THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"
glihU CDbstat.
Fr. INNOCENTIUS APAP, O.P., S.T.M.
Censor Theol.
Iinprimatnr.
EDUS. CANONICUS SURMONT
ViCARius Generalis.
Westmonasterii.
APPROBATIO ORDINIS.
^ihU ©bstat.
Fr. VINCENTIUS McNABB, O.P., S.T.M.
Fr. FABIANUS DIX, O.P., B.A.
Imprimatur.
Fr. BEDA JARRETT, O.P., S.T.L.. M.A.,
Prior Provincialis Angli^e.
LONDINI,
Vie 22 Jitlii, IQ22 .
THE
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
THIRD PART (SUPPLEMENT)
QQ. LXXXVII.— XCIX. AND APPENDICES
>>
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CONTENTS
TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS
QUESTION PAGE
LXXXVII. OF THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH, AFTER RISING AGAIN, MEN
WILL HAVE CONCERNING MERITS AND DEMERITS - I
LXXXVIII. TIME AND PLACE OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT - lO
LXXXIX. WHO WILL JUDGE AND WHO WILL BE JUDGED? - 21
XC. UNDER WHAT FORM WILL THE JUDGE APPEAR? - 38
XCI. THE STATE OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGMENT - 48
XCII. THE STATE OF THE BLESSED AFTER THE JUDGMENT:
THE BEATIFIC VISION - - - "7^
XCIII. THEIR BLISS AND THEIR MANSIONS - - - 98
XCIV. THE RELATIONS OF THE BLESSED TOWARDS THE
DAMNED . . . _ . 106
XCV. THE GIFTS OF THE BLESSED - - - III
XCVI. THE AUREOLES - - _ _ - 129
XCVII. THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED- - - 1 68
XCVIII. OF THE WILL AND INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED - 1 84
XCIX. god's MERCY AND JUSTICE TOWARDS THE DAMNED igg
Appendix I.
i. of the quality of those souls who depart this life
with original sin only - - - - * 21 5
2. of the quality of those souls who expiate actual sin
or its punishment in purgatory . - - 224
Appendix H.
two articles on purgatory ----- 236
TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS
THE **SUMMA THEOLOGICA"
THIRD PART (SUPPLEMENT)
QUESTION LXXXVII.
OF THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH, AFTER RISING AGAIN.
MEN WILL HAVE AT THE JUDGMENT CONCERNING
MERITS AND DEMERITS.
{In Three Articles.)
In the next place we must treat of those things which
follow the resurrection. The first of these to be considered
will be the knowledge, which after rising again, men will
have at the judgment, concerning merits and demerits;
the second will be the general judgment itself, as also the
time and place at which it will be ; thirdly we shall consider
who will judge and who will be judged; fourthly we shall
treat of the form wherein the judge will come to judge;
and fifthly we shall consider what will be after the judgment,
the state of the world and of those who will have risen again.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(i) Whether at the judgment every man will know all his
sins ? (2) Whether every one will be able to read all that
is on another's conscience ? (3) Whether one will be able at
one glance to see all merits and demerits ?
First Article.
whether after the resurrection every one will
know what sins he has committed ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that after the resurrection everyone
will not be able to know all the sins he has committed.
For whatever we know, either we receive it anew through
the senses, or we draw it from the treasure house of the
III. 711
Q. 87. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 2
memory. Now after the resurrection men will be unable
to perceive their sins by means of sense, because they will
be things of the past, while sense perceives only the present:
and many sins wiU have escaped the sinner's memory, and
he wiU be unable to recall them from the treasure house of
his memory. Therefore after rising again one will not be
cognizant of all the sins one has committed.
Ohj. 3. Further, It is stated in the text (iv Sent. D. 43).
that there are certain books of the conscience, wherein each
one's merits are inscribed. Now one cannot read a thing
in a book, unless it be marked do^wn in the book : and sin
leaves its mark upon the conscience according to a gloss
of Origen on Rom. ii. 15, Their conscience bearing witness,
etc., which mark, seemingly, is nothing else than the guilt
or stain. Since then in many persons the guilt or stain of
many sins is blotted out by grace, it would seem that one
cannot read in one's conscience all the sins one has com-
mitted: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.
Obj. 3. Further, The greater the cause the greater the
effect. Now the cause which makes us grieve for the sins
which we recaU to memory is charity. Since then charity
is perfect in the saints after the resurrection, they will
grieve exceedingly for their sins, if they recall them to
memory: yet this is impossible, seeing that according to
Apoc. xxi. 4, Sorrow and iiiourning shall flee az£'«y from them.*
Therefore they will not recall their own sins to memory.
Obj. 4. Further, At the resurrection the damned will be
to the good they once did as the blessed to the sins they
once committed. Now seemingly the damned after rising
again will have no knowledge of the good they once did,
since this would alleviate their pain considerably. Neither
therefore will the blessed have any knowledge of the sins
they had committed.
On the contrary, Augustine says [De Civ. Dei, xx.) that
a kind of Divine energy will come to our aid, so that we shall
recall all our sins to mind.
* The quotation is from Isa. xxxv. to. The text of the Apoca-
lypse has: Nor tnoitrmng, not crying, nor sorrow shall be any more.
3 KNOWLEDGE OF MERITS Q.87.ART.1
Further, As human judgment is to external evidence, so is
the Divine judgment to the \vitness of the conscience, accord-
ing to I Kings xvi. 7, Man seeih those things that appear,
but the Lord beholdeth the heart. Now man cannot pass a
perfect judgment on a matter unless evidence be taken on
all the points that need to be judged. Therefore, since the
Divine judgment is most perfect, it is necessary for the
conscience to ^vitness to everything that has to be judged.
But all works, both good and evil, will have to be judged
(2 Cor. V. 10) : We must all he manifested before the judgment
seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of
the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or
evil. Therefore each one's conscience must needs retain all
the works he has done, whether good or evil.
/ answer that, According to Rom. ii. 15, 16, In the day
when God shall judge each one's conscience will bear witness
to him, and his thoughts will accuse and defend him. And
since in every judicial hearing, the witness, the accuser, and
the defendant need to be acquainted with the matter on
which judgment has to be pronounced, and since at the
general judgment all the works of men will be submitted
to judgment, it will behove every man to be cognizant
then of all his works. Wherefore each man's conscience
will be as a book containing his deeds on which judgment
will be pronounced, even as in the human court of law we
make use of records. Of these books it is written in the
Apocalypse (xx. 12) : The books were opened: and another
book was opened, which is the book of life; and the dead were
judged by those things which were written in the books (Vulg., —
book) according to their works. According to Augustine's
exposition {De Civ. Dei, xx.) the books which are here said
to be opened denote the saints of the New and Old Testaments
in whom God's commandments are exemplified. Hence
Richard of S. Victor {De judic. potest.) says: Their hearts
will be like the code of law. But the book of life, of which
the text goes on to speak, signifies each one's conscience,
which is said to be one single book, because the one Divine
power will cause all to recall their deeds, and this energy.
Q. 87. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 4
in so far as it reminds a man of his deeds, is called the hook
of life.*' Or else we may refer the first books to the con-
science, and by the second book we may understand the
Judge's sentence as expressed in His providence.
Reply Ohj. i. Although many merits and demerits will
have escaped our memory, yet there will be none of them
but will remain somewhat in its effect, because those merits
which are not deadened will remain in the reward accorded
to them, while those that are deadened remain in the guilt
of ingratitude, which is increased through the fact that a
man sinned after receiving grace. In like manner those
demerits which are not blotted out by repentance remain
in the debt of punishment due to them, while those which
have been blotted out by repentance remain in the remem-
brance of repentance, which they will recall together with
their other merits. Hence in each man there will be some-
thing whereby he will be able to recollect his deeds. Never-
theless, as Augustine says [loc. cit.), the Divine energy will
especially conduce to this.
Reply Ohj. 2. Each one's conscience will bear certain
marks of the deeds done by him ; and it does not follow that
these marks are the guilt alone, as stated above.
Reply Ohj. 3. Although charity is now the cause of sorrow
for sin, yet the saints in heaven will be so full of joy, that
they will have no room for sorrow; and so they will not
grieve for their sins, but rather will they rejoice in the Divine
mercy, whereby their sins are forgiven them. Even so do
the angels rejoice now in the Divine justice whereby those
whom they guard fall headlong into sin through being
abandoned by grace; and whose salvation none the less
they eagerly watch over.
Reply Ohj. 4. The wicked will know all the good they
have done, and this will not diminish their pain; indeed, it
will increase it, because the greatest sorrow is to have lost
many goods : for which reason Boethius says {De Consol. ii.)
that the greatest misfortune is to have been happy.
* Cf. P. I., Q. XXIV., A. I, ad i.
5 KNOWLEDGE OF MERITS Q. 87. Art. 2
Second Article,
whether every one will be able to read all that is in
another's CONSCIENCE ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that it wiU be impossible for every one
to read all that is in another's conscience. For the know-
ledge of those who rise again will not be clearer than that of
the angels, equality with whom is promised us after the resur-
rection (Matth. xxii. 30). Now angels cannot read one
another's thoughts in matters dependent on the free-wiU,
wherefore they need to speak in order to notify such things
to one another.* Therefore after rising again we shall be
unable to read what is contained in another's conscience.
Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is known is known either in
itself, or in its cause, or in its effect. Now the merits or
demerits contained in a person's conscience cannot be known
by another in themselves, because God alone enters the heart
and reads its secrets. Neither will it be possible for them
to be known in their cause, since all will not see God Who
alone can act on the wiU, whence merits and demerits proceed.
Nor again will it be possible to know them from their effect,
since there will be many demerits, which through being wholly
blotted out by repentance will leave no effect remaining.
Therefore it wiU not be possible for every one to know all
that is in another's conscience.
Obj. 3. Further, Chrysostom says {Horn. xxxi. in Ep. ad
Hebr.), as we have quoted before (iv. Sent. D. 17) : // thou
remember thy sins now, and frequently confess them before God
and beg pardon for them, thou wilt very soon blot them out; but
if thou forget them, thou wilt then remember them unwillingly,
when they will be made public, and declared before all thy
friends and foes, and in the presence of the holy angels. Hence
it follows that this publication will be the punishment of man's
neglect in omitting to confess his sins. Therefore the sins
which a man has confessed will not be made known to others.
Obj. 4. Further, It is a relief to know that one has had
* Cf. P. T.. Q. CVII.
Q. 87. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 6
many associates in sin, so that one is less ashamed thereof.
If therefore every one were to know the sin of another, each
sinner's shame would be much diminished, which is unlikely.
Therefore every one will not know the sins of all.
On the contrary, A gloss on i Cor. iv. 5, will . . . bring to
light the hidden things of darkness, says : Deeds and thoughts
both good and evil will then be revealed and made known to all.
Further, The past sins of all the good will be equally
blotted out. Yet we know the sins of some saints, for instance
of Magdalen, Peter, and David. Therefore in like manner
the sins of the other elect will be known, and much more
those of the damned.
/ answer that. At the last and general judgment it behoves
the Divine justice, which now is in many ways hidden, to
appear evidently to all. Now the sentence of one who
condemns or rewards cannot be just, unless it be delivered
according to merits and demerits. Therefore just as it
behoves both judge and jury to know the merits of a case, in
order to deliver a just verdict, so is it necessary, in order that
the sentence appear to be just, that all who know the sen-
tence should be acquainted with the merits. Hence, since
every one will know of his reward or condemnation, so will
every one else know of it, and consequently as each one will
recall his own merits or demerits, so wiU he be cognizant of
those of others. This is the more probable and more common
opinion, although the Master (iv. Sent. D. 43) says the con-
trary, namely that a man's sins blotted out by repentance
will not be made known to others at the judgment. But it
would follow from this that neither would his repentance
for these sins be perfectly known, which would detract con-
siderably from the glory of the saints and the praise due to
God for having so mercifully delivered them.
Reply Obj. i. All the preceding merits or demerits will
come to a certain amount in the glory or unhappiness of
each one rising again. Consequently through eternal things
being seen all things in their consciences will be visible,
especially as the Divine power will conduce to this so that
the Judge's sentence may appear just to all.
7 KNOWLEDGE OF MERITS Q. 87. Art. 3
Reply Ohj. 2, It will be possible for a man's merits or de-
merits to be made known by their effects as stated above
(A. I, ad i), or by the power of God, although the power of
the created intellect is not sufficient for this.
Reply Ohj. 3. The manifestation of his sins to the confusion
of the sinner is a result of his neglect in omitting to confess
them. But that the sins of the saints be revealed cannot be
to their confusion or shame, as neither does it bring confusion
to Mary Magdalen that her sins are publicly recalled in the
Church, because shame is fear of disgrace, as Damascene says
{De Fide Orthod. ii.), and this will be impossible in the blessed.
But this manifestation will bring them great glory on account
of the penance they did, even as the confessor hails a man
who courageously confesses great crimes. Sins are said to
be blotted out because God sees them not for the purpose of
punishing them.
Reply Obj. 4. The sinner's confusion will not be diminished,
but on the contrary increased, through his seeing the sins
of others, for in seeing that others are blameworthy he will
all the more acknowledge himself to be blamed. For that
confusion be diminished by a cause of this kind is owing to
the fact that shame regards the esteem of men, who esteem
more lightly that which is customary. But then confusion
will regard the esteem of God, which weighs every sin accord-
ing to the truth, whether it be the sin of one man or of many.
Third Article.
r-'f
WHETHER ALL MERITS AND DEMERITS, ONE S OWN AS WELL
AS THOSE OF OTHERS, WILL BE SEEN BY ANYONE AT A
SINGLE GLANCE ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that not all merits and de-
merits, one's own as well as those of others, will be seen by
anyone at a single glance. For things considered singly
are not seen at one glance. Now the damned will consider
their sins singly and will bewail them, wherefore they say
Q. 87. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 8
(Wis. V. 8) : What hath pride profited us ? Therefore they
will not see them all at a glance.
Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says {Topic, ii.) that
we do not arrive at understanding several things at the same
time. Now merits and demerits, both our own and those of
others, will not be visible save to the intellect. Therefore
it will be impossible for them all to be seen at the same time.
Obj. 3. Further, The intellect of the damned after the
resurrection will not be clearer than the intellect of the blessed
and of the angels is now, as to the natural knowledge whereby
they know things by innate species. Now by such know-
ledge the angels do not see several things at the same time.
Therefore neither will the damned be able then to see all
their deeds at the same time.
On the contrary, A gloss on Job viii. 22, They . . . shall
be clothed with confusion, says: As soon as they shall see the
Judge, all their evil deeds will stand before their eyes. Now
they will see the Judge suddenly. Therefore in like manner
will they see the evil they have done, and for the same reason
all others.
Further, Augustine {De Civ. Dei, xx.) considers it unfitting
that at the judgment a material book should be read con-
taining the deeds of each individual written therein, for
the reason that it would be impossible to measure the size
of such a book, or the time it would take to read. But in
like manner it would be impossible to estimate the length
of time one would require in order to consider all one's
merits and demerits and those of others, if one saw these
various things one after the other. Therefore we must
admit that each one sees them all at the same time.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question.
For some say that one will see all merits and demerits,
both one's own and those of others, at the same time in
an instant . This is easily credible with regard to the blessed,
since they will see all things in the Word : and consequently
it is not unreasonable that they should see several things
at the same time. But with regard to the damned, a diffi-
culty presents itself, since their intellect is not raised so
9 KNOWLEDGE OF MERITS Q. 87. Art. 3
that they can see God and all else in Him. Wherefore
others say that the wicked will see all their sins and those of
others generically at the same time : and this suffices for the
accusation or absolution necessary for the judgment; but
that they will not see them all down to each single one at
the same time. But neither does this seem consonant with
the words of Augustine {De Civ. Dei, xx.), who says that they
will count them all with one glance of the mind; and what
is known generically is not counted. Hence we may choose
a middle way, by holding that they will consider each sin
not instantaneously, but in a very short time, the Divine
power coming to their aid. Tliis agrees with the saying of
Augustine {ibid.) that they will be discerned with wondrous
rapidity. Nor is this impossible, since in a space of time,
however short, is potentially an infinite number of instants.
This suffices for the replies to the objections on either side
of the question.
QUESTION LXXXVIIIi.
OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT, AS TO THE TIME AND
PLACE AT WHICH IT WILL BE.
{In Four Articles.)
We must next consider the general judgment, as to the
time and place at which it will be. Under this head there
are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether there will be a
general judgment ? (2) Whether as regards the debate it
will be conducted by word of mouth ? (3) Whether it will
take place at an unknown time ? (4) Whether it will take
place in the valley of Josaphat ?
First Article,
whether there will be a general judgment ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that there will not be a general
judgment. For according to Nahum i. 9, following the
Septuagint version, God will not judge the same thing a
second time. But God judges now of man's every work,
by assigning punishments and rewards to each one after
death, and also by rewarding and punishing certain ones in
this life for their good or evil deeds. Therefore it would
seem that there will be no other judgment.
Ohj. 2. Further, In no judicial inquiry is the sentence
carried out before judgment is pronounced. But the
sentence of the Divine judgment on man regards the acqui-
sition of the kingdom or exclusion from the kingdom
(Matth. XXV. 34, 41). Therefore since some obtain posses-
10
ir GENERAL JUDGMENT Q.88.Art.i
sion of the kingdom now, and some are excluded from it for
ever, it would seem that there will be no other judgment.
Obj. 3. Further, The reason why certain things are sub-
mitted to judgment is that we may come to a decision about
them. Now before the end of the world each of the damned
is awarded his damnation, and each of the blessed his
beatitude. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xii. 41): The men of
Nineve shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall
condemn it. Therefore there will be a judgment after the
resurrection.
Further, It is written (Jo. v. 29) : They that have done
good things shall come forth unto the resurrection of life, hut
they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judg-
ment. Therefore it would seem that after the resurrection
there will be a judgment.
I answer that, Just as operation refers to the beginning
wherefrom things receive their being, so judgment belongs
to the term, wherein they are brought to their end. Now
we distinguish a twofold operation in God. One is that
whereby He first gave things their being, by fashioning
their nature and by establishing the distinctions which
contribute to the perfection thereof: from this work God
is stated to have rested (Gen. ii. 2). His other operation
is that whereby He works in governing creatures; and of
this it is written (Jo. v. 17) : My Father worketh until
now; and I work. Hence we distinguish in Him a twofold
judgment, but in the reverse order. One corresponds to
the work of governance which cannot be without judgment :
and by this judgment each one is judged individually accord-
ing to his works, not only as adapted to himself, but also as
adapted to the government of the universe. Hence one man's
reward is delayed for the good of others (Heb. xi. 13, 39, 40),
and the punishment of one conduces to the profit of another.
Consequently it is necessary that there should be another,
and that a general judgment corresponding on the other hand
with the first formation of things in being, in order that, to
wit, just as then all things proceeded immediately from
Q. 88. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 12
God, so at length the world will receive its ultimate comple-
ment, by each one receiving finally his own personal due.
Hence at this judgment the Divine justice will be made
manifest in all things, whereas now it remains hidden, for
as much as at times some persons are dealt with for the
profit of others, otherwise than their manifest works would
seem to require. For this same reason there will then be a
general separation of the good from the wicked, because
there will be no further motive for the good to profit by
the wicked, or the wicked by the good: for the sake of
which profit the good are meanwhile mingled with the
wicked, so long as this state of life is governed by Divine
providence .
Reply Obj. i. Each man is both an individual person and
a part of the whole human race : wherefore a twofold judg-
ment is due to him. One, the particular judgment, is that
to which he will be subjected after death, when he will
receive according as he hath done in the body* not indeed
entirely but only in part, since he will receive not in the
body but only in the soul. The other judgment will be
passed on him as a part of the human race : thus a man is
said to be judged according to human justice, even when
judgment is pronounced on the community of which he is a
part. Hence at the general judgment of the whole human
race by the general separation of the good from the wicked,
it follows that each one will be judged. And yet God will
not judge the same thing a second time, since He \\ill not
inflict two punishments for one sin, and the punishment
which before the judgment was not inflicted completely will
be completed at the last judgment, after which the wicked
will be tormented at the same time in body and soul.
Reply Obj. z. The sentence proper to this general judg-
ment is the general separation of the good from the wicked,
which will not precede this judgment. Yet even now, as
regards the particular sentence on each individual, the
judgment does not at once take full effect, since even the
good will receive an increase of reward after the judgment,
* Cf. 2 Cor. V. 10.
13 GENERAL JUDGMENT Q. 88. Art. 2
both from the added glory of the body and from the com-
pletion of the number of the saints. The wicked also will
receive an increase of torment from the added punishment
of the body and from the completion of the number of
damned to be punished, because the more numerous those
with whom they will burn, the more will they themselves
burn.
Reply Ohj. 3. The general judgment will regard more
directly the generality of men than each individual to be
judged, as stated above. Wherefore although before that
judgment each one will be certain of his condemnation or
reward, he will not be cognizant of the condemnation or
reward of everyone else. Hence the necessity of the general
judgment.
Second Article,
whether the judgment will take place by word
OF MOUTH ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that this judgment, as regards
the inquiry and sentence, will take place by word of mouth.
For according to Augustine {De Civ. Dei, xx.) it is uncertain
how 7nany days this jitdgment will last. But it would not be
uncertain if the things we are told will take place at the
judgment were to be accomplished only in the mind. There-
fore this judgment will take place by word of mouth and not
only in the mind.
Ohj. a. Further, Gregory says (Moral, xxvi.) : Those at
least will hear the words of the Judge, who have confessed their
faith in Him by words. Now this cannot be understood as
referring to the inner word, because thus all will hear the
Judge's words, since all the deeds of other men will be known
to all both good and wicked. Therefore it seems that this
judgment will take place by word of mouth.
Obj. 3. Further, Christ will judge according to His human
form, so as to be visible in the body to all. Therefore in
like manner it seems that He will speak with the voice of
the body, so as to be heard by all.
Q. 88. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA ' ' 14
On the contrary, Augustine says [De Civ. Dei, xx.) that the
book of life which is mentioned Apoc. xx 12, 15 is a
kind of Divine energy enabling each one to remember all his
good or evil works, and to discern them with the gaze of the mind,
with wondrous rapidity, his knowledge accusing or defending
his conscience, so that all and each will he judged at the same
7noment. But if each one's merits were discussed by word
of mouth, all and each could not be judged at the same
moment. Therefore it would seem that this judgment \vill
not take place by word of mouth.
Further, The sentence should correspond proportionately
to the evidence. Now the evidence both of accusation and
of defence will be mental, according to Rom. ii, 15, 16,
Their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts
between themselves accusing or also defending one another in
the day when God shall judge the secrets of men. Therefore,
seemingly, this sentence and the entire judgment will take
place mentally.
I answer that. It is not possible to come to any certain
conclusion about the truth of this question. It is, however,
the more probable opinion that the whole of this judgment,
whether as regards the inquiry, or as regards the accusation
of the wicked and the approval of the good, or again as
regards the sentence on both, will take place mentally.
For if the deeds of each individual were to be related by word
of mouth, this would require an inconceivable length of
time. Thus Augustine says {loc. cit.) that if we suppose
the hook, from the pages of which all will he judged according
to Apoc. XX., to he a material book, ii)ho will be able to conceive
its size and length ? or the length of time required for the reading
of a book that contains the entire life of every individual ?
Nor is less time requisite for telling by word of mouth the
deeds of each individual, than for reading them if the}^ were
written in a material book. Hence, probably we should
understand that the details set forth in Matth. xxv. will be
fulfilled not by word of mouth but mentally.
Reply Obj. i. The reason why Augustine says that it is
uncertain Jiow many days this judgment will last is precisely
15 GENERAL JUDGMENT Q. 88. Art. 3
because it is not certain whether it will take place mentally
or by word of mouth. For ii it were to take place by word
of mouth, a considerable time would be necessary; but if
mentally, it is possible for it to be accomplished in an instant.
Reply Ohj. 2. Even if the judgment is accomplished solely
in the mind, the saying of Gregory stands, since though all
will be cognizant of their own and of others' deeds, as a
result of the Divine energy which the Gospel describes as
speech (Matth. xxv. 34-46), nevertheless those who have
had the faith which they received through God's words will
be judged from those very words, for it is written (Rom. ii. 12) :
Whosoever have sinned in the Law shall be judged by the
Law. Hence in a special way something will be said to
those who had been believers, which will not be said to
unbelievers.
Reply Obj. 3. Christ will appear in body, so that the
Judge may be recognized in the body by all, and it is possible
for this to take place suddenly. But speech which is
measured by time would require an immense length of time,
if the judgment took place by word of mouth.
Third Article.
whether the time of the future judgment
is unknown ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the time of the future
judgment is not unknown. For just as the holy Fathers
looked forward to the first coming, so do we look forward
to the second. But the holy Fathers knew the time of the
first coming, as proved by the number of weeks mentioned
in Dan. ix. : wherefore the Jews are reproached for not
knowing the time of Christ's coming (Luke xii. 56) : You
hypocrites, you know how to discern the face of the heaven and
of the earth, but how is it that you do not discern this time ?
Therefore it would seem that the time of the second coming
when God will come to judgment should also be certified
to us.
Q. 88. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 16
Ohj. 2. Further, We arrive by means of signs at the know-
ledge of the things signified. Now many signs of the coming
judgment are declared to us in Scripture (Matth. xxiv.,
Mark xiii., Luke xxi.). Therefore we can arrive at the know-
ledge of that time.
Ohj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (i Cor. x. 11) : It is on
us* that the ends of the world are come, and (i Jo. ii. 18) :
Little children, it is the last hour, etc. Since then it is a long
time since these things were said, it would seem that now
at least we can know that the last judgment is nigh.
Ohj. 4. Further, There is no need for the time of the judg-
ment to be hidden, except that each one may be careful to
prepare himself for judgment, being in ignorance of the
appointed time. Yet the same care would still be necessary
even were the time knowoi for certain, because each one is
uncertain about the time of his death, of which Augustine
says [Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix.) that as each ones last day finds
him, so will the world's last day find him. Therefore there is
no necessity for the time of the judgment to be uncertain.
On the contrary, It is written (Mark xiii. 32) : Of that day or
hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the
Son, but the Father. The Son, however, is said not to know
in so far as He does not impart the knowledge to us.
Further, It is written (i Thess. v. 2) : The day of the Lord
shall so come as a thief in the night. Therefore seemingly, as
the coming of a thief in the night is altogether uncertain, the
day of the last judgment is altogether uncertain.
I answer that, God is the cause of things by His knowledge, f
Now He communicates both these things to His creatures,
since He both endows some with the power of action on
others whereof they are the cause, and bestows on
some the knowledge of things. But in both cases He
reserves something to Himself, for He operates certain
things wherein no creature co-operates with Him, and
again He knows certain things which are unknown to any
* These things . . . are written Jor our correction, upon whom the
ends of the world are come.
t Cf. P. I., Q. XIV., A. 8.
17 GENERAL JUDGMENT Q. 88. Art. 3
mere creature. Now this should apply to none more than to
those things which are subject to the Divine power alone,
and in which no creature co-operates with Him. Such is the
end of the world when the day of judgment will come. For
the world "will come to an end by no created cause, even as
it derived its existence immediately from God. Wherefore
the knowledge of the end of the world is fittingly reserved
to God. Indeed our Lord seems to assign this very reason
when He said (Acts i. 7) : It is not for you to know the times
or moments which the Father hath put in His own power, as
though He were to say, which are reserved to His power alone.
Reply Obj. i. At His first coming Christ came secretly
according to Isa. xlv. 15, Verily Thou art a hidden God, the
God of Israel, the Saviour. Hence, that He might be recog-
nized by believers, it was necessary for the time to be fixed
beforehand with certainty. On the other hand, at the second
coming, He will come openly, according to Ps. xlix. 3, God
shall come manifestly. Consequently there can be no error
affecting the knowledge of His coming. Hence the compari-
son fails.
Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says, in his letter to Hesychius
concerning the day of judgment {Ep. cxcix.), the sights men-
tioned in the Gospels do not all refer to the second advent which
will happen at the end of the world, hut some of them belong
to the time of the sack of Jerusalem., which is now a thing of the
past, while some, in fact many of them, refer to the advent whereby
He ccnnes daily to the Church, whom He visits spiritually
when He dwells in us hy faith and love. Moreover, the details
mentioned in the Gospels and Epistles in connexion with
the last advent are not sufficient to enable us to determine
the time of the judgment, for the trials that are foretold as
announcing the proximity of Christ's coming occurred even
at the time of the Early Church, in a degree sometimes more
sometimes less marked ; so that even the days of the apostles
were called the last days (Acts ii. 17) when Peter expounded
the saying of Joel ii. 28, It shall come to pass in the last days,
etc., as referring to that time. Yet it was already a long
time since then : and sometimes there were more and some-
III. 7 • 2
Q. 88. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 18
times less afflictions in the Church. Consequently it is im-
possible to decide after how long a time it will take place,
nor fix the month, year, century, or thousand years as Augus-
tine says in the same book {loc. cit.). And even if we are to
believe that at the end these calamities will be more fre-
quent, it is impossible to fix what amount of such calamities
will immediately precede the judgment day or the coming
of Antichrist, since even at the time of the Early Church
persecutions were so bitter, and the corruptions of error were
so numerous, that some looked forward to the coming of
Antichrist as being near or imminent ; as related in Eusebius'
History of the Church (vi. 6) and in Jerome's book De Viris
Illustrihiis (Cap. Judex de septuaginta).
Reply Obj. 3. The statement. It is the last hour and similar
expressions that are to be found in Scripture do not enable
us to know the exact length of time. For they are not in-
tended to indicate a short length of time, but to signify the
last state of the world, which is the last age of all, and it is
not stated definitely how long this will last. Thus neither
is fixed duration appointed to old age, which is the last age
of man, since sometimes it is seen to last as long as or even
longer than all the previous ages, as Augustine remarks
[Qq. 83, qu. Iviii.). Hence also the Apostle (2 Thess. ii. 2)
disclaims the false signification which some had given to his
words, by believing that the day of the Lord was already at
hand.
Reply Obj. 4. Notwithstanding the uncertainty of death,
the uncertainty of the judgment conduces to watchfulness
in two ways. First, as regards the thing ignored, since its
delay is equal to the length of man's life, so that on either
side uncertainty provokes him to greater care. Secondly,
for the reason that a man is careful not only of his own person,
but also of his family, or of his city or kingdom, or of the
whole Church, the length of whose duration is not dependent
on the length of man's Hfe. And yet it behoves each of these
to be so ordered that the day of the Lord find us not unpre-
pared.
19 GENERAL JUDGMENT Q. 88. Art. 4
Fourth Article.
whether the judgment will take place in the valley
of josaphat ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the judgment will not
take place in the valley of Josaphat or in the surrounding
locaUty. For at least it will be necessary for those to be
judged to stand on the ground, and those alone to be raised
aloft whose business it will be to judge. But the whole land
of promise would not be able to contain the multitude of those
who are to be judged. Therefore it is impossible for the
judgment to take place in the neighbourhood of that valley.
Obj. 2. Further, To Christ in His human form judgment
is given that He may judge justly, since He was judged un-
justly in the court of Pilate, and bore the sentence of an
unjust judgment on Golgotha. Therefore these places
would be more suitably appointed for the judgment.
Obj. 3. Further, Clouds result from the exhalation of
vapours. But then there will be no evaporation or exhala-
tion. Therefore it will be impossible for the just to be taken
up . . . in the clouds to meet Christ, into the air : and conse-
quently it will be necessary for both good and wicked to be
on the earth, so that a much larger place than this valley
will be requiied.
On the contrary, It is written (Joel iii. 2): I will gather
together all nations and will bring them down into the valley
of Josaphat, and I will plead with them there.
Further, It is written (Acts i. 11): {This Jesus) . . . shall
so come as you have seen Him going into heaven. Now He
ascended into heaven from Mount Olivet which overlooks
the valley of Josaphat. Therefore He will come to judge
in the neighbourhood of that place.
I answer that. We cannot know with any great certainty
the manner in which this judgment will take place, nor how
men will gather together to the place of judgment; but it
may be gathered from Scripture that in all probability He
will descend in the neighbourhood of Mount Olivet, even as
Q. 88. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 20
He ascended from there, so as to show that He who descends
is the same as He who ascended.
Reply Ohj. i. A great multitude can be enclosed in a small
space. And all that is required is that in the neighbourhood
of that locality there be a space, however great, to contain
the multitude of those who are to be judged, provided that
Christ can be seen thence, since being raised in the air, and
shining with exceeding glory, He will be visible from a great
distance.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although through being sentenced unjustly
Christ merited His judiciary power. He will not judge
with the appearance of infirmity wherein He was judged
unjustly, but under the appearance of glory wherein He
ascended to the Father. Hence the place of His ascension
is more suitable to the judgment than the place where He
was condemned.
Reply Obj. 3. In the opinion of some the name of clouds
is here given to certain condensations of the light shining
from the bodies of the saints, and not to evaporations from
earth and water. Or we may say that those clouds will be
produced by Divine power in order to show the parallel
between His coming to judge and His ascension; so that He
Who ascended in a cloud may come to judgment in a cloud.
Again the cloud on account of its refreshing influence
indicates the mercy of the Judge.
QUESTION LXXXIX.
OF THOSE WHO WILL JUDGE AND OF THOSE WHO
WILL BE JUDGED AT THE GENERAL JUDGMENT.
(/« Eight Articles.)
We must next consider who will judge and who will be
judged at the general judgment. Under tliis head there are
eight points of inquiry: (i) Whether any men will judge
together with Christ ? (2) Whether the judicial power
corresponds to voluntary poverty ? (3) Whether the angels
also will judge ? (4) Whether the demons will carry out the
Judge's sentence on the damned ? (5) Whether all men
will come up for judgment ? (6) Whether any of the good
will be judged ? (7) Whether any of the wicked will be
judged ? (8) Whether the angels also will be judged ?
First Article,
whether any men will judge together with christ ?
We proceed thus to the First A rticle : —
Objection i. It would seem that no men will judge with
Christ. For it is written (Jo. v. 22, 23) : The Father . . .
hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men may honour
the Son. Therefore, etc.
Obj. 2. Further, Whoever judges has authority over that
which he judges. Now those things about which the coming
judgment will have to be, such as human merits and de-
merits, are subject to Divine authority alone. Therefore
no one is competent to judge of those things.
Obj. 3. Further, This judgment will take place not vocally
but mentally. Now the publication of merits and demerits
21
Q. 89. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 22
in the hearts of all men (which is like an accusation or ap-
proval), or the repayment of punishment and reward (which
is like the pronouncement of the sentence) will be the work
of God alone. Therefore none but Christ Who is God will
judge.
On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xix. 28): You also
shall sit on twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel.
Therefore, etc.
Further, The Lord will enter into judgment with the ancients
of His people (Isa. iii. 14). Therefore it would seem that
others also will judge together with Christ.
/ answer that, To judge has several significations. First
it is used causally as it were, when we say it of that which
proves that some person ought to be judged. In this
sense the expression is used of certain people in com-
parison, in so far as some are shown to be deserving of
judgment through being compared with others: for instance
(Matth. xii. 41) : The men of Nineve shall rise in judgment
with this generation, and shall condemn it. To rise in
judgment thus is common to the good and the wicked.
Secondly, the expression to judge is used equivalently, so to
say; for consent to an action is considered equivalent to
doing it. Wherefore those who will consent with Christ
the Judge, by approving His sentence, will be said to judge.
In this sense it will belong to all the elect to judge : where-
fore it is written (Wis. iii. 7, 8) : The just . . . shall judge
nations. Thirdly, a person is said to judge assessorially
and by simihtude, because he is like the judge in that his
seat* is raised above the others: and thus assessors are
said to judge. Some say that the perfect to whom judiciary
power is promised (Matth. xix. 28) will judge in this sense,
namely that they will be raised to the dignity of assessors,
because they will appear above others at the judgment,
and go forth to meet Christ, into the air. But this apparently
does not suffice for the fulfilment of our Lord's promise
{ibid.): You shall sit . . . judging, for He would seem to
make judging something additional to sitting. Hence there
* An assessor is one who sits by the judge.
23 WHO WILL BE JUDGES ? Q. 89. Art. i
is a fourth way of judging, which will be competent to per-
fect men as containing the decrees of Divine justice according
to which men will be judged: thus a book containing the
law might be said to judge : wherefore it is written (Apoc. xx.
12): {Judgment took her seat)* and the books were opened.
Richard of S. Victor expounds this judging in this way
[De judic. potest.), wherefore he says : Those who persevere in
Divine contemplation, who read every day the hook of wisdom,
transcribe, so to speak, in their hearts whatever they grasp by
their clear insight of the truth; and further on : What else are
the hearts of those who judge, divinely instructed in all truth,
but a codex of the law ? Since, however, judging denotes an
action exercised on another person, it foUows that, properly
speaking, he is said to judge who pronounces judgment on
another. But this happens in two ways. First, by his
own authority : and this belongs to the one who has dominion
and power over others, and to whose ruling those who are
judged are subject, wherefore it belongs to him to pass
judgment on them. In this sense to judge belongs to God
alone. Secondly, to judge is to acquaint others of the
sentence dehvered by another's authority, that is to announce
the verdict already given. In this way perfect men will
judge, because they will lead others to the knowledge of
Divine justice, that these may know what is due to them
on account of their merits: so that this very revelation of
justice is called judgment. Hence Richard of S. Victor
says {loc. cit.) that for the judges to open the books of their
decree in the presence of those who are to be judged signifies
that they open their hearts to the gaze of all those who are below
them, and that they reveal their knowledge in whatever pertains
to the judgment.
Reply Obj. 1. This objection considers the judgment of
authority which belongs to Christ alone: and the same
answer appHes to the Second Objection.
Reply Obj. 3. There is no reason why some of the saints
* The words in brackets are not in the Vulgate. Verse 4 we
find : / saw seats, and they sat upon them and judgment was given to
them.
Q. 89. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 24
should not reveal certain things to others, either by way of
enlightenment, as the higher angels enlighten the lower,*
or by way of speech as the lower angels speak to the higher, f
Second Article.
whether the judicial power corresponds to
voluntary poverty ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the judicial power does
not correspond to voluntary poverty. For it was promised
to none but the twelve apostles (Matth. xix. 28) : You shall
sit on twelve seats, judging, etc. Since then those who are
voluntarily poor are not all apostles, it would seem that
the judicial power is not competent to all.
Obj. 2. Further, To offer sacrifice to God of one's own
body is more than to do so of outward things. Now martyrs
and also virgins offer sacrifice to God of their own body;
whereas the voluntarily poor offer sacrifice of outward
things. Therefore the sublimity of the judicial power is
more in keeping with martyrs and virgins than with those
who are voluntarily poor.
Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Jo. v. 45): There is one
that accuseth you, Moses in whom you trust: — because you
believe not his voice, according to a gloss, and {ibid. xii. 48) :
The word that I have spoken shall judge him in the last day.
Therefore the fact that a man propounds a law, or exhorts
men by word to lead a good life, gives him the right to judge
those who scorn his utterances. But this belongs to doctors.
Therefore it is more competent to doctors than to those who
are poor voluntarily.
Obj. 4. Further, Christ through being judged unjustly
merited as man to be judge of all in His human nature.l
according to Jo. v. 27, He hath given Him power to do
judgment, because He is the Son of man. Now those who
suffer persecution for justice' sake are judged unjustly.
* Cf. P. I., Q. CVI. t Cf. P. I., Q. CVII., A. 2.
X Cf. p. III., Q. LIX., A. 6.
25 WHO WILL BE JUDGES ? Q. 89. Art. 2
Therefore the judicial power is competent to them rather
than to the voluntarily poor.
Obj. 5. Further, A superior is not judged by his inferior.
Now many who will have made lawful use of riches will
have greater merit than many of the voluntarily poor.
Therefore the voluntarily poor will not judge where those
are to be judged.
On the contrary, It is written (Job xxxvi. 6): He saveth
not the wicked, and He giveth judgment to the poor.
Further, A gloss on Matth. xix. 28, You who have left all
things* says : Those who left all things and followed God will
he the judges; those who made right use of what they had law-
fully will be judged, and thus the same conclusion follows
as before.
/ answer that, The judicial power is due especially to
poverty on three counts. First, by reason of congruity,
since voluntary poverty belongs to those who despise all
the things of the world and cleave to Christ alone. Con-
sequently there is nothing in them to turn away their judg-
ment from justice, so that they are rendered competent to
be judges as loving the truth of justice above all things.
Secondly, by reason of merit, since exaltation corresponds
by way of merit to humility. Now of all the things that
make man contemptible in this world humility is the chief:
and for this reason the excellence of judicial power is pro-
mised to the poor, so that he who humbles himself for
Christ's sake shall be exalted. Thirdly, because poverty
disposes a man to the aforesaid manner of judging. For the
reason why one of the saints will be said to judge, as stated
above (A. i), is that he will have the heart instructed in all
Divine truth which he will be thus able to make known to
others. Now in the advancement to perfection, the first
thing that occurs to be renounced is external wealth, be-
cause this is the last thing of all to be acquired. And that
which is last in the order of generation is the first in the order
of destruction: wherefore among the beatitudes whereby
we advance to perfection, the first place is given to poverty.
♦ Vulg., — You who have followed Me.
Q. 89. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 26
Thus judicial power corresponds to poverty, in so far as this
is the first disposition to the aforesaid perfection. Hence
also it is that this same power is not promised to all who are
voluntarily poor, but to those who leave all and follow
Christ in accordance with the perfection of Hfe.
Reply Ohj. i. According to Augustine {De Civ. Dei, xx.),
we must not imagine that because He says that they will sit on
twelve seats, 07ily twelve men will judge with Him ; else since
we react that Matthias was appointed apostle in the place of
the traitor Judas, Paul who worked more than the rest will have
nowhere to sit as judge. Hence the number twelve, as he
states {ibid.), signifies the whole multitude of those who will
judge, because the two parts of seven, namely three and four,
being multiplied together make twelve. Moreover twelve is a
perfect number, being the double of six, which is a perfect
number.
Or, speaking literally, He spoke to the twelve apostles in
whose person he made this promise to all who follow them.
Reply Obj. 2. Virginity and martyrdom do not dispose
man to retain the precepts of Divine justice in his heart in
the same degree as poverty does : even so, on the other hand,
outward riches choke the word of God by the cares which they
entail (Luke viii. 14). Or we may reply that poverty does
not suffice alone to merit judicial power, but is the funda-
mental part of that perfection to which the judicial power
corresponds. Wherefore among those things regarding
perfection which follow after poverty we may reckon both
virginity and martyrdom and all the works of perfection:
yet they do not rank as high as poverty, since the beginning
of a thing is its chief part.
Reply Obj. 3. He who propounded the law or urged men
to good will judge, in the causal* sense, because others will
be judged in reference to the words he has uttered or pro-
pounded. Hence the judicial power does not properly
correspond to preaching or teaching. Or we may reply that,
as some say, three things are requisite for the judicial power:
first that one renounce temporal cares, lest the mind be
* Cf. A. I.
27 WHO WILL BE JUDGES ? Q. 89. Art. 3
hindered from the contemplation of wisdom; secondly that
one possess Divine justice by way of habit both as to know-
ledge and as to observance; thirdly that one should have
taught others this same justice; and this teaching will be
the perfection whereby a man merits to have judicial power.
Reply Obj. 4. Christ humbled Himself in that He was
judged unjustly; for He was offered because it was His own
will (Isa. liii. 7): and by His humility He merited His
exaltation to judicial power, since all things are made sub-
ject to Him (Philip, ii. 8, 9). Hence, judicial power is
more due to them who humble themselves of their own will
by renouncing temporal goods, on account of which men
are honoured by worldlings, than to those who are humbled
by others.
Reply Obj. 5. An inferior cannot judge a superior by his
own authority, but he can do so by the authority of a
superior, as in the case of a judge -delegate. Hence it is not
unfitting that it be granted to the poor as an accidental
reward to judge others, even those who have higher merit
in respect of the essential reward.
Third Article,
whether the angels will judge ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the angels will judge.
For it is written (Matth. xxv. 81) : When the Son of man shall
come in His majesty, and all the angels with Him. Now He
is speaking of His coming to judgment. Therefore it would
seem that also the angels will judge.
Obj. 2. Further, The orders of the angels take their
names from the offices which they fulfil. Now one of the
angelic orders is that of the Thrones, which would seem
to pertain to the judicial power, since a throne is the judicial
bench, a royal seat, a professor's chair. '^ Therefore some of
the angels will judge.
Obj. 3. Further, Equality with the angels is promised the
* S. Isidore, Etym. vii. 5.
Q. 89. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 28
saints after this life (Matth. xxii. 30). If then men will have
this power of judging, much more will the angels have it.
On the contrary, It is written (Jo. v. 27) : He hath given
Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man.
But the angels have not the human nature in common with
Him. Neither therefore do they share with Him in the
judicial power.
Further, The same person is not judge and judge's minister.
Now in this judgment the angels will act as ministers of the
Judge and, according to Matth. xiii. 41: The Son of man
shall send His angels and they shall gather out of His kingdom
all scandals. Therefore the angels will not judge.
/ answer that, The judge's assessors must be conformed to
the judge. Now judgment is ascribed to the Son of man
because He will appear to all, both good and wicked, in His
human nature, although the whole Trinity wiU judge by
authority. Consequently it behoves also the Judge's
assessors to have the human nature, so as to be visible to all,
both good and wicked. Hence it is not fitting for the angels
to judge, although in a certain sense we may say that the
angels will judge, namely by approving the sentence.*
Reply Obj. i. As a gloss on this passage observes, the
angels will come with Christ, not to judge, but as witnesses of
men's deeds, because it was under their guardianship that men
did well or ill.
Reply Obj. 2. The name of Thrones is given to angels
in reference to the judgment which God is ever pronouncing,
by governing all things with supreme justice: of which
judgment angels are in a way the executors and promulgators.
On the other hand, the judgment of men by the man Christ
will require human assessors.
Reply Obj. 3. Equality with angels is promised to men
as regards the essential reward. But nothing hinders an
accidental reward from being bestowed on men to the ex-
clusion of the angels, as in the case of the virgins' and
martyrs' crowns: and the same may be said of the judicial
power.
* Cf. A. I.
29 WHO WILL BE JUDGES ? Q. 89. Art. 4
Fourth Article.
whether the demons will carry out the sentence
of the judge on the damned ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the demons will not carry
out the sentence of the Judge on the damned after the day
of judgment. For, according to the Apostle (i Cor. xv. 24) :
He will then bring to nought* all principality, and power, and
virtue. Therefore all supremacy will cease then. But the
carrying out of the Judge's sentence implies some kind of
supremacy. Therefore after the judgment day the demons
will not carry out the Judge's sentence.
Obj. 2. Further, The demons sinned more grievously than
men. Therefore it is not just that men should be tortured
by demons.
Obj. 3. Further, Just as the demons suggest evil things to
men, so good angels suggest good things. Now it will not be
the duty of the good angels to reward the good, but this wiU
be done by God, immediately by Himself. Therefore neither
will it be the duty of the demons to punish the wicked.
On the contrary, Sinners have subjected themselves to
the devil by sinning. Therefore it is just that they should
be subjected to him in their punishments, and punished by
him as it were.
/ answer that. The Master in the text of iv. Sent. D. 47
mentions two opinions on this question, both of which seem
consistent with Divine justice, because it is just for man to be
subjected to the devil for having sinned, and yet it is unjust
for the demon to be over him. Accordingly the opinion which
holds that after the judgment day the demons wiU not be
placed over men to punish them, regards the order of Divine
justice on the part of the demons punishing; while the con-
trary opinion regards the order of Divine justice on the part
of the men punished.
Which of these opinions is nearer the truth we cannot
* Vulg., — When He shall have brought to nought, etc.
Q. 89. Art.4 the " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 30
know for certain. Yet I think it truer to say that just as,
among the saved, order will be observed so that some will
be enlightened and perfected by others (because all the
orders of the heavenly hierarchies will continue for ever),*
so, too, will order be observed in punishments, men being
punished by demons, lest the Divine order, whereby the
angels are placed between the human nature and the Divine,
be entirely set aside. Wherefore just as the Divine illumi-
nations are conveyed to men by the good angels, so too the
demons execute the Divine justice on the wicked. Nor
does this in any way diminish the punishment of the
demons, since even in torturing others they are themselves
tortured, because then the fellowship of the unhappy will
not lessen but will increase unhappiness.
