SURVIVAL IN THE
AIR AGE
A Report by the President's
Air Policy Commission
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SURVIVAL IN THE
AIR AGE .
A Report by the Presidenfs
Air Policy Commission
Washington • January 1, 1948
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, United States Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C. - Price 75 cents
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
DECEMBER 30, 1947.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We have the honor to transmit the report on
national aviation policy as directed by your letter of July 18, 1947,
establishing the undersigned Air Policy Commission.
During the 5-month period since the appointment of the Commission
we have consulted on all phases of aviation with the best-qualified
Government and private sources. The members of the Commission are
in unanimous agreement on the conclusions expressed.
Respectfully,
THOMAS K. FINLETTER, Chairman.
GEORGE P. BAKER, Vice Chairman.
PALMER HOYT, Member.
JOHN A. McCoNE, Member.
ARTHUR D. WHITESIDE, Member.
in
PRESIDENT'S LETTER APPOINTING THE COMMISSION
JULY 18, 1947.
DEAR MR. : The rapid development of aviation in
recent years has made many of our former concepts out of date. At
the same time, there exists a danger that our national security may be
jeopardized and our economic welfare diminished through a lowered
aircraft production and a failure of the aircraft industry to keep abreast
of modern methods, with consequent retarding of the development of
air transportation. There is an urgent need at this time for an evalu-
ation of the course which the United States should follow in order to
obtain, for itself and the world the greatest possible benefits from
aviation.
It is for these reasons that, upon the recommendation of the Secre-
taries of State, War, Navy, and Commerce and of the Air Coordinating
Committee, I am creating a temporary Air Policy Commission to,
make an objective inquiry into national aviation policies and prob-
lems, and to assist me in formulating an integrated national aviation
policy. Because of your knowledge of our national needs and our
industrial capabilities, as well as your public-spirited concern for the
national welfare, I ask you to serve on this Commission.
The Air Policy Commission should study, among other pertinent
aspects of the problem, such questions as the current and future needs
of American aviation, including commercial air transportation and
the utilization of aircraft by the armed services; the nature, type, and
extent of aircraft and air transportation industries that are desirable
or essential to our national security and welfare; methods of encour-
aging needed developments in the aviation and air transportation
industry; and improved organization and procedures of the Govern-
ment that will assist it in handling aviation matters efficiently and in
the public interest.
The final recommendations of the Commission must, however, go
beyond the limits of any one phase of aviation. They should be so
broad in scope and purpose that they will assist in revising old policies
and in framing new ones, and will serve as a guide for formulating a
carefully considered national air policy.
Because of the urgency of the problem, I request the Commission to
complete its studies in time to submit its final recommendations to me
by January i, 1948. In its work, the Commission will have the full
cooperation of all agencies of the Government, including the Air
Coordinating Committee, which has been making detailed studies of
aviation policies and problems.
Although the Commission will organize its own regular staff and
secretariat, the Secretary of Commerce will provide any special staff
assistance which may be needed, as well as office headquarters and
routine administrative services.
Sincerely yours,
HARRY S. TRUMAN.
VI
Contents
Page
Letter of Transmittal in
President's Letter Appointing the Commission v
Section I. Air Power and the National Security 1
Foreign Policy, The United Nations, Disarmament, and Self-
Defense 3
The Approach of the Commission to a Program of National
Defense 7
The New Strategic Concept for the Defense of the United States . 10
The Requirements of the Air Establishment — Recommendations
of the Commission 24
The Air Force 24
The Navy Air Arm 27
Unification Act and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 28
Recommendations of the Commission for Immediate Appro-
priations for the Air Establishment 31
Military and Commercial Transport Services 36
Mobilization Planning 38
Periodic Reviews of the Military Establishment 39
Section II. Aircraft Manufacturing Industry 43
Basic Consideration for National Security 45
The State of the Aircraft Manufacturing Industry 49
Patent Cross Licensing - 50
Composition of the Industry 51
Facilities and Output 53
Financial Condition 54
Backlogs 55
Capacity 55
Civil Aircraft Production 56
Helicopters 58
Lighter-Than-Air 58
Power Plants 58
Instruments and Other Aircraft Equipment 58
Exports of Aircraft, Engines, and Equipment 58
Recommendations 59
Long-Range Planning 60
Forward Contract Authorization 60
Industrial Mobilization Planning 61
VII
Section II. Aircraft Manufacturing Industry — Continued Page
Recommendations — Continued
Mobilization Authority 63
Strategic Materials 63
Procurement Policies 64
Design and Development 64
Producibility 64
Low-Cost Production 64
Expansibility 65
Design, Development, and Production Continuity 65
Accessory Development 66
Legislation 66
H. R. 1366. Armed Services Procurement Act 66
H. R. 5031. Vinson-Trammell Repealer 66
Plant Dispersion 67
Plant Reserve 68
Machine Tool Reserve 68
Contract Overhaul 68
Federal Regulation of Personal Aircraft 69
Export Assistance 69
Conclusion 70
Section III. Aeronautical Research and Development 71
Summary 73
International Competition 74
Status of the United States Aeronautical Research and Develop-
ment 75
Suggested Areas for Continued Research 80
Atomic Propulsion 80
Electronics 80
Guided Missiles 82
Helicopters 84
Lighter-Than-Air 84
Personal Aircraft 85
Power Plants 86
Transport Equipment 86
Recommendations — Research Policy 88
Budgetary Policy 88
Coordination of Research Effort 91
Continuity of Research Programs 92
New Facilities 93
Personnel. . 94
VIII
Page
Section IV. Civil Aviation 97
Air Mail Payments and Subsidy 100
Safety and Regularity 105
Economic Regulation 110
Domestic Route Pattern 110
Contract Carrier Regulation Ill
Air Cargo Development 112
Feeder Airlines 115
Surface Carriers in Air Transportation 116
Air Line Finance 116
International Air Transport 118
Competition vs. Monopoly 118
Restrictions on Travel 119
Executive Agreements vs. Treaties 119
International Rights of Operation 120
Economic Controls Needed 120
Taxation 121
Personal Aviation 123
Federal Support 123
Federal Regulation of Personal Aviation 126
State Enforcement and Participation in Federal Aviation
Policy 126
Airports 127
Section V. Government Organization 131
A Department of Civil Aviation 135
A Government Corporation to Finance Aircraft Development. . 137
Air Safety Board 138
The Civil Aeronautics Board 139
A Department of Transportation 141
A Department of Industry and Trade Within the Department
of Commerce 142
Secretary of Commerce as Member of the National Security
Council 143
Chairman of the Air Coordinating Committee 144
Appendices 147
Government Organization and Procedures 149
History and Organization of the Commission 158
IX
Section I
Air Power and the National Security
Air Power and the National Security
Foreign Policy — The United Nations, Disarmament,
and Self-Defense
The letter of the President of July 18, 1947, establishing the Commis-
sion instructs it to make an "objective inquiry into national aviation
policies and problems" and to assist the President in "formulating an
integrated national aviation policy."
The Commission is directed to study, among other aspects of the
problem, the "current and future needs of American aviation, includ-
ing commercial air transportation, and the utilization of aircraft by
the armed services; the nature, type, and extent of the aircraft and air
transportation industries that are desirable or essential to our national
security and welfare." The President states that there is a "danger
that our national security may be jeopardized and our economic wel-
fare diminished through a lowered aircraft production and a failure
of the aircraft industry to keep abreast of modern methods, with conse-
quent retarding of the development of air transportation."
We are instructed to make the broadest kind of survey. "The final
recommendations of the Commission must, however, go beyond the
limits of any one phase of aviation," the President's letter states. "They
should be so broad in scope and purpose that they will assist in revising
old policies and in framing new ones, and will serve as a guide for
formulating a carefully considered national air policy."
* * # * * # *
The President's instructions thus require us to recommend an inte-
grated national air policy v/hich (i) will protect the Nation's security
to the greatest extent practicable and (2) will foster its economic and
social interests.
We take up first the problem of the national security.
We believe that the United States will be secure in an absolute sense
only if the institution of war itself is abolished under a regime of law.
There was a time when the United States could tolerate with safety a
world in which war was the final way of settling disputes among na-
tions. For even if war came the United States could be reasonably sure
not only of winning it but even of keeping enemy forces away from its
shores. Our geographical position, our Navy, our industrial capacity,
our manpower, and the armies, navies, and air forces of nations allied
or associated with us, protected us against direct attack in the two
World Wars through which we have just passed. But, with the recent
revolution in applied science for destruction which is still going on,
these safeguards are no longer enough.
Our national security must be redefined in relation to the facts of
modern war. Our security includes, as always, winning any war we
may get into; but now it includes more than that. It includes not
losing the first campaign of the war if the loss would mean that the
country would be invaded and occupied. It includes not having our
cities destroyed and our population decimated in the process of our
winning the first campaign. And it further includes not having our
way of life, and particularly our civil liberties, taken from us in prepar-
ing for war. Our national security, when we define it in this way, can
be assured only by the elimination of war itself.
World peace and the security of the United States thus are now
the same thing. World peace, however, is not yet in sight. We will
not be rid of war until the nations arrive at the great agreement to live
together in peace and to this end give to the United Nations organiza-
tion the legal and physical powers under a regime of law to keep the
peace. As yet there is almost no sign that this agreement will be made
within the future with which this Commission has to deal. Such an
agreement would need a unanimity of peaceful purpose among the
great powers which does not exist. It also would require a willingness
on their part to break with the traditions of the past and to put their
faith in a system of law rather than in their ability to take care of their
own national selves with their own national armaments; and this
apparently they are not yet ready to do.
The hope that the United Nations wrill be given the authority to
prevent war is therefore not one on which we can base our policy of
security. The United Nations has solid achievements to its credit in
the work of its specialized agencies and also, to a limited extent, in
the settling of political disputes. But even the most optimistic view
of the record and prospects of the United Nations does not assure us
that the United Nations will develop in time the necessary authority
and power to prevent another great war.
Throughout this report we have limited ourselves to those matters
which, if they happen when we are reliably told they will, require the
United States to do something about them immediately. There is,
however, one long-term policy which we believe should be mentioned.
We believe that the United Nations can never develop as a perma-
nent instrument of universal peace except on a foundation of free com-
munication throughout the world. Such freedom of communication
must include freedom of travel, freedom of intercourse by mail, tele-
graph, cable, and radio, and equal availability of news and public
information.
At present there are fixed and impenetrable barriers to freedom of
communication. The gathering and transmission of news is sub-
servient to the purposes of state in a large part of the world, with the
result that the peoples are not able to reach judgments based on com-
mon sets of facts. There is accordingly no common compulsion to
eliminate war despite the development of weapons so deadly and effi-
cient as to shock the imagination.
We believe that the understanding necessary for permanent world
peace cannot be achieved except on the basis of freedom of travel and
communication, the universal availability of news, and the elimination
of censorship. In the long run only an informed world can be free and
only a free world can be secure.
We urge the United Nations and the United States of America to
take all possible steps to enlarge and strengthen the present interna-
tional network of freedom as an essential basis for world peace and
national disarmament.
##*####
The provisions of the United Nations Charter for the reduction and
regulation or armaments have not been fulfilled, and unilateral dis-
armament by the United States is out of the question. There are those
who believe that peace can never come about by force and that the
United States should show the way to peace by disarming. This is
not the opinion of this Commission. We believe that it is the policy
of the people of this country — and that this policy is right — that before
the United States will give up any of its weapons, it will insist that there
be set up a foolproof system of security which will assure it that no
nation can take advantage of it in its disarmed state. And since the
only foolproof system which would give this protection is one which
would make war impossible under a system of world law and since
the nations have not yet been able to agree to set up this system, uni-
lateral disarmament is not now a possible policy for the United States.
For these reasons the United States must have a double-barrelled
policy abroad. It must work to achieve world peace through support
and development of the United Nations. At the same time it must
prepare to defend itself for the possibility that war may come. Not
being able to count on the creation, within the future for which it
now has to prepare, of a world settlement which would give it abso-
lute security under law, it must seek the next best thing — that is, rela-
tive security under the protection of its own arms.
Where does relative security lie in a world in which all nations are
free to arm as they please and in which war is the final resort for the
settlement of international disputes? Reluctantly this Commission
has come to the conclusion that this relative security is to be found only
in a policy of arming the United States so strongly (i) that other
nations will hesitate to attack us or our vital national interests because
of the violence of the counterattack they would have to face, and (2)
that if we are attacked we will be able to smash the assault at the earliest
possible moment. The alternative policy — of having inadequate arms
in a world in which war must be reckoned with as the final solution of
international differences — would be foolhardy. Nothing would be
more likely to provoke aggression than the spectacle of an unarmed
or inadequately armed United States. This country, therefore, if it is
to have even relative security, must be ready for war. Moreover, it must
be ready for modern war. It must be ready not for World War II
but for a possible World War III.
To realize this double-barrelled policy will be as difficult a task as
this country" has ever taken on. Nothing less than a reversal of our
traditional attitudes toward armaments and national sovereignty can
make it succeed.
Our policy of relative security will compel us to maintain a force
in being in peacetime greater than any self-governing people has ever
kept. Our policy of seeking world order under law is even more diffi-
cult. If it is to be successful we will have to reverse all our notions of
our sovereign independence and, equally difficult, persuade others to
do likewise.
It may be that we shall not go all-out on either part of our double-
purpose policy; that we shall compromise with both and achieve
neither. If we do compromise in this way, we shall continue to live in
a world in which war is an accepted institution and is therefore inevi-
table, and we shall be unprepared to defend ourselves in that war.
The Approach of the Commission to a Program of National
Defense
Our report discusses in considerable detail the preparedness program
which we believe is now required if we are to have the relative security
to which we have referred. But before we deal with this program we
will state our general approach to this matter of preparation in time of
peace for the possibility of war.
i. The Commission does not subscribe to the proposition that arma-
ments are a guarantee of peace. History does not assure us that a
strong armament policy by a peacefully inclined nation is certain to
frighten of! aggressor governments. An authoritarian government
bent on aggression may calculate that it can arm better and faster than
the nations it has chosen as its victims, and that if it hits hard enough
and with no warning, it can conquer. Indeed, an authoritarian govern-
ment may seek war for war's sake or to divert attention from its internal
troubles, even though it may not be certain that it will win.
Nevertheless, the Commission believes that a strong United States
will be a force for peace. Our armaments will not guarantee that
peace absolutely. But the chances of avoiding a war will be greatly
increased if this country has the available force to strike back and to
defeat anyone who breaks the peace. A strong United States will be
welcomed by all peace-loving nations. The countries who want to
live under regimes of freedom will see in our armaments not a threat
but an assurance.
2. It is difficult for a representative democracy to keep up with an
authoritarian state in an armament race in peacetime. It can, how-
ever, be done. We gained supremacy of the seas by the weight of our
naval armament. We can be supreme in the air by the weight of our
air power. The United States can build a Military Establishment which
will keep up with any nation and be a powerful force for peace.
In our opinion this Military Establishment must be built around the
air arm. Of course an adequate Navy and Ground Force must be
maintained. But it is the Air Force and naval aviation on which we
must mainly rely. Our military security must be based on air power.
3. Maintenance of a proper air establishment will require heavy
appropriations. Not only must the equipment be of the finest quality
that science can devise and money provide, but there must be enough
of it, in being and ready for immediate use. Research and develop-
ment must be increased. For a second-best air force, when war takes
place, is almost as bad as none.
Already the payments which have to be made every year on account
of past wars and current preparations for possible future wars are
draining away a large part of the money and energy of the country that
should be applied to better things — things that could add to the wealth
of the country and the intellectual and physical well-being of its people.
The taxpayer's money goes mainly for war. The Bureau of the Budget
has informed us that about 80 percent of the budget for the current
fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, is for payments for past wars or for
our present Military Establishment. Indeed, the figures show that since
1915 about 85 percent of our total Federal budgets have been spent for
war or preparation or payment for war.
8
And yet, as will be seen, this Commission has been compelled to
report that the evidence is overwhelming that even this amount is
not enough and that (i) the Federal Government should increase sub-
stantially its expenditures for the Air Force and naval aviation in the
years 1948 and 1949, and (2) that expenditures may be needed in later
fiscal years up to the end of 1952 substantially in excess of the 1948
and 1949 figures. The expenditures which we recommend, however,
would be small in comparison with the cost of another war.
The Commission has reached its recommendations for increased
military expenditures with the utmost reluctance. Every dollar spent
for military establishments is a dollar to be grudged. Large military
expenditures will help to keep taxes high and will drain away from
the people a large part of the product of their labor. For these rea-
sons we have not accepted military estimates without submitting them
to critical analysis and we have required that all estimates meet the test
of strict necessity under the broad principles as to the strategic needs
of the country which are set out in this report.
On the other hand we believe that self-preservation comes ahead of
economy. No concession should be made from the principle that our
Military Establishment must be adequate for the defense of the
country. Substantial savings within the Military Establishment are
possible, and later in this report we make recommendations on this
subject. But in making these savings the adequacy of our forces must
not be impaired. Economies, desirable as they are, must not be made
if making them would jeopardize our safety.
4. We believe that the recent unification of the services under the
Secretary of Defense will result in greater efficiency in the spending of
the security dollar.
The National Security Act of 1947 puts the duty squarely on the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject to the President and the Secretary of
Defense, (i) to prepare the over-all strategic and logistic plans to sup-
port the foreign policy of the United States and to protect the country,
and (2) to review the major material and personnel requirements of
the Services in accordance with these strategic and logistic plans.
By establishing constantly revised strategic and logistic plans and by
relating expenditures strictly to these plans it should be possible to
eliminate many expenses not sufficiently directly related to our strategic
purposes, and consequently to have a force capable of carrying out
those purposes without expenditures which would seriously strain the
economy.
# # # # # # #
The New Strategic Concept of the Defense of the United States
We have said that we believe that the defense of the United States
must be based on air power. We have reached this conclusion as a
result of prolonged discussions with the Armed Services and with
many private citizens who have appeared before us. We believe that
it is the overwhelming view of those most qualified to know that the
country must have a new strategic concept for its defense and that the
core of this concept is air power.
We need a much stronger air establishment than we now have. The
reason for this is that we can no longer follow our traditional pro-
cedure of relying entirely on the Navy as our force in being in peace-
time. Heretofore the United States has been able to make most of its
preparations for war after war began. In World Wars I and II the
oceans lay between us and the enemy. Protected by the Navy, and
by the land, sea, and air forces of our Allies, we were able to convert
our great industrial machine and our manpower for war after war
had begun. No enemy action interfered with us as we got our factories
going. Our army was trained in peaceful areas. Our cities were un-
touched. In World Wars I and II not a single enemy weapon except
a few Japanese balloons and a few shells from submarines touched the
United States mainland, and sabotage was but a minor nuisance.
This will not be the case in a future war. Our surface fleet can have
and does have a supremacy of the seas which is so nearly complete that
it can guarantee the safety of our cities and our factories from surface
attack by water. This supremacy should be maintained. To do so is
possible in a world in which no challenging naval power exists today
or can possibly exist for many years to come. The only immediate
10
naval danger— and against this we must always be on guard—is the
development of new submarine techniques on the part of a possible
enemy.
AZIMUTHAL EQUIDISTANT PROJECTION
CENTERED NEAR
POINT BARROW, ALASKA
But there is a new element through which this country may be at-
tacked— the air. And the new weapons which can be delivered
through the air make it vital that we protect ourselves from attack by
way of this new element. An air attack could be so terrible that we
must at once create the best conceivable defense against it. This means
an air force in being, strong, well equipped and modern, not only
ii
capable of meeting the attack when it comes but, even more important,
capable of dealing a crushing counterofrensive blow on the aggressor.
Atomic weapons will not long remain our monopoly. And there
are other weapons of comparable destructiveness. Mankind has not
indulged in biological warfare on a large scale so far; but the bio-
logical sciences are evolving so rapidly that it is impossible to predict
the future. The nations might be foolish enough to try it out. Bio-
logical warfare might become a serious factor in another war and we
must be alert to every aspect of defense against this kind of attack.
And sabotage — heretofore a relatively unimportant means of warfare —
is in the process of becoming a serious menace. The preplacement of
atomic and biological weapons may soon become a major military
problem.
This means that the traditional peacetime strategy of the United
States must be changed radically. We can no longer count on having
our cities and the rest of our mainland untouched in a future war. On
the contrary, we must count on our homeland becoming increasingly
vulnerable as the weapons increase in destructiveness and the means
of delivering them are improved. And we must assume that if future
aggressors will have learned anything from World Wars I and II it
will be that they must never let United States industrial power get
under way; they must destroy it at the outset if they are to win.
The strategy to meet these new conditions is obviously that which
we have described above — to have in peacetime a force in being which
will protect to the greatest extent possible our air space as well as our
water approaches and hold out to anyone who thinks of attacking us
the prospect of a counterattack of the utmost violence. The hope, of
course, is that the existence of such a force will do more than win a
war; the hope is that by serving notice that war with the United States
would be a most unprofitable business we may persuade the nations
to work for peace instead of war.
* #= # # # # #
Let us examine the premise inherent in this new strategy that we
must not only have a strong Military Establishment immediately but
also must start now to build the even stronger force which will come
into full maturity at some date in the near future.
12
To have an opinion about this we must examine some preliminary
questions. When must we assume that other nations will have atomic
or other comparable weapons in quantity sufficient to make a sustained
attack on the United States ? When will other nations have the planes
and missiles to deliver such weapons against the United States home-
land ? How long will it take us to build up the force which we must
have when we have to live in a world in which other nations have
these weapons and can deliver them against us? What force do we
need immediately, even before other nations have atomic weapons and
the means of delivering them ?
First, as to atomic weapons. If present official estimates are right
we have not yet reached the point where other nations have atomic
weapons in quantity. On the other hand, according to these same
estimates we must make our military plans on the assumption that
they will reach this point soon. No one can forecast definitely the
date, and therefore we must arrive at a time, for planning purposes,
beyond which it would not be safe to assume that the United States
will be immune from atomic attack. In dealing with a subject on
which there is so much difference of opinion, and in which the stakes
are so high, we must allow a margin of insurance for the certain error
inherent in any estimate.
We emphasize the wide range of the opinions on this question. We
have been told by highly qualified persons that other nations may have
atomic weapons now. We have been told by equally qualified per-
sons that they will not have them in quantity for 15 years. We cannot
rely entirely, therefore, on any one opinion, no matter how expert.
Our estimate is based on our composite appraisal of a large number of
estimates and of the facts on which they are based. We also have had
the benefit of a similar study made by the President's Advisory Com-
mission on Universal Training which used the estimate that other
powers would have atomic weapons sometime between 1951 and 1957.
Our conclusion is that we should make our strategic plans for the
defense of the United States on the following assumptions :
(i) It is impossible to know certainly when other nations will have
atomic weapons, but it is proper to assume, for our present planning
purposes, that other nations are not now producing such weapons in
quantity. The Commission realizes the heavy responsibility of making
this statement. We do it only after receiving much authoritative evi-
dence in support of this view. We point out once more however the
uncertainty of the whole subject and the fallibility of expert evidence
in these matters. We emphasize the high importance of our con-
tinuing every effort possible to be fully informed on this subject.
(2) It is known that other nations are working diligently on the
problem of atomic energy; that they have available to them some of
the raw materials, the quantity naturally being indeterminate; and
that they possess scientific minds capable of solving the many intricate
and complex problems involved.
(3) If an effective system for reviews of the strategic situation and
for the adapting of our procurement and research and development
policies to our strategic needs is established, it would be safe to assume,
in making our plans for the next 2 years, that possibly hostile powers
will not be producing atomic weapons in substantial quantities before
the end of 1952. We point out that this does not assume that such
powers may not have a few atomic weapons prior to that date. We
point out also that this estimate places this date more than a year and
a half further into the future than the earliest date fixed by the Presi-
dent's Advisory Commission on Universal Training.
(4) It would be an unreasonable risk, and therefore, a reckless
course, to rely on other nations not having atomic weapons in quantity
by the end of 1952.
(5) It would be an unreasonable risk to assume that this country
will surely have warning of the manufacture of atomic weapons by
others. It may be that we will know when other nations have suc-
ceeded in manufacturing atomic weapons. But it would not be wise
to rely on this. We may learn of the existence of atomic weapons in
the hands of other countries only when they are used against us.
# # # ^ # # #
Biological weapons are undoubtedly being studied in all parts of the
world. They differ from atomic and conventional weapons in that
their most destructive effect is not on impact but by slow or epidemic
spreading. That extremely violent bacteria and viruses exist is com-
mon knowledge. The problem in their military use is effective dis-
semination. They may be delivered by the air, or by preplacement by
enemy agents. So delivered or placed they would create great damage
to humans, animals, and crops. In any all-out attack on the United
States the possibility that they may be used should not be overlooked.
The danger from these weapons is, however, not only in time of war.
They can be distributed in our cities and among our crops and herds
in advance, say a year or so, of a planned attack, or as part of a cam-
paign to weaken us, without any intention of following up with a
conventional military attack. Our plans to anticipate and prevent such
sabotage, insofar as this can be done, must be intensified.
# * * * * * *
In focusing our attention on the weapons of mass destruction we must
not minimize the other, more conventional weapons. These are com-
parable in destructive power, when used in large quantity, to atomic
bombs, as the cities of Germany and Japan testify. And it is certain
that conventional weapons will be developed in the next few years so
that their destructive power will be even greater than in World War II.
Nevertheless, it is the mass-destruction weapons which now exist and
almost surely will be developed within the next few years which radi-
cally change the strategic needs of the United States. An enemy has
to have air superiority, a great industrial production and a very large
fleet of aircraft if it is to overwhelm a country by using conventional
weapons only. But an enemy can inflict enormous damage with the
mass-destruction weapons even if he does not have air superiority.
The possession by an enemy of these weapons, in quantity, changes
all the rules and requires a different strategy by a nation which may be
attacked.
*******
The possession by a possible enemy of the mass-destruction weapons
is, of course, not all that he must have before he attacks the United
States. He must also be able to deliver these weapons against us. He
must have the planes and missiles capable of making a sustained assault
on our mainland.
At the moment no possible enemy could make such an assault.
The United States has control of the surface area of the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans and therefore is not subject to surface attack by water.
The only attacks of importance which could now be made on the
United States mainland would be by air, by the preplacement of wea-
pons by enemy agents, or by attack from submarines. We do not be-
lieve that such attacks now, equipped as they would be (we may
assume) only with nonatomic weapons, could destroy our ability to
retaliate and to gear ourselves up for an all-out counterattack on the
enemy.
No other nation now has or is likely to have in the immediate future
the piloted aircraft capable of getting air supremacy over the United
States mainland. There are now in existence bombing planes (and
other nations have them) capable of one-way raids from bases 4,000
miles away. And one-way raids must be reckoned with — as the Jap-
anese suicide attacks show. These bombing planes are, however, rela-
tively slow compared with the supersonic planes of the future. They
are therefore subject to interception by the faster moving jet fighters,
and in other ways. But they will not be intercepted except by an alert
and ready force in being; and even then experience shows that the
technique of interception takes a considerable time before it gets under
way. The first attacks would show a much lower rate of interception
than the later attacks.
An attack on the United States by piloted aircraft in the immediate
future would not therefore give an enemy air superiority over our
mainland; although it could inflict a serious damage on our industry
and our cities before our defenses could be developed. But without
such air supremacy and without atomic weapons, it is not likely that
an enemy could so disrupt our country that we would be unable to
repeat the formula of World Wars I and II and build up our war
industry and our Army, Navy, and Air Force after war had begun.
Nor is it possible for an enemy now to deliver an assault on the
United States mainland with guided missiles which would be so serious
as to prevent our preparing to win after the fighting started. By the
term "guided missiles" we mean any uninhabited airplane of the con-
16
ventional kind or any winged or un winged projectile which is guided
in its flight. At one extreme of guided missiles is the superatmospheric,
supersonic missile (an improved German V-2) which balances itself by
internal mechanisms and is guided by various internal and external
devices. At the other extreme is an airplane of the conventional type
loaded with bombs and directed electronically toward its target (the
recent trans- Atlantic €-54 flight is an example). The guided winged
missile moving through the atmosphere at subsonic speeds (of which
the German buzz bomb was an early type with short range) is merely
a specially designed uninhabited airplane.
Guided missiles of the German V-2 type travelling at supersonic
speeds are now impossible to intercept; they are, however, as yet of
relatively short range. Guided missiles of the subsonic type also are
still of limited range. The problem of guidance, which is the obstacle
to range, has not yet been solved.
Neither of these two means of delivery — the piloted aircraft or the
guided missile — is a vital threat to this country in its present form.
Nor is the only remaining possible method of delivery, sabotage —
that is the preplacement of weapons by enemy agents in this country —
a vital threat at this time. The Commission has been concerned about
the possibility of the preplacement of certain of the mass destruction
weapons — such as disease weapons located in city reservoirs — and there
is no doubt that this form of sabotage is a possibility and could create
serious damage. But if we are alert a sabotage campaign would prob-
ably not disrupt the country; and this is the point we are presently
considering. The United States in the opinion of this Commission,
could now undergo the ordeal of an attack delivered by the presently
available piloted or unpiloted aircraft and by sabotage, and under the
heavy handicaps which such an attack could create, still be able to
follow our traditional course of building up our war machine after
war has begun.
# ######
So far we have spoken only of the means of delivery as they now
are. The current scientific revolution is however working on the
means of delivery at the same time as it is working to make the weapons
to be delivered more destructive. There is a race between the two.
When either reaches its next stage of development, the threat to the
United States will be great.
If other nations develop the means of direct assault on the United
States by supersonic piloted aircraft, the threat to this country will
be serious, even though these vehicles are not equipped with atomic or
comparable weapons. Similarly, if other nations develop atomic weap-
ons in quantity, or some other weapon of comparable destructiveness,
the threat to this country will be great even though these nations have
only the present means of delivery at their disposition. The addition
of supersonic transpolar or transoceanic guided missiles would intensify
the damage that could be done by an atomic attack. Should all these
developments exist at the same time, the situation would be very grave
indeed.
When will these things happen ? If they are so remote that there is
nothing we should do in relation to them now, they are not within the
terms of reference of this Commission.
We see nothing in the present situation to justify fear that the devel-
opment of supersonic transpolar or transoceanic piloted aircraft or
guided missiles by any possible enemy will threaten our air supremacy
and our homeland within the immediate future. Evidence has been
given before this Commission that such supersonic aircraft will not
be developed into the mass-production stage for several years and that
long-range supersonic missiles will not be available in operational form
for from 10 to 25 years. Evidence has also been given before this Com-
mission that subsonic guided missiles with a 5,ooo-mile range and
capable of being directed toward a sizable target such as a city can be
developed into the mass-production stage within 5 years; but these sub-
sonic missiles would be subject to a high rate of interception. All these
estimates — both as to the supersonic aircraft and guided missiles and
as to the subsonic guided missiles — are at best informed guesses. This
is a fast-moving branch of science, and any estimate may be upset by
some unforeseen development or by some unforeseen obstacle. The
estimates of the best scientists must not be accepted as laying down
an accurate timetable.
