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SEPTEMBER 15, 1972 

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-694—0 WASHINGTON : 1972 

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SEPTEMBER 15, 1972 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 


JV -694-0 WASHINGTON : 1972 


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 25 cents 



I ihrarv" U. S. Government Documents Depository 
l_ I D r a T V Franklin Pierce Law Center Library 


2116 " 


JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii 

PHILIP A. HART, Michigan HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts STROM THURMOND, South Carolina 

BIRCH BAYH, Indiana MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky 


ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida 
JOHN V. TUNNEY, California 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal 
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania 

SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina STROM THURMOND, South Carolina 

BIRCH BAYH, Indiana MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky 


J. G. Sodrwine, Chief Counsel 

Samuel J. Scott, Associate Counsel 

Warren Littman, Associate Counsel 

John R. Norpel, Director of Research 

Alfonso L. Tarabochia, Chief Investigator 


Resolved by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Com- 
mittee on the Judiciary, That the testimony of Frances G. Knight 
taken in executive session on September 15, 1972, be released from 
the injunction of secrecy, be printed and made public. 

James O. Eastland, Chairman. 
Approved September 27, 1972. 




U.S. Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act 

and Other Internal Security Laws 
op the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D.G. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 12:15 p.m., in room 
S-206, The Capitol, Senator James O. Eastland (chairman), 

Present : Senators Eastland and Gurney. 

Also present : J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, our witness today is Miss Frances G. 
Knight, who heads the Passport Office of the Department of State. 
Do you wish to swear the witness, sir ? 

The Chairman. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about 
to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help you God ? 

Miss Knight. I do. 


Mr. Sourwine. Miss Knight, the committee has been receiving testi- 
mony about narcotics, the world narcotics traffic, and its impact on the 
security of the United States. And in connection with this, we have 
had testimony about passport forgeries and loss or pseudo-loss of 
passports which, in fact, are believed or suspected to have been stolen 
or otherwise illegally disposed of. We have also, as you know, been 
interested in the matter of security of passports, and we would like 
to ask you to tell us in your own words the whole story of the passport 
security problem as it exists today. Touch, if you will, on the matter 
of narcotics and passport security, but do not fail to touch such 
matters as making the passport itself secure, passport frauds not in- 
volved in narcotics, and any of the other problems with security and 
affecting the U.S. passport which you know of. If you do not know 
of them, we know nobody does, so we will get the full story. 

Miss Knight. Yes, sir. I sincerely hope that I can help the committee 
in this investigation. We have been very close to the situation of pass- 
port fraud over a period of years, and we have quite a number of 
documents which spell out the fraud, how it is perpetrated, and what 
we have tried to do about it. And since it is a rather lengthy story, I 
would like to refer to some notes for the record, if you agree. 

The Chairman. That is fine. That will be permitted. 


Miss Knight. The Passport Office, like many other areas of Gov- 
ernment, has been concerned for some time with the rapid expansion 
and disastrous results of international drug traffic. Our concern is 
based on two closely related factors: (1) passport fraud being per- 
petrated by persons who are either drug addicts or drug traffickers, 
and (2) protecting the integrity of the U.S. passport. 

The policy of the Passport Office in any known or suspected passport 
fraud is to thoroughly investigate the information given us and to 
determine whether there has been a violation of the passport laws 
and, if so, to refer it to the Department of Justice through the appro- 
priate U.S. attorney for criminal prosecution. This is standard oper- 
ating procedure in each and every case. Oases involving more than one 
potential fraud are handled with particular urgency. As soon as the 
facts of a case are available, the Passport Office issues an alert which 
is sent to all foreign service posts and to the Immigration and Natural- 
ization Service. Every action is taken to prevent the fraud from 
spreading and to secure prosecution of the persons responsible. 

As a matter of policy, the Passport Office cooperates with all Gov- 
ernment agencies which may have an interest in a fraud case to assist 
them in the performance of their statutory responsibilities. This co- 
operation extends to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 
as well as the Bureau of Customs. 

Because your inquiry is primarily interested in the fraud-drug 
relationship, I would like to call your attention to the action taken 
by the Passport Office concerning the report on the "World Heroin 
Problem," dated May 27, 1971, prepared by Congressman Morgan F. 
Murphy of Illinois and Congressman Robert. H. Steele of Connecticut 
pursuant to H.R. 109. The following recommendation was contained 
in this report : 

That the United States consider canceling the passport of any American 
known to be engaged in the illegal trafficking of heroin. 

In our comment on this recommendation, we stated that adverse 
passport action could be taken only in the case of an American citizen 
who had been convicted or was a fugitive from a Federal warrant of 
arrest or similar order for trafficking in heroin. We indicated that this 
action would have to be based either on an Executive order or legisla- 
tion providing that the illegal sale, processing, or transportation of 
heroin is damaging to the national interest of the United States. We 
also indicated that the Department of Justice should advise U.S. 
attorneys to prosecute vigorously passport frauds involving drug 
activities. On June 15, 1971, our recommendations were forwarded to 
the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. I am 
unaware of any action taken. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean you did not get an answer to your recom- 
mendation ? Your memorandum was not acknowledged ? 

Miss Knight. Not that I know of, sir. 

Mr. Sour wine. Have you renewed those recommendations since 
June 15, 1971? 

Miss Knight. No, because I sent the recommendations through chan- 
nels, and I would not be in a position to contact the Department of 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, Miss Knight, I was not intending to imply 
that it was our opinion or the committee's opinion that you should or 

should not have done anything. I was just trying to find out what the 
situation was. 

Please go ahead. 

Miss Knight. No, I did not follow this up. 

Mr. Sourwine. I interrupted you. Please go ahead. 

Miss Knight. In January 1972, a special subcommittee of the Cabi- 
net Committee on International Narcotics Control was established in 
the Department of State to consider recommendations dealing with 
methods by which to combat the international traffic in narcotics. Rep- 
resentatives of the Passport Office were on that subcommittee and num- 
erous meetings have been held. 

As a result, procedures are currently being developed to inform the 
Passport Office of the parole of narcotics traffickers for the purpose 
of denying passport facilities to such persons until the £>arole period 
is completed or until they receive permission from their parole officer 
to leave the United States. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs is now furnishing the Passport Office with the names of persons 
who are of interest to the Bureau because of suspected illegal narcotics 
trafficking. When these individuals apply for a passport, the Bureau 
is notified. 

Another result of our liaison with the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs is receipt by the Passport Office of information 
from the Bureau concerning possible drug related passport frauds. 
While these results stemmed from discussions within the subcommittee, 
I would like to emphasize that the impetus for this coordination was 
provided by the Legal Division of the Passport Office as early as 1969. 

Mr. Sourwine. Miss Knight, you mentioned discussions within the 
subcommittee. What subcommittee are you referring to? That does 
not means this subcommittee, does it ? 

Miss Knight. No, sir ; it does not. This was a special subcommittee 
of the Cabinet Committee on the International Narcotics Control, 
which I just referred to. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right. I just wanted to be sure. Go ahead. 

Miss Knight. All passport frauds are committed for the purpose of 
covering up criminal activities. This includes fraudulent citizenship 
claims which are advanced by aliens to obtain illegal entry into the 
United States. Persons obtaining passports by fraud fall into several 
basic categories : (1) drug traffickers; (2) militant groups; (3) con- 
fidence men or swindlers; (4) illegal aliens in the United States; 
(5) fugitives from justice, and (6) imposters. These criminals special- 
ize in certain types of fraud such as adoption frauds, fradulent use 
of the passport, imposter fraud, and slot fraud. 

By way of a brief explanation : An imposter fraud is one in which 
a person assumes the identity of another individual in order to obtain 
a passport. Such cases occur domestically as well as abroad. 

The procedure involves the obtention of officially issued birth or 
baptismal certificates or hospital records, either by theft of purchase 
from persons living and with a little expert cosmetic assistance, the 
impersonation becomes effective. 

Another procedure involves the use of birth records of persons 
deceased. There is no efficient coordination between births and deaths 

in this country. As a matter of fact, there is no standardization of 
birth records or certificates in the United States. The Division of Vital 
Statistics in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has 
been working with the State authorities and the Passport Office and 
other Federal authorities to endeavor to obtain standardization of not 
only the birth document itself, but strengthening the procedures of 
filing birth records and strengthening the protection of these records 
to enhance the integrity of the documents. Birth certificates are now 
more formal and consistent but no one knows whether an individual 
born 30 years ago or 6 months ago is still with us or has gone to his 

Adoption frauds occur almost exclusively abroad and generally 
involve childless American couples who adopt a child overseas and 
then report the birth to a consular post as their own. 

Fraudulent use of a passport involves one which has been legit- 
imately issued but subsequently altered to remove a restriction or to 
indicate its issuance to another person. This may be done with or with- 
out the consent of the original bearer. 

Slot cases involve the reporting of the birth of children overseas, 
when in fact such birth did not occur. This is a method by which an 
alien child can be brought into the United States as a citizen or at some 
later date an alien may use this birth registration to enter the United 
States as a citizen. Such a procedure requires the collusion of an Amer- 
ican citizen. 

An example of a typical investigation into the fraudulent use of 
U.S. passports by drug traffickers relates to an organization known as 
the "Brotherhood of Eternal Love." 

Mr. Sourwine. Miss Knight, what is that Brotherhood of Eternal 
Love ? Is that a religious organization ? 

Miss Knight. No; I believe it is an organization of the New Left. It 
may have some religious overtones. I do not know. 

This outfit was reportedly founded by Dr. Timonthy Leary and to 
have had its base in LSD operations. Dr. Leary 's present connections 
with the Brotherhood, if any, are not known although it is claimed that 
the Brotherhood did assist him in obtaining a passport in a false 
identity to facilitate his departure from the United States after he 
escaped from a California jail where he was imprisoned on a narcotics 
charge. In early 1969, the Brotherhood turned its attention to hard 
drugs, primarily hashish and engaged in smuggling operations from 
Afghanistan into the United States. The principal source of the drugs 
appears to be Kabul, Afghanistan. 

An extensive investigation is currently being conducted concerning 
the activities of the Brotherhood by a task force of local, State, and 
Federal agencies including the Office of Security of the Department of 
State, the Bureau of Customs, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs, and the Internal Revenue Service. A grand jury in Orange 
County, Calif., has indicted 47 members of the Brotherhood on drug 
smuggling cases. 

I would like to submit for the record a copy of a press statement by 
the Orange County District Attorney released at the time of the 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, may this be received for the record 
at this point ? 

The Chairman. It may be received. 
(The document referred to follows:) 


The Brotherhood of Eternal Love is an offshoot of the League of Spiritual 
Discovery (LSD) a drug oriented religious cult founded by Dr. Timothy Leary. 

The members of the League and now the Brotherhood believe they receive 
mystical insight into life through the use of hallucinogenic drugs. 

At present Dr. Leary is a fugitive living in Switzerland, but he is still con- 
sidered the "high priest" of this drug oriented cult. His followers inhabit a 
ranch in a remote area of Southern California. 

In October 1906, Leary and his followers applied to the State of California 
for corporate status. On October 26, 1966, the Brotherhood of Eternal Love 
became a legal corporation in California and was granted tax exempt status by 
the State Franchise Tax Board on the grounds of its religious nature set forth 
in the Articles of Incorporation. 

In the year long investigation by the Special Task Force investigating the 
Brotherhood, it has been determined that this cult is one of the major suppliers 
of LSD, hashish oil, and hashish throughout the United States and the world. 
The Brotherhood has also set up a major smuggling network using false identifi- 
cation and forged passports that allow its members to travel about the world 
making illegal drug purchases for import into the U.S. 

Intelligence developed by the Task Force revealed that the Brotherhood has 
smuggled nearly 1,000 pounds of hashish into the U.S. each month. 

During the investigation of the Brotherhood the Task Force agents have seized 
more than 1.5 million LSD tablets, 30 gallons of hashish oil, more than 2y 2 tons 
of hashish, 3 LSD labs and 4 hashish oil labs, along with innumerable sets of 
falisified identifications and passports. 

Clandestine Brotherhood laboratories are the primary producer of an LSD 
tablet known as "Orange Sunshine" that lias been found throughout the United 
States and the world. 

The orange colored tablets have shown up in the drug subculture from Cali- 
fornia to Connecticut and from Canada to Australia. 

In January 1972, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) agents 
seized 230,000 "Orange Sunshine" tablets in New Jersey. In March 1972, more 
than 60,000 pink-orange LSD tablets were found in Australia. 

Just as recently as May 26, 1972, Thailand police and BNDD arrested an Amer- 
ican citizen, Thomas Gary Caudill, in a Bangkok hotel with 500 "Orange Sun- 
shine" tablets in his possession. 

The Brotherhood's hashish smuggling operation is headed by one experienced 
smuggler who coordinates the worldwide illegal drug traffic. 

To finance the smuggling operation, a group of Brotherhood members or their 
friends will combine their finances. A portion of the money will be advanced to 
the top smuggler to make arrangements to purchase the load cf hashish, obtain 
false identifications and pay expenses. 

If a car is to be used in the smuggling operation, it is usually purchased in the 
U.S. and fitted with hidden compartments. The vehicle is then shipped to 

One of the smuggling team, the "load man," will travel to Afghanistan to 
make the purchase of the hashish. In Afghanistan the Brotherhood deals with 
Amanullah Salam Tokhi and his brother Hayatuuah Tokhi to obtain the "finest 
quality" hashish. The Tokhi brothers were also indicted for their part in the 
Brotherhood's narcotics running scheme. 

"When the vehicle is loaded with hashish it is taken out of Afghanistan supplied 
with new, false registration, shipped back to the U.S., usually to a port known 
not to have major narcotics problems. 

When the vehicle arrives, it is picked up by another member of the Brother- 
hood and the shipment is never in the true name of the cult member. The Brother- 
hood's head smuggler is then informed and makes arrangements for the 
distribution of the hashish load to the investors and receives the balance of the 


The year long investigation has revealed that the Brotherhood uses numer- 
ous businesses as fronts for the sale and distribution of the hashish, LSD, and 


Brotherhood members have been tied to health food shops, juice bars, 
psychedelic shops, record stores, surf equipment stores, used car lots, a rug 
company and a beach club. 

The results of today's task force operation will severely undercut the leader- 
ship of this drug subculture which has been a strong influence, especially among 
young people, since the early 1960's. 

Mr. Sourwine. Go ahead, Miss Knight. 

Miss Knight. In connection with this release, it should be noted 
that what has been described as "forged passports" are actually 
genuine U.S. passports which were obtained by fraud. There is a 
difference. The agencies investigating the Brotherhood have furnished 
the Passport Office with a list of 155 persons who are members of the 
Brotherhood. In addition, 110 aliases for these persons have also been 
furnished to the Passport Office. We have been and continue to conduct 
file searches in an attempt to identify these individuals. 

An enormous amount of time has been invested in these searches 
but we have made progress, and I am glad to report that 91 passport 
files have been located which relate to the Brotherhood. Most of these 
applications were filed between 1969 and 1972. Many of them indicate 
use of the well-known pattern of reporting the original passport as 
lost or stolen and, subsequently, obtaining a replacement passport. 
Since the Passport Office first learned of the activities of the Brother- 
hood in June 1972, we have located, researched and documented 40 
cases which have been sent to the Office of Security for investigation 
for passport fraud. Another 10 to 12 cases, which previously had been 
sent for investigation, have been tentatively identified as members of 
the Brotherhood. 

A screening program has been established for the remainder of the 
Brotherhood files by verifying the date and place of birth and writing 
reference letters to the parents or next of kin of other suspected 
Brotherhood member cases. Through this method, eight more cases 
have been identified as passport frauds. In one such case, an individual 
had used the identity of his mentally retarded brother-in-law to obtain 
a passport. The applicant had prior arrests in the United States and 
abroad for drug offenses. A reference letter, sent to the father, resulted 
in sworn statements that the passport applicant was not his son, identi- 
fying him instead as his son-in-law. This case has been referred to the 
U.S. Attorney for prosecution. So much for the Brotherhood. 

Statistics reflect that for fiscal years 1970 to 1972, there was an 
average of more than 17,000 U.S. passports reported lost or stolen 
annually on a worldwide basis which have never been accounted for. 
Some of these passports, of course, were destroyed in some manner. 
We estimate, however, that more than half of these documents are 
still outstanding and valid and could have found their way into illicit 
channels. I would like to submit for the record charts showing reports 
of the loss of U.S. passports in significant areas for calendar years 
1970, 1971, and 1972. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, may this go in the record at this 
point ? 

The Chairman. It may go in. 

