respect of the same that the will
moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and
in potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it
actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to
act, in respect of the means; so as, in a word, to will them
actually.

Reply Obj. 2. The power of the will is always actually
present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills
an end, is not always in the will. And to this purpose it
moves itself. Accordingly it does not follow that it is
always moving itself.

Reply Obj. 3. The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise
than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of
the object: whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise
of its act, in respect of the end.

126 QUESTION IX

Fourth Article.

whether the will is moved by an exterior

principle ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the will is not moved by any-
thing exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary.
But it is essential to the voluntary act that it be from an
intrinsic principle, just as it is essential to the natural act.
Therefore the movement of the will is not from anything
exterior.

Ohj. 2. Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was
shown above (Q. VI., A. 4). But the violent act is one the
principle of which is outside the agent (Aristotle, — Ethic, iii.).
Therefore the will cannot be moved by anything exterior.

Ohj. 3. Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one
mover, needs not to be moved by another. But the will
moves itself sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by any
thing exterior.

On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as stated
above (A. i). But the object of the will can be something
exterior, offered to the sense. Therefore the will can be
moved by something exterior.

/ answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it
is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But
in so far as it is moved in the exercise of its act, we must
again hold it to be moved by some exterior principle.

For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and
at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved
by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will
something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore
it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it.
And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above (A. 3), in so far
as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of
willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid
of counsel : for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to
reflect how this can be attained, and through this reflexion

WHAT MOVES THE WILL 127

he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a
physician: and this he wills. But since he did not always
actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have
begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed.
And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity
have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous
volition. But this process could not go on to infinity.
Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will
advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation
of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter
of the Eudemian Ethics. (vii. 14).

Reply Ohj. i. It is essential to the voluntary act that its
principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that
this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by
another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an in-
ward proximate principle, nevertheless its first principle
is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the
natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which
moves nature.

Reply Ohj. 2. For an act to be violent it is not enough
that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add without
the concurrence of him that suffers violence. This does not
happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle : for
it is the will that wills, though moved by another. But this
movement would be violent, if it were counter to the move-
ment of the will: which in the present case is impossible;
since then the will would will and not will the same thing.

Reply Ohj. 3. The will moves itself sufficiently in one
respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate
agent ; but it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have
shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved by another as
first mover.

Fifth Article.

whether the will is moved by a heavenly body ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Ohjection i. It seems that the human will is moved by a
heavenly body. For all various and multiform movements

128 QUESTION IX

are reduced, as to their cause, to a uniform movement which
is that of the heavens, as is proved in Phys. viii. But human
movements are various and multiform, since they begin to
be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are
reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens,
which is uniform according to its nature.

Ohj. 2. Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii.)
the lower bodies are moved by the higher. But the movements
of the human body, which are caused by the will, could not
be reduced to the movement of the heavens, as to their
cause, unless the will too were moved by the heavens.
Therefore the heavens move the human will.

Obj. 3. Further, by observing the heavenly bodies
astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts,
which are caused by the will. But this would not be so, if
the heavenly bodies could not move man's will. Therefore
the human will is moved by a heavenly body.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii.) that
the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts. But they
would be, if the will, which is the principle of human acts,
were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is
not moved by the heavenly bodies.

I answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by
the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its
object: that is to say, in so far as exterior bodies, which
move the will, through being offered to the senses, and also
the organs themselves of the sensitive powers, are subject
to the movements of the heavenly bodies.

But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an
influence on the human will, in the same way as some exterior
agent moves the will, as to the exercise of its act. — But
this is impossible. For the will, as stated in De Anima iii.,
is in the reason. Now the reason is a power of the soul, not
bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows that the will
is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is
evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but
rather the reverse: because things incorporeal and imma-
terial have a power more formal and more universal than

WHAT MOVES THE WILL 129

any corporeal things whatever. Therefore it is impossible
for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or the
will. — For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii.) ascribed to
those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the
theory that such is the will of men, as is the day which the
father of men and of gods brings on* (referring to Jupiter,
by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all
the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs,
can be moved accidentally, by the heavenly bodies — i.e.,
through those bodies being moved, whose acts they are.

But since it has been stated (A. 2) that the intellectual
appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite,
the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect
bearing on the will ; in so far as the will happens to be moved
by the passions of the sensitive appetite.

Reply Ohj. i. The multiform movements of the human will
are reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above
the intellect and will. This can be said, not of any body,
but of some superior immaterial substance. Therefore there
is no need for the movement of the will to be referred to the
movement of the heavens, as to its cause.

Reply Ohj. 2. The movements of the human body are
reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly
body; in so far as the disposition suitable to a particular
movement, is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly
bodies; — also, in so far as the sensitive appetite is stirred
by the influence of heavenly bodies; — and again, in so far
as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the move-
ment of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins
to will or not to will something ; for instance, when the body
is chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this
movement of the will is on the part of the object offered
from without : not on the part of an inward instigation.

Reply Ohj. 3. As stated above (C/. P. I., Q. LXXXIV.,
AA. 6, 7) the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ.
Wherefore there is no reason why man should not be prone
to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason

* Odyssey xviii. 135.

IT. I 9

130 QUESTION IX

of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his
natural complexion. For the majority of men are led by
the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently,
in the majority of cases predictions about human acts,
gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies, are ful-
filled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says {Centiloquium v.),
the wise man governs the stars : which is as though to say
that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is
free and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens,
to suchlike effects of the heavenly bodies.

Or, as Augustine says [Gen. ad lit. ii.) : We must confess that
when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some
most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject
without knowing it. And since this is done in order to deceive
man, it must be the work of the lying spirits.

Sixth Article.

whether the will is moved by god alone, as exterior

principle ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the will is not moved by God
alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that the
inferior be moved by its superior : thus the lower bodies are
moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is something
which is higher than the will of man and below God, namely,
the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel
also, as exterior principle.

Obj. 2. Further, the act of the will follows the act of the
intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God
alone, but also by the angel who enlightens it. For the
same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an angel.

Obj. 3. Further, God is not cause of other than good things,
according to Gen. i. 31: God saw all the things that He had
made, and they were very good. If, therefore, man's will were
moved by God alone, it would never be moved to evil : and
yet it is the will whereby we sin and whereby we do right, as
Augustine says (Retract, i.).

WHAT MOVES THE WILL 131

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. ii. 13) : It is God Who
worketh in us (Vulg., — you) both to will and to accomplish.

I answer that, The movement of the will is from within,
as also is the movement of nature. Now although it is
possible for something to move a natural thing, without being
the cause of the thing moved, yet that alone, which is in
some way the cause of a thing's nature, can cause a natural
movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards
by a man, who is not the cause of the stone's nature; but
the natural movement of the stone is caused by no other
than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in
Phys. viii., that the generator moves locally heavy and light
things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes
moved by something that is not his cause; but that his
voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is
not the cause of his will, is impossible.

Now the cause of the will can be none other than God.
And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will
is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone,
by creation, as was stated in the First Part (Q. XC, A. 2). —
Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained
to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the
cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal
good : while every other good is good by participation,
and is some particular good ; and a particular cause does not
give a universal inclination. Hence neither can primary
matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by
some particular agent.

Reply Ohj. i. An angel is not above man in such a way as
to be the cause of his will; as the heavenly bodies are the
causes of natural forms, from which result the natural move-
ments of natural bodies.

Reply Ohj. 2. Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the
part of the object, which by the power of the angelic light,
is proposed to man's knowledge. And in this way the will
also can be moved by a creature from without, as stated
above (A. 4).

Reply Ohj. 3. God moves man's will, as the Universal

132 QUESTION IX

Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good.
And without this universal motion, man cannot will any-
thing. But man determines himself by his reason, to will
this or that, which is true or apparent good. — Nevertheless,
sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of some-
thing determinate, which is good; as in the case of those
whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on
(Q. CIX., A. 2).

QUESTION X.

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the manner in which the will is
moved. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally ?

(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object ?

(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite ?

(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover
which is God ?

First Article,
whether the will is moved to anything naturally?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the will is not moved to any-
thing naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with
the voluntary agent, as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii.
Therefore the will is not moved to anything naturally.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is natural is in a thing always:
as being hot is in fire. But no movement is always in the
will. Therefore no movement is natural to the will.

Obj. 3. Further, nature is determinate to one thing:
whereas the will is referred to opposites. Therefore the will
wills nothing naturally.

On the contrary, The movement of the will follows the
movement of the intellect. But the intellect understands
some things naturally. Therefore the will, too, wills some
things naturally.

/ answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabiis Nat.) and the
Philosopher also {Metaph. v.) the word nature is used in a

133

134 QUESTION X

manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic
principle in movable things. In this sense nature is either
matter or the material form, as stated in Phys. ii. — In
another sense nature stands for any substance, or even for
any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to
a thing which befits it in respect of its substance. And this
is that which of itself is in a thing. Now all things that do
not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are,
are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing,
as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this
sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs
to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard
to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge
are naturally known. In like manner the principle of
voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.

Now this is good in general, to which the will tends
naturally, as does each power to its object; and again it is
the last end, which stands in the same relation to things
appetible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things
intelligible: and, speaking generally, it is all those things
which belong to the wilier according to his nature. For
it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will
desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to
the entire man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only
the object of the will, but also other things that are appro-
priate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth,
which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other
like things which regard the natural well-being ; all of which are
included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.

Reply Ohj. i. The will is distinct from nature as one kind
of cause is from another; for some things happen naturally
and some are done voluntarily. There is, however, another
manner of causing that is proper to the will, which is
mistress of its act, besides the manner proper to nature,
which is determinate to one thing. But since the will is
founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement
proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just
as what belongs to a previous cause is shared by a subsequent

HOW THE WILL IS MOVED 135

cause. Because in every thing, being itself which is from
nature, precedes voHtion, which is from the will. And
hence it is that the will wills something naturally.

Reply Ohj. 2. In the case of natural things, that which is
natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them
actually, as heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a
result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes
only in potentiality : because form is act, whereas matter is
potentiality. Now movement is the act of that which is in
potentiality (Aristotle, Phys. iii). Wherefore that which
belongs to, or results from, movement, in regard to natural
things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always
move upwards, but only when it is outside its own place.*
And in like manner it is not necessary that the will (which
is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something),
should always be in the act of volition ; but only when it is
in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which
is pure act, is always in the act of volition.

Reply Ohj. 3. To every nature there is one thing corre-
sponding, proportionate, however, to that nature. For to
nature considered as a genus, there corresponds something
one generically; and to nature as species there corresponds
something one specifically ; and to the individualized nature
there corresponds some one individual. Since, therefore,
the will is an immaterial power, like the intellect, some one
general thing corresponds to it, which is the good; just as to
the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which
is the true, or being, or what a thing is. And under good in
general are included many particular goods, to none of which
is the will determined.

* The Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the
fiery heaven, i.e., the Empyrean.

136 . QUESTION X

Second Article,
whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its

OBJECT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the will is moved, of necessity,
by its object. For the object of the will is compared to the
will as mover to movable, as stated in De Anima iii. But a
mover, if it be sufficient, moves the movable of necessity.
Therefore the will can be moved of necessity by its object.

Ohj. 2. Further, just as the will is an immaterial power,
so is the intellect: and both powers are ordained to a uni-
versal object, as stated above (A. i ^^ 3). But the intellect
is moved, of necessity, by its object: therefore the will also,
by its object.

Ohj. 3. Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or
something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an
end necessarily : because it is like the principle in speculative
matters, to which principle one assents of necessity. Now
the end is the reason for willing the means ; and so it seems
that we will the means also necessarily. Therefore the will
is moved of necessity by its object.

On the contrary, The rational powers, according to the
Philosopher {Metaph. viii.) are directed to opposites. But
the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, as stated
in De Anima iii. Therefore the will is directed to opposites.
Therefore it is not moved, of necessity, to either of the
opposites.

I answer that, The will is moved in two ways : first, as to the
exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act,
derived from the object. As to the iirst way, no object
moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be,
it is in man's power not to think of it, and consequently
not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of
motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by
another not. For in the movement of a power by its object,
we must consider under what aspect the object moves the

HOW THE WILL IS MOVED 137

power. For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of
colour actually visible. Wherefore if colour be offered to
the sight, it moves the sight necessarily : unless one turns
one's eyes away ; which belongs to the exercise of the act.
But if the sight were confronted with something not in all
respects coloured actually, but only so in some respects,
and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity
see such an object : for it might look at that part of the object
which is not actually coloured, and thus it would not see it.
Now just as the actually coloured is the object of sight, so
is good the obj ec t of the will . Wherefore if the will be offered
an object which is good universally and from every point
of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything
at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other
hand, the will is offered an object, that is not good from
every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. —
And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, conse-
quently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in
nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not- will it : and
this is Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods,
in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as
non-goods : and from this point of view, they can be set aside
or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same
thing from various points of view.

Reply Obj. i. The sufficient mover of a power is none but
that object that in every respect presents the aspect of the
mover of that power. If, on the other hand, it is lacking
in any respect, it will not move of necessity, as stated
above.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an
object, which is such as to be always and necessarily true:
but not by that which may be either true or false — viz., by
that which is contingent: as we have said of the good.

Reply Obj. 3. The last end moves the will necessarily,
because it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is
ordained to that end, and without which the end cannot be
attained, such as to be and to live, and the like. But other
things without which the end can be gained, are not neces-

138 QUESTION X

sarily willed by one who wills the end : just as he who assents
to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the conclu-
sions, without which the principles can still be true.

Third Article.

whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the

lower appetite ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the will is moved of necessity
by a passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says
(Rom. vii. 19) : The good which I will I do not ; hut the evil
which I will not, that I do : and this is said by reason of con-
cupiscence, which is a passion. Therefore the will is moved
of necessity by a passion.

Ohj. 2. Further, as stated in Ethic iii., according as a man
is, such does the end seem to him. But it is not in man's
power to cast aside a passion at once. Therefore it is not
in man's power not to will that to which the passion inclines
him.

Obj. 3. Further, a universal cause is not applied to a
particular effect, except by means of a particular cause:
wherefore the universal reason does not move save by means
of a particular estimation, as stated in De Anima iii. But
as the universal reason is to the particular estimation, so is
the will to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the will is not
moved to will something particular, except through the
sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive appetite
happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion,
the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense.

On the contrary. It is written (Gen. iv. 7) : Thy lust
(Vulg., — The lust thereof) shall be under thee, and thou shall
have dominion over it. Therefore man's will is not moved
of necessity by the lower appetite.

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. IX., A. 2), the passion
of the sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will
is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through
being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges

HOW THE WILL IS MOVED 139

something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge
thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence of a
passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his
reason is wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason :
as happens in those who through a violent access of anger
or concupiscence become furious or insane, just as they
may from some other bodily disorder ; since suchlike passions
do not take place without some change in the body. And
of such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which
follow, of necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in
them there is neither movement of reason, nor, consequently,
of will.

Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed
by the passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to
a certain extent, its freedom: and thus the movement of
the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly in so far
as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion,
the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend, of
necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it. Conse-
quently, either there is no movement of the will in that man,
and the passion alone holds its sway : or if there be a move-
ment of the will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.

Reply Ohj. i. Although the will cannot prevent the
movement of concupiscence from arising, of which the
Apostle says: The evil which I will not, that I do — i.e., I
desire ; yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire,
or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus it does not
necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.

Reply Ohj. 2. Since there is in man a twofold nature,
intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such
uniformly in respect of his whole soul: either because the
sensitive part is wholly subject to his reason, as in the
virtuous; or because reason is entirely engrossed by passion,
as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason is clouded
by passion, yet something of the reason remains free. And
in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely,
or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by
the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously

140 QUESTION X

disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing
appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than it
does according to a passion.

Reply Ohj. 3. The will is moved not only by the universal
good apprehended by the reason, but also by good appre-
hended by sense. Wherefore he can be moved to some
particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive
appetite. For we will and do many things without passion,
and through choice alone; as is most evident in those cases
wherein reason resists passion.

Fourth Article.

whether the will is moved of necessity by the
exterior mover which is god ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the will is moved of necessity
by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves
of necessity. But God cannot be resisted, because His
power is infinite; wherefore it is written (Rom. ix. 19) : Who
resisteth His will ?- Therefore God moves the will of neces-
sity.

Obj. 2. Further, the will is moved of necessity to what-
ever it wills naturally, as stated above (A. 2 ad 3). But
whatever God does in a thing is natural to it, as Augustine
says {Contra Faust, xxvi). Therefore the will wills of
necessity everything to which God moves it.

Obj. 3. Further, A thing is possible, if nothing impossible
follows from its being supposed. But something impossible
follows from the supposition that the will does not will that
to which God moves it : because in that case God's operation
would be ineffectual. Therefore it is not possible for the
will not to will that to which God moves it. Therefore it
wills it of necessity.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xv. 14) : God made
man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own
counsel. Therefore He does not of necessity move man's
will.

HOW THE WILL IS MOVED 141

/ answer that, As Dionysius says {Div. Nom. iv.) it belongs
to Divine providence, not to destroy hut to preserve the nature
of things. Wherefore it moves all things in accordance
with their conditions ; so that from necessary causes, through
the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from
contingent causes, effects follow contingently. Since, there-
fore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to one
thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things,
God so moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity
to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not
necessary, except in those things to which it is moved
naturally.

Reply Ohj, i. The Divine will extends not only to the doing
of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its
being done in a way which is fitting to the nature of that
thing. And therefore it would be more repugnant to the
Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which
is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be moved freely,
which is becoming to its nature.

Reply Ohj. 2. That is natural to a thing, which God so
works in it that it may be natural to it : for thus is something
becoming to a thing, according as God wishes it to be be-
coming. Now He does not wish that whatever He works
in things should be natural to them, for instance, that the
dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be natural
to each thing, — that it be subject to the Divine power.

Reply Ohj. 3. If God moves the will to anything, it is in-
compossible with this supposition, that the will be not
moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply. Conse-
quently it does not follow that the will is moved by God
necessarily.

QUESTION XL

OF ENJOYMENT,* WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there
are four points of inquiry : (i) Whether to enjoy is an act of
the appetitive power ? (2) Whether it belongs to the
rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals ?
(3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end ? (4) Whether
it is only of the end possessed ?

First Article,
whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that to enjoy belongs not only to
the appetitive power. For to enjoy seems nothing else
than to receive the fruit. But it is the intellect, in whose
act Happiness consists, as shown above (Q. III., A. 4), that
receives the fruit of human life, which is Happiness. There-
fore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, but of the
intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, each power has its proper end, which is
its perfection : thus the end of sight is to know the visible ;
of the hearing, to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the
end of a thing is its fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to
each power, and not only to the appetite.

Obj. 3. Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight.
But sensible delight belongs to sense, which delights in its
object: and for the same reason, intellectual delight

* Or, Fruition.
142

ENJOYMENT OR FRUITION 143

belongs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive
power.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Doctr. Christ, iv. and
De Trin. x.) : To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for
its own sake. But love belongs to the appetitive power.
Therefore also to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power.

I answer that, Fruitio (enjoyment) and fructus (fruit) seem
to refer to the same, one being derived from the other;
which from which, matters not for our purpose; though it
seems probable that the one which is more clearly known,
was first named. Now those things are most manifest to
us which appeal most to the senses : wherefore it seems that
the word ' fruition ' is derived from sensible fruits. But
sensible fruit is that which we expect the tree to produce
in the last place, and in which a certain sweetness is to be
perceived. Hence fruition seems to have relation to love,
or to the delight which one has in realizing the longed-for
term, which is the end. Now the end and the good is the
object of the appetitive power. Wherefore it is evident that
fruition is the act of the appetitive power.

Reply Ohj. i. Nothing hinders one and the same thing
from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers.
Accordingly the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the
intellect; but as a good and an end, is the object of the will.
And as such is the fruition thereof: so that the intellect
attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the
motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and
enjoying the end attained.

Reply Ohj. 2. The perfection and end of every other power
is contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the
proper is contained in the common, as stated above (Q. IX.,
A. i). Hence the perfection and end of each power, in so
far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Where-
fore the appetitive power moves the other powers to their
ends; and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches
the end.

Reply Ohj. 3. In delight there are two things: perception
of what is becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive

144 QUESTION XI

power; and complacency in that which is offered as becoming :
and this belongs to the appetitive power, in which power
delight is formally completed.

Second Article.

whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature
alone, or also to irrational animals ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that to enjoy belongs to men alone.
For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ, i.) that it is given to
us men to enjoy and to use. Therefore other animals cannot
enjoy.

Ohj. 2. Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But
irrational animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore
it is not for them to enjoy.

Ohj. 3. Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath
the intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath
the sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensi-
tive appetite, it seems that for the same reason it can belong
to the natural appetite. But this is evidently false, since
the latter cannot delight in anything. Therefore the sensi-
tive appetite cannot enjoy: and accordingly enjoyment is
not possible for irrational animals.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83): It is not so
absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any
bodily pleasure.

I answer that, As was stated above (A. i) to enjoy is
not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor,
but of the power that commands the achievement ; for it
has been said to belong to the appetitive power. Now
things void of reason have indeed a power of achieving an
end by way of execution, as that by which a heavy body
has a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an
upward tendency. Yet the power of command in respect
of the end is not in them, but in some higher nature, which
moves all nature by its command, just as in things endowed
with knowledge, the appetite moves the other powers to

ENJOYMENT OR FRUITION 145

their acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge,
although they attain an end, have no enjoyment of the end:
this is only for those that are endowed with knowledge.

Now knowledge of the end is twofold : perfect and imper-
fect. Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not
only is that known which is the end and the good, but also
the universal formality of the end and the good; and such
knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On the
other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end
and the good are known in the particular. Such know-
ledge is in irrational animals: whose appetitive powers do
not command with freedom, but are moved according to
a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend. Conse-
quently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature, in a
perfect degree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other
creatures, not at all.

Reply Obj. i. Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoy-
ment.

Reply Obj. 2. Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply ;
but of that which each one chooses for his last end.

Reply Obj. 3. The sensitive appetite follows some know-
ledge; not so the natural appetite, especially in things void
of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 4. Augustine is speaking there of imperfect
enjoyment. This is clear from his way of speaking: for he
says that it is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy,
that is, as it would be, if one were to say that they use.

Third Article,
whether enjoyment is only of the last end ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that enjoyment is not only of the
last end. For the Apostle says (Philem. 20) : Yea, brother,
may I enjoy thee in the Lord. But it is evident that Paul had
not placed his last end in a man. Therefore to enjoy is not
only of the last end.

Obj. 2. Further, What we enjoy is the fruit. But the

II. I 10

146 QUESTION XI

Apostle says (Gal. v. 22): The fruit of the Spirit is charity,
joy, peace, and other like things, which are not in the nature
of the last end. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the ]ast
end.

Ohj. 3. Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another;
for I will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act
of the will : since it is the will with which we enjoy, as Augustine
says {De Trin. x.). Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment.
But the last end of man is not enjoyment, but the uncreated
good alone, which is God. Therefore enjoyment is not only
of the last end.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x.) : A man does
not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else.
But the last end alone is that which man does not desire for
the sake of something else. Therefore enjoyment is of the
last end alone.

/ answer that. As stated above (A. i) the notion of fruit
implies two things: first that it should come last; second,
that it should calm the appetite with a certain sweetness and
delight. Now a thing is last either simply or relatively;
simply, if it be referred to nothing else; relatively, if it is the
last in a particular series. Therefore that which is last
simply, and in which one delights as in the last end, is pro-
perly called fruit; and this it is that one is properly said to
enjoy. — But that which is delightful not in itself, but is
desired, only as referred to something else, e.g., a bitter
potion for the sake of health, can nowise be called fruit. —
And that which has something delightful about it, to which
a number of preceding things are referred, may indeed be
called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot be said to
enjoy it properly or as though it answered perfectly to the
notion of fruit. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. x.) that
we enjoy what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein.
But its rest is not absolute save in the possession of the last
end : for as long as something is looked for, the movement of
the will remains in suspense, although it has reached some-
thing. Thus in local movement, although any point be-
tween the two terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not

ENJOYMENT OR FRUITION 147

considered as an actual end, except when the movement
stops there.

Reply Ohj. i. As Augustine says {De Doctr. Christ, i), if he
had said, ' May I enjoy thee,' without adding ' in the Lord,*
he would seem to have set the end of his love in him. But since
he added that he set his end in the Lord, he implied his desire to
enjoy Him : as if we were to say that he expressed his enjoy-
ment of his brother not as a term but as a means.

Reply Ohj. 2. Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore
it, and another to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed
that bore it, it is compared as effect to cause; to the one
enjoying it, as the final object of his longing and the con-
summation of his delight. Accordingly these fruits men-
tioned by the Apostle are so called because they are certain
effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore they are called
fruits of the Spirit : but not as though we are to enjoy them
as our last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they
are called fruits because we should desire them for their own
sake : not indeed as though they were not ordained to the
last end; but because they are such that we ought to find
pleasure in them.

Reply Ohj. 3. As stated above (Q. I., A. 8; Q. II., A. 7), we
speak of an end in a twofold sense : first, as being the thing
itself; secondly, as the attainment thereof. These are not,
of course, two ends, but one end, considered in itself, and in
its relation to something else. Accordingly God is the last
end, as that which is ultimately sought for: while the enjoy-
ment is as the attainment of this last end. And so, just as
God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God, anothei : so
it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and where-
by we enjoy our enjoyment of God. And the same applies
to created happiness which consists in enjoyment.

148 QUESTION XI

Fourth Article,
whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that enjoyment is only of the end
possessed. For Augustine says (De Trin. x.) that to enjoy is
to use joyfully, with the joy, not of hope, but of possession. But
so long as a thing is not had, there is joy, not of possession
but of hope. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end
possessed.

Obj. 2. Further, as stated above (A. 3), enjoyment is not
properly otherwise than of the last end : because this alone
gives rest to the appetite. But the appetite has no rest save
in the possession of the end. Therefore enjoyment, pro-
perly speaking, is only of the end possessed.

Obj. 3. Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But
one does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of
the end. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.

On the contrary, To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something
for its own sake, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ, i). But
this is possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our
possession. Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even
though it be not possessed.

/ answer that, To enjoy implies a certain relation of the
will to the last end, according as the will has something by
way of last end. Now an end is possessed in two ways;
perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly, when it is possessed
not only in intention but also in reality; imperfectly, when
it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment, there-
fore, is of the end alieady possessed: but imperfect enjoy-
ment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in
intention.

Reply Obj. i. Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.

Reply Obj. 2. The will is hindered in two ways from being
at rest. First on the part of the object; by reason of its not
being the last end, but ordained to something else : secondly
on the part of the one who desires the end, by reason of his

ENJOYMENT OR FRUITION 149

not being yet in possession of it. Now it is the object that
specifies an act: but on the agent depends the manner of
acting, so that the act be perfect or imperfect, as compared
with the actual circumstances of the agent. Therefore
enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment
properly speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoy-
ment. But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is
enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of
the imperfect way in which it is possessed.

Reply Ohj. 3. One is said to lay hold of or to have an end,
not only in reality, but also in intention, as stated above.

QUESTION XII.

OF INTENTION.

{In Five Articles.)

We must now consider Intention: concerning which there
are five points of inquiry: (i) Whether intention is an act of
the intellect or of the will ? (2) Whether it is only of the
last end ? (3) Whether one can intend two things at the
same time ? (4) Whether intention of the end is the same
act as volition of the means ? (5) Whether intention is
within the competency of irrational animals ?

First Article.

whether intention is an act of the intellect
or of the will ?

We proceed thus to the First A rticle : —

Objection i. It seems that intention is an act of the intellect,
and not of the will. For it is written (Matth. vi. 22) : // thy
eye he single, thy whole body shall he lightsome : where, accord-
ing to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii.) the eye
signifies intention. But since the eye is the organ of sight,
it signifies the apprehensive power. Therefore intention is
not an act of the appetitive but of the apprehensive power.

Ohj. 2. Further, Augustine says (ihid.) that Our Lord
spoke of intention as a light, when He said (Matth. vi. 23) : //
the light that is in thee he darkness, etc. But light pertains to
knowledge. Therefore intention does too.

Ohj. 3. Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to
an end. But to ordain is an act of reason. Therefore
intention belongs not to the will but to the reason.

150

INTENTION 151

Obj. 4. Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of
the means. But the act of the will in respect of the end is
called volition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is
choice, from which intention is distinct. Therefore it is not
an act of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xi.) that the
intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen ; and the
images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the
soul's inner thought. Therefore intention is an act of the will .

/ answer that, Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies,
to tend to something. Now both the action of the mover and
the movement of the thing moved, tend to something. But
that the movement of the thing moved tends to anything, is
due to the action of the mover. Consequently intention
belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end :
hence we say that an architect or anyone who is in authority,
by his command moves others to that which he intends.
Now the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end,
as shown above (Q. IX., A. i.). Wherefore it is evident that
intention, properly speaking, is an act of the will.

Reply Obj. i. The eye designates intention figuratively,
not because intention has reference to knowledge, but
because it presupposes knowledge, which proposes to the
will, the end to which the latter moves ; thus we foresee with
the eye whither we should tend with our bodies.

Reply Obj. 2. Intention is called a light because it is
manifest to him who intends. Wherefore works are called
darkness, because a man knows what he intends, but knows
not what the result may be, as Augustine expounds (loc.
cit.).

Reply Obj. 3. The will does not ordain, but tends to some-
thing according to the order of reason. Consequently this
word intention indicates an act of the will, presupposing the
act whereby the reason orders something to the end.

Reply Obj. 4. Intention is an act of the will in regard to the
end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end.
First, absolutely; and thus we have volition, whereby we
will absolutely to have health and so forth. Secondly, it

152 QUESTION XII

considers the end, as its place of rest; and thus enjoyment
regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the term
towards which something is ordained; and thus intention
regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have
health, we mean not only that we will to have it, but that
we will to have it by means of something else.

Second Article.
/ whether intention is only of the last end ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that intention is only of the last end.
For it is said in the book of Prosper 's Sentences : The intention
of the heart is a cry to God. But God is the last end of the
human heart. Therefore intention always regards the last end.

Ohj. 2. Further, intention regards the end as the terminus,
as stated above (A. i ad ^). But a terminus is something
last. Therefore intention always regards the last end.

Ohj. 3. Further, just as intention regards the end, so does
enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end.
Therefore intention is too.

On the contrary, There is but one last end of human wills,
viz., Happiness, as stated above (Q. I., A. 7). If, therefore,
intention were only of the last end, men would not have
different intentions: which is evidently false.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. i. ad ^), intention re-
gards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will.
Now a terminus of movement may be taken in two ways.
First, the very last terminus, when the movement comes to
a stop; this is the terminus of the whole movement.
Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one
part of the movement, and the end or terminus of the other.
Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last
terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the last. And
intention can be of both. Consequently though intention is
always of the end, it need not be always of the last end.

Reply Ohj. i. The intention of the heart is called a cry to
God, not that God is always the object of intention, but

INTENTION " 153

because He sees our intention. — -Or because, when we pray,
we direct our intention to God, which intention has the force
of a cry.

Reply Ohj. 2. A terminus is something last, not always in
respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.

Reply Ohj. 3. Enjoyment impHes rest in the end; and this
belongs to the last end alone. But intention implies move-
ment towards an end, not rest. Wherefore the comparison
proves nothing.

Third Article.

whether one can intend two things at
the same time ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that one cannot intend two things at
the same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte ii.) that man's intention cannot be directed at the
same time to God and to bodily benefits. Therefore, for
the same reason, neither to any other two things.

Obj. 2. Further, intention designates a movement of the
will towards a terminus. Now there cannot be several
termini in the same direction of one movement. Therefore
the will cannot intend several things at the same time.

Obj. 3. Further, intention presupposes an act of reason
or of the intellect. But it is not possible to understand several
things at the same time, according to the Philosopher {Topic.
ii.). Therefore neither is it possible to intend several things
at the same time.

On the contrary, Art imitates nature. Now nature intends
two purposes by means of one instrument : thus the tongue is
for the purpose of taste and speech {De Anima ii.). Therefore,
for the same reason, art or reason can at the same time direct
one thing to two ends: so that one can intend several ends
at the same time.

I answer that, The expression two things may be taken in
two ways: they may be ordained to one another or not so
ordained. And if they be ordained to one another, it is
evident, from what has been said, that a man can intend

154 QUESTION XII

many things at the same time. For intention is not only of
the last end, as stated above (A. 2), but also of an inter-
mediary end. Now a man intends at the same time, both
the proximate and the last end ; as the mixing of a medicine
and the giving of health.

But if we take two things that are not ordained to one
another, thus also a man can intend several things at the
same time. This is evident from the fact that a man prefers
one thing to another because it is the better of the two . Now
one of the reasons for which one thing is better than another
is that it is available for more purposes : wherefore one thing
can be chosen in preference to another, because of the greater
number of purposes for which it is available: so that evi-
dently a man can intend several things at the same time.

Reply Ohj. i. Augustine means to say that man cannot
at the same time direct his intention to God and to bodily
benefits, as to two last ends: since, as stated above (Q. L,
A. 5), one man cannot have several last ends.

Reply Ohj. 2. There can be several termini ordained to
one another, of the same movement and in the same direction ;
but not unless they be ordained to one another. At the same
time it must be observed that what is not one in reality may
be taken as one by the reason. Now intention is a move-
ment of the will to something already ordained by the
reason, as stated above (A. i. ad 3). Wherefore where we
have many things in reality, we may take them as one term
of intention, in so far as the reason takes them as one:
either because two things concur in the intergrity of one
whole, as a proper measure of heat and cold conduce to
health : or because two things are included in one which may
be intended. For instance, the acquiring of wine and clothing
is included in wealth, as in something common to both:
wherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to acquire
wealth, from intending both the others.

Reply Ohj. 3. As stated in the First Part (Q. XII., A. 10;
Q. LVIIL, A. 2; Q. LXXXV., A. 4), it is possible to under-^
stand several things at the same time, in so far as, in
some way, they are one.

INTENTION 155

Fourth Article.

whether intention of the end is the same act
as the volition of the means ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the intention of the end and the
vohtion of the means are not one and the same movement.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xi.) that the will to see the
window, has for its end the seeing of the window ; and is
another act from the will to see, through the window, the passer s-
hy. But that I should will to see the passers-by, through
the window, belongs to intention ; whereas that I will to see
the window, belongs to the voliton of the means. Therefore
intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct
movements of the will.

Ohj. 2. Further, acts are distinct according to their objects.
But the end and the means are distinct objects. Therefore
the intention of the end and the willing of the means are
distinct movements of the will.

Ohj. 3. Further, the willing of the means is called choice.
But choice and intention are not the same. Therefore
intention of the end and the willing of the means are not the
same movement of the will.

On the contrary, The means in relation to the end, are as the
mid-space to the terminus. Now it is all the same move-
ment that passes through the mid-space to the terminus, in
natural things. Therefore in things pertaining to the will,
the intention of the end is the same movement as the willing
of the means.

I answer that, The movement of the will to the end and to
the means can be considered in two ways. First, according
as the will is moved to each of the aforesaid absolutely and
in itself. And thus there are simply two movements of the
will to them. Secondly, it may be considered accordingly as
the will is moved to the means for the sake of the end : and
thus the movement of the will to the end and its movement
to the means are one and the same thing. For when I say :

156 ' QUESTION XII

I wish to take medicine for the sake of health, I signify no more
than one movement of my will. And this is because the
end is the formal object in willing the means. Now it is the
same act that lays hold of the formal object, and of the
formal reason of laying hold of it : thus it is the same act of
sight that perceives colour and light, as stated above
(Q. VIII., A. 3 ad 2). And the same applies to the intellect;
for if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely, it
considers each by a distinct act; but when it assents to the
conclusion on account of the principles, there is but one act
of the intellect.

Reply Ohj. i. Augustine is speaking of seeing the window
and of seeing, through the window, the passers-by, according
as the will is moved to either absolutely.

Reply Ohj. 2. The end, considered as a thing, and the means
to that end, are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as
the end is the formal object in willing the means, they are
the one and the same object.

Reply Ohj. 3. A movement which is one as to the subject,
may differ, according to our way of looking at it, as to its
beginning and end, as in the case of ascent and descent
(Physic, iii.). Accordingly, in so far as the movement of the
will is to the means, as ordained to the end, it is called
choice : but the movement of the will to the end as acquired
by the means, is called intention. A sign of this is that we
can have intention of the end without having determined
the means which are the object of choice.

Fifth Article.

whether intention is within the competency
of irrational animals ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Ohjection 1. It seems that irrational animals intend the
end. For in things void of reason nature stands further
apart from the rational nature, than does the sensitive
nature in irrational animals. But nature intends the end
even in things void of reason, as is proved in Phys. ii.

INTENTION 157

Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the
end.

Obj. 2. Further, just as intention is of the end, so is enjoy-
ment. But enjoyment is in irrational animals, as stated
above (Q. XL, A. 2). Therefore intention is too.

Obj. 3. Further, to intend an end belongs to one who acts
for an end; since to intend is nothing else than to tend to
something. But irrational animals act for an end; for an
animal is moved either to seek food, or to do something of
the kind. Therefore irrational animals intend an end.

On the contrary, Intention of an end implies ordaining
something to an end: which belongs to reason. Since
therefore irrational animals are void of reason, it seems that
they do not intend an end.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. i), to intend is to tend
to something; and this belongs to the mover and to the
moved. According, therefore, as that which is moved to an
end by another, is said to intend the end, thus nature is said
to intend an end, as being moved to its end by God, as the
arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irrational
animals intend an end, in as much as they are moved to
something by natural instinct. — The other way of intending
an end belongs to the mover; according as he ordains the
movement of something, either his own or another's, to an
end. This belongs to reason alone. Wherefore irrational
animals do not intend an end in this way, which is to intend
properly and principally, as stated above (A. i).

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes intention in the sense
of being moved to an end.

Reply Obj. 2. Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of
one thing to another, as intention does; but absolute repose
in the end.

Reply Obj. 3. Irrational animals are moved to an end, not
as though they thought that they can gain the end by this
movement; this belongs to one that intends; but through
desiring the end by natural instinct, they are moved to an
end, moved, as it were, by another, like other things that
are moved naturally.

QUESTION XIII.

OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH
REGARD TO THE MEANS.

{In Six Articles.)

We must now consider the acts of the will with regard to the
means. There are three of them : to choose, to consent, and
to use. And choice is preceded by counsel. First of all,
then, we must consider choice; secondly, counsel; thirdly,
consent; fourthly, use. *

Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry: (i) Of
what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason ? (2)
Whether choice is within the competency of irrational
animals ? (3) Whether choice is only of the means, or
sometimes also of the end ? (4) Whether choice is only of
things that we do ourselves ? (5) Whether choice is only of
possible things ? (6) Whether man chooses of necessity or
freely ?

First Article.

whether choice is an act of will or of reason ?

Objection i. It seems that choice is an act, not of will but
of reason. For choice implies comparison, whereby one is
given preference to another. But to compare is an act of
reason. Therefore choice is an act of reason.

Ohj. 2. Further, it is for the same to form a syllogism, as to
draw the conclusion. But, in practical matters, it is the
reason that forms syllogisms. Since therefore choice is a
kind of conclusion in practical matters, as stated in Ethic, vii.,
it seems that it is an act of reason.

Obj. 3. Further, ignorance does not belong to the will but
to the cognitive power. Now there is an ignorance of choice,

158

CHOICE 159

as is stated in Ethic, iii. Therefore it seems that choice does
not belong to the will but to the reason.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii.) that
choice is the desire of things in our own power. But desire
is an act of will. Therefore choice is too.

/ answer that, The word choice implies something belonging
to the reason or intellect, and something belonging to the
will : for the Philosopher says [Ethic, vi.) that choice is either
intellect influenced by appetite or appetite influenced by
intellect. Now whenever two things concur to make one,
one of them is formal in regard to the other. Hence Gregory
of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Horn, xxxiii.) says that choice
is neither desire only, nor counsel only, but a combination of
the two. For just as we say that an animal is composed of soul
and body, and that it is neither a mere body, nor a mere soul,
but both ; so is it with choice.

Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that
an act belonging essentially to some power or habit, receives
a form or species from a higher power or habit, according as
an inferior is ordained by a superior: for if a man were to
perform an act of fortitude for the love of God, that act is
materially an act of fortitude, but formally, an act of charity.
Now it is evident that, in a sense, reason precedes the will
and ordains its act: in so far as the will tends to its object,
according to the order of reason, since the apprehensive
power presents the object to the appetite. Accordingly,
that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it
as being good, through being ordained to the end by the
reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act
of the reason. Now in suchlike matters the substance of the
act is as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by
the higher power. Wherefore choice is substantially not an
act of the reason but of the will: for choice is accomplished
in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which
is chosen. Consequently it is evidently an act of the
appetitive power.

Reply Ob], i. Choice implies a previous comparison; not
as though it consisted in the comparison itself.

i6o QUESTION XIII

Reply Ohj. 2. It is quite true that it is for the reason to
draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism ; and it is called
a decision or judgment, to be followed by choice. And for
this reason the conclusion seems to belong to the act of
choice, as to that which results from it.

Reply Ohj. 3. In speaking of ignorance of choice, we do not
mean that choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is
ignorance of what ought to be chosen.

Second Article.

whether choice is within the competency
of irrational animals ?

Objection i. It seems that irrational animals are competent
to choose. For choice is the desire of certain things on
account of an end, as stated in Ethic, iii. But irrational
animals desire something on account of an end : since they
act for an end, and from desire. Therefore choice is in
irrational animals.

Ohj. 2. Further, the very word electio (choice) seems to
signify the taking of something in preference to others.
But irrational animals take something in preference to
others : thus we can easily see for ourselves that a sheep will
eat one grass and refuse another. Therefore choice is in
irrational animals.

Ohj. 3. Further, according to Ethic, vi., it is from prudence
that a man makes a good choice of means. But prudence is
within the competency of irrational animals: hence it is
said in the beginning of Metaph. that those animals which,
like hees, cannot hear sounds, are prudent hy instinct. We see
this plainly, in wonderful cases of sagacity manifested in the
works of various animals, such as bees, spiders, and dogs.
For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a cross road,
tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or the
second road : and if he find that the stag has not passed there,
being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying
the scent ; as though he were reasoning by way of exclusion,
arguing that the stag must have passed by this way, since

CHOICE i6i

he did not pass by the others, and there is no other road.
Therefore it seems that irrational animals are competent to
choose.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, — De Nat,
Horn, xxxiii.) says that children and irrational animals act
willingly hut not from choice. Therefore choice is not in
irrational animals.

/ answer that, Since choice is the taking of one thing in
preference to another, it must of necessity be in respect of
several things that can be chosen. Consequently in those
things which are altogether determinate to one there is no
place for choice. Now the difference between the sensitive
appetite and the will is that, as stated above (Q. I. A. 2 ad '^),
the sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing,
according to the order of nature; whereas the will, although
determinate to one thing in general, viz., the good, according
to the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in
respect of particular goods. Consequently choice belongs
properly to the will, and not to the sensitive appetite which
is all that irrational animals have. Wherefore irrational
animals are not competent to choose.

Reply Obj. i. Not every desire of one thing on account of
an end is called choice: there must be a certain discrimina-
tion of one thing from another. And this cannot be except
when the appetite can be moved to several things.

Reply Obj. 2. An irrational animal takes one thing in
preference to another, because its appetite is naturally
determinate to that thing. Wherefore as soon as an animal,
whether by its sense or by its imagination, is offered some-
thing to which its appetite is naturally inclined, it is moved
to that alone, without making any choice. Just as fire is
moved upwards and not downwards, without its making any
choice.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated in Phys. iii. movement is the act of
the movable, caused by a mover. Wherefore the power of the
mover appears in the movement of that which it moves.
Accordingly, in all things moved by reason, the order of
reason which moves them is evident, although the things

II. I II

i62 QUESTION XIII

themselves are void of reason : for an arrow through the
motion of the archer goes straight towards the target, as
though it were endowed with reason to direct its course.
The same may be seen in the movements of clocks and all
engines put together by the art of man. Now as artificial
things are in comparison to human art, so are all natural
things in comparison to the Divine art. And accordingly
order is to be seen in things moved by nature, just as in
things moved by reason, as is stated in Phys. ii. And thus
it is that in the works of irrational animals we notice certain
marks of sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination
to set about their actions in a most orderly manner, through
being ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too,
certain animals are called prudent or sagacious; and not
because they reason or exercise any choice about things.
This is clear from the fact that all that share in one nature,
invariably act in the same way.

Third Article.

whether choice is only of the means, or sometimes

also of the end ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that choice is not only of the means.
For the Philosopher says {Ethic, vi.) that virtue makes us
choose aright ; hut it is not the part of virtue, hut of some other
power to direct aright those things which are to he done for its
sake. But that for the sake of which something is done is
the end. Therefore choice is of the end.

Ohj. 2. Further, choice implies preference of one thing to
another. But just as there can be preference of means, so
can there be preference of ends. Therefore choice can be
of ends, just as it can be of means.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii.) that
volition is of the end, hut choice, of the means.

I answer that, As already stated (A. i ad 2), choice results
from the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the con-
clusion of a practical syllogism. Hence that which is the

CHOICE 163

conclusion of a practical syllogism, is the matter of choice.
Now in practical things the end stands in the position of a
principle, not of a conclusion, as the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii.). Wherefore the end, as such, is not a matter of
choice.

But just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the
principle of one demonstration or of one science, from being
the conclusion of another demonstration or science; while
the first indemonstrable principle cannot be the conclusion
of any demonstration or science; so too that which is the end
in one operation, may be ordained to something as an end.
And in this way it is a matter of choice. Thus in the work
of a physician, health is the end : wherefore it is not a matter
of choice for a physician, but a matter of principle. Now
the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul,
consequently with one who has charge of the soul's health,
health or sickness may be a matter of choice ; for the Apostle
says (2 Cor. xii. 10) : For when I am weak, then am I powerful.
But the last end is nowise a matter of choice.

Reply Ohj. i. The proper ends of virtues are ordained to
Happiness as to their last end. And thus it is that they can
be a matter of choice.

Reply Ohj. 2. As stated above (Q. I., A. 5), there is but
one last end. Accordingly wherever there are several ends,
they can be the subject of choice, in so far as they are
ordained to a further end.

Fourth Article,
whether choice is of those things only that are done

BY US ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that choice is not only in respect of
human acts. For choice regards the means. Now, not only
acts, but also the organs, are means (Phys. ii.). Therefore
choice is not only concerned with human acts.

Ohj. 2. Further, action is distinct from contemplation.
But choice has a place even in contemplation; in so far as

i64 QUESTION XIII

one opinion is preferred to another. Therefore choice is not
concerned with human acts alone.

Obj. 3. Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether
secular or ecclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in
their regard. Therefore choice is not concerned with human
acts alone.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii.) that no
man chooses save what he thinks he can do himself.

I answer that, Just as intention regards the end, so does
choice regard the means. Now the end is either an action
or a thing. And when the end is a thing, some human
action must intervene; either in so far as man produces the
thing which is the end, as the physician produces health
(wherefore the production of health is said to be the end of
the physician) ; or in so far as man, in some fashion, uses or
enjoys the thing which is the end; thus for the miser, money
or the possession of money is the end. The same is to be
said of the means. But the means must needs be, either an
action or a thing, through some action intervening, whereby
man either makes the thing which is the means, or puts it to
some use. And thus it is that choice is always in regard to
human acts.

Reply Obj. 1. The organs are ordained to the end, inas-
much as man makes use of them for the sake of the end.

Reply Obj. 2. In contemplation itself there is the act of
the intellect assenting to this or that opinion. It is exterior
action that is put in contradistinction to contemplation.

Reply Obj. 3'. When a man chooses someone for a bishopric
or some high position in the state, he chooses to name that
man to that post. Else, if he had no right to act in the
appointment of the bishop or official, he would have no right
to choose. Likewise, whenever we speak of one thing being
chosen in preference to another, it is in conjunction with
some action of the chooser.

CHOICE 165

Fifth Article,
whether choice is only of possible things ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that choice is not only of possible
things. For choice is an act of the will, as stated above
(A. i). Now there is a willing of impossibilities (Ethic, iii.).
Therefore there is also a choice of impossibilities.

Obj. 2. Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated
above (A. 4.) Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of
choosing is concerned, whether one choose that which is
impossible in itself, or that which is impossible to the
chooser. Now it often happens that we are unable to accom-
plish what we choose; so that this proves to be impossible
to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible.

Obj. 3. Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it.
But the blessed Benedict says {Regula Ixviii.) that if the
superior command what is impossible, it should be attempted.
Therefore choice can be of the impossible.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii.) that
there is no choice of impossibilities.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 4), our choice is always
concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us,
is possible to us. Therefore we must needs say that choice
is only of possible things.

Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it con-
duces to an end. But what is impossible cannot conduce
to an end. A sign of this is that when men in taking counsel
together come to something that is impossible to them,
they depart, as being unable to proceed with the business.

Again, this is evident if we examine the process of the
reason that precedes. For the means, which are the object
of choice, are to the end, as the conclusion is to the principle.
Now it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not follow
from a possible principle. Wherefore an end cannot be
possible, unless the means be possible. Now no one is
moved to the impossible. Consequently no one would tend

i66 QUESTION XIII

to the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be
possible. Therefore the impossible is not the object of
choice.

Reply Ohj. i. The will stands between the intellect and
the external action: for the intellect proposes to the will its
object, and the will causes the external action. Hence the
principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the
intellect, which apprehends something under the universal
notion of good: but the term or perfection of the will's act
is to be observed in its relation to the action whereby a man
tends to the attainment of a thing ; for the movement of the
will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently the perfect
act of the will is in respect of something that is good for
one to do. Now this cannot be something impossible.
Wherefore the complete act of the will is only in respect of
what is possible and good for him that wills. But the in-
complete act of the will is in respect of the impossible; and
by some is called velleity, because, to wit, one would will
(vellet) such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an act
of the will, fixed on something to be done by the chooser-
And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is
possible.

Reply Ohj. 2. Since the object of the will is the appre-
hended good, we must judge of the object of the will accord-
ing as it is apprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will
tends to something which is apprehended as good, and yet
is not really good; so is choice sometimes made of something
apprehended as possible to the chooser, and yet impossible
to him.

Reply Ohj. 3. The reason for this is that the subject should
not rely on his own judgment to decide whether a certain
thing is possible; but in each case should stand by his
superior's judgment.

CHOICE ^ 167

Sixth Article,
whether man chooses of necessity or freely ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that man chooses of necessity. For
the end stands in relation to the object of choice, as the
principle to that which follows from the principles, as de-
clared in Ethic, vii. But conclusions follow of necessity
from their principles. Therefore man is moved of necessity
from (willing) the end to the choice (of the means).

Ohj. 2. Further, as stated above (A. i ad 2), choice follows
the reason's judgment of what is to be done. But reason
judges of necessity about some things: on account of the
necessity of the premisses. Therefore it seems that choice
also follows of necessity.

Ohj. 3. Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man
is not moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry
man, as Plato says (cf. De Ccelo ii.), be confronted on either
side with two portions of food equally appetizing and at an
equal distance, he is not moved towards one more than to
the other; and he finds the reason of this in the immobility
of the earth in the middle of the world. Now much less
can that be chosen which is less (eligible) than that which is
equally so. Therefore if two or more things are available,
of which one appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible
to choose any of the others. Therefore that which appears
to hold the first place is chosen of necessity. But every act
of choosing is in regard to something that seems in some way
better. Therefore every choice is made necessarily.

On the contrary, Choice is an act of a rational power; which
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii.) stands in rela-
tion to opposites.

I answer that, Man does not choose of necessity. And
this is because that which is possible not to be, is not of
necessity. Now the reason why it is possible not to choose,
or to choose, may be gathered from a twofold power in man.
For man can will and not will, act and not act; again, he can

i68 QUESTION XIII

will this or that, and do this or that. The reason of this
is seated in the very power of the reason. For the will can
tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good. Now
the reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz., to will
or to act, but also this, viz., not to will or not to act. Again,
in all particular goods, the reason can consider an aspect of
some good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect
of evil: and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one
of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided. The per-
fect good alone, which is Happiness, cannot be apprehended
by the reason as an evil, or as lacking in any way. Conse-
quently man wills Happiness of necessity, nor can he will
not to be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not
of the end, but of the means, as stated above (A. 3) ; it is not
of the perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other par-
ticular goods. Therefore man chooses not of necessity, but
freely.

Reply Obj. i. The conclusion does not always of necessity
follow from the principles, but only when the principles
cannot be true if the conclusion is not true. In Hke manner,
the end does not always necessitate in man the choosing of
the means, because the means are not always such that the
end cannot be gained without them; or, if they be such, they
are not always considered in that light.

Reply Obj. 2. The reason's decision or judgment of what
is to be done is about things that are contingent and possible
to us. In such matters the conclusions do not follow of
necessity from principles that are absolutely necessary, but
from such as are so conditionally; as, for instance. If he runs,
he is in motion.

Reply Obj. 3. If two things be proposed as equal under
one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of
them some particular point of superiority, so that the will
has a bent towards that one rather than towards the other.

QUESTION XIV.

OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE.

{In Six Articles.)

We must now consider counsel ; concerning which there are
six points of inquiry: (i) Whether counsel is an inquiry ?

(2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means ?

(3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do ?

(4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do ? (5) Whether
the process of counsel is one of analysis ? (6) Whether the
process of counsel is indefinite ?

First Article,
whether counsel is an inquiry ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that counsel is not an inquiry. For
Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. ii.) that counsel is an act
of the appetite. But inquiry is not an act of the appetite.
Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.

Ohj. 2. Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect:
for which reason it is unbecoming to God, Whose knowledge
is not discursive, as we have shown in the First Part
(Q. XIV., A. 7). But counsel is ascribed to God: for it is
written (Eph. i. 11) that He worketh all things according to
the counsel of His will. Therefore counsel is not inquiry.

Ohj. 3. Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But
counsel is given in matters that are certainly good; thus the
Apostle says (i Cor. vii. 25) : Now concerning virgins I have
no commandment of the Lord : hut I give counsel. Therefore,
counsel is not an inquiry.

169

170 QUESTION XIV

On the contrary, Gregory of N3^ssa (Nemesius, — De Nat.
Horn, xxxiv.) says: Every counsel is an inquiry ; but not every
inquiry is a counsel.

I answer that, Choice, as stated above (Q. XIII. , K. i ad2\
A. 3), follows the judgment of the reason about what is to
be done. Now there is much uncertainty in things that
have to be done: because actions are concerned with con-
tingent singulars, which by reason of their vicissitude, are
uncertain. Now in things doubtful and uncertain, the
reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous
inquiry: wherefore the reason must of necessity institute
an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice; and this
inquiry is called counsel. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic, iii.) that choice is the desire of what has heen already
counselled.

Reply Ohj. i. When the acts of two powers are ordained
to one another, in each of them there is something belonging
to the other power; consequently each act can be denomi-
nated from either power. Now it is evident that the act of
the reason giving direction as to the means, and the act of the
will tending to these means according to the will's direction,
are ordained to one another. Consequently there is to be
found something of the reason, viz., order, in that act of the
will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of
reason, something of the will, — both as matter (since counsel
is of what man wills to do), — and as motive (because it is
from willing the end, that man is moved to take counsel in
regard to the means). And therefore, just as the Philoso-
pher says (Ethic vi.) that choice is intellect influenced by
appetite, thus pointing out that both concur in the act of
choosing; so Damascene says (loc. cit.) that counsel is appe-
tite based on inquiry, so as to show that counsel belongs, in a
way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose com-
mand the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes
the inquiry.

Reply Obj. 2. The things that we say of God must be
understood without any of the defects which are to be found
in us : thus in us science is of conclusions derived by reason-

COUNSEL 171

ing from causes to effects: but science when said of God,
means sure knowledge of all effects in the First Cause, with-
out any reasoning process. In like manner we ascribe
counsel to God, as to the certainty of His knowledge or
judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry of
counsel. But such inquiry has no place in God; wherefore
in this respect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense
Damascene says : God takes not counsel : those only take counsel
who lack knowledge.

Reply Ohj. 3. There is no reason why things which are most
certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men,
should not be certainly good in the opinion of many, or at
least of carnal-minded men. Consequently it is of such
things that we take counsel.

Second Article,
whether counsel is of the end, or only of the means ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that counsel is not only of the means
but also of the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the
subject of inquiry. Now in things to be done by man there
happens sometimes a doubt as to the end, and not only as
to the means. Since therefore inquiry as to what is to be
done is counsel, it seems that counsel can be of the end.

Ohj. 2. Further, the matter of counsel is human actions.
But some human actions are ends, as stated in Ethic, i.
Therefore counsel can be of the end.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, — De Nat.
Horn, xxxiv.) says that counsel is not of the end, hut of the
means.

I answer that, The end is the principle in practical matters:
because the reason of the means is to be found in the end.
Now the principle cannot be called in question, but must be
presupposed in every inquiry. Since therefore counsel is an
inquiry, it is not of the end, but only of the means. Never-
theless it happens that what is the end in regard to some, is
ordained to something else; then what is the principle of one

172 QUESTION XIV

demonstration, is the conclusion of another: and conse-
quently that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry,
may be looked upon as the means in another; and thus it
will become an object of counsel.

Reply Ohj. i. That which is looked upon as an end, is
already fixed: consequently as long as there is any doubt
about it, it is not looked upon as an end. Wherefore if
counsel is taken about it, it will be counsel not about the end,
but about the means.

Reply Ohj. 2. Counsel is about operations, in so far as they
are ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act
be an end, it will not, as such, be the matter of counsel.

Third Article,
whether counsel is only of things that we do ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that counsel is not only of things
that we do. For counsel implies some kind of conference.
But it is possible for many to confer about things that are
not subject to movement, and are not the result of our
actions, such as the natures of various things. Therefore
counsel is not only of things that we do.

Ohj. 2. Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things
that are laid down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law.
And yet those who seek counsel thus, have nothing to do
in making the laws. Therefore counsel is not only of things
that we do.

Ohj. 3. Further, some are said to take consultation about
future events ; which, however, are not in our power. There-
fore counsel is not only of things that we do.

Ohj. 4. Further, if counsel were only of things that we do,
no one would take counsel about what another does. But
this is clearly untrue. Therefore counsel is not only of
things that we do.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, — De Nat.
Horn, xxxiv.) says: We take counsel of things that are within
our competency and that we are ahle to do.

COUNSEL 173

I answer that, Counsel properly implies a conference held
between several ; the very word {consilium) denotes this, for
it means a sitting together (considium), from the fact that
many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now
we must take note that in contingent particular cases, in
order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to
take several conditions or circumstances into consideration,
which it is not easy for one to consider, but are con-
sidered by several with greater certainty, since what one
takes note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in
necessary and universal things, our view is brought to bear
on matters much more absolute and simple, so that one man
by himself may be sufficient to consider these things. Where-
fore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly speakings
with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth
in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of it-
self, as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary ;
but it is desired as being useful towards action, because
actions bear on things singular and contingent. Conse-
quently, properly speaking, counsel is about things done
by us.

Reply Ohj. i. Counsel implies conference, not of any kind,
but about what is to be done, for the reason given
above.

Reply Ohj. 2. Although that which is laid down by the law
is not due to the action of him who seeks counsel, neverthe-
less it directs him in his action : since the mandate of the law
is one reason for doing something.

Reply Ohj. 3. Counsel is not only about what is done, but
also of whatever has relation to what is done. And for this
reason we speak of consulting about future events, in so far
as man is induced to do or omit something, through the
knowledge of future events.

Reply Ohj. 4. We seek counsel about the actions of others,
in so far as they are, in some way, one with us; either by
union of affection — thus a man is solicitous about what con-
cerns his friend, as though it concerned himself; or after the
manner of an instrument, for the principal agent and the

174 QUESTION XIV

instrument are, in a way, one cause, since one acts through
the other ; thus the master takes counsel about what he would
do through his servant.

Fourth Article,
whether counsel is about all things that we do ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that counsel is about all things that
we have to do. For choice is the desire of what is counselled
as stated above (A. i) . But choice is about all things that we
do. Therefore counsel is too.

Obj. 2. Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But,
whenever we do not act through the impulse of passion, we
act in virtue of the reason's inquiry. Therefore there is
counsel about everything that we do.

Ob]\ 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic, iii.) that if it
appears that something can be done by more means than one,
we take counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most
easily and best ; but if it can be accomplished by one means,
how it can be done by this. But whatever is done, is done by
one means or by several. Therefore counsel takes place in
all things that we do.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, — De Nat.
Hom. xxxiv.) says that counsel has no place in things that are
done according to science or art.

I answer that. Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above
(A. i). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit
of doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an
argument, is a reason that certifies to something that admitted
of doubt (Cicero, — Topic, ad Trebat.). Now, that something
in relation to human acts, admit of no doubt, arises from a
twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends
are gained by certain determinate means: as happens in the
arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action;
thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters,
for this is determined by art. — Secondly, from the fact that
it little matters whether it is done this or that way; this

COUNSEL 175

occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but Httle
towards the end aimed at ; and reason looks upon small things
as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of
which we do not take counsel, although they conduce to the
end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic, iii.) : namely, minute
things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as
in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts
that admit of conjecture, such as medicine, commerce, and
the like, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, — loc, cit.).

Reply Ohj. i. Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its
judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or
decision is evident without inquiry, there is no need for the
inquiry of counsel.

Reply Ohj. 2. In matters that are evident, the reason
makes no inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there
is no need of counsel in all that is done by reason.

Reply Ohj. 3. When a thing can be accomplished by one
means, but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when
it can be accomplished by several means: hence the need
of counsel. But when not only the means, but also the
way of using the means, is fixed, then there is no need of
counsel.

Fifth Article,
whether the process of counsel is one of analysis ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the process of counsel is not one
of analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But
the process of our actions is not one of analysis, but rather
one of synthesis, viz., from the simple to the composite.
Therefore counsel does not always proceed by way of
analysis.

Ohj. 2. Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But
reason proceeds from things that precede to things that
follow, according to the more appropriate order. Since
then, the past precedes the present, and the present precedes
the future, it seems that in taking counsel one should pro-
ceed from the past and present to the future: which is not

176 QUESTION XIV

an analytical process. Therefore the process of counsel is
not one of analysis.

Obj. 3. Further, counsel is only of such things as are pos-
sible to us, according to Ethic, iii. But the question as to
whether a certain thing is possible to us, depends on what
we are able or unable to do, in order to gain such and such
an end. Therefore the inquiry of counsel should begin
from things present.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii.) that he
who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze.

I answer that, In every inquiry one must begin from some
principle. And if this principle precedes both in knowledge
and in being, the process is not analytic, but synthetic:
because to proceed from cause to effect is to proceed syntheti-
cally, since causes are more simple than effects. But if that
which precedes in knowledge comes afterwards into being
the process is one of analysis, as when our judgment deals
with effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple
causes. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the
end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes after-
wards into execution. Hence the inquiry of counsel must
needs be one of analysis, beginning, that is to say, from
that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it
arrives at that which is to be done at once.

Reply Obj. 1. Counsel is indeed about action. But actions
take their reason from the end; and consequently the order
of reasoning about actions is contrary to the order of actions.

Reply Obj. 2. Reason begins with that which is first
according to reason; but not always with that which is first
in point of time.

Reply Obj. 3. We should not want to know whether some-
thing to be done for an end be possible, if it were not suitable
for gaining that end. Hence we must first inquire whether
it be conducive to the end, before considering whether it be
possible.

COUNSEL 177

Sixth Article,
whether the process of counsel is indefinite ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth A rticle : —

Objection i. It seems that the process of counsel is in-
definite. For counsel is an inquiry about the particular
things with which action is concerned. But singulars are
infinite. Therefore the process of counsel is indefinite.

Ohj. 2. Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not
only what is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But
every human action can be hindered, and an obstacle can
be removed by some human reason. Therefore the inquiry
about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely.

Ohj. 3. Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does
not go on indefinitely, because one can come to principles
that are self-evident, which are absolutely certain. But
suchlike certainty is not to be had in contingent singulars,
which are variable and uncertain. Therefore the inquiry of
counsel goes on indefinitely.