18
The conclusions which the Commission has reached as to the devel-
opment by other nations of the means of delivering a direct attack on
the United States by transpolar or transoceanic aircraft or missiles are
these: (i) It is probable that other nations will develop atomic weapons
before they develop supersonic bombers in quantity with a striking
range of 5,000 miles, or supersonic, accurate, guided missiles with a
5,000-mile range. (2) Nevertheless, it would be unwise to assume, in
the planning of our defense establishment, that other nations will not
have the planes and missiles capable of delivering a sustained attack
on the United States mainland by the same date we have assumed they
may have atomic weapons in quantity — namely, by the end of 1952.
If they want them enough they can surely have them at some date;
just when will be determined by the amount of effort they put into
getting them. (3) It is not certain that the United States will be the
first to develop such aircraft or missiles. On the contrary, the Ger-
mans were ahead of us in these matters at the war's end and other
nations may well be even with or ahead of us now. (4) The United
States must press most energetically and immediately its basic and ap-
plied research and development programs in aerodynamics, power
plants, electronics, and related fields with a view toward the develop-
ment at the earliest possible date of the most effective piloted aircraft
and guided missiles and the defenses against them.
• _»••»••».= .»•»"•
The conclusions of the Commission thus fix as the target date by
which we should have an air arm in being capable of dealing with a
possible atomic attack on this country at January i, 1953. For con-
venience we will refer to this date as A-day.
We believe that A-day divides the future into two clear phases for
strategic purposes. The first phase is that which begins now and ex-
tends to A-day. We call this Phase I. The second phase is that which
will exist on and after A-day. We call this Phase II.
The next question is whether we must begin now to build the force
we must have on and after A-day. How long will it take to build this
force ? Do we have to start building it now ?
There is no doubt about it. The force we need by the end of 1952
must possess the complicated defensive equipment of modern elec-
tronics and modern defensive fighter planes and ground defensive
weapons. A radar early warning system must be part of our defense;
but such a system, if designed to give complete and continuous cover-
age, would be extraordinarily expensive. Worse yet, it might divert
us — as the Maginot Line diverted France — from the best defense
against atomic attack, the counteroffensive striking force in being.
We also must have in being and ready for immediate action a
counteroffensive force built around a fleet of bombers, accompanying
planes, and long-range missiles which will serve notice on any nation
which may think of attacking us that if it does, it will see its factories
and cities destroyed and its war machine crushed. The strength of
the counteroffensive force must be such that it will be able to make an
aggressor pay a devastating price for attacking us. It must, if pos-
sible, be so strong that it will be able to silence the attack on the United
States mainland and give us the time again to build up our industrial
machine and our manpower to go on to win the war.
Such a force does not grow overnight. It takes 4 to 7 years to de-
velop a new plane from the engineering board to production. It takes
longer than that to develop many of the weapons which will be used
in any future war. No airplane was used by the United States in
World War II which had not been designed before we entered the war.
Only improvements were made after Pearl Harbor; there was no
change in fundamental design in any plane which saw war service.
An air force will probably fight a war which does not last a long time
with the general types of equipment it has on hand when the war
begins.
The method of gradual build-up, that is, a build-up in a line or curve
of progression from the force we now have to the force we must have
on A-day, is the most effective and cheapest way of getting the force
we need. To delay beginning the construction of this force, to hope
to make a sudden jump to the A-day force in a year or so is un-
realistic. An air force cannot be built that quickly. Moreover, to
delay in starting the build-up would leave us without the force we need
20
right now. We have no breathing space in which we do not need
air power.
* ******
We therefore consider the kind of air establishment we need during
Phase I. What is the likelihood of war during this Phase ? Can we
say that during this Phase the chances of war are slight or that, if war
does come, we can build up after hostilities begin and, therefore, do
not need immediately a strong force ?
On first impression it might seem that a major war during this
Phase I is unlikely; and this opinion has been expressed to this Com-
mission by high military authorities. The argument is persuasive.
Our monopoly of the atomic bomb may make any aggression-minded
nation wait until it also has the atomic bomb before it takes on the
United States. Moreover, the unrepaired devastation and the fatigue
from World War II is a powerful force working for a breathing period
from war. There usually is such a breathing period in the unending
procession of wars throughout history. Great wars usually happen
after the nations have recovered from their wounds and a new genera-
tion has forgotten the horror of the previous battles.
However, we cannot be sure. The world situation is dangerous,
and our foreign policy is not running away from the danger. This is
not to criticize our foreign policy. A nation in the position in which
the United States finds itself today has no choice but to follow policies
which may lead to friction with other nations.
There is, moreover, such a thing as blundering into a war. World
Wars I and II were planned by Germany and happened more or less
when the Germans planned them. A persuasive case can be made
that great wars are wars of aggression which take place when the
aggressor wants them to. Sometimes, though, events get out of hand
and war happens when neither side wants it. The present may be
such a time. Unless the incompatibility of East and West can be
overcome and the energy of the world turned toward the building of
peace rather than toward preparing for destruction, a war may break
out which neither side wants.
21
We must therefore be prepared for war during this Phase I. More-
over, we must not think that the atom bomb alone will win a war. If
we get into war during Phase I we cannot drop atomic bombs and sit
back. What we need during this Phase is an integrated Military
Establishment, (i) capable of an atomic attack, (2) stronger in air
power than that of any other country, and (3) capable of a sustained
and powerful air counteroffensive, either directly or by the way of
intermediate bases.
*******
What is the kind of force which we need during Phase II ? We have
reviewed this question carefully with the services.
The strategy for Phase II is determined largely by the kind of attack
which is likely to be made if war occurs during that phase. The at-
tack which we must anticipate determines the kind of force which will
be needed to meet it. The first thing to consider therefore is the nature
of the assault which could be made by an enemy equipped with atomic
or comparable weapons, and possessing the aircraft and missiles capable
of delivering them against the United States mainland. As to this, our
conclusions are as follows:
1. We must assume, in making our plans, that there will be a direct
attack on the United States mainland in any major war in which the
United States will become engaged on and after January i, 1953. It
may be that the war will not open with this direct assault. It may be
that the fighting will start at some point in the world where our forces
will come in contact with those of other nations. It may be that the
fighting will be localized at that point, on the model of the practice war
between Germany and Russia in the Spanish Civil War. But this is
not likely; and certainly we must not count on it. We must assume,
in making our plans, that if the enemy can do it he will make a direct
air assault on the United States mainland regardless how or where
the first shooting starts.
2. It must be assumed that there may be no warning of the attack.
We must assume that the force we will bring into being by the end of
1952 will be the force which will have to handle the attack. We will
get no further warning than that which we already have.
22
3. An attack by an enemy equipped with atomic weapons would be
of a violence which is difficult for us to imagine. The first bombard-
ment assault by an enemy equipped with mass destruction weapons
would probably have as its objective the destruction of our capacity for
resistance and counterattack. No one who appeared before us has
suggested that we could turn back completely such an attack. Indeed,
if we were not fully prepared, a mass destruction attack might be
followed by invasion by air-borne land troops for the purpose of taking
advantage of the first confusion to seize strategic points in the United
States and to destroy utterly the country's resistance. It might be that
the attack would be less ambitious if the enemy again made the mis-
take of allowing us time to gear up our industrial capacity and our
manpower. But in preparing our defenses and our counter measures
we must anticipate the most violent assault of which the enemy is
capable. We must not rely on his making major errors of strategy.
*******
It is apparent that the Air Establishment which we need is substan-
tially different for the two phases. During Phase I we may assume that
we will be free from an attack which would prevent our building up
for war after war begins. But an attack during Phase II might be such
as to cripple at the very outset our capacity to resist and to build up
after hostilities start. For this reason, the force which is needed on and
after the beginning of Phase II must be a force of considerably more
power than during Phase I.
In neither phase can we have in being a counteroffensive force capa-
ble of winning the war outright in the first counterblow. We cannot
support in peace a force capable of dominating the enemy's mainland.
That would require a nation in arms — a nation as dedicated to war as
the United States was at the peak of World War II. What we must
have and can support is a reasonably strong defensive establishment
to minimize the enemy's blow, but above all a counteroffensive air
force in being which will be so powerful that if an aggressor does
attack, we will be able to retaliate with the utmost violence and to
seize and hold the advanced positions from which we can divert the
destruction from our homeland to his.
We now consider the recommendations of the armed services as
to the air establishment which is needed during Phase I and Phase II.
The Requirements of the Air Establishment — Recommenda-
tions of the Commission
The Air Force
We have received from representatives of the Air Force and the
Navy exhaustive presentations of the war missions to be carried out
by each of the services and of the requirements of the services for the
conduct of their missions. We have analyzed these strategic plans and
requirements and have reached the following conclusions:
The Air Force as presently composed is inadequate. It is inadequate
not only at the present time when we are relatively free of the dangers
of sustained attack on our homeland, but is hopelessly wanting in
respect of the future Phase II period when a serious danger of atomic
attack will exist.
The present Air Force consists of 337,000 uniformed and about
125,000 civilian personnel. It is equipped with a total of 10,800 air-
craft in active status, including about 580 heavy bombers and 2,300
fighters. Backing up this force is a reserve of about 12,800 World War
II aircraft usable at any time during the next 2 or 3 years to replace
losses of planes due to current peacetime attrition or, in the event of
war, caused by combat losses.
Our present Air Force is divided into 55 groups. Each group is
trained for specific missions such as strategic bombing, tactical recon-
naissance, fighter escort, interception, and troop carrier and transport.
From evidence received from the Secretary of the Air Force, its Chief
of Staff, and many of its ranking generals as well as informed authori-
ties outside of the military establishment, we conclude that the 55-group
force, if engaged in action in this present Phase I, could not carry out
the missions assigned to it because it is lacking in the essential air units
for effective combat action. It would be even less capable of carrying
out the missions which would face it in Phase II conditions. Even
more alarming is the statement by the Air Force that the funds pres-
ently available will not permit the maintenance of the present inade-
quate Air Force and that if appropriations are not increased the estab-
lishment must be cut back to approximately 40 groups with reductions
starting in July 1948.
None of this must be permitted. There is a minimum force in being
below which we must not go if we are to protect our country and its
vital interests.
We have concluded that the minimum force necessary at the present
time is an Air Force composed of 12,400 modern planes, organized into
70 combat groups, and 22 special squadrons, supplemented by 27 Na-
tional Guard groups and 34 groups of Air Reserve. All these forces,
with the exception of the Air Reserve, must be equipped, trained, and
ready for immediate action in the event of war. We should build to
this force as rapidly as possible and once it is achieved, never permit it
to drop below this level. Nor should we permit it to become impotent
and ineffective because of failure to keep it modernized with the very
best planes and equipment available.
At first we seriously questioned the need of an Air Force of these
proportions because it was -obvious that building it and supporting it
would involve a substantial increase in expenditures. However, as we
studied the strategic and tactical needs of the Air Force we came to
the conclusion that:
(1) The 70 groups would include the very minimum number of
intercepter fighters necessary for our home defenses; and their effec-
tiveness would be almost entirely dependent upon having a satisfac-
tory radar early-warning system and adequate ground and air defen-
sive missiles. We emphasize again, however, that no plans for defense
should be made in derogation of the striking counter offensive air
arm in being.
(2) The 70 groups would provide only 700 very heavy bombers
for the strategic bombing of enemy targets. This force of bombers
seems minute as compared with the 14,000 bombers of the United
States Air Force and the Royal Air Force committed to combat in
the European theater during the ''war. Only by using the very best
equipment and the latest techniques will so small a force be able to
carry an effective war to the enemy.
25
Once committed to combat, losses of planes and personnel are very
high. From experience in the European and Pacific theaters, we
know that many operating groups lose 25 percent of their equipment
every month of actual combat. Losses must be replaced immediately.
At the outbreak of a war, industry cannot expand in time to make up
combat losses in the first year. Unless, therefore, there are planes in
reserve, combat forces would diminish rapidly after the beginning
of hostilities and we would be left without a fighting Air Force after
a few months of war.
The solution of this problem is one of the most serious tasks faced
by the Air Force and the aircraft industry. Plans for the rapid ex-
pansion of industry will help, but no evidence presented to us indi-
cates that any plan can be devised which will insure the production
of planes by industry in time to replace combat losses in the first
year of a war. Moreover there is the grave danger that enemy attack
may so disrupt our industrial production that all forecasts of plane
manufacture after war begins will prove to be unrealistic. Therefore,
a reserve of aircraft in storage must always be maintained. This re-
serve is expensive to procure and costly to keep modernized. Planes
in storage become obsolescent and must be replaced.
At the present time, we are reasonably well off because World War
II surplus planes are still usable. Fortunately the Air Force retained
a substantial number of planes as a reserve and sold or otherwise dis-
posed of only those planes considered unusable. This reserve is grad-
ually being used up. It must be replenished before the end of 1952.
Estimates by the Air Force show that 8,100 new planes must be pro-
cured for this reserve between January i, 1950, and January i, 1953.
The 8,100 figure for reserve planes is reached by establishing the
deficiency between losses, computed on the basis of past experience,
and replacement forecast under a theoretical mobilization plan. Since
both losses and replacements are estimates, later studies may cause a
revision in the recommended 8,100 plane reserve.
In summary, the problems of the Air Force are threefold: (i) The
force in being must be increased from its present level to a minimum
regular establishment of 70 groups (6,869 front line aircraft), an Air
National Guard of 27 groups (3,212 front line aircraft) and an ade-
26
quately equipped 34 group Air Reserve. (2) The level of procurement
of new aircraft must be high enough to keep this force modern at all
times. And (3) an adequate reserve, now estimated at 8,100 aircraft,
must be created and maintained in a proper state of modernization.
We must start now on such a program and complete it before the
end of 1952.
The Navy Air Arm
We also have examined and analyzed the requirements of the Navy
and its plans for the performance of its war missions both now and
in the future. In one important regard the role of the Navy will differ
in the future from that of the past. It will not be called upon to en-
gage an enemy surface Navy since none exists and it is questionable
whether any will be built by a foreign power within the next decade.
This changed condition alters the mission of the Navy and the type
of equipment it must use in the future, but it does not eliminate the
need for a Navy.
In case of war the Air Force and the Ground Forces now could not
operate effectively from the continental United States in a sustained
attack against distant enemy centers. Rather they would have to oc-
cupy and conduct their offensive action from advanced bases strate-
gically located and sufficiently close to the enemy's homeland. In
addition they would have to prevent the enemy from occupying bases
from which to conduct offensive operations against us. Only in this
way could we carry the war to the enemy during Phase I. If we
were to try to operate from our homeland without seizing advanced
bases the enemy would carry the war to us, and our cities and people
would suffer as England and Germany and Japan did in World
War II.
Furthermore, it must be recognized that while the means of waging
transoceanic warfare will some day certainly be perfected, the long-
range aircraft and guided missiles needed for sustained operations are
not yet here, and until they are transoceanic warfare will be limited
to the occasional rather than the continuous effort.
The task of securing advanced bases rests on all three services, with
the Navy having a large share of the responsibility for establishing
the troops and air forces on shore. Until the shore based establishment
can become effective, carrier aviation must be relied upon. The prob-
lem of keeping open the supply lines to these bases through submarine-
infested waters also is one of the important missions of the Navy.
Moreover, this country, rich as it is in natural resources, is dependent
on many distant sources of essential materials without which our ability
to produce in wartime and to fight would be seriously affected. Most
of these materials are transported over the seas, and securing and de-
fending these sources of supply and maintaining the vital overseas
supply lines is a Navy task.
The active Navy is now organized into two fleets — the Pacific Fleet
and the Atlantic Fleet. Each is composed of several carriers and its
supporting ships. The new strategy of the Navy is air power. The
carrier has become the major ship — the battleship now is of only
secondary importance.
In order to equip properly the carriers in operation and to conduct
other air activities considered the responsibility of the Navy, one of
the most important of which is protection against modern submarines,
the Navy requires 5,793 front-line planes, plus about 5,100 in support.
The Navy now has the planes necessary to equip its active carriers
and its supporting air operations. The Navy, however, needs funds
for the procurement of new replacement aircraft. Like the Air Force,
the Navy wisely placed a large number of World War II planes in
reserve and since VJ-day has been replacing its operational losses of
active planes by withdrawals from this storage. Knowing the reserve
would be of value for only a few years because planes in storage become
obsolescent, the Navy has followed the commendable policy of limiting
procurement of new planes and making maximum withdrawals from
reserves. This policy will soon exhaust the storage planes, and there-
fore we must increase our rate of procurement of new planes or face
the danger of seeing our great carriers tied to the docks because of
lack of planes.
The Unification Act and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The strategic plans and requirements which we have been discussing
were received by us from representatives of the Air Force and the Navy.
28
These are independent statements of each of the services and give no
effect to the consolidation of functions and savings which must be
made to result from the National Security Act of 1947.
It is the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense acting under the
President to see to it that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare integrated
strategic plans for the defense of the country and consolidate the func-
tions of the services in such a way that the plans can be carried out
with the minimum of personnel and equipment and a maximum of
effectiveness.
We requested the Secretary of Defense to furnish us the requirements
of the Air Force and the Naval Air Establishment as they should be
now and at various specified future periods. The Secretary of Defense
has been unable to comply with this request. The completion of the
necessary studies and the integration of the three services without
which our strategic plans will not be efficient and economical will
require much time. Figures, of course, can be prepared quickly but
they would be little more than a verification of the independent and
separate requirements 'of the Air Force and the naval air arm as
presented to us by the respective services. The real task — which
cannot be done quickly — is to consolidate and integrate the functions
of our total military establishment and to increase the dollar efficiency
of every segment of it.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are carrying on their analyses of require-
ments and their work to create an integrated and economical peace-
time force in both Phase I and Phase II. In addition, of course, they
must develop the wartime requirements of our consolidated military
establishment. These requirements must be worked out with two
clear objectives in mind. We must have a military establishment
capable of defending the country: any recommendation that comes
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff should never go below this minimum
requirement. And the cost of such an establishment must be built
on the most economical basis possible.
The military establishment we must have will put a heavy strain
on the economy of the country. The recommendations of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff must require the most rigorous efficiency in opera-
29
tions and in the consolidation of strategic functions. The Unifica-
tion Act was passed to achieve these two purposes.
Most of the witnesses who appeared before us have pointed out the
need for stronger military forces, with particular emphasis on the
Air Establishment. But little has been said as to the cost.
The cost of the Military Establishment as reflected in this report
shows beyond any doubt the critical need of carrying out the intent
of the Unification Act to the greatest extent possible and at the earliest
possible moment. We believe that there is an enormous opportunity
for savings, and that as these savings are effected, the forces essential
for our security can be maintained in being within the safe limits
of our financial resources.
But to attain these economies vested interests must be set aside,
traditional divisions of appropriations must be ignored, and every
unnecessary activity must be abandoned if the war of the future no
longer requires them. We are concerned by the fact that a majority
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who represent three separate Services, may
find it difficult to achieve these results. A heavy responsibility rests
upon the Secretary of Defense to exercise fearless and independent
judgment to see to it that integration means more than a mere con-
solidation of the requirements of each of the individual branches of
the services.
We view with great anxiety the pressures from many sides directed
towards the mairtenance of yesterday's establishment to fight to-
morrow's war; of unwillingness to discard the old and take on the
new; of a determination to advance the interest of a segment at the
sacrifice of the body as a whole. All this is understandable. For it
comes in large part from loyalty of each Service to its traditions. But
we can no longer afford the waste it involves. Hope rests only with
the ability of the Secretary of Defense under the President to discharge
effectively the authority vested in him with one objective in mind —
the maximum in security for the minimum cost. It is imperative that
this be done; for unless it is we will not have a military establishment
capable of defending the country.
30
Recommendations of the Commission for Immediate Appropriations
for the Air Establishment
We are informed by the Bureau of the Budget that for the cur-
rent year the Military Establishment is supported by budget expendi-
tures of $10,098,000,000 (exclusive of terminal leave, stock piling and
certain miscellaneous items). Of this amount, according to Budget
figures, $4,037,000,000 are for the Navy including naval air, $2,850,-
000,000 are for the Air Force and $3,211,000,000 for the Army. Out
of the total budget of $10,098,000,000, $4,050,000,000 is for the Air
Force and naval aviation (exclusive of the cost of construction and
operation of carriers).
We are impressed with the need for a proper balance between the
three services and have concluded that such a balance does not exist
now because of the relative and absolute inadequacy of the Air Force
Establishment. As we have said, the Air Force is inadequate for cur-
rent conditions and is hopelessly deficient for Phase II conditions;
and the Navy air arm will soon be lacking in equipment.
We make no recommendations for change in the appropriations
for the Army and the surface Navy, but confine ourselves to recom-
mendations for the maintenance of naval aviation and an immediate
build up beginning January i, 1948, of the Air Force. The appro-
priations which should be made for the Army and the surface Navy
of the future, whether higher or lower than the present levels, should
be determined by Congress after it has received from the President
his recommendations as to the total integrated Military Establishment
the country needs, based on analyses by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
to this integrated Military Establishment prepared by them tinder
the direction of the Secretary of Defense.
* # * # * # *
The increase in the Air Force must be started at once and be com-
pleted by the end of the year 1952. The 70 groups should be organized,
equipped, and ready for service by January i, 1950. An adequate
reserve of planes, now estimated at 8,100, should be in being by the
end of 1952. Uniformed personnel must be brought to the 401,000
figure now planned by the Air Force.
The chart shows the rate of build up of the 70 group force during
the calendar years 1948 and 1949, as well as an indication of the trend
of increase in the Air Force which should be made during the years
1950, 1951, and 1952 if the 70 group force plus the 8,100 plane reserve
is to be in being by the end of 1952.
Our recommendations are for the calendar years 1948 and 1949 only.
For the calendar year 1948 we recommend an increase in appropria-
tions for the Air Force in the amount of $1,300,000,000 and a further
increase of $1,300,000,000 for the calendar year 1949. We call especial
attention to our recommendation later in this report that there be a
complete review of the Military Establishment as of January i, 1950.
This review (which is marked on the chart with the words "Review
Point") should control the direction of expenditures for the years 1950
and subsequently.
We recommend that, as part of the appropriations for the Air Force
for 1948 and 1949, there be included $350,000,000 more for the pro-
curement of aircraft in the calendar year 1948 than the present rate
of such procurement ($550,000,000 for the current fiscal year) ; and
that there be included for the calendar year 1949 $660,000,000 more
for the procurement of aircraft than would be procured in 1948 under
our recommendation. These dollar figures would require the purchase
of about 9,000,000 pounds of air frame more in 1948 than the present
rate of Air Force procurement; and about 16,000,000 pounds of air
frame more in 1949 than in 1948.
The building of the reserve of new planes, now estimated at 8,100,
need not begin until January i, 1950. Reserves of World War II
planes in substantially adequate amounts are available for the years
1948 and 1949. We recommend however that in the calendar year
1949 there be allocated, out of the appropriation for that year,
$300,000,000 of contracts to begin the build-up of the 8,100 plane
reserve. These contracts, placed in 1949, would produce planes only
in the years subsequent to 1949.
Because of this deferring of the build-up of the 8,100 plane reserve
program, it is likely that the increase in expenditures for the Air Force
25,000
20,000
± 15,000
10,000
5,000
Estimated Appropriations
For National Defense Program
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
$18,000
'"
$11,590 „,-
$10,098
AIR
FORCE
$2,850
NAVY
$4,037
ARMY
$3,211
AIR
FORCE
$4,150
NAVY
$4,229
ARMY
$3,211
$13,200
AIR
FORCE
$5,450
NAVY
$4,539
ARMY
$3,211
REVIEW POINT
1947—48
FISCAL
YEAR
1948
1950
1949
CALENDAR YEARS
1951
1952
in 1948 and 1949 will be less than in the third, fourth, and fifth years.
The power of the Air Force will progressively increase, reaching the
full 70 group strength with modernized reserves only at the end
of 1952. We believe that this is the most economical way of building
the Air Force we need and at the same time satisfies, within the limits
of a calculated risk, the strategic requirements of the country for the
present and the future with which we are dealing.
33
This procedure will have the added advantage of permitting a
review as of January i, 1950, of the reserve plane requirement by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Commissions suggested later in this
report.
Some savings through internal economies in the Air Force may be
expected in 1948 and 1949. If we assume that such savings may be
as much as 10 percent of the total cost of the Air Force, they would
be of the order of $285,000,000, based on the expenditures for the
current fiscal year. Such savings, in our opinion, should not be used
to cut our recommended Air Force appropriations for 1948 and 1949
but should be converted into a like dollar amount of contracts for
the building of the 8,100 plane reserve.
* # * * * # *
The Navy must immediately increase the annual rate of contracting
for the procurement of aircraft (now at the rate of $338,000,000 per
year) in order to equip properly the present fleet with the modern
aircraft needed as World War II reserves are exhausted. To accom-
plish this result contracts for new aircraft should be in the amount of
$530,000,000 for the calendar year 1948 (an increase of $192,000,000
over the current rate) and $840,000,000 for the calendar year 1949
(a further increase of $310,000,000 over the 1948 figure). These
dollar figures would require the purchase of about 4,000,000 pounds
of air frame more in 1948 than the present rate of naval air procure-
ment; and about 6,000,000 pounds of air frame more in 1949 than
in 1948.
Any savings which may occur in the naval establishment in 1948
and 1949 should be applied to the reduction of the total naval budget,
and should not affect our recommendation for the increased purchase
of aircraft during these years.
We have received strong arguments that the air arm of the Navy
should be increased from its present level to 8,000 first-line planes in
being and 6,500 planes in support. Since any such increase would
be part of a program of expansion of the Navy as a whole, we feel
that a decision on this subject should be deferred until the Joint Chiefs
of Staff have completed their strategic plans and their statement of
34
integrated requirements and then should be made only if the security
of the country demands the expansion cf the naval establishment.
* # * # # * #
As appears from the above chart the present budget of the Air
Force is at the rate of $2,850,000,000. The recommendations of the
Commission call for Air Force appropriations in the calendar year
1948 of $4,150,000,000 and for Air Force appropriations in 1949 of
$5,450,000,000.
The present budget of the Navy is at the rate of $4,037,000,000.
The additional procurement of aircraft (assuming that the appro-
priations for the rest of the naval establishment remain the same)
would increase this figure to $4,229,000,000 for the calendar year
1948 and $4,539,000,000 for the calendar year 1949.
The present total military budget is at the rate of $10,098,000,000.
The recommendations of the Commission would increase the total
military budget for the calendar year 1948 (assuming that there are
no changes in appropriations for the Army, the surface Navy, or
the expenses of naval aviation other than for the purchase of aircraft)
to $11,590,000,000 and would call for a total military budget in the
calendar year 1949 of $13,200,000,000.
There will be, it is hoped, savings in our total Military Establish-
ment resulting from the unification of the services under the direction
of the Secretary of Defense as contemplated by the National Security
Act of 1947. But we do not believe that any integration of our military
operations under the National Security Act will lessen the need for
the 70 group Air Force in being or for the replacement of existing
naval aircraft. The likelihood of these savings should not therefore
be considered as a reason for reducing the appropriations recommended
in this report for the years 1948 and 1949.
The estimated trend of expenditures for the air establishment for
the years 1950, 1951, and 1952, is shown in the above chart. This esti-
mate is only an indication of the cost of the air establishment towards
which we may have to build. It is likely that the reviews which we
recommend later in this report will change the direction of these esti-
mates, either increasing them or decreasing them. We believe that
35
unless conditions change substantially for the better, the 1950 review
will increase the size of the establishment rather than decrease it.
But in any case, until the world situation improves, substantial ex-
penditures for the military establishment must be considered a fixed
item in the Federal budget. It is regrettable that these expenditures
have to be made, especially at a time when we must make heavy com-
mitments for economic rehabilitation abroad. But we cannot escape
the clearly demonstrated necessity for a military establishment adequate
to protect the country and its vital interests.
Military and Commercial Transport Services
The Air Force and the Navy each has its own transport service which
was organized in World War II. The Air Force service is the Air
Transport Command ( ATC) ; the Navy service is the Naval Air Trans*
port Service, referred to as NATS. In addition, the Marine Corps has
a combat air transport service which is occasionally used as an auxiliary
to NATS. The position of NATS was recognized in the National
Security Act of 1947, which states that naval aviation shall consist in
part of air transport essential for naval operations.
Each of these transport services is a sizeable operation. ATC has
a fleet of 366 aircraft with about 22,000 military and civilian personnel
and has flown an average of about 10,000,000 ton-miles per month this
year. NATS has a fleet of 84 aircraft with about 6,300 military and
civilian personnel and has flown an average of about 8,000,000 ton-miles
per month this year. For the fiscal year 1947 the two services together
carried about the same amount of freight as all United States certificated
commercial carriers combined, and about one-eighth as much pas-
senger traffic. The cost of NATS for the fiscal year 1947 has been
estimated as about $45,000,000; that of the ATC has not been estimated
but it is undoubtedly much higher.
ATC now conducts regularly scheduled operations over 66,138 miles
of routes; NATS over 41,918 miles. Many of these services are
duplicating.
A directive has recently been issued which prevents NATS and ATC
from carrying any but military traffic on routes where commercial
services are available.
The purpose of the ATC and NATS services is to have in being in
the event of war a personnel and cargo lift to the rear areas of the war
theaters. Service into the areas of combat is provided by the Troop
Carrier Command and the Marine Transport Command. ATC and
NATS take over where the Troop Carrier Command leaves off.
ATC and NATS appropriations are handled within the regular Air
Force and Navy budgets.
ATC and NATS cannot handle all the personnel and cargo lift to
the rear areas in case of war. They plan to take over, as they did in
World War II, as much of the civilian lines, domestic and international,
as circumstances permit. The question thus is whether the present
ATC-NATS planes and personnel plus the commercial line planes and
personnel are sufficient for the future strategic needs of the country in
case of war.
In any war within the future with which we are dealing the logistic
supply to our advanced combat area must be largely by water. There
are not enough planes to handle more than a fraction of the huge
supplies which must be transported. However, certain personnel and
cargo, especially in the early days of a war, must be transported quickly
by air. Tentative estimates by the Military Establishment show that
ATC and NATS at their present size plus, the present commercial air-
craft would be far short of what will be needed. For this we must
increase our commercial fleet. We recommend later in this report
certain policies for this purpose.
We also recommend the consolidation of ATC and NATS into one
Military Air Transport Service to handle all scheduled military trans-
port services for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.
We make one further recommendation on this subject. Advantage
should be taken of our World War II experience in working out in
advance the required coordination between the armed services and the
commercial air lines. Contract arrangements specifying the equip-
ment and services to be furnished to the Military Air Transport Service
by the air lines should be made now with the commercial carriers.
37
Mobilization Planning
It is not enough to have an Air Force in being on the day war
begins. Mobilization plans must be made in peacetime to enable
us to expand our production of airplanes and other equipment as
rapidly as possible after war begins. This subject is dealt with in
section II below, in our discussion of the aircraft industry.
