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14  k  si/UK?* 

TESTIMONY  OF  FRANCES  G.  KNIGHT 


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HEARING 


BEFORE  THE 


SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE 

ADMINISTRATION  OE  THE  INTERNAL  SECURITY 

ACT  AND  OTHER  INTERNAL  SECURITY  LAWS 


OF  THE 


COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

NINETY-SECOND  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 


SEPTEMBER  15,  1972 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
-694—0  WASHINGTON   :    1972 


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TESTIMONY  OF  FRANCES  G.  KNIGHT 


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HEARING 

BEFORE  THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE 

ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  INTERNAL  SECURITY 

ACT  AND  OTHER  INTERNAL  SECURITY  LAWS 

OF  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

NINETY-SECOND  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 


SEPTEMBER  15,  1972 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


GOV  DOt3  us    GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

JV  -694-0  WASHINGTON   :   1972 

6483 
.154 
1972x 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402  -  Price  25  cents 


Re 


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I  ihrarv"         U.  S.  Government  Documents  Depository 
l_  I D  r  a T  V  Franklin  Pierce  Law  Center  Library 

Sift 


Library 
2116 " 


COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi,   Chairman 

JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas  ROMAN  L.  HRUSKA,  Nebraska 

SAM  J.  ERVIN,  Jr.,  North  Carolina  HIRAM  L.  FONG,  Hawaii 

PHILIP  A.  HART,  Michigan  HUGH  SCOTT,  Pennsylvania 

EDWARD  M.  KENNEDY,  Massachusetts  STROM  THURMOND,  South  Carolina 

BIRCH  BAYH,  Indiana  MARLOW  W.  COOK,  Kentucky 

QUENTIN  N.  BURDICK,  North  Dakota  CHARLES  McC.  MATHIAS,  Jr.,  Maryland 

ROBERT  C.  BYRD,  West  Virginia  EDWARD  J.  GURNEY,  Florida 
JOHN  V.  TUNNEY,  California 


Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration  of  the  Internal 
Security  Act  and  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 

JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi,  Chairman 

JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas  HUGH  SCOTT,  Pennsylvania 

SAM  J.  ERVIN,  Jr.,  North  Carolina  STROM  THURMOND,  South  Carolina 

BIRCH  BAYH,  Indiana  MARLOW  W.  COOK,  Kentucky 

EDWARD  J.  GURNEY,  Florida 

J.  G.  Sodrwine,  Chief  Counsel 

Samuel  J.  Scott,  Associate  Counsel 

Warren  Littman,  Associate  Counsel 

John  R.  Norpel,  Director  of  Research 

Alfonso  L.  Tarabochia,  Chief  Investigator 


RESOLUTION 

Resolved  by  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  of  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  the  Judiciary,  That  the  testimony  of  Frances  G.  Knight 
taken  in  executive  session  on  September  15,  1972,  be  released  from 
the  injunction  of  secrecy,  be  printed  and  made  public. 

James  O.  Eastland,  Chairman. 
Approved  September  27,  1972. 

ii 


TESTIMONY  OF  FRANCES  G.  KNIGHT 


FRIDAY,   SEPTEMBER    15,    1972 

U.S.  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the 
Administration  of  the  Internal  Security  Act 

and  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 
op  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington,  D.G. 

The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  recess,  at  12:15  p.m.,  in  room 
S-206,  The  Capitol,  Senator  James  O.  Eastland  (chairman), 
presiding. 

Present :  Senators  Eastland  and  Gurney. 

Also  present :  J.  G.  Sourwine,  chief  counsel. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Chairman,  our  witness  today  is  Miss  Frances  G. 
Knight,  who  heads  the  Passport  Office  of  the  Department  of  State. 
Do  you  wish  to  swear  the  witness,  sir  ? 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  solemnly  swear  the  testimony  you  are  about 
to  give  is  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so 
help  you  God  ? 

Miss  Knight.  I  do. 

STATEMENT  OF  FRANCES  G.  KNIGHT,  DIRECTOR,  PASSPORT 
OFFICE,  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Miss  Knight,  the  committee  has  been  receiving  testi- 
mony about  narcotics,  the  world  narcotics  traffic,  and  its  impact  on  the 
security  of  the  United  States.  And  in  connection  with  this,  we  have 
had  testimony  about  passport  forgeries  and  loss  or  pseudo-loss  of 
passports  which,  in  fact,  are  believed  or  suspected  to  have  been  stolen 
or  otherwise  illegally  disposed  of.  We  have  also,  as  you  know,  been 
interested  in  the  matter  of  security  of  passports,  and  we  would  like 
to  ask  you  to  tell  us  in  your  own  words  the  whole  story  of  the  passport 
security  problem  as  it  exists  today.  Touch,  if  you  will,  on  the  matter 
of  narcotics  and  passport  security,  but  do  not  fail  to  touch  such 
matters  as  making  the  passport  itself  secure,  passport  frauds  not  in- 
volved in  narcotics,  and  any  of  the  other  problems  with  security  and 
affecting  the  U.S.  passport  which  you  know  of.  If  you  do  not  know 
of  them,  we  know  nobody  does,  so  we  will  get  the  full  story. 

Miss  Knight.  Yes,  sir.  I  sincerely  hope  that  I  can  help  the  committee 
in  this  investigation.  We  have  been  very  close  to  the  situation  of  pass- 
port fraud  over  a  period  of  years,  and  we  have  quite  a  number  of 
documents  which  spell  out  the  fraud,  how  it  is  perpetrated,  and  what 
we  have  tried  to  do  about  it.  And  since  it  is  a  rather  lengthy  story,  I 
would  like  to  refer  to  some  notes  for  the  record,  if  you  agree. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  fine.  That  will  be  permitted. 

(1) 


Miss  Knight.  The  Passport  Office,  like  many  other  areas  of  Gov- 
ernment, has  been  concerned  for  some  time  with  the  rapid  expansion 
and  disastrous  results  of  international  drug  traffic.  Our  concern  is 
based  on  two  closely  related  factors:  (1)  passport  fraud  being  per- 
petrated by  persons  who  are  either  drug  addicts  or  drug  traffickers, 
and  (2)  protecting  the  integrity  of  the  U.S.  passport. 

The  policy  of  the  Passport  Office  in  any  known  or  suspected  passport 
fraud  is  to  thoroughly  investigate  the  information  given  us  and  to 
determine  whether  there  has  been  a  violation  of  the  passport  laws 
and,  if  so,  to  refer  it  to  the  Department  of  Justice  through  the  appro- 
priate U.S.  attorney  for  criminal  prosecution.  This  is  standard  oper- 
ating procedure  in  each  and  every  case.  Oases  involving  more  than  one 
potential  fraud  are  handled  with  particular  urgency.  As  soon  as  the 
facts  of  a  case  are  available,  the  Passport  Office  issues  an  alert  which 
is  sent  to  all  foreign  service  posts  and  to  the  Immigration  and  Natural- 
ization Service.  Every  action  is  taken  to  prevent  the  fraud  from 
spreading  and  to  secure  prosecution  of  the  persons  responsible. 

As  a  matter  of  policy,  the  Passport  Office  cooperates  with  all  Gov- 
ernment agencies  which  may  have  an  interest  in  a  fraud  case  to  assist 
them  in  the  performance  of  their  statutory  responsibilities.  This  co- 
operation extends  to  the  Bureau  of  Narcotics  and  Dangerous  Drugs 
as  well  as  the  Bureau  of  Customs. 

Because  your  inquiry  is  primarily  interested  in  the  fraud-drug 
relationship,  I  would  like  to  call  your  attention  to  the  action  taken 
by  the  Passport  Office  concerning  the  report  on  the  "World  Heroin 
Problem,"  dated  May  27,  1971,  prepared  by  Congressman  Morgan  F. 
Murphy  of  Illinois  and  Congressman  Robert.  H.  Steele  of  Connecticut 
pursuant  to  H.R.  109.  The  following  recommendation  was  contained 
in  this  report : 

That  the  United  States  consider  canceling  the  passport  of  any  American 
known  to  be  engaged  in  the  illegal  trafficking  of  heroin. 

In  our  comment  on  this  recommendation,  we  stated  that  adverse 
passport  action  could  be  taken  only  in  the  case  of  an  American  citizen 
who  had  been  convicted  or  was  a  fugitive  from  a  Federal  warrant  of 
arrest  or  similar  order  for  trafficking  in  heroin.  We  indicated  that  this 
action  would  have  to  be  based  either  on  an  Executive  order  or  legisla- 
tion providing  that  the  illegal  sale,  processing,  or  transportation  of 
heroin  is  damaging  to  the  national  interest  of  the  United  States.  We 
also  indicated  that  the  Department  of  Justice  should  advise  U.S. 
attorneys  to  prosecute  vigorously  passport  frauds  involving  drug 
activities.  On  June  15,  1971,  our  recommendations  were  forwarded  to 
the  Director  of  the  Bureau  of  Narcotics  and  Dangerous  Drugs.  I  am 
unaware  of  any  action  taken. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  mean  you  did  not  get  an  answer  to  your  recom- 
mendation ?  Your  memorandum  was  not  acknowledged  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Not  that  I  know  of,  sir. 

Mr.  Sour  wine.  Have  you  renewed  those  recommendations  since 
June  15,  1971? 

Miss  Knight.  No,  because  I  sent  the  recommendations  through  chan- 
nels, and  I  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  contact  the  Department  of 
Justice. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Well,  Miss  Knight,  I  was  not  intending  to  imply 
that  it  was  our  opinion  or  the  committee's  opinion  that  you  should  or 


should  not  have  done  anything.  I  was  just  trying  to  find  out  what  the 
situation  was. 

Please  go  ahead. 

Miss  Knight.  No,  I  did  not  follow  this  up. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  I  interrupted  you.  Please  go  ahead. 

Miss  Knight.  In  January  1972,  a  special  subcommittee  of  the  Cabi- 
net Committee  on  International  Narcotics  Control  was  established  in 
the  Department  of  State  to  consider  recommendations  dealing  with 
methods  by  which  to  combat  the  international  traffic  in  narcotics.  Rep- 
resentatives of  the  Passport  Office  were  on  that  subcommittee  and  num- 
erous meetings  have  been  held. 

As  a  result,  procedures  are  currently  being  developed  to  inform  the 
Passport  Office  of  the  parole  of  narcotics  traffickers  for  the  purpose 
of  denying  passport  facilities  to  such  persons  until  the  £>arole  period 
is  completed  or  until  they  receive  permission  from  their  parole  officer 
to  leave  the  United  States.  The  Bureau  of  Narcotics  and  Dangerous 
Drugs  is  now  furnishing  the  Passport  Office  with  the  names  of  persons 
who  are  of  interest  to  the  Bureau  because  of  suspected  illegal  narcotics 
trafficking.  When  these  individuals  apply  for  a  passport,  the  Bureau 
is  notified. 

Another  result  of  our  liaison  with  the  Bureau  of  Narcotics  and 
Dangerous  Drugs  is  receipt  by  the  Passport  Office  of  information 
from  the  Bureau  concerning  possible  drug  related  passport  frauds. 
While  these  results  stemmed  from  discussions  within  the  subcommittee, 
I  would  like  to  emphasize  that  the  impetus  for  this  coordination  was 
provided  by  the  Legal  Division  of  the  Passport  Office  as  early  as  1969. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Miss  Knight,  you  mentioned  discussions  within  the 
subcommittee.  What  subcommittee  are  you  referring  to?  That  does 
not  means  this  subcommittee,  does  it  ? 

Miss  Knight.  No,  sir ;  it  does  not.  This  was  a  special  subcommittee 
of  the  Cabinet  Committee  on  the  International  Narcotics  Control, 
which  I  just  referred  to. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  All  right.  I  just  wanted  to  be  sure.  Go  ahead. 

Miss  Knight.  All  passport  frauds  are  committed  for  the  purpose  of 
covering  up  criminal  activities.  This  includes  fraudulent  citizenship 
claims  which  are  advanced  by  aliens  to  obtain  illegal  entry  into  the 
United  States.  Persons  obtaining  passports  by  fraud  fall  into  several 
basic  categories :  (1)  drug  traffickers;  (2)  militant  groups;  (3)  con- 
fidence men  or  swindlers;  (4)  illegal  aliens  in  the  United  States; 
(5)  fugitives  from  justice,  and  (6)  imposters.  These  criminals  special- 
ize in  certain  types  of  fraud  such  as  adoption  frauds,  fradulent  use 
of  the  passport,  imposter  fraud,  and  slot  fraud. 

By  way  of  a  brief  explanation :  An  imposter  fraud  is  one  in  which 
a  person  assumes  the  identity  of  another  individual  in  order  to  obtain 
a  passport.  Such  cases  occur  domestically  as  well  as  abroad. 

The  procedure  involves  the  obtention  of  officially  issued  birth  or 
baptismal  certificates  or  hospital  records,  either  by  theft  of  purchase 
from  persons  living  and  with  a  little  expert  cosmetic  assistance,  the 
impersonation  becomes  effective. 

Another  procedure  involves  the  use  of  birth  records  of  persons 
deceased.  There  is  no  efficient  coordination  between  births  and  deaths 


in  this  country.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  is  no  standardization  of 
birth  records  or  certificates  in  the  United  States.  The  Division  of  Vital 
Statistics  in  the  Department  of  Health,  Education,  and  Welfare  has 
been  working  with  the  State  authorities  and  the  Passport  Office  and 
other  Federal  authorities  to  endeavor  to  obtain  standardization  of  not 
only  the  birth  document  itself,  but  strengthening  the  procedures  of 
filing  birth  records  and  strengthening  the  protection  of  these  records 
to  enhance  the  integrity  of  the  documents.  Birth  certificates  are  now 
more  formal  and  consistent  but  no  one  knows  whether  an  individual 
born  30  years  ago  or  6  months  ago  is  still  with  us  or  has  gone  to  his 
reward. 

Adoption  frauds  occur  almost  exclusively  abroad  and  generally 
involve  childless  American  couples  who  adopt  a  child  overseas  and 
then  report  the  birth  to  a  consular  post  as  their  own. 

Fraudulent  use  of  a  passport  involves  one  which  has  been  legit- 
imately issued  but  subsequently  altered  to  remove  a  restriction  or  to 
indicate  its  issuance  to  another  person.  This  may  be  done  with  or  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  original  bearer. 

Slot  cases  involve  the  reporting  of  the  birth  of  children  overseas, 
when  in  fact  such  birth  did  not  occur.  This  is  a  method  by  which  an 
alien  child  can  be  brought  into  the  United  States  as  a  citizen  or  at  some 
later  date  an  alien  may  use  this  birth  registration  to  enter  the  United 
States  as  a  citizen.  Such  a  procedure  requires  the  collusion  of  an  Amer- 
ican citizen. 

An  example  of  a  typical  investigation  into  the  fraudulent  use  of 
U.S.  passports  by  drug  traffickers  relates  to  an  organization  known  as 
the  "Brotherhood  of  Eternal  Love." 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Miss  Knight,  what  is  that  Brotherhood  of  Eternal 
Love  ?  Is  that  a  religious  organization  ? 

Miss  Knight.  No;  I  believe  it  is  an  organization  of  the  New  Left.  It 
may  have  some  religious  overtones.  I  do  not  know. 

This  outfit  was  reportedly  founded  by  Dr.  Timonthy  Leary  and  to 
have  had  its  base  in  LSD  operations.  Dr.  Leary 's  present  connections 
with  the  Brotherhood,  if  any,  are  not  known  although  it  is  claimed  that 
the  Brotherhood  did  assist  him  in  obtaining  a  passport  in  a  false 
identity  to  facilitate  his  departure  from  the  United  States  after  he 
escaped  from  a  California  jail  where  he  was  imprisoned  on  a  narcotics 
charge.  In  early  1969,  the  Brotherhood  turned  its  attention  to  hard 
drugs,  primarily  hashish  and  engaged  in  smuggling  operations  from 
Afghanistan  into  the  United  States.  The  principal  source  of  the  drugs 
appears  to  be  Kabul,  Afghanistan. 

An  extensive  investigation  is  currently  being  conducted  concerning 
the  activities  of  the  Brotherhood  by  a  task  force  of  local,  State,  and 
Federal  agencies  including  the  Office  of  Security  of  the  Department  of 
State,  the  Bureau  of  Customs,  the  Bureau  of  Narcotics  and  Dangerous 
Drugs,  and  the  Internal  Revenue  Service.  A  grand  jury  in  Orange 
County,  Calif.,  has  indicted  47  members  of  the  Brotherhood  on  drug 
smuggling  cases. 

I  would  like  to  submit  for  the  record  a  copy  of  a  press  statement  by 
the  Orange  County  District  Attorney  released  at  the  time  of  the 
arrests. 


Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  this  be  received  for  the  record 
at  this  point  ? 

The  Chairman.  It  may  be  received. 
(The  document  referred  to  follows:) 

Background 

The  Brotherhood  of  Eternal  Love  is  an  offshoot  of  the  League  of  Spiritual 
Discovery  (LSD)  a  drug  oriented  religious  cult  founded  by  Dr.  Timothy  Leary. 

The  members  of  the  League  and  now  the  Brotherhood  believe  they  receive 
mystical  insight  into  life  through  the  use  of  hallucinogenic  drugs. 

At  present  Dr.  Leary  is  a  fugitive  living  in  Switzerland,  but  he  is  still  con- 
sidered the  "high  priest"  of  this  drug  oriented  cult.  His  followers  inhabit  a 
ranch  in  a  remote  area  of  Southern  California. 

In  October  1906,  Leary  and  his  followers  applied  to  the  State  of  California 
for  corporate  status.  On  October  26,  1966,  the  Brotherhood  of  Eternal  Love 
became  a  legal  corporation  in  California  and  was  granted  tax  exempt  status  by 
the  State  Franchise  Tax  Board  on  the  grounds  of  its  religious  nature  set  forth 
in  the  Articles  of  Incorporation. 

In  the  year  long  investigation  by  the  Special  Task  Force  investigating  the 
Brotherhood,  it  has  been  determined  that  this  cult  is  one  of  the  major  suppliers 
of  LSD,  hashish  oil,  and  hashish  throughout  the  United  States  and  the  world. 
The  Brotherhood  has  also  set  up  a  major  smuggling  network  using  false  identifi- 
cation and  forged  passports  that  allow  its  members  to  travel  about  the  world 
making  illegal  drug  purchases  for  import  into  the  U.S. 

Intelligence  developed  by  the  Task  Force  revealed  that  the  Brotherhood  has 
smuggled  nearly  1,000  pounds  of  hashish  into  the  U.S.  each  month. 

During  the  investigation  of  the  Brotherhood  the  Task  Force  agents  have  seized 
more  than  1.5  million  LSD  tablets,  30  gallons  of  hashish  oil,  more  than  2y2  tons 
of  hashish,  3  LSD  labs  and  4  hashish  oil  labs,  along  with  innumerable  sets  of 
falisified  identifications  and  passports. 

Clandestine  Brotherhood  laboratories  are  the  primary  producer  of  an  LSD 
tablet  known  as  "Orange  Sunshine"  that  lias  been  found  throughout  the  United 
States  and  the  world. 

The  orange  colored  tablets  have  shown  up  in  the  drug  subculture  from  Cali- 
fornia to  Connecticut  and  from  Canada  to  Australia. 

In  January  1972,  Bureau  of  Narcotics  and  Dangerous  Drugs  (BNDD)  agents 
seized  230,000  "Orange  Sunshine"  tablets  in  New  Jersey.  In  March  1972,  more 
than  60,000  pink-orange  LSD  tablets  were  found  in  Australia. 

Just  as  recently  as  May  26,  1972,  Thailand  police  and  BNDD  arrested  an  Amer- 
ican citizen,  Thomas  Gary  Caudill,  in  a  Bangkok  hotel  with  500  "Orange  Sun- 
shine" tablets  in  his  possession. 

The  Brotherhood's  hashish  smuggling  operation  is  headed  by  one  experienced 
smuggler  who  coordinates  the  worldwide  illegal  drug  traffic. 

To  finance  the  smuggling  operation,  a  group  of  Brotherhood  members  or  their 
friends  will  combine  their  finances.  A  portion  of  the  money  will  be  advanced  to 
the  top  smuggler  to  make  arrangements  to  purchase  the  load  cf  hashish,  obtain 
false  identifications  and  pay  expenses. 

If  a  car  is  to  be  used  in  the  smuggling  operation,  it  is  usually  purchased  in  the 
U.S.  and  fitted  with  hidden  compartments.  The  vehicle  is  then  shipped  to 
Afghanistan. 

One  of  the  smuggling  team,  the  "load  man,"  will  travel  to  Afghanistan  to 
make  the  purchase  of  the  hashish.  In  Afghanistan  the  Brotherhood  deals  with 
Amanullah  Salam  Tokhi  and  his  brother  Hayatuuah  Tokhi  to  obtain  the  "finest 
quality"  hashish.  The  Tokhi  brothers  were  also  indicted  for  their  part  in  the 
Brotherhood's  narcotics  running  scheme. 

"When  the  vehicle  is  loaded  with  hashish  it  is  taken  out  of  Afghanistan  supplied 
with  new,  false  registration,  shipped  back  to  the  U.S.,  usually  to  a  port  known 
not  to  have  major  narcotics  problems. 

When  the  vehicle  arrives,  it  is  picked  up  by  another  member  of  the  Brother- 
hood and  the  shipment  is  never  in  the  true  name  of  the  cult  member.  The  Brother- 
hood's head  smuggler  is  then  informed  and  makes  arrangements  for  the 
distribution  of  the  hashish  load  to  the  investors  and  receives  the  balance  of  the 
money. 


6 

The  year  long  investigation  has  revealed  that  the  Brotherhood  uses  numer- 
ous businesses  as  fronts  for  the  sale  and  distribution  of  the  hashish,  LSD,  and 

cocaine. 

Brotherhood  members  have  been  tied  to  health  food  shops,  juice  bars, 
psychedelic  shops,  record  stores,  surf  equipment  stores,  used  car  lots,  a  rug 
company  and  a  beach  club. 

The  results  of  today's  task  force  operation  will  severely  undercut  the  leader- 
ship of  this  drug  subculture  which  has  been  a  strong  influence,  especially  among 
young  people,  since  the  early  1960's. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Go  ahead,  Miss  Knight. 

Miss  Knight.  In  connection  with  this  release,  it  should  be  noted 
that  what  has  been  described  as  "forged  passports"  are  actually 
genuine  U.S.  passports  which  were  obtained  by  fraud.  There  is  a 
difference.  The  agencies  investigating  the  Brotherhood  have  furnished 
the  Passport  Office  with  a  list  of  155  persons  who  are  members  of  the 
Brotherhood.  In  addition,  110  aliases  for  these  persons  have  also  been 
furnished  to  the  Passport  Office.  We  have  been  and  continue  to  conduct 
file  searches  in  an  attempt  to  identify  these  individuals. 

An  enormous  amount  of  time  has  been  invested  in  these  searches 
but  we  have  made  progress,  and  I  am  glad  to  report  that  91  passport 
files  have  been  located  which  relate  to  the  Brotherhood.  Most  of  these 
applications  were  filed  between  1969  and  1972.  Many  of  them  indicate 
use  of  the  well-known  pattern  of  reporting  the  original  passport  as 
lost  or  stolen  and,  subsequently,  obtaining  a  replacement  passport. 
Since  the  Passport  Office  first  learned  of  the  activities  of  the  Brother- 
hood in  June  1972,  we  have  located,  researched  and  documented  40 
cases  which  have  been  sent  to  the  Office  of  Security  for  investigation 
for  passport  fraud.  Another  10  to  12  cases,  which  previously  had  been 
sent  for  investigation,  have  been  tentatively  identified  as  members  of 
the  Brotherhood. 