Reply Obj. i. The supremacy which, it is declared, will
be brought to nought by Christ in the time to come must
be taken in the sense of the supremacy which is in keeping
with the state of this world: wherein men are placed over
men, angels over men, angels over angels, demons over
demons, and demons over men ; in every case so as either
to lead towards the end or to lead astray from the end.
But then, when all things will have attained to that end,
there will be no supremacy to lead astray from the end or to
lead to it, but only that which maintains in the end, good
or evil.
Reply Obj. 2. Although the demerit of the demons does
not require that they be placed over men, since they made
men subject to them unjustly, yet this is required by the
order of their nature in relation to human nature: since
natural goods remain in them unimpaired as Dionysius says
[Div. Nam. iv.).
Reply Obj. 3. The good angels are not the cause of the
principal reward in the elect, because all receive this imme-
diately from God. Nevertheless the angels are the cause
of certain accidental rewards in men, in so far as the higher
angels enlighten those beneath them, both angels and men,
concerning certain hidden things of God, which do not
* Cf. P. I., Q. CVm., AA. 7, 8.
31 WHO WILL BE JUDGED ? Q. 89. Art. 5
belong to the essence of beatitude. In like manner the
damned will receive their principal punishment immediately
from God, namely the everlasting banishment from the
Divine vision : but there is no reason why the demons should
not torture men with other sensible punishments. There
is, however, this difference : that merit exalts, whereas sin
debases. Wherefore since the angelic nature is higher than
the human, some on account of the excellence of their merit
will be so far exalted as to be raised above the angels both
in nature and reward,* so that some angels will be enlight-
ened by some men. On the other hand, no human sinners
wiU, on account of a certain degree of virtue, attain to the
eminence that attaches to the nature of the demons.
Fifth Article.
whether all men will be present at the judg-
MENT ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that men will not all be present
at the judgment. For it is written (Matth. xix. 28): You
. . . shall sit on twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.
But all men do not belong to those twelve tiibes. Therefore
it would seem that men will not all be present at the judg-
ment.
Obj. 2. Further, The same apparently is to be gathered
from Ps. i. 5, The wicked shall not rise again in judgment.
Obj. 3. Further, A man is brought to judgment that his
merits may be discussed. But some there are who have
acquired no merits, such as children who died before reaching
the perfect age. Therefore they need not be present at the
judgment. Now there are many such. Therefore it would
seem that not all will be present.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts x. 42) that Christ
was appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead.
Now this division comprises all men, no matter how the
* Cf. P. I., Q. CVIII., A. 8.
Q. 89. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 32
living be distinct from the dead. Therefore all men will be
present at the judgment.
Further, It is written (Apoc. i. 7): Behold He cometh with
the clouds, and every eye shall see Him. Now this would not
be so unless all were present at the judgment. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, The judicial power was bestowed on Christ
as man, in reward for the humility which He showed forth in
His passion. Now in His passion He shed His blood for all
in point of sufhciency, although through meeting with an
obstacle in some, it had not its effect in all. Therefore it is
fitting that all men should assemble at the judgment, to see
His exaltation in His human nature, in respect of which
He was appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead.
Reply Obj. i. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei, xx. 5), it
does not follow from the saying, ' Judging the twelve tribes of
Israel, ' that the tribe of Levi, which is the thirteenth, is not to be
judged, or that they will judge that people alone, and not other
nations. The reason why all other nations are denoted by
the twelve tribes is because they were called by Christ to
take the place of the twelve tribes.
Reply Obj. 2. The words, The wicked shall not rise in
judgment, if referred to all sinners, mean that they will not
arise to judge. But if the wicked denote unbelievers, the
sense is that they will not arise to be judged, because they
are already jiidged (Jo. iii. 18). All, however, will rise again
to assemble at the judgment and witness the glory of the
Judge.
Reply Obj. 3. Even children who have died before reaching
the perfect age will be present at the judgment, not to be
judged, but to see the Judge's glory.
Sixth Article.
whether the good will be judged at the
judgment ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that none of the good will be
judged at the judgment. For it is declared (Jo. iii. 18) that
33 WHO WILL BE JUDGED ? Q. 89. Art. 6
he that helieveth in Him is not judged. Now all the good
beUeved in Him. Therefore they will not be judged.
Obj. 2. Further, Those who are uncertain of their bliss
are not blessed: whence Augustine proves {Gen. ad Lit. xi.)
that the demons were never blessed. But the saints are
now blessed. Therefore they are certain of their bliss.
Now what is certain is not submitted to judgment. There-
fore the good will not be judged.
Obj. 3. Further, Fear is incompatible with bliss. But
the last judgment, which above all is described as terrible,
cannot take place without inspiring fear into those who
are to be judged. Hence Gregory observes on Job. xli. 16
When he shall raise him up, the angels shall fear, etc.
{Moral, xxxiv.) : Consider how the conscience of the wicked
will then be troubled, when even the just are disturbed about
their life. Therefore the blessed will not be judged.
On the contrary. It would seem that all the good will be
judged, since it is written (2 Cor. v. 10) : We must all be mani-
fested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may
receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done,
whether it be good or evil. Now there is nothing else to be
judged. Therefore aU, even the good, will be judged.
Further, The general includes all. Now this is called
the general judgment. Therefore all will be judged.
/ answer that. The judgment comprises two things, namely
the discussion of merits and the payment of rewards. As
regards the payment of rewards, all will be judged, even the
good, since the Divine sentence will appoint to each one the
reward corresponding to his merit. But there is no discus-
sion of merits save where good and evil merits are mingled
together. Now those who build on the foundation of faith,
gold, silver, and precious stones (i Cor. iii. 12), by devoting
themselves wholly to the Divine service, and who have no not-
able admixture of evil merit, are not subjected to a discussion
of their merits. Such are those who have entirely renounced
the things of the world and are solicitously thoughtful of the
things that are of God: wherefore they will be saved but
will not be judged. Others, however, build on the founda-
ni. 7 3
Q. 89. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 34
tion of faith, wood, hay, stubble*; they, in fact, love worldly
things and are busy about earthly concerns, yet so as to
prefer nothing to Christ, but strive to redeem their sins
with alms, and these have an admixture of good with evil
merits. Hence they are subjected to a discussion of their
merits, and consequently in this account will be judged,
and yet they will be saved.
Reply Obj. i. Since punishment is the effect of justice,
while reward is the effect of mercy, it follows that punishment
is more especially ascribed antonomastically to judgment
which is the act of justice; so that judgment is sometimes
used to express condemnation. It is thus that we are to
understand the words quoted, as a gloss on the passage
remarks.
Reply Obj. 2. The merits of the elect will be discussed,
not to remove the uncertainty of their beatitude from the
hearts of those who are to be judged, but that it may be
made manifest to us that their good merits outweigh their
evil merits, and thus God's justice be proved.
Reply Obj. 3. Gregory is speaking of the just who will still
be in mortal flesh, wherefore he had already said : Those who
will still be in the body, although already brave and perfect,
yet through being still in the flesh must needs be troubled with
fear in the midst of such a whirlwind of terror. Hence it is
clear that this fear refers to the time immediately before the
judgment, most terrible indeed to the wicked, but not to the
good, who will have no apprehension of evil.
The arguments in the contrary sense consider judgment
as regards the payment of rewards.
Seventh Article,
whether the wicked will be judged ?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that none of the wicked will
be judged. For even as damnation is certain in the case of
unbelievers, so is it in the case of those who die in mortal
* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXIX., A. 2.
35 WHO WILL BE JUDGED? Q. 89. Art. 7
sin. Now it is declared because of the certainty of damna-
tion (Jo. iii. 18): He that believeth not is already judged.
Therefore in like manner neither will other sinners be
judged.
Obj. 2. Further, The voice of the Judge is most terrible to
those who are condemned by His judgment. Now accord-
ing to the text of iv. Sent. D. 47 and in the words of Gregory
[Moral, xxvi.) the Judge will not address Himself to unbelievers.
If therefore He were to address Himself to the behevers
about to be condemned, the unbelievers would reap a
benefit from their unbelief, which is absurd.
On the contrary, It would seem that all the wicked are to
be judged, because all the wicked will be sentenced to punish-
ment according to the degree of their guilt. But this cannot
be done without a judicial pronouncement. Therefore all
the wicked will be judged.
/ answer that, The judgment as regards the sentencing to
punishment for sin concerns aU the wicked; whereas the
judgment as regards the discussion of merits concerns only
behevers. Because in unbehevers the foundation of faith
is lacking, without which all subsequent works are deprived
of the perfection of a right intention, so that in them there
is no admixture of good and evil works or merits requiring
discussion. But behevers in whom the foundation of faith
remains, have at least a praiseworthy act of faith, which
though it is not meritorious without charity, yet is in itself
directed to merit, and consequently they wiU be subjected
to the discussion of merits. Consequently, behevers who
were at least counted as citizens of the City of God will be
judged as citizens, and sentence of death will not be passed
on them without a discussion of their merits; whereas un-
behevers will be condemned as foes, who are wont among
men to be extermmated without their merits being discussed.
Reply Obj. i. Although it is certain that those who die in
mortal sin will be damned, nevertheless since they have an
admixture of certam things connected with meriting well,
it behoves, for the manifestation of Divine justice, that their
merits be subjected to discussion, in order to make it clear
Q. 89. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 36
that they are justly banished from the city of the saints,
of which they appeared outwardly to be citizens.
Reply Ohj. 2. Considered under this special aspect the
words addressed to the believers about to be condemned
will not be terrible, because they will reveal in them certain
things pleasing to them, which it will be impossible to find in
unbehevers, since without faith it is impossible to please God
(Heb. xi. 6). But the sentence of condemnation which will
be passed on them all will be terrible to all of them.
The argument in the contrary sense considered the judg-
ment of retribution.
Eighth Article,
whether at the coming judgment the angels will be
JUDGED ?
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the angels will be judged
at the coming judgment. For it is written (i Cor. vi. 3):
Know you not that we shall judge angels ? But this cannot
refer to the state of the present time. Therefore it should
refer to the judgment to come.
Obj. 2. Further, It is written concerning Behemoth or
Leviathan, whereby the devil is signified (Job xl. 28) : In the
sight of all he shall be cast down ; and (Mark i. 24)* the demon
cried out to Christ: Why art Thou come to destroy us before
the time ? for, according to a gloss, the demons seeing our Lord
on earth thought they were to be judged forthwith. Therefore
it would seem that a final judgment is in store for them.
Obj. 3. Further, It is written (2 Pet. ii. 4): God spared not
the angels that sinned, but delivered them drawn down by ifh
fernal rapes to the lower hell, unto torments, to be reserved unto
judgment. Therefore it seems that the angels will be judged.
On the contrary, It is written (Nahum i. 9) according to the
Septuagint version: God will not judge the same thing a
* The reference should be Matth. viii. 29: Art Thou come hither
to torment us before the time ? The text of Mark reads : A rt Thou come
to destroy us?
37 WHO WILL BE JUDGED ? Q. 89. Art. 8
second time. But the wicked angels ?re already judged,
wherefore it is written (Jo. xvi. 11): The prince of this
world is already judged. Therefore the angels will not be
judged in the time to come.
Further, Goodness and wickedness are more perfect in the
angels than in men who are wayfarers. Now some men, good
and wicked, will not be judged as stated in the text of
iv. Sent. D. 47. Therefore neither will good or wicked angels
be judged.
/ answer that, The judgment of discussion nowise concerns
either the good or the wicked angels, since neither is any
evil to be found in the good angels, nor is any good liable
to judgment to be found in the wicked angels. But if we
speak of the judgment of retribution, we must distinguish
a twofold retribution. One corresponds to the angels'
personal merits and was made to both from the beginning,
when some were raised to bhss, and others plunged into the
depths of woe. The other corresponds to the merits, good
or evil, procured through the angels, and this retribution will
be made in the judgment to come, because the good angels
will have an increased joy in the salvation of those whom
they have prompted to deeds of merit, while the wicked will
have an increase of torment through the manifold downfall
of those whom they have incited to evil deeds. Conse-
quently the judgment will not regard the angels directly,
neither as judging nor as judged, but only men; but it will
regard the angels indirectly somewhat, in so far as they were
concerned in men's deeds.
Reply Obj. 1. This saying of the Apostle refers to the
judgment of comparison, because certain men will be found
to be placed higher than the angels.
Reply Obj. 2. The demons will then be cast down in the
sight of all because they will be imprisoned for ever in the
dungeon of hell, so that they will no more be free to go out,
since this was permitted to them only in so far as they were
directed by Divine providence to try the life of man .
The same answer applies to the Third Objection.
QUESTION XC.
OF THE FORM OF THE JUDGE IN COMING TO THE
JUDGMENT.
{In Three Articles.)
We must now consider the form of the Judge in coming to the
judgment. Under this head there are three points of in-
quiry: (i) Whether Christ will judge under the form of His
humanity ? (2) Whether He will appear under the form of
His glorified humanity ? (3) Whether His Godhead can be
seen without joy ?
First Article.
whether christ will judge under the form of
his humanity ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that Christ will not judge under
the form of His humanity. For judgment requires authority
in the judge. Now Christ has authority over the quick and
the dead as God, for thus is He the Lord and Creator of all.
Therefore He will judge under the form of His Godhead.
Ohj. 2. Further, Invincible power is requisite in a judge;
wherefore it is written (Eccles. vii. 6) : Seek not to he made a
judge, unless thou have strength enough to extirpate iniquities.
Now invincible power belongs to Christ as God. Therefore
He will judge under the form of the Godhead.
Ohj. 3. Further, It is written (John v. 22, 23): The
Father . . . hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men
may honour the Son, as they honour the Father. Now equal
honour to that of the Father is not due to the Son in respect
38
39 THE FORM OF THE JUDGE Q. 90. Art. i
of His human nature. Therefore He will not judge under
His human form.
Ohj. 4. Further, It is written (Dan. vii. 9): I beheld till
thrones were placed and the Ancient of days sat. Now the
thrones signifiy judicial power, and God is called the Ancient
by reason of His eternity, according to Dionysius [Div.
Nom. X.). Therefore it becomes the Son to judge as being
eternal; and consequently not as man.
Obj. 5. Further, Augustine says {Trad. xix. in Joan.)
that the resurrection of the soul is the work of the Word the
Son of God, and the resurrection of the body is the work of the
Word made the Son of man in the flesh. Now that last judg-
ment regards the soul rather than the body. Therefore
it becomes Christ to judge as God rather than as man.
On the contrary, It is written (Jo. v. 27) : He hath given
Htm power to do judgment, because He is the Son of
man.
Further, It is written (Job xxxvi. 17): Thy cause hath
been judged as that of the wicked, — by Pilate according to a
gloss — therefore, cause and judgment thou shall recover, —
that thou may est judge justly, according to the gloss. Now
Christ was judged by Pilate with regard to His human
nature. Therefore He will judge under the human nature -
Further, To Him it belongs to judge who made the law.
Now Christ gave us the law of the Gospel while appearing
in the human nature. Therefore He wiU judge under that
same nature.
/ answer that. Judgment requires a certain authority in
the judge. Wherefore it is written (Rom. xiv. 4): Who art
thou thatjudgest another man's servant ? Hence it is becoming
that Christ should judge in respect of His having authority
over men to whom chiefly the last judgment will be directed.
Now He is our Lord, not only by reason of the Creation,
since the Lord He is God, He made us and not we ourselves
(Ps. xcix. 3), but also by reason of the Redemption, which
pertains to Him in respect of His human nature. Wherefore
to this end Christ died and rose again, that He might be Lord
both of the dead and of the living (Rom. xiv. 9). But the goods
Q. 90. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 40
of the Creation would not suffice us to obtain the reward
of eternal life, without the addition of the boon of the Re-
demption, on account of the obstacle accruing to created
nature through the sin of our first parent. Hence, since the
last judgment is directed to the admission of some to the
kingdom, and the exclusion of others therefrom, it is becom-
ing that Christ should preside at that judgment under the
form of His human nature, since it is by favour of that
same nature's Redemption that man is admitted to the
kingdom. In this sense it is stated (Acts x. 42) that He
. . . was appointed by God to be Judge of the living and of the
dead. And forasmuch as by redeeming mankind He restored
not only man but all creatures without exception, — inas-
much as all creatures are bettered through man's restoration,
according to Coloss. i. 20, Making peace through the blood of
His cross, both as to things on earth, and the things that are in
heaven, — ^it follows that through His Passion Christ merited
lordship and judicial power not over man alone, but over all
creatures, according to Matth. xxviii. 18, All power is given
to Me, in heaven and in earth*
Reply Obj. i. Christ, in respect of His Divine nature, has
authority of lordship over all creatures by right of creation ;
but in respect of His human nature He has authority of
lordship merited through His Passion. The latter is second-
ary so to speak and acquired, while the former is natural and
eternal.
Reply Obj. 2. Although Christ as man has not of Himself
invincible power resulting from the natural power of the
human species, nevertheless there is also in His human
nature an invincible power derived from His Godhead,
whereby all things are subjected under His feet (i Cor. xv.
25-28; Heb. ii. 8, 9). Hence He will judge in His human
nature indeed, but by the power of His Godhead.
Reply Obj. 3. Christ would not have sufficed for the re-
demption of mankind, had He been a mere man. Wherefore
from the very fact that He was able as man to redeem man-
kind, and thereby obtained judicial power, it is evident that
* Cf. P. III.. Q. LIX.
41 THE FORM OF THE JUDGE Q.90.ART.2
He is God, and consequently is to be honoured equally
with the Father, not as man but as God.
Reply Obj. 4. In that vision of Daniel the whole order of the
judicial power is clearly expressed. This power is in God
Himself as its first origin, and more especially in the Father
Who is the fount of the entire Godhead; wherefore it is
stated in the first place that the Ancient of days sat. But the
judicial power was transmitted from the Father to the Son,
not only from eternity in respect of the Divine nature, but
also in time in respect of the human nature wherein He
merited it. Hence in the aforesaid vision it is further stated
{verses 13, 14) : Lo, one like the Son of man came with the
clouds of heaven, and He came even to the Ancient of days. . . .
And He gave Him power and glory, and a kingdom.
Reply Obj. 5. Augustine is speaking by a kind of appro-
priation, so as to trace the effects which Christ wrought in
the human nature to causes somewhat similar to them.
And since we are made to the image and likeness of God in
respect of our soul, and are of the same species as the man
Christ in respect of our body, he ascribes to the Godhead
the effects wrought by Christ in our souls, and those which
He wrought or will work in our bodies he ascribes to His
flesh; although His flesh, as being the instrument of His
Godhead, has also its effect on our souls as Damascene asserts
{De Fide Orthod. iii. 15), according to the saying of Heb. ix. 14,
that His blood hath cleansed our conscience from dead works.
And thus that the Word was made flesh is the cause of the
resurrection of souls; wherefore also according to His
human nature He is becomingly the Judge not only of bodily
but also of spiritual goods.*
Second Article,
whether at the judgment christ will appear in
his glorified humanity ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that at the judgment Christ
* Cf. P. III., Q. LVI.. A. 2. ad I.
Q. 90. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 42
will not appear in His glorified humanity. For a gloss* on
Jo. xix. 37, They shall look on him whom they pierced, says:
Because He will come in the flesh wherein He was crucified.
Now He was crucified in the form of weakness. Therefore
He will appear in the form of weakness and not in the form
of glory.
Obj. 2. Further, It is stated (Matth. xxiv. 30) that the
sign of the Son of man shall appear in heaven, namely, the
sign of the cross, as Chrysostom says {Hom. Ixxvii. in Matth.),
for Christ when coming to the judgment will show not only
the scars of His wounds but even His most shameful death.
Therefore itseems that He will not appear in the form of glory.
Obj. 3. Further, Christ will appear at the judgment under
that form which can be gazed upon by all. Now Christ
will not be visible to all, good and wicked, under the form
of His glorified humanity : because the eye that is not glori-
fied is seemingly unproportionate to see the clarity of a glori-
fied body. Therefore He will not appear under a glorified
form.
Obj. 4. Further, That which is promised as a reward to
the righteous is not granted to the unrighteous. Now it is
promised as a reward to the righteous that they shall see
the glory of His humanity (Jo. x. 9): He shall go in, and
go out, and shall find pastures, i.e. refreshment in His Godhead
and humanity, according to the commentary of Augustine, f
and Isa. xxxiii. 17: His eyes shall see the King in his beauty.
Therefore He will not appear to all in His glorified form.
Obj. 5. Further, Christ will judge in the form wherein
He was judged: wherefore a gloss| on Jo. v. 21, So the
Son also giveth life to whom He will, says : He will judge
justly in the form wherein He was judged unjustly, that He
may be visible to the wicked. Now He was judged in the
form of weakness. Therefore He will appear in the same
form at the judgment.
* S. Augustine {Tract, cxx. in Joan.).
t De Spiritu et Anima, work of an unknown author. S. Thomas
{De Anima) ascribes it to Alcherus, a Cistercian monk; see above,
Q. LXX., A. 2, ad i.
% S. Augustine (Tract, xix. in Joan.).
43 THE FORM OF THE JUDGE Q. 90. Art. 2
On the contrary, It is written (Luke xxi. 27) : Then they
shall see the Son of man coming in a cloud with great power
and majesty. Now majesty and power pertain to glory.
Therefore He will appear in the form of glory.
Further, He who judges should be more conspicuous than
those who are judged. Now the elect who will be judged
by Christ will have a glorified body. Much more therefore
will the Judge appear in a glorified form.
Further, As to be judged pertains to weakness, so to
judge pertains to authority and glory. Now at His first
coming when Christ came to be judged. He appeared in the
form of weakness. Therefore at the second coming, when He
will come to judge, He will appear in the form of glory.
/ answer that, Christ is called the mediator of God and men
(i Tim. ii. 5) inasmuch as He satisfies for men and inter-
cedes for them to the Father, and confers on men things
which belong to the Father, according to Jo. xvii. 22,
The glory which Thou hast given Me, I have given to them.
Accordingly then both these things belong to Him in that He
communicates with both extremes : for in that He communi-
cates with men. He takes their part with the Father, and in
that He communicates with the Father, He bestows the
Father's gifts on men. Since then at His first coming He
came in order to make satisfaction for us to the Father, He
came in the form of our weakness. But since at His second
coming He will come in order to execute the Father's justice
on men. He will have to show forth His glory which is in
Him by reason of His communication with the Father:
and therefore He will appear in the form of glory.
Reply Obj. 1. He will appear in the same flesh, but not
under the same form.
Reply Obj. 2. The sign of the cross will appear at the
judgment, to denote not a present but a past weakness: so
as to show how justly those were condemned who scorned
so great mercy, especially those who persecuted Christ
unjustly. The scars which will appear in His body will not
be due to weakness, but will indicate the exceeding power
whereby Christ overcame His enemies by His Passion and
Q. 90. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 44
infirmity. He will also show forth His most shameful death,
not by bringing it sensibly before the eye, as though He
suffered it there; but by the things which will appear then,
namely the signs of His past Passion, He will recall men to
the thought of His past death.
Reply Obj. 3. A glorified body has it in its power to show
itself or not to show itself to an eye that is not glorified,
as stated above (Q. LXXXV., A. 2, ad 3). Hence Christ
will be visible to all in His glorified form.
Reply Obj. 4. Even as our friend's glory gives us pleasure,
so the glory and power of one we hate is most displeasing
to us. Hence as the sight of the glory of Christ's humanity
will be a reward to the righteous, so will it be a torment to
Christ's enemies: wherefore it is written (Isa. xxvi. 11):
Let the envious people see and be confounded and let fire [i.e.
envy) devour Thy enemies.
Reply Obj. 5. Form is taken there for human nature
wherein He was judged and likewise will judge ; but not for
a quality of nature, namely of weakness, which will not be
the same in Him when judging as when judged (Cf. ad 2) .
Third Article.
whether the godhead can be seen by the wicked
without joy ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the Godhead can be seen
by the wicked without joy. For there can be no doubt that
the wicked will know with the greatest certainty that Christ
is God. Therefore they will see His Godhead, and yet they
will not rejoice in seeing Christ. Therefore it will be possible
to see it without joy.
Obj. 2. Further, The perverse will of the wicked is not
more adverse to Christ's humanity than to His Godhead.
Now the fact that they will see the glory of His humanity
will conduce to their punishment,, as stated above (A. 2, ad 4).
Therefore if they were to see His Godhead, there would be
much more reason for them to grieve rather than rejoice.
45 THE FORM OF THE JUDGE Q. 90. Art. 3
Ohj. 3. Further, The course of the affections is not a
necessary sequel to that which is in the intellect : wherefore
Augustine says {In Ps. cxviii: cone. 8) : The intellect precedes,
the affections follow slowly or not at all. Now vision regards
the intellect, whereas joy regards the affections. Therefore
it will be possible to see the Godhead without joy.
Obj. 4. Further, Whatever is received i^ito a thing is received
according to the mode of the receiver and not of the received.
But whatever is seen is, in a way, received into the seer.
Therefore although the Godhead is in itself supremely enjoy-
able, nevertheless when seen by those who are plunged in
grief, it will give no joy but rather displeasure.
Obj. 5. Further, As sense is to the sensible object, so is
the intellect to the intelligible object. Now in the senses,
to the unhealthy palate bread is painful, to the healthy palate
sweet, as Augustine says {Conf. vii.), and the same happens
with the other senses. Therefore since the damned have the
intellect indisposed, it would seem that the vision of the
uncreated light will give them pain rather than joy.
On the contrary, It is written (Jo. xvii. 3): This is eternal
life : That they may know Thee, the . . . true God. Wherefore
it is clear that the essence of bliss consists in seeing God.
Now joy is essential to bhss. Therefore the Godhead
cannot be seen without joy.
Further, The essence of the Godhead is the essence of
truth. Now it is deHghtful to every one to see the truth,
wherefore all naturally desire to know, as stated at the begin-
ning of the Metaphysics. Therefore it is impossible to see
the Godhead without joy.
Further, If a certain vision is not always delightful, it
happens sometimes to be painful. But intellective vision
is never painful since the pleasure we take in objects of under-
standing has no grief opposed to it, according to the Philo-
sopher {Top. ii.). Since then the Godhead cannot be seen
save by the intellect, it seems that the Godhead cannot be
seen without joy.
/ answer that. In every object of appetite or of pleasure
two things may be considered, namely the thing which is
Q. 90. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 46
desired or which gives pleasure, and the aspect of appeti-
bility or pleasurableness in that thing. Now according to
Boethius [De Hebdom.) that which is can have something
besides what it is, but ' being ' itself has no admixture of aught
else beside itself. Hence that which is desirable or pleasant
can have an admixture of something rendering it undesirable
or unpleasant; but the very aspect of pleasurableness has
not and cannot have anything mixed with it rendering it
unpleasant or undesirable. Now it is possible for things
that are pleasurable, by participation of goodness which is
the aspect of appetibility or pleasurableness, not to give
pleasure when they are apprehended, but it is impossible
for that which is good by its essence not to give pleasure when
it is apprehended. Therefore since God is essentially His
own goodness, it is impossible for the Godhead to be seen
without joy.
Reply Obj. i. The wicked will know most clearly that
Christ is God, not through seeing His Godhead, but on
account of the most manifest signs of His Godhead.
Reply Obj. 2. No one can hate the Godhead considered in
itself, as neither can one hate goodness itself. But God is
said to be hated by certain persons in respect of some of
the effects of the Godhead, in so far as He does or commands
something contrary to their will.* Therefore the vision of
the Godhead can be painful to no one.
Reply Obj. 3. The saying of Augustine applies when the
thing apprehended previously by the intellect is good by
participation and not essentially, such as all creatures are ;
wherefore there may be something in them by reason of
which the affections are not moved. In like manner God
is known by wayfarers through His effects, and their intellect
does not attain to the very essence of His goodness. Hence
it is not necessary that the affections follow the intellect,
as they would if the intellect saw God's essence which is His
goodness.
Reply Obj. 4. Grief denotes not a disposition but a passion.
Now every passion is removed if a stronger contrary cause
* Cf. II.-II., Q. XXXIV., A. I.
47 THE FORM OF THE JUDGE Q. 90. Art. 3
supervene, and does not remove that cause. Accordingly
the grief of the damned would be done away if they saw
God in His essence.
Reply Ohj. 5. The indisposition of an organ removes the
natural proportion of the organ to the object that has a
natural aptitude to please, wherefore the pleasure is hindered.
But the indisposition which is in the damned does not remove
the natural proportion whereby they are directed to the
Divine goodness, since its image ever remains in them. Hence
the comparison fails.
QUESTION XCI.
OF THE QUALITY OF THE WORLD AFTER THE
JUDGMENT.
{In Five Articles.)
We must next discuss the quality which the world and those
who rise again will have after the judgment. Here a three-
fold matter offers itself to our consideration : (i) The state
and quality of the world. (2) The state of the blessed.
(3) The state of the wicked.
Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
(i) Whether there will be a renewal of the world ?
(2) Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will
cease ? (3) Whether the heavenly bodies will be more
brilliant ? (4) Whether the elements will receive an addi-
tional clarity ? (5) Whether the animals and plants will
remain ?
First Article,
whether the world will be renewed ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the world will never be
renewed. For nothing will be but what was at some time
as to its species : What is it that hath been ? the same thing
that shall be (Eccles. i. 9). Now the world never had any
disposition other than it has now as to essential parts, both
genera and species. Therefore it will never be renewed.
Obj. 2. Further, Renewal is a kind of alteration. But
it is impossible for the universe to be altered ; because what-
ever is altered argues some alterant that is not altered,
which nevertheless is a subject of local movement: and it is
48
49 THE WORLD AFTER JUDGMENT Q. 91. Art. i
impossible to place such a thing outside the universe. There-
fore it is impossible for the world to be renewed.
Obj. 3. Further, It is stated (Gen. ii. 2) that God . . .
rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had done,
and holy men explain that He rested from forming new crea-
tures. Now when things were first established, the mode
imposed upon them was the same as they have now in the
natural order. Therefore they will never have any other.
Obj. 4. Further, The disposition which things have now
is natural to them. Therefore if they be altered to another
disposition, this disposition will be unnatural to them. Now
whatever is unnatural and accidental cannot last for ever
[De Ccelo et Mundo, i.). Therefore this disposition acquired
by being renewed will be taken away from them; and thus
there will be a cycle of changes in the world as Empedocles
and Origen [Peri Archon. ii. 3) maintained, and after this
world there will be another, and after that again another.
Obj. 5. Further, Newness of glory is given to the rational
creature as a reward. Now where there is no merit, there
can be no reward. Since then insensible creatures have
merited nothing, it would seem that they will not be renewed.
On the contrary, It is written (Isa. Ixv. 17) : Behold I create
new heavens and a new earth, and the former things shall not be
in remembrance ; and (Apoc. xxi. i): I saw a new heaven and
a new earth. For the first heaven and the first earth was gone.
Further, The dwelling should befit the dweller. But the
world was made to be man's dwelling. Therefore it should
befit man. Now man will be renewed. Therefore the
world will be Ukewise.
Further, Every beast loveth its like (Ecclus. xiii. 19),
wherefore it is evident that likeness is the reason
of love. Now man has some likeness to the universe,
wherefore he is called a little world. Hence man loves the
whole world naturally and consequently desires its good.
Therefore, that man's desire be satisfied the universe must
needs also be made better.
/ answer that, We believe all corporeal things to have
been made for man's sake, wherefore all things are stated to
m 7 4
Q. 91. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 50
be subject to him.* Now they serve man in two ways,
first, as sustenance to his bodily life, secondly, as helping
him to know God, inasmuch as man sees the invisible
thmgs of God by the things that are made (Rom. i. 20).
Accordingly glorified man will nowise need creatures to
render him the first of these services, since his body will be
altogether incorruptible, the Divine power effecting this
through the soul which it will glorify immediately. Again
man will not need the second service as to intellective know-
ledge, since by that knowledge he will see God immediately
in His essence. The carnal eye, however, wdll be unable to
attain to this vision of the Essence ; wherefore that it may
be fittingly comforted in the vision of God, it will see the
Godhead in Its corporeal effects, wherein manifest proofs
of the Divine majesty will appear, especially in Christ's
flesh, and secondarily in the bodies of the blessed, and after-
wards in all other bodies. Hence those bodies also will need
to receive a greater inflow from the Divine goodness than
now, not indeed so as to change their species, but so as
to add a certain perfection of glory: and such will be the
renewal of the world. Wherefore at the one same time, the
world will be renewed, and man will be glorified.
Reply Ohj. i. Solomon is speaking there of the natural
course: this is evident from his adding: Nothing under the
sun is new. For since the movement of the sun follows a
circle, those things which are subject to the sun's power
must needs have some kind of circular movement. This
consists in the fact that things which were before return
the same in species but different in the individual {De
Generat. i.). But things belonging to the state of glory are
not mider the sun.
Reply Ohj. 2. This argument considers natural alteration
which proceeds from a natural agent, which acts from
natural necessity. For such an agent cannot produce
different dispositions, unless it be itself disposed differently.
But things done by God proceed from freedom of will,
wherefore it is possible, without any change in God Who
* Ps. viii. 5 seq.
51 THE WORLD AFTER JUDGMENT Q. 91. Art. 2
wills it, for the universe to have at one time one disposition,
and another at another time. Thus this renewal will not
be reduced to a cause that is moved, but to an immovable
principle, namely God.
Reply Ohj. 3. God is stated to have ceased on the seventh
day forming new creatures, for as much as nothing was
made afterwards that was not previously in some hkeness*
either generically, or specifically, or at least as in a seminal
principle, or even as in an obediential potentiality. f I say
then that the future renewal of the world preceded in the
works of the six days by way of a remote Hkeness, namely
in the glory and grace of the angels. Moreover it preceded
in the obediential potentiality which was then bestowed on
the creature to the effect of its receiving this same renewal
by the Divine agency.
Reply Ohj. 4. This disposition of newness will be neither
natural nor contrary to nature, but above nature (just as
grace and glory are above the nature of the soul) : and it will
proceed from an everlasting agent which will preserve it
for ever.
Reply Ohj. 5. Although, properly speaking, insensible
bodies will not have merited this glory, yet man merited
that this glory should be bestowed on the whole universe,
in so far as this conduces to man's increase of glory. Thus
a man merits to be clothed in more splendid robes, which
splendour the robes nowise merited themselves.
Second Article.
whether the movement of the heavenly bodies
will cease ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that when the world is thus renewed
the movement of the heavenly bodies will not cease. For
it is written (Gen. viii. 22): All the days of the earth . . .
cold and heat, summer and winter, night and day shall not
* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXIII., A. I.
t Cf. P. I., Q. CXV., A. 2,ad^; P. III., Q. XI., A. i.
Q. 91- Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 52
cease. Now night and day, summer and winter result from
the movement of the sun. Therefore the movement of the
sun will never cease.
Ohj. 2. Further, It is written (Jerem. xxxi. 35, 36) : Thus
saith the Lord Who giveth the sun for the light of the day, the
order of the moon and of the stars for the light of the night :
Who stirreth up the sea, and the waves thereof roar .... //
these ordinances shall fail before Me . . . then also the seed
of Israel shall fail, so as not to be a nation before Me for ever.
Now the seed of Israel shall never fail, but will remain for
ever. Therefore the laws of day and of the sea waves, which
result from the heavenly movement, will remain for ever.
Therefore the movement of the heaven will never cease.
Obj. 3. Further, The substance of the heavenly bodies
will remain for ever. Now it is useless to admit the existence
of a thing unless you admit the purpose for which it was
made : and the heavenly bodies were made in order to
divide the day and the night; and to be for signs, and for
seasons, and for days ajid for years (Gen. i. 14). But they
cannot do this except by movement. Therefore their
movement will remain for ever, else those bodies would
remain without a purpose.
Obj. 4. Further, In this renewal of the world the whole
world will be bettered. Therefore no body will be deprived
of what pertains to its perfection. Now movement belongs
to the perfection of a heavenly body, because, as stated in
De Ccelo et Mundo, ii., those bodies participate of the Divine
goodness by their movement. Therefore the movement of
the heaven will not cease.
Obj. 5. Further, The sun successively gives hght to the
various parts of the world, by reason of its circular move-
ment. Therefore if the circular movement of the heaven
ceases, it follows that in some part of the earth's surface
there will be perpetual darkness, which is unbecoming to
the aforesaid renewal.
Obj. 6. Further, If the movement were to cease, this could
only be because movement causes some imperfection in the
heaven, for instance wear and tear, which is impossible,
53 THE WORLD AFTER JUDGMENT Q. 91. Art. 2
since this movement is natural, and the heavenly bodies
are impassible, wherefore they are not worn out by move-
ment {De Ccelo et Mundo, ii.). Therefore the movement of
the heaven will never cease.
Obj. 7. Further, A potentiality is useless if it be not
reduced to act. Now in whatever position the heavenly body
is placed it is in potentiality to another position. Therefore
unless this potentiality be reduced to act, it would remain
useless, and would always be imperfect. But it cannot
be reduced to act save by local movement. Therefore it
will always be in motion.
Obj. 8. Further, If a thing is indifferent in relation to
more than one alternation, either both are ascribed to it, or
neither. Now the sun is indifferent to being in the east or
in the west, else its movement would not be uniform through-
out, since it would move more rapidly to the place which is
more natural to it. Therefore either neither position is
ascribed to the sun, or both. But neither both nor neither
can be ascribed to it, except successively by movement ; for
if it stand still, it must needs stand in some position. There-
fore the solar body will always be in motion, and in like
manner all other heavenly bodies.
Obj. 9. Further, The movement of the heaven is the
cause of time. Therefore if the movement of the heaven
fail, time must needs fail: and if this were to fail, it would
fail in an instant. Now an instant is defined {Phys. viii.)
the beginning of the future and the end of the past. Conse-
quently there would be time after the last instant of time,
which is impossible. Therefore the movement of the
heavens will never cease.
Obj. 10. Further, Glory does not remove nature. But the
movement of the heaven is natural. Therefore it is not
deprived thereof by glory.
On the contrary, It is stated (iVpoc. x. 6) that the angel who
appeared, swore by him that livethfor ever and ever . . . that
time shall be no longer, namely after the seventh angel shall
have sounded the trumpet, at the sound of which the dead
shall rise again (i Cor. xv. 52). Now if time be not, there
Q. 91. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 54
is no movement of the heaven. Therefore the movement of
the heaven will cease.
Further: Thy sun shall go down no more, and thy moon
shall not decrease (Isa. Ix. 20). Now the setting of the sun
and the phases of the moon are caused by the movement of
the heavens. Therefore the heavenly movement will cease
at length.
Further, It is shown in De Gener. ii. that the movement of
the heaven is for the sake of continual generation in this lower
world. But generation will cease when the number of the
elect is complete. Therefore the movement of the heaven
will cease . '
Further, All movement is for some end {Met. ii.). But
all movement for an end ceases when the end is obtained.
Therefore either the movement of the heaven will never
obtain its end, and thus it would be useless, or it will cease
at length.
Further, Rest is more noble than movement, because
things are more likened to God, Who is supremely immovable,
by being themselves unmoved. Now the movement of lower
bodies terminates naturally in rest. Therefore since the
heavenly bodies are far nobler, their movement terminates
naturally in rest.
/ answer that, There are three opinions touching this ques-
tion. The first is of the philosophers who assert that the
movement of the heaven will last for ever. But this is not
in keeping with our faith, which holds that the elect are in
a certain number preordained by God, so that the begetting
of men will not last for ever, and for the same reason,
neither will other things that are directed to the begetting of
men, such as the movement of the heaven and the variations
of the elements. Others say that the movement of the heaven
will cease naturally. But this again is false, since every
body that is moved naturally has a place wherein it rests
naturally, whereto it is moved naturally, and whence it is
not moved except by violence. Now no such place can be
assigned to the heavenly body, since it is not more natural
to the sun to move towards a point in the east than to move
55 THE WORLD AFTER JUDGMENT Q. 91. Art. 2
away from it, wherefore either its movement would not be
altogether natural, or its movement would not naturally
terminate in rest. Hence we must agree with others who
say that the movement of the heaven will cease at this re-
newal of the world, not indeed by any natural cause, but
as a result of the will of God. For the body in question, like
other bodies, was made to serve man in the two ways above
mentioned (A. i): and hereafter in the state of glory man
will no longer need one of these services, that namely in
respect of which the heavenly bodies serve man for the
sustenance of his bodily life. Now in this way the heavenly -
bodies serve man by their movement, in so far as by the
heavenly movement the human race is multiplied, plants
and animals needful for man's use generated, and the tem-
perature of the atmosphere rendered conducive to health.
Therefore the movement of the heavenly body will cease
as soon as man is glorified.
Reply Obj. i. These words refer to the earth in its present
state, when it is able to be the principle of the generation and
corruption of plants. This is evident from its being said
there: All the days of the earth, seed time and harvest, etc.
And it is simply to be granted that as long as the earth is
fit for seed time and harvest, the movement of the heaven
will not cease.
We reply in like manner to Ohj. 2 that the Lord is speaking
there of the duration of the seed of Israel with regard to the
present state. This is evident from the words: Then also
the seed of Israel shall fail, so as not to be a nation before Me
for ever. For after this state there will be no succession of
days : wherefore the laws also which He had mentioned will
cease after this state.
Reply Obj. 3. The end which is there assigned to the
heavenly bodies is their proximate end, because it is their
proper act. But this act is directed further to another end,
namely the service of man, which is shown by the words of
Deut. iv. 19: Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou
see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being
deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord
Q. 91. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 56
thy God created for the service of all the nations, that are under
heaven. Therefore we should form our judgment of the
heavenly bodies from the service of man, rather than from
the end assigned to them in Genesis. Moreover the heavenly
bodies, as stated above, will serve glorified man in another
way; hence it does not follow that they will remain without
a purpose.
Reply Ohj. 4. Movement does not belong to the perfection
of a heavenly body, except in so far as thereby it is the cause
of generation and corruption in this lower world: and in
that respect also this movement makes the heavenly body
participate the Divine goodness by way of a certain like-
ness of causality. But movement does not belong to the
perfection the substance of the heaven, which substance
will remain. Wherefore it does not follow that, when this
movement ceases, the substance of the heaven will lose some-
thing of its perfection.
Reply Obj. 5. All the elemental bodies will have in them-
selves a certain clarity of glory. Hence though part of the
surface of the earth be not lit up by the sun, there will by-
no means be any darkness there.
Reply Obj. 6. A gloss of Ambrose on Rom. viii. 22, Every
creature groaneth, etc. says expUcitly that all the elements
labour to fulfil their offices : thus the sun and moon fill the
places appointed to them not without work : this is for our sake,
wherefore they will rest when we are taken up to heaven. This
work, in my opinion, does not signify that any stress or
passion occurs to these bodies from their movement, since
this movement is natural to them and nowise violent, as is
proved in De Ccelo et Mundo, i. But work here denotes a
defect in relation to the term to which a thing tends. Hence
since this movement is ordained by Divine providence to
the completion of the number of the elect, it follows that as
long as the latter is incomplete, this movement has not
reached the term whereto it was ordained : hence it is said
metaphorically to labour, as a man who has not what he
intends to have. This defect will be removed from the
heaven when the number of the elect is complete. Or it may
57 THE WORLD AFTER JUDGMENT Q. 91. Art. 2
refer to the desire of the future renewal, which it awaits from
the Divine disposal.
Reply Obj. 7. In a heavenly body there is no potentiality
that can be perfected by place, or that is made for this end
which is to be in such and such a place. But potentiality
to situation in a place is related to a heavenly body, as the
craftsman's potentiality to construct various houses of one
kind : for if he construct one of these he is not said to have
the potentiality uselessly, and in like manner in whatever
situation a heavenly body be placed, its potentiality to be
in a place will not remain incomplete or without a purpose.
Reply Obj. 8. Although a heavenly body, so far as regards
its nature, is equally inclined to every situation that it can
possibly occupy, nevertheless in comparison with things
outside it, it is not equally inchned to every situation: but
in respect of one situation it has a more noble disposition
in comparison with certain things than in respect of another
situation; thus in our regard the sun has a more noble dis-
position at daytime than at night-time. Hence it is prob-
able, since the entire renewal of the world is directed to man,
that the heaven will have in this renewal the most noble situa-
tion possible in relation to our dwelling there. Or, accord-
ing to some, the heaven will rest in that situation wherein
it was made, else one of its revolutions would remain incom-
plete. But this argument seems improbable, for since a
revolution of the heaven takes no less than 36,000 years to
complete, it would follow that the world must last that length
of time, which does not seem probable. Moreover according
to this it would be possible to know when the world will come
to an end. For we may conclude with probability from
astronomers in what position the heavenly bodies were made,
by taking into consideration the number of years that have
elapsed since the beginning of the world: and in the same
way it would be possible to know the exact number of years
it would take them to return to a like position : whereas the
time of the world's end is stated to be unknown.
Reply Obj. g. Time will at length cease, when the heavenly
movement ceases. Yet that last now will not be the begin-
Q. 91. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 58
ning of the future. For the definition quoted appHes to the
now only as continuous with the parts of time, not as termina-
ting the whole of time.
Reply Ohj. 10. The movement of the heaven is said to be
natural, not as though it were part of nature in the same way
as we speak of natural principles; but because it has its
principle in the nature of a body, not indeed its active but
its receptive principle. Its active principle is a spiritual
substance, as the Commentator says on De Ccelo et Mundo ;
and consequently it is not unreasonable for this movement
to be done away by the renewal of glory, since the nature of
the heavenly body will not alter through the cessation of that
movement.
We grant the other objections which argue in the contrary
sense, namely the first three, because they conclude in due
manner. But since the remaining two seem to conclude
that the movement of the heaven will cease naturally, we
must reply to them.
To the first, then, we reply that movement ceases when
its purpose is attained, provided this is a sequel to, and does
not accompany the movement. Now the purpose of the
heavenly movement, according to philosophers, accompanies
that movement, namely the imitation of the Divine good-
ness in the causality of that movement with respect to this
lower world. Hence it does not follow that this movement
ceases naturally.
To the second we reply that although immobility is simply
nobler than movement, yet movement in a subject which
thereby can acquire a perfect participation of the Divine
goodness is nobler than rest in a subject which is altogether
unable to acquire that perfection by movement. For this
reason the earth which is the lowest of the elements is without
movement : although God Who is exalted above all things
is without movement, by Whom the more noble bodies are
moved. Hence also it is that the movements of the higher
bodies might be held to be perpetual, so far as their natural
power is concerned, and never to terminate in rest, although
the movement of lower bodies terminates in rest.
59 THE WORLD AFTER JUDGMENT Q. 91- Art. 3
Third Article.
whether the brightness of the heavenly bodies will
be increased at this renewal ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that the brightness of the
heavenly bodies will not be increased at this renewal. For
this renewal as regards the lower bodies will be caused by
the cleansing fire. But the cleansing fire will not reach the
heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies will not
be renewed by receiving an increase of brightness.
Obj. 2. Further, Just as the heavenly bodies are the cause
of generation in this lower world by their movement, so are
they by their light. But, when generation ceases, move-
ment will cease as stated above (A. 2). Therefore in like
manner the hght of the heavenly bodies will cease rather than
increase.
Obj. 3. Further, If the heavenly bodies will be renewed
when man is renewed, it follows that when man deteriorated
they deteriorated likewise. But this does not seem prob-
able, since these bodies are unalterable as to their sub-
stance. Therefore neither will they be renewed when man
is renewed.
Obj. 4. Further, If they deteriorated then, it follows that
their deterioration was on a par with the amelioration which,
it is said, will accrue to them at man's renewal. Now it is
written (Isa. xxx. 26) that the light of the moon shall be as the
light of the sun. Therefore in the original state before siji
the moon shone as much as the sun does now. Therefore
whenever the moon was over the earth, it made it to be day
as the sun does now : which is proved manifestly to be false
from the statement of Gen. i. 16 that the moon was made to
rule the night. Therefore when man sinned, the heavenly
bodies were not deprived of their light; and so their light
will not be increased, so it seems, when man is glorified.
Obj. 5. Further, The brightness of the heavenly bodies,
like other creatures, is directed to the use of man. Now,
after the resurrection, the brightness of the sun will be of
Q. gi. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 60
no use to man : for it is written (Isa. Ix. 19) : Thou shall no
more have the sun for thy light by day, neither shall the bright-
ness of the moon enlighten thee, and (Apoc. xxi. 23) : The city
hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon to shine in it. There-
fore their brightness will not be increased.