On the contrary, No one is moved to that which he cannot
possibly reach (De Ccelo i.). But it is impossible to pass
through the infinite. If therefore the inquiry of counsel is
infinite, no one would begin to take counsel. Which is
clearly untrue.

I answer that, The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on
both sides, on that of its principle and on that of its term.
For a twofold principle is available in the inquiry of counsel.
One is proper to it, and belongs to the very genus of things
pertaining to operation: this is the end, which is not the
matter of counsel, but is taken for granted as its principle,
as stated above (A. 2). The other principle is taken from
another genus, so to speak; thus in demonstrative sciences
one science postulates certain things from another, without
inquiring into them. Now these principles which are taken
for granted in the inquiry of counsel, are any facts received
through the senses — for instance, that this is bread or iron;
and also any general statements known either through

II, I 12

178 QUESTION XIV

speculative or through practical science; for instance, that
adultery is forbidden by God, or that man cannot live with-
out suitable nourishment. Of such things counsel makes no
inquiry. — But the term of inquiry is that which we are able to
do at once. For just as the end is considered in the light of
a principle, so the means are considered in the light of a con-
clusion. Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done
first, holds the position of an ultimate conclusion, whereat
the inquiry comes to an end. — Nothing however prevents
counsel from being infinite potentially, for as much as an
infinite number of things may present themselves to be in-
quired into by means of counsel.

Reply Ohj. i. Singulars are infinite, not actually, but only
potentially.

Reply Ohj. 2. Although human action can be hindered,
the hindrance is not always at hand. Consequently it is not
always necessary to take counsel about removing the
obstacle.

Reply Ohj. 3. In contingent singulars, something may be
taken for certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being,
and as far as it concerns the work to be done. Thus that
Socrates is sitting is not a necessary statement; but that he
is sitting, as long as he continues to sit, is necessary; and
this can be taken for a certain fact.

QUESTION XV.

OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN
REGARD TO THE MEANS.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider consent; concerning which there are
four points of inquiry: (i) Whether consent is an act of the
appetitive or of the apprehensive power ? (2) Whether it
is becoming to irrational animals ? (3) Whether it is
directed to the end or to the means ? (4) Whether consent
to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul only ?

First Article.

whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of
the apprehensive power ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that consent belongs only to the
appetitive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii.)
ascribes consent to the higher reason. But the reason is an
apprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an
apprehensive power.

Obj. 2. Further, consent is co-sense. But sense is an appre-
hensive power. Therefore consent is the act of an appre-
hensive power.

Obj. 3. Further, just as assent is an application of the
intellect to something, so is consent. But assent belongs to
the intellect, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore
consent also belongs to an apprehensive power.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii.) that
if a man judge without affection for that of which he judges,

179

i8o QUESTION XV

there is no sentence, i.e. consent. But affection belongs
to the appetitive power. Therefore consent does also.

I answer that, Consent implies application of sense to
something. Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance
of things present; for the imagination apprehends the
similitude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the
things of which they bear the likeness; while the intellect
apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend indiffer-
ently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And
since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination
to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power
to the thing, in so far as it adheres thereto, takes the name
of sense, by a kind of similitude, seeking, as it were, a closer
acquaintance with the thing, in so far as it takes complacency
in it. Hence it is written (Wisd. i. i) : Think of (Sentite) the
Lord in goodness. And on these grounds consent is an act
of the appetitive power.

Reply Obj. i. As stated in De Anima iii., the will is in the
reason. Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the
reason, he takes reason as including the will.

Reply Obj. 2. Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the
apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as
it implies seeking acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive
power^, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. Assentire {to assent) is, so to speak, ad aliud
sentire (to feel towards something) ; and thus it implies a cer-
tain distance from that to which assent is given. But con-
sentire (to consent) is to feel with, and this implies a cer-
tain union to the object of consent. Hence the will, to
which it belongs to tend to the thing itself, is more properly
said to consent: whereas the intellect, whose act does not
consist in a movement towards the thing, but rather the
reverse, as we have stated in the First Part (Q. XVI., A. i;
Q. XXVII., A. 4; Q. LIX., A. 2), is more properly said to
assent: although one word is wont to be used for the other.*
We may also say that the intellect assents, in so far as it is
moved by the will .

* In Latin rather than in English.

CONSENT i8i

Second Article,
whether consent is becoming to irrational animals ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that consent is becoming to irra-
tional animals. For consent implies a determination of the
appetite to one thing. But the appetite of irrational animals
is determinate to one thing. Therefore consent is to be
found in irrational animals.

Obj. 2. Further, if you remove what is first, you remove
what follows. But consent precedes the accomplished act.
If therefore there were no consent in irrational animals, there
would be no act accomplished ; which is clearly false.

Obj. 3. Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do
something, through some passion; desire, for instance, or
anger. But irrational animals act through passion. There-
fore they consent.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii.) that
after judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his
counselling, and this is called the sentence, i.e., consent. But
counsel is not in irrational animals. Therefore neither is
consent.

/ answer that, Consent, properly speaking, is not in
irrational animals. The reason of this is that consent im-
plies an application of the appetitive movement to some-
thing as to be done. Now to apply the appetitive move-
ment to the doing of something, belongs to the subject in
whose power it is to move the appetite : thus to touch a stone
is an action suitable to a stick, but to apply the stick so that
it touch the stone, belongs to one who has the power of
moving the stick. But irrational animals have not the
command of the appetitive movement; for this is in them
through natural instinct. Hence in the irrational animal
there is indeed the movement of appetite, but it does not
apply that movement to some particular thing. And hence
it is that the irrational animal is not properly said to con-
sent: this is proper to the rational nature, which has the

i82 QUESTION XV

command of the appetitive movement, and is able to apply
or not apply it to this or that thing.

Reply Ohj. i. In irrational animals the determination of
the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive: whereas
consent implies a determination of the appetite, which is
active rather than merely passive.

Reply Ohj. 2. If the first be removed, then what follows
is removed, provided that, properly speaking, it follow
from that only. But if something can follow from several
things, it is not removed by the fact that one of them is
removed; thus if hardening is the effect of heat and of cold
(since bricks are hardened by fire, and frozen water is hard-
ened by the cold), then by removing heat it does not follow
that there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an
act follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse
of the appetite, such as is found in irrational animals.

Reply Ohj. 3. The man who acts through passion is able
not to follow the passion: whereas irrational animals have
not that power. Hence the comparison fails.

Third Article,
whether consent is directed to the end or to the

MEANS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that consent is directed to the end.
Because that on account of which a thing is such is still more
such. But it is on account of the end that we consent to the
means. Therefore still more do we consent to the end.

Ohj. 2. Further, the act of the intemperate man is his
end, just as the act of the virtuous man is his end. But the
intemperate man consents to his own act. Therefore con-
sent can be directed to the end.

Ohj. 3. Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated
above (Q. XIII. , A. i). If therefore consent were only
directed to the means it would nowise differ from choice.
And this is proved to be false by the authority of Damascene
who says (De Fide Orthod. ii.) that after the approval which he

CONSENT 183

calls the sentence, comes the choice. Therefore consent is not
only directed to the means.

On the contrary, Damascene says (ibid.) that the sentence,
i.e., the consent, takes place when man approves and embraces
the judgment of his counsel. But counsel is only about the
means. Therefore the same applies to consent.

/ answer that, Consent is the application of the appetitive
movement to something that is already in the power of him
who causes the application. Now the order of action is this :
First there is the apprehension of the end ; then the desire of
the end; then the counsel about the means; then the desire
of the means. Now the appetite tends to the last end
naturally : wherefore the application of the appetitive move-
ment to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent,
but of simple volition. But as to those things which come
under consideration after the last end, in so far as they are
directed to the end, they come under counsel: and so con-
sent can be applied to them, in so far as the appetitive
movement is applied to the judgment resulting from counsel.
But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to
counsel: rather is counsel applied to it, because counsel
presupposes the desire of the end. On the other hand, the
desire of the means presupposes the decision of counsel.
And therefore the application of the appetitive movement
to counsel's decision is consent, properly speaking. Conse-
quently, since counsel is only about the means, consent,
properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.

Reply Obj. i. Just as the knowledge of conclusions
through the principles is science, whereas the knowledge of
the principles is not science, but something higher, namely,
understanding; so do we consent to the means on account of
the end, in respect of which our act is not consent, but some-
thing greater, namely, volition.

Reply Obj. 2. Delight in his act, rather than the act itself,
is the end of the intemperate man, and for sake of this
delight he consents to that act.

Reply Obj. 3. Choice includes something that consent has
not, namely, a certain relation to something to which some-

l84 • QUESTION XV

thing else is preferred : and therefore after consent there still
remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel
several means have been found conducive to the end, and
through each of these meeting with approval, consent has
been given to each: but after approving of many, we have
given our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one
meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ
in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that
we call it consent, according as we approve of doing that
thing; but choice, according as we prefer it to those that do
not meet with our approval.

Fourth Article.

whether consent to the act belongs only to the
higher part of the soul ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that consent to the act does not
always belong to the higher reason. For delight follows
action, and perfects it, just as beauty perfects youth * [Ethic, x.).
But consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as
Augustine says [De Trin. xii.). Therefore consent to the
act does not belong only to the higher reason.

Obj. 2. Further, an act to which we consent is said to be
voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to produce
voluntary acts. Therefore the higher reason is not alone in
consenting to the act.

Obj. 3. Further, the higher reason is that which is intent on
the contemplation and consultation of things eternal, as Augus-
tine says (De Trin. xii.). But man often consents to an act
not for eternal, but for temporal reasons, or even on account
of some passion of the soul. Therefore consent to an act
does not belong to the higher reason alone.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii.): It is im-
possible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless
that mental faculty , which has the sovereign power of urging to,

* olov Tols aKixaioLs rj copa; — as youtliful vigour perfects a man in his
prime.

CONSENT 185

oy restraining from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its
slave.

I answer that, The final decision belongs to him who holds
the highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the
others; for as long as judgment about some matter remains
to be pronounced, the final decision has not been given.
Now it is evident that it belongs to the Higher reason to
judge of all : since it is by the reason that we judge of sensible
things; and of things pertaining to human principles we
judge according to Divine principles, which is the function
of the higher reason. Wherefore as long as a man is un-
certain whether he resists or not, according to Divine
principles, no judgment of the reason can be considered in
the light of a final decision. Now the final decision of what
is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to
the act belongs to the higher reason; but in that sense in
which the reason includes the will, as stated above (A. ladi.)

Reply Ohj. i. Consent to delight in the work done belongs
to the higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but
consent to delight in thought belongs to the lower reason,
just as to the lower reason it belongs to think. Neverthe-
less the higher reason exercises judgment on the fact of
thinking or not thinking, considered as an action ; and in like
manner on the delight that results. But in so far as the
act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act,
it belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained
to something else, belongs to a lower act or power than does
the end to which it is ordained: hence the act which is
concerned with the end is called the master or principal act.

Reply Ohj. 2. Since actions are called voluntary from the
fact that we consent to them, it does not follow that consent
is an act of each power, but of the will which is in the reason,
as stated above (A. 1 ad t), and from which the voluntary
act is named.

Reply Ohj. 3. The higher reason is said to consent not
only because it always moves to act, according to the eternal
reasons; but also because it fails to dissent according to
those same reasons.

QUESTION XVI.

OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN
REGARD TO THE MEANS.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider use; concerning which there are four
points of inquiry: (i) Whether use is an act of the will ?

(2) Whether it is becoming to irrational animals ?

(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also ?

(4) Of the relation of use to choice.

First Article,
whether use is an act of the will ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that use is not an act of the will.
For Augustine says {De Doctr. Christ, i.) that to use is to refer
that which is the object of use to the obtaining of something else.
But to refer something to another is an act of the reason to
which it belongs to compare and to direct. Therefore use
is an act of the reason and not of the will.

Obj. 2. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii.)
that man goes forward to the operation, and this is called
impulse ; then he makes use (of the powers) and this is called
use. But operation belongs to the executive power ; and the
act of the will does not follow the act of the executive power,
on the contrary execution comes last. Therefore use is not
an act of the will.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (Qq. 83) : All things that
were made were made for man's use, because reason with which
man is endowed uses all things by its judgment of them. But
judgment of things created by God belongs to the specula-

t86

USE 187

tive reason; which seems to be altogether distinct from the
will, which is the principle of human acts. Therefore use is
not an act of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x.) : To use is to
apply something to the purpose of the will.

I answer that, The use of a thing implies the application of
that thing to an operation : hence the operation to which we
apply a thing is called its use; thus the use of a horse is to
ride, and the use of a stick is to strike. Now we apply to an
operation not only the interior principles of action, viz., the
powers of the soul or the members of the body ; as the intel-
lect, to understand; and the eye, to see; but also external
things, as a stick, to strike. But it is evident that we do
not apply external things to an operation save through the
interior principles, which are either the powers of the soul,
or the habits of those powers, or the organs which are parts
of the body. Now it has been shown above (Q. IX., A. i)
that it is the will which moves the soul's powers to their
acts, and this is to apply them to operation. Hence it is
evident that first and principally use belongs to the will as
first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to the other
powers as executing the operation, which powers are com-
pared to the will which applies them to act, as the instru-
ments are compared to the principle agent. Now action is
properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal
agent, as building is ascribed to the builder, but not to his
tools. Hence it is evident that use is, properly speaking, an
act of the will.

Reply Ohj. i. Reason does indeed refer one thing to an-
other; but the will tends to that which is referred by the
reason to something else. And in this sense to use is to
refer one thing to another.

Reply Ohj. 2. Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it
belongs to the executive powers.

Reply Ohj. 3. Even the speculative reason is applied by
the will to the act of understanding or judging. Conse-
quently the speculative reason is said to use, in so far as it
is moved by the will, in the same way as the other powers.

i88 QUESTION XVI

Second Article,
whether use is becoming to irrational animals ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :■ —

Objection i. It seems that use is becoming to irrational
animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as
Augustine says {De Trin. x.) : We use things by referring them
to something else which we are to enjoy. But enjoyment is
becoming to irrational animals, as stated above (Q. XL, A. 2).
Much more, therefore, is it becoming for them to use.

Obj. 2. Further, to apply the members to action is to use
them. But irrational animals apply their members to
action; for instance, their feet, to walk; their horns, to
strike. Therefore it is becoming for irrational animals to
use.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83): None but a
rational animal can make use of a thing.

I answer that, as stated above (A. i), to use is to apply
an active principle to action : thus to consent is to apply the
appetitive movement to the desire of something, as stated
above (Q. XV., AA. i, 2, 3). Now he alone who has the
disposal of a thing, can apply it to something else; and this
belongs to him alone who knows how to refer it to something
else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore none but
a rational animal consents and uses.

Reply Obj. i. To enjoy implies the absolute movement of
the appetite to the appetible: whereas to use implies a
movement of the appetite to something as directed to some-
thing else. If therefore we compare use and enjoyment in
respect of their objects, enjoyment is better than use; be-
cause that which is appetible absolutely is better than that
which is appetible only as directed to something else. But
if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power
that precedes them, greater excellence is required on the
part of use: because to direct one thing to another is an act
of reason; whereas to apprehend something absolutely is
within the competency even of sense.

USE 189

Reply Ohj. 2. Animals by means of their members do
something from natural instinct; not through knowing the
relation of their members to these operations. Wherefore,
properly speaking, they do not apply their members to
action, nor do they use them.

Third Article,
whether use regards also the last end ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that use can regard also the last end.
For Augustine says [De Trin. x.) : Whoever enjoys, uses. But
man enjoys the last end. Therefore he uses the last end.

Obj. 2. Further, to use is to apply something to the purpose
of the will (ibid). But the last end, more than anything
else, is the object of the will's application. Therefore it can
be the object of use.

Obj. 3. Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii.) that Eternity is
in the Father, Likeness in the Image, i.e., in the Son, Use in
the Gift, i.e., in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, since
He is God, is the last end. Therefore the last end can be the
object of use.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83) : No one rightly
uses God, but he enjoys Him. But God alone is the last end.
Therefore we cannot use the last end.

I answer that. Use, as stated above (A. i), implies the ap-
plication of one thing to another. Now that which is applied
to another is regarded in the light of means to an end; and
consequently use always regards the means. For this
reason things that are adapted to a certain end are said to be
useful ; in fact their very usefulness is sometimes called use.

It must, however, be observed that the last end may
be taken in two ways : first, simply ; secondly, in respect of
an individual. For since the end, as stated above (Q. I.,
A. 8; Q. II., A. 7), signifies sometimes the thing itself, and
sometimes the attainment or possession of that thing (thus
the miser's end is either money or the possession of it) ; it is
evident that, simply speaking, the last end is the thing

igo QUESTION XVI

itself; for the possession of money is good only inasmuch as
there is some good in money. But in regard to the individual,
the obtaining of money is the last end ; for the miser would
not seek for money, save that he might have it. Therefore,
simply and properly speaking, a man enjoys money, because
he places his last end therein; but in so far as he seeks to
possess it, he is said to use it.

Reply Ohj. i. Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so
far as it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment
which a man seeks in that end.

Refly Ohj. 2. The end is applied to the purpose of the will,
that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in
the end, which is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense
called use of the end. But the means are applied to the
will's purpose, not only in being used as means, but as or-
dained to something else in which the will finds rest.

Reply Ohj. 3. The words of Hilary refer to use as applic-
able to rest in the last end ; just as, speaking in a general
sense, one may be said to use the end for the purpose of
attaining it, as stated above. Hence Augustine says {De
Trin. vi.) that this love, delight, felicity, or happiness, is called
use hy him.

Fourth Article.

whether use precedes choice ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that use precedes choice. For
nothing follows after choice, except execution. But use,
since it belongs to the will, precedes execution. Therefore
it precedes choice also.

Ohj. 2. Further, the absolute precedes the relative. There-
fore the less relative precedes the more relative. But
choice implies two relations: one, of the thing chosen, in
relation to the end; the other, of the thing chosen, in respect
of that to which it is preferred; whereas use implies relation
to the end only. Therefore use precedes choice.

Ohj. 3. Further, the will uses the other powers in so far
as it moves them. But the will moves itself too, as stated

USE 191

above (Q. IX., A. 3). Therefore it uses itself, by applying
itself to act. But it does this when it consents. Therefore
there is use in consent. But consent precedes choice, as
stated above (Q. XV., A. 3 ad 3). Therefore use does
also.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orthod, ii.) that
the will after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and
afterwards it uses (the powers). Therefore use follows choice.

I answer that. The will has a twofold relation to the thing
willed. One, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in
the willing subject, by a kind of proportion or order to the
thing willed. Wherefore those things that are naturally
proportionate to a certain end, are said to desire that end
naturally. — Yet to have an end thus is to have it imperfectly.
Now every imperfect thing tends to perfection. And there-
fore both the natural and the voluntary appetite tends to
have the end in reality ; and this is to have it perfectly. This
is the second relation of the will to the thing willed.

Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the
means. And the last act that belorgs to the first relation
of the will to the means, is choice; for there the will becomes
fully proportionate, by willing the means fully. Use, on the
other hand, belongs to the second relation of the will, in
respect of which it tends to the realization of the thing willed.
Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice ; provided that
by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in
moving it. But since the will, in a way, moves the reason
also, and uses it, we may take the use of the means, as con-
sisting in the consideration of the reason, whereby it refers
the means to the end. In this sense use precedes choice.

Reply Ohj. i. The motion of the will to the execution of the
work, precedes execution, but follows choice. And so,
since use belongs to that very motion of the will, it stands
between choice and execution.

Reply Ohj. 2. What is essentially relative is after the
absolute; but the thing to which relation is referred need
not come after. Indeed, the more a cause precedes, the more
numerous the effects to which it has relation.

192 QUESTION XVI

Reply Ohj. 3. Choice precedes use, if they be referred to
the same object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing
preceding the choice of another. And since the acts of the
will react on one another, in each act of the will we can find
both consent and choice and use; so that we may say that
the will consents to choose, and consents to consent, and
uses itself in consenting and choosing. And such acts as are
ordained to that which precedes, precede also.

QUESTION XVII.

OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL.

{In Nine Articles.)

We must now consider the acts commanded by the will ;
under which head there are nine points of inquiry:
(i) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason ?

(2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals ?

(3) Of the order between command and use. (4) Whether
command and the commanded act are one act or distinct ?
(5) Whether the act of the will is commanded ? (6) Whether
the act of the reason is commanded ? (7) Whether the act
of th^ sensitive appetite is commanded ? (8) Whether the
act of the vegetal soul is commanded ? (9) Whether the acts
of the external members are commanded ?

First Article,
whether command is an act of the reason or of the

WILL ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that command is not an act of the
reason but of the will. For command is a kind of motion;
because Avicenna says that a mover is fourfold, by per-
fecting, by disposing, by commanding, and by counselling.
But it belongs to the will to move all the other powers of the
soul, as stated above (Q. IX., A. i). Therefore command
is an act of the will.

Obj. 2. Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that
which is subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that
which is most free. But the root of liberty is especially in
the will. Therefore to command belongs to the will.

II. I 193 13

194 QUESTION XVII

Obj. 3. Further, command is followed at once by act. But
the act of the reason is not followed at once by act : for he who
judges that a thing should be done, does not do it at once.
Therefore command is not an act of the reason, but of the will.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, — De Nat.
Horn, xvi.) and the Philosopher {Ethic, i.) say that the appe-
tite obeys reason. Therefore command is an act of the
reason.

/ answer that, Command is an act of the reason, presup-
posing, however, an act of the will. In proof of this, we must
take note that, since the acts of the reason and of the will
can be brought to bear on one another, in so far as the
reason reasons about willing, and the will wills to reason, the
result is that the act of the reason precedes the act of the
will, and conversely. And since the power of the preceding
act continues in the act that follows, it happens sometimes
that there is an act of the will in so far as it retains in itself
something of an act of the reason, as we have stated in refer-
ence to use and choice; and conversely, that there is an act
of the reason in so far as it retains in itself something of an
act of the will.

Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason:
for the commander orders the one commanded to do some-
thing, by way of intimation or declaration; and to order
thus by intimating or declaring is an act of the reason. Now
the reason can intimate or declare something in two ways.
First, absolutely : and this intimation is expressed by a verb
in the indicative mood, as when one person says to another:
This is what you should do. Sometimes, however, the reason
intimates something to a man by moving him thereto ; and
this intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative
mood; as when it is said to someone: Do this. Now the first
mover, among the powers of the soul, to the doing of an
act is the will, as stated above (Q. IX., A. i). Since, there-
fore, the second mover does not move, save in virtue of the
first mover, it follows that the very fact that the reason
moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will. Con-
sequently it follows that command is an act of the reason,

COMMANDED ACTS 195

presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the
reason, by its command, moves (the power) to the execution
of the act.

Reply Ohj. i. To command is to move, not anyhow, but by
intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of
the reason.

Reply Ohj, 2. The root of liberty is the will as the subject
thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can
tend freely towards various objects, precisely because the
reason can have various perceptions of good. Hence philo-
sophers define the free-will as being a free judgment arising
from reason, implying that reason is the root of liberty.

Reply Ohj. 3. This argument proves that command is an
act of reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion, as
stated above.

Second Article,
whether command belongs to irrational animals ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that command belongs to irrational
animals. Because, according to Avicenna, the power that
commands movement is the appetite ; and the power that
executes movement is in the muscles and nerves. But both
powers are in irrational animals. Therefore command is to
be found in irrational animals.

Ohj. 2. Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who
receives commands. But the body is compared to the soul,
as a slave to his master, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i.).
Therefore the body is commanded by the soul, even in
irrational animals, since they are composed of soul and body.

Ohj. 3. Further, by commanding, man has an impulse
towards an action. But impulse to action is to be found in
irrational animals, as Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii.).
Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.

On the contrary, Command is an act of reason, as stated
above (A. i). But in irrational animals there is no reason.
Neither, therefore, is there command.

/ answer that, To command is nothing else than to direct

196 QUESTION XVII

someone to do something, by a certain motion of intimation.
Now to direct is the proper act of the reason. Wherefore it
is impossible that irrational animals should command in any
way, since they are devoid of reason.

Reply Ohj. i. The appetitive power is said to command
movement, in so far as it moves the commanding reason.
But this is only in man. In irrational animals the appe-
titive power is not, properly speaking, a commanding
faculty, unless command be taken loosely for motion.

Reply Ohj. 2. The body of the irrational animal is com-
petent to obey; but its soul is not competent to command,
because it is not competent to direct. Consequently there
is no ratio there of commander and commanded; but only
of mover and moved.

Reply Ohj. 3. Impulse to action is in irrational animals
otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action
arises from the directing reason; wherefore his impulse is
one of command. On the other hand, the impulse of the
irrational animal arises from natural instinct; because as
soon as they apprehend the fitting or the unfitting, their
appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to avoid. Where-
fore they are directed by another to act: and they them-
selves do not direct themselves to act. Consequently in
them is impulse but not command.

Third Article,
whether use precedes command ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that use precedes command. For
command is an act of the reason presupposing an act of the
will, as stated above (A. i). But, as we have already shown
(Q. XVI., A. i), use is an act of the will. Therefore use pre-
cedes command.

Ohj. 2. Further, command is one of those things that are
ordained to the end. But use is of those things that are
ordained to the end. Therefore it seems that use precedes
command.

COMMANDED ACTS 197

Obj. 3. Further, every act of a power moved by the will is
called use; because the will uses the other powers, as stated
above (Q. XVL, A. i). But command is an act of the reason
as moved by the will, as stated above (A. i). Therefore
command is a kind of use. Now the common precedes the
proper. Therefore use precedes command.

On the contrary, Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. ii.) that
impulse to action precedes use. But impulse to operation
is given by command. Therefore command precedes use.

I answer that, use of that which is directed to the end, in
so far as it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes
choice, as stated above (Q. XVL, A. 4). Wherefore still
more does it precede command. — On the other hand, use of
that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is subject to
the executive power, follows command: because use in the
user is united to the act of the thing used ; for one does not
use a stick before doing something with the stick. But
command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to
which the command is given: for it naturally precedes its
fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time. Conse-
quently it is evident that command precedes use.

Reply Obj. i. Not every act of the will precedes this act
of the reason which is command ; but an act of the will pre-
cedes, viz., choice; and an act of the will follows, viz., use.
Because after counsel's decision, which is reason's judgment,
the will chooses; and after choice, the reason commands
that power which has to do what was chosen; and then, last
of all, someone's will begins to use, by executing the com-
mand of reason; sometimes it is another's will, when one
commands another; sometimes the will of the one that
commands, when he commands himself to do something.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as act ranks before power, so does the
object rank before the act. Now the object of use is that
which is directed to the end. Consequently, from the fact
that command is directed to the end, one should conclude
that command precedes, rather than that it follows use.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as the act of the will in using the reason
for the purpose of command, precedes the command ; so also

198 QUESTION XVII

we may say that this act whereby the will uses the reason,
is preceded by a command of reason; since the acts of these
powers react on one another.

Fourth Article.

whether command and the commanded act are
one act, or distinct ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the commanded act is not one
with the command itself. For the acts of different powers
are themselves distinct. But the commanded act belongs
to one power, and the command to another; since one is the
power that commands, and the other is the power that
receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is
not one with the command.

Ohj. 2. Further, whatever things can be separate from
one another, are distinct: for nothing is severed from itself.
But sometimes the commanded act is separate from the
command: for sometimes the command is given, and the
commanded act follows not. Therefore command is a
distinct act from the act commanded.

Ohj. 3. Further, whatever things are related to one another
as precedent and consequent, are distinct. But command
naturally precedes the commanded act. Therefore they
are distinct.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic, iii.) that
where one thing is by reason of another, there is but one. But
there is no commanded act unless by reason of the command.
Therefore they are one.

/ answer that. Nothing prevents certain things being
distinct in one respect, and one in another respect. Indeed,
every multitude is one in some respect, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. xiii.). But a difference is to be observed in this,
that some are simply many, and one in a particular respect:
while with others it is the reverse. Now one is predicated
in the same way as being. And substance is being simply,
whereas accident or being of reason is a being only in a

COMMANDED ACTS 199

certain respect. Wherefore those things that are one in
substance are one simply, though many in a certain respect.
Thus, in the genus substance, the whole composed of its
integral or essential parts, is one simply: because the whole
is being and substance simply, and the parts are beings and
substances in the whole. But those things which are dis-
tinct in substance, and one according to an accident, are
distinct simply, and one in a certain respect: thus many
men are one people, and many stones are one heap; which
is unity of composition or order. In like manner also many
individuals that are one in genus or species are many
simply, and one in a certain respect: since to be one in genus
or species is to be one according to the consideration of the
reason.

Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is
composed of matter and form (e.g., man, who is one natural
being, though he has many parts, is composed of soul and
body) ; so, in human acts, the act of a lower power is in the
position of matter in regard to the act of a higher power, in
so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power
moving it: for thus also the act of the first mover is as the
form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is
evident that command and the commanded act are one
human act, just as a whole is one, yet, in its parts, many.

Reply Obj. i. If the distinct powers are not ordained to
one another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one
power is the mover of the other, then their acts are, in a wa^^
one : since the act of the mover and the act of the thing moved are
one act (Phys. iii.).

Reply Obj. 2. The fact that command and the commanded
act can be separated from one another shows that they are
different parts. Because the parts of a man can be separ-
ated from one another, and yet they form one whole.

Reply Obj. 3. In those things that are many in parts, but
one as a whole, nothing hinders one part from preceding
another. Thus the soul, in a way, precedes the body; and
the heart, the other members.

200 QUESTION XVII

Fifth Article,
whether the act of the will is commanded ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the act of the will is not com-
manded. For Augustine says {Conf. viii.): The mind com-
mands the mind to will, and yet it does not. But to will is
the act of the will. Therefore the act of the will is not
commanded.

Ohj. 2. Further, to receive a command belongs to one who
can understand the command. But the will cannot under-
stand the command: for the will differs from the intellect,
to which it belongs to understand. Therefore the act of the
will is not commanded.

Ohj. 3. Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for
the same reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the
will are commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity;
because the act of the will precedes the act of reason com-
manding, as stated above (A. i) ; for if that act of the will be
also commanded, this command will be preceded by another
act of the reason, and so on to infinity. But to proceed to
infinity is not possible. Therefore the act of the will is not
commanded.

On the contrary, Whatever is in our power, is subject to our
command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our
power; since all our acts are said to be in our power, in so far
as they are voluntary. Therefore the acts of the will are
commanded by us.

I answer that, As stated above (A. i), command is nothing
else than the act of the reason directing, with a certain
motion, something to act. Now it is evident that the
reason can direct the act of the will : for just as it can judge
it to be good to will something, so it can direct by com-
manding man to will. From this it is evident that an act of
the will can be commanded.

Reply Ohj. i. As Augustine says {ihid.) when the mind
commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but

COMMANDED ACTS 201

that sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the
fact that it commands imperfectly. Now imperfect com-
mand arises from the fact that the reason is moved by oppo-
site motives to command or not to command: wherefore il
fluctuates between the two, and fails to command perfectly.

Reply Ohj. 2. Just as each of the members of the body
works not for itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is
for the whole body that the eye sees; so is it with the powers
of the soul. For the intellect understands, not for itself
alone, but for all the powers; and the will wills not only for
itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore man, in so far
as he is endowed with intellect and will, commands the act
of the will for himself.

Reply Ohj. 3. Since command is an act of the reason, that
act is commanded which is subject to reason. Now the
first act of the will is not due to the direction of the reason
but to the instigation of nature, or of a higher cause, as stated
above (Q. IX., A. 4). Therefore there is no need to proceed
to infinity.

Sixth Article,
whether the act of the reason is commanded ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the act of the reason cannot be
commanded . For it seems impossible for a thing to command
itself. But it is the reason that commands, as stated above
(A. i). Therefore the act of the reason is not commanded.

Ohj. 2. Further, that which is essential is different from
that which is by participation. But the power whose act is
commanded by reason, is rational by participation, as stated
in Ethic, i. Therefore the act of that power, which is
essentially rational, is not commanded.

Ohj. 3. Further, that act is commanded, which is in our
power. But to know and judge the truth, which is the act
of reason, is not always in our power. Therefore the act of
the reason cannot be commanded.

On the contrary, That which we do of our free-will, can be
done by our command. But the acts of the reason are

202 QUESTION XVII

accomplished through the free-will: for Damascene says
(De Fide Orthod. ii.) that by his free-will man inquires, con-
siders, judges, approves. Therefore the acts of the reason
can be commanded.

I answer that. Since the reason re-acts on itself, just as it
directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act.
Consequently its act can be commanded.

But we must take note that the act of the reason may be
considered in two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act.
And considered thus, the act of the reason can always be
commanded: as when one is told to be attentive, and to use
one's reason. Secondly, as to the object; in respect of
which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is the
act whereby it apprehends the truth about something.
This act is not in our power : because it happens in virtue of
a natural or supernatural light. Consequently in this
respect, the act of the reason is not in our power, and cannot
be commanded. The other act of the reason is that whereby
it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which
the reason apprehends is such that it naturally assents
thereto, e.g., the first principles, it is not in our power to
assent or dissent to the like: assent follows naturally, and
consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our com-
mand. But some things are apprehended which do not
convince the intellect so that one cannot assent or dissent,
or at least suspend one's assent or dissent, on account of
some cause or other: and in such things assent or dissent is
in our power, and is subject to our command.

Reply Ohj. i. Reason commands itself, just as the will
moves itself, as stated above (Q. IX., A. 3), that is to say,
in so far as each power reacts on its own act, and from one
thing tends to another.

Reply Ohj. 2. On account of the diversity of objects
subject to the act of the reason, nothing prevents the reason
from participating in itself: thus the knowledge of prin-
ciples is participated in the knowledge of the conclusions.

The reply to the third objection is evident from what has
been said.

COMMANDED ACTS 203

Seventh Article.

whether the act of the sensitive appetite
is commanded ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — •

Objection i. It seems that the act of the sensitive appetite
is not commanded. For the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 15):
For I do not that good which I will : and a gloss explains this
by saying that man lusts, although he wills not to lust.
But to lust is an act of the sensitive appetite. Therefore
the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our com-
mand.

Ohj. 2. Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the
effect of formal transmutation, as was shown in the First
Part (Q. LXV., A. 4; Q. XCI., A. 2; Q. CX., A. 2). But the
act of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a formal
transmutation of the body, consisting in heat or cold. There-
fore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to man's
command.

Ohj. 3. Further, the proper motive principle of the sensi-
tive appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagina-
tion. But it is not always in our power to apprehend some-
thing by sense or imagination. Therefore the act of the
sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, — De Nat.
Horn, xvi.) says: That which obeys reason is twofold, the con-
cupiscible and the irascible, which belong to the sensitive
appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is
subject to the command of reason.

I answer that, An act is subject to our command, in so far
as it is in our power, as stated above (A. 5). Consequently
in order to understand in what manner the act of the sensi-
tive appetite is subject to the command of reason, we must
consider in what manner it is in our power. Now it must
be observed that the sensitive appetite differs from the
intellective appetite, which is called the will, in the fact
that the sensitive appetite is the power of a corporeal organ.

204 QUESTION XVII

whereas the will is not. Again, every act of a power that
uses a corporeal organ, depends not only on a power of the
soul, but also on the disposition of that corporeal organ:
thus the act of vision depends on the power of sight, and on
the condition of the eye, which condition is a help or a
hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive
appetite depends not only on the appetitive power, but also
on the disposition of the body.

Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act,
follows apprehension. And the apprehension of the im-
agination, being a particular apprehension, is regulated by
the apprehension of reason, which is universal; just as a
particular active power is regulated by a universal active
power. Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive
appetite is subject to the command of reason. — On the other
hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to
the command of reas5n: and consequently in this respect,
the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being
wholly subject to the command of reason.

Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the
sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an
apprehension of the imagination or sense. And then such
movement occurs without the command of reason: although
reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen. Hence the
Philosopher says {Polit. i.) that the reason governs the
irascible and concupiscible not by a despotic supremacy^
which is that of a master over his slave; but by a politic and
royal supremacy, whereby the free are governed, who are not
wholly subject to command.

Reply Ohj. i. That man lusts, although he wills not to lust,
is due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive
appetite is hindered from perfect compliance to the com-
mand of reason. Hence the Apostle adds {ibid.): I see
another law in my members, fighting against the law of my
mind. — This may also happen through a sudden movement
of concupiscence, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. The condition of the body stands in a two-
fold relation to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as

COMMANDED ACTS 205

preceding it: thus a man may be disposed in one way or
another, in respect of his body, to this or that passion.
Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a man becomes heated
through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not
subject to the command of reason: since it is due either to
nature, or to some previous movement, which cannot cease
at once. But the condition that is consequent, follows the
command of reason: since it results from the local move-
ment of the heart, which has various movements according
to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.

Reply Ohj. 3. Since the external sensible is necessary for
the apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to
apprehend anything by the senses, unless the sensible be
present; which presence of the sensible is not always in our
power. For it is then that man can use his senses if he will
so to do; unless there be some obstacle on the part of the
organ. — On the other hand, the apprehension of the imagina-
tion is subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion to the
strength or weakness of the imaginative power. For that
man is unable to imagine the things that reason considers,
is either because they cannot be imagined, such as in-
corporeal things ; or because of the weakness of the imagina-
tive power, due to some organic indisposition.

Eighth Article.

whether the act of the vegetal soul is
commanded ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the acts of the vegetal soul are
subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive
powers are of higher rank than the vegetal powers. But the
powers of the sensitive soul are subject to the command
of reason. Much more, therefore, are the powers of the
vegetal soul.

Ohj. 2. Further, man is called a little world, because the
soul is in the body, as God is in the world. But God is in
the world in such a way, that everything in the world obeys

2o6 QUESTION XVII

His command. Therefore all that is in man, even the
powers of the vegetal soul, obey the command of reason.

Obj. 3. Further, praise and blame are awarded only to
such acts as are subject to the command of reason. But
in the acts of the nutritive and generative power, there is
room for praise and blame, virtue and vice : as in the case of
gluttony and lust, and their contrary virtues. Therefore
the acts of these powers are subject to the command of
reason.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, — De Nat.
Horn, xvi.) says that the nutritive and generative power is one
over which the reason has no control.

I answer that, Some acts proceed from the natural appetite,
others from the animal, or from the intellectual appetite:
for every agent desires an end in some way. Now the
natural appetite does not follow from some apprehension, as
do the animal and the intellectual appetite. But the
reason commands by way of an apprehensive power. Where-
fore those acts that proceed from the intellective or the
animal appetite, can be commanded by the reason: but not
those acts that proceed from the natural appetite. And
such are the acts of the vegetal soul ; wherefore Gregory of
Nyssa (Nemesius, — loc. cit.) says that generation and nutri-
tion belong to what are called natural powers. Consequently
the acts of the vegetal soul are not subject to the command
of reason.

Reply Obj. i. The more immaterial an act is, the more
noble it is, and the more is it subject to the command of
reason. Hence the very fact that the acts of the vegetal
soul do not obey reason, shows that they rank lowest.

Reply Obj. 2. The comparison holds in a certain respect:
because, to wit, as God moves the world, so the soul moves
the body. But it does not hold in every respect: for the
soul did not create the body out of nothing, as God created
the world; for which reason the world is wholly subject to
His command.

Reply Obj. 3. Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not
affect the acts themselves of the nutritive and generative

COMMANDED ACTS 207

power, i.e., digestion, and formation of the human body;
but they affect the acts of the sensitive part, that are
ordained to the acts of generation and nutrition; for example
the desire for pleasure in the act of taking food or in the
act of generation, and the right or wrong use thereof.

Ninth Article.

whether the acts of the external members
are commanded ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the members of the body do not
obey reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the
members of the body are more distant from the reason, than
the powers of the vegetal soul. But the powers of the
vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above (A. 8).
Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.

Ohj. 2. Further, the heart is the principle of animal
movement. But the movement of the heart is not subject
to the command of reason: for Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius,
— De Nat. Horn, xxii.) says that the pulse is not controlled by
reason. Therefore the movement of the bodily members is
not subject to the command of reason.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv.) that
the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune
and not desired ; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas
the heart is warm with desire, the body remains cold. There-
fore the movements of the members are not obedient to
reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Conf. viii.) : The mind
commands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to
obey, that scarcely can one discern obedience from command.

I answer that, The members of the body are organs of the
soul's powers. Consequently according as the powers of the
soul stand in respect of obedience to reason, so do the
members of the body stand in respect thereof. Since then
the sensitive powers are subject to the command of reason,
whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all move-

208 QUESTION XVII

ments of members, that are moved by the sensitive powers,
are subject to the command of reason; whereas those move-
ments of members, that arise from the natural powers, are
not subject to the command of reason.

Reply Ohj. i. The members do not move themselves, but
are moved through the powers of the soul ; of which powers,
some are in closer contact with the reason than are the
powers of the vegetal soul.

Reply Ohj. 2. In things pertaining to intellect and will,
that which is according to nature stands first, whence all
other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of
principles that are naturally known, we desire knowledge
of the conclusions; and from volition of the end naturally
desired, we desire the choice of the means. So also in
bodily movements the principle is according to nature.
Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the
movement of the heart. Consequently the movement of
the heart is according to nature, and not according to the
will: for like a proper accident, it results from life, which
follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the move-
ment of heavy and light things results from their substantial
form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their
generator, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii) . Wherefore
this movement is called vitaL For which reason Gregory of
Nyssa (Nemesius, — loc. cit) says that, just as the movement
of generation and nutrition does not obey reason, so neither
does the pulse which is a vital movement. By the palse he
means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the
pulse veins.

Reply Ohj. 3. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv.) it is
in punishment of sin that the movement of these mem-
bers does not obey reason: in this sense, that the soul is
punished for its rebellion against God, by the insubmission
of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to pos-
terity.

But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the
sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself,
through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God

COMMANDED ACTS 209

had bestowed on man; we must consider the natural cause
of this particular member's insubmission to reason. This is
stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. Animal.) who says that
the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are
involuntary, and that the reason of this is as follows. These
members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension;
in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such
things as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions
these movements are a consequence. But they are not
moved at the command of the reason or intellect, because
these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change
of heat and cold, which change is not subject to the command
of reason. This is the case with these two organs in par-
ticular, because each is as it were a separate animal being,
in so far as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtu-
ally the whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses ;
and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal
virtue, which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently
they have their proper movements naturally: because
principles must needs be natural, as stated above. (Reply
Obi. 2).

II I

QUESTION XVIII.

OF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL.

{In Eleven Articles.)

We must now consider the good and evil of human acts.
First, how a human act is good or evil; secondly, what
results from the good or evil of a human act, as merit or
demerit, sin and guilt.

Under the first head there will be a threefold consider-
ation: the first will be of the good and evil of human acts,
in general; the second, of the good and evil of internal acts;
the third, of the good and evil of external acts.

Concerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry:
(i) Whether every human action is good, or are there evil
actions ? (2) Whether the good or evil of a human action
is derived from its object ? (3) Whether it is derived from
a circumstance ? (4) Whether it is derived from the end ?

(5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species ?

(6) Whether an action has the species of good or evil from
its end ? (7) Whether the species derived from the end is
contained under the species derived from the object, as
under its genus, or conversely ? (8) Whether any action
is indifferent in its species ? (9) Whether an individual
action can be indifferent ? (10) Whether a circumstance
places a moral action in the species of good or evil ? (11)
Whether every circumstance that makes an action better
or worse, places the moral action in the species of good or
evil ?

210

GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS 21 r

First Article.

whether every human action is good, or are
there evil actions ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that every human action is good,
and that none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Noni. iv.)
that evil acts not, save in virtue of the good. But no evil is
done in virtue of the good. Therefore no action is evil.

Ohj. 2. Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in
act. Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but
according as its potentiality is void of act ; whereas in so far
as its potentiality is perfected by act, it is good, as stated in
Metaph. ix. Therefore nothing acts in so far as it is evil,
but only according as it is good. Therefore every action is
good, and none is evil.

Obj. 3. Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally,
'as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv.). But every action
has some effect which is proper to it. Therefore no action
is evil, but every action is good.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (John iii. 20): Every one
that doth evil, hateth the light. Therefore some actions of man
are evil.

I answer that, We must speak of good and evil in actions,
as of good and evil in things : because such as everything is
such is the act that it produces. Now in things, each one
has so much good as it has being : since good and being are
convertible, as was stated in the First Part (Q. V. AA. i, 3).
But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Being in a
certain unity: whereas every other thing has its proper
fulness of being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore it
happens with some things, that they have being in some
respect, and yet they are lacking in the fulness of being due
to them. Thus the fulness of human being requires a
compound of soul and body, having all the powers and
instruments of knowledge and movement: wherefore if any
man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due

212 QUESTION XVIII

to the fulness of his being. So that as much as he has of
being, so much has he of goodness: while so far as he is
lacking in the fulness of his being, so far is he lacking in
goodness, and is said to be evil : thus a blind man is pos-
sessed of goodness in as much as he lives; and of evil, inas-
much as he lacks sight. That, however, which has nothing
of being or goodness, could not be said to be either evil or
good. But since this same fulness of being is of the very
essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of
being, it is not said to be good simply, but in a certain
respect, inasmuch as it is a being ; although it can be called
a being simply, and a non-being in a certain respect, as was
stated in the First Part (Q. V., A. i ad. i). We must there-
fore say that every action has goodness, in so far as it has
being: whereas it is lacking in goodness, in so far as it is
lacking in something that is due to its fulness of being; and
thus it is said to be evil: for instance if it lacks the quantity
determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the
kind.

Reply Ohj. i. Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness.
For if there were nothing of good there, there would be
neither being nor possibility of action. On the other hand
if good were not deficient, there would be no evil. Con-
sequently the action done is a deficient good, which is good
in a certain respect, but simply evil.

Reply Ohj. 2. Nothing hinders a thing from being in act
in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain
respect deficient in act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus
a blind man has in act the power of walking, whereby he is
able to walk; but inasmuch as he is deprived of sight he
suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.

Reply Ohj. 3. An evil action can have a proper effect,
according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus
adultery is the cause of human generation, inasmuch as it
implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it
lacks the order of reason.

GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS 213

Second Article.

WHETHER THE GOOD OR EVIL OF A MAN'S ACTION
IS DERIVED FROM ITS OBJECT ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the good or evil of an action is
not derived from its object. For the object of an action is a
thing. But evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them,
as Augustine says {De Doctr. Christ, iii.). Therefore the good
or evil of a human action is not derived from its object.

Obj. 2. Further, the object is compared to the action as
its matter. But the goodness of a thing is not from its
matter, but rather from the form, which is an act. There-
fore good and evil in actions is not derived from their object.

Obj. 3. Further, the object of an active power is com-
pared to the action as effect to cause. But the goodness of
a cause does not depend on its effect; rather is it the re-
verse. Therefore good or evil in actions is not derived from
their object.

On the contrary. It is written (Osee ix. 10) : They became
abominable as those things which they loved. Now man be-
comes abominable to God on account of the malice of his
action. Therefore the malice of his action is according to
the evil objects that man loves. And the same applies to
the goodness of his action.

/ answer that, as stated above (A. i) the good or evil of an
action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of being
or its lack of that fulness. Now the first thing that belongs
to the fulness of being seems to be that which gives a thing
its species. And just as a natural thing has its species from
its form, so an action has its species from its object, as move-
ment from its term. And therefore, just as the primary
goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form, which
gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action
is derived from its suitable object: hence some call such an
action good in its genus ; for instance, to make use of what
is one's own. And just as, in natural things, the primary

214 QUESTION XVIII

evil is when a generated thing does not reaHze its specific
form (for instance, if instead of a man, something else be
generated) ; so the primary evil in moral actions is that which
is from the object, for instance, to take what belongs to an-
other. And this action is said to be evil in its genus, genus
here standing for species, just as we apply the term mankind
to the whole human species.

Reply Obj. i. Although external things are good in them-
selves, nevertheless they have not always a due proportion
to this or that action. And so, inasmuch as they are con-
sidered as objects of such actions, they have not the qualit}^
of goodness.

Reply Obj. 2. The object is not the matter of which (a
thing is made), but the matter about which (something is
done) ; and stands in relation to the act as its form, as it
were, through giving it its species.

Reply Obj. 3. The object of the human action is not always
the object of an active power. For the appetitive power is,
in a way, passive; in so far as it is moved by the appetible
object; and yet it is a principle of human actions. — Nor
again have the objects of the active powers always the nature
of an effect, but only when they are already transformed:
thus food when transformed is the effect of the nutritive
power; whereas food before being transformed stands in
relation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it
exercises its operation. Now since the object is in some way
the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term
of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and
species, since movement derives its species from its terms. —
Moreover, although the goodness of an action is not caused
by the goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be good
from the fact that it can produce a good effect. Conse-
quently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the
measure of its goodness.

GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS 215

Third Article.

WHETHER man's ACTION IS GOOD OR EVIL FROM
A CIRCUMSTANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that an action is not good or evil
from a circumstance. For circumstances stand around
(circumstant) an action, as being outside it, as stated above
(Q. VII., A. i). But good and evil are in things themselves, as
is stated in Metaph. vi. Therefore an action does not derive
goodness or malice from a circumstance.

Ohj. 2. Further, the goodness or malice of an action is con-
sidered principally in the doctrine of morals. But since
circumstances are accidents of actions, it seems that they
are outside the scope of art: because no art takes notice oj
what is accidental {Metaph. vi.). Therefore the goodness or
malice of an action is not taken from a circumstance.

Oh]. 3. Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect
of its substance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident.
But good and evil belong to an action in respect of its sub-
stance; because an action can be good or evil in its genus
as stated above (A. 2). Therefore an action is not good or
bad from a circumstance.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says {Ethic, ii.) that a
virtuous man acts as he should, and when he should, and so
on in respect of the other circumstances. Therefore, on
the other hand, the vicious man, in the matter of each vice,
acts when he should not, or where he should not, and so on
with the other circumstances. Therefore human actions
are good or evil according to circumstances.

/ answer that. In natural things, it is to be noted that the
whole fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the
mere substantial form, that gives it its species; since a thing
derives much from supervening accidents, as man does from
shape, colour, and the like; and if any one of these accidents
be out of due proportion, evil is the result. So is it with
action. For the plenitude of its goodness does not consist

2i6 QUESTION XVIII

wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which
accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its
due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting
that is requisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil.

Reply Ohj. i. Circumstances are outside an action, inas-
much as they are not part of its essence; but they are in an
action as accidents thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural
substances are outside the essence.

Reply Ohj. 2. Every accident is not accidentally in its
subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every
art takes notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of
actions are considered in the doctrine of morals.

Reply Ohj. 3. Since good and being are convertible; ac-
cording as being is predicated of substance and of accident,
so is good predicated of a thing both in respect of its essential
being, and in respect of its accidental being; and this, both
in natural things and in moral actions.

Fourth Article.

whether a human action is good or evil
from its end ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the good and evil in human
actions are not from the end. For Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv.) that nothing acts with a view to evil. If therefore
an action were good or evil from its end, no action would be
evil. Which is clearly false.

Ohj. 2. Further, the goodness of an action is something in
the action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore
an action is not said to be good or bad according to its end.

Ohj. 3. Further, a good action may happen to be ordained
to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory;
and conversely, an evil action may happen to be ordained
to a good end, as a theft committed in order to give some-
thing to the poor. Therefore an action is not good or evil
from its end.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Differ. Topic, n.) that

GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS 217

if the end is good, the thing is good, and if the end he evil, the
thing also is evil.

I answer that, The disposition of things as to goodness is
the same as their disposition as to being. Now in some things
the being does not depend on another, and in these it
suffices to consider their being absolutely. But these are
things the being of which depends on something else, and
hence in their regard we must consider their being in its
relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as the
being of a thing depends on the agent and the form, so the
goodness of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the
Divine Persons, Whose goodness does not depend on another,
the measure of goodness is not taken from the end. Where-
as human actions, and other things, the goodness of which
depends on something else, have a measure of goodness
from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness
which is in them absolutely.

Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a
human action. First, that which, as an action, it derives
from its genus; because as much as it has of action and
being so much has it of goodness, as stated above (A. i).
Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which is
derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has goodness
from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents.
Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is com-
pared as to the cause of its goodness.

Reply Ohj. i. The good in view of which one acts is not
always a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, some-
times an apparent good. And in the latter event, an evil
action results from the end in view.

Reply Ohj. 2. Although the end is an extrinsic cause,
nevertheless due proportion to the end, and relation to the
end, are inherent to the action.

Reply Ohj. 3. Nothing hinders an action that is good in one
of the ways mentioned above, from lacking goodness in
another way. And thus it may happen that an action which
is good in its species or in its circumstances, is ordained to an
evil end, or vice versa. However, an action is not good

2i8 QUESTION XVIII

simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since evil results
from any single defect, hut good from the complete cause, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.).

Fifth Article.

whether a human action is good or evil in
its species ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that good and evil in moral actions
do not make a difference of species. For the existence of
good and evil in actions is in conformity with their existence
in things, as stated above (A. i). But good and evil do not
make a specific difference in things; for a good man is
specifically the same as a bad man. Therefore neither do
they make a specific difference in actions.

Ohj. 2. Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being.
But non-being cannot be a difference, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. iii.). Since therefore the difference
constitutes the species, it seems that an action is not consti-
tuted in a species through being evil. Consequently good
and evil do not diversify the species of human actions.

Ohj. 3. Further, acts that differ in species produce different
effects. But the same specific effect results from a good
and from an evil action: thus a man is born of adulterous or
of lawful wedlock. Therefore good and evil actions do not
differ in species.

Ohj. 4. Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or
bad from a circumstance, as stated above (A. 3). But since
a circumstance is an accident, it does not give an action its
species. Therefore human actions do not differ in species
on account of their goodness or malice.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, ii.)
like habits produce like actions. But a good and a bad habit
differ in species, as liberality and prodigahty. Therefore
also good and bad actions differ in species.

1 answer that, Every action derives its species from its
object, as stated above (A. 2). Hence it follows that a

GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS 219

difference of object causes a difference of species in actions.
Now, it must be observed that a difference of objects causes
a difference in actions, according as the latter are referred to
one active principle, which does not cause a difference in
actions, according as they are referred to another active
principle. Because nothing accidental constitutes a species,
but only that which is essential; and a difference of object
may be essential in reference to one active principle, and
accidental in reference to another. Thus to know colour
and to know sound, differ essentially in reference to sense,
but not in reference to the intellect.

Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in
reference to the reason; because as Dionysius says {Div.
Noni. iv.), the good of man is to he in accordance with reason,
and evil is to he against reason. For that is good for a thing
which suits it in regard to its form; and evil, that which is
against the order of its form. It is therefore evident that
the difference of good and evil considered in reference to the
object is an essential difference in relation to reason; that
is to say, according as the object is suitable or unsuitable to
reason. Now certain actions are called human or moral,
inasmuch as they proceed from the reason. Consequently it
is evident that good and evil diversify the species in human
actions ; since essential differences cause a difference of species.

Reply Ohj. i. Even in natural things, good and evil, inas-
much as something is according to nature, and something
against nature, diversify the natural species; for a dead body
and a living body are not of the same species. In like manner,
good, inasmuch as it is in accord with reason, and evil, in-
asmuch as it is against reason, diversify the moral species.

Reply Ohj. 2. Evil implies privation, not absolute, but
affecting some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil
in its species, not because it has no object at all; but because
it has an object in disaccord with reason, for instance, to
appropriate another's property. Wherefore in so far as the
object is something positive, it can constitute the species of
an evil act.

Reply Ohj. 3. The conjugal act and adultery, as compared

220 QUESTION XVIII

to reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically
different; because the one deserves praise and reward, the
other, blame and punishment. But as compared to the
generative power, they do not differ in species; and thus they
have one specific effect.

Reply Ohj. 4. A circumstance is sometimes taken as the
essential difference of the object, as compared to reason;
and then it can specify a moral act. And it must needs be
so whenever a circumstance transforms an action from good
to evil; for a circumstance would not make an action evil,
except through being repugnant to reason.

Sixth Article,
whether an action has the species of good or evil

from its end ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the good and evil which are
from the end do not diversify the species of actions. For
actions derive their species from the object. But the end
is altogether apart from the object. Therefore the good
and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species
of an action.

Ohj. 2. Further, that which is accidental does not consti-
tute the species, as stated above (A. 5). But it is accidental
to an action to be ordained to some particular end; for
instance, to give alms from vainglory. Therefore actions
are not diversified as to species, according to the good and
evil which are from the end.

Ohj. 3. Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained
to the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of
various virtues and vices can be ordained. Therefore the
good and evil which are taken from the end, do not diversify
the species of action.

On the contrary, It has been shown above (Q. I., A. 3)
that human actions derive their species from the end.
Therefore good and evil in respect of the end, diversify the
species of actions.

GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS 221

/ answer that, Certain actions are called human, inasmuch
as they are voluntary, as stated above (Q. L, A. i). Now,
in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz., the
interior action of the will, and the external action : and each
of these actions has its object. The end is properly the
object of the interior act of the will: while the object of the
external action, is that on which the action is brought to
bear. Therefore just as the external action takes its species
from the object on which it bears: so the interior act of the
will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper
object.

Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in
regard to that which is on the part of the external action:
because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments; nor
have external actions any measure of morality, save in so
far as they are voluntary. Consequently the species of a
human act is considered formally with regard to the end,
but materially with regard to the object of the external
action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic v.) that he who
steals that he may commit adultery, is, strictly speaking, more
adulterer than thief.

Reply Ohj. i. The end also has the character of an object,
as stated above.

Reply Ohj. 2. Although it is accidental to the external
action to be ordained to some particular end, it is not
accidental to the interior act of the will, which act is com -
pared to the external act, as form to matter.

Reply Ohj. 3. When many actions, differing in species,
are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of
species on the part of the external actions; but unity of
species on the part of the internal action.

222 ^ QUESTION XVIII

Seventh Article.

whether the species derived from the end is con-
tained under the species derived from the object,
as under its genus, or conversely ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the species of goodness derived
from the end is contained under the species of goodness
derived from the object, as a species is contained under its
genus; for instance, when a man commits a theft in order
to give an alms. For an action takes its species from its
object, as stated above (AA. 2, 6). But it is impossible for
a thing to be contained under another species, if this species
be not contained under the proper species of that thing;
because the same thing cannot be contained in different
species that are not subordinate to one another. Therefore
the species which is taken from the end, is contained under
the species which is taken from the object.

Ohj. 2. Further, the last difference always constitutes
the most specific species. But the difference derived from
the end seems to be come after the difference derived from
the object: because the end is something last. Therefore
the species derived from the end, is contained under the
species derived from the object, as its most specific species.

Ohj. 3. Further, the more formal a difference is, the more
specific it is: because difference is compared to genus, as
form to matter. But the species derived from the end, is
more formal than that which is derived from the object, as
stated above (A. 6). Therefore the species derived from
the end is contained under the species derived from the
object, as the most specific species is contained under the
subaltern genus.

On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate differ-
ences. But an action of one same species on the part of
its object, can be ordained to an infinite number of ends:
for instance, theft can be ordained to an infinite number of
good and bad ends. Therefore the species derived from the

GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS 223

end is not contained under the species derived from the
object, as under its genus.

I answer that, The object of the external act can stand in
a twofold relation to the end of the will: first, as being of
itself ordained thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained
to victory; secondly, as being ordained thereto accidentally;
thus to take what belongs to another is ordained accident-
ally to the giving of alms. Now the differences that divide
a genus, and constitute the species of that genus, must, as
the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii.), belong to that genus of
themselves : and if they belong to it accidentally, the division
is incorrect: as, if one were to say: Animals are divided into
rational and irrational ; and the irrational into animals with
wings, and animals without wings ; for winged and wingless
are not essential determinations of the irrational being.
But the following division would be correct: Some animals
have feet, some have no feet : and of those that have feet, some
have two feet, some four, some many : because the latter
division is an essential determination of the former. Accord-
ingly when the object is not of itself ordained to the end,
the specific difference derived from the object is not an essen-
tial determination of the species derived from the end, nor
is the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is
not under the other; but then the moral action is contained
under two species that are disparate, as it were. Conse-
quently we say that he that commits adultery for the sake
of theft, is guilty of a twofold malice in one action. — On
the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the end,
one of these differences is an essential determination of the
other. Wherefore one of these species will be contained
under the other.

It remains to be considered which of the two is contained
under the other. In order to make this clear, we must first
of all observe that the more particular the form is from
which a difference is taken, the more specific is the differ-
ence. Secondly, that the more universal an agent is, the
more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the
more remote an end is. the more universal the agent to

224 QUESTION XVIII

which it corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of
the army, is the end intended by the commander in chief;
while the command of this or that regiment is the end in-
tended by one of the lower officers. From all this it follows
that the specific difference derived from the end, is more
general; and that the difference derived from an object
which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference
in relation to the former. For the will, the proper object
of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect of all
the powers of the soul, the proper objects of which are the
objects of their particular acts.

Reply Ohj. i. One and the same thing, considered in its
substance, cannot be in two species, one of which is not
subordinate to the other. But in respect of those things
which are superadded to the substance, one thing can be
contained under different species. Thus one and the same
fruit, as to its colour, is contained under one species, i.e., a
white thing: and, as to its perfume, under the species of
sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as
to its substance, is in one natural species, considered in
respect of the moral conditions that are added to it, can
belong to two species, as stated above.

Reply Ohj. 2. The end is last in execution; but first in the
intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions
receive their species.

Reply Ohj. 3. Difference is compared to genus as form to
matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other
hand, the genus is considered as more formal than the
species, inasmuch as it is something more absolute and less
contracted. Wherefore also the parts of a definition are
reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated in Phys. ii.
And in this sense the genus is the formal cause of the species;
and so much the more formal, as it is more universal.

GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS 225

Eighth Article,
whether any action is indifferent in its species ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth A rticle : —

Objection i. It seems that no action is indifferent in its
species. For evil is the privation of good, according to
Augustine {Enchirid. 41). But privation and habit are
immediate contraries, according to the Philosopher (Categor.
viii.). Therefore there is no such thing as an action that
is indifferent in its species, as though it were between good
and evil.

Obj. 2. Further, human actions derive their species from
their end or object, as stated above (Q. VI., AA. i, 3). Bat
every end and every object is either good or bad. There-
fore every human action is good or evil according to its
species.

Obj. 3. Further, as stated above (A. i), an action is said
to be good, when it has its due complement of goodness;
and evil, when it lacks that complement. But every action
must needs either have the entire plenitude of its goodness,
or lack it in some respect. Therefore every action must
needs be either good or bad in its species, and none is
indifferent.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Serni. Dom. in
Mont, ii.), that there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which
can be done with a good or evil mind, of which it is rash to
form a judgment. Therefore some actions are indifferent
according to their species.

/ answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 5), every action
takes its species from its object; while human action, which
is called moral, takes its species from the object, in relation
to the principle of human actions, which is the reason.
Wherefore if the object of an action includes something in
accord with the order of reason, it will be a good action
according to its species; for instance, to give alms to a person
in want. On the other hand, if it includes something
repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act

II. I 15

226 QUESTION XVIII

according to its species; for instance, to steal, which is to
appropriate what belongs to another. But it may happen
that the object of an action does not include something
pertaining to the order of reason; for instance, to pick up a
straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the like:
and such actions are indifferent according to their species.

Reply Ohj. i. Privation is twofold. One is privation as
a result {privatum esse), and this leaves nothing, but takes
all away: thus blindness takes away sight altogether; dark-
ness, light; and death, life. Between this privation and
the contrary habit, there can be no medium in respect of
the proper subject. — The other is privation in process
(privari) : thus sickness is privation of health, not that it
takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road
to the entire loss of health, occasioned by death. And
since this sort of privation leaves something, it is not
always the immediate contrary of the opposite habit. In
this way evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius says in
his commentary on the Categories: because it does not take
away all good, but leaves some. Consequently there can be
something between good and evil.

Reply Ohj. 2. Every object or end has some goodness or
malice, at least natural to it : but this does not imply moral
goodness or malice, which is considered in relation to the
reason, as stated above.

