Skip to main content

Full text of "Testimony of Wladyslaw Tykocinski. Hearing, Eighty-ninth Congress, second session. April 6, 1966"

See other formats








APRIL 6, 1966 

Printed for the use of the 
Committee on Un-American Activities 

HARVARD coll:.-. . 


OCT 14 1956 

62-931 O WASHINGTON : 1966 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 25 cents 


United States House of REPBESENTATiviiS 
EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana, Chairman 

JOE R. POOL, Texas DEL CLAWSON, California 


GEORGE F. SENNER, Jr., Arizona 

Francis J. McNamara, Director 

William Hitz, General Counsel 

Alfred M. Nittle, Counsel 




Synopsis 851 

April 6, 1966 : Testimony of— 

Wladyslaw Tykocinski 856 

Afternoon session : 

Wladyslaw Tykocinski (resumed) 881 

Index i 


Public Law 601, 79th Congress 

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946] ; 60 
Stat. 812, which provides : 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, * * * 


Rule X 



17. Oommittee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members. 

Rule XI 


* * ***** 

(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(A) Un-American activities. 

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcom- 
mittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, 
character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, 
(ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa- 
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and at- 
tacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, 
and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any 
necessary remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the 
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such 
investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such 
times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, 
has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance 
of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and 
to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under 
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any 
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person 
designated by any such chairman or member. 


Rule XII 


Sec. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws 
and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem neces- 
sary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative 
agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the juris- 
diction of such committee ; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports 
and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of 
the Government. 


House Resolution 8, January 4, 1965 

Rule X 


1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress, 

(r) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members. 

Rule XI 



18. Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(a) Un-American activities. 

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, 
is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, char- 
acter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, 
(2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa- 
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and 
attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitu- 
tion, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress 
in any necessary remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the 
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session ) the results of any such investi- 
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times 
and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has 
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance 
of such witnesses and the production of such books, pai>ers, and documents, and 
to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under 
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any 
member designated by any such chairman, and may be ser\'ed by any person 
designated by any such chairman or member. 

* * * * * * * 

27. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in 
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, 
each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness 
of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject 
matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee ; and, for that 
purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by 
the agencies in the executive branch of the Government. 



The committee met in executive session on April 6, 1966, to receive 
testimony from Wladyslaw Tykocinski, who was head of the Polish 
Military Mission in Berlin when, on May 16, 1965, he asked for political 
asylum in the United States. 

At the time of his defection, Mr. Tykocinski had been an official in 
the Polish Ministry of Foreig:n Affairs for almost 20 years. He had 
held posts in Rome, Canberra, Vienna, and Baden-Baden; had been 
a member of tlie Polish delegation to the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York ; and vice chief of the Polish delegation to both 
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Neutral Nations 
(Truce) Supervisory Commission in Korea. He had also served as 
Chief of Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As Chief of 
the Military Mission in Berlin, he held the rank of minister. 

For 6 years of his service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — from 
1946 to 1952— Mr. Tykocinski's Foreign Service posts had been used 
to cover his operations as an officer of Z-2, the Polish military intelli- 
gence service. 

Shortly before he testified before the committee, he was tried in 
absentia and sentenced to death by a secret militai-y tribunal in Warsaw 
on the charge that he had betrayed his country by giving state secrets 
to U.S. intelligence agencies. In his testimony before the committee, 
Mr. Tykocinski stated that, prior to his defection, he had had no 
connections whatsoever with U.S. intelligence agencies. 

The Polish Military Mission in Berlin had about 50 members in it 
at the time of his defection, Mr. Tykocinski stated. He estimated 
that about 38 of these people had intelligence assignments, working 
either for Z-2 or the secret police, which is generally known as UB 
(Urzad Bezpieczenstwa — Office of Security) . 

Mr. Tykocinski testified that he had defected because the Stalinists, 
or hard-liners, were returning to power in Poland. He stated that 
Mieczyslaw Moczar, the new Minister of Interior, who directs the secret 
police, or UB, is also "the chief of the new hard-liners in the Commu- 
nist Party," and w\as flooding his Mission in Berlin, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and other departments of government with his agents. 

The return of the Stalinist-type Communist to power in Poland, 
Mr. Tykocinski testified, combined with doubts he had had for many 
years, with Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin, and similar develop- 
ments, led to his having quarrels with other officials and a realization 
that he could no longer remain a Communist. 

After two "sharp conversations," one with the Polish Ambassador 
in East Berlin and the other with the chief of the Foreign Division 
of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, Tykocinski 
noticed that he and his home were under surveillance by UB agents. 
He decided then that if he did not defect immediately, he would be 
shipped back to Poland and never have a chance to do so again. 



Mr. Tykocinski testified that, while serving as an agent of Polish 
Military Intelligence in Baden-Baden, Vienna, and Rome, his prin- 
cipal assignment was obtaining information about the military forces 
of all Western powers, particularly those in NATO. It was also part 
of his assignment to collect technical and industrial data. Local Com- 
munist parties were used for intelligence purposes, he said, until about 
1952 when, after some of them were compromised by "mishaps," an 
order was sent out from Moscow directing that they not be used except 
when it was "safe or necessary." 

Communist intelligence agents, he said, made special efforts to cul- 
tivate military personnel and industrialists. A special committee for 
technical collaboration abroad had representatives in trade delegations 
and missions and assisted tJB and Z-2 in their intelligence gathering 
functions. He also stated that the cultural exchange program was 
being used by the Communists for intelligence purposes. 

His major mission, while stationed in Rome in 1950-52, was to devise 
means for certain Italian Communists to escape from Italy to Poland. 
These people, he said, had been involved in Polish espionage opera- 
tions and also in the assassination of other Communists who had been 
involved in the theft of millions of dollars belonging to the Italian 
Government. Mussolini was trying to get out of the country with 
these funds in 1945 when he was killed by Communist partisans. 

Tykocinski said that his U.N. experience revealed that all Com- 
munist-bloc U.N. delegations are completely controlled by Moscow 
and vote as the Soviet delegates instruct them. Regular meetings of 
bloc delegates, he said, are held at the Soviet estate in Glen Cove, 
Long Island, where plans are made in advance concerning how votes 
will be cast on all matters brought before the United Nations. More- 
over, Soviet control over bloc nations in the U.N. was exercised not 
only on votes to be cast, but the content and length of speeches to be 
made and even the epithets that would be used against the United 
States and the frequency of their use in a given speech. 

The same was true, he testified, concerning the Communist-bloc dele- 
gations to the Neutral Nations Commissions in Korea, with the excep- 
tion that, with Moscow's approval, it was Peking which gave orders 
to them. Ma Mu-min, the Red Chinese official from whom Mr. Tyko- 
cinski received orders, subsequently went to North Vietnam to serve 
as "the principal secret adviser of Ho Chi Minh." 

One of the tactics used by the Communists in dealing with neutral 
nations serving on U.N. Commissions, Mr. Tykocinski stated, was to 
berate one or more of them in an effort to cow the others. The Re- 
patriation Commission in Korea, for example, was made up of repre- 
sentatives of Communist Poland and Czechoslovakia and of neutral 
India, Sweden, and Switzerland. The members of the Polish and 
Czech delegations were instructed by their Chinese Communist bosses 
to "sharply" attack members of the Swiss and Swedish delegations in 
front of the Indian representatives "so that the Indians get afr^d and 
will be easier to train." 

He also testified that the Communist nations do not believe in the 
principles of the United Nations, but use the U.N. only to advance 
the interests of the Soviet Union and Communist policy. 


Commenting on U.S. Communist Party claims that increased trade 
with Communist-bloc nations would create new jobs and profits for 
the United States, Tykocinski said that Communist countries are in- 
terested in trade with the West because of their economic difficulties. 
On a number of occasions, he heard high Polish officials discuss the 
chaotic economic situation that existed in the Soviet Union after 
Khrushcliev's fall from power. This created economic difficulties for 
all Commmiist-bloc comitries and made them determine that they 
should try to increase their trade w4th the West in an eifort to close 
some of their commodity and production gaps. 

Contrary to the rosy picture of conditions in Poland painted by 
Communist propagandists, Tykocinski stated that a feeling of grim 
despair pervades the country. It has been brought about by the return 
of the hard-liners and by the imposition over many years of a low- 
standard of living, in an effort to accomplish industrialization. He 
said it is "not possible" to force further industrialization of Poland at 
the same pace, that some respite must be given the people. There is a 
saying in Poland that "the government is only pretending to pay the 
W'Orkers, so the workers are only pretending to work," he said. 

Gomulka resists suggestions for reforms, is becoming more isolated, 
disliked, and even loathed by the people, Tykocinski stated. His fear 
that more active resistance against his regime might develop among 
the people has prompted him to return the hard-line Communists to 
power. The Communist Party which he rules is "ideologically al- 
most dead." It is no more than an instrument of his power. 

62-931 O — 66- 



United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ B.C. 
executive session ^ 

The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to call, 
at 10 :10 a.m., in Room 429, Cannon House Office Building, Washing- 
ton, D.C., Hon. William M. Tuck presiding. 