(The document referred to follows :) 

Hashish Route 






1972— actual 













Viet-Nam .. 














































South America Drug Route 






1972— actual 




























[List contains only countries reporting 25 lost/stolen passports per calendar year] 






























Col mbia 






























Venezuela _ 




















U nited Ki ngdom 




























































Australia _. 






Hong Kong 









Japan _ 







































Israel... _ 
























Leba non. 


























83-694 O— 72 2 


[List contains only countries reporting 25 lost/stolen passports per calendar year] 


Costa Rico 



Singapore.. _ 




Republic of South Africa. 





1972 — 




Jan.— July 
















































Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year 

1970 1971 1972 

Total lost or stolen.. 17, 129 

Total issued i 2, 230 347 

Percentage of lost - °-„ 77 %2J 

.8 of 1% 

Total found or recovered — 2, 738 

Total lost or stolen. icw 

Percentage of found 1°% 

Total passports lost or unaccounted for 14, 391 

Total issued i --- V, 3 .V 47 

Percentage V 64 ^°J 

.6 of 1% 

20, 620 

24, 152 


2 2,791,872 

0. 83% or 

0.87% or 

. 8 of 1% 

.9 of 1% 



20, 620 

24, 152 



17, 162 

20, 082 

2, 481, 381 

2 2,791,872 

0.69% or 

0.72% or 

. 7 of 1% 

. 7 of 1% 

i Includes figure for issuance abroad. 

2 Includes estimated figures for issuance abroad fiscal year 1972. 


Total passports issued for 3-year period (fiscal years 1970, 1971, 

1972) _ ' > ^03, 600 

Total losYor stolen for 3-year period (fiscal years 1970, 1971, 1972) _ ^x** 01 

Percentage of lost or stolen compared to number issued 0. 82% or 

. 8 of 1 % 
Total found or recovered for 3-year period (fiscal years 1970, 1971, 


10, 266 

Total passports unaccounted for over 3-year period (fiscal years 

1970, 1971, 1972) --- 51,635 

Percentage of found or recovered passports compared to number 

lost 17 % 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Go ahead, Miss Knight. 

Miss Knight. Thank you. . . 

Specific information tying lost passports to criminal activity and 
specifically to drug-related activity is not always available to the 
Passport Office, However, let me mention three cases as examples 
where information of drug-related fraud was available. 

In one case a German national was arrested attempting to use a U.S. 
passport to smuggle hashish out of Afghanistan. The passport she 
used had been reported lost at Kabul by the American girl to whom 
it had been issued. A picture of the German girl had been substituted 
for that of the original bearer. 

In another instance, a German national, found to be in possession 
of a U.S. passport, claimed the passport had been sold to him by the 
American citizen bearer along with a number of credit cards belonging 
to another American citizen. Reportedly, the passport and the credit 

cards were to be used for the purchase of narcotics in Bangkok, 

Another case involved an attempt by a young German to sell a U.S. 
passport which had been reported lost by a girl who had previously 
been apprehended trying to smuggle hashish out of Afghanistan. 

There are other cases involving drug-related passport frauds but, 
unfortunately, we rarely get the facts in time to take preventive action. 
Most frauds surface long after the event. However, patterns appear 
which cannot be ignored even though proof of actual fraud is not 

An American consular officer in New Delhi, reporting the loss of 
70 U.S. passports between January and July 1972, stated : 

Loss or theft is predominantly among the young and the pattern is quite 
similar, leading the consular officer to believe that in many cases the passports 
have either not been lost but retained by the bearer for reasons best known to 
him, or have been given or sold to persons unknown. 

The consular officer relates the pattern as follows: The American 
citizen was on a train and while sleeping, his or her purse was stolen; 
or while running across the street in heavy monsoon rain, the passport 
must have dropped in water and could not be found; or the hotel 
room was broken into while the passport bearer was sleeping ; passport 
and money stolen under vague circumstances ; or passport was stolen 
while sleeping in the park in central Delhi, etc. In most cases, travelers 
checks are stolen along with the passport and the routine involves 
application to American Express for replacement of travelers checks 
at the same time applying for a replacement passport. The procedure 
is too pat for complacency. First : the passport is reported lost. Second : 
the police authorities are informed. Third : a police statement of loss 
is acquired. Fourth : the Embassy or Consulate is advised of the loss. 
Fifth : Identification papers are' produced and replacement passport 
is issued. More recently, we have been informed that some young 
people have been coming in to register upon arrival with the Consulate 
Office in New Delhi so that their passport and other identity are re- 
corded. Several days later they are back. saying, "Remember me? I 
registered here the other day." In view of their certifications regarding 
loss, the Embassy has no alternative but to accept application for a 
replacement passport and to issue it, While there is no indication that 
an organized group is involved in the lost or stolen passports in India, 
the young people appear to be suspiciously well versed in the procedure 
for applying for a replacement, Only on rare occasions do lost or stolen 
passports turn up and we have no indication that they have been used 
for espionage purposes or fraudulent immigration purposes. Drugs, 
especially hashish, are commonly used by some "hippies" and it is 
quite possible that passports are being sold rather than lost to finance 
a personal drug habit. But how do we prove this ? 

Another reason for losing passports, according to the consular officer 
in New Delhi, may relate to visa limitations. He reports that "Many 
young people overstay their visas and may find it convenient to lose 
the passport so that they may apply for an exit visa with fresh 

All lost or stolen passport cases are forwarded to the Legal Division 
of the Passport Office for screening. 


In the month of August 1972, more than 85 screening investigations 
were initiated by the Passport Office in other drug-related cases in 
the Far East, East Asia, and Latin America. Thus far, in Septem- 
ber 1972, more than 50 such screening operations have been initiated. 
Mr. Sourwine. Why the great demand for U.S. passports by drug 
traffickers ? 

Miss Knight. The answer is that the U.S. passport is considered the 
most acceptable document of identification available. 

An American citizen can have any kind of a foreign name ; he can be 
any color and have any known accent without arousing suspicion. 
Oiir citizenship is a conglomerate of race, color, accent and appear- 
ance. Professional drug traffickers and other criminals seek cover with 
the best identification available and with the least chance of an official 
challenge. Manv of them find it advantageous to have more than one 
passport in fictitious identities because their true names already are 
known by authorities. 

Another reason for falsely reporting a passport as lost is to obtain 
a "clean passport," one which does not reflect entry or departure 
dates. Too much traveling arouses suspicion and with a clean passport, 
one can more easily pass as a tourist. We have been told this is also 
a help to those who wish to avoid certain income taxes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Miss Knight, while you are on the subject of clean 
passports, are you familiar with the practice which the committee is 
advised is common in some of the Iron Curtain countries of inserting 
in a passport a clean page, or a clean fold, and putting visas on that 
piece of paper which can subsequently be removed from the passport, 
thus leaving the passport itself, in effect, clean ? 

Miss Knight. Yes ; we are quite aware of this. 

Mr. Sourwine. Is there any way to stop this ? 

Miss Knight. No; because this is a practice of another countrv. 

Mr. Sourwine. But, it frustrates, does it not, one of the purposes 
of the passport, which is to create a travel record of the citizen who 
uses it ? 

Miss Knight. It certainly does frustrate that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Has there been any effort to reach that matter by 
treaty? Has it been discussed with any foreign nation to your 

Miss Knight. Not that I know of. That would, of course, be a matter 
of rather high policv negotiation. 

Mr. Sourwine. Other nations, while like us, do not do this, would 
have as much objection to it, find as much trouble with it as we do, 
I would think. 

Miss Knight. Yes ; I think they do. 

Mr. Sourwine. But as far as you know, there has never been any 
effort to settle this matter bv international agreement or treaty? 

Miss Knight. No ; not that I know of, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Has your office made any recommendations along 
that line? 

Miss Knight. Not along that line ; no sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You would have been sticking your neck out to do it, 
would vou not? 

Miss Knight. I am afraid so. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right, I am sorry about that interruption. Go 


Miss Knight. The stamping of entry and departure dates in a pass- 
port is of inestimable help in tracking down the travel route of crimi- 
nals when and if the involved passport is ever retrieved. 

Attempts to obtain U.S. passports through the use of fraudulent 
documents, either bought or stolen, are most prevalent in three geo- 
graphic areas. As far as we know, these are not connected with the 
international drug traffic. 

(1) These frauds are occurring in our consular posts in Mexico. 
They involve persons of Mexican origin who claim birth in the United 
States or claim U.S. citizenship by birth in Mexico of a parent born in 
the United States. This problem has been with us for years and we 
have instituted special procedures to handle these cases. The applicants 
use American birth certificates which they have purchased from other 
individuals, or, in some cases, they use delayed birth certificates which 
are fraudulently obtained. 

Most of these frauds are detected at the application stage before 
the passport is issued. We have found no connection between Mexican 
fraud and the international drug traffic. 

(2) Frauds have occurred in our consular posts in the Dominican 
Republic. These concern persons who either fraudulently claim birth 
in Puerto Rico or who are using bona fide Puerto Rican birth certifi- 
cates belonging to other persons. These might be borrowed, stolen, or 
bought. There are some applicants who were born in the Dominican 
Republic who claim American citizenship through the alleged Puerto 
Rican birth of a parent. 

Mr. Sourwine. Miss Knight, you say frauds have occurred in our 
consular posts. I take it you do not mean that any U.S. consular per- 
sonnel have been party to frauds? 

Miss Knight. Oh, no, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean they have been imposed upon fraudulently 
in the way you have described ? 

Miss Knight. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right. Go ahead. 

Miss Knight. Thank you. 

Here again, we have instituted special procedures specifically geared 
to the problem involved. Almost all of these frauds are detected at 
the application stage. We do not find any of these cases tied into the 
drug traffic. 

(3) Frauds have occurred at our consular posts in the Philippines. 
These consist of persons who are using bona fide Hawaiian birth 
certificates issued to other individuals. We have also had a number 
of cases in which American men, who marry Philippine women, falsely 
claim paternity of the children of an alien female. Insofar as the 
Philippine frauds are concerned, we believe every case was uncovered 
before the passport was issued. Again, we have found no connection 
with international drug traffic. 

With reference to the domestic varietv of passport frauds, the in- 
crease in fraudulent applications from 174 in fiscal vear 1970 to 288 
in fiscal year 1972 caused the Passport Office to look into the identifica- 
tion of the kinds of fraud involved : the modus operandi, the category 
or types of persons perpetrating the frauds, and all of the pertinent 
circumstances which would assist us in combating this rise in domestic 
frauds which was becoming; unmanageable. A study by the Legal 
Division of the Passport Office disclosed that the basic problem was 
one of impersonation fraud. Let me explain — 


(1) Impersonation cases. These involve persons who secure birth 
evidence and the identity of other individuals and then obtain iden- 
tification evidence associating them with the birth evidence. With this 
evidence, all properly documented, they then apply for and obtain 
U.S. passports. 

(2) Fraudulent document cases. This category involves persons who 
obtain counterfeit or altered birth documents, counterfeit drivers 
licenses, and obtain passports in the false nonexistent identities. This 
situation is encouraged by ads which appear in the news media pur- 
porting to provide almost any type of documentation that can be 
imagined, identity documents, drivers licenses, etc. 

Some persons have been known to obtain more than one passport 
using one or both of the above methods. In virtually every case, these 
persons claim birth in the United States. 

Since a person must establish his claim to American citizenship as 
well as his identity, you may ask what evidence of American citizen- 
ship was submitted in these fraudulent cases. Almost without excep- 
tion, the American citizenship was based on birth in the United States. 
How do these applicants get these birth certificates which refer to 
other individuals ? They obtain these birth certificates simply by writ- 
ing to a registrar of vital statistics, sending the requisite fee, and mak- 
ing a request for the document. Where do they get the information 
regarding the person whose birth certificate they are going to use ? I 
refer you to pages 355, 356, and 357 of the book entitled "Witness" 
written by WMttaker Chambers, as well as to pages 184 to 189 of the 
book entitled "The Deception" by Hede Massing. Both these individ- 
uals are well known to this committee as members of Communist 
underground activities in the United States. 

The procedure spelled out in these volumes was used by Francis 
Timothy Leary to flee from the United States as well as by Konald 

Mr. Sourwine. Miss Knight, right there, I take it you do not mean 
to say that Leary or Kaufman got their information or their inspira- 
tion from the volumes you refer to, but merely to say that the method 
they chose to use already had been described in the volumes you 
referred to? 

Miss Knight. Yes, indeed. It is not a new method and I doubt very 
much that either of these two men read the books. 

Mr. Sottrwine. Now, I am familiar with the name of Francis 
Timothy Leary, but I am not sure about Ronald Kaufman. Who is 
Ronald Kaufman ? 

Miss Knight. Mr. Kaufman is the gentleman who planted the bombs 
in a number of banks in the LTnited States last year. Since it is known 
that both of these persons were connected with so-called militant or- 
ganizations, we can assume that this method of obtaining birth cer- 
tificates is well known to these organizations. 

The situation with regard to fraudulent birth documents and identi- 
fication is further complicated by information received and published 
in the New York Times, in an article dated December 19, 1971, which 
reports that organized crime members are selling a variety of forged 
documents. Listed in the inventory of the forged documents with the 
current asking price are : New York drivers licenses at $20 ; Army dis- 
charge cards at $50 ; New York registrations at $40 ; and social security 
cards at $15. 


Mr. Sotjrwine. Miss Knight, did you mean to offer this article for 
our record? 

Miss Knight. Yes, sir. It is available. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Mr. Chairman, may it be received and entered in 
the record at this point ? 

The Chairman. It may. 

(The article referred to follows :) 

[From The New York Times, Sunday, December 19, 1971] 

Organized Crime Selling Official (Forged) Papers 

(By Nicholas Gage) 

Organized crime members are going into the business of selling a vast variety 
of official identification documents, according to law enforcement officials. 

The documents include birth certificates, driver's licenses, car registrations, 
high school diplomas, armed forces discharges, Social Security cards and even 

Some of these documents are counterfeit, but most are the real thing stolen 
from government offices or printing houses, according to Edward J. McLaughlin, 
chief counsel of the State Joint Legislative Committee on Crime. 

Mr. McLaughlin, whose committee is looking into the racket, said the docu- 
ments were put to a number of practical uses. 

Con men use identification cards to cash bad checks and commit other frauds. 
Car-theft rings use driver's licenses and car registrations to dispose of stolen 
cars easily and quickly. 

'But the largest market for some of these documents are individuals with no 
criminal connections. Many driver's licenses, for example, are bought by non- 
English-speaking persons who are not able to pass the written parts of license 

Individuals who never finished high school or college buy blank diplomas and 
degrees and have their names filled in so that they can try for better jobs. 

Traditionally the market in such documents was served by independents who 
had no links to organized crime except that its members were sometimes their 

But Mr. McLaughlin said that organized-crime figures — encouraged by the 
growing demand for documents — were going into the racket themselves. 

With their well-developed contacts, the gangsters are able to obtain certain 
kinds of identification instruments, such as police badges, that were often beyond 
the reach of the independents. 

The gangsters concentrate primarily in the wholesale end of the racket. They 
arrange to buy blocks of documents from inside contacts and then sell them to 

The retailers sell them to individual customers at a large markup. 

An underworld informant who recently inquired about purchasing blocks of 
four typical documents was quoted the following wholesale prices : 

New York driver's license $20 

Army discharge card 50 

New York registration 40 

Social Security card 15 

The retailers of the documents provide full assistance in filling them out so 
that their fraudulent character is not detected. 

For example, names and serial numbers for New York driver's licenses are 
typed in, using an IBM 1428 OCR typewriter ball, the same one used in complet- 
ing authorized licenses. 

The ball fits all standard IBM Selectric typewriters and can be purchased 
openly for $18. 

'Some services by the document sellers cost extra. A driver's license stamped 
with a red number 1 on the upper left side costs $20 more than a standard one. 

The red stamp allows its bearer to drive tractor trucks. Such licenses are 
bought by truck drivers who have not qualified for tractors but want the work, 
and by truck hijackers who carry them in case they are stopped on the road. 

Miss Knight. It was also noted that retailers of the documents pro- 
vide full assistance in fillino; them out so that their fraudulent char- 


acter is not detected. For example, names and serial numbers for New 
York drivers' licenses are typed in, using an IBM 1428, OCR type- 
writer ball, the same one used in completing authorized licenses. 

Mr. Sottrwine. Miss Knight, is that particular type font, that is the 
type font carried by the typewriter ball you referred to as number 
1428, a font which duplicates the shape of numerals as printed by a 
computer ? 

Miss Knight. Exactly. 

The ball fits all standard IBM Selectric typewriters and can be 
purchased for $18. 