Reply Ohj, 3. Not everything belonging to an action
belongs also to its species. Wherefore although an action's
specific nature may not contain all that belongs to the full
complement of its goodness, it is not therefore an action
specifically bad; nor is it specifically good. Thus a man in
regard to his species is neither virtuous nor wicked.

Ninth Article,
whether an individual action can be indifferent ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that an individual action can be
indifferent. For there is no species that does not, or cannot,

GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS 227

contain an individual. But an action can be indifferent in
its species, as stated above (A. 8). Therefore an individual
action can be indifferent.

Obj. 2. Further, individual actions cause like habits, as
stated in Ethic, ii. But a habit can be indifferent: for the
Philosopher says (Ethic, iv.) that those who are of an even
temper and prodigal disposition are not evil; and yet it is
evident that they are not good, since they depart from
virtue; and thus they are indifferent in respect of a habit.
Therefore some individual actions are indifferent.

Obj. 3. Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while
moral evil belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that
a man fails to ordain a specifically indifferent action to a
vicious or virtuous end. Therefore an individual action
may happen to be indifferent.

On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi. ijt Evang.) :
An idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude
or the motive of just necessity or pious utility. But an idle
word is an evil, because men . . . shall render an account of it
in the day of judgment (Matth. xii. 36) : — while if it does not
lack the motive of just necessity or pious utility, it is good.
Therefore every word is either good or bad. For the same
reason every other action is either good or bad. Therefore
no individual action is indifferent.

/ answer that, It happens that an action is indifferent in
its species; but considered in the individual it is good or
evil. And the reason of this is because a moral action, as
stated above (A. 3), derives its goodness not only from its
object, whence it takes its species; but also from the cir-
cumstances, which are its accidents, as it were; just as
something belongs to a man by reason of his individual
accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of his
species. And every individual action must needs have
some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in
respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to
the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliber-
ate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact
alone, repugnant to reason, and is specifically evil. But

228 QUESTION XVIII

if it be directed to a due end it is in accord with reason;
wherefore it is specifically good. Now it must needs be
either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently
every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason,
if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.

If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason,
but from some act of the imagination, as when a man
strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action,
properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this depends
on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as standing
apart from the genus of moral actions.

Reply Ohj. i. For an action to be indifferent in its species
can be understood in several ways. First in such a way that
its indifference is drawn from its very species: and the
objection proceeds on this line. But no action can be speci-
fically indifferent thus: since no object of human action is
such that it cannot be directed to good or evil, either
through its end or through a circumstance. — Secondly,
specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact that
as far as its species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad.
Wherefore it can be made good or bad by something else.
Thus man, as far as his species is concerned, is neither
white nor black; nor is it a condition of his species that he
should not be black or white; but blackness or whiteness
is superadded to man by other principles than those of
his species.

Reply Ohj. 2. The Philosopher states that a man is evil,
properly speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accord-
ingly he says that the prodigal is not evil, because he hurts
none save himself. And the same applies to all others
who are not hurtful to other men. But we say here that
evil, in general, is all that is repugnant to right reason.
And in this sense every individual action is either good or
bad, as stated above.

Reply Ohj, 3. Whenever an end is intended by dehberate
reason, it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or
to the evil of some vice. Thus, if a man's action is
directed to the support or repose of his body, it is also

GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS 229

directed to the good of virtue, provided he direct his body
itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to
other actions.

Tenth Article.

whether a circumstance places a moral action in the
species of good or evil ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that a circumstance cannot place a
moral action in the species of good or evil. For the species
of an action is taken from its object. But circumstances
differ from the object. Therefore circumstances do not
give an action its species.

Ohj. 2. Further, circumstances are as accidents in rela-
tion to the moral action, as stated above (Q. VII., A. i).
But an accident does not constitute the species. Therefore
a circumstance does not constitute a species of good or evil.

Ohj. 3. Further, one thing is not in several species. But
one action has several circumstances. Therefore a cir-
cumstance does not place a moral action in a species of
good or evil.

On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place
makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for
theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore
a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good
or bad.

I answer that, Just as the species of natural things are
constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral
actions are constituted by forms as conceived by the reason,
as is evident from what was said above (A. 5). But since
nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process of
nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate
form beyond which no further specific difference is possible.
Hence it is that in natural things, that which is accidental
to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the
species. But the process of reason is not fixed to one par-
ticular term, for at any point it can still proceed further.
And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a

230 QUESTION XVIII

circumstance added to the object that specifies the action,
can again be taken by the directing reason, as the prin-
cipal condition of the object that determines the action's
species. Thus to appropriate another's property is specified
by reason of the property being another's, and in this respect
it is placed in the species of theft; and if we consider that
action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will
be an additional circumstance. But since the reason can
direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that
the condition as to time, in relation to the object, is con-
sidered as being in disaccord with reason : for instance, reason
forbids damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently
to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to
the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of all
considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the
principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant to
reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has a
special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs
specify the moral action whether good or bad.

Reply Ohj. i. A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an
action, is considered as a condition of the object, as stated
above, and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.

Reply Ohj. 2. A circumstance, so long as it is but a cir-
cumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a
mere accident: but when it becomes a principal condition
of the object, then it does specify the action.

Reply Ohj. 3. It is not every circumstance that places the
moral action in the species of good or evil; since not every
circumstance implies accord or disaccord with reason .
Consequently, although one action may have many cir-
cumstances, it does not follow that it is in many species.
Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not
be in several, and yet disparate, moral species.

GOOD AND EVIL IN HUMAN ACTS 231

Eleventh Article.

whether every circumstance that makes an action
better or worse, places a moral action in a
species of good or evil ?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article : —

Objection i. It seems that every circumstance relating
to good or evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are
specific differences of moral actions. Therefore that which
causes a difference in the goodness or malice of amoral action,
causes a specific difference, which is the same as to make it
differ in species. Now that which makes an action better
or worse, makes it differ in goodness and malice. Therefore
it causes it to differ in species. Therefore every circum-
stance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a
species.

Ohj. 2. Further, an additional circumstance either has in
itself the character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If
not, it cannot make the action better: because what is not
good, cannot make a greater good; and what is not evil,
cannot make a greater evil. But if it has in itself the char-
acter of good or evil, for this very reason it has a certain
species of good or evil. Therefore every circumstance that
makes an action better or worse, constitutes a new species
of good or evil.

Ohj. 3. Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv.),
evil is caused by each single defect. Now every circumstance
that increases malice, has a special defect. Therefore every
such circumstance adds a new species of sin. And for the
same reason, every circumstance that increases goodness,
seems to add a new species of goodness: just as every unity
added to a number makes a new species of number; since
the good consists in number, weight, and measure (P. I.,
Q. v., A. 5).

On the contrary, More and less do not change a species.
But more and less is a circumstance of additional goodness
or malice. Therefore not every circumstance that makes

232 QUESTION XVIII

a moral action better or worse, places it in a species of good
or evil.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. lo), a circumstance
gives the species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far
as it regards a special order of reason. Now it happens
sometimes that a circumstance does not regard a special
order of reason in respect of good or evil, except on the
supposition of another previous circumstance, from which
the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to
take something in a large or small quantity, does not regard
the order of reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain
other condition be presupposed, from which the action takes
its malice or goodness; for instance, if what is taken belongs
to another, which makes the action to be discordant with
reason. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a
large or small quantity, does not change the species of the
sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin.
The same applies to other evil or good actions. Conse-
quently not every circumstance that makes a moral action
better or worse, changes its species.

Reply Ohj. i. In things which can be more or less intense,
the difference of more or less does not change the species : thus
by differing in whiteness through being more or less white
a thing is not changed in regard to its species of colour. In
like manner that which makes an action to be more or less
good or evil, does not make the action differ in species.

Reply Ohj. 2. A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or
adds to the goodness of an action, sometimes has no good-
ness or malice in itself, but in regard to some other condition
of the action, as stated above. Consequently it does not
add a new species, but adds to the goodness or malice de-
rived from this other condition of the action.

Reply Ohj. 3. A circumstance does not always involve a
distinct defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in
reference to something else. In like manner a circumstance
does not always add further perfection, except in reference
to something else. And, for as much as it does, although it
may add to the goodness or malice, it does not always
change the species of good or evil.

QUESTION XIX.

OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR
ACT OF THE WILL.

{In Ten Articles.)

We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of
the will ; under which head there are ten points of inquiry :
(i) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object ?
(2) Whether it depends on the object alone ? (3) Whether
it depends on reason ? (4) Whether it depends on the eternal
law ? (5) Whether erring reason binds ? (6) Whether
the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the
law of God ? (7) Whether the goodness of the will in
regard to the means, depends on the intention of the end ?

(8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will
depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention ?

(9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its con-
formity to the Divine Will ? (10) Whether it is necessary
for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to
the Divine Will, as regards the thing willed ?

First Article.

whether the goodness of the will depends
on the object ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the goodness of the will does
not depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed
otherwise than to what is good: since evil is outside the scope
of the will, as Dionysius says {Div. Nom. iv.). If therefore
the goodness of the will depended on the object, it would
follow that every act of the will is good, and none bad.

233

234 QUESTION XIX

Obj. 2. Further, good is first of all in the end: where-
fore the goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on
any other. But, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, vi.),
goodness of action is the end, hut goodness of snaking is
never the end : because the latter is always ordained to the
thing made, as to its end. Therefore the goodness of the
act of the will does not depend on any object.

Ohj. 3. Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a
thing to be. But the object of the will is good, by reason of
the goodness of nature. Therefore it cannot give moral
goodness to the will. Therefore the moral goodness of the
will does not depend on the object.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic, v.) that
justice is that habit /row which men wish for just things : and
accordingly, virtue is a habit from which men wish for good
things. But a good will is «one which is in accordance with
virtue. Therefore the goodness of the will is from the fact
that a man wills that which is good.

/ answer that. Good and evil are essential differences of
the act of the will. Because good and evil of themselves
regard the will; just as truth and falsehood regard reason;
the act of which is divided essentially by the difference of
truth and falsehood, for as much as an opinion is said to be
true or false. Consequently good and evil will are acts
differing in species. Now the specific difference in acts
is according to objects, as stated above (Q. XVII., A. 5).
Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived
properly from the objects.

Reply Obj. i. The will is not always directed to what is
truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good; which has
indeed some measure of good, but not of a good that is
simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the act of
the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.

Reply Obj. 2. Although an action can, in a certain way,
be man's last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of
the will, as stated above (Q. I., A. i ,ad 2).

Reply Obj. 3. Good is presented to the will as its object:
and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the moral

GOODNESS OF THE WILL 235

order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will:
because the reason is the principle of human and moral acts,
as stated above (Q. XVIIL, A. 5).

Second Article.

whether the goodness of the will depends
on the object alone ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the goodness of the will does
not depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer
relationship to the will than to any other power. But the
acts of the other powers derive goodness not only from the
object but also from the end, as we have shown above
(Q. XVIIL, A. 4). Therefore the act also of the will derives
goodness not only from the object but also from the end.

Ohj. 2. Farther, the goodness of an action is derived not
only from the object but also from the circumstances, as
stated above (Q. XVIIL, A. 3). But according to the
diversity of circumstances there may be diversity of good-
ness and malice in the act of the will : for instance, if a man
will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as he ought,
and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not. Therefore
the goodness of the will depends not only on the object, but
also on the circumstances.

Ohj. 3. Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses
malice of the will, as stated above (Q. VI., A. 8). But it
would not be so, unless the goodness or malice of the will
depended on the circumstances. Therefore the goodness
and malice of the will depend on the circumstances, and not
only on the object.

On the contrary, An action does not take its species from
the circumstances as such, as stated above (Q. XVIIL, A. 10
ad 2). But good and evil are specific differences of the act
of the will, as stated above (A. i). Therefore the goodness
and malice of the will depend, not on the circumstances, but
on the object alone.

I answer that, In every genus, the more a thing is first, the

236 QUESTION XIX

more simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it
consists: thus primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be
observed that the first things in every genus, are, in some
way, simple and consist of one principle. Now the principle
of the goodness and malice of human actions is taken from the
act of the will. Consequently the goodness and malice of
the act of the will depend on some one thing ; while the good-
ness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.

Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus,
is not something accidental to that genus, but something
essential thereto : because whatever is accidental is reduced
to something essential, as to its principle. Therefore the
goodness of the will's act depends on that one thing alone,
which of itself causes goodness in the act; and that one
thing is the object, and not the circumstances, which are
accidents, as it were, of the act.

Reply Ohj. i. The end is the object of the will, but not of
the other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will,
the goodness derived from the object, does not differ from
that which is derived from the end, as they differ in the acts
of the other powers: except perhaps accidentally, in so far
as one end depends on another, and one act of the will on
another.

Reply Ohj. 2. Given that the act of the will is fixed on
some good, no circumstance can make that act bad. Con-
sequently when it is said that a~man wills a good when he
ought not, or where he ought not, this can be understood in
two ways. First, so that this circumstance is referred to
the thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not fixed
on something good: since to will to do something when it
ought not to be done, is not to will something good.
Secondly, so that the circumstance is referred to the act of
willing. And thus, it is impossible to will something good
when one ought not to, because one ought always to will
what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in so far as a
man by willing some particular good, is prevented from
willing at the same time another good which he ought to
will at that time. And then evil results, not from his

GOODNESS OF THE WILL 237

willing that particular good, but from his not willing the
other. The same applies to the other circumstances.

Reply Ohj. 3. Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of
the will, in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed :
that is to say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of
the act which he wills.

Third Article.

whether the goodness of the will depends

on reason ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the goodness of the will does
not depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend
on what follows. But the good belongs to the will before it
belongs to reason, as is clear from what has been said above
(Q. IX., A. i). Therefore the goodness of the will does not
depend on reason.

Ohj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic, vi.) that the
goodness of the practical intellect is a truth that is in con-
formity with right desire. But right desire is a good will.
Therefore the goodness of the practical reason depends on
the goodness of the will, rather than conversely.

Ohj. 3. Further, the mover does not depend on that which
is moved, but vice versa. But the will moves the reason and
the other powers, as stated above (Q. IX., A. i). Therefore
the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.

On the contrary, Hilary says [De Trin. x.) : It is an unruly
will that persists in its desires in opposition to reason. But
the goodness of the will consists in not being unruly. There-
fore the goodness of the will depends on its being subject to
reason.

/ answer that, As stated above (AA. i, 2), the goodness of
the will depends properly on the object. Now the will's
object is proposed to it by reason. Because the good
understood is the proportionate object of the will; while
sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not to the will
but to the sensitiv/e appetite: since the will can tend to the

238 QUESTION XIX

universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the
sensitive appetite tends only to the particular good, appre-
hended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of
the will depends on reason, in the same way as it depends on
the object.

Reply Ohj. i. The good considered as such, i.e., as appet-
ible, pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason.
But considered as true it pertains to the reason, before,
under the aspect of goodness, pertaining to the will : because
the will cannot desire a good that it is not previously appre-
hended by reason.

Reply Ohj. 2. The Philosopher speaks there of the practical
intellect, in so far as it counsels and reasons about the
means: for in this respect it is perfected by prudence. Now
in regard to the means, the rectitude of the reason depends
on its conformity with the desire of a due end : nevertheless
the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of
reason a right apprehension of the end.

Reply Ohj. 3. The will moves the reason in one way: the
reason moves the will in another, viz., on the part of the
object, as stated above (Q. IX., A. i).

Fourth Article.

whether the goodness of the will depends
on the eternal law ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that the goodness of the human will
does not depend on the eternal law. Because to one thing
there is one rule and one measure. But the rule of the
human will, on which its goodness depends, is right reason.
Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on the
eternal law.

Ohj. 2. Further, a measure is homogeneous with the thing
measured (Metaph. x.). But the eternal law is not homo-
geneous with the human will. Therefore the eternal law
cannot be the measure on which the goodness of the human
will depends.

GOODNESS OF THE WILL 239

Obj. 3. Further, a measure should be most certain. But
the eternal law is unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be
the measure on which the goodness of our will depends.

On the contrary, Augustine says {Contra Faust, xxii.) that
sin is a deed, word or desire against the eternal law. But
malice of the will is the root of sin. Therefore, since malice
is contrary to goodness, the goodness of the will depends on
the eternal law.

/ answer that, Wherever a number of causes are subor-
dinate to one another, the effect depends more on the first
than on the second cause: since the second cause acts only
in virtue of the first. Now it is from the eternal law, which
is the Divine Reason, that human reason is the rule of the
human will, from which the human will derives its good-
ness. Hence it is written (Ps. iv. 6, 7) : Many say : Who
showeth us good things ? The light of Thy countenance, 0
Lord, is signed upon us: as though to say: 'The light of
our reason is able to show us good things, and guide our
will, in so far as it is the light of (i.e., derived from) Thy
countenance.' It is therefore evident that the goodness
of the human will depends on the eternal law much more
than on human reason: and when human reason fails we
must have recourse to the Eternal Reason.

Reply Obj. i. To one thing there are not several proxi-
mate measures; but there can be several measures subor-
dinate to one another.

Reply Obj. 2. A proximate measure is homogeneous with
the thing measured; a remote measure is not.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the eternal law is unknown to us
according as it is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it be-
comes known to us somewhat, either by natural reason
which is derived therefrom as its proper image; or by some
sort of additional revelation.

240 QUESTION XIX

Fifth Article.

whether the will is^evil when it is at variance
with erring reason ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the will is not evil when it is
at variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the
rule of the human will, in so far as it is derived from the
eternal law, as stated above (A. 4). But erring reason is
not derived from the eternal law. Therefore erring reason
is not the rule of the human will. Therefore the will is not
evil, if it be at variance with erring reason.

Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine, the command
of a lower authority does not bind if it be contrary to the
command of a higher authority : for instance, if a provincial
governor command something that is forbidden by the
emperor. But erring reason sometimes proposes what is
against the command of a higher power, namely, God
Whose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an
erring reason does not bind. Consequently the will is not
evil if it be at variance with erring reason.

Obj. 3. Further, every evil will is reducible to some species
of malice. But the will that is at variance with erring
reason is not reducible to some species of malice. For
instance, if a man's reason err in telling him to commit
fornication, his will in not willing to do so, cannot be reduced
to any species of malice. Therefore the will is not evil when
it is at variance with erring reason.

On the contrary, As stated in the First Part (Q. LXXIX.,
A. 13), conscience is nothing else than the application of
knowledge to some action. Now knowledge is in the
reason. Therefore when the will is at variance with erring
reason, it is against conscience. But every such will is
evil; for it is written (Rom. xiv. 23) : All that is not of faith —
i.e., all that is against conscience — is sin. Therefore the
will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason.

/ answer that, Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the

GOODNESS OF THE WILL 241

reason (for it is an application of knowledge to action, as
was stated in the First Part, Q. LXXIX., A. 13), to inquire
whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring
reason, is the same as to inquire whether an erring con-
science hinds. On this matter, some distinguished three
kinds of actions: for some are good generically, some are
indifferent; some are evil generically. And they say that
if reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good
generically, there is no error: and in like manner if it tell
us not to do something which is evil generically; since it
is the same reason that prescribes what is good and forbids
what is evil. On the other hand if a man's reason or
conscience tell him that he is bound by precept to do what
is evil in itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden,
then his reason or conscience errs. In like manner if a
man's reason or conscience tell him, that what is indifferent
in itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground, is
forbidden or commanded, his reason or conscience errs.
They say, therefore, that reason or conscience when erring
in matters of indifference, either by commanding or by for-
bidding them, binds: so that the will which is at variance
with that erring reason is evil and sinful. But they say
that when reason or conscience errs in commanding what is
evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good in itself, it does
not bind; wherefore in such cases the will which is at variance
with erring reason or conscience is not evil.

But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference,
the will that is at variance with erring reason or conscience,
is evil in some way on account of the object, on which the
goodness or malice of the will depends; not indeed on
account of the object according as it is in its own nature ;
but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason
as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object
of the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated
above (A. 3), from the very fact that a thing is proposed
by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto
becomes evil. And this is the case not only in indifferent
matters, but also in those that are good or evil in themselves.

II. I 16

242 QUESTION XIX

For not only indifferent matters can receive the character
of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which is
good, can receive the character of evil, or that which is evil,
can receive the character of goodness, on account of the
reason apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain
from fornication is good : yet the will does not tend to this
good except in so far as it is proposed by the reason. If
therefore, the erring reason propose it as an evil, the will
tends to it as to something evil. Consequently the will is
evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in
itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through being
apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to
believe in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salva-
tion: but the will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch
as it is proposed by the reason. Consequently if it be
proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to
it as to something evil: not as if it were evil in itself, but
because it is evil accidentally, through the apprehension of
the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic, vii.) that
properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not
follow right reason ; hut accidentally , he is also one who does
not follow false reason. We must therefore conclude that,
absolutely speaking, every will at variance with reason,
whether right or erring, is always evil.

Reply Ohj. i. Although the judgment of an erring reason
is not derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward
its judgment as being true, and consequently as being
derived from God, from Whom is all truth.

Reply Ohj. 2. The saying of Augustine holds good when it
is known that the inferior authority prescribes something
contrary to the command of the higher authority. But if
a man were to believe the command of the proconsul to be
the command of the emperor, in scorning the command of
the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor.
In like manner if a man were to know that human reason
was dictating something contrary to God's commandment,
he would not be bound to abide by reason: but then reason
would not be entirely erroneous. But when erring reason

GOODNESS OF THE WILL 243

proposes something as being commanded by God, then to
scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of
God.

Reply Ohj. 3. Whenever reason apprehends something as
evil, it apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance,
as being something contrary to a divine precept, or as giving
scandal, or for some suchlike reason. And then that evil
is reduced to that species of malice.

Sixth Article,
whether the will is good when it abides by erring

REASON ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the will is good when it abides
by erring reason. For just as the will, when at variance
with the reason, tends to that which reason judges to be
evil; so, when in accord with the reason, it tends to what
reason judges to be good. But the will is evil when it is at
variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore even
when it abides by erring reason, the will is good.

Ohj. 2. Further, the will is always good, when it abides by
the commandment of God and the eternal law. But the
eternal law and God's commandment are proposed to us by
the apprehension of the reason, even when it errs. There-
fore the will is good, even when it abides by erring reason.

Ohj. 3. Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with
erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it
abides by erring reason, it seems that the will is always evil
when in conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a
case a man would be in two minds, and, of necessity, would
sin: which is unreasonable. Therefore the will is good
when it abides by erring reason.

On the contrary, The will of those who slew the apostles
was evil. And yet it was in accord with their erring reason,
according to John xvi. 2: The hour cometh, that whosoever
killeth you, will think that he doth a service to God. Therefore
the will can be evil, when it abides by erring reason.

244 QUESTION XIX

/ answer that, Whereas the previous question is the same
as inquiring whether an erring conscience hinds ; so this
question is the same as inquiring whether an erring con-
science excuses. Now this question depends on what has
been said above about ignorance. For it was said (Q. VI.,
A. 8) that ignorance sometimes causes an act to be in-
voluntary, and sometimes not. And since moral good and
evil consist in action in so far as it is voluntary, as was
stated above (A. 2) ; it is evident that when ignorance causes
an act to be involuntary, it takes away the species of moral
good and evil; but not, when it does not cause the act to
be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above (Q. VI.,
A. 8) that when ignorance is in any way willed, either
directly or indirectly, it does not cause the act to be in-
voluntary. And I call that ignorance directly voluntary,
to which the act of the will tends: and that, indirectly
voluntary, which is due to negligence, by reason of a man
not wishing to know what he ought to know, as stated
above (Q. VI., A. 8).

If then reason or conscience err with an error that is
voluntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that
one errs about what one ought to know; then such an error
of reason or conscience does not excuse the will, that
abides by that erring reason or conscience, from being evil.
But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance,
and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be
involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience excuses
the will, that abides by that erring reason, from being evil.
For instance, if erring reason tell a man that he should go
to another man's wife, the will that abides by that erring
reason is evil; since this error arises from ignorance of the
Divine Law, which he is bound to know. But if a man's
reason errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he
wish to give her her right when she asks for it, his will is
excused from being evil: because this error arises from
ignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance excuses, and
causes the act to be involuntary.

Reply Ohj. i. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi.), good

GOODNESS OF THE WILL 245

results from the entire cause, evil from each particular defect.
Consequently, in order that the thing to which the will
tends be called evil, it suffices, either that it be evil in itself,
or that it be apprehended as evil. But in order for it to
be good, it must be good in both ways.

Reply Ohj. 2. The eternal law cannot err, but human
reason can. Consequently the will that abides by human
reason, is not always right, nor is it always in accord with
the eternal law.

Reply Ohj. 3. Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted
one absurdity, others must needs follow; so in moral matters,
given one absurdity, others must follow too. Thus suppose
a man to seek vainglory, he will sin, whether he does his
duty for vainglory, or whether he omit to do it. Nor is he
in two minds about the matter: because he can put aside
his evil intention. In like manner, suppose a man's reason
or conscience to err through inexcusable ignorance, then
evil must needs result in the will. Nor is this man in
two minds: because he can lay aside his error, since his
ignorance is vincible and voluntary.

Seventh Article.

whether the goodness of the will, as regards the
means, depends on the intention of the end ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the goodness of the will does
not depend on the intention of the end. For it has been
stated above (A. 2) that the goodness of the will depends
on the object alone. But as regards the means, the object
of the will is one thing, and the end intended is another.
Therefore in such matters the goodness of the will does not
depend on the intention of the end.

Ohj. 2. Further, to wish to keep God's commandment,
belongs to a good will. But this can be referred to an evil
end, for instance to vainglory or covetousness, by willing to
obey God for the sake of temporal gain. Therefore the good-
ness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end.

246 QUESTION XIX

Ob], 3. Further, just as good and evil diversify the will,
so do they diversify the end. But malice of the will does
not depend on the malice of the end intended ; since a man
who wills to steal in order to give alms, has an evil will,
although he intends a good end. Therefore neither does the
goodness of the will depend on the goodness of the end
intended.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess, ix.) that God
rewards the intention. But God rewards a thing because it
is good. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on
the intention of the end.

/ answer that, The intention may stand in a twofold
relation to the act of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly
as following* it. The intention precedes the act of the will
causally, when we will something because we intend a
certain end. And then the order to the end is considered
as the reason of the goodness of the thing willed: for in-
stance, when a man wills to fast for God's sake; because the
act of fasting is specifically good from the very fact that it is
done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the goodness of the
will depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as stated
above (AA. i, 2), it must, of necessity, depend on the in-
tention of the end.

On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will,
when it is added to a preceding act of the will : for instance,
a man may will to do something, and may afterwards refer
it to God. And then the goodness of the previous act of
the will does not depend on the subsequent intention, except
in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent
intention.

Reply Ob'j. i. When the intention is the cause of the act
of willing, the order to the end is considered as the reason of
the goodness of the object, as stated above.

Reply Ohj. 2. The act of the will cannot be said to be good,

if an evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man

wills to give an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that

which is good in itself, under a species of evil; and there-

* Leonine ed. — accompanying.

GOODNESS OF THE WILL 247

fore, as willed by him, it is evil. Wherefore his will is
evil. If, however, the intention is subsequent to the act
of the will, then the latter may be good: and the intention
does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but that
which is repeated.

Refly Ohj. 3. x\s we have already stated (A. 6 ad i), evil
results from each particular defect, hut good from the whole
and entire cause. Hence, whether the will tend to what
is evil in itself, even under the species of good ; or to the good
under the species of evil, it will be evil in either case. But
in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the good
under the species of good; in other words, it must will the
good for the sake of the good.

Eighth Article.

whether the degree of goodness or malice in the
will depends on the degree of good or evil in
the intention ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth A rticle : —

Objection i. It seems that the degree of goodness in the
will depends on the degree of good in the intention. Be-
cause on Matth. xii. 35 (Luke vi. 45), A good man out of the
good treasure of his heart, hringeth forth that which is good ,
the gloss says : A man does as much good as he intends. But
the intention gives goodness not only to the external action,
but also to the act of the will, as stated above (A. 7) .
Therefore the goodness of a man's will is according to the
goodness of his intention.

Ohj. 2. Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the
effect. But the goodness of the intention is the cause of
the good will. Therefore a man's will is good, according as
his intention is good.

Ohj. 3. Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion
to his intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a
murderous intention, he would be guilty of murder. There-
fore, for the same reason, in good actions, the will is good
in proportion to the good intended.

248 QUESTION XIX

On the contrary, The intention can be good, while the will
is evil. Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can
be better, and the will less good.

/ answer that, In regard to both the act, and the inten-
tion of the end, we may consider a twofold quantity: one,
on the part of the object, by reason of a man wilHng or
doing a good that is greater; the other, taken from the
intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts in-
tensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.

If then we speak of these respective quantities from the
point of view of the object, it is evident that the quantity
in the act does not depend on the quantity in the intention.
With regard to the external act this may happen in two
ways. First, through the object that is ordained to the
intended end not being proportionate to that end: for in-
stance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not realize
his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred
pounds. Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may
supervene in regard to the exterior action, which obstacles
we are unable to remove : for instance, a man intends to go
to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which prevent him
from going. — On the other hand, with regard to the in-
terior act of the will, this happens in only one way : because
the interior acts of the will are in our power, whereas the
external actions are not. But the will can will an object
that is not proportionate to the intended end : and thus the
will that tends to that object considered absolutely, is not
so good as the intention. Yet because the intention also
belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, — inasmuch, to wit,
as it is the reason thereof ; it comes to pass that the quantity
of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the
will ; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great good
for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a
good, is not proportionate to that good.

But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in
the act, according to their respective intensity, then the
intensity of the intention redounds upon the interior act
and the exterior act of the will: since the intention stands

GOODNESS OF THE WILL 249

in relation to them as a kind of form, as is clear from what
was said above (Q. XIL, A. 4; Q. XVIIL, A. 6). And yet
considered materially, while the intention is intense, the
interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially
speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as
much intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health.
Nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely,
redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense volition
of medicine.

We must observe, however, that the intensity of the
interior or exterior act, may be referred to the intention as
its object: as when a man intends to will intensely, or to do
something intensely. And yet it does not follow that he
wills or acts intensely : because the quantity of goodness in
the interior or exterior act does not depend on the quantity
of the good intended, as was shewn above (A. 7). And
hence it is that a man does not merit as much as he intends
to merit : because the quantity of merit is measured by the
intensity of the act, as we shall show later on (Q. XX., A. 4;
Q.CXIV., A.4).

Reply Obj. 1. This gloss speaks of good as in the estima-
tion of God, Who considers principally the intention of the
end. Wherefore another gloss says on the same passage
that the treasure of the heart is the intention, according to
which God judges our works. For the goodness of the inten-
tion, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon the good-
ness of the will, which makes even the external act to be
meritorious in God's sight.

Reply Obj. 2. The goodness of the intention is not the
whole cause of a good will. Hence the argument does not
prove.

Reply Obj. 3. The mere malice of the intention suffices to
make the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as
the intention is evil. But the same reasoning does not
apply to goodness, as stated above {ad 2)

250 QUESTION XIX

Ninth Article.

whether the goodness of the will depends on its
conformity to the divine will ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the goodness of the human will
does not depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Be-
cause it is impossible for man's will to be conformed to the
Divine will; as appears from the word of Isaias (Iv. 9):
As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are My ways
exalted above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts.
If therefore goodness of the will depended on its conformity
to the Divine will, it would follow that it is impossible for
man's will to be good. Which is inadmissible.

Obj. 2. Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine
will, so does our knowledge flow from the Divine know-
ledge. But our knowledge does not require to be con-
formed to God's knowledge; since God knows many things
that we know not. Therefore there is no need for our will
to be conformed to the Divine will.

Obj. 3. Further, the will is a principle of action. But our
action cannot be conformed to God's. Therefore neither
can our will be conformed to His.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xxvi. 39): Not as I
will, but as Thou wilt : which words He said, because He
wishes man to be upright and to tend to God, as Augustine
expounds in the Enchiridion {Enarr. in Ps. xxxii. ; serm. i.).
But the rectitude of the will is its goodness. Therefore the
goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine
will.

I answer that. As stated above (A. 7), the goodness of the
will depends on the intention of the end. Now the last
end of the human will is the Sovereign Good, namely, God,
as stated above (Q. I., A. 8; Q. III., A. i). Therefore the
goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained to the
Sovereign Good, that is, to God.

Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared to

GOODNESS OF THE WILL 251

the Divine will, as its proper object. Again that which is
lirst in any genus, is the measure and rule of all that belongs
to that genus. Moreover, everything attains to rectitude
and goodness, in so far as it is in accord with its proper
measure. Therefore in order that man's will be good, it
needs to be conformed to the Divine will.

Reply Ohj. i. The human will cannot be conformed to the
will of God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it.
In like manner human knowledge is conformed to the
Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth: and human
action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it is becoming
to the agent : — and this by way of imitation, not by way of
equality.

From the above may be gathered the replies to the
Second and Third Objections.

Tenth x\rti CLE.

WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE HUMAN WILL, IN ORDER
TO BE GOOD, TO BE CONFORMED TO THE DIVINE WILL,
AS REGARDS THE THING WILLED ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the human will need not always
be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed.
For we cannot will what we know not: since the appre-
hended good is the object of the will. But in many things
we know not what God wills. Therefore the human will can-
not be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing willed.

Ohj. 2. Further, God wills to damn the man whom He
foresees about to die in mortal sin. If therefore man were
bound to conform his will to the Divine will, in the point
of the thing willed, it would follow that a man is bound to
will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible.

Ohj. 3. Further, no one is bound to will what is against
filial piety. But if man were to will what God wills, this
would sometimes be contrary to filial piety: for instance,
when God wills the death of a father; if his son were to
will it also, it would be against filial piety. Therefore man

252 QUESTION XIX

is not bound to conform his will to the Divine will, as to the
thing willed.

On the contrary, (i) On Ps. xxxii. i, Praise hecometh the
upright, a gloss says: That man has an upright heart, who
wills what God wills. But everyone is bound to have an
upright heart. Therefore everyone is bound to will what
God wills.

(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as
does every act. If therefore man is bound to conform his
will to the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to conform
it, as to the thing willed.

(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing
different things. But whoever has a will in opposition to
the Divine will, has an evil will. Therefore whoever does
not conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing
willed, has an evil will.

/ answer that, As is evident from what has been said above
(AA. 3, 5), the will tends to its object, according as it is
proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be considered
in various ways by the reason, so as to appear good from
one point of view, and not good from another point of view.
And therefore if a man's will wills a thing to be, according
as it appears to be good, his will is good: and the will of
another man, who wills that thing not to be, according as it
appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in
willing a thief to be put to death, because this is just: while
the will of another — e.g., the thief's wife or son, who wishes
him not to be put to death, inasmuch as killing is a natural
evil, is also good.

Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason
or intellect; the more universal the aspect of the appre-
hended good, the more universal the good to which the
will tends. This is evident in the example given above:
because the judge has care of the common good, which is
justice, and therefore he wishes the thief's death, which
has the aspect of good in relation to the common estate;
whereas the thief's wife has to consider the private good
of the family, and from this point of view she wishes her

GOODNESS OF THE WILL 253

husband, the thief, not to be put to death. — Now the good
of the whole universe is that which is apprehended by God,
Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: hence what-
ever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of the common
good; this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the
whole universe. On the other hand, the apprehension of a
creature, according to its nature, is of some particular good,
proportionate to that nature. Now a thing may happen
to be good under a particular aspect, and yet not good
under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above.
And therefore it comes to pass that a certain will is good
from willing something considered under a particular aspect,
which thing God wills not, under a universal aspect, and
vice versa. And hence too it is that various wills of
various men can be good in respect of opposite things, for
as much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular
thing to be or not to be.

But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good,
unless he refer it to the common good as an end: since even
the natural appetite of each part is ordained to the common
good of the whole. Now it is the end that supplies the
formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is directed to
the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some
particular good with a right will, he must will that par-
ticular good materially, and the Divine and universal good,
formally. Therefore the human will is bound to be con-
formed to the Divine will, as to that which is willed formally,
for it is bound to will the Divine and universal good; but
not as to that which is willed materially, for the reason
given above.

At the same time in both these respects, the human will
is conformed to the Divine, in a certain degree. Because
inasmuch as it is conformed to the Divine will in the com-
mon aspect of the thing willed, it is conformed thereto in
the point of the last end. While, inasmuch as it is not
conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially,
it is conformed to that will considered as efficient cause;
since the proper inclination consequent to nature, or to

254 QUESTION XIX

the particular apprehension of some particular thing, comes
to a thing from God as its efficient cause. Hence it is
customary to say that a man's will, in this respect, is con-
formed to the Divine will, because it wills what God wishes
him to will.

There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the
formal cause, consisting in man's willing something from
charity, as God wills it. And this conformity is also reduced
to the formal conformity, that is in respect of the last end,
which is the proper object of charity.

Reply Obj. i. We can know in a general way what God
wills. For we know that whatever God wills, He wills it
under the aspect of good. Consequently whoever wills a
thing under any aspect of good, has a will conformed to the
Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed. But we
know not what God wills in particular: and in this respect
we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.

But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing
that he wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in
that particular matter. Consequently they will conform
their will to God in all things not only formally, but also
materially.

Reply Obj. 2. God does not will the damnation of a man,
considered precisely as damnation, nor a man's death,
considered precisely as death, because, He wills all men to
be saved (i Tim. ii. 4) : but He wills such things under the
aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard to such things it
suffices for man to will the upholding of God's justice and
of the natural order.

Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.

To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it
should be said that a man who conforms his will to God's,
in the aspect of reason of the thing willed, wills what God
wills, more than the man, who conforms his will to God's,
in the point of the very thing willed ; because the will tends
more to the end, than to that which is on account of the
end.

To the second, it must be replied that the species and form

GOODNESS OF THE WILL 255

of an act are taken from the object considered formally,
rather than from the object considered materially.

To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition
of wills when several people desire different things, but
not under the same aspect : but there is opposition of wills,
when under one and the same aspect, one man wills a thing
which another wills not. But there is no question of this
here.

QUESTION XX

OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN

ACTIONS.

[In Six Articles.)

We must now consider goodness and malice as to external
actions: under which point there are six points of inquiry:
(i) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the
will, or in the external action ? (2) Whether the whole
goodness or malice of the external action depends on the
goodness of the will ? (3) Whether the goodness and malice
of the interior act are the same as those of the external
action ? (4) Whether the external action adds any good-
ness or malice to that of the interior act ? (5) Whether the
consequences of an external action increase its goodness or
malice ? (6) Whether one and the same external action can
be both good and evil ?

First Article,

whether goodness or malice is first in the act of the
will. or in the external action ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that good and evil are in the external
action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will
derives goodness from its object, as stated above (Q. XIX.,
AA. I, 2). But the externa] action is the object of the
interior act of the will: for a man is said to will to commit
a theft, or to will to give an alms. Therefore good and evil
are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the

will.

256

GOODNESS OF EXTERNAL ACTION 257

Ohj. 2. Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the
end : since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of
good from its relation to the end. Now whereas the act of
the will cannot be an end, as stated above (Q. I., A. i ad 2),
the act of another power can be an end. Therefore good
is in the act of some other power prior to being in the act of
the will.

Ohj. 3. Further, the act of the will stands in a formal
relation to the external action, as stated above (Q. XVIII. ,
A. 6). But that which is formal is subsequent; since form
is something added to matter. Therefore good and evil are
in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says {Retract, i.) that it is by
the will that we sin, and that we behave aright. Therefore
moral good and evil are first in the will.

/ answer that. External actions may be said to be good or
bad in two ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the
circumstances connected with them : thus the giving of alms,
if the required conditions be observed, is said to be good.
Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, from its relation
to the end : thus the giving of alms for vainglory, is said to
be evil. Now, since the end is the will's proper object, it
is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the external
action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found
first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the
external action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice
which the external action has of itself, on account of its
being about due matter and its being attended by due cir-
cumstances, is not derived from the will, but rather from
the reason. Consequently, if we consider the goodness of
the external action, in so far as it comes from reason's
ordination and apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of
the act of the will : but if we consider it in so far as it is in
the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the
goodness of the will, which is its principle.

Reply Obj. i. The exterior action is the object of the will,
inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as a
good apprehended and ordained by the reason: and thus it

II. I 17

258 QUESTION XX

is prior to the good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as
it is found in the execution of the action, it is an effect of the
will, and is subsequent to the will.

Reply Ob]. 2. The end precedes in the order of intention,
but follows in the order of execution.

Reply Ohj. 3. A form as received into matter, is subsequent
to matter in the order of generation, although it precedes
it in the order of nature : but inasmuch as it is in the active
cause, it precedes in every way. Now the will is compared
to the exterior action, as its efficient cause. Wherefore the
goodness of the act of the will, as existing in the active
cause, is the form of the exterior action.

Second Article.

whether the whole goodness and malice of the exter-
nal action depend on the goodness of the will ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — -

Objection i. It seems that the whole goodness and malice
of the external action depend on the goodness of the will.
For it is written (Matth. vii. 18): A good tree cannot bring
forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.
But, according to the gloss, the tree signifies the will, and
fruit signifies works. Therefore it is impossible for the
interior act of the will to be good, and the external action
evil, or vice versa.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (Retract, i.) that there is
no sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the
will, there will be none in the external action. And so the
whole goodness or malice of the external action depends
on the will.

Obj. 3. Further, the good and evil of which we are speak-
ing now are differences of the moral act. Now differences
make an essential division in a genus, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. vii.). Since therefore an act is moral
from being voluntary, it seems that goodness and malice in
an act are derived from the will alone.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii.),

GOODNESS OF EXTERNAL ACTION 259

that there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good
will can make good,

I answer that, As stated above (A. i), we may consider a
twofold goodness or malice in the external action: one in
respect of due matter and circumstances; the other in
respect of the order to the end. And that which is in respect
of the order to the end, depends entirely on the will : while
that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances,
depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the
goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends towards it.

Now it must be observed, as was noted above (Q. XIX.,
A. 6 ad i), that for a thing to be evil, one single defect
suffices, whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough
for it to be good in one point only, it must be good in every
respect. If therefore the will be good, both from its proper
object and from its end, it follows that the external action
is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the
end, this is not enough to make the external action good:
and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of
the end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that the
external action is evil.

Reply Ohj. i. If the good tree be taken to signify the
good will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness
from the act willed and from the end intended.

Reply Ohj. 2. A man sins by his will, not only when he
wills an evil end; but also when he wills an evil act.

Reply Ohj. 3. Voluntariness applies not only to the interior
act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they
proceed from the will and the reason. Consequently the
difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior
and external act.

Third Article.

whether the goodness and malice of the external
action are the same as those of the interior act ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — -
Ohjection i. It seems that the goodness and malice of
the interior act of the will are not the same as those of the

26o QUESTION XX

external action. For the principle of the interior act is the
interior apprehensive or appetitive power of the soul;
whereas the principle of the external action is the power
that accomplishes the movement. Now where the princi-
ples of action are different, the actions themselves are dif-
ferent. Moreover, it is the action which is the subject of
goodness or malice: and the same accident cannot be in
different subjects. Therefore the goodness of the interior
act cannot be the same as that of the external action.

Ohj. 2. Further, A virtue makes that, which has it, good,
and renders its action good also (Ethic, ii.). But the intel-
lectual virtue in the commanding power is distinct from
the moral virtue in the power commanded, as is declared
in Ethic, i. Therefore the goodness of the interior act,
which belongs to the commanding power, is distinct from
the goodness of the external action, which belongs to the
power commanded.

Ohj. 3. Further, the same thing cannot be cause and
effect; since nothing is its own cause. But the goodness
of the interior act is the cause of the goodness of the ex-
ternal action, or vice versa, as stated above (AA. i, 2).
Therefore it is not the same goodness in each.

On the contrary, It was shown above (Q. XVIII., A. 6)
that the act of the will is the form, as it were, of the external
action. Now that which results from the material and
formal element is one thing. Therefore there is but one
goodness of the internal and external act.

I answer that. As stated above (Q. XVII., A. 4), the in-
terior act of the will, and the external action, considered
morally, are one act. Now it happens sometimes that one
and the same individual act has several aspects of goodness
or malice, and sometimes that it has but one. Hence we
must say that sometimes the goodness of the interior act is
the same as that of the external action, and sometimes not.
For as we have already said (AA. 1,2), these two goodnesses
or malices, of the internal and external acts, are ordained
to one another. Now it may happen, in things that are
subordinate to something else, that a thing is good merely

GOODNESS OF EXTERNAL ACTION 261

from being subordinate; thus a bitter draught, is good
merely because it procures health. Wherefore there are not
two goodnesses, one the goodness of health, and the other
the goodness of the draught; but one and the same. On
the other hand it happens sometimes that that which is
subordinate to another, has some aspect of goodness in
itself, besides the fact of its being subordinate to some other
good: thus a palatable medicine can be considered in the
light of a pleasurable good, besides of being conducive to
health.

We must therefore say that when the external action
derives goodness or malice from its relation to the end only,
then there is but one and the same goodness of the act of
the will which of itself regards the end, and of the external
action, which regards the end through the medium of the
act of the will. But when the external action has goodness
or malice of itself, i.e., in regard to its matter and circum-
stances, then the goodness of the external action is distinct
from the goodness of the will in regarding the end: yet so
that the goodness of the end passes into the external action,
and the goodness of the matter and circumstances passes
into the act of the will, as stated above (AA. i, 2).

Reply Ohj. i. This argument proves that the internal and
external actions are different in the physical order: yet
distinct as they are in that respect, they combine to form
one thing in the moral order, as stated above (Q. XVIL,
A. 4).

Reply Ohj. 2. As stated in Ethic, vi., a moral virtue is
ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end,
as it were, of that virtue; whereas prudence, which is in
the reason, is ordained to things directed to the end. For
this reason various virtues are necessary. But right reason
in regard to the very end of a virtue has no other goodness
than the goodness of that virtue, in so far as the goodness
of the reason is participated in each virtue.

Reply Ohj. 3. When a thing is derived by one thing from
another, as from a uni vocal efficient cause, then it is not
the same in both: thus when a hot thing heats, the heat of

262 QUESTION XX

the heater is distinct from the heat of the thing heated,
although it be the same specifically. But when a thing is
derived by one thing from another, according to analogy
or proportion, then it is one and the same in both: thus
the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived from
the healthiness of the animal's body ; nor is health as applied
to urine and medicine, distinct from health as applied to
the body of an animal, of which health medicine is the cause,
and urine the sign. It is in this way that the goodness of
the external action is derived from the goodness of the will,
and vice versa; viz., according to the order of one to the
other.

Fourth Article.

whether the external action adds any goodness or
malice to that of the interior act ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the external action does not
add any goodness or malice to that of the interior action.
For Chrysostom says {Horn. xix. in Matth.) : It is the will
that is rewarded for doing good, or punished jor doing evil.
Now works are the witnesses of the will. Therefore God seeks
for works not on His own account, in order to know how to
judge; but for the sake of others, that all may understand
how just He is. But good or evil is to be estimated according
to God's judgment rather than according to the judgment
of man. Therefore the external action adds no goodness
or malice to that of the interior act.

Ohj. 2. Further, the goodness and malice of the interior
and external acts are one and the same, as stated above
(A. 3). But increase is the addition of one thing to another.
Therefore the external action does not add to the goodness
01' malice of the interior act.

Ohj. 3. Further, the entire goodness of created things
does not add to the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely
derived therefrom. But sometimes the entire goodness of
the external action is derived from the goodness of the
interior act, and sometimes conversely, as stated above

GOODNESS OF EXTERNAL ACTION 263

(AA. I, 2). Therefore neither of them adds to the goodness
or malice of the other.

On the contrary, Every agent intends to attain good and
avoid evil. If therefore by the external action no further
goodness or malice be added, it is to no purpose that he who
has a good or an evil will, does a good deed or refrains from
an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.

/ answer that, If we speak of the goodness which the
external action derives from the will tending to the end,
then the external action adds nothing to this goodness,
unless it happen that the will in itself is made better in good
things, or worse in evil things. This, seemingly, may happen
in three ways. First in point of number; if, for instance, a
man wishes to do something with a good or an evil end in
view, and does not do it then, but afterwards wills and does
it, the act of his will is doubled, and a double good, or a
double evil is the result. — Secondly, in point of extension:
when, for instance, a man wishes to do something for a good
or an evil end, and is hindered by some obstacle, whereas
another man perseveres in the movement of the will until
he accomplish it in deed ; it is evident that the will of the
latter is more lasting in good or evil, and, in this respect,
is better or worse. — Thirdly, in point of intensity: for there
are certain external actions, which, in so far as they are
pleasurable or painful, are such as naturally to make the
will more intense or more remiss; and it is evident that
the more intensely the will tends to good or evil, the better
or worse it is.

On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which
the external action derives from its matter and due cir-
cumstances, thus it stands in relation to the will as its term
and end. And in this way it adds to the goodness or malice
of the will; because every inclination or movement is per-
fected by attaining its end or reaching its term. Wherefore
the will is not perfect, unless it be such that, given the oppor-
tunity, it reahzes the operation. But if this prove impossible,
as long as the will is perfect, so as to realize the operation
if it could; the lack of perfection derived from the external

264 QUESTION XX

action, is simply involuntary. Now just as the involuntary
deserves neither punishment nor reward in the accomplish-
ment of good or evil deeds, so neither does it lessen reward
or punishment, if a man through simple in voluntariness
fail to do good or evil.

Reply Ohj. i. Chrysostom is speaking of the case where
a man's will is complete, and does not refrain from the deed
save through the impossibility of achievement.

Reply Ohj. 2. This argument applies to that goodness
which the external action derives from the will as tending to
the end. But the goodness which the external action
takes from its matter and circumstances, is distinct from
that which it derives from the end; but it is not distinct
from that which it has from the very act willed, to which it
stands in the relation of measure and cause, as stated above
(AA. I, 2.)

From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.

Fifth Article.

whether the consequences of the external action
increase its goodness or malice ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Ai'ticle : —

Objection i. It seems that the consequences of the external
action increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-
exists virtually in its cause. But the consequences result
from the action as an effect from its cause. Therefore they
pre-exist virtually in actions. Now a thing is judged to be
good or bad according to its virtue, since a virtue makes
that which has it to be good (Ethic, ii.). Therefore the con-
sequences increase the goodness or malice of an action.

Obj. 2. Further, the good actions of his hearers are conse-
quences resulting from the words of a preacher. But such
goods as these redound to the merit of the preacher, as is
evident from Phil. iv. i: My dearly beloved brethren, my
joy and my crown. Therefore the consequences of an action
increase its goodness or malice.

Obj. 3. Further, Punishment is not increased, unless the

GOODNESS OF EXTERNAL ACTION 265

fault increases: wherefore it is written (Deut. xxv. 2):
According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also
of the stripes he. But the punishment is increased on
account of the consequences ; for it is written (Exod. xxi. 29) :
But if the ox was wont to push with his horn yesterday and
the day before, and they warned his master, and he did not
shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a woman, then the
ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death.
But he would not have been put to death, if the ox, although
he had not been shut up, had not killed a man. Therefore
the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action.

Ohj. 4. Further, if a man do something which may cause
death, by striking, or by sentencing, and if death does not
ensue, he does not contract irregularity: but he would if
death were to ensue. Therefore the consequences of an
action increase its goodness or malice.

On the contrary, The consequences do not make an action
that was evil, to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil.
For instance, if a man give an alms to a poor man who
makes bad use of the alms by committing a sin, this does
not undo the good done by the giver; and, in like manner,
if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the wrong-
doer is not thereby excused. Therefore the consequences
of an action do not increase its goodness or malice.

/ answer that, The consequences of an action are either
foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they
increase the goodness or malice. For when a man foresees
that many evils may follow from his action, and yet does
not therefore desist therefrom, this shows his will to be all
the more inordinate.

But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make
a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature of
the action, and in the majority of cases, in this respect,
the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that
action : for it is evident that an action is specifically better,
if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse,
if it is of a nature to produce worse results. — On the other
hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom,

266 QUESTION XX

then they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action :
because we do not judge of a thing according to that which
belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which
belongs to it of itself.

Re fly Ohj. i. The virtue of a cause is measured by the
effect that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that
which results by accident.

Rej)ly Ohj. 2. The good actions done by the hearers,
result from the preacher's words, as an effect that flows
from their very nature. Hence they redound to the merit
of the preacher : especially when such is his intention.

Rej)ly Ohj. 3. The consequences for which that man is
ordered to be punished, both follow from the nature of the
cause, and are supposed to be foreseen. For this reason
they are reckoned as punishable.

Reply Ohj. 4. This argument would prove if irregularity
were the result of the fault. But it is not the result of the
fault, but of the fact, and of the obstacle to the reception
of a sacrament.

Sixth Article.

whether one and the same external action can be
both good and evil ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that one and the same external
action can be both good and evil. For movement, if con-
tinuous, is one and the same [Phys. v.). But one continuous
movement can be both good and bad: for instance, a man
may go to Church continuously, intending at first vainglory,
and afterwards the service of God. Therefore one and the
same action can be both good and evil.

Ohj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher {Phys. iii.),
action and passion are one act. But the passion may be
good, as Christ's was; and the action evil, as that of the
Jews. Therefore one and the same act can be both good
and evil.

Ohj. 3. Further, since a servant is an instrument, as it
were, of his master, the servant's action is his master's, just

GOODNESS OF EXTERNAL ACITON 267

as the action of a tool is the workman's action. But it may
happen that the servant's action result from his master's
good will, and is therefore good: and from the evil will of
the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore the same
action can be both good and evil.

On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject
of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. There-
fore the same action cannot be both good and evil.

/ answer that, Nothing hinders a thing from being one,
in so far as it is in one genus, and manifold, in so far as it
is referred to another genus. Thus a continuous surface
is one, considered as in the genus of quantity; and yet it is
manifold, considered as to the genus of colour, if it be
partly white, and partly black. And accordingly, nothing
hinders an action from being one, considered in the natural
order ; whereas it is not one, considered in the moral order ;
and vice versa, as we have stated above (A. 3 i?^ i ; Q. XVIIL,
A. y adi). P'or continuous walking is one action, considered
in the natural order: but it may resolve itself into many
actions, considered in the moral order if a change take
place in the walker's will, for the will is the principle of
moral actions. If therefore we consider an action in the
moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good
and evil. Whereas if it be one as to natural and not moral
unity, it can be both good and evil.

Reply Ohj. i. This continual movement which proceeds
from various intentions, although it is one in the natural
order, is not one in the point of moral unity.

Reply Ohj. 2. Action and passion belong to the moral
order, in so far as they are voluntary. And therefore in so
far as they are voluntary in respect of wills that differ, they
are two distinct things, and good can be in one of them,
while evil is in the other.

Reply Ohj. 3. The action of the servant, in so far as it
proceeds from the will of the servant, is not the master's
action: but only in so far as it proceeds from the master's
command. Wherefore the evil will of the servant does not
make the action evil in this respect.

QUESTION XXI.

OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON
OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE.

{In Four Articles.)

We have now to consider the consequences of human actions
by reason of their goodness and malice : and under this head
there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether a human
action is right or sinful, by reason of its being good or
evil ? (2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame ?

(3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious ?

(4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious
before God ?

First x\rticle.
whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far
as it is good or evil ?

We proceed thus to the First A rticle : —

Objection 1. It seems that a human action is not right
or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil. For monsters are the
sins of nature {Phys. ii.). But monsters are not actions,
but things engendered outside the order of nature. Now
things that are produced according to art and reason imitate
those that are produced according to nature (ibid.). There-
fore an action is not sinful by reason of its being inordinate
and evil.

Obj. 2. Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii., occurs in nature
and art, when the end intended by nature or art is not
attained. But the goodness or malice of a human action
depends, before all, on the intention of the end, and on its
achievement. Therefore it seems that the malice of an
action does not make it sinful.

268

ACTIONS RIGHT OR SINFUL 269

Ohj. 3. Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful,
it follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this
is false: since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil.
Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being evil.

On the contrary, As shown above, the goodness of a human
action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and conse-
quently its malice consists in its being in disaccord with
the Eternal Law. But this is the very nature of sin; for
Augustine says {Contra Faust, xxii.) that sin is a word,
deed, or desire, in opposition to the Eternal Law. Therefore
a human action is sinful by reason of its being evil.

/ answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as
also is good than right. For every privation of good, in
whatever subject, is an evil: whereas sin consists properly
in an action done for a certain end, and lacking due order
to that end. Now the due order to an end is measured
by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this
rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end.
When therefore an action proceeds from a natural force,
in accord with the natural inclination to an end, then the
action is said to be right : since the mean does not exceed its
limits, viz., the action does not swerve from the order of
its active principle to the end. But when an action strays
from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin.

Now in those things that are done by the will, the proxi-
mate rule is the human reason, while the supreme rule is
the Eternal Law. When, therefore, a human action tends
to the end, according to the order of reason and of the
Eternal Law, then that action is right: but when it turns
aside from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now
it is evident from what has been said (Q. XIX., AA. 3, 4)
that every voluntary action that turns aside from the order
of reason and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and that every
good action is in accord with reason and the Eternal Law.
Hence it follows that a human action is right or sinful by
reason of its being good or evil.

Reply Ohj. i. Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they
result from a sin in nature's action.

270 QUESTION XXI

Reply Ohj. 2. The end is twofold; the last end, and the
proximate end. In the sin of nature, the action does
indeed fail in respect of the last end, which is the perfection
of the thing generated ; but it does not fail in respect of any
proximate end whatever; since when nature works it forms
something. In like manner, the sin of the will always fails
as regards the last end intended, because no voluntary evil
action can be ordained to happiness, which is the last end:
and yet it does not fail in respect of some proximate end:
intended and achieved by the will. Wherefore also, since
the very intention of this end is ordained to the last end,
this same intention may be right or sinful.

Reply Ohj. 3. Each thing is ordained to its end by its
action: and therefore sin, which consists in straying from
the order to the end, consists properly in an action. On
the other hand, punishment regards the person of the
sinner, as was stated in the First Part (Q. XLVIII., A. 5,
ad 4; A. 6, ad 3).

Second Article.

whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by
reason of its being good or evil ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — ■

Objection i. It seems that a human action does not
deserve praise or blame by reason of its being good or evil.
For sin happens even in things done by nature {Ethic, ii.).
And yet natural things are not deserving of praise or blame
{Ethic, iii.). Therefore a human action does not deserve
blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and, conse-
quently, neither does it deserve praise, by reason of its being
good.

Obj. 2. Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so
does it happen in the productions of art : because as stated
in Phys. ii., it is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and
in a doctor to give the wrong medicine. But the artist is not
blamed for making something bad: because the artist's
work is such, that he can produce a good or a bad thing,
just as he lists. Therefore it seems that neither is there

ACTIONS DESERVE PRAISE OR BLAME 27J

any reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact that it
is evil.

Obj. 3. Further, Dionysius says {Div. Nom. iv.) that evil
is weak and incapable. But weakness or inability either
takes away or diminishes guilt. Therefore a human action
does not incur guilt from being evil.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i.)
that virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed
to virtue deserve censure and blame. But good actions are
virtuous; because virtue makes that which has it good, and
makes its operation good : wherefore actions opposed to
virtue are evil. Therefore a human action deserves praise
or blame, through being good or evil.

/ answer that, Just as evil is more comprehensive than
sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an
action is said to deserve praise or blame, from its being
imputed to the agent: since to praise or to blame mean
nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or good-
ness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent,
when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over it : and
this is the case in all voluntary acts : because it is through
his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was
made clear above (Q. I., AA. i, 2). Hence it follows that
good or evil, in voluntary actions alone, renders them
worthy of praise or blame: and in suchlike actions, evil,
sin and guilt are one and the same thing.

Reply Obj. 1. Natural actions are not in the power of
the natural agent: since the action of nature is determinate.
And, therefore, although there be sin in natural actions,
there is no blame.

Reply Obj. 2. Reason stands in different relations to the
productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of
art, reason is directed to a particular end, which is some-
thing devised by reason: whereas in moral matters, it is
directed to the general end of all human life. Now a
particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since
therefore sin is a departure from the order to the end, as
stated above (A. i), sin may occur in two ways, in a pro-

272 QUESTION XXI

duction of art. First, by a departure from the particular
end intended by the artist: and this sin will be proper to
the art ; for instance, if an artist produce a bad thing, while
intending to produce something good ; or produce something
good, while intending to produce something bad. Secondly,
by a departure from the general end of human life : and then
he will be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work,
and does so in effect, so that another is taken in thereby.
But this sin is not proper to the artist as such, but as a man.
Consequently for the former sin the artist is blamed as an
artist; while for the latter he is blamed as a man. — ^On the
other hand, in moral matters, where we take into considera-
tion the order of reason to the general end of human life,
sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order
of reason to the general end of human life. Wherefore
man is blamed for such a sin, both as man and as a moral
being. Hence the Philosopher says [Ethic, vi.) that in
art, he who voluntarily sins is the better man ; hut in prudence,
he is the worse, just as is the case in the moral virtues, which
prudence directs.

Reply Ohj. 3. Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils,
is subject to man's power: wherefore it neither takes away
nor diminishes guilt.

Third Article.

whether a human action is meritorious or demerit-
orious, in so far as it is good or evil ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — ■

Objection i. It seems that a human action is not merit-
orious or demeritorious on account of its goodness or
malice. For we speak of merit or demerit in relation to
retribution, which has no place save in matters relating to
another person. But good or evil actions are not all re-
lated to another person, for some are related to the person
of the agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action
is meritorious or demeritorious.

Ohj. 2. Further, No one deserves punishment or reward

MERIT AND DEMERIT 273

for doing as he chooses with that of which he is master:
thus if a man destroys what belongs to him, he is not
punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs to another.
But man is master of his own actions. Therefore a man
does not merit punishment or reward, through putting his
action to a good or evil purpose.

Ohj. 3. Further, if a man acquire some good for himself,
he does not on that account deserve to be benefited by
another man: and the same applies to evil. Now a good
action is itself a kind of good and perfection of the agent:
while an inordinate action is his evil. Therefore a man
does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does a
good or an evil deed.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. iii. 10, 11): Say to the
just man that it is well ; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings.
Wo to the wicked unto evil ; for the reward of his hands shall
he given him.

I answer that. We speak of merit and demerit, in relation
to retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retri-
bution according to justice is rendered to a man, by reason
of his having done something to another's advantage or
hurt. It must, moreover, be observed that every in-
dividual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and
member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or
evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the
whole society: thus, who hurts the hand, hurts the man.
When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another in-
dividual, there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit in
his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him
by the individual to whom he has done good or harm;
secondly, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the
whole of society. — Now when a man ordains his action
directly for the good or evil of the whole society, retribution
is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole society;
secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a
man does that which conduces to his own benefit or dis-
advantage, then again is retribution owed to him, in so far
as this too affects the community, forasmuch as he is a

II. I 18

274 QUESTION XXI

part of society: although retribution is not due to him, in
so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual,
who is identical with the agent; unless, perchance, he owe
retribution to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so far
as man is said to be just to himself.

It is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves
praise or blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will:
that it is right or sinful, according to it is ordained to the
end ; and that its merit or demerit depend on the retribution
of justice to another.

Reply Ohj. i. A man's good or evil actions, although not
ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are
nevertheless ordained to the good or evil of another, i.e.,
the community.

Reply Ohj. 2. Man is master of his actions; and yet, in
so far as he belongs to another, i.e., the community, of which
he forms part, he merits or demerits, inasmuch as he dis-
poses his actions well or ill: just as if he were to dispense
well or ill other belongings of his, in respect of which he is
bound to serve the community.

Reply Ohj. 3. This very good or evil, which a man does
to himself by his action, redounds to the community, as
stated above.

Fourth Article.

whether a human action is meritorious or demerit-
orious before god, according as it is good or

EVIL ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Ohjection 1. It seems that man's actions, good or evil,
are not meritorious or demeritorious in sight of God.
Because, as stated above (A. 3), merit and demerit imply
relation to retribution for good or harm done to another.
But a man's action, good or evil, does no good or harm to
God; for it is written (Job xxxv. 6, 7): // thou sin, what
shall thou hurt Him ? . . . And if thou do justly, what shall
thou give Him .^ Therefore a human action, good or evil,
is not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.

