Full text of "Taft papers on League of nations"

Google

This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project

to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject

to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books

are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other maiginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the

publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the
public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing tliis resource, we liave taken steps to
prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.
We also ask that you:

+ Make non-commercial use of the files We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for
personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ Refrain fivm automated querying Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine
translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the
use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ Maintain attributionTht GoogXt "watermark" you see on each file is essential for in forming people about this project and helping them find
additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ Keep it legal Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just
because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other
countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of
any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner
anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liabili^ can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers
discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web

at |http: //books .google .com/I

HARVARD LAW^llBRAHy

SnotnmJ"' ' 1S21

>i a

TAFT PAPERS

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

TAFT PAPERS

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

jZ^J^

THE ICACaCILLAN OOlfPANY
m Tomc - Bonoit - cmkaco • daluui
ATUUrrA ■ SAM nuMOtoo

MAOflLLAN ft CO., Lm

THS MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Lnw

TAFT PAPERS.

ON ^

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

EDITED BY

THEODORE MARBURG, M.A., LL.D.

AND

HORACE E. FLACK, Ph,D.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1920

AU riokU rM0rv4d

Gki

BT THS KAOMIIiLAN OOMPAMT

S« ttp and doctiotyped. PublUbed Octobv, i9a»>

Speeches and articles by Williain Howard Taft,
and extracts therefrom, covering period from May
12, 191 5, to the adoption of the revised Paris
Covenant, April 28, 1919. One article on the
revised Covenant is added

FOREWORD

These addresses, articles and editorials were written when
the issue was purely on the merits of the League to Enforce
Peace plan for a League of Nations, and of the Covenant
of the League of Nations as signed by President Wilson in
Paris and by him submitted to the Senate. I have nothing
to recall in what is said in them. But the present issue over
the League is very different from that when these papers
were written, and is made so by the very unfortunate atti-
tude of President Wilson in refusing to allow the United
States to join the League of Nations because the Senate
would not consent to Article X as he had drafted it and put
it into the Covenant.

It is conceded that the other members of the League would
have accepted us as a member with the modification of Article
X insisted on by a sufficient number of senators to prevent
ratification. The Democratic party and its platform adopt
completely Mr. Wilson's position and, if Governor Cox is
elected, the League will be defeated and a deadlock ensue just
as before.

Two-thirds of the Republican senators have already voted
for the League with reservations and enough Democrats
have expressed themselves in the Senate and elsewhere on
this matter to ensure a ratification of the League with the
Republican reservations if Mr. Harding is elected and sub-
mits the German Treaty to the Senate. The doubt on this
point is whether Mr. Harding will do so, arising from his

FOREWORD

failure to say, in his letter of acceptance, that he will do so.
My own belief is that, as Mr. Harding has already twice
voted for the League with reservations, and will find that a
Democratic minority will prevent Ms putting through a
separate treaty with Germany, he will conclude that the only
satisfactory solution is a ratification of the League Covenant
with reservations.

For these reasons — though had I been a senator I would
have voted for the League Covenant just as submitted and
also for it with the reservations — I shall vote for Mr.
Harding.

William Howard Taft.

Pointe au Pic,
Province of Quebec, Canada,
July 23, 1920.

CONTENTS

Introduction • • • vn

League to Enforce Peace i

Victory Program :. 2

The Paris Covenant for a League of Nations ... 4

Plan for a League of Nations to Enforce Peace . . 28

Proposals of the League to Enforce Peace ... 46

Constitutionality of the Proposals 52

A Constructive Plan for Human Betterment ... 61

The Purposes of the League 74

Statement Made at Richmond, Va., March 21, 1917 . 79

The Menace of a Premature Peace 81

World Peace Debate 98

Victory with Power 132

Our Purpose 133

Self Determination 136

Peril in Hun Peace Offer 138

The Obugations of Victory 141

Workingmen and the League 152

A League of Nations Our National Poucy ... 153
Why a League of Nations Is Necessary . . . .156

Lesser League of Nations 160

Disarmament of Nations and Freedom of the Seas . 163

The League of Nations and the German Colonies . 164

The League of Nations and Reugious Liberty . . 166

President Wilson and the League of Nations . . 169
Senator Lodge on the League of Nations . . . .174

The League: Why and How 177

From Article in The Public T^kdger, January i, 1919 194

CONTENTS

PAOI

Representation in the League 195

Criticism Should Be Constructive 198

Roosevelt's Contribution to League of Nations . . 201

The League of Nations, What It Means and Why It
Must Be 205

League of Nations and President Wilson's Advisers • 210

'* The League of Nations Is Here " 213

The League's " Bite " 217

The League of Nations and the German Colonies . 22i<

From Address at Atlantic Congress for a League of
Nations, New York, February 5, 1919 .... 225

Ireland and the League 225

The Great Covenant of Paris 228

To Business Men 241

From Address at San Francisco, February 19, 1919 . 2A7

From Address at Salt Lake City, February 22, 1919 . 249

League of Nations as Barrier to Any Great Wars in
Future 257

The Paris Covenant for a League of Nations . . . 262

Answer to Senator Knox's Indictment 280

Paris Covenant Has Teeth 290

To Make Peace Secure 295

League of Nations Has Not Delayed Peace . . . 300

"Open Diplomacy" Slow 3^3

Russia, France, Danzig 3^5

The Round Robin 3^7

Guaranties of Article 10 3^

Religious and Racial Freedom 3^9

Secret Treaty Provisions that are at the Root of

the Crisis at the Paris Conference . . . .311
Analysis of the League Covenant as Amended . .313
Correspondence 3^1

INTRODUCTION

Here in the United States the main attack on both the
preliminary project and the perfected Covenant of the
League of Nations was on the ground that the League
would operate as an interference with our sovereignty and
with the Monroe Doctrine, that it involved abandonment of
our traditional policy against entangling alliances, and that
the country lacked the power, under its Constitution, to
enter into such a treaty. These objections are fully met
by Mr. Taft in the speeches and articles embraced in this
volume. Sovereignty is shown to be just so much liberty
of action on the part of States as is consistent with their
obligation, under international law and morality, to permit
of the exercise of equal sovereignty or liberty of action by
their sister States. The League Covenant secures all States
in their exercise of this sovereignty free from oppression
by other States, and he who wants more is really seeking
the license selfishly to disregard these obligations — to
reject, for example, the just judgments of a properly con-
stituted tribunal — which is the German conception of
sovereignty.

The Monroe Doctrine is shown to be strengthened, not
impaired, by the Covenant. In its original form the
doctrine opposed future colonization on the American conti-
nents by European governments and all interference by
Europe with the free governments of America. Later on,

the United States, under the Polk and under the Taft admin-

. .

Vll

Vlll INTRODUCTION

istrations, voiced its opposition to the transfer of American
territory by sale to any European or Asiatic government.
The original doctrine is strengthened by the League
Covenant in that it is, for the first time, specifically recog-
nized by the nations, and is extended to the world by the
provisions of Article X, which preserves " against external
aggression the territorial integrity and political independ-
ence of all members of the League." Certainly we are not
authorized by that, nor, in fact, by any other article of the
Covenant, to acquire territory in Europe by conquest or
purchase, and similarly European countries are not author-
ized by the Covenant to do it in this hemisphere.

The attitude both of Secretary Seward and of President
Roosevelt is cited to the effect that the Monroe Doctrine
does not forbid non-American Powers from justly disciplin-
ing American countries provided the action does not extend
to the point of interfering with the latter's independence and
territorial integrity. Similarly the guaranties of territorial
integrity and political independence under Article X of the
Paris Covenant will not come into operation until the char-
acter of a war, otherwise legally begun, discloses itself as
aggressive in this respect. Neither are wars of independ-
ence within the legal purview of the League though it will
naturally take notice of them and invite friendly settlement.

The sale of American territory to non-American Powers
is not specifically forbidden by the League Covenant; but
the motive for such attempted action is lessened by the very
existence of the League. When the Monroe Doctrine is
to be enforced in the western hemisphere, it is natural to
expect that a strong American State, dose to the seat of
trouble, will be selected to execute the mandate of the
League. Similar reason would control the action of the

INTRODUCTION ix

League in employing the forces of a nearby State to quell
disturbances in other parts of the world ; so that, unless the
struggle be formidable or unless an international force be
needed to allay fear of abuse of power, the forces of the
United States will rarely be called upon to act abroad.

The " entangling alliance " argument is met by a whole
series of facts and considerations. The detached position
of the United States, which obtained in Washington's day,
is shown to have disappeared with the spread of dominion
and interests since then. From a country limited to a
comparatively narrow settlement along the Atlantic sea-
board, the United States has extended its empire over the
continent to the Pacific, has acquired Alaska, Hawaii, the
Philippines, Porto Rico, and the Panama Canal strip, while
a multiplied commerce and social intercourse tie up her
fortunes intimately with the fortunes of other peoples. The
life that pulses through her veins today is the life of the
world and disease in the body politic elsewhere affects her
own health. We have seen that we cannot keep out of a
general world conflict and we risk less by assuming the
obligations of membership in the family of nations and
throwing our great influence in the scale for the preservation
of peace than if we were to attempt isolation and play the
role of onlooker until the conflagration drew us irresist-
ibly in.

Our presence will make the potential strength of the
League so overwhelming that the hand of the would-be
aggressor will be stayed, making serious assault on the
world's peace unlikely. In most instances the need for the
actual use of force will be avoided; just as the declared
purpose of the United States to maintain the Monroe
Doctrine has resulted in its being respected without our

X INTRODUCTION

being called upon to fire a shot or sacrifice the life of a single
soldier in its defence. Accordingly there will be less likeli-
hood of our being called upon to go to war than if we
declined the commitments of the League with a view to
avoiding war. While the United States, in entering the
League, will assume new responsibilities, it will not assume
new burdens. The League will prove to be a source of
economy rather than of new expense to us; for it should
not only enable us to escape the crushing expense of actual
warfare, but, in course of time, should likewise relieve us of
part of the present burden of armaments.

So much from the standpoint of self-interest. But,
irrespective of self-interest, the United States, having become
a powerful nation in point of numbers, talent and resources,
has a duty to perform in this respect to her sister nations.
Modern ingenuity has so multiplied the destructiveness of
war that the very preservation of the race is dependent on
adequate organization to suppress war. Such organization
cannot come about without the participation of the United
States. Unless we join, other important countries will
remain out and we will witness the world divided once more
in hostile groups. Without a League of Nations, the many
new States which have come into being, lacking experience
and the self-restraint which makes successful self-govern-
ment possible, will not only be unable to maintain their
independence but will be a source of danger to the general
peace, by reason of quarrels among themselves and quarrels
with the States of which they were formerly a part ; for, on
the one hand, racial animosity and the memory of the
tyranny formerly practiced against them " will prompt them
to be impatient and headstrong" in dealing with their
former masters, while, on the other hand, the latter will

IMTRODXJCTION XI

harbor resentment against States whose independent exist-
ence will remind them of their own " deserved humiliation."
Our experience in Cuba indicates what we may expect of
them. After three years of existence as an independent
republic, Cuba indulged in a revolution. " Mr. Roosevelt
sent me down there to stop it and laimch the Republic once
more. Well, I could not stop it except by sending for the
army and navy of the United States. That step had a
wholesome, conciliatory, quieting effect. We were not
called upon to fight. We took over the island and held it
for two years. We passed a lot of good statutes, among
them an election law, held a fair election under it and then
turned over the government to those elected. We had
launched her once more. If she ever requires it we will
do the same thing over again and launch her again, and then
again, until she gets strong enough — I hope she is now —
to stand alone."

This unpretentious and good-natured recital of the accom-
plishment of a task which for another might have proved
difficult indeed — and lengthy, if not bloody — shows,
more clearly than any abstract dissertation possibly could,
exactly the patience and fatherly concern which Mr. Taft
feels will be required of us in starting the new nations of
Europe safely on their way.

Our own sacrifices and the more awful sacrifices of our
allies, who were fighting our battle long before we awoke
to the fact, were made in order to suppress militarism, to
safeguard democracy and to make peace more lasting.

It was the United States, acting through its President,
that pointed the way to a league of nations. The hope of
it gave new courage to the armies of our allies and to the
people that suffered toil and hardship at home; it helped

Xll INTRODUCTION

nerve the arm of our own boys and encouraged the masses
in the enemy country to revolt against their leaders. Shall
we now disappoint their hope? Prove traitor to our pro-
fessions? Tell the maimed and the mothers of the dead,
at home and abroad, that we did not mean what we said?
Suffer conditions to grow up which will make similar —
nay, far graver — sacrifices necessary in the future ? "I
say that the men who advocate our staying out of the
League by reason of a policy against entangling alliances
laid down by Washington for a small nation struggling for
existence, whereas today we are one of the most powerful
nations in the world — I say deliberately that these men
are little Americans and belittle the United States and its
people." Now is the time to set up the international organ-
ization which for generations thinking men have sought;
now, while the dreadful character of war has so impressed
itself on nations that they are willing to make the concessions
called for.

Should we not, then, say to the nations of Europe : " We
realize that the sea no longer separates us but is become a
bond of union. We know that if war comes to you, our
neighbor, it is apt to come to us, and we are ready to stand
with you in order to suppress this scourge of nations. For
love of our brother we will do our share as men and women
conscious of the responsibility to help along mankind, a
responsibility which God has given this nation in giving it
great power."

Led, by experience in furthering new measures, to expect
violent attack on the proposed League from the side of the
Federal Constitution, Mr. Taft took early occasion to deal
with that important question. His full and satisfactory

INTRODUCTION XIU

treatment of it is among his most valuable contributions to
the discussion of the League project.

The United States is a nation, endowed with all the
powers, so far as external relations are concerned, that
appertain to a sovereign nation. Practice and legal decisions
are cited to show that its treaty-making power extends to
all subjects usually dealt with in treaties. These include, in
practice and in law, the right to agree to submit to arbitra-
tion not only existing disputes but likewise disputes which
may arise in future. Among the latter, instance the
approval, by the United States Senate, of the Hague conven-
tion for an international Court of Prize and of the Bryan
treaties. Such agreements may apply to extra-legal con-
troversies as well as to justiciable controversies. The latter
are defined as matters resolvable by the rules of law and
equity. Precedent for instituting an international Court
of Justice to pass upon the latter category of questions is
found in the Supreme Court of the United States which is
called upon at times to apply international law in con-
troversies between the States of the Union. Settlement of
extra-legal questions by a tribunal would simply be arbi-
tration as we commonly know it. A long series of agree-
ments of this nature, beginning with the Jay Treaty of 1794,
affirms the practice of the country in respect thereto. Sub-
mission of an issue to a judge, which this is, is not a dele-
gation of power to an agent.

Nor is the Government exceeding its constitutional powers
when it enters into an agreement to go to war under certain
conditions. For the complete act, the exercise of two con-
stitutional functions is required. It is the President who,
by and with the consent of the Senate, makes a treaty.
" For this purpose the President and Senate are the United

XIV INTRODUCTION

States." That is one thing. It is the Congress which,
observing the requirements of the treaty, takes supplemen-
tary action. That is quite another thing.

A treaty calling for a declaration of war under certain
conditions can no more be carried out without action on the
part of Congress than a treaty calling for the payment of
money; because in Congress alone resides the power to
declare war just as in Congress alone resides the power to
make appropriations of money from the Treasury. The
requirements of the Constitution are fulfilled only by this
double action. But that fact cannot be interpreted as limit-
ing the constitutional power of the Government to make
treaties. The treaty we made with France during the
Revolution was of that character. The Senate accepted the
principle when it approved the treaties under which we
guaranteed the independence of Cuba and Panama. " The
obligation was entered into in the constitutional way and is
to be performed in the constitutional way."

Neither can the constitutional power of the country to
enter into an agreement to limit armaments be questioned.
This power was exercised early in the history of the country
by the agreement with Canada ( 1817) to abolish armaments
on the Great Lakes and maintain no fortifications along our
lengthy common border.

The charge that the League sets up a Super-State like-
wise falls before an examination of the project. The central
organs of the League recommend — they do not command
— definite courses of action by the States of the League.
When armaments are in question, the limit prescribed for
each State is not definitive until that State has agreed to it.
For the United States, it is the Congress, acting under the
Constitution, which will finally determine what our arma-

INTRODUCTIOK XV

ments are to be. When mandates for administering back-
ward regions are assigned, the mandatory is free to accept
or reject the mandate. When the use of force is required,
each State of the League will decide for itself whether or
not it will observe the recommendation of the central organ
of the League that force be used. True, among the positive
agreements which may not be ignored, are two of major
importance, namely, the agreement to institute a boycott
against a member of the League which res6rts to war in
violation of its covenants and the agreement to "afford
passage through their territory to the forces " engaged in
disciplining the recalcitrant. These provisions abolish neu-
trality in the case of an aggressive war; but it is a condi-
tion which arises not 1)y reason of any command of the cen-
tral organs of the League but by reason of the act of the
recalcitrant itself in waging war illegally.

The power of the League rests, not on a super-govern-
ment, but on the covenants of the members to cooperate
voluntarily by boycott and by the use of force, to punish
aggression.

Combatting the views of persons who object to the ele-
ment of force in the League program, Mr. Taft declares
his respect for the motives of the advocates of non-resist-
ance but doubts whether nations are as yet proof against the
" temptations to cupidity, cruelty and injustice " manifested
in men, and whether, on that account, an international police
is not as requisite as the constabulary which " protects the
innocent and the just against the criminal and unjust"
within the State.

Mr. Bryan, in the written debate with Mr. Taft, urges
that the use of force invites violence, and cites the laying
aside of weapons by private persons as having made for the

XVI INTRODUCTION

peace fulness of sdciety. Mr. Taft replies that the instance
is not well chosen, because " men gave up weapons when
they could rely on the police, exercising the force of the
community, to protect them against violence. . . . Would
Mr. Bryan dispense with the police in city, state and na-
tion?" "There is no means of suppressing lawless vio-
lence except lawful force."

Mr. Bryan's view that a popular referendum should be
taken before a nation may declare war is met by the supposi-
tion that the people of one country to a dispute might well
vote for war while that of the other country voted against
it. " Shall another vote be taken ? In which countr>' ?
Or shall it be in both ? " We may add that when the na-
tional legislature had gone so far as to submit the question
of peace or war by referendum to the people, what likeli-
hood is there that the prospective enemy would await the
decision before striking? Picture any of the great Euro-
pean countries referring to popular vote the question of war
against a neighbor. How long would the latter delay war-
like action? The debate offers an interesting comparison,
throughout, of the minds of the two participants.

The assertion, made in certain quarters, that the League
plan has little value because nations will disregard the obli-
gations of the pact is met by the admission that nations are
sometimes utterly immoral and shamelessly break treaties
on the plea of necessity but that we cannot, on that account,
abandon treaty-making " any more than we can give up com-
mercial contracts because men sometimes dishonor them-
selves by breaking them." Moreover, flying in the face of
an organized world opinion and combined world power
involves very different consequences from those which fol-
lowed breach of treaty under the old order.

IKTRODUCTION xvii

The fear that judgments of an international tribunal will
affect adversely the interests of the United States is dis-
missed in these words: "If the judgment against her is
just she ought to obey it. If it is not, why assume that it
will be rendered at all, or, that if rendered all nations
would join in world war to enforce it? Indeed, may not
our imagination, if we let it run riot, as easily conceive
such a union of the military forces of the world against
the United States without a league and its machinery as
with them?" No inconsistency is recognized between in-
tense love of country, which is regarded as helpful and
right, and universal brotherhood. " The relation of one
to the other should be as love of home and family is to
love of country." They strengthen each other.

A league, such as is now planned, is viewed as a necessary
and natural outgrowth of the treaty foreshadowed by the
demands of the Allies. In fact the proposed treaty is im-
possible of fulfillment without the aid of some such organi-
zation. Even though drawn " by the ablest lawyers who
ever drew a contract " its numerous provisions will call for
authoritative interpretation. What instrument is there
better fitted than a court to interpret a contract authorita-
tively? Next, there are sure to be conflicts which are not
justiciable among the nations. What better institution for
settling such questions than a tribunal of inquiry and con-
ciliation? Unruliness on the part of backward countries,
or of those children among the nations to whoni reference
has already been made, will call for the use of force to con-
fine and restrain it. " You do not always have to use the
broad hand but it is helpful to have it in the family."
That was the third plank in the platform of the League to
Enforce Peace. Lastly, we cannot escape the task of de-

XVIU INTRODUCTION

veloping and defining international law» and that is the
fourth plank.

As the discussion proceeded Mr. Taft was led to change,
in the direction of enlarging, his view of the length to
which nations might be expected to go in conferring powers
on a central organization. Of the desirability of sanc-
tion for all the pronouncements of the League there was
never a question. The problem was to avoid wrecking
the project by demanding more than the nations would be
willing to concede at this time.

It will be observed, for example, that in the earliest
speeches, intention to enforce the judgment of an interna-
tional court is denied ; whereas, later on and with Mr. Taft's
approval, the platform of the League to Enforce Peace
moved up to that demand. At the same time Mr. Taft has
stood, from the beginning, for the power to hale a nation
into court. The framers of the Paris Covenant were mani-
festly unwilling to confer both powers conjointly on an in-
ternational tribunal. They neglected to confer on the
League the power to hale offenders before a tribunal or
court in matters suitable for arbitration — justiciable mat-
ters are included in the term — but, having once submitted
the matter, the disputants are bound to respect the judg-
ment or award. On the other hand, disputants in the field
of extra-legal matters, including conflicts of political policy,
may be haled before a tribunal — the Council or a com-
mittee thereof — while the recommendation arrived at by
the tribunal is not enforcible. Mr. Taft is of the opinion
that there is still a way, through the instrumentality of the
Council, to bring a nation into the Court of International
Justice under the Covenant. Certainly it is not unreason-

INTRODUCTION XIX

able to expect further development of the powers of its
tribunals, as well as of the general powers of the League,
as time may disclose the need for them.

So, too, the earlier position that the League should oper-
ate only on its own members was abandoned by Mr. Taft
and his associates in favor of insistence on resort to inquiry
in the hope of peaceful settlement before even nations out-
side the League were suffered to go to war. This is the
attitude of the Paris Q>venant. The messages printed at
the end of the volume reveal the part played by Mr. Taft
in securing modification of the covenant originally reported
to the Paris Conference (February 14, 1919). His sug-
gestions were made with a view to meeting the objections
raised against the instrument by members of the United
States Senate. The attitude of the latter, softer the ob-
jections voiced had been largely met by these modifications,
indicates the true nature of much of the opposition, namely,
desire to destroy the Covenant itself — 2l fearful responsi-
bility in view of future consequences to the welfare of man-
kind.

In addition to meeting, with his usual touch of kindly
humor and convincing reasoning, the arguments advanced
against the League project, Mr. Taft discloses in these
papers a deep conviction that a League of Nations is neces-
sary and that within it lie boundless possibilities for good.

Some one has said that the man whom we are inclined to
regard as wise is the man with whose views we happen to
agree. Be that as it may, in reviewing Mr. Taft's utter-
ances one is struck with the extent to which the things he
has advocated are the things that have been realized or
are stiD regarded as desirable. His basket of discarded no-

XX INTRODUCTieN

tions — ' notions discarded for him by the public — is ex-
ceptionally small.

Among the speeches in his best vein is that of Montreal
(September 26, 1917) analysing German motive in the light
of Prussia's history and reviewing the events which led up
inevitably to our own entry into the war. While stamped
with his characteristic fairness, it constitutes such a sweep-
ing indictment of Germany, is so eloquent and full of fire,
to exact, comprehensive and satisfactory that it should live
as a masterpiece in the literature of the war.

It goes without saying that the Papers are replete with
new evidence of our honored ex-President's grasp of the
guiding legal principles of our government, gathered on the
bench and in executive office, and of the attitude of mind
which the best thought and feeling of the country heartily
accepts as true Americanism.

Theodore Marburg.

Baltimore, November 11, 19 19.

'. »

TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE
. OF NATIONS

LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

The League to Enforce Peace was organized in Independ-
ence Hall, Philadelphia, June 17, 1915. Its objects are set
forth in the following :

• ■ . - ■ ■

Proposals

We believe it to be desirable for the United States to join
a league of nations binding the signatories to the following :

First: AH justiciable questions arising between the
signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject
to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tri-
bunal for hearing and judgment^ both upon the merits and
upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

Second: All other questions arising between the signa-
tories and not settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a
council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recom^
mendation.

Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forth-
with both their economic and military forces against any
one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of
hostility, against another of the signatories before any ques-
tion arising shall be submitted as provided in the forego-
ing.*

. ^The foUowiog interpretation of Article 3 has been authorized
by the Executive Qomnytttee:
" The signatory powers shall jointly employ diplomatic and economic

I
I

2 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall
be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of
international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify
its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern
in the dedsicms of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article
One.

VICTORY PROGRAM

Adopted at a meeting of the Executive Committee, held in
New York, November 23, ipj8, as the ofRdal platform
of the League to Enforce Peace, superseding the proposals
adopted at the organisation of the League in Philadelphia,
June 17, 191 5.

The war now happily brought to a dose has been above
all a war to end war, but in order to ensure the fruits of
victory and to prevent the recurrence of such a catastrophe
there should be formed a League of Free Nations, as uni-
versal as possible, based upon treaty and pledged that the
security of each state shall rest upon the strength of the
whole. The initiating nucleus of the membership of the
League should be the nations associated as belligerents in
winning the war.

The League should aim at promoting the liberty, progress,

pressure against any one of their number that threatens war against
a fellow signatory without havinj^ first submitted its dispute for inter-
national inquiry, conciliation, arbitration or judicial hearing, and
awaited a conclusion, or without having in good faith offered so to
submit it. They shall follow this forthwith by the joint use of their
military forces against that nation if it actually goes to war, or com-
mits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any
question arising shall be dealt with as provided in the foregoing."

VICTORY PROGRAM 3

and fidr economic opportunity of all nations, and the orderly
development of the world.

It should ensure peace by eliminating causes of dissen-
sion, by deciding controversies by peaceable means, and by
uniting the potential force of all the members as a standing
menace against any nation that seeks to upset the peace of
the world.

The advantages of membership in the League, both
^onomically and from the point of view of security, should
be so dear that all nations will desire to be members of it.

For this purpose it is necessary to create —

1. For the decision of justiciable questions, an impartial
tribunal whose jurisdiction shall not depend upon the as-
sent of the parties to the controversy; provision to be made
for enforcing its decisions.

2. For questions that are not justiciable in their character,
a Council of Conciliation, as mediator, which shall hear,
consider, and make recommendations; and failing acquies-
cence by the parties concerned, the League shall determine
what action, if any, shall be taken.

3. An administrative organization for the conduct of af-
fairs of common interest, the protection and care of back-
ward regions and internationalized places, and such matters
as have been jointly administered before and during the
war. We hold that this object must be attained by methods
and through machinery that will ensure both stability and
pr(^;ress ; preventing, on the one hand, any crystallization of
the status quo that will defeat the forces of healthy growth
and changes, and providing, on the other hand, a way by
which progress can be secured and necessary change effected
without recourse to war.

4. A representative Congress to formulate and codify

4 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

rules of international law, to inspect the work of thfc adr
ministrative bodies and to consider any matter affecting the
tranquility of the world or the progress or betterment of
human relations. Its deliberations should be public.

5. An Executive Body, able to speak with authority in the
name of the nations represented, and to act in case the peace
of the world is endangered.

The representation of the different nations in the organs
of the League should be in proportion to the responsibilities
and obligations they assume. The rules of international
law should not be defeated for lack of unanimity.

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A
LEAGUE OF NATIONS

[Similar provisions of the two drafts paralleled for comparison]

Text of the Plan Adopted by Text of the Plan Presented

the Paris Peace Confer- at the Paris Peace Con-

ence April 38, ipip ference Feb. 14, ipip

Preamble
In order to promote inter-
national cooperation and to
achieve international peace and
security, by the acceptance of
obligations not to resort to war,
by the prescription of open, just
and honorable relations between
nations, by the firm establish-
ment of the understandings of
international law as the actual
rule of conduct among Gk)vem-
ments, and by the maintenance

Preamble
In order to promote interna-
tional cooperation and to secure
international peace and security
by the acceptance of obligations
not to resort to war, by the pre-
scription of open, just and
honorable relations between na-
tions, by the firm establishment
of the understandings of mter-
national law as the actual rul^
of conduct among governments^
and by the maintenance of jus-

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

of justice and a scrupulous re-
spect for all treaty obligations
in the dealings of organized
peoples with one another, the
high contracting parties agree to
this covenant of the League of
Nations.

Article I

The original members of the
League of Nations shall be those
of the signatories which are
named in the annex to this
covenant and also such of those
other states named in the annex
as shall accede without reserva-
tion to this covenant. Such ac-
cessions shall be effected by a
declaration deposited with the
Secretariat within two months
of the coming into force of the
covenant. Notice thereof shall
be sent to all other members of
the League.

Any fully self-governing state,
dominion or colony not named
in the annex may become a
member of the League if its ad-
mission is agreed to by two-
thirds of the Assembly, provided
that it shall give effective guar-
antees of its sincere intention
to observe its international obli-
gations and shall accept such
regulations as may be prescribed
by the League in regard to its
military^ naval and air forces
and armaments.

Any member of the League
may, after two years' notice of

tice and a scrupulous respect for
all treaty obligations in the deal-
ings of organized people with
one another, the powers signa-
tory to this covenant adopt this
constitution of the League of
Nations :

Article VII

Admission to the League of
States, not signatories to the
covenant and not named in the
protocol hereto as States to be
invited to adhere to the cove-
nant, requires the assent of
not less than two-thirds of the
States represented in the body
of delegates, and shall be
limited to fully self-governing
countries, including dominions
and colonies.

No State shall be admitted to
the League unless it is .able to
give effective guarantees of its
sincere intention to observe its
international obligations and un-
less it shall conform to such
principles as may be prescribed
by the League in regard to its
naval and military forces and
armamenta.

TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

its intention so to do, withdraw
from the League, provided that
all its international obligations
and all its obligations under this
covenant shall have been ful-
filled at the time of its with-
drawal.

Article II
The action of the League un-
der this covenant shall be
effected through the instrumen-
tality of an Assembly and of a
Council, with a permanent Sec-
retariat

Article III

The Assembly shall consist of
representatives of the members
of the League.

The Assembly shall meet at
stated intervals, and from time
to time as occasion may require,
at the seat of the League, or at
such other place as may be de-
cided upon.

The Assembly may deal at its
meetings with any matter within
the sphere of action of the
League or affecting the peace
of the world.

At meetings of the Assembly
each member of the League
shall have one vote, and may

Article I

The action of the high con-
tracting parties under the terms
of this covenant shall be effected
through the instrumentality of
meetings of a body of delegates
representing the high contract-
ing parties, of meetings at more
frequent intervals of an Execu-
tive Council, and of a perma-
nent international secretariat to
be established at the seat of the
League.

Article II

Meetings of the body of dele-
gates shall be held at stated in-
tervals and from time to time,
as occasion may require, for the
purpose of dealing with matters
within the sphere of action of
the League. Meetings of the
body of delegates shall be held
at the seat of the League, or at
such other places as may be
found convenient, and shall con-
sist of representatives of the
high contracting parties. Each
of the high contracting parties
shall have one vote, but may
have not more than three repre-
sentatives.

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 7

have not more than three repre-
sentatives.

Article IV
The Council shall consist of
representatives of the principal
allied and associated powers, to-
gether with representatives of
four other members of the
League. These four members
of the League shall be selected
by the Assembly from time to
time in its discretion. Until the
appointment of the representa-
tives of the four members of the
League first selected by the As-
sembly, representatives of Bel-
gium, Brazil, Spain and Greece
shall be members of the Council.

With the approval of the ma-
jority of the Assembly, the
Council may name additional
members of the League, whose
representatives shall always be
members of the Council; the
Council with like approval may
increase the number of members
of the Les^^ue to be selected by
the Assembly for representation
on the Council.

The Council shall meet from
time to time as occasion may re-
quire, and at least once a year,
at the seat of the League, or at
such other place as may be de-
cided upon.

Article III

The Executive Council shall
consist of representatives of
the United States of Amer-
ica, the British Empire, France,
Italy, and Japan, together with
representatives of four other
States, members of the League.
The selection of these four
States shall be made by the
body of delegates on sueh prin-
ciples and in such manner as
they think fit. Pending the ap-
pointment of these representa-
tives of the other States^ repre-
sentatives of shall be mem-
bers of the Executive Council.

Meetings of the council shall
be held from time to time as
occasion may require, and at
least once a year, at whatever
place may be decided on, or, fail-
ing any such decision, at the seat
of the League, and any matter
within the sphere of action of
the League or affecting the
peace of the world may be dealt
with at such meetings.

Invitations shall be sent to
any power to attend a meeting
of the council, at which matters
directly affecting its interests
are to be discussed, and no de-
cision taken at any meeting will
be binding on such a power un-
less so invited

8 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Council may deal at its
meetings with any matter with-
in the sphere of action of the
League or affecting the peace of
the world.

Any member of the League
not represented on the Council
shall be invited to send a repre-
sentative to sit as a member at
any meeting of the Council dur-
ing the consideration of matters
specially affecting the interests
of that member of the League.

At meetings of the Council,
each member of the League
represented on the Council shall
have one vote, and may have not
more than one representative.

Article V

Except where otherwise ex-
pressly provided in this cove-
nant, or by the terms of the
present treaty, decisions at any
meeting of the Assembly or of
the Council shall require the
agreement of all the membersi of
the League represented at the
meeting.

All matters of procedure at
meetings of the Assembly or the
Council, including the appoint-
ment of committees to investi-
gate particular matters, shall be
regulated by the Assembly or by
the Council and may be decided

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 9

by a majority of the members of
ihe' League represented at the
meeting.

The first meeting of the As-
sembly and the first meeting of
the Council shall be summoned
by the President of the United
States of America.

Article VI

The permanent Secretariat
shall be established at the seat of
the League. The Secretariat
shall comprise a Secretary Gen-
eral and such secretaries and
staff as may be required.

The first Secretary General
shall be the person named in the
annex; thereafter the Secretary
General shall be appointed by
the Council with the approval
of the majority of the Assembly.

The secretaries and the staff
of the Secretariat shall be ap-
pointed by the Secretary Gen-
eral with the approval of the
Council.

The Secretary General shall
act in that capacity at all meet-
ings of the Assembly and of the
Council.

The expenses of the Secre-
tariat shall be borne by the
members of the League in ac-
cordance with the apportion-
ment of the expenses of the In-
ternational Bureau of the Uni-
versal Postal Union.

Article V

The permanent secretariat of
the League shall be established

at , which shall constitute

the seat of the League. The
secretariat shall comprise such
secretaries and staff as may be
required, under the general di-
rection and control of a Secre-
tary General of the League, who
shall be chosen by the Execu-
tive Council. The secretariat
shall be appointed by the Secre-
tary General subject to con-
firmation by the Executive
Council.

The Secretary General shall
act in that capacity at all meet-
ings of the body of delegates or
of the Executive Council.

The expenses of the secre-
tariat shall be borne by the
States members of the League,
in accordance with the appor-
tionment of the expenses of the
International Bureau of the
Universal Postal Union.

TAPT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Article VII

The seat of the League is
established at Geneva.

The Council may at any time
decide that the seat of the
League shall be established else-
where.

All positions under or in con-
nection with the League, includ-
ing the Secretariat, shall be open
equally to men and women.

Representatives of the mem-
bers of the League and officials
of the League when engaged on
the business of the League shall
enjoy diplomatic privileges and
immunities.

The buildings and other prop-
erty occupied by the League or
its officers or by representatives
attending its meetings shall be
inviolable.

Article VIII

The members of the League
recognize that the maintenance
of a peace requires the reduc-
tion of national armaments to
the lowest point consistent with
national safety and the enforce-
ment by common action of in-
ternational obligations.

The Council, taking account
of the geographical situation
and circumstances of each state,
shall formulate plans for such
reduction for the consideration
and action of the several
Governments.

Such plans shall be subject to

Article VI
Representatives of the
contracting parties and officii
of the League, when engaged in
the business of the League, shall
enjoy diplomatic privileges and
immunities, and the buildings oc-
cupied by the League or its
officials, or by representatives
attending its meetings, shall en-
joy the benefits of extra-terri-
toriality.

Article VIII
The high contracting parties
recognize the principle that the
maintenance of peace will re-
quire the reduction of national
armaments to the lowest point
consistent with national safety,
and the enforcement by com-
mon action of international obli-
gations, having special regard to
the geographical situation and
circumstances of each State, and
the Executive Council shall
formulate plans for effecting
such reduction. The Executive
Council shall also determine for
the consideration and action of

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS II

reconsideration and revision at
least every ten years.

After these plans shall have
been adopted by the several
Governments, the limits of arm-
aments therein fixed shall not be
exceeded without the concur-
rence of the Council.

The members of the League
agree that the manufacture by
private enterprise of muni-
tions and implements of war is
open to grave objections. The
Council shall advise how the
evil effects attendant upon such
manufacture can be prevented,
due regard being had to the
necessities of those members of
the League which are not able
to manufacture the munitions
and implements of war neces-
sary for their safety.

The members of the League
undertake to interchange full
and frank information as to the
scale of their armaments, their
military, naval and air programs
and the condition of such of
their industries as are adaptable
to warlike purposes.

the several Governments what
military equipment and arma-
ment is fair and reasonable in
proportion to the scale of forces
laid down in the program of dis-
armament and these limits, when
adopted, shall not be exceeded
without the permission of the
Executive Council.

The high contracting parties
agree that the manufacture by
private enterprise of munitions
and implements of war lends
itself to grave objections, and
direct the Executive Council to
advise how the evil effects at-
tendant upon such manufacture
can be prevented, due regard
being had to the necessities of
those countries which are not
able to manufacture for them-
selves the munitions and imple-
ments of war necessary for their
safety.

The high contracting parties
undertake in no way to conceal
from each other the condition of
such of their industries as are
capable of being adapted to war-
like purposes or the scale of
their armaments, and agree that
there shall be full and frank
interchange of information as
to their military and naval
programs^

AxncLS IX Article IX

A permanent commission shall A permanent commission shall
be constituted to advise the be constituted to advise the

TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Council on the execution of the
provisions of Articles I and
VIII and on military, naval and
air questions generally.
Articxe X
The members of the League
undertake to respect and pre-
serve as against external ag-
gression the territorial integrity
and existing political independ-
ence of all members of the
League. In case of any such
aggression or in case of any
threat or danger of such aggres-
sion, the Council shall advise
upon the means by which this
obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article XI

Any war or threat of war,
whether immediately affecting
any of the members of the
League or not, is hereby de-
clared a matter of concern to
the whole League, and the
League shall take any action
that may be deemed wise and
effectual to safeguard the peace
of nations. In case any such
emergency should arise, the Sec-
retary General shall, on the re-
quest of any member of the
League, forthwith summon a
meeting of the Council.

It is also declared to be the
fundamental right of each mem-
ber of the League to bring to
the attention of the Assembly or
of the Council any circum-

League on the execution of the
provisions of Article VIII and
on military and naval questions
generally.

Article X

The high contracting parties
shall undertake to respect and
preserve as against external
s^gression the territorial integ-
rity and existing political inde-
pendence of all States members
of the League. In case of any
such aggression or in case of
any threat or danger of such ag-
gression the Executive Council
shall advise upon the means by
which the obligation shall be
fulfilled.

Article XI

Any war or threat of war,
whether immediately affecting
any of the high contracting
parties or not, is hereby declared
a matter of concerp to the
League, and the high contract-
ing parties reserve the right to
take any action that may be
deemed wise and effectual to
safeguard the peace of nations.

It is hereby also declared and
agreed to be the friendly right
of each of the high contracting
parties to draw the attention of
the body of delegates or of the
Executive Council to any cir-
cumstance affecting interna-
tional intercourse which threat-
ens to disturb international

THE PARIS COVENANT POR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1 3

Stance whatever affecting inter-
national relations which threat-
ens to disturb either the peace
or the good understanding be-
tween nations upon which peace
depends.

Article XII

The members of the League
agree that if there should arise
between them any dispute likely
to lead to a rupture, they will
submit the matter either to arbi-
tration or to inquiry by the
Council, and they agree in no
case to resort to war until three
months after the award by the
arbitrators or the report by the
Council.

In any case under this article
the award of the arbitrators
shall be made within a reason-
able time, and the report of the
Council shall be made within
six months after the submission
of the dispute.

peace or the good understand-
ing between nations upon which
peace depends.

AsncLB XIII
The members of the League
agree that whenever any dispute
shall arise between them which

Article XII

The high contractii^ parties
agree that should disputes arise
between them which cannot be
adjusted by the ordinary pro-
cesses of diplomacy they will in
no case resort to war with-
out previously submitting the
questions and matters involved
either to arbitration or to in-
quiry by the Executive Council
and until three months after die
award by the arbitrators or a
recommendation by the Execu-
tive Council, and that they will
not even then resort to war as
against a member of the League
which complies with the award
of the arbitrators or the recom-
mendation of the Executive
Council.

In any case under this article
the award of the arbitrators
shall be made within a reason-
able time, and the recommenda-
tion of the Executive Council
shall be made within six months
after the submission of the dis-
pute.

Article XIII

The high contracting parties
agree that whenever any dispute
or difficulty- shall arise between

TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

they recognize to be suitable for
submission to arbitration and
which cannot be satisfactorily
settled by diplomacy, they will
submit the whole subject matter
to arbitration. Disputes as to
the interpretation of a treaty, as
to any question of international
law, as to the existence of any
fact which if established would
constitute a breach of any inter-
national obligation, or as to the
extent and nature of the repara-
tion to be made for any such
breach, are declared to be
among those which are generally
suitable for submission to arbi-
tration. For the consideration
of any such dispute the court
of arbitration to which the case
is referred shall be the court
agreed on by the parties to the
dispute or stipulated in any con^
vention existing between them.
The members of the League
agree that they will carry out
in full good faith any award
that may be rendered and that
they will not resort to war
against a member of the League
which complies therewith. In
the event of any failure to carry
out such an award, the Council
shall propose what steps should
be taken to give effect thereto^

Abticlb XIV
The Council shall formulate
and submit to the members of

them, which they recognize to be
suitable for submission to arbi-
tration and which cannot be
satisfactorily settled by diplo-
macy, they will submit the whole
matter to arbitration. For this
purpose the court of arbitration
to which the case is referred
shall be the court agreed on by
the parties or stipulated in any
convention existing between
theuL The high contracting
parties agree that they will carry
out in full good faith any award
that may be rendered. In the
event of any failure to carry
out the award the Executive
Council shall propose what steps
can best be taken to give effect
thereto.

AincLB XIV
The Executive Council shall
formulate, plans for the estab-

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1 5

the League for adoption plans
for the establishment of a perm-
anent Court of International
Justice. The court shall be
competent to hear and determine
any dispute of an international
character which the parties
thereto submit to it. The court
may also give an advisory
opinion upon any dispute or
question referred to it by the
Council or by the Assembly.

Article XV

If there should arise between
members of the League any dis-
pute likely to lead to a rupture,
which is not submitted to arbi-
tration in accordance with
Article XIII, the members of
the League agree that they will
submit the matter to the
Council. Any party to the dis-
pute may effect such submission
by giving notice of the existence
of the dispute to the Secretary
General, who will make all
necessary arrangements for a
full investigation and considera-
tion thereof. For this purpose
the parties to the dispute will
communicate to the Secretary
General, aa promptly as possible,
statements of their case, all the
relevant facts and papers; and
the Council may forthwith direct
the publication thereof.

The Council shall endeavor to
effect a settlement of any dis-

lishment of a permanent court
of international justice, and this
court shall, when established, be
competent to hear and determine
any matter which the parties
recognize as suitable for sub-
mission to it for arbitration
'under the foregoing article.

Article XV

If there should arise between
States, members of the League,
any dispute likely to lead to a
rupture, which is not submitted
to arbitration as above, the high
contracting parties agree that
they will refer the matter to the
Executive Cotmcil; either party
to the dispute may give notice of
the existence of the dispute to
the Secretary General, who will
make all necessary arrangements
for a full investigation and
consideration thereof. For this
purpose the parties agree to
communicate to the Secretary
General, as promptly as possible,
statements of their case, with all
the relevant facts and papers,
and the Executive Council may
forthwith direct the publication
thereof.

Where the efforts of the
council lead to the settlement of
the dispute, a statement shall be

TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

pute, and if such efforts are suc-
cessful, a statement shall be
made public giving such facts
and explanations regarding the
dispute and terms of settlement
thereof as the Council may deem
appropriate.

If the dispute is not thus
settled, the Council either unani-
mously or by a majority vote
shall make and publish a report
containing a statement of the
facts of the dispute and the
recommendations which are
deemed just and proper in re-
gard thereto.

Any member of the League
represented on the Council may
make public a statement of the
facts of the dispute and of its
conclusions regarding the same.

If a report by the Council is
unanimously agreed to by the
members thereof, other than the
representatives of one or more
of the parties to the dispute,
the members of the League
agree that they will not g^ to
war with any party to the dis-
pute which complies with the
recommendations of the report

If the Council fails to reach
a report which is unanimously
agreed to by the .members
thereof, other than the repre-
sentatives of one or more of the
parties to the dispute, the mem-
bers of the League reserve to
themselves the right to take

published, indicating the nature
of the dispute and the terms of
settlement, together with such
explanations as may be appro-
priate. If the dispute has not
been settled, a report by the
council shall be published, set-
ting forth with all necessary
facts and explanations the
recommendation which the
council think just and proper for
the settlement of the dispute. I f
the report is unanimously agreed
to by the members of the
council, other than the parties
to the dispute, the high contract-
ing parties agree that they will
not go to war with any party
which complies with the recom-
mendations, and that, if any
party shall refuse so to comply,
the council shall propose meas-
ures necessary to give effect to
the recommendations. If no
such unanimous report can be
made it shall be the duty of the
majority and the privilege of the
minority to issue statements, in-
dicating what they believe to be
the facts, and containing the
recommendations which they
consider to be just and proper.
The Executive Council may
in any case under this article
refer the dispute to the body of
delegates. The dispute shall be
so referred at the request of
either party to the dispute, pro-
vided that such request must be

THB PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1 7

such action as they shall con-
sider necessary for the main-
tenance of right and justice.

If the dispute between the
parties is claimed by one of
them, and is found by the
Council, to arise out of a matter
which by international law is
solely within the domestic juris-
diction of that party, the
Council shall so report, and shall
make no recommendation as to
its settlement.

The Council may in any case
under this article refer the dis-
pute to the Assembly. The dis-
pute shall be so referred at the
request of either party of the
dispute, provided that such re-
quest be made within fourteen
days after the submission of the
dispute to the Council.

In any case referred to the
Assembly all the provisions of
this article and of Article XII
relating to the action and
powers of the Council shall
apply to the action and powers
of the Assembly, provided that
a report made by the Assembly,
if concurred in by the represen-
tatives of those members of the
League represented on the
Council and of a majority of the
other members of the League,
exclusive in each case of the
representatives of the parties to
the dispute, shall have the same
force as a report by the Council,

made within fourteen days after
the submission of the dispute.
In any case referred to the body
of delegates, all the provisions
of this article, and of Article
XII, relating to the action and
powers of the Executive
Council, shall apply to the action
and powers of the body of dele-
gates.

TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

concurred in by all the members
thereof other than the repre-
sentatives of one or more of the
parties to the dispute.

Article XVI
Should any member of the
League resort to war in disre-
gard of its covenants under
Article XII, XIII or XV, it
shall ipso facto be deemed to
have committed an act of war
against all the other members
of the League, which hereby un-
dertake immediately to subject it
to the severance of all trade or
financial relations, the prohibi-
tion of all intercourse between
their nationals and the nationals
of the covenant-breaking State
and the prevention of all finan-
cial, commercial, or personal in-
tercourse between the nationals
of the covenant-breaking State
and the nationals of any other
State, whether a member of the
League or not.

It shall be the duty of the
Council in such case to recom-
mend to the several Govern-
ments concerned what effective
military, naval or air force the
members of the League shall
severally contribute to the arma-
ments of forces to be used to
protect the covenants of the
League.

The members of the League
agree, further, that they will

Akticlb XVI

Should any of the high con-
tracting parties break or disre-
gard its covenants under Article
XII it shall thereby ipso facto
be deemed to have committed an
act of war against all the other
members of the League, which
hereby undertakes immediately
to subject it to the severance of
all trade or financial relations,
the prohibition of all intercourse
between their nationals and the
nationals of the covenant-break-
ing State and the prevention of
all financial, commercial, or per-
sonal intercourse between the
nationals of the covenant-break-
ing State and the nationals of
any other State, whether a mem-
ber of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the
Executive Council in such case
to recommend what effective
military or naval force the mem-
bers of the League shall sev-
erally contribute to the armed
forces to be used to protect the
covenants of the League.

The high contracting parties
agree, further, that they will
mutually support one another in
the financial and economic meas-
ures which may be taken under

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS I9

mutually support one another in
the financial and economic
measures which are taken under
this article, in order to minimise
die loss and inconvenience re-
sulting from the above meas-
ures, and that they will mutually
support one another in resisting
any special measures aimed at
one of their number by the cove-
nant-breaking State, and that
they will take the necessary
steps to afford passage through
their territory to the forces of
any of the members of the
League which are cooperating
to protect the covenants of the
League.

Any member of the League
which has violated any covenant
of the League may be declared
to be no longer a member of the
League by a vote of the G>uncil
concurred in by the representa-
tives of all the other members
of the League represented
thereon.

Akticle XVII

In the event of a dispute be-
tween a member of the League
and a State which is not a mem-
ber of the League, or between
States not members of the
League, the State or States not
members of the League shall be
invited to accept the obligations
of membership in the League for
the purposes of such dispute,
upon such conditions as the

this article in order to minimize
the loss and inconvenience re-
sulting from the above meas-
ures, and that they will mutually
support one another in resisting
any special measure^ aimed at
one of their ntunber by the
covenant-breaking State and
that they will afford passage
through their territory to the
forces of any of the high
contracting parties who are
cooperating to protect the cove-
nants of the League.

Article XVII
In the event of disputes be-
tween one State member of the
League and another State which
is not a member of the League,
or between States not members
of the League, the high con-
tracting parties agree that the
State or States, not members of
the League, shall be invited to
accept the obligations of mem-
bership in the League for the

TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Council may deem just. If such
invitation is accepted, the pro-
visions of Articles XII to XVI
inclusive shall be applied with
such modifications as may be
deemed necessary by the
Council.

Upon such invitation being
given, the Council shall imme-
diately institute an inquiry into
the circumstances of the dispute
and recommend such action as
may seem best and most effect-
ual in the circumstances.

If a State so invited shall re-
fuse to accept the obligations of
membership in the League for
the purposes of such dispute,
and shall resort to war against
a member of the League, the
provisions of Article XVI shall
be applicable as against the
State taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute,
when so invited, refuse to ac-
cept the obligations of member-
ship in the League for the pur-
poses of such dispute, the
Council may take such meas-
ures and make such recom-
mendations as will prevent hos-
tilities and will result in the
settlement of the dispute.

purposes of such dispute, upon
such conditions as the Execu-
tive Council may deem just, and
upon acceptance of any such in-
vitation, the above provisions
shall be applied with such modi-
fications as may be deemed
necessary by the League.

Upon such invitation being
given, the Executive Council
shall immediately institute an
inquiry into the circumstances
and merits of the dispute and
recommend such action as may
seem best and most effectual in
the circumstances.

In the event of a power so in-
vited refusing to accept the obli-
gations of membership in the
League for the purposes of such
dispute, and taking any action
against a State member of the
League, which in the case of a
State member of the League
would constitute a breach of
Article XII, the provisions of
Article XVI shall be applicable
as against the State taking such
action.

If both parties to the dispute,
when so invited, refuse to ac-
cept the obligations of member-
ship in the League for the pur-
poses of such dispute, the
Executive Council may take
such action and make such
recommendations as will prevent
hostilities and will result in the
settlement of the dispute.

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 21

Articxe XVIII
Every convention or interna-
tional engagement entered into
henceforward by any member of
the League shall be forthwith
registered with the Secretariat
and shall as soon as possible be
published by it. No such treaty
or international engagement
shall be binding until so regis-
tered.

Akticle XIX
The Assembly may from time
to time advise the reconsidera-
tion by members of the League
of treaties which have become
inapplicable, and the considera-
tion of international conditions
whose continuance might en-
danger the peace of the world.

Article XX

The members of the League
severally agree that this cove-
nant is accepted as abrogating
all obligations or understandings
inter se which are inconsistent
with the terms thereof, and
solenmly undertake that they
will not hereafter enter into any
engagements inconsistent with
the terms thereof.

In case members of the
League shall, before becoming a
member of the League, have
undertaken any obligations in-

Article XXIII
The high contracting parties
agree that every treaty or inter-
national engagement entered
into hereafter by any State
member of the League shall be
forthwith registered with the
Secretary General and as soon
as possible published by him, and
that no such treaty or interna-
tional engagement shall be bind-
ing until so registered.

Article XXIV
It shall be the right of the
body of delegates from time to
time to advise the reconsidera-
tion by States members of the
League of treaties which have
become inapplicable and of in-
ternational conditions of which
the continuance may endanger
the peace of the world.

Article XXV
The high contracting parties
severally agree that the present
covenant is accepted as abrogat-
ing all obligations inter se which
are inconsistent with the terms
thereof, and solemnly engage
that they will not hereafter
enter into any engagement in-
consistent with the terms
thereof. In case any of the
powers signatory hereto or sub-
sequently admitted to the
League shall, before becoming a
party to this covenant, have

TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

consistent with the terms of this
covenant, it shall be the duty of
such member to take immediate
steps to procure its release from
such obligations.

Article XXI
Nothing in this covenant shall
be deemed to affect the validity
of international engagements
sudi as treaties of arbitration or
regional understandings like the
Monroe Doctrine for securing
the maintenance of peace.

Article XXII

To those colonies and terri-
tories which as a consequence
of the late war have ceased to
be under the sovereignty of the
states which formerly governed
them and which are inhabited by
peoples not yet able to stand by
themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modem world,
there should be applied the prin-
ciple that the well being and de-
velopment of such peoples form
a sacred trust of civilization and
that securities for the perform-
ance of this trust should be em-
bodied in this covenant.

The best method of giving
practicable effect to this prin-
ciple is that the tutelage of such
peoples should be intrusted to
advanced nations who, by
reasons of their resources, their
experience or their geogfraphi-
cal position, can best undertake

undertaken any obligations
which are inconsistent with the
terms of this covenant, it shall
be the duty of such power to
take immediate steps to procure
its release from such obligations.

Article XIX

To those colonies and terri-
tories which, as a consequence
of the late war, have ceased to
be under the sovereignty of the
States which formerly governed
them and which are inhabited by
peoples not yet able to stand by
themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modem world,
there should be applied the prin-
ciple that the well-being and de-
velopment of such peoples form
a sacred tmst of civilization and
that securities for the perform-
ance of this trust should be em-
bodied in the constitution of the
League.

The best method of giving
practical effect to this principle
is that the tutelage of such
peoples should be intmsted to
advanced nations, who by reason
of their resources, their exper-
ience, or their geographical posi-

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 23

this responsibility, and who are
willing to accept it, and that
this tutelage should be exercised
by them as mandataries on be-
half of the League.

The character of the mandate
must differ according to the
stage of the development of the
people, the geographical situa-
tion of the territory, its eco-
nomic condition and other
similar circtunstances.

Certain communities formerly
belonging to the Turkish Empire
have reached a stage of develop-
ment where their existence as
independent nations can be pro-
visionally recognized, subject to
the rendering of administrative
advice and assistance by a man-
datary until such time as they
are able to stand alone. The
wishes of these communities
must be a principal considera-
tion in the selection of the man-
datary.

Other peoples, especially those
of Central Africa, are at such
a stage that the mandatary must
be responsible for the admin-
istration of the territory under
conditions which will guarantee
freedom of conscience and re-
ligion, subject only to the main-
tenance of public order and
morals, the prohibition of
abuses, such as the slave trade,
the arms traffic and the liquor
traffic and the prevention of the

tion, can best undertake this re-
sponsibility, and that this tute-
lage should be exercised by them
as mandatories on behalf of the
League.

The character of the mandate
must differ according to the
stage of the development of the
people, the geographical sit-
uation of the territory, its
economic conditions and other
similar circumstances.

Certain communities, form-
erly belonging to the Turkish
Empire, have reached a stage
of development where their
existence as independent nations
can be provisionally recognized^
subject to the rendering of ad-
ministrative advice and assist-
ance by a mandatory power until
such time as they are able to
stand alone. The wishes of
these communities must be a
principal consideration in the
selection of the mandatory
power.

Other peoples, especially those
of Central Africa, are at such
a stage that the mandatory must
be responsible for the admini-
stration of the territory, subject
to conditions which will guar-
antee freedom of conscience or
religion, subject only to the
maintenance of public order and
morals, the prohibition of abuses
such as the slave trade, the arms
traffic, and the liquor traffic* and

TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

establishment of fortifications or
military and naval bases and of
military training of the natives
for other than police purposes
and the defense of territory, and
will also secure equal opportuni-
ties for the trade and commerce
of other members of the League.

There are territories, such as
Southwest Africa and certain of
the South Pacific Islands, which,
owing to the sparseness of their
population or their small size or
their remoteness from the cen-
ters of civilization or their geo-
graphical contiguity to the ter-
ritory of the mandatary and
other circumstances, can be best
administered under the laws of
the mandatary as integral
portions of its territory, subject
to the safeguards above men-
tioned in the interests of the in-
digenous population. In every
case of mandate, the mandatary
shall render to the Council, an
annual report in reference to the
territory committed to its
charge.

The degree of authority, con-
trol or administration to be ex-
ercised by the mandatary shall,
if not previously agreed upon by
the members of the League, be
explicitly defined in each case by
the Council.

A permanent commission shall
be constitued to receive and ex-
amine the annual reports of the

the prevention of the establish-
ment of fortifications or military
and naval bases and of military
training of the natives for other
than police purposes and the de-
fense of territory, and will also
secure equal opportunities for
the trade and commerce of other
members of the League.

There are territories, such as
Southwest Africa and certain of
the South Pacific Islandsi, which,
owing to the sparseness of the
population, or their small size,
or their remoteness from the
centers of civilization, or their
geographical contiguity to the
mandatory State and other cir-
cumstances, can be best admin-
istered under the laws of the
mandatory States as integral
portions thereof, subject to the
safeguards above mentioned in
the interests of the indigenous
population.

In every case of mandate, the
mandatory State shall render to
the League an annual report in
reference to the territory com-
mitted to its charge.

The degree of authority, con-
trol, or administration, to be ex-
ercised by the mandatory State,
shall, if not previously agreed
upon by the high contracting
parties in each case, be ex-
plicitly defined by the Executive
Council in a special act or
charter.

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 25

mandataries and to advise the
Council on all matters relating
to the observance of the man-
dates.

Article XXIII
Subject to and in accordance
with the provisions of interna-
tional conventions existing or
hereafter to be agreed upon, the
members of the League (a) will
endeavor to secure and maintain
fair and humane conditions of
labor for men, women and chil-
dren both in their own countries
and in all countries to which
their commercial and industrial
relations extend, and for that
purpose will establish and main-
tain tht necessary international
organizations; (b) undertake to
secure just treatment of the
native inhabitants of territories
under their control; (c) will in-
trust the League with the gen-
eral supervision over the execu-
tion of agreements with regard
to the traffic in women and chil-
dren, and the traffic in opium
and other dangerous drugs; (d)
will intrust the League with the
general supervision of the trade
in arms and ammunition with
the countries in which the con-
trol of this traffic is necessary

The high contracting parties
further agree to establish at the
seat of the League a mandatory
commission to receive and ex-
amine the annual reports of the
mandatory powers, and to assist
the League in insuring the ob-
servance of the terms of all
mandates.