Prior to this public disclosure, counterfeit drivers' licenses were 
fairly easy to detect since they were normally typed on a regular type- 
writer rather than the type font used in computerized operations. 

There is no doubt about it : The counterfeiting of documents is a big 
and lucrative business. 

Passport fraud as it pertains to narcotics is only one phase of a se- 
rious problem which we, in the Passport Office, have struggled with for 
years and called to the attention of anyone who would listen. Frankly, 
I am very discouraged about the whole situation and I don't believe 
that a piece-meal approach to the problem will be successful. One hole 
in the dike may be plugged up, but two others will develop. 

The recorded history of passport fraud, though sketchy, goes back 
at least to the early 1920's and indicates that the types of frauds were 
basically the same then as now, namely, impersonation, fraudulent 
evidence, altered passports. In addition during the 1920's and 1930's, 
we encountered activity in counterfeit passports. The fact that the 
fraud patterns remain the same is not surprising because the primary 
purpose of the passport is to establish the identity and the nationality 
of the bearer. Hence, the types of frauds flow from the nature of the 

In the 1930's, we had extensive frauds perpetrated by covert agents 
of the international Communist movement. This specific activity was 
the subject of a staff study dated July 11, 1958, entitled "Communist 
Passport Frauds." This was prepared for the Subcommittee to In- 
vestigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other 
Internal Security Laws of the United States, 85th Congress, Second 
Session. In reviewing the history of passport frauds, I note that 
narcotic traffickers were involved in obtaining passports by fraud in 
the 1930's. Over the years it has been established beyond any doubt 
that narcotics traffickers and other individuals engaged in illegal 
activities obtain passports in false identities to facilitate what is 
known as the "appearance and disappearance" act. For example, a 
person known to the narcotics authorities or the police authorities as 
John Smith obtains through his criminal contacts fraudulent docu- 
ments identifying him as James Jones. He then, in effect, "disappears" 
as John Smith. A new person, James Jones, then is created. When 
the activities of James Jones become known to enforcement authori- 
ties, he may repeat the process and assume another identity. Ergo : 
John Smith and James Jones disappear and a new identity appeals 
on the scene. This rationale or technique is used not only by drug 
traffickers but by other criminals engaged in a variety of illegal 
domestic or international activities. In the late 1940's and 1950's, the 
Passport Office concentrated on the very complicated problem of 
Chinese frauds. It took several years to get the situation under con- 
trol because it had been simmering; on a back burner for over a decade. 


As a result of new techniques in investigations and interrogations 

initiated by the Passport Office and coordinated with the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, this extensive fraudulent citizenship 
problem existing for over a period of 50 years was brought under 

I don't underestimate the fantastic cost and human suffering result- 
ing from worldwide drug traffic. But this should have been evident 
to any but the ridiculously naive back in the fifties and sixties. Whether 
the lack of action results from indifference or stupidity— the end 
results are the same. 

Mr. Sourwine. Miss Knight, do you feel the Passport Office has 
done all it can do to combat passport fraud and protect the security 
of the U.S. passport ? 

Miss Knight. We have done all we can do under our present orga- 
nization and circumstances. I think much more can be done. 

But, the Passport Office has been ringing the alarm on passport and 
identification frauds for 43 years. The lack of decisive action and ef- 
fective control by the upper echelons of Government who have received 
these warnings over the years is a sad commentary on high level offi- 
cial responsibility and concern for our national well-being. 

I am angry about this situation because the record of the Passport 
Office is clear as crystal. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, tell us. Miss Knight, just what has the Pass- 
port Office done? Give us some examples of the action taken by your 

Miss Knight. Well, beginning August 1, 1929, the Passport Division 
(as it was then called) started to maintain a statistical record on 
passport frauds and suspicious cases. The Passport Office has never 
been permitted to hire investigators. Fraud research, reports and 
limited actions were, then as now, carried on by a small legal unit. 
Reports and summaries were forwarded, then as now, through chan- 
nels to whoever at that precise moment had an alleged interest in 
fraud activities. 

On January 10, 1937, the Passport Office prepared a comprehensive 
report, on passport frauds and the contents are as appropriate to the 
situation today as thev were then. 

Records comniled by Mr. William Duggan, Chief of the Passport 
Office Legal Division, indicate that passport fraud was a subject 
discussed at every House Appropriations Subcommittee hearing from 
1930 through 1955 with the exception of 1952 and 1954. I became 
Director of the Passport Office on May 1, 1955, and I was appalled 
at the lack of staff, lack of space, lack of equipment, and the general 
sweat shop conditions which existed in the office. My predecessor ad- 
vised me orally and subsequently by letter that she had never been 
accorded adequate support by her superiors in the Department of 
State and that she had never received the full appropriation voted 
to the Passport Office by the Appropriations Committees. This fact 
was made known to the proper officials and for a few years thereafter, 
the Passport Office was permitted to expand and concentrate on its 
statutory responsibilities. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say thereafter. You mean after what date ? 

Miss Knight. After January 1, 1956, when we moved and acquired 
more space, a better filing situation, additional personnel. 

83-694 O— -72 3 


Mr. Sourwine. Well, now, you said the Passport Office for a few 
years after that date was permitted to expand and to concentrate on 
its statutory responsibilities. It is now 17 years after that date. Assum- 
ing a few years might mean as many as 3 or 4, do you mean that for 
13 or 14 years the Passport Office has not been permitted to expand 
as necessary-, and has not been permitted to concentrate on its statutory 

Miss Knight. I think the situation has changed somewhat in the in- 
tervening years. There is more emphasis on fraud today. There is more 
emphasis on public service. There is a 

Mr. Sourwine. More emphasis than there was when, last year, or 
10 vears ago, or 17 years ago ? 

Miss Knight. No, I would say prior to 1955. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right. Gro ahead. 

Miss Knight. And these new emphases require reorganization and 
expansion of our services, and certainly a decentralization of our 

Mr. Sourwine. All right. You were giving us specific examples, 
or telling us of what the Passport Office had done, and I interrupted 
you. Go ahead. 

Miss Knight. Yes, sir. 

In a reorganization of the office in March 1956, we established a 
fraud unit in our Legal Division under the title of Enforcement 
Branch. We also established an in-house quality review of passport 
applications. Since then, the Legal Division has given special em- 
phasis to searching for and documenting suspected passport fraud 

On June 25, 1969, I forwarded to Mr. Elliot L. Eichardson, then 
Under Secretary of State, a memorandum with attachments on pass- 
port frauds, including a detailed report which had been prepared by 
Mr. William Duggan, Chief of the Passport Legal Division, on Feb- 
ruary 28, 1958, and handed to Mr. Loy Henderson, then Under Secre- 
tary of State, who in turn referred it to the Security Office. I never 
heard anything further as to the fate of these reports. 

Mr. Sourwine. Miss Knight, do you have a copy of the report re- 
ferred to, forwarded to Mr. Richardson in June of 1969 ? 

Miss Knight. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you let the committee have that ? 

Miss Knight. Yes, I will be glad to. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, may this go in the record at this 
point ? 

The Chairman. It may go in the record. 

(The document referred to follows :) 

June 25, 196!). 

To : U— Mr. Elliot L. Richardson. 
From : PPT — Frances G. Knight. 
Subject : Passport Fraud Problems and Statistics. 

I refer to our exchange of memoranda regarding the necessity of having 
responsible individuals appointed to take passport applications. In this corre- 
spondence I stressed the need to protect the integrity of the United States pass- 
port as well as the need to maintain security in our procedures. You have asked 
for information and statistics regarding passport frauds. 

I am attaching a table showing the number of passport frauds processed for 
the years 1967 and 1968 and for the first five months of 1969 (Tab A). This 


table also includes the figures on the number of criminal prosecutions for viola- 
tion of passport statutes which have been submitted during this period. In addi- 
tion, the table shows the nationality of the person perpetrating the fraud. 
However, statistics in fraud cases arc. in and of themselves, insufficient to 
portray the need for strict control over passport application procedures. 

At present our greatest problem concerns identity frauds involving persons 
of Mexican origin who desire to obtain United States passports either to enter 
the United States or to remain in the United States. We are also experiencing 
a number of cases involving citizens of the Dominican Republic who are using 
Puerto Rican birth evidence to obtain passport documentation. A third category 
involves United States citizens who because of police problems are attempting 
to hide their true identity and leave the United States or otherwise engage in 
unlawful activities. Chinese fraud cases also are numerous and generally in- 
volve passport applications executed a number of years ago and which are now 
uncovered and handled through the so-called "confession" program. This pro- 
gram has proved very successful in keeping the Chinese problem under control 
for the first time in 50 years. The Chinese fraud problem is unique and is 
described in detail by the District Court for the District of California in the case 
of Ly Shew v. Achcson, 110 F. Supp. 50 (1953). 

I am attaching a historical background of passport frauds which was compiled 
in 1958 and which has been edited and enlarged for clarity (Tab B). It is clear 
from this study that the obtention of the United States passport for use as an 
effective cover is considered of prime importance by foreign intelligence agents. 
This aspect of passport frauds has been considered at length by various con- 
gressional committees. A congressional report entitled "Communist Passport 
Frauds," prepared for the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration 
of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the 85th Congress, gives a detailed account of this aspect of 
fraudulent activities. As stated by the Supreme Court in Browder v. U.S., 312 
U.S. 335 (1941), the purpose of the penal provisions of the passport laws is for, 
"the protection of the integrity of the United States passport." 

Since 1958 we have seen a continuation of the fraudulent obtention and use of 
United States passports by the Soviet intelligence apparatus in the notorious 
Abel case. In 1962 an American citizen obtained 18 American passports and de- 
livered them to Soviet agents in East Germany. The citizen was sentenced to two 
years imprisonment in 1965. In 1960 the Czechoslovakian intelligence apparatus 
attempted to obtain United States passports for two agents to enter the United 
States. It is apparent that there is a continuing effort and ever present danger 
from unfriendly security services to obtain authentic documentary cover for 
agents both in the United States and abroad. 

In 1968, on another facet of fraud, investigations disclosed that one Jose 
Aguiar, a citizen of Argentina who owned and operated a Spanish bookkeeping 
service at Modesto, California, was involved in assisting Mexican nationals to 
obtain United States passports by the use of fraudulent evidence. The investiga- 
tion disclosed 25 fraudulent cases. Mr. Aguiar was indicted in the United States 
District Court in Sacramento, California on December 4, 1968 and, after pleading 
guilty, was sentenced to five years in prison on February 12, 1969 and fined 

The difficulty which the Canadian Government has had with passport security 
problems in vividly set forth in the attached news item "Canadian Passport : No 
Spy Lacks One." (Tab C) The Canadian Government has previously experienced 
problems in this area as evidenced by the famous Gouzenko papers. It will be re- 
called that in the latter situation the Soviet Government was able to compromise 
one of the Canadian passport employees. Needless to say, the Canadian Govern- 
ment has taken extensive steps to tighten their passport application procedures. 
Any proposal which might dilute our control over persons who accept passport 
applications would in all probability result in a similar problem for this 

I must state as firmly as I can that I am against any dilution of the security 
or integrity of the passport issuing process from the application stage through 
the issue stage and control thereafter. We cannot as a responsible agency, afford 
to ignore the security dangers that have been evidenced in the passport field over 
the years. The damage that can be done to this country by one espionage agent, 
who fraudulently obtains and uses a United States passport is potentially too 
great to risk the use of a haphazard method of selecting the persons who will 
accept passport applications. 


The illegal purposes for which a United States passport can be used generate 
pressures on the entire structure of the passport issuing process and especially 
at the application stage. The application stage is crucial because it is at this 
point that the identity of the applicant is determined and is the point of physical 
contact with the applicant. The Reubens-Robinson case cited in tab B as well 
as the Philadelphia fraud cases, graphically illustrate the nature of the pres- 
sures which even overcame the scruples of Federal and local officials. 

The hidden, insidious nature of passport frauds is, in fact, such that Congress 
enacted special legislation extending the normal three-vear statute of limita- 
tions to 10 years (18 USC 3291). 

As the attachments illustrate passport frauds range from the intelligence- 
espionage type to bad check operations and from baby adoption rackets to 
illegal entry into the United States by aliens otherwise ineligible to immigrate. 
Even the illegal importation of automobiles into foreign countries for huge 
profits has been behind certain frauds uncovered. 

To sum up, the history of passport frauds shows that our present method of 
taking passport applications evolved to protect the Government against fraud. 
I strongly recommend that whatever steps we take to alleviate the pressure 
created by the unwillingness of the Federal Court clerks to take passport appli- 
cations, do not dilute or weaken the controls and safeguards which the record 
shows are necessary to protect the security and integrity of the United States 

Attachments : 
as stated. 

(TAB A) 


1968 1969 (5 mos.) 

1. Fraud cases processed: 

A. Fraud cases— General... _ 

B. Fraud cases— Chinese 

Total fraud cases processed... 

2. Fraud cases processed: General— 

A. Number of domestic frauds 

B. Number of foreign frauds 

Total number of general frauds 













3. Frauds by Nationalities: 




Identity fraud 




Dominican Republic. 



Italy _ 









Puerto Rico.. 

United States 





Country Imposter Identity fraud 


Australia - 1 

Bahamas - - 2 

Costa Rica___ - - - 1 

Cuba 1 

Czechoslova kia - 2 

Dominican Republic - 2 

England 1 2 

France.. -- 1 

Germany.. _ . 1 1 

Greece. 1 

Haiti - 1 

Holland... .-- - - 1 

Italy - — 1 

Jamaica - - 

Korea 1 18 

Lithuania 1 

Mexico 16 29 

Nigeria. _ -... - 1 

Philippines _ 2 21 

Portugal --- J 

Puerto Rico 1 

Romania... --- J 

Spain - J 

United States 7 4 

Unknown.. - — 2 4 

1969 (5 MONTHS) 


Country Imposter identity fraud 

Africa.. _ 1 

Canada - 2 

Costa Rica 1 

Denmark --- - 

Dominican Republic. 1 6 

England 1 --- 

Finland 1 

Germany 2 

Hungary.. 1 

Jamaica. __ 1 - - 

Japan 2 

Korea -- H 

Liberia - 1 

Mexico - 24 37 

Philippines. -- - 2 18 

Poland... 1 

Portugal. --- J 

Thailand - - 1 

United States 6 8 

West Indies... 1 - 

1967 1968 1969 (5 mos.) 

4. Fraud cases processed— Chinese: 

A. Number of Chinese domestic frauds 

B. Number of Chinese foreign frauds 

Total Chinese frauds 

C. Types of evidence submitted in Chinese fraud cases: 

(1) AA certificates of citizenship 

(2) Certificates of identity 

(1) Certificates of naturalization 

(4) Prior passports 

(5) Birth certificates _ 

(6) Court adjudications 

(7) Commissioner's discharges 

(8) Other evidence 12 84 





























1967 1968 1969 (May) 

Number of cases processed: 

A. Cases pending as of beginning of year 

Cases submitted to the U.S. Attorney during year. 


B. Cases disposed of during year 








C. Cases pending at the end of year 22 36 47 

(TAB B) 

February 28, 1958. 
Passport Frauds 

The fraudulent obteution and use of passports is not a new thing. There is 
a history going back at least 100 years. The main reason for the passage, about 
a century ago, of the law stating that only the Secretary of State could issue 
passports was the fraudulent obteution of passports issued by Governors of 
States, Mayors of cities and even by Notaries Public. However, there was no 
specific statute making it a criminal offense to apply for or use a fraudulent 
American passport until World War I. In the early years of that war, German 
agents were detected by the British traveling on fraudulently obtained American 
passports. This led President Wilson, in 1914, to issue an Executive Order taking 
the acceptance of passport applications out of the hands of notaries public and 
placing it exclusively within the jurisdiction of Passport Agents and Clerks 
of Federal courts and State courts authorized to naturalize aliens. After we 
entered the war, the Espionage Act was passed and Title IX of that Act covered 
the fraudulent obtention and use, the counterfeiting and altering, and the buying 
and selling of passports. Basically, they are the same laws as are now contained 
in sections 1541-1545, Title 18 of the United States Code. 


There are three main types of passport frauds : 

A. The Counterfeiting of a Passport and the Use Thereof 

There were at least three different editions of counterfeit passports printed 
and used during the period between World War I and World War II. They were 
imitations of the red-covered booklet form of passport used during that period. 
In each edition, the entire booklet was counterfeited, including the cover, the 
paper, the imitation watermark, the overprint and the printing. Counterfeits of 
the State Department's seal and counterfeits of the rubber stamp and legend 
machine which are placed on passports were used in preparing the passports 
for the use of individuals. Counterfeit naturalization certificates and counterfeit 
birth certificates were carried as collateral documents by some of the users. 