MERIT AND DEMERIT 275

Ohj. 2. Further, an instrument acquires no merit or de-
merit in the sight of him that uses it; because the entire
action of the instrument belongs to the user. Now when
man acts he is the instrument of the Divine power which is
the principal cause of his action; hence it is written (Isa. x.
15) : Shall the axe boast itselj against him that cutteth with it ?
Or shall the saw exalt itself against him hy whom it is drawn ?
where man while acting is evidently compared to an instru-
ment. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing in God's
sight, by good or evil deeds.

Ohj. 3. Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit
through being ordained to someone else. But not all
human actions are ordained to God. Therefore not every
good or evil action acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. xii. 14): All things
that are done, God will bring into judgment . . . whether it be
good or evil. Now judgment implies retribution, in respect
of which we speak of merit and demerit. Therefore every
human action, both good and evil, acquires merit or demerit
in God's sight.

/ ansiver that, A human action, as stated above (A. 3),
acquires merit or demerit, through being ordained to some-
one else, either by reason of himself, or by reason of the
community: and in each way, our actions, good and evil,
acquire merit or demerit in the sight of God. On the part of
God Himself, inasmuch as He is man's last end; and it is
our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as stated
above (Q. XIX., A. 10). Consequently whoever does an
evil deed, not referrible to God, does not give God the honour
due to Him as our last end. — On the part of the whole
community of the universe, because in every community, he
who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the
common good ; wherefore it is his business to award retribu-
tion for such things as are done well or ill in the community.
Now God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, as
stated in the First Part (Q. CIII., x\. 5): and especially of
rational creatures. Consequently it is evident that human
actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to Him: else

276 QUESTION XXI

it would follow that human actions are no business of
God's.

Reply Ohj. i. God in Himself neither gains nor loses any-
thing by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes
something from God, or offers something to Him, when he
observes or does not observe the order instituted by God.

Reply Ohj. 2. Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God,
that, at the same time, be moves himself by his free-will, as
was explained above (Q. IX., A. 6 ^i 3). Consequently, by
his action, he acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.

Reply Ohj. 3. Man is not ordained to the body politic,
according to all that he is and has ; and so it does not follow
that every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation
to the body politic. But all that man is, and can, and has,
must be referred to God : and therefore every action of man ,
whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the sight
of God, as far as the action itself is concerned.

QUESTION XXII.

OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS.

[In Three Articles.)

We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in
general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general,
there are four things to be considered: (i) Their subject:
(2) The difference between them: (3) Their mutual relation-
ship: (4) Their malice and goodness.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(i) Whether there is any passion in the soul ? (2) Whether
passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive
part ? (3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather
than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will ?

First Article,
whether any passion is in the soul ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that there is no passion in the soul.
Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not
composed of matter and form, as stated in the First Part
(Q. LXXV., A. 5). Therefore there is no passion in the soul.

Ohj. 2. Further, passion is movement, as is stated in
Phys. iii. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De
Anima i. Therefore passion is not in the soul.

Ohj. 3. Further, passion is the road to corruption; since
every passion, when increased, alters the substance, as is stated
in Topic, vi. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no
passion is in the soul.

On the contrary. The Apostle says (Rom. vii. 5): When we

277

278 QUESTION XXII

were in the flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law,
did work in our members. Now sins are, properly speaking,
in the soul. Therefore passions also, which are described as
being of sins, are in the soul.

I answer that, The word passive is used in three ways.
First, in a general way, according as whatever receives
something is passive, although nothing is taken from it:
thus we may say that the air is passive when it is lit up.
But this is to be perfected rather than to be passive.
Secondly, the word passive is employed in its proper sense,
when something is received, while something else is taken
away : and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that
which is lost is unsuitable to the thing: thus when an
animal's body is healed, it is said to be passive, because it
receives health, and loses sickness. — At other times the
contrary occurs: thus to ail is to be passive; because the
ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have
passion in its most proper acceptation. For a thing is said
to be passive from its being drawn to the agent : and when
a thing recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially
does it appear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in
De General, iii. we find it stated that when a more excellent
thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation
simply, and corruption in a particular respect : whereas the
reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less
excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens that
passions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception,
we speak of feeling and understanding as being a kind of
passion (De Anima i.). But passion, accompanied by the
loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily transmuta-
tion; wherefore passion properly so caUed cannot be in the
soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the composite is
passive. But here again we find a difference; because when
this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature
of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow
is more properly a passion than joy.

T^eply Obj. i. It belongs to matter to be passive in such a
way as to lose something and to be transmuted : hence this

SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS 279

happens only in those things that are composed of matter
and form. But passivity, as implying mere reception, need
not be in matter, but can be in anything that is in potenti-
ality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and
form, yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of
which it is competent to receive or to be passive, according
as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in
De Anima iii.

Reply Ohj. 2. Although it does not become the soul in
itself, to be passive and to be moved, yet it becomes it
accidentally, as stated in De Anima i.

Reply Ohj. 3. This argument is true of passion accom-
panied by transmutation to something worse. And passion,
in this sense, is unbecoming to the soul, except accidentally:
but it is becoming to the composite, which is corruptible, by
reason of its very nature.

Second Article.

whether passion is in the appetitive rather
than in the apprehensive part ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — •

Objection i. It seems that passion is in the apprehensive
part of the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that
which is first in any genus, seems to rank first among all
things that are in that genus, and to be their cause, as is
stated in Metaph. ii. Now passion is found to be in the
apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part: for the
appetitive part is not affected unless there be a previous
passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in
the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive.

Ohj. 2. Further, what is more active is less passive; for
action is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is
more active than the apprehensive. Therefore it seems that
passion is more in the apprehensive part.

Ohj. 3. Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power
of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive appre-
hension. But passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking,

28o QUESTION XXII

in respect of a bodily transmutation. Therefore passion is
not more in the appetitive than in the apprehensive part.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix.) that the
movements of the soul, which the Greeks call irdOi], are styled by
some of our writers, Cicero"^ for instance, disturbances ; by
some, affections or emotions ; while others rendering the Greek
more accurately, call them passions. From this it is evident
that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But
affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the
apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are in the appe-
titive rather than in the apprehensive part.

I answer that. As we have already stated (A. i) the word
passion implies that the patient is drawn to that which
belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing by
the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power :
because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order
to things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher
says (Metaph. vi.) that good and evil, i.e., the objects of the
appetitive power, are in things themselves. On the other
hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it
is in itself; but knows it by reason of an intention of the
thing, which intention it has in itself, or receives in its own
way. Hence we find it stated (ibid.) that the true and the
false, which pertain to knowledge, are not in things, but in
the mind. Consequently it is evident that the nature of
passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with
the apprehensive part.

Reply Obj. i. In things relating to perfection the case is
the opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect.
Because in things relating to perfection, intensity is in
proportion to the approach to one first principle; to which
the nearer a thing approaches, the more intense it is. Thus
the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends on its
approach to something endowed with light in a supreme
degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches, the more
light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect,

* Those things which the Greeks call Trddr], we prefer to call disturb-
ances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5).

SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS 281

intensity depends, not on approach to something supreme,
but in receding from that which is perfect; because therein
consists the very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore
the less a thing recedes from that which stands first, the less
intense it is : and the result is that at first we always find
some small defect, which afterwards increases as it goes on.
Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a thing
according as it is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things
that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e., to God, there
is but little potentiality and passion : while in other things,
consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the supreme,
i.e., the apprehensive, power of the soul, passion is found less
than in the other powers.

Reply Ohj. 2. The appetitive power is said to be more
active, because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the
principle of the exterior action : and this from the very fact
that it is more passive, through being related to things as
existing in themselves: since it is through the external
action that we come into contact with things.

Reply Ohj. 3. As stated in the First Part (Q. LXXVHL,
A. 3), the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways.
First, by a spiritual change, in respect of which the organ
receives an intention of the object. And this is essential to
the act of the sensitive apprehension : thus is the eye changed
by the object visible, not by being coloured, but by receiving
an intention of colour. But the organs are receptive of
another natural change, which affects their natural dis-
position; for instance, when they become hot or cold, or
undergo some similar change. And whereas this kind of
change is accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension ;
for instance, if the eye be wearied through gazing intently
at something, or be overcome by the intensity of the object :
on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive
appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions
of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural
change of the organ; for instance, anger is said to be a
kindling of the blood about the heart. Hence it is evident that
the notion of passion is more consistent with the act of the

282 QUESTION XXII

sensitive appetite, than with that of the sensitive appre-
hension, although both are actions of a corporeal organ.

Third Article.

whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather
than in the intellectual appetite, which is called

THE WILL ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — •

Objection i. It seems that passion is not more in the
sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius
declares {Div. Nom. ii.) Hierotheus to be taught by a kind of
yet more Godlike instruction ; not only by learning Divine
things, but also by suffering (patiens) them. But the sensitive
appetite cannot suffer Divine things, since its object is the
sensitive good. Therefore passion is in the intellectual
appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive appetite.

Obj. 2. Further, the more powerful the active force, the
more intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual
appetite, which is the universal good, is a more powerful
active force, than the object of the sensitive appetite, which
is a particular good. Therefore passion is more consistent
with intellectual than with the sensitive appetite.

Obj. 3. Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But
these are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the
sensitive appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the
Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore the passions
are not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii.),
while describing the animal passions : Passion is a movement
of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil : in
other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul,
when we think of good or evil.

I answer that, As stated above (A. i) passion is properly to
be found where there is corporeal transmutation. This
corporeal transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive
appetite, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive appre-
hension, but also natural. Now there is no need for corporeal

SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS 283

transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite : because
this appetite is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ .
It is therefore evident that passion is more properly in the
act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the intellectual
appetite; and this is again evident from the definitions of
Damascene quoted above.

Reply Ohj. i. By suffering Divine things is meant being
well affected towards them, and united to them by love:
and this takes place without any alteration in the body.

Reply Ohj. 2. Intensity of passion depends not only on the
power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient :
because things that are disposed to passion, suffer much
even from petty agents. Therefore although the object of
the intellectual appetite has greater activity than the object
of the sensitive appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is more
passive.

Reply Ohj. 3. When love and joy and the like are ascribed
to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual
appetite, they signify simple acts of the will having like
effects, but without passion. Hence Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei ix.): The holy angels feel no anger while they
punish . . ., no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the
unhappy : and yet ordinary human speech is wont to ascrihe
to them also these passions hy name, because, although they
have none of our weakness, their acts hear a certain resemhlance
to ours.

QUESTION XXIII.

HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider how the passions differ from one
another: and under this head there are four points of
inquiry: (i). Whether the passions of the concupiscible part
are different from those of the irascible part ? (2) Whether
the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based on
the contrariety of good and evil ? (3) Whether there is any
passion that has no contrary ? (4) Whether, in the same
power, there are any passions, differing in species, but not
contrary to one another ?

First Article.

whether the passions of the concupiscible part are
different from those of the irascible part ?

We proceed thiis to the First Article : — ■

Objection i. It seems that the same passions are in the
irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says
{Ethic, ii.) that the passions of the soul are those emotions
which are followed by joy or sorrow. But joy and sorrow are
in the concupiscible part. Therefore all the passions are in
the concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others
in the concupiscible part.

Obj. 2. Further, on the words of Matth. xiii. 33, The
kingdom of heaven is like to leaven, etc., the gloss of Jerome
says : We should have prudence in the reason ; hatred of vice, in
the irascible faculty ; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part.
But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of

284

HOW PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER 285

which it is the contrary, as is stated in Topic, ii. Therefore
the same passion is in the concupiscible and irascible
faculties.

Ohj. 3. Further, passions and actions differ specifically
according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible
and concupiscible passions are the same, viz., good and evil.
Therefore the same passions are in the irascible and con-
cupiscible faculties.

On the contrary, The acts of different powers, differ in
species ; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible
and the concupiscible are two powers into which the sensi-
tive appetite is divided, as stated in the First Part (Q.
LXXXI., A. 2). Therefore, since the passions are move-
ments of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q. XXII.,
A. 3), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically
distinct from those of the concupiscible part.

/ answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in
species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since
different powers have different objects, as stated in the First
Part (Q. LXXVIL, A. 3), the passions of different powers
must of necessity be referred to different objects. Much
more, therefore, do the passions of different faculties differ
in species: since a greater difference in the object is required
to diversify the species of the powders, than to diversify the
species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical
order, diversity of genus arises from diversity in the poten-
tiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from
diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts of the
soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only in
species but also in genus, while acts and passions regarding
different specific objects, included under the one common
object of a single power, differ as the species of that genus.

In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the
irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the
object of each of these powers. For we have stated in the
First Part (Q. LXXXI., A. 2) that the object of the con-
cupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended
as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul

286 QUESTION XXIII

must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times,
in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil,
in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature
can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good or evil,
inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the
object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions
regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible
power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred and suchlike:
whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous,
through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the
irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.

Reply Ob], i. As stated in the First Part (loc. cit.), the
irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove
the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from
tending towards its object, either by making some good
difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid.
The result is that all the irascible passions terminate in the
concupiscible passions: and thus it is that joy and sorrow,
which are concupiscible passions, follow from those passions
which are in the concupiscible faculty.

Reply Ohj. 2. Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the
irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly
a concupiscible passion; but on account of the struggle,
which belongs to the irascible power.

Reply. Ohj 3. Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves
the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain,
from this very fact it has a certain contrariety to the con-
cupiscible power: and hence the need of another power
tending to that good. The same applies to evil. And this
power is the irascible faculty . Consequently the concupiscible
passions are specifically different from the irascible passions.

Second Article.

whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is
based on the contrariety of good and evil ?

We proceed thus- to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the contrariety of the irascible
passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good

HOW PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER 287

and evil. For the irascible passions are ordained to the con-
cup iscible passions, as stated above (A. i ad i). But the
contrariety of the concupiscible passions is no other than that
of good and evil; take, for instance, love and hatred, joy and
sorrow. Therefore the same applies to the irascible passions.

Obj. 2. Further, passions differ according to their objects;
just as movements differ according to their termini. But
there is no other contrariety of movements, except that of
the termini, as is stated in Phys. v. Therefore there is no
other contrariety of passions, save that of the objects. Now
the object of the appetite is good or evil. Therefore in no
appetitive power can there be contrariety of passions other
than that of good and evil.

Obj. 3. Further, every passion of the soul is by way of
approach and withdrawal, as Avicenna declares in his sixth
book of Physics (De Anima ii.). Now approach results from
the apprehension of good ; withdrawal, from the apprehension
of evil: since just as good is what all desire (Ethic, i.), so evil
is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the soul, there
can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil.

On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one
another, as stated in Ethic, iii. But fear and daring do not
differ in respect of good and evil : because each regards some
kind of evil. Therefore not every contrariety of the irascible
passions is that of good and evil.

/ answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in
Phys. iii. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on
contrariety of movements or changes. Now there is a two-
fold contrariety in changes and movements, as stated in
Phys. V. One is according to approach and withdrawal in
respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs
properly to changes, i.e., to generation, which is a change
to being, and to corruption, which is change from being.
The other contrariety is according to opposition of termini,
and belongs properly to movements : thus whitening, which
is movement from black to white, is contrary to blackening,
which is movement from white to black.

Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions

288 QUESTION XXIII

of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e., of
good and evil; the other, according to approach and with-
drawal in respect of the same term. In the concupiscible
passions the former contrariety alone is to be found; viz.,
that which is based on the objects: whereas in the irascible
passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of
this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated
above (A. i), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely.
Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a
term whereto, since nothing shuns good as such, on the
contrary, all things desire it. In like manner, nothing
desires evil, as such ; but all things shun it : wherefore evil
cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a
term wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion
in respect of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while
every concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from
it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore,
in the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety
of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object.

On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty, is
sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under
the aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good
which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of such a
nature as to produce in us a tendency to it, which tendency
pertains to the passion of hope; whereas, considered as
arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this
pertains to the passion of despair. In like manner the
arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the aspect of some-
thing to be shunned; and this belongs to the passion oifear :
but it also contains a reason for tending to it, as attempting
something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil;
and this tendency is called daring. Consequently in the
irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and
evil (as between hope and fear) : and also contrariety accord-
ing to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term
(as between daring and fear).

From what has been said the replies to the objections are
evident.

HOW PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER 289

Third Article,
whether any passion of the soul has no contrary ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — •

Objection i. It seems that every passion of the soul has a
contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the
irascible or in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above
(A. i). But both kinds of passions have their respective
modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the soul
has its contrary.

Ohj. 2. Further, every passion of the soul has either good
or evil for its object; for these are the common objects of
the appetitive part. But a passion having good for its
object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its object.
Therefore every passion has a contrary.

Ohj. 3. Further, every passion of the soul is in respect
of approach or withdrawal, as stated above (A. 2). But
every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal,
and vice versa. Therefore every passion of the soul has a
contrary.

On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no
passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in
Ethic, iv. Therefore not every passion has a contrary.

/ answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that
it cannot have a contrary; neither according to approach
and withdrawal, nor according to the contrariety of good
and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil alread}^
present : and when such an evil is present, the appetite must
needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the
limits of sorrow, which is a concupiscible passion; or else it
has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which move-
ment is that of anger. But it cannot have a movement of
withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already
present or past. Thus no passion is contrary to anger
according to contrariety of approach or withdrawal.

In like manner neither can there be according to con-
trariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present

II. I 19

290 QUESTION XXIII

evil is good obtained, which can no longer have the aspect
of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is ob-
tained, does there remain any other movement, except the
appetite's repose in the good obtained ; which repose belongs
to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.

Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to
the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from
its movement is contrary thereto ; thus the Philosopher says
(Rhetor, ii.) that calm is contrary to anger, by opposition not
of contrariety but of negation or privation.

From what has been said the replies to the objections are

evident.

Fourth Article.

whether in the same power, there are any passions,
specifically different, but not contrary to one

ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — •
Objection i. It seems that there cannot be, in the same
power, specifically different passions that are not contrary
to one another. For the passions of the soul differ according
to their objects. Now the objects of the soul's passions are
good and evil; and on this distinction is based the con-
trariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of the same
power, that are not contrary to one another, differ specifically.
Ohj. 2. Further, difference of species implies a difference
of form. But every difference of form, is in respect of some
contrariety, as stated in Metaph. x. Therefore passions of
the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do
not differ specifically.

Ohj. 3. Further, since every passion consists in approach
or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every
difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from
the difference of good and evil; or from the difference of
approach and withdrawal; or from degrees in approach
or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause
contrariety in the passions of the soul, as stated above
(A. 2): whereas the third difference does not diversify the

HOW PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER 291

species; else the species of the soul's passions would be
infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same
power to differ in species, without being contrary to one
another.

On the contrary, Love and joy, differ in species, and are in
the concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to
one another; rather, in fact, one causes the other. There-
fore in the same power there are passions that differ in
species without being contrary to one another.

/ answer that, Passions differ according to their active
causes, which are the objects of the soul's passions. Now
active causes are differentiated in two ways : first in respect
of their species or nature; thus fire differs from water:
secondly in respect of a difference in their active powers.
And the difference of active or motive causes, in respect of
their motive powers, can be applied to the passions of the
soul, in a like manner as to natural agents. For every
mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or
drives it back. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three
things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives
the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover :
thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the
body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to
be above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its
proper place, the mover gives it movement towards that
place. — Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have
come to its proper place: since to the same cause are due,
both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The
same applies to the cause of repulsion.

Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good
has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a
force of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good
causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination,
aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this
belongs to the passion of love : the corresponding contrary
of which is hatred in respect of evil. — Secondly, if the good be
not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement
towards the attainment of the good beloved : and this belongs

292 QUESTION XXIII

to^the passion of desire or concupiscence : and contrary to
it, in respect of evil, is the passion of avoidance or dislike. — -
Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite
to rest, as it were, in the good obtained : and this belongs to
the passion of delight or joy : the contrary of which, in respect
of evil, is pain or sorrow.

On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude,
or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed
as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good
or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained,
we have hope and despair. In respect of evil not yet present
we have fear and daring. But in respect of good obtained
there is no irascible passion: because it is no longer con-
sidered in the light of something arduous, as stated above
(A. 3). But evil already present gives rise to the passion
of anger.

Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty
there are three couples of passions; viz., love and hatred,
desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there
are three couples in the irascible faculty; viz., hope and
despair, fear and daring, and anger which has no contrary
passion.

Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differ-
ing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in
the irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul
are contained.

From this the replies to the objections are evident.

QUESTION XXIV

OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the
soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the pas-
sions of the soul ? (2) Whether every passion of the soul
is morally evil ? (3) Whether every passion increases or
decreases the goodness or malice of an act ? (4) Whether
any passion is good or evil specifically ?

First Article.

whether moral good and evil can be found in the
passions of the soul ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that no passion of the soul is morally
good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man:
since morals are properly predicated of man, as Ambrose says
(Super Luc, Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man,
for he has them in common with other animals. Therefore
no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.

Obj. 2. Further, the good or evil of man consists in being
in accord, or in disaccord with reason, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv.). Now the passions of the soul are not in the
reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as stated above
(Q. XXII. , A. 3). Therefore they have no connection with
human, i.e., moral, good or evil.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic, ii.) that we
are neither praised nor blamed for our passions. But we are

293

294 ^ QUESTION XXIV

praised and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the
passions are not morally good or evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Civ. Dei xiv.) while
speaking of the passions of the soul : They are evil if our love
is evil ; good if our love is good.

I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul
in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject
to the command of the reason and will. — -If then the passions
be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the
irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in
them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above
(Q. XVIII. , A. 5). If, however, they be considered as sub-
ject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good
and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is
nearer than the outward members to the reason and will;
and yet the movements and actions of the outward members
are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary.
Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are
voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are
said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the
will, or from not being checked by the will.

Reply Ohj. i. These passions, considered in themselves,
are common to man and other animals : but, as commanded
by the reason, they are proper to man.

Reply Ohj. 2. Even the lower appetitive powers are called
rational, in so far as they partake of reason in some sort
[Ethic, i.).

Reply Ohj. 3. The Philosopher says that we are neither
praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely;
but he does not exclude their becoming worthy of praise or
blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence
he continues : For the man who fears or is angry, is not praised
. . . or hlamed, hut the man who is angry in a certain way,
i.e., according to, or against reason.

GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS 295

Second Article.

whether every passion of the soul is evil morally ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — •
Objection i. It seems that all the passions of the soul are
morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix.) that
some call the souVs passions diseases or disturbances of the
soul.'^ But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally
evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally.

Obj. 2. Further, Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. ii.) that
movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement
contrary to nature is passion. But in movements of the
soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil : hence
he says elsewhere (ibid.) that the devil turned from that which
is in accord with nature to that which is against nature. There-
fore these passions are morally evil.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of
evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are
called the passions of sins (Rom. vii. 5).. Therefore it seems
that they are morally evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv.) that
all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed.
. . . For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere ; they grieve
for sin, they rejoice in good works.

I answer that. On this question the opinion of the Stoics
differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held
that all passions are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained
that moderate passions are good. This difference, although
It appears great in words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at
all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school.
For the Stoics did not discern between sense and intellect;
and consequently neither between the intellectual and sen-
sitive appetite. Hence neither did they discriminate the
passions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so
far as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite,
while the simple movements of the will are in the intellectual

* Cf. Q. XXIII. A. 2, footnote.

296 QUESTION XXIV

appetite : but every rational movement of the appetitive part
they called will, while they called passion, a movement that
exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Tully, following
their opinion (Tusc. iii.) calls all passions diseases of the soul :
whence he argues that those who are diseased are unsound ;
and that those who are unsound are wanting in sense. Hence
we speak of those who are wanting in sense as being unsound.

On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of
passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite.
Wherefore they esteem them good, when they are checked
by reason; and evil when they are unchecked by reason.
Hence it is evident that Tully was wrong in disapproving
(ibid.) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions,
when he says that every evil, though moderate, should he
shunned ; for, just as a body, though it be moderately ailing,
is not sound ; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the
soul, is not sound. For passions are not called diseases or
disturbances of the soul, save when they are unchecked by
reason.

Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 2. In every passion there is an increase or de-
crease in the natural movement of the heart, according as
the heart is moved more or less intensely by contraction and
dilatation; and hence it derives the character of passion.
But there is no need for passion to deviate always from the
order of natural reason.

Reply Obj. 3. The passions of the soul, in so far as they are
contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so
far as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.

Third Article.

whether passion increases or decreases the goodness
or malice of an act ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that every passion decreases the
goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the
judgment of reason, on which depends the goodness of a

GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS 297

moral act, consequently decreases the goodness of the moral
act. But every passion hinders the judgment of reason:
for Sallust says (CatiVn.) : All those that take counsel about
matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship
and pity. Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a
moral act.

Obj. 2. Further, the more a man's action is like to God,
the better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. y. t): Be ye
followers of God, as most dear children. But God and the
holy angels feel no anger when they punish . . . no fellow-
feeling with misery when they relieve the unhappy, as Augus-
tine says (De Civ. Dei ix.). Therefore it is better to do such-
like deeds without than with a passion of the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, just as moral evil depends on subordina-
tion to reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is
lessened by passion : for he sins less, who sins from passion,
than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does a better
deed, who does well without passion, than he who does with
passion.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Civ. Dei ix.) that the
passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed
without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the
penitent forgiven. But nothing that is obedient to reason
lessens the moral good. Therefore a passion of the soul does
not lessen moral good.

/ answer that. As the Stoics held that every passion of the
soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of
the soul lessens the goodness of an act ; since the admixture
of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less
good. And this is true indeed, if by passions we understand
none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite,
considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we give the
name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appe-
tite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his
passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good
is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the
more perfect, according as it extends to more things per-
taining to man. Wherefore no one questions the fact that

298 QUESTION XXIV

it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that the actions
of the outward members be controlled by the law of reason.
Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated
above (Q. XVII., A. 7), it belongs to the perfection of moral
or human good, that the passions themselves also should be
controlled by reason.

Accordingly just as it is better that man should both
will good and do it in his external act ; so also does it belong
to the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved
unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect
of his sensitive appetite; according to Ps. Ixxxiii. 3: My
heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God : where by
heart we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by
■flesh the sensitive appetite.

Reply Ohj. i. The passions of the soul may stand in a two-
fold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently :
and thus, because they obscure the judgment of reason,
on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they
diminish the goodness of the act ; for it is more praiseworthy
to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than
from the mere passion of pity. — In the second place, con-
sequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redun-
dance: because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is
intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows
that movement ; and thus the passion that results in conse-
quence, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates
greater moral goodness. — Secondly, by way of choice; when,
to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be
affected by a passion in order to work more promptly
with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And
thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an
action.

Reply Ohj. 2. In God and the angels there is no sensitive
appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good
does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of
bodily actions, as it does in us.

Reply Ohj. 3. A passion that tends to evil, and precedes
the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be conse-

GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS 299

quent in either of the ways meDtioned above (Reply Ohj. i),
it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more
grievous.

Fourth Article.

whether any passion is good or evil in its

SPECIES ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that no passion of the soul is morally
good or evil according to its species. Because moral good
and evil depend on reason. But the passions are in the
sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is acci-
dental to them. Since, therefore, nothing accidental
belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is good
or evil according to its species.

Ohj. 2. Further, acts and passions take their species from
their object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil
according to its species, it would follow that those passions,
the object of which is good, are specifically good, such as
love, desire and joy: and that those passions, the object of
which is evil, are specifically evil as hatred, fear and
sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no passion
is good or evil according to its species.

Ohj. 3. Further, there is no species of passion that is not
to be found in other animals. But moral good is in man
alone. Therefore no passion of the soul is good or evil
according to its species.

On the contrary, Augustine says [De Civ. Dei ix.) that
pity is a kind of virtue. Moreover, the Philosopher says
(Ethic, ii.) that bashfulness is a praiseworthy passion.
Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their
species.

/ answer that, We ought; seemingly, to apply to passions
what has been said in regard to acts (Q. XVIII., AA. 5, 6;
Q. XX., A. i) — viz., that the species of a passion, as the
species of an act, can be considered from two points of view.
First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good
and evil have no connection with the species of an act or

300 QUESTION XXIV

passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch
as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way
moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion,
in so far as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself,
in harmony or in discord with reason : as is clear in the case
of shame which is base fear ; and of envy which is sorrow for
another's good : for thus passions belong to the same species
as the external act.

Reply Obj. i. This argument considers the passions in
their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is
considered in itself. But in so far as the sensitive appetite
obeys reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accident-
ally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially.

Reply Obj. 2. Passions having a tendency to good, are
themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good,
and in like manner, if they turn away from that which is
truly evil. On the other hand, those passions which consist
in aversion from good, and a tendency to evil, are themselves

evil.

Reply Obj. 3. In irrational animals the sensitive appetite
does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are
led by a kind of estimative power, which is subject to a
higher, i.e., the Divine, reason, there is a certain likeness of
moral good in them, in regard to the soul's passions.

QUESTION XXV.

OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the order of the jpassions to one
another : and under this head there are four points of inquiry :
(i) The order of the irascible passions in comparison with
the concupiscible passions. (2) The order of the con-
cupiscible passions among themselves. (3) The order of
the irascible passions among themselves. (4) The four
principal passions.

First Article.

whether the irascible passions precede the concu-
piscible passions, or vice versa ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the irascible passions precede
the concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions
is that of their objects. But the object of the irascible
faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest
good. Therefore the irascible passions seem to precede the
concupiscible passions.

Ohj. 2. Further, the mover precedes that which is moved.

But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible,

as mover to that which is moved : since it is given to animals,

for the purpose of removing the obstacles that hinder the

concupiscible faculty from enjoying its object, as stated

above (Q. XXIII., A. 1 ad t\ P. i, Q. LXXXI., A. 2).

Now that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover

(Phys. viii.). Therefore the irascible passions precede the

concupiscible passions.

301

302 QUESTION XXV

Ohj. 3. Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible
passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible
passions: for the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv.) that retalia-
tion causes anger to cease, because it produces pleasure instead
of the previous pain. Therefore the concupiscible passions
follow the irascible passions.

On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the
absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted,
viz., the difhcult, good. Since, therefore, the absolute good
precedes the restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible
passions precede the irascible.

/ answer that. In the concupiscible passions there is more
diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For
in the former we find something relating to movement — •
e.g., desire; and something belonging to repose, e.g., joy and
sadness. But in the irascible passions there is nothing
pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to move-
ment. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a
thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult
or arduous; whereas such is the object of the irascible
faculty.

Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the
order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If,
therefore, we compare the passions of the irascible faculty
to those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good,
it is evident that in the order of execution, the irascible
passions take precedence of suchlike passions of the con-
cupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes
it, according to the Apostle (Rom. xii. 12): Rejoicing in
hope. But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest
in evil, viz., sadness, comes between two irascible passions:
because it follows fear; since we become sad when we are
confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes
the movement of anger ; since the movement of self-vindica-
tion, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger.
And because it is looked upon as a good thing to pay back
the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this
he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every passion of the

ORDER OF PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER 303

irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion
denoting rest, viz., either in joy or in sadness.

But if we compare the irascible passions to those con-
cupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear
that the latter take precedence: because the passions of
the irascible faculty add something to those of the con-
cupiscible faculty; just as the object of the irascible adds
the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the
concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire, a certain
effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization
of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion
or detestation, a certain lowness of spirits, on account of
difficulty in shunning the evil.

Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand
between those concupiscible passions that denote move*
ment towards good or evil, and those concupiscible passions
that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore evident
that the irascible passions both arise from and terminate
in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.

Reply Ohj. i. This argument would prove, if the formal
object of the concupiscible faculty were something con-
trary to the arduous, just as the formal object of the
irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the
object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it
naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common
precedes the proper.

Reply Ohj. 2. The remover of an obstacle is not a direct
but an accidental mover : and here we are speaking of passions
as directly ordered to one another. — -Moreover, the irascible
passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible
from resting in its object. Wherefore it only follows that
the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions
that denote rest. — The third objection leads to the same
conclusion.

304 QUESTION XXV

Second Article.

whether love is the first of the concupiscible

passions ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that love is not the first of the
concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is
so called from concupiscence, which is the same passion
as desire. But names are taken from that which predominates
(De Anima ii.). Therefore desire takes precedence of love.

Ohj. 2. Further, love implies a certain union; since it is
a uniting and binding force, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv,). But concupiscence or desire is a movement towards
union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire
precedes love.

Obj. 3. Further, the cause precedes its effect. But
pleasure is sometimes th e cause of love : since some love for
the sake of pleasure (Ethic, viii.). Therefore pleasure
precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the
passions.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv.) that
all the passions are caused by love : since love yearning for the
beloved object, is desire ; and, having and enjoying it, is joy.
Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions.

/ answer that, Good and evil are the objects of the con-
cupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil;
since evil is the privation of good. Wherefore all the
passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before
those, the object of which is evil, — that is to say, each pre-
cedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is
the reason for shunning the opposite evil.

Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed
first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execu-
tion. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions
can be considered either in the order of intention or in the
order of execution. In the order of execution, the first
place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing

ORDER OF PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER 305

that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever
tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or pro-
portion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate
end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in
the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude
or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is
complacency in good; while movement towards good is
desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.
Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire
precedes pleasure. — But in the order of intention, it is the
reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and
love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which
enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is,
as stated above (Q. XI., A. 3 ad ^).

Reply Ob]', i. We name a thing as we understand it, for
words are signs of thoughts, as the Philosopher states {Peri
Herm. i.). Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect.
But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed,
is pleasure: when it is not possessed, it is desire or concu-
piscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x.), we are
more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love. Con-
sequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence
is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.

Reply Obj. 2. The union of lover and beloved is twofold.
There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one
with the other. This union belongs to joy or pleasure,
which follows desire. There is also an affective union,
consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one
thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and
an inclination to another, partakes of it : and love betokens
such a union. This union precedes the movement of
desire.

Reply Obj. 3. Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes
love in the order of intention.

II. I 20

3o6 QUESTION XXV

Third Article.

whether hope is the first of the irascible

passions ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that hope is not the first of the
irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is de-
nominated from anger. Since, therefore, names are taken
from that which predominates (cf. A. 2, Obj. i), it seems
that anger precedes and surpasses hope.

Obj. 2. Further, the object of the irascible faculty is
something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive
to overcome a contrary evil that threatens soon to over-
take us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually present,
which pertains to anger; than to strive simply to obtain
some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to
overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore
anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and
daring, than hope. And consequently it seems that hope
should not precede them.

Obj. 3. Further, when a thing is moved towards an end,
the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of
approach. But fear and despair imply withdrawal from
something; while daring and hope imply approach towards
something: Therefore fear and despair precede hope and
daring.

On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the more
it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is
the first of the passions. Therefore hope is the first of the
passions in the irascible faculty.

I answer that, As stated above (A. i) all the irascible
passions denote movement towards something. Now this
movement of the irascible faculty towards something is
due to one of two causes : one is the mere aptitude or pro-
portion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred;
the other is the presence of good or evil; and this belongs
to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good

ORDER OF PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER 307

produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above
(Q. XXIII., AA. 3, 4); but the presence of evil gives rise
to the passion of anger.

Since then in the order of generation or execution, pro-
portion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement
of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions,
anger is the last in the order of generation. And among
the other passions of the irascible faculty, which denote a
movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil,
those whose object is good, viz., hope and despair, must
needs naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz.,
daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair; since
hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essen-
tially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly;
whereas despair is a movement away from good, a move-
ment which is consistent with good, not as such, but in
respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good
is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear, through
being a movement from evil, precedes daring. — And that
hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident
from this, — that as the desire of good is the reason for
avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear
and daring : because daring arises from the hope of victory,
and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly,
anger arises from daring : for no one is angry while seeking
vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna
observes in his Physics (De Anima iv.). Accordingly,
it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible
passions.

And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in
the way of generation, love and hatred are first ; desire and
aversion, second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring,
fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which
follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic, ii. : yet so
that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope
precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy precedes
sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated
above {cf. this and preceding articles).

3o8 QUESTION XXV

Reply Ohj. i. It is because anger arises from the other
passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, that
the power takes its name from anger as being more manifest
than the other passions.

Reply Ohj. 2. It is not the arduousness but the good that
is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope,
which regards good more directly, takes precedence:
although at times daring or even anger regards something
more arduous.

Reply Ohj. 3. The movement of the appetite is essentially
and directly towards the good; its movement from evil
results from this. For the movement of the appetitive
part is in proportion not to natural movement, but to the
intention of nature, which intends the end before intending
the removal of a contrary, which removal is desired only for
the sake of obtaining the end.

Fourth Article.

whether these are the four principal passions,— joy,
sadness, hope, and fear ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that joy, sadness, hope and fear
are not the four principal passions. For Augustine {De
Civ. Dei xiv.) omits hope and puts desire in its place.

Ohj. 2. Further, there is a twofold order in the passions
of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execu-
tion or generation. The principal passions should therefore
be taken, either in the order of intention; and thus joy and
sadness, which are the final passions, will be the principal
passions; or in the order of execution or generation; and
thus love will be the principal passion. Therefore joy and
sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the four
principal passions.

Ohj. 3. Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear
is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair,
should be reckoned as principal passions, since they cause
others : or hope and daring, from being akin to one another.

ORDER OF PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER 309

On the contrary, Boethius {De Consol. i.) in enumerating
the four principal passions, says :

Banish joys: banish fears:

Away with hope : away with tears.

/ answer that, These four are commonly called the princi-
pal passions. Two of them, viz., joy and sadness, are said
to be principal, because in them all the other passions have
their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all
the other passions, as is stated in Ethic, ii. — Fear and hope
are principal passions, not because they complete the others
simply, but because they complete them as regards the
movement of the appetite towards something : for in respect
of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire,
and ends in hope ; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred,
goes on to aversion, and ends in fear. — Hence it is customary
to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present
and the future : for movement regards the future, while rest
is in something present: so that joy relates to present good;
sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future good,
and fear, future evil.

As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present
or future, they all culminate in these four. For this
reason some have said that these four are the principal
passions, because they are general passions: and this is
true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the
common tendency of the appetite to desire or aversion for
something.

Reply Ohj. i. Augustine puts desire or covetousness in
place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same
object, viz., some future good.

Reply Ohj. 2. These are called principal passions, in the
order of intention and completion. And though fear and
hope are not the last passions simply, yet they are the last
of those passions that tend towards something as future-
Nor can the argument be pressed any further except in
the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a
principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, which

310 QUESTION XXV

cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on
(Reply Ohj. 3).

Reply Ohj. 3. Despair implies movement away from
good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies
movement towards evil; and this too is accidental. Con-
sequently these cannot be principal passions; because that
which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. And so
neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it
arises from daring.

QUESTION XKVI.

OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR,
AND FIRST, OF LOVE.

{In Four Articles.)

We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular,
and (i) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the
passions of the irascible faculty.

The first of these considerations will be threefold; since
we shall consider (i) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and
aversion; (3) Pleasure and sadness.

Concerning love, three points must be considered : (i) Love
itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under
the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether
love is in the concupiscible power ? (2) Whether love, is a
passion ? (3) Whether love is the same as dilection ?
(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship,
and love of concupiscence ?

First Article ?
whether love is in the concupiscible power ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that love is not in the concupiscible
power. For it is written (Wis. viii. 2) : Her, namely, wisdom,
have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth. But
the concupiscible power, being a part of the sensitive appe-
tite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by
the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible power.

Ohj. 2. Further, love seems to be identified with every
passion: for x\ugustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv.): Love, yearn-

311

312 QUESTION XXVI

ing for the object beloved, is desire ; having and enjoying it,
is joy ; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear ; and feeling
what is contrary to it, is sadness. But not every passion is
in the concupiscible power ; indeed, fear, which is mentioned
in this passage, is in the irascible power. Therefore we
must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible
power.

Obj. 3. Further, Dionysius {Div. Nom. iv.) mentions a
natural love. But natural love seems to pertain rather to
the natural powers, that belong to the vegetal soul. There-
fore love is not simply in the concupiscible power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic, ii.) that
love is in the concupiscible power.

I answer that. Love is something pertaining to the appe-
tite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs
according to the difference of appetites. For there is an
appetite which arises, from an apprehension existing, not
in the subject of the appetite, but in some other:
and this is called the natural appetite. Because natural
things seek what is suitable to them according to their
nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them,
but in the Author of their nature, as stated in the First
Fart (Q. VL, k. 1. ad 2\Q. CIIL, A. i ad i, 3).— And there
is another appetite arising from an apprehension in the
subject of the appetite, but from necessity and not from
free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the sensitive
appetite, which, however, in man, has a certain share of
liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. — Again, there is another
appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject
of the appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual
appetite, which is called the will.

Now in each of these appetites, the name love is given to
the principle of movement towards the end loved. In the
natural appetite the principle of this movement is the
appetitive subject's connaturalhess with the thing to which
it tends, and may be called natural love : thus the connatur-
alness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of its weight
and may be called natural love. In like manner the aptitude

LOVE, IN ITSELF 313

of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good; that
is to say, its very complacency in good, is called sensi-
tive love, or intellectual or rational love. So that sensitive
love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is
in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the concu-
piscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not
under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the
irascible faculty.

Reply Ohj. i. The w^ords quoted refer to intellectual or
rational love.

Reply Ohj. 2. Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire
and sadness, not essentially but causally.

Reply Ohj. 3. Natural love is not only in the powers of
the vegetal soul, but also in all the soul's powers, and all
the parts of the bod}^ and universally in all things : because,
as Dionysius says {Div. Horn, iv.). Beauty and goodness, are
beloved by all things ; since each single thing has a con-
naturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it.

Second Article,
whether love is a passion ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that love is not a passion. For
no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Diony-
sius says [Div. Nom. iv.). Therefore love is not a passion.

Ohj. 2. Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as
Augustine says (De Trin. viii.). But a union or bond is
not a passion, but rather a relation. Therefore love is not
a passion.

Ohj. 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii.)
that passion is a movement. But love does not imply the
movement of the appetite; for this is desire, of which move-
ment love is the principle. Therefore love is not a passion.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, viii.) that
love is a passion.

I answer that. Passion is the effect of the agent on the
patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect

314 QUESTION XXVI

on the patient: for in the first place it gives it the form;
and secondly it gives it the movement that results from
the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body
both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so
that weight, from being the principle of movement to the
place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its
weight, can, in a way, be called natural love. In the same
way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain
adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that
object; and from this follows movement towards the appet-
ible object. For the appetitive movement is ciycular, as
stated in De Anima iii. ; because the appetible object moves
the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, to its intention ;
while the appetite moves towards the realization of the
appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began.
Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by
the appetible object is called love, and is nothing else than
complacency in that object; and from this complacency
results a movement towards that same object, and this
movement is desire ; and lastly, there is rest which is joy.
Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the
appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is
a passion: properly so called, according as it is in the con-
cupiscible faculty ; in a wider and extended sense, according
as it is in the will.

Reply Ob], i. Since power denotes a principle of move-
ment or action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it
is a principle of movement in the appetite.

Reply Ohj. 2. Union belongs to love in so far as by reason
of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in
relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself
or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very
relation of union, but that union is a result of love. Hence,
too, Dionysius says that love is a unitive force {Div. Norn, iv.),
and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii.) that union is the work
of love.

Reply Ohj. 3. Although love does not denote the move-
ment of the appetite in tending towards the appetible object.

LOVE. IN ITSELF 3i5

yet it denotes that movement whereby the appetite is
changed by the appetible object, so as to have complacency
therein.

Third Article,
whether love is the same as dilection ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that love is the same as dilection.
For Dionysius says {Div. Nom. iv.) that love is to dilection,
as four is to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one
composed of straight lines. But these have the same meaning.
Therefore love and dilection denote the same thing.

Ohj. 2. Further, the movements of the appetite differ
by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection
and love are the same. Therefore these are the same.

Ohj. 3. Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that
it is chiefly in the fact that dilection refers to good things,
love to evil things, as some have maintained, according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv.). But they do not differ thus;
because as Augustine says [ibid.) the holy Scripture uses
both words in reference to either good or bad things. There-
fore love and dilection do not differ : thus indeed Augustine
concludes {ibid.) that it is not one thing to speak of love, and
another to speak of dilection.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.) that some
holy men have held that love means something more Godlike
than dilection does.

I answer that, We find four words referring, in a way, to
the same thing: viz., love, dilection, charity and friendship.
They differ, however, in this, that friendship, according to
the Philosopher [Ethic, viii.) is like a habit, whereas love
and dilection are expressed by way of act or passion; and
charity can be taken either way.

Moreover these three express act in different ways.
For love has a wider signification than the others, since
every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because
dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice (electionem)
made beforeliand, as the very word denotes: and therefore

3i6 QUESTION XXVI

diiection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the
will, and only in the rational nature. — Charity denotes, in
addition to love a certain perfection of love, in so far as
that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word
itself implies.*

Reply Ohj. i. Dionysius is speaking of love and diiection,
in so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus
love is the same as diiection.

Reply Ohj. 2. The object of love is more general than the
object of diiection: because love extends to more than
diiection does, as stated above.

Reply Ohj. 3. Love and diiection differ, not in respect of
good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty
love is the same as diiection. And it is in this sense that
Augustine speaks of love in the passage quoted: hence a little
further on he adds that a right will is well directed love, and a
wrong will is ill-directed love. However, the fact that love
which is a concupiscible passion, inclines many to evil, is the
reason why some assigned the difference stated above (06/. 3).

Reply Ohj. 4. The reason why some held that, even when
applied to the will itself, the word love signifies something
more Godlike than diiection, was because love denotes a
passion, especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite;
whereas diiection presupposes the judgment of reason.
But it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it
were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly
be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature
of diiection, as stated above. And consequently love is
more Godlike than diiection.

Fourth Article.

whether love is properly divided into love of
friendship and love of concupiscence ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that love is not properly divided
into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For

* Referring to the Latin carus (dear).

LOVE, IN ITSELF 317

love is a passion, while friendship is a habit, according to the
Philosopher {Ethic, viii.). But habit cannot be the member
of a division of passions. Therefore love is not properly
divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing cannot be divided by another
member of the same division; for man is not a member of
the same division as animal. But concupiscence is a member
of the same division as love, as a passion distinct from love.
Therefore concupiscence is not a division of love.

Obj. 3. Further, according to the Philosopher {Ethic, viii.)
friendship is threefold, that which is founded on usefulness,
that which is founded on pleasure, and that which is founded
on goodness. But useful and pleasant friendship are not
without concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should
not be contrasted with friendship.

On the contrary, We are said to love certain things, because
we desire them: thus a man is said to love wine, on account
of its sweetness which he desires ; as stated in Topic, ii.
But we have no friendship for wine and suchlike things, as
stated in Ethic, viii. Therefore love of concupiscence is
distinct from love of friendship.

/ ansii)er that, As the Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.), to love is
to wish good to someone. Hence the movement of love has
a twofold tendency : towards the good which a man wishes
to someone, — to himself or to another; and towards that to
which he wishes some good. Accordingly, man has love of
concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another ;
and love of friendship, towards him to whom he wishes good.

Now the members of this division are related as primary
and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of
friendship is love simply and for itself ; whereas that which is
loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and
for itself, but for something else. For just as that which has
existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another
is a relative being ; so, because good is convertible with being,
the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that
which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently
the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have some

3i8 QUESTION XXVI

good, is love simply: while the love, with which a thing is
loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love.

Reply Obj. i. Love is not divided into friendship and
concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of con-
cupiscence. For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom
we wish good : while we are said to desire, what we wish for
ourselves.

Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 3. When friendship is based on usefulness
or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good:
and in this respect the character of friendship is preserved.
But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or
use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, in
so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses
the character of true friendship.

QUESTION XXVII.

OF TPIE CAUSE OF LOVE.

{In Four Article s.)

We must now consider the cause of love: and under this
head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether good
is the only cause of love ? (2) Whether knowledge is a
cause of love ? (3) Whether likeness is a cause of love ?
(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is the cause of
love ?

First Article,
whether good is the only cause of love ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that good is not the only cause of
love. For good does not cause love, except because it is
loved. But it happens that evil also is loved, according to
Ps. X. 6: He that loveth iniquity y hateth his own soul : else,
every love would be good. Therefore good is not the only
cause of love.

Ohj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.) that
we love those who acknowledge their evils. Therefore it seems
that evil is the cause of love.

Ohj, 3. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.) that not
the good only but also the beautiful is beloved by all.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii.) : Assuredly,
the good alone is beloved. Therefore good alone is the cause
of love.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XXVI., A. i), Love
belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty.
Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of
its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must

319

320 QUESTION XXVII

needs be love's object. Now the proper object of love is
the good; because, as stated above (Q. XXVI., AA. i, 2),
love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the
lover for the thing beloved ; and to everything, that thing is a
good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows,
therefore, that good is the proper cause of love.

Reply Ohj. i. Evil is never loved except under the aspect
of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect,
and is considered as being good simply. And thus a certain
love is evil, in so far as it tends to that which is not simply
a true good. It is in this way that man loves iniquity, in-
asmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained;
pleasure, for instance, or money, or suchlike.

Reply Ohj. 2. Those who acknowledge their evils, are
beloved, not for their evils, but because they acknowledge
them, for it is a good thing to acknowledge one's faults, in
so far as it excludes insincerity or hyprocrisy.

Reply Ohj. 3. The beautiful is the same as the good,
and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all
seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while
the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by
being seen or known . Consequently those senses chiefly regard
the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz., sight and
hearing, as ministering to reason ; for we speak of beautiful
sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other
objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression
heautiful, for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beauti-
ful odours. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness
a relation to the cognitive faculty : so that good means that
which simply pleases the appetite; while the beautiful is
something pleasant to apprehend.

Second Article,
whether knowledge is a cause of love ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — •
Objection i. It seems that knowledge is not a cause of love.
For it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things

THE CAUSE OF LOVE 321

are sought without being known, for instance, the sciences ;
for since to have them is the same as to know them, as Augustine
says (Qq. 83), if we knew them we should have them, and
should not seek them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause
of love.

Ohj. 2. Further, to love what we know not seems like
loving something more than we know it. But some things
are loved more than they are known: thus in this life God
can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in Himself.
Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.

Ohj. 3. Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there
would be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all
things there is love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.);
whereas there is not knowledge in all things. Therefore
knowledge is not the cause of love.

On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Tvin. x.) that none
can love what he does not know.

I answer that. As stated above (A. i), good is the cause of
love, as being its object. But good is not the object of the
appetite, except as apprehended. And therefore love de-
mands some apprehension of the good that is loved. For
this reason the Philosopher {Ethic, ix.) says that bodily sight
is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the
contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the be-
ginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the
cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be
loved only if known.

Reply Ohj. i. He who seeks science, is not entirely without
knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already
in some respect, either in a general way, or in some one of its
effects, or from having heard it commended, as Augustine
says (De Trin. x.). But to have it is not to know it thus,
but to know it perfectly.

Reply Oh]. 2. Something is required for the perfection of
knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love.
For knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function con-
sists in distinguishing things which in reality are united, and
in uniting together, after a fashion, things that are distinct,

II. I 21

32 2 QUESTION XXVII

by comparing one with another. Consequently the per-
fection of knowledge requires that man should know dis-
tinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and
properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive
power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it
suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved
according as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore,
that a thing is loved more than it is known ; since it can be
loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known. This
is most evident in regard to the sciences, which some love
through having a certain general knowledge of them: for
instance, they know that rhetoric is a science that enables
man to persuade others; and this is what they love in
rhetoric. The same apphes to the love of God.

Reply Ohj. 3. Even natural love, which is in all things, is
caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in
natural things themselves, but in Him Who created their
nature, as stated above (Q. XXVL, A. i; cf. P. i, Q. VI.,
A. I ad 2).

Third Article,
w^hether likeness is a cause of love ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that likeness is not a cause of love.
For the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But
likeness is the cause of hatred; for it is written (Prov. xiii. 10)
that among the proud there are always contentions ; and the
Philosopher says {Ethic, viii.) that potters quarrel with one
another. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.

Ohj. 2. Further, Augustine says {Confess, iv.) that a man
loves in another that which he would not he himself : thus he
loves an actor, hut would not himself he an actor. But it
would not be so, if likeness were the proper cause of love; for
in that case a man would love in another, that which he
possesses himself, or would like to possess. Therefore like-
ness is not a cause of love.

Ohj. 3. Further, Everyone loves that which he needs,
even if he have it not : thus a sick man loves health, and a

THE CAUSE OF LOVE 323

poor man loves riches. But in so far as he needs them and
lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not only likeness
but also unlikeness is a cause of love.

Ohj. 4. Further, the Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.) that we
love those who bestow money and health on us; and also those
who retain their friendship for the dead. But all are not such.
Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xiii. 19) : Every beast
loveth its like.

I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of
love. But it must be observed that likeness between things
is twofold. One kind of likeness arises from each thing
having the same quality actually: for example, two things
possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be alike.
Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having
potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the
other has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body
existing outside its proper place is like another heavy body
that exists in its proper place : or again, according as poten-
tiality bears a resemblance to its act ; since act is contained,
in a manner, in the potentiality itself.

Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friend-
ship or well-wishing. For the very fact that two men are
alike, having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a
manner, one in that form : thus two men are one thing in the
species of humanity, and two white men are one thing in
whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other,
as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to
himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of
concupiscence, or friendship founded on usefulness or plea-
sure: because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the
desire for its act; and it takes pleasure in its realization, if
it be a sentient and cognitive being.

Now it has been stated above (Q. XX VL, A. 4), that in
the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking,
loves himself, in willing the good that he desires. But a
man loves himself more than another : because he is one with
himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only

324 QUESTION XXVII

in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's
likeness to him arising from the participation of a form,
hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes
hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him
from gaining his own good. This is why potters quarrel
among themselves, because they hinder one another's gain:
and why there are contentions among the proud, because they
hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply Ohj. 2. Even when a man loves in another what he
loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion:
because as the latter is to that which is loved in him, so is
the former to that which he loves in himself : for instance, if
a good singer love a good writer, we can see a likeness of
proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming
to him in respect of his art.

Reply Ohj. 3. He that loves what he needs, bears a like-
ness to wliat he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its
act, as stated above.

Reply Ohj. 4. According to the same likeness of poten-
tiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is
liberal, in so far as he expects from him that which he desires.

The same applies to the man who is constant in his friend-
ship as compared to one who is inconstant. For in either
case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might
also say that although not all men have these virtues in the
complete habit, yet they have them according to certain
seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles
the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as
being in conformity with his own natural reason.

Fourth Article.

whether any other passion of the soul is a
cause of love ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Ohjection i. It seems that some other passion of the soul
ran. be the cause of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic, viii.)

THE CAUSE OF LOVE 325

says that some are loved for the sake of the pleasure they
give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore another passion
is a cause of love.

Ohj. 2. Further, desire is a passion. But we love some
because we desire to receive something from them: as
happens in every friendship based on usefulness. There-
fore another passion is a cause of love.

Ohj. 3. Further, Augustine says {De Trin. x.): When we
have no hope of getting a thing, we love it hut half-heartedly or
not at all, even if we see how beautiful it is.

On the contrary. All the other emotions of the soul are
caused by love, as Augustine says {De Civ. Dei xiv.).

/ answer that, There is no other passion of the soul that
does not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that
every other passion of the soul denotes either movement
towards something, or rest in something. Now every
movement towards something, or rest in something, arises
from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does
love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any other
passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love.
But it may happen that some other passion is the cause of
some particular love : just as one good is the cause of another.

Reply Ohj. i. When a man loves a thing for the pleasure
it affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that
very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding
love; for none takes pleasure save in that which is loved in
some way.

Reply Ohj. 2. Desire for a thing always presupposes love
for that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of
another thing being loved: thus he that desires money, for
this reason loves him from whom he receives it.

Reply Ohj. 3. Hope causes or increases love; both by
reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure ; and by reason
of desire, because hope strengthens desire, since we do not
desire so intensely that which we have no hope of receiving.
Nevertheless hope itself is of a good that is loved.

QUESTION XXVIII.

OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE.

{In Six Articles.)

We now have to consider the effects of love: under which
head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether union is an
effect of love ? (2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect
of love ? (3) Whether extasy is an effect of love ? (4)
Whether zeal is an effect of love ? (5) Whether love is a
passion that is hurtful to the lover ? (6) Whether love is
cause of all that the lover does ?

First Article,
whether union is an effect of love ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : — •

Objection i. It seems that union is not an effect of love.
For absence is incompatible with union. But love is com-
patible with absence; for the Apostle says (Gal. iv. 18): Be
zealous for that which is good in a good thing always (speaking
of himself, according to a gloss), and not only when I am
present with you. Therefore union is not an effect of love.

Ohj. 2. Further, every union is either according to essence,
— thus form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a
part to the whole, or to another part in order to make up the
whole : or according to likeness, in genus, species, or accident.
But love does not cause union of essence ; else love could not
be between things essentially distinct. On the other hand,
love does not cause union of likeness, but rather is caused by
it, as stated above (Q. XXVII., A. 3). Therefore union is
not an effect of love.

326

THE EFFECTS OF LOVE 327

Ohj. 3. Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and
the intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But
the lover in act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union
is the effect of knowledge rather than of love.

On the contrary, Dionysius says [Div. Nom. iv.) that every
love is a unitive force.

I ansiiDer that, The union of lover and beloved is twofold.
The first is real union ; for instance, when the beloved is in
the presence of the lover. — The second is union of affection :
and this union must be considered in relation to the pre-
ceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite
follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz., love
of concupiscence, and love of friendship; each of these arises
from a kind of apprehension of union between lover and
beloved. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we appre-
hend it as belonging to our well-being. In like manner when
a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills
good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he
apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills
good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's
other self {Ethic, ix.), and Augustine says (Confess, iv.). Well
did one say to his friend : Thou half of my soul.

The first of these unions is caused effectively by love;
because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of
the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him.
The second union is cdiused formally by love; because love
itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says
(De Trin. viii.) that love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking
to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved. For in
describing it as uniting he refers to the union of affection,
without which there is no love: and in saying that it seeks
to unite, he refers to real union.

Reply Ohj. i. This argument is true of real union, which
is requisite as causing pleasure; while desire implies the real
absence of the beloved: whereas love remains whether the
beloved be absent or present.

Reply Ohj. 2. Union has a threefold relation to love.
There is a union winch causes love; and this is substantial

328 QUESTION XXVIII

union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself;
while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it
is the union of likeness, as stated above (0. XXVII., A. 3).
There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This
union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to
substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object
of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to
something belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence.
Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is
real union, which the lover seeks with the object of his love.
Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love :
for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii.), Aristophanes stQ.ted
that lovers would wish to be united both into one, but since this
would result in either one or both being destroyed, they seek a
suitable and becoming union; — ^to live together, speak to-
gether, and be united in other like things.

Reply Obj. 3. Knowledge is perfected by the thing known
being united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the
effect of love is that the thing itself which is loved, is, in a
way, united to the lover, as stated above. Consequently
the union caused by love is closer than that which is caused
by knowledge.

Second Article,
whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that love does not cause mutual in-
dwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa.
For that which is in another is contained by it. But the
same cannot be container and contents. Therefore love
cannot cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the
beloved and vice versa.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole,
except by means of a division of the whole. But it is the
function of the reason, not of the appetite where love
resides, to divide things that are really united. Therefore
mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.

THE EFFECTS OF LOVE 329

Ohj. 3. Further, if love involves the lover being in the
beloved and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united
to the lover, in the same way as the lover is united to the
beloved. But the union itself is love, as stated above (A. i).
Therefore it follows that the lover is always loved by the
object of his love; which is evidently false. Therefore
mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.

On the contrary, It is written (i John iv. 16): He that
ahideth in charity ahideth in God, and God in him. Now
charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason,
every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice
versa.

/ answer that, This effect of mutual indwelling may be
understood as referring either to the apprehensive or to the
appetitive power. Because, as to the apprehensive power,
the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the
beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover, according
to Phil. i. 7, For that I have you in my heart : while the lover
is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inas-
much as the lover is not satisfied with a superficiaF appre-
hension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate
knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to
penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning
the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He searcheth all
things, yea the deep things of God (i Cor. ii. 10).

As to the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be
in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of
complacency : causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in
its good, when present ; or, in the absence of the object loved,
by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concu-
piscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with
the love of friendship : not indeed from any extrinsic cause
(as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish
good to another on account of something else), but because
the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart.
For this reason we speak of love as being intimate ; and of the
how els of charity. On the other hand, the lover is in the
beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of

330 QUESTION XXVIII

friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of con-
cupiscence is not satisfied with any external or superficial
possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess
the beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it
were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in the
beloved, inasmuch as he reckons w^hat is good or evil to his
friend, as being so to himself ; and his friend's will as his own,
so that it seems as though he felt the good or suffered the
evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to
friends to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the
same, as the Philosopher says {Ethic, ix. and Rhet. ii.).
Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend
as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as
though he were become one with him : but in so far as, on
the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for
his own sake, looking on his friend as identified with himself,
thus the beloved is in the lover.

In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friend-
ship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love: inas-
much as friends return love for love, and both desire and do
good things for one another.

Reply Ohj. i. The beloved is contained in the lover, by
being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object
of his complacency. On the other hand, the lover is con-
tained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so
to speak, into the beloved. For nothing hinders a thing
from being both container and contents in different ways:
just as a genus is contained in its species, and vice versa.

Reply Ohj. 2. The apprehension of the reason precedes the
movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides,
so does the movement of love penetrate into the beloved, a;?
was explained above.

Reply Ohj. 3. This argument is true of the third kind of
mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of
love.

THE EFFECTS OF LOVE 331

Third Article,
whether extasy is an effect of love ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that extasy is not an effect of love.
For extasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does
not always result in loss of reason : for lovers are masters of
themselves at times. Therefore love does not cause extasy.

Ohj. 2. Further, the lover desires to be united to the
beloved. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather
than betakes himself into the beloved, going forth out from
himself as it were.

Ohj. 3. Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as
stated above (A. i). If, therefore, the lover goes out from
himself, in order to betake himself into the beloved, it
follows that the lover always loves the beloved more than
himself: which is evidently false. Therefore extasy is not
an effect of love.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.) that the
Divine love produces extasy, and that God Himself suffered
extasy through love. Since therefore according to the same
author {ibid.), every love is a participated likeness of the
Divine Love, it seems that every love causes extasy.

/ answer that, To suffer extasy means to be placed outside
oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and
as to the appetitive power. As to the apprehensive
power, a man is said to be placed outside himself, when
he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him. This
may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge;
thus, a man is said to suffer extasy, inasmuch as he is
placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and
reason, when he is raised up so as to comprehend things
that surpass sense and reason : or it may be due to his being
cast down into a state of debasement; thus a man may be
said to suffer extasy, when he is overcome by violent passion
or madness,- — As to the appetitive power, a man is said to
suffer extasy, when that power is borne towards something
else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as it were.

332 QUESTION XXVIII

The first of these extasies is caused by love dispositively,
in so far namely, as love makes the beloved to dwell in the
lover's mind, as stated above (A. 2) : while the more we
give our mind to one thing, the less we think of others. — The
second extasy is caused by love directly; by love of friend-
ship, simply; by love of concupiscence, not simply but in a
restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the
lover is taken out from himself, in a certain sense ; in so far,
namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he
has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since
he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not
go out from himself simply, and this movement remains
finally within him. On the other hand, in the love of friend-
ship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because
he wishes and does good to his friend, as it were, caring and
providing for him, for his sake.

Reply Ohj. i. This argument is true of the first kind of
extasy.

Reply Ohj. 2. This argument applies to love of concu-
piscence, which, as stated above, does not cause extasy
simply.

Reply Ohj. 3. He who loves, goes out from himself, in so
far as he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet
he does not will the good of his friend more than his own
good : and so it does not follow that he loves another more
than himself.

Fourth Article,
whether zeal is an effect of love ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Ohjection i . It seems that zeal is not an effect of love. For
zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written
(i Cor. iii. 3): Whereas there is among you zeal (Douay, —
envying) and contention, etc. But contention is incom-
patible with love. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.