Article XX

The high contracting parties
will endeavor to secure and
maintain fair and humane con-
ditions of labor for men, women,
and children, both in their own
countries and in all countries to
which their commercial and in-
dustrial relations extend ; and to
that end agree to estalish as part
of the organization of the
League a permanent bureau of
labor.

Article XVIII
The high contracting parties
agree that the League shall be
intrusted with the general su-
pervision of the trade in arms
and ammunition with the
countries in which the control
of this traffic is necessary in the
common interest.

Article XXI
The high contracting parties

TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

in the common interest; (e) will
make provision to secure and
maintain freedom of communi-
cation and of transit and equit-
able treatment for the commerce
of all members of the League.
In this connection the special
necessities of the regions devas-
tated during the war of 1914-
1918 shall be in mind; (f) will
endeavor to take steps in matters
of international concern for the
prevention and control of dis-
ease.

Article XXIV

There shall be placed under
the direction of the League all
international bureaus already
established by general treaties
if the parties to such treaties
consent. All such international
bureaus and all commissions for
the regulation of matters of in-
ternational interest hereafter
constituted shall be placed under
the direction of the League.

In all matters of international
interest which are regulated by
general conventions but which
are not placed under the control
of international bureaus or com-
missions, the Secretariat of the
League shall, subject to the con-
sent of the Council and if de-
sired by the parties, collect and
distribute all relevant informa-
tion, and shall render any other
assistance which may be neces-
sary or desirable.

agree that provision shall be
made through the instrument-
ality of the League to secure
and maintain freedom of transit
and equitable treatment for the
commerce of all States members
of the League, having in mind,
among other things, special ar-
rangements with regard to the
necessities of the regions devas-
tated during the war of 1914-
1918.

Article XXII
The high contracting parties
agree to place under the control
of the League all international
bureaus already established by
general treaties, if the parties to
such treaties consent Further-
more, they agree that all such
international bureaus to be con-
stituted in future shall be placed
under control of the League.

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LBAGUS OF NATIONS 2J

The Council may include as
part of the expenses of the Sec-
retariat the expenses of any
bureau or conunission which is
placed under the direction of
the League.

Article XXV

The members of the League
agree to encourage and promote
the establishment and coopera-
tion of duly authorized volun-
tary national Red Cross organi-
zations having as purposes im-
provement of health, the preven-
tion of disease and the mitiga-
tion of suffering throughout the
world.

Article XXVI

Amendments to this covenant
will take effect when ratified by
the members of the League
whose representatives compose
the Council and by a majority of
the members of the League
whose representatives compose
the Assembly.

No such amendment shall bind
any member of the League
which signifies its dissent there-
from, but in that case it shall
cease to be a member of the
League.

Article XXVI
Amendments to this covenant
will take effect when ratified by
the States whose representatives
compose the Executive Council
and by three-fourths of the
States whose representatives
compose the body of delegates.

Annex to the Covenant
One. Original members of

the League of Nations.
Signatories of the Treaty of

Peace.

28 TAFT- PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

United States of America,
Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, British
Empire, Canada, Australia,
South Africa, New Zealand,
India, Giina, Cuba, Ecuador,
France, Greece, Guatemala,
Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy,
Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua,
Panama, Peru, Poland, Portu-
gal, Rumania, Serbia, Siam,
Czecho-Slovakia, Uruguay.

States invited to accede to the
covenant.

Argentine Republic, Chile,
Colombia, Denmark, Nether-
lands, Norway, Paraguay, Per-
sia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Venezuela.

Two. First Secretary Gen-
eral of the League of Nations,
The Honorable Sir James Eric
Drummond, K.C.M.G., C.B.

PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS
TO ENFORCE PEACE ^

Institutional advances in the progress of the world are
rarely made abruptly. They are not like Minerva who
sprang full armed from the brain of Jove. If they are to
have the useful feature of permanence, they must be a
growth so that the communities whose welfare they affect
may come to regard them as natural, and so accept them.
Our so-called Anglo-Saxon civil liberty with its guaranties
of the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of

^Address before the World Court Congress, at Ocveland, Ohio,

May 12, 1915.

PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 29

Rights, the Habeas Corpus Act and the Independence of the
Judiciary, constituting the unwritten British Constitution,
made our American people familiar with a body of moral
restraints upon executive and legislative action to secure the
liberty of the individual. The written limitations upon
legislative action in colonial charters granted by the Crown
and their enforcement by the Privy Council of England,
probably suggested to the framers of our Federal Constitu-
tion that the principles of British Constitutional liberty be
given written form and be committed to a supreme and inde-
pendent Court to enforce them, as against the Executive and
Congress, its coordinate branches in the Government. The
step, epochal as it was, from judicially enforcing such
limitations against a subordinate legislature under a written
charter of its powers, to a judicial enforcement of the limita-
tions imposed by the sovereign people on the legislature and
executive that they, the people, had created in the same
instrument, was not radical but seemed naturally to follow.
The revolted colonies after the Revolution, though united by
a common situation and a common cause in their struggle
with Great Britain, and acting together through the Con-
tinental Congress in a loose and voluntary alliance, were
sovereigns independent of one another. The Articles of Con-
federation which declared their union to be permanent were
not agreed to and ratified in such a way as to be binding
until some five years after the Declaration of Independence.
Meantime, it had become increasingly evident that, strong as
were their common interests, they had divergent ones, too,
which might embarrass their kindly relations. The leagues
of Greece had furnished an example of confederations of
small states forced together by a common oppressor and
foe, which had found it wise to settle their own differences
by some kind of an arbitral tribunal. The office which the

30 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Privy Council and the Crown had performed in settling
intercolonial controversies suggested an analogy less remote
than those in Grecian history and prompted the adoption of
a substitute. So there was inserted in the Articles of Con-
federation a provision for a ** court to determine disputes
and differences between two or more States of the Con-
federation concerning boundary jurisdiction or any other
cause whatever." The complainant state was authorized to
present a petition to Congress stating the matter in question,
and praying for a hearing. Notice of this was to be given
by order of Congress to the other state in the controversy
and a day was assigned for the appearance of the two parties
by their lawful agents who should agree upon judges to
constitute a court for hearing the matter in question. If
they could not agree, Congress was then to name three
persons out of each of the thirteen states. From this list
each party was required alternately to strike out one until
the number was reduced to thirteen, and from these thirteen
not less than seven or more than nine names, as Congress
should direct, were in the presence of Congress to be drawn
by lot, and the persons whose names were so drawn, or any
five of them, constituted the court to hear and finally de-
termine the controversy.

Proceedings were instituted under this provision before
the Constitution by New Jersey against Vermont, by New
York against Vermont, by Massachusetts against Vermont,
by Pennsylvania against Virginia, by Pennsylvania against
Connecticut, by New Jersey against Virginia, by Massachu-
setts against New York, and by South Carolina against
Georgia. Only one of these cases came to hearing and deci-
sion by a court selected as provided. That was the case of
Pennsylvania against Connecticut involving the govern-
mental jurisdiction over the Valley of Wyoming and Luzerne

PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 3 1

County. The court met and held a session of forty-one days
at Trenton, in New Jersey. Able counsel represented the
parties, and the court made a unanimous decision in favor of
Pennsylvania, without giving reasons. A compromise is
suspected, because Connecticut promptly acquiesced and soon
thereafter, with the approval of the Pennsylvania delega-
tion. Congress passed an act accepting a cession by Connecti-
cut of all the lands claimed by it west of the west line of
Pennsylvania, except the Western Reserve, now in Ohio,
which Connecticut was thus given ownership of, and which
it sold and settled. A number of the other cases were com-
promised and, in some, no proceedings were taken after the
initial ones.

In the Constitutional Convention the necessity for some
tribunal to preserve peace and harmony between the states
was fully conceded by all, but the form of the court was
the subject of some discussion. One proposal was that the
Senate should be a court to decide between the states all
questions disturbing peace and harmony between the states
while the Supreme Court was given only jurisdiction in con-
troversies over boundaries. Ultimately, however, the judi-
cial power of the United States exercised through the Su-
preme Court was extended to ''controversies between
States,'' without exception.

To those who do not closely look into this jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, it seems no different from that of
the ordinary mtmicipal court over controversies between in-
dividuals. The states are regarded merely as municipal or
private corporations subject to suit process, trial and judg-
ment to be rendered on principles of municipal law declared
by statute of State Legislature or Congress, or established
as the common law. It is assumed that the Constitution
destroyed the independence and sovereignty of the states

32 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

and made the arrangement a mere domestic affair. This
is a misconception. The analogy between the function of
the Supreme Court in hearing and deciding controversies
between states and that of an international tribunal sitting
to decide a cause between sovereign nations is very dose.
When the suit by one state against another presents a case
that is controlled by provisions of the Federal Constitution,
of course there is nothing international about it. But most
controversies between states are not covered by the Federal
Constitution. That instrument does not, for instance, fix
the boundary line between two states. It does not fix the
correlative rights of two states in the water of a non-nav-
igable stream that flows from one of the states into another.
It does not regulate the use which the state up stream may
make of the water, either by diverting it for irrigation, or by
using it as a carrier of noxious sewage. Nor has Congress
any power under the Constitution to lay down principles by
Federal Law to govern such cases. The legislature of
neither state can pass laws to regulate the right of the other
states. In other words, there is nothing but international
law to govern. There is no domestic law to settle this class
of cases any more than there would be if a similar con-
troversy were to arise between Canada and the United
States.

For many purposes the states are independent sovereigns
and not under Federal control. They have lost the
powers which the people in the Constitution gave to the
Central Government; but in the field of powers left to
them, each is supreme within its own limits, and by the
exercise of that power may trespass on the exercise of sim-
ilar power by its neighbor. How is such a conflict to be
settled? It may be by diplomacy, i. e., by negotiation and
compromise agreement ; but this, under the Constitution,

PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 33

must be with the consent of Congress. It might be settled by
war; but the Constitution forbids. And the state invaded
by the forces of another state can appeal to the General
Government to resist and suppress the invasion, no matter
what the merits of the quarrel. In other words, one of the
attributes of sovereignty and independence which the people
in ordaining the Constitution took away from the states
was the unlimited power to make agreements between each
other as to their respective rights, and the other was that of
making war on each other when other means of settlement
failed.

What did the people through the constitution substitute
for these attributes of unrestricted diplomatic negotiation
and compromise and the right to go to war over such in-
terstate issues? The right of the complaining state to hale
the offending state before the Supreme Court and have the
issue decided by a binding judgment.

Now, can the complaining state bring every issue between
it and another state before the Supreme Court? No. The
only issues which the Court can hear and decide are questions
which in their nature are capable of judicial solution. Mr.
Justice Bradley first called such questions *' justiciable " ^
and Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice Brewer used the
same terms. There are issues between states of a character
which would be likely to lead to high feeling and to war if
they arose between independent sovereignties, and which the
Supreme Court can not decide because they are not capable
of judicial solution. In such cases between states, of course
there can be no war because the Federal Government would
suppress it. Therefore, if an amicable understanding can
not be reached, the states are left with an unsettled dispute

^A conventional French word [Ed.].

^4 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

between them and no way of deciding it. They must put
up with the existing state of things.

There have been several interesting cases before our
Supreme Court illustrating the character of the jurisdiction
I have been describing. Chicago built a sewage canal to
drain her sewage with the aid of the waters of Lake Mich-
igan into the Desplaines River, thence into the Illinois and
thence into the Mississippi from which St. Louis and other
Missouri towns derived their water supply. The State of
Missouri brought suit in the Supreme Court of the United
States to enjoin the State of Illinois and the Sanitary Dis-
trict of Chicago from continuing the flow, on the ground
that the impurities added to the Mississippi water had
greatly increased the typhoid fever in Missouri. It was held
that this was a subject matter capable of judicial solution,
that Missouri was the guardian of her people's welfare and
had a right to bring such a suit and, if she made a clear case,
to enjoin such use of the Mississippi and its tributaries.

Mr. Justice Shiras, in upholding the jurisdiction (Mis-
souri V. Illinois, i8o U. S. 208, 241), spoke of the court as
follows :

" The cases cited show that such jurisdiction has been exercised
in cases involving boundaries and jurisdiction over land and their
inhabitants, and in cases directly affecting the property rights and
interests of a state. But such cases manifestly do not cover the
entire field in which such controversies may arise, and for which
the Constitution has provided a remedy ; and it would be objection-
able, and indeed impossible, for the court to anticipate by definition
what controversies can and what cannot be brought within the
original jurisdiction of this court.

" An inspection of the bill discloses that the nature of the injury
complained of is such that an adequate remedy can only be found
in this court at the suit of the State of Missouri. It is true that

PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 35

no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct property rights
belonging to the complainant state. But it must surely be con-
ceded that, if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a state
are threatened, the state is the proper party to represent and de-
fend them. If Missouri were an independent and sovereign state,
all must admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and,
that failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make
war having been surrendered to the general government, it was to
be expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of
providing a remedy and that remedy, we think is found in the con-
stitutional provisions we are considering."

This hearing was on demurrer. When the case came be-
fore the court again on the merits, Mr. Justice Holmes de-
livered the judgment of the court and, while affirming the
jurisdiction of the court, points out the difficulties the
court has in exercising it and the care it must take in doing
so. He said in the course of his opinion :

"It may be imagined that a nuisance might be created by a
state upon a navigable river like the Danube which would amount
to a casus belli for a state lower down unless removed. If such
a nuisance were created by a state upon the Mississippi, the
controversy would be resolved by the more peaceful means of
a suit in this court."

Speaking of this provision in the Constitution extend-
ing the judicial power to controversies between states, Mr.
Justice Bradley in Hans v. Louisiana ( 134 U. S. 1-15) said :

"Some things, undoubtedly, were made justiciable which were
not known as such at the common law; such, for example, as
controversies between states as to boundary lines, and other ques-
tion admitting of judicial solution. And yet the case of Penn
V. Lord Baltimore (i Ves. Sen. 444), shows that some of these
unusual subjects for litigation were not unknown to the courts
even in colonial times; and several cases of the same general

36 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

character arose under the Articles of Confederation, and were
brought before the tribunal provided for that purpose in those
articles (131 U. S. App. i). The establishment of this new
branch of jurisdiction seemed to be necessary from the extin-
guishment of diplomatic relations between the states. Of other
controversies between a state and another state, or its citizens,
which, on the settled principles of public law, are not subjects
of judicial cognizance, this court has often declined to take juris-
diction."

A very satisfactory discussion of the scope of the power
of the Supreme Court to settle controversies between states
is contained in Mr. Justice Brewer's opinion in the suit
brought by Kansas against Colorado to restrain the latter
from absorbing so much of the water of the Arkansas River
flowing from Colorado into Kansas as to interfere seri-
ously with the supply of water from the river for irrigation
purposes in Kansas. He said (206 U. S. 95, 99) :

"When the States of Kansas and Colorado were admitted into
the Union they were admitted with the full powers of local sov-
ereignty which belonged to other states, Pollard v. Hagan, supra ;
Shively v. Bowlby, supra; Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U. S. 508, 519;
and Colorado by its legislation has recognized the right of ap-
propriating the flowing waters to the purposes of irrigation.
Now the question arises between the states, one recognizing gen-
erally the common law rule of riparian rights and the other pre-
scribing the doctrine of the public ownership of flowing water.
Neither state can legislate for or impose its own policy upon
the other. A stream flows through the two and a controversy
is presented as to the flow of that stream. It does not follow,
however, that because Congress can not determine the rule which
shall control between the two states or because neither state
can enforce its own policy upon the other, that the controversy
ceases to be one of a justiciable nature, or that there is no power
which can take cognizance of the controversy and determine the
relative rights of the two states. Indeed, the disagreement^

PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 37

coupled with its effect upon a stream passing through the two
states, makes a matter for investigation and determination by this
court. . . .

"As Congress cannot make compacts between the states, as
it cannot, in respect to certain matters, by legislation compel
their separate action, disputes between them must be settled
either by force or else by appeal to tribunals empowered to de-
termine the right and wrong thereof. Force under our system of
Government is eliminated. The clear language of the Constitution
vests in this court the power to settle those disputes. We have
exercised that power in a variety of instances, determining in the
several instances the justice of the dispute. Nor is our juris-
diction ousted, even if, because Kansas and Colorado are states
sovereign and independent in local matters, the relations between
them depend in any respect upon principles of international law.
International law is no alien in this tribunal.

" One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the states to
each other, is that of equality of right. Each state stands on the
same level with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation
on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its own views
to none. Yet, whenever, as in the case of Missouri v. Illinois,
180 U. S. 208, the action of one state reaches through the agency
of natural laws into the territory of another state, the question
of the extent and the limitations of the rights of the two states
becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them, and this
court is called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will
recognize the equal rights of both and at the same time estab-
lish justice between them. In other words, through these succes-
sive disputes and decisions this court is practically building up
what may not improperly be called interstate common law."

Controversies between one state and another or its citizens
which are not justiciable or capable of judicial solution find
examples in the suits brought before the Supreme Court.
One case of which the Supreme Court refused to take juris-
diction was Wisconsin v. The Pelican Insurance Company

38 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(i U.'S.)» in which the State of Wisconsin sought to enforce
against a Louisiana Insurance Company a judgment
rendered in a Wisconsin court for penahies by a Wisconsin
Statute upon Foreign Insurance Companies for failure to
comply with statutory regulations of its business. It was
held that neither under international comity nor law was one
nation required to enforce extraterritorially the criminal law
of another nation and therefore that the controversy pre-
sented was not one of which, as between the states of the
Union, the Supreme Court could take cognizance. Again
in Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. i, Louisiana sought to
restrain the Governor of Texas from so enforcing a quaran-
tine law as to injure the business of the people of Louisiana.
The law itself on its face was a proper one for the protection
of Texas. In dismissing the suit the court said :

"But in order that a controversy between states, justiciable
in this court, can be held to exist, something more must be put for-
ward than that the citizens of one state are injured by the mal-
administration of the laws of another. The states cannot make
war, or enter into treaties, though they may, with the consent of
Congress, make compacts and agreements. When there is no
agreement, whose breach might create it, a controversy between
states does not arise unless the action complained of is state
action, and acts of state officers in abuse or excess of their powers
cannot be laid hold of as in themselves committing one state to
distinct collision with a sister state.

" In our judgment this bill does not set up facts which show
that the State of Texas has so authorized or confirmed the alleged
action of her health officer as to make it her own, or from which
it necessarily follows that the two states are in controversy within
the meaning of the Constitution."

Controversies between independent nations suggest them-
selves which are not capable of judicial solution and yet are
quite capable of leading to war.

PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 39

Thus suppose C nation in the exercise of its conceded
powers admits to its shores and indeed to its citizenship
the citizens or subjects of A nation and excludes those of B
nation from both. The discrimination is certainly within
the international right of C nation, but it may lead to
acrimony and war. This is not a justiciable question nor
one that could be settled by a court.

The so-called General Arbitration Treaties negotiated by
Secretary Knox with France and England used the word
** justiciable " to describe the kind of questions which the
parties bound themselves to submit to arbitration. They
defined this to include all issues that could be decided on
principles of law or equity. The issue whether a question
arising was justiciable and arbitrable was to be left to the
decision of a preliminary investigating commission. The
term justiciable and indeed the whole scheme of these
treaties were suggested by the provision for settling con-
troversies between states in the Federal Constitution and the
construction of it by the Supreme Court. The controversies
between states, decision of which was not determined by
rules furnished by the Constitution or by congressional
regulation, were strictly analogous to questions arising be-
tween independent nations and were to be divided into
justiciable and non-justiciable questions by the same line of
distinction.

The treaties were not ratified but their approval by Eng-
land and France and by the Executive of this country con-
stitute a valuable and suggestive precedent for the framing
of the constitution and jurisdiction of an arbitral court to
be one of the main features of a League of Peace between
the great nations of the world.

Is it idle to treat such a league as possible ? Well, let us

40 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

take England and Canada. For a hundred years we have
been at peace. For that period of time the frontier between
us and Canada, four thousand miles long, has been entirely
undefended by forts or navies. We have had issue after
issue between the two peoples that, because of their nature,
might have led to war. But we have settled them by negotia-
tion or, when that has failed, by arbitration, until now it is
not too much to say that the " habit " of arbitration between
us is so fixed that a treaty to secure such a settlement in
future issues would not make it more certain than it is. I
concede that conditions have been favorable for the creat-
ing of such a customary practice. The two peoples have
the same language and literature, the same law and civil
liberty and the same origin and history. Each has had a
wide domain, in the settlement and development of which
their energies and ambitions have been absorbed. The
jealousies and encroachments of neighbors in the thickly pop-
ulated regions of Europe have not been present to stir up
strife. And yet we ought not to minimize the beneficent
significance of this century of peace by ignoring the fact that
many of the issues which we have settled peaceably seemed
at the time to be difficult of settlement and likely to lead to
war. The Alabama Claims issue and the Oregon Boundary
dispute were two of this kind.

It is interesting to note that we now have two permanent
arbitral English-American Commissions settling questions.
One of them is to determine the equitable rules to govern
the use of waters on our national boundary, in which both
nations and their citizens have an interest, and to apply them
to causes arising. The analogy between the function which
the Supreme Court performed in the Kansas and Colorado
case in regard to the use of the Arkansas River and that

PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 4I

of this Commission in respect to rivers traversing both coun-
tries and crossing the border is perfect. Having thus
reached what is practically the institution of a League and
Arbitral Court with England and Canada for the preserva-
tion of peace between us, may we not hope to enlarge its
scope and membership and give its benefits to the world ?

Will not the exhaustion in which all the belligerents,
whether victors or vanquished, find themselves after this
awful sacrifice of life and wealth make them wish to make
the recurrence of such a war less probable ? Will they not
be in a mood to entertain any reasonable plan for the settle-
ment of international disputes by peaceable means? Can
we not devise such a plan ? I think we can.

The Second Hague Conference has proposed a perma-
nent court to settle questions of a legal nature arising be-
tween nations. But the signatories to the convention would,
under such a plan, not be bound to submit such questions.
Nor were the conferring nations able to agree on the consti-
tution of the court. But the agreement on the recommenda-
tion for the establishment of such a court shows that the
idea is within the bounds of the practical.

To constitute an effective League of Peace, we do not
need all the nations. Such an agreement between eight or
nine of the Great Powers of Europe, Asia and America
would furnish a useful restraint upon possible wars. The
successful establishment of a Peace League between the
Great Powers would draw into it very quickly the less power-
ful nations.

What should be the fundamental plan of the League?^

^This IS the earliest public utterance of these four principles which
correspond to the four articles of the program of the League to En-
force Peace as formally adopted at Phila., June 17, 1915. The prin-
ciples were worked out at a series of meetings — the last of which,

42 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS .

It seems to me that it ought to contain four provisions.
First: It ought to provide for the formation of a court,
which would be given jurisdiction by the consent of all the
members of the League to consider and decide justiciable
questions between them or any of them, which have not
yielded to negotiation, according to the principles of inter-
national law and equity, and that the court should be vested
with power, upon the application of any member of the
League, to decide the issue as to whether the question arising
is justiciable.

Second: A Commission of Conciliation for the con-
sideration and recommendation of a solution of all nonr
justiciable questions that may arise between the members of
the League should be created, and this Commission should
have power to hear evidence, investigate the causes of differ-
ence, mediate between the parties and then make its recom-
mendation for a settlement.

Third: Conferences should be held from time to time
to agree upon principles of international law, not already
established, as their necessity shall suggest themselves.
When the conclusions of the Commission shall have been
submitted to the various parties of the League for a reason-
able period of time, say a year, without calling forth objec-
tion, it should be deemed that they acquiesce in the principles
thus declared.

Fourth: The members of the League shall agree that
if any member of the League shall bring war against any
other member of the League, without first having submitted
the question, if found justiciable, to the arbitral court pro-
April 9, 1915, was attended by Mr. Taft — were formulated by a
sfnall group on April loth and immediately submitted to Mr. Taft who
gave them the final form substantially embodied, later on, in the
Phila. platform. (Editor.)

PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 43

vided in the fundamental campact, or without having sub-
mitted the question, if found non-justiciable, to the Commis-
sion of Conciliation for its examination, consideration and
recommendaton, then the remaining members of the League
agree to join in the forcible defense of the member thus
prematurely attacked.

First: The first feature involves the principles of the
general arbitration treaties with England and France, to
which England and France agreed, and which I submitted
to the Senate, and which the Senate rejected or so mutilated
as to destroy their vital principle. I think it is of the utmost
importance that it should be embraced in any effective
League of Peace. The successful operation of the Supreme
Court as a tribunal between independent states in deciding
justiciable questions not in the control of Congress, or under
the legislative regulation of either state, furnishes a prece-
dent and justification for this that I hope I have made clear.
Moreover, the inveterate practice of arbitration, which has
now grown to be an established custom for the disposition of
controversial questions between Canada, and the United
States, is another confirmation of the practical character of
such a court

Second : We must recognize, however, that the questions
within the jurisdiction of such a court would certainly not
include all the questions which might lead to war, and that,
therefore, we should provide some other instrumentality
for helping the solution of those questions which are non-
justiciable. This might well be a Commission of Concilia-
tion, a commission to investigate the facts, to consider the
arguments on both sides, to mediate between the parties, to
see if some compromise cannot be effected, and finally to
formulate and recommend a settlement. This may involve

44 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

time; but the delay, instead of being an objection, is really
one of the valuable incidents of the performance of such a
function by a commission. We have an example of such a
Commission of Conciliation in the controversy between the
United States and Great Britain over the Seal Fisheries.
The case on its merits as a judicial question was decided
against the United States ; but the world importance of not
destroying the Pribilof Seal Herd by pelagic sealing was
recognized, and a compromise was formulated by the arbitral
tribunal, which was ultimately embodied in a treaty between
England, Russia, Japan and the United States. Similar
recommendations were made by the court of arbitration
which considered the issues arising between the United
States and Great Britain in respect to the Newfoundland
Fisheries.

Third: Periodical conferences should be held between
the members of the League for the declaration of principles
of international law. This is really a provision for some-
thing in the nature of legislative action by the nations con-
cerned in respect to international law. The principles of in-
ternational law are based upon custom between nations
established by actual practice, by their recognition in treaties
and by the consensus of great law writers. Undoubtedly
the function of an arbitral court established as proposed in
the first of the above suggestions would lead to a good deal
of valuable judge-made international law. But that would
not cover the whole field. Something in the nature of
legislation on the subject would be a valuable supplement to
existing international law. It would be one of the very
admirable results of such a League of Peace, that the scope
of international law could be enlarged in this way. Mr.
Justice Holmes, in the case of Missouri v. Illinois, to which

PLAN FOR A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 45

I have already referred, points out that the Supreme Court,
in passing on questions between the states, and in laying
down the principles of international law that ought to
govern in controversies between them, should not and can-
not make itself a legislature. But in a League of Peace,
there is no limit to the power of international conferences of
the members, except the limit of the wise and the practical.
Fourth : The fourth suggestion is one that brings in the
idea of force. In the League proposed, all members are
to agree that if any one member violates its obligation and
begins war against any other member, without submitting
its cause for war to the arbitral court, if it is a justiciable
question, or to the Commission of Conciliation, if it is other-
wise, all the members of the League will unite to defend the
member attacked against a war waged in breach of plighted
faith. It is to be observed that this does not involve mem-
bers of the League in an obligation to enforce the judgment
of the court or the recommendation of the Commission of
Conciliation. It only furnishes the instrumentality of force
to prevent attack without submission. It is believed that is
more practical than to attempt to enforce judgment after the
hearing. One reason is that the failure to submit to one of
the two tribunals the threatening cause of war for the con-
sideration of one or the other is a fact easily ascertained,
and concerning which there can be no dispute, and it is a
palpable violation of the obligation of the members. It is
wiser not to attempt too much. The required submission
and the delay incident thereto, will in most cases lead to
acquiescence in the judgment of the court or in the recom-
mendation of the Commission of Conciliation. The threat
of force against plainly unjust war, for that is what is in-
volved in the provision, will have a most salutary deterrent

46 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

effect. I am aware that membership in this League would
involve, on the part of the United States, an obligation to
take part in European and Asiatic wars, it may be, and that
in this respect it would be a departure from the traditional
policy of the United States in avoiding entangling alliances
with European or Asiatic countries. But I conceive that the
interests of the United States, in view of its close business
and social relations, with the other countries of the world,
much closer now than ever before, would justify it, if such
a League could be formed, in running the remote risk of
such a war in order to make more probable the securing of
the inestimable boon of peace to the world, an object of
desire that now seems so far away.

PROPOSALS OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE

PEACE ^

In calling this meeting my associates and I have not been
unaware that we might be likened to the Tailors of Tooley
Street who mistook themselves for the people of England.
We wish, first, to say that we do not represent anybody but
ourselves. We are not national legislators, nor do we con-
trol the foreign policy of this Government. But we are
deeply interested in devising a plan for an international
agreement by which, when the present war shall cease, a
recurrence of such a war will be made less possible.

We are not here to suggest a means of bringing this war
to an end ; much as that is to be desired and much as we

^ Address delivered at the Convention of the League to Enforce
Peace which was held at Philadelphia, June 17, 19 15'.

PROPOSALS OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 47

would be willing to do to secure peace, that is not within
the project of the present meeting.

We hope and pray for peace, and our hope of its coming
is sufficient to make us think that the present is a good time
to discuss and formulate a series of proposals to which the
assent of a number of the Great Powers could be secured.
We think a League of Peace could be formed which would
enable nations to avoid war by furnishing a practical means
of settling international quarrels or suspending them until
the blinding heat of passion had cooled.

When the world conference is held, our country will have
its official representatives to speak for us. We, Tailors of
Tooley Street, shall not be there; but, if in our post-prandial
leisure we shall have discussed and framed a practical plan
for a League of Peace, our official representatives will be
aided and may in their discretion accept it and present it to
the Conference as their own.

There are Tooley Streets in every nation to-day and the
minds of earnest men are being stirred with the same thought
and the same purpose — we have heard from them through
various channels. The denizens of those Tooley Streets
will have their influence upon their respective official repre-
sentatives. No man can measure the effect upon the peoples
of the belligerent countries and upon the peoples of the
neutral countries which the horrors and exhaustion of this
unprecedented war are going to have. It is certain that
they all will look with much more favorable eye to leagues
for the preservation of peace than ever before. In no war,
moreover, has the direct interest that neutrals have in pre-
venting a war between neighbors been so clearly made
known. This interest of neutrals has been so forced upon
them that it would require only a slight development and

48 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

growth in the law of international relations to develop that
interest into a right to be consulted before such a war among
neighbors can be begun. This step we hope to have taken by
the formation of a Peace League of the Great Powers,
whose primary and fundamental principle shall be that no
war can take place between any two members of the League
until they have resorted to the machinery that the League
proposes to furnish to settle the controversy likely to lead
to war.

If any member of the League refuses to use this ma-
chinery, and attacks another member in breach of his League
obligation, all members of the League agree to defend the
member attacked by force.

We do not think the ultimate resort to force can be safely
omitted from an effective League of Peace. We sincerely
hope that it may never become necessary, and that the deter-
rent effect of its inevitable use in case of a breach of the
League obligation will help materially to give sanction to
the laws of the League and to render a resort to force avoid-
able

We are not peace-at-any-price men, because we do not
think we have reached the time when a plan based on the
complete abolition of war is practicable. As long as nations
partake of the frailties of men who compose them, war is a
possibility and that possibility should not be ignored in any
League of Peace that is to be useful. We do not think it
necessary to call peace-at-any-price men cowards, or apply
other epithets to them. We have known in history the most
noble characters who adhered to such a view and yet the ex-
ample of their physical and moral courage is a heritage of
mankind. To those who differ with us in our view of the
necessity for this feature of possible force in our plan, we say

PROPOSALS OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 49

we respect your attitude. We admit your claim to sincere
patriotism to be as just as ours. JA^e do not ascribe your de-
sire to avoid war to be a fear of death to yourselves or your
sons; but rather to your sense of the horror, injustice and
hiefFectiveness of settling any international issue by such a
brutal arbitrament. Nevertheless, we differ with you in
judgment that, in the world of nations as they are, war can
be completely avoided. We believe it is still necessary to use
a threat of overwhelming force of a great League with a
willingness to make the threat good in order to frighten na-
tions into a use of rational and peaceful means to settle their
issues with their associates of the League. Nor are we
militarists or jingoes — we are trying to follow a middle
and practical path.

Now what is the machinery, a resort to which we wish to
force on an intending belligerent of the League ? It consists
of two tribunals, to one of which every issue must be sub-
mitted. Issues between nations are of two classes : —

1st. Issues that can be decided on principles of international
law and equity, called justiciable.

2nd. Issues that cannot be decided on such principles of law and
equity, but which might be quite as irritating and provocative
of war, called non-justiciable.

The questions of the Alaskan Boundary, of the Bering Sea
Seal Fisheries, and of the Alabama Claims were justiciable
issues that could be settled by a court, exactly as the Supreme
Court would settle claims between States.

The questions whether the Japanese should be naturalized,
whether all American citizens should be admitted to Russia
as merchants without regard to religious faith, are capable
of causing great irritation against the nation denying the
privilege; and yet such nations, in the absence of a treaty on

50 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

the subject, are completely within their international right
and the real essence of the trouble can not be aided by a
resort to a court. The dispute is non-justiciable.

We propose that for justiciable questions we shall have an
impartial court to which all questions arising between mem-
bers of the League shall be submitted. If the court finds the
question justiciable, it shall decide it. If it does not, it shall
refer it to a Commission of Conciliation to investigate, con-
fer, hear argument and recommend a compromise.

We do not propose, in our plan, to enforce compliance
either with the Court's judgment or the Conciliation Com-
mission's recommendation. We feel that we ought not to
attempt too much. We believe that the forced submission,
the truce taken to investigate and the judicial decision, or
the conciliatory compromise recommended, will form a ma-
terial inducement to peace. It will cool the heat of passion
and will give the men of peace in each nation time to still
the jingoes.

The League of Peace will furnish a great opportunity for
more definite formulation of the principles of international
law. The arbitral court will amplify it and enrich it in their
application of its general principles to particular cases.
They will create a body of judge-made laws of the highest
value.

Then the existence of the League will lead to ever recur-
ring congresses of the League, which, acting in a quasi-
legislative capacity, may widen the scope of international law
in a way that a court may not feel able or competent to do.

This is our plan. It is not complicated, at least in state-
ment. In its practical application, difficulties now unfore-
seen may arise, but we believe it offers a working hypothesis
upon which a successful arrangement can be made.

PROPOSALS OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 5 1

We are greeted first by the objection that no treaties can
prevent war. We are not called upon to deny this in order
to justify or vindicate our proposals as useful. We realize
that nations are sometimes utterly immoral in breaking
treaties and shamelessly bold in avowing their right to do so
on the ground of necessity. But this is not always the case.
We cannot give up treaties because sometimes they are
broken any more than we can give up commercial contracts
because men sometimes dishonor themselves by breaking
them. We decline to assume that all nations are always
dishonorable or that a solemn treaty obligation will not have
some deterrent effect upon a nation which has plighted its
faith, to prevent its breach. In every nation there are people
who are in favor of peace and opposed to war, and when you
furnish a treaty that binds the nation not to go to war, you
strengthen the hands of the people in that nation that do
not want to go to war and are in favor of preserving the
honor of the nation. When we add to this the sanction of
an agreement by a number of powerful nations to enforce
the obligation of the recalcitrant and faithless member, we
think we have a treaty that is much more than a "scrap of
paper " — and we base our faith in this on a common sense
view of human nature.

We have got to depart from the traditional policy of this
country, I agree. But this war has borne in on us the fact
that we are so near to all the nations of the world to-day
that we are vitally interested in keeping war down as far as
we can, and that we had better step forward and assume
certain obligations in the interest of the world and in the
interest o'f mankind, because there is a utilitarian reason for
it — we are likely to be drawn in ourselves. Therefore we
ought to depart from the policy of isolation that heretofore

52 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

has served us so well, because we are a strong nation. We
must bear our share of the responsibilities of the moment,
and we must help along the world, and incidentally help
along ourselves, for I believe, even if you view it from a
selfish standpoint, in the long run it will be a better policy.
It is objected that we only propose to include the more
powerful nations. We'll gladly include them all. But we
don't propose to have the constitution of our court compli-
cated by a demand for equal representation of the many
smaller nations. We believe that when we have a League
initiated by the larger powers, the smaller powers will be
glad to come in and enjoy the protection that the League will
afford against the unjust aggression of the strong against
the weak.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS ^

To me has been assigned the discussion of the constitu-
tional objections to the proposals of the League to Enforce
Peace. These objections, so far as I understand them, are
directed against the first and third planks in our platform.
The first plank reads as follows :

" First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory
powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations
of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and
judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issues as to its
jurisdiction of the question."

This looks to an organization of a permanent court by

1 Address delivered at the First Annual Assemblage of the League
to Enforce Peace, Washington, D. C, May 26, 1916.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS 53

the signatories to the League. It contemplates the oppor-
tunity of any member of the League, having a cause of com-
plaint against any other member of the League, to sue such
member in this court and bring it into court by proper pro-
cess. The complainant's pleading will, of course, state its
cause of action. The defendant may wish to question the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground, for instance, that
the cause of action stated by the complainant does not involve
a justiciable issue; that it can not be decided on principles
of law or equity.

The court, upon this preliminary question, must decide
upon its jurisdiction. If it finds the question not to be
justiciable, it must dismiss the complaint ; but it may properly
refer its investigation to the Commission of Conciliation.
If it finds that it is justiciable, it must require the defendant
nation to answer.

What I have to discuss is whether the President and the
Senate, constituting the treaty-making power for this
Government, may consent, for and on behalf of the United
States, to the settlement of any justiciable issue arising be-
tween the United States and any other member of the League
by this permanent court ; and whether it may leave to that
court the power to decide whether the issue raised is a jus-
ticiable one. It was argued against a similar provision in
the general arbitration treaties with England and France that
such a stipulation constituted a delegation by the President
and Senate of the authority reposed in them over the foreign
relations of our Government and therefore that it was ultra-
vires. Both upon reason and authority this objection is
untenable. The United States is a nation, and, from a
foreign standpoint, a sovereign nation, without limitation
of its sovereignty It may, therefore, through its treaty-

54 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

making power, consent to any agreement with other powers
relating to subject matter that is usually considered and made
the subject of treaties. The well-known language of Mr.
Justice Field, in the case of Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U. S.
258, leaves no doubt upon this point. It is as follows :

"That the treaty power of the United States extends to all
proper subjects of negotiations between our Government and the
Governments of other nations, is clear. . . . The treaty power, as
expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited, except by
those restraints which are found in that instrument against the
action of the Government, or of its Departments, and those aris-
ing from the nature of the Government itself, and of that of the
States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to
authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the char-
acter of the Government, or in that of one of the States, or
a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter without
its consent. But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that
there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touch-
ing any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with
a foreign country."

Issues that can be settled on principles of law and equity
are proper subjects for decision by a judicial tribunal. Such
issues have been settled by Boards of Arbitration, agreed
to by independent sovereigns since there were governments.
The first provision agreed to by the United States for an
arbitration of this kind was in the Jay Treaty in 1794; and
since that time there have been eighty-four international
arbitrations to which an American nation was a party. In
forty, or nearly one-half of these, the other party was an
European Power, while the arbitrations between American
nations were forty-four. To about two-thirds of all of these
the United States was a party, the number of arbitrations be-
tween other American powers being fourteen. Of this

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS 55

number, there were ten that related to questions of boundary,
which are, of course, questions capable of solution on princi-
ples of law and equity.

In such cases, it was never suggested that the Govern-
ment was delegating any power at all to the tribunal. A
submission to a judicial decision is not a delegation of power
as to an agent. It is a submission of an issue to a judge.
It is an error to call such a submission a delegation, or to
determine its validity on principles of delegation of power
as that is limited in constitutional law. In the discussion of
the general arbitration treaties in the Senate, there was a
suggestion that the agreement to submit to a court questions
which had not yet arisen described only by definition and
classification, with power in the court to take jurisdiction,
was more of a delegation of power than the mere submis-
sion of an existing question to arbitrators. There is, how-
ever, not the slightest difference in principle between the two.
If one is a delegation, the other is. If one is invalid, the
other is ; and if one is not invalid, the other is not.

Nor does the right to determine jurisdiction of the court
involve in principle any more of a delegation than the mere
voluntary submission of the issue to the court. It only
somewhat enlarges the issues to be submitted. The question
whether the court has jurisdiction of an issue is dependent
on the question of law, involving the construction of the
treaty, and such a subject matter is the commonest instance
of the class of questions submitted to arbitration or a court.
More than this, the Senate has consented from time to time
to arbitrations on issues which may arise in the future and
defined by language of the treaty of submission.

The last notable instance, and the one which involved a
really permanent court is the advice and consent by our

56 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Senate to the Hague International Prize Court Convention
in which a permanent international prize court was estab-
lished, and the United States bound itself to submit all
questions, arising between it and foreign nations in respect
to questions of prize in naval warfare, to this international
prize court, and to abide the decision, even though that de-
cision might involve, as it generally would, the reconsidera-
tion of an issue already decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States. The treaty is not in force because Eng-
land did not finally approve, but our Senate approved it.
The International Prize Court must of necessity pass*upon
its own jurisdiction, and by agreement between the parties,
its decision is to be accepted and to be carried out in good
faith. The question as to whether conmiissioners of arbi-
tration, under the Jay Treaty, had povster to determine their
own jurisdiction was brought by Rufus King, American
Minister in London, to the attention of Lord Grenville who
submitted the question to Lord Chancellor Loughborough.
The Lord Chancellor resolved the difficulty by declaring :

" That the doubt respecting the authority of the Commissioners
to settle their own jurisdiction was absurd; and that they must
necessarily decide upon cases being within, or without, their com-
petency."

A similar question was raised by the British Government
in regard to the power of the Geneva Tribunal to deal with
what were known as the ** indirect claims," and her arbi-
trators decided that they did not have jurisdiction of the
indirect claims, and this was acquiesced in by both Govern-
ments.

In correspondence with the Chilean Minister over an arbi-
tration between this country and Chile, Mr. Olney, then
Secretary of State, used this language:

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS 57

" But the question whether any particular claim is a proper one
for the consideration and decision of an international commis-
sion is necessarily one which the commission itself must deter-
mine. The conventions under which such commissions are
organized usually describe in general terms the class of cases of
which the commission is to take jurisdiction, and whether any
particular case presented to it comes within this class the com-
mission must, of course, determine. The decisions of the late
commission, both interlocutory and final, are binding upon both
Governments, the latter absolutely so, the former unless reversed,
after proper proceedings for a rehearing."

I cpme now to the other objection. The third plank of
the platform is as follows :

"Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith
both their economic and military forces against any one of their
number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against
another of the signatories before any question arising shall be sub-
mitted as provided in the foregoing."

It is objected to this clause that it violates the Constitution
in that the effect of such a treaty signed by the United States
would take away from Congress the power, conferred upon
it by section eight of article one, to declare war.

I had the pleasure and privilege of hearing Mr. Bry^n
advance this argument at the Lake Mohonk Conference.
He said that we should need an amendment to the Consti-
tution before we could agree to any such provision. He said
that in order to carry out the provision we must have a joint
council of the powers to determine when the time had arrived
for military action and war, and that this would substitute
the action of the council for the constitutional discretion of
Congress.

I venture to think that this view is wholly without f ounda-

58 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

tion. Although it is not necessary, I am willing to accept
the assumption that some kind of a council would be ap-
pointed by the powers to make the annoimcements when the
time had come for the use of economic and military forces
against the recalcitrant member. Does that take away from
Congress the power to declare war? It does not. If the
war is a foreign war, it could not be begun under the Consti-
tution until Congress had declared war. The President
would not be authorized to direct the Army and the Navy to
begin war until Congress had declared it.

What, then, would be the situation if the fact were an-
nounced upon which the obligation of the United States to
make war arose under this treaty? It would be to make
war by Constitutional means, that is, by the preliminary
declaration of Congress that war existed. Congress might
decline to exercise that power and refuse to declare war.
What would be the effect of that? It would merely be a
breach of faith on the part of Congress, and so a breach of
faith on the part of the United States and we would not go
to war. The treaty-making power under the Constitution
creates the obligation to declare war in certain contingencies.
That obligation is to be discharged by Congress under its
Constitutional power to declare war. If it fails to do
so, and thus comply with the binding obligation created by
the treaty-making power, then it merely breaks the contract
of the Government. It is left to Congress to carry out that
which we in a Constitutional way have agreed to do. Thus
to impose in a Constitutional way by treaty an obligation on
Congress is not to take away its power to discharge it or to
refuse to discharge it.

In 1904 we entered into a treaty with the Republic ot
Panama, the first article of which is :

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS 59

" The United States guarantees and will maintain the independ-
ence of the Republic of Panama."

What is the necessary effect of this guaranty ? It neces-
sarily means that if any nation attacks Panama and attempts
to take territory from her or to subvert her Government, the
United States is under treaty obligation to make war to de-
fend Panama. Was it ever supposed that such an obligation
took away from Congress the power to declare war ? This
treaty obligation makes it the duty of the Government to
declare war under certain conditions that may arise, creates
a contract obligation to the Republic of Panama that it shall
do so, and this duty can only be discharged through the action
of Congress in declaring war. Does that deprive Congress
of its Constitutional power to declare war? It seems to me
the question answers itself.

In our relations with Cuba we find in the present treaty :

ARTICLE I

" The Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or
other compact with any foreign power or powers which will im-
pair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any
manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain
by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise,
lodgment in or control over any portion of said Island."

ARTICLE II

" The Government of Cuba consents that the United States may
exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban in-
dependence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the
protection of life, property and individual liberty, and for dis-
charging the obligation with respect to Cuba imposed by the
Treaty of Paris on the United States now to be assumed and under-
taken by the Government of Cuba.''

ARTICLE III

" To enable the United States to maintain the independence of

6o TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own de-
fense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United
States, lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain
specific points to be agreed upon with the President of the United
States."

It is quite clear from these three articles that the Govern-
ment of the United States binds itself to maintain the inde-
pendence of Cuba and to exclude other governments from
lodgment in the Island. If any Government attempts to
filch territory from Cuba or to subvert the government, it
becomes the duty of the United States to make war and
defend against such invasion. Does this treaty obligation
thus created take away from Congress the power to declare
war? It only creates the obligation on the part of the
United States to wage war, and in discharging this obliga-
tion Congress must act, or the Government must be recreant
to its agreement.

Thus, by reason and precedent, it would appear clear that
this third plank of the platform of the League is not in any
way an attempt to take from Congress the power which it
has to declare war under the Constitution. The suggestion
that in order to carry out such an obligation on the part of
the United States, it would be necessary to amend the Con-
stitution, grows out of a confusion of ideas and a failure to
analyze the differences between the creation of an obligation
of the United States to do a thing and the due, orderly and
Constitutional course to be taken by it in doing that which
it has agreed to do.

A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT 6l

A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN

BETTERMENT »

What is International Law? It is the body of rules
governing the conduct of the nations of the world toward
one another, acquiesced in by all nations. It lacks scope
and definiteness. It is found in writings of international
jurists, in treaties, in the results of arbitration, and in the
decisions of those municipal courts which apply international
law, like the Supreme Court of the United States and courts
that sit in prize cases to determine the rules of international
law governing the capture of vessels in naval warfare. It
is obvious that a Congress of the League with quasi-legisla-
tive powers could greatly add to the efikacy of international
law by enlarging its application and codifying its rules. It
would be greatly in the interest of the world and of world
peace to give to such a code of rules the express sanction of
the family of nations.

As to the submission of all questions at issue of a legal
nature to a permanent international court, it is sufficient to
point out that the proposal is practical and is justified by
precedent. The Supreme Court of the Unted States., exer^
cising the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Constitution,
sits as a permanent international tribunal to decide issues
between the States of the Union. The law governing the
settlement of most of the controversies between the States
cannot be determined by reference to the Constitution, to
statutes of Congress, or to the legislation of the States.
Should Congress in such cases attempt to enact laws they
would be invalid. The only law which applies is that which

1 Address delivered before the National Educational Association,
New York City, July 3, 1916.

62 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

applies between independent governments, to wit: Inter-
national Law. Take the case of Kansas against Colorado,
heard and decided by the Supreme Court. Kansas com-
plained that Colorado was using more of the water of the
Arkansas River which flowed through Colorado into Kansas
than was equitable for purposes of irrigation. The case
was heard by the Supreme Court and decided, not by a law
of Congress, not by the law of Kansas, not by the law of
Colorado, for the law of neither applied. It was decided
by principles of International Law.

Many other instances of similar decisions by the Supreme
Court could be cited. But it is said that such a precedent
lacks force here because the States are restrained from going
to war with each other by the power of the National Coverts
ment. Admitting that this qualifies the precedent to some
extent, we need go no further than Canada to find a com-
plete analogy and a full precedent. There is now sitting
to decide questions of boundary waters (exactly such
questions as were considered in Kansas and Colorado) a
permanent court, consisting of three Americans and three
Canadians, to settle the principles of international law that
apply to the use of rivers constituting a boundary between
the two countries and of rivers crossing the boundary. The
fact is, that we have gotten so into the habit of arbitration
with Canada that no reasonable person expects that any issue
arising between us and that country, after a hundred years
of peace, will be settled other than by arbitration.

If this be the case between ourselves and Canada and
England, why may it not be practical with every well-
established and ordered government of the Great Powers?
The Second Hague Conference, attended by all nations,
recommended the establishment of a permanent International

A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT 63

G)urt to decide questions of a legal nature arising between
nations.

The second proposal of the League involves the submis-
sion to a Commission of Conciliation of all questions that
cannot be settled in court on principles of law or equity.
There are such questions which may lead to war, and fre-
quently do, and there are no legal rules for decision. We
have such questions giving rise to friction in our domestic
life. If a lady who owns a lawn permits children of one
neighbor to play upon that lawn and refuses the privilege to
the children of another neighbor because she thinks the
latter children are badly trained and will injure her lawn or
her flowers, it requires no imagination to understand that
there may arise a neighborhood issue that will lead to friction
between the families. The issue is, however, a non-jus-
ticiable one. Courts cannot settle it, for the reason that
the lady owning the lawn has the right to say who shall
come on it and who shall be excluded from it. No jus-
ticiable issue can arise, unless one's imagination goes to the
point of supposing that the husbands of the two differing
ladies came together and clashed, and then the issue in court
will not be as to the comparative training of the children of
the families.

We have an analogous question in our foreign relations
with reference to the admission of the Chinese and Japanese.
We discriminate against them in our naturalization and im-
migration laws and extend the benefit of those laws only to
whites and persons of African descent. This discrimina-
tion has caused much ill-feeling among the Japanese and
Chinese. We are within our international right in exclud-
ing them ; but it is easy to understand how resentment, be-
cause of such discrimination, might be fanned into a flame,

64 TAl T PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

if through lawless violence or unjust State legislation the
Japanese should be mistreated within the United States.

We have had instances of the successful result of com-
missions of conciliation where the law could not cover the
differences between the two nations. Such was the case
of the Bering Sea controversy. * We sought to prevent the

^ In an address before the National Geographic Society in Wash-
ington, D. C Jan. 17, 1919, Mr. Taft has the following to say in re-
gard to this arbitration:

"The United States, by a transfer from Russia, became the owner
of the Pribiloff Islands, in the middle of the Bering Sea. Upon those
islands was the breeding place of the largest herd of fur-bearing seals
in the world. They were a valuable property «'in(I a considerable annual
income was derived by the United States from the sale of the fur.
Canadian schooners began what was called pelngic sealing. They shot
the seals in the open Bering Sea. This indiscriminate hunting killed
the females of the herd and was destroying it. Revenue cutters of the
United States, by direction of the government, sci.ed snch sealing
vessels, brought them into a port of the United States, where were
instituted proceedings to forfeit them. Great Britain objected on the
ground that the United States had no legal jurisdiction. The case was
submitted to an arbitration. The treaty contained a provision that the
arbitrators, should they reach the conclusion that the United States
had no legal right, might recommend a basis of compromise. The
United States asserted its right, on the ground, first, that it had terri-
torial jurisdiction over the open waters of the Bering Sea by transfer
from Russia, which had asserted, maintained, and enjoyed such juris-
diction, and, second, that it owned the seals while in the sea in such
a way that the Canadian schooners were despoiling its personal prop-
erty. The court of arbitration held against the United States on both
points, deciding that Russia never had any territorial jurisdiction over
the open Bering Sea to transfer to the United States, and that when
the seals left the islands and swam out into the open sea they were
the property of no one and were subject to capture by any one. The
judgment of the court, therefore, was against the United States and
awarded damages. Pursuing, however, the recommendation of the
treaty, the court made itself into a council of mediation. It said that
while the killing of seals in the open sea was not a violation of the
legal rights of the United States of which that country could legally

A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT 65

killing of female seals in the Bering Sea and asserted our
territorial Jurisdiction over that sea for this purpose. The
question was submitted to international arbitrators and the
decision was against us ; but the arbitrators, in order to save
to the world the only valuable and extensive herd of fur
seals, recommended a compromise by treaty between the na-
tions concerned, and accordingly treaties have been made
between the United States, Great Britain, Russia and Japan
which have restored the herd to its former size and value.
So much, therefore, for the practical character of the first
two proposals.

The third proposal is more novel than the others and
gives to the whole plan a more constructive character. It
looks to the use of economic means first, and military force
if necessary, to enforce the obligation of every member of

complain, it was nevertheless a great injury to the common welfare
of the world to destroy this greatest seal herd of the world, first, because
the fur was valuable and useful for the garments of men and women,
and, second, because the destruction of the herd would destroy valuable
and useful industries in the preparation of the seal pelts for use.
Therefore, they said it was good form and in the interest of the world
that the four nations concerned should agree upon a compromise by
which the United States might continue to maintain the herd and sell
the seal pelts gathered on the islands and that pelagic sealing should
be stopped, but that the United States, in consideration of the other
three nations restricting their citizens from pelagic sealing, should
divide with the other three nations some of the profits of the herd.
Accordingly, Great Britain. Russia, Japan, and the United States
made such a treaty, which is still in force and under which the herd
has been restored to its former size and value. Here we have an
example of a court passing on questions of legal right and deciding
them against the United States. Then we have the court changing
itself into a council of mediation and recommending a compromise,
prompted by considerations of decency and good form and the public
welfare of the world, which the nations appealed to have adopted
and embodied in a treaty."

66 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

the League to submit any complaint it has to make against
another member of the League, either to the permanent inter-
national court, or to the Commission of Conciliation, and to
await final action by that tribunal before beginning hostili-
ties. It will be observed that it is not the purpose of this pro-
gram to use the economic boycott or the jointly acting armies
of the League to enforce the judgment declared or the com-
promise recommended. These means are used only to pre-
vent the beginning of war before there has been a com-
plete submission, hearing of evidence, argument and de-
cision or recommendation. We sincerely believe that in
most cases, with such a delay and such a winnowing out of
the issues and such an opportunity for the peoples of the
different countries to understand the position of each other,
war would generally not be resorted to. Our ambition is
not to propose a plan, the perfect working out of which will
absolutely prevent war ; first, because we do not think such
a plan would work ; and second^ because we are willing to
concede that there may be governmental and international
injustice which cannot be remedied except by force. If,
therefore, after a full discussion and decision by impartial
judges or a recommendation by earnest, sincere and equit-
able compromisers, a people still thinks that it must vindicate
its rights by war, we do not attempt in this plan to prevent
it by force.

Having thus explained what the plan is, let us consider the
objections which have been made to it.

The first objection is that, in a dispute between two mem-
bers of the League, it would be practically difficult to de-
termine which one was the aggressor and which one, there-
fore, in fact, began actual hostilities. There may be some
trouble in this, I can see ; but what we are dealing with is a

A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT 67

working hypothesis, a very general plan. The details aire
not worked out. One can suggest that an International
Council engaged in an attempt to mediate the differences
might easily determine for the League which nation was at
fault in beginning hostilities. It would doubtless be neces-
sary where some issues arise to require a maintenance of the
status quo until the issues were submitted and decided in one
tribunal or the other; but it does not seem to me that these
suggested difficulties are insuperable or may not be com-
pletely met by a detailed procedure that, of course, must be
fixed before the plan of the League shall become operative.
The second objection is to the use of the economic boycott
and the army and the navy to enforce the obligations entered
into by the members of the League. I respect the views
of Pacifists and those who advocate the doctrine of non-
resistance as the only Christian doctrine. Such is the view
of that Society of Friends which, with a courage higher than
that possessed by those who advocate forcible means, are
willing to subject themselves to the injustice of the wicked
in order to carry out their ideal of what Christian action
should be. They have been so far in advance of the general
opinions of the world in their history of three hundred years,
and have lived to see so many of their doctrines recognized
by the world as just, that I always differ from them with
reluctance. Still, it seems to me that in the necessity of
preserving our civilization and saving our country's freedom
and individual liberty maintained now for one hundred and
twenty-five years, we have no right to assume that we have
passed beyond the period in history when nations are affected
by the same frailties and the same temptations to cupidity,
cruelty and injustice as men. In our domestic communities
we need a police force to protect the innocent and the just

68 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

against the criminal and the unjust, and to maintain the
guaranty of life, liberty and property. The analogy be-
tween the domestic community and that of nations is suf-
ficently close to justify and require what is in fact an inter-
national police force. The attitude of those who oppose
using force or a threat of force to compel nations to keep
the peace is really like that of the modem school of theoreti-
cal anarchists, who maintain that if all restraint were re-
moved and there were no government, and the children and
youth, and men and women were trained to self-responsibil-
ity, every member of society would know what his or her
duty was and would perform it. They assert that it is the
existence of restraint that leads to the violation of right. I
may be permitted to remark that with modem fads of educa-
tion we have gone far in the direction of applying this prin-
ciple of modem anarchy in the discipline and education of
our children and youth, but I do not think the result can be
said to justify the theory if we can judge from the strikes of
school children or from the general lack of discipline and
respect for authority that the rising generation manifests.
The time has not come when we can afford to give up the
threat of the police and the use of force to back up and sus-
tain the obligation of moral duty.

The third objection is that it would be unconstitutional for
the United States, through its treaty-making power, to enter
into such a League. This objection is based on the fact that
the Constitution vests in Congress the power to declare war.
It is said that this League would transfer the power to de-
clare war away from Congfress to some foreign council, in
which the United States would only have a representative.
This objection grows out of a misconception of the effect of

A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT 69

a treaty and a confusion of ideas. The United States makes
its contract with other nations under the Constitution
through the President and two-thirds of the Senate, who
constitute the treaty-making power. The President and the
Senate have a right to bind the United States to any contract
with any other nation covering the subject matter within
the normal field of treaties For this purpose the President
and the Senate are the United States. When the contract
comes to be performed, the United States is to perform it
through that department of the government which, by the
Constitution, should perform it, should represent the govern-
ment and should act for it Thus, the treaty-making power
may bind the United States to pay to another country under
certain conditions a million dollars. When the conditions
are fulfilled, then it becomes the duty of the United States
to pay the million dollars. Under the Constitution, only
Congress can appropriate the million dollars from the
treasury. Therefore, it becomes the duty of Congress to
make that appropriation. It may refuse to make the appro-
priation. If it does so, it dishonors the written obligation
of the United States. It has the power either to perform
the obligation or to refuse to perform it. That fact, how-
ever, does not make the action of the treaty power in bind-
ing the United States to pay the money unconstitutional.
So the treaty-making power may bind the United States
under certain conditions to make war. When the conditions
arise requiring the making of war, then it becomes the duty
of Congress honorably to perform the obligation of the
United States. Congress may shirk this duty and exercise
its power to refuse to declare war. It thus dishonors a bind-
ing obligation of the United States. But the obligation was

JO TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

entered into in the constitutional way and it is to be per-
formed in the constitutional way.