A  screening  program  has  been  established  for  the  remainder  of  the 
Brotherhood  files  by  verifying  the  date  and  place  of  birth  and  writing 
reference  letters  to  the  parents  or  next  of  kin  of  other  suspected 
Brotherhood  member  cases.  Through  this  method,  eight  more  cases 
have  been  identified  as  passport  frauds.  In  one  such  case,  an  individual 
had  used  the  identity  of  his  mentally  retarded  brother-in-law  to  obtain 
a  passport.  The  applicant  had  prior  arrests  in  the  United  States  and 
abroad  for  drug  offenses.  A  reference  letter,  sent  to  the  father,  resulted 
in  sworn  statements  that  the  passport  applicant  was  not  his  son,  identi- 
fying him  instead  as  his  son-in-law.  This  case  has  been  referred  to  the 
U.S.  Attorney  for  prosecution.  So  much  for  the  Brotherhood. 

Statistics  reflect  that  for  fiscal  years  1970  to  1972,  there  was  an 
average  of  more  than  17,000  U.S.  passports  reported  lost  or  stolen 
annually  on  a  worldwide  basis  which  have  never  been  accounted  for. 
Some  of  these  passports,  of  course,  were  destroyed  in  some  manner. 
We  estimate,  however,  that  more  than  half  of  these  documents  are 
still  outstanding  and  valid  and  could  have  found  their  way  into  illicit 
channels.  I  would  like  to  submit  for  the  record  charts  showing  reports 
of  the  loss  of  U.S.  passports  in  significant  areas  for  calendar  years 
1970, 1971,  and  1972. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  this  go  in  the  record  at  this 
point  ? 

The  Chairman.  It  may  go  in. 

(The  document  referred  to  follows :) 


PASSPORTS  LOST  OR  STOLEN  IN  SIGNIFICANT  DRUG  AREAS  OF  THE  WORLD 
Hashish  Route 


Country 


Calendar 
1969 


Calendar 
1970 


Calendar 
1971 


Calendar 

1972— actual 

Jan.-July 


Calendar 

1972 

projected 


Afghanistan. 

India 

Lebanon 

Morocco 

Nepal 

Pakistan 

Thailand 

Turkey 

Viet-Nam  .. 


13 

30 

38 

34 

59 

73 

109 

189 

138 

223 

27 

28 

28 

14 

24 

77 

118 

123 

76 

126 

17 

33 

27 

19 

34 

16 

17 

19 

19 

34 

95 

121 

106 

72 

122 

67 

80 

62 

52 

87 

187 

235 

255 

128 

218 

South  America  Drug  Route 


Country 


Calendar 
1969 


Calendar 
1970 


Calendar 
1971 


Calendar 

1972— actual 

Jan.-July 


Calendar 

1972 

projected 


Cohmbia. 
Equador.. 

Peru 

Mexico... 


75 

80 

100 

99 

159 

30 

31 

35 

46 

76 

45 

48 

72 

39 

64 

254 

278 

371 

259 

444 

LOST  AND/OR  STOLEN  PASSPORTS  REPORTED  BY  COUNTRY 
[List  contains  only  countries  reporting  25  lost/stolen  passports  per  calendar  year] 


Calendar 

Calendar 

Calendar 

Calendar 

1972— 

Country 

1969 

1970 

1971 

Jan.-July 

Total 

Argentina 

37 

31 

39 

38 

145 

Brazil 

69 

63 

81 

55 

268 

Canada 

45 

44 

58 

39 

186 

Col  mbia 

75 

80 

100 

99 

354 

Ecuador 

30 

31 

35 

46 

142 

Guatemala 

42 

50 

41 

37 

170 

Mexico 

254 

278 

371 

259 

1,162 

Peru 

45 

48 

72 

39 

204 

Venezuela _ 

57 

41 

68 

24 

190 

Austria 

99 

122 

133 

88 

442 

Belgium 

93 
132 

1C7 
128 

144 
133 

107 
73 

451 

Denmark.. 

466 

U nited  Ki ngdom 

784 

1,099 

1,160 

639 

3,682 

Germany 

1,048 

1,140 

1,378 

735 

4,301 

Ireland... 

66 

41 

62 

17 

186 

Netherlands. 

171 

278 

509 

195 

1,153 

Portugal. 

30 

39 

65 

48 

182 

Spain 

451 

630 

675 

417 

2,173 

Sweden 

52 

40 

51 

42 

185 

Switzerland 

175 

224 

274 

120 

793 

France 

782 

993 

1,167 

626 

3,568 

Afghanistan 

13 

30 

38 

34 

115 

Australia _. 

45 

46 

67 

38 

196 

Hong  Kong 

34 
73 
137 

57 
109 
185 

58 
189 
192 

at 

138 
110 

181 

India 

509 

Japan _ 

624 

Korea 

42 

32 

77 

23 

174 

Okinawa 

57 
67 
95 

62 
78 
121 

95 
94 
106 

36 
62 

72 

250 

Philippines 

301 

Thailand. 

394 

Viet-Nam 

187 
35 

235 
81 

255 
64 

128 
34 

805 

Yugoslavia 

214 

Greece 

146 

123 

153 

84 

506 

Iran 

35 

22 

31 

29 

117 

Israel... _ 

98 

210 

201 

119 

628 

Italy 

814 

1,124 

1,272 

484 

3,694 

Jerusalem 

60 

72 

141 

62 

335 

Kenya. 

44 

51 

60 

48 

203 

Leba  non. 

27 

28 

28 

14 

97 

Morocco 

77 

118 

123 

76 

394 

Nigeria. 

47 
67 

25 
80 

30 
62 

8 
52 

110 

Turkey 

261 

Chile 

21 

28 

40 

15 

104 

83-694  O— 72 2 

8 

LOST  AND/OR  STOLEN  PASSPORTS  REPORTED  BY  COUNTRY— Continued 
[List  contains  only  countries  reporting  25  lost/stolen  passports  per  calendar  year] 


Country 


Costa  Rico 

Norway 

Nepal 

Singapore.. _ 

Panama.. 

Indonesia. 

Taiwan 

Republic  of  South  Africa. 
Pakistan 


Calendar 

Calendar 

Calendar 

Calendar 

1972 — 

1969 

1970 

1971 

Jan.— July 

Total 

17 

31 

26 

23 

97 

16 

37 

38 

26 

117 

17 

33 

27 

19 

96 

15 

35 

28 

14 

92 

21 

19 

42 

22 

104 

12 

10 

28 

12 

62 

21 

23 

36 

22 

102 

19 

25 

27 

21 

92 

16 

17 

19 

19 

71 

PERCENTAGE  OF  OFFICIALLY  REPORTED  LOST  OR  STOLEN  PASSPORTS  AS  COMPARED  TO  TOTAL  PASSPORTS  ISSUED 


Fiscal  year  Fiscal  year  Fiscal  year 

1970  1971  1972 


Total  lost  or  stolen.. 17, 129 

Total  issued  i 2, 230  347 

Percentage  of  lost - °-„77%2J 

.8  of  1% 

Total  found  or  recovered — 2,  738 

Total  lost  or  stolen. icw 

Percentage  of  found 1°% 

Total  passports  lost  or  unaccounted  for 14, 391 

Total  issued  i ---  V,3.V47 

Percentage 0V64^°J 

.6  of  1% 


20,  620 

24, 152 

2,481,381 

2  2,791,872 

0. 83%  or 

0.87%  or 

.  8  of  1% 

.9  of  1% 

3,458 

4,070 

20, 620 

24, 152 

17% 

17% 

17, 162 

20,  082 

2,  481,  381 

2  2,791,872 

0.69%  or 

0.72%  or 

.  7  of  1% 

.  7  of  1% 

i  Includes  figure  for  issuance  abroad. 

2  Includes  estimated  figures  for  issuance  abroad  fiscal  year  1972. 

Recapitulation: 

Total  passports  issued  for  3-year  period  (fiscal  years  1970,  1971, 

1972)  _  '  >  ^03,  600 

Total  losYor  stolen  for  3-year  period  (fiscal  years  1970,  1971,  1972)  _         ^x**01 

Percentage  of  lost  or  stolen  compared  to  number  issued 0.  82%  or 

.  8  of  1  % 
Total  found  or  recovered  for  3-year  period  (fiscal  years  1970,  1971, 


1972). 


10,  266 


Total  passports  unaccounted  for  over  3-year  period  (fiscal  years 

1970,  1971,  1972) ---  51,635 

Percentage  of  found  or  recovered  passports  compared  to  number 

lost 17% 

Mr.  Sotjrwine.  Go  ahead,  Miss  Knight. 

Miss  Knight.  Thank  you.  .   . 

Specific  information  tying  lost  passports  to  criminal  activity  and 
specifically  to  drug-related  activity  is  not  always  available  to  the 
Passport  Office,  However,  let  me  mention  three  cases  as  examples 
where  information  of  drug-related  fraud  was  available. 

In  one  case  a  German  national  was  arrested  attempting  to  use  a  U.S. 
passport  to  smuggle  hashish  out  of  Afghanistan.  The  passport  she 
used  had  been  reported  lost  at  Kabul  by  the  American  girl  to  whom 
it  had  been  issued.  A  picture  of  the  German  girl  had  been  substituted 
for  that  of  the  original  bearer. 

In  another  instance,  a  German  national,  found  to  be  in  possession 
of  a  U.S.  passport,  claimed  the  passport  had  been  sold  to  him  by  the 
American  citizen  bearer  along  with  a  number  of  credit  cards  belonging 
to  another  American  citizen.  Reportedly,  the  passport  and  the  credit 


9 
cards  were  to  be  used  for  the  purchase  of  narcotics  in  Bangkok, 

Another  case  involved  an  attempt  by  a  young  German  to  sell  a  U.S. 
passport  which  had  been  reported  lost  by  a  girl  who  had  previously 
been  apprehended  trying  to  smuggle  hashish  out  of  Afghanistan. 

There  are  other  cases  involving  drug-related  passport  frauds  but, 
unfortunately,  we  rarely  get  the  facts  in  time  to  take  preventive  action. 
Most  frauds  surface  long  after  the  event.  However,  patterns  appear 
which  cannot  be  ignored  even  though  proof  of  actual  fraud  is  not 
available. 

An  American  consular  officer  in  New  Delhi,  reporting  the  loss  of 
70  U.S.  passports  between  January  and  July  1972,  stated : 

Loss  or  theft  is  predominantly  among  the  young  and  the  pattern  is  quite 
similar,  leading  the  consular  officer  to  believe  that  in  many  cases  the  passports 
have  either  not  been  lost  but  retained  by  the  bearer  for  reasons  best  known  to 
him,  or  have  been  given  or  sold  to  persons  unknown. 

The  consular  officer  relates  the  pattern  as  follows:  The  American 
citizen  was  on  a  train  and  while  sleeping,  his  or  her  purse  was  stolen; 
or  while  running  across  the  street  in  heavy  monsoon  rain,  the  passport 
must  have  dropped  in  water  and  could  not  be  found;  or  the  hotel 
room  was  broken  into  while  the  passport  bearer  was  sleeping ;  passport 
and  money  stolen  under  vague  circumstances ;  or  passport  was  stolen 
while  sleeping  in  the  park  in  central  Delhi,  etc.  In  most  cases,  travelers 
checks  are  stolen  along  with  the  passport  and  the  routine  involves 
application  to  American  Express  for  replacement  of  travelers  checks 
at  the  same  time  applying  for  a  replacement  passport.  The  procedure 
is  too  pat  for  complacency.  First :  the  passport  is  reported  lost.  Second : 
the  police  authorities  are  informed.  Third :  a  police  statement  of  loss 
is  acquired.  Fourth :  the  Embassy  or  Consulate  is  advised  of  the  loss. 
Fifth :  Identification  papers  are'  produced  and  replacement  passport 
is  issued.  More  recently,  we  have  been  informed  that  some  young 
people  have  been  coming  in  to  register  upon  arrival  with  the  Consulate 
Office  in  New  Delhi  so  that  their  passport  and  other  identity  are  re- 
corded. Several  days  later  they  are  back. saying,  "Remember  me?  I 
registered  here  the  other  day."  In  view  of  their  certifications  regarding 
loss,  the  Embassy  has  no  alternative  but  to  accept  application  for  a 
replacement  passport  and  to  issue  it,  While  there  is  no  indication  that 
an  organized  group  is  involved  in  the  lost  or  stolen  passports  in  India, 
the  young  people  appear  to  be  suspiciously  well  versed  in  the  procedure 
for  applying  for  a  replacement,  Only  on  rare  occasions  do  lost  or  stolen 
passports  turn  up  and  we  have  no  indication  that  they  have  been  used 
for  espionage  purposes  or  fraudulent  immigration  purposes.  Drugs, 
especially  hashish,  are  commonly  used  by  some  "hippies"  and  it  is 
quite  possible  that  passports  are  being  sold  rather  than  lost  to  finance 
a  personal  drug  habit.  But  how  do  we  prove  this  ? 

Another  reason  for  losing  passports,  according  to  the  consular  officer 
in  New  Delhi,  may  relate  to  visa  limitations.  He  reports  that  "Many 
young  people  overstay  their  visas  and  may  find  it  convenient  to  lose 
the  passport  so  that  they  may  apply  for  an  exit  visa  with  fresh 
passport." 

All  lost  or  stolen  passport  cases  are  forwarded  to  the  Legal  Division 
of  the  Passport  Office  for  screening. 


10 

In  the  month  of  August  1972,  more  than  85  screening  investigations 
were  initiated  by  the  Passport  Office  in  other  drug-related  cases  in 
the  Far  East,  East  Asia,  and  Latin  America.  Thus  far,  in  Septem- 
ber 1972,  more  than  50  such  screening  operations  have  been  initiated. 
Mr.  Sourwine.  Why  the  great  demand  for  U.S.  passports  by  drug 
traffickers  ? 

Miss  Knight.  The  answer  is  that  the  U.S.  passport  is  considered  the 
most  acceptable  document  of  identification  available. 

An  American  citizen  can  have  any  kind  of  a  foreign  name ;  he  can  be 
any  color  and  have  any  known  accent  without  arousing  suspicion. 
Oiir  citizenship  is  a  conglomerate  of  race,  color,  accent  and  appear- 
ance. Professional  drug  traffickers  and  other  criminals  seek  cover  with 
the  best  identification  available  and  with  the  least  chance  of  an  official 
challenge.  Manv  of  them  find  it  advantageous  to  have  more  than  one 
passport  in  fictitious  identities  because  their  true  names  already  are 
known  by  authorities. 

Another  reason  for  falsely  reporting  a  passport  as  lost  is  to  obtain 
a  "clean  passport,"  one  which  does  not  reflect  entry  or  departure 
dates.  Too  much  traveling  arouses  suspicion  and  with  a  clean  passport, 
one  can  more  easily  pass  as  a  tourist.  We  have  been  told  this  is  also 
a  help  to  those  who  wish  to  avoid  certain  income  taxes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Miss  Knight,  while  you  are  on  the  subject  of  clean 
passports,  are  you  familiar  with  the  practice  which  the  committee  is 
advised  is  common  in  some  of  the  Iron  Curtain  countries  of  inserting 
in  a  passport  a  clean  page,  or  a  clean  fold,  and  putting  visas  on  that 
piece  of  paper  which  can  subsequently  be  removed  from  the  passport, 
thus  leaving  the  passport  itself,  in  effect,  clean  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes ;  we  are  quite  aware  of  this. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Is  there  any  way  to  stop  this  ? 

Miss  Knight.  No;  because  this  is  a  practice  of  another  countrv. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  But,  it  frustrates,  does  it  not,  one  of  the  purposes 
of  the  passport,  which  is  to  create  a  travel  record  of  the  citizen  who 
uses  it  ? 

Miss  Knight.  It  certainly  does  frustrate  that. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Has  there  been  any  effort  to  reach  that  matter  by 
treaty?  Has  it  been  discussed  with  any  foreign  nation  to  your 
knowledge? 

Miss  Knight.  Not  that  I  know  of.  That  would,  of  course,  be  a  matter 
of  rather  high  policv  negotiation. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Other  nations,  while  like  us,  do  not  do  this,  would 
have  as  much  objection  to  it,  find  as  much  trouble  with  it  as  we  do, 
I  would  think. 

Miss  Knight.  Yes ;  I  think  they  do. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  But  as  far  as  you  know,  there  has  never  been  any 
effort  to  settle  this  matter  bv  international  agreement  or  treaty? 

Miss  Knight.  No  ;  not  that  I  know  of,  sir. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Has  your  office  made  any  recommendations  along 
that  line? 

Miss  Knight.  Not  along  that  line ;  no  sir. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  would  have  been  sticking  your  neck  out  to  do  it, 
would  vou  not? 

Miss  Knight.  I  am  afraid  so. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  All  right,  I  am  sorry  about  that  interruption.  Go 
ahead. 


11 

Miss  Knight.  The  stamping  of  entry  and  departure  dates  in  a  pass- 
port is  of  inestimable  help  in  tracking  down  the  travel  route  of  crimi- 
nals when  and  if  the  involved  passport  is  ever  retrieved. 

Attempts  to  obtain  U.S.  passports  through  the  use  of  fraudulent 
documents,  either  bought  or  stolen,  are  most  prevalent  in  three  geo- 
graphic areas.  As  far  as  we  know,  these  are  not  connected  with  the 
international  drug  traffic. 

(1)  These  frauds  are  occurring  in  our  consular  posts  in  Mexico. 
They  involve  persons  of  Mexican  origin  who  claim  birth  in  the  United 
States  or  claim  U.S.  citizenship  by  birth  in  Mexico  of  a  parent  born  in 
the  United  States.  This  problem  has  been  with  us  for  years  and  we 
have  instituted  special  procedures  to  handle  these  cases.  The  applicants 
use  American  birth  certificates  which  they  have  purchased  from  other 
individuals,  or,  in  some  cases,  they  use  delayed  birth  certificates  which 
are  fraudulently  obtained. 

Most  of  these  frauds  are  detected  at  the  application  stage  before 
the  passport  is  issued.  We  have  found  no  connection  between  Mexican 
fraud  and  the  international  drug  traffic. 

(2)  Frauds  have  occurred  in  our  consular  posts  in  the  Dominican 
Republic.  These  concern  persons  who  either  fraudulently  claim  birth 
in  Puerto  Rico  or  who  are  using  bona  fide  Puerto  Rican  birth  certifi- 
cates belonging  to  other  persons.  These  might  be  borrowed,  stolen,  or 
bought.  There  are  some  applicants  who  were  born  in  the  Dominican 
Republic  who  claim  American  citizenship  through  the  alleged  Puerto 
Rican  birth  of  a  parent. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Miss  Knight,  you  say  frauds  have  occurred  in  our 
consular  posts.  I  take  it  you  do  not  mean  that  any  U.S.  consular  per- 
sonnel have  been  party  to  frauds? 

Miss  Knight.  Oh,  no,  sir. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  mean  they  have  been  imposed  upon  fraudulently 
in  the  way  you  have  described  ? 

Miss  Knight.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  All  right.  Go  ahead. 

Miss  Knight.  Thank  you. 

Here  again,  we  have  instituted  special  procedures  specifically  geared 
to  the  problem  involved.  Almost  all  of  these  frauds  are  detected  at 
the  application  stage.  We  do  not  find  any  of  these  cases  tied  into  the 
drug  traffic. 

(3)  Frauds  have  occurred  at  our  consular  posts  in  the  Philippines. 
These  consist  of  persons  who  are  using  bona  fide  Hawaiian  birth 
certificates  issued  to  other  individuals.  We  have  also  had  a  number 
of  cases  in  which  American  men,  who  marry  Philippine  women,  falsely 
claim  paternity  of  the  children  of  an  alien  female.  Insofar  as  the 
Philippine  frauds  are  concerned,  we  believe  every  case  was  uncovered 
before  the  passport  was  issued.  Again,  we  have  found  no  connection 
with  international  drug  traffic. 

With  reference  to  the  domestic  varietv  of  passport  frauds,  the  in- 
crease in  fraudulent  applications  from  174  in  fiscal  vear  1970  to  288 
in  fiscal  year  1972  caused  the  Passport  Office  to  look  into  the  identifica- 
tion of  the  kinds  of  fraud  involved  :  the  modus  operandi,  the  category 
or  types  of  persons  perpetrating  the  frauds,  and  all  of  the  pertinent 
circumstances  which  would  assist  us  in  combating  this  rise  in  domestic 
frauds  which  was  becoming;  unmanageable.  A  study  by  the  Legal 
Division  of  the  Passport  Office  disclosed  that  the  basic  problem  was 
one  of  impersonation  fraud.  Let  me  explain — 


12 

(1)  Impersonation  cases.  These  involve  persons  who  secure  birth 
evidence  and  the  identity  of  other  individuals  and  then  obtain  iden- 
tification evidence  associating  them  with  the  birth  evidence.  With  this 
evidence,  all  properly  documented,  they  then  apply  for  and  obtain 
U.S.  passports. 

(2)  Fraudulent  document  cases.  This  category  involves  persons  who 
obtain  counterfeit  or  altered  birth  documents,  counterfeit  drivers 
licenses,  and  obtain  passports  in  the  false  nonexistent  identities.  This 
situation  is  encouraged  by  ads  which  appear  in  the  news  media  pur- 
porting to  provide  almost  any  type  of  documentation  that  can  be 
imagined,  identity  documents,  drivers  licenses,  etc. 

Some  persons  have  been  known  to  obtain  more  than  one  passport 
using  one  or  both  of  the  above  methods.  In  virtually  every  case,  these 
persons  claim  birth  in  the  United  States. 

Since  a  person  must  establish  his  claim  to  American  citizenship  as 
well  as  his  identity,  you  may  ask  what  evidence  of  American  citizen- 
ship was  submitted  in  these  fraudulent  cases.  Almost  without  excep- 
tion, the  American  citizenship  was  based  on  birth  in  the  United  States. 
How  do  these  applicants  get  these  birth  certificates  which  refer  to 
other  individuals  ?  They  obtain  these  birth  certificates  simply  by  writ- 
ing to  a  registrar  of  vital  statistics,  sending  the  requisite  fee,  and  mak- 
ing a  request  for  the  document.  Where  do  they  get  the  information 
regarding  the  person  whose  birth  certificate  they  are  going  to  use  ?  I 
refer  you  to  pages  355,  356,  and  357  of  the  book  entitled  "Witness" 
written  by  WMttaker  Chambers,  as  well  as  to  pages  184  to  189  of  the 
book  entitled  "The  Deception"  by  Hede  Massing.  Both  these  individ- 
uals are  well  known  to  this  committee  as  members  of  Communist 
underground  activities  in  the  United  States. 

The  procedure  spelled  out  in  these  volumes  was  used  by  Francis 
Timothy  Leary  to  flee  from  the  United  States  as  well  as  by  Konald 
Kaufman. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Miss  Knight,  right  there,  I  take  it  you  do  not  mean 
to  say  that  Leary  or  Kaufman  got  their  information  or  their  inspira- 
tion from  the  volumes  you  refer  to,  but  merely  to  say  that  the  method 
they  chose  to  use  already  had  been  described  in  the  volumes  you 
referred  to? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes,  indeed.  It  is  not  a  new  method  and  I  doubt  very 
much  that  either  of  these  two  men  read  the  books. 