Plans must also be made in peacetime for the rapid mobilization
of our manpower in event of war. In the case of our Air Establish-
ment this problem centers on the so-called civilian "components" of
the Air Force and naval aviation. In the case of the Air Force the
civilian components are the National Guard and the Air Force Re-
serve. In the case of the Navy, they are the Organized Reserve and
the Volunteer Reserve.
The problem is to have enough trained personnel to man and handle
the planes which are in storage and those which will be built after
war begins.
We have examined this question but are not prepared to make
specific recommendations with respect to the air components. There
is no point in developing a training program until the plans to pro-
vide the planes are farther advanced. If the recommendations of the
Commission for the increase in the Air Establishment are put into
effect, it will be necessary to develop corresponding plans for the
training of pilots and ground crews to man these planes. When the
Industrial Mobilization Plan has been farther advanced, estimates
must be made as to the number of planes to become available under
this plan; and corresponding plans for the training of personnel must
be developed.
The Secretary of Defense has appointed a committee within the
Military Establishment to study this question which presents problems
of long historical background and great difficulty. The problem as-
sumes importance because the Air Force is depending upon 27 Na-
tional Guard groups as part of its first line forces. The report of the
committee established by the Secretary of Defense and the necessary
action to insure satisfactory and economical functioning of the civilian
components are therefore of the highest importance.
38
Periodic Reviews of the Military Establishment
We recommend that there be periodic reviews of the Military Es-
tablishment of the United States in the light of the then international
situation and the military strength of other nations.
We must at all costs avoid a hit or miss armaments program. We
must not believe that any program which may be adopted now will
solve once and for all the problem of national defense. Our plans
for the Military Establishment must be constantly revised. The
strength and techniques of other nations are changing rapidly in the
current scientific revolution. Our Military Establishment must
change with them — not behind them but ahead of them. Moreover,
we can get the integrated fighting force we need only if continual
reviews see to it that this force is produced at the least possible cost
to the taxpayer. Unless there are such reviews, duplications and in-
effective use of the security dollar are inevitable.
There now are arrangements for such reviews by the highest officials
of government.
The National Security Act of 1947 places the responsibility for the
maintenance of our defense forces on the Secretary of Defense, under
the President and within the limits of the funds made available by
Congress. The Secretary of Defense has available to him a structure
for the manufacture of the over-all strategic plan. The National Se-
curity Council, composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, has the
duty, under the President, of integrating our foreign policy and our
military power — that is of seeing to it that we have a military force
strong enough in the light of our international policies and of inter-
national conditions. With this top-level advice the Secretary of De-
fense has the responsibility for arranging that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
prepare and keep constantly revised the strategic plans of the country.
The Secretary of Defense relates the plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to the possible by checking their proposals with the National Security
Resources Board to see if the material and human resources of the
country are enough to fulfill the plans which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
39
propose — and adjustments are made accordingly. The plans are then
referred back to the National Security Council through the Secretary
of Defense for further checking and instructions; and this process
starts all over again in order that die strategic plans will be always up
to date.
This is a sound procedure. We believe, however, that the arrange-
ment lacks an essential element — the direct participation by the people
of the country in the preparation of the plans.
Some national policies touch the people so intimately and so seriously
that the ordinary processes of government are inadequate. Under our
system of representative government, national policies usually are made
by the Executive and the Congress, with the role of the public an
indirect one. Some policies, however, cannot be made by the elected
representatives alone. The making of war is one such policy. The
preparation in peace for the defense of the country in the atomic age
is another.
This Commission does not believe that we will ever have an adequate
Military Establishment unless the people of the country know fully
what the international military and political situation is, what kind
of a military force is necessary if we are to be ready for that situation,
and how much it will cost to have this force. With these facts before
them they may choose, with full knowledge of what they are doing,
whether they will or will not pay the bill. We believe they will want
to pay it — provided they feel sure that what they are getting is as free
as possible from duplicating or other useless expenditures and is abso-
lutely necessary for their safety.
We make the following recommendations:
i. That the National Security Act of 1947 be amended to provide
that the President appoint on June i5th in each second year, or more
frequently if he sees fit, and subject to confirmation by the Senate,
a commission of five citizens with no connection with government
who shall review the Military Establishment of the country and its
adequacy in the light of the then international military and political
situation and shall submit a report of their findings and recom-
mendations to the President by the following January.
40
This commission should be composed of different persons on each
occasion. Their report should deal among other things with the
efficiency with which the procurement and other policies of the Mili-
tary Establishment are being carried on. The purpose must be not
only to have what is necessary but also to have it at the minimum cost
to the United States taxpayer.
2. That the report of this commission of citizens be made public
by the President. Military security does not require secrecy in this
matter. It may require secrecy in some details. But it does not
require secrecy as to the broad outlines of the military strength of
foreign powers and the steps which should be taken to be ready to
meet that strength if it is used against us. Not to tell the people
the military facts they are facing would not only deny to them what
they are entitled to know, but also would make it impossible to have
an adequate preparedness program.
We believe that our policies as to military secrecy in relation to
our Military Establishment require overhauling. Details of our new
air equipment and technical information as to our applied research
and development which should be kept secret are often released to
the press. This detailed information as to our airplanes and other
air equipment is of no interest to the American public but it is of
interest to nations competing with us in the current race for air power.
On the other hand the people of the country are not kept fully informed
of the dangers of the military situation they are facing and of the
preparation they ought to make to defend themselves against these
dangers. These facts are known by all foreign governments, but there
is now no procedure in our Government for systematically informing
our people about them.
We recommend a reversal of both present policies. Less informa-
tion should be given out as to the technical facts of our air establishment.
More information should be given out as to the broad lines of the
military situation which confronts the country and of the Military
Establishment needed to handle this situation. The best way to give
the people this information is to have these reviews of the state of
our Military Establishment made public.
Section II
Aircraft Manufacturing Industry
43
Aircraft Manufacturing Industry
Basic Considerations for National Security
A strong aircraft industry is an essential element in the Nation's
air power. Our air establishment would be useless unless backed by
a manufacturing industry skillful in technological application, effi-
cient in production, capable of rapid expansion, and strong in basic
financial structure.
On the basis of the evidence, the over-all aircraft industry of the
Uftited States now meets only the first of these specifications. A
parade of witnesses has testified as to its current productive weakness
as an industry, its general lack of preparation for rapid expansion,
and its general financial instability. How to remedy those defici-
encies is a matter that has engaged the Commission's close attention.
As a point of departure, it is necessary to calculate the minimum
level at which the industry must be held to provide a safe base for
expansion in an emergency. Our own studies, together with figures
supplied by the industry and the military services, tend to confirm
the general range of requirements set by the Air Coordinating Com-
mittee in its report of October 22, 1945.
Two levels were set by the Air Coordinating Committee. The
lower level was an estimate that the aircraft industry required mili-
tary purchases in the amount of 30,000,000 pounds of airframe weight
annually. This was considered "as a minimum which could be
reached only after maintenance of world peace is well assured and a
substantial degree of disarmament has taken place." The Air Co-
ordinating Committee also proposed an alternate level of about 60,-
000,000 pounds of airframe for the event that world conditions were
such that * * * "we have * * * need for a substantial strik-
ing force ready at all times to cooperate in the maintenance of world
peace." The military requirements listed in section I would lead to
a steady build-up throughout this range over the next few years.
45
This Commission believes that military requirements for 30,000,000
to 40,000,000 pounds annually, in addition to demands for commercial
and private planes, would provide a sound basis for expansion in an
emergency.
No artificial stimulation to achieve this result appears to be necessary.
If the program outlined in section I is carried out, the necessary base
for expansion of the aircraft industry will exist. The rate of procure-
ment recommended in section I would increase the present military
procurement (which is now at the rate of about 21,000,000 pounds
annually) by contracts for an additional 13,000,000 pounds during the
calendar year 1948, and for 22,000,000 pounds in 1949 more than in
1948.
This, of course, is not a permanent solution. It satisfies only the
demands of the immediately foreseeable future. If the threat of War
diminishes, or if war becomes imminent, new levels of military de-
mand (lower or higher) must be calculated and maintained. As is
recommended throughout this report, periodic reviews of the military
needs must be made, and plans and programs adjusted to fit conditions
as they change.
It was widely predicted before the end of World War II that rising
demand for commercial aircraft, both transport and personal, would
tide a number of companies over the postwar adjustments of 1946
and 1947. For various reasons, some of which are dealt with else-
where in this report, these hopes have not been justified. Although
conditions may change in the future, it is certain that current commer-
cial demands alone will not carry us through the present crisis.
Whether we like it or not, the health of the aircraft industry, for the
next few years, at least, is dependent largely upon financial support
from Government in the form of orders for military aircraft.
*******
To justify that support, the aircraft industry of the United States
must be capable of turning out superior war weapons. The impor-
tance of adequate aeronautical research programs cannot be over-
emphasized. This phase of the problem is discussed in section III
of this report.
At the time the Morrow Board convened (1925) the design of a
successful military aircraft depended largely upon the efforts of a
single man — the final product was almost wholly a reflection of one
individual's ideas. Today, every design is the end point of many
contributions by many individuals. The concept of the engineering
team is almost universally accepted. Group engineering know-how
is one of the most valuable assets carried forward by aircraft manu-
facturers out of the World War II period. If, for any reason, too
many of the war-trained teams are dispersed, we are in danger of
losing this hard-won knowledge and experience.
But the aircraft industry must do more than design aircraft of top
performance. It must also design them for efficient production in
quantities to meet the needs of the armed services. Since World
War II, military aircraft have become much more complicated. The
net result has been to increase the number of their component parts
and to complicate their final assembly. The most efficient aircraft
in the world, no matter how brilliant its performance, is of little value
to the national defense unless it can be manufactured quickly in large
quantities.
The team concept is not limited to research and design. Production
planning and production control groups are equally necessary, but it
is more difficult to keep such teams together in peacetime. When
production drops off to mere jobbing levels, their functions simply
disappear. Means must be found to keep alive the special skills that
have been evolved in these particular fields during the war years.
If they are allowed to be dissipated, time and effort will be needed
to replace them in a future emergency.
The techniques of aircraft manufacture vary widely with changes
in the volume of orders. It is uneconomical to do extensive special
tooling, either for manufacture or assembly, to turn out a few units.
If, on the other hand, thousands of similar airplanes are required, the
expenditure of relatively large sums for special jigs, fixtures, and tools
is justified. Between the two extremes are wide areas in which the
exercise of good judgment is the only controlling factor. The only
way such judgment can be generated is through actual production
47
experience. How to provide the aircraft manufacturer with orders
in sufficient quantity in peacetime to develop that kind of experience
and to justify planning and tooling to a reasonable level for emergency
expansion is one of the most important questions facing the services.
In a freely competitive economy the number of companies manufac-
turing a particular product levels off at a point determined by the
ordinary laws of economics. In the case of the aircraft industry, how-
ever, it would be dangerous to rely only on the operation of these
laws. The demand factor fluctuates too violently from peace to war.
If a reasonable degree of expansibility is to be maintained for periods
of emergency, it is necessary to exercise some industry-wide control
in the interests of national security. It may even be desirable to keep
a few marginal manufacturers in business who might be forced out
if the normal laws of supply and demand were allowed to operate.
Based on considerations of maximum security, it is essential to
maintain at least two sources of supply for similar products. It has
long been the practice for the procurement agencies of the Army and
Navy to keep alive at least two separate producers of each type of
aircraft, as well as two or more separate sources for each of the major
components. We believe that this policy is sound and should be
continued. It develops automatically a degree of manufacturing dis-
persal which might otherwise not exist. In a field in which the
technology is changing rapidly, competition between design and de-
velopment groups results in continuously improved products, and
price competition between suppliers results in lower unit costs.
=x= * =& # % * *
The financial difficulties which harass the aircraft industry today
stem from many causes. Uncertain Government policies account for
many of them. Some reflect faulty judgment by management.
Others have come about from particular circumstances which have
surrounded this peculiar industry in the postwar period of readjust-
ment. Some of them are :
(1) A product that is, almost indivisibly, a weapon of war and a
carrier of commerce;
(2) A market with but one major customer, the Government,
which purchases 80 to 90 percent of its entire output;
48
(3) A violently fluctuating demand, due to uncertainty of require-
ments of its major customer;
(4) A lack of the production continuity which is vitally impor-
tant in sustaining a trained work force and in keeping production
costs to a minimum;
(5) A rapidly changing technology which causes a high rate of
design obsolescence and abnormally high engineering costs;
(6) An extremely long design-manufacturing cycle;
(7) An organization in excess of present requirements.
The financial strength of any individual company or of the indus-
try cannot be measured by the amount of sales, the extent of working
capital, or the total floor space of its plants. It depends upon profit-
able operation. A profitable organization will attract capital and
credit. It will be able to employ and retain the most capable engineers
and craftsmen. The concern which consistently loses money will
deteriorate, its financial position will weaken, and the quality of its
product will suffer as its best employees drift away in search of better
opportunities.
The Government cannot guarantee profits. Government can and
should, however, create an atmosphere as conducive as possible to
profitable operations in the aircraft manufacturing business. This
can be done by longer-range planning, adequate volume, and the
abandonment of uneconomic procurement practices. Under these
circumstances, it will be the task of each manufacturing company to
work out its own salvation.
The State of the Aircraft Manufacturing Industry
The aircraft manufacturing industry covers all those manufacturers
whose products are included in finished aircraft, military or civil. The
normal airplane consists of the airframe (fuselage, wings, tail surfaces,
landing gear) ; the propulsion system (engines, turbo-jet units, rocket
motors, propellers); instruments (control, navigational, recording);
communication equipment; accessories (pumps, generators, landing
lights); and furnishings (seats, fire-extinguishers, and miscellaneous
fixtures) .
49
The airframe manufacturer is responsible for the final product. He
designs and builds the basic structure and installs the numerous com-
ponents. He also test-flies the airplane before delivery to the customer
and is responsible for its satisfactory performance.
The price of the airplane to the commercial customer usually in-
cludes the cost of all components. The aircraft manufacturer pur-
chases them from their producers just as he does his raw materials. In
aircraft for the military services, however, the airframe manufacturer
bases his price on the cost of the airframe and of installing in it the
various components. The Government usually buys the engines, pro-
pellers, instruments, and accessories separately. These are delivered
to the airframe manufacturer as Government furnished equipment
(GFE).
About half of the cost of the finished military aircraft is represented
by the cost of the airframe and its assembly plus the cost of installing
the GFE. The other half is the cost of the GFE. Thus, of a billion-
dollar aircraft procurement program, about $500,000,000 goes to the
airframe companies and the balance is spread among the hundreds
of companies that build engines, propellers, radios, instruments, lights,
heaters, and other gear.
Patent cross licensing. — All the principal manufacturers of aircraft
are members of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association, through
which they license each other and the Government on all their aircraft
patents. Over 90 percent of such patents are licensed without fee.
On others, small royalties per airplane are paid. There is, accordingly,
complete freedom among the MAA membership to adopt, and incor-
porate in new aircraft, features developed by other companies. Design
patents are offered for license on a percentage royalty basis.
Composition of the industry. — The aircraft manufacturing industry
may be roughly divided into (a) the 15 major companies or groups
which produce the majority of the airframes, engines, and propellers
for the military services and for the airlines and other users of trans-
port aircraft; (b) the nine major manufacturers of personal and small
commercial aircraft; (c) and numerous additional small companies
making personal and other aircraft. The divisions are not sharply
defined as some personal airplanes and helicopters are made by certain
of the 15 major companies, while some of the personal plane manu-
facturers also make transports and military liaison airplanes.
The 15 major airframe companies are:
1. Bell Aircraft Corp.
2. Boeing Airplane Co.
3. Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp.1
4. Curtiss- Wright Corp.2
5. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.
6. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.
7. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.
8. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
9. The Glenn L. Martin Co.
10. McDonnell Aircraft Corp.
11. North American Aviation, Inc.
12. Northrop Aircraft, Inc.
13. Republic Aviation Corp.
14. Ryan Aeronautical Co.
15. United Aircraft Corp.3
The nine major makers of personal and small commercial planes,
most of whom were important producers of small military aircraft
and aircraft components during the war, are:
1. Aeronca Aircraft Corp.
2. Beech Aircraft Corp.
3. Bellanca Aircraft Corp.
4. Cessna Aircraft Co.
5. Engineering & Research Corp.
6. Luscombe Airplane Corp.
7. Piper Aircraft Corp.
8. Taylorcraft, Inc.
9. Texas Engineering & Manufacturing Co.
During the war many of the major aircraft companies operated
branch plants remote from their main factories. Other airframe
and engine plants were operated by companies not traditionally a
1 Includes the Stinson Division (personal airplanes).
8 The Curtiss-Wright group includes the Curtiss Airplane Division, Curtiss Propeller Division,
and the Wright Aeronautical Corp. (engines).
8 The United Aircraft Corp. group includes the Chance Vought (aircraft), Sikorsky (heli-
copters), Hamilton Standard (propellers), and Pratt & Whitney (engines) divisions.
o
IS
il
SI
52
part of the aircraft industry. The wartime aviation industry occupied
the plants shown on the accompanying map. It will be noted that
plants were widely dispersed. Now, nearly all of the branch plants
have been relinquished and most of the companies which were tem-
porarily in aviation activities during the war have withdrawn from
aviation with the exception of the Allison Division of General Motors,
General Electric Co., and the Westinghouse Co., all of whom are
active in the turbo-jet engine field.
Facilities and output. — The accompanying table shows the floor
areas, number of employees, and airframe production of the major
1939
War
peak
1946
1947
Floor area (covered) (in millions of
sq. ft.)
Total for all manufacturers of military
and large civil airframes, engines
and propellers.
Airframe prime contractors
13 (Jan. '40)
10 (Jan '40)
175
111
54 (Dec.)4
41 (Dec.") 4
53 (June).*
40 (June) 4
Engine prime contractors
3 (Jan. '40)
55
11 (Dec.) 4
11 (June).4
Propeller prime contractors
0)
9
2 (Dec.) 4
2 (Tune).4
Employees 2 (in thousands)
Industry total for both military and
civil airframes and engines.
Industry total for military and civil
airframes.
Production — Yearly 3 (in millions of
airframe pounds)
Total military and large civil 5
76 (Dec.)
63 (Dec.)
13
1,708
1,257
1,101
221 (Dec.)
184 (Dec.)
24
200 (Oct.).
164 (Oct.).
1947
(1st 10 Mos.)
23.
Total military
11
1,101
15
10.
Total large civil **
2*
0
9
13.
*Estimated.
1 Less than 0.5 million sq. ft. (492,000 sq. ft.).
2 Includes prime contractors and sub-contractors.
8 Includes spares.
4 In the 1946 and 1947 year columns, the floor areas shown are for those companies contract-
ing with the military services during these periods, although some of these companies also
make commercial aircraft.
5 Four-place and over.
53
companies for 1939, at the war peak, for 1946 and for the first 10
months of 1947. Included in the figures for airframe weight of
large civil airplanes are aircraft of 4-place and over, some of which
are the products of the personal plane manufacturers.
Financial condition. — Pertinent financial data on the 15 major com-
panies are presented in the table below. Total sales are shown for
the calendar years 1939, 1944, and 1946, and for the first 6 months
of 1947. Net profit or loss and the ratio of profit or loss to sales are
shown for the years 1939, 1944, and 1946. Net worth, working capital,
investment in plant and equipment, and the ratio of sales to each of
these, is shown for the years ending on December 31, 1939, 1944, and
1946.
1939
1944
1946
1947
(1st 6
mos.)
Sales
millions of $. .
244
8,204
711
375
Net profit (or loss)
do
30
133
(13)
Net worth
do
138
596
640
Working capital
do..
64
424
541
Plant and equipment
do
62
105
89
Ratio — net profit (or loss) to sales
percent . .
12.4
1.6
(1.9)
Ratio — sales to net worth
do....
1.8
13. 8
1. 1
Ratio — sales to working capital
do
3. 8
19.4
1 3
Ratio — sales to plant and equipment . .
do....
3.9
77.8
8.0
NOTE. — Value figures arc rounded to nearest million; ratios were computed on actual figures.
The $13,000,000 net loss in 1946 was after application of nearly
$72,000,000 in tax-refund credits. A substantial portion of the loss
was attributable to development costs of commercial aircraft and other
nonmilitary activities. Other losses resulted from difficulties in cur-
tailing expenses as rapidly as sales declined, expense of rearranging
plants for decreased postwar volume and for new models, delays in
obtaining raw materials due to postwar shortages, acceleration of pro-
duction schedules to meet airline demands for new transports in some
companies, and heavy development costs and losses on nonaeronautical
commercial ventures by other companies.
54
Not shown in the table, but worthy of comment, is the decrease
in working capital of nearly $83,000,000 in 1946. Of this amount,
$45,000,000 was used to purchase plant and equipment.
Backlogs. — In compiling the backlog figures submitted to us by
the 15 major aircraft manufacturing companies, it was apparent that
a statement of any composite figure, even with the explanations given,
would be confusing and might be misleading. This is largely due
to the lack of a uniform basis of accounting methods within the
industry, particularly in this respect. While we have recognized and
given weight in our recommendations to the backlog figures, it was
deemed advisable to omit the publication of the exact total amount
of contracts reported to be on the books of the aircraft industry.
Capacity. — The peak capacity of the present aircraft manufacturing
industry may be estimated. At the peak of war production, "on-site"
air frame output was 9 pounds per square foot per year. The present
covered floor area of the major airframe manufacturers now con-
tracting with the military measures 41,000,000 square feet. At 9
pounds per square foot per year, this area should support a peak
output (under full wartime conditions) of 369,000,000 air frame
pounds per year.
Plants now held in reserve have a total area of 21,200,000 square
feet. Applying the same ratio, they should support an additional
191,000,000 air frame pounds per year at peak utilization. The po-
tential industry peak capacity under the best conditions attained in
1944, and without allowance for the possible contribution of the com-
panies specializing in personal plane production, is approximately
560,000,000 pounds of air frame (including spares) per year. Avail-
able space, even under normal peacetime rates of output is thus more
than adequate for the production of the aircraft for which procure-
ment is recommended in section I. Testimony has indicated that
plants now producing airplanes are readily convertible to the pro-
55
duction of guided missiles. Their capacity to produce poundage of
such missiles should be equal to or greater than their capacity in terms
of air frame pounds.
Civil aircraft production. — The relative importance of civil air-
craft manufacture is illustrated graphically in the accompanying chart.
MILITARY
CIVIL'
IW///Y/S///////
K%I4.9MILLION
TOTAL 23.5 MILLION LBS. - 1946 ACTUAL
MILITARY
CIVIL"
TOTAL 27.8 MILLION LBS.- 1947 ESTIMATED
MILITARY
CIVIL*
MILITARY
fAIR COORDINATING
: 39.1 MILLION LBS.-^ COMMITTEE REPORT
l-LOWER LEVEL (MINIMUM)
CIVIL*
- J A.C.C. REPORT-UPPER LEVEL
:mLLi6iiiLBS=l JOTAL:72.2 MILLION LBS.
AIRFRAME PRODUCTION
('EXCLUDING SMALL PRIVATE PLANES)
This shows (i) the 1946 output, in air frame pounds, of military air-
planes and of large (4-place and over) civil airplanes, (2) the esti-
mated 1947 output figures, (3) the corresponding figures for the lower
level of the Air Coordinating Committee report of October 22, 1945,
and (4) the upper level figures of the ACC report. All weights in-
clude spares (estimated for 1946-47) and excluding experimental pro-
duction. Although the production of small personal aircraft has
fallen off sharply, the output of larger civil aircraft continues in sub-
stantial volume.
An additional chart has been included to show the total military
and civil (4 place and large) air frame weight produced monthly from
1938 to late 1947. For the postwar period, the inset shows the total
production divided between the military and the large civil aircraft.
57
Helicopters. — Two of the major military aircraft manufacturers
(Bell and the Sikorsky Division of United Aircraft) produce heli-
copters for both military and civil users. A number of smaller
companies are developing helicopters and one, Piaseki Helicopter
Corporation, is producing transport helicopters for the Navy.
Lighter-than-air. — Little or no production of lighter-than-air craft
has taken place since the war, although one company, the Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., remains a source of supply for blimps for the
United States Navy and is also fostering new designs of large dirigible
types for both military and commercial uses.
Power plants. — Prior to the war, only conventional reciprocating
engines were manufactured in the United States. Two large com-
panies, Pratt and Whitney and Wright Aeronautical, supplied the
greatest number of large engines for the military and for the larger
civil aircraft. Near the end of the war, Allison (which also made
reciprocating engines), General Electric, and Westinghouse devel-
oped new type turbo-jet engines and are currently supplying them
in quantity for military aircraft. Pratt and Whitney and Wright
Aeronautical are in the process of developing turbo-jet engines while
continuing to produce conventional engines for use in current com-
mercial and civil type aircraft.
Instruments and other aircraft equipment. — The aircraft industry
also includes numerous companies (or divisions of companies) which
develop and manufacture instruments, radio and communication
equipment, accessories, and other items required in the modern air-
plane. This group generally produces for both the military and com-
mercial markets. Their combined importance is indicated by the fact
that over 17 percent of the cost of an average military aircraft is rep-
resented by Government furnished equipment procured from these
companies.
Exports of aircraft, engines, and equipment. — In the year 1946, the
United States exported 2,243 civil aircraft valued at $64,206,000 and
59 military aircraft valued at $1,057,000. In numbers, the markets
for the civil aircraft were: South America 827, the rest of North Amer-
ica (chiefly Canada and Mexico) 791, Central America and the Carib-
bean Area 169, Europe 195, and the rest of the world, 261. By value,
the markets for these civil aircraft were: South America, $15,200,000,
the rest of North America, $7,200,000; Central America and the Carib-
bean area $3,100,000, Europe $29,300,000, and to the rest of the world,
$9,400,000.
The value of the 2,490 aircraft engines exported in 1946 reached
$11,900,000, while exported propellers accounted for $1,000,000. The
markets for the exported engines were: South America 718, valued
at $2,200,000; Central America and the Caribbean area 217, valued at
$1,000,000; the rest of North America 602, valued at $1,900,000; Europe
780, valued at $5,800,000; and to the rest of the world 173, valued at
$1,100,000.
Recommendations
Most of the problems which beset the aircraft-manufacturing in-
dustry in 1946 and 1947 resulted from (a) over optimistic development
and production of commercial aircraft; (b) low-level military procure-
ment and (c) the absence of long-range military planning. As we
have said, military procurement in accordance with our recommenda-
tions in section I of this report will provide sufficient business to main-
tain the industry in a sound condition — but such business must be
wisely distributed.
The services must undertake more extensive planning and control
of procurement. We recommend that they be given the legislative
authority to do so.
We have pointed out that the industry comprises a number of sep-
arate companies. Although competition between these units should
be utilized to provide incentive to low costs and low prices, the aircraft-
manufacturing industry, being essential to the national defense, can-
not be freely competitive to such an extent that vital design teams
or production organizations are liquidated. Means must be devised
to avoid undue concentration of business in a few companies. This,
it is recognized, implies a greater degree of planning and control than
the services have heretofore undertaken, or is, in fact, permitted by
the peacetime procurement legislation which will again become ef-
59
fective on the expiration of the War Powers Act. Some continuation
of those special powers must be allowed if we are to achieve a balanced
aircraft industry.
Such planning must be directed toward avoidance of discontinui-
ties in production. As has been stated repeatedly in testimony, such
breaks in production result in high costs. Not only do many expenses
continue while production is interrupted, but the training of a new
labor force on resumption of operations involves a great increase in
unit costs.
Long-range planning. — Year-to-year planning of aircraft produc-
tion, which has been forced upon the services by current budgeting
practice, must give way to long-term planning. Evidence submitted
to us indicates that the savings on the uninterrupted production of
airplanes over a 5-year period, as compared to five annual procure-
ments of the same total number of planes, could run as high as 20 to
25 percent. Such savings result in part from the ordering of materials
and parts in larger quantities and to the more extensive tooling war-
ranted by the larger number of airplanes on the single order, but even
more from the more effective use of tools and manpower.
Long-range planning does not imply a single frozen procurement
program for a period of years, but rather the integration of several
concurrent plans, the duration of each of which will depend on its
particular character. While many projects can be planned for 5
years, others are of such a nature that they cannot be planned for
more than 2, 3, or 4 years ahead. The aggregate of such 2-, 3-, 4-,
and 5-year plans will constitute the "plan" for which a budget must
be prepared. All of these plans should be reviewed at least annually.
Forward contract authorization. — We recommend that the services
plan their aircraft procurement as far in advance as possible and that
the Congress provide the legislative base for such planning. We rec-
ommend the placing of orders for planes for delivery over a 5-year
period whenever possible. We propose that the budget be charged
each year with the necessary progress payments and the funds needed
to pay for the airplanes accepted in that year. Congress might pro-
vide funds for such planned procurement by appropriating funds
60
disbursable in the current year and for 5 or more years ahead. To do
so, however, would commit current funds needlessly. We propose,
instead, that the Congress make appropriations only of the moneys
to be disbursed in the current fiscal year, and provide for the additional
years of the procurement program by forward contract authorization,
permitting the services to contract for deliveries over the following
5 fiscal years. We recommend that the Congress retain complete con-
trol over such procurement through its subsequent annual appro-
priation of funds to liquidate the forward contract authorizations.
Industrial mobilization planning. — The ability of the aircraft man-
ufacturing industry to expand will control, to a large extent, the
magnitude of our strength in a future war. In section I of this re-
port we have concluded that the Air Force will need a storage reserve
of 8,100 airplanes to replace combat losses in the early months of
war, because industry will not be able to supply the needed planes
in time. This reserve would cost, at present standards and prices,
from $6 billion to $7 billion and, in addition, would require about
$2 billion a year to keep modern. An industrial mobilization plan
which can be depended upon to speed production after war starts
may reduce the size of the reserve which will be required.
According to the National Security Act of 1947, the coordination of
military, industrial and civilian mobilization is the responsiblty of
the National Security Resources Board. Based on the advice of the
Board, the President may direct the Secretary of Defense and the
heads of the appropriate civil departments to undertake the planning
of military and industrial mobilization. On the military side the
Secretary of Defense holds the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy
and the Air Force responsible for military and industrial mobiliza-
ticp planning within their respective services. On the civilian side,
it is our recommendation outlined in section V of this report that
the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Civil Aviation take
an active part in mobilization planning.
We urge that the Under Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the
Air Force give special attention to effecting such planning. We rec-
ommend that, at the administrative level, industrial mobilization plan-
61
ning receive attention comparable with that given to research, develop-
ment, and procurement.
It was urged on the Commission that all procurement and mobiliza-
tion planning functions of the Air Force should be carried out by
civilian personnel rather than by pilot officers whose tours of duty in
such activities are likely to be interspersed with other assignments.