B. Alteration of Genuine Passports and Their Use by Impostcrs 

This is a form of fraud which was quite prevalent during the thirties and is 
now being resumed. In such case, the photograph of the original bearer was re- 
moved and the photograph of an imposter substituted therefor. In some cases, 
the numbers and dates of the passports were also altered. In other cases, the 
descriptive sheet was removed and a counterfeited sheet substituted therefor, 
which, of course, set forth the correct description of the imposter. These sub- 
stituted pages were usually printed on blank visa pages taken from other pass- 
ports. Counterfeits of the Department's seal, legend machine, and rubber stamp 
were also used in the preparation of the altered passport. The bearers of the 
altered passports often carried, as supplementary documents, bona fide or counter- 
feit birth or naturalization certificates in the name set forth in the passport. The 
chief users of altered passports were the Italians of the immigrant type who 
were unable to obtain proper visas. Other users were Greeks of the same type. 
In addition, altered passports were used on at least several occasions by Soviet 
espionage agents. The seal used on the passports of espionage agents was much 
better than the seals used by the Italians and Greeks. 


C. Passports Obtained Upon the Basis of Fraudulent Applications 

This is the most usual type of passport fraud and it has been perpetrated both 
in the United States and abroad. In most of the eases, the applicant files his 
application in the usual way and submits his own photograph. However, he 
makes the application in a name other than his own and submits, as evidence of 
his citizenship, either a fictitious affidavit of birth or the birth certificate, the 
baptismal certificate, or the naturalization certificate of another person. When 
successful, he obtains a passport bearing his own photograph and description, 
but in a name other than his own. When the applicant is in this country, this is 
the easiest type of fraud to perpetrate and the most difficult to detect. Abroad, 
the applications are made before a consular officer who often does not have 
sufficient means of determining the identity of an applicant. Frauds of this type 
have been perpetrated in the United States by criminals, fugitives from justice, 
narcotic traffickers, aliens in the United States illegally, espionage agents, Com- 
munist agitators, etc. Abroad, they have been perpetrated and attempted chiefly 
by aliens who desire to come to the United States to live, but who could not 
obtain immigration visas. 

D. Other Types of Passport Frauds 

In addition, there have been several other types of violations of the passport 
and related laws. There have been cases of collusion in which clerks of courts 
falsely certified that an applicant and/or his witness appeared before them 
and executed the applications. Examples of this are the Rubens-Robinson case, in 
which passports were obtained for Soviet espionage agents, and the Philadelphia 
Chinese cases, in which the applicants and their identifying witnesses often did 
not appear. There have been many cases in which applicants gave false informa- 
tion concerning their destination and the purpose of their proposed travel. There 
were many cases of this nature during the Civil War in Spain and a considerable 
number, both before and after World War II, of persons who concealed the fact 
that they intended to go to the Soviet Union. 

See Sections 3 and 4 (infra) for a description of the prosecutions of these 
various types of fraud cases. 


There are a considerable number of laws which are relevant to the prosecu- 
tion of persons who engage in fraudulent passport activities. Most of them are 
now contained in Title 18 of the United States Code. 

A. Venue 

Inasmuch as violations of the passport laws may occur anywhere in the world 
or may be commenced in one judicial district and completed in another. The 
third paragraph of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Sections 3237 
and 3238 of Title 18, USC, are pertinent in establishing venue. 

B. Passport 

The sections of law which specifically refer to passports are now contained 
in Sections 1541 to 1545 of Title 18, USC. They are basically the same as Title 
IX of the Espionage Act of 1917. They were, until a few years ago, Sections 
220-224 of Title 22 of the United States Code. 

C. Limitations 

Until June 30, 1951, the usual statute of limitations (Sections 3282 and 3290. 
Title 18, USC) applied to prosecutions for violating the passport laws and re- 
quired that action be taken within three years after the commission of a crime. 
On June 30, 1941, Section 3291 became effective. This permits prosecution within 
ten years. The regular statute of limitations has since been amended to permit 
prosecution for violations of other Federal statutes within five years. 

D. Conspiracy 

This section (371) has been used in more passport prosecutions than any 
others excepting Sections 1542-1544. The ten-year statute of limitations also 
applies to indictments for conspiring to violate the passport sections. 

E. Travel Control 

The travel control law (8 USC 1185) is effective only in time of war or during 
a period of national emergency and the criminal statutes have been rarely invoked. 


F. Internal Security Act 

Although the Internal Security Act was passed in 1950, the passport portion 
is not yet effective as no organization has registered or been finally ordered to 
be registered under the act. Judging by the progress in the courts of the pro- 
ceeding to order the Communist Party to register, it will be several more years 
before we need be concerned about our part of the law. 

G. Miscellaneous Criminal Provisions 

There are various other sections of law which have been used in the past or 
which may be used in the future in connection with violations of the passport 
laws. Some examples are set forth in the portion of this paper relating to 


Several persons who have been convicted of violating the passport laws have 
appealed their cases to the circuit courts of appeals and to the Supreme Court. 
Certain of these cases are legal precedents concerning not only the meaning of 
the penal sections of the passport laws, but also interpretations of rules of evi- 
dence and Federal judicial procedures. 

A. Earl Broirdcr Case 

Earl Browder was the General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA. He 
had fraudulently obtained and used several passports in different names and 
thereafter applied for and used a passport in his own name upon an application 
in which he falsely stated that he had never had a passport previously. This 
passport, he used for two trips abroad. By the time the frauds were discovered 
and the necessary evidence was assembled, the then existing statute of limita- 
tions (three years) prevented Browder's indictment not only for making the 
passport applications in other names and using the passports, but also for making 
false statements in the application in his own name. However, certain uses of 
the passport had occurred during the preceding three years and two indictments 
were returned against Browder for using a passport issued upon the basis of an 
application in which he made false statements ; one for using the passport upon 
arrival at the Port of New York, by presenting the passport to our immigration 
officers and the other for various uses of the passport in foreign countries. From 
the evidentiary standpoint, the government decided that it would be preferable 
to try Browder on the charges of using the passport at the Port of New York. 

Early in 1940, Browder was tried and convicted. He made no defense or 
denial of the facts. However, his attorneys contended : 

1. That the use of the passport was not "willful" within the meaning of the 
statute, since the use was for a proper purpose ; 

2. That since an American citizen did not then have to present a passport 
to be admitted to the United States, there was no violation since the statute 
impliedly referred to a required use of a passport ; and 

3. That since American passports are intended for use in foreign countries, 
the presentation of a passport to an American official in the United States was 
not a use of a -passport as contemplated by Congress. 

Browder appealed his conviction to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
upheld the lower court. Later, Browder appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, which ruled against all of his contentions. This is the most 
important precedent case on the interpretation of what is now Section 1542 of 
Title 18 of the United States Code. 

B. Welwel Warszower Case 

Welwel Warszower, an alien, was Financial Secretary of the Communist 
Party, USA. He applied for, obtained, and used a passport in the name of 
Robert William Wiener upon an application in which he falsely stated that he 
was a citizen of the United States, that his name was Robert William Wiener, 
that he was born at Atlantic City, New Jersey, and that he had not resided out- 
side the United States. Since the statute of limitations prevented Warszower's 
indictment for making false statements in the passport application, he, like 
Browder, was indicted for using the passport upon his arrival at the port of 
New York. Warszower was tried and convicted shortly after Browder and their 
appeals to the Court of Api>eals and to the Supreme Court were argued at the 
same time. At the trial in New York, the government submitted evidence that 
many years before, Warszower had been admitted to the United States as an 
alien, that, when he registered for Selective Service in 1917, be stated that he 


was an alien born in Russia, and that later he applied for and obtained a re- 
entry permit as an alien. Warszower offered no evidence in rebuttal at the trial. 
His lawyers, besides making the same arguments as in the Browder ease, main- 
tained that the government had not established a prima facie case as all of 
the evidence submitted was based on admissions made by Warszower and that, 
as in the case of confessions, a person could not be convicted without corro- 
borating evidence. The courts overruled the defense contention and the Supreme 
Court in this case, for the first time, clearly distinguished between admissions 
against interest made before the commission of a crime, and admissions in the 
nature of confessions made after the crime had been committed. This is a most 
important decision upon the subject of the sufficiency of evidence not only in 
passport cases, but in all criminal prosecutions. 

C. William D. Frad Case 

Frad was a professional steamship gambler who was indicted in the United 
States District Court at Brooklyn, New York for various offenses, including the 
fraudulent obtention of a passport in the name of Fred W. Gorham. He pleaded 
guilty to all of the charges and there was then no question of law raised. How- 
ever, in addition to a two-year imprisonment sentence on one indictment, he was 
given suspended sentences on others and placed on probation at the end of the 
two years in prison. The sentences were imposed by a Federal judge from Brook- 
lyn who was temporarily detailed to the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York. The case later went to the Supreme Court on the 
question as to what judge had authority to determine whether the probation 
should be terminated and in a broader sense what judge has a right to modify a 
sentence which has been imposed. It is a precedent case on the subject, but is not 
important from our standpoint. 

D. Renault Duncan Case 

Renault Duncan or Duncan Renaldo was an alien born in Rumania who had 
entered tbe United States illegally. He became a movie actor and was employed 
as the star of the movie "Trader Horn", which was filmed in Africa. To make 
the trip, Duncan made a fraudulent application for an American passport, claim- 
ing birth in Camden, New Jersey. After his return to the United States, the fraud 
was discovered and he was indicted on three counts, (1) making false statements 
in a passport application, (2) falsely claiming to be an American citizen, and (3) 
perjury. He was convicted and appealed his case. His conviction was upheld on 
the first and third counts by the Circuit Court of Appeals and was reversed on 
the second. Duncan appealed to the Supreme Court, which refused to review the 
case. This is an important case on questions of sufficiency of evidence and use of 
foreign documents in evidence. The ruling that admissions against interest by a 
defendant are not sufficient to justify a conviction was later modified and per- 
haps entirely reversed by the Supreme Court ruling in the ease of Welwel 
B. Rubens-Robinson Case 

This case involved the fraudulent obtention of a large number of United States 
passports for use by Soviet espionage agents. The indictment returned by a 
Federal grand jury in the southern district of New York charged a conspiracy 
by a number of individuals to violate various statutes relating to the issuance 
and use of United States passports. It also charged a single conspiracy to un- 
lawfully obtain, use, and alter passports. Only three of the conspirators could be 
apprehended and, upon trial, these were convicted and sentenced to two years' 
imprisonment. At trial, the government proved that the conspirators obtained 
and used for passport application purposes the birth certificates of deceased 
persons; obtained by purchase or otherwise the naturalization certificates of 
individuals never intending to apply for passports ; obtained court orders chang- 
ing the names of sundry persons for fraudulent passport persons ; obtained com- 
mercial documents to facilitate the use of fraudulently obtained passports under 
aliases ; forged the signatures of others on passport applications, both as identify- 
ing witnesses and as applicants ; obtained the signature and seal of the county 
clerk of New York County on passport applications without ever appearing 
personally before him by means of "political favors" ; forwarded such fraudu- 
lent applications to the Department of State which issued United States passports 
without knowledge of the fraudulent evidentiary basis of the applications ; and 
used or caused to be used the passports received from the Department of State 
for travel abroad. 


C. Philadelphia Chinese Cases 

The indictments in this ease cover violations of a number of sections of law 
not ordinarily used in passport cases. They, also cover the usual charges of con- 
spiracy and violation of Section 220 of Title 22, USC (now Section 1542, Title 18) 

(a) There were two conspiracy indictments relating to two separate 

(b) The indictment against Howard Long, former United States Commis- 
sioner contains four counts (5-8) alleging violations of Title 22 USC, 220 (now 
18 USC 1542). The first to fourth counts charge Long with making false evidence 
of citizenship in violation of 8 USC 746(a) (9) (12) (now 18 USC 1015). The 
ninth to fourteenth counts charge forging or counterfeiting a public record in 
violation of 18 USC 72 (now 18 USC 494). 

(c) The indictment against Norman J. Griffin, United States Commissioner, 
contains five counts (1-5) charging violations of 22 USC 220 (now 18 USC 1542), 
nine counts (6-14), charging violations of 22 USC 746(a) (12) (now 18 USC 
1015) ten counts (15-24), charging the fraudulent use of the seal of his office in 
violation of 18 USC 130 (now 18 USC 1017), four counts (25-29), charging him 
with falsely certifying that persons made oath before him in violation of 18 USC 
75 (now 18 USC 1016) and five counts (30-34), charging that he received bribes 
in violation of 18 USC 207 (now 18 USC 202). 

(d) The indictment against Robert T. Press, Deputy Clerk of the United 
States District Court contains six counts (1-6) charging that he fraudulently 
affixed the seal of the court to false documents in violation of 18 USC 130 (now 
18 USC 1017), three counts (7-9) charging that he received bribes in violation 
of 18 USC 207 (now 18 USC 202), and six counts (10-15) charging him with 
counterfeiting public records in violation of 18 USC 72 (now 18 USC 494). 

(e) The indictment against Warren J. Belcher, the Deputy Clerk of the 
United States District Court who took passport applications, contains seven 
counts (1-7) charging him with falsely certifying that certain alleged appli- 
cants or their witnesses appeared before him and swore to the applications, in 
violation of 18 USC 75 (now 18 USC 1016), six counts (8-13) charging him with 
accepting bribes in violation of 18 USC 207 (now 18 USC 202), five counts 
(14-18) for creating false citizenship evidence in violation of 8 USC 746(a) 
(9) (12) (now 18 USC 1015), and six counts (19-24) charging him with the 
fraudulent use of the seal of the Court in violation of 18 USC 130 (now 18 
USC 1017). 

(f) The indictment against John Lee, one of the Chinese traffickers, contains 
five counts (1-5) charging him with aiding and abetting Belcher in the unlaw- 
ful preparation of false affidavits in violation of 8 USC 746 (now 18 USC 1015), 
seven counts (6-12) charging him with aiding and abetting Belcher in making 
false acknowledgments in violation of 18 USC 75 (now 18 USC 1016), twelve 
counts (13-24) charging him with giving bribes to a Federal official in violation 
of 18 USC 91 (now 18 USC 201) and four counts (25-28) charging him with 
aiding and abetting Griffin in making false acknowledgments in violation of 
18 USC 75 (now 18 USC 1016) . 

D. Moran Motors, Inc. 

In this case, officers of the Moran Motors, Inc. and other persons allegedly 
obtained a large number of passports for use in illegally taking automobiles 
and other merchandise to Brazil in violation of the laws of that -country. It 
includes a conspiracy count (18 USC 371) and eleven counts charging the 
unlawful use of passports of others (18 USC 1544). 

E. Manuel D. Gomes 

This man fraudulently obtained a no-fee passport and received return trans- 
portation to Japan upon the basis of forged army orders which purported to 
certify that he was traveling to Japan under official leave orders. It will be 
noted that the indictment is for violation of 18 USC 1001. 

F. Wilier Chapman Baker 

Wilber Chapman Baker was a fugitive from justice who applied for and 
obtained a passport in the name of his brother using the latter's birth certificate. 
The indictment is for violation of 18 USC 1542. 

G. Sing Kec 

Sing Kee was a trafficker in documents for persons of the Chinese race. The 
indictment includes a conspiracy count (18 USC 371) and four counts charging 


him with making false statements in applications for passports in violation of 
18 USC 1542. It should be noted that the indictment also refers to 18 USC 
3238 with which relates to venue. 


During the period between World War I and World War II American pass- 
ports were fraudulently obtained and used by American Communist leaders, 
agents of the Comintern and agents of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service. 
During the thirties a number of such persons were apprehended and brought 
to trial ; these included : 

A. Pat Devine 

Pat Devine, a British Communist illegally in the United States, who fraudu- 
lently obtained a passport in his own name. He was sentenced in May 1931 to 
serve one year and one day in a Federal Penitentiary for violating Section 
220 of Title 22 USC (now 18 USC 1542). 

B. Albert Feierabend 

An important agent of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service whose real 
name was Albert Feierabend, applied for passports under various names. He 
was apprehended when returning to the United States, at which time he was 
carrying a large amount of American currency. He was fined $1000 in the 
United States District Court at Boston on April 24, 1933 and was placed on 
probation for a period of two years. He was subsequently indicted in New York 
for other violations of the passport laws, was released on a small bond pending 
trial and disappeared. During World War II he operated as a Soviet agent in 
China, using a Latvian passport. Our latest report indicated that he had fallen 
into disfavor with the Soviets and that he was confined in a work camp in 

C. Charles Krumbein 

Charles Krumbein, who was later prominent in the Communist Party in the 
United States, obtained and used passports in two different names. He was 
sentenced to serve 18 months in a Federal Penitentiary in February 1935. 