Mr.  Sottrwine.  Now,  I  am  familiar  with  the  name  of  Francis 
Timothy  Leary,  but  I  am  not  sure  about  Ronald  Kaufman.  Who  is 
Ronald  Kaufman  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Mr.  Kaufman  is  the  gentleman  who  planted  the  bombs 
in  a  number  of  banks  in  the  LTnited  States  last  year.  Since  it  is  known 
that  both  of  these  persons  were  connected  with  so-called  militant  or- 
ganizations, we  can  assume  that  this  method  of  obtaining  birth  cer- 
tificates is  well  known  to  these  organizations. 

The  situation  with  regard  to  fraudulent  birth  documents  and  identi- 
fication is  further  complicated  by  information  received  and  published 
in  the  New  York  Times,  in  an  article  dated  December  19,  1971,  which 
reports  that  organized  crime  members  are  selling  a  variety  of  forged 
documents.  Listed  in  the  inventory  of  the  forged  documents  with  the 
current  asking  price  are  :  New  York  drivers  licenses  at  $20 ;  Army  dis- 
charge cards  at  $50 ;  New  York  registrations  at  $40 ;  and  social  security 
cards  at  $15. 


13 

Mr.  Sotjrwine.  Miss  Knight,  did  you  mean  to  offer  this  article  for 
our  record? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes,  sir.  It  is  available. 

Mr.  Sotjrwine.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  it  be  received  and  entered  in 
the  record  at  this  point  ? 

The  Chairman.  It  may. 

(The  article  referred  to  follows :) 

[From  The  New  York  Times,  Sunday,  December  19,  1971] 

Organized  Crime  Selling  Official  (Forged)  Papers 

(By  Nicholas  Gage) 

Organized  crime  members  are  going  into  the  business  of  selling  a  vast  variety 
of  official  identification  documents,  according  to  law  enforcement  officials. 

The  documents  include  birth  certificates,  driver's  licenses,  car  registrations, 
high  school  diplomas,  armed  forces  discharges,  Social  Security  cards  and  even 
passports. 

Some  of  these  documents  are  counterfeit,  but  most  are  the  real  thing  stolen 
from  government  offices  or  printing  houses,  according  to  Edward  J.  McLaughlin, 
chief  counsel  of  the  State  Joint  Legislative  Committee  on  Crime. 

Mr.  McLaughlin,  whose  committee  is  looking  into  the  racket,  said  the  docu- 
ments were  put  to  a  number  of  practical  uses. 

Con  men  use  identification  cards  to  cash  bad  checks  and  commit  other  frauds. 
Car-theft  rings  use  driver's  licenses  and  car  registrations  to  dispose  of  stolen 
cars  easily  and  quickly. 

'But  the  largest  market  for  some  of  these  documents  are  individuals  with  no 
criminal  connections.  Many  driver's  licenses,  for  example,  are  bought  by  non- 
English-speaking  persons  who  are  not  able  to  pass  the  written  parts  of  license 
examinations. 

Individuals  who  never  finished  high  school  or  college  buy  blank  diplomas  and 
degrees  and  have  their  names  filled  in  so  that  they  can  try  for  better  jobs. 

Traditionally  the  market  in  such  documents  was  served  by  independents  who 
had  no  links  to  organized  crime  except  that  its  members  were  sometimes  their 
customers. 

But  Mr.  McLaughlin  said  that  organized-crime  figures — encouraged  by  the 
growing  demand  for  documents — were  going  into  the  racket  themselves. 

With  their  well-developed  contacts,  the  gangsters  are  able  to  obtain  certain 
kinds  of  identification  instruments,  such  as  police  badges,  that  were  often  beyond 
the  reach  of  the  independents. 

The  gangsters  concentrate  primarily  in  the  wholesale  end  of  the  racket.  They 
arrange  to  buy  blocks  of  documents  from  inside  contacts  and  then  sell  them  to 
retailers. 

The  retailers  sell  them  to  individual  customers  at  a  large  markup. 

An  underworld  informant  who  recently  inquired  about  purchasing  blocks  of 
four  typical  documents  was  quoted  the  following  wholesale  prices : 

New  York  driver's  license $20 

Army  discharge  card 50 

New  York  registration 40 

Social  Security  card 15 

The  retailers  of  the  documents  provide  full  assistance  in  filling  them  out  so 
that  their  fraudulent  character  is  not  detected. 

For  example,  names  and  serial  numbers  for  New  York  driver's  licenses  are 
typed  in,  using  an  IBM  1428  OCR  typewriter  ball,  the  same  one  used  in  complet- 
ing authorized  licenses. 

The  ball  fits  all  standard  IBM  Selectric  typewriters  and  can  be  purchased 
openly  for  $18. 

'Some  services  by  the  document  sellers  cost  extra.  A  driver's  license  stamped 
with  a  red  number  1  on  the  upper  left  side  costs  $20  more  than  a  standard  one. 

The  red  stamp  allows  its  bearer  to  drive  tractor  trucks.  Such  licenses  are 
bought  by  truck  drivers  who  have  not  qualified  for  tractors  but  want  the  work, 
and  by  truck  hijackers  who  carry  them  in  case  they  are  stopped  on  the  road. 

Miss  Knight.  It  was  also  noted  that  retailers  of  the  documents  pro- 
vide full  assistance  in  fillino;  them  out  so  that  their  fraudulent  char- 


14 

acter  is  not  detected.  For  example,  names  and  serial  numbers  for  New 
York  drivers'  licenses  are  typed  in,  using  an  IBM  1428,  OCR  type- 
writer ball,  the  same  one  used  in  completing  authorized  licenses. 

Mr.  Sottrwine.  Miss  Knight,  is  that  particular  type  font,  that  is  the 
type  font  carried  by  the  typewriter  ball  you  referred  to  as  number 
1428,  a  font  which  duplicates  the  shape  of  numerals  as  printed  by  a 
computer  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Exactly. 

The  ball  fits  all  standard  IBM  Selectric  typewriters  and  can  be 
purchased  for  $18. 

Prior  to  this  public  disclosure,  counterfeit  drivers'  licenses  were 
fairly  easy  to  detect  since  they  were  normally  typed  on  a  regular  type- 
writer rather  than  the  type  font  used  in  computerized  operations. 

There  is  no  doubt  about  it :  The  counterfeiting  of  documents  is  a  big 
and  lucrative  business. 

Passport  fraud  as  it  pertains  to  narcotics  is  only  one  phase  of  a  se- 
rious problem  which  we,  in  the  Passport  Office,  have  struggled  with  for 
years  and  called  to  the  attention  of  anyone  who  would  listen.  Frankly, 
I  am  very  discouraged  about  the  whole  situation  and  I  don't  believe 
that  a  piece-meal  approach  to  the  problem  will  be  successful.  One  hole 
in  the  dike  may  be  plugged  up,  but  two  others  will  develop. 

The  recorded  history  of  passport  fraud,  though  sketchy,  goes  back 
at  least  to  the  early  1920's  and  indicates  that  the  types  of  frauds  were 
basically  the  same  then  as  now,  namely,  impersonation,  fraudulent 
evidence,  altered  passports.  In  addition  during  the  1920's  and  1930's, 
we  encountered  activity  in  counterfeit  passports.  The  fact  that  the 
fraud  patterns  remain  the  same  is  not  surprising  because  the  primary 
purpose  of  the  passport  is  to  establish  the  identity  and  the  nationality 
of  the  bearer.  Hence,  the  types  of  frauds  flow  from  the  nature  of  the 
document. 

In  the  1930's,  we  had  extensive  frauds  perpetrated  by  covert  agents 
of  the  international  Communist  movement.  This  specific  activity  was 
the  subject  of  a  staff  study  dated  July  11,  1958,  entitled  "Communist 
Passport  Frauds."  This  was  prepared  for  the  Subcommittee  to  In- 
vestigate the  Administration  of  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other 
Internal  Security  Laws  of  the  United  States,  85th  Congress,  Second 
Session.  In  reviewing  the  history  of  passport  frauds,  I  note  that 
narcotic  traffickers  were  involved  in  obtaining  passports  by  fraud  in 
the  1930's.  Over  the  years  it  has  been  established  beyond  any  doubt 
that  narcotics  traffickers  and  other  individuals  engaged  in  illegal 
activities  obtain  passports  in  false  identities  to  facilitate  what  is 
known  as  the  "appearance  and  disappearance"  act.  For  example,  a 
person  known  to  the  narcotics  authorities  or  the  police  authorities  as 
John  Smith  obtains  through  his  criminal  contacts  fraudulent  docu- 
ments identifying  him  as  James  Jones.  He  then,  in  effect,  "disappears" 
as  John  Smith.  A  new  person,  James  Jones,  then  is  created.  When 
the  activities  of  James  Jones  become  known  to  enforcement  authori- 
ties, he  may  repeat  the  process  and  assume  another  identity.  Ergo : 
John  Smith  and  James  Jones  disappear  and  a  new  identity  appeals 
on  the  scene.  This  rationale  or  technique  is  used  not  only  by  drug 
traffickers  but  by  other  criminals  engaged  in  a  variety  of  illegal 
domestic  or  international  activities.  In  the  late  1940's  and  1950's,  the 
Passport  Office  concentrated  on  the  very  complicated  problem  of 
Chinese  frauds.  It  took  several  years  to  get  the  situation  under  con- 
trol because  it  had  been  simmering;  on  a  back  burner  for  over  a  decade. 


15 

As  a  result  of  new  techniques  in  investigations  and  interrogations 

initiated  by  the  Passport  Office  and  coordinated  with  the  Immigration 
and  Naturalization  Service,  this  extensive  fraudulent  citizenship 
problem  existing  for  over  a  period  of  50  years  was  brought  under 
control. 

I  don't  underestimate  the  fantastic  cost  and  human  suffering  result- 
ing from  worldwide  drug  traffic.  But  this  should  have  been  evident 
to  any  but  the  ridiculously  naive  back  in  the  fifties  and  sixties.  Whether 
the  lack  of  action  results  from  indifference  or  stupidity— the  end 
results  are  the  same. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Miss  Knight,  do  you  feel  the  Passport  Office  has 
done  all  it  can  do  to  combat  passport  fraud  and  protect  the  security 
of  the  U.S.  passport  ? 

Miss  Knight.  We  have  done  all  we  can  do  under  our  present  orga- 
nization and  circumstances.  I  think  much  more  can  be  done. 

But,  the  Passport  Office  has  been  ringing  the  alarm  on  passport  and 
identification  frauds  for  43  years.  The  lack  of  decisive  action  and  ef- 
fective control  by  the  upper  echelons  of  Government  who  have  received 
these  warnings  over  the  years  is  a  sad  commentary  on  high  level  offi- 
cial responsibility  and  concern  for  our  national  well-being. 

I  am  angry  about  this  situation  because  the  record  of  the  Passport 
Office  is  clear  as  crystal. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Now,  tell  us.  Miss  Knight,  just  what  has  the  Pass- 
port Office  done?  Give  us  some  examples  of  the  action  taken  by  your 
organization. 

Miss  Knight.  Well,  beginning  August  1, 1929,  the  Passport  Division 
(as  it  was  then  called)  started  to  maintain  a  statistical  record  on 
passport  frauds  and  suspicious  cases.  The  Passport  Office  has  never 
been  permitted  to  hire  investigators.  Fraud  research,  reports  and 
limited  actions  were,  then  as  now,  carried  on  by  a  small  legal  unit. 
Reports  and  summaries  were  forwarded,  then  as  now,  through  chan- 
nels to  whoever  at  that  precise  moment  had  an  alleged  interest  in 
fraud  activities. 

On  January  10,  1937,  the  Passport  Office  prepared  a  comprehensive 
report,  on  passport  frauds  and  the  contents  are  as  appropriate  to  the 
situation  today  as  thev  were  then. 

Records  comniled  by  Mr.  William  Duggan,  Chief  of  the  Passport 
Office  Legal  Division,  indicate  that  passport  fraud  was  a  subject 
discussed  at  every  House  Appropriations  Subcommittee  hearing  from 
1930  through  1955  with  the  exception  of  1952  and  1954.  I  became 
Director  of  the  Passport  Office  on  May  1,  1955,  and  I  was  appalled 
at  the  lack  of  staff,  lack  of  space,  lack  of  equipment,  and  the  general 
sweat  shop  conditions  which  existed  in  the  office.  My  predecessor  ad- 
vised me  orally  and  subsequently  by  letter  that  she  had  never  been 
accorded  adequate  support  by  her  superiors  in  the  Department  of 
State  and  that  she  had  never  received  the  full  appropriation  voted 
to  the  Passport  Office  by  the  Appropriations  Committees.  This  fact 
was  made  known  to  the  proper  officials  and  for  a  few  years  thereafter, 
the  Passport  Office  was  permitted  to  expand  and  concentrate  on  its 
statutory  responsibilities. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  say  thereafter.  You  mean  after  what  date  ? 

Miss  Knight.  After  January  1,  1956,  when  we  moved  and  acquired 
more  space,  a  better  filing  situation,  additional  personnel. 

83-694  O— -72 3 


16 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Well,  now,  you  said  the  Passport  Office  for  a  few 
years  after  that  date  was  permitted  to  expand  and  to  concentrate  on 
its  statutory  responsibilities.  It  is  now  17  years  after  that  date.  Assum- 
ing a  few  years  might  mean  as  many  as  3  or  4,  do  you  mean  that  for 
13  or  14  years  the  Passport  Office  has  not  been  permitted  to  expand 
as  necessary-,  and  has  not  been  permitted  to  concentrate  on  its  statutory 
responsibilities? 

Miss  Knight.  I  think  the  situation  has  changed  somewhat  in  the  in- 
tervening years.  There  is  more  emphasis  on  fraud  today.  There  is  more 
emphasis  on  public  service.  There  is  a 

Mr.  Sourwine.  More  emphasis  than  there  was  when,  last  year,  or 
10  vears  ago,  or  17  years  ago  ? 

Miss  Knight.  No,  I  would  say  prior  to  1955. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  All  right.  Gro  ahead. 

Miss  Knight.  And  these  new  emphases  require  reorganization  and 
expansion  of  our  services,  and  certainly  a  decentralization  of  our 
operation. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  All  right.  You  were  giving  us  specific  examples, 
or  telling  us  of  what  the  Passport  Office  had  done,  and  I  interrupted 
you.  Go  ahead. 

Miss  Knight.  Yes,  sir. 

In  a  reorganization  of  the  office  in  March  1956,  we  established  a 
fraud  unit  in  our  Legal  Division  under  the  title  of  Enforcement 
Branch.  We  also  established  an  in-house  quality  review  of  passport 
applications.  Since  then,  the  Legal  Division  has  given  special  em- 
phasis to  searching  for  and  documenting  suspected  passport  fraud 
cases. 

On  June  25,  1969,  I  forwarded  to  Mr.  Elliot  L.  Eichardson,  then 
Under  Secretary  of  State,  a  memorandum  with  attachments  on  pass- 
port frauds,  including  a  detailed  report  which  had  been  prepared  by 
Mr.  William  Duggan,  Chief  of  the  Passport  Legal  Division,  on  Feb- 
ruary 28,  1958,  and  handed  to  Mr.  Loy  Henderson,  then  Under  Secre- 
tary of  State,  who  in  turn  referred  it  to  the  Security  Office.  I  never 
heard  anything  further  as  to  the  fate  of  these  reports. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Miss  Knight,  do  you  have  a  copy  of  the  report  re- 
ferred to,  forwarded  to  Mr.  Richardson  in  June  of  1969  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes,  I  do. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Can  you  let  the  committee  have  that  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes,  I  will  be  glad  to. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  this  go  in  the  record  at  this 
point  ? 

The  Chairman.  It  may  go  in  the  record. 

(The  document  referred  to  follows :) 

June  25,  196!). 
Memorandum 

To :  U— Mr.  Elliot  L.  Richardson. 
From  :  PPT — Frances  G.  Knight. 
Subject :  Passport  Fraud  Problems  and  Statistics. 

I  refer  to  our  exchange  of  memoranda  regarding  the  necessity  of  having 
responsible  individuals  appointed  to  take  passport  applications.  In  this  corre- 
spondence I  stressed  the  need  to  protect  the  integrity  of  the  United  States  pass- 
port as  well  as  the  need  to  maintain  security  in  our  procedures.  You  have  asked 
for  information  and  statistics  regarding  passport  frauds. 

I  am  attaching  a  table  showing  the  number  of  passport  frauds  processed  for 
the  years  1967  and  1968  and  for  the  first  five  months  of  1969  (Tab  A).  This 


17 

table  also  includes  the  figures  on  the  number  of  criminal  prosecutions  for  viola- 
tion of  passport  statutes  which  have  been  submitted  during  this  period.  In  addi- 
tion, the  table  shows  the  nationality  of  the  person  perpetrating  the  fraud. 
However,  statistics  in  fraud  cases  arc.  in  and  of  themselves,  insufficient  to 
portray  the  need  for  strict  control  over  passport  application  procedures. 

At  present  our  greatest  problem  concerns  identity  frauds  involving  persons 
of  Mexican  origin  who  desire  to  obtain  United  States  passports  either  to  enter 
the  United  States  or  to  remain  in  the  United  States.  We  are  also  experiencing 
a  number  of  cases  involving  citizens  of  the  Dominican  Republic  who  are  using 
Puerto  Rican  birth  evidence  to  obtain  passport  documentation.  A  third  category 
involves  United  States  citizens  who  because  of  police  problems  are  attempting 
to  hide  their  true  identity  and  leave  the  United  States  or  otherwise  engage  in 
unlawful  activities.  Chinese  fraud  cases  also  are  numerous  and  generally  in- 
volve passport  applications  executed  a  number  of  years  ago  and  which  are  now 
uncovered  and  handled  through  the  so-called  "confession"  program.  This  pro- 
gram has  proved  very  successful  in  keeping  the  Chinese  problem  under  control 
for  the  first  time  in  50  years.  The  Chinese  fraud  problem  is  unique  and  is 
described  in  detail  by  the  District  Court  for  the  District  of  California  in  the  case 
of  Ly  Shew  v.  Achcson,  110  F.  Supp.  50  (1953). 

I  am  attaching  a  historical  background  of  passport  frauds  which  was  compiled 
in  1958  and  which  has  been  edited  and  enlarged  for  clarity  (Tab  B).  It  is  clear 
from  this  study  that  the  obtention  of  the  United  States  passport  for  use  as  an 
effective  cover  is  considered  of  prime  importance  by  foreign  intelligence  agents. 
This  aspect  of  passport  frauds  has  been  considered  at  length  by  various  con- 
gressional committees.  A  congressional  report  entitled  "Communist  Passport 
Frauds,"  prepared  for  the  Senate  Subcommittee  to  Investigate  the  Administration 
of  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  other  Internal  Security  Laws  of  the  Committee 
on  the  Judiciary  of  the  85th  Congress,  gives  a  detailed  account  of  this  aspect  of 
fraudulent  activities.  As  stated  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  Browder  v.  U.S.,  312 
U.S.  335  (1941),  the  purpose  of  the  penal  provisions  of  the  passport  laws  is  for, 
"the  protection  of  the  integrity  of  the  United  States  passport." 

Since  1958  we  have  seen  a  continuation  of  the  fraudulent  obtention  and  use  of 
United  States  passports  by  the  Soviet  intelligence  apparatus  in  the  notorious 
Abel  case.  In  1962  an  American  citizen  obtained  18  American  passports  and  de- 
livered them  to  Soviet  agents  in  East  Germany.  The  citizen  was  sentenced  to  two 
years  imprisonment  in  1965.  In  1960  the  Czechoslovakian  intelligence  apparatus 
attempted  to  obtain  United  States  passports  for  two  agents  to  enter  the  United 
States.  It  is  apparent  that  there  is  a  continuing  effort  and  ever  present  danger 
from  unfriendly  security  services  to  obtain  authentic  documentary  cover  for 
agents  both  in  the  United  States  and  abroad. 

In  1968,  on  another  facet  of  fraud,  investigations  disclosed  that  one  Jose 
Aguiar,  a  citizen  of  Argentina  who  owned  and  operated  a  Spanish  bookkeeping 
service  at  Modesto,  California,  was  involved  in  assisting  Mexican  nationals  to 
obtain  United  States  passports  by  the  use  of  fraudulent  evidence.  The  investiga- 
tion disclosed  25  fraudulent  cases.  Mr.  Aguiar  was  indicted  in  the  United  States 
District  Court  in  Sacramento,  California  on  December  4,  1968  and,  after  pleading 
guilty,  was  sentenced  to  five  years  in  prison  on  February  12,  1969  and  fined 
$2000. 

The  difficulty  which  the  Canadian  Government  has  had  with  passport  security 
problems  in  vividly  set  forth  in  the  attached  news  item  "Canadian  Passport :  No 
Spy  Lacks  One."  (Tab  C)  The  Canadian  Government  has  previously  experienced 
problems  in  this  area  as  evidenced  by  the  famous  Gouzenko  papers.  It  will  be  re- 
called that  in  the  latter  situation  the  Soviet  Government  was  able  to  compromise 
one  of  the  Canadian  passport  employees.  Needless  to  say,  the  Canadian  Govern- 
ment has  taken  extensive  steps  to  tighten  their  passport  application  procedures. 
Any  proposal  which  might  dilute  our  control  over  persons  who  accept  passport 
applications  would  in  all  probability  result  in  a  similar  problem  for  this 
Government. 

I  must  state  as  firmly  as  I  can  that  I  am  against  any  dilution  of  the  security 
or  integrity  of  the  passport  issuing  process  from  the  application  stage  through 
the  issue  stage  and  control  thereafter.  We  cannot  as  a  responsible  agency,  afford 
to  ignore  the  security  dangers  that  have  been  evidenced  in  the  passport  field  over 
the  years.  The  damage  that  can  be  done  to  this  country  by  one  espionage  agent, 
who  fraudulently  obtains  and  uses  a  United  States  passport  is  potentially  too 
great  to  risk  the  use  of  a  haphazard  method  of  selecting  the  persons  who  will 
accept  passport  applications. 


18 

The  illegal  purposes  for  which  a  United  States  passport  can  be  used  generate 
pressures  on  the  entire  structure  of  the  passport  issuing  process  and  especially 
at  the  application  stage.  The  application  stage  is  crucial  because  it  is  at  this 
point  that  the  identity  of  the  applicant  is  determined  and  is  the  point  of  physical 
contact  with  the  applicant.  The  Reubens-Robinson  case  cited  in  tab  B  as  well 
as  the  Philadelphia  fraud  cases,  graphically  illustrate  the  nature  of  the  pres- 
sures which  even  overcame  the  scruples  of  Federal  and  local  officials. 

The  hidden,  insidious  nature  of  passport  frauds  is,  in  fact,  such  that  Congress 
enacted  special  legislation  extending  the  normal  three-vear  statute  of  limita- 
tions to  10  years  (18  USC  3291). 

As  the  attachments  illustrate  passport  frauds  range  from  the  intelligence- 
espionage  type  to  bad  check  operations  and  from  baby  adoption  rackets  to 
illegal  entry  into  the  United  States  by  aliens  otherwise  ineligible  to  immigrate. 
Even  the  illegal  importation  of  automobiles  into  foreign  countries  for  huge 
profits  has  been  behind  certain  frauds  uncovered. 