We believe that it would be extremely difficult, because of Government
pay levels and civil service restrictions, to recruit and hold the quality
of civilians necessary for this type of work in numbers sufficient to
do the job adequately. We recommend, however, that the practice
of passing combat officers through such assignments on the assumption
that a well-trained officer must have had experience in all branches
of the Air Force should be discarded. With its maturity as a full-
fledged service under the National Security Act, the Air Force should
accept the fact that procurement and mobilization planning call for
officers with specialized industrial training who wish to make a life-
long career in those fields. Such officers should have the same oppor-
tunity for advancement in rank as those in other commands.
We recommend that, in the industrial mobilization planning pro-
gram, studies be made for all planning necessary to place one model
of each basic type of aircraft in production in a reserve plant in an
emergency, such planning to include the preparation of shop drawings,
operation sheets, bills of material, work orders, and the design of all
jigs, fixtures, and special tooling. This planning must also include
continual revisions to keep all material up to date.
We believe that top level attention should be given in each aircraft
manufacturing organization to industrial mobilization planning in
peacetime. Subcontract arrangements should be worked out in ad-
vance outside the aircraft industry. Licenses or other agreements
for the production of aircraft, power plants, propellers, instruments
and accessories by nonaeronautical firms should be entered into, ready
for activation in an emergency. The peacetime integration of such
companies within the air industrial mobilization plan should expedite
any expansion greatly.
62
We have heard a great deal of criticism of the current condition
of industrial mobilization planning. We believe, however, that with
the establishment of the responsibilities and procedures above outlined
this important work should go forward satisfactorily.
Mobilization authority. — Industrial mobilization planning is futile
if the mobilization cannot be carried out according to plan when the
emergency comes. To give value to such planning it is essential
(a) that the National Military Establishment reflect such plans an-
nually in a mobilization budget showing the appropriations and
forward contract authorization necessary to put this budget into effect
should mobilization be initiated in the then current fiscal year; (£)
that the Congress authorize (but not appropriate for) such mobiliza-
tion budget annually; (c) that the National Security Resources Board
set up an Office of War Mobilization, with the necessary subsidary
offices for the control of materials, production facilities, machine tools,
and other capital goods, to be held ready for activation upon declaration
of a national emergency and mobilization by the President; and (d ) that
in the event of such mobilization the Congress immediately vote the
necessary forward contract authorization and appropriation to support
the authorized mobilization budget. These first three actions, taken
by the National Military Establishment and by the Congress in peace-
time, when they can be considered calmly and carefully, will avoid
the necessity for a repetition of the hasty and costly improvisations of
World War II. We emphasize the importance of this preparation.
It is essential, in any future emergency, that all controls and all
planned procurement be initiated immediately upon the declaration
of an emergency by the President.
Strategic materials. — No mobilization planning can be carried out
in the absence of the materials from which the aircraft and other
aeronautical equipment are to be constructed. The Strategic and
Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (Public Law 520, 79th Cong.) and
the National Security Act of 1947 establish the authority and respon-
sibilities of the National Security Resources Board, the Munitions
Board, and of the Secretaries of Defense and of the Treasury, in re-
spect to the stock piling of strategic and critical materials. Attention
is directed to the importance of maintaining domestic sources of
critical and strategic materials as an effective and advantageous al-
ternative to the stock piling of certain imported items and materials.
Procurement policies.-^- We point out that the procurement policies
of the services must be directed to the provision of incentives to (a)
the design and development of aircraft which are both technically
superior and readily producible, (b) the production of such aircraft
at the lowest possible cost, and (c) maintenance of expansibility.
Design and development. — Aircraft are initially designed and de-
veloped on contracts which provide for the reimbursement of cost,
plus a fixed fee for administration. We believe this type of contract
is desirable for such initial procurement because the cost of developing
a new airplane cannot be ascertained in advance, and because the
contractor should have the greatest possible freedom in making changes
both to increase performance and, by improving producibility, to de-
velop an airplane which will be cheaper to build in quantity production.
Under present contracts, all rights for reproduction of a new design
become Government property although the success of the airplane
may be due largely to the contractor's particular knowledge and special
skills. The retention of some rights by the developing contractor
would provide an incentive to superior effort. We recommend that
some consideration be given to this point in drafting future legislation.
Producibility. — The importance of superior performance is so ob-
vious that the attention given it has, in the past, tended to obscure
the equally important factor of producibility. An airplane must be
superior both in performance and in producibility if it is to be an
effective military weapon. Of only slightly less importance is the ease
of maintenance which, in general, is related to producibility. An air-
craft easy to produce is also usually easy to maintain. We recommend
that the services put heavy emphasis on producibility in all future
aircraft-development contracts.
Low cost production. — The aircraft procurement program we have
recommended will cost the American taxpayer a great deal of money.
Every effort must be made by the procurement agencies to see that
the most effective use is made of that money. All possible incentives
must be provided for production at low unit costs and at low prices.
Expansibility. — Lowest cost production will sometimes be incom-
patible with expansibility, which would be increased by a greater
degree of tooling than is economical for the number of articles being
produced. Such additional tooling should be regarded as a part of
industrial mobilization planning and its added cost should not be a
charge against the production contract.
Design, development, and production continuity. — To be able to
plan for reasonable continuity of production, each company should,
at any given time, have at least one type in production, one in develop-
ment, and one in the design-study stage. The type or type of planes
to be developed and produced by each company should be determined
(a) by the needs of the service, and (£) by the interest and special
skills of the manufacturer. Companies which fail to develop success-
ful aircraft or which fail to produce at competitive cost levels will,
of course, eliminate themselves from military business. Conversely,
a new group submitting a promising design should be encouraged
and given the opportunity to become a producer upon demonstration
of its capabilities.
In as far as possible aircraft should be produced by the developing
company. More often than not the production airplane differs ma-
terially in detail from the original design. Engineering changes re-
sulting from the changing requirements of the services are frequent
during all stages of production. They may be complicated, and may
exert an important influence on the ultimate performance and the
final cost of the aircraft. It is considered essential, therefore, that the
company which initiated the design should be responsible for all de-
sign changes during the course of production. It is accordingly rec-
ommended that as a normal procedure, production contracts be given
to the organization which made the original design.
Where such a production order would overload that manufacturer's
facilities however, the contracting service should require him to sub-
contract a certain percentage of the new contract (or the equivalent
man-hours on a prior contract) elsewhere in the industry. Such a
subcontract could involve complete aircraft, or any parts or subas-
semblies thereof. If the placing of such an order with the developing
company would concentrate too much production in a single area,
the service should place it elsewhere, arranging with the developing
company for any necessary engineering assistance to enable the pro-
ducing company to build the aircraft economically, and to keep up
with any design changes.
Accessory development. — In the procurement of equipment from
companies which do not operate exclusively in the aircraft field, it
is important to provide incentives for military development. The
Attorney General has recently proposed that all rights to patentable
inventions made in the course of performing a Government-financed
contract be assigned to the Government. The adoption of such a
policy would turn research and development brains from Government
developments to commercial and industrial developments. Unless
instrument and accessory companies are permitted to retain design
rights commensurate with the risks taken, they will tend to avoid
Government development contracts.
Legislation. — To provide authority for the procurement policies and
procedures above recommended, we urge the enactment by Congress
of H. R. 1366 and H. R. 5031, both Eightieth Congress.
H. R. 1366. ARMED SERVICES PROCUREMENT ACT
This bill, which was passed by the House of Representatives at the
last session of Congress, provides for purchases by negotiation: (a)
When it is impracticable to secure competition, (£) where secrecy
should be maintained, (c) under other stated conditions and safe-
guards, and (d) of research and development work. The Secretary
of Defense is required to report negotiated contracts to Congress.
H. R. 5031. VINSON-TRAMMELL REPEALER
This bill, which repeals part of the provisions of the Vinson-Tram-
mell Act of 1934, as amended, was passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives at the last session of Congress. It removes the requirement
that 10 percent of naval aircraft and engines be made in Government
plants, and substitutes the authorization that the President or the Sec-
66
retary of the Navy may use Government aircraft factories for the
manufacture of naval aircraft and engines whenever private manu-
facturing proposals indicate that the Government is being deprived
of unrestricted competition, or when private quotations appear unrea-
sonable, or when such use of Government factories appears to be in
the public interest. The 10-percent requirement of Government man-
ufacture of aircraft has in fact never been completely operative, due to
suspensions both legislative and executive. Should it become fully
operative it would work to the disadvantage of the Government, and
we believe that it should be repealed.
H. R. 5031 also removes the profit limitation of 10 percent placed
on Navy contracts for the construction of ships and the profit limi-
tation of 12 percent placed upon Navy and Air Force contracts for
the construction of aircraft. It must be noted, however, that if H. R.
5031 were enacted and the statutory profit limitation on Navy and
Air Force contracts adopted, the Services would be required in all cases
to assure themselves of the reality of competition, that contracts are
entered into at reasonable prices, and that expenditures of Government
funds are effectively controlled. It will be difficult, however, to obtain
this assurance because of the practice of awarding production contracts
to the designing contractor without competition.
We do not recommend the repeal of this statutory profit limitation
until a substitute is enacted which, by provision for renegotiation or
otherwise, will protect the Government against excessive profits and
prices.
Plant dispersion. — At the end of World War II, the aircraft and air-
craft engine plants were well dispersed, as shown on the map else-
where in this section. A large part of our total production of military
aircraft is now concentrated in the Los Angeles area, on Long Island,
and at Seattle.
It is regrettable that the wartime-plant dispersion was not main-
tained. Our reserve plants (i. e., Government-owned plants not now
in operation) are still well dispersed. If, in response to a mobilization
order, reserve plants are brought into production, the total aircraft
manufacturing plant pattern would represent an effective geographical
dispersal. If, on the other hand, an attack should precede activation
of the reserve plants, the industry will offer highly concentrated targets.
We recommend that, in future plant expansion, the services avoid
further concentration in these areas as far as possible.
Plant reserve. — The Air Coordinating Committee proposed that a
reserve of industrial plant be established and maintained, consisting
of 16,000,000 square feet of specialized airframe plant area (19,000,000
square feet if plant dispersion were not maintained) and 10,000,000
square feet of specialized engine plant area. The program for a reserve
of specialized plant has been modified to the extent that certain plants
have been sold or leased, or are being offered for sale or lease, subject
to recapture on 90 days' notice in event of an emergency. Two plants
(5,800,000 square feet) have been set aside for the storage of machine
tools under the program discussed below. Including these two plants
a total of 21,200,000 square feet of specialized airframe plane and
11,700,000 square feet of specialized aircraft engine plant are now avail-
able. We recommend that this program be maintained to assure the
continuing availability of these plants.
Machine tool reserve. — It was proposed by the Air Coordinating
Committee that a reserve of general purpose machine tools be estab-
lished and maintained, with 65,000 machine tools as a minimum.
These reserve tools are being acquired and placed in storage by the
Air Force and Navy under Public Law 364 (Both Cong.). We rec-
ommend that this program be completed.
Contract overhaul. — A number of substantial civilian organizations
are engaged in the overhaul of transport aircraft. This is a specialized
type of business quite separate from the manufacture of airplanes.
Testimony before us has indicated the economy and other advantages
of having modification and overhaul of military aircraft done by such
civilian organizations under contract. This is particularly true when
the same types of cargo or transport aircraft can be overhauled in
the same shops for both the military services and the civil airlines.
The services are not in agreement and stress the need for training
their own overhaul personnel in their own shops. We recognize the
validity of the argument but recommend that the services weigh care-
68
fully the savings possible through contract overhaul, and the possible
long-term advantages of building up civilian staffs trained in such work
for use in an emergency.
Federal regulation of personal aircraft. — The present detailed re-
quirements for certificating light aircraft of new design are complex,
and tend to retard experimental design. The Commission agrees with
the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics that it is time to recognize and
encourage the moral and legal responsibility of the light aircraft man-
ufacturers for the safety and integrity of their products. The Fed-
eral Government should continue to promulgate aircraft design
standards in collaboration with established technical groups, research
agencies and safety organizations, but compliance with these stand-
ards should be the primary responsibility of the manufacturer. After
careful initial checking for competence, each should be required to
certify to the airworthiness, the proper flight characteristics and oper-
ational limitations of the production type and to the fact that the air-
plane has been submitted to an exhaustive performance and service
test. The present testing procedure now executed by the CAA should
be conducted and sworn to by the manufacturer.
To discourage the entrance of irresponsible or technically ill-
equipped firms into the private aircraft industry and to prevent the
deterioration of standards among established firms, we recommend
that the Government establish simplified but adequate standards of
fitness and ability to be met and maintained by each company selling
personal aircraft. A manufacturer's certificate based on proven ability
should be issued by the Department of Commerce. Periodic spot
checks should be made, and the Department should have the power
of revocation for just cause. By thus certifying qualified manu-
facturers they could, in turn, certify all personal airplanes.
Export assistance. — The export of aircraft and aeronautical material
provides a volume of business which, by helping to sustain the indus-
try, contributes to the national defense potential and to our economic
welfare. The Export-Import Bank should, we believe, be utilized
as a financing medium to aid in making sales of aircraft and aero-
nautical equipment in foreign countries. The Export-Import Bank
now requires that the manufacturer assume up to 25 percent of the
credit risk. This is beyond the financial means of most of the Amer-
ican aircraft manufacturers at the present time. In view of the na-
tional defense advantage, we believe the Bank should be authorized to
assume a larger share of the credit risk on export sales of aircraft and
aircraft equipment.
Conclusion. — Setting up the National Military Establishment was
one of the most important moves in the long struggle to provide the
United States with adequate air power. As it settles down into a
smooth running organization it can, and must, deal with the many
policy problems that have long plagued our aircraft manufacturing
industry in peacetime.
A number of those problems have been laid before the Commission
in testimony. Our consultants have called our attention to others.
We have seen some for ourselves in visiting aircraft and engine fac-
tories, and a few of our great research and development centers.
The above recommendations embody our opinion of the minimum
requirements of the aircraft industry at the present time. The needs
of this important element of our national defense must be dealt with
sympathetically by those charged with the future security of the
United States.
70
Section III
Aeronautical Research and Development
Aeronautical Research and Development1
Summary
There is little need to stress the point that intensive research and
development in aeronautics are essential to the national defense and
to the national welfare. No witness before the Commission presented
a contrary view. All agreed that whatever money is spent for the
purpose can be looked upon as a vital form of national insurance, a
direct contribution toward maintaining our leadership in the air.
Evidence placed before the Commission, however, indicated some
need for reappraisal of certain phases of our research programs and
policies. During World War II we concentrated on the development
of existing types of aircraft for production, and practically abandoned
fundamental research in the aeronautical sciences. By VJ-day our
reserve of research information was largely exhausted. If we are to
have an air establishment of the first quality, we will have to concen-
trate, as other nations are doing, on our fundamental aeronautical re-
search. Development, that is the making of new aeronautical devices,
cannot move ahead faster than our fundamental research.1
The established governmental agencies for the conduct and coor-
dination of aeronautical research appear to be doing a good job with
the funds at their disposal. Care must constantly be exercised, how-
ever, that our research and development programs produce completed
articles at frequent intervals that would be immediately useful for
a war at any time.
Most witnesses urged the necessity of increased appropriations for
the purpose of expanding research activities. In this we concur. We
have been convinced that there is urgent need for extending our fun-
damental knowledge of aerodynamic phenomena in all speed ranges,
1 The distinction between the terms "research" and "development" as here used is not always
sharp. In general, however, research is the seeking for new basic knowledge from which better
aircraft, missiles, or other aeronautic devices may be developed.
73
particularly in the supersonic (above 760 m. p. h. at sea level), as such
speeds are of particular importance in the design of high-speed pilotec
aircraft and of long-range guided missiles. Also, we are seriously
deficient in our knowledge of theory and its application in the matter
of accurate guidance of missiles to selected targets. Evidence is in
the record that we lack the minimum facilities necessary to do an ade
quate research job in those new areas.
The provision of additional funds, however, will not of itself solve
the problem. The most serious shortage is in personnel. Due to the
hiatus of the war years in the output of young engineers and scientists
we are short of qualified people. Recognizing this need, the Com
mission is unanimous in its belief that every possible encouragemen
should be given to our universities and scientific institutions to train
more, and better aeronautical scientists. Undergraduate course;
should be strengthened and exceptional students encouraged to con
tinue in advanced work. The proposed establishment of a Nationa
Science Foundation with its program of grants and fellowships would
help materially. Government contracts for supplemental research
granted to educational institutions offer one of the most effective means
of providing funds for the purpose. The Commission recommends
that this method be developed as far and as fast as is consistent with
the results obtained.
International Competition
For national security, second best military aircraft are simply not
good enough. On the commercial side, inefficient or unsafe aircraft
and unreliable or inadequate nagivational aids cannot be tolerated.
We must keep ahead in the race for military supremacy. And it
is a race. Although the great aeronautical laboratories of Germany,
Italy, and Japan have been dismantled and destroyed, other strong
contenders are now in the field. Britain, France, and Russia are
vigorously pushing new aeronautical research programs. The British,
in spite of a generally strained economy, have made drastic sacrifices
to make available this year some 30,000,000 pounds sterling ($120,-
000,000) for air research. They are modernizing war-worn equipment
and are installing extensive new facilities, among them a National
74
Gas Turbine Establishment at Whetstone, the new Areonautical Re-
search Center at Bedford, and the new Telecommunications Estab-
lishment at Malvern.
The French, although seriously hampered by postwar fiscal and
social problems, are reported to be building a large group of high-
speed wind tunnels somewhere in the French Alps. A huge hydro-
electric station, developing some 100,000 horsepower, is being in-
stalled at the site to provide the necessary power. Other prewar
research facilities are being reactivated as fast as general economic
conditions permit.
There is published evidence that aeronautical research and develop-
ment programs on a very large scale are under way in Russia.
Although we have difficulty in obtaining aeronautical information
from other countries, they have almost complete access to our own
data. We spread our latest advances in the aeronautical arts on the
pages of our newspapers and magazines. The Air Force and the
Navy appear to be competing publicly for recognition of their indi-
vidual progress. When a new speed record is set, or a new model
of advanced design is pushed out of the shop, its physical dimensions
and its performance figures are quoted, and clear photographs show-
ing the general configuration and the details of the new plane are
broadcast. Admittedly, there are practical difficulties in keeping a
6-36 or a B-47 hidden from public view. Also, it is argued, the tax-
payer has a right to know what he is getting for his money. But,
whatever the difficulties or objections, the Commission believes that
continuing and rigid enforcement of wartime security measures with
regard to advanced aeronautical development is necessary now. For
reasons outlined earlier in this report, it is desirable that our military
readiness and our potential strength be known to the world. But we
cannot now afford to show all the cards in our hand. The stakes are
too high.
Status of U. S. Aeronautical Research and Development
Military aviation in the United States had its beginning with the
establishment of the Aviation Section, Signal Corps, in 1907. A
few years later (1911) the Navy set up an Aeronautics Group in the
75
Bureau of Navigation, which later became the Bureau of Aeronautics.
By 1915 it had become obvious that neither branch of the service could
cope adequately with the problem of satisfying a growing need for
basic research in aeronautics. To meet that need, Congress authorized
(1915) the formation of the National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics, an independent Federal agency. Since that time, the NACA
has produced most of the basic aerodynamic and structural data from
which the Navy and the Air Force and the aviation industry have
developed practically all commercial and military aircraft. It now
operates three of the world's largest aeronautical laboratories, (i)
at Langley Field, Va.; (2) at Moffett Field, Calif.; and (3) at Cleve-
land, Ohio. The first two cover aerodynamic, hydrodynamic, struc-
tural, and flight research. The latter engages chiefly in power plant
studies of all kinds.
On March 21, 1946, a National Aeronautical Research Policy was
'formulated by the Army Air Forces, the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics,
the Civil Aeronautics Administration, the NACA and the aircraft
industry. It was promulgated largely to clarify the relationships of
the NACA with the other research and development agencies. Under
this policy, the NACA is charged with the responsibility for "research
in the aeronautical sciences"; the military services with the respon-
sibility for the "evaluation of military aircraft and equipment and the
exploration of possible military applications of reasearch results"; the
Civil Aeronautics Administration with the responsibility of "expedit-
ing the practical use in civil aeronautics of newly developed aircraft
and equipment"; and the aircraft industry with the responsibility for
the "application of research results in the design and development
of improved aircraft equipment, both civil and military." In addition,
the policy statement sets forth the conditions under which the research
facilities of the NACA are to be available to the other groups.
Work done by the Air Force (at Wright Field, Dayton, Muroc
Air Base, Calif., and Eglin Field, Fla.) and by the Navy (at Philadel-
phia Navy Yard, Patuxent River, Md., and at Point Mugu, Calif.)
consists largely of the evaluation and testing of aircraft, power plants
and their components, and guided missiles. These laboratories draw
on the NACA for fundamental data. They collaborate with the
caircraft industry in developing practical weapons for military use.
Certain other Government agencies conduct research in fields related
to aeronautics. The Civil Aeronautics Administration operates a Tech-
nical Development Center at Indianapolis, Ind., for the testing and
evaluating of airways equipment and miscellaneous aircraft auxiliaries
for commercial use. The United States Weather Bureau and the
United States Bureau of Standards are actively engaged in research
and development projects with aviation application.
In order to increase research capacity during the war, many univer-
sities and engineering schools were awarded aeronautical research
projects under Government contract. The results have been excellent.
Not only do such projects yield answers to specific research problems,
but they have developed a nucleus of trained research personnel that
is definitely a national asset. They also provide a needed element of
competition on fundamental research problems.
Many of the companies in the aircraft manufacturing industries
have installed elaborate facilities for the development and testing of
aircraft and components. These laboratories, however, are generally
operated for the improvement of particular products, and their find-
ings contribute more than a little to the generally available pool of
information.
Since our national security is keyed directly to the state of our aero-
nautical knowledge, it is only logical that the responsibility for plan-
ning and guiding of the Government's over-all development programs
(as distinct from research) should be vested in the military. The re-
cently established Research and Development Board within the new
National Military Establishment, is charged with this responsibility.
Through its several technical committees and subcommittees it coor-
dinates the aeronautical programs of the Air Force, Navy, and other
agencies with activities in other related scientific fields, authoritatively
within the National Military Establishment and on a voluntary basis
with respect to external agencies. The establishment of this Board,
is, in the opinion of the Commission, a proper and sound means of
advancing and coordinating this very important work.
The financial support of aeronautical research in the United States
has been accepted as a proper responsibility of Government. The work
contributes directly to the national defense, and the scale of operations
is now so great that no civilian organization could foot the bill. Ex-
77
penditures for the purposes actually increased in the first postwar year
(fiscal 1946) to approximately $450,000,000, roughly $100,000,000
over the wartime peak. The following fiscal year (1947), appropria-
tions dropped back to some $240,000,000.
For fiscal 1948, the Government is spending about $312,000,000 for
aeronautical research and development. This figure represents the
total direct effort toward the solution of problems in the aeronautical
sciences. Other branches of the physical sciences, however, are mak-
ing increasing contributions to the field of aeronautics. For example,
research in the ceramic industry may lead to improvements in the
design of jet turbine Hading, or physiological research may yield re-
sults that may change the design of pressurized cockpits for high al-
titude fighters. It is difficult to evaluate the worth of such contributions
in dollars, but it is evident that the total amount of money going
into aeronautical research is considerably greater than the figures
specifically earmarked in the budgets.
The 1948 appropriations for aeronautical research and development
in the several agencies is shown in the following table:
Aeronautical Research and Development Expenditures Fiscal Year 1948
•
Agency
Expenditures
Amount
Percent
of total
Air Force
$145, 316, 000
75, 000, 000
43, 449, 000
30, 000, 000
11, 000, 000
4, 952, 000
1, 670, 000
521,000
1 (838, 200)
46.6
24-0
13-9
9.7
3-5
1.6
.5
.2
Bureau of Aeronautics — Navy . .
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
Bureau of Ordnance — Navy . .
Ordnance Department— Army
Office of Naval Research
Civil Aeronautics Administration
Weather Bureau
Bureau of Standards »
Total
$311,908,000
100.0
1 Aeronautical research and development projects conducted by the Bureau of Standards are
financed by contributions from other agencies of the Government. The amount shown is
included in the above items.
The military services, together with the NACA, absorb approxi-
mately 99 percent of the entire program. The Air Force alone takes
about half.
Aeronautical research and development programs within the air-
craft industry are almost entirely supported by the armed forces. Al-
though some very important research is carried out by industry at
ts own expense, the cost is small when compared with that financed
>y the Government. The work carried on by the aircraft companies
s chiefly development of particular items under contract with the
ervices. If, for example, the services need a ground-to-air missile
with certain characteristics, contracts may be let to several aircraft
companies to provide a number of design studies. The develop-
ment— that is, the attaining of the desired result is left to the ingenuity
of the companies.
The armed forces will allocate approximately $168,000,000 for re-
search and development contracts with the aircraft industry during
the fiscal year 1948. In the main, the work performed under such
contracts is prototype development — the experimental construction of
new aircraft, propulsion units or allied equipment for test purposes
only. In some cases, of which the RAND project is an example, the
studies are more academic in nature, and no physical article, except
a report, is called for under the contract.
Aeronautical research work in educational and scientific institu-
tions is almost entirely supported by the Government. Few uni-
versities could sponsor extensive aeronautical projects with their own
funds. The total to be allocated by all Government agencies for such
work in universities, during the year 1948, is $31,000,000. The
NACA's share is $800,000.
Thus, of the total appropriations to the services, approximately
$200,000,000 goes for research and development work carried on by
the aircraft industry and in educational and scientific institutions
under contract to the services. The balance is spent in planning and
evaluation by the services in their own facilities.
79
Suggested Areas for Continued Research
This Commission does not consider it within its province to evalu-
ate specific research projects, nor to recommend detailed programs
to be followed by research laboratories. Such matters are clearly
within the scope of the National Research and Development Board,
the NACA, and the Armed Services. During the course of the testi-
mony, however, a number of suggestions were made concerning addi-
tional research projects or desirable changes in specific current pro-
grams. They are listed below. Doubtless there are many others
which did not come to the Commission's attention. The arrange-
ment is alphabetical, and does not in any way reflect an order of rela-
tive importance.
Atomic propulsion. — The possibility of employing atomic energy
for the propulsion of aircraft and guided missiles is sufficiently im-
portant to warrant vigorous action by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, the Air Force, the Navy, and the NACA. Some work of a
preliminary nature has already been done in this field by the AEC,
the Air Force and its NEPA project. Immediate steps should be
taken to intensify research effort in this field under a plan which
would be supported by all of the above agencies and under which the
project would be given the benefit of all the background information
in the atomic field actually needed by the recipients for the appro-
priate performance of their respective functions.
Electronics. — The science of electronics contributes to almost every
segment of modern industry. It is an essential tool for aeronautical
research. The safe functioning of all commercial and military air-
craft depends upon it. It makes a vital contribution to our national
security.
At least three very important phases of current aeronautical devel-
opment involve extensive use of complicated electronic devices — (i)
the detection of the approach of enemy aircraft or missiles; (2) the
guidance of our own missiles and pilotless aircraft to targets, and (3)
the navigational and blind landing requirements of all aircraft. As
a result, the Air Force is expending approximately 12 percent of
80
all research and development funds for the current year on elec-
tronics— and the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics, 18 percent.
The funds allocated in fiscal 1948 for electronics development for
aeronautics by the two services are as follows:
Research
Develop-
ment
Total
Air Force
3 300 000
10, 780, 000
14 080 000
Bureau of Aeronautics
1 700 000
10 800 000
12. 500 000
Total
5 000 000
21, 580 000
26 580 000
The Air Force electronics facilities consist chiefly of the Electronics
Subdivision at Wright Field ; the Watson Laboratories at Eatontown,
N. J., the Cambridge Field Station at Cambridge, Mass. ; and the Flight
Research Units at Middletown, Pa., and at Boca Raton, Fla. The
Navy's electronic work, conducted principally under the Bureau of
Aeronautics and the Office of Naval Research, is carried on at the Naval
Research Laboratory at Anacostia. The Bureau of Standards operates
the Central Radio Propagation Laboratory at Washington. A com-
mittee on electronics of the Research and Development Board is
charged with the coordination of these activities.
In addition to the above, the Civil Aeronautics Administration con-
ducts its investigations and evaluations of electronic navigational equip-
ment at its own station at Indianapolis Airport. Also a number of
other laboratories throughout the country are conducting a wide range
of electronic research. Extensive work is being done in the aeronau-
tical industry, in universities, and in the large electric equipment man-
ufacturing companies such as General Electric, Westinghouse, Bell
Telephone Laboratories, RCA, and many others.
It has been suggested to the Commission that the extent and diversity
of electronic research calls for better means of coordination than now
exist. The question has been raised as to whether or not the results
obtained in the various laboratories are being made available in full
to researchers in guided missiles, and in the more highly specialized
81
fields of aeronautics. To resolve these problems, the establishment
of a new Government agency, a National Advisory Committee for
Electronics paralleling the NACA, has been suggested. Its primary
function would be coordination, but the plan, as proposed, contem-
plates also the establishment of research laboratories, including an
extensive firing range for free-flight tests of guided missiles.
After studying plans submitted by existing research agencies for
new laboratories and new flight test stations and missile firing ranges,
it would appear that adequate facilities to handle the electronic re-
quirements for aeronautical research for the foreseeable future will
be forthcoming. The injection of an entirely new organization into
the field would tend to complicate rather than simplify the problems.
It will be difficult enough to find technically qualified people to man
the presently projected facilities without considering another one.
Further, whatever coordination is required, as to the armed
services, falls properly within the purview of the Research and Develop-
ment Board. It should extend its Committee activities to cover all
governmental and private agencies engaged in electronic research. The
Commission feels that the coordination problem can well be left in
the hands of the Board, and that the formation of an NACE although
possibly desirable at some future date, is not necessary at the present
time.
Guided missiles.— During the latter phases of World War II, Ger-
many, after a great amount of basic research and experimentation,
evolved two forms of guided missiles— the subsonic airborne "buzz
bomb," V-i, and the supersonic, high altitude rocket, V-2. Both
were reasonably successful at ranges up to 200 miles. In interconti-
nental warfare of the future, both types may prove to be useful, but
their characteristics must be greatly improved and their range must
be greatly extended.
The German techniques are now well known, but the development
of successful missiles for extremely long ranges is still a tremendous
problem. It will require the most intensive application of our best
82
research talent, coupled with the. expenditure of very large amounts
of money for experimentation, before we can hope to produce a pilot-
less weapon of either class that will have a reasonable chance of hitting
a distant selected target.
We must also consider the defense against missiles launched against
us, an even more difficult problem. Nothing was developed during
the war that could cope with the V-2, yet we must be prepared to
intercept and to destroy invisible missiles that will plunge toward
our cities out of the stratosphere at speeds of over a mile per second.
The practical difficulties involved in detecting, tracking, intercepting,
and destroying them with other missiles miles above the earth are
enormous. Whether or not this can ever be done is not clear.