Committee members present: Representatives William M. Tuck, of 
Virginia; Joe R. Pool, of Texas; Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri; 
George F. Senner, Jr., of Arizona; Charles L. Weltner, of Georgia; 
John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio; Del Clawson, of California ; and John H. 
Buchanan, Jr., of Alabama. 

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; William 
Hitz, general counsel ; and Alfred M. Nittle, counsel. 

Mr. Tuck. The committee will please come to order. 

This hearing is being held pursuant to this committee's enabling 
resolution which directs it to investigate subversive and un-Ameri- 
can — and that certainly includes Communist — propaganda dissemi- 
nated within the United States, whether it comes from internal agents 
of the Communist movement or from foreign Communist govern- 

In addition to the propaganda disseminated in this country by 
domestic Communist groups, many millions of pieces of Communist 
literature are sent into the United States each year from Moscow, 
Prague, Budapest, Peking, Havana, and other Communist capitals. 
This propaganda covers many subjects — events and issues in Viet- 
nam, in Red China, Korea, Berlin, and also, of course, the Soviet 
Union and its satellites. It is designed to mislead the American Gov- 
ernment, the Congress, and the people and, in so doing, to assist the 
ultimate Communist goal of world conquest. 

The committee is fortunate today in having as a witness a man who, 
because of his background and experience, is in an excellent position 
to cut through the fog of this propaganda and to tell us, with au- 
thority, what the true Communist goals are, the tactics and devices 
they are using to achieve them and to undermine the security of the 
United States, and also what the facts are in regard to many issues 
which are the subjects of intensive Communist propaganda cam- 

Will the witness please rise and be sworn ? 

1 Released by the committee and ordered to be printed. 



Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before 
this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I swear. 

Mr. Tuck. Proceed, Mr. McNamara. 


Mr. MoNamara. Will you state your full name for the record, 
please ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Wladyslaw Tykocinski. 

Mr. McNamara. Are you a resident of the United States at the 
present time ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Are you a citizen of the United States ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No. 

Mr. McNamara. Of what country are you a citizen ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I am now a foreign resident here in the United 
States as I am sentenced to death in Poland, so I don't think that I have 
any citizenship there now. 

Mr. McNamara. You were born in Poland ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I was born in Poland. 

Mr. McNamara. When and where? 

Mr. Tykocinski. At the 20th of May 1924 in Bialystok. 

Mr. McNamara. In what part of Poland is Bialystok? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is the eastern part of Poland. 

Mr. McNamara. When did you come to the United States ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I came to the United States 10 months ago. 

Mr. McNamara. Had you previously asked for political asylum in 
this country ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I asked for political asylum in the United States. 

Mr. McNamara. When and where did you do that ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I did that in Berlin when I came over. 

Mr. McNamara. On what date was that? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That was the 16th day of May 1965. 

Mr. McNamara. What were you doing in Berlin at the time you 
asked for political asylum in the United States? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I was the Chief of the Polish Military Mission in 
West Berlin with the rank of minister. 

Mr. McNamara. You were Chief of the Polish Military Mission ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Were you a member of the Polish military ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. At this time, no, because that is only the name. 
Military Mission. That is from the times of the military occupation 
of Germany, so the name of the Military Mission remained but they 
are now diplomatic missions. 

Mr. McNamara. Mr. Tykocinski, I won't go into detail at the pres- 
ent time as regards the different posts you liave held, but is it not a 
fact that you have been in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Polish Government for approximately 20 years; that you have served 
in Rome, Canberra, Vienna, Baden-Baden, the United Nations in 
New York, with United Nations commissions in Panmunjom. Korea, 
and that von hnve been Chief of Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Poland ? 


Mr. Tykocinski. That is true. 

Mr. McNamara. Have you ever been a member of the Communist 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes ; I was. 

Mr. McNamara. In addition to being a member of the Communist 
Party and an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have you 
served in the Polish intelligence service? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes; in the military intelligence service. 

Mr. McNamara. You mentioned before that you are living under 
a so'i'^o^-.r^p of death, 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell the committee why this is so ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I read in the newspapers that the Polish press 
service stated that I was sentenced by the Supreme Military Tribunal 
to death for treason, that I worked for Americans. 

Mr. McNamara. I have an item here from an American newspaper, 
dated February 16, 1966, a UPI dispatch from Warsaw, announcing 
the fact that you liad been tried in absentia and sentenced to death. 

'llie accusation is — a secret military tribunal claimed — that you had 
connections with American intelligence, that you had been giving it 
certain information, and that you had tried to persuade other persons 
to engage in betrayal. Is this so? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No. 

Mr. McNamara. Prior to your defection, had you ever been in con- 
tact with U.S. intelligence agents ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No ; I was not. 

Mr. McNamara. Would you tell the committee how long you con- 
sidered defecting to the United States ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, that Avas for a longer time. I gradually lost 
my belief that the Communist Party can achieve anything good. My 
staying abroad helped me to see many things in that. 

Then practices of the Communist Party, like the purges of officials 
and of people from before the war who were officers, officials, and so 
on, and then killing off people whom I knew that they were honest. 
Then, later on, the things which Stalin prepared in the last days of 
his life, like the purge of the Jews in Poland. Later on, the letter 
of Khrushchev, the secret speech of Khrushchev in 1956, which told 
me also a lot of things about what the party is doing. 

Lastly, I had during more than a year very sharp political battles 
about the coming back of the strong men, of the hard-liners, in Poland. 
I have seen that they are on the comeback, and my Mission in Berlin 
was flooded with people of the counterintelligence, people from the 
new Minister of Interior who controlled the secret police, Mieczyslaw 
Moczar. I had sharp battles about all of that. 

Lastly, I have seen no compromise is possible for me ; that I would 
have to decide what do I do because I could not any more stand it. I 
could not stand it. I have seen that all the experiments which the 
Communists are doing are not at all for the good of the Polish people, 
that the Polish people are still suffering from that, and now the hard- 
liners are coming again with their old ways. So I had to decide and 
I decided this. That was a gradual process during the years which 
grew and grew. 


I seeked for compromises with myself, but lastly I have seen that 
there cannot be more compromise because I cannot honestly associate 
myself in the name of the Communist Party there. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell us, once you made your final de- 
cision to defect, how you went about doing so ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, let me explain that the last day before my 
coming over I had two sharp conversations, one with the chief of the 
Foreign Division of the Polish Communist Party Central Com- 
mittee, and the other with the Polish Ambassador in East Berlin, 
Feliks Baranowski, also about politics. 

Then at Sunday I thought that if I will not decide that, they will 
i«ll me that I should come back to the East and then it would be too 
late to decide. Then also I have seen that they are going about my 
home, that I am under observation and so on, and then I had to do it 

Mr. McNamara. You say you were under observation ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you be more specific on that point? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, I have seen two or three of the i)eople whom 
I knew from UB being around the house and then I have seen some 
others that must be explained, for instance, on the upper floor of my 
house, an officer of intelligence who had to supervise me in the last 
time, who was my chauffeur. Then I have seen that the windows are 
closed and behind the windows they are staying and watching, also, 

I have got with my wife to go for a walk and to tell her my 
troubles and problems. I had done so for the last days already. I 
tried to explain to her my political problems and so on, that I cannot 
stand it more and so on, and when we come back to the house I have 
seen all that. 

So, I have got to the Americans and asked for political asylum ; then 
immediately we came together with some of the Americans to my 
house. I wanted to take my wife and my child, but my wife didn't 
want to follow me. That was, of course, a great blow ; I didn't expect 

Mr, McNamara, You saw people from UB watching your home ? 

Mr, Tykocinski, Yes, 

Mr. McNamara, Wliat is the UB ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is the secret police. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell us what the initials "UB" stand 

Mr, Tykocinski, It means the Office of Security. 

Mr. McNamara. You were in West Berlin, Germany, with the Mil- 
itary Mission for approximately 8 years ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara, Could you tell the committee the main purpose 
or objective of the Mission ? 

Mr, Tykocinski, As for me, I saw this objective politically ; that 
means tried to establish better relations with West Germany, but at 
the last time it was not possible at all to do it because the whole 
Mission — which was a big one ; it had more than 50 people — was pene- 
trated by people from the secret police and they had their own pur- 
poses, which were not making policy in Germany, 

Mr, McNamara, What were you duties as Chief of the Mission ? 


Mr. Tykocinski. Contact the political personalities. For years, 
I tried to establisli diplomatic relations with West Germany. I had 
conversations with higher officials and with party members and so 
on. I had political duties ; tried to sell the Rapacki Plan ; also propa- 
ganda duties, to make the export of Polish propaganda to West 

Of course, in the Communist state you cannot separate propaganda 
from cultural and scientific exchange because it is very strongly cor- 
related. Wlien you are speaking about what you should do with 
Western countries about cultural exchange and so on, you also speak 
about the propaganda value of such things. 

Well, then I had also politically to say to Warsaw what the situa- 
tion is in West Germany; there were certain problems w^hich they 
were interested in. That would be like that. 