To  sum  up,  the  history  of  passport  frauds  shows  that  our  present  method  of 
taking  passport  applications  evolved  to  protect  the  Government  against  fraud. 
I  strongly  recommend  that  whatever  steps  we  take  to  alleviate  the  pressure 
created  by  the  unwillingness  of  the  Federal  Court  clerks  to  take  passport  appli- 
cations, do  not  dilute  or  weaken  the  controls  and  safeguards  which  the  record 
shows  are  necessary  to  protect  the  security  and  integrity  of  the  United  States 
passport. 

Attachments : 
as  stated. 
6/25 

(TAB  A) 
PASSPORT  FRAUDS  FOR  YEARS  1967,  1968,  1969  (JANUARY  TO  MAY) 


1967 


1968      1969  (5  mos.) 


1.  Fraud  cases  processed: 

A.  Fraud  cases— General... _ 

B.  Fraud  cases— Chinese 

Total  fraud  cases  processed... 

2.  Fraud  cases  processed:  General— 

A.  Number  of  domestic  frauds 

B.  Number  of  foreign  frauds 

Total  number  of  general  frauds 


60 
88 

141 
387 

148 

528 

11 

49 

18 
123 

60 


141 


130 
115 


245 


130 


3.  Frauds  by  Nationalities: 


1967 


Country 


Imposter 


Citizenship/ 
Identity  fraud 


Brazil 

Canada 

Cuba 

Dominican  Republic. 

England 

Germany 

Italy _ 

Japan 

Jordan 

Kinewa... 

Korea 

Liberia 

Mexico 

Morocco 

Philippines 

Puerto  Rico.. 

United  States 

Unknown 


19 

1968 

Citizenship/ 

Country                                                                                                                       Imposter  Identity  fraud 

Africa 

Australia - 1 

Bahamas - - 2 

Costa  Rica___ - - - 1 

Cuba 1 

Czechoslova  kia - 2 

Dominican  Republic - 2 

England 1  2 

France.. -- 1 

Germany..  _ . 1  1 

Greece. 1 

Haiti - 1 

Holland... .-- - - 1 

Italy - — 1 

Jamaica - - 

Korea 1  18 

Lithuania 1 

Mexico 16  29 

Nigeria. _ -... - 1 

Philippines _ 2  21 

Portugal ---  J 

Puerto  Rico 1 

Romania... ---  J 

Spain -  J 

United  States 7  4 

Unknown.. -  — 2  4 

1969  (5  MONTHS) 

Citizenship/ 

Country                                                                                                                 Imposter  identity  fraud 

Africa.. _ 1 

Canada - 2 

Costa  Rica 1 

Denmark --- - 

Dominican  Republic. 1  6 

England 1  --- 

Finland 1 

Germany 2 

Hungary.. 1 

Jamaica. __ 1  - - 

Japan 2 

Korea --  H 

Liberia -  1  

Mexico -                 24  37 

Philippines. -- -                  2  18 

Poland... 1 

Portugal. ---  J 

Thailand - - 1 

United  States 6  8 

West  Indies... 1 - 


1967  1968      1969  (5  mos.) 


4.  Fraud  cases  processed— Chinese: 

A.  Number  of  Chinese  domestic  frauds 

B.  Number  of  Chinese  foreign  frauds 

Total  Chinese  frauds 

C.  Types  of  evidence  submitted  in  Chinese  fraud  cases: 


(1)  AA  certificates  of  citizenship 

(2)  Certificates  of  identity 

(1)  Certificates  of  naturalization 

(4)  Prior  passports 

(5)  Birth  certificates _ 

(6)  Court  adjudications 

(7)  Commissioner's  discharges 

(8)  Other  evidence 12  84 


71 

355 

73 

17 

31 

40 

88 

386 

113 

1967 

1968 

1969 

16 

36 

21 

34 

72 

43 

4 

17 

3 

14 

23 

1 

1 

1  

20 

COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  OF  CRIMINAL  PROSECUTIONS  FOR  YEARS  1967,  1968,  1969  (MAY) 


1967  1968  1969  (May) 


Number  of  cases  processed: 

A.  Cases  pending  as  of  beginning  of  year 

Cases  submitted  to  the  U.S.  Attorney  during  year. 

Total 

B.  Cases  disposed  of  during  year 


30 
11 

22 
21 

34 
25 

41 
19 

43 
9 

59 

12 

C.  Cases  pending  at  the  end  of  year 22  36  47 


(TAB   B) 

February  28,  1958. 
Passport  Frauds 

The  fraudulent  obteution  and  use  of  passports  is  not  a  new  thing.  There  is 
a  history  going  back  at  least  100  years.  The  main  reason  for  the  passage,  about 
a  century  ago,  of  the  law  stating  that  only  the  Secretary  of  State  could  issue 
passports  was  the  fraudulent  obteution  of  passports  issued  by  Governors  of 
States,  Mayors  of  cities  and  even  by  Notaries  Public.  However,  there  was  no 
specific  statute  making  it  a  criminal  offense  to  apply  for  or  use  a  fraudulent 
American  passport  until  World  War  I.  In  the  early  years  of  that  war,  German 
agents  were  detected  by  the  British  traveling  on  fraudulently  obtained  American 
passports.  This  led  President  Wilson,  in  1914,  to  issue  an  Executive  Order  taking 
the  acceptance  of  passport  applications  out  of  the  hands  of  notaries  public  and 
placing  it  exclusively  within  the  jurisdiction  of  Passport  Agents  and  Clerks 
of  Federal  courts  and  State  courts  authorized  to  naturalize  aliens.  After  we 
entered  the  war,  the  Espionage  Act  was  passed  and  Title  IX  of  that  Act  covered 
the  fraudulent  obtention  and  use,  the  counterfeiting  and  altering,  and  the  buying 
and  selling  of  passports.  Basically,  they  are  the  same  laws  as  are  now  contained 
in  sections  1541-1545,  Title  18  of  the  United  States  Code. 

1.  TYPES  OF  PASSPORT  FRAUDS 

There  are  three  main  types  of  passport  frauds  : 

A.  The  Counterfeiting  of  a  Passport  and  the  Use  Thereof 

There  were  at  least  three  different  editions  of  counterfeit  passports  printed 
and  used  during  the  period  between  World  War  I  and  World  War  II.  They  were 
imitations  of  the  red-covered  booklet  form  of  passport  used  during  that  period. 
In  each  edition,  the  entire  booklet  was  counterfeited,  including  the  cover,  the 
paper,  the  imitation  watermark,  the  overprint  and  the  printing.  Counterfeits  of 
the  State  Department's  seal  and  counterfeits  of  the  rubber  stamp  and  legend 
machine  which  are  placed  on  passports  were  used  in  preparing  the  passports 
for  the  use  of  individuals.  Counterfeit  naturalization  certificates  and  counterfeit 
birth  certificates  were  carried  as  collateral  documents  by  some  of  the  users. 

B.  Alteration  of  Genuine  Passports  and  Their  Use  by  Impostcrs 

This  is  a  form  of  fraud  which  was  quite  prevalent  during  the  thirties  and  is 
now  being  resumed.  In  such  case,  the  photograph  of  the  original  bearer  was  re- 
moved and  the  photograph  of  an  imposter  substituted  therefor.  In  some  cases, 
the  numbers  and  dates  of  the  passports  were  also  altered.  In  other  cases,  the 
descriptive  sheet  was  removed  and  a  counterfeited  sheet  substituted  therefor, 
which,  of  course,  set  forth  the  correct  description  of  the  imposter.  These  sub- 
stituted pages  were  usually  printed  on  blank  visa  pages  taken  from  other  pass- 
ports. Counterfeits  of  the  Department's  seal,  legend  machine,  and  rubber  stamp 
were  also  used  in  the  preparation  of  the  altered  passport.  The  bearers  of  the 
altered  passports  often  carried,  as  supplementary  documents,  bona  fide  or  counter- 
feit birth  or  naturalization  certificates  in  the  name  set  forth  in  the  passport.  The 
chief  users  of  altered  passports  were  the  Italians  of  the  immigrant  type  who 
were  unable  to  obtain  proper  visas.  Other  users  were  Greeks  of  the  same  type. 
In  addition,  altered  passports  were  used  on  at  least  several  occasions  by  Soviet 
espionage  agents.  The  seal  used  on  the  passports  of  espionage  agents  was  much 
better  than  the  seals  used  by  the  Italians  and  Greeks. 


21 

C.  Passports  Obtained  Upon  the  Basis  of  Fraudulent  Applications 

This  is  the  most  usual  type  of  passport  fraud  and  it  has  been  perpetrated  both 
in  the  United  States  and  abroad.  In  most  of  the  eases,  the  applicant  files  his 
application  in  the  usual  way  and  submits  his  own  photograph.  However,  he 
makes  the  application  in  a  name  other  than  his  own  and  submits,  as  evidence  of 
his  citizenship,  either  a  fictitious  affidavit  of  birth  or  the  birth  certificate,  the 
baptismal  certificate,  or  the  naturalization  certificate  of  another  person.  When 
successful,  he  obtains  a  passport  bearing  his  own  photograph  and  description, 
but  in  a  name  other  than  his  own.  When  the  applicant  is  in  this  country,  this  is 
the  easiest  type  of  fraud  to  perpetrate  and  the  most  difficult  to  detect.  Abroad, 
the  applications  are  made  before  a  consular  officer  who  often  does  not  have 
sufficient  means  of  determining  the  identity  of  an  applicant.  Frauds  of  this  type 
have  been  perpetrated  in  the  United  States  by  criminals,  fugitives  from  justice, 
narcotic  traffickers,  aliens  in  the  United  States  illegally,  espionage  agents,  Com- 
munist agitators,  etc.  Abroad,  they  have  been  perpetrated  and  attempted  chiefly 
by  aliens  who  desire  to  come  to  the  United  States  to  live,  but  who  could  not 
obtain  immigration  visas. 

D.  Other  Types  of  Passport  Frauds 

In  addition,  there  have  been  several  other  types  of  violations  of  the  passport 
and  related  laws.  There  have  been  cases  of  collusion  in  which  clerks  of  courts 
falsely  certified  that  an  applicant  and/or  his  witness  appeared  before  them 
and  executed  the  applications.  Examples  of  this  are  the  Rubens-Robinson  case,  in 
which  passports  were  obtained  for  Soviet  espionage  agents,  and  the  Philadelphia 
Chinese  cases,  in  which  the  applicants  and  their  identifying  witnesses  often  did 
not  appear.  There  have  been  many  cases  in  which  applicants  gave  false  informa- 
tion concerning  their  destination  and  the  purpose  of  their  proposed  travel.  There 
were  many  cases  of  this  nature  during  the  Civil  War  in  Spain  and  a  considerable 
number,  both  before  and  after  World  War  II,  of  persons  who  concealed  the  fact 
that  they  intended  to  go  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

See  Sections  3  and  4  (infra)  for  a  description  of  the  prosecutions  of  these 
various  types  of  fraud  cases. 

2.    CRIMINAL    LAWS 

There  are  a  considerable  number  of  laws  which  are  relevant  to  the  prosecu- 
tion of  persons  who  engage  in  fraudulent  passport  activities.  Most  of  them  are 
now  contained  in  Title  18  of  the  United  States  Code. 

A.  Venue 

Inasmuch  as  violations  of  the  passport  laws  may  occur  anywhere  in  the  world 
or  may  be  commenced  in  one  judicial  district  and  completed  in  another.  The 
third  paragraph  of  Section  2,  Article  III  of  the  Constitution  and  Sections  3237 
and  3238  of  Title  18,  USC,  are  pertinent  in  establishing  venue. 

B.  Passport 

The  sections  of  law  which  specifically  refer  to  passports  are  now  contained 
in  Sections  1541  to  1545  of  Title  18,  USC.  They  are  basically  the  same  as  Title 
IX  of  the  Espionage  Act  of  1917.  They  were,  until  a  few  years  ago,  Sections 
220-224  of  Title  22  of  the  United  States  Code. 

C.  Limitations 

Until  June  30,  1951,  the  usual  statute  of  limitations  (Sections  3282  and  3290. 
Title  18,  USC)  applied  to  prosecutions  for  violating  the  passport  laws  and  re- 
quired that  action  be  taken  within  three  years  after  the  commission  of  a  crime. 
On  June  30,  1941,  Section  3291  became  effective.  This  permits  prosecution  within 
ten  years.  The  regular  statute  of  limitations  has  since  been  amended  to  permit 
prosecution  for  violations  of  other  Federal  statutes  within  five  years. 

D.  Conspiracy 

This  section  (371)  has  been  used  in  more  passport  prosecutions  than  any 
others  excepting  Sections  1542-1544.  The  ten-year  statute  of  limitations  also 
applies  to  indictments  for  conspiring  to  violate  the  passport  sections. 

E.  Travel  Control 

The  travel  control  law  (8  USC  1185)  is  effective  only  in  time  of  war  or  during 
a  period  of  national  emergency  and  the  criminal  statutes  have  been  rarely  invoked. 


22 

F.  Internal  Security  Act 

Although  the  Internal  Security  Act  was  passed  in  1950,  the  passport  portion 
is  not  yet  effective  as  no  organization  has  registered  or  been  finally  ordered  to 
be  registered  under  the  act.  Judging  by  the  progress  in  the  courts  of  the  pro- 
ceeding to  order  the  Communist  Party  to  register,  it  will  be  several  more  years 
before  we  need  be  concerned  about  our  part  of  the  law. 

G.  Miscellaneous  Criminal  Provisions 

There  are  various  other  sections  of  law  which  have  been  used  in  the  past  or 
which  may  be  used  in  the  future  in  connection  with  violations  of  the  passport 
laws.  Some  examples  are  set  forth  in  the  portion  of  this  paper  relating  to 
indictments. 

:;.  COURT  DECISIONS 

Several  persons  who  have  been  convicted  of  violating  the  passport  laws  have 
appealed  their  cases  to  the  circuit  courts  of  appeals  and  to  the  Supreme  Court. 
Certain  of  these  cases  are  legal  precedents  concerning  not  only  the  meaning  of 
the  penal  sections  of  the  passport  laws,  but  also  interpretations  of  rules  of  evi- 
dence and  Federal  judicial  procedures. 

A.  Earl  Broirdcr  Case 

Earl  Browder  was  the  General  Secretary  of  the  Communist  Party,  USA.  He 
had  fraudulently  obtained  and  used  several  passports  in  different  names  and 
thereafter  applied  for  and  used  a  passport  in  his  own  name  upon  an  application 
in  which  he  falsely  stated  that  he  had  never  had  a  passport  previously.  This 
passport,  he  used  for  two  trips  abroad.  By  the  time  the  frauds  were  discovered 
and  the  necessary  evidence  was  assembled,  the  then  existing  statute  of  limita- 
tions (three  years)  prevented  Browder's  indictment  not  only  for  making  the 
passport  applications  in  other  names  and  using  the  passports,  but  also  for  making 
false  statements  in  the  application  in  his  own  name.  However,  certain  uses  of 
the  passport  had  occurred  during  the  preceding  three  years  and  two  indictments 
were  returned  against  Browder  for  using  a  passport  issued  upon  the  basis  of  an 
application  in  which  he  made  false  statements ;  one  for  using  the  passport  upon 
arrival  at  the  Port  of  New  York,  by  presenting  the  passport  to  our  immigration 
officers  and  the  other  for  various  uses  of  the  passport  in  foreign  countries.  From 
the  evidentiary  standpoint,  the  government  decided  that  it  would  be  preferable 
to  try  Browder  on  the  charges  of  using  the  passport  at  the  Port  of  New  York. 

Early  in  1940,  Browder  was  tried  and  convicted.  He  made  no  defense  or 
denial  of  the  facts.  However,  his  attorneys  contended  : 

1.  That  the  use  of  the  passport  was  not  "willful"  within  the  meaning  of  the 
statute,  since  the  use  was  for  a  proper  purpose ; 

2.  That  since  an  American  citizen  did  not  then  have  to  present  a  passport 
to  be  admitted  to  the  United  States,  there  was  no  violation  since  the  statute 
impliedly  referred  to  a  required  use  of  a  passport ;  and 

3.  That  since  American  passports  are  intended  for  use  in  foreign  countries, 
the  presentation  of  a  passport  to  an  American  official  in  the  United  States  was 
not  a  use  of  a -passport  as  contemplated  by  Congress. 

Browder  appealed  his  conviction  to  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  which 
upheld  the  lower  court.  Later,  Browder  appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  which  ruled  against  all  of  his  contentions.  This  is  the  most 
important  precedent  case  on  the  interpretation  of  what  is  now  Section  1542  of 
Title  18  of  the  United  States  Code. 

B.  Welwel  Warszower  Case 

Welwel  Warszower,  an  alien,  was  Financial  Secretary  of  the  Communist 
Party,  USA.  He  applied  for,  obtained,  and  used  a  passport  in  the  name  of 
Robert  William  Wiener  upon  an  application  in  which  he  falsely  stated  that  he 
was  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  that  his  name  was  Robert  William  Wiener, 
that  he  was  born  at  Atlantic  City,  New  Jersey,  and  that  he  had  not  resided  out- 
side the  United  States.  Since  the  statute  of  limitations  prevented  Warszower's 
indictment  for  making  false  statements  in  the  passport  application,  he,  like 
Browder,  was  indicted  for  using  the  passport  upon  his  arrival  at  the  port  of 
New  York.  Warszower  was  tried  and  convicted  shortly  after  Browder  and  their 
appeals  to  the  Court  of  Api>eals  and  to  the  Supreme  Court  were  argued  at  the 
same  time.  At  the  trial  in  New  York,  the  government  submitted  evidence  that 
many  years  before,  Warszower  had  been  admitted  to  the  United  States  as  an 
alien,  that,  when  he  registered  for  Selective  Service  in  1917,  be  stated  that  he 


23 

was  an  alien  born  in  Russia,  and  that  later  he  applied  for  and  obtained  a  re- 
entry permit  as  an  alien.  Warszower  offered  no  evidence  in  rebuttal  at  the  trial. 
His  lawyers,  besides  making  the  same  arguments  as  in  the  Browder  ease,  main- 
tained that  the  government  had  not  established  a  prima  facie  case  as  all  of 
the  evidence  submitted  was  based  on  admissions  made  by  Warszower  and  that, 
as  in  the  case  of  confessions,  a  person  could  not  be  convicted  without  corro- 
borating evidence.  The  courts  overruled  the  defense  contention  and  the  Supreme 
Court  in  this  case,  for  the  first  time,  clearly  distinguished  between  admissions 
against  interest  made  before  the  commission  of  a  crime,  and  admissions  in  the 
nature  of  confessions  made  after  the  crime  had  been  committed.  This  is  a  most 
important  decision  upon  the  subject  of  the  sufficiency  of  evidence  not  only  in 
passport  cases,  but  in  all  criminal  prosecutions. 

C.  William  D.  Frad  Case 

Frad  was  a  professional  steamship  gambler  who  was  indicted  in  the  United 
States  District  Court  at  Brooklyn,  New  York  for  various  offenses,  including  the 
fraudulent  obtention  of  a  passport  in  the  name  of  Fred  W.  Gorham.  He  pleaded 
guilty  to  all  of  the  charges  and  there  was  then  no  question  of  law  raised.  How- 
ever, in  addition  to  a  two-year  imprisonment  sentence  on  one  indictment,  he  was 
given  suspended  sentences  on  others  and  placed  on  probation  at  the  end  of  the 
two  years  in  prison.  The  sentences  were  imposed  by  a  Federal  judge  from  Brook- 
lyn who  was  temporarily  detailed  to  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the 
Southern  District  of  New  York.  The  case  later  went  to  the  Supreme  Court  on  the 
question  as  to  what  judge  had  authority  to  determine  whether  the  probation 
should  be  terminated  and  in  a  broader  sense  what  judge  has  a  right  to  modify  a 
sentence  which  has  been  imposed.  It  is  a  precedent  case  on  the  subject,  but  is  not 
important  from  our  standpoint. 

D.  Renault  Duncan  Case 

Renault  Duncan  or  Duncan  Renaldo  was  an  alien  born  in  Rumania  who  had 
entered  tbe  United  States  illegally.  He  became  a  movie  actor  and  was  employed 
as  the  star  of  the  movie  "Trader  Horn",  which  was  filmed  in  Africa.  To  make 
the  trip,  Duncan  made  a  fraudulent  application  for  an  American  passport,  claim- 
ing birth  in  Camden,  New  Jersey.  After  his  return  to  the  United  States,  the  fraud 
was  discovered  and  he  was  indicted  on  three  counts,  (1)  making  false  statements 
in  a  passport  application,  (2)  falsely  claiming  to  be  an  American  citizen,  and  (3) 
perjury.  He  was  convicted  and  appealed  his  case.  His  conviction  was  upheld  on 
the  first  and  third  counts  by  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  and  was  reversed  on 
the  second.  Duncan  appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court,  which  refused  to  review  the 
case.  This  is  an  important  case  on  questions  of  sufficiency  of  evidence  and  use  of 
foreign  documents  in  evidence.  The  ruling  that  admissions  against  interest  by  a 
defendant  are  not  sufficient  to  justify  a  conviction  was  later  modified  and  per- 
haps entirely  reversed  by  the  Supreme  Court  ruling  in  the  ease  of  Welwel 
Warszower. 
B.  Rubens-Robinson  Case 

This  case  involved  the  fraudulent  obtention  of  a  large  number  of  United  States 
passports  for  use  by  Soviet  espionage  agents.  The  indictment  returned  by  a 
Federal  grand  jury  in  the  southern  district  of  New  York  charged  a  conspiracy 
by  a  number  of  individuals  to  violate  various  statutes  relating  to  the  issuance 
and  use  of  United  States  passports.  It  also  charged  a  single  conspiracy  to  un- 
lawfully obtain,  use,  and  alter  passports.  Only  three  of  the  conspirators  could  be 
apprehended  and,  upon  trial,  these  were  convicted  and  sentenced  to  two  years' 
imprisonment.  At  trial,  the  government  proved  that  the  conspirators  obtained 
and  used  for  passport  application  purposes  the  birth  certificates  of  deceased 
persons;  obtained  by  purchase  or  otherwise  the  naturalization  certificates  of 
individuals  never  intending  to  apply  for  passports ;  obtained  court  orders  chang- 
ing the  names  of  sundry  persons  for  fraudulent  passport  persons ;  obtained  com- 
mercial documents  to  facilitate  the  use  of  fraudulently  obtained  passports  under 
aliases  ;  forged  the  signatures  of  others  on  passport  applications,  both  as  identify- 
ing witnesses  and  as  applicants ;  obtained  the  signature  and  seal  of  the  county 
clerk  of  New  York  County  on  passport  applications  without  ever  appearing 
personally  before  him  by  means  of  "political  favors" ;  forwarded  such  fraudu- 
lent applications  to  the  Department  of  State  which  issued  United  States  passports 
without  knowledge  of  the  fraudulent  evidentiary  basis  of  the  applications ;  and 
used  or  caused  to  be  used  the  passports  received  from  the  Department  of  State 
for  travel  abroad. 


24 

C.  Philadelphia  Chinese  Cases 

The  indictments  in  this  ease  cover  violations  of  a  number  of  sections  of  law 
not  ordinarily  used  in  passport  cases.  They,  also  cover  the  usual  charges  of  con- 
spiracy and  violation  of  Section  220  of  Title  22,  USC  (now  Section  1542,  Title  18) 

(a)  There  were  two  conspiracy  indictments  relating  to  two  separate 
conspiracies. 