Ohj. 2. Further, the object of love is the good, which
communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to
communication; since it seems an effect of zeal, that a man

THE EFFECTS OF LOVE 333

refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus
husbands are said to be jealous of (zelare) their wives,
because they will not share them with others. Therefore
zeal is not an effect of love.

Obj. 3. Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither
is there without love: for it is written (Fs. Ixxii. 3) : / had a
zeal on occasion of the wicked. Therefore it should not be set
down as an effect of love any more than of hatred.

On the contrary, Dionysius says {Div. Nom. iv.): God is
said to he a zealot, on account of this great love for all things.

I ansi^jer that, Zeol, whatever way we take it, arises from
the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more in-
tensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it
withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love
is a movement toi<uards the object loved, as Augustine says
(Qq. 83), an intense love seeks to remove everything that
opposes it.

But this happens in different ways according to love of
concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of con-
cupiscence he who desires something intensely, is moved
against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the
object of his love. It is thus that husbands are said to be
jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a
hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like
manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who
seem to excel, as though these were a hindrance to their
excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written
(Ps. xxxvi. i) : Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy (zelaveris)
them that work iniquity.

On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's
good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be
moved against everything that opposes the friend's good. In
this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his
friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may
be said or done against his friend's good. In this way, too,
a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he en-
deavours, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is
contrary to the honour or will of God; according to 3 Kings

334 QUESTION XXVIII

xix. 14 : With zeal have I been zealous for the Lord . . . of hosts.
Again on the words of John ii. 17 : The zeal of Thy house hath
eaten me up, di. gloss says that a man is eaten up imth a good
zeal, who strives to remedy whatever evil he perceives ; and if
he cannot, hears with it and laments it.

Reply Ohj. i. The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the
zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not
against the object of love, but for it, and against that which
is opposed to it.

Reply Ohj. 2. Good is loved inasmuch as it can be com-
municated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders
the perfection of this communication, becomes hateful.
Thus zeal arises from love of good. — But through defect of
goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot, in their
entirety, be possessed by many at the same time : and from
the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does
not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things
which, in their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no
one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be
known entirely by many; except perhaps one may envy
another the excellence of his knowledge of some truth.

Reply Ohj. 3. The very fact that a man hates whatever is
opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence
zeal is set down as an effect of love rather than of hatred.

Fifth Article. *
whether love is a passion that wounds the

. LOVER ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that love wounds the lover. For
languor denotes a hurt in the one that languishes. But
love causes languor: for it is written (Cant. ii. 5): Compass
me about with apples ; because I languish with love. There-
fore love is a wounding passion.

Ohj. 2. Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love
melts that in which it is: for it is written (Cant. v. 6): My
soul melted when my beloved spoke. Therefore love is a

THE EFFECTS OF LOVE 335

dissolvent: therefore it is a corruptive and a wounding
passion.

Ohj. 3. Further, fervour denotes a certain excess of heat;
which excess has a corruptive effect. But love causes
fervour: for Dionysius {Co^L Hier. vii.) in reckoning the
properties belonging to the Seraphim's love, includes heat,
piercing and most fervent. Moreover it is said of love
(Cant. viii. 6) that its lamps are fire and flames. Therefore
love is a wounding and corruptive passion.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.) that every-
thing loves itself with a love that holds it together, i.e., that
preserves it. Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but
rather one that preserves and perfects.

/ answer that. As stated above (Q. XXVI., AA. i. 2,
Q. XXVIL, A. i), love denotes a certain adapting of the
appetitive power to some good. Now nothing is hurt by
being adapted to that which is suitable to it; rather, if
possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be
adapted to that which is not suitable to it, it is hurt and
made worse thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good
perfects and betters the lover; but love of a good which is
unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him. Where-
fore man is perfected and bettered chiefly by the love of
God: but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, ac-
cording to Osee ix. 10: They became abominable, as those
things which they loved.

And let this be understood as applying to love in respect
of its formal element, i.e., in regard to the appetite. But in
respect of the material element in the passion of love, i.e., a
certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by
reason of this change being excessive: just as it happens in
the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is
exercised through the change of some bodily organ.

In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four
proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz., melting,
enjoyment, languor, and fervour. Of these the first is
melting, which is opposed to freezing. For things that are
frozen, are closely bound together, so as to be hard to pierce.

336 QUESTION XXVIII

But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive
the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in
the lover, as stated above (A. 2). Consequently the freezing
or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with
love : while melting denotes a softening of the heart, whereby
the heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the
beloved. — If, then, the beloved is present and possessed,
pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the beloved be absent,
two passions arise; viz., sadness at its absence, which is
denoted by languor (hence Tully in De Tuscul. Qucest. iii.
applies the term ailment chiefly to sadness) ; and an intense
desire to possess the beloved, which is signified by fervour.
— And these are the effects of love considered formally,
according to the relation of the appetitive power to its object.
But in the passion of love, other effects ensue, proportionate
to the above, in respect of a change in the organ.

Sixth Article.

whether love is cause of all that the
lover does ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the lover does not everything
from love. For love is a passion, as stated above (Q. XXXI.
A. 2). But man does not do everything from passion: but
some things he does from choice; and some things from
ignorance, as stated in Ethic, v. Therefore man does not
everything that he does, from love.

Ohj. 2. Further, the appetite is a principle of movement
and action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii. If,
therefore, whatever a man does, is done from love, the other
passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous.

Ohj. 3. Further, nothing is produced at one and the same
time by contrary causes. But some things are done from
hatred. Therefore all things are not done from love.

On the contrary, Dionysius says [Div. Nom. iv.) that all
things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good.

I answer that. Every agent acts for an end, as stated above

THE EFFECTS OF LOVE 337

(Q. I., A. 2). Now the end is the good desired and loved by
each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, what-
ever it be, does every action from love of some kind.

Reply Ohj. i. This objection takes love as a passion exist-
ing in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of
love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual,
rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that
Dionysius speaks of love in chap. iv. of De Divinis Nomini-
bus.

Reply Ohj. 2. As stated above (A. 5: Q. XXVII. , A. 4)
desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other
passions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore every act
that proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as
from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are
proximate causes, are not superfluous.

Reply Ohj. 3. Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall
state further on (Q. XXIX., A. 2).

II. I 2i

QUESTION XXIX.

OF HATRED.

{In Six Ay tides.)

We must now consider hatred : concerning which there are
six points of inquiry: (i) Whether evil is the cause and the
object of hatred ? (2) Whether love is the cause of hatred ?
(3) Whether hatred is stronger than love ? (4) Whether a
man can hate himself ? (5) Whether a man can hate the
truth ? (6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal
hatred ?

First Article.

whether evil is the cause and object of

HATRED ?

We proceed thiis to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that evil is not the object and cause
of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If
therefore evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing
but the lack of something can be the object of hatred:
which is clearly untrue.

Ohj. 2. Further, hatred of evil is praiseworthy; hence
(2 Machab. iii. i) some are praised for that the laws were very
well kept, because of the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and
the hatred their souls (Douay, his soul) had of evil. If, there-
fore, nothing but evil be the object of hatred, it would follow
that all hatred is commendable: and this is clearly false.

Obj. 3. Further, the same thing is not at the same time
both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and
hateful to different subjects. Therefore hatred is not only
of evil, but also of good.

338

OF HATRED 339

On the contrary. Hatred is the opposite of love. But the
object of love is good, as stated above (Q. XXVI., A. i;
Q. XX Vn., A. i). Therefore the object of hatred is evil.

/ answer that, Since the natural appetite is the result of
apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same
subject as the natural appetite), it seems that what applies
to the inclination of the natural appetite, applies also to the
animal appetite, which does result from an apprehension in
the same subject, as stated above (Q. XXVI., A. i). Now,
with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as
each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is
suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a
natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it ;
and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal
appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain
harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as
suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite from that
which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now,
just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of
good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of
evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so
evil is the object of hatred.

Re-ply Ohj. i. Being, as such, has not the aspect of re-
pugnance but only of fittingness ; because being is common
to all things. But being, inasmuch as it is this determinate
being, has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate
being. And in this way, one being is hateful to another,
and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with
something else.

Reply Ohj. 2. Just as a thing may be apprehended as
good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may be appre-
hended as evil, whereas it is not truly evil. Hence it happens
sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is
good.

Reply Ohj. 3. To different things the same thing may be
lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite,
owing to one and the same thing being naturally suitable to
one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: thus heat is

340 QUESTION XXIX

becoming to fire and unbecoming to water: and in respect
of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same thing
being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad.

Second Article,
whether love is a cause of hatred ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that love is not a cause of hatred.
For the opposite members of a division are naturally simul-
taneous {Prcedic. x.). But love and hatred are opposite
members of a division, since they are contrary to one
another. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous. There-
fore love is not the cause of hatred.

Obj. 2. Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of
the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore
love is not the cause of hatred.

Obj. 3. Further, that which follows is not the cause of that
which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly:
since hatred denotes a turning away from evil, whereas love
denotes a turning towards good. Therefore love is not the
cause of evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv.) that all
emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since
it is an emotion of the soul, is caused by love.

I answer that, As stated above (A. i), love consists in a
certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while
hatred consists in a certain disagreement or dissonance.
Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with it,
before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees with
another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees
with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and
nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a suitable
thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is
caused by love.

Reply Obj. i. The opposite members of a division are
sometimes simultaneous naturally, both really and logically ;
e.g., two species of animal, or two species of colour. Some-

OF HATRED 341

times they are simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one
precedes, and causes the other; e.g., the species of numbers,
figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simul-
taneous either really or logically; e.g., substance and acci-
dent ; for substance is in reality the cause of accident ; and
being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of
accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated
of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. —
Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically
but not really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being
the cause of hatred.

Reply Ohj. 2. Love and hatred are contraries if considered
in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of
contraries, they are not themselves contrary, but conse-
quent to one another: for it amounts to the same that one
love a certain thing, or that one hate its contrary. Thus
love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its contrary.

Reply Ohj. 3. In the order of execution, the fact of turning
away from one term precedes the fact of turning towards the
other. But the reverse is the case in the order of intention :
since approach to one term is the reason for turning away
from the other. Now the appetitive movement belongs
rather to the order of intention than to that of execution.
Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an appeti-
tive movement.

Third Article,
whether hatred is stronger than love ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that hatred is stronger than love.
For Augustine says (Qq. 83) : There is no one who does not flee
from pain, more than he desires pleasure. But flight from
sorrow pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs
to love. Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

Ohj. 2. Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger.
But love is overcome by hatred : when, that is to say, love is
turned into hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

Ohj. 3. Further, the emotions of the soul are gauged by

343 QUESTION XXIX

their effects. But man insists more on repelling what is
hateful, than on seeking what is pleasant : thus also irrational
animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augus-
tine instances {loc. cit.). Therefore hatred is stronger than
love.

On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because evil
does nothing except in virtue of good, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv.). But hatred and love differ according to the
difference of good and evil. Therefore hatred is stronger
than love.

/ answer that, It is impossible for an effect to be stronger
than its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love
as its cause, as above stated (A. 2). Therefore it is impos-
sible for hatred to be stronger than love simply.

But furthermore, love must needs be simply stronger than
hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly
than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed
as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, simply
speaking, the soul's movement in respect of good is stronger
than its movement in respect of evil.

Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than
love, for two reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly
felt than love. For, since the sensitive perception is accom-
panied by a certain impression; when once the impression
has been received it is not felt so keenly as in the moment of
receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though
greater, is nevertheless not felt so much as the heat of a
tertian fever ; because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual
and like a second nature. For this reason, love is felt more
keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine
says {De Trin. x.) that love is felt more keenly, when we lack
what we love. And for the same reason, the unbecom-
ingness of that which is hated is felt more keenly, than the
becomingness of that which is loved. — Secondly, because
comparison is made between a hatred and a love which are
not mutually corresponding. Because, according to different
degrees of good there are different degrees of love to which
correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred

OF HATRED 343

that corresponds to a greater love, moves us more than a
lesser love.

Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For
the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation,
to which corresponds flight from sorrow. Wherefore we
flee from pain more than we love pleasure.

Reply Ohj. 2. Hatred would never overcome love, were it
not for the greater love to which that hatred corresponds.
Thus man loves himself, more than he loves his friend : and
because he loves himself, his friend is hateful to him, if he
oppose him.

Reply Ohj. 3. The reason why we act with greater insis-
tence in repelling what is hateful, is because we feel hatred
more keenly.

Fourth Article.

whether a man can hate himself ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that a man can hate himself. For
it is written (Ps. x. 6): He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own
soul. But many love iniquity. Therefore many hate them-
selves.

Ohj. 2. Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work
evil. But sometimes a man wishes and works evil to him-
self; e.g., a man who kills himself. Therefore some men
hate themselves.

Ohj. 3. Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii.) that avarice
makes a man hateful ; whence we may conclude that every-
one hates a miser. But some men are misers. Therefore
they hate themselves.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. v. 29) that no man
ever hated his own flesh.

I answer that, Properly speakings it is impossible for a man
to hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor
can anyone desire anything for himself, save under the aspect
of good : for evil is outside the scope of the will, as Dionysius
says {Div. Norn. iv.). Now to love a man is to will good to
him, as stated above (Q. XXVL, A. 4). Consequently, a

344 QUESTION XXIX

man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is impossible
for a man to hate himself, properly speaking.

But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself:
and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which
a man wills to himself. For it happens sometimes that what
is desired as good in some particular respect, is simply evil ;
and in this way, a man accidentally wills evil to himself;
and thus hates himself. — Secondly, in regard to himself, to
whom he wills good. For each thing is that which is pre-
dominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what the
king does, as if the king were the whole state. Now it is
clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it
happens that some men account themselves as being
principally that which they are in their material and sensi-
tive nature. Wherefore they love themselves according to
what they take themselves to be, while they hate that
which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to
reason. — And in both these ways, he that loveth iniquity
hateth not onlv his own soul, but also himself.

Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply Ohj. 2. No man wills and works evil to himself,
except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even
they who kill themselves, apprehend death itself as a good,
considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain.

Reply Ohj. 3. The miser hates something accidental to
himself, but not for that reason does he hate himself: thus
a sick man hates his sickness for the very reason that he
loves himself. — Or we may say that avarice makes man
hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it is caused
by inordinate self-love, ir respect of which, man desires
temporal goods for himself more than he should.

Fifth Article,
whether a man can hate the truth ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that a man cannot hate the truth.
For good, true, and being are convertible. But a man

OF HATRED 345

cannot hate good. Neither, therefore, can he hate the
truth.

Ohj. 2. Further, All men have a natural desire for know-
ledge, as stated in the beginning of Metaph. i. But know-
ledge is only of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired
and loved. But that which is in a thing naturally, is always
in it. Therefore no man can hate the truth.

Ohj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says {Rhetor, ii.) that
men love those who are straightforward. But there can be no
other motive for this save truth. Therefore man loves the
truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate it.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. iv. 16): Am I
become your enemy because I tell you the truth ?*

/ answer that, Good, true and being are the same in reality,
but differ as considered by reason. For good is considered
in the light of something desirable, while being and true are
not so considered: because good is what all things seek.
Wherefore good, as such, cannot be the object of hatred,
neither in general nor in particular. — Being and truth in
general cannot be the object of hatred : because disagreement
is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of love;
while being and truth are common to all things. But
nothing hinders some particular being or some particular
truth being an object of hatred, in so far as it is considered as
hurtful and repugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance
are not incompatible with the notion of being and truth,
as they are with the notion of good.

Now it may happen in three ways that some particular
truth is repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First,
according as truth is in things as in its cause and origin.
And thus man sometimes hates a particular truth, when he
wishes that what is true were not true. — Secondly, according
as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him from
gaining the object loved: such is the case of those who wish
not to know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely;
in whose person it is said (Job xxi. 14): Depart from us, we

* St. Thomas quotes the passage, probably from memory, as
though it were an assertion: / am become, etc.

346 QUESTION XXIX

desire not the knowledge of Thy ways.- — Thirdly, a particular
truth is hated inasmuch as it is in the intellect of another
man : as, for instance, when a man wishes to remain hidden
in his sin, he hates that anyone should know the truth about
his sin. In this respect, Augustine says {Confess, x.) that
men love truth when it enlightens, they hate it when it reproves.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Ohj. 2. The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself:
hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens.
But accidentally, the knowledge of truth may become hateful,
in so far as it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire.

Reply Ohj. 3. The reason why we love those who are
straightforward is because they tell the truth, the knowledge
of which is lovable for its own sake.

Sixth Article,
whether anything can be an object of universal

HATRED ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that a thing cannot be an object of
universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensi-
tive appetite, which is moved by an apprehension in the
senses. But the senses cannot apprehend the universal.
Tlierefore a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred.

Ohj. 2. Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and
where there is disagreement, there is nothing in common.
But the notion of universality implies something in common.
Therefore nothing can be the object of universal hatred.

Ohj. 3. Further, the object of hatred is evil. But evil is
in things, and not in the mind (Metaph. vi.). Since therefore
the universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the uni-
versal from the particular, it seems that hatred cannot have
a universal object.

On the contrary. The Philosopher says (Rhetor, ii.) that anger
is directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed
to a thing in general ; for everybody hates the thief and the back-
biter.

I answer that, There are two ways of speaking of the uni-

OF HATRED 347

versal: first, as considered under the aspect of universality;
secondly, as considered in the nature to which it is ascribed :
for it is one thing to consider the universal man, and another
to consider a man as man. If, therefore, we take the uni-
versal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of appre-
hension or of appetite, can attain the universal : because the
universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter,
on which every sensitive power is based.

Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension
and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus
we say that the object of sight is colour considered generic-
ally; not that the sight is cognizant of universal colour, but
because the fact that colour is cognizable by the sight, is
attributed to colour not as being this particular colour, but
simply because it is colour. Accordingly hatred in the
sensitive faculty can regard something universally : because
this thing, by reason of its common nature, and not merely
as an individual, is hostile to the animal — for instance, a
wolf in regard to a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf
universally. — ^On the other hand, anger is always caused by
something in particular : because it is caused by some action
of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from indi-
viduals. For this reason the Philosopher says that anger
is always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can
he directed to a thing in general.

But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since
it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect,
it can regard the universal in both ways.

Reply Ohj. i. The senses do not apprehend the universal,
as such : but they apprehend something in which the charac-
ter of universality is discovered by abstraction.

Reply Ohj. 2. That which is common to all cannot be a
reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being
common to many, and at variance with others, so as to be
hateful to them.

Reply Ohj. 3. This argument considers the universal
under the aspect of universality: and thus it does not come
under the sensitive apprehension or appetite.

QUESTION XXX.

OF CONCUPISCENCE.

[In Four Articles.)

We have now to consider concupiscence : under which head
there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether concupiscence
is in the sensitive appetite only ? (2) Whether concupis-
cence is a specific passion ? (3) Whether some concupis-
cences are natural, and some not natural ? (4) Whether
concupiscence is infinite ?

First Article,
whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite

ONLY ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that concupiscence is not only in
the sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of
wisdom, according to Wis. vi. 21 : The concupiscence (Douay,
desire) of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom. But
the sensitive appetite can have no tendency to wisdom.
Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite.

Obj. 2. Further, the desire for the commandments of God
is not in the sensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says
(Rom. vii. 18) : There dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my
-flesh, that which is good. But desire for God's command-
ments is an act of concupiscence, according to Ps. cxviii. 20 :
My soul hath coveted (concupivit) to long for thy justifica-
tion. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive
appetite.

Obj. 3. Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter

348

OF CONCUPISCENCE 349

of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power
of the soul, and not only in the sensitive appetite.

On the contrary, Damascene says [De Fide Orthod. ii.) that
the irrational fart which is subject and amenable to reason, is
divided into the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This
is the irrational part of the soul, passive and appetitive. There-
fore concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite.

/ answer that. As the Philosopher says (Rhetor, i.), con-
cupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant. Now
pleasure is twofold, as we shall state later on (Q. XXXL,
AA. 3, 4) : one is in the intelligible good, which is the good of
reason; the other is in good perceptible to the senses. The
former pleasure seems to belong to the soul alone: whereas
the latter belongs to both soul and body : because the sense
is a power seated in a bodily organ : wherefore sensible good
is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence
seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, since it
belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the
Latin word concupiscentia. Therefore, properly speaking,
concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the con-
cupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it.

Reply Obj. i. The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual
goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason
of a certain likeness; or on account of the craving in the
higher part of the soul being so vehement that it overflows
into the lower appetite, so that the latter also, in its own
way, tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of the
higher appetite, the result being that the body itself tenders
its service in spiritual matters, according to Ps. Ixxxiii. 3:
My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.

Reply Obj. 2. Properly speaking, desire may be not only
in the lower, but also in the higher appetite. For it does
not imply fellowship in craving, as concupiscence does; but
simply movement towards the thing desired.

Reply Obj. 3. It becomes each power of the soul to seek
its proper good by the natural appetite, which does not arise
from apprehension. But the craving for good, by the
animal appetite, which arises from apprehension, belongs to

350 QUESTION XXX

the appetitive power alone. And to crave for a thing under
the aspect of something deUghtful to the senses, wherein
concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible
power.

Second Article,
whether concupiscence is a specific passion ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that concupiscence is not a specific
passion of the concupiscible power. For passions are dis-
tinguished by their objects. But the object of the concupis-
cible power is something delightful to the senses; and this
is also the object of concupiscence, as the Philosopher
declares {Rhetor, i.). Therefore concupiscence is not a
specific power of the concupiscible faculty.

Ohj. 2. Further, Augustine says (Qq. 83) that covetous-
ness is the love of transitory things : so that it is not distinct
from love. But all specific passions are distinct from one
another. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion
in the concupiscible faculty.

Ohj. 3. Further, to each passion of the concupiscible
faculty there is a specific contrary passion, as stated above
(Q. XXIII. , A. 4). But no specific passion of the concupis-
cible faculty is contrary to concupiscence. For Damascene
says (De Fide Orthod. ii.) that good when desired gives rise to
concupiscence ; when present, it gives joy : in like manner,
the evil we apprehend makes us fear, the evil that is present
makes us sad : from which we gather that as sadness is con-
trary to joy, so is fear contrary to concupiscence. But fear
is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible part. There-
fore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupis-
cible faculty.

On the contrary, Concupiscence is caused by love, and
tends to pleasure, both of which are passions of the con-
cupiscible faculty. Hence it is distinguished from the other
concupiscible passions, as a specific passion.

I answer that, As stated above (A. i; Q. XXIII., A. i),
the good which gives pleasure to the senses is the common

OF CONCUPISCENCE 35^

object of the concupiscible faculty. Hence the various
concupiscible passions are distinguished according to the
differences of that good. Now the diversity of this object
can arise from the very nature of the object, or from a diver-
sity in its active power. The diversity, derived from the
nature of the active object, causes a material difference of
passions: while the difference in regard to its active power,
causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect of which
the passions differ specifically.

Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the
good, differs according as it is really present, or absent:
because, according as it is present, it causes the faculty to
find rest in it; whereas, according as it is absent, it causes
the faculty to be moved towards it. Wherefore the object
of sensible pleasure, causes love, inasmuch as, so to speak,
it attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it causes
concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the
faculty to itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when
present, it makes the faculty to find rest in it. Accordingly,
concupiscence is a passion differing in species from both love
and pleasure. — But concupiscences of this or that pleasurable
object differ in number.

Reply Ohj. i. Pleasurable good is the object of concupis-
cence, not absolutely, but considered as absent: just as
the sensible, considered as past, is the object of memory.
For these particular conditions diversify the species of
passions, and even of the powers of the sensitive part, which
regards particular things.

Reply Ohj. 2. In the passage quoted we have causal, not
essential, predication : for covetousness is not essentially love,
but an effect of love. — We may also say that Augustine is
taking covetousness in a wide sense, for any movement of
the appetite in respect of good to come : so that it includes
both love and hope.

Reply Ohj. 3. The passion which is directly contrary to
concupiscence has no name, and stands in relation to evil,
as concupiscence in regard to good. But since, like fear, it
regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes by the name of

352 QUESTION XXX

fear, just as hope is sometimes called covetousness. For
a small good or evil is reckoned as though it were nothing :
and consequently every movement of the appetite to future
good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard good and
evil as arduous.

Third Article.

whether some concupiscences are natural, and some
^ not natural ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that concupiscences are not divided
into those which are natural and those which are not. For
concupiscence belongs to the animal appetite, as stated above
(A. I ad 3). But the natural appetite is contrasted with
the animal appetite. Therefore no concupiscence is natural.

Ohj. 2. Further, material difference makes no difference
of species, but only numerical difference; — a difference
which is outside the purview of science. But if some con-
cupiscences are natural, and some not, they differ only in
respect of their objects; which amounts to a material differ-
ence, which is one of number only. Therefore concupis-
cences should not be divided into those that are natural
and those that are not.

Ohj. 3. Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated
in Phys. ii. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence
which is not natural, it must needs be rational. But this
is impossible: because, since concupiscence is a passion, it
belongs to the sensitive appetite, and not to the will, which
is the rational appetite. Therefore there are no concupis-
cences which are not natural.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic, iii. and Rhetor, i.)
distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are
not natural.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. i), concupiscence is the
craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable
in two ways. First, because it is suitable to the nature of
the animal; for example, food, drink, and the like: and con-
cupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be natural. —

OF CONCUPISCENCE 353

Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended
as suitable to the animal : as when one apprehends something
as good and suitable, and consequently takes pleasure in it :
and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be
not natural, and is more wont to be called cupidity.

Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural
concupiscences, are common to men and other animals:
because to both is there something suitable and pleasurable
according to nature : and in these all men agree ; wherefore
the Philosopher [Ethic, iii.) calls them common and necessary.
— But concupiscences of the second kind are proper to
men, to whom it is proper to devise something as good and
suitable, besides that which nature requires. Hence the
Philosopher says {Rhetor, i.) that the former concupiscences
are irrational, but the latter, rational. And because dif-
ferent men reason differently, therefore the latter are also
called {Ethic, iii.) proper and acquired, i.e., in ciddition to
those that are natural.

Reply Ohj. i. The same thing that is the object of the
natural appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite,
once it is apprehended. And in this way there may be an
animal concupiscence for food, drink and the like, which are
objects of the natural appetite.

Reply Ohj. 2. The difference between those concupiscences
that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a
material difference; it is also, in a way, formal, in so far as
it arises from a difference in the active object. For the
object of the appetite is the apprehended good. Hence
diversity of apprehension has a direct bearing on diversity
of the active object: according as a thing is apprehended as
suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise
natural concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls irrational
{Rhetor, i.); or by apprehension together with deliberation,
whence arise those concupiscences that are not natural, and
which for this very reason the Philosopher calls rational
{ibid.).

Reply Ohj. 3. Man has not only universal reason, pertain-
ing to the intellectual faculty; but also particular reason,

II. I 23

354 QUESTION XXX

pertaining to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the First
Part (Q. LXXVIIL, A. 4; Q. LXXXL, A. 3): so that even
rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appe-
tite.— Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by
the universal reason also, through the means of the par-
ticular imagination.

Fourth Article,
whether concupiscence is infinite ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that concupiscence is not infinite.
For the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect
of an end. But where there is infinity there is no end
{Metaph. ii.). Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.

Ohj. 2. Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good,
since it proceeds from love. But the infinite is without pro-
portion, and therefore unfitting. Therefore concupiscence
cannot be infinite.

Ohj. 3. Further, there is no passing through infinite
things: and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in
them. But the subject of concupiscence is not delighted
until he attain the ultimate term. Therefore, if con-
cupiscence were infinite, no delight would ensue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says [Polit. i.) that since
concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things.

I answer that. As stated above (A. 3), concupiscence is
twofold; one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural
concupiscence cannot be actually infinite: because it is
of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to
something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires
infinite meat, or infinite drink. — But just as in nature
there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of
concupiscence be infinite successively; so that, for instance,
after getting food, a man may desire food yet again ; and so
of anything else that nature requires: because these bodily
goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence
Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria (John iv. 13):
Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again.

OF CONCUPISCENCE 355

But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite.
Because, as stated above (A. 3) it follows from the reason,
and it belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence
he that desires riches, may desire to be rich beyond a fixed
limit, and simply to be as rich as possible.

Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philo-
sopher {Polit. i.), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and
another infinite. Because concupiscence of the end is always
infinite; since the end is desired for its own sake, e.g., health :
and thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity ;
just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, that which
is more white dilates yet more. On the other hand, concu-
piscence of the means is not infinite, because the concupis-
cence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end.
Consequently those who place their end in riches have an
infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire
riches, on account of the necessities of life, desire a finite
measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as
the Philosopher says (ibid.). The same applies to the con-
cupiscence of any other things.

Reply Ohj. i. Every object of concupiscence is taken as
something finite: either because it is finite in reality, as
being once actually desired; or because it is finite as
apprehended. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite,
since the infinite is that from which, however much we
may take, there always remains^ something to be taken
(Phys. iii).

Reply Obj. 2. The reason is possessed of infinite power, in
a certain sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely,
as appears in the addition of numbers and lines. Conse-
quently, the infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate
to reason. In fact the universal which the reason appre-
hends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it contains poten-
tially an infinite number of singulars.

Reply Obj. 3. In order that a man be delighted, there is
no need for him to realize all that he desires : for he delights
in the realization of each object of his concupiscence.

QUESTION XXXI .

OF DELIGHT* CONSIDERED IN ITSELF.

[In Eight Ay tides.)

We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning
delight four things must be considered: (i) Delight, in
itself: (2) The causes of delight: (3) Its effects: (4) Its good-
ness and malice.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(i) Whether delight is a passion ? (2) Whether delight is
subject to time ? (3) Whether it differs from joy ?
(4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite ? (5) Of the
comparison between delights of the higher appetite and
that of the lower. (6) Of the comparison between sensi-
tive delights. (7) Whether any delight is non-natural ?
(8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another ?

First Article,
whether delight is a passion ?

W£ proceed thus to the First Article .•—

Objection i. It seems that delight is not a passion. For
Damascene {De Fide Orthod. ii.) distinguishes operation
from passion, and says that operation is a movement in accord
with nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature.
But delight is an operation, according to the Philosopher
{Ethic, vii., x.). Therefore delight is not a passion.

Ohj. 2. Further, To he passive is to he moved, as stated in
Phys. ii. But delight does not consist in being moved, but
in having been moved; for it arises from good ah'eady
gained. Therefore delight is not a passion.

* Or, Pleasure.
356

OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF 357

Ohj. 3. Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the
one who is dehghted; since it perfects operation, as stated in
Ethic. X. But to be perfected does not consist in being pas-
sive or in being altered, as stated in Phys. vii. and De
Anima ii. Therefore delight is not a passion.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix., xiv.) reckons
delight, joy or gladness among the other passions of the
soul.

/ answer that, The movements of the sensitive appetite,
are properly called passions, as stated above (Q. XXII. ,
A. 3). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive appre-
hension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this
must needs be in what delight consists, since, according to
the Philosopher {Rhetor, i.), it is a certain movement of the
soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping
with the nature of the thing.

In order to understand this, we must observe that just as
in natural things some happen to attain to their natural
perfections, so does this happen in animals. And though
movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet
the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at once.
Now there is this difference between animals and other
natural things, that when these latter are established in the
state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas
animals do. And from this perception there arises a certain
movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite ; which move-
ment is called delight. Accordingly by saying that delight
is a movement of the soul, we designate its genus. By saying
that it is an establishing in keeping with the thing^s nature,
i.e."^, with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause
of delight, viz., the presence of a becoming good. By saying
that this establishing is all at once, we mean that this estab-
lishing is to be understood not as in the process of establish-
ment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the
term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a be-
coming as Plato maintained, but a complete fact, as stated
in Ethic, iii. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is
sensible, we exclude the perfections of insensible things

358 QUESTION XXXI

wherein there is no deHght. — It is therefore evident that,
since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising
from an apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul.

Reply Ohj. i. Connatural operation, which is unhindered,
is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii. : and there-
fore when a thing is established in its proper connatural
and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists
in a state of completion, as observed above. Accordingly
when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not
its essence, but its cause.

Reply Ohj. 2. A twofold movement is to be observed in
an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and
this belongs to the appetite; the other, according to the
execution, and this belongs to the external operation. And
so, although in him who has already gained the good in
which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by
which he tends to the end; yet the movement of the appeti-
tive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired
that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that
which it possesses. For though delight is a certain repose
of the appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable
good that satisfies the appetite; nevertheless there remains
the impression made on the appetite by its object, by reason
of which delight is a kind of movement.

Reply Obj. ^. Although the name of passion is more appro-
priate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil
tendency, such as bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear
in the soul ; yet some passions have a tendency to something
good, as stated above (Q. XXIII., AA. i, 4): and in this
sense delight is called a passion.

Second Article,
whether delight is in time ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that delight is in time. For delight
is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher says (Rhetor, i.).
But all movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.

OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF 359

Ohj. 2. Further, a thing is said to last long and to be
morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called
morose. Therefore pleasure is in time.

Ohj . 3. Further, the passions of the soul are of one same
genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. There-
fore delight is too.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, x.) that no
one takes pleasure according to time.

I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: first,
by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and acci-
dentally as it were. For since time is the measure of suc-
cessive things, those things are of themselves said to be in
time, to which succession or something pertaining to .suc-
cession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and
suchlike. On the other hand, those things are said to be
in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves,
to which succession is not essential, but which are subject
to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is
not essentially something successive ; since it is not a move-
ment, but the term of a movement or change, viz., of his
being begotten: yet, because human being is subject to
changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time.

Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is
not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is,
as it were, the term of the movement. But if this good
gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in
time accidentally : whereas if it be altogether unchangeable,
the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of
itself or accidentally.

Reply Ohj. i. As stated in De Anima iii., movement is
twofold. One is the act of something imperfect, i.e., in poten-
tiality, as such : this movement is successive and is in time.
Another movement is the act of something perfect, i.e., in
act, e.g., to understand, to feel, and to will and suchlike,
also to delight. This movement is not successive, nor is
it of itself in time.

Reply Ohj. 2. Delight is said to be long lasting or morose^
according as it is accidentally in time.

36o QUESTION XXXI

Reply Ohj. 3. Other passions have not for their object a
good obtained, as deUght has. Wherefore there is more of
the movement of the imperfect in them than in dehght.
And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in
time.

Third Article,
whether delight differs from joy ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — •

Objection i. It seems that delight is altogether the same
as joy. Because the passions of the soul differ according to
their objects. But delight and joy have the same object,
namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is altogether the
same as delight.

Ohj. 2. Further, one movement does not end in two terms.
But one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in
joy and delight. Therefore delight and joy are altogether
the same.

Ohj. 3. Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that
there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation,
and cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be
various passions of the soul. But this seems to be untrue.
Therefore joy does not differ from delight.

On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational
animals; whereas we do speak of delight in them. There-
fore joy is not the same as delight.

I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv.), is
a kind of delight. For we must observe that, just as some
concupiscences are natural, and some not natural, but con-
sequent to reason, as stated above (Q. XXX., A. 3), so also
some delights are natural ; whereas some are not natural and
accompany the use of reason. Or, as Damascene {De Fide
Orthod. ii.) and Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Horn.
xviii.) put it, some delights are corporeal, some are animal ;
which amounts to the same. For we take delight both in
those things which we desire naturally, when we get them,
and in those things which we desire as a result of reason.
But we do not speak of joy except when delight follows

OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF 361

reason; and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals,
but only delight.

Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object
of reasoned desire and delight, and consequently whatever
can be the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in
rational beings. And yet everything is not always the
object of joy; since sometimes one feels a certain delight in
the body, without rejoicing thereat according to reason.
And accordingly delight extends to more things than does
joy.

Reply Ohj. i. Since the object of the animal appetite is
an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains,
in a way, to diversity of the object. And so animal delights,
which are also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights,
which are not called otherwise than delights: as we have
observed above in regard to concupiscence (Q. XXV., A. 3
ad 2).

Reply Ohj. 2. A like difference is to be observed in con-
cupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupis-
cence, while joy corresponds to desire, which seems to pertain
more to animal concupiscence. Hence there is a difference
of repose corresponding to the difference of movement.

Reply Ohj. 3. These other names pertaining to delight are
derived from the effects of delight; for Icetitia (gladness) is
derived from the dilatation of the heart, as if one were to
say latitia ; exultation is derived from the exterior signs of
inward delight, which appear outwardly in so far as the
inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and cheerfulness
is so called from certain special signs and effects of gladness.
Yet all these names seem to belong to joy; for we do not
employ them save in speaking of rational beings.

Fourth Article,
whether delight is in the intellectual appetite ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Ohjection i. It seems that delight is not in the intellectual
appetite. Because the Philosopher says {Rhet. xi.) that

362 QUESTION XXXI

delight is a sensible movement. But sensible movement is
not in an intellectual power. Therefore delight is not in
the intellectual appetite.

Ohj. 2. Further, delight is a passion. But every passion
is in the sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the
sensitive appetite.

Ohj. 3. Further, delight is common to us and to the
irrational animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in
that power which we have in common with irrational
animals.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xxxvi. 4): Delight in
the Lord. But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God;
only the intellectual appetite can. Therefore delight can
be in the intellectual appetite.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 3), a certain delight
arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the
reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive appe-
tite is moved, as regards its application to some particular
thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called the
will. And accordingly, in the intellectual appetite or will
there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily
delight.

However, there is this difference of delight in either
power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied
by a bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellec-
tual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will.
Hence Augustine says {De Civ. Dei xiv.) that desire and joy
are nothing else hut a volition of consent to the things we wish.

Reply Ohj. i. In this definition of the Philosopher, he
uses the word sensible in its wide acceptation for any kind
of perception. For he says [Ethic, x.) that delight is attendant
upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of the intellect
and contemplation. — Or we may say that he is defining
delight of the sensitive appetite.

Reply Ohj. 2. Delight has the character of passion, proper!}^
speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It
is not thus in the intellectual appetite, but according to
simple movement : for thus it is also in God and the angels.

OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF 363

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic, vii.) that God rejoices
by one simple act : and Dionysius says at the end of De
Ccel. Hier.y that the angels are not susceptible to our passible
delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness of in-
corruption.

Reply Obj. 3. In us there is delight, not only in common
with dumb animals, but also in common with angels.
Wherefore Dionysius says {ibid.) that holy men often take
part in the angelic delights. Accordingly we have delight,
not only in the sensitive appetite, which we have in common
with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite,
which we have in common with the angels.

Fifth Article.

whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater
than spiritual and intellectual pleasures ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that bodily and sensible pleasures
are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For
all men seek some pleasure, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. X.). But more seek sensible pleasures, than intelli-
gible spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are
greater.

Obj. 2. Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its
effect. But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since
they alter the state of the body, and in some they cause madness
(Ethic, vii.). Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.

Obj. 3. Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered
and checked, by reason of their vehemence: whereas there
is no need to check spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily
pleasures are greater.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. cxviii. 103) : How sweet
are Thy words to my palate ; more than honey to my mouth !
And the Philosopher says (Ethic, x.) that the greatest pleasure
is derived from the operation of wisdom.

I answer that, As stated above (A. i), pleasure arises from
union with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in

364 QUESTION XXXI

the operations of the soul, especially of the sensitive and
intellectual soul, it must be noted, that, since they do not
pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections of
the agent, e.g., to understand, to feel, to will, and the like:
because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions
and perfections rather of the matter transformed ; for move-
ment is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved
(Phys. iii) . x\ccordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive
and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the
agent, and are known by sense and intellect. Wherefore
from them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their
objects.

If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sen-
sible pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions,
for instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge;
without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than
sensible pleasures. For man takes much more delight in
knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing
something by perceiving it with his sense. Because intellec-
tual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is better
known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than
sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more be-
loved: for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily
sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools
are deprived thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei {De
Trin. xiv.).

If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared
with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and
absolutely speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And
this appears from the consideration of the three things
needed for pleasure, viz., the good which is brought into
conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunc-
tion itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more
beloved than bodily good : a sign whereof is that men abstain
from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer
loss of honour which is an intellectual good. — ^Likewise the
intellectual faculty is much more noble and more knowing
than the sensitive faculty. — -Also the conjunction is more

OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF 365

intimate, more perfect and more firm. More intimate,
because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing,
whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the
object of the intellect is what a thing is. More perfect,
because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies
movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible
pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some part of
them is passing away, while some other part is looked for-
ward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of the
table and in sexual pleasures : whereas intelligible things are
without movement : hence pleasures of this kind are realized
all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily
pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas
spiritual goods are incorruptible.

On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are
more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible
things are more known to us, than intelligible things. — •
Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions
of the sensitive appetite, are accompanied by some alteration
in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual
pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the superior
appetite on the lower. — -Thirdly, because bodily pleasures
are sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence
various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason
of their succeeding griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and
consequently are more acceptable than spiritual pleasures,
which have no contrary griefs, as we shall state farther on
(Q. XXXV., A. 5).

Reply Ohj. i. The reason why more seek bodily pleasures
is because sensible goods are known better and more gener-
ally: and, again, because men need pleasures as remedies
for many kinds of sorrow and sadness : and since the majority
cannot attain spiritual pleasures, which are proper to the
virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of
the body.

Reply Ohj. 2. Bodily transmutation arises more from
bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the
sensitive appetite.

366 QUESTION XXXI

Reply Ohj. 3. Bodily pleasures are realized in the sen-
sitive faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they
need to be tempered and checked by reason. But spiritual
pleasures are perceived by the mind, which is itself the
rule: wherefore they are in themselves both sober and
moderate.

Sixth Article.

whether the pleasures of touch are greater than
the pleasures afforded by the other senses ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the pleasures of touch are not
greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses.
Because the greatest pleasure seems to be that without
which all joy is at an end. But such is the pleasure afforded
by the sight, according to the words of Tobias v. 12 : What
manner of joy shall he to me, who sit in darkness, and see not
the light of heaven ? Therefore the pleasure afforded by the
sight is the greatest of sensible pleasures.

Ohj. 2. Further, every one finds pleasure in what he loves,
as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i.). But of all the senses the
sight is loved most (Metaph. i.). Therefore the greatest
pleasure is that which is afforded by the sight.

Ohj. 3. Further, the beginning of friendship which is for
the sake of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure
is the cause of such friendship. Therefore the greatest
pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii.) that the
greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the
touch.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XXV., A. 2 ad 1;
Q. XXVII., A. 4 ad i), everything gives pleasure according
as it is loved. Now, as stated in Metaph. i., the senses are
loved for two reasons : for the purpose of knowledge, and on
account of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses afford
pleasure in both these ways. But because it is proper to man
to apprehend knowledge itself as something good ; it follows
that the former pleasures of the senses, i.e., those which

OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF 367

arise from knowledge, are proper to man : whereas pleasures
of the senses, as loved for their usefulness, are common
to all animals.

If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure which is
by reason of knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords
greater pleasure than any other sense. — -On the other hand,
if we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of
usefulness, then the greatest pleasure is afforded by the
touch. For the usefulness of the senses is gauged by their
relation to the preservation of the animal's nature. Now
the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to
this usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those
things of which an animal consists — namely, of things hot
and cold and the like. Wherefore in this respect, the
pleasures of touch, are greater as being more closely related
to the end. For this reason, too, other animals who do not
experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness,
derive no pleasure from the other senses except as sub-
ordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: /or dogs do
not take delight in the smell of hares, hut in eating them ; . . .
nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, hut in
devouring it {Ethic, iii.).

Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest
in respect of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight,
the greatest in respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to
compare these two, he will find that the pleasure of touch
is, absolutely speaking, greater than the pleasure of sight,
so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible
pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that
which is natural is most powerful : and it is to these
pleasures of the touch that the natural concupiscences,
such as those of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained.
— If, however, we consider the pleasures of sight, inasmuch
as sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures
of sight are greater, forasmuch as intellectual pleasures are
greater than sensible.

Reply Ob]'. 1. — Joy, as stated above (A. 3), denotes
animal pleasure; and this belongs principally to the

368 QUESTION XXXI

sight. But natural pleasure belongs principally to the
touch.

Reply Ohj. 2. The sight is loved most, on account of know-
ledge, because it helps- us to distinguish many things as is
stated in the same passage (Metaph. i.).

Reply Ohj. 3. Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the
sight, in another. For pleasure, especially that which is
afforded by the touch, is the final cause of the friendship
which is for the sake of the pleasant : whereas the sight is a
cause like that from which a movement has its beginning,
inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object re-
ceives an impression of its image, which entices him to love
it and to seek its delight.

Seventh Article,
whether any pleasure is not natural ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —

Objection i. It seems that no pleasure is not natural.
For pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is
to bodies. But the appetite of a natural body does not
repose save in a connatural place. Neither, therefore, can
the repose of the animal appetite, which is pleasure, be
elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no
pleasure is non-natural.

Obj. 2. Further, what is against nature is violent. But
whatever is violent causes grief {Metaph. v.) Therefore
nothing which is unnatural can give pleasure.

Obj. 3. Further, the fact of being established in one's
own nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident
from the Philosopher's definition quoted above (A. i).
But it is natural to every thing to be established in its nature ;
because natural movement tends to a natural end. There-
fore every pleasure is natural.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, vii.) that
some things are pleasant not from nature but from disease.

I answer that, We speak of that as being natural, which
is in accord with nature, as stated in Phys. ii. Now, in

OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF 369

man, nature can be taken in two ways. First, inasmuch
as intellect and reason is the principal part of man's nature,
since in respect thereof he has his own specific nature.
And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to
man, which are derived from things pertaining to man in
respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to man to
take pleasure in contemplating the truth and in doing works
of virtue. — -Secondly, nature in man may be taken as con-
trasted with reason, and as denoting that which is common
to man and other animals, especially that part of man which
does not obey reason. And in this sense, that which per-
tains to the preservation of the body, either as regards the
individual, as food, drink, sleep, and the like, or as regards
the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to afford man
natural pleasure. Under each kind of pleasures, we find
some that are not natural speaking absolutely, and yet con-
natural in some respect. For it happens in an individual
that some one of the natural principles of the species is
corrupted, so that something which is contrary to the specific
nature, becomes accidentally natural to this individual:
thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat. Conse-
quently it happens that something which is not natural to
man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the preserva-
tion of the body, becomes connatural to this individual
man, on account of there being some corruption of nature
in him. And this corruption may be either on the part of
the body, — from some ailment ; thus to a man suffering from
fever, sweet things seem bitter, and vice versa, — or from an
evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in eating earth
and coals {Ethic, v.) and the like; or on the part of the soul;
thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in
the unnatural intercourse of man and beast, or other such-
like things, which are not in accord with human nature.
This suffices for the answers to the objections.

II. I 24

37^ QUESTION XXXI

Eighth Article,
whether one pleasure can be contrary to

ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that one pleasure cannot be con-
trary to another. Because the passions of the soul derive
their species and contrariety from their objects. Now the
object of pleasure is the good. Since therefore good is not
contrary to good, but good is contrary to evil, and evil to
evil, as stated in Prcedic. viii.; it seems that one pleasure is
not contrary to another.

Ohj. 2. Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as
is proved in Metaph. x. But sadness is contrary to pleasure.
Therefore pleasure is not contrary to pleasure.

Ohj. 3. Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another,
this is only on account of the contrariety of the things which
give pleasure. But this difference is material: whereas
contrariety is a difference of form, as stated in Metaph. x.
Therefore there is no contrariety between one pleasure and
another.

On the contrary. Things of the same genus that impede
one another are contraries. But some pleasures impede
one another, as stated in Ethic, x. Therefore some pleasures
are contrary to one another.

/ answer that. Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is
likened to repose in natural bodies, as stated above
(Q. XXIII., A. 4). Now one repose is said to be contrary
to another when they are in contrary termini; thus repose
in a high place is contrary to repose in a low place (Phys. v.).
Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one
pleasure is contrary to another.

Reply Ohj. i . This saying of the Philosopher is to be under-
stood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: be-
cause one vice may be contrary to another vice, whereas
no virtue can be contrary to another virtue. But in other
things nothing prevents one good being contrary to another,

OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF 371

such as hot and cold, of which the former is good in relation
to fire, the latter, in relation to water. And in this way one
pleasure can be contrary to another. — That this is im-
possible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact
that virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some
one thing — i.e., the reason.

Reply Ohj. 2. Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is
likened to natural repose in bodies: because its object is
something suitable and connatural, so to speak. But
sadness is like a violent repose: because its object is dis-
agreeable to the animal appetite, just as the place of violent
repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now natural
repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same body,
and to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v.
Wherefore pleasure is contrary both to another pleasure and
to sadness.

Reply Ohj. 3. The things in which we take pleasure,
since they are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a
material, but also a formal difference, if the formality of
pleasureableness be different. Because difference in the
formal object causes a specific difference in acts and pas-
sions, as stated above (Q. XXIII., AA. i, 4; Q. XXX. A. 2).

QUESTION XXXII.

OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE.

[In Eight Articles.)

We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under
this head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether
operation is the proper cause of pleasure ? (2) Whether
movement is a cause of pleasure ? (3) Whether hope and
memory cause pleasure ? (4) Whether sadness causes
pleasure ? (5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of
pleasure to us ? (6) Whether doing good to another is a
cause of pleasure ? (7) Whether likeness is a cause of
pleasure ? (8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure ?

First Article.

whether operation is the proper cause of
pleasure ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that operation is not the proper and
first cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says
(Rhet. i.), pleasure consists in a perception of the senses, since
knowledge is requisite for pleasure, as stated above
(Q. XXXI., A. i). But the objects of operations are
knowable before the operations themselves. Therefore
operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.

Ohj. 2. Further, pleasure consists especially in an end
gained: since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end
is not always an operation, but is sometimes the effect of
the operation. Therefore operation is not the proper and
direct cause of pleasure.

Ohj. 3. Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from

372

OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE 373

work: and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i.). Therefore
operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, vii., x.) that
pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XXXI., A. i), two
things are requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment
of the suitable good, and knowledge of this attainment.
Now each of these consists in a kind of operation: because
actual knowledge is an operation; and the attainment of
the suitable good is by means of an operation. Moreover,
the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore
every pleasure must needs be the result of some operation.

Reply Ohj. i. The objects of operations are not pleasur-
able save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by
knowledge alone, as when we take pleasure in thinking of
or looking at certain things ; or in some other way in addition
to knowledge; as when a man takes pleasure in knowing
that he has something good, — -riches, honour, or the like;
which would not be pleasurable unless they were appre-
hended as possessed. For as the Philosopher observes
(Polit. ii.) we take great pleasure in looking upon a thing as
our own, by reason of the natural love we have for ourselves.
Now to have suchlike things is nothing else but to use
them or to be able to use them: and this is through some
operation. Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure is
traced to some operation as its cause.

Reply Ohj. 2. Even when it is not an operation, but the
effect of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant
in so far as possessed or effected: and this implies use or
operation.

Reply Ohj. 3. Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are
proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since
human power is finite, operation is proportionate thereto
according to a certain measure. Wherefore if it exceed that
measure, it will be no longer proportionate or pleasant, but,
on the contrary, painful and irksome. And in this sense,
leisure and play and other things pertaining to repose,
are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results
from labour.

374 QUESTION XXXII

Second Article,
whether movement is a cause of pleasure ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that movement is not a cause ol
pleasure. Because, as stated above (Q. XXXI., A. i), the
good which is obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause
of pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic, viii.)
that pleasure is not compared with generation, but with
the operation of a thing already in existence. Now that
which is being moved towards something has it not as yet ;
but, so to speak, is being generated in its regard, for as
much as generation or corruption are united to every
movement, as stated in Phys. viii. Therefore movement is
not a cause of pleasure.

Obj. 2. Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and
fatigue in our works. But operations through being toil-
some and fatiguing are not pleasant but disagreeable.
Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.

Obj. 3. Further, movement implies a certain innova-
tion, which is the opposite of custom. But things which
we are accustomed to, are pleasant, as the Philosopher
says (Rhet. i.). Therefore movement is not a cause of
pleasure.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Conf. viii.): What means
this, 0 Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to
Thyself, and some things around Thee evermore rejoice in
Thee ? What means this, that this portion of things ebbs
and -flows alternately displeased and reconciled ? From these
words we gather that man rejoices and takes pleasure in
some kind of alternations: and therefore movement seems
to cause pleasure.

/ answer that. Three things are requisite for pleasure;
two, i.e., the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object
conjoined to him; and a third, which is knowledge of this
conjunction: and in respect of these three, movement is
pleasant, as the Philosopher says {Ethic, vii. and Rhet. i.).

OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE 375

For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned, change is
pleasant to us because our nature is changeable; for which
reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not suitable
at another, — thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to
man in winter and not in summer. — Again, on the part of
the pleasing good which is united to us, change is pleasant.
Because the continued action of an agent increases its effect :
thus the longer a person remains near the fire, the more he
is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being
consists in a certain measure: and therefore when the con-
tinued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure
of one's natural mode of being, the removal of that object
becomes pleasant. — ^On the part of the knowledge itself
(change becomes pleasant), because man desires to know
something whole and perfect : when therefore a thing cannot
be apprehended all at once as a whole, change in such a
thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and another
succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augus-
tine says [Conf. iv.) : Thou wouldst not have the syllables
stay, hut fly away, that ■ others may come, and thou hear
the whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of
many, all of which do not exist together, all would please
collectively more than they do severally, if all could he perceived
collectively.

li therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchange-
able; the natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded
by the continuation of any pleasing object; and which can
behold the whole object of its delight at once, — -to such a
one change will afford no delight. And the more any
pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of
being continual.

Reply Ob], i. Although the subject of movement has not
yet perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is
beginning to have something thereof: and in this respect
movement itself has something of pleasure. But it falls
short of the perfection of pleasure ; because the more perfect
pleasures regard things that are unchangeable. — Moreover
movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so far as thereby

376 QUESTION XXXTI

something which previously was unsuitable, becomes suit-
able or ceases to be, as stated above.

Reply Ohj. 2. Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it
exceeds our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes
pleasure, but by removing the obstacles to our natural
aptitude.

Reply Ohj. 3. What is customary becomes pleasant, in
so far as it becomes natural : because custom is like a second
nature. But the movement which gives pleasure is not
that which departs from custom, but rather that which
prevents the corruption of the natural mode of being, that
might result from continued operation. And thus from
the same cause of connaturalness, both custom and move-
ment become pleasant.

Third Article,
whether hope and memory cause pleasure ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that memory and hope do not cause
pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as
Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. ii.). But hope and
memory regard what is absent: since memory is of the
past, and hope, of the future. Therefore memory and hope
do not cause pleasure.

Ohj. 2. Further, the same thing is not the cause of con-
traries. But hope causes affliction, according to Pro v.
xiii. 12 : Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul. Therefore
hope does not cause pleasure.

Ohj. 3. Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in re-
garding good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope
should not be assigned as a cause of pleasure, any more than
desire or love.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. xii. 12) : Rejoicing in
hope ; and (Ps. Ixxvi. 4) : I rememhered God, and was de-
lighted.

I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of suit-
able good, in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way.

OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE 377

Now a thing is present to us in two ways. First, in know-
ledge— i.e., according as the thing known is in the knower
by its hkeness; secondly, in reality — i.e., according as one
thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another, either
actually or potentially. And since real conjunction is
greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunc-
tion of knowledge: and again, since actual is greater than
potential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is
that which arises from sensation which requires the presence
of the sensible object. The second place belongs to the
pleasure of hope, wherein there is pleasurable conjunction,
not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect of
the faculty or power of obtaining the pleasurable object.
The third place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which
has only the conjunction of apprehension.

Reply Ohj. i. Hope and memory are indeed of things
which, absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet these are,
after a fashion, present, i.e., either according to apprehen-
sion only; or according to apprehension and possibility, at
least supposed, of attainment.

Reply Ohj. 2. Nothing prevents the same thing, in different
ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inas-
much as it implies a present appraising of a future good,
causes pleasure; whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of
that good, it causes affliction.

Reply Ohj. 3. Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure.
For everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover,
since love is a kind of union or connaturalness of lover and
beloved. In like manner every object of desire is pleasing
to the one that desires, since desire is chiefly a craving for
pleasure. However hope, as implying a certainty of the
real presence of the pleasing good, that is not implied either
by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in preference to
them as causing pleasure ; and also in preference to memory,
which is of that which has already passed away.

378 QUESTION XXXII

Fourth Article,
whether sadness causes pleasure ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that sadness does not cause pleasure.
For nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is con-
trary to pleasure. Therefore it does not cause it.

Ohj. 2. Further, contraries have contrary effects. But
pleasures, when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore
sad things, when remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure.

Ohj. 3. Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to
love. But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other
way about. Therefore sadness does not cause pleasure.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xli. 4) : My tears have been
my bread day and night : where bread denotes the refresh-
ment of pleasure. Therefore tears, which arise from sadness,
can give pleasure.

I answer that, Sadness may be considered in two ways : as
existing actually, and as existing in the memory: and in
both ways sadness can cause pleasure. Because sadness,
as actually existing, causes pleasure, inasmuch as it brings
to mind that which is loved, the absence of which causes
sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. —
The recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure, on
account of the deliverance which ensued: because absence
of evil is looked upon as something good ; wherefore so far
as a man thinks that he has been delivered from that which
caused him sorrow and pain, so much reason has he to re-
joice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii (Gregory,—
Moral iv.) that oftentimes in joy we call to mind sad things . . .
and in the season of health we recall past pains without feeling
pain, . . . and in proportion are the more filled with joy and
gladness : and again (Conf. viii.) he says that the more peril
there was in the battle, so much the more joy will there be in the
triumph.

Reply Obj. 1. Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause
of its contrary : thus that which is cold sometimes causes heat,

Of the cause of pleasure 379

as stated in Phys. viii. In like manner sadness is the acci-
dental cause of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the
apprehension of something pleasant.

Refly Ohj. 2. Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure,
not in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things ;
but in so far as man is delivered from them. In like manner
the recollection of pleasant things, by reason of these being
lost, may cause sadness.

Reply Ohj. 3. Hatred also can be the accidental cause of
love: i.e., so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they
agree in hating one and the same thing.

Fifth Article.

whether the actions of others are a cause of
pleasure to us ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the actions of others are not a
cause of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is
our own good when conjoined to us. But the actions of
others are not conjoined to us. Therefore they are not a
cause of pleasure to us.

Ohj. 2. Further, action is the agent's own good. If,
therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us,
for the same reason all goods belonging to others will be
pleasing to us: which is evidently untrue.

Ohj. 3. Further, action is pleasant through proceeding
from an innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic, ii. that
we must reckon the pleasure which follows after action, as
heing the sign of a habit existing in us. But the actions of
others do not proceed from habits existing in us, but, some-
times, from habits existing in the agents. Therefore the
actions of others are not pleasing to us, but to the agents
themselves.

On the contrary. It is written in the second canonical
epistle of John {verse 4): / was exceeding glad that I found
thy children walking in truth.

I answer that, As stated above (A. i; Q. XXXI. , A. i),

38o QUESTION XXXII

two things are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment
of one's proper good, and the knowledge of having obtained
it. Wherefore the action of another may cause pleasure
to us in three ways. First, from the fact that we obtain
some good through the action of another. And in this way,
the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to
us: since it is pleasant to be benefited by another. —
Secondly, from the fact that another's action makes us to
know or appreciate our own good: and for this reason men
take pleasure in being praised or honoured by others, be-
cause, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing
in themselves. And since this appreciation receives greater
weight from the testimony of good and wise men, hence men
take greater pleasure in being praised and honoured by them.
And because a flatterer is one who praises openly, therefore
flattery is pleasing to some. And as love is for something
good, while admiration is for something great, so it is
pleasant to be loved and admired by others, inasmuch as
a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness,
through their giving pleasure to others. — Thirdly, from the
fact that another's actions, if they be good, are reckoned as
one's own good, by reason of the power of love, which makes
a man to regard his friend as one with himself. And on
account of hatred, which makes one to reckon another's
good as being in opposition to oneself, the evil action of an
enemy becomes an object of pleasure: whence it is written
(i Cor. xiii. 6) that charity rejoiceth not in iniquity, hut re-
joiceth with the truth.

Reply Ohj. i. Another's action may be conjoined to me,
either by its effect, as in the first way; or by knowledge, as
in the second way; or by affection, as in the third way.

Reply Ohj. 2. This argument avails for the third mode,
but not for the first two.

Reply Ohj. 3. Although the actions of another do not pro-
ceed from habits that are in me, yet they either produce
in me something that gives pleasure; or they make me
appreciate or know a habit of mine; or they proceed from
the habit of one who is united to me by love.

OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE 381

Sixth Article.

whether doing good to another is a cause of

pleasure ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that doing good to another is not a
cause of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's
obtaining one's proper good, as stated above (AA. i, 5;
Q. XXXI., A. i). But doing good pertains not to the ob-
taining but to the spending of one's proper good. Therefore
it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure.

Ohj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv.) that
illiherality is more connatural to man than prodigality. Now
it is a mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is
a mark of illiherality to desist from doing good. Since there-
fore everyone takes pleasure in a connatural operation,
as stated in Ethic, vii. and x., it seems that doing good to
others is not a cause of pleasure.

Ohj. 3. Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary
causes. But man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds
of ill-doing, such as overcoming, contradicting or scolding
others, or, if he be angry, of punishing them, as the Philo-
sopher says {Rhet. i.). Therefore doing good to others is
a cause of sadness rather than of pleasure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. ii.) that it is
most pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and
strangers.

I answer that, Doing good to another may give pleasure
in three ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which
is the good conferred on another. In this respect, inasmuch
as through being united to others by love, we look upon
their good as being our own, we take pleasure in the good we
do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good. —
Secondly, in consideration of the end; as when a man,
from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for
himself, either from God or from man : for hope is a cause of
pleasure. — Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and

382 QUESTION XXXII

thus, doing good to another, can give pleasure in respect of
a threefold principle. One is the faculty of doing good:
and in this regard, doing good to another becomes pleasant,
in so far as it arouses in man an imagination of abundant
good existing in him, whereof he is able to give others a
share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their children, and
in their own works, as being things on which they bestow
a share of their own good. Another principle is a man's
habitual inclination to do good, by reason of which doing
good becomes connatural to him : for which reason the liberal
man takes pleasure in giving to others. The third principle
is the motive: for instance when a man is moved by one
whom he loves, to do good to someone; for whatever we
do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is the
principal cause of pleasure.

Reply Ohj. i. Spending gives pleasure as showing forth
one's good. But in so far as it empties us of our own good
it may be a cause of sadness; for instance when it is ex-
cessive.

Reply Ohj. 2. Prodigality is an excessive spending, which
is unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary
to nature.

Reply Ohj. 3. To overcome, to contradict and to punish,
give pleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertain-
ing to one's own good, which man loves more than he hates
another's ill. For it is naturally pleasant to overcome,
inasmuch as it makes a man to appreciate his own superi-
ority. Wherefore all those games in which there is a
striving for the mastery, and a possibility of winning it,
afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all
contests, in so far as they admit hope of victory. — ^To
contradict and to scold can give pleasure in two ways.
First, as making man imagine himself to be wise and ex-
cellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove
and to scold. Secondly, in so far as by scolding and reprov-
ing, one does good to another: for this gives one pleasure,
as stated above. — It is pleasant to an angry man to punish,
in so far as he thinks himself to be removing an apparent

OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE 383

slight, which seems to be due to a previous hurt : for when a
man is hurt by another, he seems to be slighted thereby;
and therefore he wishes to be quit of this slight by paying
back the hurt. — And thus it is clear that doing good to
another may be of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to
another is not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to affect
one's own good.

Seventh Article,
whether likeness is a cause of pleasure ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
' Objection i. It seems that likeness is not a cause of
pleasure. Because ruling and presiding seem to imply
a certain unlikeness. But it is natural to take pleasure in
ruling and presiding, as stated in Rhet. i. Therefore unlike-
ness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.