D. Harry Kweit 

Harry Kweit was an important Communist worker among the seamen and 
among our military personnel. He obtained and used a passport in another 
name which he used for travel in the Far East. He applied for another passport 
in a different name as a preliminary to going out on another assignment and was 
apprehended when he called at the Passport Agency in New York to pick up 
the passport. In April 1936 he was sentenced to serve one year and one day in 
a Federal Penitentiary. 

E. Dr. William Gregory Burtan 

Dr. William Gregory Burtan obtained fraudulently, an American passport 
in 1932 in the name Karl Kuhn. This Department cooperated with the Secret 
Service in the investigation. Since Burtan was also involved in the distribution 
of counterfeit American currency which had allegedly been manufactured for 
the Soviet Military Intelligence Service, Burtan was brought to trial on the 
counterfeiting charge, but the Judge also took into consideration the passport 
violations in imposing sentence. Burtan was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. 

F. Rubens-Robinson 

In connection with the so-called Rubens-Robinson fraud case, Edward Blatt, 
an attorney, Aaron Sharfin, an employee of the Egyptian Consulate General in 
New York and Ossip Barber, a photographer, were each sentenced in May of 
1939 to serve two years in a Federal Penitentiary. 

G. 1939-1940 Grand Jury Investigation 

After the conclusion of the trial of the Rubens-Robinson case the Passport 
Division assembled a large mass of evidence regarding violations of the pass- 
port laws by Communist leaders and Soviet agents and prepared a chart and 
memoranda with a view of proving that all of such frauds were a part of a 
general conspiracy controlled by the Communist Party leadership in the United 
States. The close connection between Browder and the other leaders of the 
Communist Party, USA on one hand and the Soviet espionage service on the 


other is clearly illustrated in the case of Richard Johnson. At that time il 
was believed that the World Tourist, Inc., a travel agency in New York City, 
was involved in a number of frauds. In September 1939 the United States Dis- 
trict Attorney for the Southern District of New York turned over one of the 
Grand Juries for the exclusive use of the investigation. The records of the World 
Tourist, Inc. were subpoenaed and they contained much evidence of value. 
Identified in the records were the accounts of the Communist Party which were 
under code names. We found what transportation abroad had been charged to 
the Communist Party accounts and we obtained the appropriate passport appli- 
cations from Washington and identified a number of fraudulent applications 
which we had not previously known about. The records of the Communist Party 
regarding travel were also subpoenaed, but officers of the Party claimed that 
all Party records had been destroyed except two financial statements. The old 
three-year Statute of Limitations prevented the return of a general conspiracy 
indictment, but the Grand Jury returned specific indictments for violating the 
passport laws against a number of the leading Communists including: 

a. Earl Browder, the head of the Party. 

b. Welwel Warazower, Financial Secretary of the Party. 

c. Isaac Litvakoff, a Communist Party functionary, who was sentenced 
in March 1940 to serve 15 months in a Federal Penitentiary. 

d. Nicholas Dozenberg, an agent of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service 
who was sentenced in March 1940 to serve one year and one day in a Federal 

e. Harry Gannes, the Foreign Editor of the Daily Worker, who died 
before he could be brought to trial. 

f. Joseph Sultan, editor of the Morning Freiheit, who was never appre- 
hended and who has since died. 

g. Schacne Epstein, who was then in the Soviet Union and who has since 
died and ; 

h. Isidore Jack Miller who was sentenced to serve one year and one day 
in prison. 
In connection with the same investigation, a fraudulent passport application in 
the name Samuel Liptzen was uncovered on the Communist Party account. The 
passport application was found to be in the handwriting of one Leon Josephson, 
a prominent American communist who had served as a Soviet agent abroad. The 
Statute of Limitations prevented any indictment for the passport violations. 
Later it was learned that the applicant was Gerhard Eisler, a former member of 
a German Reichstag who had served for a number of years as the Comintern 
representative in the United States, and who was later a high official in the 
Communist government of East Germany. Subsequent to the use of the passport, 
Eisler had made an application as an alien in his own name for a permit to 
depart from the United States. In the application Eisler stated that he had 
resided in the United States continuously for a period of time which included 
the periods which he had spent abroad using the Liptzen passport. He also stated 
in the application that he had never been known by any other name. Because 
of these false statements he was indicted and convicted in this city for violating 
Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code. Leon Josephson was called 
before a Congressional Committee to testify regarding his knowledge of Eisler 
and the passport applications. He refused to answer questions and was convicted 
on a contempt charge. 

In connection with the same investigation, information was turned over to 
the FBI and to the Department of Justice concerning the violation by the World 
Tourist, Inc. of the law regarding registration as agents of foreign principals. 
The company was indicted and fined. 

E. Summary 

The number of successful prosecutions is small compared with the number of 
violations by Communist leaders and Soviet agents. However, this was due to the 
following factors : 

a. The Statute of Limitations, with respect to violations of the passport 
laws, was then 3 years and we frequently did not discover the fraudulent 
nature of an application until after the expiration of this period. 

b. There was and still is no treaty with any foreign government under 
which we can extradite to this country for prosecution, persons found abroad 
in i>ossession of fraudulent passports. 


c. Frequently the impostors had no ties in the United States and the 
usual method of locating a person through his relatives and friends was not 

d. The impostors could and frequently did take refuge in the Soviet 
Union and at least some of them were afterwards provided with fraudulent 
passports of other governments for use in further travel. 

The 1939-1940 prosecutions apparently threw a scare into the Communist Party 
leadership and the subsequent violations of passport laws by Communists have, 
as far as we know, been confined to, (1) using passports in violation of the 
restrictions contained therein; (2) making false statements concerning the true 
purpose of their contemplated travel and the countries to which they plan to go 
and (3) making false affidavits that they were not and had never been members 
of the Communist Party. Each of these will be discussed under separate headings 


Both before and after Secretary Acheson imposed a ban on travel to Communist 
controlled areas, a number of Communist propaganda groups traveled to the 
Soviet Union using passports which they had obtained upon the basis of state- 
ments that they intended to travel to other countries for other purposes. A number 
of the persons who went to the P.eiping Peace Conference also made false state- 
ments of this nature. Prosecutions for violations of this kind are almost impos- 
sible, since it would be necessary to prove by actual witnesses in an open court, 
that at the time the person made his application he did not intend to go to the 
countries mentioned in his application or for the purposes stated therein. 


Despite the large number of persons of the Chinese race who have been ad- 
mitted to the United States as American citizens during the past 70 years, they 
were not a problem to the Passport Division until after World War II. Except 
for a brief period during World War I, when transportation was not available, 
there were no travel laws requiring American citizens to have passports to 
enter or depart from the United States. During that time persons of the Chinese 
race who claimed American citizenship applied for and obtained Immigation 
Form 430 from the Immigration Service which served as a travel document. 

As soon after the end of World War II as transportation facilities became 
available, a large number of Chinese in the United States desired to visit China 
and a larger number of alleged American citizens of the Chinese race in China 
desired to come to this country. In the meantime, the Chinese Exclusion Act 
under whose provisions the Form 430 had been issued had been repealed. In 
addition, our travel control law was continued in effect. These two factors 
dumped without warning on the Passport Office the problem of separating a 
few bona fide claims to American citizenship from a huge mass of fraudulent 
ones. At first we followed a lenient policy and all at once we found ourselves 
in the midst of the Philadelphia Chinese case. We then started in China and 
in Hong Kong and in various cities in the United States, intensive investiga- 
tions which disclose the widespread prevalence of fraud and the brazen activities 
of traffickers in fradulent documents. Criminal proceedings were instituted in a 
number of cases aimed principally against the traffickers in documents. While 
our success has by no means been complete, we can safely say that the Passport 
Office and SY have done more in the past 12 years to suspend, if not break up, 
a long established fraud pattern than all of the other agencies combined in all 
of the years since the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. 


As has been previously mentioned, it is not possible to extradite from a foreign 
state a person who has violated our passport laws, whether the violation occurred 
in the United States or abroad. In a few cases foreign governments have deported 
to the United States American citizens who had entered their countries illegally 
using passports in assumed names. In most cases, nothing can be done under our 
laws. However, it often occurs that there has been a violation of the local laws 
by using a fraudulent passport or by obtaining fraudulently a local identification 
document to submit to an American Consul in support of a passport application. 


Whenever such prosecutions are possible our Consuls cooperate with the appro- 
priate foreign officials. A large number of convictions has been obtained in this 
manner, but the sentences are usually light. 

(TAB G) 

[From the Sunday Star, Washington, D.C., October 13, 1968] 

Canadian Passport: No Spy Lacks One 

(By Peter Worthington, Toronto Telegram News Service) 

Ottawa — No spy worthy of the name would be without one. It is more useful 
than cloaks and daggers, code books and cyanide guns. It is an all-purpose, easily- 
obtained, reasonably-respected adjunct to espionage — the Canadian passport. 

Since Earl Ray, the accused assassin of Dr. Martin Luther King, was caught 
carrying one, Canada has received a spate of dubious publicity over its passport. 

But there is more to our passport story than Earl Ray's involvement. It's a 
long story that stretches back 40 years and links Canada to a startling number of 
the great international espionage cases. 

Few things so aptly reflect the contradictions, ironies and incongruities of our 
policies as the passport. 

It seems a national quirk, a Canadian idiosyncrasy, that ours is perhaps the 
world's most difficult country to enter legally as an immigrant — yet one of the 
easiest to enter illegally as a spy. We are reluctant to grant citizenship to honest 
applicants — yet make it ludicrously easy to obtain false Canadian citizenship. 

Broadly speaking, all anyone needs to pose as a Canadian citizen, complete 
with passport, be he Russian, Chinese or Albanian, is the initiative to visit a 
travel agency ; to have a reasonable cover story ; to lie under oath ; and to pay 
a $5 fee. 

Canada is one of the few countries that issues passports by mail and doesn't 
require a personal appearance before an official. 

Canada has never caught a Soviet intelligence officer. The closest we came was 
when Igor Gouzenko "delivered" to the RCMP Sam Carr and Fred Rose — both 
of them were long-time espionage officers but were both "legal" Canadian citizens, 
and therefore traitors. 


Soviet "illegals," judging from the evidence, have immunity in Canada. This 
is the de facto result of our policy on espionage, and not the fault of the RCMP 
which probably could identify a number of Soviet agents if the Government 
wished, and would prosecute. 

One of the early cases of the Canadian passport being used by Soviet agents 
occurred in 1931 when the British arrested Hilaire Noulens who headed the old 
Comintern espionage service in Shanghai. 

His capture resulted in the breaking of a Soviet Far East spy ring. As well 
as having 12 pseudonyms, Noulens used a Canadian passport. 

Richard Sorge has been called the greatest spy of World War II. He worked 
for Soviet intelligence in China before the war, and in Japan during it. He is 
now an official, if posthumous, "Hero of the Soviet Union." 

He is remembered popularly today as the spy who warned Stalin that Hitler 
was about to invade — information that Stalin chose to ignore. But even more 
important, he told the Soviets that Japan had no intention of attacking Russia 
from the east. This allowed the Red Army to concentrate all its forces on the 
western front. 

Before the war the "Sorge ring" carried Canadian passports. Max Klausen, 
a long-time member of the ring, used a Canadian passport as far back as 1935. 

According to Klausen, one Col. Borovich, who was Sorge's superior, headed 
a spy ring in Canada before being transferred to China. 

The Spanish Civil War produced a bonanza in passports for Soviet espionage. 
Members of the International Brigade invariably had their passports confiscated 
"for safekeeping" when they arrived in Spain and usually these had been "lost" 
when they wanted to return home. 

One of these passports was used by Soviet agent Ramon Mercader, who got 
the passport issued to Tony Babich, a Canadian of Yugoslav origin who had been 
killed in the Spanish civil war. 


The passport was "adjusted" to read Fred Jaeson of Montreal, and Mercader 
used it to visit Mexico in 1940 and sink an axe into the skull of Stalin's one-time 
rival and long-time foe, the exiled Leon Trotsky. 

The use of another of these "International Brigade" passports was revealed 
in 1946 when Sam Carr, former national organizer of the Communist Party of 
Canada and the "recruiter" for Soviet military intelligence, tried to get one 
resissued in the name of Ignacy Witczak. 

The real Witczak lived in Leamington, and had been told that his passport 
had heen "lost" when the Spanish civil war ended. 

Mikhail Milstein, deputy director of the GRU (Military Intelligence), together 
with the deputy head of the NKVD, toured the U.S., Canada and Mexico, iwsing 
as diplomatic couriers while lining up espionage activities. 

In Canada they got Sam Carr to get the Witczak passport renewed for an agent 
working in California. Sam Carr paid $3,000 to an official in the Passport Office — 
someone who has never been openly identified and who presumably is still "in 


The whole thing was "blown" when Igor Gouzenko, a military intelligence 
officer working in the embassy as a code clerk, asked for asylum in Canada and 
told everything. The phony Witczak had disappeared by the time the FBI came 
to check up. 

In recent years Canada's links with great espionage cases have been numerous. 
Col. Rudolf Abel, the most successful spyniaster known to have operated in 
the U.S., came to the U.S. through Canada. (How many Col. Abels are still in 
place is open to speculation.) 

When Gordon Lonsdale, ostensibly of Cobalt, Ont., was arrested in 1861 (sic), 
it turned out that he wasn't a Canadian after all but really Col. Konon Molody 
of the KGB. 

His partners in esponage, Peter and Helen Kroger, who are still serving time 
in Britain, carried Canadian passports as well as New Zealand ones. 

Hermine Rabinovich came to Montreal and became, through the Soviet em- 
bassy in Ottawa, a channel for funds that kept the ring in business. At the time 
Col. Zabotin, military attache at the embassy, also provided passports for agents 
working in the U.S. 

Even the notorious atom spies Klaus Fuchs, Alan Nunn Man and Bruno 
Pontecorvo worked or lived in Canada before being identified as working for 
the Soviets. 

Nunn Man provided the Soviets with samples of U-235 and U-225 when he 
was with the National Research Council : Pontecorvo was on a scientific mission 
to Canada (and now works in the Soviet "atom city" of Dubna) ; Klaus Fuchs 
was sent to Canada as a German refugee before being allowed into the U.S. 

Victor Spencer, the "sad spy" who inadertently sparked the present Royal 
Commission into security and espionage, was involved in collecting data for 

One of his jobs was to gather information from tombstones that could be 
used in establishing "covers" for Soviet agents, and one of his assignments was 
to find a dead "Japanese-Canadian" that the Russians could use. Spencer's 
death in 1966 closed a sordid chapter in petty espionage. 

With passports and visas, the punishment seldom fits the crime. Despite the 
rampant misuse of passports, only half-hearted efforts have been made to tighten 
regulations and penalties. 

On the books now is a move to authorize a 14-year sentence for misuses of 

But up to now punishments have been gentle and mild. 

Recently the government has begun to righten its visa regulations, too. Now 
entrants are issued a non-immigrant arrival-departure card in triplicate : One 
copy is put on file, one taken when the holder arrives in Canada, and one taken 
when the person departs. At least the government now knows that someone of 
similar name has left, even though his or her activities inside Canada may 
be a mystery. 

But the issuance of passports seems the biggest flaw. 

In the U.S. an applicant must appear before an authorized government of- 
ficial. A voucher may also be required, as well as the birth certificate. And 
sometimes a second person must swear that the applicant is genuine. 


It is not that the U.S. has more safeguards — it is just that Canada has none. 

A rule requiring that a person apply in person before an authorized government 
agency seems only logical before issuing a passport. It is one reason why there 
is a move to put passports under the control of the Immigration Department, 
which has more facilities and bodies than External Affairs. 

None of this will prevent Canadian passports from being misused in the future, 
but it will make it more difficult. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. You say you never heard anything further after you 
sent that memorandum. Do you recall whether that memorandum was 
answered ? 

Miss Knight. I am sorry, sir, I do not remember that. I do not think 
so. My files certainly do not indicate that it was ever answered. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. All right. Go ahead. 

Miss Knight. Thank you. 