(b)  The  indictment  against  Howard  Long,  former  United  States  Commis- 
sioner contains  four  counts  (5-8)  alleging  violations  of  Title  22  USC,  220  (now 
18  USC  1542).  The  first  to  fourth  counts  charge  Long  with  making  false  evidence 
of  citizenship  in  violation  of  8  USC  746(a)  (9)  (12)  (now  18  USC  1015).  The 
ninth  to  fourteenth  counts  charge  forging  or  counterfeiting  a  public  record  in 
violation  of  18  USC  72  (now  18  USC  494). 

(c)  The  indictment  against  Norman  J.  Griffin,  United  States  Commissioner, 
contains  five  counts  (1-5)  charging  violations  of  22  USC  220  (now  18  USC  1542), 
nine  counts  (6-14),  charging  violations  of  22  USC  746(a)  (12)  (now  18  USC 
1015)  ten  counts  (15-24),  charging  the  fraudulent  use  of  the  seal  of  his  office  in 
violation  of  18  USC  130  (now  18  USC  1017),  four  counts  (25-29),  charging  him 
with  falsely  certifying  that  persons  made  oath  before  him  in  violation  of  18  USC 
75  (now  18  USC  1016)  and  five  counts  (30-34),  charging  that  he  received  bribes 
in  violation  of  18  USC  207  (now  18  USC  202). 

(d)  The  indictment  against  Robert  T.  Press,  Deputy  Clerk  of  the  United 
States  District  Court  contains  six  counts  (1-6)  charging  that  he  fraudulently 
affixed  the  seal  of  the  court  to  false  documents  in  violation  of  18  USC  130  (now 
18  USC  1017),  three  counts  (7-9)  charging  that  he  received  bribes  in  violation 
of  18  USC  207  (now  18  USC  202),  and  six  counts  (10-15)  charging  him  with 
counterfeiting  public  records  in  violation  of  18  USC  72  (now  18  USC  494). 

(e)  The  indictment  against  Warren  J.  Belcher,  the  Deputy  Clerk  of  the 
United  States  District  Court  who  took  passport  applications,  contains  seven 
counts  (1-7)  charging  him  with  falsely  certifying  that  certain  alleged  appli- 
cants or  their  witnesses  appeared  before  him  and  swore  to  the  applications,  in 
violation  of  18  USC  75  (now  18  USC  1016),  six  counts  (8-13)  charging  him  with 
accepting  bribes  in  violation  of  18  USC  207  (now  18  USC  202),  five  counts 
(14-18)  for  creating  false  citizenship  evidence  in  violation  of  8  USC  746(a) 
(9)  (12)  (now  18  USC  1015),  and  six  counts  (19-24)  charging  him  with  the 
fraudulent  use  of  the  seal  of  the  Court  in  violation  of  18  USC  130  (now  18 
USC  1017). 

(f)  The  indictment  against  John  Lee,  one  of  the  Chinese  traffickers,  contains 
five  counts  (1-5)  charging  him  with  aiding  and  abetting  Belcher  in  the  unlaw- 
ful preparation  of  false  affidavits  in  violation  of  8  USC  746  (now  18  USC  1015), 
seven  counts  (6-12)  charging  him  with  aiding  and  abetting  Belcher  in  making 
false  acknowledgments  in  violation  of  18  USC  75  (now  18  USC  1016),  twelve 
counts  (13-24)  charging  him  with  giving  bribes  to  a  Federal  official  in  violation 
of  18  USC  91  (now  18  USC  201)  and  four  counts  (25-28)  charging  him  with 
aiding  and  abetting  Griffin  in  making  false  acknowledgments  in  violation  of 
18  USC  75  (now  18  USC  1016) . 

D.  Moran  Motors,  Inc. 

In  this  case,  officers  of  the  Moran  Motors,  Inc.  and  other  persons  allegedly 
obtained  a  large  number  of  passports  for  use  in  illegally  taking  automobiles 
and  other  merchandise  to  Brazil  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  that  -country.  It 
includes  a  conspiracy  count  (18  USC  371)  and  eleven  counts  charging  the 
unlawful  use  of  passports  of  others  (18  USC  1544). 

E.  Manuel  D.  Gomes 

This  man  fraudulently  obtained  a  no-fee  passport  and  received  return  trans- 
portation to  Japan  upon  the  basis  of  forged  army  orders  which  purported  to 
certify  that  he  was  traveling  to  Japan  under  official  leave  orders.  It  will  be 
noted  that  the  indictment  is  for  violation  of  18  USC  1001. 

F.  Wilier  Chapman  Baker 

Wilber  Chapman  Baker  was  a  fugitive  from  justice  who  applied  for  and 
obtained  a  passport  in  the  name  of  his  brother  using  the  latter's  birth  certificate. 
The  indictment  is  for  violation  of  18  USC  1542. 

G.  Sing  Kec 

Sing  Kee  was  a  trafficker  in  documents  for  persons  of  the  Chinese  race.  The 
indictment  includes  a  conspiracy  count  (18  USC  371)  and  four  counts  charging 


25 

him  with  making  false  statements  in  applications  for  passports  in  violation  of 
18  USC  1542.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  indictment  also  refers  to  18  USC 
3238  with  which  relates  to  venue. 

5.    COMMUNIST   PASSPORT    FRAUDS 

During  the  period  between  World  War  I  and  World  War  II  American  pass- 
ports were  fraudulently  obtained  and  used  by  American  Communist  leaders, 
agents  of  the  Comintern  and  agents  of  the  Soviet  Military  Intelligence  Service. 
During  the  thirties  a  number  of  such  persons  were  apprehended  and  brought 
to  trial ;  these  included  : 

A.  Pat  Devine 

Pat  Devine,  a  British  Communist  illegally  in  the  United  States,  who  fraudu- 
lently obtained  a  passport  in  his  own  name.  He  was  sentenced  in  May  1931  to 
serve  one  year  and  one  day  in  a  Federal  Penitentiary  for  violating  Section 
220  of  Title  22  USC  (now  18  USC  1542). 

B.  Albert  Feierabend 

An  important  agent  of  the  Soviet  Military  Intelligence  Service  whose  real 
name  was  Albert  Feierabend,  applied  for  passports  under  various  names.  He 
was  apprehended  when  returning  to  the  United  States,  at  which  time  he  was 
carrying  a  large  amount  of  American  currency.  He  was  fined  $1000  in  the 
United  States  District  Court  at  Boston  on  April  24,  1933  and  was  placed  on 
probation  for  a  period  of  two  years.  He  was  subsequently  indicted  in  New  York 
for  other  violations  of  the  passport  laws,  was  released  on  a  small  bond  pending 
trial  and  disappeared.  During  World  War  II  he  operated  as  a  Soviet  agent  in 
China,  using  a  Latvian  passport.  Our  latest  report  indicated  that  he  had  fallen 
into  disfavor  with  the  Soviets  and  that  he  was  confined  in  a  work  camp  in 
Siberia. 

C.  Charles  Krumbein 

Charles  Krumbein,  who  was  later  prominent  in  the  Communist  Party  in  the 
United  States,  obtained  and  used  passports  in  two  different  names.  He  was 
sentenced  to  serve  18  months  in  a  Federal  Penitentiary  in  February  1935. 

D.  Harry  Kweit 

Harry  Kweit  was  an  important  Communist  worker  among  the  seamen  and 
among  our  military  personnel.  He  obtained  and  used  a  passport  in  another 
name  which  he  used  for  travel  in  the  Far  East.  He  applied  for  another  passport 
in  a  different  name  as  a  preliminary  to  going  out  on  another  assignment  and  was 
apprehended  when  he  called  at  the  Passport  Agency  in  New  York  to  pick  up 
the  passport.  In  April  1936  he  was  sentenced  to  serve  one  year  and  one  day  in 
a  Federal  Penitentiary. 

E.  Dr.  William  Gregory  Burtan 

Dr.  William  Gregory  Burtan  obtained  fraudulently,  an  American  passport 
in  1932  in  the  name  Karl  Kuhn.  This  Department  cooperated  with  the  Secret 
Service  in  the  investigation.  Since  Burtan  was  also  involved  in  the  distribution 
of  counterfeit  American  currency  which  had  allegedly  been  manufactured  for 
the  Soviet  Military  Intelligence  Service,  Burtan  was  brought  to  trial  on  the 
counterfeiting  charge,  but  the  Judge  also  took  into  consideration  the  passport 
violations  in  imposing  sentence.  Burtan  was  sentenced  to  fifteen  years  in  prison. 

F.  Rubens-Robinson 

In  connection  with  the  so-called  Rubens-Robinson  fraud  case,  Edward  Blatt, 
an  attorney,  Aaron  Sharfin,  an  employee  of  the  Egyptian  Consulate  General  in 
New  York  and  Ossip  Barber,  a  photographer,  were  each  sentenced  in  May  of 
1939  to  serve  two  years  in  a  Federal  Penitentiary. 

G.  1939-1940  Grand  Jury  Investigation 

After  the  conclusion  of  the  trial  of  the  Rubens-Robinson  case  the  Passport 
Division  assembled  a  large  mass  of  evidence  regarding  violations  of  the  pass- 
port laws  by  Communist  leaders  and  Soviet  agents  and  prepared  a  chart  and 
memoranda  with  a  view  of  proving  that  all  of  such  frauds  were  a  part  of  a 
general  conspiracy  controlled  by  the  Communist  Party  leadership  in  the  United 
States.  The  close  connection  between  Browder  and  the  other  leaders  of  the 
Communist  Party,  USA  on  one  hand  and  the  Soviet  espionage  service  on  the 


26 

other  is  clearly  illustrated  in  the  case  of  Richard  Johnson.  At  that  time  il 
was  believed  that  the  World  Tourist,  Inc.,  a  travel  agency  in  New  York  City, 
was  involved  in  a  number  of  frauds.  In  September  1939  the  United  States  Dis- 
trict Attorney  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York  turned  over  one  of  the 
Grand  Juries  for  the  exclusive  use  of  the  investigation.  The  records  of  the  World 
Tourist,  Inc.  were  subpoenaed  and  they  contained  much  evidence  of  value. 
Identified  in  the  records  were  the  accounts  of  the  Communist  Party  which  were 
under  code  names.  We  found  what  transportation  abroad  had  been  charged  to 
the  Communist  Party  accounts  and  we  obtained  the  appropriate  passport  appli- 
cations from  Washington  and  identified  a  number  of  fraudulent  applications 
which  we  had  not  previously  known  about.  The  records  of  the  Communist  Party 
regarding  travel  were  also  subpoenaed,  but  officers  of  the  Party  claimed  that 
all  Party  records  had  been  destroyed  except  two  financial  statements.  The  old 
three-year  Statute  of  Limitations  prevented  the  return  of  a  general  conspiracy 
indictment,  but  the  Grand  Jury  returned  specific  indictments  for  violating  the 
passport  laws  against  a  number  of  the  leading  Communists  including: 

a.  Earl  Browder,  the  head  of  the  Party. 

b.  Welwel  Warazower,  Financial  Secretary  of  the  Party. 

c.  Isaac  Litvakoff,  a  Communist  Party  functionary,  who  was  sentenced 
in  March  1940  to  serve  15  months  in  a  Federal  Penitentiary. 

d.  Nicholas  Dozenberg,  an  agent  of  the  Soviet  Military  Intelligence  Service 
who  was  sentenced  in  March  1940  to  serve  one  year  and  one  day  in  a  Federal 
Penitentiary. 

e.  Harry  Gannes,  the  Foreign  Editor  of  the  Daily  Worker,  who  died 
before  he  could  be  brought  to  trial. 

f.  Joseph  Sultan,  editor  of  the  Morning  Freiheit,  who  was  never  appre- 
hended and  who  has  since  died. 

g.  Schacne  Epstein,  who  was  then  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  who  has  since 
died  and ; 

h.  Isidore  Jack  Miller  who  was  sentenced  to  serve  one  year  and  one  day 
in  prison. 
In  connection  with  the  same  investigation,  a  fraudulent  passport  application  in 
the  name  Samuel  Liptzen  was  uncovered  on  the  Communist  Party  account.  The 
passport  application  was  found  to  be  in  the  handwriting  of  one  Leon  Josephson, 
a  prominent  American  communist  who  had  served  as  a  Soviet  agent  abroad.  The 
Statute  of  Limitations  prevented  any  indictment  for  the  passport  violations. 
Later  it  was  learned  that  the  applicant  was  Gerhard  Eisler,  a  former  member  of 
a  German  Reichstag  who  had  served  for  a  number  of  years  as  the  Comintern 
representative  in  the  United  States,  and  who  was  later  a  high  official  in  the 
Communist  government  of  East  Germany.  Subsequent  to  the  use  of  the  passport, 
Eisler  had  made  an  application  as  an  alien  in  his  own  name  for  a  permit  to 
depart  from  the  United  States.  In  the  application  Eisler  stated  that  he  had 
resided  in  the  United  States  continuously  for  a  period  of  time  which  included 
the  periods  which  he  had  spent  abroad  using  the  Liptzen  passport.  He  also  stated 
in  the  application  that  he  had  never  been  known  by  any  other  name.  Because 
of  these  false  statements  he  was  indicted  and  convicted  in  this  city  for  violating 
Section  1001  of  Title  18  of  the  United  States  Code.  Leon  Josephson  was  called 
before  a  Congressional  Committee  to  testify  regarding  his  knowledge  of  Eisler 
and  the  passport  applications.  He  refused  to  answer  questions  and  was  convicted 
on  a  contempt  charge. 

In  connection  with  the  same  investigation,  information  was  turned  over  to 
the  FBI  and  to  the  Department  of  Justice  concerning  the  violation  by  the  World 
Tourist,  Inc.  of  the  law  regarding  registration  as  agents  of  foreign  principals. 
The  company  was  indicted  and  fined. 

E.  Summary 

The  number  of  successful  prosecutions  is  small  compared  with  the  number  of 
violations  by  Communist  leaders  and  Soviet  agents.  However,  this  was  due  to  the 
following  factors : 

a.  The  Statute  of  Limitations,  with  respect  to  violations  of  the  passport 
laws,  was  then  3  years  and  we  frequently  did  not  discover  the  fraudulent 
nature  of  an  application  until  after  the  expiration  of  this  period. 

b.  There  was  and  still  is  no  treaty  with  any  foreign  government  under 
which  we  can  extradite  to  this  country  for  prosecution,  persons  found  abroad 
in  i>ossession  of  fraudulent  passports. 


27 

c.  Frequently  the  impostors  had  no  ties  in  the  United  States  and  the 
usual  method  of  locating  a  person  through  his  relatives  and  friends  was  not 
practicable. 

d.  The  impostors  could  and  frequently  did  take  refuge  in  the  Soviet 
Union  and  at  least  some  of  them  were  afterwards  provided  with  fraudulent 
passports  of  other  governments  for  use  in  further  travel. 

The  1939-1940  prosecutions  apparently  threw  a  scare  into  the  Communist  Party 
leadership  and  the  subsequent  violations  of  passport  laws  by  Communists  have, 
as  far  as  we  know,  been  confined  to,  (1)  using  passports  in  violation  of  the 
restrictions  contained  therein;  (2)  making  false  statements  concerning  the  true 
purpose  of  their  contemplated  travel  and  the  countries  to  which  they  plan  to  go 
and  (3)  making  false  affidavits  that  they  were  not  and  had  never  been  members 
of  the  Communist  Party.  Each  of  these  will  be  discussed  under  separate  headings 
below. 

(i.   FALSE  STATEMENTS   CONCERNING  DESTINATION  AND  PURPOSE  OF  TRIP 

Both  before  and  after  Secretary  Acheson  imposed  a  ban  on  travel  to  Communist 
controlled  areas,  a  number  of  Communist  propaganda  groups  traveled  to  the 
Soviet  Union  using  passports  which  they  had  obtained  upon  the  basis  of  state- 
ments that  they  intended  to  travel  to  other  countries  for  other  purposes.  A  number 
of  the  persons  who  went  to  the  P.eiping  Peace  Conference  also  made  false  state- 
ments of  this  nature.  Prosecutions  for  violations  of  this  kind  are  almost  impos- 
sible, since  it  would  be  necessary  to  prove  by  actual  witnesses  in  an  open  court, 
that  at  the  time  the  person  made  his  application  he  did  not  intend  to  go  to  the 
countries  mentioned  in  his  application  or  for  the  purposes  stated  therein. 

7.    CHINESE   CASES 

Despite  the  large  number  of  persons  of  the  Chinese  race  who  have  been  ad- 
mitted to  the  United  States  as  American  citizens  during  the  past  70  years,  they 
were  not  a  problem  to  the  Passport  Division  until  after  World  War  II.  Except 
for  a  brief  period  during  World  War  I,  when  transportation  was  not  available, 
there  were  no  travel  laws  requiring  American  citizens  to  have  passports  to 
enter  or  depart  from  the  United  States.  During  that  time  persons  of  the  Chinese 
race  who  claimed  American  citizenship  applied  for  and  obtained  Immigation 
Form  430  from  the  Immigration  Service  which  served  as  a  travel  document. 

As  soon  after  the  end  of  World  War  II  as  transportation  facilities  became 
available,  a  large  number  of  Chinese  in  the  United  States  desired  to  visit  China 
and  a  larger  number  of  alleged  American  citizens  of  the  Chinese  race  in  China 
desired  to  come  to  this  country.  In  the  meantime,  the  Chinese  Exclusion  Act 
under  whose  provisions  the  Form  430  had  been  issued  had  been  repealed.  In 
addition,  our  travel  control  law  was  continued  in  effect.  These  two  factors 
dumped  without  warning  on  the  Passport  Office  the  problem  of  separating  a 
few  bona  fide  claims  to  American  citizenship  from  a  huge  mass  of  fraudulent 
ones.  At  first  we  followed  a  lenient  policy  and  all  at  once  we  found  ourselves 
in  the  midst  of  the  Philadelphia  Chinese  case.  We  then  started  in  China  and 
in  Hong  Kong  and  in  various  cities  in  the  United  States,  intensive  investiga- 
tions which  disclose  the  widespread  prevalence  of  fraud  and  the  brazen  activities 
of  traffickers  in  fradulent  documents.  Criminal  proceedings  were  instituted  in  a 
number  of  cases  aimed  principally  against  the  traffickers  in  documents.  While 
our  success  has  by  no  means  been  complete,  we  can  safely  say  that  the  Passport 
Office  and  SY  have  done  more  in  the  past  12  years  to  suspend,  if  not  break  up, 
a  long  established  fraud  pattern  than  all  of  the  other  agencies  combined  in  all 
of  the  years  since  the  passage  of  the  Chinese  Exclusion  Act  of  1882. 

8.    PROSECUTIONS    IN    FOREIGN    COUNTRIES 

As  has  been  previously  mentioned,  it  is  not  possible  to  extradite  from  a  foreign 
state  a  person  who  has  violated  our  passport  laws,  whether  the  violation  occurred 
in  the  United  States  or  abroad.  In  a  few  cases  foreign  governments  have  deported 
to  the  United  States  American  citizens  who  had  entered  their  countries  illegally 
using  passports  in  assumed  names.  In  most  cases,  nothing  can  be  done  under  our 
laws.  However,  it  often  occurs  that  there  has  been  a  violation  of  the  local  laws 
by  using  a  fraudulent  passport  or  by  obtaining  fraudulently  a  local  identification 
document  to  submit  to  an  American  Consul  in  support  of   a  passport  application. 


28 

Whenever  such  prosecutions  are  possible  our  Consuls  cooperate  with  the  appro- 
priate foreign  officials.  A  large  number  of  convictions  has  been  obtained  in  this 
manner,  but  the  sentences  are  usually  light. 


(TAB  G) 

[From  the  Sunday  Star,  Washington,  D.C.,  October  13,  1968] 

Canadian   Passport:   No  Spy  Lacks  One 

(By  Peter  Worthington,  Toronto  Telegram  News  Service) 

Ottawa — No  spy  worthy  of  the  name  would  be  without  one.  It  is  more  useful 
than  cloaks  and  daggers,  code  books  and  cyanide  guns.  It  is  an  all-purpose,  easily- 
obtained,  reasonably-respected  adjunct  to  espionage — the  Canadian  passport. 

Since  Earl  Ray,  the  accused  assassin  of  Dr.  Martin  Luther  King,  was  caught 
carrying  one,  Canada  has  received  a  spate  of  dubious  publicity  over  its  passport. 

But  there  is  more  to  our  passport  story  than  Earl  Ray's  involvement.  It's  a 
long  story  that  stretches  back  40  years  and  links  Canada  to  a  startling  number  of 
the  great  international  espionage  cases. 

Few  things  so  aptly  reflect  the  contradictions,  ironies  and  incongruities  of  our 
policies  as  the  passport. 

It  seems  a  national  quirk,  a  Canadian  idiosyncrasy,  that  ours  is  perhaps  the 
world's  most  difficult  country  to  enter  legally  as  an  immigrant — yet  one  of  the 
easiest  to  enter  illegally  as  a  spy.  We  are  reluctant  to  grant  citizenship  to  honest 
applicants — yet  make  it  ludicrously  easy  to  obtain  false  Canadian  citizenship. 

Broadly  speaking,  all  anyone  needs  to  pose  as  a  Canadian  citizen,  complete 
with  passport,  be  he  Russian,  Chinese  or  Albanian,  is  the  initiative  to  visit  a 
travel  agency ;  to  have  a  reasonable  cover  story ;  to  lie  under  oath ;  and  to  pay 
a  $5  fee. 

Canada  is  one  of  the  few  countries  that  issues  passports  by  mail  and  doesn't 
require  a  personal  appearance  before  an  official. 

Canada  has  never  caught  a  Soviet  intelligence  officer.  The  closest  we  came  was 
when  Igor  Gouzenko  "delivered"  to  the  RCMP  Sam  Carr  and  Fred  Rose — both 
of  them  were  long-time  espionage  officers  but  were  both  "legal"  Canadian  citizens, 
and  therefore  traitors. 

SOVIET   IMMUNITY 

Soviet  "illegals,"  judging  from  the  evidence,  have  immunity  in  Canada.  This 
is  the  de  facto  result  of  our  policy  on  espionage,  and  not  the  fault  of  the  RCMP 
which  probably  could  identify  a  number  of  Soviet  agents  if  the  Government 
wished,  and  would  prosecute. 

One  of  the  early  cases  of  the  Canadian  passport  being  used  by  Soviet  agents 
occurred  in  1931  when  the  British  arrested  Hilaire  Noulens  who  headed  the  old 
Comintern  espionage  service  in  Shanghai. 

His  capture  resulted  in  the  breaking  of  a  Soviet  Far  East  spy  ring.  As  well 
as  having  12  pseudonyms,  Noulens  used  a  Canadian  passport. 

Richard  Sorge  has  been  called  the  greatest  spy  of  World  War  II.  He  worked 
for  Soviet  intelligence  in  China  before  the  war,  and  in  Japan  during  it.  He  is 
now  an  official,  if  posthumous,  "Hero  of  the  Soviet  Union." 

He  is  remembered  popularly  today  as  the  spy  who  warned  Stalin  that  Hitler 
was  about  to  invade — information  that  Stalin  chose  to  ignore.  But  even  more 
important,  he  told  the  Soviets  that  Japan  had  no  intention  of  attacking  Russia 
from  the  east.  This  allowed  the  Red  Army  to  concentrate  all  its  forces  on  the 
western  front. 