Ohj. 2. Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than
sorrow. But those who are burdened by sorrow are most
inclined to seek pleasures, as the Philosopher says {Ethic.
vii.). Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause
of pleasure.

Ohj. 3. Further, those who are satiated with certain
delights, derive not pleasure but disgust from them ; as when
one is satiated with food. Therefore likeness is not a cause
of pleasure.

On the contrary, Likeness is a cause of love, as above
stated (Q. XXVIL, A. 3) : and love is the cause of pleasure.
Therefore likeness is a cause of pleasure.

/ answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity ; hence that which
is like us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just as it
causes love, as stated above (Q. XXVIL, A. 3). And if that
which is like us does not hurt our own good, but increase
it, it is pleasurable simply; for instance one man in respect
if another, one youth in relation to another. — But if it be
hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it causes disgust
or sadness, not as being like and one with us, but as hurtful
to that which is yet more one with us.

Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful

384 QUESTION XXXII

to our own good. First; by destroying the measure of our
own good, by a kind of excess ; because good, chiefly bodily
good, as health, is conditioned by a certain measure: where-
fore superfluous food or any bodily pleasure, causes dis-
gust.— Secondly, by being directly contrary to one's own
good : thus a potter dislikes other potters, not because they
are potters, but because they deprive him of his own excel-
lence or profits, which he seeks as his own good.

Reply Ohj. i. Since ruler and subject are in communion
with one another, there is a certain likeness between them:
but this likeness is conditioned by a certain superiority,
since ruling and presiding pertain to the excellence of a
man's own good: because they belong to men who are wise
and better than others; the result being that they give
man an idea of his own excellence. — -Another reason is that
by ruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is
pleasant.

Reply Ohj. 2. That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful
man, though it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the
man that is sorrowful: because sorrows are contrary to his
own good. Wherefore the sorrowful man seeks pleasure
as making for his own good, in so far as it is a remedy for
its contrary. And this is why bodily pleasures, which are
contrary to certain sorrows, are more sought than intel-
lectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall
state later on (Q. XXXV., A. 5). And. this explains why
all animals naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever
work through sense and movement. For this reason also
young people are most inclined to seek pleasures ; on account
of the many changes to which they are subject, while yet
growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong
desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow : because
his body is corroded by a base humour, as stated in Ethic, vii.

Reply Ohj. 3. Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain
fixed measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys
the proper good, and consequently gives rise to disgust and
sorrow, through being contrary to the proper good of man.

OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE 385

Eighth Article,
whether wonder is a cause of pleasure ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — •

Objection i . It seems that wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the
nature of something, as Damascene says. But knowledge,
rather than ignorance, is a cause of pleasure. Therefore
wonder is not a cause of pleasure.

Ohj. 2. Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being,
as it were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the
beginning of Metaph. (ii.). But it is more pleasant to think
of what we know, than to seek for what we know not, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic, x.) : since in the latter case we
encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the former not;
while pleasure arises from an operation which is unhindered,
as stated in Ethic, vii. Therefore wonder hinders rather
than causes pleasure.

Obj. 3. Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is
accustomed to : wherefore the actions of habits acquired by
custom, are pleasant. But we wonder at what is unwonted,
as Augustine says [Tract, xxiv. in Joan.). Therefore
wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says [Rhet. i.) that wonder
is the cause of pleasure.

/ answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as
stated above (Q. XXIII. , A. 4): and therefore the greater
the desire for the thing loved, the greater the pleasure when
it is attained: indeed the very increase of desire brings
with it an increase of pleasure, according as it gives rise to
the hope of obtaining that which is loved, since it was
stated above (A. 3 ad 3) that desire resulting from liope
is a cause of pleasure. — Now wonder is a kind of desire for
knowledge ; a desire which comes to man when he sees an
effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, or sur-
passes his knowledge or faculty of understanding. Conse-
quently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it includes

II. I 2.=,

386 QUESTION XXXII

a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have.
For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance
things that are scarce. Also, representations of things,
even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give
rise to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing
with another, because comparison of one thing with another
is the proper and connatural act of the reason, as the
Philosopher says {Poet. iv.). This again is why it is more
delightful to he delivered from great danger, because it is some-
thing wonderful, as stated in Rhet. i.

Reply Ohj. i. Wonder gives pleasure, not because it
implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of
learning the cause, and in so far as the wonderer learns
something new, i.e., thdit the cause is other than he had
thought it to be.*

Reply Ohj. 2. Pleasure includes two things; rest in the
good, and perception of this rest. As to the former there-
fore, since it is more perfect to contemplate the known truth,
than to seek for the unknown, the contemplation of what we
know, is in itself more pleasing than the research of what we
do not know. Nevertheless, as to the second, it happens
that research is sometimes more pleasing accidentally, in
so far as it proceeds from a greater desire : for greater desire
is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This
is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning
things for the first time.

Reply Ohj. 3. It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do,
inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet
things that are of rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as
regards knowledge, from the fact that we desire to know
something about them, in so far as they are wonderful; or
as regards action, from the fact that the mind is more in-
clined hy desire to act intensely in things that are new, as stated
in Ethic, x., since more perfect operation causes more perfect
pleasure.

* According to another reading: — that he is other than he thought
himself to be.

QUESTION XXXIIL

OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under
this head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether
expansion is an effect of pleasure ? (2) Whether pleasure
causes thirst or desire for itself ? (3) Whether pleasure
hinders the use of reason ? (4) Whether pleasure perfects
operation ?

First Article.

whether expansion is an effect of pleasure ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that expansion is not an effect of
pleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to love,
according to the Apostle (2 Cor. vi. 11) : Our heart is enlarged.
Wherefore it is written (Ps. cxviii. 6) concerning the precept
of charity: Thy commandment is exceeding broad. But
pleasure is a distinct passion from love. Therefore expan-
sion is not an effect of pleasure.

Obj. 2. Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to
receive more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for
something not yet possessed. Therefore expansion seems
to belong to desire rather than to pleasure.

Obj. 3. Further, contraction is contrary to expansion.
But contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand
closes on that which we wish to grasp firmly : and such is
the affection of appetite in regard to that which pleases
it. Therefore expansion does not pertain to pleasure.

On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written

3«7

388 QUESTION XXXTII

(Isa. Ix. 5) : Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder
and he enlarged. Moreover pleasure is called by the name of
laetitia, ^?>hemg derived from ^^/^z^a/^'o (expansion), as stated
above (Q. XXXI., A. 3, ad 3).

/ answer that, Breadth {latitudo) is a dimension of bodily
magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the
soul, save metaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind
of movement towards breadth ; and it belongs to pleasure
in respect of the two things requisite for pleasure. One of
these is on the part of the apprehensive power, which is
cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable good. As
a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has
attained a certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the
spiritual order: and in this respect man's mind is said to
be magnified or expanded by pleasure.— The other requisite
for pleasure is on the part of the appetitive power, which
acquiesces in the pleasurable object, and rests therein,
offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus
man's affection is expanded by pleasure, as though it sur-
rendered itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure.

Reply Obj. i. In metaphorical expressions nothing
hinders one and the same thing from being compared to
different things according to different likenesses. And in
this way expansion pertains to love by reason of a certain
spreading out, in so far as the affection of the lover spreads
out to others, so as to care, not only for his own interests,
but also for what concerns others. On the other hand
expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes
more ample in itself so as to become more capacious.

Reply Obj. 2. Desire includes a certain expansion arising
from the imagination of the thing desired ; but this expansion
increases at the presence of the pleasurable object: because
the mind surrenders itself more to that object when it is
already taking pleasure in it, than when it desires it before
possessing it ; since pleasure is the end of desire.

Reply Obj. 3. He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it
fast, by clinging to it with all his might : but he opens his
heart to it that he may enjoy it perfectly.

OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE 389

Second Article,
whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for

ITSELF ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — •

Objection i. It seems that pleasure does not cause desire
for itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is
reached. But pleasure is, as it were, a certain repose of
the movement of desire, as stated above (Q. XXIII., A. 4;
Q. XXV., A. 2). Therefore the movement of desire ceases
when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not
cause desire.

Ohj. 2. Further, a thing does not cause its contrary.
But pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of
the object: since desire regards a good which is not yet
possessed, whereas pleasure regards the good that is pos-
sessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire for itself.

Ohj. 3. Further, distaste is incompatible with desire.
But pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not
cause desire.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (John iv. 13) : Whosoever
drinketh of this water, shall thirst again : where, according
to Augustine {Tract, xv. in Joan.), water denotes pleasures
of the body.

I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two ways;
first, as existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the
memory. — Again thirst, or desire, can be taken in two ways;
first, properly, as denoting a craving for something not
possessed; secondly, in genera], as excluding distaste.

Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not cause
thirst or desire for itself, properly speaking; provided we
take thirst or desire as denoting a craving for something not
possessed: because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite
in respect of something actually present. — But it may
happen that what is actually present is not perfectly pos-
sessed: and this may be on the part of the thing possessed,
or on the .part of the possessor. On the part of the thing

390 QUESTION XXXIII

possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not
being a simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains posses-
sion of it successively, and while taking pleasure in what
one has, one desires to possess the remainder : thus if a man
is pleased with the first part of a verse, he desires to hear
the second part, as Augustine says (Conf. iv.). In this
way nearly all bodily pleasures cause thirst for themselves,
until they are fully realized, because pleasures of this kind
arise from some movement: as is evident in pleasures of
the table. — On the part of the possessor, this happens when
a man possesses a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does
not possess it perfectly, but obtains possession of it little
by little. Thus in this life, a faint perception of Divine
knowledge affords us delight, and delight sets up a thirst
or desire for perfect knowledge; in which sense we may
understand the words of Ecclus. xxiv. 29: They that drink
me shall yet thirst.

On the other hand if by thirst or desire we understand
the mere intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste,
thus more than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or
desire for themselves. Because bodily pleasures become
distasteful by reason of their causing an excess in the natural
mode of being, when they are increased or even when they
are protracted; as is evident in the case of pleasures of the
table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of
perfection in bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and some-
times desires another kind. — Spiritual pleasures, on the
contrary, do not exceed the natural mode of being, but
perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection is
reached, then do they afford the greatest delight: except,
perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contempla-
tion is accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers,
which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also
we may understand those words of Ecclus. xxiv. 29: They
that drink me shall yet thirst : for, even of the angels, who
know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is written (i Pet.
i. 12) that they desire to look at Him.

Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality.

OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE 391

but as existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural
tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself : when, to wit,
man returns to that disposition, in which he was when he
experienced the pleasure that is past. But if he be changed
from that disposition, the memory of that pleasure does not
give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the memory
of food in respect of a man who has ate to repletion.

Reply Ohj. i. When pleasure is perfect, then it includes
complete rest ; and the movement of desire, tending to what
was not possessed, ceases. But when it is imperfect, then
the desire, tending to what was not possessed, does not
cease altogether.

Reply Ohj. 2. That which is possessed imperfectly, is pos-
sessed in one respect, and in another respect is not pos-
sessed. Consequently it may be the object of desire and
pleasure at the same time.

Reply Ohj. 3. Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire
in another, as stated above.

Third Article,
whether pleasure hinders the use of reason ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that pleasure does not hinder the
use of reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due
use of reason: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii.)
that while we sit and rest the soul is inclined to knowledge and
prudence ; and it is written (Wisd. viii. 16) : When I go into
my house, I shall repose myself with her, i.e., wisdom. But
pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it helps rather than
hinders the use of reason.

Ohj. 2. Further, things which are not in the same subject
though they be contraries, do not hinder one another.
But pleasure is in the appetitive faculty, while the use of
reason is in the apprehensive power. Therefore pleasure
does not hinder the use of reason.

Ohj. 3. Further, that which is hindered by another,
seems to be moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an

392 . QUESTION XXXIII

apprehensive power moves pleasure rather than is moved
by it : because it is the cause of pleasure. Therefore pleasure
does not hinder the use of reason.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, vi.), that
pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence.

I answer that, As is stated in Ethic, x., appropriate pleasures
increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other
sources are impediments to activity. Accordingly there is
a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason,
as when one takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning :
and such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but
helps it; because we are more attentive in doing that which
gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.

On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of
reason in three ways. First, by distracting the reason.
Because, as we have just observed, we attend much to that
which pleases us. Now when the attention is firmly fixed
on one thing, it is either weakened in respect of other things,
or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and thus if the
bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the use
of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself;
or else it hinders it considerably .— Secondly, by being con-
trary to reason. Because some pleasures, especially those
that are in excess, are contrarv to the order of reason : and
in this sense the Philosopher says that bodily pleasures
destroy the estimate of prudence, but not the speculative estimate,
to which they are not opposed, for instance that the three
angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles. In
the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates. — •
Thirdly, by fettering the reason : in so far as bodily pleasure
is followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even
than in the other passions, in proportion as the appetite
is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards
an absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances hinder the
use of reason; as may be seen in the case of drunkards,
in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered.

Reply Ohj. i. Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of
the appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is some-

OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE 393

times contrary to reason; but on the part of the body it
always imphes alteration. And in respect of both points,
it hinders the use of reason.

Reply Ohj. 2. The powers of appetite and of apprehension
are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul.
Consequently when the soul is very intent on the action of
one part, it is hindered from attending to a contrary act
of the other part.

Reply Ohj. 3. The use of reason requires the due use of
the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are
exercised through a bodily organ. Consequently alteration
in the body hinders the use of reason, because it hinders
the acts of the imagination and of the other sensitive
powers.

Fourth Article.

whether pleasure perfects operation ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :--

Objection i. It seems that pleasure does not perfect
operation. For every human operation depends on the use
of reason. But pleasure hinders the use of reason, as stated
above (A. 3). Therefore pleasure does not perfect, but
weakens human operation.

Ohj. 2. Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But
pleasure is an operation (Ethic, vii,, x.), i.e., either in its
essence or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect
operation.

Ohj. 3. Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so
either as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end;
because operation is not sought for the sake of pleasure,
but rather the reverse, as stated above (Q. IV., A. 2): nor
as agent, because rather is it the operation that causes
pleasure: nor again as form, because, according to the
Philosopher {Ethic, x.), pleasure does not perfect operation,
as a hahit does. Therefore pleasure does not perfect
operation.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (ihid.) that pleasure
perfects operation.

394 QUESTION XXXITT

/ answer that, Pleasure perfects operation in two ways.
First, as an end: not indeed according as an end is that on
account of which a thing is ; but according as every good
which is added to a thing and completes it, can be called
its end. And in this sense the Philosopher says {Ethic, x.)
that pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end added to it :
that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is operation,
there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting
the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. —
Secondly, as agent; for the Philosopher says (ibid.) that
pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man
healthy, but as health does : but it does so indirectly ; inas-
much as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action,
is more eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with greater
care. And in this sense it is said in Ethic, x. that pleasures
increase their appropriate activities, and hinder those that are
not appropriate.

Reply Obj. i. It is not every pleasure that hinders the act
of reason, but only bodily pleasure ; for this arises, not from
the act of reason, but from the act of the concupiscible
faculty, which act is intensified by pleasure. On the con-
trary, pleasure that arises from the act of reason, strengthens
the use of reason.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated in Phys. ii., two things may be
causes of one another, if one be the efficient, the other the
final cause. And in this way, operation is the efficient cause
of pleasure, while pleasure perfects operation by way of final
cause, as stated above.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what
has been said.

QUESTION XXXIV.

OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures :
under which head there are four points of inquiry : (i) Whether
every pleasure is evil ? (2) If not, whether every pleasure is
good ? (3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good ?
(4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge
of moral good and evil ?

First Article,
whether every pleasure is evil ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that every pleasure is evil. For
that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason,
seems to be evil in itself : since man's good is to be in accord
with reason, as Dionysius says {Div. Nom. iv.). But pleasure
destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason; and so
much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore in
sexual -pleasures, which are the greatest of all, it is impossible
to understand anything, as stated in Ethic, vii. Moreover,
Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew (Origen, —
Horn. vi. in Num.) that at the time of conjugal intercourse,
the presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be
a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty. Therefore pleasure is
evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure is evil.

Obj. 2. Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and
the ungodly man seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should
be avoided; because, as stated in Ethic, x., the virtuous man

395

396 QUESTION XXXIV

is a kind of meastire and rule of human actions ; and the
Apostle says (i Cor. ii. 15): The spiritual man judgeth all
things. But children and dumb animals, in whom there is
no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas the man who is master
of himself does not. Therefore pleasures are evil in them-
selves and should be avoided.

Ohj. 3. Further, virtue and art are concerned about the
difficult and the good {Ethic, ii.). But no art is ordained to
pleasure. Therefore pleasure is not something good.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xxxvi. 4): Delight in the
Lord. Since, therefore. Divine authority leads to no evil,
it seems that not every pleasure is evil.

I answer that, As stated in Ethic, x., some have maintained
that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been
that they took account only of sensible and bodily pleasures
which are more manifest; since, also in other respects, the
ancient philosophers did not discriminate between the in-
telhgible and the sensible, or between intellect and sense
{cf. Be Anima iii.). And they held that all bodily pleasures
should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone
to immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by
abstaining from pleasure. — But they were wrong in holding
this opinion. Because, since none can live without some
sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who teach that all
pleasures are evil, are found in the act of taking pleasure;
men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the
example of their works instead of listening to the doctrine
of their words : since, in human actions and passions, wherein
experience is of great weight, example moves more than words.

We must therefore say that some pleasures are good,
and that some are evil. For pleasure is a repose of the
appetitive power in some loved good, and resulting from
some operation ; wherefore we may assign a twofold reason
for this assertion. The first is in respect of the good in
which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil
in the moral order depend on agreement or disagree-
ment with reason, as stated above (Q. XVIII. , A. 5): just
as in the order of nature, a thing is said to be natural, if it

GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES 397

agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees. Accord-
ingly, just as in the natural order there is a certain natural
repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its
nature, for instance, when a heavy body rests down below ;
and again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in
that which disagrees with its nature, as when a heavy body
rests up aloft : so, in the moral order, there is a good pleasure,
whereby the higher or lower appetite rests in that which is
in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the
appetite rests in that which is discordant from reason and
the* law of God.

The second reason can be found by considering the actions,
some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which
are conjoined to actions are more akin to those actions, than
desires, which precede them in point of time. Wherefore,
since the desires of good actions are good, and of evil actions,
evil ; much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and
those of evil actions evil.

Reply Ohj. i. As stated above (Q. XXVIIL, A. 3), it is not
the pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder
the reason or destroy prudence, but extraneous pleasures,
such as the pleasures of the body. These indeed hinder the
use of reason, as stated above {ibid.), either by contrariety
of the appetite that rests in something repugnant to reason,
which makes the pleasure morally bad; or by fettering the
reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the pleasure
be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason,
on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in
this case the pleasure is not morally evil ; as neither is sleep,
whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken
according to reason : for reason itself demands that the use
of reason be interrupted at times. — ^We must add, however,
that although this fettering of the reason, in conjugal inter-
course, has no moral malice, since it is neither a mortal nor
a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral malice,
namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, as stated
in the First Part (Q. XCVIIL, A. 2) the case was different
in the state of innocence.

398 QUESTION XXXIV

Reply Ohj. 2. The temperate man does not shun all
pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to
reason. The fact that children and dumb animals seek
pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil : because
they have from God their natural appetite, which is moved
to that which is naturally suitable to them.

Reply Obj. 3. Art is not concerned with all kinds of good,
but with the making of external things, as we shall state
further on (Q. LVIL, A. 3). But prudence and virtue are
more concerned with actions and passions than art is.
Nevertheless there is an art of making pleasure, namely,
the art of cookery and the art of making unguents, as stated in
Ethic, vii.

Second Article,
whether every pleasure is good ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i . It seems that every pleasure is good. Because
as stated in the First Part (Q. V., A. 6), there are three kinds
of good, the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But
everything virtuous is good; and in like manner everything
useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure is good.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is not sought for the sake of
something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic, i. But
pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else ; for it
seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased.
Therefore pleasure is good in itself. Now that which is
predicated of a thing considered in itself, is predicated thereof
universally. Therefore every pleasure is good.

Obj. 3. Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be
good of itself : because good is what all things seek, as stated
in Ethic, i. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure,
even children and dumb animals. Therefore pleasure is
good in itself : and consequently all pleasure is good.

On the contrary. It is written (Prov. ii. 14) : Who are glad
when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things.

I answer that. While some of the Stoics maintained that all
pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good

GOODNESS x\ND MALICE OF PLEASURES 399

in itself, and that consequently all pleasures are good.
They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating
between that which is good simply, and that which is good
in respect of a particular individual. That which is good
simply, is good in itself. Now that which is not good in
itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two
ways. In one way, because it is suitable to him by reason
of a disposition in which he is now, which disposition,
however, is not natural: thus it is sometimes good for a
leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable
simply to the human temperament. In another way,
through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable.
And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in some good,
if the appetite reposes in that which is good simply, the
pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But if a
man's appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but
in respect of that particular man, then his pleasure will not
be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to him ; neither will it be
good simply, but in a certain respect, or an apparent good.

Reply Ohj. i. The virtuous and the useful depend on
accordance with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous
or useful, without being good. But the pleasant depends
on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to
that which is discordant from reason. Consequently not
every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which
depends on the order of reason.

Reply Ohj. 2. The reason why pleasure is not sought for
the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end.
Now the end may be either good or evil : although nothing
can be an end except in so far as it is good in respect of such
and such a man: and so too with regard to pleasure.

Reply Ohj. 3. All things seek pleasure in the same way as
they seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite
in good. But, just as it happens that not every good which
is desired, is of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure
is of itself and verily good.

400 QUESTION XXXTV

Third Article,
whether any pleasure is the greatest good ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that no pleasure is the greatest good.
Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since
generation cannot be the last end. But pleasure is a con-
sequence of generation: for the fact that a thing takes
pleasure is due to its being established in its own nature,
as stated above (Q. XXXI., A. i). Therefore no pleasure
is the greatest good.

Ohj. 2. Further, that which is the greatest good cannot
be made better by addition. But pleasure is made better
by addition; since pleasure together with virtue is better
than pleasure without virtue. Therefore pleasure is not the
greatest good.

Ohj. 3. Further, that which is the greatest good is uni-
versally good, as being good of itself: since that which is
such of itself is prior to and greater than that which is such
accidentally. But pleasure is not universally good, as
stated above (A. 2). Therefore pleasure is not the greatest
good.

On the contrary, Happiness is the greatest good : since it is
the end of man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure :
for it is written (Ps. xv. 11) : Thou shalt fill me with joy with
Thy countenance ; at Thy right hand are delights even to the
end.

I answer that, Plato held neither with the Stoics, who
asserted that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans,
who maintained that all pleasures are good; but he said
that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no pleasure
be the sovereign or greatest good. But, judging from his
arguments, he fails in two points. First, because, from
observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consist in a
certain movement and becoming, as is evident in satiety
from eating and the like ; he concluded that all pleasure arises
from some becoming and movement: and from this, since

GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES 401

becoming and movement are the acts of something imperfect,
it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature of ultimate
perfection. — ^But this is seen to be evidently false as regards
intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only
in the becoming of knowledge, for instance, when one learns
or wonders, as stated above (Q. XXXIL, A. 8 ad 2); but
also in the act of contemplation, by making use of knowledge
already acquired.

Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that
which is the supreme good simply, i.e., the good as existing
apart from, and unparticipated by, all else, in which sense
God is the Supreme Good: whereas we are speaking of the
greatest good in human things. Now the greatest good of
everything is its last end. And the end, as stated above
(Q. L, A. 8; Q. IL,A. 7) is twofold; namely, the thing itself,
and the use of that thing; thus the miser's end is either
money, or the possession of money. Accordingly, man's
last end may be said to be either God Who is the Supreme
Good simply; or the enjoyment of God, which denotes a
certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense a certain
pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among
human goods.

Reply Obj. i. Not every pleasure arises from a becoming;
for some pleasures result from perfect operations, as
stated above. iVccordingly nothing prevents some pleasure
being the greatest good, although every pleasure is not
such.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument is true of the greatest good
simply, by participation of which all things are good;
wherefore no addition can make it better : whereas in regard
to other goods, it is universally true that any good becomes
better by the addition of another good. — Moreover it might
be said that pleasure is not something extraneous to the
operation of virtue, but that it accompanies it, as stated
in Ethic, i.

Reply Obj. 3. That pleasure is the greatest good is due
not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that
it is perfect repose in the perfect good. Hence it does not

II. I 26

402 QUESTION XXXIV

follow that every pleasure is supremely good, or even good
at all. Thus a certain science is supremely good, but not
ever^T- science is.

Fourth Article.

whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which
to judge of moral good or evil ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that pleasure is not the measure or
rule of moral good and evil. Because that which is first in
a genus is the measure of all the rest (Metaph. x.). But
pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is
preceded by love and desire. Therefore it is not the rule
of goodness and malice in moral matters.

Obj. 2. Further, a measure or rule should be uniform:
hence that movement which is the most uniform, is the
measure and rule of all movements (Metaph. x.). But
pleasures are various and multiform : since some of them are
good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not the measure
and rule of morals.

Obj. 3. Further^ judgment of the effect from its cause is
more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now
goodness or malice of operation is the cause of goodness
or malice of pleasure : because those pleasures are good which
result from good operations, and those are evil which arise from
evil operations, as stated in Ethic, x. Therefore pleasures
are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and malice.

On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Ps. vii. 10,
The searcher of hearts and reins is God, says : The end of care
and thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving.
And the Philosopher says (Ethic, vii.) that pleasure is the
architect, i.e., the principal, end,'^ in regard to which, we say
absolutely that this is evil, and that, good.

I answer that. Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly
on the will, as stated above (Q. XX., A. i) ; and it is chiefly

* St. Thomas took finis as being the nominative, whereas it is
the genitive — tov tcXovs ; hence the Greek should be rendered : Pleasure
IS the architect of the end.

GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES 403

from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil.
Now the end is taken to be that in which the will reposes:
and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good
is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be good or
bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will;
since that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in
the works of virtue ; and that man evil, who takes pleasure
in evil works.

On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are
not the rule of moral goodness and malice: since good is
universally pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good
and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure
in them in accordance with reason, to which the will of the
evil man gives no heed.

Reply Ohj. i. Love and desire precede pleasure in the
order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the
order of the end, which stands as a principle in the matter
of morals: and it is by the principle, which is the
rule and measure of such matters, that we form our
judgment.

Reply Ohj. 2. All pleasures are uniform in the point of
their being the repose of the appetite in something good:
and in this respect pleasure can be a rule or measure.
Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good :
and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.

Reply Ohj. 3. Since pleasure perfects operation as its
end, as stated above (Q. XXXIIL, A. 4); an operation
cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in
good : because the goodness of a thing depends on its end.
And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is th(^,
cause of goodness in the operation.

QUESTION XXXV.

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF.

{In Eight Articles.)

We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning
which we must consider (i) Sorrow or pain in itself: (2) Its
cause: (3) Its effects: (4) Its remedies: (5) Its goodness or
malice.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(i) Whether pain is a passion of the soul ? (2) Whether
sorrow is the same as pain ? (3) Whether sorrow or pain
is contrary to pleasure ? (4) Whether all sorrow is contrary
to all pleasure ? (5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to
the pleasure of contemplation ? (6) Whether sorrow is to
be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought ? (7) Whether
exterior pain is greater than interior ? (8) Of the species
of sorrow.

First Article,
whether pain is a passion of the soul ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that pain is not a passion of the
soul. Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But
pain can be in the body, since Augustine says {De Vera
Relig. xii.), that bodily pain is a sudden corruption of the
well-being of that thing which the soul, by making evil use of
it, made subject to corruption. Therefore pain is not a passion
of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appe-
titive, but rather to the apprehensive part: for Augustine

404

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF 405

says (De Nat. Boni, xxi.) that bodily pain is caused by the
sense resisting a more powerful body. Therefore pain is not
a passion of the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
animal appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal
appetite, but rather to the natural appetite: for Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. xiii.) : Had not some good remained in nature,
we should feel no pain in being punished by the loss of good.
Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.

On the contrary, Augustine [De Civ. Dei xiv.) reckons pain
among the passions of the soul; quoting Virgil {Mneid,

vi. 733) :

" Hence wild desires and grovelling fears

And human laughter, human tears."

Trl. CONINGTON.

/ answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleasure;
namely, conjunction with good and perception of this con-
junction; so also two things are requisite for pain; namely,
conjunction with some evil (which is in so far evil as it
deprives one of some good), and perception of this conjunc-
tion. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the aspect
of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is con-
joined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident
that something under the aspect of good or evil is the object
of pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects
of the appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and
pain belong to the appetite.

Now every appetitive movement or inclination conse-
quent to apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensi-
tive appetite: since the inclination of the natural appetite
is not consequent to an apprehension of the subject of that
appetite, but to the apprehension of another, as stated in the
First Part (Q. CIII., AA. i, 3). Since then pleasure and
pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same
subject, it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the
intellective or sensitive appetite.

Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called
a passion, as stated above (Q. XXII., AA. i, 3): and especi-

4o6 QUESTION XXXV

ally those which tend to some defect. Consequently pain,
according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most properly
called a passion of the soul: just as bodily ailments are
properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine
(De Civ. Dei xiv.) reckons pain especially as being a kind of
ailment.

Reply Ohj. i. We speak of pain of the body, because the
cause of pain is in the body : as when we suffer something
hurtful to the body. But the movement of pain is always
in the soul; since the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel
it, as Augustine says on Ps. Ixxxvii. 4.

Reply Ohj. 2. We speak of pain of the senses, not as though
it were an act of the sensitive power ; but because the senses
are required for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily
pleasure.

Reply Ohj. 3. Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness
of the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural
appetite, but because nature desires something as good,
the removal of which being perceived, there results the
passion of pain in the sensitive appetite.

Second Article,
whether sorrow is the same as pain ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that sorrow is not pain. For
Augustine says [De Civ. Dei xiv.) that pain is used to express
bodily suffering. But sorrow is used more in reference to
the soul. Therefore sorrow is not pain.

Obj. 2. Further, pain is only in respect of present evil.
But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus
repentance is sorrow for the past, and anxiety is sorrow for
the future. Therefore sorrow is quite different from pain.

Obj. 3. Further, pain seems not to follow save from the
sense of touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses.
Therefore sorrow is not pain, and extends to more objects.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. ix. 2): I have
great sorrow (Douay, — sadness) and continual pain (Douay, —

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF 407

sorrow) in my heart, thus denoting the same thing by sorrow
and pain.

I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold
apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior
sense; and from the interior apprehension of the intellect
or of the imagination. Now the interior apprehension
extends to more objects than the exterior apprehension:
because whatever things come under the exterior appre-
hension, come under the interior, but not conversely.
Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an
interior apprehension is called joy, as stated above (Q. XXXI.
A. 3) : and in like manner that pain alone which is caused
by an interior apprehension, is called sorrow. And just
as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior apprehension,
is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is
caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed
but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a kind of pain, as
joy is a species of pleasure.

Reply Ohj. i. Augustine is speaking there of the use of
the word: because pain is more generally used in reference
to bodily pains, which are better known, than in reference
to spiritual pains.

Reply Ohj. 2. External sense perceives only what is
present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the
present, past and future. Consequently sorrow can regard
present, past and future: whereas bodily pain, which follows
the apprehension of the external sense, can only regard
something present.

Reply Ohj. 3. The sensibles of touch are painful, not only
in so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive
power, but also in so far as they are contrary to nature:
whereas the objects of the other senses can indeed be dis-
proportionate to the apprehensive power, but they are not
contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to the
sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, who is a
perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects
of the other senses for their own sake; whereas other
animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the

4o8 QUESTION XXXV

sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic, iii. Accordingly, in
referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not speak
of pain in so far as it is contrary to natural pleasure : but
rather of sorrow, which is contrary to animal joy. — So then
if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which is its more
usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according
to the distinction of interior and exterior apprehension;
although, on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further
than does bodily pain. But if pain be taken in a wide sense,
then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above.

Third Article,
whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure ?

We 'proceed thus to the Third Article : — •

Objection i. It seems that sorrow is not contrary to
pleasure. For one of two contraries is not the cause of the
other. But sorrow can be the cause of pleasure; for it is
written (Matth. v. 5): Blessed are they that mourn, for they
shall he comforted. Therefore they are not contrary to one
another.

Ohj. 2. Further, one contrary does not denominate the
other. But to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus
Augustine says {Conf. iii.) that in stage-plays sorrow itself
gives pleasure: and {ibid, iv.) that weeping is a bitter thing,
and yet it sometimes pleases us. Therefore pain is not con-
trary to pleasure.

Obj. 3. Further, one contrary is not the matter of the
other; because contraries cannot co-exist together. But
sorrow can be the matter of pleasure; for Augustine says
(De Pcenit. xiii.) : The penitent should ever sorrow, and rejoice
in his sorrow. The Philosopher too says (Ethic, ix.) that,
on the other hand, the evil man feels pain at having been
pleased. Therefore pleasure and pain are not contrary to
one another.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei) that joy
is the volition of consent to the things we wish : and that sorrow
is the volition of dissent to the things we do not wish. But

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF 4^9

consent and dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and
sorrow are contrary to one another.

/ answer that, As the Philosopher says {Meiaph. x.), con-
trariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now the form
or species of a passion or movement is taken from the object
or term. Consequently, since the objects of pleasure and
sorrow or pain, viz., present good and present evil, are
contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure
are contrary to one another.

Reply Ohj. i. Nothing hinders one contrary causing the
other accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of
pleasure. In one way, in so far as from sorrow at the absence
of something, or at the presence of its contrary, one seeks
the more eagerly for something pleasant: thus a thirsty
man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a drink, as a remedy
for the pain that he suffers. In another way, in so far as,
from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not
shrink from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure.
In each of these ways, the sorrows of the present life lead
us to the comfort of the future life. Because by the mere
fact that man mourns for his sins, or for the delay of glory,
he merits the consolation of eternity. In like manner a
man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits
in order to obtain it.

Reply Ohj. 2. Sorrow itself can be pleasurable accidentally
in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays;
or in so far as it recalls a beloved object to one's memory,
and makes one feel one's love for the thing, whose absence
gives us pain. Consequently, since love is pleasant, both
pain and whatever else results from love, forasmuch as they
remind us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this reason,
we derive pleasure even from sorrows depicted on the
stage: in so far as, in witnessing them, we perceive our-
selves to conceive a certain love for those who are there
represented.

Reply, Ohj. 3. The will and the reason reflect on their
own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and
reason are considered under the aspect of good or evil. Tn

410 QUESTION XXXV

this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure, or vice versa,
not essentially but accidentally : that is, in so far as either of
them is considered under the aspect of good or evil.

Fourth Article,
whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that all sorrow is contrary to all
pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are
contrary species of colour, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary
species of the soul's passions. But whiteness and blackness
are universally contrary to one another. Therefore pleasure
and sorrow are so too.

Ohj. 2. Further, remedies are made of things contrary
(to the evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner
of sorrow, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic, vii.). There-
fore every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow.

Ohj. 3. Further, contraries are hindrances to one another.
But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure : as is evident
from Ethic, x. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to
every pleasure.

On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of con-
traries. But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite
thing, proceed from the same habit: thus from charity it
happens that we rejoice with them that rejoice, and weep
with Mem that weep (Rom. xii. 15). Therefore not every
sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.

/ answer that, As stated in Metaph. x., contrariety is a
difference in respect of a form. Now a form may be generic
or specific. Consequently things may be contraries in
respect of a generic form, as virtue and vice; or in respect
of a specific form, as justice and injustice.

Now we must observe that some things are specified by
absolute forms, e.g., substances and qualities; whereas
other things are specified in relation to something extrinsic,
e.g., passions and movements, which derive their species
from their terms or objects. Accordingly in those things

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF 411

that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species
contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to
their specific nature: but it does not happen for them to
have any affinity or fittingness to one another. For in-
temperance and justice, which are in the contrary genera of
virtue and vice, are not contrary to one another in respect
of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or
fittingness to one another. — On the other hand, in those
things that are specified in relation to something extrinsic,
it happens that species belonging to contrary genera, are
not only not contrary to one another, but also that they
have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The reason
of this is that where there is one same relation to two con-
traries, there is contrariety; e.g., to approach to a white
thing, and to approach to a black thing, are contraries;
whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a
certain likeness, e.g., to recede from something white, and
to approach to something black. This is most evident in
the case of contradiction, which is the principle of opposition :
because opposition consists in affirming and denying the
same thing, e.g., white and not-white ; while there is fitting-
ness and likeness in the afiirmation of one contrary and
the denial of the other, as, if I were to say black and not
white.

Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified
by their objects. According to their respective genera,
they are contrary to one another: since one is a kind of
pursuit, the other a kind of avoidance, which are to the
appetite, what affirmation and denial are to the intellect
{Ethic, vi.). Consequently sorrow and pleasure in respect
of the same object, are specifically contrary to one another:
whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are
not contrary but disparate, are not specifically contrary
to one another, but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow
at the death of a friend, and pleasure in contemplation.
If, however, those diverse objects be contrary to one
another, then pleasure and sorrow are not only specifically
contrary, but they also have a certain mutual fittingness

412 QUESTION XXXV

and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and to sorrow
for evil.

Reply Ohj. i. Whiteness and blackness do not take their
species from their relationship to something extrinsic, as
pleasure and sorrow do : wherefore the comparison does not
hold.

Reply Ohj. 2. Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in
Metaph. viii. : and in accidents the subject takes the place
of matter. Now it has been said above that pleasure and
sorrow are generically contrary to one another. Conse-
quently in every sorrow the subject has a disposition con-
trary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: because
in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting what it
possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And there-
fore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy
for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of all
manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed
to sorrow specifically.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. —
Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specific-
ally contrary to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to
one another in regard to their effects: since one has the
effect of strengthening the animal nature, while the other
results in a kind of discomfort.

Fifth Article.

whether there is any sorrow contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that there is a sorrow that is con-
trary to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle
says (2 Cor. vii. 10): The sorrow that is according to God,
worketh penance steadfast unto salvation. Now to look at
God belongs to the higher reason, whose act is to give itself
to contemplation, according to Augustine {De Trin. xii.).
Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF 413

Ohj. 2. Further, contrary things have contrary effects.
If therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure,
the other contrary will give sorrow : and so there will be a
sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Ohj. 3. Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the
object of sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil;
since the Philosopher says {Metaph. xii.) that it is wrong
to think of certain things. Therefore sorrow can be contrary
to the pleasure of contemplation.

Obj. 4. Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can
be an object of pleasure, as stated in Ethic, vii. and x. But
the work of contemplation can be hindered in many ways,
either so as to destroy it altogether, or so as to make it
dif&cult. Therefore in contemplation there can be a sorrow
contrary to the pleasure.

Obj. 5. Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow.
But, as it is written (Eccles. xii, 12) much study is an affliction
of the flesh. Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow
contrary to its pleasure.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. viii. 16): Her, i.e.,
wisdom's, conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company
any tediousness ; but joy and gladness. Now the conversa-
tion and company of wisdom are found in contemplation.
Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.

/ answer that. The pleasure of contemplation can be
understood in two ways. In one way, so that contemplation
is the cause, but not the object of pleasure : and then pleasure
is taken not in contemplating but in the thing contem-
plated. Now it is possible to contemplate something harm-
ful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable
and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contempla-
tion be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being
contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is under-
stood, so that contemplation is its object and cause; as
when one takes pleasure in the very act of contemplating.
And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, —

414 ' QUESTION XXXV

De Nat. Horn, xviii.), no sorrow is contrary to that pleasure
which is about contemplation : and the Philosopher says the
same (Topic, i., and Ethic, x.). This, however, is to be
understood as being the case properly speaking. The reason
is because sorrow is of itself contrary to pleasure in a
contrary object: thus pleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow
caused by cold. But there is no contrary to the object of
contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the
mind, are not contrary, but one is the means of knowing the
other. Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a
sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. — Nor
has it any sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures have,
which are like remedies against certain annoyances; thus
a man takes pleasure in drinking through being troubled
with thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the
pleasure of drinking ceases also. Because the pleasure of
contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoy-
ance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in
itself: for pleasure is not a becoming but a perfect operation,
as stated above (Q. XXXI., A. i).

Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure
of apprehension ; and this in two ways : first, on the part of
an organ, secondly, through some impediment in the appre-
hension. On the part of an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled
with apprehension, directly, as regards the apprehensive
powers of the sensitive part, which have a bodily organ ; —
either from the sensible object disagreeing with the normal
condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter,
and the smell of something foul; — ^or from the sensible
object, though agreeable, being so continuous in its action
on the sense, that it exceeds the normal condition of the
organ, as stated above (Q. XXXIII., A. 2), the result being
that an apprehension which at first was pleasant becomes
tedious. — But these two things cannot occur directly in the
contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no
corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority
quoted above that intellectual contemplation has neither
bitterness, nor tediousness. Since, however, the human

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF 4i5

mind, in contemplation, makes use of the sensitive powers
of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is incidental;
therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly mingled with
contemplation.

Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus
accidentally mingled with contemplation, contrary to the
pleasure thereof. Because pain caused by a hindrance to
contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of con-
templation, but rather is in afhnity and in harmony with it,
as is evident from what has been said above (A. 4): while
pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong
to the same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate.
Accordingly it is evident that no sorrow is contrary to
pleasure taken in the very act of contemplation ; nor is any
sorrow connected with it save accidentally.

Reply Ohj. i. The sorrow which is according to God, is not
caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but
by something which the mind contemplates: viz., by sin,
which the mind considers as contrary to the love of God.

Reply Ohj, 2. Things which are contrary according to
nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind :
for things that are contrary in reality are not contrary in
the order of thought; indeed rather is one contrary the
reason for knowing the other. Hence one and the same
science considers contraries.

Reply Ohj. 3. Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since
it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is
the good of the intellect : it can, however, be evil accidentally,
i.e., in so far as the contemplation of a less noble object
hinders the contemplation of a more noble object; or on
the part of the object contemplated, to which the appetite
is inordinately attached.

Reply Ohj. /\. Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contempla-
tion, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but
is in harmony with it, as stated above.

Reply Ohj. 5. Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation
accidentally and indirectly, as stated above.

4i6 QUESTION XXXV

Sixth Article.

whether sorrow is to be shunned more than
pleasure is to be sought ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — ■

Objection i. It seems that sorrow is to be shunned more
than pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (Qq. 83) :
There is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks
pleasure. Now that which all agree in doing, seems to be
natural. Therefore it is natural and right for sorrow to
be shunned more than pleasure is sought.

Obj. 2. Further, the action of a contrary conduces to
rapidity and intensity of movement : for hot water freezes
quicker and harder {Meteor, i.). But the shunning of sorrow
is due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow ; whereas the
desire for pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but
rather from the suitableness of the pleasant object. There-
fore sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought.

Obj. 3. Further, the stronger the passion which a man
resists according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise,
and the more virtuous: since virtue is concerned with the
difficult and the good {Ethic, ii.). But the brave man who
resists the movement of shunning sorrow, is more virtuous
than the temperate man, who resists the movement of
desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.)
that the brave and the just are chiefly praised. Therefore the
movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the
movement of seeking pleasure.

On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius
declares {Div. Nom. iv.). But pleasure is desirable for the
sake of the good which is its object; whereas the shunning
of sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore the desire for
pleasure is more eager than the shunning of sorrow.

/ answer that, The desire for pleasure is of itself more
eager than the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is
that the cause of pleasure is a suitable good; while the
cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil. Now it

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF 417

happens that a certain good is suitable without any repug-
nance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so
unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Wherefore
pleasure can be entire and perfect : whereas sorrow is always
partial. Therefore desire for pleasure is naturally greater
than the shunning of sorrow. — Another reason is because
the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought for its
own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow,
is to be shunned as being a privation of good: and that
which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is
by reason of something else. — Moreover we find a con-
firmation of this in natural movements. For every natural
movement is more intense in the end, when a thing approaches
the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the beginning,
when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to its nature:
as though nature were more eager in tending to what is suit-
able to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. Therefore
the inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more
eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.

But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow
more eagerly than he seeks pleasure: and this for three
reasons. First, on the part of the apprehension. Because,
as Augustine says {De Trin. x.), love is felt more keenly, when
we lack that which we love. Now from the lack of what we
love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of
some loved good, or by the presence of some contrary evil.
But pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests
in possession of it. Since then love is the cause of pleasure
and sorrow, the latter is the more shunned, according as
love is the more keenly felt on account of that which is
contrary to it. — -Secondly, on the part of the cause of sorrow
or pain, which cause is repugnant to a good that is more
loved than the good in -which we take pleasure. For we
love the natural well-being of the body more than the
pleasure of eating: and consequently we would leave the
pleasure of eating and the like, from fear of the pain occa-
sioned by blows or other such causes, which are contrary to
the well-being of the body. ^Thirdly, on the part of the

II. I 27

4i8 QUESTION XXXV

effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only one
pleasure, but all.

Refly Ohj. i. The saying of Augustine that sorrow is
shunned more than pleasure is sought is true accidentally
but not simply. And this is clear from what he says after :
Since we see that the most savage animals are deterred from
the greatest pleasures by fear of fain, which pain is contrary
to life which is loved above all.

Reply Ohj. 2. It is not the same with movement from
within and movement from without. For movement from
within tends to what is suitable more than it recedes from
that which is unsuitable ; as we remarked above in regard to
natural movement. But movement from without is intensi-
fied by the very opposition: because each thing strives in
its own way to resist anything contrary to it, as aiming at
its own preservation. Hence violent movement is intense
at first, and slackens towards the end. — Now the movement
of the appetitive faculty is from within : since it tends from
the soul to the object. Consequently pleasure is, of itself,
more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned. But the
movement of the sensitive faculty is from without, as it
were from the object to the soul. Consequently the more
contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And then too, acci-
dentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure
and pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure is sought.

Reply Ohj. 3. A brave man is praised, not from the fact
that, in accordance with reason, he is not overcome by any
kind of sorrow or pain, but by that which is consistent with
the danger of death. And this kind of sorrow is more
shunned, than pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse
are to be sought, which latter pleasures are the object of
temperance: thus life is loved more than food and sexual
pleasure. But the temperate man is praised for refraining
from pleasures of touch, more than for shunning the pains
which are contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic, iii.

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF 419

Seventh Article,
whether outward pain is greater than interior

SORROW ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — ■

Objection i. It seems that outward pain is greater than
interior sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises
from a cause repugnant to the well-being of the body in
which is life : whereas interior sorrow is caused by some evil
in the imagination. Since, therefore, life is loved more
than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what
has been said above (A. 6), outward pain is greater than
interior sorrow.

Obj. 2. Further, the reality moves more than its likeness
does. But outward pain arises from the real conjunction
of some contrary: whereas inward sorrow arises from the
apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore outward
pain is greater than inward sorrow.

Ob]. 3. Further, a cause is known by its effect. But out-
ward pain has more striking effects: since man dies sooner
of outward pain than of interior sorrow. Therefore outward
pain is greater and is shunned more than interior sorrow.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xxv. 17) : The sadness
of the heart is every wound (Douay, — plague), and the wicked-
ness of a woman is all evil. Therefore, just as the wicked-
ness of a woman surpasses all other wickedness, as the text
implies; so sadness of the heart surpasses every outward
wound.

I answer that, Interior and exterior pain agree in one point,
and differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a move-
ment of the appetitive power, as stated above (A. i). But
they differ in respect of those two things which are requisite
for pain and pleasure; namely, in respect of the cause,
which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect of the
apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined
evil repugnant to the body : while the cause of inward pain
is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. Again,

420 QUESTION XXXV

outward pain arises from an apprehension of sense, chiefly
of touch; while inward pain arises from an interior appre-
hension, of the imagination or of the reason.

If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause
of outward pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite
to which both these pains belong: while the latter belongs
to the appetite indirectly. Because inward pain arises from
something being repugnant to the appetite itself, while
outward pain arises from something being repugnant to the
appetite, through being repugnant to the body. Now, that
which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason
of another. Wherefore, from this point of view, inward
pain surpasses outward pain. — In like manner also on the
part of apprehension: because the apprehension of reason
and imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension
of the sense of touch. — Consequently inward pain is, simply
and of itself, more keen than outward pain : a sign whereof
is that one willingly undergoes outward pain in order to
avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is not
repugnant to the interior appetite, it becomes in a manner
pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes,
however, outward pain is accompanied by inward pain, and
then the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not
only greater than outward pain, it is also more universal:
since whatever is repugnant to the body, can be repugnant
to the interior appetite; and whatever is apprehended by
sense may be apprehended by imagination and reason, but
not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is
said expressively: Sadness of the heart is every wound,
because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised
in the interior sorrows of the heart.

Reply Ohj. i. Inward pain can also arise from things that
are destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward
to outward pain must not be taken in reference to the
various evils that cause pain; but in regard to the various
ways in which this cause of pain is compared to the appetite.

Reply Ohj. 2. Inward pain is not caused by the appre-
hended likeness of a thing : for a man is not inwardly pained

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF 421

by the apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which
the likeness represents. And this thing is all the more
perfectly apprehended by means of its likeness, as this like-
ness is more immaterial and abstract. Consequently inward
pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused by a greater evil, for-
asmuch as evil is better known by an inward apprehension.
Reply Ohj. 3. Bodily changes are more liable to be caused
by outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is
caused by a corruptive conjoined corporally, which is a
necessary condition of the sense of touch; and from the fact
that the outward sense is more material than the inward
sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material than
the intellective. For this reason, as stated above (Q. XXII .
A. 3; Q. XXXI., A. 5), the body undergoes a greater change
from the movement of the sensitive appetite : and, in like
manner, from outward than from inward pain.

Eighth Article,
whether there are only four species of sorrow ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — •

Objection i. It seems that Damascene's {De Fide Or-
thod. ii.) division of sorrow into four species is incorrect;
viz., into torpor, distress, which Gregory of Nyssa (Neme-
sius, — De Nat. Horn, xix.) calls anxiety,' — pity, and envy.
For sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But there are not several
species of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to assign
different species of sorrow.

Obj. 2. Further, Repentance is a species of sorrow; and so
are indignation and jealousy, as the Philosopher states
(Rhet. ii.). But these are not included in the above
species. Therefore this division is insufficient.

Obj. 3. Further, the members of a division should be
things that are opposed to one another. But these species
are not opposed to one another. For according to Gregory
(Nemesius, — loc. cit.) torpor is sorrow depriving of speech :
anxiety is the sorrow that weighs down ; envy is sorrow for
another's good ; pity is sorrow for another^ s wrongs. But it

422 QUESTION XXXV

is possible for one to sorrow for another's wrongs, and for
another's good, and at the same time to be weighed down
inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this
division is incorrect.

On the contrary stands the twofold authority of Gregory
of Nyssa and of Damascene.

/ answer that, It belongs to the notion of a species that
it is something added to the genus. But a thing can be
added to a genus in two ways. First, as something belong-
ing of itself to the genus, and virtually contained therein:
thus rational is added to animal. Such an addition makes
true species of a genus : as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii,
viii.). But, secondly, a thing may be added to a genus,
that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that
genus: thus white or something of the kind may be added
to animal. Such an addition does not make true species of
the genus, according to the usual sense in which we speak
of genera and species. But sometimes a thing is said to
be a species of a certain genus, through having something
foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of
that genus is applicable: thus a live coal or a flame is said
to be a species of fire, because in each of them the nature
of fire is applied to a foreign matter. In like manner we
speak of astronomy and perspective as being species of
mathematics, inasmuch as the principles of mathematics
are applied to natural matter.

In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species
of sorrow are reckoned by an application of the notion of
sorrow to something foreign to it. This foreign matter may
be taken on the part of the cause or the object, or of the
effect. For the proper object of sorrow is one^s own evil.
Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it
either through one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's
own; and thus we have pity which is sorrow for another's
evil, considered, however, as one's own: — or through one's
being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's
own, but another's good, considered, however, as one's own
evil: and thus we have envy. — ^The proper effect of sorrow

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF 423

consists in a certain iiight of the appetite. Wherefore the
foreign element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as
to affect the first part only, by excluding flight: and thus
we have anxiety which weighs on the mind, so as to make
escape seem impossible : hence it is also called perplexity.
If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even
the limbs become motionless, which belongs to torpor, then
we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is
neither flight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the
reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech
is because of all the external movements the voice is the
best expression of the inward thought and desire, not only
in men, but also in other animals, as is stated in Polit. i.

Reply Ohj. i. Pleasure is caused by good, which has only
one meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several
species as sorrow is; for the latter is caused by evil, which
happens in many ways, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.).

Reply Ohj. 2. Repentance is for one's own evil, which is
the proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to
these species. — Jealousy and indignation are included in
envy, as we shall explain later (II. -II., Q. XXXVI., A. 2).

Reply Ohj. 3. This division is not according to opposite
species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter
to which the notion of sorrow is applied, as stated above.

QUESTION XXXVI.

OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN.

[In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which
head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether sorrow
is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of
an evil ? (2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow ?

(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow ?

(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow ?

First Article.

whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by
the presence of evil ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that sorrow is caused by the loss of
a good rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augus-
tine says {De VIII. Qq. Dulcit. i.) that sorrow is caused by
the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, in like manner,
every sorrow is caused by the loss of some good.

Ob]. 2. Further, it was said above (Q. XXXV., A. 4) that
the sorrow, which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same
object as that pleasure. But the object of pleasure is
good, as stated above {Q. XXIII., A. 4; Q. XXXI., A. i;
Q. XXXV., A. 3). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by
the loss of good.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Augustine {De Civ. Dei xiv.),
love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the
soul. But the object of love is good. Therefore pain or

424

OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN 425

sorrow is felt for the loss of good rather than for an evil
that is present.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii.) that
the dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause
of sorrow.

I answer that, If privations, as considered by the mind,
were what they are in reality, this question would seem to
be of no importance. For, as stated in the First Part
(Q. XIV., A. 10; Q. XLVIIL, A. 3), evil is the privation of
good : and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack
of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow for
the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the
presence of evil. — -But sorrow is a movement of the appetite
in consequence of an apprehension: and even a privation,
as apprehended, has the aspect of a being, wherefore it is
called a being of reason : and such is evil, considered as a
privation. Accordingly, so far as the movement of the appe-
tite is concerned, the question differs as to which of the two
it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which is lost.

Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds
the same place in the actions of the soul, as natural move-
ment in natural things; the truth of the matter is to be
found by considering natural movements. For if, in natural
movements, we observe those of approach and withdrawal,
approach is of itself directed to something suitable to nature ;
while withdrawal is of itself directed to something con-
trary to nature: thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws
from a higher place, and approaches naturally to a lower
place. But if we consider the cause of both these move-
ments, viz., gravity, then gravity itself inclines towards the
lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place,
since withdrawal from the latter is the reason for its down-
ward tendency.

Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite,
sorrow is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is
a kind of pursuit or approach; just as pleasure regards first
the good possessed, as its proper object, so sorrow regards
the evil that is present. On the other hand love, which is

426 QUESTION XXXVI

the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than
evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the cause of
a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of
sorrow or pain, than the good which is lost.

Reply Ohj. i. The loss itself of good is apprehended as an
evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in
this sense Augustine says that pain results from the loss of
temporal goods.

Reply Ohj, 2. Pleasure and its contrary pain have the
same object, but under contrary aspects: because if the
presence of a particular thing be the object of pleasure, the
absence of that same thing is the object of sorrow. Now
one contrary includes the privation of the other, as stated
in Metaph. x. : and consequently sorrow in respect of one
contrary, is, in a way, directed to the same thing under a
contrary aspect.

Reply Ohj. 3. When many movements arise from one
cause, it does not follow that they all regard chiefly that
which the cause regards chiefly, but only the first of them.
And each of the others regards chiefly that which is suitable
to it according to its own nature.

Second Article,
whether desire is a cause of sorrow ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that desire is not a cause of pain or
sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated
above (A. i): whereas desire is a movement of the appetite
towards good. Now movement towards one contrary is not
a cause of the movement towards the other contrary.
Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.

Ohj. 2. Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide
Orthod. ii.), is caused by something present; whereas the
object of desire is something future. Therefore desire is not
a cause of pain.

Ohj. 3. Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not
a cause of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the

OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN 427

Philosopher says {Rhet. i.)- Therefore desire is not a
cause of pain or sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchirid. xxiv.): When
ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things
hurtful, found their way in ; error and fain stole an entrance
in their company. But ignorance is the cause of error.
Therefore desire is a cause of sorrow.

/ answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal appe-
tite. Now, as stated above (A. i) the appetitive movement
is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may be
assigned to a twofold cause; one, on the part of the end,
the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus,
on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body's downward
movement is the lower place; while the principle of that
movement is a natural inclination resulting from gravity.

Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part
of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it
has been said above (A. i) that the cause of pain or sorrow
is a present evil. — On the other hand, the cause, by way of
principle, of that movement, is the inward inclination of
the appetite ; which inclination regards, first of all, the good,
and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil. Hence
the first principle of this appetitive movement is love,
which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the
possession of good: while the second principle is hatred,
which is the first inchnation of the appetite towards the
avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire is the
first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure,
as stated above (Q. XXXH., A. 6) ; hence it is that Augus-
tine often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of
love, as was also stated (Q. XXX., A. 2 ad 2): and in this
sense he says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow.
Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the
cause of sorrow. Because whatever hinders a movement
from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now
that which is contrary to the movement of the appetite,
is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause
of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for the delay of a desired

428 QUESTION XXXVI

good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal
cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the loss of
present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than
for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.

Reply Ohj. i. The inclination of the appetite to the pos-
session of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly
from evil, as stated above. And hence it is that the appe-
titive movements that regard good, are reckoned as causing
the appetitive movements that regard evil.

Reply Ohj. 2. That which is desired, though really future,
is, nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped
for. — Or we may say that although the desired good itself is
future, yet the hindrance is reckoned as present, and so
gives rise to sorrow.

Reply Ohj. 3. Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is a
hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope
is removed through the presence of an obstacle, desire
causes sorrow.

Third Article,
whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that the craving for unity is not a
cause of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic, x.) that
this opinion, which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure,
and division* the cause of sorrow,, seems to have originated
in pains and pleasures connected with food. But not every
pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. Therefore the craving
for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow ; since repletion
pertains to unity, and division is the cause of multitude.

Ohj. 2. Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If
therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no
separation would be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as
regards the refusal of whatever is superfluous.

Ohj. 3. Further, for the same reason we desire the con-
junction of good and the removal of evil. But as conjunc-

* Aristotle wrote evheiav , want ; St . Thomas read incisionem : should
he have read indigentiam ?

OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN 429

tion regards unity, since it is a kind of union ; so separation
is contrary to unity. Therefore the craving for unity should
not be reckoned, rather than the craving for separation, as
causing sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Lib. Arh. iii.), that
from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how
their souls desire unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies.
For what else is pain but a feeling of impatience of division
or corruption ?

I answer that. Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good
is reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity,
and love, be accounted as causing sorrow. Because the
good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as
each thing has, united in itself, the elements of which its
perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists held that one
is a principle, just as good is. Hence everything naturally
desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and therefore, just
as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the
love or craving for unity.

Reply Ob], i. Not every kind of union causes perfect good-
ness, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing
depends. Hence neither does the desire of any kind of
unity cause pain or sorrow, as some have maintained : whose
opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from the fact that
repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a man
has ate to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating;
because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather
than conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is
caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for
that unity in which the perfection of nature consists.

Reply Obj. 2. Separation can be pleasant, either because
it removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or
because it has some union connected with it, such as union
of the sense to its object.

Reply Obj. 3. Separation from things hurtful and corrup-
tive is desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is
due. Wherefore the desire for a suchlike separation is not
the first cause of sorrow, whereas the craving for unity is.

430 QUESTION XXXVI

Fourth Article,
whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that a greater power should not be
reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power
of the agent is not present but future. But sorrow is for
present evil. Therefore a greater power is not a cause of
sorrow.

Ohj. 2. Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow.
But hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore
a greater power should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.

Ohj. 3. Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are
the causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater
power is something external. Therefore it should not be
reckoned as a cause of sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Nat. Boni xx.):
Sorrow in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger
power : while pain in the body is caused by sense resisting a
stronger body.

I answer that, As stated above (A. i), a present evil, is
cause of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that
which is the cause of the evil being present, should be
reckoned as causing pain or sorrow. Now it is evident that
it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to be united
with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to a thing's
inclination does not happen to it save by the action of
something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons a greater
power as being the cause of sorrow.

But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so
far as to transform the contrary inclination into its own
inclination, there will be no longer repugnance or violence :
thus if a stronger agent, by its action on a heavy body,
deprives it of its downward tendency, its consequent
upward tendency is not violent but natural to it.

Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to
take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their

OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN 431

respective inclinations, pain or sorrow will not result there-
from ; such is the result only when the contrary inclination
of the appetite remains. And hence Augustine says that
sorrow is caused by the will resisting a stronger power : for
were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result
would be not sorrow but pleasure.

Reply Ohj. i. A greater power causes sorrow, as acting
not potentially but actually, i.e., by causing the actual
presence of the corruptive evil.

Reply Ohj. 2. Nothing hinders a power which is not simply
greater, from being greater in some respect : and accordingly
it is able to inflict some harm. But if it be nowise stronger,
it can do no harm at all: wherefore it cannot bring about
that which causes sorrow.

Reply Ohj. 3. External agents can be the causes of appe-
titive movements, in so far as they cause the presence of
the object: and it is thus that a greater power is reckoned
to be the cause of sorrow.

QUESTION XXXVII.

OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the effects of pain or sorrow: under
which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether
pain deprives one of the power to learn ? (2) Whether the
effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul ? (3) Whether
sorrow or pain weakens all activity ? (4) Whether sorrow
is more harmful to the body than all the other passions of
the soul ?

First Article.

whether pain deprives one of the power to learn ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that pain does not deprive one of
the power to learn. For it is written (Isa. xxvi. 9): When
Thou shalt do Thy judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of
the world shall learn justice : and further on (verse 16) : In
the tribulation of murmuring Thy instruction was with them.
But the judgments of God and tribulation cause sorrow in
men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far from destroy-
ing, increases the power of learning.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Isa. xxviii. 9): Whom shall
He teach knowledge ? And whom shall He make to understand
the hearing ? Them that are weaned from the milk, that are
drawn away from the breasts, i.e., from pleasures. But pain
and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure; since sorrow
hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic, vii.: and (Ecclus.
xi. 29) it is stated that the affliction of an hour maketh one
forget great delights. Therefore pain, instead of taking away,
increases the faculty of learning.

432

• OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW 433

Ohj. 3. Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain,
as stated above (Q. XXXV., A. 7). But man can learn
while sorrowful. Much more, therefore, can he learn while
in bodily pain.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i.): Although
during those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, —
/ was not able to turn over in my mind other things than those
I had already learnt ; and as to learning anything, I was
quite unequal to it, because it required undivided attention.

I answer that, Since all the powers of the soul are rooted
in the one essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when
the intention of the soul is strongly drawn towards the
action of one power, that it is withdrawn from the action of
another power : because the soul, being one, can only have
one intention. The result is that if one thing draws upon
itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great portion
thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is
incompatible therewith.

Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the
soul's intention to itself; because it is natural for each thing
to tend wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may
be observed even in natural things. It is likewise evident
that in order to learn anything new, we require study and
effort with a strong intention, as is clearly stated in Pro v.
ii. 4, 5 : If thou shall seek wisdom as money, and shall dig for
her as for a treasure, then shall thou understand learning
(Vulg., — the fear of the Lord). Consequently if the pain be
acute, man is prevented at the time from learning anything :
indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is
unable to give hi*s attention even to that which he knew
already. — ^However a difference is to be observed according
to the difference of love that a man has for learning or for
considering : because the greater his love, the more will he
retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from
turning entirely to the pain.

Reply Ohj. i. Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the
mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning :
especially in regard to those things by which a man hopes

II. I 28

434 QUESTION XXXVII

to be freed from sorrow. And thus, in the tribulation of
murmuring, men are more apt to be taught of God.