• •••••••

It is said that to enter into such a compact would require
us to maintain a standing army. I do not think this fol-
lows at all. If we become, as we should become, reason-
ably prepared to resist unjust military aggression, and have
a navy sufficiently large, and coast defenses sufficiently well
equipped to constitute a first line of defense, and an army
which we could mobilize into half a million trained men
within two months, we would have all the force needed to
do our part of the police work in resisting the unlawful ag-
gression of any one member of the League against another.

Fourth, it has been urged that for us to become a party to
this League is to give up our Monroe Doctrine, under which
we ought forcibly to resist any attempt on the part of Euro-
pean or Asiatic powers to subvert an independent govern-
ment in the Western Hemisphere or to take from such a
government any substantial part of its territory. It is a
sufficient answer to this objection to say that a question
under the Monroe Doctrine would come under that class of
issues which must be submitted to a Council of Conciliation.
Pending this, of course, the status quo must be maintained.
An argument and recommendation of compromise would fol-
low. If we did not agree to the compromise and proceeded
forcibly to resist violation of the Doctrine, we should not be
violating the terms of the League by hostilities thereafter.
More than this, as Professor Wilson, of Harvard, the well-
known authority upon international law, has pointed out,
we are already under a written obligation to delay a year
before beginning hostilities in respect to any question arising
between us and most of the Great Powers, and this neces-

A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT J I

sarily includes questions relating to a violation of the Mon-
roe Doctrine. It is difficult to see, therefore, how the obli-
gation of such a League as this would put us in any different
position from that which we now occupy in regard to the
Monroe Doctrine.

Finally, I come to the most formidable objection, which
is that entering into such a League by the United States
would be a departure from the policy that it has consistently
pursued since the days of Washington, in accordance with
the advice of his farewell address that we enter into no
entangling alliances with European countries. Those of us
who support the proposals of the League believe that were
Washington living to-day he would not consider the League
as an entangling alliance. He had in mind such a treaty
as that the United States made with France, by which we
were subjected to great embarrassment when France
attempted to use our ports as bases of operation against
England while we were at peace with England. He cer-
tainly did not have in mind a union of all the Great Powers
to enforce peace ; and while he did dwell, and properly dwelt,
on the very great advantage that the United States had in
her isolation from European disputes, it was an isolation
which does not now exist. In his day we were only three
and a half millions of people, with thirteen States strung
along the Atlantic seaboard. We were five times as far
from Europe as we are now in speed of transportation, and
many times as far in speed of communication. We are now
one hundred millions of people between the two oceans and
between the Canada line and the Gulf. We face the Pacific
with California, Oregon and Washington, which alone makes
us a Pacific power. We own Alaska, the northwestern
comer of our continent, a dominion of immense extent with

72 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

natural resources as yet hardly calculable and with a country
capable of supporting a considerable population. This
makes us a close neighbor of Russia across the Bering
Straits; while ownership of islands in that sea brings us
close to Japan. We own Hawaii, 2,000 miles out to sea
from San Francisco, with 75,000 Japanese laborers consti-
tuting the largest element of its population. We own the
Philippine Islands, 140,000 square miles, with eight millions
of people, under the eaves of Asia. We are properly
anxious to maintain an open door to China, and to share
equally in the enormous trade which that country, with her
400 teeming millions, is bound to furnish when organized
capital and her wonderful laboring populations shall be
intelligently directed toward the development of her rich
natural resources. Our discrimination against the Japanese
and the Chinese presents a possible cause of friction, since
the resentment that they feel may lead to untoward incidents.
We own the Panama Canal in a country which was recently
a part of a South American confederation. We have in-
vested 400 millions in that great world enterprise to unite
our Eastern and Western seaboards by cheap transportation,
to increase the effectiveness of our navy and to make a path
for the world's commerce between the two great oceans.

We own Porto Rico, with a million people, and we owe
to those people protection at home and abroad, as they owe
allegiance to us.

We have guaranteed the integrity of Cuba, and have
reserved the right to enter and maintain the guaranty of life,
liberty and property and to repress insurrection in that
island. Since originally turning over the island to its people
we have had once to return there and restore peace and
order. We have on our southern border the international

A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT 73

nuisance of Mexico, and nobody can foresee the complica-
tions that will arise out of the anarchy there prevailing.
We have the Monroe Doctrine still to maintain. Our rela-
tions to Europe have been shown to be very near by our
experience in pursuing lawfully our natural rights in our
trade upon the Atlantic Ocean with European countries.
Both belligerents have violated our rights, and in the now
nearly two years which have elapsed since the war began
we have been close to war in the defense of those rights.
Contrast our present world relations with those we had in
Washington's time. It would seem clear that the conditions
have so changed as to justify a seeming departure from
advice directed to such a diflferent state of things. One
may reasonably question whether the United States, by
uniting with the other great powers to prevent the recur-
rence of future world war, may not risk less in assuming
the obligations of a member of the League than by refusing
to become such a member in view of her world-wide in-
terests. But even if the risk of war to the United States
would be greater by entering the League than by staying
out of it, does not the United States have a duty, as a mem-
ber of the family of nations, to do its part and run its neces-
sary risk to make less probable the coming of such another
war and such another disaster to the human race ?

We are the richest nation in the world, and in the sense of
what we could do were we to make reasonable preparation
we are the most powerful nation in the world. We have
been showered with good fortune. Our people have enjoyed
a happiness known to no other people. Does not this im-
pose upon us a sacred duty to join the other nations of the
world in a fraternal spirit and with a willingness to make
sacrifices if we can promote the general welfare of men?

74 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

At the close of this war the governments and the people
of the belligerent countries, under the enormous burdens and
suffering from the great losses of the war, will be in a con-
dition of mind to accept and promote such a plan for the
enforcement of future peace. President Wilson, at the head
of this administration and the initiator of our foreign
policies under the Constitution; Senator Lodge, the senior
Republican member of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
and therefore the leader of the opposition on such an issue,
have both approved of the principles of the League to En-
force Peace. Sir Edward Grey and Lord Bryce have indi-
cated their sympathy and support of the same principles,
and we understand that M. Briand, of France, has similar
views.

THE PURPOSES OF THE LEAGUE ^

The purpose of the League to Enforce Peace is, after the
present war, to organize the world politically so as to enable
it to use its power to prevent the hotheadedness of any nation
from lighting a fire of war which shall spread into another
general conflagration. It proposes to effect this by securing
membership in the League of all the great nations of the
world. The minor stable nations will then certainly join
because of the protection which the League would alTord
them against sudden attack by a great power. The League
will then become a World League. H it does not, it will
fail of its purpose. No member of the League is to begin

1 Address delivered at the dinner of the Chamber of Commerce of
the Borough of Queens, New York City, Saturday evening, Januao'
20, 1917.

THE PURPOSES OF THE LEAGUE 75

war against any other member until after the question be-
tween them shall have been submitted to a Court, if the
question is of a legal nature, or a Commission of Concilia-
tion, if it can not be settled on principles of law. The mem-
bers agree to await the judgment in the one case or the
recommendation of a compromise in the other, before begin-
ning hostilities. If any member violates this agreement and
begins hostilities before the appointed time, the whole power
of the League, by the joint use of the military and naval
force of its members, is to be exerted to defend the nation
prematurely attacked against the nation attacking it. The
compulsion thus to be exercised is directed only to securing
deliberation and delay sufficient to permit a hearing and
judgment on questions of a legal nature, and a hearing and
recommendation of compromise on other questions.

m
• •••••••

There would be practical difficulties in attempting to en-
force judgments, difficulties which may some day be over-
come but which the League has now no purpose to attempt
to solve. It would be still more difficult to enforce com-
promises. The League contents itself, and believes that it
will make a long step forward if it succeeds, in securing a
world agreement by which hearings of the irritating issues
may be had and a decision rendered before war is allowed to
begin. It is confident that, in most cases, a war thus delayed
for a full discussion of the issues and a fair decision will
never come.

Mr. Roosevelt objects to the League with great emphasis.
It would have added to the usefulness of his criticism if he
had read carefully the proposals of the League. He as-
sumes that the League proposes that the judgments and
recommendations of compromise reached shall be enforced

76 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

by the League. This is a fundamental error. We may
therefore dismiss further consideration of Mr. Roosevelt's
objections.

Senator Borah objects to the League because he says it
will involve the United States in a surrender of the Monroe
Doctrine and in momentous obligations which he does not
think the people would be willing to assume. I quite agree
that the League will involve momentous consequences, and
I also quite agree that the people of the United States ought
to understand exactly what those consequences are and the
burdens that they would assume in entering such a League.
It would be a great deal better not to enter such a League
than to suffer the humiliation of having made an agreement
and then repudiate it. There is no disposition on the part
of those who are urging the adoption of the League to avoid
a discussion of its necessary consequences. They, on the
contrary, seek the fullest discussion because it would be idle
for the treaty-making power to enter into a treaty of this
kind until after Congress and all the people of the United
States shall know and fully approve our participation in
such a movement.

Senator Borah supposes three cases to show its dangers.
In the first, Russia and Japan, being members of the League
with all the other great nations of the World, have a con-
troversy over a matter in Manchuria. Russia refuses sub-
mission to a Court or Commission, and begins hostilities
against Japan. Under the League, England, France, Ger-
many, Austria, Italy and the United States would unite
forces with Japan to defeat Russia's attack. The United
States would have to contribute men and vessels according
to some efjuitable rule prescribed in the Treaty, proportioned
to resources and geographical location. This is the extreme

THE PURPOSES OF THE LEAGUE JJ

responsibility which the United States must face. This is
the burden she might have. But it is improbable. With a
knowledge of this union of tremendous forces against her,
Russia would not be likely to violate her plighted faith.
The moral effect of the power of the world would prevent
her. Ought the United States not be willing to run the risk
of being called upon to contribute her quota in such a remote
contingency in order that the power of the world may be-
come effective without actual use of force to stop war?
Each instance of its successful exercise would strengthen its
future moral influence.

The second case suggested by Senator Borah is this.
Mexico transfers part of her territory to Japan, and Japan
takes it. Thus the Monroe Doctrine is violated. The
United States protests and Japan demands a submission
under the League. The question is a political one; the
Monroe Doctrine does not involve or rest on principles of
international law. It would be submitted to the Commission
of Conciliation which would, after needed time, recommend
a compromise. The United States, if it did not subscribe
to the compromise, might honorably refuse to accept it and
begin hostilities against Japan. Under the thirty treaties
initiated by Mr. Bryan, and consented to by the Senate, the
United States could not even now begin such hostilities
within a year. In what respect, therefore, is the United
States at a disadvantage in the maintenance of the Monroe
Doctrine ?

The third case supposed by Senator Borah is that Argen-
tine and a European government have a dispute and Argen-
tine refuses to submit. If Argentine begins war against the
European country, then the powers of the League must be
used against her, and European forces jointly with our own

78 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

will punish her for violating her plighted faith and treaty
obligations. This is said to involve an abandonment of the
Monroe Doctrine. Why? Mr. Seward in 1866, and Mr.
Roosevelt in his administration, said most emphatically that
the Doctrine can not be used to shelter South American
countries against punishment by European countries for
their shortcomings. The only limitation set by the Doctrine
is that the punishment inflicted shall not involve subverting
the independence of Argentine or appropriating and coloniz-
ing her territory. I submit, therefore, that the three cases
suggested by Senator Borah do not present the difficulties he
supposes.

The two questions for us are whether the League is prac-
tical and whether the United States ought to enter it. Of
course it is only a general plan, and the details would have
to be worked out in a world conference. That it is feasible,
and that such details may be worked out, is indicated by the
approval which the League has received from Germany, on
the one hand, and from the Allies, on the other. There are
of course very great difficulties in a practical union of the
forces of the world to accomplish a definite single purpose,
but they are not insuperable. The League is only applying
to the international community the same principle that has
been applied to the domestic community, that of using the
force of all to suppress the lawless force of the few for the
common good.

• •......

We are now entering upon a policy of preparation to de-
fend ourselves against the unjust aggression of any nation.
I believe this to be absolutely essential to our country's in-
terest. The League has officially recognized that such
preparation is necessary to its progress. When we have

THE PURPOSES OF THE LEAGUE 79

made this preparation and have the forces of our army and
navy adequate to it, we shall be in a position to contribute
our share to any force that we may be called upon to furnish
in a joint exercise of power by the world to suppress war.
President Wilson has said that in the next war there will be
no neutrals. If the science of war advances in the next war
as much as it has advanced in this over the last war, he is
certainly right — there will be no room for neutrals. In
this aspect, and from a selfish standpoint, therefore, our
membership in the League in the future would prove to be
safer for our interests than if we stayed out of it.

But is the selfish standpoint the only one from which we
should view this question ? We are potentially the strongest
nation in the world. We have a vast population with high
intelligence, solidarity and homogeneity. We have enor-
mous resources and incomparable wealth. We are so
situated that our position between the nations of Europe
and between those of Asia is an impartial one and we could
therefore exercise a just and commanding influence in a
council of nations. We do not realize our power in this
respect. Lord Grey says that we are necessary to the suc-
cessful launching of such a League. We must lead it.
Have we any right, therefore, to stay out of a world-ar-
rangement calculated to make a world-war improbable, be-
cause we shall risk having to contribute our share to an
international police force to suppress the disturbers of peace?
To-day war in any part of the world may rapidly manifest
itself in another part, and the advantage of suppressing it
or hedging it about so as to prevent its spread is inestimable.

[The following statement was made on the occasion of a mass meeting
at Richmond, Va., Wednesday evening, March 21, 1917 :]

The break with Germany and the imminence of war

8o TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OP NATIONS

furnish the strongest arguments for the League to Enforce
Peace.

Preparedness is one of the watchwords of the hour. The
Executive Committee of the League to Enforce Peace has
pronounced more than once in favor of national prepared-
ness to meet all emergencies and pointed out the fact that the
plan it puts forward makes preparedness a necessity.

The duty to support the President in his foreign policy
is plain. The League has declared a thousand times that
it is not a stop-the-war movement, and has pledged its sup-
port in the defense of civilization and the rights of our
citizens.

The reason 'we have protested against Germany's ruthless
submarine warfare and broken off relations with her is be-
cause her conduct is subversive of any peace that is worth
having.

As we are forced into the war, our sole purpose must be
to secure the right kind of a peace after the war, for our-
selves and for the whole world — a permanent and righteous
peace.

This fact is fundamental to the whole situation, and ought
to be kept constantly before the minds of all our people.
We are contending for a righteous and permanent peace
and for nothing else whatsoever. Preparation for such a
peace is the most important part of preparedness. The
President has this strongly in mind. If, through the growth
of hatred and the cry for vengeance, the world should lose
sight of its real purpose and come to the end of the war not
knowing what it most wants and needs, and so should fail
to roll the burden of militarism off its shoulders and to
establish lasting peace, it would be a tragedy in the history
of the world.

THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 8l

The League to Enforce Peace presents the elements of a
program that has been recognized as having in it promise
of a better future, a program that has the support in general
terms not only of the President but of leading statesmen in
all or nearly all of the leading nations. The latter have
espoused it while their countries were at war and both they
and the President are watching the growth and expression
of public opinion in the United States as the deciding factor
in the formation of a league.

During the present crisis and throughout the war which
is at hand, the duty of the League to Enforce Peace is to
stimulate military preparedness on the one hand, and on
the other to spread its gospel of world organization for
permanent peace after this conflict is over.

THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE ^

We are engaged in the greatest war of history to secure
permanent world peace. We are fighting for a definite
purpose, and that is the defeat of German militarism. If the
Prussian military caste retains its power to control the mili-
tary and foreign policy of Germany after the war, peace
will not be permanent, and war will begin again when the
chauvinistic advisers of the Hohenzollern dynasty deem a
conquest and victory possible.

Our Allies have made a stupendous effort and have
strained their utmost capacity. Unready for the war, they
have concentrated their energy in preparation. In this im-

^ Address delivered at General Conference of Unitarian and other
Christian Churches at Montreal, September 26, 191 7.

82 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

portant respect they have defeated the plan of Germany " in
shining armor " to crush her enemies in their unreadiness.

But the war has not been won. Peace now, even though
it be made on the basis of the restoration of the status quo,
" without indemnities and without annexations," would be
a failure to achieve the great purpose for which the Allies
have made heartrending sacrifice. Armaments would con-
tinue for the next war, and this war would have been fought
in vain. The millions of lives lost and the hundreds of
billions' worth of the product of men's labor would be
wasted.

He who proposes peace now, therefore, either does not
see the stake for which the Allies are fighting, or wishes the
German mihtary autocracy still to control the destinies of
all of us as to peace or war. Those who favor permanent
world peace must oppose with might and main the proposals
for peace at this juncture in the war, whether made in
socialistic councils, in pro-German conferences or by Pope
Benedict. That the Pontiff of the greatest Christian Church
should wish to bring to an end a war in which millions of
its communion are on both sides is to be expected. That
he should preserve a difficult neutrality is also natural.
That his high purpose is to save the world from further
suffering goes without saying. But the present is not the
opportunity of an intervening peacemaker who must assume
that compromise is possible.

The Allies are fighting for a principle the maintenance
of which affects the future of civilization. If they do not
achieve it they have sacrificed the flower of their youth and
mortgaged their future for a century, and all for nothing.
This is not a war in which the stake is territory or sphere
of influence. The Allies cannot concede peace until they

THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 83

conquer it. When they do so, it will be permanent.
Otherwise they fail.

There are wars like that between Japan and Russia, in
which President Roosevelt properly and successfully inter-
vened to bring about a peace that helped the parties to a
settlement. The principle at stake and the power and ter-
ritory were of such a character that a settlement might be
made substantially permanent. But the present issue is like
that in our Civil War, which was whether the Union was to
be preserved and the cancer of slavery was to be cut out.
Peace proposals to President Lincoln were quite as numer-
ous as those of to-day, and were moved by quite as high
motives. But there was no compromise possible. Either
slavery and disunion lost or won. So to-day the great moral
object of the war must be achieved or defeated.

An organization of citizens in the United States, known
as the League to Enforce Peace, has been active for three
years past in promoting its propaganda. There is a similar
association in England. In that League are many persons
who for years urged the settlement of all international con-
troversies by arbitration or judicial decision. The vortex
of death and destruction for the peoples of the world, which
the breaking out of the war portended, roused these peace
lovers and promoters to devise a plan for avoiding war after
this should end. The English plan is more ambitious in
providing that if the council of nations so decide they must
enforce the judgment or settlement.

Whatever the detailed stipulations of such a league, its
operation and success must depend on the obligations of the
treaty stipulations. Unless their binding effect is recognized
by the nations as a sacred principle, the stipulations of the

84 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

league will be " writ in water." The revelations and dis-
closures of this war will satisfy the members of the league
that as long as the present military caste controls the German
military and foreign policy, the league is impracticable, and
would not be worth the parchment on which its obligations
would be recorded. Why have they reached this conclusion ?
Why, as citizens of the United States, and as citizens of the
world anxious to promote peace, do they feel that any pro-
posal of peace in the present situation would defeat perm-
anent world peace and should be opposed by them with all
the energy they can command ? The answer to this question
must be found in the causes of this war and the revelations
it has made of Germany's purpose, stripped of confusing
pretence and naked for the whole world to see.

Germany was long divided into little states, kingdoms,
duchies and other forms of one-man rule. She was the
prey of political intrigue and manipulation of other powers.
All her well-wishers hoped for and looked forward to her
union. The Germans of yore had loved freedom. We
Anglo-Saxons were Germans once and our representative
system can be traced back to institutions found first in the
forests of Germany. In the wars of the first Napoleon,
Prussia and other German states were subjected to a great
humiliation. But ♦he German youth rebelled, organized
themselves into military reserves, and finally contributed
much to the defeat of the man whose lust for universal
power finds its counterpart in the aim of the HohenzoUerns
of to-day. Later, the Holy Alliance, retaining the principle
of the divine right of kings, and supporting it in all of
Germany, left no opportunity for the free exercise of politi-
cal power by these liberty-loving German youths. In 1848
democratic revolutions occurred throughout Germany and

THE MENACE OP A PREMATURE PEACE 85

in Austria, but they were overcome. Many of the leaders
came to the United States and with their followers became
our best adopted citizens. When our Civil War came on,
their hatred of slavery led them to volunteer for their
adopted country, and every battlefield of the war was wet
with German blood.

In Germany itself, however, the liberal element was not
allowed to work out its hopes. It had looked to a united
and liberal Germany with a government based on the repre-
sentative system. It was not to be. Under the first Wil-
liam with his Prime Minister Bismarck, who came to power
in 1862, a definite plan was adopted of perfecting the
already well^isciplined Prussian army so that by " blood
and iron " the unity of Germany should be achieved. The
whole Prussian nation was made into an army, and it soon
became a machine with a power of conquest equaled by no
other. The cynical, unscrupulous, but effective, diplomacy
of Bismarck first united Prussia with Austria to deprive
Denmark of Schleswig-Holstein by force, then secured a
quarrel with Austria over the spoils, and deprived her of
all influence over the German states by humiliating defeat in
the six weeks' war of 1866. After this war, several Ger-
man states were annexed forcibly to Prussia and offensive
and defensive alliances were made with others.

Then in 1870 the occasion was seized, when it was known
that France was not prepared, to strike at her. France was
beaten, and Alsace and Lorraine were taken from her. The
German Empire was established with a Prussian King at its
head. France was made to pay an indemnity of one billion
dollars, with which the military machine of Germany was
strengthened and improved. Then Germany settled down
to a period of peace to digest the territory which by these

86 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

three wars had been absorbed. Bismarck's purpose in main-
taining the superiority of his army was to retain what had
been taken by blood and iron, and at the same time by a
period of prolonged peace to give to Germany a full oppor-
tunity for industrial development and the self -discipline
necessary for the highest efficiency.

The marvelous work which the Germans have accom-
plished in their field of industrial activity is known to all.
The prosperity which followed increased the population of
Germany and crowded her borders. Bismarck was dis-
missed by the present Emperor, but his policy of maintain-
ing the highest efficiency of the army was continued. And
then, as the success of the German system in the material
development of the Empire showed itself and became the
admiration of the world, the destiny of Germany grew larger
in the eyes of her Emperor and her people, and the blood
and iron policy which had been directed first to the achieve-
ment of the unity of Germany and then to the defense of
the German Empire in the enjoyment of what had been taken
in previous wars, expanded into a dream of Germanizing the
world. The German people were impregnated with this
idea by every method of official instruction. A cult of
philosophy to spread the propaganda developed itself in the
universities and schools. The principle was that the state
could do no wrong, that the state was an entity that must
be sustained by force ; that everything else must be sacrificed
to its strength ; that the only sin the state could commit was
neglect and failure to maintain its power.

With that dogmatic logic which pleases the German mind,
and to which it readily adapts itself, this proposition easily
led to the further conclusion that there could be no inter-
national morality; that morality and its principles applied

THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 87

only to individuals, but that when the action of the state was
involved, considerations of honor, of the preservation of ob-
ligations solemnly made, must yield if the interests of the
state required. These were the principles taught by
Treitschke in the University of Berlin and maintained by
German economic philosophers and by the representative of
the military regime in the person of Bemhardi.

Bismarck had been keen enough in his diplomacy to await
the opportunity that events presented for seeming to be
forced into a war which he had long planned. This was the
case with Denmark. This was the case with Austria.
This was the case with France. German diplomacy has lost
nothing of this characteristic in the present war. Germany
did not plan the killing of the Austrian Archduke and his
consort ; but the minute that that event presented the likeli-
hood of war, Germany accepted it as the opportunity for her
to strike down her neighbors, Russia and France, and to
enlarge her power. She gladly gave her consent to the ulti-
matum of Austria to Servia that was sure to bring on war,
and then posed as one driven into war by the mobilization of
Russia.

She knew that Russia was utterly unprepared. She knew
that France was imprepared. She knew that Great Britain
was unprepared. She herself was ready to the last cannon
and the last reservist. Therefore, when appealed to by
Great Britain and by all the other Powers to intervene and
prevent Austria from forcing a universal war, Germany
declined to act. Not a telegram or communication between
Germany and Austria has ever been given to the public to
show the slightest effort to induce delay by Austria. While
Germany would pose as having acted only as Austria's ally
and as unwilling to influence her against her interest and

88 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

independent judgment, the verdict of history unquestionably
will be that the war is due to Germany's failure to prevent
it and to her desire to accept the opportunity of the assassina-
tion of the Austrian Archduke as a convenient time to begin
a war she long intended. The revelation of their unpre-
paredness is sufficient to show that England, France and
Russia did not conspire to bring on the war. On the other
hand, before the war began Germany had constructed a
complete system of strategic railways on her Belgian border,
adapted not to commercial uses, but only to the quick in-
vasion of Belgium.

Indeed, every fact as the war has developed forms one
more circumstance in the irrefragable case against Germany
as the Power responsible for this world-disaster. The
preparation of fifty years, the false philosophy of her destiny
and of the exaltation of force, had given her a yearning for
conquest, for the expansion of her territory, the extension
of her influence, and the Germanization of the world. She
alone is responsible for the incalculable destruction of this
war. She led on in the armament of the world that she
might rule it. She promoted therefore the armament of
other nations. Her system was followed, though not as
effectively, by other countries in pure defense of their peace
and safety.

And now her Emperor, her Prussian military caste, and
her wonderful but blinded people, have the blood of the
millions who have suffered in this world catastrophe on their
heads. The German military doctrine, that when the in-
terests of the state are concerned, the question is one of
power and force, and not of honor or obligation or moral
restraint, finds its most flagrant examples in Germany's
conduct of this war.

THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 89

Her breach of a solemn obligation entered into by her and
all the powers of Europe, in respect to Belgium's neutrality,
was its first exhibition. It was followed by the well-proven
deliberate plan of atrocities against the men, women and
children of a part of Belgium in order to terrorize the rest
of the population into complete submission. It was shown
in the prompt dropping of bombs on defenceless towns from
Zeppelins and other aircraft; in the killing of non-combat-
ant men, women and children by the naval bombardment of
unfortified towns; in the use of liquid fire and poison gases
in battle. All of these had been condemned as improper
in declarations in the Hague treaties.

The Reptile Fund, which was used under Bismarck for the
bribery of the press and for the maintenance of a spy system,
has been enlarged and elaborated, so that German bribery has
extended the world over, and the German espionage has
exceeded anything known to history. The medieval use
by the Hohenzollems of dynastic kinship has paralyzed the
action of the peoples of Greece and Russia. And now we
know, by recent revelation, of the aid that Swedish diplomats
are furnishing to Germany in her submarine warfare against
neutral ships, and that it is made possible by the influence
of the German consort of the Swedish King.

Intrigue, dislionor, cruelty, have characterized the entire
military policy of Germany. The rule^ of international
law have been cast to the winds. The murderous submarine
has sunk without warning the non-combatant commercial
vessels of the enemy and sent their officers, their crews and
their passengers, men, women and children, to the bottom
without warning. Not only has this policy been pursued
against enemy commercial vessels, but also against neutral
commercial vessels, and parts of the crew have been

go TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

assembled on the submarines and then the submarine has
been submerged and the victims left struggling in the ocean's
waste to drown. We find a German diplomat telegraphing
from a neutral port to the German headquarters advising
that if the submarine be used against the vessels of that
neutral Power it leave no trace of the attack. In other
words, the murder of the crews must be complete, because
" dead men tell no tales."

Having violated the neutrality of Belgium, having broken
its sacred obligations to that country and her people, it is
now enslaving them by taking them from Belgium and en-
forcing their labor in Germany. This is contrary to every
rule of international law, and is in the teeth of the plainest
principles of justice and honor. All these things arc done
for the state. It is not that the nature of the German people
generally is cruel — that is not the case. But the minds of
the German people have been poisoned with this false
philosophy ; and the ruling caste in Germany, in its desperate
desire to win, has allowed no consideration of humanity or
decency or honor to prevent its use of any means which in
any way could by hook or crook accomplish a military pur-
pose.

When the war began, Germany was able to convince her
people and to convince many in the world that the issue in
the war was not the exaltation of the military power of
Germany and the expansion of her plan of destiny, but that
it was a mere controversy between the Teuton and the Slav,
and Germany asked with great plausibility, " Will you have
the world controlled by the Slav or by the German?"
Those who insisted that the issue was one of militarism
against the peace of the world, of democracy against military
autocracy, of freedom against military tyranny, were met

THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 9 1

with the argument : ** Russia is an ally. She is a greater
despotism and a greater military autocracy than Germany."
As the war wore on, the real issue was cleared of this con-
fusion. Russia became a democracy. The fight was be-
tween governments directed by their people on the one hand,
and the military dynasties of Germany, Austria and Turkey,
on the other.

President Wilson says the Allies are fighting to make
the world safe for democracy. Some misconception has
been created on this head. The Allies are not struggling to
force a particular form of government on Germany. If the
German people continue to prefer an Emperor it is not the
purpose of the Allies to require them to have a republic.
Their purpose is to end the military policy and foreign policy
of Germany that looks to the maintenance of a military and
naval machine, with its hair-trigger preparation for use
against her neighbors. If this continues, it will entail on
every democratic government the duty of maintaining a
similar armament in self-defense, and, what is likely, the
duty will be wholly or partly neglected. Thus the policy
of Germany, with her purpose and destiny, will threaten
every democracy. This is the condition which it is the
determined purpose of the Allies, as interpreted by President
Wilson, to change.

How is the change to be effected ? By defeating Germany
in this war. The German people have been very loyal to
their Emperor, because his leadership accords with the false
philosophy of the state and German destiny, with which
they have been indoctrinated and poisoned. A defeat of
the military machine, a defeat of the Frankenstein of the mil-
itary dynasty to which they have been sacrificed, must open
their eyes to the hideous futility of their political course.

92 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The German Government will then be changed, as its people
will have it changed, to avoid a recurrence of such a tragedy
as they have deliberately prepared for themselves.

Men who see clearly the kind of peace which we must
have, in order to be a real and lasting peace, can have no
sympathy therefore with a patched-up peace, one made at
a council table, the result of diplomatic chaflfering and
bargaining. Men who look forward to a League of the
World to Enforce Peace in the future can have no patience
with a compromise that leaves the promoting cause of the
present awful war unaffected and unremoved. This war
is now being fought by the Allies as a League to. En force
Peace. Unless they compel it by victory, they do not
enforce it. They do not make the military autocracies of
the world into nations fit for a World League, unless they
convince them by a lesson of defeat.

When the war came on, there were a few in the United
States who felt that the invasion of Belgium required a
protest on the part of our government, and some indeed who
felt that we should join in the war at once. But the great
body of the American people, influenced by our traditional
policy of avoiding European quarrels, stood by the Admini-
stration in desiring to maintain a strict neutrality. I think
it is not unfair to say that a very large proportion of the
intelligent and thinking people of the United States — and
that means a great majority — sympathized with the Allies
in the struggle which they were making. But many of Ger-
man birth and descent, prompted by a pride in the notable
advance in the world of German enterprise, German in-
genuity, German discipline, German efficiency, and regard-
ing the struggle as an issue between Teuton and Slav,
extended their sympathy to their Fatherland.

THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 93

As conscientiously as possible, the Administration and the
country pursued the course laid down by international law
as that which a neutral should take. International lav/ is
the rule of conduct of nations toward one another accepted
and acquiesced in by all nations. It is not always as definite
as one would like, and the acquiescence of all nations is not
always as clearly established as it ought to be. But in the
law of war as to capture at sea of commercial vessels, the
principles have been established clearly by the decision of
prize courts of all nations, English, American, Prussian and
French. The right of non-combatants on commercial ves-
sels, officers, crew and passengers, either enemy or neutral,
to be secure from danger of life, has always been recognized
and never contested. Nevertheless, by submarine attack on
English and American merchant ships without warning,
Germany sent to their death one hundred and fifty American
men, women and children. We protested and Germany
halted for a time. We thought that if we condoned the
death of one hundred and fifty we might still maintain peace
with that Power.

But it was not to be, and after more than a year Germany
announced her purpose to resume this murderous and illegal
course toward innocent Americans. Had we hesitated, we
would have lost our independence as a people; we would
have subscribed abjectly to the doctrine that might makes
right. Germany left no door open to us as a self-respecting
nation except that which led to war. She deliberately
forced us into the ranks of her enemies, and she did it be-
cause she was obsessed with the belief that the submarine
was the instrument of destruction by which she might win
the war. She recked not that, as she used it, it was a weapon
of murder. Making military efficiency her god, and exalt-

94 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ing the appliances of science in the killing of men, she
ignored all other consequences.

Germany's use of the submarine brought us into the war.
But being in, we recognized as fully as any of our Allies do
that its far greater issue is whether German militarism shall
continue after this war to be a threat to the peace of the
world, or whether we shall end that threat by this struggle
in which we are to spend our life's blood. We must not
therefore be turned from the stem necessity of winning this
war.

When the war began and its horrible character was dis-
closed, there were many religious persons who found their
faith in God shaken by the fact that millions of innocent
persons could be headed into this vortex of blood and
destruction without the saving intervention of their Creator.
But the progress of the war has revealed much, and it has
stimulated our just historic sense. It shows that the world
had become, through the initiative of Germany and the fol-
lowing on of the other nations, afflicted with the cancer of
militarism. God reveals the greatness of His power and
His omnipotence not by fortuitous and sporadic intervention,
but by the working out of His inexorable law. A cancer,
if it is not to consume the body, must be cut out, and the
cutting out necessarily involves suffering and pain. The
sacrifices of lives and treasure are inevitable in the working
out of the cure of the world malady. But we must win the
war to vindicate this view.

We are now able to see the providential punishment and
weakness that follows the violation of moral law. The
crass materialism of the German philosophy that exalts force
above morality, power above honor and decency, success
above humanity, has blinded the German ruling caste to

THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 95

the Strength of moral motives that control other peoples, and
involved them in the fundamental mistakes that will cause
their downfall. They assumed that England, burdened with
Ireland, would violate her own obligation and abandon Bel-
gium and would leave her ally France to be deprived of all
her colonial possessions. They assumed that France was
decadent, permeated with socialism, and unable to make a
contest in her state of unpreparedness. They assumed that
England's colonies, attached only by the lightest tie, and
entirely independent, if they chose to be, would not sacrifice
themselves to help the mother land in her struggle. How
false the German conclusion as to England's national con-
science and fighting power, as to France's supposed deca-
dence and her actual patriotic fervor and strength, and as
to the filial loyalty of England's daughters!

England and France since 19 14 have been fighting the
battle of the world and fighting for us of America. The
war has drained their vitality, strained their credit, exhausted
their man-power, subjected many of their non-combatants to
suflFering and destruction, and they have the war weariness
which dulls the earlier eager enthusiasm for the principles at
stake. Now, specious proposals for peace are likely to be
most alluring to the faint-hearted, and most powerful in the
hands of traitors.

The intervention of the United States, by her financial aid,
has helped much; but her armies are needed and she, a
republic unprepared, required time to prepare. The war
is now to be determined by the active tenacity of purpose of
the contestants. England showed that tenacity in the wars
of Napoleon. Napoleon succumbed. General Grant, in his
Memoirs, says that the battle is won not in the first day, but
by the commander and the army which is ready, even after

g6 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

apparent defeat, to begin the next day. It is the side which
has the nerve that will win. The intervention of the United
States has strengthened that nerve in England, France and
Italy. But delay and disappointment give full opportunity
to the lethargic, the cowardly, the factious, to make the task
of the patriot and the loyal men doubly heavy. This is the
temper of the situation among our European Allies.

With us at home the great body of our people are loyal
and strong for the war. Of course, it takes time to con-
vince a people, however intelligent, when very prosperous
and comfortable and not well advised as to the vital concern
they have in the issue of a war across a wide ocean, thou-
sands of miles away. But we have, for the first time in the
history of our republic, begun a war right. We have begun
with a conscription law which requires service from men of
a certain age from every walk of life. It is democratic in
principle, and yet it offers to the Government the means of
selection so that those who shall be sent to the front may
be best fitted to represent the nation there, and those best
able to do the work in field and factory, essential to our
winning at the front, may be retained. We have adopted
a merit system of selecting from the intelligent and educated
youth of the country the company officers. The machinery
of the draft naturally creaked some because it had to be so
hastily constructed, but on the whole it has worked well.
Those who devised it and have carried it through are entitled
to great credit.

The lessons of the war are being learned and applied in
our war equipment and in neutralizing, by new construction,
the submarine destruction of commercial transports. Ade-
quate measures for the raising of the money needed to
finance our Allies have been carried through Congress.

THE MENACE OF A PREMATURE PEACE 97

Food conservation is provided for. But of course it took
time for a hundred million of peace lovers and non-mili-
tarists to get ready, however apt, however patriotic, how-
ever determined.

" It is * dogged ' that does it." Reject all proposals of
peace as ill advised or seditious, and then time will make for
our certain victory.

While there has been pro-German sentiment in the United
States, and while the paid emissaries of Germany have been
busy trying to create as much opposition to the war as pos-
sible and have found a number of weak dupes and unin-
telligent persons, who don't understand the importance of
the war, to aid them, our Allies should know that the whole
body of the American people will earnestly support the
President and Congress in carrying out the measures which
have been adopted by the United States to win this war.

When the war is won, the United States will wish to be
heard and will have a right to be heard as to the terms of
peace. The United States will insist on a just peace, not
one of material conquest. It is a moral victory the world
should win. I think I do not mistake the current of public
sentiment throughout our entire country in saying that our
people will favor an international agreement by which the
peace brought about through such blood and suflFering and
destruction and enormous sacrifice shall be preserved by the
joint power of the world. Whether the terms of the League
to Enforce Peace, as they are, will be taken as a basis for
agreement, or a modified form, something of the kind must
be attempted.

Meantime, let us hope and pray that all the Allies will
reject proposals for settlement and compromise of every
nature; that they will adhere rigidly and religiously to the

98 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

principle that, until a victorious result gives security that
the world shall not again be drenched in blood through the
insanely selfish policy of a military caste ruling a deluded
people intoxicated with material success and power, there
will be no peace.

WORLD PEACE DEBATE ^

A. Is the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace
Feasible?

The platform is not a program to stop the present war.
It looks to a treaty to be adopted at or after its close. Its
purpose is to enforce deliberation, impartial investigation
and judgment of a cause of international quarrel before
hostilities. It does not seek to enforce the decision after it
is rendered ; but by making clear to the threatening nations
and to the world what the real issue is, and what an impartial
Tribunal thinks about it, the enforced procedure and the
necessary delay will prevent most wars.

To make the platform work, the eight or nine great
Powers should join the League. The weaker nations will
then be glad to secure the benefit of its protection. Will
the great belligerent Powers join? Lord Grey and Mr.
Asquith of Great Britain, M. Briand of France, and Dr.
Bethmann-Hollweg of Germany are representative of them.
They have approved the principles of the League. Lord
Grey says that the war should not end without it. President

1 Written debate between Mr. Taft and Mr. Bryan during the first
four months of 191 7. World Peace (Doran).

WORLD PEACE DEBATE 99

Wilson, Mr. Hughes and Mr, Lodge uphold it. These
personal expressions do not bind the Nations; but they
show that the general plan is feasible and supplies a want
which the world feels.

The platform only lays down broad lines. Its machinery
must be worked out in International Conference. Its feasi-
bility is not successfully attacked by exceptional hypotheses
under which it would fail of its purpose. The most practical
plan of government may thus be shown to be futile. If the
platform will work in most cases, the value of the result
justifies its adoption.

Are the four planks considered in detail feasible ?

1. A Court to administer international justice is not new.
Our own Supreme Court is one. Questions arise between
States not settled by the Federal Constitution or Federal
statutes. In the Kansas-Colorado case, Congress had no
power to control Colorado. International Law alone fixed
the rights between the States; and the Supreme Court en-
forced these rights.

Our relations with Canada are such that we settle all
questions by negotiation or arbitration. We have now two
permanent Tribunals to decide controversies between us —
one to adjudge questions of boundary waters like that be-
tween Kansas and Colorado, and the other to pass upon
claims of the citizens of one country against the other. We
have thus contracted the habit of arbitration; and, when
negotiation fails, no one expects anything else. In our
League, the quarrelling nations, moved by their obligation,
sanctioned by the threat of compulsion by their associates,
will contract the same habit.

2. There may be, however, political or other irritating
and threatening issues between nations which cannot be

lOO TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

settled on principles of law. They are to be submitted under
the second plank for hearing and recommendation of com-
promise just as our Fur Seal Arbitration with England.

3. The third or Force plank gives vitality to the platform.
It appeals to practical men. It provides for economic
pressure and a Police Force to hold off members of the
League from war until the cooling and curative influence of
the League's judicial procedure may have time to operate,

No matter how law-abiding a community, neither the
statutes nor judgments of the Courts enforce themselves so
as to dispense with police or sheriffs. The latter may be
called on infrequently to suppress disorder or to remove
obstruction to judicial decree. The fact that they are
present, however, in the community, or in the Court, with
the power to act and the intention to act when necessary,
stays would-be disturbers or obstructors. Fear of police
action is usually effective without actual use of force.
" They also serve who only stand and wait."

4. No one will doubt the feasibility of the fourth plank.
Successful Congresses for declaring the principles of Inter-
national Law and enlarging their scope have been held
before. Such was the Congress at Paris in 1856 in which
privateering was abolished.

The agreement of all the powerful nations of the world
to unite their armies and their navies to resist the prema-
ture hostilities of one or more nations against another must
increase the binding effect of the obligation of the League
members not to rush into sudden war. The fear of forcible
restraint would thus, in most cases, render actual resort to it
unnecessary.

The League is to be a world alliance. We have had

WORLD PEACE DEBATE lOI

precedents of successful alliances for the purpose of protect-
ing the parties to them against outside attack. In various
junctures in the past, these alliances have preserved peace.
The fear of their united force has prevented others from
attacking a single member.

Moreover, the binding effect of such alliances has shown
itself. France, with no interest in Servia, and with the
danger of being crushed by Germany, keeps the letter of her
agreement with Russia. England, with no interest in
Servia, maintains her obligation to Belgium ; while Germany,
without interest in Servia, upholds her word to Austria.
Treaties may sometimes be broken; but as the best hope of
securing international progress, we should not abandon them.
The fear of another World War, which will lead the great
Powers into our League, will also lead them to meet its
obligation.

The League is not a defensive league against outside
nations. It does not defend its members against non-mem-
bers. Its purpose is to furnish a means of keeping peace
among its own members only. It proposes to secure World
Peace by attracting to its membership, first, all the Great
Powers, and then the lesser Powers which will surely follow.
The logic of circumstances must inevitably force the Great
Powers engaged in this war to membership. In seeking
permanent peace, whether they wish it or not, the League
must be their common goal.

The Allies proclaim their purpose to be to secure a perma-
nent basis for peace, safeguarded by practical guaranties,
that is, of superior force. What is that but the League?

Germany's Chancellor avows her willingness to join a

102 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

league to " suppress disturbers of peace." The League is
only a wise preparation of the members, by organization of
their united potential force, to frighten from its purpose a
would-be disturber of the World's Peace, and thus probably
make the use of actual force unnecessary.

Germany now proposes peace with suggestion of a limita-
tion of armaments. In the Hague conferences, Germany
declined to consider such a limitation. Such a suggestion
by her now looks necessarily to a continuing '* Bund " to
exact the limitation. This is only a logical corollary to our
proposals. Our League must deal with armaments and fix
a minimum to secure effective joint action. Why not a
maximum ?

Again, whether Germany's present proposals are now to
lead to peace or not, serious negotiations must sometime
come ; and then conditions will make for a League like ours.
One of Germany's motives in offering peace is, of course, her
desire to satisfy her own people that their Government is
anxious to end their almost unbearable burdens. In Russia,
the power of control is passing from the Bureaucracy to the
Council and the Duma. When whole peoples constitute
the armies and the makers of war supplies, as never before,
and all of them are enduring the sweat and woe and blood,
their will determines policies. Otherwise, dynasties fall.
In all history, no time can find the contending peoples so
anxious for guaranties of permanent peace as at the end
of this war. Lord Grey's words, that the war cannot and
should not end without such a League, will find an echo
in all their hearts.

It is these circumstances that make the League feasible.
Difficulties are suggested. They concern the detail of
operation rather than the main principles. If the nations

WORLD PEACE DEBATE IO3

are determined to create such a League, as they will be, they
can arrange the. details.

Of course, a council or other joint body of representatives
of the League must act in case of strained relations between
League members. It will naturally use diplomatic pressure
to prevent a rupture. Such a body in negotiation with them
will have excellent opportunity to learn which of the con-
testants intends a breach of its plighted faith. Upon the
decision of such a council, all members of the League, in
compliance with the third article, will withhold commerce or
dealing with the recalcitrant. A boycott of this kind would
be a powerful deterrent weapon and probably make resort
to force unnecessary.

But it is said that force is not a feasible means of securing
and maintaining peace. To say so is to ignore history and
experience, domestic and international. Fear of forcible
restraint and punishment is often an indispensable motive to
strengthen moral impulse to obey the law and follow the
right. That it may not be needed by some does not render
it safe to dispense with it in the case of others. If we need
restraint to keep men in paths of peace and law, why not
nations ? Nations are only men united in communities ; and
they have not the moral self-restraint of the average man.
Force used for selfish, vicious or improper ends is, of course,
to be deplored. But is there any method of defeating force
used for such ends, except superior force threatened or
applied for the common good? Has force, or fear of it,
never done any good among the nations ? What was it that
kept Louis XIV's greedy hand out of the Spanish Nether-
lands but the fear of the league of England, Holland and
Sweden? What was it that stopped Napoleon in his mad
lust for universal domination but a league of all Europe,

I04 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

welded by England, against him? The fact that, after the
Napoleonic wars, this league degenerated, as the Holy Alli-
ance, into a selfish plot of an inner ring to promote the divine
right of kings, does not detract from the useful purpose it
originally served. What was it but force that cut out the
cancer of slavery in our body politic? What was it but
force that freed Cuba from oppression? Have men changed
since these wars, that force or fear of force is not now
needed at times to help a just cause to prevail?

Before the present war, the Triple Alliance on the one side
and the Triple Entente on the other, divided Europe into
two vast and powerful camps ; and men spoke of their pro-
moting peace on the theory that one sword would keep the
other in its scabbard. These leagues did for a time prevent
attack upon single members; but ultimately they failed.
This war was precipitated because they were divided against
each other; and there were other motives in their main-
tenance than a mere preservation of peace. Their failure
offers no argument against the feasibility and success of our
League. Its members could not organize separate leagues
and be honest or consistent members of ours. The League's
simple plan of unity of power, with but one purpose of
forcibly maintaining World Peace by deliberation, hearing
and decision before hostilities, distinguishes it in its aim
and practical moderation from all others.

Mr. Bryan objects that if only a part of the nations
entered the League, there would ensue a test of military
strength between the League group of nations and other
groups. This objection finds no warrant in our plan because

WORLD PEACE DEBATE IO5

the League deals not at all with non-members, but only with
differences between League members. Of course, if but a
part of the nations consented to join the League, the plan
would not work. To be useful and accomplish its purpose,
it must have world membership. In my last paper, I showed
why it would have this, because the great Powers now in war,
and then the lesser Powers, would and must seek such a
League when peace comes.

Mr. Bryan objects that confidence in the armed support
of the League would prompt a League member to acts
rendering peaceful settlement impossible and precipitating
war. This rests on the same misconception as to the
League's attitude toward non-members. As between mem-
bers, such motive would be slight. The Council of the
League, in using diplomatic pressure to prevent a rupture
between two members, would have full opportunity to know
and report which was really forcing hostilities; and the
League would act accordingly.

He also objects to a League with force in it because we
have already made thirty-one treaties agreeing to investiga-
tion before war which contain no provision for force. An
agreement for investigation and orderly procedure before
war and a subsequent agfreement providing a world police
force to compel such procedure are not inconsistent.

Mr. Bryan asks what is meant by " economic pressure.*'
I answer — a boycott of the unruly nation — an embargo
threatened or imposed by all the members of the League on
their trade with the recalcitrant member. Such an embargo
must of necessity accompany war, because war means the
cessation of commerce between the belligerent parties. ' The
boycott or embargo may, however, precede war and prevent
it. This is the part which it is intended to play in our plan.

I06 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Mr. Bryan's whole argument thus far against the League
is an argument against the evils of war. But I submit this
is not to the point if war persists. The use of force to sup-
press a small war, however undesirable, is better than a
world war, and is justified in avoiding it. Mr. Bryan says,
" Why not test the friendship plan among nations ? " His-
tory has oftentimes tested it and found that it did not work.
While peaceful means of avoiding war are becoming more
successful than in the past, the present war has convinced the
world that a plan for the peaceful settlement of international
quarrels will be more certainly effective if the nations of the
world unite in their own interest to compel the working of
the plan. The present war has brought home to them their
deep interest in stopping every war, however remote, in order
to prevent the conflagration s spread.

Mr. Bryan says that force breeds violence and cites the
useful change from the time when all men carried weapons
to the time when they gave up the practice. The instance is
not helpful to his argument. Men gave up weapons when
they could rely on the police, exercising the force of the
community, to protect them against violence. By analogy,
if our plan becomes effective, it will offer a strong induce-
ment to limit armaments — a proposal that Germany has
already unofficially given out.

Would Mr. Bryan dispense with the police in city, state
and nation? Does he think a state or national prohibition
law would enforce itself without the arrest of offenders and
their restraint and punishment? Will "the friendship
plan," without any public force in the background, work
well in any of our communities, however law-abiding? If
not, why should it among the nations ?

I agree that the analogy between the domestic police force

WORLD PEACE DEBATE 107

and the union of the forces of the nations of the world is
not complete because of the difficulty of effective interna-
tional cooperation ; but the essential principle which justifies
and requires the use of force in each case is the same, to
wit, that all the people have a right and duty to exert their
united force to suppress violence between individuals dis-
turbing the community, and that all nations have a right
and duty to use their united forces to suppress a disturbance
of international peace which may involve the whole world.

Mr. Bryan questions whether the President's words or
those of Mr. Hughes, in respect to the League, are suf-
ficiently specific to justify my use of them. They were used
by the speakers with the League's proposals in mind, not
only to approve them all, but especially the third or force
proposal, which is the one to which Mr. Bryan chiefly
objects.

Of course, if the United States or any other nation is to
join the League, its principles will be embodied in a treaty
with all the necessary working details. This treaty should
not be ratified unless it is approved, after full knowledge
and consideration of the details, not only by the treaty-mak-
ing agency of each power, but also by the gfreat body of its
people and its legislature or congress, upon whom must fall
the serious burden of performance of the treaty obligations.
This would be needed to give assurance that the League
would really hold the nations when the strain comes.

B. Does the League Platform Offer the Most Practical
Plan for Securing Permanent Peace?

Is the platform of the League the most practical plan for
securing permanent peace after the war?

I08 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Should the League attempt more than it does ? Should it
enforce the judgments of the Court and the recommenda-
tions for compromise by the Commission? The two must
be distinguished. A judgment between nations, like a
domestic judgment, might be enforced. But nations will
reasonably object to final submission of vital interests to
the discretion of arbitrators, however impartial, in recom-
mending compromise of an issue not covered by principles
of law. The Supreme Court of the United States renders
and enforces judgments between the States on justiciable
issues ; but, although given broad authority to hear " con-
troversies between States," it refuses to decide issues not
involving the application of principles of law. They must
be settled by agreement or go unsettled. A judgment binds
the parties in honor to its terms. This helps to secure
acquiescence. But a recommendation of compromise im-
plies no such moral sanction. The League has deemed it
best not to attempt the enforcement of either judgments or
compromises. It is wise for it not to try too much, lest
being over ambitious, it fail.

There are said to be wrongs which only war can remedy.
If so, our plan does not prevent such a remedy. It enforces
investigation, discussion, deliberation and impartial decision
before war is begun and avoids most wars. If a war be-
tween members of the League is inevitable and necessary,
the delay secured will enable the remainder of the League
to hedge it about so as not to permit its spread.

Is a plan without force in it more practical than that of
the League? It is not practical at all because the present
belligerent powers could not be induced to adopt it. They
demand effective guaranties of future peace. They will not
trust to the security of a League which depends for its main-

WORLD PEACE DEBATE IO9

tenance of peace on the mere promises of its members to abide
a judicial settlement. In their minds, nothing will be effec-
tive which will not unite the superior force of all for the
common good to secure the world against the aggression of
reckless and faithless disturbers of its peace. Without such
a result, the war will, in their view, have been fought in vain.

The psychological effect of this war upon the world has
not been to vindicate the purely non-resistant pacifists or to
increase their number. It has been to increase " the militant
pacifists," to use a paradox, who are now willing to consent
to the use of force if it be directed to the maintenance of the
just peace of the world.

Mr. Bryan objects to the obligation of every member of
the League to be ready to do its share in creating the police
force. What good could come from a police force if it had
to be organized after the riot alarm was turned in? Each
nation, therefore, must know what force it should furnish,
and should in good faith keep in a state of reasonable
preparation to respond to a call. The share of each member
will have to be generally prescribed in the fundamental
agreement of the League, and must vary in number and
kind with the geographical location and resources of the
member and other circumstances. A self-respecting nation,
bound jointly with others to constitute an international
police force, may agree without the least sacrifice of dignity,
to keep ready a force to fulfil its obligation. It could well
afford to do so, because the security afforded by the joint
forces of the League will reduce the reasonable preparation
needed for its own defence.

Mr. Bryan insists that our League with its obligation will
increase armaments. On the contrary, it will reduce them
and the taxes necessary to maintain them. Indeed the work-

I JO TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ing out of our plan must inevitably furnish the strongest
motive for an agreement to reduce and limit armaments, in
accord with the intimation of Germany already referred to.

Mr. Bryan objects to the surrender by each member of
its control over its own military and naval policy. If so,
he objects to the reduction and limitation of maximum
armaments supervised by the League, — a plan which I sup-
posed had the approval of the most extreme pacifists. Every
treaty between two nations which accomplishes any good
involves a surrender on the part of each of some right which
it is willing to limit to accomplish a greater benefit.

The fear, expressed by Mr. Bryan and others that such
a league would degenerate into a trap for the peaceful
nations, causing them to serve the purpose of designing and
ambitious warlike members, has little to justify it. The
unity, strength and permanence of the League must depend
on its justice and fairness. The perversion of its high
purpose, shown in the action of any group attempting its
control, must inevitably and promptly lead to its dissolution.

A league for judicial settlement of international disputes
without force would prove a step forward ; but it would be
far short of our League in efficacy and scope. It would
cover only questions of legal nature. Many issues likely
to provoke war would not come within its scope. The
element of force in our League gives it an advantage not
measured solely by the sanction it adds to its obligations.
It will give to every member of the League a sense of respon-
sibility for the peace of the world. It will create a union of
interest among the members, wholly absent in a league for
judicial settlement in which a refusal to submit to the court
concerns only the refusing member and its opponent and
involves the other members of the league in no responsibility.

WORLD PEACE DEBATE III

Our League, through the active and stimulated concern of
every member in the continuing friendship of all, would
bring the nations much nearer to " the Parliament of Man
and the Federation of the World."

Mr. Bryan suggests a League of Nations of which the
members agree to delay war for a year of investigation and
report by a permanent tribunal. This is on the basis of the
stipulations of treaties negotiated by him as Secretary of
State with thirty-one separate nations. Our League's pro-
posals recognize the value of delay and investigation in
avoiding hotheaded resort to war. But Mr. Bryan's plan
did not include a judgment by a Court or a recommendation
of compromise by a Commission. Thus he has advanced
some, but little. He suggests that an arbitral judgment or
recommendation after investigation and hearing is less likely
to secure a peaceful adjustment than a mere investigation
and report without conclusion and decision. This is not
sound. The decision of an impartial tribunal must always
be of some moral weight in securing from the disputing
parties peaceful acquiescence in a settlement. He says that
investigators will appeal to the reason and sense of justice
of the parties, while arbitrators, in dealing with parties
bound to abide their decision, are not so likely to do so. On
the contrary, the most searching and just criticism of inter-
national arbitrations is that their judgments are com-
promises, intended to appeal to the acquiescence of the
parties, rather than straight decisions on principles of law.

Mr. Bryan urges that a treaty obligation of two nations to
maintain a period of delay and investigation before hos-

112 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

tilities, is inconsistent with a compact of all other nations
forcibly to require the two nations to keep their engagement
Why should this make the delay and investigation less likely
than when dependent on the naked promises of the two
nations in the heat of quarrel ? How is the insistence of all
other nations upon the delay likely to create war between
the quarrelling nations? Mr. Bryan says "the League to
Enforce Peace violates the spirit of our treaty plan; it
would send forth a dove of peace, to be sure, but its dove
would carry a sword instead of an olive branch." With
deference, this is mere rhetoric. It is not dealing with facts
as they are, or with human nature as it is. I f it be a logical
argument, then the presence of a policeman in a community
to arrest law breakers and of a court to ptmish them violates
the spirit of the law which all are under a moral obligation
to obey. Mr. Bryan says that when two neighbors fall out
they call in their friends and allow time for investigation
and friendly advice, each party reserving the right of inde-
pendent action after the conference, and that the prospect of
settlement is much lessened if the conference is opened with
a display of weapons. This is not the usual way of settling
such disputes, but assume that it is. Would Mr. Bryan con-
tend that the prospect of a settlement would be improved if
the disputants knew that, in their failure to agree, there were
no law and no courts and no police to enforce their mutual
rights and duties? In our League to Enforce Peace, there
is no display of weapons by one party to the controversy
against the other. The element of world force in the third
article is no more obtrusive and no more provocative of
temper or heat than the machinery of justice in the domestic
environment of the two supposed neighbors.

There is no proof of the feasibility of Mr. Bryan's World

WORLD PEACE DEBATE II3

League in his thirty-one treaties between other nations and
the United States. Many, but not all, nations were willing
to sign such treaties because they were revocable within a
short period, and because they were made with the United
States which is notoriously unprepared for war. They
would, doubtless, decline to make such an agreement with
their immediate and powerful neighbors; and no such
treaties have been made between other important nations.
Mr. Bryan says that all nations would enter such a League
if they would enter ours. On the contrary, the sanction of
the world's united command in securing performance of the
promises under our League will induce nations to yield their
power to strike at once for their rights in the confidence that
any opponent, however tricky or faithless, will not be per-
mitted to take advantage of their concession. What the
belligerent nations, in ending this war, are yearning for is
a guaranty of peace, not only in the promise of each nation
but in the assurance of the sanction of a superior force of all
for the common good to compel observance of its promise.
Mr. Bryan's proposal in this aspect would seem to them a
rope of sand ; and they would have none of it as a practical
object in ending the war.

Mr. Bryan thinks that the present war demonstrates the
fallacy of what he calls *' peace by terrorism." What the
present war really demonstrates is the truth of the conclusion
of Immanuel Kant, the great philosopher, that universal
peace cannot be expected until the world is politically organ-
ised, that is, until the nations of the world use the prestige
and force of all for the common good to suppress disturbers
of peace. The League to Enforce Peace, if it becomes an
accomplished fact, will be a step in this world political organ-
ization.

114 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Mr. Bryan's League would be nothing but a series of
treaties between *' couples "of nations. If two nations fell
out, the nations of the world other than the disputants,
would have no active function except to watch the two
quarrelling nations keep or break their promises to wait a
year. There would be no " political organization " oi the
world to preserve and secure peace. Our League makes
every member active and selfishly interested in maintaining
peace to escape the burden of acting as policeman. Thus we
have the " team work " of the world.

Mr. Bryan proposes four plans which he thinks more
practical than that of our League. The first one I have
already considered.