Before  the  war  the  "Sorge  ring"  carried  Canadian  passports.  Max  Klausen, 
a  long-time  member  of  the  ring,  used  a  Canadian  passport  as  far  back  as  1935. 

According  to  Klausen,  one  Col.  Borovich,  who  was  Sorge's  superior,  headed 
a  spy  ring  in  Canada  before  being  transferred  to  China. 

The  Spanish  Civil  War  produced  a  bonanza  in  passports  for  Soviet  espionage. 
Members  of  the  International  Brigade  invariably  had  their  passports  confiscated 
"for  safekeeping"  when  they  arrived  in  Spain  and  usually  these  had  been  "lost" 
when  they  wanted  to  return  home. 

One  of  these  passports  was  used  by  Soviet  agent  Ramon  Mercader,  who  got 
the  passport  issued  to  Tony  Babich,  a  Canadian  of  Yugoslav  origin  who  had  been 
killed  in  the  Spanish  civil  war. 


29 

The  passport  was  "adjusted"  to  read  Fred  Jaeson  of  Montreal,  and  Mercader 
used  it  to  visit  Mexico  in  1940  and  sink  an  axe  into  the  skull  of  Stalin's  one-time 
rival  and  long-time  foe,  the  exiled  Leon  Trotsky. 

The  use  of  another  of  these  "International  Brigade"  passports  was  revealed 
in  1946  when  Sam  Carr,  former  national  organizer  of  the  Communist  Party  of 
Canada  and  the  "recruiter"  for  Soviet  military  intelligence,  tried  to  get  one 
resissued  in  the  name  of  Ignacy  Witczak. 

The  real  Witczak  lived  in  Leamington,  and  had  been  told  that  his  passport 
had  heen  "lost"  when  the  Spanish  civil  war  ended. 

Mikhail  Milstein,  deputy  director  of  the  GRU  (Military  Intelligence),  together 
with  the  deputy  head  of  the  NKVD,  toured  the  U.S.,  Canada  and  Mexico,  iwsing 
as  diplomatic  couriers  while  lining  up  espionage  activities. 

In  Canada  they  got  Sam  Carr  to  get  the  Witczak  passport  renewed  for  an  agent 
working  in  California.  Sam  Carr  paid  $3,000  to  an  official  in  the  Passport  Office — 
someone  who  has  never  been  openly  identified  and  who  presumably  is  still  "in 
place." 

GOUZENKO  'SANG' 

The  whole  thing  was  "blown"  when  Igor  Gouzenko,  a  military  intelligence 
officer  working  in  the  embassy  as  a  code  clerk,  asked  for  asylum  in  Canada  and 
told  everything.  The  phony  Witczak  had  disappeared  by  the  time  the  FBI  came 
to  check  up. 

In  recent  years  Canada's  links  with  great  espionage  cases  have  been  numerous. 
Col.  Rudolf  Abel,  the  most  successful  spyniaster  known  to  have  operated  in 
the  U.S.,  came  to  the  U.S.  through  Canada.  (How  many  Col.  Abels  are  still  in 
place  is  open  to  speculation.) 

When  Gordon  Lonsdale,  ostensibly  of  Cobalt,  Ont.,  was  arrested  in  1861  (sic), 
it  turned  out  that  he  wasn't  a  Canadian  after  all  but  really  Col.  Konon  Molody 
of  the  KGB. 

His  partners  in  esponage,  Peter  and  Helen  Kroger,  who  are  still  serving  time 
in  Britain,  carried  Canadian  passports  as  well  as  New  Zealand  ones. 

Hermine  Rabinovich  came  to  Montreal  and  became,  through  the  Soviet  em- 
bassy in  Ottawa,  a  channel  for  funds  that  kept  the  ring  in  business.  At  the  time 
Col.  Zabotin,  military  attache  at  the  embassy,  also  provided  passports  for  agents 
working  in  the  U.S. 

Even  the  notorious  atom  spies  Klaus  Fuchs,  Alan  Nunn  Man  and  Bruno 
Pontecorvo  worked  or  lived  in  Canada  before  being  identified  as  working  for 
the  Soviets. 

Nunn  Man  provided  the  Soviets  with  samples  of  U-235  and  U-225  when  he 
was  with  the  National  Research  Council :  Pontecorvo  was  on  a  scientific  mission 
to  Canada  (and  now  works  in  the  Soviet  "atom  city"  of  Dubna)  ;  Klaus  Fuchs 
was  sent  to  Canada  as  a  German  refugee  before  being  allowed  into  the  U.S. 

Victor  Spencer,  the  "sad  spy"  who  inadertently  sparked  the  present  Royal 
Commission  into  security  and  espionage,  was  involved  in  collecting  data  for 
passports. 

One  of  his  jobs  was  to  gather  information  from  tombstones  that  could  be 
used  in  establishing  "covers"  for  Soviet  agents,  and  one  of  his  assignments  was 
to  find  a  dead  "Japanese-Canadian"  that  the  Russians  could  use.  Spencer's 
death  in  1966  closed  a  sordid  chapter  in  petty  espionage. 

With  passports  and  visas,  the  punishment  seldom  fits  the  crime.  Despite  the 
rampant  misuse  of  passports,  only  half-hearted  efforts  have  been  made  to  tighten 
regulations  and  penalties. 

On  the  books  now  is  a  move  to  authorize  a  14-year  sentence  for  misuses  of 
passports. 

But  up  to  now  punishments  have  been  gentle  and  mild. 

Recently  the  government  has  begun  to  righten  its  visa  regulations,  too.  Now 
entrants  are  issued  a  non-immigrant  arrival-departure  card  in  triplicate :  One 
copy  is  put  on  file,  one  taken  when  the  holder  arrives  in  Canada,  and  one  taken 
when  the  person  departs.  At  least  the  government  now  knows  that  someone  of 
similar  name  has  left,  even  though  his  or  her  activities  inside  Canada  may 
be  a  mystery. 

But  the  issuance  of  passports  seems  the  biggest  flaw. 

In  the  U.S.  an  applicant  must  appear  before  an  authorized  government  of- 
ficial. A  voucher  may  also  be  required,  as  well  as  the  birth  certificate.  And 
sometimes  a  second  person  must  swear  that  the  applicant  is  genuine. 


30 

It  is  not  that  the  U.S.  has  more  safeguards — it  is  just  that  Canada  has  none. 

A  rule  requiring  that  a  person  apply  in  person  before  an  authorized  government 
agency  seems  only  logical  before  issuing  a  passport.  It  is  one  reason  why  there 
is  a  move  to  put  passports  under  the  control  of  the  Immigration  Department, 
which  has  more  facilities  and  bodies  than  External  Affairs. 

None  of  this  will  prevent  Canadian  passports  from  being  misused  in  the  future, 
but  it  will  make  it  more  difficult. 

Mr.  Sotjrwine.  You  say  you  never  heard  anything  further  after  you 
sent  that  memorandum.  Do  you  recall  whether  that  memorandum  was 
answered  ? 

Miss  Knight.  I  am  sorry,  sir,  I  do  not  remember  that.  I  do  not  think 
so.  My  files  certainly  do  not  indicate  that  it  was  ever  answered. 

Mr.  Sotjrwine.  All  right.  Go  ahead. 

Miss  Knight.  Thank  you. 

With  your  permission,  I  would  like  to  place  into  this  record  the 
overall  fraud  statistics  for  fiscal  years  1970,  1971,  and  1972,  which  are 
as  follows: 


Fiscal  year- 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Domestic 

174 

288 
316 

300 

Foreign 

_.                 327 

314 

Total 

501 

604 

614 

You  will  note  that  the  foreign  passport  fraud  number  is  stabilized 
to  an  average  figure  of  about  320  frauds  annually.  The  domestic 
frauds  show  an  increase  of  from  288  in  fiscal  year  1971  to  300  in  fiscal 
year  1972.  While  these  frauds  are  of  great  concern  to  the  Passport 
Office,  they  should  be  considered  in  terms  of  the  number  of  passport 
issuances.  In  fiscal  year  1970,  we  had  174  domestic  frauds  and  we 
issued  2,079,863  passports.  This  percent  amounts  to  .000084,  or,  in 
more  concrete  terms,  you  might  say  we  had  one  passport  fraud  for 
11,953  passports  issued.  Correspondingly,  in  fiscal  year  1971  we  had 
288  domestic  frauds  and  we  issued  2,311,789  passports.  This  percent 
amounts  to  .000124,  or  in  more  concrete  terms,  you  might  say  we  had 
one  passport  fraud  for  8,374  passports  issued.  In  fiscal  year  1972,  we 
had  300  domestic  frauds  and  we  issued  2,605,321  passports.  This  per- 
cent amounts  to  .000115,  or  one  passport  fraud  for  8,684  passports 
issued.  Tab  number  4. 

Mr.  Sotjrwine.  You  are  referring  apparently  to  a  tabulation  statis- 
tical in  form,  which  the  committee  does  not  have  in  its  records.  Can 
this  tabulation  be  supplied  to  us  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes ;  I  will  be  glad  to  supply  it. 

Mr.  Sotjrwine.  And  is  there  any  reason  we  cannot  have  the  copy 
you  are  using  when  you  are  through  using  it  today  ? 

Miss  Knight.  No;  it  is  an  original  copy,  but  I  will  be  glad  to  leave 
it  here. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  May  it  go  in  the  record  at  this  point,  Mr.  Chairman? 

The  Chairman.  It  may  go  in. 


31 


(The  tabulation  referred  to  follows:) 


(TAB  4) 
PASSPORT  OFFICE  STATISTICS-COLLECTIONS  AND  OPERATING  COSTS 


Fiscal  year 


Direct 

Domestic  operating 

fees  collected  costs 


Revenue  over 

direct 

operating 

costs 


1955                                                                           $3,569,613  $1,734,054 

1956""                                4,170,460  1,953,741 

1957"""                                                                                   _.  4,054,536  1,961,504 

1958"""                                   4,852,744  2,143,304 

1959""" 5,119,527  2,324,246 

I960"""                6,206,351  2,190,827 

1961""                           "           6,366,036  2,452,726 

1962"""                  "*" " 6,739,764  2,566,397 

1963""                                  "" ""            _. 7,510,869  3,057,918 

1964"                                                             " 8,172,540  3,480,849 

1965"""                                                             ' 9,558,075  3,843,400 

1966"""                              10,988,375  4,207,087 

1967"""                    """ 12,368,551  4,818,020 

1968"""             """" --  13,518,675  5,323,212 

1969"""                                        16,550,703  5,950,739 

1970""""                         """" 20,795,123  7,951,608 

1971"""                         22,721,706  9,578,520 

1972                                                                             25,955,783  11,382,548 


$1,835,559 
2,216,719 
2,093,032 
2,709,440 
2,795,281 
4,015,524 
3,913,310 
4,173,367 
4,452,951 
4,691,691 
5,714,675 
6,781,288 
7,550,531 
8,195,463 
10,  599, 964 
12,843,515 
13, 143, 186 
14,573,235 


Passport  Office  Issuances 
(Fiscal  years  1955-1972) 

Fiscal  year:  Passports  issued 

1955___ 499,941 

1956 546,470 

1957 580,946 

1958 652,253 

1959 699,042 

1960 828,512 

1961 842,243 

1962 867,378 

1963 1,018,488 

1964                                                                          -              _      1,088,  958 

1965::^:::":::::::"" 1,267,750 

1966 1,454,923 

1967 1,624,940 

1968 1,753,606 

1969 1,759,286 

1970 2,079,863 

1971 2,311,789 

1972 2,605,321 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Had  you  finished  your  discussion  of  these  statistics, 
Miss  Knight? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes ;  except  to  point  out  that  in  any  other  table  of 
statistics,  this  percentage  would  be  considered  infinitesimal.  But  in  the 
case  of  fraud,  illegal  activities  and  impersonations,  one  case  is  just 
one  too  many. 

This  presentation  may  be  too  long,  but  believe  me,  I  have  just 
scratched  the  surface  of  what  we  in  the  Passport  Office  have  experi- 
enced and  know  about  passport  fraud.  I  am  convinced  that  there  are 
practical  and  effective  ways  and  means  of  drastically  curtailing  the 
obtention  and  use  of  fraudulent  identity  documents  which,  in  turn, 
are  used  by  criminals  engaged  in  their  illegal  activities  domestically 
and  overseas. 


32 

Unless  Congress  takes  decisive  action  to  make  fraud  a  nonpaying 
proposition,  it  will  continue  to  spread  and  be  totally  unmanageable. 
Swift  and  stern  measures  should  be  taken  to  make  the  use  and  sub- 
mission of  fraudulent  documents  to  any  department,  agency,  or  seg- 
ment of  the  U.S.  Government  a  costly  and  unpleasant  experience.  In 
my  opinion,  this  should  certainly  include  such  documents  as  natural- 
ization certificates,  social  security  cards,  visas  and  passports,  licenses 
and  any  other  such  reference  which  might  be  used  for  personal 
identification. 

I  want  to  state  as  emphatically  as  possible  that  we  in  the  Passport 
Office  are  at  the  end  of  the  rope.  We  are  drowning  in  paperwork 
involved  in  management  studies,  reports,  statistics,  time-studies,  man- 
power utilization  studies,  productivity  analyses  and  other  such  matters 
which  seep  down  to  us  from  the  upper  echelons  of  management  and 
administration.  At  a  time  when  fraud  is  increasing  we  are  denied  staff 
to  combat  it.  In  this  year,  1972,  the  Passport  Office  has  been  short  at 
all  times  between  52  and  82  permanent  employees.  Our  Legal  Division 
has  had  only  8  attorneys,  7  legal  assistants,  and  12  clerical  staff.  Over 
a  year  ago,  in  July  1971,  we  stated  we  would  need  49  positions  for  fiscal 
1972,  which  began  July  1,  1972.  Only  29  were  approved  by  the  Budget 
Office,  but  as  of  today,  they  have  not  been  allocated. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  How  has  the  failure  to  approve  these  positions 
worked  a  hardship  on  the  Passport.  Office  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Well,  in  the  first  place,  in  order  to  make  up  for  the 
lack  of  personnel,  we  are  working  under  considerable  pressure.  The 
investigations  of  passport  frauds,  and  the  analysis  of  these  cases,  which 
we  forward  to  the  Office  of  Security  of  the  Department  of  State  has 
to  be  done  by  the  small  staff  of  the  legal  division  of  the  Passport 
Office. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Is  this  work  getting  done  or  is  it  falling  behind? 

Miss  Knight.  Well,  it  has  been  falling  behind  for  quite  some  time. 

Mr,  Sourwine.  Because  you  do  not  have  the  people  to  do  the  job  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Now,  you  report  these  cases  to  the  Office  of  Security 
of  the  Department  of  State  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Does  that  office  cooperate  with  you  adequately  ? 

Miss  Knight.  We  have  had  very  good  cooperation  from  the  Office 
of  Security.  It  is  a  very  hard  working  office,  but  they  too  have  per- 
sonnel problems. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Of  the  same  nature  as  yours  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  That  is,  they  need  additional  personnel  and  cannot 
get  them  ? 

Miss  Knight.  I  have  been  told  that  they  have  not  received  the  per- 
sonnel required  to  handle  the  cases  which  we  sent  them  expeditiously. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Have  you  in  the  Passport  Office  had  any  RIFs  in  the 
last  2  years? 

Miss  Knight.  No. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Has  the  Office  of  Security  had  any  RIFs  in  the  last 
2  years  ? 


33 

Miss  Knight.  I  do  not  think  so.  They  simply  have  not  been  given 
additional  personnel. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  It  is  just  a  case  of  additional  responsibility  that 
cannot  be  handled  because  the  additional  personnel  is  not  provided? 

Miss  Knight.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Of  course,  in  your  case,  you  are  making  the  money 
which  could  pay  for  the  additional  personnel.  That  is  not  true  of  the 
Office  of  Security,  it  it?  You  are  producing  revenue  in  the  Passport 
Office.  The  Office  of  Security  does  not  produce  any  revenue? 

Miss  Knight.  This  is  true.  But,  every  additional  employee  in  the 
Office  of  Security  just  helps  that  much  more  in  avoiding  fraud. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Well,  security  should  not  be  a  question  of  dollars  and 
cents  anyway,  should  it  ? 

Miss  Knight.  I  do  not  think  so. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  say  you  get  good  cooperation  out  of  the  Office 
of  Security  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Well,  what  happens  to  the  cases  you  have  presented  ? 
Tell  us  about  that.  What  cases  have  you  sent  up,  how  many  cases 
have  you  reported,  what  has  the  Office  of  Security  done  with  them? 

Miss  Knight.  Well,  I  do  not  have  the  statistics  in  my  mind  at  the 
moment,  but  I  do  recall  sending  a  memorandum  to  Mr.  G.  Marvin 
Gentile,  who  is  the  Director  of  the  Office  of  Security,  sometime  in 
June,  and  I  was  inquiring  about  delinquent  passport  fraud 
investigations. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Is  that  your  responsibility  or  the  responsibility  of  the 
Office  of  Security  ? 

Miss  Knight.  We  cooperate  on  these.  The  responsibility  for  in- 
vestigation lies  with  the  Office  of  Security. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  These  are  cases  you  reported  to  them  then,  on  which 
they  were  delinquent  in  investigation  ? 

Miss  Knight.  This  is  correct. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  But,  you  say  it  is  not  their  fault,  they  did  not  have 
the  manpower? 

Miss  Knight.  This  is  my  understanding. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Well ;  tell  us  about  those  cases.  How  many  of  them 
are  there,  how  far  back  are  they  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Well ;  some  of  the  cases  date  back  to  almost  2  years. 
There  are  some  that  date  back  1  year.  In  my  memorandum  to  Mr. 
Gentile  I  pointed  out  that  I  felt  that  the  Department  of  State  was 
sitting  on  a  powder  keg. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Do  you  have  a  copy  of  that  memorandum  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes ;  I  do. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Can  you  supply  it  to  the  committee  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes ;  I  will  be  glad  to. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  this  go  in  the  record? 

The  Chairman.  It  will  go  in. 


34 

(The  document  referred  to  follows :) 

UNITED  STATES  GOVERNMENT 

Memorandum 

Date  :  June  16,  1972. 

To  :  A/SY — Mr.  G.  Marvin  Gentile. 

From  :  PPT — Frances  G.  Knight. 

Subject :  Delinquent  Passport  Fraud  Investigations. 

On  June  5,  1972,  I  was  requested  to  appear  before  an  Assistant  United  States 
Attorney  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  Ylork  in  connection  with  the  passport 
fraud  case  of  Sarkis  Soghanalian.  The  briefing  I  received  from  our  Legal  Division 
revealed  there  were  considerable  delays  involved  in  pursuing  the  investigation 
in  that  and  in  other  passport  fraud  cases. 

I  am  informed  that  a  discussion  was  held  this  week  between  Messrs.  Donald 
Daley  and  Raymond  Scroggs  of  your  Office  and  Messrs.  William  E.  Duggan  and 
James  L.  Ritchie  of  this  Office  in  an  effort  to  settle  at  the  working  level  the 
problems  regarding  delays  involved  in  completing  current  passport  fraud  investi- 
gations. While  certain  procedures  were  agreed  to  which  may  tend  to  alleviate 
backlog  of  work,  it  was  recognized  by  the  group  that  these  procedures  will  not 
result  in  future  investigations  being  completed  within  a  reasonable  time.  It  was 
the  position  of  the  members  of  the  Office  of  Security  that  the  present  workload 
imposed  on  SY|  by  other  areas  of  the  Department  and  the  priorities  assigned  to 
this  workload  make  it  impossible  for  SY,  with  its  present  staff,  to  meet  the 
demands  of  the  Passport  fraud  responsibility. 

The  Legal  Division  recently  embarked  on  an  extensive  fraud  training  program 
of  all  Passport  Office  personnel.  Ultimately,  this  program  will  include  all  persons 
accepting  passport  applications.  The  program  already  has  proved  successful  in 
detecting  fraud  in  the  application  stage  prior  to  the  issuance  of  a  passport. 
Obviously,  investigation  of  such  cases  must  be  handled  on  an  urgent  basis  before 
the  impostors  disappear.  Any  delays  will  be  detrimental  to  the  new  program  which 
has  been  instituted  by  the  Passport  Office.  I  am  determined  that  nothing  shall 
impair  the  progress  we  are  now  making  in  this  important  area  of  fraud 
detection. 

The  following  facts  indicate  that  the  Department  is  sitting  on  a   "powder 

1.  It  is  known  that  there  is  an  increase  in  the  number  of  passports  being 
obtained  in  false  identities  which  are  used  in  the  furtherance  of  criminal 
activitity.  (See  attached  New  York  Times  article  of  December  19,  1971,  the 
Report  of  June  5,  1972  from  the  Buffalo  Strike  Force,  and  the  memorandum 
dated  May  30,  1972  from  your  Los  Angeles  Field  Office  on  the  "Brother- 
hood").* 

2.  During  the  hearings  before  the  House  Appropriations  Committee  the 
question  of  passport  frauds  was  discussed  at  some  length.  It  is  obvious 
from  the  testimony  that  the  members  of  Congress  are  concerned  with 
the  problem. 

3.  A  number  of  passport  frauds  involve  narcotic  traffickers.  The  Presi- 
dent's deep  concern  with  this  overall  problem  is  well  known. 

4.  The  Passport  Office  has  undertaken  action  to  combat  the  situation. 

The  failure  or  inability  of  the  OflBce  of  Security  to  support  the  efforts  of  the 
Passport  Ofliee  adequately  is  a  factor  which,  in  justice,  I  must  point  out  if  the 
problem  is  not  resolved. 

I  cannot  accept  the  premise  that  passport  fraud  work  is  apparently  placed 
in  a  low  priority  category.  I  cannot  accept  delays  of  six  months  and  even  a  year 
or  longer  in  completing  passport  fraud  cases. 

In  making  these  statements,  I  am  not  downgrading  the  quality  of  the  work 
of  your  agents  who  are  in  my  opinion  experts  in  passport  fraud  investigations. 
It  is  simply  that  investigations  must  be  completed  within  effective  time  limits. 

I  am  aware  that  the  Office  of  Security  shares  with  the  Passport  Office  the 
mutual  problem  of  lack  of  sufficient  personnel.  However,  I  must  insist  that  action 
be  taken  to  provide  the  Passport  Office  with  the  investigative  service  which 
the  importance  of  the  passport  fraud  problems  demands. 

Please  let  me  know  as  promptly  as  possible  of  the  steps  you  take  to  solve  this 
problem. 

»The  New  York  Times  article  of  Dec.  19,  1971,  will  be  found  on  p.  13. 


35 

Memorandum 


Date:  June  5,  1972. 
FEL  :ao 


To:    William    H.    Bartley,   District  Director,   Immigration   &   Naturalization 

Service. 
From :  Frank  E.  Latchford,  I&NS  Representative,  Buffalo  Strike  Force. 
Subject :  Fraudulent  procurement  of  U.S.  Passports  ;  Sam  Lewis  and  Eddie  Jones, 

Rochester,  New  York. 

Confidential  informant  Buf.  I-1S5  furnished  information  that  the  above  subjects 
are  involved  in  assisting  persons  in  obtaining  U.S.  Passports  with  documents 
relating  to  someone  else  as  well  as  furnishing  counterfeit  passports. 