Mr. McNamara. In other Avords, your work there, although you 
were head of a military mission, was primarily diplomatic and 
political ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Political. 

Mr. McNamara. Now, did you also have a military mission of any 

Mr. Tykocinski. There in Berlin, no; but in other posts, yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you have an intelligence function when you 
were stationed in Berlin ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In Berlm, no, I did not have an intelligence 
function, but I had contacts with the residents of the Polish intel- 
ligence and counterintelligence and I knew approximately who their 
people are. 

Mr. McNamara. You mentioned the fact that the Mission was a 
relatively large one, with over 50 people in it. 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. About how many of those people would you esti- 
mate had intelligence assignments ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Lastly, 38. 

Mr. McNamara. Roughly 38. How did you know that they had 
intelligence assignments ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Theoretically, the residents had to tell me about 
everybody who is working for them for military or counterintelligence, 
because I was the Chief of the Mission. They didn't have to tell me 
what they are doing, but they did have to theoretically tell me who they 
are. They didn't tell me about all, but about a part they did. So I 
talked to them that I have the right to know wlio they are. So, they 
told me some more, and as to the rest I oriented myself because I knew 
something about these things and I could see what the man is doing. 
About a part of it, they told me who they are. 

Mr. McNamara. You said tliat the residents told you this. What 
do you mean by the "residents" ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I mean the illegal residents who were lastly direct- 
ing the work of the Mission, sitting in East Berlin. They were sitting 
in East Berlin and they were sending out their people with directives 
what they have to do, and the Mission was working. 

Mr. McNamara. The "resident," in general, is the top intelligence 
man in any Embassy, post, apparatus, or spy ring; is that correct? 


Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. But these were all outside the Mission. All 
outside, the illegal ones. These ones were the illegal ones. 

Mr. McNamara. These were the "illegal" residents in the sense they 
were not in the country legitimately under the cover of Mission 
officials ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

4! <: * * * * * 

Mr. McNamara. Did you see any reports that were gathered by the 
residents and sent back to Warsaw to the headquarters of the UB ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. For some time they showed me some political 
reports without names, that means the names were already cut off there 
like, for instance, about the situation among the expellees from Poland. 
I suppose now that that may have been material from the Czechoslovak 
spy, a member of the West German Parliament, arrested in West Ger- 
many. His name was Alfred Frenzel. So, such political things with- 
out names they showed me, but purely intelligence reports ; no. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell us what type of information, in 
general, they were concentrating on and interested in collecting in 

Mr. Tykocinski. In Berlin — and they tried to work also for West 
Germany, not only for Berlin — our competence was also for West 

Well, I would say tw^o lines, the civilian and the military line. As to 
the military, there is such a problem. The Polish military attache 
in Denmark was expelled by the Danes so the whole structure of the 
military intelligence was a little bit changed and Berlin acquired a 
greater role, because from this post they had to control not only the 
German, but also the Scandinavian direction. They both play a role 
in Soviet strategical thinking. 

So, now, the military attache of the Polish Mission in West Berlin 
received the so-called first-class rank of the Polish military attaches, 
and he had to collect all sorts of information from West Germany un- 
der their direction. He was also interested in military information 
about countries which are western neighbors of West Germany, as 
Belgium, because their major task was to establish as much data as pos- 
sible about the West German Army and her links with other Western 

I have seen some military reports, and they were also, as a matter 
of fact, a matter of importance for my political reports to Warsaw. 
But I have seen theirs, too, and I know what they were primarily mter- 
ested in — interested in the West German Army, in communication links 
going to West Germany. 

As to Berlin, all military specialists from the Eastern countries 
were interested in one thing : Work out every detail in order to help 
establish plans of disrupting communications, of creating incidents; 
that means alwa;ys have every possible detail which could help in 
creating trouble with regard to air lanes and other ways of access. 

Now, as to the civilian part. The secret j>olice, they had to occupy 
themselves what I know with Radio Free Europe, with the Polish 
emigre monthly, Kultura^ in Paris because Gomulka does not like it. 

Mr. McNamara. Wliat is the Polish Kultura? 


Mr. Tykocinski. That is a monthly which has plenty of material 
from Poland, and Gomulka Vv^ould like to know how these materials are 
commg out of Poland. Kultura has good materials. 

Ml". McNamara. Is it opposed to the Communist regime in Poland? 

Mr. Tykocinski. It is opposed to the Communist regime. I tell 
you that I know only parts of tliat. They would like to know how 
materials come out of Poland, how other journalists are receiving ma- 
terials in Warsaw, how Embassies are receiving — that means the ways 
materials go out of Poland. 

They tried, also, to work through the Poles in West Germany. 
There are about 150,000 Poles. They tried to get to them through 
the consular work which they were doing; then through different 
cultural associations and through exchange of radio, television, and 
press exchange. Their people worked also in my press division. 
So they knew everything about who is asking for advice as to go to 
Poland, and so on, and they could propose some of them as to try 
to make of him an agent. 

***** * * 

Mr. McNamara. Do you know whether or not the intelligence op- 
eratives in your Mission and who worked under your Mission suc- 
ceeded in finding out how this information was getting out of Poland 
to these Western journals? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, what I know only is that once they heard 
from one journalist who is, in my opinion, a very good man, but 
maybe not always prudent, they heard about some materials from 
him, that it got to the American Embassy in Warsaw, tliat was about 
an illegal brochure of the Polish Communists, of the ex-hard-liners. 

They were opposed to Gomulka so they had to quit their jobs, and 
so on, but they published some illegal pamphlets to party officials. 
This fellow said' that he saw it at the American Embassy, or some- 
thing like that ; he was not prudent enough. 

Mr. McNamara. Who was this man ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is a writer, . What I know is that 

he was only unprudent. Because he has a very good name, they tried 
only to get friendly with him because he talks from time to time. 
He needs this contact also because he writes and goes there, but I 
don't think that there could be anything intentional. 

Mr. McNamara. How effective do you believe the overall intelli- 
gence operation of your Mission was in Berlin ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In Berlin and in West Germany: Well, I don't 
think it was very effective, because they made also out of Berlin a 
stage for their people to go later to higher ranks in other places. 
They sent plenty of people to work there for a year or two in order 
to have a cover that they could have a higher rank later in the Min- 
istry of Foreign Affairs and be sent to different other posts. 

So, that was a sort of base for their people to cover up for some 
time and then to get some little practice and to get the possibility 
of having a higher rank. So many of those people were not ready ; 
they didn't have much practice. 

Mr. McNamara. Had they been trained ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I believe they were in Poland, but I don't know 

62-931 O — 66 3 


Mr. McNamara. Were they well equipped for their duties in the 
sense, for example, that they understood foreign languages ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No, but in the last time it was an improvement. 
About education, one thing I wanted to say, in the Polish Academy for 
Foreign Service, there were three secret lists which were kept in the 
Foreign Service that divided the students in three branches; those 
purely in foreign service, those in military intelligence, and those in 
civil intelligence or the secret police, and that was a top-secret docu- 
ment. So, only a few persons knew which students are already study- 
ing to work for military intelligence, which ones will work for secret 
police, and which ones for the foreign service. 

Mr. McNamara. This academy which you refer to was ostensibly 
a purely academic institution for training people in diplomacy; is 
that correct ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. Officially; yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Now, was it normal, to the best of your knowledge, 
to send to a foreign post so many people who were not too well equipped 
for intelligence duties? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell us why this situation existed in 

Mr. Tykocinski. Because they considered probably that that is a 
good training for those people to get a feeling for the subsequent 
further career ; it is not far from Warsaw. Then they have always a 
secure base in East Berlin. Then the residents are sitting there in 
relative security when they are not coming under cover to West Berlin. 
And the residents could look after those people. So it is a good post to 
have them in, as I said, to set the stage. 

Mr. McNamara. They could sort of get on-the-job training; it was 
a good place to break them in ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Now, was this also due to the fact that there was 
a new Minister of the Interior who had adopted a certain policy ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes ; it is true. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell us generally what that policy was 
and who this man is? 

Mr. Tykocinski. His name is Mieczyslaw Moczar. He is the Min- 
ister of Interior. 

Mr. McNamara. And the Ministry of the Interior is the Ministry 
which directs the UB, the intelligence service; is that correct? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes; that is correct, and he is having in his own 
hands not only the UB. He is also the chief of the new hard-liners 
in the Communist Party, which consists of the so-called Partisan 
group; that means the people who were during the war in the Com- 
munist parties and units in Poland; then from ex-members of the 
Stalinist group and a great part of the party apparatus. 

He is the most prominent hard-liner ; he is making, in the name of 
Gomulka, a special policy of takinar back again under more strong 
supeiTision the whole situation in Poland because the people are apa- 
thetic, they are resigned, they don't want to work too much, and Gomul- 
ka is fearing strikes. He is fearing passive resistance, which can 
become much stronger under certain circumstances. So he puts back 
again the hard-line to power, and the prominent chief is Moczar. 