The second is a World Court, in which all nations are to
be represented, to consider and decide justiciable issues, and
to investigate and make findings on non- justiciable issues,
the judgment or finding to be enforceable only by the parties.
This is similar to the first two proposals of our League, with
the force article left out. There is no sanction, beyond its
agreement, that any nation will delay hostilities until hear-
ing and judgment. It does not differ from Mr. Bryan's
first proposal except that his tribunal gives a decision here ;
and, in his first, it did not. This is an improvement; but,
with that exception, it is open to the same objections. It
lacks the essential quality of world organization and pressure
for peace. It is a mere combination of separate treaties of
arbitration between every two nations. This suggestion of
force adds nothing. The optional use of force by one party
to an arbitration to compel performance by the other of an

WORLD PEACE DEBATE II5

award would be implied. Mr. Bryan says, "If the nations
agreed to such a plan, the chances against war would be
a hundred to one, if not a thousand to one." Mr. Bryan's
*' If " is a formidable obstacle. The view of both the Allies
and the Central Powers, shown in the peace correspondence,
is clear. They both demand sanctions of force. Germany
will enter a league to suppress disturbers of peace. The
Allies declare in favor of " international agreements imply-
ing the sanctions necessary to insure their execution and thus
prevent an apparent security from only facilitating new
aggressions." Lloyd George, in his Guildhall speech on
January i ith, said : " The peace and security for peace
will be that the nations will band themselves together to
punish the first peace breaker who comes out. As to the
armies of Europe, every weapon will be a sword of justice
in the Government of men ; every army will be a constabulary
of peace."

Mr. Bryan's third plan is that all the nations shall agree
to a referendum before declaring war. Mr. Bryan can
hardly think that the Great Powers, Russia, Germany,
France, England, Austria, Japan and Italy, or any of them,
whose consent is necessary to form as effective league, would
agree not to begin a war until the question should be left to
a vote of their respective electorates and an affirmative vote
given. If not, his proposal is not feasible. Suppose the
electorate of one country decides for war and that of the
other does not. Shall another vote be taken? In which
country ? Or shall it be in both ? The difficulty in answer-
ing these questions shows how chimerical the proposal is,
and how ill adapted to the settlement of a pressing interna-
tional issue between two governments. The Federal Con-

Il6 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

stitution gives to Congress the power to declare war.
Without amendment, Mr. Bryan's proposal could not be
seriously entertained. Such an amendment is not likely
before this war ends.

As a fourth plan, Mr. Bryan suggests a reduction of arma-
ments. We all strongly favor this. But Mr. Bryan offers
no plan for securing and maintaining the reduction. Until
all strongly-armed nations reduce their armaments, every
wise nation will insist on providing and maintaining an
armament enabling it to make effective defence against the
possible unlawful aggression of any other armed nation.
A general reduction of armaments is entirely impractical
under a league unless the league offers to each country a
security of peace equivalent to the armament it abandons.
I have already pointed out that Germany has expressed a
willingness to consent to a limitation of armament The
Allies, in their answer to President Wilson, have intimated
that agreements as to armament should be one of the
sanctions of a secure peace. How is the reduction to be con-
tinuously maintained unless by the united and enforceable
command of all the members of the League? An agreed
reduction of armament is a corollary to our League's pro-
posals, because a world compact embodying them will fur-
nish the security to each nation it requires, and justify a
lessening of its self -protection. But Mr. Bryan suggests no
such security.

Mr. Bryan, irrelevantly, as it seems to me, charges that
all army and navy officers, including our own, "make it
their business to imperil peace." This is prompted by their
insistence on due preparedness. Applied to our officers, it
is a grave injustice to a fine body of men, fully imbued with
the true American spirit of subordination of the military

WORLD PEACE DEBATE II7

to the civil. If war were to come, our sudden sense of de-
pendence on their tried skill, courage and high patriotism
would cause us deep humiliation for such words, uttered
merely because they had warned their countrymen truly.

The practical advantage of the League is in its organizing
the political, economic and military forces of the world to
command resort to impartial tribunals for the decision and
settlement of all irritating questions between nations before
they begin war. The educational effect of this practice will
accustom them to such a mode of settlement.

They will acquire the habit of arbitration as Canada and
the United States have done. The sanction of world force,
though present, will thus become less compulsive upon the
nations ; and they will, as a matter of due course, as a habit
and by preference, seek only a peaceful form.

C. Should the United States Become a Member of the
League to Enforce Peace?

VII

The war in Europe will have weakened all nations engaged
in it by the loss of the flower of their youth and by the
destruction of industries and homes in the thousands of
miles in its train, the cost of the rehabilitation of which can
hardly be measured. The belligerents will stagger under
a stupendous debt and interest charge. The primacy of the
United States among the nations of the world will thus
become clearer than it ever was ; and this, taken with its real
neutrality, must give it a great influence in a council of na-
tions which can and ought to be exerted for the world's
benefit. Its advocacy of such a League will strongly make

Il8 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

for its acceptance by the other Great Powers, but only on
condition that it becomes a member and bears its share of
the risk and receives its share of the benefit of membership.

Our wealth in the last three years has been added to by
billions in the profits that have been reaped from the sale of
war material and war equipment to the nations of Europe
and thus from the blood and the suffering of the people of
these stricken countries. We had the right to take advan-
tage of the situation for which we were not responsible; but
the fact should make us sensitive to our duty when occasion
and opportunity arise for us to help our brethern of Europe
to avoid a recurrence of such woe. We have been blessed
beyond any other nation. Our good fortune seems to have
no limit. We shall not be worthy of it unless we recognize
our responsibility and run our share of risk in securing the
world from a return of the scourge visiting it now. Of
course, the first duty of a nation is to its own people and
to itself ; and it should not, out of a mere ideal of self-sac-
rifice, endanger the integrity of its government or its civiliza-
tion. But it has a duty as a member of the family of
nations ; and that duty is commensurate with its power for
good to the world.

Moreover the risk which the United States would run in
joining such a League should not be exaggerated. If the
United States makes adequate preparation, as it intends to
do, to defend itself against the unlawful aggression of any
nation, the army and navy which it has projected will furnish
ample constabulary force to fill any quota which may be
allotted to it in the formation of the world police to suppress
the beginnings of war in violation of the regulations of the
League.

WORLD PEACE DEBATE I I9

In the preliminary conference as to the proposals of the
League, one member present put this question to another :
Would you be willing that your boy, the apple of your eye
and the pride of your heart, should lay down his life in a
struggle over a question between Servia and Austria in
which America has no concern? The answer was: "If
the suppression of that struggle by the police force of the
world would prevent a spread of the local fire into a general
world conflagration, my boy's life could not be sacrificed in
a higher cause." It is the duty of the United States, in its
own interest and in the interest of mankind, to lead the
nations into a League to Enforce Peace.

VIII

Washington's advice has no application to the League.
The alliances which he condemned were like that with France
during the Revolution because of which we were called on
twenty years later to serve the selfish motive of our ally.
Jefferson advocated a permanent alliance with Great Britain
to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. Our League is a league
of all nations to support the selfish purposes of none. It
has only one object : to prevent unnecessary wars.

The Monroe Doctrine rests ultimately on force. The
traditions of ninety-three years strengthen it; but the Zim-
mermann note advises us that they may not be sufficient.
Indeed our interests the world over require us to protect
and maintain them. Our enormous trade with all the
countries of Europe makes it most difficult, in a European
war, to preserve our rights and interests as neutrals, and is
most likely to involve us in the war. We are now on the

120 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

brink of hostilities with Germany. Why, then, should
Washington's advice be controlling, advice given us in a day
of small things, based on an isolation and a remoteness from
the rest of the world which has ceased ? Our coming war
with Germany demonstrates, from the selfish point of view
alone, the wisdom of our joining in a world movement to
prevent the recurrence of another European war, even
though it imposes on us the burden of contributing our quota
to an international police force.

But Mr. Bryan says that in joining the League we would
abandon the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine,
shortly described, is our national policy of preventing, by
protest and by force if necessary, any non- American Power
from subverting any independent American government and
from colonizing, by such means or by purchase, American
territory under a government of its own. Our reason for
maintaining the Doctrine is that we think such a course by
a non-American Power would endanger our interests. The
Doctrine does not rest on International Law. Should a
question arise as to its enforcement between us and a non-
American Power, therefore, it would be non- justiciable and
must go to the Commission under the second article for a
recommendation of compromise in which we would not be
bound in honor to acquiesce. We would then have the same
opportunity to maintain the Doctrine by force as if there
were no league. Under the thirty-one treaties of Mr.
Bryan, we would now have to abide a year of investigation
before using force. The disadvantage to us, if any, of
delay, therefore, will certainly be no greater under the terms
of the League.

Instead of hampering our maintenance of the Doctrine,
the League would help us in any case where its violation

WORLD PEACE DEBATE 121

might be attempted, for by the terms of the League, the non-
American Power must submit its cause for hearing to one
of the Tribunals of the League before hostilities; and, if it
failed to do so, we could summon the international police
force to drive it off American shores.

But it is said that, if we mix in European politics to the
extent required by this League, we cannot exclude European
Powers from taking part in those of this hemisphere.
There is nothing in the League requiring us or authorizing
us to participate in the internal politics of any European
country or to do other than to use our good offices to prevent
a war between any two of such countries. We arc to fur-
nish our quota to suppress a premature war between them.
They are to exercise the same functions in this hemisphere.
In what respect does that violate the Monroe Doctrine?
The League does not enable us nor authorize us to acquire
and colonize territory in Europe by purchase or conquest
any more than it authorizes a European nation to do so on
this side ; and that is all the Monroe Doctrine forbids.

Mr. Bryan suggests that we should not join a World
League because our citizens of foreign nativity would divide
in their sympathies as between European nations. If our
foreign policies, needed for our protection and for that of
the world, are to be abandoned because of race prejudice in
a comparatively small group of our foreign-born citizens, we
have failed in our experiment of naturalization. I cannot
acquiesce in such a view. This would indeed be a humiliat-
ing surrender to the so-called " hyphen."

Mr. Bryan's eighth article commends the attitude of the
President in his message read to the United States Senate on

122 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

January 22nd. I have altogether misinterpreted the notes
of the President to the belligerent powers, his speech at the
dinner of the League to Enforce Peace in May, 1916, as
well as the message of January 22nd last, if he has not, in
all of these, intended to approve the general principles of our
League. His reference to " the major force of the world "
was certainly an approval of the political organization of the
world to the extent of creating an international police force
to secure compliance with a peaceable procedure for the set-
tlement of international questions likely otherwise to lead to
war. Mr. Bryan's citation of the President as authority
does not sustain his contention.

.. ....••

The question who shall command the joint military force
in a campaign is not material, provided it be understood in
advance, as it must be, what the purpose of the campaign is.
The United States has had no difficulty in the past in acting
with other nations to carry out a common purpose of a mili-
tary character, as the taking of Pekin by the Allied force
during the Boxer trouble proves. Nations have acted
together often in history; and the question who shall have
the military command or how the joint armies should be
directed is a practical military question to be agreed upon by
the joint powers in war council. The purpose of League
campaigns would be settled by the terms of the League
before the mobilization begins. It would be to restrain the
warlike activities of a nation unlawfully breaking a peace
to which it is pledged. To characterize this as placing the
destiny of the toiling millions of the United States in the
hands of aliens for their selfish purposes is to reveal a com-
plete misunderstanding of the normal operation of the
League. The United States retains complete control of its

WORLD PEACE DEBATE 1 23

forces and can withdraw them whenever the lawful and com-
mendable purpose of preserving the peace of the world shall
cease to be the object of the military campaign.

• ••••••«

Those who are promoting the League are not committed
to any particular means by which the necessary military
preparation shall be secured. Personally, I favor universal
compulsory military training, for a year, of our youth
between the ages of nineteen and twenty- four as the most
effective and most democratic plan that can be adopted. It
will fall equally upon the rich and poor. It will give a year
of valuable disciplinary education to our youth who need it
much. It will furnish a citizenship from which we can stun-
mon a trained army to defend our country. I repeat, how-
ever, this is not a part of the League plan.

The war with Germany which we now face, after every
effort to escape it and when our national conscience is wholly
void of offence toward her, is a sufficient answer to Mr.
Bryan's view that love is all that is needed to make effective
a world league to insure peace. If this war teaches us any-
thing, it is that our civilization has not advanced beyond
the time when the major force of the world is sometimes
needed for defense against selfish greed and ambition on the
part of nations. If we fail to prepare ourselves to defend
our rights against lawless aggression by ruthless military and
naval power, we are blind to the simplest lessons of current
history. If we can avail ourselves of the same preparation
to do our part in defending the peace of the world, should
we not seize the opportunity ?

124 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

We have now reached the end of the discussion. This
tenth article offers an opportunity for a summary of the
positions taken in the previous papers. The program of
the League looks to a treaty binding all nations to adopt, in
the settlement of controversies likely to lead to war between
them, a peaceable procedure for the hearing and decision
of issues capable of being settled on principles of law and
of issues that may not be so settled. It does not attempt
to enforce the decisions. The aim of the League is, by
elucidation of the facts and arguments on both sides of the
issue and by a decision of it by an impartial tribunal, to
practice nations in the art of settling irritating questions by
judicial investigation and conclusion. The example of our
relations with Canada and the constant use of arbitration to
settle our difficulties — which has become a habit — offer a
precedent from which we believe that, when such a proced-
ure is enforced, it will train all nations to adopt it rather
than to resort to war. . . . The force of the world is to be
used to compel nations to adopt this procedure before resort-
ing to hostilities. ... A pacifist who will admit a police-
man to be a proper official in the community yields the whole
case against the creation of an international police force in
our League.

Mr. Bryan attempts to meet this argument by saying that
the analogy is misleading and uses these words :

" The nations cannot, in fairness, be likened to criminals,
although we often describe their public acts as criminal, especially
in time of war. The criminal is one who intentionally violates
a law duly enacted by those having authority to make laws. He
disregards an obligation confessedly binding upon him; and the

WORLD PEACE DEBATE 1 25

policeman, acting for the outraged community, arrests the guilty
party and brings him before the bar of justice. There is no in-
ternational law-making power; and, if such a law-making power
existed, there are certain questions upon which it would not as-
sume to act — certain questions upon which each nation, whether
large or small, is conceded the right to decide for itself without
regard to the views or interests of other nations. Our arbitra^
tion treaties, the most advanced in the world, contain excep-
tions, questions of honor, questions of independence, vital in-
terests and the interests of third parties. These questions are
not to be submitted to arbitration; and yet these are the very
questions out of which wars grow."

Of all men in the world, Mr. Bryan, by reason of his
general views, is the one least entitled to put forth these
reasons in order to escape the analogy of state police. No
one has spoken more eloquently against war as a crime than
Mr. Bryan. No one has upheld more fully international
law as a binding force upon the nations. International law
is the law of nations agreed to between the nations and
deriving its sanction from their general acquiescence. A
nation which violates international law is a criminal before
the bar. The exceptions from our existing treaties of arbi-
tration of questions of vital interest and national honor, to
which Mr. Bryan refers, were exceptions which were not
recognized in the unratified general arbitration treaties made
with France and Great Britain which Mr. Bryan approved
and to which he gave effective support. More than that,
the Senate itself did not seek, in its proposed amendments,
to except questions of honor and vital interest from arbitra-
tion. Mr. Bryan's distinction is a forced one and has no
foundation, certainly as applied to the plan of the League
to Enforce Peace. The treaty forming the League is an
agreement by all nations to comply with its stipulations and

126 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

not only to comply with its stipulations, but, in case of non-
compliance by any member, to contribute their quotas to an
international police to restrain and punish that member for
non-compliance. In other words, it furnishes an interna-
tional constitution. It creates an international law and
denounces as a crime violation of the legal obligations into
which the nations voluntarily enter. The very object of
the League is to organize the world politically; and that
means to enact law and to provide for its enforcement
I submit that the analogy of the state police is not only a fair
one but a clinching and convincing one in showing the funda-
mental fallacy and error of those who have the international
pacifist views of Mr. Bryan and still are in favor of a state
and city police.

That the League is practical may be inferred from the
approval which its general principles have received from the
leading statesmen of the Great Powers in answer to direct
questions upon the subject, and also in official expression
in the correspondence between President Wilson and the
belligerent Powers engaged in the present war. It is prac-
tical because there is precedent for every detail in the League,
and because it embodies the elemental principle of govern-
ment: as it should be in city, state, and nation and in the
world: to wit, the organization of the force of all to sup-
press lawless force of the few. The lines upon which the
League has been framed are very general ; the plan is only
a working hypothesis. That it may be changed in inter-
national conference in detail goes without saying. But that
it furnishes a broad and correct foundation for the political
organization of the world, as Kant foresaw it, I submit, is
clear.
The United States should enter the League ; first, because

WORLD PEACE DEBATE 12J

of all nations in the world, it wishes to avoid war and to
make it as remote as possible ; second, because its interests
have now become so world-wide and it has become so close
a neighbor of all the Great Powers of Europe and of Asia
that a general war must involve the United States. It is
therefore of the highest importance to the United States,
viewed from the standpoint of self-interest, to secure the
joint effort of the world to prevent such a war or to confine
it to a local struggle. The present difficulty with Germany is
a most striking demonstration of the danger in which the
United States will be involved in every general war in the
future, struggle as it may to escape being drawn in.
.. ••••••

Nor does the League involve the delegation to an inter-
national council, in which the United States has but one
vote, of the power to hurry this country into war. The
President and the Senate sign the treaty of the League and
bind the United States to its obligations. Congress is the
authority which will decide whether the fact exists, calling
for action by the United States, and then will take such
action as the obligation requires. Should the purpose of
the International Police under the League be perverted to
anything other than enforcing the peaceable procedure in the
settlement of international controversies. Congress will have
full power to withdraw the United States forces and decline
further to take part in the proceedings.

..■*.•.•

With the blessings which God has showered on this
country, it should not hesitate to help the world and the
family of nations to protect itself against the recurrence of
such an awful disaster and retrograde movement in Christian
civilization as the present war.

128 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Since this discussion began, and indeed since the tenth
paper was written, the plot of the world drama now being
enacted has developed with startling rapidity. Even as we
have been arguing, a World League to Enforce Peace has
been formed; and the United States has taken its proper
place therein. The absolutism of Russia has toppled over
in the twinkling of an eye ; and the Russia people have taken
charge. Germany, in a ruthless disregard of the rights of
American citizens, has forced the United States, as a self-
respecting nation, to take up the sword against her. The
United States is thus driven into an alHance with the Entente
Allies. The democracies of Russia, Italy, France, England
and the United States are now engaged in a death struggle
with the dynasties of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs
to end the only substantial military absolutism remaining in
the world. Military dynasties are a threat against the peace
of the world. With their lust for power and the selfish
considerations that affect their policies, their respect for the
solemn obligations of a treaty are much less than that of
democracies. Democracies are not perfect in their sense of
justice, in the certainty of peaceful policies, nor in their exact
observance of treaty obligations; but they are a vast im-
provement in these respects over an autocracy dependent on
military force.

The Prussian autocracy of Germany is the great interna-
tional criminal. It has sacrificed honor; it has murdered
men and women and has, in numberless ways, violated with
ruthless cruelty the principles of international law to accom-
plish its dynastic purposes. It has dragged its allies with
it, and made them participes criminis. The League of the

WORLD PEACE DEBATE 1 29

United States and the Entente Allies, and the Central and
South American countries that may join us, is an organiza-
tion of world power to visit destruction on the dynasties
whose continued existence constitutes an obstruction to Law
and Peace. We are properly separating the Hohenzollems
and the Hapsburgs, from the great German people and the
great people of the Dual Monarchy. If we succeed, as we
must, the war, dreadful as it has been in the losses and suf-
fering it has entailed, painful and destructive as it is likely
to be, will be worth all it cost. It will make the future of
the world depend upon the rule of the peoples of the world,
will exalt the reign of international justice, and will organize
the joint forces of the world to maintain it. With the Ger-
man and the Austrian and Hungarian peoples on the one
hand, and the American, English, French, Italian and
Russian peoples on the other, in an international conference,
none will hesitate to enter a League to Enforce Peace. The
popular character of all the governments, in and of itself,
will render war between them less probable, will give greater
sanction to their promises, and will make more practical and
less burdensome a League having for its purpose compulsory
procedure for the settlement of irritating international dis-
putes.

" Whom the gods wish to destroy they first make mad."
The people of the United States, immersed in business,
lethargic with prosperity, naturally averse to war and its new
horrors as shown in the present struggle, have been loath
to take up the sword. They have made every honorable
effort to keep out of the vortex. But Germany, in her mad
desperation and with a lack of foresight that has charac-
terized all her diplomatic policies, has forced an unwilling
people to join the league of her opponents. The triumph

130 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

of Democracy in Russia and the entry of the United States
into the war make clear to the world and to history that this
is a war for the benefit of mankind.

The rulers of Germany have undervalued the power of
the United States. They have made military efficiency their
national god. A country which has, up to this time, ignored
military science, and failed to maintain a trained army,
arouses in them contempt. In their mad rage at England
and in their desire to starve her people, they have stupidly
aroused against themselves the only dangerous antagonist
remaining. When money and food and supplies are more
clearly the determining factor in the war than ever before,
they deliberately make an enemy of the country which has
greater capacity to furnish them than all other countries
combined. The military unpreparedness of the United
States blinds them to the enormous advantage which her
accession to the ranks of their opponents gives in the test
of endurance which must decide the struggle. Within a
month after her declaration of war, the United States will
place at the disposal of her allies the enormous sum of three
billions of dollars to replenish their depleted treasuries and
to strengthen the effectiveness of their serried hosts. Her
resources in the production of food and war supplies are
being promptly organized so that the energies of this country
will be directed to feeding the peoples of her allies and sup-
porting and maintaining the equipment of their armies.
The skill and courage of her navy, with the ingenuity of her
inventors, will be directed to the suppression of the sole hope
of the Prussian military hierarchy, their cruel, lawless and
murderous submarine.

The broad conception of the world-cause for which the
United States is fighting will send the blood tingling through

WORLD PEACE DEBATE I31

her giant limbs and awaken in her that moral strength which
the Hohenzollem in his plan to conquer the world has con-
sistently ignored.

The struggle may be a long one. We do not aid our
cause by under-estimating the power of our enemy or the
perfection attained by her in the organization and use of
physical and material resources, and of a people educated
and moulded to the needs of a military autocracy. We hope
the contest may end in a year. It may last double that or
longer; but however long it lasts, the end is not in doubt.
We were slow in getting in. We will never quit until our
high purpose is attained; and the cause of Democracy is
triumphant. We should not rely on the pleasing hope that
our losses will chiefly be in money. We should organize our
efforts and make our plans with the stem thought that many
of our best lives and the flower of our youth will figure
largely in the cost of our victory ; but the greatness of our
cause should reconcile us to every sacrifice. When we, by
our intervention, shall have contributed largely to the vic-
tory, when our real enemies shall have disappeared in the
deposition of the HohenzoUems and the Hapsburgs, the
influence for good that we, without motive of aggrandize-
ment, without hope or wish to increase our territory or
power, can wield in the councils of the world will be com-
manding and will make for a just peace and a world league
to maintain it.

" God works in mysterious ways his wonders to perform."
It would seem that there was now being disclosed the
providential plan for securing the future peace of the world.
Everything that has happened is forcing on the adoption of
a League to Enforce Peace. Events are shaping themselves
so that when the Congress of Nations meets, after the end

132 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

shall have come, the League will be as natural a result as
peace itself. How futile in the face of the facts of to-day
seem the arguments that we must preserve our isolation and
avoid entangling alliances! How inapplicable Washing-
ton's words, wise when uttered, become to the needs and
policy of the present! The League to Enforce Peace is
formed ; and we have joined it. On its success and perma-
nence depends the future peace of the sons of men.

VICTORY WITH POWER ^

No one in the wildest flight of his imagination now can
think of undefeated Germany yielding either proper in-
demnity to Belgium or justice to Alsace-Lorraine, each of
which Great Britain and the United States have made a sine
qua non. Nor will the unconquered German ruling dass
consent to lift the German paw and remove its crushing
weight from prostrate Russia or give over to decent rule the
blood-stained Christian provinces of Turkey. If the wrongs
of Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, and of Russians, Italians,
Poles, Armenians, Serbians and other Slav peoples are not
righted, the sacrifices of the war will have been for naught.
We must, therefore, conquer the Germans if a just and lasting
peace is to be secured. Therefore, the slogan of the Allies,
and the cry of this country must be " Victory with Power."
• •••■•■•

Our Society was organized to make this war an instru-
ment for the promotion of peace. It holds that the horrors
of the war and the awful misery it involves must make the

^Extracts from an address before League to Enforce Peace Con-
vention, Phila., May, 1918.

OUR PURPOSE 133

nations bind themselves to a common obligation for the
future to suppress war. We call for a primitive political
organization of the world, affording judicial and mediating
agencies and an international police to stamp out the begin-
nings of every riot of world violence. A member of the
family of nations which looks upon war as a normal means
of acquiring power and a justifiable condition of growth
destroys hope for the future. Such member must be
whipped into a different view and into conformity with the
public opinion of the world. Nothing but force can cure
the brutality and ruthlessness of force. In such a case the
maxim, " Similia similibus curantur" has full application.
The peaceful countries of the world are obliged to assume
the habits and the panoply of war. When they, in spite of
their lack of preparation, in spite of their peace-loving
instincts, shall strike down in battle a people that makes war
its god, the cure of that people will be complete, the scales
will fall from their eyes, and with a clear vision they will
see that he whom they have ignorantly worshipped is the
devil and not God. Until so cured, the Central Powers can
never be amenable and law-abiding members of a peaceful
world community.

OUR PURPOSE ^

We are in the war first of all to make the world safer
and a better place to live in. We are fighting to bring about
a lasting peace. There was a time when many cherished
the hope that such a peace could be established by the moral

^ Newspaper article, June 30, 1918.

134 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

force of public opinion. Now we know that peace has a
more terrible price, and we are ready to pay the price.

We have had nothing to do with the politics of Europe;
but this war is not a matter of European politics. It is
world politics; and we announced ourselves as citizens of
the world when we declared war against Germany. World
politics, after all, are only fundamental questions of right
and wrong. We are for the right against the wrong.

We are fighting to make it impossible for military autoc-
racy ever again to endanger the peace of the world. Re-
publics make mistakes, but this war has proved that they are
slow to fight.

One thing this war will accomplish: when it is over we
shall hear no more talk about the advantages of national
isolation. In taking our place among the nations we have
come with an international policy already prepared and we
have made it clear to the world that the success of this policy
is our main purpose. We are fighting, as our President has
put it, " to make the world safe for democracy."

We have not tried to set a price upon our participation in
the war. We have made no bargain. Europe knows our
purpose. When the war is over we expect to cast our vote
at the peace council for what the President called " such
cooperation of force among the great nations as may be
necessary to maintain peace and freedom throughout the
world."

The war has demonstrated the weakness of international
law unsupported by force. Such support can be furnished
by a system of international police.

........

I do not pretend to know just what our views will be

OUR PURPOSE 135

when the war is over. Nobody realized where the Spanish
war would carry us. We went into it in Cuba and came
out in the Philippines. But this is how the thing looks now.
The policy and the purpose I have explained are so broad
and their application so universal that it is difficult to see
how any event can change them.

In principle this policy and purpose have been endorsed
by many of the leading European statesmen who may sit at
the peace cotmcil beside the delegates from this side of the
Atlantic. In his speech before the United States Senate,
M. Viviani, the former premier of France and head of the
French mission, said :

" Together we will carry on that struggle ; and when by
force we have at last imposed military victory, our labors
will not be concluded. Our task will be — I quote the noble
words of President Wilson — to organize the society of
nations. . . . We will shatter the ponderous sword of mili-
tarism; we will establish guarantees of peace; and then we
can disappear from the world's stage, since we shall leave
at the cost of our common immolation the noblest heritage
future generations can possess."

.■•..*••

And Russia has joined the consensus of the enlightened
nations with this declaration by Prof. Milyukoff, first
Foreign Minister of the young Republic :

" The definition by President Wilson of the purposes of
the war corresponds entirely with the declarations of the
statesmen of the allied powers: M. Briand, Mr. Asquith
and Viscount Grey all expressed themselves continually on
the necessity of seeking to prevent conflicts of armed forces
by providing peaceful methods of solution for international
disputes and creating a new organization of nations based

136 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

upon order and justice in international life. The democracy
of free Russia is able to associate itself completely with these
declarations."

Our allies have accepted the definition of the high purpose
of the war as it came to them from this side of the Atlantic.
Now let us show them that we can wage war as well as
analyze and define it.

SELF DETERMINATION *

The task of the League of Nations called to decide the
terms of peace will be as huge as that of the war which the
peace will end. The issues as to Alsace-Lorraine, the
Trentino and Trieste will be simple as compared with the
Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav questions. The restrictions
of the Turkish domain, the protection and freedom of
Armenia, the Balkan boundaries and the government of
Albania will try the ingenuity of statesmen in working out
a just result. Above all in difficulty will be the settlement
of the questions as to Russia. Shall it be a confederation of
States like ours, or shall they be independent? Who shall
determine this?

" Let the people themselves decide," it is said. Every one
agrees that this general rule should prevail in post-war
arrangements. But how large or how small shall the unit
of a people for such decision be ? Shall units be racial or
geographical? Suppose a people as small in number as the
Belfast Orangemen compared with the whole population of
Ireland insists on a separate government, though geography,

1 Philadelphia Public Ledger Oct. 3, 1918.

SELF DETERMINATION 1 37

trade conditions and every consideration but religious differ-
ence and tradition require that the whole island be under one
Government ?

It becomes apparent at once that the general principle of
popular rule is not a panacea and that many issues will have
to be settled by the Congress of Nations, according to ex-
pedient and practical justice, over the objection of some part
of the people affected. The result will illustrate the in-
herent error in the frequent assumption that a Government
by the people is a Government in which that which is done
is the will of each one. A practical Government by the
people is a Government by a majority of the voters. The
rest of the people must yield their will to the will of this
majority. However, in the purest democracy, the voters
are not a half of the population, and the prevailing majority
is usually not more than 20 per cent, of all. The guide of
the popular will is still less helpful when the issue is the fix-
ing of the proper self-governing unit. In the intoxicating
fumes of a new freedom, municipal Councils in Russia de-
clared themselves independent governments. Should Lithu-
ania, Esthonia, the Ukraine and Great Russia be separate
entities ? This cannot be certainly and properly determined
by a plebiscite of the population of the particular district, if
its relation to the neighboring communities or to Russia
as a whole make it best for all concerned that they be united.
More than this, an ignorant people without the slightest
experience in the restraints necessary in successful self-
government and subject to the wildest imaginings under the
insidious demagoguery of venal leaders may well not know
what is best for them.

Thus, flowing phrases as to liberty and the rule of the
people do not offer a complete solution for all the problems

138 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

which the world's peacemakers will face. Still, if we can
make the adjustment to depend on just provision for the
welfare of the peoples affected instead of on the greed of
the parties, we shall secure an enormous advance over past
international settlements.

PERIL IN HUN PEACE OFFER *

The European situation is working out exactly as one
might have anticipated. Indeed, when we read the resolu-
tions of the League to Enforce Peace, adopted in the con-
vention which the League held in this city in May, their
language is like a prophecy. The league in its platform
said: —

" Apprehensive of the lure of an inconclusive peace, which
would enable the present masters of Germany to continue
their dominion of Central Europe and sooner or later again
to menace the peace and freedom of the world, the league
feels that our people should be forewarned in case Germany
should propose to make peace on terms that might well
deceive the unsuspecting. Suppose she should offer to retire
from Belgitun and France; to cede the Trentino to Italy;
even to relinquish all claims to her captured colonies and to
promise some kind of antonomy to the various races of
Central and Eastern Europe. Such an offer would be highly
seductive, and if we are not prepared to understand what it
means might well beguile the Allies into a peace which would
be inconclusive, because unless the principle of militarism is
destroyed the promise would be kept no better than those

^ Philadelphia Public Ledger Oct. 8^ 1918.

PERIL IN HUN PEACE OFFER 1 39

broken in the past. Autonomy of the other races would
mean their organization for the strengthening of Germany
until she had control of the resources of 200,000,000 for her
next war. . . . Such a settlement would be a mere truce
pending a strife more fierce hereafter. So long as pre-
datory militarism is not wholly destroyed no lasting peace
can be made."

Germany now proposes an armistice in order to enable
the representatives of the Central Powers and the Allies to
negotiate a peace on the general basis of peace indicated by
President Wilson in his address to Congress on January 8,
19 1 8. This does not really commit Germany to anything
except that she is willing to talk about the subject matter
covered in the fourteen points by President Wilson in that
address. It involves an interminable discussion of what his
fourteen points mean and include. That address was made
nearly nine months ago. It was made before the Czecho-
slovak and Jugoslav movements had crystal ized into a de-
mand for independent governments. The President in his
reference to a settlement of an Austrian peace asked for ' the
freest opportunity for autonomous development.' Austria
evidently looks to a confederation under the dual monarchy.
We have now gone further as to the Czecho-Slavs and
recognized their independence. The message of January 8
was made before the full revelations as to Germany's poli-
cies in respect to Russian and the Baltic provinces, which
reek with bad faith, cruelty and a murderous plotting
with the insane Bolsheviki against the decent people of
Russia.

The President's fourteen points are stated in general
words, the only ones which he could use at such a time.
They are not stated in the specific terms upon which a treaty
of peace could be formulated or upon which any offer of the

I40 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Germans could be accepted. The Germans do not agree to
submit to the terms stated by the President, general as they
are. All they agree to is to negotiate after an armistice, a
treaty " on the basis " of the President's address. Nothing
could be more unsatisfactory and uncertain.

The attitude of the German Kaiser is important only as it
shows the iron ring closing about him. He sees the hand-
writing on the wall, and he struggles in a peace offensive for
a halt which shall enable him to rehabilitate his forces.
Then, if he does not secure peace, with the Hohenzollem
dynasty still in the saddle, he can resist with a rested army
to the last. He sets his snare in the sight of the bird. His
offer should be rejected with the same curt rejoinder as that
which met the Austrian approach. We, of course, should
not deceive ourselves. A prompt and decided refusal on
our part to accept this offer of the Kaiser will be used by
him to arouse his people to further resistance. This is the
great alternative object which he has in mind. He will say
that this refusal indicates that the Allies seek to annihilate
the German people. He hopes that this will stiffen all his
subjects to further effort. In his dire extremity he has
called on the most peaceful and the most liberal of the promi-
nent political personages in his empire.

But this personage is a cousin of the Emperor, is a
Hohenzollern and would, of course, maintain the dynasty.
His speech reads well, but we who have at hand the damning
evidence of the militaristic treachery and the wicked ambi-
tion of the Kaiser and his crew know that the Prince is but
a pawn advanced now for the single purpose of securing a
negotiated peace. The Prince will not sit at the council
table to carry out his own ideas. Surrounding him and at
his back will be the Kaiser, Hindenburg, Ludendorff and the

THE OBUGATIONS OF VICTORY I4I

Crown Prince, the leaders of Junkerdom, ready to refuse
any terms in the treaty which will hamstring the dynasty or
prevent the possibility of the resurrection of the German
army and a future renewal of the Potsdam conspiracy.

We should read the spirit of the Kaiser's offer in the light
of burning Douai and the cruel looting and devastation of
Belgium and Northern France. He says he will consent
only to " an honorable peace." What does that mean? It
means a settlement which assures for the German High
Command and the Kaiser the position of honorable and
trustworthy foes. This, in view of their conduct, is im-
possible if we are to achieve what this war is fought for.
The Kaiser's offer should be sternly rejected and he and
Austria should be advised that in the present situation we
can have no armistice and no negotiation except upon the
same terms as those which were meted out to Bulgaria.
Any other resul? will be a profound disappointment to the
American people and our allies.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY »

The international compact which is to follow this war
is to be more ambitious than any ever made before. The
world is larger, the nations are more numerous, the field of
war has been greater, and the political changes are to be
far more extensive than the world has ever known.

The only peace comparable with this is that which was
made after Napoleon's fall by the monarchs who constituted

^Address delivered at Convention of the League to Enforce Peace,
Madison, Wisconsin, under the auspices of the University of Wisconsin,
November 9, 1918.

142 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

the Holy Alliance. That was a League of Nations, with a
high sounding declaration of disinterestedness and love of
peace. It was a failure because the real purposes which
governed its formation and life were wrong and unstable.
It rested on the divine right of kings, and its objects were
to recognize dynastic claims and to establish and maintain
them. It took into consideration neither the interest nor
the will of the peoples under the governments which it was
setting up and proposed to maintain. After a few years it
became a by-word of reproach.

The difference between the Holy Alliance and the League
of Nations we now propose is in the purpose and principle
of its formation. Our League looks to a union of the
democratic nations of the world, to the will of the peoples,
expressed through their governments, as its basis and
sanction. It looks to the establishment of new governments
by popular choice and control. It is to be founded on jus-
tice, impartially administered, and not on the interests of
kings or emperors or dynasties. It is to rise as a structure
built upon the ashes of militarism, and it is to rest on the
pillars of justice and equality and the welfare of peoples.

I have referred to the Holy Alliance not only to answer
an argument, but also as a precedent to prove that a treaty
of peace rearranging the map of Europe can not be made
without a League of Nations. Think of what this present
peace has to compass. We can realize it by considering the
points of President Wilson's message of January 8th, out-
lining the terms of the future peace.

In the first place, we are to have disposition of the German
colonies in accord with the interests of the people who live
in them. Germany has made such cruel despotisms of her
colonies that it is quite likely the Allies will insist that they

THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY 1 43

shall be put under some other power more to be trusted in
securing the welfare of backward peoples. Thus we are to
set up a new government in East and West Africa, in
Australasia, in China, and in some of the islands of the
Pacific. Then we are to deal with Russia. If we separate
from her the Ukraine, and the Baltic Provinces and Finland,
there are three or four new nations to establish. Great
Russia is now under the domination of bloody anarchists,
and we must free her and give to her good people the oppor-
tunity to organize and establish a free and useful govern-
ment. This is a problem of the utmost complexity. In
Austria we are to create a nation of the Czecho-Slavs, em-
bracing Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. We are to cut
this nation out of the Dual Empire, and take it from Austria
and from Hungary. We are to do the same thing with the
Jugo-Slavs on the south of Austria and Hungary and
establish new boundaries there. We are to settle the bound-
aries of the Balkans. We are likely to give to Rumania
the Rumanians of Hungary and of Bessarabia. We are to
establish a new state of Poland out of Russian, Austrian and
German Poland, and we are to give this state access to the
sea. The fixing of these boundaries and the determination
of the method of reaching the sea present issues of the
utmost delicacy and difficulty. We are to determine the
status of Constantinople and the small tract now known as
Turkey in Europe. We are to fix the limits of Turkey in
Asia, to set up a new government in Palestine, to recognize
a new government of Arabia, to father, it may be, the
creation of a new state in the Caucasus and to establish the
freedom of Armenia.

The mere recital of them is most convincing of the
intricacy of these problems. The Congress of Nations will

144 'TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

probably find it impossible definitely to settle them all. It
will have to create Commissions, with judicial and concilia-
tory powers, able to devote time enough to make proper in-
vestigation and thus to reach just, defensible and practical
conclusions. When the boundaries are all fixed, when the
innumerable rights growing out of access to the Baltic,
access to the Danube, access to the Black Sea and access to
the Aegean, together wtih rights of way across neighboring
states for freedom of trade, are defined, with as much clarity
as possible, there still will arise, in the practical operation
of the treaty, a multitude of irritating questions of interpre-
tation. In fixing boundaries on distinctions of race and
language, the Congress will encounter the obstruction of
racial prejudice and blindness to reasonable conclusions.
Lines of race and of language are not always so clearly
drawn that convenient and compact states may be estab-
lished within them. To attempt in a great world-agree-
ment to settle the boundaries and mutual rights of so many
new nations, without providing a tribunal whose decisions
are to control and are to be enforced by the major force of
the world, will be to make a treaty that will become a laugh-
ing stock.

We know that we have got to rearrange the map of
Europe, and, in so far as it is practicable in that arrange-
ment, to follow popular choice of the peoples to be governed.
But such a flowing phrase will not settle the difficulty. It is
merely a general principle that in its actual application often
does not offer a completely satisfactory solution ; and after
the Congress shall have made the decisions, sore places will
be left, local enmities will arise, and if that permanent peace
which is to justify the war is to be attained, the world com-
pact must Itself contain the machinery for settlement of such

THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY 1 45

inevitable disputes. In other words, we do not have to
argue in favor of a League to Enforce Peace — the nations
which enter this Congress can not do otherwise than establish
it. It faces them as the only possible way to achieve their
object.

Germany and Austria and Bulgaria and Turkey are to
indemnify the countries which they have outraged and de-
vastated. Commissions must be created, judicial in their
nature, to pass upon what the amount of the indemnity shall
be, and then an international force must exist to levy execu-
tion if necessary for the judgment upon the countries whose
criminal torts are to be indemnified. We must, therefore,
not only have, as a result of the Congress, the machinery of
justice and conciliation, but we must retain a combined mili-
tary force of the Allies and victors to see to it that these
just judgments are carried out. Moreover, the Congress
can not meet without enlarging the scope of international
law and making more definite its provisions. The very
functions which the Congress is to exercise in fixing the
terms of peace will necessitate a statement of the principles
upon which it has been guided. That will lead to a broaden-
ing of the scope of existing principles of international law
and a greater variety in their applications. Therefore,
whether those who are in the Congress wish it or not, they
can not solve the problems which are set before them with-
out adopting the principles of our League to Enforce Peace
as embodied in the four planks of our original platform —
Court, Commission of Conciliation, enforcement of submis-
sion and a Legislative International Congress to make Inter-
national Law. They will have to create such machinery for
the administration and enforcement of the treaty as to the
Central Powers, the new nations created and Russia.

146 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Having gone so far as they must, can they fail to extend
their work only a little to include the settlement of all future
differences between all the nations that are parties to the
League? A League for such future purposes will be no
more difficult to make and maintain than the temporary
League into which they are driven by the necessities of the
situation.

Now I want to take up some of the arguments made
against the League. In the first place, a good many have
created a straw League which they have knocked down with-
out difficulty. They have attributed to us the views and
principles held by extremists who perhaps support our
League, but whose extreme views we do not and need not
adopt. Thus it is said that we favor internationalism, that
we are opposed to nationalism, that we wish to dilute the
patriotic spirit into a vague universal brotherhood. That
there are socialists and others who entertain this view, and
who perhaps support the League to Enforce Peace, may be
true ; but the assumption that such views are necessary to a
consistent support of the League is entirely without war-
rant. I believe in nationalism and patriotism, as dis-
tinguished from universal brotherhood as firmly as any one
can. I believe that the national spirit and the patriotic love
of country are as essential in the progress of the world as
the family and the love of family are essential in domestic
communities. But as the family and the love of family are
not inconsistent with the love of country, but only strengthen
it, so a proper, pure and patriotic nationalism stimulates a
sense of international justice and does not detract in any
way from the spirit of universal brotherhood.

Again, it is said that in the League we injure nationalism
by abridging the sovereignty of our country in that we are

THE OBUGATIONS OF VICTORY 1 47

to yield to an international council and an international
tribunal, in which we have only one representative, the de-
cisions of questions of justice and of national policy. *

^ Mr. Taft has expressed himself elsewhere on this topic as fol-
lows:

" Certainly we do not wish to contend for a sovereignty that shall not
be limited by international law. That law should prevail in a decent
community of nations — I mean the law of good form, the law of uni-
versal brotherhood, the law of neighborly feeling, which is over and
above the absolute rules of international law. All that this League
proposes is that every nation shall enjoy complete sovereignty within
the limitations of that international law and that good form among
nations.

"What is this League of Nations to do to uphold that sovereignty?
It agrees to give sanction to law that regulates sovereignty. That
sovereignty, regulated by law, is to be clinched through the organized
action of all the nations of the world.

"Any other view, any objection to that view, savors of what? It
savors of the desire to use the sovereignty of our nation to achieve
purposes that will be defeated by the restraints which the League
offers. That is what it means. It is the German idea of sovereignty ^-
the power to use that sovereignty to achieve your purpose even when
that purpose transgresses international law or moral law." — The
Atlantic Congress for a League of Nations, New York, Feb. 5, 1919,

"To recur again to the objections which run as a thread through all
of Senator Poindexter's attacks upon the constitution of the League,
namely, that the League minimizes the sovereignty of the United States
and of every nation which joins it, there is a misconception in the
mind of the Senator as to sovereignty that needs to be pointed out
No reasonable and patriotic and properly self-respecting citizen of the
United States can claim that our sovereignty should be more than a
right to freedom of action within the limitations of international law,
international morality, and a due regard for the rights of other nations.
The only sovereignty which we ought to claim is sovereignty regulated
by these limitations. It is exactly analogous to the liberty that we enjoy
as individuals, which is liberty curtailed and regulated by law in order
that other citizens may enjoy the same liberty. It is an exercise of
rights on my part consistent with the exercise of the same rights on
the part of every other man. It is not complete liberty of action.
Proper national sovereignty is similarly restricted. Now the League
does not proceed to restrict that sovereignty further than, through the

148 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Sovereignty is a matter of definition. The League does not
contemplate the slightest interference with the internal
government of any country. The League does not propose
to interfere, except where the claims of right of one country

joint compulsion of all nations, to keep a would-be outlaw nation
within the proper existing limitation.

** The League is not a super-sovereign. It is only a partnership. Its
power is in only a partnership. Its power is in joint agreement — not
in the establishment of government. The Senator's objection is funda-
mental. If it were analyzed and logically developed it would be seen
to be a reactionary doctrine that belongs to the German view of the
state and its needs and rights. It is not consonant with any hope of
settling international differences other than by the power of the sword.
It leads directly to the proposal that ' might makes right.' It is based
on a doctrine of supreme national selfishness. It is the pessimistic and
despairing view of any* possibility of restricting war. It contemplates
with entire complacence the prospect of another war in ten or twenty
years like that through which we have passed. It perverts the glorious
idea of a national sovereignty and prevents its aiding the family of
nations. It perverts our grand federal constitution rendering helpless
— so far as aiding the outside world is concerned — a nation which,
under the providence of God, has become the world's greatest Power.

*' Will the American people acquiesce in such a small view of our
responsibilities toward mankind and of our governmental capacity to
be helpful ? We may be confident they will not." — Address at Portland,
Oregon, Feb, 16, igig,

"And then 'sovereignty' — what is sovereignty? Well, I can give
you the German view and I can give you the American view. The Ger-
man view is that sovereignty is the power to overcome the sovereignty
of other nations by force. That is all. What is the American idea
of sovereignty? It is a sovereignty regulated by international law and
international morality and international decency and international
neighborly feeling. Do we wish any sovereignty greater than that?
Sovereignty is analogous to the liberty of the individual. The latter is
liberty regulated by law which protects that liberty: and sovereignty
is the same thing applied to nations. We do not change that in this
League of Nations. All we do is to furnish the means of determining
peaceably and justly what those limitations are, and provide the means
of maintaining them. Does that deprive us of any sovereignty?" — Ad-
dress at San Francisco, Feb. 19, igig.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY I49

clash with the claims of right of another. To submit such
claims of right to an impartial tribunal no more interferes
with the sovereignty of a nation than the submission of an
individual to a hearing and decree of court interferes with
his liberty. The League is merely introducing, into the
world's sphere, liberty of action regulated by law instead of
license uncontrolled except by the greed and passion of the
individual nation.

It is said that we are giving up our right to make war or
to withhold from making it. We can not take away from
our Congress the right to declare war, and no one would
wish to do so. But that is no reason why we should not
enter into an agreement to defend the impartial judgments
of the League and to repress palpable violations of its
covenants by those who have entered it. The question must
always be for the decision of Congress whether our obliga-
tions under the League require us in honor to make war.
We have guaranteed the integrity of Cuba, we have guar-
anteed the integrity of Panama. Does that deprive us of
sovereignty ? Yet we are under an obligation to make war
if another country attacks them.

The fourth of the President's fourteen points contains
the provision that adequate guaranties must be given and
taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest
point consistent with domestic safety. That can not be
done immediately. It represents an aim and an aspiration.
We are the victors in this war which grew out of the exten-
sive armament and military power of Germany. It will be
a legitimate condition of peace exacted by the victors that
Germany shall substantially disarm and leave the Allied
Powers in a position with armament sufficient to keep
Germany within law and right. How far disarmament can

150 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

be carried must be determined by experience. Disarma-
ment will be accomplished effectively in great measure by
the economic pressure that will be felt intensely by all nations
after this war, by such mutual covenants and general super-
vision of an international council as experience may dictate,
and ultimately by a sense of security in the successful opera-
tion of this League to Enforce Peace.

For the time being the people who are afraid that the
United States will make itself helpless to defend its rights
against unjust aggression are unduly exercised. Any prac-
tical League of Nations will require the United States to
maintain a potential military force sufficient to comply
promptly with its obligations to contribute to an interna-
tional army whenever called upon for League purposes.
Such obligation may well be made the basis and reason for
universal training of youth, in accord with the Australian
or the Swiss system — a system that trains youths for a
year physically and mentally and gives them a proper sense
of duty and obligation to the state. There may be a differ-
ence of opinion as to whether we should have such a system ;
but there is nothing in the League to Enforce Peace and its
principles which prevents its adoption; and either that or
some other means of maintaining an adequate force to dis-
charge our obligations under a League must be found.
While we should lay broad the foundations for a League
looking as far into the future as we may, we must trust to
the future to work out the application of those principles,
to amend the details of our machinery and to adapt it to
the lessons of experience. We know that the real hope of
reducing armament and keeping it down is the maintenance
of a League which shall insure justice and apply in its aid the
major force of the world. As the operation of that League

THE OBLIGATIONS OF VICTORY I5I

IS more and more acquiesced in, the possibility of the safe
reduction of armaments in all countries will become apparent
to all and will be realized.

Another question that has agitated a good many people
is whether we should admit Germany to the League. That
depends upon whether Germany makes herself fit for mem-
bership in the League. If she gets rid of the Hohenzollerns,
if she establishes a real popular government, if she shows by
her national policies that she has acted on the lessons which
the war should teach her, in short if she brings forth works
meet for repentance, then of course we ought to admit her
and encourage her by putting her on an equality with other
nations and use her influence and power to make the League
more effective. The long-drawn-out payment of indemni-
ties will keep her in a chastened mood and will keep alive
in her mind the evils of militarism.

I shall not now discuss the difference in the obligations of
the members of such a League as between the Great Powers
and the lesser Powers. All should have a voice in the gen-
eral policy of the League ; but it is well worthy of considera-
tion whether, with the burden of enforcing the obligations
of the League by military force which the greater Powers
must carry, they should not have the larger voice in executive
control. As they are the only ones likely to be able to
create the major force of the world, they may reasonably
claim a right to more administrative power. The rights of
the smaller nations will be protected in the Congress, in
which they have a full voice, and by the impartial judgments
of the judicial tribunals and the recommendations of the
Commission of Conciliation. There is not the slightest
likelihood that the mere executive control by the larger
Powers would lead to oppression of the smaller Powers be-

152 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

cause, should selfishness disclose itself in one of the Great
Powers, we could be confident of the wish of the other Great
Powers to repress it.

One of the difficulties in the maintenance of a League of
all nations will be the instability of the governments of its
members if the League embraces all nations. On the whole,
the Greater Powers are the more stable and the more respon-
sible. It is well therefore that upon them shall fall the chief
executive responsibility. While the principles of the
League would prevent interference with the internal govern-
ments as a general rule, the utter instability of a government
might authorize an attempt to stabilize it. That this can be
done better by a disinterested League than by a single nation
goes without saying.

The possibilities of many-sided world benefit from a
League after it is well established and is working smoothly,
it is hard to overestimate. For the present, as the result of
this Congress of Nations to meet and settle the terms of
peace, we may well be content to have a League established
on broad lines, with principles firmly and clearly stated, and
with constructive provisions for amendment as experience
shall indicate their necessity.

I verily believe we are in sight of the Promised Land. I
hope we may not be denied its enjoyment.

WORKINGMEN AND THE LEAGUE »

The pressing imminence of the issue of a League is not
as fully understood in this country as it is in Great Britain,

^ Extract from article in Public Ledger Nov. 13, 1918.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS OUR NATIONAL POLICY 1 53

in France and in Italy. The movement was initiated in the
United States in 1915 by the formation of the American
League to Enforce Peace; but the question then had more
or less of an academic aspect because of the remoteness of
peace, and, indeed, at that time, for us, the remoteness of
the war. Associations were subsequently formed in Great
Britain and in France. As the peoples of these countries
became war-weary, as the working population felt the suffer-
ing and dreadful pinch of starvation and want, their souls
were gripped with a determination to have no more war.
The subject was given world-wide attention through the
addresses of President Wilson. The Socialists had always
included the abolition of war as a fundamental plank in their
platform. While the great majority of the Socialists and
the workingmen in the allied countries admitted the necessity
of fighting this war through, they made a peremptory de-
mand for a League of Nations to Enforce Peace after this
war was over and after the unconditional surrender of mili-
tarism.

The League of Nations, therefore, in England, France
and Italy has become the slogan of workingmen and Social-
ists and they will brook no hesitation on this subject by the
representatives of their countries in the Peace Congress.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS OUR NATIONAL

POLICY ^

Speeches are made from time to time in the Senate on
the plan of a League of Nations to Enforce Peace. Sena-

^ Article in Public Ledger Dec i, 1918.

154 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

tors Poindexter and Reed have pronounced judgment upon
the plan as dangerous to the Republic and contrary to the
established traditions of the nation. With deference, this
judgment is not up to date. It fails to note that the war,
our participation and avowed purpose in it and the treaty
which is to end it have so changed our relation to Europe
and the world that such traditions have ceased to be
applicable. These traditions were shown to be outworn by
the fact that we could not keep out of the war. We were
driven into it because of our relations as close neighbors
to the European belligerents. Having been thus driven
into war, are we to make a separate peace with Germany,
merely securing a guaranty from her that in the future we
shall be immune, as a neutral, from submarine attack upon
our commerce? This would be the logical outcome of the
attitude of the opposing Senators. Are we not rather to
take part in framing the articles of a general treaty as to
Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, the Trentino, the Czecho-Slavs, the
Jugo-Slavs, Russia, Armenia and in respect to the numerous
other questions that must be constructively answered in the
treaty ?

Certainly the American people have no doubt that we are
to have a full share in the settlement of all these issues. No
other inference can be drawn from the messages of the Presi-
dent, acquiesced in by all. If we sit at the international
council table and make this general treaty, it is idle to talk
of our taking no further part in European world politics.
If we enter into this treaty rearranging the map of Europe
and the world in the interest of the rule of, by and for the
various peoples of the world, and to secure them the bless-
ings of permanent peace, we have got to see it through. We
can't make such a treaty and run away from it as our

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS OUR NATIONAL POLICY 155

abandoned child. We must share, with those with whom we
act in making it, the responsibility of securing and maintain-
ing its full and beneficent operation. If we make a treaty
to fill the outlines of President Wilson's message of January
8, as amended by the Allies, we shall have the job of its
execution lasting a number of years. It will not execute
itself.

• ••.■•••

We have put our hand to the plow and we cannot turn
back. The opposing Senators do not see the problems which
confront us.

.......a

The imagination of Senators has been strained to conceive
a situation in which the United States shall have had a judg-
ment against her, in the international court, of vital char-
acter which she resists, and the united military forces of the
world combine to destroy her. If the judgment against her
is just, she ought to obey it. If it is not, why assume that
it will be rendered at all or that, if rendered, all nations
would join in a world war to enforce it? Indeed, may not
our imagination, if we let it run riot, as easily conceive such
a union of military forces of the world against the United
States without a league and its machinery as with them ?

Thus far the opponents of the League on the Senate floor
have been from both parties. If President Wilson returns
to his first view of the need for such a League of Nations to
Enforce Peace and succeeds in securing the concurrence of
our European allies in this view, we may assume that the
Democratic party will support him in his policy. The
League of Nations to maintain peace will likewise have the
passionate support of all the peoples of our Allies and of
neutral nations. It will have the earnest support of organ-

156 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ized labor in this country. It will arouse the enthusiasm of
the peace-loving people of this country, who are vastly in
the majority. The Republican members of the Senate will
do well to consider whether it would be wise for them to
furnish to Mr. Wilson and the Democratic party an issue
upon which the Administration would be most likely to win,
and one which would dwarf all others upon which the
Republicans now base their hope of success. Of course,
this is no reason for yielding in the face of fundamental
principle, but it may well weigh heavily when objection to
the League is based on hypotheses, strained and improbable.

WHY A LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS NECESSARY *

My feeling about the League of Nations to Enforce Peace
is that the stars in their courses are fighting to make it inevit-
able.

• •••••••

We are in a League of Nations to Enforce Peace, we have
been enforcing peace, and we are in a place where we cannot
escape it.

We went into this war because we were driven into it.
We had to be driven because of the Washington policy and
entangling alliance doctrine ; and we stayed out of it a long
time after, as we look at it now, we ought to have gone in.
We were forced in to defend our rights on the seas. That
was why those men who feared entangling alliances were
willing to waive their objection or reached the conclusion

^ Address delivered at dinner of editors and publishers, in New York,
Dec. 6, 1918.

WHY A LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS NECESSARY 1 57

that we were not departing from that policy: our rights
on the seas had really been invaded by murderous submarine
attacks on neutral ships and on enemy merchant ships, bear-
ing our citizens. And they had a right, under international
law, to be there.

When we got into the war Mr. Wilson stated — and I
never heard any objection from anybody — that our pur-
pose in this war was to make the world safe for democracy.
Not the United States, the world. It was to suppress mili-
tarism. Where? Not in the United States. Not in
Europe. In the world. To say that we are not to take
our part in world politics is to ignore just exactly where
we are, what our position is — a position we cannot escape
from.

• ••.•••a

We have made an armistice, we have imposed terms on
Germany with respect to that armistice ; but we made that
armistice on a basis of a treaty which was to deal in a
general way with fields that were outlined in the message of
January 8, 191 8, as amended by the Allies before the armis-
tice was submitted to the Germans. One amendment refer-
red to the freedom of the seas, the Entente Allies reserving
the right to deal with that subject as they were advised.
The other concerned the meaning of the word " restoration,"
which was made entirely free from doubt with reference to
indemnities.

That is the basis of the treaty ; those are the fields to be
covered in the treaty. And now it is a matter of good
faith, as I understand, between the parties.

How are you going to regulate the question of how much
armament each nation shall have ? How maintain the limit

158 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

fixed upon? Of course, everybody understands that the
armament we are especially interested in is Germany's arma-
ment. We are going to see to it that that is only such
" as domestic safety shall require."

Are we just going to leave that requirement in the treaty
and make no provision for enforcing it or maintaining it?
Is that the way we are to deal with Germany ? Under such
conditions, what will happen if Germany unites with German
Austria to make a very considerable power and retains her
military spirit ? Shall we not rather create an agency which
shall see to it that this Covenant is effective ?

Then there is Russia, controlled by the Bolsheviki. I do
not know what we are going to do about Russia. I know
what we ought to have done. We ought to have sent two
hundred thousand men in there originally, and with addi-
tional forces from our Allies we could have stamped out
Bolshevism. When a man says you encimiber the earth
and that the only way to have happiness on earth is to kill
you — the only way you can deal with him is to kill him.
That is all there is about it; and the idea of dealing with
Bolshevism in any other way is an iridescent dream. We
will have to stamp it out. That will have to be done by
the Allies, and we will have to maintain a force for that
purpose.

• •••a...

The countries we propose to set up have got to be held m
leading strings. You cannot do that except by a League
of Nations that notifies them — every one of them : " This
war was fought for your liberty and that democracy might
be safe, and we do not propose to have you start a conflagra-
tion and bring about another war that we have sacrificed

WHY A LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS NECESSARY 159

millions and billions and endured all sorts of suffering to
avoid."

• •••••••

We created a republic in Cuba. We surrounded it with
all possible safeguards, and then we had to send a force
down there to compose a revolution of gentlemen on the
outs who wanted to get in and gentlemen on the ins who
did not want to get out. That is the trouble we will find in
these new republics.