With your permission, I would like to place into this record the 
overall fraud statistics for fiscal years 1970, 1971, and 1972, which are 
as follows: 

Fiscal year- 









_. 327 






You will note that the foreign passport fraud number is stabilized 
to an average figure of about 320 frauds annually. The domestic 
frauds show an increase of from 288 in fiscal year 1971 to 300 in fiscal 
year 1972. While these frauds are of great concern to the Passport 
Office, they should be considered in terms of the number of passport 
issuances. In fiscal year 1970, we had 174 domestic frauds and we 
issued 2,079,863 passports. This percent amounts to .000084, or, in 
more concrete terms, you might say we had one passport fraud for 
11,953 passports issued. Correspondingly, in fiscal year 1971 we had 
288 domestic frauds and we issued 2,311,789 passports. This percent 
amounts to .000124, or in more concrete terms, you might say we had 
one passport fraud for 8,374 passports issued. In fiscal year 1972, we 
had 300 domestic frauds and we issued 2,605,321 passports. This per- 
cent amounts to .000115, or one passport fraud for 8,684 passports 
issued. Tab number 4. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. You are referring apparently to a tabulation statis- 
tical in form, which the committee does not have in its records. Can 
this tabulation be supplied to us ? 

Miss Knight. Yes ; I will be glad to supply it. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. And is there any reason we cannot have the copy 
you are using when you are through using it today ? 

Miss Knight. No; it is an original copy, but I will be glad to leave 
it here. 

Mr. Sourwine. May it go in the record at this point, Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. It may go in. 


(The tabulation referred to follows:) 

(TAB 4) 

Fiscal year 


Domestic operating 

fees collected costs 

Revenue over 




1955 $3,569,613 $1,734,054 

1956"" 4,170,460 1,953,741 

1957""" _. 4,054,536 1,961,504 

1958""" 4,852,744 2,143,304 

1959""" 5,119,527 2,324,246 

I960""" 6,206,351 2,190,827 

1961"" " 6,366,036 2,452,726 

1962""" "*" " 6,739,764 2,566,397 

1963"" "" "" _. 7,510,869 3,057,918 

1964" " 8,172,540 3,480,849 

1965""" ' 9,558,075 3,843,400 

1966""" 10,988,375 4,207,087 

1967""" """ 12,368,551 4,818,020 

1968""" """" -- 13,518,675 5,323,212 

1969""" 16,550,703 5,950,739 

1970"""" """" 20,795,123 7,951,608 

1971""" 22,721,706 9,578,520 

1972 25,955,783 11,382,548 

10, 599, 964 
13, 143, 186 

Passport Office Issuances 
(Fiscal years 1955-1972) 

Fiscal year: Passports issued 

1955___ 499,941 

1956 546,470 

1957 580,946 

1958 652,253 

1959 699,042 

1960 828,512 

1961 842,243 

1962 867,378 

1963 1,018,488 

1964 - _ 1,088, 958 

1965::^:::":::::::"" 1,267,750 

1966 1,454,923 

1967 1,624,940 

1968 1,753,606 

1969 1,759,286 

1970 2,079,863 

1971 2,311,789 

1972 2,605,321 

Mr. Sourwine. Had you finished your discussion of these statistics, 
Miss Knight? 

Miss Knight. Yes ; except to point out that in any other table of 
statistics, this percentage would be considered infinitesimal. But in the 
case of fraud, illegal activities and impersonations, one case is just 
one too many. 

This presentation may be too long, but believe me, I have just 
scratched the surface of what we in the Passport Office have experi- 
enced and know about passport fraud. I am convinced that there are 
practical and effective ways and means of drastically curtailing the 
obtention and use of fraudulent identity documents which, in turn, 
are used by criminals engaged in their illegal activities domestically 
and overseas. 


Unless Congress takes decisive action to make fraud a nonpaying 
proposition, it will continue to spread and be totally unmanageable. 
Swift and stern measures should be taken to make the use and sub- 
mission of fraudulent documents to any department, agency, or seg- 
ment of the U.S. Government a costly and unpleasant experience. In 
my opinion, this should certainly include such documents as natural- 
ization certificates, social security cards, visas and passports, licenses 
and any other such reference which might be used for personal 

I want to state as emphatically as possible that we in the Passport 
Office are at the end of the rope. We are drowning in paperwork 
involved in management studies, reports, statistics, time-studies, man- 
power utilization studies, productivity analyses and other such matters 
which seep down to us from the upper echelons of management and 
administration. At a time when fraud is increasing we are denied staff 
to combat it. In this year, 1972, the Passport Office has been short at 
all times between 52 and 82 permanent employees. Our Legal Division 
has had only 8 attorneys, 7 legal assistants, and 12 clerical staff. Over 
a year ago, in July 1971, we stated we would need 49 positions for fiscal 
1972, which began July 1, 1972. Only 29 were approved by the Budget 
Office, but as of today, they have not been allocated. 

Mr. Sourwine. How has the failure to approve these positions 
worked a hardship on the Passport. Office ? 

Miss Knight. Well, in the first place, in order to make up for the 
lack of personnel, we are working under considerable pressure. The 
investigations of passport frauds, and the analysis of these cases, which 
we forward to the Office of Security of the Department of State has 
to be done by the small staff of the legal division of the Passport 

Mr. Sourwine. Is this work getting done or is it falling behind? 

Miss Knight. Well, it has been falling behind for quite some time. 

Mr, Sourwine. Because you do not have the people to do the job ? 

Miss Knight. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, you report these cases to the Office of Security 
of the Department of State ? 

Miss Knight. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Does that office cooperate with you adequately ? 

Miss Knight. We have had very good cooperation from the Office 
of Security. It is a very hard working office, but they too have per- 
sonnel problems. 

Mr. Sourwine. Of the same nature as yours ? 

Miss Knight. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. That is, they need additional personnel and cannot 
get them ? 

Miss Knight. I have been told that they have not received the per- 
sonnel required to handle the cases which we sent them expeditiously. 

Mr. Sourwine. Have you in the Passport Office had any RIFs in the 
last 2 years? 

Miss Knight. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Has the Office of Security had any RIFs in the last 
2 years ? 


Miss Knight. I do not think so. They simply have not been given 
additional personnel. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is just a case of additional responsibility that 
cannot be handled because the additional personnel is not provided? 

Miss Knight. That is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Of course, in your case, you are making the money 
which could pay for the additional personnel. That is not true of the 
Office of Security, it it? You are producing revenue in the Passport 
Office. The Office of Security does not produce any revenue? 

Miss Knight. This is true. But, every additional employee in the 
Office of Security just helps that much more in avoiding fraud. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, security should not be a question of dollars and 
cents anyway, should it ? 

Miss Knight. I do not think so. 

Mr. Sourwine. You say you get good cooperation out of the Office 
of Security ? 

Miss Knight. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well, what happens to the cases you have presented ? 
Tell us about that. What cases have you sent up, how many cases 
have you reported, what has the Office of Security done with them? 

Miss Knight. Well, I do not have the statistics in my mind at the 
moment, but I do recall sending a memorandum to Mr. G. Marvin 
Gentile, who is the Director of the Office of Security, sometime in 
June, and I was inquiring about delinquent passport fraud 

Mr. Sourwine. Is that your responsibility or the responsibility of the 
Office of Security ? 

Miss Knight. We cooperate on these. The responsibility for in- 
vestigation lies with the Office of Security. 

Mr. Sourwine. These are cases you reported to them then, on which 
they were delinquent in investigation ? 

Miss Knight. This is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. But, you say it is not their fault, they did not have 
the manpower? 

Miss Knight. This is my understanding. 

Mr. Sourwine. Well ; tell us about those cases. How many of them 
are there, how far back are they ? 

Miss Knight. Well ; some of the cases date back to almost 2 years. 
There are some that date back 1 year. In my memorandum to Mr. 
Gentile I pointed out that I felt that the Department of State was 
sitting on a powder keg. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have a copy of that memorandum ? 

Miss Knight. Yes ; I do. 

Mr. Sourwine. Can you supply it to the committee ? 

Miss Knight. Yes ; I will be glad to. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, may this go in the record? 

The Chairman. It will go in. 


(The document referred to follows :) 



Date : June 16, 1972. 

To : A/SY — Mr. G. Marvin Gentile. 

From : PPT — Frances G. Knight. 

Subject : Delinquent Passport Fraud Investigations. 

On June 5, 1972, I was requested to appear before an Assistant United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of New Ylork in connection with the passport 
fraud case of Sarkis Soghanalian. The briefing I received from our Legal Division 
revealed there were considerable delays involved in pursuing the investigation 
in that and in other passport fraud cases. 

I am informed that a discussion was held this week between Messrs. Donald 
Daley and Raymond Scroggs of your Office and Messrs. William E. Duggan and 
James L. Ritchie of this Office in an effort to settle at the working level the 
problems regarding delays involved in completing current passport fraud investi- 
gations. While certain procedures were agreed to which may tend to alleviate 
backlog of work, it was recognized by the group that these procedures will not 
result in future investigations being completed within a reasonable time. It was 
the position of the members of the Office of Security that the present workload 
imposed on SY| by other areas of the Department and the priorities assigned to 
this workload make it impossible for SY, with its present staff, to meet the 
demands of the Passport fraud responsibility. 

The Legal Division recently embarked on an extensive fraud training program 
of all Passport Office personnel. Ultimately, this program will include all persons 
accepting passport applications. The program already has proved successful in 
detecting fraud in the application stage prior to the issuance of a passport. 
Obviously, investigation of such cases must be handled on an urgent basis before 
the impostors disappear. Any delays will be detrimental to the new program which 
has been instituted by the Passport Office. I am determined that nothing shall 
impair the progress we are now making in this important area of fraud 

The following facts indicate that the Department is sitting on a "powder 

1. It is known that there is an increase in the number of passports being 
obtained in false identities which are used in the furtherance of criminal 
activitity. (See attached New York Times article of December 19, 1971, the 
Report of June 5, 1972 from the Buffalo Strike Force, and the memorandum 
dated May 30, 1972 from your Los Angeles Field Office on the "Brother- 

2. During the hearings before the House Appropriations Committee the 
question of passport frauds was discussed at some length. It is obvious 
from the testimony that the members of Congress are concerned with 
the problem. 

3. A number of passport frauds involve narcotic traffickers. The Presi- 
dent's deep concern with this overall problem is well known. 

4. The Passport Office has undertaken action to combat the situation. 

The failure or inability of the OflBce of Security to support the efforts of the 
Passport Ofliee adequately is a factor which, in justice, I must point out if the 
problem is not resolved. 

I cannot accept the premise that passport fraud work is apparently placed 
in a low priority category. I cannot accept delays of six months and even a year 
or longer in completing passport fraud cases. 

In making these statements, I am not downgrading the quality of the work 
of your agents who are in my opinion experts in passport fraud investigations. 
It is simply that investigations must be completed within effective time limits. 

I am aware that the Office of Security shares with the Passport Office the 
mutual problem of lack of sufficient personnel. However, I must insist that action 
be taken to provide the Passport Office with the investigative service which 
the importance of the passport fraud problems demands. 

Please let me know as promptly as possible of the steps you take to solve this 

»The New York Times article of Dec. 19, 1971, will be found on p. 13. 



Date: June 5, 1972. 
FEL :ao 

To: William H. Bartley, District Director, Immigration & Naturalization 

From : Frank E. Latchford, I&NS Representative, Buffalo Strike Force. 
Subject : Fraudulent procurement of U.S. Passports ; Sam Lewis and Eddie Jones, 

Rochester, New York. 

Confidential informant Buf. I-1S5 furnished information that the above subjects 
are involved in assisting persons in obtaining U.S. Passports with documents 
relating to someone else as well as furnishing counterfeit passports. 

Attached are memos prepared by the undersigned containing the details fur- 
nished by the source covering five specific incidents of such activity involving 
COLLINS, STEVE HAWKINS and RICHARD CARNEY. It will be noted there- 
from the source reports three of these people were furnished birth certificates of 
other persons with which to apply for passports and two were furnished "phoney" 
passports. FIORDELISO is an alien, three others have criminal records and 
two of these criminals are now serving time in Attica Correctional Facility. The 
source reports that four of the persons involved wanted passports ostensibly for 
the purpose of having it available in the event they decided to leave the United 

The source reports that Sam Lewis aka "Canine" is about 34 years of age, 
black, resides at 36 Copeland Street, Rochester; wife Georgia employed at 
Lincoln Rochester Bank. 

Eddie Jones is about 22-24, black, 5'10", wears goatie, formerly lived in the 
Hanover Housing Project, Rochester, New York. 

The source believes that Eddie Jones may have contact with someone in the 
printing or rubber stamp business located on North Street near the Inner Loop. 
A check of the 1971 Rochester Telephone book shows the "AAA Lifetime Rubber 
Stamp Company" 133 North Street, phone 454-1269. There is no listing for the 
company in the 1968 or 1970 Rochester City Directory, but this directory lists 
the "Lifetime Recordings" at this address, Lester W. Osband, owner. The tele- 
phone number is the same as above, 454-126!). 

Investigator William Devine checked with the Monroe County Clerk's office 
in Rochester and determined that they have records stored away covering 
passport applications made during the period in question. These records include 
the name and address of the applicant. The source reports that there were 
numerous passport applications submitted with documents belonging to other 
persons. If these records are made available to the source it is possible that 
some of the names used may be identified. 

The source furnished information on other matters of interest to the Strike 
Force involving possible criminal violations at both the federal and state level. 
The two suspects referred to herein are also involved in some of these other 
criminal matters and will be the subjects of investigation by other agencies. The 
source has already testified before the grand jury, U.S. District Court, Western 
District of New York. 

It is suggested that this matter be referred to the Passport Office, Depart- 
ment of State, Washington, DC. for their information. In view of the circum- 
stances, it is suggested that any investigation undertaken by the State 
Department be co-ordinated with this office. The undersigned contacted Security 
Officer David Hall, State Department, Syracuse, New York and he was advised 
that he would be furnished with a copy of our memorandum regarding this 
matter, and that the source would be made available for de-briefing purposes. 

May 30, 1972. 
Chief, Division of Investigation, 
Atten: SY/PVB, 
SAC — Los Angeles, 
The Brotherhood. 

IRS Intelligence, Customs and the local law enforcement agencies are work- 
ing on an extensive narcotics smuggling ring in the Laguna Beach and Orange 
County area, called "The Brotherhood". 


Interested agencies estimate total membership in the group at about 200. 
All members have reportedly travelled abroad frequently and it is suspected 
that many of the group have fraudulent passports. There are reports that the 
group can produce all documents (usually counterfeit), necessary to assume 
other identities, including birth certificates, Selective Service cards, college and 
university I.D. cards and driver's licenses. 

Agencies at this point are not able to furnish aliases used by the groiip, 
but have submitted a list of 29 names of those considered to be the principals 
in The Brotherhood and will appreciate a search of PPT records and copies 
of files here for review of those listed below. It is noted that one of those 
named is Timothy LEARY, who the agencies advise was the founder of the 
group when he was in Southern California. 

Attachment : 


Distribution : 

Orig. & 1 cc. — Addressee 
1 cc. — Subject 
1 cc. — Chron 

Mr. Sourwine. Wait just a minute, Miss Knight. That is not a 
classified memorandum, is it? 

Miss Knight. No ; it is not. 

Mr. Sourwine. All right. Go ahead, Miss Knight, 

Before you continue, let me point out that that memorandum that 
you sent Mr. Gentile about the investigation of these passport fraud 
cases has been ordered into our record. If there is anything further 
you would like to say about this, this is a good place to say it. 

Miss Knight. I sent a follow-up memorandum to Mr. Gentile on 
August 9. 

Mr. Sourwine. You mean by that time you had not received a reply 
to your original memorandum ? 

Miss Knight. No; I had not, and then I received two replies from 
him explaining the situation. One was dated August the 17th, and 
the other September 5th, as I recall. 

Mr. Sourwine. May that second memorandum of yours and his 
two memoranda be supplied to the committee ? 

Miss Knight. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. Are they classified ? 

Miss Knight. Yes ; they can be supplied, and they are not classified. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, may they go in the record at this 
point ? 

The Chairman. They will go in the record. 

(The memoranda referred to follow :) 



Date: August 9, 1972. 
To : A/SY — Mr. G. Marvin Gentile. 
From : PPT — Frances G. Knight. 
Subject : Delinquent Passport Fraud Investigations. 

I refer to my memorandum of June 16, 1972 on the subject matter. To date, I 
have not received the courtesy of a reply or even an acknowledgment. 

I have asked the Passport Office Legal Division to furnish me with a list of 
oases pending investigation in 8Y prior to March 30, 1972. I am enclosing a 
copy of this list. 


In addition to the cases which are pending action by offices of the United 
States Attorney for criminal prosecution, there are 164 oases awaiting action by 
SY. There arc 40 criminal prosecution cases. 