Well, he is taking over by his men certain crucial posts in the Polish 
Government. For instance, more and more his men are taking over the 
Foreign Ministry, the Foreign Trade Ministry, and also their repre- 
sentation abroad, and especially the propaganda, radio, television, and 
so on. So, in this policy, of course, his men also penetrate more and 
more such posts as the Mission in West Berlin. 

Mr. McNamara, You stated before that you are familiar with the 
identities of the residents and agents in Berlin. 

Could you state for the record the names of these people, at least the 
key operatives? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

The resident of the UB ; his name was Kalinski.^ The resident of 
the military intelligence 

Mr. McNamara. That is Z-2, military intelligence? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. For the military intelligence Z-2, was Rosz- 

Mr, McNamara. Could you give us their first names, as well as their 

Mr. Tykocinski. I don't know their first names. 

Mr. McNamara. Can you name some of the others who worked under 
them, the key people who had diplomatic or official cover of one kind 
or another ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. The key people. Lucjan Lik, the deputy 
chief of the secretariat in the Polish Military Mission. 

Then Ernest Kucza, the chief of the Press Division in the Polish 
Military Mission. 

Czeslaw Gaska, second secretary and assistant press attache, and 
many, many others. 

Those would be the key ones. 

Mr. McNamara. Mr. Tykocinski, since the end of World War II, 
on the issue of Berlin, we have had a series of crises. They have been 
regular occurrences, dating back to the airlift in 1948. We have also 
had many minor incidents : The Communist forces stopping U.S. con- 
voys on the road to Berlin ; the buzzing of planes in the air corridor. 
As a result of these incidents there has been a lot of concern in this 
country about the possibility of a war over Berlin. It is definitely a 
hot spot in the cold war. 

At the same time these events have been taking place, the U.S. Com- 
munist Party, the Soviet Union, and other Communist nations have 
been urging the United States to demilitarize Berlin, to negotiate 
with the U.S.S.R. to settle the Berlin question. 

Here is one example of their propaganda line : In 1964, when the At- 
torney General petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board in 
this country to hold a hearing on the youth group. Advance, in New 
York to find it a Communist front, he did what he normally does in 
such cases, that is, he listed a number of issues on which this group 
followed completely the Communist Party line. 

One of those items was this : That Advance advocated "the with- 
drawal of the American Armed Forces from Berlin" and urged the 
acceptance of "the ofi'er of the U.S.S.E. to negotiate on Berlin." 

Now, based on your 8 years in Berlin and your contact with other 
Communist officials there, what do you believe is the basic Soviet aim 

^ Czeslaw Kalinski, according to subsequent check by committee. 


and policy in Berlin ? How would you explain these incidents ? Do 
you think there is a danger of war because of them ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I would exclude from what I say the blockade 
because, according to many opinions which I heard from high officials 
in Poland and from others during the blockade, Stalin had broader, 
high aims. But that is now very hard to judge. By broader aims, 
I mean he really believed that he can make the Americans get out of 
Berlin and take over Berlin. 

But the other actions which I know pretty well, they had more or 
less smaller aims ; that means to push on the Berlin lever in order to 
get some concrete results in Germany and elsewhere. For instance, 
to get West Germany and West Berlin into negotiations with East 
Germany; for Khrushchev to get an invitation to the United States; 
to get an invitation for a summit, and so on ; to get material and polit- 
ical gains for East Germany, for instance, by making difficulties on 
the roads. The West Germans paid to East Germany in order to have 
a tranquil situation on the roads and many, many such things. 

One tiling I would like to say. This whole thing is very well pre- 
pared and lies in the hand of the Russian military. The Russian mili- 
tary is not permitting the East Germans to make any move. Tliey 
would like in some instances, as I know, to make these actions of dis- 
rupting and of buzzing maybe broader, but the Russians say so far and 
no farther, that those are the aims ; we achieved it and that is all. 

It goes so far that during the buzzing by the jets there were special 
charts made prescribing to every jet how far it should go or how low 
it should fly over the Bundestag, the West German Parliament, when 
it had its sessions. Everything was prescribed and w^as discussed at the 
highest level in Moscow before the local plans were sent for approval to 

So, what I want to say is that they are cautious about what they 
could do there and they try, the Russians, to have always in their hand 
to use West Berlin as a weak point for the West, to achieve concrete 
political gains by putting a pressure there. 

Mr. McNamara. Military gains, too ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Political, economical, military. 

Mr. McNamara. Would you have any comments to make on the 
building of the Berlin wall ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I would cite one of the higher Soviet officers, and 
that was one of the generals, I don't recall now his name, from the 
staff of the command there and a Soviet diplomat from the Embassy. 
They spoke with me after a few days when already General Clay 
came and when there was a sharpening of atmosphere about the walls. 
So they said, now it is too late for a Western reaction ; they laughed 
about it. They said, now it is too late for a Western reaction. 

But what I would like to say : in my opinion, if there would be a 
sharper reaction from the West, they would possibly maybe in some 
places go back some meters and build there the wall, or they w^ould 
stop for a certain time. 

But later they would build the wall so and so because of the exodus 
of the population from East Germany. For them, it was a catas- 
trophic exodus and they had to allow East Germany to build the wall 
in order as not to compromise the whole Communist system there. 


The other Communist parties were also nervous about it, thinking 
what kind of a Communist country is that when there were millions 
going away ? I would say that the Russians hesitated about building 
the wall for years. I know that Gromyko and other higher Soviet 
officials were shown by the East Germans the situation for years al- 
ready; they were shown that the open frontier is "untenable" if the 
people escaped there, and so on, and they were asked for permission 
to do something. But they hesitated, and I suppose that was also 
practically a fear before the action. 

Mr. McNamara. There was one time when you gave the Polish For- 
eign Minister Mr. Adam Rapacki, I believe, the figures on the exodus. 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. What was his reaction ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. His reaction, he was plainly afraid. He said, is 
it possible? He said he must show these figures to Gomulka and he 
wrote down everything. Because that w^as during a conference of the 
leadership of the Foreign Ministry. Their reaction was quite panicky, 
that what kind of a Communist friend do we have there ; if they will 
all escape, what would happen ? They will compromise us, also. That 
would be more or less the reaction. 

Mr. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, this concludes the phase of my 
questioning concerning Mr. Tykocinski's assignment in Berlin, and I 
think that for the cohesion of this hearing record, if members have any 
questions on the ground already covered, they might want to ask them 
at this point. 

Mr. Tuck. Do the gentlemen have any questions ? 

Mr. IcHORD. I have no questions. 

Mr. Tuck. They have indicated they have none. 


Mr. McNamara. At this point, Mr. Tykocinski, I would like to go 
back to your early life and then bring you up through the different 
posts you have held. 

You were born in Poland in 1924. 

Were your parents natives of Poland? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr, McNamara. What was father's occupation? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Until the early thirties, he had a small library, 
bookshop, and later he was a manager for the estate of businessmen 
who lived abroad, but who had many properties in Bialystok and some 
other cities. 

Mr. McNamara. What was your educational background in Poland ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In Poland, I got to a private gymnasium and 
inomediate higher school combined and finished it during the Russian 
occupation of Bialystok in 1940-41. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you join the Young Communist League, or 
Komsomol ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell us when ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In 1940. 

Mr. McNamara. You were then about age 16, is that correct? 

Mr Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Why did you join the Komsomol ? 


Mr. Tykocinski. Well, they were appealing to the more active 
students there, and I considered that more or less a social work. 
There was also some influence on me. The son of a brother of my 
father, who was a student of law, later a lawyer, and who taught me 
when I was sick for a certain time so I could not go to this school, 
he helped me out in some lessons and he was a Communist. There 
was some influence from him. 

Others of my family were Liberals and others were Democrats. 
There were also such who were for Pilsudski. And he [the cousin] 
was a Communist. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you, a short while later, go to the Soviet 
Union ? 

Mr Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell us the circumstances ? Did you go 
volmitarily ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, they didn't force me, but they look around 
at some young people who could take arms and they had to go. Be- 
cause Bialystok was on the line of the front so we had to go a little 
farther in order to be armed and to take part in the combats because 
the war developed very quickly. 

Mr. McNamara. This was after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes ; the first day, so there was panic and every- 
thing. I w^as one of these young men who got there, also. Later got 
farther and farther and they segregated the people from Poland be- 
cause they distrusted us and they didn't want to give us arms. Later, 
after we got to the Soviet Union and we got farther from the front, 
they separated the Soviets who worked or studied there from the native 

Mr. McNamara. About how many people were taken or urged to go 
to the Soviet Union from Poland about that time ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, that was quite quick. The trains w^ere or- 
ganized, but how many I cannot say because I would have to know how 
many trains got away and I don't know that. 

Mr. McNamara. Where did you go in the Soviet Union? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, later, I w^ent to the Tatar Kepublic; that 
is, the capital of the Tatar Republic, Kazan. I went to a small region, 
and then the Komsomol sent me as helping teacher to a school because 
the teachers were taken to the army. So, I had to help out some way, 
but I didn't stay there long and they sent me to a work battalion. 

Mr. McNamara. While you were at this school, w^hat did you teach? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, I helped out with some things. I helped out 
with drawing; then some history, also, because the situation was a 
mess there. The teachers were taken to the army so they had to go. 