I say this with deference, but if there is not a League of
Nations created in Paris the whole thing is a failure — and
I do not think they are going to make a failure at Paris.

It is perfectly easy to suggest objections to a plan like
this. Take the Constitution of the United States. When
it was adopted, the prophecies in respect to it were quite
as formidable as certain distinguished Senators hold the dif-
ficulties in the operation of the League to be. And you can
imagine cases now with reference to the operation of the
Constitution that would lead to such a disturbance as to de-
stroy the Government. We had one but survived it. We
had to camp outside the Constitution until we did, and then
we got back under it again.

In the disputed election between Hayes and Tilden we had
to create an extra-constitutional body to settle that question,
but we were self-governing people and we did it.

What seems to me important is to get nations into the
habit of settling their differences otherwise than by war.
You can't get rid of war until some substitute is offered
to prevent injustice and to enable you to get justice. Of
course, we have produced that in our constitutional system.
Every state has the right to go into the Supreme Court to

l6o TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ask justice against every other state. In many cases there
is no law which governs the behavior of states except inter-
national law, and that is administered by the Supreme Court
of the United States in such cases.

.......a

I do not care what you call it, you have got to have a
court, you have got to have a committee of conciliation,
you have got to have force, you have got to fix rules of inter-
national law. You cannot get away from these.

LESSER LEAGUE OF NATIONS *

Subjects for consideration by the conference at Versailles
will naturally divide themselves into two great classes.
The first will embrace those terms exacted of Germany and
the other conquered nations to prevent them from again
beginning war now or in the near future ; the indemnities to
be assessed against them for damage inflicted on France,
Belgium, Serbia and the other Allies; the redistribution of
their territories and carving out of them the new republics
to be set up ; together with the machinery for securing those
terms and their maintenance. The second class of subjects
for discussion and settlement will be less exigent and have
more of a world-wide character. Such will be the definition
of freedom of the seas, open diplomacy, the prevention of
discriminating economic barriers and the machinery for a
general League of Nations to Enforce Peace.

This league may well consist of only the Allied nations,

^ Article in Public Ledger Dec. 9, 1918.

LESSER LEAGUE OF NATIONS l6l

England, France, Italy, Japan and the United States. These
are now the only " great " Powers for practical purposes.
They cannot achieve the end of this war without such a
league. How, if at all, this league shall be expanded to
include other or all nations may be properly inquired into by
a Congress of Nations of the World, continuing the sessions
of the Versailles conference. The greater league would
thus be a growth from the smaller league into which the
Allied Powers will find themselves forced by the necessities
of the situation. This is the best method of developing
political institutions. It is the Anglo-Saxon way. They
are framed and set in operation to meet immediate needs
and then are expanded as their adaptation to larger useful-
ness makes itself clear.

A question as to the first or smaller league will at once
demand answer from us. That is, whether we shall join it.
The reactionaries, of whom there seem to be several in our
Senate, will insist that we should keep our skirts clear of it
and leave it to the other four Great Powers. After we have
signed and approved the treaty, in their view, we should rid
ourselves of any responsibility for its enforcement or the
maintenance of the just, equitable and democratic status
which its signatories seek to establish. This is the counsel
of cowardice and atavism. It breaks the word of promise
to the oppressed peoples of Europe. It would take out of
the executive council of such a league the only member of
it to which the peoples of the new republics and the rest of
Europe would look with confidence for purely disinterested
counsel and action. After our magniloquent declarations of
purpose in this war, after our high-sounding announcement
of the equitable bases of settlement of the war upon which
the armistice and the treaty to follow are conditioned, what

1 62 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

a lame and impotent conclusion it would be for our President
to come back to this country, leaving, as an arbiter of half
the world, a League of Nations in which we were to have
no voice and over whose actions we were to have no con-
trol!

Could we thus selfishly retire to our isolated seclusion and
repudiate the responsibility that our participation in the war
and in the terms of peace must thrust upon us as the most
powerful and most impartial member of the family of na-
tions? It is inconceivable that President Wilson, after what
he has written and said to the world, would consent to play
such a humiliating part. If, on the contrary, he is consistent
with himself, if he stands up to the character he has assumed
before to the plain people of Europe and the world, and signs
a treaty by which the United States becomes a responsible
factor in the world's progress, the men of small vision in the
Senate and Congress will be swept from their opposition by
a public opinion they cannot withstand.

Such a general league must always be of the highest
benefit to every small nation. It would offer protection
against any oppression by a greater nation, and it would give
relief from the burden of armament. Full reliance could be
had on the fairness of the league, because a conspiracy by
all the Great Powers, including the United States, to oppress
a small Power is tmthinkable. Therefore, every small
nation would ultimately seek admission. It would then
willingly submit to reasonable restrictions on its own repre-
sentative weight in the league to which, as an initiating con-
stituent member, it might make vociferous objection.

DISARMAMENT OF NATIONS 163

DISARMAMENT OF NATIONS AND FREEDOM

OF THE SEAS ^

The original program of the League to Enforce Peace
contained no clause with reference to disarmament of
nations. This was not because the projectors of the league
did not deem disarmament of the utmost importance in the
ultimate maintenance of permanent peace but because they
deemed real disarmament possible only as the result of the
successful operation of the league. The league could only
serve its purpose by furnishing to the nations the protection
that the nations secured by armament. It was to be substi-
tuted for armament. Until it proved its usefulness as such,
the armed nations could not be expected to part with their
own insurance.

• •»•••••

In a league of nations to Enforce the Versailles Treaty
the Allied Powers must retain armament to constitute a
police force to secure peace between the new nations of
Middle and Eastern Europe and Asia Minor. This will
justify the United States in maintaining a potential army
by a system of universal training. It accords with Secretary
Daniels' recommendations that we continue the peace plan
of increasing our navy.

As the smaller league of peace proves its adequate pro-
tection against war the motive of economy will prompt com-
pliance with Mr. Wilson's armament clause in the fourteen
points by a proportionate decrease in all armaments, and a
mutual agreement will become possible and practical.
Meantime we must be patient. Reforms of this kind do

1 Article in Public Ledger Dec. 11, 1918.

164 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

not come at once and should not be expected to. We take
an important step, and its success leads to another forward
movement.

There is nothing in England's position respecting her fleet
that should discourage the friends of the League of Nations
to Enforce Peace. The exaggerated language of a Winston
Churchill should not discourage us. It is the language of
an advocate in a heated political campaign. We must ad-
mit the justice of England's position — that she cannot give
up her fleet in the absence of the test of a new league of na-
tions. She cannot know whether the League will be
sufficient protection to her against attack. Her isolated
position requires her to protect herself against starvation in
time of war. She is dependent on other countries for food
and raw materials. These can only reach her by the sea.
She must keep open the access by sea in time of war. Only
by her fleet can she do this. Not until the operation of the
League of Nations demonstrates that this danger in war is
minimized can she be expected to reduce her fleet.

So far as freedom of the seas in time of peace is con-
cerned, wherever the British flag floats there is and always
has been freedom of the seas.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE GERMAN

COLONIES *

No one can overestimate the weight in winning this war
of the morale of the Allies born of the righteousness of their
cause. They said, and the world believed them, that they
were engaged in this war for no selfish purpose. They were

* Article in Public Ledger Dec. 16, 1918.

THE LEAGUE AND THE GERMAN COLONIES 165

enlisted in the terrible struggle to end the hideous immorality
and unmorality of militarism, to restore stolen goods and
to further the establishment of governments in accordance
with the will of those governed.

France sought Alsace-Lorraine as a measure of justice*
Italy sought the Trentino and Trieste on the same ground.
The United States and Great Britain sought the acquisition
of no new territory. Great Britain has indicated that she
does not desire the return of Helgoland, that island off the
mouth of the Elbe which Lord Salisbury sold to Germany
and which has proved so formidable a naval outpost of the
German empire in this war.

The question as to the German colonies, however, has
raised a doubt among some whether Great Britain will adhere
religiously to the attitude of seeking no additional territory.
Germany has colonies in East and West Africa of large
extent. She has a colony of large area in the neighborhood
of Australia, part of the island of New Guinea. The
Australians, the New Zealanders and the South Africans
among the English colonists object to the return of these
colonies to Germany, because Germany's ownership of them
has been a threat to Australia and New Zealand and has
required special defenses by them.

It is to be inferred from the clearly proved outrageous
treatment by Germany of her colonists that the Peace Con-
ference in Versailles will conclude that none of her colonies
should be returned to Germany. They have not been ad-
ministered for the benefit of the backward peoples in the
colonies. The treatment of these peoples is of a piece with
the atrocious conduct of the Germans in this war.

Under the principles laid down in the fourteen points,
therefore, the only question which the conferees can take up

1 66 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

is how shall these colonies be administered. That they are
not now capable of self-government goes without saying.
The Australians and New Zealanders would doubtless wish
that the German colony in New Guinea should be taken over
by Great Britain. The South African English colonists will
probably seek the same result.

It would be too bad for Britain to yield to the urgings of
her daughters in this regard. She cannot afford to do it It
will arouse at once the attack that she is exhibiting the same
land-grabbing propensities which have been charged to her
in the past.

There is no argument making more strongly for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a league of nations in connec-
tion with this treaty than the need of a proper method of
providing for these German colonies. They should be
governed by an agency of the league of nations charged with
the duty of educating the natives, leading them on in the
paths of civilization and extending self-government to them
as rapidly as their fitness will permit. They will thus prove
to the world the equitable and just motives and aims of the
nations who frame the provisions of this epoch-making
treaty.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND RELIGIOUS

LIBERTY »

The earnest effort of the Jews of the United States to
induce our executive to remedy the intolerable condition of
their co-religionists in the backward countries of Europe has
often been met and defeated by the argument that our

1 Article in Public Ledger Dec. 17, 1918.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND REUGIOUS LIBERTY 167

government can not interfere with the domestic affairs of
another nation. This argument has little if any application
to the present situation. There is much evidence accumulat-
ing to show that the pogroms and abuses of the Jews con-
tinue in the countries where they have heretofore existed,
and that the chaotic and lawless condition in these countries
has offered an opportunity for the cruel gratification of race
and religious prejudice. On the whole, it is not too much
to say that the people of the Jewish race have suffered more
in this war, as noncombatants, than any other people, unless
it be the Serbians and the Armenians.

In Poland and in Galicia the true story of their agonies
and losses is heartrending. The five nations who are to
draft the treaty at Versailles are setting up governments in
Poland, in the Ukraine and in the Baltic provinces. In all
of these the Jewish population is a substantial percentage of
the whole. In their sad story we find the Jews in the Middle
Ages seeking refuge from the oppression and cruelty of
Western Europe and rushing to the great empire of Poland,
then stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, to take
advantage of a charter of religious tolerance and oppor-
tunity granted by one of the liberal Polish kings. The irony
of fate, however, ended the Polish kingdom and a large part
of it was turned over to Russia, which ground the Jews
under its tyrannous heel. This is why half of the thirteen
millions of Jews living in the world were at the beginning
of this war to be found in the Russian pale in which Jews
were permitted to live, to which they were limited, and which
was practically coterminous with the territory which Russia
had taken from old Poland.

One of the great projects of this Congress of Powers at
Versailles is to set up independent governments in these ter-

1 68 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ritories of the Russian, Jewish pale. We shall be derelict in
our duty if we do not require, as part of the fundamental
law of these new republics, that the Jews shall have as great
religious freedom as they have in the United States. But
we must do more. We must have a league of nations to
see to it that such fundamental law exacted by the treaty shall
be enforced. We find full precedent for such a provision
in the law in the treaty made by the Cong^ress of Berlin, in
which Bulgaria and Rumania were established as independ-
ent countries. Rumania, which had long been a heinous
sinner against the Jews, was forced by the Berlin Congress
to accept, as part of its constitution, a declaration that there
should be complete religious freedom and that no citizen
should be discriminated against on account of his religion
in any respect. The Rumanian government had the
audacity, after incorporating the guaranty in its fundamental
law, to declare and hold that Jews who had lived in Rumania
for two or three hundred years, father and son, were aliens.
In this way the protection of the Jews provided for in the
treaty of Berlin was denied, and this was after Rumania had
secured recognition as a government on an additional
promise of fair treatment of the Jews.

Let us have no farcical result in working out this treaty of
Versailles. Could we find a stronger argument for the con-
tinuance of our league of nations than this ignominious fail-
ure of that congress of 1879, under the presidency of Bis-
marck, to carry out its declared purpose? If there be any
people who should be earnestly in favor of a league of na-
tions as the outgrowth and the condition of this treaty now
being framed at Versailles the Jews are that people.

PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1 69

PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF

NATIONS '

President Wilson says that the statement of the Chicago
Tribune that, before sailing, he approved the plan of the
League to Enforce Peace is untrue and that he never directly
or indirectly indorsed the plan. It is not believed that any
one, for the American League, ever claimed that he did.
From what he has said, however, he has given the world
reason to believe that he favored action by a league of
nations to achieve results only to be brought about along
the lines of the American League to Enforce Peace. He
has, because of his addresses and messages on the subject,
come to be regarded as the foremost champion of a league
of nations to maintain peace after this war. It is the con-
fident belief of the people of France that he has attended the
conference in order to secure such a league which prompts
their enthusiastic and affectionate acclaim. He will do well
to bear this in mind. He must not give the word of promise
to the ear and break it to the hope. He has spoken so much
on the objects of this war, he has laid down in a didactic
form so many principles in their application to all the peoples
in the sphere of the war, he has pictured with such eloquence
the idealistic results for the freedom, justice and peace of the
large and small nations affected by the war, that if he now
fails to propose and secure in the treaty practical machinery
for a real league of nations, which shall enforce peace, he
will properly be held responsible for a lame and impotent
conclusion iDcfore the world and its expectant peoples.

Mr. Wilson is master of an inspiring style of promise, in

» Article in Public Ledger Dec. 23, 1918.

170 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

which he encourages hopes and ideals and awakens the
enthusiasm of popular expectancy without committing him-
self to constructive suggestions for a definite method of
achievement. In dealing with the peoples of the world, who
are looking to him as a savior from future war and a pre-
server of peace and democracy, this habit of mind and
expression is now to be subjected to the severest test in his
career. He has in his keeping not alone his own reputation
for good faith, but that of the great people for whom he is
the spokesman.

Let us see what this League of Nations, whose formation,
he says, is absolutely indispensable to the maintenance of
peace, is. Let us study it from his speeches.

On May 27, 1916, Mr. Wilson delivered a written address
at the dinner of the League to Enforce Peace in Washington.
He expressly declined to discuss the program of the League,
whose guest he was, but he clearly specified certain objects
and laid down principles of international action which ac-
corded with the objects and principles of the league. He
said the people of the United States would wish " a universal
association of the nations to maintain an inviolate security of
the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use
of all nations of the world and to prevent any war begun
either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and
full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world —
a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence." He further said at this dinner that ** the world
was even then upon the eve of a great consummation, when
some common force will be brought into existence which
shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental
interest of all peoples and all governments, when coercion
shall be summoned not to the service of political ambition

PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS I /I

or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a
common justice and a common peace."

He delivered these words to a society whose plan included
for its proposed league of nations a congress of Powers
to improve international law, an international court and an
international council of conciliation, to which all interna-
tional differences were to be submitted, and, finally, a com-
mon and combined police force of the nations together with
combined economic boycott to prevent the advent of war
before there has been full submission of the dispute to such
tribunals. It was impossible for those who heard the Presi-
dent against this background to escape the conviction that
he was in general and almost specific accord not only with
the purposes but with the method of the league. How could
the just results which he sought be obtained without interna-
tional tribunals ? How could a league of nations act through
a common force without obligation of its members to respond
with contributors to such a common force when war was
begun without submission?

Since that speech much has happened. But the President
has continued to refer to a league of nations and to the
major force of the world as a means of securing peace and
justice.

In the fourteen points of the message of January 8, 191 8,
we find references to a League of Nations and its guarantee
as follows:

In the second point it is said that the high seas may be
closed only " by international action for the enforcement of
international covenants."

In the third point establishment of equality of trade con-
ditions is to be required " among all nations consenting
to the peace and associating themselves for its mainte-

nance."

172 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

In the fourth point adequate guarantees are to be " given
and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the
lowest point consistent with domestic safety."

In the eleventh point it is provided that " international
guarantees of the political and economic independence and
territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be
entered into/'

By the twelfth it is enjoined that '' the Dardanelles should
be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and
commerce of all nations under international guarantees."

In the thirteenth point it is required that Poland shall be
secured '' a free passage to the seas/' and her " political and
economic independence and territorial integrity should be
guaranteed by international covenants."

In the fourteenth point it is said that a ** general associa-
tion of nations must be formed under specific covenants for
the purpose of political independence and territorial integrity
to great and small States alike."

In his address of September 27, 1918, he said: "There
can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and un-
derstandings within the general and common family of the
League of Nations."

" There can be no special, selfish economic combinations
within the League and no employment of any form of
economic boycott or exclusion, except as the power of
economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the
world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a
means of discipline and control."

He signaled the entry of the United States into the war
by his message of April 2, 19 17, in which he said we were
to fight " for a universal dominion of right by such concert

PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1 73

of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations
and make this world itself at last free."

Other passages of similar import might be cited, but these
are enough to show that those who read them had a right to
believe the President was committing himself to a league
of nations, bound by covenants of its members to maintain
justice, freedom and peace among nations large and small
and to do this by force; i. e., by the combined armies and
navies of the members of the League. The maintenance of
justice necessarily carries with it the conception of a court
to administer it : to hear the differences submitted, pronounce
judgment and enforce it through the executive agencies of
the League.

This is the general plan of the League to Enforce Peace.
Mr. Wilson's plan is more ambitious in that the members
of the League are mutually to guarantee the political and
territorial integrity of all the signatories of the treaty. By
this the United States would bind itself to preserve by arms
the boundaries and independence of Poland, of the Balkans,
of the Czecho-Slavs and all the new republics to be bom of
this treaty, as Great Britain did those of Belgium.

We cannot suppose that, after giving these assurances to
the peoples of Europe, President Wilson will be content with
a treaty of mere good intentions and with declarations obli-
gating no nation to do anything to maintain justice, freedom
and peace, but leaving it to the uncertain moral sanction of
the conscience of each nation to find out what justice is and
then to do it.

174 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SENATOR LODGE ON THE LEAGUE OF

NATIONS *

Senator Lodge's speech in the senate on the twenty-first
of this month was the best yet made on the aims of the Allies
and the elements of a satisfactory treaty of peace. It was
comprehensive and accurate, lucid and forcible, felicitous in
phrase and elevated in tone. It was in the senator's best
style, and that is a high standard.

Its great merit is in its broad vision of the real purposes of
the United States and her present obligation. The senator
summarizes certain objections to the general League of Na-
tions. These are, as lawyers would say, obiter dicta in this
speech, because he now asks a postponement of that subject
matter, not its rejection on its merits.

There are those who minimize the burden the United
States should assume in execution of this peace; they deny
that she should share it with her Allies. Mr. Lodge is not
one of those. He is not a little American. He does not
recur to the farewell address of Washington and the phrase,
" entangling alliances," enjoined by Jefferson in order to
employ them narrowly to limit the responsibilities of the
United States, now that it has become the most powerful
nation in the worid.

In his address he said :

" We went to war to save civilization. For this mighty
purpose we have sacrificed thousands of American lives and
spent billions of American treasure. We cannot, therefore,
leave the work half done. We are as much bound, not
merely by interests and every consideration for a safe future,

^ Article in Pmblic Ledger Dec. jo, 1918.

SENATOR LODGE ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1 75

but by honor and self-respect, to see that the terms of peace
are carried out, as we were to fulfill our great determination
that the armies of Germany should be defeated in the field.
We cannot halt or turn back now. We must do our share
to carry out the peace as we have done our share to win the
war, of which the peace is an integral part We must do
our share in the occupation of German territory which will
be held as security for the indemnities to be paid by Germany.
We cannot escape doing our part in aiding the peoples to
whom we have helped to give freedom and independence in
establishing themselves with ordered governments, for in
no other way can we erect the barriers which are essential to
prevent another outbreak by Germany upon the world. We
cannot leave the Jugo-Slavs, the Czecho-Slovaks and the
Poles, the Lithuanians and the other states which we hope to
see formed and marching upon the path of progress and de-
velopment, unaided and alone."

He says that the United States is obliged to aid Russia in
rising from the chaos and disorder which has come upon her
to the place which she ought to occupy in the family of na-
tions; that the object of the Russian Bolsheviki has been to
destroy their fellow citizens and every element which was
necessary to a social fabric under which men could live and
prosper while they themselves profit in money and in power
from the ruin they have wrought; that they indulged in
murder and massacre, destroyed property and all the instru-
ments of industry, and the unhappy and ignorant people of
Russia, in whose name they undertook to act, are to-day suf-
fering from famine and disease, and are in a worse condition
than they were in the days of the Romanoffs ; that if Russian
anarchy should be permitted to spread through western civil-
ization, that civilization would fall; that we cannot leave

1/6 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Russia lying helpless and breathing out infection on the
world ; and that it would be discreditable to the United States
if we failed to recognize our duty to her.

The Senator's speech was delivered to establish the neces-
sity for postponing the consideration by the conference of
five of the fourteen points of the President's message of
January 8, referring to secret diplomacy, to freedom of navi-
gation and the seas, to the removal of economic barriers, to
the reduction of armament, and to the central League of
Nations.

It must be admitted the Senator's argument for a post-
ponement of these questions to an adjourned conference has
weight. It may be that in the immediate settlement of them
is to be found a means of solving difficulties in agreement
upon specific terms of peace, of which neither the Senator
nor we are advised.

A stipulation that the five Allies dictating this treaty
should not make any treaty as between themselves incon-
sistent with the purpose of the great treaty and should make
no secret treaties at all, may well strengthen mutual con-
fidence in the good faith of all in the main treaty.

The general reduction of armaments of all nations does
not immediately concern the peace in the sphere of war, pro-
vided Germany's teeth are effectively drawn.

The provision against economic barriers is a general
question of world trade, the immediate settlement of which
does not, on the surface, seem essential to the adjustment of
the purposes of the nations in winning this war. The sub-
currents of selfish purpose in respect to trade, however, may
require a preliminary settlement of such a general principle
as the best basis for adjusting special interests.

The freedom of the seas in time of war is a very general

THE league: why and how 177

issue, postponement of which to the adjourned conference
would hardly interfere with a satisfactory peace settlement
for the present.

What should be emphasized, however, and what Senator
Lodge brings out with force of argument that cannot be
met, is the fact that we now have a league of nations —
the United States, England, France, Italy and Japan —
whose obligations in respect to securing the results of the
war in Europe are equal. They are dictating this peace.
The treaty will not enforce itself.

• ••••■••

Unless we stamp out the poisonous infection of Russian
Bolshevism and prevent its spread throughout the countries
of Europe, we shall only substitute anarchy, chaos and
plundering, murderous violence for imperial despotism.

We can only achieve these results by continuance of this
existing league of Great Powers. Of this Senator Lodge's
great address is a demonstration.

THE LEAGUE : WHY AND HOW *

It is possible that we need not include all the nations in
the League in order to perform the task that we have set
for ourselves ; but it is essential that we should have a league
of the Great Nations to enforce peace, if the treaty of peace
is to accomplish any of the objects that we and the Allies
have had in the war.

^Address delivered at Montclair, N. J., Dec. 30, 1918, under the
auspices of the College Women's Club.

178 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Now, the expression league of nations is used to indicate
something, and I think it is just as well to define it so that
we may know what we are talking about. Of course it
serves some purposes to have a slogan which you do not
have to define. It gives you an opportunity to make a cam-
paign without reference to details. You shout it to the
crowd, and when anybody presents objections you can say
that that is not the kind of a league of nations you favor.
Therefore I think it best to define what we mean. I say
we ; I mean a party of dreamers, mayhap, who got together,
after the war began, to formulate something. Way back in
an administration that is now forgotten — I did not wish
to bring it up again, but I only refer to it as a reminiscence
and a date — treaties of peace were negotiated with Eng-
land and with France by the United States. They provided
for arbitration of all justiciable issues between the contract-
ing parties. We thought we had made a good deal of pro-
gress in negotiating and signing those treaties, and the Sec-
retary of State and the Ambassadors who signed were
photographed and there was a general feeling that something
had been done that was of historical interest. Well, that
is the only interest it has now ; because when they got to the
Senate, that august body truncated them and amended them
and qualified them in such a way that their own father could
not recognize them.

There was no danger of war between the United States
and either France or England; we had proven the lack of
danger by a hundred years of peace. And since the treaties
had really been framed as models, when they came back thus
crippled and maimed, they were not very useful. So I put
them on the shelf and let the dust accumulate on them in
the hope that the Senators might change their minds, or

THE league: why and how 179

that the people might change the Senate ; instead of which
they changed me. Now those treaties were an improvement
on previous treaties. The previous treaties, of which there
were many (there is no trouble in getting treaties of arbi-
tration; you can get them by the bushel when they do not
clinch anything), had provided that the contracting nations
would arbitrate every question except one that concerned
vital interests, honor or territorial integrity, leaving it, of
course, to either party to determine what concerned its vital
interests or its honor. Well, as no nation would ever go
to war for anything but what did, in its opinion, concern its
vital interests or its honor, the treaties ought to have read,
and properly and freely rendered did read, " we agree to
arbitrate every question which is not likely to lead to war."
Therefore the assistance such treaties gave in the matter of
peace was not perceptible.

So we adopted this form by which we agreed to arbitrate
every justiciable question. It is necessary to know what
justiciable means. Old Noah Webster said that the word
had become obsolete. Well, since his time it has been
revived, notably in the decisions and opinions of the Supreme
Court. It is used by Mr. Justice Bradley, by Chief Justice
Fuller and by Mr. Justice Brewer, and it means a contro-
versy that can be settled in court on principles of law ; one
capable of settlement by the disposition of justice.

• •••••••

Those of us who have been engaged in promoting the
settlement of difficulties by arbitration were of course over-
come with disappointment when the war broke out. We
knew that armament was heavy ; but we thought it would be
a brake on the people, who must realize from the armament
itself first, how destructive war would be, and second, how

l8o TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

enormously expensive it would be. Nevertheless, within
a week after the first of August, 1914, Europe was at war.
And then those of us who had suffered this disappointment
gathered ourselves together to see if we could not get some
plan to discourage war, some plan which we could induce the
nations to adopt after this war was over, after this dreadful
destruction had come to an end, and when men would be
longing for some means of promoting and making peace
permanent. We met at the Century Club and afterwards at
the Independence Hall, and organized the League to Enforce
Peace.

.•..a...

When the war began the people of this country were anxious
to keep out of it. The President's proclamation of neu-
trality was received by them with approval. We did not
realize then what was at stake. We thought we could be
neutral and keep within the lines of international law and
avoid being drawn into the struggle. We were neutral and
we did keep within the lines of international law; but we
found it was impossible to avoid being drawn into the
struggle. Of course we say we were drawn into it, as we
were, by the blindness and cruelty of Germany's submarine
policy. But what did that grow out of? It grew out of
the circimistance that in war, as it is now carried on, it is
impossible for a nation, which furnishes to the world what
we furnish, to remain neutral. We were the market to
which all the nations engaged in this war resorted for food,
munitions and war equipment. Until the British navy
swept the German navy from the seas, we furnished to both
sides with impartiality what they came to buy. The
fortunes of war having limited us to the Allies as our
customers, that which was inevitable came about : Germany

THE league: why and how i8i

came to realize that our resources were going to enable the
Allies to win the war. We were within our rights under
international law in doing what we did. But it was found
that we were so close to Europe, so much involved by our
trade with all of Europe, that it was practically impossible
for us to exercise our rights as international tradesmen with-
out in effect so strengthening one side that that side was
bound to look upon us as the means by which they could
carry on the war ; and its enemy was bound to take the same
view. Accordingly Germany determined to resort to the
murderous policy of the submarines, in which she was will-
ing to sacrifice the rights of innocent noncombatants and
citizens of the United States in order to frighten us out of
exercising our international rights upon the seas. That is
what drove us into the war; and any future European war
will probably bring about the same result. It shows how
deeply interested we are, even from a selfish standpoint, in
suppressing European war or war anywhere that is likely
to spread. The world is now so closely knit together,
oceans to-day being means of union rather than of separa-
tion, that in future wars there will be no great neutral.

When we got into this war we found that its issues were
infinitely greater than that which drove us in. Our vision
broadened. We discovered that our purposes in the war
must be as broad as the purpose of the enemy we were
fighting, that we must utterly crush him in order to cure his
lust for power and to defeat that which was divulged as no
less than a purpose to rule the world. Germany had, for
forty years, been preparing for this war. Bismarck had
taught her the value of military force. By wonderful suc-
cesses in three wars, in each of which Germany, or Prussia,
acquired territory and by all of which Germany was solidi-

1 82 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

fied, the German people became convinced that they were
supermen, became convinced that they had learned the secret
of applying scientific principles to the military art. They
were taught in their schools that the highest development of
national greatness was military force. They were taught to
worship the supremacy of the Grerman State. Having ap-
plied this system of efficiency and thoroughness and these
scientific principles to the military art, they proceeded to
extend them to every field of human activity. That
thoroughness, that system, that efficiency, which they called
" kultur," enabled them to win in agriculture, manufacture,
business, transportation, and every field of applied science.
It also added to the size of their heads, already enlarged
by military successes. They prospered under that false and
wicked philosophy. Materialism forced itself into their
schools and dominated their general view ; and while grow-
ing ever more materialistic they began to use the conception
of God as a partner in the enterprise. They said that He
needed them in supporting His philosophy, that it was their
design, under His direction, to spread this kultur by force
in order to help Him make civilization a success. No con-
sideration of decency, humanity, honor or morality must be
allowed to interfere. That was the doctrine; you can see
it in the lectures from their university platforms. The
whole people were saturated with this dreadful principle,
namely, that the victories of the state must be achieved at all
hazards and without regard to those ordinary considera-
tions that restrain individuals in society. And that led to
their atrocious conduct of the war. They became obsessed
with a madness. When we got into the war we began to
realize — what our Allies had realized before — that the
only thing that could rid the world of this danger was com-

THE league: why and how 183

plete defeat of the German people. We were fighting the
German people, not the HohenzoUerns alone; for until we
cured the German people of this obsession, until we cured
them of this disease which was in their heads, we had not
achieved the purposes of the war that had forced itself on
us. We could only do this by a surgical operation on their
heads to be performed with a club. We have been using
that club and now we have got to keep our grip on it for
some time until they show, by bringing forth works meet for
repentance, that the cure has been effected.

That is the purpose of the war. How are we going to
achieve it? We have got through the first act, a very im-
portant one; but others remain. The armistice was made
as the basis of a future treaty which was to cover the sub-
ject matter and to achieve the purposes outlined in President
Wilson's message of January 8, 19 18, as modified and quali-
fied by the Allies' insistence upon indemnities and by the
refusal on their part to yield to the clause with respect to
freedom of the seas, which they said was too indefinite.
• •>••■••

We shall have to use some agency like the League of
Nations in dealing with Constantinople, which will have to
be internationalized, because the Bosporus, the Dardanelles,
and the Sea of Marmora constitute a throat through which
the countries on the Black Sea obtain access to the Mediter-
ranean. Constantinople must therefore not be presided over
by any nation having a selfish motive to close that passage.

Then we come to Russia, what are we going to do about
Russia ? Russia had the Romanoffs, but as between a one
man despot and a mob I prefer the one man. The Bol-
sheviki are the lowest proletarians led by a few professionals
and if you can get a worse combination than that, I do not

184 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

know what it is. They proceed on the theory that anybody
with thrift, anybody with enterprise, anybody who dresses
well and tries to help his family to a higher level, is an enemy
of society. In order to be rid of them they get the country
into a condition where there is not enough food to go round,
divide the people into classes — the rich, or rather those who
were rich, the bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and the pro-
letariat — feed the lowest element of the proletariat, starve
the other classes, and then, if the latter do not disappear
rapidly enough, imprison the leaders and shoot them en
masse without trial. This is simple, if it does not commend
itself in any other way; and that minority — for they are a
minority of the proletariat — will ultimately become a ma-
jority if they just keep it up. The Bolsheviki are, in fact,
deadly enemies of society. They are not democrats; they
are not republicans; they are not in favor of popular rule.
They called a constituent assembly and then drove the dele-
gates out of the assembly chamber. On what ground ? On
the ground that a majority of those elected were bourgeoisie ;
they were respectable; and they could not brook having a
respectable majority in power. Therefore they took forcible
possession of the country and through the Soviet they are
maintaining a tyranny the like of which has never been seen
in history. They have far exceeded the tyranny of the
French Revolution, without any justification. Unless we
suppress that, unless those nations that are responsible for
this loosening of the social ties see to it that that poison is
stamped out, they have not done their work, they have not
achieved their purpose. We must (when I say we, I mean
the Allies) , by some means, and force is the only means, give
to these poor people of Russia an opportunity themselves to
set up government by majority ; and we cannot do that unless

THE league: why and how 185

we maintain a combined force of the Allies. That is an
essential part of it, and that is one of the provisions of our
League.

• •••••••

Then there are half a dozen republics, perhaps more,
which we are to launch. Their peoples have not had any
experience in self-government. Self-government, which has
been defined by President Wilson as character, is a great
boon to people who are able to practice it. It needs train-
ing, self-restraint. We do not realize that in this country.
We seem to think that it is a panacea which we can apply
to the troubles of Hottentots or anybody else. The same is
true of our idea of liberty. We talk about liberty, but we
really don't understand its value, because it comes to us as
the air we breathe. It is hard to make people understand
the benefits which they are enjoying under this government
and to realize that our liberty has been the result of sacrifices
and blood and struggle for a thousand years by our Anglo-
Saxon ancestors. And so it is with self-government. We
had to take our liberty by forcibly separating ourselves from
England ; but she had herself enabled us to learn self-govern-
ment even before we separated. This country has since be-
come the great exemplar of self-government by the power
of popular self-restraint. At no time is this self-restraint
more in evidence than in the period between the presidential
conventions and the second day after the election. Each
party holds a convention and makes a platform. The plat-
form explains with elaborate detail, with eloquence and with
perfect fairness, what a horrible thing it will be to let in the
other party or to continue the other party in power. Candi-
dates are nominated and subjected to a scrutiny which be-
littles the power of the microscope. I know something

l86 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

about it. And then the orators, the torch-light procession,
and the party activity! The visitor from Mars, interested
only in the developments attending these great mass meet-
ings and heated discussions, says : " Well, I will stay here
until the election, because, with all this feeling, with people
dividing into such equal forces and determined to win, there
is certain to be an explosion then." The election comes
and it is as quiet as a May morning. Each voter, man or
woman, goes into the booth and votes as he or she wishes,
or he votes as she wishes or she votes as he wishes. The
votes are counted and the result is announced, perhaps that
night, perhaps the next day or the next afternoon. But
when the result is known, every man and woman is aware
who it is that is certain, if he lives, to carry on and guide
the destinies of this country in the executive branch of the
government. Everybody acquiesces, and men, women and
children follow the pursuits of the day as usual. Now, that
is self-government. The minority acquiesce. They may
think of the next election, but they make no trouble.
Why? Because they realize that the majority, when they
come into power, will administer the government as a trust
for all the people, and that the rights of all will be preserved
equally. That is what makes self-government possible. In
Central America you find a very different state of affairs.
There, whenever they have an election, the minority take to
the woods, with their guns, and try to shoot themselves into
a majority. Those are the two extremes. But any people,
who have not had the training in popular self-restraint that
we have had — this understanding of the responsibility of
the majority for all the people — are likely to stumble and
fall. We have tried it in the Philippines and in Cuba. We
gave Cuba self-government After three years they had an

THE league: why and how 187

election which caused a revolution. Mr. Roosevelt sent me
down there to stop it and launch the Republic once more.
Well, I could not stop it except by sending for the army and
navy of the United States. That step had a wholesome,
conciliating, quieting effect. We were not called upon to
fight We took over the island and held it for two years.
We passed a lot of good statutes, among them an election
law, held a fair election under it and then turned over the
government to those elected. We had launched her once
more. If she ever requires it, we will do the same thing over
again and launch her again, and then again, until she gets
strong enough — I hope she is now — to stand alone. And
now, instead of setting up one Cuba we are setting up half
a dozen. We are carving them out of the dominion of the
empires that we have been engaged in fighting. We are
putting them where the racial resentment, combined with
memory of the tyranny practiced, will prompt them to be im-
patient and headstrong in dealing with those empires. And
the people of those empires will harbor the resentment which
always comes against persons that have broken away from
one's control. We are setting up these governments for two
reasons : first, because we are in favor of giving people a
chance to choose their own government ; and second, because
we are hemming in Germany, taking away the territories she
ought not to have so that she may never again raise her head
in pursuit of world power.

In order to do this we have got to arrange the machinery
that shall maintain peace. The old powerful empires were
much more likely to maintain peace than are these numerous
new governments left to themselves. Unless we exercise
the power of the father over these new children of ours they
will prove unruly and bring about the very war that we are

1 88 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

trying to prevent by creating them. I do not know any
mathematical demonstration that is clearer than that. The
danger is that these nations do not know their rights. They
have the frailties of human nature, and it is an unaccustomed
business for them. They are ambitious. Each one is deal-
ing, without experience, with liberty and independence and
self -development. Our liberty is liberty regulated by law.
And when you say liberty regulated by law, you mean liberty
regulated and limited by the rights of others so that all may
enjoy the same liberty and equal rights. Just so nations
must have independence limited and regulated by law — by
international law ; and we have got to devise and maintain
the machinery that shall make it possible.

This treaty is going to be as long as the moral law.
There never was a treaty so complicated as this will be.
No matter what the character of the contract, even though
drawn by the ablest lawyer who ever drew a contract, if it
has many provisions, if it is complicated, it will need inter-
pretation in application. But how interpret a contract
authoritatively? That is a justiciable matter. That is what
we have courts for ; and it is impossible for this treaty to be
executed unless you have a court, appointed by the same
power that made the treaty, to interpret the treaty. It will
be especially needed when the new events arise that are
certain to arise in the lives of these new nations. If you
know any way by which those questions can be satisfactorily
decided other than by a court with authority to decide them, I
shall be glad to hear of it. And there you have the first
plank in the platform of the League to Enforce Peace.

Next, there will be questions of policy which do not come
under the head of justiciable questions. You have got to
have somebody representing the League to negotiate and ad-

THE league: why and how 189

just compromises of that kind. This League that is meeting
in Paris is a ponderous body. Premiers and Presidents
cannot be there all the time. They have got to leave an
agency there and that agency must represent the League in
the matter of settling differences which arise between the
nations they are creating and the nations out of which they
are created. And so you have the second provision as to
a commission of conciliation. These new nations are going
to manifest all the faults and the weaknesses of children.
It is inevitable. And the thing that makes children better
and leads them on is discipline. You do not always have to
use the broad hand, but it is helpful to have it in the family.
Therefore we need a combined force, which can be counted
on when needed, to convince these creations of this treaty,
these governments, and these people, that there is a power
having the means of enforcing the judgments and the com-
promises that will be reached under the court or the com-
mission. This is the third or force plank of the League
platform.

Then the Congress of Powers is bound to enlarge and, in
a way, codify and make more definite the principles of inter-
national law, and this is the fourth plank of the platform of
the League to Enforce Peace.

Now, having that League before us as a necessity, the
question arises, shall we go on to the larger League?
Shall we invite in the other nations of the world to form a
league that shall assume the responsibility of this treaty and
also endeavor to make war less probable in the world at
large? Shall we introduce a league which shall work not
only to keep peace in that sphere but also to keep peace be-
tween the very Powers that make this league, and between all
the other Powers of the world? The question whether that

190 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

shall be done now or later is a question that can be de-
termined on the ground. Even if it is not determined
now, the step that is taken by creating this smaller league
to achieve its purpose of maintaining peace, where peace
is more doubtful and where the problems are so much
more difficult than in a normal world at peace, will be a long
step towards the possibility of a general League of Nations.
Heretofore this has been an academic question. Peq[>le
have been interested in its discussion, but the war seemed
remote and peace seemed remote. Now the question is live ;
it is before us ; since the President will bring back with him
this treaty with a provision for a league of nations in it.

If the President does come home with a treaty like this,
then it behooves us all to unite in support of it ; if there be
difficulties in it, to suggest how the difficulties may be over-
come ; but to appreciate the purposes of that League, to ap-
preciate the fact that the world is longing for it and the
oppressed and suffering peoples of the Allies are longing for
the machinery that shall prevent a recurrence of the dread
disaster through which they have passed. We should look
at it from a progressive standpoint, should realize that some-
thing has happened since the war began, that the assumption
that everything which has occurred in the past is going to
recur, that there is no hope of change, is the doctrine of
pessimism and fatalism. This war has been fundamental in
its character. It has shaken the foundations of society.
And people who look forward, who look for better things,
are not discouraged because something like that which is
now proposed has been tried before and failed. They refuse
to assume that it will therefore fail again. Progress is not
made without some risk. We never enter into new experi-

THE league: why and how 191

ments without realizing that there may be a failure. But
is that a reason why we should not go forward ? Eloquence
is all right, platforms are all right, declarations of ideals are
all right, provided they are accompanied by willingness to
make sacrifices and run risks to accomplish the ideals. But
they must not be treated as things of substance, their mere
declaration an end in itself, imposing no obligations on those
who have uttered them to go on and do the things they extol.
I have heard it said that this League of Nations takes
away sovereignty. Now, if we say to a nation we are going
to keep you within the bounds of international law by this
organization, do we limit its independence any more than
we limit our own independence under a system of laws that
are enacted for the benefit of society and for our own bene-
fit? Every time we make a treaty by which we bind our-
selves to do anything we limit our sovereignty. Sovereignty
is only a matter of definition and degree. The question is :
how far are we willing to go in yielding that entire freedom
of action and that license to wage war for aggressive and
selfish purposes. We need not be frightened by a definition.
We agree to arbitrate; we agree to abide the result of an
arbitration. That limits our sovereignty, does it not?
Well, is that so heinous ? We have agreed not to put war-
ships on our great lakes. That is a limitation of our sov-
ereignty, is it not? If we were a jingo nation which in-
sisted on doing everything it wanted to do, right or wrong,
we ought to be able to put men of war on that water bound-
ary; but we have agreed not to. Are we ashamed of that
limitation on our sovereignty ? Are we not on the contrary,
proud of it? We know that England and the United States
will never get into a war. Everybody knows that ; we have
got the habit of arbitrating. It took us fifty years to get it

192 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

and then we had each to lose a case. England lost the Ala-
bama Claim and we lost that Fisheries Case. They said we
had stolen five millions worth of fish and apparently they
proved it. They got a judgment and we paid it just as they
paid the judgment against them. Well, that limited our
sovereignty. Was it so disgraceful? We learned to play
the game. You can't go into an arbitration and play it on
the theory of heads I win, tails you lose ; that unless you do
win you won't play. You have got to be good losers.
When we go on and say that we are going to have this great
court lay down the law and that we are going to enforce
the judgment, of course that interferes with our freedom of
action — to the extent that we cannot escape execution of
the judgment — exactly as a man's freedom is limited when
he agrees to pay a thousand dollars and does not pay it and
his creditor comes into court and gets a judgment under
which an execution is levied on his property.

Now I am ready to answer any questions concerning the
League that may occur to the audience.

A Voice: I would like to have you state, if you will,
what membership you would begin with, and what limita-
tions, if any, you would impose upon it.

Mr. Taft : That is a very apt question. I think it is
wise to begin with the Great Powers. When you organize
a club and you want clubable members you make your se-
lections with care. There are a lot of nations that are ir-
responsible. If you call them all into a convention at once,
they will insist on having equal voice with the most re-
sponsible and powerful nations, and I am not in favor of
that. I am in favor of a practical arrangement; and this
peace creates the opportunity for it. These five nations are
an initiating nucleus that is most valuable in creating a

THE league: why and how 193

real league of all nations which are responsible nations.
If we call a convention of all then every one will want to
be heard and they will object if they are not given full
representation. Now you have got to make a practical ar-
rangement. Every nation ought to be heard in a congress
that lays down the rules of law. What the proportion of
representation should be is a matter of expediency and jus-
tice. You cannot fix it according to population alone, be-
cause China would then have four times as many votes as
the United States. There ought to be a proportionate rep-
resentation on some fixed basis, depending on importance and
power, and perhaps on the average intelligence of the people ;
but you can fix that when you have a managing commit-
tee that passes on qualifications for admission. Such a
league is going to be a great boon for the small nations.
It is going to give them protection ; and therefore it is go-
ing to be such an advantage that they will be glad to
come in under reasonable conditions. But if you consult
them all at once they will not be able to agree. We have
had experience in that matter. In arranging the framework
of an international court of admiralty prize, a court to
deal with captures at sea, we were able to agree upon the
membership because there were a lot of nations which had
no navies and no merchantmen and which were therefore
not concerned about naval prizes. But just as soon as we
tried to establish a world-court, passing on general disputes
between nations, then every nation wanted a judge on that
court. That would have made the court worse than a town
meeting, and it became impossible.

. .......

I am not in favor of letting in Germany for a long time.
She must show herself worthy. She is a criminal before

194 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

the bar of justice. When you arrest a criminal and find a
pistol on him you take it away. That is why, in this matter
of reduction of armament, we have the right to say to
Germany, " we will draw your teeth," and that is what we
have been doing. I do not know whether you share my
feeling, but nothing has occurred since the armistice that
has given me more satisfaction than the delivery of those
great war vessels at the Firth of Forth, and of those sub-
marines at the mouth of the Thames. The punishment was
richly deserved.

FROM AN ARTICLE IN THE PUBLIC LEDGER,

JAN. I, 1919

The League of Nations, to be useful, must command the
respect of the world as upholding right and justice. The
United States is the least interested of all the nations of the
League in the terms of peace from a selfish standpoint. Our
membership in it is, therefore, of the highest value. It will
give confidence to the peoples of Europe in the purity and
sincerity of the League's intentions to secure the good of all.
President Wilson's trip has shown clearly the weight the
United States has in this respect. It is not too much to say
that he is stronger to-day with the people of Great Britain,
France and Italy than are the respective Premiers of these
countries. The longing of tliese peoples for a league of
nations to maintain peace and his championing of such a
league have had much to do with bringing about this result.
It has secured the support of Lloyd George and Clemenceau
for the League. This phase of the situation imposes the

REPRESENTATION IN THE LEAGUE I95

heaviest obligation on the United States to retain an active
part in the execution of all the provisions of the treaty.

REPRESENTATION IN THE LEAGUE *

An objection made to the general idea of a League of
Nations is the impossibility of adjusting properly and satis-
factorily the representation of the small and large nations in
the governmental agencies of the League. Every one is
aware of this difficulty. It was one upon which the proposal
for a world court halted before the war. The Study Com-
mittee of the League to Enforce Peace, believes the solution
is to be found in giving representation, where representation
is necessary, according to responsibility.

The functions of the League may conveniently be divided
into the legislative, the judicial, the mediating and the execu-
tive. The congress of all the world Powers, great and
small, will consider and determine general principles of inter-
national law and policy for the guidance of the judicial and
executive branches. It may well codify international law
and give it that definite legislative sanction the absence of
which has led some jurists to deny that it is law at all. In
such a congress the nations should have representation in
accord with their world importance, measured by power,
population and responsible character.

The great advantage of having a small league of the
great Powers formed first for the immediate necessities of
maintaining the terms of this peace and constituting the

^Article in Public Ledger Jan. 3, 1919.

196 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

initiating nucleus of a larger world league is that the small
league could work out the equitable representation of the
smaller nations as they apply for admission. The protection
the greater league will assure them will induce them to seek
the boon of membership.

The great Powers of the small league as the trustees for
all, made so by circumstances, may then fairly adjust the
representation which each incoming member of the great
league should have.

The judicial branch or court of the League should not be
a representative body at all. It should be a tribunal made
up of great international jurists, selected for their high
character, judicial and impartial bent of mind, their learning
in jurisprudence and their ability. They should be perma-
nent judges, made independent in tenure and compensation.
Citizenship in countries parties to the controversy should
disqualify members of the court in the particular case. They
should have jurisdiction only to hear pure questions of law
and fact.

No political question should come before them. They
should interpret treaties and declare and apply the inter-
national law as now established or as qualified and enacted
by the congress of Powers. The difficulty as to representa-
tion should not, therefore, arise as to the constitution of the
court. Of course, to give confidence in its broad view of the
world law, care should be taken to select judges from dif-
ferent countries with diflFerent systems of law, and thus give
the tribunal a world character.

The commission of conciliation, which is a negotiating,
mediating body, should have the representative feature.
The small nations are too many to have members of it
permanently ; but every nation having a real interest in the

REPRESENTATION IN THE LEAGUE 197

issue to be settled should be represented on it for the time
being, and its representative should take part in the media-
tion, hearing and recommendation of settlement.

In its practical working the great Powers will furnish the
police force of the League, and their representatives should
exercise the executive function. The safety and security of
the lesser nations who cannot be expected to share the burden
of military contribution will be found in the judgments of the
impartial international court, in the recommendation of the
commission of conciliation and the principles of international
justice ordained in a congress of the world's nations. More-
over, without representatives in the executive, they may well
confide in the friendly and just attitude of the united execu-
tive council of great Powers in carrying out the judgments
of the League court and in dealing with the compromises
recommended by the League commission of conciliation.
The great Powers in the executive council will have no united
interest adverse to small nations as a group or individually.
On the contrary, they will watch one another in dealing with
every small nation. The resultant action will be dictated by
the common purpose of the League.

We are not now considering the representation of the
United States in the branches of the League. As one of the
great Powers, it will have an influential voice in all of them.
We are only suggesting a method of giving the small nations
the protection they should have and a representation when
practical and needed.

igS TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CRITICISM SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE *

Objections to a general League of Nations are numerous.
Senator Borah makes merry over it. The funny column of
the Evening Sun is filled with hypotheses of its operation and
its absurd results. Mr. Lodge and Mr. Knox treat the pro-
posal with more deference. Mr. Lodge in a speech at the
dinner of the League to Enforce Peace in May, 191 6, advo-
cated the use of force to support an international tribunal's
judgment. Since that time he has changed his mind, but in
his last speech he appreciates the seriousness of the proposal
sufficiently to discuss in more detail the plan of the League.
Mr. Knox has favored treaties of universal arbitration of
justiciable questions and therefore has also a past to observe.

The force and weight of objections to the League should
be gathered first from the attitude of mind of the objector.
If he is content to dispose of the matter on the ground that
the idea is an old one and has never been realized, we are
not likely to have useful help from him. One who does
not hope that the great war has changed the feeling of the
peoples of the world toward war so that they are willing to
bind themselves to a world policy of peace as they never
were before will certainly not entertain the plea of the
League with patience. He must be waked up before he will
give it his consideration. One who has no sense of respon-
sibility about future world peace, but is anxious to return to
domestic business and politics, is equally beyond reach.

It is only from those who appreciate our great oppor-
tunity in the dreadful results of this war to arouse all peoples
to the wisdom of uniting the major force of the world to

^ Article in Public Ledger Jan. 5, 19191

CRITICISM SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE I99

prevent their recurrence that we can have sympathetic dis-
cussion and constructive thought. The proposal of a league
of nations should not be flouted because the members of the
Senate are justifiably indignant over the way in which the
President has ignored them and ignored Congress in this
matter. When he returns with a treaty providing for some
kind of a league of nations to maintain peace, the people
are unlikely to be interested in the personal soreness of the
Senate or to accept that as any factor in judging the treaty.
The Democrats of the Senate, with only one or two excep-
tions, will approve what the President submits. If the
Republicans who object to the League are numerous enough
to defeat the treaty they will have to decide whether their
objection is really so weighty and sincere that they wish to
furnish it as an issue to the President and his party in the
next campaign. The pressure of the popular desire will be
to have immediate peace. The party which delays that must
have a strong case.

The League of Nations is very strong with the peoples of
Europe. It is growing stronger here. Organized labor has
approved it. It is going to attract the mass of wage-earners
and the plain people as it has abroad. With the President
and the Democratic party behind it, Republican objectors
who manifest no constructive desire to create machinery to
keep the peace, but depend wholly as of old on armament
and troops to settle difliculties, will not be heard with favor.
The contemptuous skepticism of the Senate cloakroom, the
cheap sarcasms of " the old diplomatic and senatorial band,"
the manifest spirit of " how not to do it," will be very poor
weapons with which to combat an idealistic campaign for a
definite plan for permanent peace and democracy.

The next presidential campaign promises well for the

200 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Republican party if that party, through its congressional
representatives, does nothing to change the present trend.
But if enough Republican senators attempt to defeat or hold
up the treaty of peace because it makes the United States a
member of a League of Nations to maintain peace they will
seriously endanger the chance of Republican success.

The Senators who discuss any plan for a League should
show their interest, not by knocking it out with one blow,
but by suggesting changes in it which would be more prac-
tical than the ideals proposed and would still serve the gen-
eral purpose. They should make their consideration hope-
ful and optimistic by searching for alternative details of
method which might avoid the objections they conceive. If
any of the critics of the League in the Senate, or out of it,
have given such evidence of their sympathetic interest in
the project and its purpose, it has not been brought to our
knowledge. The whole tone of the objectors has been
pessimistic. Running through all their attacks is the C3aiical
assumption that the great war has made no difference in the
attitude and duty of the peoples of the world toward war
and peace, except that for the time it has injured the power
of Germany to make further trouble. They, in effect, ad-
vocate the retirement of the United States to its shell of
isolation, to reappear again only when the war-making
proclivities of any nation, Germany, or any other country,
shall threaten the interests of the United States. This is
the gospel of despair and national selfishness.

The possibility of a breach of national faith may be
pointed out as a weakness of the League. If so, it is
inherent in every treaty, the value and utility of which must
ultimately rest in the honor of the nations making it. The
more responsible the nations the greater their power of per-

Roosevelt's contribution to league 201

formance, the keener their appreciation of their honor, the
clearer their perception of the value to themselves and the
world of maintaining the treaty, the greater the certainty
that the treaty will live and effect its purpose.

ROOSEVELT'S CONTRIBUTION TO LEAGUE

OF NATIONS ^

The last editorial of Colonel Roosevelt on the League of
Nations, posthumously published, is one of the most im-
portant he ever wrote. It is important in its useful sug-
gestions and limitations as well as in the spirit of construc-
tive statesmanship which prompted it and shines through it.

The idea of a League of Nations is not a new one, as
Senator Knox pointed out in his Senate speech. Among
others, Sully, the great minister of France, proposed it.
Tennyson with his poetic vision and pen fixed it forever in
memory. In more recent times Theodore Roosevelt, in his
speech accepting the Nobel peace prize, revived the thought
and gave it more definite character by emphasizing the
feature of an international police force which could impose
international justice.

During the war, men of action, intensely absorbed in the
great and critical task of developing all the energies of the
Allies to win in a contest so fraught with the fate of the
world, found it diflicult to be patient with the discussion of
a plan for peace which could only be realized after the war
was won, and under which they saw lurking a tendency to
a peace by negotiation and without victory. Roosevelt,

* Article in Public Ledger, Jan. 15, 1919.

202 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Clemenceau and Lloyd George shared this feeling. As
might be expected, it found freer expression from the Ameri-
can leader, in his unofficial status, than from the other two.
Colonel Roosevelt's nature recoiled from association with
an idea he found supported by men without a country who
exalt internationalism and deprecate nationalism. With
them the League of Nations seems to mean the dilution of
that intense and moving love of country, the source of all
real effective progress, into a nervous, colorless, flabby and
transcendental brotherhood of man. Universal brotherhood
should, of course, be an increasing influence in the world
and is, but it will never be useful if it means the loss of
patriotism. The relation of one to the other should be as
love of home and family is to the love of country. The one
strengthens the other. The emasculated supporters of inter-
nationalism as an antidote for love of country are inclined
to regard the home and family as reactionary. Those insti-
tutions find no sympathetic protection among the Bolsheviki,
foreign or domestic.

Moreover, men of the dynamic type, like Roosevelt, had a
suspicion that all pacifists were pressing a league of nations
as a stalking horse for compromising the vital principles at
stake in the war. Hence their coldness toward the subject
and their criticism of any definite plan. But proceeding in
due order, these men of action now find themselves con-
fronted by a situation that demands an organization of world
force to secure the just fruits of the war. Now they look
upon a league of the Great Powers, who won the war, as an
existing fact, and they face the problem of how the mani-
fold and complicated purposes of the treaty, after they have
been defined and the treaty signed, shall be effectively car-
ried out and maintained. As practical men they now take

ROOSEVELT'S CONTRIBUTION TO LEAGUE 203

up the League of Nations and study it in the earnest desire
to make it work.

In this way Theodore Roosevelt, having long ago pro-
posed a league in his Nobel prize address, was brought
around by logic of events to a sincere eflFort to frame a plan
which would avoid the numerous objections that have been
suggested by himself and others and still make progress
toward the ideal he held out at Christiania. He studied all
the plans proposed, considered their possible weaknesses and
defects and busied his ingenious mind with finding alterna-
tives which would be practical and still achieve the main
purpose. He had in his mind the thought that under the
general obligations of the League, when force had to be
threatened or used, a great Power like the United States
should act as a policeman in the western hemisphere, while
the great Powers of Europe should in the first instance keep
the peace of the world in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe*

It was clearer to him than it seems to be to others who
do not see the real need of a league and who are not so
anxious, therefore, to make it useful to the world, that the
European nations will only be too glad to recognize our
Monroe Doctrine as a policy in the interest of world peace.
Why should they not, when the principles and operation of
the League are really directed to the creation of a Monroe
Doctrine of the world?

What Colonel Roosevelt always insisted on was that the
United States should not promise in a treaty to do things
which it could not or would not perform. Certainly, every
one must sympathize with this common-sense restriction
upon tmwise and transcendental enthusiasm. He feared
there were issues not to be settled on principles of law and
thus called nonjusticiable, which might, nevertheless, be sub-

204 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

mitted to a court and decided against the will of a party to
the treaty. His suggestion is that each nation might state
those issues and after discussion have them specifically in-
corporated in the treaty as nonjusticiable.

He feared, too, that the United States might be committed
to an obligation not to maintain military preparedness
sufficient to protect itself against unjust aggression. He
protested against reduction of armament which was on the
theory that the League of Nations would form a substitute
for reasonable defense, at least until its efficacy for such a
purpose had been fully demonstrated by actual test of time.
Certainly, many who earnestly support a League concur
in such a view and believe with him that universal military
training of the Swiss type may well be instituted in this
country, both as an insurance against unjust aggression and
as a proper preparation for such contribution to the world's
police force as the United States may be called upon to make.
Incidentally it will constitute an important factor in the edu-
cation of our youth in the duties of life.

For these reasons the proponents of the League of Nations
to enforce peace may rejoice in this posthumous aid that
Theodore Roosevelt gives to the League. He has the great-
est personal following in this country, and his words go far.

His attitude toward the problems involved in the League
may well furnish an example to the doubters and opponents.
Let them treat the League as something in its purpose to be
desired, and let them lend their thoughts not to devising
and imaging objections but to finding alternative substitutes
in its structure which will not be subject to their own objec-
tions.

WHAT IT MEANS AND WHY IT MUST BE 205

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, WHAT IT MEANS

AND WHY IT MUST BE *

The original program of the League to Enforce Peace ^
adopted at Philadelphia June 17, 191 5, was enlarged and
made more ambitious at a meeting of the governing body
of the League on November 24, 1918. It then declared
that the initiating nucleus of the membership of the League
should be the nations associated as belligerents in winning the
war.

