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J  r  ?■?  '/.  /  -J 


Sarbarli  ColUge  library 


GEORGE  B.  SOHIER  PRIZE  FUND 

"The  lurplus  eich  y«u  over  and  alxwe  what  ihall  be 

required  for  the  prize  shall  be  expended 

for  booka  for  the  libraiy" 


TACTICS 


BY 


B  A  L  C  K 

Colonel,  German  Army. 


VOLUME    II. 

CAVALRY,  FIELD  AND  HEAVY  ARTILLERY 

IN  FIELD  WARFARE. 


AUTHORIZED  TRANSLATION  FROM  THE  GERMAN 

BY 

WALTER    KRUEQER, 

First  Lieutenant,  Third  Infantry,  U.  S.  Army, 


Fottrtk  erlar^ti  mml  completely  revieed  editioii. 
W^itk  numerovLB  plates  m  tke  text. 


U.  8.  CAVALRY  ASSOCIATION, 

Fort  Liavemwobth,  Kansas. 

1914. 


u/. 


av 


%r] 


15* 


JAN  25  1916 


uaL  «^t«.*.v"C^ 


coptbiqht,  1914, 
Bt  Waltbb  Kbuioeb. 


PBB88  or  KBTOHBaOK  PRINTING  CO.. 

IiSAtbu'wobth,  kaitsas. 


TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE. 

The  kind  reception  accorded  his  translation  of  Volume  I 
of  Tactics  here  and  abroad,  and  many  urgent  requests  re- 
ceived from  brother  officers  for  a  similar  book  on  cavalry 
and  artillery,  prompted  the  translator  to  undertake  the  trans* 
ation  of  Volume  II. 

This  is  an  epitome  of  the  interpretation  and  application 
of  tactical  principles  in  the  cavalry,  field  and  heavy  artillery 
of  the  various  armies,  discussed  in  the  light  of  tactical  views 
and  methods  prevailing  in  Germany,  and  amplified  by  numer- 
ous examples  from  military  history. 

The  author's  views  diflFer  in  many  respects  from  those 
generally  accepted  in  our  service,  but  that  very  fact  tends  to 
enhance  the  value  of  his  work,  for  it  enables  the  student  to 
see  things  from  a  different  angle  and  stimtdates  reflection. 

The  translator's  aim  has  been  to  reproduce,  in  English, 
as  faithfully  as  possible,  the  ideas  of  the  author.  If  he  has 
been  moderately  successful  in  this,  and  has  helped  his  brother 
officers  to  get  a  deeper  and  broader  conception  of  tactics,  he 
will  feel  amply  repaid  for  his  work. 


PREFACE. 


This,  the  second  volume  of  'TACTICS"  treats  of  the 
employment  of  cavalry,  field  and  heavy  artillery  in  field 
warfare,  with  due  regard  to  the  great  influence  exerted  on 
them  by  the  lessons  of  recent  campaigns.  Although  cavalry 
was  imable  to  win  victories  with  the  arw^  blancheinthe  Balkans, 
in  South- Africa,  and  in  Manchuria,  the  science  of  combat  as 
such  should  nevertheless  point  out  that  cavalry  need  by  no 
means  dispense  with  shock  action;  that,  in  spite  of  all 
mechanical  improvements  in  fire  arms,  saber  and  lance  have 
not,  by  a  long  shot,  become  useless.  While  I  place  a  high 
value  upon  the  use  of  fire  action,  I  am  firmly  convinced  that 
the  days  of  mounted  charges  are,  by  no  means,  over.  The 
more  our  opponents  are  convinced  of  the  futility  of  a  charge 
against  infantry  or  artillery,  the  better  the  chances  of  our 
success. 

The  employment  of  heavy  artillery  has,  of  course,  re- 
ceived thorough  treatment  in  these  pages.  The  events  of 
the  Russo-Japanese  war  give  but  a  faint  idea  of  the  power 
of  the  modem  rapid  fire  gim,  although  the  latter's  shrapnel 
was  so  effective  as  to  force  the  artillery  of  both  belligerents 
into  masked  positions  and  very  materially  protracted  the 
combats. 

The  lessons  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  however,  are 
applicable  only  to  gtms  without  shields,  and  in  my  opinion 
the  changes  produced  in  tactics  by  the  adoption  of  rapid  fire 
gtms  in  place  of  the  slower  firing  cannon,  were  by  no  means 
so  radical  as  those  that  were  the  immediate  result  of  the  in- 
troduction of  gun  shields.  Gim  shields  will  impart  an  en- 
tirely new  character  to  the  artillery  combat  of  the  future. 


vi  Preface. 

New  weapons,  new  Tactics.  Tactics  can  not  wait  until 
the  next  great  war  is  upon  us,  but  must  look  into  the  future 
and  endeavor  to  devine  the  changes  that  coming  events  will 
require.  Nevertheless,  we  w411  not  be  spared  surprises. 
These  will  be  the  greater,  the  less  we  have  studied,  in  time  of 
peace,  the  characteristic  properties  of  modem  weapons,  and 
the  less  we  have  appreciated  these  w^eapons  at  their  true 
value. 

In  discussions  on  effects  of  fire,  I  have  throughout  fol- 
lowed the  exhaustive  works  of  His  Excellency  Lieutenant- 
General  Rohne.  Statements  in  regard  to  the  strength  of 
opposing  forces  during  the  Franco-German  war  are  taken  from 
the  very  able  and  trustworthy  research  work  of  Major  Kunz. 
Wherever  examples  from  military  history  are  taken  from 
General  Staff  Accounts  (Gen.  St.  W.)  or  from  regimental 
histories,  appropriate  references  are  given  in  all  cases.  On 
the  Russo-Turkish  war,  I  have  consulted  the  comprehensive 
work  of  Major  Springer,  Austrian  Army,  and  the  Critical 
Review  (Kritische  Riickblicke)  by  General  Kuropatkin  as 
well  as  the  Austrian  translation  of  the  Russian  General  Staff 
Account,  now  in  course  of  preparation.  The  copious  lit- 
erature available  on  the  Russo-Japanese  war  w^as  utilized 
as  far  as  possible. 

I  desire  to  express,  at  this  point,  my  sincere  thanks  for 
the  assistance  received  from  officers  of  all  arms  and  from  those 
who  participated  in  the  recent  campaigns. 

The  Author. 


CONTENTS. 

CAVALRY. 

PAOB 

I.  GENERAL. 8 

1.  Arms  and  Eqaipment 3 

Purchase  (augmentation)  hones 3 

Landwehr  cavalry 4 

Organization,  arms,  ammunition,  equipment  (table) 4 

Views  on  the  lance 6 

2.  Organization  of  the  Cavalry 9 

(a)  Minor  Cavalry  Units 9 

Escadron 9 

Regiment 9 

Brigade 11 

(6)  Major  Cavalry  Units 11 

Cavalry  division 11 

Organization  of  German  cavalry  divisions  in  the 

Franco-German  war 12 

Organization  of  cavalry   divisions  in   various 

armies  (table) 13 

Assignment  of  cyclists  to  cavalry  divisions 14 

Assignment  of  horse  artillery  to  cavalry  divisions.  16 

Assignment  of  machine  guns  to  cavalry  divisions. .  1 6 
Assignment  of  pioneers  and  trains  to  cavalry 

divisions 17 

Formation  of  cavalry  divisions  in  time  of  peace..  19 

Cavalry  Corps 20 

II.  THE  FOBMATIONS 24 

1.    Tlie  Escadron 25 

(o)  The  Formation  of  the  Escadron 25 

(&)   Contact  and  Frontage,  Number  of  ranks  and  Dis- 
tance between  then; 29 

(c)  Elementary  Movements 30 

(d)  Gaits : 31 

Distance  covered  per  minute 32 

(6)  General  Principles  for  Movements 35 

1.  Commands,  Orders,  Bugle  and  Visual  Signals 
and  Verbal  Directions 86 

2.  Wheels  and  Turns 36 

3.  Deployments  and  Front  into  Line 37 


i^ii  Contents. 

1.  The  Escadron— continued.  page 

(/)  Movements  of  the  Escadron  in  Line 38 

(g)  The  Columns  of  the  Escadron 39 

1.  Column  of  Platoons 39 

Computation  of  distance  between  platoons..  40 

Forming  column  of  platoons  from  line 41 

Inversion 41 

Forming  line  from  column  of  platoons 42 

Time  required  for  forming  column  of  pla- 
toons and  line 44 

2.  The  Echelon  Formation 44 

Comparison  of  echelon  formation  and  col- 
umn of  platoons 45 

Single  rank  formation 45 

3.  Route  Columns 46 

2.  The  Regriment 61 

(a)  The  Formations 61 

1.  The  Regiment  in  Line 52 

2.  Line  of  Escadrons  in  Colunms  of  Platoons 53 

3.  The  Regimental  Column 66 

4.  Column  of  Platoons 58 

6.     Double  Column 69 

6.     Route  Column 60 

(b)  Evolutions  of  the  Regiment 61 

Deployments 62 

(c)  Transitions  to  Narrower  Formations  (Ployments)  ..  64 

(d)  Movements  in  Column  and  in  Line  of  Columns 68 

(e)  Transition  to  Line 68 

(/)  Time  Required  for  Deploying 71 

Computation 72 

3.  The  Brigade* 73 

4.  The  Cavalry  DiviHion  and  the  Cavalry  Corps 79 

Assembly  formations 80 

5*    Comparison  between  lAne  and  Column 82 

Charges  in  column 82 

III.  THE  COMBAT  OPERATIONS  OF  CAVALRY 85 

1*    The  Employment  of  Cavalry  in  Battle 85 

The  English  cavalry  in  the  Boer  war 85 

Initial  conclusions  drawn  by  the  British  from  the 

Boer  war 87 

Russian  and  Japanese  cavalry  in  Manchuria 88 

Operations  of  the  cavalry  brigade  under  Prince 

Kanin 89 

Cavalry  at  Wafangkou 91 


Contents.  ix 

!•    The  Employment  of  Cavalry  in  Battle — continued,  page 

Cavalry  at  Sandepu 93 

Russian  views 96 

Proportion  of  cavalry  to  other  arms 96 

Position  of  the  cavalry  in  battle 98 

Cavalry  duels 100 

Action  of  cavalry  in  battle 101 

2.  The  Lieader 102 

Importance  of  personality 104 

3.  The  DUmonnted  Action  of  Cavalry 108 

Conditions  in  the  Franco-German  war 1 08 

Occasions  for  the  employment  of  dismounted 

action Ill 

Formation 113 

Dismounting  to  fight  on  foot  and  mounting  up 114 

Skirmishers,  supports  and  dismounted  reserve 116 

Mounted  reserve,  led  horses 117 

Armament  with  fire  arms 117 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 118 

The  attack 121 

Fire  surprise 125 

Defense 126 

Breaking  off  the  action 128 

Examples  of  the  employment  of  dismounted 

action 129 

English  views  on  the  employment  of  mounted 

infantry 131 

Machine  guns 133 

IV.    CAVALRY  VERSUS  CAVALRY 137 

1.  General 137 

Necessity  of  launching  masses 138 

Ground  scouting  and  reconnaissance 139 

Examples  of  inadequate  ground  scouting 140 

Combat  reconnaissance 142 

2.  The  Advance  to  the  Attack 142 

Order  for  the  development  for  action 143 

Formation  in  echelon 145 

3.  The  Conduct  of  the  Chargre 147 

Distribution  in  depth,  supports,  line 149 

Supporting  escadrons 151 

Origin  of  "Three  Line  Tactics" 152 

Frederick  the  Great's  attack  formation 153 

Weakness  of  "Three  Line  Tactics" 154 

The  flank  attack 155 


X  Contents. 

IV.  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry — continued.  page 

4.  The  Impact  and  the  Melee 161 

Decision  in  the  mfil^e 162 

Use  of  weapons 163 

Mounted  fire  action 166 

Result  of  cavalry  actions 169 

5.  The  Purnuit 170 

6.  Rally 174 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 175 

Austria-Hungary 175 

France 177 

Echelon  Tactics 179 

Italy 182 

Russia 183 

England 185 

7.  Charges  by  Successive  Kscadrons 185 

8.  The  Chargre  in  Extended  Order 187 

9.  The  Lava  of  the  Cossacks 188 

Examples  from  military  history 192 

V.  CAVALRY  VERSUS   INFANTRY 194 

Factors  that  make  a  charge  against  infantry 

difficult 197 

Charges  from  several  directions 201 

Charge  in  successive  lines 203 

Charge  on  a  square 204 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 205 

VI.  CAVALRY  VERSUS  ARTILLERY 209 

Bringing  off  captured  guns 212 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 213 

Charges  against  heavy  artillery 214 


Contents.  xi 


ARTILLERY. 

PAGE 

I.     ARMAMENT,    MOBILITY,   AM)   OROANIZATIOX 

OF  FIKL.I)  ARTILLICKV 217 

1.  Hevelopment  of  Field  Artillery  since  the  Franco- 

German  War 217 

Recoil  guns 218 

Gun  shields 219 

Bombardment  of  guns  provided  with  shields 220 

Shrapnel  shell  and  high  explosive  shrapnel  220 

Materiel  and  ammunition  supply  of  the  field  artil- 
lery of  various  armies  (table) 220 

Condensed  table  of  fire  for  French  and  German 

field  guns 222 

2.  Flat  Trajectory  Guns 223 

Shrapnel 223 

Shell 226 

Canister 229 

3.  The  Light  Field  Howitzer  and  the  Heavy  Field 

Howitzer 230 

The  effect  of  shrapnel  bullets  on  animate  targets  .  234 

4.  Mobility 236 

Marching  powers 237 

5.  Armament  with  Small  Arms 238 

G.    Relative  Htrength  of  Field  Artillery  to  other 

Arms 241 

7.    Organization 243 

The  battery 244 

Eight,  six,  and  four-gun  batteries 244 

Organization  of  batteries  in  the  various  armies 247 

The  battalion 249 

The  regiment 249 

Heavy  artillery 250 

Assignment  of  artillery  to  higher  units 250 

Abolition  of  corps  artillery 252 

XL    THE  FORMATIONS 256 

1.  The  Piece 256 

2.  Gaits 259 

3.  The  Battery 260 

Organization  of  the  German  battery 261 

The  battery  in  line 261 


xii  Contents. 

3.  The  Battery — continued.  page 

Organization  of  the  French  battery 262 

Organization  and  formation  of  the  heavy  howit- 
zer battery 262 

Organization  and  formation  of  the  21  cm.  mortar 

battery 263 

The  order  in  line 264 

The  order  in  route  column 265 

Double  column 265 

Flank  marches 266 

Horse  battery  in  column  of  platoons 267 

Tounlimber 269 

Effect  of  fire  upon  caissons 270 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 273 

4.  The  Battalion 279 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 281 

5.  Heavy  Artillery 284 

The  battery,  Formation  of 285 

Occupation  of  a  position  by 285 

The  mortar  battery 286 

The  battalion,  Formation  of 287 

Organization  of 288 

6.  Besume 289 

The  order  in  battery  (Plates) 290 

Germany 290 

Austria ,.  291 

France 291 

England 292 

Russia 292 


III.    EMPLOYMENT  OF  ARTIL.L.KUY  IN  ACTION 293 

1.  Oeneral  Principles 293 

Employment  of  single  guns 294 

Mass  effect 294 

Posting  guns  in  the  infantry  trenches 294 

Examples  from  military  history 295 

Mass  effect  or  the  mass  in  readiness 296 

Artillery  reserves 297 

Characteristic  properties  of  modern  artillery 299 

2.  The  Position  of  Artillery  in  a  Column 300 

Heavy  artillery 304 

Advance  guard  artillery 304 

Rear  guard  artillery 307 


Contents.  xiii 

III.     Bmployment  of  Artillery  in  Action — continued.  page 

3.  Deployment  of  Artillery 308 

Reconnaissance  by  artillery  officers'  patrols 3 08 

Ground  scouting 310 

Reconnaissance  of  the  objective 311 

Reconnaissance  of  artillery  targets 312 

Austrian  and  French  views 313 

Reconnaissance  duties  af  artillery  commanders.  ..314 

Selection  of  artillery  positions 318 

Increasing  the  difficulties  of  hostile  obeervation....  321 

Unmasked  and  masked  positions 324 

Posting  artillery  in  groups 331 

Semi-masked  positions 332 

Positions  in  readiness  and  in  observation 333 

Positions  for  heavy  artillery 335 

Observation  stations 336 

Advance  to  and  occupation  of  the  position 336 

4.  Battle  Ranges 340 

5.  Firingr  over  Friendly  Infantry 343 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 347 

Examples  from  military  history 347 

e«    Artificial  Cover 348 

Gun  pits  and  epaulements 349-354 

7.  Artillery  Combat  at  Short  Ranges 354 

(a)  Artillery  versus  infantry 354 

(6)  Artillery  versus  Cavalry 356 

8.  Artillery  Supports 357 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 361 

Examples  from  military  history 361 

9.  Reinforcing  the  Firing  Hattories  in  Action 362 

10.  Changes  of  Position 364 

11.  Fire  Direction 368 

(a)  Order  of  Fire  of  Field  Artillery 372 

(6)  Order  of  Fire  of  Heavy  Artillery 374 

(c)  Rate  of  Fire 375 

(d)  Conduct  of  Fire 376 

(e)  The  use  of  the  Various  Projectiles 377 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 377 

France 377 

Holland 380 

Austria-Hungary 381 

Italy 383 

Russia 383 


xiv  Contents. 

III.  Employment  of  Artillery  in  Action— continued.  pagb 

12.    Bzpenditnre  of  Ammanition 384 

18.    Ammanition  Supply 887 

14.  Replacement  of  Ammunition 390 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 396 

15.  Replacement  of  Personnel  and  Materiel 397 

IV.  THE  ATTACK 401 

1  •    The  Cooperation  of  Infantry  and  Artillery 401 

2«    Artillery  in  a  Rencontre 409 

8*    The  Attack  on  an  Enemy  Deployed  for  Defense  416 

Artillery  duel 418 

Battle  ranges 420 

Frontage 421 

Conduct  of  the  infantry  attack 421 

Accompanying  the  infantry  attack 423 

Pursuit 428 

4.    The  Employment  of  Artillery  in  the  Attack  on 

Fortified  Positions 429 

Reconnaissance 431 

Launching  the  artillery 436 

Preparation  of  the  assault 440 

V.  THE  DEFENSE 441 

Advanced  positions 441 

Selection  of  artillery  positions 442 

Opening  fire 446 

Repelling  the  attack 447 

Counter-attack 448 

VI.  THE  RETREAT 460 

VII.  THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF  ARTILLERY  ACCORD- 

ING TO  VARIOUS  REGULATIONS 466 

Austria 466 

France 468 

Japan 464 

England 466 

Russia 466 

VIII.  MOUNTAIN  ARTILLERY 469 


Contents.  xv 

PAoa 

IX.     HOBSB  ARTULLEBY. 471 

Horse  artillery  in  the  service  of  reconnaissance..  471 

Horse  artillery  in  the  cavalry  combat 472 

Horse  artillery  in  battle 476 

Provisions  of  various  rejpilations 477 

France 477 

Italy 478 

Austria 478 

Russia 479 

rBTDEat— CAVALRY 481 

INDEX  OF  EXAMPLES  FROM  MILITARY  HISTORY 

—CAVALRY 601 

IKI>EX-ARTILLERY 507 

INDEX  OF  EXAMPLES  FROM  MILITARY  HISTORY 

—ARTILLERY 629 


ABBREVIATIONS  USED  IN  THIS  TRANSLATION. 

British  Reports  =  Reports  of  British  Officers  attached  to  the  Russian 

and  Japanese  forces. 

C.  D.  R.=  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations. 

F.  A.  D.  R.=  Field  Artillery  Drill  Regulations. 

F.  A.  F.  R.=  Field  Artillery  Firing  Regulations. 

Gen.  St.  W.^General8tahswerk=GeTmsji  General  Staff  Account  of  the 

Franco-German  War   (unlesss  otherwise 
indicated). 

H.  A.  D.  R.=  Heavy  Artillery  Drill  Regulations. 

H.  A.  F.  R.= Heavy  Artillery  Firing  Regulations. 

HoFFBAUER,  Deutsche  Ariillerie,      1=  German  Artillery  at  Weiszenburg. 

11=       "  "        "  Worth. 

ft  II  II  TTT^  t> 

II  f»  II  TV=  " 

II  II  tt  V^  " 

>t  tt  It  VT=         *' 

VII=       " 
It  tt  tt      VIII=       " 

I.  D.  R.= Infantry  Drill  Regulations. 

I.  F.  R.=Infatnry  Firing  Regulations. 

KuNZ,  Deutsche  iJei<em,=  German  Cavalry  in  the  Battles  and  Engage- 
ments of  the  Franco-German  War,  by  Major 
Kunz. 


"    Colombey. 

»»  J  VlonvlUe- 
I  Mars-la-Tour. 

"    Gravelotte. 


"    Noisseville. 
"    Beaumont. 


tt 


Sedan. 


g.=gram=  15,432  troy  grains. 

kg.=kilogram=  1,000  g.=2.2  lbs. 

kgm.=  kilogrammeter=a  unit  of  work  accomplished  in  raising  a  kilogram 

through  a  meter  against  the  force  of  gravity. 

m.=  meter  =  39.37  inches. 

km.= kilometer  =1,000  ra.—%  mile. 

x=pace. 


THE 


FORMAL  TACTICS 


OF 


CAVALRY. 


lEVIATI01>a' 


^TX 


SED  IN  THIS  TRANSLATION. 

r     British  Officers  attached  to  the  Russian 
^^=iO  forces. 

X">rill  Regulations. 
'I^irin^  Regulations. 

t  =  Gern>an  General   Staff   Account   of  the 
>.^r..x>-uerman   War    (unlesas   otherwiw. 

n."     r'^.r*r^  R<V«i^^::on&. 


»» 


»• 


:i^  Artilleo-  at  Weiszenburg. 

Worth. 

Colombey. 

•»  *  Vk>nvllie- 

^^  »  Mars-la-Tour. 

Gravelotte. 
**  Noisseville. 
**  Beaumont. 
**    Sedan. 


«■ 


»• 


»« 


♦-     fc       ^      -N 


« 


«.  N\ 


^    "-  ii    «  AT.  by  Major 


■•«   »» 


w     - 


\  ■'K      •■* 


y. 


V    «fc 


N  V 


THE 


FORMAL  TACTICS 


OF 


CAVALRY. 


4  Arms  and  Equipment. 

Cavalry  formed  during  the  cotirse  of  a  campaign  is, 
for  the  time  being  and  tmtil  it  succeeds  in  attaining  a  higher 
standard  of  training,  not  much  more  than  motmted  infantry. 
This  explains  the  complete  failure  of  the  French  to  make 
any  battle  use  of  their  cavalry  during  the  spring  campaign  of 
1813,  and  of  their  march  regiments  (forty-five  of  which  were 
newly  organized)  in  1870-71,  and  the  similar  failure  on  the 
part  of  the  British  in  the  South  African  war  after  all  their 
available  horses  had  been  used  up. 

At  the  commencement  of  hostilities  in  1813,  the  French  cavalry  num- 
bered only  1, 600  mounted  and  1,200  dismounted  troopers.  After  the  vic- 
tory at  Bautzen,  the  French  army,  according  to  Foucart,  numbered  202,500 
men  of  all  arms,  including  11,000  cavalry.  The  failure  of  the  French  cav- 
alry during  the  pursuit  after  this  battle  was  not  due  to  to  its  small  num- 
bers, but  to  its  poor  training. 

In  May,  181 3,  the  Prussian  cavalry  consisted  of  76  escadrons  with 
7,291  horses,  and  at  the  termination  of  the  armistice,  it  consisted  of 
84  Line  and  116  Landwehr  escadrons,  20  escadrons  Volunteer  Jager,  and 
3  National  cavalry  regiments,  with  a  total  of  27,945  horses.  This  does  not 
include  22  dep6't  escadrons. 

In  a  memorial  addressed  to  Fieldmarshal  Blucher  in  181 7,  General  von 
Borstell  made  the  following  observations  in  regard  to  the  Landwehr  cav- 
alry raised  during  the  War  of  Liberation  :*  "  The  Landwehr  troopers,  how- 
ever, could  not  ride,  although  that  is  indispensable  for  service  in  ranks. 
They  rode  poor,  weak  mounts,  whom  they  were  unable  to  control.  Besides, 
they  did  not  know  how  to  use  their  weapons,  and  were,  in  addition,  undiB- 
ciplined.  During  a  charge,  they  were  brave  to  the  point  of  forgetting  all 
obedience  and  order ;  during  a  retreat,  on  the  contrary,  after  a  charge  that 
had  been  repulsed,  only  natural  obstacles  were,  as  a  rule,  able  to  stop  them. 
In  a  word,  the  Landwehr  cavalry,  even  more  than  the  cavalry  of  the  Line, 
lacked  physical  and  moral  stamina  and  unqualified  obedience  to  the  trum- 
pet. The  latter,  however,  should  be  part  and  parcel  of  the  trooper's 
make-up  to  an  even  greater  extent  than  obedience  to  the  signal  horn  is  to 


Nabbonnib.  Lbgard's  translation,  p.  225. — It  is  worthy  of  note  that,  during  the 
mobilization  in  1870,  the  purchase  horses  of  the  15th  Uhlan  Regiment  were  formed 
Into  a  fifth  platoon  in  each  escadron  iEskadron).  This  arrangement  was  prac- 
ticable because  the  escadrons  were  still  at  full  strength  when  they  took  the  field, 
and,  moreover,  gave  an  opportunity  gradually  to  accustom  the  horses  to  work 
under  the  saddle.     Ibid.,  p.  278. 

Note:  The  term  Eskadron  has  been  rendered  by  escadron  in  this  work. 
The  escadron  is  the  tactical,  as  well  as  the  lowest  administrative  unit  of 
European  cavalry.  For  the  strength  of  the  escadron  in  the  varioos  armies,  see 
table  facing  this  page. — Translator. 

*  Kabhleb  Pr9U8zisch$  KataUerie,^,  10. 


■y  OABRIBD  BT 
JL  HOB8E. 

BBliARKB. 

>ons 118  kg. 

mfl 184kg. 

skiers 188  kg. 

*  Only  in  regiments  belonging  to  a  cavalry  dlvUlon 

t  Reserve  cavalry  regiments  are  equipped  neither 
with  bridge  nor  with  Signal  Oorps  wagons. 

X  A  cavalry  division  has,  In  addition: 

(a)    One  1-horse  tool  wagon  belonging  to  the  de- 
tachment of  pioneers  and  attached  to  the 
combat  train; 

( 6 )    Seven  cavalry  ammunition  wagons  belonging 

oayalry — 106  kg. 
>on8 110  kg. 

^slers 188  kg. 

a 
i 

• 

to  the  light  ammunition  column; 

(0)    One  0-horse  Medical  Corps  store  wagon  and 
one  led  horse  for  the  commander  of  the  de- 
tachment of  pioneers,  both  belonging  to  the 
field  train. 

Each  regiment  has  one  rowing  ferry  and  mat4rlel  for 
constructing  a  foot-bridge  10  m.  long,  or  a  reinforced 
foot-bridge  8-18  m.  long. 

s 
J 

9      136  kg. 

t 

• 

A  cavalry  division  has  six  rowing  ferries  and  materiel 
for  constructing  a  foot-bridge  100  m.  long,  or  a  rein- 
forced foot-bridge  08  m.  long. 

IT  In  a  cavalry  division  there  are  carried,  In  addition, 
on  the  1st  and  8d  ammunition  wagons,  118  explosive 
cartridges  as  well  as  8  sets  of  railway  demolition 
tools. 

4.  180-180  kg. 

i 

Some  escadrons  have  mountain  Train  equipment 
pack  animals  being  used  even  for  transporting  oats. 

181  kg. 

0 

r 
1 

1      180  kg. 

i  Without  intrenching  tools,  which  are  provided  as 
pari  of  the  wagon  equipment. 

.     J^^  ' 


*  .ii.  •  > 


Saber,  Lance  and  Carbine.  6 

that  of  thm  tnailliur.  In  the  cotine  of  the  war,  I  saw  Landwehr  cavalry 
regiments  that,  without  having  suffered  serious  losses  at  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  had  an  effective  strength  of  not  more  than  loo  horses ;  and  yet  such 
organisations  were  classed  as  regiments  and  disposed  of  as  such.  This 
weakness  is  a  result  of  rapidly  and  hastily  raising  cavalry  units  at  the  out- 
break of  war."*  Until  185a,  the  Landwehr  cavalry  was  armed  with  the 
lance,  and  troopers  who  had  not  been  trained  in  handling  that  weapon  had 
to  learn  how  to  use  it  during  the  period  of  mobilization.  The  Landwehr 
cavalry  regiments  to  be  raised  in  a  future  mobilization  will  have  an  advan- 
tage over  those  raised  in  18 13,  in  that  they  will  at  least  possess  trained 
riders,  of  whom,  if  they  are  recruited  in  a  district  where  good  mounts  are 
available,  something  may  be  expected  soon  after  the  opening  of  hostilities. 
During  the  battle  of  Noisseville,  the  ist  Escadron  of  Prussian  Reserve 
Dragoons  began  to  charge,  and  at  Oswiecim  (also  written  Auschwitz), 
June  27th,  1866,  the  ad  Escadron  of  Landwehr  Uhlans  successfully 
charged  Austrian  Uhlans. 

The  German  cavalry,  both  divisional  and  independent, 
is  uniformly  trained,  armed  and  equipped.  Differences  in 
the  physical  development  of  men  and  horses  necessitate  a 
division  into  heavy,  medium  and  light  cavalry,  but  this  in 
no  way  affects  the  tactical  employment  of  the  cavalry. 
To  the  introduction  of  a  neutral  tinted  imiform,  there  is  the 
objection  that  friend  may  not  be  distinguishable  from  foe,t 
and  that  it  is  more  difficult  to  assemble  a  large  unit  after 
a  charge.  The  trooper  carries  the  lance,  the  carbine  and 
the  saber.  The  saber  is  carried  attached  to  the  saddle  in 
order  that  the  movements  of  the  trooper  may  not  be  im- 
peded when  dismotmted  to  fight  on  foot.  This  mode  of 
canying  the  saber  is  objectionable  only  in  case  the  trooper 
falls  or  becomes  separated  from  his  horse.    Officers,  non- 


*  See  also  ▼.  d.  Marwitz.  ErinntrunQvn,  II.  p.  83.  In  regard  to  the  charge 
made  by  Landwehr  cavalry  during  the  engagement  at  Hagelberg,  Colonel  yon 
BisifABX  Btatee:  "I  can  turn  them  loose  soon  enough,  but  whether  I  shall  after- 
wards again  see  a  single  man,  that  is  a  different  question,  and  I  can  not  be  responsible 
for  it."  (v.  d.  Mabwitz.  II.  p.  170).  In  regard  to  a  charge  made  during  the 
armistice,  and  in  which  all  order  was  lost,  v.  d.  Mabwitz  writes  (II,  p.  73) :  "  His 
majesty  observed  that  it  was  indeed  fortunate  that  the  waU  had  stood  so  firmly." 

t  KuNZ,  lUiterei,  p.  38  (Prussian  Black  Hussars  and  Baden  Dragoons  on  August. 
4th);  p.  e9  (Prussian  Uhlans,  and  Bavarian  Cuirassiers  in  white  overcoats  on 
August  6th);  p.  138  (French  Light  Blue  Guard  Lancers  at  Vlonville.  which,  in 
order  to  prevent  confusion,  had  left  behind  their  white  coats  {Uhlankas)  on  moving 
Into  the  field);  p.  142  (French  Brown  Hussars  are  charged  by  French  Dragoons). 


6  Arms  and  Equipment. 

commissioned  officers  and  trumpeters  cany  the  revolver,* 
and  non-commissioned  officers,  in  addition,  the  lance. 

Views  on  the  lance.  In  the  Russian  cavalry,  in  which 
formerly  the  front-rank  men  in  each  regiment  were  armed 
with  the  lance,  that  weapon  was  aboHshed  in  1884.  In 
Austria,  the  lance  was  abolished  in  1863,  and  in  France,  in 
1871.  At  the  present  time,  the  lance  has  been  readopted 
for  the  entire  German  cavalry,  and  the  Dragoon  regiments 
of  the  French  cavalry  divisions  have  likewise  been  again 
armed  with  that  weapon.  The  first  British  Lancer  and 
Dragoon  regiments  sent  to  South  Africa  carried  the  lance; 
the  regiments  mobilized  later  exchanged  the  lance  for  the 
rifle.  The  Germans  enumerate  the  following  as  special  ad- 
vantages of  the  lance:  the  moral  effect  produced  by  a  line 
of  charging  cavalry  armed  with  the  lance;  the  value  of  the 
lance  in  riding  down  the  opposing  cavalry;  the  chance  it 
affords  the  trooper  of  defending  himself  against  several 
opponents  armed  with  sabers;  and  the  dangerous  character 
of  the  wounds  produced  by  it.t  The  lance  alone  does  not 
absolutely  guarantee  success,  for  the  success  of  a  charge  is, 
in  the  main,  determined  by  other  factors,  but  the  lance  un- 
doubtedly contributes  to  the  successful  issue  of  the  fight. 
In  a  close  m616e,  the  lance  may  become  an  impediment  and 
the  saber  may  be  an  advantage.! 

But  as  soon  as  the  m616e  turns  into  a  ntunber  of  iso- 
lated hand-to-hand  combats,  during  a  pursuit  and  during 

*  The  revolver  has  been  replaced  by  pistol,  model  1908, 

t  Staff  Surgeon  Dr.  Schaefer  (Archive  of  Olinlcal  Surgery,  Vol.  62,  Chapter 
III)  lays  particular  stress  on  the  mild  character  of  the  wounds  produced  by  the 
lance.  Out  of  600  wounds  reported  to  have  been  produced  accidentally  in  time 
of  peace,  only  10.8  percent,  resiilted  fatally.  Although  wounds  produced  by  the 
lance  belong  to  the  class  of  pimcture  wounds  (the  lance  penetrates,  as  has  been 
observed,  horse  and  rider  when  It  is  driven  into  the  ground  and  the  horse  runs 
against  It),  its  comparatively  blunt  and  gently  tapering  point  enables  the  lance  to 
push  aside  unharmed,  when  it  penetrates  into  the  body,  easily  displaced  or* 
gtaiBf  such  as  the  heart;  the  stomach,  nerves  and  entrails. 

I  "In  a  mei€e  it  [the  lance]  never  proved  troublesome  or  unnecessary  to 
the  trooper.  In  the  various  situations,  he  always  knew  how  to  use  it  to  advantage. 
The  greater  length  of  the  [Prussian]  lance  was  an  advantage  and  cost  the  enemy 
much  loss  in  a  charge.  The  shorter  Austrian  lance,  provided  with  a  button,  was 
often  used  as  a  dub,  and  the  purpose  for  which  the  lance  was  intended  was  thus 
Ignored."     Bbssbb,  PreiL$gi$ch§  KavallirU  in  d$r  Campagne  von  1869,  p.  101. 


Sabbr  and  Lancb.  7 

an  attack  on  infantry  or  artillery,  the  lance  at  once  regains 
its  superiority.  A  trooper  armed  with  a  lance  will  be  better 
able  to  keep  a  pursuer  at  a  distance  than  a  trooper  who  is 
armed  with  the  saber  only.  Against  a  cuirass  neither  the 
lance  nor  the  saber  can  accomplish  anything. 

In  the  report  made  by  the  nth  Uhlan  Regiment  en  the  charge  at 
KoniffgratZy  it  is  emphasized  that  the  lance  proved  superior  to  the  sabers 
of  the  Anstrians  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  latter  wore  loose,  flowing  over- 
coats ;  and  that  the  lance  proved  a  much  more  terrible  weapon  than  had 
been  anticipated.  The  engagement  at  Saar  (July  9th,  1866)  is  especially 
instructive.  In  this  engagement,  two  escadrons  of  the  9th  Uhlans  [armed 
with  the  lance],  charged  two  escadrons  of  Austrian  Hussars  [armed  with 
the  saber],  threw  them  back  and  pursued  them  for  5  km.,  while  at  the  same 
time  keeping  up  a  running  hand-to-hand  iight.    The  losses  were  as  follows: 

Uhlans:    i  officer,  17  men  and  —  horses; 
Hussars:    5  officers,  38  men  and  38  horses.* 

In  the  charge  made  by  French  Guard  Lancers  against  Oldenburg 
Dragoons  at  Mars-Ia^Tour,  the  total  loss  of  the  Prussian  cavalry  employed 
was  46  officers  and  40a  men  (out  of  an  effective  strength  of  9,925  men,  u  /.,  a 
loss  of  I $.3  percent),  the  loss  of  the  Oldenburg  Dragoons  alone  being  is 
officers  and  113  men  (37.3  percent).!  During  the  charge,  the  troox>er8  of 
the  various  German  regiments,  some  armed  with  the  saber,  some  with 
the  lance,  made  common  cause,  in  order  to  break  down  the  resistance 
offered  by  isolated  French  troopers  who,  separated  from  their  horses, 
defended  themselves  with  their  firearms. 

The  lanoe  will  likewise  be  superior  to  the  saber  in  a 
charge  against  infantry  and  against  artillery4 

After  the  charge  at  Koniggratz,  many  non-commissioned  officers  of 
the  4th  Uhlan  Regiment  armed  themselves  with  the  lance,  whose  worth 
they  had  learned  to  appreciate  in  action.^ 

*  Aooordlng  to  the  HisUrry  of  th$  9(h  XfJUan  IUgim$nt,  p.  14.  See  also  the 
small  action  at  Bolchea  (August  9th,  1870)  in  Caoalry  on  Sortie;  hj  v.  Pauff- 
Nabbonms.  Lboabd's  trandatloQ,  p.  119. 

t  KxrNZ,  BHterH,  pp.  139  and  141. 

{Length  of  the  lance: 

Old  Austrian  lance 2.03  m. 

Old  FreQGh  lance 4^.84  " 

Old  Pnisaian  lanoe 3.14  " 

Ooasack  lance. 3.10  *'  (Weight,  2.87  kg.) 

New  French  lanoe .2.90  "    (Weight.  1.85  kg.) 

New  Gterman  lanoe  (of  steel  tubing) il.52  " 

New  Italian  lance. 2.95  '*   (Weight.  2.55  kg.) 

t  04$eM€ht$  d$$  4.  Uhlanen  BsgimenU,  p.  82. 


8  Arms  and  Equipment. 

The  employment  of  the  lance  reqtiires  that  troopers  and 
remounts  be  well  develoi)ed  physically,  and  that  the  trooper 
be  thoroughly  trained  in  handling  his  horse  and  his  weapon.* 
This  may,  perhaps,  make  it  necessary  in  a  campaign  to  arm 
recruits  with  the  saber  only.t  The  lance  considerably  in- 
creases the  load  to  be  carried  and  causes  an  unequal  dis- 
tribution of  the  same.  This  is  a  disadvantage  that  is  apt 
to  lead  the  trooper  to  lounge  in  the  saddle  when  fatigued 
and  riding  at  a  walk  for  long  distances,  thus  causing  sore 
backs.  It  can  not  be  denied  that  the  lance  is  an  impediment 
in  the  field  when  writing  messages,  when  riding  across 
country,  especially  through  woods,  and  on  roads  with  over- 
hanging branches  of  trees;  when  jumping  and  climbing; 
in  dismounted  action,  and  on  young,  imruly  and  fractious 
horses.  But  these  disadvantages  can  not  outweigh  the 
other  advantages  of  the  lance. 

**'...  The  lance,  although  a  terrible  weapon  in  the  hands  of  a  man 
who  knows  how  to  use  it.  is  an  impediment,  in  fact  a  positiye  detriment,  in  the 
hands  of  one  not  accustomed  to  it.'*  Heros  von  Borckb,  Zwei  Jahre  im  SaU$l 
und  am  Feinde^  I.  p.  43. — General  Maricont  is  also  a  warm  advocate  of  the  lance 
as  a  weapon  for  cayalry  of  the  Line.  In  Esprit  des  Institutions,  p.  46.  he  says: 
"The  lance  should  be  the  principal  arm  and  the  saber  an  axudliary  arm." 

General  Dragomirov  says:  "Military  history  shows  that  in  a  charge 
made  in  close  order,  as  well  as  in  hand-to-hand  combat,  the  saber  always  gains 
the  superiority,  provided  a  m616e  actually  occurs." 

Colonel  Wai/ter  von  Walthofen,  Austrian  Army,  voices  the  same  opinion 
in  Kavallerie  im  Zukunftskriege.  He  says:  "The  lance  has  gained  importance  as 
a  weapon  through  a  very  different  feeling,  through  the  desire  for  self-preservatlain, 
the  desire  to  keep  the  enemy  at  a  distance  and  to  avoid  fighting  him  breast  to 
breast." 

t  The  Prussian  Landwehr  troopers  from  Brandenburg  entered  the  spring 
campaign  of  1813  armed  with  lances.  After  four  weeks'  instruction  in  its  use, 
the  troopers  gained  confidence  in  and  regard  for  it.  v.  d.  Marwitz,  Posthumous 
Works,  II.  p.  74,  says:  "  ...  The  men  were  tormented , with  it  (the  lance] 
the  entire  day,  first  dismounted,  then  mounted."  This  writer  ascribes  absolute 
superiority  to  the  Lancer  and  goes  so  far  as  to  maintain  that,  in  a  charge  made  in 
close  order  by  a  line  armed  with  the  saber  against  a  line  armed  with  the  lance,  it 
ts  inmiaterial  whether  in  the  former  the  men  are  armed  with  sabers  or  with  feather- 
dusters.     IlHd.,  p.  172. 


Thb  Escadron  and  the  Rbgimbnt. 


2.    ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  CAVALRY. 

( a)    MINOR  CAVALRY  UNITS. 

The  principles  that  govern  in  determining  the  size 
of  an  escadron  have  akeady  been  given.*  The  esca- 
dron must  be  small  enough  to  allow  of  its  being  con- 
trolled, when  in  combat  formation,  by  the  voice  and  the 
personal  example  of  a  single  leader;  it  must  be  capable  of 
sustaining  an  action  independently  and  of  performing  a 
simple  combat  task.  If  twelve  files  (24  men)  is  assumed  to 
be  the  minimum  strength  allowable  for  a  platoon,  we  ob- 
tain, in  the  four-platoon  escadron,  which  is  everywhere,  ex- 
cept in  Switzerland,  recognized  as  the  proper  organization, 
a  minimum  strength  of  96  men.  If  we  add  to  this  about 
30  men  and  horses  that  are  not  to  be  taken  into  the  field, 
and  a  like  number  of  men  and  horses  absent  on  detached 
service,  sick,  etc.,  we  arrive  at  a  peace  strength  of  approxi- 
mately 150  troopers  for  the  escadron.  To  go  below  this 
figure  would  curtail  the  independence  of  the  escadron,  in 
view  of  the.  casualties  in  horses  and  the  nimierous  details 
to  be  made  in  the  field,  while,  to  raise  this  figure  consider- 
ably (say  to  over  170  men)  would  reduce  mobility  and  make 
supervision  over  trooper  and  horse  too  diBBcult. 

The  question  of  the  organization  of  a  cavalry  regiment 
appears  to  be  less  free  from  objections.  In  the  field,  the 
German  and  French  cavalry  regiments  have  four,  the 
English  and  Swiss  regiments  three,  and  the  Russian  and 
Austrian  regiments  six  escadrons  each. 

In  time  of  peace,  six-escadron  regiments  are  tmdoubt- 
edly  cheaper  than  four-escadron  regiments,  as  fewer  regi- 
mental staffs  are  reqiiired  in  the  former  case.f    Detach- 

*  Tactics,  I,  Kbttxobb'b  translation,  p.  82. 

t  A  German  cavalry  dlvliion  has  three  brigade  and  six  regimental  staffs, 
whOe  an  Austrian  cayalry  division,  which  has  the  same  number  of  escadrons  as 
UielQemian Jhas  onl^  two  brigade  and  four  regimental^staffs. 


10  Organization  op  the  Cavalry. 

■ 
I 

ments  can  be  made  with  more  or  less  imptmity  from  a  six-  I 

escadron  regiment  without  thereby  causing  an  appreciable 

diminution  of  the  fighting  power  of  the  remainder.    In 

fact,  six-escadron  regiments  actually  offer  a  temptation  to  - 

make  detachments,  as  they  are  unwieldy  in  diflBcult  cotmtry, 

can  not,  even  under  favorable  conditions,  be  controlled  by  the 

voice  of  a  single  leader,  and  necessitate  the  introduction  of 

an  intermediate  tmit  between  regiment  and  escadron,  the 

so-called  ** division,"  consisting  in  Russia  of  two,  in  Austria 

of  three  escadrons.*  ' 

Fotu'-escadron  regiments  are  more  easily  managed,  and 
are  capable  of  deplo5ring  quickly  in  any  direction — even 
from  the  most  imfavorable  formation,  the  column  of  pla- 
toons and  the  regimental  coltunn  (mass).  They  can  form 
line  from  route  column  more  quickly  than  the  six-escadron 
regiment  (this  movement  taking  four  minutes  in  the  former 
and  six  minutes  in  the  latter),  and  their  size  actually  demands 
that  each  regiment  be  kept  intact  and  employed  as  one  unit. 

Six-escadron  regiments  are  too  strong  to  be  assigned  to 
infantry  divisions,  yet,  split  in  two,  hardly  strong  enough 
to  fulfill  the  combat  ftmctions  of  divisional  cavalry.  When 
consisting  of  four  escadrons  each,  regiments  of  the  cavalry 
divisions  can  be  exchanged,  in  case  of  necessity,  for  those  at- 
tached to  the  infantry  divisions. 

Three-escadron  regiments  possess  great  mobility,  but 
they  are  so  weak  that  the  personality  of  the  regimental  com- 
mander is  not  properly  utilized. 

Thus,  tactical  considerations  argue  for  four-escadron  regi- 
ments, considerations  of  economy  for  six-escadron  regiments. 

Cavalry  can  be  quickly  mobilized  and  can  take  the  field 
properly  moimted  if  its  field  escadrons  possess,^  in  time  of 
peace,  trained  and  militarily  schooled  moimts.  The  annual 
levy  of  the  yoimgest  remounts  is  not  available  for  the  peace 
cadres.    Frequently  a  second  levy,  embracing  the   horses 

eliminated  as  imfit  in  the  particular  year,  those  temporarily 

^ • 

*In  Italy  one  escadron  from  each  cavaliy  regiment  wlU  preeumAbly  be 
attMhed  to  Infantry  dlvUdons. 


The  Brigade.  11 

sick  and  others  not  fit  to  be  taken  along  into  the  field,  is  like- 
wise unavailable.  Assuming  that  one-tenth  of  the  total 
number  of  horses  in  service  will  have  to  be  replaced  annually, 
it  follows  from  the  foregoing  that,  in  order  to  enable  all  units 
to  take  the  field  at  once  at  full  war  strength,  one-fifth  more 
horses  than  required  must  be  kept  in  readiness  in  time  of 
peace — ^whether  this  be  done  by  raising  the  peace  strength 
of  each  escadron  by  one-fifth  or  by  imiting  the  extra  mounts 
into  a  fifth  escadron  in  each  regiment.  This  fifth  escadron 
exchanges  its  serviceable  motmts  and  equipment  for  the  un- 
serviceable mounts  and  equipment  of  the  field  escadrons  of 
the  regiment  and  then  constitutes  the  depot  escadron. 
Each  fifth  escadron  must  consist  of  about  140  to  150  mounts 
in  time  of  peace. 

In  Austria,  each  cavalry  regiment  has  in  time  of  peace  a  reserve  cadre 
(2  officers,  5  N.  C.  O.,  i6  privates  and  7  horses),  which,  during  the  period 
of  mobilization,  is  expanded  into  a  dep6t  escadron  of  344  men  and  315 
horses  by  the  transfer  to  it  of  men  and  horses  not  fit  for  field  service  from 
other  organizations,  and  by  recruits  and  remounts.  As  an  escadron 
receives  annually  a  number  of  remounts  equal  to  is  per  cent,  of  its  strength, 
twenty-five  horses  are  purchased  annually  in  order  that  more  horses  may 
be  available  for  the  field  escadrons  on  mobilization.  These  purchase 
horses  are  then  trained  and,  during  the  continuance  of  peace,  farmed  out 
to  private  parties.  They  are  annually  examined  as  to  their  serviceability 
and  must  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  organization  to  which  they  are 
assigned,  within  twenty-four  hours  after  the  order  for  mobilization  is 
issued.  After  six  years  (in  Hungary  after  five  years)  these  animals  be- 
come the  property  of  the  private  persons  into  whose  keeping  they  have 
been  given.  The  horses  for  the  Landwehr  cavalry  are  provided  for  in  a 
similar  manner,  after  having  been  trained  for  five  months  in  the  organiza- 
tion to  which  they  are  assigned. 

The  brigade,  consisting  of  two  regiments,  can  still  be 
controlled,  when  deployed  in  line,  by  the  voice  of  a  single 
person,  the  brigade  commander. 

(b)    MAJOR  CAVALRY  UNITS. 

The  Cavalry  Division. 

Cavahy  is  employed  either  independently  (in  the  form 
of  cavalry  divisions  or  cavalry  corps  attached  to  armies)  or 


12  Organization  op  the  Cavalry. 

as  divisional  cavalry,  and,  in  some  states,  as  corps  cavalry. 
The  function  of  independent  cavalry  is  to  defeat  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  so  as  to  make  reconnaissance  possible,  and  to  operate 
against  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  enemy.  In  addition,  it  is 
to  assist  in  bringing  about  the  decision  on  the  field  of  battle. 
Divisional  cavalry  is  an  auxiliary  arm  of  the  infantry  and 
artillery,  and,  in  spite  of  its  inferior  numerical  strength,  it 
also  will  be  able  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  fight. 

For  a  discussion  of  independent  and  divisional  cavalry , 
see  Taktik,  IV,  p.  191,  et  seq. 

For  a  discussion  of  divisional  and  corps  cavalry,  see 
Taktik,  III,  p.  38,  et  seq. 

For  a  discussion  of  the  organization  of  cavalry  divisions 
(from  a  strategical  point  of  view)  see  Taktik,  III,  p.  53,  et  seq. 

The  Franco-German  war  furnished  valuable  lessons  in 
regard  to  the  strength  and  appropriate  composition  of  cav- 
airy  divisions.  In  general,  about  2.8  guns  per  1,000  troop- 
ers was  considered  a  proper  proportion.  Of  the  eight  Ger- 
man cavalry  divisions  used  in  the  Franco-German  war,  four 
consisted  of  three  brigades  and  two  horse  batteries  each, 
and  four  of  two  brigades  and  one  to  two  horse  batteries 
each.  To  the  demand  for  great  mobility  and  independence, 
properly  appreciated  at  that  time,  must  now  be  added  the 
demand  for  a  high  degree  of  fire  power  and  for  an  abundant 
equipment  with  the  means  for  accomplishing  demoUtions 
and  for  transmitting  information. 

Under  the  present  highly  developed  agricultural  con- 
ditions of  Central  Europe,  the  cavalry  division,  consisting 
of  3,000  to  4,000  troopers,  is  the  largest  cavalry  organiza- 
tion that,  handled  as  one  unit,  can  act  under  the  control  of 
a  single  leader.  **The  combat  is  the  severest  test  of  gov- 
emability.  The  rapid  course  of  a  mounted  action  requires, 
on  principle,  not  only  that  the  commander  be  able  to  take 
in  at  a  single  glance  the  frontal  extension  of  his  organization, 
but  also  whatever  occurs  on  adjacent  terrain.     Otherwise, 


The  Cavalry  Division. 

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14  Organization  op  the  Cavalry. 

control  and  timely  launching  of  the  reserves,  the  principal 
means  that  the  commander  has  of  influencing  the  combat, 
are  impossible.  Besides,  the  very  nature  of  a  cavalry  com- 
bat requires  that,  immediately  after  the  collision  of  the  lead- 
ing lines,  the  reserves  be  available  for  instant  and  direct  par- 
ticipation in  the  fight.  With  a  mass  of  six  regiments  de- 
ployed for  action,  the  space  available  will  still  permit  the 
above  conditions  to  be  fulfilled. — ^To  form  a  cavalry  division 
of  fewer  regiments,  for  example  of  four  only,  is  not  advisable, 
since,  in  most  cases,  it  is  unavoidable  to  make  detachments, 
whereby  the  fighting  strength  of  the  division  is  considerably 
reduced.  The  division  would,  if  so  reduced  in  strength, 
scarcely  be  equal  to  the  problems  confronting  it  in  war. 
These  problems  are,  in  any  case,  however,  not  easy,  and  the 
leader  of  the  division,  even  if  he  is  talented,  requires  an 
extensive  preliminary  training  to  solve  them  successfully. 
When  the  division  consists  of  more  than  six  regiments,  only 
eminently  talented  leaders,  and  these  only  when  the  subordi- 
nate leaders  and  the  troops  are  thoroughly  trained,  are 
likely  to  be  successful  in  directing  it  in  combat.  "*  It  is 
not  advantageous  to  reduce  the  number  of  escadrons  in  a 
division,  because,  whenever  detachments  are  made,  its 
fighting  strength  will  be  too  greatly  reduced.  The  leader 
must  make  the  numerous  detachments  required  for  recon- 
naissance and  the  transmission  of  information,  t  harmonize 
with  the  demand  of  appearing  as  strong  as  possible  on  the 
battlefield.  The  duty  of  protecting  message  collecting 
stations,  signal  stations  and  trains  can  very  properly  be 
transferred  to  cyclist  detachments,  which  can  also  relieve 
the  cavalry  of  furnishing  the  relay  service.  The  wide  dis- 
semination of  the  cyclist  sport  compels  us  to  take  advantage 
of  it,  and  gives  us  an  opportunity,  after  we  have  suffered 

*  V.  Vbrdt.  StudUn  Hber  TruppenfiUiruno,  IV.  p.  0. 

t  A  cavalry  divlaion  may  have  to  furnish  the  following:  three  reoonnaiflianoe 
eeeadrons.  three  escadrons  for  the  signal  stations  and  the  message  collecting  sta- 
tions, and  two  escadrons  as  escorts  for  the  trains  and  colanms.  In  this  manner, 
one-third  of  the  division  is  fHttered  away. 


Assignment  op  Horse  Artillery.  16 

heavy  casualties  in  horses,  to  mount  the  men  that  have  be- 
come dismounted,  on  requisitioned  wheels  and  to  transport 
them  after  the  cavahy  division,  in  order  to  use  them  at  least 
as  cyclists.  Mounted  infantry  would  ever  be  a  poor  make- 
shift. On  the  other  hand,  the  assigimient  of  a  seventh 
regiment  to  each  cavahy  division,  this  regiment  to  take  the 
place  of  the  escadrons  that  have  been  detached,  is  well  worth 
considering. 

The  peculiar  character  of  mounted  actions  would  appear 
to  make  a  three-unit  organization  desirable.*  From  this 
follows  the  organization  of  a  cavalry  division  iiito  three 
brigades,  each  of  two  regiments.  Military  history  shows 
that  this  organization  is  the  best,  although  it  does  not,  of 
cotirse,  meet  all  the  requirements  of  a  changing  situation. 
The  mission  of  a  cavalry  force  and  the  numerical  strength 
of  the  opposing  cavalry  may  make  it  necessary  to  augment 
the  strength  of  the  cavalry  at  one  point  at  the  expense  of 
the  forces  employed  at  others.  This  is  especially  true 
where  the  divisional  cavalry  is  brought  up.  Until  the  prin- 
cipal cavalry  actions  have  been  fought  to  a  decision,  the 
columns  in  rear  must  be  satisfied  with  the  minimum  cavalry 
force  with  which  they  can  get  along. 

When  a  stronger  resistance  is  encountered,  one  that  the 
cavalry  can  overcome  but  slowly  by  means  of  dismounted 
action  and  at  the  cost  of  disproportionately  great  sacrifices, 
it  is  advisable  to  attach  horse  artillery  to  the  cavalry. 
Artillery  fire  is  best  calculated  to  force  the  enemy  to  show 
his  hand.  For  a  motmted  action  alone,  a  single  battery  is 
sufficient;  for  bringing  a  strong  artillery  force  into  action, 
time  is  usually  lacking ;  and  in  battle,  it  is  seldom  necessary  to 
prepare  a  cavalry  charge  by  artillery  fire,  since  the  cavalry 
need  only  make  the  most  of  the  effect  produced  by  the  other 
arms.  When  the  cavalry  division  is  laimched  for  independ- 
ent action  against  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy,  it  will  not 

*  The  organisation  of  a  cavalry  diviiion  as  deduced  from  its  strategical 
tasks,  according  to  t.  Sohsrff;   see  TakiiK  IHi  P.  55.  et  seq. 


16  Organization  op  the  Cavalry. 

be  difiBcult  to  reinforce  its  artillery,  when  necessary,  with  a 
few  batteries  of  the  army  corps.*  As  the  success  of  a 
dismounted  fight  depends  to  a  great  extent  upon  the  strength 
and  activity  of  the  artillery,  it  is  a  good  plan  to  assign  one 
battery  to  each  brigade.  Nowadays,  that  we  have  the  rapid 
fire  gun,  the  number  of  guns  is  of  less  importance  than  the 
number  of  caissons.  Three  horse  batteries,  each  of  four  gtms 
(Austria),  are  best  adapted  for  such  assignment  to  brigades; 
caissons  not  required  in  the  battery  are  combined  into  a 
light  ammtuiition  column  to  which  are  also  assigned  the  seven 
cavalry  ammunition  wagons  of  the  division,  t 

Similar  principles  are  applicable  to  the  assignment  of 
machine  gun  units  (consisting  of  three  platoons,  one  for 
each  brigade)  to  cavalry  divisions.  In  Germany  wheeled 
carriages  are  employed  for  transporting  the  machine  guns;  in 
all  other  states  pack  animals  are  used  for  this  purpose. 
Machine  guns  carried  on  pack  animals  possess  great  mobility, 
offer  a  smaller  target  than  those  having  wheeled  carriages, 
but  must  first  be  assembled  and  set  up  before  they  can  be 
used.j: 

The  necessity  of  destroying  large  artificial  structures 
leads  to  the  organization  of  special  cavalry  pioneer  detach- 
ments. In  Austria,  for  example,  there  is  a  pioneer  platoon 
in  each  regiment,  in  Germany,  one  pioneer  detachment, 
consisting  of  1  officer  and  32  men  (on  wheels),  in  each 
division.  Great  mounted  performances  can  not  be  expected 
of  the  moimted  pioneers,  but  good  technical  work  should 
be  demanded  of  them ;  they  must  be  able  to  reach  at  a  trot 
or  gallop  the  designated  locality  where  demolition  work  is 
to  be  done.  In  addition  to  pioneers,  field  signal  corps 
detachments  are  assigned  to  a  cavalry  division. 

*  On  the  morning  of  August  16th,  1870,  the  6th  Oayalry  Dlyiaion  wm  re- 
inforced by  the  two  horse  batteries  of  the  corps  artillery  of  the  Xth  Corps,  so  that 
that  division,  subtracting  detachments  made,  consisted  of  35  escadrons  and  24 
guns.    Oen    St.   W.,  I,  p.  641. 

t  A  German  horse  battery  consists  of  0  guns,  6  caissons  and  a  light  ammo* 
nition  column  for  2  horse  batteries.  This  light  ammunition  column  consists  of  25 
caissons  and  other  vehicles. 

X  TacHci,  I,  Kbvbobb's  translation,  p.  251. 


Pioneers;  Trains.  17 

The  necessity  of  having  pioneers  with  a  cavalry  di- 
vision appeared,  for  example,  during  the  demolition,  in 
1870,  of  the  bridge  at  Saargemund,*  and  during  Gurko's 
first  passage  of  the  Balkans. t 

As  trains  hamper  movements,  the  Germans  do  not  as- 
sign them  permanently.  J  It  is  generally  much  easier 
to  supply  the  men  of  the  cavalry  operating  in  front  of 
the  army  than  the  troops  in  rear.  Greater  difficulty  is, 
however,  encountered  in  supplying  the  horses  with  oats.^f 
In  the  rarest  cases  only,  can  one  count  upon  the  country 
to  furnish  all  that  is  required  in  the  way  of  supplies. § 
On  its  forage  wagons  and,  as  an  emergency  ration,  in  saddle 
bags,  a  cavalry  division  carries  oats  for  one  and  one-third 
or  at  most  for  two  days.  Even  in  front  of  the  army,  the 
cavalry  will  not  always  be  able  to  count  upon  the  supplies 
of  the  country,  but  will  frequently  have  to  have  recourse 
to  the  trains  following  the  troops  in  rear,  if  it  desires  to 
avoid  being  hampered,  by  far-reaching  requisitions,  in  its 
tactical  movements.  The  formation  of  light  supply  trains 
for  the  cavalry  divisions  is  still  an  unsolved  problem,  but 
an  imperative  necessity. 

A  sanitary  detachment,  which  is  to  take  care  of  the 
sanitary  service  on  the  battlefield,  is  formed  of  two-thirds  of 
the  personnel  of  the  ambulances;  otherwise,  the  cavalry  has 


*Ktmz.  Kavallerie,  p.  40. 

tCABDXNAi.  Y.  WiDDBBN.  Buttisctis  KafallerUdiHaion$n»  I,  p.  27.  MUU 
tar-Wochenblatt  1908,  No.  124. 

X  Loss  of  the  field  train  of  the  10th  Hussars  in  the  engagement  at  Vernon. 
November  22(1,  1870.     EuNz.  Deutsche  Reiterei,  P-  219. 

^  On  the  successful  raid  made  in  April  1803  by  Union  cavalry  under 
Stoneman,  an  eight  days'  supply  of  oats  and  commissaries  was  carried  along  on 
wagons.     V.  FBaTTAo-LoBiNOHOVEN.  Sludien  iiber  KriegfUhrung.  II.  p.  59. 

i  Par.  476,  German  F.  S.  R.  states:  "So  long  as  the  Independent  cavalry 
(i.  e.,  a  cavalry  division)  is  in  firont  or  on  the  flanks  of  the  army,  it  will,  in  most  cases, 
have  to  depend  upon  the  supplies  offered  by  the  theater  of  war.  In  order  to  uti- 
lize to  the  full  all  that  the  country  affords,  it  may  be  advisable  to  form  supply 
columns  of  requisitioned  wagons.  These  columns  are  especially  suited  for  trans- 
porting oats,  reserve  forage  and  imperishable  ration  articles.  When  ordered  by 
the  army  commander,  supply  columns  consisting  of  one-horse  wagons  and  prin- 
cipally loaded  with  oats,  may  be  assigned  to  the  independent  cavalry."  See 
TakHk,  IV,  pp.  271  and  300,  and  ibid.,  p.  191. 


18  Organization  op  the  Cavalry. 

to  depend  upon  the  sanitary  facilities  of  the  army  corps. 
This  suiBfices,  as  the  losses  in  a  cavalry  action  are  generally 
apt  to  be  but  insignificant. 

The  seven  ammunition  wagons  attached  to  the  light 
ammunition  coliunn  suffice  to  replenish  the  first  want  of 
ammimition. 

Thorough  training,  machine  guns  and  a  good  firearm 
make  an  assignment  of  infantry  superfluous.  In  colonial 
wars  mounted  infantry  may  occasionally  do  good  service, 
but  even  in  the  Boer  war,  as  its  ability  to  ride  increased,  it 
very  natiu-ally  did  not  want  to  forego  the  mounted  charge. 
According  to  all  experience,  moimted  infantry  invariably  de- 
generates into  inferior  cavalry;  when  mounted,  it  is  helpless 
against  cavalry,  and  when  dismounted,  it  is  hampered  in  its 
movements  by  the  led  horses.  During  the  second  part  of 
the  Franco-German  war,  the  German  cavalry  was  assigned  the 
task  of  covering  the  siege  operations  against  Paris,  toward 
the  south  and  west,  where  the  country  was  broken  and 
covered.  At  this  time,  the  field  operations  had  come  to  a 
standstill,  while  the  rising  and  arming  of  the  inhabitants 
constantly  assumed  greater  proportions.  This  made  the 
task  of  the  cavalry  a  difficult  one,  and  calls  for  infantry 
were  soon  heard  from  its  ranks.  The  pecuKar  character  of 
the  situation  and  insufficient  equipment  of  the  cavalry  with 
a  firearm  were  responsible  for  this.* 

Although  a  day's  march  of  a  small  infantry  command 
does  not,  in  the  long  run,  differ  materially  from  the  average 
day's  march  of  a  cavalry  division,  and  it  is  comparatively  easy 
to  push  infantry  forward,  after  the  cavalry,  from  one  support- 
ing point  to  another,  cavalry  only,  is  able  to  withdraw 
quickly  from  unfavorable  situations.  Infantry  can  not  do 
this.    Thus,  there  arises  for  the  cavalry  a  conflict  of  duties 

*  For  examples  from  military  history,  see  Taktik,  III.  p.  69.  et  seq.  In 
regard  to  British  mounted  Infantry,  see  infra,  and  Tactics,  I,  Erueodr'b  translation, 
p.  26.  et  seq. — Infantry  may  occasionaUy  be  transported  on  wagons,  but,  on  account 
of  the  difficulty  of  assembling  and  moving  a  large  number  of  wagons,  this  method  of 
transportation  is  not  apt  to  find  frequent  application.  Bee  Takiik,  III.  pp.  202  and 
404. 


Assignment  op  Infantry.  19 

— ^to  remain  with  the  infantry,  or,  in  pursuing  a  more  im- 
portant tactical  aim,  to  leave  the  infantry  in  the  lurch. 

Cyclist  infantry  best  meets  the  requirements  that  must 
be  fulfilled  by  infantry  attached  to  a  cavalry  division.  One 
to  two  companies  of  such  cyclists  might  suffice  for  a  cavalry 
division  (see  p.  15,  supra)  *  It  will  always  remain  a  draw- 
back, however,  that  a  cycUst  can  move  but  a  short  distance 
across  country,  and  that  he  is,  to  a  great  extent,  dependent 
upon  the  nature  of  the  grotmd  and  the  state  of  the  weather. 

Cavalry  divisions  should  have  a  permanent  existence  in 
time  of  peace,  in  order  that  they  may  be  able  promptly  to  do 
justice  to  their  tasks  in  war.  They  should,  likewise,  possess 
the  composition  that  they  would  have  in  war  (though  this 
should  be  changed  at  stated  periods),  and  the  necessary  ad- 
ministrative and  executive  staffs.  Only  when  this  is  the 
case,  can  leader  and  troops  learn  to  understand  and  grow 
accustomed  to  each  other ;  only  then  can  training  according 
to  tmiform  principles  be  accomplished.  This  is  particularly 
important  as  the  newly  organized  cavalry  divisions  will 
scarcely  ever  have  an  opportunity  to  maneuver  as  such 
after  the  mobilization  has  been  ordered.  The  division  com- 
mander can  have  confidence  in  his  subordinate  leaders, 
in  his  staff  and  in  his  troops  only  if,  in  time  of  peace,  he  has 
become  personally  acquainted  with  them  and  their  capacity 
as  soldiers. 

"The  rapid  course  of  a  cavalry  action  requires  that  leader  and  troops 
be  thoroughly  used  to  each  other.  It  requires,  further,  that  the  leader 
have  the  highest  degree  of  technical  skill  in  selecting  and  using  the  various 
formations.  It  is  a  remarkable  phenomenon  that  in  the  Franco-German 
war  the  leaders  of  cavalry  divisions  rarely  decided  to  lead  their  divisions 
in  masse,  as  battle  units.  Almost  invariably  we  find  these  divisions  dis- 
integrated into  brigades."  (ad  Cavalry  Division  at  Coulmiers.)  '*No 
combat  makes  such  great  demands  on  leadership  as  the  combat  of  a  cavalry 
division,  and  it  is  our  conviction  that,  in  the  field  of  troop-leading,  there  is 
not  a  more  difficult  problem.  It  is,  therefore,  of  the  utmost  importance 
that  the  cavalry  be  given  the  most  diverse  and  ample  opportunities  to  pre- 
pare itself  for  war ;  that  it  do  so  in  the  organization  in  which  it  is  to  appear 


*  See  TaeHes,  I.  Krusgub's  translation,  p.  28.  and  Takiik,  IV,  p.  268. 


20  Organization  op  the  Cavalry. 

on  the  theater  of  war  ;  and  that  it  be  trained  by  the  men  who  will  be  its 
leaders  in  war."* 

In  Germany  this  question  has  not  as  yet  been  settled. 
Russia  has  in  time  of  peace  twenty-two,  France  eight,  and 
Austria  six  cavalry  divisions.! 

The  difficulties  that  stand  in  the  way  of  the  permanent 
formation  of  cavalry  divisions  in  time  of  peace,  are  partly 
obviated  if  the  regiments  serving  in  a  cavalry  division  are 
constantly  changed.  If  this  is  done,  the  fear  of  the  crea- 
tion of  two  classes  of  cavalry  will  be  set  at  rest,  and  the  draw- 
backs growing  out  of  the  isolation  of  the  arm  will  be  met. 
The  friction  that  might  result  from  the  territorial  limitation 
of  army  corps  in  regard  to  personnel  [and  administrative 
matters,  does  not  constitute  an  insurmotmtable  obstacle  to 
the  permanent  formation  of  cavalry  divisions  in  time  of 
peace. 

Cavalry  Corps*  t 

The  Napoleonic  cavalry  performed  the  duties  of  a  cav- 
alry reserve  in  addition  to  those  of  reconnaissance;  it  had  to 
be  concentrated  where  needed,  in  order  to  direct  a  blow, 
en  masse,  at  the  shaken  enemy.  1[  In  order  to  cover  the 
broad  front  of  an  army  in  motion,  the  cavalry  divisions 
must  be  widely  extended  and  employed   along  divergent 

^Yebdt  du  Vxbnois,  Siudien  Ub^r  TruppenfUhrung;  dU  KavalUrUdiH'' 
tUm,  in.  p.  130. 

t  Literature  bearing  on  this  subject:  v.  Pelst-Narbonnb,  tyber  Oroani- 
MoHon,  FUhrung,  und  Ereiehung  der  Kavalkrie,  2d  Ed.  p.  205. 

Militar-Wochenblait,  1896.  Nos.  27.  28.  37.  88,  44.  53  and  60. 

Jahrbiicher  fiir  Arnue  und  Marine,  October  and  November  Nos.  of  1901. 
Mehr  Kavallerie,  1903. 

▼.  Bernhardi.  Cavalry  in  Future  Wars,  Goldman's  translation,  p.  161. 

X  ▼.  Bernhardi,  Cavalry  in  Future  Wars,  Goldman's  translation,  p.  16d. 

IfAfter  the  battle  of  EckmOhl  (1809).  the  cavalry  corps,  consisting  of 
the  cavalry  divisions  of  Nansouty  and  St.  Sulpice,  started  in  pursuit  vlth  10 
heavy  and  7  light  regiments. 

At  Krasnoi  (1812).  Murat  had  36  cavalry  regiments  and  7  horse  batteries 
at  his  disposal.  These  regiments  charged,  by  escadron  and  by  regiment,  against 
the  Russian  division  under  Neworovskoi,  only  7,000  men  strong,  and  inflicted  » 
loss  of  2.000  men  and  8  guns. 


Cavalry  Corps.  21 

lines.  To  place  the  cavalry  divisions  that  are  moving  over 
different  roads  and  along  diverging  lines  tinder  the  orders  of  a 
cavalry  corps  commander,  would  be  useless  and  would  fre- 
quently hamper  them.  This  is  not  true  when  several  divi- 
sions are  employed  in  a  common  direction  and  for  a  common 
purpose.  In  this  case,  the  cavalry  divisions  should  be 
placed  under  a  single  commander.  The  lessons  so  far 
learned  from  military  history  do  not  favor  a  cavalry  corps 
that  marches,  is  supplied  and  employed  as  a  single  unit.^ 

When  army  headquarters  has  not  as  yet  arrived  or  is  a 
great  distance  away,  several  cavalry  divisions  may  be  placed 
under  the  orders  of  one  commanderf  to  take  charge  of  the 
reconnaissance,  to  cover  the  concentration,  to  defeat  the 
enemy's  cavalry, t  or  to  pursue  the  opponent.  On  the  battle- 
field, it  will  often  be  practicable  to  launch  several  cavalry 
divisions,  though  they  may  occupy  different  positions  at  the 
start,  in  concert  against  a  common  objective.  What  a  suc- 
cess the  5th  and  6th  Cavalry  Divisions  could  have 
gained  on  the  morning  of  August  16th,  1870,  if  they  had  been 
under  the  orders  of  a  common  commander  who  knew  what 
he  was  about!  The  dictum,  * 'March  dispersed,  but  fight 
united,"  must  here  also  be  the  guiding  principle,  for  the 
rapid  course  of  a  motmted  action  makes  it  impossible  to  de- 
ploy a  long  route  column  against  an  enemy  who  is  ready  to 
charge. 

A  critical  analysis  of  the  employment  of  the  German 
cavalry  at  the  battle  of  Vionville  shows  that  decisive  re- 
sults were  only  to  be  achieved  by  laimching  masses;  that, 

*  See  remarks  of  the  Prince  of  Prussia,  later  Emperor  William  I. 
in  his  Collected  Works,  p.  117.  In  Remarks  on  the  Draft  of  a  Plan  of  Mobilization 
for  the  year  ISSO,  the  Prince  objects  to  the  permanent  establishment  of  a  cavalry 
corps,  but  recommends  an  occasional  concentration  of  several  divisions  for  maneuv- 
ers as  a  single  unit. — Aus  dem  Leben  des  Generals  von  Reyher,  IV.  p.  oi, 

t  For  examples,  see  Taktik,  III.  P-  02. 

I  In  1805,  five  French  cavalry  divisions  under  Murat,  crossed  the  Black 
Forest  to  deceive  the  Austrians  and  to  screen  the  enveloping  movements  made 
by  the  French  army. 

From  July  29th,  1870  imtil  the  battle  of  Spicheren,  while  the  lid  Army 
was  being  transported  by  raU,  the  cavalry  divisions  of  that  army  the  (5th  and  6th) 
were  placed  under  the  orders  of  a  single  commander.  Qen.  St.  W.,  I,  pp.  108  and 
300. 


22  Organization  of  the  Cavalry. 

while  a  charge  made  by  an  escadron  or  by  a  regiment  did, 
perhaps  occasionally,  score  a  local  success  here  and  there,  it 
exerted  no  appreciable  effect  on  the  course  of  the  battle. 
The  charge  made  by  Bredow's  brigade  did  not,  as  has  been 
demonstrated,  cripple  the  French  Vlth  Corps.  The  inac- 
tivity of  Marshal  Canrobert  was  due  to  entirely  different 
causes.  If  other  cavalry  had  been  launched,  in  addition  to 
the  lone  Prussian  brigade,  a  greater  success  would  have  been 
won  at  this  point.  A  successful  charge  made  by  a  cavalry 
regiment  may  perhaps  have  a  damaging  effect  on  the 
activity  of  a  hostile  division,  but  it  will  exert  a  scarcely  appre- 
<iable  influence  on  the  action  of  an  army.  The  loss  of  an 
infantry  brigade  through  a  cavalry  charge  is  a  far  more  seri- 
ous loss  to  an  army  consisting  of  two  or  three  army  corps, 
than  to  an  army  twice  that  size.  Therefore,  if  the  cavalry 
does  not  wish  to  forego  its  usefulness  in  battle,  it  must 
appear  in  masses  whose  size  increases  with  the  size  of  the 
armies. 

Cavalry  charging  unshaken  infantry  requires  a  broad 
front,  so  that  the  hostile  fire  can  not  have  a  concentric  effect 
but  will  be  distributed  over  a  greater  space.  On  the  other 
hand,  however,  distribution  in  depth  is  also  necessary,  in 
order  to  add  force  to  the  shock  produced  by  the  first  line,to 
strike  deep  into  the  hostile  position,  and  to  provide  reserves, 
^which  can  turn  against  other  hostile  cavalry  that  might  pos- 
sibly take  a  hand  in  the  fight  These  various  demands  can 
be  fulfilled  by  a  mass  of  cavalry  only  ,  For  this  reason  and 
also  for  the  purpose  of  involving  as  large  a  part  of  the  enemy's 
force  as  possible,  several  divisions  will  have  to  be  combined 
for  common  action,  if  decisive  results  are  to  be  obtained  in 
Jbattle. 

The  launching  of  large  cavalry  masses,  however,  is  like- 
wise imperatively  necessary  in  front  of  the  army  (independ- 
ent cavalry),  in  order  to  drive  away  the  hostile  cavalry  and 
to  ascertain  the  measures  taken  by  the  enemy.  It  is  espec- 
ially important  to  be  superior  at  the  decisive  point.  As  all 
the  powers  employ  their  cavalry  divisions  in  front  of  their 


Cavalry  Corps.  23 

annies  with  the  same  oflfensive  intention,  each  leader  will  have 
to  seek  to  combine  superior  cavalry,  i.e.,  several  divisions, 
at  the  point  where  he  intends  to  bring  about  the  decision, 
and  content  himself  with  an  inferior  cavalry  force  at  the  less 
important  points.  The  French  practice  of  temporarily  at- 
taching, for  this  purpose,  the  corps  cavalry  brigades  to  the 
cavalry  in  front  of  the  army  does  not  appear  to  be  effective 
enough.  It  is  better  and  more  reUable  to  combine,  at  the 
decisive  point,  several  divisions  that  are  marching  on  differ- 
ent roads,  and  to  place  them  under  the  orders  of  a  single 
leader  for  united  employment  as  a  cavalry  corps.  Only  by 
having  a  single  leader  can  we  avoid  having  too  much  cavalry 
at  one  point  while  there  is  not  enough  at  another.*  The 
inconveniences  formerly  experienced  in  employing  cavalry 
corps  disappear  if  such  bodies  are  not  kept  in  a  confined  space 
on  the  march,  in  camp  and  in  battle.  The  charge  that  the 
headquarters  of  a  cavalry  corps  constitutes  a  hampering 
intermediate  channel  between  those  of  the  divisions  and  the 
general  headquarters,  is  imfounded,  provided  the  leaders  are 
well  trained.  The  several  units  must  be  trained  to  send 
inteUigence  not  only  to  the  next  higher  headquarters  but  also 
to  the  highest  commander  and  to  the  corps  following  in  rear. 
The  necessity  of  forming  a  cavalry  corps  may  make  it- 
self felt  at  various  points,  at  the  beginning  of  a  campaign  as 
well  as  during  the  course  of  the  same.  Instead  of  forming 
a  cava  ry  corps  directly,  it  would  perhaps  be  better  to  meet 
this  necessity  by  attaching  the  required  executive  and  admin- 
istrative staff  to  the  army  headquarters.  The  latter  can 
then,  without  interfering  with  the  composition  of  the  divi- 
sion staffs,  create  cavalry  corps.t  The  emplojrment  of 
such  cavalry  masses  makes  the  assignment  of  supply  trains 
absolutely  necessary.if 

*  For  example:  The  launching  of  exooflsiTe  forces,  owing  to  the  lack  of 
a  common  leader,  dming  the  reconnaissance  toward  Saargemttnd  on  August  7th, 
1870.  A  further  result  of  this  was  the  tardy  arrival  of  Intelligence  at  the  proper 
headquarters. 

t  This  scheme  was  proposed  by  General  von  Mpltke  after  the  campaign 
of  18M.    See  Mox/fkb'b  MilitariscJie  Werke,  II,  p.  126. 

t  Y.  Bbbnhabdi   Cavairy  in  Futuu  Warn,  GtoLDiiAN'B  translation,  p.  108. 


II.    THE   FORMATIONS. 

In  the  cavalry — ^thorough  training  of  trooper  and  horse, 
good  mounts  and  good  morale  being  presupposed — combat 
efficiency  depends  to  a  greater  extent  upon  tactical  forma- 
tions than  in  the  infantry.  The  rapid  course  of  a  motmted 
action  makes  it  impossible  to  give  detailed  instructions  for 
its  execution.  The  leader  must,  in  many  cases,  content 
himself  with  simply  calling  out  his  directions.  In  the  in- 
fantry and,  to  a  more  limited  extent,  in  the  artillery,  it  is 
practicable  to  correct  errors  in  the  plan  of  action,  at  least 
during  the  preliminary  stage.  In  a  cavalry  action,  how- 
ever, it  is  seldom  possible  to  make  a  change  in  movements 
once  begun.  Everything  depends  upon  making  the  tacti- 
cal formations  fit  the  particular  situation,  and  upon  accus- 
toming the  troops,  in  time  of  peace,  to  that  which  promises 
success  in  battle.  Formations  that  can  not  be  employed  in 
face  of  the  enemy  are  superfluous.  In  the  cavalry,  more 
than  in  any  other  arm,  all  doubts  as  to  the  general  principles 
of  combat  and  as  to  the  formations  to  be  employed  in  action 
must  be  precluded.  This  is  the  function  of  drill  regulations. 
The  authorized  drill  regulations  are  the  basis  upon  which  the 
independent  judgment  of  subordinate  leaders  must  be  de- 
veloped, for  it  will  depend  upon  their  prompt  and  correct 
judgment  whether,  during  imexpected  developments  in  a 
fight,  the  proper  action  is  taken.  On  accoimt  of  the  rapidity 
with  which  events  occur  in  a  mounted  action,  an  interference 
on  the  part  of  the  superior  commander  during  the  fight,  is 
almost  wholly  precluded.  Even  when  laimching  his  organi- 
zation into  action,  it  will  not  always  be  possible  for  a  com- 
mander to  see  everything  sufficiently  well  from  one  point  to 


Formation  op  the  Escadron.  25 

enable  him  to  assign  definite  tasks  to  his  subordinate  leaders. 
Frequently,  the  superior  commander  will  be  able  to  control 
even  the  reserves  to  a  limited  extent  only. 

1.    THE  ESCADRON.* 

The  escadron,  whether  regularly  formed  or  not,  must 
be  able  to  execute  quickly  and  with  precision,  under  all  con- 
ditions and  on  any  terrain,  aU  movements  prescribed  in  the 
regulations.  Even  when  deployed,  it  must  remain  well  in 
hand.  Particular  importance  should  be  attached  to  a  uni- 
form, steady  trot  and  to  an  extended  gallop  (especially  dur- 
ing frontal  movements) ;  to  prompt  picking  up  and  main- 
tenance of  the  march  direction;  to  precise  and  skillful  hand- 
ling of  the  lance ;  to  brisk  motmting  and  dismounting ;  and 
to  swift  passage  from  column  to  line,  even  when  the  direction 
of  march  is  changed.  In  the  larger  units,  the  maintenance 
of  order  depends  upon  the  precision  and  steadiness  with  which 
each  individual  escadron  marches.  ''This  means  that  the 
tactical  unit  must  be  independent;  that  it  must  march  un- 
influenced by  neighboring  escadrons;  and  that  its  chief, 
who  should  have  it  well  in  hand,  must  lead  it  with  steadiness 
and  precision  at  all  times. — The  escadron  must  maintain 
proper  interior  cohesion  under  all  conditions.  An  involun- 
tary seesawing  and  a  dribbling  away  of  some  of  the  files,  a 
deployment,  must  not  be  allowed  to  take  place  tmder  any 
circumstances."  (General  v.  Schmidt).  Dismotmted  drill 
is  restricted  to  the  minimtun  in  Germany.  This  drill  is  in- 
dispensible,  however,  for  the  training  of  the  individual 
trooper  as  well  as  for  the  employment  of  cavalry  dismotmted. 

(a)     THE  FORMATION  OF  THE  ESCADRON. 

The  platoons,  each  in  two  ranks,  are  formed  abreast 
without  intervals.  The  guides  (N.  C.  O.)  are  posted  in  the 
front  rank,  on  the  flanks  of  each  platoon.     Non-commis- 

*Pan.  61-eo,  0€rman  C.  D,  R, 


26 


The  Escadron. 


sioned  file  closers  are  posted  in  the  rear  rank,  on  the  flanks 
of  each  platoon,  the  files  in  rear  of  the  guides  being  left 
blank.  The  troopers  are  arranged,  in  each  rank,  according 
to  height,  from  right  to  left. 

Officers  are  posted  in  front  of  their  units  in  the  cavalry 
of  all  armies  in  order  to  enable  them  to  regulate  the  march 
direction  and  gait,  and  to  obtain  a  good  view.  So  posted, 
they  can  be  seen  by  all  their  men,  just  before  the  shock 
occurs,  can  exert  an  influence  by  personal  example,  and  can 
lead  their  men  by  means  of  signals  or  commands.  "In 
front  of  his  unit,  the  ofiioer  is  a  leader,  in  the  ranks,  a  fighter." 
(v.  Bismark).  In  this  connection,  it  should  be  remem- 
bered that  well-motmted  officers  who  ride  far  ahead  of  their 
units  during  a  charge,  may  reach  the  enemy  all  alone  and 
may  be  cut  down  before  support  arrives.     (Colonel  v.  Dolffts 


nnr* 


jp- 


4l  Platoon 


ft  Escadron  commander 

Q  Chief  of  platoon 

fi  Officer  (file  closer) 

d  First  sergeant 

^  Right  guide  (N.  C.  O.) 

g  Left  guide  (N.  CO.) 


0  Right  file  closer  (N.  C.  O.) 

Q  Left  file  closer  (N.  C.  O.) 

Q  Trumpeter 

Q  Front-rank  trooper 

Q  Rear-rank  trooper 


Division  into  Platoons  and  Squads.  27 

at  Hainau,  in  1813).  The  Prussian  regulations  of  1812  pre- 
scribed that  officers  should  join  the  line  in  such  a  manner 
during  a  charge  that  the  croups  of  their  horses  wotdd  be  in 
the  front  rank.  Such  a  decrease  in  speed  on  the  part  of  the 
officers,  as  this  regulation  entailed,  easily  communicates  it- 
self to  the  organization,  and  it  is  better,  therefore,  to  post 
officers  closer  to  the  line  (as  in  Germany)  and  to  let  them  fall 
back  to  the  line  of  platoon  commanders  just  before  the  charge 
begins  (as  in  Austria). 

The  figure  shown  below  represents  a  Russian  escadron  in  line.  The 
chiefs  of  the  flank  platoons  are  posted  in  front  of  the  second  file  froni  the 
exterior  flank  of  their  respective  platoons.  OfBcers  not  commanding  pla- 
toons are  likewise  posted  in  front  of  the  line,  to  be  precise,  in  front  of  the 
second  file  from  the  inner  flank  of  the  ist  and  4th  platoons. 

The  platoons  are  divided  into  squads  of  four  files  each. 
The  Russians,  who  still  retain  squads  of  three  files  each, 
have  to  cotmt  twos  for  dismotmting  and  threes  for  forming 
route  coltmin.  In  Italy,  each  platoon  is  divided  into  sets 
of  twos  from  its  center  toward  either  flank.  In  Austria, 
the  platoons  are  still  divided  into  three  so-called  patrols 
{Patrouillen) .  Platoons  generally  have  an  equal  nimaber  of 
files  and  are  composed,  as  nearly  as  practicable,  of  men  and 
horses  of  the  same  standard  of  serviceability.*  In  Germany 
and  Russia,  the  platoons  retain  their  original  numerical 

Russia. 


ft\^^ 


0  u 

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It*  ^ 

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i 


*In  Austria  and  Italy*  the  front  rank  1b  to  be  composed  ezdnalTely  of  dark 
horses  having  no  dtattngniihlng  marki. 


28  The  Escadron. 

designations,  whereas,  in  France  and  Austria,  they  are  num- 
bered, irrespective  of  their  original  designations,  from  right 
to  left  when  in  line,  and  from  head  to  rear  when  in  column. 
Whenever  a  platoon  would  consist  of  fewer  than  twelve  files, 
including  guides  (N.  C.  0.)i  the  number  of  platoons  in  the 
escadron  is  decreased. 

The  center  trooper  of  the  base  platoon  (i.  e.,  the  third 
platoon  from  the  right)  is  the  guide  of  the  escadron.  In 
movements,  the  alignment  is  maintained  by  all  the  men  rid- 
ing forward  steadily  and  at  a  uniform  gait.  The  selection 
of  a  good  man  for  duty  as  guide,  and  of  a  good  horse  for  him 
to  ride,  is  one  of  the  most  important  duties  of  the  escadron 
commander.  The  guide  (center  trooper)  of  an  escadron 
must  possess  some  influence  over  his  comrades;  he  must 
be  a  good  rider  and  must  ride  a  powerful,  quiet,  and  well 
trained  horse.  Next  to  the  chiefs  of  platoons  and  the  non- 
commissioned guides  on  the  flanks  of  the  platoons,  the  center 
trooper  is  the  pillar  of  an  escadron.  In  Italy,  the  chiefs 
of  the  two  center  platoons  are  to  maintain  the  alignment 
by  observing  the  escadron  commander. 

**The  execution  of  eyes  right  or  left  when  in  motion 
must  be  completely  tabooed.  Proper  alignment  must  be 
obtained  by  maintaining  a  steady,  uniform  cadence  and  by 
loose  contact,  and  under  no  considerations  by  turning  head 
and  eyes  right  or  left.  Whenever  the  alignment  is  main- 
tained by  means  of  a  imiform  cadence,  i.  e.,  by  instinct,  when- 
ever the  gait  is  steady  and  the  cadence  uniform,  one  sees 
good  lines;  whenever  this  is  not  the  case,  and  eyes  right  or 
left  alone  are  employed,  one  sees  poor  lines  and  an  eternal 
seesawing  that  ruins  the  horses.  The  eyes  must  remain, 
as  much  as  practicable,  straight  to  the  front,  and,  as  an  aid 
to  maintaining  a  uniform  cadence,  may  occasionally  be  turned 
now  to  the  right,  now  to  the  left,  but  never  toward  one  side 
alone.'*  * 

* '  The  base  unit  is  responsible  for  maintaining  the  march 
direction,  the  gait  and  the  cadence ;  all  the  other  imits  take 

^General  v.  Schmidt.  Instruktionen,  p.  111. 


Frontage;  Distance;  Number  op  Ranks.        29 

their  distances  and  intervals  from  it.  In  units  riding  abreast, 
the  necessary  alignment  is  likewise  obtained  in  this  manner. 
The  leader  of  the  base  unit  is  responsible  for  its  conduct. 
The  leaders  of  the  other  units  give  to  their  subordinates 
whatever  directions  are  necessary  to  preserve  the  general 
alignment."  (Par.  31,  German  C.  D.  R.).  In  large  units, 
when  intervals  are  not  definitely  prescribed,  the  designation 
of  an  aUgnment  (on  some  base  unit)  is  replaced  by  a  state- 
ment showing  where  and  how  contact  is  to  be  maintained. 

(b)    CONTACT  AND  FRONTAGE;  NUMBER  OF  RANKS 
AND  DISTANCES  BETWEEN  THEM. 

Prussia:  Under  Seydlitz,  the  Prussian  cavalry  rode 
boot  to  boot;  at  a  later  date,  it  rode  knee  to  knee;  and 
since  1812,  it  rides  stirrup  to  stirrup.  The  front  of  a  trooper 
is  taken  as  0.80  m. 

Austria :  An  interval  of  the  width  of  half  a  hand  is  left  between 
troopers.    The  front  of  a  trooper  is  i)4  paces  or  0.93  m. 

France:  Loose  touch  is  maintained.  "They  [the  troopers]  close  in 
on  but  do  not  gain  touch  with  the  trooper  next  in  line  toward  the  center, 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  have  freedom  of  movement  in  ranks."  The  front 
of  a  trooper  is  i  m. 

Russia:  The  troopers  ride  stirrup  to  stirrup.  The  front  of  a  trooper 
is  0.80  m. 

Italy:  The  front  of  a  trooper  is  0.94  m.  (four  troopers  take  up  a 
space  five  paces  or  3. 75  m.  wide ).  A  small  interval  is  left  between  stirrups 
of  adjacent  troopers. 

England:  An  interval  of  15  cm.  is  left  between  knees  of  adjacent 
troopers.    The  front  of  a  trooper  is  0.92  m. 

In  the  German  cavalry,  the  distance  between  ranks 
(measured  from  the  tails  of  front-rank  horses  to  the  heads 
of  rear-rank  horses)  is  three  paces  (2.40  m.)  in  line,  and  one 
pace  (0.80  m.)  in  colimm  of  platoons. 

In  Austria,  France  and  Italy,  the  distance  between  ranks  is  two 
paces  ( 1.50  m.). 

In  Russia,  the  distance  between  ranks  is  one  pace  ( 0.70  m.). 

In  England,  the  distance  between  ranks  is  three  paces  (a.40  m.)  in 
line. 


30  The  Escadron. 

The  distance  between  ranks  used  in  the  German  cav- 
ahy,  while  greater  than  that  used  in  most  other  armies, 
facilitates  movements  at  the  faster  gaits.  When  the  rear 
rank  rides  close  upon  the  heels  of  the  front  rank,  a  horse 
falling  down  in  the  front  rank  will  inevitably  bring  down 
the  horse  in  rear  of  it. 

Number  of  ranks.  In  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  the  Cuirassiers  of 
the  Imperial  army  were  formed  in  eight  ranks  and  the  Dragoons  of  that 
army  in  five  ranks,  whereas  the  cavalry  of  the  Swedish  army  had  already 
adopted  the  three-rank  formation.  Since  the  battle  of  Roszbach,  the  Prus- 
sian cavalry  has  used  the  two-rank  formation.  In  the  Prussian  cavalry, 
the  two-rank  formation  was  first  prescribed  in  the  regulations  of  1743.* 
The  Swedish  cavalry  foujjht  in  two  ranks  as  early  as  1705.  In  a  boot  to 
boot  charge,  the  troopers  in  the  third  rank  hardly  evtr  had  an  opportunity 
to  use  their  weapons  ;  they  served  to  fill  gaps  and  were  likewise  used  for 
special  purposes,  for  example,  to  make  fiank  attacks.  A  line  formed  in 
two  ranks  will  invariably  envelop  a  line  formed  in  three,  provided  both 
have  the  same  number  of  troopers.  A  further  chang^e  from  the  two-rank 
to  the  single-rank  formation,  does  not  seem  advisable,  as  this  would  tend 
to  impair  cohesion,  which  the  cavalry  needs  more  than  anything  else  when 
charging  cavalryf.  It  might  be  well  to  mention  that  Lord  Wellington  ob- 
jected to  a  second  rank,  even  when  cavalry  had  to  charge  cavalry,  because 
it  did  not  augment  the  shock  power  but  increased  disorder.  Prince  Fred- 
erick Charles  {,  likewise  believed  the  single-rank  formation  to  be  the.  for- 
mation of  the  cavalry  of  the  future. 

It  is  claimed  that  the  single-rank  formation  has  greater  mobility  than 
other  formations ;  that  it  facilitates  movements  and  assembling  after  a 
charge ;  and  that  it  suffers  less  from  fire. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  claimed  that  the  single-rank  formation  is  dif- 
ficult to  handle  and  easily  pierced  and  that  it  breaks  easily  during  move- 
ments, whereas  a  second  rank,  if  provided,  fills  gaps  occasioned  by  losses 
and  resists  any  hostile  troopers  that  may  have  succeeded  in  breaking 
through  the  front  rank. 

(c)     ELEMENTARY  MOVEMENTS. 

A  trooper,  when  alone,  can  execute  a  turn  on  the  fore- 
hand, but,  when  in  ranks  in  close  order,  he  can  not  do  this 


*At  Kesselsdorf  (December  15th,  1746),  the  cavalry  of  the  second  Proasian 
line  was  formed  in  two  ranks,  in  order  that  it  might  cover  approximately  the  same 
extent  of  front  as  the  first  line.     Oeschichte  des  litauischen  Dragonerregiments,  p.  87. 

tOeneral  v.  Brandt.  GrundsUge  der  Taktik  der  drei  Waffen,  3d  Bd.,  Berlin. 
1850.  pp.  42  and  222. 

^KAJBBiiBR.  Preussischi  KavallerU,  p.  204. 


Gaits.  31 

as  he  takes  up  a  space  one  pace  wide  and  three  paces  deep. 
Wheels  and  ployments,  executed  by  squads  and  platoons, 
take  the  place  of  the  mdividual  turn  (exception :  the  about 
by  squad  executed  by  the  rear  rank  when  moving  into  biv- 
ouac.    Par.  422,  German  F.  S.  R.). 

To  moimt  and  dismount  (pars.  73-76,  German  C.  D.  R.). 

Passaging  and  backing  (par.  102,  German  C.  D.  R.)  are 
executed  for  short  distances  only.  In  Austria,  Russia  and 
Italy,  the  even  nimibers  of  the  rear  rank  move  two  paces  to 
the  rear  at  the  conmiand  to  dismotmt. 

(d)    GAITS. 

Uniformity  in  the  gait  is  of  prime  importance  in  main- 
taining the  ahgnment  when  in  motion  and  in  simultane- 
ously moving  large  masses,  especially  when  the  latter,  like 
the  German  cavalry  divisions,  are  not  formed  until  a  mobi- 
lization is  ordered.  The  influence  exerted  by  speed  on 
timely  arrival  at  the  decisive  point  and  on  prompt  termina- 
tion of  a  movement  must  not  be  magnified.  The  decisive 
factors  are  timely  commencement  of  a  movement  and  correct 
appreciation  of  time  and  space  by  the  leader.  The  leader 
who  properly  appreciates  time  and  space  will  be  able  to 
move  his  unit  at  a  moderate  gait  and  without  winding  his 
horses,  so  as  to  arrive  at  the  proper  time  at  the  point  where 
he  desires  to  use  it.  The  leader  who  lacks  this  faculty  will 
vainly  rush  his  unit  forward,  at  an  increased  gait,  only  to 
arrive  too  late  after  all.  Rising  to  the  trot*  is  the  rule  in 
all  units.  The  German  trott  may  be  employed  in  drills 
where  great  precision  is  required,  for  example  in  executing 
wheels.     It  is  more  difficult  to  obtain  the  gallop  when  ris- 

*In  rising  to  the  trot  (posting),  the  rider  allows  himself  to  be  raised  by  the  thmst 
of  one  diagonal  pair  of  legs,  the  right,  for  example,  (1.  e..  right  fore  and  left  hind); 
he  avoids  the  thrust  produced  by  the  planting  of  the  left  diagonal  pair  and  drops 
back  Into  the  saddle  Just  as  the  right  pair  Is  re-planted ;  this  pair  then  again  raises 
him. — Translator, 

tin  the  Oerman  trot,  the  rider  allows  himself  to  be  raised  slightly  by  the  thrust 
of  each  diagonal  pair  of  legs  in  turn.  1.  e..  he  rides  the  seat  we  employ  at  the  slow 
trot,  but  makes  no  effort  to  sit  dose:  in  conseauence,  he  bumps  the  saddle  lightly 
at  each  step  the  horse  takes. — Translator. 


32 


The  Escadron. 


ing  to  the  trot  than  when  using  the  German  trot,  as  the  horse 
can  not  be  gathered  so  well  in  the  former  as  in  the  latter 
case. 

The  mobility  of  an  organization  is  influenced  by  the 
load  carried  by  the  horses,  by  training,  by  previous  exer- 
tions, by  feeding,  and  by  the  character  of  the  ground. 
When  some  speed  is  required,  it  is  best  to  employ  a  steady 
short  trot;  when  considerable  speed  is  required,  a  smooth 
gallop  (the  horses  taking  long  strides  without  rushing  and 
assimiing  an  tmconstrained,  natural  position),  as  these  gaits 
produce  the  least  fatigue. 

The  following  table  shows  the  distances  covered  at 
the  various  gaits  per  minute  :• 


Walk. 


Paces. 


Germany 
Austria .... 

France 

Italy 

England . 

Russia* .... 


125 
140 


m. 


100 

105 

110 

100 

106 
89) 
to   y 
106) 


Trot. 


Paces. 


275 
300 


m. 


220 
225 
240 
250 
214 

212 


Gallop. 


Paces.      m 


500 
500 


400 
375 
340 
350 
400 

283 


Accelerated 
Gallop. 


Paces. 


700 


m. 


560 

440 
450 

425 


A  short  trot  that  does  not  strain  the  lungs  and  an  extended  gfallop 
au"e  used  everywhere.  The  gallop  is  particularly  well  developed  in  the 
German  cavalry,  which,  with  its  accelerated  gallop,  covers  120  m.  more  per 
minute  than  the  French  cavalry  with  its  gallop  along'e^  and  135  m.  more 
per  minute  than  the  Russian  cavalry  with  its  "field  gallop."  In  charging 
over  1,500  m.  of  open  ground,  against  infantry,  a  German  escadron  would 
be  exposed  to  fire  for  3  minutes  and  37  seconds,  a  French  escadron  for  3 
minutes  and  24  seconds,  and  a  Russian  escadron  for  3  minutes  and  32  sec- 
onds. The  short  distances  covered  per  minute  by  the  Russian  cavalry  are 
due  to  the  attempt  to  harmonize  the  performance  of  a  mount  in  the  cav- 


•Instead  of  at  the  gallop,  the  Cossacks  ride  at  an  accelerated  trot.  This 
may  be  increased  to  the  so-called  Namjot,  a  species  of  lope  in  which  283  m.  are 
covered  per  minute.  The  accelerated  Nam  jot  corresponds  to  the  '*  field  gallop'' 
of  the  cavalry  of  the  Line. 


Gaits.  33 

airy  of  the  Line  with  that  of  the  smaller  Cossack  horse.  In  Prance,  train- 
ing is  to  be  so  regulated  that  horses  will  cover  lo  km.  at  a  trot,  or  6  km.  at 
a  gallop  without  exertion.  No  definite  figures  can  be  given  for  distances 
covered  per  minute  at  top  speed,  as  allowance  must  be  made,  in  a  unit  in 
close  order,  for  the  weaker  horses,  whose  performance  is  more  reduced  by 
exertion  and  by  difficult  ground  than  that  of  the  stronger  horses.  The 
Russians  count  on  covering  Boo  paces  ( 565  m.)  during  the  first  minute  of 
riding  at  top  speed. 

According  to  Austrian  observations,  the  distances  covered  per  minute 
on  soft  ground  in  the  field,  are  as  follows : 

At  a  walk,  90-96  m. 

At  a  trot,  150-160  m.  This  may  be  continued  up  to  30  minutes  aa 
4,8go  m. 

At  a  grallop,  260-280  m.  This  may  be  continued  up  to  5  minutes ■■ 
1,400  m. 

At  top  speed,  370-400  m.  This  may  be  continued  up  to  t  minute  =s 
400  m. 

The  work  a  horse  is  capable  of  performing  is  limited  by  the  exhaus- 
tion of  its  lungs  and  muscles.  The  lungs  become  exhausted  first,  the 
muscles  next.  A  horse,  when  quiet,  takes  eight  to  twelve  breaths  per 
minute;  after  going  at  top  speed,  however,  it  takes  130  breaths  per  min- 
ute* 

The  following  table  sljows  the  number  of  respirations  that  a  horse 
takes  per  minute : 

Without  kit:  With  field  kit: 

Slow  walk    16-24  Ordinary  walk 30-39 

Lively  walk 34  Walk  uphill 34 

Trot,  after  1  km. 42  Walk  downhill 28 

Trot,  after  2  km 46  Trot,  after  i  km 56 

Trot,  after  3  km 51  Trot,  after  2  km 60 

Trot  for  longer  distances,  up  to      65  Trot,  after  3  km 62 

Gallop  for  i  km 55  Trot  for  longer  distances,  up  to  79 

Gallop  for  ^}i  km 72-84  Trot  uphill 74 

Top  speed  for  300  m. 58  Trot  downhill 55 

Top  speed  for  i  km 60-72  Gallop  for  j  km 74 

Top  speed  for  longer  distances, 

up  to 130 

Finally:    Congestion  of  the  lungs. 

The  trot  over  soft  ground  imposes  the  same  strain  on  the  lungs  as 
the  gallop  over  hard,  level  ground. 

Fast  gaits  uphill  tire  principally  the  lungs,  fast  gaits  downhill  the 
muscles  and  joints.  Soft  ground  tires  lungs  and  muscles  and  affects  par- 
ticularly the  sinews,  hard  ground  principally  joints  and  hoofs. 

*Pleldmamhal.  Lieut.  Gen.  Oonbad  v.  H'VrzBNDOBF,  Ohlef-of-Stafl   of  the 
Auatro-Hunsarlan  Army,  Zum  Studium  der  TaJUik,  p.  748. 


84  The  Escadron. 

Upon  halting,  the  number  of  respirations  decreases  rapidly,  the  rate  of 
this  decrease  being  directly  proportional  to  the  speed  with  which  the  horse 
moved.  If  a  horse  shows  55  respirations  after  traveling  i  km.,  this  number, 
upon  halting,  drops  in  5  minutes  to  4s,  in  10  minutes  to  28,  and  in  ao  minutes 
to  17.  This  clearly  indicates  the  necessity  of  rests  or  of  coming  down  to  a 
walk  for  corresponding  periods.  The  breathing,  recognizable  by  ttie  heav 
ing  of  the  flanks,  is  an  index  of  the  remaining  energy  in  a  horse. 

Lungs  and  muscles  are  tired  least  by  the  walk.  This  gait  promises, 
therefore,  the  greatest  endurance  on  the  part  of  the  horse.  A  horse  will 
walk  ten  hours  a  day  without  considerable  fatigue.  This  is  equivalent  to 
6,000  m.  per  hour  or  60  km.  per  day.  But,  to  ride  continually  at  a  walk  tires 
the  trooper  and  causes  him  to  lounge  in  the  saddle,  which  produces  a  de- 
leterious effect  on  the  horse. 

If  nothing  but  the  trot  were  used  in  covering  long  distances,  the 
horses  would  soon  become  exhausted.  Therefore,  walk  and  trot  are  used 
alternately. 

A  fast  gallop  in  itself  exhausts  horses  suddenly ;  after  auch  an  ex- 
ertion they  require  from  ten  to  fifteen  minutes  to  recover,  to  reestablish 
the  normal  action  of  the  lungs.  General  Bonie  of  the  French  army  con- 
siders 5,000  m.  to  be  the  maximum  distance  that  a  horse  can  gallop  at  a  single 
stretch  on  one  day.  For  some  time  after  such  a  performance,  however,  a 
horse  can  move  only  at  a  walk.  At  Vionvillo,  v.  Bredow*s  brigade  rode 
5,Soo  m.  at  top  speed.  General  v.  Schmidt*  says:  "It  is  absolutely 
essential  that  the  horses  gallop  quietly  and  steadily.  They  must  not  gallop 
hurriedly  and  violently,  change  from  one  lead  to  the  other,  and  throw  their 
riders  about  in  the  saddle,  for  this  not  only  causes  disorder  in  ranks  and 
loss  of  cohesion  in  the  line,  but  makes  the  movement  more  difficult  for  the 
horses,  exhausts  them  prematurely  and  deprives  them,  on  account  of  their 
excitement,  of  their  wind,  which  they  need  more  than  anything  else. — The 
gallop  stride  must  go  fiat  and  evenly  over  the  ground  and  must  be  without 
high  action. — The  troopers  must  sit  still,  press  the  crotch  firmly  down  into 
the  saddle  and  must  not  flounder  about.  They  must  let  their  lower  legs 
hang  quietly  down  the  sides  of  their  horses  so  that  the  latter  are  in  no  way 
disturbed  and  excited  either  by  the  seat  or  by  the  position  of  the  legs. 
They  must,  further,  closely  conform  with  their  bodies  to  every  movement  of 
their  horses,  must  have  a  light  hand,  giving  and  taking  rein  when  neces- 
sary, and  must  make  every  effort  to  keep  their  mounts  down  to  a  uniform, 
long  stride.  After  a  few  drills,  the  horses  will  no  longer  become  excited 
nor  be  in  the  air,  and  will  gallop  in  good  balance,  quietly,  without  hurry 
and  without  rushing  forcibly  into  the  bit.  Both  trooper  and  horse  must 
simultaneously  learn  to  keep  their  wind,  coolness  and  temper,  and  acquire 
a  natural,  free  and  unconstrained  carriage.  Horse  and  trooper  must  give 
one  the  impression  that  this  extended  gallop  is  easy  and  pleasant;  that 
they  enjoy  it ;  and  that  they  are  in  a  perfectly  unconstrained,  natural  posi- 
tion." 


*In9tnikH(m€n  p.  43. 


Commands;  Orders;  Signals.  35 

'*Thift  is  the  only  way  in  which  the  escadrons  can  be  kept  from  increas- 
ing the  gait  to  top  speed  against  the  will  of  their  leaders  and  that  of  the 
troopers.  Such  headlong  rushes  can  occur  only  when  the  gallop  during 
the  charge  is  violent,  hurried  and  unsteady ;  then  the  ranks  become  dis- 
ordered and  cease  to  exist  entirely,  so  that  finally  six,  eight,  and  perhaps 
ten  ranks  are  formed :  this  is  the  gravest  fault  in  the  shock."* 

(e)     GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  FOR  MOVEMENTS. 

1.     Commanday  Orders,  Bugle  and  Visual  Signals,  and 

Verbal  Directions. 

Cavalry  is  led  by  means  of  commands,  orders,  bugle 
and  visual  signals,  and  verbal  directions.  Leader  and  or- 
ganization should  keep  each  other  constantly  in  view.  Com- 
mands should  be  given  only  when  the  leader  is  certain  that 
they  will  be  understood;  generally  speaking,  they  can  not 
be  employed  in  organizations  larger  than  an  escadron. 
In  large  units,  commands  are  replaced  by  orders  or  by 
verbal  directions.  For  transmitting  orders  quickly,  the 
regimental  conunander  may  avail  himself  of  his  adjutant 
and  his  orderly  officer.  If  he  does  this,  his  orders  can  sim- 
ultaneously reach  both  flanks  of  the  regiment. 

Bugle  signals,  whose  nimiber  is  rather  limited  in  Ger- 
many, enable  the  leader  to  communicate  his  will  quickly 
and  thoroughly  to  the  troops.  Bugle  signals  should  not 
be  used  when  they  might  betray  the  presence  of  the  organ- 
ization or  cause  misunderstanding  in  other  units.  A  bugle 
signal  is  executed  as  soon  as  it  is  understood,  i.  e.,  the  imits 
should  "ride  to  the  tune  of  the  bugle  signal'*  {in  das  Signal 
hineinreiten) .  The  most  important  bugle  signals  are 
"front"  {Front) ff  "assemble,*'  and  the  "regimental  call" 

♦JWd.,  p.  45. 

t'*The  signal  'front'  is  employed: 

"  (a)  To  cause  a  line,  a  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons,  or  a  regi- 
mental column  (mass)  that  has  wheeled  to  a  flank  or  to  the  rear  by  platoons,  to 
resume  the  original  march  direction; 

"  (&)  To  cause  a  double  column  or  a  column  of  platoons  to  face  toward  the 
firont  (1.  e.,  toward  the  enemy)  by  wheeling  into  line  by  platoons,  or  a  route  col- 
umn to  face  toward  the  f^ont  (i.e..  toward  the  enemy)  by  wheeling  into  line  by 
squads; 

"  (c)  To  cause  a  route  column  that  is  moving  to  the  rear  into  a  defile,  to  re- 
smne  the  original  march  direction; 

"  {dy  To  cause  a  unit  that  is  moving  to  the  rear  in  extended  order,  to  face 
again  toward  the  enemy. 

"Whenever  the  execution  of  the  signal  necessitates  a  wheel  or  a  turn  to  the 
rear,  the  wheel  or  turn  is  made  to  the  left  about."     (Par.  21,  Oertnan  C.  X>.  R.), 


36  The  Escadron. 

(Regimentsruf)  ,*  a  special  one  being  prescribed  for  each  reg- 
iment. The  regimental  call  is  to  be  used  in  critical  moments 
when  no  time  is  available  for  giving  orders  or  commands. 
Its  purpose  is  to  cause  the  eyes  of  all  to  be  directed  upon 
the  leader.  The  organization  must  be  trained  to  form  for  at- 
tack in  correct  formation  and  in  the  proper  direction  at  a 
signal  from  the  leaders,  and  must  follow  in  trace  as  soon  as 
the  latter  move  off. 

Visual  signals  are  used  to  lead  troops  silently.  Before 
giving  such  signals,  the  leader  may  attract  the  attention  of 
his  men  by  means  of  a  blast  on  the  whistle.  As  visual  signals 
can  not  be  seen  by  all  the  troopers  when  in  route  colimin,  they 
are  repeated  by  all  subordinate  leaders  down  to  and  in- 
cluding chiefs  of  platoons.  Visual  signals  and  verbal  direc- 
tions are  valuable  when  the  enemy  is  to  be  surprised.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  such  signals  do  not  always  ensure 
the  simultaneous  and  orderly  execution  of  movements.  It 
is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  each  unit  follow  its  leader 
wherever  he  moves.  In  front  of  the  enemy,  we  must  abso- 
lutely rely  upon  each  trooper's  following  the  lead  of  his 
commander.  The  leader  indicates  by  raising  his  arm,  that 
his  unit  is  to  follow  him  without  command  or  signal. 

2.     Wheels  and  Turns* 

The  regulations  prescribe  wheels^  (on  fixed  pivot),  such 
as  wheel  into  column,X  wheel  into  line,%  and  about  wheel,% 
by  platoons  and  by  squads,  and  turns\  (on  moving  pivot) » 
i.  e.,  changes  in  the  march  direction  without  change  in  the 
formation.  (Pars.  36-39,  German  C.  D.  R.).  Wheel  are 
executed  at  angles  of  90  and  180  degrees,  and  turns  (changes 

•Par.  23,  German  C.  D.  B. 

iSehwtnkungin. 

XAbschwenktn. 

^EiniChtoenk§n. 

%KehrtschW9nkung. 

\\Drehung§n. 


Deployments;  Front  into  Line.  37 

of  direction)  at  any  angle.  Turns  may  be  executed  by 
command  or  by  signal  at  angles  of  45  or  90  degrees.  Dur- 
ing turns,  the  chief  of  the  base  platoon  maintains  the  ca- 
dence. The  other  chiefs  of  platoons  and  troopers  or  tmits 
diminish  or  increase  the  cadence,  according  to  their  position, 
or  change  the  gait  when  necessary.  The  leader  of  the  base 
platoon  (or  base  unit)  may  be  directed  to  decrease  the 
cadence  when  necessary. 

3.     Deplosrments  and  Front  into  Line. 

The  term  deplojrment,  as  used  in  the  regulations,  de- 
notes the  change  from  one  of  the  deep  coltmms  of  the  regi- 
ment to  a  broader  combat  formation,  for  example,  the  change 
from  column  of  platoons  to  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  pla- 
toons. Line  may  be  formed  from  coltunn  by  executing  front 
into  line.  In  the  deployment  as  well  as  in  front  into  line,  the 
imits  in  rear  habitually  place  themselves  on  both  flanks  of 
the  leading  unit,  the  second  and  third  to  its  right,  the  others 
ta  its  left.  The  distances  to  be  traversed  by  the  units  in 
rear  may  be  decreased  by  first  changing  the  march  direc 
tion  and,  simultaneously  therewith,  deploying  or  executing 
right  front  into  line  or  left  front  into  line,  as  the  case  may 
be,  in  the  direction  in  which  the  turn  is  made. 

The  deployments  and  front  into  Une  are  executed  as. 
follows : 

If  halted  or  if  marching  at  the  walk,  at  the  trot ; 

If  marching  at  the  trot,  at  the  gallop ;  and 

If  marching  at  the  gallop,  at  the  gallop. 

In  the  deployments,  if  executed  from  the  halt  (or  while 
marching  at  the  walk),  the  base  unit  advances  the  dis- 
tance prescribed  or  ordered  in  the  particular  case,  at  the 
trot,  and  then  halts  (or  comes  down  to  the  walk) ;  if  exe- 
cuted while  marching  at  the  trot  or  at  the  gallop,  the  base 
vmit  advances  the  distance  prescribed  or  ordered,  without 
changing  the  gait,  and  then  comes  down  to  the  next  slower 
gait,  or,  if  deplo3ang  from  route  column,  comes  down  to  the 


38  The  Escadron. 

walk.  In  forming  front  into  line  from  a  halt  (or  while 
marching  at  the  walk),  the  leading  element  advances 
twenty  paces  at  the  trot  and  halts  (or  comes  down  to  the 
walk);  if  executed  while  marching  at  the  trot  or  at  the 
gallop,  the  leading  element  continues  to  advance  without 
changing  the  gait. 

By  halting  the  leading  element,  the  deployment  is  accele- 
rated, and  gain  of  ground  to  the  front  is  avoided. 

Changes  from  one  formation  to  another,  in  so  far  as 
they  do  not  involve  the  execution  of  front  into  line,  and 
ployments  (habitually  executed  on  the  base  unit)  seldom 
require  haste.  Therefore,  such  movements  are  executed 
without  changing  the  gait. 

(f)     MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  ESCADRON  IN  LINE.* 

The  line  is  the  most  important  formation  of  the  cav- 
-airy,  as  it  is  the  formation  in  which  the  charge  is  made.  It 
is  essential  in  all  movements  made  in  line  that  the  horses  be 
perpendicular  to  the  front  and  that  accurate  contact  be 
maintained  between  stirrups.  The  march  direction  can  be 
maintained,  after  a  charge  is  once  begim,  only  when  this 
principle  is  observed.  The  front-rank  men  take  care  to 
maintain  proper  contact,  while  the  rear-rank  men  preserve 
the  proper  distance  and  cover  in  file.  The  center  trooper 
(guide  of  the  escadron)  follows  at  the  prescribed  distance 
in  the  trace  of  his  chief  of  platoon.  In  Austria,  when 
marching  at  fast  gaits,  rear-rank  troopers  are  permitted  to 
ride  so  as  to  cover  the  intervals  between  front-rank  men. 

The  oblique  (used  for  short  distances  only)  is  executed 
by  each  trooper  making  a  half  ttun  individually,  and  march- 
ing at  an  angle  of  45  degrees  to  the  original  direction. 

Changes  of  front  are  effected  either  by  executing  turns 
or  by  the  leader  of  the  base  unit's  marching  upon  a  new 
objective  point,  the  rest  of  the  escadron  gradually  conform- 
ing to  the  movement. 

♦Pars.  78-80,  Oerman  C.  D.  R^ 


Column  op  Platoons.  39 

If  the  escadron  is  to  move  to  the  rear,  the  platoons 
execute  an  about  wheel  (in  Russia  the  about  wheel  in  this  case 
may  be  executed  either  by  threes  or  by  platoons) .  At  the 
signal  "front,"  platoons  wheel  to  the  left  about  and  face 
again  toward  the  enemy.  The  term  ** front"  denotes  the 
side  on  which  the  leader  is  posted. 

(g)     THE  COLUMNS  OF  THE  ESCADRON. 
1.     Column  of  Platoons. 

Cavalry  must  be  able  to  form  line  from  coltmin  quickly 
in  any  direction.  For  this  reason,  columns  must  be  open, 
narrow  and  not  too  deep.  In  addition,  they  must  be  capa- 
ble of  changing  direction  easily,  and  the  distance  between 
ranks  in  the  various  elements  must  be  sufficient  to  enable 
the  horses  to  gallop  comfortably,  and  to  prevent  disorders 
occurring  in  any  one  subdivision  from  being  communicated 
to  others.  In  a  close  colimm,  the  dust  raised  settles  very 
slowly  and  the  horses  can  not  see  where  they  are  stepping; 
in  consequence,  they  fall  and,  at  the  faster  gaits,  order  is 
easily  lost.  It  is  not  advisable  to  increase  the  distance 
between  ranks  as  the  fonnation  of  line  is  thereby  retarded. 
The  column  of  platoons  meets  all  the  requirements  of  an 
assembly  and  principal  march  formation  of  an  escadron  on 
the  battlefield.  Line  may  be  quickly  formed  in  any  di- 
rection from  coltmm  of  platoons,  by  first  partially  changing 
direction.  In  passing  defiles,  the  files  on  the  flanks  are 
broken  off  and  follow  their  platoons.  (Par.  93,  German 
C.  D.  R.).  When  this  is  done,  care  must  be  taken  that 
elongation  of  the  column  does  not  take  place.  In  Austria, 
entire  squads  break  from  the  flanks,  in  France,  as  many 
files  as  required.  Column  of  platoons  is  formed  either  by 
wheeling  into  column  or  by  ploying.  The  last-named  move- 
ment is  habitually  executed  on  the  center  platoon,  i.  e.,  the 
base  platoon,  in  exceptional  cases,  on  a  flank  platoon.  When 
the  column  of  platoons  is  to  be  given  a  different  march 


40 


The  Escadron. 


direction  than  that  obtainable  by  wheeling  into  column, 
the  march  direction  is  indicated  in  the  command.  In  colimm 
of  platoons,  the  platoons  are  in  rear  of  and  covering  each 


» 


30' 


i   mmmna 
0 


gmrrmira. 


0 


gmnmrffl, 


other;  the  rear  rank  in  each  platoon  is  one  pace  in  rear  of 
its  front  rank;  the  chiefs  of  rear  platoons  follow  the  next 
preceding  platoon  at  a  distance  equal  to  the  front  of  their 
platoon  less  eleven  paces;  the  center  trooper  of  each  pla- 
toon follows  at  one  pace  distance  in  the  trace  of  his  chief 
of  platoon. 

The  eleven  paces,  mentioned  above,  are  obtained  by  adding  to  the 
depth  of  one  platoon  ( 3  + 1  -f-  3  paces ),  the  depth  of  the  horse  ( 3  paces )  of 
the  chief  of  the  next  platoon  in  the  column,  and  the  distance  of  that  chief 
from  his  own  platoon  ( i  pace ).  To  enable  the  horse  of  a  chief  of  platoon 
to  move  at  fast  gaits,  it  must  be  at  least  one  pace  from  the  next  preceding 
platoon.  Moreover,  rear  platoons  must  be  able  to  wheel  into  line.  Hence, 
the  front  of  a  platoon  must  not  be  less  than  twelve  paces.  Since  each  trooper 
occupies  a  front  of  one  pace,  the  minimum  strength  of  a  platoon  is  thus 
obviously  twelve  files. 


Column  op  Platoons. 


41 


In  Prance,  the  distance  in  the  clear  between  platoons  amounts  to  half 
platoon  front.  The  platoons  can  wheel  into  line  when  each  consists  of 
twelve  to  thirteen  files,  but  not  when  each  consists  of  a  greater  number  of 
files.  When  each  platoon  consists  of  eighteen  files  ( each  file  occupying  a 
front  of  I  m.),  the  distance  in  the  clear  between  platoons  is  9  m.  and  th« 
depth  of  the  two  ranks  of  each  platoon  6  m.  Hence,  when  the  platoons 
wheel  into  line,  three  files  in  each  platoon  find  no  room,  as  the  platoon  front 
amounts  to  18  m.  while  the  distance  between  platoons  plus  the  depth  of  a 
platoon  is  15  m.  only. 

In  other  armies,  the  rear  ranks  in  column  of  plate  ons  preserve  the 
same  distance  from  the  front  ranks  as  in  line.  In  Austria  and  Prance,  in 
forming  column  of  platoons  on  a  flank  platoon,  the  latter  moves  straight  to 
the  front,  the  second  platoon  executes  two  wheels,  each  of  45  degrees,  the 
third  and  fourth  each  a  quarter  wheel,  each  platoon  then  following  the 
leading  platoon. 


Forming   Column   of   Pla- 
toons from  Line,  on  the 
Center  Platoon. 

t 


Forming  Column  of  Pla- 
toons from  Line,  on  the 
Right  Platoon. 


r 


■** 


J 


I 


\ 


\ 


\ 


', r— 

« 


] 


Cavalry  should  be  able  to  deploy  in  any  direction  for 
attack.  Hence,  all  ideas  of  the  drawbacks  of  inversion 
should  be  abandoned.     It  is  essential  that  the  platoons  be 


42 


The  Escadron. 


able  to  wheel  into  line  to  the  right  as  well  as  to  the  left,  and 
that  they  be  able  to  form  front  into  line  irrespective  of  the 
numerical  order  in  which  they  happen  to  be.  The  term 
"front"  always  denotes  the  side  of  the  column  on  which  the 
leader  is  posted.  It  is  immaterial  whether  the  first  or  the 
fourth  platoon  is  on  the  right  flank  in  line. 

This  apparently  simple  principle  has  only  recently  received  general 
recognition  in  the  cavalry,  least  of  all  in  armies  where  the  number  of  a 
unit  changes  with  its  position.  At  Mockem,  October  i6th,  1813,  the  Lithu- 
anian Dragoons,  after  charging  hostile  cavalry,  had  wheeled  about  by  pla* 
toons  and  then  wheeled  to  the  right  by  escadrons  in  order  to  charge,  in 
echelon,  retreating  French  infantry.  "  By  charging  with  inverted  platoons 
and  inverted  escadrons,  such  confusion  had  been  created,  that  a  single 
hostile  escadron  would  have  sufficed  to  rout  the  entire  regiment.  After 
the  fight,  I  was  compelled  to  post  the  first  sergeant  of  the  Jager  Escadron 
where  the  right  was  to  rest  and  then  gradually  to  form  one  escadron  aftei 
another  into  line."* 


Right  and  Left  Front  into      Right  Front  into 


from 


Line     from    Column  of 
Platoons. 

t 


Column  of  Platoons. 


r— T 


I 


z 


V 


« 

} 


en 


; 


/ 


V 


Line  is  formed  from  coltmm  of  platoons  either  by  ex- 
ecuting front  into  line  or  by  wheeling  into  line.  It  is  simpler 
to  wheel  into  line  than  to  execute  front  into  line,  as  contact, 
alignment  and  march  direction  are  more  easily  maintained, 
the  pivot  flanks  of  the  platoons  being  already  in  the  new  line* 


*Oraf  Hbnckxl  v.  Donnbrsmabok,  BrinMTunqtn  aiM  mtiMmi  lAlitn,  p.220. 


Front  into  Line.  43 

Besides,  a  simple  command  of  the  escadron  commander  suf- 
fices for  wheeling  into  line,  whereas  several  commands  of 
the  chiefs  of  platoons  are  required  to  execute  front  into  line. 
Moreover,  especially  at  the  fast  gaits,  it  is  easier  for  the 
troopers  to  wheel  than  to  oblique,  and,  in  addition,  the 
hesitation  on  the  inner  and  the  rushing  on  the  outer  flanks, 
the  seesawing  of  the  line,  when  executing  front  into  line 
toward  one  flank  only,  is  avoided.  But,  when  only  a  short 
distance  separates  the  organization  from  the  enemy  whom 
it  is  to  charge,  wheeling  into  line  makes  it  more  difficult  to 
put  the  horses  into  a  fast  gait.  The  manner  of  forming 
line  is  of  less  importance  in  an  escadron  than  in  larger  units. 
If  the  leading  element  continues  the  march  while  front  into 
line  is  being  executed,  the  deployment  is  retarded,  but  the 
distance  to  the  objective  is  reduced.  When,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  leading  element  halts,  or  changes  direction,  while 
the  remaining  elements  wheel  into  line,  the  deployment  is 
accelerated,  but  the  distance  to  the  objective  is  not  reduced. 
Front  into  line  is  habitually  executed  by  the  rear  pla- 
toons placing  themselves,  at  the  commands  of  their  leaders, 
to  the  right  and  left  respectively  of  the  leading  platoon. 
In  exceptional  cases,  right  front  into  line  or  left  front  into 
line  may  be  executed.  This  is  especially  true  if  the  march 
direction  is  changed  at  the  same  time,  when  the  rear  pla- 
toons execute  right  front  into  line  or  left  front  into  line,  as 
the  case  may  be,  in  the  direction  in  which  the  turn  is  made. 
In  the  Russian  and  the  French  cavalry,  right  front  into  line 
and  left  front  into  line  alone  are  used.  In  the  Austrian 
cavalry,  the  second  platoon  places  itself  to  the  right  and 
the  other  platoons  place  themselves  to  the  left  of  the  leading 
platoon.  In  France,  the  escadron  commander,  by  placing 
himself  either  on  the  right  or  on  the  left  of  the  leading  pla- 
toon, indicates  whether  right  front  into  line  or  left  front  into 
line  is  to  be  executed.  The  advantages  of  simultaneously 
executing  right  and  left  front  into  line  are  obvious.  When 
executing  right  and  left  front  into  line,  the  leading  platoon 
remains  the  base  platoon;   its  chief  can,  without  difficulty. 


44  The  Escadron. 

maintain  the  march  direction :  the  gait  is  steadier  during  the 
movement  and  order  is  more  easily  preserved ;  and,  finally, 
line  can  be  formed  more  quickly  than  when  front  into  line  is 
executed  toward  one  side  only.  Right  and  left  front  into 
line,  simultaneously  executed,  has  the  disadvantage  that, 
in  certain  circumstances,  a  platoon  that  is  led  by  a  chief  who 
possesses  little  skill  or  one  who  is  not  well  mounted,  may 
become  the  base  platoon. 

Right  and  left  front  into  line  follows  quite  logically  from  the  ploy- 
men  t  on  the  center  platoon.  In  an  escadron,  it  is  immaterial  how  front 
into  line  is  executed,  as  the  time  that  could  be  gained  is  insignificant.  It 
is  simply  a  question  of  maintaining  a  principle  that  applies  to  the  regiment 
and  is  logically  also  extended  to  the  escadron.  For  mention  of  a  further 
drawback  of  right  and  left  front  into  line,  see  p.  71,  infra. 

The  following  will  give  an  idea  of  the  time  required  to 
form  front  into  line  from  column  of  platoons  when  each 
platoon  consists  of  twelve  files : 

Right  (or  left)  front  into  line  at  the  trot  requires  21, 
at  the  gallop  14  seconds ; 

Right  and  left  front  into  line  at  the  trot  requires  15, 
at  the  gallop  12  seconds; 

Platoons  front  into  line  from  column  of  fours  (each  pla- 
toon forming  front  into  line)  at  the  trot  requires  18,  at  the 
gallop  9  seconds. 

Hence,  front  into  line  from  route  coltmm,  under  fav- 
orable conditions,  requires,  at  the  trot  33,  at  the  gallop  21 
seconds. 

On  the  other  hand,  to  wheel  into  line  when  the  leading 
platoon  has  changed  direction  (90  degrees),  requires,  at 
the  trot  16,  at  the  gallop  10  seconds. 

2.     The  Echelon  Formation. 

The  German  C.  D.  R.  of  1909  no  longer  prescribe  the 
** echelon  formation"  (the  so-called  "half -column"),  ia 
which  the  platoons  were  posted  so  as  to  uncover  each  other 
wholly  or  in  part.  The  formation  was  valuable  in  train- 
ing leaders  and  troops  in  riding  accurately ;  it  could  scarcely 


Single-Rank  Formation.  45 

be  said  to  be  suitable  on  the  battlefield  for  the  purpose  of 
gaining  the  flank  of  the  enemy. 

Orderly  moTements  in  this  echelon  formation  are  practicable  only 
when  the  terrain  is  open  and  when  the  platoon  leaders  are  carefully  trained. 
Each  platoon  leader  follows  his  own  march  direction,  and  cohesion  during 
the  movement  can  be  maintained  only  by  close  observation  of  the  distance 
from  the  next  preceding  platoon.  If  the  rear  platoons  close  up  too  much, 
they  can  not  wheel  into  line ;  if  they  lose  distance,  and  this  is  the  most 
common  error,  the  alignment,  on  forming  line,  is  lost.  Another  drawback, 
finally,  was  caused  by  the  fact  that  the  position  of  the  non-commissioned 
guide  on  the  outer  flank  of  each  platoon  was  not  fixed,  but  depended  upon 
the  number  of  files  in  his  platoon.  The  only  way  in  which  the  echelon  for- 
mation could  be  taken  up  from  line  by  wheeling,  was  in  a  direction  making 
an  angle  of  either  45  or  135  degrees  with  the  original  front;  whereas  col- 
umn of  platoons  can  be  formed  in  any  direction.  When  in  echelon  forma- 
tion, the  march  direction  can  be  changed  only  by  first  forming  column  of 
platoons. 

In  echelon  formation,  it  is  difficult  to  utilize  cover  and  to  avoid  ob- 
stacles. 

To  form  lint  from  echelon  formation.    When  a 

executing  right  and  left  front  into  line  from  column  ^j^ 

of  platoons,  the  leader  of  the  base  platoon  is  already  | 

in  front  with  his  platoon  and  need  only  continue  to  | 

maintain  the  march  direction,  whereas,  in  forming  V     ! 

line  from  echelon  formation,  he  is  the  second  to  \  ;  ^m^ 

reach   the  line,  whereby  the   maintenance  of  the  ^   

march  direction  is  endangered.     When  in  echelon  |\ 

formation,  the  escadron  can  form  line  at  once  in  ■-^■\ 

three  definite  directions  only,  whereas,  when  in  col-         mmmm  \ 

umn  of  platoons,  the  escadron,  by  first  partially  >^ 

changing  direction,  can  quickly  form  line  in  any  direction  toward  the  front 
or  half  front. 

Single-Rank  Foimation. 

In  order  to  minimize  losses,  the  escadron  when  in 
line,  or  the  platoons  when  the  escadron  is  in  column  of 
platoons,  may  be  formed  in  single  rank.  (Par.  98,  German 
C.  D.  R.).  The  platoons,  when  the  escadron  is  in  column 
of  platoons,  may  also  be  formed  in  single  rank  when  at- 
tacking infantry,  artillery,  or  machine  guns.  (Par.  113, 
German  C.  D.  R.).  Single  rank  is  fonned  by  the  rear-rank 
troopers  placing  themselves  with  or  without  an  interval  to 
the  right  of  their  file  leaders.    The  troopers  must  be  trained 


\ 


46 


The  Escadron. 


to  form  single  rank  from  route  column  and  from  column  of 
platoons.  If  an  escadron  consisting  of  120  troopers  forms 
single  rank  with  an  interval  of  one  pace  between  troopers, 
it  will  cover  a  front  of  240  paces,  i.  e.,  approximately  the 
same  front  as  a  regiment  in  line. 

3.     Route  Columns. 
Cavalry  marches  either  in  column  of  twos  or  in  column 
of  fours,  as  side  roads  average  from  two  to  three,  main  roads 
from  five  to  seven  paces  in  width.     In  column  of  fours,  the 

Germany. 
Column  of  Fours.  Column  of  Twos. 


Route  Columns.  47 

vaiious  sets  of  fours  follow  each  other  without  distance,  the 
rear-rank  troopers  in  each  squad  covering  the  intervals  to 
the  right  of  their  file  leaders.  Thus,  the  front-rank  troopers 
in  each  squad  but  the  first,  cover  the  front-rank  troopers  in 
the  next  preceding  squad,  the  rear-rank  troopers  in  each 
squad  but  the  first,  covering  the  rear-rank  troopers  in  the 
next  preceding  squad.  In  column  of  twos,  the  half -squads 
follow  each  other  in  a  similar  manner.  More  than  two 
men  are  never  allowed  to  ride  abreast  in  column  of  twos, 
except  where  the  chiefs  of  platoons  are  posted. 

Route  column  is  generally  formed  by  first  forming 
coliunn  of  platoons  and  then  by  ploying  on  a  flank  squad 
(in  Italy  by  ploying  on  a  center  squad,  in  France  by  habitually 
ploying  on  the  right  squad,  i.  e.,  by  executing  right  forward, 
fours  right) .  Route  column  may  also  be  formed  by  wheeling 
by  squads.  As  each  squad  is  four  paces  wide  and  six  paces 
deep  (when  the  rear  rank  follows  the  front  rank  without 
distance),  the  squads  can  not  wheel  simultaneously  into 
coliunn,  but  must  follow  each  other  successively.  The 
change  from  column  of  fours  to  column  of  twos  is  effected 
by  ploying.  Platoons  front  into  line  from  colimin  of  fours 
is  executed  simultaneously  by  the  platoons,  or  successively 
(for  example  on  debouching  from  a  defile) , 

Line  is  formed  from  route  column  in  a  similar  manner 
as  from  coltimn  of  platoons.  When  the  escadron  is  in  route 
column  and  it  is  impracticable  to  form  line  in  the  usual 
manner,  line  may  be  formed  quickly  toward  a  flank  by  the 
command  *' Right''  (or  *'Left")  ''Front,"  given  by  the 
escadron  commander,  or  by  the  signal  'Tront,"  at  which 
command,  or  signal,  the  squads  (or  half-squads)  wheel  into 
line  and  close  in  while  riding  forward  at  the  trot. 

Since  a  squad  as  well  as  a  half-squad  is  six  paces  deep,  but  the  former 
four,  the  latter  two  paces  wide,  gaps  of  two  and  four  paces  respectively 
occur  when  line  is  formed  by  wheeling  by  squads.  These  gaps  must  be 
closed  by  the  troopers*  closing  in  toward  the  center.  The  regulations  of 
all  the  other  armies  prescribe  that,  in  forming  line  to  a  flank,  each  platoon  is 
first  partially  to  change  direction  and  then  to  form  line. 


48  The  Escadron. 

In  order  to  decrease  the  depth  of  route  columns, 
fours  (or  twos)  follow  each  other  without  distance  in  the 
German  cavalry.  This  practice  interferes  with  riding  at 
fast  gaits,  but  accelerates  the  formation  of  line.  Dis- 
orders are  easily  communicated  to  the  entire  coltunn,  whose 
depth  prevents  the  leaders  from  exerting  as  much  influence 
over  their  men  as  in  other  formations.  Moreover,  when 
speed  is  required,  it  will,  as  a  rule,  be  necessary  to  use  a  for- 
mation that  permits  line  to  be  formed  with  despatch  (colunm 
of  platoons,  for  example,  the  flank  files  being  broken  off 
when  necessary). 

On  June  28th,  1866,  the  3d  Cuirassier  Regiment  received  orders  to 
march  to  Koniginhof  with  one  horse  battery  and  one  field  battery.  The 
batteries  finally  found  the  road  impracticable.  The  three  escadrons  that 
marched  in  rear  of  the  batteries  wheeled  about  and  moved  to  the  rear  at 
the  trot.  As  it  was  almost  dark  and  the  path  was  steep  and  covered  with 
stones,  a  number  of  horses  in  the  escadrons  stumbled  and  fell  here  and 
there.  The  gaps  occasioned  thereby  caused  the  troopers  in  rear  to  gallop 
ahead  to  close  up,  whereby  the  outposts  of  the  1st  Army  Corps,  which  could 
not  account  for  this  unexpected  return  of  the  column,  were  alarmed.  The 
panic  of  the  Bavarian  cavalry  at  Hiinf«ld  and  Gersfeld  likewise  occurred 
in  route  column.  • 

In  other  armies  fours  and  twos  cover  in  file.  In  Austria,  France  and 
Italy*  the  distance  between  fours  (or  twos)  is  0.75  m.,  in  England,  1.20  m. 
In  practice,  the  distance  of  one  pace  between  fours  (or  twos)  is  generally 
increased,  as  it  is  difficult  to  maintain.  The  French  regulations  therefore 
count  on  an  elongation  of  from  one-sixth  to  one-fourth  of  the  depth  of  each 
escadron,  but  permit  a  reduction  or  total  elimination  of  the  distance 
between  fours  or  twos  (*7^j  cavaliers  peuvent  mtme  gagnet  du  terrain  d 
droit e  ou  d  gauche  de  ceux  qui  les  pr^chienf). 

An  escadron  of  1 48  troopers,  when  formed  in  column  of  fours  in  the 
German  manner,  has  a  depth  of  97  m.,  and  when  formed  in  column  of  fours 
in  the  Austrian  manner,  a  depth  of  124  m.  This  difference  of  27  m.,  while  of 
little  importance  in  a  single  escadron,  must  be  reckoned  with  in  larger  units, 
as  it  retards  the  execution  of  front  into  line.  This  movement  is  very  apt  to 
be  still  more  retarded,  because  the  distance  between  fours  is  more  likely  to 
be  increased  than  diminished.  The  German  escadron  in  column  of  twos  has 
a  depth  of  1 78  m.,  the  Austrian  a  depth  of  233  m.  There  is  thus  a  difference 
of  55  m.  between  the  two. 

The  Russian  cavalry  uses  the  column  of  threes  and  the  column  of 
twos  as  route  columns.  Each  rank  turns  independently  by  threes  (or 
forms  column  of  sixes — the  so-called  "turning  column,"  the  route  column 

*See  V.  Lettow-Yorbbcx,  KtUq  von  1866,  III,  pp.  82  and  105;     N€u$  mU 
lititrische  Bldtter,  1902. 1,  p.  97.  Quecktnoor  und  Gersfeld. 


Russian,  Italian,  and  English  Escadrons.       49 

used  on  wide  roads),  the  rear-rank  troopers  following  and  covering  their 
file  leaders.  In  Austria,  the  turning  column  is  also  used  for  moving  a  short 
distance  to  a  flank.  Route  ooltmin  may  likewise  be  formed  by  ploying. 
Column  of  twos  is  formed  from  column  of  threes  in  the  same  manner  as 
column  of  twos  from  column  of  squads  in  the  infantry.  Aside  from  the 
disadvantage  of  counting  off  twice  (i  e.,  counting  twos  for  dismounting 
and  threes  for  forming  route  column),  the  column  of  threes  is  longer  than 
the  column  of  fours.  As  the  distance  between  sets  of  threes  is  one  pace 
(0.71  m.),  the  depth  of  an  escadron  in  column  of  threes  amounts  to  151  m., 
as  against  97  m.,  the  depth  of  a  German  escadron  in  column  of  fours. 

The  Italian  cavalry  uses  the  most  logical  procedure,  in  that  the 
principle  of  forming  column  of  platoons  on  the  base  platoon,  and  front  into 
line  on  both  flanks  of  the  leading  element,  has  been  extended  to  forming 
route  column  and  platoons  front  into  line  from  route  column.  The  senior 
non-commissioned  officer  of  a  platoon  rides  directly  in  rear  of  his  chief  of 
platoon,  the  next  ranking  non-commissioned  officer  of  the  platoon  riding 
in  the  rear  rank  and  covering  the  senior  non-commissioned  officer.  Thus, 
if  the  chief  of  platoon  should  be  disabled,  he  can  be  replaced  in  the  simplest 
manner. 

The  two  junior  non-commissioned  officers  of  the  platoon  are  posted 
on  the  flanks  of  the  front  rank  of  the  platoon.  The  platoon  is  then  divided 
into  sets  of  twos,  from  the  center  toward  each  flank,  the  '^center  trooper" 
( the  senior  non-commissioned  officer  )  counting  as  number  one.  In  form- 
ing column  of  fours,  the  four  files  in  the  center  of  the  platoon  ride  straight 
to  the  front;  they  are  followed  by  the  two  files  next  on  the  right  and  by 
the  two  next  on  the  left,  these  forming  a  new  squad  in  rear  of  the  former 
center  squad,  and  so  on.  Front  into  line  is  executed  by  each  two  files  on 
the  right  of  each  squad  placing  themselves  abreast  and  to  the  right  of  the 
leading  squad,  each  two  files  on  the  left  of  each  squad  similarly  placing 
themselves  abreast  and  to  the  left  of  the  leading  squad.  When  the  column 
is  to  form  line  to  the  right  or  to  the  left,  the  chiefs  of  platoons  turn  the 
heads  of  their  platoons  in  the  indicated  direction,  and  each  platoon  then 
executes  front  into  line  as  explained.  In  forming  column  of  twos  from 
column  of  fours,  the  exterior  files  of  each  squad  place  themselves  in  rear  of 
the  center  files  of  their  squad. 

A  difficulty  can  arise  only  when  the  route  column  has  faced  to  the 
rear  and  then  executes  front  into  line.  In  this  case,  front  into  line  must 
be  executed  by  half -platoons,  the  last  half -platoon  moving  abreast  of  the 
one  in  the  lead. 

In  the  English  cavalry,  column  of  fours  is  formed  in  a  similar  man- 
ner as  in  the  Italian  cavalry,  the  squad  on  the  right  of  the  center  trooper 
moving  out  first. 


50 


The  Escadron. 


Italy. 


Forming  Route  Column 
and 
Front  into  Line. 


B 


i 


V 


s 


■ 


» 


H' 


9 


/2 


■  J'  /'  J"  ■ 


I 


I 


I 


I 
I 
I 
I 

ii 


i 


\\ 


Forming  Column  of 
Twos  from  Column 
of  Fours. 


E 


il 


Formations  of  the  Regiment. 


61 


2.    THE  REGIMENT. 


(a)     THE  FORMATIONS.* 


The   regiment  consisting  of  from  three  to  five  esca- 
drons,  can  be  led  directly  by  its  commander, 'and,  if  oon- 


♦Oompariflon:     Th$  FornuUUnu  of  ik$  Bufiment: 


1. 
2. 


6 


8. 


France. 

>t    The  escadrons,  each  Id  line, 
are  ahreast  at  Interrals  of  16  paoei. 


Lin*    of    Eacadrons     In     Column* 
of  Platoons  {Ligne  de  coUmnes) : 
The  escadroDS,  each  In  column  of 
platoons,  are  abreast  at  deploying 
Intervals  plus  15  paces. 

Must  The  escadrons,  each  In  col- 
umn of  platoons,  are  abreast  at  In- 
tervals of  16  paces. 

Column  of  Platoons  {Colonne  de 
jfeloUms) :  The  escadrons,  each  In 
column  of  platoons,  are  in  rear  of 
ea<di  other  at  a  distance  of  23  paces. 

Column  of  Escadrons  (Colonne  d'  €$•' 
cadrons):  This  is  a  line  of  esca- 
drons in  columns  of  platoons  that  has 
wheeled  to  a  flank.  The  escadrons, 
each  In  line,  are  in  rear  of  each  other 
at  full  distance  (68  paces),  half  dis- 
tance (38  paces),  or  close  distance 
(23  paces). 

Double  Column  I  The  escadrons, 
each  in  column  of  platoons,  are 
formed  two  and  two  abreast  at  16 
paces  interval.  The  distance 
between  the  leading  two  escadrons 
and  the  rear  two  is  23  paces. 

Route  Column:  Oolumn  of  twos 
or  column  of  fours.  The  distance 
between  twos  or  fours  is  0.75  m.,  be- 
tween escadrons.  12  m. 

Line  of  Platoons  In  Columns  of 
Fours  (Ligne  de  pelottms  par  quatre) : 
This  is  formed  by  ploying  ftomline. 
The  distance  between  fours  is  1 .60  m. 


1. 


3. 


Germany. 

LInet    The  escadrons,  each  in  line, 
are  abreast  at  Intervals  of  0  paces. 


2.     line 


of  Eseadrons  In  Colui 
of  Platoons  (Esk4idrons1tolonn€n) : 
The  escadrons.  each  in  column  of 
platoons,  are  abreast  at  deploying 
Intervals  plus  6  paces. 

Regimental  Coluntn  {RegimentskO' 
Umne):  The  escadrons.  each  in 
column  of  platoons,  are  abreast  at 
Intervals  of  6  paces. 

Coluntn  of  Platoons  i  The  esca- 
drons, each  in  column  of  platoons, 
are  in  rear  of  each  other  at  a  dis- 
tance of  6  paces. 

Double  Column  I      The  escadrons, 
each  in  column  of  platoons, 
formed  two  and  two  abreast. 


Route  Columns  Column  of  twos 
or  column  of  fours.  No  distance 
between  fours  or  twos.  The  dis- 
tance between  escadrons  is  8  m. 


7.     Open  Formations. 


52  The  Regiment. 

ditions  are  not  too  unfavorable,  can  be  controlled  by  his 
voice.  The  regiment  is  not  too  large  for  the  regimental 
commander  to  make  his  influence  felt. 

The  evolutions  of  the  regiment,  especially  its  combat 
exercises,  are  designed  to  weld  the  escadrons  into  a  homo- 
geneous whole,  to  train  the  escadron  commanders  to  act 
on  their  own  initiative  in  accordance  with  the  situation, 
and  to  prepare  the  regiment  for  its  duties  as  a  part  of  a 
larger  organization.     (Par.  116,  Gernian  C.  D.  R.). 

Escadron  commanders  are  responsible  for  the  main- 
tenance of  cohesion  in  and  the  correct  execution  of  move- 
ments by  their  escadrons.  Escadron  commanders  should 
foresee  fluctuations  in  the  evolution  executed  by  the  cavalry 
force  of  which  their  escadrons  form  a  part.  Each  escadron 
commander  must  prevent  those  fluctuations  from  being 
commimicated  to  his  own  escadron,  or  cause  them  to  be 
gradually  adjusted  while  the  movement  is  in  progress. 
(Par.  122,  German  C.  D.  R.). 

When,  as  will  frequently  happen,  the  voice  of  the  regi- 
mental commander  does  not  sufiice  for  giving  commands 
for  the  execution  of  evolutions,  recourse  must  be  had  to 
orders.  For  their  transmission,  the  regimental  conmiander 
has  at  his  disposal  the  adjutant  and  one  orderly  officer. 

1.     The  Regiment  in  Line.* 

When  the  German  regiment  is  in  line,  the  escadrons, 
each  in  line,  are  posted  abreast  of  each  other  at  intervals  of 
six  paces  (4.8  m.).  In  the  Austrian  regiment,  the  interval 
between  escadrons  in  line  is  7.5  m.,  (between  "divisions" — 
so-called — ^in  line,  22.5  m.t),  in  the  FrenchJ  and  Italian 

•Par.  127,  Oerman  C.  D.  R, 

flf  the  regiment  Is  in  one  of  its  oolmnns,  the  Interral  between  "dlvlBlonfl*' 
Is  reduced  to  ten  paces  (7.6  m.). 

tOn  account  of  this  interval  and  the  loose  touch  maintained  by  the  French 
troopers,  a  French  regiment  overlaps  a  German  regiment  by  one  and  one-fourth 
times  escadron  front,  provided  the  two  regiments  considered  are  equal  in  strength. 


Line  and  Line  of  Escadrons.  53 

regiments,  12  m.,  in  the  English  regiment,  7.3  m.,  and  in 
the  Russian  regiment,  platoon  front.  The  line  is  the  com- 
bat formation  of  cavalry.     It  can  not  be  handled  with  suf- 


Ma     J 


1 

% 

0 

1 

? 

•                             ? 

1 

1 
1 

i 

1  ■■  ■                           w           -                  ,  „ 

.,..-     *- 

s' 

n^ 

Regimental  commander  with  adjutant  and 
orderly  officer. 

6 

Major  attached  to  the  regimental  itaff. 

o 

Escadron  commander. 

• 

Chief  of  platoon. 

X 

Trumpeter. 

Eacadron. 

Platoon. 

ficient  ease  to  permit  march  direction  or  front  to  be  changed' 
quickly  at  a  fast  gait.  It  is  best  adapted  for  moving 
straight  to  the  front  or  straight  to  the  rear.  When  a  charge 
is  contemplated,  line  shpuld  not  be  formed  tmtil  the  organi- 
zation is  facing  in  the  direction  in  which  the  shock  is  to  be 
delivered. 


2.     Line  of  Escadrons  in  Columns  of  Platoons.* 

When  in  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons,  the 
regiment  possesses  greater  readiness  for  combat  than  in 
any  other  formation,  barring  line.  Line  of  escadrons  in 
columns  of  platoons  is  taken  up  when  evolutions  are  no 
longer  necessary  and  when  the  regiment  is  facing  in  the  di- 
rection in  which  it  is  to  attack.    This  formation  once  taken 


^S$kadron9kolcnn$ru 


54  The  Regiment. 

up,  the  regiment  moves,  in  the  main,  straight  to  the  front. 
In  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons,  the  escadrons, 
each  in  column  of  platoons,  are  abreast  of  each  other  at  de- 
ploying interval  plus  six  paces.  In  this  formation,  when 
the  platoons  consist  of  twelve  files  each,  the  regiment  has  a 
depth  of  40  paces  and  a  front  of  162  paces  (when  the  platoons 
consist  of  sixteen  files  each,  a  front  of  228  paces). 


{ 


«p 


I 


rrone  o$ 
pluftepdc«« 


When  in  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons,  the 
regiment  can  form  line  without  difficulty,  can  avoid  ob- 
stacles easily,  and  its  losses  are  less  than  in  line,  as  the  small 
columns  marching  abreast  compel  the  enemy  to  distribute 
his  fire.  Furthermore,  this  formation  facilitates  detaching 
•escadrons  on  independent  missions. 

Regiments  of  six  escadrons  (Austria  and  Russia)  possess 
these  advantages  to  a  limited  extent  only,  as  they  cover  a 
front  of  290  paces  (or,  when  platoons  consist  of  sixteen  files 
each,  a  front  of  400  paces). 

The  high  value  placed  on  line  of  escadrons  in  columns 
of  platoons  had  its  origin  in  the  era  in  which  all  cavalry 
formations  were  designed  with  a  view  to  the  emplojrment 
of  cavalry  in  successive  lines.  **It  [line  of  escadrons  in 
columns  of  platoons]  possesses  little  handiness,  renders  ma- 
terially more  diffictdt  all  changes  of  direction,  loses  direction 


Line  of  Escadrons.  55 

and  distances  very  easily,  and  necessitates  complex  move- 
ments in  order  to  form  coltmin.  These  disadvantages  be- 
come strikingly  apparent  when  considerable  masses  of  cav- 
alry are  assembled.  Even  in  a  brigade  these  drawbacks 
make  themselves  very  sensibly  felt.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  forma- 
tion designed  exclusively  with  a  view  to  the  employment  of 
units  in  successive  lines,  and  for  this  reason  alone  meets 
one-sided  requirements  only.  There  is,  however,  no  com- 
pelling reason  for  retaining  it  as  the  principal  maneuvering 
formation  of  cavalry  and  for  considering  it,  as  it  were,  out- 
side the  limits  of  discussion".*  General  v.  Bemhardi 
recommends  that  the  regiment  be  formed  in  "line  of  demi- 
regiments, "  each  of  the  latter  forming  one  unit  and  embrac- 
ing two  escadrons,  each  in  column  of  platoons,  abreast. 
This  formation  is  already  employed  in  Austria,  where  the 
regiment  advances  in  line  of  "division  columns" — so-called. 


\   v 


\     \     \     /   / /        \\   \     \  , 

\*-     *  /    /  ••  \\    '^   —^    .*  / 

\ /  V  ^'' 

"The  regimental  commander  would  then  have  but  two 
units  to  direct.  These^two  units  will  maintain  their  posi- 
tion relative  to  each  other  more  readily  than  four,  will  exe- 
cute changes  of  direction  with  great  ease,  and  will  be  able 
to  form  line  just  as  quickly^as  will  a  line  of  escadrons  in 
columns  of  platoons.  Moreover,  they  will  permit  column 
or  successive  lines  to  be  formed  with  greater  ease  than  is 
I)OSsible  from  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons. 
The  formation  in  demi-regiments  permits  successive  lines 
to  be  formed,  in  the  simplest  manner,  to  the  front,  and  an 

*y.  BsBMHABDi,  U7i$fr$  KavalhrU  im  nMutm  KrUif$»  p.  102  (see  Cavairy  In 
Fuhif  Wars,  by  y.  Bbbmhabdi,  Goldman's  traiulation.  p.  228). 


56  The  Regiment. 

echelon  formation  to  be  taken  up  in  any  direction.  In 
addition,  this  formation  is  very  mobile,  easily  concealed,  and 
combines  the  advantages  of  a  route  formation  of  little  depth 
with  those  of  a  maneuvering  formation.  In  the  latter 
character,  it  might  be  employed  to  particularly  good  advant- 
age by  large  units  operating  in  close  country,  as  it  enables 
the  regimental  commander  to  keep  the  troops  well  in  hand, 
while,  at  the  same  time,  permitting  deployment  with  the 
utmost  despatch  in  combat  formation  in  successive  lines 
either  to  the  front  or  to  a  flank.  It  would,  without  doubt, 
have  the  same  advantages  in  the  brigade  when  the  regi- 
ments are  formed  side  by  side.  It  will  be  particularly 
adapted  for  flank  movements,  in  which  it  is  essential  to 
develop,  while  in  motion,  the  maximum  fighting  power  in  the 
direction  of  the  movement,  and  in  which  it  is  desirable,  after 
wheeling  into  line,  to  have  the  requisite  depth  as  well  as 
protection  on  the  exposed  flank.  "* 


3.     The  Regimental  Column.t 

The  regimental  column  (called  **mass"  in  all  the  other 
regulations)  is  used  principally  as  an  assembly  formation. 
It  should  be  used  as  little  as  possible  on  the  battlefield,  as  it 
may  receive  artillery  fire  at  long  ranges  and  is  never  secure 
from  being  surprised  by  fire.  On  account  of  its  width,  a 
regimental  colimm  is  difficult  to  conceal  and  the  dust  raised 
by  it  at  fast  gaits  does  not  settle  quickly,  which  fact  makes 
it  more  difficult  to  surmount  obstacles.  When  the  regiment 
is  in  this  formation,  the  regimental  commander  can  still  con- 

■hr.  BxRNHAROi,  Unsere  Kavallerie  im  ndchslen  Ktiege,  p.  163  (see  Ca9dlry  in 
Future  Wars,  by  y.  Bernhardi,  Golduan'8  trandation.  pp.  228  and  229). 

iRegimentskolonne.  This  formation  is  identical  with  the  "mass"  used  in 
the  United  States  Cavabry,  except  that  the  escadrons  are  in  columns  of  platoons 
instead  of  fours,  and  that  the  interval  between  elements  is  0  paces  Instead  of  11 
yards. — Translator. 


\ 


Regimental  Column.  57 

trol  it  directly  by  commands. 
In  regimental  column,  the  esca- 
drons,  each  in  column  of  pla- 
toons, are  abreast  of  each  other 
^^  at   intervals   of    six   paces    (in 

France,   Italy  and  Austria  ten 

o  o  o    *     o  o 

/'  '  paces,  in  Russia,  seven  paces), 

!*"■*"    "^  "^    "*~     As  the  regimental  column  can 

-*"    "*-    "'*•    "*•   "^     not   be   directly   deployed  into 

-^    .J-    -.-    ,j-.    -A-     line,  it  affords  the  regiment  a 

•j«    -.A-    -JL-    -JL-.,  .-jt-     readiness  for  combat  next  in- 

ferior  to  Une  and  line  of  esca- 
drons  in  coltimns  of  platoons.  When  platoons  consist  of 
twelve  files  each,  the  regimental  column  is  40  paces  deep 
and  66  paces  wide  (in  Austria  122  paces  wide).  On  account 
of  this  favorable  ratio  of  width  to  depth,  this  column  is  both 
very  compact  and  very  mobile.*  To  form  line  quickly  to 
the  front  reqtiires  special  training.  The  deployment  into 
line  in  an  obUque  direction  as  a  rule  causes  an  echeloning 
of  the  escadrons-  The  regimental  column  appears  to  be 
particularly  imsuited  for  regiments  of  six  escadrons.  In 
Italy,  the  "mass**  formation  is  to  be  employed  only  so  long 
as  the  enemy's  actions  or  the  terrain  do  not  compel  the  as- 
sumption of  line  of  escadrons  in  colimms  of  platoons.  The 
Russians  seek  to  remedy  the  disadvantages  of  the  regi- 
mental coltunn  by  breaking  off  the  flank  escadrons. 

*When  cavalry  In  regimental  coltunn  enters  the  zone  of  effective  hostile  fire. 
it  very  quickly  suffers  serious  losses. 

Obstacles  on  the  battlefield  of  YionviUe  compelled  the  16th  Cavalry  Brigade 
to  dose  intervals  when  it  rode  past  Flavigny  in  line  of  escadrons  In  columns  of  pla- 
toons. This  converted  the  brigade  into  a  dense  mass,  which  offered  a  favorable 
target  to  the  French  projectiles.  The  brigade  was  then  forced  to  retire  on  ao- 
count  of  the  heavy  losses  suffered  by  it.  The  3d  Hussars  lost  on  this  occasion  3  offi- 
cers. 80  men  and  more  than  100  horses.     Kunz,  RHterei,  p.  lOl 


68 


The  Regiment. 


Front  into  Line  from  the  Russian  Regimental  Column» 
in  wliich  the  Flank  Escadrons  are  broken  off. 


O^^SO"' 


4.     Column  of  Platoons. 

The  escadrons,  each  in  column  of  platoons,  cover  and 
follow  each  other  at  platoon  distance  plus  six  paces.  This 
column  can  be  controlled  by  the  voice  of  the  regimental 
commander  in  exceptional  cases  only.  — ^ 

Visual  signals  and  bugle  signals  increase 
in  importance.  This  is  likewise  true  of 
following  in  trace,  the  escadrons  in  rear 
taking  up,  without  specific  orders  to  that 
effect,  the  cadence  and  formation  of  the 
next  preceding  escadron.  When  in  this 
formation,  the  regiment  can  easily 
change  direction,  take  advantage  of  the 
grotmd  and  surmoimt  obstacles.  If 
ditches  with  marshy  borders  have  to  be 
taken,  it  is  advisable  first  to  execute 
escadrons  front  into  line.  By  wheel- 
ing into  line  by  platoons,  the  coltunn  of 
platoons  is  quickly  rendered  ready  for 
action  to  a  flank,  and  for  this  and  the 
previously  mentioned  reasons,  it  is 
especially  adapted  for  executing  flank 
movements.  The  weakness  of  the 
column  in  the  direction  of  march  re- 
quires that  special  measures  be  taken  to  protect  its  head. 


Double  Column.  59 

Coltimn  of  platoons  is  not  a  suitable  formation  for  a  frontal 
movement  against  the  enemy,  as  it  is  difficxilt  to  deploy  the 
column  in  that  direction. 


{ 


5.     Double  Column. 

The  necessity  of  protecting  the  head  of  the  column  of 

platoons,  quite  naturally  leads  to  the  forma^ 

tion  of  double  coltunn.     In  this  the  escadrons, 

each  in  coltmin  of  platoons,  are  two  and  two 

^*  abreast  with  an  interval  of  six  paces  between 

,  them,  the  distance  between  successive  escad- 

f«   .   I  ,  Y     rons  being  platoon  distance  and  six  paces. 


With  an  imeven  ntmiber  of  escadrons,  the 

left    column,  in  which  the  base  escadron 

"■*"  is  posted,  is  the  stronger.    The  double  col- 

^J^  Q^       umn  is  the  mean  between  coltunn  of  platoons 

p(us6pcM      and  regimental   coltunn.     It  possesses   the 

great  mobility  of  the  latter  without  being 
"^  encumbered  with  the  depth  of  the  former, 

"*"   "■*"       and  can  deploy  as  readily  to  the  front  as  to  a 
-*"    -*-       flank.     Moreover,  it  has  the  same  advant- 
ages formerly  possessed  by  columns  that  had 
"*"  wheeled  to  a  flank.  For  this  reason,  the  double 

"*"  column  is  especially  adapted  for  flank  move- 

-*-  ments,  particularly  when  two  "waves"  are 

-^  to  be  formed  for  a  charge. 

Although  the  advantages  of  the  double  column  are  especially  apparen  t 
in  siz-escadron  regiments,  some  objections  are  raised  against  it  by  the 
Austrians.  For  example,  it  is  stated,  "that  on  account  of  the  noise,  com- 
mands can  be  heard  with  difficulty  only;  that  the  deployment  (in  a  six- 
eicadron  regiment)  is,  in  reality,  restricted  to  the  head  of  the  column;  and 
that  the  latter  invariably  forms  the  objective  of  the  hostile  attack.  The 
area  of  burst  of  a  shrapnel  covers  the  entire  space  occupied  by  the  double 
column,  and  a  single  good  hit  by  such  a  projectile  might  perhaps  suffice  to 
disperse  the  column.  In  spite  of  this,  the  double  column  finds  more  advo- 
cates and  more  frequent  application  than  it  deserves."  * 


*v.  WaldstIitbn.  TakHk,  I,  p.  97. 


60  The  Regiment. 


6.     Route  Column.* 

When  the  regiment  is  in  column  of  twos  or  fours,  the 
escadrons  follow  each  other  at  10  paces  (8  m.)  distance  (in 
Russia  at  platoon  distance).  To  form  line  from  these  col- 
umns is  difficult  and  time-consuming  on  accoimt  of  their 
great  depth.  For  this  reason,  special  protection  is  neces- 
sary. Large  units  will,  as  a  rule,  march  in  coliunn  of  fours, 
the  deployment  being  accelerated  by  a  timely  execution  of 
platoons  front  into  Une.  The  units  in  rear  of  the  leading 
element  must  assume — independently  and  without  await- 
ing orders — the  formation  taken  up  by  those  in  front.  On 
the  march,  commanders  of  escadrons  and  of  platoons  ride 
wherever  their  presence  in  supervising  their  organizations 
is  required.  A  trtmipeter  rides  at  the  tail  of  the  column  in 
order  to  blow  "cleai  the  road,"  this  being  the  signal  for 
clearing  one  side  of  the  road. 

The  field  train  marches  at  the  tail  of  the  regiment  in 
order  that  it  may  not  interfere  with  the  deployment  when 
the  enemy  is  encountered.  When  the  regiment  marches 
alone,  it  may  be  advisable  to  let  the  field  train  march  at 
some  distance  in  rear. 

Depth  of  a  regiment : 

Germany  (4  escadrons) : 

In  column  of  fours  (with  combat  train)  530  m.,  in  col- 
umn of  twos  1,010  m. 

A  ustria  (6  escadrons) : 

In  column  of  fours 723  m.,  in  col- 
umn of  twos  1,493  m.t 

Line  of  route  columns  may  be  used  on  the  battlefield 
by  a  large  unit,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  advantage  of 
accidents  of  the  grotmd,  for  crossing  difficult  terrain,  and 

*Par.  348,  Qtrman  F.  3.  A. 
fFor  details  tee  p.  60,  tupra. 


Evolutions  of  the  Regiment.       61 

for  minimizing  losses  when  exposed  to  frontal  artillery  fire. 
This  formation  is  taken  up,  for  example,  from  line  of  esca- 
drons  in  coltmins  of  platoons,  by  one,  several,  or  all  of  the 
escadrons  forming  route  column,  while  maintaining  their 
relative  positions  with  reference  to  each  other  (open  for- 
mations). Intervals  and  distances  may  be  given  up  when 
crossing  groimd  swept  by  the  enemy's  fire.  Close  order 
formations  are  resumed  as  soon  as  the  dangerous  zone  has 
been  crossed  or  the  position  from  which  the  charge  is  to  be 
made  has  been  reached.  This  formation  in  Une  of  route 
columns  is,  however,  unsuitable  when  an  encoimter  with 
hostile  cavalry  is  imminent.  Since  it  is  difiicult  to  gallop 
in  colunm  of  fours  (closed  up),  it  would  perhaps  be  desirable 
to  form  line  of  platoons  or  half -escadrons  in  columns  of  twos, 
in  which  the  horses  can  gallop  with  greater  ease.* 

France:  Line  of  platoons  in  coltunns  of  fours  {Ligne 
de  pelotons  par  quatre)^  i.  e.,  the  foiu:  platoons,  each  in  route 
column  with  the  distance  between  fours  increased  to  1.50  m., 
are  abreast  of  each  other  at  diminished  or  normal  intervals.f 

(b)  EVOLUTIONS  OF  THE  REGIMENT^ 

The  regiment  marches  to  the  front,  to  the  rear,  and  to 
a  flank  (usually  for  short  distances  only,  by  wheeling  into 
coltmMi  by  platoons),  in  the  same  manner  as  the  escadron. 
It  changes  direction,  when  in  column,  by  turning,  by  march- 
ing on  a  new  objective,  or  by  simply  following  in  trace. 
Considerable  changes  of  direction  (i.  e.,  those  exceeding 
45  degrees)  require  a  different  procedure  when  the  regiment 
is  in  line  or  in  line  of  escadrons  in  colimms  of  platoons. 


*For  riding  In  this  formation,  aee  y.  Edblshsim,  \jber  kriegsmdszige  Ausbildung 
fww..  p.  174. 

iRevue  ds  CwahrU,  July  1908,  VAnarchU. 

Line  of  platoons  in  columns  of  fours  is  called  le  bloc  when  the  interval  between 
platoons  is  4  m.,  and  le  carri  when  that  interval  is  8  m.  Intervals  of  from  12  to 
16  m.  are  recommended  for  crossing  difficult  terrain,  and  Intervals  of  36  m.,  for 
croasing  fire  swept  ground. 

tPars.  136-160,  German  C.  D.  B. 


I 


62  The  Regiment. 

When  the  regiment  is  in  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of 
platoons,  for  example,  and  a  considerable  change  of  direc- 
tion is  to  be  executed,  all  the  escadrons  first  change  direc- 
tion, those  in  rear  of  the  first  then  moving  by  the  shortest 
route  to  their  new  positions  abreast  of  the  leading  escadron. 
(See  plate  p.  68).  When  the  regiment  is  in  line  and  a  con- 
siderable change  of  direction  is  to  be  effected,  the  regiment 
first  wheels  into  column  of  platoons  and  then  executes  front 
into  line.  Under  certain  circumstances,  it  may  be  advisable 
to  have  the  escadron  on  the  inner  flank  in  line  change  direc- 
tion at  once,  the  other  escadrons  then  moving  by  the  shortest 
route  to  their  proper  positions  in  the  new  line.* 

Deployments. 

The  regulations  make  a  distinction  between  develop- 
ment,\  deploymentX  and  front  into  line,^  The  term  develop- 
ment denotes  the  transition  from  route  column  to  column  of 
platoons,  double  column,  or  regimental  column.  The  term 
deployment  denotes  the  transition  to  line  of  escadrons  in 
colunms  of  platoons.  The  term  front  into  line  denotes  the 
transition  to  line.  The  term  transition^  is  used  to  desig- 
nate all  other  changes  of  formation.  Transitions  to  a 
broader  formation  are  executed  as  a  deployment,  transitions 
to  a  narrower  formation  as  a  ployment.  (Par.  45,  German 
C.  D.  R.). 