Mr. McNamara. You were then assigned to a work or labor bat- 
talion ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Labor battalion. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell the committee what people made 
up this battalion? 

Mr. Tykocinski. People from different countries taken by the So- 
viets, mostly. 

Mr. McNamara. Estonia, Latvia? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland. 


Mr. McNamara. Were these people serving in these labor battalions 
voluntarily or were tJiey impressed ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. They were sent there ; yoii conld not choose that. 

Mr. IcHORD. What year was this, Mr. McNamara ? 

Mr. McNamara. In 1942, 1948; that period. 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Where did you work in the labor battalion, what 
part of the Soviet Union? 

Mr. Tykocinski. On the Welchow front ; that is near Leningrad. 

Mr. McNamara. What type of work did you do? 

Mr. Tykocinski. We constructed roads, bridges ; we worked on pon- 
toon bridges, supervising them also and keeping them in order, like 

Mr. McNamara. Did you eventually enter military service? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes; I tried to get to the Polish Army of General 
Wladyslaw Anders, but they didn't let me go. 

Mr. McNamara. That was the First Polish Army ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes; which later got to London, but they didn't let 
me go at this time. Later, at the end of 1943, when the Communist- 
Polish Army was formed in the Soviet LTnion, they let me go on my 
request, and I got to the Third Polish Division. 

Mr. McNamara. What was your position in the army ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In the army, I went to the major rank. 

After the war in 1946 and before going to Korea in 1955, 1 got the 
rank of lieutenant colonel. 

Mr. McNamara. While you were still in the Soviet Union, did you 
attend an officers' school ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In the Soviet Union, I attended a Polish officers' 
school on the front. 

Mr. McNamail\. It was in the Soviet Union ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. It was staffed by Polish army officers; is that cor- 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamail\. And you were graduated from that school? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. And commisioned an officer? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. What was your first assignment after graduation 
from the officers' school ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, I worked like a political officer in different 
field units and later, at the end of the war, I was in the General Staff 
and in the Ministry of Defense. 

Mr. McNamail\. You went back to Poland at the end of the war, 
is that correct, in June of 1945 ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is correct. 

Mr. McNamara. And did you remain in military service? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I remained until 1946 in the military service. I 
was head of an office in the Ministry of Defense. 

Mr. McNamara. What office was that? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That was the political office in the Third Vice 

Mr. McNamara. What was that? 


Mr. Tykocinski. The Vice Ministiy which occupied itself with sup- 
plies, the whole rear service. 

Mr. McNamara. Would it be the equivalent of our Quartermaster 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. After you returned to Poland, did you eventually 
join the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In 1945 ; yes. 

Mr. McNamara. And you were then roughly 20 years of age ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell us the circumstances of your join- 
ing the party? 

Mr. Tykocinski. There came some high political officers to the 
front and they took such people like me who were in Komsomol or 
who were in the Communist Party before or others and they said that 
it is already time to join the Polish Communist Party, and that 
would be it. 

Mr. McNamara. At the time this developed and you joined the 
party, had you had any training in Marxist-Leninist theory and 
doctrines ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. At this time that I got in the officers' school, and 
I read some before when I was in Komsomol. 

Mr. McNamara. Did they have indoctrination in Communist the- 
ory, then, in the officers' school in the Soviet Union ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. At the time you joined the Polish Communist 
Party, did that party tell you what its basic aims and objectives were? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In some instances; yes. For instance, when there 
was a Polish provisional government formed with a part of the gov- 
ernment from London they were saying that we should remain in 
force, the Communist element; that it is only a facade, that is, the 
provisional government, and we should work for the Communist 
Party and enforce it behind the scenes. 

Mr. McNamara. With the idea that eventually you would take over 
the government? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Take over the government. 

Mr. McNamara. Were you also instructed to use your position in 
the military to assist in this ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Was it legal to be a member of the Communist 
Party while serving in the Polish Army ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No. Officially, there was no Communist Party 
in the Polish Army, because they didn't want the other parties to also 
have the representation in the army, but we existed illegally and we 
were guided by a special office in the central committee. 

Mr. McNamara. How did that office in the central committee con- 
vey Its orders to you ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. There was a special representative who occupied 
himself with these things, with things of the army, with the Com- 
munist Party in the army. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you, while in the army, in view of the fact that 
the party was illegal, meet with other party members ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 


Mr. MoNamara. Was this more or less a large-scale operation, or 
were these meetings small? 

Mr. Tykocinski. More or less on an individual basis and if they 
met on a larger scale that would be in the central committee. 

Mr. McNamara. What would you generally discuss and what actions 
would you take at these meetings ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. For instance, recruiting more and more members 
for the Communist Party. 

Mr. McNamara. That was your major assignment ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That would be one of the assignments. 

My oJfRcial major assignment was the political side of the work there. 
That means political lectures, the social life, and so on. That would be 
the official. 

The unofficial, recruiting other members for the Communist Party, 
and so on. 

Mr. McNamara. Were you instructed that your political lectures 
should contain slanted propaganda material, that you should promote 
certain ideas ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes; there were directives in this direction. 

Mr. McNamara. And you received those directives from men who 
were your superiors in the party in the army ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Would you tell us, briefly, what were the major 
weapons the Communists used in taking over the government in 

Mr. Tykocinski. First of all, infiltrating the crucial offices, po- 
lice, army. The other officers, the old ones who still served in the 
General Staff, and so on, they started to put them out under different 
pretexts and taking over more and more, taking over the Foreign 
Ministry, taking over everything of propaganda value, reinforcing the 
party. That means so many members as possible; later they would 
make a purge ; but first to have as many members as possible in order 
to have a huge organization. 

Then, after they had force in their hands, they organized terror 
against their opponents, against different factions of the opponents, 
accusing them, reviling them, accusing them for working against 
Poland, accusing their leaders of subversive action, and getting them 
out of circulation. 

Mr. McNamara. In the party, did you discuss, say, in 1945 and 1946, 
the possibilities of taking over the government and about how long it 
might take you to accomplish this ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No; not in such a way. Not in such a way, be- 
cause the directives to different officers, and so on, were kept by the 
central committee individually. For instance, there was not such a 
meeting together with security people and foreign affairs so that they 
should all discuss about that because that was not thought secure 
enough, so the central committee did it with each one separately. 

Mr. McNamara. I don't mean in a large meeting of any kind, but 
just in your personal contacts, more or less, with other party people, 
was this subject discussed? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes ; of course. 

62-931 O — 66- 


Mr. McNamara. Would you say that the Communists succeeded in 
taking over in Poland more rapidly than they had expected they would 
be able to ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. It is entirely possible, but there was a great deal 
also of Soviet urging. The Soviet specialists, so-called, also played a 
big role in the different central offices and in crucial points of power, 
and they were urging also quicker action and they helped out also 
in that by using the force of the Soviet Army and the Soviet organ- 

Mr. McNamara. Looking back now, can you think of any steps that 
might have been taken by the Polish people to prevent the Commu- 
nist takeover ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I cannot see then that it would achieve anything, 
an uprising, because an uprising really was there but it was a con- 
stant struggle for years with different organizations of the Partisan 
groups. There was a struggle m which ten thousands of people 
died, so there "was a standing struggle, but it did not achieve any- 
thing, because the massive pressure from the Soviet Army also and 
from the Polish military organizations with Soviet officers there, and 
so on, was too great, 

Mr. McNamara. Was it generally understood in the party that, if 
needed, the Soviet forces would come to your help ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. In 1946, did you leave the Ministry of Defense 
and change your work to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Why did you make this switch ? 

Mr, Tykocinski. I tried to get out of the Ministry of Defense 
because I didn't like the actions, which means reviling the old officers 
before putting them out of the army, arresting some, and so on. 
I didn't like it. I 'didn't want to have any part in that so I tried to 
get out of the army and to get into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
First, they didn't want me to, but later they said yes. 

I tried through the central committee. Finally, it was agreed upon 
under tlie condition that I would work together with the military in- 
telligence and under this condition I can get out. So, I agreed to 
that and I got to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I was also as • 
signed as one of the military intelligence. 

Mr. McNamara. What was your first assignment in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs? 

Mr. Tykocinski. First I was in Baden-Baden. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you spend time in Poland before going to 
Baden-Baden ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes ; I spent some time in the Ministry of For- 
eign Affairs in order to prepare myself, some months, and then I went 

Mr. McNamara. You were then in Z-2, which was Division 2 of 
the Polish General Staff? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you receive formal training in intelligence 
work at this time? 


Mr. Tykocinski. Not then. I went to Baden-Baden as the vice 
chief of the Polish legation Mission to the French commander in 

Mr. McNamara. That was in mid-1946 'i 

Mr. Tykocinski. It was ; ves. Mid-1946. 

Mr. McNamara. Now, before going into your assignment in Baden- 
Baden, I would like to discuss with you briefly the Polish intelligence 

You were in intelligence work from 1946 to 1952 ; is that correct? 

Mr. Tykocinski. It is correct. 