It declared further :

First, that the judgments of the international court on
justiciable questions should be enforced ;

Second, that the League should determine what action, if
any, should be taken in respect to recommendations of the
Council of Conciliation in which the parties concerned did
not acquiesce ;

Third, that provision should be made for an administra-
tive organization of the League to conduct affairs of common
interest and for the protection and care of backward regions
and international places and other matters jointly adminis-
tered before and during the war, and that such administra-
tive organization should be so framed as to insure stability
and progress, preventing defeat of the forces of healthy
growth and changes, and providing a way by which progress
could be secured and the needed change effected without
recourse to war ;

Fourth, that a representative Congress of Nations should
formulate and codify rules of international law, inspect the

^An address delivered before the National Geographic Society, in
Washington, D. C, January 17, 1919.
' The Program is printed in full on page i.

2o6 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

work of the League's administrative bodies, and consider
any matter affecting the tranquillity of the world or the
progress or the betterment of human relations ;

Fifth, that the League should have an executive council to
speak with authority in the name of the nations represented
and to act in case the peace of the world is endangered.

It further declared that the representation of the different
nations in the organs of the League should be in proportion
to the responsibilities and obligations that they assume, and
that rules of international law should not be defeated for
lack of unanimity.

It will thus be seen that the American association has be-
come more ambitious in its aims since its first declarations.
Under the first declaration it did not propose to enforce
judgments of the court or in any way to deal with the recom-
mendations of compromise, the exercise of force by the
League being directed only against a nation beginning war
before submission to the Court or the Council.

In England, after the organization of the American
League, a British League of Free Nations Association was
formed, proposing a Court and a Commission of Concilia-
tion, the use of force to execute the decisions of the Court,
and the joint suppression, by all means at their disposal,
of any attempt by any State to disturb the peace of the
world by acts of war.^

^The first important group formed in England for advancing the
idea of a League of Nations was the Bryce group. Others which fol-
lowed were the League of Nations Society, the Fabian Society group
and the Union of Democratic Control. The London International Allied
Labor and Socialist Conference Feb. 22, 1918, likewise put out a most
important program. Following the formation of the League of Free
Nations Association, to which Mr. Taft refers, that body and the
League of Nations Society merged into the League of Nations Union.
[Editor].

WHAT IT MEANS AND WHY IT MUST BK 2O7

It looked to the immediate organization of a League of
Great Britain and her then allies, with a view to the ultimate
formation of a League of Nations on a wider basis, includ-
ing states then neutral or hostile. It excluded the German
peoples until they should bring forth works meet for repent-
ance and become a democracy.

It contained a provision for action by the League as trustee
and guardian of uncivilized races and undeveloped terri-
tories. It proposed as a substitute for national armaments
an international force to guarantee order in the world, and
proposed a further function for the Council of the League
in supervising, limiting, and controlling the military and
naval forces and the armament industries of the world.

Late in 191 8 a French Association for the Society of Na-
tions ^ reconmiended that the Society of Nations should be
open to every nation who would agree to respect the right
of peoples to determine their own destiny, and to resort only
to judicial solutions for the settlement of their disputes; that
the use of force be reserved exclusively to the international
society itself as the supreme sanction in case one of the
member states should resist its decisions; that the Allies
shotild form their association immediately and should work
it out as completely as possible in the direction of sanctions
of every kind — moral, judicial, economic, and in the last
resort military — as well as in that of promulgating gen-
eral rules of law.

The French Society further provided that the Society of
Nations thus immediately formed should control and con-
duct the negotiations for the coming peace.

It will thus be seen that the League of Nations, as con-

^ In France we had, antedating the French Association for the
Society of Nations, two very active groups, The League of the Rights
of Man and League for a Society of Nations. [Editor].

208 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ceived by its proponents in three of the four great nations
that have won this war, has substantially the same structure.
It includes a court to decide justiciable questions, a Council
of Conciliation to consider other or nonjusticiable questions
and to recommend a compromise. It calls for the organiza-
tion of the combined economic and military forces of the
world to enforce the judgments of the courts, and to deal
with a defiance of the recommendations of the mediating
council as the executive body of the League shall deem wise.
■ •••••••

The American, English, and French plans all show a pur-
pose to create a smaller League of the allied nations fighting
this war, who are, so to speak, to be charter members of a
larger League, which they are to form by inviting other
nations into it as they show themselves fitted to exercise the
privileges of the League, to enjoy its protection and to meet
their obligations as members. The American plan refers to
these allied nations who won the war as the initiating nucleus
of the larger League.

Each plan looks to the enforcement of judgments and
leaves open to the League the question of what shall be done
with reference to compromises recommended and not
acquiesced in. Each one looks to a congress of nations to
declare and codify international law.

One of them provides for the reduction of armament;
the others omit it. It does not appear in the American plan.
I may say that this was not because the ultimate reduction
of armament was not regarded as important, but because it
was thought that this feature of a League of Nations might
meet serious objection until the League should be shown to
be an effective substitute for the insurance which reasonable

WHAT IT MEANS AND WHY IT MUST BE 209

preparation for self-defense gives against unjust foreign
aggression.

• •••••>•
What are the objections to a League of Nations developed

in this way and thus constituted ? The first and chief objec-
tion is that the United States ought not to bind itself to make
war upon the decree of an executive council in which it has
but one vote out of four or five.

What authority and duty does the executive council have
in the League? It will be its duty to see that judgments are
executed.

Why should we object if called upon to declare war and
make our contribution to the police force to maintain peace
by enforcing a judgment of an impartial court? Such a
judgment is not the result of the vote of other powers than
our own. It is merely a decision on principles of inter-
national law as between two contending nations.

We have heard a great deal during this campaign of inter-
national justice. Why should we favor international justice
and then refuse to furnish the machinery by which that jus-
tice can be declared and enforced? What risk do we run?

• ••.•••.
With reference to the enforcement of recommendations

of compromise, the executive council should consider
whether it is a case in which peace would be promoted more
by economic or military enforcement than merely by inter-
national public opinion.

If, in such a case, it is thought that a majority of the
executive council should not control the right to call for
military execution of the compromise, such action might be
limited to a unanimous decision of the executive council.

2IO TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

This would prevent the imposition of the burden of war, by
the determination of the League members, upon any nation
without its consent. Or the enforcement of such a com-
promise, if determined on by a majority of the executive
council, might be left to that majority.

Senator Knox seems to anticipate that the United States
will be drawn into war against its will by a majority vote of
a convention of heterogeneous nations.

No such result could follow from the organization of a
League as indicated above. The assumption that the votes
of Haiti, or San Salvador, or Uruguay could create a mar
jority forcing the United States into a war against its interest
and will, under a practical League of Nations, is wholly
unfounded. It would be left to the vote of an executive
council of the Great Powers, and even then the United
States, under the modifications above suggested, could not
be drawn into war against its will.

Objectors who rely on the Constitution seem to assume
that the League plans contemplate a permanent international
police force, constantly under command of a Marshal Foch,
who may order the international army to enforce a judgment
or a compromise without the preliminaries of declarations
of war by the League members. This is wholly unwar-
ranted and no plan justifies it. When force has to be used,
war will be begun and carried on jointly in the usual way.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND PRESIDENT
WILSON'S ADVISERS *

The reports of correspondents to whom has been attrib-

^ Article in Public Ledger Jan. 20, 1919L

LEAGUE AND PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADVISERS 211

uted the privilege of peeping into the presidential mind give
rise to some concern among the sincere advocates of a
League of Nations to Enforce Peace. The failure of the
President to indicate any definite structure for the League,
as the champion of which he is now hailed by the world with
such acclaim, creates an uneasy suspicion that he has not
thought out any definite plan of his own. In his frequent
references to the League, he has stated what it will not be
rather than what it will be. His attitude is that of one seek-
ing a plan which will encounter no objections either in the
congress at Paris or in the congress at Washington. In
the formulation of a new political institution the sincere and
successful builder works by the affirmative method primarily.
He has before him always the object to be achieved, and he
frames the cooperating parts of his plan with that first in
view. He should be trying to do something. He should not
be trying merely to fulfill a promise to do something by com-
ing as near to it as he can without meeting criticism. No
reform worth having was ever put through without a fight.
Faith not only in the value of the ideal but faith in a prac-
tical plan needed to realize the ideal is required to bring real
results.

The element of the plan of a present League of Nations,
which must distinguish it from past efforts to secure peace
by agreement of nations, is the organization of the forces of
lawful nations to compel justice from lawless nations. The
President loves to dwell on the moral sanction of justice
which is to prevail after this war. Let us agree with him
that it will be stronger than before the war and that in and
of itself it will help to make war less probable. But if that
is the only sanction the League of Nations is going to furnish
for the judgments of its court and for the suppression of

212 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

lawless violence by recalcitrant nations, it will be a failure
and a laughing stock — at least the influence of such moral
force will be as great without the League as with it.

It is unfortunate that the President, with his apparent lack
of any definite plan for a league should not be able to find
a single earnest supporter of a real league of nations to
secure peace in the commission which he has taken with
him.

Secretary Lansing has heretofore always been opposed to
a league of nations to enforce peace. His confidential ad-
viser, James Brown Scott, has always opposed it and vigor-
ously urged merely an international court, whose judgments
are to be enforced by the obligations of honor and moral
suasion. Mr. White has had the traditional attitude of the
old diplomatic hand toward such an innovation. Few know,
if any, what Mr. House's real attitude is or that of General
Bliss. The commission is now engaged in examining forty
different plans, we are told, with the hope, by the selective
method, of hitting upon something as innocuous to Senate
predilections as possible. A reported interview with Mr.
White makes conformity to the Senate's views his objective.
Has the cold attitude of the commission toward an effective
league been changed by the eagerness of the common peoples
of the Allies for it and by the enthusiasm with which the
President's eloquent periods concerning the League have been
greeted? Let us hope so.

Lloyd George and Clemenceau are practical men. They
have declared for a league. They will wish to create some-
thing which will be a real instrument to do the things that
have to be done by the treaty. They have men about them,
Lord Robert Cecil, M. Leon Bourgeois and others, who, as
earnest advocates of a league, have been framing plans and

"the league of nations is here" 213

studying details under the official authority of their respec-
tive governments. May we not hope that in this way there
will be offered to the President by Great Britain and France
the constitution of a league which will have vigor and clinch-
ing efficacy and which, after full consideration and needed
qualification, he will accept? A mere reliance on moral
force and good intentions to maintain peace among the new
and old nations of Central and Eastern Europe and to resist
and suppress the pacifistic ideals of the Bolsheviki, and the
massacres and destruction wrought by them, will make the
congress a dangerous and discouraging farce. It will be
retreat and not advance.

i€

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS HERE " ^

The expression at the Peace Conference of President
Poincare and Premier Qemenceau in reference to the
League of Nations and the published rules of the Congress
are reassuring to those who look to the growth of an effec-
tive and real league out of the situation. The French
leaders see clearly, and say with emphasis, that we have a
league of nations now, and that it must be maintained in
order to achieve the purpose of the war. The circumstances
of the struggle forced the Allies into an interallied council
and then into a common command of the armies under Foch.
But for that the war might not have been won.

The rules of the Congress recognize that the five great
nations, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United
States, are the ones which have an interest in all the

* Article in Public Ledger, Jan. 23, 1919.

214 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

questions coming before the Congress as guardians of the
welfare of the world, made so by the logic of their winning
the war. They are thus established as the initiating nucleus
of a world union, as the charter members of a league of
nations.

It is to be noted that the League of Nations is the first
subject to be considered by the Congress. This seems to be
at variance with the views of James M. Beck and Senators
Lodge and Knox. Mr. Beck argues that, as our fathers
waited five years after winning independence before mak-
ing a constitution, the nations ought to be equally deliberate
in discussing and framing a constitution for the world.
Most people agree, after reading the description by Hamilton
and Madison of conditions existing in the interval between
our independence and the convention of 1787, that it would
have been much better if the convention could have been
called earlier. Of course it may be said that the bad state
of affairs during the interval was necessary to bring the
people to see the necessity for a stronger government. But
surely Mr. Beck would not wish a recurrence of the quarrels
of nations and another war to convince the peoples of the
world of the necessity and advantage of world unity to sup-
press war and maintain peace. It is now, just after this
horrible war when its agonies, its sufferings, its lessons, its
inhuman character, all are fresh in the minds of men, that
they will be willing to go farther in making the needed and
proper concessions involved in a useful and real league of
nations. Delay will dull their eagerness to adopt the ma-
chinery essential to organized protection against war.

But another fact which Mr. Beck and Mr. Knox seem to
ignore is that a treaty of peace cannot be made at Paris, by
which the peace of Europe can be secured and maintained

"TttE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IS HERE*' 21$

without a league of nations. These gentlemen may well
be challenged to tell us what arrangements they would sug-
gest to the five nations engaged in forming this treaty for
peace and in making it work, unless it be a continuing league
of those five nations to maintain it.

How can the objects and purposes of the fourteen points,
especially those directed to rearranging the map of Eastern
and Central Europe and Asia Minor, be achieved and carried
to peaceful realization except through a league of nations
embracing the five great powers? No one opposed to the
league of nations idea has essayed to answer this very
practical question. The Paris conference is confronted with
it and must answer it suggestively by making the League of
Nations the first subject for discussion. Premier Clemen-
ceau said:

" The League of Nations is here. It is for you to make
it live." Senator Lodge in his speech fully recognized the
existence of the League of great nations in the war and the
necessity for its continuance. Indeed it is probable that if
Senator Knox and Mr. Beck were cross-examined, their ad-
missions would show them to be not very far removed from
the view that something substantially equivalent to a league
of great nations must be definitely formed by this Congress
with agreed-upon means of enforcing the stipulated peace.

The Associated Press informs us that a league of nations
is in the forming, but that the super-sovereignty of an inter-
national police force is to be rejected as part of it. This
negation is not very helpful. Except in Tennyson's poetic
vision and in the plans of impracticables, no such suggestion
as super-sovereignty has been advanced.

• ..•*•••

Most opponents of the League idea have assumed that the

2l6 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

so-called international police is to be a permanent body under
an international commander and subject to orders without
invoking consent of the nations contributing to the force.
This is a misconception. A potential international police
force will be erected by an agreement of the Great Nations
to furnish forces when necessary to accomplish a legitimate
purpose of the League. In most instances, no actual force
will need to be raised. The existence of an agreement and
confidence that the nations will comply with it is all that will
be needed. Nations who have judgments against them in a
court of the nations will generally perform them. It will
only be where defiances of such judgments will lead to a
dangerous war that the League force need be raised.

Of course, during the interval after the conclusion of
peace, the possibility of differences and the danger of Bol-
shevism may require a retention of some of the war army
strength of the Allies to see the treaty through to its effective
execution. But after the return of normal times the
strength of the League to secure compliance with the treaty
obligations and justice will not be in its serried columns, but
in its potential power under the joint agreement.

In the convenient division of the world into zones, in
which the respective Great Powers shall undertake the
responsibility of seeing to it that members of the League
conform to the rules laid down by the treaty, it will be
unnecessary for any nation to send forces to a distant
quarter. The United States can properly take care of the
Western Hemisphere and need not maintain in normal times
a military establishment more extensive than she ought to
maintain for domestic use and the proper maintenance of
the Monroe Doctrine without such a league. They may be
well supplied, not by a professional army, but by a system

THE league's '*BITE" 21 7

of universal training on democratic principles like that in
Switzerland or New Zealand. If this be conscription, its
opponents may make the most of it. It will help our boys
in discipline of character and in a most useful educational
way. It will provide for the prompt display of democratic
power to achieve justice. The picture painted by Senator
Borah of the army of the United States needed for the pur-
poses of the League is the result of a lively imagination, but
does not find support in the real need of the League.

After the League of the Great Powers has been estab-
lished for the purpose of executing the plans of the new
treaty, it will be time enough to take in all other responsible
Powers. The lesser League will grow naturally into a
larger League. Experience will test the practical character
of the lesser League and in this wise and in due course the
world League will come into being. But meanwhile as a
necessary condition precedent to the success of the treaty
of peace, it must provide for a League of the Great Nations.

THE LEAGUE'S " BITE "^

Those who are looking for something real in a league of
Nations to preserve peace, in creating sanctions for inter-
national law, justice and equity, may well feel concerned
over the developments in Paris. Such persons have based
their hopes on the psychological effect of the horrors of the
war upon all nations, which should make them willing to
concede much to achieve the main object of the war. They
have counted on securing a covenant between the members

1 Article in Public Ledger, Jan. ap, 1919.

2l8 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

of the League to unite, whenever necessity may arise, with
the powerful members of the League to compel compliance
with judgments of the League and to suppress recalcitrant
members faithless to the principles of the League and to their
obligations. They can hardly be blamed for so doing, in
view of President Wilson's words, as follows:

" I pray God that if this contest have no other result, it
will at least have the result of creating an international
tribunal and producing some sort of joint guaranty of peace
on the part of the great nations of the world." ..." Now,
let us suppose that we have formed a family of nations and
that family of nations says : ' The world is not going to
have any more wars of this sort without at least first going
through certain processes to show whether there is any-
thing in the case or not.' If you say, ' We shall not have
any war,' you have got to have the force to make the ' shall '
bite. And the rest of the world, if America takes part in
this thing, will have the right to expect from her that she can
contribute her element of force to the general understanding.
Surely that is not a militaristic idea. That is a very prac-
tical ideal."

The indorsement of these views by Mr. Lloyd George was
as follows:

" The best security for peace will be that nations will band
themselves together to punish the peace-breaker."

Mr. Asquith's comment on the President's views was as
follows :

" The President held out to his hearers the prospect of an
era when the civilization of mankind, banded together for the
purpose, will make it their* joint and several duty to repress
by their united authority and, if need be, by their combined
naval and military forces, any wanton or aggressive invasion

THE league's "bite" 219

of the peace of the world. It is a fine ideal, which must
arouse all our sympathies/'

From these statements of this ideal it is a descending
climax now to hear that no member of the League is to bind
itself to unite its forces with any other in enforcing the
judgments of the league court or in punishing the peace-
breaker. We are now to depend on moral force or the exer-
cise of an economic boycott, it may be, and on the general
public opinion of the world. If a nation which is interested
in a judgment in its behalf desires, it is to be given the right
to go to war to enforce it. We have still the wonderful
and eloquent preaching of the ideal of a League of Nations
while we see its strength and *' bite," to use Mr. Wilson's
expression, fading into merely moral aspirations and moral
sanctions.

This is doubtless in part due to the difficulties that the
nations now sitting around the council board in Paris are
having in maintaining their armies. After four years of
war the pressure of the men engaged in it to be released from
their military duty is so strong that the nations cannot resist
it. That is probably the explanation of the very weak policy
adopted in respect to the Bolsheviki. The Congress cer-
tainly would not have run the risk of exposing its members
to just criticism had they not felt deeply the difficulty con-
fronting them in sending an adequate force to Russia to
stamp out the contagion, to rescue the Czecho-Slavs and to
give Russia a chance. The error that our administration
made during the war was in resisting the urgent appeal of
our Allies to send a large force into Russia, through
Vladivostok and Archangel, to create an eastern front.
Such a force would have largely obviated the Bolsheviki
complication. The Czecho-Slovaks, whom we have

220 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

promised to help, are in a perilous situation, while our own
little handful of men are fighting an aimless fight against
great odds near Archangel.

Should they who have expected real " bite," to repeat Mr.
Wilson's expression, in the League of Nations, be dis-
couraged? Institutions like the League of Nations, which
represent an advance in civilization, are created by the
necessity of the situation.

• ••.*••*

It is, of course, difficult to comment on plans for the
League as they are outlined in the cabled reports of cor-
respondents. They seem to be anxious to convince every-
body that, while the League of Nations is a beautiful idea
and inspires emotion when urged as President Wilson urged
it in the congress at Saturday*s session, nevertheless, its
covenants are not going to involve any trouble or obliga-
tion or burden for the United States, but will permit com-
plete freedom of action or withholding of action when war
shall come again.

Lord Robert Cecil is reported to have suggested a court
to which all justiciable questions are to be submitted, while
nonjusticiable questions leading to trouble are to go to a
council of conciliation. This is accompanied, however, by
the notable proviso that every nation may determine for
itself whether the question threatening war is justiciable or
not. This is equivalent to saying that every nation may
keep out of the court of the League if it chooses, no matter
what the issue. The court is thus to be constituted to decide
questions which both quarreling nations are willing to sub-
mit to it. It is thus as effective as the present voluntary
arbitration of the Hague tribunal and no more. If, now,
every proposal with anything of a "bite" in it is to be

THE LEAGUE AND THE GERMAN COLONIES 221

weakened to ineffectiveness, the common peoples of France,
England, Italy and the United States, who have been look-
ing upon the League as a real machine, with the " bite " in
it to prevent future wars, may well feel that there has been
much thtmdering in the index about the League of Nations
without tangible result. If the League is only to be an
agreement to confer over any breach of peace by the nations,
and will not even bind nations to submit legal differences
to a court, the man in the street will not put much faith in
fine words in the future.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE GERMAN

COLONIES *

It was to be expected that selfish desire to take advantage
of the victory over Germany would appear in the congress
at Paris ; but it should not be gratified. The strength of the
Allies was in the justice of their cause German lies and
propaganda concealed the facts and at first misled many.
As the war progressed, Germany's sole responsibility for the
war and the grinning skeleton of her vicious purposes were
revealed. They were confirmed by her atrocious conduct of
the war. The claim of the Allies that theirs was only a de-
fensive struggle to save the world from the German monster
of militarism, in which they were prompted by no spirit of
conquest or self-aggrandizement, gained credence among all
nations. Declarations of war against Germany as the enemy
of mankind followed from every quarter of the globe. Her
isolation from all the world save from her allies, who were
under her iron heel, became a greater and greater factor in
lowering the morale of her people. The material influence

1 Article in Public Ledger Feb. 3, 1919.

222 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

of the moral righteousness of the cause of the Allies is one
of the inspiring circumstances in the history of the Great
War.

This feature of the victory should not be allowed to lose
its beneficent force by a yielding to selfish claims of partici-
pants in the peace pact. The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine
to France or even of the coal mines of the neighboring Saar
district is only justice. The German outrageous destruction
of the mines at Lens and elsewhere makes the transfer of the
Saar district only an equitable indemnity. The same view
justifies the delivery to Italy of Italia Irridenta. But no
such principle applies in respect to the German colonies.

All will applaud and support the conclusion that Germany
has forfeited ownership of her colonies. She has grossly
mistreated the backward peoples living in them, and in whose
interest they should be administered. How are they to be
governed? It is agreed that their peoples are now incap-
able of self-government ; that to attempt to extend it to them
would be only less hurtful to them than German domination.
Who then shall govern them? As a member of the confer-
ence, Australia asks the transfer of the South Pacific colonies
to it or to Great Britain, while British South Africa presses
for British control over the former German dependencies
in her neighborhood.

These pretensions are advanced on two grounds. First,
that in the past the proximity of German possessions has
been a continual threat to them, and, second, that their sacri-
fices in the war entitle them to take these territories over as
an indemnity. As to the first, the exclusion of German
control should remove any danger. As to the second, it is
contrary to principles upon which, under the armistice terms,
the treaty was to be framed. It involves in its essence the

THE LEAGUE AND THE GERMAN COLONIES 223

proposal that these countries and their backward peoples are
to be traded as a commodity to compensate the two British
dominions for sacrifices in war. They are thus to be treated
as something of value belonging to Germany and are to be
used as a substitute for money indemnity.

President Wilson insists that they should be administered
by the League of Nations for the benefit of theii" peoples. In
this he is clearly right. Where his proposal lacks strength,
however, is in his suggestion that the League shall
administer them through the British dominions as *' manda-
tories." Theoretically this means that the League shall
supervise while the respective dominions actually govern.
Previous experience shows that such arrangements are a
source of much friction and interfere with eflFectiveness.
The Algeciras method of dealing with Tangier and Morocco
was like this and was not satisfactory. Moreover, the deal-
ing by Australia and by South Africa with native races is
not likely to be as just and equitable as that of their mother
country.

Why should not the League itself establish and maintain
a proper government of these countries? We could be in
this way much more certain of right treatment of the back-
ward peoples than under the "mandatories." No danger
to their British colonial neighbors could arise f rcnn a govern-
ment of the League.

Why then does Mr. Wilson suggest this jJan which really
hides territorial acquisition and complete possession and con-
trol under a thin cloak of League supervision? It is
because he has not given any life to his ideal of a league.
If he gave it flesh and bones in real and definite machinery
and power, the purpose he has as to these German colonies
might be successfully worked out. As it is, these colonies

224 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

will in fact meet the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina under
Austria, which was complete absorption. It would seem to
be better for the backward peoples who are the wards of the
Peace Congress to give them directly and openly to Great
Britain, who will govern them more sympathetically and
wisely than will her own colonial daughters.

The President is being further embarrassed by the pro-
posal that the United States shall administer Constantinople,
Palestine and Armenia as a mandatory of the League. He
does not wish to entangle the United States in the compli-
cations of the near Eastern question, and no wonder ! Had
he and his colleagues planned a real League of Nations and
not a mere figure of rhetoric, or noble conception without
1)ody, the international agency to discharge this important
function would be at hand.

Will not these troublesome experiences with the very first
problems, simpler indeed than many yet to come, convince
the Congress that a real league of nations with a '' bite " in
it is indispensable in achieving their puipose ?

Is it too much to hope that the history of the framing of
the Constitution of the United States may repeat itself in
the present Congress and the proposed League of Nations?
When the members of the convention met there were no
definite plans of government except one which Hamilton had
formulated and which was not adopted. Few thought they
would be successful in framing a real nation. Hamilton
and a few other constructive statesmen were the only ones
who were not faint-^hearted. As their deliberations pro-
ceeded, as the necessities of the situation developed, proposals
which at first were thought to be chimerical and impossible
seemed to become more practical and necessary, and out of
it all we got our wonderful fundamental instrument of

FROM AN ADDRESS AT THE ATLANTIC CONGRESS 22$

government May not the League in the same way become
a living thing?

FROM AN ADDRESS AT THE ATLANTIC CON-
GRESS FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS, NEW
YORK, FEBRUARY 5, 1919.

You will only get the ideal court when the members are
independent, their only qualifications being their probity,
their ability, their learning and their experience.

They will not represent anybody, but simple justice, on
that court. They are to apply pure principles of law and
exercise their acumen to determine facts impartially in the
disposition of the legal questions which come before them.
Therefore it is not representative. But, appointees should
be distributed with reference to bringing in knowledge of
all law throughout the world, just as our own Supreme
Court is distributed, not by any law, but through the dis-
cretion of the Executive, so that the different parts of the
country, with different methods of administration of law,
may be brought in.

IRELAND AND THE LEAGUE ^

The resolution proposed in the House of Representa-
tives to urge upon the President in Paris that he take steps
to secure a government in Ireland independent of the gov-
ernment of Great Britain is ill-timed. It can only embarrass

1 Article in Public Ledger Feb. 13, 1919.

226 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

him in securing an agreement between the Great Powers
who are dictating the terms of peace to Germany and rear-
ranging the map of Middle and Eastern Europe.

The relation of Ireland to Great Britain is a British
domestic question, and cannot properly be made other by
the intervention of the United States. Hope of a satis-
factory peace in which the whole world is interested would
have to be abandoned if the Great Powers were to look
into and discuss the internal affairs of one another. The
relations of the government of France to Algiers, to Tunis,
to Morocco and her African interests, the relation of Japan
to Formosa, that of the United States to the Philippines,
to the Indian tribes or to the colored voters of the States of
the South, might all be thus added to the bewildering issues
that now claim the attention of the delegates at the Paris
conference. This treaty is to close the war with Germany
and her Allies, and England's relation to Ireland is not
germane to that war and has no connection with it

Irishmen must know that the wrongs of Ireland in the
past have sunk deep in the minds and memories of the
people of the United States. Whenever there has been a
movement to remedy these wrongs, whenever the issue of
home rule has been raised, it has awakened the strongest
sympathy in the hearts and soub of Americans, whether of
Irish blood or not. Americans have had immense satis-
faction in learning that the land laws of Ireland have been
so improved and changed that now there is a large increase
in the number of small farms owned in fee simple by the

farmers.

Sir Horace Plunkett, an Irishman, has led Irish farmers
into associations by which they have learned to improve their
agriculture and dairy farming, to unite in the disposition

IRELAND AND THE LEAGUE 227

of their product and get rid of the heavy toll of the middle-
men, so that to-day it is not too much to say that rural Ire-
land is in better economic condition than any other agri-
cultural part of the British Islands. This has been directly
due to the legislation of Parliament, the leadership of such
men as Plunkett, and the capacity for organization developed
among the farmers.

The political blundering of the English government and
what, to many of us, seems the unreasonable obstinacy of the
Protestant half of Ulster have prevented that home rule to
which most Americans believe that Ireland is entitled. If
she could have been made a Dominion like Canada, with
hardly more than nominal union to Great Britiain, except in
international matters, Ireland would certainly have been
satisfied before Sinn Feinism was fanned into flame by the
delay in home rule.

Self-determination is not a certain solvent of political
difficulty. Self-determination means a rule of the majority;
but the question what the unit shall be, of which the majority
is to rule, still remains. This is affected by considerations
of geography, language, race, religion and other factors of
solidarity or variety in the mental attitudes of the people con-
cerned. Geography forbids a separation of Ulster from Ire-
land, especially in view of the fact that Ulster has been repre-
sented in Parliament by half home rule and half unionist
members of Parliament. On the other hand, the geographi-
cal relation of Ireland to Great Britain makes the former a
necessary outpost against hostile attack, while the difference
in race and the traditional lack of sympathy justify the great-
est autonomy in Ireland consistent with British protection.

It is remarkable that Great Britain, which has been won-
derfully successful in dealing with colonial dependencies of

228 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

all kinds, should have been so unsuccessful in Ireland. This
has been true, even since her statesmen have been sincerely
and earnestly anxious to be just to Ireland, and to eliminate
completely from her Irish policy the motive which so long
disgraced it, that of exploiting Ireland and her people for
the profit of England. In Irish affairs, English statesmen
are always a length behind. They are always willing to g^ve,
when it is too late, that which would have satisfied Irishmen
at an earlier stage.

Whatever the merits of the issue now, it is not within the
field of jurisdiction of the Paris conference, and those who
press it there, whatever their motive, are not helping the
successful outcome of that fateful congress. Pressure for
the proposed resolution is due, first, to the sincere sentiment
for it of men of Irish blood in this country ; second, to the
desire of reckless politicians to win political support by its
advocacy, and, third, to the timidity of others who, though
really opposed to it as unwise, are afraid of the personal
political consequences of their opposition. Nor should we
omit from the elements pressing for its adoption a class of
persons anxious to make the conference at Paris a failure.
It is to be hoped that the resolution will be taUed.

THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS ^

The League to Enforce Peace, of which this is a congress
called for Oregon, Washington and Idaho, is a voluntary
association of men and women of the United States organ-
ized early in 191 5 to spread propaganda in favor of a plan

1 Address at Portland, Oregon, Feb. 16, 1919.

THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 229

for world cooperation to maintain peace, by enforced settle-
ment of differences likely to lead to war, on principles of
justice and fairness. Its promoters had long been interested
in promoting arbitration between nations. They thought
that the end of this world-destructive war would find the
peoples of the various countries in a frame of mind in which
they would gladly accept any reasonable international co-
operation to prevent war. Accordingly the League adopted
a platform in which it recommended that the United States
enter a League of Nations, in which the members of the
League should stipulate that all differences arising between
them of a justiciable character should be submitted to a
court and those of a non-justiciable character to a council
of conciliation; that every member of the League should
agree to refrain from going to war until after judgment by
the court or recommendation by the council of conciliation,
and that any member who violated this obligation by attack-
ing any other member should be overwhelmed by the
economic pressure of all the members of the League and the
joint military forces of the League, if need be. Similar
associations were formed in England and France, with
similar platforms, except that they provided for a forcible
execution of the judgments and a dealing with the recom-
mendations of the councils of conciliation by the League.

There has been until now no means of knowing exactly
what is meant by a league of nations except by reference
to the platforms of these voluntary associations. The
governments of England and France created commissions
for the special purpose of studying the proper framework
of a league of nations, but the result of their studies was
not given to the public. Our government had declined to
create such a commission. On Friday last, however, the

230 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

committee to whom the great Paris congress had delegated
the work of preparing a plan for a league of nations, of
which President Wilson was the chairman, made a report
which was concurred in by the representatives of all of the
fourteen nations at the conference. Now therefore we have
an authoritative statement of the constitution of a league of
nations and an official basis for its discussion.

This constitution is indeed wider in the scope of its pur-
pose than was the platform of our League to Enforce Peace.
The platform of our League was a mere skeleton. It had
prepared a tentative draft of a treaty to give it body and
constructive details, but that tentative draft was never given
to the public, because it was thought wiser by governmental
authority to withhold it. The sole object of the League to
Enforce Peace platform was to promote peace and avoid war
by instrumentalities for administering justice between na-
tions and by enforcing submission to such instrumental-
ities. It did not even contain a provision with respect to
the limitation of armament. The purpose of the constitu-
tion reported at Paris, which we may properly call " the great
covenant of Paris," is much wider. It rs to organize a real
and permanent league, whose first object is to provide for
the just settlement of differences between nations and the
prevention of war, and for this purpose to limit armaments.
Its second object is to exercise executive functions in the
administration of international trusts like the government of
backward peoples whom this war has released from the '
sovereignty of the Germans and the other Central Powers.
Its third object is to promote cooperation between the na-
tions, with a view to the betterment of the condition of labor
in all the nations and for joint action in respect to other use-
ful matters now dealt with by international bureaus, like the

THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 23 1

postal union. This provides a constant series of functions
for the League to perform and gives it substance.

The League is to be formed by a covenant which recites
in its preamble its general purpose, and then states in twenty-
six different articles the agreements included in the covenant.

The present membership of the League is to consist of
the fourteen nations who are to be signatories to the covenant
and to sigfn the treaty of peace. The most numerous acting
governmental branch of the League is a body of delegates to
meet once a year or oftener if necessary, to consist of at least
one representative and not more than three from each nation,
with but one vote for each state. This body of delegates is
to pass upon the question of membership of other nations
applying to be admitted. Before a nation shall be admitted
it must show itself able and willing to conform to the cove-
nant and must receive the vote of two-thirds of the members
of the League. This is drawn to keep Germany out until
she is fit. The body of delegates also has the function of
taking the place of the executive council as a tribunal of
conciliation and compromise when either party to the con-
troversy demands it. The most important agency of the
League is the executive council, which consists of representa-
tives of the five Great Powers and of four other members
to be selected by the body of delegates. This council has
numerous executive duties for the League and in most
respects is the League, and it performs an important function
in mediation and settlement of differences. There is a
permanent secretariat of the League, which is to be estab-
lished at the seat of the League, there to perform the duties
indicated by its name. A permanent military commission is
to advise the council on questions of the limitation of arma-
ment and upon military and naval matters. The League is

232 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

given a definite diplomatic status by securing to its repre-
sentatives the immunity and privileges of ambassadors and
extra-territoriality for the buildings and home in which it
has its headquarters.

States members of the League, having a difference, may
submit it by agreement to arbitration. The members of
the League covenant that if they become parties to an arbi-
tration they will abide the award of the arbitrators. If
either party objects to arbitration, then the difference is to
be submitted to the executive council for mediation or recom-
mendation. If the council succeeds in securing an agree-
ment it is to be published. If not, then the council may
report a recommendation. If it is unanimous, excluding
representatives of interested parties, then the council must
take measures to carry the recommendation into effect.
Should the executive council divide, the majority is required
to publish its recommendations with reasons and the minority
may do so, without further action.

Every member of the League agrees not to resort to
any war until three months after the difference between it
and its opponent has been submitted to arbitration and an
award made, or to the executive council and a recommenda-
tion made, and not then if the party against whom war is
threatened complies with the award or the recommendation.
If any member of the League begins war prematurely and in
violation of its agreement, such breach of its covenant is an
act of war against all other members of the League and is
to be met by universal boycott of all the members of the
League against the recalcitrant member. Not only is this
boycott to be conducted by members of the League, but they
are required to prevent non-members of the League also
from having any commercial or personal relations with the

THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 233

outlaw member and its nationals or citizens. The boycott
is to include a complete severance of all trade, financial and
personal relations between the citizens of the respective
countries, and a sundering of all diplomatic and consular
relations. The executive council is to recommend to the
members of the League the effective military or naval forces
which they should severally contribute to the armed forces
of the League to be used to protect the covenants of the
League. The members of the League are to divide the loss
incident to the boycott falling on some members and not on
others, and mutually to support one another in resisting any
special measure of hostility brought by the outlaw state
against any one or more of them. The League members
are bound to afford passage through their territory for the
force of any member or members who are cooperating to
protect the covenants of the League. The participation in
the boycott is obligatory upon all members of the League.
The contribution of needed military force from the several
members of the League, while fixed by the council, is not
obligatory. The result is, however, to create a state of war
between the recalcitrant member and all the members of
the League at their option, much like that existing between
certain South American countries and Germany during the
late war.

The Paris Covenant does not immediately provide a
permanent international court. It directs that the executive
council shall formulate plans for its establishment, and that,
when established, it shall be competent to determine any
matter which the parties recognize as proper to submit to it.
Its jurisdiction, therefore, even when created, will be de-
pendent on the voluntary submission by the parties.

When a difference arises between a non-member and a

234 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

member or between two non-members, they are to be invited
to accept temporary membership of the League for the pur-
pose of settling the dispute, in accordance with the proced-
ure just described. If the non-member refuses to accept
the obligations of the League, it is to be treated as a mem-
ber of the League would be treated which violated its
covenant. This attitude toward non-members is in pur-
suance of a declaration of the constitution that the League
is interested in the maintenance of universal peace and holds
any threatened breach of it as a matter of its concern as to
which it may take action.

Three classes of countries with peoples not ready for
self-government are committed to the trusteeship of the
League, which administers them through competent govern-
ments as mandatories of the League.

A permanent mandatory commission is established,
which is to require annual reports of the mandatories and
to see that the restrictions contained in the constitution or in
the special charters which are issued by the executive council
to mandatories have been observed.

Amendments to the covenant are to be made only upon a
unanimous vote of the executive council and a two-thirds
vote of the delegates.

This summary of the constitution of the League shows
very clearly that the nations that agreed to it intended to
give the League real power. This power rests on the cove-
nants of the members of the League and on their agreed
cooperation in the universal boycott and in their voluntary
cooperation by the use of military force to punish any cove-
nant-breaking member.

This Paris covenant has been made by the five nations
who are to prescribe the terms of the treaty of peace. It

THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 235

has been made in view of the necessities of that treaty and
the machinery required for its execution. This is a very
fortunate circumstance in the creation of the League and its
growth into a League of all Nations. A convention of all
the nations would never have agreed on anything as prac-
tical as this. Though the ultimate object of the League is
the protection of the interest of weaker nations, such nations
are most likely to be obstructive in their insistence upon
excessive representation. This League is growing up as an
institution forced by the necessities of the situation. It is
a wholesome and natural process in the establishment of
needed and permanent institutions. Out of a clear sky in
normal times it would be a matter of the utmost difficulty to
form such a League of Nations. Here the condition which
confronts the world and those responsible for its welfare
calls for immediate action. Out of that immediate action
comes this League, adapted to present uses and admirably
available as a foundation for a world league.

On the whole, the short program of the League to En-
force Peace, adopted in June, 191 5, differs but little from
the nub of this, except that military contribution is not
expressly obligatory and that in this either party to a differ-
ence may avoid a court and an award and seek a council of
conciliation in the executive body of the League where
unanimity of recommendation is required. The proposal
to use compulsion to secure submission rather than execu-
tion of judgment or recommendation came from the pro-
gram of the League to Enforce Peace, and was adopted by
General Smuts in a remarkable brochure submitted by him
December 16, 1918. It is understood that the President was
much impressed with the paper of General Smuts and with
his plan as well. We may be certain the constitution as

236 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

now adopted was largely taken from his recommendation.
He argued for the joint obligation of League members to
use force, which was only partly adopted, as I have pointed
out. He, too, recommended required submission of the
justiciable questions to a court and of nonjusticiable
questions to a conciliation council as the League to Enforce
Peace had done. But the Smuts plan was much more com-
prehensive than that of the League to Enforce Peace. From
that plan came the mandatory system of administering
backward countries and internationalizing cities as wards of
the League through competent and existing governments as
agents answerable to the League. From that plan came the
union of all present international bureaus under the League,
as well as the permanent secretariat. He advocated inter-
national labor reforms through the League, and this function
is left to be developed under the League. He, too, brought
non-members of the League under its influence and action.

The gfiving to the Great Powers five votes in an executive
council of nine is one of the most important features of the
constitution and is indispensable to any practical working
of it. They are the responsible members who are to do the
work. The minor states of the League enjoy its protection,
but will not be willing to expend money or effort in main-
taining its authority. They should not be permitted to
arrogate to themselves equal authority with the Great Powers
and thus seriously interfere with the League's efficient
operations. This is a sufficient safeguard against a too early
admission of Germany.

The treaty of peace to be framed is to deal with Middle
and Eastern Europe, the Near East and the German colonies.
The plan is to create ten or a dozen new states, more than
half of them independent republics and the remainder under

THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 237

some sort of suzerainty of the League. These new states
are to be founded not only in the interest of the peoples who
form them, but also to constitute bulwarks against a revival
of German power. Finland, the Baltic provinces, Poland,
the Czecho-Slovak state, the Ukraine, the Jugo-Slav state
are all to be republics to curb and make impossible a revival
of Germany's dream of Middle Europe and of an empire
reaching from Hamburg to the Persian gulf. They are to
prevent the extension of Germany's influence in Russia,
where her commercial schemes have had in the past a con-
trolling influence. These new nations must be rendered
stable and must be kept at peace with each other and at
peace with the countries out of which they have been carved.
They will cherish resentments against their former owners
because of the oppression which they suffered at their hands
and the latter will feel bitter toward them because their inde-
pendent existence will remind them of their deserved humi-
liation and defeat. Moreover, their peoples have never been
used to self-government and we must expect internal dis-
orders, due to that lack of self-restraint that practice in self-
government gives. They are to be six or seven Cubas and
must remain under the kindly assistance of the nations who
dictate this peace until their stability is secured.

The League of Nations which existed during the war,
and by which the war was won, continues in the conference
at Paris and must be continued, after the signing of the
treaty, with machinery to secure the peaceful settlement of
the myriad questions and differences that will arise between
the new countries and the old in the ultimate establishment
of their relations. The flxing and the maintenance of the
boundaries in the Balkans, always a most diflicult question,
and the determination of the rights of new neighbors will be

238 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

a continuous source of adjudication and adjustment if peace
is to be enjoyed instead of a continual state of war. In
responding to these necessities this League has been con-
stituted. No one could look into the problems before the
nations ccxnferring at Paris without realizing that a league
with judicial and adjustment machinery and provision for
the enforcement of judgments and settlements was an abso-
lute requirement. As the conferees proceed to consider the
details of the treaty and the need for speedy and in forced
settlements and measures repressive of war, they may con-
clude that the provisions contained in this constitution are
not fully adapted to the present needs. If so, special articles
can be added to the constitution to meet such exigencies.
Indeed one may reasonably predict that within the elastic
provisions of this constitution new means will be developed
to increase the effectiveness of the League as a peacemaker.

On the whole, we should thank God that such a great
advance toward the suppression of war and the promotion
of permanent peace has been make as in the agreement upon
this constitution, with every reasonable prospect of its em-
bodiment into the permanent treaty at Paris. Is it possible
that such a vital feature of the treaty, upon which fourteen
states through their representatives at Paris agree, is to be
defeated by the lack of the necessary two-thirds vote in our
Senate? I cannot think so. When President Wilson
returns to present the result of his visit to Europe it must
be that the American people will welcome him with approval
and congratulations upon the success of the congress in
which he has taken so prominent a part.

In the President's addresses and messages during the
war and since, he has promised to the long-harassed peoples
of the Allied nations that the United States would press for

THE GREAT COVENANT OF PARIS 239

a League of Nations which should secure permanent peace
when this war ended. Thus he revived the morale of the
war-weary soldiers and workers of our Allies. These
promises were not repudiated by any American when they
were made. They were echoed in all the appeals to the
American people and they found ready response among them
and no protest. The nation is thus pledged to the idea of
a League of Nations to render peace permanent. Good
faith requires that what other nations are willing to under-
go to secure the peace of the world we should ourselves be
willing to undergo.

Only now, after the reaction that the end of the war
brings and after impatience at the delays in reaching peace
conditions, do we hear on the floor of the Senate the criti-
cisms of the President's promise of a league of nations.
If uttered during the war they would have been out of tune
with the overflowing spirit of the American people and their
determination to win this war and end the possibility of any
such war in the future. Now for the first time do we hear
the claim that we did not go into this war for the benefit of
the world, but for our own selfish purposes.

Senator Poindexter attacks the eighth article of the con-
stitution of the League on disarmament as follows:

" The provision is unconstitutional and an impairment
of the sovereignty and independence of this country."

Congress under the constitution determines what our
armament shall be; and therefore, even if we made an agree-
ment, Congress would retain the constitutional power of
violating that agreement and increasing the armament be*
yond the limit set ; but that does not prevent the treaty-mak-
ing power from entering into the obligation. It is not a
transfer of sovereignty — it is only an agreement to limit

240 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF 17ATI0NS

our fortifications and our means of attack in consideration
of other nations doing the same thing. The most famous
agreement that we have made on this point is the agreement
we have with Great Britain, by which we bind ourselves not
to fortify the water boundary between Canada and the
United States, or to place war vessels on the lakes. That
agreement is of one hundred years' standing, and has been
praised by every statesman who has referred to it. It was
first made by correspondence between two secretaries of state
and afterwards was embodied in a treaty. Does Senator
Poindexter claim that this was unconstitutional and
destroyed the sovereignty of the United States ? The Sena-
tor says we cannot agree with another nation to take over
and govern the exclusive right of manufacturing munitions
and instruments of war. Why not, if other nations agree
to do the same thing and to limit their production in the
same way? The trouble with Senator Poindexter's concep-
tion of this government is that it hasn't the powers of other
great nations to help along the world by a joint agreement
that shall prevent the dangerous increase of armament on
the part of any nation. In asstuning to exalt the sovereignty
of the nation as above ever)rthing, he falls into the error of
minimizing its power to do anything to help the preservation
of peace.

Senator Poindexter objects to article XVIII, in which
the League is to supervise the traffic of arms in countries
where it is deemed necessary, for the public welfare, to re-
strict the traffic. No one who is not a searcher for objec-
tions could apply that article to the United States. It of
course refers to countries of backward peoples who cannot be
trusted with firearms, and whose use of them the world may
well restrict to maintain its safety.

TO BUSINESS MEN 24 1

The most extreme position of Senator Poindexter is
that the United States cannot consent to arbitration of issues
between it and other countries because it might affect the
vital interests of the nation. There have been scores of
arbitrations between the United States and other countries,
many of them of very great concern. The question of the
payment of the Alabama claims related to a principle of
international law and international safety that was of
the highest importance. The arbitration of the Alaskan
boundary was another. The arbitration of our rights in the
Bering Sea and in the seal herd of the Pribilof islands was
another. On this arbitration we submitted to the decision
of an impartial tribunal the question whether we had the
rights or not which we claimed. The assumption that either
the court of arbitration or the executive council of the
League by unanimous judgment would seek to take away
the sovereignty or the liberty or the independence of the
United States is utterly gratuitous. It is so extreme a view
that it ought not to be given any weight as an objection to
machinery for the peaceful adjustment of differences by
decision of international courts.

TO BUSINESS MEN ^

We have been discussing the question for four years as
to how the world could make anything out of this war that
would be useful for its further progress. Four years ago
we adopted a plan in the League to Enforce Peace which

^ Address before the Commonwealth Club of California, at San
Francisco, Feb. 19, 19 19.

242 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

provided for the cooperation of nations in attempting to stop
the spread of war. We thought that if there was anything
silly, anything cruel, it was war, and that the nations could
not be said to be forward-looking or intelligent or business-
like, or even to have common sense, if they permitted the
condition of affairs to continue which made possible such a
war as we have just had. That was an academic question
when we raised it — academic in the sense that people were
thinking rather of how the war could be ended than what
we should do after it ended.

Then we got into the war ourselves. We were a long
time in getting in. As we look back upon it now, I think
we regret that we did not get in earlier. I am offering no
criticism that we did not, because our hindsight is always
a great deal better than our foresight ; but what I would like
to say to you gentlemen, business men of San Francisco, is
this: use your foresight now rather than your hindsight
hereafter in respect to this particular question that we are
bringing before you. I do not want you to be in the attitude
of the man who rides with his back to the engine and does
not see anything until he gets by it. And that is what you
are likely to do unless you take this thing to heart and under-
stand what the necessity of it is and what it means.

If, in ten or twenty years, we are called into another war,
that war will be world suicide. The instrumentalities now
capable of being used in war are far more destructive than
they were when this war began; we have discovered
explosives and poisonous gases which can destroy a whole
community.

Are we going deliberately to allow that condition to con-
tinue which will make such a war possible? Are we going
to sit down here in San Francisco and think that we are so

TO BUSINESS MEN 243

many thousand miles away from Paris that we are not con-
cerned in that matter ?

That is what we thought for three years of this war, and
then we were drawn into it. And even when we were drawn
into it we did not realize it: it was still remote. I know
what I am talking about. I was going around the country.
Those in Washington and those in responsible positions
began to realize what it meant. But it was a long time
before the real spirit of earnestness entered into the people
of the United States; and it spread west with a good deal
of slowness. Finally it became the solidest public opinion
that America ever had.

Now comes the reaction from the efforts made to win
the war and we are looking around to get on a peace basis.
We feel that the war is over and that Germany, under this
armistice, cannot again come to the front as it did. There-
fore we will let the world wag as it will and we will not
concern ourselves about finishing a task in such a way as to
make another war impossible.

I want to stir you up, men of business ! The labor men
are getting stirred up; they are receiving communications
from their brethren over there and they are beginning to
understand it. Now, I want you to study this thing, and
take it to your hearts and souls, and understand that no
one has a deeper interest in getting this League of Nations
than you have.

The American people are intelligent, but the difficulty is to
challenge their attention. They have got their minds on
something else. That something else is the question of
domestic readjustment, and this deliberation at Paris and the
telegrams concerning it, though they fill the front page of
the newspapers, do not bring home to you the issues that

244 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

are in Paris. The question is whether you are up to date ;
whether you sympathize with the forward-looking men that
are trying to take a great step forward in civilization and end
war or make it so remotely possible that you can say that
the prospect is that it is ended; whether you are going to
agree with men who believe that the sovereignty and the Con-
stitution of the United States lend themselves to going for-
ward with other nations, or whether you agree that they are
to be perverted to defeat the plans of the world framed to
benefit mankind.

Is it possible that we cannot agree to settle our differ-
ences peaceably and refrain from appealing to the arbitra-
ment of war, which seldom results in justice but always in
the victory of the strongest? Sometimes the strongest is
right ; sometimes it is wrong. Now let us adopt some means
of settling differences that shall lean on justice as a guide,
and not on force.

Our President, representing this country, and the thirteen
nations there in Paris have agreed upon a League of Na-
tions.

I wish you would study that covenant ; I wish you would
work out what it means. It is a well-conceived plan. It
does not involve as much compulsory force as our League
to Enforce Peace has recommended, but it comes very near
it ; and it carries with it an arrangement for amendment and
for an elasticity that, as experience goes on, will enable the
League to adopt other methods.

Those nations that are gathered at Paris are in the
presence of a very serious problem. Study it; analyze it;
see whether they can get along without a League; see
whether they can get along without the instrumentality for
deciding questions justly by a tribunal of judges ; see whether

TO BUSINESS MEN 245

they can get along without a council of conciliation to adjust
and readjust matters between the many new states there
created.

• •••••■•

We are interested in that problem. Our soldiers are over
there to see that this peace is carried through. We are
going to be involved in any mix-up that comes from an
attempt to settle this war without having the instrumentality
for making that settlement effective. It is not a remote
thing. It is at your door. We have got the responsibility
for this peace along with all the other nations. These
nations have realized that responsibility and have established
the League of Nations, founded now with fourteen mem-
bers, with a view of enlarging it afterwards and letting in
others as they shall show themselves fit.

The covenant provides a way for the nations constantly
to confer, to get closer together, to bring about a better
understanding and to resort to joint action, when necessary,
to secure justice.

Can we avoid that ? Are we going to retire into our shells
and say, " We are all right ; we have resources within our-
selves ; we can live against the boycott ; we can go on chasing
the dollar comfortably and keep our people prosperous.
What is the use? Why should we bother ourselves about
other nations ? " That is what we thought before this war,
but we thought wrong.

Now, merely on selfish grounds, in order to avoid the
disasters that may come to us in another war, we ought to
do everything we can in the way of reasonable contribution
to the general safety — and, certainly, all that is asked of us
here is reasonable contribution. We are asked to join in
a boycott, to unite with the other members of the League to

246 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

say to any outlaw or recalcitrant nation that threatens to
bring on war, ** When you do, we will suspend all contracts
and the payment of all monies which may be owing to your
citizens; all the food, all the products, manufactures and raw
materials, we are sending you will be stopped. We will
withdraw our ambassadors and consular agents." And
when all the world says that to a nation, that nation will
occupy a position grand and gloomy, but peculiar.

We agree among ourselves that if there is any special loss
to individual nations, all the other nations of the League will
share that loss. The boycott may prove to be expensive.
It may prove troublesome to some of our merchants who
have dealings with the outlaw nation. But we can indem-
nify them, and doubtless the country would be entirely will-
ing to do so.

So far as forcing this country into war is concerned, there
is nothing in the constitution of the League that does this.
Such a provision is found in the program of the League to
Enforce Peace, and I should be glad to have it in the cove-
nant. France wanted it. She is at the point of danger
and she thinks she needs an obligation on the part of the
other nations to come to her assistance ; but the other nations
did not agree to go so far. All they did was to provide that
the executive council should recommend the number of
forces that each country should contribute to make the
League eflFective, and any neighbor of the outlaw nation
is bound to allow the League's soldiers to go over its terri-
tory. The agreement does unite us with other nations; it
does say that we shall live up to our ideals in dealing justly
with other nations and respect their sovereignty ; but that is
all it entails.

We are told in a set of lurid speeches that we are sur-

FROM AN ADDRESS AT SAN FRANCISCO 247

rendering our sovereignty and violating the Constitution.
My friends, I recommend you to read the speeches that were
made after the Constitution of the United States was
framed, the speeches of George Mason and Patrick Henry
and Samuel Adams, and of all those patriots who were
vociferous in denunciation of the Constitution of the United
States. You will find nothing in the present speeches in
the Senate more startling.

Accompanying a forward movement there are always
some who are looking backward. You always have those
who see the difficulties without seeing the advantages. In
the enthusiasm of debate they exaggerate difficulties;
whereas, after the thing is done, they are very willing to for-
get it, and others have not time to look back to see how
lacking in foresight these men were.

FROM AN ADDRESS AT SAN FRANCISCO,

FEBRUARY 19, 19 19

In addition to its functions in respect to peace and war
and the administration of territories containing backward
peoples formerly administered by the defeated Central
Powers, there are to be gathered, to act under the auspices
of the League, all existing international bureaus like the
postal tmion and all future international bureaus, including
a new international bureau of labor under which it is pro-
posed that, by international agreement, more humane con-
ditions in respect to labor of men, women and children may
be effected.

They give the Paris covenant wider scope and are greatly

248 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

to be commended. They give the League substance and
constant operation in some of its functions which will greatly
promote the unity of nations. Out of this nucleus will come
closer understanding and greater mutual interest suggesting
new fields of international action for the betterment of man-
kind.

The administra^tion of the German colonies with back-
ward peoples in Africa and in the Pacific and the
government of countries like Palestine, Syria, Armenia,
Mesopotamia and the Caucasus, not yet ready for self-
government, is a problem forced upon the League because
these countries cannot be trusted to the suzerainty or govern-
ment of the defeated Powers. Their previous conduct
toward them has forfeited all right, if any ever existed, to
have them restored.

• .....•a

We agree to limit our armament in consideration of the
other parties to this treaty limiting their armament, thus
reducing the necessity for our maintaining an armament
beyond that stipulated. The limitation upon our armament
is not arbitrarily fixed by somebody else. It is to be fixed
upon the recommendation of the executive council and
agreed to by us. As our armament potentially threatens
the other countries if used in a sinister way, so their arma-
ment potentially threatens us, and so by joint agreement we
reduce the mutual threat by common proportionate reduc-
tion. To hold this beyond our power would be to hold that
there is no possibility of curbing competitive armament,
which, if it is to go on — and it will go on unless restrained
— will invite world suicide.

FROM AN ADDRESS AT SALT LAKE CITY 249

FROM AN ADDRESS AT SALT LAKE CITY,

FEBRUARY 22, 1919

When they object to certain features of this covenant let
them tell us what they would substitute for them in order to
accomplish the same purpose. Have you heard any con-
structive suggestions from them? They do not enter into
the consideration of this League in the proper spirit. The
IH'esident has been struggling over there, with his colleagues
in that conference, to work out the most difficult problem
that has ever been presented to a congress. They have
criticized him for going over. I am glad he went, because
he got into the atmosphere of the conference, and there on
the ground it was brought home to him what a tremendous
problem it is for those nations, in conference, to settle ; and
there he learned, as he never had before, the necessity for a
league of nations.

Why should we enter into the League ? Well, I want to
give you three commanding reasons : In the first place, we
fought this war to secure permanent peace. That is what
we promised our people when we came here and elsewhere,
through our speakers, pleading for the Liberty Loan. They
oflFered to you what ? They offered to you the prospect of
victory; and with the victory the defeat of militarism; and
with the defeat of militarism, safety for democracy; and as
a basis for safety for democracy, permanent peace. Those
were the great objects proclaimed when we roused our
people to action. Those were the objects proclaimed to
our boys as they went over: " Go," we said; " we follow
you with our hearts ; we offer to make every necessary sacri-
fice because the struggle is worthy of every sacrifice."

Did we mean that, or didn't we mean it? That is the

250 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

question. If we meant it, are we going to abandon the task
and run away just at the moment when we can clinch it?
Are we going to say to other nations : " No, we will not run
any further risk. We have done all we ought to do. We
will let you try to maintain the peace without us.'* Is that
what we promised when we went in? Is that what we gave
those peoples to expect when we sent the messages of our
President across the seas? What did those messages con-
tain? They contained a promise that we would fight this
war through to victory, to the defeat of militarism, to
making the world safe for democracy, to permanent peace.
By what — by what, my friends ? By a league of nations.
That is what we said. That is what the President said ; and
he said it in a number of notes. The premiers on the other
side said, " We agree to a league of nations." Now, what
was the effect of those promises? It was to stiffen the
morale of the plain people of those countries. At other
conventions we have had present, as speakers, members of
labor commissions and socialist commissions that were sent
over by our government to talk with labor and socialist
groups on the other side. What for ? To offset the insid-
ious conspiracies of German socialist and labor groups,
aimed to defeat, to destroy the morale of those suffering
peoples in France and Italy and England, who had been
three long years in the war with the end nowhere in sight.
When we came in with the promise of an army, their morale
improved ; though when our soldiers failed to come soon in
great numbers, it began to weaken again. Then we followed
with a promise to send more, and with the promise that we
would give them a league of nations in order to make the
peace permanent when it was won. These labor delegates
testified to us that what maintained the morale of those

FROM AN ADDRESS AT SALT LAKE CITY 25 1

people to fight the war through — soldiers, working men,
all — was the promise of a league of nations in which the
United States would take part. No one, at that time, when
the President was promising this league of natoins, no one
said nay, in the Senate or elsewhere. Why not? Because
the spirit of the people was aroused. They were willing to
go the whole length in order to achieve this purpose; and
there could not be a higher or a more glorious purpose. I
do not mean to say that we did not enter this war with the
idea that our interests were affected; but I do say there
never was a war fought through in which a nation was less
motived by desire for gain of power, for gain of money,
for gain of territory, for the acquisition of anything 1
permanent peace, than this war.