Reply Ohj. 2. Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they
draw upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason
from the act of consideration, wherefore it is stated in
Ethic, vii. that in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot
understand anything. Nevertheless pain attracts the soul's
intention more than pleasure does: thus we observe in
natural things that the action of a natural body is more
intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot water is
more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence
freezes harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate,
it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, in so
far as it takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it
is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether.

Reply Ohj. 3. External pain arises from hurt done to the
body, so that it involves bodily transmutation more than
inward sorrow does: and yet the latter is greater in
regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs to
the soul. Consequently bodily pain is a greater hindrance
to contemplation which requires complete repose, than
inward sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very
intense, it attracts the intention, so that man is unable to
learn anything for the first time: wherefore on account of
sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel
{Hom. xxii. in Ezechiel).

Second Article,
whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden

THE SOUL ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that it is not an effect of sorrow to
burden the soul. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. vii. 11):
Behold this self-same thing, that you were made sorrowful
according to God, how great carefulness it worketh in you : yea
defence, yea indignation, etc. Now carefulness and indigna-
tion imply that the soul is uplifted, which is contrary to

OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW 435

being depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of
sorrow.

Ohj. 2. Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the
effect of pleasure is expansion : the opposite of which is not
depression but contraction. Therefore depression should
not be reckoned as an effect of sorrow.

Ohj. 3. Further, sorrow consumes those who are afflicted
therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle
(2 Cor. ii. 7): Lest perhaps such an one he swallowed up with
overmuch sorrow. But that which is depressed is not con-
sumed; nay, it is weighed down by something heavy,
whereas that which is consumed enters within the consumer.
Therefore depression should not be reckoned an effect of
sorrow.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, — De Nat.
Horn, xix.) and Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii.) speak of
depressing sorrow.

I answer that, The effects of the soul's passions are some-
times named metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible
bodies: for the reason that the movements of the animal
appetite are like the inclinations of the natural appetite. And
in this way fervour is ascribed to love, expansion to pleasure,
and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be de-
pressed, through being hindered in his own movement by
some weight. Now it is evident from what has been said
above (Q. XXIII., A. 4; Q. XXV., A. 4; Q. XXXVL, A. i)
that sorrow is caused by a present evil: and this evil, from
the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the
will, depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from
enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil
which is the cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive
one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be de-
pressed in so far as, for the present, it fails to grasp that
which it craves for; yet it retains the movement whereby
to repulse that evil. If, on the other hand, the strength of
the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even
the interior movement of the afdicted soul is absolutely
hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or

436 QUESTION XXXVII

that. Sometimes even the external movement of the body
is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied.

Reply Ohj. i. That uplifting of the soul ensues from the
sorrow which is according to God, because it brings with it
the hope of the forgiveness of sin.

Reply Ohj. 2. As far as the movement of the appetite is
concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same :
because the soul, through being depressed so as to be unable
to attend freely to outward things, withdraws to itself,
closing itself up as it were.

Reply Ohj. 3. Sorrow is said to consume man, when the
force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of
evasion: and thus also it both depresses and consumes at
the same time. For certain things, taken metaphorically,
imply one another, which taken literally, appear to exclude
one another.

Third Article,
whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that sorrow does not weaken all
activity. Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is
clear from the passage of the Apostle quoted above (A. 2,
Ohj. i). But carefulness conduces to good work: wherefore
the Apostle says (2 Tim. ii. 15): Carefully study to present
thyself ... a workman that needeth not to he ashamed.
Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance to work, but helps one
to work well.

Ohj. 2. Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as
stated in Ethic, vii. But desire causes intensity of action.
Therefore sorrow does too.

Ohj. 3. Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful,
so are others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to
mourn. Now a thing is improved by that which is suitable
to it. Therefore certain actions are not hindered but
improved by reason of sorrow.

On the contrary. The Philosopher says (Ethic, x. ) that pleasure
perfects action, whereas on the other hand, sorrow hinders it.

OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW 437

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 2), Sorrow at times does
not depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all move-
ment, internal or external; but certain movements are some-
times caused by sorrow itself. Accordingly action stands
in a twofold relation to sorrow. First, as being the object
of sorrow : and thus sorrow hinders any action : for we never
do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that which we
do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The reason for this is
that the will is the cause of human actions: and conse-
quently when we do something that gives pain, the action
must of necessity be weakened in consequence. — Secondly,
action stands in relation to sorrow, as to its principle and
cause : and such action must needs be improved by sorrow :
thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing,
the more one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is
a hope of shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action
would result from that sorrow.

From what has been said the replies to the objections are
evident.

Fourth Article.

whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than
the other passions of the soul ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that sorrow is not most harmful
to the body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the
soul. But those things which have only a spiritual existence
do not cause a transmutation in the body: as is evident
with regard to the images of colours, which images are in.
the air and do not give colour to bodies. Therefore sorrow
is not harmful to the body.

Ohj. 2. Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only
be due to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction
with it. But bodily transmutation takes place in all the
passions of the soul, as stated above (Q. XXII., AA. i, 3).
Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the
other passions of the soul.

438 QUESTION XXXVII

Ohj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says {Ethic. vii.)that
anger and desire drive some to madness : which seems to be
a very great harm, since reason is the most excellent thing
in man. Moreover despair seems to be more harmful than
sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow. Therefore sorrow is
not more harmful to the body than the other passions of
the soul.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. xvii. 22): A joyful
mind maketh age flourishing : a sorrowful spirit drieth up
the hones : and (ihid. xxv. 20): As a moth doth hy a garment,
and a worm hy the wood ; so the sadness of a man consumeth
the heart : and (Ecclus. xxxviii. 19) : Of sadness cometh death.

I answer that, Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most
harmful to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow
is repugnant to man's life in respect of the species of its
movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or
quantity, as is the case with the other passions of the soul.
For man's life consists in a certain movement, which flows
from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this
movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain
fixed measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond
the right measure, it will be repugnant to man's life in
respect of the measure of quantity; but not in respect of
its specific character : whereas if this movement be hindered
in its progress, it will be repugnant to life in respect of its
species.

Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul,
the bodily transmutation which is their material element,
is in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive
movement, which is the formal element: just as in every
thing matter is proportionate to form. Consequently those
passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit
of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as
regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as
regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like;
wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the
body; though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful
to it. — On the other hand, those passions which denote in

OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW 439

the appetite a movement of flight or contraction, are repug-
nant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure,
but also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply
harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow,
which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which
makes a stronger impression than future evil.

Reply Ohj. i. Since the soul naturally moves the body,
the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of
bodily transmutation. Nor is there any parallel with
spiritual images, because they are not naturally ordained
to move such other bodies as are not naturally moved by the
soul.

Reply Ohj. 2. Other passions imply a bodily transmuta-
tion which is specifically in conformity with the vital move-
ment: whereas sorrow implies a transmutation that is
repugnant thereto, as stated above.

Reply Ohj. 3. A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of
reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many
ailments deprive one of the use of reason, before depriving
one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great
harm to the body, by reason of the sorrow which they imply,
and which arises from the absence of the thing desired.
Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives man of the use of
reason : as may be seen in those who through sorrow become
a prey to melancholy or madness.

QUESTION XXXVIII.

OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN.

{In Five Articles.)

We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow:
under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(i) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure ?
(2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping ? (3) Whether it is
assuaged by the sympathy of friends ? (4) Whether it is
assuaged by contemplating the truth ? {5) Whether it is
assuaged by sleep and baths ?

First Article.

whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every

pleasure ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that not every pleasure assuages
every pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage
sorrow, save in so far as it is contrary to it: for remedies
work by contraries (Ethic, ii.). But not every pleasure is
contrary to every sorrow; as stated above (Q. XXXV.,
A. 4). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow.

Obj. 2. Further, that which causes sorrow does not
assuage it. But some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as
stated in Ethic, ix., the wicked man feels pain at having been
pleased. Therefore not every pleasure assuages sorrow.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says [Conf. iv.) that he fled
from his country, where he had been wont to associate with
his friend, now dead : for so should his eyes look for him less,
z&here they were not wont to see him. Hence we may gather

440

OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN 441

that those things which united us to our dead or absent
friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn their
death or absence. But nothing united us more than the
pleasures we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very
pleasures become burdensome to us when we mourn.
Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, vii.) that
sorrow is driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure
and by any other, provided it be intense.

I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above
(Q. XXIII. , A. 4), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite
in a suitable good; while sorrow arises from something un-
suited to the appetite. Consequently in movements of the
appetite pleasure is to sorrow, what, in bodies, repose is to
weariness, which is due to a non-natural transmutation; for
sorrow itself denotes a certain weariness or ailing of the
appetitive faculty. Therefore just as all repose of the body
brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing from any
non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings relief by assuag-
ing any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever.

Reply Obj. i. Although not every pleasure is specifically
contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated
above (Q. XXXV., A. 4). And consequently, on the part
of the disposition of the subject, any sorrow can be assuaged
by any pleasure.

Reply Obj. 2. The pleasures of wicked men are not a
cause of sorrow while they are enjoyed, but afterwards:
that is to say, in so far as wicked men repent of those things
in which they took pleasure. This sorrow is healed by
contrary pleasures.

Reply Obj. 3. When there are two causes inclining to con-
trary movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which
is stronger and more persistent, prevails in the end. Now
when a man is made sorrowful by those things in which he
took pleasure in common with a deceased or absent friend,
there are two causes producing contrary movements. For
the thought of the friend's death or absence, inclines him
to sorrow: whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure.

442 QUESTION XXXVIII

Consequently each is modified by the other. And yet, since
the perception of the present moves more strongly than the
memory of the past, and since love of self is more per-
sistent than love of another; hence it is that, in the end,
the pleasure drives out the sorrow. Wherefore a little
further on {loc. cit.) Augustine says that his sorrow gave
way to his former pleasures.

Second Article,
whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — •

Objection i. It seems that tears do not assuage sorrow.
Because no effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans
are an effect of sorrow. Therefore they do not diminish
sorrow.

Ohj. 2. Further, just as tears or groans are an eifect of
sorrow, so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does
not lessen joy. Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow.

Ohj. 3. Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is
present to the imagination. But the image of that which
saddens us increases sorrow, just as the image of a pleasant
thing adds to joy. Therefore it seems that tears do not
assuage sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says [Conf. iv.) that when he
mourned the death of his friend, in groans and in tears alone
did. he find some little refreshment.

I answer that, Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow :
and this for two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing
hurts yet more if we keep it shut up, because the soul is
more intent on it: whereas if it be allowed to escape, the
soul's intention is dispersed as it were on outward things,
so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why when
men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show of their
sorrow, by tears or groans or even by words, their sorrow is
assuaged. — Secondly, because an action, that befits a man
according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to
him. Now tears and groans are actions befitting a man

OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN 443

who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently they become
pleasant to him. Since then, as stated above (A. i), every
pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that
sorrow is assuaged by plaints and groans.

Reply Ohj. i. The very relation of cause to effect is con-
trary to the relation between the sorrowing man and his
sorrow : because every effect agrees with its cause, and con-
sequently is pleasant to it; whereas the cause of sorrow is
disagreeable to him that sorrows. Consequently the rela-
tion of the cause of sorrow to the sorrowful is contrary
to the relation of sorrow to its cause; so that sorrow is
assuaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid con-
trariety.

Reply Ohj. 2. The relation of effect to cause is like the
relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure
in it: because in each case the one agrees with the other.
Now every like thing increases its like. Therefore joy is
increased by laughter and the other effects of joy : except
they be excessive, in which case, accidentally, they lessen it.

Reply Ohj. 3. The image of that which saddens us, con-
sidered in itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow:
yet from the very fact that a man imagines himself to be
doing that which is fitting according to his actual state, he
feels a certain amount of pleasure. For the same reason
if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed that he
thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry for it, as having done
something unbecoming to him, as Tully says {Tusc. Quaest.

iii.).

Third Article.

whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the
sympathy of friends ?

We proceed thus to the Third A rticle : —

Objection i. It seems that the sorrow of sympathizing
friends does not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries
have contrary effects. Now as Augustine says (Conf. viii.),
when many rejoice together, each one has more exuberant joy,
for they are kindled and inflamed one hy the other. Therefore,

444 QUESTION XXXVIII

in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it seems that
their sorrow is greater.

Ohj. 2. Further, friendship demands mutual love, as
Augustine declares {Conf. iv.). But a sympathizing friend
is pained at the sorrow of his friend with whom he sym-
pathizes. Consequently the pain of a sympathizing friend
becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further cause of sorrow :
so that his pain, being doubled, his sorrow seems to in-
crease.

Ohj. 3. Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a
friend, as though it affected oneself: since a friend is ones
other self {Ethic, ix.). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the
sorrow of the sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the
friend with whom he sympathizes.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, ix.) that
those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sym-
pathize with them.

I answer that, When one is in pain, it is natmral that the
sympathy of a friend should afford consolation : whereof the
Philosopher indicates a twofold reason {Ethic, ix.). The
first is because, since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is
like a weight whereof we strive to unburden ourselves: so
that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow,
it seems as though others were bearing the burden with
him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight ; w^herefore the
load of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like this
occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens. — The second and
better reason is because when a man's friends condole with
him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords him
pleasure, as stated above (Q. XXXII., A. 5). Consequently,
since every pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated above
(A. i), it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing
friend.

Reply Ohj. i. In either case there is a proof of friendship,
viz., when a man rejoices with the joyful, and w^hen he
sorrows with the sorrowful. Consequently each becomes an
object of pleasure by reason of its cause.

Reply Ohj. 2. The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause

OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN 445

of sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz., his love,
gives rise rather to pleasure.

And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.

Fourth Article.

whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the con-
templation of truth ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the contemplation of truth does
not assuage sorrow. For it is written (Eccles. i. 18) : He
that addeth knowledge addeth also sorrow (Vulg., — labour).
But knowledge pertains to the contemplation of truth.
Therefore the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow.

Obj. 2. Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the
speculative intellect. But the speculative intellect is not a
principle of movement ; as stated in De Anima iii. There-
fore, since joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it
seems that the contemplation of truth does not help to
assuage sorrow.

Obj. 3. Further, the remedy for an ailment should be
applied to the part which ails. But contemplation of truth
is in the intellect. Therefore it does not assuage bodily
pain which is in the senses.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i.) : It seemed to
me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds,
either I should not feel that pain, or at least that the pain
would seem nothing to me.

I answer that. As stated above (Q. III., A. 5), the greatest
of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth.
Now every pleasure assuages pain as stated above (A. i) :
hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sorrow,
and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom.
And therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the
contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness,
according to James i. 2: My brethren, count it all joy, when
you shall fall into divers temptations : and, what is more, even
in the midst (jf bodily tortures this joy is found; as the martyr

446 QUESTION XXXVIII

TiHirtiuSi ivhen he was walking barefoot on the burning coals,
said : Methinks, I walk on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ.
(Cf. Dominican Breviary, August lo, commemoration of
S. Tiburtius.)

Reply Obj. i. He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow,
either on account of the difficulty and disappointment in
the search of truth; or because knowledge makes man ac-
quainted with many things that are contrary to his will.
Accordingly, on the part of the things known, knowledge
causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of
truth, it causes pleasure.

Reply Obj. 2. The speculative intellect does not move the
mind on the part of the thing contemplated : but on the part
of contemplation itself, which is man's good and naturally
pleasant to him.

Reply Obj. 3. In the powers of the soul there is an over-
flow from the higher to the lower powers : and accordingly, the
pleasure of contemplation, which is in the higher part, over-
flows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses.

Fifth Article.

whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep

and baths ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that sleep and baths do not assuage
sorrow. For sorrow is in the soul : whereas sleep and baths
regard the body. Therefore they do not conduce to the
assuaging of sorrow.

Obj. 2. Further, The same effect does not seem to ensue
from contrary causes. But these, being bodily things, are
incompatible with the contemplation of truth, which is a
cause of the assuaging of sorrow, as stated above (A. 4).
Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like.

Obj. 3. Further, Sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect
the body, denote a certain transmutation of the heart.
But such remedies as these seem to pertain to the outward
senses and limbs, rather than to the interior disposition of
the heart. Therefore they do not assuage pain.

OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN 447

On the contrary, Augustine says [Conf. ix.) : I had heard
that the hath had its name* . . . from the fact of its driving
sadness from the mind. And further on, he says: / slept,
and woke up again, and found my grief not a little assuaged :
and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose (cf.
Sarum Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the
Epiphany, H^^mn for first Vespers), in which it is said that
Sleep restores the tired limbs to labour, refreshes the weary
mind, and banishes sorrow.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XXXVII., A. 4),
Sorrow, by reason of its specific nature, is repugnant to the
vital movement of the body; and consequently whatever
restores the bodily nature to its due state of vital movement,
is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. — Moreover such
remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back
to its normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is pre-
cisely in what pleasure consists, as stated above (Q. XXXI.,
A. i). Therefore, since every pleasure assuages sorrow,
sorrow is assuaged by suchlike bodily remedies.

Reply Obj. i. The normal disposition of the body, so far
as it is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently
assuages sorrow.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. XXXI., A. 8), one
pleasure hinders another; and yet every pleasure assuages
sorrow. Consequently it is not unreasonable that sorrow
should be assuaged by causes which hinder one another.

Reply Obj. 3. Every good disposition of the body reacts
somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning and end of
bodily movements, as stated in De Causa Mot. Animal, xi.

* Balneum, from the Greek ^aXavelov.

QUESTION XXXIX.

OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain
or sorrow: under which head there are four points of in-
quiry : (i) Whether all sorrow is evil ? (2) Whether sorrow
can be a virtuous good ? (3) Whether it can be a useful
good ? (4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil ?

First Article,
whether all sorrow is evil ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : — •

Objection i. It seems that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory
of Nyssa {Nemesius, De Nat., Horn, xix.) says: All sorrow
is evil, from its very nature. Now what is naturally evil, is
evil always and everywhere. Therefore all sorrow is evil.

Ohj, 2. Further, That which all, even the virtuous, avoid,
is evil. But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as
stated in Ethic, vii., though the prudent man does not aim
at pleasure, yet he aims at avoiding sorrow. Therefore sorrow
is evil.

Ohj. 3. Further, Just as bodily evil is the object and cause
of bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of
sorrow in the soul. But every bodily pain is a bodily evil.
Therefore every sorrow of the soul is an evil of the soul.

On the contrary, Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in
evil. But pleasure in evil is evil ; wherefore, in condemnation
of certain men, it is written (Pro v. ii. 14), that they are glad
when they have done evil. Therefore sorrow for evil is good.

448

GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN 449

/ answer that, A thing may be good or evil in two ways:
first considered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow
is an evil, because the mere fact of a man's appetite being
uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it
hinders the repose of the appetite in good. — Secondly, a
thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of some-
thing else : thus shame is said to be good, on the supposition
of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic, iv. Accord-
ingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or
painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain
on account of this present evil. For if he were not to be
in sorrow or pain, this could only be either because he
feels it not, or because he does not reckon it as something
unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils. Conse-
quently it is a condition of goodness, that, supposing an
evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. Wherefore
Augustine says [Gen. ad lit. viii.) : It is also a good thing
that he sorrows for the good he has lost : for had not some good
remained in his nature, he could not he punished hy the loss
of good. — Because, however, in the science of Morals, we
consider things individually, — for actions are concerned
about individuals, — that which is good hypothetically,
should be considered as good: just as that which is volun-
tary, on some supposition, is judged to be voluntary, as
stated in Ethic, iii., and likewise above (Q. VI., A. 6).

Reply Ohj. i. Gregory of Nyssa is speaking of sorrow on
the part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of
the subject that feels and rejects the evil. — And from this
point of view all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they shun evil:
but they do not shun the perception and rejection of evil. — ■
The same also applies to bodily pain : because the perception
and rejection of bodily evil is the proof of the goodness of
nature.

This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third
Objections.

II. I 29

450 QUESTION XXXIX

Second Article,
whether sorrow can be a virtuous good ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that sorrow is not a virtuous good.
For that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But,
as Augustine says [Gen. ad lit. xii.), Jacob seems to have
feared lest he should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so,
instead of entering into the rest of the blessed, be consigned
to the hell of sinners. Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous
good.

Obj. 2. Further, The virtuous good is praiseworthy and
meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the
Apostle says (2 Cor. ix. 7) : Everyone, as he hath determined
in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity. Therefore
sorrow is not a virtuous good.

Obj. 3. Further, As Augustine says [De Civ. Dei xiv.),
sorrow is concerned about those things which happen against
our will. But not to will those things which are actually
taking place, is to have a will opposed to the decree of God,
to Whose providence whatever is done is subject. Since,
then, conformity of the human to the Divine will is a con-
dition of the rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q. XIX.,
A. 9), it seems that sorrow is incompatible with rectitude
of the will, and that consequently it is not virtuous.

On the contrary, Whatever merits the reward of eternal
life is virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from
Matth. V. 5: Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be
comforted. Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good.

/ answer that, In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a
virtuous good. For it has been said above (A. i) that sorrow
is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of
evil. These two things, as regards bodily pain, are a proof
of the goodness of nature, to which it is due that the senses
perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful thing that
causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of the
evil is sometimes due to a right judgment of reason; while

GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN 451

the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well disposed
and detesting that evil. Now every virtuous good results
from these two things, the rectitude of the reason and of the
will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow may be a virtuous
good.

Reply Obj. i. All the passions of the soul should be regu-
lated according to the rule of reason, which is the root of
the virtuous good : but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine
is speaking, oversteps this rule, and therefore it fails to be a
virtuous good.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a
right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a
good is due to a perverse reason and will, which detest the
good. Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle to the
praise and merit of the virtuous good; for instance, when a
man gives an alms sorrowfully.

Reply Obj. 3. Some things do actually happen, not be-
cause God wills, but because He permits them to happen, —
such as sins. Consequently a will that is opposed to sin,
whether in oneself or in another, is not discordant from the
Divine will. — Penal evils happen actually, even by God's
will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will,
that man should will them in themselves: but only that he
should not revolt against the order of Divine justice, as
stated above (Q. XIX., A. 10).

Third Article,
whether sorrow can be a useful good ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that sorrow cannot be a useful good.
For it is written (Ecchis. xxx. 25) : Sadness hath killed
many, and there is no profit in it.

Obj. 2. Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end.
But sorrow is not an object of choice ; in fact, a thing without
sorrow is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow
{Topic, iii.). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.

Obj. 3. Further, Everything is for the sake of its own

452 QUESTION XXXIX

operation, as stated in De Ccelo ii. But sorrow hinders opera-
tion, as stated in Ethic, x. Therefore sorrow is not a useful
good.

On the contrary. The wise man seeks only that which is
useful. But according to Eccles. vii., the heart of the wise
is where there is monrning, and the heart of fools where there
is mirth. Therefore sorrow is useful.

/ answer that, A twofold movement of the appetite ensues
from a present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is
opposed to the present evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is
of no use; because that which is present, cannot be not
present. — The other movement arises in the appetite to the
effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil: and, in
this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for something which
ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for
which it may be right to avoid a thing. First, because it
should be avoided in itself, on account of its being contrary
to good; for instance, sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is
useful as inducing man to avoid sin: hence the Apostle
says (2 Cor. vii. 9) : / am glad : not because you iiuere made
sorrowful, hut because you were made sorrowful unto penance.
— Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were
evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either
through one's being attached to it, and loving it too much,
or through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an
evil, as is evident in the case of temporal goods. And, in this
respect, sorrow for temporal goods may be useful; according
to Eccles. vii. 3: It is better to go to the house of mourning,
than to the house of feasting : for in that we are put in mind
of the end of all. *

Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is
always useful, since it adds another motive for avoiding it.
Because the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided:
while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as every-
one seeks the good, and pleasure in the good. Therefore
just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more
earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more
eagerly.

GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN 453

Reply Ohj. i. This passage is to be taken as referring to
excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow
paralyzes the soul, and hinders it from shunning evil, as
stated above (Q. XXXVII., A. 2).

Reply Ohj. 2. Just as any object of choice becomes less
eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be
shunned is still more to be shunned by reason of sorrow:
and, in this respect, sorrow is useful.

Reply Ohj. 3. Sorrow caused by an action hinders that
action : but sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one
do it more earnestly.

Fourth Article,
whether bodily pain is the greatest evil ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that pain is the greatest evil. Be-
cause the worst is contrary to the best (Ethic, viii.). But a
certain pleasure is the greatest good, viz., the pleasure of
bliss. Therefore a certain pain is the greatest evil.

Ohj. 2. Further, Happiness is man's greatest good, because
it is his last end. But man's Happiness consists in his
having whatever he will, and in willing naught amiss, as stated
above (Q. III., A. 4, Ohj. 5; Q. V., A. 8, Obj. 3). Therefore
man's greatest good consists in the fulfilment of his will.
Now pain consists in something happening contrary to the
will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv.). Therefore
pain is man's greatest evil.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i.) : We
are composed of two parts, i.e. of a sottl and a body, whereof
the body is the inferior. Noin) the sovereign good is the greatest
good of the better part : while the supreme evil is the greatest
evil of the inferior part. But wisdom is the greatest good of
the soul ; while the worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore
man's greatest good is to be wise : while his greatest evil is to
suffer patn.

On the contrary, Guilt is a greater evil than pimishment
as was stated in the First Part (Q. XLVIIL, A. 6). But,

454 QUESTION XXXIX

sorrow or pain belongs to the punishment of sin, just as the
enjoyment of changeable things is an evil of guilt. For
Augustine says {De Vera Relig. xii.) : What is fain of the
soul, except for the soul to he deprived of that which it was
wont to enjoy, or had hoped to enjoy ? And this is all that
is called evil, i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin. Therefore
sorrow or pain is not man's greatest evil.

I answer that. It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to
be man's greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either
for something that is truly evil, or for something that is
apparently evil, but good in reality. Now pain or sorrow
for that which is truly evil cannot be the greatest evil: for
there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as
evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it. Again,
sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really
good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to
be altogether separated from that which is truly good.

Reply Ohj. i. Pleasure and sorrow have two good points
in common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and
evil; and the right order of the will in approving of good
and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that in pain or sorrow
there is a good, by the removal of which they become
worse : and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the
removal of which the pleasure is better. Consequently, a
pleasure can be man's highest good, in the way above stated
(Q. XXXIV., A. 3): whereas sorrow cannot be man's
greatest evil.

Reply Ohj. 2. The very fact of the will being opposed to
evil is a good. And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot
be the greatest evil; because it has an admixture of good.

Reply Ohj. 3. That which harms the better thing is worse
than that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called
evil hecauseit harms, as Augustine says {Enchirid. xii.). There-
fore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than
that which is an evil to the body. Therefore this argument
does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as his own, but
as taken from another.*

* Cornelius Celsus.

QUESTION XL.

OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF
HOPE AND DESPAIR.

[In Eight Articles.)

We must now consider the irascible passions; (i) Hope
and despair; (2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under the
first head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether
hope is the same as desire or cupidity ? (2) Whether hope
is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty ?
(3) Whether hope is in dumb animals ? (4) Whether despair
is contrary to hope ? (5) Whether experience is a cause of
hope ? (6) Whether hope abounds in young men and
drunkards ? (7) Concerning the order of hope to love ?
(8) Whether hope conduces to action ?

First Article,
whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity ?

We -proceed thus to the First A rticle : —

Objection i. It seems that hope is the same as desire or
cupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the four •
principal passions. But Augustine in setting down the
four principal passions puts cupidity in the place of hope
{De Civ. Dei xiv.). Therefore hope is the same as cupidity
or desire.

Obj. 2. Further, Passions differ according to their objects.
But the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity
or desire, viz., the future good. Therefore hope is the same
as cupidity or desire.

Obj. 3. If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes

455

456 QUESTION XL

the possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary,
whatever is accidental to the object does not make a dif-
ferent species of passions. But possibility of acquisition is
accidental to a future good, which is the object of cupidity
or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope does not differ
specifically from desire or cupidity.

On the contrary, To different powers belong different species
of passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas
desire or cupidity is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope-
differs specifically from desire or cupidity.

/ answer that, The species of a passion is taken from the
object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four con-
ditions. First, that it is something good; since,- properly
speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, hope
differs from fear, which regards evil.— Secondly, that it is
future; for hope does not regard that which is present and
already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy
which regards a present good.- — Thirdly, that it must be
something arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not
speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one's power
to have at any time : in this respect, hope differs from desire
or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely:
wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible, while hope belongs
to the irascible faculty. — Fourthly, that this difficult thing
is something possible to obtain: for one does not hope for
that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope
differs from despair. It is therefore evident that hope differs
from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the con-
cupiscible. For this reason, moreover, hope presupposes
desire: just as all the irascible passions presuppose the
passions of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above
(Q. XXV., A. I).

Reply Ohj. i. Augustine mentions desire instead of hope,
because each regards future good; and because the good
which is not arduous is reckoned as nothing : thus implying
that desire seems to tend chiefly to the arduous good, to
which hope tends likewise.

Reply Ohj. 2. The object of hope is the future good con-

HOPE AND DESPAIR 457

sidered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of
attainment, as stated above.

Reply Ohj. 3. The object of hope adds not only possi-
bility to the object of desire, but also difficulty: and this
makes hope belong to another power, viz. the irascible,
which regards something difficult, as stated in the First
Part (Q. LXXXL, A. 2). Moreover, possibility and im-
possibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the
appetitive power: because the appetite is a principle of
movement ; and nothing is moved to anything except under
the aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that
which he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope
differs from despair according to the difference of possible
and impossible.

Second Article.

whether piope is in the apprehensive or in the
appetitive power ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that hope belongs to the cognitive
power. Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting;
for the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 25) : If we hope for that which
we see not ; we wait for it with patience. But awaiting seems
to belong to the cognitive power, which we exercise by
looking out. Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power.

Ohj. 2. Further, Apparently hope is the same as confi-
dence; hence when a man hopes he is said to be confident,
as though to hope and to be confident were the same thing.
But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive
power. Therefore hope does too.

Ohj. 3. Further, Certainty is a property of the cognitive
power. But certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope
belongs to the cognitive power.

On the contrary, Hope regards good, as stated above
(A. i). Now good, as such, is not the object of the cognitive,
but of the appetitive power. Therefore hope belongs, not
to the cognitive, but to the appetitive power.

/ answer that, Since hope denotes a certain stretching out

458 QUESTION XL

of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the
appetitive power; since movement towards things belongs
properly to the appetite : whereas the action of the cognitive
power is accomplished not by a movement of the knower
towards things, but rather according as the things known
are in the knower. But since the cognitive power moves
the appetite, by presenting its object to it; there arise in
the appetite various movements according to various
aspects of the apprehended object. For the apprehension
of good gives rise to one kind of movement in the appetite,
while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another : in like
manner various movements arise from the apprehension of
something present and of something future; of something
considered absolutely, and of something considered as
arduous; of something possible, and of something impossible.
And accordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive
power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good,
difficult but possible to obtain ; namely, a stretching forth
of the appetite to such a good.

Reply Ohj. i. Since hope regards a possible good, there
arises in man a twofold movement of hope; for a thing
may be possible to him in two ways, viz. by his own power,
or by another's. Accordingly when a man hopes to obtain
something by his own power, he is not said to wait for it,
but simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is
said to await that which he hopes to get by another's help
as though to await [exspectare) implied keeping one's eyes
on another {ex alio spectare), in so far as the apprehensive
power, by going ahead, not only keeps its eye on the good
which man intends to get, but also on the thing by whose
power he hopes to get it; according to Ecclus. li. lo: /
looked for the succour of men. Wherefore the movement of
hope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the
preceding inspection of the cognitive power.

Reply Ohj. 2. When a man desires a thing and reckons
that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; and from
this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing
movement is called confidence. Because the movement of

HOPE AND DESPAIR 459

the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that pre-
cedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better known ;
for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than
that of the appetite.

Reply Ohj. 3. Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not
only of the sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus
we say that a stone is certain to tend downwards. This is
owing to the inerrancy which the movement of the sensitive
or even natural appetite derives from the certainty of the
knowledge that precedes it.

Third Article,
whether hope is in dumb animals ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that there is no hope in dumb animals.
Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says
[De Fide Orthod. ii.). But knowledge of the future is not
in the competency of dumb animals, whose knowledge is
confined to the senses and does not extend to the future.
Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.

Obj. 2. Further, The object of hope is a future good,
possible of attainment. But possible and impossible are dif-
ferences of the true and the false, which are only in the mind,
as the Philosopher states [Metaph. vi.). Therefore there is
no hope in dumb animals, since they have no mind.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says [Gen. ad lit. ix.) that
animals are moved by the things that they see. But hope is
of things unseen :/of what a man seeth, why doth he hope for .^
(Rom. viii. 24). Therefore there is no hope in dumb
animals.

On the contrary, Hope is an irascible passion. But the
irascible faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also.

/ answer that, The internal passions of animals can be
gathered from their outward movements: from which it is
clear that hope is in dumb animals. For if a dog see a hare,
or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it makes no movement
towards it, having no hope, as it were, to catch it: whereas,

46o QUESTION XL

if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in
hopes of catching it. Because, as stated above (Q. L, A. 2;
Q.XXVI., A. i; Q. XXXV., A. i), the sensitive appetite of
dumb animals, and hkewise the natural appetite of insensible
things, result from the apprehension of an intellect, just as the
appetite of the intellectual nature, which is called the will.
But there is a difference, in that the will is moved by an ap-
prehension of the intellect in the same subject; whereas the
movement of the natural appetite results from the appre-
hension of the separate Intellect, Who is the Author of
nature; as does also the sensitive appetite of dumb animals,
who act from a certain natural instinct. Consequently,
in the actions of irrational animals and of other natural
things, we observe a procedure which is similar to that
which we observe in the actions of art : and in this way hope
and despaii- are in dumb animals.

Reply Obj. i. Although dumb animals do not know the
future, yet an animal is moved by its natural instinct to
something future, as though it foresaw the future. Because
this instinct is planted in them by the Divine Intellect that
foresees the future.

Reply Obj. 2. The object of hope is not the possible as
differentiating the true, for thus the possible ensues from
the relation of a predicate to a subject. The object of hope
is the possible as compared to a power. For such is the
division of the possible given in Metaph. v., i.e., into the
two kinds we have just mentioned.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the thing which is future does not
come under the object of sight ; nevertheless through seeing
something present, an animal's appetite is moved to seek
or avoid something future.

Fourth Article,
whether despair is contrary to hope ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objectio7i I. It seems that despair is not contrary to hope.
Because to one thing there is one contrary {Metaph. x.). But

HOPE AND DESPAIR 461

fear is contrary to hope. Therefore despair is not contrary
to hope.

Ohj.2. Further, contraries seem to bear on the same thing.
But hope and despair do not bear on the same thing : since
hope regards the good, whereas despair arises from some
evil that is in the way of obtaining good. Tlierefore liope
is not contrary to despair.

Ohj. 3. Further, movement is contrary to movement;
while repose is in opposition to movement as a privation
thereof. But despair seems to imply immobility rather than
movement. Therefore it is not contrary to hope, which
implies movement of stretching out towards the hoped-for
good.

On the contrary, The very name of despair (desperatio)
implies that it is contrary to hope (spes).

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XXIIT, A. 2), there is
a twofold contrariety of movements. One is in respect of
approach to contrary terms: and this contrariety alone is
to be found in the concupiscible passions, for instance
between love and hatred. The other is according to ap-
proach and withdrawal with regard to the same term;
and is to be found in the irascible passions, as stated above
{loc. cit.). Now the object of hope, which is the arduous
good, has the character of a principle of attraction, if it
be considered in the light of something attainable ; and thus
hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach. But
in so far as it is considered as unobtainable, it has the
character of a principle of repulsion, because, as stated in
Ethic, iii., when men come to an impossibility they disperse.
And this is how despair stands in regard to this object,
wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal : and conse-
quently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is to approach.

Reply Ohj. i. Fear is contrary to hope, because their
objects, i.e. good and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety
is found in the irascible passions, according as they ensue
from the passions of the concupiscible. But despair is con-
trary to hope, only by contrariety of approach and with-
drawal.

462 QUESTION XL

Reply Ohj. 2. Despair does not regard evil as such; some-
times, however, it regards evil accidentally, as making the
difficult good impossible to obtain. But it can arise from
the mere excess of good.

Reply Ohj. 3. Despair implies not only privation of hope,
but also a recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its
being esteemed impossible to get. Hence despair, like hope,
presupposes desire ; because we neither hope for nor despair
of that which we do not desire to have. For this reason, too,
each of them regards the good, which is the object of
desire.

Fifth Article,
whether experience is a cause of hope ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that experience is not a cause of
hope. Because experience belongs to the cognitive power;
wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic, ii.) that intellectual
virtue needs experience and time. But hope is not in the
cognitive power, but in the appetite, as stated above (A. 2).
Therefore experience is not a cause of hope.

Ohj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.) that the
old are slow to hope, on account of their experience ; whence it
seems to follow that experience causes want of hope. But
the same cause is not productive of opposites. Therefore
experience is not a cause of hope.

Ohj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says {De Ccelo ii.) that
to have something to say ahout everything, without leaving
anything out, is sometimes a proof of folly. But to attempt
everything seems to point to great hopes ; while folly arises
from inexperience. Therefore inexperience, rather than
experience, seems to be a cause of hope.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii.) some are
hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many
opponents : which seems to pertain to experience. Therefore
experience is a cause of hope.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. i), the object of hope
is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Conse-

HOPE AND DESPAIR 463

quently a thing may be a cause of hope, either because it
makes something possible to a man: or because it makes
him think something possible. In the first way hope is
caused by ever3rthing that increases a man's power; e.g.
riches, strength, and, among others, experience: since by
experience man acquires the possibility of getting some-
thing easily, and the result of this is hope. Wherefore
Vegetius says (De Re Milit.): No one fears to do that which
he is sure of having learnt welL

In the second way, hope is caused by everything that
makes man think that he can obtain something: and thus
both teaching and persuasion may be a cause of hope. And
then again experience is a cause of hope, in so far as it
makes him reckon something possible, which before his ex-
perience he looked upon as impossible. — 'However, in this
way, experience can cause a lack of hope: because just as it
makes a man think possible what he had previously thought
impossible; so, conversely, experience makes a man con-
sider as impossible that which hitherto he had thought
possible. Accordingly experience causes hope in two ways;
despair in one way : and for this reason we may say rather
that it causes hope.

Reply Ohj. i. Experience in matters pertaining to action
not only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit,
by reason of custom, which renders the action easier. More-
over, the intellectual virtue itself adds to the possibility of
acting with ease : because it shows something to be possible ;
and thus is a cause of hope.

Reply Ohj. 2. The old are wanting in hope because of their
experience, in so far as experience makes them think some-
thing impossible. Plence he adds (ibid.) that many evils
have befallen them.

Reply Obj. 3. Folly and inexperience can be a cause of
hope accidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge
which would help one to judge truly a thing to be impossible.
Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope, for the same
reason, as experience causes lack of hope.

464 QUESTION XL

Sixth Articlp:.

whether hope abounds in young men and
drunkards ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that youth and drunkenness are not
causes of hope. Because hope impHes certainty and steadi-
ness; so much so that it is compared to an -anchor (Heb. vi.
19). But young men and dnmkards are wanting in steadi-
ness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore youth
and drunkenness are not causes of hope.

Obj. 2. Further, as stated above (A. 5), the cause of hope
is chiefly whatever increases one's power. But youth and
drunkenness are united to weakness. Therefore they are
not causes of hope.

Obj. 3. Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated
above (A. 5). But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is
not a cause of hope.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii.) that
drunken men are hopeful : and {Rhet. ii.) that the young are
full of hope.

I answer that, Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons,
as the Philosopher states in Rhet. iii. : and these three reasons
may be gathered from the three conditions of the good
which is the object of hope — namely, that it is future,
arduous and possible, as stated above (A. i). For youth
has much of the future before it, and little of the past: and
therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the future,
it has little to remember, and lives very much in hope. —
Again, youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are
full of spirit; so that their heart expands: and it is owing
to the heart being expanded that one tends to that which is
arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful. — Like-
wise, they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience
of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing
possible to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience
of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a

HOPE AND DESPAIR 465

thing possible; and consequently are of good hope. Two
of these causes are also in those who are under the influence
of drink — viz., heat and high spirits, on account of wine,
and heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. — For the
same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons attempt
everything and are full of hope.

Reply Ohj. i. Although youths and those who are under
the influence of drink, lack steadiness in reality, yet they are
steady in their own estimation, for they think that they will
steadily obtain that which they hope for.

In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must
observe that young people and those who are under the
influence of drink, are indeed unsteady in reality: but, in
their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not
their shortcomings.

Reply Ohj. 3. Not only experience, but also lack of ex-
perience, is, in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above.

Seventh Article,
whether hope is a cause of love ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —

Objection i. It seems that hope is not a cause of love.
Because, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv.), love is
the first of the soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of
the soul. Therefore love precedes hope, and consequently
hope does not cause love.

Ohj. 2. Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is
caused by love, as stated above (Q. XXV., A. 2). Therefore
hope, too, follows love, and consequently is not its cause.

Ohj. 3. Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above
(Q. XXXII., A. 3). But pleasure is only of the good that
is loved. Therefore love precedes hope.

On the contrary, The gloss commenting on Matth. i. 2,
Ahraham hegot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob, says, i.e., faith
begets hope, and hope begets charity. But charity is love.
Therefore love is caused by hope.

/ answer that, Hope can regard two things. For it regards

11. I , 30

466 QUESTION XL

as its object, the good which one hopes for. But since the
good we hope for is something difficult but possible to
obtain; and since it happens sometimes that what is difficult
becomes possible to us, not through ourselves but through
others; hence it is that hope regards also that by which
something becomes possible to us.

In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get,
it is caused by love : since we do not hope save for that which
we desire and love. — But in so far as hope regards one
through whomx something becomes possible to us, love is
caused by hope, and not vice versa. Because by the very
fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through some-
one, we are moved towards him as to our own good; and
thus we begin to love him. Whereas from the fact that we
love someone we do not hope in him, except accidentally,
that is, in so far as we think that he returns our love.
Wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope
in him ; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have
in him.

Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.

Eighth Article,
whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that hope is not a help but a hin-
drance to action. Because hope implies security. But
security begets negligence which hinders action. Therefore
hope is a hindrance to action.

Obj. 2. Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above
(Q. XXXVII. , A. 3). But hope sometimes causes sorrow:
for it is written (Pro v. xiii. 12) Hope that is deferred afflict eth
the soul. Therefore hope hinders action.

Obj. 3. Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated
above (A. 4). But despair, especially in matters of war,
conduces to action; for it is written (2 Kings ii. 26), that
it is dangerous to drive people to despair. Therefore hope
has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action.

HOPE AND DESPAIR 467

On the contrary, It is written (i Cor. ix. 10) that he that
ploitgheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit : and iLe
same applies to all other actions.

I answer that, Hope of its very nature is a help to action
by making it more intense: and this for two reasons. First,
by reason of its object, which is a good, difficult but possible.
For the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention ;
while the thought that it is possible is no drag on our effort.
Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is intent on his
action. Secondly, on account of its effect. Because hope,
as stated above (Q. XXXII. , A. 3), causes pleasure; which
is a help to action, as stated above (Q. XXXIII., A. 4).
Therefore hope is conducive to action.

Reply Ohj. i. Hope regards a good to be obtained;
security regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security
seems to be contrary to fear rather than to belong to hope.
Yet security does not beget negligence, save in so far as it
lessens the idea of difficulty: whereby it also lessens the
character of hope: for the things in which a man fears no
hindrance, are no longer looked upon as difficult.

Reply Ohj. 2. Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by acci-
dent that it causes sorrow, as stated above (Q. XXXII.,
A. 3 ad 2).

Reply Ohj. 3. Despair threatens danger in war, on account
of a certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair
of flight, strive less to fly, but hope to avenge their death :
and therefore in this hope they fight the more bravely, and
consequently prove dangerous to the foe.

QUESTION XLI.

OF FEAR, IN ITSELF.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider, in the first place, fear ; and, secondly,
daring. With regard to fear, four things must be considered :
(i) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether fear is a passion of the soul ? (2) Whether fear
is a special passion ? (3) Whether there is a natural fear ?
(4) Of the species of fear.

First Article,
whether fear is a passion of the soul ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that fear is not a passion of the soul.
For Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iii.) that fear is a
power, by way of avo-ToX')] — i.e., of contraction — desirous of
vindicating nature. But no virtue is a passion, as is proved
in Ethic, ii. Therefore fear is not a passion.

Obj. 2. Further, every passion is an effect due to the
presence of an agent. But fear is not of something present,
but of something future, as Damascene declares {De Fide
Orthod. ii.). Therefore fear is not a passion.

Obj. 3. Further, every passion of the soul, is a movement
of the sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension
of the senses. But sense apprehends, not the future but
the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it seems
that it is not a passion of the soul.

On the contrary, Augustine [De Civ. Dei xiv.) reckons fear
among the other passions of the soul.

468

OF FEAR, IN ITSELF 469

/ answer that. Among the other passions of the soul, after
sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of passion. For as we
have stated above (Q. XXII.), the notion of passion implies
first of all a movement of a passive power — i.e., of a power
whose object is compared to it as its active principle: since
passion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both to feel
and to understand are passions. Secondly, more properly
speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive power;
and mxore properly still, it is a movem.ent of an appetitive
power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accom-
panied by a bodily transmutation. And, again, most
properly those movements are called passions, which imply
some deterioration. Now it is evident that fear, since it
regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself
regards good and evil. Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive
appetite : for it is accompanied by a certain transmutation —
i.e., contraction — as Damascene says [cf. Ohj. i). Again,
it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some
particular good. Wherefore it has most properly the char-
acter of passion ; less, however, than sorrow, which regards
the present evil: because fear regards future evil, which is
not so strong a motive as present evil.

Reply Ohj. i. Virtue denotes a principle of action: where-
fore, in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive
faculty are principles of external action, they are called
virtues. But the Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue
by way of habit.

Reply Ohj. 2. Just as the passion of a natural body is due
to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the
soul due to the agent being present to the soul, although
neither corporally nor really present : that is to say, in so far
as the evil which is really future, is present in the appre-
hension of the soul.

Reply Ohj. 3 . The senses do not apprehend the future : but
from apprehending the present, an animal is moved by
natural instinct to hope for a future good, or to fear a future
evil.

470 QUESTION XLI

Second Article,
whether fear is a special passion ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that fear is not a special passion.
For Augustine says (Qq. 83) that the man who is not dis-
traught by fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor woitnded
by sickness — i.e., sorrow — nor tossed about in transports of
empty joys. Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all
the other passions are removed. Therefore fear is not a
special but a general passion.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic, vi.) that
pursuit and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and
denial are in the intellect. But denial is nothing special in
the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but something
common to many. Therefore neither is avoidance anything
special in the appetite. But fear is nothing but a kind of
avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a special passion.

Obj. 3. Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be
chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the con-
cupiscible: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii.) th.d± fear is
a kind of sorrow ; and Damascene says {pe Fide Orthod. iii.)
that fear is a power of desire : and both sorrow and desire
are in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Q. XXIII.,
A. 4). Therefore fear is not a special passion, since it
belongs to different powers.

On the contrary. Fear is condivided with the other passions
of the soul, as is clear from Damascene [De Fide Orthod. ii).

I answer that, The passions of the soul derive their species
from their objects: hence that is a special passion, which has
a special object. Now fear has a special object, as hope
has. For just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult
but possible to obtain; so the object of fear is a future evil,
difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear is a special
passion.

Reply Obj. i. All the passions of the soul arise from one
source, viz., love, wherein they are connected with one

OF FEAR, IN ITSELF 471

another. By reason of this connection, when fear is put
aside, the other passions of the soul are dispersed; not
however, as though it were a general passion.

Reply Ohj. 2. Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear,
but avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefoie,
though avoidance be something common, yet fear is a special
passion.

Reply Ohj. 3. Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it
regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so
as to be almost unavoidable. But since the irascible pas-
sions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty,
and terminate therein, as stated above (Q. XXV., A. i) ;
hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed
to fear. For fear is called sorrow^ in so far as the object
of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the Philoso-
pher says [loc. cit.) that fear Sivises from the representation of
a future evil which is either corruptive or painful. In like
manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because
just as hope arises from the desire of good, so fear arises from
avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the
desire of good, as is evident from what has been said above
(Q. XXV., A. 2; Q. XXIX., A. 2; Q. XXXVI. , A. 2).

Third Article,
whether there is a natural fear ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that there is a natural fear. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. iii.) that there is a natural
fear, through the soul refusing to he severed from the hody.

Ohj. 2. Further, fear arises from love, as stated above
(A. 2). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius states
{Div. Nom. iv.). Therefore there is also a natural fear.

Ohj. 3. Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above
(Q. XL., A. 4. ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is
evident from Rom. iv. 18, where it is said of Abraham that
against hope of nature, he helieved in hope of grace. There-
fore there is also a fear of nature.

472 QUESTION XLI

On the contrary, That which is natural is common to things
animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate.
Therefore there is no natural fear.

/ answer that, A movement is said to be natural, because
nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways.
First, so that it is entirely accomplished by nature, without
any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to have an
upward movement is natural to fire, and to grow is the
natural movement of animals and plants.— Secondly, a
movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines thereto,
though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty
alone: since, as stated above (Q. X., A. i), the movements of
the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to nature
as to their first principle. In this way, even the acts of the
apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, and
remembering, as well as the movements of the animal
appetite, are sometimes said to be natural.

And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear ;
and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of
the diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii.), there is a fear of corriiptive evil, which nature
shrinks from on account of its natural desire to exist; and
such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a fear of
painful evil, which is repugnant not to nature, but to the
desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In this
sense we have stated above (Q. XXVI., A. i; Q. XXX.
A. 3; Q. XXXI., A. 7) that love, desire, and pleasure are
divisible into natural and non-natural.

But in the first sense of the word nattiral, we must observe
that certain passions are sometimes said to be natural, as
love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called
natural. The reason of this is because love and hatred,
desire and avoidance, imply a certain inclination to pursue
what is good or to avoid what is evil ; which inclination is to
be found in the natural appetite also. Consequently there
is a natural love ; while we may also speak of desire and hope
as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. — On
the other hand, the other passions of the soul denote certain

OF FEAR, IN ITSELF 473

movements, whereto the natural inchnation is nowise
sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or
knowledge is essential to these passions (thus we have said
that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and
sorrow), w^herefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be
said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful : or else it is because
suchlike movements are contrary to the very nature of
natural inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on
account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelhng a
contrary evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination
of nature. Wherefore suchlike passions are in no way
ascribed to inanimate beings.
Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.

Fourth Article,
whether the species of fear are suitably assigned ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the species of fear are un-
suitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii.);
namely, laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor,
and anxiety. Because, as the Philosopher says [Rhet. ii.),
fear regards a saddening evil. Therefore the species of fear
should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are
four species of sorrow, as stated above (Q. XXV., A. 8).
Therefore there should only be four species of fear corre-
sponding to them.

Ohj. 2. Further, that which consists in an action of our
own is in our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses
our power, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore laziness,
shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions,
should not be reckoned as species of fear.

Ohj. 3. Further, fear is of the future, as stated above
(AA. I, 2). But shame regards a disgraceful deed already
done, as Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Horn, xx.)
says. Therefore shame is not a species of fear.

Ohj. 4. Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and
stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or

474 QUESTION XLI

evil. Therefore amazement and stupor are not species of
fear.

Obj. 5. Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement
to seek the truth, as stated at the beginning of Metaph.
But fear leads to flight rather than to search. Therefore
amazement is not a species of fear.

On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and
Gregory of Nyssa [cf. Ohjs. i, 3).

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 2), fear regards a future
evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that
it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be
considered either in his action or in external things. In his
action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, there is the toil
that burdens his nature: and hence arises laziness, as when
a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil. — Secondly,
there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of
others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet
to be done, there is shamefacedness ; if, however, it be in a
deed already done, there is shame.

On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things
may surpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways.
First by reason of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a
man considers some great evil the extent of which he is
unable to gauge: and then there is amazement. — Secondly,
by reason of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some
unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great
in our estimation : and then there is stupor, which is caused
by the representation of something unwonted. — Thirdly, by
reason of its being unforeseen; because, to wit, it cannot be
foreseen : thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this
kind is called anxiety.

Reply Obj. 1. Those species of sorrow given above are
not derived from the diversit}^ of objects, but from the
diversity of effects, and for certain special reasons. Conse-
quently there is no need for those species of sorrow to corre-
spond with these species of fear, which are derived from the
proper division of the object of fear itself.

Reply Obj. 2. A deed considered as being actually done.

OF FEAR, IN ITSELF 475

is in the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into
consideration something connected with the deed, and sur-
passing the faculty of the doer, for which reason he shrinks
from the deed. It is in this sense that laziness, shamefaced-
ness, and shame are reckoned as species of fear.

Reply Ohj. 3. The past deed may be the occasion of fear
of future reproach or disgrace : and in this sense shame is a
species of fear.

Reply Ohj. 4. Not every amazement and stupor are species
of fear ; but that amazement which is caused by a great evil,
and that stupor which arises from an unwonted evil. — Or
else we may say that, just as laziness shrinks from the toil
of external work, so amazement and stupor shrink from the
difficulty of considering a great and unwonted thing, whether
good or evil : so that amazement and stupor stand in relation
to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to external work.

Reply Ohj. 5. He who is amazed shrinks at present from
forming a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to
fall short of the truth, but inquires into the future: whereas
he w^ho is overcome by stupor both fears to judge at present,
and to inquire into the future. Wherefore amazement is a
beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a
hindrance thereto.

QUESTION XLII.

OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR.

{In Six Articles. )

We must now consider the object of fear: under which head
there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether good or evil is
the object of fear ? (2) Whether evil of nature is the object
of fear ? (3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear ?
(4) Whether fear itself can be feared ? (5) Whether sudden
things are especially feared ? (6) Whether those things are
more feared against which there is no remedy ?

First Article,
whether the object of fear is good or evil ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that good is the object of fear. For
Augustine says (Qq. 83) that we fear nothing save to lose
what we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we
hope for. But that which we love is good. Therefore fear
regards good as its proper object.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii.) that power
and to be above another is a thing to be feared. But this is a
good thing. Therefore good is the object of fear.

Obj. 3. Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are
commanded to fear God, according to Ps. xxxiii. 10: Fear
the Lord, all ye saints. Therefore even the good is an object
of fear.

On the contrary, Damascene says [De Fide Orthod. ii.) that
fear is of future evil.

I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power.

476

OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR 477

Now it belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to
avoid, as stated in Ethic, vi. : and pursuit is of good, while
avoidance is of evil. Consequently whatever movement of
the appetitive power implies pursuit, has some good for its
object: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an
evil for its object. Wherefore, since fear denotes an avoid-
ance, in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil
as its proper object.

It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referrible
to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch
as an evil causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from
the very fact that it is a privation of some good. Wherefore,
since evil is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is
shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues
through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says
that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love.

In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause :
in so far as some good can by its power bring harm to the
good we love: and so, just as hope, as stated above (Q. XL.,
A. 7), regards two things, namely, the good to which it
tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of obtain-
ing the desired good; so also does fear regard two things,
namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good, which
by its power, can inflict that evil. In this way God is feared
by man, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual
or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the power of man;
especially when it has been thwarted, or when it is unjust,
because then it is more likely to do us a harm.

In like manner one fears to he over another, i.e., to lean on
another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm : thus a
man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime,
lest he reveal it to others.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

478 QUESTION XLII

Second Article,
whether evil of nature is an object of fear ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It. seems that evil of nature is not an object
of fear. For the Philosopher says [Rhet. ii.) ihditfear makes
us take counsel. But we do not take counsel about things
which happen naturally, as stated in Ethic, iii. Therefore
evil of nature is not an object of fear.

Ohj. 2. Further, natural defects such as death and the
like are always threatening man. If therefore suchlike
evils were an object of fear, man would needs be always in
fear.

Ohj. 3. Further, nature does not move to contraries.
But evil of nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man
shrinks from suchlike evils through fear thereof, this is not
an effect of nature. Therefore natural fear is not of the
evil of nature; and yet it seems that it should be.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii.) that the
most terrible of all things is death, which is an evil of nature.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.), fear is
caused by the imagination of a future evil which is either
corruptive or painful. Now just as a painful evil is that
which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that
which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil of nature.
Consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear.

But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes
arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of
nature, not merely from being a privation of the good of
nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are
natural death and other like defects. But sometimes evil
of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent
death inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of nature
is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not.
For since fear arises /row the imagination of future evil, as the
Philosopher says [loc. cit.), whatever removes the imagina-
tion of the future evil, removes fear also. Now it may

OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR 479

happen in two ways that an evil, considered as future, may
not seem great. First, through being remote and far off:
for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered
as though it were not to be at all. Hence we either do not
fear it, or fear it but little: for, as the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii.), we do not fear things that are very far off ; since all
know that they shall die, hut as death is not near, they heed it
not. — Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it were
not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we
look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher
says (Rhet. ii.) that those who are already on the scaffold, are
not afraid, seeing that they are on the very point of a death
from which there is no escape; hiit in order that a man he
afraid, there must he some hope of escape for him.

Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not
apprehended as future: but if evil of nature, that is cor-
ruptive, be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some
hope of escape, then it will be feared.

Reply Ohj. i. The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect
of nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of
nature, although it may be impossible to avoid it entirely,
yet it may be possible to delay it. And with this hope
one may take counsel about avoiding it.

Reply Ohj. 2. Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet
it does not always threaten from near at hand: and conse-
quently it is not always feared.

Reply Ohj. 3. Death and other defects of nature are the
effects of the common nature ; and yet the individual nature
rebels against them as far as it can. Accordingly, from the
inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow
for suchlike evils, when present; fear when threatening in
the future.

Third Article,
whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Ohjection i. It seems that the evil of sin can be an object
of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of

48o QUESTION XLII

John [Tract, ix.), that by chaste fear man J ears to he severed
from God. Now nothing but sin severs us from God; accord-
ing to Isa. lix. 2: Your iniquities have divided between you
and your God. Therefore the evil of sin can be an object
of fear.

Obj. 2. Further, Tully says [QucBst. Tusc. iv.) that we

fear when they are yet to come, those things which give us fain

when they are present. But it is possible for one to be pained

or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin. Therefore one

can also fear the evil of sin.

Obj. 3. Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good
of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher
declares [Ethic, ix.) : and the Apostle says (Gal. v. 10):
/ have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will not be of
another mind. Therefore fear can regard evil of sin.

Obj. 4. Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above
(Q. XLL, A. 4). But shame regards a disgraceful deed,
which is an evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says [Rhet. ii.) that not
all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow,

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XL., A. i; Q. XLL,
A. 2), while the object of hope is a future good difficult but
possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil,
arduous and not to be easily avoided. From this we may
gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and
will, is not an object of fear; and that nothing gives rise to
fear save what is due to an external cause. Now human will
is the proper cause of the evil of sin: and consequently evil
of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear.

But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an
extrinsic cause: if this cause have a strong power of in-
clination, in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin,
in so far as it arises from that extrinsic cause: as when
he fears to dwell in the company of wicked men, lest he be
led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus
disposed, fears the being led astray rather than the sin con-
sidered in its proper nature, i.e., as a voluntary act; for
considered in this light it is not an object of fear to him.

OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR 481

Reply Ohj. i. Separation from God is a punishment re-
sulting from sin: and every punishment is, in some way,
due to an extrinsic cause.

Reply Ohj. 2. Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since
each regards evil: they differ, however, in two points.
First, because sorrow is about present evil, whereas fear is
of future evil. Secondly, because sorrow, being in the con-
cupiscible faculty, regards evil absolutely; wherefore it can
be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear, being in
the irascible part, regards evil wdth the addition of a certain
arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so far
as a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things
that give us pain when they are present, make us fear when
they are yet to come, but only some things, namely, those
that are difficult.

Reply Ohj. 3. Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now
one may obtain a good either of oneself, or through another :
and so, hope may be of an act of virtue, which lies within
our own power. On the other hand, fear is of an evil that
does not lie in our own power: and consequently the evil
which is feared is always from an extrinsic cause; while the
good, that is hoped for, may be both from an intrinsic and
from an extrinsic cause.

Reply Ohj. 4. As stated above (Q. XLL, A. 4 ad 2, 3),
shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace
or ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is due to an
extrinsic cause.

Fourth Article.

whether fear itself can be feared ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that fear cannot be feared. For
whatever is feared, is prevented from being lost, through
fear thereof: thus a man who fears to lose his health, keeps
it, through fearing its loss. If therefore a man be afraid
of fear, he will keep himself from fear by being afraid:
which seems absurd.

Ohj. 2. Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing

II. I 31

482 QUESTION XLII

flies from itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of
fear.

Ohj. 3. Further, fear is about the future. But fear is
present to him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the
object of his fear.

On the contrary, A man can love his own love, and can
grieve at his own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he
can fear his own fear.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 3), nothing can be an
object of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but
not that which ensues from our own will. Now fear arises
partly from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the
will. It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far as it is a passion
resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil. In this
sense it is possible for fear to be the object of fear, i.e., a
man may fear lest he should be threatened by the necessity
of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil. — It
is subject to the will, in so far as the lower appetite obeys
reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this
sense fear cannot be the object of fear, as Augustine says
(Qq. 83). Lest, however, anyone make use of his argu-
ments, in order to prove that fear cannot at all be the
object of fear, we must add a solution to the same.

Reply Ohj. i. Not every fear is identically the same;
there are various fears according to the various objects of
fear. Nothing, then, prevents a man from keeping himself
from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so that the fear
which he has preserves him from the fear which he has not.

Reply Ohj. 2. Since fear of an imminent evil is not iden-
tical with the fear of the fear of an imminent evil ; it does not
follow that a thing flies from itself, or that it is the same
flight in both cases.

Reply Ohj. 3. On account of the various kinds of fear
already alluded to [ad 2) a man's present fear may have
a future fear for its object.

OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR 483

Fifth Article,
whether sudden things are especially feared ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that unwonted and sudden things
are not especially feared. Because, as hope is about good
things, so fear is about evil things. But experience con-
duces to the increase of hope in good things. Therefore it
also adds to fear in evil things.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says [Rhet. ii.) that
those are feared most, not who are quick-tempered, hut who are
gentle and cunning. Now it is clear that those who are
quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions.
Therefore sudden things are less to be feared.

Ohj. 3. Further, we think less about things that happen
suddenly. But the more we think about a thing, the
more we fear it; hence the Philosopher says [Ethic, iii.) that
some appear to he courageous through ignorance, hut as soon as
they discover that the case is different from what they expected,
they run away. Therefore sudden things are feared less.

On the contrary, Augustine says {Conf. ii.) : Fear is startled
at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things heloved,
and takes forethought for their safety.

I answer that. As stated above (A. 3; Q. XLL, A. 2), the
object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled,
but with difficulty. Now this is due to one of two causes:
to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that
fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce to both
of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to seem
greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil,
the more we consider them, the smaller they seem. Conse-
quently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in
course of time, as Tully states (QucFst. Tusc. iii.); so, too,
fear of a future evil, is diminished by thinking about it
beforehand. — Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness in-
crease the weakness of him that fears, in so far as they deprive
him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide

484 QUESTION XLII

himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil
taking him by surprise.

Reply Ohj. i. The object of hope is a good that it is
possible to obtain. Consequently whatever increases a
man's power, is of a nature to increase hope, and, for the
same reason, to diminish fear, since fear is about an evil
which cannot be easily repelled. Since, therefore, experi-
ence increases a man's power of action, therefore, as it
increases hope, so does it diminish fear.

Reply Ohj. 2. Those who are quick-tempered do not hide
their anger; wherefore the harm they do others is not so
sudden, as not to be foreseen. On the other hand, those
who are gentle or cunning hide their anger; wherefore the
harm which may be impending from them, cannot be fore-
seen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the
Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others.