Mr. McNamara. You have already brought out the fact that the 
UB was the secret police or the civilian intelligence agency and Z-2 
was the military intelligence agency. 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. UB was under the Ministry of the Interior ; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. It was Department VII of the Ministry of the In- 
terior ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. And Z-2, as you just mentioned, was the Division 
2 of the General Staff. 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Can you tell us what "Z" means in Z-2 ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That was Direction 2. That is, direction would be 
an office, large office. 

Mr. McNamara. Did both UB and Z-2 have counterintelligence as 
well as intelligence functions? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Do both operate abroad as well as in Poland? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Are the two today, and have they always been, sep- 
arate organizations? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No; not always. For a certain time, they were 
united under one man. 

Mr. McNamara. Was he Ministry of Interior or military? 

Mr. Tykocinski. He was the chief of Z-2, military. They oper- 
ated for a certain time under one man. 

Mr. McNamara. 'About when was this ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That would be about in the fifties; in the early 

Mr. McNamara. And since, they have been separated again? 

Mr. Tykocinski. They were separated again, and after 1956 the 
civilian security service underwent certain reorganization again. The 
secret police were reorganized because a part of them were purged, you 
know, in the period after October 1956. After that, they were again 
reorganized in pretty much the old way. 

Mr. McNamara. In Polish installations abroad, was the Z-2 repre- 
sentative usually a military attache? Would that be his normal 
cover ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Wliat about the UB man ? 


Mr. Tyocinski. The one who Avas in the Mission would be in the con- 
sular service or the chief of chancellery or a second secretary. 

Mr. McNamara. Would they ever be very high-ranking men ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, the highest ranking would be if he would be 
a chief of Consular Division or a counselor. 

Mr. MoNamara. Wliy did they usually use middle-rank men as 
covers ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Because they don't attract so much attention. 

Mr. McNamara. In addition to their legal residents, did UB and 
Z-2 both have illegal residents in various foreign countries? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In some of the countries ; yes. 

Mr. McNamara. And all information collected w^as funneled 
through the resident, is that correct, back to Warsaw ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. To your knowledge, was it normal practice to 
have transmitters in all Embassies ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Code clerks? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Code clerks, yes ; and in some Embassies also there 
Avere two code clerks. One of them was for the military attache and 
gave already to the other clerk from the Embassy who was usually a 
UB man, gave already coded messages which the other coded once 

Mr. McNamara. So they would be double-coded before the message 
was actually sent? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Ml. McNamara. Wliat about the use of couriers? Was informa- 
tion also conveyed to Warsaw by couriers ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, because I sent them myself. 

Mr. McNamara. Did these couriers always travel with diplomatic 
cover ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Always. 

Mr. McNamara. Was it common practice to have two couriers? 

Mr. Tykocinski. It is, as a rule ; yes. 

Mr. McNamara. One from UB and one from Z-2 ? 

Ml. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. And then each one of them 

Mr. Tuck. Mr. McNamara, let us pause a few minutes to enable the 
reporter to rest. 

(A brief recess was taken.) 

Ml . Tuck. The committee will come to order. 

Mr, McNamara. Do you know, Mr. Tykocinski, whether or not in- 
telligence gathered by UB and Z-2 abroad, after being sent to Warsaw, 
is forwarded to Moscow ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No; I doii't know directly, but from pieces of in- 
formation which I got, for instance, I had regular meetings with the 
chief of secret police. All the Chiefs of Missions and higher officials 
had to go to him for some briefings, and so on. His name was Witold 

From conversations with other officials in Z-2 and conversations 
with higher party officials, and so on, from these pieces of infrequent 
information, I suppose that every interesting information got to 


Moscow, but there is also something else. For a certain time, the chief 
of Z-2 was a Soviet officer, for instance. 

Mr. McNamara. What time was this ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. His name was Vedmed,^ and that was in the fifties ; 
in 1951, 1952 ; something like that. So, he directly sent it to Moscow. 
He was a Soviet colonel, and the Soviets had high advisers in the 
Ministry of Interior ; had all over their advisers. 

Mr. McNamara. Was it customary practice for Polish intelligence 
representatives, when stationed abroad, to use the local Communist 
Party as a source of information ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes ; it was, but after some mishaps, namely, when 
some of them were caught and it compromised the Communist parties, 
there was an order sent from Moscow through the different services 
which cooperated with the Soviet services not to use the Communist 
parties, only when it is safe or necessary. For instance, I had to use 
the party when I was in Italy because I had a special problem. 

Mr. McNamara. Can you tell us, approximately, the date of that 
directive ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That could be in 1952 ; something like that. 

Mr. McNamara. To your knowledge, do some Communist j)arties 
have special units within their ranks of people who have intelligence 
or espionage assignments ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Many of the officials in the Communist Party, in 
the secretariat, the secretary general, in the personnel department, for 
instance, have possibilities for gathering military and other intelli- 
gence, checking on people, and so on. I know that from my own ex- 
perience in working with the Communist Party. 

Mr. McNamara. But did they have a special unit within the party 
for this type work ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I don't know that. Special people; yes; but 
special imits, I don't know officially ; no. 

Mr. McNamara. In the course of your experience with Z-2, did 
you ever hear or learn anything about the existence of a terror or 
assassination unit? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I know only from Italy about these people in- 
volved in the assassination of some people connected with the Dongo 
affair.- The Dongo affair is the affair of the treasury of Mussolini 
which the Communist Party took over. And some of tliose Commu- 
nists were involved in killing people who knew too much, and they 
were involved also in the Polish espionage process. 

Mr. McNamara. Wliat I had in mind here was the existence of such 
a unit in UB or Z-2. 

1 Polish transliteration : Wiedzmiedz. 

- When Benito Mussolini tried to escape to Switzerland, he took with him his private 
fortune, all Italian gold reserves that had not been seized by the Germans and all bank 
notes in the Italian treasury. He was captured by Communist partisans and killed at 
Dongo on Lake Como on April 28. 1945. Italian Communists seized his treasure and, 
according to the New York Times of November 24, 1947. "most if not all of it found its 
way into the coffers of the [Italian] Communist party." Estimates of the value of the 
so-called Dongo treasure have run as high as 10 billion lire (approximately $20 million at 
the offlcial exchange rate in 1947). 

An official inquiry into what happened to the Dongo treasure was undertaken, but called 
off in early 1947. and such facts as it developed were never revealed — allegedly because 
Communists, then in the Cabinet, managed to have the inquiry quashed and the facts 
developed in it suppressed. All leaders of the Dongo affair have disappeared. Some of 
them are known to have been murdered on orders of the Italian Communist Party to pre- 
vent them from talking. 


Mr. Tykocinski. You mean in Warsaw ? In Warsaw, no ; I don't 

Mr. MoNamara. Now, outside of the Communist Party members 
whom the intelligence representatives cultivated and used in their 
foreign assigiunents, what other type person did they concentrate 
on and try to develop as sources of information ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. They wanted to have military men if possible, 
of course. They wanted to have people who could give them valuable 
economical information and technical information not available 
openly; thaJt means engineers or directors from different factories 
because of the delicate work some of them do and to people to whom 
I talked, that is, newspapermen, because they go around and see 
different things. Well, that would be that. 

Mr. MoNamara. Basically, it would be their assignment to collect 
all types of information, anything they could gather at all; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Basically ; yes. 

Mr. McNamara. But there would be emphasis on information re- 
lating to military, defense, technical, and scientific data ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is correct. 

Mr. McNamara. In your experience and from your experience, do 
you know of an effort made to collect technical documents published 
by the target countries, the United States, or other Western nations ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Was this a considerable effort ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. It was a considerable effort and it still is a con- 
siderable effort. I suppose it was in 1963 there was organized a 
special committee for technical collaboration abroad. This commit- 
tee has representatives also in the most important trade representa- 
tions abroad and this committee should help out the UB and Z-2 
with some of the technical gathering, technical information. 

As to sending technical materials to Z-2 and/or to UB, I received 
some of such materials with the help of members of the Austrian 
Communist Party and sent some such materials to Warsaw. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you recall who was head of Z-2 at the time 
you were assigned to it in 1946 ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Who attended the what ? 

Mr. McNamar,\. No. Who was the head of Z-2, the military intel- 
ligence, at the time Mr. Tykocinski joined it in 1946. 

Mr. Tykocinski. General Waclaw Komar. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you know who was the head of it at the time 
you defected roughly a year ago ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. General Grzegorz Korczynski. 

Mr. McNamara. In the intervening years, about how many dif- 
ferent chiefs had they had in Z-2 ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In Z-2, there was Komar and then this Soviet 
Colonel Vedmed and then there was an interval when Tadeusz Jedy- 
nak was acting chief and then later General Korczynski. 

Mr. McNamara. Now about UB, are you familiar, too, with the 
identities of the men who have headed that ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. For many years it was Sienkiewicz; later 
he was relieved because he was criticized that he was too soft, a little 
bit too soft after 1956, especially. So, when the hard men came back 


and the changes started there, the paramount chief became the Min- 
ister of Interior and under him as the chief of the secret police came 
one named Henryk Sokolak. 