Obj. 6. Further, It were not a wise craftsman who would
make very great instruments for the making of a small
work. Now man is a very small thing in comparison with
the heavenly bodies, which by their huge bulk surpass the
size of man almost beyond comparison : in fact the size of the
whole earth in comparison with the heaven is as a point
compared with a sphere, as astronomers say. Since then
God is most wise it would seem that man is not the end of
the creation of the heavens, and so it is unseemly that the
heaven should deteriorate when he sinned, or that it should
be bettered when he is glorified.
On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xxx. 26) : The light of
the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun
shall be sevenfold.
Further, The whole world will be renewed for the better.
But the heaven is the more noble part of the corporeal world.
Therefore it will be altered for the better. But this cannot
be unless it shine out with greater brightness. Therefore its
brightness will be bettered and will increase.
Further, Every creature that groaneth and travaileth in
pain, awaiteth the revelation of the glory of the children of
God (Rom. viii. 21, 22).* Now such are the heavenly bodies,
as a gloss says on the same passage. Therefore they await
the glory of the saints. But they would not await it unless
they were to gain something by it. Therefore their bright-
ness will increase thereby, since it is their chief beauty.
/ answer that. The renewal of the world is directed to the
end that, after this renewal has taken place, God may become
visible to man by signs so manifest as to be perceived as it
were by his senses. Now creatures lead to the knowledge
* The creature also itself shall he delivered from the servitude of
corruption, into the liberty of the children of God. For we know that
every creature groaneth and travaileth in pain, etc.
6i THE WORLD AFTER JUDGMENT Q. 91. Art. 3
of God chiefly by their comeliness and beauty, which show
forth the wisdom of their ]\Iaker and Governor; wherefore
it is written (Wis. xiii. 5) : By the greatness of the beauty and
of the creatiire, the Creator of them may he seen, so as to he
known thereby. And the beauty of the heavenly bodies
consists chiefly in light; wherefore it is written (Ecclus.
xliii. 10) : The glory of the stars is the beauty of heaven, the
Lord enlighteneth the world on high. Hence the heavenly
bodies will be bettered, especiaUy as regards their brightness.
But to what degree and in what way this betterment will
take place is knowii to Him alone Who will bring it about.
Reply Obj. i. The cleansing fire will not cause the form of
the renewal, but will only dispose thereto, by cleansing from
the vileness of sin and the impurity resulting from the
mingling of bodies, and this is not to be found in the heavenly
bodies. Hence although the heavenly bodies are not to
be cleansed by fire, they are nevertheless to be Divinely
renewed.
Reply Obj. 2. Movement does not denote perfection in the
thing moved, considered in itself, since movement is the
act of that which is imperfect : although it may pertain to
the perfection of a body in so far as the latter is the cause of
something. But light belongs to the perfection of a light-
some body, even considered in its substance: and conse-
quently after the heavenly body has ceased to be the cause
of generation, its brightness will remain, while its movement
will cease.
Reply Obj. 3. A gloss on Isa. xxx. 26, The light of the moon
shall be as the light of the sun, says: All things made for man's
sake deteriorated at his fall, and sun and moon diminished
in light. This diminishment is understood by some to mean
a real lessening of light. Nor does it matter that the
heavenly bodies are by nature unalterable, because this
alteration was brought about by the Divine power. Others,
however, with greater probabiUty, take this diminishment
to mean, not a real lessening of light, but a lessening in
reference to man's use; because after sin man did not receive
as much benefit from the light of the heavenly bodies as
Q. 91. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 62
before. In the same sense we read (Gen. iii. 17, 18): Cursed
is the earth in thy work. . . . Thorns and thistles shall it
bring forth to thee; although it would have brought forth
thorns and thistles before sin, but not as a punishment to
man. Nor does it follow that, supposing the light of the
heavenly bodies not to have been lessened essentially
through man sinning, it will not really be increased at man's
glorification, because man's sin wrought no change upon the
state of the universe, since both before and after sin man
had an animal Ufe, which needs the movement and genera-
tion of a corporeal creature; whereas man's glorification
will bring a change upon the state of all corporeal creatures,
as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. 7). Hence there is no
comparison.
Reply Obj. 4. This diminution, according to the more
probable opinion, refers not to the substance but to the
effect. Hence it does not follow that the moon while over
the earth would have made it to be day, but that man would
have derived as much benefit from the light of the moon
then as now from the light of the sun. After the resurrec-
tion, however, when the light of the moon will be increased
in very truth, there will be night nowhere on earth but only
in the centre of the earth, where hell will be, because then,
as stated, the moon will shine as brightly as the sun does
now; the sun seven times as much as now, and the bodies
of the blessed seven times more than the sun, although
there be no authority or reason to prove this.
Reply Obj. 5. A thing may be useful to man in two ways.
First, by reason of necessity, and thus no creature will be
useful to man because he will have complete sufficiency from
God. This is signified (Apoc. xxi. 23) by the words quoted,
according to which that city hath no need of the sun, nor
of the moon. Secondly, on account of a greater perfection,
and thus man will make use of other creatures, yet not as
needful to him in order to obtain his end, in which way he
makes use of them now.
Reply Obj. 6. This is the argument of Rabbi Moses who
endeavours to prove [Dux errantium iii.) that the world was
63 THE WORLD AFTER JUDGMENT Q. 91- Art. 4
by no means made for man's use. Wlierefore he maintains
that what we read in the Old Testament about the renewal
of the world, as instanced by the quotations from Isaias,
is said metaphorically : and that even as the sun is said to be
darkened in reference to a person when he encounters a
great sorrow so as not to know what to do (which way of
speaking is customary to Scripture), so on the other hand
the sun is said to shine brighter for a person, and the whole
world to be renewed, when he is brought from a state of
sorrow to one of very great joy. But this is not in harmony
with the authority and commentaries of holy men. Conse-
quently we must answer this argument by saying that
although the heavenly bodies far surpass the human body,
yet the rational soul surpasses the heavenly bodies far more
than these surpass the human body. Hence it is not un-
reasonable to say that the heavenly bodies were made for
man's sake; not, however, as though this were the principal
end, since the principal end of all things is God.
Fourth Article.
whether the elements will be renewed by an
addition of brightness ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth A rticle : —
Objection i. It would seem that the elements will not be
renewed by receiving some kind of brightness. For just as
light is a quality proper to a heavenly body, so are hot and
cold, wet and dry, qualities proper to the elements. There-
fore as the heaven is renewed by an increase of brightness,
so ought the elements to be renewed by an increase of
active and passive qualities.
Ohj. 2. Further, Rarity and density are qualities of the
elements, and the elements will not be deprived of them at
this renewal. Now the rarity and density of the elements
would seem to be an obstacle to brightness, since a bright
body needs to be condensed, for which reason the rarity of
the air seems incompatible with brightness, and in like
manner the density of the earth which is an obstacle to
Q. 91. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 64
transparency. Therefore it is impossible for the elements
to be renewed by the addition of brightness.
Obj. 3. Further, It is agreed that the damned will be in
the earth. Yet they will be in darkness not only internal
but also external. Therefore the earth will not be endowed
with brightness in this renewal, nor tor the same reason will
the other elements.
Obj. 4. Further, Increase of brightness in the elements
implies an increase of heat. If therefore at this renewal the
brightness of the elements be greater than it is now, their
heat will likewise be greater; and thus it would seem that
they will be changed from their natural qualities, which are
in them according to a fixed measure : and this is absurd.
Obj. 5. Further, The good of the universe which consists
in the order and harmony of the parts is more excellent
than the good of any individual creature . But if one creature
be bettered, the good of the universe is done away, since
there will no longer be the same harmony. Therefore if
the elemental bodies, which according to their natural
degree in the universe should be devoid of brightness, were
to be endowed with brightness, the perfection of the universe
would be diminished thereby rather than increased.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. xxi. i): I saw a new
heaven and a new earth. Now the heaven wiU be renewed
by an increase of brightness. Therefore the earth and
likewise the other elements will also.
Further, The lower bodies, like the higher, are for man's
use. Now the corporeal creature will be rewarded for its
services to man, as a gloss of Ambrose seems to say on Rom.
viii. 22, Every creature groaneth, and a gloss of Jerome on Isa.
XXX. 26, And the light of the moon shall be, etc. Therefore the
elements will be glorified as well as the heavenly bodies.
Further, Man's body is composed of the elements.
Therefore the elemental particles that are in man's body
will be glorified by the addition of brightness when man
is glorified. Now it is fitting that whole and part should
have the same disposition. Therefore it is fitting that the
elements themselves should be endowed with brightness.
65 THE WORLD AFTER JUDGMENT Q. 91. Art. 4
/ answer that, Just as there is a certain order between the
heavenly spirits and the earthly or human spirits, so is there
an order between heavenly bodies and earthly bodies.
Since then the corporeal creature was made for the sake of
the spiritual and is ruled thereby, it follows that corporeal
things are dealt with similarly to spiritual things. Now in
this final consummation of things the lower spirits will
receive the properties of the higher spirits, because men will
be as the angels in heaven (Matth. xxii. 30) : and this will be
accomplished by conferring the highest degree of perfection
on that in which the human spirit agrees with the angelic.
Wherefore, in like manner, since the lower bodies do not
agree with the heavenly bodies except in the nature of light
and transparency {De Anima, ii.), it follows that the lower
bodies are to be perfected chiefly as regards brightness.
Hence all the elements will be clothed with a certain bright-
ness, not equally, however, but according to their mode:
for it is said that the earth on its outward surface will be as
transparent as glass, water as crystal, the air as heaven,
fire as the lights of heaven.
Reply Obj. i. As stated above (A. i), the renewal of the
world is directed to the effect that man even by his senses
may as it were see the Godhead by manifest signs. Now
the most spiritual and subtle of our senses is the sight. Con-
sequently all the lower bodies need to be bettered, chiefly
as regards the visible qualities the principle of which is
fight. On the other hand, the elemental qualities regard the
touch, which is the most material of the senses, and the excess
of their contrariety is more displeasing than pleasant;
whereas excess of fight will be pleasant, since it has no con-
trariety, except on account of a weakness in the organ, such
as will not be then.
Reply Obj. 2. The air wifi be bright, not as casting forth
rays, but as an enfightened transparency; while the earth,
although it is opaque through lack of light, yet by the Divine
power its surface will be clothed with the glory of brightness,
without prejudice to its density.
Reply Obj. 3. The earth will not be glorified with bright-
III. 7 5
Q. 91. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 66
ness in the infernal regions ; but instead of this glory, that
part of the earth will have the rational spirits of men and
demons, who though weak by reason of sin are nevertheless
superior to any corporeal quality by the dignity of their
nature. Or we may say that, though the whole earth be
glorified, the wicked will nevertheless be in exterior darkness,
since even the fire of hell, while shining for them in one
respect, will be unable to enlighten them in another.
Reply Obj. 4. This brightness will be in these bodies even
as it is in the heavenly bodies, in which it causes no heat,
because these bodies will then be unalterable, as the heavenly
bodies are now.
Re-ply Obj. 5. The order of the universe will not be done
away by the betterment of the elements, because all the other
parts will also be bettered, and so the same harmony will
remain.
Fifth Article,
whether the plants and animals will remain in this
RENEWAL ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the plants and animals
will remain in this renewal. For the elements should be
deprived of nothing that belongs to their adornment. Now
the elements are said to be adorned by the animals and
plants.* Therefore they will not be removed in this renewal.
Obj. 2. Further, Just as the elements served man, so also
did animals, plants, and mineral bodies. But on account of
this service the elements will be glorified. Therefore both
animals and plants and mineral bodies will be glorified like-
wise.
Obj. 3. Further, The universe will remain imperfect if any-
thing belonging to its perfection be removed. Now the
species of animals, plants, and mineral bodies belong to the
perfection of the universe. Since then we must not say that
the world will remain imperfect when it is renewed, it seems
that we should assert that the plants and animals will remain.
* Cf. Gen. i. 11, 12, 20, 21, 24, 25.
67 THE WORLD AFTER JUDGMENT Q. 91. Art. 5
Obj. 4. Further, Animals and plants have a more noble
form than the elements. Now the world, at this final renewal,
will be changed for the better. Therefore animals and plants
should remain rather than the elements, since they are
nobler.
Obj. 5. Further, It is unseemly to assert that the natural
appetite will be frustrated. But by their natural appetite
animals and plants desire to be for ever, if indeed not as
regards the individual, at least as regards the species : and to
tliis end their continual generation is directed {De Generat. ii.).
Therefore it is unseemly to say that these species will at
length cease to be.
On the contrary, If plants and animals are to remain, either
all of them will, or some of them. If all of them, then dumb
animals, which had previously died, will have to rise again,
just as men will rise again. But this cannot be asserted,
for since their form comes to nothing, they cannot resume
the same identical form. On the other hand if not all but
some of them remain, since there is no more reason for one
of them remaining for ever rather than another, it would
seem that none of them will. But whatever remains after
the world has been renewed will remain for ever, generation
and corruption being done away. Therefore plants and
animals will altogether cease after the renewal of the world.
Further, According to the Philosopher [De Generat. ii.)
the species of animals, plants, and suchlike corruptible
things, are not perpetuated except by the continuance of the
heavenly movement. Now this will cease then. There-
fore it will be impossible for those species to be perpetuated.
Further, If the end cease, those things wliich are directed
to the end should cease. Now animals and plants were
made for the upkeep of human hfe; wherefore it is wiitten
(Gen. ix. 3) : Even as the green herbs have I delivered all flesh*
to you. Therefore when man's animal life ceases, animals
and plants should cease. But after this renewal animal Hfe
will cease in man. Therefore neither plants nor animals
ought to remain.
* Vulg., — have 1 delivered them all to you.
Q. 91. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 68
/ answer that, Since the renewal of the world will be for
man's sake it follows that it should be conformed to the
renewal of man. Now by being renewed man will pass from
the state of corruption to incorruptibility and to a state of
everlasting rest, wherefore it is written (i Cor. xv. 53) : This
corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must
put on immortality ; and consequently the world will be
renewed in such a way as to throw off all corruption and
remain for ever at rest. Therefore it will be impossible for
anything to be the subject of that renewal, unless it be a
subject of incorruption. Now such are the heavenly bodies,
the elements, and man. For the heavenly bodies are by
their very nature incorruptible both as to their whole and
as to their part : the elements are corruptible as to their
parts but incorruptible as a whole : while men are corruptible
both in whole and in part, but this is on the part of their
matter not on the part of their form, the rational soul to
wit, which will remain incorrupt after the corruption of man.
On the other hand, dumb animals, plants, and minerals, and
all mixed bodies, are corruptible both in their whole and in
their parts, both on the part of their matter which loses its
form, and on the part of their form which does not remain
actually; and thus they are in no way subjects of incorrup-
tion. Hence they will not remain in this renewal, but those
things alone which we have mentioned above.
Reply Ohj. i. These bodies are said to adorn the elements,
inasmuch as the general active and passive forces which are
in the elements are applied to specific actions : hence they
adorn the elements in their active and passive state. But
this state will not remain in the elements : wherefore there
is no need for animals or plants to remain.
Reply Ohj. 2. Neither animals nor plants nor any other
bodies merited anything by their services to man, since
they lack free-will. However, certain bodies are said to be
rewarded in so far as man merited that those things should
be renewed which are adapted to be renewed. But plants
and animals are not adapted to the renewal of incorruption,
as stated above. Wherefore for this very reason man did
69 THE WORLD AFTER JUDGMENT Q. 91. Art. 5
not merit that they should be renewed, since no one can
merit for another, or even for himself, that which another
or himself is incapable of receiving. Hence, granted even that
dumb animals merited by serving man, it would not follow
that they are to be renewed.
Reply Ohj. 3. Just as several kinds of perfection are
ascribed to man (for there is the perfection of created nature
and the perfection of glorified nature), so also there is a
twofold perfection of the universe, one corresponding to this
state of changeableness, the other corresponding to the state
of a future renewal. Now plants and animals belong to
its perfection according to the present state, and not accord-
ing to the state of this renewal, since they are not capable
thereof.
Reply Ohj. 4. Although animals and plants as to certain
other respects are more noble than the elements, the elements
are more noble in relation to incorruption, as explained
above.*
Reply Ohj. 5. The natural desire to be for ever that is
in animals and plants must be understood in reference to
the movement of the heaven, so that they may continue
in being as long as the movement of the heaven lasts:
since there cannot be an appetite for an effect to last longer
than its cause. Wherefore if at the cessation of movement in
the first movable body, plants and animals cease as to their
species, it does not follow that the natural appetite is
frustrated.
* Cf. Q. LXXIV., A. I, ad 3.
QUESTION XCII.
OF THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE IN
REFERENCE TO THE BLESSED.*
{In Three Articles.)
In the next place we must consider matters concerning the
blessed after the general judgment. We shall consider :
(i) Their vision of the Divine essence, wherein their bliss con-
sists chiefly. (2) Their bliss and their mansions. (3) Their
relations with the damned. (4) Their gifts, which are con-
tained in their bliss. (5) The crowns which perfect and adorn
their happiness.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(i) Wliether the saints will see God in His essence ?
(2) Whether they will see Him with the eyes of the body ?
(3) Whether in seeing God they will see all that God sees ?
First Article.
whether the human intellect can attain to the vision
of god in his essence ?
We proceed thus to the First A rticle : —
Objection i. It would seem that the human intellect cannot
attain to the vision of God in His essence. For it is written
(Jo. i. 18) : No man hath seen God at any time ; and Chry-
sostom in his commentary says [Horn. xiv. in Joan.) that not
even the heavenly essences, namely the Cherubim and Sera-
phim, have ever been able to see Him as He is. Now, only
equality with the angels is promised to men (Matth. xxii. 30) :
They . . . shall be as the angels of God in heaven. There-
* Cf. P. I., Q. XII.
70
71 VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q.92.ART.1
fore neither will the saints in heaven see God in His
essence.
Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius argues thus {Div. Nom. i.):
Knowledge is only of existing things. Now whatever exists
is finite, since it is confined to a certain genus : and therefore
God, since He is infinite, is above all existing things. There-
fore there is no knowledge of Him, and He is above all
knowledge.
Obj. 3. Further, Dionysius {De Myst. Theol. i.) shows that
the most perfect way in which our intellect can be united to
God is when it is united to Him as to something unknown .
Now that which is seen in its essence is not unknown. There-
fore it is impossible for our intellect to see God in His essence.
Obj. 4. Further, Dionysius says {Ep. ad Caium Monach.)
that the darkness, — for thus he calls the abundance of light,
— which screens God is impervious to all illuminations, and
hidden from all knowledge : and if anyone in seeing God under-
stood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but one of those
things that are His. Therefore no created intellect will be
able to see God in His essence.
Obj. 5. Further, According to Dionysius {Ep. ad Doroth.)
God is invisible on account of His surpassing glory. Now
His glory surpasses the human intellect in heaven even as
on the way. Therefore since He is invisible on the way, so
will He be in heaven.
Obj. 6. Further, Since the intelligible object is the perfec-
tion of the intellect, there must needs be proportion between
intelligible and intellect, as between the visible object and
the sight. But there is no possible proportion between our
intellect and the Divine essence, since an infinite distance
separates them. Therefore our intellect will be unable to
attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Obj. 7. Further, God is more distant from our intellect than
the created intelligible is from our senses. But the senses
can nowise attain to the sight of a spiritual creature. There-
fore neither will our intellect be able to attain to the vision
of the Divine essence.
Obj. 8. Further, Whenever the intellect understands
Q. 92. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 72
something actually it needs to be informed with the likeness
of the object understood, which likeness is the principle of
the intellectual operation terminating in that object, even
as heat is the principle of heating. Accordingly if our
intellect understands God, this must be by means of some
hkeness informing the intellect itself. Now this cannot be
the very essence of God, since form and thing informed
must needs have one being, while the Divine essence differs
from our intellect in essence and being. Therefore the form
whereby our intellect is informed in understanding God must
needs be a likeness impressed by God on our intellect. But
this Hkeness, being something created, cannot lead to the
knowledge of God, except as an effect leads to the knowledge
of its cause. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect
to see God except through His effect. But to see God
through His effect is not to see Him in His essence. There-
fore our intellect will be unable to see God in His essence.
Obj. 9. Further, The Divine essence is more distant from
our intellect than any angel or intelligence. Now according
to Avicenna [Met. iii.), the existence of an intelligence in our
intellect does not imply that its essence is in our intellect,
because in that case our knowledge of the intelUgence would
be a substance and not an accident, hut that its likeness is
impressed on our intellect. Therefore neither is God in our
intellect, to be understood bj/ us, except in so far as an
impression of Him is in our intellect. But this impression
cannot lead to the knowledge of the Divine essence, for
since it is infinitely distant from the Divine essence, it
degenerates to another image much more than if the image
of a white thing were to degenerate to the image of a black
thing. Therefore, just as a person in whose sight the image
of a white thing degenerates to the image of a black thing, on
account of an indisposition in the organ, is not said to see
a white thing, so neither "will our intellect be able to see God
in His essence, since it understands God only by means of
this impression.
Ohj. 10. Further, In things devoid of matter that which
understands is the same as that which is understood [De
y^ VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q. 92. Art. i
Anima, iii.). Now God is supremely devoid of matter.
Since then our intellect, which is created, cannot attain to
be an uncreated essence, it is impossible for our intellect
to see God in His essence.
Obj. II. Further, Whatever is seen in its essence is known
as to what it is. But our intellect cannot know of God what
He is, but onl}^ what He is not, as Dionysius [Div. Nom. vii.)
and Damascene {De Fide OrtJiod. i.) declare. Therefore our
intellect will be unable to see God in His essence.
Ohj. 12. Further, Every infinite thing, as such, is un-
known. But God is in every way infinite. Therefore He
is altogether unknown. Therefore it will be impossible for
Him to be seen in His essence by a created intellect.
Obj. 13. Further, Augustine says [De Videndo Deo:
Ep. cxlvii.) : God is by nature invisible. Now that which
is in God by nature cannot be otherwise. Therefore it is
impossible for Him to be seen in His essence.
Obj. 14. Further, Whatever is in one way and is seen in
another way is not seen as it is. Now God is in one way
and will be seen in another way by the saints in heaven : for
He is according to His own mode, but will be seen by the
saints according to their mode. Therefore He wiU not be
seen by the saints as He is, and thus will not be seen in His
essence.
Obj. 15. Further, That which is seen through a medium
is not seen in its essence. Now God will be seen in heaven
through a medium which is the Hght of glory, according to
Ps. XXXV. 10, In Thy light we shall see light. Therefore He
will not be seen in His essence.
Ohj. 16. Further, In heaven God will be seen face to face,
according to i Cor. xiii. 12. Now when we see a man face
to face, we see him through his Ukeness. Therefore in
heaven God will be seen through His likeness, and conse-
quently not in His essence.
On the contrary, It is written (i Cor. xiii. 12) : We see now
through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. Now
that wliich is seen face to face is seen in its essence. There-
fore God will be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.
Q. 92. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 74
Further, It is written (i Jo. iii. 2) : When He shall appear
we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is.
Therefore we shall see Him in His essence.
Further, A gloss on i Cor. xv. 24, When He shall have
delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father, says: Where,
i.e. in heaven, the essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost
shall be seen : this is given to the clean of heart alone and is
the highest bliss. Therefore the blessed will see God in His
essence.
Further, It is written (Jo, xiv. 21) : He that loveth Me
shall be loved of My Father; and I will love him, and will
manifest Myself to him. Now that which is manifested is
seen in its essence. iTherefore God will be seen in His
essence by the saints in heaven.
Further, Gregory commenting [Moral. Iviii.) on the words
ef Exod. xxxiii. 20, Man shall not see Me and live, disapproves
of the opinion of those who said that in this abode of bliss
God can be seen in His glory but not in His nature; for His
glory differs not from His nature. But His nature is His
essence. Therefore He will be seen in His essence.
Further, The desire of the saints cannot be altogether
frustrated. Now the common desire of the saints is to see
God in His essence, according to Exod. xxxiii. 13, Show me
Thy glory ; Ps. Ixxix. 20, Show Thy face and we shall be saved ;
and Jo. xiv. 8, Show us the Father and it is enough for us.
Therefore the saints will see God in His essence.
I answer that, Even as we hold by faith that the last end
of man's life is to see God, so the philosophers maintained
that man's ultimate happiness is to understand immaterial
substances according to their being. Hence in reference to
this question we find that philosophers and theologians
encounter the same difEculty and the same difference of
opinion. For some philosophers held that our passive
intellect can never come to understand separate substances ;
thus Alfarabius expresses himself at the end of his Ethics,
although he says the contrary in his book On the Intelligence,
as the Commentator attests (DeAnima, iii.). In Uke manner
certain theologians held that the human intellect can never
75 VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q. 92. Art. i
attain to the vision of God in His essence. On either side
they were moved by the distance which separates our intel-
lect from the Divine essence and from separate substances.
For since the intellect in act is somewhat one with the intel-
ligible object in act, it would seem difficult to understand how
the created intellect is made to be an uncreated essence.
Wherefore Chrysostom says {Horn. xiv. in Joan.); How can
the creature see the uncreated ? Those who hold the passive
intellect to be the subject of generation and corruption, as
being a power dependent on the body, encounter a still greater
difficulty not only as regards the vision of God but also as
regards the vision of any separate substances. But this
opinion is altogether untenable. First, because it is in contra-
diction to the authority of canonical scripture, as Augustine
declares [De Videndo Deo : Ep. cxlvii.). Secondly, because,
since understanding is an operation most proper to man, it
follows that his happiness must be held to consist in that
operation when perfected in him. Now since the perfection of
an intelligent being as such is the intelligible object, if in the
most perfect operation of his intellect man does not attain to
the vision of the Divine essence, but to something else, we shall
be forced to conclude that something other than God is the
object of man's happiness : and since the ultimate perfection of
a thing consists in its being united to its principle, it follows
that something other than God is the effective principle of
man, which is absurd, according to us, and also according to
the philosophers who maintain that our souls emanate from
the separate substances, so that finally we may be able to
understand these substances. Consequently, according to
us, it must be asserted that our intellect will at length attain
to the vision of the Divine essence, and according to the
philosophers, that it will attain to the vision of separate
substances.
It remains, then, to examine how this may come about.
For some, hke Alfarabius and Avempace, held that from
the very fact that our intellect understands any intelligible
objects whatever, it attains to the vision of a separate sub-
stance. To prove this they employ two arguments. The
Q. 92. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 76
first is that just as the specific nature is not diversified in
various individuals, except as united to various individuating
principles, so the idea understood is not diversified in me
and you, except in so far as it is united to various imaginary
forms: and consequently when the intellect separates the
idea understood from the imaginary forms, there remains
a quiddity understood, which is one and the same in the
various persons understanding it, and such is the quiddity
of a separate substance. Hence, when our intellect attains
to the supreme abstraction of any intelligible quiddity, it
thereby understands the quiddity of the separate substance
that is similar to it. The second argument is that our intel-
lect has a natural aptitude to abstract the quiddity from all
intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, then, the quid-
dity which it abstracts from some particular individual
be a quiddity without a quiddity, the intellect by under-
standing it understands the quiddity of the separate sub-
stance which has a like disposition, since separate substances
are subsisting quiddities without quiddities; for the quid-
dity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna
says {Met. iii.). On the other hand if the quiddity abstracted
from this particular sensible be a quiddity that has a quid-
dity, it follows that the intellect has a natural aptitude to
abstract this quiddity, and consequently since we cannot go
on indefinitely, we shall come to some quiddity without a
quiddity, and this is what we understand by a separate
quiddity.*
But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive- First,
because the quiddity of the material substance, which the
intellect abstracts, is not of the same nature as the quid-
dity of the separate substances, and consequently from the
fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities of material
substances and knows them, it does not follow that it knows
the quiddity of a separate substance, especially of the Divine
essence, which more than any other is of a different nature
from any created quiddity. Secondly, because granted that
it be of the same nature, nevertheless the knowledge of a
* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXXVIII., A. 2.
77 VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q. 92. Art. i
composite thing would not lead to the knowledge of a separate
substance, except in the point of the most remote genus,
namely substance : and such a knowledge is imperfect unless
it reach to the properties of a thing. For to know a man
only as an animal is to know him only in a restricted sense
and potentially : and much less is it to know only the nature
of substance in him. Hence to know God thus, or other
separate substances, is not to see the essence of God or the
quiddity of a separate substance, but to know Him in His
effect and in a mirror as it were. For this reason Avicenna
in his Metaphysics propounds another way of understanding
separate substances, to wit that separate substances are
understood by us by means of intentions of their quiddities,
such intentions being images of their substances, not indeed
abstracted therefrom, since they are immaterial, but im-
pressed thereby on our souls. But this way also seems inade-
quate to the Divine vision which we seek. For it is agreed
that whatever is received into anything is therein after the
mode of the recipient : and consequently the likeness of the
Divine essence impressed on our intellect will be accordmg
to the mode of our intellect : and the mode of our intellect
falls short of a perfect reception of the Divine Ukeness. Now
the lack of perfect Likeness may occur in as many ways, as
unUkeness may occur. For in one way there is a deficient
likeness, when the form is participated according to the same
specific nature, but not in the same measure of perfection :
such is the defective likeness in a subject that has little white-
ness in comparison with one that has much. In another way
the likeness is yet more defective, when it does not attain to
the same specific nature but only to the same generic nature :
such is the likeness of an orange-coloured or yellowish object
in comparison with a white one. In another way, still
more defective is the likeness when it does not attain to
the same generic nature, but only to a certain analogy or
proportion: such is the likeness of whiteness to man, in
that each is a being : and in this way every likeness received
into a creature is defective in comparison with the Divine
essence. Now in order that the sight know whiteness, it
Q. 92. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 78
is necessary for it to receive the likeness of whiteness accord-
ing to its specific nature, although not according to the same
manner of being, because the form has a manner of being
in the sense other from that which it has in the thing out-
side the soul: for if the form of yellowness were received
into the eye, the eye would not be said to see whiteness.
In like manner in order that the intellect understand a
quiddity, it is necessary for it to receive its likeness accord-
ing to the same specific nature, although there may possibly
not be the same manner of being on either side: for the
form which is in the intellect or sense is not the principle
of knowledge according to its manner of being on both sides,
but according to its common ratio with the external object.
Hence it is clear that by no likeness received in the created
intellect can God be understood, so that His essence be seen
immediately. And for this reason those who held the Divine
essence to be seen in this way alone, said that the essence
itself will not be seen, but a certain brightness, as it were
a radiance thereof. Consequently neither does this way
suffice for the Divine vision that we seek.
Therefore we must take the other way, which also certain
philosophers held, namely Alexander and Averroes {De
Anima, iii.). For since in every knowledge some form is
required whereby the object is known or seen, this form by
which the intellect is perfected so as to see separate substances
is neither a quiddity abstracted by the intellect from com-
posite things, as the first opinion maintained, nor an im-
pression left on our intellect by the separate substance, as the
second opinion affirmed; but the separate substance itself
united to our intellect as its form, so as to be both that which
is understood, and that whereby it is understood. And what-
ever maybe the case with other separate substances, we must
nevertheless allow this to be our way of seeing God in His
essence, because by whatever other form our intellect were
informed, it could not be led thereby to the Divine essence.
This, however, must not be understood as though the Divine
essence were in reality the form of our intellect, or as though
from its conjunction with our intellect there resulted one
79 VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q. 92. Art. i
being simply, as in natural things from the natural form
and matter : but the meaning is that the proportion of the
Divine essence to our intellect is as the proportion of form
to matter. For whenever two things, one of which is the
perfection of the other, are received into the same recipient,
the proportion of one to the other, namely of the more
perfect to the less perfect, is as the proportion of form to
matter : thus light and colour are received into a transparent
object, light being to colour as form to matter. When
therefore intellectual light is received into the soul, together
with tlie indwelling Divine essence, though they are not
received in the same way, the Divine essence will be to the
intellect as form to matter : and that this suffices for the intel-
lect to be able to see the Divine essence by the Divine essence
itself may be shown as follows.
As from the natural form (whereby a thing has being)
and matter, there results one thing simply, so from the form
whereby the intellect understands, and the intellect itself,
there results one thing intelligibly. Now in natural things
a seif-subsistent thing cannot be the form of any matter,
if that thing has matter as one of its parts, since it is impos-
sible for matter to be the form of a thing. But if this
self-subsistent thing be a mere form, nothing hinders it
from being the form of some matter and becoming that
whereby the composite itself is,* as instanced in the soul.
Now in the intellect we must take the intellect itself in
potentiality as matter, and the intelHgible species as form;
so that the intellect actually understanding will be the
composite as it were resulting from both. Hence if there
be a self-subsistent thing, that has nothing in itself besides
that which is intelHgible, such a thing can by itself be the
form whereby the intellect understands. Now a thing is
intelligible in respect of its actuality and not of its poten-
tiahty {Met. ix.): in proof of which an intelligible form
needs to be abstracted from matter and from all the proper-
ties of matter. Therefore, since the Divine essence is pure
* Literally, — and becoming the whereby-it-is of the composite
itself.
Q. 92. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 80
act, it will be possible for it to be the form whereby the intel-
lect understands : and this will be the beatific vision. Hence
the Master says (ii. Sent. D. i) that the union of the body
with the soul is an illustration of the blissful union of the
spirit with God.
Reply Obj. 1. The words quoted can be explained in three
ways, according to Augustine [De Videndo Deo : Ep. cxlvii.).
In one way as excluding corporeal vision, whereby no one
ever saw or will see God in His essence ; secondly, as exclud-
ing intellectual vision of God in His essence from those who
dwell in this mortal flesh; thirdly, as excluding the vision
of comprehension from a created intellect. It is thus that
Chrysostom understands the saying, wherefore he adds:
By seeing, the evangelist means a most clear perception, and
such a comprehension as the Father has of the Son. This
also is the meaning of the evangelist, since he adds: The
only-begotten Son Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath
declared Him : his intention being to prove the Son to be
God from His comprehending God.
Reply Obj. 2. Just as God, by His infinite essence, sur-
passes all existing things which have a determinate being,
so His knowledge, whereby He knows, is above all knowledge.
Wherefore as our knowledge is to our created essence, so is
the Divine knowledge to His infinite essence. Now two
things contribute to knowledge, to wit, the knower and the
thing known. Again, the vision whereby we shall see God
in His essence is the same whereby God sees Himself, as
regards that whereby He is seen, because as He sees Himself
in His essence, so shall we also see Him. But as regards the
knower there is the difference that is between the Divine
intellect and ours. Now in the order of knowledge the object
known follows the form by which we know, since by the form
of a stone we see a stone: whereas the efficacy of know-
ledge follows the power of the knower: thus he who has
stronger sight sees more clearly. Consequently in that
vision we shall see the same thing that God sees, namely
His essence, but not so effectively.
Reply Obj. 3. Dionysius is speaking there of the know-
8i VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q. 92. Art. i
ledge whereby wayfarers know God by a created form,
whereby our intellect is informed so as to see God. But
as Augustine says {loc. cit.), God evades every form of our
intellect, because whatever form our intellect conceive,
that form is out of proportion to the Divine essence. Hence
He cannot be fathomed by our intellect: but our most
perfect knowledge of Him as wayfarers is to know that He
is above all that our intellect can conceive, and thus we
are united to Him as to something unknown. In heaven,
however, we shall see Him by a form which is His essence,
and we shall be united to Him as to something known.
Reply Obj. 4. God is light (Jo, i. 9). Now illumination
is the impression of light on an illuminated object. And
since the Divine essence is of a different ^mode from any
Likeness thereof impressed on the intellect, he (Dionysius)
says that the Divine darkness is impervious to all illumination^
because, to wit, the Divine essence, which he calls darkness
on account of its surpassing brightness, remains undemon-
strated by the impression on our intellect, and consequently
is hidden from all knowledge. Therefore if anyone m, seeing
God conceives something in his mind, this is not God but
one of God's effects.
Reply Obj. 5. Although the glory of God surpasses any
form by which our intellect is informed now, it does not
surpass the Divine essence, which will be the form of our
intellect in heaven: and therefore although it is invisible
now, it will be visible then.
Reply Obj. 6. Although there can be no proportion between
finite and infinite, since the excess of the infinite over the
finite is indeterminate, there can be proportionateness or a
hkeness to proportion between them: for as a finite thing
is equal to some finite thing, so is an infinite thing equal to
an infinite thing. Now in order that a thing be known
totally, it is sometimes necessary that there be proportion
between knower and known, because the power of the knower
needs to be adequate to the knowableness of the thing
known, and equality is a kind of proportion. Sometimes,
however, the knowableness of the thing surpasses the power
HI. 7 6
Q. 92. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 82
of the knower, as when we know God, or conversely when
He knows creatures : and then there is no need for proportion
between knower and known, but only for proportionateness ;
so that, to wit, as the knower is to the knowable object, so
is the knowable object to the fact of its being known : and this
proportionateness suffices for the infinite to be known by
the finite, or conversely.
We may also reply that proportion according to the strict
sense in which it is employed signifies a ratio of quantity to
quantity based on a certain fixed excess or equality; but
is further transferred to denote any ratio of any one thing
to another; and in this sense we say that matter should be
proportionate to its form. In this sense nothing hinders
our intellect, although finite, being described as proportionate
to the vision of the Divine essence ; but not to the compre-
hension thereof, on account of its immensity.
Reply Ohj. 7. Likeness and distance are twofold. One is
according to agreement in nature; and thus God is more
distant from the created intellect than the created intelli-
gible is from the sense. The other is according to pro-
portionateness; and thus it is the other way about, for sense
is not proportionate to the knowledge of the immaterial,
as the intellect is proportionate to the knowledge of any
immaterial object whatsoever. It is this likeness and not
the former that is requisite for knowledge, for it is clear that
the intellect understanding a stone is not like it in its natural
being; thus also the sight apprehends red honey and red
gall, though it does not apprehend sweet honey, for the red-
ness of gall is more becoming to honey as visible, than the
sweetness of honey to honey.
Reply Ohj. 8. In the vision wherein God will be seen in
His essence, the Divine essence itself will be the form, as
it were, of the intellect, by which it will understand: nor is
it necessary for them to become one in being, but only to
become one as regards the act of understanding.
Reply Ohj. 9. We do not uphold the saying of Avicenna as
regards the point at issue, for in this other philosophers also
disagree with him. Unless perhaps we might say that
83 VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q.92.ART.1
Avicenna refers to the knowledge of separate substances, in
so far as they are known by the habits of speculative sciences
and the likeness of other things. Hence he makes this
statement in order to prove that in us knowledge is not a
substance but an accident. Nevertheless, although the
Divine essence is more distant, as to the property of its
nature, from our intellect, than is the substance of an angel,
it surpasses it in the point of intelligibility, since it is pure
act without any admixture of potentiaUty, which is not the
case with other separate substances. Nor will that know-
ledge whereby we shall see God in His essence be in the
genus of accident as regards that whereby He will be seen,
but only as regards the act of the one who understands
Him, for this act will not be the very substance either of the
person understanding or of the thing understood.
Reply Ohj. 10. A substance that is separate from matter
understands both itself and other things; and in both cases
the authority quoted can be verified. For since the very
essence of a separate substance is of itself intelligible and
actual, through being separate from matter, it is clear that
when a separate substance understands itself, that which
understands and that which is understood are absolutely
identical, for it does not understand itself by an intention
abstracted from itself, as we understand material objects.
And this is apparently the meaning of the Philosopher
{De Anima, iii.) as indicated by the Commentator [loc. cit.).
But when it understands other things, the object actually
understood becomes one with the intellect in act, in so far
as the form of the object understood becomes the form of the
intellect, for as much as the intellect is in act; not that it
becomes identified with the essence of the intellect, as
Avicenna proves {De Natural, vi.), because the essence of the
intellect remains one under two forms whereby it under-
stands two things in succession, in the same way as primary
matter remains one under various forms. Hence also the
Commentator (De Anima. iii.) compares the passive intel-
lect, in this respect, to primary matter. Thus it by no
means follows that our intellect in seeing God becomes the
Q. 92. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 84
very essence of God, but that the latter is compared to it
as its perfection or form.
Reply Obj. II. These and all like authorities must be
understood to refer to the knowledge whereby we know
God on the way, for the reason given above.
Reply Obj. 12. The infinite is unknown if we take it in the
privative sense, as such, because it indicates removal of
completion whence knowledge of a thing is derived. Wliere-
fore the infinite amounts to the same as matter subject to
privation, as stated in Phys. iii. But if we take the infinite
in the negative sense, it indicates the absence of limiting
matter, since even a form is somewhat limited by its matter.
Hence the infinite in this sense is of itself most knowable;
and it is in this way that God is infinite.
Reply Obj. 13. Augustine is speaking of bodily vision,
by which God will never be seen. This is evident from what
precedes : For no man hath seen God at any time, nor can any
man see Him as these things which we call visible are seen:
in this way He is by nature invisible even as He is incorrupt-
ible. As, however, He is by nature supremely being, so He
is in Himself supremely intelligible. But that He be for a
time not understood by us is owing to our defect : wherefore
that He be seen by us after being unseen is owing to a
change not in Him but in us.
Reply Obj. 14. In heaven God will be seen by the saints as
He is, if this be referred to the mode of the object seen, for
the saints will see that God has the mode which He has.
But if we refer the mode to the knower, He will not be seen
as He is, because the created intellect will not have so great
an efficacy in seeing, as the Divine essence has to the effect
of being seen.
Reply Obj. 15. There is a threefold medium both in bodily
and in intellectual vision. The first is the medium under
which the object is seen, and this is something perfecting
the sight so as to see in general, without determining the
sight to any particular object. vSuch is bodily hght in
relation to bodily vision ; and the light of the active intellect
in relation to the passive intellect, in so far as this light is a
85 VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q. 92. Art. i
medium. The second is the hght hy which the object is seen,
and this is the visible form, whereby either sight is deter-
mined to a special object, for instance by the form of a stone
to know a stone. The third is the medium in which it
is seen : and this is something by gazing on which the sight
IS led to something else: thus by looking in a mirror
it is led to see the things reflected in the mirror, and by
looking at an image it is led to the thing represented by
the image. In this way, too, the intellect from knowing an
effect is led to the cause, or conversely. Accordingly in the
heavenly vision there will be no third medium, so that, to
wit, God be known by the images of other things, as He is
known now, for which reason we are said to see now in a
glass: nor will there be the second medium, because the
essence itself of God will be that whereby our intellect will
see God. But there will only be the first medium, which
will upraise our intellect so that it will be possible for it to
be united to the uncreated substance in the aforesaid manner.
Yet this medium will not cause that knowledge to be me-
diate, because it does not come in between the knower and
the thing known, but is that which gives the knower the
power to know.*
Reply Ohj. 16. Corporeal creatures are not said to be seen
immediately, except when that which in them is capable
of being brought into conjunction with the sight is in con-
junction therewith. Now they are not capable of being
in conjunction with the sight of their essence on account of
their materiality : hence they are seen immediately when their
image is in conjunction with the sight. But God is able to
be united to the intellect by His essence : wherefore He would
not be seen immediately, unless His essence were united to
the intellect : and this vision, which is effected immediately,
is called vision of face. Moreover the likeness of the cor-
poreal object is received into the sight according to the same
ratio as it is in the object, although not according to the
same mode of being. Wherefore this likeness leads to the
* Cf. P. I.. Q. XII.. A. 5.
Q. 92. Art. 2 THE " SUMM A THEOLO GICA " 86
object directly: whereas no likeness can lead our intellect in
this way to God, as shown above: and for this reason the
comparison fails.
Second Article.
whether after the resurrection the saints will
see god with the eyes of the body ?*
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that after the resurrection the
saints will see God with the eyes of the body. Because the
glorified eye has greater power than one that is not glori-
fied. Now the blessed Job saw God with his eyes (Job xlii. 5) :
With the hearing of the ear, I have heard Thee, but now my eye
seeth Thee. Much more therefore will the glorified eye be
able to see God in His essence.
Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Job xix. 26) : In my flesh
I shall see God my Saviour (Vulg., — my God). Therefore in
heaven God will be seen with the eyes of the body.
Obj. 3. Further, Augustine, speaking of the sight of the
glorified eyes, expresses himself as follows {De Civ. Dei, xxii.) :
A greater power will be in those eyes, not to see more keenly, as
certain serpents or eagles are reported to see {for whatever
acuteness of vision is possessed by these animals they can see only
corporeal things), but to see even incorporeal things. Now any
power that is capable of knowing incorporeal things can be
upraised to see God. Therefore the glorified eyes will be
able to see God.
Obj. 4. Further, The disparity of corporeal to incorporeal
things is the same as of incorporeal to corporeal. Now the
incorporeal eye can see corporeal things. Therefore the
corporeal eye can see the incorporeal : and consequently the
same conclusion follows.
Obj. 5. Further, Gregory, commenting on Job iv. 16,
There stood one whose countenance I knew not, says {Moral, v.) :
Man who, had he been willing to obey the command, woiild
have been spiritual in the flesh, became, by sinning, carnal
even in mind. Now through becoming carnal in mind, he
* a. p. I.. Q. XII., A. 3.
8; VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q. 92. Art. 2
thinks only of those things which he draws to his soul by the
images of bodies [ibid.) . Therefore when he will be spiritual in
the flesh (which is promised to the saints after the resur-
rection), he will be able even in the flesh to see spiritual things.
Therefore the same conclusion follows.
Obj. 6. Further, Man can be beatified by God alone.
Now he will be beatified not only in soul but also in body.
Therefore God will be visible not only to his intellect but also
to his flesh.
Obj. 7. Further, Even as God is present to the intellect
by His essence, so will He be to the senses, because He will
be all in all (i Cor. xv. 28). Now He will be seen by the
intellect through the union of His essence therewith. There-
fore He will also be visible to the sense.
On the contrary, Ambrose, commenting on Luke i. 11,
There appeared to him an angel, says : God is not sought with
the eyes of the body, nor surveyed by the sight, nor clasped by
the touch. Therefore God will by no means be visible to the
bodily sense.
Further, Jerome, commenting on Isa. vi. i, I saw the Lord
sitting, says : The Godhead not only of the Father, but also of
the Son and of the Holy Ghost is visible, not to carnal eyes, but
only to the eyes of the mind, of which it is said: Blessed are the
pure in heart.
Further, Jerome says again (as quoted by Augustine,
Ep. cxlvii.): An incorporeal thing is invisible to a corporeal
eye. But God is supremely incorporeal. Therefore, etc.
Further, Augustine says {De Videndo Deo, Ep. cxlvii.) :
No man hath seen God as He is at any time, neither in this
life, nor in the angelic life, in the same way as these visible
things which are seen with the corporeal sight. Now the angeUc
life is the life of the blessed, wherein they will live after the
resurrection. Therefore, etc.
Further, According to Augustine [De Trin. xiv.), man is
said to be made to God' s image inasmuch as he is able to see
God. But man is in God's image as regards his mind, and
not as regards his flesh. Therefore he wifl see God with his
mind and not with his flesh .
Q. 92. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 88
/ answer that, A thing is perceptible to the senses of the
body in two ways, directly and indirectly. A thing is per-
ceptible directly if it can act directly on the bodily senses.
And a thing can act directly either on sense as such or on a
particular sense as such. That which acts directly in this
second way on a sense is called a proper sensible, for instance
colour in relation to the sight, and sound in relation to the
hearing. But as sense as such makes use of a bodily organ,
nothing can be received therein except corporeally, since
whatever is received into a thing is therein after the mode
of the recipient. Hence all sensibles act on the sense as
such, according to their magnitude: and consequently
magnitude and all its consequences, such as movement,
rest, number, and the like, are called common sensibles,
and yet they are direct objects of sense.
An indirect object of sense is that which does not act on
the sense, neither as sense nor as a particular sense, but
is annexed to those things that act on sense directly: for
instance Socrates, the son of Diares, a friend and the like
which are the direct object of the intellect's knowledge in
the universal, and in the particular are ,the object of the
cogitative power in man, and of the estimative power in
other animals. The external sense is said to perceive things
of this kind, although indirectly, when the apprehensive
power (whose province it is to know directly this thing
known), from that which is sensed directly, apprehends them
at once and without any doubt or discourse (thus we see
that a person is ahve from the fact that he speaks) : other-
wise the sense is not said to perceive it even indirectly.