Some say : " Let them have a league of European na-
tions and leave the United States out." That is a great
mistake. Who would constitute such a league? England,
France and Italy — three nations. You would have an
Entente Alliance ; that is all — a balance of power with all
the disappointing results that we have had in previous bal-
ances of power. The United States is indispensable to
make that league go as a general league of nations, for the
reason that it is the most disinterested member, the purest
type of democracy, and its presence in the League will
repudiate and refute any suggestion that it is an intrigue for
autocratic action. Our presence will give to the League a
potential strength and prestige which it will not have without
us. So it is our duty to join, if we want to see the thing
through, if we want to be square with those who fought
this war for three years for us. We did not know they were
fighting the war for us ; but we found it out. They made
enormous sacrifices before we went in. Are we going to

252 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

say to them now : " We will not help further; our Consti-
tution forbids; our policy against entangling alliances for-
bids. Oh, yes, we want to help you, but really, . . ."?
How do you like that? How would you like to play that
role in a partnership ? I say that the men who advocate our
staying out of the League by reason of a policy against
entangling alliances laid down by Washington, for a small
nation struggling for existence, whereas to-day we are one
of the most powerful nations in the world — I say that
these men belittle the United States and its people.

• •••*•••

It is alleged that our entry into a league of nations would
imperil the Monroe Doctrine. Now, what is the origin
and nature of this doctrine? It was announced in a mes-
sage of President Monroe to Congress in 1823 under the
following circumstances. Many of the Spanish colonies
had, from time to time, declared their independence and the
United States had recognized them as independent govern-
ments. The Holy Alliance, formed to perpetuate the
" Divine Right of Kings," and consisting of Russia, Austria
and Prussia, had threatened to help Spain recover these
colonies. Mr. Canning, the British foreign minister, had
urged upon our minister at London, Mr. Rush, the necessity
for action to prevent this step and proposed that the United
States and Great Britain unite in a protest against any such
attempt. Thomas Jeflferson and James Madison, both of
whom were consulted by Mr. Monroe, thought the suggestion
of Great Britain should be accepted and that there should be
such an agreement to prevent the Holy Alliance from inter-
fering with governments in this hemisphere. John Quincy
Adams, who was Secretary of State, opposed the suggestion
of a joint declaration. He felt that we should make the

FROM AN ADDRESS AT SALT LAKE CITY 253

announcement alone, and his view prevailed. The message,
probably drafted by Adams, opposed any extension of the
monarchical system by interference with independent repub-
lics on this side of the water, and, having in mind Russia's
attempt to push down her boundary in the old territory of
Oregon, asserted that there was no longer room for future
colonization by European governments in the Western
Hemisphere. ^ That is the Monroe Doctrine as originally
proclaimed. Later, on, occasion gave rise to the extension
of the doctrine in two instances. On one occasion some
filibusters, who had gotten temporary control of Yucatan,
offered to sell it to President Polk. When he said to them
" I do not want Yucatan," they threatened to sell it to
France or England. To this threat Polk responded, " No,
you will not; we will not permit it." It was Polk who in-
troduced that new feature of the Doctrine. Again, in my
administration, a resolution was introduced in the Senate de-
manding to know the circumstances under which certain
lands on the shores of Magdalena Bay in Southern Califor-

^ The language of Monroe's message is :

"The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle
in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved,
that the American continents, by the free and independent condition
which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be
considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.

"We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their
system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace
And safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any
European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But
with the governments who have declared their independence and
maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration
and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any inter-
position for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other
manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than
as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United
States."

254 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

nia were being taken over by a sjmdicate. It was reported
that the Japanese were trying to get a base there. On inves-
tigation the State Department found the facts to be the fol-
lowing. A syndicate, which had acquired some thousands
of acres on Magdalena Bay as an investment, were disap-
pointed in their venture and attempted to unload. The at-
torney, in whose hands they had placed the matter, tried
unsuccessfully to sell the property to a Japanese company,
and thereupon told the '' cock and bull '' story about a Jap-
anese corporation trying to acquire the land with a view to
turning it over to the Japanese Government. But the Senate
passed a resolution to the effect that outside nations could
not be allowed to acquire strategic points near the United
States and thus endanger its interests. I do not object to
this extension of the Monroe Doctrine. On the contrary
I think it is a good thing. But the spirit of the League
covenant would prevent that sort of transaction; though, if
we desire our view of the matter to be doubly fortified, I
have not the slightest doubt that we could get it specifically
recognized in the covenant.

The Monroe Doctrine has never been violated, except
when France, under Napoleon III, seized Mexico. That
trespass was shortlived ; for when we got through with the
Civil War and sent Sheridan to the border, France with-
drew. The Monroe Doctrine, in so far as it forbids the
overthrow of independent governments, is in accord with the
principles of any league of nations thus far proposed. It
is covered over as with a blanket by Article X of the present
covenant. Therefore, if *iny government did attempt to
come over here to violate it — and when you are in the
Senate you just see them coming — we could, under the
provisions of the League, summon the united forces of the

l-KOM AN ADDRESS AT SALT LAKE CITY 255

League to prevent it. We would not be compelled to act
as the sole policeman of this hemisphere, as we are now
under the Monroe Doctrine. Instead of the doctrine being
imperiled, it is strengthened. Its violation would, in every
case except that of the sale of territory, be a direct violation
of the legal rights of one of the nations of this hemisphere
and would be a case for the League Court, brought by the
assailed nation against its assailant. The judgment would
be one which the United States would probably be delegated
to enforce, acting exactly as it does in enforcing the Monroe
Doctrine independently.

President Wilson said that a league of nations would
extend the Monroe Doctrine to the world. Now, if it is
extended to the world, I presume it would remain in the
Western Hemisphere. The object of such extension of the
doctrine would be to prevent the very thing which the United
States resents, namely, the overthrow of weaker nations by
force, and that is what all this machinery is provided for.
The language of Article X is: "The members of the
League undertake to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political
independence of all members of the League. In case of
any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of
such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by
which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

This is a declaration against the disturbers of political
independence and territorial integrity everywhere. I can-
not read it in any other way. If that be so, the League and
the United States will be maintaining the same thing, and
signing the treaty will only give to the United States the
protection of the League in its traditional attitude.

When the Monroe Doctrine was declared by the United

'256 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

States, many American statesmen thought that it would
certainly involve us in constant wars. For nearly a century,
however, it has been peacefully and successfully maintained.
Not a shot has been fired by the United States, not a soldier
of the United States has been killed or injured in support
of it. Its mere announcement, coupled with our known
determination to enforce it, has dispensed with the necessity
for the exercise of force.

It is a mistake to suppose that, under the League covenant,
the armies of the United States are to be called into distant
countries. We must expect the Executive Council to be
reasonable in its recommendations in this respect not only
because it will wish to be just but because it will want to
act promptly in suppressing disturbance and the threat of
war, and it can do this best by calling upon nations which
are close at hand and which can do the work of the League
most conveniently and economically. Moreover, with the
unanimity required of the Council by a proper construction
of the covenant, the presence of our representative in that
Council will naturally make certain only a proper assign-
ment of the League's work to the United States. The as-
sumption that membership in the League will involve us
in frequent wars is directly contrary to its purpose and
natural operation. Its potential primitive force will prevent
the coming of war.

Finally comes the question, my friends, whether we are
willing to run the risk involved in joining the League.
How much risk is there? I have tried to show that the
risk is the danger of a boycott, the cost of a boycott, divided
up between all the nations of the League, the risk involved
in consenting to limit armament, after we have learned
and consented to that limit, and the agreement to pay the

BARRIER TO ANY GREAT WARS IN FUTURE 257

expenses of a secretariat of the League jointly with other
nations. As a consideration, we secure the strength of the
union of nations in common action and a common purpose
to suppress war and make peace permanent.

I appeal to the women who hear me: Do they want
war again ? Are they not willing that we should make con-
cessions now in order that we may avoid war ten and twenty
years hence? Do they wish their children and their grand-
children subjected to the suffering that we have seen Eng-
land and France and Italy undergo? It not this the time
when enduring peace is to be bom — when everybody is
impressed with the dreadful character of war, and the ne-
cessity for avoiding it, when all the nations are willing to
make concessions? Isn't now the time to take our share
of the responsibility and say to our brothers : " We realize
that the sea no longer separates us but is become a bond of
union. We know that if a war comes to you, our neighbor,
it will come to us, and we are ready to stand with you
in order to keep off that scourge of nations. In the love
of our brother we will do our share as men and women con-
scious of the responsibility to help along mankind, a re-
sponsibility which God has given this nation in giving it
great power.*'

LEAGUE OF NATIONS AS BARRIER TO ANY
GREAT WARS IN FUTURE »

The practical working of this covenant will be to suppress
and avoid most wars. Of course, hypotheses can be imag-

^ Address at the National Congress for a League of Nations at the
Odeon, St Louis, Feb. 25, 1919.

258 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ined that will break clown any constitution, even that of the
United States, or any plan of the kind I have described ; but
this plan has a real bite in it, a real mutual obligation for
union of the lawful economic and military forces of the
world to police the world and prevent the recurrence of
such another awful war as that from which we have just
emerged. I have said " from which we have just emerged."
That is a wrong term to use. I should use the expression
" which we are now trying to end in such a way as to achieve
its purpose and make the peace a stable and permanent one."

You have heard Mr. Morgenthau describe, with trenchant
accuracy, the conditions that now prevail in the sphere of
war in Europe, and the danger there is from the spread of
Bolshevism and from a reaction to autocracy as a desperate
antidote for Bolshevism. Some who oppose the covenant
most are blind to the critical conditions now existing in
Europe, are blind to the absolute necessity for a league such
as this covenant creates.

. . . From time immemorial a most frequent subject
matter of treaties is an agreement to submit differences
to arbitration. The earliest treaties made by the United
States with England and the Barbary States, and with other
countries, contained a clause providing for such arbitration.

Since that time we have had numbers of treaties of arbi-
tration, among them general treaties of arbitration. These
latter excepted some classes of questions, it is true, but they
were general treaties, notwithstanding, in that the character
of the differences could not be anticipated. Not by the
wildest stretch of the imagination can such an agreement be
construed to be a delegation of governmental powers or a
parting with sovereignty. It is no more a curtailment of
sovereignty than is the obligation of a man to abide the judg-

BARRIER TO ANY GREAT WARS IN FUTURE 259

ment of an impartial court, or the award of an agreed
arbitration, an infringement on his liberty secured by the
constitution.

. . . This covenant does not create a super-sovereignty —
it is only a loose obligation among the nations of the world
by which they agree to unite together in a policy of sub-
mitting their differences to arbitration and mediation, to
withhold war until those efforts have proved unsuccess-
ful and to boycott any nation which violates the covenant
to comply with this obligation. It provides a method for
reaching an agreement as to a limit of armament and an obli-
gation to keep within that limit of armament until condi-
tions shall require a change by a new agreement. The
agreement on the part of one balances the agreement on
the part of others in securing a general reduction of arma-
ment. It does not impair our just sovereignty in the slight-
est — it is only an arrangement for the maintenance of our
sovereignty within its proper limits: to wit, a sovereignty
regulated by international law and international morality
and international justice, with a somewhat rude machinery
created by the agreement of nations to prevent one sov-
ereignty from being used to impose its unjust will on other
sovereignties. Certainly we, with our national ideals, can
have no desire to secure any greater sovereignty than this.

The argument that to enter this covenant is a departure
from the time-honored policy of avoiding entangling alli-
ances with Europe is an argument that is blind to the
changed circumstances in our present situation. The war
itself ended that policy. Res ipsa loquitur. We attempted
to carry it out. We stayed out of the war three years
when we ought to have been in it, as we now see.

We were driven into it because, with the dependence of all

26o TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

the world upon our resources of food, raw material and
manufacture, with our closeness, under modem conditions
of transportation and communication, to Europe, it was im-
possible for us to maintain the theory of an isolation that
did not in fact exist. It will be equally impossible for us
to keep out of another general European war. We are,
therefore, just as much interested in stopping such a war
as if we were in Europe. This war was our war. The
settlement of the war is our settlement. The maintenance of
the terms of that settlement is our business, as it is the
business of the other nations. To say that we should avoid
it is to say that we should be recreant to our duty to our-
selves and to the world and blind to the progress of events.
To say that it mixes us up with kings is amusing when
we consider the dominance of democracy in Europe.

The superlative expressions contained in the denunciations
of Mr. Fess and Mr. Reed and Mr. Borah and Mr. Poin-
dexter as to the dangerous working of this covenant find
no basis in a clear understanding of its provisions. The
contention that we are to be bound by the decision of the
Executive Council on a critical issue of war or peace, of
arbitration or no arbitration, of limit of armament or no
armament, finds no justification in the covenant itself.

The Executive Council is an executive body only to recom-
mend measures to be adopted by the nations in the matter
of the reduction of armament and in the matter of the fur-
nishing of military forces and in other lines of action.
The obligation is upon the governments through their usual
constitutional agencies (which, in our case, is Congress)
to perform the obligations they have assumed. Our obli-
gations are: first, to submit differences to arbitration or
mediation; second, not to make war until three months

BARRIER TO ANY GREAT WARS IN FUTURE 261

after an award or a report of a proper settlement and not
then if the losing nation complies ; third, to lay an embargo
or boycott against a covenant-breaking nation; fourth, to
keep within an armament Congress agrees to. These are
the " bite " of the League.

The fundamental weakness of the attitude of Senator
Poindexter and Senator Reed and Senator Borah is that
they confine their arguments to pointing out the dangers of
this Covenant to the United States, which, as I think I have
shown, are comparatively slight, while they utterly fail to
tender any constructive suggestions to the conference for a
method by which peace can be maintained and the just re-
sults of the war can be secured. They are merely destruc-
tive critics and are not in search of a solution of the diffi-
culty that we, in common with the other nations at the Paris
conference, have to meet and solve. Such criticisms are not
helpful. They are apparently prompted by a desire to find
fault rather than by the duty of suggesting a remedy.

General Smuts, who recommended the system of manda-
tories, thought that the League itself could not get up an
organization sufficiently effective to conduct these govern-
ments, that therefore it ought to employ competent govern-
ments as agencies to carry on the governments of these
dependencies for the benefits of the people in them and
that they should make a report of their trusteeship at the
end of each year. In his opinion the principles should be
laid down in the treaty or be contained in a charter granted
by the Executive Council, so as to make a rule of conduct
for the agencies acting as mandatories.

Now, there is nothing in the League that requires any gov-
ernment to accept the position of a mandatory. The South
Sea colonies and the Pacific colonies of Germany will doubt-

262 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

less come under England or under Australia. There are
some Northern islands, perhaps, that may come under Japan
as a mandatory. Then Palestine and Armenia and Con-
stantinople may come under some other government They
would be glad to have the United States take that, but
you will remember that the representatives of the United
States said in the Council, that this was impossible, that
they could not agree to it.

Now, if they took that attitude in the Council, how un-
reasonable it is to contend that they would have consented
to a league which obliged a member to accept a mandate
of this character. You will find nothing compulsory in
this provision of the League.

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE

OF NATIONS ^

We are here to-night in sight of a league of peace, of
what I have ever regarded as the " promised land." Such
a war as the last is a hideous blot on our Christian civili-
zation. The inconsistency is as foul as was slavery under
the Declaration of Independence. If Christian nations
cannot now be brought into a united effort to suppress a re-
currence of such a contest it will be a shame to modem
society.

During my administration I attempted to secure treaties
of universal arbitration between this country and France
and England, by which all issues depending for their set-

^ Address delivered at the Metropolitan Opera House on March 4>
1919.

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 263

dement upon legal principles were to be submitted to an
international court for final decision. These treaties were
emasculated by the Senate, yielding to the spirit which pro-
ceeds, unconsciously doubtless, but truly, from the conviction
that the only thing that will secure to a nation the justice it
wishes to secure is force; that agreements between nations
to settle controversies justly and peaceably should never be
given any weight in national policy ; that in dealing between
civilized nations we must assume that each nation is
conspiring to deprive us of our independence and our
prosperity; that there is no impartial tribunal to which
we can entrust the decison of any question vitally affect-
ing our interests or our honor, and that we can afford to
make no agreement from which we may not immediately
withdraw, and whose temporary operation to our detriment
may not be expressly a ground for ending it. This is the
doctrine of despair. It leads necessarily to the conclusion
that our only recourse to avoid war is competitive armament,
with its dreadful burdens and its constant temptation to
resort to the war it seeks to avoid.

The most important covenant with reference to peace and
war in the constitution of the League is that looking to a
reduction of armament by all nations. The Executive
Council, consisting of representatives of the United States,
the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and of four other
nations to be selected by the body of delegates, is to con-
sider how much the armaments of the nations should be
reduced, having regard to the safety of each of the nations
and their obligations under the League. Having reached a
conclusion as to the proportionate limits of each nation's
armament, it submits its conclusion to each nation, which
may or may not agree to the limit thus recommended ; but

264 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

when an agreement is reached it covenants to keep within
that limit until, by application to the Executive Council, the
limit may be raised. In other words, each nation agrees
to its own limitation. Having so agreed, it must keep
within it.

Our Constitution contains no inhibition, express or im-
plied, against making such an agreement. On the contrary,
for one hundred years we have maintained an agreement
to limit armaments between this country and Canada. The
evil of competition in armament as between us has been
avoided by abstaining from armament altogether. Could
there be a more complete precedent for this provision of the
Paris Covenant?

The importance of providing for a reduction of armament
every one recognizes. It is affirmed in the newly proposed
Senate resolution. Can we not trust our Congress to fix a
limitation which is safe for the country and to stick to it?
If we cannot, no country can. Yet all the rest are anxious
to do this and they are far more exposed than we.

The character of this obligation is affected by the time
during which the covenants of the League remain binding.
There is no stipulation as to how long this is. In my judg-
ment there should be a period of ten years or a permis-
sion for any member of the League to withdraw from the
covenant by giving a reasonable notice of one or two years
of its intention to do so.

The members of the League and the non-members are re-
quired, the former by their covenant, the latter by an en-
forced obligation, to submit all differences between them,
not capable of being settled by negotiation, to arbitration
before a tribunal composed as the parties may agree. They
are required to covenant to abide the award. Should either

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 265

party deem the question one not proper for arbitration,
then it is to be taken up by the Executive Council of the
League. The Executive Council mediates between the par-
ties and secures a voluntary settlement of the question if
possible. If it fails, it makes a report. If the report is
unanimous, the Executive Council is to recommend what
shall be done to carry into effect its recommendation. If
there is a dissenting vote, then the majority report is pub-
lished, and also the minority report, if desired, and no
further action is taken. If either party or the Executive
Council itself desires, the mediating function is to be dis-
charged by the Body of Delegates in which every member
of the League has one vote. There is no direction as to
what shall be done with reference to the recommendation
of proper measures to be taken, and the whole matter is
then left for such further action as the members of the
League agree upon. There is no covenant by the defeated
party that it will comply with the unanimous report of the
Executive Council or the Body of Delegates.

And right here I wish to take up the objection made to
the League that under this machinery we might be compelled
to receive immigrants contrary to our national desire from
Japan or China. We could and would refuse to submit
the issue to arbitration. It would then go to mediation.
In my judgment the Council, as a mediating body, should
not take jurisdiction to consider such a difference. Im-
migration by international law is a domestic question com-
pletely within the control of the Government into which im-
migration is sought, unless the question of immigration is
the subject of treaty stipulation between two countries.
If, however, it be said that there is no limitation, in the
Covenant, of the differences to be mediated, clearly we would

266 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

run no risk of receiving from the large body of delegates
of all the members of the League a unanimous report recom-
mending a settlement by which Japanese immigrants shall
be admitted to our shores, or Japanese applicants be ad-
mitted to citizenship, against our protest. But were it
made, we are under no covenant to obey such recommenda-
tion. If it could be imagined that all of the other nations
of the world would thus unite their military forces to com-
pel us to receive Japanese immigrants under the covenant,
why would they not do so without the covenant?

These articles compelling submission of differences either
to arbitration or mediation are not complete machinery for
settlement by peaceable means of all issues arising between
nations. But they are a substantial step forward. They
constitute an unambitious plan to settle as many ques-
tions as possible by arbitration or mediation. They illus-
trate the spirit of those who drafted this covenant and their
sensible desire not to attempt more till after actual experi-
ence.

The next covenant is that the nations shall not begin war
until three months after the arbitration award or the recom-
mendation of compromise, and not then if the defendant
nation against whom the award or recommendation has
been made shall comply with it. This is the great restraint
of war imposed by the Covenant upon members of the
League and non-members. It is said that this would pre-
vent our resistance to a border raid of Mexico or self-de-
fense against any invasion — a most extreme construction.
If a nation refuses submission at all, as it does when it
begins an attack, the nation attacked is released instanter
from its obligation to submit and is restored to the com-
plete power of self-defense. Had this objection not been

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 26/

raised in the Senate one would not have deemed it neces-
sary to answer so unwarranted a suggestion.

If the defendant nation does not comply with the award
or unanimous report, then the plaintiff nation can begin
war and carry out such complete remedy as the circum-
stances enable it to do. But if the defendant nation does
comply with the award or unanimous report, then the plain-
tiff nation must be content with such compliance. It runs
the risk of not getting all that it thought it ought to have
or might have by war, but as it is asking affirmative relief
it must be seeking some less vital interest than its political
independence or territoral integrity, and the limitation is
not one which can be dangerous to its sovereignty.

The third covenant, the penalizing covenant, is that if a
nation begins war in violation of its covenant, then ipso
facto that is an act of war against every member of the
League and the members of the League are required definitely
and distinctly to levy a boycott on the covenant-breaking
nation and to cut off all commercial, trade, financial, per-
sonal and official relations between them and their citizens
and it and its citizens. Indeed, the boycott is compound
or secondary in that it is directed against any non-members
of the League continuing to deal with the oudaw nation.
This is an obligation operative at once on each member of
the League. With us the Executive Council would report
the violation of the covenant to the President and it would
be reported to Congress. Congress would then, by reason
of the covenant of the League, be under a legal and moral
obligation to levy an embargo and prevent all intercourse
of every kind between this nation and the covenant-break-
ing nation.

The extent of this penalty and its heavy, withering effect.

268 ' TAFT PAPERS ON I.EAGUE OF NATIONS

when the hostile action includes all members of the League
as well as all non-members, may be easily appreciated. The
prospect of such an isolation would be likely to frighten
any member of the League from a reckless violation of its
covenant not to begin war. It is inconceivable that any
small nation, dependent as it must be on larger nations for its
trade and su3tenance, indeed for its food and raw material,
would for a moment court such a destructive ostracism as
this would be.

Other covenants of the penalizing article impose on the
members of the League the duty of sharing the expense of a
boycott with any nation upon which it has fallen with un-
even weight and of supporting such a nation in its resistance
to any special measure directed against it by the outlaw
nation. But there is no specific requirement as to the
character of the support beyond the obligation of the boy-
cott, the contribution of expenses and the obligation of
each member of the League to permit the passage through
its territory of forces of other members of the League co-
operating with military forces against the outlaw nation.

If, however, the boycott does not prove sufficient, then
the Executive Council is to recommend the number of the
military and naval forces to be contributed by the members
of the League to protect the covenants of the League in
such a case. There is no specific covenant by which they
agree to furnish a definite force, or, indeed, any force at
all. to a league army. The use of the word " recommend "
in describing the function of the Executive Council shows
that the question whether such forces shall be contributed
and what shall be their amount must ultimately address
itself to the members of the League severally for their sev-
eral decision and action. There is this radical and impor-

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 269

tant diflFerence, therefore, between the obligation to lay a
boycott and the obligation to furnish military force, and
doubtless this distinction was insisted upon and reached by
a compromise. The term " recommendation " cannot be
interpreted to impose any imperative obligation on those
to whom the recommendation is directed.

By Article X, the high contracting parties undertake to re-
spect and preserve against external aggression the political
independence and territorial integrity of every member of
the League, and when these are attacked or threatened the
Executive Council is to advise as to the proper means to
fulfill this obligation. The same acts or series of acts
which make Article X applicable will be a breach of the
covenant which creates an outlaw nation under Article XVI,
so that all nations must begin a boycott against any nation
thus breaking the territorial integrity or overthrowing the
independence of a member of the League. Indeed Article X
will usually not be applicable until a war shall be fought to
the point of disclosing its specific purpose. Action under it
will usually take the form of preventing, in a treaty of
peace, the appropriation of territory or the interference
with the sovereignty of the attacked and defeated nation.
We have seen this in the construction put upon the Monroe
Doctrine by Secretary Seward and President Roosevelt.
The former, when Spain attacked Chili and that country
appealed to the United States to protect it, advised Spain
that under our policy we would not interfere to prevent the
punishment by war of an American nation by a non-Ameri-
can nation, provided it did not extend to a permanent de-
privation of its territory or an overthrow of its sovereignty.
President Roosevelt, in the Venezuelan matter, also an-
nounced that the Monroe Doctrine did not prevent nations

2/0 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

from proceeding by force to collect their debts provided
oppressive measures were not used which would deprive the
nation of its independence or territorial integrity. This
furnishes an analogy for the proper construction of
Article X.

The fact that the Executive Council is to advise what
means shall be taken to fulfill the obligation shows that
they are to be such as each nation shall deem proper and
fair under the circumstances. Remoteness from the seat of
trouble and the fact that the nearer presence of other nations
should induce them to furnish the requisite military force
would naturally be included among the factors considered.
It thus seems to me clear that the question, both under
Article XVIII, and under Article X, as to whether the
United States shall declare war and what forces it shall
furnish, are remitted to the voluntary action of the Con-
gress of the United States under the Constitution, regard
being had to the matter of a fair division between all the
nations of the burden to be borne under the League and
the proper means to be adopted, whether the enjoined and
inevitable boycott alone, or the advance of loans of money,
or the declaration of war and the use of military force.
This is as it should be. It fixes the obligation of action
in such a way that American nations will attend to America,
European nations will attend to Europe, and Asiatic nations
to Asia, unless all deem the situation so threatening to the
world and to their own interests that they should take a
more active part. It seems to me that appropriate words
might be added to the pact which would show distinctly
this distribution of obligation. This would relieve those
anxious to exclude European or Asiatic nations from for-
cible intervention in issues between American nations until

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 271

requested to intervene by the United States, or l?y an exe-
cutive council of the American nations formed for the
purpose.

Objection is made that Great Britain might have more
representatives in the Executive Council than other coun-
tries. This is an error. The British Empire, which, of
course, includes its dominions, is limited to one delegate in
the Executive Council. As regards the other central organ,
known as the Body of Delegates, provision is made by
which, upon a two-thirds vote of that body, new members
may be admitted who are independent states or are self-gov-
erning dominions or colonies. Under this Canada and
Australia and South Africa might be allowed to send dele-
gates. I presume, too, the Philippines might be admitted.
But the function of the Body of Delegates is not one which
makes membership in it of great importance. When it acts
as a mediating and compromising body, its reports must be
unanimous to have any effect. And the addition of
members is not likely to create greater probability of
unanimity. More than this, the large number of countries
who will become members will minimize any increase of
British influence from the addition of such dominions and
colonies, which are really admitted because they have dif-
ferent interests from their mother country. When analyzed,
the suggestion that Great Britain will have any greater
power than other member nations in shaping the policy
of the League in really critical matters will be seen to have
no fotmdation whatever.

A proposed resolution in the Senate recites that the Con-
stitution of the League of Nations in the form now offered
should not be accepted by the United States, although the
sense of the Senate is that the nations of the world should

2^2 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

unite to promote peace and general disarmament. The
resolution further recites that the efforts of the United
States should immediately be directed to the utmost expedi-
tion of the urgent business of negotiating peace terms with
Germany satisfactory to the United States and the nations
with whom the United States is associated in the war against
the German Government, and that the proposal for a League
of Nations to insure the permanent peace of the world should
be taken up for careful and serious consideration later. It
is said that this resolution will be supported by thirty-seven
members of the new Senate, and thus prevent the confirma-
tion of any treaty which includes the present proposed
Covenant of Paris.

The President of the United States is the authority under
the Federal Constitution which initiates the form of treaties
and which at the outset determines what subject matter they
shall include. Therefore, if it shall seem to the President
of the United States, and to those acting with him with
similar authority for other nations, that a treaty of peace
cannot be concluded except with a covenant providing for
a league of nations, in substance like that now proposed,
as a condition precedent to the proper operation and effect-
iveness of the treaty itself, it will be the duty of the Presi-
dent and his fellow delegates to the Conference to insert
such a covenant in the treaty. If accordingly such a cov-
enant should be incorporated in a Treaty of Peace, signed
by the representatives of the Powers and should be brought
back by the President and submitted by him to the Senate,
the question which will address itself to the proponents of
this Senate resolution will be not whether they would pre-
fer to consider a league of nations after a Treaty of Peace
but whether they will feel justified in defeating or post-

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 273

poning a treaty because it contains a constitution of a league
of nations deemed by the President necessary to the kind of
peace which all seek.

... In the dark background is the threatening specter
of Bolshevism, hard, cruel, murderous, uncompromising, de-
structive of Christian civilization, militant in pressing its
hideous doctrines upon other peoples, and insidious in its
propaganda among the lowest element in every country.
Confronted with the chaos and the explosive dangers of
Bolshevism throughout all the countries of Europe, a League
of Nations must be established to settle controversies peace-
ably and to enforce the settlement

Were the United States to withdraw, the League would be
nothing but a return to the system of alliances and the bal-
ance of power. We would witness a speedy recurrence
of war in which the United States would be as certainly
involved as it was in this war. New inventions for the de-
struction of men and peoples would finally result in world
suicide, while in the interval there would be a story of
progressive competition in armaments, with all their heavy
burdens upon peoples already burdened almost to the point
of exhaustion. With such a prospect, and to avoid such
results, the United States should not hesitate to take its
place with the other responsible nations of the world and
make the light concessions and assume the light burdens
involved in membership in the League.

No critic of the League has offered a single constructive
suggestion to meet the crisis that I have thus summarily
touched upon. The resolution of the Senate does not sug-
gest or refer in any way to machinery by which the func-
tion of the League of Nations in steadying Europe and
maintaining the peace agreed upon in the treaty shall be

274 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

secured. Well may the President, therefore, decline to
comply with the suggestions of the proposed resolution.
Well may he say when he returns with the treaty, of which
the covenant shall be a most important and indispensable
part, "If you would postpone peace, if you would defeat
it, you can refuse to ratify the treaty. Amend it by striking
out the Covenant and you will leave confusion worse con-
founded, with the objects of the war unattained and sacri-
ficed and Europe and the world in chaos."

. . . Whatever nation secures the control of the seas will
make the United States its ally, no matter how formal and
careful its neutrality, because it will be the sole customer
of the United States in food, raw material and war necessi-
ties. Modern war is carried on in the mines and the work-
shops and on the farm, as well as in the trenches. The
former are indispensable to the latter. Hence the United
States will certainly be drawn in, and hence its interests are
inevitably involved in the preservation of European peace.
These conditions and circumstances are so different from
those in Washington's day and are so unlike anything which
he could have anticipated that no words of his, having
relation to selfish, offensive arid defensive alliances, should
be given any application to the present international status.

Objection is made that the Covenant destroys the Monroe
Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine was announced and
adopted to keep European monarchies from overthrowing
the independence of, and fastening their system upon, gov-
ernments in this hemisphere. It has been asserted in various
forms, some of them extreme — I presume that no one now
would attempt to sustain the declarations of Secretary Olney
in his correspondence with Lord Salisbury. But all will
probably agree that the sum and substance of the Monroe

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 275

Doctrine is that we do not propose in our own interest to
allow European nations or Asiatic nations to acquire,
beyond what they now have, through war or purchase or
intrigue, territory, political power or strategical opportunity
from the countries of this hemisphere. Article X of the
Constitution of the League is intended to secure this to all
signatory nations, except that it does not forbid purchase of
territory.

In recent speeches in the Senate the Monroe Doctrine has
been enlarged beyond what can be justified. Those who
seek to set up a doctrine which would make the Western
hemisphere a preserve in which we may impose our sov-
ereign will on other countries in what we suppose to be
their own interest — because, indeed, we have done that in
the past — should not be sustained. Our conquests of
Western territory made for civilization have increased our
own usefulness and the happiness of those who now occupy
that territory. But we have reached a stage in history
when the world's progress should be determined and se-
cured under just and peaceful conditions, and attempted
progress through conquest by powerful nations should be
prevented.

To suppose that, with the great trade relations between
North America and Europe, we can isolate ourselves is to
look backward, not forward. It does not face existing con-
ditions.

The European nations desire our entrance into this League
not that they may control America but to secure our aid in
controlling Europe ; and I venture to think that they would
be relieved if the primary duty of keeping peace and policing
this Western hemisphere were relegated to us and our West-
ern colleagues. I object, however, to such a reservation as

276 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

was contained in the Hague Conference against entangling
alliances, because the recommendation was framed before
this war and contained provisions as to the so-called policy
against entangling alliances that are inconsistent with the
present needs of this nation and of the rest of the world
if a peaceful future is to be secured to both. I would
favor, however, a recognition of the Monroe Doctrine as
I have stated it above by specific words in the covenant,
and with a further provision that the settlement of purely
American questions should be remitted primarily to the
American nations, with machinery like that of the present
League, and that European nations should not intervene un-
less requested to do so by the American nations.

Objection is made to this League on constitutional
grounds. . . . The Supreme Court has over and over again,
through Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, indicated that the
United States was a sovereign nation capable of dealing with
other nations as such, and seized of all the powers inferable
from sovereignty. It is said that the League will change the
form of our government. But no function or discretion
which it now exercises is taken from any branch of the gov-
ernment. It is asserted that the Covenant delegates to an
outside tribunal, viz., the Executive Council, the power vested
by the Constitution in Congress or the Senate. But the
Executive Council has no power but to recommend to the
nations of the League courses which those nations may ac-
cept or reject, save in the matter of increasing the limit of
armament, to which, after full consideration, a nation shall
have consented. In our case it would be Congress that
had considered and consented to the limitation. Neither
the Executive Council nor the Body of Delegates, in the
machinery for the peaceful settling of differences, does

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 277

Other than recommend a compromise which the United
States does not, under the League, covenant to obey. In
all other respects these bodies are mere instruments for
conference by representatives for devising plans which are
submitted to the various governments of the League for their
voluntary acceptance. No obligation of the United States
under the League is fixed by action of either the Executive
Council or the Body of Delegates.

Then it is said we have no right to agree to levy an em-
bargo and a boycott. It is true that Congress determines
what our commercial relations shall be with other countries
of the world. It is true that if a boycott is to be levied
Congress must levy it in the form of an embargo, as that
which was levied by Congress in Jefferson's administration
and sustained by the Supreme Court, with John Marshall
at its head. It is also true that Congress might repudiate
tlie obligation entered into by the treaty-making power
and refuse to levy such an embargo. But none of these
facts would invalidate or render unconstitutional a treaty
by which the obligation of the United States was assumed.

In other words, the essence of sovereign power is that
while the sovereign may make a contract it retains the
power to repudiate it if it chooses to dishonor its promises.
That does not render null the original obligation or lessen
its binding moral force. The nations of Europe are will-
ing to accept, as we must be willing to accept from them,
mutual promises, the one in consideration of the other, in
the confidence that neither will refuse to comply with such
promises honorably entered into.

Finally, it is objected that we have no right to agree to
arbitrate issues since we might, by arbitration, lose our ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence. This is a mar-

278 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

velous stretch of imagination by the distinguished Senator
who made it. In the face of Article X, which is an under-
taking to respect the territorial integrity and political in-
dependence of every member of the League, how could a
board of arbitration possibly reach such a result? More-
over, we are not compelled to arbitrate a dispute. If pre-
ferred, we can throw the matter into mediation and con-
ciliation, and we do not covenant to obey the recommenda-
tion of compromise by the conciliating body.

We have agreed in treaties to arbitrate classes of ques-
tions long before the questions arise. Now, in the present
treaty, the issue to be arbitrated would have to be formu-
lated by our treaty-making power — the President and the
Senate of the United States. The award would have to be
executed by that branch of the government which executes
awards, generally the Congress of the United States. If
it involved payment of money, Congress would have to ap-
propriate it. If it involved limitation of armament, Con-
gress would have to limit it. If it involved any duty with-
in the legislative power of Congress under the Constitu-
tion, Congress would have to perform it. If Congress sees
fit to comply with the report of the compromise by the con-
ciliating body, Congress will have to make such compliance.

The Covenant takes away the sovereignty of the United
States only as any contract curtails the freedom of action
which an individual has voluntarily surrendered for the pur-
pose of the contract and to obtain the benefit of it. The
Covenant creates no super-sovereignty. It merely creates
contract obligations. It binds nations to stand together
to secure compliance with those obligations. That is all.
This does not diflfer from a contract between two nations.
If we enter into an important contract with another nation

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE OF- NATIONS 279

to pay money or to do things of vital importance and we
break it, then we expose ourselves to the just effort of
that nation to attempt by force of arms to compel us to com-
ply with our obligations. This covenant is only a limited
and loose union of many nations to do the same thing.
The assertion that we are giving up our sovereignty carries
us logically and necessarily to the absurd result that we can
not make a contract to do anything with another nation
because it limits our freedom of action as a sovereign.

Sovereignty is freedom of action of nations. It is exactly
analogous to the liberty of the individual regulated by law.
The sovereignty that we should insist upon and the only
sovereignty we have a right to insist upon is a sovereignty
regulated by international law, international morality and
international justice, a sovereignty enjoying the sacred
rights which sovereignties of other nations may enjoy, a
sovereignty consistent with the enjoyment of the same sov-
ereignty by other nations. It is a sovereignty limited by the
law of nations and limited by the obligation of contracts
fully and freely entered into as in respect to matters which
are usually the subject of contracts between nations.

Those persons who require more than this are really de-
manding the license — they term it necessary American sov-
ereignty — to trample upon all tribunals and to assert their
own unregulated desires. That is not in accord with Ameri-
can principles nor with the Constitution of the United States.

The President is now returning to Europe. As the repre-
sentative of this nation he has joined in recommending,
in this proposed covenant, a league of nations for consid-
eration and adoption by the conference. He returned home
to discharge other executive duties and this has given him
an opportunity to follow the discussion of the question

28o TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

in the Senate of the United States and elsewhere. Some
speeches, notably that of Senator Lodge, have been useful
in taking up the League Covenant, article by article, criticis-
ing its language and expressing doubts either as to its mean-
ing or as to its wisdom.

The President will differ, as many others differ, with
Senator Lodge in respect to many of the criticisms, but in
the constructive part of his speech he will find useful sug-
gestions which he will be able to present to his colleagues
in the conference. These suggestions should prove
especially valuable in the work of revising the form of the
Covenant and in making changes, to which the conference
may readily consent, where Senator Lodge and other critics
have misunderstood the purpose and meaning of the words
used.

The League Covenant should be in the Treaty of Peace.
It is indispensable if the war is to accomplish the declared
purpose of this nation and of the world and if it is to bring
the promised benefit to mankind. We know the President
believes this and will insist upon including the Covenant.
Our profound sympathy in his purpose and our prayers for
his success should go with him in his great mission.

ANSWER TO SENATOR KNOX'S INDICTMENT *

My friend. Senator Knox, has presented a formidable in-
dictment against the proposed Covenant of the League of
Nations. A number of his colleagues seem to have accepted
his views as to its meaning. He says that it is unconstitu-

^ Address at dinner of Economic Club of New York, March nth, 1919.

ANSWEE TO SENATOR KNOX's INDICTMENT 28 1

tional in that it turns over to the Executive Council of the
League the power to declare and make war for us, to fix
our armament and to involve us as a mandatory in all sorts
of duties in the management of backward peoples. He
says that it thus transfers the sovereignty of this nation to
the governing body of the League, which he asserts the
Executive Council to be.

When Senator Knox's attack upon the validity of the Cov-
enant is analyzed, it will be seen to rest on an assumption
that the Executive Council is given executive powers, which
is unwarranted by the text of the instrument. The whole
function of the Executive Council is to be the medium
through which the League members are to exchange views,
the advisory board to consider all matters arising in the
field of the League's possible action and to advise the
members as to what they ought, by joint action, to do.

The Council makes few if any orders binding on the
members of the League. After a member of the League
has agreed not to exceed a limit of armament, the Execu-
tive Council must consent to raising the limit Where the
Executive Council acts as a mediating and inquiring body
to settle differences not arbitrated, its unanimous recom-
mendation of a settlement must satisfy the nation seeking
relief, if the defendant nation complies with the recom-
mendation.

These are the only cases in which the United States as a
member of the League would be bound by action of the
Executive Council. All other obligations of the United
States under the League are to be found in the covenants of
the League, and not in any action of the Executive Council.
When this is understood clearly, the whole structure of
Senator Knox's indictment falls.

282 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Executive Council is a most necessary and useful
body for coordinating the activities of the League, for
initiating consideration by the members of the League of
their proper joint and individual action, and for keeping
all advised of the progress of events in the field of the League
jurisdiction.

It is impossible, in the time I have, to follow through
Senator Knox's argument in all the Articles of the League,
but his treatment of Article XVI is a fair illustration of the
reasons he advances for ascribing to the Executive Council
super-sovereign power.

Article XVI is the penalizing section. Whenever a
member of the League violates its covenant not to make
war under Article XII, it is an act of war against the other
members and they are to levy a boycott against the outlaw
nation. There is in the Covenant no agreement to make
war. An act of war does not produce a state of war unless
the nation acted against chooses to declare and wage war
on account of it. The Executive Council is given the duty
of recommending what forces should be furnished by
members of the League to protect the covenants of the
League. The members are required to allow military forces
of a member of the League, cooperating to protect the
covenants, passage through their territory.

Of this article Senator Knox says:

" If any of the high contracting parties breaks its cov-
enant under Article XII, then we must fly to arms to pro-
tect the covenants," Again he says of it: "Whether or
not we participate, and the amount of our participation in
belligerent operations, is determined not by ourselves but
by the Executive Council in which we have seemingly, at
most, but one voice out of nine, no matter what we

ANSWER TO SENATOR KNOX's INDICTMENT 283

think of the controversy, no matter how we view the wisdom
of a war over the cause, we are bound to go to war when
and in the manner the Executive Council determines." He
asserts that the power of the Executive Council is that of
" recommending what effective military or naval forces each
member of the League shall contribute to protect the cov-
enants of the League, not only against League members but
non-League members: that is, as a practical matter, the
power to declare war/'

I submit in all fairness that there never was a more palp-
able fU)n sequitur than this. I venture to think that were
Senator Knox charged as Secretary of State with construing
the obligation of the United States under this Covenant, he
would on behalf of the United States summarily reject such
a construction.

By what manner of reasoning can the word " recom-
mend " be converted into a word of direction or command?
Yet upon this interpretation of the meaning of the words
" recommend,*' " advise " and words of like import, as they
occur in many articles, depends his whole argument as to the
powers of the Executive Council under the Covenant, and
their super-sovereign character.

Senator Knox contends that the plan of the League will
create two Leagues — one of the Allies and one of the out-
cast nations. The Covenant provides for a protocol to in-
vite in all nations responsible and fit for membership. Cer-
tainly Germany and the other enemy countries ought not now
to be taken in, but they ought to be kept under control. The
League wishes to prevent war in the world and realizes, of
course, that excluded nations are quite asJikely to make war
as their own members.

The Covenant therefore declares the concern of the League

284 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

in threatened war between nations whether members or not
and asserts its right to take steps to prevent it. This dec-
laration is made as the justification for Article XVII, by
which a nation or nations not members of the League
who threaten war are invited to become temporary mem-
bers of the League in order to enable them to settle their
disputes peaceably as permanent members covenant to do.
These temporary members are visited with the same
penalties for acts which would be, if committed by per-
manent members, breaches of their covenants not to begin
war. Thus the scope of the League s action is extended to
all nations.

This is the explanation and the purport of Articles XI
and XVII. They involve the whole world in the covenants
of the League not to make war. They operate to defeat the
formation and warlike organization of a rival league of
nations, composed of countries not admitted as permanent
members to this league. They unite the rest of the world
against such nations in any case of war threatened by them.

There is no supreme court to construe this G>venant and
bind the members, and each nation, in determining its own
obligations and action under it, must construe it for itself.
Our duties under it are not to be declared and enforced
against us by a hostile tribunal or by one actuated by dif-
ferent principles and spirit from our own. Its whole
strength is to rest in an agreed interpretation by all. Its
sanction must be in the good sense of the covenanting na-
tions who know that, in order that it may hold together and
serve its purpose, they must all be reasonable in their con-
struction. What rules of interpretation should and must we
therefore apply?

The President and Senate are to ratify this Covenant if it

ANSWER TO SENATOR KNOX's INDICTMENT 285

be ratified, by virtue of their constitutional power to make
treaties. This power, as the Supreme Court has held, en-
ables them to bind the United States to a contract with an-
other nation on any subject matter usually the subject matter
of treaties between nations, subject to the limitation that
the treaty may not change the form of government of the
United States, and may not part with territory belonging to
a State of the United States, without the consent of the
State. The making of war, of embargoes, or armament,
and of arbitration are frequently subject matter of treaties.

The President and Senate may not, however, confer on
any body, constituted by a league of nations, the power and
function to do anything for the United States which is
vested by the Federal Constitution in Congress, the treaty
making power or any other branch of the United States
Government.

It, therefore, follows that whenever the treaty-making
power binds the United States to do anything, it must be
done by the branch of that Government vested by the Con-
stitution with that function. A treaty may bind the United
States to make or not make war in any specific contingency;
it may bind the United States to levy a boycott, to limit its
armament to a fixed amount ; it may bind the United States
to submit a difference or a class of differences to arbitration.
But the only way in which the United States can perform
the agreement is for Congress to fulfill the promise to de-
clare and make war ; for Congress to perform the obligation
to levy a boycott; for Congress to fix or reduce armament
in accord with the contract; and for the President and
Senate, as the treaty-making power, to formulate the issues
to be arbitrated and agree with the opposing nation on the
character of the court.

286 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

When the treaty provides that the obligation arises upon a
breach of a covenant, and does not make the question of the
breach conclusively determinable by any body or tribunal,
then it is for Congress itself to decide in good faith whether
or not the breach of the Covenant upon which the obligation
arises, has in fact occurred, and finding that, it has to per-
form the obligation.

These plain limitations upon the Federal treaty-making
power are known to nations of this conference, and any
treaty of the United States is to be construed in the light
of them. Following these necessary rules of construction,
the provisions of the Covenant entirely and easily conform
to the Constitution of the United States. They lose alto-
gether that threatening and dangerous character and effect
which Senator Knox and other critics would attach to them.
They delegate to no body but to our own Federal consti-
tutional agencies the duty of deciding in good faith what
our obligations under the Covenant are, when they become
immediate, the appropriate means and method by which they
are to be performed, and the performance of them.

By the first article the action of the high contracting par-
ties under the Covenant are to be " effected through the in-
strumentality of a meeting of a body of delegates represent-
ing the high contracting parties, of meetings at more fre-
quent intervals of an Executive Council, and of a permanent
international secretariat."

This means only that when the high contracting parties
wish to take joint action, it is to be taken through such
meetings. This does not vest these bodies with power ex-
cept as it is especially described in the succeeding articles.
The unusual phrase " effected through the instrumentality
of meetings " means what it says. It does not confer

ANSWER TO SENATOR KNOX's INDICTMENT 287

authority on the Body of Delegates or the Executive Coun-
cil, but only designates the way in which the high contract-
ing parties shall, through their representatives, express their
joint agrement and take action.

On this head, Lord Robert Cecil, who had much to do with
formulating the Covenant, made an illuminating remark in
his address following the report by the Committee of the
Covenant to the Conference. He said :

"Secondly — We have laid down (and this is the very
great principle of the delegates, except in very special cases,
and for very special reasons which are set out in the Cov-
enant) that all action must be unanimously agreed to in
accordance with the general rule that governs international
relations. That this will to some extent, in appearance at
any rate, militate against the rapidity of action of the organs
of the League is undoubted. In my judgment, that de-
fect is far more than compensated by the confidence that it
will inspire that no nation, whether small or great, need
fear oppression from the organs of the League."

This interpretation by one of the most distinguished
draftsmen of the League shows that all its language, rea-
sonably contrued, delegates no power to these bodies to act
for the League and its members without their unanimous
concurrence unless the words used make such delegation
dear.

Senator Knox asserts that, as the recommendation for a
reduction of armaments will be made with the consent of
our representative on the Council, we shall be in honor
bound to accept the limit and bind ourselves. It is difficult
to follow this reasoning. The body which is to* accept the
limitation is the Congress of the United States. Why
should the Congress of the United States be bound by a

288 TAFT PAP£RS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

representative selected by the President to represent the
United States in this function, in respect to a matter of great
importance under the control of Congress?

That the United States should recognize the wisdom of a
reduction of armament, under a world plan for it, seems
manifest. The history of competitive armaments, with its
dreadful sequel, is too fresh in the minds of the peoples
of the world for them not to recognize the wisdom of an
agreed reduction* If we are to have an agreed reduction,
then there must be some limit to which the governments
agree to submit. If the nations of Europe, with so many
dangerous neighbors, are content to bind themselves to a
limitation, why should we hesitate to help this world move-
ment? There is not the slightest probability that we will
wish to exceed the limit proposed. Our national failing has
been not to maintain enough armament.

.....a..

Senator Knox objects to the provision that no treaties
made by members of the League shall have effect until after
they have been registered in the office of the League. He
says this is contrary to the Constitution, because treaties
are to take effect when ratified by the Senate and proclaimed
by the President

This objection is not very formidable. All this requires
is that the United States shall provide, in every one of its
future treaties, that the treaty shall not take effect until it is
registered in the Secretariat of the League. Certainly an
agreement on the part of the United States and the nation
with whom it is making a treaty as to conditions upon which
it shall take effect is not in violation of the constitutional
requirements to which Senator Knox refers.

ANSWER TO SENATOR KNOX's INDICTMENT 289

Senator Knox criticizes the League because it recognizes
the possibility of war and proposes to use war to end war.
Certainly there is no means of suppressing lawless violence
but by lawful force, and any League which makes no provi-
sion for that method, and fails to recognize its validity,
would be futile. He points out that the plan of the League
is not war-proof, and that war may come in spite of it.
Then he describes the kind of league which he would frame,
a league which will involve the United States in quite as
many wars and in just as great a transfer of its sovereignty
as he charges this Covenant with doing.

He proposes to have compulsory arbitration, before an in-
ternational court, of international differences, including
questions of policy. His court would not settle all differ-
ences likely to lead to war, for questions of policy are just
as likely to produce war as questions which are justiciable.
Then he would declare war a crime and punish any nation
engaged in it, other than in self-defense, as an international
criminal. Would not punishing a nation as a criminal be
likely to involve war? The court would have the right to
call on powers constituting the league to enforce its decrees
and awards by force and economic pressure. It would be
difficult to conceive a league more completely transferring
sovereignty to an outside body and giving it power to in-
volve us in war than the plan of Senator Knox. It is far
more drastic and ambitious, and derogates much more
from national control than anything in this league. In
contrast with it, the present league is modest.

The supporters of the present covenant do not claim it
to be a perfect instnunent. It does not profess to abolish
war. It only adopts a somewhat crude machinery for mak-
ing war improbable, and it furnishes a basis for the union

290 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

of nations by which, if they are so minded, they can pro-
tect themselves against the recurrence of the disaster of
such a war as that with which Europe has been devastated
during the last four years. Experience under the League
will doubtless suggest many improvements. But it is the
first step that counts. Let us take it now when the whole
world is yearning for it.

PARIS COVENANT HAS TEETH ^

Many misconceptions of the effect of the Covenant of
Paris have been set afloat by broadside denunciations of the
•League based on loose constructions of it entirely unwar-
ranted by the text. The attitude of those who favor the
Covenant has been misconstrued, increasing the confusion
in the mind of the public in respect to the inestimable value
of the instrument as it is. Were the alternatives presented
to me of adopting the Covenant exactly as it is, or of post-
poning the coming of peace and continuing the state of war
until the conference could reconvene and make other provi-
sions for peace, I should, without the slightest fear as to
the complete safety of my country under its provisions,
vote for it as the greatest step in recorded history in the
betterment of international relations for the benefit of the
people of the world and for the benefit of my country.

I was president of the League to Enforce Peace and
continue to be. Our plan was somewhat more ambitious
in the method of settling differences peaceably, in that fewer
might escape a binding peaceful settlement. The proposed

1 Article in Public Ledger Mar. 16, 1919.

PARIS COVENANT HAS TEETH 29 1

covenant, however, makes provision for peaceful settlement
of most differences. Both plans include a definite obliga-
tion on the part of all members of the League to use
economic power to suppress an outlaw nation by wither-
ing world ostracism. Ours also provided for definite con-
tributions of force to an army to be called upon if the boy-
cott failed to effect its purpose. The present covenant does
not, in my judgment, impose such a definite obligation on
the members of the League, but its theory, doubtless sound,
is that their voluntary action in their own interest will lead
to the raising of sufficient force without a covenant. The
proposed league has real teeth and a bite to it. It furnishes
real machinery to organize the power of the peaceful nations
of the world and translate it into economic and military
action. This, by its very existence and certainty, will keep
nations from war, will force them to the acceptance of a
peaceable settlement, and will dispense with the necessity for
the exercise of economic pressure or force.

Why, then, it is asked, if this is my view, have I ani-
madverted upon the language of the League Covenant and
suggested changes? I have done this not because I wished
to change the structure of the League, its plan of action or
its real character. I have done it for the purpose of re-
moving objections to it created in the minds of conscientious
Americans. There are many such anxious for a league of
nations, anxious to make this peace permanent, whose fears
have been roused by suggested constructions of the Cov-
enant which its language does not justify. These fears can,
without any considerable change of language or additions,
be removed.

The language of the Covenant is in diplomatic phrases, is
verbose and not direct. When, however, we examine the

292 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

important treaties of history, including those negotiated by
our own country, we find that this is characteristic of most
of them. They are not drawn with the concise, direct words
of a business contract, nor in the clear style of a domestic
statute. When reduced to such a style, the Covenant be-
comes quite clear and presents to me no danger whatever
of involving the United States in any obligation or burden
which its people would not be, and ought not to be, glad to
bear for the preservation of the peace of the world and
their own.

Take, for instance, the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe
Doctrine in spirit and effect is a policy of the United States
which forbids any non-American nation, by external ag-
gression, by purchase or by intrigue, to acquire the terri-
tory in whole or in part, or the governmental power in
whole or in part, of any country or nation in this Western
Hemisphere. So far as external aggression is concerned,
the policy is fully covered by Article X of the Covenant,
which would enable the United States to use the whole power
of the League, in addition to its own, to preserve the doc-
trine. So far as the acquisition of such territory or power
by purchase or intrigue is concerned, the United States
could at once bring the matter before the Body of Dele-
gates, which will include representatives of all the na-
tions of North, South and Central America. Unless the
whole Body of Delegates, so constituted, unanimously re-
jects the Monroe Doctrine, the United States is completely
at liberty to proceed to enforce it. Can it be supposed,
by the wildest flight of imagination, that such a unanimous
report could be obtained from a body including representa-
tives of seventeen or eighteen countries of this Western
Hemisphere? Though I have this view, I am entirely will-

PARIS COVENANT HAS TEETH 293

ing to see, and will be glad to see, a reservation introduced
into the Covenant which shall be more explicit and more
satisfying to those whose fears are roused.

From the plan of the Covenant, from the language of
Lord Robert Cecil, one of its chief draftsmen, and from the
general rules of construction of international agreements, I
think that the action of the executive council, unless other-
wise expressly provided, must be unanimous. This would
necessitate the concurrence of a representative of the United
States in such recommendations and other actions as it may,
in the course of its duties in the League, have to take. The
same is true of the Body of Delegates. But I would be
entirely willing to have the rule of unanimity stated ex-
pressly ; it would clarify a matter which troubles many.

Doubt has been expressed as to the time during which this
Covenant is to run. There is now no express limitation.
I would be glad to have a definite time limitation, say of
ten years, for the League as a whole, and perhaps of five
years for the obligation to restrict armament within a limit
agreed to by the Congress of the United States. This
would relieve many who reasonably fear perpetual obliga-
tions. My own view is that, unless this be done, the nations
composing the League will construe this to be a covenant
from which any one of them may withdraw after reasonable
notice. I think it is wiser to give it a definite term than
to have it a covenant from which any member may with-
draw at will.

I do not mean to say there may not be other changes
of a similar character that would aid in relieving unfounded
objections. But I am distinctly opposed to a revision of
the form of the League so as to change its nature. This is
the League which, as amended in the conference, must be

294 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

adopted unless we are to have an indefinite postponement
of peace.

The suggestions of the impossible and radically different
leagues which have been put forward as a better solution
than tfic present one will not be particularly relevant or
helpful. To provide for amendments and reservations,
that do not change the structure of the League and its es-
sence and do satisfy doubting, conscientious Americans in
respect to the safety of the United States in the obligations
assumed, is a high and important duty of the representa-
tives of the United States in this conference. If they per-
form it, they will help materially to secure the ratification of
the treaty.

Of course the securing of amendments after fourteen na-
tions have fought their way by earnest discussion to an agree-
ment in committee is not free from difficulty. European
nations, anxious to have us join the League, will consent
to reservations and limitations as to strictly American ques-
tions and policies; but it is not the easiest task to draw
these in such form as to prevent their having wider effect.
The solution of this problem will be facilitated by a con-
sideration and study of the criticisms which are construc-
tively directed to rendering this league unobjectionable.
I regret to say that many of the speeches are so far afield
and so entirely unwarranted by the present language of the
Covenant that they are not helpful.

TO MAKE PEACE SECURE 295

TO MAKE PEACE SECURE *

I favor the obligation on the part of all the nations to use
their military force to maintain the covenants of the League.
That was a feature of the plan of the League to Enforce
Peace. I do not think it is clearly set forth in the present
Covenant. The nearer it comes to that the more satisfactory
it is to me, and the more effective that League will become.
The burden of carrying on war, which has been held up
as a reason for not entering the League, is one entirely re-
moved by the certainty of cooperation of the nations. The
usefulness of such a league is far greater in its warning
and restraining effect upon reckless nations willing to begin
war than even in its actual suppression of war. It is vastly
more economical on our part to agree that, should occasion
arise, we will contribute economic and military pressure to
suppress war than it is to refuse such an agreement and
then be drawn into a war like the one we have just passed
through, leaving an indebtedness of twenty-five billions,
a war that would have been avoided by the knowledge on
the part of Germany and Austria that aggression would
array the whole world against them. The arguments that
Senator Borah advances in this regard are arguments that
are the figments of his imagination. The very object of
the League is to prevent war, not to fight little wars, and
the clearer the obligation to exert economic pressure and
military force against the aggressor, the greater the im-
probability that wars will come. Instead of being a source
of increased expense, the League will greatly reduce ex-
penses to the government of the United Stats, first, in re-

^ From an Address at the Methodist Church in Augusta, Georgia,
March 23, 19 19.

296 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ducing armaments, and second, in reducing the number of
the wars into which it is likely to be drawn.

If the provisions I have mentioned were limited to the
members of the League they would lack comprehensiveness
in preserving world peace, because it may be some time be-
fore two-thirds of the Body of Delegates shall conclude
that it is wise to admit to permanent membership in the
League countries like Germany, Austria, Turkey or Bul-
garia, or countries with no sense of responsibility and so
weak in police power and self-restraint as not to be able to
perform the covenants of the League. To correct what
otherwise would be a defect in the constitution of the League,
there is a declaration that the League is interested in war
between any countries whether members of the League or
not, and will take such action as the peace of the world
may require in order to prevent injury from such a war.