This list reveals the following status of passport cases requiring investigation 
by SY: 

1. There are 28 cases which were submitted to SY more than two years 
ago and are not completed. 

2. There are 53 cases which were submitted to SY more than one year 
ago and are not completed. 

3. There are 83 cases which were submitted to SY more than 90 days ago 
and are not completed. 

These facts speak for themselves and should evoke deep official concern from 
those Federal officials who will be responsible for any disastrous results due 
to these delays. 

For the reasons given in my memorandum of June 16, 1972, I must request 
again an explanation for the failure of SY to complete the investigation in every 
case submitted to your office prior to March 30, 1972. I have instructed the Legal 
Division of the Passport Office to request the completion of the investigations 
within 90 days, unless there are unusual or exceptional circumstances which 
make the completion of the case impossible. 

I have been informed by members of my staff that attempts to obtain effective 
service, action, or at least some explanation of the delays through personal 
contacts with your staff, as well as my memorandum of June 16, have failed. 
The situation has reached the point where it is affecting efficient and timely 
operation of the Passport Fraud Program as well as the integrity of the United 
States passport. This inaction has the effect of assisting an apparent program 
to downgrade and force a deterioration of passport services — therefore, the 
reason for this explicit memorandum for the record. 

If you do not have sufficient staff to service these Passport Office requests, 
then the matter should be taken up with Mr. William Macomber, Jr. In this 
connection, I must refer again in the strongest terms possible to the "powder 
keg" situation which I mentioned in my memorandum of June 16. 

In view of the personnel freeze which allegedly is responsible for the Pass- 
port Office being short of lawyers, supervisors, and adjudicators, and technicians, 
it seems improbable that investigating the "new employees" for other 
areas of the Department of State is so great as to interfere with our request 
for investigating possible passport frauds. 

Because of the false implications and misstatements made by Miss Barbara 
Watson when she appeared before Congressman John Rooney on February 24, 
1972, it is indeed difficult to avoid the conclusion that there are some admin- 
istrative impresarios who are deliberately undermining and delaying Passport 
Office efforts to get action on suspected frauds. Despite our lack of lawyers and 
staff, the Passport Office Legal Division has worked long hours for many 
months to spell out in detail for the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs 
the full report on passport frauds. There has been no discernible action taken, 
nor has there been any acknowledgement of this tremendous effort. 

With so many chiefs, especially the bevy of passport experts scattered around 
the Department who doublethink every operation of this office, and so few 
indians to do the work, I have a very difficult time to get letters, reports, and 
other documents typed. I presume that you, too, are short the required per- 
sonnel to meet your work load ; however, that does not alter the end result which 
is the Department's failure to give priority to security matters and passport 
services which are being paid for by the public. 

Enclosure : 
As stated. 

Investigations Pending in SY for over 90 Days as of June 30, 1972 

Summary : 

Criminal prosecutions 40 

Investigations pending: 

Over 2 years 28 

Over 1 year 53 

Over 90 days 83 

Total 204 


Name To SY Last report 

Abrams, Gerald Bernard __ _ _ 11-19-68 5-30-72 (CP) 

Adams, John. g_ g_ 7 i 6 _ 5 _ 72 (C p) 

Aldama, Mary Julieta _._ 5-18-70 

Alvarado, Lorenzo " 5-27-70 3-29-72 (CP) 

Anglada, Miguel Lira _ 12-31-70 6-21-71 

Arguello, Domingo 4-4-69 

Arroyo, Benito.... _ 11-12-71 3-7-72 (CP) 

Arthur, David Alan 3-21-68 5-21-72 (CP) 

Avila-Rivera, Carmen 12-14-71 

Ayala-Calderon,Guillermo 3-1-72 

Baronofsky, Carl Leonard 6- 4-71 3-27-72 (CP) 

Barr, Richard Scott 9-13-71 6-28-72 

Becker, Harold Robert 11-25-70 11-22-71 

Bosco, Doris Carina _ 2- 1-71 

Brewer, Robert ferrence . 11-23-71 5^23-72 

Briger, Margaret Allison 6-15-71 

Brooks, Fred Horace _ 3-17-70 8- 5-70 

Brown, Richard Shaw _ 2-4-69 2- 1-71 (CP) 

Bruyn, Irvin W 9-18-69 8- 6-71 (CP) 

Bunting, Gabrielle 11-12-70 3-16-71 

Caccamo, Frank Paul 8- 8-70 

Calderon-Mier, Valente 9-22-69 

Calvillo, Elvira Menchaca _ 2-26-71 5- 8-72 

Camacho-Rivera Angel Luis 3-22-71 

Carl, Ronald Lee 4-1-71 5-23-72 (CP) 

Carr, Daniel William .. . ._ 9-18-70 3-31-71 

Cartagena, Jorge Luis 2- 2-71 11-24-71 

Castillo-Diaz, Carlos Julio 12-15-71 

Ceballos, Eloisa . 7-8-69 

Chang, Lui Sam Mui 11-23-71 218-72 

Chapman, Charles Robert _ 11-23-71 6-23-72 

Chapman, Douglas Doyle. .12-2-71 

Chavolla, Ruban . .. .. .. 4-6-69 3- 8-70 (CP) 

Cheung, Lin Yueng ._ 3-29-72 5- 8-72 

Cloudenjohn . 2-26-71 12-14-71 

Collado, Orlando Pina 5-7-71 . . 

Colon, Lydia 7-19-71 

Contreras, Maria 5-18-70 7-28-70 

Core-Marquez, Juan. ... .... 5-30-71 

Correa, Pablo Gonzales .. .. 5-28-71 6-28-72 

Cotton, Vernon Zina Jr 2-11-71 6-21-72 

Cox, John Allen (Sherwood) 11-25-68 8-24-71 (CP) 

Crain, Patricia Elizabeth _ 8-20-71 6-30-72 

Cromwell, Gary Travis .. ... .... 2-25-72 7- 6-72 (CP) 

Cruz-Soto, Juan _ 2-16-72 4- 3-72 

Cruz-Franqui, Luis A. 12-13-71 

Cuevas-lrizarry, Dogoberto. 3-28-72 

Davidian, Geoffrey Keith 3-7-69 4-18-72 

DeCamillis, Joseph.. . .. 5-7-70 6-22-72 

DeCillo, Debra Ann. .. 8-24-71 11-22-71 

Delgado-Rosario, Felix 3-10-72 

Delgado-Lopez.Sigfredo... 3-13-72 

De Mauriez Barton, Richard Joseph 10-23-64 5- 8-72 (CP) 

Develine, Robert Michael 2-25-72 (CP) 

Devereaux, Michelle Ronica 3-10-71 5-19-72 

Dickson, Frank Anthony ...11-6-69 6- 7-72 (CP) 

Dissick, Jeffrey Roy 8-39-71 4-28-72 

Dollard, David A.. _ _ 10-26-71 

Boyle, Loring Anne.. 5-7-71 8-6-71 

Driscoll, Robert Donald 11-30-71 5- 8-72 (CP) 

Ehrman.Vivienne. 2-24-71 7-11-72 (CP) 

Feola, Evelina Adelino ....11-10-71 2-8-72 

Feola, Maria Gabriella .. . .. 11-10-71 2-8-72 

Flores, Eustaquia 8-11-71 3- 8-72 (CP) 

Flores, Francisco 1-7-71 6-1-71 

Flynn, Thomas Willard III _ ■. 3-16-72 6-21-72 (CP) 

Foster, Paul M ._ 5-27-71 2-23-72 

Frank, Walter Matthew. 11-23-71 6-23-72 

Fugate-Wilcox, Raymond T 12-15-71 

Fugate-Wilcox, Valerie 12-15-71 

Garcia, Antonio.... 12-13-71 6-26-72 (CP) 

Garcia, James Martin _,_ 1-28-72 

Gavigan, Francoise Nicole... 7-29-71 

Gesualdo, Ramon _ 10-21-71 

Gonzalez, Alicia V 11-12-70 

Gonzalez-Canales, Damaso 11-15-71 

Grant, Evadney E 2-10-72 

Gravino, Santo 1-7-72 2-18-72 (CP) 

Greco, Laurence 4-10-72 2- 9-71 (CP) 

Greenberg, Arthur (Raymond Smith).. 2-25-72 5- 4-72 (CP) 

Gutierrez, Lara 5-28-69 2-19-71 

Hadad.Hercel .. 8-10-71 9-27-71 

Hamill, Lydia Lewis... 2-26-70 

Helton, Roy P 5-27-71 2-23-72 

Herrera, Nicholas 9-22-70 

Hodge, Donald Benjamin 1- 4-72 4- 6-72 


Name ToSY Last report 

Johnson, Ralph Lawrence - - I -2 ,! -7 , 2 ) — 

Johnson, Richard R. -- 3- 21-72 -=-==-=5 

Joyner, Robert Barry - - — iHH, 1 T? 

Keller, Robert Baxter. - - — 12-13-71 7-6-72 

Kerrington, Alexis K U -1 ?"?? 4-30-71 

Klinger, Norman. - - -- 5- 7-/1 

Lagares, Arleen Joy... %~ J-/1 -i~m 

Lauria, Nicholas A - - 8- f-71 6- 2-72 

Leary, Timothy Francis «- ' jT ,° "/.£ 

Lebron.Antonia - XXT-X \'Wk\ 

Lee, Hen Yee - - 3-16-72 6-27-72 

I pp lirk Sane 0-24-/1 i>-ii.-ll 

ffi?Do a nl:::::::::::::::::::::::::::..--:.- - - wi *%%<&> 

Lettner, Samuel - - 1 J-}| _ ?; 2-28-72 

Lem, Chung Wong.... - ,,,7? 

Lopez-Acosta, Adalberto - '-12-71 

Lopez, Miguel Luis - 1 -« -72 

Lopez-Etanislao, Tomas. • -Jl -71 

Loverdos, Adela llutiza ,?,£,? "c'i'c"™ 

Lynas, William Posnett H'W'll VvTihcp* 

Lyons, Marshall ,»-15-69 6-27-72 (CP) 

McDonald, Milford Michael.. - \\' 2 l~l^ i'k^ tro\ 

McGovern, Nancy Joan 10- 2-70 3-6-72 (CP) 

McNabb, Melanie Ann. 3- 1-72 6-29-72 

Melave, Carmelo -- --- 7 90 7? 

Marcosky, Patricia - 7-Z8-71 --- 

Mariani, Luz Maria - — \- 2 °-'f. -£^"79 /rp\ 

Martin, Jack William - -- 3-5-70 6-26-72 (OP) 

Martinez, Carmelo Cruz — - ? 00 cq 

Molina, Cecilia Ramirez... - - - - — 7-28-69 o'c'^i 

Morales, Antonio — - rH'li o £79 

Morales, Refugio. --- - - TTii'l} 3 ~ 6_7Z 

Morris, Charles G - ,f~il~l\ 

Naranjo, Maria E. S J 2_ J2 _ Z9 

Negri, Michale 10-13-71 

O'Brien, Richard A - - — — - 5 _2 ?~Zi I'll nl ( ' 

Oleson, Darrel Lee.... 2-4-72 5-30-72 

Oliver. James Wilbam \~Vtll ,-,«„ ( } 

Oliver, Robert Joseph — i - ,, 2 H, li 

Ong, Hong June - 6- 1-71 5-23-72 

Ortega, Gilberto — - - 4-17-69 

Pagan, Juan, Jr --- 2- 2-71 11-24-71 

Paredes, Jesus Estrada -- 2- 9-72 

Pasea, Charles Theophilus.. --- J- 7-71 -------- 

Patti, Joseph Henry - - 2-1-71 4-10-72 

Peffer, Jonettam - ---- l~ 2 \~l\ ? ,i ,n 

Pennellatore, James Philip ■_ - - 4- 3-70 J-* 4 "/." 

Pesta, Helen _ _ — 12-15 -70 5-31-72 

Phillips, Robert M... — * , ™ "'" 

Poorman, Richard Lee.. 4- 7-70 

Quinomes-Quinones, Aquilino - l"™ 10 " 

Quinones, Haydee M.. — --- "0-H ._ 

Rabell, Jose Andres - 10 ,-13-/1 

Ramirez-Aviles, Jorge - - ,, « 7? 'kbiio 

Ramos, Alejo ----- " 2 §" PT 2 ^ 2 , 

Rider, Gordon Joseph.... 10- 2 -70 3- 6-72 

Rivera-Molina, Confesora - £-29-/1 

Rivera-Reyes, Emma Luz - i\}~ 1} 

Rivera, Jose Dionisio - — 7-21 -71 

Rivera, Madoline B.. - - g - 17— 71 - 

Rivera, Manuel t~}.Vi 

Rodd.Vicas - 5-{*-71 

Rodriguez, Antonio Fernand Viera --- --- 2 -16- 72 

Rodriguez, Elisa. 1- 6-/0 

Rodriguez, Luis - •>- 7-/1 

Rodriguez, Primo Lozano... 9- 7-70 

Rodriguez, Roberto 2- 1-/2 

Rodriguez, Vincente — - ---- 3-3-72 .. ... --- 

Roll, Hugh Wilson - '" ' 6-23-/2 

Roman, Aristaloo 7-13 -71 

Rosa, Jose lZ I'll 

Rosenberg, Paul Daniel - J "™ 

Royer, Paul Alan - 1-5-71 

Rubi.Juana - - - 5-14-70 12- 2-70 

Ruiz, Esnedo - - ° -30- 71 - 

Ruiz, Maria Sanchez.... - ,=7? "7 be. 71 1 /rp-> 

Ryon, Robert Douglas ---- - J- 7-26-71 (Cf) 

Saint-Jacques, Eunice - 7 -28-71 

Salinas, Elias - - - 10- } -69 

Sanabria-Rivera, Carmen 5 -21-71 

Sanchez, Maria Jimenez - — - , „ ,? o "q't> 

Scherman, Alan D.._. HHi n -T-A 

Schneider, Joseph Jay - - l-U-Jj 7-7-72 

Schurgast, Frank M 9-24-68 2-25-70 (CP) 

Sefton, Allan - - 5-27-71 

Serrano, Maria Guadalupe * 1 in 7« 




Silver, Gerald 1-29-70 (CP) 




Last report 

Silver, Gerald aka Moss, James .. 1-29-70 

Smith, Adele _ 9-13-71 

Smith, Livesey Mark 1- 3-69 3-13-72 (CP) 

Spanakos, Mariane ... 12-31-68 5-4-70 

Strickland, Albert Lee _ _ 1-13-72 (CP) 

Stubberfield, Colin John 3-28-72 (CP) 

Sullivan, Kathleen Marie _._ 1-12-72 (CP) 

Sumerlin, Ernest James _ 11-10-71 1-19-72 

Supera, David M _ 11-18-70 6- 3-71 

Susbilla, Ernie Henry Clemente 11- 2-70 

Swede, Southworth W 8-21-70 3- 8-72 (CP) 

Swinton, Patricia Elizabeth 3-31-72 7- 5-72 

Tavarez-Nieves, William _ .... . 12-29-71 

Taylor, Erma 8-25-70 2-11-71 

Vega, Luis Angel __ 12-23-71 1-15-72 

Vessa, Delores Ann 8-28-71 11-17-71 (CP) 

Vidal, Julip Mexicana _ 5-14-70 1-27-71 

Villalobos-Rivera, Rosa . . 6-8-71 

Vincent, Clifford Wayne 12-17-71 2-17-72 

Welch, Roy Cecil 12-23-70 5-23-72 

Wheless, Marilyn 10-20-69 

White, Creig 12- 3-71 

Wilford, Anthony T _ 2-22-71 5-15-72 (CP) 

Williamson, Dennis Paul 4- 9-71 4- 6-72 

Wingenfeld, George R _ 7-7-71 

Wobby, Louis Tom 12-20-71 6-27-72 (CP) 

Wong, Tai Bing 9-23-70 6-26-72 

Zanini, Paul , 12- 2-71 

Zapata, Jose J 1 7- 8-69 

Zuniga, Jose Enrique _. 11- 3-69 


Department op State 

Office of Security 

August 17, 1972. 
To : PPT — Miss Frances G. Knight. 
From : A/SY — G. Marvin Genttxe. 
Subject : Delinquent Passport Fraud Investigations. 

In answer to your August 9, 1972, memorandum in this matter please accept 
my apology for not having acknowledged your previous memorandum of June 16, 
1972. I can assure you the delay in my acknowledgement was not due to a lack of 
concern or action on the part of the Office of Security. 