Changes  of  formation  must  likewise  be  capable  of  be- 
ing executed  while  the  march  direction  of  the  entire  regi- 
ment is  changed  simultaneously  therewith.  For  example, 
when  the  regiment  is  in  double  column  or  in  regimental 
coliunn,  the  leading  element  of  the  regiment  executes  a 
turn  in  the  new  direction ;  when  the  regiment  is  in  any  other 

*In  Aiutria  changes  of  front  are  effected  In  a  very  awkward  manner  on  fixed 
pirot  when  the  regiment  la  in  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons. 

iEntfaltung. 

XEntvHeklung. 

^Aufmarsch. 

itibergang. 


Deployments.  63 

formation,  the  head  of  each  escadron  executes  such  a  turn, 
the  new  formation  being  ordered,  in  either  case,  while  the 
movement  is  in  progress.  The  escadrons  are  then  led  by 
the  shortest  route  to  their  proper  positions.  The  guiding 
principle  is,  "First  determine  the  march  direction^  then  the 
formation."     (Par.  168,  German  C.  D.  R.). 

In  Russia,  the  ist,  2d  and  3d  escadrons  habitually  place  themselves 
to  the  right,  the  4th,  5th  and  6th  habitually  to  the  left  of  the  leading  element^ 

In  France,  when  deployments  and  changes  of  formation  are  to  be^ 
executed,  the  regimental  commander,  followed  by  the  standard  bearer 
moves  in  the  new  direction  for  thirty  paces  and  then  orders  the  new  forma- 
tion. The  escadrons  then  move  by  the  shortest  route,  by  obliquing,  by 
partially  changing  direction,  or  by  the  flank  to  their  positions.  When  de- 
ploying preparatory  to  a  charge,  it  is  considered  advisable  to  decrease  the 
gait  in  order  to  obtain  better  cohesion. 

Being  in  regimental  column,  or  in  double  column,  to 
form  line  of  escadrons  in  coltmins  of  platoons:  When  the 
regiment  is  marching,  the  escadrons  extend  (in  the  reverse 
movement,  they  close)  on  the  base  escadron.  When  the 
regiment  is  halted  (necessarily  in  a  covered  position,  if  the 
charging  ground  in  front  is  limited),  the  escadrons  on  the 
right  wheel  to  the  right,  those  on  the  left  to  the  left,  by  pla- 
toons, gain  the  necessary  groimd  at  the  trot  and  wheel  again 
to  the  front  by  platoons  and  move  to  their  positions.  The 
escadron  on  which  this  movement  is  executed  moves  forward 
a  distance  equal  to  platoon  front  plus  six  paces. 

Being  in  column  of  platoons,  to  form  line  of  escadrons 
in  coltimns  of  platoons:  The  leading  escadron  rides  for- 
ward sixty  paces  at  the  gait  ordered  and  then  comes  down 
to  the  walk.  Each  of  the  other  escadrons  changes  direction 
and  moves  to  its  proper  place.  (Par.  143,  German  C.  D. 
R).  When  this  movement  is  to  be  executed  so  that,  at  its 
conclusion,  all  the  rear  escadrons  will  be  on  one  side  of  the 
leading  escadron,  a  special  order  to  that  effect  must  be  given. 

Being  in  column  of  platoons,  to  form  line  of  escadrons 
in  columns  of  platoons  to  a  flank :  Each  escadron  changes 
direction. 


64  The  Regiment. 

Being  in  route  column,  to  form  line  of  escadrons  in  col- 
tmms  of  platoons :  The  leading  escadron  executes  platoons 
front  into  line,  each  of  the  others  changes  direction,  forms 
column  of  platoons  and  moves  to  its  proper  position. 

(c)     TRANSITIONS  TO  NARROWER  FORMATIONS 

(PLOYMENTS). 

Being  in  line,  to  form  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of 
platoons :     Each  escadron  forms  column  of  platoons. 

Being  in  line,  to  form  double  coltunn  or  regimental 
column :  The  base  escadron  forms  coltunn  of  platoons,  the 
others  likewise  form  coltunn  of  platoons  and  move  to  their 
proper  places. 

Being  in  line,  to  form  column  of  platoons  to  a  flank: 
The  regiment  wheels  into  column  by  platoons. 

Being  in  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons,  to 
form  column  of  platoons  to  a  flank:  The  escadron  on  the 
flank  toward  which  the  movement  is  to  be  made  wheels  into 
line  by  platoons  in  the  direction  in  which  the  column  is  to 
face  and  then  forms  column  of  platoons ;  the  other  escadrons 
conform  to  the  movement. 

Being  in  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons  (or 
in  double  column),  either  at  a  halt  or  while  marching,  to 
form  regimental  column:  The  escadrons  close  in  on  the 
base  escadron. 

The  transition  from  regimental  column  to  double  col- 
umn and  to  column  of  platoons  to  the  front  or  to  a  flank,  is 
executed  according  to  the  principles  already  mentioned. 


Changes  of  Formation. 


65 


The  Regiment  Forming  Line  of  Eecadrons  in  Columns 

of  Platoons  from  Line. 


The  Regiment  Forming 

Column  of  Platoons 

from  Regimental 

Column. 


t 


from  Regimental 
Column  to  Line  of  Escadrons 
in  Columns  of  Platoons. 

-      1      . 

-        4        - 


•V 


■2rdtr=r 


66  The  Regiment. 


Example  of  a 

Considerable  Change  of  Direction  Effected  by  the 

Regiment  while  in  Line  of  Escadrons  in 

Columns  of  Platoons. 


i  I 


\ 


t 


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1 

1 

T 

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1 

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1 

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1 

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k        *— 

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it^. 

f-IH 

«•• 


ff  H 


Changes  of  Formation. 


67 


The  Regiment  Forming  Regimental  Column  (while  in 

motion)  from  Line  of  Escadrons  in 

Columns  of  Platoons. 


\ 


/ 


% 


The  Regiment  Forming  Line  of  Escadrons  in  Columns 
of  Platoons  from  Double  Column. 


I 
\ 

\  I 


N 

V 


-       .-f 


68  The  Regiment. 


(d)    MOVEMENTS  IN  COLUMN  AND  IN  LINE  OF  COLUMNS. 

Transition  from  Column  of  Platoons  to  Line  of  Eacadrons 

in  Columns  of  Platoons. 


+ 


\ 

% 
% 


t 


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=  / 


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^  \  V  / 


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(•)     TRANSITION  TO  LINE. 

Line  may  be  formed  in  the  simplest  and  most  orderly 
manner  from  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons  and 
from  column  of  platoons,  by  executing  front  into  line  in  the 
former  case,  and  by  wheeling  into  line  in  the  latter.  On 
account  of  the  depth  of  the  route  column  and  of  the  coltunn 
of  platoons,  the  escadrons  will  frequently  not  be  able  to 
move  out  at  once  when  the  command  front  into  line  is  given. 
The  leading  escadron  forms  front  into  line  at  once,  each  of 
the  others  changes  direction  and  gains  sufficient  ground  to 
the  flank  to  enable  it  to  execute  front  into  line  and  to  move 
straight  to  the  front.     In  close  proximity  to  the  enemy,  the 


Transition  to  Line.  69 

regiment,  when  in  cx)ltuim  of  platoons,  will  frequently  be 
able  with  advantage  to  change  direction  and  to  wheel  into 
line  by  platoons. 

Line  is  formed  from  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of 
platoons,  by  all  the  escadrons  simultaneously  executing 
front  into  line.  When  the  regiment  is  halted,  or  when 
marching  at  the  walk,  this  movement  is  executed  at  the  trot ; 
when  marching  at  the  trot,  it  is  executed  at  the  gallop; 
when  marching  at  the  gallop,  it  is  executed  at  an  accelerated 
gallop.  As  each  escadron  executes  right  and  left  front  into 
line  simultaneously,  it  may  happen,  when  the  intervals  are 
too  small,  that  the  exterior  platoons  of  two  adjacent  esca- 
drons collide.  (Par.  260,  German  C.  D.  R.).  Being  in 
line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons,  to  form  Une  in  an 
obhque  direction:  The  escadrons  first  partially  change 
direction,  each  then  executes  front  into  line,  and  moves  to  its 
place  in  the  new  line. 

Front  into  line  from  regimental  coltunn*  is  not  so  very 
simple,  if  time  and  room  are  lacking  for  first  forming  Une  of 
escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons.  It  may,  however,  fre- 
quently become  necessary  to  form  line  from  regimental 
column.f     Each  escadron  executes  front  into  line  separately, 

*The  regulationfl  do  not  prescribe  how  firont  Into  line  from  regimental  column 
la  to  be  executed.  Oeneral  v.  Schmidt,  In  hla  Instruktionen,  p.  197,  says:  "Itlt- 
of  the  utmost  Importance  that  as  broad  a  front  as  possible  be  presented  at  onoe  to- 
the  enemy,  either  In  the  direction  tn  which  the  column  Is  facing,  or,  after  the  lead- 
ing element  has  changed  direction,  toward  the  objective."  Execution:  '*The 
right  and  the  left  flank  escadrons  execute  right  flront  Into  line  and  left  front  Into 
line,  respectively,  and  then  move  out  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  flank  attack  on 
the  enemy.  The  escadron  next  In  line  on  the  right  and  the  one  next  In  line  on  the 
the  left  then  promptly  execute  right  front  Into  line  and  left  front  into  Une,  respec- 
tively. In  this  manner,  all  the  escadrons  but  the  one  In  the  center  (If  the  regi- 
ment consists  of  five  escadrons),  are  deployed." 

tAt  Worth,  the  13th  Hussar  Regiment,  while  in  regimental  column,  wheeled 
about  by  platoons  on  sighting  French  cavalry,  and  charged  directly  from  Its  posi- 
tion, as  neither  time  nor  room  was  available  for  forming  line.  The  rear  platoonf 
moved  out  of  the  column  and  turned  against  the  flank  of  the  hostile  cavalry. 
Kwz,  Reiterei,  p.  50. 

Two  escadrons  of  the  same  regiment  attacked  French  cavalry  that  was  de- 
bouching in  column  from  Oautler  (Sedan).  The  leading  platoons  of  the  two  esca- 
drons mentioned,  charged;  the  remaining  six  platoons  moved  to  the  rear  to  gain 
room,  executed  front  Into  line  and  then  charged  In  echelon  formation  flrom  one 
flank.     Ibid.,  p.  198. 


70  The  Regiment. 

as  follows:  The  base  escadron,  on  which  the  extension  is 
made,  as  soon  as  it  has  room  for  forming  line;  the  other 
escadrons.  as  soon  as,  by  changing  direction,  they  have 
gained  sufficient  interval  to  the  right  and  left  front,  respec- 
tively. Each  one  of  these  escadrons,  as  soon  as  it  has 
formed  line,  then  places  itself  abreast  of  the  base  escadron, 
whose  subsequent  conduct  is  determined  by  orders.  This 
proceduie  is  accurately  adapted  to  that  of  the  regulations. 
The  certainty  of  its  execution  in  a  critical  moment  is  as- 
sured because  the  deployment  is  effected  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  if  time  had  been  available  for  first  forming  line  of 
escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons  and  then  executing  front 
into  line,  except  that  in  this  procedure  the  several  move- 
ments shade  more  closely  into  one  another.  If  a  special 
form  of  executing  front  into  line  were  prescribed  for  this 
deployment,  there  would  be  danger  of  misunderstanding 
and  of  friction  that  might  impair  the  success  of  the  charge. 

Franc*!  The  right  aiicl  left  center  esc&droDs  execute  rlgbt  front  into 
line  Uid  left  front  into  line,  respectively.  The  right  and  left  flank  escad- 
rons gain  the  necessary  deploying  interval  by  changing  direction,  and  then 
execute  right  front  into  line  and  left  front  into  line,  respectively, 

Auatriai  The  two  center  escadrons  move  forward  a  distance  equal 
to  the  depth  of  the  column  and  execute  front  into  line.  The  remaining 
escadrons  gain  the  necessary  interval  and  each  then  executes  right  front 
into  line  or  left  front  into  line,  as  the  case  may  be,  depending  upon  whether 
it  is  to  the  right  or  to  the  left  of  the  base  escadron. 

Russia:  According  to  the  Russian  regulations,  the  flank  escadrons 
wheel  toward  the  outer  flanks  by  platoons,  each  escadron  then  wheeling  to 
the  left  or  right,  as  the  case  may  be.  as  soon  as  it  has  gained  sufficient 
ground,  and  marching  in  line  to  its  place.  The  right  and  the  left  center 
escadrons  execute  right  front  into  line  and  left  front  into  line,  respectively. 
Jt  will,  at  best,  take  considerable  time  to  form  a  broad  front  in  this  manner. 


Time  Required  for  Deploying.  71 

(f)  time  required  for  deploying. 

Control  of  time  and  space  is  of  prime  importance 
to  the  leader  when  leading  troops  on  the  terrain.  Prompt 
and  correct  recognition  of  the  point  where  the  collision  with 
the  hostile  cavalry  will  take  place,  in  many  cases  determines 
the  mode  of  deployment,  i.  e.,  whether  the  deployment  is 
to  be  made  forward  or  by  the  flank.  If  by  the  flank,  the 
leading  element  is  halted.  While  the  deployment  forward, 
which  includes  covering  part  of  the  distance  to  the  enemy, 
frequently  contains  the  element  of  surprise,  it  always  re- 
sults in  increasing  the  morale.  One  wiU  choose  this  mode 
of  deployment,  if  one  may  hope  to  encotmter  the  enemy 
while  he  is  still  in  the  act  of  forming  line.  To  halt  the  lead- 
ing element  and  to  deploy  by  the  flank  saves  time,  room 
and  energy.  The  deployment  by  the  flank  will  be  used 
when  unfavorable  terrain  is  located  in  the  immediate  front ; 
when  one  can  compel  the  enemy  to  charge  uphill,  over  very 
soft  ground,  or  on  difficixlt  terrain;  and  when  one  desires 
to  give  one's  artillery  time  to  produce  some  effect.  In  re- 
spect to  the  feasibiUty  of  making  evolutions  in  the  presence 
of  hostile  cavalry.  General  v.  Schmidt  lays  down  the  rule 
that  the  leader  of  the  first  line  must  be  finished  with  all  de- 
ployment by  the  time  he  has  approached  to  within  500 
paces  of  the  enemy ;  that  wheels  to  a  flank  by  platoons  can 
still  be  made  at  600  paces;  and  that  more  extensive  flank 
movements  are  possible  at  1,000  paces. 

A  cavahy  regiment,  provided  platoons  consist  of  twelve 
files  each,  requires  80  seconds  at  the  trot  and  40  seconds  at 
the  gallop  to  form  column  of  platoons  from  column  of  fours. 
When  the  units  have  to  execute  front  into  line  successively, 
these  figures  are  increased  to  240  and  120  seconds,  respec- 
tively. It  takes  70  seconds  at  the  trot  and  SO  seconds  at  the 
gallop  to  form  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons  from 
colimm  of  platoons.  To  form  line  from  line  of  escadrons  in 
coltmans  of  platoons  [each  escadron  executing  front  into  line]> 


72  The  Regiment. 

requires  an  additional  20  seconds^  when  executed  at  the  trot, 
or  12-15  seconds,  when  executed  at  the  gallop.  It  is  thus 
evident  that  a  cavalry  regiment,  in  order  to  pass  from  route 
column  to  Une  toward  the  front,  requires  at  the  trot  170, 
at  the  gallop  105  seconds.  When  the  escadrons  successively 
form  colimin  of  platoons  (for  example,  on  debouching  from 
a  defile),  these  figures  are  increased  to  268  and  139  seconds, 
respectively.  When  signals  are  not  used,  the  time  con- 
sumed is  still  further  increased  by  the  escadron  commanders ' 
repeating  commands.  In  105  seconds,  the  hostile  cavalry 
can  cover  720  m.,  in  268  seconds,  1,750  m. 

A  knowledge  of  the  time  required  for  deploying  will 
enable  the  leader  to  determine  whether  he  has  time  enough 
to  form  Une  of  escadrons  in  coltunns  of  platoons  from  col- 
umn of  platoons  (i.  e.,  whether  he  can  deploy  forward),  or 
whether,  in  order  to  form  line  more  quickly,  he  should  have 
his  leading  element  change  direction  and  then  have  the 
whole  force  wheel  into  line  by  platoons.  When  platoons 
consist  of  sixteen  files  each,  the  regiment  can  form  line  of 
escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons  from  column  of  platoons 
in  70  seconds,  the  entire  movement  into  line  consiuning  92 
seconds  (leading  element  at  the  trot).  If  we  assiune  that, 
in  addition,  a  space  of  200  m.  is  required  for  fully  develop- 
ing speed  for  the  charge,  this  mode  of  deployment  should 
be  used  only  if  the  two  opposing  forces  are  still  at  least  1,000 
m.  apart.  For  the  leading  element  to  change  direction  and 
for  the  platoons  to  wheel  into  line  at  the  gallop  requires 
about  60  seconds.  This  mode  of  deployment  proceeds  with 
considerably  greater  rapidity  than  the  one  first  mentioned, 
and  can  still  be  employed  when  the  enemy  is  from  600  to 
1,000  m.  away.  A  regiment  that,  while  in  column  of  pla- 
toons, encounters  the  enemy  within  500  m.,  will  not  be  able 
to  cotmt  upon  deploying  all  of  its  escadrons,  but  will  be 
compelled  to  let  them  charge  individually. 

The  time  required  for  deploying  may  be  computed  as  follows:  If  the 
leading  element  continues  the  march  at  the  trot  ( 300  paces  per  minute ), 


Time  Required  for  Deploying.  73 

it  will  be  overtaken  by  the  last  subdivision  in  x  minutes,  when  the  latter 
has  covered  500  paces  in  x  minutes.  If  we  let  1  represent  the  depth  of  the 
column,  we  obtain  the  equation: 

xX30o-f-l=xX5oo 

1  -SEX  (500 300) 

I 

x= 

500 — 300 

In  other  words,  the  time,  in  minutes,  required  for  deploying  is  equal 
to  the  depth  of  the  column  divided  by  the  difference  between  the  gait  of  the 
leading  element  and  that  of  the  rear  subdivision.  The  result,  to  be  sure,  is 
but  a  rough  approximation,  which  can  have  a  conditional  value  only. 


3.    THE  BRIGADE.* 

The  exercises  of  the  brigade  serve  the  purpose  of  train- 
ing from  two  to  three  regiments  for  employment  in  one  body 
as  an  independent  tactical  imit,  and  as  an  integral  part  of  a 
cavalry  division.  The  drill  is  concluded  in  the  division. 
The  importance  of  the  brigade  as  a  tactical  unit  has  been 
enhanced  by  the  employment  of  cavalry  by  wings  (i.  e.,  the 
tactical  units  abreast).  The  brigade  will  almost  invariably 
be  given  an  independent  combat  mission.  The  brigade 
Commander,  who  will  usually  have  ridden  far  in  advance, 
will  be  able  to  communicate  his  intentions  to  his  brigade 
only  by  means  of  bugle  and  visual  signals  and  by  means  of 
orders  transmitted  through  orderly  officers. 

When  the  brigade  is  in  line,  the  regiments,  each  in  line, 
are  posted  abreast  of  each  other  with  an  interval  of  fifteen 
paces  between  them.  When  the  brigade  is  in  coltimn,  the 
regiments  are  either  abreast  or  in  rear  of  each  other.  The 
following  are  the  formations  of  the  brigade : 

*Par8.  180-202,  Oerman  C,  D.  A. 


74  The  Brigade. 

The  brigade  in  line; — ^in  line  of  escadrons  in   3^4^-1^^^ 

.  in  Regi- 

^  mental 

.{<  .rX  Columns. 

columns  of  platoons; — ^in  brigade  column   (the  m-- 

regiments,   each  in  regimental  column,   abreast  ""^j^, 

with  an  interval  of  15  paces  between  them)  ;* — in  -  i^'^^ 

regimental  columns  (the  regiments,  each  in  regi-  i-iil 

mental  column,  in  rear  of  one  another  at  a  dis-   _.  ,      . 

i5riffAClo 
tance  of  30  paces)  ;t — in  double  column  (the  regi-        j^^ 

ments,  each  in  double  column,  in  rear  of  one  an-  Double 
other) .     The  employment  of  the  double  colunm,  Column 
the  regiments  in  rear  of  one  another,  appears  to  pi^toons. 
be  particularly  profitable  when,  in  charging  in- 
fantry, two  successive  lines  are  to  be  formed  to-  -     i? 
ward   a   flank.     The   brigade   may   likewise   be  ^fjf    ji 
formed  in  double  (or  treble)  column  of  platoons 
[the  regiments,  each  in  column  of  platoons, abreast  Zi 
of  one  another].     The  brigade  column,  the  brigade  ;^ 
in  regimental  colunms,  the  double  column,  or  the  — 
double  coliunn  of  platoons  should  be  used  for  as-  ^ 
sembly.     These  formations  do  not  permit  de-  '^ 
ployment  with  sufficient  ease  to  make  them  suit-  ^ 
able  for  movements  under  hostile  fire  and  when  an  •* 
encounter  with  hostile  cavalry  is  imminent.     The  it 
double  column  may  frequently  be  employed  pre-  3^ 
paratory  to  a  charge  against  infantry.     In  other  -f- 
cases,  the  leader  will  apply  par.  192,  German  C.  -«■ 


^General  y.  Bernhabdi,  says:  " This  is  the  popular  and  favored  maneuver 

formation  of  all  cavalrymen  of  the  old  school.  It  should,  of  course,  not  be  al- 
lowed to  appear  on  the  battlefield  at  all.  It  might  profitably  be  replaced  by  the 
line  of  regiments  in  double  columns  at  deploying  intervals." 

tWhen  regiments  consist  of  four  escadrons  each,  it  is  possible  to  wheel  into 
line  toward  a  flank — this,  to  be  sure,  only  at  the  expense  of  the  interval  between 
the  regiments. 


Evolutions  of  the  Brigade.  75 

D.  R.,  which  states:  "Moreover,  the  brigade  commander 
is  not  debarred  from  grouping  the  regiments  (each  in  some 
formation  prescribed  for  it),  in  such  a  manner  at  any  time, 
as,  in  his  opinion,  the  situation  and  his  intentions  require. " 
This  means  that  the  brigade  is  to  be  led  forward  according 
to  the  terrain  and  the  purpose  of  the  action.  For  example,  the 
regiments  may  be  formed  in  regimental  coltmins  or  in  double 
columns  with  deploying  interval  between  them,  either  on 
the  same  line  or  in  echelon,  abreast  of  each  other.  The  regi- 
ment on  the  left  flank  of  the  brigade  is  designated  as  the 
base  regiment,  or  some  imit  is  directed  to  maintain  contact. 
All  the  others  conform  to  it  in  their  movements  and 
measures. 

The  brigade  may,  in  addition,  be  formed  in  column  of 
platoons  (with  platoon  distance  plus  15  paces  between  regi- 
ments), and  in  route  colimm  (with  twenty  paces  distance 
between  regiments). 

DeploymentB.     (Par.  195,  German  C.  D.  R.), 

When  the  regiments  are  abreast  of  one  another  without 
deploying  interval,  they  deploy  right  front  into  Une  and  left 
front  into  line  respectively.  When  they  are  abreast  with 
deploying  interval  between  them,  each  regiment  deploys  as 
if  alone,  i.  e.,  each  regiment  deploys  by  executing,  simul- 
taneously, right  and  left  front  into  Une. 

When  the  regiments  are  in  rear  of  one  another — ^the 
brigade  in  regimental  columns,  or  in  double  colimm — ^the 
leading  regiment  deploys  left  front  into  line,  the  rear  regi- 
ment right  front  into  line. 

Transitions.     (Par.  196,  German  C.  D.  R.). 

''A.  Transitions  within  the  regiments,  without 
change  in  their  relative  positions: 

"(a)  When  the  regiments  are  in  rear  of  one  another 
and  retain  their  relative  positions: 


76 


The  Brigade. 


*  *  Ployment : 
Transition 
to  narrower    i 
front : 


1. 


2. 


3. 


If 


Deploy- 
ment: 
Transition 
to  broader 
front : 


f4. 

5. 


I 


From  brigade  in  regimental 
columns  to  double  col- 
umn; 

From  brigade  in  regimental 
columns  to  coltman  of 
platoons ; 

From  double  column  to 
column  of  platoons; 

From  column  of  platoons  1 

to  double  column; 
From  colvunn  of  platoons 

to  brigade  in  regimental 

columns ; 
From    double    colimrn    to 

brigade    in    regimental 

columns ; 


The  rear 
regiment 
h^ts  until 
disen- 
gaged. 


J 


All  these 
transitions 
are   exe- 
ecuted  as 
prescribed 
for  a  regi- 
ment act- 
ing alone. 


**{d)      When  the  regiments  are  abreast  of  one  another  and 
retain  their  relative  positions: 

The  base  regi- 
ment forms  on 

1.  From  line  to  brigade    its  base  esca- 

dron.    The  regi- 

2.  From  line  to    double    mentonthe 

right,  in  order  to 

3.  From  line  of  escadrons  reduce  the  dis- 
tance to  be  tra- 
versed by  it, 

^  may  form  on  its 
inner  flank-esca- 
dron,at  the  com- 
mand of  its  regi- 
mental com- 
mander, and 
then,  if  neces- 
sary,   move    a- 
breast  of  the 
[  J  base  regiment.* 


**  Ployment: 
Transition 
to  narrower 
front : 


From  line  to  brigade 
column ; 

From  line  to  double 
column  of  platoons ; 

From  line  of  escadrons 
in  columns  of  pla- 
toons to  brigade 
column; 

From  line  of  escadrons 
in  columns  of  pla- 
toons to  double  col- 
umn   of    platoons ; 

From  brigade  column 
to  double  column  of 
platoons ; 


*"  The  new  formation  would.  In  the  above  caaes,  be  taken  up  more  expedl- 
tlouBly.  If  the  base  regiment  would  likewise  form  on  Its  Inner  flank-escadron. 
This,  however,  would  mean  the  abrogation  of  the  principle  laid  down  for  the 
base  regiment.  No  sound  reason  existed  for  doing  this.  In  view  of  the  advantages 
of  uniform  principles  and  the  insignificant  increase  in  the  distance  traversed  by 
the  base  regiment  when  moving  as  laid  down  above."     v.  Ungsb. 


Evolutions  of  the  Brigade. 


77 


<i 


Deploy- 
ment: 
Transition 
to  broader 
front: 


1  The  right  regi- 

From  double  column    ^^^^^  ^^™^  ^^ 
of  platoons  to  bri-  I  Jj^  ^^^^  ^^^?^' 

i?ade  column-  1^^^    ^^^^    ^^' 

gade  column .  ^^^^  ^  ^j^^  j^^^ 

front. 


*'  (c)     W/j^n  ^fe^  regiments  are  abreast  of  one  another  at  deploy- 
ing interval*  and  retain  their  relative  positions: 

"Each  regiment  executes  the  transition  within  itself, 
as  prescribed  for  a  regiment  acting  alone. 

^'B.     Transitions  that  change  the  relative  positions 
of  the  regiments,  one  to  the  other. 

**(a)     When  the  regiments  are  in  rear  of  one  another  and  move 
so  as  to  come  abreast  of  one  another: 


1.     From  brigade  in  regi- 

The   rear   regi- 

mental colimms  to 

ment  moves  to 

brigade  cohimn; 

the  right  front 
^and  forms  on 

"Deploy- 

the right  of  the 

ment: 

leading  regi- 

Transition 

ment; 

to  broader 

2.    From  double  coltmin' 

The  leading  reg- 

front: 

to  brigade  cohimn; 

iment  forms  to 
the    left    front, 

3.    Prom  column  of  pla- 

on   its    leading 

toons  to  brigade  col- 

escadron;     the 

umn; 

rear  regiment 
moves  to  the 
right  front  and 
forms  to  the 
right    front    on 
its  leading  esca- 
dron. 

•Par.  192L  German  C.  D,  A. 


78 


The  Brigade. 


'  *  (6)     When  the  regiments  are  abreast  of  one  another  and  move 
so  as  to  come  in  rear  of  one  another: 


* '  Ployment : 
Transition 
to    narrower 
front : 


From  brigade  column 
to  brigade  in  regi- 
mental   columns ; 

From  brigade  coltunn 
to  double  column; 


From  brigade  column 
to  column  of  pla- 
toons ; 


1.     From  brieade  column  1  The  base   regi- 
ment moves  out 
(and    ploys) 
first,  the  rear 
regiment  con- 
forming to  the 
movement  as 
soon    as    disen- 
gaged.    Until 
disengaged,    the 
rear  regiment 
halts,  as  other- 
wise  the  transi- 
tion would  con- 
simie  too  much 
time. 

**  Route  columns  have  not  been  considered.  Neither 
is  a  discussion  given  of  the  transition  from  line  to  line  of  esca- 
drons  in  columns  of  platoons,  nor  from  the  latter  formation 
to  line  of  double  columns  at  deploying  interval,  as  no  change 
takes  place.*'* 

Foreign  cavaby  drill  regulations  prescribe,  in  the  main, 
the  same  formations.  It  does  not  seem  necessary  to  pre- 
scribe specially  the  formation  in  which  the  regiments  are 
abreast  with  deploying  interval  between  them,  as  is  done 
for  example,  in  France  and  Italy.  The  German  deploy- 
ment into  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons  from  bri- 
gade column,  on  the  center  (i.  e.,  on  the  first  escadron  of 
of  the  left  regiment) ,  proceeds  more  rapidly  than  if  the  regi- 
ments, each  being  in  regimental  column,  were  first  to  extend 
to  deploying  intervals  and  then  to  form  line  of  escadrons  in 
coltunns  of  platoons. 

It  takes  about  four  minutes  to  form  coltmm  of  platoons 
from  colimm  of  fours  and  eight  minutes  to  execute  the  same 
movement  from  column  of  twos, when  the  platoons  simul- 


■»Supp/em0nM  Nos.  4  and  5  to  MiXitAr-WocyienUaiU  1909.  p.  179. 


Time  Required  for  Deploying.  79 

taneously  execute  front  into  line  (their  leading  elements 
coming  down  to  the  walk).  For  the  brigade  to  pass  at  the 
gallop  from  column  of  platoons  (each  platoon  consisting  of 
sixteen  files)  to  line  consumes  at  least  four  or  five  minutes 
when  signals  are  used.  The  time  consumed  is  considerably 
increased,  due  to  the  repetition  of  commands,  when  the 
movement  is  executed  by  command. 

Greneral  v.  Verdy  computes  that  a  brigade  with  a  horse  battery  re- 
quires 7  minutes  at  the  trot  and  4  minutes  at  the  gallop  to  deploy  from 
column  of  threes  into  two  lines ;  that  a  second  brigade  ( with  a  horse  battery ) 
following  the  first  in  like  formation,  requires  14  minutes  at  the  trot  and  8^ 
minutes  at  the  gallop  for  this  purpose.  * 


4.     THE  CAVALRY  DIVISION  AND  THE 
CAVALRY  CORPS.t 

The  division  consists,  as  a  rule,  of  three  cavalry  brigades, 
one  battalion  of  horse  artillery  with  light  ammunition  col- 
umn, one  machine  gun  battery  and  one  pioneer  detachment. 

It  may  become  necessary,  during  the  operations  as  well 
as  on  the  battlefield,  to  combine  several  divisions  into  a 
cavalry  corps.  The  depth  of  an  army  corps  in  route  coltimn 
requires  that,  in  approaching  the  battlefield,  each  division, 
at  least,  be  assigned  a  separate  road. 

No  fixed  formations  are  perscribed  for  a  cavalry  divi- 
sion. The  division  commander,  by  making  proper  dispo- 
sition of  the  tactical  tmits,  forms  his  division  in  each  case 
according  to  the  end  in  view. 


*3tudien  nber  TruppenfUhrung,    Die  Kavallerledivision,  I,  p.  100. 
tPara.  203-221.  Qerman  C.  D.  R. 


80 


Cavalry  Division. 


Division 

in 

Brigade 

Columns. 


Assembly  Formations. 
Division 


li* 


Xi 


Columns. 


r— .-l.-.^ 


••  • 


V 


^.' 


»U 


i^  -• 


¥ 


1*   *.t'i 


•iili 


m  The  choice  of  an  assembly 

Regimental  formation  is  governed  by  the 

extent  of  the  available  room. 
When  the  available  space  is 
very  deep,  and  especially  when 
the  division  is  about  to  begin  a 
march  in  close  formation,  it 
will  frequently  be  a  good  plan 
to  use  the  treble  column  of 
platoons  (the  brigades,  each  in 
column  of  platoons,  abreast  of 
each  other  at  intervals  of  IS 
"'"*  -r!?^!?      paces).    When  the  division  is 

in  regimental  coliunns,  the 
regiments  are  in  rear  of  one 
zzzzi  another  at  a  distance  of  30 
paces.  The  space  required  by  the  division  in  this  forma- 
tion, when  the  horse  batteries  and  the  pioneer  detachment 
are  not  present,  is  about  65  m.  wide  and  400  m.  deep. 
When  the  division  is  in  brigade  coltmins,  the  brigade  col- 
umns are  in  rear  of  one  another  at  a  distane  of  SO  paces. 
When  in  this  formation,  the  division  requires  a  space  140  X 
200  m. 

On  the  battlefield,  the  formation  of  the  division  de- 
pends upon  the  situation  and  the  terrain.  The  formation 
in  groups  enhances  readiness  for  combat  and,  tmder  certain 
drcimistances,  reduces  losses.  So  long  as  the  subdivi- 
sions of  the  division  march  in  rear  of  one  another,  the  rear 
subdivisions  conform  to  the  formation  and  gait  of  the  lead- 
ing subdivisions  without  specific  orders  to  that  effect. 
The  greater  the  depth  of  the  division,  the  greater  the  im- 
portance of  keeping  it  in  uninterrupted  motion  by  main- 
taining a  uniform  cadence  and  by  other  requisite  measures, 
and  of  preventing  elongation  of  the  column.    The  leading 


Development  and  Deployment.  81 

unit  follows  the  division  commander  tmtil  a  march  direc- 
tion is  assigned  to  it.  An  officer  of  the  leading  brigade 
(after  the  development,  an  oflBcer  of  the  base  brigade) 
must  be  permanently  charged  to  keep  the  division  staff 
in  view. 

The  deployment  of  the  division  will  generally  be  pre- 
ceded by  a  development,  i.  e.,  the  passage  from  column  to 
a  formation  of  broader  front.  When  the  division  commander 
desires  to  develop  the  division  (from  route  column  or  some 
assembly  formation),  he  designates  (in  a  development 
order)  the  brigade  on  which  the  development  is  to  be  made, 
as  the  base  brigade  and  indicates  its  march  direction.  In 
this  case,  the  brigades  may  be  posted  either  abreast,  on  the 
same  line,  or  in  echelon.  Intervals  and  distances  are  re- 
gulated by  orders.  Artillery  and  machine  gims  should  be 
posted  where  their  subsequent  employment  is  most  prob- 
able. When  a  change  of  direction  is  to  be  effected,  the 
division  commander  indicates  to  the  base  brigade  the  new 
march  direction,  to  which  the  others  must  conform  by  the 
shortest  route.  When  haste  is  not  necessary,  the  base 
brigade  may  decrease  the  cadence.  The  relative  posi- 
tions of  the  brigades  to  each  other  remain  tmchanged  un- 
less otherwise  ordered.  When  more  extended  changes  of 
front,  for  example  to  the  right  or  left,  become  necessary, 
another  formation  is  usually  taken  up. 

The  brigade  commanders  independently  choose  the  for- 
mations in  which  their  brigades  are  to  move,  being  governed, 
in  so  doing,  by  the  following  considerations : 

Utilization  of  accidents  of  the  grotmd  as  cover; 

Employment  of  formations  that  minimize  the  effect 
of  the  hostile  fire;  and 

Degree  of  readiness  for  combat  according  to  the  dis- 
tance to  the  enemy. 

In  the  deployment,  the  brigade  commanders  inde- 
pendently make  the  necessary  dispositions  for  distribution 
in  depth  and  for  flank  protection. 


82         Comparison  between  Line  and  Column. 


5.     COMPARISON  BETWEEN  LINE  AND  COLUMN. 

The  line  is  the  only  combat  formation  in  which  cav- 
alry can  charge  in  close  order.  In  case  of  necessity  only, 
when  cavalry  is  surprised  and  can  not  form  line  in  time,  is 
a  charge  in  column  conceivable.  The  success  of  a  charge 
depends  upon  the  force  of  the  shock  (cohesion  and  speed) 
and  upon  the  use  of  the  arme  blanche.  The  speed  that  is 
in  the  horses  can  be  brought  out  in  line  only.  Line  only, 
I)ennits  all  available  sabers  and  lances  to  be  employed. 

On  November  30th,  1808,  the  escadron  of  Polish  Lancers  detailed  as 
Emperor  Napoleon's  body  g^uard,  and  the  remainder  of  that  regiment 
charged  in  column  of  fours  up  the  pass  of  Somma  Sierra  under  cover  of 
the  morning  fog  and  powder  smoke,  rode  down  the  Spanish  infantry  and 
captured  4  batteries,  posted  in  tiers,  with  15  guns.  The  Lancers  lost  6 
officers  and  80  men  out  of  an  effective  strength  of  7  officers  and  150  men.  * 

At  Dembe  Wielki,  March  31st,  1831,  when  the  Russians  had  already 
made  dispositions  for  the  retreat,  12  Polish  escadrons  charged  in  column  of 
sixes  along  the  chaussee  embankment  under  cover  of  darkness.  They 
capturf  d  4  guns,  dispersed  Russian  infantry  and  repulsed  a  counter-attack 
made  by  Russian  cavalry. 

The  charge  at  Meslay  (engagement  at  Monnai»  December  20th,  1870): 
See  Chapter  V,  infra. 

Cavalry  should  never  allow  itself  to  be  charged  while 
standing  still,  for  it  would  be  crushed  by  the  force  of  the 
shock.  A  charge  in  column  is  but  a  makeshift,  since  an 
equally  strong  and  efficient  cavalry  force  in  line  would  be 
superior  to  the  former  on  account  of  its  formation  alone. 

During  the  battle  of  Balaklava,  October  25th,  1854,  a  Russian  cavalry 
mass  under  General  Ryow  and  consisting  of  2900  men  formed  in  a  single 
column,  was  thrown  back  by  six  weak  English  escadrons  under  General 
Scarlett.  The  English  escadrons  charged  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  Rus- 
sian column,  tke  latter  receiving  the  charge  while  halted,  f 


*Kavalleristische  Monatshefte.  December  number  1908. 
tKiNGLAKa.  Invasion  of  th§  Crimea,  VII,  p.  180. 


Comparison  between  Line  and  Column.         83 

The  principle  enunciated  is  directly  responsible  for 
the  demand  made  on  the  cavalry  for  great  mobility.  But 
mobility  is  possessed  neither  by  the  line  nor  by  the  line  of 
colimms.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  changes  of  direction 
in  these  formations  are  awkward  movements  and  that  pass- 
able grovmd  along  the  entire  front  is  to  be  fotmd  only  here 
and  there  for  distances  of  any  length.  For  this  reason, 
the  cavalry  needs  the  column  as  a  maneuvering  formation. 
The  column  has  the  advantage  of  greater  mobility  in  all 
directions  than  the  line.  It  can  change  front  and  march 
direction  more  easily  and  can  take  advantage  of  accidents  of 
the  grotmd  better  than  can  the  line.  Moreover,  it  permits 
line  to  be  formed  quickly  either  to  the  front  or  to  a  flank. 
The  column,  in  addition  to  possessing  great  mobility,  must 
permit  line  to  be  formed  in  the  quickest  and  simplest  man- 
ner. This  is  the  standard  that  determines  the  usefulness 
of  the  various  coltmms  on  the  batttlefield. 

The  deficient  maneuvering  capacity  of  the  French  cavalry  at  the  be- 
ginning of  this  century,  compelled  the  French  to  hold  it  together  in  dense 
masses,  and  was  responsible  for  the  introduction  of  the  charge  in  column. 
('The  principal  foes  of  the  column  are  disorder  and  unwieldiness,  which 
are  caused  by  the  leaders'  losing  almost  all  influence  over  their  units  as 
soon  as  the  column  is  moving  at  a  fast  gait.  This  disorder  is  augmented 
by  dust  and  by  natural  obstacles.  No  one  sees  where  he  is  going ;  an  evasion 
of  obstacles  is  not  to  be  thought  of;  btillets  drop  into  the  column;  here  and 
there  a  horse  and  trooper  break  down,  the  others  must  press  on  over  their 
bodies;  the  voice  of  the  leaders  and  even  the  blast  of  the  trumpet  is  lost 
in  the  thunder  of  hoof -beats,  the  rattle  of  arms,  the  roar  of  hostile  guns; 
the  column  becomes  a  mob,  which,  at  best,  if  crowded  together,  rushes 
along  like  a  mass  of  wild  horses.  It  may  ride  down,  it  is  true,  whatever  is 
opposed  to  it,  but  nothing  more,  and  no  one  can  tell  what  will  subsequently 
become  of  it.  If,  therefore,  the  enemy  avoids  the  direct  onslaught  and 
falls  upon  the  flank  and  rear  of  this  unwieldy  mob,  from  which  all  order 
and  leadership  have  parted,  the  combat  is  bound  to  end  with  the  defeat  of 
the  column."  • 


*v.  OBiABBsm.  Taktik,  p.  300 


84         Comparison  between  Line  and  Column. 

The  line  has  another  pronounced  advantage  over  a 
column  of  equal  strength— that  of  greater  front,  which  en- 
ables the  overlapping  portions  to  envelop  the  enemy  and 
to  attack  him  at  his  weakest  point,  his  flank.  The  line, 
however,  has  the  disadvantage  that  its  flanks  are  weak 
and  require  special  protection  (defensive  wings,  so-called, 
i.  e.,  echelons  posted  on  or  in  rear  of  the  flanks)  and  that  the 
danger  of  being  pierced  increases  with  its  length  (making  sup- 
porting escadrons  necessary).  Cavalry  that  is  charged  in 
flank  is  just  as  stire  to  be  defeated  as  cavalry  that  awaits 
the  enemy's  charge.  In  either  case  the  cotmter-attack  is 
wanting.  As  the  flanks  of  infantry  and  artillery  are  like- 
wise better  objectives  for  a  charge  than  the  firing  fronts,  the 
efforts  of  the  cavalry  should  always  be  directed  toward 
gaining  the  exposed  flank  of  the  enemy.  In  doing  this, 
however,  the  cavalry  must  take  care  that  its  own  flanks  are 
not  exposed  to  hostile  attack. 


III.    THE  COMBAT  OPERATIONS   OP  CAVALRY. 

I.    THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF  CAVALRY  IN  BATTLE. 

It  is  only  when  superficially  viewed  that  the  expe- 
riences of  the  British  in  South  Africa  and  of  the  Russians 
and  the  Japanese  in  Manchuria  argue  against  a  battle  use 
of  cavalry.  It  is  the  latter's  right  and  duty  to  lay  claim  to  a 
full  share  in  the  decision.  Every  victory  that  the  cavalry 
did  not  improve,  every  defeat  that  it  did  not,  with  reckless 
self-sacrifice,  do  its  utmost  to  avert,  is  a  reproach  to  the  arm. 
It  is  immaterial  whether  cavalry  fights  moimted  or  dis- 
motmted,  so  long  as  something  decisive  is  done.  When 
mounted,  cavalry  can  take  trenches  neither  from  the  front 
nor  from  the  rear,  but,  whendismoimted,  a  considerable  force 
of  cavalry  can  break  down,  with  its  fire,  the  power  of  resist- 
ance of  the  enemy.  Cavalry  may,  perhaps,  have  occasion 
to  use  the  carbine  fifty  times  before  it  can  use  the  lance 
once,  but  this  one  instance  may  decide  the  battle,  this  one 
charge  may  save  months  of  further  bloodshed.  It  has  been 
asserted — ^and  not  imjustly — ^that  the  failure  of  the  Japanese- 
cavalry  at  the  close  of  the  battle  of  Mukden  deprived  Japan 
of  her  war  indemnity. 

In  the  Boer  war*  the  English  cavabry  had  to  suffer  the  consequences 
of  poor  training  and  of  errors  in  army  administration.  Trained  solely 
for  the  mounted  charge,  the  cavalry  had  had  no  practice  in  covering  long 
distances  at  a  fast  gait  and  with  full  kit.  Little  importance  had  been 
attached  to  dismounted  action,  because,  in  earlier  campaigns,  this  had 
always  fallen  to  the  lot  of  dismounted  infantry.  It  was  not  until  De- 
cember of  1899  that  the  regiments  that  had  been  embarked  too  late». 
reached  South  Africa  much  worn  out  by  a  sea  trip  lasting  twenty  ta 
thirty  days.  On  their  arrival,  the  hottest  summer  weather  prevailed, 
but  no  time  could  be  given  the  horses  to  recuperate.  The  unfavorable 
reports  arriving  from  all  parts  of  the  theatre  of  war  called  the  regiments  to 
the  front  at  once.    In  these  circumstances,  the  load  of  145  kg.  carried 


86  Employment  op  Cavalry  in  Battle, 

by  each  horse  proved  excessive.  The  first  impressions  received  by  these 
troops  on  their  arrival  on  the  theater  of  operations  were  not  particularly 
favorable  to  a  battle  use  of  cavalry.  The  terrain,  in  many  cases  covered 
with  boulders,  the  steep  kopjes,  and  the  thin  skirmish  lines  of  the  enemy 
made  charging  difficult.  All  the  reports  that  reached  the  troops  on  their 
way  to  the  front  emphasized  the  difficulties  of  any  attack,  and  mentioned 
the  unprecedented  effect  of  fire,  even  at  long  ranges.  If  the  English  cavalry 
did  not  want  to  charge  the  Boer  skirmishers,  would  it  not  have  been  pos- 
sible to  seek  out  and  disperse  the  Boer  led  horses? 

But  the  fact  that  favorable  situations  were  not  seized  or  could  not 
be  turned  to  good  account  owing  to  the  scarcity  of  good  horses,  does  not 
Justify  the  conclusion  that  the  day  of  a  battle  use  of  cavalry  is  past. 

A  cavalry  division*  that  was  hurriedly  formed  under  the  command  of 
<jeneral  Sir  John  French  had  to  contend  continually  with  all  the  drawbacks 
<of  improvisation.  At  Klipdrift»  on  February  16th,  1900,  this  division 
-succeeded,  however,  in  riding  down,  with  slight  loss  to  itself,  the 
Boer  skirmish  line  (about  900  men  on  a  front  of  3  km.),  whose  fire  had, 
up  to  that  time,  caused  all  the  British  attacks  to  fail.  After  the  relief 
of  Kimberley  on  the  evening  of  February  15th,  British  cavalry  overtook 
•Cronje's  retreating  forces  at  Koedoesrand  on  February  17th,  after  a 
inarch  of  66  km.  and  held  them  in  check  by  dismounted  action  until  the 
arrival  of  British  infantry. 

The  cavalry,  scarcely  recuperated  from  its  sea  voyage,  was  much 
exhausted  by  this  expedition.  The  early  start,  as  well  as  the  scarcity  of 
water,  contributed  not  a  little  to  this  exhaustion.  In  the  9th  Lancer 
Regiment,  which  was  well  mounted  on  February  9th,  only  twenty-eight 
horses  were  able  to  trot  during  an  inspection  held  on  the  17th.  A  horse 
battery  lost  thirty-two  horses  from  exhaustion  alone.  The  most  un- 
favorable single  factor  was,  however,  that  the  ration  of  oats,  on  which  the 
English  horses  primarily  depended,  had  to  be  reduced.  To  make  matters 
worse,  after  De  Wet  had  captured  a  supply  column  on  the  16th,  the  grain 
ration  had  to  be  reduced  to  1.8  kg.  at  the  very  time  when  the  cavalry  had 
to  make  the  greatest  exertions.  No  hay  was  available  at  all,  and  the  horses 
had  to  depend  on  grazing.  This  was  attended  with  difficulties  on  account 
of  the  concentration  of  masses  of  cavalry.  Besides,  the  sparse  grass 
<;ontained  very  little  nourishment.  The  cavalry  deteriorated  more  and 
more,  and  available  horses  were  transferred  to  the  newly  organized  detach- 
ments of  mounted  infantry.  On  February  27th,  after  fifteen  day's  service, 
only  3,633  horses  out  of  5,027  were  available.  In  other  words,  29  per- 
cent, of  the  horses  had  succumbed  to  hardships  and  the  remainder  was 
so  worn  out  and  exhausted  that,  on  March  6th,  the  cavalry  had  to  look 
on  inactive  while  the  Boers  fied  in  complete  disorder  past  their  front  at  a 
distance  of  6  km.  All  mounted  charges,  all  extended  expeditions  were 
form  now  on  out  of  the  question.  Unless  it  was  satisfied  to  remain  in- 
active, the  cavalry  had  to  take  to  dismounted  action  in  all  cases,  and  it 

*See  the  author's  lecture  entitled,  Die  Lehren  des  BurenkrUgea  fUr  dU 
Gefechtsmigkeit  der  drei  Waffen.     Berlin.  1904. 


Boer  War.  87 

had  thus  degenerated  into  mounted  infantry.  The  operations  in  South 
Africa  confirm  the  old  principle  that  in  war  nothing  is  more  difficult  than 
to  improvise  cavalry.  Even  by  mounting  well  trained  troopers  on  un- 
trained animals,  one  does  not,  by  a  long  shot,  obtain  cavalry. 

In  the  Boer  war,  mounted  infantry  steps  into  the  fore- 
ground, in  place  of  cavalry  designed  for  battle  use.  The 
absence  of  real  cavalry  was  never  felt,  as  the  Boers  them- 
selves were  but  mounted  infantry.  To  be  sure,  the  Boers 
themselves,  emboldened  by  the  poor  horseflesh  of  the  British, 
finally  made  mounted  charges.  Thus,  the  experiences 
gained  during  this  war  can  have  but  a  limited  weight. 

Lord  Roberts  says  in  a  memorial:  ** Since  Waterloo, 
for  example  in  the  Sikh  and  Ptmjab  campaigns,  during  the 
Indian  Mutiny,  in  the  War  of  Secession,  and  in  the  wars 
of  1866  and  1870-71,  charges  against  cavalry  have  always 
taken  place.  Although  it  can  not  be  asserted  that  they  were 
ever  decisive,  or  that  they  produced  'demoralizing'  losses, 
they  were,  nevertheless,  successful  enough  to  demonstrate 
that,  of  two  cavalry  forces  that  charged  each  other  with  the 
anne  blanche,  the  stronger,  if  well  led,  soon  gained  the  upper 
hand.  Not  only  ordinary  common  sense  but  history  as 
well  shows  that  the  weaker  cavalry  force  will  have  recourse 
to  fire  action  as  soon  as  it  perceives  the  hostile  superiority." 
In  his  introduction  to  the  English  Drill  Regulations  of  1904, 
Lord  Roberts  emphasized  the  fact  that  with  the  introduction 
of  a  long  range  magazine  rifle  of  great  accuracy,  there 
would  occur  a  change  in  cavalry  tactics  approximately 
corresponding  to  that  which  took  place  in  infantry  tactics 
with  the  change  from  crossbow  and  pike  to  rifle  and  bayonet. 
While  the  saber  or  the  lance  was  in  the  past  the  principal 
weapon  of  the  cavalry,  the  saber  has  now  become  an  auxiliary 
to  the  rifle.  *  *  *  *  *  The  improvement  in  firearms  will  turn 
victory  to  the  side  that  dismounts  first.  *  *  *  If  the  modem 
rifle  has  curtailed  the  opix)rtunities  for  a  successful  mounted 
charge,  the  cavalry,  by  its  mobility  and  by  its  being  armed 
with  a  long  range  rifle,  has  gained  an  independence  never 
before  possessed  by  it.     The  conditions  for  a  successful  or 


88  Employment  op  Cavalry  in  Battle. 

unsuccessful  tennination  of  a  campaign  rest  in  the  hands 
of  the  cavalry." 

With  the  new  regulations  of  1907,  the  English  cavalry 
has  recovered  its  senses.  It  is  divided  into  independent  or 
strategical  cavalry,  divisional  cavalry  (for  security  and 
messenger  service)  and  protective  cavalry.  The  latter  is 
to  perform  the  duties  of  security  and  screening.  It  consists 
of  one  (mounted)  brigade  of  Territorial  cavalry,  one  cavalry 
regiment,  one  horse  battery  with  an  ammunition  column, 
two  battalions  of  moimted  infantry,  transport  and  supply 
columns,  and  one  cavalry  field  hospital.  "The  essence  of 
cavalry  spirit  consists  of  maintaining  the  correct  mean  in 
employing  dismounted  and  moimted  action.  The  occasional 
training  of  a  cavalry  unit  in  the  former,  need,  by  no  means, 
deprive  it  of  confidence  in  the  latter.  *  *  *  In  peace 
training,  it  is  important  to  lay  stress  on  training  cavalry  in 
using  offensive  tactics  even  when  it  fights  dismotmted.  *  *  ♦ 
It  is  certain  that  the  rifle,  no  matter  how  effective  it  may  be, 
can  not  replace  the  effect  produced  by  the  onrushing  horse, 
the  force  of  the  shock,  nor  the  terror  inspired  by  the  arme 
blanche.  During  a  charge,  these  factors  produce  such  en- 
thusiasm and  superiority  of  morale,  as  to  make  cavalry 
indispensable.  This  fact  explains  the  success  of  many 
seemingly  'impossible'  cavahy  charges  of  the  past." 

The  Russo-Japanese  war  likewise  presented  no  oppor- 
timities  for  gathering  special  lessons  on  the  battle  use 
of  cavalry. 

The  plains  of  the  theater  of  war,  on  account  of  their 
manner  of  cultivation,  and  the  mountains,  from  the  very  nature 
of  things,  were  imfavorable  for  cavalry  operations.  The 
Japanese  cavalry  was  numerically  too  inferior  to  be  able  to 
seek  the  decision  in  a  mounted  charge.  But,  as  the  Russian 
cavalry  did  nothing  to  increase  the  difficulties  of  its  op- 
ponent's reconnaissance,  and  as  this  reconnaissance  was, 
in  most  cases,  attended  to  by  spies,  the  Japanese  cavalry, 
with  few  exceptions,  remained  under  cover  of  its  infantry. 


Russo-Japanese  War.  89 

Poor  care  for  the  horses,  poor  riding,  mediocre  and  over- 
loaded moiints,*  prevented  energetic  mounted  employ- 
ment of  the  cavalry. 


The  Operations  of  the  Cavalry  Brigade  Under   Prince 

Kanin,  October  12tht  1904.t 

On  Octob^  12th,  1904,  (Shaho)»the  Russian  Eastern  Detachment 
(Ist,  lid,  and  Hid  Siberian  Army  Corps,  and  Rennenkampf  s  detachment, 
the  latter  consisting  of  13  battalions,  16  sotnias,  and  3  H  batteries)  had 
furiously  attacked  the  Japanese  right  flank.  The  advance  of  Rennen- 
kampfs  Cossacks,  south  of  the  Taitzu  River  made  the  Japanese  general 
headquarters  feel  apprehension  for  the  rearward  communications  of  the 
army.  For  this  reason,  the  2d  Cavalry  Brigade  (consisting  of  8  escadrons 
and  6  machine  guns,  under  Prince  Kanin)  was  on  the  same  day  (the  12th) 
drawn  to  the  right  flank  and  a  battalion  from  the  line  of  communications 
brought  up  to  reinforce  it.  Support  was  not  to  be  expected  from  the  hard 
pressed  12th  Infantry  Division,  which  received,  in  addition,  a  very  effective 
flanking  fire  from  Rennenkampfs  horse  artillery.  Prince  Kanin's  brigade 
took  up  a  position  to  the  right  rear  of  the  right  flank  of  the  12th  Division. 
Here  it  was  a  little  later  reinforced  by  the  battalion  above-mentioned. 
The  machine  guns  succeeded  in  so  completely  surprising  two  Russian  bat- 
talions, which  were  eating  their  noon-day  meal  without  having  taken  any 
measure  for  protection,  that  they  dispersed  with  heavy  loss.  On  the  same 
day,  the  reserves  of  the  Transbaikal  and  the  Siberian  Cossack  Divisions 
were  successfully  surprised  by  fire  at  Pensihu.  Both  sides  received  re- 
inforcements, Prince  Kanin,  a  mountain  battery,  Rennenkampf,  several 
battalions.  Nothing  was  more  obvious  than  that  Rennenkampf  should 
now  go  for  the  Japanese  cavalry.  The  contrary  happened.  Rennenkampf 
coniddered  that  a  fight  at  this  point  offered  no  advantages,  and,  in  the 
evening,  without  awaiting  further  orders,  he  decided  to  retreat.  This 
was  actually  begun  without  being  observed  by  the  Japanese.  Prince 
Kanin  moved  to  the  rear  for  about  6  km.,  went  into  camp  and  threw  out 
an  outpost  consisting  of  two  escadrons.  The  latter  apparently  avoided 
making  any  reconnaissance  around  the  fianks  of  the  enemy.  On  the 
13th,  Prince  Kanin  cautiously  followed  directly  in  rear  of  Rennenkampfs. 
rear  guard  (3  battalions  and  2 — 3  escadrons)  as  far  as  Weiningying. 

Prince  Kanin  certainly  accomplished  much  on  October  12th  with 
small  resources,  but  there  his  spirit  of  enterprise  ended.  The  terrain 
was,  without  doubt,  difficult,  but  the  Japanese  horses  were  used  to  mountain 


*BrUiih  Reports,  II.  pp.  527.  634  and  647. 
f/Mtf.,  I.  pp.  667  and  664. 


90  Employment  of  Cavalry  in  Battle. 

country.    In  view  of  this,  a  movement  against  the  rear  of  the  enemy 
would,  unquestionably,  have  been  in  order.* 

The  Russian  cavalry,  however,  was  no  better.  There 
were  only  18  escadrons  of  Dragoons  with  the  army,  and  of 
the  207  sotnias  of  Cossacks  with  it,  only  59  were  of  the  first 
levy.  The  numerous  officers  transferred  from  the  Guards 
and  from  the  cavalry  of  the  Line  to  the  Cossacks  were  un- 
able to  become  accustomed  to  the  peculiarities  of  the 
latter.  The  Russian  cavalry  can  not  be  relieved  of  the 
charge  that  it  was  deficient  in  enterprise,  esprit  of  the 
offensive,  and  mobility.  Colonel  Baykov  pronounced  a 
similar  judgment  on  the  Russian  cavalry  in  the  campaign 
of  1877-78.  He  said:  **When  it  encountered  infantry, 
the  cavalry  either  retired  or  had  recourse  to  dismounted 
action.  Cavalry  of  the  vanguard  dismounted  in  order  to 
defend  itself  against  a  charge  made  by  300  Turkish  troop- 
ers, and  then  participated  in  the  fire  fight  in  which  the 
infantry  was  engaged.  This  cavalry  had  lost  all  cavalry 
spirit  and  had  degenerated  into  poor  mounted  infantry. 
And  what  was  the  reason  for  this?  It  had  been  taught 
every  conceivable  thing  except  one — to  go  for  the  enemy.** 
Kuropatkin  practically  accused  the  cavalry  of  being  afraid 
to  stiffer  losses.  He  gave  the  following  as  the  reason 
for  the  small  usefulness  of  the  cavalry  in  front  of  Plevna: 
*'Fear  of  the  commanders  to  cope  with  problems  that, 
although  well  within  their  powers,  might  have  led  to  an 
encounter  with  Turkish  infantry  and  to  losses."  Kuro- 
patkin demands  ''training  in  self-sacrifice  in  time  of  peace." 
In  the  first  instructions  issued  by  him  in  1904,  he  used  the 


^Unfortunately  no  details  are  available  In  regard  to  the  operations  of  the  2d 
Cavalry  Brigade,  reinforced  by  two  battalions  of  Infantry  (one  battalion  of  the  7th 
Division  and  one  of  the  Reserve  Brigade  of  the  Hid  Army)  on  March  3d,  1905  Geft 
flank  at  Mukden).  It  succeeded  In  stopping  strong  cavalry  forces  (the  Ural  and 
Transbalkal  Cossack  Divisions,  according  to  English  sources.  25  escadrons)  at 
Tafangshen,  and  forcing  them  to  withdraw.  (Schlacht  von  Mukden  Supplement  No. 
JO  to  MililOr-Wochenblatt,  1905;  British  Reports,  II,  p.  222;  v.  Tettau.  Achtzehn 
Monate  mit  Busslands  Heeren  in  der  Mandschurei,  II,  pp.  288  and  302). 

See  also  U.  S.  Gen.  St.,  Epitome  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  p.  119. — Trans^ 
lator. 


Cavalry  at  Wafangkou.  91 

harsh  words:  **If  the  morale  of  the  Cossacks  had  been 
better,  they  would  have  charged  the  enemy  with  cold  steel.*' 
The  Russian  cavalry  masses  were  on  hand  on  the  battle- 
field, it  is  true,  but  their  leaders  waited  for  orders  to  act. 

On  August  3l8t,  1904,  when  the  infantry  of  the  lid  and  IVth  Arnues 
had  been  defeated  south  of  liaoyang,  Samsonov's  and  Grekov's  cavahy 
divisions,  as  well  as  Mishchenko's  brigade,  were  on  the  right  flank,  but 
no  one  assumed  the  responsibility  of  engaging.  The  same  thing  hap- 
pened on  September  2d,  when  Mishchenko's  cavalry  division  was  di- 
rected to  await  orders.  When  these  did  not  arrive,  he  did  nothing,  al- 
though it  was  known  that  the  enemy  was  in  inferior  strength. 

The  cavalry  suffered  from  a  frittering  away  of  its  strength.  Its 
difficulties  were  increased  by  the  passive  resistance  of  the  inhabitants, 
by  ignorance  of  the  native  language,  and  by  the  absence  of  good  maps. 

Mounted  charges  were  seldom  attempted.  When  made  against 
infantry  or  artillery,  they  partook  of  the  nature  of  skirmishes.  The 
opponents  accuse  each  other  of  having  fired  from  the  saddle,  while  halted, 
when  warding  off  hostile  cavalry.*  Engagement  at  Lichiatun  (south  of 
Wafangkou),  May  30th,  1904:  Three  escadrons  of  Akiyama's  brigade 
charged  three  sotnias  of  Cossacks.  The  Japanese  were  repulsed,  came 
under  the  fire  of  dismounted  Dragoons,  and  lost  4  officers  and  68  men, 
as  against  2  officers  and  36  men  lost  by  the  Russians.  The  lance  is  said 
to  have  been  especially  useful,  t 

At  Lidiatun  (Shaho),  on  October  30th,  1904,  the  Sd  Sotnia  of  the 
19th  Cossack  Regiment,  which  had  been  designated  to  cover  the  left 
flank,  charged  in  lava  formation  (see  p.  188,  infra)  against  a  Japanese 
battery  that  was  in  the  act  of  moving  out  of  position.  The  charge  failed 
after  the  Russians  had  lost  their  leader,  who  had  collided  with  a  wire  fence. 
They  lost  1  officer,  47  men,  and  70  horses. 

On  January  26th,  1906,  a  sotnia  of  Terek-Kuban  Cossacks  sur- 
prised and  charged  Japanese  infantry.  The  Japanese  lost  40  killed  and 
26  prisoners;  the  Russians  only  6  men.t  For  the  charge  at  Langtungkou, 
see  p.  94,  infra. 

Situations  interesting  from  a  cavalry  point  of  view  occurred  In 
June  1904,  when  Akiyama's  brigade  (8  escadrons,  2  battalions  and 
2  machine  guns)  took  charge  of  protecting  the  siege  operations  of  Port 
Arthur.  The  Russians,  in  order  to  screen  their  defensive  measures, 
had  pushed  forward  General  Samsonov  to  Wafangkou  with  13  escadrons, 
one-half  company  of  Frontier  Guards,  and  1  battery.     The*  measures 


^British  Reports,  I.  p.  616,  and  III.  p.  221. 

^Taktische  Detaildarstellungen  aus  dem  Russisch-Japanischen  Kriege,  Part  2 
(Vienna.  1900). — Kriegsgeschichtlicfu  Einzelschriften  iiber  den  RussischrJapan' 
ischen  Krieg,  I,  p.  308  (Vienna,   1906). 

XKavalUristische  Monatshefte,  Nos.  8  and  9  of  1907. 
NiBSisL.  Eneeignements  tactiques,  pp.  84-95. 


92  Employment  of  Cavalry  in  Battle. 

taken  by  these  two  opposing  forces  resulted  on  May  30th,  1904,  in  the 

engagement  at  Lichiatun  (south  of  Wafangkou). 

In  their  effort  to  screen  their  dispositions,  the  Russians  reinforced 

Samsonov  more  and  more  during  the  early  part  of  June.  Finally,  by 
June  10th,  1904,  6  battalions,  16  escadrons  and  2  batteries  of  Stackef- 

berg's  corps  (which  consisted  of  363^  battalions,  19  escadrons,  and  11 
batteries),  had  been  used  up  as  an  outpost.  This  consisted  of  a  chain  of 
posts  30  km.  long,  pushed  toward  the  south,  the  reserve  being  posted  at 
Wafangtien.  Although  all  lines  of  approach  were  guarded,  the  Japanese 
succeeded,  by  means  of  local  superiority  of  numbers,  in  breaking  through 
this  screen  and  in  obtaining  information.  In  these  reconnaissance  fights, 
which  frequently  partook  of  the  nature  of  surprises,  the  carbine  natu- 
rally played  an  important  rOle. 

The  advance  of  Oku's  Army  on  June  13th,  resulted  in  the  engage- 
ment of  Wafangkou  (or  Telistu)  on  June  16th.  Two  Japanese  divisions 
were  launched  frontally  against  the  Russian  position  at  Wafangkou. 
This  Russian  position  was  from  seven  to  eight  kilometers  long  and  faced 
in  a  general  way  toward  the  south.  One  Japanese  division  had  been 
pushed  far  to  the  west,  and  Akiyama's  cavalry  brigade  far  toward  the 
east.  Thus,  the  situation  on  the  Japanese  side  was  as  follows  on  the 
evening  of  the  14th:  Two  divisions  were  opposite  the  enemy's  line  and 
already  very  close  to  it;  one  strong  group  was  on  either  flank  and  at  that 
time  still  some  eight  miles  from  the  battlefield  and  ready  to  attack  the 
enemy's  flank.  On  June  15th,  when  the  right  wing  of  the  3d  Division 
was  endangered  by  the  advance  of  parts  of  Glasko's  brigade  (8 
battalions  and  2  batteries),  Akiyama's  brigade  appeared  on  the  battle- 
field and,  by  means  of  dismounted  action,  brought  the  Russian  envelop- 
ing movement  to  a  standstill  in  time.  The  Russian  cavalry  division 
stood  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  Russian  right  wing.  It  neglected 
to  inform  the  Russian  general  headquarters  of  the  approach  of  the  4th 
Japanese  Division.*  Moreover,  it  failed  to  delay  the  latter,  and  with- 
drew without  offering  serious  resistance.! 

Although  the  Japanese  cavahy  sought  protection 
with  its  infantry,  which  fought  principally  behind  in- 
trenchments,  it  would,  nevertheless,  have  had  frequent 
opportunities  for  taking  hand  in  the  fight.  If  the  fight- 
ing branches  did  not  offer  objectives  for  a  mounted  charge, 
the  hostile  ammunition  columns  would  have  been  so  much 
the  more  favorable  objectives.  In  general,  however,  the 
cavalry  should  not  chase  after  such  cheap  laurels,  so  long 

*The  Russians  excuse  this  neglect  by  saying  that  the  Une  of  advance  of  the 
4th  Japanese  Divlfiion  lay  outside  of  the  reconnaissance  area  of  the  Russian  cavalry. 

tKavalleristische  Monatshefte,  March  number  of  1907,  pp.  105  and  211. 


Cavalry  at  Sandepu.  93 

as  there  is  a  possibility  for  it  to  assist  in  bringing  about 
the  decision  of  the  battle.  Only  a  leader  wlio  is  tactically 
trained  and  enterprising  wiU  see  the  opportunity  of  making 
himself  useful,  whereas  a  leader  of  a  different  stamp  will 
have  nothing  but  difficulties  before  him  in  a  similar 
situation. 

For  the  operations  against  Sandepu,  in  January  1906,  General 
Kuropatkin  had  given  the  following  instructions  to  his  cavalry:  "As  we 
are  in  possession  of  a  numerous  cavalry,  we  should  conceive  its  principal 
task  on  days  of  battle  to  lie  in  its  cooperating  with  the  other  arms  for 
the  purpose  of  winning  the  victory.  If  the  corps  cavalry  and  the  mounted 
scouts  are  to  rest  during  the  day,  it  is  necessary  for  their  operations  at 
night  that  they  be  notified  in  time  of  the  appearance  of  hostile  forces." 

The  cavalry  corps  assembled  under  Lieutenant-General  Mishchenko 
consisted  of  43H  sotnias,  of  which  number  only  11  were  of  the  first  levy. 
Mishchenko,  instead  of  breaking  through  the  chain  of  detachments 
posted  on  the  Japanese  left  fiank,  contended  himself  with  attacking 
and  driving  them  away,  one  after  another.  On  January  25th,  Mishchenko 
appeaved  with  30>^  sotnias  and  2  batteries  before  Wukiakantsy,  which 
was  held  by  the  Japanese  with  2  escadrons  and  2  machine  guns. 

The  vanguard  sotnia  of  the  2d  Daghestan  Cossack  Regiment,  on 
approaching  the  village,  received  a  heavy  fire  from  its  edge.  The  sotnia 
dismounted  to  fight  on  foot  and  was  a  little  later  supported  by  the  two 
other  sotnias  and  a  platoon  of  the  20th  Horse  Battery.  The  corps 
commander  now  interfered  and  issued  the  following  orders:  'The  20th 
Battery  will  move  closer  to  the  village.  Under  cover  of  its  fire,  the 
Daghestan  Cossack  Regiment  will  attempt  to  attack  the  village  from  the 
west.  The  25th  Don  Cossack  Regiment,  supported  by  the  3d  Don 
Cossack  Battery,  will  attack  from  the  direction  of  Lantsgou.  The  4th 
Ural  Cossack  Regiment  wiU  advance  in  the  direction  of  Siaupeiho  for  the 
purpose  of  reconnoitering  the  enemy." 

Despite  the  artillery  support,  the  attack  of  the  Daghestan  Cossack 
Regiment  made  no  progress.  The  1st  Sotnia  of  the  25th  Don  Cossack 
Regiment  attempted  to  charge  mounted.  On  debouching  from  Lants- 
gou, however,  it  was  met  by  such  a  heavy  fire  that  it  hurried  back  into 
the  viUage,  where  it  halted  without  dismounting.  The  remaining  five 
sotnias,  though  mounted,  were  in  the  mean  time  standing  idle  in  rear  of 
the  village.  No  one  made  an  effort  to  do  anything.  At  this  moment 
the  corps  commander  arrived  and  ordered  the  1st  Sotnia  to  dismount, 
to  occupy  the  outskirts  of  the  village  and  to  open  fire.  To  the  8d  Don 
Cossack  Battery  he  pointed  out  the  place  where  it  was  to  go  into  posi- 
tion. Finally,  he  even  indicated  the  target  to  the  battery  commander. 
Under  cover  of  the  fire  of  this  battery,  the  1st  Sotnia  reached  a  ravine 
between  Lantsgou  and  Wukiakantsy.  The  26th  Don  Cossack  Regi- 
ment, 2  sotnias  of  Caucasus  Cossacks,  and  the  machine  guns  were  now 


I 


94  Employment  of  Cavalry  in  Battle. 

despatched  from  the  reserve  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  Wukiakantsy 
from  the  south.  Thereupon,  Mishchenko  turned  to  General  Telichev 
and  directed  him  to  attack  with  his  entire  force.  Telichev,  however, 
hurt  by  the  interference  of  the  corps  commander,  gave  no  orders  what- 
soever. His  chief-of-staff  first  proceeded  slowly  to  the  1st  Sotnia  of  the 
26th  Don  Cossack  Regiment  to  ascertain  whether  it  still  had  ammunition 
available,  and  not  until  then  did  he  give  the  order  for  the  advance.  This 
sotnia,  however,  was  unable  to  advance,  for  its  regimental  commander 
did  not  support  it,  but  kept  his  fresh  sotnias  back. 

Meantime,  the  Daghestan  Cossack  Regiment  advanced  slowly^ 
while  the  4th  Ural  Cossack  Regiment,  opposed  by  hostile  infantry  at 
Lobou,  had  made  a  lodgment  with  dismounted  skirmishers  on  the  Hun 
River.  The  26th  Don  Cossack  Regiment  had  deployed  its  sotnias  into 
"lava"  formation,  mounted,  had  searched  the  villages  between  Wukia- 
kantsy and  the  Hun  River,  and  was  in  the  act  of  advancing  against 
Lobou  when  it  was  recalled,  as  General  Mishchenko  wished  to  break  off 
the  action.  At  the  last  moment,  however,  Wukiakantsy  was  assaulted 
by  the  Daghestan  Cossack  Regiment  and  the  1st  Sotnia  of  the  25th 
Don  Cossack  Regiment.  On  January  27th,  the  same  picture  presented 
itself.  Dispersion  of  forces  everywhere.  The  Japanese  6th  Division, 
hurrying  up  to  reinforce  the  Japanese  8th  Division,  threw  out  a  flanking 
detachment  to  protect  itself  against  the  Russian  cavalry,  but,  with  the 
remainder,  continued  its  march  to  the  battlefield. 

To  protect  a  Russian  battery  that  had  run  out  of  ammunition  and 
was  threatened  by  hostile  skirmishers,  the  2d  Daghestan  Cossack  Regi- 
ment (6  sotnias  of  Caucasus  volunteers),  in  reserve  at  Siuchiatai,  was 
ordered  to  stop  the  attack  of  the  hostile  skirmishers  by  charging  them 
in  rear.  On  debouching  from  Siuchiatai,  the  regiment  found  itself  on 
an  open  plain  and  was  at  once  fired  upon  by  a  Japanese  battery  that  had 
gone  into  position  on  the  western  outskirts  of  Langtungkou.  The  Japanese 
skirmishers  meanwhile  directed  a  lively  fire  against  the  Russian  battery 
and  the  staff  of  the  Russian  corps  commander.  Exposed  as  it  was  to 
violent  shrapnel  fire,  the  Daghestan  Regiment  did  not  charge  the  rear 
of  the  advancing  Japanese  skirmishers  as  ordered,  but  moved  against 
the  Japanese  battery.  Other  Japanese  skirmishers  now  deployed  from 
Langtungkou,  in  order  to  protect  this  battery,  and  directed  their  fire 
against  the  front  and  flank  of  the  Daghestan  Regiment.  When  the  latter 
had  approached  to  within  600  paces  of  the  battery,  its  progress  was  stopped 
by  a  ravine  with  steep  banks.  The  regiment  now  withdrew.  Its  loss 
in  killed  is  not  given.    Its  loss  in  wounded  amounted  to  70  men. 

On  the  28th,  the  Russian  cavalry  corps  likewise  allowed  itself  to 
be  contained  by  weak  hostile  detachments. 

The  complete  failure  of  Mishchenko's  cavalry  was,  in  the  first 
place,  due  to  the  desire  of  capturing,  before  a  further  advance  was  made, 
every  village  that  was  held  by  a  few  Japanese  patrols.  This  procedure 
exhausted  the  troops,  who,  even  in  these  operations  manifested  a  notice- 
able aversion  to  attack.    A  further  cause  of  the  failure  of  Mishchenko's 


Russian  Views.  96 

cavalry  is  to  be  found  in  the  continual  dispersion  of  the  troops.  The 
principal  cause  lies,  however,  in  the  total  failure  to  appreciate  the  task 
falling  to  the  lot  of  the  cavalry  corps.  It  should  have  taken  a  direct 
part  in  the  fight  of  the  right  wing  of  the  army.  Had  it  done  so,  it  was 
not  improbable  that,  at  least  until  January  26th,  inclusive,  a  great  success 
might  have  been  gained.  Instead,  it  moved  farther  and  farther  away 
from  the  army  in  the  vain  hope  that  it  might  contain  approaching  hostile 
forces,  and  that  its  mere  appearance  in  rear  of  the  Japanese  engaged, 
would  accelerate  the  latter's  retreat. 

Lieutenant-General  Herschelmann,  himself  a  cavalryman  (Assis- 
tant to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Military  District  of  Warsaw), 
says:  "The  growth  of  armies  increases  the  size  of  battlefields,  makes 
more  difiicult  the  concentration  of  the  several  parts  of  the  armies  before 
the  decisive  blows  are  struck,  but  likewise  requires  a  more  thorough  re- 
connaissance of  their  movements.  Even  local  reconnaissance  has  grown 
in  importance.  The  strength  of  fortified  lines  necessitates  extended 
turning  movements.  To  perceive  these  turning  movements,  or  to  screen 
them,  as  the  case  may  be,  is  primarily  the  duty  of  the  cavalry.  Finally, 
an  energetic  mode  of  waging  war  requires  a  thorough  pursuit  of  the  de- 
feated enemy,  preferably  by  cavalry.  With  the  growth  of  armies,  the 
sensitiveness  of  their  communications  has  increased.  The  threatening 
of  these  offers  to  the  cavalry  another  rich  field  of  operations.  The  ful- 
fillment of  these  important  requirements  makes  the  attainment  of  modem 
tre  effect  more  difidcult.  The  mounted  charge  by  cavalry  masses  has 
become  the  exception  and  is  feasible  only  on  exceedingly  rare  occasions, 
when  led  by  talented  leaders.  The  principal  importance,  on  the  contrary, 
must  be  attached  to  training  in  field  service  and  in  dismounted  action, 
as  well  as  on  increasing  the  maneuvering  capacity  of  large  bodies  of  cav- 
alry and  on  speed  in  their  movements  on  the  battlefield.  The  present 
training  of  cavalry  does  not  conform  to  these  requirements."  General 
Herschelmann  expresses  himself,  moreover,  as  being  opposed  to  the  high 
value  attached  to  accuracy  in  drill.  He  states  that  the  principal  reason 
for  such  accuracy — ^the  attainment  of  cohesion — has  disappeared,  for, 
even  against  cavalry,  one  would  nowadays  charge  in  extended  order. 
He  cites  that  the  Cossacks  have  always  managed  to  get  along  without  a 
charge  in  close  order.  He  believes  that  the  intermediate  formations, 
used  in  moving  cavalry  masses  preparatory  to  a  charge,  could  be  dis- 
pensed with.  On  the  other  hand,  General  Herschelmann  demands  in- 
creased speed  in  all  other  movements  and  a  charge  in  extended  order  over 
broken  ground.  He  does  not  entirely  disapprove  of  a  certain  amount  of 
cohesion  in  the  movements  of  an  escadron. 

In  contrast  to  this  view,  General  Ostrogradski  emphasizes  the  neces- 
sity of  training  cavalry  for  battle  use. 

Lieutenant-General  von  Pelet-Narbonne*  very  properly  concludes 
that,  aside  from  showing  the  necessity  of  attaching  greater  importance 
to  dismounted  action,  the  Manchurian  campaign  does  not  offer  any 


*DU  LehrenfUr  die  Kavallerie  aus  dem  mandschuritchen  Feldzuge,  BerUn,  1908 


96  Employment  op  Cavalry  in  Battle. 

partictilarly  instructive  tactical  lessons  for  cavalry.  He  qualifies  this 
by  saying  that,  even  to-day,  "the  cavalry  will  be  able  to  produce  a  decisive 
effect  in  battle,  if,  massed  in  large  units  on  suitable  terrain,  it  is  launched 
against  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy."  "Nowadays,"  he  continues,  "after 
battles  lasting  for  days,  even  with  troops  of  such  stubborn  bravery  as  the 
Russian,  the  mere  appearance  of  cavalry  may  produce  panics  of  the 
worst  sort,  which  will  enable  the  cavalry  to  convert  the  retreat  of  the 
opponent  into  rout  and  annihilation."  "With  the  so  extraordinarily 
increased  sensitiveness  of  the  rearward  communications  of  the  giant 
armies  of  to-day,"  he  adds,  "their  destruction  by  cavalry  will  fall  more 
heavily  into  the  scales  than  formerly." 

Nowadays,  however,  only  a  first  class  cavalry  is  worth  its  salt. 
The  necessity  of  using  cavalry  masses,  commanded  by  a  single  leader, 
has  never  before  been  so  conclusively  demonstrated — even  if  only  by  its 
negative  results.  But  much  cavalry  does  not  yet  mean  cavalry  in  the 
modern  acceptation  of  that  term. 

In  contrast  herewith.  General  P^doya*  of  the  French  Army,  arrives 
at  the  conclusion: 

1.  That  the  time  of  great  cavalry  charges  is  past; 

2.  That  cavalry  will  make  a  much  greater  use  of  dismounted 
action  in  future;  and 

3.  That  large  cavalry  masses,  united  under  a  single  leader,  are  more 
hampering  than  useful. 

The  unfavorable  proportion  of  cavalry  to  the  other 
arms,t  the  improvement  of  rifles  and  guns,  the  greater 
independence  of  the  infantry,  and  the  everywhere  increasing 
cultivation  of  the  soil,  materially  restrict  the  employ- 
ment of  cavalry.  But  these  factors  never  restrict  its 
employment  to  such  an  extent  that  its  fight  against  the 
other  arms  would  offer  no  chance  of  success.  Cavalry 
acts  above  all  else  by  the  moral  effect  that  the  sudden  ap- 

*La  cavalerie  dans  la  guerre  russo-japonaise  et  dans  Vavenir.  General  PAdota, 
anden  commandant  du  16  ^me  corps  d'armde.  Henri  Charles-Lavauzelle,  Paris, 
79  S.  1908.     1.50  Francs. 

f  The  proportion  of  cavalry  to  infantry  at  the  outbreak  of  war  has  become 
more  and  more  unfavorable  to  the  mounted  arm  in  the  course  of  time.  But, 
during  a  campaign,  this  proportion  changes  in  favor  of  the  cavalry.  In  the 
Swedish  army  under  Gustavus  Adolphus,  the  proportion  of  cavalry  to  Infantry 
was  as  1:  2.3;  in  the  army  with  which  Frederick  the  Great  Invaded  Bohemia  in 
1757.  it  was  as  1:  3;  in  the  Austrian  army  and  the  French  army,  in  1809  it  was  as 
1:  8  and  as  1:  4.8,  respectively.  In  the  campaign  of  1866,  on  the  German  thea- 
ter of  war,  this  proportion  was  as  1:  8.6  in  the  Austrian  army,  and  as  1:  7.7  In 
the  Prussian  army,  whereas,  on  the  Italian  theater  of  war,  it  was  as  1:  24  In  the 
Austrian  army  and  as  1:  26  In  the  Italian  army.  In  1870,  this  proportion  was 
as  1:  6  in  the  French  army  and  as  1:  8  in  the  German  army. 


Duties  of  Cavalry  in  Battle.  97 

pearance  of  its  swiftly  moving  mass  produces.  Men  have 
not  changed,  and  are  now,  as  of  old,  susceptible  to  the 
impressions  produced  by  danger  that  threatens  them  tm- 
expectedly.  This  susceptibility  is  directly  proportional 
to  the  length  of  time  the  men  have  been  exposed  to  the 
influence  of  a  protracted  combat,  or  perhaps  a  disastrous 
one,  in  which  troops  lose  the  very  quality  that  is  essential 
for  warding  off  a  cavalry  charge. 

After  the  cavalry  has  satisfied  the  first  demands  of 
reconnaissance,  and  after  the  opposing  infantry  and  artil- 
lery  forces  have  become  engaged,  the  commander-in-chief 
will  expect  it  to  recormoiter  constantly  on  the  flanks  and 
rear  of  the  enemy.  Besides,  he  will  expect  it,  at  the 
same  time,  to  drive  away  the  hostile  cavalry,  to  threaten 
the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  enemy,  to  keep  at  a  distance 
hostile  reinforcements,*  to  contain  hostile  reserves,  and  to 
disperse  hostile  ammimition  columns.  Moreover,  he  will 
demand  that  it  reap  the  utmost  benefit  from  the  fire  effect 
produced  by  the  other  arms ;  that  it  pursue  the  enemy  until 
he  is  annihilated ;  and  that  it  sacrifice  itself  for  its  own  in- 
fantry in  critical  situations.  Finally,  in  case  a  retreat 
becomes  necessary,  he  will  expect  his  cavalry  to  throw  itself 
on  the  enemy  to  check  the  pursuit.  Cavalry  should  guard 
against  one  fault,  however,  against  inactivity,  as  this  inevit- 
ably leads  to  defeat. 

*A  French  force,  consisting  of  3  battalions,  40  to  60  troopers,  and  2  guns, 
which  was  marching  from  Cambray  toward  the  battlefield  of  Bapaume.  was 
delayed  by  1%  escadrons  of  Hussars  of  the  Guard,  by  means  of  dismounted 
action.     KUNZ,  Nordarmee,  II,  p.  39. 

Although  the  German  cavalry  at  Mars-la-Tour  perceived  in  time  the 
advance  of  the  French  Hid  and  IVth  Army  Oorps.  it  failed  to  watch  the  enemy's 
movements  and  to  retard  his  advance.  Thus  it  happened  that  the  Grerman 
General  Headquarters  received  no  intelligence  of  the  arrival  of  Oissey's  divi- 
sion. Instead  of  the  10  escadrons  and  I  horse  battery  actually  employed,  28 
escadrons  and  5  horse  batteries  could  easily  have  been  united  here.  With  such  a 
force,  the  advance  of  the  enemy  could  have  been  effectively  checked.  But  the 
French,  likewise,  should  have  used  their  cavalry  energetically,  to  drive  the  Prus- 
sian horsemen  off  the  field  and  to  advance  against  the  Prussian  left  flank.  Kriega- 
gesehiehUiche  Eimelschriften,  Part  26,  p.  11.  et  seq. 

The  Japanese  cavalry  brigade  under  Akiyama  and  the  Russian  cavalry 
brigade  under  Samsonov  at  Wafangkou.     See  p.  91,  supra. 


98  Employment  of  Cavalry  in  Battle. 

On  the  battlefield,  the  cavalry  should  take  position 
where  it  is  most  likely  to  find  most  effective  employment. 
When  inactive,  it  should  seek  to  take  advantage  of  avail- 
able cover  by  taking  up  a  formation  in  groups  and  protect 
itself  against  losses.  Moreover,  it  should  seek  to  keep 
itself  fresh  for  combat  operations,  by  watering  and  feeding 
by  successive  units.  The  position  chosen  by  the  cavalry 
should  offer  it  security  against  an  unexpected  attack  and 
enable  it  to  enter  the  action  without  delay.  This,  how- 
ever, is  assured  only  when  the  cavalry  commander  selects 
an  observation  point  from  which  he  can  see  the  terrain, 
the  enemy  and  his  own  force.  He  will  come  into  action 
too  late,  if  he  waits  imtil  he  is  ordered  to  charge,  or  if  he 
clings  to  his  command. 

The  best  position  for  cavalry  to  take  up  is  one  on 
the  flank.  This  position  enables  it  to  move  in  several 
directions  without  interfering  with  the  other  arms,  and  to 
reach,  by  the  shortest  route,  the  line  of  retreat  of  the  enemy, 
so  as  to  be  at  once  on  hand  to  inaugurate  the  pursuit. 
When  posted  in  advance  of  a  flank,  the  cavalry  threatens 
the  enemy  by  its  mere  presence  and  gives  the  artiUery 
of  its  own  force  a  chance  to  occupy  flanking  positions. 
Cavalry  will  seek  a  position  to  the  right  rear  or  the  left 
rear  of  a  flank  only  when  compelled  to  do  so  on  account 
of  its  ntmierical  inferiority,  or  when  its  task  is  a  ptu^ely 
defensive  one.  The  farther  it  is  kept  in  rear,  the  more 
difficult  will  be  its  timely  entry  into  action,  the  smaller 
the  chance  of  its  arriving  in  time  on  the  battlefield  at  the 
critical  moment.  When  posted  in  rear  of  the  center  of 
the  line,  cavalry  either  becomes  a  bullet  stop,  or  it  will 
have  to  be  kept  so  far  in  rear,  in  order  to  avoid  losses,  that 
its  timely  appearance  on  the  fighting  line  is  problematical. 
If,  in  this  case,  it  desires  to  charge,  it  will  have  to  pass 
through  the  firing  lines  of  its  infantry  and  artillery  and 
thereby  interfere  with  their  fire  (Examples:  French  cav- 
alry at  Worth ;  Prussian  cavalry  at  Koniggratz)  or  it  will 


Duties  of  Cavalry  in  Battle.  99 

have  to  make  a  long  detoiir  in  order  to  strike  the  "enemy's 
flank.  Long  battle  lines  and  lack  of  room  may  make  it 
necessary  to  post  cavalry  in  rear  of  the  center,  but,  in  such 
an  event,  steps  must  be  taken  to  assure  its  timely  entry 
into  action,  by  agreement  with  the  various  commanders 
of  troops  in  the  fighting  line. 

Lack  of  Room:  French  cavalry  at  Sedan.  Likewise,  the  Prussian 
6th  Cavalry  Division,  which,  at  Mars-la-Tour,  was  supporting  the  Hid 
Army  Corps,  as  the  latter  was  fighting  without  infantry  reserves.  The 
distribution  of  the  French  cavalry  divisions  in  rear  of  the  Gravelott*- 
St.  Privat  position  was  not  judicious,  because  so  posted,  they  frequently 
lost  an  opportunity  to  charge.  The  French  cavalry  should  have  been  poch 
ted  in  the  vicinity  of  Ste.  Marie-auz-Chdnes  and  assigned  the  task  of 
checking  the  advance  of  the  corps  belonging  to  the  German  lid  Army. 
The  distribution,  by  brigades,  of  the  2d  Cavalry  Division  at  Coulmiersy 
must  likewise  be  condemned.  Had  this  division  been  led  as  a  single 
unit,  it  could  have  checked  the  French  deployment  against  Coulmiers, 
a  task  well  worth  the  trouble. 

It  frequently  depends  on  chance  whether  the  cavalry 
will  reach  the  decisive  flank.  When  the  cavalry  quits  the 
front  of  the  army  after  an  encoimter,  perhaps  an  tmfortu- 
nate  one,  with  the  hostile  cavalry,  it  will  not  be  able,  in 
every  case,  to  choose  the  line  by  which  it  had  best  retreat. 
Besides,  it  will  frequently  not  become  apparent,  until 
the  fight  is  in  progress,  which  flank  is  of  decisive  import- 
ance. Even  a  cavalry  division  that  is  hurrying  to  the  battle- 
field from  a  flank,  can  not  decide  which  flank  is  the  most 
important  one.  If  it  happens  to  be  on  the  flank  on  which 
the  decision  is  not  contemplated  for  the  present,  its  move- 
ment to  the  other  flank  will  consume  so  much  time  and 
energy  that  it  will,  in  all  probability,  come  too  late  any- 
way.* 

But,  no  matter  on  which  flank  it  may  happen  to  be 
posted,  the  cavalry  must  seek  to  attack  the  enemy  after 
the  manner  of  an  offensive  wing  (i.  e.,  one  bent  toward 
the  enemy).     However,  the  cavalry  will  be  able  to  main- 

*Leiigth  of  lines  of  battle:     Kdniggr&tz  12,  Oravelotte  14,  Ldaoyang  40, 
Shaho  60,  and  Mukden  110  km. 


100  Employment  of  Cavalry  in  Battle. 

tain  itself  in  such  an  advanced  position  only  if  it  has  driven 
the  hostile  cavalry  off  the  field  or  if  it  can  hold  that  cavalry 
in  check  with  a  weak  force.  This  will  give  rise  to  cavalry 
duels  whose  usefulness  is  frequently  denied  in  view  of 
the  cavalry  action  at  Ville  sur  Yron  on  August  16th,  1870. 
Nevertheless,  these  duels  are  necessary  for  the  purpose 
of  gaining  information.  If  we  assume,  for  the  sake  of 
argiunent,  that  there  was  no  German  cavalry  on  the  German 
right  flank  at  Mars-la-Tour,  it  is  obvious  that  a  charge 
en  masse  made  by  the  French  cavalry  would  necessarily 
have  had  the  most  serious  consequences  on  the  course  of 
that  battle.  Neither  infantry  nor  artillery  was  available 
to  oppose  such  a  charge,  being  no  doubt  employed  else- 
where to  better  advantage,  and  it  was  therefore  quite 
proper  for  the  German  cavalry  to  engage  that  of  the  French. 
Had  this  cavalry  action  been  fought  out  to  a  finish,  the 
victorious  cavalry  should  have  advanced  immediately 
against  the  hostile  infantry  and  artillery.  However,  if 
one  has  at  the  start  neglected  to  drive  oflE  the  field  the 
hostile  cavalry,  it  will  make  itself  tmpleasantly  annoy- 
ing and  check  one's  own  cavalry  as  soon  as  it  becomes 
important  for  the  latter  to  take  a  hand  in  the  fight  and  to 
cooperate  with  the  other  arms.  But  the  defeat  of  the  hos- 
tile cavalry  is  purely  a  family  affair  and  without  influence 
on  the  course  of  the  battle,  if  the  cavalry  contents  itself 
with  this  first  small  success  and  does  not  endeavor  to  attain 
the  greater  and  more  important  result  of  advancing,  sup- 
ported by  its  horse  artillery,  against  flank  and  rear  of  the 
enemy.* 

If  the  hostile  cavalry  does  not  accept  battle,  the  con- 
tinued molestation  of  its  own  infantry  will  either  force 
it  to  act,  or  compel  it  to  leave  the  battlefield.  The  duties 
of  the  cavalry  in  pursuit  and  retreat  are  very  aptly  de- 
scribed by  the  German  regulations: 

*The  4th  Cavalry  Division  did  this  at  Loigny.  To  be  sure,  no  charge 
preceded  its  movement  against  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear.  Kunz.  Loigny,  p. 
116.     Consiilt  also  the  conduct  of  the  cavalry  at  Artenay,  October  10th,  1870. 


Pursuit  and  Retreat.  101 

"After  a  battle  is  won,  the  most  aggressive  pursuit 
is  requisite  in  order  to  reap  the  fruits  of  victory.  The 
pursuit  must  be  conducted  with  all  available  forces  and 
kept  up  so  long  as  there  is  a  breath  left  in  horse  and  man, 
until,  if  possible,  the  enemy  is  completely  dispersed.  This 
task  will  fall,  in  the  main,  to  the  lot  of  the  cavalry.  When 
the  battle  nears  the  crisis,  all  cavalry  units,  even  those  of  the 
divisional  cavalry,  hurry  forward  of  their  own  accord,  in 
order  to  be  on  the  spot  and  ready  for  their  subsequent  tasks. 
After  a  victorious  battle,  the  bulk  of  the  army  can  dis- 
pense with  cavalry. 

"When  difficult  terrain  does  not  permit  the  laimching 
of  large  cavalry  units  in  tactical  ptu"siiit,  the  leaders  of 
these  units  indicate  a  general  objective  and  leave  it  to  the 
brigades  and  the  regiments  to  work  themselves,  as  best 
they  can,  close  to  the  fleeing  enemy.  It  is  then  better 
to  make  local  motmted  charges  than  to  do  nothing. 

"The  leader  of  each  cavalry  unit,  even  though  it  be 
independent  for  the  time  being  only,  is  personally  re- 
sponsible that  all  the  measures  possible  in  the  circum- 
stances are  taken  by  him  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  retreat- 
ing enemy."*     (Par.  514,  German  C.  D.  R.) 

"When  the  battle  terminates  unfavorably,  the  cavalry 
must  exert  all  its  energy  to  facilitate  the  retreat  of  the  other 
arms.  This  is  the  very  situation  in  which  an  aggressive 
offensive  on  its  part  is  requisite.  Above  all  else,  however, 
repeated  charges  against  the  flanks  of  the  pursuing  enemy 
will  be  worth  while.  Even  temporary  relief  afforded  the 
retiring  infantry  and  a  Uttle  time  gained  may  avert  com- 
plete defeat.  To  cavalry  that  succeeds  in  doing  this  wiU 
belong,  if  not  victory,  at  least  the  honor  of  the  day." 
(Par.  518,  German  C.  D.  R.). 

France.  General  Bumez,  President  of  the  Cavalry  Board,  demands 
numerous  combined  exercises  of  the  two  arms  in  order  that  they  may 


*Dem  abziehenden  Feinde  an  der  Klinge  zu  bleiben;  literally,  to  keep  blade 
crossed  with  the  retreating  enemy. 


102  The  Leader. 

become  acquainted  with  one  another's  combat  performance.  General 
Tremeau  went  still  farther  in  that  he  advocated  cavalry  charges  in  battle, 
even  against  unshaken  infantry.  "Such  charges  will  succeed  more 
easily  nowadays  than  in  the  past,  as  they  will  be  prepared  fcy  the  in- 
tense fire  of  numerous  batteries.  Thanks  to  their  exceedingly  rapid 
course,  these  charges  wiD  even  be  able  to  open  the  door  to  the  decisive 
infantry  attack."  The  regulations  do  not  consider  the  effect  that  the 
formation  of  large  tactical  units  of  cavalry  will  have  on  cavalry  operations. 
Neither  do  they  consider  the  expenditure  of  moral  energy  that  every 
large  engagement  entails.* 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  commander-in-chief  to  designate  the  moment 

when  the  cavahy  is  to  be  launched.     On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  duty  of 

the  cavalry  to  be  prepared  to  ride  down  unshaken  infantry  and,  when 

the  battle  is  about  to  terminate,  to  complete  the  enemy's  defeat  by  a 

.jcharge. 


2.    THE  LEADER.t 

'Cavalry  is  to  make  the  most  of  the  success  gained  by 
"the  other  arms  and  of  moments  of  temporary  weakness 
of  the  enemy.  It  is  a  fact,  constantly  recurring  in  miUtary 
history,  that,  with  the  approach  of  a  crisis  in  the  fight, 
calls  for  cavalry  either  to  pursue  or  to  check  the  enemy 
become  heard.  It  is,  indeed,  in  the  rarest  cases  only, 
that  the  crisis  occurs  suddenly  and  unexpectedly.  Usually 
the  approximate  time  and  place  of  its  occurrence  may  be 
foretold.  The  commander-in-chief  must  perceive  when 
and  where  the  crisis  will  occur  and  move  the  cavalry 
closer  to  the  decisive  points.  Whatever  losses  the  cavalry 
unavoidably  suffers  in  such  advanced  positions  must  be 

*But  these  views  are  by  no  means  generally  shared  by  the  whole  arm. 
Thus,  to  quote  ft'om  an  essay  appearing  in  the  May  1908  number  of  the  Revue 
4e  Cavalerie,  under  the  title.  La  cavalerie  dans  la  dicouverte: 

"It  is  not  until  after  the  battle,  when  the  fight  of  all  the  arms  has  shaken 
the  enemy,  that  we  have  an  opportunity  to  draw  saber.  Then  it  is  essential 
that  good  work  be  done;  that  the  point  where  the  force  is  to  be  launched  be  deter- 
mined, in  order  to  convert  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  into  rout.  .  .  .  Lance 
and  saber  are  the  weapons  of  the  nightfall  of  battle;  it  is  then  that  they  demon- 
strate their  value  and  produce  their  legendary  eflfect.  The  thrust  is  replaced 
by  the  cut;  the  flash  of  the  blade  deprives  the  enemy  of  all  ideas  of  resistance; 
•everything  is  effective:  the  appearance  of  a  Don  Quixote  on  a  broken-down  steed 
strikes  the  inhabitants  of  a  whole  farm  with  terror;  four  Uhlans  capture  a  village. 
«  French  escadron  a  whole  fortress." 

fPars.  398-407,  Oerman  C.  D.  R. 


Moment  for  Charging.  103 

borne.  The  cavalry  leaders  will  have  plenty  of  time  and 
opportunity  to  become  acquainted  with  the  terrain  over 
which  they  will  have  to  charge.  At  any  rate,  however, 
the  cavalry  will  be  able  to  charge  better  prepared  and  with 
better  prospects  of  success  than  if  it  first  has  to  be  brought 
up  from  the  rear. 

The  moments  that  are  favorable  for  a  charge  are 
fleeting.  Every  position  and  every  movement  must  be 
calculated  to  enable  the  unit  quickly  to  deploy  in  any 
direction  for  a  charge.  But  the  increased  range  of  modem 
weapons  compels  the  cavalry  to  remain  farther  away  from 
the  fighting  Le*  than  Js  the  case  during  the  era  of 
Frederick  the  Great.  Therefore,  if  the  cavalry  were  to 
wait  tmtil  the  commander-in-chief  ordered  it  to  charge, 
it  would,  in  most  cases,  arrive  too  late.  A  cavalry  leader 
shoidd  not  wait  imtil  he  is  ordered  to  charge.  He  should 
choose  an  observation  point  from  which  he  can  follow  the 
progress  of  the  general  action  and  hold  his  force  in  readi- 
ness in  a  covered  position  that  will  enable  it  to  advance 
promptly  at  any  time.f  To  send  officers  ahead  and  to 
have  them  observe  the  battlefield  is  but  a  makeshift. 

**To  see  for  oneself  is  the  best  plan  in  all  situations; 
when  charging  cavalry,  it  is  absolutely  essential  (Par.  403, 
German  C.  D.  R.).  Surprise  is  a  prerequisite  to  success, 
since,  if  surprised,  the  enemy  will  not  have  time  to  take 
adequate  counter-measures  to  ward  off  the  charge.  Cavalry 
that  is  halted,  J  or  in  a  formation  that  does  not  per- 
mit it  to  bring  all  of  its  weapons  into  play,  or  that  is  in  the 
act  of  deplojdng  on  debouching  from  a  defile,  If  is  always  a 

'H^harglnc  distanoest  The  17th  Hussars  coyered  2»800  m.  In  charging  a 
battery  of  the  French  Guard  at  YionvUle,  and  Bredow's  Brigade  covered  3,200  m. 
during  its  charge.  The  6th  Oavah'y  Dlylslon.  which  attacked  at  1  o'clock 
P.  M.,  covered  6,100  m.,  2,800  m..  of  this  before  It  arrived  abreast  of  VionviUe. 
After  the  taking  of  St.  Privat,  the  11th  and  the  17th  Hussars  had  to  ride  2,400 
m.  before  they  could  charge  and — ^they  arrived  too  late. 

fThe  conduct  of  the  2d  Bscadron  of  the  11th  Uhlans  at  Loigny.  Kunz, 
ReitBTei,  p.  288. 

tOharge  made  by  Bemhardi's  Uhlan  brigade  against  Tucfi's  brigade  at 
Orleans.     Kunz,  Beiterei,  p.  304. 

tOenappes.  June  17th,  1815.     v.  Ollboh,  Feldzug  von  1815,  p.  181. 


104  The  Leader. 

favorable  objective  even  for  an  inferior  cavalry  force.  The 
opponent  will  likewise  be  imprepared  when  his  horses  are 
exhausted,  when  he  is  in  the  act  of  assembling,  or  when  he 
allows  himself  to  be  enticed  into  pursuing  without  reserves. 
To  come  too  early  is  just  as  dangerous  as  to  come  too  late. 

A  worthy  model  is  the  conduct  of  General  von  Seydlitz  at  Zomdorf » 
where  that  general  fearlessly  opposed  the  royal  impatience  with  the  con- 
sciousness of  his  own  knowledge  and  ability  to  do  the  correct  thing  at  the 
proper  time.  Patience  and  adequate  preparation  of  a  charge  are  what 
distinguished  Seydlitz  from  M-urat,  who — violent,  rash  and  restless  as 
he  was — Gloved  to  throw  himself  pell-mell  upon  the  enemy  wherever  he 
found  him. 

**I  rate  personality  in  the  arm  so  highly,  that  every- 
thing else  pales  into  insignificance  beside  it ;  that  all  prog- 
nostications, all  efforts  to  raise  the  importance  of  the  arm 
in  future  war  come  to  nothing,  if  provisions  are  not  made 
beforehand  in  this  respect.  It  is  certain  that,  in  many 
a  man,  powers  never  before  noticed  or  lying  dormant  very 
frequently  do  not  become  apparent  until  the  enemy  is 
faced,  and  that  there  are  likewise  cases  where  fond  ex- 
pectations are  shattered.  But  it  is  equally  certain  that, 
in  the  cavalry,  daring  and  the  ability  to  make  bold  deci- 
sions quickly,  are  far  more  essential  than  in  the  other  arms. 
It  is  indispensable  that  a  cavalry  leader  be  in  the  full  vigor 
of  manhood;  that  the  joy  of  daring  be  not  as  yet  too  much 
dulled  by  deliberation.  He  must  unquestionably  be  picked 
out  only  from  among  men  who  still  enjoy  putting  their  horses 
over  natural  obstacles. 

**The  necessary  tactical  and  strategical  knowledge 
and  confidence  in  leading  the  command  that  is  to  be  en- 
trusted to  him  are  further  prerequisites  of  a  cavalry  leader, 
for  youth  and  bold  riding  alone  do  not  suffice.  For  this 
reason,  the  scheme  proposed  here  and  there,  of  placing 
youthful  officers,  without  regard  to  their  length  of  service, 
at  the  head  of  cavalry  divisions  in  case  of  mobilization, 
does  not  seem  practicable,  because  the  ability  to  lead  cavalry 


Importance  of  Personality.  105 

masses  can  be  acquired  only  by  practice  and  experience. 
Where  experience  is  lacking — ^if  we  except  a  genius  like 
Seydlitz — ^the  inability  of  many  of  the  young  officers  to 
fill  the  positions  to  which  they  are  chosen  in  the  proposed 
scheme,  and  their  consequent  lack  of  confidence  in  their 
own  ability,  would  become  apparent/'* 

The  demands  that  must  be  made  on  a  cavalry  leader 
who  is  acting  independently  are  extraordinarily  high. 
Even  poorly  trained  cavalry  is  capable  of  doing  good  work 
when  led  by  an  eminent  leader.  ''Most  of  the  distinguished 
cavalry  leaders  known  to  history,"  writes  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  **were  between  25  and  40  years  old.  To  be  sure, 
most  of  our  general  officers  and  regimental  commanders 
have  passed  this  age — ^the  fire  of  youth  is  gone;  but  train- 
ing may,  nevertheless,  make  up  for  much  of  this,  if  strength, 
devotion  to  duty  and  energy  are  combined. "t  As  a  cavalry 
leader  is  left  to  exercise  his  independent  judgment  in  regard 
to  taking  a  hand  in  the  battle,  he  must  possess  capacity 
for  high  command  and  an  intimate  knowledge  of  all  strate- 
gical and  tactical  situations.  In  order  to  employ  cavalry 
successfully,  he  requires,  fiuther,  a  thorough  knowledge 
of  his  own  and  other  arms,  great  skill  in  leading,  and  cor- 
rect judgment  in  regard  to  the  capacity  of  horses.  The 
qualities  of  mind  and  heart,  without  which  the  cavalry 
leader  is  not  equal  to  his  task,  consist  of  extremes  that  are 
very  rarely  harmoniously  combined  in  one  and  the  same 
person. 

"Aside  from  youthful  agility  when  moimted,  he  must 
possess  a  keen  eye,  the  ability  of  correctly  judging  a  situation 
at  a  glance,  prompt  decision,  a  firm  will  and  the  gift  of 
expressing  the  latter  in  clear  and  concise  orders.  He 
requires  imperturbable  patience   to   await   the   favorable 

♦von  Pblbt-Narbonnb,  Die  Vorbedinoungen  des  Erfolges  fUr,  die  ReiUrei, 
Supplement  No,  12  to  Militar-Wochenblatt,  1904. 

tCromwell  and  Zieten  attained  high  command  at  45,  Seydlitz  at  36,  Stuart 
at  27,  and  Murat  at  23.  General  French  was  47  years  old  in  1900,  and  both 
Rennenkampf  and  Mlshchenko  reached  that  age  during  the  Russo-Japanese 
war. 


106  The  Leader. 

moment  just  as  much  as  he  does  dash  and  courage  in 
recklessly  laimching  all  his  forces  when  the  time  for  deli- 
beration has  passed."     (Par.  398,  German  C.  D.  R.).* 

During  a  battle,  the  cavalry  leader  must  be  in  con- 
stant communication  with  the  commander-in-chief,  in 
order  to  keep  himself  informed  in  regard  to  the  governing 
tactical  purpose  as  well  as  the  state  of  the  fight.  He, 
in  turn,  keeps  the  commander-in-chief  constantly  informed 
in  regard  to  the  results  of  combat  reconnaissance  and 
in  regard  to  his  own  measures.  He  must  likewise  keep  in 
touch,  through  the  medium  of  information  officers,  with 
events  that  occur  in  neighboring  parts  of  the  army.  (Par. 
70,  German  F.  S.  R.). 

The  leader  must  keep  his  force  together  and  make 
careful  provisions  to  counteract  dispersion,  which  is  very 
easily  occasioned.  He  should  laimch  only  so  much  of  his 
force  as  the  attainment  of  the  object  in  view  requires. 

Brigade  commanders  ride  with  division  headquarters 
tmtil  the  development  begins,  whereupon  they  join  their  bri- 
gades keeping  in  view  adjoining  brigades  and  the  divi- 
sion conmiander.  The  commanders  of  the  artillery  and  the 
machine  gims  remain  with  the  division  staff  until  the  time 
of  their  employment.  An  officer  from  each  brigade,  from 
the  artillery,  and  from  the  machine  guns  is  attached  to 
division  headquarters  to  facilitate  transmission  of  orders. 
The  pioneer  detachment  is  given  special  orders  when 
necessary.  In  order  to  prevent  mistakes,  it  is  a  good 
plan  for  those  transmitting  orders  to  repeat,  on  returning, 
to  the  general  staff  officer  of  the  division  the  orders  they 
have  actually  given.  The  headquarter's  flag  should  be  visible 
to  the  troops  belonging  to  the  command,  but  must  not 
betray  the  position  of  headquarters  to  the  enemy.  As 
a  rule,  the  division  commander  will  not  lead  his  division  in 
person;  he  indicates  when  the  reserves  are  to  engage. 

*"If  you  do  not  ride  your  horse  like  a  centaur,  if  you  do  not  posneBs  the 
glance  of  the  eagle,  the  courage  of  the  lion,  the  decision  of  the  thunderbolt,  you 
are  not  fit  to  command  a  cavalry  charge."     For. 


Factors  upon  which  Success  Depends.         107 

The  conduct  of  the  opposing  cavalry  leaders  had  a 
great  influence  on  the  issue  of  the  cavalry  action  at  Ville 
sur  Yron.  The  French  cavalry  commander  threw  himself 
into  the  fight  and  was  killed,  whereas  his  opponent  desisted 
from  personal  participation  in  the  action.  The  superior 
cavalry  commander  can  direct  and  lead  his  command 
only  when  he  keeps  out  of  the  turmoil.  If  the  leader 
is  killed,  the  general  staff  officer  or  the  adjutant  assumes 
command  until  the  next  ranking  officer  has  been  notified 
and  has  arrived. 

The  freshness  and  physical  condition  of  the  horses 
are  additional  factors  upon  \^hich  success  depends.  The 
leader  should  take  care  to  conserve  the  energy  of  his  organi- 
zation until  the  fight  begins.  He  should,  therefore,  avoid 
useless  detours,  take  care  not  to  tire  his  horses  during  the 
march  to  the  battlefield,  and,  by  halting  and  dismounting, 
give  them  a  chance  to  rest.  Even  on  the  battlefield,  he 
should  take  advantage  of  every  opportunity  to  water  and 
feed.  The  cavalry  should  be  spared  imnecessary  and 
premature  losses.  But  it  should  not  be  withdrawn  so 
far  from  the  zone  of  effective  fire  that  its  timely  entry 
into  action  would  be  doubtful. 

Within  the  limits  of  the  commander-in-chief's  intentions, 
the  cavalry  leader  must  be  left  freedom  of  action  in  employ- 
ing his  unit  as  he  sees  fit.  He  should  never  wait  for  orders, 
but  cheerfully  asstmie  the  responsibility  of  grasping  oppor- 
tunities to  engage.  In  doubtful  cases,  he  should  act  on 
the  principle  that  the  bolder  decision  is,  as  a  rule,  like- 
wise the  better  one.  All  leaders  should  bear  in  mind  and 
should  impress  upon  their  subordinates  that  omission  or 
neglect  are  greater  crimes  than  a  mistake  made  in  the  choice 
of  means. 


108  Dismounted  Action  of  Cavalry. 


3.    THE  DISMOUNTED  ACTION  OF  CAVALRY.* 

Mounted  action  continues  to  be  the  principal  combat 
method  of  cavahy.  But  its  small  arm,  its  machine  guns 
and  its  horse  artillery,  endow  the  cavalry  with  such  many- 
sidedness  that  it  can  act  independently  under  almost  any 
war  conditions  and  can  make  itself  useful  in  nearly  every 
situation  on  the  battlefield.  Dismounted  action,  when 
conducted  effectively  and  on  a  large  scale,  is  expensive.  The 
probable  gain  to  be  derived  from  it  should  be  properly 
commensurate  with  the  unavoidable  losses  it  entails. 
For  this  reason,  a  decision  to  fight  on  foot  requires  the  most 
serious  consideration.  Our  opponents  will  endeavor  to 
contest  with  their  rifles  the  advance  of  our  cavalry,  and 
the  hostile  inhabitants  will  arm  themselves,  so  that  the 
cavalry  will  be  obliged  to  employ  its  carbine  more  frequently 
than  ever  before.  When  this  is  the  case,  the  leader  must 
bear  in  mind  that  the  strength  of  the  cavalry  lies  in 
offensive  action.  The  mounted  charge  produces  a  greater 
moral  effect  on  friend  and  foe  than  dismounted  action. 
Dismoimted,  the  cavalry  can  make  itself  exceedingly 
useful,  but  the  decision  always  lies  in  the  mounted  charge. 
Cavalry  that  fights  on  foot  only,  can  screen  properly, 
but  it  can  not  reconnoiter.  Its  efficiency  will  be  still 
further  reduced  if  its  led  horses  get  into  effective  hosile 
fire.  Its  armament  with  a  long  range  magazine  small 
arm,t  and  the  employment  of  smokeless  powder — ^which 

*Pars.  296-388  and  452-496.  German  C.  D.  R. 

tThe  Insufficient  armament  of  the  German  cavalry  with  carbines,  waa 
felt  particularly  during  the  second  part  of  the  Franco-German  war,  when  a  con- 
siderable number  of  Inhabitants  began  to  take  part  in  the  war.  In  a  number  of 
cases  escadrons  of  Dragoons  or  of  Hussars  were  attached  to  the  regiments  not 
armed  with  carbines  (Geschichte  des  Kdnig-Ulanen-Regiments,  pp.  72,  91-96), 
and  patrols  and  escorts  were  formed  of  Dragoons  and  Uhlans  (Iunk.  Bewegunoen 
und  das  Entkommen  des  Korps  Vinoy,  p.  30).  Frequently  the  4th  platoons  in 
the  escadrons  of  Uhlan  regiments  were  armed  with  captured  Ohassepots.  (Gs' 
Bchichte  des  Uhlanenregiments  Nr.  10,  p.  204).  Even  regiments  armed  with  the 
carbine  seized  Ohassepots.  as  the  needle  carbine  did  not  carry  far  enough.  (Qt- 
schichte  der  Leibhusaren,  II.  p.  984).  It  was  ft-equently  necessary  to  attach  in- 
fantry to  the  cavalry  divisions,  but  this  reduced  the  mobility  of  the  cavalry. 
iKriegsgeschichiliche  Einzelschriften,  Part  11.  Gen.  St.  W.,  I,  pp.  396  and  398; 
III,  p.  402).  This  procedure  was  successful  only  when  the  cavalry  did  duty 
In  observation  stations  or  had  to  hold  Isolated  points.     See  p.  18,  supra. 


General  Discussion.  109 

makes  it  very  diflBcult  to  determine  the  strength  of  a  force 
lodged  in  some  feature  of  the  terrain — ^have  considerably 
increased  the  power  of  cavalry  in  dismounted  action. 
But  dismounted  cavalry  is  considerably  restricted  as  regards 
its  freedom  of  movement  by  consideration  for  its  led  horses. 
Neither  is  it  in  condition  to  sustain  the  losses  incident  to 
a  decisive  fire  fight,  if  it  desires  to  continue  to  fulfill  its 
proper  functions.  After  a  dismounted  fight  carried  on  to 
within  close  range,  the  victor  will  not  allow  the  defeated 
cavalry  to  motmt  up.  As  a  consequence,  the  escadrons 
dismounted  to  fight  on  foot  will  be  annihilated.  Losses 
in  fire  action  impair  the  fighting  power  of  cavalry,  since,  for 
every  man  disabled,  a  second  one,  who  holds  the  horse  of 
the  former,  falls  out.  It  is  always  a  good  plan  to  deceive 
the  enemy  in  regard  to  the  character  of  the  arm  by  which 
he  is  opposed.  In  Austria,  the  head-covering  peculiar 
to  the  cavalry  is  to  be  fastened  to  the  saddle,  if  time  ad- 
mits, and  the  field  cap  worn.  The  difficulty  of  replenish- 
ing the  ammimition  of  the  cavalry  in  front  of  the  army  should 
likewise  not  be  underestimated.  The  leader  should  ap- 
preciate these  difficulties,  but  they  should  never  be  allowed 
to  serve  as  an  excuse  for  inactivity.  **No  unit  except 
one  that  is  thoroughly  master  of  dismounted  fire  action 
will  employ  its  carbine  with  confidence.  A  dismounted 
fighty  half-heartedly  undertaken,  contains  within  itself  the 
seed  of  failure''     (Par.  452,  German  C.  D.  R.). 

The  combat  formation  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  in- 
fantry. But  in  this  a  considerable  difference  must  be 
noticed.  The  cavalry,  taking  advantage  of  its  mobility 
and  bringing  into  action,  with  the  utmost  despatch,  all 
of  its  rifles,  seeks  to  attain  success  quickly.  Nothing 
is  more  imfavorable  than  for  it  to  become  involved  in  a 
protracted,  vaccilating  skirmish,  for  which  its  ammunition 
does  not  suffice.  Such  an  action  would,  moreover,  con- 
siderably weaken  it  for  mounted  action.  Infantry  is 
launched  for  attack  in  deep  formation  and  equipped  with 


110  Dismounted  Action  op  Cavalry. 

about  200  roimds  of  ammunition  per  man,  whereas  cavalry 
is  deployed  on  a  broad  front  with  at  most  only  90  rotmds 
of  ammunition  per  carbine.  Infantry  reckons  in  defense 
with  the  enemy's  breaking  down  at  the  muzzles  of  the 
defender's  rifles;  cavalry  must  endeavor  to  bring  about 
the  decision  at  long  ranges.  *'The  cavalry  conducts  its 
dismoimted  action  by  suddenly  developing  a  strong  fire 
power  so  as  to  attain  quickly  the  superiority  of  fire.  There- 
fore, the  fire  fight  of  the  cavalry  should  not  have  the  in- 
fantry character  of  an  obstinate  struggle,  but  the  cavalry 
character  of  a  pressing  to  a  prompt  decision.  The  mo- 
bility of  the  cavalry  may  be  utilized  even  while  the  fight  is  in 
progress,  for  the  purpose  of  influencing  the  tactical  situa- 
tion. The  dismounted  reserve  should  be  restricted  to 
the  minimum  size  compatible  with  the  necessities  of  the 
particular  case;  all  other  available  forces  should  join  the 
moimted  reserve."* 

General  v.  Bemhardi  believes  that  an  escadron  at  war  strength  is 
considerably  superior  in  fire  action  to  a  company  of  infantry  at  war  strength. 
He  states: 

"It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  discuss  which  body  of  troops  must  have 
greater  steadiness,  or  on  which  one  is  more  likely  to  be  able  to  depend  in 
cases  where  moral  qualities,  cohesion  and  fire  discipline  are  all  essential. 
I  should  only  like  to  add  that,  apart  from  all  other  considerations,  the 
direct  influence  of  the  leaders  in  the  cavalry  and  their  supervision  over 
their  men  is  much  more  highly  developed  than  in  the  infantry.  It  must 
also  be  remembered  that  there  are  generally  fewer  skulkers  in  the  cavalry, 
partly  because  of  the  more  thorough  military  training  due  to  closer  super- 
vision and  to  the  longer  period  of  service,  and  partly  because  everybody  en- 
deavors not  to  be  separated  from  his  horse,  and  finds  in  his  presence  with 
the  men  of  his  unit  the  best  guarantee  of  getting  back  to  his  mount.  In 
view  of  these  considerations,  I  believe  that  our  cavalry  is  justified  in  claim- 
ing that  it  can  engage  the  best  existing  infantry  with  reasonable  prospects 
of  success,  and  that  it  has  a  right  to  feel  superior  at  all  times  to  inferior 
infantry.  With  this  knowledge,  the  scope  of  its  activity  is  enormously 
increased." 

The  fear  formerly  entertained  that  the  cavalry  spirit 
would  suffer  through  a  frequent  application  of  dismounted 

*Y.  Edelsheim,  Uber  kriegsmdszige  Ausbildung  und  Verwendung  unser  r 
Kavallerie,  p.  141. 


Occasions  for  Using  Dismounted  Action.      Ill 

action  has  proven  tinfotinded.  At  any  rate,  the  squadrons 
of  Frederick  the  Great  and,  in  more  recent  times,  the  sqtiad- 
rons  of  Stuart  and  of  Sheridan*  have  demonstrated  that> 
in  spite  of  using  dismounted  action,  the  dashing  cavalry 
spirit  was  by  no  means  impaired.  The  contention  that 
dismotmted  action  would  impair  the  cavalry  spirit  was  a 
favorite  slogan  employed  to  cover  the  aversion  felt  against 
using  the  carbine.  But,  be  this  as  it  may,  for  a  handfull 
of  partisans  to  check  whole  cavalry  regiments  that  did  not 
possess  the  means  of  brushing  them  aside  was  certainly 
detrimental  to  the  cavalry  spirit. 

The  drill  regulations  of  Frederick  the  Great  for  his  Cuirassiers, 
Dragoons  and  Hussars  not  only  required  that  villages  were  to  be  for- 
tified and  held  against  hostile  attacks,  but  demanded,  likewise,  that 
cemeteries,  etc.,  were  to  be  attacked  and  taken  by  cavalry.  After  the 
Seven  Years'  war,  the  king  declared  the  11th  Dragoon  Regiment  (v. 
Mitzlaff)  "to  be  entirely  unfit  for  war,  because  it  could  not  fire  smooth 
volleys  when  dimounted."  In  his  Instructions  of  March  17th,  1744,  the 
king  says:  "The  Dragoons,  however,  are  to  drill  diligently  on  foot,  just 
as  the  infantry  drills,  with  all  three  ranks,  the  bayonets  fixed;  and  they 
must  drill  as  well  on  foot  as  does  a  regiment  of  infantry." 

OCCASIONS  FOR  EMPLOYING  DISMOUNTED  ACTION. 

The  combat  methods  employed  by  the  enemy  and  the 
character  of  the  terrain  of  the  theater  of  operations  are  the 
factors  that  determine  whether  or  not  dismounted  action 
should  be  employed.  A  belligerent  who  is  prepared  to 
operate  on  passable  terrain  that  permits  great  freedom  of 
movement,  would  do  well  to  put  prominently  forward  the 
purely  moimted  side ;  but  one  who  may  expect  to  encoimter 
his  enemy  in  the  moim tains  or  on  a  covered  or  broken  plain 
will,  whether  he  likes  or  not,  be  obliged  to  take  to  dismounted 
action,  if  he  wishes  to  avoid  being  stalemated. 

Dismotmted  action  may  be  employed, — 

1.     In  the  service  of  reconnaissance,  for  the  purpose 

*Stuart  and  his  squadrons  fought  dismounted  at  the  battle  of  Fredericks- 
burg; Sheridan  did  the  same  at  Five  Forks. 


112  Dismounted  Action  of  Cavalry. 

of  forcing  occupied  defiles  that  prevent  a  further  advance 
and  that  can  not  be  turned  except  by  making  a  detour  in- 
volving loss  of  time.* 

2.  In  the  service  of  screening,!  for  the  purpose  of 
barring  defiles  or  gaining  localities  ahead  of  the  enemy  and 
holding  them  until  the  arrival  of  friendly  infantry. 

3.  In  retrogade  movements,  for  the  purpose  of  delay- 
ing the  enemy  and  forcing  him  to  deploy. 

4.  When  escadrons  with  machine  guns  are  pushed 
forward  to  create  supporting  points  for  the  deplojrment,  to 
support  the  motmted  charge  by  fire  or  to  furnish  a  rallying 
point  upon  which  the  charging  force,  if  defeated,  can  rally. 
(Par.  438,  German  C.  D.  R.)t 

5.  When  cavalry  acts  as  support  for  artillery  and  when 
broken  terrain  or  great  fire  effect  of  the  enemy  precludes 
successful  mounted  action.  The  cavalry  of  the  rear  guard 
will  frequently  be  employed  in  this  manner,  to  enable 
artillery  to  maintain  its  position  after  the  infantry  has  taken 
up  its  march.lF 

6.  During  the  *  *  enveloping  pursuit ' '  (par.  515,  German 
C.  D.  R.),  for  the  purpose  of  dispersing  trains  and  supply 
columns  and  checking  route  columns  until  the  pursuing 
infantry  can  come  up.     (See  p.  86,  supra). 

7.  To  molest  by  fire  hostile  route  columns  in  order 
better  to  ascertain  their  strength,  to  impair  their  cohesion, 
and  to  delay  them  by  forcing  them  to  deploy  or  to  deviate 
from  their  march  direction.  §  Fire  surprise.  (Par.  47 1-— 473 
and  497,  German  C.  D.  R.) 

*  Dismounted  action  of  the  16th  HuBsars  at  Voncq,  north  of  Vouzlen. 
August  2Qth.  1870.     Gen.  St.  W.,  II.  p.  1031.     KUNZ.  Reiterei,  p.  184. 

tPars.  194-198.  German  F.  S.  R.—Taktik,  IV,  pp.  186,  198  and  207. 

^French  Chasseurs  &  cheval  at  Busancy,  August  27th,  1870.  Kunz,  Reiierei, 
p.  181. 

^The  Austrian  brigade  under  Appel  at  Gltschin  in  1866. 

$The  engagement  of  Llebenau,  June  26th.  1866.  An  escadron  of  Prussian 
Hussars  that  had  dismounted  in  rear  of  some  abatis  on  Semmel  hill,  was  mis- 
taken for  infantry,  caused  the  advance  guard  of  the  7th  Infantry  Division,  con- 
sisting of  the  4th  Battalion  of  Jagers  and  the  72d  Infantry  (Geschichte  des  Regi- 
ments, p.  61),  to  deploy  and  delayed  it  three-quarters  of  an  hour. 

French  Dragoons  on  Kaninchen  hill  at  Forbach,  August  6th,  1870.  See 
p.  129,  infra. 

Hussars  of  the  Prussian  Guard  at  Bapaume,  January  30th.  1871.  Kunz, 
Reiterei,  p.  241.  The  approaching  French  reinforcements  were  delayed.  See 
p.  97.  supra. 


Formation.  113 

8.  To  deceive  and  molest  the  enemy  (by  surprising 
him  with  fire  directed  against  his  flanks  and  rear)  in  action 
and  in  camp,  and  to  carry  out  surprises  both  by  day  and  by 
night,  particulariy  in  rear  of  the  hostile  army.  To  support 
the  infantry  in  battle  by  taking  the  utmost  advantage  of 
mobility.  A  cavalry  division  that  develops  its  whole  fire 
power  on  a  flank  or  in  rear  of  the  enemy,  may  produce  a  de- 
cisive effect.* 

9.  To  defend  its  own  cantonments  (in  Italy,  in  addi- 
tion, to  enable  it  to  mount  up),  and,  in  the  service  of  security 
to  spare  the  horses  tmdue  hardships. 

The  general  principles  governing  the  use  and  conduct 
of  dismoimted  action  are  similarly  expressed  in  all  the 
drill  regulations.  But  a  special  fondness  for  the  use  of 
the  fire  arm  is  perhaps  not  unjustly  ascribed  to  the  Russian 
cavalry.  The  Russian  regulations  do  emphasize  repeat- 
edly, to  be  sure,  that  the  cavalry  is  to  solve,  by  means  of 
moimted  action,  the  problems  falling  to  its  lot,  and  that 
its  use  in  dismoimted  action  is  to  be  restricted  to  excep- 
tional cases.  But  the  thorough  infantry  training  that  the 
Russian  cavalryman  receives  as  regards  dismoimted  drill 
and  even  bayonet  fencing,  the  rifle  and  bayonet  of  the 
Dragoons,  and  the  frequent  mention  of  hand-to-hand 
combat  when  fighting  on  foot,  force  the  cultivation  of 
dismoimted  action  more  into  the  foreground. 

FORMATION. 

The  escadron  is  the  tactical  unit  for  dismounted  action. 
Larger  organizations  are  formed  abreast,  as  a  general 
rule,  so  as  to  preserve  order  and  facilitate  regaining  the  led 
horses.  If  employed  in  echelon  formation,  all  units  would 
be  disordered  to  such  an  extent  in  action  that  their  sub- 
sequent employment  immediately  thereafter  would  have 

*The  attack  made  against  Chenebier.  January  17th,  1871,  by  French  In- 
fantry and  dismounted  troopers  of  the  6th  March  Dragoons.  Kunz.  EnischeU 
dungskHmpfe  d$s  Oenerals  van  Werder,  II,  p.  129,  et  seq. 


114  Dismounted  Action  of  Cavalry. 

to  be  dispensed  with.  The  unit  designated  for  dismounted 
action  is  formed  into  skirmishers^  when  requisite  with 
supports,  led  horses,  sl  mounted  reserve,  and,  when  necessary, 
a  dismounted  reserve. 

Dismounted  or  mounted  combat  patrols  observe  on 
the  flanks.     (Par.  338,  German  C.  D.  R.). 

DISMOUNTING  TO  FIGHT  ON  FOOT  AND 

MOUNTING  UP.* 

The  number  of  carbines  that  a  unit  can  bring  into 
action  depends  upon  the  degree  of  mobility  of  its  led 
horses.  The  circumstances  of  each  individual  case  deter- 
mine which  is  more  important:  whether  to  develop  as 
great  a  fire  power  as  possible,  or  whether  to  retain  the  ability 
quickly  to  resume  mounted  action.  Another  factor  of 
importance  is,  whether  or  not  the  led  horses  can  be  posted 
in  the  vicinity  under  cover.  It  may  sometimes  be  a  good 
plan  in  such  situations  to  designate  a  greater  ntmiber 
of  escadrons  for  dismounted  action,  but  to  have  them 
dismount  half  of  their  men  only.  Ordinarily,  one-half 
of  the  troopers  (the  odd  numbers,!  according  to  par.  365, 
German  C.  D.  R.)  or  three-fourths  (par.  366,  German 
C.  D.  R.)  dismount.  In  the  last-mentioned  case,  each 
horse-holder  (the  trooper  on  the  left  flank  of  each  rank) 
leads  not  more  than  four  horses.  These  he  can  lead  at  the 
walk,  while  at  the  same  time  carrying  on  his  shoulder 
the  lances  fastened  together  with  an  arm  strap.  This 
makes  it  possible  to  execute  minor  changes  of  position, 
and  to  keep  at  a  distance  hostile  patrols  by  means  of  a 
few  dismounted  troopers.  When  the  led  horses  are  secure 
against  molestation  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  fight- 
ing line,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  number  of  horse-holders 

*Par8.  454  and  364-368,  German  C.  D.  R. 

fThe  fact  that  horses  are  more  easily  led  IVom  the  right  Is  of  trifling  Im- 
portance. The  dismounting  proceeds  more  rapidly  when  executed  ft-om  oolunm 
of  twos — in  which  case  the  platoons  move  into  their  respective  sections — than, 
when  executed  Arom  line. 


Dismounting  and  Mounting  Up.  115 

should  not  be  fttrther  reduced.  Definite  rules  showing 
when  one-half  and  when  three-fourths  of  the  troopers 
should  be  dismounted  to  fight  on  foot,  can  not  be  given. 
The  conflicting  requirements  of  fire  power  and  mobility 
must  be  harmonized  in  each  particular  case. 

The  led  horses  retain  the  same  relative  positions  as 
the  platoons  to  which  they  belong.  The  leader  of  the  led 
horses  must  keep  himself  informed  in  regard  to  the  pro- 
gress of  the  action,  and  must  take  care  to  ward  off  hostile 
patrols  by  means  of  sentries.  Moreover,  he  must  facili- 
tate the  prompt  mounting  up  of  the  skirmishers,  by  form- 
ing his  led  horses  in  an  orderly  manner,  platoons  and  ranks 
being  kept  distinct  and  a  proper  distance  apart. 

The  lances  are  laid  on  the  ground— when  in  line,  in 
advance  of  the  ranks,  when  in  column,  on  a  flank — ^in  such 
a  manner  that  they  can  not  be  damaged  by  the  horses. 
Unless  otherwise  ordered,  the  first  sergeant  and  the  non- 
commissioned ofiicers  posted  on  the  left  flanks  of  platoons 
remain  with  the  led  horses,  in  addition  to  the  horse-holders. 

An  escadron  of  140  troopers  can  bring  into  action 
from  70  to  105  carbines,  and  a  regiment,  if  one  escadron 
is  retained  as  a  mounted  reserve,  from  200  to  300  carbines, 
i.  e.,  approximately  the  equivalent  of  one  company.  A 
cavalry  division,  if  one  regiment  is  kept  out  as  a  mounted 
reserve,  can  develop  a  fire  power  equivalent  to  that  of  two 
battalions  of  infantry. 

If  the  troops  are  to  moimt  up  after  their  mission  is 
accomplished,  the  tactical  situation,  cover,  and  the  degree 
of  mobility  of  the  led  horses  will  determine  whether  they 
can  be  brought  up  to  meet  the  skirmishers,  or  whether 
the  latter  should  fall  back  upon  the  led  horses.  By  send- 
ing to  the  rear  men  that  can  be  spared,  even  led  horses 
that  possess  little  mobility  can  be  quickly  brought  up. 
The  carbine  remains  slung  on  the  trooper's  i)erson  for  the 
time  being. 


116  Dismounted  Action  of  Cavalry. 


SKIRMISHERS,  SUPPORTS  AND  DISMOUNTED  RESERVE. 

The  troopers  who  have  dismounted  form  by  platoons 
either  in  front  of  the  escadron  or  on  that  flank  of  the  column 
on  which  the  escadron  commander  happens  to  be.  The 
men  of  two  mounted  platoons  form  one  dismounted  platoon, 
which  is  in  turn  divided  into  squads  of  four  files  each.  A 
range  finder  joins  each  platoon  commander.  When  dis- 
mounted, the  escadron  may  be  formed  either  in  line,  or  in  line 
of  platoons  in  columns  of  squads.  The  methods  of  extended 
order  fighting  correspond  to  those  of  the  infantry.  If 
several  escadrons  are  sent  into  action,  each  provides  for  dis- 
tribution in  depth  (supports).  In  some  cases  a  dismoimted 
reserve  may  be  required  for  the  purpose  of  launching 
it  where  a  weak  spot  of  the  enemy  develops  during  the 
progress  of  the  fight  or  where  the  point  that  is  decisive  for 
the  attacker  is  perceived.  It  will  frequently  be  practi- 
cable to  dispense  with  it  entirely  until  it  is  required,  and  then 
to  take  it  from  the  parts  of  the  force  that  have  remained 
motmted.  By  taking  the  dismounted  reserve  from  the 
parts  of  the  command  that  have  remained  mounted,  one 
preserves  tmtil  the  last  moment  the  principal  advantage 
of  cavalry,  mobility. 

At  the  commencement  of  an  engagement,  care  must 
be  taken  that  suflficient  ammunition  is  provided.  To 
this  end,  the  ammunition  carried  by  the  horse-holders 
(45  rounds  per  carbine)  must,  in  the  first  place,  be  turned 
over  to  the  skirmishers,  provided  this  does  not  delay  the 
opening  of  fire.  Furthermore,  ammunition  should  be  ob- 
tained from  other  troops,  when  necessary,  or  the  ammunition 
wagons  brought  up.     (Par.  462,  German  C.  D.  R.). 


Mounted  Reserve;  Led  Horses. 


117 


Those  portions  of  the  command  that  have  not  dis- 
mounted constitute  the  mounted  reserve.  This  may  be 
used  either  mounted  or  dismounted.  It  continues  the 
combat  reconnaissance,  covers  the  led  horses,  and  may  be 
used  offensively  to  good  effect  against  the  flanks  of  the 
enemy,  or,  if  the  opposing  force  consists  of  dismounted 
cavalry,  against  its  led  horses.  When  the  action  is  being 
broken  off,  it  covers,  either  mounted  or  dismoimted,  the 
mounting  up. 

Armament  with  Fire  Arms. 


Year  of  construction. 


Weight  in  kg.. 
Length  in  cm. 


Caliber,  in  mm 

Sight  graduated  up  to,  m. 

Bayonet 

Magazine  is  loaded  by.... 


Ammunition   carried   by 
each  man 


Ger- 
many. 


1898 


Weight  of  ammunition  in 
K 


3.6 
1Q0.5 


8. 
2,000 


clip 
hold'g 

5 
rounds 

46 


Austria. 


1890 


3.3 
100.6 


8. 
1,800 


frame 
hold'g 

6 
rounds 

80 1[ 


Italy. 


1891 


3. 

92. 

with 

bayonet 

126. 

6.5 
2,000 

t 
frame 
hold'g 

6 
rounds 

96 


France. 


Rrissia. 


1890 


3. 
94.5 


8. 
2,000 


1,135 


1,582 


1,400 


frame 
hold'g 

3 
rounds 

66 

(Cuiras- 
siers, 
48) 

1,980 
(1,440) 


cos- 
sacks. 


Dra- 
goons. 


1896    I    1891 


3.28 


3.8* 
116.6 


7.62        7.62 
1,600      1,920 

t 

clip 
hold'g 
5 
rounds   rounds 


clip 

hold'g 

6 


45 


45 


1,010 


1,010 


Eng- 
land. 


1903 


3.7 


7.7 
1,800 


100 


2,975 


Cavalry  must  endeavor  to  place  its  led  horses  as  close 
as  possible  to  the  firing  line,  in  a  sheltered  position  per- 

*The  rifle  with  bayonet  fixed  weighs  4.094  kg.,  and  is  160.8  cm.  long..       ^ 

+The  bayonet  la  attached  to  the  rifle  by  means  of  a  hinge  and  when  not 
In  use  is  folded  back  so  as  to  He  along  the  stock. 

{The  bayonet  is  detachable. 

^The  trooper  carries  20  rounds  in  his  cartridge  pouches  and  30  rounds  in 
the  saddle  bags. 


118  Dismounted  Action  of  Cavalry. 

mitting  covered  commtmication  between  skirmishers  and 
led  horses.  It  is  particularly  important  that  the  posi- 
tion chosen  for  the  led  horses  be  sheltered  from  artillery 
fire.  When  attacking  dismounted,  cavalry  becomes  sepa- 
rated from  its  horses.  They  should,  therefore,  be  so 
posted  that  the  dismounted  force  need  not  worry  about 
them.  In  any  event,  a  threat  against  the  led  horses  should 
not  cause  the  force  of  the  attack  to  be  impaired.  In 
defense,  it  will  frequently  be  practicable  to  keep  the  led 
horses  very  close  to  the  firing  line.  But  even  in  this  case, 
they  should  be  posted  under  cover  and  due  consideration 
given  to  the  necessity  of  mounting  up  quietly  without 
interference  on  the  part  of  the  enemy. 

The  initial  velocity,  the  accuracy  and  the  beaten  zone  of  the  carbine 
are  smaller  than  in  the  infantry  rifle.  If  dismounted  cavalry  hopes  to 
engage  infantry  successfully,  it  requires  a  weapon  that  has  the  same  range 
as  that  of  the  infantry,  and  likewise  a  bayonet.  The  lance,  if  taken  along 
by  the  trooper  when  dismounted  to  fight  on  foot,  would  hamper  him  too 
much.  For  prompt  dismounting,  it  is  an  advantage  if  carbine  and  am- 
munition are  carried  on  the  trooper's  person. 

Provisions  of  Various  Regulations. 

Austria.     Two  methods  of  dismounting  are  used. 

First  metJiod  (the  led  horses  being  immobile  in  this  case):  The 
front  rank  advances  a  distance  of  ten  paces  and  dismounts.  The  horses 
on  the  flanks  are  then  moved  forward  and  each  rank  forms  a  circle,  each 
horse  being  linked,  by  means  of  the  halter-strap,  to  the  horse  on  its  left. 
One  trooper,  who  is  first  relieved  of  his  carbine  and  ammunition,  steps 
into  the  circle. 

Second  method:  Numbers  1,  2,  and  3  dismount.  If  time  admits, 
the  troopers  relieve  themselves  of  their  sabers  and  put  on  their  field  caps. 
The  regulations  prescribe  that  more  troopers  than  are  absolutely  required 
should  not  be  dismounted  to  fight  on  foot.  No  dismounted  reserve  is 
to  be  retained.  Escadrons  are  the  tactical  units  in  dismounted  action. 
They  are  not  to  be  combined  into  larger  units,  when  dismounted.  A 
mounted  reserve  (in  an  escadron,  a  platoon,  in  larger  units,  an  entire 
escadron)  is  always  to  be  provided.  The  frontage  of  a  platoon  dismounted 
to  fight  on  foot  is  given  as  approximately  50  paces  (38  m.). 

Kinds  of  fire  used:  Volleys  by  squad  and  by  platoon,  and  fire  at 
will.  The  latter  is  the  principal  fire  used.  Decisive  fire  is  to  be  used  only 
at  close  ranges  (up  to  600  paces)  and  at  mid  ranges  (up  to  1,200  paces= 


Provisions  op  Various  Regulations.  119 

900  m.)*  Long  range  fire  is  to  be  employed  only  when  ordered  by  the 
escadron  commander.  Squads  are  to  advance  by  rushes.  When  the 
dismounted  force  is  to  mount  up,  the  led  horses  are  to  be  brought  up,  if 
practicable. 

Franca.  An  escadron  retains  one  platoon,  a  regiment  one  to  two 
escadrons  as  a  mounted  reserve.  In  the  other  platoons,  either  all  the 
men  or  only  the  even  numbers  dismount.  In  the  former  case,  one 
horse-holder  is  detailed  for  each  rank.  When  Dragoons  dismount 
to  fight  on  foot,  the  lance  remains  in  its  boot  at  the  stirrup  and  is  fastened 
to  the  saddle-bags  by  means  of  a  hook  attached  to  the  arm-strap.  When 
only  a  small  number  of  skirmishers  is  required,  one  to  two  platoons 
may  be  designated  for  dismounted  action.  In  certain  circumstances 
(when  surprised  or  when  it  is  essential  to  get  away  quickly),  it  may  be 
a  good  plan  to  dismount,  hold  the  horses  by  the  reins,  and,  after  firing 
a  few  shots,  mount  up  again.  When  the  led  horses  {chevauz  haul  le  pied) 
can  be  posted  under  cover  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  skirmishers, 
two  horse-holders  suffice  for  each  platoon.  If  the  platoons  of  an  esca- 
dron fight  separated  from  one  another,  it  will  likewise  be  advisable  to 
divide  the  led  horses  into  corresponding  groups.  In  defense,  the  firing 
line  is  to  be  made  as  strong  as  possible,  a  support  comprising  one-third 
of  the  force  being  kept  out.  Closed  bodies  are  to  move  in  column  of 
fours.  When  the  skirmishers  are  to  mount,  the  led  horses  are  to  be 
brought  up  to  meet  them. 

Kinds  of  fire  tiaed:  Volley  fire  (in  exceptional  cases  only;  under 
no  circumstances  at  close  ranges);  fire  at  will  {feu  d.  volontc);  short  and 
violent  bursts  of  fire  (par  rafales  violentes  et  courtea);  and  rapid  fire  (feu 
rapide). 

Russia:  The  Dragoons  (armed  with  rifle  and  bayonet)  in  the 
first  place,  the  Cossacks  in  the  second,  are  designed  for  dismounted  action. 
The  platoon  is  the  tactical  unit  in  dismounted  action.  Ordinarily,  in 
dismounting  to  fight  on  foot,  number  two  in  each  set  of  threes  remains 
mounted,  i.  e.,  two-thirds  of  the  unit  is  available  for  dismounted  action. 
When  a  greater  proportion  of  the  unit  is  to  dismount  (a  procedure  to 
be  employed  when  good  cover  is  available  for  the  led  horses,  and  when 
the  latter  will  not,  in  all  probability,  have  to  change  position),  only 
number  two  of  the  rear  rank  of  each  set  of  threes  remains  mounted, 
i.  e.,  five-sixths  of  the  unit  is  available  for  dismounted  action.  When 
necessary,  the  number  of  horse-holders  may  be  still  further  reduced. 
Each  escadron  retains  one  platoon,  each  regiment  one  escadron  as  a 
mounted  reserve.  When  the  dismounted  force  is  to  mount  up,  the 
led  horses  (if  mobile)  are  to  be  brought  up  to  meet  it.  In  the  Cossacks, 
when  a  greater  number  of  troopers  than  usual  is  to  dismount  to  fight 
on  foot,  the  horses  of  a  platoon  are  linked — the  so-called  dismounting 
with  the  haiowka  of  the  horses.  In  this  case,  only  one  horse-holder 
remains  with  the  led  horses  of  the  platoon,  and  one  non-commissioned 
officer,  in  addition,  with  those  of  each  sotnia.  The  procedure  is  as 
follows:    The  odd  numbers  advance  eight  paces;  then  all  the  troopers 


120  Dismounted  Action  of  Cavalry. 

of  the  front  rank  execute  a  left  about,  while,  at  the  same  time,  each 
trooper  of  the  rear  rank  leads  his  horse  forward  until  its  head  is  in  line 
with  the  saddle  of  that  of  his  file  leader.  The  reins  of  each  horse  are 
then  drawn  through  the  cincha  of  the  one  opposite,  placed  over  the 
cantle  of  the  saddle,  and  drawn  taut.  When  tied  together  in  this 
manner,  the  horses  can  move  and  turn  as  much  as  they  like,  but 
they  can  not  run  away.  The  Cossacks  employ  a  third  method  of  dis- 
mounting, that  of  dismounting  in  a  circle.  In  this,  the  sotnia,  in  single 
rank,  forms  a  circle;  the  men  dismount;  the  horses  lie  down;  and  the 
troopers  use  the  horses  as  cover  and  as  rifle  rests.  This  method  of  dis- 
mounting is  to  be  used  in  exceptional  cases  only,  when  a  unit  is  surrounded 
on  open  terrain  by  hostile  cavalry,  and  is  required  to  hold  its  position 
until  the  arrival  of  reinforcements.  The  same  kinds  of  fire  are  used  as 
in  the  infantry.     Closed  bodies  are  to  fire  volleys  only. 

Italy:  The  escadron  is  the  tactical  unit  in  dismounted  action. 
When  the  led  horses  are  immobile,  all  the  troopers,  with  the  exception 
of  one  horse-holder  for  each  rank,  dismount  to  fight  on  foot.  When  the 
led  horses  are  mobile,  from  one  to  three  troopers  out  of  every  four  may 
be  used  for  dismounted  action. 

In  dismounted  action,  an  escadron  is  divided  into  dismounted 
platoons  {plcioni  appiedati)  of  two  squads  (squadri)  each,  into  the  led 
horses  (cavalli  a  mano)  and  the  mounted  reserve  (sostegno  a  cavallo).  Lan- 
cers fasten  the  lance  to  the  right  stirrup  and  the  cantle  of  the  saddle,  on 
dismounting. 

The  following  methods  of  dismounting  to  fight  on  foot  are  used: 

1.  All  the  troopers,  with  the  exception  of  one  horse-holder  for 
each  platoon,  dismount.     The  horses  are  linked. 

2.  "Number  three  of  each  set  of  fours  acts  as  horse-holder;  the 
rest  of  the  men  dismount. 

3.  Number  three  of  the  rear  rank  of  each  set  of  fours  turns  over 
his  horses  to  his  file  leader  and  dismounts  with  the  rest  of  the  troopers. 

4.  Either  all  the  even  or  all  the  odd  numbers  dismoimt. 

England :  Either  one-half  or  three-fourths  of  a  unit  may  be  dis- 
mounted to  fight  on  foot.  Fire  against  skirmishers  is  permitted  only 
up  to  300  m.,  against  larger  targets  up  to  700  m.  On  open  ground, 
led  horses  are  to  be  kept  not  more  than  500  m.  from  the  firing  line. 
The  horses  are  to  be  specially  trained  in  moving  as  led  horses,  so  as  to 
be  able  to  follow  the  dismounted  skirmishers  at  a  fast  gait. 

When  a  mounted  reserve  is  not  kept  out,  an  escadron  of  IJ^O  troopers 
can  dismount  to  fight  on  foot,  the  following: 

In  England  and  Germany:     70 — 105  men; 

In  Austria,  France  and  Italy:     70 — 132  men; 

In  Russia:  Dragoons:  94 — 117;  Cossacks:  a  maximum  of  135 
men. 


The  Attack.  121 


THE  ATTACK. 

Most  of  the  dismounted  actions  that  cavalry  has 
fought,  have  been  attacks.  In  its  operations  in  front 
of  an  army,  cavalry  will  undertake  a  costly  attack,  neces- 
sitating the  expenditure  of  a  great  deal  of  ammunition, 
only  if  it  can  not  force  a  passage  in  any  other  way  (by 
making  a  detour  or  by  awaiting  the  effect  produced  by  its 
artillery),  or  if  it  is  opposed  by  a  weak  opponent.  Expe- 
ditions against  the  enemy's  rearward  communications,  such 
as  the  seizure  of  railway  stations  and  depdts,  the  destruction 
of  artificial  structures,  and  the  capture  of  isolated  posts, 
etc.,  will  Ukewise  result  in  dismounted  attacks  on  the  part 
of  the  cavalry.  In  a  battle,  on  the  other  hand,  it  will 
be  comparatively  rare  for  dismounted  cavalry  to  be  launched 
in  attack.  The  attack  order  (par.  462,  German  C. 
D.  R.)  is  not  issued  until  all  the  circumstances  bearing 
on  the  situation  have  been  thoroughly  weighed,  the  terrain 
over  which  the  attack  is  to  be  made,  artillery  positions, 
attack  sections,  thoroughly  reconnoitered,  and  the  point 
where  the  development  of  the  force  is  to  begin,  deter- 
mined. The  attack  order  must  assure  the  cooperation 
of  all  parts  of  the  command.  Each  tactical  unit  is  as- 
signed a  definite  mission.  Each  is,  in  addition,  assigned 
the  front  upon  which  it  is  to  deploy  and  an  objective. 
When  necessary,  the  order  should  specify  where  the  dis- 
mounted reserve  is  to  be  posted.  The  replenishment 
of  ammunition  should  be  regulated;  ammunition  wagons 
should  be  brought  up  and  their  contents,  if  time  admits, 
issued  to  the  attacking  troops.  The  disposition  to  be  made 
of  the  ammunition  in  hands  of  the  horse-holders  should 
be  indicated.  In  certain  circumstances,  some  instruc- 
tions  in  regard  to  the  position  of  the  led  horses  are  necessary 
(for  example,  for  them  not  to  advance  or  not  to  retire 
beyond  a  certain  Une).  The  mounted  reserve  is  either 
ordered  to  cover  the  led  horses,  or  directed  to  advance 


122  Dismounted  Action  op  Cavalry. 

offensively  with  the  bulk  of  its  force  against  the  flank  and 
rear  of  the  enemy. 

The  superiority  of  the  cavalry  lies  in  its  mobility, 
and  it  should  take  advantage  of  this  mobility  in  attack 
more  than  anywhere  else.  From  this  it  follows  that  the 
dismounted  attack  should  be  directed  against  a  point 
(hostile  flank  or  rear)  where  it  is  not  expected,  and  that 
the  attacking  force  should  advance  rapidly  to  most  effec- 
tive range,  the  several  escadrons  or  platoons,  in  open  order 
formation,  endeavoring  to  reach  the  points  at  which  they 
can  take  up  the  fire  fight  with  prospects  of  success.  A 
slow  advance  in  thin  skirmish  line  that  becomes  gradually 
more  and  more  dense,  is  incompatible  with  the  nature  of 
cavalry.  In  the  Boer  war,  English  motmted  infantry 
frequently  managed  to  gallop  close  up  to  the  defender, 
to  dismount,  and  to  send  back  its  led  horses  to  cover. 
Dismounted  cavalry,  supported  by  its  horse  batteries 
and  machine  guns,  attacks  the  enemy  in  front  as  above 
described,  but  does  not  venture  on  unfavorable  terrain 
devoid  of  cover.  While  the  enemy  is  thus  held  in  front, 
the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  endeavors  to  direct,  either  mounted 
or  dismounted,  a  sudden  and  unexpected  blow  against 
his  flank  and  rear.  This  alone  may  compel  the  enemy 
to  desist  from  further  resistance.  When  local  reconnais- 
sance is  efficiently  performed,  cavalry  can  quickly  with- 
draw itself  from  a  critical  situation.  This  requires,  how- 
ever, that  a  strong  mounted  reserve  be  provided  when  the 
combat  is  initiated.*  If  the  opponent  consists  of  dismounted 
cavalry,  this  reserve  may  be  laimched  mounted  to  capture 
his  led  horses;  if  hostile  infantry  is  to  be  driven  away,  it 
may  be  launched  dismounted.  Finally,  parts  of  the 
mounted  reserve  may  be  employed  as  a  dismounted  re- 
serve, if  during  the  progress  of  the  fight  a  weak  spot  of  the 
enemy  or  a  point  of  decisive  importance  to  the  attacker 

"^Contrary  to  the  practice  of  infantry,  an  attack  by  dismounted  cavlilry 
is  to  be  made  in  the  direction  of  march  in  exceptional  cases  only. 


The  Attack.  128 

is  perceived.  If  cavalry  were  to  go  into  action  at  the 
outset  in  deep  formation,  like  infantry,  it  would  sacrifice 
its  principal  weapon — ^mobility.  A  fire  fight  that  is  syste- 
matically fed  is  incompatible  with  the  nature  of  cavalry. 
Cavalry  will  endeavor  to  form  at  the  very  start  long  but 
effective  firing  lines,  in  order  to  break  down  quickly  the 
resistance  of  the  enemy  and  to  regain  its  own  freedom  of 
movement;  therefore,  it  should  bring  into  action  as  many 
carbines  as  possible.  The  dismounted  attack,  however, 
requires  mobility  on  the  part  of  the  led  horses.  These 
must  be  quickly  brought  up  from  their  sheltered  positions, 
which  are,  as  a  rule,  some  distance  in  rear,  so  that,  if  its 
attack  is  successful,  the  cavalry  may  again  be  free  to 
move.  The  object  of  bringing  into  action  an  adequate 
niunber  of  carbines  is  sought  to  be  attained  by  dismotmt- 
ing  a  greater  ntimber  of  escadrons.  This  procedure  is 
open  to  the  objection  that  the  strength  of  the  mounted 
reserve  is  thereby  reduced.  Moreover,  there  is  a  limit 
to  its  application — ^the  available  strength  of  the  force. 
In  many  quarters  it  is  beUeved  that  the  problem  of  obtain- 
ing an  adequate  number  of  carbines  for  the  firing  line  may 
be  solved  by  having  the  moimted  reserve  bring  up  the  led 
horses.  But,  is  it  likely  that  the  mounted  reserve  will 
be  on  hand  immediately  after  a  victory?  Will  it  not  be 
more  profitably  employed  elsewhere  in  reaping  the  fruits 
of  victory?  The  firing  line  is  to  be  pushed  close  to  the 
enemy  according  to  infantry  principles.  Cavalry  attack- 
ing dismounted  should  likewise  not  shrink  from  making 
an  assault.  But,  if  a  hand-to-hand  combat  actually  takes 
place,  it  will  be  in  a  critical  situation,  indeed,  as  it  is  not 
equipped  with  a  bayonet.  Even  a  bayonet  fixed  on  the 
carbine  can  not  convert  the  latter  into  an  effective  thrust- 
ing weapon.  The  lance,  on  the  other  hand,  is  too  un- 
wieldy for  dismounted  work,  and  the  saber,  if  carried  along, 
would  hamper  the  movements  of  the  dismounted  trooper. 
Cavalry  will  endeavor  to   make  its   dismounted   assault 


124  Dismounted  Action  of  Cavalry. 

in  conjunction  and  simultaneously  with  the  launching 
of  its  mounted  reserve.  The  latter  will  then  take  up  the 
pursuit.  As  soon  as  the  position  is  taken,  the  leader 
must  make  every  effort  to  mount  his  unit  again,  but  he  must 
likewise  see  to  it  that  the  possession  of  the  position  is 
properly  assured.  If  practicable,  the  led  horses  are  brought 
up  at  a  fast  gait.  When  this  can  not  be  done,  only  a  part 
of  the  skirmishers  is  at  first  sent  back  to  the  led  horses. 

England:  The  cavalry  is  to  ride  rapidly  close  up  to  the  enemy 
and  to  surprise  him,  using  for  this  purpose  covered  avenues  of  approach. 
It  is  then  to  dismount  quickly  and  to  develop  an  overwhelming  fire. 
The  firing  line  is  to  advance  by  irregular  rushes  made  by  small  fractions, 
or  by  crawling,  supported  in  either  case  by  the  fire  of  neighboring  groups. 

Russia:  When  practicable,  the  cavalry  is  to  dismount  not  more 
than  1,000  m.  from  the  hostile  position.  The  decisive  range  of  560  m. 
is  to  be  gained  as  quickly  as  possible.  On  open  ground,  when  the  dis- 
mounted force  arrives  within  1,200  paces  (860  m.)  of  the  enemy,  the 
advance  is  to  be  made  by  rushes.  These  are  not  to  exceed  100  paces 
each,  in  length.  Between  200  and  100  m.  from  the  enemy,  the  fire  is 
to  be  increased  to  the  utmost  intensity.  From  here  on,  fire  while  in 
motion  is  to  be  used.  When  a  point  35  m.  from  the  enemy  is  reached, 
the  assault  is  to  be  made  with  a  cheer.  Cossacks  are  to  use  the  saber 
in  the  assault.  The  firing  line  of  an  escadron,  from  one  to  three  platoons 
in  extended  order,  covers  a  front  of  70  to  85  m.  The  supports  follow 
either  in  close  or  in  extended  order,  350  m.  in  rear  of  the  firing  line. 
In  a  unit  larger  than  an  escadron,  dismounted  escadrons  may,  in  addition, 
be  provided  to  reinforce  the  firing  line,  to  make  a  bayonet  attack,  or 
to  ward  off  a  sudden  hostile  move. 

France:  "The  cavalry  fights  on  foot  when  the  tactical  situation 
or  the  terrain  prevent  it  from  fighting  mounted.  It  is,  therefore,  to 
use  dismounted  action  in  all  cases  where  that  course  appears  desirable 
for  the  fulfillment  of  its  mission.  But  it  should  never  look  upon  dis- 
mounted action  as  an  excuse  for  evading  hand-to-hand  combat."  The 
Firing  Regulations  of  1903  add:  "The  cavalry,  thanks  to  its  mobility, 
can  avoid  losses,  appear  at  a  point  where  it  is  not  expected,  open  fire 
suddenly,  break  off  the  action  when  necessary,  begin  it  elsewhere,  and 
repeat  its  attacks,  without  allowing  itself  to  be  held." 

The  regulations  emphasize,  in  addition,  that  the  dismounted  action 
is  always  to  bear  the  stamp  of  the  cavalry  spirit  of  the  offensive  They 
recommend  sudden  appearance  and  prompt  display  of  strong  fire  power 
in  dismounted  attack.  They  enumerate  the  following  cases  in  which 
the  latter  may  be  employed:  Forcing  of  crossings  whose  turning  would 
consume  too  much  time;  prompt  occupation  of  important  positions; 


Fire  Surprise;  Defense.  125 

penetration  of  hostile  covering  lines;  molestation  of  hostile  route  columns; 
fludden  attacks  on  quarters  or  camps  of  hostile  troops;  capture  of  con- 
voys; etc.     Ground  swept  by  hostile  fire  is  to  be  crossed  at  the  gallop. 

FIRE  SURPRISE.* 

Fire  stirprise  is  the  combat  method  most  in  keeping 
with  the  mobility  of  cavalry  armed  with  a  long  range  fire 
arm  and  supported  by  artillery  and  machine  gtms. 
Whether  the  fire  surprise  is  conducted  by  the  artillery 
alone,  imder  cover  of  the  cavalry,  or  whether  all  the  arms 
participate,  depends  upon  the  situation.  Pushed  close 
to  the  enemy  by  a  skillftd  use  of  accidents  of  the  ground, 
the  force  whose  fire  bursts  forth  all  at  once,  can  seriously 
shake  his  morale.  It  is  essential  that  heavy  losses  be  at 
once  inflicted  on  the  enemy,  in  other  words,  that  the 
fire  of  the  assailant  produce  an  effect  at  mid  ranges.  Horse 
artillery  and  machine  gims  shotdd  not  open  fire  prematurely. 
It  is  advisable  to  assign  their  subsequent  targets  to  them. 
When  in  any  way  practicable,  the  fire  action  should  be 
followed  by  a  charge.  Large  imits,  in  particular,  should 
endeavor  to  bring  about  a  charge,  as  it  is  difficult  to  deploy  a 
considerable  force  in  close  proximity  to  the  enemy.  In 
fire  surprises,  even  smaU  tmits  will  find  an  opportunity 
to  make  themselves  very  useful  against  reserves  and 
ammimition  coltunns  of  the  enemy. 

The  led  horses  had  best  be  kept  immediately  in  rear 
of  the  skirmishers.  If  the  operation  is  successftd,  and  a 
reverse  should  take  place,  cavalry  will  then  be  able  to 
withdraw  itself  quickly  from  the  critical  situation. 

DEFENSE. 

In  defense,  cavalry  may  be  required  to  delay  an  ad- 
vancing enemy,  to  maintain  positions  or  villages  until  the 
arrival  of  the  infantry,  to  obstruct  a  hostile  screening  line 
(par.  196,  German  F.  S.  R.),  or  to  ward  off  attacks  made 

*See  TactiC9,  I,  Krttsosb^s  traiiBlation.  pp.  151  and  330. 


126  Dismounted  Action  op  Cavalry. 

against  its  own  cantonments.  In  battle,  one  will  only 
with  reluctance  permit  cavalry  to  fight  dismoimted,  shoulder 
to  shoulder  with  the  infantry.  It  will  frequently  fall  to 
the  lot  of  cavalry  to  delay  the  march  of  hostile  reinforce- 
ments, to  divert  them  from  their  march  direction  (by  taking 
up  a  flank  position)  or  to  prevent  their  advance  (by  throw- 
ing itself  across  their  path). 

When  the  action  is  fought  simply  with  the  object  of 
gaining  time,  all  measures  calculated  to  deceive  the  enemy 
— such  as  hiding  the  led  horses,  and  concealing  any  evi- 
dence that  might  betray  the  fact  that  the  enemy  is  opposed 
only  by  cavalry — ^increase  in  importance.  Upon  this  is 
based  the  necessity  for  the  adoption  of  the  gray  field 
tmiform  for  the  cavalry.  (See  p.  5,  supra).  Timely 
provision  should  be  made  for  breaking  off  the  action.  A 
premature  and  complete  occupation  of  a  defensive  posi- 
tion should  be  avoided.  The  best  plan  is  to  occupy  at  the 
outset  only  a  few  points,  and  to  keep  the  bulk  of  the  force 
in  a  position  in  readiness.  The  partial  occupation  of  a 
defensive  position  makes  it  possible  to  defend  a  broad 
front  when  the  enemy  is  at  long  and  mid  ranges,  and  de- 
ceives him  as  to  the  strength  of  the  defender.  It  is  im- 
possible to  lay  down  definite  figures  for  the  extent  of 
front  to  be  occupied  in  defense.  There  is  no  objection  to 
assign  to  an  escadron  a  front  of  approximately  200  m. 
Machine  guns  may  be  distributed  by  platoons.  In  like 
manner,  one  will  frequently  let  batteries  of  artillery  fire 
by  platoons,  or  even  by  piece,  from  a  concealed  position, 
for  the  purpose  of  deceiving  the  enemy.  Units  that  are 
to  protect  a  flank,  are  echeloned  in  rear  of  it;  whether  they 
are  employed  mounted  or  dismounted  will  depend  upon 
the  tactical  situation  and  the  terrain.  After  the  hostile 
attack  has  been  repulsed,  such  units  enable  the  defender 
to  assume  the  offensive  and  to  take  up  the  pursuit.  It  is 
particularly  important  that  meastu'es  be  taken  for  the 
protection  of  the  led  horses.     A  mounted  reserve  is  nearly 


Defense.  127 

always  necessary,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  skir- 
mishers to  break  off  the  action,  if  for  no  other  reason. 
Cavalry  that  fights  a  defensive  action,  is  in  danger  of 
being  held  in  front  at  short  range  by  the  enemy,  while  the 
led  horses  are  attacked  by  the  mobile  parts  of  his  force. 

The  defense  will  have  the  character  of  a  containing 
action.  When  engaged  with  hostile  infantry,  dismounted 
cavalry  will  be  able  to  mount  up  only  when  the  enemy 
has  not  as  yet  approached  too  close.  For  these  reasons, 
the  cavalry  will  endeavor  to  use  its  carbines  at  ranges 
up  to  the  maximum  sight  graduation  and  to  equalize  any 
existing  numerical  inferiority  by  a  greater  expenditure 
of  ammunition.  In  other  words,  cavalry  will  endeavor  to 
maintain  a  lively  fire  at  will  even  at  long  ranges.  If  the 
enemy  is  once  permitted  to  get  to  close  range,  he  will  soon 
perceive  that  he  has  to  contend  only  with  dismounted 
cavalry,  and  attempt  to  bring  the  fight  to  a  conclusion  in 
short  order.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  carbine  fire, 
especially  when  directed  against  upright  targets  the  height 
of  a  man,  gives  good  results  at  mid  ranges,  but  that  the 
better  marksmanship  training  of  the  infantry  is  bound 
to  make  itself  felt  when  once  the  hostile  infantry  has  been 
allowed  to  approach  to  the  lower  limit  of  mid  ranges. 
(Par.  452,  German  I.  D.  R.).  Even  a  comparison  of  the 
results  of  target  practice  shows  that  infantry  fire  is  very 
decidedly  superior  at  short  ranges  to  carbine  fire.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  efficacy  of  the  carbine  must  not  be  under- 
estimated by  the  infantryman,  if  he  wishes  to  avoid  laying 
himself  open  to  very  painful  reverses  when  attacking  dis- 
mounted cavalry. 

Similar  views  are  entertained  in  Austria  and  in  France. 

Ruuia:  The  fire  is  to  be  withheld  until  the  enemy  arrives  within 
short  range.  The  fire  fight  is  to  be  fought  at  ranges  from  560  to  140  m. 
If  the  object  of  the  defense  is  merely  to  contain  the  enemy,  the  action  is  to 
be  broken  off  when  the  assailant  has  approached  to  within  250  m.  Other- 
wise the  decision  is  to  be  brought  about  by  a  frontal  counter-attack 
with  the  bayonet  when  the  enemy  has  approached  to  within  25  paces 


128  Dismounted  Action  op  Cavalry. 

of  the  position.  If  the  counter-attack  is  successful,  the  advantage  gained 
is  to  be  followed  up  with  fire  and,  in  conjunction  therewith,  a  mounted 
pursuit.  If  the  counter-attack  is  repulsed,  the  cavalry  will  be  in 
an  exceedingly  uncomfortable  situation;  the  led  horses  must  be  moved 
to  the  rear,  and  nothing  but  prompt  action  on  the  part  of  the  mounted 
reserve  can  make  possible  the  retreat  of  the  force. 

England:  "The  troops  must  be  capable,  mounted  as  well  as  on 
foot,  of  quickly  changing  position  under  cover.  They  must  likewise  be 
capable  of  evacuating  a  position  without  it  being  perceived  by  the  enemy. 
One  can  best  deceive  him  in  regard  to  such  a  movement,  if  it  is  undertaken 
suddenly  immediately  after  deluging  him  with  a  violent  burst  of  fire." 

BREAKING  OFF  THE  ACTION. « 

It  will  be  comparatively  easy  to  break  off  the  action 
if,  favored  by  the  terrain  and  one's  dispositions,  one  succeeds 
in  deceiving  the  enemy  as  to  one's  intentions,  and  if  the 
led  horses  are  close  at  hand  and  can  be  brought  up  quickly. 
In  many  cases,  one  may  deceive  the  enemy  by  sending 
back  only  a  few  men,  who  then  bring  up  the  led  horses. 
The  retirement  by  combat  groups  (par.  490,  German 
C.  D.  R.)  invites  the  enemy  to  a  more  energetic  advance. 
It  would  be  better,  therefore,  to  retire  all  along  the  line 
under  cover  of  an  offensive  wing,  after  developing  a  strong 
fire,  and  to  hurry  to  the  led  horses.  Dead  angles  located 
in  front  of  the  position  are  especially  valuable. 