The rapid development of long-range missiles for offense, and of
accurate, high-altitude target-seeking missiles for defense are of great
importance to our national security. Research in these areas must be
given the highest priority. Further, research effort must not be limited
by failure to provide adequate funds. What may appear to be over-
generosity in appropriations now may easily prove most economical
in the long run.
The funds being spent this year on guided-missiles research are not
insignificant. Some $75,000,000 — almost one-quarter of the total re-
search and development appropriation — are earmarked for the pur-
pose. This work also benefits indirectly from appropriations for
research in many other fields.
The figures which have been furnished us indicate some disparity
of effort in the subsonic and in the supersonic, pointing up a trend
toward the abandonment of the slower, more vulnerable, missiles.
The Commission has been advised, however, that the subsonic missile
offers the most practical means of testing and developing the intricate
guidance mechanisms for the supersonic types, and it suggests, there-
fore, that the technique be fully exploited before funds for subsonic
research are entirely eliminated.
The Commission has noted that at least four agencies of the Na-
tional Defense Establishment are concerned with research on guide
missiles. It understands that their activities are coordinated throu^
a very active committee of the Research and Development Board. L
view of the extremely high cost of this work, such coordination shoulc
be given high priority.
From the evidence submitted, it appears that there may be som<
danger of overrunning our basic knowledge in an effort to develc
production articles too soon in order to justify the optimistic pre
dictions of the "push-button warfare" protagonists. We must fin
be certain that we are on the right track, and not permit ourselves to
be led up blind alleys by too great impatience for results.
Here is a case where making haste slowly will certainly pay. A
modern long-range military missile is an exceedingly complicated
device built of the finest materials to watchmaker's standards. It
depends for its proper functioning on the solution of the most complex
problems in aerodynamics, ballistics, electronics, and metallurgy. It
is extremely expensive. Time and money will be wasted unless a
reasonable balance can be maintained between research progress and
development demand.
Helicopters. — The direct-lift, rotary-wing type of aircraft appears
so promising that continuous research and development effort is war-
ranted. It has many possible military and commercial uses. Its ca-
pabilities for rescue work at sea and in isolated areas has been well
demonstrated by the United States Coast Guard. There are many
other applications that should be thoroughly explored. The direction
of the research and the priorities to be assigned to helicopter investi-
gations are matters to be decided by the NACA. There are several
young and vigorous companies in the field that may be counted upon
to push helicopter development as fast as the basic data become avail-
able to them.
Lighter-than-atr. — We have been advised that nonrigid airships
(blimps) of the type used during World War II will be useful in the
future for carrying radar and other devices for the detection of sub-
marines. The Commission has no comment to offer in this connection
except that the Navy should continue whatever research and devel-
opment effort may be necessary to insure the provision of lighter-than-
air equipment most suitable for its special purposes.
Regarding the large rigid airship, the decision made by the Army
and the Navy some years ago that it had little military use appears
to have been sound. The armed services must decide such matters
on the basis of their special requirements for carrying out their mis-
sions. A case has been presented for the large airship as an economical
means of long-range transport for commercial passengers and cargo.
If the argument is sound, private capital will no doubt be attracted
to the project — and there should be little need for Government sub-
sidy.
Personal aircraft. — Elsewhere in this report the economics of per-
sonal flying have been discussed. The assistance given to the private
owner by the Government in providing and in maintaining airports
and airways has also been noted.
Another way in which Government may properly encourage the
development of aircraft suitable for private use is by the NACA
continuing some research directly applicable to small aircraft. Any
device that would make possible lower landing speeds coupled with
higher top speeds would be significant from the standpoint of the
private pilot and would have useful military implications. Slotted
wings and trailing-edge flaps have been the subject of NACA investi-
gations for many years, but further research on boundary-layer con-
trol would appear to be useful. Unconventional configurations (pos-
sibly combining the principles of the helicopter and the fixed-wing
airplane) should be fully explored, as such studies might open new
fields for designers in their search for the ideal aircraft for the private
owner.
The NACA effort in these areas should be limited strictly to basic
research, and not be applied to the development of any commercial
article. In such fields of activity, the normal laws of economics
should control the direction and rate of development.
The military services cannot offer much in the way of direct finan-
cial assistance to the individual experimenter who may have a new
idea for the development of a new type of personal aircraft. They
should lend what encouragement they can, however, in the form of
loans of surplus or semiobsolete equipment for experimental pur-
poses. The prewar practice of lending engines, instruments, propel-
lers, etc., should be pursued whenever occasion offers. When such
equipment is thus loaned, the services should be given first informa-
tion on any new inventions or developments which may result.
Power plants. — The Commission has been advised by witnesses that
gas turbines and rocket engines will ultimately replace reciprocating
engines in future military aircraft. There is no doubt that these new
and powerful power plants hold great promise for the future and re-
search and development on them must be pursued diligently. The
jet engine is applicable to high-speed fighters and fast bombers. It
is the power plant that will make possible routine flights in the super-
sonic-speed range. Its development, therefore, is of prime importance.
The present limitation of the jet engine is its high fuel consumption,
which reduces the range of the plane. Its service life is also relatively
short. Research must be directed toward overcoming both handi-
caps. The turbine-propeller combination offers possibilities for range
improvement at somewhat lower aircraft speeds. Continued research
and development on this type is also important.
The suggestion has been made that all research and development
on piston-type engines should be abandoned to permit full concentra-
tion on the newer types. In this we cannot agree. The conventional
combination of the piston engine and propeller will be useful for many
years for both long-range bombers and transports and, therefore, any
suggestion of the abandonment of research and development in this
field seems premature. Moreover, it is not impossible that new ap-
plications of ducted fan or compressor jet designs may actually open
up new uses for the piston engine. These potentials should be com-
pletely exhausted before the conventional engine is discarded.
Transport equipment. — The design of transport and cargo aircraft
benefits directly from research and development on military types.
As far as basic theory is concerned, laboratory data secured for one
class applies equally well to the other. For this reason there appears
to be little need for specialized basic research (apart from develop-
86
ment) on the airplanes themselves. It is obvious, however, that there
is an urgent need for improvement in equipment and methods required
to increase the safety and regularity of transport operations, civil or
military. The most important single item for intensified research is
in the field of navigation, particularly the problem of making safe
landings on airfields where visibility is limited because of bad weather
conditions.
The Army, Navy, and CAA are conducting research and develop-
ment in all-weather flying techniques. During the past 10 years, some
progress has been made, but the surface of the problem has only been
scratched. We are still a long way from the goal of 100 percent safety
and 100 percent schedule regularity.
The Commission has heard a great deal of testimony regarding the
several systems that have been devised for making blind landings
with aircraft. Whether Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) or In-
strument Landing System (ILS) or any combination thereof is proper
for any particular site is a matter that must be decided on a purely
technical basis. The systems are not competitive. One supplements
the other, but the combination is extremely expensive. There may
be more effective and more economical ways of doing the job.
The Government is now making installations of one or both systems
at some major airports in the United States. This is certainly a long
step in the right direction. At best, however, these installations do
not permit full operation under all weather conditions. Their capacity
for the safe handling of traffic is far below requirements at many
air terminals. Although they are far better than anything that has
heretofore been available, they do not yet permit the degree of safety
and regularity of operations that must be attained before our air trans-
portation system can be fully acceptable. More money and more re-
search effort must be put on the problem immediately. The public
interest demands a solution at the earliest possible moment.
Since the blind landing of military aircraft in wartime may be even
more important than the handling of commercial aircraft in peacetime,
the Research and Development Board of the National Military Es-
tablishment should take the matters under immediate advisement in
its Air Navigation Committee.
The Air Coordinating Committee has set up a subcommittee with
members from airlines, Department of Commerce, military services,
and the manufacturers to pull together all the existing facts and to
recommend a course of action to be followed. The responsibility
for future development should be clarified — whether it should be in
the hands of the military or of the civil air authorities. The ACC
should also advise the Congress as to the appropriations which should
be made annually to implement its recommendations.
Since the problem of weather is so intimately involved, the recom-
mendation should be extended to cover whatever research appears
necessary in that field. The work so far carried out by the Armed
Services and the Weather Bureau on the structure of thunderstorms,
the behavior of cyclones and hurricanes, and on other natural phe-
nomena has opened the door to better understanding of the weather.
The possibility of inducing precipitation or of dispersing fogs around
airports by artificial means has important civil and military implica-
tions. Vigorous research should be continued in such fields.
Recommendations — Research Policy
The Commission has, of necessity, limited itself in the preceding
paragraphs to outlining certain suggestions for particular avenues
of research. Paradoxically, it can be more specific in the broader
areas of policy.
Budgetary policy. — The ordinary procedures laid down by the
Bureau of the Budget for the procurement of specific articles are inad-
equate when applied to research projects. When a particular object
is the end-point of a purchase order, a specification may be written,
a definite delivery date agreed upon, and an estimate of cost may be
made. A research project, on the other hand, particularly in a field
which is as fluid as that of the aeronautical sciences, does not lend
itself to this approach. It is practically impossible to forecast the out-
come of a pure research project, to say nothing of detailing the pro-
cedures that must be followed, the inventions that may be necessary,
or the wastage that may develop in the course of the work. To try
to satisfy a formula which involves a detailed description of the pro-
posed research and its expected results approximately a year in ad-
vance of the beginning of the work is a sheer waste of effort for the
research agency and for the Bureau of the Budget alike.
To simplify procedures and to eliminate restrictive budgeting limi-
tations on urgent research programs, the Commission recommends
that each aeronautical research agency be allocated a lump sum an-
nually. The appropriation should be based on its estimated over-all
operating requirements, modified by its performance record, the im-
portance of the objective toward which the project is aimed, and the
then-current over-all budget situation. No fixed amount should be
allocated to any particular piece of research. The agency should have
blanket permission to distribute funds to meet the needs of the several
projects on its program. At the end of each fiscal year it would be
required to present a detailed accounting of the utilization of its funds
to the Bureau of the Budget and to the Congress. The Commission
feels that by annual review, research funds could be reasonably con-
trolled without imposing limitations which now tend to retard
progress.
The above applies to funds required for the conduct of research.
Frequently an agency is hampered because an unexpected need arises
within a fiscal period for the construction of a new facility or for the
installation of some equipment urgently required to carry out a par-
ticular project. To meet such emergencies the Commission further
recommends that each agency be allotted annually a revolving fund
for the construction of new facilities. Expenditures from this fund
should be approved by the Director of the Budget and should be re-
viewed annually by the Congress.
One of the most serious limitations on research at the present time
is the inability on the part of a research agency or a contractor to com-
mit funds for a period greater than 2 years beyond the fiscal year for
which the funds are appropriated. Research is inherently a long-
term matter. Few projects can yield satisfactory results if rushed to
completion to meet a short-term contractual deadline. Adequate
planning cannot be carried out on such a basis. It is difficult to secure
and to retain the type of personnel required unless some continuity of
employment is guaranteed. The Commission recommends, therefore,
that appropriate legislation be passed so that research agencies may be
granted contracting authorization to cover a 5-year period, and that
research contracts covering work in universities and outside labora-
tories be drawn on a 5-year, rather than a i- or 2-year basis. It urges
the enactment by Congress of H. R. 4035 (8oth Cong.). This bill
facilitates research and development by and for the Air Force and
Navy. It authorizes the Secretaries to establish Research Advisory
Committees and to employ experts, and provides for the availability
of appropriations for four fiscal years following the year of obligation.
Some safeguards must be provided. A limit must be put on the
current rate of expenditure to insure that the large volume of con-
tract carry-over will not be used up at an improper rate and run out
too soon. Also some provision should be made to recover funds that
may become frozen in contracts that prove to be impracticable of
completion, and should be terminated.
It would appear worthwhile to encourage manufacturers to accept
research and development contracts more readily by liberalizing pol-
icies regarding cost allowances. It is now the practice to disallow most
of the items that would usually be included as normal overhead in
negotiating commercial contracts. Fees for management are trimmed
down or eliminated entirely. As a result, manufacturers tend to shy
away from taking contracts on projects that may be inherently worth-
while, but on which they stand to lose money, or, at least, break even.
Items for research are generally disallowed in aircraft contracts,
unless it can be shown that the research involved applies directly
to a particular contract. Pure research can seldom be so specific. The
net result has been to discourage general research on the part of air-
craft manufacturers. They have been forced to rely almost entirely
on the output of the NACA for their fundamental information.
The Commission would not argue that research effort by the NACA
be reduced in any degree, but it does recommend that Government
auditors be allowed more leeway in accepting reasonable costs for
90
research by manufacturers as legitimate charges against development
contracts. By thus encouraging manufacturers to increase their own
research effort, the aeronautic art will move ahead faster. More re-
search facilities, well dispersed, will come into being — and, most im-
portant of all, the roster of aeronautical research workers will tend to
expand.
Coordination of research effort. — Under the Policy Statement of
March 21, 1946, it is clearly the duty and the responsibility of the NACA
to coordinate Government aeronautical research with civilian, indus-
trial, and university programs. Coordination is carried on largely
through the NACA technical committees and subcommittees. These
groups are made up of representatives of the military, civil aeronau-
tical agencies of Government, the aircraft industrial and educational
and scientific institutions. It has been stated that the present coor-
dination is not adequate due mainly to shortages of personnel within
the NACA staff.
The Commission recommends that the NACA be granted funds
to strengthen its organization where necessary for the proper coor-
dination of all aeronautical research. The heads of all Government
agencies involved in aeronautics are urged to establish and enforce a
policy of seeking the advice of the NACA in the planning and ex-
ecution of any of their own aeronautical research projects.
It has been suggested that the NACA should expand its program
of research outside of its own laboratories in order to bring to bear
as much of the Nation's air research potential as possible on the ur-
gent problems in the field. We agree. The NACA should take the
leading role in sponsoring supplementary aeronautical research in
educational and scientific institutions. There is a limit, of course,
to the rate at which Government funds can be expended efficiently
in such institutions. The availability of qualified personnel is usually
the controlling factor, but it is unlikely that the capacity of our edu-
cational institutions to absorb additional research in aeronautics has
yet been reached. It should be expanded to its fullest extent.
It would appear to be profitable for all Government agencies deal-
ing in aeronautics to have a limited program of this nature, coordi-
nated, of course, through the NACA. The benefit to be derived from
direct association of military and civil government personnel with
scientists has been clearly demonstrated by the wartime and postwar
contract research programs of the Office of Naval Research and by the
work already done in the universities by the NACA. Also, as has
been mentioned earlier, such contracts offer the best available means
of training the additional personnel needed for our expanding aero-
nautical requirements.
Research carried on in this manner should be closely correlated with
Government-sponsored research in the basic physical sciences out-
side of the strict aeronautical field (as covered by the NACA). The
machinery for such coordination already exists in part in the newly
formed Research and Development Board of the National Military
Establishment. It would be further facilitated and broadened by the
proposed establishment of a National Science Foundation.
As far as research is concerned, a clear distinction should always
be made between coordination and control. Research of all kinds
welcomes coordination, but resists control. Researchers must be kept
informed of the work of others in their own and in related fields in
order to avoid duplication of effort, but it is fatal to try to steer their
thinking toward any predetermined goal. Development may be kept
within planned limits, but research must be unrestricted to be of value.
Continuity of research programs. — Research by its very nature is
unpredictable. No one can forecast with accuracy the time at which
the end result will be available. In a development project, however,
the end product is definitely foreseen at the outset and a time table
for completion can be set up. Every orderly program for development
must be backed by a series of research projects which will permit
step-by-step advances as new knowledge becomes available when each
intermediate stage of research is completed. All development projects
must be consistently reviewed and brought up to date. Only by keep-
ing them in a fluid state can the armed forces be continuously sup-
plied with modern aircraft.
On the other hand, the current international situation requires that
behind our air forces in being we have a backlog of fully developed
advanced projects ready to be put into production at a moment's notice.
92
We must not become so concerned with long-range "out in the blue"
thinking that we overlook the possibility that we may stumble into
a war in the immediate future which will require something better
than the equipment with which we ended World War II. Research
must be continuous and forward-looking, but development projects
must go ahead on a step-by-step basis. There must be frequent and
definite points at which production of useful articles could be started
if necessary. We must never be caught in an emergency with nothing
but partially completed projects in our lockers.
New facilities. — A growing need for intensified research in trans-
sonic and supersonic aerodynamics has led recently to many pro-
posals for new supersonic wind tunnels. Various Government depart-
ments and a number of aircraft manufacturers have drawn up plans
and have sought funds for such equipment. Because high-speed
tunnels are expensive and supersonic research is costly, some coordi-
nation seemed necessary to avoid waste and duplication of effort.
The NACA, quite properly, within the scope of its directive, under-
took the job in midsummer of 1945. With the help of the industries
and the services, it evolved "A National Program of Transsonic and
Supersonic Wind Tunnels," now known as the "Unitary Plan."
The Plan provides for 16 small tunnels to be located in universities
and other educational institutions throughout the United States;
several new supersonic tunnels at existing Government laboratories;
and the establishment of two new research centers, (i) the National
Supersonic Research Center (NSRC), and (2) the Wind Tunnel Di-
vision of the United States Air Forces' Air Engineering Develop-
ment Center (AEDC). The function of NSRC is to conduct trans-
sonic and supersonic research. The function of AEDC is to test and
evaluate transsonic and supersonic air vehicles.
The NSRC, as planned, is to be an entirely new installation operated
under the NACA. It will eventually include a number of supersonic
wind tunnels, somewhat larger than those already in existence. The
site has not yet been selected. Because of extremely high power re-
quired to operate supersonic wind tunnels, it must be located in a
section of the country where electric power is cheap and abundant.
93
The AEDC is designed to perform much the same functions as are
now handled by Wright Field, but on a greatly expanded scale. The
installation will include facilities for testing and evaluating airframes,
engines, propellers, electrical equipment, armament, and other acces-
sories of much larger size than can be handled with the present equip-
ment at Dayton. The most expensive single item is a 40-foot square,
transsonic wind tunnel. The estimated cost of the tunnel is $140,-
000,000, and 500,000 horsepower will be required to operate it. A fir-
ing range for the launching and testing of guided missiles is also pro-
jected. The site for AEDC has not been determined. It obviously
must be located in an area where large quantities of electric power are
available.
We are thoroughly convinced, however, that the United States is
dangerously short of equipment for research in the transsonic and
supersonic speed ranges. This deficiency should be remedied as quickly
as possible. We recommend that the 16 supersonic tunnels projected
for the universities be authorized and installed as quickly as possible.
This will not only expand olir available facilities, but will tend to
alleviate the present personnel shortage by training more students in
aeronautical research techniques. We recommend also that we pro-
ceed without delay in supplementing existing laboratory equipment
with the new tunnels projected under the Unitary Plan in whatever
order of priority and at whatever rate as will be recommended by the
Research and Development Board. The Board will provide the nec-
essary coordination to keep the programs in balance, and insure that
our research establishments will get the equipment they need.
Personnel. — The most serious bottleneck in the research and devel-
opment picture as laid before the Commission, is not money nor
facilities — but men. During the course of the war, the output of
engineering and scientific graduates from our schools and universities
suffered a serious decline. We are short-handed now, so there is real
danger that we may find ourselves without qualified personnel to man
the new wind tunnels and test centers that are being planned. The
problem is acute in all scientific fields. It has been dealt with in de-
94
tail by Dr. John R. Steelman in the report of the President's Scientific
Research Board on "Science and Public Policy."
The Commission recommends that education in the aeronautical
sciences be given high piority in research policy discussions. The
fact that the problem was not covered in the drafting of the Policy
Statement of March 21, 1946, is a defect in that document which
should be corrected. To insure uniformity of relationships and con-
tinuity of effort, some national program must be set up on a permanent
basis, under a National Science Foundation.
The placing of supplemental research contracts in universities and
other educational institutions is one way of improving the situation,
but that in itself is not enough. Without further encouragement, the
demands for scientific personnel of all kinds will cut into the avail-
able supply of those who might normally tend toward specialization
in the aeronautical sciences.
One way to attract capable men for aeronautical research, particu-
larly in Government, would be to lift the current limitation on salaries.
Under the present Classification Act, the limit is $10,000 a year, un-
less raised in individual cases by special act of Congress, or under
certain limited powers within the National Military Establishment.
In view of the impossibility of attracting top-calibre scientists at such
a figure, with industry also bidding for their services, we recommend
that the Congress remove the salary ceiling for such categories.
Once having induced good civilian research workers to enter Gov-
ernment service, they must not be driven out by poor working condi-
tions and bad housing for themselves and their families. This is
particularly true where their jobs are in arid or remote localities.
The Air Force Air Base at Muroc Dry Lake in California is one case
in point which we happen to have seen. It is an ideal place for high-
speed testing of rocket motors and piloted aircraft, but living quarters
for the staff are substandard, and along with other similar installa-
tions, should be improved immediately.
Continuity of leadership in research is highly desirable, particu-
larly in view of the long-range nature of aeronautical problems. The
research and development work of the armed services has suffered
95
because of frequent transfers of officer personnel from engineering to
operations or from shore to sea duty. Such rapid turn-over in per-
sonnel puts a serious handicap on research projects because of the
loss of individual experience and the break-up of long-range thinking
it entails. Continuity is important at policy-forming levels, but it is
also necessary down through the lower echelons. Any research or-
ganization that does not encourage specialization of its personnel,
and that suffers frequent changes in its research staff, is destined to
mediocrity.
The Commission recommends, therefore, that the Services offer
every possible inducement for capable officers to enter aeronautical
research and development work. They should be given opportunity
to take graduate work in their specialty in the best civilian schools in
the country at Government expense. They should be assured that
they will be allowed to work in their special fields without interrup-
tion, and that their opportunities for advancement in rank will not
be prejudiced as a result. Only by so doing will we be assured of
the continuity of research leadership that we require.
Section IV
Civil Aviation
97
Civil Aviation
The air lines, the most important element of civil aviation, are
passing through one of the most serious crises of their history. The
domestic trunk lines of the country suffered an operating loss of ap-
proximately $22,000,000 in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947.
This situation is significant for two reasons. If not relieved it will
contribute to the rapid deterioration of air-line service to the public.
A second reason is now of even greater importance. The air lines
have a fleet of aircraft of great value to the military services as a
reserve in time of war. As a potential military auxiliary, the air
lines must be kept strong and healthy. They are not in such a con-
dition at the present time.
Most of the air lines are in financial difficulties for a number of
reasons. Both their management and Government aviation officials
were over optimistic as to the volume of postwar passenger traffic.
Starved for both airplanes and personnel during the war, the lines
hired large numbers of new people when the war ended, ordered many
new airplanes and in several instances made what may prove to have
been unwise route extensions.
Losses for a number of lines began in the latter half of 1946. There
were high expenditures due to the changeover from war to peacetime
conditions. These included costs from the expansion of routes, services,
and organizations; the introduction of new types of airplanes; rapid
and unforeseeable cost increases; a reduction in passenger fares and
mail rates coupled with a decline in mail volume; the reappearance
of seasonal declines in passenger traffic; a series of dramatic accidents;
and public dissatisfaction resulting from lack of dependability. Strikes
and the grounding of airplanes have added additional heavy financial
burdens on some lines. To a large extent the causes of these losses are
temporary, but only if the air lines and the Government profit by the
recent experience.
99
We have heard much testimony on what to do to rectify the present
situation. We will discuss the major problems under the headings
of Air Mail Payments and Subsidy, Safety and Regularity, Economic
Regulation, Taxation, and International Transport Problems.
Air Mail Payments and Subsidy
The Government has had a policy of encouraging the development
of an air transport system in this country ever since 1918. In 1925 the
Kelly Act provided for financial assistance to private air line operators.
The most important promotional legislation was the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938. Throughout the prewar years, the air transport system
which we had in this country could not have existed without subsidies
by the Government. The Congress recognized that a strong air trans-
port industry was necessary for national defense, for American com-
merce and for the postal service, and accordingly enacted the policy of
governmental financial aid to the air lines.
By the end of 1942, several of the largest air transport companies
which had grown up with the aid of subsidy had reached a point where
they could earn a profit without depending on subsidy mail pay.
Their receipts from passenger service, express service, and a mail pay-
ment based on a rate roughly equal to the passenger rate, more than
offset their total expenses. This was an important milestone in the
history of air transportation, for it indicated a successful policy on the
part of the Government and successful management by those com-
panies which had reached the much desired point of relative self-
sufficiency.
Throughout the war the air lines were financially strengthened by
military contract work plus abnormally high load factors. In both the
CAB and the air lines it was believed that a greatly increased demand
for air transportation in the postwar years would continue this trend
toward self-sufficiency. The difficulties in which the air transport
industry now finds itself can be traced primarily to over-expansion
based on the mistaken assumptions of postwar traffic.
Although some air line problems of 1947 may differ from those of
the prewar period, the over-all situation is the same: The revenue from
100
passengers and cargo, plus a revenue for the carriage of the mail
roughly equal to the passenger rate, will not support the operations of
many of the companies. If they are to continue in operation and
start again up the ladder toward self-sufficiency the Government will
have to increase the mail rates.
There is no need to change the law in this respect. It already is
drawn to cover exactly such a situation.
The method of determining mail payment for subsidized carriers
under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was developed by the Civil
Aeronautics Board as follows: On the basis of estimates made by an
air line and by the Board's staff, the Civil Aeronautics Board deter-
mined the probable future income to the line from the carriage of
passengers and property. It likewise determined the probable over-all
cost of the operations. Such a cost figure invariably exceeded the
estimated nonmail revenues. The mail rate then was set at a figure
which provided enough additional income to close the gap between
nonmail revenues and expenses incurred under honest, economic and
efficient management and to leave something over as a profit.
By "subsidy" is meant the payment to an air line for the carriage
of mail of a sum greater than that to which the carrier would be
entitled for the simple performance of this function at a service rate
on a strictly business basis. The excess of payments above the "service"
rate is a subsidy, or as described in the Civil Aeronautics Act, a "need"
payment, based on the need of the air line for financial assistance to
balance its expenses with its revenues and earn a reasonable profit.
As noted above in the early days of the war certain lines reached a
stage where mail payments could be based on a rate roughly equivalent
to the passenger rate. Since that time there have been two principal
ways of paying for the carriage of the mail. Ton-mile payments have
been made to relatively self-sufficient carriers; plane-mile payments
have been made to other carriers considered to be in the "need" class
and therefore requiring higher mail rates. In either case, if the carrier
has found that the rate does not in fact enable it to cover its expenses,
it may petition the Board to increase the rate. When the Board has
examined the new facts it may fix a new future rate. The Board may
101
and usually does then also set a retroactive rate back to the date on
which the carrier petitioned for a rate increase.
In the case of the international carriers, the Board has followed a
slightly different practice. It usually fixes an avowedly temporary,
experimental rate and then, in the light of experience, adjusts this
rate to meet the actual needs of the carrier over a past period of a year
or more. The rate continues to be a temporary one until such time
as the Board feels experience is sufficient to enable it to fix a permanent
rate, if necessary retroactive to the date of the original petition.
Recently the Board has modified somewhat the usual forms of do-
mestic mail payment for certain carriers in special distress. In grave
emergencies such as existed during the winter of 1946-47, the Board
sets an emergency rate without taking its usual careful consideration
and then starts a careful scrutiny of the justification of the expenses
of the companies to make sure that the gap between nonmail revenues
and expenses is not due to uneconomical, inefficient, or dishonest
management.
The task of making the estimates necessary to setting a mail rate is a
difficult one almost always involving disagreement between the claims
of the interested air line and the Government officials who must be
concerned about the public expenditure of funds.
We consider that direct Government financial aid to commercial
air lines is fully justified on grounds of national security and economic
welfare. We believe the air transport system of this country can, with
such aid now, become self-supporting in the future. We are convinced
that any impartial investigators of air transport would endorse the use
of public funds to obtain such a sound air transport system. This means
the continued granting of subsidies to air lines for an additional period.
* ^ =& * * # #
Means must be found to decrease the time necessary for the Civil
Aeronautics Board to process rate cases. We believe that the transfer
of safety functions out of the Board, an increase in the Board's staff,
and an increase in the number of members in order to make possible
a special division of the members focusing their attention primarily
102
on rate cases are therefore desirable. These are recommendations in
Section V of the report.
It is not only necessary that the Board act quickly in determining
air mail rates but that it grant enough mail pay to keep all the lines
in business to the extent required by the public interest, provided their
difficulties are not due to dishonest, uneconomical or inefficient manage-
ment. This can be done at a total cost that appears reasonable com-
pared with other Federal expenditures for aviation purposes.
It has been suggested to us that a division in the air mail pay be
made to show how much of the pay is for service rendered by the
air line and how much is for subsidy. We see no advantage now
in disturbing a practical working situation. It is desirable, however,
for the Civil Aeronautics Board, in cooperation with the Post Office
Department, to study the cost of air mail service with a view to the
future when most air lines will be able to operate without subsidy
payments. It is to be expected that, as the Civil Aeronautics Board
develops new methods of cost accounting in determining fair and
reasonable rates for the carriage of passengers and property, it also
will develop cost standards applicable to mail carriage.
When the Civil Aeronautics Board made temporary upward adjust-
ments in mail payments for certain carriers in financial difficulties in
the spring of 1947, at the same time it wisely initiated field investiga-
tions into the efficiency and economy of those carriers. It is admittedly
difficult for any Government regulatory agency to determine whether
the management of a particular company in any field is in fact efficient
and economical. Yet such a requirement is imposed upon the Board
by the mail rate provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act.
It has therefore been suggested to us that standard operating costs
for various types of services be developed by the Board. These standard
costs would be kept current with changes in the general price level by
frequent adjustments to conform to an industry cost index. Com-
ponents making up the index would be the major items which enter
into air-line costs. The standard operating costs could then be used as
yardsticks on which "need" air-mail payments could be based. With
103
such yardsticks, "need" mail payments could be made more quickly
and bear a closer relation to efficient and economic operation.
We have considered this proposal and believe that it might have
substantial advantage to all air lines. The Board might well be able
to keep a closer check on efficiency and economy of air-line operation.
We realize that the Civil Aeronautics Board has considered similar
proposals. We recommend that the Board give this problem further
study and investigation.
A suggested financial aid to the air lines would be the carriage of
first-class mail by air where delivery would be expedited. Domestic
air-mail volume for fiscal 1947 amounted to an estimated 33,000,000
ton-miles. The Post Office Department has estimated an additional
146,000,000 ton-miles of domestic first-class mail which movement by
air would expedite. The institution of a policy of moving first-class
mail by air whenever the postal service would benefit thereby would
increase the volume of air mail by something over eight times in pounds
and over five times in ton-miles. The benefits to the air lines by giving
them this traffic, even if a large amount were carried at "service" mail
rates, are obvious. For during the same period, total mail revenue to
the domestic carriers amounted to a little over $21,000,000.
We do not believe however that provision of traffic to the air lines
is the major criterion in advocating the movement of first-class mail
by air without surcharge. Rather, the test as to what first-class mail
shall move by air should be the best mail service to the public. And it
is obvious that long-haul mail can often be handled faster by the air
lines than by surface carriers.