A/SY is as concerned as PPT over the current delinquency in the investigation 
of passport fraud cases. This present delinquency has been due to the shortage 
of manpower caused by such factors as the heavy deluge of applicant cases 
received by SY during the early part of the year (these include summer hires, 
interns, PPT peak cases) and several high priority security requirements in 
other aspects of the total security program. 

As you are probably aware, A/SY lost twenty-one positions in the last personnel 
cut effective June 30, 1972. This office has a pending request for approval to hire 
six new special agents. 

While SY has been unable to keep fraud investigations current, it should be 
noted that SY has devoted considerable time and resources to PPT fraud cases as 
evidenced by the fact that this office closed 557 passport fraud cases during 
FY-72, 466 during FY-71 and 485 during FY-70. We have made every effort to 
handle the most urgent and serious cases and to be responsive to any special 
PPT requests. 

I can assure you that SY will make every effort to reduce the current 
delinquency during the upcoming fall months when the applicant case load is 
normally lighter. 


Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 20520 

September 5, 1972. 
To : PPT— Miss Frances G. Knight. 
From : A/SY — G. Marvin Gentile 
Subject : Delinquent Passport Fraud Investigations. 

Reference is made to your memorandum of August !), 1972, and my reply of 
August 17, 1972 regarding the delinquencies in passport fraud investigation. 


A case^by-case review by SY of the list furnished with your memorandum of 
August 9, 1972 disclosed the possibility of certain errors and discrepancies. As 
a result, the list was reviewed with your Passport Advisory Division on August 17, 
1972. The list was reconciled and corrected to eliminate errors in duplication of 
names and aliases used to identify same Subjects. It was also discovered that 
23 closing reports, which had been forwarded to PPT, either had never been 
received or had been niisfiled. Copies of these reports are attached. 

The criminal prosecution cases, which are a separate entity from delinquent 
investigations, were indicated as 40 on your list. The SY records reflect that 
five (5) of these are closed; however, four (4) other criminal prosecution cases 
were listed among the delinquent investigations, and not identified as criminal 
prosecution. Therefore, the list currently stands at 39 criminal prosecution cases. 
The delinquent case list (164) has been adjusted and reconciled in the follow- 
ing manner : 

Of the 28 cases which were submitted to 'SY more than two (2) years ago, 
only seven (7) cases are outstanding. 

Of the 53 cases which were submitted to SY more than one (1) year ago, 
there are 36 cases outstanding. 

Of the 83 cases which were submitted to SY more than 90 days ago, there 
are 64 cases outstanding. 
Fifty-seven cases have been eliminated from the delinquent investigation list : 
Twenty-two (22) copies of closing reports are furnished with this memo- 
randum (one additional copy of a closing report is furnished on a "criminal 
prosecution case"). 

Eight (8) cases w T ere eliminated because of duplication and/or use of 

Twenty-seven (27) cases have been closed since June 30, 1972, the date 
of your list. 
Again, please be assured that SY is working toward the goal of reducing the 
number of delinquent passport fraud investigations. 

Attachments : 
As Stated. 

Delinquent Passport Fraud Investigations 

Cases previously closed Date closed 

Arguello, Domingo 6-30-69 

Calderon-Mier, Valente 2- 4-72 

Carr, Daniel William 6- 4-71 

Ceballos, Eloisa 10-29-69 

Chavolla, Ruben (CP) 6-30-70 

Clouden, John 1-17-72 

Gutierrez, Lara 8-31-7 1 

Herrera-Espinoza, Nicholas 1 1-18-7 1 

Klinger, Norman 3-13-72 

Mariani, Luz Maria 5-19-72 

Molina, Cecilia Ramirez 11-22-71 

Ortega, Gilberto 6-27-69 

Phillips, Robert McKay 8- 6-71 

Rubi, Juana 10- 6-71 

Salinas, Elias 12-14-71 

Sanchez, Maria Jimenez 6- 8-71 

Sanchez-Naranjo, Maria Elena 9-24-71 

Supera, David Mark 7-13-71 

Vidal, Julio Mexicano 3-16-71 

Vincent, Clifford Wayne 2- 7-72 

Wingenfeld, George 8- 2-71 

Zapata, Jose J 2_ 4_7 2 

Zuniga, Jose Enrique 10- 6-71 

Mr. Sourwixe. Thank you, Miss Knight. Go ahead with your 

Miss Knight. Thank you, sir. 

Because of the fraud situation we have stepped up our quality 
review of applications, especially those from our overseas posts and 


the applications now being accepted at over 650 post offices around 
the country. While the acceptance of passport applications at post 
offices is convenient for the public, it has not made an appreciable 
difference in the crowded conditions of the Passport Field Agencies. 
The switch of applicants to the post offices is from the clerks of court 
rather than from the Passport Field Agencies. The important fraud 
prevention work such as the screening of the application, its adjudica- 
tion, clearance, correct, if necessary, and the production and mailing 
of the passport still rests with the Passport Office. 

It is a known fact that even the most dedicated employees working 
day-after-day under the stress and strain of handling hundreds of 
passport applicants pushing and arguing for expeditious service will 
sometimes make mistakes or overlook details. It is in this atmosphere 
of pressure that fraud thrives. For 4 long years, I have recommended 
and budgeted for the establishment of additional passport field agen- 
cies to serve heavily populated areas. Each year the request has been 
turned down within the Department of State. This year, for instance, 
the situation in the New York Passport Agency became intolerable. 
I have asked for an application acceptance agency in downtown Man- 
hattan to ease the pressure. Within the past 2 weeks, I have been 
advised that this request has been turned down. 

Virtually every recommendation and request I have made for 
alleviating the burden of overwork and the prevailing anxiety regard- 
ing fraud has been either ignored or refused because of budgetary cuts. 
Of course, we are given complicated and involved reasons why this 
and that cannot be done and to the uninitiated, these reasons, standing 
alone, might make sense. Frankly, they are pure, unadulterated fiction. 
This myopic view of economy, the refusal to expand and provide a 
public service which is self-supporting, the refusal to provide ade- 
quate staff to combat fraud by establishing efficient quality checks and 
legal assistance, is difficult, if not impossible, to understand. 

Like the Bureau of Customs, the Internal Revenue Service, and 
the Government's security agencies, every additional facility and em- 
ployee of the Passport Office not only adds to Federal revenue, but 
makes a substantial contribution to the containment of fraud and 
the security of this Nation. 

Like every other American citizen, I am a taxpayer but I resent 
paying taxes to finance crime and its disastrous results. I would 
rather pay taxes to finance the requirements and facilities for crime 
prevention and stiff penalties for violators. I think I may have some 
supporters in this view. 

I am fully aware of the wrath that this statement will engender in 
some quarters, but the time has come to put the cards on the table, 
and I hope that I have presented my hand clearly and with proper 
emphasis. I am fully prepared to face the consequences. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions to ask of 
this witness. 

The Chairman. Miss Knight, we are very grateful to you tor 
coming up here in response to our summons. I think you have been 
frank with us, and I think we have been discussing a situation that 
called for frankness. The committee is indebted to you. 
We will now stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair. 


(Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or organization 
in this index.) 



AAA Lifetime Rubber Stamp Co 35 

Abel case 17 

Abel, Col. Rudolf 29 

Acheson, Secretary 27 

Afghanistan 4, 5, 8, 9 

Africa 23 

Aguiar, Jose 17 

American Express 9 

Atlantic City, N.J 22 

Australia 5 


Babich, Tony 28 

Baker, Wilber Chapman 24 

Bangkok, Thailand 5, 9 

Barber, Ossip 25 

Bartley, William H 35 

Belcher, Warren J 24 

Blatt, Edward 25 

Borovich, Colonel 28 

Brazil 24 

Brotherhood of Eternal Love (organization) 4-6, 34-36 

Browder, Earl 22, 25, 26 

Browder v. U.S -, 17 

Buffalo Strike Force 34, 35 

Bureau of Customs 2, 4, 42 

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) 2-5 

Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs 37 

Burtan, Dr. William Gregory 25 


Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control 3 

California, State of 4, 5, 29 

State Franchise Tax Board 5 

Camden, N.J 23 

Canada 5, 28 

Canadian Government 17 

"Canadian Passport: No Spy Lacks One" (news item) 17, 28 

Carney, Richard 35 

Carr, Sam 28, 29 

Caudill, Thomas Gary 5 

Cavacante, Joanne (or Cavalcante) 35 

Chambers, Whittaker 12 

China 25, 27, 28 

Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 27 

Chinese frauds 14 

Circuit Court of Appeals 22, 23 

Civil War in Spain 21 

Cobalt, Ontario 29 

Collins, Thomas 35 




Comintern 25, 26, 28 

Communist 12, 14, 25-27 

Communist Party 25-27 

Communist Party of Canada 29 

Communist Party, USA . 22, 25 

"Communist Passport Frauds" (staff study) 14, 17 

Comparative Summary of Criminal Prosecutions for Years 1967, 1968, 

1969 (May) (table) 20 

Connecticut, State of 2, 5 

Czechoslovakian intelligence 17 


Daily Worker (newspaper) 26 

Daley, Donald 34 

"Deception, The" (book) 12 

Delinquent Passport Fraud Investigations (table) 41 

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 4 

Department of Justice 2, 26 

Department of State 1, 3, 4, 15, 23, 33, 35, 37, 40, 42 

Office of Security 4, 6, 32-34 

Devine, Pat 25 

Devine, William 35 

District Court, District of California 17 

Division of Vital Statistics 4 

Dominican Republic 11, 17 

Dozenberg, Nicholas 26 

Dubna (Soviet "atom city") 29 

Duggan, William 15, 16, 34 

Duncan, Renault, a/k/a Duncan Renaldo 23 


Earl Browder case 22, 23 

East Asia 10 

East Germany 17, 26 

Eastland, Senator James O 1-42 

Egyptian Consulate General, New York 25 

Eisler, Gerhard 26 

Epstein, Schacne 26 

Espionage Act 20 

Espionage Act of 1917 21 

Executive Order 20 


Far East 10,25,28 

FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 26, 29 

Feierabend, Albert 25 

Fiordeliso, Thomas 35 

Frad, William D 23 

Fuchs, Klaus 29 


Gage, Nicholas 13 

Gannes, Harry 26 

Gentile, G. Marvin 33,34,36,40 

German Reichstag 26 

Gomes, Manuel D 24 

Gorham, Fred W 23 

Gouzenko, Igor 28, 29 

Gouzenko papers 17 

Greeks 20 

Griffin, Norman J 24 

GRU (Military Intelligence) 29 

Gurney, Senator Edward J 1-42 


H Page 

Hall, David 35 

Hawkins, Steve 35 

Henderson, Loy 16 

Hitler 28 

Hong Kong 27 

House Appropriations Committee 34 

House Appropriations Subcommittee 15 

H.R. 109 2 


IBM Selectric typewriter 13, 14 

Illinois, State of 2 

Immigration Department 30 

Immigration and Naturalization Service 2, 15, 35 

Immigration Service 27 

Internal Revenue Service 4, 42 

Internal Security Act 22 

International Brigade 28, 29 

Investigations Pending in S Y for over 90 Days as of June 30, 1972 (table) . 37-40 

Iron Curtain 10 

IRS Intelligence 35 

Italians 20 


Jacson, Fred 29 

Japan 28 

Johnson, Richard 26 

Jones, Eddie 35 

Jones, James 14 

Josephson, Leon 26 


Kabul, Afghanistan 4, 8 

Kaufman, Ronald 12 

KGB 29 

King, Dr. Martin Luther 28 

Klausen, Max 28 

Knight, Frances G 1-42 

Kroger, Peter and Helen 29 

Kuhn, Karl 25 

Kweit, Harry 25 


Laguna Beach 35 

Latchford, Frank E 35 

Latin America 10 

Latvian passport 25 

League of Spiritual Discovery (LSD) 5 

Leamington 29 

Leary, Dr. Timothy 4, 5, 12,36 

Lee, John 24 

Lewis, Sam (a/k/a "Canine") 35 

Lewis, Georgia 35 

Lifetime Recordings 35 

Lincoln Rochester Bank 35 

Liptzen, Samuel 26 

Litvakoff , Isaac 26 

Long, Howard 24 

Lonsdale, Gordon 29 

Los Angeles Field Office 34 

Lost and/or Stolen Passports Reported by Country (table) 7 

Ly Shew v. Acheson 17 


M Page 

McLaughlin, Edward J 13 

Macomber, William, Jr 37 

Man, Alan Nunn 29 

Massing, Hede 12 

Mercader, Ramon 28, 29 

Mexico 11,29 

Miller, Isidore Jack 26 

Milstein, Mikhail 29 

Modesto, Calif 17 

Molody, Col. Konon 29 

Monroe County Clerk's Office 35 

Montreal 28 

Moran Motors, Inc 24 

Morning Freiheit (newspaper) 26 

Murphy, Congressman Morgan F 2 


National Research Councl 29 

New Delhi 9 

New Jerse} r , State of 5 

New Left 4 

New York 12-14, 22, 23, 25 

New York City 26 

New York County 23 

New York Passport Agency 42 

New York Times (newspaper) 12, 13, 34 

New Zealand 29 

NKVD 29 

Noulens, Hilaire 28 


Orange County, Calif 4, 35 

District Attorney 4 

"Organized Crime Selling Official (Forged) Papers" (article) 13 

Osband, Lester W 35 

Ottawa 28 


Passport Advisory Division 41 

Passport Agency 25 

Passport Division 15, 25, 27 

Passport Field Agencies 42 

Passport Fraud Program 37 

Passport Frauds for Years 1967, 1968, 1969 (January to May) (table) 18 

Passport Office 1-4, 6, 8-11, 14-16 

Legal Division 3, 9, 11, 15, 16, 32, 34, 36, 37 

Enforcement Branch 16 

Passport Office Issuances (Fiscal Years 1955-1972) (table) 31 

Passport Office Statistics — Collections and Operating Costs (table) 31 

Passports Lost or Stolen in Significant Drug Areas of the World (table) _ _ 7 

Peiping Peach Conference 2T 

Percentage of Officially Reported Lost or Stolen Passports As Compared 

to Total Passports Issued (table) 8 

Philadelphia Chinese cases 21, 24, 27 

Philadelphia fraud cases 18 

Philippines 11 

Pontecorvo, Bruno 29 

Portof New York 22 

Press, Robert T 24 

Puerto Rico 11 


Rabinovich, Hermine 29 

Ray, Earl 28 

RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) 28 

Renault Duncan case 23 

Reubens- Robinson case 18 


Richardson, Elliot L 16 

Ritchie, James L 34 

Rochester, N.Y 35 

Rooney, Congressman John 37 

Rose, Fred i 28 

Rubens- Robinson case 21, 23, 25 

Russia 23, 28 


Scroggs, Raymond 34 

Secret Service 25 

Secretary of State 20 

Sharfin, Aaron 25 

Sing Kee 24 

Smith, John 14 

Soghanalian, Sarkis 34 

Sorge, Richard 28 

Sourwine, J. G 1-42 

Soviet 20,23,25,26,28,29 

Soviet Embassy, Montreal 29 

Soviet Government 17 

Soviet intelligence _ 17 

Soviet Military Intelligence Service 25, 26 

Soviet Union." 21, 26, 27 

Spencer, Victor 29 

Spain 28 

Spanish Civil War 28,29 

Special Task Force 5 

Stalin 28,29 

State Joint Legislative Committee on Crime 13 

Statute of Limitations 21, 22, 26 

Steele, Congressman Robert H 2 

Sultan, Joseph 26 

Sunday Star (newspaper) 28 

Supreme Court 22, 23 

Switzerland 5 

Syracuse, N.Y 35 


Thailand 5 

Tokhi, Amanullah Salam 5 

Tokhi, H ayatuuah 5 

Toronto Telegram News Service 28 

"Trader Horn" (movie) 23 

Trotsky, Leon 29 


Under Secretarv of State 16 

United States.! 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17, 21, 27 

Code 20,21,22, 24, 25 

Commissioner 24 

District Attorney 26 

District Court 24 

Boston 25 

Brooklyn, N.Y 23 

Southern District of New York 23 

Western District of New York 35 

U.S. Government 32,34, 36 


Warszower, Welwel 22, 23, 26 

Washington 26, 28, 35 

Watson, Barbara 37 

Welwel Warszower case 22 

Wiener, Robert William 22 

William D. Frad case 23 



Wilson, President ,,„ 

Witczak, Ignacy 9 

"World Heroin Problem" (report) * 

World Tourist, Inc ~z , 97 

World War I f> j*> ii 

World War II M,Z\,lb,U,M 

Worthington, Peter 

Z 29 

Zabotin, Colonel 

o . 


3 9999 05995 149 9