First, his cover was he was in the consular service; later, he went 
into the open and was the chief of the secret police. He is now the 
chief of the secret police. 

Mr. McNamara. What is your estimate of the size of the UB and the 
Z-2, if you could make one ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. You mean only their workers who work openly 
for them ? 

Mr. McNamara. That is right ; not including the contacts they de- 
velop in foreign countries, that is, sources of information, but their 
own personnel, shall we say. 

Mr. Tykocinski. I could not say that. I was very often in the 
UB and Z-2. For instance, the Z-2 occupies one big floor of the 
building of the General Staff so there could be about this floor and 
they have some two or three small other buildings. So, in their gen- 
eral central staff offices, that could be some hundred, apart from the 
people whom they plant in the Foreign Affairs and Minister of For- 
eign Trade in the Ministry of Merchant Navy, and in other things. 

As to the secret police, they occupy such a big building that there 
must be, I suppose, more than a thousand there in the center. 

Mr. McNamara. That is in the central headquarters alone ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. As far as the number of people Z-2 has planted 
in these other agencies is concerned, you could not make any estimate 
on that? 

Mr. Tykocinski. As to that, I know only those people, but how 
many I could not say. I would only guess by proportions which I 
know more or less in the Foreign Service and in the Foreign Trade. 
I would say not less than half of the people would be from Z-2 and 
UB together. 

Mr. McNamara. After switching from the Ministry of Defense to 
Foreign Affairs, your first assignment, as you mentioned a little while 
ago, was in Baden-Baden, Germany? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. And that covered from mid-1946 to the end of 
1947 ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. It is correct. 

Mr. McNamara. You were then approximately 22 or 23 years of 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. What was your specific position ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I was the vice chief of the Polish Mission ac- 
credited by the French commander, the commander of the French 
troops in Germany. 

Mr. McNamara. This was during the occupation of Germany ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. How large was this Mission ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Wlien we went there, the Mission practically did 
not exist, so we had to organize it; but when we organized it, together 
with all the officers, the consulate officei-s and everything, there were 
about 30 people. 


Mr. McNamara. Did you receive any training for this assignment 
before you left Warsaw ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I only had to read in the headquarters of Z-2 
some materials coming from the French Zone, but they were not 
marked; some reports about displacement of French units, but not 
complete; and some political reports because they had only some 
Polish officers who came from the prison camps to this post, in the 
provisional mission until we came. So, I had to read these materials 
and I got my instructions what I shall do there. I should try to 
gather military information, if possible, about the French Army, the 
order of battle of the French Army there, the placement of different 
units, about the maneuvers of the French Army, and political reports, 

Mr. McNamara. Were you the resident or was there another one? 

Mr. Tykocinski. There was, to my knowledge, no resident there 
because this was early. The Z-2 definitely organized ; they got to the 
period of reorganization and of completing the cadres or exchanging 
the old ones, and so on, until 1947, at least, so there was not such 
a situation that they would have in every post a very large quantity 
of people. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you have a transmitter and code clerk there ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No ; not there. 

Mr. McNamara. So all your contact was through courier ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Through couriers. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell us briefly what your main sources 
of information were ; how did you collect your intelligence in Baden- 

Mr. Tykocinski. That, I must say, was quite primitive, because we 
got around ourselves; we exchanged information with other Missions. 
That means with the Soviet and the Czechoslovakian. For instance, 
I got the French order of battle from the Czechoslovak officers who 
later came over to the West and, in exchange, I gave some political 
report about the situation there. Then, when we went to the maneu- 
vers or we voyaged through the zone, we tried to establisli where the 
different units and so and so were in such a way. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you have sources within the Communist Party 
of Austria? 

Mr. Tykocinski. You ask now 

Mr. McNamara. I am sorry ; Germany. I beg your pardon. 

Mr. Tykocinski. The party in the Frencli Zone was a very weak 
one, a weak one, the organization of the party there. So, the contacts 
were not really close; the party didn't know much, and she was 
organizing the cadres and so depressed that she practically did not 
exist. So I didn't have much contact. 

Mr. McNamara. At the end of 1947, you returned to Warsaw for 
several months? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. "VVliy did you go back ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I was recalled. 

Mr. McNamara. You were simply recalled. 

What did you do in Warsaw for that period of 8 or 4 or so months? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I worked as a counselor for Department IV of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That occupies itself with the rest of 


European affairs, with Germany, especially. I worked on the 
German affairs. 

"^Mr. McNamara. And your next assignment was in Vienna, Austria ; 
is that correct?. 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. From the period of about February 1948 to Octo- 
ber or November of 1949 ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Almost 2 years. 

What was your position there? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I went there in a special atmosphere. That is, I 
was sent in a hurry because the Ambassador, Felix Mantel, an old 
Social Democrat, came over to the West. So I was sent as Charge 
d'Affaires, that means the provisional chief of the Mission, in a hurry 
to take over this political mission. It was called political representa- 
tion of Poland in Austria. 

So, I w^as sent, like I said, as the Charge d'Affaires. 

Mr. McNamara. What was the intelligence setup there when you 
arrived ? Was there another resident ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes; a resident for the Z-2, Markowski, and a 
resident for the UB — Levitski. So, I had to collaborate with 

Mr. McNamara. He was the Z-2 man ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. /ou worked under him ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. That means he could not give me orders, 
but we had to collaborate together. This was already a two-pronged 
work. That means they w^anted to use me and they w^anted also to 
have a standing resident there. 

Mr. McNamara. Wliat was your major intelligence assignment in 
Austria ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, I had to collect there different things, differ- 
ent technical materials, economical materials, to look for specialists 
who could go to Poland eventually. 

Mr. McNamara. Wliat type specialists? 

Mr. Tykocinski. For instance, constructors; constructors of ma- 
chines, and so on. The different documentation about new metal 
alloys, new processes of miniature photography, other processes, and 
also the location of the Western troops in Austria ; then clifferent mate- 
rials about Germans being in Austria. That means the Germans from 
the Nazi period who came over to Austria, where are they, because 
they wanted to know if somebody of them could be recruited or caught. 

Mr. McNamara. To your knowledge, did the Communists make a 
considerable effort to recruit former Nazis for intelligence work? 

Mr. Tykocinski. As to this, I don't know because from the Austrian 
territory the Nazis which we followed, what they do there, and so on, 
they were too much compromised. But I heard about it, that would 
be the case in other places. 

Mr. McNamara. To the best of your knowledge, are the men you 
named as residents of UB and Z-2 in Vienna still active in Polish 
intelligence work ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. To my knowledge, not one, certainly not, because 
I heard later that he came over to the West, Levitski. Markowski, I 


met in Warsaw. He worked already not in the Foreign Service, but 
in one of the directions of communication in Warsaw. So, I don't 
think that is very useful to the Z-2. 

The reason why Markowski was recalled was also one of the intelli- 
gence assigmnents, namely, I sent to Warsaw his wife who also worked 
for Z-2 with secret materials, economical materials — she was a code 
clerk — secret materials to be photocopied because I had to return 
them back. They were taken from some files of a great economic 

That was already the time when my last days in Vienna came and 
already a new Polish Ambassador had come over and I was in such 
a hurry that I didn't inform him that I sent her, and he made a great 
hello of that and they both were recalled, although I tried to prevent it 
l)ecause I sent her without the knowledge of the Ambassador. 

Mr. McNamara. How was this information obtained from the files 
of the institute, from a source within the institute ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I suppose because I received that through the 
Polish commerce representative in Vienna, but I know he received it 
from engineers, members of the party. 

Mr. McNamara. This was an institute in Vienna ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Was the Communist Party of Austria a source of 
information when you were stationed in Vienna ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Some of their members were. For instance, I 
had good relations with the vice chief of the police of Vienna, who was 
a Communist, Strobl ; then an ex-chief of the Vienna police from the 
time of the Austrian coalition government — you know that after the 
war they had the government together with the Communists. I don't 
recall now his name — Durenstein, I think, something. He was the 
chief of the police in Vienna durmg the time of the coalition. So 
some of them, the economic ones, the political ones, the development in 
the police about some persons were received from such people. 

There were also some people who not being members of the Com- 
munist Party sympathized with the Communist Party and worked 
with them, like an industrialist one; he had some factories, he was a 
rich man, but he worked, nevertheless, sympathized with the Commu- 
nist Party. His name was Kaufmann, I suppose. 

Mr. McNamara. What type information did you get from him? 
Would it be primarily teclinical ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Technical, economical. 

Mr. McNamara. Industrial data ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Was your leaving Vienna after approximately 2 
years just a routine change in assignment ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I received nomination to the first secretary in the 
Embassy in Rome. 

Mr. McNamara. And you served in Rome from December 1949 to 
about October 1952 ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is correct. 

Mr. McNamara. Almost 3 years. 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. And what was your major mission in Rome? You 
were still working for Z-2 ; is that correct? 


Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara, Throughout your Rome assignment ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is correct. My major assignment was to try 
to disentangle a very complicated process for espionage, namely; 
I must tell you how it was. 