I say then that God can nowise be seen with the eyes of the
body, or perceived by any of the senses, as that which is seen
directly, neither here, nor in heaven : for if that which belongs
to sense as such be removed from sense, there will be no
sense, and in like manner if that which belongs to sight as
sight be removed therefrom, there will be no sight. Accord-
ingly seeing that sense as sense perceives magnitude, and
sight as such a sense perceives colour, it is impossible for
the sight to perceive that which is neither colour nor magni-
89 VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q. 92. Art. 2
tude, unless we call it a sense equivocally. Since then sight
and sense will be specifically the same in the glorified body,
as in a non-glorified body, it will be impossible for it to see the
Divine essence as an object of direct vision; yet it will see it
as an object of indirect vision, because on the one hand the
bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in bodies,
especially in the glorified bodies and most of all in the body of
Christ, and, on the other hand, the intellect will see God so
clearly, that God will be perceived in things seen with the eye
of the body, even as life is perceived in speech. For although
our intellect will not then see God from seeing His creatures,
yet it will see God in His creatures seen corporeally. This
manner of seeing God corporeally is indicated by Augustine
{De Civ. Dei, xxii.), as is clear if we take note of his words,
for he says : It is very credible that we shall so see the mundane
bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most
clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things,
not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood
by those that are made, but as when we see men . . . we do not
believe but see that they live.
Reply Obj. 1. This saying of Job refers to the spiritual
eye, of which the Apostle says (Eph. i. 18): The eyes of our
(Vulg, — your) heart enlightened.
Reply Obj. 2. The passage quoted does not mean that we
are to see God with the eyes of the flesh, but that, in the
flesh, we shall see God.
Reply Obj. 3. In these words Augustine speaks as one
inquiring and conditionally. This appears from what he
had said before: Therefore they will have an altogether dif-
ferent power, if they shall see that incorporeal nature : and then
he goes on to say : Accordingly a greater power, etc., and after-
wards he explains himself.
Reply Obj. 4. All knowledge results from some kind of
abstraction from matter. Wherefore the more a corporeal
form is abstracted from matter, the more is it a principle of
knowledge. Hence it is that a form existing in matter is
in no way a principle of knowledge, while a form existing
in the senses is somewhat a principle of knowledge, in so far
Q. 92. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGI CA " 90
as it is abstracted from matter, and a form existing in the
intellect is still better a principle of knowledge. Therefore
the spiritual eye, whence the obstacle to knowledge is re-
moved, can see a corporeal object: but it does not foUow
that the corporeal eye, in which the cognitive power is
deficient as participating in matter, be able to know perfectly
incorporeal objects of knowledge.
Reply Obj. 5. Although the mind that has become carnal
cannot think but of things received from the senses, it thinks
of them immaterially. In like manner whatever the sight
apprehends it must always apprehend it corporeally : where-
fore it cannot know things which cannot be apprehended
corporeally.
Reply Obj. 6. Beatitude is the perfection of man as man.
And since man is man not through his body but through his
soul, and the body is essential to man, in so far as it is per-
fected by the soul: it follows that man's beatitude does not
consist chiefly otherwise than in an act of the soul, and
passes from the soul on to the body by a kind of overflow,
as explained above (Q. LXXXV., A. i). Yet our body will
have a certain beatitude from seeing God in sensible crea-
tures: and especially in Christ's body.
Reply Obj. 7. The intellect can perceive spiritual things,
whereas the eyes of the body cannot : wherefore the intel-
lect will be able to know the Divine essence united to it, but
the eyes of the body will not.
Third Article,
whether the saints, seeing god, see all that god
SEES ?*
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that the saints, seeing God in
His essence, see all that God sees in Himself. For as Isidore
says {De Sum. Bon. i.): The angels know all things in the
Word of God, before they happen. Now the saints will be
equal to the angels of God (Matth. xxii. 30). Therefore the
saints also in seeing God see all things.
* Cf. P. I., Q. XII.. AA. 7, 8.
91 VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q. 92. Art. 3
Ohj. 2. Further, Gregory says [Dial, iv.): Since all see
God there with equal clearness, what do they not know, who
know Him Who knows all things ? and he refers to the
blessed who see God in His essence. Therefore those who
see God in His essence know all things.
Ohj. 3. Further, It is stated in De Anima, iii., text. 7,
that when an intellect understands the greatest things, it is all
the more able to understand the least things. Now God
is the greatest of intelligible things. Therefore the power
of the intellect is greatly increased by understanding
Him. Therefore the intellect seeing Him understands all
things.
Ohj. 4. Further, The intellect is not hindered from under-
standing a thing except by this surpassing it. Now no
creature surpasses the intellect that understands God,
since, as Gregory says {Dial, ii.), to the soul which sees its
Creator all creatures are small. Therefore those who see
God in His essence know all things.
Ohj. 5. Further, Every passive power that is not reduced
to act is imperfect. Now the passive intellect of the human
soul is a power that is passive as it were to the knowledge
of all things, since the passive intellect is in which all are in
potentiality [De Anima, iii., text. 18). If then in that beati-
tude it were not to understand all things, it would remain
imperfect, which is absurd.
Ohj. 6. Further, Whoever sees a mirror sees the things
reflected in the mirror. Now all things are reflected in the
Word of God as in a mirror, because He is the type and
image of all. Therefore the saints who see the Word in
its essence see all created things.
Ohj. 7. Further, According to Prov. x. 24, to the just their
desire shall he given. Now the just desire to know all things,
since all men desire naturally to know, and nature is not done
away by glory. Therefore God will grant them to know
all things.
Ohj. 8. Further, Ignorance is one of the penalties of the
present life.* Now all penalty will be removed from the
* Cf. I.-II.. Q. LXXXV., A. 3.
Q. 92. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 92
saints by glory. Therefore all ignorance will be removed:
and consequently they will know all.
Ohj. 9. Further, The beatitude of the saints is in their soul
before being in their body. Now the bodies of the saints
will be reformed in glory to the Ukeness of Christ's body
(Philip, iii. 21). Therefore their souls will be perfected in
hkeness to the soul of Christ. Now Christ's soul sees all
things in the Word. Therefore all the souls of the saints
will also see all things in the Word.
Obj. 10. Further, The intellect, Hke the senses, knows all
the things with the image of which it is informed. Now
the Divine essence shows a thing forth more clearly than any
other image thereof. Therefore since in that blessed vision
the Divine essence becomes the form as it were of our intel-
lect, it would seem that the saints seeing God see all.
Ohj. II. Further, The Commentator says {De Anima, iii.),
that if the active intellect were the form of the passive intellect,
we should understand all things. Now the Divine essence
represents all things more clearly than the active intellect.
Therefore the intellect that sees God in His essence knows
all things.
Ohj. 12. Further, The lower angels are enlightened by the
higher about the things they are ignorant of, for the reason
that they know not all things. Now after the day of
judgment, one angel will not enlighten another; for then all
superiority will cease, as a gloss observes on i Cor. xv. 24,
When He shall have brought to nought, etc. Therefore the
lower angels will then know all things, and for the same
reason all the other saints who will see God in His essence.
On the contrary, Dionysius says {Hier. Eccles. vi.): The
higher angels cleanse the lower angels from ignorance. Now
the lower angels see the Divine essence. Therefore an
angel while seeing the Divine essence may be ignorant of
certain things. But the soul will not see God more perfectly
than an angel. Therefore the souls seeing God will not
necessarily see all things.
Further, Christ alone has the spirit not by measure
(Jo. iii. 34). Now it becomes Christ, as having the spirit
93 VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q. 92. Art. 3
without measure, to know all things in the Word : wherefore
it is stated in the same place {verse 35) that the Father . . .
hath given all things into His hand. Therefore none but
Christ is competent to know all things in the Word.
Further, The more perfectly a principle is known, the
more of its effects are knowTi thereby. Now some of those
who see God in His essence will know God more perfect^
than others. Therefore some will know more things than
others, and consequently every one will not know all.
/ answer that, God by seeing His essence knows all things
whatsoever that are, shall be, or have been: and He is
said to know these things by His knowledge of vision, because
He knows them as though they were present in Hkeness to
corporeal vision. Moreover by seeing this essence He knows
all that He can do, although He never did them, nor ever
will: else He would not know His power perfectly; since a
power cannot be known unless its objects be known: and
this is called His science or knowledge of simple intelligence.
Now it is impossible for a created intellect, by seeing the
Divine essence, to know all that God can do, because the
more perfectly a principle is known, the more things are
known in it; thus in one principle of demonstration one who
is quick of intelligence sees more conclusions than one
who is slow of intelligence. Since then the extent of the
Divine power is measured according to what it can do, if
an intellect were to see in the Divine essence all that God
can do, its perfection in understanding would equal in extent
the Divine power in producing its effects, and thus it would
comprehend the Divine power, which is impossible for any
created intellect to do. Yet there is a created intellect,
namely the soul of Christ,* which knows in the Word all
that God knows by the knowledge of vision. But regarding
others who see the Divine essence there are two opinions.
For some say that all who see God in His essence see all that
God sees by His knowledge of vision. This, however, is
contrary to the sayings of holy men, who hold that angels
are ignorant of some things ; and yet it is clear that according
* Cf. P. III., Q. XVI., A. 2.
Q 92. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 94
to faith all the angels see God in His essence. Wherefore
others say that others than Christ, although they see God in
His essence, do not see all that God sees because they do not
comprehend the Divine essence. For it is not necessary?'
that he who knows a cause should know all its effects, unless
he comprehend the cause : and this is not in the competency
of a created intellect. Consequently of those who see God
in His essence, each one sees in His essence so much the
more things according as he sees the Divine essence the more
clearly : and hence it is that one is able to instruct another con-
cerning these things. Thus the knowledge of the angels and
of the souls of the saints can go on increasing until the day of
judgment, even as other things pertaining to the accidental
reward. But afterwards it will increase no more, because
then will be the final state of things, and in that state it is
possible that all will know everything that God knows by
the knowledge of vision.
Reply Obj. i. The saying of Isidore, that the angels know
in the Word all things before they happen, cannot refer to those
things which God knows only by the knowledge of simple
intelhgence, because those things will never happen ; but it
must refer to those things which God knows only by the
knowledge of vision. Even of these he does not say that
all the angels know them all, but that perhaps some do;
and that even those who know do not know all perfectly.
For in one and the same thing there are many intelligible
aspects to be considered, such as its various properties and
relations to other things : and it is possible that while one
thing is known in common by two persons, one of them per-
ceives more aspects, ^and that the one learns these aspects
from the other. Hence Dionysius says [Div. Nom. iv.)
that the lower angels learn from the higher angels the intellig-
ible aspects of things. Wherefore it does not follow that
even the angels who know all creatures are able to see all
that can be understood in them.
Reply Obj. 2. It follows from this saying of Gregory
that this blessed vision suffices for the seeing of all things
on the part of the Divine essence, which is the medium by
95 VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE O. 92. Art. 3
which one sees, and whereby God sees all things. That all
tilings, however, are not seen is owing to the deficiency of
the created intellect which does not comprehend the Divine
essence.
Reply Ohj. 3. The created intellect sees the Divine essence
not according to the mode of that same essence, but according
to its own mode which is finite. Hence its efficacy in know-
ing would need to be infinitely increased by reason of that
vision in order for it to know all things.
Reply Ohj. 4. Defective knowledge results not only from
excess and deficiency of the knowable object in relation
to the intellect, but also from the fact that the aspect of
knowableness is not united to the intellect : thus sometimes
the sight sees not a stone, through the image of the stone
not being united to it. And although the Divine essence
which is the type of all things is united to the intellect of
one who sees God, it is united thereto not as the type of all
things, but as the type of some and of so much the more
according as one sees the Divine essence more fully.
Reply Ohj. 5. When a passive power is perceptible by
several perfections in order, if it be perfected with its ultimate
perfection, it is not said to be imperfect, even though it
lack some of the preceding dispositions. Now all knowledge
by which the created intellect is perfected is directed to the
knowledge of God as its end. Wherefore he who sees God
in His essence, even though he know nothing else, would
have a perfect intellect : nor is his intellect more perfect
through knowing something else besides Him, except in
so far as it sees Him more fully. Hence Augustine says
{Conf. V.) : Unhappy is he who knoweth all these (namely,
creatures), and knoweth not Thee: hut happy whoso knoweth
Thee, though he know not these. And whoso knoweth both
Thee and them is not the happier for them, hut for Thee only.
Reply Ohj. 6. This mirror has a will : and even as He will
show Himself to whom He will, so will He show in Himself
whatsoever He will. Nor does the comparison with a
material mirror hold, for it is not in its power to be seen or
not to be seen.
Q. 92. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 96
We may also reply that in a material mirror both object
and mirror are seen under their proper image ; although the
mirror be seen through an image received from the thing
itself, whereas the stone is seen through its proper image
reflected in some other thing, where the reason for seeing
the one is the reason for seeing the other. But in the
uncreated mirror a thing is seen through the form of the
mirror, just as an effect is seen through the image of its
cause and conversely. Consequently it does not follow
that whoever sees the eternal mirror sees all that is reflected
in that mirror : since he who sees the cause does not of
necessity see all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause.
Reply Ohj. 7. The desire of the saints to know all things
will be fulfilled by the mere fact of their seeing God: just as
their desire to possess all good things will be fulfilled by
their possessing God. For as God suffices the affections in that
He has perfect goodness, and by possessing Him we possess all
goods as it were, so does the vision of Him suffice the intellect :
Lord, show us the Father and it is enough for us (Jo. xiv. 8).
Reply Ohj. 8. Ignorance properly so called denotes a
privation and thus is it a punishment : for in this way igno-
rance is nescience of things, the knowledge of which is a
duty or a necessity. Now the saints in heaven will not
be ignorant of any of these things. Sometimes, however,
ignorance is taken in a broad sense of any kind of nescience :
and thus the angels and saints in heaven will be ignorant
of certain things. Hence Dionysius says [loc. cit.) that the
angels will he cleansed from their ignorance. In this sense
ignorance is not a penalty but a defect. Nor is it necessary
for all such defects to be done away by glory : for thus we
might say that it was a defect in Pope Linus that he did not
attain to the glory of Peter.
Reply Ohj. 9. Our body will be conformed to the body of
Christ in glory, in likeness but not in equality, for it will
be endowed with clarity even as Christ's body, but not
equally. In like manner our soul will have glory in hke-
ness to the soul of Christ, but not in equahty thereto : thus
it will have knowledge even as Christ's soul, but not so
great, so as to know all as Christ's soul does.
97 VISION OF DIVINE ESSENCE Q. 92. Art. 3
Reply Ohj. 10. Although the Di\ane essence is the type of
all things knowable, it will not be united to each created
intellect according as it is the type of all. Hence the
objection proves nothing.
Reply Obj. 11. The active intellect is a form proportionate
to the passive intellect ; even as the passive power of matter
is proportionate to the power of the natural agent, so that
whatsoever is in the passive power of matter or of the passive
intellect is in the active power of the active intellect or of
the natural agent. Consequently if the active intellect
become the form of the passive intellect, the latter must of
necessity know all those things to which the power of the
active intellect extends. But the Divine essence is not a
form proportionate to our intellect in this sense. Hence
the comparison fails.
Reply Ohj. 12. Nothing hinders us from saying that after
the judgment day, when the glory of men and angels will
be consummated once for all, all the blessed will know all
that God knows by the knowledge of vision, yet so that not
all will see all in the Divine essence. Christ's soul, however,
will see clearly all things therein, even as it sees them now;
while others will see therein a greater or lesser number of
things according to the degree of clearness wherewith they
\vill know God: and thus Christ's soul will enlighten all
other souls concerning those things which it sees in the Word
better than others. Hence it is written (Apoc. xxi. 23) :
The glory of God shall enlighten the city of Jencsalem* and
the Lamb is the lamp thereof. In like manner the higher
souls will enlighten the lower (not indeed with a new en-
lightening, so as to increase the knowledge of the lower),
but with a kind of continued enlightenment ; thus we might
understand the sun to enlighten the atmosphere while
at a standstill. Wherefore it is written (Dan. xii. 3) : They
that instruct many to justice shall shine as stars for all eter-
nity. The statement that the superiority of the orders will
cease refers to their present ordinate ministry in our regard,
as is clear from the same gloss.
* Vulg., — hath enlightened it.
Hi. 7 7
QUESTION XCIII.
OF THE HAPPINESS OF THE SAINTS AND OF THEIR
MANSIONS.
{In Three Articles.)
We must next consider the happiness of the saints and
their mansions. Under this head there are three points
of inquiry: (i) Whether the happiness of the saints will
increase after the judgment ? (2) Whether the degrees of
happiness should be called mansions ? (3) Whether the
various mansions differ according to various degrees of
charity ?
First Article.
whether the happiness of the saints will be
greater after the judgment than before ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the happiness of the
saints will not be greater after the judgment than before.
For the nearer a thing approaches to the Divine Ukeness,
the more perfectly does it participate happiness. Now
the soul is more like God when separated from the body
than when united to it. Therefore its happiness is greater
before being reunited to the body than after.
Obj. 2. Further, Power is more effective when it is united
than when divided. Now the soul is more united when
separated from the body than when it is joined to the body.
Therefore it has then greater power for operation, and con-
sequently has a more perfect share of happiness, since this
consists in action.*
* Cf. I.-IL, Q. III., A. 2.
98
99 THE MANSIONS OF THE BLESSED Q. 93- Art. i
Obj. 3. Further, Beatitude consists in an act of the
speculative intellect. Now the intellect, in its act, makes
no use of a bodily organ; and consequently by being re-
united to the body the soul does not become capable of
more perfect understanding. Therefore the soul's happiness
is not greater after than before the judgment.
Obj. 4. Further, Nothing can be greater than the infinite,
and so the addition of the finite to the infinite does not
result in something greater than the infinite by itself. Now
the beatified soul before its reunion with the body is ren-
dered happy by rejoicing in the infinite good, namely God;
and after the resurrection of the body it will rejoice in noth-
ing else except perhaps the glory of the body, and this is a
finite good. Therefore their joy after the resumption of the
body will not be greater than before.
On the contrary, A gloss on Apoc. vi. 9, / saw finder the
altar the so^^ls of them that were slain, says: At present the
souls of the saints are under the altar, i.e. less exalted than they
will be. Therefore their happiness will be greater after the
resurrection than after their death.
Further, Just as happiness is bestowed on the good as a
reward, so is unhappiness awarded to the wicked. But the
imhappiness of the wicked after reunion with their bodies
will be greater than before, since they will be punished not
only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore the happi-
ness of the saints will be greater after the resurrection of the
body than before.
/ answer that. It is manifest that the happiness of the saints
will increase in extent after the resurrection, because their
happiness will then be not only in the soul but also in the
body. Moreover, the soul's happiness also will increase in
extent, seeing that the soul will rejoice not only in its own
good, but also in that of the body. We may also say that
the soul's happiness will increase in intensity.* For man's
body may be considered in two ways : first, as being depen-
dent on the soul for its completion ; secondly, as containing
♦ Cf. I. -II., Q. IV., A. 5, ad 5, where S. Thomas retracts this
statement.
Q. 93- Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " loo
something that hampers the soul in its operations, through
the soul not perfectly completing the body. As regards the
first way of considering the body, its union with the soul
adds a certain perfection to the soul, since every part is
imperfect, and is completed in its whole; wherefore the
whole is to the part as form to matter. Consequently the
soul is more perfect in its natural being, when it is in the
whole — namely, man who results from the union of soul and
body — than when it is a separate part. But as regards the
second consideration the union of the body hampers the
perfection of the soul, wherefore it is written (Wis. ix. 15)
that the corruptible body is a load upon the soul. If, then,
there be removed from the body all those things wherein
it hampers the soul's action, the soul will be simply more
perfect while existing in such a body than when separated
therefrom. Now the more perfect a thing is in being, the
more perfectly is it able to operate : wherefore the operation
of the soul united to such a body will be more perfect than
the operation of the separated soul. But the glorified body
will be a body of this description, being altogether subject to
the spirit. Therefore, since beatitude consists in an opera-
tion,* the soul's happiness after its reunion with the body
will be more perfect than before. For just as the soul
separated from a corruptible body is able to operate more
perfectly than when united thereto, so after it has been
united to a glorified body, its operation will be more perfect
than while it was separated. Now every imperfect thing
desires its perfection. Hence the separated soul naturally
desires reunion with the body, and on account of this desire
which proceeds from the soul's imperfection, its operation
whereby it is borne towards God is less intense. This agrees
with the saying of Augustine [Gen. ad Lit. xii. 35) that on
account of the body's desire it is held back from tending with all
its might to that sovereign good.
Reply Obj. i. The soul united to a glorified body is more
like to God than when separated therefrom, in so far as
when united it has more perfect being. For the more per-
* Cf. I.-II., Q. III., A. 2 seqq.
loi THE MANSIONS OF THE BLESSED Q. 93- Art. 2
feet a thing is the more it is like to God : even so the heart, the
perfection of whose life consists in movement, is more like
to God while in movement than while at rest, although
God is never moved.
Reply Obj. 2. A power which by its own nature is capable
of being in matter is more effective when subjected in matter
than when separated from matter, although absolutely
speaking a power separate from matter is more effective.
Reply Obj. 3. Although in the act of understanding the soul
does not make use of the body, the perfection of the body
will somewhat conduce to the perfection of the intellectual
operation in so far as through being united to a glorified body,
the soul will be more perfect in its nature, and consequently
more effective in its operation, and accordingly the good
itself of the body will conduce instrumentally, as it were, to
the operation wherein happiness consists: thus the Philo-
sopher asserts {Ethic, i. 8, 10) that external goods conduce
instrumentally to the happiness of Hfe.
Reply Obj. 4. Although finite added to infinite does not
make a greater thing, it makes more things, since finite and
infinite are two things, while infinite taken by itself is one.
Now the greater extent of joy regards not a greater thing
but more things. Wherefore joy is increased in extent,
through referring to God and to the body's glory, in com-
parison with the joy which referred to God. Moreover, the
body's glory will conduce to the intensity of the joy that
refers to God, in so far as it will conduce to the more perfect
operation whereby the soul tends to God: since the more
perfect is a becoming operation, the greater the delight,*
as stated in Ethic, x. 8.
Second Article.
whether the degrees of beatitude should be
called mansions ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that the degrees of beatitude
should not be called mansions. For beatitude implies the
* Cf. I.-II., Q. XXXII., A. I.
Q. 93- Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 102
notion of a reward: whereas mansion denotes nothing per-
taining to a reward. Therefore the various degrees of
beatitude should not be called mansions.
Obj. 2. Further, mansion seemingly denotes a place. Now
the place where the saints will be beatified is not corporeal
but spiritual, namely God Who is one. Therefore there is
but one mansion: and consequently the various degrees of
beatitude should not be called mansions.
Ohj. 3. Further, As in heaven there will be men of various
merits, so are there now in purgatory, and were in the limbo
of the fathers. But various mansions are not distinguished
in purgatory and limbo. Therefore in like manner neither
should they be distinguished in heaven.
On the contrary, It is written (Jo. xiv. 2) : In My Father's
house there are many mansions: and Augustine expounds
this in reference to the different degrees of rewards [Tract.
Ixvii. in Joan.).
Further, In every well-ordered city there is a distinction
of mansions. Now the heavenly kingdom is compared to
a city (Apoc. xxi. 2). Therefore we should distinguish
various mansions there according to the various degrees of
beatitude.
I answer that, Since local movement precedes all other move-
ments, terms of movement, distance and the like are derived
from local movement to all other movements according to
the Philosopher (Phys. viii.,text.55,56). Now the end of local
movement is a place, and when a thing has arrived at that
place it remains there at rest and is maintained therein.
Hence in every movement this very rest at the end of the
movement is called an establishment [collocatio] or mansion.
Wherefore since the term movement is transferred to the
actions of the appetite and will, the attainment of the end
of an appetitive movement is called a mansion or establish-
ment : so that the unity of a house corresponds to the unity
of beatitude, which unity is on the part of the object, and the
pluraUty of mansions corresponds to the differences of
beatitude on the part of the blessed : even so we observe in
natural things that there is one same place above to which
103 THE MANSIONS OF THE BLESSED Q. 93- Art. 3
all light objects tend, whereas each one reaches it more
closely, according as it is lighter, so that they have various
mansions corresponding to their various lightness.
Reply Obj. 1. Mansion implies the notion of end and con-
sequently of reward which is the end of merit.
Reply Obj. 2. Though there is one spiritual place, there
are different degrees of approaching thereto : and the various
mansions correspond to these.
Reply Obj. 3. Those who were in hmbo or are now in
purgatory have not yet attained to their end. Wherefore
various mansions are not distinguished in purgatory or
limbo, but only in heaven and hell, wherein is the end of
the good and of the wicked.
Third Article.
whether the various mansions are distinguished
according to the various degrees of charity?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the various mansions are
not distinguished according to the various degrees of charity.
For it is written (Matth. xxv. 15) : He gave to every one accord-
ing to his proper virtue (Douay, — ability) . Now the proper
abihty of a thing is its natural power. Therefore the gifts
also of grace and glory are distributed according to the
different degrees of natural power.
Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Ps. Ixi. 12): Thou wilt
render to every man according to his works. Now that which
is rendered is the measure of beatitude. Theiefore the
degrees of beatitude are distinguished according to the
diversity of works and not according to the diversity of
charity.
Obj. 3. Further, Reward is due to act and not to habit:
hence it is not the strongest who are crowned but those who
engage in the conflict {Ethic, i. 8) and he . . . shall not be
(Vulg., — is not) crowned except he strive lawfully. Now
beatitude is a reward. Therefore the various degrees of
Q. 93- Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 104
beatitude will be according to the various degrees of works
and not according to the various degrees of charity.
On the contrary, The more one will be united to God the
happier will one be. Now the measure of charity is the
measure of one's union with God. Therefore the diversity
of beatitude will be according to the difference of charity.
Further, // one thing simply follows from another thing
simply, the increase of the former follows from the increase of
the latter. Now to have beatitude follows from having
charity. Therefore to have greater beatitude follows from
having greater charity.
/ answer that. The distinctive principle of the mansions
or degrees of beatitude is twofold, namely proximate and
remote. The proximate principle is the difference of dis-
position which will be in the blessed, whence will result the
difference of perfection in them in respect to the beatific
operation : while the remote principle is the merit by which
they have obtained that beatitude. In the first way the
mansions are distinguished according to the charity of
heaven, which the more perfect it will be in any one, the
more will it render him capable of the Divine clarity, on the
increase of which will depend the increase in perfection of the
Divine vision. In the second way the mansions are dis-
tinguished according to the charity of the way. For our
actions are meritorious, not by the very substance of the
action, but only by the habit of virtue with which they are
informed. Now every virtue obtains its meritorious efficacy
from charity,* which has the end itself for its object. f
Hence the diversity of merit is all traced to the diversity of
charity, and thus the charity of the way will distinguish the
mansions by way of merit.
Reply Obj. i. In this passage virtue denotes not the natural
abiUty alone, but the natural abihty together with the
endeavour to obtain grace. J Consequently virtue in this
sense will be a kind of material disposition to the measure
of grace and glory that one will receive. But charity is the
* Cf. I.-II., p. CXIV., A. 4.
t Cf. II.-II.,'q. XXIV., A. 3, ad 1.
X Cf. II.-II., Q. XXIII.. A. 8.
105 THE MANSIONS OF THE BLESSED Q. 93- Art. 3
formal complement of merit in relation to glory, and there-
fore the distinction of degrees in glory depends on the degrees
of charity rather than on the degrees of the aforesaid virtue.
Reply Obj. 2. Works in themselves do not demand the
payment of a reward, except as informed by charity: and
therefore the various degrees of glory will be according to
the various degrees of charity.
Reply Obj. 3. Although the habit of charity or of any
virtue whatever is not a merit to which a reward is due, it
is none the less the principle and reason of merit in the act :
and consequently according to its diversity is the diversity
of rewards. This does not prevent our observing a certain
degree of merit in the act considered generically, not indeed
in relation to the essential reward which is joy in God, but
in relation to some accidental reward, which is joy in some
created good.
QUESTION XCIV.
OF THE RELATIONS OF THE SAINTS TOWARDS THE
DAMNED.
{In Three Articles.)
We must next consider the relations of the saints towards
the damned. Under this head there are three points of
inquiry: (i) Wliether the saints see the sufferings of the
damned ? (2) Whether they pity them ? (3) Whether they
rejoice in their sufferings ?
First Article.
whether the blessed in heaven will see the
sufferings of the damned ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : — •
Objection i. It would seem that the blessed in heaven will
not see the sufferings of the damned. For the damned are
more cut off from the blessed than wayfarers. But the
blessed do not see the deeds of wayfarers : wherefore a gloss
on Isa. Ixiii. 16, Abraham hath not known us, says: The dead,
even the saints, know not what the living, even their own children,
are doing* Much less therefore do they see the sufferings
of the damned.
Obj. 2. Further, Perfection of vision depends on the per-
fection of the visible object : wherefore the Philosopher says
{Ethic. X. 4) that the most perfect operation of the sense of sight
is when the sense is most disposed with reference to the most
beautiful of the objects which fall under the sight. Therefore,
on the other hand, any deformity in the visible object
* S. Augustine, De cura pro mortuis xiii., xv.
106
107 SAINTS AND THE DAMNED Q.94ART.1
redounds to the imperfection of the sight. But there will
be no imperfection in the blessed. Therefore they will not
see the sufferings of the damned wherein there is extreme
deformity.
On the contrary, It is written (Isa. Ixvi. 24): They shall
go out and see the carcasses of the men that have transgressed
against Me ; and a gloss says : The elect will go out by under-
standing or seeing manifestly, so that they may be urged the
more to praise God.
I answer that. Nothing should be denied the blessed
that belongs to the perfection of their beatitude. Now
everything is known the more for being compared with its
contrary, because when contraries are placed beside one
another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in
order that the happiness of the saints may be more delight-
ful to them and that they may render more copious thanks
to God for it, they are allowed to see perfectly the sufferings
of the damned.
Reply Obj. i. This gloss speaks of what the departed
saints are able to do by nature : for it is not necessary that
they should know by natural knowledge all that happens to
the living. But the saints in heaven know distinctly all that
happens both to wayfarers and to the damned. Hence
Gregory says [Moral, xii.) that Job's words (xiv. 21),
' Whether his children come to honour or dishonour, he shall
not understand,' do not apply to the souls of the saints, because
since they possess the glory of God within them, we cannot
believe that external things are unknown to them.*
Reply Obj. 2. Although the beauty of the thing seen con-
duces to the perfection of vision, there may be deformity of
the thing seen without imperfection of vision: because the
images of things wfiereby the soul knows contraries are not
themselves contrary. Wherefore also God Who has most
perfect knowledge sees all things, beautiful and deformed.
* Concerning this Reply cf. P. I., Q. LXXXIX., A. 8.
Q. 94- Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGIC A " 108
Second Article.
whether the blessed pity the unhappiness of
the damned ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that the blessed pity the
unhappiness of the damned. For pity proceeds from
charity;* and charity will be most perfect in the blessed.
Therefore they will most especially pity the sufferings of
the damned.
Obj. 2. Further, The blessed will never be so far from
taking pity as God is. Yet in a sense God compassionates
our afflictions, wherefore He is said to be merciful.
On the contrary, Whoever pities another shares somewhat
in his unhappiness. But the blessed cannot share in an3r
unhappiness. Therefore they do not pity the afflictions
of the damned.
/ answer that, Mercy or compassion may be in a person
in two ways: first by way of passion, secondly by way of
choice. In the blessed there will be no passion in the lower
powers except as a result of the reason's choice. Hence
compassion or mercy will not be in them, except by the
choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of the
reason's choice when a person wishes another's evil to be
dispelled : wherefore in those things which, in accordance with
reason, we do not wish to be dispelled, we have no such com-
passion. But so long as sinners are in this world they are
in such a state that without prejudice to the Divine justice
they can be taken away from a state of unhappiness and
sin to a state of happiness. Consequently it is possible to
have compassion on them both by the choice of the will, —
in which sense God, the angels and the blessed are said to
pity them by desiring their salvation, — and by passion,
in which way they are pitied by the good men who are in the
state of wayfarers. But in the future state it will be im-
possible for them to be taken away from their unhappi-
ness : and consequently it will not be possible to pity their
* Cf. II.-II., Q. XXX.
109 SAINTS AND THE DAMNED Q. 94. Art. 3
sufferings according to right reason. Therefore the blessed
in glory will have no pity on the damned.
Reply Obj. i. Charity is the principle of pity when it is
possible for us out of charity to wish the cessation of a
person's unhappiness. But the saints cannot desire this
for the damned, since it would be contrary to Divine justice.
Consequently the argument does not prove.
Reply Obj. 2. God is said to be merciful, in so far as He
succours those whom it is befitting to be released from their
afflictions in accordance with the order of wisdom and
justice : not as though He pitied the damned, except per-
haps in punishing them less than they deserve.
Third Article.
whether the blessed rejoice in the punishment
of the wicked ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the blessed do not rejoice
in the punishment of the wicked. For rejoicing in another's
evil pertains to hatred. But there will be no hatred in
the blessed. Therefore they will not rejoice in the unhappi-
ness of the damned.
Obj. 2. Further, The blessed in heaven will be in the
highest degree conformed to God. Now God does not
rejoice in our afflictions. Therefore neither will the blessed
rejoice in the afflictions of the damned,
Obj. 3. Further, That which is blameworthy in a way-
farer has no place whatever in a comprehensor. Now
it is most reprehensible in a wayfarer to take pleasure in
the pains of others, and most praiseworthy to grieve for
them. Therefore the blessed nowise rejoice in the punish-
ment of the damned.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. Ivii. 11): The just shall
rejoice when he shall see the revenge.
Further, It is written (Isa. Ivi. 24) : They shall satiate*
the sight of all flesh. Now satiety denotes refreshment of
* Douay, — They shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh.
Q. 94. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " no
the mind. Therefore the blessed will rejoice in the punish-
ment of the wicked.
/ answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in
two ways. First directly, when one rejoices in a thing
as such : and thus the saints will not rejoice in the punish-
ment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly, by reason
namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the
saints will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by
considering therein the order of Divine justice and their
own deliverance, which will fill them with joy. And thus
the Divine justice and their own deliverance will be the
direct cause of the joy of the blessed : while the punishment
of the damned will cause it indirectly.
Reply Obj. i. To rejoice in another's evil as such belongs
to hatred, but not to rejoice in another's evil by reason
of something annexed to it. Thus a person sometimes
rejoices in his own evil as when we rejoice in our own
afflictions, as helping us to merit life : My brethren, count it
all joy when you shall fall into divers temptations (J as. i. 2).
Reply Obj. 2. Although God rejoices not in punishments
as such, He rejoices in them as being ordered by His justice.
Reply Obj. 3. It is not praiseworthy in a wayfarer to
rejoice in another's afflictions as such : yet it is praiseworthy
if he rejoice in them as having something annexed. How-
ever it is not the same with a wayfarer as with a compre-
hensor, because in a wayfarer the passions often forestall
the judgment of reason, and yet sometimes such passions
are praiseworthy, as indicating the good disposition of
the mind, as in the case of shame, pity and repentance for
evil: whereas in a comprehensor there can be no passion
but such as follows the judgment of reason. * '^.'.^^^'f ^ j ^t j|
QUESTION XCV.
OF THE GIFTS* OF THE BLESSED.
{In Five Articles.)
We must now consider the gifts of the blessed ; under which
head there are five points of inquiry: (i) Whether any
gifts should be assigned to the blessed ? (2) Wliether a
gift differs from beatitude ? (3) Whether it is fitting for
Christ to have gifts ? (4) Whether this is competent to the
angels ? (5) Whether three gifts of the soul are rightly
assigned ?
First Article.
whether any gifts should be assigned as dowry
to the blessed ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that no gifts should be
assigned as dowry to the blessed. For a dowry (Cod. v. 12,
De jure dot., 20: Dig. xxiii. 3, De jure dot.) is given to the
bridegroom for the upkeep of the burdens of marriage.
But the saints resemble not the bridegroom but the bride,
as being members of the Church. Therefore they receive
no dowry.
Ohj. 2. Further, The dowry is given not by the bride-
groom's father, but by the father of the bride (Cod. v. 11,
De dot. promiss., 7: Dig. xxiii. 2, De rit. nup.). Now aU
the beatific gifts are bestowed on the blessed by the father
of the bridegroom, i.e. Christ: Every best gift and every
perfect gift is from above coming down from the Father of
* The Latin dos signifies a dowry.
Ill
Q. 95. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 112
lights. Therefore these gifts which are bestowed on the
blessed should not be called a dowry.
Obj. 3. Further, In carnal marriage a dowry is given
that the burdens of marriage may be the more easily borne.
But in spiritual marriage there are no burdens, especially
in the state of the Church triumphant. Therefore no
dowry should be assigned to that state.
Ohj. 4. Further, A dowry is not given save on the occasion
of marriage. But a spiritual marriage is contracted with
Christ by faith in the state of the Church mihtant. There-
fore if a dowry is befitting the blessed, for the same reason
it will be befitting the saints who are wayfarers. But it
is not befitting the latter : and therefore neither is it befitting
the blessed.
Ohj. 5. Further, A dowry pertains to external goods,
which are styled goods of fortune : whereas the reward of the
blessed will consist of internal goods. Therefore they should
not be called a dowry.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. v. 32): This is a great
sacrament: hut I speak in Christ and in the Church. Hence
it follows that the spiritual marriage is signified by the
carnal marriage. But in a carnal marriage the dowered
bride is brought to the dwelling of the bridegroom. There-
fore since the saints are brought to Christ's dwelHng when
they are beatified, it would seem that they are dowered
with certain gifts.
Further, A dowry is appointed to carnal marriage for
the ease of marriage. But the spiritual marriage is more
blissful than the carnal marriage. Therefore a dowry
should be especially assigned thereto.
Further, The adornment of the bride is part of the dowry.
Now the saints are adorned when they are taken into glory,
according to Isa. Ixi. 10, He hath clothed me with the garments
of salvation . . . as a hride adorned with her jewels. There-
fore the saints in heaven have a dowry.
/ answer that, Without doubt the blessed when they are
brought into glory are dowered by God with certain gifts
for their adornment, and this adornment is called their
113 THE GIFTS OF THE BLESSED Q.95.ART.1
dowry by the masters. Hence the dower of which we speak
now is defined thus : Tlie dowry is the everlasting adornment
of soul and body, adequate to life, lasting for ever in eternal
bliss. This description is taken from a likeness to the
material dowry whereby the bride is adorned and the
husband provided with an adequate support for his wife
and children, and yet the dowiy remains inalienable from
the bride, so that if the marriage union be severed it reverts
to her. As to the reason of the name there are various
opinions. For some say that the name dowry is taken
not from a likeness to the corporeal marriage, but according
to the manner of speaking whereby any perfection or adorn-
ment of any person whatever is called an endowment;
thus a man who is proficient in knowledge is said to be
endowed with knowledge, and in this sense Ovid employed
the word endowment {De Arte Amandi, i. 538): By whatever
endowment thou canst please, strive to please. But this does
not seem quite fitting, for whenever a term is employed
to signify a certain thing principally, it is not usually trans-
ferred to another save by reason of some likeness. Where-
fore since by its primary signification a dowry refers to
carnal marriage, it follows that in every other application
of the term we must observe some kind of likeness to its
principal signification. Consequently others say that the
likeness consists in the fact that in carnal marriage a dowry
is properly a gift bestowed by the bridegroom on the bride
for her adornment when she is taken to the bridegroom's
dwelhng: and that this is shown by the words of Sichem
to Jacob and his sons (Gen. xxxiv. 12): Raise the dowry,
and ask gifts, and from Exod. xxii. 16: If a man seduce a
virgin . . . and lie with her, he shall endow her, and have
her to wife. Hence the adornment bestowed by Christ
on the saints, when they are brought into the abode of
glory, is called a dowry. But this is clearly contrary to
what jurists say, to whom it belongs to treat of these
matters. For they say that a dowry, properly speaking,
is a donation on the part of the wife made to those who are
on the part of the husband, in view of the marriage burden
III. 7 8
Q. 95- Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 114
which the husband has to bear; while that which the bride-
groom gives the bride is called a donation in view of marriage.
In this sense dowry is taken (3 Kings ix. 16) where it is
stated that Pharao the king of Egypt, took Gezer . . . and
gave it for a dowry to his daiighter, Solomon's wife. Nor
do the authorities quoted prove anything to the contrary.
For although it is customary for a dowry to be given by
the maiden's parents, it happens sometimes that the bride-
groom or his father gives the dowry instead of the bride's
father; and this happens in two ways: either by reason
of his very great love for the bride as in the case of Sichem's
father Hemor, who on account of his son's great love
for the maiden, wished to give the dowry which he had
a right to receive; or as a punishment on the bridegroom,
that he should out of his own possessions give a dowry to
the virgin seduced by him, whereas he should have received
it from the girl's father. In this sense Moses speaks in
the passage quoted above. Wlierefore in the opinion of
others we should hold that in carnal marriage a dowry,
properly speaking, is that which is given by those on the
wife's side to those on the husband's side, for the bearing
of the marriage burden, as stated above. Yet the difficulty
remains how this signification can be adapted to the case
in point, since the heavenly adornments are given to the
spiritual spouse by the Father of the Bridegroom. This
shall be made clear by replying to the objections.
Reply Obj. i. Although in carnal marriage the dowry
is given to the bridegroom for his use, yet the ownership
and control belong to the bride: which is evident by the
fact that if the marriage be dissolved, the dowry reverts
to the bride according to law (Cap. i, 2, 3, De do7iat. inter
virimi et uxor em.). Thus also in spiritual marriage, the
very adornments bestowed on the spiritual bride, namely
the Church in her members, belong indeed to the Bride-
groom, in so far as they conduce to His glory and honour,
yet to the bride as adorned thereby.
Reply Obj. 2. The Father of the Bridegroom, that is of
Christ, is the Person of the Father alone : while the Father
115 THE GIFTS OF THE BLESSED Q. 95- Art. i
of the bride is the whole Trinity, since that which is effected
in creatures belongs to the whole Trinity. Hence in spiritual
marriage these endowments, properly speaking, are given
by the Father of the bride rather than by the Father of
the Bridegroom. Nevertheless, although this endowment
is made by all the Persons, it may be in a manner appro-
priated to each Person. To the Person of the Father, as
endowing, since He possesses authority; and fatherhood
in relation to creatures is also appropriated to Him, so
that He is Father of both Bridegroom and bride. To the
Son it is appropriated, inasmuch as it is made for His sake
and through Him: and to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as it
is made in Him and according to Him, since love is the
reason of all giving.*
Reply Obj. 3. That which is effected by the dowry belongs
to the dowry by its nature, and that is the ease of marriage :
while that which the dowry removes, namely the marriage
burden which is lightened thereby, belongs to it accident-
ally : thus it belongs to grace by its nature to make a man
righteous, but accidentally to make an ungodly man
righteous. Accordingly, though there are no burdens in
the spiritual marriage, there is the greatest gladness; and
that this gladness may be perfected the bride is dowered
with gifts, so that by their means she may be happily united
with the bridegroom.
Reply Obj. 4. The dowry is usually settled on the bride
not when she is espoused, but when she is taken to the
bridegroom's dwelling, so as to be in the presence of the bride-
groom, since while we are in the body we are absent from the
Lord (2 Cor. v. 6). Hence the gifts bestowed on the
saints in this life are not called a dowry, but those
which are bestowed on them when they are received
into glory, where the Bridegroom delights them with His
presence.
Reply Obj. 5. In spiritual marriage inward comehness is
required, wherefore it is written (Ps. xliv. 14): All the glory
of the king's daughter is within, etc. But in carnal marriage
* Cf. P. I., Q. XXXVIII., A. 2.
Q. 95- Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 116
outward comeliness is necessary. Hence there is no need
for a dowry of this kind to be appointed in spiritual marriage
as in carnal marriage.
Second Article,
whether the dowry is the same as beatitude ?*
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the dowry is the same as
beatitude. For as appears from the definition of dowry
(A. i), the dowr37 is the everlasting adornment of body and
soul in eternal happiness. Now the happiness of the soul
is an adornment thereof. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.
Obj. 2. Further, A dowry signifies something whereby
the union of bride and bridegroom is rendered delightful.
Now such is beatitude in the spiritual marriage. There-
fore beatitude is a dowry.
Obj. 3. Further, According to Augustine {De Trin. i.)
vision is the whole essence of beatitude. Now vision is
accounted one of the dowries. Therefore beatitude is a
dowry.
Obj. 4. Further, Fruition gives happiness. Now fruition
is a dowry. Therefore a dowry gives happiness and thus
beatitude is a dowry.
Obj. 5. Further, According to Boethius {De Consol. iii.),
beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good
things. Now the state of the blessed is perfected by the
dowries. Therefore the dowries are a part of beatitude.
On the contrary, The dowries are given without merits:
whereas beatitude is not given, but is awarded in return
for merits. Therefore beatitude is not a dowry.
Further, Beatitude is one only, whereas the dowries are
several. Therefore beatitude is not a dowry.
Further, Beatitude is in man according to that which
is principal in him {Ethic, x. 7): whereas a dowr}^ is also
appointed to the body. Therefore dowry and beatitude
are not the same.
* Cf. P. I., Q. XII., A. 7, adi; I.-II.. Q. IV., A. 3.
117 THE GIFTS OF THE BLESSED Q. 95. Art. 2
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question.
For some say that beatitude and dowry are the same in
reahty but differ in aspect: because dowry regards the
spiritual marriage between Christ and the soul, whereas
beatitude does not. But seemingly this will not stand,
since beatitude consists in an operation, whereas a dowry
is not an operation, but a quality or disposition. Where-
fore according to others it must be stated that beatitude
and dowry differ even in reality, beatitude being the perfect
operation itself by which the soul is united to God, while
the dowries are habits or dispositions or any other qualities
directed to this same perfect operation, so that they are
directed to beatitude instead of being in it as parts thereof.
Reply Obj. i. Beatitude, properly speaking, is not an
adornment of the soul, but something resulting from the
soul's adornment, since it is an operation, while its adorn-
ment is a certain comeliness of the blessed themselves.
Reply Obj. 2. Beatitude is not directed to the union but is
the union itself of the soul with Christ. This union is by
an operation, whereas the dowries are gifts disposing to
this same union.
Reply Obj. 3. Vision may be taken in two ways.
First, actually, i.e. for the act itself of vision; and thus
vision is not a dowry, but beatitude itself. Secondly, it
may be taken habitually, i.e. for the habit whereby
this act is elicited, namely the clarity of glory, by which
the soul is enlightened from above to see God: and thus it
is a dowry and the principle of beatitude, but not beatitude
itself. The same answer applies to Obj. 4.
Reply Obj. 5. Beatitude is the sum of all goods not as
though they were essential parts of beatitude, but as being in
a way directed to beatitude, as stated above.
Q. 95- Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " ii8
Third Article,
whether it is fitting that christ should receive
A DOWRY ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem fitting that Christ should
receive a dowry. For the saints will be conformed to Christ
through glory, according to Philip, iii. 21, Who will reform
the body of our lowness made like to the body of His glory.
Therefore Christ also will have a dowry.
Obj. 2. Further, In the spiritual marriage a dowry is
given in likeness to a carnal marriage. Now there is a
spiritual marriage in Christ, which is peculiar to Him, namely
of the two natures in one Person, in regard to which the
human nature in Him is said to have been espoused by the
Word, as a gloss* has it on Ps. xviii. 6, He hath set His
tabernacle in the sun, etc., and Apoc. xxi. 3, Behold the
tabernacle of God with men. Therefore it is fitting that
Christ should have a dowry.
Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says {De Doctr. Christ, iii.)
that Christ, according to the Rule-\ of Tyconius, on account
of the unity of the mystic body that exists between the head
and its members, calls Himself also the Bride and not only
the Bridegroom, as may be gathered from Isa. Ixi. 10, As
a bridegroom decked with a crown, and as a bride adorned with
her jewels. Since then a dowry is due to the bride, it would
seem that Christ ought to receive a dowry.
Obj. 4. Further, A dowry is due to all the members of the
Church, since the Church is the spouse. But Christ is a
member of the Church according to i Cor. xii. 27, You are
the body of Christ, and members of member, i.e. of Christ,
according to a gloss. Therefore the dowry is due to Christ.
Obj. 5. Further, Christ has perfect vision, fruition, and
joy. Now these are the dowries. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, A distinction of persons is requisite
* S. Augustine, De Consensu Evang. i. 40.
f Liber regularum.