When  exposed  to  effective  fire  at  close  range,  the  de- 
fender can  break  off  the  action  only  if  the  retirement  can 
be  effected  under  cover  or  tmder  the  protection  of  fresh 
troops  that  enter  the  fight.  To  break  off  an  action  in  attack, 
even  at  mid  ranges,  requires  specially  favorable  terrain. 
At  short  ranges,  it  will  be  more  expensive  to  retire  than 
to  fight  the  action  with  determination  to  a  finish.  Artil- 
lery and  machine  guns  cover  the  retreat  by  drawing  upon 
themselves  the  enemy's  fire  and  by  preventing  his  forces 
from  pursuing.  They  ought  not  to  shrink  from  sacrific- 
ing their  gxms  and  machine  guns  to  save  their  sister  arm. 
Attacks  by  a  reserve  against  the  flanks  of  the  pursuing  enemy, 

*Pan.  490-406,  German  C.  D.  R, 


Examples  prom  Military  History.  129 

whether  they  are  made  mounted  with  the  artne  blanche 
or  dismounted  with  the  carbine,  will  considerably  facili- 
tate the  retreat.  When  once  the  led  horses  are  reached, 
the  force  seeks  to  withdraw  itself  quickly  from  the  pursu- 
ing fire  of  the  enemy.  Horses  whose  riders  have  been  dis- 
abled are  taken  along.  As  soon  as  the  force  has  broken 
away  from  the  enemy,  every  effort  must  be  made  to  get  it 
again  well  in  hand. 

EXAMPLES  OF  THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF  DISMOUNTED  ACTION. 

The  dismounted  action  of  French  Dragoons  on  Kaninchen  Hill 
at  Forbach,  August  6th,  1870. 

The  protection  of  the  Saarlouis — Forbach  road,  which  passed  in 
rear  of  the  French  position  on  Spicheren  Heights,  and  which  was  used 
by  the  13th  Prussian  Infantry  Division  in  its  advance,  was  entrusted  to 
Valaz^'s  Infantry  Brigade  and  one  pioneer  company  which  had  con- 
structed a  line  of  trenches  about  1000  m.  long  on  Kaninchen  Hill.  When 
Valaz^'s  Brigade  was  brought  up  to  the  battlefield  in  the  course  of  the 
day,  there  remained  in  the  position: 

The  pioneer  company 150  men — with   80   rounds 

of  ammunition 
apiece; 

Two  escadrons  of  the  12th  Dragoons*....  170  men — with   20   rounds 

of  ammunition 
apiece. 


320  men. 


On  receiving  information  of  the  approach  of  a  hostile  column,  the 
trenches  were  occupied.  The  Dragoons  dismounted  120  men,  leaving 
behind  50  men  as  horse-holders.  At  5:30  P.  M.,  fire  was  opened  on  the 
Prussian  advance  guard,  which  deployed,  its  skirmishers  finally  getting 
within  250  m.  of  the  French  position.  At  7  P.  M.,  the  defenders  received 
an  unexpected  reinforcement  in  the  shape  of  200  Reservists,  which  arrived 
at  the  railway  station  of  Forbach,  and  of  one  field  battery,  which  fired  a 
few  shots.  The  retreat  to  Forbach  was  begun  at  7:30  P.  m.,  the  railway 
embankment  being  held  until  9  P.  M.  The  retirement  into  the  second 
position  was  covered  by  a  charge  made  by  the  Dragoons,  which  had  quickly 
mounted  up. 

The  records  give  only  the  losses  of  the  Dragoons.  These  amounted 
to  2  officers  and  17  men  killed,  2  ofiicers  and  5  men  wounded,  and 
80  horses  disabled.    The  fire  of  the  Prussian  infantry,  directed  from  low 


^hree  platoons  were  In  otMervation  near  Bmmenweiler. 


180  Dismounted  Action  of  Cavalry. 

ground  against  a  completely  sheltered  opponent  in  position  on  high 
ground,  produced  only  an  insignificant  effect.  On  the  Prussian  side, 
the  65th  Infantry  lost  3  officers  and  85  men,  and  the  7th  Jager-Battalion, 
7  men.  But  the  advance  of  the  13th  Division  was,  in  this  manner, 
delayed  by  a  weak  opponent,  whose  strength  was  considerably  over- 
estimated. A  participation  of  this  division  in  a  pursuit,  might  have 
had  important  results.* 

The  following  instances  of  the  employment  of  dismounted  action 
in  the  Franco-German  war  may  be  cited:  The  attack  on  Theillay  le 
Paillux,  December  12th,  1870.  A  platoon  of  the  4th  Hussars  (whose 
regimental  history  contains  an  interesting  account  of  a  number  of  dis- 
mounted actions)  captured  the  railway  station  at  Bee  Oiseau.t  on  Sep- 
tember 15th,  1870,  Draveil,!  on  September  16th,  1870,  and  Maison 
Affort.t 

On  January  18th,  1870,  the  1st  Escadron  of  the  11th  Hussars 
captured  Ferri^res.§  The  southern  portion  of  this  village  was  taken 
without  difficulty.  Then  a  stronger  resistance  was  encountered.  This 
was  overcome  after  some  horse-holders  had  been  brought  up  as  a  rein- 
forcement. The  loss  amounted  to  11  men  killed  and  wounded,  and  4 
horses  killed.il 

On  July  7th,  1877,  General  Gurko,  advancing  with  the  advance 
guard  corps,  found  Tirnova  occupied  by  a  hostile  force  consisting  of 
2,000  infantry,  500  cavalry,  and  6  mountain  guns.  A  brigade  of  Dra- 
goons dismounted  to  fight  on  foot  and  deployed  under  cover  of  the 
fire  of  the  artillery,  which  had  a  support  of  dismounted  Dragoons,  while 
the  Cossacks  turned  the  flanks  of  the  Turks.  The  Turks  evacuated 
the  place  before  the  brigade  of  Dragoons  could  effectively  engage  them.** 

On  January  25th,  1905,  one  regiment  of  Akiyama's  cavalry  bri- 
gade was  to  hold  Sandepu  for  six  hours  against  two  Russian  rifle  regi- 
ments until  the  arrival  of  the  reinforcements  sent  by  General  Oku.  The 
regiment  lost  all  of  its  horses;  those  not  killed  outright  were  frightened 
by  the  violent  artillery  Are  and  stampeded.  Thus,  the  Japanese  cavalry 
perhaps  saved  the  entire  lid  Army  from  being  rolled  up.  Details  are, 
unfortunately,  lacking. 

Mishchenko's  attack  on  Yinkou  on  the  evening  of  January  11th, 
1905,  with  fifteen  escadrons  and  sotnias  and  four  scout  detachments, 
though  faulty  in  plan  and  half-heartedly  executed,  shows  what  cavaby 
can  do. 


*G€n.   St.    W.,  I,  pp.  367-390.     French  Oen.  St,  W.:     BatailU  de  Forbach, 
p.  146. 

^Oeschichte  des  4.  Husarenregiments,  p.  147. 
tIMd.,  p.  148. 
^ItHd.,  p.  149. 

^Oeschichte  des  11.  Husarenregiments,  p.  322. 
JIKUNZ.  Reiterei,  p.  222. 

^Russisch'tUrkisch€r  KrUg  {Gen,  St,   IT.),  II,  p.  152.  et  seq.    Engagement 
at  EasanUk.  July  17th.  1877,  /Md..  p.  181. 


English  Views  on  Mounted  Infantry.         131 


ENGLISH  VIEWS  ON  THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF 
MOUNTED  INFANTRY. 

The  need  of  having,  in  addition  to  cavalry  trained 
for  battle  use,  a  very  mobile  force  that  can  shoot  well,  has 
been  felt  in  all  wars.  In  the  continental  states  of  Europe, 
an  attempt  was  made  to  fill  this  want  by  training  cavalry 
more  thoroughly  in  dismounted  action,  and  by  assigning 
to  it  cyclists  and  machine  guns,  whereas,  in  England, 
special  bodies  of  mounted  infantry  were  formed.  The 
principal  drawback  to  the  employment  of  mounted  infantry 
is,  however,  that,  when  mounted,  it  is  defenseless  against 
cavalry,  and  that,  while  in  motion,  it  really  needs  a  sup- 
porting force.  In  the  Boer  war  the  mounted  infantry 
grew  finally  to  a  strength  of  50,000  men.*  As  it  was  not 
confronted  by  cavalry,  it  made  good  during  the  execution 
of  wide  turning  movements,  which  Lord  Roberts  employed 
with  success  for  the  purpose  of  striking  the  flank  of  the 
Boers,  who  always  rapidly  extended  their  lines.  In  spite 
of  these  good  services,  it  could  not  be  denied  that  mounted 
infantry  had  many  faults.  The  men  knew  nothing  of  the 
care  of  their  mounts,  as  is  evidenced  by  the  large  per- 
centage of  horses  that  became  unserviceable.  As  mounted 
infantry  units  were  improvised  bodies,  they  lacked  the 
requisite  training  in  marching  and  tactical  employment. 
After  the  war  had  lasted  for  some  time,  the  mounted  in- 
fantrymen, however,  had  completely  forgotten  their  in- 
fantry character  and  deported  themselves  like  cavalrymen, 
even  if  only  as  poor  ones.  Thus,  we  find  toward  the  close 
of  the  campaign  numerous  mounted  charges  made  by 
mounted  infantry  on  the  British  side,  as  strange  to  relate, 
also  on  that  of  the  Boers. 


*A8  there  was  a  disproportionately  large  force  of  artillery  in  the  several 
columns  during  the  last  stages  of  the  Boer  war,  eighteen  batteries  were  trans- 
formed into  mounted  infantry.  At  the  close  of  the  war,  the  British  army  con- 
listed  of  247,270  men,  of  which  number  67,898  men  were  mounted.  Of  the  latter, 
28,244  men  belonged  to  the  regular  establishment  (10,256  cavalrymen,  and  9,083 
infantrymen  and  2,905  artillerymen  converted  into  mounted  Infantry). 


182  Dismounted  Action  op  Cavalry. 

In  this  experiment  of  creating  mounted  infantry,  all 
those  drawbacks  which  had  been  learned  for  centuries  were 
exemplified.  As  an  improvisation,  mounted  infantry  dis- 
turbs the  cohesion  of  organizations;  if  permanently  orga- 
nized, it  must  become  cavalry,  just  as  the  dragoons  became 
cavalry:  for  mounted  infantry  is  neither  flesh,  fish,  nor 
fowl  and  can  not  endure.     (See  pp.  18  and  87,  supra). 

The  English  Drill  Regulations  (1904)  for  mounted 
infantry  lay  down  the  following  principles  for  its  employ- 
ment: 

In  the  practical  employment  of  mounted  infantry,  sight  must  not 
be  lost  of  the  fact  that  this  arm  is  drilled  and  trained  as  infantry.  On 
account  of  its  greater  mobility,  it  should  be  able  to  cover  greater  dis- 
tances, and,  in  addition,  be  capable  of  executing  wider  turning  move- 
ments than  infantry.  As  a  rule,  mounted  infantry  is  to  be  used  in  the 
following  cases: 

(a)  It  is  to  perform  the  service  of  security  in  the  immediate 
front  of  infantry  divisions,  in  conjunction  with  cavalry  and  the  horse 
batteries  assigned  to  the  latter,  in  addition  to  augmenting  the  fire  of 
the  cavalry.  It  is,  further,  to  occupy,  as  expeditiously  as  possible, 
tactically  important  positions.  It  is  to  find  positions  from  which  it 
can  bring  fire,  preferably  flanking  fire,  to  bear  on  the  flanks  of  hostile 
cavalry  before  the  actual  combat  begins.  It  is  to  improve  every  success 
gained  and  constitute  a  formed  nucleus  in  case  of  a  retreat.  Moreover, 
mounted  infantry  should  enable  the  cavalry  divisions,  far  in  advance  of 
the  army,  to  devote  themselves  exclusively  to  the  strategical  reconnais- 
sance with  which  they  are  charged. 

(b)  In  addition,  the  mounted  infantry  is  to  constitute  a  light 
mobile  reserve  which  the  commander-in-chief  can  despatch  at  a  moment's 
notice  from  one  wing  to  the  other  for  the  purpose  of  lending  assistance, 
or  for  influencing  the  action  at  particular  points  and  for  which  other 
troops  are  not  available  on  account  of  the  extraordinary  extension  of 
modem  lines  of  battle. 

(c)  Finally,  mounted  infantry  is  to  fill  the  rdle  of  a  mobile  col- 
umn in  minor  warfare  or  in  expeditions  in  colonial  wars,  and  in  per- 
forming this  duty  assume  the  functions  of  the  absent  cavalry  in  the 
service  of  reconnaissance  and  patrolling. 

The  following  is  the  organization  and  strength  of  mounted  in- 
fantry organizations: 

In  war  every  infantry  battalion  is  to  furnish  one  company  of  mounted 
infantry,  consisting  of  5  officers,  138  men,  and  144  horses;  and  every 
brigade  (4  battalions)  one  battalion  of  four  companies.  To  each  bat- 
talion of  mounted  infantry  is  assigned:  one  machine  gun  platoon,  con- 


Machine  Guns.  133 

sisting  of  two  guns  and  two  ammunition  carts  (2  officers,  40  men,  and 
64  horses).  Hence,  the  aggregate  strength  of  a  battalion  of  mounted 
infantry  is,  28  officers,  630  men,  and  676  horses. 

The  creation  of  motinted  infantry  is  proper  only  where 
climatic  conditions  make  long  marches  by  European 
troops  impossible,  or  in  cases  where  the  arrival  of  a  few 
soldiers  at  distant  points  will  exert  a  potent  influence  on 
the  actions  of  an  opponent.  As  shown  by  our  experience 
in  Southwest  Africa,  the  proper  field  for  mounted  infantry 
is  colonial  (guerilla)  warfare,  especially  when  it  is  impor- 
tant to  prevent  the  outbreak  of  threatened  disorders 
and  to  let  the  country  retimi  quickly  to  a  state  of  peace 
upon  completion  of  the  principal  actions.  On  European 
theaters  of  war,  space  is  lacking  for  the  employment  of 
mounted  infantry  and,  moreover,  there  are  not  enough 
horses. 

During  the  Boer  war,  a  mixed  division  was  formed  and  placed 
under  command  of  Sir  Ian  Hamilton.  This  division  consisted  of  the 
following: 

2  infantry  brigades  (each  of  4  battalions  and  1  battery)  a  field 
hospital  and  ambulance  companies; 

1  cavalry  brigade  of  3  regiments  and  1  horse  battery; 

1  brigade  of  mounted  infantry  of  4  detachments  (each  having  1 
pompom  gun)  and  1  battery; 

Divisional  troops:    Rimington's  Guides  (doing  duty  as  messengers); 

2  batteries; 

1  platoon  of  12.5  cm.  guns. 

The  effective  strength  of  this  division  was  11,000  men,  4,600  horses,. 
8,000  mules,  36  field  guns,  2  12.5  cm.  guns,  6  pompom  guns,  and  23 
machine  guns. 

The  division  left  Bloemfontein  on  April  22d,  1900,  covered  a  dis- 
tance of  640  km.  in  45  marching  days,  participated  in  9  large  and  18 
minor  engagements,  and  was  able  to  march  into  Pretoria  on  June  5th. 

MACHINE  GUNS. 

The  machine  gun  battery*  combines  high  infantry 
fire  power  (approximately  equivalent  to  that  of  the  skir- 
mishers of  a  German  cavalry  regiment,  armed  with  car- 

See  Tactics,  I,  Krueobb'b  tranalation  p.  273,  et  uq. 


184  Dismounted  Action  of  Cavalry. 

bines,  or  to  that  of  4 — 6  platoons  of  infantry)*  with  instant 
readiness  for  firing,  and  a  mobility  which  enables  it  to 
follow  the  mounted  arms  anywhere.  Machine  gun  bat- 
teries accomplish  the  principal  object  that  cavalry  expects 
to  attain  by  the  assignment  of  infantry,  viz.,  relief  from 
fighting  on  foot,  great  fire  power,  and  mobility.  Even  in 
reconnaissance  duty,  machine  gtms  will  be  employed  to 
break  down  the  resistance  of  the  enemy  in  occupied  localities 
and  to  augment  the  resistance  of  their  own  force  in  such 
places.  During  an  advance,  machine  guns  should  go 
into  position  at  an  early  moment  in  order  to  cover  as 
effectively  as  possible  (preferably  from  a  flank)  the  advance 
and  the  deployment  for  the  mounted  charge.  It  is  advis- 
able to  post  the  guns  of  a  machine  gun  battery  together, 
so  as  not  to  have  niunerous  lines  of  fire  interfere  with 
the  movements  of  the  cavalry;  this  is  especially  empha- 
sized by  the  Austrian  regulations.  Machine  gun  batteries, 
like  horse  batteries  (artillery),  remain  with  the  cavalry 
divisions  during  a  battle.  The  chance  of  producing  a 
sudden  fire  effect  within  a  short  space  of  time  must  be 
especially  utilized.  Special  efforts  should  therefore  be 
made  to  place  entire  machine  gun  batteries  into  action. 
The  employment  of  single  guns  is  precluded  on  account 
of  the  danger  of  breakdowns.  The  employment  of  platoons 
is  especially  proper  in  defense. 

The  duties  of  machine  guns  naturally  grow  out  of 
their  tactical  advantages.  Their  fire  power  should  be  saved 
for  tall  targets  that  appear  in  decisive  moments,  in  which  a 
development  of  strong  fire  at  short  range  is  requisite. 

*A  German  cavalry  regiment  at  peace  strength  numbers  firom  552  to  576 
sabers;  a  platoon  of  Infantry,  on  a  peace  footing,  numbers  from  48  to  53  men. 

In  making  a  comparlslon  between  a  cavalry  regiment  and  a  machine  gun 
battery.  It  must  be  borne  In  mind  that  horse-holders  are  deducted  from  the  strength 
jglven  for  a  cavalry  regiment. — Translator. 


^^ 


■wn 


Machine  Guns. 


135 


r 


Machine  guns  can  be  transported  upon  larger  vehicles  capable  of 
being  unlimbered;  they  can  also.be  carried  on  pack  horses  or  other  pack 
animals,  and  for  short  distances  by  men.  Although  pack  animal  trans- 
portation enables  the  guns  to  follow  the  troops  anywhere,  the  amount 
of  ammunition  that  can  be  carried  along  is  limited,  and  the  opening  of 

A  PlatCMn  of  the  Austrian  Machine  Gun  Battery. 


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Ammuni+ion  Horse 


ffl  First  Sergeant  W  Artificer 


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1  Gun  Commander  2,3,  Gunners 


-^,5, Ammunition  Carriers 

fire  is  retarded,  since  gun  and  tripod  must  first  be  assembled;  the  opening 
of|fire  may  even  be  delayed  when  a  pack  animal  falls;  ammunition  can  not 
be^carried  on  the  gun;  and  the  animals  get  sore  backs  even  if  pack  saddles 
are  carefully  adjusted.  It  is  difficult  to  distinguish  advancing  machine 
gun  batteries  equipped  with  pack  animal  transportation  from  cavalry. 


186  Dismounted  Action  op  Cavalry. 

Although  the  greatest  readiness  for  firing  was  obtained  with 
guns  mounted  on  cavalry  carriages  (two-wheeled  carts  similar  to  limbers, 
and  equipped  with  shafts),  which  also  permitted  the  greatest  amount  of 
ammunition  to  be  carried  along,  these  guns  offered  such  a  high  target 
that  their  use,  in  an  infantry  action,  was  entirely  out  of  the  question, 
leading  only  to  their  being  quickly  silenced.  Another  defect  was  that 
the  guns  were  unable  to  follow  immediately  upon  the  heels  of  the  organi- 
zation to  which  they  were  attached. 

In  Germany  a  sled  mount  and  transportation  on  a  gun  carriage  is 
preferred.  In  all  other  states,  preference  is  given  to  the  tripod  mount 
and  pack  animal  transportation.  The  advantages  of  the  tripod  and  the 
wheeled  carriage  have  been  skillfully  combined  in  the  carriage  adopted 
in  Germany.  In  this,  the  gun  rests  on  a  sled;  this  is  in  turn  supported 
by  the  carriage  proper,  which  is  wheeled.  This  arrangement  permits 
the  gun  to  be  fired  quickly,  directly  from  the  wheeled  carriage,  or  from 
the  sled,  which  is  detached  from  the  carriage  for  that  purpose.  The 
sled  permits  the  gun  to  be  laid  at  any  desired  height  and  enables  it  to 
follow  infantry  anywhere  during  an  action. 

The  following  complement  per  gun  is  considered  necessary: 

Germany:  14^  men 9  horses; 

Switzerland:  83^  men 12  horses. 

In  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  the  machine  gun  detachments  of  the 
Russian  cavalry  were  equipped  with  Rezer  guns,  which  can  scarcely 
be  considered  machine  guns  owing  to  their  slow  rate  of  fire  and  extreme 
heating  of  the  barrel. 

Austria:  A  cavalry  machine  gun  battery — provided  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  the  Jiiger  battalion  formerly  attached  to  each  cavalry  division 
— consists  of  4  machine  guns  transported  on  pack  animals.  The  ammuni- 
tion carried  amounts  to  16,000  rounds  per  gun  (6,000  rounds  on  pack 
animals  and  10,000  rounds  on  the  ammunition  wagon).  A  gun  section 
(Gewehr)  consists  of  one  machine  gun,  9  mounted  men,  and  4  pack  ani- 
mals, 3  of  the  latter  carrying  ammunition.    Two  guns  form  a  platoon. 

Formations:  The  order  in  line,  the  guns  10  paces  apart;  the  combat 
order,  the  guns  26  paces  apart;  and  the  route  column,  the  distance 
between  horses  being  one  pace.  The  road  space  of  a  machine  gun  battery 
is  approximately  120  m. 

Kinds  of  fire:  Volley  fire  (Salve);*  fire  at  will  (Eimelfeuer),t  and 
single  shots. 

Machine  gun  batteries  are  to  relieve  the  cavalry  of  dismounted 
fighting,  participate  in  mounted  action,  and  reinforce  reconnaissance 
escadrons. 

Switzerland :  See  Tactics,  I,  Krueger'S  translation,  pp.  284  and 
288. 


■"This  corresponds  to  the  German  volley  fire  {Reihenfeuer), 
fThls  corresponds  to  the  German  continuous  fire  iDatterfeuer), 


IV.  CAVALRY  VERSUS  CAVALRY. 

1.  GENERAL. 

Victory  over  the  hostile  cavalry  is  the  prerequisite  to 
any  reconnaissance  and  to  all  further  cavalry  operations. 
What  our  cavalry  obtained  with  ease  during  the  Franco- 
German  war  can  not  be  gained  at  present'except  by  fighting. 
The  cavalry  must  charge,  tmless  it  desires  merely  to  threaten 
on  the  battlefield.  It  will  find  support  in  the  fire  of 
its  artillery  and  machine  guns  and  in  that  of  dismounted 
units.  By  combining  mounted  and  dismounted  action, 
cavalry  can  operate  independently  in  almost  any  situation, 
can  delay  hostile  forces  of  all  arms,  and  can  inflict  losses 
on  them. 

The  special  peculiarities  of  the  cavalry  combat  arise 
from  the  nature,  the  virtues  and  the  shortcomings  of  the 
horse.  On  account  of  its  speed,  its  weight,  and  its  highly 
excitable  nature,  the  horse  is  especially  suited  for  dash- 
ing at  the  enemy.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  so  well 
adapted  to  persevere  inactive  tmder  hostile  fire,  and  sub- 
mits but  tmwillingly  to  firing  from  the  saddle.  By  making 
a  rapid  dash,  in  a  combat  in  which  all  the  three  arms  are 
engaged,  cavalry  may,  indeed,  penetrate  a  hostile  position, 
overrun  parts  of  the  same,  and  capture  batteries,  but  it 
is  incapable  of  maintaining,  by  means  of  an  adequate 
defense,  the  advantages  gained.  When  mounted,  cavalry 
can  penetrate  the  enemy's  line  only  by  utilizing  its  shock 
power — the  shock  itself,  supplemented  by  the  use  of  the 
arme  blanche — and  the  m616e.  The  impact  with  the  hostile 
line  is  always  preceded  by  a  movement  of  variable  length 
for  developing  full  speed  and  for  gaining  a  favorable  shock 
direction.     This  movement  is  called  the  advance  to  the  attack. 


138  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

Only  horses  that  are  entirely  fresh  are  capable  of 
developing  and  maintaining  full  speed  for  a  protracted 
period  while  canying  field  kit.  Hence,  the  necessity  on  the 
battlefield  of  keeping  the  cavalry  fresh  by  assigning  rest 
periods,  and  by  feeding  and  watering.  (Par.  401 ,  German  C. 
D.  R.).  General  von  Barby  complains  on  August  16th, 
1870,  '*that  the  horses  were  not  in  condition  to  charge 
with  more  speed."  And  yet  the  brigade  had  marched 
only  30  km.,  and  then  charged  over  a  distance  of  2,400  m. 

Mass  and  velocity  are  the  factors  upon  which  success 
depends.  The  velocity  can  not  be  increased  beyond  a 
certain  point  and  is,  moreover,  reduced  by  broken  ground 
and  by  obstacles.  "In  an  engagement  of  all  arms,  even 
small  imits  may  gain  success,  if  they  seize  the  right  moment. 
A  decisive  interference  in  the  course  of  a  battle,  whether 
this  is  accomplished  by  warding  off  the  hostile  attack,  or 
by  supporting  one's  own,  is  only  possible  by  launching 
large  masses  of  cavalry."  (Par.  398,  German  C.  D.  R.). 
In  Manchuria,  the  Russian  commander-in-chief  kept 
numerous  bodies  of  cavalry  in  readiness,  but  these  lacked 
the  capacity  of  advancing  imitedly,  the  determination 
of  closing  with  the  enemy.  Cavalry  is  the  very  arm  that 
is  easily  frittered  away  in  petty  missions.  At  the  point 
where  the  commander  wishes  to  use  cavalry,  he  should 
gather  together  all  that  is  available  of  that  arm,  place  this 
cavalry  mass  under  a  single  leader  and  exercise  an  influ- 
ence over  its  operations  by  means  of  orders.  Kuropatkin 
also  gave  his  cavalry  such  orders,  it  is  true,  but  they  were 
qualified  at  the  last  moment.  General  v.  Pelet-Narbonne* 
seeks  to  explain  the  inactivity  of  the  cavalry  on  some  days 
of  battle,  as  follows: 

''Charging  cavalry  is  like  a  fired  projectile,  whose 
effect  is  incalculable  and  which  may,  in  certain  circum- 
stances, rebound  on  the  marksman.  Many  a  cavalry 
officer,  though  personally  brave,  hesitates  to  come  to  such 

*MilUilr'Woch$nblaU,  1004,  Supplement  No.  12. 


Ground  Scouting  and  Reconnaissance.         139 

a  decision  (to  charge),  fraught  as  it  is  with  consequences 
that  are  usually  incalctilable,  and  to  demand  from  his 
troops  great  and  perhaps  useless  sacrifices.  Though  it 
is  feasible  for  the  other  arms  to  break  oflf  an  action,  it  is 
not  possible  for  cavalry  so  to  break  off  a  mounted  charge. 
Events  take  their  course.  In  the  cavalry^  literally  every- 
thing depends  upon  the  initiative  of  the  leader,  hence  the  decisive 
importance  of  personality  in  that  arm.  Nothing  is  done  without 
the  leader's  taking  direct  personal  action.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  easily  conceivable,  for  example,  that  an  infantry  divi- 
sion in  a  rencontre  might  gain  a  victory  solely  through  a 
natural  development  of  events  and  the  action  of  subordi- 
nates, without  the  division  commander's  having  contri- 
buted in  the  sUghtest  degree  to  the  result.  When  cavalry 
units,  whose  leader  is  perhaps  struggling  hard  to  come  to 
a  decision,  belong  to  a  force  commanded  by  an  officer 
of  another  arm,  the  latter  should,  in  a  given  case,  shrink 
less  from  ordering  a  charge  that  is  deemed  necessary, 
than  is,  in  general,  the  practice.  The  cavalry  leader  who 
is  thereby  relieved  from  responsibility  would,  perhaps, 
greet  such  an  order  with  joy  and  execute  it  with  skill  and 
energy.  In  all  probability,  Bredow's  famous  charge  at 
Vionville  would  never  have  been  made  without  a  specific 
order."* 

GROUND  SCOUTING  AND  R£CONNAISSANCE.t 

Cavalry  avoids  terrain  that  prevents  the  horses  from 
developing  all  the  speed  that  is  in  them — such  as  rising 
slopes,  marshy,  soft  or  sandy  ground — endeavors  to  obtain, 
by  timely  despatch  of  ground  scouts,  information  of  the 
passableness  of  the  terrain  in  all  directions,  and  looks 
for  and  marks  crossings  over  obstacles.     Seydlitz  caused 

^Nearly  all  the  charges  made  by  French  cavalry  during  the  Franco-German 
war,  were  made  by  orders  of  the  commanders  of  units  of  which  the  cavalry  formed 
a  part. 

iPars.  47-49,  Qtrman  C.  D.  B. 

The  term  Erkundung  has  been  rendered  by  "ground  scouting,"  the  term 
Aufkldrung  by  "reconnaissance.' 


140  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

the  crossings  over  the  Zabem  bottoms  at  Zomdorf  to  be 
marked  by  wisps  of  straw.* 

On  forming,  one  non-commissioned  officer  and  at  least  two  pri- 
vates are  detailed  as  ground  scouts  in  each  escadron.  These  men  gallop 
ahead  charged  with  the  duty  of  indicating  obstacles  by  means  of  sig- 
nals. To  raise  and  hold  the  lance  in  a  perpendicular  position,  signifies, 
"passable  at  this  point;"  to  raise  and  hold  it  in  a  horizontal  position, 
signifies,  "not  passable  at  this  point."  The  distance  at  which  ground 
scouts  precede  the  escadron  depends  upon  the  terrain;  but,  in  any  event, 
ground  scouts  and  escadron  must  keep  each  other  in  view.  A  ground 
scout  remains  behind  at  places  suitable  for  passing  obstacles  until  he 
is  certain  that  the  crossing  point  has  been  recognized.  Ground  scouts 
thus  left  behind  then  regain  the  requisite  distance  by  taking  up  a  faster 
gait.  They  must  scout  the  ground  in  time  to  prevent  their  organization 
from  encountering  obstacles  unexpectedly.  It  is  a  good  plan  for  leaders 
of  independent  escadrons,  and  higher  commanders,  to  have  a  few  ground 
scouts  ride  with  them. 

Groimd  scouting  begins  at  once  upon  arrival  on  the 
battlefield,  and  should  be  concluded  long  before  the  unit 
starts  to  charge.  Measures  for  local  recormaissance  are 
taken  independently  of  ground  scouting,  but  this  does 
not  mean  that  these  two  operations  could  be  separated. 

Provisions  of  Various  Regulations. 

France:  Each  escadron  is  preceded  at  200  m.  by  two  ground 
scouts. 

Austria:  Each  escadron  is  preceded  at  300  m.  by  two  ground 
scouts. 

Italy:  Each  escadron  is  preceded  by  two  ground  scouts.  The 
distance  at  which  they  precede  the  escadron  is  not  stated. 

Russia:  Each  escadron  sends  out  eight  ground  scouts  to  a  dis- 
tance of  600 — 600  m.  to  the  front,  rear,  and  both  fianks. 

Examples  of  Inadequate  Ground  Scouting. 

Ligny,  1815.  The  charge  made  by  the  6th  Prussian  Uhlans  against 
French  Guard  infantry  failed  in  a  grain-field  when  a  steep  six  foot  de- 
clivity was  reached. 

Koniggratz,  1866.  To  cover  the  artillery  of  the  Vlth  Army  Corps 
at  Nedelist  (Koniggratz),  the  4th  Hussars  received  orders  to  charge 

■^Lieutenant-General  Oount  v.  Bisma-BK,  Die  Kdniglich  Preuszische  Ka- 
vallerie  unter  Seydlitt  (Karlsruhe,  1837).  p.  121- 


Examples  of  Inadequate  Ground  Scouting.      141 

an  Austrian  battery  that,  supported  by  cavalry,  had  gone  into  position 
at  Lochnitz.  In  its  desire  to  get  at  the  enemy,  the  regiment  neglected 
to  send  out  ground  scouts,  and  encountered,  after  it  had  taken  up  the 
gallop,  a  cut  6  m.  in  breadth  and  3 — 4  m.  in  depth.  Even  had  ground 
scouts  been  used,  they  could  hardly  have  given  timely  warning  of  the 
presence  of  this  obstacle,  as  it  was  located  in  a  grain-field  and  in  im- 
mediate vicinity  of  the  hostile  battery.  Only  a  part  of  the  men  succeeded 
in  stopping  in  time;  most  of  them  were  precipitated  into  the  cut.  The 
commander  of  the  Hussars  desired  to  rally  his  badly  dispersed  regiment, 
but  in  this  he  was  only  partially  successful,  as  the  Hussars  that  had 
crossed  the  obstacle  could  return  only  by  making  a  detour.  The  Austrian 
cavalry  took  advantage  of  this  state  of  affairs  to  make  an  advance,  which 
brought  about  a  mdl^e  that  resulted  unfavorably  to  the  Hussars.* 

Three  charges  made  against  an  Austrian  battalion  that  was  re- 
tiring from  Horenowes  failed  likewise  when  an  impassable  cut  was  en- 
countered. The  battalion  mentioned  retired  skillfully  along  one  side 
of  this  cut.f 

At  Worth,  the  ground  over  which  the  cavalry  had  to  charge  had  not 
been  reconnoitered.t 

But,  since  a  successful  charge  extends  far  beyond 
the  sphere  of  action  of  the  ground  scouts,  cavalry  that  is 
in  the  act  of  pursuing,  or  that  has  just  formed  line  before 
the  impact,  may  encounter  obstacles  that  the  troopers 
can  not  surmoimt.  (Example:  The  stone  quarries  of 
Ploing  on  the  battlefield  of  Sedan). T  Whether  an  obstacle 
is  formidable  depends  upon  the  training  and  condition 
of  the  cavalry.  A  ditch  may  be  an  obstacle  for  tired, 
womout  cavalry  that  is  not  trained  to  jump  in  close  order, 
whereas  it  is  taken  easily  by  cavalry  that  is  better  moimted. 

At  Trautenauy  in  1866,  Austrian  Windischgratz  Dragoons  over- 
estimated the  formidableness  of  an  obstacle  in  their  front.  This  ob- 
stacle consisted  of  a  ditch  with  a  dike  one  meter  in  height  and  was  taken 
by  Lithuanian  Dragoons  during  their  charge,  only  eleven  men  of  their 
1st  escadron  being  thrown  in  jumping  the  ditch.} 


*Oe3chicJite  des  4.  Husarenregiments,  p.  128.     Qen.  St.  W„  1866,  p.  389. 

tBBBBER,  PreuszUche  KavallerU,  p.  108. 

{Balgk-Eunz.   Wdrth  pp.  132  and  198. 

ISee  likewise,  charge  made  by  the  Daghestan  Cossack  Beglment  in  the 
BusBO-Japanese  war,  p.  94  supra, 

$See  the  viyid  account  of  this  charge  In  Erlebnisse  des  Lithauischen  DrO' 
g<msrr$giments  Nr.  1  im  Feldtuge  gegen  Osterreich.     Berlin.  1869. 


142  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

The  combat  reconnaissance  in  front  and  on  the  flanks 
should  be  continued  until  the  various  combat  patrols 
encotmter  resistance  that  they  can  not  overcome;  an  in- 
ferior opponent  should  be  thrown  back:  whereas  contact 
should  be  maintained  with  a  stronger  one.  Measures 
should  likewise  be  taken  to  ensure  reconnaissance  in  case 
a  victory  is  not  gained.  (Par.  133,  German  F.  S.  R.).* 
But  the  reconnaissance  has  a  limit  if  superior  hostile  cavalry 
is  present.  The  latter  must  therefore  be  driven  off  the 
field  or  turned. 


2.  THE  ADVANCE  TO  THE  ATTACK,  f 

To  enable  it  to  count  with  certainty  on  the  coopera- 
tion of  all  its  parts,  cavalry  when  opposed  by  stronger 
cavalry  that  has  not  as  yet  been  definitely  defeated,  will 
march  in  a  single  column.  Cavalry  that  arrives  upon 
the  battlefield  with  its  integral  parts  scattered,  will  seek  to 
concentrate  them  either  by  avoiding  an  encoimter  or  by 
occupying  and  holding  suitable  points.  (Par.  413,  German 
C.  D.  R.).  A  cavalry  unit  marching  in  a  single  column 
will  remain  in  route  formation  on  the  roads  as  long  as 
possible  in  order  to  save  the  troops.  A  more  suitable 
formation — one  that  permits,  finally,  a  united  laimching 
of  the  entire  body — ^is  not  taken  up  until  the  patrols  have 
ascertained  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  The  necessity 
for  extended  reconnaissance  is  obvious.  It  is  by  such 
reconnaissance  alone  that  the  cavalry  can  avoid  the  dangers 
incident  to  being  surprised  by  hostile  fire,  or  can  prevent 
being  forced  to  fight  on  unfavorable  ground. 

So  long  as  the  various  elements  of  the  division  march 
in  rear  of  one  another,  the  rear  tmits  take  up,  without 
further  orders,  the  formation  and  gait  of  the  leading  unit. 
The  importance  of  keeping  the  movement  going  uninter- 

«Combat  patrols,  para.  50,  388,  409.  410  and  411,  Oerman  C.  D,  R, 
fPara.  412—416,  German  C.  D.  R, 


The  Advance  to  the  Attack.  143 

ruptedly  by  means  of  an  even  cadence,  or  by  other  suitable 
measures,  increases  with  the  depth  of  the  division. 
Elongation  of  the  coltunn,  as  well  as  closing  up  to  make 
up  distances  lost,  should  be  avoided. 

An  assembly  formation  is  taken  up  (preparatory  to 
combat)  in  exceptional  cases  only.  A  number  of  groups 
is  formed  instead,  as  a  rule,  and  a  greater  front  thus  covered. 
This  is  to  facilitate  the  subsequent  deployment  forward, 
or  to  expedite,  if  necessary,  the  entry  into  action,  the  leading 
element  being  halted  and  the  deployment  being  made  by 
the  flank  (pars.  141,  142,  332  and  434,  German  C.  D.  R.), 
or  to  make  the  advance  conform  to  the  conduct  of  a  base 
tmit  (pars.  175  and  224,  German  C.  D.  R.).  It  necessi- 
tates that  the  depth  of  the  column  be  reduced  and  that  the 
combat  train  be  cut  out  of  the  column. 

A  cavalry  brigade  in  route  column  takes  up  a  road  space  of  1,070  m. 
At  the  trot,  the  transition  to  column  of  platoons,  which  has  a  depth 
of  440  m.,  takes  four  and  one-half  minutes,  and  to  double  column, 
which  has  a  depth  of  220  m.,  seven  minutes.  In  a  cavalry  division  in 
which  two  brigades  march  in  rear  of  the  artillery,  it  takes  from  sixteen 
to  twenty  minutes  at  the  trot,  for  these  brigades  to  form  double  column 
and  to  arrive  abreast  of  the  leading  brigades. 

On  leaving  the  road*  (pars.  414  and  217-219,  German 
C.  D.  R.),  the  advance  guard,  the  artillery  and  the  machine 
guns  are  assigned  their  several  tasks,  in  orders  for  the 
development  for  action y  or  are  attached  to  some  brigade. 
The  brigade  upon  which  the  development  is  to  be  made 
is  then  designated  as  the  base,  an  objective  upon  which 
the  march  is  to  be  directed  being  at  the  same  time  indi- 
cated.    In  this  the  brigades  may  be  posted  either  abreast  or  in 

^Explanation  of  certain  German  terms:  The  Aufmarsch  (concentration) 
of  the  Infantry  (par.  315,  Part  II,  German  I.  D.  R.)  corresponds  to  the  enoen 
Versammlung  (mass)  of  the  cavalry.  In  the  cavalry,  the  term  Aufmarsch  (Aront 
into  line)  denotes  transition  to  line.  The  meaning  of  the  term  Entfaltung  (develop- 
ment for  action)  is  the  same  in  all  arms.  In  the  infantry,  the  Entwicklung  (de- 
ployment) consists  of  forming  the  troops  for  battle  and  includes  the  extension 
into  line  of  skirmishers;  whereas,  in  the  cayalry,  it  consists  of  forming  line  of 
escadrons  in  colunms  of  platoons. 

See  Tactics,  I,  Kbuxqbb's  translation,  p.  205  et  ssq.,  and  ibid.,  II.  Kbusobb's 
translation,  p.  62. 


144  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

echelon.  Intervals  and  distances  are  regulated  in  orders. 
The  combat  train  is  cut  out  (par.  441,  German  F.  S.  R.), 
and  a  dressing  station  (par.  481,  German  F.  S.  R.)  estab- 
lished. Pioneers  may  be  utilized  either  to  assist  with  their 
rifles  in  defense  or  to  execute  technical  work. 

It  is  desirable  to  come  down  to  the  walk,  even  if  only 
for  a  short  time,  so  as  to  enable  the  rear  units  to  come  up. 
The  carbines  are  slung.  In  order  to  utilize  the  terrain 
to  the  best  advantage,  to  minimize  the  effect  of  the  enemy's 
fire,  and  to  increase  one's  own  readiness  for  action,  the 
brigades  take  up  a  broad  formation  of  little  depth,  fre- 
quently the  double  column  of  platoons  or  the  double  column. 
Orders  for  protecting  the  flanks  should  never  be  awaited. 
The  commander  of  each  flank  unit  of  his  own  accord  sends 
combat  patrols  toward  the  flank.  (Par.  50,  German 
C.  D.  R.). 

The  subsequent  advance  is  made  from  point  to  point, 
the  artillery  being  brought  up  from  one  position  in  readi- 
ness to  another.  Cavalry  combats  resemble  rencontres; 
the  commander  who  strikes  first  secures  freedom  of  action 
for  himself  and  has  a  chance  to  dictate  a  course  of  action 
to  the  enemy.  In  the  cavalry,  moreover,  it  is  more  diffi- 
cult than  in  the  infantry,  to  overcome  the  start  gained  by 
the  enemy  in  deploying.  On  encoimtering  the  enemy, 
the  leader  must  decide  whether  he  should  make  the  most 
of  such  a  start  (pars.  407,  408,  409,  422  and  434,  German 
C.  D.  R.),  or  whether  he  should  place  greater  reliance  on 
launching  his  whole  force  in  one  body.  In  many  cases, 
particularly  in  the  service  of  reconnaissance,  success  gained 
at  an  early  moment,  is  of  special  importance.  On  the  other 
hand,  retained  portions  of  the  command  should  not  be  so 
far  in  rear  that  the  attacking  line  can  be  thrown  back 
before  these  supports  can  take  a  hand  in  the  fight.  If 
the  situation  is  not  as  yet  cleared  up,  the  advance  is  made 
with  corresponding  caution  and  it  becomes  necessary 
to  keep  certain  parts  of  the  command  in  reserve  so  as  to 


Attack  Formation  in  Echelon. 


145 


enable  the  force  to  deploy  not  only  to  the  front  but  in  some 
other  direction  as  well.  Placing  supports  on  both  flanks 
appears  to  be  the  simplest  method  of  accomplishing  this. 
This  formation  permits  line  to  be  formed  quickly  in  any 
direction  by  each  element  partially  changing  direction. 
When  one  flank  can  be  so  posted  as  to  rest  on  impassable 


^ 


▼h. 


> 

N 


* 

I 


groimd,  or  on  terrain  that  is  open  to  view  for  a  long  dis- 
tance but  commanded  by  one's  own  artillery,  one  will 
provide  echelons  on  one  flank  only. 

An  attack  formation  having  an  advanced  echelon  may 
be  the  natural  result  of  the  advance  guard  relation  and 
arises  primarily  from  a  desire  to  assume  the  offensive. 
Such  an  echelon  may  be  able  to  induce  an  imprudent 
enemy  to  make  a  charge  against  which  the  other  echelons 
then  turn.  Placing  echelons  in  advance  in  this  manner 
best  accords  with  the  offensive,  but  counts  upon  a  defi- 
nite line  of  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  If  condi- 
tions on  the  enemy's  side  can  be  ascertained  with  reasonable 
accuracy,  the  cavalry  leader  will  be  able  to  develop  his 
forces  from  the  very  outset  abreast  of  each  other  and  on 
as  wide  a  front  as  has  been  determined  upon  beforehand 
for  the  attack.  The  start  gained  hereby,  coupled  with 
rapidity,  will  frequently  make  it  possible  to  attack  the 
enemy  so  as  to  envelop  him  while  he  is  still  in  the  act  of 
deploying.     The  brigade  commanders  in  the  various  eche- 


146  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

Ions  take  measures,  on  their  own  initiative,  for  the  proper 
distribution  in  depth  of  their  respective  brigades  and  for 
protection  of  the  flanks.  The  division  commander  may 
either  order  directly  what  reconnaissance  is  to  be  made, 
or  assign  definite  combat  fronts  to  his  brigades. 

The  flexibility  of  the  echelon  formation  enables  the 
cavalry  commander,  as  the  clearness  of  the  situation 
grows  apace,  to  gain  that  grouping  of  his  force  from  which 
as  a  basis  the  attack  is  to  be  made.  But  the  leader  must 
guard  against  the  danger  of  beginning  the  action  with 
inadequate  forces  and  then  launching  them  in  driblets. 
This  would  give  the  enemy  the  best  of  it  in  the  first  en- 
counter and  it  is  doubtful  \vhether  the  advantage  thus 
gained  could  ever  be  wrested  away  from  him. 

As  soon  as  the  division  commander  has  decided  to 
attack,  tasks  are  first  of  all  assigned  to  machine  guns 
and  artillery.  If  these  arms  are  to  do  efficient  work, 
they  must  go  into  position  promptly.  Their  position 
must  lie  within  effective  range  of  the  point  where  the 
encounter  w411,  in  all  probability,  take  place.  In  case  both 
combatants  are  actuated  by  this  intention,  the  horse  batteries 
of  friend  and  foe  may  finally  oppose  each  other  at  close 
range.* 

The  brigades  then  receive  their  orders  for  attack, 
provided  an  objective  can  be  assigned  to  each;  otherwise 
the  march  direction  is  indicated  to  the  base  brigade  and 
a  part  of  the  force  is  detailed  as  a  reserve.  Everything 
else  is  the  business  of  the  brigade  commanders  (direction 
of  the  charge,  base  regiments  or  objectives). 

♦There  ts  not  much  time  available.  If  the  two  opposing  cavalry  forcei 
are  4,000  m.  apart  when  the  order  for  attack  U  issued,  only  seven  to  eight  min- 
utes remain  before  the  collision. 


The  Conduct  of  the  Charge.  147 


3.  THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  CHARGE. 

The  charge  will  have  the  best  chance  of  success  against 
cavahy  that  is  ready  for  action,  if  the  charging  force  is 
properly  formed,  maintains  the  trot  as  long  as  possible 
and,  after  covering  a  short  distance  at  the  gallop,  endeavors 
with  a  powerful  shock  to  ride  down  the  enemy.* 

The  speed  at  the  moment  of  impact  depends  upon  the 
capacity  of  the  slowest  horses.  Hence  the  shock  can  be 
delivered  in  two  clearly  defined  closed  ranks,  in  which 
each  individual  trooper  maintains  his  place  with  the  firm 
resolution  of  riding  and  thrusting  down  the  opponent. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  an  opportunity  offers  to  strike 
the  enemy  while  his  deployment  is  still  in  progress,  advan- 
tage should  be  taken  of  this  weakness  by  charging  him, 
even  without  awaiting  the  completion  of  one's  own  deploy- 
ment, with  such  parts  of  the  force  as  are  ready  for  action. 
Success  will  then  depend  upon  quickly  covering  the  dis- 
tance to  the  enemy  (fast  gallop) .  An  arbitrary  assignment 
of  gaits  to  be  used  at  the  various  stages  of  the  charge  is 
out  of  place;  the  terrain,  the  character  of  the  ground, 
the  degree  of  the  enemy's  preparedness  for  action,  and 
the  condition  of  the  horses  will  be  the  governing  factors. 
It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  if  the  attack  is  begun  from 

^General  Stuart's  method  of  attack:  Advance  to  the  attack  at  a  walk; 
when  200  paces  from  the  enemy,  well  collected  trot;  at  50  paces  gallop  progres- 
dvely  increased.  It  should  be  borne  In  mind  that  the  opposing  cavalry  had  a 
penchant  for  awaiting  the  charge  and  receiving  it  with  fire. 

The  views  anent  the  use  of  short  gaits  in  a  charge,  though  they  have  noth- 
ing but  an  historical  Interest,  are  here  quoted:  Jomini  writes:  "The  fast  trot 
■eems  to  me  to  be  the  best  gait  for  charges  in  line,  because  here  everything  de- 
pends upon  the  combination  of  boldness  and  order,  conditions  that  are  not  found 
in  charges  made  at  a  fast  gallop  .  .  .  Some  experienced  offlcora  prefer  the 
canter  begun  when  200  paces  from  the  enemy.  I  know  that  many  troopers  think 
likevrlse.  But  I  also  know  that  the  most  distinguished  generals  of  that  arm  in* 
dine  toward  charges  at  the  trot.  La  Salle,  one  of  the  most  skillful  of  our  generals] 
said  one  day  upon  seeing  the  hostile  ^cavalry  at  the  gallop,  'those  men  are 
lost'."  In  his  report  of  the  engagemem^  at  Zehdenik  on  October  26th,  1806, 
La  Salle  boasts  of  not  having  given  the  signal  to  charge  until  his  brigade  was 
within  ten  paces  of  the  hostile  Une.  This  is  in  line  with  the  Inclination  of  the 
cavalry  of  the  First  ^Empire  .to  await  alcharge^and  to  receive  it  with  carbine  fire. 


148  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

a  halt  and  line  is  formed  just  prior  to  the  moment  of  impact, 
the  charge  can  never  gain  the  momenttmi  that  it  could 
have  attained  if  a  longer  distance  had  been  covered  at  an 
easy  gallop,  straight  to  the  front,  without  urging  the 
horses.  When  charging  an  opponent  who  is  already 
formed,  one  will  have  to  count  on  covering  400  to  800  m. 
at  a  gallop  and  50  to  100  m.  at  top  speed. 

The  cavalry  combat  is  not  preceded  by  preparatory 
stages,  but  enters  at  once  upon  the  decisive  act,  which 
is  over  in  a  very  few  minutes.  Favorable  moments,  more- 
over, are  fleeting.  For  these  reasons,  the  very  nature  of 
the  cavalry  combat  requires  that  as  large  a  force  as  possible 
be  simultaneously  launched  at  the  decisive  point.  *Tor, 
if  this  first  attack  is  repulsed,  a  second  or  a  third  will  succeed 
in  the  rarest  cases  only.  The  first  line  will  then  form, 
in  the  mSlee  as  well  as  in  the  retreat,  an  obstacle  through 
which  the  second  line  could  not  possibly  advance  in  good 
order.  The  direct  support  from  the  rear  is,  at  best,  but 
a  numerical  reinforcement,  which  can  become  effective 
only  in  a  protracted  and,  for  that  reason,  rare  m616e." 
(Fieldmarshal  Moltke). 

As  soon  as  the  attacking  force  moves  against  the 
enemy,  it  forms  line  of  escadrons  in  columns  of  platoons. 
Line  is  formed  as  soon  as  the  proper  direction  for  the 
charge  has  been  gained.  If  one  forms  Hne  prematurely, 
one  sacrifices  some  mobility,  betrays  one's  intentions  to 
the  enemy,  and  gives  up  all  hope  of  subsequently  using 
advantages  offered  by  the  terrain.  A  tardy  deplo3mient 
entails  the  danger  of  one's  being  surprised.  Every  imit 
that  is  launched  in  a  charge  must  ride  down  the  opponent 
indicated  to  it,  without  regard  to  what  happens  on  either 
side.  This,  and  this  alone,  assures  that  the  enemy  will 
be  actually  struck  at  the  first  impact,  by  as  many  regiments 
and  escadrons  as  the  commander  deemed  necessary  to 
laimch.  In  each  regiment,  the  escadrons,  each  well  closed, 
must  be  so  led  as  to  assure  a  united  attack.     The  attack- 


Distribution  in  Depth;  Supports;  Line.        149 

ing  line  may  be  preceded  or  followed  by  supporting  echelons 
consisting  of  single  escadrons,  but  it  is  followed  only  in 
exceptional  cases  by  an  escadron  as  a  second  line. 

DISTRIBUTION  IN  DEPTH;  SUPPORTS;  LINE. 

To  assure,  by  protecting  the  flanks  in  the  first  place, 
the  success  of  an  attack  made  by  a  considerable  number 
of  escadrons,  to  make  flank  attacks,  to  pursue  the  enemy, 
and  to  cover  the  rally,  requires  distribution  in  depth. 
Whereas  an  escadron  is  launched,  as  a  rule,  in  a  single 
line,  a  regiment  finds  it  necessary  to  guard  the  flanks,  and 
a  brigade  to  provide  a  reserve.  Infantry  begins  an  action 
with  a  comparatively  weak  fraction  of  its  force,  and  grad- 
ually strengthens  the  firing  line  by  pushing  in  retained 
imits.  In  the  cavalry,  on  the  other  hand,  when  advancing 
to  attack  cavalry,  the  retained  fractions  have  subsidiary 
tasks.  Whereas  cavalry  finds  itself  at  once  in  a  combat 
situation,  ripe  in  every  respect  and  requiring  instant 
decision,  in  the  infantry  everything  is,  for  the  time  being,  still 
in  the  process  of  developing,  and  the  decision  can  not  be 
brought  about  except  by  means  of  a  prolonged  fire  fight. 
The  reserves  of  the  infantry  are  posted  in  rear  of  the 
units  that  they  are  to  reinforce,  the  distances  being  such 
that  the  reserves  are  as  much  as  possible  sheltered  from 
hostile  fire.  Thus  the  infantry  combat  leads  ultimately 
to  an  admixture  of  all  tmits.  In  the  cavalry,  the  retained 
units  can  not  be  directly  pushed  into  the  attacking  line, 
but  must  be  placed  on  either  or  both  flanks  of  that  line. 
This  then  governs  the  location  of  such  retained  fractions 
a  short  distance  in  rear  of  one  or  both  flanks  of  the  attack- 
ing line,  or  in  prolongation  of  that  line  and  separated  from 
it  by  an  interval.  To  place  retained  units  directly  in 
rear  of  the  attacking  line  would  expose  them,  in  case  of  a 
repulse,  to  the  danger  of  being  run  down  and  carried  away 
by  that  line.  Except  in  an  attack  against  infantry  or  artil- 
lery, in  which  the  cavalry  must  break  up  and  multiply,  in 


150  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

the  direction  of  depth,  the  number  of  targets  it  offers,  the 

various   cavalry    units  are  posted  abreast,  i.  e.,  by  wings, 

so-called. 

^^  This  has   the   advantage   that  tactical  organizations 

are  not  broken  up  and  that  the  force,  split  up  into  brigades 

and  into  regiments  can  pick  out  suitable  positions.    Be- 

Cavalry  Division  formed  in  one  Ime  for  AttocK 


3d. Cov.  Briq. 


2d  Cov  Brig. 
± 


^  z'- 


Ist  Cov  Brig       "**.    "^ 


sides,  it  enables  the  leader  to  dispose  with  greater  facility 
of  the  several  fractions,  and  makes  it  possible  to  keep  the 
enemy  in  the  dark  tmtil  the  very  last  moment  in  regard 
to  the  true  attack  direction.  Moreover,  the  leader  of  every 
subdivision  can  form  his  own  reserve,  all  reinforcing  is 
done  from  the  rear  by  troops  of  the  same  organization 
as  the  attacking  line,  and  rallying  after  a  charge  is  con- 
siderably facilitated.  In  addition,  greater  freedom  is 
offered  to  the  initiative  of  subordinate  leaders,  in  con- 
trast to  the  former  combat  formation  in  successive  lines, 
which  excluded  rather  than  required  initiative.  But 
now  as  in  the  past,  the  prerequisite  to  success  is  the  deter- 
mination on  the  part  of  every  leader  to  be  on  hand  at  the 
decisive  moment. 

The  Germans  call  lines  that  follow  in  the  trace  of  the 
•attacking  line,  "Treffen,'*    As  the  lines  in  rear,  owing  to 


Supporting  Escadrons.  151 

the  cohesion  of  the  first  line,  can  find  employment  in  a 
charge  against  cavalry  only  when  hostile  troops  pierce 
the  attacking  line  (task  of  the  so-called  supporting  esca- 
drons), or  when  there  are  gaps  in  that  line,  it  follows  that 
a  formation  in  successive  lines,  as  mentioned  above,  is 
permissible  only  in  a  charge  against  infantry  or  artillery. 
Units  that  are  not  employed  in  the  first  line  may  be  posted 
either  in  rear  of  the  flanks  as  ''defensive  wings,"  or  in  front 
of  the  flanks  as  advance  echelons.  Whereas  a  supporting 
escadron  is  employed  directly  to  the  front  only,  an  echelpn 
of  the  line  that  has  been  pierced  can  make  a  flank  attack, 
can  prolong  a  line,  and  can  execute  an  envelopment  or  repulse 
such  a  movement  if  made  by  the  enemy. 

Whether  so-called  * 'supporting  escadrons"  are  to  be 
condemned  on  general  principles,  can  only  be  determined 
by  experience  gained  in  war.  Such  escadrons  are  to  be 
used  against  hostile  troops  that  have  broken  through  the 
first  line.  The  danger  of  their  being  carried  away  by  a 
retreating  first  line  must  be  reckoned  with.  Another  draw- 
back is  that  a  regimental  commander  employing  a  sup- 
porting escadron,  volimtarily  deprives  himself  of  one- 
fourth  of  his  regiment,  which  might  have  been  used  to  better 
advantage  on  a  flank.  Whether  supporting  escadrons 
should  be  used  will  therefore  have  to  be  decided  in  each 
individual  case.  Their  employment  may  be  proper  in 
case  the  march  directions  assigned  to  the  various  fractions 
during  an  attack  do  not  guarantee  cohesion  at  the 
moment  of  impact.* 

*Par.  170,  German  C.  D.  R.  (Regiment):  "An  escadron  will  follow  as 
a  second  line  in  exceptional  cases  only."  Par.  200.  Oerman  C.  D.  R.  (Brigade): 
"Under  certain  conditions  single  escadrons  in  line  may  follow  the  attacking  line." 

During  the  charge  against  Montalgu's  Oavalry  Brigade  (French),  the 
2d  Hussar  Regiment,  (No.  10) — distributed  by  platoons  in  rear  of  the  13th  Dra- 
goons— ^fell  upon  the  French  Hussars  that  had  broken  through  the  German  lines. 
Cavalry  action  at  Ville  sur  Yron. — Conduct  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Division.  Sup' 
pUment  to  Militar-Wochenblatt,  1892,  p.  311. 


152  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

Supporting  escadrons  are  the  remains  of  the  Great  Frederick's 
second  line,  whose  strength  visibly  decreased  as  the  superiority  over 
the  hostile  cavalry  increased. 

In  a  memorial  written  in  1872,  General  Count  Stolberg  suggested 
that  cavalry  divisions  be  formed  and  used  in  three  lines.*     Count  Stol- 

Cavalry  Division  formed  in  echelon 
ottocking  Artillery 

2d  Etc.  2d  Esc 

300 


2d.  Esc.  2d.Esc. 

300 


if 


IV  Gov.  Brig 


2d  Gov. Brig.  ____ 


_^_  3d.cov.Bri9.      _.tL_ 


Column  of  Plotoons 

in  single  rank  for  motion 


R(X»t«  columns 


berg  advocated  the  use  of  successive  lines  as  such,  in  rear  of  one  another, 
in  attacks  on  infantry  and  artillery  only,  such  use  to  be  confined  to  the 
two  leading  lines.    In  all  other  cases,  lines  in  rear  were  to  be  used  abreast 

*y.  Kashleb,  Die  preustische  Reiterei  von  1806  bis  1876,  p.  258. 


Three  Line  Tactics.  153 

of  the  leading  line.  The  revivers  of  the  tactics  of  successive  lines  were 
therefore  fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  their  lines  were  by  no  means  at  all 
times  to  appear  in  that  relation.  General  von  Schmidt,  who  had  earned 
great  distinction  in  developing  the  regulations  governing  the  employment 
of  cavalry  in  combat,  recognized  the  advantages  of  this  formation. 
Through  his  efforts  the  following  normal  attack  formation  for  the  division 
was  adopted:  one  brigade  as  the  first  line,  followed  directly  at  150  paces 
by  two  supporting  escadrons  furnished  by  another  brigade,  the  remainder 
of  this  brigade  following  160  paces  farther  in  rear  as  a  second  line  and 
overlapping  the  first  line  on  the  exposed  flank;  the  third  brigade  was 
posted  on  the  opposite  flank  and  160  paces  in  rear  of  the  second  line. 
Definitely  prescribed  formations  for  going  into  action  facilitate  deploy- 
ment and  simplify  command,  but,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that,  on  the 
other  hand,  they  tend  to  produce  a  rigid  "pattern''  conduct.  The 
system  of  three  line  tactics  facilitated  the  united  launching,  in  one  body, 
of  all  of  the  escadrons.  Furthermore,  in  it,  the  division  constituted  a 
single  unit  of  command,  each  and  every  subdivision  having  its  own  well 
defined  task,  closely  coordinated  with  that  of  the  whole  division.  These 
advantages  led  all  armies  to  incorporate  the  system  of  three  line  tactics 
into  their  regulations.  After  this  tactical  system  had  proven  successful 
on  the  maneuver  ground,  people  sought  to  find  points  of  similarity 
between  the  modem  employment  of  cavalry  and  that  of  Frederick  the 
Great.  In  this  comparison,  however,  the  very  important  difference 
was  overlooked,  that  in  the  Great  Frederick's  cavalry  the  first  and  second 
lines  were  launched  as  one  unit,  whereas  in  three  line  tactics  the  first 
line  usually  made  the  frontal  attack,  the  second  line  the  fiank  attack. 
Under  Frederick  the  Great,  the  third  line  was  not  placed  under  the 
orders  of  the  cavalry  commander,  but  constituted  an  independent  army 
reserve.  Nowadays,  we  form  such  an  army  reserve  of  all  three  arms, 
whereas  the  third  line  in  the  cavalry  division  constitutes  the  reserve  of 
the  cavalry  leader. 

Frederick's  cavalry  was  formed  in  two  closely  united  lines  when 
attacking  cavalry.  The  first  was  to  throw  back  the  enemy.  For  this 
purpose,  it  was  to  be  made  as  strong  as  the  length  of  the  hostile  line 
necessitated  and  the  terrain  permitted.  The  first  line  was  to  ride  straight 
at  the  enemy  and  to  maintain  such  good  cohesion  as  to  enable  it  to  ride 
down  anything  opposed  to  it.  If  practicable,  it  was  to  outflank  the  enemy, 
and  to  turn  with  its  flanking  groups  at  once  against  the  hostile  reserves. 
A  second  line,  usually  weaker  than  the  first,  was  to  follow  a  considerable 
distance  in  rear  of  that  line  as  a  reserve  and  to  overlap  it  with  some 
escadrons  so  as  to  protect  the  flanks.  The  second  line  was  charged  with 
the  task  of  ensuring  success  when,  perchance,  the  impact  of  the  first 
line  had  failed  to  bring  about  a  victory.  It  was,  furthermore,  charged 
with  immediately  protecting  the  flanks  of  the  first  line,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent that  line  from  being  misled  by  possible  hostile  flank  attacks  and 
enticed  into  maneuvering.  Part  of  a  number  of  escadrons  of  Hussars, 
in  column,  accompanied  the  wing  that  was  in  the  air,  and  others  followed 


154        Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

injrear  of  the  two  leading  lines  as  a  third  line.  These  Hussars  were 
not  under  the  orders  of  the  cavalry  commander,  but  entirely  independent. 
It  was  their  duty  to  oppose  the  more  extensive  flank  or  turning 
movements  that  might  be  made  by  the  enemy,  particularly  by  mobile 
hostile  Hussars,  or,  when  circumstances  permitted,  to  move  on  their 
own  account  against  the  enemy's  flanks  and  rear.* 

Whereas  the  French,  until  the  appearance  of  the  drill  regulations 
of  May  12th,  1899,  preferred  three  equally  strong  lines,  the  Germans 
increased  the  strength  of  the  first  line  to  three  and  four  regiments  and 
divided  the  other  regiments  between  the  second  and  third  lines. 

In  France,  General  Gallifet  did  not  believe  in  this  decisive  success 
of  the  first  line.  He  was  of  the  opinion  that  even  weak  reserves  might 
turn  the  scale  in  a  cavalry  fight.  He  argued  that  long  lines  would 
have  to  deploy  at  an  early  moment,  frequently  before  accurate  infor- 
mation was  available  as  to  the  direction  in  which  the  enemy  was  to  be 
found.  Moreover,  that,  once  deployed,  they  could  no  longer  be  con- 
trolled and  would  run  danger,  in  case  the  first  direction  taken  was  in- 
accurate, of  missing  the  enemy.  Furthermore,  that  they  did  not  even 
have  the  moral  element  to  assist  them,  for  each  unit  could  see  only  those 
immediately  in  its  front.  In  his  opinion,  long  lines  are,  on  the  contrary, 
adapted  to  enhance  the  morale  of  the  enemy,  as  they  are  easily  thrown 
into  confusion.  Gallifet  recommended  that,  when  opposed  by  the  strong 
German  first  line,  the  French  cavalry  keep  well  concentrated  and  pierce 
that  line.  This  was  based  on  the  assumption  that  a  German  cavalry 
division  would  hurl  itself  like  an  enraged  animal  at  the  enemy,  and  it 
was  sought  to  meet  this  alleged  thoughtless,  unwieldy  onslaught  by 
maneuvering  and  by  a  skillful  use  of  echelons  (groups).  The  French, 
therefore,  condemn  "three  line  tactics"  and  recommend  that  suitable 
dispositions  be  made  to  fit  each  particular  case. 

To  launch  a  cavalry  division  according  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  three  line  tactics,  each  line  having  an  accurately 
defined  task,  requires  that  the  division  be  concentrated. 
The  moment  a  part  of  the  division  is  missing,  or  when  the 
division  is  not  concentrated  or  other  troops  join  it,  this 
tactical  procedure  undergoes  a  decided  change.  Further- 
more, three  line  tactics  are  adapted  only  to  open  terrain 
permitting  an  unobstructed  view,  presuppose  that  the 
leader  will  be  able  to  see  the  enemy  as  well  as  his  own 
troops,  and  reckon  with  the  fact  that  the  flanks  will  be  in 
in  the  air.  Other  drawbacks  are  the  disruption  of  units 
of  command,  caused  by  splitting  up  the   brigades,    and 

^Militdr-Wochenblatt,  1904.  No.  1.     Die  Treffen  in  der  Kavallerie'laktik. 


The  Flank  Attack.  155 

the  set  scheme  of  employment  produced.  Three  line 
tactics  correspond,  in  a  certain  sense,  to  the  fiercely  assailed 
normal  attack  of  the  infantry.  Three  line  tactics,  like  the 
normal  attack  of  the  infantry  find  less  and  less  appli- 
cation, as  the  deployment  takes  place  more  and  more 
frequently  from  route  column  and  not  from  an  assembly 
or  transitory  formation.  When  hostile  fire  forces  the 
division  to  break  up  into  brigades,  when  the  brigades 
arrive  upon  the  battlefield,  separated  from  each  other, 
or  when  single  divisional  cavalry  regiments  or  cavalry 
brigades,  or  entire  divisions,  join  the  attack,  a  so-called 
employment  "by  wings'*  (disposition  of  the  several  units 
of  command)  naturally  results.  The  division  commander 
is  then  replaced  by  independent  brigade  commanders, 
who  relieve  him  of  issuing  detailed  orders.  (Employment 
of  the  Prussian  cavalry  on  the  plateau  of  Ville  sur  Yron, 
on  August  16th,  1870,  and  the  charge  made  by  Pulz'  and 
Bujanovicz'  Cavalry  Brigades  at  Custozza.)*  Owing  to 
the  rapid  course  of  the  cavalry  combat,  the  difficulty  of 
leading  consists  of  bringing  the  various  units  into  action 
at  the  proper  time  and  place.  When  orders  do  not  arrive, 
it  must  be  left  to  the  initiative  of  each  individual  leader 
to  take  proper  action. 

THE  FLANK  ATTACK.! 

** Numbers  alone  are  not  decisive;  mobility  and  skilled 
leadership  may  double  the  power.  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
leader  to  launch  the  decisive  blow  at  the  correct  place  and 
at  the  proper  time.  A  great  stride  toward  victory  will 
have  been  made  if  one  succeeds  in  dictating  the  enemy's 
course  of  action  and  imposing  upon  him  the  disadvantages 
of  the  defensive.*'     (Par.  422,  German  C.  D.  R.). 

*The  term  "employment  by  wings"  (Jlugelweiae  Verwendung)  Is  not  quite 
accurate,  for  in  three  line  tactics  the  several  parts  of  the  force  may  likewise  be 
employed  abreast  of  one  another.  The  Austrian  term  "formation  in  groups'* 
(gruppenweise  GHederung)  is  better,  and  the  term  "combat  with  units  of  com- 
mand" (Kampf  mit  KommandoeinheUen)  better  still. 

tPars.  394  and  428,  German  C.  D.  R. 


I 


156  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

In  a  purely  frontal  encounter,  the  number  of  troopers 
launched  and  the  skillful  use  of  the  saber  alone  decide. 
Units  that  have  no  enemy  in  front  of  them  will  wheel  into 
line  and  will  seek  to  envelop  a  hostile  flank.  A  blow  directed 
at  the  opponent's  flank  does  not  produce  an  immediate 
offensive  counter-movement.  The  part  of  the  enemy's 
line  that  is  threatened  must  first  turn  to  face  the  attacking 
line  and  may  be  ridden  down  by  the  latter  during  this 
movement  or  throwTi  back  upon  that  part  of  the  hostile 
force  which  is  still  faced  to  the  front.  A  line  of  cavalry 
advancing  to  the  attack  will  rarely  be  able  by  itself  to  ward 
off  a  flank  attack.  This  it  must  leave  to  units  following 
in  rear.  Poor  cavalry  will  be  tempted  to  turn  tail  be- 
fore the  shock  takes  place.  Although  this  effect  of  the 
flank  attack  may  perhaps  be  confined  at  the  outset  to  the 
flank  units,  it  may  be  communicated  finally  to  the  entire 
line.  'Three  men  in  (the  enemy's)  rear  do  more  than  fifty 
in  front."  (Frederick  the  Great).  Front  and  flank  at- 
tacks should,  therefore,  be  combined.  The  effect  of  the 
flank  attack  is  increased  if  it  is  converted  into  an  envelop- 
ment during  the  m61ee.  From  this  we  may  deduce  the 
following : 

1.  In  a  combat  against  cavalry,  the  flank  attack  is 
the  most  decisive  form  of  attack.  Its  effect  is  increased 
in  proportion  to  the  suddenness  with  which  it  is  made. 
**If  the  flank  attack  is  made  only  against  the  flank  of  the 
leading  hostile  line,  it  will,  to  be  sure,  produce  an  effect 
through  the  shock  and  the  attendant  moral  impression, 
but  promises  only  a  local  success.  Such  an  attack  offers 
single  escadrons  a  favorable  target.  If  the  attack  is  di- 
rected against  the  flank  of  the  entire  hostile  force,  in  a 
broader  sense,  it  will  compel  the  enemy  to  change  formation 
at  a  critical  moment  and  may,  when  combined  with  a 
frontal  attack,  through  envelopment,  bring  about  a  decisive 
victory.     A  simultaneous  attack  of  both  flanks  presupposes 


The  Flank  Attack.  157 

a  considerable  superiority  or  an  opponent  who  has  not 
as  yet  deployed.*'     (Par.  428,  German  C.  D.  R.). 

The  bulk  of  the  force  is  launched  where  it  is  desired 
to  bring  about  the  decision.  Owing  to  its  importance,  the 
flank  attack  is  frequently  employed  to  bring  about  the  de- 
cision. In  such  a  case,  only  as  many  troops  as  are  necessary 
to  hold  him  are  launched  against  the  enemy's  front. 

2.  The  deployment  in  the  direction  of  the  point  of 
impact  should  not  be  made  prematurely,  in  order  that  the 
opponent  may  be  left  in  the  dark  as  long  as  possible  in 
regard  to  the  direction  from  which  the  shock  is  coming. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  should  not  be  made  too  late,  so  that 
there  will  be  enough  time  to  bring  every  weapon  into  line 
and  give  the  horses  a  chance  to  get  up  all  the  speed  that 
is  in  them.  As  soon  as  the  proper  direction  for  the  charge 
has  been  gained  and  maneuvering  is  no  longer  possible, 
line  is  formed.  The  idea  of  gaining  the  enemy's  flank 
by  maneuvering  is  as  tempting  as  the  danger  of  being 
attacked  in  turn  during  the  movement  is  great.  Labored 
artifices  are  out  of  place  in  face  of  the  enemy.  Only  by 
going  straight  at  him  can  one  dictate  the  enemy's  course 
of  action  and  prevent  him  from  maneuvering  and  from 
making  flanking  movements.  *'The  King  hereby  for- 
bids all  officers  of  cavalry,  under  pain  of  being  cashiered 
in  disgrace,  ever  to  allow  themselves  in  any  action  to  be 
charged  by  the  enemy,  for  the  Prussians  themselves  are 
always  to  charge  the  enemy."* 

3.  The  enemy  is  to  be  held  in  front  and,  when  practi- 
cable, to  be  induced  to  deploy  in  a  wrong  direction. 

4.  The  unit  in  the  first  line  must  be  completely 
relieved  of  all  care  for  its  flanks  and  rear  by  units  that  follow 
in  rear   (echeloning),   by  the  terrain,   or  by  dismotmted 

*Fbbdiirigk  the  Orbat.  Disposition  toie  sich  die  Orders  von  d$r  Kav.  u.  s.  to, 
torn  »5.  Juli,  174^. 

The  requirement  "ftlways  charge  the  enemy  first/'  is  foimd  as  far  back 
as  1727  in  the  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations  of  Frederick  William  I. 


158  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

troopers   or  machine   guns  posted  in   suitable  positions. 
(Pars.  432,  435  and  438^  German  C.  D.  R.). 

5.  The  flanks  should  be  constantly  observed  by  com- 
bat patrols,  who  likewise  continue  in  observation  during 
the  charge.     (Pars.  50,  410  and  411,  German  C.  D.  R.). 


The  difficulty  of  execution  lies  in  striking  the  flank 
of  the  hostile  cavalry,  owing  to  the  inconsiderable  target 
ofl^ered  by  the  same.  Hence  the  charge  should  be  launched 
in  the  direction  of  a  point  toward  which  both  forces  are 
moving.  But  a  skillful  opponent  will  have  means  of  minimi- 
zing the  effect  of  the  flank  attack.  If  a  flank  attack  fails, 
the  attacking  cavalry  may  easily  be  dispensed  or  the  flank- 
ing group  may  be  thrown  upon  the  frontal  group. 

A  flank  attack  is  either  the  immediate  consequence 
of  the  direction  of  march  of  the  force,  or  may  be  brought 
about,  if  the  terrain  is  favorable,  by  forces  retained  in  rear. 
It  may  be  made  with  the  entire  force  or  may  be  intended 
to  support  an  attack  made  from  another  direction.  In 
order  to  keep  the  enemy  in  the  dark  as  long  as  possible 
about  the  direction  of  the  attack  and  to  reduce  the  dis- 
tances that  have  to  be  covered,  it  may  sometimes  be 
advisable  to  make  the  flank  attack  ^\4th  the  leading  line. 

It  is  important  to  decide  how  many  troops  are  to  be 
employed  to  deliver  the  blow  at  the  enemy's  flank.  One 
must  decide  whether  the  flank  attack  should  be  directed 
against  a  hostile  line  that  has  already  been  launched,  or 
whether  an  enveloping  movement  of  greater  magnitude 
should  be  made,  so  that  not  only  the  first  but  a  second 
line  as  well  may  be  struck.  In  the  first  case,  only  a  few 
escadrons  need  be  employed,  as  there  are  not  enough 
objectives  (flank  of  the  first  line)  to  make  a  broader  frontage 
worth  while.  When  the  center  of  the  flank  attack  strikes 
the  flank  of  the   deployed   opponent,   there   must   be   a 


The  Flank  Attack.  159 

sufficient  excess  of  force  remaining  to  wheel  against  his 
flank  and  rear.  In  any  case,  however,  too  many  escadrons 
should  not  be  employed,  as  a  large  part  of  the  force  might 
strike  nothing.  A  few  escadrons  will  suffice  in  most  cases; 
the  others  remain  available  to  guard  the  leading  element 
and  the  exposed  flank,  and,  as  a  reserve,  to  ward  off  hostile 
coiuiter-attacks.  It  is  idle  to  ask  whether  the  flank  attack 
should  be  made  simultaneously  with  the  frontal  attack, 
or  later;  the  main  thing  is  that  the  blow  be  effective.  A 
flank  attack  made  subsequent  to  the  collision  may  turn 
the  scale  in  a  m&lee  that  is  a  stand-off. 

When  initiating  a  flank  attack,  it  is  advisable  to  form 
double  column,  to  have  the  head  of  the  column  execute 
an  appropriate  change  of  direction  and  to  lead  it  against 
the  enemy's  flank.  The  force  must  be  in  a  formation 
that  enables  it  to  deploy  with  equal  ease  in  direction  of 
the  leading  element  and  toward  the  front. 

The  column  of  platoons  is  weak  in  direction  of  its  head,  but  strong 
toward  a  flank.  At  any  rate,  its  head  requires  to  be  specially  protected 
by  a  unit  posted  at  the  required  deploying  distance  from  the  column. 
After  the  column  of  platoons  has  wheeled  into  line,  this  unit  follows 
in  rear  of  the  exposed  flank. 

When  the  second  echelon  is  already  in  line  of  escadrons, 
the  heads  of  escadrons  may  be  caused  to  change  direction 
at  the  signal  "heads  of  escadrons"  {Eskadronteten-Ruf) 
and  led,  in  this  manner,  against  the  enemy's  flank.  From 
this  formation,  it  is  equally  easy  to  deploy  against  the  flank 
of  the  enemy  and  against  an  attack  coming  from  a  direc- 
tion opposite  to  the  direction  of  march.  This  formation 
requires,  however,  open  terrain  permitting  easy  passage 
on  a  sufficiently  wide  front. 

According  to  the  very  thorough  Russian  regulations,  the  second 
echelon,  if  already  in  line  and  if  opposed  on  open  terrain  by  a  very 
mobile  and  wide-awake  enemy,  is  to  wheel  by  platoons,  half  right,  for 
example,  move  toward  the  enemy's  flank,  make  a  quarter  left  wheel 
by  platoons,  execute  front  into  line  in  each  escadron,  and  charge.  The 
Russians  claim  that  this  procedure  has  the  advantage  that  the  enemy 


160  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

does  not  recognize  the  purpose  of  this  movement  until  a  very  late  moment 
and  that  the  direction  in  which  the  charge  is  to  be  made  is  retained 
during  the  forward  movement,  making  it  possible  to  ward  off  a  counter^ 
attack  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  When  covered  approach  is  practicable, 
when  the  enemy  lacks  enterprise,  and  has  no  reserves  in  rear  of  his  wings, 
the  cavalry  is  to  be  led  in  column  of  platoons  toward  the  hostile  flank. 
When  the  second  echelon  is  a  considerable  distance  in  rear  of  the  first, 
it  is  sufficient  to  advance  in  echelon  from  one  wing,  and  to  wheel  into 
line  toward  the  hostile  flank. 

Protection  for  the  flanks  (warding  off  of  a  flank  attack, 
pars.  436  and  437,  German  C.  D.  R.)  is  provided  by  form- 
ing a  defensive  wing,  so-called,  which  moves  straight  to- 
ward the  flank  attack.  In  this  operation  the  opponent 
has  the  initiative  and  may,  if  the  attack  is  successful, 
throw  the  defensive  wing  upon  the  first  line.  The  defen- 
sive wing  is  nothing  but  a  makeshift  in  case  one  is  surprised 
by  a  flank  movement  and  time  is  lacking  to  take  more 
adequate  cotmter-measures.  It  is  better  to  post  troops 
in  prolongation  of  the  general  line  and  to  fall  upon  the 
leading  elements  of  the  enemy,  or  to  envelop  his  main 
force.  Such  a  maneuver  is  in  line  with  the  spirit  of  the 
offensive.  The  initiative,  which  the  enemy  seeks  to  gain, 
is  wrested  from  him.     If  he  wishes  to  avoid  being  himself 


.**' 


i 

r 


/ 
...\ 


I  I  II M  I  I 

•  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  "  ■'! 


/ 


\h 


Defensive  win( 


Warding  off  a  Flank  Attack 
by  means  of  offensive  action. 


The  Impact  and  the  M£l£e.  161 

taken  in  flank,  he  will  have  to  change  his  formation  as 
soon  as  he  becomes  aware  of  our  advance.  If  he  dis- 
covers our  movement  too  late,  he  will  not  have  enough 
time  left  to  form  a  new  front  on  his  leading  element  and 
will  go  down  to  defeat.  When  the  echelon  is  very  strong, 
a  combination  of  both  methods  will  usually  force  the  enemy 
to  abstain  from  his  intention. 


4.     THE  IMPACT  AND  THE  M^L^E. 

Even  when  the  terrain  offers  no  difficulties,  and 
hostile  bullets  produce  no  losses  in  its  ranks,  charging 
cavalry — ^in  actual  war — ^never  forms  such  a  solid  wall 
that  it  could  not  be  broken  by  the  onrushing  lines  of 
the  opponent.  Besides,  a  Une  of  charging  cavalry  is  never 
straight  enough  to  bear  comparison  with  a  stone  wall. 
The  desire  to  close  with  the  enemy — a  desire  that  does 
not  appear  equally  strong  in  all  the  men — and  losses  will 
impair  the  cohesion  of  the  line.  The  best  men  will  seek  to 
join  their  officers  riding  in  front.  Thus  wedges  are  formed, 
which  are  driven  against  the  enemy's  line.*  There  is  no 
collision  of  two  solid  bodies.  A  horse  will  invariably  try 
to  evade  an  obstacle,  and  the  better  the  cohesion  of  the 
unit  advancing  to  the  charge,  the  smaller  is  the  chance 
of  such  evasion.  Consequently,  the  denser  wedges  will 
turn  instinctively  against  those  parts  of  the  hostile  line 
where  cohesion  has  been  lost,  and  will  penetrate  them. 
The  inrushing  troops  will  then  carry  away  with  them  the 
adjacent  parts  of  the  enemy's  line.  The  broken  part  of  the 
line  then  either  begins  the  m§lee,  in  which  it  will  soon  succumb 

*The  formation  of  the  Hanoverian  cavalry  was  actuaUy  calculated  to 
produce  this,  for  the  best  and  strongest  troopers  on  the  best  and  strongest  horses 
were  posted  In  the  center  of  the  escadron  and  were  to  form  a  wedge  In  rear  of  the 
escadron  commander. 

Example:  The  successful  charge  made  near  Stresetltz  by  two  escadrons 
of  the  11th  Austrian  Uhlans  against  the  1st  Dragoons  of  the  Prussian  Guard, 
whose  cohesion  had  been  considerably  impaired  by  crossing  a  ditch. — KaviUle' 
risHsehe  Monatshefts,  1908. 


162  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

on  account  of  its  numerical  inferiority,  or,  in  view  of  that 
inevitable  outcome,  evacuates  the  battlefield,  carrying 
with  it,  if  the  morale  of  the  force  is  not  good,  parts  of  the 
line  still  intact.  Both  opponents  may  have  their  line 
penetrated.  Both  will  likewise  lose  a  number  of  troopers 
who,  believing  the  turn  taken  by  affairs  in  their  front  to  be 
imfavorable  to  hand-to-hand  combat,  leave  the  field 
voluntarily  or  are  soon  forced  to  do  so.  The  number 
of  men  thus  withdrawing  from  the  m^lee  grows  apace  as  the 
cohesion  with  which  the  line  advances  to  the  charge  decreases, 
as  the  niunber  of  points  of  penetration  offered  the  enemy 
increases,  and  as  the  ease  with  which  the  men  can  turn 
tail  is  enhanced.  On  the  other  hand,  the  number  of  men 
so  shirking  the  fight,  increases  in  proportion  as  the  enemy, 
thanks  to  better  cohesion  (local  superiority)  increases, 
in  the  mind  of  the  individual  opponent,  the  impression 
of  personal  danger.  The  larger  the  number  of  those  morally 
vanquished  at  the  moment  of  impact,  the  smaller  the  pros- 
pects of  that  unit's  victoriously  terminating  the  m616e. 

In  a  comprehensive  study  of  the  cavalry  combats 
at  Stresetitz  in  1866,  and  at  Ville  sur  Yron  in  1870,  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Wenninger*  sought  to  obtain  a  clear  con- 
ception of  the  collision.  Such  a  thing  as  two  cavalry 
forces  in  close  order  meeting  and  riding  each  other  down 
did  not  occur.  At  Stresetitz,  sixteen  and  a  half  escadrons 
and  at  Ville  sur  Yron  thirty-five  and  a  half  escadrons, 
their  own  cohesion  somewhat  impaired,  made  a  charge, 
which,  not  being  pushed  home,  resulted  in  a  m616e.  At 
Stresetitz,  eight  escadrons  turned  tail  before  they  struck 
the  hostile  line. 

''Against  cavalry,  the  escadron  charges  in  line,  as  a 
rule.  The  shock  must  be  delivered  with  full  force  and  in 
two    clearly    defined    ranks    maintaining    firm    cohesion. 

*Ober  Verlauf  und  Ergebnls  von  Reiterzusammenstdszen.  Eln  offener 
Brief  an  alio  noch  lebenden  Zeugen  von  Relterkampfen."  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Wenninger.  Commanding  Ist  Bavarian  Heavy  Cavalry  Regiment,  Vienna.  1.80 
Kr.   Kav.  Monatshefte,   1908. 


The  Impact  and  the  MfeL^E.  163 

Cohesion,  above  all  else,  is  decisive.  Every  trooper  should 
know  this,  keep  his  place  in  ranks  and  maintain  close 
touch. 

"The  two  guides  on  the  flanks  of  the  escadron  keep 
the  escadron  closed  on  its  center.  Small  gaps  in  the  front 
rank  are  removed  by  closing  in;  larger  gaps  are  filled  by 
rear-rank  troopers  moving  up.**  (Par.  106,  German  C.  D. 
R.).  *'The  charge  may  be  made  without  cheering  only 
in  case  the  attention  of  adjacent  hostile  units  is  not  to  be 
drawn  to  the  charging  unit.*'     (Par.  109,  German  C.  D.  R.). 

In  order  that  the  trooper,  immediately  after  penetrat- 
ing the  hostile  line,  may  be  able  to  throw  his  horse  about 
and  begin  the  hand-to-hand  fight,  he  must  have  a  thoroughly 
trained,  obedient  moimt.     As  a  rule,  the  troops  engaged 
in  a  m616e  continue  to  move  in  the  direction  in  which  the 
shock  of  the  sui)erior  force  was  delivered.     Frequently, 
of  course,  the  shock  alone  may  decide  the  action,  hence 
the  demand  to  make  the  first  line  as  strong  as  possible, 
in  order  that  success  may  be  assured.     The  lance — ^whose  ^ 
superiority  over  the  saber  both  in  the  shock  and  during    ^ 
the  pursuit  is  imquestioned,  though  it  may  be  a  disad-    , 
vantage  in  the  m616e  in  a  crowded  space — should  induce 
us  to  bring  about  the  decision  by  main  force  and  cohesion 
at  the  moment  of  impact,  so  that  the  enemy  will  not  take 
chances  on  a  m616e. 

The  impression  produced  by  the  collision  is  so  tremen- 
dous that  in  a  force  that  charges  the  enemy  for  the  first 
time  the  example  and  encouragement  of  the  officers  is 
required  to  cause  the  men  to  make  use  of  their  weapons. 
Experience  teaches  that,  if  the  m61ee  does  not  come  to  a 
standstill  but  moves  along  over  a  wide  space,  the  troopers 
rarely  if  ever  think  of  using  their  weapons,*  and  the  losses 
that  the  enemy  suffers  are  in  consequence  insignificant. 

*Three  escadrons  of  the  Ist  UtLlans  at  Orleans.  Kunz,  Reiterie,  p.  305. 
12th  Hussars  at  Langenhof-Stresetitz. — Oharge  made  by  the  Newmark  Dragoons 
at  Stresetltz  (K5niggrfttz).     v,  Qtistobp. 


164  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

The  combat  of  small  imits  with  the  artne  blanche 
will  invariably  be  decided  in  a  very  short  time.  When  the 
opponents  are  completely  intermixed,  the  m616e  may  per- 
haps continue  for  a  while  at  the  point  where  the  collision 
took  place.  Very  soon,  however,  first  one  trooper  here 
and  there,  then  several,  will  withdraw  from  the  fight, 
and  the  action  will  begin  to  move  in  one  or  the  other  di- 
rection. The  various  groups  will  now  open  up  somewhat, 
and  the  melee  will  finally  become  flight  on  the  one  side  and 
pursuit  on  the  other. 

The  mfil^e  is  decided  most  quickly  by  the  action  of 
fresh  bodies  in  close  order,  especially  if  they  attack  from 
a  flank  in  rapid  succession.  Charging  in  close  order  into 
the  disintegrated  mass,  no  matter  if  friendly  troopers  are 
ridden  down  in  the  process,  such  bodies  drive  the  entire 
mass  before  them  in  the  direction  of  the  charge  and  on  a 
front  equal  to  their  own.  But  they  in  turn  gradually  lose 
more  and  more  of  their  own  cohesion  and  effectiveness. 
The  hostile  troopers  must  be  aware  that  their  flank  is 
attacked  and  that  their  line  of  retreat  is  endangered,  before 
thoughts  of  turning  tail  become  rife  in  their  minds.  If 
another  unit  tries  to  stem  the  headlong  rush  of  retreating 
troopers  by  advancing  against  them,  it  will  be  carried  away.* 
The  best  way  for  such  a  unit  to  differentiate  between 
victor  and  vanquished  (friend  and  foe)  is  to  approach  from 
a  flank.  It  is  inmiaterial  in  what  formation  such  a  move- 
ment is  made. 

Koniggratz.  On  debouching  at  the  trot,  in  column  of  platoons, 
from  a  defile,  the  4th  Uhlans  (great  cavalry  charge  at  Langenhof-Strese- 
titz),  saw  a  large  cavalry  mass,  Prussians  and  Austrians  intermingled, 
approaching  at  a  rapid  pace  from  the  left  front.  The  two  leading  es- 
cadrons  of  the  4th  Uhlans  formed  line  and  charged  into  the  mass.    The 


*The  leading  escadron  of  General  C16rembault'8  Division  at  the  dose 
of  the  cavalry  action  at  Vllle  sur  Yron.  Kunz,  Reiterei,  p.  142.  Advancing 
straight  to  the  firont.  at  Stresetits.  the  3d  and  4th  Bscadrons  of  the  5th  Hussars, 
and  the  3d  Escadron  of  the  7th  Hussars,  were  carried  away  by  the  fugitives. 
KavaUeriati$che  Monatshefu,  1908,  XI,  p.  918.  See  also  the  successful  flank  at- 
tack made  by  the  16th  Dragoons  at  Ville  sur  Yron.  KavallerisHsche  Afonol«- 
hefU,  1902.  XII.  p.  ^023. 


The  Impact  and  the  MfeL^E.  165 

8d  and  4th  Escadrons  followed  the  leading  escadrons  for  the  time  being 
in  column  of  platoons,  then  formed  line  to  the  flank  by  wheeling  by  pla- 
toons, and  charged.  This  stopped  the  Austrian  pursuit  and  gave  the 
defeated  12th  Hussars  (Prussian)  a  chance  to  rally.* 

Such  a  procedure  is,  however,  permissible  only  so  long 
as  formed  hostile  bodies  need  no  longer  be  reckoned  with. 
Such  hostile  bodies  must  first  be  defeated  before  the  leader 
of  a  imit  that  has  not  as  yet  entered  the  fight,  can  think 
of  throwing  himself  into  a  mfel6e.  (Par.  418,  German 
C.  D.  R.). 

From  this  we  may  deduce  the  following:  In  order  to 
assure  a  decision  before  a  m61ee  takes  place,  the  shock  must 
be  delivered  with  as  many  troops  as  possible.  If  the  troops 
are  once  launched,  the  first  line  should  charge  straight  at 
the  enemy,  without  apprehension  for  its  flanks  and  with 
the  firm  conviction  that  these  are  best  protected  by  the 
following  units  and  by  making  the  advance  unhesitatingly. 
This  and  this  only,  enstu'es  that  the  enemy  will  actually  be 
struck,  at  the  first  impact,  with  the  force  that  the  leader 
considered  sufficient,  f 

Since  the  m616e  of  large  bodies  of  cavalry  extends  over 
a  large  area  and  requires  considerable  time  before  a  decision 
is  reached,  a  shock  delivered  by  fresh  bodies  is  necessary  to 
cut  down  the  length  of  the  action.  Hence,  the  necessity 
of  providing  reserves  to  decide  the  mfilee,  to  take  up  the 
pursuit,  or  to  cover  the  rally.  In  a  cavalry  combat  of  any 
magnitude,  victory  generally  rests  with  the  side  that  is 
able  to  bring  into  action  the  last  formed  body.  The  dis- 
tribution in  depth  of  the  larger  cavalry  bodies  is  governed 

*Qeschichte  des  UhlanenreoitMnts  Nr,  4,  p.  80. 

Contrary  View:  "If  a  m^l^e  threatens  to  become  disastrous,  reserves 
are  thrown  in,  on  as  broad  a  firont  as  possible,  not  from  a  flank  however,  but 
straight  to  the  ftont.  The  longer  the  front,  the  smaller  the  effect  of  flank  attacks. 
Such  attacks  easily  miss  the  objective  and  thus  lead  to  a  squandering  of  forces.'! 
▼.  Bemhardi. 

tThe  German  regulations  thus  declare  against  the  independent  employment 
of  escadrons  on  the  wings,  which  is  required  by  other  regulations.  Such  an 
employment  is  permissible  only  when  there  are  no  formed  bodies  following  in 
rear  of  the  wing  that  la  attacked. 

Example:  The  1st  Bscadron  of  the  19th  Dragoons  during  the  cavalry  action 
at  Vllle  sur  Yron.     Kunz,  Reiterei,  p.  138. 


166  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

by  the  requirements  stated  above.  It  would  be  a  mistake, 
however,  if  one  is  numerically  inferior,  to  laimch  the  various 
fractions  one  after  another  and  thereby  to  deprive  oneself 
of  the  advantage  of  bringing  about  the  decision  by  the 
shock  of  a  strong  line.  As  a  rule,  an  escadron  or  a  regiment 
will  launch  all  its  parts  simultaneously. 

After  the  m616e,  victors  and  vanquished  are  in  equal 
disorder.  While  the  sense  of  elation  produced  by  the  knowl- 
edge of  having  gained  a  victory  gives  the  victors  an  ad- 
vantage over  the  vanquished,  the  greatest  danger  for  the 
victorious  cavalry  lies  in  blindly  rushing  after  the  defeated 
force. 

In  reading  the  history  of  cavalry,  we  find  recurring 
attempts  to  augment  the  shock  by  fire  action  and  to  make 
the  trooper  place  greater  dependence  in  the  m616e  upon  his 
firearm  than  upon  his  saber  or  his  lance.  Aside  from 
endangering  the  officers  riding  in  front  of  the  line,  this  is 
not  advisable  for  other  reasons.  When  we  consider  the 
nervousness  produced  in  the  majority  of  horses  by  the 
sound  and  flash  of  a  firearm  discharged  in  immediate 
proximity  to  their  ears  and  the  extraordinary  memory  of 
these  animals,  it  would  appear  to  be  by  no  means  easy  to 
maintain  order,  unimpaired  cohesion  and  equable  progress 
in  a  line  of  charging  cavalry.  But,  if  this  is  done,  the  force 
of  the  shock  is  not  only  broken,  but  the  charging  troopers 
themselves  are  greatly  endangered  by  the  fire  of  their 
comrades. 

Toward  the  close  of  the  South-African  war,  the  Boers 
used  moimted  fire  action  when  advancing  to  the  attack. 

In  the  United  States  cavalry,  which  still  charges  in 
single-rank  formation,  the  revolver  may  be  used  before  the 
.  shock,  and  mounted  fire  action  is  still  used  in  the  following 
vcases : 

.1.     When  weak  forces  are  to  create  a  short  delay; 

2.     In  pursuit,  when  a  mounted  charge  can  not  be  made ; 


Mounted  Fire  Action.  167 

3.  In  covering  a  retreat,  when  it  is  risky  to  dismount 
or  it  is  impracticable  to  advance  to  the  charge ; 

4.  In  warding  off  a  hostile  charge  that  is  moving  over 
difficult   ground. 

Firing  with  the  rifle,  motmted,  is  to  be  confined,  as  a  rule, 
to  extended  order  formations,  the  interval  between  troopers 
being  four  yards. 

Feeling  its  own  inferiority,  a  unit  that  has  been  incorrectly  trained, 
may  take  a  notion  to  meet  the  charge  of  the  hostile  cavalry  with  volley 
fire  (delivered  at  a  halt),  and  to  take  advantage  of  the  disorder  attending 
the  loss  inflicted,  by  charging.  There  are  serious  objections  to  this 
procedure.  In  the  first  place,  the  shortness  of  the  firearm  and  the 
distance  between  ranks  enable  but  one  rank  to  fire  and  compel  each 
trooper  to  turn  his  horse  forty-five  degrees  to  the  right.  In  the  second 
place,  aiming  in  an  oblique  direction  is  even  less  practicable  than  in  the 
infantry.  Besides,  the  requirement  that  the  front  of  the  charging  body 
be  approximately  parallel  to  the  objective  can  not  be  fulfilled,  even  in 
a  unit  of  so  narrow  a  front  as  an  escadron,  owing  to  the  mobility  of  the 
objective.  Although  one  may  succeed  in  training  horses  so  that  they 
will  tolerate  firing  from  the  saddle,  the  great  majority  of  them  can  not 
be  so  highly  trained  as  to  make  possible  reasonably  accurate  aiming 
from  the  saddle.  (Heaving  of  the  flanks  after  covering  some  distance 
at  the  trot  or  gallop).  If  we  reckon  200  m.  as  the  distance  that  must 
be  covered  to  get  up  speed  to  develop  the  momentum  requisite  for  the 
shock,  and  thirty  seconds  for  slinging  carbines,  grasping  saber  or  lance, 
and  pointing  the  horses  straight  to  the  front,  the  last  volley  would  have 
to  be  delivered  when  at  least  400  yards  from  cavalry  that  is  advancing 
to  the  attack.  Military  history  shows  that  cavalry  that  advanced  with 
determination  against  cavalry  that  placed  dependence  upon  this  ma- 
neuver, invariably  overthrew  the  latter.  General  Suchotin,  Russian  Army, 
a  few  years  ago  again  advocated  mounted  fire  action,  but  without  finding 
many  followers  even  in  Russia.  Practical  tests  made  of  mounted  fire 
action  under  favorable  conditions,  in  Russia,  furnished  unsatisfactory 
results.* 

At  Soor,  on  September  30th,  1745,  the  cavalry  of  the  Prussian  right 
wing  charged  in  two  lines  against  the  Austrian  carbineers  and  mounted 
grenadiers.  The  latter  considered  the  ground  over  which  the  charge 
was  made  impassable  on  account  of  the  steep  slopes,  and  received  the 
Prussian  cavalry  with  carbine  fire.  Although  this  fire  produced  con- 
siderable confusion  in  the  Prussian  first  line,  the  Prussian  cavalry  suc- 
ceeded in  breaking  the  Austrian  line  and  in  throwing  it  back  upon  its 
second  line.    Twenty-seven  Austrian  escadrons  retreated  in  disorderly 

**'Neiie  AusMldungsmethoden  bei  der  russischen  Kavallerie,  von  Qtneral 
Suchotin,"  translated  by  A.  v.  Drtoalski.  Berlin  1892. 


168  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

flight  and  enabled  the  Prussian  infantry  to  make  the  attack  on  Graner 

Hill*. 

In  the  action  at  la  Chausaee,  February  3d,  1814,  French  Cuirassiers 

received  the  Prussian  Hussars,  who  advanced  at  dawn,  with  a  carbine 
volley  delivered  at  six  paces.  The  French  Cuirassiers  were  thrown  back 
and  in  their  flight  carried  away  their  second  line.  A  battalion  of  Prussian 
infantry  that  had  followed  immediately  upon  the  heels  of  the  Hussars 
was  enabled  to  take  advantage  of  the  victory  gained.  This  very  interest- 
ing action  is  unfortunately  not  well  known,  t 

In  the  Thirty  Years'  war,  the  imperial  troopers  galloped  back  and 
forth  firing  their  weapons  as  they  went.  Gustavus  Adolphus,  on  the 
other  hand,  required  his  troopers  to  charge  sword  in  hand  after  the  front 
rank  had  discharged  one  pistol  volley  during  the  advance  to  the  attack.} 
Charles  XII,  and  Frederick  William  I  (Orders  dated  March  8th,  1734) 
prohibited  the  use  of  firearms  during  the  charge.  The  cavalry  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great  was  permitted  to  fire  from  the  saddle  only  after  the  hostile 
cavalry  had  turned  tail. 

During  the  cavalry  actions  of  the  American  War  of  Sec«Mion»  the 
cavalry  of  both  sides  evinced  a  strange  predisposition  for  firearms,  the 
saber  falling,  finally,  completely  into  disrepute.  The  Confederate 
cavalry  was  from  the  outset  mounted  infantry,  but  did  not  hesitate  to 
charge  mounted.  On  the  other  hand,  it  dismounted  to  fight  on  foot  in 
cases  where  European  cavalry  would  undoubtedly  have  sought  to  bring 
about  the  decision  by  means  of  the  arme  blanche,^ 

*Kriege  Friedrichs  des  Groszen,  II,  Chap.  3.  p.  73. 

+v.  Ullecu.  C.  F.  W.  v.  Reyher,  II,  p.  223. 

Weil,  La  campagne  de  1814,  II.  P-  140. 

V.  CoLOMB,  Geschichie  der  preuszischen  Kavallerie^  p.  19. 

Look  up  also  engagement  at  Zehdenick»  April  5th,  1813,  in  Mackbnben, 
Schwarze  Husaren,  I.  p.  374. 

^According  to  Chbmnitz  {Cfironica  Koniglichen  Schicedischen  in  TetUscMand 
gefUhrten  Krieges,  I.  p.  475):  "He  (Gustavus  Adolphus  did  not  take  much  stock 
in  wheeling  and  caracoling.  His  cavalry  was  formed  in  three  ranks,  was  to  move 
straight  at  the  enemy  and  to  collide  with  him.  The  fjront  rank  only,  or  at  most 
the  first  two  ranlu  were  allowed  to  fire,  and  then  only  when  they  were  close  enough 
to  the  enemy  to  see  the  white  of  his  eyes:  then  they  were  to  grasp  their  swords. 
The  rear  rank,  however,  without  firing  a  shot,  was  to  close  sword  in  hand  with  the 
enemy,  aad  each  man  in  this  rank  was  to  keep  both  his  pistols  in  reserve  (the  men 
of  the  two  leading  ranks,  one  pistol  each)  for  use  in  the  mt^l^e." 

niThe  following  is  taken  from  instructions  issued  by  General  Stuart  in  18<IS: 
"The  bad  habit  acquired  from  tlie  enemy,  and  which  is  entirely  dictated  by  coward- 
ice, of  advancing  to  the  attack  at  a  fast  gait  when  a  quarter  of  a  mile  fTom  the 
enemy  and  of  halting  and  firing  at  pistol  shot  range.  Is  foolish  and  always  useless. 
The  revolver  should  never  be  used  in  a  charge,  except  when  the  enemy  is  in  rear  of  an 
obstacle  and  can  not  be  reached  with  the  arm,  or  when  the  trooper  is  separated 
from  his  horse  and  fights  on  foot,  in  wlilch  case  this  weapon  is  very  effective."  "If 
an  attack  fails,  the  sharpshooters  (mounted)  on  the  flanks  are  not  to  go  to  the  rear 
but  are  to  bring  a  concentric  fire  to  bear  on  the  enemy,  and  seek  to  delay  him  until 
the  reserve  comes  up."     It  was  thus  that  Stuart  received  his  death  wound. 

In  this  connection,  the  cavalry  battle  at  Brandy  Station.  June  6th.  1863.  Is 
interesting. 

Heros  von  Borcke.  Zwei  Jahre  im  Sattel  und  am  Feinde,  II,  p.  203. 

V.  BoRCKE-ScBBiBEBT.  Die  groszB  Reiurschlacht  bei  Brandy  Station,  Berlin. 
1893. 


Result  of  Cavalry  Actions.  169 

As  the  war  progressed,  the  Union  cavalry  imitated  the  example  of 
the  Confederate  cavalry.  Both  were  incapable  of  making  a  boot-to-boot 
charge  across  country.  In  the  mC'l^e,  the  revolver  brought  about  the 
decision.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  several  Confederate  cavalry 
organizations  were  even  armed  with  shotguns  and  used  the  butts  of  these 
weapons  during  a  mel^^^e.  The  revolver  came  into  general  use  gradually. 
Under  the  peculiar  conditions  existing  on  the  American  theater  of  war, 
it  proved  more  effective  than  either  saber  or  lance,  as  the  cavalry  of  both 
sides  was  not  trained  in  the  use  of  the  saber,  did  not  have  supple,  well 
trained  horses,  such  as  the  hand-to-hand  combat  requires,  and  as, 
even  in  civil  life,  the  American  preferred  the  revolver  to  cold  steel.  Be- 
sides, life  on  the  frontier  with  its  combats  against  Indians  and  Mexicans 
had  accustomed  Americans  to  firing  from  the  saddle.  The  situation 
would  have  been  considerably  altered,  if  fully  trained  European  cavalry 
had  been  pitted  from  the  very  start  against  the  Confederate  cavalry  before 
the  latter  was  sufficiently  trained.  As  it  was,  it  became  necessary  to 
continue  on  the  course  that  had  been  attended  with  success,  and  to  perfect 
the  tactics  so  far  as  this  was  possible  in  war  time.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
wooded  and  broken  nature  of  the  terrain  favored  the  method  of  combat 
employed.  The  advantages  claimed  for  the  revolver,  viz.,  its  superior 
range  and  moral  effect,  the  greater  severity  of  wounds  produced  by  it 
and  its  deadly  effect  in  the  milee*  must  be  in  part  acknowledged,  but. 
come  into  play  only  with  a  corresponding  national  aptitude  for  its  use.  I 
The  fact  that  encouragement  on  the  part  of  the  leaders  is  necessary,  as  a  ' 
rule,  during  a  charge,  to  cause  the  men  to  use  their  weapons,  shows  that 
perhaps  only  a  small  percentage  of  the  men  possess  the  requisite  coolness 
to  use  a  firearm  with  telling  effect.  The  advantages  that  Americans 
claim  for  the  revolver  are  offset  by  corresponding  disadvantages.  These 
consist  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  aim,  which,  on  account  of  the  range 
of  the  weapon,  endangers  friend  and  foe  alike,  and  the  comparatively 
unarmed  condition  of  the  trooper  as  soon  as  the  revolver  is  emptied. 
The  use  of  the  firearm  is  undoubtedly  coupled  with  a  deterioration  of 
true  cavalry  spirit.  This  deterioration  did  not  become  apparent  in  the 
United  States,  it  is  true,  so  long  as  such  leaders  as  Stuart,  Forest,  Grierson, 
and  Sheridan  rode  at  the  head  of  the  cavalry,  but  must  inevitably  appear 
when  such  leaders  are  wanting. 

The  result  of  great  cavalry  battles  can  not  be  judged, 
as  a  rule,  by  the  numerical  loss  in  killed  and  wounded.  This 
loss,  like  disorder  and  exhaustion,  is  usually  the  same  on 
both  sides.     But  the  vanquished  force  leaves  a  large  number 

^Engagement  (November  1864)  between  a  troop  of  Federal  cavalry  armed 
with  sabers  and  a  troop  of  Mosby'B  Cavalry  armed  with  revolvers.  Losses:  Con- 
federates, 1  trooper;  Federals,  24  killed,  12  womided  and  62  prisoners  (out  of  a 
total  of  100  men).  This  is  an  extraordinarily  high  ratio  of  killed  to  wounded. 
Scott,  Partisan  Life  with  Mosby,  p.  371. 


170  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

of  prisoners  and  horses  in  the  hands  of  the  victor,  since 
only  the  latter  is  able  to  round  up  the  troopers  and  horses 
that  have  become  scattered  and  isolated  on  the  battlefield. 
The  moral  effect  of  a  victory  exerts  such  a  far-reaching 
influence  that,  after  several  victories,  the  defeated,  intimi- 
dated, hostile  cavalry  evacuates  the  field  without  more  ado, 
and  leaves  to  the  victor  the  freedom  of  pursuing  his  mission 
without  let  or  hindrance. 

It  Ib  well  known  that  both  French  and  Germans  claim  the  victory 
in  the  great  cavalry  engagement  on  the  plateau  of  Villa  sur  Yron»  on 
August  16th,  1870.  The  Germans  put  in  2,936  sabers,  and  lost  44  officers, 
386  men,  and  416  horses.  The  French  entered  the  fight  with  2,640 
sabers,  and  lost  86  officers  and  626  men;  the  rather  large  number  of 
prisoners  could  not  be  ascertained.  The  loss  of  the  Germans  amounted 
to  12 fo,  that  of  the  French  to  26^.* 

If  the  unit  is  defeated,  the  enemy  will  dictate  at  what 
gait  and  what  distance  it  must  retreat.  During  the  re- 
trograde movement  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers 
should  endeavor  to  keep  the  unit  in  hand,  so  that,  in  case 
of  necessity,  they  may  be  able  to  give  it  another  march  di- 
rection. '  *  If  the  pursuit  flags  or  help  arrives,  the  leader 
directs  the  signal  'front'  to  be  blown.  At  this  signal, 
which  is  to  be  repeated  on  the  trumpet  by  all  the  trumpeters, 
and  shouted  by  all  officers,  non-commissioned  officers  and 
privates,  every  trooper  turns  to  the  front  by  making  a  left 
about.  This  is  followed,  as  a  rule,  by  the  signal  'Rally.  *  ' ' 
(Par.  112,  German  C.  D.  R.). 


S.     THE   PURSUIT. 

*'The  fruits  of  victory  must  be  reaped  by  a  vigorous 
pursuit  in  order  to  inflict  as  much  loss  as  possible  on  the 
enemy,  and  to  prevent  him  from  again  facing  to  the  front. 
Bodies  in  close  order  follow  him  to  turn  his  defeat  into 


^Aooordlng  to  Kriegsgeschichtliche  Eintelschriften,  25,  p.  67. 


The  Pursuit.  171 

annihilation  and  to  sectire  the  pursuing  troops  from  a  re- 
verse. Units  that  can  be  spared  are  made  available  for 
new  tasks/'     (Par.  419,  German  C.  D.  R.). 


"If  both  lines  of  the  enemy  have  been  thrown  back, 
the  front  rank  of  the  attacking  first  line  is  to  fall  out  and 
to  pursue. 

'*This  is  likewise  to  be  done  on  the  flanks  by  the 
Hussars,  which,  with  the  Cuirassiers,  are  to  pursue  the 
fleeing  enemy,  so  that  the  escadrons  will  remain  assembled 
and  in  good  order  not  more  than  200  paces  in  rear  of  the 
men  that  have  fallen  out  to  pursue. 

**N.  B. — In  pursuing  the  enemy,  the  Cuirassiers  as 
well  as  the  Hussars  must  not  give  the  enemy  time  to  rally, 
but  must  ptu'sue  him  as  far  as  a  defile,  a  dense  forest, 
or  some  such  obstacle,  as  the  enemy  will  then  suffer  enor- 
mous damage. 

' '  If  the  enemy  becomes  dispersed,  those  that  piu"sue  him 
must  always  seek  to  overtake  his  leading  troopers,  as  those 
in  rear  will  in  any  case  be  theirs,  and  if  they  gain  the  head 
of  the  fleeing  enemy  the  others  (of  the  enemy)  will  be  theirs 
by  that  alone.  During  the  action  they  (the  pursuing 
troopers)  are  to  cut  or  shoot  down  as  many  of  the  enemy 
as  possible,  and  begin  to  make  prisoners  only  when  every- 
thing will  soon  be  over. 

**The  second  line,  when  it  sees  that  both  hostile  lines 
are  defeated,  is  to  wheel,  in  conjunction  with  a  few  of  the 
nearest  escadrons,  upon  the  infantry  of  the  enemy,  and 
charge  and  penetrate  both  lines  of  the  hostile  infantry 
simultaneously  in  flank. 

*'The  King  also  hereby  enjoins  upon  all  commanders  of 

escadrons  that  each  and  every  one  of  them  is  to  act  for 
himself  after  the  first  charge.  As  soon  as  they  have  been 
in  the  m61ee,  the  one  who  has  his  xmit  formed  first,  must, 


172  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

without  waiting  for  his  comrade,  close  with  the  enemy. 
For  generals  may  be  killed  during  the  charges,  or  have 
their  horses  shot  from  under  them,  in  which  case  it  becomes 
the  duty  of  the  field  officers  to  act  at  once  on  their  own 
initiative,  without  reference  to  what  the  right  or  the  left 
wing  may  be  doing.  One  and  all  are  to  observe  the  gen- 
eral rule,  that  the  front  rank  is  never  to  be  allowed  to  fall 
out  until  the  two  lines  of  the  enemy  are  defeated.  The 
man  in  ranks  is  accordingly  to  be  well  instructed  in  this."* 

What  Frederick  the  Great  says  above  in  his  instruc- 
tions dated  July  25th,  1744,  applies  even  under  the  con- 
ditions of  to-day. 

Clearly  visible  superiority  of  the  enemy,  unfavorable 
ground,  and  the  prospect  of  getting  under  severe  infantry 
or  artillery  fire,  may  determine  the  leader  not  to  accept 
the  charge  and  to  avoid  the  collision.  However,  none  but 
poor  cavalry  will,  without  orders,  turn  tail  before  the 
impact.  In  either  case,  the  hostile  cavalry  will  have  gained 
an  advantage  and,  if  the  retrograde  movement  begins 
within  striking  distance,  will  have  to  endeavor  by  piu"- 
suing  to  convert  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  into  flight.  For 
this  purpose,  escadrons  and  platoons  are  designated.  These 
take  up  the  charge  as  foragers  at  the  command:  **As 
foragers,  March!.*'  '*Each  trooper,  cheering  the  while, 
takes  up  the  pursuit  without  regard  to  direction,  formation, 
and  cohesion  and  endeavors  to  disable  as  many  opponents 
as  possible.  The  pursuit  is  terminated  by  the  signal 
'Rally*.*'  (Par.  110,  German  C.  D.  R.).  This  maneuver 
will  be  effective  if  the  hostile  cavalry  is  routed,  but  not 
if  it  is  retiring  by  order,  for  if  it  faces  again  to  the  front 
or  is  reinforced  by  fresh  troops,  the  attacker  is  botmd  to 
suffer  a  reverse.  In  any  event,  formed  bodies  must  be 
at  hand. 


*Thls  quotation  from  Instnictiona  given  by  Frederick  the  Great  to  blB  car- 
airy,  has  been  rendered  as  literally  as  possible  consistent  with  deamess. — Tram- 
lator. 


The  Pursuit.  173 

According  to  the  Austrian  regulations,  the  pursuit 
is  to  be  made  by  certain  parts  of  the  force  in  case  the 
enemy  turns  tail  when  still  a  considerable  distance  away. 
If  he  faces  about  when  only  a  short  distance  away,  how- 
ever, the  unit  nearest  the  enemy  takes  up  the  fast  gallop 
and  endeavors  to  cut  its  way  into  his  ranks. 

Katzler's  so-called  "long  charge''  at  Berry  au  Bac  on  March  14th, 
1814,  is  a  warning  example. 

When  York's  and  BLleist's  Corps  advanced  toward  the  Aisne  after 
the  battle  of  Laon,  Major  v.  Krafft  was  pushed  across  the  river  with  one 
escadron  of  the  2d  Household  Hussar  Regiment.  "The  enemy  pushed 
back  the  flankers  with  superior  force  and  posted  an  escadron  of  lancers 
on  a  height  that  obstructed  all  view.  As  no  one  knew  what  was  behind 
this  hill,  it  was  rather  a  precarious  undertaking  to  advance  against  the 
lancers.  Major  v.  Krafift  decided  to  lure  the  lancers  from  their  hill. 
He  told  his  men  that  he  would  lead  them  to  within  a  short  distance  of  the 
enemy,  when  all  were  to  turn  about  and  let  their  horses  run,  but  that  all 
were  to  rally  at  his  first  word  and  to  face  to  the  front  as  soon  as  the  time 
came  to  renew  the  attack.  This  was  done.  As  soon  as  he  had  faced  his  es- 
cadron to  the  rear,  the  lancers  rushed  wildly  after  him,  and  soon  formed 
a  wedge  that  had  lost  all  control  of  its  horses.  Major  v.  Krafft  now 
wheeled  his  escadron  to  the  front  and  the  lancers,  who  saw  themselves 
outwitted,  wanted  to  save  themselves  by  crying  'Quarter,  comrades, 
wer're  desterters'.  But  the  Hussars  did  not  see  it  that  way  and  during 
the  chase,  which  covered  nearly  a  mile,  almost  all  the  lancers  were  cut 
down."* 

A  defeated  cavalry  force  can  not  rally  unless  the 
pursuer  is  driven  off  the  field  by  fresh  troops,  gets  under 
effective  fire,  or  his  horses  are  blown.  A  pursuit  that  is 
the  continuation  of  a  running  hand-to-hand  fight,  will 
always  stretch  over  a  large  area,  so  that  men  motinted  on 
poor  horses  will  be  left  behind.  All  leaders  will  endeavor 
to  form  all  men  not  immediately  engaged  with  an  enemy 
into  groups  of  two  ranks.  In  doing  this  no  attention  should 
be  paid  to  the  formation,  nor  to  the  fact  that  the  men  belong 
to  different  organizations.  With  the  units  so  formed 
they  should  throw  themselves  upon  the  enemy,  as  soon 

*Damitz,  Geaehichte  des  Feldtuges  van  18 14,  p.  163.  This  maneuyer  was  also 
employed  by  BIticher  during  the  campaign  on  the  Rhine  In  1704,  and  Is  described 
in  the  Campagne  Journal,  p.  01. 


174  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

as  he  shows  a  disposition  to  face  about  or  brings  up  his  reserves. 
These  groups  assemble  and  form  escadrons  while  ad- 
vancing and  constitute  the  first  formed  reserves  of  the 
leader.  The  superior  commander  will  not  be  able  until 
later  to  attempt  to  get  formed  bodies  in  hand.  Units 
that  have  found  no  opponent  or  that  were  not  launched 
in  pursuit,  at  once  place  themselves  at  the  disposal  of  the 
leader.  (Par.  202,  German  C.  D.  R.).  But  all  troops 
engaged  in  hand-to-hand  combat  with  the  enemy  continue 
that  action — ^not  a  single  lance  should  be  wanting.  Fail- 
ure to  provide  a  reserve  was  responsible  for  the  fact  that 
the  initial  success  of  Colonel  von  Edelsheim*s  charge  at 
Solferino,  that  of  the  British  Light  Brigade  at  Balaklava, 
and  that  of  Bredow*s  Brigade  at  Vionville  could  not  be 
followed  up,  and  terminated  in  disaster.  The  French  regula- 
tions prescribe  that  the  pursuit  be  made  'Vigorously'*  {Veph 
dans  les  reins),  and  that  it  reach  out  toward  a  flank  and 
overtake  the  enemy,  so  as  to  cut  him  off  and  prevent  him 
from  again  facing  to  the  front. 


6.     THE  RALLY. 

The  ability  to  rally  quickly  has  ever  been  characteristic 
of  good  cavalry.  It  is  only  when  cavalry  can  do  this  that  it 
remains  a  flexible,  useful  weapon  in  the  hands  of  its  leader. 
Just  when  the  rally  can  be  executed  depends  upon  the  enemy 
and  one's  own  intentions.*  The  escadrons  rally  in  line.  The 
formation  to  be  taken  up  by  larger  units  is  ordered  after 
the  escadrons  have  rallied.  As  the  rally  is  rarely  followed 
by  a  for^^ard  movement,  it  is  advisable  to  rally  units  larger 
than  an  escadron  at  once  in  column.  The  larger  the 
force  launched,  the  longer  it  takes  to  rally  and  the  larger 
the  area  over  which  the  cavalry  is  scattered.  During  the 
battle  of  Prague  in  1757,  eighty  Prussian  escadrons  were 

^Frequently  both  opponents  begin  to  rally  simultaneously.  Imbued  with  the 
idea  that  they  are  unable  to  bring  about  a  decision.     (Cavalry  action  at  Trautenau). 


Austrian  Regulations.  175 

completely  scattered  and  cotdd  not  be  rallied  until  evening ; 
only  one  regiment  remained  together.  After  the  cavalry 
action  on  the  plateau  of  Ville  star  Yron  likewise,  a  long  time 
was  required  to  rally  the  cavalry.  The  accounts  of  this 
action  give  ten  minutes,  half  an  hour,  a  whole  hour,  and 
even  two  hotirs  as  the  time  it  took  to  rally  all  the  imits.* 
The  German  regulations  of  1909  have  abolished  the  rally 
to  the  rear,  the  so-called  Appell.  The  occasional  advan- 
tages that  this  form  of  rally  may  have,  had  disappeared 
through  the  disadvantages  growing  out  of  its  misuse. 
Each  trooper  fights  as  long  as  possible — ^the  mode  of  succumb- 
ing can  not  be  prescribed  in  regulations. 

Provisions  of  Various  Regulations. 

AtMtria-Hungary:t  Formation:  The  smallest  unit  to  have  a  re- 
serve is  the  division,  so-called,  which  consists  of  three  escadrons.  The 
reserve  provided  in  this  unit  consists  of  half  an  escadron.  In  addition 
to  the  line,  the  column  may  be  used  when  it  becomes  necessary  to 
break  through  the  hostile  line  at   any   cost,   or  when  time  or  room 

Attack  Formation  of  a  Regiment. 

(NumlMrs  indicat*  paces.) 


Sh»  50-80 

■■    '    r 

I 


Phtoon  of  Pioneers 


X'iOO 


*At  Hagelberg,  August  27th,  1818.  eleven  escadrons  of  Landwehr  cavalry 
rode  a  brilliant  charge  through  French  cavalry,  which  they  surprised  in  camp,  and 
through  infantry  of  Girard's  Division,  which  was  in  the  act  of  forming.  As  the 
Landwehr  cavalry  had  no  reserve,  it  flnaUy  suffered  a  reverse,  and  as  it  was  able  to 
raUy  but  slowly  it  took  no  further  part  in  the  engagement.  v.  Quistorp,  Nord- 
armee,  I,  p.  410. 

Compare  this  with  the  surprise  of  the  French  cavalry  by  the  6th  Prussian 
Cavalry  Division  at  Vlonvilie. 

f  Major-Oeneral  Tersztyanski  de  Naoas,  Austrian  Army,  OefeehUauabildunQ 
dsr  Kavallerie.     (With  82  sketches).     Vienna,  1907. 


176         Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

is  lacking  for  deployment.  The  regiment,  consisting  of  six  escadrons, 
provides  one  platoon  as  a  defensive  wing  40 — 60  m.  in  rear  of  each 
wing.  The  platoon  of  pioneers  is  posted  in  rear  of  the  center  for  the 
purpose  of  filling  gaps  in  the  attacking  line  or  of  falling  upon  an  enemy 
who  manages  to  break  through  that  line.  A  reserve  (about  one  escadron), 
invariably  follows  about  150 — 300  m.  (200 — 400  paces)  in  rear  and  to 
the  right  or  left,  as  the  case  may  be,  of  the  exposed  wing. 

Small  detachments  are  to  deceive  and  to  occupy  the  attention  of 
the  opponent.  Cavalry  that  is  already  deployed  is  to  be  attacked  in 
flank.  Pure  frontal  attacks  are  to  be  made  only  when  time  is  wanting. 
On  open  ground,  all  officers  in  front  of  the  line  fall  back  to  the  line  of 
platoon  leaders  when  the  attacking  line  is  760  m.  from  the  enemy.  In 
close  country,  they  fall  back  as  soon  as  the  enemy  is  sighted.  Two 
ground  scouts  from  each  escadron  precede  the  attacking  line  by  250  m. 
The  question  as  to  when  the  gallop  should  be  taken  up  depends 
upon  the  condition  of  the  horses,  upon  the  terrain,  and  the  chance  of 
surprising  the  enemy.  When  75  m.  from  the  enemy,  the  command 
Charge!  is  given,  and  each  trooper  urges  his  horse  into  a  run  and  en- 
deavors to  be  the  first  to  reach  the  enemy.  "Prematurely  to  increase 
the  gallop  to  the  run  jeopardizes  the  success  of  the  charge,  as  the  troopers 
get  too  far  apart,  a  condition  which  impairs  the  crushing  shock  of  the 
mounted  charge."  "Fresh  units  are  to  be  launched  into  a  mel6e  only 
when  the  outcome  of  that  action  threatens  to  become  unfavorable  to 
one's  own  side.  Troops  involved  in  a  hand-to-hand  encounter  that  is 
at  a  standstill,  are  most  effectively  supported  when  formed  bodies  con- 
tinue to  advance  beyond  and  prevent  fresh  hostile  troops  from  joining 
in  the  m^l6e.  Success  is  not  assured  until  the  last  hostile  unit  has  been 
defeated."  When  the  enemy  is  defeated  in  the  melee  or  turns  tail 
while  the  attacking  line  has  already  taken  up  the  charge,  that  entire 
line  pursues.  Only  reserves  and  defensive  wings  follow  in  close  order. 
In  case  the  enemy  retreats  before  the  attacking  line  enters  upon  the  charge, 
only  one  flank  platoon  pursues,  if  the  attacking  line  consists  of  an  esca- 
dron, or  one  escadron,  if  that  line  consists  of  a  regiment,  while  the  re- 
mainder, in  either  case,  follows  at  the  trot  or  at  the  gallop.  At  the  signal 
to  rally,  all  form  in  rear  of  the  leader. 

The  Austrian  cavalry  division  of  two  brigades  (4  regiments  or 
24  escadrons)  rarely  moves  in  one  body  on  the  battlefield.  Instead, 
it  moves,  as  a  rule,  in  groups,  which  operate  concentrically  against  a 
common  objective.  This  employment  in  groups  accelerates  deploy- 
ment and  facilitates  posting  the  troops  on  the  battlefield,  but  increases 
to  an  appreciable  extent  the  difficulties  of  command. 

A  combat  formation  is  not  specially  prescribed.  The  regulations 
contain  principles  only.  From  these  we  obtain  the  following:  The  divi- 
sion of  a  force  into  three  parts  best  meets,  in  most  cases,  the  requirements 
of  battle;  one  strong  group  to  deliver  the  shock,  a  second  for  immediate 
support,  and  a  third  as  a  reserve. 


Austrian  Regulations. 


177 


The  first  line  contains  the  bulk  of  the  entire  force.  Moving;  by 
the  shortest  route,  its  flanks  protected  by  defensive  wings  and  by  the 
second  line,  this  line  delivers  the  deciding  shock.  If  any  escadrons 
of  this  line  overlap  that  of  the  enemy,  they  wheel  against  his  flank. 
The  pioneer  platoons  follow  in  rear  of  the  regiments  and  turn  against 
hostile  detachments  that  break  through  the  line.  In  advancing  to  the 
attack,  the  first  line  moves  in  line  of  columns  (the  German  line  of  esca- 
drons in  columns  of  platoons)  or  in  double  column. 

The  second  line  follows  about  300  paces  (225  m.)  in  rear  of  the  wing 
on  which  the  decision  is  sought.  The  second  line  throws  itself,  wholly 
or  in  part,  against  hostile  forces  that  threaten  the  flank,  endeavors  to 
fall  on  the  rear  of  the  enemy  during  the  mel^  and  turns  against  any 
rearward  lines  that  the  enemy  might  have.  During  the  advance  to 
the  attack,  the  second  line  moves,  as  a  rule,  in  double  column. 

The  Austrian  Cavalry  Division. 


300m.  J 


PMoon  of 


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Ptafoon  of  PioMPts 


A 

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/WooJ9  of  Pionpors 


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m 


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><  JOOm. 


The  third  line  (one-fourth  of  the  entire  force)  follows  the  second 
at  400  to  500  paces  (300 — 375  m.),  and,  in  contrast  to  the  second  line, 
is  not  to  endeavor,  for  the  time  being,  to  engage.  Since  it  is  the  last 
available  force,  the  third  line  is  never  to  be  thrown  into  the  fight  pre- 
maturely, but  to  be  saved,  at  least  in  part,  as  long  as  possible  for  unfor- 
seen  exigencies.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  leader  should  not  hesi- 
tate, if  the  situation  demands  it,  to  launch  his  reserve  to  the  last  man. 

The  leaders  of  the  various  lines  independently  determine  the  group- 
ing and  formation  of  their  lines,  and  the  distances  between  them.  The 
brigade  commander  who  furnishes  one  regiment  for  forming  the  third 
line,  Joins  the  division  commander  and  remains  at  that  officer's  disposal. 

The  provisions  of  the  French  and  the  Italian  regulations  are  similar 
to  those  of  the  Austrian  regulations. 

France:  The  regiment  and  larger  units  habitually  employ  a  re- 
serve. During  the  charge,  intervals  between  escadrons  are  closed. 
The  fiank  platoons  follow  the  attacking  line  as  flank  guards  ijsardB 


178         Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

flcnes).  A  normal  formation  is  not  prescribed.  The  use  of  echelon 
formations  that  combine  the  advantas^es  of  line  and  column  is  recom- 
mended. The  regulation  of  the  gait,  a  subject  that,  in  the  past,  was 
accurately  prescribed  (at  500  or  600  m.  gallop,  at  40  or  50  paces  charge), 
is  now  left  to  the  leader,  who  should  endeavor  to  anticipate  the  enemy 
in  charging.  The  charge  is  to  be  directed,  if  practicable,  against  the 
hostile  flank  and  rear.  It  may  likewise  be  advantageous  to  support 
a  charge  with  artillery  and  carbine  fire.  After  line  has  been  formed  and 
the  gallop  taken  up,  all  the  men  riding  in  front  of  the  line  drop  back 
to  the  line  of  platoon  leaders  at  the  command  "To  the  Charge"  {pour 
VaUaque),  The  command  charge  (ehargez)  is  repeated  by  all  officers 
and  men  when  the  collision  is  imminent.  The  French  regulations, 
contrary  to  those  of  the  Austrians,  prescribe  that  (at  the  command 
charge)  the  troopers  let  their  horses  "stretch  out  at  the  gallop  as  quickly 
as  possible  without  letting  them  get  out  of  hand  or  without  losing  co- 
hesion." "It  is  also  important  that,  at  the  command  charge,  the  bravest 
troopers  riding  the  best  horses  be  not  held  back  and  that  their  individual 
valor,  which  must  finally  decide  success,  leave  to  each  one  all  the  advan- 
tages of  his  boldness,  tenacity,  physical  strength  and  skill.  The  short 
range  of  the  charge  ensures  the  maintenance  of  cohesion  without  impair- 
ing individual  elan."  When  there  is  not  enough  room  or  time,  or  when 
the  hostile  line  must  be  broken  at  any  cost,  the  charge  may  be  made 
in  column,  the  leading  platoon  (or  escadron)  being  followed,  in  this 
case,  at  a  distance  of  100  paces  by  the  remainder  of  the  force. 

With  the  adoption  of  the  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations  of  May  12th, 
1899,  the  French  cavalry  definitely  abandoned  three  line  tactics,  which 
had  been  used  according  to  a  fixed  pattern.  While  the  provisions  of 
the  regulations  of  May  31st,  1882,  have  nothing  but  an  historical  value 
at  the  present  time,  they  are  of  interest  as  illustrating  the  excrescenses 
of  normal,  three  line  tactics. 

According  to  the  1882  regulations  mentioned,  the  cavalry  division, 
when  attacking  cavalry,  deployed  in  three  equally  strong  lines,  the 
second  and  third  following  the  first  at  200—300  and  300 — 400  m. 
distance,  respectively.  The  first  line  (cuirassiers)  was  the  attacking 
line  and  moved  straight  to  the  front,  the  third  line  furnishing  two  sup- 
porting escadrons. 

The  second  line  was  the  maneuvering  line.  It  was  to  be  posted 
on  the  fiank  on  which  the  decision  was  sought.  Its  duties  were  to 
support  the  first  line,  either  by  charging  from  a  flank  into  the  mek'^e, 
or  by  turning  against  a  second  hostile  line  that  advanced  to  attack. 
A  simultaneous  charge  by  the  first  and  the  second  line  was  not  to  be 
made.  The  desire  to  support  the  first  line  required  a  rather  hesitating 
conduct  imtil  the  most  favorable  sphere  of  action  had  been  recognized. 
For  this  purpose  it  also  seemed  desirable  not  to  launch  simultaneously 
all  of  the  escadrons  of  the  second  line. 

The  third  line  remained  as  a  reserve  in  the  hands  of  the  division 
commander.     It  was  not  to  be  launched  into  the  fight  as  one  body» 


French  Regulations.  179 

but  a  few  eecadrons  at  a  time,  as  a  general  rule,  for  the  purpose  of  rein- 
forcing the  other  lines,  and  to  meet  hostile  flank  movements. 

The  French  Cavalry  Division. 

Brig. of  Cuiroseiere 
.  r    ,  r         , 

A  A  A 

^  V   ^^  ^      Brig,  of  Dragoons 

is  Y    jL   £  ^   £   £   f   f   •& 

Brig. of  Chasseurs.  S   S  S   S   S   S    S    S 


^  ^0^ 


Provisions  of  the  Regulations  of  May  I2th  1899:  The  brigades 
are  employed  as  required  by  the  situation.  All  normal  formations  are 
prohibited.  When  it  is  desired  to  make  a  frontal  attack,  one  brigade 
In  close  order  is  launched.  This  brigade  is  reinforced  and  supported 
{renforete  et  Boulenue)  by  parts  of  the  other  brigades  as  circumstances 
require.  The  other  parts  subordinate  their  action  to  that  of  the  line 
making  the  frontal  attack.  The  reserve  is  not  less  than  a  regiment 
in  strength.    After  a  charge,  each  brigade  rallies  in  line. 

Echelon  Tactics:  The  French  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations  of  1899 
say  in  paragraph  452:*  "The  echelon  formation,  which  combines  the 
advantages  of  extended  and  close  order,  may  find  frequent  application 
in  action.  This  formation  makes  it  possible  to  advance  or  refuse  a  flank 
or  the  center;  to  retain  part  of  the  force  while  another  part  carries  on 
the  action;  to  make  successive  attacks;  to  move  to  the  counter-attack; 
and  to  outflank  or  envelop  the  enemy.  This  formation  is,  at  one  and 
the  same  time,  offensive  and  defensive,  and  is  especially  well  adapted 
to  support  the  advanced  troops.  If  these  are  defeated,  they  will  not 
carry  away  the  echelons  following  them,  and  do  not  hamper  the  action 
of  these  echelons. 

"The  echelon  formation  is  not  only  advantageous  when  our  fight- 
ing line  overlaps  that  of  the  enemy,  but  also  when  we  desire  to  compen- 
sate for  a  corresponding  advantage  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  To 
envelop,  it  is  only  necessary  to  advance  one  wing;  to  prevent  an  envelop- 
ment, on  the  other  hand,  an  overlapping  wing  is  refused. 

"But  the  use  of  echelons  is  not  only  to  be  recommended  for  in- 
itiating and  carrying  through  an  action,  but  during  a  retreat  as  well, 
to  hold  the  enemy  at  a  distance  and  to  make  offensive  returns. 

"In  a  word,  the  echelon  formation  favors  maneuvering." 


*KavaUeristische  Monatshefte,   1908.     Die  Entwicklung  und  der  Stand  der 
Staffeltaktik  in  der  franzMschen  Kavallerie.  von  Pelet-Nabbonnb. 


180         Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

In  the  chapter  devoted  to  the  employment  of  the  regiment,  the 
use  of  echelons  is  likewise  recommended  (par.  607,  French  C.  D.  R.). 
We  find  here,  among  other  things,  the  following: 

"Their  use  rests  in  the  first  place,  upon  the  principle  of  mutual 
support  and  cooperation  of  all  parts  of  the  force  according  to  the  instruc* 
tions  of  the  leader.  In  a  regiment,  the  echelons  may  consist  of  single 
platoons,  of  escadrons,  or  of  a  de mi-regiment." 

The  French  believe  that  in  the  skillful  use  of  echelons  they  have 
found  an  antidote  against  the  "brutal  onslaught"  of  the  German  cavalry. 
But  in  contrast  to  the  formation  in  lines,  each  with  an  independent 
mission,  the  echelons  are  elements  of  one  and  the  same  body.  Since 
all  echelons  have  the  same  march  direction  as  the  leading  echelon  and 
get  their  distance*  from  the  latter,  it  is  very  easy  to  take  up  this  for- 
mation. The  fact  that  each  echelon  in  rear  is  a  reserve  for  the  one 
immediately  preceding  it,  may  be  an  advantage,  but  certainly  hampers 
the  unrestricted  employment  of  the  echelons  and  is  apt  to  produce 
artificial  conduct,  which  does  not  simulate  war  conditions. t  This  ap- 
peared during  the  experiments  made  under  the  direction  of  General 
Burnez  during  the  cavalry  maneuvers  in  1906,  to  determine  a  suitable 
combat  procedure  against  the  German  cavalry,  which,  according  to 
French  opinion  at  once  forms  a  wall-like  front  followed  by  supporting  esca- 
drons for  filling  gaps,  and  which  then  rushes  like  "an  enraged  animal"  at  the 
enemy.  It  was  decreed  that  a  counter-formation  be  found  against 
this  unwieldy,  thoughtless  onslaught.  In  the  first  place,  it  was  rec- 
ommended that  the  first  French  line  evade  the  attack  made  by  the 
German  line  composed  of  one  to  two  brigades,  while  the  two  other 
brigades  advance  right  and  left  to  make  a  fiank  attack.  Theoretically 
this  is  undoubtedly  correct,  but  its  execution  is  attended  with  great 
difficulties.  In  the  first  place,  the  movements  are  by  no  means  simple 
and  require  the  most  accurate  coordination  both  as  regards  time  and 
space.  Secondly,  since  we  must  reckon  with  all  sorts  of  friction  in 
war,  there  is  always  something  artificial,  one  is  almost  tempted  to  say 
unwarlike,  about  such  movements.  Besides,  the  proposed  scheme 
counts  upon  an  enemy  who  dispenses  with  reconnaissance;  one  who 
possesses  neither  energy  nor  independence;  in  fine,  one  who  leaves  his  oppo- 
nent complete  freedom  of  action  and  who  himself  does  next  to  nothing.  The 
French  had  overlooked  the  fact  that  the  German  cavalry  had  abandoned 
the  inflexible  three  line  tactics  and  prefers  the  employment  by  wings, 
so-called.  Thus,  quite  naturally,  a  solution  was  sought  in  launching 
one  brigade  frontally,  while  the  other  two  brigades  turn  against  the  hos- 
tile flanks.     Tests  were  made  with  a  first  line  pushed  far  ahead.    This 


*For  purposes  of  regimental  drill,  a  distance  of  lOO  m.  between  echelons 
Is  recommended. 

iNotes  sur  le  Combat  par  un  Irrtgulier.  Revue  de  Cavalerie,  Oct.  1907, 
Echelons  offensifs,  15  paces  distance  between  escadrons;  echelons  en  garde.  Increased 
distance  between  escadrons;  echelons  difensifs.  Increased  distances  and  Intervals 
between  escadrons.       See  Militdr-WochenblaU,  1908,  No.  32. 


French  Regulations.  181 

line  was  to  entice  the  enemy  into  attacking,  only  to  retreat  at  a  timely 
moment  while  retained  forces  fell  upon  the  enemy  from  a  favorable 
direction.  It  was  also  proposed  to  lure  the  enemy  on  with  dismounted 
skirmishers  (armed  with  the  carbine)  and  with  horse  artillery,  and  then 
to  charge  him  with  the  bulk  of  the  force.  * 

In  employing  echelons,  a  distinction  is  made  between  the  echelon 
as  a  maneuver  formation  and  the  echelon  as  a  tactical  unit.  The  latter 
has  undeniable  advantages,  whereas  the  former  makes  supervision  and 
maneuvering  more  difficult. 

The  following  is  taken  from  the  instructions  issued  by  General 
Burnez  in  1908: 

"Echelon  formations  are  by  no  means  a  matter  of  fashion.  They 
are,  on  the  contrary,  the  simplest  maneuvering  formation,  because  they 
furnish  the  only  means  for  disposing  one's  forces  beforehand  according 
to  a  preconceived  plan  of  action,  without  thereby  losing  mobility.  The 
deployed  line  is  suitable  for  an  immediate  frontal  attack  only,  but  does 
not  permit  maneuvering;  the  column  formation  does  permit  maneuver- 
ing, but  permits  an  immediate  attack  to  be  made  in  direction  of  its  flanks 
only.  The  echelon  formation,  on  the  other  hand,  possesses  not  only 
the  advantages  of  the  deployed  line,  but  those  of  the  column  as  welL 
The  following  echelon  formations  are  to  be  distinguished:  one  wing  ad- 
vanced; the  center  advanced;  or  both  wings  advanced.  When  they  have 
different  objectives,  the  several  echelons  may  be  independent  of  one 
another;  otherwise  they  are  bound  to  each  other." 

Pursuit:  "The  pursuit  with  so  large  a  mass  ofescadrons  con- 
sists of  two  actions,  simultaneous  but  distinct.  The  one,  immediate 
and  direct,  is  executed  by  the  escadrons  already  engaged  with  the  enemy, 
who  push  him  vigorously  and  strive  for  his  destruction.  The  other  is 
effected  by  the  elements  that  remain  in  hand  and  that  support  the 
movement  by  seeking  to  cut  the  line  of  retreat  of  the  enemy  or  impairing 
his  offensive  return  movement.  The  ensemble  of  these  dispositions 
constitutes  the  pursuit.  If  the  enemy  turns  tail  before  the  shock,  a  few 
units  deployed  as  foragers  will  be  thrown  in  at  the  head  of  the  pursu- 
ing troops,  the  remainder  of  the  division  supporting  the  movement  in 
good  order." 

In  a  cavalry  corps,  the  divisions  are  employed  in  the  same  manner 
as  the  brigades  in  a  division. 


*A  description  of  the  French  divisional  maneuyers,  including  all  orders 
Issued,  may  be  found  In  Revue  de  Cavalerie,  Dec.  No.  1907,  under  the  title  En 
marge  des  manoeuvres  de  Vittel, 

The  French  cavalry  divisions  have  annual  divisional  maneuvers.  Corps 
cavalry  brigades  and  Chasseur  battalions,  as  well  as  cyclist  companies,  sometimes 
participate  in  these  maneuvers.  The  1st,  2d,  5th,  6th,  and  8th  Cavalry  Divisions 
consist  of  two  brigades  each;  the  3d  and  4th  Cavalry  Divisions,  of  three  brigades 
of  two  regiments  each;  the  7th  Cavalry  Division,  of  Ave  regiments.  Each  division 
has,  ta  addition,  two  horse  batteries,  two  machine  gun  platoons  of  four  guns  each, 
and  a  platoon  of  cavalry  pioneers  on  wheels. 


182  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

Italy  I  During  a  charge,  all  leaders,  from  the  escadron  commander 
on  up,  are  posted  in  the  line  of  platoon  commanders.  The  cavalry 
regiment  of  five  escadrons  is  to  charge  on  as  broad  a  front  as  possible 
and  to  overlap  the  enemy's  line  when  practicable.  The  flanks  are 
protected  by  retained  platoons  belonging  to  flank  escadrons.  Flank 
escadrons  are  to  ward  off  or  to  execute  flank  attacks  on  their  own  in- 
itiative. A  reserve  follows  75 — 100  m.  in  rear  of  one  of  the  flanks. 
A  charge  in  echelon  formation  (scaglioni)  is  recommended,  echelons 
to  consist  of  two  or  three  escadrons.  The  command  charge  (earieat) 
is  repeated  by  all  leaders.  The  shock  is  accompanied  by  cheering 
(Savoias). 

The  cavalry  division  consists  of  two  brigades,  each  of  two  regi- 
ments (26  escadrons  and  2  horse  batteries). 

In  the  assembly  formation  (ardina  di  aitesa),  the  regiments  or  bri- 
gades are  in  rear  of  one  another.    A  combat  formation  with  suitable 

The  Italian  Cavalry  Division. 

?10  m 


Jm  ^    1.   2.   jl    ^ 

^m  E  E  E  E   S 

distribution  in  depth  is  assumed  when  the  moment  for  action  arrives* 
The  following  general  principles  are  laid  down  for  fighting  cavalry: 
The  first  line  (schiera)  is  made  strong  enough  to  assure  that  the  enemy 
will  be  defeated.  It  is  usually  one  brigade  in  strength,  but  this  is  not 
an  ironclad  rule.  Of  the  ten  .escadrons  in  the  first  line,  two  follow  113  m. 
(150  paces)  in  rear  of  the  flanks.  Supporting  escadrons  (squadrone 
di  ricalzo)  are  taken  from  the  second  or  third,  seldom  from  the  first  line. 
It  is  their  duty  to  take  a  hand  in  the  m616e  or  to  throw  themselves  upon 
the  enemy  if  he  has  broken^throughVthe  line.  If  the  enemy  habitually 
attacks  with  a  strong  first  line,  the  supporting  escadrons  may  be  taken 

-irom  the  third  line. 

The  second  line  consists  of  one  regiment  and  follows  250  paces 
(190  m.)  in  rear  of  the  exposed  fiank.  Its  duty  is  to  protect  this  flank 
or  to  charge  the  enemy  in  flank  during  the  m6l6e. 

The  third  line  consists  of  one  regiment  and  follows  the  first  at 
400  paces  (300  m.).  It  remains  in  close  order  and  is  posted  in  rear 
of  the  center  or  in  rear  of  the  flank  that  is  not  protected  by  the  second 


Russian  Regulations. 


183 


line.  The  third  line  Ib  launched  when  victory  depends  upon  its  taking 
a  hand  in  the  fight.  The  first  and  second  lines  simultaneously  form 
line  of  escadrons  as  soon  as  they  come  under  artillery  fire. 

Russia:  The  cavalry  should  endeavor  to  outflank  the  hostile 
cavalry  and  to  advance  to  the  attack  on  as  broad  a  front  as  possible. 
A  regiment  acting  alone  is  not  to  charge  without  providing  a  reserve. 
The  latter  follows  160 — ^200  m.  in  rear  of  one  of  the  flanks.  The  charge 
is  developed  either  progressively  from  the  trot  (the  gallop,  being  taken 
up  when  300  to  376  m.  from  the  enemy)  or  from  a  halt.  For  the  charge 
proper,  which  is  to  take  place  when  anywhere  between  160  and  70  m. 
(200  and  100  paces)  from  the  enemy,  cohesion  is  not  necessarily  to  be 
insisted  upon  in  order  that  speed  may  not  be  sacrificed.  For  maneuvers, 
it  is  prescribed  that  when  a  distance  of  160  m.  has  to  be  covered  in  a 
charge,  an  escadron  is  not  to  extend  over  more  than  five  times  platoon 
front. 

The  Russian  Cavalry  Division. 


I— -I- 


150/n 

1   i  i   X   X        >^ 

r  s  s  =  sj 


Sfirfft^  platdlsfance. 


VOm 


In  a  brigade  acting  alone,  the  first  line  consists  of  a  regiment. 
The  second  regiment  follows  the  first,  two  of  its  escadrons  forming  the 
second  line,  one  the  support,  and  the  remainder  (a  demi-regiment)  the 
reserve. 

The  cavalry  division  consists  of  two  brigades,  in  all  twenty-four 
escadrons,  (among  these  there  are  six  sotnias  Cossacks)  and  two  horse 
batteries.  From  the  route  formation,  the  division  takes  up  the  so- 
called  reserve  formation.  In  this,  the  brigades,  their  regiments  in  mass 
and  abreast  of  each  other  with  an  interval  of  30  m.  between  them,  are 
posted  in  column  with  42  m.  distance  between  them.  The  horse  bat- 
teries are  posted  in  column  in  rear  of  and  near  the  center  of  the  cavalry. 
In  changes  of  front  and  of  formation,  the  base  regiment  moves  at  a  walk. 
This  makes  the  execution  slow.  Riding  according  to  given  directions 
and  visual  signals  is  prescribed,  but  rarely  put  into  practice. 

The  combat  order  in  three  lines  is  to  be  taken  up  as  late  as  pos- 
sible. The  distribution  into  three  lines  is  to  assure  full  development 
of  force  for  the  shock,  while,  at  the  same  time,  furnishing  dependable 


184  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

protection  for  the  flanks  and  constant  readiness  to  meet  any  and  all 
contingencies  that  might  arise  during  the  fight. 

The  first  line,  destined  to  deliver  the  principal  shock,  must  be 
stronger  than  the  first  line  of  the  enemy,  since  the  success  of  a  cavalry 
action  depends  principally  upon  the  success  of  the  first  line.  The  first 
line  is  formed  in  line  of  escadrons  and  forms  line  immediately  before 
beginning  the  charge  proper  or  when  it  comes  under  hostile  fire.  The 
flank  escadrons  form  column  of  platoons  and  follow  in  rear  of  their  re- 
spective flanks  at  a  distance  of  not  more  than  five  times  platoon  front 
for  the  immediate  protection  of  the  flanks  of  the  first  line. 

The  second  line  supports  the  first  and  protects  the  latter's  flanks. 
It  assists  the  first  line  to  deliver  the  shock  and  cooperates  closely  with 
that  line,  (1)  in  enveloping  hostile  flanks  and  in  warding  off  hostile  flank 
attacks;  (2)  in  the  charge  against  the  enemy,  when  the  success  of  the 
first  line  is  doubtful;  (3)  in  relieving  the  first  line  when  the  latter  is 
repulsed;  and  (4)  in  reinforcing  the  first  line.  The  second  line  takes 
up  either  one  of  the  assembly  or  maneuvering  formations  or  forms  line 
of  escadrons.  Line  is  formed  when  the  tactical  situation  or  the  effect 
of  the  hostile  fire  requires  it.  The  second  line  is  either  echeloned  in  rear 
and  some  distance  away  from  one  or  both  flanks  of  the  first  line,  or 
follows  directly  in  rear  of  that  line.  The  last  mentioned  position  would 
be  taken  up,  for  example,  in  a  charge  against  infantry  or  when  room  is 
lacking.  The  distance  separating  the  second  line  from  the  first  must 
not  exceed  200  paces  (140  m.).  While  in  motion,  it  is  considered 
desirable  to  reduce  this  distance,  depending  upon  the  terrain  and  the 
hostile  fire,  but  in  no  circumstances  to  increase  it. 

The  third  line  is  the  general  reserve.  It  remains  at  the  immediate 
disposal  of  the  commander,  (1)  to  ward  off  a  sudden  envelopment  of 
the  flank  that  is  not  guarded  by  the  second  line;  (2)  to  rescue  the  flrst 
or  second  line  from  a  dilemma;  (3)  to  attack  hostile  forces  that  have 
broken  through  the  first  line;  and  (4)  to  retrieve  an  unfavorable 
tactical  situation.  The  general  reserve  furnishes  the  leader  the  only 
means  to  repair  blunders  made  in  the  distribution  of  the  echelons  and 
to  conduct  the  action  in  accordance  with  the  task  allotted  to  him.  The 
general  reserve  takes  up  either  one  of  the  assembly  or  maneuvering 
formations  or  forms  line  of  escadrons  and  is  posted  in  rear  of  the  center 
or  in  rear  of  one  of  the  flanks — usually  the  one  not  protected  by  the 
second  line.  The  distance  of  the  general  reserve  from  the  first  line  must 
not  exceed  400  paces  (280  m.). 

"The  senior  commands,  without  further  orders,  in  each  line.  In 
a  division,  for  example,  one  brigade  commander  commands  the  first 
line;  the  other,  unless  he  remains  with  the  division  commander,  commands 
the  second  line.  The  nature  of  the  echelon  formation  and  the  character 
of  the  cavalry  combat  require  initiative  on  the  part  of  subordinate 
leaders,  for  they  must  frequently  act  without  being  able  to  wait  for 
orders.  Manifestations  of  initiative  on  the  part  of  subordinate  leaders 
— ^provided  such  manifestations  meet  the  requirements  of  the  moment 


Charges  by  Successive  Escadrons.  185 

and  are  consonant  with  the  general  instructions  of  the  commander 
of  the  whole  force — should  not  only  be  permitted  but  encouraged.  The 
leader  of  the  third  line,  however,  does  nothing  without  an  express  order 
from  the  division  commander.  It  is  only  in  the  exceptional  case  when  the 
division  commander  is  absent  that  he  takes  such  measures  on  his  own 
responsibility  as  become  necessary  to  ward  off  the  enemy  or  to  relieve 
friendly  troops. 

''It  is  the  duty  of  all  echeloned  escadrons,  if  circumstances  require, 
to  charge  the  enemy's  flanks  without  waiting  for  orders  to  that  effect, 
to  protect  the  flanks  of  their  own  force  against  hostile  envelopment, 
and  to  protect  the  artillery  in  case  its  support  proves  too  weak.  The 
other  escadrons,  those  of  the  flrst  as  well  as  those  of  the  second  line, 
remain  in  all  cases  under  the  immediate  orders  of  the  commander  of  the 
particular  line  to  which  they  belong.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  of  the 
utmost  importance  that  unity  of  command,  upon  which  unity  of  action 
depends,  and  coordination  of  all  forces  for  the  attainment  of  the  object 
in  view,  be  assured,  and  be  not  undermined  by  a  desire  for  too  extensive 
independence.  For,  in  a  cavalry  action,  this  leads  but  to  the  one  result, 
that  the  troops  get  completely  out  of  hand." 

England:  In  a  charge  extending  over  1,600  m.,  500  m.  are  cov- 
ered at  the  trot,  1,000  m.  at  the  gallop,  and  45  m.  at  top  speed.  Up 
to  the  moment  when  the  gait  is  increased  to  top  speed,  close  touch  and 
two  distinct  ranks  are  insisted  upon.  During  the  charge  proper,  how- 
ever, each  trooper  endeavors  to  get  the  utmost  speed  out  of  his  horse, 
with  the  firm  determination  to  ride  down  his  opponent.  The  interval 
between  escadrons  is  7  m.  An  echelon  formation  is  recommended  both 
for  maneuvering  and  for  combat.  The  cavalry  division  is  led  entirely 
according  to  the  principles  of  three  line  tactics:  Assembly,  transition, 
and  line  formation.  A  cavalry  division  (two  brigades,  or  eighteen 
escadrons)  is  to  form  as  follows  when  charging  cavalry:  First  line, 
one  brigade  (9  escadrons);  second  line,  two  regiments  (6  escadrons,  250 
m.  in  rear  of  the  flrst  line  and  at  an  interval  of  100  m.  from  its  flank); 
and  third  line,  one  regiment  (3  escadrons).  A  strong  third  line  may  push 
supporting  escadrons  as  far  forward  as  the  second  line. 


7.    CHARGES  BY  SUCCESSIVE  ESCADRONS. 

Against  cavalry,  charges  by  escadron  are  justified 
only  when  debouching  from  a  defile,  or  when,  in  deploying 
quickly  from  column  toward  a  flank,  there  is  not  time  enough 
to  take  up  a  more  suitable  formation.  On  debouching 
from  a  defile,  the  attack  direction  should  be  chosen  with 
a  view  to  prevent  the  force  from  being  thrown  back  upon 
the  defile  in  case  of  a  reverse.     Celerity  in  deploying  from 


186  Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

a  defile  forms  an  important  branch  of  cavalry  training.  In 
order  to  prevent  distances  between  escadrons  from  becoming 
too  great,  and  to  clear  the  exit  oT  the  defile  for  the  following 
tmits,  the  longest  route  should  be  assigned  to  the  leading 
organization  imless  close  proximity  of  the  enemy  (in  a 
regiment  in  column  of  platoons,  about  500  m.)  requires 
that  a  force  be  thrown  against  him  at  once  to  gain  the  time 
necessary  for  forming  line.  But  then  there  is  always 
danger  that  the  leading  escadrons  will  be  thrown  back 
upon  the  next  following  imits  that  have  not  as  yet  de- 
ployed. In  deploying  from  a  defile,  horse  artillery,  machine 
guns  and  dismounted  skirmishers  will  be  pushed  at  a 
gallop  beyond  the  defile  to  cover  the  deployment  by  their 
fire.  The  force  passes  the  defile  at  a  gallop  in  as  broad  a 
formation  as  practicable,  and  deploys,  as  a  rule,  by  the 
flank,  when  practicable  by  both  flanks,  the  leading  element 
Ibeing  halted.  For  a  line  of  columns  to  cross  an  obstacle 
is  not  without  danger,  because  the  columns  do  not,  as  a 
rule,  pass  the  defiles  simultaneously  and  the  enemy  has  an 
opporttmity  to  defeat  some  of  these  columns  in  detail 
before  the  others  can  come  up.  For  this  reason,  it  is  in 
this  case  also  preferable  to  keep  the  force  well  concentrated 
and  to  cross  the  obstacle  at  one  point,  unless  the  available 
crossings  are  very  close  together.  The  success  of  the 
whole  charge  depends  largely  upon  that  of  the  leading 
element,  which  for  this,  if  for  no  other  reason,  should  be 
made  as  strong  as  possible. 

The  distances  between  escadrons  are  governed  by  their 
deployment  one  after  another.  If  these  distances  are  too 
great,  there  is  danger  that  the  escadrons  will  be  defeated 
in  detail. 


The  Charge  in  Extended  Order.  187 


8.  THE  CHARGE  IN  EXTENDED  ORDER. 

By  giving  up  the  close  order  and  taking  up  the  ex- 
tended order  formation,  an  organization  loses  shock  power, 
as  well  as  order,  cohesion  and  efficiency.  The  troopers 
are  thrown  upon  their  own  resources.  Everything  depends 
upon  their  personal  courage  and  resolution.  This  is  still 
more  true  the  less  the  unit  is  habituated  to  rallying  promptly, 
especially  when  this  operation  is  not  facilitated  by  troops 
following  in  rear.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  mobility 
is  increased.  The  best  horses  can  go  as  fast  as  they  like, 
and  soon  take  the  lead,  whereas  the  slower  ones  fall  behind. 
In  a  charge  in  extended  order  against  cavalry,  the  danger 
of  a  reverse,  caused  by  hostile  bodies  in  close  order,  even 
if  they  are  but  weak,  charging  into  the  dispersed  swarm, 
grows  apace.  But  in  charging  infantry  and  artillery,  the 
dispersed  formation  of  the  cavalry  diminishes  the  losses. 
Against  cavalry,  the  charge  in  extended  order  is  used  during 
the  pursuit  only.     (Par.  610,  German  C.  D.  R.) 

Austria:  Each  platoon  covers  a  front  of  100  paces,  the  troopers 
following  their  squad  leaders.  One  of  the  center  platoons  of  the  es- 
cadron  follows  45 — 60  m.  (60 — 80  paces)  in  rear  of  the  center  or  in  rear 
of  a  flank. 

France:  Charge  as  foragers  {charge  en  foragewrs)'.  In  an  escadron 
at  least  one  platoon  is  in  close  order.  The  two  men  composing  one 
file  are  to  keep  together  for  mutual  support.  Frontage,  not  to  exceed 
160  paces. 

Italy:  The  charge  may  be  made  in  extended  order  by  the  entire 
force,  or  by  a  part  of  it  in  conjunction  with  a  charge  in  close  order. 
During  the  charge  as  foragers  {carica  a  stormi),  groups  of  two,  three 
or  more  troopers  are  to  be  formed. 

Russia:    In  an  escadron  acting  alone,  a  demi-escadron  usually 

remains  in  close  order  and  follows  70  m.  (100  paces)  in  rear  of  the  line 

of  foragers,  whose  two  ranks  are  six  paces  apart.     In  a  regiment,  several 

escadrons  may  advance  to  the  charge  in  extended  order.    The  reserve 

ollows  the  line  in  this  case  at  100  m.  (150  paces). 


188 


Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 


9.    THE  LAVA  OF  THE  COSSACKS.* 

The  lava  may  be  classed  as  a  charge  in  extended  order 
in  a  restricted  sense  only,  as  it  serves  as  much  for  maneuver- 
ing (reconnaissance  and  screeniilg)  as  for  an  actual  attack. 
The  lava  is  the  combat  formation  of  the  Cossacks  and  was 


Deployment  of  a  Sotnia  into 

(1st  stage) 


of  Half-Platoons 


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originally  transmitted  to  them  by  Asiatic  nomad  tribes  of 
horsemen.  Yelling  and  firing,  the  Cossacks  swarm  in 
dispersed  formation  all  around  an  enemy,  in  order  to 
induce  him  to  disperse  likewise,  thus  enabling  them  in 
hand-to-hand  combat,  to  bring  into  play  their  superiority 
in  riding  and  handling  their  weapons.  The  lava  may  be 
formed  either  from  line  or  from  colimin.     In  taking  up 

*Y.  Tbttau,  Die  Kasakenfieere,  Berlin,  1892.  The  word  Java  is  an  abbre- 
▼iation  of  the  tartar  word  ablawa,  which  meant  "hunting  by  driving  game  into 
an  enclosed  space." 


The  Lava  op  the  Cossacks.  189 

the  lava  formation,  a  sotnia  first  forms  line  of  half  platoons 
50  paces  to  the  front,  on  the  center  platoon,  and  then 
deploys  that  line  so  that  there  will  be  one  Cossack  for 
every  four  paces  of  front.  In  this  manner  a  sotnia  covers 
a  front  of  400  m.  One  platoon  follows  the  deployed  line 
in  close  order.  If  this  platoon  also  deploys,  one  non- 
commissioned officer  and  six  Cossacks  remain  with  the 
guidon*  to  mark  the  rallying  point,  the  so-called  Majak 
(lighthouse) . 

Sotnia  in  Line  and  in  Lava  Formation* 

(2d  Stage) 


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In  the  larfi^er  units,  at  least  one  sotnia  remains  in  close  order  and 
foUows  350  m.  in  rear  of  the  deployed  line.  The  great  extent  of  front 
covered  by  the  lava  makes  it  possible  simultaneously  to  envelop  one 
flank  of  the  enemy,  to  direct  attacks  against  his  rear,  and  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  any  opening  by  partially  assembling.t     The  lava  is  to  be  used 

*Each  Cossack  regiment,  as  well  as  each  sotnia,  has  a  guidon.  The  regi- 
mental guidon  Is  rectangular,  is  of  the  same  color  as  the  shoulder  straps  of  the 
regiment,  and  bears  the  regimental  number.  The  guidon  of  a  sotnia  is  swaUow- 
tailed  and  has  two  horizontal  stripes,  each  one-half  the  width  of  the  flag;  the  upper 
half  is  of  the  color  of  the  shoulder  straps  of  the  regiment,  the  lower  half  is  of  the 
color  corre8i>onding  to  the  number  of  the  sotnia. 

tin  the  Wars  of  Liberation,  a  similar  combat  formation  was  used  by  the 
Prussian  Landwehr  cavalry,  though  in  this  case  it  was  the  natural  result  of  recruit- 
ment and  training.  The  Prussian  Landwehr  cavalry  used  single>rank  formation, 
avoided  the  shock  delivered  by  bodies  in  close  order,  and  attacked  flank  and 
rear  of  the  enemy.    Au*  d€m  Nachlasze  de$  Oeneralleulnants  v.  d.  Mar-toitM,  II.  p.  72. 


190         Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

"to  avoid  colliding  mth  an  enemy  who  is  in  close  order;  to  wear  him 
out  by  continually  harrassing  him  in  front  and  on  the  flanks;  to  divide 
and  disperse  him;  and  to  entice  him  into  hand-to-hand  combat,  in  which 
the  Cossacks,  due  to  their  great  skill  in  horsemanship  and  in  handling 
their  weapons,  will  have  the  advantage  over  regular  (sic)  cavalry,  which 
is  better  trained  for  fighting  in  close  order.  In  addition,  the  movements 
of  the  lava  may  cause  the  enemy  to  commit  blunders  of  which  other 
bodies  of  cavalry  can  take  advantage." 

The  Russian  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations  recommend  that  the  lava 
be  used  for  pursuit,  for  forced  reconnaissances  and  for  preventing  similar 
operations  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  They  further  recommend  that  the 
lava  be  used  to  screen  movements,  to  draw  the  enemy  off  from  the  attack 
direction  chosen  by  him,  to  entice  him  into  the  attack  direction  of  the 
other  regiments  and  to  cause  him  to  make  as  many  blunders  as  possible. 

"Since,"  to  quote  from  the  regulations,  "senseless  blazing  away 
only  serves  to  encourage  the  enemy,"  none  but  the  best  shots  should 
be  allowed  to  fire,  and  they  should  fire  at  will.  But  several  troopers, 
or  entire  units  may  dismount  to  fire.  No  opportunities  are  to  be  allowed 
to  escape  for  falling  in  lava  formation  upon  the  enemy.  This,  how- 
ever, is  more  a  teasing  and  harrassing  than  a  regular  attack.  Before 
making  an  attack,  the  regiment  is  always  to  assemble.  Appreciation  of 
the  fact  that,  when  confronted  by  an  opponent  in  close  order,  the  fighting 
power  of  a  unit  in  lava  formation  is  but  small,  has  led  the  Russians  to 
substitute  the  regiment  for  the  sotnia  as  the  tactical  unit  in  the  lava 
formation.  By  charging  with  its  formed  reserves,  the  regiment  can  take 
advantage  of  blunders  made  by  the  enemy. 

At  the  signal  or  command  "charge,"  the  Cossacks  are  to  ride  at 
top  speed  and  are  to  throw  themselves  cheering  upon  the  enemy.  In 
hand-to-hand  combat,  Cossacks  may  use  the  saber  as  well  as  the  rifle. 

Instead  of  the  gallop,  the  Cossacks  use  an  accelerated  trot,  the 
so-called  namjoU  At  this  gait  they  cover  283  m.  per  minute.  Superior 
riding,  absolute  trustworthiness  of  the  individual  trooper,  and  skillful 
use  on  his  part  of  his  weapons,  justified  the  lava  formation.  These 
qualities  were  developed,  in  the  nature  of  things,  by  fighting  on  the 
frontiers  with  the  nomad  tribes  of  horsemen  of  Central  Asia.  These 
basic  conditions  are  no  longer  applicable  to  a  large  portion  of  the  Cossack 
armies.*  This  was  demonstrated  during  the  Russo-Japanese  war. 
Horse  breeding  has  been  replaced  by  other,  more  lucrative,  and  at  the 
same  time  more  peaceful  pursuits.  The  poverty  of  the  Cossacks  is 
constantly  increasing.  As  they  are  obliged  to  provide  their  own  mounts, 
they  have  to  be  satisfied  with  mediocre  horses;  in  addition,  the  number 
of  horses  is  decreasing.  As  a  consequence,  the  number  of  Cossacks 
that  is  accustomed  from  childhood  to  horses  is  becoming  smaller  from 
year  to  year.     The  present  generation  did  not  grow  up  with  martial 


*The  true  Cossacks  arc  at  present  In  the  minority  In  the  Don  army,  for 
example,  on  account  of  the  imigratlon  of  foreign  elements. 


The  Lava  op  the  Cossacks.        191 

Ideas  and  under  warlike  conditions.  The  fund  of  military  experience 
gathered  during  centuries  and  transmitted  by  inheritance,  as  it  were, 
has  gradually  dwindled  until  not  a  trace  is  left.  The  Cossacks  have 
become  peasants,  the  Cossack  regiments  mediocre  cavalry  regiments  of 
the  Line.  And  with  cavalry  regiments  of  the  Line,  the  Cossack  regi- 
ments can  not  compete.    The  deeds  the  Cossacks  are  said  to  have  per- 

A  Unit  in  Lava  Formation  Assembling  toward  the  Flanks. 


formed  at  the  beginning  of  the  19th  Century  have  been  repeated  neither 
in  Poland  in  1831,  in  the  Balkans,*  nor  in  Manchuria.  But,  be  this 
as  it  may,  their  combat  activity  was  insignificant,  a  few  cases,  notably 
that  of  the  Caucasian  Cossack  Brigade  at  Lovtcha  in  1877,  excepted. 
The  Cossacks  were  accused  of  cowardice  and  lack  of  discipline. 