The Post Office Department estimates a loss of approximately $5,000,-
ooo to domestic surface carriers if first-class mail were to be carried by
the air lines whenever such handling gives faster service. The taking
of a large volume of first-class mail now handled by surface carriers
and giving it to the air lines would not be discriminating against the
surface carriers if the service to the public were better. The question
raises, however, the over-all problem of the dependence of a war effort
on all forms of transportation. We have not gone into that problem
but anticipate that the Congress will do so.
104
The Congress will undoubtedly also consider the fact that carrying
first-class mail by air without surcharge, whenever delivery can be
expedited thereby, will involve, according to the Post Office figures, an
additional cost to the Government of some $96,000,000. This loss
would come from a decrease in the present profit made on first-class,
3-cent mail, a profit which now subsidizes the carriage of other classes
of mail.
We understand that the Post Office Department has now under way
studies of the cost of inaugurating air parcel post on both domestic
and international air routes. Our recommendation is that the step of
carrying by air all first-class mail which can be expedited thereby and
the step to parcel post service by air not be taken until the air lines
achieve a satisfactory regularity status. At that time we recommend
that the Congress should give most serious consideration to these
proposals.
Safety and Regularity
We have not gone into the technical aspects of safety because the
President's Board of Inquiry on Air Safety, appointed June 15, 1947,
has been intensively studying the problem. We do, however, wish to
make a few comments on this important subject.
In section V of this report, we recommend the establishment of an
Air Safety Board.
The question of safety in commercial aviation is of prime importance,
not only because of the importance of human life but because of its
psychological effect on traffic and the effect of traffic upon the self-
sufficiency of the air lines. Air line travel is, in fact, far safer than
the public believes. The increasing size of planes, with the resultant
increase in number of passengers killed in any one accident, has in-
creased public anxiety out of all proportion to the actual conditions of
safety. The disproportionate amount of publicity inevitably given air
line crashes gives an unwarranted impression that air line travel is
basically unsafe. Statistics on scheduled air-line operations compiled
by the Civil Aeronautics Board show that the chances of fatality in
terms of passenger miles flown are very slight.
105
Normal competitive business factors, between manufacturers and
between air lines, as well as the pressures of traffic upon equipment,
result in a strong tendency to put new planes into service as quickly as
possible. In spite of this, new planes have been put through long and
careful test periods. It is our belief, however, that events have proved
that these periods have not been long enough.
We recommend that new types of transport planes be operated
regularly on nonpassenger schedules for a specified mileage before
passengers are carried. The period should be sufficiently long to
permit mechanical or design weaknesses to become apparent under
normal operating conditions. We suggest that the test airplanes
be operated day by day on cargo and air-mail runs over approximately
the same routes and using the same airports as they will later be flown
in passenger use. We realize that both the manufacturer and the air
line buying a new type of plane have flown the aircraft for long periods
prior to its use in passenger service. But such flights are usually made
with special crews, under special conditions, and with special main-
tenance. We are aware that it may be expensive to follow our recom-
mended practice. The test planes may be operated at a relatively low
load factor and income will necessarily be less than if the airplane is
carrying passengers.
We are also concerned over the lack of consideration for safety that
has been shown by some contract carriers.
The fact that the Civil Aeronautics Board does not have economic
regulatory control of contract carriers means that the Board has no
official record of their activities. Often the Board's first consciousness
of the existence of a charter operation over which its safety regulations
do apply is when such accidents as that of the Bermuda Sky Queen or
of Page Airways call public attention to the operations. We are con-
fident that the Civil Aeronautics Board is endeavoring to take all
possible steps to eliminate hazardous accidents among contract opera-
tions. Its effectiveness in this regard will be greatly increased if it is
given the economic control of such carriers we recommend below.
Next in importance to increased safety on the air lines is an increase
in regularity of service.
106
Air travel will never be mass transportation until people are reason-
ably certain that they can depart ,and arrive on schedule. An illustra-
tion of unreliability in good weather is afforded by the figures from
an air line flying in and out of New York City in June 1947, which
was a good- weather month. This air line offers over-all service con-
sidered to be among the best in the country, yet of planes arriving in
New York, 89 percent were late and 46 percent of all airplanes were
delayed more than i hour. Forty-one percent of all airplane depart-
ures from New York were late, and 16 percent were over i hour late.
The steady traveler, most often a business man with appointments to
maintain, has learned from bitter experience that his plane will arrive
on time about once in ten trips and will depart on time even less often.
Delayed departures are often as irritating as late arrivals. It is irk-
some to passengers to make a great effort to get to the airport 20 or 30
minutes before scheduled departure, a practice recommended by the
air lines, only to wait an hour or more for the take-off. This is espe-
cially true on early morning flights.
It is equally irritating for the passengers not only to arrive at their
destination hours late but sometimes to arrive at alternate airports
which are often miles away from the intended destination of the
particular flight. Problems of cancelled flights or the using of alternate
airports, however, will not be solved until safe all-weather flying has
been achieved.
For safety and regularity on the air lines a basic requirement is a
Nation-wide system of air traffic control, navigation, and landing aids.
The Federal Government has, for many years, built and operated navi-
gational facilities and emergency landing fields.
We consider that adequate airways and airports coupled with ground
aids for traffic control, navigation and landing are so important to the
preservation of our air transport system that the Government must
continue to be responsible for developing, installing and maintaining
a thoroughly adequate network. The Federal Government must accept
the financial burden until the users of these aids are in a financial
position to pay their fair share of the costs.
All-weather flying will not be achieved until adequate instrument
107
landing systems are installed and operating at a majority of air line
stops. Technical knowledge in the field of electronic aids for aviation
is far ahead of actual practice. Systems have been developed which
would go far toward increasing reliability and safety.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration has already installed im-
proved-type radio and high intensity lighting facilities at a considerable
number of air fields. But the program has only been started. The
CAA estimates the cost of new construction of air navigation aids, air
traffic control and landing aids over the next 5 fiscal years as $190,-
000,000. The estimated annual cost of maintenance and operation for
an integrated network of aids will cost $100,000,000 per year, beginning
with 1953.
Before the Congress can be expected to appropriate these large sums,
the various interested private groups and responsible Government
agencies must reach agreement on a common system of landing aids
for immediate installation which will adequately serve both civil and
military needs. Such agreement is now being sought by a technical
group of experts, the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics,
at the special request of the Air Coordinating Committee. As soon
as agreement has been reached, the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment should request the Congress for funds to carry out the necessary
air traffic control, navigation and landing aids programs.
Equally important is early agreement on research and development
programs in the field of electronic aids to aviation, which will insure
that the means of handling traffic will keep pace with the steadily in-
creasing traffic. The Research and Development Board is now en-
gaged in exploring the types of research and development in electronic
aids which will have application to both military and civil aviation.
The work of this Board should be expedited and should be coordinated
with the long-range program on electronic aids, now being developed
by the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics under the policy
direction of the Air Coordinating Committee.
Larger expenditures for electronic aids to air traffic control, naviga-
tion, and landing will do more than anything else foreseeable today to
build the air lines toward economic self-sufficiency. They will also
108
materially bolster certain phases of the national defense. A carefully
worked out program for these aids together with its rapid implementa-
tion has become a top priority for civil air transportation.
We believe that Government money can be spent more productively
on the means for increased regularity of operation than by increasing
subsidy payments to support additional competition in the present
air-line system.
The question of dependability with safety is not exclusively a domes-
tic matter. It affects the international operations of our air carriers
as well. Testimony has been submitted which shows that aviation
communications and electronic aids are in a very unsatisfactory state
on most of the international routes now in operation. We have
investigated the "joint support" program of the International Civil
Aviation Organization. Under this program each nation whose air
lines expect to use a facility outside its own territory which is not being
constructed by the state where the facility is found to be required,
contributes to the cost of its establishment and operation in proportion
to the use made of the facility. It was under this program that the
nations flying the North Atlantic agreed on the Ocean Weather Stations
Program for that area of the World. We believe that the "joint sup-
port" program of ICAO provides the best and fairest means of insuring
the installation of adequate aviation aids along the routes of the world,
and accordingly recommend that the Congress appropriate funds
necessary to permit the United States to participate fully.
Airplanes are often late in clear weather due to congested airports.
Airports at large centers of population are not adequate for handling
air traffic at peak periods. Although the Civil Aeronautics Board
might be blamed in part for authorizing more air lines into these
airports than can be handled, the solution for this phase of the problem
lies in the hands of the local governments. In cities where existing
airport facilities are inadequate to handle growing traffic, local govern-
ment action, plus Federal aid under the Airport Act, can and must
remedy the situation. It is obvious that the Nation's airport system
must be improved if we are to have a larger fleet of commercial
109
airplanes in daily operation. Specific recommendations on the Federal
Airport program are made below.
As discussed above the Government can and should do much to
improve regularity of service on the air lines. But the air lines them-
selves have control of a large share of their own destiny. They can
improve their operations to make air travel more attractive to the
public. They are now carrying many empty seats that could be filled
if their service were better.
In the investigations of the Commission an interesting fact came to
light. It developed that neither the Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion nor the Civil Aeronautics Board keep records of air line regularity,
nor were they, on request, able to supply them. Nor do many of the
air lines themselves keep more than fragmentary statistics on this
subject.
Now that air travel is accepted as a standard form of transportation,
passengers are deeply critical of delays and the whole matter of public
dissatisfaction and lack pf confidence in the air lines touches everyone's
pocketbook because it can directly affect subsidy. We have been given
estimates of millions of dollars which the air lines have lost because
of flight cancellations and irregularity in general.
Economic Regulation
Domestic route pattern— -The problem whether there is too much or
too little competition in our domestic, air-transport system involves not
only the question of new entries into the field and competitive exten-
sions of the routes of existing companies, but also the important ques-
tion whether combination of existing companies should be encouraged
or prevented by the Board.
We recommend that the Civil Aeronautics Board defer for a short
time decisions in new route certification cases. This should not be
confused with a freezing of the present route pattern, which would
certainly be undesirable. There is, however, a widespread confusion
as to the principles which guide the Civil Aeronautics Board in its route
determinations. A body which is under the constant pressure of daily
decisions of case after case cannot accomplish the careful planning
which the development of a national route pattern demands. The
present air transportation system has not developed as expected before
and during the war. There is need for a comprehensive survey of the
no
Dresent situation and the development of a more cohesive philosophy.
The resulting clarification of policy should bring about acceleration of
subsequent route decisions.
As a part of such review, if the Board should find any routes no
onger now required by public convenience and necessity, it should use
any present legal powers such as suspension or reduction of "need"
payments to reduce the effect of any errors in the present system.
This appears preferable to causing instability in the industry through
granting to the Board the right of outright revocation of routes.
If it is found that the Board is unwilling or unable to develop a more
clear-cut plan for an over-all domestic air transport pattern, the Con-
gress should give serious thought to giving over-all planning functions
of route development to the Secretary of Civil Aviation recommended
in Section V. We have had testimony from some of those interested
in Government organization and procedure that such a step is now
desirable, but we are much impressed with the difficulty, both practical
and theoretical, in breaking apart this function from other Board func-
tions, and propose that the Board be given ample opportunity to de-
velop a thoughtful, over-all approach to the problem before such action
be taken.
Contract carrier regulation. — A contract carrier in any form of trans-
port can operate when he wishes and renders his service by specific
contract with a shipper or group of shippers. The contract carrier has
less responsibility than a common carrier and is normally subject to
more competition. A common carrier of goods or people holds him-
self out to serve the public at large and has many responsibilities to
the public. In return for undertaking these obligations it has been
customary for the Government to grant to the common carrier a limi-
tation on the amount of competition from other common carriers in
his field. The Congress found it necessary to give the Interstate Com-
merce Commission control of both common and contract motor
carriers. In contrast, although the Civil Aeronautics Board has eco-
nomic control over common carriers, it has no such control over con-
tract carriers. This is true in spite of the fact that competition between
the two types is often intense.
in
When the Civil Aeronautics Act was passed the volume of business
done by contract carriers was small and few carriers were engaged
in contract operations except those who had qualified for common
carriers status before the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Much of the development of air cargo over the past 2 years is due
to the aggressive and capable management of certain contract cargo
carriers. Unfortunately, some passenger contract carriers have mis-
represented their services, and have operated illegally as common car-
riers. Disregard by some of these contract carriers of the responsi-
bility and duty owed to the public by any carrier for hire tends to
discredit all carriers in the eyes of the traveling and shipping public.
We believe that the economic regulation of contract carriers is
necessary to prevent unstable conditions in the air transport field
similar to those in the motor carrier field prior to the Motor Carrier
Act of 1935. The difficulties encountered by the Civil Aeronautics
Board during the past 2 years as regards contract carriers is adequate
evidence that the Board should be given the authority to regulate all
types of air carriers for hire. There should of course be adequate pro-
vision in any new legislation to protect legitimate contract carrier
rights of currently operating contract air carriers, including those now
operating under CAB regulation 292.1 and those operating under
regulation 292.5 if their present request for full common carrier status
is denied, just as was done for contract motor carriers on adoption
of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.
Furthermore, until the Civil Aeronautics Board is given the authority
to promulgate and enforce economic regulations over contract carriers,
the Board will constantly be placed in the embarrassing position of
having little or no information on the services performed by such
operators.
Air cargo development. — The question of air cargo development has
been widely discussed. The issues appear to be two: (i) Should the
potential market for air cargo by common carriers be spread among
more lines than now exist in the category, and (2) should there be
subsidy stimulation of cargo carriage by common or contract carriers,
or both ?
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Property carried by air has increased strikingly since the end of the
war although there has been some carriage of property by air as long
as there has been air transportation. It was slowly and steadily grow-
ing in the period just before the war. Several factors account for the
fact that since the war more air cargo has been carried by noncertificated
carriers than by certificated carriers.
One was the necessary concentration of the certificated lines on
handling passenger traffic which was overwhelming their equipment.
This required the concentration of management upon that problem
and the use of available financing for the building up of the passenger-
fleet. Another factor was the existence of large numbers of military
surplus cargo planes available at low cost and on easy terms from the
War Assets Administration.
A third factor was the large number of men who started and operated
air cargo lines and developed traffic; but at rates too low to cover
their costs of operation. Their activity created an increasing con-
sciousness in the shippers' minds of the possibilities of air cargo service.
Yet another factor was the aggressiveness and lasting power of a few
of the more rugged organizations which entered the air cargo field.
Cargo operations by noncertificated lines were carried on as con-
tract carrier operations. The certificated carriers gave only their sec-
ondary attention to the increase of air cargo. With the realization
that postwar passenger business was not going to be as great as had
been expected, and with the striking results of aggressive management
on the part of some of the contract operators becoming evident, the
certificated air-line managements, while bedeviled with organization
and safety problems, nevertheless began to turn with more and more
energy to the development of the cargo business.
In regard to the first issue (spreading air cargo among more lines
than now exist as common carriers) as we have said above, most
common carrier air lines certificated for the carriage of passengers,
property, and mail, after a steady progression toward self-sufficiency
from 1938 to 1946 have suffered a serious set-back. Our major problem
is to get them started once again up the ladder toward self-sufficiency.
To advocate at this time the entry into this field of a large number of
113
new carriers would certainly seem to postpone rather than hasten the
attainment of such a state.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has faced this problem of the economic
number of companies since 1938, in regard to the carriage of both pas-
sengers and property, although the problem has only recently been
focused in the direction of property. Trie basic question to be decided
by the Board is whether the public convenience and necessity require
that additional service be supplied and if so whether it should be sup-
plied by expanding the service of existing lines or by letting in addi-
tional carriers. This is exactly the kind of problem for which the act
of 1938 has provided a Civil Aeronautics Board and it is certainly not
for this Commission to recommend the decision.
We do express our belief, however, that in deciding on certificates
for new cargo operations, the Board should avoid impairing the sound-
ness of the existing air-transport system by spreading the present and
potential traffic among too many separate carriers. If the Board finds
that the public convenience and necessity does require some additional
common carrier operators, we hope that it will give weight to the rec-
ords built up by any of those contract operators that have proven their
ability to operate economically and efficiently and now desire common
carrier status. The Board will also undoubtedly give serious consid-
eration to the suggestion that certification for cargo operations should
apply between and within specified areas rather than between fixed
terminii.
In regard to the second issue raised above (a subsidy stimulation
of cargo carriage), we feel that the only excuse for the subsidization
of cargo carriage by air at this time would be to develop a fleet of
cargo planes to act as a military pool for emergency use. One way to
meet the military need would be for the services to buy the air trans-
ports they need in the same way that they buy combat aircraft. Con-
gress may decide not to appropriate money for this purpose and may
prefer to obtain replacements and additions to the present military
transport fleet reserve, through subsidizing the carriage of cargo by air.
If it chooses the latter method, it will undoubtedly weigh the effect
114
such a course would have on other forms of transport since it might
well raise the possibility of a sudsidy or reduction in taxes to these
forms to make possible the readiness for war loads on such transporta-
tion. The problem of building up a pool of military transport planes
in commercial use seems to warrant a more coordinated study of the
number of transports needed, the potential commercial cargo traffic,
and the possible subsidy cost to the Government than has been carried
on by the armed services, the Department of Commerce, and the Civil
Aeronautics Board. We recommend that the problem receive the
immediate attention of the Air Coordinating Committee.
Witness after witness has testified to the difficulty of obtaining the
amounts of private capital that are needed to develop new and ad-
vanced types of airplanes.
The soundest way to build up a pool of cargo planes for an emer-
gency is to develop a cargo plane that can operate on a profitable
basis. We are recommending the creation of an Aircraft Develop-
ment Corporation whose initial and primary task could be the develop-
ment of an all-cargo transport airplane. Such a plane would of course
have to be useful to the military; but it should be designed primarily
with a view to economic commercial operation. A description of
the proposed corporation is given in section V of this report.
Feeder air lines. — A complicated problem facing the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board is that of the feeder air lines, a term popularly used to apply
to an air line operating a local service with frequent stops at inter-
mediate centers of population.
The chief objection to these local service air lines is their poten-
tially high cost to the Federal Government. Their costs vary widely
with different regions, depending upon the adequacy of surface trans-
portation. Some regions have topographical features which make
the surface connections between cities unsatisfactory. In these areas
there appears to be a need for local service air transportation and we
believe that feeder air lines in such places are desirable for the full
development of the national air line network.
There is a real need on such routes for proper navigation and landing
aids, and adequate airport facilities. In carrying out its airport and
electronic aids programs, the Federal Government will undoubtedly
pay adequate attention to the needs of population centers served only
by local service air lines.
In granting feeder air-line franchises, the Civil Aeronautics Board
has done so on a 3-year experimental basis. Feeder-line officials appear-
ing before us have pointed out that the 3-year period does not give
them enough stability to permit sound financial and other planning.
We recommend that the experimental period for existing feeder
air lines remain for the present at 3 years, unless it becomes evident
that this period can be extended without burdensome cost in mail pay.
Then, and only in that case, it should be extended, even if the initial
testing period has not been completed. We also recommend that new
certifications, if any are found to be required by the public convenience
and necessity, be made for 5 years.
Surface carriers in air transportation. — The question of whether or
not surface carriers, such as railroads, busses, and steamship lines,
should be permitted to enter the air transport business is an important
policy matter. There are differences of opinion as to the intent of
the 1938 act.
We recommend that the Civil Aeronautics Board prevent the con-
trol by surface carriers of the United States air transport system or any
important segment thereof. We believe, however, that individual pro-
gressive surface carriers, desirous of developing air transport as a part
of a coordinated service, should not be automatically prevented from
such action simply on the grounds that they are surface carriers — as
now appears from the record to be the case. We recommend that
the Congress enact legislation clarifying these two points.
Air line finance. — The air lines have traditionally operated on low
working capital. Moreover, current assets accumulated during the
war years were depleted by the purchase of new airplanes and by
operating losses.
Loans secured by equipment are difficult to obtain in the air trans-
port field. Railroads are able to secure financial aid to buy new equip-
ment through the sale of equipment trust certificates at low interest
116
rates without restrictions on their operations or finances. It would
be desirable if the equipment-trust method of financing, so successful
with railroads, could be used for the purchase of air transport equip-
ment.
Three legal obstacles, however, must be overcome before this method
can be made effective. These are: (i) Federal recordation of engines,
propellers and major spare parts, similar to the present recordation
of aircraft; (2) clarification of the liability of the trustees of equipment
trusts for damage done by aircraft; and (3) assurance that creditors
having equipment liens can obtain immediate possession of the equip-
ment in event of reorganization, similar to that now applicable to
railroad equipment under section 77 (j) of the Bankruptcy Act.
In addition United States air lines operating the international routes
are faced with the difficulty that in many cases foreign laws are not
uniform either among themselves or with American law concerning
the rights of lien holders on aircraft used in international operations.
These legal obstacles should be removed as soon as possible. It may
be that the private market for aircraft equipment-trusts will never
reach the high credit standing now enjoyed by rail equipment trusts.
Every effort should be made, however, to make aircraft equipment-
trusts salable in the private investment market. The elimination of
these obstacles would hasten that accomplishment.
Studies are now being made with a view to making recommenda-
tions for legislative action by the Federal Government and the states
to eliminate these domestic legal obstacles. It is recommended that
the Department of Commerce take the lead through the Air Coordinat-
ing Committee in developing an agreed legislative program to elimi-
nate these domestic impediments to the sale of aircraft equipment
trusts.
For aircraft engaged in operations abroad, an international conven-
tion to make uniform the rights of lien holders has been drafted
for presentation to the next assembly of the International Civil Aviation
Organization. %We recommend that the United States Government
press for adoption of the convention and promptly ratify it thereafter.
It has been suggested by members of the Civil Aeronautics Board
117
that they be given authority to pass upon air-line financing. The
Interstate Commerce Commission now has the duty of approving or
disapproving security issues of railroads as does the Maritime Com-
mission for subsidized shipping lines. The public utilities commis-
sions of the States in many cases have similar authority as to the
security issues of public utilities. The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934
give to the Securities and Exchange Commission the duty of consider-
ing security issues in the interest of the investing public.
It has been argued before us that unsound financial planning has
played a part in contributing to the difficulties of the air lines today.
It may be that the absence of legal control over air-line financing
is a gap in our regulatory system which should be filled.
However, any authority which the Board might be given over air-
line financing would have to be applied with great expedition. In
another part of this report we have made recommendations aimed at
facilitating a speed-up in Board procedures. If, as a result of the carry-
ing out of these recommendations or for any other reason, the Board
does reach a point where it is in a position to handle its present duties
expeditiously, consideration should then be given to the question of
conferring the desired authority upon the Board.
International Air Transport
Competition vs. monopoly. — We agree with the present Civil Aero-
nautics Board policy which favors limited competition among Ameri-
can operators on international routes. We have studied the testimony
before the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the House
of Representatives in the spring of 1947, in which both sides of the issue
were exhaustively presented. The Commission has also heard testi-
mony from those advocating one international air line instead of a
number of lines operating abroad.
Some forecast that we shall carry less and less international traffic
through inability to compete with low-cost, heavily-subsidized, foreign
air lines and that we shall be driven from the skies, as our Merchant
Marine was once driven from the sea. We do not agree with this
pessimism. We believe that our international operators should receive
118
such Government aid as will permit them to compete effectively with
their foreign rivals. American technical and managerial ability, plus
the spur of competitive effort, should win for them a substantial share
of the world's traffic. The policy of regulated competition that has
assured the development of our domestic air lines should be followed
in our international system. Present competition seems only adequate
to provide the desired incentive to management and a yardstick for
comparison between American carriers.
Several of the most important certificates granted by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board for international operations are temporary and will
expire in 1952. At that time there should be a complete review of the
entire international competitive picture. There is no evidence now
that an earlier reappraisal is either necessary or desirable.
Restrictions on travel. — International air travel can reach its fullest
development only when governments have taken steps to do away
with or improve the restrictive conditions which now exasperate the
passenger. Requirements for the issuance of passports and visas;
customs rules, and public health and quarantine regulations must be
greatly simplified subject to proper security regulations. Our own
Government is and has been one of the chief offenders in imposing
burdensome regulations. Full support should be given to the efforts
of the Air Coordinating Committee to eliminate obstacles to inter-
national trade and travel by air created by our own laws and regula-
tions, and to the work which the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation is attempting in the same field.
Executive agreements vs. treaties. — Past experience has proven that
executive agreements are better than treaties for covering international
air transport rights. It is only because the Department of State, work-
ing closely with the Civil Aeronautics Board, effectively negotiated
bilateral agreements with some 34 nations that we have a world-wide
pattern of operating rights. These agreements came into effect upon
signature, thus permitting immediate inauguration of services.
Treaties would have required ratification in most instances by the legis-
lative bodies of the two signatory states. The inevitable delay in
getting the ratification of 34 treaties would have kept our air lines
119
out of action so long that foreign competitors would have had a com-
manding leadership from the start. Due to prompt action on our
part, that leadership is now ours.
Because of changing conditions, it will almost certainly be necessary
to amend the existing agreements with various countries from time
to time. We should not incur the risks we would run from delay if
these agreements were in treaty form and could be amended only by
the treaty process.
International rights of operation. — The Commission has seen with
regret the failure of the International Civil Aviation Conference at
Geneva to agree on a multilateral treaty covering rights and obligations
in international air operations. We feel, however, that agreements
should not be sought at the cost of abandoning the so-called Bermuda-
type provision in regard to the right to carry passengers between any
two foreign countries on a route.
This right, known as the Fifth Freedom, appears essential not only
for the economic operation of our international carriers, but also for
the widest development of air transportation. Unreasonable restric-
tions on traffic would adversely affect all long-haul international car-
riers, and would hamper that full expansion of world-wide air com-
merce which modern aviation can do so much to promote. While for
a few nations such restrictions may appear temporarily advantageous
to their national air lines, in the long run these restrictions will react
against the best interests of those nations along with the rest of the
world.
We feel that there should be no change in our present policy of ex-
changing operating routes through executive bilateral agreements, and
fixing universal standards of practice and procedure through multi-
lateral treaties.
Economic Control Needed. — The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 gives
the Civil Aeronautics Board control over all types of domestic traffic
rates. Similar control over international rates is conspicuous by its
absence from the act. The volume of traffic and the number of United
States flag carriers employed in carrying that traffic have increased
greatly. With the present lack of specific authority over international
rates the Civil Aeronautics Board cannot control the rates set by foreign
120
air carriers permitted into this country under reciprocal agreements
as effectively as is desirable. We see no valid reason why rate control
is not just as necessary in international operations as in domestic opera-
tions. The Executive Branch of the Government has committed itself,
under the Bermuda and other bilateral air transport agreements, to use
its best efforts to obtain direct authority over international rates from
the Congress. We recommend that the Congress comply with the
Civil Aeronautics Board request that it be given authority over all
international rates.
The control of contract carriers operating internationally poses
especially difficult problems. At the present time, the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board has no control over nonscheduled and contract foreign
carriers entering this country. The only requirement for the entry of
these carriers is a permit issued by the Civil Aeronautics Administration
under the reciprocal provisions of Section 6 (c) of the 1926 Air Com-
merce Act.
The extension of Civil Aeronautics Board economic regulation to
cover all carriers for hire as recommended above would permit the
economic regulation of all types of carriers by air operating into or
out of this country to be centered in the Civil Aeronautics Board.
However, the status of nonscheduled and contract carriers operating
internationally still needs clarification. Article 5 of the Convention
on International Civil Aviation states that aircraft not engaged in
scheduled international air services and carrying passengers, cargo, or
mail for hire, shall have complete traffic rights subject only to regu-
lations, conditions, or limitations as any State may consider desirable.
At the present time, no agreement has been reached among the coun-
tries adhering to the convention on the meaning of this article. We
recommend that our Government urge an early clarification with
respect to the interpretation of Article 5 of the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation so that there shall be clearly established legal
status for nonscheduled and charter flights, operating internationally.
Taxation
Air lines engaged in interstate commerce operate in many taxing
jurisdictions. They are thus subject to multiple taxation which may
121
well result in burdens on interstate commerce. The Congress, realizing
this situation, adopted Public Law 416, Seventy-eighth Congress, sec-
ond session, pursuant to which an investigation was made by the Civil
Aeronautics Board resulting in a report to the Congress.
On the basis of the facts disclosed in this report, it appeared that an
undue burden may be imposed on interstate commerce by (i) the
multiple taxation by the States and their subdivisions of air carriers
engaged in interstate commerce; (2) the absence of adequate judicial
protection against multiple taxation; and (3) the absence of statutory
standards or administrative procedures for accomplishing the avoid-
ance of such multiple tax burdens on interstate commerce.
Taxation of aviation fuel by the States is an anomaly caused by the
fact that State taxes on gasoline were intended to be paid by operators
of automobiles. Taxes collected on gasoline for aviation uses were not,
in any significant amount, used for aviation needs. The injustice of
such taxation is attested by the fact that 27 States and the District of
Columbia grant either total exemption or a full refund of such taxes,
and 12 States grant a partial refund. However, there is no assurance
that these exemptions and refunds will not be rescinded, or taxes
increased, by State legislation at any time.
It is true that the States are making substantial contributions to
airport development. On the other hand the air lines make user con-
tributions to airports in the landing fees and rentals and other charges.
Any additional contributions through a tax on fuel in the case of the
subsidized carriers often constitute an additional levy on the Federal
Treasury since these payments will have to be balanced by higher mail
payments.
To meet these problems, a bill, H. R. 1241, has been introduced in the
Eightieth Congress. This bill provides formulae for the equitable allo-
cation of the taxable base between different jurisdictions measured by
(a) value of operating property, operating revenues, or capital stock rep-
resenting investments in operating properties, and (b) net income. The
bill makes unlawful any tax imposed on the air carrier on a tax base in
excess of the allocation provided by the authorized formulae. The
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allocation formulae do not apply to real property and tangible personal
property permanently located in a particular taxing jurisdiction. The
Civil Aeronautics Board is named as the agency to administer the pro-
visions of the bill, including the allocation of the tax base to be used by
the several taxing jurisdictions. Provision is also made in this bill for
judicial review of such allocations on the petition of an air carrier or
an interested taxing jurisdiction.
With respect to the taxation of aviation fuel, section 6 of the bill
directs the Secretary of the Treasury to consult with the State authori-
ties and recommend within 12 months a program which will remove
impediments to a balanced and normal development of civil aviation.
The Federal Government establishes, operates, and maintains the
Federal airways, and a reasonable Federal tax on aviation fuel is a
means of making aviation generally and the air lines in particular
contribute to the Government a portion of this expense. It is hoped
that as a result of the consultation provided in section 6 of the bill, an
equitable reallocation of aviation fuel taxes can be arranged.
We therefore recommend that hearings be held on this bill at an
early date, and that it be enacted into law with such amendments as
the hearings may show to be desirable.
Personal Aviation
The term "personal aviation" is meant to include all flying activities
not classifiable as either military or as the carrying of persons or prop-
erty for hire. It includes "private carriers," that is, the flying of execu-
tives and other personnel in company-owned planes, and "industrial
flying." The latter consists of crop dusting, aerial advertising, and
other activities using the airplane as a tool. The term also includes
most of the activities of "fixed-base operators" such as the sale, renting,
repairing, and servicing of personal aircraft, and flight instruction.