119 THE GIFTS OF THE BLESSED Q. 95- Art. 3
between the bridegroom and the bride. But in Christ there
is nothing personally distinct from the Son of God WTio
is the Bridegroom, as stated in John iii. 29, He that hath
the bride is the bridegroom. Therefore since the dowry is
allotted to the bride or for the bride, it would seem unfitting
for Christ to have a dowry.
Further, The same person does not both give and receive
a dowry. But it is Christ Who gives spiritual dowries.
Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should have a dowry.
/ answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For
some say that there is a threefold union in Christ. One is
the union of concord, whereby He is united to God in the
bond of love; another is the union of condescension, whereby
the human nature is united to the Divine; the third is the
union whereby Christ is united to the Church. They say,
then, that as regards the first two unions it is fitting for
Christ to have the dowTies as such, but as regards the third,
it is fitting for Him to have the dowries in the most excellent
degree, considered as to that in which they consist, but not
considered as dowries; because in this union Christ is the
bridegroom and the Church the bride, and a dowry is given
to the bride as regards property and control, although it
is given to the bridegroom as to use. But this does not
seem congruous. For in the union of Christ with the
Father by the concord of love, even if we consider Him as
God, there is not said to be a marriage, since it implies no
subjection such as is required in the bride towards the bride-
groom. Nor again in the union of the human nature with
the Divine, whether we consider the Personal union or
that which regards the conformity of will, can there be a
dowry, properly speaking, for three reasons. First, because
in a marriage where a dowry is given there should be Hke-
ness of nature between bridegroom and bride, and this is
lacking in the union of the human nature with the Divine;
secondly, because there is required a distinction of persons,
and the human nature is not personally distinct from the
Word; thirdly, because a dowry is given when the bride
is first taken to the dwelling of the bridegroom and thus
Q. 95- Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 120
would seem to belong to the bride, who from being not
united becomes united; whereas the human nature, which
was assumed into the unity of Person by the Word, never
was otherwise than perfectly united. Wherefore in the
opinion of others we should say that the notion of dowry
is either altogether unbecoming to Christ, or not so properly
as to the saints; but that the things which we call dowries
befit Him in the highest degree.
Reply Obj. i. This conformity must be understood to
refer to the thing which is a dowry and not to the notion of
a dowry being in Christ; for it is not requisite that the thing
in which we are conformed to Christ should be in the same
way in Christ and in us.
Reply Obj. 2. Human nature is not properly said to be
a bride in its union with the Word, since the distinction
of persons, which is requisite between bridegroom and bride,
is not observed therein. That human nature is sometimes
described as being espoused in reference to its union with
the Word is because it has a certain act of the bride, in that
it is united to the Bridegroom inseparably, and in this union
is subject to the Word and ruled by the Word, as the bride
by the bridegroom.
Reply Obj. 3. If Christ is sometimes spoken of as the Bride,
this is not because He is the Bride in very truth, but in
so far as He personifies His spouse, namely the Church,
who is united to Him spiritually. Hence nothing hinders
Him, in this way of speaking, from being said to have
the dowries, not that He Himself is dowered, but the
Church.
Reply Obj. 4. The term Church is taken in two senses.
For sometimes it denotes the body only, which is united
to Christ as its Head. In this way alone has the Church
the character of spouse: and in this way Christ is not a
member of the Church, but is the Head from which all the
members receive. In another sense the Church denotes
the head and members united together; and thus Christ is
said to be a member of the Church, inasmuch as He fulfils
an office distinct from all others, by pouring forth hfe into
121 THE GIFTS OF THE BLESSED Q. 95- Art. 4
the other members : although He is not very properly called
a member, since a member implies a certain restriction,
whereas in Christ spiritual good is not restricted but is
absolutely entire,* so that He is the entire good of the
Church, nor is He together with others anything greater
than He is by Himself. Speaking of the Church in this
sense, the Church denotes not only the bride, but the bride-
groom and bride, in so far as one thing results from their
spiritual union. Consequently although Christ be called
a member of the Church in a certain sense, He can by no
means be called a member of the bride; and therefore the
idea of a dowry is not becoming to Him.
Reply Ohj. 5. There is here a fallacy of accident; for
these things are not befitting to Christ if we consider them
under the aspect of dowry.
Fourth Article,
whether the angels receive the dowries ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that the angels receive dowries.
For a gloss on Cant. vi. 8, One is my dove, says: One is the
Church among men and angels. But the Church is the bride,
wherefore it is fitting for the members of the Church to
have the dowries. Therefore the angels have the dowries.
Obj. 2. Further, A gloss on Luke xii. 36, And you your-
selves like to men who wait for their lord, when he shall return
from the wedding, says: Our Lord went to the wedding when
after His resurrection the new Man espoused to Himself
the angelic host. Therefore the angelic hosts are the spouse
of Christ and consequently it is fitting that they should
have the dowries.
Obj. 3. Further, The spiritual marriage consists in a
spiritual union. Now the spiritual union between the
angels and God is no less than between beatified men and
God. Since, then, the dowries of which we treat now are
* Cf. P. III., Q. VIII.. A. I.
Q. 95- Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 122
assigned by reason of a spiritual marriage, it would seem
that they are becoming to the angels.
Ohj. 4. Further, A spiritual marriage demands a spiritual
bridegroom and a spiritual bride. Now the angels are by
nature more conformed than men to Christ as the supreme
spirit. Therefore a spiritual marriage is more possible
between the angels and Christ than between men and Christ.
Ohj. 5. Further, A greater conformity is required between
the head and members than between bridegroom and bride.
Now the conformity between Christ and the angels suffices
for Christ to be called the Head of the angels. Therefore for
the same reason it suffices for Him to be called their bride-
groom.
On the contrary, Origen at the beginning of the prologue
to his commentary on the Canticles, distinguishes four
persons, namely the bridegroom with the bride, the young
maidens, and the companions of the bridegroom : and he says
that the angels are the companions of the bridegroom. Since
then the dowry is due only to the bride, it would seem that
the dowries are not becoming to the angels.
Further, Christ espoused the Church by His Incarnation
and Passion: wherefore this is foreshadowed in the words
(Exod. iv. 25), A bloody spouse thou art to me. Now by
His Incarnation and Passion Christ was not otherwise
united to the angels than before. Therefore the angels
do not belong to the Church, if we consider the Church as
spouse. Therefore the dowries are not becoming to the
angels.
I answer that, Without any doubt, whatever pertains to
the endowments of the soul is bej5.tting to the angels as
it is to men. But considered under the aspect of dowry
they are not as becoming to the angels as to men, because
the character of bride is not so properly becoming to the
angels as to men. For there is required a conformity of
nature between bridegroom and bride, to wit that they
should be of the same species. Now men are in conformity
with Christ in this way, since He took human nature, and
by so doing became conformed to all men in the specific
123 THE GIFTS OF THE BLESSED Q. 95. Art. 4
nature of man. On the other hand, He is not conformed
to the angels in unity of species, neither as to His Divine
nor as to His human nature. Consequently the notion of
dowry is not so properly becoming to angels as to men.
Since, however, in metaphorical expressions, it is not
necessary to have a likeness in every respect, we must not
argue that one thing is not to be said of another metaphori-
cally on account of some lack of likeness; and consequently
the argument we have adduced does not prove that the
dowries are simply unbecoming to the angels, but only that
they are not so properly befitting to angels as to men, on
account of the aforesaid lack of likeness.
Reply Obj. i. Although the angels are included in the
unity of the Church, they are not members of the Church
according to conformity of nature, if we consider the Church
as bride : and thus it is not properly fitting for them to
have the dowries.
Reply Obj. 2. Espousal is taken there in a broad sense,
for union without conformity of specific nature : and in this
sense nothing prevents our saying that the angels have
the dowries taking these in a broad sense.
Reply Obj. 3. In the spiritual marriage although there is
no other than a spiritual union, those whose union answers
to the idea of a perfect marriage should agree in specific
nature. Hence espousal does not properly befit the angels.
Reply Obj. 4. The conformity between the angels and
Christ as God is not such as suffices for the notion of a
perfect marriage, since so far are they from agreeing in
species that there is still an infinite distance between them.
Reply Obj. 5. Not even is Christ properly called the Head
of the angels, if we consider the head as requiring conformity
of nature with the members. We must observe, however,
that although the head and the other members are parts
of an individual of one species, if we consider each one
by itself, it is not of the same species as another member,
for a hand is another specific part from the head. Hence,
speaking of the members in themselves, the only confor-
mity required among them is one of proportion, so that one
Q. 95- Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 124
receive from another, and one serve another. Conse-
quently the conformity between God and the angels suffices
for the notion of head rather than for that of bridegroom.
Fifth Article.
whether three dowries of the soul are suitably
assigned ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem unfitting to assign to the soul
three dowries, namely, vision, love and fruition. For the
soul is united to God according to the mind wherein is the
image of the Trinity in respect of the memory, understand-
ing, and will. Now love regards the will, and vision the
understanding. Therefore there should be something cor-
responding to the memory, since fruition regards not the
memory but the will.
Ohj. 2. Further, The beatific dowTies are said to corre-
spond to the virtues of the way, which united us to God:
and these are faith, hope, and charity, whereby God Himself
is the object. Now love corresponds to charity, and vision
to faith. Therefore there should be something correspond-
ing to hope, since fruition corresponds rather to charity.
Obj. 3. Further, We enjoy God by love and vision only,
since we are said to enjoy those things which we love for their own
sake, as Augustine says {De Doctr. Christ, i. 4). Therefore
fruition should not be reckoned a distinct dowry from love.
Obj. 4. Further, Comprehension is required for the per-
fection of beatitude: So run that you may comprehend
(i Cor. ix. 24). Therefore we should reckon a fourth dowry.
Obj. 5. Further, Anselm says {De Simil. xlviii.) that the
following pertain to the soul's beatitude : wisdom, friendship,
concord, power, honour, security, joy: and consequently the
aforesaid dowries are reckoned unsuitably.
Obj. 6. Further, Augustine says [De Civ. Dei, xxii.) that
in that beatitude God will be seen unendingly, loved without
wearying, praised untiringly. Therefore praise should be
added to the aforesaid dowries.
125 THE GIFTS OF THE BLESSED Q. 95- Art. 5
Ohj. 7. Further, Boethius reckons five things pertaining
to beatitude [De Consol. iii.) and these are: Sufficiency
which wealth offers, joy which pleasure offers, celebrity
which fame offers, security which power offers, reverence
which dignity offers. Consequently it seems that these
should be reckoned as dowries rather than the aforesaid.
/ answer that, All agree in reckoning three dowries of
the soul, in different ways however. For some say that
the three dowries of the soul are vision, love, and fruition;
others reckon them to be vision, comprehension, and fruition ;
others, vision, delight, and comprehension. However, all
these reckonings come to the same, and their number is
assigned in the same way. For it has been said (A. 2) that
a dowry is something inherent to the soul, and directing it
to the operation in which beatitude consists. Now two
things are requisite in this operation: its essence which is
vision, and its perfection which is deHght: since beatitude
must needs be a perfect operation. Again, a vision is
delightful in two ways : first, on the part of the object, by
reason of the thing seen being delightful; secondly, on the
part of the vision, by reason of the seeing itself being delight-
ful, even as we delight in knowing evil things, although the
evil things themselves delight us not. And since this
operation wherein ultimate beatitude consists must needs
be most perfect, this vision must needs be delightful in both
ways. Now in order that this vision be delightful on the
part of the vision, it needs to be made connatural to the
seer by means of a habit ; while for it to be delightful on the
part of the visible object, two things are necessary, namely
that the visible object be suitable, and that it be united
to the seer. Accordingly for the vision to be delightful on
its own part a habit is required to ehcit the vision, and thus
we have one dowry, which all call vision. But on the part
of the visible object two things are necessary. First,
suitableness, which regards the affections, — and in this
respect some reckon love as a dowry, others fruition (in so
far as fruition regards the affective part) since what
we love most we deem most suitable. Secondly, union is
Q. 95- Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 126
required on the part of the visible object, and thus some
reckon comprehension, which is nothing else than to have
God present and to hold Him within oneself;* while others
reckon fruition, not of hope, which is ours while on the way,
but of possession! which is in heaven.
Thus the three dowTies correspond to the three theo-
logical virtues, namely vision to faith, comprehension (or
fruition in one sense) to hope, and fruition (or delight accord-
ing to another reckoning) to charity. For perfect fruition
such as will be had in heaven includes delight and compre-
hension, for which reason some take it for the one, and some
for the other.
Others, however, ascribe these three dowries to the
three powers of the soul, namely vision to the rational, delight
to the concupiscible, and fruition to the irascible, seeing that
this fruition is acquired by a victory. But this is not said
properly, because the irascible and concupiscible powers
are not in the intellective but in the sensitive part, whereas
the dowries of the soul are assigned to the mind.
Reply Ohj. i. Memory and understanding have but one
act : either because understanding is itself an act of memory,
or — if understanding denote a power — because memory does
not proceed to act save through the medium of the under-
standing, since it belongs to the memory to retain knowledge.
Consequently there is only one habit, namely knowledge,
corresponding to memory and understanding: wherefore
only one dowry, namely vision, corresponds to both.
Reply Ohj. 2. Fruition corresponds to hope, in so far as it
includes comprehension which will take the place of hope :
since we hope for that which we have not yet; wherefore
hope chafes somewhat on account of the distance of the
beloved: for which reason it will not remain in heaven J but
will be succeeded by comprehension.
Reply Ohj. 3. Fruition as including comprehension is
distinct from vision and love, but otherwise than love
* Cf. I.-IL. Q. IV.. A. 3-
I Literally of the reality, — non spei . . . sed rei.
X Cf. II.-II., Q. XVIII., A. 2.
127 THE GIFTS OF THE BLESSED Q. 95- Art. 5
from vision. For love and vision denote different habits,
the one belonging to the intellect, the other to the affective
faculty. But comprehension, or fruition as denoting com-
prehension, does not signify a habit distinct from those two,
but the removal of the obstacles which made it impossible
for the mind to be united to God by actual vision. This is
brought about by the habit of glory freeing the soul from all
defects; for instance by making it capable of knowledge
without phantasms, of complete control over the bod3^
and so forth, thus removing the obstacles which result ui
our being pilgrims from the Lord.
Reply Ohj. 4 is clear from what has been said.
Reply Ohj. 5. Properly speaking, the dowries are the
immediate principles of the operation in which perfect
beatitude consists and whereby the soul is united to Christ.
The things mentioned by Anselm do not answer to this
description ; but they are such as in any way accompany or
follow beatitude, not only in relation to the Bridegroom, to
Whom wisdom alone of the things mentioned by him refers,
but also in relation to others. They may be either one's
equals, to whom friendsliip refers as regards the union
of affections, and concord as regards consent in actions, or
one's inferiors, to whom power refers, so far as inferior
things are ordered by superior, and honour as regards that
which inferiors offer to their superiors. Or again (they
may accompany or follow beatitude) in relation to oneself:
to this security refers as regards the removal of evil, and
joy as regards the attainment of good.
Reply Obj. 6. Praise, which Augustine mentions as the
third of those things which will obtain in heaven, is not a
disposition to beatitude but rather a sequel to beatitude:
because from the very fact of the soul's union with God,
wherein beatitude consists, it follows that the soul breaks
forth into praise. Hence praise has not the necessary
conditions of a dowry.
Reply Obj. 7. The five things aforesaid mentioned b}^
Boethius are certain conditions of beatitude, but not
dispositions to beatitude or to its act, because beatitude
Q. 95. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 128
by reason of its perfection has of itself alone and undividedly
all that men seek in various things, as the Philosopher de-
clares [Ethic, i. 7, X. 7, 8). Accordingly Boethius shows that
these five things obtain in perfect beatitude, because they
are what men seek in temporal happiness. For they pertain
either, as security, to immunity from evil, or to the attain-
ment either of the suitable good, as joy, or of the perfect
good, as sufficiency, or to the manifestation of good, as
celebrity, inasmuch as the good of one is made known to
others, or as reverence, as indicating that good or the know-
ledge thereof, for reverence is the showing of honour which
bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that these five
should not be called dowries, but conditions of beatitude.
QUESTION XCVI.
OF THE AUREOLES.
{In Thirteen Articles.)
In the next place we must consider the aureoles. Under
this head there are thirteen points of inquiry: (i) Whether
the aureoles differ from the essential reward ? (2) Whether
they differ from the fruit ? (3) Whether a fruit is due to
the virtue of continence only ? (4) Whether three fruits
are fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence ?
(5) Whether an aureole is due to virgins ? (6) Whether it
is due to martyrs ? (7) Whether it is due to doctors ?
(8) Whether it is due to Christ ? (9) Whether to the angels ?
(10) Whether it is due to the human body ? (11) Whether
three aureoles are fittingly assigned ? (12) Whether the
virgin's aureole is the greatest ? (13) Whether one has the
same aureole in a higher degree than another ?
First Article
whether the aureole is the same as the essen-
tial reward which is called the aurea ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the aureole is not distinct
from the essential reward which is called the aurea. For
the essential reward is beatitude itself. Now according to
Boethius [De Consol. iii.), beatitude is a state rendered perfect
by the aggregate of all goods. Therefore the essential reward
includes every good possessed in heaven ; so that the aureole
is included in the aurea.
in. 7 129 9
g. 96. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 130
Ohj. 2. Further, More and less do not change a species.
But those who keep the counsels and commandments
receive a greater reward than those who keep the command-
ments only, nor seemingly does their reward differ, except
in one reward being greater than another. Since then the
aureole denotes the reward due to works of perfection it
would seem that it does not signify something distinct
from the aurea.
Obj. 3. Further, Reward corresponds to merit. Now
charity is the root of all merit. Since then the aurea
corresponds to charity, it would seem that there will be no
reward in heaven other than the aurea.
Ohj. 4. Further, All the blessed are taken into the angelic
orders as Gregory declares [Horn, xxxiv. in Ev.). Now as
regards the angels, though some of them receive certain gifts
in a higher degree, nothing is possessed by any of them exclu-
sively, for all gifts are in all of them, though not equally,
because some are endowed more highly than others with gifts
which, however, they all possess, as Gregory says {ibid.).
Therefore as regards the blessed, there will be no reward
other than that which is common to all. Therefore the
aureole is not a distinct reward from the aurea.
Obj. 5. Further, A higher reward is due to higher merit.
If, then, the aurea is due to works which are of obligation,
and the aureole to works of counsel, the aureole will be more
perfect than the aurea, and consequently should not be
expressed by a diminutive.* Therefore it would seem that
the aureole is not a distinct reward from the aurea.
On the contrary, A glossf on Exod. xxv. 24, 25, Thou
shall make . . . another little golden crown [coronam aureo-
lam), says : This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins
alone sing in the presence of the Lamb. Wherefore apparently
the aureole is a crown awarded, not to all, but especially
to some : whereas the aurea is awarded to all the blessed.
Therefore the aureole is distinct from the aurea.
Further, A crown is due to the fight which is followed by
* Aureola, i.e., a little aurea.
t Ven. Bede, De Tahernaculis i. 6.
131 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. i
victory: He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully
(2 Tim. ii. 5). Hence where there is a special kind of
conflict, there should be a special crown. Now in certain
works there is a special kind of conflict. Therefore they
deserve a special kind of crown, which we call an aureole.
Further, The Church militant comes down from the
Church triumphant: / saw the Holy City, etc. (Apoc. xxi. 2).
Now in the Church militant special rewards are given to
those who perform special deeds, for instance a crown to
the conqueror, a prize to the runner. Therefore the same
should obtain in the Church triumphant.
/ answer that, Man's essential reward, which is his beati-
tude, consists in the perfect union of the soul with God,
inasmuch as it enjoys God perfectly as seen and loved
perfectly. Now this reward is called a crown or aurea
metaphorically, both with reference to merit which is gained
by a kind of conflict, — since the life of man upon earth is a
warfare (Job vii. i), — and with reference to the reward
whereby in a way man is made a participator of the God-
head, and consequently endowed with regal power: Thou
hast made us to our God a kingdom, etc. (Apoc. v. 10); for a
crown is the proper sign of regal power.
In like manner the accidental reward which is added
to the essential has the character of a crown. For a crown
signifies some kind of perfection, on account of its circular
shape, so that for this very reason it is becoming to the
perfection of the blessed. Since, however, nothing can
be added to the essential, but what is less than it, the
additional reward is called an aureole. Now something
may be added in two ways to this essential reward which
we call the aurea. First, in consequence of a condition
attaching to the nature of the one rewarded: thus the glory
of the body is added to the beatitude of the soul, wherefore
this same glory of the body is sometimes called an aureole.
Thus a gloss of Bede on Exod. xxv. 25, Thou . . . shall
make another little golden crown, says that finally the aureole
is added, when it is stated in the Scriptures that a higher degree
of glory is in store for us when our bodies are resumed. But
Q. 96. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 132
it is not in this sense that we speak of an aureole now.
Secondly, in consequence of the nature of the meritorious
act. Now this has the character of merit on two counts,
whence also it has the character of good. First, to wit,
from its root which is charity, since it is referred to the
last end, and thus there is due to it the essential reward,
namely the attainment of the end, and this is the aurea.
Secondly, from the very genus of the act which derives a
certain praiseworthiness from its due circumstances, from
the habit eliciting it and from its proximate end, and thus
is due to it a kind of accidental reward which we call an
aureole: and it is in this sense that we regard the aureole
now. Accordingly it must be said that an aureole denotes
something added to the aurea, a kind of joy, to wit, in the
works one has done, in that they have the character of a
signal victory : for this joy is distinct from the joy in being
united to God, which is called the aurea. Some, however,
affirm that the common reward, which is the aurea, receives
the name of aureole, according as it is given to virgins,
martyrs, or doctors: even as money receives the name of
debt through being due to some one, though the money
and the debt are altogether the same. And that neverthe-
less this does not imply that the essential reward is any
greater when it is called an aureole; but that it corresponds
to a more excellent act, more excellent not in intensity of
merit but in the manner of meriting; so that although two
persons may have the Divine vision with equal clearness,
it is called an aureole in one and not in the other, in so far
as it corresponds to higher merit as regards the way of
meriting. But this would seem contrary to the meaning
of the gloss quoted above. For if aurea and aureole were
the same, the aureole would not be described as added to
the aurea. Moreover, since reward corresponds to merit,
a more excellent reward must needs correspond to this
more excellent way of meriting: and it is this excellence
that we call an aureole. Hence it follows that an aureole
differs from the aurea.
Reply Obj. 1. Beatitude includes all the goods necessary
133 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. i
for man's perfect life consisting in his perfect operation.
Yet some things can be added, not as being necessary for
that perfect operation as though it were impossible without
them, but as adding to the glory of beatitude. Hence they
regard the well-being of beatitude and a certain fitness
thereto. Even so civic happiness is embellished by nobility
and bodily beauty and so forth, and yet it is possible without
them as stated in Ethic, i. 8: and thus is the aureole in com-
parison with the happiness of heaven.
Reply Obj. 2. He who keeps the counsels and the com-
mandments always merits more than he who keeps the
commandments only, if we gather the notion of merit in
works from the very genus of those works; but not always
if we gauge the merit from its root, charity: since sometimes
a man keeps the commandments alone out of greater charity
than one who keeps both commandments and counsels. For
the most part, however, the contrary happens, because the
proof of love is in the performance of deeds, as Gregory says
[Horn. XXX. in Ev.). Wherefore it is not the more excellent
essential reward that is called an aureole, but that which
is added to the essential reward without reference to the
essential reward of the possessor of an aureole being greater,
or less than, or equal to the essential reward of one who has
no aureole.
Reply Obj. 3. Charity is the first principle of merit: but
our actions are the instruments, so to speak, whereby we
merit. Now in order to obtain an effect there is requisite
not only a due disposition in the first mover, but also a
right disposition in the instrument. Hence something
principal results in the effect with reference to the first
mover, and something secondary with reference to the
instrument. Wherefore in the reward also there is some-
thing on the part of charity, namely the aurea, and
something on the part of the kind of work, namely the
aureole.
Reply Obj. 4. All the angels merited their beatitude by
the same kind of act namely by turning to God: and con-
sequently no particular reward is found in anyone which
Q. 96. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 134
another has not in some way. But men merit beatitude
by different kinds of acts : and so the comparison fails.
Nevertheless among men what one seems to have
specially, all have in common in some way, in so far as
each one, by charity, deems another's good his own. Yet
this joy whereby one shares another's joy cannot be called
an aureole, because it is not given him as a reward for his
victory, but regards more the victory of another: whereas
a crown is awarded the victors themselves and not to those
who rejoice with them in the victory.
Reply Ohj. 5. The merit arising from charity is more
excellent than that which arises from the kind of action:
just as the end to which charity directs us is more excellent
than the things directed to that end, and with which our
actions are concerned. Wherefore the reward corresponding
to merit by reason of charity, however little it may be,
is greater than any reward corresponding to an action by
reason of its genus. Hence aureole is used as a diminutive
in comparison with aurea.
Second Article,
whether the aureole differs from the fruit ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the aureole does not
differ from the fruit. For different rewards are not due
to the same merit. Now the aureole and the hundredfold
fruit correspond to the same merit, according to a gloss on
Matth. xiii. 8, Some a hundredfold. Therefore the aureole
is the same as the fruit.
Ohj. 2. Further, Augustine says [De Virgin, xlv.) that the
hundredfold fruit is due to the martyrs, and also to virgins.
Therefore the fruit is a reward common to virgins and
martyrs. But the aureole also is due to them. Therefore
the aureole is the same as the fruit.
Ohj. 3. Further, There are only two rewards in beatitude,
namely the essential, and the accidental which is added to
the essential. Now that which is added to the essential
135 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 2
reward is called an aureole, as evidenced by the statement
(Exod. XXV. 25) that the Httle crown {aureola) is added to the
crown. But the fruit is not the essential reward, for in
that case it would be due to all the blessed. Therefore it
is the same as the aureole.
On the contrary, Things which are not divided in the same
way are not of the same nature. Now fruit and aureole
are not divided in the same way, since aureole is divided
into the aureole of virgins, of martyrs, and of doctors:
whereas fruit is divided into the fruit of the married, of
widows, and of virgins. Therefore fruit and aureole are
not the same.
Further, If fruit and aureole were the same, the aureole
would be due to whomsoever the fruit is due. But this is
manifestly untrue, since a fruit is due to widowhood, while
an aureole is not. Therefore, etc.
/ answer that, Metaphorical expressions can be taken
in various ways, according as we find resemblances to
the various properties of the thing from which the com-
parison is taken. Now since fruit, properly speaking, is
applied to material things born of the earth, we employ
it variously in a spiritual sense, with reference to the various
conditions that obtain in material fruits. For the material
fruit has sweetness whereby it refreshes so far as it is used
by man : again it is the last thing to which the operation of
nature attains: moreover it is that to which husbandry
looks forward as the result of sowing or any other process.
Accordingly fruit is taken in a spiritual sense sometimes for
that which refreshes, as being the last end: and according
to this signification we are said to enjoy {fnd) God perfectly
in heaven, and imperfectly on the way. From this signi-
fication we have fruition which is a dowry : but we are not
speaking of fruit in this sense now. Sometimes fruit
signifies spiritually that which refreshes only, though it is
not the last end; and thus the virtues are called fruits,
inasmuch as they refresh the mind with genuine sweetness,
as Ambrose says.* In this sense fruit is taken (Gal. vi. 22) :
* De Par ad. xiii.
Q. 96. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 136
The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, etc. Nor again is this
the sense in which we speak of fruit now; for we have
treated of this already.*
We may, however, take spiritual fruit in another sense,
in likeness to material fruit, inasmuch as material fruit
is a profit expected from the labour of husbandry: so that
we call fruit that reward which man acquires from his
labour in this life : and thus ever}^ reward which by our
labours we shall acquire for the future life is called a fruit.
In this sense fruit is taken (Rom. vi. 22) : You have your
fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting. Yet
neither in this sense do we speak of fruit now, but we are
treating of fruit as being the product of seed : for it is in this
sense that our Lord speaks of fruit (Matth. xiii. 23), where
He divides fruit into thirtyfold, sixtyfold, and hundredfold.
Now fruit is the product of seed in so far as the seed power
is capable of transforming the humours of the soil into its
own nature; and the more efficient this power, and the better
prepared the soil, the more plentiful fruit will result. Now
the spiritual seed which is sown in us is the Word of God :
wherefore the more a person is transformed into a spiritual
nature by withdrawing from carnal things, the greater is
the fruit of the Word in him. Accordingly the fruit of the
Word of God differs from the aurea and the aureole, in that
the aurea consists in the joy one has in God, and the aureole
in the joy one has in the perfection of one's works, whereas
the fruit consists in the joy that the worker has in his own
disposition as to his degree of spirituality to which he has
attained through the seed of God's Word.
Some, however, distinguish between aureole and fruit, by
saying that the aureole is due to the fighter, according to
2 Tim. ii. 5, He . . . shall not be crowned, except he strive law-
fully ; whereas the fruit is due to the labourer, according
to the saying of Wisdom iii. 15, The fruit of good labours is
glorious. Others again say that the aurea regards conversion to
God, while the aureole and the fruit regard things directed to
the end ; yet so that the fruit regards the will rather, and the
* Cf. I. -II., Q. LXX., A. I, ad 2.
137 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 3
aureole the body. Since, however, labour and strife are in the
same subject and about the same matter, and since the body's
reward depends on the soul's, these explanations of the differ-
ence between fruit, aurea and aureole would only imply a
logical difference : and this cannot be, since fruit is assigned
to some to whom no aureole is assigned.
Reply Obj. i. There is nothing incongruous if various
rewards correspond to the same merit according to the various
things contained therein. Wherefore to virginity corre-
sponds the aurea in so far as virginity is kept for God's sake
at the command of charity; the aureole, in so far as virginity
is a work of perfection having the character of a signal
victory; and the fruit, in so far as by virginity a person
acquires a certain spirituality by withdrawing from carnal
things.
Reply Obj. 2. Fruit, according to the proper acceptation as
we are speaking of it now, does not denote the reward
common to martyrdom and virginity, but that which corre-
sponds to the three degrees of continency. This gloss
which states that the hundredfold fruit corresponds to
martyrs takes fruit in a broad sense, according as any reward
is called a fruit, the hundredfold fruit thus denoting the
reward due to any perfect works whatever.
Reply Obj. 3. Although the aureole is an accidental reward
added to the essential reward, nevertheless not every acci-
dental reward is an aureole, but only that which is assigned
to works of perfection, whereby man is most conformed to
Christ in the achievement of a perfect victory. Hence it
is not unfitting that another accidental reward, which is
called the fruit, be due sometimes to the withdrawal from
a carnal life.
Third Article,
whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence
ALONE ?
We Proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that a fruit is not due to the
virtue of continence alone. For a gloss on i Cor. xv. 41,
Q. 96. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 138
One is the glory of the sun, says that the worth of those who
have the hundredfold fruit is compared to the glory of the sun;
to the glory of the moon those who have the sixty fold fruit ; and
to the stars those who have the thirtyfold fruit. Now this
difference of glory, in the meaning of the Apostle, regards
any difference whatever of beatitude. Therefore the various
fruits should correspond to none but the virtue of con-
tinence.
Ohj. 2. Further, Fruits are so called from fruition. But
fruition belongs to the essential reward which corresponds
to all the virtues. Therefore, etc.
Obj. 3. Further, Fruit is due to labour: The fruit of good
labours is glorious (Wis. iii. 15). Now there is greater labour
in fortitude than in temperance or continence. Therefore
fruit does not correspond to continence alone.
Obj. 4. Further, It is more difficult not to exceed the
measure in food which is necessary for life, than in sexual
matters without which life can be sustained: and thus the
labour of frugality is greater than that of continence . There-
fore fruit corresponds to frugality rather than to continence-
Obj. 5. Further, Fruit implies delight, and delight regards
especially the end. Since then the theological virtues have
the end for their object, namely God Himself, it would seem
that to them especially the fruit should correspond.
On the contrary is the statement of the gloss on Matth.
xiii. 23, The one a hundredfold, which assigns the fruits to
virginity, widowhood, and conjugal continence, which are
parts of continence.
I answer that, A fruit is a reward due to a person in that
he passes from the carnal to the spiritual hfe. Conse-
quently a fruit corresponds especially to that virtue which
more than any other frees man from subjection to the flesh.
Now this is the effect of continence, since it is by sexual
pleasures that the soul is especially subject to the flesh;
so much so that in the carnal act, according to Jerome {Ep.
ad Ageruch.), not even the spirit of prophecy touches the heart
of the prophet, nor is it possible to understand anything in the
midst of that pleasure, as the Philosopher says [Ethic, vii. 11).
139 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 4
Therefore fruit corresponds to continence rather than to
another virtue.
Reply Ohj. i. This gloss takes fruit in a broad sense,
according as any reward is called a fruit.
Reply Ohj. 2. Fruition does not take its name from fruit
by reason of any comparison with fruit in the sense in which
we speak of it now, as evidenced by what has been said.
Reply Ohj. 3. Fruit, as we speak of it now, corresponds
to labour not as resulting in fatigue, but as resulting in the
production of fruit. Hence a man calls his crops his labour,
inasmuch as he laboured for them, or produced them by his
labour. Now the comparison to fruit, as produced from
seed, is more adapted to continence than to fortitude, because
man is not subjected to the flesh by the passions of fortitude,
as he is by the passions with which continence is concerned.
Reply Ohj. 4. Although the pleasures of the table are more
necessary than the pleasures of sex, they are not so strong:
wherefore the soul is not so much subjected to the flesh
thereby.
Reply Ohj. 5. Fruit is not taken here in the sense in which
fruition applies to delight in the end; but in another sense
as stated above (A. 2). Hence the argument proves nothing.
Fourth Article.
whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the
three parts of continence ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that three fruits are unfittingly
assigned to the three parts of continence : because twelve
fruits of the Spirit are assigned, charity, joy, peace, etc.
(Gal. V. 22). Therefore seemingly we should reckon only
three.
Ohj. 2. Further, Fruit denotes a special reward Now
the reward assigned to virgins, widows, and married persons
is not a special reward, because all who are to be saved are
comprised .under one of these three, since no one is saved
who lacks continence, and continence is adequately divided
Q. 96. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 140
by these three. Therefore three fruits are unfittingly as-
signed to the three aforesaid.
Ohj. 3. Further, Just as widowhood surpasses conjugal
continence, so does virginity surpass widowhood. But the
excess of sixtyfold over thirt3^fold is not as the excess of a
hundredfold over sixtyfold; neither in arithmetical propor-
tion, since sixty exceeds thirty by thirty, and a hundred
exceeds sixty by forty; nor in geometrical proportion,
since sixty is twice thirty and a hundred surpasses sixty as
containing the whole and two-thirds thereof. Therefore the
fruits are unfittingly adapted to the degrees of continence.
Ohj. 4. Further, The statements contained in Holy Writ
stand for all time : Heaven and earth shall pass away, hut My
words shall not pass away (Luke xxi. 33): whereas human
institutions are liable to change every day. Therefore
human institutions are not to be taken as a criterion of the
statements of Holy Writ : and it would seem in consequence
that the explanation of these fruits given by Bede is unfitting.
For he says {Expos, in Luc. iii. 8) that the thirtyfold fruit
is assigned to married persons, hecause in the signs drawn
on the ' ahacus ' the numher 30 is denoted hy the thumh and
index finger touching one another at the tips as though kissing
one another: so that the numher 30 denotes the embraces of
married persons. The numher 60 is denoted hy the contact
of the index finger ahove the middle joint of the thumh, so that
the index finger hy lying over the thumh and weighing on it,
signifies the hurden which widows have to hear in this world.
When, Jiowever, in the course of enumeration we come to the
numher 100 we pass from the left to the right hand, so that the
numher 100 denotes virginity, which has a share in the
angelic excellence; for the angels are on the right hand, i.e. in
glory, while we are on the left on account of the imperfection
of the present life.
I answer that, By continence, to which the fruit corre-
sponds, man is brought to a kind of spiritual nature, by
withdrawing from carnal things. Consequently various
fruits are distinguished according to the various manners
of the spirituality resulting from continence. Now there
141 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 4
is a certain spirituality which is necessary, and one which
is superabundant. The spirituality that is necessary
consists in the rectitude of the spirit not being disturbed
by the pleasures of the flesh : and this obtains when one
makes use of carnal pleasures according to the order of
right reason. This is the spirituahty of married persons.
Spirituality is superabundant when a man withdraws
himself entirely from those carnal pleasures which stifle
the spirit. This may be done in two ways : either in respect
of all time past, present, and future, and this is the spiritu-
ahty of virgins; or in respect of a particular time, and this
is the spirituality of widows. Accordingly to those who
keep conjugal continence, the thirtyfold fruit is awarded;
to those who keep the continence of widows, the sixtyfold
fruit ; and to those who keep virginal continence, the hundred-
fold fruit: and this for the reason given by Bede quoted
above, although another motive may be found in the very
nature of the numbers. For 30 is the product of 3 multipHed
by 10. Now 3 is the number of everything, as stated in
De Ccelo et Mundo, i., and contains a certain perfection com-
mon to all, namely of beginning, middle, and end. Where-
fore the number 30 is fittingly assigned to married persons,
in whom no other perfection is added to the observance of
the Decalogue, signified by the number 10, than the common
perfection without which there is no salvation. The
number six the multiplication of which by 10 amounts to
60 has perfection from its parts, being the aggregate of all
its parts taken together; wherefore it corresponds fittingly
to widowhood, wherein we find perfect withdrawal from
carnal pleasures as to all its circumstances (which are the
parts so to speak of a virtuous act), since widowhood uses
no carnal pleasures in connexion with any person, place,
or any other circumstance; which was not the case with
conjugal continence. The number 100 corresponds fittingly
to virginity; because the number 10 of which 100 is a mul-
tiple is the hmit of numbers: and in like manner virginity
occupies the limit of spirituality, since no further spirituality
can be added to it. The number 100 also being a square
Q. 96. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 142
number has perfection from its figure : for a square figure
is perfect through being equal on all sides, since all its sides
are equal : wherefore it is adapted to virginity wherein
incorruption is found equally as to all times.
Reply Ohj. i. Fruit is not taken there in the sense in which
we are taking it now.
Reply Ohj. 2. Nothing obliges us to hold that fruit is a
reward that is not common to all who will be saved. For
not only the essential reward is common to all, but also
a certain accidental reward, such as joy in those works with-
out which one cannot be saved. Yet it may be said that
the fruits are not becoming to all who will be saved, as
is evidently the case with those who repent in the end after
leading an incontinent life, for to such no fruit is due but
only the essential reward.
Reply Ohj. 3. The distinction of the fruits is to be taken
according to the species and figures of the numbers rather
than according to their quantity. Nevertheless even if we
regard the excess in point of quantity, we may find an expla-
nation. For the married man abstains only from one that
is not his, the widow from both hers and not hers, so that
in the latter case we find the notion of double, just as 60 is
the double of 30. Again 100 is 60 + 40, which latter number
is the product of 4 x 10, and the number 4 is the first solid
and square number. Thus the addition of this number is
fitting to virginity, which adds perpetual incorruption to the
perfection of widowhood.
Reply Ohj. 4. Although these numerical signs are a human
institution, they are founded somewhat on the nature of
things, in so far as the numbers are denoted in gradation,
according to the order of the aforesaid joints and contacts.
143 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 5
Fifth Article.
whether an aureole is due on account of
virginity ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that an aureole is not due on
account of virginity. For where there is greater difficulty
in the work, a greater reward is due. Now widows have
greater difficulty than virgins in abstaining from the works
of the flesh. For Jerome says {Ep. ad Ageruch.) that the
greater difficulty certain persons experience in abstaining
from the allurements of pleasure, the greater their reward,
and he is speaking in praise of widows. Moreover, the
Philosopher says [De Anim. Hist, vii.) that young women
who have been deflowered desire sexual intercourse the more
for the recollection of the pleasure. Therefore the aureole
which is the greatest reward is due to widows more than
to virgins.
Obj. 2. Further, If an aureole were due to virginity, it
would be especially found where there is the most perfect
virginity. Now the most perfect virginity is in the Blessed
Virgin, wherefore she is called the Virgin of virgins : and yet
no aureole is due to her because she experienced no conffict
in being continent, for she was not infected with the corrup-
tion of the fomes.* Therefore an aureole is not due to
virginity.
Obj. 3. Further, A special reward is not due to that which
has not been at all times praiseworthy. Now it would not
have been praiseworthy to observe virginity in the state of
innocence, since then was it commanded: Increase and
multiply and fill the earth (Gen. i. 28): nor again during the
time of the Law, since the barren were accursed. There-
fore an aureole is not due to virginity.
Obj. 4. Further, The same reward is not due to virginity
observed, and virginity lost. Yet an aureole is sometimes
due to lost virginity; for instance if a maiden be violated
* Cf. P. III.. Q. XXVII., A. 3.
Q. 96. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 144
unwillingly at the order of a tyrant for confessing Christ.
Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.
Obj. 5. Further, A special reward is not due to that which
is in us by nature. But virginity is inborn in every man
both good and wicked. Therefore an aureole is not due to
virginity.
Ohj. 6. Further, As widowhood is to the sixtyfold fruit,
so is virginity to the hundredfold fruit, and to the aureole.
Now the sixtyfold fruit is not due to every widow, but only,
as some say, to one who vows to remain a widow. There-
fore it would seem that neither is the aureole due to any
kind of virginity, but only to that which is observed by vow.
Obj. 7. Further, Reward is not given to that which is
done of necessity, since all merit depends on the will. But
some are virgins of necessity, such as those who are naturally
cold-blooded, and eunuchs. Therefore an aureole is not
always due to virginity.
On the contrary, A gloss on Exod. xxv. 25: Thou shalt
also make a little golden crown (coronam aureolam) says:
This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins sing in
the presence of the Lamb, those, to wit, who follow the Lamb
whithersoever He goeth. Therefore the reward due to virgin-
ity is called an aureole.
Further, It is written (Isa. Ivi. 4) : Thus saith the Lord
to the eunuchs: and the text continues [verse 5): / will give
to them . . . a name better than sons and daughters: and a
gloss* says: This refers to their peculiar and transcendent
glory. Now the eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs
for the kingdom of heaven (Matth. xix. 12) denote virgins.
Therefore it would seem that some special reward is due
to virginity, and this is called the aureole.
/ answer that. Where there is a notable kind of victory,
a special crown is due. Wherefore since by virginity a
person wins a signal victory over the flesh, against which
a continuous battle is waged : The flesh lusteth against the
spirit, etc. (Gal. v. 17), a special crown called the aureole
is due to virginity. This indeed is the common opinion of
* S. Augustine, De Virginii. xxv.
145 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 5
all; but all are not agreed as to the kind of virginity to which
it is due. For some say that the aureole is due to the act.
So that she who actually remains a virgin will have the
aureole provided she be of the number of the saved. But
this would seem unreasonable, because in this case those
who have the will to marry and nevertheless die before
marrying would have the aureole. Hence others hold that
the aureole is due to the state and not to the act : so that those
virgins alone merit the aureole who by vow have placed
themselves in the state of observing perpetual virginity*
But this also seems unreasonable, because it is possible to
have the same intention of observing virginity without a
vow as with a vow. Hence it may be said otherwise that
merit is due to every virtuous act commanded by charity.
Now virginity comes under the genus of virtue in so far as
perpetual incorruption of mind and body is an object of
choice, as appears from what has been said above (iv. Seyit.
D. 33- Q- HI., AA. i, 2).* Consequently the aureole is
due to those virgins alone, who had the purpose of observr
ing perpetual virginity, whether or no they have confirmed
this purpose by vow, — and this I say with reference to the
aureole in its proper signification of a reward due to merit, — •
although this purpose may at some time have been inter-
rupted, integrity of the flesh remaining withal, provided
it be found at the end of life, because virginity of the mind
may be restored, although virginity of the flesh cannot.
If, however, we take the aureole in its broad sense for any
joy added to the essential joy of heaven, the aureole will
be appUcable even to those who are incorrupt in flesh,
although they had not the purpose of observing perpetual
virginity. For without doubt they will rejoice in the
incorruption of their body, even as the innocent will rejoice
in having been free from sin, although they had no oppor-
tunity of sinning, as in the case of baptized children. But
this is not the proper meaning of an aureole, although it
is very commonly taken in this sense.
Reply Obj. 1. In some respects virgins experience a
* Cf. II.-II., Q. CLII., AA. I, 3.
III. 7 10
Q. 96. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 146
greater conflict in remaining continent ; and in other respects,
widows, other things being equal. For virgins are inflamed
by concupiscence, and by the desire of experience, which
arises from a certain curiosity as it were, which makes
man more willing to see what he has never seen. Sometimes,
moreover, this concupiscence is increased by their esteeming
the pleasure to be greater than it is in reaUty, and by their
failing to consider the grievances attaching to this pleasure.
In these respects widows experience the lesser conflict, yet
theirs is the greater conflict by reason of their recollection
of the pleasure. Moreover, in different subjects one motive
is stronger than another, according to the various conditions
and dispositions of the subject, because some are more
susceptible to one, and others to another. However, what-
ever we may say of the degree of conflict, this is certain, —
that the virgin's victory is more perfect than the widow's,
for the most perfect and most brilhant kind of victory is
never to have yielded to the foe : and the crown is due, not
to the battle but to the victory gained by the battle.
Reply Ohj. 2. There are two opinions about this. For
some say that the Blessed Virgin has not an aureole in reward
of her virginity, if we take aureole in the proper sense as
referring to a conflict, but that she has something more than
an aureole, on account of her most perfect purpose of
observing virginity. Others say that she has an aureole
even in its proper signification, and that a most transcendent
one : for though she experienced no conflict, she had a certain
conflict of the flesh, but owing to the exceeding strength
of her virtue, her flesh was so subdued that she did not
feel this conflict. This, however, would seem to be said
without reason, for since we believe the Blessed Virgin to
have been altogether immune from the inclination of the
fomes on account of the perfection of her sanctification'
it is wicked to suppose that there was in her any conflict
with the flesh, since suchlike conflict is only from the
incHnation of the fomes, nor can temptation from the flesh
be without sin, as declared by a gloss* on 2 Cor. xii. 7,
* S. Augustine, De Civ. Dei. xix. 4.
147 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 5
There was given me a sting of my flesh. Hence we must say-
that she has an aureole properly speaking, so as to be
conformed in this to those other members of the Church
in whom virginity is found : and although she had no conflict
by reason of the temptation which is of the flesh, she had
the temptation which is of the enemy, who feared not even
Christ (Matth. iv.).
Reply Obj. 3. The aureole is not due to virginity except
as adding some excellence to the other degrees of continence.
If Adam had not sinned, virginity would have had no per-
fection over conjugal continence, since in that case marriage
would have been honourable, and the marriage-bed un-
sulUed, for it would not have been dishonoured by lust:
hence virginity would not then have been observed, nor
would an aureole have been due to it. But the condition
of human nature being changed, virginity has a special
beauty of its own, and consequently a special reward is
assigned to it.
During the time of the Mosaic law, when the worship of
God was to be continued by means of the carnal act, it was
not altogether praiseworthy to abstain from carnal inter-
course : wherefore no special reward would be given for such
a purpose unless it came from a Divine inspiration, as is
beheved to have been the case with Jeremias and Ehas,
of whose marriage we do not read.
Reply Obj. 4. If a virgin is violated, she does not forfeit
the aureole, provided she retain unfailingly the purpose
of observing perpetual virginity, and nowise consent to
the act. Nor does she forfeit virginity thereby; and be this
said, whether she be violated for the faith, or for any other
cause whatever. But if she suffer this for the faith, this
will count to her for merit, and will be a kind of martyr-
dom : wherefore Lucy said : // thou caiisest trie to be violated
against my will, my chastity will receive a double crown ;*
not that she has two aureoles of virginity, but that she will
receive a double reward, one |for observng virginity, the
other for the outrage she has suffered. Even supposing
* Of&ceof S, Lucy; led. vi. (Dominican Breviary, Deccmter i3tli)
Q. 96. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 148
that one thus violated should conceive, she would not for
that reason forfeit her virginity: nor would she be equal
to Christ's mother, in whom there was integrity of the flesh
together with integrity of the mind.*
Reply Obj. 5. Virginity is inborn in us as to that which is
material in virginity : but the purpose of observing perpetual
incorruption, whence virginity derives its merit, is not
inborn, but comes from the gift of grace.
Reply Obj. 6. The sixtyfold fruit is due, not to every
widow, but only to those who retain the purpose of remain-
ing widows, even though they do not make it the matter
of a vow, even as we have said in regard to virginity.