The  Cossacks  are  not  suited  for  close  order  movements.  Their 
horses  are  undersized  and,  while  possessed  of  extraordinary  endurance 
in  covering  long  distances,  show  little  speed  in  covering  short  distances. 
As  the  Cossack  horses  are  poorly  trained  and  are  bitted  with  the  snaffle 
only,  they  are  not  well  adapted  for  accurate  movements  in  close  order. 
No  doubt,  when  a  unit  in  close  order  is  surrounded  by  Cossacks,  it  may 
be  severely  harrassed  and  even  suffer  losses,  especially  if  the  Cossacks 
operate  in  conjunction  with  Line  regiments.  To  attack  them  in  close 
order  is  futile  as  the  Cossacks  in  lava  formation  evade  every  collision 
and  can  not  be  caught  at  any  point.  But  even  granting  that  the  Cossacks 
possess  superior  skill  in  handling  their  sabers  and  lances, t  a  statement 
that  is  contested  by  the  Russians  themselves,  cavalry  of  the  Line  is 
superior  to  them  in  speed,  and  in  size  and  weight  of  mounts.  The 
superior  stature  of  his  mount  gives  the  cavalryman  of  the  Line  a  dis- 
tinct advantage  over  the  Cossack  in  hand-to-hand  combat.     The  German 


♦The  frittering  away  of  Cossack  regiments  In  orderly  and  escort  duty, 
so  that  not  infrequently  only  the  regimental  commander  with  his  officers  remained 
with  the  standard,  is  held  responsible  for  the  failure  of  the  Cossacks.  "One  is 
accustomed  in  the  service,  to  look  upon  the  Cossacks  as  an  auxiliary  force  that 
one  can  sacrifice  to  preserve  the  rest  and  security  of  the  troops  of  the  Line. 

f  Front-rank  men  carry  the  lance,  except  in  the  Caucasian  regiments,  which 
are  armed  with  saber  and  rifle  only;  rear-rank  men  carry  the  Cossack  saber 
without  guard;  both  front  and  rear-rank  men  carry  the  rifle  without  bayonet. 


192         Cavalry  versus  Cavalry. 

lance  is  about  40  cm.  longer  than  the  Cossack  lance.  The  superior  speed 
of  our  saddle  horses  (accelerated  gallop  660  m.  per  minute,  as  compared 
with  the  accelerated  namjot  of  the  Cossacks,  425  m.  per  minute),  enables 
us  to  overtake  a  fleeing  Cossack.  On  account  of  its  inaccuracy,  flanking 
fire  delivered  from  the  saddle  is  not  to  be  recommended  in  fighting  Cossacks. 
It  would  be  better  for  us  to  rely  on  the  superior  training  of  the  German 
trooper  in  hand-to-hand  combat,  and  to  sail  vigorously  into  them  with 
the  lance,  several  troopers,  in  this  case,  habitually  acting  in  concert.  At 
any  rate,  when  fighting  Russian  cavalry,  it  will  be  a  good  plan  to  provide 
defensive  wings.  These  should  follow  in  rear  of  the  units  in  close  order, 
as  a  protection  against  the  lava.  These  wings  are  to  assure  that  the  bulk 
of  the  force  can  pursue  its  object  unmolested.  More  than  a  few  platoons, 
or  at  most  escadrons,  should  not  be  employed  in  combating  the  lava. 
These  units  allow  the  lava  to  approach  close  enough  to  make  sure  that 
they  can  overtake  it.  One  thing  must  be  avoided,  and  that  is  inactivity, 
as  this  increases  the  chances  of  the  lava  attack  succeeding,  and  may  even 
expose  one's  own  force  to  defeat.  "The  operations  of  the  lava  will  be 
attended  with  success  only  when  the  opponent  is  surprised  and  does  not  fa- 
thom its  object."  (Cossack  Regulations  1899).  From  the  foregoing,  it  fol- 
lows that  the  lava  formation  of  a  Cossack  unit  not  operating  in  conjunction 
with  cavalry  regiments  of  the  Line,  is,  comparatively  speaking,  little  to 
be  feared.  It  is  only  when  cavalry  regiments  of  the  Line  are  ready  to 
take  advantage  of  every  opening  caused  through  combating  the  lava, 
that  it  becomes  a  formation  whose  formidableness  must  not  be  underesti- 
mated. The  importance  of  Cossacks  in  operations  on  a  theater  of  war 
in  western  Europe  depends  less  on  their  military  efl[iciency  than  on  their 
large  number,  Russia  possessing  670  sotnias. 

At  Luckenwalde,  August  19th,  1813,  a  French  Cuirassier  regiment, 
advancing  at  the  trot  in  column  of  escadrons,  was  attacked  by  Cossacks, 
the  flankers  that  it  had  thrown  out  being  forced  back.  "The  French 
advanced  Against  the  center  of  the  Russians.  The  latter's  thin  line  at 
once  dispersed,  all  the  Cossacks  throwing  themselves  against  the  flanks 
and  rear  of  the  French.  The  French  column  halted  when  it  no  longer 
had  an  enemy  in  its  front.  Meantime,  the  Cossacks  thrust  or  fired  into  the 
flank  files  and  rear  ranks  of  the  French  Cuirassiers.  After  a  while,  the 
French  column  was  in  such  confusion  that  orderly  movement  was  out  of 
the  question.  The  Cossacks,  though  numerically  inferior  and  unable 
to  disperse  the  French  column  by  charging  it  in  close  order,  were  elated 
because  they  felt  that  they  were  better  horsemen  than  the  French,  and 
continued  with  great  glee  to  fire  their  rifles  and  thrust  their  lances  into 
the  French  ranks.  The  flank  files  and  rear  line  of  the  French  finally 
turned  to  the  flank  and  grasped  their  carbines."  The  Cuirassiers  were 
not  relieved  from  their  unhappy  predicament  until  fresh  cavalry  arrived.* 

At  Boragk,  September  19th,  1813,  1,200  Cossacks  attacked  2,000 
French  Dragoons.  The  latter  remained  passive,  received  the  attack 
with  carbine  fire  and  sought  to  form  line  in  place  to  avoid  being  enveloped. 

*Y.  QUTBTORp,  Nordarmee  I,  p.  215. 


Examples  from  Military  History.  193 

The  action  terminated  in  the  rout  of  the  French  cavalry.     In  a  quarter 
of  an  hour  the  Cossacks  made  19  officers  and  400  men  prisoners.! 

During  the  engagement  of  Rudnia4  August  8th,  1812,  Count 
Bismark  had  his  troopers  form  square  without  dismounting,  and  repulsed 
the  attack  of  the  Cossacks  at  a  halt.  But  his  situation  was  not  relieved 
until  reinforcements  arrived,  otherwise  he  would,  undoubtedly,  have 
succumbed. 


UMd.,  II.  p.  31. 

tOount  V.  BisiCABK,  Ideentaktik  der  Reiterei,  pp.  261-263. 


V.  CAVALRY  VERSUS  INFANTRY.*  f 

The  principal  strength  of  cavalry  lies  in  its  ability, 
thanks  to  the  speed  of  its  horses,  to  surprise  the  enemy, 
and  in  the  moral  effect,  not  always  sufficiently  appreciated, 
it  is  true,  produced  by  its  irresistably  approaching  line. 
The  main  strength  of  infantry  lies  in  its  fire  power.     In- 

« 

fantry  that  fires  deliberately  and  steadily  is  invincible 
so  far  as  cavalry  is  concerned.  But,  as  the  morale  of 
infantry  gradually  dwindles  during  a  protracted  fire  fight 
that  entails  heavy  losses,  the  moral  effect  of  a  cavalry 
charge  and  the  chance  of  its  succeeding,  increase  and  the 
losses  suffered  by  the  cavalry  decrease  proportionally. 
It  is  hardly  probable  that  the  18th  and  19th  Centuries 
witnessed  such  demoralized  infantry  as  is  bound  to  be 
produced  by  every  serious  modem  fire  fight. 

The  skirmisher  who  has  participated  in  a  fluctuating 
fight  lasting  from  six  to  eight  hours,  his  nerves  constantly 
jarred  by  the  incessant  roar  of  the  firing  and  his  whole 
being  stirred  by  the  tremendous  excitement  incident  to 
the  scene  of  every  battle,  without  a  single  opportunity 
to  rest  or  even  to  draw  a  quiet  breath,  is  physically  and 
mentally  exhausted.  To  be  sure,  the  material  and  moral 
deterioration  of  the  infantry  is  not  the  same  all  along  the 
line,  but  there  will  always  be  sections  in  which  the  infantry 
will  be  completely  worn  out,  and  these  localities  are  the 
most  favorable  field  for  cavalry  operations. 

There  is  a  vast  difference  between  infantry  enlisted 
for  a  long  term  of  years  and  retreating  while  exposed  to  the 
fire  of  smooth-bore  muskets  and  modem  infantry,  which 

*Par8.  113.  114-177.  201.  224.  440-448.  and  522.  German  C.  D,  B, 

+Examples  trom  the  Franco-German  war  are  taken  from  KuNz.  KrUgi^ 
gescMchiliche  Beispiele,  6  and  6. 


General  Discussion.  195 

is  obliged  to  cross  the  entire  zone  of  effective  fire  of  the 
magazine  rifle  without  being  able  to  avail  itself  of  cover. 
Compare  the  condition  of  the  fragments  of  the  Prussian 
infantry  at  Etoges  in  1814  w^th  that  of  the  38th  Brigade 
(Prussian)  at  Mars-la-Tour ;  the  state  of  the  British  Fusilier 
Brigade  at  Albuera  in  1811  and  of  the  British  Guards  at 
Inkerman  in  1855,  with  the  meagre  resisting  power  of  the 
British  Guards  at  Modder  River  and  of  the  Highlanders 
at  Magersfontain.  '*At  such  a  moment  it  is  quite  im- 
material whether  these  fragments  carry  a  repeating  rifle, 
a  flintlock  musket,  or  a  pitch  fork.'*  (F.  Honig.)  Just 
because  favorable  situations  were  not  seized  and  utilized 
in  the  more  recent  campaigns,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow 
that  the  days  of  battle  action  are  over  for  the  cavalry. 

The  fact  that  small  caliber  bullets  have  very  httle 
stopping  power  and  that  a  horse  struck  by  a  bullet  at 
short  range  will  frequently  have  strength  enough  left  to 
carry  its  rider  into  the  hostile  ranks,*  augur  well  for  the 
success  of  a  mounted  charge. 

During  the  Franco-German  war,  mounted  charges 
made  by  small  bodies  of  cavalry  against  unshaken  infantry, 
with  few  exceptions,  did  not  produce  an  appreciable  effect, 
but  were  almost  invariably  accompanied  by  tremendous 
losses.     To  produce  a  result  would  have  required  systematic 

^Lieutenant  v.  Salzmann  writes  the  following  anent  his  book  (Im  Kampfe 
gegen  die  Hereros,  p.  146)  to  Captain  Count  Schwerin  (Kavalleristlsche  Mo- 
nat8heft«,  Nos.  8  and  9  of  1907,  p.  698):  "The  bullets  were  fired  at  me  and  my 
horse  at  a  range  of  not  over  100  m.  .  It  is  of  course  impossible  for  me  to  give 
(he  range  with  absolute  accuracy,  for.  after  all,  I  myself  do  not  know  which  one 
of  the  men  fired  the  shots.  The  maximum  range  was,  at  any  rate,  not  over 
100  m.,  for  one  can  not  see  farther  in  the  dense  brush.  Most  likely  it  was  ftom  30 
to  50  m.  I  am  convinced  that  the  shots  were  fired  ftom  quite  modern  breech- 
loaders, for  all  three  bullets  made  clean  holes.  I  still  have  the  bullet  perforated 
clnchas  showing  the  entrance  and  exit  of  the  bullets.  I  remember  verj-  distinctly 
that  the  bullet  that  struck  my  horse  in  the  breast  produced  a  wound  about  the 
aize  of  a  hand  on  leaving  the  body  on  the  right  side.  This  was  undoubtedly 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  point  of  the  bullet  had  been  filed  off.  All  three  bulleta 
came  from  the  left.  My  horse  carried  me  perhaps  1,500—2.000  m.  farther,  though 
it  grew  weaker  with  every  stop,  and  finally  stopped  short  and  broke  down." 


196  Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

preparation  and  the  action  of  large  masses  of  cavalry.* 
But  when  the  hostile  infantry  can  be  surprised,  when  it 
loses  its  head,  formation  and  numbers  are  immaterial. 

This  is  strikingly  illustrated  by  the  charge  made  by  the  9th  Uhlan 
Regiment  at  Monnaie,  December  20th,  1870. — The  regiment  {}4  of  the 
Ist,  H  of  the  2d,  and  ^  of  the  4th  Escadron)  followed  the  forward  move- 
ment of  the  German  infantry  on  the  left  flank,  and  at  ChAteau  Meslay 
turned  into  the  chau88('e  leading  to  Tours.  While  advancing  along  the  vil- 
lage street,  the  regimental  commander  received  a  message  to  the  effect  that 
hostile  infantry  was  retiring  in  disorder  along  the  chau8s>e.  The  regiment 
charged  in  column  of  threes,  its  leading  element  turning  toward  the  right 
into  the  chausst'e,  thus  splitting  the  French  column  into  two  parts,  the 
larger  of  which  continued  its  retreat  toward  Tours.  The  regiment 
charged  in  column  of  threes  along  the  chatiss/ef  riding  down  and  tossing 
right  and  left  into  the  ditch  all  before  it.  After  charging  through  the 
entire  hostile  column,  the  regiment  rallied  and  re-formed.  It  had  lost  1 
non-commissioned  officer  and  4  Uhlans  killed,  and  one  officer  and  4  Uhlans 
wounded.  The  entire  loss  was  sustained  by  the  leading  platoon.  Half 
an  hour  later,  the  regiment  received  orders  to  pursue  the  enemy,  who 
had  retreated  toward  Tours.  Many  prisoners  were  taken.  North  of 
Notre  dame  d'O^'  three  French  battalions  were  seen  posted  astride 
the  road.  They  constituted  the  intact  part  of  the  column  through  which 
the  Uhlan  regiment  had  broken  and  against  whose  tail  it  had  made  a 
successful  charge.  The  softness  of  the  ground  on  either  side  of  the 
road  prevented  the  Uhlans  from  forming  line.  But,  as  the  French 
infantry  seemed  shaken,  the  commander  of  the  regiment  determined  to 
charge  again  in  column  of  threes.  The  gallop  was  taken  up  when  the 
column  was  400  m.  from  the  French.  The  signal  "gallop"  was  not 
obeyed  by  all  the  units  simultaneously,  as  it  was  not  understood.  The 
French  infantry,  however,  had  completely  re-established  order  in  its 
ranks,  and  held  its  fire  until  the  Uhlans  came  within  26  m.  Though  a 
part  of  the  Uhlans  managed  to  break  into  the  hostile  line  and  1  officer 
and  24  men  broke  through  and  galloped  on  to  Tours,  the  number  of 
dead  horses  piled  up  on  the  chaussce  prevented  the  rear  platoons  from 
reaching  the  enemy,  and  the  regiment  had  to  retire.  During  this  second 
charge,  the  seven  platoons  of  Uhlans  engaged  (about  168  men)  suffered 
the  following  loss: 

Killed:  6  officers,  19  men,  34  horses; 

Wounded:      3  officers,    8  men,  12  horses; 
Missing:         1  officer,    24  men,  26  horses; 

Total:  9  officers,  51  men,  72  horses. 


*General  GalUfet's  first  charge,  directed  against  the  0th  and  12th  Com- 
panies of  the  87th  Prussian  Infantry  at  Sedan,  undoubtedly  would  hare  reached 
the  insufficiently  protected  artillery  of  the  Xlth  Army  Corps,  if  the  two  other 
regiments  of  the  French  division  had  followed  the  first  line.  Kuxz,  Kriegsg^^ 
aehiehaiehe  Beispiele,  5,  p.  28. 


Difficulties  of  the  Charge.  197 

To  surprise  infantry  in  battle  does  not  seem  to  be  with- 
out prospects  of  success.*  Infantry  relaxes  its  attention 
on  its  flanks  when  engaged  in  a  hot  fire  action  with  hostile 
infantry.  While  the  eyes  of  all  arms  are  turned  toward 
the  advancing  cavalry,  which  is  discernible  at  a  great 
distance,  the  infantry  but  too  often  neglects  to  look  out 
for  other  cavalry  lines  that,  under  cover  of  a  feint,  charge 
from  an  entirely  different  direction.  And  even  if  the 
cavalry  does  not  reach  the  enemy's  line  without  being 
fired  upon,  the  infantry  will,  in  any  event,  be  obliged  to 
divide  its  fire. 

The  mounted  charge  against  infantry  is  made  more  diffi- 
cult: 

1.  By  the  improvement  in  firearms,  which  enables 
even  poorly  trained  infantry  to  repulse  the  charge  made  by 
efficient  cavalry  t  and  which  gives  defeated  infantry  a 
greater  power  of  resistance. 

The  use  of  smokeless  powder  makes  it  more  difficult 
for  cavalry  to  surprise  infantry.  The  great  range  of  pro- 
jectiles forces  cavalry,  especially  that  of  the  attacker,  to 
keep  away  from  decisive  points,  unless  the  terrain  enables 
it  to  get  a  covered  position  in  closer  proximity.  J 

♦During  the  battle  of  Kdnlggr&tz.  the  Ist  Escadron  of  the  10th  Hussars, 
on  debouching  from  the  Swlep  Wald,  surprised  the  Hid  Battalion  of  the  5l8t 
Infantry  and  took  16  officers  and  655  men  prisoners.  History  of  the  10th  Hussars^ 
p.  90. 

During  the  battle  of  Custozza,  June  24th,  1866,  three  platoons  Sicilian 
Uhlans  under  Captain  Bechtoldshelm  (3  officers  and  101  men)  broke  entirely 
through  Pisa's  Brigade  (Italian),  which  was  deployed  for  action,  and  struck  the 
following  brigade,  Forll's.  which  was  In  route  column,  with  such  force  that  of  the 
five  battalions  composing  that  brigade  only  one  remained  Intact.  The  dlvl- 
don  and  brigade  staffs  were  completely  dispersed  and  two  gims  were  taken, 
but  these  could  not  be  brought  off.  The  Uhlans  lost  2  officers.  84  men,  and  79 
horses.     Osterreichs  Kdmpfe,  II,  p.  74. 

tCharge  against  a  square  of  French  Chasseurs  at  Saplgnles,  January 
4tb,  1871. 

^Toward  12  o'clock,  noon,  August  16th,  1870,  the  commanding  general 
of  the  Hid  Army  Corps  ordered  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  to  attack  the  retiring 
Infantry  of  Pouget's  Dlrlslon  (French).  When  the  cavalry  appeared  on  the 
plateau,  French  Infantry  could  already  be  seen  advancing  again  everywhere. 
KuNz,  Beitereit  p.  100.)  The  reasons  given  In  Gen.  St»  W.  I,  p.  576,  for  holding 
back  the  cavalry  division  so  far  and  for  deploying  It  slowly,  were  not  shared  by 
the  commanding  general  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps.  Kriegsgeschichtliche  Einsel' 
schriften.  III,  pp.  655  and  557.     Woidb,  Ursachen  der  Siege,  I,  p.  288. 


198  Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

In  the  days  of  smooth-bore  muskets,  on  the  other 
hand,  cavalry  was  able  to  wait  in  immediate  proximity  of 
the  decisive  points  for  the  appearance  of  opportune  situations. 
But,  it  should  always  be  remembered  that  a  hit  does  not 
necessarily  stop  a  horse,  for  even  a  wounded  horse  will 
frequently  reach  the  enemy^s  Une  and  not  break  down 
until  he  reaches  it. 

2.  By  changed  infantry  combat  tactics,  which  derive 
greater  power  of  resistance  from  the  terrain,  and  give  the 
various  imits  greater  independence. 

3.  By  increased  and  more  extensive  cultivation  of  the 
ground. 

The  moment  favorable  for  making  a  cavalry  charge 
is  usually  of  brief  duration  and  difficult  to  recognize,  since 
cavalry  must  usually  remain  distant  from  the  decisive 
points.  Favorable  opportunities  for  charging  occur  when 
infantry  runs  out  of  ammunition,  or  suddenly  suffers 
severe  losses  that  impair  its  morale;  when  infantry,  after 
making  an  attack  that  has  been  repulsed,  Jias  to  retire 
imder  the  uninterrupted  fire  of  the  defender,  or  when  it 
is  desirable  to  hold  the  enemy  within  the  effective  fire  of 
one's  own  infantry,  and  to  induce  him  if  possible,  to  change 
front  or  to  take  up  a  denser  formation.  When  cooperat- 
ing '^dth  infantry,  a  threat  to  charge  frequently  suffices  to 
bring  about  the  desired  result.  (Austrian  cavalry  at 
Koniggratz). 

The  task  of  stopping  a  hostile  advance  (Bredow's 
Brigade  at  Vionville),  of  helping  the  infantry  over  a  grave 
crisis  and  of  facilitating  its  retreat,  is  a  difficult  one.  But 
when  the  infantry  sacrifices  its  very  best  troops  in  attack 
as  well  as  in  defense,  the  cavalry  should  not  be  wanting. 
**Even  temporary  relief  afforded  the  retiring  infantry  and 
a  little  time  gained,  may  often  avert  a  complete  defeat. 
To  cavalry  that  succeeds  in  doing  this  will  belong,  if  not 
the  palm  of  victory,  at  least  the  honor  of  the  day.'*  (Par. 
318,  German  C.  D.  R.).     The  more  parts  of  the  enemy 


Effect  Produced  by  a  Charge.  199 

are  threatened  and  forced  to  take  counter-measures,  the 
greater  the  relief  afforded  the  sister  arms.  The  intention 
to  charge  must  be  commimicated  to  the  infantry  comman- 
ders concerned  so  that  they  can  take  advantage  of  the  time 
gained  for  them  and  that  the  sacrifice  of  the  cavalry  may 
not  be  made  in  vain.  (Par.  442,  German  C.  D.  R).  "The 
arm  is  too  valuable  to  accomplish  nothing."  (General 
von  Schmidt.)  Popular  historians  love  to  dilate  on  **rides 
into  the  jaws  of  death,*'  and  thereby  add  anything  but 
clearness  to  their  descriptions  of  cavalry  charges.  In 
speaking  of  the  appellation  **ride  into  the  jaws  of  death" 
given  to  the  charge  made  by  von  Bredow's  Brigade,  General 
von  Alvensleben  says:  **We  had  become  unaccustomed 
to  launching  cavalry  in  such  a  manner."  Bredow^s  Bri- 
gade (6  escadrons,  in  all  740  men)  lost,  16  officers,  363 
men,  and  409  horses,  or  54  per  cent.  If  such  expressions 
become  current,  they  can  have  no  other  than  a  harm- 
ful effect.  If  its  attack  is  repulsed,  infantry  must  count 
on  suffering  similar  losses.  But,  whereas  such  an  infantry 
attack  must  be  considered  a  defeat  from  a  tactical  view- 
point and  seldom  brings  about  a  concrete  result,  a  costly 
mounted  charge,  even  if  repulsed,  as  a  rule  produces  such 
a  far  reaching  moral  effect  on  the  enemy,  that  the  sacrifice 
is  well  worth  the  price.  Therefore,  let  us  not  talk  of  a 
"ride  into  the  jaws  of  death,"  but  of  a  "ride  to  victory" 
of  Bredow's  Brigade.  Insufficient  preparation,  indeed, 
did  make  the  charge  of  the  French  Cuirassiers  at  Worth 
a  veritable  "ride  into  the  jaws  of  death." 

According  to  the  French  General  Staff  Account  of  the  Franco- 
German  war,  the  twelve  batteries  present  on  the  height  between  Rezon- 
ville  and  the  Roman  road  during  the  charge,  left  their  positions.  The 
7th  and  12th  Batteries  of  the  8th  Artillery,  which  were  not  struck  by  the 
onslaught,  were  the  only  ones  that  were  able  to  go  into  position  again 
after  they  had  retired  as  far  as  the  patch  of  timber.  The  other  ten 
batteries  fell  back  upon  their  reserves  for  the  purpose  of  making  good 
the  losses  suffered  by  their  personnel,  but  took  no  further  part  in  the 
fight  during  the  day.  The  ten  batteries  mentioned  lost  164  men  and 
183  horses.    The  75th  Infantry  and  the  twelve  companies  of  the  93d 


200        Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

Infantry  retired  to  the  Bois  Pierrot  where  they  remained  until  nightfall 
without  again  taking  part  in  the  action.  Six  companies  of  the  93d 
Infantry  alone,  remained  on  hill  306  on  the  right  of  the  70th  Infantry. 
"The  heroic  charge  of  the  German  cavalry,"  to  quote  the  French  General 
Staff  Account,  "attained  the  object  that  the  commanding  general  of 
the  Hid  Prussian  Army  Corps  had  in  view.  The  terrain  over  which 
the  charge  passed  was  evacuated  by  the  bulk  of  the  French  infantry; 
the  artillery  in  action  north  of  the  chaussie  was,  likewise,  almost  completely 
dispersed.  The  long  line  of  guns  on  the  Roman  road  was  now  disinte- 
grated. From  the  opening  of  the  battle  the  guns  in  this  line  had  very  se- 
verely annoyed  the  Prussian  6th  Division  and  had  done  their  share  in 
pressing  back  the  left  wing  of  that  division  as  far  as  the  Forest  of 
Tronville.  The  German  infantry,  which  just  a  few  moments  before 
had  been  seriously  threatened,  was  again  enabled  to  advance  on  both 
sides  of  the  main  road.  Finally,  the  lull  that  succeeded  tne  powerful 
charge  everywhere  raised  the  confidence  of  the  Prussian  troops,  who 
fully  realized  that  they  had  escaped  from  grave  danger  and  had  passed 
through  a  crisis  that,  prior  to  the  arrival  of  the  expected  reinforcements, 
might  have  had  a  bad  ending." 

Custozza»  1866.  The  13th  Uhlan  Regiment  of  Pulz'  Brigade  charged 
the  16th  Italian  Division.  The  second  line,  consisting  of  the  remainder 
of  the  brigade,  threw  back  some  Italian  cavalry  and  then  made  an 
unsuccessful  attack  against  a  square.  Three  escadrons  (450  lances) 
of  the  first  line  rode  through  a  dense  skirmish  line  and  charged  four 
and  a  half  battalions  (1,600  rifles).  The  defensive  wing  of  the  first 
line,  one  escadron  (150  lances),  at  the  same  time  fought  against  three 
and  a  half  battalions  (1,400  rifles).  The  flanks  and  rear  of  the  infantry 
were  protected.  The  losses  were  as  follows:  Uhlans,  10  officers  and  350 
men.   Hussars  30  to  40  men    killed   and    wounded;    Italian   infantry, 

4  men  killed  and  10  men  wounded;  Italian  cavalry,  8  officers  and  100 
men  killed  and  wounded.  Results :  ( 1 . )  The  Italians  (7th  and  16th  Divi- 
sions) believed  this  charge  to  be  the  precursor  of  a  general  offensive 
movement.  They  accordingly  discontinued  their  advance  and  were  kept 
away  from  the  actual  battlefield.  (2.)  Panic  among  the  trains.  (8.) 
Withdrawal  of  the  16th  Division,  which  was  unable  to  take  further  part 
in  the  battle.  The  charge  was  made  at  7  o'clock  A.  M.,  but,  as  late  as  4 
P.  M.,  the  two  infantry  divisions  still  stood  in  front  of  Villafranca,  rooted 
to  the  spot,  as  it  were,  by  the  impression  produced  by  this  reckless 
onslaught.     The  same  cavalry  regiments  then  made  another  charge  about 

5  P.  M.  the  same  day.* 

Vionvilla — Mars-la-Tour:  Charge  made  by  the  1st  Regiment  of 
Dragoons  of  the  Guard  to  relieve  the  38th  Brigade,  which  had  been 
repulsed  with  a  loss  of  75^  of  its  officers  and  54^  of  its  men.  The 
charge  struck  two  French  regiments.  The  Dragoons  had  16  officers, 
410  men  and  426  horses.  They  lost  13  officers  (81.25^),  125  men 
(30%),  and  246  horses  (60^). 

*dsteTreich8  KHmpfe,  II.  p.  61 — 65.  91.  177. 
Stbobl.  Custoita    pp.  23  and  59. 


Charge  against  Front  or  Flank.  201 

Results  of  this  charge:  (1.)  Time  was  gained.  (2.)  The  6th  Light 
Battery  of  the  10th  Field  Artillery  Regiment,  was  able  to  limber  up. 
But  after  repulsing  the  charge,  the  French  advanced  for  some  distance.* 

The  front  and  flanks  of  a  body  of  infantry  in  proper 
formation  are  equally  strong,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  a  flank  attack  always  produces  a  greater  moral  effect 
than  a  frontal  attack  and  that  it  takes  longer  to  form  a 
firing  line  toward  a  flank  than  toward  the  front.  In  pick- 
ing out  an  attack  direction,  it  is  better  to  select  the  shortest 
route,  than  first  to  lead  the  cavalry  into  the  flank  of  the 
hostile  infantry,  imless  the  terrain  makes  a  covered  approach 
possible.  When  a  crisis  in  the  battle  necessitates  launch- 
ing the  cavalry,  there  will  usually  be  no  time  to  gain  the 
most  favorable  direction  for  the  attack  by  making  an  ex- 
tended movement,  and  the  shortest  route  will  then  be  the 
best  route. 

When  the  infantry  combat  nears  its  end,  and  the  dis- 
tribution in  depth  that  obtained  during  the  opening  stage 
of  the  action  has  disappeared  through  absorption  of  sup- 
ports and  reserves,  the  fire  power  of  the  infantry  toward 
a  flank  will  be  noticeably  weaker.  Moreover,  it  will  fre- 
quently be  impossible,  in  such  a  case,  for  the  infantry  to 
form  a  new  firing  line  when  under  hostile  infantry  fire, 
if  it  desires  to  avoid  exposing  itself  to  annihilation.  A 
flank  attack  made  at  this  time  will,  therefore,  have  a  better 
chance  of  succeeding.  A  flank  attack  should  strike  not 
only  the  leading  line  of  the  enemy,  but  the  lines  in  rear 
as  well  at  the  same  time.  If  these  lines  in  rear  are  not 
so  struck,  their  attention  should  at  least  be  occupied. 
When  the  objective  is  narrow,  distribution  in  depth  may 
well  be  employed  even  by  individual  escadrons.  If  this 
is  not  done,  and  the  cavalry  advances  on  a  broader  front, 
a  large  number  of  troopers  will  strike  nothing. 

Infantry  in  route  column  had  best  be  attacked  in 
front  or  rear.     An  attack  should  not  be  made  against  the 

*KrieosgescMchtHch€  EinzelschrifUn,  26    p.  67. 


202  Cavalry  versus  Infantry.  j 

flank  of  such  a  column,  as  it  can  form  a  firing  line  very 
quickly  in  that  direction. 

In  charging  infantry  that  is  shaken  or  surprised, 
the  formation  employed,  the  strength  of  the  charging 
body,  and  the  direction  of  the  charge  are  immaterial. 
The  important  thing  is  to  seize  the  proper  moment  and 
quickly  to  make  the  most  of  it.  An  attack  against  in- 
fantry that  is  shaken  but  little  or  that  is  intact  requires 
a  large  force,  on  the  other  hand,  in  order  that  there  may 
not  be  a  single  fraction  of  the  hostile  infantry  whose  atten- 
tion is  not  completely  occupied.  (Par.  440,  German 
C.  D.  R.).*  According  to  all  experience,  infantry,  when 
charged  by  cavalry,  relaxes  its  observations  on  the  flanks.  For 
this  reason,  a  charge  is  laimched  either  from  several  directions, 
or  from  one  direction  on  a  broad  front,  but  with  proper 
distribution  in  depth.  As  soon  as  cavalry  comes  under 
effective  infantry  fire,  it  can  do  nothing  but  ride  straight  to 
the  front  or  to  the  rear.  It  must,  therefore,  gain  the 
proper  attack  direction  before  entering  the  zone  of  infantry 
fire.  Cavalry  can  cross  this  fire  zone  in  a  single  line,  in 
extended  order,  at  a  gallop  increased  progressively  as 
the  enemy  is  approached.  This  movement  may  be  in- 
terrupted by  breathing  spells  under  cover.  Since  the  force 
of  the  impact  is  of  less  importance  in  this  case  than  to  get 
at  the  enemy,  no  matter  how,  the  charge  may  be  made 
at  an  accelerated  gallop.  When  practicable,  the  attack 
is  made  simultaneously  from  several  directions.  The  in- 
fantry will  then  be  forced  to  deploy  in  various  directions 
and  to  scatter  its  fire.  The  moral  effect  produced  on  the 
infantry  by  this  attack  from  several  directions,  must  not 

♦At  SapiKnies,  January  4th,  1871,  seven  platoons  of  the  8th  Cuirassiers 
charged  the  square  of  a  French  Chasseur  battalion.  The  Chasseurs  held  their 
fire  until  the  Cuirassiers  came  within  80  m.  One  escadron.  which  was  to  turn 
against  a  flank  of  the  square,  was  stopped  by  an  impassable  ravine,  so  that  In 
reality  only  three  platoons  advanced  to  the  charge.  They  were  repulsed,  although 
some  of  the  Cuirassiers  had  broken  Into  the  square.  The  three  platoons  lost 
2  officers,  29  men.  and  73  horses  (32%  of  the  troopers,  and  80%  of  the  horses). 
Although  the  intention  of  charging  the  square  f^om  several  directions  was  correct, 
the  force  employed  was  much  too  small.     Kunz.  Beitergi,  p.  243. 


Charge  in  Successive  Lines.     '  203 

be  overlooked.  Frequently,  various  bodies  of  infantry 
will  likewise  fire  upon  one  another  in  such  a  case.  When 
time  and  terrain  admit,  escadrons  are  placed  in  readiness 
for  this  attack,  either  singly  or  in  groups.  The  cavalry 
shoxild  endeavor  to  strike  the  infantry  simultaneously  in 
front  and  in  flank,  but  this  is  not  essential.  It  is,  in  fact, 
desirable  that  the  infantry  develop  its  fire  toward  the  side 
on  which  the  principal  cavalry  charge  is  not  contemplated. 

When  unshaken  infantry  can  not  be  attacked  from 
several  sides,  the  charging  cavalry  will  require  distribution 
in  depth,  in  order  that  at  least  a  part  of  it  may  strike  the 
infantry.  Successive  lines  are  the  result.  These  lines — 
"waves,*'  so-called — ^follow  one  another  at  a  distance  of  200 
paces.  The  second  line  charges  that  part  of  the  hostile 
infantry  that  was  not  struck  at  the  first  impact.  Charges  made 
on  a  narrow  front  succumb  to  the  concentric  fire  of  the  in- 
fantry. Charges  without  proper  distribution  in  depth  lack  the 
necessary  force.  A  broad  front  can  be  combined  with  appro- 
priate distribution  in  depth  in  large  units  only.  A  broad  front 
alone  promises  success.  If  individual  escadrons  seek  their 
own  objectives,  they  will  frequently  miss  them  entirely. 
One  may  make  the  objection  to  this  procedure  that  no  line 
will  rely  upon  its  own  strength  alone,  but  will  hope  that  in 
case  of  failure,  the  other  lines  will  be  more  fortunate.  It  is 
easier  for  infantry  to  ward  off  such  a  charge,  as  it  is  con- 
fronted, for  the  time  being,  by  one  target  only.  Fiuther- 
more,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  speed  and  cohesion  of 
rearward  lines  are  bound  to  suffer  when  these  lines  encounter 
fallen  horses  and  troopers.  (Charge  of  the  Cuirassiers 
of  the  French  Guard  at  Vionville).*  If  the  leading  line 
turns  tail,  there  is  danger  that  it  may  carry  along  with  it 
those  in  rear.     The  disadvantages  of  successive  lines  are 

*The  charge  made  by  General  GalUfet  during  the  battle  of  Sedan,  shortly 
after  9  A.  M.,  with  three  regiments  and  two  escadrons  (in  all  17  escadrons  or 
1,500  troopers)  failed  for  the  same  reason  on  encountering  the  Are  of  flye  com- 
panies of  the  82d  and  87th  Prussian  Infantry  Regiments.  As  the  charge  came 
as  a  complete  surprise,  these  companies  delivered  their  fire  at  50  m.  Oen.  St. 
W.,  II,  pp.  1217  and  1218.     KuNZ.  KriegsgeschiehtHcfie  Beispiele,  5,  p.  57. 


204  Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

diminished  if  the  cavalry  charges  with  the  escadrons  in 
the  first  line  posted  at  intervals  and  those  in  the  second 
line  opposite  these  intervals.  If  the  cavalry  once  gets 
among  the  infantry,  the  latter*s  defense  will  be  made  much 
more  difficult.  '* Anyone  who  has  seen  a  cavalry  charge 
against  infantry,  will  have  the  following  impression  of  it: 
The  infantry  at  first  completely  loses  its  head  (Grenier's 
Division  of  the  Vlth  Corps  at  Vionville),  forgets  that  it 
has  rifles,  scatters  in  all  directions  and  thereby  uncovers 
the  artillery,  transmits  confusion  to  the  rearward  echelons, 
and,  by  its  rush  to  the  rear,  prevents  those  echelons  from 
firing.  In  the  second  stage,  the  infantry  recovers  from  its 
fright;  it  opens  fire,  more  from  fear  than  from  reflection, 
and,  therefore,  as  a  rule,  without  effect;  it  halts  and  rallies 
for  the  purpose  of  stemming  the  tide  of  the  hostile  on- 
slaught.*'* 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  reserve  to  prevent  this  rall3ring 
and  to  increase  the  confusion  and  panic  in  the  ranks  of  the 
infantry.  A  cavalry  charge  against  infantry  and  artillery 
in  the  latter's  vicinity,  calls  all  available  hostile  cavalry 
to  the  scene  of  action.  The  charging  cavalry  will  therefore 
need  a  reserve  with  which  to  turn  against  this  new  opponent,  t 

Cavalry  will  rarely  find  itself  in  a  situation  where  it  will  have 
to  charge  a  square.  When  it  does,  a  broad  front  is  requisite  to  compel 
the  infantry  to  scatter  its  fire  and  to  prevent  the  charging  force  from  glanc- 
ing off  the  square,  a  contingency  that  might  easily  arise  if  a  narrow  front 
were  used.  Units  charging  in  narrow  formation  have  almost  invar- 
iably ridden  past  the  square  that  they  attempted  to  attack.  Austrian 
cavalry  at  Villafranca  in  1866.  At  Worth,  the  wing  of  a  charging  body 
of  French  Cuirassiers  carried  away  the  corner  of  a  square  of  pioneers. 

The  charge  made  by  Cuirassiers  of  the  French  Guard 
at  Vionville  and  that  made  by  the  first  line  of  Gallifet's 
Brigade  at  Sedan,  show  that  horses  will  break  out  of  ranks 
when  but  a  few  strides  from  the  infantry  and  will  race 


*Di$  KavallerU  als  SchlachtenMrper, 

fThe  charge  made  byPulz'  Brigade  at  Custozza.  The  second  line  dropped 
back  and  followed  the  first  line  at  a  distance  of  800  m.  It  arrived  too  late 
to  prevent  the  rallying  of  the  hostUe  Infantry. 


Provisions  of  Various  Regulations.  205 

around  the  latter's  flanks  and  then  on.  This  breaking  out 
of  ranks  can  be  guarded  against  only  by  the  firm  resolution 
of  each  trooper  to  break  into  the  hostile  ranks  and  by  the 
cohesion  of  the  unit.  The  pressure  produced  by  keeping 
closed  in  on  the  center  closes  gaps  at  once,  counteracts  the 
involuntary  breaking  out  of  ranks  of  individual  troopers 
and,  in  addition,  assures,  more  than  anything  else,  the  main- 
tenance of  the  direction  once  taken  up  toward  the  objective. 
But,  after  it  has  broken  into  the  infantry  and  has  warded 
off  hostile  cavalry,  the  work  of  the  cavalry  is  by  no  means 
done.  It  must  strive  toward  mutual  cooperation  with  the 
other  troops  of  its  own  force.  After  cavalry  has  charged 
dismoxmted  cavalry  or  mounted  infantry,  it  has  still  to 
disperse  the  hostile  led  horses.  Machine  guns,  which  are 
capable  of  producing  great  havoc  when  turned  against 
troops  in  close  order,  nowadays  belong  to  the  infantry. 
The  attention  of  machine  guns  must  be  occupied,  a  weak 
force  being  used  for  this  purpose,  and  they  must  be  charged 
in  flank  and  rear.  (Pars.  113,  and  451,  German  C.  D.  R.). 
Captured  machine  guns  had  best  be  brought  off  with  their 
own  teams.  When  they  can  not  be  carried  off,  they  should 
be  disabled  or  at  least  deprived  of  their  mobility.  The 
attention  of  infantry  firing  from  a  flank  or  of  artillery  must 
be  occupied  in  the  same  manner,  a  weak  force  in  extended 
order  being  used  for  this  purpose.  (Par.  447,  German  CD. 
R.).  A  successful  charge  against  infantry  will  frequently 
be  followed  by  an  attack  against  artillery. 

Provisions  of  Various  Regulations. 

Austria  X  The  escadron  charges  in  line  or  as  foragers.  No  fixed 
attack  formation  is  prescribed  for  the  regiment.  The  attack  formation 
that  the  regiment  is  to  assume  must  be  specified  in  each  particular  case, 
care  being  taken  not  to  interfere  with  the  action  of  friendly  infantry  and 
artillery.  The  regiment  is  formed  either  in  one  line,  with  normal  or 
extended  intervals  between  the  escadrons,  or  in  two  lines.  In  the  latter 
case,  the  escadrons  in  the  first  line  are  posted  at  intervals,  those  in  the 
second  following  150  to  225  m.  directly  in  rear  of  those  of  the  first  or  op- 


206  Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

posite  the  intervals  in  that  line.  If  a  reserve  is  used,  it  follows  160 — 
800  m.  to  the  right  or  left  rear  of  the  second  line.  When  deemed  neces- 
sary the  first  line  may  be  formed  as  foragers,  and  may  cover  a  broader 
front  than  the  following  lines,  which  are  to  deliver  the  shock.  The 
broad  front  of  the  first  line  keeps  adjoining  hostile  infantry  units  that 
are  not  directly  threatened  by  the  charge,  from  concentrating  their 
fire  on  the  bodies  of  cavalry  advancing  in  close  order.  The  first  line 
is  to  charge  through  the  hostile  infantry,  make  as  much  use  as  possible 
of  its  weapons  and  seek  to  advance  beyond  the  hostile  reserves.  The 
following  lines  are  formed  of  escadrons  in  close  order,  posted,  as  a  rule, 
at  considerable  intervals.  They  are  to  charge  the  hostile  infantry  with 
energy,  especially  hostile  infantry  in  close  order,  and  to  ride  it  down. 

France:  The  regulations  recommend  that  the  shock  delivered  by 
several  lines  in  close  order,  be  prepared  and  supplemented  by  the  co- 
5peration  of  units  in  extended  order.  But  the  cavalry  is  to  charge  only 
when  the  results  to  be  gained  are  commensurate  with  the  losses  to  be 
expected.  When  infantry  can  be  surprised  while  it  is  on  the  march, 
or  is  encountered  in  a  condition  of  complete  exhaustion,  or  when  its 
attention  and  fire  are  occupied  in  another  direction,  the  cavalry  leader 
should  not  hesitate  to  charge.  The  French  cavalry  proposes  to  attack 
favorable  objectives  that  it  hopes  to  find  on  the  fianks  and  in  rear  of  the 
enemy,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  task  of  its  infantry.  Retreating  hostile 
infantry  is  to  be  surrounded  upon  all  sides  in  order  to  delay  it  and  to 
make  the  most  of  every  opportunity  to  inflict  damage  on  the  enemy. 
The  cavalry  is  to  throw  itself  recklessly  upon  victorious  hostile  infantry. 
Charges  from  all  directions  are  preferred,  the  decisive  blow  being  deliv- 
ered, after  the  hostile  infantry  has  deployed,  from  a  direction  from  which 
the  latter  did  not  expect  it  to  be  made.  According  to  the  Cavalry  Drill 
Regulations  of  1908,  a  cavalry  brigade  is  formed  in  four  successive  lines, 
each  consisting  of  two  escadrons,  on  a  front  of  600  m.  The  first  and 
second  lines  are  in  single  rank  with  2  m.  distance  between  them,  the  third 
and  fourth  in  line  of  platoons  in  columns  of  fours  with  deploying  in- 
tervals between  platoons.  Finally,  one  regiment  is  held  out  for  deliver- 
ing the  decisive  blow,  and  is  posted  some  distance  away  from  a  flank 
of  the  preceding  lines,  flank  protection  being  provided  by  echelons  posted 
in  rear  of  the  flanks. 

Italy:  Covered  avenues  of  approach  are  desirable,  but,  since 
opportune  moments  for  charging  are  fleeting,  it  is  not  always  practicable 
to  seek  such  avenues.  Therefore,  it  is  generally  advisable  to  choose  the 
shortest  route.  Even  infantry  that  is  distributed  in  depth  has  less 
fire  power  toward  a  flank  than  toward  the  front. 

A  charge  in  extended  order  is  to  be  made  against  thin  skirmish 
lines  only.  When  practicable,  the  charge  is  to  be  made  in  three  echelons, 
each  in  close  order.  Of  these,  the  leading  echelon  is  the  weakest.  It 
is  to  move  in  close  order  and  is  to  draw  the  enemy's  fire  upon  itself  and 


Russian  Regulations.  207 

to  penetrate  as  far  as  possible  into  the  hostile  position.  Each  of  the  other 
echelons  is  to  follow  a  short  distance  in  rear  of  the  preceding  one,  and 
to  seek  its  own  objective. 

Russia:  "Incase  it  is  impossible  to  surprise  the  enemy,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  provide  distribution  in  depth  and  to  bring  up  fresh  troops 
in  order  to  make  good  the  great  losses  sustained  by  the  first  line  and  to 
reap  the  fruits  of  victory.  The  charges  must  follow  one  another  so  rapidly 
that  the  hostile  infantry  can  not  recover  from  its  bewilderment.  Larger 
units  endeavor  to  combine  front  and  fiank  attack,  each  attacking  group 
being,  in  this  case,  formed  in  several  lines.  The  cooperation  of  the 
horse  artillery  may  be  an  advantage. 

"Against  infantry,  the  cavalry  charges  either  in  close  or  in  extended 
order.  In  the  latter  case,  the  first  line  is  in  extended  order,  the  second 
and  third,  on  the  other  hand,  are  each  in  line,  in  close  order.  In  larger 
cavalry  units,  if  a  fourth  line  is  formed,  it  follows  the  others  in  line  in 
close  order,  or  in  regimental  or  brigade  column.  The  position  of  the 
second  and  third  lines  in  rear  of  the  first,  is  to  assure  the  fulfillment 
of  the  conditions,  above-mentioned,  for  the  success  of  the  charge  against 
infantry.  The  second  line  is  to  follow  70  m.,  and  the  third  175  m.  in 
rear  of  the  first  line. 

"Dispositions  for  a  charge  are  to  be  made  so  that  there  will  be  from 
three  to  six  escadrons  in  the  first  line  for  every  section  of  from  250  to 
650  m.  of  the  hostile  fighting  line. 

"If  the  hostile  infantry  can  not  be  approached  under  cover  and 
the  charge  can  not  be  made  unexpectedly,  the  cavalry  must,  on  open 
ground,  form  outside  the  zone  of  hostile  infantry  fire,  if  practicable 
at  least  two  verst  or  more  away  from  that  infantry  and  cover  that  en- 
tire distance  at  the  field  gallop.  This  gait  is  to  be  increased  progres- 
sively, the  last  70 — 100  m.  being  covered  at  charging  speed." 

"The  sections  of  the  hostile  line  are  designated  by  the  commander 
of  the  first  line.  During  the  advance  and  before  the  charge  proper 
begins,  escadron  commanders  choose  their  own  objectives,  conforming, 
in  so  doing,  to  the  base  escadron. 

"The  first  line  charges  through  the  hostile  position;  the  second 
and  third  charge  those  parts  of  the  enemy  that  were  not  struck  by  the 
first  line  or  could  not  be  defeated. 

"Unshaken  infantry  that  makes  correct  use  of  the  ground,  is  almost 
equally  strong  in  front  and  on  the  flank.  But,  in  view  of  its  greater 
readiness  for  repulsing  a  frontal  charge  and  of  the  moral  effect  of  attacks 
against  flanks  and  rear,  cavalry  should  always  endeavor  to  charge  against 
flanks  and  rear  of  hostile  infantry.  However,  when  this  is  impracticable, 
a  combination  of  frontal  attack  with  envelopment  of  the  flanks  is  to  be 
attempted. 

"Selection  of  the  proper  moment  for  charging  infantry  is  of  the 
utmost  importance.  The  following  are  considered  suitable  moments 
for  charging  infantry: 


208  Cavalry  versus  Infantry. 

1.  When  there  is  a  chance  to  surprise  the  hostile  infantry  un* 
prepared  to  ward  off  the  charge; 

2.  When  the  hostile  infantry  is  in  confusion  or  its  morale  Is 
shaken  by  previous  fighting. 

"The  last  phases  of  an  infantry  action,  in  attack  as  well  as  in  de- 
fense, may  give  cavalry  a  suitable  opportunity  for  making  a  successful 
charge,  because  by  that  time  the  infantry  units  are  generally  mixed 
up  more  or  less,  considerable  losses  have  occured  among  its  leaders, 
and  the  nervous  strain  and  physical  exhaustion  have  reached  their 
extreme  limits." 


VI.     CAVALRY  VERSUS  ARTILLERY.* 

Temporary  weakness  and  surprise  of  the  artillery, 
impairing  the  effective  use  of  its  gims,  are  conditions  pre- 
cedent to  the  success  of  a  cavalry  charge  against  that 
arm.  The  long  artillery  columns  with  their  echelons  and 
trains,  often  but  pooriy  protected,  actually  invite  a  cavalry 
charge.  The  charge  made  by  the  French  cavalry  during 
the  battle  of  Culm  (1813),  against  the  Prussian  artillery 
halted  on  the  Dresden  chaussee^  shows  to  what  dangers 
artillery  is  exposed  in  such  situations.  Unless  other  arms 
come  to  the  rescue,  artillery  while  in  motion,  f  or  while 
in  the  act  of  limbering  or  unlimbering,  falls  a  sure  prey  to 
the  cavalry.  During  the  Franco-German  war,  enter- 
prising cavalry  would  have  been  able  to  endanger  the  Ger- 
man artillery,  which  frequently  hurried  forward  to  the 
battlefield  without  adequate  support. 

The  growth  of  the  number  of  gims,  the  great  road 
space  taken  up  by  artillery  units  in  route  column  (4,800  m. 
of  the  total  road  space  of  10,000  m.  taken  up  by  an 
infantry  division),  and  the  extent  of  the  long  artillery 
Unes  on  the  battlefield,  enable  cavalry  to  gain  great  successes. 
When  the  artillery  has  suffered  heavy  losses,  when  it  is 
without  support,  and  when  there  is  a  chance  to  surprise 
the  firing  batteries  by  taking  them  in  flank  or  rear,  or, 
when  the  ground  is  favorable,  by  advancing  unexpectedly 
from  nearby  cover  against  their  front,  it  will  be  easier  for  the 
cavalry  to  gain  success.  Batteries  in  a  masked  position 
can  not,  as  a  rule,  keep  the  terrain  in  their  immediate 
front  tmder  fire.     From  the  front,  artillery  forms  a  material 

*Par8.  113,  174-176.  201,  224.  444^60.  German  C.  D.  R. 

tThe  capture  of  a  French  battery  by  the  2d  Escadron  of  the  11th  Uhlani 
at  Lolgny.  la  a  good  examplCp  both  as  regards  conception  and  execution.  Kunz, 
BtiUrH,  p.  380. 


210  Cavalry  versus  Artillery. 

obstacle  on  account  of  the  position  of  its  caisson  bodies. 
It  is  difficult  for  artillery  to  change  front  after  the  spades 
of  the  pieces  are  once  firmly  imbedded  in  the  ground. 
The  most  difficult  change  of  front  that  can  be  imdertaken 
by  artillery  is  toward  that  flank  on  which  the  caisson  bodies 
are  posted.  When  the  artillery  is  under  hostile  fire,  a  change 
of  front  that  entails  giving  up  the  cover  afforded  by  the 
caisson  bodies,  increases  its  losses.  It  is  difficult  for  artil- 
lery  to  fire  on  cavalry  approaching  from  the  right  or  left, 
and  besides,  such  fire  is  not  very  effective.  When  artillery 
is  charged  from  the  rear,  its  guns  will  frequently  not  be  able 
to  fire  at  all. 

The  most  brilliant  example  of  more  recent  times,  is  the  charge 
made  at  Tobitschau,  July  15th,  1866,  by  three  escadrons  of  the  5th 
Prussian  Cuirassiers,  against  Austrian  artillery.  While  the  two  horse 
batteries  of  the  division  opened  fire,  and  one  platoon  of  Cuirassiers 
advanced  against  the  hostile  artillery  so  as  to  cover  the  flank  of  the  move- 
ment, three  escadrons  crossed  the  Blatte  brook  in  column  of  threes 
and,  supported  by  the  flanking  platoon  in  front  of  the  hostile  artillery, 
charged  by  escadron  along  a  depression  against  the  flank  of  the  hostile 
battery.  The  artillery  discharged  a  few  ineffective  rounds  of  canister 
at  short  range;  its  support  was  dispersed;  an  escadron  that  hurried  up 
was  repulsed;  and  18  guns,  15  limbers,  and  7  caissons  were  taken  and 
2  officers,  168  men,  and  157  horses  captured.  The  Cuirassiers  lost  only 
10  men.* 

During  the  battle  of  Orleans,  though  the  1st  Escadron  of  the  4th 
Prussian  Hussars,  after  surprising  French  infantry,  numbered  only 
65  sabers,  it  charged  a  French  battery  from  the  rear. 

The  battery  did  not  have  time  to  fire.  The  Hussars,  who  suffered 
no  loss  at  all,  captured  and  brought  off  4  guns,  4  caissons,  4  officers,  76 
men,  and  79  horses,  t 

But  the  tactical  situation  may,  on  the  other  hand, 
require  that  cavalry  be  launched  regardless  of  the  cost, 
to  silence  artillery  that  is  becoming  annoying,  or  to  divert 
its  fire  from  important  targets.  (Par.  450,  German  C. 
D.  R.) .     Examples  from  history  are  the  charge  of  Cardigan's 

•Besser.  Preuszisehe  Kavallerie,  1866,  p.  163.  Geschicht$  des  KuirasiUf" 
regiments  Nr.  5,  p.  80. 

•i-KuNZ,  ReiUrei,  p.  808. 


Method  op  Attack.  211 

Brigade  at  Balaklava,  and  that  of  Bredow's  Brigade  at 
Vionville. 

If  the  artillery  is  protected  by  a  body  of  other  troops, 
the  principal  attack  should,  in  the  first  place,  be  directed 
against  the  latter.  When  the  artillery  support  has  been 
defeated  and  perhaps  thrown  back  upon  the  artillery,  the 
latter  will  scarcely  be  in  condition  to  repulse  an  energetic 
cavalry  charge  directed  against  its  flank. 

When  cavalry  can  not  surprise  artillery  by  taking 
it  in  flank,  and  is  forced  to  charge  against  front  and  flank, 
it  must  endeavor  to  have  both  attacks  strike  the  enemy 
simultaneously,  in  order  that  the  attacking  bodies  may  not 
be  defeated  in  detail.  Aside  from  the  probability  of 
striking  an  artillery  support,  this  has  the  advantage  that 
it  is  more  difficult  for  the  artillery  to  fire  upon  the  charging 
bodies.  In  order  to  divert  the  fire  of  the  artillery  as  much 
as  possible  from  the  charging  troops,  weak  bodies  of  cavalry 
should  support  this  attack  by  advancing  straight  at  the 
artillery  in  such  a  manner  as  to  cover  its  entire  front. 
Single-rank  formations,  followed  at  300  m.  by  a  few  esca- 
drons  in  close  order,  are  especially  suited  for  this  work. 
In  charging  artillery  in  flank,  the  units  that  strike  first 
should  ride  as  far  as  possible  along  the  artillery  line  in  order 
to  spread  confusion  over  as  large  a  portion  of  it  as  possible. 

In  making  a  frontal  charge  against  artillery,  cavalry 
forms  in  several  lines,  the  first,  in  single  rank,  being  followed 
at  300  m.  by  escadrons  in  close  order.  When  it  is  impracti- 
cable to  advance  tmder  cover,  the  gallop  is  taken  up  at 
an  early  moment  and  increased  progressively  as  the  ob- 
jective is  approached.  A  slower  gait  may  be  taken  up  in 
depressions  that  afford  cover,  in  order  that  the  horses 
may  regain  their  breath.  The  first  line  is  charged  with 
the  duty  of  riding  through  the  battery  and  of  repulsing 
any  attempt  to  retake  the  gims;  the  second  with  the  duty 
of  breaking  down  the  resistance  in  the  battery  itself  by  cut- 
ting down  the  gim  squads.  A  third  line  turns  against 
hostile  cavalry,  if  any  is  present. 


212  Cavalry  versus  Artillery. 

A  battery  is  captured  when  it  has  been  deprived  of 
mobility,  whether  this  condition  results  from  carrying  off 
the  teams  or  from  the  fact  that  limbers  and  caissons  drive 
oflF  to  safety.  If  the  guns  have  to  discontinue  their  fire — 
even  if  temporarily  only — on  accoimt  of  lack  of  ammunition, 
this,  in  itself,  is  a  great  success  for  the  cavalry.  But 
even  if  this  is  the  case,  the  battery  is  not  yet  tsiken;  the 
resistance  of  the  gun  squads  must  first  be  broken  quickly,  and 
troops  that  attempt  to  recapture  the  guns  must  be  repulsed. 
Therefore,  to  make  the  victory  complete,  and  to  enable 
the  guns  to  be  carried  off,  an  adequate  force  must  be  pushed 
beyond  the  battery.  It  is  generally  a  more  difficult  task 
to  carry  off  or  to  disable  the  guns  than  to  capture  them, 
since  all  hostile  troops  in  the  vicinity  will  hasten  up 
to  recapture  them.  Military  history  shows  that  the 
instances  in  which  cavalry  lost  the  guns  captured  by  it, 
are  more  numerous  than  those  in  which  it  succeeded  in 
retaining  permanent  possession. 

In  1865,  the  Prussian  Ministry  of  War  prescribed  a 
method  of  using  a  saddle  horse  for  draft  purposes,  the 
picket  line  being  used  like  the  American  lasso.  One  end 
of  the  picket  line  was  to  be  fastened  to  the  upper  part  of 
the  cincha,  the  other  to  the  object  to  be  drawn  away. 
The  horses  pull  well,  as  the  rider's  weight  acts  on  back 
and  ribs,  but  on  long-legged  horses  the  saddle  is  apt  to 
slip.  When  so  hitched,  a  horse  is  capable  of  pulling  5 
cwt.  even  on  soft  grotmd.  Hence  it  would  take  5-6  horses 
to  draw  a  French  or  a  Russian  field  gun  in  this  manner. 
It  is,  of  course,  necessary  to  draw  the  spade  of  the  gun  out 
of  the  ground.  Horses  hitched  to  the  trail  act  as  a  brake. 
The  Russian  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations  (1896)  prescribe 
that  harness  for  carrying  off  captured  guns  be  improvised 
out  of  the  hobbles  and  picket  lines,  the  former  being  used 
to  improvise  a  rude  collar.  Two  horses  are  considered 
sufficient  for  each  gun.  It  is  better  to  use  the  teams 
belonging  to  the  gims  to  carry  them  off.     To  cut  down  the 


Provisions  of  Various  Regulations.  213 

teams  is  therefore  not  so  good  a  plan  as  to  cut  the  drivers 
from  their  horses  or  to  intimidate  them.  Guns  may  be 
disabled  (pars.  99—101,  German  C.  P.  R.  1907)  by  deto- 
nating 3 — 5  explosive  cartridges,  if  available,  placed  flat 
upon  the  muzzle  or  breech  of  the  gim,*  by  removing  the 
breechblock  (weight  about  17kg.),  or  by  destroying  the  brake 
and  laying  apparatus.  French  or  Russian  guns  with  screw 
breech  mechanism  may,  in  addition,  be  disabled  by  flatten- 
ing the  screw  threads  in  the  breech,  and  by  destroying 
the  fuse  setters  on  the  caisson  bodies.  The  French  guns 
may  also  be  disabled  by  breaking  off  the  metal  at  the  muzzle. 
On  the  right  side  of  the  upper  carriage  there  is  a  screw 
that  closes  the  aperture  through  which  the  brake  fluid 
may  be  drained.  When  this  screw  is  removed,  the  valve 
in  the  interior  may  be  destroyed  by  driving  a  pointed 
instrument  into  it,  whereupon  the  brake  fluid  will  flow  out. 
Since  the  guns  all  carry  a  considerable  number  of  spare 
parts,  it  does  not  suffice  to  damage  the  breechblock  alone. 

a.  Austria:  A  small  force  suffices  for  fighting  artillery  itself ;  the 
bulk  of  the  force  must  be  used  to  repulse  troops  that  may  perhaps  hurry 
up  to  protect  the  artillery.  It  is  only  when  these  troops  are  repulsed 
that  the  attack  may  be  considered  as  having  succeeded.  Direct  attack: 
First  line  as  foragers,  followed,  if  sufficient  troops  are  available,  by  a 
few  escadrons  in  close  order  and  separated  from  each  other  by  an  interval 
of  from  225  to  300  m.  This  formation  is  likewise  a  good  one  when  the  main 
attack  is  launched  against  a  flank.  In  a  flank  attack  against  a  long  line  of 
hostile  artillery,  distribution  in  depth  is  necessary.  The  first  line  must  en- 
deavor to  ride  quickly  along  the  entire  hostile  line  to  the  opposite  flank;  the 
following  units  must  take  possession  of  the  guns.  It  is  seldom  possible 
to  bring  off  the  captured  guns  (sic).  In  order  to  take  advantage  of  the 
element  of  surprise  and  to  minimize  losses,  the  attack  should  be  made 
at  top  speed. 

b.  Italy:  The  regulations  governing  the  attack  against  artillery 
are  similar  to  those  of  Austria. 

c.  France:  The  regulations  governing  the  attack  against  artillery 
are  similar  to  those  of  Austria. 

d*  Russia:  "In  the  frontal  attack  against  artillery,  the  field 
gallop  is  taken  up  when  the  attacking  line  is  at  least  two  verst  from  the 
enemy,  the  charging  gait  being  taken  up  when  110  m.  from  the  batteries. 


^Explosive  cartridgoB  are  not  very  effective  when  applied  to  barrels  of 
cast  nickel-steel. 


214  Cavalry  versus  Artillery. 

"The  first  line  may  operate  either  in  extended  or  in  close  order. 
The  other  lines  follow  the  first  in  line  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  it 
if  effective  artillery  fire  compels  it  to  turn  tail,  or  to  ward  off  a  charge 
made  by  hostile  cavalry;  in  fine,  to  meet  all  possible  contingencies  that 
might  arise  in  the  coiirse  of  the  charge. 

"The  peculiarities  of  the  formation  and  fire  of  artillery  enable 
the  first  line  to  cover  a  broad  front  in  extended  order,  and  permit  the 
other  troops  to  form  in  rear  of  the  first  in  shallow  formation. 

"In  making  dispositions  for  a  charge  against  artillery,  one  to  three 
escadrons  should  be  placed  in  the  first  line  for  every  six  to  eighteen 
guns  in  the  hostile  line. 

"When  the  artillery  is  the  principal  objective,  special  bodies  of 
troops  should  be  detailed  to  attack  the  artillery  support,  the  sections 
of  the  hostile  infantry  line  nearest  the  artillery,  as  well  as  the  hostile 
cavalry.  In  this  case,  the  charge  against  sections  of  the  hostile  infantry 
line  or  that  against  the  hostile  cavalry,  should  precede  that  made 
against  the  artillery  position. 

"When  one  of  the  flanks  of  the  artillery  is  not  protected,  or  its 
supporting  troops  on  that  flank  are  not  strong  enough,  it  is  desirable 
to  direct  the  charge  against  that  flank.  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that 
the  laimching  of  even  a  small  body  of  troops  against  flank  or  rear  of 
hostile  artillery  may  facilitate  the  movement  of  all  other  attacking  units 
and  assure  the  success  of  the  charge." 

The  heavy  artillery  of  the  field  army  usually  fights  at  a 
considerable  distance  from  its  other  troops,  and,  as  a  rule, 
in  masked  positions.  On  account  of  its  slow  rate  of  fire 
and  the  fact  that  it  carries  shell  only,  it  falls  an  easier  prey 
to  cavalry  than  field  artillery,  which  fights  in  close  coopera- 
tion with  infantry.  But  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that 
heavy  artillery  is  able  to  provide  for  its  own  security  with 
the  rifles  with  which  its  personnel  is  armed. 


THE 
FORMAL  TACTICS 


OF 


FIELD  ARTILLERY 


THE  TACTICS  OF  FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

I.    ARMAMENT,  MOBILITY  AND  ORGANIZATION 

OF  FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

1.      DEVELOPMENT    OF    FIELD    ARTILLERY   SINCE 

THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR. 

After  the  campaign  of  1870-71,  the  development  of  the 
field  artillery  of  all  European  armies  tended  toward  the  in- 
troduction of  a  field  gun  having  a  flat  trajectory  and  shrapnel 
effective  against  animate  targets  standing  in  the  open.  In 
Germany,  lightness  of  materiel  was  sacrificed  to  increased 
effectiveness,  and  an  attempt  was  made  to  facilitate  the 
ammunition  supply  by  adopting  a  single  type  of  gun  for 
field  and  horse  batteries.  Germany  had,  perhaps,  made  the 
greatest  strides  in  perfecting  shrapnel  when  the  lessons 
derived  from  the  battles  around  Plevna  showed  that  shrapnel 
would  produce  no  effect  on  an  opponent  in  shelter  trenches  if 
its  effectiveness  against  targets  standing  in  the  open  was  in- 
creased. The  equipment  of  infantry  with  portable  intrench- 
ing tools  forcibly  emphasized  that  greater  attention  should 
be  paid  to  combating  an  enemy  in  shelter  trenches.  The 
hope  that  explosive  shell  would  be  effective  against  covered 
targets  was  not  realized.  This  result  was  not  obtained  until 
the  idea  of  a  single  type  of  gun  was  abandoned  and  the  light 
10.5  cm.  field  howitzer,  model  1898  was  adopted.* 

The  heavy  field  howitzer,  originally  attached  to  the 

*After  March,  1859,  the  artillery  of  a  mobilized  Prussian  army  corps  con- 
sisted of  three  horse  batteries,  each  armed  with  six  6-pounder  gims  and  two  7-pounder 
howitzers;  six  foot  batteries,  each  armed  with  eight  12-pounder  gims;  and  three 
foot  batteries,  each  armed  with  eight  7-pounder  howitzers.  Thus  the  artillery  of 
an  army  corps  numbered  30  howitzers  and  60  guns.  Of.  Lieutenant-General  Rohnb*s 
article  Zur  Feldhaubitzenfrage,  in  Artilleristische  Monatshefte,  1909,  X.  p.  276,  et  seq. 

The  French  have  adopted  howitzers  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  material 
objects.  The  French  consider  the  very  curved  trajectory  of  these  gims  a  drawback 
that  must  be  accepted  as  they  would  be  much  too  heavy  for  field  operations  if  given 
a  flat  trajectory.     Of.  Pa  loque.  ArtiUerie  de  Campagne,  p.  205. 


218  Development  of  Field  Artillery. 

field  army  for  the  purpose  of  reducing  barrier  fortifications, 
was  permanently  assigned  to  the  field  army  on  accotmt  of  the 
great  effect  of  its  projectiles  against  targets  sheltered  by  over- 
head cover  and  shields.  The  transition  to  a  rapid  fire  gun 
became  possible  only  when  smokeless  powder  was  introduced. 
The  introduction  of  the  recoil  barrel  made  it  possible  to 
provide  shields  for  the  cannoneers,  who  were  no  longer  forced 
to  step  clear  of  the  wheels  as  each  shot  was  fired.  This  and 
not  an  increased  rate  of  fire  caused  artillery  tactics  to  enter 
upon  an  entirely  new  phase.  Increased  weight  of  materiel 
had  to  be  accepted,  as  a  reduction  in  caliber  was  inadvisable. 
The  latter  would  have  entailed  a  reduction  of  weight  of  the 
projectile. 

Other  things  being  equal,  a  heavy  shrapnel  is  superior  to  a  lighter 
projectile,  both  as  regards  effect  produced  and  ease  with  which  it  can  be 
observed.  This  superiority  increases  in  proportion  with  the  range  and  with 
the  difficulty  of  determining  the  range  accurately.  The  inferior  effect  of  a 
single  shot  can  be  offset  by  increased  expenditure  of  ammunition  at  short 
ranges  only.  The  lighter  guns  have  the  advantage  of  a  greater  rate  of 
fire,  but  this  is  outweighed  by  the  drawback  that  the  number  of  vehicles 
is  increased.  This  results  in  a  corresponding  lengthening  of  route  columns 
if  as  much  ammunition  is  to  be  carried  for  the  batteries  as  is  required  to 
attain  an  effect  equal  to  that  of  batteries  having  heavier  guns. 

When  recoil  guns  are  once  firmly  fixed  in  position,  re- 
laying during  the  firing  is  superfluous.  Hence  these  guns 
attain  a  high  rate  of  fire,  which  is  limited  by  the  time  re- 
quired for  setting  fuzes,  and  for  the  barrel  to  recoil  and  to 
slide  back  into  position.  The  recoil,  in  addition,  consider- 
ably decreases  the  work  of  the  cannoneers  in  that  they  are 
relieved  of  the  fatiguing  labor  of  running  the  carriage  back 
into  battery  after  each  round.  Losses  suffered  by  the  per- 
sonnel are  of  little  importance.  While  two  men  remain  to 
serve  the  gun,  it  can  fire  as  rapidily  as  before.  The 
objections  made  to  the  recoil  gun  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
too  complicated  and  consequently  not  serviceable  were  im- 
founded.  Even  the  danger  of  waste  of  ammunition  is  not 
great.  The  military  history  of  the  more  distant  past  records 
more  instances  of  bodies  of  troops  and  guns  running  out  of 
ammunition,  than  that  of  the  present  day.     If  the  ammimi- 


Gun  Shields.  219 

tion  fired  has  produced  an  effect,  the  object  has  been  at- 
tained, and  it  is  immaterial  whether  a  certain  number  of 
roimds  was  fired  in  half  an  hour  or  in  an  hour,  though  the 
moral  effect,  which  is  frequently  the  deciding  factor,  is  greater 
if  the  losses  occur  in  a  shorter  period  of  time. 

When  the  lower  carriage  is  anchored  by  means  of  a 
trail  spade  or  by  the  method  used  by  the  French,  the  gtm 
becomes  so  firmly  fixed  in  position  during  firing,  that  it  is 
difficult,  when  a  change  of  target  becomes  necessary,  to 
move  the  trail  quickly  by  hand  so  as  to  give  the  gun  the 
proper  direction.  It  is,  therefore,  feasible  for  small  columns 
to  make  short  flank  movements  at  a  rapid  gait,  provided 
the  artillery  has  not  been  able  beforehand  to  adjust  its  fire 
on  the  ground  to  be  covered. 

The  objection  made  to  gun  shields,  at  the  start,  on  the 
ground  that  they  were  disproportionately  heavy  and  might 
make  it  easier  for  an  enemy  to  pick  up  the  position  of  the 
guns,  were  outweighed  by  the  advantage  of  cover  they 
afforded  the  cannoneers  against  shrapnel  fire.  The  accuracy 
of  the  fire  is  bound  to  be  increased  when  the  gtmner  can  do 
his  work  while  completely  sheltered.  Sheet  steel  3  mm. 
thick  is  penetrated  neither  by  8  mm.  projectiles*  at  ranges 
over  400  m.,  nor  by  shrapnel  bullets. 

*The  following  Is  taken  from  Artilleristische  Monatshefte,  May  number  of 
1909: 

"During  the  street  fighting  In  Constantinople  In  1909.  a  battery  was  one  night 
placed  in  position  600 — 600  m.  from  the  barrack  and  a  large  quantity  of  ammunition 
was  deposited  beside  the  guns  so  that  none  of  the  personnel  had  to  leave  cover 
during  the  fight.  In  consequence  of  this  precaution,  and  in  spite  of  the  heavy  in- 
fantry fire,  the  battery  lost  but  one  non-commissioned  oflQcer,  who  was  shot  through 
the  head  while  peering  around  the  gun  shield  at  the  target.  After  the  fight.  400 
hits  were  counted  on  the  shields.  These  hits  were  all  caused  by  small  arms  bullets 
that  had  failed  to  penetrate  the  shields.  The  protection  afforded  by  the  Turkish 
7.5  cm.  shields  is.  Indeed,  excellent,  as  they  have  no  semicircular  opening  in  the  rigid 
upper  part,  and  as  the  oval  aperture  in  the  center  of  the  shield,  in  which  the  barrel 
moves  up  and  down,  is  completely  covered  by  a  funnel-shaped  contrivance.  This 
funnel  caught  a  great  many  bullets  that,  in  its  absence,  might  perhaps  have  passed 
along  the  barrel  and  struck  the  cannoneers." 

In  a  test  held  in  Denmark  in  1909,  270  shrapnel  were  fired  at  a  range  of  2,000 
m.  against  a  battery  equipped  with  gun  shields.  The  shields  were  frequently  hit, 
but  only  five  large  fragments  or  imexplodod  projectiles  penetrated  them.  But 
■hrapnel  that  fails  to  f imctlon  on  hitting  a  shield  bursts  so  far  in  rear  of  the  gun  that 
it  produces  no  effect  on  the  personnel  at  all.  In  the  above  mentioned  case,  six  men 
of  the  personnel  were  disabled  by  nine  hits,  but  not  a  single  gun  was  placed  out  of 
action. 


220  Development  of  Field  Artillery. 

But  it  affords  protection  neither  against  large  fragments, 
projectiles  that  penetrate  without  bursting,  nor  against  3.5 
cm.  shell.  Shields  1.4 — 1.6  m.  high  weigh  from  SO — 60  kg. 
Intact  projectiles  that  strike  a  gun  have  little  chance  of  dis- 
mounting it.  The  effect  produced  by  such  shots  is,  at  best, 
problematical  as  shrapnel  that  fails  to  function  when  it  strikes 
the  shield,  bursts  about  1  m.  in  rear  of  the  gim,  though  shell 
will,  of  coiu^e,  produce  some  effect  on  the  personnel.* 

The  difficulties  encountered  in  fighting  batteries  provided 
with  shields,  lead  to  more  extensive  employment  of  curved  fire 
gims  and  special  projectiles  (combination  shrapnel-shell),  f 

But  no  matter  what  is  done,  one  will  never  be  able  to 
produce  so  annihilating  an  effect  on  the  personnel  of  a  battery 
provided  wfth  shields  as  on  that  of  one  without  shields. 
Therefore,  one  will  always  have  to  reckon  with  the  possibility 
that  when  the  infantry  advances  to  the  attack,  single  batteries 
or  gtms  of  the  defender  will  again  come  into  action  and  by 
their  effective  rapid  fire  force  the  advancing  infantry  to  halt. 
Since  it  is  impossible  to  demolish  these  batteries  quickly,  it  has 
been  proposed  to  cripple  them  by  bursting  a  large  number  of 
smoke-producing  projectiles  in  front  and  in  rear  of  them, 
thus  preventing  them  from  training  and  adjusting  their  fire  on 
the  targets  that  are  in  motion.  Colonel  Ruffey  of  the  French 
Army  is  of  the  opinion  that  this  object  will  be  attained  if  16 — ^20 
projectiles  per  minute  are  burst  in  the  vicinity  of  artillery  that 
occupies  a  front  of  100  m. 

*Lieu  ten  ant-General  Rohne  (Art.  Monatshefte,  Sept.  number  1907.  p.  185,  et 
seQ.)  computes  that,  at  3,000  m.,  217  rounds  (0.40%)  would  have  to  be  flred  In  order 
to  have  one  projectile  strike  a  gun  without  bursting. 

+Krupp*s  "shrapnel-shell"  and  Ehrhardt's  "explosive  shrapnel"  are  similar 
In  that  both  produce  essentially  a  shrapnel  effect  when  burst  by  time  fuze,  and  shell 
effect  when  burst  by  percussion  fuze.  That  such  a  projectile,  on  striking  a  gun- 
shield,  will  produce  a  greater  effect  among  the  cannoneers  of  a  shielded  gun  than  an 
ordinary  shrapnel  that  strikes  a  shield  without  bursting,  is  obvious.  When  the  time 
fuze  in  the  explosive  shrapnel  functions,  it  ignites  the  base  charge;  the  combination 
fuze  with  the  high  explosive  charge  goes  on  and  bursts  on  impact.  The  high  ex- 
plosive charge  contains  a  smoke  producing  composition.  This  makes  it  possible 
to  observe  the  point  of  impact  of  the  fuze,  lying  as  it  does  practically  in  prolongation 
of  the  trajectory,  whereby  data  for  possible  future  correction  are  obtained.  See 
RosKOTEN.  Die  heuHgeFeldarliHerie,  p.  167,  et  seq. 


221 

:,ered, 

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shell 

.  m.). 
ise  a 
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Modern  Materiel.  221 

The  field  artillery  of  all  the  states  that  need  be  considered, 
is  armed  with  a  rapid-fire  gun  provided  with  shields  (4 — 6  cm. 
thick)  and  capable,  under  peace  conditions,  of  firing  as  many 
as  twenty  shots  per  minute.  Its  caliber  varies  from  7.5  to 
8.38  cm.  (Germany,  7.7 ;  France,  7.5 ;  Russia,  7.62 ;  and  England 
8.38  cm.,  the  last-named  being  an  18  pdr.).  The  German  gun 
fires  shrapnel  weighing  6.85  kg.  (the  Russian,  6.5,  and  the 
French,  7.25  kg.)  and  high  explosive  shell  of  approximately 
the  same  weight,  with  an  initial  velocity  of  465  m.  (the  Rus- 
sian 588,  and  the  French  530  m.).  The  projectiles  are  burst 
through  the  action  of  combination  fuzes  (in  Germany  grad- 
uated to  5 ,000,  in  France  and  Russia  to  5 ,500  m.) .  The  projec- 
tiles have  a  maximum  range  of  8,000  m.  when  percussion  fuze 
is  used.  Canister  has  been  replaced  by  shrapnel,  which  bursts 
approximately  200  m.  in  front  of  the  gun  when  the  fuse  is  set 
at  zero.  The  German  field  artillery  is  also  equipped  with  a 
light  field  howitzer,  cal.  10.5  cm.,  which  fires  shrapnel  weigh- 
ing 12.8  kg.  (time  fuze  ranging  from  300  to  5,600  m.)  and  shell 
weighing  15.7  kg.  (time  fuze  ranging  from  500  to  5,600  m.). 
In  the  heavy  artillery  of  the  field  army,  the  Germans  use  a 
heavy  field  howitzer,  cal.  14.91  cm.  firing  shell  that  weighs 
39.5  kg.  and  has  an  extreme  range  of  7,400  m.,  the  French 
the  Rimailho  howitzer,  and  the  English  a  12.7  cm.  howitzer 
and  a  12  cm.  gun. 

Some  of  the  states  have  adopted  moimtain  guns  for  use 
in  difficult  country.  When  dismounted  and  carried  on  pack 
animals,  these  guns  offer  a  smaller  target  than  ordinary  field 
artillery.  They  were  used  by  the  Japanese  on  the  plains  of 
Manchuria  to  accompany  the  infantry  attack,  and  were  found 
particularly  useful  for  dismoimting  machine  gims.  Balloon 
guns,  frequently  transported  on  armored  auto  trucks,*  are 
still  in  the  experimental  stage.  Their  projectiles  are 
designed  to  tear  the  envelope  of  balloons  or  to  ignite  the  gas 
therein  contained. 

*The  balloon  gnu  has  a  caliber  of  5  cm.     Total  weight  of  gun  and  carriage 
including  gun  squad  of  five  men.  is  3,200  kg.     Its  extreme  range  is  7,800  m.     At  a 
range  of  4,200  m. ,  the  maximum  ordinate  of  its  trajectory  is  2,480  m.     The  balloon 
shrapnel  weighs  2.4  kg. 


222 


Development  of  Field  Artillery. 


Table  of  Fire  for  German  and  French  Field  Guns. 

(Condensed  from  the  table  of  fire  computed  by  Lieut. 
Gen.  Rohne). 

Muzzle  velocity,  German  gun :     465  m. ;  French  gun,  530 
m. 


Beaten 

Angle  of 

Angle 

zone  for 

Velo- 

Gun. 

Range. 

Eleva- 
tion. 

of 
Pall. 

targets 
j  1  m.  high. 

city. 

Remarks. 

m. 

degr. 

degr. 

1         m. 

m. 

German.. 

1,000 

19* 

11. 

32 

369 

♦The  small  figures 
denote  sixteenths 

French... 

1» 

1« 

41 

421 

of  a  degree. 

German.. 

310 

41a 

12 

310 

French.... 

2,000 

2i» 

8»» 

16 

344 

German.. 

6* 

8>^ 

6.6 

279 

French.... 

3,000 

4» 

6« 

8 

299 

German.. 

9» 

13  • 

4.2 

256 

French.... 

4,000 

•yn 

1110 

4.9 

274 

German... 

13 » 

19 » 

2.8 

237 

French.... 

6,000 

11» 

16^1 

3 

256 

German. . 

18» 

26 » 

2.0 

220 

French... 

6,000 

15* 

22 « 

2 

239 

The  following  are  characteristic  features  of  the  new  type 
of  gun: 

1.  Increased  effectiveness  of  the  individual  projectile, 
which,  when  it  strikes  any  troops  in  the  open  within  a  range 
of  4,000  m.,  either  quickly  annihilates,  or,  at  the  very  least, 
neutralizes  them,  i.  e.,  robs  them  of  unrestricted  mobility. 

2.  Invulnerability  of  the  personnel  to  losses,  thanks  to 
the  introduction  of  shields. 

3.  The  ability  (of  single  batteries,  at  least),  thanks  to 
improved  laying  apparatus,  of  delivering  fire  from  masked 
positions. 


Flat  Trajectory  Guns. 


223 


2.     FLAT  TRAJECTORY  GUNS. 

The  principal  projectile  of  field  guns,  model  96,  is  a 
base  charge  shrapnel  provided  with  a  combination  time  and 
percussion  fuze.  This  shrapnel  weighs  6.85  kg.  and  contains 
300  bullets  weighing  10  g.  each.     Its  initial  velocity  is  465  m. 

Percussion  Shrapnel  is  used  for  defense  at  short  range 
and  in  fire  for  adjustment ;  its  effect  depends  upon  the  range 
and  the  nature  of  the  ground.  It  is  effective  against  troops 
lodged  in  tall  timber.  Masks,  branches  of  trees,  etc.,  fre- 
quently cause  the  premature  burst  of  these  projectiles.* 
On  striking,  the  projectile  cuts  a  furrow  in  the  ground  and 
bursts  two  to  three  meters  beyond  the  point  of  impact. 


Shrapnel. 


•;.  t' 


Percussion  shrapnel  is  effective  only  when  bursting  imme- 
diately in  front  of  the  target  (5 — 25  m.  in  front  of  it,  depend- 
ing upon  the  range).  However,  even  in  this  case,  the  bullets 
often  pass  over  low  targets,  such  as  skirmishers  lying  down, 
and  low  parapets  afford  sufficient  protection.  An  adequate 
effect  can  be  obtained  only  when  the  fire  is  directed  on  stand- 
ing targets.    Soft  groimd,  newly  ploughed  fields,   terrain 

*Eiigagement  of  Azay.  January  6th,  1871.    Geschichte  des  Regiments  Nr.  20. 
HorFBAXTXR.  DetUeche  Artillerie,  I,  pp.  16  and  48.     Taktik,  VI.  p.  42. 


224  Plat  Trajectory  Guns. 

covered  with  snow  or  underbrush,  small  folds  of  the  ground, 
or  a  rising  slope,  diminish  the  fire  effect.*  When  the  angle 
of  fall  is  10  degrees  or  more  (with  the  German  piece  at  ranges 
of  3,300  m.  and  over),  half  of  the  bullets  penetrate  the  groimd, 
the  remainder  ricochet  and  pass  on  at  a  greatly  reduced 
velocity.  For  this  reason,  percussion  shell  is  more  effective 
at  the  longer  ranges  than  time  shrapnel.  Percussion  shrap- 
nel penetrates  thin  walls  and  shields  and  bursts  beyond  them. 
The  explosive  or  incendiary  effect  of  shrapnel  is  insignificant 
owing  to  the  smallness  of  the  bursting  charge.  However, 
some  incendiary  effect  is  possible  if  the  projectile  strikes 
an  easily  inflammable  target,  f 

Time  Shrapnel  (used  in  Germany  up  to  5,000  m.)  is 
fairly  independent  of  the  terrain,  the  burst  being  easily 
observed  since  the  bullets  are  embedded  in  a  * 'smoke-pro- 
ducing composition.*'  It  can,  therefore,  be  used  in  fire  for 
adjustment,  provided  the  point  of  burst  is  low.  The  ex- 
treme range  at  which  this  projectile  can  be  employed  is 
fixed  by  the  facility  of  observing  the  fire  and  by  the  remain- 
ing velocity  of  the  shrapnel  bullets,  both  of  which  diminish 
as  the  range  increases.  Field  guns,  model  '96,  may  be  effec- 
tively employed  up  to  a  range  of  4,000  m.;  under  3,000  m. 
their  fire  is  very  effective  against  targets  in  the  open.  The 
use  of  the  combination  fuze,  on  account  of  its  certainty  of 
burst,  either  by  time  or  percussion,  permits  the  trajectory 
to  be  accurately  determined  in  every  case.  This  fuze  also 
makes  it  possible  to  employ  shrapnel  against  rapidly  advanc- 
ing targets,  and  in  warding  off  a  sudden  attack  at  short  range. 
The  French  regulations  give  the  width  of  the  beaten  zone  of  a 
single  shrapnel  as  20,  that  of  two  from  the  same  piece  as 

*"Wlien  the  ground  at  the  target  is  uneven,  for  example  newly  ploughed  soil, 
the  effect  of  the  fire  la  wholly  a  matter  of  chance.  If,  for  example,  the  shell  strikes 
the  top  of  the  ridge  between  two  furrows,  the  effect  is  likely  to  be  enhanced;  but  if. 
on  the  other  hand,  it  strikes  the  base  of  such  a  ridge,  the  effect  may  be  entirely  nulli- 
fied, since  all  the  ft'agments  propelled  in  direction  of  the  objective  bury  themselves 
in  the  soil."     (Lieutenant- General  Rohne.) 

-^Consult  Taktik,  VI,  p.  45,  in  regard  to  the  incendiary  effect  of  projectiles. 
The  incendiary  effect  of  the  French  Obus  RoMn  ia  said  to  be  greater,  as  the  bullets  are 
embedded  in  an  explosive. 


Time  Shrapnel. 


225 


25  m.  The  maximixm  depth  of  the  beaten  zone  is  300  m. 
The  angle  of  the  cone  of  dispersion  of  the  German  shrapnel, 
model  '96,  is  16degrees  at  2,000  m.,  that  of  the  French  shrapnel 
about  19  degrees.*  Rearward  lines  of  infantry  are  not  safe 
from  shrapnel  fired  at  their  first  line  unless  they  follow  300  to 
400  m.  in  rear  of  that  line.  The  German  shrapnel  gives  very 
good  results  when  set  to  burst  30  to  150  m.  short  of  the 
target,  the  height  of  burst  being  regulated  accordingly 
(approximatley  j^  of  the  whole  number  of  hundreds  of  meters 
of  the  range).  At  ranges  under  1,500  m.,  an  adequate  fire 
effect  may  be  expected,  however,  even  when  the  fuze  is  set 
to  burst  the  projectile  300  m.  short  of  the  target. 

Shrapnel  is  most  effective  against  prone  skirmishers  at 
ranges  from  1,000  to  3,000  m.  when  burst  28  to  22  m.  short 
and  against  standing  skirmishers  at  the  same  ranges  when 
burst  56  to  45  m.  short. 

Effect  of  a  Single  Time  Shrapnel  of  the  German  Field 

Gun. 


TARGETS. 

When  firing  at  the  targets  named  (1  skirmish  figure 
per  m.)  with  time  shrapnel  set  to  burst  50  m. 
short,  the  following  hits  per  shrapnel  may  be  ex- 
pected after  the  adjustment  has  been  effected: 

600 
m. 

1,000 
m. 

2,000 
m. 

3,000 
m. 

4,000 
m. 

SkirmiBhers,  standing 

Skirmishers,  kneeling 

Skinnishers,  prone 

18.4 

10.6 

6.4 

3.5 

14.2 
8.2 
4.9 
2.7 

12.0 
6.9 
4.1 
2.3 

11.0 
6.3 
3.8 
2.1 

10.0 
5.8 
8.5 

Head  targets 

1.9 

*The  following  Is  quoted  from  Lieutenant-General  Robnb'b  article  in  Artil- 
leristische  Monatshefie,  April  number  1909,  p.  287 :  "The  angle  of  fall  of  projectile! 
fired  ftom  the  French  gun  is  smaller,  and  the  depth  of  their  beaten  zone  is  therefore 
greater.  This  is  a  distinct  advantage  when  the  points  of  burst  lie  low  and  the  in- 
tervals of  biu^t  are  considerable.  The  range  at  which  the  angle  of  fall  will  equal 
half  of  the  angle  of  the  cone  of  dispersion — and  beyond  which  the  depth  of  the  beaten 
zone  rapidly  decreases — I  estitnate  at  about  3,200  m.  in  the  German  field  gun.  model 
'96.  and  at  about  4,200  m.  in  the  French  75  mm.  gun.  In  the  French  gun,  the  angle 
of  fall  of  projectiles  Increases  more  slowly,  the  angle  of  the  cone  of  dispersion  more 
rapidly,  than  in  the  German  field  cpun,  model  '96." 


226 


Flat  Trajectory  Guns. 


Effect  per  Minute. 


TARGETS. 


When  tiring  at  the  tarKets  named  (1  skirmish  figure 
per  m.)  with  time  slirapnel.  mod.  '96,  set  to  burst 
50 — 100  m.  short,  the  following  hits  per  minuts 
may  be  expected  on  an  average : 


Skirmishers,  standing. 
Skirmishers,  kneeling. 

Skirmishers,  prone 

Head  Targets 


600 
m. 

1,000 
m* 

2,000 
m. 

3,000 
m. 

364 

202 

109 

46 

210 

117 

63 

27 

126 

70 

38 

16 

70 

39 

21 

9 

4,000 
m. 


14 
8 
6 

a 


More  than  80%  of  the  men  struck  by  fragments  and 
bullets  from  shrapnel  bursting  within  100  m.  are  disabled. 
The  penetration  of  shrapnel  bullets  is  so  great  at  ranges 
under  2,000  m.,  that  when  they  strike  bones  or  vital  organs 
of  horses,  they  produce  instant  incapacity  for  action.  This 
is  especially  true  when  the  interval  of  burst  is  100  m.  or  less. 
The  effect  of  shrapnel  directed  against  batteries  provided 
with  shields  is  insignificant.  Time  shrapnel  is  the  principal 
projectile  employed  by  artillery  against  animate  objects, 
provided  these  are  not  located  immediately  in  rear  of  para- 
pets, within  tall  timber,  or  imder  bomb  proofs.  This  pro- 
jectile is  ineffective  against  such  cover  on  accotmt  of  the 
flatness  of  the  trajectory  and  the  sensitiveness  of  the  fuze. 

Shrapnel  is  supplemented  by  shell*  filled  with  ex- 
plosive charge,  model  '88,  which  has  a  great  explosive  effect 
at  extreme  ranges  and  in  tall  timber. 

Percussion  shell,  on  account  of  its  very  sensitive  fuze, 
bursts  on  penetrating  a  shield,  whereas  shrapnel  goes  en- 
tirely through  a  shield  and  bursts  about  1 — 2  m.  in  rear  of  it. 

^During  the  Franco-German  war  the  common  shell  xised  burst  Into  30,  the 
double-walled  shell  Into  76.  and  the  ring  shell  into  150  fragments.  These  fragmenta 
did  not  have  a  satisfactory  shape  and  weighed  13 — 14  g.  each  (I.  e..  about  21  frag- 
ments per  kg.).    V.  MOllbb,  Bnhoicklung  4$r  FeidarHturU,  III.  i^.  202. 


Percussion  and  Time  Shell. 


227 


a 


Shell,  Model  '96. 


Targets  located  immediately  in  rear  of  parapets  or  under 
light  splinter  proofs  may  be  reached  with  time  shell  burst 
directly  over  or  close  in  front  of  them.  But  even  a  slight 
increase  in  the  interval  of  burst  may  nullify  the  effect. 
This  was  one  reason  why  the  effect  of  Japanese  shells  was 
not  satisfactory  in  Manchuria.*  The  French  Obus  allonge,  a 
high  explosive  percussion  shell  (melinite  charge ;  angle  of  the 
cone  of  dispersion  exceeds  100  degrees)  is  employed  only  for 
the  destruction  of  material  objects.  Its  fuze  acts  only  after 
the  projectile  has  pierced  thin  walls  or  shields,  whereas  the 
German  shell  bursts  while  penetrating  such  a  target. 

When  firing  on  animate  objects,  the  beaten  zone  of  the  French  shell 
does  not  exceed  a  space  50  m.  wide  and  20  m.  deep,  but  the  concussion 
of  the  explosion  will  undoubtedly  be  felt  at  a  greater  distance.  The  ex- 
plosive effect  of  the  projectile  is  equivalent  to  that  of  30  kg.  of  powder. 
The  explosion  of  the  projectile  produces  a  cone-shaped  crater  having  a 
diameter  of  2  and  a  depth  of  0.60  m.  Ten  melinite  shells  per  running 
meter  are  required  to  destroy  a  parapet  3  m.  thick  and  2.80  m.  high. 

Time  Shell,  Model  '96. 


*v.  Tettau,  Achtzehn  Monate,  1,  p.  219. 


228  Plat  Trajectory  Guns. 

Even  very  small  fragments  of  the  shell  are  capable  of 
inflicting  disabling  wotmds,  provided  the  point  of  burst  is 
appropriately  situated  (i.  e.,  when  the  interval  of  burst  is 
not  too  large  and  the  point  of  burst  not  too  high) .  Generally 
speaking,  about  75%  of  all  the  wounds  produced  by  shell, 
model  '96,  incapacitate  for  action.  About  20  fragments  may 
be  reckoned  to  every  kilogram  of  shell-weight,  or  130 — 140 
effective  fragments  for  the  projectile.  Tests  have  developed 
the  fact  that  three  fragments  (in  shrapnel,  model  '96,  about 
five)  weigh  2  kg.  These  fragments  are  capable  of  penetrat- 
ing steel  plate  2  mm.  thick.  The  angle  of  the  cone  of  dis- 
persion of  shell,  model  '96,  is  about  114  degrees;  the  frag- 
ments number  500,  of  which  only  those  weighing  10 — 20  g. 
are  effective  up  to  50  m.  distance  from  point  of  burst.  The 
English  regulations  assume  that  the  radius  of  effect  of  an 
'explosive  shell  does  not  exceed  22  m. 

The  fragments  are  not  evenly  distributed.  The  central 
portion  of  the  shell  is  very  nearly  empty,  and,  in  consequence, 
an  effect  is  not  to  be  expected  from  any  fragments  but  those 
at  the  base  of  the  shell.  The  depth  of  the  beaten  zone  does 
not  exceed  50  m.  even  when  the  fire  is  directed  against 
targets  in  the  open.  The  large  angle  of  the  cone  of  dispersion 
makes  it  possible  to  strike  targets  located  immediately  in 
rear  of  parapets.  The  extreme  angle  of  fall  of  shell  fragments 
is  61  degrees  at  a  range  of  2,000  m.,  and  67  degrees  at  a  range 
of  3,000.  From  this  it  follows  that  when  fire  is  directed 
against  targets  immediately  in  rear  of  a  parapet,  an  effect 
may  be  expected  only  when  the  points  of  burst  are  very 
accurately  placed  in  the  most  advantageous  position  with 
reference  to  the  target,  i.  e.,  immediately  over  or  a  little 
short  of  the  interior  crest.  (In  the  above  figure,  only  target 
1  is  struck,  whereas,  field  howitzer  shells  burst  over  target 
3  would  not  only  strike  that  but  target  1  as  well.)  This  re- 
quires not  only  a  very  careful  adjustment  but  great  accuracy 
in  the  gim  itself  and  imif ormity  in  the  fuzes.  But,  even  under 
the  most  favorable  conditions,  the  number  of  hits  is  small. 


Canister.  229 

Shots  striking  the  interior  crest  or  within  the  work 
itself,  may,  under  certain  conditions,  have  a  tremendous 
effect. 

The  number  of  effective  shots  will  be  still  further  re- 
duced when  it  is  impossible  to  adjust  the  fire  accurately 
upon  the  target,  and  it  becomes  necessary  to  search  an  area 
by  firing  successive  salvos,  increasing  or  decreasing  the 
range  by  50  m.  after  each.*  Even  under  favorable  con- 
ditions, only  a  very  small  ntunber  of  effective  hits  can  be 
coimted  on  when  firing  against  covered  targets.  A  great 
expenditure  of  ammunition  must,  therefore,  be  expected- 
In  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  such  fire  was,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  ineffective.  In  many  instances,  therefore,  one  will  have 
to  be  satisfied  with  harrassing  the  occupants  of  the  hostile 
trenches,  unless  one  adopts  the  better  plan  of  awaiting  the 
moment  when  the  hostile  infantry  is  forced  to  man  its  para- 
pets. For  measures  to  be  taken  against  shell  fire,  consult 
pars.  49-51,  German  P.  A.  D.  R.  Splinter  proofs  whose 
roofs  have  a  slope  of  12  degrees  afford  protection  against 
projectiles  from  flat  trajectory  guns  at  ranges  up  to  3,000  m. 

In  canister,  the  contained  bullets  have  a  smaller  initial  velocity 
than  the  case.  They  richochet  on  striking.  The  range  of  these  ricochets 
depends  upon  the  character  of  the  ground.  Solid,  level  ground,  or  a 
gentle  downward  slope  increase  their  range,  whereas  snow,  sand,  wet 
meadows,  ploughed  and  cultivated  land  reduce  their  range.  Since  the 
introduction  of  smokeless  powder,  the  range  of  canister  has  decreased,  as 
this  powder  required  that  the  projectile  close  the  barrel  more  tightly  than 
canister  is  capable  of  doing.  Of  the  ammunition  carried  by  the  smooth- 
bore 12-pounder,  C/42, 20%  was  canister,  whose  6  oz.  bullets  were  effec- 
tive up  to  800  m.,  the  3  oz.  and  IH  oz.  bullets  up  to  600  m.  The  small 
dispersion,  the  superficial  direction,  and  flat  trajectory  of  its  individual 
bullets  made  canister  very  effective  against  standing  targets  at  short  ranges. 

*Lieutenant-General  Rohne  computes  that  an  interval  of  burst  of  3.7  m.  In 
the  explosive  sheU,  corresponds  to  one  of  10.7  m.  In  the  common  shell,  and  to  one  of 
60  m.  in  the  shrapnel.  To  quote :  "The  number  of  hits  is  reduced  by  half  when  the  In- 
terval of  burst  is  doubled ;  that  is  to  say,  an  interval  of  burst  of  100  m.  in  the  shrapnel 
corresponds  to  one  of  7.4  m.  in  the  explosive  shell  and  to  one  of  20.4  m.  in  the  com- 
mon shell.  According  to  par.  80.  German  F.  A.  F.  Regulations,  the  shrapnel  of  the 
field  gun  is  still  effective  when  burst  150  m.  short.  This  would  correspond  to  11.1 
and  30.6  m.  respectively,  in  common  and  explosive  shell.  Hence,  an  error  of  25  m. 
in  placing  a  shot  impairs  its  effectiveness  enormously  if  it  is  shell,  little  or  not  at  all 
if  it  is  shrapnel.  For  this  reason,  the  shrapnel  of  the  field  gun  can  never  be  replaced 
by  an  explosive  shell." 


230  Curved  Fire  Guns. 

The  simplicity  and  safety  of  handling  it,  the  impossibility  of  using 
it  at  long  ranges,  and  its  effectiveness  against  targets  at  close  range,  justi- 
fied its  existence.*  Its  usefulness  disappeared,  however,  as  soon  as  it 
became  possible  to  use  shrapnel  effectively  at  short  range. 


3.    THE  LIGHT  FIELD  HOWITZER  AND  THE  HEAVY 

FIELD  HOWITZER. 

In  direct  and  curved  fire,  the  light  field  howitzer,  model 
'98  (rigid  mount  with  trail  spade;  no  shields)  heretofore 
fired  shrapnel  weighing  12.8  kg.  (500  jacketed  bullets,  @  10 
:g.  each;  time  fuze  graduated  from  300  to  5,600  m.)  and  shell 
weighing  15.7  kg.  (explosive  charge,  model  '88;  time  fuze 
graduated  from  500  to  5,600  m.).  The  new  fixed  ammtuii- 
tion,  model  1905,  for  the  field  howitzer  is  burst  by  percussion  at 
ranges  over  600  m.  only,  time  fuze  being  used  at  ranges  under 
600  m.  As  40%  of  the  projectiles  carried  are  equipped  with 
delay  action  fuzes,  it  is  possible  to  utilize  to  the  fullest  extent 
the  power  of  penetration  of  the  projectile  before  it  bursts. 
Howitzers  are  especially  effective  against  batteries  provided 
with  shields. 

A  single  shrapnel  from  a  light  field  howitzer  produces  a 
greater  number  of  hits  when  the  point  of  burst  is  favorably 
situated,  than  one  fired  from  a  field  gun.  However,  the  pro- 
jectiles fired  from  the  latter  have  a  deeper  beaten  zone  on 
account  of  the  flatter  trajectory  of  the  piece,  and  a  greater 
penetration  owing  to  their  greater  remaining  velocity.  At 
the  principal  ranges,  when  the  intervals  of  burst  are  moderate 
(30 — 150  m.),  the  effect  produced  by  the  two  projectiles  is 
the  same.  The  effect  of  shrapnel  from  the  field  gun  and  from 
the  light  field  howitzer  is  considered  satisfactory  at  ranges 
imder  1,500  m.  when  the  intervals  of  burst  are  repsectively, 
300  and  200  m.  The  superiority  of  shrapnel  fired  from  a 
field  gun  is  due  to  the  greater  penetration  of  its  jacketed 
bullets,  a  result  of  greater  velocity  of  the  projectile  itself  at 

*Sylvlus'  Battery  repulsed  an  infantry  attack  at  W6rth  with  five  rounds  of 
<;anister.     Hoffbauer.  Deutsche  Artillerie,  II,  pp.  57  and  123. 


Time  Shell.  231 

the  point  of  burst.  But,  in  this  connection,  it  is  to  be  borne 
in  mind  that  only  the  effect  of  single  shots  is  here  considered. 
The  shrapnel  fire  of  the  field  gun  is  considerably  superior  to 
that  of  the  howitzer.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  how- 
itzer fires  more  slowly  than  the  field  gim  and  must  expend 
twice  the  weight  of  ammunition  to  produce  the  same  results. 
If,  in  addition  it  is  remembered  that  the  field  battery  carries 
approximately  two  and  one-half  times  as  many  shrapnel  as 
the  light  field  howitzer  battery,  it  is  obvious  that  the  fire 
of  the  former  will  be  two  and  one-half  times  as  effective, 
against  targets  in  the  open,  as  that  of  the  latter. 

The  superiority  of  the  heavier  projectile  asserts  itself 
when  it  becomes  necessary  to  destroy  material  objects. 
Direct  fire  with  time  shell  is  employed  against  troops  im- 
mediately behind  cover.  The  shell  is  burst  immediately 
in  front  of,  over,  or  in  rear  of  the  target,  which  is  thus 
struck  by  fragments  from  above.  The  more  nearly  perpen- 
dicular the  fragments  strike  the  target,  and  the  greater  their 
number  and  weight,  the  greater  will  be  the  effect  produced. 

Time  Shell,  Model  *98. 


Direct  fire  is  used  for  adjustment,  for  effect  against 
material  objects,  and  against  troops  in  the  open.  Percus- 
sion shell  is  used  to  reach  targets  under  splinter  proofs.  In 
shell  fitted  with  percussion  fuze  without  delay  action,  the 
sensitiveness  of  the  latter  is  so  great  that  it  acts  at  once 


232  Curved  Fire  Guns. 

upon  striking.  Delay  action  fuzes  ensure  that  the  shells  will 
penetrate  before  bursting.  The  angle  of  the  cone  of  disper- 
sion is  about  200  degrees ;  with  appropriate  points  of  burst, 
fragments  weighing  IS  g.  disable  80%  of  the  men  struck. 
In  curved  fire,  at  ranges  beyond  2,100  m.,  shell  with  delay 
action  fuze  is  capable  of  penetrating  most  of  the  splinter 
proof  cover  usually  employed  in  the  field.  Lieutenant- 
General  Rohne  estimates  that  in  firing  tmder  service  con- 
ditions, only  3 — 4  of  the  270  shells  of  a  light  field  howitzer 
battery  will  penetrate  overhead  cover  3  m.  thick.  At  ranges 
under  2, 100  m. ,  the  angle  of  fall  is  too  small  to  make  adequate 
effect  certain. 

The  largest  angle  at  which  fragments  may  fall  from  point  of  burst  is 
equal  to  the  angle  of  fall  of  the  projectile  plus  one-half  of  the  angle  of  the 
cone  of  dispersion.  In  the  shell  of  the  field  gun,  the  angle  of  the  cone  of 
dispersion  is  about  114  degrees,  in  that  of  the  light  field  howitzer,  about 
200  degrees.  From  this  it  follows  that,  at  a  range  of  2,600  m.,  at  which 
the  angle  of  fall  of  the  shell  of  the  field  gun  is  about  6  degrees,  that  of  the 
shell  of  the  light  field  howitzer,  about  9  degrees,  the  fragments  of  the  for- 
mer will  fall  at  angles  up  to  63  degrees,  those  of  the  latter  at  angles  up  to 
109  degrees.  Boards  about  6  cm.  thick  afford  adequate  protection 
against  the  smaller  fragments. 

The  heavy  field  howitzer  fires  percussion  shell  model, 
'04  (with  or  without  delay  action)  weighing  39.5  kg.  As  this 
shell  contains  a  large  explosive  charge,  it  is  to  be  used,  with 
delay  action,  to  penetrate  the  roofs  of  splinter  proofs.  An 
earth  covering  5 — 6  m.  thick  is  necessary  to  afford  protection 
against  these  projectiles.  At  3,000  m.,  a  15  cm.  shell  pro- 
duces a  crater  1  m.  deep  and  2.4  to  3.6  m.  in  diameter,  i.  e., 
2  cu.  m.  (in  made  ground  this  crater  is  three  times  this  size.) 
Shell  fragments  have  a  considerable  range  (about  4,000  m.) 
and,  when  the  projectile  is  fired  without  delay  action,  are 
especially  effective  against  batteries  provided  with  shields. 
Assuming  their  rates  of  fire  to  be  the  same  and  the  conditions 
for  adjustment  equally  favorable,  the  weight  of  metal  thrown 
in  a  certain  period  of  time  at  an  objective  by  two  heavy  field 
howitzer  batteries  will  approximately  equal  that  so  thrown 


Examples  from  Military  History.  233 

in  the  same  time  by  five  light  field  howitzer  batteries.  In 
this  comparison,  the  superior  penetration  of  the  heavy  shells 
is  offset  by  the  greater  number  of  hits  of  the  lighter  shells. 
It  is,  therefore,  a  good  plan  to  use  two  heavy  field  how- 
itzer batteries  against  a  narrow  front  provided  with  especi- 
ally strong  overhead  cover  of  the  type  used  in  the  field,  and 
five  light  field  howitzer  batteries  against  a  broad  front  pro- 
vided with  ordinary  overhead  cover,  splinter  proofs,  etc. 

At  Montm^dy,  a  21  cm.  shell  penetrated  through  an  airshaft  into 
a  casemate  and  killed  6  and  wounded  7 — 8  men.* 

On  January  20th,  1871,  during  the  siege  of  Belfort,  a  21  cm.  shell 
entered  Bastion  No.  11  at  a  point  where  ammunition  was  stored  and  artil- 
lerymen were  resting.  A  powder  magazine  blew  up  and  1  officer  and  3 
non-commissioned  officers  were  disabled.! 

On  January  22d,  1871,  during  the  attack  on  Paris  from  the  north, 
a  shell  penetrated  a  bomb  proof  in  a  double  crown  work  and  disabled  13 

men.t 

Captain  von  Limprun  relates  the  followingf  in  regard  to  the  effect 
produced  by  a  conunon  shell  that  penetrated  the  bomb  proof  of  battery 
No.  17  on  January  8th,  1871,  during  the  siege  of  Paris:  "Heartrending 
groans  issued  from  the  bomb  proof.  A  number  of  men  came  running  out; 
only  the  mortally  wounded  and  the  dead  remained  inside.  These  groans 
and  the  constantly  bursting  shells  produced  a  terrible  effect.  Three  men 
were  delirious  and  fought  against  being  bandaged.  They  ran  out  of  the 
battery  and  yelled  commands;  others  prayed.  By  Heaven,  it  required 
iron  nerves  to  keep  cool.  To  transport  the  wounded  was  out  of  the  question 
for  the  communications  were  too  miserable  and  dangerous.  The  fragments 
of  the  heavy  shells  invariably  tore  and  lacerated  bodies  in  the  most  fright- 
ful manner.  Formless  shapes  that  once  were  human  bodies  often  rolled 
with  gruesome  convulsions  on  the  terreplein  and  on  the  emplacements, 
producing  a  worse  impression  on  the  men  remaining  unhurt  than  severe 
hostile  fire.  It  was,  therefore,  of  the  utmost  importance  to  remove  the 
dead  and  wounded  as  quickly  as  possible  from  the  battery."  In  another 
place,  Lieutenant-General  MtiUer  states  that  after  the  war  and  until  the 
early  eighties,  one  officer,  two  non-commissioned  officers  (one  of  them  a 
corporal  decorated  with  the  Iron  Cross  of  the  First  Class)  and  four  men 
of  the  company  that  had  formed  the  garrison  of  this  battery  died  in  insane 
asylums. 


^.  MOller.  Die  Tdtigkeit  der  deutschen  Festungsartillerie  bei  den  Belagerungen 
u.  8.  w.  im  Krieoe  1870-71,  II.  p.  353, 

+JWd,  III.  p.  172. 

tlbid,  IV,  p.  222. 

ir/Wd.  IV,  p.  162. 


/ 


N 


234 


Effect  of  Shrapnel. 


THE  EFFECT  OF  SHRAPNEL  BULLETS  ON  ANIMATE 

TARGETS.* 

During  the  Franco-German  war,  8.4%  of  all  serious 
wounds  on  the  German  side,  and  during  the  Russo-Japanese 
war,  15%  of  all  serious  woimds  on  each  side,  were  caused  by 
artillery  fire,  f 

I.     Shaho. 


Division 

Wounds. 

Wounds  produced  by  artillery. 

Percent. 

Guards 

1716 
2869 
1604 

176 
306 
333 

10.26 

2d 

10.70 

12th 

20.19 

Total 

6188 

815 

13.75 

II.      Mukden. 

Division 

Wounds 

Wounds  produced  by  artillery. 

Percent. 

Guards 

t 
2851          1                                  347 

4881                                            R(^^ 

12  17 

2d 

17  68 

12th 

1778 

284 

15.97 

Total 

9510          !                                 1494 

15.27 

According  to  the  above  table,  the  least  ratio  of  wounds  produced  by  artillery 
to  all  others  is  10  %.  the  maximum,  over  20  %,  and  the  average  about  14.5  %.  Com- 
pare this  with  the  statement  of  losses  at  Liaoyang  in  Tactics,  I,  Kruegbr's  trans* 
lation.  p.  1G7. 

If  the  effect  of  shrapnel  was  unsatisfactory  during  the 
Russo-Japanese  war,  this  was  due  to  the  fact  that  its  very 
efficacy  increased  the  desire  for  cover  and  that  the  artillery 
of  the  contestants  scarcely  ever  dared  to  advance  to  close 
range. 

*BiRCHER,  Colonel  and  Corps  Surgeon  lid  Swiss  Army  Corps:  Die  Wir- 
hung  der  Artilleriegeschosse.  Aarau.  1899. — KOttner  Kriegschirurgische  Erfahf' 
ungen  aus  dem  SUdafrikanischen  Kriege  1900.  TTibingen.  1900. — Hildbbrand, 
Die  Verwundungen  durch  die  modernen  Kriegsfeuerwaffen,  h  1906. — Rohnb. 
Vber  die  Wirkung  des  Schrapnelschusses.  Mil.  Wochenblatt,  No.  74,  1902. — Ober 
die  ArtillerietDirkung  im  Ostasiatischen  Kriege.  Mil.  Wochenblatt,  No8.  84-86, 1908. 
Art.  MonatshefU  1908,  IX.  p.  197. 

tThe  following  Is  taken  firom  the  article  **Stati8Uc3  of  losses  during  Vie  Busso- 
Japanese  and  the  Franco-German  war,"  appearing  In  Vierteljahrshefte  fUr  Truppen- 
fHhrung  und  Heereskunde,  V.  No.  1  (wounds  on  the  killed  are  said  to  be  included  In 
the  table): 


Character  of  Shrapnel  Wounds.  235 

The  wounds  produced  by  shrapnel  bullets  are  similar 
to  those  caused  by  the  lead  bullets  of  the  infantry  weapons 
of  the  past.  When  the  bullet  strikes  normally  to  the  sur- 
face, it  produces  a  wound  circular  at  the  point  of  impact  and 
considerably  enlarged  at  the  point  of  exit;  bones  are  fre- 
quently shattered;  and  the  most  serious  effect  is  the  intro- 
duction of  foreign  substances,  such  as  pieces  of  cloth,  par- 
ticles of  earth  or  sand,  or  of  the  material  in  which  the  bullets 
are  embedded. 

The  effect  of  shrapnel  bullets  on  animate  targets  depends 
upon  the  striking  energy  of  the  bullets  (expressed  by  kgm.) 
and  on  their  sectional  density,  those  of  smaller  diameter 
having  the  greater  penetration.  The  closer  the  point  of 
burst  is  to  the  target,  the  greater  the  velocity,  and,  naturally, 
the  effect. 

Opinions  differ  as  to  the  amount  of  ''striking  energy" 
necessary  to  put  animate  targets  out  of  action.  In  France, 
an  energy  of  at  least  4.8  kgm.  is  considered  necessary  to 
disable  human  beings,  and  for  horses  an  average  of  19  kgm., 
whereas  in  Germany,  an  average  energy  of  8  kgm.  is  deemed 
sufficient.  The  10  g.  hardened  lead  bullet,  having  a  diameter 
of  12.3  mm.,  retains  this  energy  until  its  remaining  velocity 
is  only  120  m.  This  fixes  the  limit  of  effective  shrapnel  fire 
at  5,000  m.,  at  which  range  its  beaten  zone  is  still  50  m. 
deep.  At  ranges  up  to  1,500  m.,  over  80%  of  the  men 
struck  by  fragments  and  bullets  from  shrapnel  bursting 
within  300  m.  (and  beyond  this  range,  from  shrapnel  bursting 
within  150  m.)  are  put  out  of  action.  Artillery  projectiles 
produce  a  relatively  greater  number  of  fatal  wounds  than 
infantry  projectiles. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  packed  knapsack  affords 
protection  against  all  shrapnel  bullets  having  a  velocity  of 
100  m.  and  against  half  of  those  having  a  velocity  of  200  m. 
The  overcoat  roll  stops  shrapnel  bullets  having  a  velocity  of 
less  than  250  m.  The  penetration  of  these  bullets  is  so  great 
at  ranges  under  2,000  m.,  that  when  they  strike  bones  or 


236  Mobility. 

vital  organs  of  horses,  they  almost  invariably  produce  in- 
stant incapacity  for  action.  This  is  especially  true  when  the 
interval  of  burst  is  100  m.  or  less. 


4.    MOBILITY. 

Experience  has  shown  that  in  carriages  intended  to 
accompany  rapidly  moving  columns  on  roads  and  across 
country,  six-horse  teams  are  the  most  economical,  for  an 
increase  beyond  this  nimiber  does  not  produce  a  proportion- 
ate increase  of  draft  power.  Each  near  horse,  moreover, 
expends  a  part  of  its  energy  in  carrying  a  driver,  and  in 
consequence,  a  pair  does  only  one  and  one-half  times  as  much 
work  as  a  single  horse.  In  the  early  stages  of  a  campaign, 
the  fact  that  purchase  horses  are  not  accustomed  to  pull  in  a 
six-horse  team  will  make  itself  noticeably  felt  when  ma- 
neuvering over  varied  ground.  Schamhorst  gives  250  kg. 
as  the  maximum  draft  power  of  a  horse  in  a  horse  battery 
and  327  kg.  as  that  of  one  in  a  field  battery.  This  would 
amount  to  a  total  weight  of  1,500  and  1,972  kg.  respectively, 
in  the  two  batteries  under  discussion,  for  a  carriage,  com- 
plete. These  weights  are  at  present  exceeded  in  almost  all 
guns  and  still  more  in  caissons.  The  more  effective  a  gim, 
the  greater  its  weight.  Effectiveness  and  mobility  are  con- 
flicting factors  that  are  not  always  easy  to  harmonize.  The 
high  muzzle  velocity  of  the  French  field  gun  and  the  great 
weight  of  its  projectile  were  obtained  by  sacrificing  lightness 
of  materiel  and  mobiUty. 

In  the  artillery  of  the  First  Empire,  the  12-pdr.  weighing  1,880  kg. 
was  abolished  as  too  heavy.  The  heavy  field  gun,  model  '61,  that  was  used 
during  the  Franco-German  war  weighed  1,835  kg.,  its  caisson  1,966  kg., 
and  the  gun  of  the  horse  batteries  1,571  kg.  In  spite  of  its  greater  power, 
the  field  gun,  model  '96,  is  13  ^  lighter  than  the  heavy  field  gun,  model 
'61,  whereas  the  present  gun  of  the  horse  artillery  is  heavier. 

At  Worth,  the  4th  Heavy  Battery  of  the  11th  German  F.  A.,  was  for 
a  time  able  to  bring  only  four  of  its  guns  into  position  on  the  heights  of 
Gunstett.    On  account  of  the  rainsoaked  ground,  extra  teams  had  to  be 


Example  from  Military  History.  237 

brought  up  to  draw  the  guns  up  the  slope.*  The  caissons  of  the  three 
horse  batteries  of  the  same  regiment  were  unable  to  accompany  their  guns 
until  extra  teams  were  provided,  t  The  5th  Heavy  Battery  of  the  same 
regiment  was  for  the  moment,  able  to  bring  only  three  guns  into  position 
on  the  heights  of  Elsaszhausen.t 

The  1st  Light  Battery  of  the  5th  German  F.  A.  moved  a  considerable 
distance  over  the  muddy  roads  of  the  Niederwald  at  the  trot,  during  the 
battle  of  Weiszenburg.  The  resulting  fatigue  of  its  horses  forced  it  to 
ascend  the  slope  of  the  Geisberg  at  a  walk  and  was  the  cause  of  its  bringing 
only  three  of  its  guns  into  position.  IF 

Relative  lUftrching  powers  of  field  and  horse  batteries. 
Spicheren.  The  1st  Heavy  Battalion  of  the  7th  German  F.  A. 
covered  40  km.  in  8  hours,  and  the  lid  Heavy  Battalion  of  the  same  regi- 
ment, 28  km.  in  7  hours.J  The  Horse  Artillery  Battalion  of  the  3d  German 
F.  A.,  after  making  a  march  during  the  morning,  covered  an  additional 
34  km.  in  3  hours.  Stophasius'  Field  Battery  of  the  same  regiment 
covered  36  km.  in  5  }i  hours,  and  the  other  batteries  of  the  regiment  36  km. 
n  6 — 7  hours.  The  roads,  though  good,  involved  steep  grades.  During 
the  night  following  this  march,  a  few  purchase  horses  died  of  overexertion. 

Vionvilie.  The  horse  batteries  of  the  llld  German  Army  Corps 
covered  10  km.  in  hilly  country  in  45  minutes  on  August  16th,  1870;  the 
field  batteries  did  not  arrive  until  45  minutes  later.  I', 

On  August  30th,  1870,  the  Horse  Artillery  Battalion  of  the  German 
Guards  and  a  brigade  of  Uhlans  marched  14 — 16  English  miles  from 
Busancy  at  an  uninterrupted  trot,  though  the  country  was  hilly  and  the 
column  had  to  cross  some  bad  stretches  while  passing  by  the  2d  Infantry, 
Division.  Though  this  trot  was  kept  up  for  two  and  one-half  hours 
touch  with  the  cavalry  was  never  lost.  As  soon  as  Sedan  was  reached, 
these  batteries  were  able  to  go  into  position  at  once  without  difficulty, 
whereas  the  field  batteries  had  to  call  upon  the  infantry  for  assistance. 

At  Worth,  the  field  batteries  were  likewise  unable  to  keep  up  with 
the  cavalry  during  the  pursuit.  ° 

On  November  27th,  1870,  during  the  movement  toward  the  battle- 
field of  Amiens,  the  2d  and  3d  Horse  Batteries  of  the  1st  German  F.  A., 
which  were  attached  to  the  corps  artillery,  made  a  march  of  11  km., 
partly  over  muddy  roads,  in  40 — 50  minutes.  During  this  march  five 
infantrymen  were  carried  on  each  gun  carriage  and  six  on  each  one  of  the 
other  carriages.  During  the  afternoon  of  the  battle,  these  batteries  while 
carrying  the  same  load,  made  a  fiank  march  of  6  km.,  over  rainsoaked  and 
hilly  ground,  in  30  minutes.     During  the  expedition  against  Dieppe*  on 


*HoFFBAUER.  Deutscfie  Artillerie,  II,  p.  46. 
t/Wd.,  p.  59. 
tibid.,  p.  63. 
HJbid.,  I,  p.  36. 

^KriegsgeschichtlicheEinzelsehriften,  11,  p.  413. 
EHoHONLOHE.  Briefe  aber  Artilhrie,  pp.  86  and  207. 
''KuNZ,  Reiterei,  p.  62. 


238  Armament  with  Small  Arms. 

January  13th,  1871,  four  guns  of  the  3d  Horse  Battery  of  the  above  men- 
tioned regiment  marched  86  km.  between  the  hours  of  6:30  A.  m.  and  12 
o'clock  midnight,  though  the  ground  was  covered  with  a  sheet  of  ice. 

According  to  the  French  regulations,  field  batteries  are  to  cover 
8  km.  and  horse  batteries  9  km.  per  hour.  A  halt  of  10  minutes  is  to  be 
made  every  two  hours  when  the  march  does  not  exceed  35  km. 

The  weight  of  the  heavy  field  howitzer,  2,600  kg.,  exceeds 
that  of  the  caissons  used  during  the  Franco-German  war. 

Heavy  artillery  uses  cold-blooded  horses.  Thorough- 
breds were  found  unsuitable  and  were  unable  in  the  long  run 
to  do  the  work  required  of  them  on  difficult  terrain. 

Experience  teaches  that  on  varied  ground  cold-blooded 
horses  work  better  in  harness  than  do  thoroughbreds.  The 
former  do  not  overexert  themselves  so  much  as  the  latter 
when  working  in  a  team  and  when  a  difficult  pull  is  encoun- 
tered. In  consequence,  cold-blooded  horses  pull  more  steadily 
than  thoroughbreds.  Besides,  their  conformation  enables 
cold-blooded  horses  to  throw  themselves  into  the  harness 
with  considerably  greater  weight  than  thoroughbreds  and 
they  are,  consequently,  better  suited  for  draft  purposes  than 
the  latter,  which  are  better  adapted  for  work  under  the  saddle. 

Cold-blooded  horses  likewise  do  quite  well  at  the  trot 
in  level  country,  on  roads,  and  on  soil  that  is  neither  too 
sandy  nor  too  muddy.  They  are  able  to  cover  5 — 6  km.  at 
the  trot  without  material  exertion.  In  deep  mud  and  on 
very  steep  grades,  cold-blooded  horses  should  not  be  urged, 
for  the  expansion  of  which  their  hearts  are  capable  is  too 
slight  for  sudden  exertion.  Even  on  difficult  groimd,  they 
work  best  when  pulling  steadily  and  slowly. 


5.    ARMAMENT  WITH  SMALL  ARMS. 

The  difficulties  confronting  artillery  personnel  in  ward- 
ing off  an  enemy  who  has  penetrated  into  a  battery,  the  vul- 
nerability of  artillery  on  the  march  and  in  camp,  and  the 
danger  of  surprise  when  artillery  is  firing  from  a  masked 
position,  has  led  to  arming  the  personnel  with  a  carbine.     In 


France.  239 

the  German  artillery,  all  mounted  men  are  armed  with  auto- 
matic pistol,  model  1908*  cannoneers  with  the  former  cav- 
alry carbine,  whose  maximum  range  is  1,200  m.  If  the  can- 
noneers were  armed  with  a  long  range  weapon,  they  would 
be  tempted,  during  the  excitement  incident  to  a  threatened 
attack  at  close  range,  to  use  their  carbines,  instead  of  trust- 
ing to  the  effect  of  the  last  available  round  of  shrapnel.  On 
the  march,  thorough  reconnaissance  and  support  of  the  other 
arms  should  protect  the  artillery  against  all  danger.  When 
the  danger  is  great  and  the  cavalry  is  too  weak  to  furnish 
adequate  protection  to  the  artillery,  infantrymen  may  be 
transported  on  limbers  and  caissons,  so  that  they  may  be  at 
hand  the  moment  the  guns  unlimber. 

The  permanent  assignment  of  special  bodies  as  artillery 
supports,  a  practice  followed,  for  example,  in  the  Prussian 
army  during  the  campaign  of  1866,  seems  no  longer  advis- 
able. When  the  French  XVth  Army  Corps  was  organized 
a  demi-company  was  permanently  assigned  to  each  battery 
as  a  support.  The  men  of  these  demi-companies  also  re- 
ceived instruction  in  serving  the  piece,  f 

At  Beaumont*  each  battery  of  the  Bavarian  2d  Division  carried  a 
section  of  Jiigers  and  moved  at  the  trot  with  this  load  for  over  two  miles 
on  the  chatL8see,t    See  also  p.  237,  supra,  Amiens. 

The  men  of  a  Bavarian  battery,  who  were  armed  with  Chassepot 
rifles,  facilitated  the  limbering  of  their  guns  at  Coulmiera.1[  At  Meunsr* 
December  7th,  1870,  the  cannoneers  of  a  French  battery  are  said  to  have 
defended  themselves  with  their  mousqiieions,  until  help  arrived,  against  the 
Bavarian  skirmishers  that  had  penetrated  into  the  battery. 

France:  Officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  trumpeters,  drivers 
and  cannoneers  of  horse  batteries  are  armed  with  the  revolver  and  carry 
18  rounds  of  ammunition  each. 


*It8  caliber  is  9  mm.  and  Its  magazine  holds  8  cartridges.  Target  practice  Is 
had  up  to  a  range  of  75  m.  only,  and  individual  field  practice  up  to  100  m.  only. 
For  unfavorable  comment  on  the  weapon,  based  on  experience  with  it  in  China,  see 
v.  Binder-Krisglstbin.  Die  Kdmpfe  des  Deutschen  Expeditionskorps,  Berlin* 
1902,  p.  238. 

fDES  Palu&res,  Campagne  de  1870,  p.  40. 

tHoFFBAUER,  Deutsc?i€  Arttllerie,  7,  p.  60. 

ITAccording  to  Ohanct,  La  deuxUme  armie  de  la  Loire^  p.  116;  Hbllwio. 
Das  I.  bayrische  Armeekorps,  p.  305. — Gen.  St.  W.  Ill,  p.  415. 


240  Armament  with  Small  Arms. 

Cannoneers  of  field  batteries  and  the  personnel  of  ammunition 
columns  are  armed  with  carbines  (mousquetons)  and  knife  bayonets.  Each 
man  carries  18  rounds  of  ammunition. 

Italy:  Officers,  non-commissioned  officers  and  trumpeters  carry 
the  revolver.  For  the  immediate  defense  of  a  battery,  the  support  of  the 
other  arms  is  required.  A  carbine  (model  '91)  is  carried  by  the  personnel 
of  ammunition  columns  and  by  that  of  mountain  artillery  only. 

Austria:  Ofiicers,  non-commissioned  officers,  trumpeters  and 
cannoneers  of  horse  batteries  are  armed  with  the  revolver  and  carry  30 
rounds  of  ammunition  apiece.  The  cannoneers  of  field  batteries  and  the 
personnel  of  trains  and  of  ammunition  columns  are  armed  with  a  rifle 
(without  bayonet)  and  each  man  carries  30  rounds  of  ammunition.  The 
rifles  of  the  drivers  are  carried  on  the  carriages.  Scouts  are  armed  with 
the  carbine. 

Russia:  Officers,  non-commissioned  officers  and  mounted  men 
(scouts  excepted)  are  armed  with  saber  and  revolver.  Scouts  are  armed 
with  the  carbine.  The  personnel  of  ammunition  columns  is  armed  with 
the  carbine.     Cannoneers  are  armed  with  the  kinshal  (knife)  and  revolver. 

England:  There  are  48  carbines  in  a  battery.  Drivers  carry  the 
revolver,  but  are  not  armed  with  the  saber.  The  personnel  of  ammuni- 
tion columns  is  armed  with  the  carbine. 

As  heavy  artillery  fires  generally  from  masked  positions 
and  as  its  long  ammunition  columns  require  special  pro- 
tection on  the  march,  at  a  halt,  and  in  action,  its  personnel 
is  armed  with  the  rifle  (model  '91).  These  rifles  are  to  be 
used  not  only  for  defense  at  close  range,  but  also  to  keep 
hostile  patrols  at  a  distance.  Small  arms  practice  in  the 
heavy  artillery  is  not  designed  to  teach  units  how  to  conduct 
a  fire  fight,  but  aims  to  teach  the  individual  and  small  bodies 
to  handle  the  rifle  properly.  (Pars.  391  and  480,  German 
Heavy  Artillery  Firing  Regulations).*  *Tield  firing  is 
divided  into  individual  practice  (sentinels,  operators,  cyclists, 
observers)  and  collective  practice,  the  latter  being  had  by 
small  or  meditun  sized  bodies." 


*The  men  fire  at  ranges  up  to  200  m.  only.     The  initial  velocity  of  the  rifle 
bullet  is  570  m. 


Relative  Strength  op  Field  Artillery.        241 


6.    RELATIVE  STRENGTH  OF  FIELD  ARTILLERY  TO 

OTHER  ARMS."" 

Dtiring  the  campaign  of  1866  in  Bohemia,  the  Prussians 
as  well  as  the  Austrians  had  3.1  guns  per  1,000  men  of  their 
total  strength.  At  the  battle  of  Koniggratz,  the  Prussians 
had  3.54  and  the  allied  Austrians  and  Saxons  3.7  guns  per 
1,000  men  of  their  total  strength,  and  5  and  5.5  guns,  respec- 
tively, per  1,000  infantry.  During  the  campaign  of  1870, 
the  French  had  2.6  guns  per  1,000  men,  of  their  paper 
strength,  but,  in  reality,  3.S  guns  per  1,000  men,  whereas  the 
Germans  had  2.3  and,  at  Sedan,  3.3  guns  per  1,000  men. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-German  war,  the  Hid 
Army  Corps  of  the  German  Army  had  4.6  gtms  per  1,000  men 
and  about  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Le  Mans,  5.8  guns  per 
1,000  men.  At  Vionville,  the  Xth  Army  Corps  had  4.16, 
about  the  time  of  the  capitulation  of  Metz,  5.8  guns  per 
1,000  men,  and  at  Beaune  la  Rolande  6.4  guns  per  1,000 
men.  The  1st  Bavarian  Army  Corps  had  8.8  gtms  per  1,000 
men  on  December  3d,  and  11.1  gims  per  1,000  men  on  Decem- 
ber 9th,  1870.  At  the  present  time,  a  German  army  corps 
has  5.76  guns  per  1,000  infantry,  and  a  German  cavalry 
division  3.3  guns  per  1,000  lances.  In  army  corps  of  the 
same  strength  as  the  1st  Bavarian  Corps  on  December  9th, 
1870,  this  would  amount  to  40  artillery  carriages,  15  guns. 
It  would  be  inadvisable,  therefore,  to  exceed  these  figures 
inasmuch  as  the  horsed  batteries  of  heavy  artillery  must  also 

*Clausbwitz'  remark  that  culminates  with  the  words.  "How  much  artillery 
can  one  have  without  inconvenience?"  has.  at  present,  an  historical  value  only. 
But  to  quote — 

"An  excess  of  artillery  is  bound  to  cause  operations  to  partake  more  and  more 
of  a  defensive  and  passive  character.  One  will  seek  salvation  in  strong  positions, 
in  formidable  features  of  the  terrain,  and  even  In  mountain  positions,  in  order  to  shift 
the  burden  of  defense  and  of  protecting  the  numerous  artillery  onto  the  obstacles 
presented  by  the  ground,  so  that  hostile  forces  need  only  advance  to  be  annihilated. 
War  will  be  waged  at  a  stately,  formal  pace,  d  la  minuet. 

"A  shortage  of  artillery  will,  on  the  contrary,  enable  us  to  let  the  offensive, 
mobility  and  maneuvering  predominate.  Marches,  hardships,  exertions,  will  become 
peculiar  weapons  for  us:  war  will  become  more  diversified,  more  lively,  more  ruffled: 
great  battles  will  be  gained  quid  pro  quo/' 


242       Relative  Strength  of  Field  Artillery. 

be  reckoned  with.  If  these  batteries  were  included,  the  rel- 
ative strength  of  artillery  to  other  arms  in  an  army  corps 
would  be  increased  to  6.4  guns  per  1,000  men.  The  pro- 
portion of  artillery  to  other  arms  has  recently  been  fixed  at 
4.8  guns  per  1,000  men  in  the  French  army,  and  at  5.9  guns 
per  1,000  men  in  the  British  army.  In  all  other  armies,  the 
ratio  that  existed  about  the  time  of  the  Franco-German  war 
still  obtains.  With  crowding,  the  144  guns  of  an  army  corps 
occupy  a  front  of  2,500  m.  (each  battery  a  front  of  104  m.,  in- 
cluding the  interval  to  the  next  adjoining  battery).  The 
frontage  that  may  be  assigned  to  the  several  units  grows 
apace  with  the  increase  in  artillery.  The  amount  of  artillery 
that  may  be  assigned  to  the  several  units  is  limited  by  the 
amount  of  protection  that  infantry  can  give  artillery  on  the 
march  and  in  action.  Artillery  should  properly  occupy  road 
space  not  exceeding  half  the  total  depth  of  the  column  of 
which  it  forms  a  part.  The  road  space  of  the  artillery  of  a 
German  army  corps  amounts  to  9.5  km.  (exclusive  of  field 
train),  whereas  that  of  the  infantry  (neglecting  distances  inci- 
dental to  advance  guard  formation)  amounts  to  10  km.  The 
artillery  of  a  German  division  (total  road  space  10  km.)  oc- 
cupies 4,000  m.  road  space,  and  on  the  battlefield  it  occupies 
yi  to  y2  oi  the  total  frontage  of  the  division.  The 
great  depth  of  artillery  columns  and  the  danger  that  the  de- 
ployment of  the  slower  moving  infantry  will  not  keep  pace 
with  that  of  the  artillery,  undoubtedly  constitute  a  difficult 
problem  for  the  higher  troop  leader.  This  problem  becomes 
more  and  more  difficult  as  the  effective  strength  of  the  in- 
fantry diminishes  in  the  course  of  a  campaign.  A  division 
whose  battalions  average  600  men,  takes  up  a  total  road 
space  of  7.5  km.,  of  which  the  artillery  takes  up  4  km.  How 
is  the  artillery  to  be  adequately  protected? 


Organization.  243 


7.     ORGANIZATION 

Artillery,  embracing  as  it  does  guns,  teams,  and  per- 
sonnel, is  difficult  to  organize,  but,  in  spite  of  this,  is  more 
easily  raised  than  cavalry,  as  France's  example  during 
the  Franco-German  war  proves.  Skilled  mechanics  that 
would  make  good  cannoneers  are  everjrwhere  available  in 
abundance,  whereas  trained  riders  are  fotmd  in  but  few  dis- 
tricts in  sufficiently  large  numbers  to  enable  a  state  quickly 
to  create  cavalry  that  is  fit  for  service. 

Of  the  224  batteries  belonging  to  the  French  army  in  1870,  only  69 
remained  after  the  capitulations  of  Metz  and  Sedan.  Yet,  the  formation 
of  new  batteries  did  not  offer  insuperable  difficulties.  In  Paris  alone,  124 
batteries  were  organized.  From  October  10th,  1870  to  February  2d,  1871, 
the  gun  factories  at  Nantes  turned  out  altogether  238  batteries  with  1,428 
guns,  i.  e.,  an  average  of  one  and  one-half  batteries  per  day.  In  all,  362 
new  batteries  were  created.* 

Depending  upon  the  purpose  for  which  they  are  to  be 
used,  batteries  may  be  divided  into  flat  trajectory  and 
curved  fire  batteries,  field  and  mountain  batteries.  In  order 
to  simplify  the  ammunition  supply,  it  is  imperative  that  the 
nimiber  of  calibers  used  be  reduced  to  the  minimum.  For 
this  reason,  it  would  be  desirable  to  abolish  the  light  field 
howitzer. 

Artillery  is  fit  for  action  only  when  at  a  halt  and  im- 
limbered.  Its  maneuvering  should,  therefore,  be  cut  down 
to  the  minimum  and  completed  in  the  shortest  possible 
time.  Artillery  remains  longer  imder  control  of  the  leader 
than  the  other  arms,  and,  even  after  suflfering  severe  losses 
in  men  and  horses,  is  again  ready  for  action  in  a  compara- 
tively short  time,  always  provided  ammunition  is  avail- 
able, t 

*HUioTique  de  la  10  dm«  brigade  de  Vartillerie,  p.  26. 

fExamples:  Corps  artillery  of  the  IXth  Oerman  Army  Corps  at  Oravelotte. 
HOFFBAUER,  Deutsche  Arlillerie,  Y.  p,  68.— 4th  Field  Battery.  4th  German  F.  A. 
at  Beaumont,  ibid.,  VII.  pp.  44  and  86. 


244  Organization. 

The  very  natiire  of  the  arm,  its  stability  in  action, 
would  seem  to  justify  increasing  the  frontage  of  a  battery 
beyond  the  100  paces  laid  down  for  the  tactical  unit  of  in- 
fantry and  cavalry,  the  company  and  the  escadron.*  But 
it  would  be  imwise  materially  to  increase  the  number  of 
gtms  and,  consequently,  the  frontage  of  a  battery,  because 
the  quantity  of  materiel,  the  number  of  horses  and  men  in- 
volved in  such  an  extension  would  make  thorough  supervision 
of  the  battery  by  a  single  individual  impossible. 

A  gun  with  its  team  requires  a  space  of  from  16  to  20 
paces  for  turning.  This  then  fixes  the  minimum  interval 
that  may  be  left  between  guns.  A  further  reduction  of  this 
interval  is  permissible  only  when  the  guns  are  not  exposed 
to  hostile  fire.  On  a  front  of  100 — 150  paces,  this  would 
allow  6 — 8  guns  to  a  battery.  Since  the  beginning  of  the 
19th  Century,  both  the  six  and  the  eight-gun  batteries 
have  been  represented  in  the  field  artilleries  of  various  armies. 

A  battery  should  carry  with  it  the  ammunition  that  it 
will,  in  all  probability,  require  on  going  into  action  and  should 
possess  the  necessary  means — ^both  of  personnel  and  mat6riel 
— ^to  repair  losses  and  damage.  The  German  battery  is 
divided  into  the  firing  battery,  the  combat  train  and  the 
field  train. 

The  six-gun  battery  has  greater  mobility  than  the  eight- 
gun  battery.  The  latter  is  unwieldy  and  directly  invites 
splitting  up.  A  Russian  battery  is  commanded  by  a  lieuten- 
ant-colonel and  divided  into  two  demi-batteries,  each  com- 
manded by  a  captain.  Thus,  the  Russian  battery  in  reality 
constitutes  a  small  battalion  of  two  four-gun  batteries.  A 
battery  acting  alone  is  the  exception.  Hence,  to  arrive  at 
the  proper  strength  of  a  battery,  it  is  necessary  to  decide 
whether  the  guns  assigned  to  an  army  corps  had  best  be 
formed  into  batteries  of  eight,  six,  or  four  guns.  The  eight- 
gim  battery  has  the  advantage  of  least  unit  cost,  for,  in 
forming  twenty-four  guns  into  eight-gun  batteries,  one  six- 

*See  Tactics,  I,  Krueger's  translation,  p.  32. 


The  Battery.  245 

gtin  or  three  four-gun  batteries  are  saved.  But,  in  order  to 
keep  the  number  of  its  carriages  within  reasonable  bounds, 
the  ammunition  carried  per  piece  must  be  reduced.* 

With  the  adoption  of  the  materiel  of  '96,  such  a  high 
rate  of  fire  had  aheady  been  attained  that  in  slow  continuous 
fire  some  of  the  pieces  were  ready  to  fire  before  their  turn 
came  around  again  and  thus  served  only  as  targets  to  the 
enemy.  To  obviate  this  defect  and  to  develop  the  full  power 
of  a  battery,  recourse  could  still  be  had  to  fire  at  will.  But, 
to  adopt  fire  at  will  as  the  usual  method  of  fire  would  make 
all  fire  direction  impossible,  not  to  mention  the  enormous 
amoimt  of  ammunition  consumed.  The  objections  made  to 
increasing  the  artillery  of  an  army  corps  from  84  to  90  guns 
(1870-71)  and  later  to  144  gims,  on  the  groimd  that  there 
would  not  be  room  enough  to  bring  all  these  guns  into  posi- 
tion in  battle,  are  justified  to  a  certain  extent  only,  for  modem 
weapons  actually  permit  an  extension  of  combat  areas  f 
and  increased  ranges  make  longer  lines  available. 

Improvements  made  in  the  method  of  indirect  laying 
enable  artillery  to  use  positions  that  were  not  to  be  thought 
of  in  the  past.  At  any  rate,  it  is  better  to  have  too  many 
guns  than  too  few,  for  an  excess  can,  after  all,  be  held  in 
reserve.  At  Vionville,  surely  no  one  thought  that  we  had 
too  many  gtms. 

*The  four-gun  battery  has  been  adopted  by  France,  Switzerland,  Sweden, 
Denmark,  the  United  States,  and  by  Austria  (by  the  latter  for  horse  and  mountain 
artillery  only). 

Germany,  Austria,  England.  Italy,  Japan.  Norway.  Holland,  and  Belgium 
use  the  six-gun  battery. 

Russia  uses  the  eight-gun  battery. 

ton  August  18th,  1870,  3  batteries  of  the  corps  artillery  of  the  Vllth  German 
Army  Corps  were  unable  to  go  Into  action  as  there  was  no  room  for  them.  (Ge 
■chlchte  des  F.  A.  R.  Nr.  7,  p.  248). — On  the  east  fh>nt  at  Sedan,  19  batteries  (be> 
longing  to  the  Guards,  the  IVth  and  Xllth  Prussian,  and  to  the  1st  Bavarian  Army 
Corps)  were  kept  out  of  action  on  account  of  lack  of  room.  A  recent  examination 
of  the  situation,  however,  brings  to  light  the  fact  that  the  development  of  so  large 
a  force  at  this  point,  was  inadvisable. — General  von  Hoffbausr  (AUes  und  Neues 
aus  der  Feldartillerie,  p.  146),  asserts  that,  out  of  41  battles  and  engagements  during 
the  Campaign  of  1870-71.  there  were  but  7  battles  in  which  lack  of  room  prevented 
the  artillery  firom  bringing  all  of  its  guns  into  action.  In  the  other  34  cases,  lack  of 
room  did  not  become  apparent. 


246  Organization. 

With  the  adoption  of  recoil  guns,  the  question  of  re- 
ducing the  number  of  guns  entered  upon  a  new  phase. 
Whereas  the  six  field  guns,  model  73  fired  only  15  rounds  per 
minute,  the  four  French  field  guns,  model  *97,  fire  60 — 80 
rounds  in  the  same  period.  A  numerical  inferiority  in  guns 
may  be  compensated  by  accelerating  the  fire  and,  without 
loss  of  effect,  the  number  of  guns  may  be  reduced  in  pro- 
portion as  the  rate  of  fire  is  increased.  It  is  not  the  number 
of  gtins  firing  that  is  decisive,  but  the  mass  of  projectiles 
that  biu-st  in  the  enemy's  ranks.  So  long  as  the  German 
artillery  used  nothing  but  obsolete  materiel,  the  French 
could  reasonably  expect  the  92  guns  of  their  army  corps  to 
cope  with  the  144  guns  of  a  German  corps. 

The  high  rate  of  fire  of  the  modem  gun  requires  that  a 
correspondingly  large  amount  of  ammunition  be  kept  at 
hand.  During  the  Franco-German  war,  each  gun  had  one 
caisson.  The  number  of  caissons  was  increased,  upon  the 
adoption  of  the  mat6riel  of  1873,  to  one  and  one-half  caissons 
per  gim.  The  French  had  three  caissons  per  gun.  One 
must,  therefore,  choose  one  of  two  alternatives,  (1)  To  re- 
tain the  present  number  of  guns  in  a  battery  and  to  increase 
the  number  of  caissons  (in  fine,  burden  the  batteries  with 
more  carriages) ;  or  (2 )  To  reduce  the  number  of  guns  in  a 
battery,  slightly  to  increase  the  nimiber  of  caissons,  and  to 
compensate  for  the  discrepancy  in  guns  by  an  accelerated  rate 
of  fire. 

But,  after  all,  everything  depends  upon  the  probable 
opponent.  Until  October  1st,  1899,  the  German  army 
corps  with  its  twenty-four  6-gun  batteries  having  a  total  of 
144  guns,  had  to  reckon  with  the  French  army  corps  with 
its  twenty-three  4-gun  batteries  having  a  total  of  92  guns. 
During  the  summer  of  1909,  after  extensive  trials,  the  French 
increased  the  artillery  of  their  corps  to  144  guns,  formed  into 
thirty-six  batteries.  These  batteries  are  distributed  as  fol- 
lows: 9  batteries  to  each  of  the  two  divisions,  12  batteries 
corps  artillery,  and  6  batteries  reserve  brigade.     Tests  both 


The  Battery. 


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248  Organization. 

in  Germany  and  in  France  furnished  very  good  restdts  as  to 
the  efficiency  and  usefulness  of  a  4-gun  battery.  Financial 
reasons  and  aversion  to  strike  from  the  list  guns  already 
on*  hand,  determined  Germany  to  retain  the  6-gun  battery.* 
At  present,  the  question  resolves  itself  into  whether  the 
guns  of  an  army  corps  should  be  formed  into  4-gun  batteries 
or  into  6-gun  batteries.  The  advantages  and  disadvantages 
of  the  two  types  of  batteries  may  be  summed  up  as  follows : 

1.  In  the  4-gtm  battery,  the  difference  between  peace 
and  war  strength  is  less  than  in  the  6-gun  battery ; 

2.  If  the  6-gun  battery  is  to  develop  a  fire  power  equal 
to  that  of  the  4-gun  battery,  the  number  of  its  caissons  will 
have  to  be  increased.  This  would  very  considerably  over- 
burden these  batteries ;  f 

3.  The  6-gim  battery  can  not  use  its  full  fire  power  to 
advantage.  In  continuous  fire,  two  guns  either  stand  ready 
for  firing,  but  idle,  as  a  reserve,  or,  if  all  fire,  there  is 
danger  of  the  battery  nmning  out  of  ammunition.  In- 
cluding the  ammunition  carried  for  it  in  the  light  ammuni- 
tion coliunn,  the  German  battery  has  284  roimds  available 
per  gun,  whereas  the  French  battery  has  312  rotmds  avail- 
able per  gtm; 

4.  In  the  4-gun  battery,  fire  direction  is  easier  than  in 
the  6-gun  battery.  The  greater  mobility  of  the  former  is, 
above  all,  noticeable  in  horse  batteries. 


*Durlng  the  reorganization  in  1899,  General  von  Hoffbauer  favored  the  0-gun 
battery.  But  he  admitted  that  if  the  French  were  to  equip  their  army  corps  with 
thirty  4-gun  batteries,  these  with  their  120  guns  would  be  superior  to  the  144  Ger- 
man guns  formed  into  twenty-four  batteries.  Cf.  v.  Hoffbauer,  Altes  und  Neues 
aus  der  deutschen  Feldartillerie,  p.  158. — Attention  is  invited  to  the  following  essays 
by  Lieutenant-General  Rohne:  Progress  of  Modern  Field  Artillery,  Macomb's 
translation:  Rvckblick  auf  die  Organisation  der  deutschen  und  franzdsischen  Feld- 
artiUerie  (Jahrbucher  fur  Armee  u.  Marine,  1908):  Z«r  Reorganisation  der  franzQ- 
sischen  Feldartillerie  (January  number  Artilleristische  Monatshefte,  1900);  Der 
Bericht  der  Militdrkommission  uber  die  Reorganisation  der  franzdsischen  Artillerie 
(July — December  number  Artilleristische  Monatshefte,  1909). 

tTwo  demi-batteries.  each  consisting  of  three  gims.  were  tried  out  in  France, 
but  were  found  unsatisfactory,  although  each  demi-battery  developed,  for  a  ahoit 
time,  the  same  fire  power  as  a  four-gun  battery.  August  numb«»  ArtiU§rUH$ek0 
MonatshefU,  1900. 


The  Battalion,  Regiment  and  Brigade.        249 

The  principal  disadvantage  of  the  4-gun  battery  with  its 
large  ammiinition  supply  consists  of  the  increased  burden- 
ing of  the  route  columns.  This  defect  may  be  obviated 
by  marching  on  a  broad  front,  and  by  more  extensive  employ- 
ment of  auto  trucks.  Another  defect  of  this  type  of  battery 
is  that  its  fire  power  is  at  once  impaired  the  moment  one  of 
its  gims  becomes  disabled. 

During  the  Franco-German  war,  the  chief  of  artillery 
of  a  division  was  frequently  tmable  to  handle  the  divisional 
artillery  (4  batteries)  both  tactically  and  technically.  In 
consequence,  the  battalion  organization  frequently  disap- 
peared and  artillery  commanders  were  forced  to  put  their 
artillery  in  piecemeal,  by  batteries,  a  procedure  that  made 
massed  employment  of  the  gims  impossible.  As  the  artillery 
force  increased,  a  division  and  distribution  of  work  became 
necessary.  The  regimental  commander  is  now  charged  with 
the  tactical,  the  battalion  commanders  generally  with  the 
purely  technical  conduct  of  the  action.* 

In  Germany  and  France,  battaUons  consist  of  three 
batteries.  In  action,  such  a  battahon  has  a  frontage  of 
from  300  to  400  m.  and  can  still  be  controlled  by  a  single 
person.  Moreover,  it  possesses  greater  mobility  and  takes  up 
less  road  space  than  a  4-battery  battalion  and  does  not  invite 
detaching  batteries  to  the  same  extent  as  the  latter.  Bat- 
talions of  two  batteries,  as  used  in  Austria,  are  not  strong 
enough  to  deserve  the  appellation  ''battalion."  Since  the 
adoption  of  S-battery  battalions  and  Ught  ammunition  col- 
umns, the  employment  of  artillery  by  battaUons  has  become 
the  rule,  the  use  of  batteries  alone,  the  exception,  f  As  light 
ammimition  columns  are  closely  allied  to  the  batteries,  the 
personnel  of  the  former  can  get  some  training  at  the  piece 
after  mobilization.  A  regiment  consists  of  two  battalions 
and  a  brigade  of  two  regiments.     No  valid  objection  can 

*In  Russia,  the  commander  of  the  artillery  is  charged  only  with  the  purely 
technical  handling  of  the  arm. 

tThe  Italian  regulations  call  the  battery  the  combat  unit,  the  battalion  (of 
four  batteries)  the  tactical  unit. 


250    Assignment  of  Artillery  to  Higher  Units. 

be  urged  against  this  two-unit  organization,  as  the  simul- 
taneous employment  of  a  large  number  of  guns — ^not  a  succes- 
sive employment — ^is  based  on  the  characteristics  of  the  arm. 
A  division  should  have  the  artillery  necessary  to  enable  it  to 
fight  any  target  that  might  appear.  Hence,  in  addition  to 
its  light  field  guns,  the  division  should  have  a  number  of 
batteries  capable  of  employing  curved  as  well  as  direct  fire. 
These  requirements  are  fulfilled  by  the  light  field  howitzer. 
The  batteries  of  the  heavy  artillery  of  the  field  army 
have  four  guns  each.  Two  mortar  batteries,  or  four  howitzer 
batteries  with  a  light  ammunition  column  form  a  battalion. 
At  the  present  time,  this  is  all  the  artillery  that  is  attached, 
for  road  spaces  are  already  considerably  increased  by  the 
addition  of  ammunition  columns. 

ASSIGNMENT  OF  ARTILLERY  TO  HIGHER  UNITS. 

In  Germany,  Austria  and  Russia,  the  artillery  is  dis- 
tributed equally  among  all  the  divisions,  whereas,  in  France 
and  Italy  corps  artillery  is  still  used. 

Germany:  The  artillery  of  an  infantry  division  consists  of  a  field 
artillery  brigade  of  two  regiments,  each  composed  of  six  batteries.  One 
light  field  howitzer  battalion  of  three  batteries  is  assigned  to  one  of  the 
divisions  of  each  army  corps  in  lieu  of  a  battalion  of  field  guns.  The  artil- 
lery of  an  army  corps  consists  of  144  guns.  A  heavy  field  howitzer  bat- 
talion of  four  batteries,  each  composed  of  four  heavy  field  howitzers,  is 
attached  to  each  army  corps. 

Austria:  The  artillery  of  an  army  corps  of  three  divisions  consists 
of  a  field  artillery  brigade  of  three  light  field  artillery  regiments  and  of 
one  howitzer  regiment.  Each  artillery  regiment  consists  of  two  battalions 
(called  divisions),  and  each  battalion  of  two  batteries.  The  artillery  of  an 
infantry  division  consists  of  two  battalions,  one  composed  of  two  field 
batteries,  the  other  of  two  field  howitzer  batteries.  The  assignment  of  a 
heavy  howitzer  battalion  of  three  batteries  to  each  corps,  as  corps  artillery 
appears  to  be  contemplated. 

Italy:  The  artillery  of  a  division  consists  of  a  demi-regiment  com- 
prising two  field  batteries  and  two  howitzer  batteries  (10.5  cm.  howitzers). 
The  corps  artillery  of  an  army  corps  consists  of  two  battalions  of  three 
field  batteries  each,  and  of  one  light  field  howitzer  battalion  of  two  batteries, 
in  all  sixteen  batteries  with  a  total  of  96  guns. 


Divisional  and  Corps  Artillery.  251 

France:  The  artillery  of  a  division  consists  of  one  regiment  of 
nine  batteries.  An  army  corps  has,  in  addition,  corps  artillery  consisting 
of  four  battalions  (12  batteries).  To  this  must  be  added,  two  battalions 
of  reserve  artillery,  and  two  new  Rimailho  batteries,  each  composed  of  two 
156  mm.  howitzers.  The  whole  artillery  force  of  an  army  corps,  therefore, 
consists  of  144+4  guns. 

Russia:  The  artillery  of  one  division  of  an  army  corps  consists  of 
two  battalions,  each  of  three  batteries,  a  total  of  48  guns,  that  of  the  other 
division  of  one  brigade  of  two  battalions  of  three  batteries  each,  and  of  one 
battalion  of  two  batteries.     An  army  corps  has  112  guns  available. 

England:  The  field  army  consists  of  six  infantry  divisions  and 
auxiliary  troops.  The  divisional  artillery  consists  of  three  battalions  of 
field  artillery  of  three  batteries  each,  and  a  light  ammunition  column,  of 
one  howitzer  battalion  of  two  batteries  and  alight  ammunition  column,  and 
of  one  battery  of  heavy  guns  (4  guns  and  light  ammunition  column),  in 
all  70  guns. 

Starting  with  the  assumption  that  combats  by  in- 
dependent divisions  and  army  corps  will  be  the  exception 
and  that  all  organization  must  be  based  on  the  supposition 
that  the  decisive  battle  will  be  fought  by  armies,  we  may 
assume  that,  in  attack,  an  army  corps  consisting  of  from 
twenty-four  to  thirty  battalions,  will  have  a  frontage  of 
5,000  m.  On  varied  ground,  it  will  almost  invariably  be 
practicable  to  put  140 — 160  guns  into  position.  If,  in  addi- 
tion to  these  considerations,  and  bearing  in  mind  the  probable 
opponent  and  the  probable  theater  of  war,  one  believes  that 
a  modem  army  corps  should  have  from  five  to  six  guns  per 
1,000  men,  these  guns  will  take  up  all  the  available  room  in 
the  battle  line.  It  will  be  impossible  for  lack  of  room, 
therefore,  to  reinforce  a  part  of  the  line  by  putting  in  reserve, 
corps,  or  army  artillery,  unless  intervals  between  gims  are 
decreased,  an  expedient  that  would  be  sure  to  increase  losses. 

An  army  corps  acting  independently  is  differently  sit- 
uated, for  it  is  less  hampered  as  regards  its  frontage.  But,  in 
an  army  corps  acting  alone,  it  will  often  be  necessary  to 
reinforce  the  artillery  of  one  of  the  divisions  while  depleting 
that  of  the  other.  If  corps  artillery  is  available,  this  re- 
quirement may  be  met  by  placing  it  in  position  at  the   de- 


252      Assignment  op  Artillery  to  Higher  Units. 

cisive  point.  According  to  its  advocates,  corps  artillery  is 
to  enable  the  general  commanding  a  corps  of  two  divisions, 
to  influence  the  battle  in  any  manner  that  he  may  consider 
requisite.  ''Such  a  mass  of  guns  will  quickly  make  itself 
felt.  Wherever  it  appears  and  prepares  the  attack,  infantry 
will  involuntarily  congregate.  The  line  occupied  by  this 
artillery  will  fix  the  front  of  the  entire  army  corps."* 

But  this  artillery  reserve  alone  does  not  suffice.  The 
corps  commander  unquestionably  requires,  in  addition,  an 
infantry  reserve.  This  he  takes  from  the  division  that  is 
not  as  yet  to  be  laimched  into  decisive  action  and  whose 
advance  he  wishes  to  retard. 

It  would  appear  to  be  better,  therefore,  to  attach 
to  an  army  corps  a  third  battle  unit,  composed  of  all  arms. 
This  unit  would  then  obviate  the  necessity  of  corps  artillery. 
To  comply  strictly  with  the  principle  that  an  army  corps  in 
route  coliunn  must  not  be  so  long  that  it  can  not  deploy  for 
action  in  one  day,  would  mean  a  reduction  of  the  strength  of 
infantry  battalions,  if  the  army  corps  consisted  of  three 
divisions.  In  practice,  however,  it  is  not  a  good  plan  to 
make  this  reduction,  since  it  is  almost  always  practicable 
to  march  on  a  broader  front  than  in  column  of  squads,  or  at 
least  on  two  roads,  and  since  the  strength  of  battalions  in- 
variably decreases  rapidly  in  the  course  of  a  campaign.  The 
objections  made  to  adding  a  third  division  to  an  army  corps, 
on  the  ground  that  this  would  unduly  increase  the  road 
space  taken  up  by  a  corps,  are  tenable  in  theory  only.     If 

♦v.d.  GoLTZ,  Volk  in  Waffen,  p.  38. 

V.  SehUchting,  Taktische  u.  stratetfische  GrundsOtze  der  Gegenwart,  III,  p.  51. 

"Whether  corps  artillery  should  be  retained  or  not  depends  upon  the  general 
situation.  Corps  artillery  is  necessary  when  it  becomes  desirable  to  reinforce  the 
artillery  line.  Corps  artillery  is  to  bring  about  the  decision  in  the  artillery  combat, 
to  assure  it  in  attack  and  to  ward  it  off  in  defense.  The  corps  artillery  may  be 
launched  by  the  corps  commander  only.  Corps  artillery  constitutes  a  link  between 
the  two  divisions  that  can  not  be  formed  at  the  very  last  moment  out  of  the  divisional 
artillery,  for  it  would  then  be  too  late  and  would  cripple  the  division,  as  it  Is  not  a 
question  of  forming  a  reserve  but  one  of  throwing  a  strong  artillery  force  into  posi- 
tion as  soon  as  possible.  But.  if  this  is  recognized  as  necessary  at  all,  it  is  unques- 
tionably better  to  form  corps  artillery  at  the  very  start  than  to  create  it  for  a  particu- 
lar contingency  by  breaking  up  other  uxUts."  v.  Sgbbll,  Studien  Uber  Taktik  d$r 
FeldartillerU,  1882. 


Divisional  and  Corps  Artillery.  253 

it  is  considered  undesirable  to  disturb  the  organization 
based  on  the  two-imit  system,  nothing  remains  but  to  at- 
tach reserve  divisions  to  the  army  corps.  But,  unless  large 
peace  cadres  are  available,  these  reserve  divisions  will  scarcely 
be  on  a  par,  during  the  early  stages  of  the  campaign,  with 
regular  divisions. 

One  question  is  important,  viz.,  will  the  deplo3mient  of 
the  artillery  be  retarded  in  a  rencontre,  by  the  formation  of 
corps  artillery,  and  will  the  latter  be  the  cause  that  the  bulk 
of  the  artillery  is  not  employed  at  the  decisive  point  ? 

When  an  army  corps  marches  in  two  columns,  a  dis- 
position certainly  to  be  desired,  it  will  be  an  advantage  in 
case  of  an  unexpected  encounter  with  the  enemy,  if  the  artil- 
lery is  equally  divided  between  the  two  coliunns,  since  one 
can  rarely  tell  beforehand  which  of  the  two  columns  should 
be  made  the  stronger  in  artillery.  Such  a  division  of  the 
artillery  becomes  a  necessity  when  the  two  columns  are 
marching  along  widely  separated  roads  and  when  unfavor- 
able intervening  ground  increases  the  difficulties  of  trans- 
ferring the  artillery  from  one  column  to  the  other.  The 
advantages  that  were  expected  to  accrue  from  corps  artillery 
materialized  in  scarcely  any  of  the  engagements  of  the  Franco- 
German  war.  Scarcely  a  single  instance  can  be  cited  where 
a  corps  commander  exetcised  a  decisive  influence  on  the 
course  of  a  battle  by  putting  in  his  corps  artillery  or  wherethe 
employment  of  the  divisional  artillery  would  have  been 
materially  diflFerent. 

On  August  6th,  1870,  during  the  advance  toward  the  Saar,  it  would 
have  been  advantageous  if  the  corps  artillery  of  the  Vllth  German  Army 
Corps  had  been  equally  divided  between  the  two  divisions.  The  Vllth 
Army  Corps  advanced  in  two  columns  that  were  separated  from  each  other 
by  13  km.  and  the  intervening  terrain  made  all  communication  difficult. 
The  corps  artillery  marched  with  the  right  column.  The  timely  arrival  , 
of  the  corps  artillery  at  Forbach — and  this  could  have  been  managed 
easily — would  have  been  most  desirable,  especially  if  the  divisions  of 
Bazaine's  corps  had  hurried  to  the  battlefield. 

At  Colombey,  the  corps  artillery  of  the  1st  German  Army  Corps  was 
assigned  to  the  left  column  with  orders  to  support  the  advance  guard  of  the 


254      Assignment  of  Artillery  to  Higher  Units. 

Vllth  Army  Corps,  and,  in  consequence,  it  was  absent  from  the  right 
column  when  the  hostile  envelopment  made  itself  felt. 

The  assignment  of  the  corps  artillery  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps  to  the 
left  column  (6th  Division)  on  August  16th,  1870  (battle  of  VionviUe),  has 
been  cited  as  proof  of  the  harmfulness  of  having  corps  artillery,  because 
it  could  have  been  employed  to  better  advantage  with  the  5th  Division, 
whose  artillery  force  proved  inadequate.  Critics  overlook  the  fact  that 
the  batteries  would  have  been  delayed  by  crossing  the  chain  bridge  at 
Corny,  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  transfers  of  artillery  from  the  6th  to 
the  5th  Division  would  have  been  facilitated  if  good  lateral  communications 
had  been  available.  So,  although  reinforced  by  Lyncker's  Detachment, 
the  5th  Division  did  not  receive  effective  support  until  the  corps  artillery  went 
into  action  in  the  section  assigned  to  the  6th  Division.  It  would  hav» 
been  better  if,  instead  of  halting  as  it  did  at  Onville,  the  corps  artillery 
had  concentrated  with  the  6th  Division  at  Buxi^res. 

It  is  a  good  plan  for  a  large  force  acting  on  the  defensive,  to  retain  an 
artillery  reserve.  Such  a  reserve  enables  the  commander — as  at  Noisseville 
— to  employ  the  bulk  of  his  artillery  according  to  necessity  as  the  hostile 
main  attack  develops.  The  disintegration  of  the  artillery  reserve  at  Coul- 
miers  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  defensive  position  selected  was  too 
txtensive  to  be  held  by  the  weak  infantry  force  available.  But  even  in 
ehis  case,  it  would  have  been  better  to  hold  the  artillery  reserve  intact. 

In  favor  of  assigning  all  the  artillery  to  the  divisions* 
(Russia,  Austria,  Germany),  it  may  be  urged, — 

1.  That,  nowadays,  war  is  not  carried  on  by  means  of 
army  corps  acting  independently,  but  by  armies  operating 
abreast  of  each  other; 

2.  That  such  assignment  facilitates  the  timely  deploy- 
ment of  the  artillery  which  modem  battle  demands; 

3.  That,  whereas  the  creation  of  corps  artillery  in 
certain  corps  may  be  necessary  at  times  in  defense,  and 
occasionally  desirable  in  a  battle  fought  according  to  a  pre- 
conceived plan,  it  may  be  a  distinct  disadvantage  in  a  ren- 
contre ; 

4.  That  such  assignment  facilitates  command  and 
simplifies  the  problems  of  shelter  and  supply ; 

*For  reasons  for  abolishing  corps  artillery,  see  MOllbr,  EntvHcklung  der 
Feldartillerie,  III.  p.  282;  LoebelVs  Jahresberichte.  1898,  p.  752;  ibid.,  1800.  p.  329, 
ibid.,  1891,  p.  369;  ibid.,  1892.  p.  285;  ibid.,  1893.  p.  343;  ibid.,  1895.  p.  355;  and 
Militdr-WochenblaU,  1890.  Nos.  44  and  45;  ibid.,  1899.  Nos.  58.  59  and  61. 


Divisional  and  Corps  Artillery.  255 

5.  That  it  brings  about  closer  relations  between  ar- 
tillery and  infantry  in  time  of  peace. 

The  desirability  of  permanently  assigning  all  of  the 
artillery  to  the  divisions  follows  from  the  foregoing.  Now, 
whereas  light  field  batteries  should  quickly  go  into  position 
at  the  very  beginning  of  an  attack,  curved  fire  batteries 
should  be  held  back  until  the  situation  is  clear.  But,  since 
any  army  corps  may  encounter  a  fortified  position  that  can 
be  made  so  strong  by  six  hours  of  labor  that  the  fire  power  of 
light  field  artillery  alone  will  not  suffice,  it  is  desirable,  from 
a  tactical  point  of  view,  to  assign  howitzer  batteries  to  army 
corps.  When  engaged  with  batteries  provided  with  shields, 
an  increase  of  fire  power  will,  likewise,  be  welcomed  in  a 
rencontre.  Since  these  batteries  are  capable  of  firing  from 
masked  positions  and  over  the  heads  of  other  troops  and 
batteries,  and  since  a  collective  effect  is  imperatively  neces- 
sary, it  is  advisable  to  keep  these  batteries  together  in  one 
body  within  the  army  corps  and  to  use  them  together  after 
the  manner  of  an  * 'artillery  reserve'*  as  soon  as  the  informa- 
tion requisite  for  their  employment  has  been  obtained.  In 
the  large  armies  of  todays  the  existence  of  corps  artillery  is  justi- 
fied only  when  it  consists  of  curved  fire  batteries. 


II.     THE  FORMATIONS. 

1.    THE  PIECE. 

"Good  artillery  needs  only  a  few  simple  formations, 
but  these  it  should  know  thoroughly.     It  should  be  able  to 
use  them  to  the  best  advantage  in  any  situation  and  while 
going   at   a  fast    gait,    without  becoming  committed  to  a 
stereotyped  course  of  action,  all 
of  its  elements,  at  the  same  time, 
mutually  supporting  each  other 
pnn.    If  artillery  can  do  this,  if  it  can 
make  long  marches,  post  its  guns 
quickly   in  any  and  all   situa- 
swing  tions,  fire  coolly  and  effectively, 
"'''■    and  knows  how  to  make  the  best 
tactical  use  of  its  fire,  it  will  be 
equal  to  its  task  in  action.     It 
Wheel  would  be  unseemly  for  artillery 
to  indulge  in  exhibitions  and  cere- 
monies, and  not  consonant  with 
the  serious  duties  that  it  has  to 
Qg      perform.     In  everything  that  it 
■ide.     does  and  practices,  artillery 
should  be  animated  by  the  con- 
.j'._i  seriousness  that  direct  preparation 

for  the  critical  time  of  action  is 
the  essential  thing.  What  artillery  has  learned  in  time  of 
peace,  it  will  be  able  to  put  into  practice  in  war;  what  it  has 
neglected,  it  will  lack  at  the  critical  moment."  (Austrian 
Drill  Regulations  of  1909  for  Field  and  Heavy  Artillery). 