"Private flying" is the ownership and operation of aircraft for personal
business or pleasure.
Federal Support. — A number of witnesses representing these varied
activities came before the Commission. Most of them pleaded for
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Government subsidies for flight training, airport development, naviga-
tion aids, research on personal planes, or for other services that would
benefit personal aviation. Many arguments were based on claims that
the stimulation of personal aviation would be of military benefit.
Personal aviation clearly proved its value to the military services in
the last war. The fact that the Nation was air-minded was a national
asset. Without pilots and mechanics drawn from personal aviation,
and the use of civil airports and ground facilities, the Air Force and the
Navy would have been retarded. The Civilian Pilot Training Pro-
gram was especially successful. Light aircraft, developed originally
for private fliers, were of value as artillery spotters, for personnel trans-
ports and for other uses. Private pilots of the Civil Air Patrol made an
admirable contribution. In any future conflict there is little doubt that
an air-minded Nation, with hundreds of thousands of civilian pilots
and mechanics, and a network of airports and navigation aids is better
prepared for an air war than a nation with undeveloped civil air
facilities.
Although instruction skills have historically been valuable to the mili-
tary, testimony of the armed services indicates that this will not be
as true in the future. The usefulness of civilian instructors in military
training is constantly being diminished by the advancement and refine-
ment of military techniques and equipment. But most important is
the fact that according to evidence submitted to the Commission civilian
instructors are unlikely to be required for any emergency within the
next 15 years because of the availability of World War II pilots. This
15-year availability of World War II pilots for instructor, patrol, and
transport duties ensures personnel for these three important emergency
functions which were largely performed by private pilots in the early
years of World War II.
The taxpayer has contributed generously in the past to personal avi-
ation. Considerable help was given throughout the prewar years, but
the greatest benefits were in the Government-sponsored civilian pilot
training in the American colleges. Airport operators in all parts of the
country were able to hire new instructors, refurnish and reequip their
buildings, improve their airports and in general put themselves on a
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businesslike basis. The greatest help to the private plane industry was
the demand for new airplanes for instruction, purchases of which
reached a new peak in 1940 and 1941.
During the war nearly all manufacturers of personal planes produced
aircraft for military purposes, or had subcontracts from other plane
manufacturers. They were able to modernize their factories and buy
new equipment that they could not previously afford.
Many airports built or improved by the Government during the war
are now being used by civilian pilots. In addition, other new airports
are being built under the Federal Airport Act of 1946. This is a pro-
gram now going on which will be of considerable help to pilots.
Greatest postwar windfall to the personal aviation industry has been
the decision of thousands of veterans to learn to fly, or to improve their
flying, under the GI bill of rights. The Veterans' Administration
estimates that $125,000,000 was spent for flight training in 1946 and it
is likely that veterans will continue to take flight training until the
program terminates.
As was true with the Civilian Pilot Training Program before the war,
Government money under the GI bill filters down to nearly all phases
of the personal aviation industry. A considerable amount goes to
manufacturers for new airplanes. Other Government money spent
for airports, control tower operation, navigation facilities, and other
purposes is also a direct help to private flyers.
In the past 10 years the Government has paid for the training of
hundreds of thousands of military and civilian pilots who compose the
largest ready-made market for personal planes and for airport facilities
that has ever existed. This great mass of pilots will decide the near
future of personal aviation. If enough of them do not continue flying
to support the personal plane industry, their neglect should be an
unmistakable sign to airplane designers that a new airplane is needed
which will provide more utility at a lower operating cost. If, in fact,
private aircraft do possess a significant economic potential, the Com-
mission is confident that private enterprise will seize the opportunity
as it already appears to be doing in the development of light planes for
executive transportation.
125
This Commission, trying to judge personal aviation impartially, be-
lieves that a healthy, personal plane industry is of value to the Nation.
We believe that it should be encouraged by the continuation of funds
for airports, for navigation and landing facilities, and for basic im-
provement in personal plane design (discussed in Sec. Ill of this
report). We believe that the appropriations to personal aviation for
these purposes, plus the very substantial financial assistance provided
for veterans' flight training, are sufficient.
Federal Regulation of Personal Aviation. — We recommend that every
effort be made by Government aviation agencies to simplify and reduce
the air and ground regulations affecting the personal flyer as a further
step toward the development of personal aviation. In Section II of this
report we have made recommendations aimed at lightening the regula-
tory burden on the light plane manufacturer.
State Enforcement and Participation in Federal Aviation Policy. —
The postwar expansion of personal aviation has made impossible the
direct Federal enforcement of Civil Air Regulations without the crea-
tion of a large and cumbersome Federal policing agency. Rather than
expanding the Federal pay roll, the Commission recommends that the
Civil Aeronautics Act be amended to authorize State aviation officials
or courts to enforce the noncarrier safety regulations of the Federal
Government. We emphasize, however, our belief that the Govern-
ment should retain its power to promulgate Civil Air Regulations in
order to preserve national uniformity.
State aviation activities have grown rapidly in both extent and func-
tion, and the States will have an increasing concern with Federal poli-
cies. At present, the States have no formal representation or participa-
tion in any Federal aviation agency. Section 205 (b) of the Civil
Aeronautics Act empowers the Civil Aeronautics Authority to confer
with or to hold joint hearings with State aeronautical agencies. We
believe that more extensive use of this provision by the constituent
Federal agencies is desirable.
To give official recognition to State and local aviation organizations
at the Federal level, we recommend the establishment of a State-local
aviation panel, advisory to the Air Coordinating Committee. The
126
panel should be organized along lines parallel to the ACC industry
advisory panel and should include representation from nationally recog-
nized State and municipal aviation associations. This panel would
provide Government agencies other than Federal agencies with a
formal medium wherein they can work closely with Federal aviation
agencies. The panel will permit responsible State and local aviation
officials to express their views on the larger issues of national air policy
and will guarantee their associations official status in consulting with
departments and agencies represented on the Air Coordinating
Committee.
Airports
An adequate domestic airport system can best be achieved through
the combined efforts of the Federal and local governments. By en-
actment of the Federal Airport Act in 1946, which provides for Fed-
eral participation with local governments in building new airports or
improving old ones, Congress has reaffirmed its long-established policy
of furthering' such cooperation.
As a general rule, military fields were not built close enough to
cities for air-line or personal-plane use, and there is still need for more
commercial airports. Traffic congestion in large metropolitan areas
is so great that additional airports are badly needed. Many smaller
communities must also have new fields if they are to attract air lines
and get the benefit of civil aviation.
The Federal Airport Act authorizes financial grants totaling $500,-
000,000 within the United States over a 7-year period and an additional
$20,000,000 for Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico, and placed a limit
of $100,000,000 in any one year. The act did not appropriate any
funds. The 1947 appropriation was $45,000,000. Although the Pres-
ident requested $65,000,000 for 1948, Congress appropriated only half
that amount. We recommend that Congress appropriate each year
the full amount of Federal aid permissible under the law.
Representatives of local governments and the aviation industry
testified that the airport construction program has been delayed by
complicated and confusing CAA regulations. While we believe there
127
is some merit in these complaints, we recognize that much of the
delay is due to difficulties of hiring a staff and carrying out the new
act. The CAA is now taking steps for future simplification of regu-
lations which are expected to result in the desired acceleration of this
program.
Whether a public airport should grant exclusive rights to any fixed-
base operator or other person to engage in an aviation or a nonavia-
tion business is at best a difficult question and one which is ordinarily
best answered on the merits of each individual airport situation.
Due to the relatively small business potential at many airports,
some local communities find it difficult to assume the financial burden
of airport maintenance and operation without the power to grant
exclusive rights. In these circumstances, there may be some cases
where exclusivity is justified.
On the other hand, fixed-base operators and others prevented from
establishing themselves at public airports argue that they are built
with public funds and should be open to all desiring to engage in
business.
We feel there is no question but that the landing area should be
available for the use of all aircraft on a nonexclusive basis. At the
other extreme, we feel there is no objection to exclusive contracts for
such services as a restaurant at an airport. The difficult question to
decide is whether exclusivity should apply to such services as gaso-
line and maintenance facilities. The Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion is now in the process of working out regulations to cover these
questions. In doing so, it has the advice and cooperation of interested
airport officials. We believe that experience under the new regula-
tions should be watched carefully with an eye to amendment in the
light of results over the next few years.
It is charged that certain overseas facilities were constructed in whole
or in large part with Government funds made available to the owner
air line through mail pay or otherwise, and therefore that these
facilities should be available on reasonable and equal terms to all
United States civil aircraft. Otherwise there must be a wasteful
128
duplication of facilities the cost of which the American taxpayer will
be called upon to defray through air-mail payments.
The Commission believes that where a question arises as to whether
airport facilities were constructed with the aid of Government funds
or through the use of private capital, an investigation should be made
by the Civil Aeronautics Board, with the cooperation of the other
pertinent Government agencies through the Air Coordinating Com-
mittee. In the event it is found that Government funds were used,
steps should be taken to make these facilities available to other United
States civil aircraft at reasonable rates.
129
Section V
Government Organization
Government Organization
Never before in our history have we maintained a large military
organization in peacetime. After each war, we have demobilized
most of our ground and air forces, keeping as our only force in being
the Navy. In the immediate years to come, however, we will face
a new situation. We must also keep a strong air force in being, and
our ground Army, because of occupation duties and the need for a
skeleton force capable of rapid expansion, must be larger and more
mobile than in the past. This degree of preparedness — new in Ameri-
can life — calls for a new concept for the organization of the civilian
branches of the Government whose activities directly relate to military
plans.
The creation of a Military Establishment capable of defending the
country will put a disproportionate share of the power of Government
in the hands of the military, and at the same time will place new and
heavy burdens on the civilian agencies of Government in matters con-
tributing to the national security. This will require the strengthening
of the civilian departments in those areas which are of common
concern to the Military Establishment and the civilian agencies of
the Government.
As we are not an aggressor nation, and as attack upon us may be
delayed for years, our will to continue to carry the financial burden,
which will increase from year to year for several years, may weaken,
especially if we should have a period of depression combined with
calculated changes for the better in the public attitude of a possible
enemy.
That is our gravest danger.
For a potential enemy is apt to be contentious and threatening when
getting ready and reverse his attitude when preparing to strike.
While we believe that a planned war will not start until other coun-
tries have the atomic bomb or other comparable weapons in quantities,
the possibility that constant friction may cause war will compel us to
133
continue in a state of partial mobilization of our productive resources
to be adequately prepared for war.
Our people will look to the military agencies to formulate the pro-
grams for their requirements and to civilian agencies to organize in-
dustry and foreign and domestic commerce to be prepared to furnish
those requirements.
During this entire period commerce and industry must be maintained
on the highest possible productive level to yield earnings which will
enable business, and the public sharing the profits distributed, to meet
the mobilization costs without unbearable taxes.
We accordingly have been influenced in our recommendations for
changes in the organization and procedures of the Government dealing
with aviation by the need to make the civilian agencies having to do
with aviation more efficient in themselves and to strengthen them in
relation to the growing military establishment.
# # * * # # #
In the Federal Government there are now three agencies which are
primarily concerned with civil aviation. The Civil Aeronautics Board
(now within the Department of Commerce for housekeeping purposes
only) grants or denies air routes, fixes rates, prescribes systems of ac-
counts, promulgates safety regulations and investigates aircraft acci-
dents. The Civil Aeronautics Administration, now a part of the
Department of Commerce, enforces safety regulations, operates the
Federal Airways System, and directs the Federal Aid Airport Program.
The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics supervises and
directs the scientific study of the problems of flight and propulsion
and conducts research in aeronautics and power plants. Several other
agencies participate in governmental civil aviation activities, such
as the Weather Bureau and the Coast and Geodetic Survey (both of
which are part of the Department of Commerce), the Post Office De-
partment, the Coast Guard (now a part of the Treasury Department),
the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of State.
The Air Coordinating Committee examines aviation problems affect-
ing more than one governmental agency, develops and recommends
integrated policies, and coordinates the aviation activities of the Govern-
134
ment. A description of certain other governmental agencies dealing
with aviation is in the appendix which follows.
A Department of Civil Aviation
We recommend that the Government's executive functions relating
to civil aviation remain under the direction of the Secretary of Com-
merce, who shall have immediately under him a Secretary of Civil
Aviation in charge of a Department of Civil Aviation. The position
of Administrator of Civil Aeronautics should be abolished and the
functions, activities, and duties of the Civil Aeronautics Administration
transferred to the newly formed Department.
We believe that when and if all executive transportation functions
of the Government are centralized within the Department of Com-
merce (as discussed below), the title of Secretary of Civil Aviation
should be changed to Secretary of Transportation and the organization
reporting to the Secretary of Transportation should be set up to con-
form with the change.
A Department of Civil Aviation would have all the functions of
the present Civil Aeronautics Administration as well as the responsi-
bility for safety regulations now in the Civil Aeronautics Board. The
Department of Civil Aviation would also have certain duties in con-
nection with the Aircraft Development Corporation which is discussed
below. In addition it would perform administrative housekeeping
functions for the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Air Safety Board
referred to below.
The Secretary of Civil Aviation would have the responsibility of
initiating our broad domestic and foreign civil aviation policy, subject
to the direction of his superior officer, the Secretary of Commerce, who
in turn would consult with the Secretary of State on matters of foreign
policy. The Secretary of Civil Aviation also would have the responsi-
bility of making recommendations with respect to the mobilization
of our aircraft and air transport industries resources as part of the
industrial mobilization plan of the country. We also recommend
below that the Secretary of Civil Aviation be Chairman of the Air
Coordinating Committee.
We do not recommend the inclusion of the Weather Bureau or the
135
Coast and Geodetic Survey in the Department of Civil Aviation as
these agencies have only specialized interests in aviation and serve
numerous non-aviation departments and agencies.
*******
With this responsibility and authority, the Secretary of Civil Avia-
tion would become the recognized spokesman in executive matters
for civil aviation in the Government.
We lay special emphasis on the duties of the Secretary of Civil Avia-
tion in connection with the Industrial Mobilization Plan. Of the
many important tasks which American industry performed during
the last war as part of our industrial mobilization, the building of
aircraft was of major importance. In any future war aircraft pro-
duction would form an even greater part of our industrial mobiliza-
tion. We must therefore have a close and smoothly coordinated rela-
tionship between the civilian and military departments of the Govern-
ment in the development of our future Industrial Mobilization Plan.
The Secretary of Civil Aviation can perform a highly useful service
in its development. At present the responsibility within the Depart-
ment of Commerce for intimate knowledge of conditions in the air-
craft industry, the air lines and other phases of aviation is not concen-
trated in one point. The planning of industrial mobilization of our
air establishment will necessitate arrangements in peacetime for the
assembly of the production of literally thousands of manufacturers
of primary components, instruments and other items required in air-
craft production. The civilian agencies should have a leading role in
this planning. This role is appropriately that of the Secretary of Com-
merce and as to aviation matters, the Secretary of Civil Aviation.
The Department of Commerce could effectively act as the chief
representative of the Government as to civil aviation and related
matters, serving as a balance to the Military Establishment.
The Department of Commerce would be organized on a pattern
comparable to the Military Establishment. The Secretary of Com-
merce would have under him the Secretary of Civil Aviation and the
Secretary of Industry and Trade which we recommend below. The
National Security Act of 1947 injected a new form of organization
into our governmental structure: that of three non-Cabinet Secre-
136
taries reporting to the Secretary of National Defense. Civil aviation
and commercial matters would be represented by the Secretary of Civil
Aviation and the Secretary of Industry and Trade under the Secretary
of Commerce.
The combination of the various civil aviation functions in the De-
partment of Civil Aviation would have additional advantages, partic-
ularly in relation to safety regulation. There is some confusion in
this regard at the moment. Now the Civil Aeronautics Board formu-
lates safety regulations while the Civil Aeronautics Administration
has the responsibility for enforcing them. The concentration of the
responsibility for safety regulations in the Department of Civil Avia-
tion would relieve the hard-pressed Civil Aeronautics Board members
from the kind of work which takes much of their time. The Civil
Aeronautics Board members would be given more time for their
principal work — that of making decisions on route and rate cases.
A Government Corporation to Finance Aircraft Development
In the preceding section, we have discussed the importance of air-
cargo development as a means of building a fleet of commercial planes
that could be used by the military services in war. From testimony
presented to us, we have concluded that a major handicap to such a
development is the lack of a suitable cargo aircraft.
We propose that a Government Aircraft Development Corporation
be set up within the Department of Civil Aviation. The Board of
Directors would consist of five members, with the Secretary of Civil
Aviation as Chairman. The Secretary of the Air Force would be a
member, and one other member appointed by the Secretary of National
Defense. The Secretary of Commerce would appoint a fourth member
and these four would choose the fifth. The Corporation would be
authorized to pay all or a portion of the development cost of cargo or
other non-military planes, components, navigational aids and safety
appliances, which the Board of Directors would decide should be de-
veloped in the national interest and could not be developed by private
enterprise. The Corporation also would be authorized to make loans
to manufacturers for the development costs when such financing could
137
not be obtained from private sources. We believe that a specialized
Government corporation directed by the Departments could do this
work better than if the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, operating
in a much broader and varied field, were assigned the responsibility.
The Aircraft Development Corporation should finance the develop-
ment of planes, components, navigational aids and safety appliances
only when there is a proven need for the product. There is nothing
new about this method of developing commercial airplanes. Many of
our transports have been created in this way. Many transports are
commercial developments of military planes, the developmental cost of
which was paid in major part by the Military Establishment. The
purpose of our recommendation for an Aircraft Development Corpo-
ration is to provide an orderly specialized medium to carry out this
method for the development of commercial aircraft and components.
At the outset we believe that the Aircraft Development Corporation
will be concerned with the development of an efficient and economical
cargo plane. Its authority, however, would not be limited to this
type of plane. It would finance the development of such types of
planes, components, navigational aids or safety appliances as would
be shown to be necessary from time to time in the judgment of its
Board of Directors.
Air Safety Board
There is no phase of commercial aviation that is more important
than safety. We believe that an Air Safety Board should be established
within the Department of Civil Aviation. We recommend that it
consist of three members appointed by the President, subject to con-
firmation by the Senate. The Air Safety Board would be responsible
for the investigation and analysis of air accidents and for submitting
reports to the Secretary of Civil Aviation to be made public by him.
The Air Safety Board could, in its discretion, delegate to the Depart-
ment of Civil Aviation, the investigation and analysis of minor acci-
dents, as the Civil Aeronautics Board now delegates to the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration in the great majority of accidents. The Air
Safety Board should be provided with sufficient staff to enable it to
carry out its assigned functions, but the Secretary of Commerce should
138
determine that there is no unnecessary duplication or overlapping of
activities between the Air Safety Board and the Department of Civil
Aviation. We believe that the Air Safety Board should have the same
relationship to the Department of Civil Aviation that the Civil Aero-
nautics Board now has to the Department of Commerce. It thus would
not be a separate agency within the Government but would be within
the Department of Civil Aviation for housekeeping purposes only.
We realize that the success of an Air Safety Board will depend upon
two factors: the quality of its members and their independence of
judgment. If these factors are assured, the Board should be able to
make a valuable contribution to air safety.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has done commendable work in con-
nection with safety. We recommend the transfer of these safety func-
tions from it principally because we believe that it should be as free
as possible for the performance of its economic functions.
We are aware of the difficulties that surrounded the earlier Safety
Board, and realize that our proposal has a striking similarity to it.
We believe, however, that the logic of the situation compels the estab-
lishment of such a Board. The function of accident investigation
and analysis should not, we believe, be in the Department of Civil
Aviation; for such an arrangement would not provide the desired
independence of the investigators. We believe that it should be in a
Board with an independence analagous to that of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board. But since we believe that the Civil Aeronautics Board
should not have this function for the reasons we have just given there
is no alternative other than to create a new body.
The Civil Aeronautics Board
We believe that the Civil Aeronautics Board should continue to
be an independent agency, located within the Department of Civil
Aviation for housekeeping purposes only, for granting or denying
air routes; fixing rates of air carriers and mail rate computation; ap-
proving or disapproving consolidations, mergers, interlocking rela-
tionships, and so forth, affecting airline carriers; and prescribing the
accounts and records to be kept by air carriers and the reports required
139
from them. All of these functions are broadly classified as Air Carrier
Economic Regulation in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
We have heard considerable criticism of delays by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board in the processing of cases before them and of the re-
sultant high cost to the carriers in these cases.
The route and rate functions of the CAB are judicial functions.
The procedures for the determination of these cases are judicial.
These procedures therefore are subject to the delays that are inherent
in the judicial process; for the theory of this process is that where the
rights of individuals are affected, these individuals shall have the
fullest opportunity to present their case and defend their interests.
It may be argued that because of the high national interest in the
domestic and international route pattern, the determination of routes
and possibly of the rates to be charged should be decided by an
administrative process rather than by a judicial process. If this were
done, it would be possible to speed up substantially the decisions to
be made. But if this were done, the guarantee of a full hearing which
the judicial process provides might well be lost. We are not prepared
to make a recommendation that the determination of routes and rates
be determined otherwise than by judicial forms.
For these reasons, then, we must anticipate some delay in the process-
ing of route and rate cases. Nevertheless, we believe some improve-
ments in speeding up this work can be made.
We believe that the membership of the Civil Aeronautics Board
should be increased from five to seven in order that the practice of
the Interstate Commerce Commission of operating by divisions may
be adopted.
We also recommend that the salaries of the Board members be es-
tablished at $15,000 a year. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 pro-
vided that the members of the Civil Aeronautics Authority, the prede-
cessor of the Civil Aeronautics Board, should receive $12,000 a year,
but Congress has not appropriated sufficient funds to pay Board mem-
bers more than $10,000.
The Civil Aeronautics Board also recommends that its staff be
increased. From the evidence submitted to us, we believe that this
demand is justified.
140
The recommended increase in the membership of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board brings up the important point of the calibre of men to
form its membership. We recommend that experienced career men
within the Government, as well as qualified persons from private
life, be considered in selecting members of the Board.
A Department of Transportation
We believe that sometime within the near future all executive trans-
portation functions of the Government should be centered in a single
executive department, in order effectively to cordinate the development
of all forms of transportation. The establishment of a Department
of Civil Aviation within the Department of Commerce will provide
the structure that can later be used to combine all transportation
functions within one department.
The Department of Commerce presently contains a nucleus of
transportation agencies, namely, the Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion, the Inland Waterways Corporation, and the transportation activi-
ties of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. The Weather
Bureau and the Coast and Geodetic Survey, both of which provide
services for transportation, are also a part of the Department of Com-
merce. And it should be noted that the President's Advisory Commit-
tee on the Merchant Marine has just recommended that all functions
of the Maritime Commission, other than quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial, be transferred to the Department of Commerce. Although the
Weather Bureau and the Coast and Geodetic Survey would not be in-
cluded in the Department of Civil Aviation, these two organizations
could be included in the Department of Transportation.
There is an evident need of executive coordination in the over-all
field of transportation. At present there is no official in the admin-
istration who has responsibility for such coordination. We believe that
bringing the various executive functions in regard to transportation
within one department will satisfactorily fill the present requirements.
One of the most notable examples of the need for the establishment
of such clear-cut responsibility is the recent Sea-Air issue dealing with
the control of air carriers by surface carriers in which the Civil Aero-
141
nautics Board and the Maritime Commission took opposing views.
There should be some executive official responsible for bringing the
two Commissions together to work out a common policy. Lacking
success in this, he should advise the President as to recommendations
to the Congress for clarifying action. Moreover, another war may
involve the disruption of transportation facilities within the United
States, and Government planning should be now going forward on
an over-all transportation basis with this fact in mind.
The independent, semijudicial bodies in the transportation field
should be brought into the Department of Transportation for admin-
istrative housekeeping purposes only. These independent regulatory
agencies should maintain full independence in the way the Civil Aero-
nautics Board has maintained its complete freedom of action in all
policy matters. This is not a recommendation to consolidate all
regulatory agencies dealing with transportation into one regulatory
body. We doubt that one judicial body could handle the many and
diverse cases which are presented in the whole transportation field.
A Department of Industry and Trade Within the Department
of Commerce
We recommend the establishment within the Department of Com-
merce of a separate Department of Industry and Trade. All activities
of the Department of Commerce would be divided at the outset be-
tween civil aviation on the one hand and industry and trade on the
other and later between transportation (including aviation) and in-
dustry and trade.
We would not have recommended the establishment of a Depart-
ment of Civil Aviation unless we believed that it was also necessary
to have a parallel department within the Department of Commerce
dealing with trade and industry. The need for this latter department
is, we believe, clear.
To support the military establishment we need a strong industry.
It should be the responsibility of the Department of Industry and
Trade to take the leadership in all matters in which Government is
concerned for the development of this strong industry.
142
The Department of Industry and Trade would have the further
responsibility of organizing all pertinent industrial information for the
benefit of our businessmen and for the Government. This informa-
tion could be a guide to business and the Government to a much greater
extent than ever before.
Periodic reports showing the flow of merchandise, by key products,
from raw materials to finished goods, by price lines, would be invaluable
to every businessman and banker in the country.
This information would serve as a basis for ascertaining industrial
and trading trends and would serve the needs of all branches of the
Government and particularly of Congress, the Council of Economic
Advisers to the President, the Treasury Department, the Bureau of
the Budget, and other agencies. Data on foreign and domestic com-
merce, properly analyzed, interpreted, and presented by the Depart-
ments of the Government representing business, would clarify many
of our domestic and international policies.
These activities should not conflict with the functions of the De-
partments of Agriculture, Interior, and Labor, as the Department of
Commerce is the authorized agency to obtain essential information on
all transactions after resources and agricultural products enter the
processing or trading stage.
Secretary of Commerce as Member of the National Security
Council
The function of the National Security Council is to advise the Presi-
dent on all phases of national defense. The Secretary of Commerce
is the chief governmental representative for two important activities
which must be coordinated with national-defense planning: Civil avi-
ation, and major segments of commerce, industry, and some phases of
transportation other than aviation. It is appropriate that the Secretary
of Commerce be a member of the National Security Council to insure
the representation of these important activities in national-defense plan-
ning. The Secretary of Commerce is already a member of the National
Security Resources Board. Making him a member of the National
Security Council would round out the utilization of his Department,
143
and give proper recognition to the indispensable part which industry
plays in both war and peace.
Chairman of the Air Coordinating Committee
The Secretary of Civil Aviation should be the Chairman of the Air
Coordinating Committee. The ACC is an interdepartmental advisory
and coordinating group responsible for examining aviation problems
and developments affecting more than one participating agency, and
for developing and recommending integrated policies to be carried
out by the governmental agencies affected. The membership of the
Air Coordinating Committee consists of one representative each from
the Departments of State, Commerce, Air Force, Navy, and Post Office,
and the Civil Aeronautics Board, with a representative of the Bureau
of the Budget serving as a nonvoting member.
The Air Coordinating Committee, as is evident from all the testi-
mony presented to us, has served a useful and effective purpose. It
should continue as the over-all coordinating agency in aviation matters
of the Government.
The Secretary of Civil Aviation, in his individual capacity and as
Chairman of the Air Coordinating Committee, should be recognized
as the governmental spokesman on civil aviation matters except for
those activities which are the responsibility of other agencies, such as
the Department of State and the Civil Aeronautics Board. He should
be able to give adequate time and attention to ACC problems, most
of which will have common factors with those facing him within his
Department.
It has been forceably presented to us that the Air Coordinating
Committee should have a permanent full-time Chairman appointed
by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate. It has also
been suggested that there should be an administrative assistant to the
President to advise on civil aviation matters. Our basic concept is that
the President should look on military matters to the Secretary of
Defense and on civil aviation matters to the Secretary of Commerce
except where these matters lie primarily within the responsibility of
the Secretary of State or the Civil Aeronautics Board. Where the Air
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Coordinating Committee cannot resolve differences, the Secretary of
Civil Aviation as Chairman of the Air Coordinating Committee
should have the responsibility of referring the matter to his superior,
the Secretary of Commerce. It would then devolve upon the Secretary
of Commerce to work out a solution at the Cabinet level. Failing in
this the matter should be referred to the President. We do not there-
fore subscribe to either of the recommendations above.
145
Appendices
Appendix I
Government Organization and Procedures
The information in this appendix contains a brief description of the functions,
as of January i, 1948, of those organizations of the Executive branch of the
Federal Government which are primarily responsible for civil aviation activities
and a history of Federal Government organization for civil aviation since 1926.
Civil Aeronautics Authority. — The Civil Aeronautics Authority, as originally
established by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, was an independent agency
composed of three parts — a five-member group confusingly also called the Civil
Aeronautics Authority, an Administrator, and a three-member Air Safety Board.
By Reorganization Plans Nos. Ill and IV of 1940 the five-man group was re-
named the Civil Aeronautics Board. Certain of its functions were transferred
to the Administrator, who was renamed the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics;
the three-member Air Safety Board was abolished and its functions transferred
to the Civil Aeronautics Board. Reorganization Plans Nos. Ill and IV further
provided that together the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Administrator of
Civil Aeronautics would constitute the Civil Aeronautics Authority within the
Deparment of Commerce. The Civil Aeronautics Authority as such performs
no functions and has no significance.
The Board is established within the framework of the Department for "ad-
ministrative housekeeping" purposes and reports to the Congress and the Pres-
ident through the Secretary of Commerce but exercises its functions independently
of the Secretary.
The Administrator performs his functions under the direction and supervision
of the Secretary of Commerce.
Civil Aeronautics Board. — The Civil Aeronautics Board is an independent
quasi-judicial agency composed of five members appointed by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The five-man body is directed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 to encourage
the development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the present
and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States,
of the Postal Service, and of the national defense; to regulate air transportation
so as to best promate its development and safety and preserve its inherent ad-
vantages; to consider in the public interest competition to the extent necessary
to assure the sound development of the air transportation system described.
In general, the Board grants or denies applications for air routes both domestic
and international; fixes rates of domestic air carriers; fixes mail rate compensation;
149
approves or disapproves consolidations, mergers, interlocking relationships, etc.,
affecting air carriers; prescribes accounts, records, and memoranda to be kept
by air carriers and reports required from them. The Board cooperates with the
Department of State in the negotiation of any agreements with foreign govern-
ments for the establishment and development of international air routes and
services. The Board prescribes safety rules and regulations including standards
covering the issuance of airman, aircraft type, production, airworthiness, and
air carrier operating certificates. The Board investigates aircraft accidents and
analyses them in order to ascertain the facts, circumstances, and probable causes.
Department of Commerce. — The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Aero-
nautics supervises the activities of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, the
Weather Bureau, and the Coast and Geodetic Survey.