Reply Obj. 7. If cold-blooded persons and eunuchs have
the will to observe perpetual incorruption even though they
were capable of sexual intercourse, they must be called
virgins and merit the aureole: for they make a virtue of
necessity. If, on the other hand, they have the will to
marry if they could, they do not merit the aureole. Hence
Augustine says {De Sancta Virgin., xxiv.): For those like
eunuchs whose bodies are so formed that they are imable to
beget, it suffices when they become Christians and keep the
commandments of God, that they have a mind to have a wife
if they could, in order to rank with the faithful who are married.
Sixth Article,
whether an aureole is due to martyrs ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that an aureole is not
due to martyrs. For an aureole is a reward given for
works of supererogation, wherefore Bede commenting on
Exod. XXV. 25, Thou shall also make another . . . crown,
says : This may be rightly referred to the reward of those who
by freely choosing a more perfect life go beyond the general
commandments. But to die for confessing the faith is
sometimes an obligation, and not a work of supererogation,
* Cf. II.-II., Q. LXIV., A. 3, ad 3; Q. CXXIV.. A. ^, ad 2;
Q. CLII., A. I.
149 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 6
as appears from the words of Rom. x. 10, With the heart,
we believe unto justice, hut with the mouth confession is made
unto salvation. Therefore an aureole is not always due to
martyrdom.
Ohj. 2. Further, According to Gregory (Moral, ix.)* the
freer the service, the more acceptable it is. Now martyrdom
has a minimum of freedom, since it is a punishment inflicted
by another person with force. Therefore an aureole is not
due to martyrdom, since it is accorded to surpassing merit.
Ohj. 3. Further, Martyrdom consists not only in suffering
death externally, but also in the interior act of the will:
wherefore Bernard in a sermon on the Holy Innocents dis-
tinguishes three kinds of martyr, — in will and not in death,
as John; in both will and death, as Stephen; in death and
not in will, as the Innocents. Accordingly if an aureole
were due to martjn'dom, it would be due to voluntary rather
than external martyrdom, since merit proceeds from will.
Yet such is not the case. Therefore an aureole is not due to
martrydom.
Ohj. 4. Further, Bodily suffering is less than mental,
which consists of internal sorrow and affliction of soul. But
internal suffering is also a kind of martyrdom: wherefore
Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption:! / should say
rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr^
although she ended her days in peace, wherefore: Thine own
soul a sword hath pierced — namely for her Son's death. Since
then no aureole corresponds to interior sorrow, neither
should one correspond to outward suffering.
Obj. 5. Further, Penance itself is a kind of martyrdom^
wherefore Gregory says (Horn. iii. in Ev.)\ Although persecu-
tion has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy
is not without its martyrdom ; since even if we no longer yield
the life of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires
in the soul with the sword of the spirit. But no aureole is due
to penance which consists in external works. Neither
therefore is an aureole due to every external martyrdom.
* Cf. S. Augustine, De Adult. Conjug., i. 14.
t Ep. ad Paul, et Eustoch.
Q. 96. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 150
Obj. 6. Further, An aureole is not due to an unlawful
work. Now it is unlawful to lay hands on oneself, as Augus-
tine declares {De Civ. Dei, i.), and yet the Church celebrates
the martyrdom of some who laid hands upon themselves
in order to escape the fury of tyrants, as in the case of
certain women at Antioch (Eusebius, — Eccles. Hist. viii. 24).
Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom.
Obj. 7. Further, It happens at times that a person is
wounded for the faith, and survives for some time. Now
it is clear that such a one is a martyr, and yet seemingly
an aureole is not due to him, since his conflict did not last
until death. Therefore an aureole is not always due to
martyrdom.
Obj. 8. Further, Some suffer more from the loss of tem-
poral goods than from the affliction even of their own body,
and this is shown by their bearing many afflictions for the
sake of gain. Therefore if they be despoiled of their tem-
poral goods for Christ's sake they would seem to be martyrs,
and yet an aureole is not apparently due to them. There-
fore the same conclusion follows as before.
Obj. 9. Further, A martyr would seem to be no other than
one who dies for the faith, wherefore Isidore says {Etym.
vii.): They are called martyrs in Greek, witnesses in Latin:
because they suffered in order to bear witness to Christ, and
strove unto death for the truth. Now there are virtues more
excellent than faith, such as justice, charity, and so forth,
smce these cannot be without grace, and yet no aureole
is due to them. Therefore seemingly neither is an aureole
due to martyrdom.
Obj. 10. Further, Even as the truth of faith is from God,
so is all other truth, as Ambrose* declares, since every truth
by whomsoever uttered is from the Holy Ghost. Therefore if
an aureole is due to one who suffers death for the truth of
faith, in Uke manner it is also due to those who suffer death
for any other virtue : and yet apparently this is not the case.
Obj. II. Further, The common good is greater than the
good of the individual. Now if a man die in a just war in
* Another author on 1 Cor. xii. 3, No man can say, etc.
151 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 6
order to save his country, an aureole is not due to him.
Therefore even though he be put to death in order to keep
the faith that is in himself, no aureole is due to him: and
consequently the same conclusion follows as above.
Obj. 12. Further, All merit proceeds from the free will.
Yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who had
not the use of the free will. Therefore they did not merit an
aureole : and consequently anaureole is not due toallmartyrs.
On the contrary, Augustine says [De Sancta Virgin, xlvi.) :
No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom.
Now an aureole is due to virgmity, and consequently also
to martyrdom.
Further, The crown is due to one who has striven. But
in martyrdom the strife presents a special difficulty. There-
fore a special aureole is due thereto.
/ answer that, Just as in the spirit there is a conflict
with the internal concupiscences, so is there in man a con-
flict with the passion that is inflicted from without. Where-
fore, just as a special crown, which we call an aureole, is
due to the most perfect victory whereby we triumph over
the concupiscences of the flesh, in a word to virginity, so too
an aureole is due to the most perfect victory that is won
against external assaults. Now the most perfect victory
over passion caused from without is considered from two
points of view. First from the greatness of the passion.
Now among all passions inflicted from without, death holds
the first place, just as sexual concupiscences are chief among
internal passions. Consequently, when a man conquers
death and things directed to death, his is a most perfect
victory. Secondly, the perfection of victory is considered
from the point of view of the motive of conflict, when, to
wit, a man strives for the most honourable cause; which is
Christ Himself. Both these things are to be found in martyr-
dom, which is death suffered for Christ's sake : for it is not
the pain hut the cause that makes the martyr, as Augustine
says {Contra Crescon. iii.). Consequently an aureole is due
to martyrdom as well as to virginity.
Reply Obj. i. To suffer death for Christ's sake is, absolutely
Q. 96. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 152
speaking, a work of supererogation ; since every one is not
bound to confess his faith in the face of a persecutor: yet
in certain cases it is necessary for salvation, when, to wit, a
person is seized by a persecutor and interrogated as to his
faith which he is then bound to confess. Nor does it follow
that he does not merit an aureole. For an aureole is due
to a work of supererogation, not as such, but as having a
certain perfection. Wherefore so long as this perfection
remains, even though the supererogation cease, one merits
the aureole.
Reply Obj. 2. A reward is due to martyrdom, not in respect
of the exterior infliction, but because it is suffered volun-
tarily: since we merit only through that which is in us.
And the more that which one suffers voluntarily is difficult
and naturally repugnant to the will, the more is the will that
suffers it for Christ's sake shown to be firmly estabhshed in
Christ, and consequently a higher reward is due to him.
Reply Obj. 3. There are certain acts which, in their very
selves, contain intense pleasure or difficulty: and in such
the act always adds to the character of merit or demerit,
for as much as in the performance of the act the will, on
account of the aforesaid intensity, must needs undergo an
alteration from the state in which it was before. Conse-
quently, other things being equal, one who performs an act
of lust sins more than one who merely consents in the act,
because in the very act the will is increased. In Uke manner
since in the act of suffering martyrdom there is a very great
difficulty, the will to suffer martyrdom does not reach the
degree of merit due to actual martyrdom by reason of its
difficulty: although indeed it may possibly attain to a
higher reward, if we consider the root of merit, since the
will of one man to suffer martyrdom may possibly proceed
from a greater charity than another man's act of martyrdom.
Hence one who is willing to be a martyr may by his will
merit an essential reward equal to or greater than that
which is due to an actual martyr. But the aureole is due
to the difficulty inherent to the conflict itself of martyrdom :
wherefore it is not due to those who are martyrs only in will.
153 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 6
Reply Obj. 4. Just as pleasures of touch, which are the
matter of temperance, hold the chief place among all plea-
sures both internal and external, so pains of touch surpass
all other pains. Consequently an aureole is due to the diffi-
culty of suffering pains of touch, for instance, from blows
and so forth, rather than to the difficulty of bearing internal
sufferings, by reason of which, however, one is not properly
called a martyr, except by a kind of comparison. It is in this
sense that Jerome speaks.
Reply Obj. 5. The sufferings of penance are not a martyr-
dom properly speaking, because they do not consist in
things directed to the causing of death, since they are
directed merely to the taming of the flesh : and if any one
go beyond this measure, such afflictions will be deserving
of blame. However such afflictions are spoken of as a
martyrdom by a kind of comparison ; and they surpass the
sufferings of martyrdom in duration but not in intensity.
Reply Obj. 6. According to Augustine {De Civ. Dei, i.)
it is lawful to no one to lay hands on himself for any reason
whatever; unless perchance it be done by Divine instinct
as an example of fortitude that others may despise death.
Those to whom the objection refers are believed to have
brought death on themselves by Divine instinct, and for this
reason the Church celebrates their martyrdom.*
Reply Obj. 7. If any one receive a mortal wound for the
faith and survive, without doubt he merits the aureole:
as instanced in blessed Cecilia who survived for three days,
and many martyrs who died in prison. But, even if the
wound he receives be not mortal, yet be the occasion of his
dying, he is believed to merit the aureole : although some say
that he does not merit the aureole if he happen to die through
his own carelessness or neglect. For this neglect would
not have occasioned his death, except on the supposition of
the wound which he received for the faith : and consequently
this wound previously received for the faith is the original
occasion of his death, so that he would not seem to lose the
aureole for that reason, unless his neglect were such as to
* Cf. II.-II., Q. LXIV., A. 5.
Q. 96. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 154
involve a mortal sin, which would deprive him of both aurea
and aureole. If, however, by some chance or other he were
not to die of the mortal wound received, or again if the
wounds received were not mortal, and he were to die while
in prison, he would still merit the aureole. Hence the
martyrdom of some saints is celebrated in the Church for
that they died in prison, having been wounded long before,
as in the case of Pope Marcellus. Accordingly in whatever
way suffering for Christ's sake be continued unto death,
whether death ensue or not, a man becomes a martyr
and merits the aureole, li, however, it be not continued
unto death, this is not a reason for calling a person a martyr,
as in the case of the blessed Sylvester, whose feast the Church
does not solemnize as a martyr's, since he ended his days in
peace, although previously he had undergone certain sufferings.
Reply Obj. 8. Even as temperance isnot about pleasures of
money, honours, and the hke, but only about pleasures of
touch as being the principal of all, so fortitude is about
dangers of death as being the greatest of all {Ethic, iii. 6).
Consequent!}' the aureole is due to such injuries only as are
inflicted on a person's own body and are of a nature to cause
death. Accordingly whether a person lose his temporali-
ties, or his good name, or anything else of the kind, for
Christ's sake, he does not for that reason become a martyr,
nor merit the aureole. Nor is it possible to love ordinately
external things more than one's body; and inordinate love
does not help one to merit an aureole : nor again can sorrow
for the loss of corporeal things be equal to the sorrow for
the slaying of the body and other like things.*
Reply Obj. g. The sufficient motive for martyrdom is not
only confession of the faith, but any other virtue, not civic
but infused, that has Christ for its end. For one becomes
a witness of Christ by any virtuous act, inasmuch as the
works which Christ perfects in us bear witness to His good-
ness. Hence some virgins were slain for virginity which
they desired to keep, for instance blessed Agnes and others
whose martyrdom is celebrated by the Church.
* Cf. II.-II., Q. CXXIV., A. 5.
155 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 6
Reply Obj. 10. The truth of faith has Christ for end and
object; and therefore the confession thereof, if suffering be
added thereto, merits an aureole, not only on the part of the
end but also on the part of the matter. But the confession
of any other truth is not a sufficient motive for martyrdom by
reason of its matter, but only on the part of the end; for
instance if a person were willing to be slain for Christ's sake
rather than sin against Him by telling any lie whatever.
Reply Obj. 11. The uncreated good surpasses all created
good. Hence any created end, whether it be the common
or a private good, cannot confer so great a goodness on an
act as can the uncreated end, when, to wit, an act is done for
God's sake. Hence when a person dies for the common good
without referring it to Christ, he will not merit the aureole ;
but if he refer it to Christ he will merit the aureole and he
will be a martyr; for instance, if he defend his country
from the attack of an enemy who designs to corrupt the faith
of Christ, and suffer death in that defence.
Reply Obj. 12. Some say that the use of reason was by
the Divine power accelerated in the Innocents slain for
Christ's sake, even as in John the Baptist while yet in his
mother's womb: and in that case they were truly martyrs
in both act and will, and have the aureole. Others say,
however, that they were martyrs in act only and not in will:
and this seems to be the opinion of Bernard, who distin-
guishes three kinds of martyrs, as stated above {Obj. 3).
In this case the Innocents, even as they do not fulfil all the
conditions of martyrdom, and yet are martyrs in a sense,
in that they died for Christ, so too they have the aureole,
not in all its perfection, but by a kind of participation, in
so far as they rejoice in having been slain in Christ's service ;
thus it was stated above (A. 5) in reference to baptized
children, that they will have a certain joy in their innocence
and carnal integrity.*
* Cf. II.-II., Q. CXXIV., A. I, ad i, where S. Thomas declares
that the Holy Innocents were truly martyrs.
Q. 96. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 156
Seventh Article,
whether an aureole is due to doctors ?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that an aureole is not due to
doctors. For every reward to be had in the life to come
will correspond to some act of virtue. But preaching or
teaching is not the act of a virtue. Therefore an aureole
is not due to teaching or preaching.
Obj. 2. Further, Teaching and preaching are the result of
studying and being taught. Now the things that are
rewarded in the future life are not acquired by a man's
study, since we merit not by our natural and acquired
gifts. Therefore no aureole will be merited in the future
life for teaching and preaching.
Obj. 3. Further, Exaltation in the Hfe to come corre-
sponds to humiliation in the present life, because he that
humbleth himself shall be exalted (Matth. xxiii. 12). But
there is no humiliation in teaching and preaching, in fact
they are occasions of pride; for a gloss on Matth. iv. 5,
Then the devil took Him up, says that the devil deceives many
who are puffed up with the honour of the master's chair.
Therefore it would seem that an aureole is not due to
preaching and teaching.
On the contrary, A gloss on Eph. i. 18, 19, That you may
know . . . what is the exceeding greatness, etc., says: The
holy doctors will have an increase of glory above that which
all have in common. Therefore, etc.
Further, A gloss on Cant. viii. 12, My vineyard is before
me, says: He describes the peculiar reward which He has
prepared for His doctors. Therefore doctors will have a
peculiar reward: and we call this an aureole.
/ answer that, Just as by virginity and martyrdom a
person wins a most perfect victory over the flesh and the
world, so is a most perfect victory gamed over the devil,
when a person not only refuses to yield to the devil's assaults,
but also drives him out, not from himself alone, but from
others also. Now this is done by preaching and teaching:
157 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 8
wherefore an aureole is due to preaching and teaching,
even as to virginity and martyrdom. Nor can we admit,
as some affirm, that it is due to prelates only, who are
competent to preach and teach by virtue of their office ; but
it is due to all whosoever exercise this act lawfully. Nor is
it due to prelates, although they have the office of preaching,
unless they actually preach, since a crown is due not to the
habit, but to the actual strife, according to 2 Tim. ii. 5,
He . . . shall not be (Vulg., — is not) crowned, except he strive
lawfully.
Reply Obj. 1. Preaching and teaching are acts of a virtue,
namely mercy, wherefore they are reckoned among the
spiritual alms-deeds.*
Reply Obj. 2. Although ability to preach and teach is
sometimes the outcome of study, the practice of teaching
comes from the will, which is informed with charity infused
by God: and thus its act can be meritorious.
Reply Obj. 3. Exaltation in this life does not lessen the
reward of the other life, except for him who seeks his own
glory from that exaltation: whereas he who turns that
exaltation to the profit of others acquires thereby a reward
for himself. Still, when it is stated that an aureole is due
to teaching, this is to be understood of the teaching of things
pertaining to salvation, by which teaching the devil is
expelled from men's hearts, as by a kind of spiritual weapon,
of which it is said (2 Cor. x. 4) : The weapons of our warfare
are not carnal but spiritual (Vulg., — but mighty to God).
Eighth Article,
whether an aureole is due to christ ?
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that an aureole is due to
Christ. For an aureole is due to virginity, martyrdom, and
teaching. Now these three were pre-eminently in Christ.
Therefore an aureole is especially due to Him.
Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is most perfect in human
* Cf. II.-II., Q. XXXII., A. 2.
Q. 96. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 158
things must be especially ascribed to Christ. Now
an aureole is due as the reward of most excellent merits.
Therefore it is also due to Christ.
Ohj. 3. Further, Cyprian says {De Habit. Virg.) that
virginity bears a likeness to God. Therefore the exemplar
of virginity is in God. Therefore it would seem that an
aureole is due to Christ even as God.
On the contrary, An aureole is described as joy in being
conformed to Christ. Now no one is conformed or likened
to himself, as the Philosopher says [Met. x., text. 10, 11).
Therefore an aureole is not due to Christ.
Further, Christ's reward was never increased. Now
Christ had no aureole from the moment of His conception,
since then He had never fought. Therefore He never had
an aureole afterwards.
/ answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For
some say that Christ has an aureole in its strict sense,
seeing that in Him there is both conflict and victory, and
consequently a crown in its proper acceptation. But if
we consider the question carefully, although the notion of
aurea or crown is becoming to Christ, the notion of aureole
is not. For from the very fact that aureole is a diminutive
term it follows that it denotes something possessed by par-
ticipation and not in its fulness. Wherefore an aureole is
becoming to those who participate in the perfect victory
by imitating Him in Whom the fulness of perfect victory
is realised. And therefore, since in Christ the notion of
victory is found chiefly and fully, for by His victory others
are made victors, — as shown by the words of John xvi. 33,
Have confidence, I have overcome the world, and Apoc. v. 5,
Behold the lion of the tribe of Juda . . . hath prevailed, — it
is not becoming for Christ to have an aureole, but to have
something from which all aureoles are derived. Hence it
is written (Apoc. iii. 21): To him that shall overcome, I will
give to sit with Me in My throne, as I also have overcome,
and am set down in My Father's throne (Vulg., — with My
Father in His throne). Therefore we must say with others
that although there is nothing of the nature of an aureole
159 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 9
in Christ, there is nevertheless something more excellent
than any aureole.
Reply Obj. i. Christ was most truly virgin, martyr, and
doctor; yet the corresponding accidental reward in Christ
is a negligible quantity in comparison with the greatness
of His essential reward. Hence He has not an aureole in
its proper sense.
Reply Obj. 2. Although the aureole is due to a most per-
fect work, yet with regard to us, so far as it is a diminutive
term, it denotes the participation of a perfection derived
from one in whom that perfection is found in its fulness.
Accordingly it implies a certain inferiority, and thus it is not
found in Christ in Whom is the fulness of every perfection.
Reply Obj. 3. Although in some way virginity has its
exemplar in God, that exemplar is not homogeneous. For
the incorruption of God, which virginity imitates, is not in
God in the same way as in a virgin.
Ninth Article,
whether an aureole is due to the angels ?
We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that an aureole is due to the
angels. For Jerome {Serm. de Assump.)* speaking of vir-
ginity says : To live without the flesh while living in the flesh
is to live as an angel rather than as a man : and a gloss on
I Cor. vii. 26, For the present necessity, says that virginity
is the portion of the angels. Since then an aureole corresponds
to virginity, it would seem due to the angels.
Obj. 2. Further, Incorruption of the spirit is more excel-
lent than incorruption of the flesh. Now there is incorrup-
tion of spirit in the angels, since they never sinned. There-
fore an aureole is due to them rather than to men incorrupt
in the flesh and who have sinned at some time.
Obj. 3. Further, An aureole is due to teaching. Now
angels teach us by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting!
* Ep. ad Paul, et Eusioch. x. f Cf. P. I., Q. CXI., A. i.
Q. 96. Art. 10 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 160
us, as Dionysius says {Hier. Eccles. vi.). Therefore at least
the aureole of doctors is due to them.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. ii. 5): He . . . shall
not he (Vulg., — is not) crowned, except he strive lawfully. But
there is no conflict in the angels. Therefore an aureole is
not due to them.
Further, An aureole is not due to an act that is not per-
formed through the body : wherefore it is not due to lovers
of virginity, martyrdom, or teaching, if they do not practise
them outwardly. But angels are incorporeal spirits. There-
fore they have no aureole.
I answer that. An aureole is not due to the angels. The
reason of this is that an aureole, properly speaking, corre-
sponds to some perfection of surpassing merit. Now those
things which make for perfect merit in man are con-
natural to angels, or belong to their state in general, or to
their essential reward. Wherefore the angels have not an
aureole in the same sense as an aureole is due to men.
Reply Obj. 1. Virginity is said to be an angelic hfe, in so far
as virgins imitate by grace what angels have by nature.
For it is not owing to a virtue that angels abstain altogether
from pleasures of the flesh, since they are incapable of such
pleasures.
Reply Obj. 2. Perpetual incorruption of the spirit in the
angels merits their essential reward : because it is necessary
for their salvation, since in them recovery is impossible after
they have fallen.*
Reply Obj. 3. The acts whereby the angels teach us belong
to their glory and their common state: wherefore they do
not merit an aureole thereby.
Tenth Article,
whether an aureole is also due to the body ?
We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that an aureole is also due
to the body. For the essential reward is greater than the
* Cf. P. I., Q. LXIV., A. 2.
i6i THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 10
accidental. But the dowries which belong to the essential
reward are not only in the soul but also in the body. There-
fore there is also an aureole which pertains to the accidental
reward.
Obj. 2. Further, Punishment in soul and body corresponds
to sin committed through the body. Therefore a reward
both in soul and in body is due to merit gained through
the body. But the aureole is merited through works
of the body. Therefore an aureole is also due to the
body.
Ohj. 3. Further, A certain fulness of virtue will shine
forth in the bodies of martyrs, and will be seen in their bodily
scars: wherefore Augustine says {De Civ. Dei, xxii.): We
feel an undescrihahle love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire
to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their bodies,
which they bore for Christ's name. Perchance indeed we shall
see them, for this will not make them less comely, but more
glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty,
though in the body, yet not of the body hut of virtue. There-
fore it would seem that the martyr's aureole is also in his
body; and in like manner the aureoles of others.
On the contrary. The souls now in heaven have aureoles;
and yet they have no body. Therefore the proper subject
of an aureole is the soul and not the body.
Further, All merit is from the soul. Therefore the whole
reward should be in the soul,
I answer that, Properly speaking the aureole is in the mind :
since it is joy in the works to which an aureole is due. But
even as from the joy in the essential reward, which is the
aurea, there results a certain comeliness in the body, which
is the glory of the body, so from the joy in the aureole there
results a certain bodily comeliness: so that the aureole is
chiefly in the mind, but by a kind of overflow it shines forth
in the body.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. It must be
observed, however, that the beauty of the scars which will
appear in the bodies of the martyrs cannot be called an
aureole, since some of the martyrs will have an aureole in
HI- 7 II
Q. 96. Art. ii THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 162
which such scars will not appear, for instance those who were
put to death by drowning, starvation, or the squalor of
prison.
Eleventh Article.
WHETHER three AUREOLES ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED, THOSE
OF VIRGINS, OF MARTYRS, AND OF DOCTORS ?
We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the three aureoles of
virgins, martyrs, and doctors are unfittingly assigned. For
the aureole of martyrs corresponds to their virtue of forti-
tude, the aureole of virgins to the virtue of temperance,
and the aureole of doctors to the virtue of prudence.
Therefore it seems that there should be a fourth aureole
corresponding to the virtue of justice.
Obj. 2. Further, A gloss on Exod. xxv. 25: A polished
crown, etc., says that a golden [aurea) crown is added, when
the Gospel promises eternal life to those who keep the command-
ments : ' If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments '
(Matth. xix. 17). To this is added the little golden crown
{aureola) when it is said: ' If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell
all that thou hast, and give to the poor' {ibid. 21). There-
fore an aureole is due to poverty.
Obj. 3. Further, A man subjects himself wholly to God
by the vow of obedience : wherefore the greatest perfection
consists in the vow of obedience. Therefore it would seem
that an aureole is due thereto.
Obj. 4. Further, There are also many other works of
supererogation in which one will rejoice in the life to come.
Therefore there are many aureoles besides the aforesaid
three .
Obj. 5. Further, Just as a man spreads the faith by
preaching and teaching, so does he by publishing wiitten
works. Therefore a fourth aureole is due to those who
do this.
/ answer thai. An aureole is an exceptional reward cor-
responding to an exceptional victory: wherefore the three
aureoles are assigned in accordance with the exceptional
i63 THE AUREOLES Q.96.ART.11
victories in the three conflicts which beset every man. For
in the conflict with the flesh, he above all wins the victory
who abstains altogether from sexual pleasures which are
the chief of this kind; and such is a virgin. Wherefore an
aureole is due to virginity. In the conflict with the world,
the chief victor}^ is to suffer the world's persecution even
until death : wherefore the second aureole is due to martyrs
who win the victory in this battle. In the conflict with the
devil, the chief victory is to expel the enemy not only from
oneself but also from the hearts of others: this is done by
teaching and preaching, and consequently the third aureole
is due to doctors and preachers.
Some, however, distinguish the three aureoles in accor-
dance with the three powers of the soul, by saying that
the three aureoles correspond to the three chief acts of the
soul's three highest powers. For the act of the rational
power is to pubhsh the truth of faith even to others, and
to this act the aureole of doctors is due : the highest act of
the iracsible power is to overcome even death for Christ's
sake, and to this act the aureole of martyrs is due : and the
highest act of the concupiscible power is to abstain alto-
gether from the greatest carnal pleasures, and to this act the
aureole of virgins is due.
Others again, distinguish the three aureoles in accordance
with those things whereby we are most signally conformed
to Christ. For He was the mediator between the Father
and the world. Hence He was a doctor, by manifesting to
the world the truth which He had received from the Father ;
He was a martyr, by suffering the persecution of the world;
and He was a virgin, by His personal purity. Wherefore
doctors, martyrs and virgins are most perfectly conformed
to Him: and for this reason an aureole is due to them.
Reply Obj. i. There is no conflict to be observed in the
act of justice as in the acts of the other virtues. Nor is it
true that to teach is an act of prudence : in fact rather is it
an act of charity or mercy, — inasmuch as it is by suchhke
habits that we are inclined to the practice of such an act, —
or again of wisdom, as directing it.
Q. 96. Art. 12 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 164
We may also reply, with others, that justice embraces
all the virtues, wherefore a special aureole is not due to it.
Reply Obj. 2. Although poverty is a work of perfection, it
does not take the highest place in a spiritual conflict, because
the love of temporalities assails a man less than carnal
concupiscence or persecution whereby his own body is
broken. Hence an aureole is not due to poverty; but judi-
cial power by reason of the humihation consequent upon
' poverty. The gloss quoted takes aureole in the broad
sense for any reward given for excellent merit.
We reply in the same way to the Third and Fourth Objec-
tions.
Reply Obj. 5. An aureole is due to those who commit the
sacred doctrine to writing: but it is not distinct from the
aureole of doctors, since the compiling of writing is a way
of teaching.
Twelfth Article,
whether the virgin' s aureole is the greatest
OF ALL ?
We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the virgin's aureole is
the greatest of all. For it is said of virgins (Apoc. xiv. 4)
that they/o//oz£; the Lamb whithersoever He goeth, and {ibid. 3)
that no other maji could say the canticle which the virgins
sang. Therefore virgins have the most excellent aureole.
Obj. 2. Further, Cyprian [De Habit. Virg.) says of virgins
that they are the more illustrious portion of Christ's flock.
Therefore the greater aureole is due to them.
Obj. 3. Again, it would seem that the martyr's aureole
is the greatest. For Aymo, commenting on Apoc. xiv. 3,
No man could say the hymn, says that virgins do not all take
precedence of married folk; but only those who in addition
to the observance of virginity are by the tortures of their passion
on a par with married persons who have suffered martyrdom.
Therefore martyrdom gives virginity its precedence over
other states: and consequently a greater aureole is due to
virginity.
i65 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 12
Obj. 4. Again, it would seem that the greatest aureole is
due to doctors. Because tlie Church miUtant is modeUed
after the Church triumphant. Now in the Church mihtant
the greatest honour is due to doctors (i Tim. v. 17): Let
the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double hoiwur,
especially they who labour in the word atid doctrine. There-
fore a greater aureole is due to them in the Church trium-
phant.
/ answer that, Precedence of one aureole over another may
be considered from two standpoints. First, from the point
of view of the conflicts, that aureole being considered greater
which is due to the more strenuous battle. Looking at it
thus the mart\T"s aureole takes precedence of tlie otliers
m one way. and the virgin's in another. For the martyr's
battle is more strenuous in itself, and more intensely painful;
while the conflict wixh the flesh is fraught \dth greater
danger, inasmuch as it is more lasting and threatens us
at closer quarters. Secondly, from the point of view of the
things about which tlie battle is fought : and thus the doctor s
aureole takes precedence of all others, since this conflict
is about intelligible goods; while the other conflicts are
about sensible passions. Nevertheless, the precedence that
is considered in view of the conflict is more essential to the
aureole; since the aureole, according to its proper character,
regards tlie victon^- and the battle, and the difficulty of
fighting which is viewed from the standpomt of the battle
is of greater importance than tliat which is considered from
our standpoint through the conflict being at closer quarters.
Therefore the mart\T's aureole is simply the greatest of all:
for which reason a gloss on Matth. v. 10, says that all tlie
other beatitudes are perfected in tJte eighth, which refers to
tlie martyrs, namely. Blessed are tltey thai suffer persecution.
For this reason, too, the Church in enumerating the saints
together places the martyrs before tlie doctors and \-irgins.
Yet nothing hinders the other aureoles from being more
excellent in some particular way. And tills suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
Q. 96. Art. 13 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 166
Thirteenth Article.
WHETHER one PERSON HAS AN AUREOLE MORE
EXCELLENTLY THAN ANOTHER PERSON ?
We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that one person has not the
aureole either of virginity, or of martyrdom, or of doctrine
more perfectly than another person. For things which
have reached their term are not subject to intension or
remission. Now the aureole is due to works which have
reached their term of perfection. Therefore an aureole
is not subject to intension or remission.
Obj. 2. Further, Virginity is not subject to being more or
less, since it denotes a kind of privation ; and privations are
not subject to intension or remission. Therefore neither
does the reward of virginity, the virgin's aureole to wit,
receive intension or remission.
On the contrary, The aureole is added to the aurea. But
the aurea is more intense in one than in another. There-
fore the aureole is also.
/ answer that, Since merit is somewhat the cause of
reward, rewards must needs be diversified, according as
merits are diversified: for the intension or remission of a
thing follows from the intension or remission of its cause.
Now the merit of the aureole may be greater or lesser:
wherefore the aureole may also be greater or lesser.
We must observe, however, that the merit of an aureole
may be intensified in two ways: first, on the part of its
cause, secondly on the part of the work. For there may
happen to be two persons, one of whom, out of lesser charity,
suffers greater torments of martyrdom, or is more constant
in preaching, or again withdraws himself more from carnal
pleasures. Accordingly, intension not of the aureole but
of the aurea corresponds to the intension of merit derived
from its root ; while intension of the aureole corresponds to
intension of merit derived from the kind of act. Conse-
quently it is possible for one who merits less in martyrdom
i67 THE AUREOLES Q. 96. Art. 13
as to his essential reward, to receive a greater aureole for
his martyrdom.
Reply Obj. i. The merits to which an aureole is due do
not reach the term of their perfection simply, but according
to their species: even as fire is specifically the most subtle
of bodies. Hence nothing hinders one aureole being more
excellent than another, even as one fire is more subtle than
another.
Reply Obj. 2. The virginity of one may be greater than
the virginity of another, by reason of a greater withdrawal
from that which is contrary to virginity: so that virginity
is stated to be greater in one who avoids more the occasions
of corruption. For in this way privations may increase,
as when a man is said to be more blind, if he be removed
further from the possession of sight.
QUESTION XCVII.
OF THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED.
[In Seven Articles.)
In due sequence we must consider those things that concern
the damned after the judgment: (i) The punishment of
the damned, and the fire by which their bodies will be
tormented; (2) matters relating to their will and intellect;
(3) God's justice and mercy in regard to the damned.
Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:
(i) Whether in hell the damned are tormented with the sole
punishment of fire ? (2) Whether the worm by which they
are tormented is corporeal ? (3) Whether their weeping is
corporeal ? (4) Whether their darkness is material ?
(5) Whether the fire whereby they are tormented is corporeal ?
(6) Whether it is of the same species as our fire ? (7) Whether
this fire is beneath the earth ?
First Article.
whether in hell the damned are tormented
by the sole punishment of fire ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that in hell the damned are
tormented by the sole punishment of fire; because Matth.
XXV. 41, where their condemnation is declared, mention is
made of fire only, in the words : Depart from Me, you cursed,
into everlasting fire.
Obj. 2. Further, Even as the punishment of purgatory
is due to venial sin, so is the punishment of hell due to mortal
sin. Now no other punishment but that of fire is stated
168
i69 PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED Q. 97- Art. i
to be in purgatory, as appears from the words of i Cor. iii. 13 :
The fire shall tfy every man's wmk, of what sort it is. There-
fore neither in hell will there be a punishment other than
of fire.
Ohj. 3. Further, Variety of punishment affords a respite,
as when one passes from heat to cold. But we can admit no
respite in the damned. Therefore there will not be various
punishments, but that of fire alone.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. x. 7) : Fire and brimstone
and storms of winds shall be the portion of their cup.
Further, It is written (Job. xxiv. 19) : Let him pass from
the snow waters to excessive heat.
I answer that, According to Basil (Cone. xiv. De Futuro
Judic, and Horn. i. in Ps. xxviii.), at the final cleansing of
the world, there will be a separation of the elements, what-
ever is pure and noble remaining above for the glory of the
blessed, and whatever is ignoble and sordid being cast down
for the punishment of the damned: so that just as every
creature will be to the blessed a matter of joy, so will all
the elements conduce to the torture of the damned, according
to Wis. V. 21, the whole world will fight with Him against
the unwise. This is also becoming to Divine justice, that
whereas they departed from One by sin, and placed their
end in material things which are many and various, so should
they be tormented in many ways and from many sources.
Reply Obj. 1. It is because fire is most painful, through
its abundance of active force, that the name of fire is given
to any torment if it be intense.
Reply Obj. 2. The punishment of purgatory is not
intended chiefly to torment, but to cleanse: wherefore it
should be inflicted by fire alone which is above all possessed
of cleansing power. But the punishment of the damned
is not directed to their cleansing. Consequently the com-
parison fails.
Reply Obj. 3. The damned will pass from the most intense
heat to the most intense cold, without this giving them
any respite : because they will suffer from external agencies,
not by the transmutation of their body from its original
Q. 97- Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 170
natural disposition, and the contrary passion affording a
respite by restoring an equable or moderate temperature,
as happens now, but by a spiritual action, in the same way
as sensible objects act on the senses, being perceived by
impressing the organ with their forms according to their
spiritual and not their material being.
Second Article,
whether the worm of the damned is corporeal ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the worm by which the
damned are tormented is corporeal. Because flesh cannot
be tormented by a spiritual worm. Now the flesh of the
damned will be tormented by a worm : He will give fire and
worms into their flesh (Judith xvi. 21), and: The vengeance
on the flesh of the ungodly is fire and worms (Ecclus. vii. 19).
Therefore that worm will be corporeal.
Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says {De Civ. Dei, xx. 22;
xxi. 20) : Both, namely fire and worm, will be the pvmishment
of the body. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, Augustine says {De Civ. Dei, xx. 22):
The unquenchable fire and the restless worm in the pimish-
ment of the damned are explained in various ways by different
persons. Some refer both to the body, some, both to the soul:
others refer the fire, in the literal sense, to the body, the worm
to the soul metaphorically: and this seems the more probable.
I answer that, After the day of judgment, no animal or
mixed body will remain in the renewed world except only
the body of man, because the former are not directed to
incorruption,* nor after that time will there be generation
or corruption. Consequently the worm ascribed to the
damned must be understood to be not of a corporeal but
of a spiritual nature : and this is the remorse of conscience,
which is called a worm because it originates from the corrup-
tion of sin, and torments the soul, as a corporeal worm born
of corruption torments by gnawing.
* Cf. Q. XCI., A. 5.
171 PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED Q. 97- Art. 3
Reply Obj. i. The very souls of the damned are called
their flesh for as much as they were subject to the flesh.
Or we may reply that the flesh will be tormented by the
spiritual worm, according as the afliictions of the soul over-
flow into the body, both here and hereafter.
Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks by way of comparison.
For he does not wish to assert absolutely that this worm
is material, but that it is better to say that both are to be
understood materially, than that both should be understood
only in a spiritual sense : for then the damned would suffer
no bodily pain. This is clear to anyone that examines the
context of his words in this passage.
Third Article.
whether the weeping of the damned will be
corporeal ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the weeping of the
damned will be corporeal. For a gloss on Luke xiii. 28,
There will be weeping, says that the weeping with which our
Lord threatens the wicked is a proof of the resurrection
of the body. But this would not be the case if that weeping
were merely spiritual. Therefore, etc.
Obj. 2. Further, The pain of the punishment corresponds
to the pleasure of the sin, according to Apoc. xviii. 7: As
much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so
much torment and sorrow give ye to her. Now sinners had
internal and external pleasure in their sin. Therefore they
will also have external weeping.
On the contrary. Corporeal weeping results from dissolving
into tears. Now there cannot be a continual dissolution
from the bodies of the damned, since nothing is restored to
them by food; for everything finite is consumed if something
be continually taken from it. Therefore the weeping of
the damned will not be corporeal.
/ answer that. Two things are to be observed in corporeal
weeping. One is the resolution of tears: and as to this
Q. 97. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 172
corporeal weeping cannot be in the damned, since after the
day of judgment, the movement of the first movable being
at an end, there will be neither generation, nor corruption,
nor bodily alteration: and in the resolution of tears that
humour needs to be generated which is shed forth in the shape
of tears. Wherefore in this respect it will be impossible for
corporeal weeping to be in the damned. The other thing
to be observed in corporeal weeping is a certain commotion
and disturbance of the head and eyes, and in this respect
weeping will be possible in the damned after the resurrection :
for the bodies of the damned will be tormented not only
from without, but also from within, according as the body
is affected at the instance of the soul's passion towards
good or evil. In this sense weeping is a proof of the body's
resurrection, and corresponds to the pleasure of sin, ex-
perienced by both soul and body.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Fourth Article,
whether the damned are in material darkness ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the damned are not in
material darkness. For commenting on Job. x. 22, But
everlasting horror dwelleth, Gregory says [Moral, ix.) : Although
that fire will give no light for comfort, yet, that it may torment
the more it does give lightfor a purpose, for by the light of its flame
the wicked will see their followers whom they have drawn thither
from the world. Therefore the darkness there is not material.
Obj. 2. Further, The damned see their own punishment,
for this increases their punishment. But nothing is seen
without Hght. Therefore there is no material darkness there.
Obj. 3. Further, There the damned will have the power
of sight after being reunited to their bodies. But this power
would be useless to them unless they see something.
Therefore, since nothing is seen unless it be in the hght, it
would seem that they are not in absolute darkness.
On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xxii. 13): Bind his
173 PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED Q. 97. Art. 4
hands and his feet, and cast him into the exterior darkness.
Commenting on these words Gregory says (Moral, ix.) :
If this fire gave any light, he would by no means he described
as cast into exterior darkness.
Further, Basil says [Horn. i. in Ps. xxviii. 7, The voice of
the Lord divideth the flame of fire) that by God's might the
brightness of the fire will be separated from its power of burning,
so that its brightness will conduce to the joy of the blessed, and
the heat of the fiame to the torment of the damned. There-
fore the damned will be in material darkness.
Other points relating to the punishment of the damned
have been decided above (Q. LXXXVL).
/ answer that, The disposition of hell will be such as to
be adapted to the utmost unhappiness of the damned.
Wherefore accordingly both Ught and darkness are there,
in so far as they are most conducive to the unhappiness of
the damned. Now seeing is in itself pleasant for, as stated in
Metaph. i., the sense of sight is most esteemed, because thereby
many things are known. Yet it happens accidentally that
seeing is painful, when we see things that are hurtful to
us, or displeasing to our will. Consequently in hell the
place must be so disposed for seeing as regards light and
darkness, that nothing be seen clearly, and that only such
things be dimly seen as are able to bring anguish to the
heart. Wherefore, simply speaking, the place is dark.
Yet by Divine disposition, there is a certain amount of
light, as much as suffices for seeing those things which are
capable of tormenting the soul. The natural situation of
the place is enough for this, since in the centre of the earth,
where hell is said to be, fire cannot be otherwise than thick
and cloudy, and reeky as it were.
Some hold that this darkness is caused by the massing
together of the bodies of the damned, which will so fill the
place of hell with their numbers, that no air will remain,
so that there will be no translucid body that can be the
subject of Hght and darkness, except the eyes of the damned,
which will be darkened utterly.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Q. 97. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 174
Fifth Article,
whether the fire of hell will be corporeal ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the fire of hell whereby the
bodies of the damned will be tormented will not be corporeal.
For Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iv.) : The devil, and
demons, and his man* namely Antichrist, together with the
ungodly and sinners, will he cast into everlasting fire, not
material fire, such as that which we have, but such as God
knoweth. Now everything corporeal is material. Therefore
the fire of hell will not be corporeal.
Obj. 2. Fmlher, The souls of the damned when severed
from their bodies are cast into hell fire. But Augustine
says [Gen. ad Lit. xii. 32): In my opinio?i the place to which
the soul is committed after death is spiritual and not corporeal.
Therefore, etc.
Obj. 3. Further, Corporeal fire in the mode of its action
does not follow the mode of guilt in the person who is burnt
at the stake, rather does it follow the mode of humid and
dry: for in the same corporeal fire we see both good and
wicked suffer. But the fire of hell, in its mode of torture
or action, follows the mode of guilt in the person punished;
wherefore Gregory says [Dial. iv. 63) : There is indeed hut
one hell fire, hut it does not torture all sinners equally. For
each one will suffer as much pain according as his guilt deserves.
Therefore this fire will not be corporeal.
On the contrary. He says [Dial. iv. 29) : 1 doubt not that
the fire of hell is corporeal, since it is certain that bodies are
tortured there.
Further, It is written (Wis. v. 21): The . . . world shall
fight . . . against the unwise. But the whole world would
not fight against the unwise if they were punished with a
spiritual and not a corporeal punishment. Therefore they
will be punished with a corporeal fire.
* Cf. 2 Thess. ii. 3, And the man of sin be revealed, the son of per-
dition.
175 PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED Q. 97- Art. 5
/ answer that, There have been many opinions about
the fire of hell. For some philosophers, as iVvicenna, dis-
believing in the resurrection, thought that the soul alone
would be punished after death. And as they considered
it impossible for the soul, being incorporeal, to be punished
with a corporeal fire, they denied that the fire whereby
the wicked are punished is corporeal, and pretended that
all statements as to souls being punished in future after
death by any corporeal means are to be taken metaphori-
cally. For just as the joy and happiness of good souls will
not be about any corporeal object, but about something
spiritual, namely the attainment of their end, so will the
torment of the wicked be merely spiritual, in that they will
be grieved at being separated from their end, the desire
whereof is in them by nature. Wherefore, just as all
descriptions of the soul's delight after death that seem to
denote bodily pleasure, — for instance, that they are refreshed,
that they smile, and so forth, — must be taken metaphorically,
so also are all such descriptions of the soul's suffering as
seem to imply bodily punishment, — for instance, that they
bum in fire, or suffer from the stench, and so forth. For
as spiritual pleasure and pain are unknown to the majority,
these things need to be declared under the figure of corporeal
pleasures and pains, in order that men may be moved the
more to the desire or fear thereof. Since, however, in the
punishment of the damned there will be not only pain of
loss corresponding to the aversion that was in their sin, but
also pain of sense corresponding to the conversion, it follows
that it is not enough to hold the above manner of punish-
ment. For this reason Avicenna himself {Met. ix.) added
another explanation, by saying that the souls of the wicked
are punished after death, not by bodies but by images of
bodies^ just as in a dream it seems to a man that he is
suffering various pains on account of suchlike images being
in his imagination. Even Augustine seems to hold this
kind of punishment {Gen. ad Lit. xii. 32), as is clear from
the text. But this would seem an unreasonable statement.
For the imagination is a power that makes use of a bodily
Q. 97- Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 176
organ : so that it is impossible for such visions of the imagi-
nation to occur in the soul separated from the body, as
in the soul of the dreamer. Wherefore Avicenna also, that
he might avoid this difficulty, said that the soul separated
from the body uses as an organ some part of the heavenly
body, to which the human body needs to be conformed,
in order to be perfected by the rational soul, which is like
the movers of the heavenly body, — thus following somewhat
the opinion of certain philosophers of old, who maintained
that souls return to the stars that are their compeers. But
this is absolutely absurd according to the Philosopher's
teaching, since the soul uses a definite bodily organ, even as
art uses definite instruments, so that it cannot pass from one
body to another, as Pythagoras is stated [De A nima i, text. 53)
to have maintained. As to the statement of Augustine we
shall say below how it is to be answered [ad 2). However,
whatever we may say of the fire that torments the separated
souls, we must admit that the fire which will torment the
bodies of the damned after the resurrection is corporeal,
since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body
unless that punishment itself be bodily. Wherefore Gregory
(Dial, iv.) proves the fire of hell to be corporeal from the
very fact that the wicked will be cast thither after the
resurrection. Again Augustine, as quoted in the text of
iv. Sent. D. 44, clearly admits {De. Civ. Dei, xxi. 10) that the
fire by which the bodies are tormented is corporeal. And
this is the point at issue for the present. We have said
elsewhere (0. LXX., A. 3) how the souls of the damned are
punished by this corporeal fire.
Reply Obj. i. Damascene does not absolutely deny that
this fire is material, but that it is material as our fire, since
it differs from ours in some of its properties. We may also
reply that since that fire does not alter bodies as to their
matter, but acts on them for their punishment by a kind of
spiritual action, it is for this reason that it is stated not to
be material, not as regards its substance, but as to its
punitive effect on bodies and, still more, on souls.
Reply Obj. 2. The assertion of Augustine may be taken
177 PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED Q. 97- Art. 6
in this way, that the place whither souls are conveyed after
death be described as incorporeal, in so far as the soul is
there, not corporeally, i.e. as bodies are in a place, but in
some other spiritual way, as angels are in a place. Or
we may reply that Augustine is expressing an opinion
without deciding the point, as he often does in those
books.
Reply Obj. 3. That fire will be the instrument of Divine
justice inflicting punishment. Now an instrument acts not
only by its own power and in its own way, but also by the
power of the principal agent, and as directed thereby.
Wherefore although fire is not able, of its own power,
to torture certain persons more or less, according to the
measure of sin, it is able to do so nevertheless in so far as its
action is regulated by the ordering of Divine justice : even
so the fire of the furnace is regulated by the forethought of
the smith, according as the effect of his art requires.
Sixth Article,
whether the fire of hell is of the same species
AS OURS ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that this fire is not of the same
species as the corporeal fixe which we see. For Augustine
says {De Civ. Dei, xx. 16) : In my opinion no man knows of
what kind is the everlasting fire, unless the Spirit of God has
revealed it to anyone. But all or nearly all know the nature
of this fire of ours. Therefore that fire is not of the same
species as this.
Obj. 2. Further, Gregory commenting on Job. xx. 26,
A fire that is not kindled shall devour him, says [Moral, xv.) :
Bodily fire needs bodily fuel in order to become fire; neither
can it be except by being kindled, nor live unless it be renewed.