The four great steps to secure peace are, first, reduction
of armament; second, union against conquest by arms;
third, peaceful settlements of differences and a covenant
not to begin war until every effort has been made to secure
such peaceful settlement, together with a world boycott of
the outlaw nation and the exercise of military compulsion,
if necessary; and finally, fourth, the inhibition of all secret
treaties and an enforcement of open diplomacy. Nothing
like it has heretofore been attempted in the history of the

world. The problem of German peace has forced it

.*••.••■

We have fourteen nations, seven of them being the na-
tions who won the war with Germany, agreeing through
their representatives at Paris upon these steps. The ques-
tion now is whether the Senate of the United States is to
destroy the possibility of this advance in the civilization of

TO MAKE PEACE SECURE 297

the world by its vote against the action of the President
and against what I verily believe to be the opinion of the
majority of the people of the United States. I would un-
hesitatingly vote for the Covenant just as it was unanimously
reported by the committee of representatives of the fourteen
countries engaged in drafting the treaty. I am hopeful,
however, that the fears of some, who conscientiously favor
the treaty, as to certain possibilities of danger may be re-
moved by more express limitation. The treaty is in process
of amendment now and any clarifying amendments should
be welcomed in order, if possible, to secure ratification. I
believe the President and the Commission have a sense of
duty in this regard and that we may look for amendments of
this character.

What are the objections to the League ? They are, first,
that the United States has gotten along so well since the
beginning without being drawn into the politics of the out-
side world that it ought to keep out of them and ought not
to involve itself in a league of nations. This opinion, I think
we may say, is confined to a small body of persons rep-
resented by Senators Borah, Reed and Poindexter. If there
are others who take this position in the Senate, their names
do not occur to me. All the other members of the Senate
who have objected to this covenant have averred that they
are in favor of a league of nations to secure peace. If
they are, they are in favor of something that binds the
United States to some kind of an obligation to help in the
preservation of peace. A league of nations means some-
thing that binds one nation to another in respect to certain
obligations. That is the etymological derivation of the
word and that is its actual meaning. If they are therefore
in favor of a league of nations, they have, by that fact, ad-

298 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

mitted the necessity of departing from the traditional policy
of the United States to enter into no alliances with foreign
nations, because a league is an alliance, and, as a league
contains obligations, it must entangle the United States to
the extent at least of the performance of those obliga-
tions.

We cannot avoid being affected by international quarrels
in Europe. It is economical for us to unite with the other
countries to maintain peace instead of waiting until we are
driven into war and then making a superhuman effort to
defend ourselves against a war that has meantime grown
into enormous proportions because of our failure, and that
of the other nations, of the world to suppress it in its in-
ception.

The Executive Council has no power to fix the obligatipn.
It does not determine conclusively for any member of the
League any fact upon which the obligation of that member
Ijecomes immediate. Its duties are executive in the sense
that it acquires all the necessary information, follows
closely matters with which the League has to do and takes
action in the sense of making a recommendation to the
various Powers as to how the difficulties shall be met. It
furnishes a means by which the Powers confer together
in order that they may agree upon joint action; but in no
sense is any power delegated to it to declare war, to wage
war, to declare a boycott, to limit armament or to force
arbitration.

The only two things which it does, things that can be
said in any way to be binding on nations, are, first, not to
increase the limit of armament to which a nation has agreed
to confine itself after full consideration, and, second (where

TO MAKE PEACE SECURE 299

jurisdiction is not taken from it by reference to the Body
of Delegates) if it can act unanimously, to make a report
of settlement of a difficulty such that if the defendant nation
complies with it, the plaintiff nation may not begin war to
get more. It may propose measures to the members of the
League by which they can carry out its recommendations of
settlement, but it does not decide upon those measures and
it is left to the members of the League to agree whether
they desire to use force to carry out recommendations or
not. In every other respect its action is advisory and of a
recommending character.

Still less can there be said to be sovereign authority dele-
gated to the Body of Delegates. The Body of Delegates
selects the four countries whose representatives are to enter
the Executive Council. It elects, by two-thirds vote, new
members to the League after they have shown themselves
able to fulfill the covenants of the League. It may be sub-
stituted as a mediating body and a body to recommend set-
tlement in place of the Executive Council. It may also ad-
vise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties
which have become inapplicable to international conditions
and which may endanger the peace of the world. This is
all.

It is impossible, therefore, for one looking through the
Covenant, without a determined purpose to formulate ob-
jections to it, to find any transfer of sovereignty to the
Executive Council or the Body of Delegates. The whole
theory of the Covenant is that the nations are to act to-
gether under obligations of the Covenant, that they are to
come to an agreement, through these two bodies, but that
the action to be taken is to be determined by each nation
on its conscience under its agreement, and that when the

•n

CX> TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

action is to be taken it is to be taken by that nation in ac-
cord with its constitution.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS HAS NOT DELAYED

THE PEACE *

The project of the League of Nations has, in the minds of
its opponents, to bear the blame for many things. Ac-
cording to their view, if it had not been for the League of
Nations, peace would now have been declared and every-
thing would be smooth and easy in the sphere of the late
war. It is their view that only the absurd insistence of
idealists has postponed the settlement needed to produce
normal times. The fact is entirely otherwise. The League
of Nations was made the first subject of consideration by
the conference because it could be more promptly and easily
disposed of than other issues rearing their ugly heads among
the Allies. These latter needed earnest and painful con-
sideration in confidential interviews between the represen-
tatives of the leading powers. The full facts were not
known to the conference and the issues were not ready for
open discussion.

The delay in fixing the terms of the League would not
have happened but for the need of settling the other ques-
tions. One of the most troublesome of these is the amount
of the indemnities which France and Belgium and Italy and
England and Serbia should exact from the Central Powers.
It is complicated with the question how much the Central
Powers can pay. Each premier has found himself em-

^ Article in Public Ledger Mar. 29, 19191

LEAGUE OF NATIONS HAS NOT DELAYED PEACE 3OI

barrassed by promises to his people as to what the treaty
must contain. In this regard, each one has found that his
claims, based only on the viewpoint of himself and his
countrymen, must be moderated.

Another burning question is that of the boundary of
Italy on the Adriatic. Italy insists on having Fiume be-
cause the port has probably a majority of Italians in it.
But it has always been the port of the Slav dependency
of Hungary and it is surrounded by a country with which
it has the closest business connection, a country which is
overwhelmingly Slav.

It is the normal and appropriate seaport of the projected
Jugo-Slav State. Sonnino, the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs of Italy, is reported to be uncompromising in his de-
mand. Fiume has become a political issue in Italy. Or-
lando, a man of more judicial and conciliatory mind, is said
to be embarrassed by Sonnino. Both are affected by the
fact that the Italian elections are near at hand.

Then, as a background to the whole settlement, there is
the question of the defense of France against another and
sudden attack by Germany. Marshal Foch and the French
military strategists see no complete protection unless France,
in some way, controls the crossing of the Rhine. A pro-
posal which has received great support in the French papers
and which has been urged by France has been the creation
of a buffer state called Rhineland. The objection to this
is that Rhineland is really German. Its separation from
Germany is. not within the basis of the armistice. It has
never within centuries been French. Its s)mipathies would
all be with Germany. It would create a new Alsace-Lor-
raine, with the boot on the other leg. It would be a con-
stant source of irritation in Germany and a persistent in-

302 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

yitation to a new war by her when opportunity offered.

Lloyd George is seeking to make such a frontier unneces-
sary by a required limitation on conscription in Germany
and an agreed limitation of armament among the Allied
Powers. This, of course, would become a part of
the machinery of the League of Nations for securing peace.

The question of Hungary, which is now being made
prominent by the threat of Bolshevism or its actual appear-
ance at Budapest and in the surrounding country, is also
a difficult one. Unscrupulous leaders of Hungarian politics
seem to have invited Bolshevism in order to fight a settle-
ment which would limit Hungary to the Magyar country
and the Danubian plains. The Magyars are a masterful
race, a race of aristocrats, who have arbitrarily oj^ressed
the Slovaks in mountainous northern Hungary, the
Rumanians in Transylvania and indeed the Germans where
they have settled within the Hungarian kingdom. As they
see their power passing, they have become desperate and
war threatens again.

The specter of Bolshevism will not down. To charge this
to delay due to seeking an agreement upon the League of
Nations is ridiculously opposed to the facts. The outbreak
in Hungary only demonstrates the necessity for a strong,
firm league. The signing of a treaty which formally re-
stores peace with Germany and Austria-Himgary will not
give us peace unless there is guaranty in the power of
the united Allies to compel peace. That power will be dis-
solved unless a league of allies, the nucleus of the League
of Nations, shall be established, not only to suppress im-
mediate disorder, but also to settle differences (a great
number of which will at once arise between the new gov-

»< ^».^-^, v^.^* ^«-. -, ^-- >>

OPEN DIPLOMACY SLOW 3O3

ernments established and the old ones cut down) and to
enforce the settlements peaceably arrived at.

The news that amendments are being considered in the
League of Nations and that it is nearly ready for incorpora-
tion in the treaty itself demonstrates that it has not inter-
fered at all with reaching terms of peace with Germany.
The truth is, a league of nations is necessary to a satis-
factory treaty. It helps and speeds it.

OPEN DIPLOMACY " SLOW ^

The fluid conditions in the countries of the Central Pow-
ers lead all to press for a speedy peace treaty that shall
stabilize them. But this very fluidity adds to the com-
plexity of the problem and delays its solution. The Allies
are also embarrassed by the unrest of their troops, who re-
garded the armistice as the end of the war and wish now
to be released and to go home. Yet armies of occupation,
and perhaps armies for further campaigns, are necessary.
Then, between the seven Powers which fought the war, the
peace terms are not easy to agree upon — the treatment
Germany is to receive, the amount of indemnity she is to
pay, the restrictions, if any, upon her competition in the
world trade pending the slow industrial recovery of France
and Belgium, the balancing considerations of the heavy in-
demnity and her opportunity for freedom in trade to enable
her to pay it, the defensive frontier of France, the Italian
frontier on the Adriatic shore, the boundaries of the new
States, the definition of neighborhood rights, the Balkan

* Article in Public Ledger Apr. 5, igig.

304 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

boundaries, the autonomous units in Asia Minor, the dis-
position of the German colonies — all involve controversy,
some of it of the most acute and irritating character.

We must bear in mind that the conference was delayed
by the need to gather together, from fourteen nations from
all over the world, men who are to frame the treaty. Special
commissions had to be formed to get at the facts. Hear-
ings had to be held for claimants. The British elections
kept Lloyd George at home, and during that time made it
impossible for him to join in those confidential interviews
with other leaders and premiers so necessary in smoothing
out difficulties and reaching understandings. While the
making of the terms has been in the absence of the defeated
powers, the interests of the conferees themselves are often
acutely adverse. Then, too, the disinterested attitude of the
United States leads its representatives to consider more care-
fully than those of the conferees seeking purely selfish ob-
jects the wisdom of restrictions upon Germany. Too great
severity may defeat its own purpose.

The treaty is being negotiated by representatives of pop-
ular constituencies and not by kings. Explanation is easier
to one man than to a people. Room has to be given for
what is called in this country "buncombe." A show of
iight must be made on hopeless issues for home consumption.
" Open *' diplomacy cannot move so swiftly as the old-
fashioned kind.

Then, there is a more substantial reason for time in the
deliberations : the negotiators must discuss and argue all of
the conflicting issues over and over again until each one has
deeply impressed on him the real point of view of every
other. This often takes the form of heated criticism and
even recrimination, apparently most discouraging to a pros-

RUSSIA, FRANCE, DANZIG 305

pect of agreement but necessary to clear the air. Such talk
is not waste of time. It is the usual and the only way to
reach a compromise.

The armistice in our Spanish war was signed on the 12th
of August, 1898, and the treaty of Paris was not signed till
December 12, a period of four months. This was in con-
nection with a war which had only begun in the previous
April. And it was a peace which involved the settlement
of rather simple issues between only two nations.

The period between the armistice and the treaty of peace
in the Franco-Prussian War was about the same and there,
also, the issues were simple and limited to two countries.

The Congress of Vienna, convened to arrange the map of
Europe after the Napoleonic wars, took a year for its delib-
erations, and the conferees had only kings and emperors
to satisfy. We see, therefore, that the delegates now at
Paris have not been unreasonably slow in their work, con-
sidering the great detail and the many conflicting interests
they have to settle and agree upon.

RUSSIA, FRANCE, DANZIG^

One may admit that a great mistake was made in not
sending large armies to Archangel and Vladivostok to es-
tablish an Eastern front in Russia during the war. Had
this been done, Bolshevism could have been then repressed
and an opportunity for a Russian constituent assembly and
popular government could have been secured. But that is

1 Article in Public Ledger Apr. 7, 1919.

306 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

past history and the conference at Paris is dealing with
present conditions. One of these is the difficulty of main-
taining large armies at this juncture to enter upon a mili-
tary crusade against Bolshevism in Russia. All the Allies
hope to do is to prevent its spread into other coiuitries. It
will probably burn itself out in Russia because of its un-
fulfilled and impossible promises.

The issue with France as to proper provisions for her
safety is not by any means so clear as these cocksure
statesmen and correspondents would have their readers
believe.

■ ••••••a

The razing of fortresses on the German front, the en-
forced limit of German armament, the restriction upon Ger-
man conscription, the appropriation of the German navy,
the taking over of German guns and the united power of
the League of Nations to defend France and restrain Ger-
many will in the long run be far better protection to French
territory and independence than what France now seeks at
the instance of her military strategists.

The hesitation over Danzig is regarded as another damn-
ing proof of a weak yielding to German truculence. Dan-
zig is a German city. The people object to Polish sov-
ereignty. It is the only practical port of access to the
sea for Poland. Can it be made a free port for full use
by Poland without complete sovereignty? This is being
argued in the conference. It is not a question which an-
swers itself. One may differ with the statesmen, corres-
pondents and critics and still not be guilty of basely betray-
ing Poland or truckling to Germany. A similar question
is presented, as to Fiume, between the Italians and the
Jugo-Slavs.

THE ROUND ROBIN 307

THE ROUND ROBIN '

The League of Nations is an organization which cannot
disclose its advantages in the rapid manner an army or a
military expedition can. Its operation is bound to be slow
and cumbersome at first. Its influence on its members
and on outside nations in avoiding war and promoting jus-
tice will grow as the real strength of the uniting and common
covenants comes to be clearly perceived. Experience under
the League will disclose defects and suggest useful changes
to make it more practical and effective. But the agreement
upon a covenant providing for reduction and limitation of
armament, for union of nations to prevent conquest, for
definite postponement of war till after every opportunity
for peaceful settlement has been secured, and for spreading
international agreements on the table before the world is
a series of steps forward toward permanent peace which
only " ready made" military correspondents can belittle.

If the cabled information as to the character of the
amendments adopted is reliable, we may now confidently
hope that the Senators who signed the Round Robin will
be able to vote for the League as it is amended without
being embarrassed in any degree by their signatures to that
document. It will be remembered that they merely said that
the Covenant in its then form was unacceptable to them,
which of course does not prevent their consistently sup-
porting the Covenant as at present amended. The further
statement in the Round Robin was that they thought the
peace treaty ought to be adopted at once and that the League
should be postponed for further consideration. Of course

* From an article in the Public Ledger April 12, igig.

308 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

such a view, which rested on the importance of having peace
come at once without delaying it for the sake of framing a
league of nations covenant, ceases to apply when the peace
treaty has been signed, with the League of Nations Cov-
enant as a part of it, and indeed as an indispensable con-
dition to its effective enforcement The Round Robin
Senators may well say that the second objection is removed,
because now to insist upon opposing or amending the League,
which is web and woof of the peace treaty submitted to
them, is to postpone peace rather than to expedite it

GUAJtANTIES OF ART. X »

It has been suggested that this Article X is in the interest
of Great Britain, that it is designed to preserve the terri-
torial integrity of her far-flung empire through the aid of
the United States and other countries. There is no founda-
tion for such a suggestion. Can any one point out in the
history of the last fifty years any war against Great Britain
by a foreign country to take away territory from her ? No ;
war of that sort is not ordinarily begun against a nation
as powerful as Great Britain. Wars are begun as Austria
began the war against Servia, namely, because Servia was
a weak nation and Austria a strong one ; and this guaranty
is for the benefit of the weaker nations whom it is to our in-
terest to protect against a war of conquest that will ulti-
mately involve the world, as the attack upon Servia did.

Another objection made to this Article is that if Ireland
were to rebel against England and seek to establish her-

^ From an address at Kansas City, April 19, 19 19.

RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL FREEDOM * 309

self as an independent republic, England cotild invite, under
this Article X, the other nations of the world to assist her
in suppressing the rebellion. This is utterly unfounded, be-
cause Article X is only an undertaking to preserve territorial
integrity and political independence against external aggres-
sion. Nations must take care of their own revolutions, and,
if their conduct of government is such that revolutions
occur and new nations are established out of old ones, there
is nothing in Article X to prevent this happening.

RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL FREEDOM ^

News comes from Paris that the effort of a committee
of the Jews to secure, in the constitution of the League,
a declaration in favor of religious tolerance and the means
of securing it has failed. This is not accurate. There is
in the League Covenant a provision that in all countries
which are to be governed by a mandatory of the League,
the charter, under which the mandatory acts, shall require
protection of religious freedom. This provision will apply
in Constantinople, in Palestine, in Syria, in Armenia, in
Mesopotamia and in the former colonies of Germany in
Africa and the Pacific

The Executive Council may add to such general provi-
sions detailed guaranties and machinery to make the general
declaration effective. The mandatories have to render
yearly reports of their stewardship, so that violations of
such guaranties may be brought before the organs of the
League for remedy.

1 Article in Public Ledger Apr. 24, 1919.

3IO TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The failure of the application for a general declaration
in respect to freedom of religion was doubtless due to the
sensitiveness of the British colonies and, indeed, of the
United States, toward the attempt of Japan to obtain a
declaration in favor of social equality and against racial
discrimination in any state of the League. The American
representatives probably felt that such a declaration, however
neutral in its effect in this country because our Constitution
secures the equal protection of the law to all, would be suc-
cessfully used to defeat the ratification of the League Cov-
enant as part of the treaty. They were therefore obliged
to sacrifice the clause securing religious tolerance.

But there still remains an opportunity to achieve every
useful and practical end in regard to religious freedom.
There exists no danger of pogroms and oppressive laws
against the Jews in the United States or Britain or France
or Italy. It exists only in certain states like Poland,
Rumania, the Ukraine and possibly in the Czecho-Slav and
Jugo-Slav countries. Of these, Rumania is the chief of-
fender. Poland, under Paderewski, also shows obduracy in
the matter. All these states are, so to speak, children of the
League ; they may well be required, as a condition of their
national independence and the protection they are to en-
joy from the League, to give pledges against racial and
religious discrimination in their laws and in favor of com-
plete religious freedom. Means should be retained by the
League to enforce the pledges.

Pledges were required by the Congress of Berlin in 1879
from Bulgaria, Servia and Rumania that their fundamental
laws would put Jews on an equality with all other citizens
and protect them in the exercise of their religion. Bulgaria
and Servia faithfully complied, but Rumania deliberately

SECRET TREATY PROVISIONS 3 11

and dishonestly evaded, and dishonored, her solemn obliga-
tion. If now she is to receive Transylvania from Hungary
by decree of the League, she may well be put under effective
bond to give to her Jewish people that freedom and justice
which she has faithlessly denied to them for forty years.
Poland, too, which was long the only refuge for the op-
pressed and unhappy children of Israel, should be made,
as the price of her restoration to nationality, to issue a new
charter of religious liberty and civic equality to her Jewish
citizens.

The Jews are not the only denomination who need pro-
tection. There are Unitarians and others who, in some of
these new states, have suffered for their faith. It will be
an important accomplishment if the League uses its power
to remove this last vestige of mediaevalism.

SECRET TREATY PROVISIONS THAT ARE AT

THE ROOT OF THE CRISIS AT THE

PARIS CONFERENCE \

ITAUAN CLAIMS TO FIUME WOULD, IF GRANTED, SOW THE
SEEDS OF TROUBLE AND DISCONTENT AMONG THE

JUGO-SLAVS

The peace treaty with Austria-Hungary is delayed by the
controversy over the disposition of the port of Fiume, near
the head of the Adriatic. When the war broke out in 19 14
the Entente Allies and Germany wooed Italy intensively to
induce her to join their respective sides. The obligations of
the Triple Alliance had not been made public, but it was

* Article in Public Ledger, Apr. 25, 1919.

312 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

understood that Italy was bound to lend her aid to Austria
and Germany in case of a defensive war. Italy positively
insisted that this was not such a war, and so maintained
her neutrality for a time. Then she was induced by
promises of the Entente Allies (Great Britain, France and
Russia) to declare war on Austria and subsequently on
Germany. Her course was criticized as one wholly in-
fluenced by greed of territory. The treaty by which she
became an ally of France and Great Britain was secret,
but enough was known to enable Italy's critics to aver that
it was the consummation of a successful bid. Italy's de-
fenders met these attacks by showing that she was entitled
under the treaty of the Triple Alliance to be consulted be-
fore Austria attacked Serbia, and by revealing the bad faith
of Germany and Austria in Italy's war with Turkey and
their secret aid to the Sultan. This aroused sympathy with
Italy, and it was assumed that the heart cry of the Irre-
dentists for a restoration of Italy's territory everywhere had
been satisfied by an agreement that Trentino and Trieste
should become hers.

It now appears that the Dalmatian coast was also included
in territory promised to Italy. As to Fiume, Italians per-
haps form a majority of the inhabitants, but it is, and has
been for years, a Croatian city. It is, and has been always,
the port by which the solidly Slav population in the country
behind the city reach the sea.

Italy seeks to push the principle of self-determination too
far. The unit of population in which the majority is to
determine the nation's control should include the back
country with which the port is united.

Unless some explanation is given, Italy's insistence will
tend to revive the charge that greed was her chief motive

ANALYSIS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT AS AMENDED 3I3

in this war. Our entrance into the war was accompanied
by a declaration in favor of only jfist restitution of ter-
ritory and upon the assumption, often stated, that it was not
a war of conquest by the Allies. The terms of the armistice
followed these lines.

If the facts are correctly stated, the public opinion of the
United States and the disinterested world will sustain the
President in resisting Italy's determination to take over
Fiume and close Croatian access to the sea. The question
is one of Italian politics. Italy has taken possession of
Fiume with the strong hand of conqueror against the
Croatians. Orlando may lose power in the Italian Parlia-
ment if he fails to stand by the Italian claim. Sonnino,
his colleague at the conference and his associate as premier,
is rigid and uncompromising. He would probably resist
Orlando if the latter yielded. The situation is therefore
acute. But can Italy afford to break, on such an issue,
with the conference? One would think not. The Presi-
dent would seem to be clearly right in maintaining that at
least Fiume be made a free port for Croatia as Danzig is
to be for Poland. If Italy's wish were to prevail, the set-
tlement, with palpable injustice in it, would create a sense
of wrong among the Jugo-Slavs that would return to plague
Italy when most inconvenient.

ANALYSIS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT

AS AMENDED^

The amendments to the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions adopted in Paris on Monday will bear careful study,

* Article in Public Ledger Apr. 30, 1919.

314 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

and perhaps it is unwise hastily to express a confident
opinion. But several readings suggest the following com-
ment:

In the first place, the language and arrangement of the
articles have been greatly improved. The use of different
terms to mean the same thing, which tended to prevent an
easy reading of the document, has been largely corrected.
Provisions having immediate relation to one another have
been assembled where they belong, avoiding application of
them to subjects or countries which they were not intended
to affect. Then names, misleading or clumsy, have been
changed. The Executive Council, which was and is not
executive but advisory, has become the Council. The Body
of Delegates has become the Assembly, a much more suit-
able term.

Second, rules of construction that ought to have ob-
tained in interpreting the original Covenant are now made
express and relieve the real doubts of friends and supporters
of the League. The most important of these, perhaps, is
the privilege specifically reserved to any member of the
League to withdraw from it after two years' notice and
after a compliance with its obligation under international
law and under the League Covenant incurred before with-
drawal. This gives any nation an opportunity to test the
operation of the League and its usefulness and to avoid
undue and unreasonable danger or burden in the future
which actual trial may develop. Moreover, taken with the
power of amendment which can be effected by a unanimous
vote of the nine countries whose representatives compose the
Council and by a majority of the members of the League,
there is ample opportunity for such a country as the United
States to secure a revision of the Covenant and a reexami-

ANALYSIS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT AS AMENDED 315

nation of the status of the states composing the League
after peace has stabilized conditions and has shown where
changes should be made. We are so important a member of
an effective world league, and so indispensable to its suc-
cessful working, because of our impartial position and
world power, that an announcement of our purpose to with-
draw unless amendments were made would be most per-
suasive. In this view Mr. Root's suggestion, that it would
be well to reexamine treaty provisions made just after the
war in the light of the test of five years or more of peace,
can be carried out.

The second change of the same character is the provision
that, except where otherwise specifically provided, the action
of the Council or the Assembly shall be by unanimous vote.
The original covenant, properly interpreted, meant this, but
it is of great importance to remove objections of those who
did not think so. There are some who believe that such
required unanimity will make the League ineffective and that
a majority would have sufficed. But progress toward com-
plete international cooperation in a new field like this must
be gradual, and must, for the present, leave safeguards
to nations against abuse of joint power which, experience
may show, can be dispensed with later. The required
imanimity in the action of the Council is very important in
the answer it gives to the claim that under Articles X and
XVI the United States may be required to send expedi-
tionary forces into distant parts of the world to defend
the integrity and independence of a country with which we
have no relation of interest or to suppress remote wars not
affecting us. Such expeditions are to be planned and recom-
mended by the Council, and the plan is to be accepted in
the discretion of the countries to whom the recommendation

3l6 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

is addressed. The plan would certainly mark the limit of
the obligation of the nations to whom it is presented. The
United States will have a representative on the Council,
whose vote must approve the plan before its presentation.
Is it likely, then, that the plan will be unreasonable in pro-
posing an undue share of the League's work to the United
States? May we not be sure that what is to be done will
be apportioned according to the convenience and natural
interest of the members of the League, because it must in ef-
fect be by mutual agreement?

It is now made clear that under Article VIII the limit
of armament for each country, under a general plan of
reduction proposed by the Council, is only to be adopted
and made binding as a covenant for each member of the
League after its full examination and acceptance by that
member. Moreover, there is to be a reexamination of the
plan and the limits every ten years, and meantime a specific
limit may be increased by consent of the Council.

It is now made an express provision that only nations who
choose to accept the duty may be made mandatories of the
League. This removes another objection that was strongly
pressed. We do not have to take charge of Constantinople
or Armenia unless we choose to do so.

One important change made by addition is the result of
Mr. Root's constructive criticism. Mr. Root thought, and
all who supported the plan of the League to Enforce Peace
agreed with him, that the provision for arbitration ought
to have required arbitration in justiciable issues, and he de-
fined what he thought was clearly within the meaning of
that term. By the present Article XIII the members agree
to submit to arbitration any dispute which they recognize as
suitable for arbitration. The Covenant then declares dis-

ANALYSIS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT AS AMENDED 317

pules of the character described by Mr. Root, and, as the
writer recollects, in Mr. Root's language, to be suitable
for arbitration. Disputes as to interpretations of treaties,
as to international law, as to facts upon which its applica-
tion turns and damages for its breach are all declared to be
arbitrable, or, in other words, justiciable. This imposes on
members of the League having a dispute the duty of recog-
nizing such disputes to be arbitrable and to submit them to
arbitration. Can this duty be enforced under the League?
Practically yes. If a nation declines to arbitrate such an
issue, it goes to the Council or Assembly, with interested
members excluded. Such body will at once recommend
arbitration or will refer the issue to an international court
of the League, as it may, to determine whether the issue
is arbitrable under the obligations of the Covenant and will
doubtless follow the judicial advice thus given. As this
machinery thus works out indirectly the result sought for
in the plan of the League to Enforce Peace, an amendment
to substitute a court of the League to take up and decide
such questions directly will doubtless approve itself to the
nations.

Mr. Root was anxious that, in addition to the declaration
in the preamble, there should be practical recognition of
international law as a guiding star of the League, its tri-
bunals and its action. In the addition to Article XIII,
which we have been discussing, we find such a recognition
in the present Article XIV providing for a permanent
international court of justice which is competent to hear and
determine any dispute of international character submitted
to it and to give an advisory opinion upon any dispute
or question referred to it by the Council or Assembly.

The provision for mediation and recommendation of set-

3l8 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

tlement in the first report of the Covenant, which met Mr.
Root's unqualified approval, has not been changed, except
that the unanimity required for an effective recommendation
by the Body of Delegates is now made unanimity by coun-
tries represented in the Council and a majority of the As-
sembly, a change which makes for effectiveness. Another
important change is the addition of Article XXI, as fol-
lows:

Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity
of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or
regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the
maintenance of peace

This meets two of Mr. Root's criticisms in full. First,
it removes all doubt that all present arbitration treaties are
to stand and bind the parties to them whether members of
the League or not, and relieves those who were concerned
lest progress toward peace by arbitration already made
might be lost.

Second, it not only enables the United States to maintain
the Monroe Doctrine, which was all that friends of that
doctrine asked, but it recognizes it as a regional understand-
ing for the securing of international peace. Never before
in our history has the world set its approval upon the doc-
trine as in this Covenant. It is really a great triumph for
the supporters of the doctrine. It is not only a reservation
in favor of the United States asserting it, but it is an af-
firmative declaration of its conventional character and of its
value in securing international peace.

The exclusion of immigration and tariff and other in-
ternal and domestic questions is secured by the following:

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them and
is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by inter-

ANALYSIS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT AS AMENDED 3x9

national law is solely within the jurisdiction of that party, the
Council shall so report and shall make no recommendation as to
its settlement.

If anything is clearly settled in international law, it is that,
except where a nation limits its rights by treaty, it may
impose whatever condition it chooses upon the admission of
persons or things into its territory. Those who express
alarm lest the Council should reach a different conclusion,
in spite of international law, can hardly be aware how
jealous all countries must and will be of their right to deter-
mine methods of raising taxes and protect their industries,
and how strenuously many of the nations will insist on the
right to exclude persons not desirable as permanent resi-
dents. Indeed, Japan has not urged, in the conference,
the view that immigration was anything but a domestic ques-
tion, but only pressed for an express recognition of racial
equality in the treatment of foreign persons resident in each
country. Even this the conference did not deem it wise
to grant.

Finally, we come to Article X, by which the members of
the League undertake to respect and preserve against ex-
ternal aggression the territorial integrity and political in-
dependence of every member. Mr. Root, as the writer
understands, strongly favors this article ; but he thinks there
should be a reexamination of the arrangements made under
the influence of the recent war, after conditions have be-
come stabilized by peace, to remedy the possible mistakes
made and to avoid too great rigidity. How this can be
brought about indirectly through powers of amendment and
withdrawal has already been pointed out.

The arguments against Article X which have been most
pressed are those directed to showing that under its obli-

320 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

gations the United States can be forced into many wars
and burdensome expeditions to protect countries in which
it has no legitimate interests. This objection will not bear
examination. If Germany were to organize another con-
piracy against the world, or if she and her old allies, to-
gether with Russia, were to organize a militant campaign
for Bolshevism against the world, we should wish to do
our share in fighting her, and in doing so quickly. If a
stronger nation were to attack a weaker nation, a member
of the League, our immediate and selfish interest in the
matter would be determined by the question whether it would
develop into a world war and so drag us in. But we are
interested as a member of the family of nations in main-
taining international justice in the interest of international
peace everywhere, and we should share the responsibility
and burden. It was a mixture of all these motives which
carried us into this war and we accepted as a slogan the
cry: " The world must be made safe for democracy. We
make this war to secure the liberty and independence of
nations against the doctrine that ' might makes right' "
This is all that Article X proposes. It is an answer to
Germany's assertion of her right of conquest. It organizes
the powers of the world to maintain the international com-
mandment, " Thou shalt not steal."

To what extent will it involve us in war? Little, if any.
In the first place, the universal boycott, first to be applied,
will impose upon most nations such a withering isolation and
starvation that in most cases it will be effective. In the
second place, we will not be drawn into any war in which it
will not be reasonable and convenient for us to render ef-
ficient aid, because the plan of the Council must be approved
by our representative, as already explained.

CORRESPONDENCE 32 1

In the third place, the threat of the universal boycott and
the union of overwhelming forces of the members of the
League, if need be, will hold every nation from violating
Article X and Articles XII, XIII and XV, unless there is a
world conspiracy, as in this war, in which case the earlier
we get into the war the better.

The warning effect of such a threat from a combination
of nations, like those in the League, is shown conclusively
in the maintenance of our Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine
was announced in 1823. Its declaration was deprecated by
American statesmen because it would involve us in con-
tinual friction and war. It was directed against most
powerful European nations. Yet we have maintained it
inviolate without firing a shot or losing a soldier for now
near a century. Article X merely extends the same pro-
tection to the weaker nations of the world which we gave
to the weaker nations of this hemisphere against the greed
of non- American nations. If our declaration accomplished
this much, how much more can we count upon the effective-
ness of the declaration of a powerful world-league of nations
as a restraint upon a would-be bully and robber of a small
nation !

CORRESPONDENCE

The following correspondence is published with the con-
sent of President Wilson.

Washington, Tuesday, March 18, 1919.

Personal.

Dear Mr. Tumulty:
I enclose a memorandum note to the President that is

322 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

probably superfluous, but may contain a suggestion. Do
with the note as you choose — for the next ten days, the
situation in Paris will be crucial and critical.

Sincerely yours,

Wm. H. Taft.
Hon. Joseph P. Tumulty,
Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C

Washington, D. C.
931 Southern Building,
March 18, 1919.
Mr. President:

If you bring back the treaty with the League of Nations
in it, make more specific reservation of the Monroe Doctrine,
fix a term for duration of the League and the limit of arma-
ment, require expressly unanimity of action in Executive
Council and Body of Delegates, and add to Article XV a
provision that, where the Executive Council of the Body
of Delegates finds the difference to grow out of an exclu-
sively domestic policy, it shall recommend no settlement,
the ground will be completely cut from under the opponents
of the League in the Senate. Addition to Article XV will
answer objection as to Japanese immigration as well as
tariffs under Article XXL Reservation of the Monroe
Doctrine might be as follows :

Any American State or States may protect the integrity
of American territory and the independence of the govern-
ment whose territory it is, whether a member of the League
or not, and may, in the interests of American peace, object
to and prevent the further transfer of American territory
or sovereignty to any European or non-American power.

CORRESPONDENCE 323

■

Monroe Doctrine reservation alone would probably carry
the treaty but others would make it certain.

Wm. H. Taft.
Hon. Woodrow Wilson,
President of the United States,
Paris, France. Augusta, Georgia.

March 19, 1919.
My dear Mr. Tumulty:

Gus Karger has telegraphed me that the President will
welcome any suggestions, and the sooner the better. I have
thought perhaps it might help more if I was somewhat more
specific than I was in the memorandum note I sent you yester-
day, and I therefore enclose another memorandum for
such action as you deem wise.

Sincerely yours,

Wm. H. Taft.
Hon. Joseph P. Tumulty,
Secretary to the President,
Washington, D. C.

Augusta, Ga., March 19th, 1919.
Memorandum for the President:
From William H. Taft.

Duration of the Covenant

Add to the Preamble the following :

*' from the obligations of which any member of the
League may withdraw after July i, 1929, by two years'
notice in writing, duly filed with the Secretary Greneral of
the League."

Explanation,

I have no doubt that the construction put upon the agree-

324 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

ment would be what I understand the President has already
said it should be, namely that any nation may withdraw
from it upon reasonable notice, which perhaps would be a
year. I think, however, it might strengthen the Covenant
if there was a fixed duration. It would completely remove
the objection that it is perpetual in its operation.

Duration of Armament Limit

Add to the first paragraph of Article VIII, the following :
" At the end of every five years, such limits of armament
for the several governments shall be reexamined by the Exe-
cutive Council, and agreed upon by them as in the first in-

stance."

Explanation

The duration of the obligation to limit armament, which
now may only be changed by consent of the Executive
Council, has come in for criticism. I should think this
might be thus avoided, without in any way injuring the
Covenant. Perhaps three years is enough, but I should
think five years would be better.

Unanimous action of the Executive Council or Body of
Delegates

Insert in Article IV, after the first paragraph, the follow-
ing:

'' Other action taken or recommendations made by the
Executive Council or the Body of Delegates shall be by the
unanimous vote of the countries represented by the members
or delegates, unless otherwise specifically stated/'

Explancttion

Great objection is made to the power of the Executive
Council by a majority of the members and the Body of

CORRESPONDENCE 325

Delegates to do the things which they are authorized to do
in the Covenant. In view of the specific provision that
the Executive Council and the Body of Delegates may act
by a majority of its members as to their procedure, I feel
confident that, except in cases where otherwise provided,
both bodies can only act by unanimous vote of the countries
represented. If that be the right construction, then there
can be no objection to have it specifically stated, and it will
remove emphatic objection already made on this ground.
It is a complete safeguard against involving the United
States primarily in small distant wars to which the United
States has no immediate relation, for the reason that the
plan for taking care of such a war, to be recommended or
advised by the Executive Council, must be approved by a
representative of the United States on the Board.
Add to Article X.

a. " A state or states of America, a member or members
of the League and competent to fulfil this obligation in
respect to American territory or independence, may, in event
of the aggression actual or threatened, expressly assume
the obligation and relieve the European or non-American
members of the League from it until they shall be advised
by such American state or states of the need for their
aid.*'

b. *' Any such American state or states may protect the
integrity of any American territory and the sovereignty of
the government whose territory it is, whether a member
of the League or not, and may, in the interest of American
peace, object to and prevent the further transfer of Ameri-
can territory or sovereignty to any European or non-Ameri-
can power."

326 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Explanation

Objection has been made that, under Article X, European
governments would come to America with force and be con-
cerned in matters from which heretofore the United States
has excluded them. This is not true, because Spain fought
Chili, in Seward's time, without objection from the United
States, and so Germany and England instituted a blockade
against Venezuela in Roosevelt's time. This fear could be
removed, however, by the first of the above paragraphs.

Paragraph (b) is the Monroe Doctrine pure and simple.
I forwarded this in my first memorandum.

It will be observed that Article X only covers the integ-
rity and independence of members of the League. There
may be <5ome American countries which are not sufficiently
responsible to make it wise to invite them into the League.
This second paragraph covers them. The expression
" European or non-American " is inserted for the purpose of
indicating that Great Britain, though it has American
dominion, is not to acquire further territory or sovereignty.

Japanese Immigration and Tariffs

Add to Article XV :

"If the difference between the parties shall be found by
this Executive Council or the Body of Delegates to be a
question which by international law is solely within the do-
mestic jurisdiction and polity of one of the parties, it shall
so report and not recommend a settlement of the dispute."

Explanation

Objection is made to Article XV that under its terms the
United States would be bound by unanimous recommenda-
tion for settlement of a dispute in respect to any issue foreign
or domestic; that it therefore might be affected seriously

CORRESPONDENCE 327

and unjustly by recommendations against the exclusion of
Japanese or Chinese, or by recommendations forbidding
tariffs on importations. In my judgment, we could rely on
the public opinion of the world, evidenced by the Body of
Delegates, not to interfere with our domestic legislation and
action. Nor do I think that under the League as it is, we
covenant to abide by a unanimous recommendation. But if
there is a specific exception made in respect to matters com-
pletely within the domestic jurisdiction and legislation of a
country, the whole criticism is removed. The Republican
Senators are trying to stir up anxiety among Republicans,
lest this is to be a limitation upon our tariff. The President
has already specifically met the objection as to limitation
upon the tariff when the fourteen points were under discus-
sion. Nevertheless, in respect to the present language of
the Covenant, it would help much to meet and remove ob-
jections, and cut the ground under Senatorial obstruction.
Prospect of Ratification

My impression is that if the one article already sent, on
the Monroe Doctrine, be inserted in the treaty, sufficient
Republicans who signed the Round Robin would probably
retreat from their positions and vote for ratification so that
it would carry. If the other suggestions were adopted, I
feel confident that all but a few who oppose any League at
all would be driven to accept them and to stand for the
League.

The White House, Washington, D. C,

March 22nd, 191 9.
Hon. William H. Taft:
Have just received following from the President.

328 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

" Please thankfully acknowledge to Mr. Taft his message
and say that I hope it will be very useful/'

J. P. Tumulty.

Augusta, Georgia,
March 28, 19 19.
Hon. Joseph P. Tumulty,
White House,
Washington, D. C.

Venture to suggest to President that failure to reserve
Monroe Doctrine more specifically, in face of opposition in
conference, will give great weight to objection that League as
first reported endangers Doctrine. It will seriously em-
barrass advocates of League. It will certainly lead to
Senate amendments embodying Doctrine and other provi-
sions in form less likely to secure subsequent acquiescence of
other nations than proper reservation now. Deem some
kind of Monroe Doctrine amendment now to Article Ten
vital to acceptance of League in this country. I say this
with full realization that complications in conference are
many and not clearly understood here. A strong and suc-
cessful stand now will carry the League.

Wm. H. Taft.

The White House, Washington, D. C,

Mar. 31, 1919.
Hon. Wm. H. Taft,
Dayton, Ohio.

The President has asked me to thank you for your cable-
gram about the Monroe Doctrine.

J. P. Tumulty.

CORRESPONDENCE 329

New York, N. Y.,
April loth, 1 91 9.
My dear Mr. Tumulty:

We are very much troubled over the report that the
Monroe Doctrine amendment to the Covenant is being op-
posed by England and Japan. Will you be good enough to
send the enclosed to the President ? We had a meeting to-
day of the Executive Committee of the League to Enforce
Peace, and Dr. Lowell and I, at the instance of the League,
will be glad to have this matter presented directly to the
President by cable.

Sincerely yours,

Wm. H. Taft.
Hon. Joseph P. Tumulty,
Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C

New York, N. Y.,
April loth, 1 91 9.
The President,
Paris.

Friends of Covenant are seriously alarmed over report
that no amendment will be made more specifically safeguard-
ing Monroe Doctrine. At full meeting of Executive Com-
mittee of League to Enforce Peace, with thirty members
from eighteen States present, unanimous opinion that, with-
out such amendment, Republican Senators will certainly
defeat ratification of treaty because public opinion will sus-
tain them. With such amendment treaty will be promptly
ratified.

William H. Taft.
A. Lawrence Lowell.

330 TAFT PAPERS ON LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

14 April, 19 19.
Dear Mr. Taft:

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the tenth
instant, and to say that I have transmitted to the President
by cable the message enclosed.

Sincerely yours,

J. P. Tumulty,
Secretary to the President
Hon. William H. Taft,
Washington, D. C.

William H. Taft

washington, d. c.

May 5, 1919.
My dear Mr. Tumulty :

I am very much troubled that this conference at Paris was
unable to adopt a provision in favor of religious freedom
throughout the world. There is no necessity for such a reso-
lution in respect to the allied countries, because there is now
religious freedom there. The acute necessity for it is with
respect to Poland, Rumania, and those other new States
carved out of Russia, Austria and Germany. I would like,
therefore, to have you transmit to the President, as coming
from me, a cable message of the following purport:

" The Jews of the United States are greatly disturbed over re-
liable reports coining to them of continued abuses of their co-
religionists in Poland, Rumania and in the new Slav States created
under the auspices of the conference. Is it not possible to im-
pose on these States, as a condition of their recognition and
membership in the League, the maintainence of religious free-
dom under their respective governments? What was done in the

CORRESPONDENCE 33 1

Berlin Conference of 1879 ought to be possible in the more
favorable atmosphere of this conference, with the additional
securities of performance that the League will give."

I tmderstand that unless something of this sort is done,
there will be a strong movement among the Jews to attack
the League and I do not need to tell you that there are men in
the Senate who will seize every opportunity of this kind as
an instrument to defeat its ratification.

Sincerely yours,

WiLUAM H. Taft.

Hon. Jos. P. Tumulty,
Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington,
6 May 1919.
My dear Mr. Taft :

Let me acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the fifth
of May quoting a message regarding religious freedom which
you wish me to transmit to the President. I am doing so
to-day by caUe.

Sincerely yours,

J. P. Tumulty,
Secretaxy to the President.
Hon. William H. Taft,
931 Southern Building,
Washington, D. C.

PKVTID IN THB VSVPWD STATB8 OV IMBKOA

INDEX

Adams, John Quincy, reference

to, 252
Administrative Organization of

League, 3
Alabama Claims, 40, 49, 192
Alaskan Boundary Arbitration, 49,

241
Alsace-Lorraine, reference to, 85,

132, 136, 16s, 222
Ammunition, Supervision of trade

in, 25
Appeal to Business Men, 241
Appeal to Women, 257
Arbitration (see " Arbitration

Treaties " and " Concilia-
tion"), 13, 191, 220, 232, 241,

264, 316
Concerning Seal Fisheries, 44
With Canada, 62
Arbitration, compulsory, 289
Arbitration Treaties, 39, 43, 178,

262
Arbitration Treaties of the United

States, 54
Armaments —
Limitation of, 102, 109, 157, 298,

324

Reduction of, 10, 116, 149, 178,

208, 248, 263, 264, 288
Armenia, reference to, 136, 143,

154,248
Armenia as mandatory, 224
Armenians, 167
Armistice, basis of, 183
Arms (see "Munitions")
Articles of Confederation, refer-
ence to, 29, 30
Article 10 of the League —
Arguments against answered,
319

Article 10 of the League — confd.

Discussion of, 255, 269, 325

Guaranties of, 308
Asquith, Mr., quoted, 218

Referred to as favoring the
League, ^
Assembly, reference to, 6, 7, 314
Australian System of Military

Training (see " Military
Training ")

Balkan States, reference to, 136^

Baltic Provinces, 139, 143, 237
Beck, James M., reference to, 214,

215

Belgium, invasion of, 92

Belgium's Neutrality, Violation of
obligation to protect, 89

Bering Sea Controversy, arbitra-
tion of, 44, 64, 241

Bemhardi, reference to, 87

Bessarabia, 143 ^

Bethmann-Hollweg referred to as
favoring League, 98

Bismarck, reference to, 85, 86, 89,
181

Body of Delegates, 265, 271, 299

Bohemia, 143

Bolsheviki, 175, 183, 184, 213, 219

Bolshevism, 158, 177, 273, 302, 305

Bourgeois, M. Leon, reference to,
212

Borah, Senator —
Objections of to League an-
swered, 76
Reference to, 198^ 217, 260, 295,

297
Bosnia, reference to, 224

333

334

INDEX

Boycott, refe r e nce to, 65, 219, 232,
245, 267, 268, 321
Objections to answered, 67
Use for prevention of war» lOS
When to be instituted, i, 18
Boxer Affair, reference to, 122
British League of Free Nations,

206
Briand, M., referred to as favor-
ing the League, 74, 98
Bryan, W. J^ answered as to con-
stitutionality of plank for use
of military forces, 57
Debate with on League to En-
force Peace, 98-132
Bryce, Lord, referred to, 74
Business Men, appeal to, 241

Canada —

Agreement with as to fortifica-
tions, etc., XIV, 240^ 264

Arbitration with, 62

Our relations with, 40
Caucasus, the, reference to, 248
Canning, reference to, 252
Cases Cited —

Geoffrey v. Riggs, 54

Hans V. Louisiana, 35

Kansas v. Colorado, 36, 52

Louisiana v. Texas, 38

Missouri v. Illinois, 34

Wisconsin v. The Pelican In-
surance Co., 37
Cecil, Lord Robert,

Quoted, 287

Reference to, 212, 220
Children, Traffic in, 25
Chinese, Question as to naturali-
zation of, 63
Civil War, Analogy to war with

Germany, 83
Clemenceau —

Quoted, 215

Reference to, 194, 202, 212, 213

Commission on Condliation, 42,

43. 5c^ 53. 189. 196
Compulsory Military Training, 123

Conciliation, Instances of, 63, 64
Conciliation, Commission of (see
'' Commission on Concilia-
tion" and ''Council of Con-
ciliation ")
Confederations of small States,

example of, 29
Congress of Nations, 205
Congress, Power to declare war
(see Treaty-making power),
68
Conscription law, reference to, 96
Constantinople as mandatory, 224
Constitution of United States,

framing of, 224
Constitutionality of Proposab of
the League to Enforce Peace,

(Constitutionality of the League,

276
Council of Conciliation, 100, 160^

2Q5
Court (see '* International

Court")
Court Decisions (see "(^es

Cited ")
Court of International Justice, 14
Covenant of Paris (see "Paris

Covenant ")
Criticism of League, should be

constructive, 198, 200
Cuba —
Integrity guaranteed, 149
Our relation to, 72
Reference to, 159, 187
Treaty with, 59
Czecho-Slovaks, reference to, 136,

139. 175. 237
Czecho-Slavs, 143, 154
Czecho-Slavs, in Russia, 219

Dalmatian Coast, 312
Danzig, 306

INDBX

335

Dardanelles, 183

Delegates, Body of (tee "Bodr

of Delegates")
Democrats, Support of League by,

199
Denmark —

Schleswig-Holstein taken from.

Disarmament, 149, 163, 239

Disarmament and Freedom of the
Seas, 163

Disease, Control of, 26

Disputes —
Cases before Court to determine
disputes between States un-
der Articles of Confederation,
30
Procedure for settlement of, 15,

19
Divine Right of Kings, 142

Draft, reference to, 96

England, Our relations with, 40
England and Her Navy, 164
Entangling Alliances (see " Wash-
ington's Advice")
Economic Barriers, discussion of,

176
Europe, to rearrange map of, 144,

154
Executive Council —
Power of, 209, 298
Reference to, 206, 260, 265, 276^

aSi, 3x4

Fess, Mr., reference to, 260
Finland, 143, 237
Fisheries Calse, 192
Fiume, reference to, 301, 306^ 311,
Foch, Marshal, reference to, 301
Forr (see "Military Force'')
Discussion of, XV, 103, 124, 160^
189

Necessary for effective League,

108
Necessary to use force against
force, 133

Fourteen Points, reference to, 139^
14a, 149. iSS» iS7, 163, 165,
171, 176. 183, 215

France, War of 1870, 85

Freedom of the Seas, 160^ 163, 176

French Association for the Soci-
ety of Nations, 207

German Colonies, reference to, 22^

142, 164, 248
(jerman Colonies and the League,

221
(jerman efficiency, 182
German Militarism, reference to,

81, 9i> 94
(jerman Preparedness for War, 87
Ckrmany, 157
And the membership in the

League, 151
Essential to defeat, 132
Growth and development of, 85
Hemming in, 187
Not to join League at once, 193
War of 1870^ %
Grant, Cieneral, quoted, 95
Great Britain, Representation of,

271
Greater League, loi, 161
Great Powers and the League, 151,
i6x, 162, 177. 192, 19s, 196^ 197,
202, 215, 216, 217
Greece, Leagues of, 29
Grey, Lord —
In favor of League^ 74, gB
Quoted, 79

Hague Conference, Second, 41
Hague Tribunal, referred to, 220

336 IN,

Hamilton, reference to, 224
Hayes and Tilden dispute, IS9
Henry, Patrick, reference to, 24?
Herzegovinia, reference to, 224
Holy Alliance, reference to, 142
Hughes, Mr^ referred to ai fav-
oring League, 99
Hungary, 302

Immigration, 318
Indcmnitie*, 300
Internationa] Bureau of Labor

provided for in League, 247
International Army, Necessity for,

ISO
International Bureaus, 26
International Court, $0, 53, til, 99,

160, 188, 196, 205, 23f, 317
Supreme Court as precedent

for, 43
International Law, SO, 189, 195,

205, 208
Conferences to agree upon, 42,

44
Definitioo of, 61, 93, 125
Uethod for formulating and

codifying, 2, 3
The Logue to formulate princi-
ples of, 100
International Police (see "Mili-

tory Police")
International Prise Court, 56
Internationalism, Argument as to

answered, 146
Ireland and the League, 235
Isolation inconceivable, 162
Italy and Her Entrance into Ibe

War, 31 1> 312

Japanese, Immigration and natu-
ralization of, 49, 63, 266, 310,
326

Jay Treaty, 54, 56

Jefferson, Thos., reference to, 119,

174. 252
Jews and religious liberty, 166,

309, 330
Jews in Rumania, Poland, etc,

310
Jugo Slavs, 136, 139, 143, 154, 175,

237
Justiciable, definition of, 179
Justiciable questions, 1, 3, 33, 39>

«. 53

Kaiser, reference to, 140
Kant, reference to, 113
Knox, Senator —

Answered, 280

Discussion of plan of League
proposed by, 289

Reference to, igS, 301, 210^ 214,

215

} miprove <
all countries, 25
Secretary, reference to.

Larger League, 189
League —

A barrier to wars, 257

Analogy to Domestic Govern-
ment, 78

British, 206

Constitutionality of, 376, 277,
280 ff

Covenant, As amended, Analy^
of, 313

English plan referred to, 83

Feasibility of, discussed, 78

Functions of, 195

Fundamental plan of, 41 fi

Greatest step in history, ago

Members of, 27

Objections to, 297

Reasons for entering, 249

Withdrawal from, 333

INDEX

337

League of Nations (see "Paris

Covenant")! 52
Defined, 178

League to Enforce Peace —
Constitutionality of Proposals*

52
Planks of Platform, 188
Platform of, i, 205
Purposes of, 74
Steps in organization of, 180
Legislative Body of League (see
"Assembly" and "Body of
Delegates"), 3
Lesser League, loi, 160, 163, 195,

208, 217
Lesser Powers and the League,

151
Lincoln, referred to, 83

Lithuanians, 175

Lloyd George —

Quoted, 115, 218

Reference to, 194, 202, 212, 302
Lodge, Senator —

Reference to, 74; 198, 214

Referred to as favoring the
League, 99, '74
Loughborough, Lord Chancellor,
quoted, 56

Madison, James, reference to, 252
Mandatories, 22, 223, 224, 234, 262,

309, 316
Mason, George, reference to, 247
Members of League, 27
Mesopotamia, referlence to, 248
Milyukoff, quoted, 135
Militarism, 94, 138^ 142, 157, 165,

221
Military Aid, when to be given, 18
Military Force —
Analogy to police in maintain-
ing order, 106
Discussion of, 65, 100, 112
Objections to answered, 57, 67
When to be used, i, 18, 42, 45,
48

Military Training, Universal, 150,

163, 204, 217
Missouri v. Illinois, 34
Monroe Doctrine —
Interpretation of, 269
Message of President Monroe

enunciating, 253
Reference to or discussion of,
VII, VIII, 22, 70, TJ, "9, 203,
216, 252, 254, 274, 2^s^ 276, 292,

322, 328, 329
Reservation as to, 318

Morgenthau, Mr^ reference to,

258
Munitions, manufacture of, 11

Napoleon, reference to, 95, 103,

141

National isolation impossible in
the future, 134

Nationalism, League not incon-
sistent with, 146

Naturalization, 63

Neutrality of Belgium, Violation
of, 90

New Nations or Republics to be
created, X, 143, 145, 160, 185,
187. iffl, 236

Non-Justiciable Questions, 49

Objections to League, 198, 200,
209,249
Answered:
(i) As to Boycott, 67

(2) As to Military Force, 67

(3) As to Unconstitutional-

ity of, 68
Olney, former Secretary of State,

quoted, 57-58
Opium, Traffic in, 25
Oregon Boundary Dispute, 40
Orlando, reference to, 313

338

INDEX

Paderewski, reference to, 310
Palestine, 248

As Mandatory, 224
Panama —

Independence of, guaranteed, 59^

149
Treaty with, 58
Panama Canal, reference to, 72
Paris Covenant, discussion of,

228, 233, 262, 290
Peace —
Dangers of Premature, 81
Not delayed by League, 300
Steps to secure, 296
Peace Offer, Danger of, 138
Pennsylvania v. Connecticut, un-
der Articles of Confederation,
30
Platform of League (see
" League ")
Discussion of, 98, 107, 145
Plunkett, Sir Horace, reference

to, 226
Poincare, President, reference to,

213
Poindexter, Senator —
Answered, 147, 240
Quoted, 239

Reference to, 154, 260^ 297
Pogroms, reference to, 167
Poland, 143. 154. 237
Poles, 17s

Police (see "International Po-
lice ")
Polk, President, quoted, 253
Preparedness, in relation to

League, 80
Presidential Election, description

of, 185^186
Pro-German sentiment, 9^, 97
Purpose of United Sutes in the
War, 133

Racial Freedom, 309

Reasons for entering the League,
249

Reed, Senator, reference to, 154,
260, 297

Referendum, discussion of use be-
fore declaring war, 115

Regional Understandings, Reser-
vations as to, 318

Religious Liberty, 166, 309, 330

Republicans and the League, 199

Reptile Fund, reference to use of
to bribe the press, 89

Republics, New (see "New Re-
publics **)

Roosevelt, Former President, re-
ferred to, 75> ^i> aos, 203

Roosevelt and the Japanese-Rus-
sian War, 83

Root, Mr., reference to, 315, 317*

319

Round Robin, the, 307

Rumania, 143

Rumania and the Jews, 168^ 310

Russia —
Discussion of problems of, 183
Reference to, 87, 91, 135, 136,

I43> 154. 175* 219, 30s
S

Scott, James Brown, reference to,

212
Seal Fisheries (see "Bering Sea

Controversy ")
Secret Treaties, 311
Self -Determination, 136
Self-Govemment, definition of,

18S
Separate Peace, Logical result of

those opposing League, 154
Slovakia (see " Czecho-Slavs '0
Smuts, General, reference to, 235,

261
Saar District, 222
Small Nations, 196, 197

Protection of by League, 193
Smaller League (see "Lesser

League ^

INDEX

339

Socialists, reference to, 146, 153
Sonnino, reference to, 301, 313
Sovereignty, discussion of, VIII,

147, 148, 191, 279
Submarine Warfare, reference to

use of, 80, 89, 93, 94, 157. 180,
181

Sully, reference to, 20X

Super-sovereignty, League not to
establish, XIV, 14^ 215, 259

Supreme Court, Analogy to inter-
national tribunal, 32

Swiss System of Military Train-
ing (see "Military Train-
ing")

Syria, reference to, 248

Tariff, Exclusion from League,

318. 326
Tennyson, reference to, 20X
Treaties —
Secret, 311
To be registered with League,

20
Those negotiated by Mr. Bryan,

III
Treaty of Versailles —
Delay in making, 303
Long and complicated, 188
Treaty-making Power, discussion

of. S3, 58, 68, 239, 285, 286
Treaty of Peace and the League

of Nations, 272, 280
Trentino, reference to, 136, 154,

i6s, 312
Triple Alliance, reference to, 104,

312
Triple Entente, reference to, 104,

312
Turkey, reference to, 136, 143
Turkish Empire, Disposition of

certain communities, 23

U
Ukraine, reference to, 143, 237

United States —
Discussion as to whether the
United States should join the
League, 117
Driven to the war, 156
Influence in League, 194
Power, wealth and growth of,

71 ff, 79
Purpose of in the war, 133, 181
Universal Training (see "MiU-
tary Training")

Victory, Obligations of, 141
Victory Program, 2
Victory with Power, 132
Viviani, M., quoted, 135

War-
Delay of by investigation, 11 1
Right of Congress to declare,

149

Washington's advice against en-
tangling Alliances, Discussion
of, IX, XII, 71 ff, lift 132, 156^
174, 274

Whhe, Henry, reference to, 212

Wilson, President —
And the Fiume Controversy,

313
Correspondence with in refer-
ence to the League, 321 ff
Influence in Europe, 194
Quoted, 7ft 91. 134, IS7, 218
Reference to, 74, 153, 154, 162,

169, 211, 223, 230, 238. 255
Referred to as favoring the
League, 98
Wilson, Professor, quoted, 70
Women, Appeal to, 257
Workingmen and the League, 152
World Court, discussk>n of, 114

340 INDEX

World Court Congress, Address Z

before, 28
World Politics, 134 Zeppelins, reference to use of, 89

World War, Beginning of, ^ Zones, Division of world into,

216

BK2003