Civil Aeronautics Administration. — The Civil Aeronautics Administration is
headed by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics who is appointed by the Presi-
dent by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and is directed by the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 to encourage and foster the development of civil
aeronautics and air commerce in the United States and abroad and to encourage
the establishment of civil airways, landing areas, and other air navigation
facilities.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration applies and enforces the safety standards,
rules, and regulations established by the Civil Aeronautics Board; plans, con-
structs, maintains, and operates the Federal Airways System; maintains and
operates the Washington National Airport; develops, directs, and fosters the
coordination of a national system of airports, and directs the Federal- Aid Airport
Program; performs developmental work, evaluation and service testing of devices
and systems required for the safety and development of civil aeronautics; fosters
and encourages the development of civil aviation education and training; collects
and disseminates civil aviation information; regulates for purposes of safety
United States-flag air carriers operating internationally; promotes United States
air commerce abroad through technical assistance to foreign governments, training
of foreign nationals, and the provisions of technical aviation experts to represent
the United States at international conferences.
Weather Bureau. — The Weather Bureau was created in the Department of
Agriculture in 1890 and transferred to the Department of Commerce by Reorgani-
zation Plan IV of 1940. Prior to 1890 its functions were performed in part by
the Signal Corps of the Army beginning in 1870.
The basic purpose of the Weather Bureau is to collect, process, and disseminate
weather information required for the public safety and national welfare. More
specifically, the Weather Bureau disseminates forecasts, warnings, and advices
for public and private uses; and organizes and operates special weather services
required for safe and efficient air transport. In addition to its general public
150
services it also operates special services for agriculture (including forest resources)
and for several other fields of business, industry and transportation (including
maritime commerce). The Bureau publishes information on climatic conditions
in the United States and elsewhere as it affects the national interest; and promotes
the development of meteorological science through research.
The Weather Bureau maintains close liaison with the Army and Navy to
coordinate civil and military meteorological operations, and cooperates closely
with the Civil Aeronautics Administration, the Coast Guard, the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the Department of Agriculture, the United
States Engineers, and Reclamation Service, etc., in the performance of its func-
tions. With ships provided by the Coast Guard, it participates with the
meteorological services of foreign countries in the maintenance of ocean weather
stations.
Coast and Geodetic Survey. — The Congress authorized a survey of the coast
of the United States in 1807 and in 1871 provided for the extension of the
geodetic work across the country.
Included among the functions of the Coast and Geodetic Survey are the
surveying and charting of the coasts of the United States and its possessions
and the study of tides and currents to insure the safe navigation of coastal
and intracoastal waters; the establishment of geodetic control, including gravi-
tational and astronomical observations, to provide a framework of positions
and elevations necessary to coordinate all surveying and mapping of the country,
and the observation and analyses of the earth's magnetic data essential to the
land surveyor and to the navigator of the air and sea.
The Air Commerce Act of 1926 made it the responsibility of the Department
of Commerce to provide aeronautical charts for civil aviation. The production
of these charts was delegated by the Secretary of Commerce to the Coast and
Geodetic Survey.
By Act of Congress approved August 6, 1947, the Coast and Geodetic Survey
was further authorized (i) to conduct field surveys for aeronautical charts; (2)
to compile and print aeronautical charts of the United States, its territories
and possessions, and charts covering international airways required primarily by
United States civil aviation; and (3) to distribute these aeronautical charts and
related navigational publications.
State Department. — The State Department has responsibility for assisting
the President in the determination of United States foreign policy. The Sec-
retary of State, who is the highest ranking member of the Cabinet, directs
the home establishment in Washington and the Foreign Service abroad.
One of the six Assistant Secretaries of State, the Assistant Secretary — Trans-
portation and Communications Affairs, is responsible for the initiation and
coordination of policy and action concerning the international aspects of trans-
port and communications; and is currently serving as Chairman of the Air
Coordinating Committee, the Shipping Coordinating Committee, and the Tele-
communications Coordinating Committee, which are interdepartmental advisory
groups composed of representatives from the various governmental agencies
concerned. The Office of Transport and Communications, which is under
the direction of the Assistant Secretary, is divided into three divisions: the
Aviation, Shipping, and Telecommunications Divisions.
With specific reference to the development of international air transport serv-
ices, the Department of State conducts negotiations with foreign governments
for new or additional rights determined to be desirable as a result of collabora-
tion between the Department and the Civil Aronautics Board and with the
advice of the Air Coordinating Committee. Applications of foreign air carriers
for permits to operate into United States territory are forwarded through dip-
lomatic channels and, upon receipt by the State Department, are transmitted
to the Board for appropriate action. The Department also has responsibility
for liaison with and representation on ICAO and the coordination of this gov-
ernment's policies with that organization.
Post Office Department. — The Postmaster General superintends generally the
business of the Department; executes all laws relative to the Postal Service; and,
subject to the approval of the President, negotiates postal treaties with foreign
governments.
The second of the four Assistant Postmasters General is charged with authority
and responsibility for administering all matters relating to the transportation
of the domestic and international mails by any and all media of transportation,
and the management of the international postal service. He is assisted in the
execution of these duties by an under Second Assistant Postmaster General
and four deputy Second Assistant Postmasters General. One of these deputies
supervises all domestic and foreign air mail routes flying the American flag
and is responsible for research and analysis with respect to proposed new air
services, and for the development, improvement, and expansion of transportation
of mail by air. Another deputy is responsible for the establishment and main-
tenance of postal relations with foreign postal administrations and for the prep-
aration of agreements and formal conventions with foreign countries covering
all phases of international postal operations.
Air Coordinating Committee. — The Air Coordinating Committee was orig-
inally established on March 27, 1945, by agreement of the Secretaries of State,
War, Navy, and Commerce which was adhered to shortly thereafter by the
Civil Aeronautics Board subject to certain reservations. It was formalized by
Executive Order 9781 of September 19, 1946, in which provision is made for
submission to the President of important matters upon which the Committee
cannot reach a unanimous decision.
152
The functions of the Committee are to examine aviation problems and de-
velopments affecting more than one participating agency; to develop and rec-
ommend integrated policies to be carried out and actions to be taken by the
participating agencies or by any other government agency charged with respon-
sibility in the aviation field; and, to the extent permitted by law, to coordinate
the aviation activities of such agencies except those relating to the exercise of
quasi-judicial functions.
The Executive order provided that the Committee shall have as members one
representative from each of the following-named agencies: the State, War, Post
Office, Navy, and Commerce Departments and the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The members are designated by the respective heads of the participating agencies.
The President names one of the members as the Chairman of the Committee.
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget designates a representative of the
Bureau as a nonvoting member of the Committee.
At the present time the following are members of the Air Coordinating Com-
mittee: an Assistant Secretary of State who serves as chairman, the Chairman
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, who serves as co-chairman, the Under Secretary
of Commerce, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, an Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force, and the Second Assistant Postmaster General, with an Assistant
Director of the Bureau of the Budget as a nonvoting member.
The Committee, after obtaining the views of the head of each agency concerned,
submits to the President, together with the said views, (a) such of the Com-
mittee's recommendations on aviation policies as require the attention of the
President by reason of their character or importance, (£) those important aviation
questions the disposition of which is prevented by the inability of the agencies
concerned to agree, (c) an annual report of the Committee's activities during
each calendar year, which is submitted not later than January 31 of the next
succeeding year, and (d) such interim reports as may be necessary or desirable.
The Committee has a Technical Division concerned with technical questions
affecting techniques of flight, an Economic Division for economic and political
problems affecting air transportation, and an Industrial Division for problems
relating to the aircraft manufacturing industry. It also has an Aviation Industry
advisory panel composed of representatives of the Aircraft Industries Association,
the Air Transport Association, the Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences, the
National Aeronautic Association, the American Federation of Labor, and the
Congress of Industrial Organizations; an ICAO (International Civil Aviation
Organization) panel which plans and coordinates the work performed by the
Committee's divisions and subcommittees; and a legal subcommittee which
among other things coordinates agency views with respect to legislaion.
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. — The National Advisory Com-
mittee for Aeronautics was established by the Congress on March 3, 1915, to
153
supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems of flight with a view
to their practical solution, and to direct and conduct research and experiment
in aeronautics in laboratories placed in whole or in part under its direction.
In general, the Committee coordinates the research needs of private, com-
mercial, and military aviation; and conducts fundamental and applied research
with a view to increasing the performance, economy, and safety of aircraft.
The Committee is composed of 15 members serving without compensation
appointed by the President: two representatives each of the Navy and the Air
Force Departments and the Civil Aeronautics Authority; one representative
each of the Smithsonian Institution, the United States Weather Bureau, and
the National Bureau of Standards; together with six additional persons who
are "acquainted with the needs of aeronautical science, either civil or military,
or skilled in aeronautical engineering or its allied sciences." To assist the
main committee in the formulation of programs of scientific research and in
the coordination of aeronautical research generally there are 6 major and 20
subordinate technical committees comprising members serving without com-
pensation and drawn from the military, industrial, and scientific aeronautical
organizations.
Within the NACA are two subsidiary organizations: the Office of Aeronautical
Intelligence, which serves as a depository and distributing agency for scientific
and technical data on aeronautics; and the Office of Aeronautical Inventions
which gives preliminary consideration to, and analyses and prepares reports on,
the merits of aeronautical inventions and designs submitted to the Government
through any agency.
The Committee operates the Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory at
Langley Field, Va., the Ames Aeronautical Laboratory at Moffett Field, Calif.,
and the Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory at Cleveland, Ohio, which are
the principal aeronautical research laboratories of the Government.
National Security. — The National Security Act of 1947 provides for coordi-
nation for national security through the establishment of the National Security
Council (with the Central Intelligence Agency under it) and the National
Security Resources Board; and establishes the National Military Establishment,
headed by the Secretary of Defense.
The function of the National Security Council is to advise the President
with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies re-
lating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in
matters involving the national security. Membership includes the President,
who presides over meetings of the Council or designates a member to preside
in his place; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries
of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Chairman of the National
Security Resources Board; and any of the following whom the President may
designate from time to time: the Secretaries of the executive departments, the
Chairman of the Munitions Board; and the Chairman of the Research and
Development Board.
The function of the National Security Resources Board is to advise the Pres-
ident concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobiliza-
tion. Membership includes the Chairman, appointed from civil life by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and such heads or repre-
sentatives of the various executive departments and independent agencies as
the President may designate from time to time. On November 13 last the Presi-
dent appointed the Secretaries of the Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture,
Commerce, and Labor as members of the Board.
The National Military Establishment consists of the Department of the Army,
the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force; the War
Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (including the Joint Staff), the Munitions
Board, and the Research and Development Board.
HISTORY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION FOR CIVIL AVIATION
AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926
Promotion of Air Commerce. — The act made it the duty of the Secretary of
Commerce to foster air commerce by encouraging the establishment of airports,
civil airways, and other air navigation facilities; by making recommendations
to the Secretary of Agriculture as to necessary meteorological service; by studying
the possibilities for the development of air commerce and the aeronautical in-
dustry and trade in the United States and by collecting and disseminating avia-
tion information; by cooperating with other executive agencies of the Govern-
ment in research and development for the improvement of air navigation facil-
ities; by investigating and publishing the causes of accidents in civil air naviga-
tion in the United States, etc.
Regulatory Powers. — The Secretary was authorized to provide for the regis-
tration of civil aircraft; for the certification of civil aircraft as to their air-
worthiness; for the rating of airmen and air navigation facilities; for the issu-
ance, suspension, and revocation of registration, aircraft, and airman certificates;
and for the establishment of air traffic rules for the navigation, protection, and
identification of aircraft.
Aids to Air Navigation. — All airways, together with all emergency landing
fields and other air navigation facilities except airports and terminal landing fields,
used in connection with the air-mail service were transferred from the juris-
diction of the Postmaster General to that of the Secretary of Commerce.
The Secretary was authorized to designate and establish civil airways; to estab-
lish, operate, and maintain along such airways all necessary air navigation fa-
155
cilities except airports; to chart and arrange for the publication of maps of such
airways.
The Chief of the Weather Bureau, under the direction of the Secretary of
Agriculture, was directed to furnish weather reports, forecasts, warnings, and
advices required to promote the safety and efficiency of air navigation in the
United States and above the high seas.
Assistant Secretary of Commerce. — Provision was made for an additional
Assistant Secretary of Commerce, to be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to assist the Secretary in performing his duties
under the act. (The Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce was
created to administer the act; name changed to Bureau of Air Commerce by
administrative order of the Secretary of Commerce, July i, 1934.)
Air Mail Act of 1934. — The act authorized the Postmaster General to award
air-mail contracts and to determine the routes for the transportation of air mail.
Holders of air-mail contracts were required to keep their books, records, and
accounts in the manner prescribed by the Postmaster General; and were restricted
as to maximum remuneration, aviation stockholdings, directorships, etc.
The Interstate Commerce Commission was required, after notice and hearing,
to fix fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the carriage of air mail over
each route, not to exceed the maximum established by the legislation. (The
Bureau of Air Mail was created in the Interstate Commerce Commission to
carry out the provisions of the act.)
The Secretary of Commerce, administering the Air Commerce Act of 1926,
was ordered to certify to the Postmaster General the nature of the equipment
to be required with respect to speed, load, and safety. The Secretary prescribed
maximum flying hours for pilots and operational techniques for mail carriers.
The Air Mail Act of 1934 also called for the President to appoint a five-man
Federal Aviation Commission to study the country's air transportation system,
and to report to Congress "its recommendations of a broad policy covering all
phases of aviation and the relation of the United States thereto."
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. — The act created an independent agency for
civil aviation — the Civil Aeronautics Authority — composed of the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority of five members which exercised broad adjudicative and
rule-making functions classified as economic and safety regulation; the Ad-
ministrator who was responsible for the designation of airways and the construc-
tion, operation, and maintenance of air-navigation facilities; the Air Safety Board
of three members which investigated aircraft accidents. All such appointments
were made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The personnel and property of the Bureau of Air Commerce of the Depart-
ment of Commerce and of the Bureau of Air Mail of the Interstate Commerce
Commission were transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
156
The Secretary of State was directed to advise the Authority concerning the
negotiation of air agreements with foreign governments.
The Chief of the Weather Bureau, under the direction of the Secretary of
Agriculture, was directed to furnish the required meteorological services.
Reorganization Plan III of 7940. — The intent of plan III was to clarify the
relations of the Administrator and the five-member Board of the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority. The administrator, renamed the Administrator of Civil
Aeronautics, was made the chief administrative officer of the Authority with
respect to all functions other than those relating to economic regulation and
certain other activities primarily of a rule-making and adjudicative character
entrusted to the Board.
To this end certain functions were transferred to the Administrator of Civil
Aeronautics, including the functions vested in the Authority by the Civilian
Pilot Training Act of 1939; the functions of aircraft registration and of safety
regulation (except the prescription of safety standards, rules, and regulations)
and the function of suspending and revoking certificates after hearing, etc.
Reorganization Plan IV of 1940. — By this plan the Civil Aeronautics Authority
was brought within the framework of the Department of Commerce. The
Weather Bureau was transferred from the Department of Agriculture to the
Department of Commerce to permit better coordination of government activities
relating to aviation and to commerce generally.
The Air Safety Board was abolished and its functions transferred to the five-
member Civil Aeronautics Authority, renamed the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The plan further provided that the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics and
the Civil Aeronautics Board would constitute the Civil Aeronautics Authority
within the Department of Commerce; the Administrator exercising his functions
under the direction and supervision of the Secretary of Commerce; the Board
reporting to Congress and the President through the Secretary of Commerce and
performing its budgeting, accounting, personnel, procurement, and related
routine management functions under the direction and supervision of the Sec-
retary but exercising its functions of rule-making (including the prescription
of rules, regulations, and standards), adjudication, and investigation independ-
ently of the Secretary.
157
Appendix II
History and Organization — President's Air Policy Commission
Immediately following the appointment of the Commission by the Presi-
dent's letter of July 18, 1947, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman met in
Washington to discuss plans, programs, and policies. Much of the procedural,
groundwork was laid before the first formal meeting of the entire group on
July 29. On that day, the five commissioners were sworn in, and the nucleus
of the staff was assembled. The Executive Director was appointed on July
30, and was sworn in on August n.
By mid-August, the recruitment and organization of the working staff was
virtually complete. Before the end of the month, an outline for the final
report and the procedures for the conduct of the entire program had been
agreed upon and were in effect.
An accompanying chart shows the organization of the Commission and its
staff. Some changes in staff personnel and functions took place in the course
of the work but they were of a minor character. The chart shows accurately
the duties and responsibilities of the members of the organization during its
active life.
One major change occurred in Commission membership. For reasons stated
in his letter to President Truman of September 16, Mr. Henry Ford tendered
his resignation. It was accepted by the President on September 27, and on
the same day, Mr. John A. McCone, the Commission's advisor on national
security matters, was appointed to replace Mr. Ford. Subsequent to his
appointment Mr. McCone continued to carry the specific responsibility for the
national security phase of the study.
The Commision opened its formal hearings on September 8 and closed them
on December 3, 1947. Both public and executive sessions were held, inter-
spersed by many less formal conferences and meetings with civilian and gov-
ernmental representatives and agencies. The National Military Establishment,
the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, and the Bureau of the Budget were particularly cooperative in arranging
presentations of their problems at the Commission's convenience. The total
number of formal Commission meetings was 206, distributed as follows:
Open hearings 96
Executive sessions 65
Luncheon meetings 33
Dinner meetings 5
Miscellaneous 7
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Witnesses before the Commission were requested to file statements in ad-
vance. The formal hearings consisted mainly of questioning by the Commis-
sion to elaborate upon or to clarify the information submitted by the witness
in his statement. Full stenographic records were kept of all public hearings.
Abstracts were made of both the statements and the testimony as taken. For
convenience, these abstracts have been compiled both alphabetically by witnesses
and also classified by subject matter. These documents form a part of the
records of the Commission.
An accompanying list shows all those who gave formal testimony before the
Commission, either in public or executive session. Many others, not listed,
gave the benefit of their views on many subjects, either orally or in writing.
The Commission takes this opportunity to make acknowledgement of the in-
valuable assistance rendered by all those who appeared, or who contributed of
their time and experience during the course of the investigation.
It was impossible, within the time available, for the Commission to visit all
centers of aeronautical activity in the United States. It did, however, make
several field trips.
On August 26, the NACA laboratories at Langley Field were inspected.
During the week of October 5-12 the Commission visited aircraft establish-
ments in the midwestern and Pacific regions of the United States including:
Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, Dayton.
Civil Aeronautics Administration Technical Development Center,
Indianapolis.
Allison Division, General Motors Corp., Indianapolis.
Beech Aircraft Corporation, Wichita.
Boeing Airplane Co., Wichita.
Cessna Aircraft Co., Wichita.
Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corporation, Fort Worth, San Diego.
Ryan Aeronautical Co., San Diego.
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Glendale, Calif.
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., Santa Monica, Calif.
Northrop Aircraft, Inc., Hawthorne, Calif.
North American Aviation, Inc., Inglewood, Calif.
Hughes Aircraft Co., Culver City, Calif.
Muroc Army Air Base, Calif.
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Moffat Field, Calif.
Naval Air Transport Service Headquarters, Moffat Field, Calif.
Boeing Airplane Co., Seattle.
On October 21, at the invitation of the Department of the Navy, members
of the Commission and staff, together with members of the Congressional Air
160
Policy Board, went aboard the aircraft carrier Midway for a day's demonstration
of aerial tactics at sea.
On November 6, members of the Commission visited the following eastern
aircraft plants:
Grumman Aircraft Co., Bethpage, N. Y.; Republic Aviation Corp., Farming-
dale, N. Y.; United Aircraft Corp., East Hartford, Conn. On December 10 the
groups inspected the Glenn L. Martin Co.'s plant at Baltimore.
For the western tour, and the trip of November 6, the President made his
personal airplane, the Independence available to the Commission, a fact which
added greatly to the speed and comfort of both trips, and which was much ap-
preciated by all those aboard.
Many Government departments contributed in many ways to the Commission's
work. The temporary release of needed personnel for transfer to the staff was
of great assistance. A willingness everywhere to consult with Commission staff
at any time on any subject was also very helpful.
Special mention should be made of the untiring work of the military liaison
officers, Brig. Gen. Bryant L. Boatner, United States Air Force, and Capt. Paul
E. Pihl, United States Navy. As the designated channels through which all
military material flowed to the Commission, these officers were called upon
to handle extraordinary loads under conditions that were often far from ideal.
Their work did much to pave the way for the Commission in its research in
matters pertaining to the armed services.
The responsibility for housing and servicing the Commission during its
entire existence has been in the hands of the Department of Commerce. Special
acknowledgment is due to its administrative officers for the high degree of
cooperation that has been accorded to the Commission and its staff. The per-
sonnel, fiscal, and housekeeping problems that inevitably arise in conjunction
with a temporary organization working under high pressure require extraor-
dinary tact and patience in the handling. The efficiency and dispatch with
which all our problems were handled by our hosts in the Department of
Commerce contributed in no small degree to the successful operation of the
Air Policy Commission.
The Commission expresses its especial appreciation to S. Paul Johnston, the
Executive Director, for his efficient organization and direction of the staff and
his invaluable and informed advice.
Final acknowledgment is due to the loyal and untiring work of the members
of the Commission staff. From beginning to end, they have worked long
hours under extreme pressure to provide the necessary background material,
to prepare for hearings, to analyze testimony, and to assemble the facts and
figures on which this report is based. Without their help, it would have been
impossible for the Commission to carry out the President's directive within
the time limit that was set.
161
List of Witnesses Heard by the President's Air Policy
Commission in Formal Public and Executive Sessions
Aiken, Paul — Second Assistant Postmaster General.
Aitchison, Clyde — Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission.
Akerman, John D. — Professor of Engineering, University of Minnesota.
Alison, John R. — Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Aeronautics.
Allen, C. B. — Washington correspondent, New York Herald Tribune (formerly
member, Air Safety Board).
Allen, William M. — President, Boeing Aircraft Co.
Anderson, William L. — National Association of State Aviation Officials.
Appleby, Paul — Dean, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
Baldwin, Hanson — The New York Times.
Balfour, Maxwell W. — Aeronautical Training Society.
Bassett, Preston R. — President, Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc.
Batchelor, James W. — Aviation Attorney, United Pilots and Mechanics
Association.
Behncke, David — President, Airline Pilots Association.
Bell, Lawrence D. — President, Bell Aircraft Corp.
Berle, Adolph — Columbia University (formerly Assistant Secretary of State).
Berliner, Henry A. — Chairman of the Board, Engineering and Research
Corporation of America.
Bertrandias, Victor C. — Vice President, Douglas Aircraft.
Betts, Alan — Consultant, Aircraft Industries Association.
Branch, Harllee — Member, Civil Aeronautics Board.
Braniff, T. E. — President, Braniff Airways.
Brent, J. L. — President, Pacific Overseas Airlines.
Brophy, Gerald — Aviation Attorney, Chadbourne, Wallace, Parke & White-
side.
Brown, John Nicholas — Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air.
Brownell, George A. — Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland and Krenal.
Brownlow, Louis — Public Administration Clearing House.
Buckley, Charles B. — Manager, Aircraft Division of Weber Showcase &
Fixture Co.
Buckley, James — Director of Airport Development, New York Port Authority.
Burden, William A. M. — Former Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Aero-
nautics.
162
Burgess, Robert S. — Deputy Second Assistant Postmaster General, Air Postal
Transport, Post Office Department.
Bush, Dr. Vannevar — Chairman, Research and Development Board.
Gallery, Francis — Victor Emanuel & Co.
Clevering, Richard B. — Allison Division, General Motors Corp.
Cohu, LaMotte — President, Transcontinental & Western Airlines, Inc.
Compton, Dr. Karl T. — President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Coy, Wayne— Vice President, Radio Station WINX and WINX-FM.
Damon, Ralph — President, American Airlines, Inc.
Darr, Harold S. — President, Monarch Airlines.
Davison, General F. Trubee — Former Assistant Secretary of War for Air;
Director, Museum of National History.
de Florez, Dr. Luis — Independent Consultant, Doubleday Publishing Co.
de Sever sky, Major Alexander — Aviation Author.
Dean, Allen — President, Air Freight Forwarder Association (since dissolved).
Dinu, Madeline C. — National Association of State Aviation Officials.
Douglas, Donald — President, Douglas Aircraft Corp.
Dryden, Hugh L. — Director of Research, National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics.
Dyer, J. — President, Florida Airways.
Echols, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. — President, Aircraft Industries Association of
America.
Eisenhower, General Dwight D. — Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
Emmerich, Herbert — Director, Public Administration Clearing House.
Ferguson, Malcolm P. — President, Bendix Aviation.
Flavin, Thomas A. — Judicial Officer, Department of Agriculture.
Fletcher, R. V. — Special Counsel, Association of American Railroads.
Ford, Tirey L. — Chairman, Sea-Air Committee.
Forrestal, James — Secretary of National Defense.
Foster, William C. — Under Secretary of Commerce.
Garside, Joseph — President, E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc.; Chairman, Council
of Local Airlines.
Gates, Artemus — Formerly Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air.
Gillen, John J. — Deputy Assistant Postmaster General, International Postal
Transport, Post Office Department.
Glacy, G. F. — Comptroller, Boston & Maine Railroad.
Glass, Fred M. — President, Air Cargo, Inc.
Gross, Robert E. — President, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
Gurley, F. G.— President, The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.
Hardin, Col. Thomas O. — Air Transport Command (formerly Chairman,
Air Safety Board).
163
Harriman, W. Averell — Secretary of Commerce.
Hartranft, J. B. — President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.
Hazen, R. M. — Director of Engineering, Allison Division of General Motors.
Hensel, H. Struve — Counsel, The Air Freight Association (formerly Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Air).
Hicks, Gwin — Vice President, Empire Airlines.
Hinckley, Robert H. — American Broadcasting Co.
Hoffman, Clifford — National Flying Farmers Association.
Horner, H. M. — President, United Aircraft Corp.
Howard, Beverly — President, Hawthorne Flying Service; President, National
Aviation Trades Association.
Hunsaker, Jerome C. — Chairman, National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics.
Hunt, Ralph V. — Vice President, Douglas Aircraft Co.
James, R. B. — Attorney, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad.
Kennan, George F. — Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.
Kindelberger, J. H. — President, North American Aviation.
Klak, John J. — General Counsel, Independent Air Carriers Conference.
Kline, Robert E. — Counsel, Sea-Air Committee.
Kuter, Maj. Gen. Laurence S. — United States Representative, International
Civil Aviation Organization.
Laddon, I. M. — Executive Vice President, Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft.
Land, Vice Adm. Emory S., U. S. N. (Ret.) — President, Air 'transport
Association of America.
Landis, James M. — Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board.
Law, Hervey — General Superintendent of Airports, New York Port Authority.
Lee, Josh — Member, Civil Aeronautics Board.
Lewis, William C. — Director, Air Reserve Association of the United States.
Litchfield, Paul W. — Chairman of the Board, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Lombard, Dr. Albert E. — Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft.
Lovett, Robert — Under Secretary of State.
McDonald, David J. — Secretary-Treasurer, United Steel Workers of America.
Mahoney, E. J. — Director, International Postal Transport, Post Office
Department.
Marshall, George C. — Secretary of State.
Martin, Glenn L. — President, Glenn L. Martin Co.
Martin, Roy — Under Second Assistant Postmaster General.
Merriam, Lewis — Vice President, The Brookings Institution.
Merritt, K. N. — Vice President, Railway Express Agency.
Mooney, James — President, Willys-Overland Motors, Inc.
Moseley, C. C. — Cal Aero Technical Institute.
164
Munro, C. Bedell — Former President, Capital Airlines, Inc.
Munter, Herbert — Vice President, West Coast Airlines.
Murray, Roger — Vice President, Bankers Trust Co.
Nelson, Donald — President, Society of Motion Picture Producers of America
(formerly Chairman, War Production Board).
Nimitz, Fleet Admiral Chester W., U. S. N.
Northrop, John K. — President, Northrop Aircraft, Inc.
Norton, Garrison — Assistant Secretary of State; Chairman, Air Coordinating
Committee.
Patterson, Robert — Patterson, Belknap and Webb (formerly Secretary of War).
Patterson, W. A. — President, United Air Lines.
Peale, Mundy I. — President, Republic Aircraft Corp.
Phillips, Mallory — Director, Domestic Air Postal Transport, Post Office
Department.
Piasecki, Frank N. — President, Piasecki Helicopter Co.
Pogue, L. Welch — Chairman of the Board, National Aeronautics Association.
Pois, Joseph — Assistant to the President, Signode Steel Strapping Co.
Putnam, Carleton — President, Chicago and Southern Airlines.
Ray, James C. — Vice President, Southwest Airways.
Raymond, A. E. — Vice President-Engineering, Douglas Aircraft Corp.
Rentzel, D. W. — President, Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
Richardson, Rear Admiral, L. B., U. S. N. (Ret.)— Vice President, Curtiss-
Wright Corp., Airplane Division.
Rickenbacker, E. V. — President, Eastern Airlines, Inc.
Robinson, R. G. — Assistant Director of Research, National Advisory Com-
mittee for Aeronautics.
Roig, Harold J. — President, Pan American Grace Airways.
Rosendahl, Rear Admiral C. E., U. S. N., (Ret.).
Rosenheim, Howard H. — International Register Co.
Royall, Kenneth — Secretary of the Army.
Schildhauer, C. H.— Captain, U. S. N. (Ret.); U. S. Flying Boats, Inc.
Schroeder, Lester — National Association of State Aviation Officials.
Sikorsky, Igor I. — Director of Engineering, Sikorsky Division of United
Aircraft.
Slater, John — Chairman of the Board, American Overseas Airlines, Inc.
Slick, Earl F. — President, The Air Freight Association.
Smith, C. R. — Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, American
Airlines, Inc.
Smith, William W. — Chairman, Maritime Commission.
Snyder, George W., Jr. — President, Challenger Airlines.
Solomon, S. J. — President, Atlantic Airlines.
165
Spaatz, General Carl — Chief of Staff, U. S. Army Air Force.
Stunkel, Regan C. — President, Aviation Maintenance Corp.
Sullivan, John Dwight — Secretary, National Air Council.
Sullivan, John L. — Secretary of the Navy.
Swirbul, Leon A. — President, Grumman Aircraft Corp.
Symington, W. Stuart — Secretary of the Air Force.
Tibbets, Kenneth W.— President, National Credit Corp.
Trippe, Juan T. — President, Pan American Airways System.
Van Zandt, Parker — Aviation Consultant.
Victory, John F. — Executive Secretary, National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics.
Wallace, Dwane L. — President, Cessna Aircraft Company.
Ward, J. Carlton, Jr. — President, Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.
Webb, James E. — Director, The Bureau of the Budget.
Webb, R. A. — General Agent, Illinois Central Railroad.
Webster, Edward M. — Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission.
Wetmore, Alexander M. — Chairman, National Air Museum.
Willis, Charles F., Jr.— President, Willis Air Service.
Wright, Burdette — Vice President, Curtiss- Wright Corp.
Wright, T. P. — Administrator, Civil Aeronautics Administration.
166
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1948
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