On the other hand the fire of hell, since it is a bodily fire, and
burns in a bodily way the wicked cast therein, is neither kindled
by human endeavour, nor kept alive with fuel, but once created
endures unquenchably; at one and the same time it needs no
HI. 7 12
Q. 97. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 178
kindling, and lacks not heat. Therefore it is not of the same
nature as the fire that we see.
Ohj. 3. Further, The everlasting and the corruptible
differ essentially, since they agree not even in genus, accord-
ing to the Philosopher [Metaph- x.). But this fire of ours
is corruptible, whereas the other is everlasting: Depart from
Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire (Matth. xxv. 41). There-
fore they are not of the same nature.
Ohj. 4. Further, It belongs to the nature of this fire of
ours to give hght. But the fire of hell gives no light, hence
the saying of Job xviii. 5: Shall not the light of the wicked
be extinguished ? Therefore . . . as above.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher [Top. i. 6),
every water is of the same species as every other water. There-
fore in hke manner every fire is of the same species as every
other fire.
Further, It is written (Wis. xi. 17): By what things a man
sinneth by the same also he is tormented. Now men sin by
the sensible things of this world. Therefore it is just that
they should be punished by those same things.
/ answer that. As stated in Meteor, iv. i, fire has other bodies
for its matter, for the reason that of all the elements it has
the greatest power of action. Hence fire is found under
two conditions: in its own matter, as existing in its own
sphere, and in a strange matter, whether of earth, as in
burning coal, or of air, as in the flame. Under whatever
conditions however fire be found, it is always of the same
species, so far as the nature of fire is concerned, but there
may be a difference of species as to the bodies which are the
matter of fire. Wherefore flame and burning coal differ
specifically, and hkewise burning wood and red-hot iron;
nor does it signify, as to this particular point, whether they
be kindled by force, as in the case of iron, or by a natural
intrinsic principle, as happens with sulphur. Accordingly
it is clear that the fire of hell is of the same species as the
fire we have, so far as the nature of fire is concerned. But
whether that fire subsists in its proper matter, or if it sub-
sists in a strange matter, what that matter may be, we know
179 PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED Q. 97- Art. 6
not. And in this way it may differ specifically from the fire
we have, considered materially. It has, however, certain
properties differing from our fire, for instance that it needs
no kindling, nor is kept alive by fuel. But the differences
do not argue a difference of species as regards the nature of
the fire.
Reply Obj. i. Augustine is speaking of that fire with
regard to its matter, and not with regard to its nature.
Reply Obj. 2. This fire of ours is kept alive with fuel,
and is kindled by man, because it is introduced into a
foreign matter by art and force. But that other fire needs
no fuel to keep it alive, because either it subsists in its own
matter, or is in a foreign matter, not by force but by nature
from an intrinsic principle. Wherefore it is kindled not
by man but by God, Who fashioned its nature. This is
the meaning of the words of Isaias (xxx. 33): The breath
of the Lord is as a torrent of brimstone kindling it.
Reply Obj. 3. Even as the bodies of the damned will be of
the same species as now, although now they are corruptible,
whereas then they will be incorruptible, both by the ordering
of Divine justice, and on account of the cessation of the
heavenly movement, so is it with the fire of hell whereby
those bodies will be punished.
Reply Obj. 4. To give light does not belong to fire accord-
ing to any mode of existence, since in its own matter it
gives no light ; wherefore it does not shine in its own sphere
according to the philosophers : and in like manner in certain
foreign matters it does not shine, as when it is in an opaque
earthly substance such as sulphur. The same happens also
when its brightness is obscured by thick smoke. Where-
fore that the fire of hell gives no light is not sufficient proof
of its being of a different species.
Q. 97- Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " i8o
Seventh Article,
whether the fire of hell is beneath the earth ?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that this fire is not beneath
the earth. For it is said of the damned (Job. xviii. i8),
And God shall rem^ove him out of the globe (Douay, — world).
Therefore the fire whereby the damned will be punished is
not beneath the earth but outside the globe.
Obj. 2. Further, Nothing violent or accidental can be
everlasting. But this fire will be in hell for ever. There-
fore it will be there, not by force but naturally. Now fire
cannot be under the earth save by violence. Therefore the
fire of hell is not beneath the earth.
Obj. 3. Further, After the day of judgment the bodies of
all the damned will be tormented in hell. Now those bodies
will fill a place. Consequently, since the multitude of the
damned will be exceeding great, for the number of fools is
infinite (Eccles. i. 15), the space containing that fire must
also be exceeding great. But it would seem unreasonable
to say that there is so great a hollow within the earth, since
all the parts of the earth naturally tend to the centre.
Therefore that fire will not be beneath the earth.
Obj. 4. Further, By what things a man sinneth, by the same
also he is tormented (Wis. xi. 17). But the wicked have
sinned on the earth. Therefore the fire that punishes them
should not be under the earth.
On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xiv. 9): Hell below was
in an uproar to meet Thee at Thy coming. Therefore the fire
of hell is beneath us.
Further, Gregory says [Dial, iv.): I see not what hinders
us from believing that hell is beneath the earth.
Further, A gloss on Jonas ii. 4, Thou hast cast me forth . . .
into the heart of the sea, says, i.e. into hell, and in the Gospel
(Matth. xii. 40) the words in the heart of the earth have the
same sense, for as the heart is in the middle of an animal,
so is hell supposed to be in the middle of the earth.
i8i PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED Q. 97. Art. 7
/ answer that, As Augustine says {De Civ. Dei, xv. 16), / am
of opinion that no one knows in what part of the world hell is
situated, unless the Spirit of God has revealed this to some one.
Wherefore Gregory {Dial, iv.) having been questioned on
this point answers: About this matter I dare not give a rash
decision. For some have deemed hell to be in some part of
the earth's surface; others think it to be beneath the earth. He
shows the latter opinion to be the more probable for two
reasons. First from the very meaning of the word. These
are his words: // we call it the nether regions (infernus),*
for the reason that it is beneath us [inferius], what earth is
in relation to heaven, such should be hell in relation to earth.
Secondly, from the words of Apoc. v. 3: No man was able,
neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor under the earth, to
open the book: where the words in heaven refer to the
angels, on earth to men hving in the body, and under the
earth to souls in hell. Augustine too {Gen. ad Lit. xii. 34)
seems to indicate two reasons for the congruity of hell
being under the earth. One is that whereas the souls of
the departed sinned through love of the flesh, they should be
treated as the dead flesh is wont to be treated, by being buried
beneath the earth. The other is that heaviness is to the body
what sorrow is to the spirit, and joy (of spirit) is as Hghtness
(of body). Wherefore just as in reference to the body, all
the heavier things are beneath the others, if they be placed
in order of gravity, so in reference to the spirit, the lower
place is occupied by whatever is more sorrowful; and thus
even as the empyrean is a fitting place for the joy of the
elect, so the lowest part of the earth is a fitting place
for the sorrow of the damned. Nor does it signify that
Augustine {ibid.) says that hell is stated or believed to
be under the earth, because he withdraws this {Retract.
ii. 29) where he says: Methinks I should have said that hell
is beneath the earth, rather than have given the reason why it
is stated or believed to be under the earth. However, some
philosophers have maintained that hell is situated be-
neath the terrestrial orb, but above the surface of the
* The Latin for hell.
Q. 97- Art- 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 182
earth, on that part which is opposite to us. This seems
to have been the meaning of Isidore when he asserted that
the sun and the moon will stop in the place wherein they were
created, lest the wicked should enjoy this light in the midst
of their torments. But this is no argument, if we assert that
hell is under the earth. We have already stated how these
words may be explained (Q. XCI., A. 2).
Pythagoras held the place of punishment to be in a fiery
sphere situated, according to him, in the middle of the whole
world : and he called it the prison-house of Jupiter as Aris-
totle relates [De Coelo et Mundo. ii.). It is, however, more in
keeping with Scripture to say that it is beneath the earth.
Reply Ohj. i. The words of Job, God shall remove him out
of the globe, refer to the surface of the earth,* i.e. from this
world. This is how Gregory expounds it {Moral, xiv.)
where he says : He is removed from the globe when, at the
coming of the heavenly judge, he is taken away from this
world wherein he now prides himself in his wickedness. Nor
does globe here signify the universe, as though the place of
punishment were outside the whole universe.
Reply Obj. 2. Fire continues in that place for aU eternity
by the ordering of Divine justice: although according to its
nature an element cannot last for ever outside its own
place, especially if things were to remain in this state of
generation and corruption. The fire there will be of the
very greatest heat, because its heat will be all gathered
together from all parts, through being surrounded on all
sides by the cold of the earth.
Reply Obj. 3. Hell wiU never lack sufficient room to
admit the bodies of the damned: since heU is accounted
one of the three things that never are satisfied (Prov. xxx,
15, 16). Nor is it unreasonable that God's power should
maintain within the bowels of the earth a hollow great
enough to contain all the bodies of the damned.
Reply Obj. 4. It does not follow of necessity that by what
things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented, except
* De orbe tevravum, which might be rendered from the land of the
living.
i83 PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED Q. 97- Art. 7
as regards the principal instruments of sin : for as much as
man having sinned in soul and body will be punished in both.
But it does not follow that a man will be punished in the very
place where he sinned, because the place due to the damned
is other from that due to wayfarers. We may also reply
that these words refer to the punishments inflicted on man
on the way: according as each sin has its corresponding
punishment, since inordinate love is its own punishment,
as Augustine states [Conf. i. 12).
QUESTION XCVIII.
OF THE WILL AND INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED.
{In Nine Articles.)
We must next consider matters pertaining to the will and
intellect of the damned. Under this head there are nine
points of inquiry : (i) Whether every act of will in the damned
is evil ? (2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have
done ? (3) Whether they would rather not be than be ?
(4) Whether they would wish others to be damned ?
(5) Whether the wicked hate God ? (6) Whether they can
demerit ? (7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge
acquired in this life ? (8) Whether they ever think of God ?
(9) Whether they see the glory of the blessed ?
First Article,
whether every act of will in the damned is
EVIL ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that not every act of will in the
damned is evil. For according to Dionysius {Div. Nom. iv.),
the demons desire the good and the best, namely to he, to live,
to understand. Since, then, men who are damned are not
worse off than the demons, it would seem that they also can
have a good will.
Obj. 2. Further, As Dionysius says [ibid.), evil is altogether
involuntary. Therefore if the damned will anything, they
will it as something good or apparently good. Now a will
that is directly ordered to good is itself good. Therefore
the damned can have a good will.
Obj. 3. Further, Some will be damned who, while in
184
i85 WILL OF THE DAMNED Q. 98. Art. i
this world, acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance
heathens who had civic virtues. Now a will ehcits praise-
worthy acts by reason of virtuous habits. Therefore there
may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of the damned.
On the contrary, An obstinate will can never be inclined
except to evil. Now men who are damned will be obstinate
even as the demons.* Therefore their will can never be
good.
Further, As the will of the damned is in relation to evil,
so is the will of the blessed in regard to good. But the
blessed never have an evil will. Neither therefore have
the damned any good will.
I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in the
damned, namely the deliberate will and the natural will.
Their natural will is theirs not of themselves but of the
Author of nature, Who gave nature this inclination which
we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature remains in
them, it follows that the natural will in them can be good.
But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch
as it is in their power to be inclined by their affections to
this or that. This will is in them always evil: and this
because they are completely turned away from the last end
of a right will, nor can a will be good except it be directed
to that same end. Hence even though they will some good,
they do not will it well so that one be able to call their will
good on that account.
Reply Obj. i. The words of Dionysius must be understood
of the natural will, which is nature's inclination to some
particular good. And yet this natural inclination is cor-
rupted by their wickedness, in so far as this good which
they desire naturally is desired by them under certain
evil circumstances. f
Reply Obj. 2. Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but in
so far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their
wickedness that they esteem that which is evil as though
it were good. Hence their will is evil.
* Cf. P. I., Q. LXIV., A. 2.
t Cf. P. I., Q. LXIV., A. 2, ad 5.
Q. 98. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 186
Reply Obj. 3. The habits of civic virtue do not remain
in the separated soul, because those virtues perfect us only
in the civic Hfe which will not remain after this hfe. Even
though they remained, they would never come into action,
being enchained, as it were, by the obstinacy of the mind.
Second Article,
whether the damned repent of the evil they
have done ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the damned never repent
of the evil they have done. For Bernard says on the
Canticle* that the damned ever consent to the evil they have
done. Therefore they never repent of the sins they have
committed.
Obj. 2. Further, To wish one had not sinned is a good will.
But the damned will never have a good will. Therefore
the damned will never wish they had not sinned : and thus
the same conclusion follows as above.
Obj. 3. Further, Accordmg to Damascene [De Fide Orthod.
ii.), death is to man what their fall was to the angels. But the
angel's will is irrevocable after his fall, so that he cannot
withdraw from the choice whereby he previously sinned. f
Therefore the damned also cannot repent of the sins com-
mitted by them.
Ohj. 4. Further, The wickedness of the damned in hell
will be greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in
this world some sinners repent not of the sins they have
committed, either through blmdness of mind, as heretics,
or through obstinacy, as those who are glad when they have
done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things (Prov. ii. 14).
Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, It is said of the damned (Wis. v. 3):
Repenting within themselves (Vulg., — Saying within them-
selves, repenting).
* a. De Consideratione v. 12, and De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ix.
t Cf. P. I., Q. LXIV., A. 2.
18; WILL OF THE DAMNED Q. 98. Art. 3
Further, The Philosopher says [Ethic, ix. 4) that the wicked
are full of repentance; for afterwards they are sorry for that
in which previously they took pleasure. Therefore the
damned, bemg most wicked, repent all the more.
I answer that, A person may repent of sin in two ways:
in one way directly, in another way indirectly. He repents
of a sin directly who hates sin as such: and he repents in-
directly who hates it on account of something connected
with it, for instance punishment or something of that kind.
Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins directly,
because consent in the maUce of sin will remain in them;
but they will repent indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer
from the punishment inflicted on them for sin.
Reply Obj. i. The damned will wickedness, but shun
punishment : and thus indirectly they repent of wickedness
committed.
Reply Obj. 2. To wish one had not sinned on account of
the shamefulness of vice is a good will : but this will not be in
the wicked.
Reply Obj. 3. It will be possible for the damiaed to repent
of their sins without turning their will away from sin, because
in their sins they will shun, not what they heretofore desired,
but something else, namely the punishment.
Reply Obj. 4. However obstinate men may be in this
world, they repent of the sins indirectly, if they be punished
for them. Thus Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 36):
We see the most savage beasts are deterred from the greatest
pleasures by fear of pain.
Third Article.
whether the damned by right and deliberate
reason would wish not to be ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem impossible for the damned,
by right and deliberate reason, to wish not to be. For
Augustine says [De Lib. Arb. iii. 7): Consider how great a
good it is to be; since both the happy and the unhappy will it; for
Q. 98. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 188
to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater thing than not to be
at all.
Obj. 2. Further, Augustine argues thus {ibid. 8) : Prefer-
ence supposes election. But not to be is not eligible; since
it has not the appearance of good, for it is nothing. There-
fore not to be cannot be more desirable to the damned than
to be.
Obj. 3. Further, The greater evil is the more to be
shunned. Now not to be is the greatest evil, since it removes
good altogether, so as to leave nothing. Therefore not to
be is more to be shunned than to be unhappy : and thus the
same conclusion follows as above.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. ix. 6): In those days
men . . . shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them.
Further, The unhappiness of the damned surpasses all
unhappiness of this world. Now in order to escape the
unhappiness of this world, it is desirable to some to die,
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. xli. 3, 4): 0 death, thy sen-
tence is welcome to the man that is in need, and to him whose
strength faileth ; who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care
about all things, and to the distrustftd that loseth wisdom
(Vulg., — patience). Much more, therefore, is not to be
desirable to the damned according to their deliberate reason.
/ answer that, Not to be may be considered in two ways.
First, in itself, and thus it can nowise be desirable, since it
has no aspect of good, but is pure privation of good.
Secondly, it may be considered as a relief from a painful
life or from some unhappiness: and thus not to be takes on
the aspect of good, since to lack an evil is a kind of good as
the Philosopher says {Ethic, v. i). In this way it is better
for the damned not to be than to be unhappy. Hence it
is said (Matth. xxvi. 24): It were better for him, if that man
had not been born, and (Jerem. xx. 14): Cursed be the day
wherein I was born, where a gloss of Jerome observes: It
is better not to be than to be evilly. In this sense the damned
can prefer not to be according to their deUberate reason.*
Reply Obj. i. The saying of Augustine is to be understood
* Cf. P. I., g. v., A. 2. ad 3.
i89 WILL OF THE DAMNED Q. 98. Art. 4
in the sense that not to he is eligible, not in itself but acci-
dentally, as putting an end to unhappiness. For when it
is stated that to be and to live are desired by all naturally,
we are not to take this as referable to an evil and corrupt
life, and a life of unhappiness, as the Philosopher says
[Ethic, ix. 4), but absolutely.
Reply Obj. 2. Non-existence is ehgible, not in itself, but
only accidentally, as stated already.
Reply Obj. 3. Although not to be is very evil, in so far
as it removes being, it is very good, in so far as it removes
unhappiness, which is the greatest of evils, and thus it is
preferred not to be.
Fourth Article.
whether in hell the damned would wish others
were damned who are not damned ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that in hell the damned would
not wish others were damned who are not damned. For
it is said (Luke xvi. 27, 28) of the rich man that he prayed
for his brethren, lest they should come into the place of
torments. Therefore in like manner the other damned
would not wish, at least, their friends in the flesh to be
damned in hell.
Obj. 2. Further, The damned are not deprived of their
inordinate affections. Now some of the damned loved
inordinately some who are not damned. Therefore they
would not desire their evil, i.e. that they should be damned.
Obj. 3. Further, The damned do not desire the increase of
their punishment. Now if more were damned, their punish-
ment would be greater, even as the joy of the blessed is
increased by an increase in their number. Therefore the
damned desire not the damnation of those who are saved.
On the contrary, A gloss on Isa. xiv. 9, are risen up from
their thrones, says : The wicked are comforted by having many
companions in their punishment.
Further, Envy reigns supreme in the damned. Therefore
Q. 98. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 190
they grieve for the happiness of the blessed, and desire their
damnation.
/ answer that, Even as in the blessed in heaven there will
be most perfect charity, so in the damned there will be the
most perfect hate. \Vherefore as the saints will rejoice in
all goods, so will the damned grieve for all goods. Conse-
quently the sight of the happiness of the saints will give
them very great pain; hence it is written (Isa. xxvi. 11):
Let the envious people see and he confounded, and let fire
devour Thy enemies. Therefore they will wish all the good
were damned.
Reply Obj. i. So great will be the envy of the damned
that they will envy the glory even of their kindred, since
they themselves are supremely unhappy, for this happens
even in this life, when envy increases. Nevertheless they
will envy their kindred less than others, and their punish-
ment would be greater if all their kindred were damned,
and others saved, than if some of their kindred were saved.
For this reason the rich man prayed that his brethren
might be warded from damnation: for he knew that some
are guarded therefrom. Yet he would rather that his
brethren were damned as well as all the rest.
Reply Obj. 2. Love that is not based on virtue is easily
voided, especially in evil men, as the Philosopher says
{Ethic, ix. 4). Hence the damned will not preserve their
friendship for those whom they loved inordinately. Yet
the will of them will remain perverse, because they will
continue to love the cause of their inordinate loving.
Reply Obj. 3. Although an increase in the number of the
damned results in an increase of each one's punishment,
so much the more will their hatred and envy increase that
they will prefer to be more tormented with many rather
than less tormented alone.
igi WILL OF THE DAMNED Q. 98. Art. 5
Fifth Article,
whether the damned hate god ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that the damned do not hate
God. For, according to Dionysius {Div. Nam. i.), the
beautiful and good that is the cause of all goodness and beauty
is beloved of all. But this is God. Therefore God cannot
be the object of anyone's hate.
Obj. 2. Further, No one can hate goodness itself, as neither
can one will badness itself, since evil is altogether involun-
tary, as Dionysius asserts {Div. Nom. iv.). Now God is
goodness itself. Therefore no one can hate Him.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. Ixxiii. 23): The pride
of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually.
I answer that. The appetite is moved by good or evil
apprehended. Now God is apprehended in two ways,
namely in Himself, as by the blessed, who see Him in His
essence; and in His effects, as by us and by the damned.
Since, then. He is goodness by His essence. He cannot in
Himself be displeasing to any will; wherefore whoever sees
Him in His essence cannot hate Him. On the other hand,
some of His effects are displeasing to the will in so far as
they are opposed to any one: and accordingly a person
may hate God not in Himself, but by reason of His effects.
Therefore the damned, perceiving God in His punishment,
which is the effect of His justice, hate Him, even as they hate
the punishment inflicted on them.*
Reply Obj. i. The saying of Dionysius refers to the
natural appetite; and even this is rendered perverse in the
damned, by that which is added thereto by their deliberate
will, as stated above (A. i.)f
Reply Obj. 2. This argument would prove if the damaed
saw God in Himself, as being in His essence.
* Cf. Q. XC, A. 3, ad 2, and II.-II., Q. XXXIV., A. i.
t Cf. II.-II., Q. XXXIV., A. I. ad i, where S. Thomas gives
another answer.
Q. 98. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 192
Sixth Article,
whether the damned demerit ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the damned demerit.
For the damned have an evil will, as stated in the last Dis-
tinction of iv. Sent. But they demerited by the evil will
that they had here. Therefore if they demerit not there,
their damnation is to their advantage.
Ohj. 2. Further, The damned are on the same footing
as the demons. Now the demons demerit after their fall,
wherefore God inflicted a punishment on the serpent, who
induced man to sin (Gen. iii. 14, 15) . Therefore the damned
also demerit.
Ohj. 3. Further, An inordinate act that proceeds from a
deliberate will is not excused from demerit, even though
there be necessity of which one is oneself the cause : for the
drunken man deserves a double punishment, if he commit a
crime through being drunk [Ethic, iii.). Now the damned
were themselves the cause of their own obstinacy, owing
to which they are under a kind of necessity of sinning.
Therefore since their act proceeds from their free will,
they are not excused from demerit.
On the contrary, Punishment is contradistinguished from
fault.* Now the perverse will of the damned proceeds
from their obstinacy which is their punishment. There-
fore the perverse will of the damned is not a fault whereby
they may demerit.
Further, After reaching the last term there is no further
movement, or advancement in good or evil. Now the
damned, especially after the judgment day, will have reached
the last term of their damnation, since then there will cease
to be two cities, according to Augustine [Enchir. cxi.). There-
fore after the judgment day the damned will not demerit
by their perverse will, for if they did their damnation would
be augmented.
/ answer that, We must draw a distinction between the
* Cf. P. I., Q. XL VIII., A. 5.
193 WILL OF THE DAMNED Q. 98. Art. 6
damned before the judgment day and after. For all are
agreed that after the judgment day there will be neither
merit nor demerit. The reason for this is because merit
or demerit is directed to the attainment of some further
good or evil: and after the day of judgment good and evil
will have reached their ultimate consummation, so that there
will be no further addition to good or evil. Consequently,
good will in the blessed will not be a merit but a reward,
and evil will in the damned will be not a demerit but a
punishment only. For works of virtue belong especially to
the state of happiness, and their contraries to the state
of unhappuaess {Ethic, i. 9, 10).
On the other hand, some say that, before the judgment
day, both the good merit and the damned demerit.
But this cannot apply to the essential reward or to the
principal punishment, since in this respect both have
reached the term. Possibly, however, this may apply to
the accidental reward, or secondary punishment, which are
subject to increase until the day of judgment. Especially
may this apply to the demons, or to the good angels, by whose
activities some are drawn to salvation, whereby the joy of
the blessed angels is increased, and some to damnation,
whereby the punishment of the demons is augmented.*
Reply Obj. 1. It is in the highest degree unprofitable to
have reached the highest degree of evil, the result being that
the damned are incapable of demerit. Hence it is clear
that they gain no advantage from their sin.
Reply Obj. 2. Men who are damned are not occupied in
drawing others to damnation, as the demons are, for which
reason the latter demerit as regards their secondary punish-
ment.*
Reply Obj. 3. The reason why they are not excused from
demerit is not because they are under the necessity of
sinning, but because they have reached the highest of
evils-
* Cf. P. I., Q. LXII., A. 9, ad 3: II.-II., Q. XIII., A. 4, ad 2;
where S. Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed liere as to
merit or demerit.
m. 7 13
Q. 98. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 194
However, the necessity of sinning whereof we are ourselves
the cause, in so far as it is a necessity, excuses from sin,
because every sin needs to be voluntary: but it does not
excuse, in so far as it proceeds from a previous act of the
will : and consequently the whole demerit of the subsequent
sin would seem to belong to the previous sin.
Seventh Article.
whether the damned can make use of the
knowledge they had in this world?*
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the damned are unable
to make use of the knowledge they had in this world. For
there is very great pleasure in the consideration of know-
ledge. But we must not admit that they have any pleasure.
Therefore they cannot make use of the knowledge they
had heretofore, by applying their consideration thereto.
Obj. 2. Further, The damned suffer greater pains than
any pains of this world. Now in this world, when one is in
very great pain, it is impossible to consider any intelligible
conclusions, through being distracted by the pains that one
suffers. Much less therefore can one do so in hell.
Obj. 3. Further, The damned are subject to time. But
length of time is the cause of forgetfuhiess {Phys. iv., text. 128).
Therefore the damned will forget what they knew here.
On the contrary, It is said to the rich man who was damned
(Luke xvi. 25) : Remember that thou didst receive good things
in thy lifetime, etc. Therefore they will consider about the
things they knew here.
Further, The intelligible species remain in the separated
soul, as stated above (Q.LXX., A. 2, adz; ?• ^■> Q-LXXXIX.
AA. 5, 6). Therefore, if they could not use them, these
would remain in them to no purpose.
I answer that. Even as in the saints, on account of the
perfection of their glory, there will be nothing but what is a
matter of joy, so there will be nothing in the damned but
* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXXIX.
195 INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED Q.9§Art.7
what is a matter and cause of sorrow; nor will anything
that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their unhappi-
ness is consummate. Now the consideration of certain
things known brings us joy, in some respect, either on the
part of the things known, because we love them, or on
the part of the knowledge, because it is fitting and perfect.
There may also be a reason for sorrow both on the part of
the things known, because they are of a grievous nature,
and on the part of the knowledge, if we consider its imper-
fection; for instance a person may consider his defective
knowledge about a certain thing, which he would desire
to know perfectly. Accordingly, in the damned there will
be actual consideration of the things they knew heretofore
as matters of sorrow, but not as a cause of pleasure. For
they will consider both the evil they have done, and for
which they were damned, and the delightful goods they
have lost, and on both counts they will suffer torments.
Likewise they will be tormented with the thought that the
knowledge they had of speculative matters was imperfect,
and that they missed its highest degree of perfection which
they might have acquired.
Reply Obj. i. Although the consideration of knowledge
is delightful in itself, it may accidentally be the cause of
sorrow, as explained above.
Reply Obj. 2. In this world the soul is united to a corrupt-
ible body, wherefore the soul's consideration is hindered by
the suffering of the body. On the other hand, in the future
hfe the soul will not be so drawn by the body, but however
much the body may suffer, the soul will have a most clear
view of those things that can be a cause of anguish to it.
Reply Obj. 3. Time causes forgetfulness accidentally,
in so far as the movement whereof it is the measure is the
cause of change. But after the judgment day there wiU
be no movement of the heavens; wherefore neither wiU it
be possible for forgetfulness to result from any lapse of time
however long. Before the judgment day, however, the
separated soul is not changed from its disposition by the
heavenly movement.
Q. 98. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 196
Eighth Article,
whether the damned will ever think of god ?
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the damned will some-
times think of God. For one cannot hate a thing actually,
except one think about it. Now the damned will hate God,
as stated in the text of iv. Sent, in the last Distinction.
Therefore they will think of God sometimes.
Obj. 2. Further, The damned will have remorse of con-
science. But the conscience suffers remorse for deeds done
against God. Therefore they wiU sometimes think of God.
On the contrary, Man's most perfect thoughts are those
which are about God: whereas the damned will be in a
state of the greatest imperfection. Therefore they will not
think of God.
/ answer that, One may think of God in two ways. First,
in Himself and according to that which is proper to Him,
namely that He is the fount of all goodness : and thus it is
altogether impossible to think of Him without delight, so
that the damned will by no means think of Him in this way.
Secondly, according to something accidental as it were to
Him in His effects, such as His punishments, and so forth,
and in this respect the thought of God can bring sorrow, so
that in this way the damned will think of God.
Reply Obj. i. The damned do not hate God except because
He punishes and forbids what is agreeable to their evil will :
and consequently they will think of Him only as punishing
and forbidding. This suffices for the Reply to the Second
Objection, since conscience will not have remorse for sin
except as forbidden by the Divine commandment.
197 INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED Q. 98. Art. 9
Ninth Article,
whether the damned see the glory of the
BLESSED ?
We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the damned do not see
the glory of the blessed. For they are more distant from
the glory of the blessed than from the happenings of this
world. But they do not see what happens in regard to us:
hence Gregory commenting on Job. xiv. 21, Whether his
children come to honour etc. says {Moral, xii.): Even as
those who still live know not in what place are the souls of the
dead; so the dead who have lived in the body know not the
things which regard the life of those who are in the flesh.
Much less, therefore, can they see the glory of the blessed.
Ohj. 2. Further, That which is granted as a great favour to
the saints in this life is never granted to the damned.
Now it was granted as a great favour to Paul to see the life
in which the saints live for ever with God (2 Cor. xii.).
Therefore the damned will not see the glory of the saints.
On the contrary, It is stated (Luke xvi. 23) that the rich
man in the midst of his torments saw Abraham . . . and
Lazarus in his bosom.
I answer that, The damned, before the judgment day,
will see the blessed in glory, in such a way as to know, not
what that glory is like, but only that they are in a state
of glory that surpasses all thought. This will trouble
them, both because they will, through envy, grieve for
their happiness, and because they have forfeited that glory.
Hence it is written (Wis. v. 2) concerning the wicked:
Seeing it they shall be troubled with terrible fear. After
the judgment day, however, they will be altogether deprived
of seeing the blessed : nor will this lessen their punishment,
but will increase it; because they will bear in remembrance
the glory of the blessed which they saw at or before the
judgment: and this will torment them. Moreover they will
be tormented by finding themselves deemed unworthy
even to see the glory which the saints merit to have.
Q. 98. Art. 9 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 198
Reply Obj. 1. The happenings of this life would not, if
seen, torment the damned in hell as the sight of the glory
of the saints; wherefore the things which happen here are
not shown to the damned in the same way as the saints'
glory; although also of the things that happen here those
are shown to them which are capable of causing them sorrow.
Reply Obj. 2. Paul looked upon that Ufe wherein the saints
live with God,* by actual experience thereof and by hoping
to have it more perfectly in the life to come. Not so the
damned; wherefore the comparison fails.
* Cf. II.-II.. Q. CLXXXV., A. 3> ad 2.
QUESTION XCIX.
OF GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE TOWARDS THE
DAMNED.
{In Five Articles.)
We must next consider God's justice and mercy towards
the damned: under which head there are five points of
inquiry: (i) Whether by Divine justice an eternal punish-
ment is inflicted on sinners ? (2) Whether by God's mercy
all punishment both of men and of demons comes to an
end ? (3) WHiether at least the punishment of men comes
to an end ? (4) Whether at least the punishment of Christians
has an end ? (5) Whether there is an end to the punishment
of those who have performed works of mercy ?
First Article,
whether by divine justice an eternal punish-
ment is inflicted on sinners ?*
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that an eternal punishment
is not inflicted on sinners by Divine justice. For the
punishment should not exceed the fault: According to the
measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be
(Deut. XXV. 2). Now fault is temporal. Therefore the
punishment should not be eternal.
Obj. 2. Further, Of two mortal sins one is greater than the
other; and therefore one should receive a greater punish-
ment than the other. But no punishment is greater than
eternal punishment, since it is infinite. Therefore eternal
* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXVII.. AA. 3. 4.
199
Q. 99. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 200
punishment is not due to every sin; and if it is not due to
one, it is due to none, since they are not infinitely distant
from one another.
Ohj. 3. Further, A just judge does not punish except in
order to correct, wherefore it is stated [Ethic, ii. 3) that
punishments are a kind of medicine. Now, to punish the
wicked eternally does not lead to their correction, nor to
that of others, since then there will be no one in future
who can be corrected thereby. Therefore eternal punish-
ment is not inflicted for sins according to Divine justice.
Obj. 4. Further, No one wishes that which is not desirable
for its own sake, except on account of some advantage.
Now God does not wish punishment for its own sake, for
He delights not in punishments.* Since then no advan-
tage can result from the perpetuity of punishment, it would
seem that He ought not to inflict such a punishment for sin.
Obj. 5. Further, Nothing accidental lasts for ever {De
Ccelo et Mundo, i.). But punishment is one of those things
that happen accidentally, since it is contrary to nature.
Therefore it cannot be everlasting.
Obj. 6. Further, The justice of God would seem to require
that sinners should be brought to naught : because on account
of ingratitude a person deserves to lose all benefits; and
among other benefits of God there is being itself. Therefore
it would seem just that the smner who has been ungrateful
to God should lose his being. But if sinners be brought to
naught, their punishment cannot be everlasting. Therefore
it would seem out of keeping with Divine justice that sinners
should be punished for ever.
On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xxv. 46): These,
namely the wicked, shall go into everlasting punishment.
Further, As reward is to merit, so is punishment to guilt.
Now, according to Divine justice, an eternal reward is
due to temporal merit: Every one who seeth the Son and
believeth in Him hath (Vulg., — that everyone . . . may have) life
* The allusion is to Wis. i. 13, Neither hath He pleasure in the
destruction of the living, as may be gathered from I. -II., Q. LXXXVII.,
A. 3, Obj. 3.
201 GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE Q.99.ART.1
everlasting. Therefore according to Divine justice an ever-
lasting punishment is due to temporal guilt.
Further, According to the Philosopher [Ethic, v. 5), punish-
ment is meted according to the dignity of the person sinned
against, so that a person who strikes one in authority
receives a greater punishment than one who strikes anyone
else. Now whoever sins mortally sins against God, Whose
commandments he breaks, and Whose honour he gives
another, by placing his end in some one other than God.
But God's majesty is infinite. Therefore whoever sins
mortally deserves infinite punishment; and consequently
it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be punished
for ever.
/ answer that, Since punishment is measured in two ways,
namely according to the degree of its severity, and according
to its length of time, the measure of punishment corre-
sponds to the measure of fault, as regards the degree of
severity, so that the more grievously a person sins the more
grievously is he punished: As much as she hath glorified
herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow
give ye to her (Apoc. xviii. 7). The duration of the punish-
ment does not, however, correspond with the duration of the
fault, as Augustine says [De Civ. Dei, xxi. 11), for adultery
which is committed in a short space of time is not punished
with a momentary penalty even according to human laws.*
But the duration of punishment regards the disposition of
the sinner: for sometimes a person who commits an offence
in a city is rendered by his very offence worthy of being
cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens, either by
perpetual exile or even by death : whereas sometimes he
is not rendered worthy of being cut off entirely from the
fellowship of the cizitens; wherefore in order that he may
become a fitting member of the State, his punishment is
prolonged or curtailed, according as is expedient for his
amendment, so that he may live in the city in a becoming
and peaceful manner. So too, according to Divine justice,
sin renders a person worthy to be altogether cut off from
* Cf. I.-II.. Q. LXXXVIL, A. z,adi.
Q. 99- Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 202
the fellowship of God's city, and this is the effect of every
sin committed against charity, which is the bond uniting
this same city together. Consequently, for mortal sin
which is contrary to charity a person is expelled for ever
from the fellowship of the saints and condemned to everlast-
ing punishment, because as Augustine says {loc. cit.), as
men are cut off from this perishable city by the penalty of the
first death, so are they excluded from that imperishable city by
the punishment of the second death. That the punishment
inflicted by the earthly state is not deemed everlasting is
accidental, either because man endures not for ever, or
because the state itself comes to an end. Wherefore if man
lived for ever, the punishment of exile or slavery, which is
pronounced by human law, would remain in him for ever.
On the other hand, as regards those who sin in such a way
as not to deserve to be entirely cut off from the fellowship
of the saints, such as those who sin venially, their punish-
ment will be so much the shorter or longer according as
they are more or less fit to be cleansed, through sin clinging
to them more or less : this is observed in the punishments of
this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice.
We find also other reasons given by the saints why some
are justly condemned to everlasting punishment for a
temporal sin. One is because they sinned against an
eternal good by despising eternal life. This is mentioned
by Augustine {ibid. 12) : He is become worthy of eternal evil,
who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal. Another
reason is because man sinned in his own eternity;* where-
fore Gregory says {Dial, iv.), it belongs to the great justice
of the judge that those should never cease to be punished, who
in this life never ceased to desire sin. And if it be objected
that some who sin mortally propose to amend their life
at some time, and that these accordingly are seemingly
not deserving of eternal punishment, it must be replied
according to some that Gregory speaks of the will that is
made manifest by the deed. For he who falls into mortal
sin of his own will puts himself in a state whence he cannot
* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXVII., A. 2,, ad I.
203 GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE Q. 99 Art. i
be rescued, except God help him: wherefore from the very
fact that he is wilHng to sin, he is wilHng to remain in sin
for ever. For man is a wind that goeth, namely to sin, and
returneth not by his own power (Ps. Ixxvii., 39). Thus if
a man were to throw himself into a pit whence he could
not get out without help, one might say that he wished to
remain there for ever, whatever else he may have thought
himself. Another and a better answer is that from the very
fact that he commits a mortal sin, he places his end in a
creature ; and since the whole of life is directed to its end, it
follows that for this very reason he directs the whole of his life
to that sin, and is willing to remain in sin for ever, if he could
do so with impunity. This is what Gregory says on
Job xli. 23, He shall esteem the deep as growing old {Moral.
xxxiv.) : The wicked only put an end to sinning because their
life came to an end: they would indeed have wished to live for
ever, that they might continue in sin for ever, for they desire
rather to sin than to live. Still another reason may be given
why the punishment of mortal sin is eternal : because thereby
one offends God Who is infinite. Wherefore since punish-
ment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature
is incapable of an infinite quality, it must needs be infinite
at least in duration. And again there is a fourth reason for
the same : because guilt remains for ever, since it cannot be
remitted without grace, and men cannot receive grace after
death ; nor should punishment cease so long as guilt remains.
Reply Obj. 1. Punishment has not to be equal to fault as
to the amount of duration, as is seen to be the case also
with human laws. We may also reply with Gregory
(Dial, xliv.) that although sin is temporal in act, it is eternal
in will.
Reply Obj. 2. The degree of intensity in the punishment
corresponds to the degree of gravity in the sin; wherefore
mortal sins unequal in gravity will receive a punishment
unequal in intensity but equal in duration.
Reply Obj. 3. The punishments inflicted on those who are
not altogether expelled from the society of their fellow-
citizens are intended for their correction: whereas those
Q. 99- Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 204
punishments, whereby certain persons are wholly banished
from the society of their fellow-citizens, are not intended for
their correction; although they may be intended for the
correction and tranquillity of the others who remain in the
state. Accordingly the damnation of the wicked is for the
correction of those who are now in the Church ; for punish-
ments are intended for correction, not only when they are
being inflicted, but also when they are decreed.
Reply Obj. 4. The everlasting punishment of the wicked
will not be altogether useless. For they are useful for two
purposes. First, because thereby the Divine justice is safe-
guarded which is acceptable to God for its own sake. Hence
Gregory says [Dial, iv.): Almighty God on account of His
lovingkindness delights not in the torments of the unhappy,
but on account of His justice. He is for ever unappeased
by the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, they are useful,
because the elect rejoice therein, when they see God's
justice in them, and realize that they have escaped them.
Hence it is written (Ps. Ivii. 12): The just shall rejoice when
he shall see the revenge, etc., and (Isa. Ixvi. 24) : They, namely
the wicked, shall be a loathsome sight* to all flesh, nam.ely
to the saints, as a gloss says. Gregory expresses himself
in the same sense [Dial, iv): The wicked are all condemned
to eternal punishment, and are punished for their own wicked-
ness. Yet they will burn to some purpose, namely that the
just may all both see in God the joys they receive, and perceive
in them the torments they have escaped: for which reason they
will acknowledge themselves for ever the debtors of Divine grace,
the more that they will see how the evils which they overcame
by its assistance are punished eternally.
Reply Obj. 5. Although the punishment relates to the
soul accidentally, it relates essentially to the soul infected
with guilt. And since guilt will remain in the soul for ever,
its punishment also will be everlasting.
Reply Obj. 6. Punishment corresponds to fault, properly
speaking, in respect of the inordinateness in the fault, and
* Ad satieiatem visionis, which S. Thomas takes to signify being
satiated with joy. Cf. Q. XCIV., A. 3.
205 GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE Q. 99. Art. 2
not of the dignity in the person offended: for if the latter
were the case, a punishment of infinite intensity would cor-
respond to every sin. Accordingly, although a man deserves
to lose his being from the fact that he has sinned against
God the author of his being, yet, in view of the inordinate-
ness of the act itself, loss of being is not due to him, since
being is presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being lost
or corrupted by the inordinateness of sin :* and consequently
privation of being cannot be the punishment due to any sin.
Second Article.
WHETHER BY GOD'S MERCY ALL PUNISHMENT OF THE
DAMNED, BOTH MEN AND DEMONS, COMES TO AN
END ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that by God's mercy all
punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes
to an end. For it is written (Wis. xi. 24) : Thou hast mercy
upon all, 0 Lord, because Thou canst do all things. But
among aU things the demons also are included, since they
are God's creatures. Therefore also their punishment will
come to an end.
Obj. 2. Further, God hath concluded all in sin (Vulg., —
unbelief), that He may have mercy on all (Rom. xi. 32). Now
God has concluded the demons under sin, that is to say.
He permitted them to be concluded. Therefore it would
seem that in time He has mercy even on the demons.
Obj. 3. Further, As Anselm says (Cwr Deus Homo ii.),
it is not just that God should permit the utter loss of a creature
which He made for happiness. Therefore, since every
rational creature was created for happiness, it would seem
unjust for it to be allowed to perish altogether.
On the contrary. It is written (Matth. xxv. 41): Depart
from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which is prepared
for the devil and his angels. Therefore they will be punished
eternally.
♦ Cf. I.-II.. Q. LXXXV., A. I.
Q. 99. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 206
Further, Just as the good angels were made happy
through turning to God, so the bad angels were made
unhappy through turning away from God. Therefore if
the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to
an end, the happiness of the good will also come to an end,
which is inadmissible.
/ answer that, As Augustine says {Dc Civ. Dei, xxi.)
Origen* erred in maintaining that the demons will at length,
through God's mercy, he delivered from their punishment.
But this error has been condemned by the Church for two
reasons. First because it is clearly contrary to the authority
of Holy Writ (Apoc. xx. 9, 10): The devil who seduced them
was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the
beasts and the false prophets] shall be tormented day and
night for ever and ever, which is the Scriptural expression for
eternity. Secondly, because this opinion exaggerated God's
mercy in one direction and depreciated it in another.
For it would seem equally reasonable for the good angels
to remain in eternal happiness, and for the wicked angels
to be eternally punished. Wherefore just as he maintained
that the demons and the souls of the damned are to be
delivered at length from their sufferings, so he maintained
that the angels and the souls of the blessed will at length
pass from their happy state to the unhappiness of this life.
Reply Obj. i. God, for His own part, has mercy on all.
Since, however. His mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom,
the result is that it does not reach to certain people who
render themselves unworthy of that mercy, as do the demons
and the damned who are obstinate in wickedness. And
yet we may say that even in them His mercy finds a place,
in so far as they are punished less than they deserve con-
dignly, but not that they are entirely dehvered from punish-
ment.
Reply Obj. 2. In the words quoted the distribution (of
the predicate) regards the genera and not the individuals:
so that the statement applies to men in the state of way-
* Cf. P. I., Q. LXIV., A. 2.
t Vulg., — the beast and false prophet, etc.
207 GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE Q. 99 Art. 3
farer, inasmuch as He had mercy both on Jews and on Gen-
tiles, but not on every Gentile or every Jew.
Reply Ohj. 3. Anselm means that it is not just with
regard to becomingness to God's goodness, and is speaking
of the creature generically. For it becomes not the Divine
goodness that a whole genus of creature fail of the end for
which it was made : wherefore it is unbecoming for all men
or all angels to be damned. But there is no reason why some
men or some angels should perish for ever, because the
intention of the Divine will is fulfilled in the others who are
saved.
Third Article.
WHETHER god's MERCY SUFFERS AT LEAST MEN TO
BE PUNISHED ETERNALLY ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that God's mercy does not
suffer at least men to be punished eternally. For it is
written (Gen. vi. 3): My spirit shall not remain in man for
ever, because he is flesh ; where spirit denotes indignation, as
a gloss observes. Therefore, since God's indignation is not
distinct from His punishment, man will not be punished
eternally.
Obj. 2. Further, The charity of the saints in this life
makes them pray for their enemies. Now they will have
more perfect charity in that Ufe. Therefore they will pray
then for their enemies who are damned. But the prayers
of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most acceptable
to God. Therefore at the saints' prayers the Divine mercy
wiU in time deliver the damned from their punishment.
Obj. 3. Further, God's foretelling of the punishment of
the damned belongs to the prophecy of commination. Now
the prophecy of commination is not always fulfilled: as
appears from what was said of the destruction of Nineve
(Jonas iii.); and yet it was not destroyed as foretold by the
prophet, who also was troubled for that very reason (iv. i).
Therefore it would seem that much more will the threat
of eternal punishment be commuted by God's mercy for
Q. 99- Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 208
a more lenient punishment, when this will be able to give
sorrow to none but joy to all.
Ohj. 4. Further, The words of Ps. Ixxvi. 8 are to the point,
where it is said : Will God then be angry for ever ?* But God's
anger is His punishment. Therefore, etc.
Obj. 5. Further, A gloss on Isa. xiv. 19, But thou art cast
out, etc., says: Even though all souls shall have rest at last,
thou never shall: and it refers to the devil. Therefore it
would seem that all human souls shall at length have rest
from their pains.
On the contrary. It is written (Matth. xxv. 46) of the elect
conjointly with the damned: These shall go into everlasting
punishment : but the just, into life everlasting. But it is
inadmissible that the life of the just will ever have an end.
Therefore it is inadmissible that the punishment of the
damned will ever come to an end.
Further, As Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. ii.) death
is to men what their fall was to the angels. Now after their
fall the angels could not be restored, f Therefore neither
can man after death : and thus the punishment of the damned
will have no end.
/ answer that, As Augustine says {De Civ. Dei, xxi. 17, 18),
some evaded the error of Origen by asserting that the
demons are punished everlastingly, while holding that all
men, even unbeUevers, are at length set free from
punishment. But this statement is altogether unreasonable.
For just as the demons are obstinate in vvickedness and
therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are the
souls of men who die without charity, since death is to
men what their fall was to the angels, as Damascene
says.
Reply Obj. i. This saying refers to man generically,
because God's indignation was at length removed from the
human race by the coming of Christ. But those who were
unwilling to be included or to remain in this reconciliation
effected by Christ, perpetuated the Divine anger in them-
* Vulg., — Will God then cast off for ever ?
t Cf. P. I., Q. LXIV., A. 2.
209 GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE Q. 99. Art. 3
selves, since no other way of reconciliation is given to us
save that which is through Christ.
Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine {De Civ. Dei, xxi. 24) and
Gregory {Moral, xxxiv.) say, the saints in this life pray for
their enemies, that they may be converted to God, while it
is yet possible for them to be converted. For if we knew
that they were foreknown to death, we should no more pray
for them than for the demons. And since for those who
depart this life without grace there will be no further time
for conversion, no prayer will be offered for them, neither
by the Church mihtant, nor by the Church triumphant.
For that which we have to pray for them is, as the Apostle
says (2 Tim. ii. 25, 26), that God may give them repentance
to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from the
snares of the devil.
Reply Obj. 3. A punishment threatened prophetically is
only then commuted when there is a change in the merits of
the person threatened. Hence : / will suddenly speak
against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to
ptdl down and to destroy it. If that nation . . . shall repent
of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought
to do to them (Jer. xviii. 7). Therefore, since the merits of the
damned cannot be changed, the threatened punishment
will ever be fulfilled in them. Nevertheless the prophecy
of commination is always fulfilled in a certain sense, because
as Augustine says [ibid.): Nineve has been overthrown, that
was evil, and a good Nineve is built up, that was not: for while
the walls and the houses remained standing, the city was over-
thrown in its wicked ways.