Reply Ohj. 3. Bodily good or evil, considered in itself,
seems greater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is
more obvious when seen in juxtaposition with its contrary.
Hence when a man passes unexpectedly from penury to
wealth, he thinks more of his wealth on account of his
previous poverty: while, on the other hand, the rich man
who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty all the more dis-
agreeable. For this reason sudden evil is feared more,
because it seems more to be evil. — However, it may happen
through some accident that the greatness of some evil is
hidden; for instance if the foe hides himself in ambush:
and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear through
being thought much about.

Sixth Article.

whether those things are more feared, for which
there is no remedy ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that those things are not more to be
feared, for which there is no remedy. Because it is a con-
dition of fear, that there be some hope of safety, as stated

OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR 485

above (A. 2). But an evil that cannot be remedied leaves
no hope of escape. Therefore such things are not feared
at all.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death:
since, in the natural course of things, there is no return from
death to life. And yet death is not the most terrible thing
of all, as the Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.). Therefore those
things are not feared most, for which there is no remedy.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic, i.) that a
thing which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one
day : nor is that which lasts for ever any better than that which
is not everlasting : and the same applies to evil. But things
that cannot be remedied seem to differ from other things,
merely in the point of their lasting long or for ever. Conse-
quently they are not therefore any more to be feared.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says [Rhet. ii.) that those
things are most to be feared which le^hen done iiDrong cannot
be flit right, . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not
easy.

I answer that, The object of fear is evil: consequently
whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of
fear. Now evil is increased not only in its species of evil,
but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above
(Q. XVIII., A. 3). And of all the circumstances, long-
lastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the
greatest bearing on the increase of evil. Because things
that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to the
duration of time : wherefore if it be an evil to suffer some-
thing for a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil
doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time
And, accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an infinite
length of time, i.e., for ever, implies, so to speak, an infinite
increase. Now those evils which, after they have come,
cannot be remedied at all, or at least not easily, are consi-
dered as lasting for ever or for a long time : for which reason
they inspire the greatest fear.

Reply Obj. i. Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by
which a future evil is warded off from coming. If such a

486 QUESTION XLII

remedy be removed, there is an end to hope and conse-
quently to fear ; wherefore we do not speak now of remedies
of that kind. The other remedy is one by which an already
present evil is removed : and of such a remedy we speak now.

Reply Ohj. 2. Although death be an evil without remedy,
yet, since it threatens not from near, it is not feared, as
stated above (A. 2).

Reply Ohj. 3. The Philosopher is speaking there of things
that are good in themselves, i.e., good specifically. And
suchlike good is no better for lasting long or for ever: its
goodness depends on its very nature.

QUESTION XLIIl.

OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR.

[In Two Articles.)

We must now consider the cause of fear : under which head
there are two points of inquiry : (i) Whether love is the cause
of fear ? (2) Whether defect is the cause of fear ?

First Article,
whether love is the cause of fear ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that love is not the cause of fear.
For that which leads to a thing is its cause, ^wtfear leads
to the love of charity as Augustine says on the canonical
epistle of John {Tract, ix.). Therefore fear is the cause of
love, and not conversely.

Ohj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.) that
those are feared most from whom we dread the advent of some
evil. But the dread of evil being caused by someone, makes
us hate rather than love him. Therefore fear is caused by
hate rather than by love.

Ohj. 3. Further, it has been stated above (Q. XLIL, A. 3)
that those things which occur by our own doing are not
fearful. But that which we do from love, is done from our
inmost heart. Therefore fear is not caused by love.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83) : There can he no
doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we
lovey when we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope
for. Therefore all fear is caused by our loving something:
and consequently love is the cause of fear.

487

488 • QUESTION XLIIT

/ answer that, The objects of the soul's passions stand in
relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial:
because the passions of the soul take their species from
their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms.
Therefore, just as whatever is a cause of the form, is a cause
of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause,
in any way whatever, of the object, is a cause of the passion.
Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either by way
of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus
the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and
conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the
conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or appre-
hension of that good thing; while its cause by way of
material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition by
reason of which this conjoined good becomes suitable or is
apprehended as such.

Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of
fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand
and difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict
such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and,
consequently, of fear itself. While that which renders a
man so disposed that a thing is such an evil to him, is a
cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposition.
And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his
loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that
good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as
an evil.

Reply Ohj. i. As stated above (Q. XLII., A. i), fear, of
itself and in the first place, regards the evil from which it
recoils as being contrary to some loved good : and thus fear,
of itself, is born of love. — But, in the second place, it regards
the cause from which that evil ensues: so that sometimes,
accidentally, fear gives rise to love; in so far as, for instance,
through fear of God's punishments, man keeps His com-
mandments, and thus begins to hope, while hope leads to
love, as stated above (Q. XL., A. 7).

Reply Ohj. 2. He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed
hated at first; but afterwards, when once we begin to hope

OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR 489

for good from him, we begin to love him. But the good,
the contrary evil of which is feared, was loved from the
beginning.

Reply Ohj. 3. This argument is true of that which is the
efficient cause of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes
fear by way of material disposition, as stated above.

Second Article,
whether defect is the cause of fear ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that defect is not a cause of fear.
Because those who are in power are very much to be feared.
But defect is contrary to power. Therefore defect is not
a cause of fear.

Ohj. 2. Further, the defect of those who are already being
executed is extreme. But suchlike do not fear as stated in
Rhet. ii. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.

Ohj. 3. Further, men compete with one another from
strength not from defect. But those who contend fear those
who contend with them (Rhet. ii.). Therefore defect is not a
cause of fear.

On the contrary, Contraries ensue from contrary causes.
But wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive
fear away [Rhet. ii.) . Therefore fear is caused by lack of these.

I answer that. As stated above (A. i), fear may be set down
to a twofold cause : one is by way of a material disposition,
on the part of him that fears ; the other is by way of efficient
cause, on the part of the person feared. As to the first then,
some defect is, of itself, the cause of fear : for it is owing to
some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a
threatening evil. And yet, in order to cause fear, this defect
must be according to a measure. For the defect which
causes fear of a future evil, is less than the defect caused by
evil present, which is the object of sorrow. And still greater
would be the defect, if perception of the evil, or love of the
good whose contrary is feared, were entirely absent.

But as to the second, power and strength are, of them-

490 QUESTION XLIll

selves, the cause of fear: because it is owing to the fact that
the cause apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its
effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen, however, in
this respect, that some defect causes fear accidentally, in
so far as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt
another; for instance, by reason of injustice, or because that
other has already done him a harm, or because he fears to
be harmed by him.

Reply Ohj. i. This argument is true of the cause of fear,
on the part of the efficient cause.

Reply Ohj. 2. Those who are already being executed, are
actually suffering from a present evil; wherefore their
defect exceeds the measure of fear.

Reply Ohj. 3. Those who contend with one another are
afraid, not on account of the power which enables them
to contend : but on account of the lack of power, owing to
which they are not confident of victory.

QUESTION XLIV.

OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the effects of fear : under which head
there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether fear causes
contraction ? (2) Whether it makes men suitable for
counsel ? (3) Whether it makes one tremble ? (4) Whether
it hinders action ?

First Article,
whether fear causes contraction ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that fear does not cause contraction.
For when contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits
are withdrawn inwardly. But accumulation of heat and
vital spirits in the interior parts of the body, dilates the heart
unto endeavours of daring, as may be seen in those who are
angered: while the contrary happens in those who are
afraid. Therefore fear does not cause contraction.

Ohj. 2. Further, when, as a result of contraction, the
vital spirits and heat are accumulated in the interior
parts, man cries out, as may be seen in those who are
in pain. But those who fear utter nothing : on the con-
trary they lose their speech. Therefore fear does not
cause contraction.

Ohj. 3. Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above
(Q. XLI., A. 4). But those who are ashamed blush, as Tully
{Quaest. Tusc. iv.), and the Philosopher (Ethic, iv.) observe.
But blushing is an indication, not of contraction, but

491

492 QUESTION XLIV

of the reverse. Therefore contraction is not an effect of
fear.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. iii.)
that fear is a power according to avaroXr], i.e., contrac-
tion.

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. XXVIIL, A. 5), in the
passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of
the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the
material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate ;
and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resem-
blance to and the very nature of the appetitive movement.
Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies
a certain contraction : the reason of which is that fear arises
from the imagination of some threatening evil which is
difficult to repel, as stated above (Q. XLL, A. 2). But that
a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated
above (Q. XLIIL, A. 2): and the weaker a power is, the
fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the
very imagination that causes fear there ensues a certain
contraction in the appetite. Thus w^e observe in one who
is dying that nature withdraws inwardly, on account of the
lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city,
when seized with fear, leave the outskirts, and, as far as
possible, make for the inner quarters. It is in resemblance
to this contraction, which pertains to the appetite of the
soul, that in fear a similar contraction of heat and vital
spirits towards the inner parts takes place in regard to the
body.

Reply Ohj. i. As the Philosopher says [Problem, xxvii.),
although in those who fear, the vital spirits recede from the
outer to the inner parts of the body, yet the movement of
vital spirits is not the same in those who are angry and
those who are afraid. For in those who are angry, by reason
of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits, which result
from the craving for vengeance, the inward movement has
an upward direction: wherefore the vital spirits and heat
concentrate around the heart : the result being that an angry
man is quick and brave in attacking. — But in those who

OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR 493

are afraid, on account of the condensation caused by the
cold, the vital spirits have a downward movement ; the said
cold being due to the imagined lack of power. Consequently
the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart instead of con-
centrating around it: the result being that a man who is
afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run
away.

Reply Ohj. 2. To everyone that is in pain, whether man
or animal, it is natural to use all possible means of repelling
the harmful thing that causes pain by its presence : thus
we observe that animals, when in pain, attack with their jaws
or with their horns. Now the greatest help for all purposes,
in animals, is heat and vital spirits: wherefore when they
are in pain, their nature stores up the heat and vital spirits
within them, in order to make use thereof in repelling the
harmful object. Hence the Philosopher says {Problem.
xxvii.) when the vital spirits and heat are concentrated
together within, they require to find a vent in the voice:
for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain
from crying aloud. — On the other hand, in those who are
afraid, the internal heat and vital spirits move from the
heart downwards, as stated above {ad i) : wherefore fear
hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the vital
spirits in an upward direction through the mouth : the result
being that fear makes its subject speechless. For this
reason, too, fear makes its subject tremble, as the Philosopher
says {Problem, xxvii.).

Reply Obj. 3. Mortal perils are contrary not only to the
animal appetite, but also to nature. Consequently in such-
like fear, there is contraction not only in the appetite, but
also in the corporeal nature: for when an animal is moved
by the imagination of death, it experiences a contraction of
heat towards the inner parts of the body, as though it were
threatened by a natural death. Hence it is that those who
are in fear of death turn pale {Ethic, iv.). — But the evil that
shame fears, is contrary, not to nature, but only to the
appetite of the soul. Consequently there results a contrac-
tion in this appetite, but not in the corporeal nature; in

494 QUESTION XLTV

fact, the soul, as though contracted in itself, is free to set
the vital spirits and heat in movement, so that they spread
to the outward parts of the body : the result being that those
who are ashamed blush.

Second Article,
whether fear makes one suitable for counsel ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that fear does not make one suitable
for counsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to
counsel, and a hindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel:
because every passion disturbs repose, which is requisite
for the good use of reason. Therefore fear does not make
a man suitable for counsel.

Obj. 2. Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking
and deliberating about the future. But a certain fear
drives away all thought, and dislocates the mind, as Tully
observes (Quaest. Tusc. iv.). Therefore fear does not con-
duce to counsel, but hinders it.

Obj. 3. Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in
order to avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things.
But whereas fear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of
good things to be obtained. Therefore fear is not more con-
ducive to counsel, than hope is.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii.) that fear
makes men of counsel.

I answer that, A man of counsel may be taken in two
ways. First, from his being willing or anxious to take
counsel. And thus fear makes men of counsel. Because,
as the Philosopher says {Ethic, iii.), we take counsel on great
matters, because therein we distrust ourselves. Now things
which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a
certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult to
repel, and because they are apprehended as near to us, as
stated above (Q. XLIL, A. 2). Wherefore men seek for
counsel especially when they are afraid.

Secondly, a man of counsel, means one who is apt for

OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR 495

giving good counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any
passion makes men of counsel. Because when a man is
affected by a passion, things seem to him greater or smaller
than they really are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems
better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful.
Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every
passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving
good counsel.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Ohj. 2. The stronger a passion is, the greater
hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Conse-
quently, when fear is intense, man does indeed wish to take
counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can
find no counsel. If, however, the fear be slight, so as
to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely
disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him
to take good counsel, by reason of its making him wishful
to do so.

Reply Ohj. 3. Hope also makes man a good counsellor:
because, as the Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.), no man takes
counsel in matters he despairs of, nor about impossible things,
as he says in Ethic, iii. But fear incites to counsel more than
hope does. Because hope is of good things, as being possible
of attainment ; whereas fear is of evil things, as being difficult
to repel, so that fear regards the aspect of difficulty more
than hope does. And it is in matters of difficulty, especially
when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated
above.

Third Article,
whether fear makes one tremble ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that trembling is not an effect of
fear. Because trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we
observe that a cold person trembles. Now fear does not
seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a parching heat :
a sign whereof is that those who fear are thirsty, especially
if their fear be very great, as in the case of those who are

496 QUESTION XLIV

being led to execution. Therefore fear does not cause
trembling.

Obj. 2. Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat;
hence laxative medicines are generally warm. But these
evacuations are often caused by fear. Therefore fear
apparently causes heat; and consequently does not cause
trembling.

Obj. 3. Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the
outer to the inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man
trembles in his outw^ard parts, through the heat being with-
drawn thus; it seems that fear should cause this trembling
in all the external members. But such is not the case.
Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear.

On the contrary, TuUy says (Quaest. Tusc. iv.) that fear
is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth.

I answer that. As stated above (A. i), in fear there takes
place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner
parts of the body, the result being that the outer parts
become cold; and for this reason trembling is occasioned in
these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling
the members: which lack of power is due to the want of
heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those
members, as stated in De Anima ii.

Reply Obj. i. When the heat withdraws from the outer
to the inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in
the inferior or nutritive parts. Consequently the humid
element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes indeed the
result is a loosening of the bowels, and urinary or even
seminal evacuation. — Or else suchlike evacuations are due
to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, as the Philoso-
pher says [Problem, xxii.).

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3. In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a
downward movement: hence in those who are afraid the
heart especially trembles, as also those members which are
connected with the breast where the heart resides. Hence
those who fear tremble especially in their speech, on account
of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip,

OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR 497

too, and the lower jaw tremble, through their connection
with the heart; which explains the chattering of the teeth.
For the same reason the arms and hands tremble. — Or else
because the aforesaid members are more mobile. For
which reason the knees tremble in those who are afraid,
according to Isa. xxxv. 3 : Strengthen ye the feeble hands,
and confirm the trembling (Vulg., weak) knees.

Fourth Article,
whether fear hinders action ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that fear hinders action. For action
is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which
directs action. But fear disturbs reason, as stated above
(A. 2). Therefore fear hinders action.

Obj. 2. Further, those who fear while doing anything, are
more apt to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed
aloft, is likely to fall through fear; whereas, if he were to
walk on the same plank down below, he would not fall,
through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders action.

Obj. 3. Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But
laziness hinders action. Therefore fear does too.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. ii. 12) : With fear
and trembling work out your salvation : and he would not say
this if fear were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore
fear does not hinder a good action.

I answer that, Man's exterior actions are caused by the
soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as instru-
ments. Now action may be hindered both by defect of the
instrument, and by defect of the principal mover. On the
part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in itself,
is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the
outward members being deprived, through fear, of their
heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate,
without much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to
working well, in so far as it causes a certain solicitude, and
makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention.

II. I 32

498 QUESTION XLIV

— If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the
reason, it hinders action even on the part of the soul. But
of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Re'ply Ohj. 2. He that falls from a plank placed aloft,
suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the
fall that is pictured to his imagination.

Reply Ohj. 3. Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears:
and therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being
toilsome, it hinders work by withdrawing the will from it.
But fear of other things conduces to action, in so far as it
inclines the will to do that whereby a man escapes from
what he fears.

QUESTION XLV.

OF DARING.

[In Foiir Articles.)

We must now consider daring: under which head there are
four points of inquiry: (i) Whether daring is contrary to
fear ? (2) How is daring related to hope ? (3) Of the
cause of daring: (4) Of its effect.

First Article,
whether daring is contrary to fear ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that daring is not contrary to fear.
For Augustine says (Qq. 83) that daring is a vice. Now
vice is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a
virtue but a passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to
fear.

Ohj. 2. Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But
hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary
to fear.

Ohj. 3. Further, every passion excludes its opposite.
But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says [Conf. ii.) that
fear takes forethought for safety. Therefore safety is contrary
to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says [Rhet. ii.) that
daring is contrary to fear.

I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be
farthest removed from one another, as stated in Metaph. x.
Now that which is farthest removed from fear, is daring:

499

500 QUESTION XLV

since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of
its victory over him that fears it; whereas daring turns on
threatened danger, because of its own victory over that
same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is
contrary to fear.

Reply Ohj. i. Anger, daring and all the names of the
passions can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting
absolutely movements of the sensitive appetite in respect
of some object, good or bad: and thus they are names of
passions. — Secondly, as denoting besides this movement,
a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are
names of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks
of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first sense.

Reply Ohj, 2. To one thing, in the same respect, there are
not several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above
(Q. XXIII., A. 2; Q. XL., A. 4) that the irascible passions
admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the
opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to
hope: the other, according to the opposition of approach
and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and
despair contrary to hope.

Reply Ohj. 3. Safety does not denote soinething contrary
to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear : for he is said to be
safe, who fears not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear,
as a privation : while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary.
And as contrariety implies privation, so daring implies
safety.

Second Article,
whether daring ensues from hope ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that daring does not ensue from
hope. Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as
stated in Ethic, iii. But hope regards good things, as stated
above (Q. XL., A. i). Therefore they have different objects
and are not in the same order. Therefore daring does not
ensue from hope.

OF DARING 501

Ohj. 2. Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is
despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from
despair: in fact despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher
says [Rhet. ii.). Therefore daring does not result from
hope.

Ohj. 3. Further, daring is intent on something good, viz.,
victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is
good and difficult. Therefore daring is the same as hope;
and consequently does not result from it.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii.) tha\
those who are hopeful are full of daring. Therefore it seems
that daring ensues from hope.

/ answer that, As we have often stated (Q. XXIL, A.. 2;
Q. XXXV., A. i; Q. XLL, A. i), all these passions belong
to the appetitive power. Now every movement of the
appetitive power is reducible to one either of pursuit or of
avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something
either by reason of itself or by reason of something else.
By reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil,
the object of avoidance: but by reason of something else,
evil can be the object of pursuit, through some good attach-
ing to it; and good can be the object of avoidance, through
some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of
something else, follows that which is by reason of itself.
Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and
avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these
four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good
belongs to hope, avoidance of evil, to fear, the pursuit of
the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of
good, to despair. It follows, therefore, that daring results
from hope ; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threaten-
ing object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But despair
results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is
because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should
hope for.

Reply Ohj. i. This argument would hold, if good and evil
were not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain
relation to good, since it comes after good, as privation comes

502 QUESTION XLV

after habit; consequently daring which pursues evil, comes
after hope which pursues good.

Reply Ohj. 2. Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior
to evil, yet the relation of avoidance to evil precedes its re-
lation to good; just as the pursuit of good precedes the
pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring,
so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not always
lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does
not always lead to daring, save only when it is strong.

Reply Ohj. 3. Although the object of daring is an evil to
which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of
victory is conjoined; yet daring regards the evil, and hope
regards the conjoined good. In like manner despair regards
directly the good which it turns aw^ay from, while fear
regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking,
daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: just as despair is
an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring
cannot be a principal passion.

Third Article,
whether some defect is a cause of daring ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that some defect is a cause of dm^ng.
For the Philosopher says {Problem xxvii.) that lovers of
wine are strong and daring. But from wine ensues the de-
fect of drunkenness. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii.) that those
who have no experience of danger are bold. But want of
experience is a defect. Therefore daring is caused by a
defect.

Obj. 3. Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont
to be daring; like the beasts when beaten, as stated in Ethic, iii.
But the suffering of wTongs pertains to defect. Therefore
daring is caused by a defect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says [Rhet. ii.) that the
cause of daring is the presence in the imagination of the hope

OF DARING 503

that the means of safety are nigh, and that there is nothing or
very little to fear. But anything pertaining to defect implies
either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity
of something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining to
defect is a cause of daring.

/ answer that, As stated above (AA. i, 2) daring results
from hope and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is
naturally apt to cause hope or banish fear, is a cause of
daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and also daring,
being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, and
in a certain bodily transmutation ; a thing may be considered
as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope,
or by banishing of fear ; in one way, on the part of the appe-
titive movement ; in another way, on the part of the bodily
transmutation.

On the part of the appetitive movement which follows
apprehension, hope that leads to daring is roused by those
things that make us reckon victory as possible. Such
things regard either our owm power, as bodily strength, ex-
perience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or
they regard the power of others, such as having a great
number of friends or of any other means of help, especially,
if a man trust in the Divine assistance; wherefore those are
more daring, with whom it is well in regard to godlike things
[Rhet. ii.). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal of
threatening causes of fear; for instance, by the fact that a
man has no enemies, through having harmed nobody, so
that he is not aware of any imminent danger; since those
especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have
harmed others.

On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused
through the incitement of hope and the banishment of fear,
by those things which raise the temperature about the heart.
Wherefore the Philosopher says [De Part. Animal, iii.) that
those whose heart is small in size, are more daring ; while
animals whose heart is large are timid ; because the natural
heat is unable to give the same degree of temperature to a large
as to a small heart ; just as a fire does not heat a large house

504 QUESTION XLV

as well as it does a small house. He says also [Problem xxvii.)
that those whose lungs contain much blood, are more daring,
through the heat in the heart that results therefrom. He says
also in the same passage that lovers of wine are more daring,
on account of the heat of the wine : hence it has been said
above (Q. XL., A. 6) that drunkenness conduces to hope,
since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope,
by reason of the dilatation and enlargement of the
he-art.

Reply Obj. i. Drunkenness causes daring, not through
being a defect, but through dilating the heart: and again
through making a man think greatly of himself.

Reply Obj. 2. Those who have no experience of dangers,
are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally,
i.e., in so far as through being inexperienced they do not
know their own faihngs, nor the dangers that threaten.
Hence it is that the removal of the cause of fear gives rise
to daring.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says [Rhet. ii.) those w>ho
have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God
comes to the assistance of those who suffer unjustly.

Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except
accidentally, i.e., in so far as some excellence attaches thereto,
real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another.

Fourth Article.

whether the brave are more eager at first than in

the midst of danger ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the brave are more eager at
first than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is
caused by fear, which is contrary to daring, as stated above
(A. I.; Q. XLIV., A. 3). But the brave sometimes tremble
at first, as the Philosopher says {Problem xxvii.). There-
fore they are not more eager at first than in the midst of
danger.

Obj. 2. Further, passion is intensified by an increase in

OF DARING 505

its object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet
more lovable. But the object of daring is something diffi-
cult. Therefore the greater the difficulty, the greater the
daring. But danger is more arduous and difficult when
present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest.

Obj. 3 Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of
wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says
{Rhet. ii.) that anger makes man hold. Therefore when man
is in the midst of danger and when he is being beaten, then
is he most daring.

On the contrary, It is said in Ethic, iii. that the daring are
precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the
midst of dangers they stand aloof.

I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sensitive
appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty.
But the sensitive faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can
it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous.
Now it happens sometimes that it is impossible for a man
to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain
situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to
face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the
danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected,
and so gives way.

On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of
a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face
danger according to the judgment of reason, at first seem
slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with
due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst of danger,
they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the
difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated; where-
fore they are more persevering. — Moreover, it may be be-
cause they face the danger on account of the good of virtue
which is the abiding object of their will, however great the
danger may prove: whereas men of daring face the danger
on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banish-
ing fear, as stated above (A. 3).

Reply Obj. i. Trembling does occur in men of daring, on
account of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the

5o6 QUESTION XLV

inner parts of the body, as occurs also in those who are
afraid. But in men of daring the heat withdraws to the
heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it withdraws to the
inferior parts [cf. A. i; A. 3 ad 3).

Reply Ohj. 2. The object of love is good simply, wherefore
if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object
of daring is a compound of good and evil ; and the movement
of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope
towards good. If, therefore, so much difficulty be added
to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of
daring does not ensue, but fails. — But if the movement of
daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the
daring considered to be.

Reply Ohj. 3. Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there
be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on (Q. XLVI.,
A. i). Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish
all hope of victory, anger does not ensue. — -It is true, how-
ever, that if anger does ensue, there will be greater daring.

QUESTION XLVI.

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF.

{In Eight Articles.)

We must now consider anger; and (i) anger in itself: (2) the
cause that produces anger : (3) the effect of anger.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(i) Whether anger is a special passion ? (2) Whether the
object of anger is good or evil ? (3) Whether anger is in
the concupiscible faculty ? (4) Whether anger is accom-
panied by an act of reason ? (5) Whether anger is more
natural than desire ? (6) W^hether anger is more grievous
than hatred ? (7) Whether anger is only towards those
with whom we have a relation of justice ? (8) Of the
species of anger.

First Article,
whether anger is a special passion ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that anger is not a special passion.
For the irascible power takes its name from anger [ira).
But there are several passions in this power, not only one.
Therefore anger is not a special passion.

Ohj. 2. Further, to every special passion there is a con-
trary passion; as is evident by going through them one by
one. But no passion is contrary to anger, as stated above
(Q. XXIII., A. 3). Therefore anger is not a special passion.

Ohj. 3. Further, one special passion does not include
another. But anger includes several passions: since it
accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher
states {Rhet. ii.). Therefore anger is not a special passion.

507

5o8 QUESTION XLVI

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii.) calls
anger a special passion: and so does Tully (QucBst. Tusc. iv.).

/ answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways.
First, by predication ; thus animal is general in respect of
all animals. — Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the
general cause of all things generated here below, according
to Dionysius [Div. Nom. iv.). Because just as a genus
contains potentially many differences, according to a like-
ness of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects
according to its active power. — Now it happens that an
effect is produced by the concurrence of various causes;
and since every cause remains somewhat in its effect, we
may say that, in yet a third way, an effect which is due to
the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality,
inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion, actually existing
therein.

Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion,
but is condivided with the other passions, as stated above
(Q. XXIII. , A. 4). — In like manner, neither is it in the second
way: since it is not a cause of the other passions. But in
this way love may be called a general passion, as Augustine
declares {De Civ. Dei. xiv.), because love is the primary root
of all the other passions, as stated above (Q. XXVI I. , A. 4).
— But, in the third way, anger may be called a general pas-
sion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several
passions. Because the movement of anger does not arise
save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be
desire and hope of revenge: for, as the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii.), the angry man hopes to punish ; since he craves for
revenge as being possible. Consequently if the person, who
inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue,
but only sorrow, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv.).

Reply Obj. i. The irascible power takes its name from ira
(anger), not because every movement of that power is one
of anger ; but because all its movements terminate in anger ;
and because, of all these movements, anger is the most
patent.

Reply Obj. 2. From the very fact that anger is caused by

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF 509

contrary passions, i.e., by hope, which is of good, and by
sorrow, which is of evil, it includes in itself contrariety : and
consequently it has no contrary outside itself. Thus also
in mixed colours there is no contrariety, except that of the
simple colours from which they are made.

Reply Ohj. 3. Anger includes several passions, not indeed
as a genus includes several species; but rather according to
the inclusion of cause and effect.

Second Article,
whether the object of anger is good or evil ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the object of anger is evil. For
Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Horn, xxi.) sa^^s that
anger is the sword-bearer of desire, inasmuch, to wit, as it
assails whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But
an obstacle has the character of evil. Therefore anger
regards evil as its object.

Obj. 2. Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect,
since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred
regards evil as its object, as stated, above (Q. XXIX., A. i).
Therefore anger does also.

Obj. 3. Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic, vii.) that anger acts with sorrow.
But evil is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the
object of anger.

On the contrary, Augustine says {Conf. ii.) that anger craves
for revenge. But the desire for revenge is a desire for some-
thing good: since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the
object of anger is good.

2. Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, where-
fore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says [Rhet. ii.).
But the object of hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore
good is also the object of anger.

I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power
follows an act of the apprehensive power. Now the appre-
hensive power apprehends a thing in two ways. First, by

510 QUESTION XLVI

way of an incomplex object, as when we understand what a
man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when we
understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in
each of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both
good and evil: — by way of a simple and incomplex object,
when the appetite simply follows and adheres to good, or
recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope,
pleasure, sorrow, and so forth : — by way of a complex object,
w^hen the appetite tends to the effect of some good or evil
being in, or being done to another, the appetite either tend-
ing towards some particular object, or recoiling from some
other. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for
we love someone, in so far as we wish him some good; and
we hate someone, in so far as we wish him some evil. It is
the same with anger ; for when a man is angry, he wishes to
be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a
twofold tendency: viz., to vengeance itself, which it desires
and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in
it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to
something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character
of evil.

We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this
respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love
on the other. The first difference is that anger always re-
gards two objects : whereas love and hatred sometimes regard
but one object, as when a man is said to love wine or some-
thing of the kind, or to hate it.^The second difference is,
that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes
good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself:
while both the objects of hatred bear the character of evil:
for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to some-
thing disagreeable to him. Whereas anger regards one ob-
ject under the aspect of good, viz., vengeance, which it de-
sires to have; and the other object under the aspect of evil,
viz., the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged.
Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary
passions.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF 511

Third Article,
whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that anger is in the concupiscible
faculty. For TuUy says [QiicBst. Tusc. iv.) that anger is a
kind of desire. But desire is in the concupiscible faculty.
Therefore anger is too.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that anger
grows into hatred : and Tully says {loc. cit.) that hatred is
inveterate anger. But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible
passion. Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.

Obj. 3. Further, Damascene {De Fide Orthod. ii.) and
Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Horn, xxi.) say that
anger is made up of sorrow and desire. Both of these are in
the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is a concupiscible
passion.

On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the
irascible faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the con-
cupiscible power, the irascible would not take its name
from it.

/ answer that. As stated above (Q. XXIIL, K. i), the
passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the
concupiscible faculty, in that the objects of the concupiscible
passions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas
the objects of the irascible passions are good and evil of a
certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been stated
(A. 2) that anger regards two objects: viz., the vengeance
that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance;
and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness :
for the movement of anger does not arise, unless there be
some magnitude about both these objects; since we make
no ado about things that are naught or very minute, as the
Philosopher observes {Rhet. ii.). It is therefore evident
that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible
faculty.

Reply Obj, i. Tully gives the name of desire to any kind

512 QUESTION XLVI

of craving for a future good, without discriminating between
that which is arduous and that which is not. Accordingly
he reckons anger as a kind of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire
of vengeance. In this sense, however, desire is common to
the irascible and concupiscible faculties.

Reply Obj. 2. Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as
though the same passion which at first was anger, after-
wards becomes hatred by becoming inveterate; but by a
process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long time
engenders hatred.

Reply Obj. 3. Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and
desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are
its causes: and it has been said above (Q. XXV., A. 2) that
the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible
passions.

Fourth Article,
whether anger requires an act of reason ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that anger does not require an act
of reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive
appetite. But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension,
not of reason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger
does not require an act of reason.

Obj. 2. Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and
yet they are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not
require an act of reason.

Obj. 3. Further, drunkenness fetters the reason: whereas
it is conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require
an act of reason.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says [Ethic, vii.) that
anger listens to reason somewhat.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), anger is a desire for
vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between
the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore
the Philosopher says [Ethic, vii.) that anger, as if it had
drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel with such a person,
is therefore immediately exasperated. Now to compare and

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF 513

to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore anger,
in a fashion, requires an act of reason.

Reply Ohj. i. The movement of the appetitive power may
follow an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it
f oUows the reason in so far as the reason commands : and thus
the will follows reason, wherefore it is called the rational
appetite. In another way, it follows reason in so far as the
reason denounces, and thus anger follows reason. For the
Philosopher says {Problem xxviii.) that anger follows reason,
not in obedience to reason's command, but as a result of reason s
denouncing the injury. Because the sensitive appetite is
subject to the reason, not immediately but through the
will.

Reply Obj. 2. Dumb animals have a natural instinct im-
parted to them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which
they are gifted with movements, both internal and external,
like unto rational movements, as stated above (Q. XL., A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3. As stated in Ethic, vii., anger listens somewhat
to reason in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted,
but listens not perfectly, because it does not observe the rule
of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore,
requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to
reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says {Problem iii.) that
those who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use
of reason, do not get angry : but those who are slightly drunk,
do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to
form a judgment of reason.

Fifth Article,
whether anger is more natural than desire ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article.: — ■

Objection 1. It seems that anger is not more natural than
desire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle
animal. But gentleness is contrary to anger, as the Philos-
opher states {Rhet. ii.). Therefore anger is not more natural
than desire, in fact it seems to be altogether unnatural
to man.

II- I 33

514 QUESTION XLVI

Obj. 2. Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since
those things that are according to reason, are not said to
act according to nature. Now anger requires an act of
reason, but desire does not, as stated in Ethic, vii. Therefore
desire is more natural than anger.

Obj. 3. Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while
desire is a craving for those things especially which are
pleasant to the touch, viz., for pleasures of the table and for
sexual pleasures. But these things are more natural to man
than vengeance. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, vii.) that
anger is more natural than desire.

I answer that. By natural we mean that which is caused
by nature, as stated in Phys. ii. Consequently the question
as to whether a particular passion is more or less natural
cannot be decided without reference to the cause of that
passion. Now the cause of a passion, as stated above
(Q. XXX VL, A. 2), may be considered in two ways: first,
on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the sub-
ject. If then we consider the cause of anger and of desire,
on the part of the object, thus desire, especially of pleasures
of the table, and of sexual pleasures, is more natural than
anger; in so far as these pleasures are more natural to man
than vengeance.

If, however, w^e consider the cause of anger on the part
of the subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural;
and, in a manner, desire is more natural. Because the
nature of an individual man may be considered either as to
the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to the
particular temperament of the individual. If then we con-
sider the generic nature, i.e., the nature of this man con-
sidered as an animal ; thus desire is more natural than anger ;
because it is from this very generic nature that man is in-
clined to desire those things which tend to preserve in him
the life both of the species and of the individual. — If, how-
ever, we consider the specific nature, i.e., the nature of this
man as a rational being ; then anger is more natural to man
than desire, in so far as anger follows reason more than

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF 515

desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv.)
that reve7ige which pertains to anger is more natural to man
than meekness : for it is natural to everything to rise up
against things contrary and hurtful. — And if we consider
the nature of the individual, in respect of his particular
temperament, thus anger is more natural than desire; for
the reason that anger is prone to ensue from the natural
tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion,
is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which ten-
dencies result from a man's individual temperament. Be-
cause disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament;
and of all the humours, the bile moves quickest ; for it is like
fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed
to anger is sooner incensed with anger, than he that is
temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire :
and for this reason the Philosopher says [Ethic, vii.) that a
disposition to anger is more liable to be traUvSmitted from
parent to child, than a disposition to desire.

Reply Ohj. i. We may consider in man both the natural
temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On
the part of the bodily temperament, a man, considered
specifically, does not naturally excel others either in anger
or in any other passion, on account of the moderation of his
temperament. But other animals, for as much as their
temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches
to an extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some
excess of passion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in
anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. — On the part of reason,
however, it is natural to man, both to be angry and to be
gentle: in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by de-
nouncing the injury which causes anger; and somewhat
appeases anger, in so far as the angry man does not listen
perfectly to the command of reason, as stated above {A. ^ad-^).

Reply Ohj. 2. Reason itself belongs to the nature of man:
wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of
reason, it follows that it is, in a manner, natural to man.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument regards anger and desire on
the part of the object.

5i6 QUESTION XLVI

Sixth Article,
whether anger is more grievous than hatred ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that anger is more grievous than
hatred. For it is written (Pro v. xxvii. 4) that anger hath no
mercy, nor fury when it hreaketh forth. But hatred some-
times has mercy. Therefore anger is more grievous than
hatred.

Ohj. 2. Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for
it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is
contented if the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the
angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger
know it and be aggrieved thereby, as the Philosopher says
{Rhet. ii.). Therefore, anger is more grievous than hatred.

Ohj. 3. Further, a thing seems to be so much the more
firm according as more things concur to set it up: thus a
habit is all the more settled through being caused by
several acts. But anger is caused by the concurrence of
several passions, as stated above (A. i) : whereas hatred is
not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous
than hatred.

On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred
to a beam, but anger to a mote.

I answer that. The species and nature of a passion are taken
from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in
substance as the object of hatred; since, just as the hater
wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man
wish evil to him with whom he is angry. But there is a
difference of aspect : for the hater desires evil to his enemy,
as evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom
he is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of
good, that is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a
means of vengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above
(A. 2) that hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas
anger denotes application of good to evil. — Now it is evident
that to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil,

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF 517

than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil
to someone under the aspect of justice, may be according
to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with the order
of reason ; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey
the precept of reason in taking vengeance. Consequently
it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger.

Reply Ohj. i. In anger and hatred two points may be
considered: namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of
the desire. As to the thing desired, anger has more mercy
than hatred has. For since hatred desires another's evil
for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no particular measure of
evil: because those things that are desired for their own sake,
are desired without measure, as the Philosopher states
(Polit. i.), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence
it is written (Ecclus. xii. 16) : An enemy . . . if he find an op-
portunity, will not he satisfied with blood. — Anger, on the other
hand, seeks evil only under the aspect of a just means of
vengeance. Consequently when the evil inflicted goes
beyond the measure of justice according to the estimate of
the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Phil-
osopher says {Rhet. ii.) that the angry man is appeased if
many evils befall, whereas the hater is never appeased.

As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy
more than hatred does; because the movement of anger is
more impetuous, through the heating of the bile. Hence
the passage quoted continues: Who can bear the violence of
one provoked ?

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above, an angry man desires evil
to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance.
Now vengeance is wrought by the infliction of a punishment :
and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary
to the will, painful, and inflicted for some fault. Conse-
quently an angry man desires this, — that the person whom
he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and know that this
has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the
other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this,
since he desires another's evil as such. — It is not true, how-
ever, that an evil is worse through giving pain: because

5i8 QUESTION XLVI

injustice and imprudence, although evil, yet, being voluntary,
do not grieve those in whom they are, as the Philosopher
observes {Rhet. ii.).

Reply Ohj. 3. That which proceeds from several causes,
is more settled when these causes are of one kind : but it may
be that one cause prevails over many others. Now hatred
ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because
anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong
inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a
man, by reason of which he considers that which he hates
to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as
passion is more transitory than disposition or habit, so
anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is
a passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the
Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.) that hatred is more incurable
than anger.

Seventh Article.

whether anger is only towards those to whom
- one has an obligation of justice ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —

Objection i. It seems that anger is not only towards those
to whom one has an obligation of justice. For there is no
justice between man and irrational beings. And yet some-
times one is angry with irrational beings ; thus, out of anger,
a writer throws away his pen, or a rider strikes his horse.
Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has
an obligation of justice.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor
is there justice towards one's own {Ethic, v.). But sometimes
a man is angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on
account of his sin; hence it is written (Ps. iv. 5) : Be ye angry
and sin not. Therefore anger is not only towards those
with whom one has a relation of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, justice and injustice can be of one man
towards an entire class, or a whole community: for instance,
when the state injures an individual. But anger is not
towards a class but only towards an individual, as the

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF 519

Philosopher states [Rhet. ii.)- Therefore properly speaking,
anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation
of justice or injustice.

The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philoso-
pher {Rhet. ii.).

I answer that, As stated above (A. 6), anger desires evil
as being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger
is towards those to whom we are just or unjust: since
vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is an act of
injustice. Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz., the
harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance
sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns
those to whom one is just or unjust.

Reply Ohj. i. As stated above (A. ^ad2), anger, though it
follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals
that are devoid of reason, in so far as through their natural
instinct they are moved by their imagination to something
like rational action. Since then in man there is both reason
and imagination, the movement of anger can be aroused in
man in two ways. First, when only his imagination
denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to
a movement of anger even against irrational and inanimate
beings, which movement is like that which occurs in animals
against anything that injures them. — Secondly, by the
reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the
Philosopher [Rhet. ii.), it is impossible to he angry with in-
sensible things, or with the dead : both because they feel no
pain, which is, above all, what the angry man seeks in those
with whom he is angry : an,d because one cannot be avenged
on them, since they can do us no harm.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says [Ethic, v.), meta-
phorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice
between a man and himself, in so far as the reason rules the
irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul . And in this sense
a man is said to be avenged on himself, and, consequently,
to be angry with himself. But properly, and in accordance
with the nature of things, a man is never angry with himself.

Reply Obj. 3. The Philosopher [Rhet. ii.) assigns as one

520 QUESTION XLVI

difference between hatred and anger, that hatred may be
felt towards a class, as we hate the entire class of thieves ;
whereas anger is directed only towards an individiial. The
reason is that hatred arises from our considering a quality
as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to
a thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the other
hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his action.
Now all actions are the deeds of individuals : and conse-
quently anger is always pointed at an individual. — When
the whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one
individual.

Eighth Article.

whether the species of anger are suitably

assigned ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that Damascene [De Fide Orthod. ii.)
unsuitably assigns three species of anger, — wrath, ill-will
and rancotir. For no genus derives its specific differences
from accidents. But these three are diversified in respect
of an accident: because the beginning of the movement of
anger is called wrath (^^0X09) , if anger continue it is called ill-
will [firjvis:) ; while rancour (koto^) is anger waiting for an
opportunity of vengeance. Therefore these are not different
species of anger.

Obj. 2. Further, Tully says [Quaest. Tusc. iv.) that ex-
candescentia [irascibility) is what the Greeks call Ov/jlco(ti<;,
and is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently ;
while according to Damascene Ov^coat^; is the same as a:oto9
[rancour] . Therefore k6to^ does not bide its time for taking
vengeance, but in course of time spends itself.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory [Moral, xxi.) gives three degrees
of anger, namely, anger without utterance, anger with utter-
ance, anger with perfection of speech, corresponding to the
three degrees mentioned by Our Lord (Matth. v. 22) : Who-
soever is angry with his brother (thus implying anger without
utterance), and then, whoever shall say to his brother, ' Raca '
(implying anger with utterance), and lastly, whosoever shall

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF 521

say ' Thou fool' (where we have perfection of speech).
Therefore Damascene's division is imperfect, since it takes
no account of utterance.

On the contrary stands the authority of Damascene [loc.
cit.) and Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Horn. xxi.).

I answer that, The species of anger given by Damascene
and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which
give increase to anger. This happens in three ways. First
from the facility of the movement itself, and he calls this
kind of anger ;^oXo9 [hile) because it is quickly aroused.
Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and
which dwells some time in the memory ; this belongs to /ATji^t?
(ill-zmll) which is derived from jjueveiv {to dwell) . Thirdly, on
the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz., vengeance ;
and this pertains to k6to<; {rancour) which never rests until
it is avenged. Hence the Philosopher {Ethic, iv.) calls
some angry persons aKpoxoXoc {choleric), because they are
easily angered; some he calls TriKpoi {bitter), because they
retain their anger for a long time ; and some he calls ^aXeTroL
{ill-tempered) , because they never rest until they have re-
taliated.

Reply Ohj. i. All those things which give anger some kind
of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and
consequently nothing prevents them from causing a certain
specific difference thereof.

Reply Obj. 2. Irascibility, which Tully mentions, seems
to pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a
certain quickness of temper, rather than to rancour {furor) .
And there is no reason why the Greek OvfiMcri^, which is
denoted by the Latin furor, should not signify both quick-
ness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged.

Reply Ohj. 3. These degrees are distinguished according
to various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of
perfection in the very movement of anger.

QUESTION XLVII.

OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF ITS

REMEDIES.*

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and
its remedies. Under this head there are four points of
inquiry: (i) Whether the motive of anger is always some-
thing done against the one who is angry ? (2) Whether
shght or contempt is the sole motive of anger ? (3) Of the
cause of anger on the part of the angry person. (4) Of the
cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is
angry.

First Article.

whether the motive of anger is always some-
thing done against the one who is angry ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the motive of anger is not
always something done against the one who is angry.
Because man, by sinning, can do nothing against God;
since it is written (Job xxxv. 6) : If thy iniquities be multi-
plied, what shalt thou do against Him ? And yet God is
spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin,
according to Ps. cv. 40 : The Lord was exceedingly angry with
His people. Therefore it is not always on account of
something done against him, that a man is angry.

Ob). 2. Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But
one may desire vengeance for things done against others.

* There is no further mention of these remedies in the text.

522

THE CAUSE OF ANGER 523

Therefore we are not always angry on account of something
done against us.

Obj. 3. Further, as the Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.) man is
angry especially with those le^ho despise what he takes a great
interest in ; thus men who study philosophy are angry with
those who despise philosophy, and so forth. But contempt
of philosophy does not harm the philosopher. Therefore
it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry.

Obj. 4. Further, he that holds his tongue when another
insults him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom
observes {Horn. xxii. in Ep. ad Rom.). But by holding
his tongue he does the other no harm. Therefore a man is
not always provoked to anger by something done against
him.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.) that
anger is always diie to something done to oneself : whereas
hatred may arise without anything being done to us, for we
hate a man simply because we think him such.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XLVL, A. 6), anger is
the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance.
Now unless some injury has been done, there is no question
of vengeance : nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance,
but only that which is done to the person who seeks ven-
geance: for just as everything naturally seeks its own good,
so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done
by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be
something done against him. Consequently the motive of
a man's anger is always something done against him.

Reply Obj. i. We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion
of the soul but as of a judgment of justice, inasmuch as
He wills to take vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by
sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he
himself is concerned, he acts against God in two ways.
First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments.
Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; which
injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured
is an object of God's providence and protection.

Reply Obj. 2. If we are angry with those who harm others,

524 QUESTION XLVII

and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are
injured belong in some way to us: either by some kinship
or by friendship, or at least because of the nature we have
in common.

Reply Ohj. 3. When we take a very great interest in a
thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone
despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were despised
and injured.

Reply Ohj. 4. Silence provokes the insulter to anger when
he thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were
slighted: and a slight is an action.

Second Article.

whether the sole motive of anger is slight or

contempt ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that slight or contempt is not the
sole motive of anger. For Damascene says {De Fide
Orthod. ii.) that we are angry when we suffer, or think that
we are suffering, an injury. But one may suffer an injury
without being despised or slighted. Therefore a slight is
not the only motive of anger.

Ohj. 2. Further, desire for honour and grief for a slight
belong to the same subject. But dumb animals do not
desire honour. Therefore they are not grieved by being
slighted. And yet they are roused to anger, when wo^mded,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic, iii.). Therefore a slight is
not the sole motive of anger.

Ohj. 3. Further, the Philosopher [Rhet. ii.) gives many
other causes of anger, for instance, being forgotten by others ;
that others should rejoice in our misfortunes ; that they should
make known our evils ; being hindered from doing as we like.
Therefore being slighted is not the only motive for being angry .

On the contrary. The Philosopher says [Rhet. ii.) that anger
is a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming
slight done unbecomingly.

I answer that. All the causes of anger are reduced to

THE CAUSE OF ANGER 525

slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii.^
viz., contempt, despiteful treatment, i.e., hindering one from
doing one's will, and insolence : and all motives of anger are
reduced to these three. Two reasons may be assigned for
this. First, because anger seeks another's hurt as being
a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks vengeance in
so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only
for that which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes
anger is always something considered in the light of an
injustice. Wherefore the Philosopher says [Rhet. ii.) that
men are not angry, — if they think that they have wronged some
one and are siiffering justly on that account ; because there is
no anger at what is just. Now injury is done to another in
three ways: namely, through ignorance, through passion,
and through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an
injustice, when he does it from choice, on purpose, or from
deliberate malice, as stated in Ethic, v. Wherefore we are
most of all angry with those who, in our opinion, have hurt
us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us
an injury through ignorance or through passion, either we
are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to
do anything through ignorance or through passion takes
away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls
for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, who
do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from contempt; where-
fore we are angr}- with them most of all. Hence the Philoso-
pher says {Rhet. ii.) that we are either not angry at all, or
not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because
they do not seem to have acted slightingly.

The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a
man's excellence: because men think little of things that are
not worth much ado [Rhet. ii.). Now we seek for some kind
of excellence from all our goods. Consequently whatever
injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is derogatory to our
excellence, seems to savour of a slight.

Reply Obj. i. Any other cause, besides contempt, through
which a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion
of injury: contempt or slight alone adds to the motive

526 QUESTION XLVII

of anger, and consequently is of itself the cause of
anger.

Reply Ohj. 2. Although a dumb animal does not seek
honour as such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority,
and is angry with anything derogatory thereto.

Reply Ohj. 3. Each of those causes amounts to some kind
of slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem,
for the more we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our
memory. Again if a man does not hesitate by his remarks-
to give pain to another, this seems to show that he thinks
little of him : and those too who show signs of hilarity when
another is in misfortune, seem to care little about his good
or evil. Again he that hinders another from carrying out
his will; without deriving thereby any profit to himself,
seems not to care much for his friendship. Consequently
all those things, in so far as they are signs of contempt,
provoke anger.

Third Article.

WHETHER A MAN'S EXCELLENCE IS THE CAUSE OF HIS

BEING ANGRY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that a man's excellence is not the
cause of his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher
says [Rhet. ii.) that some are angry especially when they are
grieved, for instance, the sick, the poor, and those who are
disappointed. But these things seem to pertain to defect.
Therefore defect rather than excellence makes one prone
to anger.

Ohj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (ibid.) that some
are very much inclined to he angry when they are despised
for some failing or weakness of the existence of which there are
grounds for suspicion ; hut if they think they excel in those
points, they do not trouble. But a suspicion of this kind is
due to some defect. TherefoT e defect rather than excellence
is a cause of a man being angry.

Ohj. 3. Further, whatever savours of excellence makes
a man agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says

THE CAUSE OF ANGER 527

[Rhet. ii.) that men are not angry when they flay, make jokes,
or take part in a feast, nor when they are prosperous or success-
ful, nor in moderate pleasures and well-founded hope. There-
fore excellence is not a cause of anger.

On the contrary. The Philosopher says {ibid.) that excel-
lence makes men prone to anger.

/ answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who is angry,
ma}^ be taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive
of anger: and thus excellence is the cause of a man being
easily angered. Because the motive of anger is an unjust
slight, as stated above (A. 2). Now it is evident that the
more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered
him in the matter in which he excels. Consequently those
who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be
slighted in that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his
riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so forth.

Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry,
may be considered on the part of the disposition produced
in him by the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that
nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves
him: while whatever savours of defect is above all a cause
of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more
easily hurt. iVnd this is why men who are weak, or subject
to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are
more easily grieved.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Ohj. 2. If a man be despised in a matter in which
he evidently excels greatty, he does not consider himself
the loser thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and in this
respect he is less angered. But in another respect, in so far
as he suffers a greater indignity through being despised, he
has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks
that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but
through ignorance, or some other like cause.

Reply Ghj. 3. All these things hinder anger in so far as
they hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are
naturally apt to provoke anger, because they make it more
unseemly to insult anyone.

528 QUESTION XLVII

Fourth Article.

whether a person's defect is a reason for being
more easily angry with him ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that a person's defect is not a reason
for being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher
says [Rhet. ii.) that we are not angry with those who confess
and repent and hiimhle themselves ; on the contrary^ we are
gentle with them. Wherefore dogs bite not those who sit still.
But these things savour of littleness and defect. Therefore
littleness of a person is a reason for being less angry with
him.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no greater defect than death.
But anger ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect
of a person does not provoke anger against him.

Obj. 3. Further, no one thinks little of a man through his
being friendly towards him. But we are more angry with
friends, if they offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is
written (Ps. liv. 13) : // my enemy had reviled me I would
verily have borne with it. Therefore a person's defect is not
a reason for being more easily angry with him.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Rhet. ii.) that the
rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him ;
and in like manner the prince is angry with his subject.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 3), unmerited con-
tempt more than anything else is a provocative of anger.
Consequently deficiency or littleness in the person with
whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, in so far
as it adds to the indignity of being despised. For just as
the higher a man's position the greater the indignity in
despising him; so the less exalted a man is, the greater the
indignity in being despised by him. Thus a nobleman is
angry if he be insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a
fool; a master, if by a servant.

If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the in-
dignity of the contempt, then it does not increase but

THE CAUSE OF ANGER 529

lessens anger. In this way those who repent of their ill-
deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who are
humbled and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according to
Prov. XV. I : A mild answer breaketh wrath : because, to wit,
they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those
before whom they humble themselves.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Ohj. 2. There are two reasons why anger ceases at
the sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable
of sorrow and sensation ; and this is chiefly what the angry
seek in those with whom they are angered. — Another reason
is because the dead seem to have attained to the limit of
evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are grievously
hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of just
retaliation.

Reply Ohj. 3. To be despised by one's friends seems also
a greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by
hurting or by failing to help, we are angry with them for
the same reason for which we are angry with those who are
beneath us.

II. I 34

QUESTION XLVIII. •

OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the effects of anger : under which head
there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether anger causes
pleasure ? (2) Whether above all it causes heat in the
heart ? (3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason ?
(4) Whether it causes taciturnity ?

First Article,
whether anger causes pleasure ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that anger does not cause pleasure.
Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never
without sorrow, since, as stated in Ethic, vii., everyone that
acts from anger, acts with pain. Therefore anger does not
cause pleasure.

Ohj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv.) that
vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure
for pain : whence we may gather that the angry man derives
pleasure from vengeance, and that vengeance quells his
anger. Therefore on the advent of pleasure, anger departs :
and consequently anger is not an effect united with pleasure.

Obj. 3. Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is
conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger, as
stated in Rhet. ii. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.

On the contrary. The Philosopher {ibid.) quotes the saying
that anger is

" Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste."

—Iliad, xviii. 109, no; trl. Pope.

530

THE EFFECTS OF ANGER 531

/ answer that, As the Philosopher says {Ethic, vii.),
pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies
against sorrow: and therefore the greater the sorrow or
anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals
it, as is evident in the case of thirst which increases the
pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has been said
(Q. XLVIL, AA. I, 3), that the movement of anger arises
from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow
vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as
vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the
greater according as the sorrow was greater. — ^Therefore if
vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely
excluding sorrow, so that the movement of anger ceases. —
But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present
to the angry man in two ways: — in one way, by hope; be-
cause none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated
above (Q. XLVL, A. i) ; — in another way, by thinking of it
continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is
pleasant to dwell on the thought of what he desires ; where-
fore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly an
angry man takes pleasure in thinking about vengeance.
This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow
and consequently anger.

Reply Ohj. i. The angry man does not grieve and rejoice
at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he
takes pleasure in the thought and hope of vengeance. Con-
sequently sorrow is to anger as its beginning ; while pleasure
is the effect or terminus of anger.

Reply Ohj. 2. This argument holds in regard to pleasure
caused by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes
anger altogether.

Reply Ohj. 3. Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from
ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But
pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from vengeance.

532 QUESTION XLVIII

Second Article,
whether anger above all causes fervour in the heart ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that heat is not above all the effect
of anger. For fervour, as stated above (Q. XXVIII., A. 5;
Q. XXXVII., A. 2), belongs to love. But love, as above
stated, is the beginning and cause of all the passions. Since
then the cause is more powerful than its effect, it seems that
anger is not the chief cause of fervour.

Ohj. 2. Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse
fervour, increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger
the longer it lasts. But in course of time anger grows
weaker; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii.) that time puts
an end to anger. Therefore fervour is not the proper effect
of anger.

Ohj. 3. Further, fervour added to fervour produces greater
fervour. But the addition of a greater anger banishes already
existing anger, as the Philosopher says [ibid.). Therefore
anger does not cause fervour.

On the contrary, Damascene says that anger is fervour of
the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of the
bile.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XLIV., A. i), the bodily
transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul, is pro-
portionate to the movement of the appetite. Now it is
evident that every appetite, even the natural appetite,
tends with greater force to repel that which is contrary to it,
if it be present: hence we see that hot water freezes harder,
as though the cold acted with greater force on the hot object.
Since then the appetitive movement of anger is caused by
some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it
follows that the appetite tends with great force to repel the
injury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues great
vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of anger.
And because the movement of anger is not one of recoil,
which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of prosecu-

THE EFFECTS OF ANGER 533

tion, which corresponds to the action of heat, the result is
that the movement of anger produces fervour of the blood
and vital spirits around the heart, which is the instrument
of the soul's passions. And hence it is that, on account of
the heart being so disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are
angry betray signs thereof in their outer members. For,
as Gregory says [Moral, v.) the heart that is inflamed with the
stings of its oivn anger heats quick, the body trembles, the tongue
stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce, they
that are well known are not recognized. With the mouth indeed
he shapes a sound, but the understanding knows not what it
says.

Reply Obj. i. Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence
of the beloved, as Augustine observes [De Trin. x.). Conse-
quently when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excel-
lence that he loves, he feels his love thereof the more : the
result being that his heart is moved with greater heat to
remove the hindrance to the object of his love: so that
anger increases the fervour of love and makes it to be felt
more.

Nevertheless, the fervour arising from heat differs accord-
ing as it is to be referred to love or to anger. Because the
fervour of love has a certain sweetness and gentleness; for
it tends to the good that one loves: whence it is likened to
the warmth of the air and of the blood. For this reason
sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and
hence the saying that love springs from the liver, because of
the blood being formed there.— On the other hand, the
fervour of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency
to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary
evil: whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of
the bile, and for this reason Damascene says [loc. cit.)
that it results from an exhalation of the bile iii)hence it takes
its name %o\^.

Reply Obj. 2. Time, of necessity, weakens all those things,
the causes of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident
that memory is weakened by time ; for things which happened
long ago easily slip from our memory. But anger is caused

534 QUESTION XLVIII

by the memory of a wrong done. Consequently the cause
of anger is impaired little by little as time goes on, until at
length it vanishes altogether. — Moreover a wrong seems
greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is
gradually lessened the further the sense of present wTong
recedes into the past. — The same applies to love, so long as
the cause of love is in the memory alone: wherefore the
Philosopher says [Ethic, vii.) that if a friend's absence lasts
long, it seems to produce a cessation of friendship. But in
the presence of a friend, the cause of friendship is continually
being multiplied by time : wherefore the friendship increases :
and the same would apply to anger, were its cause continually
multiplied.

Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself
proves the strength of its fervour : for as a great fire is soon
spent having burnt up all the fuel ; so too anger, by reason
of its vehemence, soon dies away.

Reply Ohj. 3. Every power that is divided in itself is
weakened. Consequently if a man being already angry
with one, becomes angry with another, by this very fact his
anger with the former is weakened. Especially is this so
if his anger in the second case be greater : because the wrong
done which aroused his former anger, will, in comparison
with the second wrong, which is reckoned greater, seem to
be of little or no account.

Third Article,
whether anger above all hinders the use of reason ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that anger does not hinder the use
of reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason,
does not seem to hinder the use of reason. But anger follows
reason, as stated in Ethic, vii. [Problem, xxviii. ; cf. Ethic, vii.).
Therefore anger does not hinder reason.

Obj. 2. Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less
does man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says
[Ethic, vii.) that an angry man is not cunning hut shows

THE EFFECTS OF ANGER 535

what he thinks. Therefore anger does not seem to hinder
the use of reason, as desire does; for desire is cunning, as he
also states [ibid.).

Ohj. 3. Further, the judgment of reason becomes more
evident by juxtaposition of the contrary : because contraries
stand out more clearly when placed beside one another.
But this also increases anger: for the Philosopher says
{Rhet. ii.) that men are more angry if they receive unwonted
treatment ; for instance ^ honourable men, if they be dishonoured :
and so forth. Therefore the same cause increases anger,
and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore anger
does not hinder the judgment of reason.

On the contrary, Gregory 'says [Moral, v.) that anger
withdraws the light of understanding, while by agitating it
troubles the mind.

I answer that, Although the mind or reason makes no use
of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain
sensitive powers for the execution of its act, the acts of
which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it
follows of necessity that any disturbance in the body hinders
even the judgment of reason; as is clear in the case of
drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated (A. 2) that
anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in the region of
the heart, so much as to affect even the outward members.
Consequently, of all the passions, anger is the most manifest
obstacle to the judgment of reason, according to Ps. xxx. 10 :
My eye is troubled with wrath.

Reply Obj. i. The beginning of anger is in the reason, as
regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal
element of anger. But the passion of anger forestalls the
perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened but im-
perfectly to reason, on account of the commotion of the
heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the
material element of anger. In this respect it hinders the
judgment of reason.

Reply Obj. 2. An angry man is said to show his thoughts, not
because it is clear to him what he ought to do, but because
he acts openly, without thought of hiding himself. This is

536 QUESTION XLVIII

due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern
what should be hidden and what done openly, nor to devise
the means of hiding ; and partly to the dilatation of the heart
which pertains to magnanimity which is an effect of anger:
wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man
{Ethic, iv.) that he is open in his hatreds and his friendships
. . . and speaks and acts openly. — Desire, on the other hand,
is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases,
the pleasurable things that are desired, savour of shame and
voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But
in those things that savour of manliness and excellence,
such as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the
open.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above {ad i), the movement of
anger begins in the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of
one contrary with another facilitates the judgment of reason,
on the same grounds as it increases anger. For when a
man who is possessed of honour or wealth, suffers a loss
therein, this loss seems all the greater, both on account of
the contrast, and because it was unforeseen. Consequently
it causes greater grief: just as a great good, through being
received unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in
proportion to the increase of the grief that precedes,
anger is increased also.

Fourth Article,
whether anger above all causes taciturnity ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that anger does not cause taciturnity.
Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase of
anger conduces to speech; as is evident from the degrees
of anger laid down by Our Lord (Matth. v. 22) : where
He says : Whosoever is angry with his brother ; and ...
whosoever shall say to his brother, ' Raca ' ; and . . . whoso-
ever shall say, ' Thou fool.' Therefore anger does not cause
taciturnity.

Obj. 2. Further, through failing to obey reason, man

THE EFFECTS OF ANGER 537

sometimes breaks out into unbecoming words: hence it is
written (Prov. xxv. 28) : As a city that lieth open and is not
compassed with walls, so is a man that cannot refrain his own
spirit in speaking. But anger, above all, hinders the judg-
ment of reason, as stated above (A. 3). Consequently above
all it makes one break out into unbecoming words. There-
fore it does not cause taciturnity.

Ohj. 3. Further, it is written (Matth. xii. 34): Out of the
abtmdance of the heart the mouth speaketh. But anger, above
all, causes a disturbance in the heart, as stated above (A. 2).
Therefore above all it conduces to speech. Therefore it
does not cause taciturnity.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral, v.) that when anger
does not vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the
more fiercely.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3; Q. XLVI., A. 4),
anger both follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason :
and in both respects it may cause taciturnity. On the part
of the reason, when the judgment of reason prevails so far,
that although it does not curb the appetite in its inordinate
desire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from unbridled
speech. Wherefore Gregory says [Moral, v.) : Sometimes
when the mind is disturbed, anger, as if in judgment, com-
mands silence. — On the part of the impediment to reason
because, as stated above (A. 2), the disturbance of anger
reaches to the outward members, and chiefly to those mem-
bers which reflect more distinctly the emotions of the heart,
such as the e^^es, face and tonp^ue; wherefore, as observed
above (A. 2), the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire,
the eyes grow fierce. Consequently anger may cause such a
disturbance, that the tongue is altogether deprived of speech;
and taciturnity is the result.

Reply Obj. i. Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the
reason from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet
farther, so as to paralyze the tongue and other outward
members.

And this suflices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3. The disturbance of the heart may some-

538 QUESTION XLVIII

times superabound to the extent that the movements of the
outward members are hindered by the inordinate movement
of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and immobiHty of
the outward members; and sometimes even death. — If,
however, the disturbance be not so great, then out of the
abundance of the heart thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds
to speak.

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The '^Summa theological of
St. Thomas Aquinas

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