Each  gun  has  its  own  caisson.  One  chief  of  section  and 
five  cannoneers  constitute  the  gun  squad  and  five  cannoneers 
(in  a  horse  battery,  three)  the  caisson  squad.  In  a  horse 
battery  there  are,  in  addition,  two  horse  holders  for  each 


The  Piece. 


257 


piece  and  one  for  each  caisson.  In  a  field  battery,  two 
cannoneers  are  mounted  on  the  axle  seats  and  three  on  the 
limber  chest  of  each  gun  carriage.  On  route  marches,  can- 
noneers may  march  either  beside  or  in  rear  of  their  carriages. 

The  chief  of  section  is  habitually 
posted  boot  to  boot  with  the  lead 
driver  of  his  piece.  In  a  field  battery, 
the  cannoneers  are,  as  a  general  rule, 
mounted  on  the  carriages.  They 
march  on  foot,  when  ordered  to  do  so, 
on  route  marches,  on  bad  roads,  on 
steep  grades,  and  when  obstacles  are 
encotmtered,  in  order  to  lighten  the 
load  or  to  assist  the  teams.  The 
length  of  a  field  gun  with  its  team  is 
19  paces  (15  m.),  that  of  a  field  how- 
itzer, 18  paces  (14  m.).  In  a  horse 
battery,  the  cannoneers  of  each  piece  are  formed  in  double  rank 
with  one  pace  distance  between  ranks,  and  posted  either  at 
close  distance  (2  paces)  or  full  distance  (6  paces)  in  rear  of  their 
piece.  Full  distance  is  used  only  when  the  battery  is  ad- 
vancing in  the  order  in  line  (from  which  the  order  in  battery 
is  usually  taken  up)  in  order  to  enable  the  cannoneers  to 
dismoimt  quickly  and  to  prevent  their  running  into  the 
pieces  when  checks  occur  or  the  battery  is  brought  to  a  halt 
from  the  trot  or  the  gallop.  On  route  marches,  cannoneers 
may  ride  on  both  sides  of  their  carriages  or  in  column  of  twos 
in  rear  of  their  carriages.  The  road  space  of  a  horse  artillery 
gun  is  28  paces  at  close  distance  and  32  paces  (25.6  m.)  at  full 
distance.  In  France,  cannoneers  are  posted  one  meter  in 
rear  of  their  pieces,  with  one  meter  between  ranks. 

In  the  order  in  battery,  one  caisson  body  is  posted  one- 
half  pace  to  the  right,  and  slightly  to  the  rear  of  each  field 
gun,  and  one  and  one-half  paces  to  the  right  and  slightly 
to  the  rear  of  each  howitzer.  In  France,  caisson  bodies 
stand  0.5  m.  to  the  left  of  their  pieces,  axles  on  the  same  line. 


258 


The  Formations. 


The  gun  squads  of  field  batteries  are  protected  by  the  gun 
shields,  but  cannoneers  of  light  field  howitzer  batteries  have  to 
step  clear  of  the  wheels  at  each  shot. 


Germany. 


Field  Howitzer. 


Field  Gun. 


Am 


^9     ' 

.ee  ^ 


^S1T7'^" 


5 


>     ''.;  "     ■  ■«> 


France. 


Heavy  Field  Howitzer. 


3* 


Projecfiks 


<t> 


Fo^Afd^r  basket 
baskets     g^. 


-U  'Z*'  J  * . ' — U  -  -  * 


(t> 


Rifles 
1Z0  7$ 

S6U  a 


Gaits. 


259 


2.     GAITS. 

As  artillery  can  fire  only  when  halted,  the  time  consumed 
in  changing  position  should  be  cut  down  to  the  minimum. 
Since  batteries  will  have  to  move  forward  from  their  places 
in  colunm  in  order  to  go  into  position,  it  is  essential  that  they 
be  able  to  cover  considerable  distances  over  varied  ground 
at  the  trot.  A  slower  trot  than  that  ordinarily  used  may  be 
taken  up  when  the  column  is  long.  The  teams  must  bring 
their  guns  into  position,  if  it  kills  them. 


Rate  of  March  per  Minute. 


Wa 
paces. 

ilk 
m. 

paces 

Trot 
m. 

Gs 

paces 

Eillop 

m. 

Accelc 
Gal 
paces 

crated 
lop 

m. 

Germany.. 

125 

100 

275 

220 

500 

400 

700 

560 

Austria 

125-130 

94 

300 

200 

500 

375 

France 

100 

200 

340 

440 

Italy 

100 

200 
Fast  trot 
up  to  280 

380 

450 

England... 

106 

214 

400 

Russia 

. 

89 
Horse 

Btry 

(slow) 

108 

212  in 
ezceptnl 

circ. 

226 

427 
Uorse 
Btrs. 
only. 

425 

Rates  of  March. 

France:  When  marching  alone,  field  artillery  covers  8  (horse 
artillery  9)  km.  per  hour,  and  from  30  to  40  (horse  artillery  40)  km.  per 
day,  without  requiring  extended  rest. 

Italy:  Field  artillery  covers  from  5  to  8  km.  per  hour  and  from  30 
to  40  km.  per  day.  In  a  forced  march,  it  is  expected  to  cover  80  km.  in 
one  day. 

Austria:  Large  bodies  of  artillery  are  expected  to  make  15  km., 
and  small  bodies  23  km.  per  day.  In  a  forced  march,  artillery  when  part 
of  an  infantry  column,  is  expected  to  cover  45  km.  per  day,  and  when  it  is 


260  The  Formations  op  the  Battery. 

part  of  a  cavalry  column,  60  km.  per  day.  In  movements  that  take  some 
time  to  execute,  artillery  is  to  move  at  the  trot,  covering  200  m.  per  minute. 
Artillery  marching  alone  is  to  move  at  the  trot  and  walk;  within  the  zone 
of  battle,  it  is  to  move  at  the  trot.  The  gallop  is  to  be  used  in  exceptional 
cases,  and  then  only  on  favorable  ground.  Trotting  uphill  is  to  be  avoided. 
Horse  batteries  are  not  to  trot  for  longer  periods  than  20  minutes,  and  field 
batteries  are  to  use  the  gallop  only  when  they  are  in  line  at  full  intervals 
and  this  gait  ia  not  to  be  kept  up  for  more  than  500  m. 

Russia:  The  regulations  prescribe  that  artillery  is  to  cover  S — 6 
km.  per  hour  at  the  walk  and  7 — 9  km.  per  hour  at  the  trot.  Field  artillery, 
marching  alone,  is  to  cover  32  km.  in  53^  hours;  horse  artillery  as  much  as 
60  km.  Mixed  commands  are  expected  to  cover,  without  undue  exertiont 
80  km.  in  73^  —  9  hours,  but  this  is  the  maximum. 

"The  gallop  is  incompatible  with  steady  pulling,  as  the  horses  in- 
variably throw  their  weight  into  the  collar  with  a  jerk  and  never  move  for- 
ward together.  In  spite  of  this  and  the  fact  that  our  field  batteries  could, 
UAQuestionably,  get  along  just  as  well  without  the  gallop  in  war  as  the 
French  field  batteries,  which  scarcely  use  it,  no  doubt,  most  artillerymen 
are  in  favor  of  retaining  the  gallop.  The  gallop  increases  the  skill  of  the 
drivers,  steels  their  nerves  and  teaches  them  to  watch  for  signals  and  com- 
mands even  in  the  most  critical  situations.  A  battery  that  can  maneuver 
well  at  the  gallop,  will  assuredly  march  better  at  the  trot  over  difficult 
ground,  than  one  whose  drivers  have  not  learned  to  keep  their  eyes  and  ears 
open  even  moving  at  the  gallop.  On  a  good  chaussie,  a  steady  gallop  in 
route  column  does  not  impair  cohesion.  But  to  form  line  at  a  wild  gallop 
and  to  halt  abruptly  preparatory  to  unlimbering,  or,  worse  yet,  to  gallop 
for  twenty  paces  during  a  change  of  front  executed  in  line,  does  impair 
cohesion."  The  gallop  is  useful  in  crossing  difficult  places  and  in  bringing 
up  guns  that  have  dropped  behind. 


3.    THE  BATTERY. 

The  order  in  line*  and  the  order  in  line  at  close  intervals 
(pars.  293  and  298-304,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.)  differ  from  each 
other  in  that  in  the  latter  the  interval  between  guns  is  five  paces , 
in  the  former  twenty  paces,  measured,  in  either  case,  from  the 
center  of  one  carriage  to  the  center  of  the  next  in  line.  The 
order  in  line  has  the  following  important  advantages : 

*It  l8  to  be  understood  that  whenever  thla  term  appears  without  quali- 
flcatlon.  lin«  at  full  intorrals  Is  meant. — Translator, 


I 
I 

6 


l8t  Platoon 


Firing 
Battery 


2d 


3d 


It 


« 


Combat 
Train 

Field 
Train 


G6niuiny* 

Fl«ld,  Field  Howitzer,  or  Horao  Battery. 

r  lit  Piece 
2d       " 
3d       " 
4th      " 
6th      " 
6th      " 
iBt  Caimon 
2d        " 
3d        " 
4th       " 
6th       « 
6th       •• 

Ist  Store  wagon  (6-horBe) 

(8  and  4)  officers'  led  horses  and  (6  and  10)  spare  horses. 

3d  Store  wagon  (6-horBe) 
Ration  wagon  (2-hor8e) 
Forage  wagon  (4-hor8e) 


1st  Caisson  Platoon 


2d 
8d 


i« 


M 


II 


II 


{ 


Reserre 


Battery  (Field)  in  Line. 

e 

Ldu 

QB       6QQ,     ml      at) 

(D      m      m      CD 


Explanation  of  symbols. 


Battery  (Horse)  in  Une  at 
Close  Intervals. 


uj8 


8 

a 

e 


* 
± 


Battery  Commander.       6 
Lieutenant 
lit  Sergeant. 

Commander  of  the  reierre. 
Chief  of  Seetion,  Calaion  Corporal, 
N.  C.  O.,  Orderly. 

Tmmpeter. 

DrlTer,  Mounted  man.  Led  hon« 

Onn. 
Cainon. 


A-^T'^ 


m 


»«*• 


i' 


.  (D  (D  m  m  CD  m 


«" 


em 
m 


Z' 
Z'l 


m   A   41  Kp  A 

4<  w  *  »k.*. 


nnm  nnm  nnm  rrrri  firn  mnn 

im  OD  OD  cm  cm  to 

V;.Q         ffi         B     ^- 


rtj 


0^ 


r 

r 


I 


1. 


Length  of  light  field  howltaer,  honed,  la 
ISpaoea.  _*  ^  « 

In  a  horte  battery.  calMons  are  posted  9 
paoee  in  rear  of  the  moanted  sqaadi  of 
the  gnni. 

The  calMoni  may  likewise  follow  n  rear 
of  any  other  piece,  or  in  line. 


CD 
CD 


f7' 


CD  eOQ  CD  eGD  CD  eoQ 

m  m  m  m  m  m 

cp  CD  m  m  Dp 

I--I  I--I  M  A  A 

m  M  »*«  M  M 


CD    ^.1  .-.-..-..-..-.  i-i 

*         _j„..aiDCQDQQIDCDDDCDDDaiD 


2" 


^HBBB   H^ 


^ 


0 

The  oalnoni  may  llkewiie  be  posted  on  the  right 
or  left  of  their  respeotiye  guns. 


France. 


c 

0 

m 


Firing 
Battery 

{batterU 
detir) 


Reaerve 

{EchiUm) 

Field 
Train 

(Train 
ngimentaire) 


j 


let  Caisson 

Ist  Piece 

2d  Caisson 

2d  Piece 

3d   Caisson 

3d    Piece 

4th  Caisson 

4th  Piece 

5th  Caisson 

6th       " 

7th— 12th  CaisBona 


)-  let  Platoon 

I 

J 


'  2d 


f  7th- 
\  1  Fi 


Field  forge 


f 


I   1  Store  wagon 
.    1  Forage  wagon 
3  (horse btr8.4)  ration  wagons 


in  Lintti 


a 


I 


Heavy  Field  Howitser  Battery. 


C 

o 

I 

•2 

I 


Firing 
Battery 


Combat 
Train 


Field 
Train 


Reserve   \ 

I 


'  Observation  wagon 

Ist  Piece 

2d      " 

3d      " 
.   4th     " 

1st  Caisson 

2d 

Sd 
.  4th 
f  6th 
i  6th 


u 


(t 


« 


I* 


u 


7th 


II 


(I 


}  let  Platoon 

}2d 

\  1st  Caiaaon  Platoon 

j.  2d 

}  3d 
I  4th 


it 


ti 


^  8th 

f  Le<l  horse  an^i  spare  horses 
^  Field  kitchen 
[  Store  wagon 

Kit  wagon 
Ration  wagon 
Forge 
Forage  wagon 


Order  in  Line  at  Cloee  Intervals. 

I 

, 8UA%    e 

f leoea]  ©09303) 

«.j       ffi  ffl  ffi  ffl 

jl 5  ^  ?b  dB 

|:i:::::r::::j 

:      "BDflBQ  ffiflBQ 
^\  ffl  ffl  ffi  ffl 

( 
I 

B 


e 
0 

8 

a 
e 


Explanation  of  aymbola. 

Battery  comman<3er 

LleutenaDt 

lit  Sergeant 


N.  C.  O.  (dlimounted) 
Qun  iquad 


e 

0 


AMiBtant  lit  Sergeant 
N.C.  O. 
Tram  peter 
Driver 
Led  horse 


± 


Obiervatlon  wagon 


Piece  (howltser) 


Calason 


Platform 
Echelon 


Gun 
Echelon 


I 


21  cm.  Mortar  Battery. 

Observation  wagon 

iBt  Platform  wagon    1  ^^^  Platform  Platoon 

2a  "  ' 


II 


M 


U 


II 


11 


II 


2d 

3d 
-i  4th 

5th 

6th 

7th 
[  8th 

iBt  Carriage 

2d 

3d 

4th 

let  Gun  wagon 

2d 

3d 

4th 


II 


II 


}  2d 
}  3d 
}  4th 

}  iBt  Carriage  Platoon 

}2d 

I  let  Gun  Platoon 

}2d 


'  Led  horse  and 

Combat 

spare  horses 

Train 

Field  kitchen 

.  Store  wagon 

'  Kit  wagon 

Field 

Ration  wagon 

Train 

Forge 

.  Forage  wagon 

n 

t 


I 

G 


e 

•a. 

e 


I 


fl 


^ 


w 


^^ 


eDfflffleQflQeQeDfiQeQ 
j'l —  B 


tO" 


J". 


eDQQD  mrffi  eom  fflSD 
ffiffifflfflfflffiaDeo 


I 


J 


a 


Explanation  of  symbols. 


Q  Battery  Commander 

Q  Lieutenant 

Q  lit  Sergeant 

Q  Ajilfltant  lit  Sergeant 

Q  N.  C.  O. 

Q  Tmmpeter 

Q  Drirer 

Q  Led  hone 

g  Farrier 


N.C.O.    (mounted) 
Qnn  iqnad 
Obaerratlon  wagon 
Store  wagon 
Platform  wngon 

Carriage 

Gun  Wtgon 


264  The  Formations  op  the  Battery. 

1.  It  presents  a  number  of  small  targets,  separated  by 
intervals,  to  the  enemy's  fire,  and,  as  a  result,  minimizes 
losses,  whereas  the  order  in  line  at  close  intervals  offers  the 
enemy  a  single,  compact  target. 

2.  Disorders  occuring  at  one  piece  are  not  communi- 
cated to  other  parts  of  the  line. 

3.  The  guns  can  turn,  imlimber  upon  completing  the 
advance,  change  direction  easily,  and  evade  obstacles,  all  of 
which  is  impossible  in  the  order  in  line  at  close  intervals, 
on  account  of  the  lack  of  room  between  the  guns. 

The  order  in  line  at  close  intervals  should,  therefore, 
never  be  used  when  it  might  become  necessary  to  unlimber 
at  once.  But,  the  order  in  line  at  close  intervals  does  en- 
able the  unit  to  be  concentrated  within  the  smallest  space 
and  is  used  for  assembly  and  for  parades.  In  the  order  in 
line  at  close  intervals,  the  interval  between  guns  is  5  paces 
in  the  German  artillery,  6  paces  in  the  Russian  and  the 
Austrian  artillery,  and  2  m.  in  the  French  artillery. 

The  order  in  line  is  used  for  movements  to  the  front 
or  rear  under  hostile  fire,  for  moving  forward  htirriedly  from 
a  firing  position  in  order  to  pursue,  for  crossing  long  ridges, 
and  preparatory  to  going  into,  or  upon  evacuating  a  position. 
When  longer  distances  have  to  be  covered,  the  route  column 
is  used.*  A  German  field  battery  of  six  guns  has  a  front  of 
80  m.,  a  Russian  battery  of  eight  gims,  a  front  of  95  m.,  and  a 
French  battery  of  four  guns  a  front  of  47  m.  In  the  order 
in  line,  it  is  still  possible  to  execute  turns  of  90  and  180  de- 
grees in  which  each  carriage  moves  over  the  arc  of  a  circle 

*The  following  Is  quoted  fk-om  General  y.  Berendt's  "Erinnerungen  aus  meiner 
Dienstzeit/'  in  regard  to  the  advance  in  line  at  Mars-la-Tour,  of  two  batteries  of  the 
Xth  Army  Corps.  "Several  wet  ditches,  a  number  of  roads  across  our  path,  and 
the  exceedingly  varied  character  of  cultivation  and  vegetation  considerably  delayed 
some  of  the  guns  and  platoons,  while  others,  meantime,  were  able  to  continue  their 
advance  without  trouble.  It  required  an  unusual  amoimt  of  personal  effort  on  the 
battery  commander's  part  to  lead  the  battery  into  its  position,  and  I  was  glad  when 
we  finally  approached  the  locality  where  we  could  open  fire." 


The  Order  in  Route  Column.  265 

whose  diameter  is  16  paces.  When  in  line  at  close  intervals, 
the  battery  can  move  only  by  wheeling  or  inclining  as  a 
whole.  Intervals  may  be  extended  or  closed.  (Pars.  301- 
302,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.). 

The  order  in  route  column,*  Artillery  uses  roads  as 
long  as  possible.  The  formation  best  suited  to  movements 
on  roads  is  in  the  order  in  route  column.  In  this,  the  carriages 
follow  each  other  at  four  paces  distance.  In  a  horse  battery 
in  route  column,  the  guns  follow  each  other  at  thirteen,  the 
caissons  at  nine  paces  distance.  A  reduction  of  this  distance 
to  2  m.,  as  in  Austria,  to  2.13  m.,  as  in  Russia  (8-gun  battery), 
and  to  1  m.,  as  in  France,  interferes  with  the  smooth  and 
steady  movement  of  the  battery.  When  a  battery  marches 
by  the  flank  from  route  coltunn  (par.  302,  German  F.  A.  D. 
R.),  the  interval  between  guns  is  23  paces  (19+4=23)  and 
is  reduced,  when  necessary,  to  20  paces.  In  order  to  shorten 
the  column,  double  column  f  may  be  formed,  the  reserve 
(i.  e.,  all  the  caissons)  being  brought  up  alongside  the  guns. 

Being  in  line  (or  in  line  at  close  intervals) ,  to  form  route 
coltmm:  The  right  (left)  carriage  moves  straight  to  the 
front,  the  others  in  turn  wheel  to  the  right  (left)  and  follow 
in  rear  of  the  first.  Line  is  formed  from  route  column  by 
executing  either  "right  (left)  into  line,"  or  "right  (left)  front 
into  line." 

The  order  in  route  column  is  the  habitual  maneuver  and 
route  formation,  and,  on  roads,  is  Ukewise  used  for  assembly 
ptirposes.    Route  colunm  enables  artillery  to  utilize  existing 

*KolonnB  gu  Einem.  It  differs  fkt>m  our  section  column  In  that  the  CBiflsons 
do  not  follow  their  respective  guns. 

iDoppelkolonne.  This  corresponds  exactly  to  the  double  section  coltunn  of 
our  Field  Artillery.  A  literal  translation  of  the  German  term  was  preferred  since 
the  Germans  form  their  double  (section)  column  differently  than  we  do  from  route 
(section)  column. — Translator, 


266  The  Formations  of  the  Battery. 

roads,  bridges,  and  the  cover  afforded  by  the  ground.  Be- 
sides, it  is  by  no  means  unsuitable  for  flank  movements, 
although  the  effectiveness  of  shrapnel  fire  forces  artillery  to 
abstain,  whenever  possible  from  making  such  movements.* 

Battery  in  Route  Column. 


^^'  """"m  a  ^.  J 


«W    M       Jk 

When  in  route  column,  artillery  can  form  line  quickly 
and  easily  and  can  avoid  obstacles  without  difficulty.     Under 

*Flank  marches  involved  very  little  danger  during  the  Franco-German  war. 
as  the  French  shells  had  a  small  radius  of  effect  and  were,  moreover,  fitted  with  a 
single  action  fuze  only,  a  defective  one  at  that.  Hohenlohe,  Militdrische  Brief e, 
III,  p.  211. 

At  Vionville.  the  1st  Horse  Battery  of  the  10th  F.  A.,  made  a  flank  march 
on  the  ridge  west  of  Vionville  within  300  m.  of  hostile  infantry  and  suffered  but 
trifling  loss.  Qeschichte  des  Feldartillerieregiments  Nr.  10,  p.  83.  At  Gravelotte, 
Bynatten's  Battalion  of  Artillery  executed  a  flank  march  in  colunm  of  platoons 
under  cover  and  unlimbered  to  the  flank.  Geschichte  des  Feldartillerieregiments  Nr. 
7,  p.  245. 


Column  of  Platoons.  267 

favorable  conditions  of  light  and  background,  artillery  will 
be  less  conspicuous  when  advancing  in  route  column  than 
when  advancing  in  line.  Unless  dust  betrays  the  movement, 
artillery  moving  by  the  flank  in  route  column  is  usually  very 
diflBcult  to  distinguish  against  a  dark  background  (for  ex- 
ample, timber). 

(Horse)  Battery  in  Column  of  Platoons. 

fiDQ  an-" 
m  m 


m  qp 

•44     I--I 


mmnrrn-^ 


ODD  Q3i: 

on  cm 
m  m 

:  cDDonan 

fs'  ODD  OD 


;■ 


In  addition,  a  battery  is  not  so  apt  to  get  hit  when  it 
advances  in  route  coliunn  as  when  it  advances  in  line,  as  it 
will  be  difficult  for  the  enemy  to  locate  his  bursts  with  refer- 
ence to  the  head  of  the  route  column.  Front  into  line  should 
not  be  executed  under  hostile  fire.     In  taking  up  a  masked 


268  The  Formations  op  the  Battery. 

position  under  the  crest  of  a  hill,  the  battery  can  move  in 
route  column  imder  cover  along  the  position  and  xmlimber  for 
action  to  a  flank.  By  doing  this,  the  pieces  get  into  position 
more  quickly,  as  they  can  be  brought  closer  to  the  top  of  the 
crest  than  if  the  battery  were  to  advance  in  line  and  were  to 
unlimber  to  the  front.  But  moving  into  position  from  a 
flank  has  the  disadvantage  that  the  battery  can  not  form  line 
so  accurately  facing  the  objective  as  if  front  into  line  had  been 
executed. 

Since  gun  and  caisson  belong  together,  the  column  of 
platoons  at  full  and  at  close  intervals  has  been  abolished 
so  far  as  field  batteries  are  concerned.  Horse  batteries, 
which,  in  many  cases,  will  not  have  their  caissons  at  hand, 
still  use  it  to  reduce  the  length  of  their  column.  In  column 
of  platoons,  the  interval  between  guns  is  5  paces,  the  distance 
between  platoons,  IS  paces.  This  distance  is  measured  from 
the  heads  of  the  lead  pair  of  one  platoon  to  the  rear  of  the 
carriages  of  the  next  preceding  platoon.  Being  in  route 
column,  to  form  line:  The  battery  first  forms  column  of 
platoons,  and  then  executes  right  (left)  front  into  line,  or 
right  (left)  into  line,  intervals  being  at  the  same  time  ex- 
tended from  17  to  20  paces. 

Movements  in  column.  When  the  tactical  situation 
requires  and  the  terrain  permits,  artillery  marching  in  colunm 
may  use  the  gallop  to  good  advantage,  but  the  trot  is  the 
habitual  gait.  When  moving  to  the  battlefield,  artillery 
should  be  able,  without  appreciable  rest,  to  cover  from  8  to  12 
km.  at  the  trot.  In  long  artillery  columns,  it  is  advisable  to 
increase  the  distances  normally  separating  batteries.  This 
should  be  done  likewise  when  artillery  is  drawn  forward  from  its 
position  in  the  column,  as  the  dust  raised  will  dissipate  more 
quickly  and  will  therefore  not  annoy  the  other  troops  so 
much.  In  addition,  no  battery  will  be  forced  to  trot  uphill 
or  over  a  bad  piece  of  road  in  order  to  maintain  its  proper 
distance. 


To  Unlimber.  269 

If  for  any  reason  a  gun  or  a  caisson  is  forced  to  halt, 
this  check  should  in  no  circumstances  be  permitted  to  com- 
municate itself  to  the  rest  of  the  column.  Chiefs  of  car- 
riage and  drivers  should  keep  a  watchful  eye  upon  the 
carriage  preceding  theirs,  so  that,  in  case  that  carriage  is 
disabled,  they  may  be  able  promptly  to  turn  out  of  the  col- 
umn, without  checking  the  gait,  and  trot  past.  A  disabled 
carriage  should  regain  its  proper  place  in  the  column  as  soon 
as  possible. 

Movements  to  the  rear.  The  about  by  carriage.  On 
narrow  roads  a  battery  in  route  column  may  have  to  unlimber 
and  turn  carriages  and  limbers  separately.  On  very  narrow 
roads,  a  different  method  may  sometimes  have  to  be  em- 
ployed. In  this,  lead  and  swing  pairs  are  unhitched  and  led 
to  the  rear  past  the  column.  The  carriages  are  then  un- 
limbered  and  each  carriage  and  each  limber  are  turned  about. 
This  will  result  in  placing  each  limber  in  rear  of  its  gun  or  its 
caisson  body,  as  the  case  may  be.  The  last  piece  (or  caisson 
body),  now  become  the  first,  is  now  removed  and  its  limber 
attached  to  the  piece  (or  caisson  body)  next  in  order,  and  so 
on,  the  last  limber  in  the  column  picking  up  the  first  piece 
(or  caisson  body),  previously  run  aside. 

TO  UNLIMBER. 

The  battery  can  unlimber  all  its  pieces  simultaneously 
to  the  front  or  to  the  rear  from  line,  and  to  a  flank  from  col- 
umn. In  debouching  from  a  defile  (road),  when  it  is  im- 
perative that  fire  be  opened  at  once,  guns  may  unlimber  suc- 
cessively. It  is  not  a  good  plan  for  a  battery  to  use  the  same 
method  of  unlimbering  each  time  it  goes  into  action.  The 
method  of  unlimbering  should  be  selected  with  due  regard 
to  the  tactical  situation  and  the  character  of  the  ground. 

Action  front  (pars.  269-278,  322-332,  German  F.  A. 
D.  R.)  is  usually  employed  when  fire  is  to  be  opened  quickly. 
The  limbers  wheel  to  the  left  about  and  go  to  their  designated 


270  The  Formations  of  the  Battery. 

position  at  a  walk.  They  remain  eight  paces  directly  in 
rear  of  their  guns  in  exceptional  cases  only.  The  battery 
commander  decides  whether  or  not  gun  limbers  should  be 
emptied  entirely  or  partially.  The  reserve  at  once  approaches 
the  guns,  from  a  flank  if  the  gun  limbers  have  vacated 
the  space  in  rear  of  their  guns,  and  unlimbers  one  caisson 
body  to  the  right*  of  each  piece.  The  caisson  limbers  are 
then  emptied. 

In  the  order  in  battery,  the  guns,  unlimbered  for 
action,  are  posted  abreast  of  each  other  with  normal  intervals 
between  them.  This  interval  may  be  reduced  to  ten  paces, 
or  extended,  provided  fire  direction  is  not  hampered  thereby* 
Large  imits,  especially  when  firing  from  a  captured  position 
and  at  a  retreating  opponent,  will  frequently  be  forced  to 
reduce  intervals  between  guns  in  battery.  In  such  a  case, 
intervals  may  usually  be  diminished  with  impunity,  as  the 
hostile  artillery  will  have  suffered  some  loss.  As  far  as  practi- 
cable, battery  and  platoon  commanders  and  chiefs  of  section 
should  avail  themselves  of  the  cover  afforded  by  the  guns 
and  caisson  bodies. 

The  interval  between  batteries  (30  paces)  should  in  no 
event  be  gained  at  the  expense  of  the  interval  between  the 
guns.  When  there  is  plenty  of  room,  or  when  the  hostile 
artillery  is  superior,  the  intervals  between  guns  in  battery 
should  be  increased.  Since  advantage  should  be  taken  of 
the  ground,  the  intervals  between  the  guns  in  battery  need 
not  be  uniform. 

Caissons  filled  with  shrapnel  run  comparatively  little 
danger  of  blowing  up  when  struck  by  intact  projectiles.  At 
the  worst,  the  effect  of  such  a  shot  is  restricted  to  the  caisson 
struck  and  the  nearest  piece.  But  if  a  shell  should  strike 
and  burst  in  a  caisson  carrying  shell,  it  may  detonate  the 
whole  contents.  This  is  bound  to  disable  the  two  adjacent 
pieces  and  will  place  the  whole  battery  out  of  action  for  some 

*Sliice  fixed  ammunition  Is  now  used,  loading  would  proceed  more  rapidly,  If 
the  caisson  body  were  posted  to  the  left  of  Its  gun. 


Action  Rear;  Action  Right.  271 

time.  It  will,  therefore,  be  advisable  to  place  caisson  bodies 
filled  with  shell  beside  the  guns  only  in  case  hostile  shell* 
need  scarcely  be  feared,  in  other  words,  when  one's  artillery- 
is  occupying  a  masked  position.  In  order  to  enable  it  to 
fire  effectively  from  masked  positions,  artillery  must  be  pro- 
vided with  observation  towers  or  ladders  and  observation 
wagons. 

Gun  and  caisson  limbers  are  conducted  and  posted  by 
the  commander  of  the  reserve,  if  an  officer,  otherwise  by  the 
first  sergeant.  When  necessary,  gun  limbers  are  posted  in 
one  group  and  caisson  limbers  in  another.  The  combat 
train  is  also  brought  up  and  joins  the  limbers.  The  two 
groups  of  limbers,  each  in  route  column,  are  posted  abreast 
of  each  other,  facing  to  the  front  with  an  interval  of  about 
twenty  paces  between  them,  about  300  m.  in  rear  and,  when 
practicable,  to  a  flank  of  the  firing  position.  Drivers  dis- 
mount. The  commander  of  the  reserve  or  the  first  sergeant 
usually  remains  mounted.  A  caisson  corporal  designated 
by  the  commander  of  the  reserve  joins  the  firing  battery  and 
establishes  signal  communication  with  the  reserve. 

Action  rear  (par.  329,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.).  On  heavy 
soil,  it  is  advisable  to  turn  the  carriages  about  first  and  then 
to  tmlimber  to  the  rear. 

Action  right,  or  left  (par.  330,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.). 
This  is  usually  employed  when  the  position  can  be  approached 
under  cover  of  a  crest.  The  gims  are  drawn  up  the 
slope  by  their  teams,  but  not  so  high  that  the  enemy  can  see 
the  mounted  drivers  over  the  crest.  It  is  a  good  plan  to 
send  a  mounted  man  to  mark  the  line  beyond  which  drivers 
should  not  advance.  It  is  of  course  desirable  to  unlimber  the 
guns  under  cover  as  close  as  possible  to  the  position  where 
they  are  to  go  into  battery.     To  this  end,  drivers  may  be 

*Izi  1903  during  a  Swedish  firing  test,  a  shrapnel  burst  in  a  caisson  filled 
with  20  shell,  and  a  shell  penetrated  another  caisson  and  burst  within  it.  Although 
explosive  shell  in  the  compartments  of  these  caissons  were  torn  to  bits  by  these 
projectiles,  their  primers  dented  and  the  primer  envelopes  torn  apart,  so  that  the 
powder  was  exposed,  not  a  single  shell  was  detonated. 


272  The  Formations  of  the  Battery. 

directed  to  dismount,  though  this  entails  the  disadvantage 
that  teams  will  not  pull  as  well,  particularly  if  the  ground 
is  soft. 

The  guns  are  brought  into  battery  by  hand,  the  prolonge 
being  used  when  necessary. 

Artillery  may  go  into  position  openly,  i.  e.,  without 
attempting  to  conceal  itself  from  view,  or  concealed,  i.  e., 
its  guns  and  caissons  sheltered  from  the  enemy's  view. 
Positions  may  be  either  unmasked,  semi-masked,  or  masked. 

In  an  unmasked  position,  the  guns  are  not  concealed 
from  view  and  the  line  sights  may  be  used  in  laying. 

In  a  semi-masked  position,  the  guns  are  concealed  from 
the  enemy's  view,  but  a  man  standing  beside  a  gun  can  still 
lay  it  for  direction. 

In  a  masked  position,  the  guns  are  so  concealed  that  it  is 

impossible  for  the  gunners  to  aim  directly  at  the  target. 

The  positions  mentioned  above  give  rise  to  a  number 

of  ways  of  going  into  position.     In  going  into  a  masked 

position,  for  example,  the  guns  may  be  unlimbered  to  the 

front,  but  the  movement  will  usually  be  made  at  the  walk, 

in  order  that  it  may  not  be  betrayed  by  the  dust  raised. 

Upon  unlimbering,  the  guns  should  stand  where  they  are  to 

fire.     In  case  a  battery  is  directed  to  conceal  its  movements 

while  going  into  an  immasked  or  a  semi-masked  position, 

guns  and  caisson  bodies  are  brought  into  battery  by  hand 

as  soon  as  they  are  unlimbered.     When  the  prolonge  is  used 

for  this  purpose,  special  care  should  be  exercised  that  the 

men  do  not  expose  themselves.     Men  should  not  be  posted 

to  indicate  the  limits  of  the  battery  position  when  there  is 

danger  that  the  enemy's  attention  might  be  attratced  there- 

by. 

For  details  of  the  order  in  battery,  see  p.  290,  infra. 

When  the  position  offers  special  difficulties,  platoon 
commanders  and  chiefs  of  section  may  be  brought  up  to  re- 
connoiter  the  positions  to  be  occupied  by  their  guns  and  to 
supervise  bringing  them  into  battery.    When  this  is  done, 


Prance.  273 

» 

the  first  sergeant  is  left  in  charge  of  the  guns.  But  when 
the  distance  between  the  battery  and  the  position  it  is  to 
occupy  is  considerable,  one  officer  remains  with  the  battery. 
When  practicable,  the  evacuation  of  a  position  should  be 
so  managed  that  the  movement  will  not  be  perceived  by  the 
enemy.  To  this  end,  first  the  caisson  bodies*and,  after  the 
battery  commander's  command  for  changing  position,  the 
gims,  should  be  run  by  hand  far  enough  to  the  rear  to  enable 
the  battery  to  limber  up  tmder  cover. 

France:  'The  chief  of  a  unit  is  the  guide  of]  that  unit,"  i.  e.,  he 
indicates  in  his  person,  the  direction  and  gait  and  should  select  his  position 
so  that  the  leaders  of  the  leading  subdivisions  can  see  him 
well.  When  necessary,  he  may  direct  some  other  officer  to 
act  as  guide  in  his  stead.  When  several  battalions  operate 
together  as  one  unit,  each  moves  as  if  acting  alone,  but 
their  leaders  should  maintain  cohesion  by  cooperating  with 
each  other.  The  commander  (guide)  has  no  time  to  see  that 
his  orders  are  executed.  A  file  closer  (serrefile)  is  charged 
with  maintaining  order. 

The  battery  is  divided  into  nine  sections  (pelotona  de 
jyUce^).  The  first,  second,  third  and  fourth  sections  are 
gun  sections,  each  consisting  of  one  gun  and  one  caisson. 
For  tactical  purposes,  the  battery  is  divided  into  the  fighting 
battery  (baUerie  de  combat)  and  the  field  train.  The  fighting 
battery  consists  of  the  firing  battery  (haUerie  de  tir)  and 
the  reserve  (echelon).  The  firing  battery  consists  of  four 
guns  and  six  caissons,  the  reserve  of  six  caissons,  the  field 
forge  and  the  store  wagon.  Of  the  six  caissons  in  the  firing 
battery,  four  belong  to  gun  sections,  each  forming  with  the 
gun  to  which  it  belongs,  a  single  unit  (pUce);  the  other  two 
caissons  of  the  firing  battery  are  to  replace  the  first  ammu- 
nition expended  and  are  therefore  called  caissons  de  premier 
ravitaiUemeni, 

The  order  in  line  (ordre  en  hataillet  see  p.  262,  supra), 
is  that  in  which  the  four  gun  sections  of  the  battery  are 
posted  abreast  of  each  other,  the  caissons  in  front  with  \  ^  1* 
three  cannoneers  mounted  on  each.  The  two  caissons  of 
the  fifth  section  (caissons  de  premier  ravitaillement)  are 
posted  in  rear  of  the  flank  guns.  The  distance  between 
carriages  is  1  m.  The  interval  between  carriages  is  nor- 
mally 14  m.,  but  may  be  diminished  to  2  m.,  and  is  never 
to  exceed  30  m.    Intervals  are  measured  from  the  hub  of  B' 

one  carriage  to  the  hub  of  the  next  in  line.    On  going  into  battery,  each 
gun  moves  to  a  position  abreast  and  to  the  right  of  its  caisson,  the  limbers 


■■■I  III 


274  The  Formations  of  the  Battery. 

wheeling  to  the  left  about  over  the  arc  of  a  circle  whose  diameter  is  6  m. 
When  the  battery  is  in  the  order  in  line,  however,  and  the  interval  between 
caissons  is  not  less  than  6  m.,  the  guns  may  be  moved  abreast  and  1.50  m. 
from  their  respective  caissons,  i.  e.,  double  section  line  may  be  formed. 

The  order  in  section  column  {ordre  en  eolonne  par  px^ce).  In  this 
the  sections  follow  each  other  in  column,  the  caissons  being  in  front  in  each 
section,  the  distance  between  carriages  being  1  m.  The  two  caissons  of 
the  fifth  section  (caissons  de  premier  ratntaiUem^ni)  march  at  the  tail  of 
the  column. 

Double  section  column  (ordre  en  eolonne  douhlie)  is  employed 
when  it  is  desired  to  diminish  the  length  of  the  column.  It  is  formed  from 
section  column  by  the  guns  moving  up  abreast  and  to  the  right  of  their 
respective  caissons.  From  this  column  the  guns  may  be  directly  unlim- 
bered  to  the  left.  To  unlimber  to  the  right,  guns  and  caissons  must  first 
change  places,  i.  e.,  the  guns  must  be  moved  to  the  left  of  their  respective 
caissons. 

The  maneuvers  of  the  battery  are  very  simple.  In  the  oblique  march, 
each  carriage  individually  makes  the  appropriate  change  of  direction. 
During  this  movement,  intervals  may  be  increased  or  diminsihed.  A  wheel 
may  be  executed  only  when  the  battery  is  in  the  order  in  line  at  close  in- 
tervals. To  form  section  column  from  line,  the  right  (left)  section  moves 
out,  the  other  sections  successively  executing  a  partial  change  of  direction 
and  following  the  leading  section.  Line  may  be  formed  from  section 
column  or  from  double  section  column.  The  battery  habitually  forms 
line  toward  the  side  on  which  the  battery  commander  posts  himself. 

In  the  order  in  battery,  the  guns  stand  to  the  right  and  .5  m.  from 
their  respective  caisson  bodies.  The  interval  between  one  caisson  body 
and  the  next  one  in  battery  is  14  m.  As  soon  as  a  caisson  has  been 
brought  into  battery  and  unlimbered,  the  caisson  body  is  upended,  the  lid 
of  the  chest  to  the  rear.  This  lid,  fashioned  like  a  double  door,  is  opened 
to  right  and  left,  and  the  automatic  fuze  setter  (d6bov^hoir),  capable  of 
setting  simultaneously  the  fuzes  of  two  projectiles,  is  dropped.  The  com- 
partments of  the  chest  are  now  exposed  so  that  the  projectiles  may  be 
removed.  As  the  guns  are  provided  with  steel  shields  and  as  walls  and 
doors  of  the  caisson  bodies  are  armored,  ample  protection  is  afforded  the 
gun  squads  during  lulls  in  the  firing.  The  anchoring  of  the  wheels,  the  so- 
called  abattage,  is  very  complicated.  As  soon  as  the  gun  is  unlimbered,  it 
is  laid  for  direction.  Then  two  men  let  down  the  brake  shoes,  while  two 
others,  at  the  same  time,  raise  the  trail  (very  high),  until  the  shoes  take 
hold.  This  is  done  in  order  that  the  brake  shoes  may  hang  down  low  so  as 
to  lock  the  wheels  properly.  This  work  is  to  be  done  very  carefully  in 
order  that  the  piece — already  laid  for  direction,  be  it  remembered — ^may  not 
be  disturbed.  But,  since  this  is  impossible,  the  gun  must  be  relaid  after 
it  has  been  anchored.  All  this  is  done  during  a  time  when  the  battery  is 
more  defenseless  than  at  any  other,  at  a  time  when  there  is  urgent  need  to 
open  fire  quickly.  It  is,  at  best,  a  very  slow  procedure,  which  may  be- 
come very  dangerous  if  hostile  artillery  saw  the  battery  go  into  position. 


France;  Japan;  Italy.  275 

The  chiefs  of  platoon  are  posted  in  rear  of  the  first  caisson  of  their  respec- 
tive platoons.  One  of  the  caissons  of  the  fifth  section,  the  caisson  section 
of  the  firing  battery,  is  posited  on  the  flank  of  the  battery  where  the  bat- 
tery commander  desires  to  observe  the  fire.  The  other  caisson  of  this 
section  is  posted  15  m.  in  rear  of  the  opposite  flank  of  the  battery.  The 
limbers  with  their  teams  are  posted  in  double  section  column  10  m.  in  rear 
of  one  of  the  flanks  of  the  battery.  The  reserve  (echelon),  consistins:  of  the 
remaining  six  caissons  of  the  battery,  is  posted  about  500  m.  in  rear  of  the 
position.  The  occupation  of  a  position  is  invariably  to  be  preceded  by  a 
reconnaissance,  during  which  the  battery  commander  is  to  expose  himself 
as  little  as  possible.  The  fire  preparation  should  be  as  complete  as  pos- 
sible, but  should  not  cause  loss  of  time.  The  battery  commander  indicates 
to  the  next  senior  battery  oflicer  a  position  {position  d*arr^)  up  to  which 
that  officer  is  to  move  the  battery.  The  battery  commander  then  pro- 
ceeds to  the  locality  tentatively  selected  for  the  battery.  He  is  accompanied 
by  a  non-commissioned  oflicer,  whom  he  can  later  send  back  to  notify  the 
battery  to  come  up,  the  quartermaster  sergeant  (brigadier  fourier),  a  trum- 
peter, and  the  mounted  orderly  who  carries  the  battery  commander's 
telescope.  Special  care  should  be  exercised  that  the  enemy's  attention 
may  not  be  prematurely  attracted  by  this  reconnaissance.  The  battery 
commander  examines  the  target,  its  nature  and  extent,  measures  its  front, 
selects  an  aiming  point,  and  decides  upon  the  best  way  of  bringing  his 
battery  into  position.  The  flanks  of  the  battery  are  indicated  by  the 
two  non-commissioned  officers  with  the  captain.  When  the  battery  is  to 
go  into  position  at  a  fast  gait,  these  two  non-commisioned  officers  are 
posted  some  distance  apart  and  covering  each  other  so  as  to  indicate  the 
center  of  the  battery.  When  desired,  platoon  leaders  and  gunners  may  be 
brought  up  and  instructed  in  regard  to  the  target  and  aiming  point.  The 
gunners  select  the  positions  to  be  occupied  by  their  pieces,  which  are  then 
brought  into  battery  in  the  manner  previously  ordered.  When  the  posi- 
tion can  be  approached  under  cover,  batteries  are  habitually  to  unlimber  to 
a  flank. 

Japan:  The  regulations  of  1908  are  almost  an  exact  translation  of 
the  German  regulations. 

Italy  (Drill  Regulations  of  1905) :  The  lead  driver  of  the  directing 
gun  is  the  guide  of  the  battery  or  battalion.  The  platoon  (battery)  com- 
mander sees  that  the  guide  does  his  duty  properly  and  is  held  responsible 
that  his  unit  maintains  proper  direction  and  distance  with  reference  to  the 
directing  carriage.  Chiefs  of  section  and  platoon  therefore  ride  abreast 
and  on  the  near  side  of  the  lead  drivers.  The  interval  between  carriages  is 
16.5  m.  In  horse  batteries,  the  cannoneers  are  formed  in  double  rank  30 
m.  in  front  of  the  battery  and  may  form  a  screen  (hatteria  maacherata). 

Section  Column:  Carriages  follow  each  other  at  a  distance  of  2  m. 
The  reserve  (reparto  di  eassone)  follows  either  directly  in  rear  of  the  battery 
or  echeloned  in  rear  of  a  flank.  The  depth  of  a  battery  is  155  m.  (230 
paces). 


276  The  Formations  of  the  Battery. 

Column  of  platoons:  The  platoons,  thdr  carriagee  in  line  at 
extended  intervals  (16.6  m.)  or  at  close  intervals  (5.26  m.)>  are  posted  in 
rear  of  one  another  at  a  distance  of  6  m.  Line  is  formed  by  executing 
right  (left)  front  into  line,  or  by  platoons  simultaneously  executing  right 
(left)  into  line,  or  on  right  (left)  into  line. 

The  order  in  ItTie  of  columns  (Ordine  in  linea  di  eolonne):  The 
platoons,  each  with  the  caissons  belonging  to  it,  are  in  section  column, 
abreast  of  one  another.  The  depth  of  this  column  is  70  paces  (63  m.). 
Intervals  may  be  diminished  to  seven  paces  (5.2  m.)  or  extended  to  44 
paces  (33  m.).  This  formation  is  better  suited  than  the  section  column  for 
maneuvering  under  artillery  fire  and  for  crossing  difficult  ground. 

Austria :  One  gun  and  one  caisson  constitute  a  section,  *  two  sections, 
a  platoon,  two  or  three  platoons,  a  battery.  In  addition,  a  battery  has 
one  telephone  wagon.  In  the  order  in  section  column,  the  sections  of 
the  battery  follow  each  other  in  column,  the  distance  between  carriages 
being  2  m.  When  it  is  desired  to  decrease  the  depth  of  the  section  colunm, 
the  caissons  may  march  abreast  of  their  respective  guns,  in  other  words, 
double  section  column  may  be  formed.  In  the  order  in  line,  which  is 
modeled  after  the  line  of  columns  {ordine  in  linea  di  eolonne)  of  the  Italians, 
the  platoons,  each  in  section  column,  are  posted  abreast  of  each  other 
with  intervals  of  40  m.  between  them.  The  line  is  to  be  used  as  the  ma- 
neuvering formation  under  hostile  fire.  The  order  in  line  at  dose 
intervals  is  similar  to  the  order  in  line,  but  the  interval  between  platoons 
is  5  m.  It  is  used  as  an  assembly  formation.  In  the  order  in  battery', 
the  guns,  unlimbered,  are  posted  at  intervals  of  20  m.,  caisson  bodies  on  the 

jr ^ff/n + '-^nv A 

iji  i|i  ill 

i         i         i 

li  til  iji 

i        i        i 

1 

right'of  their  respective  pieces.  Larger  intervals  are  considered  desirable, 
smaller  intervals  to  be  avoided.  When  a  battery  is  about  to  go  into  posi- 
tion, its  commander  ascertains  whether  time  enough  is  available  for  doing 
so  under  cover.    When  practicable,  the  movements  of  batteries  going  into 


*  Halbzug,  literally,  demi-platoon. 


Austria;  Russia.  277 

position  should  be  concealed.  To  this  end,  drivers  may  be  ordered  to 
dismount,  and  the  c^uns  brought  into  battery  by  hand  by  the  personnel  or» 
when  necessary,  by  the  support.  In  field  batteries,  the  reserve  is  formed 
of  caissons  belonging  to  the  ammunition  columns.  In  field  howitzer  bat- 
teries, the  caissons  that  do  not  belong  to  the  gun  sections  form  the  reserve. 
Great  importance  is  attached  to  designating  an  officer  whose  duty  it  is  to 
take  charge  of  fire  direction  in  case  the  battery  commander's  observation 
station  is  at  a  distance  from  the  battery.  Importance  is  likewise  attached 
to  protection  against  surprise.  The  officer  in  charge  of  the  limbers  selects 
a  position  for  them. 

In  horse  batteries,  which,  by  the  way,  have  four  guns,  the  interval 
between  carriages  is  15  m.  These  batteries  use  the  column  of  platoons 
in  addition  to  the  other  formations  employed  by  field  batteries.  In  column 
of  platoons,  the  commander  of  the  second  platoon  is  posted  2  m.  in  rear  of 
the  rear  rank  of  the  squad  of  cannoneers  of  the  leading  platoon.  The 
caissons  may  be  directed  to  follow  the  battery  at  a  distance  of  600  m. 

Russia  (Provisional  Regulations  of  1907):  One  gun  and  one  caisson 
constitute  an  inseparable  unit,  the  section.  The  firing  battery  consists 
of  eight  guns  and  eight  caissons,  the  battery  reserve  of  eight  caissons. 
Two  gun  sections  form  a  platoon,  two  platoons,  under  a  captain,  a  demi- 
battery.  Full  interval  is  24  paces  (17  m.),  reduced  interval,  16  paces 
(11.4  m.),  and  close  interval,  8  paces  (6.5  m.).  Section  column  and  line  of 
platoons  in  section  column  are  used.  In  the  order  in  seetUm  eolumnt 
the  sections,  each  in  section  column,  follow  each  other.  In  the  order  in 
line  of  platoons  in  eection  columns,  the  four  platoons,  each  in  section 
column  are  posted  abreast  of  each  other  with  intervals  of  16  paces  (11.4  m.) 
between  them.  When  in  this  formation,  the  b  attery  has  a  front  of  35  m.  and 
a  depth  of  70  m.,  including  the  battery  reserve,  a  depth  of  105  m.  To 
diminish  the  depth  of  the  battery,  caissons  of  the  gun  sections  may  be 
posted  abreast  of  their  guns  (double  section),  or,  when  the  battery  is  in 
line  at  full  intervals,  may  be  posted  in  front  of  their  guns.  Artillery  is  to 
conceal  its  movements  as  much  as  possible  when  going  into  position. 
Guns  are  not  loaded  until  they  are  in  battery.  Guns  and  caissons  unlimber 
at  the  same  time.  One  caisson  body  is  posted,  under  cover  when  practi- 
cable, in  rear  of  each  gun.  Gun  and  caisson  limbers  of  gun  sections  move 
to  the  rear.  When  the  limbers  are  posted  in  close  proximity,  ammunition 
is  first  to  be  taken  from  them,  and  then  from  the  caisson  bodies.  But  in 
practice,  the  ammunition  in  the  caisson  bodies  will  be  used  first,  as  a  rule, 
as  it  is  close  at  hand.  As  soon  as  the  ammunition  in  the  caisson  bodies 
is  exhausted,  the  caisson  limbers  are  brought  up,  the  ammunition  com- 
partments with  their  ammunition  taken  out  and  deposited  beside  the 
caisson  bodies.  The  latter  are  then  limbered  up  and  sent  back  to  the 
battery  reserve.  As  soon  as  the  commander  of  the  battery  reserve 
notices  that  the  caisson  limbers  have  gone  forward,  he  sends  the  full 
caissons  of  the  battery  reserve  to  the  firing  battery.  These  caissons  are 
unlimbered  in  the  position,  their  caisson  bodies  are  left  with  the  guns  and 
thejimbers  move  back  to  the  position  of  the  gun  limbers.    But  the  battery 


278  The  Formations. 

commander  may  first  use  the  ammunition  of  the  caisson  limbers,  order  up 
a  certain  number  of  caisson  bodies,  leave  the  contents  of  the  caissons  of 
the  gun  sections  untouched  and  take  an  adequate  supply  from  the  battery 
reserve  at  the  start,  or  deposit  beside  the  guns,  upon  unlimbering,  the 
ammunition  carried  by  the  caisson  limbers. 

England:  The  interval  between  carriages  is  20  yards  (18  m.). 
The  distance  between  carriages  in  column  is  4  yards.  Formations:  The 
order  in  line,  the  order  in  echelon  (by  platoon),  column  of  platoons  (the 
so-called  battery  column)  and  route  column.  The  battery  is  divided  into 
the  firing  battery  (6  guns  and  6  caissons)  and  the  reserve  (6  casisons).  A 
battery  may  go  into  position  either  directly  or  after  some  preparation  has 
been  made.  In  the  latter  case,  the  position  that  each  gun  is  to  occupy  ia 
selected  and  marked.  When  the  battery  moves  directly  into  position^ 
the  caissons  drop  back  to  a  position  36  m.  in  rear  of  the  guns.  At  the  com* 
mand  "Action  Front,"  the  gims  move  into  the  position.  At  the  com- 
mand "Drive  On,"  the  limbers,  except  those  of  the  two  flank  guns,  move 
forward  one  pace,  wheel  to  the  right  about,  and  move  at  the  trot  to  their 
position.  The  limbers  of  the  right  and  left  flank  guns  take  post  abreast 
of  the  line  of  guns,  ten  paces  from  the  right  and  the  left  flank,  respectively- 
These  two  limbers  are  at  once  unhitched  and  the  poles  turned  toward  the 
iront.  As  soon  as  the  trails  of  the  guns  touch  the  ground,  the  caissons 
drive  up  abreast  and  15  cm.  to  the  left  of  their  respective  guns,  axles  of  guns 
and  caisson  bodies  on  a  line,  in  order  that  the  protection  afforded  by  the 
shields  of  the  guns  and  caissons  may  be  utilized  to  the  fullest  extent.  The 
caissons  are  then  unhitched.  Limbers,  teams  and  led  horses  move  to  the 
rear  to  their  position. 

The  ammunition  in  the  caisson  bodies  is  to  be  used  first,  as  a  ru]e. 
When  the  caisson  bodies  are  emptied,  they  are  unlimbered  and  pushed  to 
the  rear,  and  their  limbers  drawn  back  until  their  axles  are  on  line  with  the 
gun  axles. 

As  a  rule,  carriages  and  limbers  are  to  be  posted  abreast  of  each 
other  at  full  intervals,  either  to  the  right  (left)  rear  of  the  guns,  or  directly 
in  rear  of  them.  In  the  latter  case,  they  are  not  to  be  closer  than  360  m. 
to  the  guns. 

When  it  becomes  necessary  to  replenish  ammunition,  the  caissons 
of  the  reserve  are  brought  up,  one  being  placed  on  the  right  of  each  gun. 
When  the  battery  is  not  exposed  to  a  heavy  fire  and  when  there  is  no  danger 
that  they  may  betray  the  position,  these  caissons  may  drive  directly  along- 
side the  guns,  unhitch  their  teams  and  hitch  them  to  the  empty  caissons 
and  drive  to  the  rear.  In  case  the  battery  is  exposed  to  a  heavy  fire,  any 
method  of  replenishing  ammimition  may  be  employed,  but,  when  practi- 
cable, lulls  in  the  firing  are  to  be  utilized  for  this  purpose. 


The  Battalion  in  Line.  279 


4.     THE  BATTALION.* 

In  the  German  artillery,  the  battalion  movements  laid 
down  in  the  drill  regulations  are  to  be  executed  by  **orders/* 
not  by  '^commands."  Evolutions  are  to  be  confined  to  those 
absolutely  essential  for  assembling  and  moving  the  larger  imits 
outside  the  zone  of  hostile  fire.  Attention  should  principally 
be  paid  to  the  combat  leading  of  the  battalion  and  this  is 
quite  naturally  done  more  often  by  means  of  "orders'*  than 
by  means  of  '^commands."  For  a  mobilized  battalion  of 
artillery  to  maneuver  after  the  fashion  of  cavalry  is  not 
simulating  war  conditions,  since  artillery  will  rarely  be  re- 
quired to  deploy  from  a  close  formation  in  a  direction  not 
previously  reconnoitered.  Such  a  deployment  furthermore 
requires  horses  well  broken  to  harness,  and  well  trained 
drivers,  platoon  leaders  and  chiefs  of  section.  As  the  strength 
of  a  battery  in  men  and  horses  is  nearly  doubled  on  mobiliza- 
tion, and  as  each  battery  is  obliged  to  detach  a  good  many 
men  and  horses  at  the  same  time,  accurate  evolutions  with  a 
mobilized  battalion  are  an  impossibility. 


FORMATIONS. 

The  order  in  line.  The  batteries,  each  in  line,  are 
posted  abreast  of  each  other,  with  intervals  of  30  paces  be- 
tween them.  They  may  be  posted  in  any  order  from  right 
to  left  at  discretion.  The  intervals  between  batteries  may  be 
extended  or  closed. 

The  order  in  line  at  close  intervals  (Breitkolonne) : 
The  batteries,  each  in  line  at  close  intervals,  are  posted 
abreast  of  each  other  with  intervals  of  15  paces  between 
them,  the  battery  reserves  in  rear.  This  formation  is  used 
for  assembly  and  for  parades. 

*Par8.  342-352,  German  F,  A.  D.  R, 


280  The  Formation  op  the  Battalion. 

The  order  in  mass  ( Tiefkolonne)  :*  The  batteries,  each 
in  line  at  close  intervals,  are  posted  in  rear  of  one  another 
with  distances  of  15  paces  (horse  batteries,  24  paces)  between 
them.  The  battery  reserves  are  posted  either  in  rear  or 
abreast  of  their  batteries.  This  formation  is  used  for  the 
same  purpose  f  as  the  order  in  line  at  close  intervals. 

The  order  in  route  column:  The  batteries,  each  in 
route  column,  are  posted  in  rear  of  one  another  with  distances 
of  15  paces  (horse  batteries,  20  paces)  between  them.  Or- 
dinarily, the  battery  reserves  are  posted  directly  in  rear  of 
their  respective  batteries,  but,  during  a  flank  march,  or  when 
it  is  desired  to  decrease  the  depth  of  the  column,  they  may  be 
posted  abreast  of  their  respective  batteries  (double  coliunn, 
which  in  form  corresponds  to  our  double  section  column) . 

Line  of  route  columns  (Batteriekolonnen):  The  bat- 
teries, each  in  route  column,  are  posted  abreast  of  each  other 
with  intervals  of  130  paces  between  them.  Depending  upon 
the  available  room  and  the  nature  of  the  grotmd,  these  in- 
tervals may  be  diminished  or  increased.  This  formation 
is  used  for  movements  on  the  battlefield. 

In  certain  circumstances,  the  battalion  commander  may 
have  to  give  special  instructions  in  regard  to  the  disposition 
of  the  battery  reserves. 

In  addition  to  the  formations  described  above,  horse 
artillery  battalions  use  the  column  of  platoons  (batteries, 
each  in  column  of  platoons,  following  each  other  at  a  distance 
of  25  paces),  and  the  line  of  platoon  columns  {Abteilungs- 
kohnne)  in  which  the  batteries,  each  in  column  of  platoons, 
are  posted  abreast  of  each  other  with  intervals  of  30  paces 
between  them. 


*Iii  our  artillery,  a  battalion  is  said  to  be  closed  in  mass  when  it  Is  in  column 
of  batteries  at  closed  distances. — Translator. 

ton  August  18th,  1870.  the  corps  artillery  of  the  Prussian  Guard  Oorps  used 
this  formation  during  its  advance  ftom  Doncoiu>t  to  a  point  beyond  Anouy  la  Grange. 
On  this  occasion,  battery  reserves  were  posted  in  the  second  Une,  in  rear  of  each  bat- 
tery. On  approaching  the  effective  zone  of  the  French  Artillery,  the  reserves  were 
halted.  The  batteries  then  went  into  action  one  after  another,  those  following  th& 
leading  battery  being  echeloned  to  the  left  and  front  of  that  battery.  Hohbnlohb,. 
Milit&rische  BHefe.  p.  218. 


France;  Italy;  Austria.  281 

France:  When  the  battalion  is  in  line,  the  batteries  are  posted 
abreast  of  each  other  with  an  interval  not  greater  than  double  that  between 
carriages  and  not  less  than  6  m.,  between  them.  The  mass,  in  which  the 
batteries,  each  in  line,  are  posted  in  rear  of  each  other  at  a  distance  of  20  m.,  is 
used  for  parade.  The  habitual  maneuvering  formation  on  the  battlefield 
Is  the  line  of  section  columns  (ordre  enVigne  de  colonnes  par  pidee).  In  this, 
the  batteries,  each  either  in  section  column  or  in  double  section  colunm, 
are  posted  abreast  of  each  other  with  not  less  than  14  m.  between  them. 
When  this  interval  is  14  m.  or  less  (in  horse  artillery  battalions,  17  m.  or 
less),  the  formation  is  termed  the  order  in  line  of  section  columns  (or 
double  section  columns)  at  close  intervals  (ordre  en  mease  de  colonnes  par 
piiee  ou  doublie).  The  French  attach  less  importance  to  their  section 
column  and  double  section  column,  in  which  the  batteries  are  posted  in 
rear  of  one  another  at  20  m.  distance,  than  the  Germans  do  to  their  cor- 
responding formations,  the  route  column  and  the  double  column.  The 
reserve  follows  30  m.  in  rear  of  the  last  battery,  the  distance  between 
battery  reserves  being  20  m.  The  reserve  drops  back  to  600  m.  when  the 
battalion  approaches  the  selected  position,  halts  at  that  distance  when  the 
battalion  goes  into  position,  and  sends  battery  reserves  to  join  their  bat* 
teries  in  case  any  of  the  latter  are  detached  from  the  battalion  to  carry 
out  special  missions.  The  staffs  are  numerically  strong.  The  manner 
in  which  communication  is  to  be  kept  up  between  the  various  elements 
of  the  battalion,  is  prescribed  in  great  detail. 

Italy:  The  battalion  (hrigaia)  consists  of  four  field  batteries.  The 
column  of  batteries  is  used  for  assembly.  In  this,  the  distance  between 
batteries  is  21  paces  (15  m.).  For  movements  on  the  battlefield,  the 
Italians  use  the  line  of  columns.  In  this,  the  batteries  are  posted  at  de- 
ploying intervals  abreast  of  each  other,  each  battery  being  either  in  column 
of  platoons,  in  section  column,  or  in  line  of  platoons  in  section  columns 
(brigata  in  linea  di  coUmne  di  sezione).  Section  column  and  column  of  pla- 
toons (at  full  or  closed  distance)  are  likewise  used  on  the  battlefield,  as  is 
also  the  order  in  line,  the  batteries  at  closed  or  extended  intervals.  From 
the  moment  when  the  artillery  leaves  the  column,  the  battalions  are  no 
longer  to  be  moved  according  to  the  hard  and  fast  rules  of  the  drill  regula- 
tions. Batteries  are  to  be  moved  into  position  by  their  leaders  in  the  most 
suitable  formation  and  along  such  roads  as  may  be  available. 

Austria:  Two  field  or  three  horse  batteries  constitute  a  battalion 
(division).  The  formations  used  are  the  order  in  section  column,  the  order 
in  line,  the  order  in  battery,  and  the  order  in  line  at  close  intervals  (Masse), 
In  the  last-named  formation  the  batteries,  each  in  line  at  close  intervals, 
are  posted  abreast  of  each  other  with  close  intervals  between  them. 

In  the  order  in  line,  the  interval  between  batteries  is  30  m.,  in  the 
order  in  line  at  close  intervals  (Masse)  it  is  10  m.  In  section  column,  the 
distance  between  batteries  is  30  m.  The  interval  between  batteries  in  the 
order  in  battery  is  not  prescribed. 


282 


The  Formations  of  the  Battalion. 


A  horse  artillery  battalion  consists  of  three  horse  batteries.  In 
addition  to  the  formations  mentioned  above,  the  horse  artillery  battalion 
employs  the  double  column.  In  this,  two  of  the  batteries,  each  in  column 
of  platoons,  are  posted  abreast  of  each  other  either  with  full   interval 


Deployment  from  Double  Column. 


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(30  m.)  or  close  interval  (8  m.)  between  them;  the  third  battery,  likewise 
in  column  of  platoons,  is  posted  20  m.  in  rear  of  the  right  or  the  left  battery. 
The  double  column  is  used  as  an  assembly  and  maneuvering  formation 
both  on  and  off  the  battlefield.  All  changes  of  formation  are  habitually 
executed  at  an  increased  gait.    The  reserves  generally  follow  under  com- 


Austria;  Russia.  283 

mand  of  an  officer.  The  deployments  are  by  no  means  simple.  "To  form 
line  to  the  front  from  double  column,  the  right  column  executes  right  front 
into  line,  the  left  column,  left  front  into  line.  When  very  little  room  is 
available  in  front,  the  deployment  may  be  effected  at  the  saber  signal 
"extend"  (Offnen),  given  by  the  battalion  commander,  the  two  columns 
moving  to  the  right  and  left  respectively  and  forming  line  to  the  rear, 
whereupon  they  are  at  once  halted."  In  deploying  toward  a  flank,  the 
interior  column  (i.  e.,  that  on  the  flank  toward  which  the  deployment 
is  to  be  made)  may  be  assigned  the  longer  route,  the  exterior  column  un- 
limbering  toward  the  flank  (action  right  rear),  or  the  interior  column  may 
at  once  unlimber  to  a  flank  while  the  exterior  column  places  itself  on  a 
flank  (action  right). 

The  ammunition  supply  is  managed  as  follows:  The  personnel  in 
the  first  place  empties  the  caisson  bodies  of  the  caisson  platoon  and  carries 
the  ammunition  to  the  guns.  As  soon  as  these  caisson  bodies  are  emptied, 
the  commander  of  the  reserve  is  ordered  to  send  up  two  full  caissons, 
which  replace  the  empty  caissons  of  the  caisson  platoon.  The  latter  then 
drive  back  to  the  reserve,  where  they  are  refilled  with  ammunition  taken 
from  the  limbers,  if  necessary.  The  ammunition  in  the  gun  limbers  is 
to  be  kept  intact  as  long  as  possible. 

Russia:  The  battalion  consists  of  three  batteries,  of  the  first  re« 
serve,  composed  of  the  battery  reserves,  and  of  the  battalion  reserve. 
The  latter  is  composed  of  twelve  caissons,  four  from  each  battery  reserve, 
and  is  commanded  by  an  officer.  This  reduces  each  battery  reserve,  which 
normally  has  eight  caissons,  to  four  caissons. 

The  order  in  line  at  full  intervals  (17  m.),  reduced  intervals  (8.5  m.), 
or  dose  intervals  (2.55  m.)  between  guns  is  used.  In  this  the  interval 
between  batteries  is  17  m.  The  four  caissons  of  each  battery  reserve 
follow  the  fifth  gun  of  their  battery  during  movements  in  section  column 
and  take  post  in  rear  of  their  respective  platoons  after  the  guns  are  un- 
limbered. 

The  order  in  section  column:  Caissons  are  united  into  one  body  in 
rear  of  the  guns.  The  distance  between  batteries  in  column  is  21  m. 
Upon  reaching  the  battlefield,  the  battalion  reserve  follows  in  one  body  at 
the  tail  of  the  battalion. 

Column  of  platoons:  This  is  used  on  broad  roads  and  for  movements 
outside  the  zone  of  hostile  fire.  In  this  formation  the  batteries  follow  one 
another  at  a  distance  of  21  m. 

The  order  in  mass:  The  batteries,  each  in  line  at  close  intervals, 
are  posted  in  rear  of  one  another.    This  formation  is  used  for  parade. 

The  order  in  line  of  columns:  The  batteries,  each  either  in  section 
column  or  in  column  of  platoons,  are  posted  abreast  of  each  other  with 
intervals  of  35,  71,  or  156  m.  between  them,  depending  upon  the  manner 
of  their  subsequent  employment.  This  formation  is  similar  to  the  German 
line  of  route  columns  (Batleriekolonnen),  both  as  regards  form  and  employ- 
ment. 


284  The  Formations. 

The  order  in  line  of  plaioon  columns  correspondB  to  the  French  order 
in  line  of  section  (or  double  section)  columns,  the  so-called  ordre  en  masse 
de  colonnes  par  piice  ou  doubUe.  In  this  formation,  the  batteries,  each  in 
column  of  platoons  at  dose  intervals,  are  posted  abreast  of  each  other 
with  intervals  of  8.6  m.  between  them,  the  battalion  reserve  being  posted 
in  rear  of  the  fighting  batteries.  It  is  used  for  assembly  and  for  maneuver- 
ing outside  of  the  zone  of  hostile  fire.  When  in  this  formation,  a  battalion 
of  three  field  batteries  has  a  front  of  46  m.  and  a  depth  of  123  m.;  a  horse 
artillery  battalion  of  two  horse  batteries,  a  front  of  28  m.  and  a  depth  of 
102  m. 


5.    HEAVY  ARTILLERY. 

The  battalions  of  heavy  artillery  assigned  to  army  corps 
are  usually  field  howitzer  battalions  of  four  batteries  and  a 
heavy  artillery  ammunition  column  of  eight  sections,  each 

fffig 


I... 


flBSOT' 


—       15' 


6' 


Heavy  Artillery.  285 

comprising  seventeen  caissons.  The  heavy  field  howitzer, 
model  1902,  is  a  recoil  gun  without  shields.  Its  limbers 
cany  no  ammtmition,  its  caisson  bodies  carry  36  shell  each. 
The  mobility  of  this  gun  is  suited  to  its  task.  It  can  keep 
up  with  infantry  even  on  indifferent  roads,  can  move  at  the 
trot  across  coxmtry,  provided  the  ground  is  favorable,  and 
can  cover  as  much  as  7  km.  per  hour  on  good  roads.  Its 
rate  of  march  at  the  trot  and  walk  is  the  same  as  that  of 
field   artillery. 

For  the  organization  of  the  heavy  howitzer  battery,  see 
pp.  262  and  263,  supra. 

The  tactical  formations  are  very  simple.  The  order  in 
line  at  close  intervals  is  used  for  assembly,  the  route  column 
or  double  coliunn  for  marching.  The  formations  are  the 
same  as  those  described  imder  field  artillery. 

The  battery  commander  indicates  the  target  and  the 
sector  assigned  to  the  battery  to  the  observer  (an  officer), 
to  the  assistant  observer,  and  to  the  instrument  sergeant, 
determines  the  general  direction  in  which  the  fire  is  to  be 
deUvered  and  directs  the  observation  station  to  be  established 
at  a  point  from  which  he  can  observe  the  fire  with  ease  and 
direct  it  with  certainty.  He  likewise  determines  the  firing 
position,  indicates  how  communication  is  to  be  kept  up  be- 
tween firing  battery  and  observation  station,  and  directs 
the  fire  of  the  battery.  During  the  firing,  he  may  join  the 
firing  battery  whenever  he  deems  his  presence  there  necessary. 
In  such  an  event,  the  observing  ofiicer  takes  charge  of  fire 
direction. 

The  executive  officer  is  the  captain's  representative  in 
the  firing  battery.  He  gives  all  commands,  supervises  their 
execution  and,  when  necessary,  provides  for  flank  protection. 
When  firing  from  a  masked  position,  he  indicates  an  aiming 
point,  unless  the  battery  commander  has  already  done  so. 
Before  fire  is  opened,  he  examines  the  positions  of  the  various 
pieces  to  see  that  their  axes  are  parallel.  He,  Ukewise, 
assures  himself  that  charges  and  fuzes  are  properly  assembled. 


286  The  Formations. 

adjusted  and  stored,  and  sees  that  losses  in  the  personnel  are 
made  good. 

The  observer  is  charged  with  erecting  the  observation 
station  and  with  installing  communication  with  the  battery. 
He  supervises  the  telephone  squad,  and  assists  the  battery 
commander  in  reconnaissance  and  fire  direction. 

The  assistant  observer  has  direct  charge,  under  the 
direction  of  the  observer,  of  the  erection  of  the  observation 
station.  He  is  also  charged  with  making  and  keeping  a 
record  of  the  firing  data  as  announced  by  the  battery  com- 
mander. 

The  instrument  sergeant*  determines  deflections  for  the 
first  shot,  when  the  battery  is  occupying  a  masked  position. 
Accuracy  and  certainty  in  handling  the  instruments  are 
absolutely  essential  for  this.  During  the  firing  he  acts  as  a 
telephone  operator  or  observer. 

The  signal  squad  installs  communication  between  the 
observation  station  and  the  firing  battery  and  serves  the 
telephone  and  signal  flag  equipment. 

The  observation  station  is  installed  before  the  guns  are 
brought  into  battery.  The  guns  are  unlimbered  at  the  com- 
mand of  the  battery  commander,  the  cannoneers  stack  arms 
and  everything  is  made  ready  for  firing.  The  caissons  move 
up  to  the  guns  and  are  relieved  of  their  ammunition,  which  is 
stacked  up  to  the  left  of  each  gun.  It  takes  a  battery  about 
five  minutes  to  get  ready  for  firing.  Limbers  and  caissons 
move  about  500  paces  to  the  rear,  toward  the  reserve,  which 
they  may  be  ordered  to  join.  When  cover  is  lacking,  they 
may  be  formed  in  route  column  facing  the  battery. 

In  exceptional  cases,  when  it  is  probable  that  strongly 
fortified  field  positions  or  barrier  fortresses  will  have  to  be 
attacked,  2 1  cm.  mortar  battalions  may  be  assigned  to  army 
corps.  These  mortars  possess  very  little  mobility,  although 
gun  and  mount  are  transported  separately.  The  mortar 
battery,  its  observation  wagon  excepted,  can  move  at  a  walk 


*Richtunt€rofflzier. 


Heavy  Artillery.  287 

only.  On  bad  roads  and  heavy  grades  the  draft  power  of 
its  teams  is  generally  insufficient.  For  this  reason,  support- 
ing troops  are  attached  to  these  batteries  from  the  outset. 
Bad  places  in  the  road  must  be  repaired  before  a  mortar  bat- 
tery can  pass  them.  Special  measures  must  be  taken  to 
move  a  mortar  battery  over  soft  ground  off  the  roads. 
These  batteries  use  the  same  formation  as  howitzer  batteries. 
The  mortar  can  be  fired  only  from  a  gun  platform.  The 
gun  platforms  are  laid  before  the  guns  move  up  to  the  posi- 
tion. As  soon  as  the  platforms  are  in  place,  the  wagons 
carrying  the  gun  carriages  are  brought  up  and  unUmbered. 
The  gim  wagons  then  move  up,  and  the  guns  are  mounted 
on  the  carriages  and  made  ready  for  firing.  As  soon  as  the 
various  wagons  are  unloaded,  they  limber  up  and  assemble  in 
the  formation  and  position  ordered. 

The  formations  used  by  the  mortar  battalions  are  the 

order  in  Une  at  close  intervals,  the  order  in  mass,*  and  the 
route  column.  Before  moving  into  position,  a  mortar  bat- 
talion forms  column  of  echelons.  In  this,  the  observation 
wagons  are  followed  by  the  platform  echelons  of  the  first 
and  second  ^batteries,  these  being  in  turn  followed  by  the 
batteries  proper. 

*See  p.  280  supra. 


Howitzer  Battalion  with  Resarva  In  Routa  Column. 


1 


Battalion  observation  wagons 
Observation  wagon  of  1st  battery 


2d 
8d 
4th 


n 
tt 


1st  Firing  battery 


I 
I 
I 
I 


I     Reserve  of  the  1st  battery 
I 


I 


2d 


dd 


4th 


t» 


ft 


ft 


ft 


ft 


tt 


ft 


It 


"      2d       " 
"      3d       " 


I  "  "     4th      " 

Mortar  Battalion  in  Column  of  Echelons. 

I I  Observation  wagons  of  the  battalion 

I     Observation  wagon  of  the  1st  battery 
I  "  "  "      2d       " 


Platform 
Echelon 


Platform  echelon  of  the  1st  battery 


ft 


tt 


tt 


2d 


tt 


Gun 
Echelon 


I 
I 
I 
I 


Gun  carriages 

Guns 

Gun  carriages 
Guns 


1 

1 
1 

J 


1st  battery 


2d  battery 


Rtsvut.  289 

France  t  Each  anny  corps  has  two  heavy  howitzer  batteries,  each 
consisting  of  two  Rimailho  howitzers  (officially  155  cm.  c  t  r  =»  court  tir 
rapide).  The  howitzer  and  its  mount  are  separately  transported.  The 
howitzer  has  long  recoil  carriage  and  is  provided  with  shields.  It  fires  a 
shell  weighing  43  kg.,  which  is  filled  with  a  charge  of  13  kg.  of  melinite. 
This  howitzer  is  to  be  used  against  shielded  batteries  and  against  troops 
protected  by  splinter  proofs.  Its  rate  of  fire  is  said  to  be  five  rounds  per 
minute. 


6.   r£sum£. 

A  comparison  of  the  formations  of  the  three  arms  shows 
that  the  cavahy  has  a  great  diversity  of  formations,  that  the 
artillery  has  but  a  very  small  number,  and  that  the  infantry 
holds  the  mean  between  the  two. 

The  combination  of  horse  and  trooper  enables  cavalry 
to  employ  a  large  number  of  different  formations.  And  it 
needs  all  of  them,  since  it  must  be  able  to  maneuver  until  the 
last  minute,  just  before  the  shock  takes  place,  in  order  to 
gain  the  enemy's  flank  or  to  meet  a  flank  attack.  It  is  fre- 
quently impossible  to  determine  beforehand  in  what  direction 
the  charge  will  finally  be  made.  The  nature  and  speed  of  all 
cavalry  movements,  as  well  as  the  rapid  course  of  the 
mounted  action  demand  that  cavalry  be  able  to  form  Une 
quickly  from  any  formation  and  in  any  direction. 

In  the  infantry,  all  movements  in  combat  are  made  at 
the  walk,  or,  at  the  most,  partly  at  a  run.  The  only  combat 
formation  employed  when  fighting  infantry,  is  the  skirmish 
line,  which,  when  it  enters  the  zone  of  hostile  fire,  is  capable 
of  moving  straight  to  the  front  only.  Close  order  formations 
are  used  only  outside  the  zone  of  hostile  fire. 

In  the  artillery,  a  similar  diversity  of  formations  as  in  the 
cavalry  is  out  of  the  question.  Artillery  uses  roads  whenever 
possible  and  does  not  leave  them,  as  a  rule,  imtil  just  before 
it  goes  into  action.  The  movements  of  the  artillery  carriages 
are  more  difficult  and  depend  to  a  greater  extent  upon  the  ter- 
rain than  those  of  moimted  men.     Besides,  artillery  positions 


290 


The  Formations. 


are  reconnoitered  beforehand,  so  that  changes  of  foitnation 
and  of  front  need  not  be  executed  at  the  last  moment.  More- 
over, artillery  fights  at  a  halt  only  and  the  order  in  battery, 
the  guns  unlimbered  and  in  line  at  full  intervals,  is  its  sole 
combat  formation. 

THE  ORDER  IN  BATTERY.* 


Germany* 


ilii 


I  li 


Inftrraf  bffwmtt 


5004^ 


\Comba^     Train 


Present  with  the  flriag  battery:    4  olfict^rti,  7  N.  G.  0.,  43  privates. 
Ammanition  available  od  opening;  fire  (that  of  alight  field  howitser  battery  shown  in 
brackets): 


(a)  In  the  firing  battery^  52>'  shrapnelt  [156  shrapnel,  192  shell], 

(b)  In  the  reserve 216        "       t[170        "        —    «    ],  36  8heil.{ 

(c)  In  the  iixht  ammuni- 

tion column 362        "  [  58         "         348    "    ],264 


<4 


Totol 1,096        "  [384         *•         640    "    ],300 

The  light  ammanition  column  is  posted  not  more  than  600  m.  away. 


(t 


*  Field  batteriei  (gUDt)  alone  are  ooniildered. 

tin  the  ilx  caliBoa  bodiei,  812  ihrapnel,  ia  the  liz  gan  limben»  21S  ihrapnel,  total  638. 

tin  the  lis  eaiaion  llmbera. 

{ In  the  lint  store  wacon. 


The  Order  in  Battery, 


291 


I 


Austria. 


111 


I 


Present  with  the  firing  battery : 

4  officers,  8  N.  G.  0.,  45  privates. 

Am  inanition  available  on  opening  fire : 

(a)  In  the  firing  battery 860  rounds 

(b)  In  the  reserve.. 206      " 

(Ammnnition  colamn 2,232  rounds). 


France. 


^il 


Ml 

6 


ml 


^:i 


<f>n 


k 


^X^m 


II 


III 


A 


I 


\6gi4nand6 
t/s&on/imbin 
/Tkfephorm 


M     Infer  vat  ^e/iMr«/r 
BiftMrits  Zem. 

u 


Umbers  in  Co/offrf  doubUe 

Present  with  the  firing  battery :    40  men,  2  horses  (that  of  one  trumpeter  and 

that  of  the  B.  C.) 
Present  with  limbers  and  teams:    35  men,  74  horses. 
Ammunition  in  the  firing  battery :    432  shrapnel. 

"  in  the  limbers:  240        *' 

**  in  the  reserve :  432        *'       ,  144  explosive  shell. 

The  reserve  is  posted  500  m.  in  rear  of  the  battery. 


England. 


^i 


II 


i'l' ik   i 


II 


I 

I 

I 
I 

I 


i 


II 


iH 


8  Teams 

i  OunlimberM 

6  Cais$on9 


B€9$rw$ 


Present  with  the  firing  battery :    About  60  men. 
Ammanition  in  the  firing  battery :    336  rounds. 

"  in  the  reserve  (4  gun  limbers  and  6  caissons) :    552  rounds. 


II 


Russia. 


II 


II 


I 
f 
1 
I 
f 

t 
I 
« 
I 
I 


II 


II 


II 


BGuntiiftbmrs 
and 

BCaissontimben 


JJO^^ 


BcrtHrtf  fhsitry^ 


Present  with  the  firing  battery:      About  70  men. 

Ammunition  in  the  firing  battery :      884  rounds. 

limbers:  808 

battery  reserve :  704 


M 
•I 


•f 
U 


(I 
(I 


III.    EMPLOYMENT  OP  ARTILLERY  IN  ACTION. 


1.    GENERAL  PRINCIPLES. 

Field  artillery  is  to  pave  the  way  for  victory.  It  is 
essential,  therefore,  that  it  shoot  well  and  at  the  proper  time 
and  place.  Heavy  artillery  may  be  used  even  at  very  long 
ranges  against  targets  that  prove  too  much  for  field  artillery 
or  that  are  most  dangerous  to  the  infantry.  The  fire  of 
heavy  artillery  has  a  decisive  effect  upon  shielded  artillery 
when  visible,  upon  infantry  in  trenches  or  behind  parapets, 
and  particularly  upon  fortified  supporting  points.  But  the 
first  and  foremost  duty  of  heavy  artillery  consists  of  reliev- 
ing its  field  artillery,  in  order  that  the  latter  may  devote  itself 
to  supporting  its  infantry.  The  effectiveness  of  artillery 
depends  upon  observation  of  its  fire,  upon  the  determination 
whether  its  shots  strike  short  or  over,  in  order  that  errors 
in  estimating  the  range  may  be  corrected  and  the  correct 
range  obtained.  At  long  ranges,  observation  of  fire  may  be 
so  difficult  that  an  adequate  effect  may  be  counted  upon  tmder 
favorable  conditions  of  terrain,  weather,  etc.,  only.  When 
observation  is  impossible,  as  on  dark  nights,  during  rainy 
or  foggy  weather,  it  is  usually  not  worth  while  for  artillery  ta 
go  into  action. 

Artillery  usually  opens  the  fire  fight  and,  so  far  as  con- 
siderations for  its  saftey  permit,  must  accordingly  be  placed 
as  near  the  head  of  the  column  as  possible.  It  is  important 
to  deploy  a  superior  ntunber  of  guns  at  the  very  start  and  to 
develop  a  mass  effect  as  early  as  possible.  The  employment 
of  artillery  by  regiments  or  by  battalions  is  the  rule,  the  use 
of  single  batteries,  the  exception.  The  use  of  single  platoons, 
or,  occasionally,  of  single  gtms  may  become  justified  in  un- 


294  Employment  op  Artillery. 

usual  situations,  such  as  might  arise  in  mountain  warfare,  in 
street  fighting,*  or  when  certain  portions  of  the  terrain  have 
to  be  kept  under  fire  and  when  an  assault  has  to  be  prepared 
or  repelled.  But  in  such  cases  the  fire  is  dispersed  and  it  is 
difficult  to  supply  ammunition,  f 

The  French  and  the  Russian  reg:ulation8  permit  single  guns  to  be 
poBted  in  trenches.  This  practice  was  justifiable  only  so  long  as  the  effect 
of  a  round  of  canister  was  considerably  superior  to  the  fire  of  a  number  of 
infantrymen  posted  in  the  same  space,  so  long  as  the  attacker's  artillery  did 
not  possess  the  means  quickly  to  silence  such  guns,  and  the  range  of  the  in- 
iantry  rifle  was  not  long  enough  to  reach  the  assaulting  troops  that  were 
assembling  some  400  or  500  paces  from  the  trench.  The  practice  of  po8t> 
ing  guns  in  shelter  trenches  causes  artillery  units  to  be  broken  up  and  con- 
sequently to  be  more  quickly  vanquished  than  would  otherwise  be  the 
*case.  Artillery  should  be  posted  behind  cover  specially  constructed  for 
its  use,  for,  if  it  is  posted  in  the  general  line  of  trenches,  the  space  occupied 
by  it  reduces  the  fire  power  of  the  infantry.  If  guns  posted  in  infantry 
trenches  are  silenced  or  withdrawn  at  a  decisive  moment,  this  is  bound  to 
exert  a  discouraging  influence  on  the  garrison  of  the  trenches.  When  all 
is  said  and  done,  it  must  be  admitted  that  guns  can  find  better  and  more 
profitable  employment  outside  of  the  general  line  of  trenches.  The  same 
is  true  of  the  use  of  platoons  of  artillery  in  the  defense  of  forests  and  vil- 
lages, a  practice  much  in  vogue  in  the  past. 


*Aii  example  of  street  fighting,  taken  firom  tbe  more  recent  military  history 
la  the  breaching  of  the  Landau  gate  of  Wainanburg  at  a  range  of  50  paces  by  a 
platoon  of  the  3d  Battery  of  the  5th  Prussian  Field  AriiUery  and  at  a  range  of  500 
paces  by  another  platoon  of  the  same  battery.  Hoffbaueb.  DettUche  ArtUUrU,  p. 
29. 

BaaallUs.  Two  guns  fired  efTectively  against  a  garrisoned  house  and  then 
turned  their  fire  upon  Villa  Beurmann.  After  firing  some  twelve  rounds,  these  guns 
had  to  be  drawn  back  by  infantry. 

L«  Mans.  A  few  rounds  sufficed  to  force  the  French  to  evacuate  a  strongly 
occupied  caf6  on  the  Place  des  Hallos.    Gem.  SL  W.,  IV,  p.  898. 

Layrim, Zur  Ausbildung  derFeldartillerie,  U9Q0).  p.  59. 

It  is  always  dangerous  to  expose  guns  to  the  fluctuating  course  of  village 
fighting.  Example:  Loss  of  a  gun  of  the  Saxon  artillery  during  the  night  attack 
on  Etrapagny,  November  20/30.  1870.  Kunz.  Deutsche  Reiljerei,  pp.  227-234. 
But  artillery  fire  is  the  surest  means,  on  the  other  hand,  to  force  the  garrison  of  a 
key  point  to  abstain  ft-om  further  resistance.  Because  of  the  absence  of  artillery 
support,  it  was  impossible  to  capture  the  key  of  the  position  at  Sandapu  (1905). 
See  TaktikW,  pp.  101-102. 

f  As  the  artillery  had  been  di«ttributed  among  the  various  units  during  the 
battle  at  Matsiunda,  platoons  of  artillery  being  frequently  sent  to  support  this  or 
that  section  of  the  battle  line,  it  had  become  badly  mixed  up."  Rbnnsnkampf* 
Schlaeht  bet  Mukden,  p.  180. 


Examples  from  Military  History.  295 

''New  Weapons t  new  tactics''  The  short  range  of 
smooth-bore  guns  necessitated  bringing  the  guns  within  close 
range  of  their  target  in  order  to  obtain  a  mass  effect,  but  did 
not  permit  the  fire  of  a  long  artillery  line  to  be  concentrated 
on  one  point.  For  this  reason,  the  batteries  destined  to 
prepare  the  decisive  assault,  had  to  be  kept  out  of  action 
until  the  decisive  point  in  the  enemy's  line  was  recognized, 
and  the  enemy  held  in  check  all  along  the  line  and  forced 
to  put  in  his  reserves .  * 

These  batteries  were  usually  taken  from  the  divisions  kept  in  reserve. 
The  range  of  the  light  guns  was  about  1,500  paces,  that  of  the  heavy  guns 
2,000  paces.  In  the  armies  of  the  French  Republic,  the  artillery  was 
equally  divided  among  the  divisions.  This  practice  was  not  calculated  to 
promote  the  formation  of  large  artillery  masses.  For  example,  the  long 
line  of  twelve-pounders  at  Austerlitz  had  to  be  formed  by  drawing  pla- 
toons of  those  guns  from  the  various  units.  The  massed  employment  of 
the  Austrian  artillery  at  A«pern  forced  the  French  to  form  an  artillery 
reserve  of  120 — 140  guns,  which  was  then  attached  to  the  Imperial  Guard. 

In  1812,  Napoleon  assigned  corps  artillery  to  each  one  of  his  army 
corps,  but  he  never  thought  of  creating  army  artillery. 

At  Wagram,  General  Drouot  formed  an  artillery  mass  of  60  guns 
drawn  from  the  Guard  and  40  guns  drawn  from  the  divisions  kept  in  re- 
serve, for  the  purpose  of  preparing  the  attack  to  be  delivered  by  Mac- 
Donald's  colunu.  The  artillery  of  the  Guard  fired  15,000  rounds  and  lost 
18  officers,  457  men,  and  564  horses  and,  in  consequence,  was  unable  to 
move  after  the  battle.! 

At  Friedlandy  in  spite  of  the  remonstrances  of  the  division  com- 
manders, General  S^narmont  advanced  30  guns  of  Victor's  corps  to  within 
400  m.  of  the  hostile  line.  After  firing  five  or  six  salvos,  he  advanced  the 
guns  to  200  m.  and,  finally,  after  firing  twenty  salvos  from  that  position, 
he  advanced  them  to  a  point  120  m.  from  the  hostile  line.  This  artillery 
force  achieved  brilliant  results.  In  twenty-five  minutes,  inclusive  of  the 
time  consumed  in  changing  position,  it  fired  2,516  rounds,  among  these  368 
round  shot,  an  average  of  from  three  to  four  rounds  per  gun  per  minute. 
In  addition,  these  guns  without  assistance  repelled  a  cavalry  charge 
directed  against  them.  Their  losses  amounted  to  only  4  officers  and  52 
men.t 

The  contrast  between  the  Napoleonic  use  of  artillery  and  the  use 
made  of  that  arm  during  the  Franco-German  war  is  marked.  During  this 
war,  the  Germans  were  able  quickly  to  form  large  artillery  masses  and  to 


*HoFFBAt7BR,  Entwicklung  des  Ma8seng$brauch$  der  FeldartiUerU,  Berlin,  1000. 
tGiROD  DB  L'Aii^t  Qrand$  ArtiUturs,  p.  82. 
tibid,,  pp.  180  and  183. 


296  Employment  op  Artillery. 

combine  the  fire  of  long  lines  from  the  very  opening  of  a  battle.  This  gave 
their  artillery  such  a  decided  superiority  over  the  French  artillery,  which 
was  employed,  in  the  main,  like  the  smooth-bore  artillery  of  the  past,  that 
the  attainment  of  the  superiority  of  artillery  fire  came  to  be  looked  upon 
as  a  prerequisite  to  the  success  of  any  infantry  attack.  This  belief  con- 
tinued to  be  held  until  the  Boer  war  demonstrated  that  even  a  weak  artil- 
lery force,  provided  it  was  posted  in  a  judiciously  selected  masked  position, 
could  persevere  until  the  opening  of  the  infantry  attack.* 

At  Sedan,  a  group  of  114  guns  belonging  to  the  Wttrttemberg  Divi- 
sion and  to  the  lid  Bavarian  Army  Corps,  was  posted  in  the  south  near 
Fr^snois  and  fired  into  Sedan;  another  group,  consisting  of  6  batteries 
of  the  IVth  Army  Corps,  was  posted  at  le  Pont  Maugy  and  flanked  the 
terrain  north  of  BazeiUes.  In  the  eastern  part  of  the  battlefield,  24  batteries 
belonging  to  the  1st  Bavarian  Army  Corps  and  to  the  IVth  and  Xllth 
Army  Corps,  had  crossed  the  Givonne  valley  and  deluged  Balan,  Fond  de 
Givonne  and  the  old  camp  with  their  fire.  Eighteen  batteries  of  these 
three  corps  did  not  find  room  to  go  into  position.  Farther  northward,  90 
guns  of  the  Guard  Corps  fired  on  the  Bois  de  la  Garenne.  In  the  north- 
west, the  artillery  line  of  the  Vth  and  the  Vlth  Army  Corps  had  grown  to 
166  guns,  which  directed  their  fire  against  the  Bois  de  la  Garenne  and  the 
ground  north-west  of  the  same.  Thus,  540  gims,  or  three-fourths  of  all 
the  artillery  available,  were  in  action  against  one  and  the  same  objective. 

The  latest  French  regulations  were  the  first  to  lay  down 
the  principle  that  artillery  should  be  massed  in  position  ready 
to  fire.  This  is  contrary  to  the  German  view,  which  aims  at 
the  production  of  a  mass  effect.  But  the  French  actually 
aim  to  use  only  as  many  of  the  batteries  held  in  readiness 
as  are  required  to  fight  the  line  occupied  by  the  enemy.  The 
batteries  that  are  not  to  go  into  position  immediately,  are 
posted,  at  the  discretion  of  the  artillery  commander,  either 
limbered,  "in  readiness"!  (position  d'attente),  or  unlimbered, 
ready  to  fire,  "in  observation* 'J  {position  de  surveillance). 
By  placing  the  batteries  in  readiness,  either  imlimbered  and 
ready  to  fire,  or  limbered  and  available  for  action,  the 
French  expect  to  be  able  to  use  them,  prepared  for  action 
as  completely  as  possible  and  without  waste  of  time,  against 

^Relative  number  of  guns: 

Col«nso,  December  15,  1899 5  :  44  guns. 

PUtors  Hill,  February  23>27.  1900 10  :  70     '* 

P««rd«b«rff,  February  19-27,  1900 6  :  9t      '* 

^BereitsUUung. 

tLatiersteUung. 


Artillery  Reserves.  297 

suddenly  appearing  targets,  or  to  direct  their  fire  upon  targets 
against  which  the  fire  of  the  other  batteries  has  not  as  yet 
produced  an  adequate  effect.  This  idea  is  by  no  means 
foreign  to  the  German  regulations. 

Artillery  does  not  depend  to  the  same  extent  as  the  other 
arms  upon  a  reserve  of  formed  bodies.  But  this  statement 
should  not  be  confounded  with  the  requirement  to  keep  out 
of  action  curved  fire  batteries  until  the  situation  is  cleared 
up,  or  to  leave  undisturbed  the  artillery  belonging  to  intact 
organizations  of  the  general  reserve.  To  relieve  silenced 
or  disabled  guns  by  putting  in  fresh  guns  is  contrary  to  the 
nature  of  the  arm,  which  is  to  produce  an  effect  by  simul- 
taneously coming  into  action  with  a  superior  number  of 
guns.  But  there  is  no  objection  to  withdrawing  batteries 
from  action  and  to  employing  them  at  another  point.  The 
best  way  to  get  a  disabled  battery  again  ready  for  action 
is  to  replenish  its  ammtmition  and  to  make  good  its  losses 
in  teams  and  personnel.  Batteries  that  have  rtm  out  of 
ammtmition  should  maintain  their  position  as  best  they  can 
under  the  hostile  fire  and  should  not  withdraw.  Even  such 
silent  batteries  will  not  fail  to  produce  an  effect  upon  the 
enemy,  as  he  can  not  fathom  the  reason  for  their  silence 
and  does  not  know  but  what  they  may  again  open  fire  at  the 
decisive  moment.  The  reserve  of  an  artillery  force  does 
not  consist  of  retained  batteries,  as  in  the  day  of  smooth-bore 
cannon,  but  of  ammunition  coltmins.  For,  in  a  company  or 
in  an  escadron,  all  the  members  of  the  organization  can 
participate  directly  in  the  fight,  whereas  in  a  battery,  this  is 
only  possible  in  case  of  the  personnel  directly  engaged  in 
serving  the  guns  (about  one-fifth  of  the  effective  strength  of 
the  battery) .  The  bulk  of  the  personnel  is  with  the  reserve 
and  the  light  ammtmition  coltimn.  These  views  are  not 
shared  in  Russia,  whose  artillery  regulations,  while  prescrib- 
ing that  a  superior  number  of  gtms  should  be  brought  into 
action  at  a  timely  moment,  point  out  that  **in  a  large  force. 


298  Employment  op  Artillery. 

it  may  be  advisable  to  keep  a  part  of  the  artillery  with  the 
general  reserve." 

During  the  RuMO-Turkish  war  of  1877-78,  the  range  of  the  4- 
pounder  batteries  proved  wholly  inadequate.  They  were,  therefore,  kept 
in  reserve  and  did  not  get  into  action  at  all  in  many  instances,  as  the  fight- 
ing was  carried  on  at  too  long  a  range.  During  the  second  battle  of  Plevna, 
80  out  of  the  176  guns  available,  remained  inactive  in  reserve.  On  Sep- 
tember 10th,  1877,  the  Russians  brought  288  field  and  20  siege  guns  into 
action  to  prepare  the  assault  on  Plevna,  and  kept  186  guns  in  reserve. 

During  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  batteries  were,  likewise,  held  back 
in  reserve  in  many  cases.  The  result  was  that  the  Russian  artillery, 
though  numerically  stronger  than  the  Japanese  artillery,  almost  invariably 
fought  at  a  numerical  disadvantage. 

In  his  instructions  of  April  15th,  1904,  General  Kuropatkin  ex- 
pressed himself  decidedly  against  retaining  reserves  composed  of  artillery. 
To  quote:  "For,  it  is  better,  at  long  ranges,  to  let  the  enemy  believe  that 
he  has  already  gained  the  fire  superiority.  Batteries  and  the  garrisons  of 
shelter  trenches  are,  therefore,  not  to  reply  to  the  enemy's  fire  at  all  at 
long  ranges,  but,  as  soon  as  he  begins  the  attack,  to  open  up  a  murderous 
fire  on  him,  which  should  increase  in  intensity  as  he  approaches."  Later 
on.  General  Kuropatkin's  views  changed  slightly.  In  an  army  order 
dated  January  9th,  1906,  he  again  emphasizes  the  necessity  of  retaining 
strong  army  reserves,  and  then  continues:  "The  same  is  also  true  of 
strong  artillery  reserves.  During  the  preparatory  stage  of  engagements 
and  until  the  most  favorable  target  for  artillery  had  become  apparent,  we 
kept  our  artillery  too  long  in  reserve  and  were  therefore  worse  off  than  the 
Japanese,  who  put  all  their  artillery  into  action." 

At  Beaune  la  Rolande,  6  batteries  were,  for  a  time,  held  in  re- 
serve at  Marcilly,  and  on  the  Lisaine,  4  batteries  were  attached  to  the  re- 
serve. 

Artillery  that  has  been  held  in  reserve  is  frequently  no 
longer  able  to  go  into  action. 

At  Worth,  the  eight  batteries  of  the  French  artillery  reserve  did 
not  come  into  action  until  it  was  too  late  and  until  the  remainder  of  the 
French  artillery  had  been  silenced.  The  tardy  appearance  of  these  forty- 
eight  guns  failed  to  make  much  of  an  impression  on  the  Germans,  whose 
skirmishers  entered  the  batteries  after  the  latter  had  fired  but  a  few  rounds. 
Thirteen  guns  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans.  The  decision  lay  at  an 
entirely  different  range  than  during  the  Napoleonic  era.  At  short  ranges, 
at  which,  in  the  past,  artillery  had  very  little  to  fear,  batteries  were  no 
longer  able  to  hold  their  own  for  any  length  of  time,  even  when  exposed  to 
the  fire  of  the  needle  gun  only,  and  after  the  superiority  of  fire  had  once 
been  lost  it  could  not  be  regained  in  the  short  space  of  a  quarter  of  an  hour. 


Characteristic  Properties  op  Modern  Artillery.    299 

The  Russo-Japanese  war  demonstrated  the  tremendous 
eflfectiveness  of  shrapnel  fire.  Shrapnel  fire  increased 
the  duration  of  combats  and  compelled  troops  to  take  up 
extended  order  formations,  forced  advancing  infantry  to 
hug  the  grotitid,  and  compelled  artillery  to  fight  at  long  range 
and  in  masked  positions.  Attacks  and  changes  of  position 
had  to  be  undertaken  at  night  more  often  than  had  been 
originally  intended.  But  against  intrenched  skirmishers  or 
those  otherwise  sheltered  behind  features  of  the  terrain 
shrapnel  did  not  produce  the  expected  effect. 

Modem  field  artillery  is  quite  a  different  weapon  from 
the  artillery  of  the  past,  and  many  hide-bound  customs  must 
be  eliminated  if  its  inherent  power  is  to  be  fully  utilized. 
The  following  points  deserve  special  mention : 

1 .  A  numerical  inferiority  in  guns  may  be  compensated 
to  a  certain  degree  by  an  accelerated  rate  of  fire. 

2.  Increased  effectiveness  of  the  individual  projectile, 
which,  when  it  strikes  any  troops  in  the  open  within  a  range 
of  4,000  m.,  either  annihilates  them  in  a  very  short  time,  or, 
at  the  very  least,  neutralizes  them,  i.  e.,  robs  them  of  unre- 
stricted mobility.  This,  moreover,  in  effect  enables  artillery 
to  *  'nail"  hostile  troops  to  their  cover.  The  effect  of  artillery 
fire  against  troops  in  trenches,  especially  in  masked  trenches, 
is  surprisingly  small.  Clearly  visible  shelter  trenches,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  not  only  good  objectives,  but  serve  as  good 
orientation  points. 

3.  Artillery  has  become  a  much  more  formidable  foe 
of  the  infantry  than  it  was  in  the  past,  as  infantry  can  no 
longer  hope  to  attack  it  frontally  at  short  range.  Shields 
afford  so  much  protection  to  the  personnel,  that  the  artillery 
of  the  attacker  can  no  longer  overpower  the  guns  of  the 
defender  in  a  short  time  by  massing  a  superior  number  of 
guns  against  them. 

4.  The  ability  of  modem  field  artillery  to  deliver 
effective  fire  from  masked  positions  with  at  least  some  of  the 
batteries. 


300  Employment  of  Artillery. 

The  artilleryman  who  wishes  to  make  the  most  of  the 
efficacy  of  the  new  gun,  must  get  into  position  ahead  of  his 
opponent.  Masked  positions  generally  have  the  advantage 
that  preparations  for  firing  may  be  made  without  molestation 
by  the  enemy. 

2.     THE   POSITION  OF  ARTILLERY  IN  A  COLUMN. 

When  the  enemy  is  encountered,  it  is  essential  to  success 
that  a  superior  artillery  force  be  brought  qiiickly  into  action. 
Accordingly,  artillery  should  be  posted  as  near  the  head  of 
the  column  as  considerations  for  its  saf tey  permit.  But  in  so 
posting  it,  infantry  units  should  not  be  imduly  broken  up. 
Since  the  advance  guard  screens  the  deployment  for  action, 
it  is  only  necessary  to  take  care  that,  in  distributing  artillery 
throughout  the  column,  the  leading  battery  be  protected 
by  infantry  in  its  front.  Depending  upon  its  strength, 
artillery  will  usually  be  posted  in  rear  of  the  first  or  second* 
battalion,  <>r  in  rear  of  the  leading  infantry  regiment  of  the 
main  body.  The  artillery  of  a  division  takes  up  a  front  of 
1 ,500  m. ,  hence  care  must  be  exercised  to  see  that  the  ntunber 
of  guns  brought  into  action  bears  a  proper  relation  to  the 
infantry  force  deployed,  as  the  latter  not  only  protects  the 
front  of  the  artillery  but  its  flanks  as  well.  Artillery  should 
not  be  posted  at  the  tail  of  a  column.  The  reserves  and 
combat  trains  of  the  batteries  march  directly  in  rear  of  the 
last  battery  of  their  battalion.  The  light  ammunition  col- 
umns march,  as  a  rule,  in  rear  of  the  infantry  and  the  am- 
bulance company  of  the  division.  It  is,  however,  permis- 
sible to  have  them  march  in  the  coltunn  or  at  the  tail  of  the 
advance  guard.  Since  the  caissons  are  heavily  loaded  and, 
to  make  matters  worse,  are  drawn  in  part  by  horses  requisi- 
tioned on  mobilization,  it  appears  to  be  inadvisable  to  let 
them  march  as  part  of  an  artillery  coltunn.     But,  on  the 

*T1i1b  18  the  better  poeitlOD  when  the  main  body  has  to  change  direction  and 
throw  out  a  new  advance  guard. 


Position  of  Artillery  in  a  Column.  301 

other  hand,  military  history  shows  that  in  a  long  column,  re- 
ierves  separated  from  their  batteries  are  very  easily  forced 
aside  by  other  troops  and  are  then  unable  to  find  their  bat- 
teries on  the  battlefield. 

"The  battery  reserves,  which  as  a  general  rule  follow  close  upon  the 
heels  of  their  batteries  on  the  march  and  on  going  into  action,  dropped 
behind.  This  was  primarily  due  to  the  fact  that  the  heavily  loaded  cais- 
sons were  unable  to  keep  up  with  the  guns  on  the  difficult  terrain  that  had 
to  be  crossed.  After  they  had  lost  considerable  distance  on  this  account 
the  reserves  became  still  farther  separated  from  their  batteries  by  other 
troops  pushing  ahead  of  them,  this  being  a  natural  result  of  the  peculiar 
deployment  of  the  Xlth  and  the  Vth  Army  Corps." 

"That  the  second  ammunition  echelons  of  the  artillery  battalions 
that  were  taken  out  of  the  long  route  columns  of  two  competing  corps 
and  hurried  far  in  advance,  lost  touch  with  their  battalions  for  several 
hours,  seems  likewise  easy  of  explanation.  At  any  rate,  it  proves  the 
soundness  of  the  principle  that  the  command  of  these  echelons  should  be 
entrusted  to  resourceful,  energetic  officers."* 

During  the  first  three  hours  of  the  fire  action  in  which  the  Hid  Bat- 
talion, 11th  Prussian  Field  Artillery  was  engaged  at  Sedan,  only  a  single 
battery  reserve  was  available.  At  Vionville,  the  batteries  of  the  6th 
Infantry  Division  were  likewise  without  their  battery  reserves  and  their 
ammunition  ran  very  low  in  consequence.! 

The  separation  of  battery  reserves  from  their  batteries  in  the  artil- 
lery of  the  Prussian  Guard,  when  the  latter  was  hurrying  ahead  toward 
the  battlefield  of  K6niggratz»  had  a  similar  result.! 

A.German  division  takes  up  a  road  space  of  about  10  km. 
Of  this,  4,800  m.  is  required  by  the  artillery  and  its  light 
ammunition  columns.  The  insertion  of  such  a  long  artillery 
column  on  the  one  hand  retards  the  deployment  of  the  in- 
fantry imits  marching  in  rear  of  it,  and,  on  the  other,  breaks 
up  the  continuity  of  the  infantry  column.  Besides,  such  a 
long  artillery  column  is  a  good  objective  for  enterprising  cav- 
alry. This  danger  may  be  diminished  by  inserting  platoons 
or  companies  of  infantry  between  artillery  units  (par.  365, 
German  F.  S.  R.,)  or  by  splitting  the  artillery  into  several 
parts,  one  of  which,  usually  the  weaker,  is  assigned  to  the  ad- 

*HoFFBArEB.  Die  deutsche  Artillerie,  VIII,  pp.  80  and  199. 

t/Mtf..  II.  pp.  33.  34  and  38. 

^OHBNLOHB,  BrUfe  HJber  ArtillerU,  pp.  116  and  116. 


302  Employment  of  Artillery. 

vance  guard,  the  other,  stronger  part,  to  the  main  body.  The 
first  duty  that  confronts  the  artillery,  consists  of  opening  the 
way  for  the  advance  guard  and  of  forcing  hostile  advance  de- 
tachments to  retire  on  their  main  body.  These  requirements 
are  approximately  fulfilled  by  the  following  distribution  of 
troops.* 

Advance  Guard :  Three  battalions  of  infantry ;  one  bat- 
talion of  artillery  between  the  two  battalions  of  the  reserve; 
and  the  light  ammunition  column  at  the  tail  of  the  reserve. 

Main  Body :  Two  and  three-fourths  battalions  of  in- 
fantry ;  one  battalion  of  artillery ;  one  company  of  infantry ; 
the  second  artillery  regiment  (one  company  of  the  second 
infantry  brigade  between  the  two  battalions);  the  second 
infantry  brigade;  the  ambulance  company;  three  light  am- 
munition columns.  When  a  second  division  follows  the  first, 
it  should  march  its  artillery  in  rear  of  the  leading  regiment. 

Austria:  In  assigning  artillery  a  place  in  a  column,  tactical  con- 
siderations are  to  govern.  In  addition,  artillery  may  be  grouped  in  a 
different  manner  than  that  laid  down  in  the  table  of  organization.  In 
general,  the  necessity  of  infantry  and  artillery  cooperating  will  cause  all 
the  larger  columns  to  be  provided  with  artillery,  and  even  small  columns 
to  be  assigned  batteries  or  platoons.  Artillery  (about  one-third  of  that 
available)  will,  likewise,  frequently  be  assigned  to  the  covering  detach 
ments  of  large  columns.  In  small  columns,  however,  all  the  artillery  wil 
march  as  a  rule  with  the  main  body. 

The  field  howitzer  batteries  should  be  assigned  to  the  column  that 
will,  in  aU  probability,  require  curved  fire  guns.  In  case  subsequent 
developments  of  the  situation  can  not  be  foreseen  with  sufficient  accuracy 
at  the  time  of  issuing  the  march  order,  these  batteries  should  be  assigned 
to  the  column  from  which  they  can  be  most  easily  detached  and  moved  to 
the  point  where  their  services  are  required.  In  special  cases,  it  may  be  a 
good  plan  to  distribute  the  field  howitzer  batteries  among  the  various 
columns. 

These  remarks  apply  with  equal  force  to  ammunition  columns.  In 
general,  one  ammunition  column  is  placed  at  the  disposal  of  each  artillery 


*The  question  of  assigning  artlUery  to  the  advance  guard  has  been  treated  in 
various  ways  in  our  regulations.     To  quote: 

F.  S.  R.  of  1895:  "As  required,  care  being  taken  not  to  break  up  tactical 
units." 

F.S.R.ofl905:     *  *  This  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  commander  of  the  force. ' ' 

F.  S.  R.  of  1908:  "Especially  in  the  larger  units,  field  artillery  should  be  as- 
signed to  the  advance  guard." 


Position  of  Artillery  in  a  Column.  303 

regiment  as  a  regimental  ammunition  column.  This  ammunition  column 
usually  marches  in  rear  of  all  the  troops,  but  in  difficult  country  may  follow 
directly  in  rear  of  the  artillery. 

France:  Artillery  is  posted  near  the  head  of  a  column,  but  not  so 
far  forward  as  unduly  to  retard  the  arrival  of  the  infantry.  In  ordinary 
circumstances,  the  divisional  artillery  of  the  leading  division,  or  that  part 
of  it  not  assigned  to  the  advance  guard,  marches  in  rear  of  the  leading 
battalion  of  the  main  body,  and  the  corps  artillery  in  rear  of  the  leading 
division.  The  divisional  artillery  of  the  second  division  marches  between 
the  brigades  of  that  division.  When  all  the  artillery  of  the  leading  divi- 
sion is  assigned  to  the  advance  guard,  the  corps  artillery  is  posted  farther 
forward  in  the  column.  The  French  frequently  use  a  single  advance 
guard  battery  in  an  endeavor  to  entice  the  enemy  to  show  all  of  his  ar- 
tillery, against  which  they  then  bring  to  bear  all  the  artillery  of  their  main 
body. 

Russia  t  Infantry  units  are  inserted  in  the  artillery  column.  When 
three  batteries  are  attached  to  an  infantry  brigade,  two  of  them  march 
between  the  battalions  of  the  leading  regiment,  while  the  remaining  bat- 
tery marches  ahead  of  the  last  battalion  of  the  second  regiment. 

In  an  infantry  division  (16  bns.,  2  esc,  8  btrs.)  on  the  march,  the 
artillery  is  distributed  as  follows:  Ye  to  Hoi  the  artillery  (2  btrs.)  with 
the  advance  guard;  one  battalion  of  three  batteries  in  rear  of  the  leading 
battalion- of  the  main  body;  the  third  battalion  of  artillery  with  the  second 
infantry  brigade.  This  distribution  in  effect  provides  an  artillery  reserve 
in  the  route  column. 

Italy:  Detachments  about  the  si^e  of  an  infantry  brigade  do  not 
attach  artillery  to  their  advance  guards.  In  a  division,  two  batteries  are 
assigned  to  the  advance  guard  and  two  to  the  main  body.  In  an  army 
corps,  the  divisional  artillery  is  assigned  to  the  advance  guard,  the  corps 
artillery  marching  in  rear  of  the  leading  regiment  of  the  main  body. 


When  a  column  of  troops  is  obliged,  on  debouching  from 
a  defile,  to  deploy  in  face  of  an  enemy  who  is  already  deployed, 
a  task  that  confronted  the  Vth  Army  Corps  at  Nachod  and 
the  Guard  Corps  at  Raatsch-Burkersdorf  in  1866,  it  is  of  the 
utmost  importance  to  bring  a  strong  force  of  artillery  quickly 
into  position,  and  to  that  end  to  have  it  march  so  far  forward 
in  the  column  that  its  prompt  deplojnnent  will  be  assured.* 
When  the  force  marches  on  several  roads,  and  the  situation 
is  not  as  yet  cleared  up,  the  artillery  is  usually  allowed  to 


*For  the  distribution  of  the  artillery  in  the  column  during  tbe  advance  on 
Beaumont,  see  Taktik  III,  p.  271,  ei  seq. 


304  Employment  op  Artillery. 

march  with  the  unit  to  which  it  properly  belongs.  But  it 
may  be  advisable,  on  the  other  hand,  to  group  the  artillery 
within  the  units  to  which  it  belongs,  comformable  to  the  in- 
tentions of  the  commander. 

Heavy  artillery  usually  marches  at  the  tail  of  the  main 
body  in  rear  of  the  light  ammimition  columns  of  the  field 
artillery,  in  order  that  it  may  not  retard  the  deployment  of 
the  infantry.  This  position,  so  far  in  rear,  is  quite  imobjec- 
tionable  as  a  rule,  since  it  is  requisite  that  the  situation  be 
cleared  up  before  the  heavy  batteries  are  brougfit  into  action. 
But,  when  their  employment  can  be  foreseen,  the  firing  bat- 
teries should  be  placed  far  enough  forward  in  the  column  (for 
example,  in  rear  of  the  field  artillery),  that  their  timely  entry 
into  action  will  be  assured.  In  many  cases,  nothing  but  the 
fire  of  these  heavy  batteries  will  make  it  possible  for  the 
field  batteries  to  go  into  action.  As  the  cannoneers  of  the 
heavy  artillery  are  armed  with  rifles  and  are  very  numerous,  it 
is  unnecessary  to  detail  infantry  to  protect  it  or  to  assist  it 
on  the  march.  The  observation  wagons  usually  march  at  the 
head  of  their  respective  battalions,  but  they  (as  well  as  bat- 
tery commanders)  may  be  sent  forward,  at  the  discretion  of 
the  commander,  to  the  advance  guard  when  a  fortified  posi- 
tion is  to  be  attacked.  The  battery  reserves  of  each  battalion 
of  heavy  artillery  march  in  rear  of  the  last  battery  of  their 
battalion.  The  light  ammunition  columns  of  howitzer  bat- 
talions march  in  rear  of  those  battalions.  When  howitzer 
battalions  are  pushed  forward,  these  columns  march  either 
in  rear  of  the  light  ammvmition  columns  of  the  field  artillery 
or  in  rear  of  the  fighting  troops. 

Since  the  introdution  of  gun  shields,  advance  guard  ar- 
tillery that  is  skillfully  handled,  is  better  off  than  formerly. 
By  accelerating  its  fire,  it  may  deceive  the  enemy  for  some 
time  in  regard  to  its  strength  and  may  frequently  entice  the 
enemy  to  reply  to  its  fire,  thereby  betraying  his  intentions. 
Considering  the  penchant  of  our  neighbors  (the  French)  for 
advanced  positions,  the  fire  of  such  advance  guard  artillery 


Advance  Guard  Artillery.  305 

is  best  calculated  to  break  down  quickly  any  hostile  resistance 
that  would  f  onnerly  have  required  the  action  of  a  consider- 
able force  of  infantry.  Artillery  fire  admonishes  the  advancing 
opponent  to  be  cautious .  Except  in  an  advance  against  a  hostile 
position  that  is  already  fortified,  or  over  open  ground  entirely 
devoid  of  cover,  it  is  always  an  advantage  to  assign  artillery 
to  an  advance  guard.  But  the  artillery  force  in  the  advance 
guard  should  never  be  out  of  proportion  to  the  infantry.  If  a 
battalion  of  three  batteries  is  assigned  to  a  detachment,  it  is . 
best  to  keep  all  the  batteries  with  the  main  body,  in  order 
that  the  battalion  organization  may  not  be  broken  up  and 
that  mutual  cooperation  may  be  assured.  In  ordinary  dr- 
ciunstances,  it  is  objectionable  to  assign  artillery  to  a  weak 
advance  guard.  In  an  advance  guard  consisting  of  a  bat- 
talion of  infantry  and  a  battery,  or  about  what  one  of  our 
brigades  would  throw  out  during  maneuvers,  the  battalion 
is  practically  nothing  but  an  artillery  support.  The  pro- 
tection afforded  by  one  or  two  companies  of  infantry  march- 
ing ahead  of  the  artilleiy  is  inadequate.  The  infantry 
marching  in  the  lead  is  but  too  apt  to  find  other  employment 
that  will  deflect  it  from  the  road  followed  by  the  column,  so 
that  the  artillery  will  suddenly  find  itself  alone  on  the  road 
and  devoid  of  any  infantry  support.  The  trifling  amount  of 
time  gained  is  not  at  all  commensurate  with  the  increased 
danger  to  which  the  battery  will  be  exposed,  especially  if  the 
terrain  is  unfavorable.  If  the  enemy  is  encountered,  deployed 
and  in  position,  a  battery  that  imprudently  exposes  itself 
in  the  face  of  stronger  hostile  artillery,  may  find  itself  in  a 
tight  place  which  may  also  make  it  difficult  for  the  batteries 
of  the  main  body  to  come  into  action.*  In  such  a  case,  the 
advance  guard  battery  will  have  to  be  held  in  rear  in  readi- 


•In  thia  ccnmectlon.  the  engftgement  at  Gerchshelm.  July  25th,  1866.  It  par* 
tlcularly  Instructive.  T  wel ve  guns  of  the  Prussian  advance  guard  went  into  position 
east  of  the  chatissie  Immediately  in  trant  of  the  Hochtel  wood.  They  were  at  once 
overwhelmed  by  the  violent  fire  of  40  hostile  guns.  As  a  result,  they  bad  to  be  with- 
drawn behind  the  wood,  after  a  fight  lasting  three  quarters  of  an  hour.  It  was  not 
until  von  Wrangel's  brigade  attacked,  that  the^e  guns  could  again  be  brought  into 
action.    V.  Lbitow-Vobbbck.  Ftldzug  um  1866,  III,  p.  340. 


306  Employment  op  Artillery. 

ness  until  the  arrival  of  the  batteries  of  the  main  body.  In 
an  encounter  with  an  enemy  who  has  already  completed  his 
deployment,  there  would,  therefore,  seem  to  be  nothing  to  be 
said  in  favor  of  using  a  single  battery  in  the  advance  guard, 
unless  that  battery  is  to  serve  the  purpose  of  drawing  the 
enemy's  fire. 

Those  who  oppose  assigning  a  strong  artillery  force  to  an 
advance  guard,  hold  that  the  premature  action  of  a  large 
number  of  guns  is  very  apt  to  lead  to  haste  and  may  unduly 
influence  the  decision  of  the  conmiander-in-chief.  They 
argue  that  a  strong  body  of  artillery  in  the  advance  guard  re- 
quires a  strong  force  of  infantry,  as  the  latter  arm  would 
otherwise  serve  no  purpose  except  that  of  protecting  the  ar- 
tillery. Strong  advance  guards,  they  maintain,  are  apt  to 
succumb  to  the  temptation  to  engage  in  independent  actions 
or,  as  the  saying  goes,  to  bolt,  which  reacts  on  the  main 
body  and  forces  it  to  shape  its  deployment  according  to  the 
tactical  needs  of  the  advance  guard.  They  insist  that  this 
precludes  a  united  deployment  and  a  systematic  use  of  the 
masses  to  accomplish  the  main  object  sought  to  be  attained ; 
that  the  principal  duty  of  the  advance  guard  consists  not  so 
much  of  combating  the  enemy  as  of  clearing  up  the  situa- 
tion. They  recommend,  therefore,  that  advance  guards  be 
made  weak  in  infantry  but  strong  in  cavalry,  and  that  no 
artillery  be  assigned  to  them  at  all. 

An  infantry  attack  undertaken  without  artillery  support 
soon  hesitates  and  is  shattered  by  the  hostile  fire.  By  as- 
signing artillery  to  it,  the  commander  can  best  stimulate  the 
advance  guard  to  energetic  action,  and  by  keeping  all  the 
artillery  with  the  main  body,  he  can  best  curb  the  ambition 
of  the  advance  guard,  unless  he  prefers  to  accomplish  the 
same  result  by  accompanying  the  advance  guard  in  person. 
The  dangers  of  assigning  artillery  to  an  advance  guard  be- 
come apparent  when  a  completely  deployed  opponent  is  en- 
countered in  position,  and  the  advantages  of  such  assignment 
are  evidenced  in  a  rencontre.    It  would  not  be  difficult  prop- 


Rear  Guard  Artillery.  307 

erly  to  distribute  artillery  in  a  column  if  one  were  accurately 
informed,  in  each  case,  of  the  intentions  and  measures  of  the 
enemy.  In  order  to  secure  the  advantages  that  accrue  from 
the  assignment  of  artillery  to  the  advance  guard,  it  would 
be  a  good  plan  for  the  commander  of  an  advancing  division 
either  to  put  one  battalion  of  artillery  into  the  advance  guard 
and  to  send  it  all  into  action  as  soon  as  reports  indicate  that 
the  enemy  is  likewise  advancing,  so  as  to  gain,  in  this  way, 
a  start  over  the  enemy  in  deployment,  or  to  keep  it  in  rear 
if  the  enemy  is  encotmtered  completely  deployed  in  position. 
But  even  in  the  latter  case,  it  may  be  advantageous  to  use 
artillery  for  the  purpose  of  pressing  back  the  advance  troops 
of  the  opponent,  of  capturing  supporting  points  that  lie  in 
front  of  the  hostile  position,  and  of  forcing  the  enemy  to 
disclose  his  intentions. 

Artillery  attached  to  a  rear  guard  enables  the  latter  to 
keep  the  pursuing  enemy  at  a  distance,  and  to  conduct  an 
action  with  less  infantry  or  cavalry  than  would  otherwise  be 
possible.  Rear  guard  artillery  can  escape  from  a  critical 
situation  or  regain  its  proper  place  in  the  column  by  moving 
at  a  rapid  pace.  The  proper  moment  for  retiring  will  have 
arrived  when  artillery  fears  to  lose  its  mobility.  Artillery 
remains  in  hand  so  long  as  the  enemy  does  not  directly  pene- 
trate into  the  batteries.  It  is  always  easier  for  artillery  than 
for  infantry  to  break  off  an  action.  A  numerous,  well  horsed 
artillery  furnishes  a  retiring  force  with  the  most  effective 
means  for  checking  pursuit  and  for  increasing  the  distance 
that  separates  pursuer  and  pursued.  It  is  only  when  the 
disorder  among  the  retreating  troops  and  the  character  of 
the  ground  are  such  as  to  endanger  artillery,  that  one  will 
of  necessity,  dispense  with  its  services  in  a  rear  guard.  In 
general,  more  artillery  should  be  assigned  to  a  rear  guard  than 
to  an  advance  guard,  but  light  ammunition  columns,  if  still 
full,  should  be  kept  intact  with  the  main  body. 


308  Employment  op  Artillery. 


3.    DEPLOYMENT  OF  ARTILLERY. 

The  senior  artillery  officer  of  a  division,  of  an  independ* 
ent  detachment  of  all  arms,  or  of  a  covering  force  composed 
of  all  arms,  is  the  commander  of  its  artillery  and  accompanies 
the  commander  of  the  troops  until  the  commencement  of  the 
action  and  receives  orders  from  the  latter  in  regard  to  the  use 
and  action  of  the  artillery.  With  the  approval  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  troops,  he  then  issues  orders  for  bringing  up  the 
light  ammunition  columns.  The  ammtmition  coltunns  are 
brought  up  by  order  of  the  corps  commander,  or,  in  case  they 
are  attached  to  the  divisions,  by  order  of  the  division  com- 
manders, and  the  commander  of  the  artillery  notified  of  their 
position.  It  is  a  good  plan  for  subordinate  artillery  com- 
manders to  ride  at  the  head  of  their  respective  commands 
in  constant  readiness  promptly  to  obey  a  simimons  to  move 
forward.  In  a  division,  on  accoimt  of  the  distances  separat- 
ing the  various  elements,  it  is  advisable  for  the  commander 
of  the  artillery  brigade  to  assemble  his  regimental  comman- 
ders from  the  outset  for  reconnaissance  and  to  keep  them  near 
his  person  during  the  advance  into  action.  While  at  head- 
quarters, the  commander  of  the  artillery  has  been  able  to 
watch  the  situation  develop  and  the  decision  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief take  form.  The  entry  into  action  is  pre- 
ceded by  a  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy  and  of  the  firing 
positions.  The  commander  of  the  troops  must  expect  that 
these  duties  will  be  about  terminated  by  the  time  the  order 
for  going  into  action  is  issued.  The  reports  of  the  cavalry 
require  elaboration  from  an  artillery  standpoint.  This  is 
accomplished  by  sending  out  artillery  officers*  patrols.* 
(Par.  154,  German  F.  S.  R.).  When  an  advance  is  made 
against  an  enemy  in  position,  these  patrols  may  be  sent  ahead 
with  the  cavalry.    Otherwise,  it  is  advisable  not  to  send  them 


•MUitSr-Wochenblatt  of  1908,  No.  l^.--ArtUl€H3ti$che  M<maisheft$  of  1909, 
11. —Strgffleur,  1909.  VIII. 


Deployment  op  Artillery.  809 

out  until  after  some  inkling  has  been  gained  as  to  the  enemy's 
intentions  and  the  decision  of  the  commander-in-chief  is 
fixed.  The  necessity  of  reconnoitering  with  artillery  patrols 
is  a  direct  result  of  the  fact  that  cavalry  patrols  never  re- 
port accurately  the  very  details  that  are  valuable  for  the  ar- 
tillery. And  it  is  not  within  the  province  of  cavalry  to  do 
this.  Cavalry  ascertains  the  presence  of  the  enemy  and  fur- 
nishes the  commander-in-chief  with  an  outline  of  the  sit- 
uation; the  detailed  information  that  every  arm  needs  for  its 
activity,  it  must  gain  for  itself.  Artillery,  moreover,  must 
reconnoiter  to  assure  its  own  safety  and  to  gain  information 
in  regard  to  the  practicability  of  the  terrain.  Artillery 
patrols  are,  furthermore,  to  obtain  information  that  will  be 
of  service  from  a  purely  technical  artillery  standpoint  (re- 
connaissance of  the  objective). 

The  tasks  of  artillery  patrols  may  be  divided  into  two 
classes:  (1)  Reconnaissance  to  determine  whether  or  not 
the  terrain  over  which  the  artillery  is  to  advance  is  passable 
and  whether  any  of  the  positions  tentatively  selected  on  the 
map  are  suitable;  (2)  Reconnaissance  to  obtain  tactical 
and  technical  information.  In  tasks  of  the  first  class,  it  is 
sufiicient  if  only  one  man  accompanies  the  officer,  as  the 
patrol  retimis  to  its  organization  upon  completing  its  work 
and  as  it  is  therefore  unnecessary  to  send  back  messages. 
Tasks  of  this  class  also  include  that  of  requesting  troops 
marching  ahead  of  the  artillery  to  clear  one  side  of  the  road 
so  that  the  batteries  can  advance.  Tasks  of  the  second  class 
are  turned  over  to  patrols  consisting  of  a  specially  selected 
leader  and  a  niunber  of  mounted  orderlies  (trumpeters)  pro- 
portionate to  the  duty  the  patrol  is  called  upon  to  perform. 
Ten  moimted  orderlies  are  attached  by  the  commander  of 
the  troops  to  the  howitzer  battalion  and  remain  permanently 
with  it.  Since  an  interruption  of  the  reconnaissance  may 
have  the  most  serious  effect,  patrols  charged  with  the  task 
of  obtaining  tactical  and  technical  information  should  be 
made  rather  strong.    In  many  cases,  one  will  not  be  able 


810  Employment  op  Artillery. 

to  count  upon  their  returning  until  the  engagement  is  over. 
The  patrol  leader  must  know  definitely  whether  he  is  to 
return,  where  he  is  to  report  upon  returning,  and,  in  case  he 
finds  hostile  artillery  in  a  certain  sector,  how  much  time  he  is 
allowed  to  accomplish  his  mission.  Artillery  patrols  shoxild, 
as  a  rule,  avoid  encounters  with  hostile  patrols,  but  may,  in 
case  of  necessity,  use  their  pistols  to  repel  such  patrols. 

Two  batteries  of  the  Austrian  IVth  Army  Corps  (4th  Field  Battery 
and  8th  Horse  Battery),  which  had  occupied  redoubt  No.  8,  at  KoniggrSts 
were  surprised  by  infantry  of  the  Prussian  Guard  Corps,  because  they  had 
neglected  to  have  their  scouts  observe  the  ravine  that  ran  in  front  o' 
their  position  and  whose  bottom  was  not  visible  from  the  position.  Of 
the  sixteen  guns  in  the  position,  only  two  managed  to  escape. 

Austrian  artillery  at  TobtUchau,  July  15th,  1866.  See  p.  210, 
Mupra. 

The  disaster  that  overtook  the  corps  artillery  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps, 
at  St.  Privat,  might  have  been  averted,  or  at  least  considerably  lessened, 
*f  timely  steps  had  been  taken  to  reconnoiter  in  front  and  on  the  left  flank.* 

The  scouts  sent  forward  to  reconnoiter  the  terrain  should 
also,  during  the  advance,  direct  their  attention  upon  move- 
ments of  the  enemy.  The  commander  of  the  artillery, 
whether  the  artillery  is  on  the  march  or  halted,  should  see  to 
it,  in  order  to  prevent  surprise,  if  for  no  other  reason,  that 
reconnaissance  is  kept  up  in  front  and  on  the  flanks,  and 
should  maintain  communication  with  the  commanders  that 
have  ridden  ahead.  Artillery  in  position  will  in  the  first 
place  send  out  scouts  on  the  flanks  and  have  them  occupy  any 
crossings  over  obstacles.  In  addition  to  this  reconnaissance 
on  the  flanks,  reconnaissance  of  the  terrain  in  rear  of  the 
batteries  and  for  protecting  the  reserves  may  become  neces- 
sary. When  artillery  is  firing  from  a  masked  position,  when 
the  guns  are  posted  in  rear  of  the  crest  of  a  hill  and  infantry 
support  is  lacking  or  inadequate,  it  will  frequently  be  neces- 
sary to  send  scouts  to  the  front.  Timely  reconnaissance  is 
likewise  necessary  when  artillery  accompanies  the  infantry 
attack,  in  order  that  the  batteries  may  not  suddenly  encoimter 

*Der  18,  Auoust,  p.  217. 


Deployment  of  Artillery.  311 

the  enemy  and  in  consequence  be  forced  to  unlimber  within 
the  most  effective  range  of  his  fire.  The  effect  of  modem 
arms  is  such  that  the  artillery  would  certainly  be  annihilated 
in  such  a  case. 

Ezamplaai 

1.  Collapse  of  the  6th  Heavy  Battery  of  the  7th  Field  Artillery  at 
Colombey.*    See  p.  355,  infra, 

2.  The  conduct  of  the  2d  Light  Battery  and  the  2d  Heavy  Battery 
of  the  10th  Field  Artillery  at  Mars-la-Tour.t 

3.  The  surprise  of  the  British  artillery  at  Colenao,  December  15th, 
1899,  at  a  range  of  800 — 1,000  m.,  by  the  Boers,  was  the  result  of  Colonel 
Long's  decision  to  move  his  guns  at  a  rapid  gait  to  within  600  m.  of  the 
enemy. 

It  is  difficult  to  reconnoiter  the  objective,  but  it  must  be 
accomplished.  The  earlier  an  artillery  patrol  is  on  the 
ground,  the  better  its  chances  of  observing  the  deployment  of 
the  hostile  artillery.  Artillery  posted  in  a  masked  position 
can  frequently  be  seen  from  a  flank.  Even  a  report  to  the 
effect  that  no  artillery  was  found  in  certain  localities,  is  often 
important.  The  enemy  will  not  voluntarily  disclose  the 
position  of  his  masked  batteries,  and  infantry  covering  de- 
tachments will,  in  any  case,  prevent  approach,  so  that  noth- 
ing remains  but  to  use  "decoy  batteries"  to  induce  the  enemy 
to  open  fire. 

It  is  important  to  ascertain  how  many  and  what  type 
of  gims  the  enemy  already  has  in  position  by  the  time  one's 
own  artillery  goes  into  position.  Information  from  which 
conclusions  may  be  drawn  as  to  the  time  when  and  the  place 
where  hostile  artillery  will  presumably  go  into  position 
(route  columns  and  preparation  of  fire),  is  likewise  of  great 
importance.  The  report  of  the  scout  charged  with  re- 
connoitering  an  objective  should  contain  the  following  in- 
formation : 


*KuNz,  Btitpiele,  7,  p.  10. 

fSupplBTMnt  to  Militdr'Woehenblatt,  1896.  p.  201. 


312  Employment  op  Artillery. 

1.  Ntnnber  of  hostile  guns  and  batteries;  whether  they 
are  posted  in  observation,  in  readiness,  or  for  immediate 
action ;  if  the  latter,  whether  they  are  posted  in  an  unmasked, 
semi-masked,  or  masked  position;  the  type  of  guns,  i.  e., 
whether  field  guns  or  howitzers;  location  of  hostile  observa- 
tion stations. 

2.  The  actual  location  and  extent  of  the  hostile  artil- 
lery position;  the  location  of  the  flanks  of  the  hostile  artil- 
lery line  with  reference  to  the  line  of  fire  and  to  features  of  the 
terrain.  A  knowledge  of  the  frontage  of  the  hostile  artil- 
lery position  is  important  in  locating  covered  avenues  of 
approach  and  in  selecting  cover.  Panoramic  sketches  have 
very  little  value,  since  observer  and  recipient  scarcely  ever 
view  the  ground  from  the  same  point. 

3.  Intrenchments. 

4.  Masks,  dummy  intrenchments  and  dummy  targets; 
the  latter  often  betray  their  real  character  by  their  im- 
mobility and  by  the  fact  that  even  before  the  fight  begins 
they  are  already  in  evidence. 

When  infantry  is  the  objective,  its  frontage  and  depth 
should  be  ascertained ;  likewise,  whether  the  infantry  has 
made  a  lodgment  within  or  in  front  of  the  edge  of  woods  or 
villages.  Special  importance  should  be  attached  to  deter- 
mining the  position  of  clearly  visible  points  with  reference 
to  the  target.  At  Magersfontain,  December  12th,  1899, 
and  at  Colenso,  December  15th,  1899,  th^  British  artillery 
fire,  owing  to  insufficient  reconnaissance,  did  not  hit  the  Boer 
trenches  at  all,  but,  with  an  accuracy  that  even  the  Boers 
praised,  did  search  areas  that  were  believed  to  be  occupied 
by  the  enemy,  but  which,  in  reality,  were  tmoccupied.  Similar 
cases  are  reported  to  have  occurred  in  Manchuria. 

For  a  discussion  of  the  reconnaissance  during  an  attack 
against  a  fortified  position,  see,  p.  432,  infra. 

At  ArtMiay,  five  batteries  of  the  1st  Bavarian  Field  Artillery 
Regiment  in  position  were  severely  bombarded  by  a  single  French  battery. 
After  some  search,  it  was  thought  that  this  hostile  battery  was  posted  in 


Deployment  of  Artillery.  313 

rear  of  Artenay.  Later  on»  clouds  of  smoke  were  visible  from  time  to  time 
in  another  direction,  and  all  the  five  batteries  fired  on  the  concealed  bat- 
tery. But  when  in  spite  of  this,  the  fire  of  the  French  battery  continued 
to  produce  losses,  doubts  began  to  arise  as  to  whether  a  hostile  battery  was 
actually  located  in  the  area  that  was  being  searched.  A  reconnaissance 
made  by  the  battalion  adjutant  developed  the  fact  that  the  hostile  bat- 
tery supposedly  posted  in  rear  of  Artenay,  was  in  reality  posted  in  another 
locality  in  a  masked  position,  and  that  the  hostile  battery  commander  was 
using  the  church  spire  as  an  observation  station.  Further,  that  the  clouds 
of  smoke  at  first  thought  to  emanate  from  the  hostile  artillery  were  caused 
by  bursts  of  shells  fired  by  a  horse  battery  of  Prince  Albrecht's  Cavalry 
Division.  After  this  reconnaissance,  the  fire  was  directed  with  good  effect 
upon  the  hostile  battery  and  it  was  soon  forced  to  retire.* 

Assistant  observers  and  scouts  t  can  supplement  the 
information  available  in  regard  to  the  objective,  by  getting 
closer  to  it,  the  only  difficulty  being  that  of  transmitting  their 
information  to  the  rear.  They  should  report  the  location  of 
bursts  with  reference  to  the  target,  details  of  the  latter  and 
any  changes  that  occur  in  it.  It  is  a  good  plan  to  have  artil- 
lery officers  accompany  the  advancing  infantry.  %  It  is  the 
duty  of  such  officers  to  inform  the  commander  of  the  artillery 
how  close  the  firing  line  is  to  the  enemy  and  to  report  against 
what  parts  of  the  hostile  position  special  artillery  support  is 
required. 

France  t  The  second  ranking  officer  of  the  battalion  staff  is  usually 
placed  in  charge  of  the  scouts.  There  are  three  scouts  in  each  battery. 
Their  duty  is  to  ascertain  whether  the  terrain  is  passable  and,  when  neces- 
sary, to  leave  one  of  their  number  behind  to  ensure  that  the  proper  road  is 
taken  by  the  batteries.  They  are  to  give  infantry  columns  timely  warning 
of  the  fact  that  artillery  is  about  to  pass,  in  order  that  the  road  may  be 


'From  Information  furnished  by  Major-General  Baron  von  Stengel.  Bavarian 
Afmy,  formerly  an  officer  of  the  Ist  Bavarian  Field  Artillery  Regiment. — Latbiz, 
X)U  FtidartilkrU  im  Zukunftakampf. 

tEumpUai  •  Engagement  of  Chevllly,  September  30th,  1870.  Oeschichte  dea 
Ffl^rtillerU  RegimenU  Nr.  0,  p.  283. 

Engagement  at  Vlllejulf.  December  16th,  1870.  ibid. 

Conduct  of  the  4th  Heavy  Battery  of  the  Guard  Artillery  at  Le  Bourget. 
OfSeMcKU  der  Garde-Feldartillerig,  p.  276. 

|Par.  369.  Oerman  H.  A.  D.  B.  "Measures  should  be  taken  to  maintain  un- 
interrupted communication  with  the  firing  line.  To  this  end,  officers  should,  as  a 
role,  be  sent  ahead.  These  should  send  information  to  the  rear  by  telephone  or  by 
■Ignala.  They  are  to  supplement  the  observations  made  from  stations  in  rear  and 
report,  during  the  progress  of  the  action,  when  the  sheaf  of  fire  should  be  shifted." 


314  Employment  of  Artillery. 

deared.    Finally,  they  are  charged  with  tactical  reconnaissance  in  action 
and  on  the  march,  especially  when  the  batteries  are  being  brought  up. 

Austria  (1909) :  *  Each  battery  has  a  reconnoitering  patrol,  consistr 
ing  of  one  officer,  one  artificer,  and  two  corporals.  These  men  are  to  be 
well  instructed  in  signalling  and  telephone  work.  The  commander  of  the 
artillery  directs  one  or  more  patrols  to  report  to  him.  One  of  them  usually 
accompanies  the  point  of  the  advance  guard  and  picks  out  and  marks  routes 
by  means  of  which  obstacles  may  be  avoided.  In  general,  the  duties  o^ 
artillery  patrols  consist  of  ground  scouting,  reconnaissance  of  positions 
and  of  the  objective,  and  local  reconnaissance.  Battery  patrols  are  to 
remain  in  sight  of  their  batteries;  when  necessary,  they  are  to  take  along  a 
telescope;  if  practicable,  telephone  communication  is  to  be  kept  up  be- 
tween patrols  and  their  batteries.  Patrols  should  make  a  written  report 
accompanied  by  a  sketch  and  legend.  Communication  is  to  be  kept  up 
with  the  infantry  firing  line.  The  patrols  are  to  be  sent  out  early  enough 
to  enable  them  to  observe,  from  points  permitting  a  good  view,  the  prog- 
ress of  the  action  from  the  moment  when  the  advanced  troops  of  both 
forces  come  in  contact.  When  a  fortified  position  is  to  be  attacked,  it  is 
considered  advisable  to  send  out  as  soon  as  practicable  the  scouts  that  are 
to  reconnoiter  the  objective.  In  general,  two  patrols  are  to  work  together, 
so  that  observations  may  be  made  simultaneously  from  two  points.  The 
leader  of  the  patrol  is  usually  to  remain  pretty  close  to  the  line  of  march, 
so  that  he  can,  without  delay,  report  any  information  gained  to  the  artillery 
commander;  he  is  to  send  scouts  to  reconnoiter  any  ground  that  he  can 
not  cover  in  person.  Command  is  considerably  facilitated  by  accurately 
defining  tasks. 

England  (1908):  The  mounted  men  of  the  battalion  staff  or  of 
the  staff  of  the  divisional  artillery  are  specially  trained  as  artillery  patrols. 
They  are  to  maintain  communication  between  the  commander  of  the  artil- 
lery and  the  commander  of  the  troops,  reconnoiter  positions,  observe  on  the 
flanks,  reconnoiter  hostile  positions,  and  observe  the  fire.  They  are  also 
to  observe  the  movements  made  by  troops  of  their  own  force. 


RECONNAISSANCE  DUTIES  OF  ARTILLERY  COMMANDERS.! 

The  commander  of  the  artillery  should  recoimoiter  the 
position  that  is  to  be  taken  up,  and  the  subordinate  com- 
manders, who  bring  up  their  respective  organizations,  should 
reconnoiter  the  approaches  to  the  position.  **In  all  recon- 
naissances, care  should  be  taken  to  avoid  drawing  the  enemy's 
attention  to  the  position  that  has  been  selected.  The  artil- 
lery commanders  and  the  motmted  men  accompanying  them, 

*3treffleur,  1009. 1. 

fPara.  406-410,  German  F.  A.  D.  R. 


Reconnaissance  Duties  of  Artillery  Commanders.    315 

as  well  as  patrols  and  scouts,  should  take  advantage  of  any 
available  cover.  Special  care  is  requisite  in  approaching  the 
firing  position.  The  reconnoitering  commander  should 
leave  his  companions  behind  when  necessary,  and  should 
examine  the  position  on  foot.'*  (Par.  400,  German  P.  A.  D. 
R.). 

The  hostile  artillery  is  usually  the  first  target.  The 
commander  of  the  artillery  brigade  should  ascertain  the  ex- 
tent of  the  objective  or  the  area  within  which  the  hostile 
artillery  is  supposed  to  be  located,  so  that  he  can  intelligently 
assign  combat  tasks  to  his  regiments  and  have  data  available 
for  selecting  covered  avenues  of  approach.  The  brigade 
commander  need  not  ride  over  the  whole  position,  as  this 
would  only  tend  to  retard  the  reconnaissance  work  of  the 
subordinate  leaders.  As  soon  as  a  regimental  commander 
receives  his  orders,  if  practicable  before  this,  he  should  as- 
semble his  battalion  commanders  and  have  them  begin  their 
reconnaissance.  It  is  a  good  plan  to  have  the  battalion 
commanders  ride  at  the  head  of  the  main  body.  The  farther 
they  are  posted  ahead  of  their  respective  organizations,  the 
more  time  they  will  have  for  reconnoitering. 

If  the  commander  of  the  artillery  brigade  rides  at  the 
head  of  the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard,  the  leading  element 
of  the  artillery  of  the  main  body  will  be  about  3  km.  in  rear 
of  him.  Hence,  he  can  expect  his  batteries  to  arrive  thirty 
minutes  after  he  has  despatched  an  order  directing  them  to 
advance.  Orders  should  be  promptly  issued,  quickly  trans- 
mitted, and  clear.  This  is  essential,  for  otherwise  batteries 
might  stand  idle  in  rear  of  the  position.  Regiments  and 
battalions  are  assigned  to  definite  sections  for  combat  and  for 
observation.  Whereas  it  is  sufficient  simply  to  assign  a  regi- 
ment to  a  section  in  which  it  is  to  go  into  position,  battalions 
should  be  given  more  comprehensive  instructions,  which 
should  specify,  among  other  things,  how  communication  is 
to  be  maintained  with  regimental  headquarters. 


816  Employment  op  Artillbry. 

Each  battalion  commander  should  have  his  battery 
commanders  come  forward  early  enough  to  enable  them  to 
complete  their  reconnaissance  by  the  time  their  batteries 
arrive.  In  accordance  with  whatever  instructions  he  may 
have  received  from  his  regimental  commander,  the  battalion 
commander  should  then  indicate  the  general  direction  in 
which  the  batteries  are  to  face,  the  sections  they  are  to  occupy, 
the  objectives  they  are  to  fire  upon  or  the  areas  they  are  to 
observe,  and  where  observation  stations  are  to  be  located,  in 
case  the  position  is  masked.  He  furthermore  should  deter- 
mine the  manner  of  going  into  position  and  the  kind  of  posi- 
tion, whether  fire  is  to  be  opened  at  once  by  each  battery  or 
when  ordered,  and  how  commimication  is  to  be  installed  be- 
tween his  observation  station  and  the  batteries. 

Battery  commanders,  who  had  best  ride  at  the  head  of 
the  battalion  to  which  they  belong,  should,  in  the  first  place, 
make  a  detailed  reconnaissance  of  the  objective,  or  of  the  area 
assigned  them  for  observation.  Then  each  shotdd  decide 
upon  the  position  of  his  battery,  the  formation  to  be  employed 
in  going  into  battery,  and  the  location  of  his  observation 
station.  The  manner  of  going  into  position  pursuant  to  the 
general  directions  given  by  the  battalion  commander,  should 
be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  battery  commanders.  When 
special  directions  have  to  be  given  in  this  regard,  the  neces- 
sary orders  should  be  sent  back  to  the  oflBcer  bringing  up  the 
unit.  Chiefs  of  platoon  and  chiefs  of  section  may,  like- 
wise, be  brought  up  to  examine  the  position. 

An  officer  charged  with  reconnoitering  a  position  had  best  submit 
the  result  of  his  work  in  the  form  of  a  sketch  that  should,  among  other 
things,  give  such  information  as  the  map  of  the  commander  does  not  con- 
tain. It  may  be  a  good  plan  to  attach  to  this  sketch  a  profile  showing 
estimated  elevations. 

The  message  covering  the  reconnaissance  or  the  reconnaissance  sketch 
should  show: 

1.  How  far  the  road  on  which  the  troops  are  marching  can  be  used; 
where  the  road  must  be  left  (mile  stone);  and  on  what  side  of  the  road 
the  artillery  should  march  to  avoid  cutting  infantry  columns. 

2.  What  route  should  be  followed;  whether  it  is  possible  to  keep  up 
a  trot;  and  whether  the  route  is  sheltered  from  the  enemy's  view. 


Reconnaissance  Duties  op  Artillery  Commanders.   317 

8.  Location  of  the  position,  unless  this  is  obvious  from  the  sketch; 
how  the  artillery  should  go  into  position;  any  preparatory  work  that  should 
be  done  (cutting  down  banks);  nature  of  the  ground;  masks;  observation 
by  the  enemy;  and  defiladed  spaces. 

4.  How  far  one  can  see  from  the  position;  the  presumable  position 
of  the  hostile  artillery;  and  whether  the  approaches  to  the  hostile  position 
are  visible. 

6.    Where  reserves  and  light  ammunition  columns  should  be  posted. 

6.     Whether  covering  bodies  are  required. 

France:  The  reconnaissance  of  the  position,  whether  it  is  to  be 
used  for  immediate  action  or  for  placing  the  artillery  in  readiness,  is  to  be 
made  by  the  various  artillery  commanders,  thoroughly  or  superficially, 
depending  upon  the  tactical  situation.  When  the  artillery  is  to  accompany 
an  infantry  attack,  this  reconnaissance  is  to  be  made  more  quickly  than  at 
any  other  time.  It  may  be  advisable  to  employ  a  reconnaissance  officer 
(officier  orienteur),  to  assist  a  higher  artillery  commander.  This  recon* 
naissance  officer  gathers  the  necessary  information  in  regard  to  neighbor- 
ing troops,  and  picks  out  points  on  the  map  to  make  it  easier  for  his  chief 
to  find  his  way  on  the  ground,  in  order  that  the  latter  may  be  enabled  to 
devote  his  whole  attention  to  the  tactical  situation.  As  far  as  practicable, 
the  various  commanders  should  make  their  reconnaissances  simultaneously. 
To  this  end,  it  may  be  advisable  for  battalion  commanders  to  accompany 
the  artillery  commander  in  order  that  they  may  quickly  bring  up  their 
battery  commanders.  The  latter,  meantime,  ride  at  the  head  of  the  bat- 
talion to  which  they  belong  and  join  their  battalion  commander  as  soon  as 
he  gets  orders  from  the  artillery  commander  to  bring  his  battalion  into 
position. 

The  reconnaissance  duties  are  distributed  as  follows: 

The  artillery  commander  reconnoiters  the  enemy,  in  a  general  way, 
the  objective  designated  by  the  commander  of  the  troops,  and  the  position 
assigned  to  him,  and  divides  this  position  up  between  the  subordinate 
units.  According  to  the  situation  and  task  as  specified  in  the  orders  he  has 
received,  he  designates  the  battalion  that  is  to  open  fire  first,  and  assigns 
to  the  other  battalions  (posted  in  readiness  or  in  observation)  areas  to  be 
observed. 

The  reconnaissance  made  by  a  battalion  commander  covers  all  de- 
tails pertaining  to  the  position  of  each  battery.  The  battalion  commander 
directs,  when  necessary,  how  the  batteries  are  to  go  into  position,  indicates 
the  battery  that  is  to  open  fire  first,  and  the  position  of  the  reserve.  It  may 
become  necessary  in  a  battalion,  likewise,  to  keep  certain  batteries  either  in 
readiness  or  in  observation. 

The  battery  commander  reconnoiters  the  section  assigned  him,  with 
particular  reference  to  the  manner  of  unlimbering,  to  fire  direction,  and  to 
observation.  Artillery  is  to  utilize  roads  as  long  as  possible  when  approach* 
ing  a  position.  The  formations  used  should  be  those  best  adapted  to  the 
ground  encountered  and  to  keep  the  movements  hidden  from  the  enemy's 
view. 


318  Employment  op  Artillery. 


SELECTION  OF  ARTILLERY  POSITIONS. 

The  artillery  position  constitutes  the  framework  upon 
which  the  arrangement  of  the  other  fighting  forces  as  a  rule 
depends. 

The  requirements  that  an  artillery  position  should  fulfill 
as  to  a  field  of  fire,  i.e.,  whether  a  good  field  of  fire  is  necessary 
only  at  long  ranges  or  also  at  short  ranges,  vary  with  the 
object  in  view  and  with  the  tactical  situation.  The  nature 
of  the  ground  will  often  exercise  a  decisive  influence  on  the 
distance  at  which  the  artillery  is  posted  from  the  enemy. 
(Example :  Position  of  the  batteries  of  the  1st  Army  during 
the  battle  of  Gravelotte).  The  first  consideration  in  select- 
ing a  position  is  always  the  attainment  of  the  maximum  fire 
effect.*  Cover  against  hostile  view  and  fire  may  be  a  pre- 
requisite to  the  attainment  of  the  superiority  of  fire. 

Every  artillery  position  should  be  reconnoitered  thor- 
oughly, but  without  useless  expenditure  of  time,  and  with 
due  regard  to  the  objective  and  the  distribution  of  one's  own 
troops.  But  the  reconnaissance  can  be  made  quickly  and 
thoroughly  and,  at  the  same  time,  without  attracting  the 
enemy's  attention,  only  if  each  and  every  leader  confines 
himself  strictly  to  his  own  affairs,  i.  e.,  if  he  refrains  from 
bothering  with  details  with  which  subordinates  are  charged, 
and  if  he  sees  to  it  that  his  subordinate  leaders  are  brought  up 
at  any  early  moment  by  the  shortest  route  to  participate  in 
the  reconnaissance.  The  brigade  commander  should  as- 
certain the  extent  of  the  objective  and  assign  sections  thereof 
to  the  regiments.  As  far  as  practicable,  he  should  assign  a 
separate  road  to  each  regiment. 

It  is  particularly  important  that  the  line  face  in  the 
proper  direction,  as  a  change  of  front  interrupts  the  fire  and 
in  long  artillery  lines  is  difficult  and  entails  losses.  To  facili- 
tate supervision  and  fire  direction,  the  batteries  of  a  bat- 

*It«lyi  Every  position  should  fulfln  two  prime  conditions,  viz..  it  should 
have  an  adequate  field  of  fire,  and  permit  good  observation  of  that  fire.  Every- 
thing else,  oven  cover,  is  of  secondary  importance. 


Artillery  Positions.  319 

talion  are  separated  by  intervals  of  thirty  paces,  and  the 
battalions  by  larger  intervals,  if  practicable.  In  the  larger 
units,  however,  care  should  be  taken  from  the  very  outset, 
to  confine  the  size  of  these  intervals  to  reasonable  limits,  in 
order  that  the  available  room  may  be  utilized  and  reinforce- 
ments come  intact  into  the  line.  Whether  the  various  bat- 
teries are  posted  abreast  of  each  other  or  in  echelon  depends 
upon  the  terrain,*  the  probable  course  of  the  action,  and  the 
effect  of  the  hostile  artillery  fire.  In  a  battalion  of  artillery 
whose  batteries  are  posted  in  echelon,  fire  direction  must 
not  be  impaired  by  large  intervals  and  distances.  The  danger 
that  artillery  posted  in  echelon  runs  of  being  enfiladed  and 
the  drawback  that  its  batteries  have  but  a  very  limited  field 
of  action,  must  be  reckoned  with.  Distances  should  be 
approximately  as  large  as  intervals  between  batteries  and 
intervals  between  guns  should  be  decreased  in  many  cases. 


In  a  large  battle,  it  may  become  necessary  to  post  the 
artillery  in  two  lines.  The  drawbacks  incident  to  this  ar- 
rangement, such  as  the  depth  of  the  target  offered,  the 
difficulty  of  recognizing  the  objective,  of  observing  the  fire, 
of  communicating  between  the  two  lines,  and  of  supplying 
the  first  line  with  ammunition,  must  be  accepted,  f 

■*Cf.,  the  maps  of  battles  of  the  Franco-German  war,  showing  how  the  for- 
mation of  the  ground  necessitated  echeloning  the  batteries  on  the  Folster  Heights 
at  Spicheren.  Of. » the  corps  artillery  of  the  IXth  Army  Corps  at  Vemdville,  August 
18th,  1870;  the  artillery  of  the  Xllth  Army  Corps  at  Fond  de  Givonne,  and  that  of 
the  Xlth  Army  Corps  north-east  of  Floing  (Sedan). 

tEzamples:  Craonne,  1814;  Lovtcha.  1877.  Kuropatkin-Krahueb.  I. 
p.  67. 

After  the  Prussian  artillery  had  gained  the  superiority  of  fire  at  St.  Privat. 
the  artillery  of  the  French  Vlth  Army  Corps  went  into  position  in  three  lines,  one 
above  the  other,  north  of  the  stone  quarries  of  Amanweiler,  to  cover  the  withdrawal 
of  its  infantry.  According  to  montlusiant  each  gun  had  only  ten  rounds  of 
ammunition  available. 

In  a  restricted  sense,  the  position  of  the  3d  Light  Battery  of  the  Vllth  Army 
Corps  at  St.  Hubert,  in  front  of  the  long  line  of  artillery  at  Gravelotte,  may  like- 
wise be  dted  as  an  example  of  the  employment  of  artillery  in  two  lines. 


320  Employment  of  Artillery. 

The  two  lines  of  artillexy  should  be  separated  according 
to  the  principle  laid  down  on  p.  343,  for  firing  over  infantry. 
At  all  events,  this  distribution  might  be  found  more  practi- 
cable than  to  push  batteries  that  arrive  late  on  the  battle- 
field, into  the  firing  line  by  piece. 

Tactical  and  technical  considerations  should  be  har- 
monized in  selecting  an  artillery  position.  If  these  considera- 
tions conflict  with  one  another,  tactical  considerations  take 
precedence.  Artillery  should  strive  to  cooperate  with  the 
other  arms  without  hampering  their  freedom  of  movement. 
Since  the  artillery  is  practically  acting  alone,  for  the  time 
being,  at  the  opening  of  an  engagement,  the  other  arms  should 
treat  it  with  consideration  and  allow  the  batteries  as  much 
freedom  as  possible  in  their  choice  of  position.  This  is 
specially  prescribed  in  the  Russian  regulations.  The  infan- 
try must  subordinate  its  action  and  movements  in  all  re- 
spects to  the  requirements  of  the  artillery.  This  relation 
is  reversed  the  moment  the  infantry  goes  into  action.  The 
artillery  now  becomes  an  auxiliary  arm  and  must  adapt  it- 
self to  the  demands  of  the  infantry  fight.  In  pursuit  or  re- 
treat, it  may  be  a  good  plan  to  despatch  artillery  under  weak 
escort  to  gain  flanking  positions. 

Efficacy  of  fire  is  the  principal  technical  requirement,  A 
free  field  of  fire  devoid  of  cover  that  the  enemy  might  utilize 
for  his  advance  is  desirable.  When  firing  from  a  masked 
position  dead  angles  can  not  be  avoided.  The  tactical  sit- 
uation determines  what  the  extent  of  the  free  field  of  fire 
should  be.  Groimd  that  slopes  gently  toward  the  enemy  is 
the  most  favorable.  High  points  that  draw  the  enemy's 
fire  are  better  suited  for  observation  than  for  gun  positions. 
The  conditions  for  observing  the  fire  should  be  good.  When 
the  sun  is  nearing  the  horizon  in  rear  of  the  battery,  the  target 
will  usually  appear  silhouetted  against  the  background. 
When  the  sun  is  above  the  target,  when  the  light  is  bright 
and  when  the  sun  is  low,  observation  is  more  difficult  and  may 


Artillery  Positions.  321 

cause  errors  to  be  made  in  bracketing.*  Commanding  posi- 
tions are  desirable,  as  they  permit  the  terrain  in  front  and  in 
rear  of  the  objective  to  be  observed.  The  hostile  fire  effect 
should  be  minimized.  Parapets  covered  with  sod  afford  the 
best  cover.  Isolated  gun  emplacements  are  apt  to  show  and 
should,  therefore,  be  made  as  inconspicuous  as  possible. 
This  may  be  accomplished  by  connecting  them  with  a  slight 
parapet. 

The  effect  of  the  hostile  fire  (see  p.  223,  supra)  is  re- 
duced by  ground  rising  in  respect  to  the  enemy's  line  of  sight, 
especially  if  the  groimd  is  terraced,  and  by  ground  that  limits 
the  range  of  ricochets.  Newly  ploughed  soil,  fiuxows  run- 
ning parallel  to  the  front  of  the  battery  and  marshy  ground 
would  have  this  effect.  Positions  near  walls,  piles  of  stones, 
and  on  rocky  soil  should  be  avoided.  Intervals  shotdd  not 
be  smaller  than  ten  paces.  Protection  against  flank  and 
enfilading  fire  should  be  provided. 

The  service  of  the  guns  should  be  facilitated  by  posting 
them  on  level,  solid  ground,  f  All  parts  of  the  position  should 
be  visible  to  the  commander,  and  the  line  of  guns  should  not 
be  unnecessarily  irregular. 

The  position  should  be  such  as  to  enable  the  guns  to 
move  freely  in  any  direction,  should  have  covered  approaches 
from  the  rear,  and  should  enable  the  artillery  to  go  into 
action  imobserved.  It  should ,  moreover,  permit  each  element 
to  have  its  own  commtmicating  way  to  its  reserve,  so  that 
caissons  will  not  cross  each  other  in  coming  up  from  the  rear. 

The  enemy's  observation  of  fire  should  be  made  difficult. 
It  is  desirable  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  adjusting  his  fire 
accurately,  and  to  compel  him  to  search  large  areas.  The 
more  inconspicuous  a  position  is,  the  better.  Artillery 
should  not  be  posted  in  the  vicinity  of  conspicuous  points, 
especially  when  these  are  indicated  on  the  maps. 

^Thls  disadvantage  was  particularly  noticeable  during  the  battle  of  Colombey 
The  lower  the  sun  sank,  the  more  it  blinded  the  eyes,  and  made  it  difficult  to  observe 
the  fire  and  to  lay  the  guns.     HoFrBAUEB,  Deutsche  Artillerie,  III.  p.  16. 

tThe  Prussian  batteries  (Yoss*  and  Stiimprs)  posted  on  the  Boten  Berg  at 
Spicheren.    Qen.  St.  W„  I.  p.  356. 


322  Employment  of  Artillery. 

Bright  backgroiind — ^the  skyline — is  unfavorable,  as  the 
guns  are  silhouetted  against  it.  Dark  background  increases 
the  difficulties  of  adjustment.  Batteries  posted  in  front  of 
woods  usually  betray  their  position  by  the  flashes  of  their 
guns  only.*  It  is  not  difficult  to  get  the  range  to  natural  or 
artificial  masks,  but  it  is  difficult  to  determine  the  relative 
position  with  respect  to  the  objective  of  bursts  visible  in  rear 
of  the  mask.  When  the  mask  consists  of  trees,  the  pro- 
jectiles passing  through  frequently  burst  prematiu^ely.  (See 
p.  223,  supra.)  This  is  of  special  importance  to  shielded 
batteries  posted  in  the  open.  A  mask  affords  better  pro- 
tection when  it  runs  obliquely  to  the  front  of  the  battery  that 
is  sheltered  behind  it.  This  is  likewise  true  of  several  rows 
of  masks  running  parallel  to  the  front  of  the  battery.  Hedges 
in  rear  of  which  a  battery  proposes  to  take  position  should  be 
reconnoitered  from  the  enemy's  side  to  ascertain  whether 
there  are  any  gaps  through  which  the  guns  can  be  seen.  Em- 
bankments one  meter  high,  when  used  as  a  mask,  will  often 
give  better  protection  than  epaulements.  Extensive  grain 
fields  in  front  of  a  battery  make  it  difficult  for  the  enemy  to 
observe  his  fire.  Dummy  emplacements  or  objects  that 
slightly  resemble  guns  (heaps  of  fruit,  clumps  of  bushes) 
frequently  lead  an  observer  astray  even  after  he  has  recog- 
nized them  as  such.  An  excited  observer  whose  mental 
balance  has  been  disturbed  by  the  heat  of  action  and  the  weight 
of  responsibility  resting  upon  him,  is  without  doubt  more  prone 
to  make  such  mistakes  than  one  examining  everything  calmly 
with  practiced  eye  and  sober  judgment.  During  the  en- 
gagement of  Tashihchiao  (1904),  the  Russian  artillery  fired 
for  the  first  time  from  a  concealed  position.     The  gim  epaule- 

■^The  German  Artillery  DriU  Regulations  of  1877.  par.  198,  cautioned  artil- 
lery not  to  take  up  a  position  in  front  of  woods,  because  of  the  conspicuousness  of 
the  target  that  it  would  present  to  the  enemy.  The  Russian  and  Italian  regiUaUona 
consider  such  a  position  positively  unfavorable.  With  smokeless  powder  this  li 
not  true.  Though  "over"  shots  disappear  in  the  woods  and  thus  facilitate  the 
enemy's  adjustment  of  fire,  it  is  usuaUy  impossible  for  him  to  ascertain  the  distance 
of  his  objective  from  the  woods  and  the  interval  of  burst,  unless  he  succeeds  in  plac- 
ing his  bursts  so  that  the  objective  is  clearly  defined  against  them. 


Artillery  Positions.  323 

ments  constructed  in  plain  view  on  the  heights  very  natur- 
ally drew  the  enemy's  fire. 

At  Weiszenburg,  several  Prussian  batteries  were  engaged  with  a 
French  battery  that  was  masked  by  the  trees  that  lined  the  chaussie,* 

The  position  of  the  village  of  Vionville  made  it  impossible  for  the 
French  batteries  to  observe  their  short  shots  directed  at  the  Prussian  bat- 
teries posted  on  the  hill  west  of  the  village,  t 

The  4th  Light  Battery  and  the  4th  Heavy  Battery  of  the  10th 
German  Field  Artillery  were  unable  to  maintain  their  position  east  of 
Mars-la-Tour  under  the  fire  of  superior  hostile  artillery,  because  they 
were  screened  by  the  trees  and  the  embankment  of  the  ehavssie  that  ran 
within  thirty  paces  along  their  front,  t 

At  Gravelotte  some  of  the  batteries  of  the  1st  Army  were  so  posted 
that  they  could  just  see  over  the  tops  of  the  trees  in  the  valley  of  the  Mance 
brook.  This  explains  why  the  hostile  artillery  found  it  so  difficult  to  hit 
these  batteries.  ^ 

The  cutting  down  of  a  conspicuous  poplar  at  Koniggratz  decreased 
the  effect  of  the  Austrian  artillery  fire,  which  previous  to  this,  had  caused 
rather  serious  losses.^ 

A  similar  effect  was  produced  by  tearing  down  a  house  at  Lovtcha.ll 
During  the  engagement  of  Blumenau  (1866),  the  2d  six-pounder 
Battery  (v.  Schaper's)  of  the  4th  Field  Artillery,  lost  25  men  and  27  horses 
in  its  last  position,  because  it  happened  to  be  posted  on  ground  that  was 
littered  with  a  number  of  white  stones.  These  attracted  the  enemy's 
attention  and  facilitated  his  ranging.  The  other  three  batteries  of  the 
reserve  artillery,  of  which  v.  Schaper's  Battery  formed  a  part,  lost  10  men 
and  10  horses  only.® 

Hollows  in  front  of  a  battery  are  of  special  value,  as  they 
catch  and  hide  the  enemy's  short  salvos,  upon  the  proper 
determination  of  which  the  observation  of  fire  largely  de- 
pends. Even  if  the  smoke-cloud  does  not  disappear  entirely, 
it  is  dissipated  so  quickly  that  the  target  may  be  seen  through 
it,  thus  frequently  producing  the  optical  illusion  of  an  over 
shot.  A  low  crest  in  front  of  and  parallel  to  the  battery  posi- 
tion has  a  similar  effect.     The  ineffectiveness  of  the  British 


*HoPFBAUER,  Deutsche  Artillerie,  I,  pp.  16  and  49. 

t/Wcf..  IV,  p.  103. 

t  Kriegsgeschichtliche  Einzelschrifien,  25,  p.  18. 

IfHoFFBAUER,  Deutsche  Artillerie,  V.  p.  69. 

^eschichte  des  Regiments  Nr.  Z,  p.  36. 

IIKuropatkin-Krahmeb,  I,  p.  69. 

°Qeschichte  des  Jjt.  Feldartillerieregiments,  p.  194. 