Reply Obj. 4. These words of the Psalm refer to the vessels
of mercy, which have not made themselves unworthy of
mercy, because in this hfe (which may be called God's anger
on account of its unhappiness) He changes vessels of mercy
into something better. Hence the Psalm continues [verse 11) :
This is the change of the right hand of the most High. We
may also reply that they refer to mercy as granting a relaxa-
tion but not setting free altogether if it be referred also
to the damned. Hence the Psalm does not sa3^• Will He
ni. 7 14
Q. 99. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 210
from His anger shut up His mercies ? but in His anger,
because the punishment will not be done away entirely;
but His mercy will have effect by diminishing the punish-
ment while it continues.
Reply Ohj. 5. This gloss is speaking not absolutely but
on an impossible supposition in order to throw into relief
the greatness of the devil's sin, or of Nabuchodonosor's.
Fourth Article.
whether the punishment of christians is brought
to an end by the mercy of god ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that at least the punishment
of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of God.
For he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved (Markxvi. 16).
Now this applies to every Christian. Therefore all Chris-
tians will at length be saved.
Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Jo. vi. 55): He that
eateth My body and drinketh My blood hath eternal life.
Now this is the meat and drink whereof Christians partake
in common. Therefore all Christians will be saved at length.
Obj. 3. Further, If any mans work burn, he shall suffer
loss: but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire (i Cor. iii. 15),
where it is a question of those who have the foundation of
the Christian faith. Therefore all such persons will be saved
in the end.
On the contrary. It is written (i Cor. vi. 9): The unjust
shall not possess the kingdom of God. Now some Christians are
unjust. Therefore Christians will not all come to the kingdom
of God, and consequently they will be punished for ever.
Further, It is written (2 Pet. ii. 21): It had been better
for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they
have known it, to turn back from that holy commandment
which was delivered to them. Now those who know not the
way of truth will be punished for ever. Therefore Christians
who have turned back after knowing it will also be punished
for ever.
211 GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE Q. 99- Art. 4
I answer that, According to Augustine [De Civ. Dei, xxi.
20, 21), there have been some who predicted a delivery from
eternal punishment not for all men, but only for Christians;
although they stated the matter in different ways. For some
said that whoever received the sacraments of faith would
be immune from eternal punishment. But this is contrary
to the truth, since some receive the sacraments of faith, and
yet have not faith, without which it is impossible to please
God (Heb. xi. 6). Wherefore others said that those alone
will be exempt from eternal punishment who have received
the sacraments of faith, and professed the Catholic faith.
But against this it would seem to be that at one time some
people profess the Catholic faith, and afterwards abandon
it, and these are deserving not of a lesser but of a greater
punishment, since according to 2 Pet. ii. 21, it had been
better for them not to have known the way of justice than, after
they have known it, to turn back. Moreover it is clear that
heresiarchs who renounce the Catholic faith and invent
new heresies sin more grievously than those who have
conformed to some heresy from the first. And therefore
some have maintained that those alone are exempt from
eternal punishment, who persevere to the end in the Catholic
faith, however guilty they may have been of other crimes.
But this is clearly contrary to Holy Writ, for it is written
(James ii. 20) : Faith without works is dead, and (Matth. vii. 21)
Not every one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the
kingdom of heaven : but he that doth the will of My Father
Who is in heaven : and in many other passages Holy Scripture
threatens sinners with eternal punishment. Consequently
those who persevere in the faith unto the end will not all
be exempt from eternal punishment, unless in the end they
prove to be free from other crimes.
Reply Obj. i. Our Lord speaks there of formed faith*
that worketh by love (Vulg., — charity, Gal. v. 6) : wherein who-
soever dieth shall be saved. But to this faith not only is
the error of unbelief opposed, but also any mortal sin
whatsoever.
* Cf. II.-IL, Q. IV.. A. 3.
Q. 99- Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 212
Reply Obj. 2. The saying of our Lord refers not to those
who partake only sacramentally, and who sometimes by
receiving unworthily eat and drink judgment to themselves
(i Cor. xi. 29), but to those who eat spiritually and are
incorporated with Him by charity, which incorporation
is the effect of the sacramental eating, in those who approach
worthily.* Wherefore, so far as the power of the sacrament
is concerned, it brings us to eternal life, although sin may
deprive us of that fruit, even after we have received worthily.
Reply Obj. 3. In this passage of the Apostle the foundation
denotes formed faith, upon which whosoever shall build
venial sinsj shall suffer loss, because he will be punished
for them by God ; yet he himself shall be saved in the end
by fire, either of temporal tribulation, or of the punishment
of purgatory which will be after death.
Fifth Article.
whether all those who perform works of mercy
will be punished eternally ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that all who perform works
of mercy will not be punished eternally, but only those who
neglect those works. For it is written (James ii. 13) :
Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy;
and (Matth. v. 7): Blessed are the merciful for they shall
obtain mercy.
Obj. 2. Further, (Matth. xxv. 35-46) we find a description
of our Lord's discussion with the damned and the elect.
But this discussion is only about works of mercy. There-
fore eternal punishment will be awarded only to such as
have omitted to practise works of mercy: and consequently
the same conclusion follows as before.
Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Matth. vi. 12): Forgive us
our debts, as we also forgive our debtors, and further on
{verse 14) : For if you will forgive men their offences, your
* Cf. P. III., Q. LXXX., AA. I, 2, 3.
t Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXIX., A. 2.
213 GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE Q. 99- Art. 5
heavenly Father will forgive you also your offences. There-
fore it would seem that the merciful, who forgive others
their offences, will themselves obtain the forgiveness of their
sins, and consequently will not be punished eternally.
Obj. 4. Further, A gloss of Ambrose on i Tim. iv. 8,
Godliness is profitable to all things, says : The sum total of a
Christian s rule of life consists in mercy and godliness. Let
a man follow this, and though he should suffer from the incon-
stancy of the flesh, without doubt he will be scourged, but he
will not perish: whereas he who can boast of no other exercise
but that of the body will suffer everlasting punishment. There-
fore those who persevere in works of mercy, though they be
shackled with fleshly sins, will not be punished eternally:
and thus the same conclusion follows as before.
On the contrary, It is written (i Cor. vi. 9, 10) : Neither
fornicators, . . . nor adulterers, etc., shall possess the kingdom
of God. Yet many are such who practise works of mercy.
Therefore the merciful will not all come to the eternal
kingdom: and consequently some of them will be punished
eternaUy.
Further, It is written (James ii. 10): Whosoever shall keep
the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all.
Therefore whoever keeps the law as regards the works
of mercy and omits other works, is guilty of transgressing
the law, and consequently will be punished eternally.
I answer that. As Augustine says in the book quoted
above {De Civ. Dei, xxi. 22), some have maintained that not
all who have professed the Catholic faith will be freed
from eternal punishment, but only those who persevere in
works of mercy, although they be guilty of other crimes.
But this cannot stand, because without charity nothing
can be acceptable to God, nor does anything profit unto
eternal hfe in the absence of charity. Now it happens that
certain persons persevere in works of mercy without having
charity. WTierefore nothing profits them to the meriting of
eternal life, or to exemption from eternal punishment, as may
be gathered from i Cor. xiii. 3. Most evident is this in the case
of those who lay hands on other people's property, for after
Q. 99- Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 214
seizing on many things, they nevertheless spend something
in works of mercy. We must therefore conclude that all
whosoever die in mortal sin, neither faith nor works of
mercy will free them from eternal punishment, not even
after any length of time whatever.
Reply Obj. i. Those will obtain mercy who show mercy
in an ordinate manner. But those who while merciful to
others are neglectful of themselves do not show mercy
ordinately, rather do they strike at themselves by their
evil actions. Wherefore such persons will not obtain the
mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain that
mercy which rebates somewhat their due punishment.
Reply Obj. 2. The reason why the discussion refers only to
the works of mercy is not because eternal punishment will
be inflicted on none but those who omit those works, but
because eternal punishment will be remitted to those who
after sinning have obtained forgiveness by their works of
mercy, making unto themselves friends of the mammon of
iniquity (Luke xvi. g).
Reply Obj. 3. Our Lord said this to those who ask that
their debt be forgiven, but not to those who persist in sin.
Wherefore the repentant alone will obtain by their works
of mercy the forgiveness that sets them free altogether.
Reply Obj. 4. The gloss of Ambrose speaks of the incon-
stancy that consists in venial sin, from which a man will
be freed through the works of mercy after the punishment
of purgatory, which he calls a scourging. Or, if he speaks
of the inconstancy of mortal sin, the sense is that those who
while yet in this life fall into sins of the flesh through frailty
are disposed to repentance by works of mercy. Wherefore
such a one will not perish, that is to say, he will be disposed
by those works not to perish, through grace bestowed on
him by our Lord, Who is blessed for evermore. Amen.
APPENDIX I
The following two questions were compiled by Nicolai from
St. Thomas's commentary on the Sentences, and by him
included in the supplement between Questions LXX. and
LXXL
QUESTION I
OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART
THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY.
{In Two Articles.)
We must next consider the various qualities of souls that
are stripped of their bodies, according to their respective
states; and first we shall treat of the souls which depart
this life with original sin only.
Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(i) Whether these souls suffer from a bodily fixe, and are
inflicted with punishment by fi.re ? (2) Whether these souls
suffer from a spiritual torment within themselves ?
First Article.
whether those souls which depart with original sin
alone, suffer from a bodily fire, and are punished
BY FIRE ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : — •
Objection i. It would seem that souls which depart with
none but original sin, suffer from a bodily fire and are punished
by fire. For Augustine* says: Hold firmly and doubt not
that children who depart this life without the sacrament of
* Fulgentius, De Fide ad Fetrum, xxvii.
215
Q. I. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 216
Baptism will be punished everlastingly. Now punishment
denotes sensible pain. Therefore souls which depart this
life with original sin alone, suffer from a bodily fire and are
tormented with the pain of fire.
Ohj. 2. Further, A greater fault deserves a greater punish-
ment. Now original sin is greater than venial, because it
contains more aversion, since it deprives its subject of
grace, whereas venial sin is compatible with grace; and
again because original sin is punished eternally, whereas
venial sin is punished temporally. Seeing then that venial
sin is deserving of the punishment of fire, much more so is
original sin.
Obj. 3. Further, Sins are more severely punished after
this life than during lifetime, for in this life there is room for
mercy. Now, sensible punishment corresponds to original
sin in this life, for children who have only original sin
are justly subject to many sensible punishments. Therefore
sensible punishment is due to it after this life.
Obj. 4. Further, Even as in actual sin there is aversion
and conversion, so in original sin there is something cor-
responding to aversion, namely the privation of original
justice, and something corresponding to conversion,
namely concupiscence. Now the punishment of fire is due
to actual sin by reason of the conversion. Therefore it
is also due to original sin by reason of concupiscence.
Obj. 5. Further, After the resurrection the bodies of
children will be either passible or impassible. If they be
impassible — and no human body can be impassible except
either on account of the gift of impassibility (as in the
blessed) or by reason of original justice (as in the state of
innocence) — ^it follows that the bodies of children will either
have the gift of impassibility, and thus will be glorious, so
that there will be no difference between baptized and non-
baptized children, which is heretical, or else they will have
original justice, and thus will be without original sin, and
will not be punished for original sin, which is likewise
heretical. If, on the other hand, they be passible, since
everything passible suffers of necessity in the presence of
217 APPENDIX I Q.I. Art. I
the active, it follows that in the presence of active sensible
bodies they will suffer sensible punishment.
On the contrary, Augustine says {Enchir. xxiii.) that the
mildest punishment of all will be for those who are burdened
with original sin only. But this would not be so, if they
were tormented with sensible punishment, because the
pain of hell fire is most grievous. Therefore they will not
suffer sensible punishment.
Further, The grief of sensible punishment corresponds
to the pleasure of sin (Apoc. xviii. 7): As much as she hath
glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and
sorrow give ye to her. But there is no pleasmre in original
sin, as neither is there operation, for pleasure follows opera-
tion, as stated in Ethic, x. 4. Therefore punishment by fire
is not due to original sin.
Further, Gregory Nazianzen in his fortieth sermon, which
is entitled On Holy Baptism, distinguishes tliree classes of
unbaptized persons : those namely who refuse to be baptized,
those who through neglect have put off being baptized
until the end of life and have been surprised by sudden
death, and those who, like infants, have failed to receive
it through no fault of theirs. Of the first he says that
they will be punished not only fox their other sins, but also
for their contempt of Baptism; of the second, that they
will be punished, though less severely than the first, for
having neglected it ; and of the last he says that a just and
eternal Judge will consign them neither to heavenly glory nor
to the eternal pains of hell, for although they have not
been signed with Baptism, they are without wickedness and
malice, and have suffered rather than caused their loss of
Baptism. He also gives the reason why, although they do
not reach the glory of heaven, they do not therefore suffer
the eternal punishment suffered by the damned: Because
there is a mean between the two, since he who deserves not
honour and glory is not for that reason worthy of punishment,
and on the other hand he who is not deserving of punishment
is not for that reason worthy of glory and honour.
I answer that, Punishment should be proportionate to
Q. I. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 218
fault, according to the saying of Isaias xxvii. 8, In measure
against measure, when it shall he cast off, thou shalt judge it.
Now the defect transmitted to us tlirough our origin, and
having the character of a sin does not result from the
withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent upon human
nature by virtue of its principles, but from the withdrawal
or corruption of something that had been superadded to
nature. Nor does this sin belong to this particular man,
except in so far as he has such a nature, that is deprived of
this good, which in the ordinary course of things he would
have had and would have been able to keep. Wherefore no
further punishment is due to him, besides the privation of
that end to which the gift withdrawn destined him, which
gift human nature is unable of itself to obtain. Now this
is the divine vision; and consequently the loss of this vision
is the proper and only punishment of original sin after
death: because, if any other sensible punishment were
inflicted after death for original sin, a man would be punished
out of proportion to his guilt, for sensible punishment is
inflicted for that which is proper to the person, since a man
undergoes sensible punishment in so far as he suffers in
his person. Hence, as his guilt did not result from an
action of his own, even so neither should he be punished
by suffering himself, but only by losing that which his
nature was unable to obtain. On the other hand, those
who are under sentence for original sin will suffer no loss
whatever in other kinds of perfection and goodness which
are consequent upon human nature by virtue of its principles.
Reply Obj. 1 . In the authority quoted punishment denotes,
not pain of sense, but only pain of loss, which is the priva-
tion of the divine vision, even as in Scripture the word fire
is often wont to signify any kind of punishment.
Reply Obj. 2. Of all sins original sin is the least, because
it is the least voluntary; for it is voluntary not by the will
of the person, but only by the will of the origin of our
nature. But actual sin, even venial, is voluntary by the
will of the person in which it is; wherefore a lighter punish-
ment is due to original than to venial sin. Nor does it
219 APPENDIX I Q.I. Art. I
matter that original sin is incompatible with grace; because
privation of grace has the character, not of sin, but of
punishment, except in so far as it is voluntary: for which
reason that which is less voluntary is less sinful. Again it
matters not that actual venial sin is deserving of temporal
punishment, since this is accidental, for as much as he who
falls venially has sufficient grace to attenuate the punish-
ment. For if venial sin were in a person without grace,
it would be punished eternally.
Reply Obj. 3. There is no parity between pain of sense
before and after death, since before death the pain of sense
results from the power of the natural agent, whether the
pain of sense be interior as fever or the like, or exterior
as burning and so forth. Whereas after death nothing will
act by natural power, but only according to the order of divine
justice, whether the object of such action be the separate
soul, on which it is clear that fire cannot act naturally,
or the body after resurrection, since then all natural
action will cease, through the cessation of the first movable
which is the cause of all bodily movement and alteration.
Reply Obj. 4. Sensible pain corresponds to sensible
pleasure, which is in the conversion of actual sin: whereas
habitual concupiscence, which is in original sin, has no
pleasure. Hence, sensible pain does not correspond thereto
as punishment.
Reply Obj. 5. The bodies of children will be impassible,
not through their being unable in themselves to suffer, but
through the lack of an external agent to act upon them:
because, after the resurrection, no body will act on another,
least of all so as to induce corruption by the action of nature,
but there will only be action to the effect of punishing
them by order of the divine justice. Wherefore those
bodies to which pain of sense is not due by divine justice
will not suffer punishment. On the other hand, the bodies
of the saints will be impassible, because they will lack the
capability of suffering; hence impassibility in them will be
a gift, but not in children.
Q. I. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 220
Second Article.
whether these same souls suffer spiritual affliction
on account of the state in which they are ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the souls in question
suffer spiritual affliction on account of the state wherein
they are, because as Chrysostom says {Horn, xxiii. in Matth.),
the punishment of God in that they will be deprived of
seeing God will be more painful than their being burnt in
hell fire. Now these souls will be deprived of seeing God.
Therefore they will suffer spiritual affliction thereby.
Ohj. 2. Further, One cannot, without suffering, lack
what one wishes to have. But these souls would wish to
have the divine vision, else their will would be actually
perverse. Therefore since they are deprived of it, seemingly
they also suffer.
Ohj. 3. Further, If it be said that they do not suffer,
because they know that through no fault of theirs they are
deprived thereof, on the contrary:- — ^Freedom from fault
does not lessen but increases the pain of punishment: for
a man does not grieve less for that he is disinherited or
deprived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore these
souls likewise, albeit deprived of so great a good through
no fault of theirs, suffer none the less.
Ohj. 4. Further, As baptized children are in relation to the
merit of Christ, so are unbaptized children to the demerit
of Adam. But baptized children receive the reward of
eternal life by virtue of Christ's merit. Therefore the
unbaptized suffer pain through being deprived of eternal
life on account of Adam's demerit.
Ohj. 5. Further, Separation from what we love cannot be
without pain. But these children will have natural know-
ledge of God, and for that very reason will love Him natur-
ally. Therefore since they are separated from Him for
ever, seemingly they cannot undergo this separation without
pain.
221 APPENDIX I Q.I. Art. 2
On the contrary, If unbaptized children have interior
sorrow after death, they will grieve either for their sin or
for their punishment. If for their sin, since they cannot
be further cleansed from that sin, their sorrow will lead
them to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the damned
is the worm of conscience. Therefore these children will
have the worm of conscience, and consequently theirs
would not be the mildest punishment, as Augustine says
it is.* If, on the other hand, they grieve for their punish-
ment, it follows, since their punishment is justly inflicted by
God, that their will opposes itself to divine justice, and thus
would be actually inordinate, which is not to be granted.
Therefore they will feel no sorrow.
Further, Right reason does not allow one to be disturbed
on account of what one was unable to avoid; hence Seneca
proves (Ep. Ixxxv., and De ira ii. 6) that a wise man is
not disturbed. Now in these children there is right reason
deflected by no actual sin. Therefore they will not be
disturbed for that they undergo this punishment which
they could nowise avoid.
/ answer that, On this question there are three opinions.
Some say that these children will suffer no pain, because
their reason will be so much in the dark that they will not
know that they lack what they have lost. It, however,
seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily burden
should ignore things which, to say the least, reason is able
to explore, and many more besides. Hence others say that
they have perfect knowledge of things subject to natural
reason, and know God, and that they are deprived of seeing
Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow on this account
but that their sorrow will be mitigated, in so far as it was
not by their will that they incurred the sin for which they
are condemned. Yet this again would seem improbable,
because this sorrow cannot be little for the loss of so great
a good, especially without the hope of recovery: wherefore
their punishment would not be the mildest. Moreover the
very same reason that impugns their being punished with
* Cf. Art. I, On the contrary, . . .
Q.I. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 222
pain of sense, as afflicting them from without, argues against
their feehng sorrow within, because the pain of punishment
corresponds to the pleasure of sin; wherefore, since original
sin is void of pleasure, its punishment is free of all pain.
Consequently others say that they will know perfectly
things subject to natural knowledge, and both the fact of
their being deprived of eternal life and the reason for this
privation, and that nevertheless this knowledge will not
cause any sorrow in them. How this may be possible we
must explore.
Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided by
right reason one does not grieve through being deprived of
what is beyond one's power to obtain, but only through
lack of that which, in some way, one is capable of obtaining.
Thus no wise man grieves for being unable to fly like a bird,
or for that he is not a king or an emperor, since these things
are not due to him; whereas he would grieve if he lacked
that to which he had some kind of claim. I say, then, that
every man who has the use of free-will is adapted to obtain
eternal life, because he can prepare himself for grace whereby
to merit eternal life;* so that if he fail in this, his grief will
be very great, since he has lost what he was able to possess.
But children were never adapted to possess eternal life,
since neither was this due to them by virtue of their natural
principles, for it surpasses the entire faculty of nature, nor
could they perform acts of their own whereby to obtain so
great a good. Hence they will nowise grieve for being
deprived of the divine vision; nay, rather will they rejoice
for that they will have a large share of God's goodness and
their own natural perfections. Nor can it be said that they
were adapted to obtain eternal life, not indeed by their own
action, but by the actions of others around them, since they
could be baptized by others, like other children of the
same condition who have been baptized and obtained
eternal life: for this is of superabundant grace that one
should be rewarded without any act of one's own. Where-
fore the lack of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children
* Cf. I.-II., Q. CIX.. AA. 5, 6.
223 APPENDIX I Q.I. Art. 2
who die without Baptism, any more than the lack of many
graces accorded to others of the same condition makes a
wise man to grieve.
Reply Ohj. i. In those who, having the use of free-will,
are damned for actual sin, there was aptitude to obtain
eternal life, but not in children, as stated above. Con-
sequently there is no parity between the two.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although the will may be directed both to
the possible and to the impossible as stated in Ethic, iii. 5,
an ordinate and complete will is only of things which in
some way are proportionate to our capability; and we
grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but not if we fail in the
will that is of impossibilities, and which should be called
velleity* rather than will ; for one does not will such things
absolutely, but one would if they were possible.
Reply Ohj. 3. Everyone has a claim to his own inheritance
or bodily members, wherefore it is not strange that he
should grieve at their loss, whether this be through his own
or another's fault: hence it is clear that the argument is
not based on a true comparison.
Reply Ohj. 4. The gift of Christ surpasses the sin of
Adam, as stated in Rom. v. 15 seqq. Hence it does not
follow that unbaptized children have as much of evil as the
baptized have of good.
Reply Ohj. 5. Although unbaptized children are separated
from God as regards the union of glory, they are not utterly
separated from Him: in fact they are united to Him by
their share of natural goods, and so will also be able to
rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge and love.
* Cf. I. -II.. Q. XIII., A. ^adi; III., Q. XXL, A. 4.
Q. 2. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 224
QUESTION 11
OF THE QUALITY OF SOULS WHO EXPIATE ACTUAL SIN
OR ITS PUNISHMENT IN PURGATORY.
{In Six Articles.)
We must next treat of the souls which after this life expiate
the punishment of their actual sins in the fire of Purgatory.
Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(i) Whether the pain of Purgatory surpasses all the tem-
poral pains of this life ? (2) Whether that punishment is
voluntary ? (3) Whether the souls in Purgatory are
punished by the demons ? (4) Whether venial sin as
regards its guilt is expiated by the pains of Purgatory ?
(5) Whether the fire of Purgatory frees from the debt of
punishment ? (6) Whether one is freed from that punish-
ment sooner than another ?
First Article.
whether the pains of purgatory surpass all the
temporal pains of this life ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that the pains of Purgatory
do not surpass all the temporal pains of this life. Because
the more passive a thing is the more it suffers if it has the
sense of being hurt. Now the body is more passive than
the separate soul, both because it has contrariety to a fiery
agent, and because it has matter which is susceptive of the
agent's quality: and this cannot be said of the soul. There-
fore the pain which the body suffers in this world is greater
than the pain whereby the soul is cleansed after this life.
Obj. 2. Further, The pains of Purgatory are directly
ordained against venial sins. Now since venial sins are
the least grievous, the lightest punishment is due to them,
if the measure of the stripes is according to the measure of
225 APPENDIX I Q. 2. Art. I
the fault. Therefore the pain of Purgatory is the lightest
of aU.
Ohj. 3. Further, Since the debt of punishment is an effect
of sin, it does not increase unless the sin increases. Now
sin cannot increase in one whose sin is already remitted.
Therefore if a mortal sin has been remitted in a man who
has not fully paid the debt of punishment, tliis debt does
not increase when he dies. But while he lived he was not
in debt to the extent of the most grievous punishment.
Therefore the pain that he will suffer after this life will not
be more grievous to him than all other pains of this life.
On th& contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (xli. de
Sanctis) : This fire of Purgatory will he more severe than any
pain that can be felt, seen or conceived in this world.
Further, The more universal a pain is the greater it is.
Now the whole separate soul is punished, since it is simple:
which is not the case with the body. Therefore this, being
the punishment of the separate soul, is greater than any
pain suffered by the body.
/ answer that, In Purgatory there will be a twofold pain;
one will be the pain of loss, namely the delay of the divine
vision, and the pain of sense, namely punishment by
corporeal fire. With regard to both the least pain of
Purgatory surpasses the greatest pain of this life. For the
more a thing is desired the more painful is its absence.
And since after this life the holy souls desire the Sovereign
Good with the most intense longing, — both because their
longing is not held back by the weight of the body, and
because, had there been no obstacle, they would already
have gained the goal of enjoying the Sovereign Good, — it
follows that they grieve exceedingly for their delay. Again,
since pain is not hurt, but the sense of hurt, the more sensi-
tive a thing is, the greater the pain caused by that which
hurts it: wherefore hurts inflicted on the more sensible
parts cause the greatest pain. And, because all bodily
sensation is from the soul, it follows of necessity that the
soul feels the greatest pain when a hurt is inflicted on the
soul itself. That the soul suffers pain from the bodily fire
in 7 15
Q. 2. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 226
is at present taken for granted, for we shall treat of this
matter further on.* Therefore it follows that the pain of
Purgatory, both of loss and of sense, surpasses all the pains
of this life.
Some, however, prove this from the fact that the whole
soul is punished, and not the body. But this is to no
purpose, since in that case the punishment of the damned
would be milder after the resurrection than before, which
is false.
Reply Obj. i. Although the soul is less passive than the
body, it is more cognizant of actual suffering (passionis):
and where the sense of suffering is greater, there is the
greater pain, though the suffering be less.
Reply Obj. 2. The severity of that punishment is not so
much a consequence of the degree of sin, as of the disposi-
tion of the person punished, because the same sin is more
severely punished then than now. Even so a person who
has a better temperament is punished more severely by
the same sentence than another; and yet the judge acts
justly in condemning both for the same crimes to the same
punishment.
This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
Second Article,
whether this punishment is voluntary ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that this punishment is
voluntary. For those who are in Purgatory are upright
in heart. Now uprightness in heart is to conform one's
will to God's, as Augustine says [Serm. i. in Ps. xxxii.).
Therefore, since it is God's \vill that they be punished, they
will suffer that punishment voluntarily.
Obj. 2. Further, Every wise man wills that without
which he cannot obtain the end he has in view. Now those
who are in Purgatory know that they cannot obtain glory,
unless they be punished first. Therefore they are punished
willingly.
* Cf. SuppL, Q. LXX., A. 3.
227 APPENDIX I Q.2.ART
On the contrary, No one asks to be freed from a punish-
ment that he suffers willingly. Now those who are in
Purgatory ask to be set free, as appears from many inci-
dents related in the Dialogue of Gregory (iv. 40, 65). There-
fore they will not undergo that punishment voluntarily.
I answer that, A thing is said to be voluntary in two ways.
First, by an absolute act of the will; and thus no punish-
ment is voluntary, because the very notion of punishment
is that it be contrary to the will. Secondly, a thing is said
to be voluntary by a conditional act of the will : thus cautery
is voluntary for the sake of regaining health. Hence a
punishment may be voluntary in two ways. First, because
by being punished we obtain some good, and thus the will
itself undertakes a punishment, as instanced in satisfaction,
or when a man accepts a punishment gladly, and would not
have it not to be, as in the case of martyrdom. Secondly,
when, although we gain no good by the punishment, we
cannot obtain a good without being punished, as in the case
of natural death: and then the will does not undertake the
punishment, and would be delivered from it; but it submits
to it, and in this respect the punishment is said to be volun-
tary. In this latter sense the punishment of Purgatory is
said to be voluntary.
Some, however, say that it is not voluntary in any way,
because the souls in Purgatory are so replete with suffering,
that they know not that they are being cleansed by their
pains, and deem themselves damned. But this is false, for
did they not know that they will be set free, they would
not ask for prayers, as they often do.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Third Article.
whether the souls in purgatory are punished
by the demons ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the souls in Purgatory
are punished by the demons. For, according to the Master,
Q. 2. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 228
they will have for torturers in their pains, those who were their
tempters in sin. Now the demons tempt us to sin, not only
mortal, but also venial when they fail in the former. There-
fore in Purgatory also they will torture souls on account of
venial sins.
Ohj. 2. Further, The just are competent to be cleansed
from sin both in this life and afterwards. Now, in this life,
they are cleansed by pains inflicted by the devil, as was
the case with Job. Therefore after this life also, those who
have to be cleansed will be punished by the demons.
On the contrary, It were unjust that he who has triumphed
over someone, should be subjected to him after victory.
Now those who are in Purgatory have triumphed over the
demons, since they died without mortal sin. Therefore
they will not be subjected to them through being punished
by them.
/ answer that. As after the Judgment day the Divine
justice will kindle the fire with which the damned will be
punished for ever, even so now the elect are cleansed aiter
this life by the Divine justice alone, and neither by the
ministry of the demons whom they have vanquished, nor
by the ministry of the angels who would not inflict such
tortures on their fellow-citizens. It is, however, possible
that they take them to the place of punishment: also that
even the demons, who rejoice in the punishment of man,
accompany them and stand by while they are being cleansed,
both that they may be sated with their pains, and that when
these leave their bodies, they may find something of their
own in them. But in this life, while there is yet time for
the combat, men are punished both by the wicked angels
as foes, as instanced in Job, and by the good angels, as
instanced in Jacob, the sinew of whose thigh shrank at
the angel's touch.* Moreover, Dionysius says explicitly
that the good angels sometimes mflict punishment.
This sufhces for the Replies to the Objections.
* Gen. xxxii. 25.
229 APPENDIX I Q. 2. Art. 4
Fourth Article.
whether venial sin is expiated by the pains of
purgatory as regards the guilt ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that venial sin is not expiated
by the pains of Purgatory as regards the guilt. For a
gloss* on I John v. i6, There is a sin unto death, etc., says:
It is vain to ask pardon after death for what was not amended
in this life. Therefore no sin is remitted as to guilt after
this life.
Ohj. 2. Further, The same subject is freed from sin as
faUs into sin. But after death the soul cannot sin veniaUy.
Therefore neither can it be loosed from venial sin.
Ohj. 3. Further, Gregory saysj that every man will be
at the judgment as he was when he left the body, because
the tree . . . wheresoever it shall fall, there shall it he.X If,
then, a man go forth from this life with venial sin, he will
be with venial sin at the judgment: and consequently one
does not atone for venial sin in Purgatory.
Ohj. 4. Further, It has been stated (Suppl. ii. 3) that
actual sin is not blotted out save by contrition. But there
will be no contrition after this life, because it is a meritorious
act. For then there will be neither merit nor demerit
since, according to the Damascene, § death is to men what
the fall was to the angels. Therefore, after this life, venial
sin is not remitted in Purgatory as to its guilt.
Ohj. 5. Further, Venial sin is not in us except on account
of the fomes. Wherefore in the original state Adam would
not have sinned venially, as was stated (2 Sent. xxi. 2).
Now after this life there will be no sensuality; because the
fomes will cease when the soul is separated, since it is called
the law of the flesh (Rom. vii.). Hence there will be no
venial sin then, and consequently it cannot be expiated by
the fire of Purgatory.
* St. Gregory {Moral, xvi. 28). f Dial. iv. 39.
X Eccles. xi. 3. § De Fide Orthod. ii. 4.
Q. 2. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 230
On the contrary, Gregory* and Augustine t say that certain
slight sins will be remitted in the life to come. Nor can
this be understood of the punishment: because thus all
sins, however grave they be, are expiated by the fire of
Purgatory, as regards the debt of punishment. Therefore
venial sins are cleansed by the fire of Purgatory as to their
guilt.
Further, Wood, hay, stubble (i Cor. iii. 12) denote venial
sins, as we have said (I.-IL, Q. LXXXIX., A. 2). Now
wood, hay, stubble are consumed in Purgatory. Therefore
venial sins are remitted after this life.
/ answer that, Some have asserted that no sin is remitted
after this life, as regards the guilt: that if a man die with
mortal sin, he is damned and incapable of being forgiven;
and that it is not possible for a man to die with a venial
sin and without mortal sin, since the final grace washes the
venial sin away. They assign as reason for this that venial
sin is excessive love of a temporal thing, in one who has
his foundation in Christ, which excess results from the
corruption of concupiscence. Wherefore if grace entirely
overcome the corruption of concupiscence, as in the Blessed
Virgin, there is no room for venial sin. Hence, since this
concupiscence is altogether abated and removed, the powers
of the soul are wholly subject to grace, and venial sin is
cast out. But this opinion is nonsensical in itself and in
its proof. In itself, because it is opposed to the statements
of holy men and of the Gospel, which cannot be expounded
as referring to the remission of venial sins as to their punish-
ment, as the Master says in the text,| because in this way
both light and grave sins are remitted in the life to come:
while Gregory§ declares that light sins alone are remitted
after this life. Nor does it suffice for them to say, that this
is said expressly of light sins, lest we should think that we
shall suffer nothing grievous on their account: because the
remission of sin diminishes punishment rather than aggra-
vates it. As to the proof, it is shown to be worthless, since
* Dial. iv. 39.
t De vera ei falsa poenit. iv., xviii. by some other author.
X 4 Sent. D. xxi. § I. c.
231 APPENDIX I Q. 2. Art. 4
bodily defect, such as obtains at the last moment of life,
does not remove the corruption of concupiscence; nor does
it diminish it in its root but in its act, as instanced in those
who lie dangerously ill; nor again does it calm the powers
of the soul, so as to subject them to grace, because tran-
quillity of the powers, and their subjection to grace, is
effected when the lower powers obey the higher which
delight together in God's law. But this cannot happen in
that state, since the acts of both kinds of powers are im-
peded; unless tranquillity denote the absence of combat,
as occurs even in those who are asleep; and yet sleep is
not said, for this reason, to diminish concupiscence, or to
calm the powers of the soul, or to subject them to grace.
Moreover, granted that the aforesaid defect diminish con-
cupiscence radically, and that it subject the powers U
grace, it would still be insufficient to wash away venial sin
already committed, although it would suffice in order to
avoid it in the future. Because actual sin, even if it be
venial, is not remitted without an actual movement of
contrition, as stated above (Suppl., Q. II., A. 3), however
much the latter be in the habitual intention. Now it happens
sometimes that a man dies in his sleep, being in a state of
grace and yet having a venial sin when he went to sleep:
and such a man cannot make an act of contrition for his
venial sin before he dies. Nor may we say, as they do, that
if he repented neither by act nor by intention, neither in
general nor in particular, his venial sin becomes mortal, for that
" venial becomes mortal when it is an object of complacency " ;
because not all complacency in venial sin makes it mortal
(else all venial sin would be mortal, since every venial sin
pleases for as much as it is voluntary), but only that com-
placency which amounts to enjoyment, wherein all human
wickedness consists, in that we enjoy what we should use,
as Augustine says.* Hence the complacency which makes
a sin mortal is actual complacency, for every mortal sin
consists in an act. Now it may happen that a man, after
committing a venial sin, has no actual thought of being
* De Trin. x. 10.
Q. 2. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 232
forgiven or of remaining in that sin, but thinks perhaps
about a triangle having its three angles equal to two right
angles, and while engaged in this thought falls asleep, and
dies.
It is therefore clear that this opinion is utterly unreason-
able : and consequently we must say with others that venial
sin in one who dies in a state of grace, is remitted after
this life by the fire of Purgatory: because this punishment
so far as it is voluntary, will have the power, by \drtue of
grace, to expiate all such guilt as is compatible with grace.*
Reply Obj. i. The gloss refers to mortal sin. Or it may
be replied that although, in this life, it is not amended in
itself, it is amended in merits, because a man merited here
that his punishment should be meritorious to him there.
Reply Obj. 2. Venial sin arises from the corruption of
the fomes, which will no longer be in the separate soul that
is in Purgatory, wherefore this soul cannot sin venially.
On the other hand, the remission of venial sin proceeds
from the will informed by grace, which will be in the separate
soul in Purgatory. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply Obj. 3. Venial sins do not alter a man's state, for
they neither destroy nor diminish charity, according to
which the amount of the soul's gratuitous goodness is
measured. Hence the soul remains such as it was before,
notwithstanding the remission or commission of venial sins.
Reply Obj. 4. After this life there can be no merit in
respect of the essential reward, but there can be in respect
of some accidental reward, so long as man remains in the
state of the way, in a sense. Consequently in Purgatory
there can be a meritorious act in respect of the remission
of venial sin.
Reply Obj. 5. Although venial sin arises from the prone-
ness of the fomes, sin results in the mind; wherefore even
when the fomes is no more, sin can still remain.
* St. Thomas expresses himself differently, De Malo, Q. VII.,
A. 2 a^ 9 and ad ij: Guilt is not remitted by punishment, but venial
sin as to its guilt is remitted in Purgatory by virtue of grace, not only
as existing in the habit, but also as proceeding to the act of charity in
detestation of venial sin.
233 APPENDIX I Q. 2. Art. 5
Fifth Article.
whether the fire of purgatory delivers from the
debt of punishment ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the fire of Purgatory
does not deHver from the debt of punishment. For every
cleansing is in respect of some uncleanness. But punish-
ment does not imply uncleanness. Therefore the fire of
Purgatory does not deliver from punishment.
Ohj. 2. Further, A contrary is not cleansed save by its
contrary. But punishment is not contrary to punishment.
Therefore one is not cleansed from the debt of punishment
by the punishment of Purgatory.
Ohj. 3. Fm"ther, A gloss on i Cor. iii. 15, He shall he
saved, yet so, etc., says: This fire is the trial of trihulation,
of which it is written (Ecclus. xxvii. 6): The furnace tries the
potter's vessels, etc. Therefore man expiates every punish-
ment by the pains of this world, at least by death, which
is the greatest punishment of all, and not by the fire of
Purgatory.
On the contrary, The pains of Purgatory are more grievous
than all the pains of this world, as stated above (A. 3).
Now the satisfactory punishment which one undergoes in
this life atones for the debt of punishment. Much more
therefore is this effected by the punishment of Purgatory.
I answer that, Whosoever is another's debtor, is freed
from his indebtedness by paying the debt. And, since the
obligation incurred by guilt is nothing else than the debt
of punishment, a person is freed from that obligation by
undergoing the punishment which he owed. Accordingly
the punishment of Purgatory cleanses from the debt of
punishment.
Reply Ohj. i. Although the debt of punishment does not
in itself imply uncleanness, it bears a relation to uncleanness
by reason of its cause.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although punishment is not contrary to
punishment, it is opposed to the debt of punishment.
Q. 7. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 234
because the obligation to punishment remains from the fact
that one has not undergone the punishment that was due.
Reply Obj. 3. Many meanings underUe the same words of
Holy Writ. Hence this fire may denote both the present
tribulation and the punishment to come, and venial sins
can be cleansed from both of these. That natural death is
not sufficient for this, has been stated above (4 Sent. D. xx.).
Sixth Article.
whether one person is delivered from this punish-
ment sooner than another ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that one person is not delivered
from this punishment sooner than another. For the more
grievous the sin, and the greater the debt, the more severely
is it punished in Purgatory. Now there is the same pro-
portion between severer punishment and graver fault, as
between lighter punishment and less grievous fault. There-
fore one is delivered from this punishment as soon as
another.
Obj. 2. Further, In point of duration unequal merits
receive equal retribution both in heaven and in hell. There-
fore seemingly it is the same in Purgatory.
On the contrary is the comparison of the Apostle, who
denotes the differences of venial sins by wood, hay, and
stubble. Now it is clear that wood remains longer in the
fire than hay and stubble. Therefore one venial sin is
punished longer in Purgatory than another.
/ answer that, Some venial sins cling more persistently
than others, according as the affections are more inclined
to them, and more firmly fixed in them. And since that
which clings more persistently is more slowly cleansed,
it follows that some are tormented in Purgatory longer
than others, for as much as their affections were steeped in
venial sins.
Reply Obj. i. Severity of punishment corresponds properly
speaking to the amount of guilt: whereas the length cor-
235 APPENDIX I Q. 2. Art. 6
responds to the firmness with which sin has taken root in
its subject. Hence it may happen that one may be delayed
longer who is tormented less, and vice versa.
Reply Obj. 2. Mortal sin which deserves the punishment
of hell, and charity which deserves the reward of heaven,
will, after this life, be immovably rooted in their subject.
Hence as to all there is the same duration in either case.
It is otherwise with venial sin which is punished in Purgatory,
as stated above (A. 6).
APPENDIX II
TWO ARTICLES ON PURGATORY.
First Article,
whether there is a purgatory after this life ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that there is not a Purgatory
after this life. For it is said (Apoc. xiv. 13): Blessed are
the dead who die in the Lord. From henceforth now, saith
the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours. Therefore
after this life no cleansing labour awaits those who die in
the Lord, nor those who do not die in the Lord, since they
cannot be cleansed. Therefore there is no Purgatory after
this life.
Obj. 2. Further, As charity is to an eternal reward, so
is mortal sin to eternal punishment. Now those who die
in mortal sin are forthwith consigned to eternal punish-
ment. Therefore those who die in charity go at once to
their reward; and consequently no Purgatory awaits them
after this life.
Obj. 3. Further, God Who is supremely merciful is
more inclined to reward good than to punish evil. Now
just as those who are in the state of charity, do certain evil
things which are not deserving of eternal punishment, so those
who are in mortal sin, at times perform actions, generically
good, which are not deserving of an eternal reward. There-
fore since these good actions are not rewarded after this
life in those who will be damned, neither should those evil
actions be punished after this life. Hence the same con-
clusion follows.
On the contrary. It is said (2 Machab. xii. 46): It is a
holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they
236
237 APPENDIX II Q. I. Art. i
may be loosed from sins. Now there is no need to pray for
the dead who are in heaven, for they are in no need; nor
again for those who are in hell, because they cannot be
loosed from sins. Therefore after this life, there are some
not yet loosed from sins, who can be loosed therefrom;
and the like have charity, without which sins cannot be
loosed, for chanty covereth all sins* Hence they will not
be consigned to everlasting death, since he that liveth and
believeth in Me, shall not die for ever :] nor will they obtain
glory without being cleansed, because nothing unclean shall
obtain it, as stated in the last chapter of the Apocalypse
[verse 14). Therefore some kind of cleansing remains after
this life.
Further, Gregory of Nyssa| says: // one who loves and
believes in Christ, has failed to wash away his sins in this
life, he is set free after death by the fire of Purgatory. There-
fore there remains some kind of cleansing after this life.
7 answer that, From the conclusions we have drawn
above (III., Q. LXXXVI., AA. 4, 5: SuppL, Q. XII., A. i)
it is sufficiently clear that there is a Purgatory after this
life. For if the debt of punishment is not paid in full after
the stain of sin has been washed away by contrition, nor
again are venial sins always removed when mortal sins are
remitted, and if justice demands that sin be set in order by
due punishment, it follows that one who after contrition
for his fault and after being absolved, dies before making
due satisfaction, is punished after this life. Wherefore
those who deny Purgatory speak against the justice of God:
for which reason such a statement is erroneous and contrary
to faith. Hence Gregory of Nyssa, after the words quoted
above, adds: This we preach, holding to the teaching of truth,
and this is our belief ; this the universal Church holds, by
praying for the dead that they may be loosed from sins. Tliis
cannot be understood except as referring to Purgatory:
and whosoever resists the authority of the Church, incurs
the note of heresy.
Reply Obj. 1. The authority quoted is speaking of the
* Prov. X. 12. •{■ John xi. 2G. J De its qui in fide dormiunt.
Q. I. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 238
labour of working for merit, and not of the labour of suffer-
ing to be cleansed.
Reply Obj. 2. Evil has not a perfect cause, but results
from each single defect: whereas good arises from one
perfect cause, as Dionysius asserts.* Hence each defect is
an obstacle to the perfection of good; while not every good
hinders some consummation of evil, since there is never
evil without some good. Consequently venial sin prevents
one who has charity from obtaining the perfect good,
namely eternal life, until he be cleansed; whereas mortal
sin cannot be hindered by some conjoined good from bring-
ing a man forthwith to the extreme of evils.
Reply Obj. 3. He that falls into mortal sin, deadens all
the good he has done before, and what he does, while in
mortal sin, is dead: since by offending God he deserves to
lose all the good he has from God. Wherefore no reward
after this life awaits him who dies in mortal sin, whereas
sometimes punishment awaits him who dies in charity,
which does not always wash away the sin which it finds,
but only that which is contrary to it.
Second Article.
whether it is the same place where souls are
cleansed, and the damned punished ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that it is not the same place
where souls are cleansed and the damned punished. For
the punishment of the damned is eternal, according to
Matth. XXV. 46, These shall go into everlasting punishment
(Vulg., — fire). But the fire of Purgatory is temporary, as
the Master says (4 Sent. D. xxi.). Therefore the former
and the latter are not punished together in the same place :
and consequently these places must needs be distinct.
Obj. 2. The punishment of hell is called by various names,
as in Ps. x. 7, Fire, and brimstone, and storms of winds, etc.,
whereas the punishment of Purgatory is called by one name
* Div. Nom. iv. 4.
239 APPENDIX II Q.I. Art. 2
only, namely fire. Therefore they are not punished with the
same fire and in the same place.
Ohj. 3. Further, Hugh of St. Victor says [De Sacram.
ii. 16): It is probable that they are punished in the very
places where they sinned. And Gregory relates {Dial. iv. 40)
that Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found Paschasius being
cleansed in the baths. Therefore they are not cleansed in
the same place as heU, but in this world.
On the contrary, Gregory says:* Even as in the same fire
gold glistens and straw smokes, so in the same fire the sinner
burns and the elect is cleansed. Therefore the fire of Pur-
gatory is the same as the fire of heU: and hence they are
in the same place.
Further, The holy fathers, before the coming of Christ,
were in a more worthy place than that wherein souls are
now cleansed after death, since there was no pain of sense
there. Yet that place was joined to heU, or the same as
heU: otherwise Christ when descending into Limbo would
not be said to have descended into heU. Therefore Pur-
gatory is either close to, or the same place as, hell.
I answer that. Nothing is clearly stated in Scripture about
the situation of Purgatory, nor is it possible to offer con-
vincing arguments on this question. It is probable, how-
ever, and more in keeping with the statements of holy men
and the revelations made to many, that there is a twofold
place of Purgatory. One, according to the common law;
and thus the place of Purgatory is situated below and in
proximity to heU, so that it is the same fire which torments
the damned in heU and cleanses the just in Purgatory;
although the damned being lower in merit, are to be con-
signed to a lower place. Another place of Piu^gatory is
according to dispensation: and thus sometimes, as we read,
some are punished in various places, either that the living
may learn, or that the dead may be succoured, seeing that
their punishment being made known to the living may be
mitigated through the prayers of the Church.
Some say, however, that according to the common law
* The quotation is from St. Augustine {De Civ. Deii. 8).
Q. I. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 240
the place of Purgatory is where man sins. This does not
seem probable, since a man may be punished at the same
time for sins committed in various places. And others say
that according to the common law they are punished above
us, because they are between us and God, as regards their
state. But this is of no account, for they are not punished
for being above us, but for that which is lowest in them,
namely sin.
Reply Ohj. i. The fire of Purgatory is eternal in its sub-
stance, but temporary in its cleansing effect.
Reply Ohj. 2. The punishment of hell is for the purpose
of affliction, wherefore it is called by the names of things
that are wont to afflict us here. But the chief purpose of
the punishment of Purgatory is to cleanse us from the
remains of sin; and consequently the pain of fire only is
ascribed to Purgatory, because fire cleanses and consumes.
Reply Ohj. 3. This argument considers the point of
special dispensation and not that of the common law.
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