Attached  are  memos  prepared  by  the  undersigned  containing  the  details  fur- 
nished by  the  source  covering  five  specific  incidents  of  such  activity  involving 
THOMAS  FIORDELISO,  JOANNE  CAVACANTE  or  CAVALCANTE,  THOMAS 
COLLINS,  STEVE  HAWKINS  and  RICHARD  CARNEY.  It  will  be  noted  there- 
from the  source  reports  three  of  these  people  were  furnished  birth  certificates  of 
other  persons  with  which  to  apply  for  passports  and  two  were  furnished  "phoney" 
passports.  FIORDELISO  is  an  alien,  three  others  have  criminal  records  and 
two  of  these  criminals  are  now  serving  time  in  Attica  Correctional  Facility.  The 
source  reports  that  four  of  the  persons  involved  wanted  passports  ostensibly  for 
the  purpose  of  having  it  available  in  the  event  they  decided  to  leave  the  United 
States. 

The  source  reports  that  Sam  Lewis  aka  "Canine"  is  about  34  years  of  age, 
black,  resides  at  36  Copeland  Street,  Rochester;  wife  Georgia  employed  at 
Lincoln  Rochester  Bank. 

Eddie  Jones  is  about  22-24,  black,  5'10",  wears  goatie,  formerly  lived  in  the 
Hanover  Housing  Project,  Rochester,  New  York. 

The  source  believes  that  Eddie  Jones  may  have  contact  with  someone  in  the 
printing  or  rubber  stamp  business  located  on  North  Street  near  the  Inner  Loop. 
A  check  of  the  1971  Rochester  Telephone  book  shows  the  "AAA  Lifetime  Rubber 
Stamp  Company"  133  North  Street,  phone  454-1269.  There  is  no  listing  for  the 
company  in  the  1968  or  1970  Rochester  City  Directory,  but  this  directory  lists 
the  "Lifetime  Recordings"  at  this  address,  Lester  W.  Osband,  owner.  The  tele- 
phone number  is  the  same  as  above,  454-126!). 

Investigator  William  Devine  checked  with  the  Monroe  County  Clerk's  office 
in  Rochester  and  determined  that  they  have  records  stored  away  covering 
passport  applications  made  during  the  period  in  question.  These  records  include 
the  name  and  address  of  the  applicant.  The  source  reports  that  there  were 
numerous  passport  applications  submitted  with  documents  belonging  to  other 
persons.  If  these  records  are  made  available  to  the  source  it  is  possible  that 
some  of  the  names  used  may  be  identified. 

The  source  furnished  information  on  other  matters  of  interest  to  the  Strike 
Force  involving  possible  criminal  violations  at  both  the  federal  and  state  level. 
The  two  suspects  referred  to  herein  are  also  involved  in  some  of  these  other 
criminal  matters  and  will  be  the  subjects  of  investigation  by  other  agencies.  The 
source  has  already  testified  before  the  grand  jury,  U.S.  District  Court,  Western 
District  of  New  York. 

It  is  suggested  that  this  matter  be  referred  to  the  Passport  Office,  Depart- 
ment of  State,  Washington,  DC.  for  their  information.  In  view  of  the  circum- 
stances, it  is  suggested  that  any  investigation  undertaken  by  the  State 
Department  be  co-ordinated  with  this  office.  The  undersigned  contacted  Security 
Officer  David  Hall,  State  Department,  Syracuse,  New  York  and  he  was  advised 
that  he  would  be  furnished  with  a  copy  of  our  memorandum  regarding  this 
matter,  and  that  the  source  would  be  made  available  for  de-briefing  purposes. 


May  30,  1972. 
Chief,  Division  of  Investigation, 
Atten:  SY/PVB, 
SAC — Los  Angeles, 
The  Brotherhood. 

IRS  Intelligence,  Customs  and  the  local  law  enforcement  agencies  are  work- 
ing on  an  extensive  narcotics  smuggling  ring  in  the  Laguna  Beach  and  Orange 
County  area,  called  "The  Brotherhood". 


36 

Interested  agencies  estimate  total  membership  in  the  group  at  about  200. 
All  members  have  reportedly  travelled  abroad  frequently  and  it  is  suspected 
that  many  of  the  group  have  fraudulent  passports.  There  are  reports  that  the 
group  can  produce  all  documents  (usually  counterfeit),  necessary  to  assume 
other  identities,  including  birth  certificates,  Selective  Service  cards,  college  and 
university  I.D.  cards  and  driver's  licenses. 

Agencies  at  this  point  are  not  able  to  furnish  aliases  used  by  the  groiip, 
but  have  submitted  a  list  of  29  names  of  those  considered  to  be  the  principals 
in  The  Brotherhood  and  will  appreciate  a  search  of  PPT  records  and  copies 
of  files  here  for  review  of  those  listed  below.  It  is  noted  that  one  of  those 
named  is  Timothy  LEARY,  who  the  agencies  advise  was  the  founder  of  the 
group  when  he  was  in  Southern  California. 

Attachment : 

A/S 

Distribution : 

Orig.  &  1  cc. — Addressee 
1  cc. — Subject 
1  cc. — Chron 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Wait  just  a  minute,  Miss  Knight.  That  is  not  a 
classified  memorandum,  is  it? 

Miss  Knight.  No  ;  it  is  not. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  All  right.  Go  ahead,  Miss  Knight, 

Before  you  continue,  let  me  point  out  that  that  memorandum  that 
you  sent  Mr.  Gentile  about  the  investigation  of  these  passport  fraud 
cases  has  been  ordered  into  our  record.  If  there  is  anything  further 
you  would  like  to  say  about  this,  this  is  a  good  place  to  say  it. 

Miss  Knight.  I  sent  a  follow-up  memorandum  to  Mr.  Gentile  on 
August  9. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  You  mean  by  that  time  you  had  not  received  a  reply 
to  your  original  memorandum  ? 

Miss  Knight.  No;  I  had  not,  and  then  I  received  two  replies  from 
him  explaining  the  situation.  One  was  dated  August  the  17th,  and 
the  other  September  5th,  as  I  recall. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  May  that  second  memorandum  of  yours  and  his 
two  memoranda  be  supplied  to  the  committee  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Are  they  classified  ? 

Miss  Knight.  Yes ;  they  can  be  supplied,  and  they  are  not  classified. 

Mr.  Sourwine.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  they  go  in  the  record  at  this 
point  ? 

The  Chairman.  They  will  go  in  the  record. 

(The  memoranda  referred  to  follow  :) 

UNITED  STATES  GOVERNMENT 

Memorandum 

Date:  August  9,  1972. 
To :  A/SY — Mr.  G.  Marvin  Gentile. 
From  :  PPT — Frances  G.  Knight. 
Subject :  Delinquent  Passport  Fraud  Investigations. 

I  refer  to  my  memorandum  of  June  16,  1972  on  the  subject  matter.  To  date,  I 
have  not  received  the  courtesy  of  a  reply  or  even  an  acknowledgment. 

I  have  asked  the  Passport  Office  Legal  Division  to  furnish  me  with  a  list  of 
oases  pending  investigation  in  8Y  prior  to  March  30,  1972.  I  am  enclosing  a 
copy  of  this  list. 


37 

In  addition  to  the  cases  which  are  pending  action  by  offices  of  the  United 
States  Attorney  for  criminal  prosecution,  there  are  164  oases  awaiting  action  by 
SY.  There  arc  40  criminal  prosecution  cases. 

This  list  reveals  the  following  status  of  passport  cases  requiring  investigation 
by  SY: 

1.  There  are  28  cases  which  were  submitted  to  SY  more  than  two  years 
ago  and  are  not  completed. 

2.  There  are  53  cases  which  were  submitted  to  SY  more  than  one  year 
ago  and  are  not  completed. 

3.  There  are  83  cases  which  were  submitted  to  SY  more  than  90  days  ago 
and  are  not  completed. 

These  facts  speak  for  themselves  and  should  evoke  deep  official  concern  from 
those  Federal  officials  who  will  be  responsible  for  any  disastrous  results  due 
to  these  delays. 

For  the  reasons  given  in  my  memorandum  of  June  16,  1972,  I  must  request 
again  an  explanation  for  the  failure  of  SY  to  complete  the  investigation  in  every 
case  submitted  to  your  office  prior  to  March  30,  1972.  I  have  instructed  the  Legal 
Division  of  the  Passport  Office  to  request  the  completion  of  the  investigations 
within  90  days,  unless  there  are  unusual  or  exceptional  circumstances  which 
make  the  completion  of  the  case  impossible. 

I  have  been  informed  by  members  of  my  staff  that  attempts  to  obtain  effective 
service,  action,  or  at  least  some  explanation  of  the  delays  through  personal 
contacts  with  your  staff,  as  well  as  my  memorandum  of  June  16,  have  failed. 
The  situation  has  reached  the  point  where  it  is  affecting  efficient  and  timely 
operation  of  the  Passport  Fraud  Program  as  well  as  the  integrity  of  the  United 
States  passport.  This  inaction  has  the  effect  of  assisting  an  apparent  program 
to  downgrade  and  force  a  deterioration  of  passport  services — therefore,  the 
reason  for  this  explicit  memorandum  for  the  record. 

If  you  do  not  have  sufficient  staff  to  service  these  Passport  Office  requests, 
then  the  matter  should  be  taken  up  with  Mr.  William  Macomber,  Jr.  In  this 
connection,  I  must  refer  again  in  the  strongest  terms  possible  to  the  "powder 
keg"  situation  which  I  mentioned  in  my  memorandum  of  June  16. 

In  view  of  the  personnel  freeze  which  allegedly  is  responsible  for  the  Pass- 
port Office  being  short  of  lawyers,  supervisors,  and  adjudicators,  and  technicians, 
it  seems  improbable  that  investigating  the  "new  employees"  for  other 
areas  of  the  Department  of  State  is  so  great  as  to  interfere  with  our  request 
for  investigating  possible  passport  frauds. 

Because  of  the  false  implications  and  misstatements  made  by  Miss  Barbara 
Watson  when  she  appeared  before  Congressman  John  Rooney  on  February  24, 
1972,  it  is  indeed  difficult  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  there  are  some  admin- 
istrative impresarios  who  are  deliberately  undermining  and  delaying  Passport 
Office  efforts  to  get  action  on  suspected  frauds.  Despite  our  lack  of  lawyers  and 
staff,  the  Passport  Office  Legal  Division  has  worked  long  hours  for  many 
months  to  spell  out  in  detail  for  the  Bureau  of  Security  and  Consular  Affairs 
the  full  report  on  passport  frauds.  There  has  been  no  discernible  action  taken, 
nor  has  there  been  any  acknowledgement  of  this  tremendous  effort. 

With  so  many  chiefs,  especially  the  bevy  of  passport  experts  scattered  around 
the  Department  who  doublethink  every  operation  of  this  office,  and  so  few 
indians  to  do  the  work,  I  have  a  very  difficult  time  to  get  letters,  reports,  and 
other  documents  typed.  I  presume  that  you,  too,  are  short  the  required  per- 
sonnel to  meet  your  work  load  ;  however,  that  does  not  alter  the  end  result  which 
is  the  Department's  failure  to  give  priority  to  security  matters  and  passport 
services  which  are  being  paid  for  by  the  public. 

Enclosure : 
As  stated. 

Investigations  Pending  in  SY  for  over  90  Days  as  of  June  30,  1972 

Summary : 

Criminal  prosecutions 40 

Investigations  pending: 

Over  2  years 28 

Over  1  year 53 

Over  90  days 83 

Total 204 


38 

Name                                                                                                                          To  SY  Last  report 

Abrams,  Gerald  Bernard __ _ _ 11-19-68  5-30-72  (CP) 

Adams,  John.       g_  g_7i  6_  5_72  (Cp) 

Aldama,  Mary  Julieta _._ 5-18-70 

Alvarado,  Lorenzo "    5-27-70  3-29-72  (CP) 

Anglada,  Miguel  Lira _ 12-31-70  6-21-71 

Arguello,  Domingo 4-4-69 

Arroyo,  Benito.... _ 11-12-71  3-7-72  (CP) 

Arthur,  David  Alan 3-21-68  5-21-72  (CP) 

Avila-Rivera,  Carmen 12-14-71 

Ayala-Calderon,Guillermo 3-1-72 

Baronofsky,  Carl  Leonard 6-  4-71  3-27-72  (CP) 

Barr,  Richard  Scott 9-13-71  6-28-72 

Becker,  Harold  Robert 11-25-70  11-22-71 

Bosco,  Doris  Carina _ 2-  1-71 

Brewer,  Robert  ferrence .        11-23-71  5^23-72 

Briger,  Margaret  Allison 6-15-71 

Brooks,  Fred  Horace _ 3-17-70  8-  5-70 

Brown,  Richard  Shaw _ 2-4-69  2- 1-71  (CP) 

Bruyn,  Irvin  W 9-18-69  8-  6-71  (CP) 

Bunting,  Gabrielle 11-12-70  3-16-71 

Caccamo,  Frank  Paul 8-  8-70 

Calderon-Mier,  Valente 9-22-69 

Calvillo,  Elvira  Menchaca _ 2-26-71  5-  8-72 

Camacho-Rivera  Angel  Luis 3-22-71 

Carl,  Ronald  Lee 4-1-71  5-23-72  (CP) 

Carr,  Daniel  William .. .     ._ 9-18-70  3-31-71 

Cartagena,  Jorge  Luis 2-  2-71  11-24-71 

Castillo-Diaz,  Carlos  Julio 12-15-71 

Ceballos,  Eloisa .  7-8-69 

Chang,  Lui  Sam  Mui 11-23-71  218-72 

Chapman,  Charles  Robert _ 11-23-71  6-23-72 

Chapman,  Douglas  Doyle. .12-2-71 

Chavolla,  Ruban .               ..             ..        ..                 4-6-69  3-  8-70  (CP) 

Cheung,  Lin  Yueng ._ 3-29-72  5-  8-72 

Cloudenjohn .                                                        2-26-71  12-14-71 

Collado,  Orlando  Pina 5-7-71  .      . 

Colon,  Lydia 7-19-71 

Contreras,  Maria 5-18-70  7-28-70 

Core-Marquez,  Juan.  ...  ....  5-30-71  

Correa,  Pablo  Gonzales ..           ..    5-28-71  6-28-72 

Cotton,  Vernon  Zina  Jr 2-11-71  6-21-72 

Cox,  John  Allen  (Sherwood) 11-25-68  8-24-71  (CP) 

Crain,  Patricia  Elizabeth _ 8-20-71  6-30-72 

Cromwell,  Gary  Travis                          ..     ...     ....    2-25-72  7- 6-72  (CP) 

Cruz-Soto,  Juan _ 2-16-72  4-  3-72 

Cruz-Franqui,  Luis  A. 12-13-71        

Cuevas-lrizarry,  Dogoberto.        3-28-72        

Davidian,  Geoffrey  Keith 3-7-69  4-18-72 

DeCamillis,  Joseph..     .                  .. 5-7-70  6-22-72 

DeCillo,  Debra  Ann.     .. 8-24-71  11-22-71 

Delgado-Rosario,  Felix 3-10-72        

Delgado-Lopez.Sigfredo... 3-13-72        

De  Mauriez  Barton,  Richard  Joseph 10-23-64  5-  8-72  (CP) 

Develine,  Robert  Michael 2-25-72        (CP) 

Devereaux,  Michelle  Ronica 3-10-71  5-19-72 

Dickson,  Frank  Anthony        ...11-6-69  6- 7-72  (CP) 

Dissick,  Jeffrey  Roy                    8-39-71  4-28-72 

Dollard,  David  A.. _ _ 10-26-71        

Boyle,  Loring  Anne.. 5-7-71  8-6-71 

Driscoll,  Robert  Donald 11-30-71  5-  8-72  (CP) 

Ehrman.Vivienne. 2-24-71  7-11-72  (CP) 

Feola,  Evelina  Adelino     ....11-10-71  2-8-72 

Feola,  Maria  Gabriella  ..      .     ..  11-10-71  2-8-72 

Flores,  Eustaquia 8-11-71  3-  8-72  (CP) 

Flores,  Francisco 1-7-71  6-1-71 

Flynn,  Thomas  Willard  III _ ■. 3-16-72  6-21-72  (CP) 

Foster,  Paul  M ._ 5-27-71  2-23-72 

Frank,  Walter  Matthew. 11-23-71  6-23-72 

Fugate-Wilcox,  Raymond  T 12-15-71        

Fugate-Wilcox,  Valerie 12-15-71        

Garcia,  Antonio.... 12-13-71  6-26-72  (CP) 

Garcia,  James  Martin _,_ 1-28-72        

Gavigan,  Francoise  Nicole... 7-29-71        

Gesualdo,  Ramon _ 10-21-71        

Gonzalez,  Alicia  V 11-12-70        

Gonzalez-Canales,  Damaso 11-15-71        

Grant,  Evadney  E 2-10-72        

Gravino,  Santo 1-7-72  2-18-72  (CP) 

Greco,  Laurence 4-10-72  2-  9-71  (CP) 

Greenberg,  Arthur  (Raymond  Smith).. 2-25-72  5-  4-72  (CP) 

Gutierrez,  Lara 5-28-69  2-19-71 

Hadad.Hercel     ..                            8-10-71  9-27-71 

Hamill,  Lydia  Lewis... 2-26-70        

Helton,  Roy  P 5-27-71  2-23-72 

Herrera,  Nicholas 9-22-70 

Hodge,  Donald  Benjamin 1-  4-72  4-  6-72 


39 


Name                                                                                                                          ToSY  Last  report 

Johnson,  Ralph  Lawrence - - I-2,!-7,2)        — 

Johnson,  Richard  R. --    3- 21-72  -=-==-=5 

Joyner,  Robert  Barry - - — iHH,1  T? 

Keller,  Robert  Baxter. - - —  12-13-71  7-6-72 

Kerrington,  Alexis  K U-1?"??  4-30-71 

Klinger,  Norman. - - --    5-  7-/1        

Lagares,  Arleen  Joy... %~  J-/1  -i~m 

Lauria,  Nicholas  A - - 8-  f-71  6-  2-72 

Leary,  Timothy  Francis «-    '  jT ,° "/.£ 

Lebron.Antonia - XXT-X  \'Wk\ 

Lee,  Hen  Yee - -    3-16-72  6-27-72 

I  pp    lirk  Sane                                                                      0-24-/1  i>-ii.-ll 

ffi?Doanl:::::::::::::::::::::::::::..--:.- - -  wi  *%%<&> 

Lettner,  Samuel - -  1J-}|_?;  2-28-72 

Lem,  Chung  Wong.... - ,,,7? 

Lopez-Acosta,  Adalberto - '-12-71        

Lopez,  Miguel  Luis - 1  -« -72        

Lopez-Etanislao,  Tomas. • -Jl -71 

Loverdos,  Adela  llutiza ,?,£,?  "c'i'c"™ 

Lynas,  William  Posnett H'W'll  VvTihcp* 

Lyons,  Marshall ,»-15-69  6-27-72  (CP) 

McDonald,  Milford  Michael.. - \\'2l~l^  i'k^  tro\ 

McGovern,  Nancy  Joan 10-  2-70  3-6-72  (CP) 

McNabb,  Melanie  Ann. 3-  1-72  6-29-72 

Melave,  Carmelo -- --- 7  90  7?        

Marcosky,  Patricia -    7-Z8-71        --- 

Mariani,  Luz  Maria - —     \-2°-'f.  -£^"79  /rp\ 

Martin,  Jack  William - -- 3-5-70  6-26-72  (OP) 

Martinez,  Carmelo  Cruz — - ?  00  cq        

Molina,  Cecilia  Ramirez... - - - - —    7-28-69  o'c'^i 

Morales,  Antonio — - rH'li  o    £79 

Morales,  Refugio. --- - - TTii'l}  3~  6_7Z 

Morris,  Charles  G - ,f~il~l\        

Naranjo,  Maria  E.  S J2_J2_Z9        

Negri,  Michale 10-13-71 

O'Brien,  Richard  A - - — —  -    5_2?~Zi  I'll  nl  (     ' 

Oleson,  Darrel  Lee.... 2-4-72  5-30-72 

Oliver.  James  Wilbam \~Vtll  ,-,«„  (     } 

Oliver,  Robert  Joseph — i-,,2  H,  li 

Ong,  Hong  June - 6-  1-71  5-23-72 

Ortega,  Gilberto — - - 4-17-69 

Pagan,  Juan,  Jr --- 2-  2-71  11-24-71 

Paredes,  Jesus  Estrada -- 2-  9-72        

Pasea,  Charles  Theophilus.. ---    J-  7-71  -------- 

Patti,  Joseph  Henry - - 2-1-71  4-10-72 

Peffer,  Jonettam - ---- l~2\~l\  ?  ,i  ,n 

Pennellatore,  James  Philip ■_ - - 4-  3-70  J-*4"/." 

Pesta,  Helen _ _ — 12-15 -70  5-31-72 

Phillips,  Robert  M... — *    ,  ™        "'" 

Poorman,  Richard  Lee.. 4-  7-70 

Quinomes-Quinones,  Aquilino - l"™  10        " 

Quinones,  Haydee  M.. — --- "0-H        ._ 

Rabell,  Jose  Andres -  10,-13-/1        

Ramirez-Aviles,  Jorge - - ,,  «  7?  'kbiio 

Ramos,  Alejo ----- "2§"  PT2^2, 

Rider,  Gordon  Joseph.... 10-  2 -70  3-  6-72 

Rivera-Molina,  Confesora -    £-29-/1        

Rivera-Reyes,  Emma  Luz - i\}~  1} 

Rivera,  Jose  Dionisio - —    7-21  -71        

Rivera,  Madoline  B.. - -    g- 17— 71 - 

Rivera,  Manuel t~}.Vi        

Rodd.Vicas -    5-{*-71 

Rodriguez,  Antonio  Fernand  Viera --- --- 2 -16- 72 

Rodriguez,  Elisa. 1-  6-/0 

Rodriguez,  Luis - •>-  7-/1 

Rodriguez,  Primo  Lozano... 9-  7-70 

Rodriguez,  Roberto 2-  1-/2        

Rodriguez,  Vincente — - ----    3-3-72  .. ... --- 

Roll,  Hugh  Wilson - '"    '  6-23-/2 

Roman,  Aristaloo 7-13 -71 

Rosa,  Jose lZ  I'll 

Rosenberg,  Paul  Daniel - J"™ 

Royer,  Paul  Alan -    1-5-71 

Rubi.Juana - - -    5-14-70  12-  2-70 

Ruiz,  Esnedo - - ° -30- 71        - 

Ruiz,  Maria  Sanchez....                                                               - ,=7?  "7  be.  71 1  /rp-> 

Ryon,  Robert  Douglas ---- - J-  7-26-71  (Cf) 

Saint-Jacques,  Eunice - 7 -28-71        

Salinas,  Elias - - - 10-  } -69        

Sanabria-Rivera,  Carmen 5 -21-71        

Sanchez,  Maria  Jimenez - —  - ,  „  ,?  o  "q't> 

Scherman,  Alan  D.._. HHi  n    -T-A 

Schneider,  Joseph  Jay -                                             -    l-U-Jj  7-7-72 

Schurgast,  Frank  M 9-24-68  2-25-70  (CP) 

Sefton,  Allan -  -     5-27-71 

Serrano,  Maria  Guadalupe * 1  in  7« 


5-22-72 
12-29-70 


5-16-72 
6-29-72 


3-23-72 


Silver,  Gerald 1-29-70        (CP) 


40 


Name 


ToSY 


Last  report 


Silver,  Gerald  aka  Moss,  James ..  1-29-70 

Smith,  Adele _ 9-13-71 

Smith,  Livesey  Mark 1-  3-69  3-13-72  (CP) 

Spanakos,  Mariane ...      12-31-68  5-4-70 

Strickland,  Albert  Lee _ _    1-13-72  (CP) 

Stubberfield,  Colin  John 3-28-72  (CP) 

Sullivan,  Kathleen  Marie _._    1-12-72        (CP) 

Sumerlin,  Ernest  James _ 11-10-71  1-19-72 

Supera,  David  M _ 11-18-70  6-  3-71 

Susbilla,  Ernie  Henry  Clemente 11-  2-70 

Swede,  Southworth  W 8-21-70  3-  8-72  (CP) 

Swinton,  Patricia  Elizabeth 3-31-72  7-  5-72 

Tavarez-Nieves,  William _  ....  .  12-29-71 

Taylor,  Erma 8-25-70  2-11-71 

Vega,  Luis  Angel __ 12-23-71  1-15-72 

Vessa,  Delores  Ann 8-28-71  11-17-71  (CP) 

Vidal,  Julip  Mexicana _ 5-14-70  1-27-71 

Villalobos-Rivera,  Rosa .  .    6-8-71 

Vincent,  Clifford  Wayne 12-17-71  2-17-72 

Welch,  Roy  Cecil 12-23-70  5-23-72 

Wheless,  Marilyn 10-20-69 

White,  Creig 12-  3-71 

Wilford,  Anthony  T _ 2-22-71  5-15-72  (CP) 

Williamson,  Dennis  Paul 4-  9-71  4-  6-72 

Wingenfeld,  George  R _ 7-7-71  

Wobby,  Louis  Tom 12-20-71  6-27-72  (CP) 

Wong,  Tai  Bing 9-23-70  6-26-72 

Zanini,  Paul , 12-  2-71        

Zapata,  Jose  J 1    7-  8-69        

Zuniga,  Jose  Enrique _.  11-  3-69        

Memorandum 

Department  op  State 

Office  of  Security 

August  17,  1972. 
To :  PPT — Miss  Frances  G.  Knight. 
From  :  A/SY — G.  Marvin  Genttxe. 
Subject :  Delinquent  Passport  Fraud  Investigations. 