324  Employment  of  Artillery. 

artillery  fire  directed  against  the  Boer  position  at  Colenso 
and  against  Lieutenant  v.  Wichmann's  Battery  at  Lady- 
smith  on  October  30th,  1899,  was  largely  due  to  this  cir- 
cumstance. 

When  the  guns  are  posted  on  sandy  soil,  the  blast  of 
their  discharge  raises  a  dust  cloud  that  dissipates  all  the 
advantages  of  smokeless  powder.  This  may  be  obviated 
by  wetting  the  groimd  or  by  covering  it  with  canvass  or  with 
sod. 


Concealment  often  suflBces  to  preclude  all  hostile  fire 
effect,  for  an  enemy  who  can  not  observe  his  fire  can  count  only 
upon  accidental  hits.  For  this  reason,  masked  positions  are 
preferred  to  unmasked  positions.*  Positions  may  be  de- 
fined as  unmaskedy  semi-masked,  and  masked,  depending 
upon  the  degree  of  concealment  afforded. 

In  an  unmasked  position,  the  gtms  are  not  concealed 
from  vi6w  and  the  line  sights  can  be  used  in  laying. 

In  a  semi-masked  position,  the  guns  are  concealed  from 
the  enemy's  view,  but  a  man  standing  beside  a  gim  can  still 
lay  it  for  direction. 

In  a  masked  position,  the  gtms  are  so  concealed  that  it  is 
impossible  for  the  gunners  to  aim  directly  at  the  target. 

As  it  takes  two  minutes  to  anchor  the  French  field  gun 
and  as  the  latter,  in  addition,  moves  into  position  very  slowly, 
the  French  prefer  masked  positions  on  principle.  Depending 
upon  the  degree  of  concealment  afforded  their  gims,  the 
French  describe  positions  by  the  following  terms : 

^ArHllerisiische  MonaUchefU,  No.  XI  of  1907. —MilitOr-WochenblaU,  N08.14. 
141.  ISl.  154. 157.  of  1906;  Nos.  16. 19.  20,  22.  30.  31.  76. 116.  of  1907;  Nos.  93. 143. 
Of  1908;  Nos.  9.  3d.  of  1909. — Streffleur,  June  No.  of  1909;  see  also  article  in  the 
February  and  May  numbers  of  1909.  entitled.  EindrUcke  vom  artiUerisiUchen  In/or- 
maiianskurnu. 


Necessity  op  Masked  Positions.  325 

Sight  defilade  (defilement  du  maUriel)  i.  e., 

Dismounted  defilade  {defilement  de  V-  ^semi-masked; 
homme  d  pied)  J 

Mounted  defilade  (defilement  d  chevat)  | 

Plash  defilade  (defilement  d  lueurs)  i.e.,  [        -     - 

withdrawn  so  far  that  the  flash  of  the  guns  j 

is  concealed.  J 

Since  field  artillery  in  plain  view  exposes  itself  to  annihila- 
tion,* unmasked  positions  are  selected  only  when  artillery 
accompanies  an  infantry  attack,  or  when  it  is  to  sweep  the 
immediate  foreground  and  this  is  impracticable  from  flank- 
ing positions.  Whenever  the  tactical  end  in  view  admits^ 
field  artillery  should  invariably  use  masked  fire,  just  as  the 
heavy  artillery  does.  Heavy  artillery  has  more  freedom  in 
choosing  its  position  than  field  artillery.  Effective  shrapnel 
fire  forced  the  Russian  as  well  as  the  Japanese  artillery  to 
fight  as  a  rule  in  masked  positions.  This  was  practicable 
because  all  the  fighting  centered  around  field  fortifications* 
In  spite  of  this,  both  sides  felt  the  absence  of  shields.  Yet 
even  after  gun  shields  were  introduced,  the  value  of  masked 
XX>sitions  did  not  diminish.  Batteries  equipped  with  shields 
are  insensible  to  shrapnel  fire,  though  their  ammunition 
supply  and  their  movements  may  be  hampered  by  such  fire. 

*On  June  27th,  1904,  Just  after  the  opening  engagements,  Ldeutenant-Colond 
Pabhenko,  Russian  Army  wrote  the  following:  "The  use  of  unmasked  artillery 
positions  is  henceforth  out  of  the  question."  Colonel  Namaoata,  Japanese  Artil- 
lery, similarly  states:  "We  could  not  post  our  batteries  in  the  open,  for  they  would 
have  been  annihilated  by  the  Russian  rapid  fire  guns.  To  post  a  battery  in  an  un* 
masked  position  spells  its  annihilation."  The  following  is  reported  of  the  battle 
on  the  Yalu :  "All  epaulements  stood  out  conspicuously  and  were  visible  at  a  great 
distance.  It  is  not  surprising  that  the  twenty-four  Russian  field  guns  were  silenced 
inside  of  twenty-five  minutes  and  that,  when  they  again  opened  fire  during  the  after- 
noon, they  were  silenced  in  an  hour."  The  guns,  it  is  true,  had  no  shields,  but  were 
in  pits  and  therefore  could  scarcely  be  said  to  be  posted  in  the  open.  But  the  batteries 
were  clearly  visible  and  their  position  became  accurately  known  when  they  allowed 
themselves  to  be  enticed  into  opening  direct  fire  on  a  small  body  of  Japanese  pioneers 
who  were  reoonnoltering  on  the  banks  of  the  Yalu.  During  the  attack  on  Nanshan 
HiU  by  Oku's  Army,  the  Russian  batteries  posted  in  conspicuous  positions  were 
tOenced  by  7  a.  m.,  after  a  bombardment  lasting  only  one  hour.  At  Wafangkou* 
the  3d  and  4th  Batteries  of  the  1st  East  Siberian  Rifle  Artillery  Brigade,  posted  in 
unmasked  positions,  were  so  shot  to  pieces  that  their  firagments  later  fell  into  the 
bands  of  the  victorious  Japanese. 


326  Employment  of  Artillery. 

If  one  wishes  to  attack  a  shielded  battery  frontally,  one  must 
employ  shell  or  use  curved  fire  guns.  In  either  case,  careful 
adjustment  of  fire  is  requisite  and  this  can  only  be  obtained 
when  the  target  or  the  dust  or  smoke-cloud  produced  by  the 
bursting  projectile  is  directly  visible,  otherwise  the  desired 
effect  must  be  produced  by  searching  an  area,  a  procedure 
that  entails  an  enormous  consumption  of  ammunition.  The 
closer  the  guns  are  posted  to  the  crest,  the  sooner  will  the 
fire  produce  results.  As  the  Russian  and  the  French  artil- 
lery show  an  unmistakable  preference  for  masked  positions, 
we  would  create  unnecessary  difficulties  for  ourselves  were 
we  to  attempt  to  fight  them  from  immasked  positions  and 
thereby  permit  them  to  bombard  us  with  percussion  fire.  On 
the  contrary,  we  must  fight  in  masked  positions  and  endeavor 
to  force  the  enemy  to  leave  his  masked  positions.  Masked 
fire  makes  it  more  difficult  to  estimate  the  strength  of  the 
opposing  artillery  and,  at  the  same  time,  deprives  the  higher 
commander  of  indications  upon  which  he  can  base  deductions 
as  to  the  strength  of  the  opposing  forces.*  This  will  not 
fail  to  produce  an  effect  on  a  vacillating  leader. 

Improvements  in  laying  apparatus  also  facilitate  change 
of  target.  It  is  unquestionably  a  disadvantage,  however, 
that  artillery  can  not  see  the  slope  in  front  of  the  crest  in 
rear  of  which  it  is  posted  nor  keep  it  under  effective  fire. 
When  so  situated,  artillery  requires  the  support  of  infantry 
in  its  front.  It  will  be  difficult  for  artillery  when  in  a  masked 
position,  to  take  a  hand  in  the  infantry  combat.  A  battery 
commander t  must  follow  the  general  course  of  the  action, 
direct  his  fire  on  the  shifting  targets  common  to  field  warfare, 
observe  its  effect,  and  also  conduct  the  fire  of  his  battery. 
Thus  arises  a  conflict  of  duties  that  is  hard  to  harmonize 


*Csicseric8  v.  Bacbant.  Colonel  Austrian  General  Staff.  "Die  Schlacht" 
Special  Supplement  to  Slreffieur,  Vienna,  1008.  On  p.  159  of  this,  the  author  relates 
bow  he  succeeded  In  estimating  the  strength  of  hostile  artillery  by  observing  the  balls 
of  smoke  of  bursting  shrapnel. 

tCaptain  v.  Habelmann,  German  Artillery.  "Afif  welchen  Schvrierigkeiten 
haben  wir  beim  Schieszen  au3  verdeckter  Sullung  tu  rechnen,  und  wie  mfervdnden  wir 
dieselben  am  beaten."     Artilleristiache  Monatahefte,  1908.  July  No.  p.  37. 


Masked  Fire.  327 

in  actual  war.  If  the  battery  commander  leaves  his  guns 
to  observe  his  fire,  he  can  not  exercise  an  influence  on  his 
battery;  what  happens  when  he  is  disabled?  If  he  directs 
his  battery  in  person,  the  effectiveness  of  his  fire  will  depend 
upon  the  efficiency  of  the  observer  detailed  by  him,  upon 
whom  he  must  rely  absolutely.  The  battery  commander  is 
personally  responsible  for  the  effectiveness  of  his  battery; 
the  maintenance  of  fire  discipline,  the  exertion  of  every  ounce 
of  energy  in  critical  moments,  and  the  regulation  of  the  am- 
munition supply  require  close  communication  between  leader 
and  his  organization.  For  this  reason,  a  single  person  should 
both  conduct  and  observe  the  fire.  In  the  French  artillery, 
the  commander  is  required  personally  to  observe  the  fire 
and  also  to  conduct  it,  whereas  in  the  Austrian  artillery, 
whenever  conduct  and  observation  of  fire  must  be  performed 
by  two  persons,  the  officer  next  in  rank  to  the  commander  is 
charged  with  conduct  of  fire.  The  danger  of  mistakes  is 
increased  by  this  separation.  While  it  can  not  be  denied 
that  such  a  procedure  is  practicable  in  a  battery  acting  alone, 
it  is  not  practicable  in  a  long  artillery  line,  as  the  observer 
will  frequently  not  be  aware  whether  the  shot  that  he  is  to 
observe  has  been  fired.  The  difficulties  will,  moreover,  be 
increased  when  the  battery  commander  is  unable  to  conceal 
himself  in  rear  of  a  mask  (tree,  bush)  or  other  natural  cover 
from  the  view  and  fire  of  the  enemy,  but  is  forced  to  kneel 
or  lie  down  in  his  chosen  station,  as  this  naturally  increases 
the  difficulty  of  selecting  suitable  observation  stations  which 
permit  a  good  view  of  the  terrain.  In  spite  of  these  difficul- 
ties, it  will  perhaps  always  be  practicable  to  find  a  suitable 
observation  station  not  far  from  the  battery  when  the  latter 
is  acting  alone.  In  Manchuria,  more  than  two  or  three  bat- 
teries rarely  fired  simultaneously  from  any  one  masked  posi- 
tion, so  that  the  difficulties  encountered  were  comparatively 
trifling.  The  preference  for  masked  positions  is  bound  to  lead 
to  the  employment  of  artillery  in  groups  posted  at  wide  in- 
tervals, but  finds  a  limit  in  the  restriction  of  frontage  in 


828  Employment  op  Artillery. 

battle.*  It  will  be  comparatively  easy  to  find  observation 
stations  for  one,  two,  or  three  batteries,  but  not  for  a  larger 
number  of  batteries.  One  will  seldom  be  so  forttmate  as  the 
Japanese  were  on  the  Yalu,  where  they  found  elevated  ob- 
servation stations  immediately  in  rear  of  their  batteries. 

Conduct  of  fire  becomes  more  and  more  difficult  as  the 
distance  between  battery  commander  and  battery  is  increased, 
and  it  also  becomes  more  difficult  to  judge  the  ground  as  it 
would  appear  from  the  battery.  The  errors  that  he  is  bound 
to  make  in  determining  the  location  of  bursts  on  a  flank  of 
the  objective,  and  the  inaccuracy  of  his  estimate  or  measure- 
ment of  the  difference  in  deflection  between  new  targets  that 
appear  at  ranges  other  than  that  to  the  objective  fired  upon 
previously,  will  be  correspondingly  greater.  The  foregoing 
demonstrates  the  necessity  of  providing  observation  wagons 
and  observation  towers  on  which  the  observer  is  protected 
by  an  armored  shield.  These  observation  stations  however, 
should  not  be  allowed  to  betray  the  position  of  the  batteries,  f 
Artificial  means  of  communication  are  imcertain.  Con- 
necting posts  and  visual  signals  suffice  for  transmitting  short 
observations.     At  the  present  time,  the  telephone  is  the  most 

*At  the  battle  on  the  Shaho.  batteries  of  the  Illd  Siberian  Army  Corps  and  of 
the  Xth  Army  Corps  (168  guns  on  a  front  of  14  km.)  occupied  an  average  ftont  of 
600  m.  each.  In  1870-71,  batteries  occupied  an  average  fkH>nt  of  270  m.  each,  and 
at  present,  with  a  total  frontage  of  5.000  m.  for  an  army  corps,  they  occupy  180  m., 
each.  At  Tashihchiao,  July  24th.  1904.  Colonel  Pashenko  had  two  batteries  In  a 
position  500  m.  In  rear  of  the  general  line  and  fired  against  three  and  later  on  against 
thirteen  Japanese  batteries  at  a  range  of  4.000 — 5.000  m.  On  August  30th  and  Slst  t 
at  Liaoyang.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Slusharenko  successfully  fought  with  two  bat- 
teries against  two  hostile  artillery  groups  containing  twenty-four  and  twelve  guns 
respectively,  at  a  range  of  4,200  and  4,500  m.  In  this  case,  the  observation  station 
was  800  m.  from  the  batteries.  In  both  cases,  the  battalion  commander,  who  was 
some  distance  fk-om  the  guns,  conducted  the  fire  and  observed  its  effect.  Communi- 
cation was  kept  up  by  means  of  signal  flags.  On  August  30th.  the  position  of  the 
gims  was  betrayed  by  their  flashes  and  by  the  dust  raised  by  the  blast  of  the  dis- 
charge; on  the  Slst,  the  guns  were  so  much  better  concealed  that  the  Japanese 
had  to  have  recourse  to  searching  flre.  v.  Tettau.  Achtuhn  Monate,  I,  p.  317. 
note     ♦     •     ♦    . 

Eimelschrift  43-44.  p.  40.  See  MilitOr-WochenblaU,  1906,  Nos.  60,  61.  108. 
and  109. 

tThe  Rhenish  Hardware  Co.  manufactures  an  observation  wagon  equipped 
with  a  tower  10.5  m.  high.  The  wagon  complete  weighs  1,756  kg.  The  same  flrm 
manufactures  an  observation  tower  5.6  m.  high  and  equipped  with  armored  shield, 
the  whole  contrivance  weighing  only  9.2  kg. 


Masked  Fire.  329 

satisfactory  medium  for  transmitting  orders,  but  its  use- 
fulness in  the  noise  of  battle  is  open  to  serious  question.* 
But,  be  this  as  it  may,  timely  measures  should  be  taken  to 
provide  a  substitute  for  the  telephone.  When  visual  signals 
are  used,  two  extra  men  should  be  detailed  for  duty  at  the 
observation  station.  Flag  signals  are  apt  to  betray  the 
location  of  the  station,  and  visual  signalling  requires  more 
thoroughly  trained  men  than  the  telephone.  In  addition 
to  communication  between  observation  station  and  battery, 
commtmication  with  the  battalion  commander  must  be  pro- 
vided. Message  cards  pulled  along  a  cord  might  perhaps 
suffice  for  this. 

The  necessity  of  masked  positions  must  unquestionably 
be  recognized.  The  difficulties  encotmtered  in  these  posi- 
tions are  not  in  indirect  la3dng  itself,  which  at  long  ranges 
is  frequently  much  easier  than  direct  laying,  but  in  prepara- 
tion and  conduct  of  fire  in  large  units. 

In  some  test  firings  held  in  Holland,  the  following  results  were 
obtained:  A  4-gun  battery  required  6,  a  6-gun  battery  7  minutes  to  set 
the  guns  parallel,  6^  minutes  to  adjust  the  fire  with  a  single  piece  upon  a 
target  representing  a  gun,  posted  at  a  range  of  3,000  m.,  and  8^  minutes 
slow  fire  to  verify  the  deflection.  The  fire  for  effect  began  16  minutes  after 
the  first  shot,  in  the  case  of  the  4-gun  battery,  and  17  minutes  after  the 
first  shot,  in  the  case  of  the  6-gun  battery.  The  battery  commander  has, 
in  addition,  the  following  duties  to  perform:  (1.)  To  determine  how  far 
in  rear  of  the  crest  he  shall  post  his  guns  to  ensure  that  the  trajectories  will 
clear  the  crest;  (2.)  To  reconnoiter  and  establish  the  observation  station 
assigned  him  by  the  battalion  commander;  (3.)  To  establish  communication 
between  the  observation  station  and  the  position  of  the  guns;  (4.)  To  as- 
certain the  angle  of  site  (i.  e.,  the  difference  in  level  between  guns  and  target) ; 
and  (5.)  To  ascertain  the  deflection  for  the  directing  gun. 


«To  quote  f^om  Prince  Hohbnlobe  on  the  battle  of  K5nlggr&tz  {Ails  meinem 
L0ben,  III,  p.  294) :  "Entire  teams  rolled  in  their  own  blood.  And  the  noise  made 
hy  shells  was  so  deafening  that  in  order  to  communicate  with  anyone  we  had  to  cup 
our  hands  and  yell  into  his  ears."  And  on  the  battle  of  Sedan  (ibid.t  VI.  p.  181, 
el  seg.):  "The  continual  bursting  of  shells  did  not  fail  to  produce  a  moral  effect  on 
the  personnel  of  the  batteries.  «  ♦  •  Each  gimner  fired  when  he  got  ready; 
observation  and  correction  were  absolutely  out  of  the  question;  soon  the  gunners 
did  not  even  train  the  gtms,  but  blazed  away  into  the  air;  and  with  such  fire  it  was 
alike  impossible  to  hit  or  to  Impress  the  enemy."    This  battery  suffered  no  losses. 


330  Employment  of  Artiu-ery. 

The  guns  must  be  so  posted  that  the  trajectories  will 
actually  clear  the  crest.  Good  clearance  is  especially  im- 
portant in  case  it  becomes  necessary  to  fire  on  targets  at 
short  range.*  The  defiladed  space  in  front  of  the  crest  de- 
creases as  the  distance  the  guns  are  posted  in  rear  of  the  crest 
increases. 

Masked  positions  have  the  disadvantage  that  artillery 
occupying  them  finds  it  difficult  to  shift  its  fire  from  one 
moving  target  to  another,  especially  when  the  targets  are 
not  moving  on  a  line  perpendicular  to  the  front  of  the  line 
of  guns.  Of  course,  instead  of  following  such  targets,  artil- 
lery may  content  itself  with  searching  a  specified  area. 

But  the  disadvantages  of  masked  positions  are  compen- 
sated by  the  following  advantages:  They  make  it  possible 
to  open  fire  unexpectedly,  to  shift  guns,  and  to  change  posi- 
tion, and  they  facilitate  the  ammunition  supply.  From  this 
it  follows  that  artillery  firing  from  a  masked  position  is  always 
imder  control  of  its  leader,  whereas  artillery  firing  from  a 
semi-masked  or  an  unmasked  position  is  as  much  out  of  the 
leader's  control  as  deployed  infantry.  The  greater  material 
cover  afforded  artillery  by  a  masked  position  is  of  special 
value,  the  losses  of  a  concealed  battery  amotmting  to  about 
one-sixth  of  those  suffered  by  one  in  an  unmasked  position. 
The  opponent  will  scarcely  ever  be  able  accurately  to  locate 
a  masked  battery  either  in  direction  or  range,  and  it  is  out  of 
the  question  to  try  for  direct  hits  upon  it. 

The  best  masked  position  is  one  in  which  the  battery  is 
posted  from  200  to  300  m.  in  rear  of  the  crest.     The  Russians 

■^'Rule  for  posting  field  howitzers  model  98  (curved  flre) :  At  all  ranges,  no 
matter  what  charges  are  used,  post  the  guns  in  rear  of  the  crest  a  distance  equal 
approximately  to  3  or  4  times  the  height  of  that  crest  above  the  position  of  the  guns. 

"Rule  for  posting  guns:  For  every  meter  of  cover,  post  the  guns  60  m.  in 
rear  of  the  crest  when  firing  at  a  range  of  1.000  m.  (still  farther  to  the  rear  for  shorter 
ranges).  20  m.  when  the  range  is  2,(X)0  m..  and  10  m..  when  it  is  3.(X)0  m.  or  over." 

When  the  mask  is  but  a  short  distance  in  fkt>nt  of  the  guns,  a  glance  through 
the  bores  will  tell  whether  the  projectiles  will  clear  the  mask.  The  line  of  sight  of 
the  gun  drops  below  the  axis  of  the  bore  by  the  height  of  a  head  at  100  m..  by  the 
height  of  a  body  at  200  m.,  by  the  height  of  a  mounted  man  at  3(X)  m.,  and  by 
double  the  height  of  a  moimted  man  at  400  m.  If  the  guns  are  still  farther  In  rear  of 
the  crest,  one  can  accurately  compute  from  the  range  table,  at  what  distance  tn  rear 
of  the  crest  the  guns  should  be  posted  in  order  that  their  flre  will  clear  the  crest. 


Posting  Artillery  in  Groups.  331 

consider  a  position  400  m.  in  rear  of  the  crest  as  the  best.  A 
battery  can  usually  drive  directly  into  such  a  position  and  is 
therefore  quickly  ready  to  open  fire.  In  addition,  it  has  great 
freedom  of  movement,  the  supply  of  ammunition  is  facili- 
tated, and,  when  necessary,  it  can  limber  up  and  move 
quickly  into  an  unmasked  position.  Masked  fire  is  prefer- 
ably employed  against  immobile  targets,  or  when  the  enemy 
is  to  be  deceived  as  to  our  strength  and  intentions.  The 
masked  position  must  unquestionably  be  abandoned  when 
it  becomes  necessary  to  sweep  the  foreground  effectively, 
when  moving  targets  are  to  be  followed,  or  when  there  is 
likelihood  of  endangering  one's  own  infantry.* 

Masked  fire  is  facilitated  by  posting  the  artillery  in 
groups.  (Par.  366,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.).  The  advantages 
of  this  arrangement  are  obvious.  "It  makes  it  difficult  for 
the  enemy  to  determine  our  position  and  to  adjust  his  fire, 
and  consequently,  diminishes  the  efficacy  of  his  fire.  It 
enables  our  artillery  to  bring  a  concentric  fire  to  bear  on  the 
enemy,  and,  especially  if  the  positions  are  masked,  facilitates 
observation  and  conduct  of  fire  in  the  various  groups.  In 
addition,  the  ground  can  be  utilized  to  better  advantage, 
since  the  various  groups  need  not  be  posted  on  the  same  line.** 

Fire  direction  is  the  only  thing  that  presents  any  diffi- 
culties when  the  artillery  is  posted  in  groups,  for  it  is 
easier  to  direct  the  fire  against  decisive  points  and  to  change 
targets  when  artillery  is  posted  in  one  line.  Good  telephone 
or  visual  signal  communications  (connecting  posts  are  too 
tmcertain),  and,  above  all  else,  plenty  of  room,  are  absolutely 
essential  when  artillery  is  to  be  posted  in  groups.  When  an 
army  corps  is  acting  alone,  there  will  be  plenty  of  oppor- 
timities  to  post  artillery  in  groups,  but  when  several  army 
corps  are  engaged  abreast  of  each  other,  this  is  out  of  the 


*On  August  30th,  1904.  during  the  battle  of  Liaoyang,  the  Sd  Battery  of  the 
0th  East  Siberian  Rifle  Ari^Ulery  Brigade,  "advanced  from  its  masked  position  to 
the  crest  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  defeated  infantry.  During  this  movement,  it 
lost  half  of  its  personnel  and  was  able  to  bring  only  three  of  its  guns  into  action." 
Binulaehriften,  43-44.  p.  38. 


332  Employment  of  Artillery. 

question.    It  is  advisable  to  keep  battalions  and  itegiments 
intact. 

At  Mukd«n  the  artillery  of  the  Japanese  lat  Army*  180  guoa,  fought 
the  Ruasian  poeitiona  from  February  26th  to  March  7th,  1906,  from  a 
position  that  waa  14  km.  long.  The  Japanese  artillery  was  posted  in  five 
groups,  as  follows: 

1.  4  16  cm.,  4  12  cm.,  14  10  cm.  howitzers,  and  18  mountain  guns; 

2.  8  batteries; 
8.    4  batteries; 

4.    2  batteries  with  a  total  of  8  guns; 

6.    7  batteries  with  a  total  of  40  guns. 

The  chief  of  artillery  of  the  Ist  Army  occupied  an  observation  station 
on  high  ground  and  was  connected  by  telephone  with  army  headquartera 
and  with  the  various  groups.  It  is  claimed  that  fire  direction  presented  no 
difficulties  on  this  occasion. 


An  unmasked  or  a  semi-masked  position  should  be 
selected  when  fire  is  to  be  opened  promptly  and  when  the 
sheaf  of  fire  may  have  to  be  shifted  quickly,  especially  against 
mobile  objectives.  (Pars.  367  and  46^,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.). 
The  necessity  of  assigning  several  tasks  to  the  same  battery 
(contrary  to  the  French  practice  of  assigning  a  r61e  to  each 
group)  quite  naturally  causes  the  semi-masked  position  to 
be  looked  upon  as  the  principal  artillery  position.  It  has  the 
advantage  that  the  battery  commander  can  direct  and 
observe  the  fire  from  one  point  and  that  the  guns  can  be 
quickly  run  forward  to  the  crest,  i.  e.,  into  an  immasked 
position.  That  the  position  be  absolutely  concealed  from 
the  enemy's  view  is  of  less  importance  than  that  the  fire  of 
the  artillery  siu-prise  him,  and  that  any  change  of  target  be 
effected  promptly  and  without  loss.  It  is  particularly  for- 
tunate for  the  German  artillery  that  in  fixed  ammtmition, 
the  flash  of  discharge  has  been  largely  eliminated. 

It  is  absolutely  essential  that  nothing  be  done  that  might 
give  the  enemy  an  idea  as  to  the  direction  in  which  our  guns 
are  posted.  To  this  end,  due  care  should  be  exercised  in  re- 
cotmaissance  and  in  moving  into  position;  when  there  is 


Position  in  Readiness  or  in  Observation.      333 

dust,  the  guns  should  move  at  a  walk  and  should  be  unlim- 
bered  and  run  noiselessly  into  battery  by  hand.  When  time 
admits,  the  initial  direction  may  be  given  to  one  of  the  guns 
by  means  of  the  extension  sight,  and  the  other  guns  laid  par- 
allel. If  there  is  any  chance  of  dust  being  thrown  up  by  the 
blast  of  discharge,  the  ground  should  be  wetted  down  in  front 
of  the  muzzles.  Cover  should  be  utilized  and  the  position 
should  be  as  inconspicuous  as  possible.  Artificial  cover 
should  be  constructed  when  necessary. 

In  order  to  enable  it  to  go  into  action  promptly  and 
suddenly,  artillery  may  be  posted  either  in  readiness,  or  in 
observation.  When  posted  in  readiness,  the  gims  are  not  un- 
limbered,  but  posted  immediately  in  rear  of  the  prospective 
position.  When  posted  in  observation  (position  de  sur- 
veillance),  the  guns  are  unlimbered  and  posted  either  in  a 
masked  position  or  immediately  in  rear  of  the  selected  posi- 
tion. The  principal  thing  is  that  artillery  be  actually  con- 
cealed until  the  moment  for  opening  fire. 

Guns  are  posted  in  readiness  when  there  is  still  doubt 
about  the  position  and  front  to  be  occupied.  No  hard  and 
fast  rules  can  be  laid  down  as  to  the  formation  that  batteries 
should  use  when  posted  in  readiness.  When  the  groimd 
between  the  locality  where  the  guns  are  posted  in  readiness 
and  the  position  they  are  eventually  to  occupy  is  visible  to 
the  enemy,  one  will  frequently  have  to  be  satisfied  with  a 
reconnaissance  made  from  a  flank  or  even  from  some  point  in 
rear.  If  such  is  the  case,  the  batteries  should,  at  a  prear- 
ranged signal,  move  rapidly  straight  forward  into  the  position. 
It  may  be  a  good  plan  to  cotmtermarch  and  to  execute 
''action  rear,"  so  as  to  get  the  limbers  qiiickly  tmder  cover. 
The  closer  the  guns  posted  in  readiness  are  to  the  position 
they  are  to  occupy,  the  less  occasion  there  is  for  moving  them 
forward  at  a  gallop.  When  they  are  very  close  to  the  firing 
position,  they  should  be  run  up  by  hand.  On  roads,  in  rear 
of  farm  buildings  and  patches  of  timber,  route  coliunn  will 
frequently  be  the  most  judicious  formation  for  a  battery 


334  Employment  of  Artillery. 

posted  in  readiness,  and  line  of  route  columns  at  reduced 
intervals,  for  a  battalion.  But,  whatever  the  formation, 
everything  is  prepared  for  action,  the  guns  loaded,  quadrants 
and  sights  removed  from  their  cases.  In  addition,  while  the 
men  bring  up  the  guns,  the  target  may  be  pointed  out  to  chiefs 
of  platoon  and  chiefs  of  section  provided  this  can  be  done 
without  attracting  the  enemy's  attention. 

In  a  battalion,  a  position  in  readiness  is  taken  up  only 
when  ordered  by  the  battalion  commander,  but  the  method 
of  unlimbering  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  battery  com- 
manders. 

It  will  frequently  be  easy  for  two  of  the  batteries  of  a 
battalion  to  go  into  position,  while  the  third  battery  will 
encotmter  difficulties.  In  such  a  case,  especially  if  but  few 
objectives  present  themselves,  it  will  be  a  good  plan  to  move 
two  of  the  batteries  into  position  and  to  have  them  divert 
the  enemy's  attention  from  the  third  battery,  which  can  then 
move  forward  rapidly  as  soon  as  the  other  batteries  have 
adjusted  their  fire. 

When  posted  in  observation,  preparatory  to  occupying 
a  semi-masked  or  tinmasked  position,  the  guns  should  be 
directly  in  rear  of  that  position.  Care  should  be  taken  that 
the  men  who  draw  the  guns  into  battery  with  the  prolonge 
do  not  expose  themselves.  When  the  terrain  is  open,  a  few 
batteries  will  often  be  held  in  readiness  while  others  are  already 
posted  in  observation.  The  time  until  fire  is  opened  is  used 
to  make  preparations  for  firing  (reconnaissance  of  objectives, 
determination  of  firing  data) . 

Contrary  to  the  practice  of  field  artillery,  heavy  field 
howitzers  fight  almost  invariably  in  masked  positions.  This 
enables  them  to  open  fire  suddenly  when  least  expected,  pre- 
vents the  enemy  from  locating  them  without  considerable 
trouble,  prevents  him  from  ascertaining  their  numbers  and 
the  intentions  of  their  commander,  simplifies  ammunition 
supply  and  facilitates  changing  position.  Heavy  flat  tra- 
jectory guns  that  are  to  fire  on  mobile  targets  are  almost 


Positions  for  Heavy  Artillery.  335 

invariably  forced  to  fight  in  semi-masked  or  in  unmasked 
positions. 

Heavy  artillery  will  usually  go  into  position  in  rear  of  the 
field  artillery.  It  may  often  be  desirable  to  have  it  go  into 
position  early,  to  enable  field  artillery  to  go  into  action  under 
cover  of  its  fire.  It  is  important  to  select  observation  stations 
(pars.  359,  361,  and  362,  German  H.  A.  D.  R.)  at  incon- 
spicuous points  as  close  as  possible  to  the  batteries,  but  out- 
side the  limits  of  the  probable  zone  of  hostile  searching  fire. 
In  order  to  minimize  the  effect  of  the  hostile  fire,  unmasked 
observation  stations  should  be  placed  at  least  25  m.  apart 
and  masked  observation  stations  at  least  10  m.  apart.  Pla- 
toon and  battery  commanders'  stations  should  be  established 
accol-ding  to  the  same  principles.  The  character  of  the  soil 
is  of  even  greater  importance  than  in  the  operations  of  field 
artillery,  and  special  precautions  should  be  taken  to  prevent 
throwing  up  dust.  It  will  sometimes  be  necessary  to  take 
up  a  position  in  timber.  In  this  case,  the  difficulties  encoun- 
tered in  moving  into  battery  and  in  supplying  ammtmition 
make  it  desirable  to  locate  the  position  as  close  to  a  road  as 
possible.  All  routes  of  approach  should  be  carefully  recon- 
noitered.  Covered  avenues  of  approach  are  important  when 
the  position  lies  within  the  zone  of  hostile  shrapnel  fire. 

A  position  is  taken  up  about  as  follows  (pars.  304-313, 
320-322,  and  422,  German  H.  A.  D.  R.) :  The  battalion 
commander,  who  up  to  this  moment  has  accompanied  the 
commander  of  the  troops,  sends  for  his  battery  commanders 
and  informs  them  of  the  situation  and  the  purpose  of  the 
action,  and  indicates  the  general  direction  of  the  fire  and  the 
approximate  location  of  the  observation  stations.  He  like- 
wise designates  the  direction  in  which  each  battery  is  to  face 
and  the  front  each  is  to  occupy ;  gives  orders  for  going  into 
position,  for  protection  of  the  batteries  and  for  opening  fire ; 
and,  when  necessary,  indicates  where  the  reserves  are  to  be 
posted.  The  assistant  observers  (non-commissioned  officers) 
establish  the  observation  stations  and  the  telephone  squad 


336 


Employment  op  Artillery. 


lays  the  telephone  line.    Each  battery  is  brought  into  its 
position  by  its  commander  or   by   its   senior  lieutenant. 
The  ammunition  is  deposited  near  the  guns  and  the  lim- 
bers and  caissons  move  about  500  m.  to  the  rear  and  take 


O  ^Qbs9r¥aHonJtaHon  of  Bothy  commandtrn 

Baffah'orf  comrnoncfet 
.  T^ephone  Jine 


& 


p--... 


MMt. 


1        ^ 

I  si  Echelon        ^      .^.i..      ^ 
Combat  train  and  Umbtrs 

il  V^icles  p€r  Batt^jf 

Light  Ammunition  Co/umn 
29  Vzhicles^of  vs/hich 
Z^ore  Caissons 

up  a  concealed  position.  Here  they  may  be  joined  by  the 
combat  train  and  by  the  reserve.  The  light  ammtmition 
columns  move  up  and  take  post  about  800  m.  in  rear  of  the 
guns. 


ADVANCE  TO  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  THE  POSITION. 

At  the  same  time  that  the  commanders  of  the  various 
artillery  tmits  are  ordered  forward,  the  batteries  are  usually 
directed  to  take  up  the  trot,  pass  the  infantry,  and  move  for- 
ward to  a  certain  point,  or  along  routes  previously  recon- 
noitered.    The  commanders  of  the  various  artillery  imits 


Advance  to  and  Occupation  of  the  Position.      337 

can  not  look  after  all  the  details  and,  in  addition,  they  re- 
main in  the  selected  position,  so  that  much  must  be  left  to 
the  discretion  of  the  officers  left  in  charge  of  the  units.*  It  is 
especially  important  that  cover  be  utilized,  that  communica- 
tion be  kept  up  with  the  battery  commanders,  who  have 
preceded  their  batteries,  that  steps  be  taken  to  assure  the 
security  of  the  batteries  during  the  advance,  and  that  a  re- 
connaissance be  made  to  ascertain  whether  the  grotmd  is 
passable.  All  artillery  commanders,  from  the  battalion 
commanders  up,  should  remain  in  the  proposed  position  in 
order  that  they  may  be  able  to  keep  the  enemy  and  friendly 
troops  in  view,  as  the  situation  may  change  before  the  bat- 
teries arrive  and  the  selected  position  would  then  no  longer 
be  suitable.  A  battery  commander,  on  the  other  hand, 
should  remain  responsible  for  his  unit,  for  he  is  better  fitted 
than  anyone  else  to  help  it  over  difficulties.  He  may,  there- 
fore, find  it  necessary  to  ride  back  to  meet  his  battery  and 
personally  lead  it  into  the  position. 

The  roads  should  be  used  as  long  as  possible,  as  the 
difficulties  encountered  when  moving  across  country  may 
considerably  retard  the  advance .  It  is  a  good  plan  to  advance 
simultaneously  along  parallel  roads.  It  is  seldom  practicable 
to  shorten  the  column  by  forming  the  command  in  double 
column,  because,  in  the  first  place,  the  batteries  will  have  to 
trot  some  distance  to  pass  the  infantry,  f  The  artillery  scouts 
are  charged  with  the  duty  of  ascertaining  whether  the  ground 
is  passable  and  the  reconnaissance  made  by  the  other  arms 
does  not  exempt  the  artillery  from  the  responsibility  of  pro- 
tecting itself  against  surprise  by  taking  proper  measures  on 
its  own  account.  When  advancing  to  the  position,  special 
attention  should  be  paid  to  the  use  of  cover.  To  this  end, 
it  is  generally  advisable  to  move  in  route  coltunn  until  near 

*At  worth,  the  batteries  of  the  lid  Heavy  battalion  of  the  6th  Field  Artillery 
lost  touch  with  their  battery  commanders,  who  had  ridden  ahead.  Gtschichte  dM 
FeldarHtl$rier$QimenU  Nr.  5,  p.  69. 

tWhen  the  route  of  an  artillery  column  crosses  that  of  an  Infantry  column, 
the  latter  passes  in  small  bodies  through  gaps  between  artillery  units  and  even 
through  those  between  guns. 


338  Employment  op  Artillery. 

the  position.  (See  p.  265,  supra.) ;  but  it  is  not  necessary 
nor  advisable  to  adopt  any  uniform  procedure. 

The  gait  depends  upon  the  intentions  of  the  commander, 
the  tactical  situation,  and  the  character  of  the  ground.  The 
horses  have  not  done  their  part,  until  they  have  brought  the 
guns  into  position,  even  if  it  takes  the  last  oimce  of  energy 
that  is  in  them.  Batteries  should  move  at  the  trot,  as  a  rule ; 
at  the  walk  when  crossing  bad  places ;  at  the  gallop  for  short 
distances  to  hasten  the  advance,  or  to  pass  quickly  over 
ground  exposed  to  view  or  fire  of  the  enemy.  When  used  for 
any  length  of  time,  the  gallop  is  apt  to  lag  and  comparatively 
little  of  gained  by  using  it.  In  order  that  the  battery  may  be 
brought  in  good  order  and  with  certainty  into  its  appointed 
position,  it  may  be  advisable  to  move  it  at  a  slower  gait  the 
last  part  of  the  way.  In  dry  weather,  provided  the  tactical 
situation  admits,  it  is  a  good  plan  to  move  into  position  at 
the  walk,  so  as  not  to  betray  prematurely  the  presence  of 
artillery  by  throwing  up  dust. 

Special  efforts  should  be  made  to  bring  artillery  secretly 
into  position,  unless  the  situation  demands  great  haste,  and 
to  open  fire  suddenly  and  unexpectedly.  The  secret  occupa- 
tion of  a  position  loses  in  value,  however,  when  parts  of  the 
artillery  were  obliged  to  expose  themselves  to  the  enemy's 
view  during  the  advance,  or  when  dust  betrays  the  movement. 
The  retardation  due  to  secretly  occupying  a  position  may  even 
have  a  deleterious  effect.  Therefore,  when  cover  is  lacking, 
rapidity  of  movement  must  compensate  for  the  lack  of 
secrecy  in  occupying  the  position. 

The  manner  of  moving  into  position  and  of  tmlimbering 
may  be  determined  by  answering  the  following  question: 
**Does  the  tactical  situation  demand  prompt  action;  is  haste 
necessary  or  is  it  better  to  go  into  position  only  after  thorough 
preparation,  even  if  the  occupation  of  the  position  is  delayed 
thereby?**  It  will  depend  upon  the  answer  to  this  question 
whether  one  moves  into  position  openly  as  fast  as  the  horses 
can  go,  or  whether  one  utilizes  all  available  cover,  tmlimbers 


Occupation  of  the  Position.  339 

tinder  cover,  and  has  the  guns  run  up  by  hand.  (See  p.  269, 
supra.).  When  the  enemy  is  already  in  position,  prepara- 
tions should  be  made  to  cut  down  as  much  as  possible  the 
time  between  the  appearance  of  the  battery  and  the  opening 
shot,  and  to  avoid  assembling  a  lot  of  men  and  horses  in  the 
battery  position.  When  it  is  desired  to  put  a  superior 
number  of  batteries  into  position,  to  have  them  open  fire 
simultaneously  and  to  maintain  order  and  coolness  when  they 
move  into  the  initial  position,  it  will  be  advisable,  tmless 
haste  is  requisite,  to  place  the  batteries  in  readiness  first. 
The  advance  of  batteries  into  a  position  is  often  facilitated 
by  the  fact  that  the  fire  of  other  batteries  diverts  the  enemy's 
attention,  or  that  the  movement  is  made  under  cover  of  the 
fire  of  heavy  batteries. 

When  a  large  unit  has  to  unlimber  to  a  flank  (especially 
on  debouching  from  a  defile  or  after  turning  off  a  road)  the 
leading  elements  should  be  assigned  the  longer  routes.  It  is 
much  simpler,  to  be  sure,  to  post  first  the  battery  whose  flank 
will  rest  on  the  road  and  to  bring  the  others  into  position 
successively,  but  the  battery  at  the  tail  of  the  column  will 
not  then  be  ready  to  fire  nearly  so  soon.  Since  the  leading 
battery  will  be  ready  to  fire  much  sooner,  this  leads,  especi- 
ally during  peace  maneuvers,  to  a  second  still  greater  mis- 
take, viz.,  opening  fire  by  successive  units.  This  mistake, 
which  may  imperil  the  deployment  of  the  entire  artillery 
force,  does  not,  indeed,  exact  its  penalty  during  peace  man- 
euvers, but  may  lead  to  great  inconvenience  and  serious 
losses  in  actual  war  in  case  some  of  the  batteries  are  still 
marching  in  rear  of  the  batteries  that  are  already  engaged. 


340  Employment  op  Artillery. 


4.    BATTLE  RANGES.* 

Artillery  fire  should  be  utilised  to  the  fullest  extent 
at  ranges  that  lie  outside  the  zone  of  effective  infantry  fire. 
It  is  in  exceptional  cases  only  that  artillery  will  fire  at  the 
extreme  ranges  laid  down  in  its  tables  of  fire.  But  such  fire 
may  be  used  in  containing  actions,  occasionally  in  rencontre 
fights,  in  defense,  to  force  the  enemy  to  take  cover  and  to 
compel  him  to  make  wide  turning  movements,  and  in  pur- 
suit, to  disperse  distant  hostile  troops.  At  extreme  ranges, 
observation  is  difficult  and  the  effect  of  percussion  fire  is 
small.  Besides,  the  striking  energy  of  shrapnel  bullets  di- 
minishes more  and  more  rapidly  as  the  range  increases,  f 
Por  the  foregoing  reasons,  artillery  should  fight  at  ranges  at 
which  an  effect  commensurate  with  the  expenditure  of  am- 
munition  may  be  expected.  J  Percussion  fire  produces  very 
little  effect  at  ranges  over  3,500  m.,  as  the  projectiles  bury 
themselves  in  the  ground  and  a  large  part  of  the  explosive 

*ParB.  435-466.  German  F.  A.  D.  B. 

tin  addition,  the  depth  of  the  beaten  zone  decreases  rapidly  from  the  moment 
the  angle  of  the  cone  of  dlBperelon  becomes  smaller  than  the  angle  of  fall  of  the  pro- 
iectUe,  since  the  upper  half  of  the  sheaf  of  shrapnel  bullets  will  no  longer  ascend. 
When  firing  on  low  targets,  errors  in  adjustment  make  themselves  more  and  more 
seriously  felt  as  the  angle  of  fall  increases.  Such  errors  may.  under  certain  condi- 
tions, nullify  the  effect. 

^During  the  Franco-German  war.  2,600  m.  was  the  longest  effecUve  range* 
but  on  August  16th  and  18th.  1870.  this  was  frequently  exceeded  by  some  500  m.  On 
August  18th.  the  1st  Battery  of  the  Field  Artillery  Regiment  of  the  Guard  even 
fired  at  4,000  m. 

Engagement  of  Lagulin.  July  31st,  1904:  Two  Russian  batteries  that  had 
been  imder  fire  for  twelve  hours,  received  shell  fire  from  five  Japanese  batteries  at 
ranges  of  4,600  and  5,400  m.  One  of  the  Russian  batteries  lost  2  men  killed  and  7 
men  wounded,  the  other  only  2  men  wounded,  although  the  projectiles  burst  In- 
cessantly among  guns  and  caissons.  The  observation  station  was  close  to  the  bat- 
tery.    V.  Tettau,  Achlzehn  Monale,  I,  p.  219. 

At  Wafangkou  the  artillery  fired  at  4,200  m. ;  at  Tashihchlao.  the  9th  Artillery 
Brigade  fired  with  fuzes  set  at  the  extreme  graduation,  and  the  Ist  Brigade  even  ex- 
ceeded this;  and  Colonel  Slusharenko's  artillery  fired  at  4.300  m.  on  August  30th 
and  31st,  and  at  5.300  m.  on  October  12th. 

Russia  s  The  best  ranges  as  far  as  effect  is  concerned  lie  between  1.070  and 
2.500  m.  In  attack,  the  first  positions  selected  are  to  be  located  between  2,500  and 
8.000  m. 

Itslyi  The  range  should  not  exceed  3,000  m.  If  it  can  be  avoided,  no  posi- 
tion that  lies  within  the  zone  of  effective  infantry  fire  (under  1.200  and  1.500oa.) 
should  be  selected. 


Battle  Ranges.  341 

effect  is  dissipated.  Such  fire  is  effective  against  artillery 
at  2,200 — 2,300  m.  Shell  bursts  on  graze.  At  a  range  of 
3,000  m.,  the  effect  of  time  shrapnel  against  any  target  is 
considered  very  satisfactory,  and  at  ranges  under  2,500  m., 
its  effect  is  actually  annihilating.  Its  effect  does  not  increase 
materially  as  the  range  decreases.  Bad  roads  and  the  desire 
to  open  fire  at  an  early  moment,  may  justify  firing  at  the 
longer  ranges.  Artillery  should  not  take  up  a  position  at 
extreme  range  from  its  objective.  When  the  guns  have  a 
better  range  than  those  of  the  enemy,  it  may  be  a  good  plan 
to  take  up  a  position  outside  the  zone  of  his  effective  fire. 
The  Japanese  artillery,  which  was  numerically  and  ballistic 
cally  inferior  to  the  Russian  artillery,  always  preferred  to 
keep  out  of  reach  of  the  latter's  time  fire  and,  on  the  plains 
of  Manchuria,  fought  almost  invariably  in  widely  dispersed 
positions  and  atlon^ranges  (3,000 — 4,000  m.,  and  occasionally 
even  at  6,000  m.).  Since  it  seemed  dangerous  to  the  Jap- 
anese artillery  to  change  position,  the  Japanese  infantry 
finally  had  to  get  along  as  best  it  could  without  artillery 
support.  As  the  battle  progresses,  the  ranges  must  of 
necessity  decrease.  It  may  be  laid  down  as  axiomatic  that 
one's  own  infantry  should  never  be  without  artillery  support. 
Artillery  can  do  justice  to  its  duties  and  receive  the  full  pro- 
tection of  the  other  arms  only  if  it  keeps  close  to  its  infantry 
and  understands  how  to  adapt  itself  to  the  changing  phases 
of  the  combat.  At  the  decisive  moment,  artillery  should 
not  shrink  from  the  severest  infantry  fire.  A  battery  that 
has  fired  with  annihilating  effect  for  five  minutes  at  a  de- 
cisive point  and  is  then  captured,  will  have  done  more  for 
its  side  than  ten  batteries  that  have  kept  up  a  well-aimed» 
but  less  effective  fire  from  very  distant  well-chosen  positions. 

During  the  RuMo-Turkish  war  of  1877-789  the  Russian  artillery 
fought  at  unusually  long  ranges  and  almost  invariably  neglected  to  support 
the  infantry  attack  by  occupying  positions  nearer  the  enemy,  in  which  it 
would  then  have  been  exposed  to  losses  occasioned  by  infantry  fire. 

At  Lovtcha»  92  Russian  guns  failed  to  silence  6  Turkish  guns.  The 
artillery  fired  at  a  range  of  4,000  m.    After  the  capture  of  the  Turkish 


342  Employment  of  Artillery. 

advance  position  on  the  Red  Hill,  only  a  single  battery  was  brought  up 
into  this  position,  though  it  was  the  first  from  which  effective  fire  could 
have  been  brought  to  bear  upon  the  enemy.  "Unfortunately,  the  Turkisli 
rifles,  effective  up  to  2,000  m.,  caused  many  of  the  commanders  to  come  to 
the  erroneous  and  disastrous  conclusion  that  artillery  neither  could  no 
should  appear  within  the  zone  of  effective  rifle  fire."* 

At  Plevna,  from  September  7th  to  11th,  1877,  the  Russians  had  400 
field  and  20  siege  guns  in  action  against  60  Turkish  guns,  but  were  able 
neither  to  silence  them,  nor  to  shake  the  defenders.  The  ranges  ran  all 
the  way  from  2,000  to  3,600  ro.,  although  orders  had  been  issued  that  the 
9-pounders,  which  were  almost  the  only  guns  that  produced  any  effect  in 
this  instance,  should  not  fire  at  ranges  over  2,400  m.  Three  batteries  of 
the  16th  Brigade  even  fired  at  3,000  and  4,000  m.,  and,  on  account  of  the 
large  angles  of  elevation  used,  four  guns  damaged  their  carriages  and  were 
disabled.  "Severe  losses  occasioned  by  rifie  fire,"  induced  three  other 
batteries  of  the  same  brigade  to  evacuate  their  position,  which  was  some- 
what more  advanced.  The  severe  losses  (sic)  in  this  case,  amounted  to  2 
officers  and  18  men. 

During  the  attack  on  Gomi  Dubniac,  the  artillery  of  the  Guards 
tbowed  some  sound  tactical  sense  when  it  went  into  action  at  the  outset 
at  close  range  and  endeavored  to  support  the  infantry. 

Heavy  Artillery  (pars.  396-399,  German  H.  A.  D.  R.). 
The  employment  of  heavy  artillery  is  governed  by  the  pur- 
pose of  the  action,  the  terrain,  and  cx)nditions  of  observation^ 
as  well  as  by  the  necessity  of  cooperating  with  the  field  artil- 
lery. Thanks  to  the  aid  afforded  by  its  excellent  instruments 
for  observation,  long  range  fire  presents  no  difficulties  to 
heavy  artillery.  The  battle  ranges  of  heavy  howitzers  lie 
between  2,100  and  5,000  m.  It  is  not  advisable  for  these 
guns  to  approach  closer  than  4,000  m.  to  a  target,  since  the 
effect  of  hostile  shrapnel  fire  must  be  considered.  Except 
at  ranges  of  2,100  m.  and  over,  shell  with  delay  action  is 
incapable  of  penetrating  the  cover  that  is  usually  employed  in 
the  field. 

Heavy  artillery  should  go  into  action  at  longer  ranges 
when  it  is  to  facilitate  the  advance  of  the  field  artillery  to 
effective  ranges. 

*KuROPATKXN  in  the  Russian  Gen.  St,  W.,  I,  p.  18. 


Firing  over  Friendly  Infantry.  343 


5.     FIRING  OVER  FRIENDLY  INFANTRY.* 

The  increase  of  artillery  in  all  units  does  not  permit 
gaps  to  be  left  for  it  in  the  firing  line.  Besides,  artillery  re- 
quires the  protection  afforded  by  advanced  infantry,  in 
order  that  it  may  be  enabled  to  devote  all  of  its  energy  to 
its  principal  task.  Hence,  it  is  necessary  for  artillery  to  fire 
over  friendly  infantry. 

It  is  impossible  to  specify  definitely  the  ranges  at  which 
firing  over  infantry  is  permissible.  At  Pieters  Hill  (1900),  the 
British  infantry  was  told  to  advance  until  it  could  smell  the 
fumes  of  the  Lyddite  shells.  Colonel  Kitchener  is  said  to 
have  told  his  artillerymen  that  he  would  not  censiure  them 


if  two  or  three  of  their  shrapnel  burst  in  the  ranks  of  his 
infantry.  Curved  fire  guns  can,  at  any  rate,  continue  their 
fire  longer  than  flat  trajectory  guns,  but  it  must  be  remembered 
that  the  infantry  may  be  endangered  by  shell  fragments  that 
fly  to  the  rear.  The  character  of  the  terrain  and  the  feasi- 
bility of  observing  the  fire  will  govern  in  each  individual  case ; 
the  leader  must  decide,  in  view  of  the  tactical  situation, 
whether  it  is  permissible  to  continue  the  fire  according  to 
the  experience  gained  at  target  practice,  or  whether  the  fire 
should  be  discontinued.     Even  under  most  unfavorable  con- 


*Par.  375,  German  F.  A.  D.  A. 


344  Employment  op  Artillery. 

ditions,  artillery  can  continue  to  fire  longer  over  the  heads 
of  friendly  troops  when  it  is  posted  on  low  grotind  and  its 
objective  is  on  high  ground  (line  a-b  in  the  figure),  than  when 
both  are  situated  in  a  plain.  But  this  becomes  impossible 
when  the  objective  is  at  c  (figure)  for  example.  In  the  latter 
case,  the  artillery  would  have  to  change  jxjsition.  Artillery 
may  endanger  its  own  infantry  when  the  light  is  poor  and  it 
can  no  longer  distinguish  friend  from  foe  on  account  of  their 
neutral  tinted  uniforms.* 

Infantry  posted  in  front  of  artillery  must  be  protected 
against  hostile  shots  that  burst  short  and  against  the  effect 
of  projectiles  that  burst  in  the  guns.  Such  premature  bursts 
occur  very  rarely — only  about  one  projectile  (shell  or  shrap- 
nel) in  8,000  bursting  before  it  leaves  the  gun.  These  pro- 
jectiles are  not  effective,  however,  up  to  400  m.  f  In  any 
event,  the  distance  between  infantry  and  its  artillery  should 
be  such  that  the  hostile  artillery  can  not  fire  effectively  upon 
both  at  once,  i.  e.,  at  least  300  m.  When  it  is  impossible 
for  the  batteries  to  adjust  fire  by  getting  an  "over"  and 
"creeping"  back,  they  can  fire  for  adjustment  over  their 
infantry  on  level  ground  so  long  only  as  the  shirmishers  have 
not  approached  closer  than  500  m.  to  the  objective.  For 
effect,  they  may  fire  until  the  skirmishers  are  within  300  m. 
from  the  target.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  when  a 
projectile  passes  less  than  10  m.  above  a  man's  head,  the 
atmospheric  disturbance  is  very  unpleasantly  noticeable. 
With  German  field  gims,  firing  at  a  range  of  1,500  m.,  this 
occtu-s  when  the  infantry  is  300  m.  from  the  objective ;  at  a 
range  of  2,000  m.,  when  it  is  250  m.  from  the  objective  against 
which  the  fire  is  directed.  Either  of  these  distances  (300  or 
250  m.)  exceeds  the  depth  of  the  entire  (100%)  zone  of  dis- 
persion of  projectiles  (which  at  2,000  m.  amoxmts  to  136  m.), 


*  Artillery  of  the  let  Army  on  the  evenhig  of  Auguat  18th.  1870.     Ho  r  VBAtJSB, 
Deutsche  Artillerie,  V,  p.  126. 

tAccordlng  to  Austrian  data,  the  proportion  of  premature  bursta  to  rounds 
fired  l8  as  follows: 

1  to  803  shell  (.33%) — effective  up  to  240  m. 
1  to  175  shrapnel  (.67%) —  effective  up  to  8(X)  m 


Firing  over  Friendly  Infantry.  345 

andof  points  of  burst  (120  m.),  so  that  the  infantry  skirmishers 
are  not  in  danger  of  being  hit,  unless  gross  mistakes  are 
made  by  the  cannoneers.  In  certain  circumstances,  the  fire 
may  be  continued  with  percussion  projectiles,  whose  points 
of  burst  are  more  easily  observed  with  reference  to  one's 
own  infantry.  The  objection  that  friendly  infantry  might  be 
demoralized  by  projectiles  that  pass  over  it,  is  not  well  taken ; 
on  the  contrary,  all  shots  so  fired  in  action,  will  be  considered 
a  welcome  assistance.  But  it  is  otherwise  when  the  artillery 
fires  by  mistake  into  its  own  infantry.  Then  there  happens 
what  is  so  aptly  described  by  Hohenlohe  when  he  says,  **To 
be  sure,  the  men  did  not  think  of  flight,  but  they  were  par- 
alysed by  that  feeling  of  despair  that  takes  hold  of  a  man  when 
he  must  admit  that  the  game  is  up." 

To  quote  from  the  German  General  Sta£F  Account  of  the  Franco- 
German  war:*  "The  increased  losses  inflicted  on  the  artillery  by  rifle 
fire,  urgently  demand  that  adequate  protection  be  afforded  that  arm 
by  pushing  infantry  to  the  front."  The  33d  and  the  60th  Infantry  occu- 
pied Grav«lotte  and  the  Ist  Battalion,  67th  Infantry,  Malmaison,  to  pro- 
tect the  artillery  of  the  Ist  Army,  but  as  these  organizations  were  almost 
on  line  with  the  artiUery,  the  latter  suffered  from  the  fire  of  French  skir- 
mishers lodged  in  the  edge  of  the  woods.  Efforts  made  to  dislodge  them 
precipitated  an  infantry  fight.t  At  St.  Ail  (August  18th,  1870),  the  artil- 
lery of  the  Prussian  Guards  was  several  times  forced  to  turn  from  the  hostile 
artillery  and  against  bodies  of  French  infantry  that  had  molested  it,  until 
finally  some  infantry  that  was  pushed  to  within  400  paces  of  the  hostile 
lines,  supported  it.t 

According  to  Hoffbauer,!  artillery  fired  on  its  own  infantry:  In 
trying  to  fire  over  the  latter  when  in  close  country  the  two  opposing  lines 
were  not  clearly  distinguishable  on  account  of  dust,  powder  smoke,  or  bad 
light;  during  pursuits  when  isolated  disordered  bodies  rushed  after  the 
enemy;  and  in  enveloping  attacks  reaching  far  around  the  enemy's 
flank  (attack  on  the  trenches  at  Gorni  Dubniac);J  finally,  in  bringing  up 
batteries  out  of  a  route  column  to  reinforce  artillery  that  is  already  engaged 
with  hostile  batteries  that  can  not  be  clearly  recognized  on  account  of  the 
nature  of  the  terrain,  or  perhaps  are  entirely  hidden  from  the  view  of  the 


*Gen.  St  W.,  II,  p.  924.  rteum6  of  the  results  of  the  battles  around  Mets. 
tMoiynoB,  Krieo  von  1870-71,  p.  55. 
tOen,  St.  W.,  II,  pp.  747  and  771. 
H Deutsche  ArHllerie,  V,  p.  216. 
IPusTRBWBXJ,  Russi3ch$  Garde,  p.  130. 


346  Employment  of  Artillery. 

artillery  units  in  rear.    This  actually  happened  to  the  artiUery  of  the  Xlth 
Army  Corps  at  Sedan.* 

The  following  statement  appears  in  a  British  Memorial 
on  the  lessons  of  the  war  in  the  Far  East :  **The  moral  effect 
produced  by  artillery  fire,  which  forced  the  defenders  to  take 
to  cover  and  did  not  even  permit  them  to  raise  their  heads 
above  the  parapet,  was  so  highly  esteemed  by  the  Japanese 
infantry,  that  it  requested  the  batteries  to  continue  firing, 
without  regard  to  the  losses  thereby  inflicted  in  its  own  ranks, 
until  it  had  taken  the  position  or  unfurled  small  national 
flags  as  an  indication  that  fire  support  was  no  longer  needed. 
According  to  the  opinion  of  the  Japanese  themselves,  the 
losses  inflicted  in  their  infantry  by  their  own  guns  were  in- 
significant in  comparison  to  the  losses  that  the  defender  could 
inflict  by  delivering  his  fire  undisturbed  at  a  range  of  a  few 
hundred  meters  when  not  kept  down  by  the  attacking  artil- 
lery." 

When  the  infantry  wishes  the  fire  to  be  still  more  effec- 
tively stifled,  it  should  give  the  signal  gz;,  whereupon  the 
artillery  will  direct  its  percussion  or  time  fire  upon  the  grottnd 
in  rear  of  the  hostile  position  in  order  to  prevent  or  to  in- 
terfere with  any  movement  on  the  part  of  the  hostile  reserves. 
It  is  often  not  easy  for  artillery  to  decide  when  it  should  cease 
firing  or  when  it  should  change  targets.  If  this  is  done  pre- 
maturely, the  enemy  will  get  an  opportunity  to  bring  a  heavier 
fire  to  bear  on  the  infantry,  which  is  now  thrown  on  its  own 
resources ;  f  if  it  is  done  too  late,  the  advance  of  the  infantry 
will  be  facilitated  for  the  time  being,  to  be  sure,  but  bodies 
of  infantry  that  rush  forward  on  their  own  initiative  are 
very  apt  to  run  into  the  fire  of  their  own  artillery,  as  happened 
during  the  assault  on  St.  Privat.  J 

*HoFFBAUER,  Deutsche  Artillerie,  YlII,  p.  78. 

tHoHENLOHB,  MUitOrische  Briefe,  II.  p.  87.  Attack  on  Vlllejoiian,  Decem- 
ber lOth,  1870.  Wald  und  Ortsgefecht,  p.  212.  The  Russian  assaults  on  Plevna 
likewise  failed  because  the  hostile  fire  was  no  longer  kept  down. 

XOeschichtB  des  Kaiser  Fram  Gards^renadUr-RegiminU,  p.  118. 


Firing  over  Friendly  Infantry.  347 

During  the  assault  on  Ste.  Marie-aux-ChSnes,  the  bat- 
teries on  the  right  wing  were  notified  that  the  infantry  was 
about  to  advance  to  the  charge.  Only  one  battery  on  the 
left  wing  kept  up  its  fire  and  did  not  cease  firing  until  informed 
that  the  village  had  been  taken.* 

France:  All  the  ground  for  a  distance  of  600  m.  in  front  of  the 
guns  is  considered  within  the  danger  zone.  When  the  infantry  has  arrived 
within  500  m.  of  the  objectives  upon  which  the  artillery  is  firing,  the  fire 
of  the  latter  should  be  entirely  discontinued  or  suspended. 

England:  It  is  risky  for  artillery  to  fire  over  friendly  troops 
at  ranges  under  1,400  m.,  and  at  longer  ranges,  on  level  ground,  when  the 
infantry  is  600  yards,  or  in  the  case  of  heavy  artillery  800  yards,  from  the 
objective.  When  the  enemy  occupies  commanding  ground,  the  fire  can 
be  kept  up  much  longer.  Field  howitzers  can  continue  firing  with  lyddite 
shell  even  when  it  would  be  dangerous  to  fire  shrapnel.  The  responsibility 
for  discontinuing  the  fire  at  the  proper  moment  rests  upon  the  artillery,  the 
other  arms  must  assist. 

Italy:  Artillery  is  always  to  be  protected  by  infantry  pushed  at 
least  300 — 400  m.  to  the  front.  This  infantry  should  advance  far  enough 
to  enable  it  to  inflict  losses  on  any  hostile  infantry  that  attempts  to  molest 
the  artillery. 

Russia :  The  following  is  taken  from  one  of  General  Gurko's  orders : 
"Artillery  can  be  most  useful  to  the  attacking  troops  by  firing  as  vigorously 
as  possible  when  the  infantry  fire  usually  dies  down,  especially  during  the 
attack  proper.  In  this  case,  artillery  should  not  shrink  from  firing  over 
its  own  infantry." 

Combat  Regulationa  par.  48:  "Artillery  should  avoid  firing  over 
other  troops,  but  may  do  so  when  the  distance  to  the  enemy  is  still  so  great 
and  the  corresponding  angle  of  fall  of  the  projectiles  so  large  that  there 
is  little  probability  of  accidents,  and  when  the  use  of  artillery  fire  may 
materially  contribute  to  gaining  the  object  in  view." 

Examples  of  artillery  firing  over  friendly  infantry: 

Worth  (Gen.  St.  W.,  I,  pp.  229  and  285):  After  the  reverse  suffered 
by  the  Vth  Corps,  the  offensive  movement  of  the  French  infantry  was 
brought  to  a  halt  by  the  fire  of  the  Prussian  artillery.  The  range  was 
1,700^—1,800  paces  and  Prussian  skirmishers  were  in  position  200 — 300 
paces  from  the  target. 

Spicheren:     (See  Gen.  St.  W.,  I,  pp.  313,  330  and  364). 

At  Gravelotte,  20  batteries  fired  for  dve  hours  over  the  almost 
entirely  disorganized  Vllth  and  Vlllth  Army  Corps,  thereby  enabling 
the  infantry  to  hold  its  position  on  the  left  of  the  Mance  valley. 

*0m.  St,  W.,  II,  p.  759. 


348  Employment  op  Artillery. 

St.  Privats  When  the  skirmiBh  lines  of  the  Pnusian  Guards  had 
advanced  to  a  point  some  400  or  500  m.  from  St.  Privat,  16  Prussian  bat- 
teries posted  700  paces  farther  in  rear  and  on  lower  ground,  fired  over  their 
heads.*  The  1st  Infantry  Brigade  of  the  Guards  and  the  skirmishers  of 
two  Saxon  regiments,  supported  by  the  fire  of  12  Saxon  batteries  posted 
700 — 800  paces  directly  in  rear  of  them,  advanced  to  the  assault  of  St. 

Privat.t 

During  the  RusM^Japanese  war»  the  first  assaults  on  Nanahan 
Hill  failed  because  the  Japanese  artillery  discontinued  its  fire  too  soon. 
The  attack  made  by  the  4th  Regiment  of  Guards  on  October  ISth,  1904. 
and  the  assaults  on  redoubts  16  and  17  at  Mukden  succeeded,  because  the 
artillery  kept  up  its  fire  to  the  very  last.^ 


6.     ARTIFICIAL  COVER. 

Even  in  the  days  when  guns  were  not  provided  with 
shields,  it  was  found  that  battery  niat6riel  was  not  easily 
damaged  and  that  batteries  whose  fire  was  silenced,  were  in 
most  cases  reduced  to  that  state  not  because  their  guns  were 
disabled,  but  because  they  were  short  of  men  and  am- 
munition. Losses  among  the  teams  may  deprive  batteries 
of  mobility,  but  the  horses  can  be  protected  as  much  as  pos- 
sible by  sending  the  limbers  to  the  rear,  and  by  unhitching 
the  caissons.  When  batteries  advance  with  infantry  and 
support  it  during  the  assault,  the  Umbers  should  remain  with 
their  gims,  no  matter  what  losses  are  suffered  in  consequence. 

At  the  battle  of  Vionvilie,  August  16th,  1870,  a  number  of  batteries 
lost  a  large  part  of  their  officers  (14  batteries  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps,  24, 
those  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps,  13  officers)  and  three-fourths  of  their  can* 
noneers.  As  a  consequence,  many  guns  had  to  cease  firing  until  reinforce- 
ments came  up  from  the  second  echelon. 

At  St.  Privat  the  artillery  of  the  Guard  Corps  lost  one-fourth  of 
the  horses  and  one-fifth  of  the  men  with  the  fighting  batteries.  Killed  and 
wounded  should  be  removed  from  the  batteries,  as  their  presence  lowers 
the  morale  of  the  personnel. 

Our  losses  in  materiel  were  not  serious,  but,  at  the  same  time,  the 
damage  done  to  it  by  the  French  artillery  was  not  inconsiderable.  Four- 
teen Prussian  guns  were  disabled  during  the  Franco-German  war,  and  six 
during  the  campaign  of  1866.    On  August  16th,  1870  (Vionville),  the 

•Gen.  St.,  W.  II.  p.  876. 

t/Mif.,  II.  p.  889. 

Xr.  LOttwits,  Dot  Angriffsverfahren  der  Japaner,  pp.  25^8. 


Artificial  Cover. 


849 


following  dkinaEBi  minor  miBhapa  excepted,  was  done  to  the  German  artll- 
lerjr  (222  gana) :  6  trail  flasks,  2  primer  box«e,  a  number  of  poles,  1  limber 
chest  lid,  1  Umber  chest,  2  limbers,  1  axle  seat  and  the  laying  Kear  on  one 
xnn- 

Gun  Pit  for  Field  Gun,  Modal  *96  (remodeled). 

(lime  of  construction  I    2houn). 


I 


^N^ 

--!'■" 

... 

.-"y,,,^^ 

/\\=  //  ^ 

J.\JMii^ 

1 

i 

^ 

r 

A 

■asm. 

§   ? 

rr* 

ii 

ii 

Jl 


The  cover  afforded  by  the  shields  of  the  field  gun  should 
invariably  be  augmented  by  earthworks  (pars.  88-102, 
Gennan  Manual  of  Field  Engineering).  The  space  between 
the  shield  and  the  ground  should,  in  the  first  place,  be  filled 
with  earth.  During  pauses  in  the  firing,  an  epaulement  0.8  m. 
high  can  then  be  thrown  up  to  give  additional  protection 
to  the  gim  and  its  caisson  body,  the  necessary  earth  for  this 
being  obtained  by  excavating  a  ditch  in  front.  In  case  of 
frontal  fire,  the  ditch  should  be  located  on  the  side  of  the  gun 
on  which  the  caisson  body  is  not  posted.  When  time  admits, 
separate  cover  should  be  provided  for  each  gun.  In  this  case, 
ammunition  is  deposited  beside  the  guns  and  the  caissons  with- 


350 


Employment  op  Artillery. 


drawn.  Care  should  be  taken  to  provide  shelter  for  the  obser- 
vation stations.  In  prepared  positions,  several  sets  of  gun  pits 
are  requisite,  since  the  artillery  will  seldom  be  able  to  meet 
from  a  single  position  all  demands  made  upon  it.    When 


Epaulement  for  Field  Gun,  Model  '96  (remodeled). 


Sect  ton  b^a 


epaulements  are  unskillfully  located,  they  frequently  be- 
tray the  position  to  the  enemy,  and  are  then  more  detri- 
mental than  useful.  In  order  to  make  them  less  conspicuous, 
it  is  a  good  plan  to  connect  them  by  a  thin  parapet  and  to 


Artificial  Cover. 


35X 


take  precautions  to  prevent  dust  clouds  visible  at  a  great 
distance  being  raised  at  every  shot.  A  breastwork  may  like- 
wise be  thrown  up  in  front  of  the  guns.    By  digging  a  con- 


Gun  Pits. 
(Time  of  conat  uctiont 


!l 


352 


Employment  op  Artillery. 


necting  trench  in  rear  of  the  connecting  parapet,  mentioned 
above,  and  by  constructing  splinter  proofs  and  observation 
stations,  the  work  may  be  further  perfected  in  five  hours. 


Austria. 
Epaulemantt* 


•J 


Cover  frcffek 

•for  gijut  s^aod 


([ISZl.i 


V 


Lfj 


^^..•• 


During  prolonged  spells  of  wet  weather,  water  will  accumu- 
late in  the  ditches  and  trenches  and  proper  drainage  must 
be  provided. 


Artificial  Cover. 


356 


In  providing  cover  for  light  field  howitzers  the  first 
thing  that  should  be  attended  to  is  the  construction  of 
trenches  for  the  gun  squads.  These  can  be  dug  in  forty  min- 
utes. The  caisson  body  of  each  howitzer  is  posted  in  rear 
of  the  trenches  provided  for  the  personnel.  A  pit  and  epaule- 
ment  for  a  light  field  howitzer  can  be  constructed  in  about 
two  hours. 

Russia- 
Gun  Pit. 


fl,-  Gun  pH  (for  mcrfars  and 

A-  Cover  ireffch^s  fot^un  sfu^t/, 
Q  .  p//  for  Caisson  bodtf 

-H«r 


Cover  for  Light  Field  Howitzer. 


2,00y 


^Z,q€i{\f2j(H) 


Section  b.a. 


864 


Employment  op  Artillery. 


Cover  for  the  heavy  field  howitzer  is  constructed  simi- 
larly. "When  not  protected  by  shields,  part  of  the  men 
seek  cover  in  the  trenches  on  the  flanks  of  the  guns  and  the 
remainder  in  the  magazines."  (German  Manual  of  Battery 
Intrenchments).  Magazines  should  be  provided  for  the 
ammunition,  the  projectiles  and  charges  being  stored  s^v 
arately. 

Cover  for  Heavy  Held  Howitzer. 

(WhMi  tim*  admiU,  an  ep«ul«niant  ahould  b*  prttrictod  In  front.) 


^3 


7.    ARTILLERY  COMBAT  AT  SHORT  RANGES. 
(a)     Artillery  versus  Infantry. 

Purely  frontal  infantry  fire  is  ineffective  against  artil- 
lery at  mid  ranges;  some  effect  can  be  counted  upon  at  very 
close  ranges  only.  Even  in  the  latter  case,  infantry  can  do 
no  more  than  deprive  artillery  of  its  mobility  and  endanger 
its  ammunition  supply.  "If  artillery  does  not  wish  to  move, 
infantry  can  never  drive  it  off  the  field.     On  the  contrary,  if 


Artillery  Combat  at  Short  Range.  355 

the  intensity  of  the  fire  increases,  it  can  not  move  for  the  time 
being,  because  many  of  its  horses  will  be  shot.  But  that  does 
not  spell  its  ruin,  by  any  means,  for  so  long  as  a  few  men  remain 
with  each  gun  and  load  and  train  cooly,  the  battery  continues 
to  exist  and  to  retain  its  f uU  power  until  the  last  man  at  each 
gun  is  disabled/**  The  full  significance  of  these  words 
is  just  beginning  to  be  appreciated.  Artillery — in  particular 
its  observation  stations — is  most  susceptible  to  the  fire  of 
scattered  groups  of  concealed  skirmishers  that  are  plentifully 
supplied  with  ammunition,  since  it  has  no  means  of  repell- 
ing them,  unless  some  of  its  own  infantry  is  {pushed  to  the 
front. 

Examples  illustrating  ths  artillery  combat  at  short  ranges. 

1.  After  the  capture  of  Elsaszhausen  at  the  battle  of  Worth,t 
Sylvius'  Hone  Battery  engaged  French  infantry  at  a  range  of  600  m.  and 
repelled  a  charge  at  a  range  of  80  m.  with  canister.  During  the  assault 
on  Froschweiler  Ohnesorge's  Horse  Battery  advanced  beyond  the 
firing  line  of  its  own  infantry  and  prepared  the  assault  by  firing  on  the 
edge  of  the  viUage  at  a  range  of  600  m.  While  in  this  position,  the  battery 
repulsed  unaided  a  cavalry  charge.  The  battery  had  lost  94  horses,  was 
absolutely  immobile  and  unable  to  move  intb  the  bivouac  assigned  to  it, 
though  this  was  only  400  m.  away,  until  fresh  teams  were  brought  up. 
The  5th  Light  Battery  of  the  11th  Field  Artillery  unlimbered  abreast  of 
Ohnesorge's  Battery,  though  a  violent  fire  was  directed  upon  it  by  French 
infantry  and  mitrailleuses. 

Out  of  an  effective  strength  of  4  officers,  150  men  and  207  horses, 
each,  Sylvius'  Battery  lost  1  officer,  7  men,  and  33  horses,  and  Ohnesorge's 
Battery,  12  men,  and  94  horses. 

2.  Stumpfs  and  Vosz'  Batteries  (Hid  Army  Corps)  maintained 
their  positions  on  the  Roten  Berg  (battle  of  Spicheren)  in  face  of  French 
infantry  lodged  in  trenches  700  m.  away  and  supported  by  three  batteries.]: 

3.  The  5th  Heavy  Battery  of  the  7th  Field  Artiiiery  went  into 
position  on  August  14th,  1870  (battle  of  Colombey)  at  the  little  wood  of 
Colombey,  within  700  m.  of  unshaken  French  infantry.  In  addition,  the 
battery  received  a  heavy  shrapnel  and  mitrailleuse  fire,  was  able  to  fire 
only  twenty-eight  rounds  of  shell  in  return  in  ten  minutes  and  was  then 
obliged  to  retire,  leaving  two  of  its  guns  temporarily  on  the  ground.  Its 
losses  amounted  to  5  officers,  3  non-commissioned  officers  and  11  men.K 

*HoHBNLOHB,  MUitdrische  Briefc,  III.  p.  140. 
tHoPFBAUER,  Deutsche  Artillerie,  II,  pp.  53  and  67. 
tOen.  St.  TF..  I.  p.  35. 

%G€9chicht$  d€8  7  Fetdartilleriereoiments,  II,  pp.  53  and  67. — KuNi,  Kri$99' 
g^wthUhOMm  BtiipUU,  7,  p.  10. 


356  Employment  of  Artillery. 

4.  Aitilltfy  of  the  Vllth  Army  Corps  at  St.  Hubwt  (battle  of 
Gravolotte).* 

6.  During  the  opening  engagements  of  the  South  African  war, 
the  Engliah  artillery  was  diapoaed  to  occupy  positionB  at  too  great  a  range 
from  the  enemy,  though  in  aome  inatanoeap  aa  at  the  Tugela,  the  nature  of 
the  terrain  forced  it  to  do  ao.  On  the  other  hand,  it  never  hesitated  a 
moment  to  advance  closer  to  the  enemy.  Its  losses  were  trifling.  At 
Modder  River,  November  28th,  1899,  it  fired  at  a  range  of  1,600  m.,  at 
Magerafontein,  finally,  at  1,200  and  900  m.  F<»'  the  conduct  of  the 
English  artillery  at  Coienao,  see  p.  311,  $upra. 

If  the  enemy  actually  penetrates  into  the  battery,  the 
personnel  continues  the  fight  with  its  small  arms.  This  is 
by  no  means  hopeless.  Although  it  will  rarely  be  possible 
to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  the  battery  in  this  way,  time  will 
be  gained  until  other  troops  can  come  up. 

(b)    Artillery  veraua  Cavalry.f 

In  order  to  enable  them  to  repel  a  cavalry  charge,  it  is 
essential  that  the  batteries  receive  early  notice,  through 
timely  reconnaissance,  of  the  impending  charge,  to  give  them 
ample  time  to  make  all  needful  preparations  to  meet  it. 
Whether  artillery  can  repulse  a  charge,  depends  upon 
mutual  cooperation  of  all  of  its  elements,  upon  good  fire 
discipline.  If  cavalry  advancing  frontally  to  the  charge 
is  observed  at  an  early  moment,  it  is  a  good  plan  to  cease 
firing  upon  the  old  target,  get  a  400  m.  bracket  upon  the 
cavalry  with  time  fire  and  open  volley  fire,  distributed  evenly 
over  the  entire  objective,  at  the  short  limit  of  the  bracket. 
The  sooner  the  charge  is  repulsed,  the  shorter  the  interrup- 
tion of  the  activity  of  the  artillery.  The  principal  danger 
to  the  artillery  does  not  lie  in  the  first  thin  hostile  line,  but 
in  the  luiits  following  that  line,  and  in  hostile  escadrons  that 
may  have  been  laimched  against  its  flank.     It  is  a  good  plan 

*KuNZ,  Krieffsgeschichtliche  Beispiele,  7,  p.  23. 

tSee  p.  209,  supra.  When  repelling  a  cayalry  charge,  the  EngliBh  artillery 
■eta  fuzea  at  600  yards  and  fires  at  will,  thereby  keeping  a  certain  zone  under  flre 
between  guns  and  cavalry.  No  effect  is  obtained  at  the  longer  ranges;  under  500 
yards,  fuzes  are  set  at  zero.  This  procedure  ensures  a  high  rate  of  fire,  but  the  rear- 
ward echelona — ^and  these  are  the  deciding  factors  in  a  charge — can  approach  al- 
most unscathed. 


Artillery  Supports.  357 

to  designate  platoons  or  batteries  to  turn  against  such  objec- 
tives. The  fire  should,  therefore,  be  continued  even  after  the 
leading  hostile  line  has  ridden  through  the  battery.  Even 
when  the  artillery  receives  timely  notice  of  a  flank  attack, 
the  task  of  repelling  it  is  by  no  means  easy,  as  a  change  of 
front  can  be  executed  but  slowly,  one  piece  at  a  time,  after 
the  trail  spade  of  each  has  been  pulled  out  of  the  ground. 
If  engaged  with  hostile  artillery  at  this  time,  the  protection 
of  the  shields  is  dispensed  with  after  such  a  change  of  front. 
In  addition,  the  distances  that  have  to  be  covered  by  the 
ammunition  carriers  increase  as  the  caisson  bodies  can  be 
moved  but  slowly,  and  a  certain  amount  of  excitement  and 
nervousness  among  the  personnel  is  unavoidable.  A  cav- 
alry charge  from  the  rear  presents  still  more  imfavorable 
features. 

Cavalry  will  have  scored  a  success,  if  it  succeeds  in  tem- 
porarily silencing  a  long  artillery  line,  or  in  dispersing  the 
reserves  and  spreading  disorder  and  panic.  It  is,  at  any  rate, 
easier  for  cavalry  to  capture  artillery  than  for  artillery  to 
ward  off  a  well  planned  charge  made  by  a  large  mass  of 
cavalry.* 


8.    ARTILLERY  SUPPORTS,! 

Formerly  the  opinion  prevailed  that  artillery  should 
always  be  provided  with  a  support,  but  our  more  recent  regula- 
tions represent  the  view,  based  on  lessons  from  the  last 
campaigns,  that  artillery  supports  should  only  be  provided 
when  the  artillery  can  not  keep  the  foreground  under  effec- 
tive fire,  when  its  flanks  are  exposed  to  the  attacks  of  enter- 

*For  examples  ftx)m  military  history,  see  pp.  176  and  177,  supra.  Charge  of 
French  cavalry  against  artillery  of  the  Xlth  Army  Corps  at  Sedan.  KuNz,  KrUgi- 
gBSchichtliehe  BeispUle,  6.  p.  24,  et  89Q.  In  spite  of  the  violent  canister  fire  that  met 
them,  hostile  escadrons  penetrated  the  3d  Heavy  Battery  of  the  11th  Field  Artil- 
lery. The  men  of  this  battery  defended  themselves  with  sidearms  and  sponges  until 
infantry  arrived  on  the  scene. 

tPar.  371,  German  F.  A,  D.  R. 

Journal  des  BcUnua  mUitaires,  March  and  April  numbers  1005. 


858  Employment  op  Artillery. 

prising  cavalry,  or  when  it  appears  isolated  and  unprotected 
by  the  other  arms.  Cases  like  the  one  last  mentioned  occur 
when  artillery  is  taken  out  of  the  route  column  when  still 
a  long  distance  away  from  the  enemy  and  pushed  forward 
into  action,  **when  necessary"  in  the  combat  of  the  cavalry 
division  (pars.  524,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.),  in  pursuit  (pars. 
521,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.),  and  when  a  retreat  is  to  be  facili- 
tated by  fire  from  a  flank  position  or,  when  in  pursuit  (pars. 
516,  German  P.  A.  D.  R.),  **a  pressure"  is  to  be  exerted  on 
the  hostile  line  of  retreat.  It  is  well  worth  considering 
whether  cyclist  detachments  would  not  frequently  suflBce 
for  this  purpose.  The  fact  that  the  Germans  lost  gtms* 
in  battle  at  Gravelotte,  at  Etrepagny,  and  at  Beatme  la 
Rolande  only,  undoubtedly  influenced  them  somewhat  in 
writing  their  regulations.  The  French  and  Russians,  who 
had  quite  a  contrary  experience,  lay  far  greater  stress  upon 
the  necessity  of  artillery  supports.  Infantry  and  cavalry 
do  not  have  the  same  value  as  artillery  supports.  Cavalry 
can  reconnoiter  to  a  great  distance  and  can  follow  the  move- 
ments of  the  guns  without  difficulty  and  is  therefore  able 
to  protect  them  at  the  very  moment  when  they  are  least 
capable  of  offering  resistance,  i.  e.,  while  on  the  march  and 
while  limbering  and  unlimbering.  But  cavalry  does  not  pos- 
sess the  same  power  of  resistance  as  infantry.  On  accoimt  of 
its  more  diversified  combat  activity,  infantry  is  better  able 
than  cavalry  to  protect  artillery  effectively.  This  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  infantry  can  fight  on  any  terrain  and  against  any 
arm  of  the  enemy,  whereas  cavalry  can  only  in  the  rarest 
cases  afford  protection  against  infantry  approaching  under 
cover.  Hence,  an  artillery  support  that  would  meet  all 
demands  made  upon  it,  should,  strictly  speaking,  be  composed 
of  both  arms.     But  this  is  impracticable,  since  an  artillery 

^During  the  Franco-German  war,  the  German' artillery  lost  six  guns  (KuNS« 
Kriegsifeschichtliche  Beispiele,  7.  pp.  fiO-62).  viz..  2  guns  of  the  4th  Heavy  Battery, 
9th  F.  A.,  on  August  18th.  1870.  (ibid.,  6.  p.  23).  2  Bavarian  Reserve  guns  on  the 
retreat  to  Coulmlers  (ibid.,  5,  pp.  70,  71),  1  gun  of  the  3d  Heavy  Battery.  10th  F.  A. 
at  Beaune  la  Rolande  (ibid.,  5,  pp.  73  and  76).  and  1  Saxon  gun  at  Etrepagny  on 
November  30th,  1870  (Reilerei,  pp.  227-234). 


Artillery  Supports.  359 

support  must  not  be  made  too  strong,  as  it  is  withdrawn 
from  participation  in  the  actual  engagement.  Besides, 
the  artillery  supports  will  usually  be  furnished  by  the  troops 
that  happen  to  be  in  the  vicinity.  Batteries  hunying  to 
the  battlefield  had  best  be  supported  by  cavalry;  later, 
during  the  action,  this  can  be  relieved,  if  necessary,  by  in- 
fantry. In  defense,  it  is  less  a  question  of  making  extended 
movements  than  of  repelling  attacks  on  the  artillery,  and  the 
artillery  supports  are  taken  from  the  infantry  as  a  matter  of 
course.  In  this  case,  reconnaissance  is  performed  by  the 
divisional  cavalry  and  the  scouts  of  the  artillery.  An  artillery 
support  should  be  made  as  small  as  possible.  A  support  vary- 
ing in  strength  from  a  platoon  to  a  company  of  infantry  or 
from  a  platoon  to  an  escadron  of  cavalry,  is  suflBcient,  as  a 
rule,  for  a  single  battery.  During  an  advance,  the  cavalry 
hurries  ahead,  reconnoiters  and  protects  the  artillery  against 
surprise,  but  must  take  care,  in  case  of  an  encounter  with  the 
enemy,  not  to  get  between  the  latter  and  the  battery,  as  this 
will  prevent  the  guns  from  firing.  During  a  retreat,  the 
cavalry  keeps  in  close  contact  with  the  enemy  and  endeavors 
to  retard  his  pursuit. 

In  such  circumstances,  it  is  not  easy  for  infantry  to  be 
on  hand  at  the  proper  time.  At  Beaumont,  Bavarian  in- 
fantrymen were  moimted  on  the  caissons  of  the  artillery.* 
To  be  sure,  only  a  few  men  can  be  carried  in  this  way  and  they 
can  do  little  more  than  merely  protect  the  guns  against 
small  bodies  of  cavalry,  guard  the  unlimbering,  and  cover 
guns  that  are  temporarily  in  a  critical  situation.  But,  since 
the  caimoneers  are  now  armed  with  the  carbine,  they  can  do 
as  much.  An  artillery  support  composed  of  infantry  follows 
the  artillery  as  quickly  as  possible,  and,  above  all  else, 
endeavors  to  keep  in  touch  with  it.  Infantry  can  best  pro- 
tect a  firing  battery  by  taking  up  a  position  in  front  or  to 
the  right  or  left  front  of  it.  The  French  split  up  their  support, 
placing  one-half  on  a  fiank  of  the  battery  for  the  latter's 

^Fgt  additional  examples,  see  p.  237.  supra. 


860  Employment  op  Artillery. 

immediate  protection  and  pushing  the  other  half  forward. 
This  distribution  has  for  its  primary  object  the  repulse  of  a 
cavalry  charge  directed  against  flank  and  rear.  When  hos- 
tile cavalry  approaches,  infantry  should  endeavor  to  prevent 
its  getting  to  the  gims  by  taking  up  a  position  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  battery.  When  engaged  with  hostile  infantry,  the 
artillery  support  should  endeavor  to  select  its  position  with 
a  view  to  divert  the  hostile  fire  from  the  battery. 

Cavalry  acting  as  an  artillery  support  had  best  be  posted 
to  the  right  or  left  rear  of  the  guns,  as  it  can  then  take  any 
hostile  attack  in  flank  and  is  as  much  as  possible  withdrawn 
from  the  hostile  fire.  When  infantry  approaches  to  attack 
the  battery,  the  important  thing  is  to  seize  the  proper  moment 
for  charging,  to  ride  quickly  and  unexpectedly  against  its 
flank,  preferably  at  the  moment  when  the  infantry  moves  to 
the  charge,  and,  when  necessary,  to  dismount  some  men  to 
fight  on  foot.  When  advancing  to  the  charge  against  hostile 
cavalry,  care  should  be  taken  to  prevent  being  thrown  back 
upon  the  battery  in  case  of  defeat,  as  the  guns  will  then  be 
aunble  to  fire. 

Former  regulations  prescribed  that  a  mounted  charge  be  made  by 
the  personnel  of  a  horse  battery  for  the  purpose  of  covering  the  withdrawal 
of  the  battery  against  hostile  cavahry.  Such  a  charge  was  successfully  made 
by  the  personnel  of  a  horse  battery  at  S«llershausen  in  1806,  and  at 
Leipzig  in  1813,  to  repel  hostile  skirmishers.  At  Novlon  Porcien, 
September  3d,  1870,  such  a  charge  was  made  by  the  personnel  of  the  1st 
Horse  Battery,  6th  F.  A.,*  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  prisoners.  Such  a 
handful  of  horsemen  will  scarcely  be  able  to  check  a  cavalry  charge,  and  if 
the  hostile  troopers  are  so  few  in  number  that  the  forty-eight  horse  artil- 
lerymen could  chase  them  away,  a  well  aimed  shrapnel  would  be  much  more 
effective.  The  danger  that  the  enemy  might  enter  the  battery  at  the  same 
time  with  the  defeated  cannoneers  is,  at  any  rate,  greater  than  the  chance 
of  their  success. 

The  other  arms  should  feel  in  duty  bound  not  to  abandon 
their  artillery.  An  order  issued  by  Blucher  on  April  6th, 
1813  to  the  Army  of  Silesia,  deserves  to  be  called  to  mind: 
It  ran,  in  part,  as  follows:  **When  an  engagement  takes 
place,  I  demand  that  the  troops  of  all  arms  of  a  brigade,  as 

•Gen.  St.  TT..  III.  p.  13. 


Provisions  op  Various  Regulations.  361 

well  as  of  any  body  of  troops,  regard  each  other  as  brothers 
in  arms  and  do  not  abandon  each  other,  and  that  they  look 
upon  their  artillery  as  a  sacred  charge  upon  whose  safety 
their  honor  depends.  The  commander  of  a  body  of  troops, 
whether  of  infantry  or  of  cavalry,  who  abandons  a  gun  that 
happens  to  be  in  the  vicinity,  no  matter  whether  it  belongs 
to  his  unit  or  to  another,  tmless  he  has  sacrificed  at  least 
half  of  his  men  in  its  defense,  shall  be  court-martialed." 

Heavy  field  artillery  does  not  require  a  support,  as  it 
has  plenty  of  men  that  are  not  needed  for  serving  the  guns 
and  are,  in  addition,  armed  with  rifles. 

In  France  and  Russia,  supporting  escadrons  are  attached  to  the 
batteries  of  cavalry  divisions. 

Franca:  Infantry  is,  as  a  general  rule,  posted  on  the  flanks  of  a 
long  artillery  line,  and  also  some  800 — 900  m.  in  front  of  gaps  in  that  line  to 
check  the  approach  of  hostile  skirmishers.  A  company  charged  with  this 
task  will  frequently  be  compelled  to  divide  its  men  between  front  and  flank 
of  the  line  of  guns. 

Russia :  The  artillery  support  is  to  repel  any  attack  on  the  guns. 
Its  firing  line  is  posted  abreast  of  the  batteries,  its  reserves  in  close  order 
in  rear  of  the  batteries  or  in  rear  of  their  flank  and  close  enough  to  be  able 
to  bring  help  promptly. 

Austria!  The  commander  of  the  artillery  support  (which  is  never 
smaller  than  half  a  company  or  half  an  escadron)  is  under  the  orders  of  the 
artillery  commander  if  the  latter  is  the  senior  in  rank,  otherwise  arrange- 
ments for  mutual  codperation  are  to  be  made.  In  addition,  to  the  measures 
to  be  taken  by  the  commander  of  the  troops,  the  artillery  is  to  provide  for 
its  own  safety  by  making  suitable  provision  for  reconnaissance.  Upon 
evacuating  a  position,  the  artillery  support  remains  behind  until  the  guns 
have  the  requisite  start. 

Examples:  The  batteries  of  the  6th  Infantry  Division,  were  sup- 
ported by  two  escadrons,  and  the  corps  artillery  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps  by 
the  16th  Dragoons,  during  the  advance  to  the  battlefield  of  Vionville.* 

At  Langensalza,  thirty  Prussian  infantrymen  prevented  Cam- 
bridge Dragoons  from  taking  two  guns  that  were  stuck  in  the  mud  in  a 
sunken  road.t 

At  Vionville,  an  escadron  of  the  2d  Dragoons  of  the  Guard 
covered  the  withdrawal  of  Planitz'  Horse  Battery  against  three  approach- 
ing French  escadrons.t 

Sapignies,  January  2d,  1871.11 

*HoFFBAUEB.  Deutsche  Artillerie,  TV,  pp.  24  and  58. 
tLBTTOW-YoBBECK,  FeldzuQ  vcn  1866,  I.  p.  812. 

tKuNZ,  Reiterei,  p.  130. 
iriMd..  p.  241. 


362  Employment  of  Artillery. 

At  the  battle  of  Grav*lottep  the  left  flank  of  the  corps  artillery 
of  the  IXth  Army  Corps,  at  Vern^ville,  was  without  support.* 


9.    REINFORCING  THE  FIRING  BATTERIES 

IN   ACTION, 

When  reinforcements  may  be  expected,  sufficient  room 
should  be  provided  for  the  batteries  that  arrive  late  on  the 
field,  by  appropriately  curtailing  the  frontage  and  by  closing  in 
in  each  battalion,  in  order  that  an  admixture  of  units  may  be 
avoided.  On  level  ground,  batteries  that  arrive  late  on  the 
field  should  avoid  going  into  position  immediately  beside 
or  abreast  of  an  objective  upon  which  the  enemy  has  already 
adjusted  his  fire.  (Par.  424,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.).t  It 
may  be  advantageous  to  post  the  guns  in  echelon  if  it  does 
not  interfere  with  fire  direction.  To  run  guns  up  individually 
into  an  artillery  line  that  is  already  engaged,  interrupts  the 
firing,  considerably  increases  the  density  of  the  target  offered 
and  is  only  permissible  in  pursuit  or  when  the  enemy's  fire 
is  dying  down.  Artillery  units  should  be  maintained  intact 
as  long  as  possible  or,  at  any  rate,  if  broken  up,  reestablished 
during  a  change  of  position.  Battalions  or  batteries  that  go 
into  action  within  the  limits  of  a  command  other  than  their 
own,  are  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  officer  commanding 
in  that  locality.  The  same  is  true  of  heavy  batteries,  which 
in  similar  circumstances  are  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  senior 
artillery  officer  commanding  in  the  new  position.  (Par. 
381,  German  H.  A.  D.  R.).  The  brigade  commander  should 
regulate  matters  affecting  conunand.  It  will  sometimes  be 
practicable  to  make  room  by  moving  batteries  toward  a 
flank,  t  but  when  this  is  impossible  an  attempt  will  have  to 

*Gen.  SL  W.,  II,  p.  707. — Hoffbaubr,  Deutsche  ArHUerie,  V,  p.  36. 

tThe  Saxon  4th  Light  Battery  reinforced  the  German  batteries  that  were  en- 
gaged with  superior  French  artillery  during  the  engagement  at  Villieni.  November 
80th.  1870.  Only  four  of  the  guns  were  able  to  go  into  position  at  first,  and  in  a 
short  time  casualties  reduced  the  gun  squads  to  one  or  two  men  per  gun.  In  spite 
of  this,  the  battery  maintained  its  position.  Kbbtsch  me  b,  OeaehichU  dsr  aOchMitditn 
Feldartillerie,  p.  170. 

IHOHBNLOHB.  MUUOrische  Brief e.  III,  p.  196. 


Reinforcing  the  Firing  Batteries. 


363 


be  made  to  close  intervals  between  guns  in  each  battery, 
(though  even  this  is  difficult),  so  that  other  guns  may  be 
posted  in  the  intervals  between  batteries. 

At  Worthy  the  four  batteries  of  the  2l8t  Infantry  Division  went 
into  position  at  large  intervals  (total  frontage,  600  paces),  on  the  heights 
of  Gunstett.  As  a  consequence,  some  of  the  batteries  that  came  up  later 
had  to  move  into  these  intervals,  the  heights  not  affording  enough  room, 
and  two  batetries  found  no  room  at  all  and  were  unable  to  go  into  action. 

After  the  capture  of  Elsaszhausen,  the  admixture  of  batteries  of 
the  Vth  and  of  the  Xlth  Army  Corps  became  still  worse.  (See  sketch). 
The  same  thing  occured  in  the  very  restricted  position  occupied  by  the 
Xlth  Army  Corps  on  the  heights  of  St.  Menges  (battle  of  Sedan). 

At  Gravelotte,  some  guns  of  the  batteries  of  the  lid  Army  Corps 
unlimbered  in  the  intervals  between  batteries  of  the  Vllth  Army  Corps, 
which  were  already  engaged,  but  fired  only  from  1  to  15  rounds,  so  that 
difficulties  in  fire  control  did  not  become  apparent.* 

In  the  following  figure,  a  circle  with  single  flag  denotes  a  battery  of 
the  Ist  Division,  a  circle  with  a  double  flag  a  battery  of  the  2d  Division, 
and  a  black  circle  with  a  cross  a  battery  of  the  corps  artillery,  either  of  the 
Vth  or  of  the  Xlth  Army  Corps: 


asshauserir 


Position  of  the  Artillery  of  the 

Vth  and  the  Xlth  Corps 

at  Elsaszhausen. 


^-O^ 


Gunstett 


First  Position  of  the 

Artillery  of  the 

Xlth  Corps. 


*HoiTBAUBB,  Devische  Artillerie,  V,  p.  126. 


364  Employment  op  Artillery. 


10.    CHANGES  OF  POSITION.* 

Frequent  changes  of  position  intemipt  the  fire.  To  the 
time  lost  in  moving  from  one  position  to  another,  must  be 
added  the  time  consumed  in  adjusting  the  fire  in  the  new 
position.  It  is  not  advisable  to  change  to  a  new  position 
only  a  few  hundred  paces  away  from  the  old,  as  such  a  change 
does  not  appreciably  influence  the  effect  of  the  fire.  And 
even  if  it  does,  such  an  increase  is  nullified  by  the  cessation 
of  the  fire.  The  Austrians  and  Italians  prohibit  changes  of 
less  than  600  paces,  the  Russians,  f  changes  of  less  than  600  m. 
In  an  attack,  a  change  of  position  must  bring  about  a 
material  increase  in  effect,  otherwise  such  a  change  had  better 
not  be  made  at  all,  unless  there  is  danger  that  by  remaining 
in  the  old  position,  touch  ^ith  the  advancing  troops  will 
be  lost.  A  change  of  position  is  made  by  order  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  troops;  when  necessary,  his  permission  is 
obtained.  When  the  tactical  situation  demands  an  im- 
mediate advance,  or  when  it  is  a  question  of  making  the  most 
of  advantages  gained,  artillery  must  disregard  this  regula- 
tion. When  it  does  so,  the  commander  of  the  troops  should 
be  promptly  notified.  In  Manchuria — the  country  being 
very  open — the  artillery  usually  did  not  attempt  to  change 
position  in  the  day  time,  as,  at  the  very  outset,  during  the 
first  engagements  of  the  campaign,  advancing  batteries  had 
been  severely  handled,  t  A  change  of  position  was  either 
effected  by  piece  or  postponed  imtil  dark.  In  face  of  gims  pro- 
vided with  shields,  the  difficulties  attending  a  change  of  posi- 
tion are  increased.  At  the  battle  of  the  Shaho,  on  October 
12th,  1904,  two  Japanese  field  batteries  advanced  by  successive 


*Par8. 464  and  465.  German  F.  A.  D.  R, 

What  is  stated  here  also  applies  to  heavy  artillery.  It  Is  desirable  that  the 
latter  accomplish  all  Its  tasks  ftom  a  single  position. 

tThe  first  position  is  to  be  located  firom  2,000  to  8,000  m.  from  the  obJeetlTa. 
that  for  preparing  the  infantry  attack,  firom  1,000  to  1,600  m.  and  that  for  support- 
ing that  attack,  not  less  than  800  m.  ftrom  the  objective. 

IBuBsiaa  batteries  on  the  Yalu,  at  Wafangkou.  and  at  Tashihchlao. 


Changes  of  Position. 


365 


pieces,  the  latter  following  one  another  at  400  m.,  over  an 
area  swept  by  hostile  shrapnel,  and  suffered  no  serious  loss. 
Of  the  26  carriages,  16  were  fired  upon,  but  in  spite  of  this, 
the  loss  amounted  only  to  3  men  and  1 7  horses.  At  Yangtsu- 
ling,  four  batteries  of  the  2d  Japanese  Division  were  in  a 
very  short  time  deprived  of  mobility  when  they  attempted 
to  move  closer  to  the  enemy.  At  the  Yalu,  a  Russian  bat- 
tery that  attempted  to  limber  up,  lost  most  of  its  horses  in  a 
few  minutes. 

When  the  hostile  artillery  is  superior  and  its  fire  has 
been  carefully  adjusted,  it  may  be  a  good  plan  to  move  the 
gims  either  forward  or  to  the  rear,  in  order  to  diminish  the 
enemy's  fire  effect,  to  mislead  him  and  possibly  to  compel  him 
to  readjust  his  fire.  In  Italy,  gtms  are  to  be  moved  some  ten 
or  twelve  meters  in  this  manner,  and  in  Russia,  according 
to  General  Totleben,  twenty  to  fifty  meters.*  It  is  unneces- 
sary, of  course,  to  obtain  permission  from  the  commander  of 
the  troops  for  such  a  trifling  change  of  position.  The  same 
is  true  of  a  change  of  position  effected  by  running  the  gtms 
forward  when  defending  a  crest,  in  order  to  enable  them  better 
to  sweep  the  forward  slope.  For  short  distances  (about  50 
m.),  when  the  ground  permits,  the  desired  result  will  be  at- 
tained much  more  quickly  by  running  the  guns  forward  by 
hand,  opening  fire  as  soon  as  two  or  three  guns  are  in  battery. 
The  necessary  ammimition  can  be  taken  along  on  the  axle 

^According  to  Rohne,  Schiestlehre  fUr  die  Artillerie,  p.  95,  when  firing  on  artil- 
lery In  position,  wltb  time  shrapnel,  model  '91,  the  following  hits  per  shrapnel  may 
be  expected: 


Range 
m. 


2.000. 
2.600 
8.000 
8,500 


Intervals  of  Burst. 

50 

100 

150 

200 

4.6 

2.2 

1.4 

1 

4.8 

2. 

1.2 

0.8 

4. 

1.7 

0.9 

0.55 

3.8 

1.5 

0.7 

0.1 

250  m. 


0.7  hits 
0.4     •• 
0.25    " 


366  Employment  op  Artillery. 

seats.  It  shotild  be  borne  in  mind  that  loaded  limbers  and  cais- 
sons can  be  moved  by  hand  by  great  exertions  only.  When 
considerable  distance  has  to  be'  traversed  in  a  change  of 
position  and  when  the  ground  is  soft,  it  is  always  better  to 
bring  up  the  teams.  This  will  no  doubt  increase  the  losses, 
but  the  moral  effect  and  the  advantage  of  getting  all  the  guns 
simultaneously  into  position  should  not  be  underestimated. 
The  commander  of  the  artillery  (battalion  commander) 
turns  over  the  command  of  the  gims  in  the  old  position  to 
the  next  senior  officer,  reconnoiters  the  new  position,  sends 
back  his  adjutant  (or  an  orderly)  with  the  order  to  move  the 
batteries  up,  and  meets  the  battery  conmianders,  who  hasten 
forward  ahead  of  their  batteries,  with  orders  for  moving  into 
the  new  position.  A  battery  usually  moves  intact  into  the 
new  position  (in  Russia  also  by  demi-battery),  but  exposed 
areas  devoid  of  cover  may  be  crossed  by  a  piece  or  by  a  pla- 
toon at  a  time.  Units  larger  than  a  battery  will  effect  a 
change  of  position  by  echelons,  those  remaining  in  the  old 
position  meantime  keeping  down  the  enemy's  fire.  Since 
artillery  that  is  in  the  act  of  limbering  up  or  that  is  in  motion 
presents  a  very  good  target,  the  defender's  artillery,  even  if 
temporarily  withdrawn,  will  seize  this  opportunity  to  come 
again  into  action.  Guns  must  at  any  rate  be  kept  in  readi- 
ness to  fire  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  firing  without 
interference.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  artillery 
changing  position  limber  up  under  cover,  even  if  this  entails 
running  back  the  guns  first,  that  it  use  covered  avenues  of 
approach,  at  least  for  the  batteries  that  move  first,  that  the 
whole  movement  be  made  rapidly,  and  that  the  fire  be  re- 
opened promptly. 

From  the  foregoing,  it  appears  that  when  a  change  of  position  is 
contemplated,  the  following  measures  should  be  taken: 

1.  The  new  position  and  its  approaches  should  be  reconnoitered; 

2.  The  reserves  and  the  light  ammunition  column  should  be  notified, 
the  limbers  should  be  refilled,  unless  this  has  already  been  done,  and  the 
manner  of  limbering  up  should  be  specified; 

8.    The  batteries  that  are  to  move  first  should  be  indicated. 


Changes  op  Position.  367 

As  many  units  should  be  kept  back  in  the  old  position, 
as  seem  to  be  required  in  view  of  the  intensity  of  the  hostile 
fire.  But,  in  any  event,  as  many  batteries  should  be  sent 
forward  to  the  new  position  as  may  be  necessary  to  develop 
a  strong  enough  fire  power  from  the  shorter  range  gained  to 
facilitate  the  movement  of  the  other  batteries.  Larger  units 
(regiments)  should  change  position  by  battalion.  By  doing 
this,  time  is  gained  and  mixture  of  batteries  is  avoided.* 
When  a  change  of  position  is  made  in  order  to  support  f  he 
infantry  attack,  haste  is  generally  necessary;  it  will  then 
no  longer  be  possible  to  make  the  most  of  available  cover  and 
losses  will  have  to  be  borne.  As  the  critical  stage  of  the 
action  approaches,  batteries  will  have  to  go  into  action  re- 
gardless of  losses. 

The  reserves  and  the  light  ammunition  column  follow 
the  batteries  as  soon  as  the  latter  are  in  their  new  position, 
and  take  along  any  materiel  that  may  have  been  left  in  the 
old  position. 

During  a  retrograde  movement,  the  artillery  commander 
as  a  rule  rides  ahead  to  reconnoiter  the  proposed  position. 
The  other  artillery  leaders  as  a  rule  remain  with  their  com- 
mands (par.  398,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.),  but  send  experienced 
officers  ahead  to  receive  orders  and  to  reconnoiter  the  posi- 
tion. (Par.  521,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.).  These  officers 
may  also  be  directed  to  clear  the  road  that  is  to  be  used  of 
trains  and  wagons.  The  reserves  and  ammunition  columns 
are  sent  ahead  beforehand.  Artillery  leaders  do  not  ride 
ahead  to  reconnoiter  until  their  commands  are  approaching 
the  selected  position. 

The  execution  of  a  change  of  position  will  vary,  depend- 
ing upon  whether  the  enemy  has  gained  the  superiority  of 
fire  or  not.  In  the  latter  case,  in  order  to  keep  the  enemy  at 
a  distance,  it  is  usually  advisable  to  withdraw  by  echelons. 

'While  the  artillery  battalions  of  the  Saxons  were  Intact  north  of  Ste.  Marle- 
aiiz-Oh6nes,  scarcely  two  batteries  of  any  one  battalion  were  together  In  the  position 
south  of  Ronconrt.  The  presence  of  light  and  heavy  batteries  of  different  degrees 
of  mobility  In  one  and  the  same  organization,  likewise  contributed  to  the  dlslntegra- 
tfon  of  units. 


368  Employment  of  Artillery. 

But  when  the  enemy  has  gained  the  superiority  of  fire,  it  is 
ahnost  invariably  a  mistake  to  withdraw  by  echelons,  as 
this  would  enable  the  hostile  artillery  to  turn  all  its  fire  on 
the  batteries  that  have  remained  in  position  and  prevent 
them  from  limbering.  The  gims  should  limber  up  suc- 
cessively, in  order  that  the  batteries  may  be  enabled  to  take 
their  places  in  the  column  without  check  or  loss  of  time. 
The  batteries  that  have  been  most  exposed  to  the  hostile 
fire  begin  to  limber  up  first.  To  hasten  the  execution  of  the 
withdrawal,  a  separate  route  should  be  assigned,  if  practi- 
cable, to  each  battery.    The  movement  is  begim  at  the  walk. 


11.    FIRE  DIRECTION, 

The  effectiveness  of  artillery  is  measured  by  the  effect 
produced  on  the  target  within  a  certain  space  of  time  by  a 
mass  of  its  projectiles.  This  effect  will  make  itself  felt 
proportionately  sooner  when  the  fire  is  opened  unexpectedly, 
when  it  is  concentrated,  both  as  to  time  and  space  (fire  sur- 
prise, par.  436,  German  F.  A.  D.  R. ),  and  when  one  succeeds 
in  obtaining,  even  if  only  with  part  of  the  guns,  a  flanking 
effect.  The  employment  of  cross  fire  is  then  frequently  a 
natural  consequence.  To  obtain  the  maximum  effect  in 
the  shortest  possible  time  with  the  minimum  expenditure 
of  ammimition,  is  the  guiding  principle  of  modem  artillery 
tactics.  **Nothing  but  correct  fire  direction  can  harmonize 
the  effect  produced  by  the  artillery  with  the  intentions  of 
the  commander  of  the  troops  and  with  the  actions  of  the  other 
arms,  especially  with  those  of  the  infantry.  Correct  fire 
direction  is  the  expression  of  tactical  appreciation  of  the 
situation  and  of  the  purpose  of  the  action.  Correct  fire  direc- 
tion is  the  certificate  written  with  a  hail  of  iron  by  the 
artillery  commander  as  to  the  appropriate  execution  of  the 
orders  received  and  the  intelligent  appreciation  of  the  inten- 
tions of  the  commander  of  the  troops.    Finally,  it  is  com- 


Fire  Direction.  369 

plete  proof  of  soldierly  ability  to  shoulder  responsibility  and 
of  capacity  for  using  initiative."* 

The  commander  of  the  troops  indicates  in  general  terms 
the  purpose  of  the  action  and  the  objectives.  The  artil- 
lery commander  and  the  commanders  of  the  higher  artillery 
units  assign  objectives  to  elements  of  their  commands  and 
regulate  the  conduct  and  progress  of  the  artillery  action 
(fire  direction) .  The  conduct  of  fire  is  the  function  of  bat- 
tery and  of  platoon  commanders.  It  is  their  duty  to  see 
that  the  orders  given  by  the  officers  charged  with  fire  direc- 
tion are  intelligently  executed. 

The  Austrian  regulations,  after  pointing  out  that  artil- 
lery should  always  select  the  objective  that  is  most  danger- 
ous to  the  principal  arm,  add:  **One  of  the  most  difficult 
and,  at  the  same  time,  most  important  duties  of  the  artil- 
lery commander  during  an  action,  consists  of  deciding  in  all 
phases  of  the  fight,  whether  to  combat  the  hostile  artillery, 
which  is  retarding  our  own  infantry,  or  the  hostile  infantry, 
whose  defeat  it  is,  after  all,  that  decides  the  action."  One 
of  the  principal  duties  of  the  officers  charged  with  fire  direc- 
tion consists  in  properly  apportioning  the  work  of  heavy  artil- 
tory  and  field  artillery.  Heavy  artillery  can  best  cooperate 
with  field  artillery  by  directing  its  fire  against  the  target  that 
is  most  dangerous  for  the  time  being,  against  the  hostile 
field  artillery,  which  fires  as  a  rule  from  a  masked  position, 
and  by  keeping  down  the  fire  of  the  hostile  field  artillery, 
thereby  releasing  as  many  field  batteries  as  possible  to  fight 
the  hostile  infantry.  But  it  is  essential  that  the  positions 
of  the  hostile  artillery  be  at  least  approximately  known.  To 
search  a  large  area  in  which  hostile  artillery  is  beUeved  to  be 
located,  leads  to  waste  of  ammunition.  Field  artillery 
should  endeavor  to  combat  these  very  effective  howitzer 
batteries  by  firing  shrapnel  on  them  from  a  fiank.  Later 
in  the  action,  the  heavy  artillery  should  prepare  the  assault  by 
turning  its  fire  on  the  point  of  attack  and  endeavor  to  de- 

*Swis8  Artillery  arid  Engineer  Journal,  1008,  No.  1.  p.  2. 


370  Employment  op  Artillery. 

molish  supporting  points  and  to  annihilate  infantry  under 
overhead  cover.  (Par.  358,  German  H.  A.  D.  R.).  It  is  a 
waste  of  energy  to  put  more  batteries  into  action  than  are 
necessary  to  accomplish  the  object  sought  to  be  attained. 
In  many  cases,  one  can  achieve  the  same  result  with  a  small 
number  of  guns  firing  rapidly  as  with  a  larger  ntunber  of 
guns  firing  slowly.  This  is  particularly  true  when  repelling 
cavalry.     (Par.  438,  German  P.  A.  D.  R.). 

Every  opportunity  to  fire  on  the  higher  staffs  and  on 
observation  stations  (balloons)  shoidd  be  utilized.*  Machine 
guns  should,  when  practicable,  be  put  out  of  action  at  ranges 
that  are  outside  their  effective  zone,  i.  e.,  at  ranges  over 
1,600  m.  When  opposed  by  deployed  infantry,  artillery 
should,  as  a  rule,  direct  its  fire  first  against  the  leading  line, 
and  turn  any  excess  fire  power  that  may  be  available  against 
objectives  in  rear  of  that  line.  Infantry  targets  of  consider- 
able width  should  be  combated  section  by  section,  so  that  no 
part  of  the  target  will  for  any  length  of  time  remain  tmtouched 
by  fire.  Even  inferior  artillery  should  endeavor,  by  con- 
centrating its  fire,  to  obtain  a  superiority  over  at  least  a 
part  of  the  objective.  It  is  usually  impossible  to  avoid 
distributing  the  fire  among  several  targets,  in  order  that 
some  parts  of  the  hostile  force  may  not  get  into  action  un- 
molested. One  should  avoid  dispersing  the  fire,  for  a  numeri- 
cal superiority  in  batteries  becomes  effective  only  through 
concentration  of  fire. 

Batteries  equipped  with  shields  should  be  combated 
according  to  the  same  principles  as  objectives  protected  by 
artificial  cover.     One  diffictilty  is  that  there  are  very  few 

*For  this  reason  care  should  be  exercised  In  posting  headquarters'  flags,  which 
have  also  been  adopted  by  other  armies.  They  should  be  so  posted  that  they  will 
not  draw  the  hostile  Are  on  the  staff.  The  death  of  General  Douay  at  Welszenbuig 
and  the  wounding  of  Marshal  MacMahon  at  Sedan  exerted  a  marked  effect  upon 
the  battles  named.  On  September  Ist,  1870,  Marshal  LeboeuTs  staff  waa  fired 
upon.  KuNZ.  Noisseville,  p.  89.  Hoffbauer,  VI,  p.  105.  The  fire  against 
headquarters'  staffs  Is  conducted  as  laid  down  In  par.  196,  Oerman  F.  A.  F.  JR., which 
says:  "Depending  upon  the  degree  of  accuracy  with  which  the  range  Is  known,  the 
three  platoons  or  the  six  guns,  as  the  case  may  be,  fire  by  platoon  In  the  one  case,  or 
by  volley  in  the  other,  with  time  shrapnel  at  ranges  progressively  increased  by  100 


•t 


Fire  Direction.  371 

animate  targets  visible  in  a  battery,  that  losses  inflicted 
impair  its  firing  but  slightly,  and  that  it  is  impossible  in 
most  cases  to  observe  the  target  directly.  Time  shell  of  the 
hght  field  howitzer  and  percussion  shell  (without  delay  action) 
of  the  heavy  field  howitzer,  promise  the  best  and  qiiickest 
results.  On  the  target  range,  good  results  have  been  obtained 
with  guns  using  alternately  time  and  percussion  fire.  This 
may  likewise  hold  good  in  actual  service.  The  use  of  shell 
against  hostile  guns  presupposes  accurate  adjustment  and 
requires  that  the  flash  of  the  hostile  guns  be  clearly  per- 
ceptible or  that  the  guns  be  visible  and  that  the  range  be  not 
too  great,  i.  e.,  not  over  2,500  m.  It  will  frequently  be  prac- 
ticable to  combat  in  this  manner  batteries  provided  with 
shields,  when  they  advance  to  repel  the  infantry  attack. 

Lieutenant^General  von  Reichenau  and  General  Langlois  advo- 
cate the  adoption  of  a  small  caliber  gun  to  be  used  to  dismount  guns. 
But,  among  other  things,  the  drawbacks  inseparably  connected  with  the 
introduction  of  a  special  type  of  gun,  the  low  ballistic  qualities  of  small  cal- 
iber projectiles  and  the  difficulties  of  ranging  with  them  argue  against  its 
adoption.  When  the  hostile  guns  are  visible,  they  can  just  as  well  be  dis- 
mounted by  the  fire  of  the  field  gun. 

A  battery  should  keep  its  sheaf  of  fire  intact.  It  should, 
while  developing  the  whole  fire  power  of  which  it  is  capable, 
combat  several  targets  only  when  it  receives  orders  during 
the  assault  to  prevent  the  silenced  artillery  of  the  defender 
from  reopening  fire.  In  a  battalion,  a  change  of  target  is 
ordinarily  not  made  without  orders  from  the  battalion  com- 
mander. When  necessary,  a  battalion  can  switch  all  or 
a  part  of  its  fire  to  another  section  than  the  one  assigned  to 
it.  Frequent  changes  of  target  impair  the  efficacy  of  the  fire, 
as  each  change  requires  that  the  fire  be  again  adjusted.  A 
battery  commander  is  justified  in  shifting  the  fire  of  his 
battery  on  his  own  initiative  to  another  target  when  danger 
is  imminent,  or  when  important  targets  appear  suddenly 
and  remain  visible  for  but  a  short  time. 

At  Worthy  whenever  the  situation  did  not  require  a  continuation  of 
fire,  the  German  artillery  adjusted  its  fire  on  certain  points  west  of  the 


372  Employment  of  Artillery. 

village  of  Wdrth  and  on  the  road  exits  at  the  Albrechtshouae  farm,  and  was 
thereby  enabled  at  once  to  take  under  fire  French  columns  and  a  mitrail- 
leuse battery  that  appeared  at  these  points.* 

(a)    ORDER  OF  FIRE  OF  FIELD  ARTILLERY.! 

The  pieces  are  loaded  in  rotation  immediately  after 
being  fired,  when  that  method  of  loading  is  specified.  A 
•alvo  (Lage)  consists  of  a  single  discharge  from  each  of  the 
guns  of  a  battery,  fired  n  regular  order  from  one  flank  to  the 
other.  When  fire  by  salvo  is  used,  as,  for  instance,  in 
adjusting  the  height  of  burst,  only  one  rotmd  is  made  ready. 

Continuous  fire  {Flilgelfeuer)  begins,  as  a  rule,  from  one 
flank  or  the  other.  The  guns,  beginning  with  the  one  on 
the  flank  indicated  in  the  command,  are  fired  in  regular 
rotation  at  the  command  of  the  chiefs  of  platoon,  the  first  gun 
firing  again  when  the  last  one  has  fired.  Each  round  must 
be  observed.  This  regulates  the  rate  of  ordinary  fire 
(4-6  rounds  per  minute) .  The  rate  of  fire  may  be  increased 
or  diminished  by  the  command  **short"  or  "long"  fire  pauses. 
In  fire  by  piece,  the  battery  commander  gives  the  commands 
for  firing.  It  is  therefore  advisable  to  use  this  method  of 
fire  during  adjustment  so  long  as  * 'errors  in  distribution  re- 
quire interference  of  the  battery  commander  or  when  targets 
are  to  be  kept  continuously  under  fire  without  expenditure 
of  a  large  amount  of  ammunition." 

When  a  gun  is  not  ready  to  fire,  the  chief  of  platoon  at  onoe  directs 
his  other  gun  to  fire,  or  notifies  the  chief  of  platoon  whose  platoon  is  to 
are  next.  The  delinquent  gun  does  not  fire  until  its  turn  comes  around 
again.  Whether  the  fiank  gun  that  fired  first  will  be  able  to  take  up  the 
fire  when  its  turn  comes  again,  seems  doubtful,  as  there  is  neither  smoke 
nor  noticeable  recoil  to  show  when  the  last  gun  fires,  and  as  the  noise  in  a 
firing  battery  is  deafening.  The  History  of  the  18th  Field  Artillery 
states:  "It  seemed  as  if  we  were  right  in  the  midst  of  a  thunderstorm. 
Everyone,  oficers,  non-comnusioned  officers  and  cannoneers,  was  deaf 
as  a  doorpost.  It  was  necessary  to  yell  to  make  oneself  understood  even 
at  short  range.  Our  ears  rang  for  days  after  the  fight  and  any  penetrating 
noise  caused  them  to  ache." 


^HoFFBAUXB,  Deutsche  Artilkri$,  II,  pp.  46  and  122. 

tPar.  133.  Gerrrum  F.  A,  D.  R.,  and  pars.  77-84.  German  F.  A.  F.  R. 


Order  op  Fire  on  Field  Artillery.  873 

Volley  fire.  Each  gun,  without  reference  to  the 
others,  fires  from  one  to  three  rounds,  at  the  command  of  its 
chief.  In  many  cases,  this  class  of  fire  may  facilitate  ob- 
servation and  simplify  judging  of  heights  of  burst.  It  makes 
it  ix)ssible,  moreover,  in  larger  units,  to  distinguish  the  bursts 
of  the  various  batteries.  It  is  adapted  for  obtaining  an  effect 
quickly  and  for  utilizing  favorable  moments  in  a  rapidly 
changing  situation.  At  the  same  time,  it  enables  the  bat- 
tery commander,  even  when  its  rapidity  is  increased,  to 
retain  control.  But,  it  may  easily  lead  to  a  greater  expendi- 
ture of  ammunition  than  contemplated  and  should,  there- 
fore, be  used  for  short  periods  only.  Continuous  and  volley 
fire  will  be  used  alternately,  as  a  rule,  in  fire  for  effect. 

Rapid  fire  (maximum  about  25  rounds  per  minute) ,  en- 
ables a  battery  to  develop  its  maximum  fire  power,  but  makes 
fire  control  difficult  and  entails  a  large  expenditure  of  am- 
munition. It  should,  therefore,  be  used  only  in  case  of  im- 
minent danger  and  when  severe  losses  in  personnel  and  ma- 
teriel have  impaired  the  normal  action  of  a  battery.  When 
rapid  fire  (either  time  or  percussion)  is  used  during  calm 
or  damp  weather,  such  a  dense  smoke-cloud  will  be  formed 
in  front  of  the  target  that  if  the  latter  is  low,  it  will  be  scarcely 
visible.  If  then  the  fire  is  directed  at  the  lower  edge  of  this 
smoke-cloud,  the  shots  will  fall  short,  and  if  the  target  is 
low  and  percussion  fire  is  used,  the  results  will  be  insigni- 
ficant on  account  of  the  limited  radius  of  effect.  Pauses 
in  the  fire  are,  therefore,  necessary  to  let  the  smoke  dissipate. 
The  French  contemplate  blinding  the  enemy  in  this  manner 
by  smoke,  dust,  and  fragments. 

Fire  by  battery  {Salve*)  is  employed  in  adjustment, 
either  concentrated  or  distributed  to  facilitate  observation — 
for  example,  when  several  batteries  have  the  same  target, 
when  conditions  for  observation  are  unfavorable,  and  when 
the  smoke  ball  of  a  single  projectile  can  not  be  seen  with 

*Simultaneott8  discharge  of  all  the  guns.  The  term  **flre  by  battery**  was 
■elected  for  want  of  a  better  term. — Tran$Uuof. 


374  Employment  op  Artillery. 

sufficient  clearness  ;*  and  in  fire  for  effect  to  produce  a  great 
simultaneous  effect  on  the  target,  f  since  the  effect  is  increased 
when  a  number  of  projectiles  strike  the  target  simultaneously. 
When  fire  by  battery  is  used  against  animate  targets,  it  is 
distributed.  The  battery  commander  gives  the  commands 
for  firing.  After  firing  one  roimd  (time  fire),  the  pieces 
are  reloaded  at  the  command  of  the  battery  commander. 
The  long  pauses  between  successive  discharges  by  battery 
are  a  drawback,  but  the  great  effect  produced  in  a  short 
time  and  the  facility  of  observing  the  fire  are  an  advantage.  J 

(b)    ORDER  OF  FIRE  OF  HEAVY  ARTILLERY.  T 

Fire  by  piece  is  used  in  the  adjustment  and  when  the 
battery  commander  desires  to  keep  the  fire  under  control, 
for  example  in  firing  on  moving  targets  and  to  take  advantage 
of  good  conditions  of  light  and  observation. 

Ordinary  fire  may  begin  as  soon  as  a  bracket  has  been 
obtained.  It  should  be  ordered  not  later  than  the  moment 
of  passing  to  fire  for  effect.  Rapid  fire  should  be  used  for 
very  brief  periods  only,  as  it  unduly  taxes  strength  and 
accuracy  of  the  cannoneers.  Fire  by  battery  {Salve)  may 
be  employed  in  adjustment  when  the  conditions  for  obser- 
vation are  unfavorable  and  to  avoid  mistaking  the  bursts  of 
other  batteries  for  those  of  one's  own  battery;  to  verify 
whether  the  guns  are  properly  laid  on  the  target  announced 
when  firing  in  larger  units ;  and  to  take  advantage  of  favor- 
able moments  that  occur  diiring  the  action.     In  a  critical 


*Beobachtungssalven,  literally,  observation  salvoe.  The  term  salvo  here 
means  simultaneous  discharge  of  all  the  guns  of  the  battery  (platoon). — Translator. 

t  Wirkungs$alven. 

tSKO BE  lev's  orders  to  his  artillery  during  the  battle  of  Lovtcha  state:  "Aa 
soon  as  our  troops  advance  to  assault  the  Ryschaja  Gora.  lire  by  battery  should  be 
employed  as  long  as  possible,  until  the  forward  movement  of  our  troops  necessitatee 
a  cessation  of  fire."     Kuropatkin.  I.  p.  59. 

Fire  by  battery  was  used  as  a  signal  for  making  a  simultaneous  attadc  at  Goml 
Dubniac.  Pustrevski.  Russische  Qarde,  p.  125.  The  attack  was  to  be  made  at 
the  ninth  discharge.  The  scheme  failed.  Fire  by  battery  was  likewise  used  aa  a 
signal  to  widely  separated  advancing  troops.     Kunz,  Otlians,  p.  217. 

fPars.  14S-151,  Qtrman  H.  A,  F.  R. 


Rate  of  Fire.  375 

situation,  the  battery  commander  is  able  to  keep  better 
control  by  employing  fire  by  battery.  The  drawback  of 
this  class  of  fire  lies  in  the  unavoidable  pause  between  suc- 
cessive discharges  and  in  the  fact  that  it  is  impossible  quickly 
to  correct  an  error  in  direction  in  any  one  gun.  The  last 
mentioned  disadvantage  may  be  obviated  by  using  a  rapid 
salvo  (the  so-called  Rollsalve),  in  which  the  guns  are  fired 
rapidly  in  rotation. 

(c)     RATE  OF  FIRE. 

The  rate  of  fire  of  a  single  gun  depends  upon  the  time 
consumed  by  the  piece  in  returning  into  battery  after  a 
shot  is  fired,  and  upon  that  consumed  in  setting  the  fuze 
of  the  next  shrapnel.  When  several  guns  are  considered, 
the  rate  of  fire  during  adjustment  (adjustment  of  height  of 
biu-st)  is  governed  by  the  necessity  of  observing  each  burst 
(field  gtm  model  '96 :  time  of  fiight  of  projectile  at  1,500  m., 
4  seconds,  at  3,000  m.,  9  seconds)  and  of  making  the  requisite 
corrections. 

The  expenditure  of  ammimition  and  the  rate  of  fire 
depend  upon  the  object  of  the  action  and  upon  the  im- 
portance of  the  target.  A  dangerous  target,  as  well  as  a 
favorable  one,  and  the  necessity  of  utilizing  fleeting  moments 
increase  the  rate  of  fire.  But  accuracy  of  lajdng  and  of 
setting  fuzes  should,  in  no  circumstances,  be  impaired  by 
even  the  most  rapidly  delivered  fire.  Timely  change  from 
slow  fire  to  accelerated  fire  interrupted  by  pauses,  must  form 
the  rule  and  will  be  best  calculated  to  avert  waste  of  am- 
mimition. The  effect  produced  by  the  fire  in  actual  war 
will  be  the  best  guide.  The  great  effect  produced  by  time 
shrapnel  makes  it  unnecessary,  as  a  rule,  to  increase  the  rate 
of  fire  for  any  length  of  time.  When  practicable,  longer 
pauses  are  made.  When  an  effect  is  to  be  produced  sud- 
denly at  the  critical  moment,  and  to  take  advantage  of  rap- 
idly passing  opportunities,  these  pauses  should  be  shortened 
as  much  as  the  reliable  service  of  the  guns  permits. 


376  Employment  op  Artillery. 

(d)    CONDUCT  OF  FIRE.* 

In  firing,  it  is  less  important  to  obtain  the  maximum 
eflfect,  a  matter  that  would  entail  painfully  accurate  adjust- 
ment and  much  time,  than  to  obtain  a  sufficient  effect  in  the 
shortest  possible  time.  One  should  endeavor  to  obtain  this 
effect  not  so  much  by  saving  ammunition,  as  by  saving  time. 
The  better  the  conduct  of  fire,  the  sooner  will  an  effect  be 
produced. 

Fire  for  effect  is  preceded  by  fire  for  adjustment,  f 
The  latter  has  for  its  object  the  prompt  determination  of 
the  data  required  for  fire  for  effect,  namely  the  range,  the 
corrector  and  the  proper  distribution.  In  France,  Russia, 
and  Austria,  time  fire  is  used  in  adjustment,  the  fire  being  dis- 
tributed over  the  whole  target.  Adjustment  by  percussion 
fire  does,  indeed,  enable  the  batteries  to  go  into  position 
with  loaded  guns,  and  this  is  an  advantage,  but  observation 
of  the  quickly  rising,  dirty-white  cloud  of  burst  depends  to  a 
great  extent  upon  the  terrain.  At  any  rate,  adjustment  by 
time  fire  is  quicker,  as  no  bursts  are  lost,  as  it  is  easier  to 
observe  the  snow-white  ball  of  smoke,  which  descends  im- 
mediately upon  becoming  visible>  and  as  the  very  first  round 
is  frequently  effective.  In  Germany,  the  100  m.  bracket 
is  obtained  by  firing,  frequently  with  one  piece  only,  at  two 
limiting  distances  (one  short,  the  other  over).  This  is  fol- 
lowed by  time  fire,  beginning  at  the  inferior  limit  of  the 
bracket.  To  obtain  a  100  m.  bracket  when  adjusting  by 
time  fire,  the  two  guns  of  a  platoon  fire  in  rapid  succession 
with  the  same  elevation  and  corrector.  With  low  points  of 
burst,  this  method  of  adjusting  presented  no  difficulties. 

The  French  obtain  a  200  m.  bracket  by  firing  salvos 
of  four  shots  with  the  same  elevation  and  corrector.  A 
verifying  salvo  is  then  fired  at  the  inferior  limit  of  the  bracket. 

^RoBKOTBN,  Die  heutige  Feldartillerie,  I.  p.  209,  et  seq.  Captain  H.  ScHBsr- 
MDR.  Austrian  Artillery,  Ober  die  Schieszregeln  der  FeldarHllerie  der  konHnentalen 
Qroezmdchte,  Mitteilungen  Uber  Geoenstdnde  dee  Artillerie  und  Genietoesens,  1909, 
VI.  p.  405. 

tin  Ruflsla  and  Germany  against  immobile  and  mobile  targets,  in  France* 
Austria  and  Italy,  against  troops  and  immobile  targets. 


France.  377 

It  is  easier  to  get  the  gunners  in  the  target  when  using  a 
single  gun;  but  firing  several  shots  certainly  facilitates 
observation,  and  the  somewhat  greater  expenditure  of  am- 
munition is  negligible.  If  in  percussion  shell  fire,  one  de- 
sires to  obtain  a  50  m.  bracket,  one  must  reckon  with  the 
fact  that  errors  in  observation  multiply.* 


(e)    THE  USE  OF  THE  VARIOUS  PROJECTILES. 

(See  p.  223,  supra,  ei  8eq,) 

Provisions  of  Various  Regulations. 

France:     The  salvo,  rafale  fire, 

and  fire  at  will  (d  volorUS)  are  used. 

'^  ^  ^        The  latter  is  employed  against 

XX         XX         ZOuU    targets  that  suddenly  appear  at 

ranges  under  500  m.,  and  is  discon- 
tinued as  soon  as  the  desired  effect 
is  obtained.  The  salvo  corre- 
sponds to  the  German  salvo  (Lage), 
0*        ^  which  begins  with  a  flank  gun.     In 

N^  v        V         '74 nn    *^®  salvo,  all  the  pieces  have  the 

X        X  X        X         ZIUU    same  elevation  and  are  fired  in  turn 

A       vX       ''X     *X  from  the  flank  indicated  in  the 

1^      ^  command,  the  intervals  between 

I      I  the  shots  being  about  2  or  3  sec- 

I      I  onds.     The  rafale  consists  of  a 

series  of  shots,  usually  2  or  3,  flred 

rapidly  by  each  gun  independently 

of  the  others,  all  guns  using  the 

2  2        2        2  same  elevation.      Salvos,  either 

vy         XXX    Z300    ^^"^®  ®'  percussion,  are  used  in  fire 

for  adjustment    {tir  de  reglage). 
X  1-4  BurstB  during  adjustment,    ^he  methods  of  fire  for  effect  (iir 

d*efficaciie)  are: 


♦As  Lieutenant-General  Rohne  points  out  (in  Artillerieschieszspiel  and  in  the 
article  tyber  die  ZuverlSssigkeit  des  EinscMeszens,  in  Archiv  fiir  die  ArtilleHe  und 
Ingenieuroffitiere,  1897),  tne  difficulties  in  adjustment  increase  as  the  length  of  the 
bracket  decreases,  behig  greatest  when  it  is  desired  to  determine  the  range  acciu*ately 
to  within  26  m.  "This  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  closer  the  bursts -are 
to  the  target,  the  more  difficult  it  is  to  decide  whether  they  are  short  or  over.  Be- 
sides, the  trajectories  of  two  projectiles  flred  at.franges  differing  by  only  50  or 
26  m.,  may  frequently  overlap,  due  to  dispersion,  thus  leading  to  incorrect  determi- 
nation of  range  in  spite  of  accurate  observation." 

Under  the  assumption  that  one-tenth  of  all^observations  are  in  error  when  the 
mean  dispersion  in  depth  is  50  m..  Lieutenant-GeneralSRoHNS  computes  that  of 
one  hundred  200  m.  brackets  obtained  by  two  shots  percussion  fire,  only  about 


378 


Employment  of  Artillery. 


1 .  Progressive  fire  (iir  progressif) ; 

2.  Progressive  fire  with  sweeping  (iir  progressif  asee  fauehags);  and 

3.  Fire  at  a  single  range  (le  tir  sur  hausse  unique). 


1.  Progressive  fire.  This  begins  after  a  200 
m.  bracket  has  been  obtained.*  By  means  of  this 
fire,  it  is  intended  to  beat  a  broad  and  deep  zone 
in  rapid  fire,  two  shots  being  fired  by  piece  at  four 
elevations,  differing  by  100  m.,  and  beginning  at 
one  smaller  by  100  m.  than  the  inferior  limit  of 
the  bracket.  For  example:  Suppose  that  the 
target  is  located  within  a  bracket  whose  limits  are 
2,100  and  2,300  m.  After  this  has  been  obtained, 
each  piece  fires  two  shots,  fire  at  will,  at  2,000,  at 
2,100,  at  2,200,  and  at  2,300  m.  At  3,000  m.,  the 
beaten  zone  of  a  shrapnel  is  150 — 180  m.  deep,  so 
that  when  employing  progressive  fire  (without 
sweeping),  a  battery  can  cover  with  its  fire  an  area 
100  m.  wide  and  560  m.  deep. 

In  progressive  fire,  two  shrapnel  fragments  or 
bullets  per  minute  fall  within  the  space  that  is 
taken  up  by  the  German  company  column  ( Kom- 
pagniekohnne)  which  has  a  width  of  12  m.  and  a 
depth  of  17  m.  This,  of  course,  gives  nothing  but 
an  approximate  idea  of  the  density  of  the  hail  of 


^600 


tsoo 


Shoo 


VOO 


I        I        I 


444- 

I        \        I 

*      I      • 
I      I      I 

iii- 


i 


leventy-one  are  correct,  in  other  words,  that  more  than  a  fourth  of  the  total  number 
are  false.  Out  of  one  hundred  100  m.  brackets,  each  obtained  by  three  rounds,  only 
about  fifty-two  are  correct,  hence  about  half  of  the  total  number  are  false.  Accord- 
ing to  General  Sabudski.  Russian  Army — Die  Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung  und  ihrt 
Anioendung  *  *  *  auf  die  Theorie  des  Einschiestens,  translated  by  Lieutenant 
Ritter  von  Eberhardt — from  10.1  %  to  30.7  %  out  of  12,000  rounds  fired  at  the  Rus- 
sian Artillery  School  of  Fire,  were  observed  incorrectly. 

Military  history  furnishes  many  instances  of  failure  to  adjust  fire  correctly. 
The  3d  and  4th  Batteries  5th  Field  Artillery,  fired  at  the  same  target,  the  former  with 
an  elevation  of  1.600  m.,  the  latter  with  one  of  2,250  m.  Neither  battery  hit  any- 
thing.    The  correct  range  was  2.000. 

*R«sresslv«  fir«  (Hr  regressif)  begins  with  the  longer  limit  of  the  bracket 
and  continues  until  the  battery  commander  observes  bursts  In  front  of  the  target. 
In  this  method  of  fire,  he  can  do  this  much  more  readily  than  if  he  begins  firing  at  a 
range  that  will  give  bursts  short  of  the  target,  as  the  smoke-clouds  of  these  will  then 
obscure  those  of  the  succeeding  shots.  Regressive  fire  makes  it  easy  for  the  battery 
commander  to  eliminate  inefiPective  ranges. 


France. 


379 


fragments.  When  the  fire  is  actually  directed  upon  a  company,  the  latter's 
losses  soon  increase  until  they  become  annihilating.  In  his  Instruetian 
mithodiqtie  (p.  78),  S.  Laithbz  assumes  that  a  battery  will  fire  forty-eight 
rounds  in  forty  seconds.  This  would  mean  one  fragment  to  every  area 
1  m.  wide  and  6  m.  deep.  According  to  official  figures/  progressive  fire 
(32  rounds)  directed  against  a  front  of  100  m.,  at  the  targets  named,  will 
produce  the  following  losses  per  100  men: 


1.    Infantry  standing 
in  single  rank. 

2.    Infantry  lying  down  in  single  rank. 

At 

without  knapsack!  with  knapsacks 

carried  on  backs 
At                       of  the  men 

knapsacks 
used  as  head- 
cover. 

2,000  m.      45 

2,000  m.     19 

15 

6 

3,000  "        33 

3,000   "      16 

8 

11 

4,000   "        21 

4,000  "       13 

— 

5,000  "        14 

3.    Artillery. 


At 

without  shields 

with  shields  of  French  pattern. 

2,000    m. 
3,000     " 
4,000     " 

33 

28 
20 

20 
15 
11 

When  the  cannoneers  take  shelter  behind  the  shields,  the  above 
losses  are  reduced  three  percent.  Accounts  of  the  campaign  in  Morocco 
state  that  of  all  men  struck  by  shrapnel  bullets  or  fragments  at  ranges  under 
2,500  m.,  10^  were  killed  outright,  20^  very  seriously,  and  70^  slightly 
wounded;  that  the  latter  were  able  to  leave  the  field  without  assistance 
and  that  they  recovered  rapidly. 


^Tbsouodb.  Cours  elementaire  de  ttr  en  campagne,  Paris,  1908. 


380 


Employment  op  Artillery. 


2.  ProgTMsiT*  fir«  with  sw^aplng  (tir  progreanf  avee  fauehage)^ 
This  is  used  when  a  target  of  considerable  breadth  is  to  be  attacked.  In 
this  method  of  fire,  each  piece  fires  three  rounds  at  each  of  four  ranges. 
After  each  round  fired  at  the  first  ]| 

range,  each  piece  is  traversed  to     iq^  ^  %i2 

the  left  by  three  turns  of  the  hand- 
wheel,  i.  e.,  its  direction  is  changed 
by  T50JT  o'  the  range.  This  pro- 
cedure is  then  repeated  at  the  other  B 
three  ranges,  except  that  at  the  ^^ 
second  each  piece  is  traversed  to 
the  right,  at  the  third  to  the  left, 
and  at  the  fourth  back  to  the  right. 

3.     Fire  at  a  single  range  ([e       40. 
tir  8ur  hausse  unique).     This  is 
employed  when  an  accurate  ad- 
justment has  been  secured.    This 
fire  produces  the  necessary  effect  2 

with  the  minimum  expenditure  of 


•7 


8i 


ammunition.  It  is  used  chiefly  for  demolishing  obstacles  and  materiel  and 
for  annihilating  a  specially  dangerous  or  stubborn  enemy,  whether  this  be 
to  prevent  a  partially  defeated  enemy  from  moving,  or  a  moving  target  from 
crossing  a  particular  zone.  The  French  progressive  fire  takes  errors  of  ad- 
justment into  account  and  brings  out  the  characteristic  properties  of  rapid 
fire  guns  most  clearly.  At  a  single  command,  the  storm  of  fire  starts  auto- 
matically. After  32  or  48  rounds,  as  the  case  may  be,  a  pause  occurs  in 
the  fire.  It  is  impossible  to  adjust  the  height  of  burst,  and  it  is  difficult  to 
distinguish  one  shot  from  another  at  the  various  ranges.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  whole  area  is  swept,  and  an  effect  produced  that,  while  not  the 
maximum  attainable,  is  sufficient.  The  moral  effect  is  tremendous,  as 
a  rafale  without  sweeping  lasts  two  minutes  only,  and  with  sweeping 
three  minutes  only.  The  effect  should  not  be  judged  by  the  hits  on  any 
one  target,  for,  in  spite  of  the  latter's  distribution  in  depth,  the  whole 
body  of  troops  constituting  the  target  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  swept  by  the 
fire. 

In  contrast  to  the  French  progressive  fire,  the  German  volley  is 
fired  at  one  elevation  only.  This  facilitates  observation  and  determina- 
tion of  the  intervals  of  burst,  but  requires  accurate  adjustment.  The 
German  method  of  fire  is  characterized  by  the  endeavor  to  obtain  maximum 
effect  with  minimum  expenditure  of  ammiuntion. 

Holland:  The  firing  regulations  combine  the  German  and  the 
French  methods  of  fire,  taking  from  the  former  the  volley  {Gruppenfeuer) 
and  from  the  latter  the  progressive  fire  with  sweeping  (tir  progreasif  avee 
fauchage).  In  sweeping  fire,  each  piece  fires  three  rounds  at  a  single 
range.  The  first  round  is  fired  with  the  line  of  sight  normal;  before  firing 
the  second,  each  piece  is  traversed  to  the  right  by  a  full  turn  of  the  hand- 
wheel,  and  before  firing  the  third,  it  is  traversed  by  two  full  turns  to  the 


France;  Austria.  381 

Fire  for  Effect. 

tir  progreasif  avac  fauchag* 

ZOOO      i2  Roundr 


In  2  nuDUtes:    32x300.                                             In  3  minutes:  48x300. 

Fragments  and  bullets = 

In  2  minutes:     9,600.                                               In  3  minutes:  14,400. 

In  1  minute:      4,800.                                                In  1  minute:  4,800. 

left.  In  sweeping  a  broad  zone,  five  rounds  are  fired  by  each  piece.  The 
first  round  is  fired  directly  to  the  front;  before  firing  each  of  the  two  suc- 
ceeding rounds,  each  piece  is  traversed  to  the  right  by  one  full  turn  of  the 
handwheel;  before  firing  the  fourth  round,  each  piece  ia  traversed  to  the 
left  by  four  full  turns  of  the  handwheel;  before  firing  the  fifth  round,  each 
piece  is  then  traversed  to  the  right  by  one  full  turn  of  the  handwheel. 
Another  full  turn  of  the  handwheel  will  then  bring  each  piece  back  to  the 
original  direction. 

Austria-Hungary  I  General  principles:  "1,  An  effect,  even  if 
but  moderate  at  first,  should  be  obtained  quickly  for  the  purpose  of  gain- 
ing the  superiority  of  fire,  and  this  efTect  should  be  promptly  augmented 
by  correcting  the  firing  data  during  the  fire  for  effect.     When  the  situation 


382  Employment  op  Artillery. 

demands  it,  fire  for  effect  may  be  began  with  firing  data  that  are  only 
approximately  correct. 

''2.  The  method  of  fire  used  should  be  that  best  adapted  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  case.  To  this  end,  the  fire  should,  as  a  rule,  be  con- 
trolled directly  by  the  battery  commander.  When  necessary  (fire  surprise) 
in  firing  on  targets  that  are  visible  for  brief  periods  only,  gunners  should 
independently  make  the  necessary  corrections. 

"8.  Each  element  of  the  battery  may  be  assigned  a  separate  section 
of  the  target,  which  it  must  keep  under  fire." 

A  first  lieutenant  assists  the  battery  commander  in  conducting  fire. 
Methods  of  fire: 

1.  Salvo  (Lage),  In  this,  the  pieces  fire  one  round  each  in  regular 
rotation  from  one  fiank  of  the  battery  to  the  other. 

2.  Progressive  fire  (Streuen):  Each  piece  fires  shrapnel  at  ranges 
differing  from  each  other  by  100  m.,  a  sone  about  400  m.  deep  being  swept. 
Chiefs  of  section  give  the  commands  for  firing.  This  method  of  fire  cor- 
responds to  the  French  tir  progresiif. 

8.    Volley  fire  (Einulfeuer):     This  corresponds  to  the  German 

"volley  fire"  (Gruppenfeuer). 

4.  Fire  by  battery  (Salve):  In  this,  all  the  guns  of  the  battery 
are  simultaneously  discharged.  It  corresponds  to  the  German  "fire  by 
battery"  {Salve),  and  to  the  "salvo"  of  the  U.  S.  A.  D.  R.  of  1891. 

5.  *'Ausfeuern,"  corresponds  to  the  German  *'Rohre  frei,"  and 
to  the  "Loaded  guns.  Rapid  fire"  of  the  U.  S.  A.  D.  R.  of  1891. 

6.  Firm  hy  pimcm  (Batteriefeuer):  This  corresponds  to  the  German 
"fire  by  piece"  (Einzelfeuer),  and  to  the  "fire  by  piece"  of  the  U.  S.  A.  D.  R. 
of  1891. 

7.  Ordinary  fire  {Geschiltzfukrerfeuer),  corresponds  to  the  German 
"ordinary  fire"  (gewoknlichen  Feuer),  except  that  commands  are  given  and 
corrections  are  made  by  chiefs  of  section  as  in  France,  whereas  this  is 
done  by  platoon  commanders  in  Germany. 

"During  adjustment,  the  fire  is  usually  distributed  from  the  very 
start  over  the  whole  target,  so  that  each  gun  covers  a  front  about  20  m. 
wide.  The  adjustment  is  usually  effected  by  firing  platoon  salvos  (2 
rounds),  but  in  certain  circumstances,  battery  salvos  may  be  used  for  this 
purpose.  The  same  kind  of  fire  (time  or  percussion)  that  is  to  be  used  in 
fire  for  effect  is  generally  used  in  fire  for  adjustment.  In  adjusting  by  time 
fire  (and  this  is  the  rule  when  the  fire  is  directed  against  troops),  low  points 
of  burst  should  be  used.  A  long  bracket — 200  or  400  m. —  is  first  sought* 
and  then  reduced  to  100  m. 

"The  adjustment  may  be  expedited  by  letting  the  elements  of  the 
battery  fire  at  different  elevations.  This  is  called  "progressive  adjust- 
ment" {skalieries  Einschieszen).  It  should  be  used  when  the  range  has 
been  measured,  when  previous  firing  on  another  target  furnishes  data  in 
regard  to  the  range,  or,  finally,  when  it  is  desired  to  obtain  quickly  data 
for  fire  for  effect  at  long  ranges  on  targets  that  are  distributed  in  depth  or 


Austria;  Italy;  Russia.  383 

movins.    In  this  class  of  fire,  the  platoons  of  the  battery  fire  at  ranges 
differing  from  each  other  by  from  100  to  400  m."* 
The  methods  of  fire  for  effect  are: 

1.  Salvos  (Lagen); 

2.  Progressive  fire  (Streuen) — ^in  case  of  guns; 

8.    Ordinary  fire  (GesckiltzfUhrerfeuer) — in  case  of  howitzers; 
4.     Short  range  fire  ( Nahfeuer). 

In  firing  salvos,  it  is  permissible  to  make  corrections  of  50  or  100  m. 
until  effective  salvos  are  obtained.  The  elevations  may  also  be  changed 
from  time  to  time.  Against  moving  targets,  the  fire  begins  with  the  limit 
of  the  bracket  toward  which  the  target  is  moving,  or,  if  this  is  not  apparent, 
with  the  mean  of  the  bracket. 

Progressive  fire  is  generally  used  against  moving  targets.  A  200  m. 
bracket  is  first  sought.  Each  gun  then  fires  one  round  at  each  of  four 
ranges,  differing  by  100  m.  and  beginning  with  one  smaller  by  100  m.  than 
the  inferior  limit  of  the  bracket.  The  Firing  Manual  prescribes  still 
another  method,  regressive  fire  (ins  Kurze  streiLen),  in  which  each  gun 
fires  one  round  at  each  of  four  elevations,  beginning  with  the  long  limit  of 
the  bracket. 

In  close  range  fighting,  shrapnel  set  to  burst  275  m.  in  front  of  the 
muzzle  is  used  at  ranges  from  300  to  500  m.  At  closer  ranges  than  these, 
shrapnel  with  fuzes  set  at  zero  are  used.t 

Italy  (Provisional  Regulations):  Projectiles  are  used  a?  in  Ger- 
many. Kinds  of  fire:  Fire  by  platoon  and  fire  by  battery  (i.  e.,  simul- 
taneous discharge  of  all  the  pieces  of  the  platoon  or  battery,  as  the  case  may 
be);  fire  by  piece;  progressive  fire.  Fire  at  a  single  range,  either  by  pla- 
toon or  by  battery  (simultaneous  discharge  of  all  the  pieces).  Fire  by 
platoon  at  several  ranges  may  be  used  in  bracketing  the  target.  Fire  by 
piece  may  be  used  in  fire  for  adjustment.  Progressive  fire  is  of  two  kinds: 
In  the  first,  each  piece  fires  one  round  (time  fuze)  at  each  of  four  ranges 
differing  by  50  m.,  beginning  with  the  shortest  range  of  the  four;  the  second 
(called  per  serie  radoppiate)^  is  like  the  first,  except  that  each  piece  fires 
two  rounds  at  each  of  the  four  ranges.  In  general,  a  200  m.  bracket  is 
considered  sufficient  for  time  fire,  and  one  of  100  m.  for  percussion  (shell) 
fire. 

Russia  (Provisional  Regulations):  The  methods  of  fire  may  be 
divided  into  two  general  classes,  viz.,  salvos  and  volley  fire.  Salvos  are 
fired  by  battery,  by  demi-battery,  or  by  platoon.  In  any  salvo,  the  pieces 
are  fired  in  regular  order  from  one  flank  of  the  battery  (demi-battery  or 
platoon)  to  the  other  and  back  again.  There  is  one  exception;  the  bat^ 
tery  salvo  may  also  begin  with  some  specially  designated  piece  other  than  one 
on  a  flank.     The  battery  may  pass  from  demi-battery  or  platoon  salvos 

*Artilleri9ti8che  Monatschefte,  1900.  p.  372,  etseq. 

fDie  Feuermtgkeit  der  8  cm,  FeldkanonenbaUerien.  A  study  for  artillery 
officers.  KarlEisNEB.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Austrian  Army.  2d  Ed.  (with  two 
plates)  Vienna,  1000. 


884  Employment  op  Artillery. 

to  battery  salvos,  and  from  platoon  salvos  to  demi-battery  or  battery 
salvos  and  vice  versa.  Continuous  fire  may  be  accelerated  or  retarded 
by  specifying  what  the  interval  between  consecutive  shots  is  to  be.  When 
this  interval  has  not  been  indicated,  shots  follow  each  other  at  from  two 
to  three  seconds.    This  still  allows  the  burst  of  each  to  be  observed. 

Volley  fire  is  delivered  at  the  maximum  rate.  Each  piece  is  fired 
as  soon  as  it  is  ready,  the  number  of  rounds  to  be  fired  being  specified,  ex- 
cept in  imminent  danger,  for  the  immediate  defense  of  the  guns,  when  the 
number  to  be  fired  is  not  announced  and  fuzes  are  set  at  zero. 

Adjustment  by  time  fire  is  the  rule  at  ranges  over  2,000  m.,  a  200  m. 
bracket  being  sought.  Progressive  fire  is  used  for  effect,  the  ranges  used 
in  this,  differing  by  120  m.  Series  differing  regiilarly  by  the  same  amount 
are  not  to  be  used,  in  order  that  the  enemy  may  not  recognize  the  kind  of 
fire  employed. 

In  firing  on  advancing  troops,  after  the  bracket  has  been  obtained, 
the  elevation  and  corrector  are  reduced  three  or  more  sight  divisions  (120 
m.  or  more);  but,  in  certain  circumstances,  the  target  may  be  allowed  to 
run  into  the  fire. 

England!  The  adjustment  of  fire  is  effected  by  one  platoon  (in 
exceptional  cases  by  a  single  piece),  the  two  pieces  of  which  simultaneously 
fire  one  round  (time  fuze)  each  at  elevations  differing  by  800  yards  (270  m.). 
During  the  firing,  the  bracket  may  be  narrowed  to  100  m.  Progressive 
fire:  In  this,  each  piece  fires  three  rounds  at  each  of  three  ranges  differing 
by  100  m.,  the  initial  range,  which  is  the  shortest  of  the  three,  being  an- 
nounced in  the  command.  This  procedure  may  be  repeated  several  times. 
Progressive  fire  with  sweeping  is  executed  like  progressive  fire  without 
sweeping,  except  that  the  direction  of  each  piece  is  changed  by  two  degrees 
after  each  round. 


12,    EXPENDITURE  OF  AMMUNITION.* 

"Ammunition  is  the  life  of  artillery.  One  of  the  prin- 
cipal duties  of  a  commander  of  troops  (commander  of  ammu- 
nition columns  and  commander  of  artillery  groups)  consists 
of  disposing  the  ammunition  columns  (and  ammunition 
dep6ts)  during  the  advance  as  well  as  during  the  action  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  secure  to  each  artillery  battalion  as  much 
ammunition  as  the  fulfillment  of  its  task  will,  in  all  pro- 
bability, require. 

*'Such  a  disposition  of  the  ammunition  coltunns  is,  in 
addition,  the  best  means  of  shifting  the  center  of  gravity  of 
the  artillery  combat — ^without  protracted  and  frequently 

*3uppl0ment  to  MilitHr^WochenblaU  1872. 


Expenditure  of  Ammunition. 


385 


impracticable  displacements  of  entire  bodies  of  artillery — ^to 
the  areas  that,  in  view  of  the  tactical  situation,  are  recog- 
nized as  the  decisive  ones. 

**It  is  the  duty  of  all  artillery  commanders  to  make  both 
ends  meet,  and  to  see  that  ammimition  is  replenished  without 
loss  of  time  and  without  causing  complaint  from  the  ammuni- 
tion columns."     (Provisional  Austrian  A.  D.  R.). 

At  Grosa-Gorschen  the  Prussian  artillery  (136  g^uns)  fired  an 
average  of  61  rounds  per  gun,  at  Ligny  (192  guns)  47,  and  at  Konig- 
gratz  (672  guns),  69  rounds  per  gun. 

At  Soiferino,  the  Austrian  artillery  (368  guns)  fired  an  average  of 
29  rounds  per  gun,  and  at  Koniggratz  (672  guns)  29  rounds  per  gun. 

During  the  Franco-German  war,  the  German  batteries  named  had 
the  following  ammunition  available: 


With  the  battery. 
Total.   I  Per  gun. 


Light  battery 942 

Heavy  battery 798 


157 
133 


With  the  battery  and  amm.  columns. 
Total.  I  Per  gun. 


2,100 
1,710 


860 
285 


The  average  number  of  rounds  expended  per  gun  was  as  follows: 
Vionville  94,  Coulmiars  67.6,  Gravelotte  56.5,  Sedan  55.8,  and  Worth 
42.6  rounds. 

At  Vionville,  the  batteries  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps  expended  the 
following  ammunition:  Two  batteries  825  rounds  each,  two  batteries 
1,040  rounds  each,  and  the  others  1,164, 1,148, 925, 844, 735,  584,  562,  552, 
470,  and  432  rounds,  respectively.  The  batteries  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps, 
expended  1,048,  785,  677,  603,  597,  475,  444,  332,  259,  255,  248, 175,  157, 
and  141  rounds,  respectively.  The  batteries  of  the  IVth,  the  IXth,  and 
the  Vlllth  Army  Corps  that  participated,  expended  585, 400, 289, 211, 65, 
and  38  rounds,  respectively.  There  were  in  all  37  German  batteries  en- 
gaged at  Vionville,  and  they  expended  a  total  of  19,650  rounds  of  am- 
munition. 

The  two  artillery  ammunition  columns  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps  were 
the  only  ones  at  hand.  The  1st  ammunition  echelon  of  the  Xth  Army 
Corps,  comprising  two  ammunition  columns,  was  delayed  by  other  troops 
on  its  march  and  did  not  arrive  until  the  morning  after  the  battle.  Am- 
munition frequently  ran  short  therefore,  as  all  the  batteries  had  to  re- 
plenish their  supply  from  the  two  ammunition  columns  of  the  Hid  Army 
Corps.    The  severe  losses  among  the  personnel  and  teams  made  it  impos- 


An  aver- 
i      age  of 

1 
per  gun 


886  Employment  of  Artillery. 

Bible  for  the  batteries  to  send  back  their  reserves  to  replenish  the  supply, 
and  the  caissons  of  the  ammunition  columns  had  to  be  sent,  one  after  an- 
other, to  the  batteries,  to  be  emptied  there.  Under  these  drcumstances, 
losses  were  unadvoidable. 

At  VionTilU,  August  16th,  1870,  of  the  artillery  of  the  Illd  Army 
corps. 

One  light  and  one  heavy  battery  expended  over  700  rounds 

each; 
One  light  and  two  heavy  batteries  expended  over  800  rounds 

each;  }  139  rounds 

Five  light  batteries  and  one  heavy  battery  expended  over  900  I 

rounds  each.  j 

At  Gravelotte*  August,  18th,  1870,  the  average  number  of  rounds 
expended  per  gun  was  as  follows:  In  the  Guard  Corps  94,  in  the  Hid 
Army  Corps  46,  in  the  Vlllth  Army  Corps  65,  and  in  the  IXth  Army 
Corps  50  rounds. 

At  Magersfontein  (1899),  four  English  batteries  expended  164, 
167, 168,  and  208  rounds  of  ammunition,  respectively,  per  gun. 

Russo-Japanes*  war.*  "The  large  expenditure  of  ammunition  ia 
due  to  the  fact  that  existing  conditions,  which  diminish  or  make  it  diffi- 
cult to  obtain  an  efifect,  frequently  compel  artillery  to  fire  though  it  knows 
that  a  part  of  its  projectiles  will  not  produce  an  effect.  To  this  category 
belong  fire  by  battery  (simultaneous  discharge  of  all  the  guns)  to  facili- 
tate observation,  and  searching  fire,  which  must  be  used  in  attacking 
targets  that  are  both  wide  and  deep,  and  also  against  targets  located  in 
areas  that  can  not  be  observed  or  whose  position  can  not  be  accurately 
determined  because  they  are  not  plainly  visible,  i.  e.,  masked. 

"In  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  it  appeared  clearly  how  the  tactical 
demand  for  artillery  effect  in  circumstances  that  made  it  technically  diffi- 
cult to  obtain,  led  to  a  great  expenditure  of  ammunition.  The  principal 
factor  in  this  was  the  endeavor  to  silence  the  hostile  artillery.  The  Jap- 
anese batteries  often  ceased  firing  when  they  were  severely  bombarded. 
But  very  soon  they  opened  up  again,  and  thereby  forced  the  Russian  bat- 
teries to  double  the  intensity  of  their  fire  in  order  to  silence  them.  As  is 
well  known,  batteries  were  put  entirely  out  of  action  in  exceptional  cases 
only,  and  so  the  game  went  on  merrily  for  whole  days,  cost  a  large  amount 
of  ammunition,  and  produced  but  trifling  results. 

"The  meagre  results  produced  by  the  ammunition  expended  by  the 
Japanese  artillery  when  preparing  the  infantry  attack  on  prepared  posi- 
tions, is  just  as  astonishing.  So  long  as  the  advance  of  the  Japanese  in- 
fantry did  not  force  the  Russian  infantry  to  fire,  it  sought  cover  in  its 
trenches  and  suffered  practically  no  losses  at  all. 

"During  the  nine  days  fighting  at  Liaoyang,  an  artillery  brigade 
expended  a  total  of  15,933  rounds  of  ammunition.  The  mobile  amount 
of  ammunition  available  within  a  corps  amounted  to  17,644  rounds. 
Hence,  a  period  of  nine  days'  fighting  failed  to  exhaust  the  supply." 

*08ic8erlc8  V.  Bacsant,  Unur  neuea  Feldg$seh1Us,  p.  27,  el  seq. 


Ammunition  Supply. 


387 


At  the  battle  on  the  Shaho  during  the  winter  of  1904-05, 200  rounds 
per  day  were  made  available  for  each  field  gun  and  80  shell  and  40  shrapnel 
per  day  for  each  field  mortar. 


* 

Engagement 

Organization. 

Total 

number 

of  rounds 

expended. 

Number 
of  rounds 
expended 
per  piece 
per  day. 

TMhihchiao,  July  24,  1904 

2d  Btry.,  9th  East  Siberian  Rifle 

Brigade 
3d  Btry.,  9th  East  Siberian  Rifle 

Brigade. 
1st  Btry.,  9th  Arty.  Brig. 
2d      " 

1st  &  2d  Btrs., 
3d  Btry., 
4th      " 
5th  Btry., 

1st  Btry.,  31st  Arty.  Brig. 
One  Btry.,  31st  Arty.  Brig. 

Sixteen  btrs.,  1st  &  Hid  Siberian 

A.  C. 
Four  and  one-half  btrs.  36th  Div. 
Three  btrs.,  9th,  Arty.  Brig. 
One  btry., 
Three  btrs.,          " 

4,178 

1,992 

2.600 

3,304 

3,730 

680 

279 

50 

620 

227 

108,000 

22,672 
2,100 
4,034 
3,624 

522 

"           July  24,  1904 

249 

Liaoyang,  August  30,  1904 

Average 
325 

"         August  30,  1904 

418 

"         August  31,  1904 

233 

"         August  30,  1904 

72.6 

"         August  30, 1904 

35 

"         August  30,  1904 

6 

"         August  30,  1904 

77.6 

"         August  30,  1904 

16(?) 

August  30  &  31,  1904... 
Shaho»  October  14&15.  1904 

Average 
422 

316 

Mukden,  March  5, 1905 

87.6 

"        March  3, 1906 

604 

March  9,  1905 

161 

13.     AMMUNITION  SUPPLY. 


At  the  beginning  of  the  19th  Century,  the  Prussians 
allowed  100-150  rounds  per  gun  (1842:  7-pdr.  howitzer, 
114  rounds  =  979  kg.;  12-pdr.  133  rounds  =  941  kg.;  6-pdr. 
1 50  rounds =654  kg. ) .  During  the  Franco-German  war,  there 
were  157  rounds  of  ammunition  (weighing  769  kg.)  available 
for  each  heavy  gtm.  At  the  present  time,  280  rounds  of 
ammunition,  weighing  1,918  kg.,  are  carried  in  the  battery 
and  in  the  light  ammunition  column  for  each  field  gtm. 


388 


Employment  op  Artillery. 


Supply  of  Projectilttt — in  t«nns  of  th«  total  numbor  available. 

Smooth-boro  Guna,  Cy42. 


Round  shot. 

SheU. 

Shrapnel. 

Canister. 

6-pdr 66 

12-pdr 59 

17 
22 

17 
16 

Rifled  Guns. 


Round  shot. 

Shell. 

Shrapnel. 

Canister. 

9  cm.  C/61,  until  1866        — 
after  1866        — 

9  cm.  C/73 — 

since  1884....         — 

1896 — 

63.4 
92.6 

67.5 
48.26 

4.64 

31.6 

2dv6 
48.26 

95.46 

6. 

7.6 

9. 

3.48 

Shell  is  carried  in  the  limber  of  the  first  store  wagon 
only.  The  limbers  and  caisson  bodies  of  a  field  battery 
(guns)  carry  shrapnel  only — each  gun  and  each  caisson  limber 
containing  36,  and  each  caisson  body  52  rounds.  A  field 
battery  has  the  following  ammunition  available  :* 

In  the  gun  limbers,  6  X36  shrapnel  =216  shrapnel 

In  the  caissons,        6  X  (36 + 52)  shrapnel=528  shrapnel 
In  the  1st  store 

wagon 36  shell. 

Total 780  rounds,  i.  e.,  744  shrapnel,  36 

shell,  or  130  rounds  per  gun. 


*In  a  light  field  howitzer  battery,  each  gun  Umber  contains  24  shrapnel,  each 
caisson  limber.  20  shrapnel,  and  each  caisson  body,  32  shell.  Hence  the  battery  has 
available: 

In  the  gun  limbers 6  z  24«144  shrapnel 

In  the  caisson  limbers 6  z  26=-156  shrapnel 

In  the  caisson  bodies. 6  z  32  (shell) —192  shell 

Total  300  shrapnel.  192  shell 
In  addition,  the  limber  of  the  first  store  wagon  contains  26  shrapnel. 


Ammunition  Supply.  389 

According  to  the  experience  of  the  Franco-German  war, 
this  ammunition  was  about  sufficient  for  an  action  lasting 
one  day.  Of  thirty-seven  German  batteries  engaged  at 
Vionville,  only  ten  had  each  expended  more  than  the 
amount  of  shrapnel  at  present  carried  by  a  field  battery. 
If  we  assume  that  a  battery  will  fire  four  rounds  per  minute, 
the  ammunition  of  the  firing  battery  will  last  two  and  a 
quarter  hours.  When  the  employment  of  rapid  fire  is  con- 
sidered, a  supply  in  the  firing  battery  of  300  rounds  per  gtm 
does  not  appear  to  be  excessive.  The  light  ammtmition 
columns  of  the  artillery  battalions  constitute  the  first  am- 
mtmition reserve  of  the  artillery  commander,  who  indicates 
when  and  where  they  shall  move.  In  case  the  ammtmition 
columns  are  not  as  yet  up,  the  artillery  commander  assigns 
parts  of  the  light  ammunition  columns  to  the  battalions 
that  need  the  most  ammunition.  The  light  ammunition 
column  of  a  field  artillery  battalion  (guns)  consists  of  two 
shrapnel  sections,  each  of  three  platoons,  each  platoon  of 
two  caissons,  and  of  one  shell  section  of  three  platoons,  each 
of  three  caissons.  (Par.  116,  German  P.  S.  R.).  From  this 
it  follows  that  a  field  artillery  battalion  (guns)  has  available, 
1.056  rounds  of  shrapnel  and  792  rounds  of  shell,  a  field 
howitzer  battalion,  174  rounds  of  shrapnel  and  1,044  rounds 
of  shell.* 

A  heavy  field  howitzer  battery  carries  ammunition  in 
eight  caissons  only,  each  of  the  latter  containing  thirty-six 
rounds  of  shell.  In  addition,  a  battalion  has  available  a 
light  ammunition  column  (par.  118,  German  F.  S.  R.), 
which  consists  of  eight  platoons  (in  all  24  caissons)  and  carries 
for  each  battery  six  times  thirty-six,  or  216  rounds  of  shell. 
Hence,  there  are  432  rounds  of  shell  available  for  each  howit- 
zer in  the  battalion. 