In  answer  to  your  August  9,  1972,  memorandum  in  this  matter  please  accept 
my  apology  for  not  having  acknowledged  your  previous  memorandum  of  June  16, 
1972.  I  can  assure  you  the  delay  in  my  acknowledgement  was  not  due  to  a  lack  of 
concern  or  action  on  the  part  of  the  Office  of  Security. 

A/SY  is  as  concerned  as  PPT  over  the  current  delinquency  in  the  investigation 
of  passport  fraud  cases.  This  present  delinquency  has  been  due  to  the  shortage 
of  manpower  caused  by  such  factors  as  the  heavy  deluge  of  applicant  cases 
received  by  SY  during  the  early  part  of  the  year  (these  include  summer  hires, 
interns,  PPT  peak  cases)  and  several  high  priority  security  requirements  in 
other  aspects  of  the  total  security  program. 

As  you  are  probably  aware,  A/SY  lost  twenty-one  positions  in  the  last  personnel 
cut  effective  June  30,  1972.  This  office  has  a  pending  request  for  approval  to  hire 
six  new  special  agents. 

While  SY  has  been  unable  to  keep  fraud  investigations  current,  it  should  be 
noted  that  SY  has  devoted  considerable  time  and  resources  to  PPT  fraud  cases  as 
evidenced  by  the  fact  that  this  office  closed  557  passport  fraud  cases  during 
FY-72,  466  during  FY-71  and  485  during  FY-70.  We  have  made  every  effort  to 
handle  the  most  urgent  and  serious  cases  and  to  be  responsive  to  any  special 
PPT  requests. 

I  can  assure  you  that  SY  will  make  every  effort  to  reduce  the  current 
delinquency  during  the  upcoming  fall  months  when  the  applicant  case  load  is 
normally  lighter. 

Memorandum 


Department  of  State 
Washington,  D.C.  20520 

September  5,  1972. 
To  :  PPT— Miss  Frances  G.  Knight. 
From  :  A/SY — G.  Marvin  Gentile 
Subject :  Delinquent  Passport  Fraud  Investigations. 

Reference  is  made  to  your  memorandum  of  August  !),  1972,  and  my  reply  of 
August  17,  1972  regarding  the  delinquencies  in  passport  fraud  investigation. 


41 

A  case^by-case  review  by  SY  of  the  list  furnished  with  your  memorandum  of 
August  9,  1972  disclosed  the  possibility  of  certain  errors  and  discrepancies.  As 
a  result,  the  list  was  reviewed  with  your  Passport  Advisory  Division  on  August  17, 
1972.  The  list  was  reconciled  and  corrected  to  eliminate  errors  in  duplication  of 
names  and  aliases  used  to  identify  same  Subjects.  It  was  also  discovered  that 
23  closing  reports,  which  had  been  forwarded  to  PPT,  either  had  never  been 
received  or  had  been  niisfiled.  Copies  of  these  reports  are  attached. 

The  criminal  prosecution  cases,  which  are  a  separate  entity  from  delinquent 
investigations,  were  indicated  as  40  on  your  list.  The  SY  records  reflect  that 
five  (5)  of  these  are  closed;  however,  four  (4)  other  criminal  prosecution  cases 
were  listed  among  the  delinquent  investigations,  and  not  identified  as  criminal 
prosecution.  Therefore,  the  list  currently  stands  at  39  criminal  prosecution  cases. 
The  delinquent  case  list  (164)  has  been  adjusted  and  reconciled  in  the  follow- 
ing manner : 

Of  the  28  cases  which  were  submitted  to  'SY  more  than  two  (2)  years  ago, 
only  seven  (7)  cases  are  outstanding. 

Of  the  53  cases  which  were  submitted  to  SY  more  than  one  (1)  year  ago, 
there  are  36  cases  outstanding. 

Of  the  83  cases  which  were  submitted  to  SY  more  than  90  days  ago,  there 
are  64  cases  outstanding. 
Fifty-seven  cases  have  been  eliminated  from  the  delinquent  investigation  list : 
Twenty-two  (22)  copies  of  closing  reports  are  furnished  with  this  memo- 
randum (one  additional  copy  of  a  closing  report  is  furnished  on  a  "criminal 
prosecution  case"). 

Eight    (8)    cases  wTere  eliminated  because  of  duplication  and/or  use  of 
aliases. 

Twenty-seven   (27)   cases  have  been  closed  since  June  30,  1972,  the  date 
of  your  list. 
Again,  please  be  assured  that  SY  is  working  toward  the  goal  of  reducing  the 
number  of  delinquent  passport  fraud  investigations. 

Attachments : 
As  Stated. 

Delinquent  Passport  Fraud  Investigations 

Cases  previously  closed  Date  closed 

Arguello,  Domingo 6-30-69 

Calderon-Mier,  Valente 2-  4-72 

Carr,  Daniel  William 6-  4-71 

Ceballos,  Eloisa 10-29-69 

Chavolla,  Ruben  (CP) 6-30-70 

Clouden,  John 1-17-72 

Gutierrez,  Lara 8-31-7 1 

Herrera-Espinoza,  Nicholas 1 1-18-7 1 

Klinger,  Norman 3-13-72 

Mariani,  Luz  Maria 5-19-72 

Molina,  Cecilia  Ramirez 11-22-71 

Ortega,  Gilberto 6-27-69 

Phillips,  Robert  McKay 8-  6-71 

Rubi,  Juana 10-  6-71 

Salinas,  Elias 12-14-71 

Sanchez,  Maria  Jimenez 6-  8-71 

Sanchez-Naranjo,  Maria  Elena 9-24-71 

Supera,  David  Mark 7-13-71 

Vidal,  Julio  Mexicano 3-16-71 

Vincent,  Clifford  Wayne 2-  7-72 

Wingenfeld,  George 8-  2-71 

Zapata,  Jose  J 2_  4_72 

Zuniga,  Jose  Enrique 10-  6-71 

Mr.  Sourwixe.  Thank  you,  Miss  Knight.  Go  ahead  with  your 
statement. 

Miss  Knight.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Because  of  the  fraud  situation  we  have  stepped  up  our  quality 
review  of  applications,  especially  those  from  our  overseas  posts  and 


42 

the  applications  now  being  accepted  at  over  650  post  offices  around 
the  country.  While  the  acceptance  of  passport  applications  at  post 
offices  is  convenient  for  the  public,  it  has  not  made  an  appreciable 
difference  in  the  crowded  conditions  of  the  Passport  Field  Agencies. 
The  switch  of  applicants  to  the  post  offices  is  from  the  clerks  of  court 
rather  than  from  the  Passport  Field  Agencies.  The  important  fraud 
prevention  work  such  as  the  screening  of  the  application,  its  adjudica- 
tion, clearance,  correct,  if  necessary,  and  the  production  and  mailing 
of  the  passport  still  rests  with  the  Passport  Office. 

It  is  a  known  fact  that  even  the  most  dedicated  employees  working 
day-after-day  under  the  stress  and  strain  of  handling  hundreds  of 
passport  applicants  pushing  and  arguing  for  expeditious  service  will 
sometimes  make  mistakes  or  overlook  details.  It  is  in  this  atmosphere 
of  pressure  that  fraud  thrives.  For  4  long  years,  I  have  recommended 
and  budgeted  for  the  establishment  of  additional  passport  field  agen- 
cies to  serve  heavily  populated  areas.  Each  year  the  request  has  been 
turned  down  within  the  Department  of  State.  This  year,  for  instance, 
the  situation  in  the  New  York  Passport  Agency  became  intolerable. 
I  have  asked  for  an  application  acceptance  agency  in  downtown  Man- 
hattan to  ease  the  pressure.  Within  the  past  2  weeks,  I  have  been 
advised  that  this  request  has  been  turned  down. 

Virtually  every  recommendation  and  request  I  have  made  for 
alleviating  the  burden  of  overwork  and  the  prevailing  anxiety  regard- 
ing fraud  has  been  either  ignored  or  refused  because  of  budgetary  cuts. 
Of  course,  we  are  given  complicated  and  involved  reasons  why  this 
and  that  cannot  be  done  and  to  the  uninitiated,  these  reasons,  standing 
alone,  might  make  sense.  Frankly,  they  are  pure,  unadulterated  fiction. 
This  myopic  view  of  economy,  the  refusal  to  expand  and  provide  a 
public  service  which  is  self-supporting,  the  refusal  to  provide  ade- 
quate staff  to  combat  fraud  by  establishing  efficient  quality  checks  and 
legal  assistance,  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  understand. 

Like  the  Bureau  of  Customs,  the  Internal  Revenue  Service,  and 
the  Government's  security  agencies,  every  additional  facility  and  em- 
ployee of  the  Passport  Office  not  only  adds  to  Federal  revenue,  but 
makes  a  substantial  contribution  to  the  containment  of  fraud  and 
the  security  of  this  Nation. 

Like  every  other  American  citizen,  I  am  a  taxpayer  but  I  resent 
paying  taxes  to  finance  crime  and  its  disastrous  results.  I  would 
rather  pay  taxes  to  finance  the  requirements  and  facilities  for  crime 
prevention  and  stiff  penalties  for  violators.  I  think  I  may  have  some 
supporters  in  this  view. 

I  am  fully  aware  of  the  wrath  that  this  statement  will  engender  in 
some  quarters,  but  the  time  has  come  to  put  the  cards  on  the  table, 
and  I  hope  that  I  have  presented  my  hand  clearly  and  with  proper 
emphasis.  I  am  fully  prepared  to  face  the  consequences. 

Mr.  Sotjrwine.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  no  more  questions  to  ask  of 
this  witness. 

The   Chairman.  Miss  Knight,  we  are   very  grateful   to  you   tor 
coming  up  here  in  response  to  our  summons.  I  think  you  have  been 
frank  with  us,  and  I  think  we  have  been  discussing  a  situation  that 
called  for  frankness.  The  committee  is  indebted  to  you. 
We  will  now  stand  in  recess  subject  to  the  call  of  the  Chair. 


INDEX 


(Note. — The  Senate  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  attaches  no  significance 
to  the  mere  fact  of  the  appearance  of  the  name  of  an  individual  or  organization 
in  this  index.) 

A 

Page 

AAA  Lifetime  Rubber  Stamp  Co 35 

Abel  case 17 

Abel,  Col.  Rudolf 29 

Acheson,  Secretary 27 

Afghanistan 4,  5,  8,  9 

Africa 23 

Aguiar,  Jose 17 

American  Express 9 

Atlantic  City,  N.J 22 

Australia 5 

B 

Babich,  Tony 28 

Baker,  Wilber  Chapman 24 

Bangkok,  Thailand 5,  9 

Barber,  Ossip 25 

Bartley,  William  H 35 

Belcher,  Warren  J 24 

Blatt,  Edward 25 

Borovich,  Colonel 28 

Brazil 24 

Brotherhood  of  Eternal  Love  (organization) 4-6,  34-36 

Browder,  Earl 22,  25,  26 

Browder  v.  U.S -, 17 

Buffalo  Strike  Force 34,  35 

Bureau  of  Customs 2,  4,  42 

Bureau  of  Narcotics  and  Dangerous  Drugs  (BNDD) 2-5 

Bureau  of  Security  and  Consular  Affairs 37 

Burtan,  Dr.  William  Gregory 25 

C 

Cabinet  Committee  on  International  Narcotics  Control 3 

California,  State  of 4,  5,  29 

State  Franchise  Tax  Board 5 

Camden,  N.J 23 

Canada 5,  28 

Canadian  Government 17 

"Canadian  Passport:  No  Spy  Lacks  One"  (news  item) 17,  28 

Carney,  Richard 35 

Carr,  Sam 28,  29 

Caudill,  Thomas  Gary 5 

Cavacante,  Joanne  (or  Cavalcante) 35 

Chambers,  Whittaker 12 

China 25,  27,  28 

Chinese  Exclusion  Act  of  1882 27 

Chinese  frauds 14 

Circuit  Court  of  Appeals 22,  23 

Civil  War  in  Spain 21 

Cobalt,  Ontario 29 

Collins,  Thomas 35 

(I) 


II 

Page 

Comintern 25,  26,  28 

Communist 12,  14,  25-27 

Communist  Party 25-27 

Communist  Party  of  Canada 29 

Communist  Party,  USA . 22,  25 

"Communist  Passport  Frauds"  (staff  study) 14,  17 

Comparative  Summary  of  Criminal  Prosecutions  for  Years   1967,   1968, 

1969  (May)  (table) 20 

Connecticut,  State  of 2,  5 

Czechoslovakian  intelligence 17 

D 

Daily  Worker  (newspaper) 26 

Daley,  Donald 34 

"Deception,  The"  (book) 12 

Delinquent  Passport  Fraud  Investigations  (table) 41 

Department  of  Health,  Education,  and  Welfare 4 

Department  of  Justice 2,  26 

Department  of  State 1,  3,  4,  15,  23,  33,  35,  37,  40,  42 

Office  of  Security 4,  6,  32-34 

Devine,  Pat 25 

Devine,  William 35 

District  Court,  District  of  California 17 

Division  of  Vital  Statistics 4 

Dominican  Republic 11,  17 

Dozenberg,  Nicholas 26 

Dubna  (Soviet  "atom  city") 29 

Duggan,  William 15,  16,  34 

Duncan,  Renault,  a/k/a  Duncan  Renaldo 23 

E 

Earl  Browder  case 22,  23 

East  Asia 10 

East  Germany 17,  26 

Eastland,  Senator  James  O 1-42 

Egyptian  Consulate  General,  New  York 25 

Eisler,  Gerhard 26 

Epstein,  Schacne 26 

Espionage  Act 20 

Espionage  Act  of  1917 21 

Executive  Order 20 

F 

Far  East 10,25,28 

FBI  (Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation) 26,  29 

Feierabend,  Albert 25 

Fiordeliso,  Thomas 35 

Frad,  William  D 23 

Fuchs,  Klaus 29 

G 

Gage,  Nicholas 13 

Gannes,  Harry 26 

Gentile,  G.  Marvin 33,34,36,40 

German  Reichstag 26 

Gomes,  Manuel  D 24 

Gorham,  Fred  W 23 

Gouzenko,  Igor 28,  29 

Gouzenko  papers 17 

Greeks 20 

Griffin,  Norman  J 24 

GRU  (Military  Intelligence) 29 

Gurney,  Senator  Edward  J 1-42 


Ill 

H  Page 

Hall,  David 35 

Hawkins,  Steve 35 

Henderson,  Loy 16 

Hitler 28 

Hong  Kong 27 

House  Appropriations  Committee 34 

House  Appropriations  Subcommittee 15 

H.R.  109 2 

I 

IBM  Selectric  typewriter 13,  14 

Illinois,  State  of 2 

Immigration  Department 30 

Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service 2,  15,  35 

Immigration  Service 27 

Internal  Revenue  Service 4,  42 

Internal  Security  Act 22 

International  Brigade 28,  29 

Investigations  Pending  in  S  Y  for  over  90  Days  as  of  June  30,  1972  (table) .  37-40 

Iron  Curtain 10 

IRS  Intelligence 35 

Italians 20 

J 

Jacson,  Fred 29 

Japan 28 

Johnson,  Richard 26 

Jones,  Eddie 35 

Jones,  James 14 

Josephson,  Leon 26 

K 

Kabul,  Afghanistan 4,  8 

Kaufman,  Ronald 12 

KGB 29 

King,  Dr.  Martin  Luther 28 

Klausen,  Max 28 

Knight,  Frances  G 1-42 

Kroger,  Peter  and  Helen 29 

Kuhn,  Karl 25 

Kweit,  Harry 25 

L 

Laguna  Beach 35 

Latchford,  Frank  E 35 

Latin  America 10 

Latvian  passport 25 

League  of  Spiritual  Discovery  (LSD) 5 

Leamington 29 

Leary,  Dr.  Timothy 4,  5,  12,36 

Lee,  John 24 

Lewis,  Sam  (a/k/a  "Canine") 35 

Lewis,  Georgia 35 

Lifetime  Recordings 35 

Lincoln  Rochester  Bank 35 

Liptzen,  Samuel 26 

Litvakoff ,  Isaac 26 

Long,  Howard 24 

Lonsdale,  Gordon 29 

Los  Angeles  Field  Office 34 

Lost  and/or  Stolen  Passports  Reported  by  Country  (table) 7 

Ly  Shew  v.  Acheson 17 


IV 

M  Page 

McLaughlin,  Edward  J 13 

Macomber,  William,  Jr 37 

Man,  Alan  Nunn 29 

Massing,  Hede 12 

Mercader,  Ramon 28,  29 

Mexico 11,29 

Miller,  Isidore  Jack 26 

Milstein,  Mikhail 29 

Modesto,  Calif 17 

Molody,  Col.  Konon 29 

Monroe  County  Clerk's  Office 35 

Montreal 28 

Moran  Motors,  Inc 24 

Morning  Freiheit  (newspaper) 26 

Murphy,  Congressman  Morgan  F 2 

N 

National  Research  Councl 29 

New  Delhi 9 

New  Jerse}r,  State  of 5 

New  Left 4 

New  York 12-14,  22,  23,  25 

New  York  City 26 

New  York  County 23 

New  York  Passport  Agency 42 

New  York  Times  (newspaper) 12,  13,  34 

New  Zealand 29 

NKVD 29 

Noulens,  Hilaire 28 

O 

Orange  County,  Calif 4,  35 

District  Attorney 4 

"Organized  Crime  Selling  Official  (Forged)  Papers"  (article) 13 

Osband,  Lester  W 35 

Ottawa 28 

P 

Passport  Advisory  Division 41 

Passport  Agency 25 

Passport  Division 15,  25,  27 

Passport  Field  Agencies 42 

Passport  Fraud  Program 37 

Passport  Frauds  for  Years  1967,  1968,  1969  (January  to  May)  (table) 18 

Passport  Office 1-4,  6,  8-11,  14-16 

Legal  Division 3,  9,  11,  15,  16,  32,  34,  36,  37 

Enforcement  Branch 16 

Passport  Office  Issuances  (Fiscal  Years  1955-1972)  (table) 31 

Passport  Office  Statistics — Collections  and  Operating  Costs  (table) 31 

Passports  Lost  or  Stolen  in  Significant  Drug  Areas  of  the  World  (table)  _  _  7 

Peiping  Peach  Conference 2T 

Percentage  of  Officially  Reported  Lost  or  Stolen  Passports  As  Compared 

to  Total  Passports  Issued  (table) 8 

Philadelphia  Chinese  cases 21,  24,  27 

Philadelphia  fraud  cases 18 

Philippines 11 

Pontecorvo,  Bruno 29 

Portof  New  York 22 

Press,  Robert  T 24 

Puerto  Rico 11 

R 

Rabinovich,  Hermine 29 

Ray,  Earl 28 

RCMP  (Royal  Canadian  Mounted  Police) 28 

Renault  Duncan  case 23 

Reubens- Robinson  case 18 


Page 

Richardson,  Elliot  L 16 

Ritchie,  James  L 34 

Rochester,  N.Y 35 

Rooney,  Congressman  John 37 

Rose,  Fred i      28 

Rubens- Robinson  case 21,  23,  25 

Russia 23,  28 

S 

Scroggs,  Raymond 34 

Secret  Service 25 

Secretary  of  State 20 

Sharfin,  Aaron 25 

Sing  Kee 24 

Smith,  John 14 

Soghanalian,  Sarkis 34 

Sorge,  Richard 28 

Sourwine,  J.  G 1-42 

Soviet 20,23,25,26,28,29 

Soviet  Embassy,  Montreal 29 

Soviet  Government 17 

Soviet  intelligence _   17 

Soviet  Military  Intelligence  Service 25,  26 

Soviet  Union." 21,  26,  27 

Spencer,  Victor 29 

Spain 28 

Spanish  Civil  War 28,29 

Special  Task  Force 5 

Stalin 28,29 

State  Joint  Legislative  Committee  on  Crime 13 

Statute  of  Limitations 21,  22,  26 

Steele,  Congressman  Robert  H 2 

Sultan,  Joseph 26 

Sunday  Star  (newspaper) 28 

Supreme  Court 22,  23 

Switzerland 5 

Syracuse,  N.Y 35 

T 

Thailand 5 

Tokhi,  Amanullah  Salam 5 

Tokhi,  H ayatuuah 5 

Toronto  Telegram  News  Service 28 

"Trader  Horn"  (movie) 23 

Trotsky,  Leon 29 

U 

Under  Secretarv  of  State 16 

United  States.! 1,  3,  4,  5,  8,  11,  12,  16,  17,  21,  27 

Code 20,21,22,  24,  25 

Commissioner 24 

District  Attorney 26 

District  Court 24 

Boston 25 

Brooklyn,  N.Y 23 

Southern  District  of  New  York 23 

Western  District  of  New  York 35 

U.S.  Government 32,34,  36 

W 

Warszower,  Welwel 22,  23,  26 

Washington 26,  28,  35 

Watson,  Barbara 37 

Welwel  Warszower  case 22 

Wiener,  Robert  William 22 

William  D.  Frad  case 23 


VI 

Page 

20 
Wilson,  President ,,„ 

Witczak,  Ignacy 9 

"World  Heroin  Problem"  (report) * 

World  Tourist,  Inc ~z  0,  97 

World  War  I f>  j*>  ii 

World  War  II M,Z\,lb,U,M 

Worthington,  Peter 

Z  29 

Zabotin,  Colonel 

o    . 


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