*Tbe  composition  of  the  light  ammimltlQn  oolunin  of  the  hone  artillery  bat- 
talion of  a  caTalry  diylsion,  la  somewhat  different. 


390  Employment  op  Artillery. 

The  German  firing  battery  has  only  one  caisson,  or, 
including  the  light  ammunition  column,  only  2}i  caissons 
available  per  gun,  whereas  the  French,  the  Italian,  the 
Russian  and  the  American  fir  ng  batteries  each  have  three 
caissons  available  per  gun.  On  account  of  the  great  weight 
of  its  projectiles,  a  greater  niunber  of  caissons  is  provided  for 
each  heavy  field  howitzer,  there  being  two  available  in  the 
firing  battery  and  reserve,  and  3j4,  inclusive  of  the  light 
ammunition  colimm.  Assuming  a  rate  of  fire  of  five  roimds  for 
every  two  minutes,  a  battery  will  have  exhausted  the  contents 
of  its  caissons  in  two  hours.  The  contents  of  the  light  am- 
munition coliunn  will  tide  the  battery  over  another  hour  and 
a  half,  provided  the  rate  of  fire  remains  the  same,  and  the 
heavy  artillery  ammunition  columns  carry  an  additional 
eight  hours*  supply.  Although  such  a  high  rate  of  fire 
will  be  exacted  in  exceptional  cases  only,  the  figures  given 
show  the  advisability  of  moving  the  ammunition  coliunns 
luiinterruptedly  during  the  advance,  so  as  to  shorten  as 
much  as  possible,  the  distance  that  separates  them  from  the 
batteries. 

A  French  field  battery  has  1,248  rounds  of  ammunition  available, 
or  312  rounds  per  gun.  Gun  and  caisson  limbers  contain  24  rounds  each, 
and  caisson  bodies  72  rounds  each. 

4  gun  limbers,  @  24  rounds=      96  rounds. 

12  caissons,         @  24-1-72  rounds=  1,152      " 

Total  1,248  rounds. 

Two  of  the  caisson  bodies  carry  shell  (obus  explasifs).  Hence  the 
battery  actually  carries  1,104  rounds  of  shrapnel  {obu8  d  bailee)  and  144 
rounds  of  shell. 


14.     REPLACEMENT  OF  AMMUNITION,* 

The  position  of  ammunition  columns  in  a  route  column. 
See  p.  800,  supra, 

*  Timely  replenishment  of  ammunition  is  of  the  utmost 
importance.    Every  artillery  cx)mmander  is  in  duty  boimd 

♦Pars.  513-521,  German  F.  S.  R.;  pars.  62-79, German  Train  Reg.;  para.  441- 
400,  German  F.  A.  D.  Rr,  and  pars.  430-439,  German  H.  A.  D,  R. 


Replacement  op  Ammunition.  391 

constantly  to  regulate  it  within  his  command.  In  addition, 
all  officers  and  men  charged  with  replenishing  ammunition 
should  be  animated  by  the  firm  determination  to  supply 
the  firing  batteries  with  ammunition,  even  when  orders  or 
directions  to  that  effect  have  not  been  issued."  (Par.  441, 
German,  F.  A.  D.  R.). 

The  ammunition  supply  of  field  artillery  is  replenished 
first  from  the  reserves,  then  from  the  light  ammunition 
column.  The  limbers  are  sent  to  the  rear  under  cover  as  a 
rule,  and  remain  with  the  guns  only  when  a  position  is  to 
be  occupied  for  a  short  time.  Before  they  are  sent  to  the 
rear,  gun  limbers  are  partly  or  wholly  emptied,  and  caisson 
limbers  are  always  emptied.  Visual  signal  communicatiions 
established  between  the  battery  and  the  reserve,  which  is 
posted  about  500  m.  in  rear  of  the  battery.  Gun  limbers  are 
promptly  refilled  at  the  reserve.  One  caisson  corporal 
proceeds  to  the  firing  battery,  takes  charge  of  the  signal 
communications,  and  informs  the  commander  of  the  reserve 
from  time  to  time  how  much  ammunition  is  on  hand.  The 
combat  train,  including  the  first  store  wagon,  joins  the  re- 
serve. The  light  ammunition  columns  are  posted  not  more 
than  600  m.  in  rear  of  their  respective  battalions.  The  com- 
mander of  a  light  ammunition  column  establishes  com- 
munication with  the  battalion  commander,  with  the  reserve, 
and  with  the  ammunition  column  in  rear,  and  informs  him- 
self as  to  the  amount  of  ammunition  on  hand.  Com- 
manders of  batteries,  of  reserves,  and  of  light  ammunition 
columns  endeavor  to  arrange  that  batteries  changing  position 
go  with  full  caissons.  When  it  is  impracticable  to  transfer 
ammtmition  on  account  of  the  loss  of  time  that  this  would 
involve,  full  caissons  of  the  light  ammunition  columns  may 
be  exchanged  for  empty  caissons  of  the  reserves. 

"No  fixed  rules  can  be  laid  down  as  to  how  firing  bat- 
teries are  to  be  supplied  with  ammunition.  As  a  rule,  an 
attempt  should  be  made  to  have  the  caissons  drive  as  close 
up  to  the  line  as  the  available  cover  and  the  hostile  fire  admit. 


392  Employment  op  Artillery. 

The  commander  of  the  light  ammtmition  column  should 
cause  timely  reconnaissance  to  be  made  with  this  end  in 
view.  Lulls  in  the  action  will,  in  many  cases,  enable  caissons 
to  drive  clear  up  into  the  battery.  When  caissons  are 
obliged  to  remain  farther  oflF,  it  will  depend  upon  circum- 
stances as  to  how  ammtmition  should  be  transported  from 
them  to  the  gims.  As  far  as  practicable,  this  operation  should 
be  supervised  by  an  officer.  When  the  nature  of  the  ground 
and  the  distance  to  the  firing  battery  admit,  caissons  may  be 
unlimbered  and  the  caisson  bodies,  partially  emptied,  if 
necesssary,  run  into  battery  by  hand  by  the  personnel 
of  the  light  ammunition  column,  the  men  during  the  move- 
ment utilizing  the  cover  afforded  by  the  caisson  body.  When 
this  is  impracticable,  the  caissons  are  emptied,  and  the  am- 
munition carried  to  the  guns  by  the  men  of  the  light  ammuni- 
tion column.  When  circumstances  imperatively  demand 
it,  caissons  must  be  driven  clear  into  the  battery  under  fire. 
In  this,  it  is  of  course  essential  that  the  caissons  move  un- 
expectedly and  rapidly,  and  that  they  be  quickly  emptied 
and  brought  off  to  the  rear. 

"The  empty  caissons,  or,  if  imlimbered,  their  limbers, 
move  back  to  the  position  of  the  light  ammunition  column. 
AH  the  men  belonging  to  the  light  ammunition  coltmm, 
except  those  that  have  been  kept  in  the  firing  batteries  to 
replace  losses,  follow  assembled  in  caisson  squads.'*  (Pars. 
454  and  455,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.). 

**When  the  battalion  approaches  its  position,  the  bat- 
tery reserves  are  moved  by  their  respective  commanders  to  a 
point  in  rear  of  their  batteries  and  are  there  posted  tmder 
cover  as  soon  as  the  position  is  occupied.  Battery  reserves 
should  pay  special  attention  to  communication  with  their 
batteries,  and  to  cover,  at  least  from  the  view  of  the  enemy. 
They  should  be  posted  about  300  m.  in  rear  of  their  batteries. 
In  exceptional  cases,  all  the  reserves  of  the  battalion  may 
be  united  and  posted  together."  (Par.  328,  Gennan  P. 
A.  D.R.). 


Replacement  of  Ammunition.  393 

The  ammunition  of  the  heavy  howitzer  batteries  is 
taken  f  om  the  caissons  of  the  firing  battery  and  deposited 
near  the  guns.  Limbers  and  caissons  move  to  the  rear  to 
the  reserve,  with  which  they  may  be  consolidated.  In  order 
that  they  may  be  secure  from  fire  directed  at  their  battery, 
they  must  go  about  500  m.  to  the  rear.  This  applies  likewise 
to  the  reserve.  The  combat  train  joins  the  reserve.  The 
commander  of  the  reserve  establishes  personal  commimica- 
tion  either  by  means  of  orderlies  or  by  means  of  visual 
signals  with  the  battery  and  takes  timely  steps  to  ensure 
that  filled  caissons  reach  it.  The  light  ammunit  on  columns 
attached  to  the  heavy  howitzer  battaUons  follow  in  rear  of 
those  of  the  field  artillery,  or  at  the  tail  of  the  combatant 
troops.  With  the  approval  of  the  commander  of  the  troops, 
the  commander  of  the  heavy  artillery  directs  the  light  am- 
munition coliunns  of  the  heavy  artillery  to  move  forward. 
This  order  is  usually  issued  at  the  same  time  that  the  heavy 
artillery  moves  forward  from  its  place  in  the  route  column. 
The  light  ammunition  coltmin  of  a  heavy  artillery  battalion 
is  posted  about  800  m.  in  rear  of  the  batteries.  Empty 
caissons  of  the  batteries  and  battery  reserves  are  exchanged 
for  filled  caissons  of  the  light  ammunition  column.  Empty 
light  ammunition  columns  move  back  to  the  ammunition 
column,  where  they  are  refilled. 

The  ammunition  columns  of  an  army  corps*  are  assigned 
to  both  the  1st  and  the  lid  echelon  of  trains  and  columns. 
The  light  howitzer  ammunition  column  is  with  the  1st 
echelon.  When  an  engagement  is  imminent,  a  whole  or  half 
of  an  ammunition  coliunn  and  a  field  hospital  or  two  may  march 
as  a  combat  echelon  ahead  of  the  field  trains  or  just  in  rear  of 

*An  ammunition  train  comprising  Z  infantry  and  4  artillery  ammunition  columns 
(one  of  the  latter  containing  ammunition  for  light  flold  howitzers)  conBlsta  of  1,180 
men,  1,165  horses,  and  185  carriages,  and  takes  up  a  road  space  of  3,815  m. 

An  ammunition  train  comprising  Z  infantry  and  S  artillery  ammunition  columns 
eonsiflts  of  997  men,  972  horses,  and  146  carriages,  and  takes  up  a  road  space  of 
8,200  m. 

The  ammunition  train  of  a  heavy  hovjitzer  battalion  consist  of  8  heavy  artillery 
ammunition  columns  with  a  total  strength  of  860  men,  810  horses,  and  163  carriagesf 
and  takes  up  a  road  space  of  2,600  m.  Each  one  of  the  caissons  contains  36  rounds  of 
shell  weighing  11,606  kg. 


894  Employment  op  Artillery. 

the  troops.  The  senior  officer  with  this  combat  echelon 
commands  it,  unless  a  commander  has  been  specially  desig- 
nated.    (Par.  447,  German  P.  S.  R.) 

The  ammunition  columns  with  the  lid  echelon,  relieve 
those  of  the  1st  echelon  or  replenish  their  ammunition 
supply,  and  bring  up  ammunition  from  the  advanced  base 
or  from  the  transport  of  the  line  of  communications. 

The  commander  of  the  ammunition  columns  regulates 
the  movements  of  the  artillery  ammunition  columns  in  ac- 
cordance with  orders  issued  by  the  corps  commander,  or, 
when  they  are  attached  to  divisions,  in  accordance  wdth 
orders  issued  by  the  division  commanders.  But  this  does 
not  relieve  him  of  the  responsibility  of  moving  the  columns 
forward  on  his  own  initiative  when  a  battle  has  begun. 
The  orders  for  the  forward  movement  of  the  ammunition 
columns  should  be  given  as  soon  as  it  appears  probable  that 
a  serious  action  will  be  fought.  It  is  only  by  doing  this 
that  an  orderly  replenishment  of  ammunition  can  be  assured. 
When  the  ammunition  columns  are  brought  up  too  late,  it 
may  be  impossible  to  avoid  sending  their  caissons  directly 
up  into  the  firing  batteries  to  cover  a  pressing  need  of  am- 
munition. The  commander  of  the  troops  informs  the  com- 
mander of  the  artillery  of  the  time  and  place  of  the  probable 
arrival  of  the  artillery  ammunition  columns.  From  these 
the  light  ammunition  columns  are  refilled  as  far  as  practicable 
on  the  battlefield.  When  time  is  pressing,  artillery  am- 
munition columns  or  parts  thereof  may  be  brought  up  to 
the  firing  batteries,  and  filled  caissons  may  be  temporarily 
turned  over  to  the  troops. 

After  an  action,  the  ammimition,  men,  horses,  and  ma- 
teriel required  by  batteries  to  make  good  expenditures  and 
losses,  are,  as  a  rule,  taken  directly  from  the  artillery  ammimi- 
tion columns,  which  are  brought  up  for  the  purpose.  After 
every  engagement,  commanders  of  artillery  units  have  to 
render  a  report  to  the  commanders  of  troop  units  of  which 
their  organizations  form  a  part,  specifying  whether  or  not  am- 


Replacement  of  Ammunition.  395 

munition  has  been  replenished,  and  if  not,  the  reasons  for 
not  replenishing  it.  (Par.  74,  German  Train  Regulations). 
Artillery  ammunition  columns  are  required  to  supply 
ammunition  to  troops  of  other  units  than  their  own  when  re- 
quested to  do  so  and  the  situation  of  their  own  unit  permits. 
Light  ammunition  columns  do  this  only  when  ordered  to 
do  so  by  the  commander  of  the  force  of  which  they  form  a 
part.  Empty  ammunition  colnmns  of  the  combat  echelon 
and  of  the  1st  eschelon  return  to  the  lid  chelon,  half  a  col- 
umn at  a  time.  As  soon  as  two  empty  half-columns  have 
thus  joined  the  lid  echelon,  no  matter  whether  they  are 
parts  of  infantry,  artillery,  or  heavy  artillery  ammunition 
columns,  they  are,  in  general,  sent  to  the  rear  to  refill. 
They  are  refilled  at  the  advanced  base,  or  from  motor  trucks, 
railway  cars  or  other  transport  of  the  lines  of  communication. 

During  the  Franco-German  war  it  was  very  often  necessary  for 
ammunition  columns  to  supply  units  other  than  their  own  with  ammunition. 
At  Vionville,  for  example,  the  ammunition  columns  of  the  Hid  Army 
Corps  issued  ammunition  to  a  number  of  batteries  of  the  Xth  Army 
Corps,  and  the  batteries  of  the  Xth  and  of  the  Vlllth  Army  Corps, 
which  did  not  arrive  on  the  field  until  the  afternoon,  supplied  ammunition 
to  the  batteries  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps. 

At  St.  Privat,  August  18th,  1870,  the  ammunition  train  of  the  IXth 
Army  Corps  first  took  station  near  Villers-aux-Bois,  and  was  later  brought 
forward  to  the  battlefield.  The  ammunition  columns  advanced  as  far  as 
Vern^ville,  where  mounted  men  of  the  various  batteries  received  the  cais- 
sons destined  for  their  respective  batteries,  and  took  them  to  their  batteries. 
A  rendezvous  position  was  designated  for  the  empty  caissons  500  paces 
in  rear  of  the  firing  batteries.  The  caissons  that  were  sent  forward  later, 
sent  their  teams  back  to  this  position.  * 

The  1st  Echelon  of  the  ammunition  column  of  the  Guard  Corps 
detrained  at  Kaiserslautern  on  August  4th,  1870,  the  lid  Echelon  at 
Mayence  on  August  8th,  1870.  The  latter  reached  Dieulouard  on  August 
17th,  after  a  series  of  hard  marches.  On  the  same  day,  the  1st  Echelon 
reached  Sponville,  immediately  in  rear  of  the  Guard  Corps,  which  was 
concentrated  at  Mars-la-Tour.  On  August  18th,  the  ammunition  columns 
(1st  Echelon)  were  first  posted  near  Doncourt,  and  later  between  Habon- 
ville  and  Batilly.  The  lid  Echelon,  meantime,  had  marched  via  Thiau- 
court  to  the  battlefield,  a  distance  of  56  km. 

At  2  p.  M.,  August  19th,  1870,  all  the  ammunition  columns  had  been 
emptied  of  their  contents,  had  furnished  114  men  and  205  horses  to  re- 

"^HoFFBAUER,  Deutschc  Artillene,  V.  p.  186. 


396  Employment  of  Artillery. 

place  losses  in  the  batteries,  and  were  in  march  via  Pont  d  Mouason  to 
the  field  ammuntion  park  at  Hemy.  As  they  were  unable  to  obtain  am- 
munition here,  they  continued  their  march  to  Saarlouis.  After  receiving 
their  ammunition,  they  marched  westward,  learned  that  the  Guard  Corps 
formed  part  of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  found  the  trail  of  that  corps  and 
hurried  after  it  without  specific  orders,  completing  their  teams  on  the  way 
by  requisitioning  horses.  On  the  29th,  the  first  of  the  columns  again 
reached  the  army  corps,  and  by  the  31st  all  of  them  had  rejoined.  The 
1st  column  had  covered  338  km.  in  10  days,  the  last  375  km.  in  12  days. 
One  day  should  be  deducted  from  the  10  and  12  days  respectively,  as  it 
was  taken  up  in  receiving  and  packing  ammunition.  On  September  6th, 
the  columns  again  marched  toward  Saarlouis,  and  on  the  19th  they  arrived 
in  front  of  Paris,  having  traversed  about  540  km.  in  14  days.  The  columns 
marched  both  morning  and  afternoon,  cooked  a  meal  at  noon,  and  went 
into  bivouac  each  night  covered  by  their  own  men,  who  were  armed  with 
the  rifle.* 

The  1st  Artillery  Ammunition  Column  of  the  1st  Army  Corps  was 
brought  forward  to  Remilly  on  August  31st,  1870  (battle  of  NoisseviUe). 
It  utilized  the  nighc  from  August  31st  to  September  1st,  to  replenish  the 
ammunition  of  the  batteries,  marched  the  next  forenoon  to  Saarlouis, 
returned  the  succeeding  night,  and  arrived  again  in  St.  Barbe,  after  a 
night  march  of  45  km.  The  column  had  covered  136  km.  in  48  hours. 
"Considering  the  hard  forced  marches  demanded  by  the  pressing  nature 
of  the  circumstances,  it  is  not  surprising  that  a  good  many  horses  dropped 
dead  in  their  tracks,  and  that  many  others  strained  tendons  and  muscles.t 

a.  France:^  The  ammunition  of  the  caisson  bodies  of  the  gun 
sections  is  used  first.  These  caisson  bodies  contain  72  rounds  apiece; 
they  are  upended  50  cm.  to  the  left  of  their  respective  guns,  and  their 
doors  opened.  The  ammunition  contained  in  the  caisson  bodies  of  the 
5th  and  6th  caissons  (caissons  de  premier  ravitaillement),  which  are  posted 
on  the  flanks  of  the  battery,  is  transferred  to  the  caisson  bodies  of  the  gun 
sections  as  the  latter  are  emptied.  The  other  six  caissons  of  the  battery 
are  posted  about  500  m.  in  rear  of  the  firing  battery  and  form  the  battery 
reserve,  one  ofldcer  commanding  all  the  battery  reserves  of  the  battalion. 
Full  caisson  bodies  from  the  battery  reserve  replace  the  two  caisson  bodies 
of  the  5th  section  (caissorts  de  premier  ravitaillement),  which  then  return 
to  the  battery  reserve.  Here  they  are  refilled  from  the  limbers,  if  the 
caissons  of  the  ammunition  columns  are  not  as  yet  up,  the  contents  of 
the  gun  limbers  being,  in  any  case,  used  ^as  a  last  resort.  If  the 
battery  commander  desires  to  use  shell,  he  orders  up  from  the  reserve 
the  two  caisson  bodies  containing  it  (144  rounds),  and  indicates  where  they 
shall  be  posted.  The  battalion  commander,  when  informed  by  the  com- 
mander of  the  reserves  that  a  battery  is  running  short  of  ammunition. 


*HoHBNLOHB,  MilitSrischeBriefe,  III,  p.  121. 
tHoFFBAUBR.  Deutsch^  ArHlUrie,  IV,  p.  130. 
tInstrucHon  sur  U  remplaeement  de$  munitions,  VIII,  1902. 


Replacement  of  Personnel  and  Materiel.       397 

may  direct  the  deficiency  to  be  supplied  by  the  issue  of  ammunition  belong- 
ing to  other  batteries. 

The  battery  reserves  replenish  their  supply  from  the  three  echelons 
ofthe  corps  ammunition  park.  A  number  of  artillery  ammunition  sections 
of  the  1st  echelon  are  pushed  forward  and  posted  1,000  or  1,600  m.  in  rear 
of  the  battery  reserves.  From  this  position,  caissons  are  then  sent  to  the 
battery  reserves,  where  they  are  emptied,  their  contents  being  transferred 
to  battery  caissons.  Empty  ammunition  sections  go  back  to  the  lid 
echelon,  15  km.  away,  where  they  are  refilled,  while  full  sections  are  again 
sent  up  to  the  1st  echelon.  The  ammunition  of  the  lid  echelon  is  replen- 
ished in  a  similar  manner  from  the  Hid  echelon,  and  that  of  the  latter  from 
the  artillery  park  of  the  army. 

Each  piece  has  available  in  the  corps,  501.5  rounds  of  ammunition, 
distributed  as  follows: 


With  the  battery 312  rounds. 

1st  echelon   62.6  rounds 

lid  echelon  62.6 

Illd  echelon  64.3      "         )    189.5     " 


In  the 
corps  park 


Total 501.5  rounds. 


b.  Austriia:  Each  infantry  division,*  has  4  field  artillery  ammuni- 
tion columns  consisting  of  24  caissons  each,  and  4  howitzer  ammunition 
colunms  consisting  of  12j!aissons  each.  The  caissons  of  the  1st  and  2d 
columns  are  armored,  so  that  they  can  be  exchanged  for  battery  caissons. 
The  ammunition  in  limbers  may  be  unloaded  beside  the  guns.  The  cais- 
son bodies  of  the  batteries  are  emptied  and  replaced  by  full  caisson  bodies 
of  the  1st  and  2d  ammunition  columns.  The  ammunition  of  the  caisson 
limbers  is  transferred  to  the  gun  limbers  as  soon  as  the  latter  are  emptied. 


15.    REPLACEMENT  OF  PERSONNEL  AND  MAT^RIEL^t 

* 'Every  battery  engaged  with  the  enemy  should  strain 
every  nerve  and  utilize  all  its  resources  to  remain  ready  to 
move  or  to  fire  at  any  moment.  *  *  (Par.  461 ,  German  F.  A.  D. 
R.). 

Batteries  are  never  withdrawn  while  tmder  fire,  but 
supported  by  pushing  others  up  into  the  line.  Even  severe 
losses  do  not  in  themselves  justify  evacuation  of  the  posi- 

*A  cavalry  dlvlsioii  has  a  cayalry  ammuziltlon  column  that  carries  both  small 
arms  and  artillery  ammunition. 

tPars.  461-463.  Oerman  F.  A.  D.  R. 


398  Employment  of  Artillery. 

tion.  If  a  battery  that  has  succumbed  in  the  fire  fight  were 
to  be  withdrawn,  the  battery  that  replaced  it,  might  perhaps 
not  produce  an  effect  at  all,  as  it  must  first  adjust  its  fire, 
but  would  in  all  probability  break  down  while  going  into 
position,  there  being  no  more  vulnerable  target  than  a  bat- 
tery in  the  act  of  unlimbering.  Besides,  the  forward  move- 
ment of  the  teams  with  a  view  to  bringing  off  the  guns  would 
invite  the  enemy  to  redouble  the  intensity  of  his  fire,  unless 
the  terrain  affords  cover  to  the  movement. 

Each  battery  possesses  sufficient  materiel  in  its  battery 
reserve  for  keeping  the  guns  and  their  limbers  fit  for  action 
a  long  time.  When  a  battery  is  tmable  to  make  the  neces- 
sary repairs  with  the  means  at  its  disposal,  the  commander 
of  the  reserve  takes  timely  steps  to  procure  what  is  needed 
from  the  light  ammimition  column.  The  latter  is  obliged 
to  turn  over  to  the  batteries  not  only  any  materiel  that  they 
may  require,  but  also  to  replace  their  losses  in  men  and  horses, 
even  if  this  entails  disintegrating  the  ammunition  column. 
When  necessary,  the  battalion  or  the  regimental  commander 
may  direct  another  battery  to  furnish  what  is  needed.  So 
far  as  practicable,  such  assistance  should  be  rendered  even 
to  batteries  belonging  to  another  unit.  In  so  far  as  possible, 
repairs  should  be  made  during  the  action,  but  when  this  is 
impracticable,  repair  work  should  be  started  as  soon  as  the 
action  is  over.  Spare  parts  and  tools  for  making  repairs 
are  carried  in  the  first  store  wagon  of  the  battery  reserve. 
In  addition,  there  is  available  with  the  field  train,  the  second 
store  wagon  with  field  forge.  Artillery  should  therefore  be 
specially  interested  in  quickly  bringing  up  the  field  train  as 
soon  as  an  engagement  is  over. 

Losses  among  the  cannoneers  are  first  replaced  from  the 
men  attached  to  the  caissons.  A  battery  thus  has  a  Uttle 
more  than  an  extra  set  of  cannoneers.  As  a  last  resort, 
the  drivers  are  used  as  cannoneers.  A  battery  can  continue 
its  fire — ^though  at  a  considerably  reduced  rate — so  long  as 
two  men  still  remain  with  each  gun,  or  three  with  each  how- 


Replacement  of  Personnel  and  Materiel.      399 

itzer.  When  a  battery  is  about  to  succtimb,  its  commander 
may  stop  the  firing  in  order  to  refit,  so  that  it  may  be  able 
to  take  a  hand  in  the  infantry  fight  during  the  later  stages 
of  the  action.  (Par.  374,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.).  Chiefs 
of  section  are  more  difficult  to  replace  than  any  other  men  of 
the  battery. 

**  Capable  chiefs  of  section  {Geschiltzfuhrer)  are  by  no 
means  ntunerous  in  a  newly  mobilized  battery,  because  in 
the  artillery  the  corps  of  non-commissioned  officers  is  drained 
to  a  far  greater  extent  than  in  the  other  arms,  by  details 
to  new  organizations.  When,  in  addition,  the  few  remaining 
professional  non-commissioned  officers  are  disabled  in  the 
first  battle,  the  problem  of  providing  substitutes  becomes 
really  embarrassing."* 

An  endeavor  should  always  be  made  to  shelter  the  teams 
as  much  as  possible  from  hostile  fire,  but  it  will  be  impracti- 
cable to  protect  them  altogether  against  losses.  When  the 
batteries  desire  to  change  position,  or  to  accompany  the 
attack,  the  teams  must  be  brought  up ;  and  it  will  be  impos- 
sible to  move  to  the  new  position  without  suffering  some  loss 
en  route. 

The  loss  of  saddle  animals  is  particularly  serious.  "In  the  en- 
deavor to  render  the  combatant  part  of  the  battery,  the  guns,  as  ready  and 
fit  for  service  as  possible,  I  assigned  almost  all  the  horses  of  the  permanent 
establishment,  including  all  available  saddle  horses,  to  gun  teams  and 
drivers  on  mobilization.  As  the  horses  that  came  to  the  battery  by  pur- 
chase (augmentation  horses)  were  almost  without  exception  untrained  to 
go  into  a  six-horse  team  or  to  work  under  the  saddle,  I  assigned  them  to 
the  reserve  and  combat  train.  But,  at  Mars-la-Tour,  we  lost  all  of  our 
officers'  horses,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  mounts  of  chiefs  of  section, 
trumpeters  and  non-commissioned  officers.  Where  were  substitutes  to 
be  obtained?  We  did  find  a  few  suitable  mounts  among  the  gxm  teams, 
and  used  them,  but  the  best  of  these  were  gone  and  there  seemed  no  way 
out  of  the  dilemma."t    The  battery  lost  23  of  its  126  horses. 

In  1870-71,  a  horse  battery  consisted  normally  of  150  men,  and  207 
horses,  and  a  field  battery  of  151  men  and  126  horses.  At  Vionville,  six 
out  of  twelve  field  batteries  lost  more  than  40  horses  each,  and  three  horse 
batteries  lost  respectively,  59,  41,  and  70  horses.    In  spite  of  this  loss,  all 


*Bbrbndt.  Au$  meiner  DienstzeiU  p-  74. — See  p.  426,  mpra. 
t/Wd. 


400  Employment  of  Artillery. 

but  four  of  these  batteries  were  able  by  the  morning  of  August  I8th,  to 
turn  out  with  complete  six-horse  teams. 

On  August  18th,  1870,  the  batteries  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps,  had  to 
take  part  in  the  battle  of  Grmv^lotte,  after  having  made  a  long  march. 
The  ammunition  columns  had  furnished  171  horses  to  the  batteries  and 
were  obliged  to  replace  these  by  requisitioning  others  on  their  march  to 
the  rear. 

In  the  future  also,  we  shall  make  frequent  use  of  the 
expedient  of  drawing  on  the  ammunition  columns  for  teams,* 
for  a  battery  that  has  lost  half  of  its  personnel  and  horses, 
can  not  bring  its  guns  into  position  without  immediate  as- 
sistance. Each  caisson  of  the  ammunition  colunm  can  with- 
out difficulty  spare  two  horses,  until  others  arrive  from  the 
rear,  as  it  will  still  have  four  horses,  which  suffice  to  draw 
the  empty  caisson.  In  addition,  led  horses  are  available. 
Each  artillery  ammunition  column  could  thus  furnish  50-60 
horses,  and  all  the  field  artillery  ammunition  columns  of 
an  army  corps,  about  350-420  horses. 

■^be  horse  depOts  are  to  replace  disabled  horses  of  various  headquarters  or 
infantry  (including  machine  gun  companies),  of  pioneers  (Including  bridge  train), 
of  corps  telegraph  detachments,  of  telephone  detachments,  and  of  field  supply 
depdts  of  the  army  corps.  In  urgent  cases,  the  coriM  commander  may  direct  machine 
gun  batteries,  cavalry,  field  artillery,  heavy  artillery,  ambulance  companies,  and 
train  organizations  of  the  army  corps,  to  draw  horses  from  the  horse  depOts.'*  (Par- 
117,  Oerman  Train  Regulations). 


IV.    THE  ATTACK. 

1.     THE  COOPERATION  OF  INFANTRY  AND 

ARTILLERY. 

Artillery,  regardless  of  the  losses  it  may  suflfer  in  con- 
sequence, should  always  combat  the  target  that  makes  it 
most  diflficult  for  the  infantry  to  attain  the  object  of  the 
action.  The  hostile  infantry  is  the  principal  target.  Artil- 
lery should  engage  the  hostile  artillery  only  to  the  extent  of 
preventing  the  latter  from  firing  undisturbed.  In  order  to 
place  modem  artillery  out  of  action,  numerous  curved  fire 
guns  must  be  brought  into  action,  and  even  then  this  object 
will  not  be  completely  attained,  for  some  of  the  hostile  bat- 
teries will  be  able,  again  and  again  to  develop  their  full  fire 
power.  The  victor  will  find  on  the  battlefield  but  few  bat- 
teries that  are  shot  to  pieces.  He  is  much  more  apt  to  find 
them  immobilized.  The  regulations  of  the  nineties  still 
insisted  that  the  success  of  the  infantry  attack  depended,  in 
the  main,  upon  the  attainment  of  the  superiority  of  artillery 
fire.*  But,  he  who  waits  until  this  superiority  is  gained 
will  never  get  to  attack. 

The  artillery  combat  is  no  longer  a  special  act  of  the 
drama  of  the  battle.  It  will  not  so  much  precede  as  accom- 
pany the  infantry  attack  to  the  very  last.  Close  coopera- 
tion between  artillery  and  infantry  is  more  necessary  than 
ever  before. 


*G«rmanyi  Par.  344,  F.  A.  D.  R.  of  1899:  "A  planned  atack  has  a  chance 
of  succeeding  only  when  the  superiority  of  fire,  in  the  first  place  that  of  artillery,  has 
been  gained." 

Par.  82.  Part  II,  /.  D.  R.  of  1899:  "In  the  first  place,  the  superiority  of  artil- 
lery fire  should  be  gained,  to  smooth  the  way  for  the  infantry." 

Frances  /.  D.  R.  of  1904  (German  guns  without  shields  being  considered 
the  targets) :  "Artillery  during  the  preparatory  stage :  An  attempt  should  be  made 
to  overwhelm  the  hostile  artillery  as  quickly  as  possible,  but  without  engaging  more 
force  than  absolutely  necessary.  *  *  *  It  is  not  until  the  preparation  is  con- 
sidared  sufficient  that  (he  commander  of  the  troops  gives  the  order  for  the  attack,** 


402  The  Attack. 

England  I  F.  A.  D.  R.  of  1907:  "The  artillery  and  the  infantry 
must  cooperate,  the  former  by  firing  rapidly  when  it  sees  that  its  own  in- 
fantry has  trouble  to  advance,  and  the  latter  by  taking  advantage  of  this 
period  of  intense  artillery  fire,  to  gain  ground  to  the  front.  The  closest 
cooperation  of  guns  with  the  infantry  firing  lines  is  essential.  Communi- 
cation  between  infantry  and  artillery  commanders  is  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance and  the  way  should  be  paved  for  it  whenever  circumstances 
admit.  All  orders  for  the  infantry  attack  should  be  communicated  to  the 
artillery  commander  and  arrangements  made  to  have  the  guns  continue 
their  fire  until  the  last  possible  moment.  Infantry  is  most  effectively 
supported  by  concentrating  the  fire  of  guns  and  of  howitzers  upon  the  point 
to  be  attacked.  The  shrapnel  fire  of  the  guns  will  nail  the  enemy  to  his 
trenches,  force  him  to  keep  down,  interfere  with  his  aim,  and  divert  his 
attention  from  the  advancing  infantry.  The  fire  of  the  howitzers,  whether 
it  consist  of  shrapnel  or  of  lyddite  shell,  will  sweep  the  interior  of  the  enemy's 
trenches  and  their  approaches,  and  retard  the  movement  of  his  reserves. 
Should  the  attacker's  artillery  be  forced  to  discontinue  its  fire  in  view  of 
the  superiority  of  the  hostile  artillery  fire,  it  must  open  fire  again  at  any 
cost,  when  it  becomes  necessary  to  help  the  infantry  ward  off  an  attack, 
or  to  repel  a  counter-attack.  When  the  infantry  has  approached  so  close 
to  the  hostile  position  that  it  masks  the  fire  of  its  own  artillery,  the  latter 
should  continue  its  fire  at  a  greater  elevation  in  order  to  sweep  the  ground 
in  rear  of  the  hostile  position  and  to  prevent  the  advance  of  hostile  re- 
serves." 

The  fusion  of  infantry  and  artillery  preparation  is  the 
basic  principle  of  the  new  tactics.  Nothing  but  mutual 
cooperation  of  infantry  and  artillery,  directed  by  the  com- 
mander, will  assure  success.  The  danger  that  the  artillery 
combat  may  degenerate  into  an  ineffective  cannonade,  is 
obviated  by  the  demand  that  the  infantry  force  the  defender, 
while  the  artillery  combat  is  still  in  progress,  openly  to  en- 
gage his  troops,  especially  his  masked  batteries,  so  that  they 
will  form  targets  for  its  own  artillery-.  It  is  very  difficult 
for  artillery  to  combat  advancing  infantry  from  a  masked 
position,  especially  when  it  is  not  a  question  of  hitting  a 
few  targets,  as  on  the  target  range,  but  one  of  hitting  groups 
of  numerous  targets,*  and  the  observations  of  the  battery 

^General  Richtbr,  Beitrag  zu  dem  ZusammentDirken  der  Infantrie  und  Feld- 
artillerie  bei  der  5.  japanischen  Division  in  der  Schlacht  von  Mukden.  JahrbUcher  fUr 
Armee  und  Marine,  July  number  1009.  In  1896.  General  Lanoxx)I8  stated  that  In- 
fantry could  never  unaided  gain  the  fire  superiority  over  the  defender,  because  its 
action  alternated  between  movement  and  firing,  whereas  the  defender  fired  unin- 
terruptedly, and  that  artillery  unaided  was  Just  as  little  capable  of  effectively  pre- 
paring the  assault.     For.  he  argued,  as  soon  as  artillery  directs  its  fire  against  the 


Cooperation  of  Infantry  and  Artillery.      403 

commander,  who  is  some  distance  away  from  his  guns, 
can  not  be  used  in  the  battery  without  risk  of  error.  Par. 
374,  German  I.  D.  R.,  is  particularly  important.  To  quote: 
** Although  an  attempt  should  be  made  to  gain  beforehand  a 
superiority  of  artillery  fire,  the  execution  of  the  infantry  attack 
should  not  be  made  absolutely  dependent  upon  it.  The  tactical 
situation  is  the  governing  factor.''  The  drill  regulations  of 
the  field  and  heavy  artillery  enimciate  similar  views.  But 
there  is  unquestionably  great  danger  of  the  infantry  attack 
bolting  to  the  front,  of  advancing  too  hurriedly,  before  the 
artillery  has  created  the  conditions  upon  which  success  is 
predicated.  A  warning  against  the  ''headlong  attack"  is 
justified,  even  in  peace  times.  Before  Mukden,  General 
Oku  made  the  following  statement  in  one  of  his  orders: 
"The  infantry  must  advance,  no  matter  how  slow  its  progress. 
When  it  is  not  as  yet  possible  for  the  infantry  to  advance, 
the  artillery  should  hold  its  fire.  The  advance  of  the  in- 
fantry and  artillery  must  proceed  simultaneously."  This 
statement  is  now  embodied  in  the  Japanese  regulations. 

An  attempt  will  now  be  made  to  present  a  detailed 
statement  of  the  demands  of  the  two  arms  in  attack. 

1.  The  occupation  of  the  position  and  the  adjustment 
of  fire  take  time.  In  a  rencontre,  it  will  frequently  be  im- 
possible to  avoid  engaging  the  artillery  prematurely  (par. 
357,  German  I.  D.  R.)  when  the  advance  guard  requires  the 
support  of  artillery  in  order  to  fulfill  its  mission,  or  when  an 
attempt  is  to  be  made  to  clear  up  the  situation  by  means  of 
artillery  fire."  (Par.  361,  German  I.  D.  R.).  When  at- 
tacking an  enemy  deployed  and  in  position  on  the  defensive, 
the  premature  advance  of  the  infantry  must  not  impel  the 
artillery  to  precipitate  and  hurried  action.*     The  infantry 

point  of  attack,  the  defender,  utilizing  all  the  natural  and  artificial  cover  available^ 
would  withdraw  Arom  its  fire,  unless  the  Infantry  of  the  attacker  advances  to  dose- 
range  and  threatens  an  immediate  attack,  thereby  forcing  the  defender  to  come  out 
from  his  cover  and  to  present  to  the  artillery  firing  over  its  own  infantry  a  welcome 
target  for  its  death-dealing  shrapnel. 

*The  attempt  made  at  Oravelotte  by  the  Ist  Battalion,  8th  Field  Artillery 
which  was  posted  in  readiness,  to  go  prematurely  Into  position  in  order  to  divert 
the  hostile  fire  from  the  recklessly  advancing  infantry  is  of  questionable  utility  and 
should  be  avoided. 


404  The  Attack. 

should  not  advance  iintil  the  artillery  is  ready  to  support  it 
with  fire. 

The  artillery  must  demand  such  protection  of  infantry 
in  its  vicinity  as  to  enable  it  to  go  into  position  quietly  and 
unmolested.  As  the  first  positions  of  the  artillery  will  gen- 
erally be  masked  or  semi-masked,  it  has  little  to  fear  from 
the  frontal  fire  of  hostile  infantry,  but  may  be  molested  by 
small  hostile  detachments  and  machine  guns,  which  will 
endeavor  to  bring  oblique  fire  to  bear  on  batteries  that  have 
pushed  recklessly  forward.  In  a  rencontre,  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  advance  guard  to  secure  the  selected  artillery  posi- 
tion and  its  observation  points.  Important  points,  particu- 
larly commanding  heights  that  he  in  advance  or  on  a  flank  of 
the  artillery  position,  should  be  promptly  seized.  *'The 
flanks  and  rear  of  the  artillery  position  are  particularly 
vulnerable  to  the  daring  and  sudden  operations  of  small 
detachments.  In  open  country,  artillery  in  position  protects 
its  own  front  by  its  fire.  It  is  only  in  case  the  artillery  line 
is  long  that  a  small  infantry  force  is  required  in  front  to  pre- 
vent the  enemy's  patrols  from  annoying  the  artillery.  Small 
detachments  of  infantry  posted  at  considerable  intervals 
suffice  for  this  purpose."     (Par.  448,  German,  I.  D.  R.). 

2.  The  advance  of  infantry  past  or  through  artillery 
lines,  must  not  materially  impair  the  artillery  fire.  In  any 
event,  the  infantry  and  artillery  commanders  concerned 
should  agree  beforehand  on  the  time  when  and  the  place 
where  the  movement  is  to  be  made.  (Par.  445,  German 
I.  D.  R.).  In  many  cases,  it  will  be  practicable  to  pass 
at  one  bound  through  the  batteries  that  are  not  as  yet 
engaged  but  ready  to  fire.  When  the  guns  are  in  a  masked 
position,  they  can  resume  firing  as  soon  as  the  infantry 
has  cleared  the  crest  in  their  front. 

3.  The  artillery  should  demand  that  infantry  force 
the  defender  to  man  his  parapets  and  to  offer  targets  to 
shrapnel  in  order  that  it  may  be  enabled  thereby  to  distin- 
guish masks  and  dummy  works  from  the  true  position.    The 


Cooperation  op  Inpantry  and  Artillery.      405 

artillery  must,  in  the  first  place,  know  how  close  its  in- 
fantry has  gotten  to  the  hostile  position.  It  is  a  good  plan 
to  attach  artillery  officers  to  the  infantry  (par.  376,  German 
F.  A.  D.  R.) .  This  is  the  only  method  that  ensures  that  the 
results  of  the  infantry  reconnaissance  will  be  communicated 
to  the  artillery  and  that  the  infantry  will  seek  hostile  obser- 
vation stations  and  direct  its  fire  upon  them.  Observation 
stations  are  the  eyes  of  artillery  that  is  posted  in  a  masked 
position;  when  these  are  put  out,  the  fire  effect  ceases. 
Batteries  in  masked  positions  will  then  be  forced  to  leave 
their  cover  and  may  be  annihilated.  This  attack  against 
observation  stations  is  a  new  and  important  element  in 
modem  combat.  Par.  593,  German  F.  S.  R.,  emphasizes 
this  point  particularly,  by  saying:  "The  outcome  of  the 
combat  of  two  lines  of  artillery  that  are  numerically  approxi- 
mately equal,  depends  largely  upon  the  use  of  that  arm  and 
upon  the  cooperating  activity  of  the  infantry.  It  is  no  longer 
possible  to  accomplish  anything  with  frontal  fire,  but  it  is 
practicable  to  interfere  with  the  movement  of  hostile  guns 
from  the  masked  to  the  unmasked  position  and  to  rob  the 
hostile  artillery  of  freedom  of  movement  and  to  cripple  its 
ammunition  supply  service.* 

4.  The  artillery  may  and  should  demand  that  all  the 
wishes  of  the  infantry  be  communicated  to  it. 

The  infantry  demands — 

(a)  That  during  the  advance  that  has  been  begun  to 
give  the  artillery  a  chance,  it  be  not  left  without  support 
and  at  the  mercy  of  the  hostile  artillery  fire,  in  other  words, 
that  the  hostile  artillery  be  silenced,  or  at  least  completely 
occupied.  The  activity  of  a  hostile  battery  posted  in  a 
masked  position  may  be  crippled  by  firing  upon  its  obser- 
vation station.  This  should  be  sought  at  points  permitting 
good  view,  its  firing  battery  being  perhaps  posted  in  what 
wotdd  seem  to  be  an  entirely  unlikely  place.  In  many  cases, 
a  doud  of  smoke  projected  in  front  of  a  hostile  battery  in  a 
masked  position,  may  suffice  to  cripple  its  activity. 

*HoFFBAX7BB,  DeuUthe  ArtUUfU,  III.  p.  00. 


406  The  Attack. 

(fe)  That  the  artillery  render  it  all  possible  assistance, 
to  enable  it  to  overcome  a  crisis,  and  that  the  artillery  pre- 
vent the  hostile  infantry  from  firing  undisturbed. 

(c)  That  the  artillery  protect  it  in  critical  situations, 
particularly  after  a  successful  assault,  by  hurrying  forward 
into  the  captured  position. 

(d)  That  the  artillery  support  it  in  the  combat  for  the 
possession  of  villages.  'In  partictdar  they  (the  higher  artil- 
lery commanders)  should  see  that  the  maximum  effect  is 
obtained  at  the  right  time  and  at  the  proper  place,  by  con- 
centrating and  accelerating  the  fire.  To  this  end,  they  must 
constantly  observe  the  enemy  and  the  conduct  of  their 
own  troops  and  supplement  their  own  observations  by  in- 
formation gathered  by  officers'  patrols  and  scouts."  (Par. 
426,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.). 

For  the  commander  of  the  troops  to  inform  the  artil- 
lery commander  against  what  point  he  intends  to  launch 
the  decisive  attack  (par.  470,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.),  by  no 
means  solves  the  question  of  mutual  cooperation.  The 
artillery  commander  should  carefully  observe  the  leading 
infantry  line  in  order  that  he  may  perceive  at  once  where 
assistance  is  needed.  Infantry  detachments  that  have 
prematurely  rushed  forward  and  that  can  facilitate  the  ad- 
vance of  the  following  units,  require  effective  artillery  sup- 
port. A  check  in  any  movement  or  an  advance  by  groups 
or  other  units,  is  always  an  appeal  to  the  batteries  to  furnish 
support  with  their  fire. 

The  difficulties  of  providing  cooperation  between  in- 
fantry and  artillery  are  due  to  the  elimination  of  powder 
smoke  and  the  adoption  of  neutral  tinted  uniforms,  which 
makes  it  impossible  to  distinguish  friend  from  foe  at  all 
times  with  certainty  (though  ''assault  guidons''  may  help), 
and  to  the  drctunstance  that,  while  we  have  a  signal  {go) 
directing  artillery  to  increase  its  range,  we  have  none  in- 
dicating that  artillery  is  to  concentrate  its  fire  upon  certain 
points.     In  England  it  has  been  proposed  to  indicate  the  point 


Cooperation  op  Infantry  and  Artillery.     407 

upon  which  fire  is  to  be  concentrated,  by  means  of  the  colored 
ball  of  smoke  of  a  special  projectile.  Morse  signals  are  not 
clear  enough  and  are  liable  to  be  misunderstood.  The  Swiss 
have  adopted  a  very  good  scheme,  which  consists  of  holding 
aloft  all  signal  flags  to  indicate  to  artillery  that  it  is  to  in- 
crease its  elevation.  To  give  each  leader  in  the  skirmish 
line  authority  to  indicate  the  points  against  which  the  fire  is 
to  be  directed,  would  not  be  permissible.  This  authority 
belongs  properly  to  the  officer  commanding  a  combat  section — 
usually  a  regimental  commander.  In  many  cases,  it  will  be 
advisable  to  direct  some  artillery  unit  (for  example  a  bat- 
talion) to  support  the  advance  of  the  1st  infantry  regiment 
against  the  line  a — b.  It  is  only  by  issuing  orders  in  this 
form  that  cooperation  of  infantry  and  artillery  can  be  ensured, 
otherwise  that  cooperation  will  be  entirely  a  matter  of  chance. 
The  operation  of  the  scheme  mentioned  is  facilitated  by  the 
fact  that  the  relative  strength  of  the  infantry  and  artillery 
of  a  division  is  such  that  an  artillery  regiment  will  naturally 
be  assigned  a  combat  section  equal  in  extent  to  that  assigned 
to  an  infantry  brigade.  Telephone  lines  that  connect  the 
different  brigade  headquarters  with  division  headquarters 
on  the  one  hand  and  with  the  headquarters  of  the  artil- 
lery regiment  on  the  other,  prepare  the  way  for  mutual  co- 
operation. But  visual  signal  communications  must  be 
maintained  in  addition,  as  interruption  of  the  telephone 
service  is  inevitable.  Mutual  visibility  of  the  troops  con- 
cerned does  not  suffice,  as  this  might  give  rise  to  mistakes, 
and  as  the  fire  of  the  artillery  would  be  governed  more  by  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  than  by  the  effect  of  his  fire,  which 
the  artillery  can  not  in  every  case  perceive.  Moreover, 
the  artillery  might  frequently  direct  its  fire  against  points 
that  the  infantry  does  not  intend  to  attack  or  that  it  can  not  as 
yet  capture. 

Artillery  reconnaissance  officers  sent  ahead  keep  up 
communication  with  the  various  infantry  headquarters  and 
transmit  the  necessary  technical  information  in  regard  to  the 


408  The  Attack. 

targets,  the  distance  of  the  firing  line  from  the  enemy,  the 
location  of  hostile  machine  guns,  etc..  One  ofiScer  at  each 
headquarters  will  rarely  suffice  for  this  work,  and  two  will 
therefore  be  sent  in  most  cases,  one  remaining  at  the  head- 
quarters of  the  infantry  tuiit,  the  other  accompanying  the 
advancing  infantry  line.  Panoramic  sketches  on  whidi  the 
various  parts  of  the  target  are  indicated  by  means  of  letters, 
will  often  prove  useful,  if  sent  back  promptly.  If  artillery 
reconnaissance  officers  are  disabled  or  not  available,  in- 
fantry officers  perform  their  duties.  It  requires  strict  at- 
tention on  the  part  of  the  infantry  to  make  its  work  harmonize 
with  that  of  the  artillery.  Every  opportunity,  as  when  the 
hostile  infantry  is  forced  under  cover  by  a  burst  of  fire, 
should  be  utilized  for  advancing.  This  is  particularly 
emphasized  by  the  French  (see  p.  460,  infra),  who  are  of  the 
opinion  that  the  fire  of  their  artillery  can  overcome  any 
check  produced  by  hostile  fire,  bring  the  advancing  troops 
almost  unharmed  close  to  the  enemy,  and  protect  them  against 
any  counter-attack.  The  defender  is  to  be  blinded  by  smoke 
and  by  a  hail  of  shrapnel.  "Every  rafale  of  the  artillery  will 
either  cause  the  most  advanced  line  to  make  a  rush,  or  the 
troops  of  the  rear  line  to  come  up  to  the  firing  line  in  order 
to  reinforce  it,  or  carry  it  forward  as  much  as  possible.  Thus 
the  rafale  becomes  a  veritable  shield  for  the  infantry  (veri- 
table bouclier  de  Vinfanterie),''    Langlois. 

In  infantry  combat  exercises,  by  far  too  little  attention 
is  paid  to  utilizing  this  moment  for  advancing  by  long  rushes 
of  strong  groups  under  cover  of  the  smoke-clouds  of  a  rafale. 

Field  and  heavy  artillery  should  likewise  cooperate 
under  the  direction  of  the  commander  of  the  artillery,  who 
regulates  their  reconnaissance  and  fire  action.  The  long 
range  and  certain  action  of  the  heavy  howitzer,  which  fires 
shell  model  1904,  whose  radius  of  action  is  very  great,  should 
be  utilized  to  silence,  one  section  at  a  time,  shielded  batteries 
whose  position  has  been  recognized,  or  to  keep  down  the 
fire  of  such  batteries  (by  distributing  the  fire  over  their  entire 


Artillery  in  a  Rencontre.  409 

front),  in  order  to  relieve  as  many  field  batteries  as  possible 
from  this  work  and  to  enable  them  to  direct  shrapnel  fire 
against  the  hostile  infantry  position  and  against  hostile  curved 
fire  batteries  in  masked  positions.  The  attention  of  hostile 
batteries  that  have  been  silenced  or  that  have  not  as  yet  been 
taken  tmder  fire,  should  be  occupied.  Field  artillery  will 
frequently  be  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  cover  afforded 
by  the  fire  of  the  heavy  artillery  to  go  into  position.  Finally, 
the  commander  of  the  troops  demands  that  the  point  of 
attack  be  kept  tmder  effective  fire.  Fortified  villages  offer 
less  resistance  to  heavy  shells  than  do  supporting  works  of 
low  profile. 


2.     ARTILLERY   IN  A  RENCONTRE.* 

In  a  rencontre  in  which  a  route  column  deploys  against 
an  enemy  who  is  still  in  the  act  of  advancing,  the  advance 
guard  is  to  gain  time  and  room  for  the  deployment  of  its  main 
body,  throw  the  enemy  upon  the  defensive,  and  dictate  his 
course  of  action.  The  principal  share  of  this  task  falls  to  the 
lot  of  the  field  artillery.  The  commander  will  find  it  very 
diffictdt  adequately  to  protect  his  rapidly  forming  artillery 
lines  with  infantry,  which  marches  more  slowly,  tmless  heavy 
howitzer  batteries,  which  are  able  to  play  a  powerful  part 
in  such  a  situation,  have  been  brought  into  position  at  a 
timely  moment.  The  unexpected  collision  of  two  opposing 
forces,  which  often  happens  at  maneuvers,  produces  a  critical 
situation.  A  skillful  commander  will  be  able,  in  many  cases, 
to  hasten  the  entry  of  the  troops  into  action  by  making  proper 
preparations,  but  it  will  be  unavoidable  sometimes  to  accept 
battle  in  a  tactically  unfavorable  locality.  The  endeavor 
to  terminate  the  fight  as  quickly  as  possible  by  launching  the 
troops  promptly,  is  characteristic  of  the  rencontre.  When 
this  desire  animates  both  opponents,  it  leads  quite  naturally 

•Para.  476-482,  German  F.  A.  D.  B.,  para.  414-428.  Oerman  H.  A,  D.  R.,  and 
TakUk,  V.  p.  198.  Bt  $€q. 


410  The  Attack. 

to  a  piecemeal  launching  of  the  troops  by  battalions;  when, 
on  the  other  hand,  one  of  the  commanders  decides  to  stand  on 
the  defensive,  a  lull  favorable  for  a  united  launching  of  the 
troops  will  occur. 

Modem  field  artillery  has  imparted  an  entirely  new  char- 
acter to  rencontre  fights  such  as  the  combat  for  the  heights  of 
Gorze  during  the  battle  of  Vionville,  and  the  actions  incident 
to  the  invasion  of  Bohemia. 

A  commander  who  desires  to  avoid  being  surprised  by 
hostile  fire  while  he  is  on  the  march,  must  take  steps  to  keep 
himself  informed,  by  extensive  reconnaissance,  of  the  measures 
taken  by  the  enemy.  But  to  reconnoiter  only  within  effec- 
tive range  (4  km.)  does  not  suffice;  the  reconnaissance  should 
extend  for  at  least  double  that  distance  (i.  e.,  8 — 10  km.), 
as  time  must  be  allowed  for  transmitting  messages  to  the  rear 
and  for  ordering  and  taking  counter-measures.  This  requires 
that  the  cavalry  assigned  to  the  unit  be  pushed  far  ahead. 
As  patrols  are  not  strong  enough  to  penetrate  the  hostile 
screen,  the  divisional  cavalry,  reinforced  if  necessary,  must 
be  used  for  this  purpose.*  The  French  scheme  of  surround- 
ing the  force  with  a  belt  of  independant  detachments  im- 
doubtedly  has  its  advantages.  The  difficulties  encountered 
in  reconnaissance  produce  a  protracted  period  of  tmcertainty 
in  regard  to  the  actions  and  intentions  of  the  enemy.  This 
uncertainty  exerts,  above  all  else,  a  hampering  influence  on 
the  actions  of  the  artillery.  The  commander  should  always 
ask  himself  the  question,  where  will  my  troops  come  tmder 
artillery  fire  ?  when  can  I  fire  upon  the  hostile  route  column 
(fire  surprise)  ?  t  and  where  will  the  covering  forces  collide  ? 

*\A  commander  who  desires  to  derive  the  utmost  benefit 
from  his  rapid  fire  guns,  must  seek  to  get  them  ready  for  action 
as  early  as  possible,  i.  e.,  ahead  of  the  enemy's  artillery." 

*3tT€SUuT,  February  number  of  1009:  Hobsbtzkt,  BindrUekB  vom  Artii- 
krieinformationskura, 

tif  we  assume  that  It  will  take  40  seconds  to  adjust  the  flre  with  three  bracket- 
ing shots,  and  80  seconds  for  giving  the  necessary  commands  and  for  laying,  the 
first  round  for  effect  (time  flre)  can  be  flred  two  minutes  after  the  first  shot. 


Artillery  in  a  Rencontre.  411 

(Horsetzky).  This  naturally  results  in  posting  artillery 
in  readiness,  for  the  purpose  of  at  once  protecting  the  infantry, 
which  would  otherwise  be  defenseless  at  the  mercy  of  the 
hostile  artillery  fire.  This  is  also  advisable  when  infantry 
is  crossing  difficult  ground  or  broad  valleys,  and  when  the 
weather  is  hazy.*  The  difficulty  of  following  the  infantry,  of 
moving  from  one  position  to  another,  lies  in  bringing  up  the 
artillery  at  a  timely  moment.  This  requires  that  the  next 
position  be  reconnoitered  early  and  that  orders  be  trans- 
mitted by  signals.  If  possible,  the  artillery  should  be  in  its 
new  position  by  the  time  the  infantry  has  reached  the  next 
crest.  Whether  the  batteries  should  change  position  si- 
multaneously or  by  echelons  depends  upon  the  situation.  The 
movement  by  echelons,  if  properly  timed,  affords  the  best 
protection  to  both  artillery  and  infantry. 

The  employment  of  the  artillery  of  the  Vth  Army  Corps  atNachod, 
growing  as  it  did  out  of  the  position  the  artillery  occupied  in  the  column, 
is  very  instructive.t 

At  5  A.  M.,  June  27th,  1866,  the  Prussian  advance  guard  and  the 
head  of  the  main  body  were  16  km.  apart.  The  early  occupation  of  the 
Wenzelberg  plateau  was  considered  desirable,  but  as  the  distance  to  the 
nearest  supporting  troops  was  great  and  could  not  be  increased  except  for 
the  most  pressing  reasons,  the  advance  guard  commander  decided  to  post- 
pone the  departure  of  his  advance  guard  an  hour.  At  8  a.  m.,  when  the 
leading  elements  of  the  support  reached  the  height  south  of  Wysokow,  the 
head  of  the  reserve  was  still  4  km.  from  the  road  fork  east  of  Wysokow.  It 
was  expected  that  by  9  A.  M.,  1}4  battalions,  6  escadrons,  2  batteries,  and 
2  pioneer  companies  would  be  on  the  battlefield  of  Wenzelberg.  At  this 
time,  the  elements  of  the  column  were  disposed  as  follows  and  resumed 
their  march  after  a  long  halt: 

Wunck*8Cav.Brig.  (8  esc,  1  btry.)  at  Sackish,  10  km.  from  the  heights 
of  Wenzelberg; 

Main  body  (12  bns.,  8  esc,  6  btrs.)  at  Gellenau,  12  km.  from  the 
heights  of  Wenzelberg; 

Reserve  (3  bns.,  8  btrs.)  at  Lewin,  15  km.  from  the  heights  of  Wen- 
zelberg. 

The  result  of  assigning  so  few  guns  to  the  advance  guard,  which  was 
entirely  dependent  upon  its  own  infantry  until  11:30  A.  m.,  and  of  pushing 

*It  should  be  remembered  that  In  hazy  weather  the  light  oondltlons  may 
change  e'very  few  moments. 

tKOBNB,  KHHsche  Wandtrungen,  I.  p.  2,  et  seq. 
Bat)  ex  MSB.  DU  FeldartiUtrie  im  Beo$gnuno9kampf. 


412  The  Attack. 

it  still  farther  forward,  was  that  it  had  to  cover  entirely  too  much  front 
(6  bna.,  and  2  btrs.,  on  a  front  of  2,600  m.),  and  that  the  artillery,  which 
usually  arrived  a  battery  at  a  time,  was  split  up  and  never  succeeded  in 
gaining  the  superiority.  General  von  Steinmets  had  90  guns,  30  of  them 
smooth-bores,  whereas  his  opponent  had  88  guns,  all  of  them 
There  were  in  action: 


Austrians 

8  A.  H.  8  guns 

9  A.  M.  32     " 
Noon  80 
1  P.  If.  80 


ft 
•t 


Priuaiana 


2    "  80 

2:30  P.  M.  80    "      i  74    " 


12  guns 
12    " 

18    *'     (Horse  btry.  of  the  Cav.  Brig,  arrives) 
26    "      (Ohnesorge's  Btry.  silenced) 
38    "      (One  btry.  of  12-pdrs.  can  bring  only  2  of  its 

guns  into  action) 


If  orders  had  been  issued  in  time,  the  artillery  of  the  reserve  could 
have  arrived  on  the  field  between  12  o'clock  Noon  and  1  P.  M. 

The  advance  guard  batteries  remained  in  action.  The  successively 
arriving  batteries  of  the  cavalry  brigade  and  of  the  main  body  suffered 
severe  losses  in  going  into  action  uncovered  and  were  temporarily  silenced. 
It  was  not  until  the  batteries  of  the  reserve  arrived  in  one  body,  that  the 
scales  were  turned. 

**At  the  beginning  of  the  fight,  the  advantage  will  rest 
with  the  commander  who  understands  how  to  ensure  to 
himself  freedom  of  action  by  gaining  a  start  over  the  enemy 
in  preparation  for  action.  The  artillery  can  materially  assist 
the  commander  of  the  troops  in  this,  by  making  dispositions 
and  movements  promptly." 

As  a  preparatory  measure,  the  artillery  should  be  taken 
out  of  the  main  body  and  brought  up  to  the  tail  of  the  advance 
guard,  and  the  light  ammunition  columns  should  be  brought 
up  into  the  gap  left  in  the  main  body  by  the  artillery.  In  this 
way,  a  higher  state  of  preparedness  for  launching  the  force 
is  attained.  In  many  cases,  it  will  likewise  be  practicable 
to  prepare  for  the  development  of  the  infantry  by  having 
the  head  of  its  subordinate  imits  turn  out  of  the  column. 

The  distance  between  advance  guard  and  main  body 
will  be  decreased  by  bringing  up  the  artillery  of  the  main 
body.  It  is,  consequently,  just  as  well  to  dispense  with  a  large 
advance  guard,  and  to  have  the  entire  column  of  the  army 


Artillery  in  a  Rencontre.  413 

corps  follow  in  rear  of  a  single  battalion*  pushed  forward 
1,000  m.  The  German  P.  S.  R.  (par.  169)  therefore  very 
properly  recommend  that  only  the  most  necessary  disposi- 
tions for  protection  be  made,  in  order  that  the  development 
forward  may  be  hastened. 

That  there  is  danger  that  the  main  body  may  suddenly 
come  under  artillery  fire,  can  certainly  not  be  denied,  but 
this  danger  may  be  obviated  by  energetic  reconnaissance 
and  by  a  proper  employment  of  the  advance  guard  artil- 
lery. The  purpose  of  the  distance  between  advance  guard 
and  main  body  is,  above  all  else,  to  give  the  commander  of 
the  troops  time,  in  case  of  collision  with  the  enemy,  to  decide 
what  to  do. 

An  infantry  attack  undertaken  without  artillery  support 
worth  mentioning,  runs  danger  of  being  converted  into  dis- 
aster when  exposed  to  a  sudden  burst  of  hostile  artillery 
fire.  If  the  attack,  in  such  a  case,  is  made  with  energy  and 
dash,  the  disaster  will  be  all  the  worse.  As  a  rule,  troops 
do  not  easily  forget  such  an  experience.  Colonel  Csicserics 
von  Bacsanyt  states:  *Trom  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  we 
may  draw  the  conclusion  that,  after  the  opening  battles  of  a 
war,  an  army  will  have  to  use  a  certain  circumspection,  not 
to  say  caution,  during  the  preparatory  stage  of  combat. 
The  Russian  defeats  are  interesting  proof  of  the  fact  that 
an  army  that  is  not  prepared  to  use  this  necessary  delibera- 
tion is  very  apt  to  become  quite  unenterprising  in  spite  of 
the  dash  carefully  inculcated  in  time  of  peace  (the  bayonet 
cult),  and  loses  nearly  all  its  effectiveness  in  spite  of  all 
bravery." 

The  advance  guard  is  to  gain  the  time  and  room  nec- 
essary for  the  deployment  of  its  main  body.  The  artillery 
position  selected  by  the  commander  of  the  force  must,  above 
all  else,  be  secured.  The  advance  guard  may  find  itself  in  a 
situation  that  forces  it  to  overcome  unexpected  resistance 

*It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  German  battalion  of  1,066  men  is  here 
meant. — Translator, 

\DiB  SchlachU  p.  24. 


414  The  Attack. 

quickly,  or  to  hold  captured  supporting  points  stubbornly 
even  against  superior  numbers.  The  artillery  attached  to 
the  advance  guard  may,  with  advantage,  be  used  for  these 
tasks.  In  order  to  keep  the  enemy  in  the  dark  as  to  one's 
intentions  and  dispositions,  it  may  be  advisable  to  post 
the  elements  of  the  advance  guard  artillery  at  wide  intervals 
and  in  masked  positions. 

The  artillery  mast  make  the  best  of  the  terrain  it  finds. 
No  time  should  be  wasted  in  looking  for  ideal  positions. 
Our  improved  laying  apparatus  is  of  great  assistance.  At 
present,  the  governing  principle  is  to  utilize  the  artillery 
fire  power  to  the  utmost  to  sweep  every  spot  of  the  entire  field 
of  battle.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  officer  charged  with  fire  direc- 
tion to  assign  combat  sections  in  such  a  way  as  to  ensure  the 
attainment  of  the  maximum  fire  effect.  It  is  desirable  not 
to  begin  the  artillery  combat  tmtil  the  infantry  is  about  to 
advance,  so  as  to  keep  the  enemy  in  the  dark  as  long  as  pos- 
sible. But  this  design  will  have  to  be  abandoned  when  the 
advance  guard  requires  artillery  support  in  order  to  fulfill 
its  mission,  or  when  an  attempt  is  to  be  made  to  force  the 
enemy's  hand  by  means  of  artillery  fire. 

An  attempt  should  be  made  to  bring  all  the  artillery 
of  the  main  body  into  action  at  once.  But  cases  may  arise 
in  which  the  commander  will  unhesitatingly  send  into  action 
the  successively  arriving  artillery  units,  in  order  to  secure 
an  advantage  gained  by  the  advance  guard  or  to  reap  the 
fruits  of  such  an  advantage.  No  commander  will  volimtarily 
dispense  with  the  assistance  of  his  heavy  artillery,  especially 
when  he  desires  to  make  his  field  artillery  available  for 
carrying  through  the  fire  fight.  The  most  important  target 
of  the  heavy  artillery  is  the  hostile  artillery,  which  will  fre- 
quently take  up  unmasked  positions  so  as  to  get  the  maximxim 
effect  against  moving  infantry  targets.  (Par.  426,  German 
H.  A.  D.  R.).  Observation  is  a  preliminary  condition,  and 
the  commander  of  the  troops  and  the  commander  of  the  artil- 
lery must  cooperate  to  the  end  that  favorable  observation 


Artillery  in  a  Rencontre.  415 

stations  will  not  be  occupied  with  a  fractional  part  of  the 
field  artillery. 

* 'Since  information  in  regard  to  the  enemy's  situation 
and  the  terrain  is  indispensable  to  the  decisions  of  the  com- 
mander, it  is  obvious  that  favorable  observation  points 
will  play  a  prominent  part.  That  these  observation  points 
will  exert  a  powerful  attraction  on  the  hostile  fire  for  these 
very  same  reasons  should  always  be  borne  in  mind,  especially 
by  heavy  artillery.  Accordingly,  the  observation  stations 
of  the  latter  should  be  selected  with  this  in  mind,  and,  if 
time  admits,  protected.  In  a  great  many  cases,  an  observa- 
tion station  not  located  in  the  best  and,  consequently,  most 
conspicuous  locality,  may,  therefore,  be  just  as  useful.*' 

In  a  rencontre,  the  commander  will  frequently  decide 
to  concentrate  his  force  under  cover  of  the  advance  guard, 
which  has  been  reinforced  by  the  artillery,  to  let  the  enemy 
advance,  and  then  to  bring  about  the  decision  by  launching 
all  his  retained  forces  in  one  body.  The  defensive  r61e 
thus  forced  upon  the  commander  generally  lacks  the  advan- 
tages that  would  otherwise  accrue  from  deliberately  choosing 
and  strengthening  a  position. 

During  the  fluctuations  from  offensive  to  defensive  and 
back  again,  a  frontal  fire  fight  ensues,  in  which  the  last  fresh 
forces  turn  the  scale.  Compared  with  the  delibertely 
planned  attack,  the  rencontre  presents  greater  difiiculties  to 
the  commander,  while  it  is  easier  for  the  troops. 

'*If  the  enemy  has  gained  a  start  over  us  in  preparedness 
for  action,  prudence  is  advisable.  The  commander  will 
then  avoid  a  serious  fight  until  an  adequate  force  of  artillery 
is  available."  (Par.  482,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.).  In  actual 
war,  the  commander  and  the  infantry  will  perceive  that  the 
enemy  has  gained  this  start  in  deployment  for  action,  only 
when  superior  hostile  fire  apprises  them  of  the  fact.  Hence, 
this  theoretically  correct  evasion  of  a  fight,  is  confined  to  a 
few  exceptional  cases.  If  it  does  occur,  infantry  that  sud- 
denly finds  itself  in  a  critical  situation  is  justly  entitled  to 


416  The  Attack. 

demand  support  from  artillery.  Batteries  provided  with 
shields  can  be  silenced  in  a  short  time  by  curved  fire 
only.  Moreover,  modem  guns  are  capable,  up  to  a  certain 
point,  of  compensating  an  inferiority  of  numbers  by  an  in- 
creased rate  of  fire. 


3.  THE  ATTACK  ON  AN  ENEMY  DEPLOYED  FOR 

DEFENSE* 

An  enemy  who  does  not  attack,  renounces  the  initiative 
for  the  time  being  and  permits  his  opponent  to  reconnoiter  at 
leisure,  to  make  his  dispositions,  and  to  coordinate  the  ad- 
vance of  his  infantry  with  the  action  of  his  artillery.  In 
difficult  country,  the  attacker  is  at  liberty  to  postpone  his 
advance  until  nightfall.  One  is,  therefore,  justified  to  a 
certain  extent  in  speaking  of  a  ''planned  attack^  Portable 
intrenching  tools  enable  troops  quickly  to  construct  cover 
that  considerably  increases  their  power  of  resistance.  It  is 
important  for  the  commander  of  the  troops  and  the  com- 
mander of  the  artillery  to  decide  whether  the  enemy  really  in- 
tends to  stand  on  the  defensive,  so  as  to  use  the  groimd  to 
the  best  advantage  and  to  let  us  attack,  or  whether  he  simply 
desires  to  make  us  believe — as  the  French  propose  to  do — 
that  he  will  stand  on  the  defensive,  only  to  fall  upon  us 
later,  better  prepared  for  action  than  we  are. 

A  numerical  superiority  in  guns  makes  it  easier  to  gain 
the  victory.  This  superiority  is  obtained  by  latmching  more 
imits  (infantry  divisions)  than  the  enemy,  and  by  bringing 
up  the  artillery  of  organizations  that  are  held  in  reserve  for 
the  time  being.  The  concentric  attack  enables  the  assailant 
to  bring  more  guns  into  action  than  the  defender.  The 
effect  produced  by  the  assailant's  guns  will  be  enhanced, 
moreover,  when  the  defender's  artillery  is  confined  to  a  small 
area. 

An  accurate  knowledge  of  the  hostile  position  upon 
which  to  base  measures  for  the  attack,  can  not  be  gained 


Attack  on  an  Enemy  Deployed  for  Defense.  417 

by  cavalry  reconnaissance  alone.  Masked  batteries  can  be 
recognized  only  under  favorable  conditions.  Smokeless 
powder  enables  the  defender  to  keep  his  dispositions  hidden 
from  hostile  view.  As  a  rule,  it  will  be  necessary  to  launch 
infantry  in  order  to  obtain  the  information  required  as  a 
basis  for  the  decision,  to  determine  the  extent  of  the  hostile 
position  and  to  recognize  any  advanced  posts  to  which  artil- 
lery may  perhaps  have  been  attached.  The  best  plan  would 
be  to  entice  the  enemy  to  open  fire,*  and  to  cause  him  to 
make  movements  that  would  enable  us  to  draw  conclusions 
as  to  the  manner  of  occupation  of  his  position.!  The  re- 
connaissance from  a  distance  is  replaced  by  forced  recon- 
naissance by  fire.  In  this,  the  area  in  which  the  hostile  artil- 
lery is  presumably  located  is  swept  by  decoy  batteries  in 
order  to  induce  a  reply,  or  the  hostile  infantry  position  is 
taken  under  fire.  The  surest  way  to  force  the  enemy  to 
occupy  his  position  and  to  disclose  his  artillery,  is  to  push 
forward  one's  infantry.  While  the  purpose  of  reconnais- 
sance may  be  served  by  surprising  the  enemy  with  artillery, 
the  commander  is  not  justified  in  bringing  artillery  into 
action  at  decisive  ranges  except  when  immediate  advantage 
is  taken  of  the  results  achieved. 

In  this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  examine  how  the  combat  was 
initiated  at  Weiazenburg,  at  Vionville,  at  Verneville  (August  18th,  1870) 
and  at  Beaumont.  In  all  these  cases,  the  hostile  artillery  fire  proved  to  be 
the  best  means  of  alarming  the  troops  that  were  surprised,  t 

To  latmch  the  bulk  of  the  force  prematurely,  before  the 
necessary  information  in  regard  to  the  hostile  main  position 

*At  worth,  on  the  morning  of  August  6th,  1870.  a  battery  attached  to 
Prussian  reconnoiterlng  troops,  opened  fire  at  2,500 — ^3,200  m.  and  Induced  a  French 
mitrailleuse  battery  and  a  light  battery  to  reply,  while  a  number  of  other  hostile 
batteries  and  hostile  infantry  showed  themselves  without,  however,  coming  into 
action.    The  object  of  the  reconnaissance  had  thus  been  gained. 

tAt  the  battle  of  Splcheren.  August  6th,  1870,  a  strong  show  of  artillery 
an  Winter  and  Qalgen  Hills  would,  in  all  likelihood,  have  demonstrated  shortly 
that  we  had  to  deal  not  with  a  retreating  enemy  but  with  one  in  position. 

The  bombardment  of  the  Boer  {positions  at  Magersfontein  and  at  Colenso. 
on  the  other  hand,  did  not.  in  the  least,  affect  the  Boer  measures,  as  the  English 
artillery  was  icept  far  in  rear  and  the  infantry  did  not  advance  to  effective  range. 

XTakHk,  V,  p.  190. 


418  The  Attack. 

has  been  gained,  can  have  nothing  but  a  harmful  effect. 
Before  the  batteries  of  the  main  body  are  sent  into  action, 
data  must  be  obtained  in  regard  to  combat  sections  and  front 
to  be  attacked.  The  reconnaissance  develops  of  itself  into 
the  preparatory  stage  of  the  action,  in  which  the  artillejrr 
bombards  the  hostile  positions  recognized  as  advanced  posts, 
in  order  to  enable  the  infantry  to  capttu^  them.  To  this 
may  be  added,  the  task  of  diverting  the  hostile  fire  from  col- 
umns that  are  in  the  act  of  concentrating.  This  task 
usually  requires  further  reinforcement  of  the  artillery.  In 
any  event,  artillery  must  do  its  utmost  to  draw  the  hostile 
artillery  fire  upon  itself.  By  doing  this,  the  artillery  will 
give  the  infantry  the  necessary  protection  and  support  for 
the  advance.  So  long  as  the  attacking  infantry  is  defenseless 
at  the  mercy  of  hostile  artillery  fire,  the  assailant's  artillery 
must  endeavor  at  least  to  keep  the  defender's  artillery  from 
firing  undisturbed.  The  greater  the  effect  of  the  hostile 
artillery  fire  on  the  attacker's  infantry  and  the  stronger  the 
cover  of  the  defender's  infantry,  the  more  insistently  will 
the  attacker  demand  artillery  support  for  his  infantry. 
From  this  it  follows  that  the  defender's  artillery  will  likewise 
have  to  do  its  utmost  to  prevent  the  batteries  of  the  assail- 
ant from  developing  their  full  fire  power  against  the  de- 
fender's infantry.  *  The  action  of  the  opposing  artillery  forces 
of  throwing  themselves  into  the  breach  for  their  infantry, 
explains  the  existence  of  the  artillery  combat  that  initiates 
a  battle.  As  the  infantry  fight  progresses,  the  artillery 
commander  should  designate  some  parts  of  the  artillery  to 
direct  their  fire  upon  the  hostile  infantry.  (Par.  469, 
German  P.  A.  D.  R.).  The  French  divide  their  artillery 
into  groups  from  the  outset,  according  to  the  task  each  is  to 
perform.  In  the  various  battles  of  the  Franco-German  war, 
the  German  artillery  succeeded  in  thoroughly  defeating  the 
French  artillery  after  short  resistance.  Accordingly,  the 
German  artillery  was  able  to  do  pretty  much  as  it  pleased. 
The  theory  of  the  artillery  duel,  of  the  separation  of  artil- 


Attack  on  an  Enemy  Deployed  for  Defense.  419 

lery  and  infantry  preparation  of  an  attack  is  based  upon  the 
experience  of  the  Franco-German  war.  This  theory  proved 
no  longer  tenable  even  during  the  campaign  of  1877-78, 
and  during  the  Boer  war  (at  Colenso,  Magersfontein,  and 
Paardeberg) .  The  positions  supposedly  held  by  the  enemy 
were  for  days  deluged  by  the  fire  of  numerous  guns,  and  when 
the  infantry  finally  attacked,  the  enemy's  artillery  and  in- 
fantry were  almost  as  strong  as  ever  and  repulsed  the  attack.* 
The  theory  of  the  artillery  duel  is  still  less  tenable  to-day, 
when  gims  equipped  with  shields  can  not  be  silenced  by  flat 
trajectory  guns  alone.  It  is  idle  therefore  to  talk  of  the 
"silence  of  death  reigning"  on  the  side  of  the  vanquished. 
It  is  the  purpose  of  artillery  fire  to  cripple  the  hostile  artil- 
lery, to  "nail"  it  down  to  its  positions,  to  prevent  it  from 
changing  position,  and  to  interfere  with  its  ammunition 
supply  service. 

The  artillery  commander  should  take  his  measures 
with  a  view  to  opening  fire  as  suddenly  as  possible  with  the 
bulk  of  his  batteries.  (Par.  486,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.). 
For  this  reason,  the  orders  for  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy 
and  of  the  terrain  by  artillery  leaders,  and  those  for  bringing 
up  the  artillery,  should  be  issued  as  early  as  possible.  When 
the  situation  does  not  require  that  the  batteries  go  im- 
mediately into  action,  they  remain  posted  in  readiness. 
The  attacker  should  take  care  that  he  does  not  lose  the  ad- 
vantage that  simultaneous  and  sudden  action  of  his  artillery 
gives  him.  The  orders  should  either  indicate  when  the  artil- 
lery is  to  come  into  action,  or  specify  that  all  artillery  units 
govern  their  conduct,  as  regards  time,  by  that  of  a  designated 
unit,  usually  a  regiment.  When  large  forces  and  diversified 
terrain  are  considered,  it  is,  of  course,  not  to  be  expected 
that  all  of  the  batteries  will  be  able  to  go  into  position  at  the 
same  time  and  to  open  up  simultaneously.  But  with  careful 
reconnaissance  work  and  judicious  distribution  of  combat 

*The  last  artillery  duel  occurred  on  the  Yalu.  At  Liaoyang,  on  August  30th, 
1904.  the  Japanese  artillery  bombarded  the  Russian  artillery  for  sixteen  hours 
without  producing  any  result. 


420  The  Attack. 

sections  and  objectives,  discrepancies  in  time  will  be  pro- 
protionately  small. 

During  the  Franeo»G«nn«n  %rar  the  inefficiency  of  the  French 
batteriee  enabled  the  Gennans  to  mass  their  artillery  little  by  little,  a  weak 
artillery  force  being  able  to  hold  its  own  against  superior  numbers.  The 
4th  Light  Battery,  12th  German  F.  A.,  moved  through  Lacretelle  (battle  of 
Sedan),  and  at  a  range  of  1,860  m.  held  its  own  against  the  fire  of  six 
French  batteries.* 

The  longer  the  range  f  at  which  the  fight  is  initiated,  the 
more  impenetrable  will  be  the  veil  that  hides  the  dispositions 
of  the  enemy,  and  the  more  must  the  advantage  of  the  pre- 
paredness for  action  of  the  defender's  artillery  come  into  play. 
Diffictilties  of  observation  are  felt  most  on  the  attacker's  side 
and  impart  to  long  range  fire  more  the  character  of  a  contain- 
ing cannonade. 

During  the  artillery  combat,  the  artillery  of  the  attack 
should  not  come  to  such  close  range  as  to  give  the  artillery 
of  the  defense  too  great  an  advantage.  The  necessity  of 
obtaining  an  adequate  effect  against  the  well  masked  hostile 
artillery,  whose  position  is  usually  difficult  to  recognize, 
determines  the  range  beyond  which  it  is  not  profitable  for 
artillery  to  fire.  At  ranges  over  4,000  m.,  one  can  count 
upon  crippling  the  hostile  artillery  under  favorable  conditions 
only,  and  by  expending  a  large  amotmt  of  ammtmition.  But 
the  fire  of  a  superior  number  of  gtms  should  be  able,  in  any 
case,  to  coimterbalance  the  preparations  made  by  the  de- 
fender. The  advantages  possessed  by  the  defender  dwindle 
as  the  range  decreases,  and  are  compensated  by  the  attacker's 
superior  number  of  gtms.  With  modem  materiel  and  means 
for  observation,  the  first  position  of  the  attacking  artillery 
might,  therefore,  be  located  anywhere  from  3,000  to  4,000  m. 
from  the  enemy. 

^HoFFBAUVR.  Deutseh€  ArtiUeru,  VIII,  pp.  28  and  38. 
tdee  p.  340,  9upra, 


Attack  on  an  Enemy  Deployed  for  Defense.    421 

At  the  battle  of  Gravelotte,  the  frontage  of  anny  corps 
varied  from  2.5  to  4  km.  In  rencontre  fights,  the  frontage 
was  greater,  the  Hid  Army  Corps  at  Vionville,  for  example, 
covering  a  front  of  4.5  km.  The  twenty-four  batteries  of  an 
army  corps  at  present  cover  a  front  of  2,500  m.  At  the  battle 
of  Gravelotte,  August  18th,  1870,  some  of  the  batteries  of 
the  lid  Army  Corps  were  unable  to  come  into  action  on  ac- 
count of  lack  of  room,  and  others  moved  their  guns  into 
the  small  intervals  between  the  gims  of  the  artillery  of  the 
Vllth  Army  Corps.  In  the  latter  corps,  Ukewise,  three 
batteries  (the  3d  and  4th  Light  and  the  3d  Horse)  were  held 
back  in  rear  of  the  village  of  Gravelotte  on  account  of  lack 
of  room.*  On  the  east  front  at  Sedan,  the  problem  of  finding 
room  for  the  artillery  was  much  more  diflficult.  Of  the  artil- 
lery of  the  fotu-  army  corps  (Guard,  IVth,  and  Xllth,  and 
1st  Bavarian  Army  Corps)  engaged  there,  nineteen  batteries 
were  unable  to  go  into  action  for  want  of  room,  f 

If  the  army  corps  had  had  as  much  artillery  at  that  time 
as  they  have  at  present,  51  batteries,  i.  e.,  more  than  half 
of  the  entire  artillery,  would  have  found  no  room  for  coming 
into  action.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  more  force  was  employed 
than  was  necessary. 

For  the  passage  of  Infantry  through  Artillery  Lines,  see 
Tactics,  I,  Krueger's  translation,  p.  316. 

For  Changes  of  position,  see  p.  364,  supra. 

"As  soon  as  the  commander  of  the  artillery  has  been 
informed  by  the  commander  of  the  troops  against  what  point 
the  decisive  attack  is  to  be  made,  or  in  case  he  himself  per- 
ceives this,  an  overwhelming  fire,  if  practicable,  from  flank- 
ing positions,  should  be  concentrated  against  it.  Then  and 
not  later,  any  artillery  tmits  that  may  have  been  retained, 
should  be  brought  into  action."  (Par.  47,  German  P.  A.  D, 
R.).  An  artillery  tmit  will  find  it  difficult  to  adjust  its  fire 
upon  a  point  that  is  already  being  fired  upon  by  other 

*Ge8chichte  des  FeldartUUriereoimenU  Nr,  7,  p.  248. 
fKuNz.  Kri€g8ii€tehleMH€hs  BeispUtt,  6.  p.  7. 


422  The  Attack. 

artillery  units.     Pauses  in  the  firing  will  frequently  have  to 
be  made  and  utilized  for  this  ptirpose. 

"While  the  infantry  gradually  draws  within  assaulting 
distance  of  the  enemy,  the  fire  of  the  attacker's  artillery 
must  continuously  contribute  to  shake  the  defender's  in- 
fantry. The  batteries  that  can  be  spared  from  this  duty 
should  keep  down  the  fire  of  the  hostile  artillery  that  is 
firing  against  the  attacking  infantry.  If  new  hostile  bat- 
teries, or  others  that  have  been  silenced  but  come  again 
into  action,  turn  against  the  attacking  artillery,  the  latter 
should  combat  them  only  to  the  extent  that  it  can  do  so 
without  diminishing  the  support  afforded  its  infantry 
(Par.  471,  German  P.  A.  D.  R.). 


«    *    *» 


General  Langlois  estimates  that  the  preparation  of  an  infantry 
attack  against  the  objectives  mentioned  will  require  the  following  number 
"of  rounds  of  shrapnel  per  meter  of  front  attacked: 

Shelter  trenches 3    — 4     rounds  of  shrapnel  (o6tt8  d  miiraUle  (90  mm.) 

Edge  of  village 2^—3 

Edge  of  woods 2    — 2K     " 

Uncovered  position.l     — l}i 


ff  >» 


The  heavy  field  artillery  should  direct  its  fire  against 
hostile  batteries  that  are  recognizable  and  that  are  also  being 
combated  by  the  field  artillery.  Hostile  batteries  that  are 
able  to  bring  effective  fire  to  bear  on  the  attacking  troops 
should  by  all  means  be  rendered  harmless.  As  soon  as  this 
has  been  accomplished,  the  heavy  batteries  should  direct 
their  fire  upon  that  part  of  the  hostile  position  which  has 
been  designated  as  the  point  of  attack.  The  principal  task 
of  heavy  artillery  consists  of  making  the  field  artillery  avail- 
able as  quickly  as  possible  for  combating  the  hostile  in- 
fantry. The  more  batteries  we  succeed  in  relieving  from  the 
artillery  combat  and  turning  against  the  point  of  attack,  the 
better. 

A  clear  conception  of  the  situation  is  requisite  to  enable 
one  to  decide  at  the  very  start,  how  many  batteries  will  be 
required  to  keep  down  the  defender's  artillery,  so  that  prompt 


Attack  on  an  Enemy  Deployed  for  Defense.  423 

success  may  be  assured,  as  more  batteries  than  are  abso- 
lutely essential  to  perform  the  first  task  must  not  be  with- 
drawn from  the  second  and  most  important  task,  that  of 
firing  on  the  point  of  attack.  It  is  an  advantage  when  the 
point  of  attack  can  be  bombarded  from  a  commanding  or,  if 
practicable,  flanking  position,  since  a  change  of  position 
will  then  be  unnecessary  so  long  as  the  conditions  necessary 
for  certain  fire  control  make  it  possible  to  distinguish  friend 
from  foe,  and  there  is  no  danger  of  the  fire  endangering  one's 
own  troops.  As  soon  as  the  attacking  troops  get  close  to  the 
hostile  position,  the  artillery  should  likewise  sweep  the  ground 
in  rear  of  it,  in  order  to  make  it  more  difficult  for  the  enemy 
to  bring  up  his  reserves.  Judicious  distribution  of  duties 
between  various  artillery  units  in  action  is  one  of  the  most 
important  tasks  of  the  higher  artillery  commanders.  It 
requires  that  the  latter  possess  full  information  of  the  inten- 
tions of  the  commander  of  the  troops  and  that  they  correctly 
estimate  the  tactical  situation. 

The  commander  of  the  artillery  will  finally  have  to 
designate  a  part  of  his  force  for  the  duty  of  keeping  down  the 
hostile  artillery.  The  unit  designated  should,  if  necessary, 
develop  its  full  fire  power  for  the  purpose,  or  remain  in  readi- 
ness for  combating  newly  appearing  hostile  batteries.  The 
bulk  of  the  field  and  heavy  artillery  should  be  used  for  di- 
rectly preparing  the  infantry  attack. 

The  crises  that  occur  in  every  battle  are  best  overcome 
by  boldly  launching  the  artillery  into  action.  It  may  there- 
fore even  be  advisable  for  single  batteries  or  even  single  pla- 
toons to  advance  to  the  closest  effective  range  for  the  purpose 
of  accompanying  the  infantry  attack*  It  is  immaterial 
whether  the  artillery  fires  at  2,000  or  at  1,000  m.  as  there 
is  virtually  no  difference  in  its  fire  effect  at  the  two  ranges. 

♦Examples:  Kwz,  KrieosgesehichtlicheBeispiele,  7. —  Weiszenburg:  let  and 
2d  Light  Batteries,  and  3d  Heavy  Battery  5th  F.  A.  Kunz.  ibid.,  p.  4. — Balck, 
WORTH. — Kunz,  ibid.,  p.  Q  (this  Is  very  instructive). — Colombey:  5th  Heavy  Bat- 
tery 7th  F.  A. — Kunz,  ibid.,  p.  10.  The  artillery  of  the  1st  Division  at  Bellecroix, 
p.  11.  PnissiaQ  batteries  going  into  position  at  St.  Hubert  (August  18th.  1870), 
KuNS,  ibid,,  p  23. 


424  The  Attack. 

If  the  batteries  remain  at  long  ranges,  they  are  apt  to  lose 
touch  with  the  advancing  infantry,  in  consequence  of  which 
they  will  be  endangered  more  than  would  otherwise  be  the 
case,  and  will  come  too  late  to  occupy  a  captured  position. 
The  batteries  that  follow  the  infantry  constitute  supporting 
points  in  case  of  a  reverse.  They  will  be  able  to  arrive  in 
the  captured  position  close  upon  the  heels  of  the  victorious 
infantry  and  will  secure  the  position.  It  is  scarcely  to  be 
expected  that  artillery  fire  from  a  position  far  in  rear  will 
repel  an  offensive  return  made  simultaneously  and  ener- 
getically all  along  the  line  after  the  taking  of  the  position,  when 
it  is  remembered  that  observation  of  this  fire  is  made  very 
difficult,  especially  in  close  country,  because  friendly  troops 
are  closely  engaged  with  the  enemy.  Artillery  that  is  3,000 
m.  away  from  the  hostile  position  and  does  not  limber  up 
until  the  moment  the  assault  begins,  throws  upon  its  infantry 
the  entire  burden  imposed  by  this  situation.  Retiring 
infantry  will  usually  not  find  the  support  necessary  to  enable 
it  to  face  again  to  the  front  until  it  reaches  its  own  line  of 
guns.  The  moral  effect  produced  on  the  infantry  by  artil- 
lery that  follows  upon  its  heels  should  not  be  underestimated. 
"What  matters  it,  if  the  battery  is  disabled  temporarily,  so 
long  as  the  thunder  and  lightning  of  its  gims  close  at  hand 
electrifies  the  infantry  to  charge  or  induces  it  to  hold  the 
position.  After  the  victory  is  won,  the  battery  will  again 
come  to  life,  for  its  gtms  still  remain  intact.  But,  if  the 
sacrifice  was  made  in  vain,  the  artillery  that  remained  till  the 
last  will  have  covered  the  retreat  of  its  infantry.  After 
such  a  brave  fight,  its  capture,  though  a  bitter  loss,  will  be  a 
glorious  end." 

The  demand  that  artillery  accompany  the  infantry 
attack,  is  based  principally  on  the  lessons  of  the  Franco- 
German  war.  It  dates  from  the  time  when  artillery  fire 
superiority  was  looked  upon  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the 
success  of  any  attack,  and  when  the  attacking  artillery, 
after  fulfilling  this  task,  could  take  any  liberties  it  pleased. 


Attack  on  an  Enemy  Deployed  for  Defense.    425 

The  French  count  strongly  upon  their  accompanying  bat- 
teries {batteries  d* accompagnement) ,  but  their  employment  is 
practicable  only  when  the  terrain  permits  an  advance.  Even 
in  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  the  artillery  refrained  from  ac- 
companying the  infantry  attack  when  the  ground  was  open, 
because  such  an  operation  was  bound  to  lead  to  useless 
losses.  Mountain  and  machine  guns  endeavored  to  perform 
the  duty  that  had  formerly  been  assigned  to  field  batteries, 
and  such  guns  are  able  to  occupy  positions  that  artillery  can 
not  reach.  This  is  still  more  true  since  gun  shields  have  been 
introduced.  A  few  effective  gtms  of  the  defender's  artillery 
are  at  present  capable  of  crippling  whole  advancing  batteries.* 

It  is  impossible  to  state  specifically  how  closely  these 
batteries  should  approach  the  enemy,  as  this  will  depend 
largely  upon  the  character  of  the  grotmd.  On  level  ground, 
the  batteries  should  advance  to  within  about  1,000  m.  of  the 
hostile  position.  At  ranges  tmder  1,000  m.,  firing  over  the 
heads  of  the  infantry  is  attended  with  some  risk.  The  new 
artillery  position  should  be  reconnoitered  beforehand — ^just 
as  is  done  in  any  other  change  of  position — ^with  special 
reference  to  the  position  of  friendly  infantry,  f  When  this 
is  not  done,  especially  when  the  batteries  accompany  the  in- 
fantry across  a  valley,  they  may  run  upon  the  hostile  position 
without  being  able  to  find  a  field  of  fire,  or  may  hamper  their 
own  infantry. 

As  each  change  of  position  interrupts  the  firing,  and  as 
the  hostile  artillery  must  not  be  given  an  opportunity 
to  open  effective  fire,  more  batteries  than  are  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  purpose,  should  not  be  brought  forward 
to  accompany  the  infantry.  Batteries  that  occupy  the  poor- 
est positions,  and  batteries  that  still  have  adequate  teams 
are  first  considered  in  connection  with  this  duty. 

*Seethe  essay  of  General  Richtbr  in  ArtilleHstUche  Monatshefte,  IX.  1007,  p. 
249.  The  author  suggests  that  guns  mounted  on  automobiles  accompany  the  in- 
fantry. 

t Advance  of  the  artillery  of  the  1st  Infantry  Division  across  the  valley  of  the 
VaUidres  brook  near  la  Planchette  (battle  of  Colombey).  The  batteries  unllmbered 
when  300  m.  in  rear  of  their  infantry,  and  successfully  fought  hostile  skirmishers  at 
ranges  varying  flrom  900  to  1,000  paces.     Hoffbauxr,  Deutsche  ArtiUerie,  III.  p.  81. 


426  The  Attack. 

At  Elsaszhauaen  (battle  of  Worth),  the  victorious  German  infantry 
was  attacked  by  fresh  French  troops  and  thrown  back.  The  French 
attack  was  finally  stopped  by  the  fire  of  three  batteries  of  the  Xlth  Army 
Corps,  and  the  gallant  forward  movement  was  succeeded  by  wild  flight. 

At  Vionville,  batteries  of  the  Xth  Army  Corps — Lancelle's  (2d) 
Heavy  Battery,  Richard's  (6th)  Light  Battery,  and  Berendt's  (5th)  Light 
Battery — covered  the  retreat  of  Wedell's  Brigade  after  its  attack  had  been 
repulsed  by  the  French.  The  batteries  lost  heavily.  Berendt's  Battery 
did  not  withdraw  until  the  last  of  the  infantry  came  abreast  of  it,  and  then 
the  only  thing  that  enabled  it  to  limber  up  at  all  was  the  charge  made  by 
the  1st  Escadron  of  Dragoons  of  the  Guard. 

When  the  infantry  attack  has  failed,  the  artillery, 
especially  that  which  is  farthest  advanced,  must  cover  the 
withdrawal  of  the  infantry.  The  latter  usually  halts  when 
it  reaches  these  advanced  batteries. 

It  is  only  when  the  infantry  rushes  forward  to  the  assault 
that  the  artillery  can  think  of  changing  position,  for  then 
the  defender's  guns  have  more  important  work  to  do  than  to 
pay  attention  to  a  few  advancing  batteries.  But  available 
cover  should  be  utilized  anyhow,  because  the  ground  in  rear 
of  th  eadvancing  infantry  is  endangered  by  hostile  shots. 

While  burst  of  fire  and  advance  alternate,  the  infantry 

worms  itelf  closer  and  closer  to  the  enemy's  position.     When 

the  ground  is  level  and  time  fire  is  used,  artillery  can,  at  all 

events,  furnish  this  support  until  the  infantry  gets  within  300 

m.   of  the  enemy's  position,  and  when  percussion  fire  is 

used,  until  the  infantry  gets  within  about  150  m.  of  the 

enemy's  position.     But  then,  at  the  most  critical  moment, 

the  support  rendered  by  the  artillery  ceases;  it  can  only 

direct  its  fire  upon  the  ground  in  rear  of  the  hostile  position 
and  interfere  with  the  movement  of  hostile  reserves,   and 

the  infantry  has  to  bear  the  bnmt  of  the  action.  In  the 
opening  fights  of  the  Boer  War,  the  advancing  infantry  was 
supported  by  the  fire  of  its  artillery  until  it  approached  to 
within  300  or  400  m.  of  the  enemy,  when  that  fire  was  discon- 
tinued. As  a  result,  the  attacks  failed.  Much  is  at  stake, 
and  the  infantry  must  expect  to  have  a  few  short  shots  burst 
in  its  ranks.     (See  p.  343,  supra) . 


Attack  on  an  Enemy  Deployed  for  Defense.  427 

In  preparing  the  assault,  it  may  be  a  good  plan  after  the 
hostile  position  has  been  vigorously  bombarded,  and  pro- 
vided both  arms  are  working  in  complete  harmony,  to  shift 
the  fire  occasionally  to  the  ground  in  rear  of  the  hostile 
position,  to  let  the  enemy  resume  his  fire,  and  then  to  batter 
him  again  with  fire.  In  case  the  assault  succeeds,  all  the 
artillery  that  is  still  able  to  move,  should  quickly  hurry  into 
the  captured  position. 

"As  soon  as  the  infantry  has  penetrated  into  the  position,  part  of 
the  batteries  should  hurry  forward  into  the  captured  position  to  assist 
the  infantry  in  holding  it.  In  such  a  case,  the  artillery  should  executa  the 
change  of  position  independently.  The  remaining  batteries  should  con- 
tinue to  fire  on  the  retreating  enemy.  If  he  gets  out  of  effective  range, 
they  should  move  after  him  at  a  rapid  gait,  should  deluge  him  with  fire  and 
should  prevent  him  from  halting  and  reforming.  At  this  moment,  when  all 
the  troops  press  forward  to  the  captured  position  and  all  energies  must  be 
bent  upon  robbing  the  enemy  of  the  last  remnant  of  resistance,  every  con- 
sideration of  distribution  and  maintaining  units  intact  is  forced  into  the 
background."     (Par.  473,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.). 

The  artillery  will  find  clearly  visible  targets  only  by 
moving  into  the  captured  position.  The  thunder  of  its  guns 
coming  directly  out  of  the  hostile  lines  will  not  fail  to  produce 
an  effect  on  the  troops  that  are  still  struggling.  The  bat- 
teries that  have  advanced  into  the  hostile  position  will 
therefore  have  to  protect  the  infantry  as  it  reforms,  repel 
offensive  returns,  and  engage  hostile  batteries  that  attempt 
to  interfere  with  the  occupation  of  the  captured  position. 
While  the  fight  continued  to  rage  within  the  village  of  St. 
Privat,  a  tremendous  mass  of  artillery  was  being  formed 
on  the  heights  south-west  and  north-east  of  that  village.  It 
is  not  difficult  to  imagine  what  the  course  of  the  battle  at 
this  point  would  have  been  if  Picard's  Grenadier  Division 
(French)  had  arrived  on  the  scene  in  time  and  had  taken  a 
hand  in  the  fight.  During  the  battle  of  Worth,  such  an 
offensive  return  was  actually  made  at  Elsaszhausen  by  the 
French,  and  a  German  battery  was  involved  in  the  resulting 
retrograde  movement,  but  the  French  advance  was  shattered 


428  The  Attack. 

by  the  fire  of  the  other  German  batteries.*  The  French 
contemplate  making  such  oflfensive  returns  even  to-day.  In 
such  a  critical  situation,  they  reason,  something  must  be 
risked.  In  case  the  attack  fails,  it  is,  above  all  else,  essential 
to  impart  to  the  infantry  the  necessary  stamina  to  face  again 
to  the  front,  and  to  beat  back  the  hostile  pursuit. 

Victory  is  followed  by  the  pursuit,  in  which  the  artil- 
lery, owing  to  its  latent  power,  is  able  to  do  particularly 
effective  work.  In  pursuit,  every  available  gun  must  be 
employed  at  the  most  effective  range.  While  a  part  of  the 
artillery  still  deluges  the  enemy  with  a  hail  of  fire,  the  re- 
mainder, in  conjunction  with  the  pursuing  infantry  or  cav- 
alry, must  push  after  the  enemy  and  open  fire  at  once  when 
the  artillery  that  remained  behind  loses  sight  of  the  targets. 
In  this  way  the  enemy  is  prevented  from  making  a  stand 
and  from  reforming  his  troops,  and  his  defeat  may  be  con- 
verted into  rout,  f  The  conduct  of  a  vigorous  ptu*suit  re- 
quires all  the  energy  of  which  the  leaders  are  possessed.  At 
such  a  time,  they  must  demand  the  impossible  almost, 
and  should  not  shrink  from  treating  their  troops  with  severity* 
Artillery  commanders  should  not  await  orders  for  changing 
position.  They  should  anticipate  the  orders  of  the  com- 
manders of  the  troops,  for  the  latter  will  usually  not  give 
orders  other  than  to  advance,  and  an  order  to  halt  will  always 
arrive  soon  enough.  It  will  often  be  a  good  plan  to  fire  on 
the  most  distant  hostile  troops,  as  these  will  be  most  easily 
thrown  into  confusion.  J     It  will  frequently  be  impracticable 

♦Balck-Kunz,  ScMacht  von  Wdrth,  p.  130. 

tCLAFSBWiTZ,  On  War,  IV.  Chapter  12:  "Nothing  makes  a  worae  impres- 
sion on  a  soldier,  than  for  the  thunder  of  the  hostile  guns  to  become  audible  again 
at  the  very  moment  when  he  is  about  to  compose  himself  to  rest  after  a  hard  march. 
When  this  is  repeated  for  some  time,  day  after  day.  It  may  produce  a  panic  This 
iS  invariably  an  admission  that  one  is  forced  to  obey  the  dictates  of  the  enemy  and  is 
incapable  of  offering  resistance :  this  consciousness  Is  bound  to  undermine  the  morale 
of  the  army."' 

tJapanese  Regulations:  "After  an  action  that  has  been  fought  to  a  successful 
conclusion,  the  artillery  should  pursue  the  enemy  with  fire,  which  should  be  dis- 
continued in  case  of  absolute  necessity  only.  An  attempt  should  be  made  to  fire 
first  upon  the  head  of  the  retreating  hostile  columns,  so  that  the  other  parts  of  these 
columns  may  be  damaged  as  soon  as  they  enter  the  tone  of  fire.  In  pursuit.  It  Is  fre- 
quently within  the  province  even  of  battery  commanders,  to  order  any  change  of 
position  that  may  become  necessary.  Enfilading  fire  may  produce  a  decisive  effect. 
But  care  should  always  be  exercised  to  prevent  running  out  of  ammunition." 


Attack  on  Fortified  Positions.  429 

to  keep  organizations  intact.  It  will  likewise  be  no  longer 
possible  to  issue  orders  to  each  tinit  for  changing  position. 
To  advance  rapidly  is  the  only  mandate.  Flanking  fire 
is  especially  effective.  Horse  artillery  operating  with 
cavalry  is  particxilarly  adapted  for  exerting  a  pressure  on  the 
line  of  retreat  of  the  enemy.  There  is  no  time  for  careful 
reconnaissance  and  for  taking  up  covered  positions;  a  bold 
advance  even  beyond  the  infantry  line  is  in  order.  All  this 
changes  as  soon  as  the  enemy  takes  up  a  rallying  position. 
The  pursuit  then  again  resolves  itself  into  an  attack.  To  be 
sure,  one  will  not  have  to  proceed  as  cautiously  as  when  con- 
fronted by  a  fresh  opponent,  and  one  can  confidently  expect 
that  the  enemy  will  not  hold  his  ground  very  long  as  a  rule. 
But  if,  on  this  account,  one  were  entirely  to  disregard  proper 
caution,  one  might  experience  an  unpleasant  reverse. 

During  a  pursuit,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that 
ammunition  be  brought  up,  in  order  that  the  artillery  may 
not  find  itself  in  the  anomalous  position  of  being  on  hand  but 
unable  to  fire.  In  a  ptu*suit  on  a  large  scale,  the  higher 
artillery  commanders  should  give  this  matter  their  special 
attention. 


4-    THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF  ARTILLERY  IN  THE 
ATTACK  ON  FORTIFIED  POSITIONS,* 

A  fortified  field  position  consists  of  shelter  trenches  of 
low  relief,  cut  deep  enough  to  afford  protection  to  the  oc- 
cupants against  artillery  fire  when  they  themselves  are  not 


*Par8.  488-500.  German  F.  A.  D.  R.  and  pars.  440-460.  Qerman  H.  A.  D.  R. 
Cf.  Taktik,  V.  p.  237  and  historical  rteumfi  of  the  views  entertained  in  regard  to 
the  employment  of  artillery  against  fortified  positions,  p.  248. — General  von  Hoff- 
BAi^R,  German  Artillery.  Zur  Verwendung  der  Haubitzen  im  Feld  und  Positions- 
kriege,  Berlin.  1901. — Captain  Krisak.  Angriff  auf  befestigU  Feldstellungen,  Berlin. 
1901.  (This  contains  complete  solution  of  a  map  problem). — Major  Mktbr, 
Artilleristische  Erkundung  (einer  befestigten  Feldstellung  fUr  den  Zweck  der  FustarHh 
Isrie)*  Berlin.  1901. — Lieutenant-General  Rohnb.  Die  Mittoirkung  der  Artilleris 
beim  Angriff  auf  eine  befestigte  Feldstellung,  Supplement  6  and  7  to  Militdr'  Wochen* 
blatt,  1901.  (This  contains  a  theoretical  discussion  and  a  map  problem). — Colonel 
VOQ  GianrcKi,  Der  Kampf  um  befestigte Feldstellungen,  1901 .  (Problem  and  Initiation 
of  the  attack).  Major  Hoppbnbtbdt,  Der  Kampf  um  befestigte  Feldstellungen, 
Berlin.  I90fi. 


430  The  Attack. 

firing,  and  permitting  of  easy  lateral  communication. 
Splinter-proofs  may  be  constructed  when  additional  protec- 
tion  is  desired.  These  afford  protection  against  the  shells 
of  flat  trajectory  guns  and  against  the  shrapnel  of  curved 
fire  guns  of  medium  caliber.  To  the  foregoing  shelter  for  the 
firing  line  should  be  added  cover  trenches  for  the  supports^ 
breastworks  and  expedients  for  the  comfort  of  the  troops 
when  the  position  is  occupied  for  any  length  of  time.  To  the 
latter  category  belong  latrines,  cooking  pits,  dressing  stations, 
wind  shields  constructed  of  shelter  tents,  etc.,  etc.  It  is 
likewise  desirable  to  construct  obstacles  that  force  the  enemy 
to  employ  pioneers  to  clear  the  ground  before  he  can  assault. 
Similar  preparations  are  made  for  protecting  the  artillery. 
Under  favorable  conditions,  defenses  against  which  the  fire 
of  flat  trajectory  guns  will  be  powerless  can  be  constructed 
by  an  infantry  division  in  about  eight  hours.  This  means 
that  a  fortified  field  position  has  been  created,  in  the  attack 
of  which  the  assailant  requires  the  vigorous  cooperation  of 
heavy  guns  to  annihilate  the  hostile  artillery  and  to  batter 
the  point  of  attack.  When  such  a  position  is,  in  addition, 
provided  with  obstacles,  it  can  not  be  taken  by  assault 
without  the  aid  of  pioneers.  The  characteristic  features 
of  such  a  position  are  its  strength  in  front,  the  inconspicuous- 
ness  of  all  its  works,  and  its  security  against  direct  fire,  but 
on  the  other  hand,  the  weakness  of  its  flanks  and  the  sen- 
sitiveness of  its  rearward  communications  owing  to  the 
meagre  mobility  of  the  defenders.  It  would  be  a  mistake, 
however,  to  attack  every  position  strengthened  by  shelter 
trenches  as  one  would  attack  a  fortified  field  position.  This 
would  be  necessary  only  when  the  defensive  works  are  pro- 
vided with  obstacles,  splinter-proofs,  and  cover  trenches  and 
afford  complete  protection  to  the  defenders  when  they  are 
resting.  A  defender  attacked  with  inadequate  forces,  may 
perhaps  not  have  strengthened  his  position  in  this  manner 
until  he  has  learned  the  necessity  therefor  while  repelling 
the  attack.     This  was  true  at  Plevna,  on  the  north-west 


Attack  on  Fortified  Positions.  431 

front  at  Port  Arthur,  and  at  203  Meter  Hill.  The  assailant 
will  rarely,  at  the  very  start,  know  of  the  presence  of  such  a 
position,  and  it  is  to  the  defender's  interest  to  prevent  the 
hostile  reconnaissance,  to  make  the  works  inconspicuous  by 
throwing  up  low  parapets  only,  and  to  mislead  the  assailant 
by  constructing  dummy  intrenchments  and  masks.  The  order 
for  the  attack  on  the  position  recognized  as  the  main  posi- 
tion, will  then  have  to  be  based  upon  and  delevop  from  the 
failure  of  the  troops  initiating  the  fight. 

*  There  is  considerable  difference  in  the  strength  of 
fortified  field  positions,  depending  upon  whether  they  have 
been  fortified  superficially,  or  whether  several  days  have 
been  spent  in  strengthening  them  with  all  the  means  avail- 
able.  The  attack  of  such  positions  will  differ  accordingly. 
It  will  frequently  be  impossible  to  approach  the  hostile 
position  except  under  cover  of  darkness.  Large  combats 
of  position  may  last  several  days."  (Pars.  440  and  441, 
German  H.  A.  D.  R.).  The  stronger  the  position,  the  more 
extensive  the  preparations,  and  the  more  protracted  the 
fight,  which  in  many  cases  will  last  a  number  of  days. 

The  attack  should  seek  to  bring  such  a  concentric  fire 
to  bear  on  the  part  of  the  hostile  position  designated  as  the 
point  to  be  attacked,  that  the  advantage  accruing  to  the  de- 
fense through  preparation  of  a  selected  battlefield  will  be 
neutralized.  The  sooner  the  assailant  gains  his  object,  the 
better.  But  when  opposed  by  an  energetic  defender,  noth- 
ing will  be  left  to  the  attacker  but  to  utilize  darkness  for 
his  advance,  and  daylight  for  battering  the  enemy.  The  plan 
of  attack  is  based  upon  extensive  reconnaissance  that  each 
arm  makes  according  to  its  particular  needs.  Success  is 
assured  only  by  a  planned,  detailed  reconnaissance  whose 
results  are  arranged  and  classified  at  headquarters.  But  the 
defender  will  not  without  a  fight  permit  the  attacker  to  re- 
connoiter,  and  the  latter  will  be  compelled  to  employ  a  strong 
force  in  order  to  gain  favorable  observation  points.  (Pars. 
406  and  373,  German  I.  D.  R.).*    As  hostile  advance  troops 

*See  Balck,  NachtgeftchU  iind  NachtH^nQti^  Berlin.  1010. 


432  The  Attack. 

will  oppose  this  reconnaissance  and  as  it  will  be  difficult, 
even  with  the  best  glasses,  to.  find  the  works  of  the  defender, 
an  idea  of  the  situation  will  be  gained  gradually  only.  When 
the  hostile  position  is  extensive,  it  will  be  a  good  plan  to 
divide  the  ground  occupied  by  the  enemy  into  sections  for 
the  purpose  of  reconnaissance. 

It  is,  in  the  first  place,  important  to  ascertain  by  balloon 
reconnaissance,  or  imder  cover  of  cavalry  that  is  pushed 
forward,  the  extent  of  the  position,  the  location  of  its  flanks, 
and  whether  they  rest  on  impassable  obstacles,  and  to  deter- 
mine whether  the  enemy  is  holding  the  foreground  with  ad- 
vanced troops  or  is  confining  himself  to  his  prepared  posi- 
tions. Important  conclusions  may  be  drawn  from  the  fact 
that  the  enemy  is  observed  to  be  intrenching  or  collecting 
troops  in  rear  of  his  position.  The  hostile  fire  sets  a  limit 
to  the  reconnaissance  work  of  cavalry  and  artillery  patrols 
toward  the  front.  But  the  defender  will,  likewise,  endeavor 
to  prevent  the  patrols  of  the  assailant  from  ascertaining 
where  the  flanks  of  the  position  rest  and  by  the  fire  of  small 
infantry  detachments  force  the  troopers  of  the  assailant 
to  make  more  and  more  extensive  turning  movements. 
Nevertheless,  information  must  be  gained  either  by  dis- 
motmting  troopers  and  letting  them  gain  good  points  of 
observation  on  foot,  or  by  force  with  the  carbine  or  the  lance. 
If  the  cavalry  does  not  succeed  in  solving  this  problem, 
nothing  remains  but  to  resort  to  a  forced  reconnaissance  with 
infantry  and  artillery.  The  defender  could  not  commit  a 
greater  blunder  than  to  reply  to  this  artillery  fire,  which  can 
have  no  other  object  than  that  of  reconnaissance,  imless  he 
desires  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  assailant  to  points  at 
which  a  serious  defense  is  not  contemplated.  In  most  cases, 
accurate  information  in  regard  to  the  strength  with  which 
the  position  is  held  and  the  disposition  of  the  defender's 
artillery,  will  not  be  gained  until  the  attack  is  initiated, 
until  the  infantry  advances,  forces  back  the  covering  troops 
and  captures  advanced  positions.       The    defender    will, 


Attack  on  Fortified  Positions.  433 

however,  frequently  let  his  artillery  fire  from  positions 
that  are  not  to  be  occupied  at  all  during  the  real  defense. 
The  desire  to  keep  the  artillery  out  of  action  until  the  situation 
is  cleared  up  is  not  always  capable  of  fulfillment,  for  field 
and  heavy  artillery  will  often  have  to  be  sent  into  action 
for  the  very  purpose  of  clearing  it  up,  and  to  break  down  re- 
sistance offered  by  the  enemy  in  villages. 

The  reconnaissance  is  to  determine  above  all  else,  the 
location  of  the  hostile  main  position,  to  identify  masks  and 
dummy  intrenchments,  and  to  ascertain  the  position  of 
machine  guns  and  searchlights.  According  to  the  Firing 
Regulations  for  Heavy  Artillery  (pars.  78  and  84),  the  artil- 
lery reconnaissance  is  to  determine — 

"The  type  and  extent  of  the  hostile  artillery  position — 
whether  the  artillery  is  posted  in  rear  of  a  crest  (distance  in 
rear)  or  in  the  open,  in  echelon  or  in  line;  the  position  of 
obstacles,  other  troops,  reserves,  higher  staffs,  signal  and 
telegraph  stations,  and  machine  guns;  movements  of  any 
kind ;  the  location  and  extent  of  shelter  trenches  and  other 
field  works  and  the  presence  of  overhead  cover  and  obstacles ; 
the  character  of  the  terrain  in  the  vicinity  of  the  targets ; 
balloons  and  balloon  ascension  stations.  It  is  important  to 
identify  masks  and  dummy  intrenchments.  In  all  cases,  it 
must  be  specified  what  parts  of  the  targets  it  is  most  import- 
ant to  combat,  and  what  parts  are  most  favorable  for  the 
purposes  of  observation. 

'Troperly  fortified  positions  appear  as  fine  lines  that 
closely  follow  the  contour  of  the  groimd.  Conclusions  as  to 
the  location  and  extent  of  such  positions  may  be  drawn  from 
breaks  in  the  continuity  of  color  or  regularity  of  the  ground, 
movements  in  the  trenches  or  in  any  visible  commtmicating 
ways.  Shelter  trenches  are  frequently  not  made  out  until 
their  parapets  are  manned,  and  masks  and  dununy  works 
are  generally  not  perceptible  until  this  occurs.  It  is  diffi- 
cult and  sometimes  impossible  to  recognize  splinter-proofs. 
But  it  is  always  safe  to  asstmie  that  overhead  cover  was  pro- 


434  The  Attack. 

vided,  if  the  defender  has  had  any  time  at  all  to  prepare  his 
position  for  defense.  Observation  loopholes,  gaps  in  the 
hostile  line,  and  slight  mounds  overtopping  the  rest  of  the 
work  may  indicate  the  presence  of  such  cover.  Wire  en- 
tanglements in  plain  view  often  facilitate  the  finding  of 
shelter  trenches  and  their  subsidiary  works. 

"The  most  difficult  task  consists  of  finding  the  curved 
fire  batteries  of  the  enemy  and  such  of  his  flat  trajectory  bat- 
teries as  are  not  to  cover  the  immediate  foreground  of  the 
position  with  their  fire.  In  many  cases,  their  position  can 
be  approximately  fixed  by  conjecture  only.  The  other  bat- 
teries likewise  seldom  reveal  any  of  the  cover  constructed 
for  their  protection,  and  can  be  located  only  when  they  are 
firing  and  by  the  movements  of  single  individuals  (observers, 
for  example) ,  or  by  protruding  epaulements.  This  frequently 
applies  also  to  batteries  of  field  artillery. 

*  'Smoke,  dust,  and  the  flashes  of  the  gtms,  sometimes  make 
it  possible  to  get  the  direction  to  a  masked  artillery  position 
by  directing  a  battery  commander's  telescope  upon  them. 
The  range  and  location  of  the  target  may  likewise  be  approxi- 
mately determined  by  intersection.  Conclusions  as  to  the 
position  of  masked  batteries  may  also  be  drawn  from  the 
surroundings  of  the  target,  the  character  of  the  groxmd, 
road  communications,  location  of  observation  stations,  etc. 
While  it  is  impossible  to  ascertain  the  exact  position 
of  a  masked  target,  it  is  perfectly  feasible  to  determine  the 
limits  within  which  it  must  be  located.  It  may  even  be 
advantageous  to  determine  that  the  target  is  not  located  at 
certain  points,  in  order  to  reduce  to  the  smallest  size  the 
area  that  will  have  to  be  taken  tmder  fire.  In  many  cases, 
information  of  the  location  of  the  target  can  be  gained  by 
means  of  balloon  reconnaissance  only . " 

The  reconnaissance  initiated  according  to  arms  and 
sections,  should  be  begun  as  early  as  possible,  and  it  is  there- 
fore a  good  plan,  if  one  has  information  of  the  existence  of  a 
fortified  position,  to  bring  the  observation  wagons  up  to  the 


Attack  on  Fortified  Positions.  435 

advance  guard.  Sufficient  time  should  be  allowed  for  re- 
connaissance. The  commander  of  the  troops  can  not  decide 
whether  to  attack  at  once,  or  whether  to  wait  for  darkness, 
until  a  detailed  reconnaissance  has  furnished  him  with  the 
basis  for  a  decision.  A  change  of  plan  occasions  loss  of  time 
and  is  usually  difficult  of  execution. 

Even  when  the  hostile  position  is  to  be  approached  under 
cover  of  darkness,  it  is  advisable  to  bring  at  least  the  heavy 
artillery  into  position  tmder  cover  of  advanced  infantry  while 
it  is  still  light,  and  to  have  it  open  fire.  To  concentrate 
artillery  at  night  requires  that  special  preparations,  similar 
to  those  of  siege  operations,  be  made.  Each  battery 
must  have  accurate  information  as  to  the  route  by  means 
of  which  it  is  to  reach  the  position.  It  is  not  permissible 
to  move  elements  of  a  column  of  artillery  past  the  other 
elements.  Before  the  march  begins,  the  various  elements 
should  be  arranged  in  column  in  the  order  in  which  they  are 
to  be  used.  Long  columns  should  be  divided,  and  stretches 
of  road  swept  by  hostile  fire  should  be  passed  either  by  a 
piece  or  a  small  group  at  a  time,  or  turned.  A  disabled  car- 
riage should  not  retard  the  march  of  those  following.  It  is  a 
good  plan  to  place  auxiliary  teams  in  readiness  at  difficult 
places  of  the  road.* 

The  commander  of  the  artillery  of  an  army  corps  is 
charged  with  the  duty  of  directing  the  artillery  attack.  For 
this  purpose  he  will  have  at  his  disposal,  if  one  battalion  of 
heavy  artillery  be  included,  126  flat  trajectory  guns  and  34 
curved  fire  gtms,  viz., 

2 1  field  batteries,  in  alll26  guns,  with  281  shrapnel  and  56 
shell  per  gun; 

3  light  field  howitzer  batteries,  in  all  18  guns,  with  223 
field  howitzer  projectiles  (model  05)  per  gun ; 

4  heavy  field  howitzer  batteries,  in  all  16  guns,  with  422 
shell  (model  04)  per  gun. 

(Timely  requisition  should  be  made  for  replenishing  the 
ammunition  from  the  dep6t.) 

*For  details,  see  NachiQefechte  und  NachtUbunoen,  pp.  219  and  249. 


436  The  Attack. 

The  order  for  opening  fire  (FeuerbefeM)  is  based  upon  the 
result  of  the  reconnaissances. 

In  order  for  the  attack  to  succeed,  superior  artillery  must 
be  brought  into  action  at  the  point  where  the  decision  is 
sought.  The  commander  will  often  be  able  from  the  map 
to  decide  upon  the  division  into  combat  sections,  and,  in 
case  heavy  artillery  is  attached,  assign  a  section  to  it  during 
the  advance  or  during  the  development  for  action.  The 
artillery  should  be  so  disposed  as  to  enable  it  to  bring  a  con- 
centric fire  to  bear  on  the  principal  supporting  points  of  the 
hostile  position.  The  observation  station  of  the  heavy  artil- 
lery should  be  selected  with  especial  care  and  due  regard 
should  be  had  to  this  in  posting  the  field  artillery.  By  far 
the  most  important  consideration  will  be  to  cripple  the  hostile 
artillery. 

Frontal  and,  if  practicable,  flanking  shrapnel  fire  of 
field  guns  should  be  employed  against  hostile  batteries  of 
field  and  heavy  artillery  posted  in  masked  positions,  unless 
the  latter  are  such  as  to  preclude  obtaining  an  effect,  and 
percussion  shell  fire  of  howitzers  against  visible  field  bat- 
teries. (Pars.  426-452,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.).*  This  is  at 
this  stage  so  important  that  curved  fire  gims  are  not  available 
for  other  duties  than  these.  At  the  same  time,  field  guns 
attack  observation  stations,  machine  guns,  and  balloons. 
To  employ  flat  trajectory  guns  against  shelter  trenches  from 
which  no  one  is  firing  and  which  may  not  be  occupied  at  all 
is  a  pure  waste  of  ammtmition,  for  if  no  one  is  firing  from  such 
trenches,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  our  infantry  from  ad- 
vancing. Besides,  even  if  the  trenches  are  occupied,  direct 
artillery  fire  does  not  dittu'b  the  occupants  in  the  least.  So 
it  is  better,  in  any  event,  to  wait  until  the  hostile  parapets 
are  actually  occupied  by  firing  skirmishers  and  then  to  direct 
shrapnel  fire  upon  them.     Unoccupied  trenches,  because 

*  During  the  battle  of  Dhomokos.  May  17th.  1897.  a  TurldBh  12  cm.  howltcer 
battery  firing  at  3.000  m..  quickly  silenced  four  Greek  field  batteries,  inflicting  on  the 
latter  a  loss  of  25%  of  their  personnel.  The  Turkish  howitzers  were  provided  only 
with  common  shell  and  shrapnel,  v.  d.  Ooltz,  Dtr  Thessaliache  KrUg,  1898,  p.  198 
ArtilleristUche  Monatshefte,  1908,  p.  205. 


Attack  on  Fortified  Positions.  437 

they  are  very  apt  to  be  mistaken  for  other  lines,  are  at  best 
difficult  to  recognize. 

It  is  especially  important  to  place  an  adequate  supply 
of  ammunition  in  readiness.  This  will  be  simplified  by  the 
fact  that  a  change  of  position  need  not  be  considered.  The 
light  ammunition  columns  of  the  heavy  artillery  deposit  their 
ammtmition  at  suitable  points  and  then  bring  up  the  ammuni- 
tion of  the  heavy  artillery  ammunition  columns,  which  are 
in  the  meantime  unloaded  at  designated  points. 

The  artillery  of  the  defense  must  not  allow  the  hostile 
infantry  to  cross  unmolested  the  zone  of  effective  artillery 
fire — extending  from  4,500 — 1 ,500  m.  If  it  suffers  the  hostile 
infantry  to  do  this,  it  will  have  committed  an  irretrievable 
blunder,  and  will  have  failed  to  fulfill  its  principal  mission. 
The  advance  of  the  attacking  infantry  will  necessarily  cause 
the  defender  to  move  some  of  his  batteries  from  their  masked 
positions  to  a  position  from  which  their  fire  will  command 
the  immediate  foreground.  The  attacking  artillery  will 
now  be  able  to  combat  successfidly  the  defender's  batteries. 
In  order  to  do  this,  it  is  absolutely  essential  that  the  assail- 
ant's artillery  work  hand-in-hand  with  its  infantry.  A 
separation  of  artillery  combat  and  infantry  attack  is  a  pure 
waste  of  ammunition.  (See  p.  41 8,  supra) .  If  the  defender's 
artillery  at  once  begins  the  artillery  combat,  it  is  absolutely 
essential  that  its  fire  be  kept  down  before  one  can  enable 
one's  infantry  to  make  a  lodgment  at  close  range. 

When  the  contending  forces  are  large,  especially  when 
the  defender's  position  is  strongly  fortified  and  furnished 
with  heavy  artillery,  it  will  rarely  be  feasible  for  the  attacker 
to  open  fire  simultaneously  with  all  his  artillery.  In  many 
cases,  some  of  his  batteries  will  not  be  able  to  go  into  posi- 
tion until  they  can  do  so  imder  cover  of  the  fire  of  other  bat- 
teries. It  may  likewise  be  advisable  to  retain  some  bat- 
teries or  battalions  in  readiness  for  combating  hostile  artil- 
lery that  has  not  as  yet  been  located,  or  for  creating  a  sudden 
diversion. 


438  The  Attack. 

During  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  the  most  effective  way 
to  attack  advancing  infantry  was  fotxnd  to  be  flanking  shrap- 
nel fire  from  masked  batteries  located  in  adjacent  combat 
sections,  even  when  this  fire  was  delivered  at  long  ranges. 
Such  batteries  (or  even  guns  or  platoons)  are  very  difficult 
to  locate  and  to  hit,  and  can  be  crippled  only  by  fire  from 
flanking  positions.     (See  p.  448,  infra). 

But  one  will  not  be  able  to  cotmt  on  completely  silencing 
the  defender's  artillery.  When  the  latter  is  unable  to  con- 
tinue the  fight  against  the  superior  artillery  of  the  attacker, 
this  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  it  will  not  come  into 
action  again  when  the  assailant  advances  to  the  assault. 
The  assault  will  succeed  only  when  the  attacker  manages 
to  silence  the  defender's  artillery  permanently  and  to  bring 
curved  fire  to  bear  on  his  infantry  in  its  splinter-proofs*  and 
cover  trenches.  In  this  work,the  howitzers  are  assisted 
by  the  shell  fire  of  gun  batteries.  When  the  attack  consumes 
several  days,  the  attacker  should  endeavor  to  move  his 
field  artillery  to  close  range  under  cover  of  darkness.  But 
the  longer  the  defender  is  able  to  divert  the  curved  fire  of 
his  opponent  from  the  infantry  position,  by  means  of  the 
fire  of  batteries  posted  in  masked  positions,  the  more  difficult 
will  it  be  for  the  attacker's  artillery  to  shake  the  defender's 
infantry  sufficiently  to  permit  an  assault  to  be  made.  So 
long  as  the  attacker's  infantry  has  not  as  yet  approached  to 
close  range,  and  the  obstacles  in  front  of  the  position  are  still 
intact,  the  defender  will  occupy  the  position  only  with  small 
well  concealed  observation  detachments  and  machine  guns, 
and  hold  the  bulk  of  his  infantry  farther  in  rear  in  cover 
trenches.  This  is  prescribed  in  Russia.  The  position  can 
not  be  considered  ripe  for  assault  unless  it  is  made  impossible 


*To  produce  an  effect,  a  regular  bombardment  of  splinter-proofs  requires  the 
expenditure  of  a  good  deal  of  ammunition.  If  the  center  of  Impact  lies  In  the  center 
of  a  target  4.5  m.  wide,  200  rounds  of  shell  may  suffice  to  hit  10  spllnter-proofli 
located  within  a  shelter  trench  150  m.  long.  When  the  center  of  Impact  lies  15  m. 
short  or  over,  a  rather  favorable  condition,  only  4  or  5  hits  may  be  expected  flrom 
200  rounds  fired.  To  destroy  7  out  of  10  spUntei^proofs.  would,  therefore,  require 
the  expenditure  of  400  rounds  of  shell. 


Attack  on  Fortified  Positions.  439 

for  the  defender's  infantry  to  stay  in  these  cover  trenches.* 
The  closer  the  attacker  approaches  the  position,  the  more 
strongly  must  it  be  occupied  by  the  defender. 

The  task  of  shaking  the  defender  may  be  accomplished 
most  quickly  by  compelling  him  to  expose  himself  to  small 
arms  and  shrapnel  fire.  This  object  may  be  attained  by 
directing  the  fire  upon  the  ground  in  rear  of  the  position  and 
by  discontinuing  it  temporarily,  only  to  resume  it  suddenly 
according  to  an  accurately  regulated  plan  determined  upon 
beforehand.  The  defender's  infantry  will  frequently  line 
its  parapets  in  the  expectation  that  an  attack  will  be  made 
especially  when  the  attacker,  by  showing  his  infantry, 
gives  the  impression  that  the  assault  is  about  to  begin. 
The  attacker's  infantry  likewise  should  not  let  this  oppor- 
tunity to  develop  its  full  fire  power  escape.  The  above  de- 
scribed method  of  combat  should  be  regulated  all  over  the 
battlefield  by  one  person.  It  may  be  objected  that  the  de- 
fender will  be  familiar  with  this  scheme  and  will  not  leave 
his  cover  but  will  be  satisfied  to  have  observation  posts 
observe  the  ground  over  which  the  attack  will  be  made. 
From  a  purely  theoretical  standpoint,  this  objection  is  well 
taken,  but  the  fear  that  they  may  occupy  their  parapets 
too  late,  that  a  negligent  observation  post  may  fail  to  notify 
them  of  the  impending  attack,  and  the  desire  to  get  a  breath 
of  fresh  air,  will,  in  most  cases,  induce  the  defenders  to 
leave  their  cramped  splinter-proofs.  In  order  thoroughly 
to  shake  the  enemy,  however,  the  fire  must  be  continued 
during  the  night.  The  obstacles  are  destroyed  by  infantry 
and  pioneers  during  lulls  in  the  firing.  Artillery  projectiles 
are  capable  of  destroying  comparatively  insignificant  ob- 
stacles only.  When  it  becomes  necessary  to  disable  search- 
light plants  and  machine  guns,  single  guns  are  brought 
forward  by  hand  for  the  purpose,  and  intrenched. 


*The  artillery  preparatioxi  against  a  Russian  field  position  would  seem  to  be 
particularly  difficult,  requiring  much  time  and  ammunition  on  account  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  targets  in  depth  (extensive  obstacles  and  numerous  splinter-proofs, 
the  latter  being  usually  constructed  in  rear  of  one  another).  See  sketch  in  Taktik, 
y.  p.  805. 


440  The  Attack. 

When  the  assault  is  imminent,  the  fire  against  the  point 
of  attack  must  be  so  regulated  and,  during  the  last  stages 
of  the  fight,  so  increased,  that  the  defenders  will  not  dare 
to  raise  their  heads  above  their  parapets  to  face  the  combined 
infantry,  machine  gun,  and  artillery  fire  of  the  assailant,  and 
will  find  seoaity  from  the  latter's  curved  fire  neither  in  their 
fire  trenches  nor  imder  their  splinter-proofs. 

After  the  attacker's  artillery  has  repeatedly  interrupted 
its  fire  for  irregular  periods  for  the  purpose  of  causing  the 
defenders  to  relax  their  attention,  and  has  deluged  them  with 
fire  whenever  they  occupied  their  parapets,  it  may  be  ad- 
visable to  initiate  the  assault  during  one  of  these  lulls.  This  is 
especially  desirable  when  the  assault  is  to  be  made  under  cover 
of  darkness.  But  it  may  likewise  be  a  good  plan  to  latmch 
the  assaulting  troops  from  their  positions  at  the  same  moment 
(watches  being  accurately  set  beforehand),  to  direct  the  fire 
of  the  artillery  upon  the  ground  in  rear  of  the  hostile  position, 
at  the  same  instant,  and  to  designate  several  batteries  ot 
keep  down  the  fire  of  hostile  batteries  that  come  again  into 
action,  or  to  repel  counter-attacks  made  by  hostile  reserves. 
In  case  the  attack  fails,  the  defender  must  again  be  driven 
under  cover  by  intense  artillery  fire,  in  order  that  the  attack- 
ing infantry  may  be  enabled  to  make  a  lodgment  on  the 
ground  it  has  gained. 


V.    THE  DEFENSE.* 

The  attacker  seeks  to  reconnoiter  quickly  and  thor- 
oughly. This  is  opposed  by  the  defender,  who  not  only 
tries  to  prevent  the  hostile  reconnaissance,  but  also  endeavors 
to  gain  for  himself,  as  soon  as  possible,  information  in  re- 
gard to  the  direction  of  the  opponent's  attack.  Both  tasks 
require  the  use  of  small  advanced  detachments  of  all  arms 
in  the  foregroimd  of  the  position,  especially  in  front  of  the 
flanks,  t  As  these  detachments  are  to  deceive  the  enemy  and 
are  apt  to  become  seriously  involved  and  to  retire  too  late, 
if  too  strong  in  infantry,  the  leading  r61e  must  be  played  by 
the  artillery,  which  can  produce  an  effect  at  long  range, 
force  the  enemy  to  deploy  and  to  disclose  his  hand.  The 
assignment  of  infantry  and  of  machine  gtms  is  governed  in 
this  case  by  the  amoimt  of  protection  required  by  the  artil- 
lery. 

The  French  favor  the  employment  of  advanced  detachments  of  all 
arms4  In  these,  the  difficulty  will  ever  be  to  withdraw  the  batteries 
without  making  them  suffer  severe  losses.  The  disadvantages  of  such 
advanced  detachments  become  apparent  when  the  attacker  advances  on  a 
broad  front.  In  judging  the  merits  of  such  detachments,  it  is  instructive 
to  study  the  conduct  of  the  artillery  of  the  Austrian  Hid  and  Xth  Army 
Corps  in  the  advanced  position  on  the  Bistritz  (Koniggratz).  The  two 
batteries  of  the  Hid  Army  Corps  were  quickly  silenced  by  the  four  bat- 
teries of  the  Prussian  8th  Division,  which  came  simultaneously  into  action, 
and  forced,  as  were  also  the  infantry  supports,  to  retire.  The  eleven  bat- 
teries of  the  Xth  Army  Corps,  however,  inflicted  heavy  losses  on  the 
successively  appearing  batteries  of  the  4th  Prussian  Infantry  Division, 
and  were  able  to  reach  the  main  position  unmolested. 

The  failure  of  Douay's  isolated  division  at  Waiszenburg,  on  the 
other  hand,  stands  in  marked  contrast  to  the  success  of  the  operations  of 
the  German  advanced  detachments  on  the 


*ParB.  001-614,  Oerman  F.  A.  D.  A.,  and  pars.  601-619.  Q$rman  H,  A,  D,  R, 
tSee  TakHk,  Y.  p.  280. 
tllHd.,  p.  277. 


442  The  Defense. 

The  line  on  which  the  artillery  is  to  fight  the  decisive  action 
forms  the  framework  of  every  defensive  position.  The  artillery 
will  rarely  be  able  to  accomplish  all  its  tasks  in  a  single 
position.  A  single,  central  position  will  usually  be  advan- 
tageous for  a  weak  artillery  force  only.  Such  a  position  be- 
comes a  disadvantage  to  a  strong  artillery  force,  as  the  hostile 
guns  will  have  a  concentric  fire  effect  upon  it.  The  first 
position  should  be  selected  with  a  view  to  enabling  the  artil- 
lery to  command  the  approaches  and  to  force  the  hostile  in- 
fantry to  deploy.  It  is  likewise  important  in  selecting  this 
position,  to  consider  where  the  attacking  artillery  will 
probably  go  into  position  and  whether  fixe  can  be  brought  to 
bear  upon  it  while  it  is  moving  into  position.  An  oppor- 
ttmity  may,  at  the  same  time,  offer  to  draw  the  attacker  onto 
unfavorable  terrain.  In  the  defense  of  hill  positions,  the 
artillery  of  the  defender  is  usually  posted  in  rear  of  the  crest, 
but  in  order  to  sweep  the  forward  slope  of  the  height  when  re- 
pelling the  infantry  attack,  it  will  be  obliged  to  leave  its 
masked  position  and  advance  farther  to  the  front.  This  is 
fatal  when  the  attacking  artillery  has  obtained  good  adjust- 
ment, and  it  is  usually  better,  therefore,  to  send  the  batteries 
into  action  at  anotHer  point.  When  the  batteries  can  make 
use  of  farm  buildings  or  of  patches  of  timber,  they  will  fre- 
quently be  able  to  maintain  their  positions  and  to  bring 
flanking  fire  to  bear  on  the  forward  slope  of  the  height  held. 
(See  p.  448,  infra). 

As  the  defender  is  pretty  much  in  the  dark  imtil  the 
direction  of  the  hostile  attack  becomes  known  to  him,  he 
is  usually  imable  to  designate  at  the  very  start  where  his 
artillery  is  to  go  into  position.  The  artillery  must,  in  con- 
sequence, be  posted  in  readiness,  in  order  to  avoid  being 
forced  to  undertake  a  hasty  change  of  position  when  the 
enemy  advances.  In  any  event,  the  artillery  should  prepare 
to  meet  an  attack  from  several  directions,  and  this  it  will 
rarely  be  able  to  do  in  a  single  position.  The  defender  should 
endeavor  to  have  his  heavy  howitzer  batteries  open  fire 


Artillery  Positions.  443 

before  the  hostile  artillery  does  so.  Their  target  is,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  the  attacker's  artillery.  This  enables  the 
defender's  field  artillery  to  devote  itself  to  combating  the 
advancing  hostile  infantry  and  to  keeping  down  the  fire  of 
the  ciirved  fire  batteries  of  the  attacker.  Heavy  flat  trajec- 
tory guns,  on  account  of  the  effectiveness  of  their  shrapnel, 
should  be  kept  in  readiness  to  fire  oh  the  routes  leading  to 
the  position,  and  on  the  flanks  to  oppose  hostile  turning  move- 
ments. Artillery  posted  in  readiness  should  utilize  the  time 
until  fire  is  opened,  for  carefully  examining  the  position,  re- 
pairing roads  and  ascertaining  ranges,  particularly  those  to 
the  probable  artillery  positions  of  the  enemy  and  to  points 
in  the  direction  in  which  the  hostile  infantry  attack  will,  in 
all  likelihood,  be  made.* 

Gun  pits,  masks,  and  epaulements  should  be  constructed 
in  adequate  numbers  to  enable  the  artillery  to  meet  attacks 
from  the  directions  in  which  they  will  probably  be  made. 
Frequently  it  is  overlooked  that  by  placing  a  gun  in  a  pit, 
the  line  of  sight  is  lowered  and  the  field  of  fire  in  consequence 
decreased.  When  time  admits,  it  is  advisable  to  take  a 
look  at  the  position  from  the  front,  as  its  shortcomings  will 
be  most  clearly  apparent  from  that  side.  Gun  pits  with 
epaulements  that  can  be  recognized  as  such  a  long  way  off, 
are  worse  than  none,  as  they  make  it  easier  for  the  enemy  to 
observe  his  shots  and  therefore  facilitate  his  adjustment. 
But  the  artillery  commander  should  not  use  gun  pits  simply 
because  they  have  been  dug,  for,  should  the  attack  come  from 
a  direction  other  than  that  anticipated,  the  batteries  might  be 
forced  to  move  into  position  obliquely  and  with  insufficient 
intervals.  The  firing  position  is  taken  up  as  soon  as  the 
direction  of  the  hostile  attack  becomes  known,  if  practicable, 
before  the  enemy  has  brought  his  guns  into  battery.  Cov- 
ered terrain  and  ignorance  of  the  enemy's  measures,  make 
it  difficult  to  recognize  this  moment ;  if  the  artillery  hesitates 

*See  corps  orders  Issued  on  January  11th.  1871,  for  the  defense  of  the  Lisalne 
position.     Kvnz,  Enucheidungskdmpfe  dea  Generals  wm  Werder,  I.  p.  178. 


1 


444  The  Defense. 

too  long,  it  might  have  to  go  into  position  under  the  fire  of 
the  hostile  artillery.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  goes  into  posi- 
tion prematurely,  it  may  have  to  change  front  or  position, 
perhaps,  at  a  critical  moment. 

Artillery  should,  on  principle,  be  protected  by  infantry 
that  is  pushed  to  the  front  to  prevent  hostile  skirmishers 
from  taking  part  in  the  fight  against  the  defender's  artillery. 
Aside  from  considerations  of  terrain,  it  will  be  advisable  to 
push  the  infantry  line  about  600  m.  beyond  the  position  of 
the  batteries,  and  to  keep  the  troops  destined  as  immediate 
supports  in  close  proximity.  But  the  terrain  exercises  a 
decisive  influence  on  the  location  of  the  supports.  When 
the  foreground  affords  adequate  cover  to  supports  and  re- 
serves, the  sheltering  features  generally  restrict  the  field 
of  fire  and  impair  the  effect  of  the  artillery.  But  when  the 
ground  is  open  and  sloping  toward  the  enemy  and  the  in- 
fantry reserves  have  to  be  kept  in  rear  of  the  artillery,  the 
infantry  will  find  few  favorable  conditions  for  its  action.  The 
supports  that  must  be  pushed  forward  to  the  firing  position 
are  obliged  to  cross  terrain  devoid  of  cover,  and  this  dis- 
advantage increases  with  the  distance  to  the  main  position. 
The  commander  will  rarely  be  able  to  harmonize  the  require- 
ments of  the  two  arms,  as  every  compromise  is  only  too  apt 
to  work  a  disadvantage  to  one  of  them.  But  since  the  in- 
fantry must  conduct  the  fight  from  start  to  finish  in  its  posi- 
tions, its  wishes  should  be  given  the  most  attention.  It  is  a 
good  plan  to  keep  curved  fire  batteries  in  rear  imtil  data  for 
their  employment  have  been  obtained.  In  large  units, 
when  the  situation  is  not  as  yet  cleared  up,  it  may  be  advis- 
able to  hold  out  all  the  artillery  as  a  reserve.  This  may  also 
be  done  when  a  cotmter-attack  on  a  large  scale  is  contemplated 
and  the  conunander  is  not  stu-e  that  he  will  be  able  to  with- 
draw batteries  from  the  fight  for  this  task. 

At  B«aune  la  Rolande,  one  infantry  brigade  and  six  batteries  of 
the  Xth  Army  Corps  were  posted  at  Marcilly  as  a  reserve.  When  the 
French  envelopment  made  itself  felt  on  the  right  flank,  four  of  these  bat-> 
teries  went  into  action  to  support  the  right  wing. 


Opening  Fire.  445 

On  the  LiMune,  the  strong  reserve  that  was  kept  out  needed  artil- 
lery to  enable  it  to  carry  out  an  independent  mission  which  would,  in 
all  likelihood,  have  consisted  of  a  counter-attack.  On  account  of  the 
great  extent  of  the  position  and  the  absence  of  roads,  it  was  doubtful 
whether  artillery  could  have  been  withdrawn  from  action,  and  especially 
whether  it  would  have  arrived  in  time  at  another  point.  It  was,  therefore, 
entirely  consonant  with  the  requirements  of  the  situation  to  form  the  re- 
serve of  all  arms. 

At  Worth,  the  artillery  of  the  French  reserve  was  no  longer  able 
to  come  into  action. 

At  Gravelotte,  August  18th,  1870,  French  batteries  did,  indeed, 
succeed  in  coming  into  action  between  Moscow  and  Point  du  Jour,  during 
a  lull  in  the  fight  and  under  cover  of  dusk,  but,  at  Vionville,  August 
16th,  1870,  batteries  of  the  Vlth  Corps  in  vain  attempted  to  go  into  posi- 
tion east  of  Rezonville. 

With  the  first  shot  fired  by  the  defender,  the  uncertainty  of 
the  attacker  vanishes.  The  commander  of  the  whole  force 
therefore  generally  reserves  to  himself  the  right  to  direct 
when  fire  shall  be  opened,  but  in  particular  cases  may  dele- 
gate this  right  to  the  commander  of  the  artillery.  No  oppor- 
tunity should  be  neglected  to  surprise  with  fire  artillery  that 
is  in  motion.  While  the  defender  is  ready  for  action  in  his 
position,  the  attacker's  dispositions  are  still  in  progress  of 
developing.  Favorable  opportunities,  such  as  are  presented 
by  imlimbering  artillery  and  by  suddenly  appearing  columns 
of  infantry,  pass  rapidly.  If  one  were  to  get  the  commander's 
I)ermission  by  telephone,  to  open  fire  in  such  a  situation, 
one  would  perhaps  invariably  come  into  action  too  late. 
It  is  therefore  advisable  in  such  cases  to  allow  greater  lati- 
tude to  artillery  of  the  defense.  The  duty  of  keeping  at  a 
distance  hostile  reconnoitering  detachments  should  prefer- 
ably be  entrusted  to  the  advanced  infantry  alone.  To  open 
fire  prematurely  betrays  the  position;  to  open  it  unex- 
pectedly enhances  the  effect.  Artillery  of  the  defense  should 
fire  at  distances  beyond  effective  shrapnel  range  in  exceptional 
cases  only. 

We  say,  the  defender  should  force  the  attacker  to  deploy 
as  soon  as  possible.  This  is  eminently  correct  when  the 
principal  object  is  to  gain  time.     But  when  a  decision  is 


446  The  Defense. 

to  be  brought  about,  the  first  consideration  is  to  inflict  dam- 
age on  the  enemy.  In  this  instance,  it  is  proper  to  open  fire 
at  long  range  in  exceptional  cases  only,  for  example,  against 
a  defile.  But  it  is  generally  better  to  let  the  enemy  approach 
to  effective  range,  for  to  open  fire  at  long  range  would 
be  playing  into  his  hands,  as  he  is  naturally  desirous  to  draw 
our  fire.  If  the  enemy  knows  that  the  position  has  been 
occupied  and  proceeds  cautiously,  he  will  perhaps  bring  artil- 
lery into  action  beyond  effective  range.  This  will  likewise 
induce  the  defender  to  open  long  range  fire,  which  will  be 
exceedingly  embarrassing  to  the  attacker's  artillery,  as  it 
will  be  obliged  to  change  position. 

Known  ranges  can  be  utilized  and  the  initial  superiority 
of  the  artillery  made  permanent  only  when  fire  is  not  opened 
until  the  enemy  gets  within  shrapnel  range.  When  practi- 
cable, one  should  avail  oneself  to  the  fullest  extent  of  the  moral 
effect  produced  by  the  sudden  burst  of  fire  of  a  mass  of 
artillery  at  effective  range  on  an  enemy  who  is  still  in  route 
column.  When  the  hostile  artillery  is  decidedly  superior 
numerically,  it  may  be  advantageous  to  dispense  entirely 
with  artillery  fire,  to  save  it  up  for  repelling  the  infantry 
attack,  and  to  remain  in  readiness  in  order  to  deluge  with 
fire  carelessly  advancing  hostile  artillery  and  isolated  hostile 
batteries. 

But  this  will  be  a  bitter  pill  for  the  defender,  who 
thereby  yields  to  the  attacker's  artillery  such  complete  con- 
trol over  the  battlefield,  that  its  fire  may  produce  results 
Uke  those  obtained  on  the  target  range.  These  tactics  were 
used  in  many  of  the  fights  waged  by  the  Boers  against  the 
British  in  South  Africa. 

When  batteries  provided  with  shields  are  posted  in  a 
masked  position  and  can  change  position  without  being 
observed  by  the  enemy,  they  can  hold  their  own  even  against 
superior  numbers ;  the  danger  of  their  being  silenced  is  very 
slight.  It  is  only  when  the  hostile  artillery  is  very  much 
stronger  numerically  and  when  the  terrain  does  not  permit 


Repelling  the  Attack.  447 

firing  on  the  hostile  artillery,  that  the  batteries,  if  ordered 
to  do  so  by  the  commander  of  the  troops,  may  withdraw 
temporarily  from  the  hostile  fire,  i.  e.,  either  move  back  and 
remain  in  readiness,  or  withdraw  their  personnel  under 
cover.  There  will  then  be  opportunities  to  overwhelm  with 
fire  carelessly  advancing  hostile  batteries  or  to  direct  fire 
upon  uncovered  gtms  of  the  attacker. 

If  the  defender  takes  up  the  artillery  combat,  he  should 
use  all  the  artillery  force  at  his  disposal;  the  attacker,  who 
is  obliged  to  bring  his  forces  into  action  gradually  from  the 
route  formation,  must  be  combated  from  the  outset  by  the 
greatest  available  superiority.  In  view  of  the  special  ad- 
vantages that  usually  assist  the  attack,  the  defender's  artil- 
lery will  but  rarely  be  able  to  count  upon  winning  a  decisive 
victory  over  the  attacker's  artillery.  The  defender  will 
have  gained  quite  a  good  deal  if  his  artillery  and  that  of  the 
attacker  are  evenly  matched.  The  more  evenly  matched  the 
opposing  artillery  forces,  the  more  easily  will  the  defender  be 
able  to  withdraw  a  part  of  his  artillery  from  action,  in  order 
to  employ  it  against  threatened  enveloping  movements  or 
during  an  offensive  movement  made  by  his  reserve. 

Heavy  artillery  should,  in  the  first  place,  join  the  field 
artillery  in  combating  those  parts  of  the  hostile  artillery 
that  are  recognizable.  Then  the  heavy  artillery  should 
direct  its  fire  against  hostile  batteries  whose  fire  has  become 
most  annoying. 

When  superior  hostile  fire  forces  some  parts  of  the 
defender's  artillery  to  cease  firing  temporarily,  the  other  bat- 
teries, particularly  those  of  the  heavy  artillery,  should  con- 
tinue their  fire,  increasing  its  intensity. 

WhQn  the  infantry  of  the  opponent  advances  to  the  at- 
tack, the  heavy  artillery  of  the  defender  generally  continues 
to  fire  without  abatement  on  the  artillery  of  the  attacker 
and  thereby  makes  it  easier  for  its  field  artillery  to  combat 
the  hostile  infantry.  The  batteries  that  accompany  the  in- 
fantry attack  likewise  afford  good  targets,  as  they  generally 


448  The  Defense. 

go  into  position  uncovered.  The  Austrians  contemplate 
posting  single  giuis  or  platoons  in  the  infantry  position  for 
the  purpose  of  repelling  the  assault,  and  unmasking  them  at 
the  last  moment.  This  is  also  recommended  in  England, 
as  it  appears  preferable  to  moving  guns  up  by  hand.  Field 
artillery  will  frequently  have  to  leave  cover  and  go  into  posi- 
tion uncovered,  in  order  to  fire  upon  the  attacking  infantry 
without  regard  to  the  fire  of  the  hostile  artillery.  When  this 
happens,  gun  pits  and  epaulements  are  an  advantage.  Bat- 
teries that  can  not  fire  upon  the  hostile  infantry,  turn  against 
the  artillery.  It  is  preferable  for  the  purpose  of  warding 
off  the  assault,  to  move  artillery  out  of  the  positions  that  it 
occupied  during  the  artillery  combat.  The  enemy  will  de- 
vote his  attention  to  the  abandoned  positions  anyway  and, 
besides,  his  fire  is  adjusted  upon  them.  A  defense  seeking 
a  decision,  must  be  combined  with  a  counter-attack,  which, 
like  any  other  attack,  must  be  supported  by  artillery  fire. 
Since  the  hostile  counter-batteries  will  usually  go  into  posi- 
tion uncovered,  in  order  to  save  time,  they  offer  good  targets 
for  the  defender's  heavy  artillery.  The  problem  of  disposing 
artillery  for  the  coimter-attack  is  a  difficult  one.  The 
English  often  designate  for  this  duty  batteries  that,  while 
they  participate  in  repelling  the  attack,  are  to  keep  themselves 
in  readiness  to  cooperate  in  a  cotmter-attack  and  quietly  to 
reconnoiter  their  position.  But  it  is  doubtful  whether  they 
will  be  available  at  the  right  time.  Since  it  is  not  a  good  plan 
to  hold  out  an  artillery  reserve,  one  will  have  to  wait  imtil 
batteries  are  available  for  supporting  the  counter-attack. 

If  the  commander  decides  to  await  the  assault,  the  bat- 
teries remain  in  their  positions.  The  howitzer  batteries  con- 
tinue to  fire  on  the  assailant's  artillery,  especially  on  the  bat- 
teries that  accompany  the  assaulting  troops.  It  is  better  for 
the  artillery  to  operate  from  a  flank  position  (for  example  one 
resting  on  a  village),  than  from  within  the  infantry  lines,  as 
its  activity  will  not  be  hampered  and  its  fire  will  not  be 


Heavy  Batteries.  449 

masked  in  the  former  case  by  retiring  skirmishers  and  as  the 
hostile  artillery  will  have  difficulty  in  damaging  it.  (See  p. 
453,  infra).  Whenever  attacking  Japanese  infantry  was  ex- 
posed to  such  fire,  its  attack  failed. 

*' During  the  assault,  the  artillery  should  hold  on  firmly 
until  Ike  last  moment.  This  course  will  reject  the  greatest  glory 
upon  the  artillery,  even  if  it  should  lead  to  the  loss  of  the  guns.'' 
(Par.  514,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.).*  In  case  the  attack 
succeeds,  all  the  batteries  should  concentrate  their  fire  upon 
the  assaulting  infantry,  so  as  to  cooperate  with  the  reserves 
in  driving  the  enemy  out  of  the  position.  Batteries  that  are 
unable  to  take  part  in  the  fight  of  the  infantry,  prevent 
hostile  artillery  from  advancing  into  the  captured  position. 

The  heavy  artillery  endeavors,  in  conjunction  with  the 
field  artillery,  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  making  a  lodgment 
in  the  captured  position.  The  commander  of  the  troops 
decides  whether  this  shall  be  done  from  the  position  the  artil- 
lery occupied  during  the  action  or  from  the  rallying  position. 
When  there  is  no  longer  any  chance  of  using  the  guns,  the 
situation  existing  at  the  moment  will  decide  whether  the  men 
should  use  their  rifles  or  whether  the  batteries  should  retire 
into  another  position.  The  distance  between  batteries  and 
the  crest  under  cover  of  which  they  are  posted,  governs. 
When  posted  close  up,  they  can  not  sweep  the  immediate 
foreground  and  the  men  must  have  recotu*se  to  their  rifles, 
in  the  event  that  the  assatilt  extend  to  the  position  of  the  bat- 
teries. It  is  impracticable  for  the  batteries  to  turn  their  fire 
upon  a  point  of  attack  lying  laterally  with  respect  to  their 
position.  When  the  batteries  are  posted  a  greater  distance 
in  rear  of  the  crest,  it  is  doubtful  whether  they  will  be  able 
to  distinguish  friend  from  foe  well  enough  in  the  fluctuating 
fight,  to  permit  them  to  fire  safely.    And  even  if  these  heavy 

*The  heroic  stand  made  by  the  Austrian  artlUery  at  KOniggrtttz  Is  a  model 
worthy  of  imitation.  In  this  case,  the  Austrian  artillery  left  187  guns  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy,  but  covered  the  retreat  of  its  army. 


450  The  Defense. 

batteries  were  to  succeed  in  retiring  into  a  new  position,  they 
would  scarcely  have  time  to  take  up  a  masked  position,  and 
would,  if  coming  into  action  in  the  open,  fall  an  easy  prey  to 
the  shrapnel  fire  of  the  batteries  brought  up  by  the  victorious 
enemy.  When  the  battle  terminates  in  the  defeat  of  the 
defender,  his  heavy  batteries  are  the  first  spoils  that  fall  into 
the  hands  of  the  victor. 


VI.    THE  RETREAT.* 

The  conditions  under  which  a  tinit  may  have  to  break 
away  from  an  enemy  are  so  various,  depending  upon  the 
distance  to  the  enemy  and  the  mobility  of  one's  own  artillery 
that  it  is  impossible  to  formtilate  rules  that  would  fit  every 
case.  When  artillery  still  has  an  adequate  amotmt  of  am- 
mimition  and  a  sufficient  number  of  teams,  it  is  particularly 
suited  to  stem  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  and  to  enable  the 
other  arms  to  reform.  In  conjunction  with  cavalry  that 
has  been  left  in  rear,  the  artillery  then  forms  the  screen 
xmder  cover  of  which  the  infantry  reforms  in  route  formation. 
If  the  guns  are  lost  in  the  effort  to  facilitate  the  retreat  of  the 
other  arms,  in  the  attempt  to  avert  disaster,  such  loss  can 
not  but  redoimd  to  the  honor  of  the  artillery. 

When  the  artillery  can  be  withdrawn  from  action  in 
time — ^at  the  latest  perhaps  just  before  the  assault — ^and  into  a 
position  in  rear,  it  will  most  effectively  prevent  the  enemy  from 
spreading  out  and  his  batteries  from  advancing.  The  artil- 
lery must  comply  with  two  requirements.  The  one  to  reach 
the  rallying  position  in  time,  the  other,  not  to  deprive  the 
infantry  prematurely  of  support,  least  of  all,  at  the  point 
where  the  enemy  is  pressing  most  violently  and  where  re- 
sistance must  be  kept  up  longest.  The  batteries  that  have 
farthest  to  go  are  first  withdrawn.  By  doing  this,  the  bat- 
teries can  take  their  proper  places  in  the  route  columns 
without  being  delayed.  Artillery  can  be  of  use  in  the  with- 
drawal of  other  troops  only  if  it  has  reached  a  rallying  position 
within  effective  range  of  the  enemy.  When  the  rallying 
position  is  too  close  to  the  enemy,  the  artillery  will  soon  be 
forced  to  make  another  change  of  position ;  when  it  is  too  far 
away,  the  retreating  troops  will  be  without  the  support  of 

*Par8.  618-521,  OermanF.  A.  D.  B.  and  para.  620-622.  Qerman  H.  A.  D  B. 


452  Retreat. 

the  artillery,  which  is  withdrawn  from  them  for  some  time. 
A  distance  of  3,000  m.  between  rallying  position  and  main 
defensive  position  would  be  very  appropriate.  It  is  desirable 
to  have  the  rallying  position  located  so  that  the  fire  may  be 
directed  from  it  upon  the  old  defensive  position,  in  which 
the  enemy  will  luidoubtedly  linger  for  some  time  in  order  to 
reform  his  disordered  troops  to  some  extent  at  least. 

The  batteries  that  remain  behind  will  usually  find  them- 
selves in  a  very  critical  situation,  and  their  \vithdrawal  is 
possible  only  when  covered  by  the  other  arms.  When  this 
assistance  is  wanting,  the  batteries  will  break  down  under  the 
pursuing  fire  of  the  enemy,  and  their  retreat  will  be  converted 
into  rout.  It  is  always  difficult  to  withdraw  the  batteries 
when  they  are  exposed  to  hostile  fire.  While  artillery  units 
are  still  within  the  zone  of  effective  hostile  fire,  it  is  impera- 
tively necessary,  as  a  rule,  for  battalion  and  battery  com- 
manders to  remain  with  their  respective  conmiands.  The 
brigade  and  regimental  commanders  ride  ahead  to  reconnoiter 
the  new  position  and  battalion  commanders  despatch  ex- 
perienced officers  ahead  for  a  like  purpose. 

While  battery  and  platoon  commanders  are  doing  their 
utmost  to  ensure  the  gims  getting  off  at  all,  by  properly- 
distributing  the  available  horses,  by  quickly  removing  from 
the  teams  those  that  are  disabled,  by  detailing  uninjured 
men  where  severe  losses  jeopardize  the  proper  execution 
of  orders,  by  causing  repairs  to  be  made  so  as  to  save  all  that 
can  still  be  saved,  and  by  devising  means  how  best  to  with- 
draw the  remnants  from  the  fire,  the  battalion  commander 
has  kept  in  close  touch  with  the  tactical  situation.  He  de- 
cides whether  all  the  batteries  shall  withdraw  simultaneously 
or  whether  some  of  them  shall  remain  in  action  to  cover  the 
retreat  of  the  remainder,  what  road  shall  be  followed,  and 
how  the  battalion  shall  enter  the  column.  Besides,  he  must 
consider  from  what  direction  the  most  imminent  danger 
threatens,  take  suitable  measures  to  ward  it  off,  and  apply 
to  the  nearest  troops  for  assistance.     The  battery  commanders 


Retreat.  453 

are  too  completely  occupied  by  affairs  in  their  immediate 
domains  to  pay  any  attention  to  tactical  measures  of  security. 
In  moving  into  the  rallying  position,  care  should  be  taken 
that  the  enemy's  attention  be  not  drawn  to  the  position  it  is 
proposed  to  occupy. 

During  the  subsequent  stage  of  the  retreat,  the  artillery 
should  occupy  rallying  positions  in  rear  of  which  the  retiring 
troops  can  find  time  and  room  to  reestablish  order  in  the 
various  units  and  to  form  route  column.  When  this  is  once 
accomplished,  the  artillery  attached  to  the  rear  guard  should 
increase  the  distance  between  the  retreating  columns  and  the 
pursuing  enemy.  Positions  in  rear  of  defiles  are  especially 
suited  for  this  purpose.  It  is  important  that  an  adequate 
supply  of  ammunition  be  placed  in  readiness,  that  routes  to 
the  rear  be  thoroughly  reconnoitered  and  that  several 
parallel  routes  to  the  rear  be  found,  so  as  to  facilitate  the 
withdrawal  into  a  new  position. 

Increased  attention  should  be  paid  to  the  flanks,  since 
the  most  dangerous  interference  with  the  retreat  threatens 
from  these  directions.  When  suitable  flank  positions  can 
be  found  and  occupied  by  the  artillery,  the  retreat  can  be 
materially  facilitated,  as  the  enemy  will  be  forced  to  make 
changes  of  front  that  will  cause  him  to  lose  considerable  time. 

Particularly  profitable  tasks  await  the  heavy  artillery 
during  a  retreat  when  the  hostile  artillery  shows  a  disposition 
to  press  forward  in  pursuit.  Heavy  artillery  is  preferably 
assigned  to  the  rear  guard  for  the  purpose  of  delaying  the 
enemy.  It  is  important  that  it  retire  by  echelons  from  one 
rallying  position  to  another,  that  sufficient  ammunition  be 
made  available,  and  that  lines  of  retreat,  preferably  a  sepa- 
rate one  for  each  battery,  be  reconnoitered.  **When  heavy 
artillery  undertakes  to  combat  the  pursuing  infantry,  it 
may  be  quickly  overcome  or  overtaken  on  a  flank  by  the  latter 
and  lose  its  mobility  in  consequence.  Besides,  it  would 
have  to  engage  the  infantry  principally  from  unmasked 
positions,  which,  as  the  guns  have  no  shields,  would  be  more 


454  Retreat. 

or  less  of  a  useless  sacrifice.  Heavy  artillery  can  not  con- 
sider taking  up  immasked  positions  unless  it  succeeds  in 
registering  its  fire  on  crests  before  the  latter  are  reached  by 
the  hostile  artillery  or  unless  such  unmasked  positions  are  out 
of  range  of  the  hostile  guns. 

*  It  is  in  rear  guard  actions  more  than  anywhere  else  that 
heavy  artillery  will  find  plenty  of  opportunities  for  disabling 
hostile  batteries  that  push  forward  precipitately  or  go  into 
action  recklessly.  By  combating  them,  heavy  artillery  will 
render  its  own  field  artillery  and  infantry  the  greatest  service. 
For  the  field  artillery,  relieved  of  all  anxiety  in  regard  to  the 
hostile  artillery,  can  concentrate  its  fire  that  much  more 
effectively  on  the  piu^uing  infantry,  and  the  infantry  can 
break  off  the  action  much  more  easily,  since  the  pursuing 
infantry — so  we  learn  from  military  history* — ^will  never,  by 
means  of  its  legs  alone,  be  able  to  overtake  retreating  in- 
iantry." 

Light  ammunition  columns  and  combat  trains  should 
usually  be  sent  ahead  to  previously  designated  points,  in 
order  that  they  may  not  hamper  the  batteries  dining  the 
withdrawal,  but  battery  reserves  of  field  artillery  should  be 
sent  ahead  in  exceptional  cases  only.  The  battery  reserves 
of  heavy  artillery,  on  the  other  hand,  should  be  sent  ahead, 
and  the  ammunition  deposited  near  the  batteries  must  be 
repacked  in  the  caissons. 

*Friedkbich,  p.  66. 


VII.    THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF  ARTILLERY  ACCORD- 
ING TO  VARIOUS  REGULATIONS. 

AUSTRIA, 

Rencontre.  "When  in  a  recontre,  the  deployment  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  has  progressed  farther  than  one's  own,  the  artillery  of  the  ad- 
vanced troops  must  make  very  skillful  use  of  the  ground  in  order  to  be  able 
by  means  of  indirect  fire  on  a  broad  front,  to  cope  effectively  with  a  superior 
number  of  hostile  guns.  In  this,  it  will  often  be  desirable  to  develop  a 
high  rate  of  fire,  in  order  to  induce  the  enemy  to  unmask  his  batteries. 
When  nothing  but  unmasked  positions  are  available  and  conditions  are 
unfavorable,  advance  guard  artillery  should  avoid  an  artillery  combat  that 
is  without  prospect  of  success.  A  better  plan  would  be  for  the  advance 
guard  commander  to  order  it  to  get  under  cover,  there  to  await  the  arrival 
of  the  artillery  of  the  main  body.  But  when  its  own  infantry  requires 
decisive  assistance,  advance  guard  artillery  should  unhesitatingly  open 
fire,  even  if,  by  so  doing,  it  should  suffer  severe  losses." 

When  two  opposing  forces  are  still  in  motion  toward  one  another, 
the  batteries  attached  to  the  advance  guards  of  the  columns,  should  at- 
tempt to  surprise  the  enemy  by  prompt  and  vigorous  action  on  a  broad 
front  and  endeavor  to  fire  on  him  while  he  is  still  in  march,  cause  him  to 
deploy  prematurely,  hamper  his  deployment,  deceive  him  as  to  our  own 
intentions,  support  the  infantry  in  its  advance,  or  in  maintaining  the  ground 
it  has  gained,  thereby  create  favorable  conditions  for  launching  the  main 
body  and  contribute  with  its  fire  to  clearing  up  the  situation. 

The  attack  on  an  enemy  in  position.  The  Austrians  are  not  as  yet 
quite  ridof  the  idea  that  a  superiority  of  artillery  fire  must  be  gained  before 
the  infantry  attack  can  be  made.  The  regulations  attribute  far  too  much 
importance  to  battering  the  hostile  artillery,  equipped  as  all  artillery  now 
is  with  shields.  "The  attacking  artillery  should  endeavor  to  gain  as  quickly 
as  possible  a  superiority  of  fire  over  the  hostile  artillery,  in  order  that  it 
may  be  able  at  the  earliest  moment  to  devote  itself  to  its  proper  task,  that 
of  directly  supporting  its  own  infantry.  It  should  not  lose  sight  of  the 
importance  of  combating  the  concealed  hostile  batteries  and  machine 
guns.  Even  during  the  artillery  combat,  the  attacking  artillery  should 
always  stand  ready  to  assist  its  own  infantry,  without  regard  to  the  losses 
that  it  may  expect  to  suffer  at  the  hands  of  the  hostile  artillery.  Even  at 
this  early  stage  of  the  combat,  bodies  of  infantry  destined  to  initiate  the 
attack  may  materially  assist  the  attacking  artillery  by  firing  on  the  hos- 


456  Employment  op  Artillery. 

tUe  batteries.  It  will  sometimes  be  practicable,  likewise,  to  detail  small 
bodies  of  infantry  and  machine  gun  batteries  for  the  special  purpose  of 
firing  at  short  range  on  the  hostile  artillery." 

When  the  hostile  artillery  is  difficult  to  combat  in  its  masked  posi- 
tions, it  will  frequently  be  a  good  plan  to  have  the  infantry  advance  by 
echelons,  while  the  batteries  that  remain  behind  in  readiness  for  immediate 
action,  open  a  vigorous  fire  as  soon  as  the  position  of  the  hostile  artillery 
becomes  apparent.  "When  the  hostile  artillery  has  been  partially  or 
wholly  silenced,  or  when  its  own  infantry  begins  to  advance  to  take  up  the 
decisive  fire  fight,  the  majority  of  the  batteries  should  bring  an  over- 
whelming fire,  when  practicable  from  flank  positions,  to  bear  on  the  section 
indicated  by  the  commander  of  the  troops  as  the  one  to  be  attacked,  direct- 
ing their  fire  preferably  against  the  supporting  points,  but  not  neglecting  to 
prevent  the  advance  of  hostile  reserves,  by  sweeping  the  approaches  in 
rear  of  the  hostile  position.  The  more  thorough  this  bombardment,  the 
smaller  will  be  the  losses  and  the  more  certain  the  success  of  attacker's 
infantry. 

"A  few  batteries  should,  when  necessary,  continue  the  combat 
against  the  hostile  artillery." 

When  the  hostile  artillery  has  discontinued  its  fire,  this  is  not  neces- 
sarily an  indication  that  it  has  been  definitely  defeated,  and  a  few  batteries 
posted  in  readiness  for  immediate  action  should,  therefore,  observe  that 
part  of  it  which  is  still  capable  of  firing  effectively  upon  the  attacking 
troops,  and  silence  it,  when  necessary,  by  vigorous  action. 

But  the  greater  part  of  the  batteries  must  unquestionably  be  used  to 
support  the  infantry  attack.  Each  battery  should  be  prepared  at  all  times 
to  change  target  promptly  for  the  purpose  of  combating  hostile  counter- 
attacks directed  against  a  fiank  of  the  attacking  infantry. 

"The  most  important  duties  of  the  higher  artillery  commander 
consist  of  quickly  grasping  and  correctly  distributing  the  tasks  falling 
at  this  stage  of  the  combat  to  the  lot  of  the  various  units,  and  of  making 
an  appropriate  disposition  cf  the  available  ammunition.  To  perform  these 
duties  properly,  the  artillery  commander  must  be  fully  informed  of  the  in- 
tentions of  the  commander  of  the  troops  and  must  correctly  estimate  the 
situation." 

The  necessity  of  keeping  up  the  artillery  fire  until  just  before  the 
assault,  is  not  emphasized  as  forcibly  as  in  the  German  regulations.  "As 
soon  as  the  artillery  finds  that  it  can  no  longer  continue  to  fire  on  the  point 
of  attack,  the  batteries  that  have  remained  behind  in  their  position, 
should  direct  their  fire  upon  hostile  reserves  and  the  routes  by  which  they 
are  approaching  the  defensive  position  and  likewise  against  hostile  artillery 
that  appears  for  the  first  time  or  that  reappears  in  action,  always  however, 
remaining  in  readiness  and  prepared  to  combat  hostile  counter-attacks.'* 
In  case  the  attack  succeeds,  "a  part"  of  the  batteries  is  to  hasten  forward 
into  the  captured  position. 

"When  the  action  is  being  broken  off,  the  artillery  should  gain  time 
for  its  own  troops  to  effect  an  orderly  retreat.    It  will  usually  be  advis- 


Austria.  457 

able  to  assign  a  part  of  the  artillery  to  the  infantry  reserves,  and  have  it 
take  up,  when  practicable  off  the  line  of  retreat,  a  suitable  position  upon 
which  the  advanced  troops  can  rally. 

"The  flanks  must  be  watched  at  all  times,  as  the  opponent  can  most 
effectively  operate  against  the  line  of  retreat  from  their  direction.  Flank 
positions  should  be  used  in  order  to  force  the  enemy  to  make  changes  of 
front  that  will  entail  loss  of  time,  and  to  prevent  one's  own  fire  from  being 
masked  by  the  troops  that  are  retiring  directly  to  the  rear." 

The  regulations  recommend  that,  in  pursuit,  single  batteries  sup- 
ported by  cavalry,  be  pushed  ahead  of  the  infantry. 

In  defense,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  artillery  to  command  the  ground 
over  which  the  attacker  will  have  to  pass,  so  as  to  make  it  difficult  for  him 
to  approach  the  position,  and  in  conjunction  with  the  infantry  to  bring 
about  the  failure  of  the  attack,  as  well  as  the  success  of  the  counter-attack. 

In  defense,  greater  importance  is  attached  to  posting  the  artillery 
in  groups,  to  concentrating  the  fire  in  the  various  groups,  and  to  using 
the  terrain  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  enfilade  fire  to  bear  on  the  enemy. 
It  is  a  good  plan  to  detail  small  units  supplied  with  plenty  of  ammunition 
to  bring  flanking  fire  to  bear  and  to  sweep  defiladed  spaces  in  the  foreground. 
In  exceptional  cases,  it  may  likewise  be  advisable  to  employ  at  important 
points  of  the  infantry  position,  single  guns  (demi-platoons)  or  platoons, 
which  are  uncovered  at  the  very  last  moment  and  take  part  in  repelling 
the  infantry  attack.  But  the  available  artillery  must  not  be  split  up  for 
this  purpose  under  any  circumstances.  The  regulations  do  not  specify 
what  the  distance  between  infantry  and  artillery  positions  is  to  be.  When 
the  ground  requires  it,  a  battery  commander  is  not  to  hesitate  to  post 
his  battery  within,  or  at  any  rate,  very  close  to  the  infantry  line. 

It  is  absolutely  essentipl  to  the  solution  of  the  problems  that  con- 
front it  in  the  course  of  an  action,  that  the  artillery  of  the  defense  be  em- 
ployed energetically,  and  that  its  ammunition  be  disposed  of  correctly 
as  required  by  the  tactical  situation.  By  promptly  occupying  good  posi- 
tions one  after  another,  especially  flank  positions,  when  the  ground  admits, 
and  by  developing  at  the  proper  time  a  superior  fire  against  the  most  im- 
portant targets,  skillfully  handled  artillery  of  the  defense  will  be  able  to 
obtain  a  superiority  even  if  the  opponent's  artillery  is  numerically  stronger. 

Night  operations*  In  order  to  avoid  the  heavy  losses  incident  to 
crossing  the  hostile  zone  of  fire  in  attacking  an  enemy  who  occupies  a 
strong  defensive  position,  it  will  often  be  advisable  to  utilize  the  cover  of 
darkness  for  approaching  the  position,  for  deploying  and  for  making  a 
lodgment  at  the  most  effective  ranges,  so  as  to  be  in  readiness  to  make  a 
vigorous  attack  suddenly  at  dawn.  When  darkness  puts  an  end  to  a 
fight,  changes  made  at  night  in  the  dispositions  may  make  it  possible 
suddenly  to  resume  the  fight  with  success.  In  all  these  cases,  the  artillery 
will  play  an  important  part. 

"At  night,  friction  and  mistakes  are  much  more  apt  to  occur  than 
in  the  day  time,  and  otherwise  unimportant  accidents  may  exert  great 
influence  on  the  course  of  events.    It  is  almost  impossible  to  control 


458  Employment  op  Artillery. 

large  bodies  of  troops  on  a  dark  night,  and  rarely  possible  to  count  upon 
the  mutual  cooperation  of  separated  groups.  It  is  also  difficult  to  maintain 
direction  and  to  keep  up  communication.  "It  is,  therefore,  particularly 
important  to  make  all  orders  as  clear,  definite,  and  simple  as  possible,  and 
to  give  subordinate  commanders  thorough  instructions.  The  success  of 
such  night  operations  depends  largely  upon  the  initiative,  resourcefulness 
and  energy  of  the  subordinate  leaders. 

"Accurate  information  of  the  terrain  and  of  the  enemy  is  essential 
to  the  success  of  night  operations.  As  a  rule,  such  information  will  have 
to  be  obtained  the  day  before  by  thorough  reconnaissance.  When  stations 
of  troops  are  changed  during  the  night,  trustworthy  guides  will  be  of  the 
greatest  assistance.  Every  effort  should  be  made  to  surprise  the  enemy. 
This  requires,  above  all  else,  that  complete  silence  be  maintained.  It  is 
also  advisable  to  provide  means  by  which  friendly  troops  may  be  dis- 
tinguished. 

"When  the  infantry  advances  closer  to  the  enemy  under  cover  of 
darkness  while  the  artillery  remains  in  its  positions,  the  latter  should  keep 
up  its  fire  during  the  night  by  the  aid  of  searchlights,  or  by  training  its 
guns  on  previously  designated  targets  before  darkness  sets  in,  and  should 
increase  it  at  daybreak  to  the  maximum  intensity.  In  this  connection, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  commander  of  the  artillery  quickly  to  adapt  himself, 
to  any  changes  in  the  situation  that  may  have  occurred  during  the  night 
by  making  an  appropriate  selection  of  new  targets  and  by  developing  the 
maximum  fire  power  against  the  most  important  targets." 


FRANCE. 

General  Principles  t  1.  There  is  no  artillery  duel  and  no  massed 
fire;  these  are  replaced  by  counter-attack  and  economy  of  forces.  2. 
Targets  are  very  seldom  completely  disabled — it  suffices  to  neutralize 
them.    3.    Success  is  ensured  only  by  the  cooperation  of  the  arms. 

Cooperation  of  infantry  and  artillery*  is  attained  by  the  manner 
in  which  orders  are  issued,  by  accurately  designating  the  points  of  attack, 
and  by  keeping  up  permanent  communication  between  the  artillery,  the 
commander,  and  the  troops.  In  a  circular  issued  in  1907  by  the  Minis- 
try of  War,  attention  is  called  to  the  importance  of  this.  "Frequent 
combined  exercises  of  the  two  arms,  including  when  practicable  the  use  of 
ball  ammunition,  will  enable  officers  to  make  the  same  estimate  of  the 
tactical  situation  existing  at  the  moment  and  to  act  in  mutual  accord. 
Officers  and  men  of  the  infantry  should  become  familiar  with  the  physical 


*NiBS8Bii,  Chefdt  batailUm,  ConUdnaison  d99  §fforts  d§  VinfanUrU  et  d§  VarHl- 
l€ri§,  Paris,  1908.  Oh.  Lavausslia.  See  ArtUhristiMche  Monatshefte,  April  and 
September  numbers  1908. — MUmr-Woeh§nbtau,  No.  70  of  1908.  No.  75  of  1907. — 
Revue  militaire  giniraie,  June  number  1908.  Nxbbsbl,  Procidis  de  Liaison  dant  la 
domaine  taetiqtie,  Qeneral  Pbbgin.  La  manoeuwre  de  Lorlanges,  exiaMe  par  le  IS 
corps  le  IZ  eepteni^e  J908. 


France.  459 

and  moral  effect  of  artillery  fire  in  order  to  gain  confidence  in  the  assist- 
ance of  that  arm,  and  to  understand  that  for  its  own  artillery  to  fire  over 
its  heads,  a  proceeding  that  may  become  necessary  sometime,  involves  no 
danger.  The  infantry  should  also  learn  to  take  full  advantage,  by  ad- 
vancing promptly,  of  the  effect  produced  by  the  bursts  of  fire  of  the  artil- 
lery, which  prevent  the  enemy,  when  he  shows  himself,  from  using  his 
weapons.  In  employing  such  bursts  of  fire,  on  the  other  hand,  the  artil- 
lery should  know  how  often  and  for  how  long  they  can  be  used  in  view  of 
the  ammunition  available.  The  two  arms  can  learn  to  cooperate  in  this 
manner,  only  when  they  are  continually  associated  together  in  combined 
exercises.  Such  exercises  are,  therefore,  an  indispensable  preliminary 
condition  to  success  in  war." 

General  Gallieni,  late  commanding  general  of  the  XlVth  Army 
Corps,  stationed  at  Lyons,  lays  down  the  following :  "In  order  that  mutual 
cooperation  may,  at  all  times,  be  attained,  the  commander  of  the  whole 
force  and  the  commanders  of  the  artillery,  should  be  thoroughly  familiar 
with  the  principles  of  the  infantry  and  artillery  regulations  and  should 
always  keep  in  touch  with  the  tactical  situation  and  the  needs  and  inten- 
tions of  the  infantry; — in  other  words,  orient  each  other  continually. 
To  this  end,  the  artillery  should  detail  an  ofidcer  permanently  to  accompany 
the  infantry  that  is  engaged.  This  officer  should  keep  the  commander  of 
the  artillery  in  constant  touch  with  affairs  by  means  of  mounted  orderlies, 
visual  signals,  and  telephone.  Furthermore,  the  attack  must  not  be  rushed 
through  as  is  so  often  done  during  maneuvers,  at  the  expense  of  reality, 
otherwise  the  situation  and  intentions  can  not  be  transmitted  during  lulls 
in  the  action  and  the  artillery  can  not  take  adequate  steps  to  remove  the 
obstacles  that  check  the  infantry."  General  Gallieni  demanded  a  complete 
fusion  of  the  activities  of  the  two  arms  and  consequently  increased  con- 
fidence of  the  infantry  in  its  artillery,  as  the  factor  indispensable  to  success. 

In  practice,  the  French  have  gone  farther  than  their  regulations 
(pars.  624,  625,  and  619),  which  left  the  duty  of  selecting  a  target  to  the 
commander  of  the  artillery  after  he  had  been  informed  of  the  intentions 
of  the  commander  of  the  troops.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  artillery  can 
properly  cooperate  with  the  infantry,  only  when  the  former  is  apprised 
of  the  wishes  of  the  infantry  and  when  both  arms  are  familiar  with  their 
own  and  each  other's  sphere  of  action.  Since  all  European  artilleries 
have  adopted  gun  shields,  the  French  artillery  shows  an  even  greater  pref- 
erence for  masked  positions  than  formerly,*  and,  in  connection  therewith, 
distribution  in  groups,  in  order  to  facilitate  observation  and  fire  direction, 
which  is  difficult  in  long  artillery  lines.    In  all  exercises,  the  battalion 


*Lii  Bond,  L9  canon  d  Hr  rajHde  et  Vinstruction  de  VarHllerte,  1906.  (MiHUlr* 
Wochinblatt,  No.  61.  of  1906).  General  Lanolois'  views  are  briefly  discussed  la 
Landausb.  Merkjmnkte  fUr  dtn  Batteriectuf,  Berlin.  1908. 

Contribution  aux  exercises  de  tir  en  pleins  champs  par  le  o^nirtLl  Goiran. 
Reeue  mil.  gintrale»  February-March  number  of  1907. 

BonBQBT  (Capitaine,  officier  d*ordonnance  de  giniral  commandant  de  XIII 
corps  d'armte),  Paris.  1908-  Discussed  in  ArtilUristische  Monatshefte,  January- 
February  number  1908,  Zur  modemen  Artillerietaktik. 


460  Employment  op  Artillery. 

organisation  is  to  be  kept  intaet  whenever  poaiible.  Tbe  French  do  not 
propoee  to  engage  in  a  decisive  artillery  combat  before  the  infantry  action 
begina.  Such  an  artillery  combat  would  coet  a  large  amount  of  ammuni- 
tion without  bringing  about  an  adequate  result.  They  endeavor  to  gain 
the  superiority  of  artillery  fire,  but  in  carrying  out  the  attack,  they  are 
satisfied  with  neutralising,  with  crippling  the  hostile  artillery.  Conse- 
quently, they  use  only  as  many  guns  for  this  subsidiary  task, "  as  are  deemed 
necessary  to  attain  the  desired  end  in  the  minimum  time."  (Par.  620, 
French  F.  A.  D.  R.)  As  the  hostile  guns  can  not  be  counted  as  of  old» 
the  French  do  not  oppose  battery  by  battery,  but  are  content  to  assign  a 
certain  number  of  batteries  the  task  of  firing  upon  a  definite  front.  When 
a  battery  uses  sweeping  fire  (tir  fauehant),  it  is  expected  to  cover  a  front 
of  200  m.  at  the  most  effective  ranges.*  The  remaining  batteries  are 
posted  in  observation  (poaUion  de  turveiUanee),  at  the  disposal  of  the 
commander  of  the  artillery,  ready  to  deluge  any  visible,  profitable  target 
with  an  annihilating  hail  of  fragments.  This  procedure  is  a  result  of  the 
unwieldiness  of  the  French  mat^el  and  of  the  fact  that,  when  posted  in  a 
masked  position,  more  time  is  required  to  change  target,  t  Single 
batteries,  their  guns  posted  at  large  intervals  (4  guns  to  a  front  of  200  m.), 
are  to  serve  the  purpose  of  drawing  the  enemy's  fire  (decoy  batteries, 
batteriea  d*armoree)t,  while  the  majority  of  the  batteries  remains  posted 
in  observation,  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  mistake  made  by  the 
enemy. 

Attack.  When  the  infantry  prepares  to  begin  the  attack,  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  cripple  the  hostile  artillery  with  as  small  a  number  of 
guns  as  possible,  and  to  fire  on  the  point  of  attack  with  the  greatest  avail- 
able number  of  batteries.  The  French  incline  to  the  opinion  that  the 
fire  of  their  artillery  can  overcome  any  check  produced  by  the  effect  of 
the  enemy's  weapons,  enable  the  attacking  troops  to  approach  the  enemy 
almost  unmolested,  and  protect  them  from  any  counter-attack.  The 
rafale  is  to  be  a  shield  for  every  movement,  whether  this  be  made  to  the 
front  or  to  the  rear.  The  desired  object  is  attained  when  the  defender 
seeks  cover,  or  when  a  curtain  of  smoke  is  stretched  before  him,  which 
prevents  him  from  seeing  and  combating  the  assaulting  troops.  The  effect 
produced  should  be  so  great  that  the  hostile  force  fired  upon  will  reqture 
considerable  time  to  regain  its  equilibrium. 


*See  Artilleriatische  M(maishefte,  December  number  of  1908.  p.  418. 

tAccordlng  to  an  artdde  by  General  Percin  in  the  Bevue  militaire  giniralt 
(February.  1907),  4H  minutes  were  required  to  switch  the  Are  to  a  target  located 
000  meters  to  a  flank.  The  observation  station  was  at  some  distanoe  from  the  bat- 
tery, which  was  posted  in  a  masked  position. 

XRe9u$  militaire  ginirale,  1907,  p.  223.  Progreesive  fire  with  sweeping  (Hr 
progressif  avec  fauchage)  ttom.  a  single  piece  is  to  be  used.  1.  e.,  four  rounds  In  suc- 
cession, so  as  to  create  the  impression  that  a  battery  and  not  a  single  gun  is  in  posi- 
tion. The  battery  should  not  open  fire  until  the  bulk  of  the  artillery  is  ready  for 
action,  and  then  preferably  f^m  a  point  where  the  enemy  might  weU  expect  the 
bulk  of  the  artillery  to  come  into  action. 


France.  461 

As  is  80  often  the  case  in  French  regulations,  the  authors  are  generous 
in  the  extreme  on  the  one  hand,  only  to  depreciate  the  value  of  their  work 
on  the  other.  According  to  the  Revue  milUaire  gSnSrale,  the  attacking 
infantry  will  be  able  to  reach  the  hostile  position,  800  m.  from  its  own  initial 
firing  position,  in  sixteen  50  m.  nishes,  each  consuming  fifteen  seconds, 
and  interrupted  by  fifteen  breathing  spells,  each  from  one  to  one  and  one- 
half  minutes  long.  During  the  rushes,  the  artillery  is  to  fire  four  rounds 
per  gun  per  minute,  and  during  the  breathing  spells  from  nine  to  ten  rounds 
per  gun  per  minute.  Technically,  this  is  entirely  feasible,  as  it  amounts 
to  160  rounds  per  gun.  ''Every  rafale  of  the  artillery  will  either  cause  the 
most  advanced  line  to  make  a  rush,  or  the  troops  of  the  rear  line  to  come 
up  to  the  firing  line,  in  order  to  reinforce  it  or  to  carry  it  forward  as  much 
as  possible.  Thus  the  rafale  becomes  a  veritable  shield  for  the  infantry." 
But  the  regulations  at  the  same  time  state  that  the  artillery  can  continue 
to  fire  over  the  infantry,  only  so  long  as  the  latter  has  not  approached  closer 
than  within  500  m.  of  the  enemy.  In  other  words,  from  the  moment  that  it 
arrives  at  a  point  500  m.  from  the  enemy,  the  infantry  can  no  longer  count, 
in  general,  on  the  active  support  of  the  artillery,  though  that  is  the  very 
thing  upon  which  the  whole  method  of  attack  is  based. 

The  French  have  paid  special  attention  to  the  duties  of  the  batteries 
that  are  to  support  the  infantry  attack.  The  artillery  is  to  perform  the 
following  duties: 

1.  It  is  directly  to  prepare  the  infantry  attack.     In  the  service, 

the  batteries  detailed  for  this  task,  are  popularly  called  infantry  or 
breaching  batteries. 

2.  It  is  to  remove  anything  that  might  interfere  with  the  attack 
of  the  infantry,  whether  such  interference  consist  of  a  hostile  flank  attack, 
or  of  artillery  that,  once  silenced,  resumes  firing.  Batteries  charged  with 
this  duty  are  called  counter  batteries  {conlrebaiteriea)  and  counter- 
attack batteries  (batteries  de  eorUreaUaqiie).  As  soon  as  the  position  is 
taken,  the  counter-attack  batteries  hurry  at  once  into  it. 

3.  It  is  to  provide  some  batteries  to  accompany  the  infantry  attack. 
These  are  known  as  accompanying  batteries  {batteries  d'accompagifie-' 
menO**  These  batteries  follow  the  infantry  from  one  position  to  another 
(for  example  from  a  position  2,000  m.  from  the  enemy,  to  one  1,000  m. 
and  then  to  one  500  m.  from  the  enemy).  Rather  than  arrive  too  late  with 
the  whole  battery,  it  is  better  to  work  only  one-half  of  the  guns.  The 
number  of  batteries  to  be  assigned  to  the  various  permanent  tasks  should 
be  determined  by  the  commander  of  the  artillery  in  each  case  as  necessity 
arrives  therefor.  Battalion  organizations  need  not  be  kept  intact,  and 
provisional  battalions  may  have  to  be  formed  to  meet  the  problems  that 
arise. 

Our  attention  is,  in  the  first  place,  claimed  by  the  breaching  or  in- 
fantry batteries,  for  it  is  upon  the  effect  of  their  fire  that  the  success  of 
the  attack  mainly  depends.    They  should  be  crushed  by  the  fire  of  all 

^According  to  ao  example  cited  in  the  Revue  militaire  ginirale  (February 
number  of  1907).  17  batteries  were  used  as  foUows:  8  as  counter,  3  as  infantry.  8  as 
accompanying  batteries,  and  3  to  coyer  the  flanks. 


462  Employment  of  Artillery. 

available  howitzer  and  gun  batteries  of  the  defender  before  the  infantry 
aault  begins.  At  maneuvers,  it  has  frequently  been  observed  that  assign- 
ment of  batteries  \a  made  prematurely  so  that  infantry  batteries  have 
to  change  target  again  and  fire  upon  artillery.  Infantry  batteries*  can 
fulfiU  their  mission,  only  when  their  own  and  the  hostile  firing  lines  can 
be  seen  from  the  battery  positions.  It  will  f req  uently  not  even  be  desirable 
for  an  infantry  battery  to  act  as  a  unit,  and  chiefs  of  platoon  must  act  on 
their  own  initiative.  This  requires  that  the  masked  position  be  given 
up  and  that  an  unmasked  position  be  occupied.    But  as  soon  as  infantry 


I  fires  upon  the  hostile  infantry,  and  is  in  turn  fired  upon  by  1  and  2, 
whose  fire  is  returned  by  II»  which  is  sheltered  by  the  wooda 
against  fire;  ^  •  jj 

III  fires  upon  the  infantry  of  the  counter-attack  (Ca),  and  in  return 
receives  fire  from  3  to  which 

IV  replies  without  bothering  about  the  fire  directed  against  it  by  4. 
Should  5  now  open  fire  against  I»  this  may  (but  need  not)  be  an- 
swered by  IIIa»  and  certainly  not  by  I- 


*R9Vii§  d'infanUrie,  of  November  15th  and  December  15th,  1009. 


Prance.  463 

batteries  occupy  unmasked  positions,  they  will  be  exposed  to  the  fire  of 
the  hostile  artillery,  to  which  they  must  pay  no  attention,  on  principle, 
for  that  is  the  business  of  the  counter  batteries.  But  while  the  infantry 
batteries,  thanks  to  their  shields,  can  treat  the  hostile  artillery  fire  with 
indifference,  the  defender's  artillery,  which  is  usually  firing  from  masked 
positions,  will  not  need  to  bother  about  the  fire  of  the  counter  batteries. 
The  batteries  designated  to  repel  the  infantry  attack,  as  they  will  frequently 
have  to  occupy  an  unmasked  position,  are  the  only  ones  that  will  suffer 
from  the  fire  of  the  counter  batteries.  When  the  batteries  of  the  defense 
are  so  posted  that  the  flashes  of  their  guns  will  not  betray  the  position,  the 
attacker  has  very  little  chance  of  crippling  them.  But  batteries  posted 
in  semi-masked  positions  will  often  be  forced  to  switch  their  fire  from  the 
infantry  batteries  upon  the  counter  batteries.  The  sketches  contained 
in  Major  Bourguet's  book  show  how  these  counter  batteries  rest  on 
patches  of  timber  and  on  villages,  which  in  part  hide  the  flashes  of  the  guns. 
The  French  artillery,  on  principle,  refuses  to  reply  to  the  fire  of  the  artil- 
lery that  fires  upon  it  and  that  endeavors  to  induce  it  to  divert  its  fire  from 
its  target,  but  directs  its  fire,  instead,  upon  a  target  that  is  firing  in  another 
direction  (contreatUique,  par.  631,  French  F.  A.  D.  R.).  The  result  is 
oblique  fire,  which  is  frequently  effective  when  directed  against  batteries 
equipped  with  shields  and  is  not  subject  to  the  same  drawbacks  that  arise 
when  the  enemy's  adjustment  has  progressed  pretty  far. 

The  employment  of  French  artillery  is  characterized  by  the  follow- 
ing: Each  artillery  unit  is  given  a  definite,  concrete  task,  which  it  must 
accomplish  without  changing  position  or  target  and  without  bothering 
about  the  effect  of  the  enemy's  fire.  Even  when  the  hostile  artillery  is 
superior,  the  latter's  attention  must  be  so  completely  occupied  that  it 
will  not  dare  shift  its  fire  from  the  attacking  artillery  to  other  targets. 

General  Goiran  estimates  that  the  following  ammunition  will  be 
required  for  the  attack  proper:* 

(a)  Preparation  of  the  Attack: 

6  infantry  batteries  on  a  front  of  900 
m., adjustment,  4  rafales 22  rounds  per  gun«528  rounds; 

6  counter  batteries,  adjustment  and 
10  rafales  with  sweeping 40       "        "     "  =960      " 

6  counter-attack  batteries,  adjust- 
ment   .12        "       "      "  =144      " 

Total 1,632  rounds. 

(6)     Attack  Proper: 

6  infantry  batteries 136  rounds  per  gun=  3,264  rounds; 

6  counter  batteries 80      "         "    "=1,920       " 

3  accompanying  batteries 60      "        "    "  «     720      " 

8  counter-attack  batteries —      "        "    "  «      -^      " 

Total 6,904  rounds. 

*B€9U$  tnilitair§  girUrale,  1907,  p.  144. 


464  Employment  of  Artillery. 

Infantry  batteries  and  counter  batteries  use  up  more  ammunition 
than  they  have  available  in  their  firing  batteries  (158  and  120  rounds, 
respectively,  whereas,  they  have  but  108  rounds  apiece).  It  is,  therefore, 
imperatively  necessary  to  provide  for  replenishment  of  ammunition 
before  the  attack,  which  eats  up  about  half  of  the  ammunition  carried  by 
the  ammunition  columns  of  a  corps. 


JAPAN. 

Since  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  no  material  changes  have  been  made 
in  the  Japanese  regulations,  which  are  a  reproduction  of  German  service 
regulations.  A  battery  carries  thirty-six  rounds  of  ammunition  in  each 
of  its  six  gun  limbers,  thirty-six  rounds  in  each  of  its  six  caisson  limbers, 
and  sixty-four  rounds  in  each  of  its  six  caisson  bodies.  The  caissons  of 
the  batteries  are  not  armored  and  do  not  form  part  of  the  firing  battery 
(Gefechtshatterie).  Each  piece  has  available  136  rounds  in  the  firing  bat- 
tery and  reserve,  and  76  rounds  (including  25  rounds  of  shell)  in  the  light 
ammunition  column  of  the  regiment.  Particular  stress  is  laid  upon  the 
cooperation  of  infantry  and  artillery,  and  the  latter  is  warned  not  to  over- 
estimate the  value  of  masked  positions.  In  consequence,  the  artillery 
now  fires  by  preference  from  unmasked  or  from  semi-masked  positions. 
The  disadvantages  of  the  semi-masked  and  the  unmasked  positions  are  to  be 
minimized  by  skillful  selection  of  the  position,  by  use  of  masks  and  dummy 
works,  and  by  {posting  the  caissons  15  m.  in  rear  of  the  line  of  guns.  When 
practicable,  the  guns  are  to  Umber  up  under  cover.  A  battery  may  effect 
a  change  of  position  even  by  gun  or  by  platoon,  the  guns  that  remain  behind 
meantime  enveloping  the  enemy  in  a  cloud  of  smoke.  Observation 
stations  are  to  be  carefully  prepared,  masked,  and  intrenched.  Telephone 
lines  have  been  found  very  susceptible  to  damage  and  serve  only  for  com- 
munication with  higher  commanders.  In  the  organizations  themselves, 
communication  is  to  be  kept  us  by  means  of  visual  signals,  megaphones, 
and  orderlies.  The  adjustment  of  fire  is  effected  as  in  the  German  artil- 
lery. While  the  battery  commander  observes  from  one  flank  of  the  battery, 
an  assistant  may  sometimes  observe  from  the  other.  This  is  of  material 
assistance  to  the  battery  commander,  and  considerably  accelerates  the 
adjustment.  The  Japanese  pass  directly  from  fire  for  adjustment  to 
salvos  and  volley  fire.  In  progressive  fire  the  range  is  increased  by  100  m. 
after  each  round. 

In  attack,  the  Japanese  propose  to  draw  the  enemy's  fire  with  decoy 
batteries  and  to  overwhelm  him  with  the  bulk  of  their  artillery  posted  in 
groups  in  observation.  They  do  not  intend  to  bring  the  bulk  of  their  artil- 
lery into  action  against  the  defender  with  the  intention  of  crippling  him, 
until  the  infantry  attack  begins.  The  artillery  will  often  facilitate  the 
advance  of  the  infantry  by  increasing  the  intensity  of  its  fire  and  by  envelop- 
ing the  enemy  with  a  cloud  of  smoke.    It  is  considered  desirable  to  have  ar- 


England.  465 

tillery  accompany  the  infantry  attack  (mountain  artillery)  particularly  for 
the  purpose  of  annihilating  machine  guns. 

Defense.  The  importance  of  flanking  fire  in  repelling  an  attack 
is  emphasized.  The  counter-attack  is  to  be  accompanied  by  batteries 
that  are  not  already  posted  in  the  first  line.  In  engagements  lasting  sev- 
eral days,  it  is  considered  an  advantage  to  occupy  successive  positions. 


ENGLAND. 

Attack.  The  secondary  attack  is  to  induce  the  defender  to  launch 
and  to  use  up  his  reserves;  the  main  attack  is  to  be  made  suddenly, 
when  necessary  at  night,  infantry  and  artillery  co5perating  closely. 
If  the  artillery  of  the  defense  opens  fire,  the  artillery  of  the  attack  is  to 
reply,  in  order  to  force  it  to  divert  its  fire  from  the  attacking  infantry. 
For  artillery  to  change  position  by  moving  forward  so  as  to  remain  in  close 
touch  with  its  infantry,  is  considered  desirable  but  seldom  practicable, 
except  at  night. 

Communication  between  infantry  and  artillery  commanders  is 
considered  very  important  and  is  to  be  provided  whenever  circumstances 
permit.  Orders  for  the  infantry  attack  are  to  be  communicated  to  the 
commander  of  the  artillery  and  arrangements  made  to  enable  the  guns  to 
continue  firing  until  the  very  last  moment.  The  most  effective  way  to 
support  the  infantry  is  to  concentrate  the  fire  of  guns  and  howitzers  upon 
the  point  of  attack.  The  shrapnel  of  the  former  will  ''nail"  the  enemy  to 
his  trenches,  force  him  to  keep  under  cover,  interfere  with  his  aim,  and 
divert  his  attention  from  the  advancing  infantry.  The  fire  of  the  howit- 
zers, whether  shrapnel  or  lyddite  shell,  will  sweep  the  interior  of  the  hostile 
shelter  trenches  and  the  approaches  to  the  latter,  and  will  delay  the  move- 
ment of  reinforcements  to  the  threatened  points.  In  case  the  artillery 
of  the  assailant  was  forced  to  cease  firing  in  view  of  the  superiority  of  the 
hostile  artillery  fire,  it  must  resume  firing  at  any  cost  when  it  becomes 
necessary  to  support  its  infantry,  to  ward  off  an  attack  made  against  the 
latter,  or  to  repel  a  counter-attack.  When  the  infantry  has  approached 
so  close  to  the  hostile  position  as  to  mask  the  fire  of  the  guns,  the  latter  are 
to  increase  their  elevation  and  to  keep  up  their  fire,  so  as  to  sweep  the  ground 
in  rear  of  the  hostile  position  and  to  prevent  hostile  reserves  from  advanc- 
ing. 

As  soon  as  the  hostile  position  is  taken,  every  available  gun  is  to 
hurry  forward  to  fire  upon  the  retreating  enemy,  to  maintain  the  captured 
position,  and  to  repel  an  offensive  return. 

In  defense,  the  artillery  may  be  employed  either  in  mass  or,  when 
the  enemy  has  a  superior  number  of  guns,  dispersed,  i.  e.,  by  battery  or 
platoon.  Opportunities  to  bring  enfilade  or  oblique  fire  to  bear  and  to 
sweep  certain  areas  with  a  cross  fire  from  the  dispersed  groups,  should 
never  be  neglected.    At  the  same  time,  the  artillery  should  endeavor  to 


1 


466  Employment  of  Artillery. 

prevent  the  enemy  from  delivering  oblique  or  enfilade  fire.  As  a  rule,  it 
is  desirable  to  attach  artillery  to  the  general  reserve,  or  to  hold  it  in  reserve 
with  other  troops  for  use  in  the  counter-attack.  When  it  appears  inadvis- 
able to  place  all  the  artillery  in  action  at  decisive  ranges,  it  will  always  be 
a  good  plan  to  despatch  mobile  batteries  to  the  points  where  their  presence 
might  become  necessary.  If  the  artillery  has  no  chance  to  win  in  the  artil- 
lery combat,  it  is  to  be  used  to  repel  the  attack,  to  force  the  hostile  infantry 
to  reply  prematurely,  and  to  batter  the  hostile  artillery  while  the  latter  is 
advancing.  In  warding  off  the  infantry  attack,  special  tasks  will  have  to 
be  assigned.  Some  batteries  will  have  to  give  up  their  masked  positions 
in  order  to  repel  the  attack,  whereas  others  stand  prepared  to  prevent 
the  hostile  guns  from  concentrating  their  whole  fire  power  against  those 
batteries.  It  is  considered  particularly  important  to  distribute  the  heavy 
artillery  among  the  various  parts  of  the  position,  as  this  best  enables  the 
defense  to  bring  effective  fire  to  bear  upon  the  advancing  hostile  troops, 
no  matter  from  which  direction  they  may  be  coming,  and  to  force  the  enemy 
to  deploy  prematurely. 


RUSSIA. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  the  Russian  artillery 
suffered  from  a  want  of  familiarity  with  its  new  materiel.  The  Russian 
regulations  were  obsolete  and  in  no  way  adapted  to  the  changed  matMel. 
Although  these  regulations  specified  that,  upon  gaining  contact  with  the 
enemy,  aggressive  action  was  to  be  the  keynote  of  all  operations,  it  is  a 
fact  that  commanders  of  troops  were  singularly  averse  to  assume  the 
offensive.  The  requirement  that  as  many  guns  as  possible  be  brought  into 
action  from  the  very  start  was  inconsistent  with  the  demand  that  a  reserve 
of  artillery  be  maintained.  During  the  whole  course  of  the  campaign, 
the  Russian  artillery  evinced  a  disposition  to  fire  at  long  range.  This  was 
partly  due  to  the  character  of  the  terrain  and,  in  the  opening  fights  of  the 
war,  to  the  desire  to  keep  the  Japanese  at  a  distance  by  bombarding  them 
with  shrapnel  that  was  known  to  have  a  greater  range  than  that  of  the 
Japanese.    The  artillery  was  to  avoid  firing  over  friendly  troops. 

According  to  the  Russian  Aitillery  Firing  Regulations,  a  battery 
is  permitted  to  fire  over  other  troops  in  exceptional  cases  only,  the  battery 
commander  being  held  personally  responsible.  Even  in  such  exceptional 
cases,  it  is  to  fire  over  other  troops,  only  when  all  danger  of  striking  these 
troops  is  precluded  and  there  is  no  likelihood  of  their  being  alarmed  by  the 
shrieking  of  the  projectiles  that  pass  over  their  heads. 

"None  of  the  regulations  of  other  armies  contains  such  strict  rules, 
which,  in  addition,  admit  of  any  number  of  interpretations  as  to  the  feasi- 
bility of  firing  over  friendly  troops.  It  is  due  to  these  rules  that  in  our 
last  war,  the  artillery  very  often — to  be  sure,  in  the  opening  engagements 
only — ceased  firing  at  the  very  moment  when  the  fight  had  reached  its 


Russia.  467 

most  critical  stage.  Later  on,  all  this  changed.  Firing  over  friendly 
troops  became  the  rule,  and  the  men  listened  with  pleasure  to  the  shrieking 
projectiles  that  passed  over  their  heads,  for  they  knew  that  their  artillery 
was  fighting  with  them  and  helping  them."* 

In  defense,  the  construction  of  artificial  cover  was  to  be  restricted 
to  the  minimum  required,  in  order  that  freedom  of  action  might  not  be 
sacrificed.  Russian  artillerists  showed  a  preference  for  the  French  views 
of  fire  tactics,  and  followed  the  teaching  of  General  Langlois.  They  failed 
to  bear  in  mind  that  the  French  regulations  were  specially  designed  for 
batteries  equipped  with  shields  and,  further,  that  it  was  Langlois  who 
demanded  that  the  infantry  be  vigorously  supported  by  its  sister  arm,  and 
this  support  was  not  furnished  during  the  Russo-Japanese  war.  Langlois 
recommends  masked  positions,  but  he  also  insists  that  the  battery  com- 
mander observe  and,  at  the  same  time,  direct  the  fire  of  his  battery.  The 
practice,  borrowed  from  the  French,  of  distributing  duties  among  the  var- 
ious batteries,  combined  with  their  own  penchant  for  forming  reserves 
could  lead  to  but  one  result,  viz.,  the  Russians  never  obtained  an  actual 
superiority  of  artillery  fire.  In  contrast  to  the  French  artillery,  the  Rus- 
sian artillery  fought  at  first  on  principle  in  unmasked  positions,  and  did 
not  adopt  masked  positions  until  it  had  suffered  several  defeats.  The 
views  of  commanders  of  troops  and  commanders  of  artillery  clashed.  As 
a  consequence,  artillery  commanders  encountered  unnecessary  difftculties. 
The  Russian  artillery  fought  almost  exclusively  in  defense;  its  tactics 
were  characterized  by  long  range  fire,  by  searching  fire,  and  by  distri- 
bution in  groups,  in  masked  positions.  The  guns  were  frequently  posted 
as  much  as  400  m.  in  rear  of  a  crest. 

New  combat  regulations  are  in  course  of  preparation.  The  inclina- 
tion, prevalent  up  to  a  short  time  ago,  of  fighting  exclusively  in  masked 
positions,  is  counteracted  by  more  rational  views.  Great  importance  is 
attached  to  thorough,  unhurried  reconnaissance,  and  to  the  use  of  recon- 
naissance parties.  The  defender  is  to  be  held  all  along  the  front,  and  the  bulk 
of  the  artillery  is  not  to  go  into  action  until  the  point  of  attack  is  recog- 
nized. 

The  principal  duty  of  the  artillery  consists  of  supporting  the  infantry. 
During  the  preparatory  stage  of  the  action,  "decoy  platoons,"  f  endeavor 
to  draw  the  hostile  fire,  the  bulk  of  the  artillery  then  coming  into  action 
against  the  hostile  artillery  until  the  superiority  of  fire  is  attained.  As 
soon  as  this  is  accomplished,  the  bulk  of  the  artillery  is  to  direct  its  fire  upon 
the  point  of  attack,  the  remainder  is  to  keep  down  the  fire  of  the  hostile 
artillery.     In  general,  the  fire  fight  with  the  hostile  artillery  is  conducted 


*Ru3sian  Artillery  Journal,  December  number  \905. 

tOoIonel  NoviKOV  is  authority  for  the  statement  that  the  Japanese  drew  the 
RuBsian  fire  by  pushing  forward  platoons  of  mountain  artillery,  which  offered  but  a 
small  target  and  could  disappear  quickly  and  then  deluged  the  Russian  artillery  with 
fire  fW>m  another  direction.  (A  translation  of  Oolonel  Novikov's  book  appeared 
in  the  December  1906  and  January  1907  numbers  of  the  Journal  dea  aetences  milU 
tairea). 


468  Employment  op  Artillery. 

from  a  single  podUon,  but  u  soon  as  the  superiority  of  fire  has  been  gained, 
and  good  positions  are  located  farther  to  the  front,  a  part  of  the  batteries 
ii  to  go  forward  to  occupy  them  with  the  intention  of  enfilading  the  enemy. 
When  the  infantry  has  approached  to  within  360  or  400  m.  of  the  hostile 
position,  the  artillery  is  to  sweep  the  ground  in  rear  and  flank  of  that  posi- 
tion and  to  inflict  damage  upon  the  reserves  and  adjoining  troops  of  the 
enemy. 

In  defense,  the  artillery  is  to  occupy  masked  and  semi-masked  posi- 
tions. During  the  artillery  combat,  its  observation  stations  are  to  be  in 
advance  and  intrenched.  Telephone  lines  are  to  be  laid  underground. 
Single  guns  or  platoons  may  be  pushed  forward  for  fire  for  adjustment. 
A  second  position,  from  which  it  can  repel  the  infantry  attack,  is  to  be 
prepared.  According  to  the  regulations,  it  may  likewise  be  a  good  plan 
to  push  forward  a  few  guns  for  repelling  the  assault.  The  regulations 
state  than  an  attacker  will  find  it  exceedingly  difiScult  to  locate  the  true 
position  among  this  maze  of  dummy  works,  masks,  supporting  points, 
shelter  and  cover  trenches. 

General  Woronzov-Dashkov  warns  the  artillery  not  to  betray  the 
position  by  prematurely  opening  fire.  He  maintains  that  the  defender 
need  not  reply  to  the  long  range  fire  of  the  assailant  at  all,  or  could  take 
small  units  out  of  the  position  for  this  purpose  and  thus  mislead  the  at- 
tacker. 

The  defender  is  vitally  interested  in  combining  a  large  number  of 
guns  for  repelling  the  hostile  attack;  he  must  see  to  it  that  each  one  of  the 
routes  over  which  the  enemy  la  likely  to  advance  is  at  once  vigorously 
swept  by  the  fire  of  the  battery  assigned  to  that  front,  the  so-called  "combat 
section  battery. "  When  the  position  is  very  extensive,  some  of  the  batteries 
are  to  be  kept  in  reserve  for  the  time  being,  and  not  brought  into  action 
beside  the  "combat  section  batteries,"  until  it  is  clearly  apparent  from 
which  direction  the  hostile  attack  is  coming. 


VIII.    MOUNTAIN  ARTILLERY.* 

The  demand  that  artillery  support  the  infantry  in 
mountain  warfare  even  where  wheeled  carriages  can  not 
move,  has  induced  those  states  whose  armies  are  likely  to 
be  called  uix)n  to  operate  in  mountainous  coimtry,  to  form 
mountain  batteries.  The  mat6riel  of  these  batteries  Js 
light  and  transported  in  sections  on  pack  animals,  each 
carrying  a  load  varsring  from  80 — 150  kg.  This  materiel 
has  the  following  characteristic  properties: 

The  guns  can  not  come  into  action  very  quickly,  can 
move  only  at  a  walk  and  are  tmquestionably  inferior  to  field 
guns.  The  replacement  of  ammunition  is  very  slow.  Am- 
mtmition  is  carried  on  pack  animals.  Since  the  mountain 
guns  have  only  a  slightly  longer  range  than  the  latest  in- 
fantry rifles,  the  superiority  of  motmtaia  artillery  over  in- 
fantry is  due  entirely  to  greater  effectiveness  of  its  pro- 
jectiles, greater  ease  of  observing  the  shots  and  greater 
accuracy.  The  Austrian  7  cm.  moimtain  gun,  model  1909, 
a  recoil  gtm  equipped  with  shields,  fires  shell  and  shrapnel, 
and  has  an  extreme  range  of  4,000  m. ;  the  height  of  the  axis 
of  the  piece  in  action  is  64  cm.  The  ammunition  carried 
with  the  battery  amounts  to  76  roimds  of  shrapnel  and  36 
rounds  of  shell  per  gun.  A  battery  of  four  guns  has  about 
70  pack  animals.  Six  pack  animals  are  reckoned  per  gim, 
two  carrying  sixteen  rotmds  of  shell  or  of  shrapnel  each. 
The  projectile  weighs  4.68  kg.  The  10  cm.  mountain  how- 
itzer, model  1908,  is  also  a  recoil  gim  equipped  with  shields. 
The  limber  is  used  only  in  drawing  the  gun.  The  carriage, 
cradle  and  barrel  are  transported  separately  on  wheels, 
and  consequently,  confined  to  moving  on  roads.  Two  am- 
mtmition  pack  animals  carry  six  rounds  of  shell  or  of  shrapnel. 

•See  Takta,  YI»  p.  260,  el ««. 


470  Mountain  Artillery. 

The  maximum  range  of  the  shrapnel  is  5.700  m.,  that  of 
shell  6,000  m.  Each  gun  has  available  60  rounds  of  shell 
(each  weighing  11.7  kg.)  and  60  roimds  of  shrapnel  (each 
weighing  12.7  kg.).* 

In  attack,  mountain  artillery  is  almost  invariably  to 
operate  by  battery.  Specifically,  it  is  to  support  the  ascent 
of  the  infantry,  prevent  the  enemy  from  moving  forward 
from  his  positions,  give  its  infantry  a  chance  to  take  breath- 
ing spells,  and  support  the  infantry  attack  by  firing  on  the 
enemy  from  commanding  positions.  On  the  march,  the  pack 
animals  move  in  single  file,  half  of  the  cannoneers  are  posted 
in  the  lead  to  make  any  repairs  in  the  road  that  may  be  neces- 
sary, and  the  other  half  march  with  the  battery.  The  march 
of  a  moimtain  battery  is  made  more  difficult  by  the  fact  that 
in  ascending  a  mountain  path,  a  pack  mule  accelerates  his 
pace,  whereas  a  man  moves  more  slowly;  and  conversely,  on 
descending  a  man  accelerates  his  pace,  whereas  a  pack  mule 
moves  more  slowly.  In  the  firing  battery,  each  gun  is  im- 
mediately followed  by  one  pack  mule  carrying  ammunition. 
In  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  the  Japanese  used  their  mountain 
gims  with  good  results  to  accompany  their  attacking  in- 
fantry. 

*The  following  will  give  aD  Idea  of  the  strength  and  composition  of  a  mountain 
hhtUttj: 

France  I     4  officers.  226  men.  and  160  horses  and  mules;  4  guns  (80  mm.)  and  2  cais- 
sons;  122K  rounds  of  shrapnel  and  11^  rounds  of  canister  per  gun. 
Austiiai   3  officers,  110  men.  6  horses.  63  mules;  4  guns  C7  cm.)  and  2  caissons;  AS 
rounds  of  shell.  56  rounds  of  shrapnel,  and  8  rounds  of  canister  per  gun. 


IX.     HORSE  ARTILLERY.* 

The  horse  artillery  attached  to  the  independent  cavalry 
increases  the  offensive  and  defensive  power  of  the  cavalry. 
The  fire  of  horse  artillery  is  capable  of  forcing  the  enemy  to 
deploy  his  route  columns  or  of  diverting  them  from  their 
march  direction.  Guns  attached  to  an  independent  part  of  a 
cavalry  division,  may  deceive  the  enemy  and  give  the  divi- 
sion commander  information  of  an  encounter. 

The  commander  of  the  cavalry  decides  whether  he  will 
employ  his  artillery  or  not  (decision  of  the  commander  of 
the  5th  Cavalry  Division  on  the  morning  of  August  16th, 
1870).  He  communicates  his  intentions  to  the  commander 
of  the  artillery  and  issues  the  order  for  the  artillery  to  go  into 
position.  In  case  he  decides  not  to  use  his  artillery,  it  may  be 
left  behind  either  in  observation  or  in  readiness.  The  artil- 
lery commander,  when  necessary,  makes  suitable  suggestions 
to  his  chief  in  regard  to  the  use  of  his  arm. 

In  the  service  of  reconnaissance,  horse  artillery  will 
most  frequently  be  employed  to  break  down  the  resistance 
of  the  enemy,  or  to  increase,  when  requisite,  the  power  of 
resistance  of  the  cavalry.  Sometimes  a  few  platoons,  to 
which  caissons  may  be  attached,  suffice  for  this  purpose. 
(Par.  500,  German  C.  D.  R.).  When  ravines  or  defiles  have 
to  be  crossed  in  retreating  in  face  of  the  enemy,  the  artillery 
should  retire  first  through  the  defile  and  by  its  fire  prevent 
the  enemy  from  pressing  his  ptirsuit.  When  such  ravines 
or  defiles  have  to  be  crossed  in  the  advance,  the  artillery 
should  take  up  a  position  on  a  flank  of  the  defile,  when  practi- 
cable, and  fire  upon  the  enemy  from  that  position  until  the 
cavalry  has  passed  through  the  defile.  (Par.  338,  German 
C.  D.  R.).    The  advance  guard  of  a  cavalry  division  is  pri- 

•Pan.  522-535,  German  F.  A.  D.  R.,  and  i>ani.  497-513.  German  C.  D.  R. 


472  HoRSB  Artillbrt. 

maxily  charged  more  with  protecting  the  main  body  than  with 
fighting.  Accordingly,  artillery  is  assigned  to  the  advance 
guard  in  exceptional  cases  only.  As  the  advance  guard  con- 
sists only  of  about  a  regiment,  the  artillery,  if  assigned  to 
it,  would  prove  nothing  short  of  an  encumbrance.  The 
horse  artillery  battalion  is  usually  posted  in  rear  of  the  ma- 
chine guns  of  the  leading  regiment  of  the  main  body.  This 
best  assures  getting  the  guns  into  action  early.  During  the 
development  for  action,  it  may  be  advisable  to  bring  up  the 
artillery  successively  from  one  position  to  another. 

In  action,  the  artillery,  without  regard  to  the  losses  that 
it  may  suffer  in  consequence,  should  combat  the  target  that 
is  of  decisive  importance.  It  should  quickly  make  the  most 
of  any  weakness  of  the  hostile  artillery.  In  general,  fire 
directed  upon  the  hostile  cavalry  does  not  promise  speedy 
results. 

In  the  action  of  cavalry  against  cavalry,  the  artillery 
should  go  into  position  as  early  as  possible,  in  order  to  sup- 
port first  the  deplojmient  and  then  the  charge  of  its  cavalry. 
Since  the  batteries  move  more  slowly  than  the  escadrons, 
the  commander  of  the  artillery  should,  as  a  rule,  be  the  first 
to  get  his  orders  when  a  deployment  is  contemplated.  It  is 
also  a  good  plan  for  battery  commanders  to  remain  with  their 
battalion  commander  when  the  deployment  of  the  artil- 
lery is  imminent.  It  is  desirable  for  the  horse  artillery  to 
engage  the  hostile  artillery,  only  in  the  event  that  the  cav- 
alry has  not  as  yet  been  launched.  When  the  hostile  cavalry 
is  visible,  the  artillery  should  direct  its  fire  upon  the  leading 
hostile  line  and  crush  it,  so  as  to  ensure  the  success  of  the 
charge  of  its  own  cavalry.  In  case  the  hostile  cavalry  is 
defeated,  it  will  be  immaterial  how  much  the  hostile  artil- 
lery has  been  crippled.  It  is  only  when,  just  before  the  col- 
lision, the  artillery  can  no  longer  fire  upon  the  hostile  cavalry 
without  endangering  its  own  troopers,  that  the  fire  should 
be  directed  upon  the  hostile  artillery.  The  artillery  should 
fire  upon  the  enemy  as  long  as  possible.     This  reqtiires 


Cavalry  Combat.  478 

that  it  take  up  a  position  in  advance  and  to  a  flank  of  the  ren- 
dezvous position  of  the  division.  Such  a  position  Ukewise 
best  protects  a  flank  of  the  advancing  cavahy.  French 
tacticians  very  pedantically  place  this  position  some  200  or 
300  m.  to  a  flank  and  some  600  or  700  m.  in  rear  of  the  area 
in  which  the  collision  will,  in  all  likelihood,  occur.  If  the 
enemy  has  the  same  intention,  the  two  opposing  artillery 
forces  would  have  to  go  into  action  some  600  or  800  m.  from 
each  other.  This  is  impracticable.  The  foregoing  discussion 
shows  how  important  it  is  to  throw  the  artillery  forward  with 
the  utmost  despatch  as  soon  as  the  commander  has  made 
up  his  mind  to  charge.  When  so  thrown  forward,  the  artil- 
lery will  get  ahead  of  the  hostile  artillery,  and  will  force  it  to 
tmlimber  a  long  distance  off.  This  will  prevent  the  hostile 
artillery  from  intervening  in  the  mounted  action  as  effectively 
as  our  own  artillery.  French  tacticians  have  proposed  that 
the  artillery  be  posted  in  front  of  the  center  of  the  concen- 
trated division.  This  is  impracticable  in  most  cases,  as  it 
would  force  the  cavalry  to  make  extensive  turning  move- 
ments. In  many  cases,  it  may  be  advantageous  to  throw 
the  artillery  forward  under  the  protection  of  a  weak  support 
and  then  to  make  an  attack  with  the  entire  division  against 
the  hostile  cavalry  as  soon  as  the  latter  prepares  to  charge 
the  batteries.  Theoretically,  a  position  on  the  interior 
flank  is  the  best,  as  it  constitutes  a  pivot  and  permits  all 
available  forces  to  be  massed  on  the  opposite  flank.  If 
posted  on  the  exterior,  i.  e.,  exposed  flank,  the  artillery  has 
farther  to  go,  hampers  the  movements  of  its  cavalry,  and  is 
very  apt  to  lose  touch  with  the  latter.  No  historical  in- 
stances of  such  artillery  employment  have  come  to  my  know- 
ledge. 

The  artillery  of  the  division,  one  battalion,  is  sent  into 
action  intact,  the  guns  being  posted,  when  necessary,  at 
diminished  intervals.  When  time  is  pressing,  the  fire  of  the 
whole  battaHon  of  artillery,  controlled  by  a  single  person,  is 
required  to  tear  gaps  in  the  hostile  line  and  to  make  the  latter 


474  Horse  Artillery. 

waver.  When  one  battery  is  posted  on  each  flank,  the  move- 
ments of  the  cavahy  would  very  shortly  mask  the  fire  of  one 
of  them.  To  separate  the  two  batteries  of  the  battalion  and 
to  post  them  on  the  flanks,  not  only  scatters  and  impairs 
the  fire  effect,  but  increases  the  difficulties  of  fire  direction 
and  usually  tends  to  hamper  the  movements  of  the  cavalry. 
The  more  rapid  the  course  of  the  action,  the  more  swiftly 
favorable  opportunities  for  firing  pass,  the  more  necessary 
is  it  to  keep  the  artillery  together,  in  order  that  an  intense 
fire  effect  may  be  produced  at  one  point  at  least.  The  very 
nature  of  the  cavalry  action  compels  artillery  to  take  up 
unmasked  positions  and  precludes  a  change  of  position  on 
its  part  before  the  decision.  The  peculiar  character  of 
mounted  actions  will  often  make  it  advisable  to  keep  the  lim- 
bers near  the  guns.  It  may  be  a  good  plan  to  leave  behind 
a  part  of  the  battery  reserves  and  the  ammunition  wagons 
of  the  machine  gun  battery  at  a  sheltered  spot  and  to  assign 
the  light  ammimition  column  to  a  place  ahead  of  the  field 
train. 

The  echelon  or  imit  nearest  to  the  artillery  is  charged 
with  protecting  the  artillery  against  hostile  attacks,  an  order 
to  that  effect  being  unnecessary.  A  special  support  is  as- 
signed to  the  artillery  when  needed,  the  necessity  therefor 
being  determined  in  each  individual  case.  When  the  bat- 
teries are  some  distance  from  the  division,  it  is,  of  course, 
necessary  to  detail  such  a  support,  but  when  they  are  posted 
in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  division  or  are  protected 
by  the  terrain  from  direct  attack,  it  is  usually  a  mistake  to 
detail  a  support,  as  it  reduces  the  effective  strength  of 
the  division. 

When  a  part  of  the  hostile  cavalry  charges  the  artil- 
lery, this  should  be  an  additional  inducement  for  the  cavalry 
commander  to  crush  the  remainder  of  the  opponent.  If 
he  defeats  the  hostile  cavalry,  he  will  regain  not  only  his 
own  artillery,  in  case  that  has  been  captured,  but  almost 
invariably  also  that  of  the  enemy.    The  main  thing  is  to 


Cavalry  Combat.  475 

assure  the  victory  of  the  cavalry,  and  that  is  accomplished 
by  throwing  every  available  trooper  into  the  fight.  In  case 
of  defeat,  one  or  two  escadrons  can  not  save  the  artillery 
anyway,  and  the  latter  may  very  well  be  able  without  as- 
sistance to  repel  isolated  attacks.  The  artillery  commander 
will  have  to  decide  whether  he  ought  to  maintain  his  position 
or  whether  he  should  retire  into  a  rallying  position.  In  any 
case,  it  will  usually  be  too  late  to  adopt  the  latter  course. 

Attacks  from  the  rear  upon  the  artillery  are  by  no  means 
impossible  in  a  cavalry  action.  Should  such  an  attack  be 
made,  the  artillery  can  do  nothing  but  face  about  under  fire 
and  fire  to  the  rear. 

The  conduct  of  Caspari's  Battery  (Vlllth  Army  Corps)  at  Kdnig- 
griitz.* 

'The  battery  held  its  fire  and  received  the  charge  of  the  hostile 
Uhlans  with  canister  at  very  close  range.  Only  a  few  of  the  hostile  troopers, 
who  were  unable  to  turn  in  time,  passed  through  the  gaps  between  the  guns 
and  attempted,  by  making  a  wide  detour,  to  regain  the  part  of  their  regi- 
ment that  was  being  driven  toward  Stresetitz.  Another  attack  made 
against  this  same  battery  by  a  large  body  of  hostile  Uhlans  that  had  been 
held  in  rear  of  the  hostile  left  flank,  was  also  repulsed  by  Captain  Caspar! 
with  canister  at  200  paces.'* 

During  the  campaign  of  1866,  this  maneuver  was  executed  twice  in  the 
Army  of  the  Main,  by  Blottnitz'  Battery  (the  3d  4-pdr.  Battery,  6th  F.  A.) 
at  Langensalza,  and  by  Konig's  Battery  (the  4th  Horse  Battery,  7th  F.  A.) 
at  Hettstadt. 

When  the  cavalry  fights  on  foot,  the  artillery  is  used 
according  to  the  principles  that  govern  its  emplojntnent  in  an 
action  in  which  all  three  arms  are  engaged,  but  the  mobility 
of  the  cavalry  and  the  fact  that  it  is  usually  impossible, 
for  lack  of  time,  to  wait  for  the  artillery  to  produce  its  full 
fire  effect,  should  be  taken  into  account.  In  defense,  it 
may  frequently  be  advisable  to  use  single  platoons  of  artil- 
lery. 

*Al80  the  conduct  of  Ohnoeorge's  Battery  in  front  of  FrOschweller  at  the  battle 
of  worth.     HoFFBAiTBB,  Deutsche  Artillerie,  II,  p.  07. 


476  Horse  Artillbry. 

''The  batteries  assigned  to  the  cavaby  remain  with  it  in 
battle,  as  they  ai^  indispensable  to  that  arm  during  and 
especially  after  the  battle,  in  accomplishing  the  special  tasks 
with  which  it  is  charged.  But  the  cavalry  leader  should 
carefully  consider  whether  the  tactical  situation  does  not  re- 
quire that  his  batteries  be  used  in  conjunction  with  the  rest 
of  the  artillery."     (Par.  506,  German  F.  A.  D.R.). 

The  German  regulations,  contrary  to  the  views  enter- 
tained by  the  French  and  the  Russians,  very  properly  place 
the  decision  of  this  question  in  the  hands  of  the  commander 
of  the  cavalry  division.  When  the  main  battle  is  preceded 
by  an  encounter  of  the  opposing  cavalry  forces,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, was  the  battle  of  Mars-la-Tour,  on  the  morning  of 
August  16th,  1870,  the  horse  batteries  will  quite  naturally 
remain  in  action  and  continue  firing  in  conjunction  with  the 
other  artillery  of  the  various  army  corps. 

When  the  cavalry  is  posted  in  rear  of  the  fighting  line, 
it  can  usually  dispense  with  the  support  of  its  artillery, 
but  when  it  is  posted  on  the  flanks,  it  will  often  sorely  miss 
the  cooperation  of  its  horse  batteries.  At  Vionville,  the 
commander  of  the  10th  German  Field  Artillery  Regiment  re- 
fused to  allow  the  horse  batteries  of  the  5th  Cavalry  Division 
to  rejoin  their  division,  although  he  had  been  requested  to 
return  them.  No  doubt,  these  batteries  could  hardly  be 
spared  where  they  were,  but  on  the  other  hand,  they  could 
have  rendered  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  very  effective  as- 
sistance in  its  fight  on  the  left  flank.  Artillery  is  indispen- 
sable to  a  cavalry  division  when  the  latter  is  charged  with  the 
task  of  operating  against  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy  and  of 
keeping  hostile  reinforcements  away  from  the  battlefield. 

These  views  were  not  sanctioned  in  Germany  until  the  appearance 
of  the  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations  of  1896,  in  which  they  were  incorporated. 
According  to  the  views  formerly  entertained,  for  example,  those  contained 
in  the  F.  A.  D.  R.  of  1892,  horse  batteries  of  the  cavalry  division  were  to 
be  used  in  conjuction  with  the  artillery  of  the  army  corps  and  not  to  rejoin 
their  own  division  until  after  the  battle.  (Example:  Horse  batteries 
of  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  at  Vionville).    Prince  Hohenlohe*  also  held 

Hien,  3U  W„  pp.  418  and  414.     Hohbnlobb,  Briefe  Uber  ArHOerU,  p.  160. 


Prance.  477 

these  views,  arguing  that  in  battle  the  cavalry  division  had  nothing  to 
do  but  reap  the  fruits  of  the  victory  gained  by  the  other  arms,  whereas 
in  the  fight  itself,  the  most  important  thing  was  to  crush  the  hostile  artil- 
lery as  soon  as  possible. 

When  the  horse  batteries  of  a  cavaky  divsion  that  is 
ordered  to  pursue,  are  fighting  as  part  of  the  rest  of  the  artil- 
lery of  the  various  army  corps,  the  cavaky  division  will 
frequently  be  unable  to  get  them  to  join  in  time.  And  even 
if  they  do  join  in  time,  it  will  be  fotmd  that  their  mobility 
has  been  materially  impaired  by  the  protracted  artillery 
combat  in  which  they  have  been  engaged. 

The  4th  Cavalry  Division  did  not  have  the  good  fortune  to  make  a 
charge  at  Loigny,  but,  nevertheless,  it  achieved  notable  success  in  that 
battle,  for  Michel's  Cavalry  Division  evacuated  the  battlefield  before  it; 
the  French  left  wing  was  kept  in  constant  apprehension;  the  advancing 
dd  Division  of  the  XVIIth  Army  Corps  was  diverted  from  its  objective, 
Villepion,  and  its  arrival  at  the  decisive  point  delayed.  While  the  fight 
for  the  possession  of  Loigny  still  raged  furiously,  the  two  batteries  of  the 
4th  Cavalry  Division  were  in  position  near  Gommiers  and  fired  into  the 
rear  of  the  French  masses  concentrated  around  Loigny,  Favrolles,  and 
Villepion.  The  French  artillery  was  in  several  instances  forced  to  turn 
upon  these  batteries.* 

Frances  On  the  march,  the  reserves  may  be  divided  into  two  parts, 
of  which  the  first,  which  consists  of  three  caissons  for  each  battery,  follows 
from  5  to  6  km.  in  rear  of  the  batteries,  the  second  joining  the  field  train 
(train  regimerUaire). 

The  two  horse  batteries  assigned  to  a  cavalry  division  are  to  prepare 
the  attack  with  their  fire,  by  throwing  the  hostile  escadrons  into  confusion. 
Supports  are  permanently  attached.  Their  commander  is  responsible 
for  the  safety  of  the  artillery,  but  is  not  under  the  orders  of  the  artillery 
commander.    During  the  advance,  roads  are  to  be  used  as  long  as  possible. 

When  the  cavalry  division  is  operating  as  a  unit,  the  proper  position 
for  its  horse  artillery  is  usually  from  400  to  500  m.  in  advance  of  the 
division,  an  escadron  being  assigned  as  a  support,  but  it  may  be  posted 
on  a  flank.  In  the  latter  case,  it  must  be  so  posted  as  not  to  interfere 
with  the  movements  of  the  cavalry.  The  batteries  are  employed  together 
as  a  rule.  When  a  charge  is  contemplated,  it  is  a  good  plan  for  the  bat^ 
teries  to  go  into  position  some  800  m.  from  the  flank  of  the  charging  ground. 
From  this  position,  they  should  endeavor  to  fire  as  soon  as  possible  on  the 
advancing  opponent.  It  may  likewise  be  advantageous  to  throw  the  bat- 
teries forward,  properly  supported,  to  induce  the  enemy  to  attack  them. 


*KuNB,  Schlacht  von  LoignV'Poupry,  p.  116.     See  also  the  dlBCuaaion  of  the 
employment  of  the  cavalry  at  Man-Ia-Tour.  note  2,  p.  97,  supra. 


478  Horse  Artillery. 

and  then  to  charge  him  in  turn  while  he  is  charging.  The  batteries  should 
first  direct  their  6re  upon  the  leading  hostile  line.  During  the  collision, 
they  should  direct  it  against  advancing  hostile  reserves  or  against  the  hos- 
tile artillery.  Should  the  enemy  turn  tail,  the  batteries  should  cease 
firing  to  avoid  injuring  their  own  troopers. 

In  battle,  the  horse  batteries  usually  remain  at  the  disposal  of  the 
commander  of  the  cavalry  division. 

Italy:  Like  the  Germans,  the  Italians  believe  that  the  value  of 
assigning  horse  batteries  to  the  cavalry,  lies  principally  in  the  support  they 
render  that  arm  in  reconnaissance  and  not  in  their  codperation  in  preparing 
the  attack.  The  Italians  hold  the  same  views  as  the  Germans,  in  regard 
to  the  employment  of  horse  artillery.  Since  cavalry  actions  are  of  very 
short  duration,  the  artillery  is  to  obtain  an  effect  quickly  by  concentrating 
its  fire  on  the  decisive  point.  The  regulations  state  that  changes  of  target 
and  of  position  are  precluded.  For  this  reason,  the  artillery  position  is 
to  be  selected  with  a  view  to  enable  the  artillery  to  fire  on  the  enemy  as 
long  as  possible  without  hampering  the  cavalry  and  without  being  hampered 
by  the  latter.  In  selecting  a  position,  considerations  of  speed  and  effect 
take  precedence  over  those  of  cover.  When  it  is  impossible  to  determine 
beforehand  on  what  flank  the  artillery  is  to  operate,  it  marches  100 — 160 
paces  either  in  front  or  in  rear  of  the  center  of  the  first  line.  The  artillery 
is  to  direct  its  fire  upon  that  part  of  the  hostile  cavalry  that  is  to  be  at- 
tacked first.  This  fire  may  be  continued,  even  during  the  charge,  provided 
the  artillery  position  lies  far  enough  to  a  flank.  When  the  artillery  can 
no  longer  fire,  it  awaits  the  outcome  of  the  cavalry  action  with  its  guns 
limbered  and  in  readiness  to  change  position  if  necessary.  In  case  the 
enemy  is  routed,  the  artillery  joins  the  cavalry  so  as  to  be  on  hand 
during  the  pursuit  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  making  any  lodgment.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  charge  is  repulsed,  and  a  continuance  of  fire 
is  impossible  from  the  position  taken  up,  the  artillery  is  quickly  to  retire 
to  a  rallying  position  in  rear.  In  general,  the  nearest  line  is  charged  with 
protecting  the  artillery,  but  an  order  to  that  effect  is  unnecessary.  But 
it  is  considered  a  pretty  good  plan  to  detail  anything  from  a  platoon  to  an 
escadron  as  an  artillery  support  in  order  to  give  the  cavalry  greater  freedom 
of  action.  In  battle,  the  artillery  assigned  to  the  cavalry  is  to  go  into  action 
alongside  of  the  rest  of  the  artillery.  After  a  victory,  it  is  to  rejoin  the  cav- 
alry in  order  to  take  part  in  the  pursuit. 

Austria:*  The  provision  that  artillery  is,  on  principle,  to  operate 
intact,  has  not  been  incorporated  in  the  latest  regulations.  "During 
a  charge,  the  horse  artillery,  making  the  most  of  its  mobility,  should  come 
into  action  unexpectedly  at  the  proper  moment,  so  as  to  divert  the  atten- 
tion of  the  enemy  from  the  cavalry  and  to  draw  the  fire  of  the  hostile  artil- 
lery upon  itself.  Besides,  it  should  shake  the  charging  hostile  troops  with 
its  fire,  interfere  with  their  deployment,  and  effectively  prepare  the  charge 


*MaJor-Oeneral  v.  Czerlien,    Austrian    Army,    Kavallerutische  Studien, 
Vienna,  1906,  p.  0  et  seq. 


Russia.  479 

of  its  own  cavalry."  The  regulations  demand  that  fire  be  opened  at  an 
early  moment  and  that  it  be  kept  up  as  long  as  possible.  But  in  case  the 
fire  directed  upon  the  hostile  first  line  might  injure  friendly  troopers,  it  is 
to  be  turned  upon  the  rearward  hostile  lines  and  reserves.  The  fire  is  to 
be  directed  upon  hostile  artillery  and  machine  guns,  only  when  no  cavalry 
targets  are  available.  If  the  charge  is  successful,  the  artillery  is  to  change 
position  quickly,  in  order  to  make  the  most  of  the  victory  and  to  cover  the 
rally.  If  the  charge  is  unsuccessful,  the  artillery  is  either  to  change  posi- 
tion quickly,  or  to  check  the  pursuing  enemy. 

"In  a  battle,  horse  artillery  may  be  particularly  valuable  in  case  the 
cavalry  divisions  are  employed  to  operate  on  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the 
enemy.  Its  flanking  fire  will  alarm  the  enemy,  paralyze  his  initiative, 
draw  troops  away  from  other  points,  and  create  situations  than  can  be 
utilized  to  advantage  by  the  cavalry. 

"When  it  is  impossible  to  use  large  bodies  of  cavalry,  the  horse  artil- 
lery attached  to  them  can,  in  exceptional  cases,  be  used  with  advantage  in 
conjunction  with  other  troops.  Its  great  mobility  should  in  this  event 
also  be  utilized." 

Russia :  The  regulations  require  that  the  batteries  be  kept  together, 
but  do  not  state  with  sufficient  emphasis  that  the  hostile  cavalry  is  always 
the  principal  target.  When  the  cavalry  can  not  wait  until  its  attack  is 
prepared  by  the  artillery,  the  latter  is  to  direct  its  fire  upon  the  reserves 
and  the  artillery  of  the  enemy.  Fire  is  to  be  opened  at  an  early  moment  so 
as  to  produce  a  moral  effect  and  to  divert  the  enemy's  attention  from  the 
cavalry.  The  artillery  is  to  go  into  position  in  front  of  and  some  distance 
away  from  a  fiank  of  the  deployed  cavalry.  But  this  position  is  not  to  be 
so  far  to  the  front  that  the  collision  of  the  opposing  cavalry  forces  will 
probably  take  place  in  rear  of  the  batteries.  As  soon  as  the  target  is 
masked  by  the  advancing  cavalry,  the  artillery  is  to  direct  its  fire  upon 
those  sections  of  the  hostile  attack  formation  that  are  nearest  the  immediate 
objective  of  the  charge.  A  change  of  position  is  precluded.  Movements 
may  be  made  at  the  field  gallop  of  the  cavalry.  A  special  support  of  from 
one  to  two  escadrons  is  always  to  be  provided  for  the  batteries.  The  com- 
mander of  this  artillery  support  is  responsible  for  the  protection  of  the 
artillery,  but  may  participate  in  the  action  of  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry 
when  the  latter  operates  in  his  vicinity.  When  the  batteries  can  no  longer 
continue  firing  during  the  charge,  they  limber  up  and  either  await  the 
outcome  of  the  m616e  or  retire  into  a  rallying  position. 

In  preparing  the  charge  against  infantry,  the  horse  artillery  is  to  be 
given  suflicient  time  to  gain  actual  results.  It  is  to  direct  its  fire  against 
the  supports  and  reserves  of  that  section  of  the  hostile  line  against  which 
the  charge  is  to  be  launched. 

In  a  battle,  the  batteries  are,  on  principle,  to  remain  with  the  cavalry 
units  to  which  they  belong,  even  when  the  latter  are  held  in  reserve. 


INDEX 

CAVALRY. 


A 

PAOB 

ABOUT  WHEEL 38 

ACCELERATED  GALLOP— 5ec  Gallop. 

ACTION 

Breaking  off  the 128 

Dismounted 108 

Mounted  fire 166 

Of  cavalry  in  battle 100 

pursuit  and  retreat 101 

ACTIONS,  Results  of  cavalry 169 

ADVANCE  TO  THE  ATTACK 142 

AGES  OF  CAVALRY  LEADERS 105 

AMMUNITION 

Organization,  arms,  equipment,  and  (table) 4 

ARMAMENT  WITH  FIRE  ARMS 117 

ARMS,  Proportion  of  cavalry  to  other 96 

ARMS  AND  EQUIPMENT 3 

Various  armies  (table) 4 

ARTILLERY 

Cavalry  versus 209 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 213 

Heavy,  Charge  against 214 

Horse,  Assignment  of 16 

Battery,  Strength  of  the  German 16 

Batteries,  Assignment  to  cavalry  division 13 

Method  of  attacking 211 

ASSEMBLING  FROM  LAVA  FORMATION 191 

ATTACK 

Advance  to  the 142 

Dismounted 121 

Flank 155 

Formation  against  artillery 211 

in  echelon 145 

of  Frederick  the  Great 153 

AUGMENTATION  HORSES— Sec  Horses 

AUSTRIA 

Ammunition  carried  (table) 4 

Armament  with  fire  arms 117 

Arms  and  equipment  (table) 4 

Bridge  equipage,  Cavalry  (table) 4 


482  Index  —  Cavalry. 

AUSTRIA— cmifinued.  pagb 

Cavalry  division,  Organization  of  the 13 

versus  artillery 213 

cavalry 175 

infantry 205 

Charge  in  extended  order 187 

Defense 127 

Dismounted  action 118 

Distance  between  fours  and  twos 48 

ranks 29 

Division,  Organization  of  the  cavalry 13 

Escadron,  Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Explosives  carried  by  cavalry  (table) 4 

Frontage 29 

of  a  regiment  in  line  of  escadrons 54 

Front  into  line,  Kegiment  forming 70 

Ground  scouts 140 

Interval  between  troopers 29 

Machine  gun  battery 136 

Organization  of  the  cavalry  division 13 

escadron  (table) 4 

regiment  (table) 4 

Pioneers,  Assignment  of,  To  cavalry  (table) 4 

Ranks,  Distance  between 29 

Number  of 29 

Regiment,  Frontage  of  a,  In  line  of  escadrons 64 

Front  into  line,  How  executed  by  the 70 

Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Signal  troops  (table)  4 

Train,  Combat  and  field  (table) 4 


B 

BACKING 31 

BASE  UNIT,  Function  of  the 28 

BATTERY,  Strength  of  the  German 16 

BATTLE 

Action  of  cavalry  in 100 

Duties  of  cavalry  in 97 

Employment  of  cavalry  in 85 

Lines,  Length  of 99 

Position  of  cavalry  in 98 

BATTLE  LINES,  Length  of 99 

BATTLE  USE  OF  CAVALRY 

French  views  on 96 

German  views  on 95 

Russian  views  on 95 

BREAKING  OFF  THE  ACTION 128 

BRIDGE  EQUIPAGE,  In  the  cavalry  of  various  armies  (table) 4 

BRIGADE 

Column 74 

Deployments  of  the 75 

Exercises,  Function  of 73 

Formations 73 

Organization  of  the 11 


Index  —  Cavalry.  483 

BRIGADE  —  continued,  paob 

Road  space  of  a  cavalry 143 

Time  required  for  deploying  a  cavalry 79,  143 

Transitions 76 

BRIGADE  COLUMN 74 

BRIGADE  COLUMNS,  Cavalry  division  in 80 

BRIGADE  EXERCISES,  Function  of 73 

BRINGING  OFF  CAPTURED  GUNS 212 

BUGLE  SIGNALS 35 


c 

CARBINE,  Armament  with  the,  In  various  armies  (table) 4, 117 

CAVALRY 

Action  of,  In  battle 100 

In  pursuit  and  retreat 101 

Actions,  Results  of 169 

Battle  use  of,  French  views  on 96 

German  views  on 95 

Russian  views  on 95 

Cavalry  versus 137 

Charge — See  Charge 

Combat  formation  of  dismounted 109 

operations  of 85 

Conduct  of.  In  battle 100 

In  pursuit  and  retreat 101 

Corps 79 

Organization  and  functions  of 20 

Dismounted  action  of 108 

Division — See  Cavalry  division 

Duels 100 

During  Boer  war 85,  86 

Russo-Japanese  war 89-96 

Duties  of,  In  battle 97 

Employment  of 11 

In  battle 85 

Improvisation  of 4 

Landwehr 4 

Leaders,  Ages  of 105 

Operations  of  Prince  Kanin's  Brigade 89 

Organization 9 

Position  of,  In  battle 98 

Proportion  of,  To  other  arms 96 

Versus  artillery 209 

cavalry 137 

heavy  artillery 214 

infantry 194 

CAVALRY  ACTIONS,  Results  of 169 

CAVALRY  BRIDGE  EQUIPAGE,  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

CAVALRY  CHARGE— 5cg  Charge 

CAVALRY  CORPS,  Organization  and  functions  of 20 

CAVALRY  DIVISION 

Bridge  equipage  (table) 4 

Combat  strength  of  the 13 


484  Index  —  Cavalry. 

CAVALRY  DIVISION  — con«nM«d.  paqi 

Cydists,  Assignment  of 13, 14 

Deployment 81 

Formation  of  the,  In  brigade  columns 80 

echelon  attacking  artil- 
lery  152 

line  for  attack 150 

regimental  columns 80 

Horse  artillery,  Assignment  of 13,15 

Organization  of  the 12 

In  various  armies 18 

Ration  strength  of  the 13 

Sanitary  personnel  of  the 13 

Special  troops.  Assignment  of 13 

CAVALRY  DIVISIONS,  Permanent  formation  of 19 

CAVALRY  LEADERS,  Ages  of 105 

CAVALRY  ORGANIZATION— S:e€  Organization. 

CAVALRY  VERSUS  ARTILLERY 209 

Provisions  of  various  regulation3..213 

CAVALRY  VERSUS  CAVALRY 137 

Advance  to  the  attack 142 

Attack  formation  in  echelon 145 

Austrian  regulations 175 

Charge — See  Charge 

Combat  reconnaissance 139 

Distribution  in  depth  during  charge.  149 

English  regulations 185 

Fire  action.  Mounted 166 

Flank  attack 155 

French  regulations 177 

Ground  scouting  and  reconnaissance.  139 

Impact  and  m^lde 16^ 

Lava  formation 188 

Mounted  fire  action 166 

Pursuit 170 

Rally 174 

Reconnaissance  and  ground  scout- 
ing  139 

Russian  regulations 183 

Supports  in  the  mounted  charge 149 

Weapons,  Use  of,  In  a  m^^ 166 

CAVALRY  VERSUS  HEAVY  ARTILLERY 214 

CAVALRY  VERSUS  INFANTRY 194 

Charge  against  front  and  flank8...201 

in  successive  lines 203 

Austrian  regulations 2C^ 

French  regulations 206 

Italian  regulations 206 

Russian  regulations 207 

CHARGE 

Against  front  and  flanks  of  infantry 201 

heavy  artillery 214 

infantry 197 

As  foragers 187 

By  successive  escadrons 185 


Index  —  Cavalry.  485 

CHARGE  —  continued.  page 

Conduct  of  the 147 

Distribution  in  depth  during  the 149 

Effect  produced  by  a  mounted 199 

In  column 82 

extended  order 187 

lava  formation 188 

line 149 

successive  lines 203 

Moment  for  making  the 103 

Supports  in  the  mounted 149 

CHARGE  AGAINST  HEAVY  ARTILLERY 214 

CHARGE  AGAINST  INFANTRY 197 

CHARGE  AS  FORAGERS 187 

CHARGE  IN  COLUMN 82 

CHARGE  IN  EXTENDED  ORDER 187 

CHARGE  IN  LAVA  FORMATION 188 

CHARGE  IN  LINE 149 

CHARGE  IN  SUCCESSIVE  LINES 203 

CHARGING,  Moment  favorable  for 103 

CHARGING   DISTANCE 103 

COLUMN 

Brigade 74 

Charge  in 82 

Comparison  between  line  and 82 

Depth  of  a  regiment  in 5T 

Double,  Brigade  in 74 

Regiment  in 61,  59 

Movements  of  the  regiment  in 68 

Regiment  in  double 61,  69 

route 61,  60 

Regimental 61,  66 

Route 46 

Wheel  into 36 

COLUMN  OF  ESCADRONS,  Regiment  in 61 

COLUMN  OF  FOURS 

Escadron  in 46 

How  formed 47 

Depth  of  a  regiment  in 60 

Regiment  in 61,  60 

COLUMN  OF  PLATOONS 

Brigade  in 76 

Escadron  in 39 

How  formed  from  line 41 

Regiment  in 61,  68 

Time  required  for  forming 48 

COLUMN  OF  SIXES 48 

COLUMN  OF  THREES 48 

COLUMN  OF  TWOS 46 

Depth  of  a  regiment  in 60 


486  Index  —  Cavalry. 

COLUMNS  PAGE 

Brigade  in  regimental 74 

Cavalry  division  in  brigade  80 

regimental 80 

COMBAT  FORMATION  OF  DISMOUNTED  CAVALRY  109 

COMBAT  OPERATIONS  OF  CAVALRY 85 

COMBAT  RECONNAISSANCE 142 

COMBAT  STRENGTH,  Cavalry  division  in  various  armies 13 

COMBAT  TRAIN— Sf^?  Train 

COMBINED  EXERCISES • 101 

COMMANDS 85 

COMPARISON 

Depth  of  German  and  Austrian  regiments 60 

Echelon  formation  and  column  of  platoons 45 

French  and  German  regimental  formations 51 

Line  and  column 82 

COMPUTATION  OF  TIME  REQUIRED  FOR  DEPLOYING   A 

REGIMENT 72 

CONDUCT  OF  THE  CHARGE 147 

COSSACKS 

Lava  of  the 188 

Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

CYCLISTS,  Assignment  of,  To  cavalry 13,  14 


D 

DEFENSE 125 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 127 

DEFINITION  OF 

Deployment 62 

Development 62 

Escadron 4 

Front  into  line 62 

German  trot 31 

Posting 31 

Regimental  formations 51 

Transition ,..    62 

DEMI-REGIMENTS,  Line  of 55 

DEMOLITION  TOOLS  (table) 4 

DEPLOYING,  Time  required  for 71,  79 

DEPLOYMENT,  Definition  of 62 

DEPLOYMENT  OF  A  CAVALRY  DIVISION 81 

DEPLOYMENT  OF  A  SOTNIA  INTO  LINE  OF  HALF-PLA- 
TOONS  188 

DEPLOYMENTS 37 

Escadron 37 

Brigade 75 

Regiment 62 


Index  —  Cavalry.  487 

DEPTH  PAGE 

Regiment  in  regimental  column 67 

route  column 60 

DEVELOPMENT,  Definition  of 62 

DEVELOPMENT  FOR  ACTION,  Orders  for  the 143 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  A  CAVALRY  DIVISION 81 

DIFFICULTY  OF  A  CHARGE  AGAINST  INFANTRY 197 

DIRECTIONS,  Verbal 36 

DISMOUNT 31 

DISMOUNTED  ACTION 108 

Austrian  regulations 118 

Breaking  off  the 128 

Combat  formation  in 109 

Conduct  of  a 110 

Defense 125 

Dismounted  reserve  in 116 

English  regulations 120 

Escadrons  the  tactical  unit  in 113 

French  regulations 119 

Italian  regulations 120 

Number  of  men  available  for.  In  various 

armies 120 

Occasions  for  employing Ill 

Reserve,  Dismounted,  In 116 

Russian  regulations 119 

Skirmishers  in 116 

Supports  in 116 

DISMOUNTED  ATTACK 121 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 124 

See  also.  Dismounted  Action 

DISMOUNTING  TO  FIGHT  ON  FOOT 114 

DISTANCE 

Charging 103 

Between  platoons 40 

ranks  in  column  of  fours  and  twos 48 

various  armies 29 

Covered  per  minute  at  various  gaits 32 

DISTRIBUTION  IN  DEPTH  IN  A  CHARGE 149 

DIVISION— iSee  Cavalry  Division. 

DOUBLE  COLUMN 

Brigade  in 74 

Regiment  in 61,  69 

DOUBLE  COLUMN  OF  PLATOONS,  Brigade  in 74 

DOUBLE  RANK  FORMATION 30 

DUELS,  Cavalry 100 


E 

ECHELON 

Attack  formation  in 146 

Cavalry  division  formed  in 162 

Formation 44 

Tactics 179 


488  Index  —  Cavalry. 

PAOK 

EFFECT  PRODUCED  BY  A  MOUNTED  CHARGE 199 

EMPLOYMENT  OF  CAVALRY  IN  BATTLE 85 

French  views 96,  101 

Geiman  views 95 

Russian  views 95 

EMPLOYMENT  OF  DISMOUNTED  ACTION.  Occasions  for  the    111 

EMPLOYMENT  OF  MOUNTED  INFANTRY,  English  views  on  the.lSl 

ENGLAND 

Ammunition  carried  (table) 4 

Armament  with  fire  arms 117 

Arms  and  equipment  {table} 4 

Cavalry  division,  Organization  of  the 13 

operations  during  Boer  war 85 

versus  cavalry 185 

Column  of  fours 49 

Defense 128 

Demolition  tools  (table) 4 

Dismounted  action 120 

attack 124 

Distance  between  fours  and  twos 48 

ranks 29 

Division  organization  of  cavalry 13 

Escadron,  Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Explosives  carried  by  cavalry  (table) 4 

Frontage 29 

Interval  between  troopers 29 

Intrenching  tools  (table) 4 

Machine  gun  platoons,  Organization  of  (table) 4 

Mounted  infantry  in  Boer  war 87 

Organization  of 132 

Views  on  the  employment  of 131 

Organization  of  the  cavalry  division 13 

escadron  (table) 4 

machine  gun  platoon  (table) 4 

mounted  infantry 132 

regiment  (table) 4 

Ranks,  Distance  between 29 

Number  of 29 

Regiment,  Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Tools,  Intrenching  and  demolition  (table) 4 

Train,  Combat  and  field  (table) 4 

ENGLISH  VIEWS  ON  THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF  MOUNTED  IN- 
FANTRY  131 

ESCADRON 25 

Definition  of  the  term 25 

Deployments  of  the 37 

Division  of  the.  Into  platoons  and  squads 27 

Echelon  formation  of  the 44 

Formation  of  the 25 

In  column  of  fours 46 

platoons 39 

twos 46 

line 26 

route  column 46 


Index  —  Cavalry.  489 

ESC  ADRON  —  continued.  page 

Fonning  column  of  platoons  from  line 41 

front  into  line 37 

line  from  column  of  platoons 26 

German,  Formation  of  the 26 

Italian,  Formation  of  the 49,  50 

Movements  of  the,  In  line 38 

Organization  of  the,  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

Peace  strength  of  the,  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

Single-rank  formation  of  the 46 

Time  required  for  forming  column  of  platoons 44 

line 44 

Turns 36 

War  strength  of  the,  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

Wheels 36 

ESCADRONS 

Charges  by  successive 185 

Frontage  of  a  regiment  in  line  of 54 

Line  of,  In  column  of  platoons 51,  53 

Number  of.  In  a  cavalry  division 13 

regiment 9 

Regiment  in  column  of 51 

Supporting,  Use  of 151 

EQUIPAGE,  Bridge,  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

EQUIPMENT 

Arms  and 3 

Organization,  Arms,  Ammunition  and  (table) 4 

EVOLUTIONS,  Regimental 61 

EXPLOSIVES  (table) 4 

EXTENDED  ORDER,  Charge  in 187 


FIELD  TRAIN— See  Train. 

FIRE  ACTION,  Mounted 166 

FIRE  SURPRISE 125 

FLANK,  Charge  against  front  and 201 

FLANK  ATTACK 155 

FORAGERS,  Charge  as 187 

FORMATION 

Attack,  In  echelon 145 

Frederick  the  Great's  attack 153 

Lava,  Sotnia  in 189 

FORMATIONS 24 

Brigade 73 

Cavalry  division 79 

Comparison  of  French  and  German  regimental  forma- 
tions   51 

Escadron 25 

Regiment 51 


490  Index  —  Cavalry. 

france  page 

Ammunition  carried  (table) 4 

Armament  with  lire  arms 117 

Arms  and  equipment  (table) 4 

Battle  use  of  cavalry,  Views  on 102 

Bridge  equipage,  Cavalry  (table) 4 

Cavalry  division,  Organization  of  the 13 

versus  artillery 213 

cavalry 177 

infantry 206 

Charge  in  extended  order 187 

Combined  exercises 101 

Defense 127 

Dismounted  action 119 

attack 124 

Distance  between  fours  and  twos 48 

platoons 41 

ranks 29 

Division  organization  of  cavalry 13 

Echelon  tactics 179 

Escadron,  Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Explosives  carried  by  cavalry  (table) 4 

Formations  of  the  regiment 51 

Front  into  line,  Regiment  forming 70 

Frontage 29 

Ground  scouts 140 

Interval  between  troopers 29 

Machine  guns  (table) J 

Organization  of  the  cavalry  division 13 

escadron  (table) ^ 

regiment  (table) J 

Ranks,  Distance  between 29 

Number  of ^^ 

Regiment,  Formation  of  the 51 

Front  into  line,  How  executed  by  the 'J 

Organization  of  the  (table) * 

Train,  Combat  and  field  (table) * 

FRONTAGE 29 

Battle 99 

Regiment  in  line  of  escadrons 54 

regimental  column 57 

Trooper 29 

In  various  armies 29 

FRONT  AND  FLANK,  Charge  against 201 

FRONT  INTO  LINE 37 

Definition  of  the  term J2 

Escadron  forming.  From  column  of  platoons....  42 
Right  and  left,  Escadron  forming *^ 


G 

GAITS 31 

Distance  covered  per  minute  at  various 32 

GALLOP 32 

GERMAN  TROT 31 


Index  —  Cavalry.  491 

GERMANY  page 

Ammunition  carried  (table) 4 

Armament  with  fire  arms 117 

Arms  and  equipment  (table) 4 

Battle  use  of  cavalry,  Views  on 95 

Bridge  equipage,  Cavalry  (table) 4 

Cavalry  division,  Organization  of  the 13 

versus  artillery 209 

cavalry 137 

heavy  artillery 214 

infantry 194 

Charge  in  extended  order 187 

Column  of  fours 46 

or  twos,  how  formed 47 

twos 46 

Defense 125 

Demolition  tools  (table) 4 

Dismounted  action 108 

Distance  between  platoons 40 

ranks 29 

Division,  Organization  of  the  cavalry 13 

Escadron,  Formation  of  the 25 

Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Explosives  carried  by  cavalry  (table) 4 

Formations  of  the  cavalry  division 79 

brigade 73 

escadron 25 

regiment 51 

Frontage 29 

Machine  guns 136 

Organization  of  the  cavalry  division 11,  13 

brigade 11 

escadron 9 

(table) 4 

regiment 9 

(table) 4 

Ranks,  Distance  between 29 

Number  of 29 

Regiment,  Organization  of  (table) 4 

Train,  Assignment  to  cavalry  divisions 17 

Combat  and  field  (table) 4 

GROUND  SCOUTING 139 

GROUND  SCOUTS,  In  various  armies 140 

GUIDES,  Posts  of 25 

GUNS 

Bringing  off  captured 212 

Number  of.  In  a  cavalry  division 13 


H 

HEAVY  ARTILLERY,  Charge  against 214 

HISTORY— 5ee  Military  History. 

HORSE 

Loads  carried  by  a.  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

Respirations  of  a.  At  various  gaits 33 


492  Index  —  Cavalry. 

PAGE 

HORSE  ARTILLERY  ASSIGNED  TO  A  CAVALRY  DIVISION  13.15 

HORSE  BATTERY,  Strenjjth  of  a  German 16 

HORSES 

Comparison  of  trained  and  untrained 3 

Failure  of  purchase    3 

Number  of,  In  a  cavalry  division,  In  various  armies 13 

an  eicadron.  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

a  regiment,  In  various  armies  (table) 4 


I 

IMPACT  AND  MftLfeE  161 

INFANTRY 

Assignment  of,  To  cavalry 18 

Cavalry  versus 194 

Provisions  of  various  regulations 205-208 

Mounted — See  Mounted  Infantry. 

INTERVAL 29 

INTRENCHING  TOOLS  (table) 4 

INVERSION 41 

ITALY 

Ammunition  carried  (table) ^ 

Armament  with  fire  arms 11' 

Arms  and  equipment  (table) 4 

Cavalry  division,  Organization  of  the Ij 

versus  artillery 213 

cavalry 182 

infantry  206 

Charge  in  extended  order 187 

Column  of  fours  or  twos 49,  50 

Dismounted  action IjJ 

Distance  between  fours  and  twos 48 

ranks 29 

Division,  Organization  of  the  cavalry 13 

Escadron,  Organization  of  the  (table) * 

Explosives  carried  by  cavalry  (table) J 

FronLaj^e 29 

Ground  scouts 140 

Intervals  between  troopers 29 

Intrenching  tools  (table) 4 

Organization  of  the  cavalry  division  (table) 4 

escadron  (table) 4 

regiment  (table) J 

Ranks,  Distance  between 29 

Number  of ;. 29 

Regiment,  Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Tools,  Intrenching  (table) * 

Train,  Combat  and  field  (table) 4 


J 

JAPAN 

Cavalry  operations  during  Russo-Japanese  war ^^ 


Index  —  Cavalry.  493 


L 

PAGE 

LANDWEHR  CAVALRY 4,5 

LANCE 

Character  of  wounds  produced  by  the 6 

Length  of  the,  In  various  armies 7 

Views  on  the 6 

LAVA  OF  THE  COSSACKS 188 

LEADER,  The 102 

Importance  of  personality  in 104 

LEADERS,  Ages  of 106 

LED  HORSES,  Position  of,  In  dismounted  action 116, 117 

LENGTH  OF  BATTLE  LINES 7 

LENGTH  OF  THE  LANCE  IN  VARIOUS  ARMIES 7 

LINE 

Brigade  in 74 

Charge  in 149 

Comparison  between  column  and 82 

Escadron  in 26 

Formation  of.  From  route  column 47 

Front  into 87 

How  formed  from  column  of  platoons 42 

Movements  of  the  escadron  in 38 

Regiment  in 51,  62 

Sotniain ,189 

Time  required  by  an  escadron  to  form 44 

Transition  to 68 

Wheel  into.. 86 

LINE  OF  COLUMNS,  Movements  of  the  regiment  in 68 

LINE  OF  DEMI-REGIMENTS 66 

LINE  OF  ESCADRONS  IN  COLUMNS  OF  PLAT00NS....61,  53,  54 

LINE  OF  PLATOONS  IN  COLUMNS  OF  FOURS 51.  61 

LINES,  Charge  in  successive 203 

LOSSES 7,169,170 

Relative,  Produced  by  lance  and  saber 7 

revolver  and  saber 169 

LOAD  CARRIED  BY  A  HORSE  IN  VARIOUS  ARMIES  (table)....    4 


M 

MACHINE  GUNS 133 

Assignment  of,  To  a  cavalry  division 16 

Austria 136 

England  (table) 4 

France  (table) 4 

Germany 136 

Switzerland 136 

MAJOR  CAVALRY  UNITS 11 

MASS 51,66 

MATERIEL,  Cavalry  bridge  (table) 4 


494  Index  —  Cavalry. 

MEDICAL  CORPS— S^e  Sanitary  Personnel.  paqb 

MfiLfeE   161 

Decision  in  the 164 

Impact  and - 161 

Use  of  weapons  in  the 163 

METHOD  OF  ATTACKING  ARTILLERY 211 

MILITARY  HISTORY 

Artillery,  Charge  against 210 

Battery,  Capture  of  a 209 

Boer  war,  Cavalry  operations  during  the 85 

Cavalry  corps 20 

duel 100 

leader,  Conduct  of  the 103 

operations,  Boer  war 85 

Russo-Japanese  war 89—92 

Charge  against  artillery .210 

halted  on  a  chaussSe..  .209 

a  square 197,  202 

cavalry  debouching  from  a  de- 
file  103 

halted  in  colunm 82 

in  column 192 

halted  cavalry 103 

infantry 82,  196,  197,  200 

skirmishers 86 

by  small  body  of  cavalry 197 

Distance  covered  in  a 103 

in  column 82 

lava  formation 91,  94,  193 

against  a  battery 91 

line  of  escadrons 57 

route  column 82 

Rally  after  a 5 

Cohesion 161 

Column,  Charge  in 82 

Confusion  caused  by  inversion 42 

Delaying  action 90,  97,  112 

hostile     reinforcements     by      dis- 
mounted action 97,  112 

Dismemberment  of  cavalry  divisions 19,  99 

Dismounted  action 86,  93,  97,  111,  112, 

113,  129,  130 

attack 130 

Distance  covered  in  a  cavalry  charge 103 

Distribution  in  depth 196,  203 

Double-rank  formation 30 

Effect  produced  by  a  strong  cavalry  force 100 

Failure  of  cavalry  to  delay  the  enemy 97 

purchase  horses 3 

Faulty  position  of  French  cavalry 99 

Field  train,  Loss  of 17 

Forced  reconnaissance  by  mounted  and  dis- 
mounted cavalry 91,  92 

Ground  scouting 141 

Inadequate 140,  141 

Horse  artillery  with  cavalry 16 


Index  —  Cavalry.  495 

MILITARY  HISTORY  —  continued.  page 

Impact 167 

and  m§16e 151,  164 

Inadequate  ground  scouting , 140,  141 

Infantry,  Charge  against 197,  200 

Insufficient  reconnaissance 141 

Inversion,  Confusion  caused  by 42 

Lack  of  room 99 

Lance,  Use  of  the 7 

Versus  Saber 7 

Landwehr  cavalry 4,  5 

Lava  formation.  Charge  in 91,  94,  192,  193 

Against  a  battery..  91 

Leader,  Conduct  of  the  cavalry 103 

Lack  of  a  common 29 

Leading 130 

Loss  of  field  train 17 

Losses 7,  170 

Relative,  Produced  by  saber  and  lance..    7 

revolver..l63 

Made 163 

Use  of  weapons  in  the 163 

Mounted  fire  action 168 

infantry,  Use  of.  During  Boer  war.. 133 

square 163 

Need  of  pioneers 17 

Panic 48 

Passage  of  cavalry  through  infantry  and  artil- 
lery   98 

Pioneers,  Need  of 17 

Purchase  horses,  Failureof 3 

Pursuit 173 

Raid,  Stoneman's 17 

Rally 6,174,175 

Reconnaissance,  Insufficient 141 

Russo-Japanese  war.  Cavalry  operations  dur- 
ing  89-92 

Saber  versus  lance 7 

revolver 169 

Square,  Charge  against  a 197,  202 

Mounted 193 

Stoneman's  raid 17 

MINOR  CAVALRY  UNITS 9 

MOBILITY,  Factors  influencing 32 

MOUNT,  To 31 

MOUNTED  CHARGE— Sec  Charge. 

MOUNTED  FIRE  ACTION 166 

MOUNTED  INFANTRY 87,  131, 132 

English  views  on 131 

Organization  of 132 

MOUNTED  RESERVE 117 

MOUNTING  UP 114 

MOVEMENTS 

Brigade 75 

Elementary 30 


496  Index  —  Cavalry. 


MOVEMENTS  —  continued.  pag« 

Escadron 36 

General  principles  for 35 

Regiment 61 

MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  ESCADRON  IN  LINE 38 


OCCASIONS  FOR  USING  DISMOUNTED  ACTION Ill 

OFFICERS,  Posts  of 26 

ORDERS 35 

ORDERS  FOR  THE  DEVELOPMENT  FOR  ACTION 143 

ORGANIZATION 9 

Cavalry  division 11—20 

Brigade 11 

Cossacks  (table) 4 

Escadron 9 

In  various  armies  (table) 4 

Mounted  infantry 132 

Regiment 9 

In  various  armies  (table) 4 

Train,  Combat  and  field,  In  various  armies    (table)     4 

ORIGIN  OF  THREE  LINE  TACTICS 152 


P 

PASSAGING 31 

PERSONALITY,  Importance  of,  In  a  cavabry  leader 105 

PIONEERS 

Assignment  of.  To  a  cavalry  division 16 

minor  cavalry  units  (table) 4 

Number  in  a  cavalry  division  in  various  armies 13 

PISTOL,  Armament  with  the,  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

PLATOONS 

Brigade  in  column  of 75 

double  column  of 74 

Column  of 40,  51,  58 

Distance  between 40 

Division  of  the  escadron  into 27 

Regiment  in  column  of 51,  68 

line  of 51,  61 

PLOYMENTS 31.  64 

POSITION  OF  CAVALRY  IN  BATTLE 98 

POSITION  OF  LED  HORSES  IN  DISMOUNTED  ACTI0N....116.  117 

POSTING 31 

POSTS 

Guides 26 

Officers 26 


Index  —  Cavalry.  497 

PAGE 

PROPORTION  OF  CAVALRY  TO  OTHER  ARMS 96 

PURCHASE  HORSES.  Failure  of 3 

PURSUIT 170 

Action  of  cavalry  in 101 


RALLY 174 

RANKS,  Number  of 29,30 

RATION    STRENGTH  OF  A  CAVALRY  DIVISION,  In  various 

armies 13 

RECONNAISSANCE 139 

Combat 142 

REGIMENT 61 

Austrian,  Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Column  of  escadrons 61 

fours  or  twos 51,  60 

platoons 61,  68 

Combat  train  of  the,  Organization  of  the,  In  various  ar- 
mies (table) 4 

Comparison  of  formations  of  the  French  and  the  German..  61 

Deploying  a,  Time  required  for 71 

Deployments  of  the 62 

Depth  of  a.  In  regimental  column 67 

route  column 60 

Double  colunm 61,  69 

English,  Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Evolutions  of  the 61 

Function  of  the 62 

Field  train  of  the,  Organization  of  the,  In  various  armies 

(table) 4 

Position  of  the 60 

Formations  of  the 61 

French  organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Frontage  of  the,  In  regimental  column 67 

German,  Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Italian,  Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Line 61,  62 

of  demi-regiments 66 

escadrons  in  column  of  platoons 61,  63,  64 

platoons 51,  61 

route  columns 60 

Mass 61,  66 

Movements  of  the.  In  column  and  line  of  columns 68 

Number  of  escadrons  in  a 9 

Organization  of  the.  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

Ployments  of  the 64 

Regimental  column 51,  66 

Route  column 61,  60 

Russian,  Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Strength,  Peace  and  war.  Of  a.  In  various  armies  (table) ..    4 

Time  required  for  deploying  a 71 

Transitions 64 

War  strength  of  a,  In  various  armies  (table) 4 


498  Index  —  Cavalry. 

PAGE 

REGIMENTAL  COLUMN 61,66 

REGIMENTAL  COLUMNS 

Brigade  in 74 

Cavalry  division  in 80 

REGIMENTS,  line  of  demi- 55 

RESERVE 

Dismounted 116 

Mounted 117 

RESPIRATIONS,  Number  a  horse  takes  per  minute  at  various  gaits  .  33 

RESULTS  OP  CAVALRY  ACTIONS 169 

RETREAT,  Action  of  cavalry  in 101 

REVOLVER,  Armament  with  the.  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

ROUTE  COLUMN 46 

Elscadron  in 46 

How  formed 47 

Regiment  in 51,60 

ROUTE  COLUMNS 46 

Line  of,  Regiment  in 60 

RUSSIA 

Ammunition  carried  (table) 4 

Armament  with  fire  arms 117 

Arms  and  equipment  (table) ^ 

Battle  use  of  cavalry,  Views  on 95 

Cavalry  division,  Organization  of  the 13 

operations  during  Russo-Japanese  war 89 

versus  artillery 213 

cavalry 183 

infantry 207 

Charge  in  extended  order 187 

Column  of  sixes 48 

threes 48 

Cossacks,  Organization  of  the  (table) ^ 

Defense 127 

Dismounted  action 119 

Dismounted  attack 124 

Distance  between  ranks 29 

Division,  Organization  of  the  cavalry 13 

Escadron,  Formation  of  the 27 

Organization  of  the  (table) ^ 

Frontage 29 

of  a  regiment  in  line  of  escadrons 54 

Front  into  line,  Regiment  forming 70 

Ground  scouts 140 

Interval  between  troopers 29 

Intrenching  tools  (table) * 

Lava  formation 188 

Organization  of  the  cavalry  division Ij 

escadron  (table) * 

regiment  (table) J 

Ranks,  Distance  between 29 

Number  of 29 

Regimental  column 58 


Index  —  Cavalry.  499 

RUSSIA  —  continued.  page 

Regiment  forming  front  into  line 74 

in  line  of  escadrons,  Frontage  of  a 50 

Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

Tools,  Intrenching  and  demolition  (table) 4 

Train,  Field  and  combat  (table) 4 


s 

SABER,  Armament  with  the,  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

SANITARY  PERSONNEL,  In  a  cavalry  division.  In  various  armies 

(table) 4 

SCOUTING,  Ground 139 

SCOUTS,  Ground,  In  various  armies 140 

SIGNALS 

Bugle 36 

Function  of  various 35,  36 

Visual 35 

SIGNAL  TROOPS 

Assignment  of,  To  minor  units.  In  various  armies 

(table) 4 

cavalry    division    in    various 

armies 13 

SINGLE-RANK  FORMATION 30,45 

SOTNIA 

Deployment  of  a.  Into  line  of  half-platoons 188 

In  line  and  in  lava  formation 189 

Organization  of  the  (table) 4 

SPECIAL  TROOPS,  Assignment  of.  To  a  cavaby  division 13 

SQUADS,  Division  of  the  escadron  into 27 

STRENGTH,  Peace  and  war 

Cavalry  division  in  various  armies 13 

Escadron  and  regiment  in  various  armies 

(table) 4 

German  cavalry  regiment 134 

SUCCESSIVE  ESCADRONS,  Charges  by 185 

SUCCESSIVE  LINES,  Charge  in 203 

SUPPORTING  ESCADRONS 151 

SUPPORTS  IN  DISMOUNTED  ACTION 116 

SUPPORTS  IN  THE  MOUNTED  CHARGE 149 

SURPRISE,  Fire 125 


T 

TACTICS 

Echelon 179 

Frederick  the  Great's 153 

Three  line,  origin  of 152 

Weakness  of « 154 

THREE  LINE  TACTICS,  Origin  of 162 

THREES,  Column  of 48 


500  Index  —  Cavalry. 

TIME  REQUIRED  paqe 

By  a  brigade  to  deploy 79 

an  escadron  to  form  column  of  platoons 44 

Une 44 

a  regiment  to  deploy 71 

TOOLS,  Demolition  and  intrenching,  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

TRAINS 

Assignment  of,  To  a  cavalry  division  in  various  armies 13, 17 

Bridge,  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

Combat  and  field.  In  various  armies  (table) 4 

Field,  Position  of 60 

TRANSITION,  Definition  of  the  term 62 

TRANSITION  TO  UNE 64 

TRANSITIONS 64 

Brigade 75 

TROOPER,  Frontage  of  a W 

TROOPERS,  Interval  between 29 

TROT 

Distance  covered  per  minute  at  the ^ 

German 51 

TURN 30 

TURNS 86 

TWOS,  Column  of 46 

Depth  of  a  regiment  in 60 


U 
UNIT,  Function  of  the  base 28 

V 

VERBAL  DIRECTIONS 86 

VISUAL  SIGNALS W 


w 

WALK,  Distance  covered  per  minute  at  the - 82 

WAR  STRENGTH 

Escadron  in  various  armies  (table) | 

Regiment  in  various  armies  (table) ^ 

WEAKNESS  OF  THREE  LINE  TACTICS 15* 

WEAPONS,  Use  of.  In  the  m§16e 166 

WHEEL,  About 86 

WHEEL  INTO  COLUMN 36 

WHEEL  INTO  LINE 86 

WHEELS 31 

WHEELS  AND  TURNS 86 

WOUNDS,  Character  of.  Produced  by  the  lanoe 6 


IND£X  OF 
EXAMPLES  PROM  MILITARY  HISTORY. 

CAVALRY. 


B 

Balaklava,  October  25th,  1854.  paoh 

Charge  against  cavalry  halted  in  column 82 

Balkan  War,  1877-78. 

Gurko's  first  passage  of  the  Balkans,  Need  of  pioneers  in 17 

Bapaume,  January  3d,  1870. 

Dismounted  action,  Delaying  hostile  reinforcements  by 97,  112 

Bee  Oiseau,  September  15th,  1870. 

Dismounted  attack 130 

Berry  au  Bac,  March  14th,  1814. 

Cavalry  charge 17S 

Boer  War. 

Cavalry,  Use  of 85 

Mounted  infantry,  Use  of 133 

Bolchen,  August  9th,  1870. 

Lance,  Use  of  the 7 

Boragk»  September  19th,  1813. 

Lava,  Use  of  the 192 

Brandy  Station,  June  6th,  1863. 

Mounted  fire  action.  Use  of 168 

Busancy,  August  27th,  1870. 

Dismounted  action 112 


c 

la  Chausee,  February  3d,  1814. 

Mounted  fire  action,  Use  of 168 

Chenebier,  January  17th,  1871. 

Dismounted  action 113 

Coulmiers,  November  9th,  1870. 

Dismemberment  of  cavalry  divisions 19,  99 

Culm,  1813. 

Charge  against  artillery  halted  on  a  ehams^e 209 

Cuetozza,  January  24th,  1866. 

Charge  made  by  a  small  body  of  cavalry 197 

against  infantry 200 


502  Index  of  Examples  —  Cavalry 


Dmmhm  Wi«l]d,  March  31st,  1831.                                                            pags 
Charge  in  route  column 82 

Drsvttll,  September  16th,  1870. 

Dismounted  attack 130 


Eckmtthl,  1809. 

French  cavalry  corps 20 

F 

FMrri^TM,  January  18th,  1871. 

Dismounted  attack 130 

Flv  Forks,  April  Ist,  1866. 

Dismounted  action Ill 

Forbacht  Au8:ust  6th,  1870. 

Dismounted  action 112,  129 

Fr«dericksburc,  December  13th,  1862. 

Dismounted  action Ill 

G 

GenappaSf  June  17th,  1816. 

Charge  against  cavalry  debouching  from  a  defile 103 

Gersfeld,  1866.. 

Panic 48 

Gitschin,  1866. 

Dismounted  action ,112 

Gravelotte,  August  18th,  1870. 

Faulty  position  of  French  cavalry 99 

Lack  of  room 99 

H 

HagelbM'g,  August  28th,  1813. 

Rally  after  a  charge 5 

Horenowes. 

Insufficient  reconnaissance 141 

HUnfeld,  1866. 

Panic 48 

K 

Kasanlik,  July  17th,  1877. 

Dismounted  action 130 

KesseUdorf,  December  15th,  1746. 

Double-rank  formation 30 

Klipdrift,  February  15th,  1900. 

Successful  charge  against  skirmishers 86 


Index  op  Examples  —  Cavalry.  503 

Koedoasrand,  February  17th,  1900.                                                       paqk 
Dismounted  action 86 

Koniginhof,  June  28th,  1866. 

Panic 48 

K6niggratz»  July  3d,  1866. 

Cohesion 161 

Ground  scouting^  Inadequate 140 

M§1^,  Use  of  weapons  in  the 163 

Passage  of  cavalry  through  artillery  and  infantry  lines 98 

Use  of  the  lance 7 

KrasnoU  1812. 

French  cavalry  corps 20 


L 

Langtungkou,  1904. 

Charge  in  lava  formation 91,  94 

Lichiatun,  May  30th,  1904. 

Forced  reconnaissance  by  mounted  and  dismounted  cavalry.. 91,  92 
Lidiatun»  (Shaho)  October  30th,  1904. 

Charge  in  lava  formation  against  a  battery 91 

Liebenau»  June  26th,  1866. 

Dismounted  action 112 

Ugny,  1815. 

Ground  scouting,  Inadequate 140 

Loigny,  1870. 

Capture  of  a  battery 209 

Conduct  of  the  cavalry  leader 103 

Effect  produced  by  a  strong  cavalry  force 100 

Luckenwalde,  August  19th,  1813. 

Charge  against  cavalry  in  column 192 


M 

Maison  Affort. 

Dismounted  attack 130 

Mara-la-Tour,  August  16th,  1870. 

Cavalry  duel 100 

Charge  against  infantry... 200 

Distance  covered  in  a  cavalry  charge 103 

Failure  of  cavalry  to  delay  the  enemy 97 

Lack  of  room 99 

Losses  suffered  by  the  cavalry 7, 170 

Purchase  horses.  Failure  of 3 

Lance  and  saber,  Use  of  the 7 

Meslay  (Monnaie),  December  20th,  1870. 

Charge  against  infantry 82,  196 

Mockarn,  October  16th,  1813. 

•    Confusion  caused  by  inversion 42 

Mukden,  March  3d,  1905. 

Japanese  cavalry  delaying  superior  hostile  forces 90 


504  Index  of  Examples  —  Cavalry. 


N 

NolM«VilU.  PAGB 

Landwehr  cavalry 6 

o 

OrlMuu*  December  3d,  1870. 

Charge  against  artillery 210 

halted  cavalry 103 

M«l^ 163 

Oawi«cim,  June  27th,  1866. 

Landwehr  cavalry 5 

P 
Pont  k  MouMon. 

Failure  of  purchase  horses 3 

Prague,  1757. 

Rally 174 

R 

Rudnia,  September  8th,  1812. 

Charge  in  lava  formation 193 

Mounted  square 193 

s 

Saar,  July  9th,  1866. 

Lance  versus  saber 7 

Losses 7 

SaargemUnd,  August  7th,  1870. 

Lack  of  a  common  leader 23 

Pioneers 17 

Sandepu,  January  25th,  1905. 

Cavalry  operations 98 

Dismounted  action ^ 130 

Sapignies,  January  4th,  1871. 

Charge  against  a  square 197,  202 

Secceftsion,  American  War  of. 

Dismounted  action HI 

Mounted  fire  action Igg 

Stoneman's  raid  (April,  1863) ".   17 

Sedan,  September  1st,  1870. 

Distribution  in  depth 196,  203 

Insufficient  reconnaissance '.141 

Lack  of  room '"^'  99 

Shaho,  October  12th,  1904. 

Operations  of  Prince  Kanin's  Cavalry  Brigade 39 

Somma  Sierra,  November  30th,  1808. 

Charge  in  column go 

Soor,  September  30th,  1745.  

Impact j^gj 

St.  Privet— See  Gravelotte. 


Index  of  Examples  —  Cavalry.  505 


T 

TheiUay  le  Paillux,  December  12th,  1870.                                            paob 
Dismounted  attack 130 

Tirnova,  July  7th,  1877. 

Dismounted  attack 130 

Tobitschau,  July  15th,  1866. 

Charge  against  artillery 210 

Trautanauy  1866. 

Ground  scouting 141 

Rally 174 

V 

Vernon,  November  22d,  1870. 

Field  train,  Loss  of 17 

Villa  sur  Yron,  August  16th,  1870. 

Cavalry  duel 100 

Failure  of  purchase  horses 3 

Impact  and  m§i6e 151, 164 

Losses 170 

Rally 176 

Vionville,  August  16th,  1870. 

Charge  against  infantry 197,  200 

In  line  of  escadrons 57 

Confusion  caused  by  uniforms 6 

Distance  covered  in  a  charge 103 

Horse  artillery  with  cavalry 16 

Voncq,  August  29th,  1870. 

Dismounted  action 112 


w 

Wafangkou,  June  15th,  1904. 

Cavalry  operations 91,  92 

Delaying  actions 97 

Worth,  August  16th,  1870. 

Ground  scouting,  Inadequate 141 

Passage  of  cavalry  through  infantry  and  artillery  lines 98 

WukiakanUy,  1905. 

Dismounted  action 93 

Y 

Yinkou,  January  11th,  1905. 

Dismounted  attack 130 

z 

Zorndorf. 

Leading 104 


INDEX. 


ARTILLERY. 


A 

PAOB 

ABOLITION  OF  CORPS  ARTILLERY 252 

ABOUT  BY  CARRIAGE 269 

ACCELERATED  GALLOP,  Distance  covered  at  the 259 

ACCOMPANYING  BATTERIES 461 

ACCOMPANYING  THE  INFANTRY  ATTACK 423 

ACTION  FRONT 269 

ACTION  LEFT 271 

ACTION  REAR 271 

ACTION  RIGHT 271 

ADJUSTMENT 376 

ADVANCE  GUARD  ARTILLERY 304 

ADVANCE  TO  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  A  POSITION 336 

ADVANCED  POSITIONS 441 

AMMUNITION 

Battery,  In  various  armies 220,  247,  290-292,  390 

Expenditure  of 384 

Historical  examples 385 

Replacement  of 390 

Austria 397 

France 396 

Rounds  of.  Per  battery 220,  247,  290-292,  390 

Per  gun 220,  247,  290-292 

Supply  of 387 

AMMUNITION  COLUMN,  Ammunition  carried  in  the....220,  291,  292 

AMMUNITION  SUPPLY 387 

In  various  armies 220,  247,  290-292 

ANIMATE  TARGETS,  Effect  of  shrapnel  bullets  on 234 

ARMAMENT  OF  ARTILLERY  WITH  SMALL  ARMS 238 

ARMS,  Armament  of  artillery  with  small 238 

ARTIFICIAL  COVER 248 

ARTILLERY 

Attack,  Employment  in 401 

Attack  on  a  fortified  position,  Employment  in  an 429 

an  enemy  deployed  for  defense,  Employment 

in  an 416 

Characteristic  properties  of  modern 299 

Cooperation  of  infantry  and 401 

Defense,  Employment  in 441 

Deployment  of 308 


508  Index  —  Artillery. 

ARTILLERY  —  continued,  page 

Employment  of 293 

According  to  various  regulations 455--466 

In  attack 401 

defense 441 

rencontre 409 

retreat 450 

Field,  Order  of  fire  of 372 

Heavy,  Order  of  fire  of 374 

Horse 471 

Mountain 469 

Position  in  a  column 300 

Rencontre,  Employment  in  a 409 

Retreat,  Employment  in  a 450 

versus  cavalry 356 

infantry 354 

ARTILLERY  COMBAT  AT  SHORT  RANGES 354 

ARTILLERY  COMMANDERS,  Reconnaissance  duties  of 314 

French  views. 317 

ARTILLERY  DUEL 418 

ARTILLERY  OFFICERS*  PATROLS 308 

ARTILLERY  PATROLS,  Tasks  of 309 

ARTILLERY  POSITIONS,  Selection  of 318 

ARTILLERY  RESERVES 297 

ARTILLERY  SUPPORTS 357 

Views  of  various  regulations 361 

ARTILLERY  TARGETS,  Reconnaissance  of 312 

ARTILLERY  VERSUS  CAVALRY 356 

ARTILLERY  VERSUS  INFANTRY 354 

ASSAULT,  Preparation  of  the 427,440 

ASSIGNMENT  OF  ARTILLERY  TO  HIGHER  UNITS 250 

ATTACK 401 

Accompanying  the  infantry 423 

England 465 

France 460 

Infantry,  Conduct  of  the 421 

Japan 464 

On  a  fortifit'd  position 429 

an  enemy  deployed  for  defense 416 

Repelling  the,  In  defense 447 

ATTACK  ON  A  FORTIFIED  POSITION 429 

ATTACK  ON  AN  ENEMY  DEPLOYED  FOR  DEFENSE 416 

ATTACK  ON  AN  ENEMY  IN  POSITION,  Austria 456 

AUSTRIA 

Ammunition,  Replacement  of 397 

Ammunition  supply.  Details  in  re 220,  247,  291 

Armament  of  Artillery  with  small  arms 240 

Artillery,  Employment  of 455-458 

Artillery  supports 361 

Assignment  of  artillery  to  higher  units 250 

Attack  of  an  enemy  in  position 455 

Battalion,  Formations  of  the 281 


Index  —  Artillery.  509 

AUSTRIA  —  continued.  page 

Battery,  Formations  of  the 276 

Organization  of  the 247 

Battery  reserve 291 

Column,  Position  of  artillery  in  a 302 

Defense,  Employmeet  of  artillery  in 457 

Employment  of  artillery 455-458 

Epaulements 352 

Fire,  Methods  of 381-383 

Firing  battery 291 

Formations  of  the  battalion 281 

battery 276 

Horse    artillery 278 

Materiel,  Details  in  re  (table) 220 

Methods  of  fire 381-383 

Mountain  artillery 470 

Night  operations 457 

Order  in  battery 291 

Organization  of  the  battery 247 

Position  of  artillery  in  a  column 302 

Rate  of  march  of  artillery 259 

Reconnaissance  patrols 314 

Rencontre 456 

Replacement  of  ammunition 397 

Scouts 314 

Small  arms.  Armament  of  artillery  with 240 

Strength  of  various  batteries 247 

Supports  for  artillery 361 


B 

BALLOON  GUNS 221 

BATTALION 279 

Formations  of  the 279 

Howitzer,  In  route  column 288 

Mortar,  In  column  of  echelons 288 

Organization  of  the 249 

BATTERY 260 

Ammunition  supply 220,  290-292 

Austrian,  Formation  of  the 276-277 

Division  of  the 261-263, 290-292 

Double  column 265 

Double  section  column 265 

Eight,  six,  or  four  gun 244 

English,  Formation  of  the 278 

Field,  Strength  of  a 247 

Fire  by 273,374 

Firing 261-263,290-292 

Formation  of  the 260 

Austria 276-277 

England 278 

France 273-275 

Italy 275-276 

Japan 275 

Russia „ 277 

French,  Formation  of  the 273-276 

Organization  of  the 262 


510  Index  —  Artillery. 

BATTERY —  continued.  paqs 

German,  Organisation  of  the 261 

Heavy  field  howitzer,  strength  of  a 247 

Heavy  60-pounder,  Strength  of  a 247 

Horse,  Strength  of  a 247 

Howitaer,  Strength  of  a 247 

Italian,  Formation  of  the 275—276 

Japanese,  Formation  of  the 275 

Organization  of  the 244 

In  various  armies 247,  261-263 

Order  in 270 

Austria 291 

France 2S1 

England 292 

Germany 290 

Russia 292 

Order  in  line   264 

Peace  strength  of  a,  In  various  armies 247 

Reserve 261-263,  290-292 

Route  column 265 

Russian,  Formation  of  the 277 

War  strength  of  a.  In  various  armies 247 

BATTERY  RESERVE,  Ammunition  available  in  the 290-292 

BATTERIES 

Accompanying 461 

Breaching 461 

Counter 461 

Counter-attack 461 

Infantry 461 

Reinforcing  firing 362 

BATTLE  RANGES 340,420 

BOMBARDMENT  OF  SHIELDED  GUNS 220 

BREACHING  BATTERIES 461 

BRIGADE,  Organization  of  the 249 

BULLET,  Weight  of  the  shrapnel 220 

BULLETS,  Efifect  of  shrapnel,  On  animate  targets 234 

BURSTING  CHARGE  OF  VARIOUS  PROJECTILES 220 


c 

CAISSON,  Ammunition  carried  in  the 220,  290— 292 

CAISSONS,  Effect  of  fire  upon 270 

CALIBER  OF  VARIOUS  GUNS  AND  HOWITZERS 220 

CANISTER 229 

CAVALRY,  Artillery  versus 355 

CAVALRY  COMBAT,  Horse  artillery  in  the 472 

CHANGES  OF  POSITION 364 

CHARACTERISTIC  PROPERTIES  OF  MODERN  ARTILLERY....297 

COLUMN,  Position  of  artillery  in  a 300 

COLUMN  OF  ECHELONS,  Mortar  battalion  in "288 

COLUMN  OF  PLATOONS,  Battalion  in 280 


Index — Artillery.  511 

PAGE 

COMBAT  AT  SHORT  RANGES 364 

Artillery  versus  cavalry 356 

infantry 354 

COMBAT  TRAIN,  Composition  of  the,  In  various  arnaies 261-263 

CONDUCT  OF  FIRE 376 

Austria 381-383 

England 384 

France 377-380 

Holland 380 

Italy 383 

Russia 383 

CONDUCT  OF  THE  INFANTRY  ATTACK 421 

CONTINUOUS  FIRE 373 

COOPERATION  OF  INFANTRY  AND  ARTILLERY 401 

CORPS  AMMUNITION  COLUMN,  Ammunition  carried  in  the 220 

CORPS  ARTILLERY,  Abolition  of 252 

COVER,  Artificial 348 

COUNTER-ATTACK  IN  DEFENSE 448 

COUNTER  BATTERIES 461 

COUNTER-ATTACK  BATTERIES 461 

CURVED  FIRE  GUNS 230,  250,  258,  261-263,  284-289.  374 


D 

DEFENSE 441 

Advanced  positions  in 441 

Artillery  positions.  Selection  of 442 

Austria 457 

Counter-attack  in 448 

England 466 

Japan 465 

Opening  fire  in 445 

Repelling  the  attack  in 447 

Selection  of  artillery  positions  in 442 

DEFILADE 325 

DEFINITIONS,  Masked,  Semi-masked,  and  Unmasked  positions. 272, 

324 

DEPLOYMENT  OF  ARTILLERY 308 

Advance  to  and  occupation  of  the 

position 336 

Austrian  views 314 

French  views 313 

Ground  scouting 310 

Increasing  the  difficulties  of  hos- 
tile observation 321 

Masked  positions 324 

Observation  stations 335 

Position  in  readiness  and  in  ob- 
servation  333 

Positions  for  heavy  artillery 335 


512  Index  —  Artillery. 

DEPLOYMENT  OF  ARTILLERY— con«nucd.  paob 

Posting  artillery  in  groups 331 

Reconnaissance  by  artillery  offi- 
cers' patrols.. 308 
duties  of    artil- 
lery    com- 
manders  314 

of  artillery  tar- 
gets  312 

of  the  objective. 311 
Selection  of  artillery  positions  ...318 

Semi-masked  positions 332 

Unmasked    and    masked    posi- 
tions  324 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  FIELD  ARTILLERY 217 

DISMOUNTED  DEFILADE 325 

DIVISION  AMMUNITION  COLUMN,  Ammunition  carried  in  the..220 

DIVISIONAL  AND  CORPS  ARTILLERY 253 

DOUBLE  COLUMN 265 

DOUBLE  SECTION  COLUMN 265,  274 


E 

EFFECT,  Fire  for 376 

France 381 

EFFECT  OF  FIRE  UPON  CAISSONS 270 

EFFECT  OF  SHRAPNEL 226.  226 

EFFECT  OF  SHRAPNEL  BULLETS  ON  ANIMATE  TARGETS  .234 

EMPLOYMENT  OF  ARTILLERY 293 

Ammunition,  Expenditure  of 384 

Ammunition,  Supply  of 387 

Artificial  cover 348 

Artillery  combat  at  short  range8..354 

Artillery  supports 357 

Attack 401 

on  a  fortified  position 429 

on   an   enemy   deployed 

for  defense 416 

Austria 465-458 

Battle  ranges 340 

Changes  of  position 364 

Conduct  of  fire 376 

Various  armies. 377-383 
Cooperation  of  infantry  and  artil- 
lery  401 

Defense 441 

Deployment  of  artillery 308 

England 466-466 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 384 

Fire  direction 368 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 343 

France 468-464 

Japan 464-465 


i 


Index — Artillery.  513 

EMPLOYMENT  OF  ARTILLERY — continued.  page 

Position  of  artillery  in  a  column.. 300 
Reinforcing    firing  batteries  in 

action 362 

Rencontre 409 

Replacement  of  amunition 390 

personnel   and 
materiel.. ..397 

Retreat 450 

Russia 466-468 

EMPLOYMENT  OF  ARTILLERY  IN  AN  ATTACK  ON  A  FOR- 
TIFIED POSITION 429 

Launching  the  artillery 435 

Preparation  of  the  assault 440 

Reconnaissance 431 

EMPLOYMENT   OF  ARTILLERY  IN   AN  ATTACK  ON   AN 

ENEMY  DEPLOYED  FOR  DEFENSE 416 

Accompanying  the  infantry  at- 
tack  423 

Artillery  duel 418 

Battle  ranges 420 

Conduct  of  the  infantry  attack.. 421 

Frontage 421 

Pursuit 428 

EMPLOYMENT  OF  HEAVY  ARTILLERY 342 

EMPLOYMENT  OF   HORSE   ARTILLERY 471 

According   to   various 

regulations 477-479 

Battle,  In 476 

Cavalry  Combat,  In. ...472 
Reconnaissance,  In  the 
service  of 471 

EMPLOYMENT  OF  SINGLE   GUNS 294 

ENGLAND 

Ammunition  supply 220,  247,  292 

Armament  of  artillery  with  small  arms 240 

Artillery,  Employment  of 465-466 

Assignment  of  artillery  to  higher  units 251 

Attack 465 

Battery,  Formation  of  the 278 

Organization  of  the 247 

Battery  reserve 291 

Co5peration  of  infantry  and  artillery 402 

Defense 465 

Employment  of  artillery 465-466 

Fire,  Methods  of 384 

Firing  battery 291 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 347 

Formations  of  the  battery 278 

Materiel,  Details  in  re  (table) 220 

Methods  of  fire 384 

Order  in  battery 292 

Organization  of  the  battery 247 

Rate  of  march 259 

Reconnaissance  patrols 314 


514  Index  —  Artillery. 

ENGLAND  —  continued.  page 

Scouts 314 

Small  arms,  Armament  of  artillery  with 240 

ENLISTED  MEN,  Number  of,  In  a  battery 247 

EPAULEMENT  FOR  A   FIELD  GUN 350 

EPAULEMENTS,  Types  of 360.  352 

EXPENDITURE  OF  AMMUNITION 384 


F 

FIELD  ARTILLERY 

Order  of  fire  of 372 

Relative  strength  of,  To  other  arms 241 

FIELD  BATTERY,  Strenfi:th  of  a,  In  various  armies  (table) 247 

FIELD  BATTERIES,  Marching  power  of 237 

FIELD  GUN 220,223 

Canister 229 

Epaulement 350 

French 220,258 

German 220,258 

Gun  pit 349 

Shell 226-229 

Shrapnel 223-226 

FIELD  GUNS  IN  VARIOUS  ARMIES,  Details  in  re  (table) 220 

FIELD  HOWITZER 

German 258 

In  various  armies.  Details  in  re  (table) 220 

Light  and  Heavy 230 

Projectiles 230-233 

FIELD  HOWITZER  BATTERY,  Strength  in  various  armies  (table)  .247 

FIELD  TRAIN,  Composition  of  the,  In  various  armies 261-263 

FIRE 

At  a  single  range 380 

At  will : 377 

Austrian  methods  of 381-383 

By  bjittery 373,374,382 

By  piece 372,374 

Condensed  table  of 222 

Conduct  of 376 

In  various  armies 377-384 

Continuous 372 

Dutch  methods  of 380 

English  methods  of 384 

For  adjustment 376 

For  effect  376 

France 381 

French  methods  of 377-380 

Italian  methods  of 383 

Order  of,  Field  Artillery 372 

Heavy  artillery 374 

Ordinary 372,374 

Progressive 878 

with  sweeping 380 


Index  —  Artillery.  515 

FIRE  —  continued.  page 

Rafale 377 

Rapid : 373,374 

Rate  of 375 

Regressive 378 

Russian  methods  of 383 

Volley 373 

FIRE  AT  A  SINGLE  RANGE 380 

FIRE  AT  WILL 377 

FIRE  BY  BATTERY 373,  374,  382 

FIRE  BY  PIECE 372,374 

FIRE  DIRECTION 368 

Conduct  of  fire 376 

Order  of  fire  of  field  artillery 372 

heavy  artillery 374 

Rate  of  fire 375 

Use  of  various  projectiles 223,  377 

Various  regulations 377-384 

FIRE  FOR  ADJUSTMENT 376 

France 377 

FIRE  FOR  EFFECT 376 

France 377.378,381 

FIRING  BATTERY 

Ammunition  available  in  the 290-292 

Composition  of  the 261-263 

Personnel  in  the 290-292 

FIRING  OVER  FRIENDLY  INFANTRY 343 

FLASH  DEFILADE 325 

FLAT  TRAJECTORY  GUNS 223 

Projectiles 223-230 

FORMATIONS 256 

Austrian  battalion 281 

battery 276-277,292 

Battalion 279 

Column  of  platoons 280 

Line 279 

Line  at  close  intervals 279 

Line  of  platoon  columns 280 

Line  of  route  columns 280 

Mass 280 

Route  column 280 

Various  regulations 281-284 

Battery 260 

Column  of  platoons 267,  268 

Double  column 265 

Line 260-265 

Order  in  battery 270,  272,  290-292 

Route  column 265 

Various  regulations 273-278,  290-292 

English  battery 278,292 

French  battalion 281 

battery 273-275,291 

Heavy  artillery 284 


516  Index  —  Artillery. 

FORMATIONS  —  continued.  paot 

Italian  battalion 281 

battery 275-276 

Japanese  battery 275 

Russian  battalion 283 

battery 277.291 

FORTIFIED  POSITIONS,  Employment  of  artillery  in  an  attack  on  .429 
FRANCE 

Accompanyingbatteries 461 

Ammunition,  Replacement  of 396 

Ammunition  available  in  a  battery 220,  390 

firing  battery 291 

Ammunition  supply 220,  247 

Armament  of  artillery  with  small  arms 239 

Artillery,  Employment  of 458-464 

Artillery  supports 361 

Assignment  of  artillery  to  higher  units 251 

Attack 460 

Battalion,  Formations  of  the 281 

Organization  of  the 249 

Battery,  Formations  of  the 273 

Strength  of  the 247 

Battery  reserve 291 

Breaclung  batteries 463 

Column,  Position  of  artillery  in  a 301 

Cooperation  of  infantry  and  artillery 401 

Counter  batteries 461 

Counter-attack  batteries 461 

Employment  of  artillery 458-464 

Field  battery  in  line 262 

Field  gun 258 

Fire,  Condensed  table  of 222 

Methods  of 377-380 

Fire  at  a  single  range 380 

Fire  for  effect 378,  381 

Firing  battery 291 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 347 

Formations  of  the  battalion 281 

battery 262,  273,  291 

Heavy  field  howitzer 258 

battery  in  line 262 

Heavy  howitzer  batteries 289 

Horse  artillery 477 

Infantry  batteries 461 

Materiel,  Details  in  re  (table) 220 

Methods  of  fire 377-380 

Mountain  artillery 470 

Order  in  battery 291 

Order  in  line  at  close  intervals 262 

Organization  of  the  battalion 249 

battery 247 

field  battery 262 

heavy  field  howitzer  battery 262 

Position  of  artillery  in  a  column 303 

Progressive  fire 378 

with  sweeping 380 

Rates  of  march 259 


Index  —  Artillery.  517 

FRANCE  —  continued,  paod 

Reconnaissance  duties  of  artillery  commanders 317 

Reconnaissance  patrols 313 

Regressive  fire 378 

Replacement  of  ammunition 396 

Scouts 313 

Small  arms,  Armament  of  artillery  with 239 

Supports  for  artillery 361 

Train,  Composition  of  the  field  and  combat 262 

FRONTAGE 421 


GALLOP,  Distance  covered  at  the 269 

GAITS 269 

GERMANY 

Ammunition  supply,  Details  in  re 220,   247,   290 

Assignment  of  artillery  to  higher  units 260 

Battalion,  Organization  of  the 249 

Battery,  Organization  of  the 247,  261 

Battery  in  line 261 

Cooperation  of  infantry  and  artillery 401 

Field  gun 258 

Field  howitzer 258 

Fire,  Condensed  table  of 222 

Formations  of  the  battalion 279 

battery 262 

Materiel,  Details  in  re  (table) 220 

Order  in  battery 270,  290 

Organization  of  the  battalion 249 

field,  field  howitzer  and  horse  battery.. 261 

Rates  of  march 259 

Reconnaissance  duties  of  artillery  commanders 314 

Shrapnel,  Effect  of 224,  226 

Strength  of  the  field,  field  howitzer,  and  horse  battery.... 247 
Train,  Composition  of  the  field  and  combat 261 

GROUND  SCOUTING 310 

GROUPS,  Posting  artillery  in 331 

GUNS 

Caliber  of  various  (table) 220 

Flat  trajectory 223 

Number  of,  In  a  battery 247 

GUN  PIT  FOR  FIELD  GUN 349 

GUN  PITS 349.  361,  353 

GUN  SHIELDS 219 


518  Index — Artillery. 


H 

PAGE 

HEAVY  ARTILLERY 230,250.234 

Battalion,  Formations  of  the 285 

Organization  of  the 287 

Battery,  Formations  of  the 285 

Occupation  of  a  position  by  a 285 

Organisation  of  the 262, 268 

Employment  of 342 

Fire,  Order  of 374 

Formations 284 

Light  and  heavy  field  howitzer 230 

Heavy  field  howitzer  battery,  Organization  of 

a  .247,262 

Mortar  battery 247,263,286 

Order  of  fire  of 374 

Organization 247,  250,  262,263 

Position  in  a  column 304 

Positions  for 335 

HEAVY  FIELD  HOWITZER 230 

Cover  for 354 

France 2o8 

In  various  armies  (table) 220 

SheU 232 

HEAVY  FIELD  HOWITZER  BATTERY 262 

Organization  in  various^ 

armies 247 

HIGH  EXPLOSIVE  SHRAPNEL 220 

HISTORY-T^ce  Military  History. 

HOLLAND,  Methods  of  fire  in 380 

HORSE  ARTILLERY 4'^ 

Employment  of.  According  to  various  regula- 
tions  ^'^^zH 

In  battle JiJ 

cavalry  combat Ji!* 

service  of  reconnaissance *'^ 

HORSE  BATTERY 

Column  of  platoons 267 

Line *^. 26 

Organization  of  a,  In  various  armies 247 

HORSE  BATTERIES,  Marching  powers  of 23 

HOWITZER  BATTALION  IN  ROUTE  COLUMN 288 

HOWITZER  BATTERY 261,262 

Organization  in  various  armies  (table)        247 
HOWITZERS,  Details  in  re  various  types  of  (table) 220 

I 

INCREASING  THE  DIFFICULTIES  OF  HOSTILE  OBSERVA- 
TION  321 

INFANTRY 

Artillery  versus 354 

Codperation  of  artillery  and ^^^ 


f 


Index — Artillery.  519 

INFANTRY — continued.  paqb 

Firing  over  friendly 343 

Views  of  various  regulations 347 

INFANTRY  ATTACK 

Accompanying  the 428 

Conduct  of  the 421 

INFANTRY  BATTERIES 461 

INFANTRY  TRENCHES,  Posting  guns  in 294 

INITIAL  VELOCITY— See  Muzzle  Velocity. 

ITALY 

Ammunition  supply,  Details  in  re 220,  247 

Armament  of  artillery  with  small  arms 240 

Assignmentof  artillery  to  higher  units 250 

Battalion,  Formations  of  the 281 

Battery,  Formations  of  the ...275 

Organization  of  the 247 

Battle  ranges 340 

Column,  Position  of  artillery  in  a  column 303 

Fire,  Methods  of 383 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 347 

Formations  of  the  battalion 281 

battery 276 

Horse  artillery 478 

Materiel,  Details  in  re  (table) 220 

Methods  of  fire 383 

Organization  of  the  battery 247 

Position,  Requisites  of  an  artillery 318 

Position  of  artillery  in  a  column 303 

Ranges  in  battle 340 

Rates  of  march 259 

Small  arms.  Armament  of  artillery  with 240 

J 

JAPAN 

Attack,  Employment  of  artillery  in 464 

Battery,  Formations  of  the 276 

Defense,  Employment  of  artillery  in 464 

Employment  of  artillery 464-466 

Formations  of  the  battery 276 

L 

LIGHT  AMMUNITION  COLUMN,  Ammunition  carried  in  the..220,  290 

LIGHT  FIELD  HOWITZER 230 

Cover  for 353 

Details    in    re.    In    various    armies 

(table) 220 

Shell 220,231 

Shrapnel 220,  230 

LIMBERS,  Ammunition  carried  in 220,  290-293 

LINE,  Order  in 260,  264,  279 

LINE  OF  PLATOON  COLUMNS 280 

LINE  OF  ROUTE  COLUMNS 280 

LOSSES 348,358,399,400 


520  Index — Artillery. 


M 

PlOS 

MARCH.  Rate  of  259 

MARCHING  POWERS  OF  FIELD  AND  HORSE  BATTERIES  237 

MATERIEL 

Description  of  modem  artillery 221 

Mountain  artillery 469 

Replacement  of 397 

Various  armies,  Details  in  re  (table) 220 

MASKED  POSITIONS    272.324 

MASS  280 

MASS  EFFECT 294,296 

MASS  IN  READINESS 296 

MAXIMUM    RANGE    OF   VARIOUS    PROJECTILES    (table)    220 

METHODS  OF  FIRE 

Austria 381-383 

England 384 

France 377-380,381 

Holland 380 

Italy 383 

Russia 383 

MILITARY  HISTORY 

Accompanying  the  infantry  attack 423,426 

Adjustment,    Increasing   the   difficulties  of 

hostile 323 

Admixture  of  units 368 

Advance,  Reconnaissance  during  the 311 

Advance  guard  artillery 30d 

Advance  in  line 264 

mass 280 

Advanced  position ^^J 

Ammunition,  Expenditure  of 385,  386, 38i 

Ammunition  columns 385,  395,  396 

Armament  of  artillery  with  small  arms 239 

Artillery,  Marching  powers  of 237 

Artillery  duel 419 

fire,  Impression  produced  by 3*J 

posted  in  several  lines 319 

reserve 254,  298,  444, 445 

support,  Absence  of 294 

supports 361,  362 

Assistant  observers 313 

Attack,  accompanying  the  infantry 423 

Batteries,  Echeloning  of 280,319 

Battle  ranges 340,  341,  342,420 

Canister,  Use  of 230 

Change  of  position 364,365 

Charge  against  rear  of  horse  batteries 4i5 

made  by  the  personnel  of  a  horse  bat- 

tery S60 

Close  range  artillery  fighting... 355,  356,  357, 4W 

Cooperation  of  infantry  and  artillery 402, 403 

Corps  Artillery 253,  25i 


Index — Artillery.  521 

MILITARY  HISTORY— con<int/6d.  paqb 

Corps  artillery  of  the  Vllth  A.  C.  at  Grave- 

lotte 246 

IXth  A.  C.  at  Grave- 

lotte 243 

Corps  orders 443 

Counter-attack  against  advanced  artillery 427 

Curved  fire,  Use  of 436 

Development 417 

Disintegration  of  units 367 

Echeloning  of  batteries 280,  319 

Effect  produced  by  a  21  cm.  shell 233 

Enticing  the  enemy  into  opening  fire 417 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 385,  386,  387 

Facilitating  hostile  observation 323 

the  service  of  the  guns 321 

Fire  by  battery,  Use  of 374 

Fire  by  battery  used  as  a  signal 374 

Fire  surprise 311 

Firing  against  shielded  batteries 219 

over  friendly  troops..343, 346, 346, 347, 

348 

Flank  march 266 

Flank  marches 266 

Following  up  the  infantry 425 

Formation  of  masses  of  artillery 295 

new  batteries 243 

Frontage 421 

German  losses  in  guns  during  Franco-German 

war 358 

Ground  scouting  in  front  of  the  position 310 

Groups,  Posting  artillery  in 332 

Horse  artillery 477 

Charge  made  by  the  personnel 

of  a 360 

Horse  batteries.  Charge  against  rear  of 475 

Hurrying  forward  into  captured  position 426 

Impression  produced  by  artillery  fire 329 

Increasing  the  difiiculties  of  hostile  observa- 
tion  323 

Infantry  attack,  Accompanying  the 423 

Infantry  transported  on  artillery  carriages 

237,  239 
Influence  exerted  by  wounding  of  MacMahon 

at  Sedan 370 

Initiating  the  action 417 

Intervals 363 

Lack  of  room 245 

Line,  Advance  in 264 

Loss  of  communication  between  leaders  and 

batteries 337 

Losses 348,399,400 

in  guns,  German,  Franco-German  war  .358 

Marching  power  of  artillery 237 

Masked  positions 325,  328,  331 

Masks 223,323 

Mass,  Advance  in 280 

Massed  employment  of  artillery 295,  297 


522  Index  —  Artillery. 

MILITARY  HISTORY  ^continued.  paqi 

Meager  draft  power  of  battery  teams 237 

Position,  Advanced 441 

Change  of 364,  365 

Reconnaissance  in  front  of  the 310 

Requirements  of  an  artillery 321 

Positions.  Masked 325,  328,  331 

Unmasked 325 

Posting  artillery  in  groups 332 

several  lines 319 

Reconnaissance 310 

during  the  advance 311 

in  front  of  the  position 310 

of  the  objective 312 

Reinforcing  firing  batteries  in  action 362 

Relative  number  of  guns  in  opposing  forces  .296 
Relative  strength  of  artillery  to  other  arms.  241 
Rencontre,  Artillery  of  the  Vth  A.  C.  in  a,  At 

Nachod 411 

Reserves  of  the  artillery  dropping  behind       301 

remaining  behind  in 

the  route  column 301 

Requirements  of  an  artillery  position 321 

Shell,  Effect  of 233 

Shielded  batteries,  Firing  against 219 

Small  arms,  Armament  of  artillery  with 239 

Shrapnel  fire 299 

Street  fighting,  Use  of  ^uns  in 294 

Strength,  Relative,  Artillery  to  other  arms  .241 

Supports,  Artillery 361,  362 

Teams,  Meager  draft  power  of  battery 237 

Transporting  infantry  on  artillery  carriages 

237, 239 

Unmasked  positions 325 

Use  of  curved  fire 436 

guns  in  street  fighting 294 

Wounds  produced  by  artillery  projectiles 234 

MOBILITY 236 

MODERN  ARTILLERY,  Characteristic  properties  of 299 

MORTAR  BATTALION  IN  COLUMN  OF  ECHELONS 288 

MOUNTAIN  ARTILLERY 469 

MOUNTED  DEFILADE 325 

MOVEMENTS  IN  COLUMN 268 

MOVEMENTS  TO  THE  REAR 269 

MUZZLE  VELOCITY  OF  VARIOUS  PROJECTILES  (table) 220 


N 
NIGHT  OPERATIONS 467 


Index  —  Artillery.  523 


O 

PAGE 

OBJECTIVE,  Reconnaissance  of  the 311 

OBSERVATION,  Position  in 333 

OBSERVATION  STATIONS 335 

OCCUPATION  OF  A  POSITION,  Advance  to  and 336 

OFFICERS,  Number  of,  In  a  battery  (table) 247 

ORDER  IN  BATTERY 270 

Various  armies 290-292 

ORDER  IN  COLUMN  OF  PLATOONS 267 

ORDER  IN  DOUBLE  COLUMN 265 

ORDER  IN  DOUBLE  SECTION  COLUMN 265,  274 

ORDER  IN  LINE 260,  264 

Battalion  in  the 279 

ORDER  IN  LINE  OF  ROUTE  COLUMNS 280 

ORDER  IN  MASS 280 

ORDER  IN  ROUTE  COLUMN 265,  280 

ORDER  IN  SECTION  COLUMN ^ 265,  274,  276,  277,  280 

ORDER  OF  FIRE  OF  FIELD  ARTILLERY 372 

ORDER  OF  FIRE  OF  HEAVY  ARTILLERY 374 

ORDINARY  FIRE 372,374 

Austria 382 

ORGANIZATION 243 

Battalion 249 

Battery 244 

in  various  armies  (table) 220 

Brigade 249 

Combat  train 261-263 

Field  battery  in  various  armies 247 

Field  train 261-263 

French  field  and  heavy  field  howitzer  battery 263 

German  field,  field  howitzer  and  horse  battery 262 

Heavy  artillery 250 

Heavy  field  howitzer  battery  in  various  armies 247 

Heavy  60-pdr.  battery 247 

Horse  battery  in  various  armies 247 

Howitzer  battery  in  various  armies 247 

Regiment 249 

21  cm.  mortar  battery 263 


P 

PATROLS 

Artillery  oflftcers',  Reconnaissance  by 308 

Tasks  of 309 

PEACE  STRENGTH  OF  A  BATTERY  IN  VARIOUS  ARMIES 

(table) 247 

pe;rcus6ion  shell 

Field  gun 226 

Heavy  field  howitzer 232 


524  Index  —  Artillery. 

PERCUSSION  SHRAPNEL,  Field  gun 223 

PERSONNEL,  Replacement  of 397 

PIECE,  Fire  by 372,  374 

POSITION 

Advance  to  and  occupation  of  a 336 

Changes  of 364 

Report  on  the  reconnaissance  of  a 316 

POSITION  IN  READINESS  AND  IN  OBSERVATION 333 

POSITION  OF  ARTILLERY  IN  A  COLUMN 300 

POSITIONS 

Advanced 441 

Artillery,  Selection  of 442 

Employment  of  artillery  in  attack  on  fortified 429 

Heavy  artillery 335 

in  readiness  and  in  observation 333 

Masked 324 

Selection  of  artillery 818 

Semi-masked  324 

Unmasked 324 

POSTING  ARTILLERY  IN  GROUPS 331 

POSTING  ARTILLERY  IN  SEVERAL  LINES 319 

POSTING  GUNS  IN  INFANTRY  TRENCHES 294 

PREPARATION  OF  THE  ASSAULT 427,440 

PROGRESSIVE  FIRE 378 

Austria 382 

ElToct  of,  Against  artillery  and  infantry 329 

France 378,  381 

PROGRESSIVE  FIRE  WITH  SWEEPING 378,380,381 

PROJECTILES 

Details  in  re  virious  (table) 220 

Field  gun 223-230 

Howitzer 230-233 

Maximum  range  of  various  (table) 220 

Weight  of  various  (table) 220 

PURSUIT 428 


RAFALE  FIRE 377 

RANGE  OF  VARIOUS  PROJECTILES    (table) 220 

RANGES 

Artillery  combat  at  short 354 

Battle 340,420 

RAPID  FIRE 373,  374 

RATE  OF  FIRE 220,  375 

RATE  OF  MARCH 259 

READINESS 

Mass  in 296 

Position  in 333 

REAR  GUARD  ARTILLERY 307 


1 


Index — Artillery.  525 

PAGE 

RECOIL  GUNS 218 

RECONNAISSANCE,  Horse  artillery  in  the  service  of 471 

RECONNAISSANCE  BEFORE  AN  ATTACK  ON  A  FORTIFIED 

POSITION 431 

RECONNAISSANCE  BY  ARTILLERY  OFFICERS'  PATROLS  .308 

RECONNAISSANCE  DUTIES  OF  ARTILLERY  COMMANDERS.314 

RECONNAISSANCE  OF  ARTILLERY  TARGETS 312 

RECONNAISSANCE  OF  A  POSITION,  Report  of  a 316 

RECONNAISSANCE  OF  THE  OBJECTIVE 311 

Austrian  and  French 
views 313 

REGIMENT,  Organization  of  the 249 

REGRESSIVE  FIRE 378 

REINFORCING  FIRING  BATTERIES  IN  ACTION 362 

RELATIVE  STRENGTH  OF  FIELD  ARTILLERY  TO  OTHER 

ARMS 241 

RENCONTRE 409 

Austria 465 

REPLACEMENT  OF  AMMUNITION 390 

Austria 397 

France 396 

REPLACEMENT  OF  PERSONNEL  AND  MATERIEL 397 

RESERVE 

Composition  of  the  battery 261-263 

Ammunition  available  in  the  battery 290-292 

RESERVES,  Artillery 297 

RETREAT 460 

ROUTE  COLUMN 266 

Battalion  in 280 

Howitzer  battalion  in 288 

ROUTE  COLUMNS,  Line  of 280 

RUSSIA 

Ammunition  supply,  Details  in  re  (table) 220 

Firing  battery,  limbers,  battery  reserve.. 292 

Armament  of  artillery  with  small  arms 240 

Artillery,  Employment  of 266-268 

Artillery  supports 361 

Assignment  of  artillery  to  higher  units 261 

Battalion,  Formations  of  the 283 

Battery,  Formations  of  the 272,  292 

Organization  of  the 247 

Battle  ranges 340 

Column,  Position  of  artillery  in  a 303 

Employment  of  artillery 466-468 

Fire,  Methods  of 383 

Firing  battery 292 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 347 

Formation  of  the  battalion 283 

battery 277,  292 

Gun  pit 353 


1 


526  Index  —  Artillery. 

RUSSIA  —  continued,  page 

Horse  artillery       479 

Materiel.  DeUils  in  re  (table)     220 

Methods  of  lire    383 

Order  in  buttery 292 

Organization  of  the  battery  (table) 247 

Pociition  of  artillery  in  a  column 303 

RanRea  in  battle 340 

Rates  of  march 260 

Small  arms,  Armament  of  artillery  with  240 

Supports  for  artillery 361 


SALVO 372 

Austria 382 

France 377 

Germany 372 

SCOUTS ...310 

SECTION  COLUMN 265.  274,  276,  277,  280 

SELECTION  OF  ARTILLERY  POSITIONS 318,442 

SEMI-MASKED  POSITION 272,  274. 324 

SHELL 

Fiold  gun  226 

Heavy  field  howitzer 232 

In  various  armies,  Details  in  re  (table) 220 

Light  field  howitzer 231 

Number  of  rounds  carried  (table) 220 

Proportion  of,  To  other  projectiles 388 

Time  and  percussion 226,  227 

Weight  of  a  (table) 220 

SHIELDS— Srr  Gun  Shields. 

SHORT  RANGES,  Artillery  combat  at 354 

Artillery  versus  cavalry 356 

infantry 354 

SHRAPNEL 

Effect  of 225,226 

Field  gun 223,  224 

High  explosive 220 

In  various  armies.  Details  in  re  (table) 220 

Light  field  howitzer 230 

Number  of  rounds  carried  (table) 220 

Percussion 223 

Proportion  of,  To  other  projectiles 388 

Time 224 

Wei-ht  of  a  (table) 220 

SHRAPNEL  BULLET,  Weight  of  a  (table) 220 

SHRAPNEL  BULLETS,  Effect  of.  On  animate  targets 234 

SHRAPNEL  SHELL 220 

SIGHT  DEFILADE 325 

SINGLE  GUNS,  Employment  of 294 

SINGLE  RANGE,  Fire  at  a 380 

SMALL  ARMS,  Armament  of  artillery  with 238 


Index  —  Artillery.  527 

STRENGTH  page 

Battery  in  various  armies  (table) 247 

Relative,  Of  field  artillery  to  other  arms 241 

SUPPLY  OP  AMMUNITION 387 

Details  in  re  (table) 220 

Number  of  rounds  in  the  battery. 247, 390 

firing   bat- 
tery.290-292 

reserve  .290-292 
Number  of  rounds  per  gun 247 

SUPPORTS,  Artillery 357 

SWEEPING,  Progressive  fire  with 380,  381 


T 

TARGETS,  Reconnaissance  of  artillery 312 

TIME  SHELL 

Field  gun 227 

Light  field  howitzer 231 

TIME  SHRAPNEL,  Field  gun 224 

TRAIN,  Composition  of  the  combat  and  field 261-263 

TROT,  Distance  covered  at  the 259 


u 

UNLIMBER 269 

UNMASKED  POSITION 272,324 

USE  OF  VARIOUS  PROJECTILES 223 

V 

VARIOUS  PROJECTILES 

Details  in  re.  In  various  armies  (table) 220 

Use  of 223 

VELOCITY— See  Muzzle  Velocity. 

VOLLEY  FIRE 373 

Austria 382 


w 

WALK,  Distance  covered  at  the 259 

WAR  STRENGTH  OF  A  BATTERY  IN  VARIOUS  ARMIES 

(table) 247 

WEIGHT  OF  MATERIEL  IN  VARIOUS  ARMIES  (table) 220 

WEIGHT  OF  VARIOUS  PROJECTILES  (table) 220 

WITHDRAWAL 426 

WOUNDS  PRODUCED  BY  SHRAPNEL  BULLETS 234 

Character  of 
the 235 


INDEX  OF 
EXAMPLES  FROM  MILITART  HISTORY, 

ARTILLERY. 


A 

PAOB 

Amiens,  November  27th,  1870. 

Infantry  transported  on  artillery  carriages 237 

Artenay.  October  10th,  1870. 

Reconnaissance  of  the  objective 312 

Aspern,  1809. 

Massed  employment  of  artillery 295 

Austerlitz,  1806. 

Massed  emplojrment  of  artillery 296 

Azay,  January  6th,  1871. 

Masks 228 


B 

Bazeillet,  September  1st,  1870. 

Use  of  single  guns  in  street  fighting 294 

Beaumont,  August  30th,  1870. 

Infantry  transported  on  artillery  carriages 239 

Beaune  la  Rolande,  November  28th,  1870. 

Artillery  reserve 298,444 

Belfort,  January  20th,  1871. 

Effect  produced  by  a  21  cm.  shell 233 

Blumenau  1866. 

Facilitating  hostile  observation 323 

Boer  War. 

Relative  number  of  guns  in  opposing  forces 296 


c 

Chevilly,  September  30th,  1870. 

Assistant  observers 313 

Colenso,  December  16th,  1899. 

Close  range  artillery  fighting 366 

Development 417 

Fire  surprise 311 

Relative  number  of  guns,  Assailant  and  defender 296 


530  Index  of  Examples  —  Artillery. 

Colomb«y,  August  14th,  1870.  paqs 

Accompanying  the  infantry  attack 423 

Close  range  artillery  fighting 366 

Corpe  artillery 253 

Following  up  the  infantry 426 

Requirements  of  an  artillery  position 321 

Constantinople*  1909. 

Firing  against  shielded  batteries 219 

Coulmiors,  November  9th,  1870. 

Armament  of  the  artillery  with  small  arms 239 

Artillery  reserve 254 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 385 

Craonn«t  1814. 

Artillery  posted  in  two  lines  one  above  the  other 319 


Dhomokos,  May  17th,  1897. 

Use  of  curved  fire 436 


Etrepag ny,  November  29th-30th,  1870. 

Use  of  guns  in  street  fighting 294 


F 

Franco*Gemian  War. 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 385 

Flank  marches 266 

Formation  of  masses  of  artillery 295 

Formation  of  new  batteries 243 

German  losses  in  guns 358 

Relative  strength  of  artillery  to  other  arms 241 

Friedland,  1807. 

Massed  employment  of  artillery 295 


G 

Gerchsheim,  July  25th,  1866. 

Advance  guard  artillery    306 

Corn!  t>ubniac»  1877. 

Battle  ranges 342 

Fire  by  battery  used  as  signal 374 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 345 

Gravelotte-St.  Privat,  August  18th,  1870. 

Accompanying  the  infantry  attack 423 

Admixture  of  units '3^3 

Advance  in  mass 280 

Ammunition,  Expenditure  of 385V  386 


Index  of  Examples — Artillery.  531 

Gravelotte-St.  Prlvat  —  continued.  paqb 

Ammunition  columns 395 

Artillery  posted  in  three  lines,  one  above  the  other 319 

Artillery  supports 362 

Attack,  Accompanying  the  infantry 423 

Batteries,  Echeloning  of 280,  319 

Close  range  artillery  fighting... 356,  403 

Codperation  of  artillery  and  infantry 403 

Corps  artillery  of  the  Vllth  Army  Corps  at 245 

Xth,  Army  Corps  at 243 

Deep  column.  Advance  in 280 

Echeloning  of  batteries 280,  319 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 385,  386 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 347 

Flank  march 266 

Frontage 421 

Infantry  attack,  Accompanying  the 423 

Lack  of  room 245 

Losses 348,400 

Masks 323 

Posting  artillery  in  three  lines,  one  above  the  other 319 

Reconnaissance  in  front  of  the  position 310 

Supports,  Artillery 362 

Grost-Gorschen,  1813. 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 385 


K 

Koniggratz,  July  3d,  1866. 

Advanced  position 441 

Charge  against  the  rear  of  horse  batteries 475 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 385 

Ground  scouting  in  front  of  the  position 310 

Impression  produced  by  artillery  fire 329 

Increasing  the  difficulties  of  hostile  adjustment 323 

Reserves  of  the  artillery  dropping  behind 301 


L 

Lagulin,  July  dlst,  1904. 

Battle  ranges 340 

Langenaalza,  1866. 

Artillery  supports 361 

Le  Bourget. 

Assistant  observers 313 

Leipzig,  1813. 

Charge  made  by  the  personnel  of  a  horse  battery 360 

L«  Mans,  1871. 

Use  of  single  guns  in  street  fighting 294 

Liaoyangt  1904. 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 386,  387 

Masked  positions 331 


532  Index  op  Examples — Artillery. 

Ucnyt  1816.  pAca 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 3S5 

LiMUMt  1871. 

Artillery  reserve 298,445 

Corpe  orders 443 

Loifny»  November  2nd,  1870. 

Horse  artillery 477 

Lovtcha,  September  2nd,  1877. 

Battle  ranges 341 

Fire  by  battery 374 

Increasing  the  difficulties  of  hostile  adjustment 323 

Posting  artillery  in  several  lines,  one  above  the  other 319 


Magersfontein,  December  13th,  1899. 

Close  range  artillery  fighting 856 

Development 417 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 386 

Mara^U-Tour*  August  16th,  1870. 

Advance,  Reconnaissance  during  the 311 

Advance  in  line 264 

Ammunition,  Expenditure  of 385,386 

Ammunition  column 385,395 

Artillery  supports 361 

Corps  artillery 254 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 385,  386 

Flank  march 266 

Frontage 421 

Hurrying  forward  into  captured  position 426 

Initiating  the  action 417 

Line,  Advance  in 364 

Losses S48,  399 

Marching  powers  of  artillery 237 

Masks 323 

Reconnaissance  during  the  advance 311 

Reserves  remaining  behind  in  the  route  column 301 

Supports,  Artillery 362 

Matsiunda,  1905. 

Use  of  singlaguns 294 

Meung,  December  7th,  1870. 

Armament  of  artillery  with  small  arms 239 

Modder  River,  November  28th,  1899. 

Close  range  artillery  fighting 35^ 

Montm^dy,  1870. 

Effect  of  shell 233 

Mukden,  1905. 

Co5peration  of  infantry  and  artillery 402 

Expenditure  of  ammunition ].   387 

Firing  over  other  troops '348 

Posting  artillery  in  groups .y332 

Use  of  single  guns 294 

Wounds  produced  by  artillery  projectiles !    234 


Index  op  Examples — Artillery.  533 


N 

Nackod,  1866.  paob 

Rencontre,  Artillery  of  the  Vth  Army  Corps  in  a 411 

Nanshan,  1904. 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 348 

Unmasked  positions 826 

NoiMeville,  August  31st — September  1st,  1870. 

Ammunition  colur  ns 396 

Artillery  reserve 264 

Novion  Porcien,  September  3d,  1870. 

Charge  made  by  the  personnel  of  a  horse  battery 360 


o 

Orleans,  December  3d,  1870. 

Fire  by  battery 374 


P 

Paardeberg,  February  19th,  1900. 

Relative  nu  nber  of  guns,  Assailant  and  defender 296 

Paris,  Siege  of 

Effect  of  shell 233 

Pieters  Hill,  February  23d,  1900. 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 348 

Relative  number  of  guns.  Assailant  and  defender 296 

Plevna,  September  10th,  1877. 

Artillery  reserve 298 

Battle  ranges 342 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 346 


R 

Russo-Japanese  War  1904-1906. 

Artillery  reserve 298 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 386 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 348 

Masked  positions 326 

Shrapnel  fire 299 


s 

Saar,  Advance  toward  the  (August  6th,  1870) 263 

Sandepu,  1906. 

Absence  of  artillery  support 294 

Sapignies. 

Artillery  supports 861 


534  Index  of  Examples — Artillery. 

Ssdajfk,  September  Ist,  187a  page 

Admixture  of  units 363 

Ammunition,  Expenditure  of 385 

Battle  ranges 421 

Close  range  artillery  fighting  against  cavalry 357 

Echeloning  batteries 310 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 386 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 349 

Frontage 425 

Impression  produced  by  artillery  fire 329 

Influence  exerted  by  wounding  of  MacMahon 370 

Lack  of  room 245 

Marching  power  of  horse  artillery 237 

Massed  enployment  of  artillery 297 

Reserves  remaining  behind  in  the  route  column 301 

S«lUrahaiis*n,  1806. 

Charge  made  by  the  personnel  of  a  horse  battery .-  ...360 

Shaho,  1904. 

Change  of  position 364 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 387 

Masked  positions 328 

Wounds  produced  by  artillery  projectiles 234 

Solferino,  1859. 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 385 

Spicheren,  August  6th,  1870. 

Close  range  artillery  fighting 355 

Development 417 

Echeloning  batteries 319 

Facilitating  the  service  of  the  guns 321 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 347 

Marching  powers  of  artillery 237 

St.  Hubert*  August  18th,  1870. 

Close  range  artillery  fighting 356 

St.  Privat — See  Gravelotte. 
Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes,  1870. 

Disintegration  of  units 367 


T 

Tashihchiao,  1904. 

Battle  ranges : 340 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 387 

Masked  positions 328 

Tobitschau,  July  15th,  1866. 

Reconnaissance 310 

Tugela,  1900. 

Close  range  artillery  fighting 356 


Index  of  Examples — Artillery.  535 

V 

Villejouan,  Dece  aber  10th,  1870.                                                          page 
Firing  over  friendly  troops 346 

ViUejuif,  Dece  Tiber  15th,  1870. 

Assistant  observers 313 

ViUiers,  Nove  Tiber  30th,  1870. 

Reinforcing  firing  batteries 362 

Vionville, — See  Mars-la-Tour. 


W 

Wafangkou,  1904. 

Battle  ranges 340 

•  Jnmasked  positions 326 

Weiszenburg,  August  4th,  1870. 

Advanced  positions 441 

Initiating  the  action 417 

Masks 323 

Meager  draft  power  of  battery  teams 237 

Use  of  small  artillery  units  in  street  fighting 294 

Worth,  August  6th,  1870. 

Accompan3ring  the  infantry  attack 426 

Am  nunition.  Expenditure  of 385 

Artillery  reserve 298,  445 

Canister,  Use  of 230 

Close  range  artillery  fighting 355 

Counter-attack  against  advanced  artillery 427 

Enticing  the  enemy  to  open  fire 417 

Expenditure  of  ammunition 385 

Firing  over  friendly  troops 347 

Hurrying  forward  into  the  captured  position 426 

Intervals 363 

Loss  of  communication  between  leaders  and  batteries 337 

Meager  draft  power  of  battery  teams 236,  237 


Y 

Yalu,  1904. 

Artillery  duel 419 

YangUuling,  1904. 

Change  of  position 365 


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