There were some Italians caught in this process that they worked 
for the Polish military attache. The Polish military attache was 
asked to leave the country, and the Italians were arrested because they 
were caught when they gave over secret materials to his representative 
of the military attache. One of the Italians was also involved in a 
big affair which compromised the Italian Communist Party, namely, 
in the so-called Dongo affair, the affair of Mussolmi's treasure, 
whether the party has it or not. The party is suspected of killing 
some people who knew too much about it. One of those Italians 
probably took part in these killings and now he was in prison for 
working with the Polish espionage. 

So, I had to get him out of the prison and send him through Switzer- 
land with false documents to Poland. Then I had to make some ar- 
rangements that the aft'air should not be played too high in the press, 
try to make some arrangements with the Italians for an exchange. 
The Poles arrested some Italians in Warsaw for black marketing and 
they proposed an exchange, that the affair should be kept quiet and 
they will let those people go. 

Then I had to follow all possible materials from the affair of how 
it develops. I got it all from the party; I mean, the materials from 
the preliminary interrogation procedure and how the affair develops, 
and so on. 

That would be one line. It was an assignment for a long time be- 
cause the affair got, well 

Mr. McNamara. Did you eventually succeed? Where did you get 
the false documents you gave this Italian who was in prison ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I gave him documents and money; I got it from 
Warsaw. The escape route was mapped by the Italian Commmiist 
Party. I met him in a tailor's shop ; the tailor was a Communist ; and 
then I gave him over the documents and money, and to my best knowl- 
edge he is now in Warsaw. 

Mr. McNamara. What means did you use in your attempts to have 
this kept out of the press, or at least not blown up to a very big thing? 
What tactics? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, I had a judge \vho belonged to the Com- 
munist Party. I made his acquaintance through the secretary of 
Togliatti, the cliief of the Communist Party of Italy, and he told us 
what we should do, that we should try for an exchange of some Italians 
caught in Warsaw. 

So, as I told you, they caught some Italian people working in the 
trade representation on black marketing operations, and later we pro- 
posed to the Italians an exchange that we will let those people go 
without big hello and they should not put too many things in the press 
about the affair. 

Mr. Weltner. Were the black market charges drummed up, 
imaginary ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That I don't know, because this operation was 
made in Warsaw. I only know that they started there, but probably 
there was something in this. 


Mr. Weltner. In other words, instiiictions came out of Italy to 
Poland saying arrest some Italians in Poland ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. What setup did you find in Rome when you arrived 
there — from the intelligence viewpoint, Polish intelligence? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That apart from this assignment, I had also other 
assignments apart from the Dongo affair, but that may be later. 

Mr. McNamara. Why not mention it now, your basic assignment? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Also to collect military data about the NATO 
troops, and so on, that I also got from the party members from the 
secretary of Togliatti, some data about it, and then to try to recruit 
possibly a higher officer of the Italian Army. 

Then I had to have also some other such operations as giving money 
and documents to other persons to try to get them out from Italy, 
and such things. 

Now, as to the setup, I found that the military attache's office was 
without a head because the military attache was ousted from Italy. 

Mr. McNamara. Why was he ousted ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. He was ousted in early 1950 or in late 1949 maybe 
in connection with tlie affair leading to the process I mentioned. So 
in his office there was only a code clerk, a woman code clerk working. 

Mr. McNamara. Pardon me. He w^as ousted because he had been 
involved in espionage activities ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes; that is correct. There was only a woman 
code clerk for the office of military attache and the office itself, so I had 
to take care of the affairs of the military attache office. There was 
an Ambassador, but he had to go to Poland. I worked with him for 
2 or 3 months, and then he was recalled. I, for the whole time I stayed 
there, I was not only first secretary, but Charge d'Affaires. 

Mr. McNamara. Were there residents in the Embassy ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No. 

Mr. McNamara. No residents in the Rome Embassy ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No. 

Mr. McNamara. No code clerks ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No residents from Z-2; no. For UB; yes. It 
was a head of the Consular Division. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you recall his name ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Warzynski. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you know whether or not the military attache 
who was ousted on espionage charges is still with Z-2, or did that more 
or less kill his usefulness for service abroad ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No ; he is still with Z-2 and he is now an Ambas- 
sador. If he is active now as a Z-2 man, I don't know, but I know 
the Z-2 sent him later to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They 
wanted first to send him to Great Britain, but I fold the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs when I got this nomination that I know this whole 
affair in Italy and I don't know if he can be sent to Great Britain. 

So, he told me to go to the chief of Z-2 and speak with him about it. 
I got to the chief of Z-2 and I told him about that. It was a new- 
chief, the one who is now, Korczynski. And they didn't send him 
eventually to Great Britain as military attache, but they sent him to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the vice director of Department IV. 
He worked for a certain time there in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 


and now he was sent as an Ambassador to one of the Middle Eastern 

Mr. McNamara. You don't recall to which country? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No. 

Mr. Tuck. The committee will recess until 3 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed to reconvene at 
3 p.m. the same day.) 


(The committee reconvened at 3 p.m., Hon. William M. Tuck pre- 

(Committee membere present: Representatives Tuck, Pool, Ichord, 
Senner, Weltner, Ashbrook, Clawson, and Buchanan.) 

Mr. Tuck. The committee will please come to order. 


Mr. McNamara. Mr. Tykocinski, when we ended the session this 
morning I believe you had just told us about the Polish military 
attache in Rome who was ousted because of his involvement in espio- 
nage and who today, to the best of your knowledge, is serving as 
Ambassador to some Middle Eastern country. 

I believe we covered the intelligence organization that you found in 
Italy when you arrived there. I would now like to ask you this ques- 
tion : Before your Italian assignment, or during it, did you receive 
any special training for intelligence work ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes ; in Warsaw. 

Mr. McNamara. Wliere did you receive this training? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In Z-2, in Warsaw. 

Mr. McNamara. Before you went to Rome ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. During my stay. 

Mr. McNamara. You went back to Warsaw for a period ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Roughly, how long? 

Mr. Tykocinski. A month. But not all the time for the training. 
I went for business and I had some free time and in this time I had 
this training. 

Mr. McNamara. What was the name of the man who gave you the 
code training? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Captain Fidler. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you know if that was his regular assignment at 
Z-2 headquarters in Warsaw ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. He was a code specialist. 

Mr. McNamara. Would you have any information about Polish in- 
telligence coding, in general, that you could give to the committee? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, not about the systems because I do not know 
very much about it. I know only that it is an individual system. 
That means that they are changing all the time the tables. That means 
that by each time they are changing the tables using a certain cue, but 
that is Avhy tliey tliink it is unbreakable. I had a lighter code. I had 
a military code, but one of the lightest, in order that I should give 
my secret messages of military character to the code clerk already 
coded, so I gave them already coded and he encoded it once again. 


The Department of Communications in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which is handling the coding and so on, is entirely composed 
of UB personnel. This is one of the four departments which are 
entirely, or one of them largely, mamied by intelligence personnel. 
Relatively few personnel of the Foreign Affaire work in three of 
them — and none in the Communications Department. 

Mr. McNamara. Wliat are the other three offices that are entirely, 
or almost entirely, manned by Z-2 and UB ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In addition to the decoder, that is, the Communi- 
cations Department, the Consular Department and the Personnel 
Department have quite a number of Ministry of Internal Affairs per- 
sonnel assigned to them, and their regular personnel have much con- 
tact with UB and Z-2. Besides, between other departments — the 
Press and Information Departments could be mentioned as having a 
more than average share of UB and Z-2 people. 

Mr. McNamara. You mentioned before, I believe, that while you 
were in Italy you at one time transferred funds from the Polish Com- 
munist Party to the Italian Communist Party? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is true. 

Mr. McNamara. Now, could you explain why this was done? Po- 
land at that time was not exactly a wealthy nation and yet it was being 
used, apparently, to finance Commmiist activities in Italy. 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is between the Communist parties, a division 
of who shall help whom by what kind of action. Like for instance, 
the central propaganda brought in Italian language was served by 
Radio Prague. 

Mr. McNamara. By that you mean the transmitting? 

Mr. Tykocinski. The broadcasting of propaganda and news in 
Italian went from Prague; some money for election propaganda for 
the Italian party came from Poland. That is what I gave, that should 
help them in their electoral fund. 

Then also Poland had to support to some extent the Italian trade 
unions, and I gave the second bunch of money to the secretary general 
of the trade unions, Giuseppe di Vittorio. In the Communist Party 
I gave the money to Luigi Longo, who is now the secretary general of 
the party. I gave to him personally. 

Mr. McNamara. As I recall, there was a very crucial election in 
Italy — in 1948 or 1949 — before you were in the Embassy in Rome. 
Do you know whether or not money went from Poland to Italy to 
help influence that election ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I don't have exact information about that. 

Mr. IcHORD. How much was involved that you are talking about 
here ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That w\as in a sealed packet, but I suppose they 
were dollars, because they rather use dollars in such operations. I 
suppose the money I gave w^ere dollars. 

Mr. IcHORD. You don't know how much money was involved? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I cannot say. The packet was sealed by the cen- 
tral committee in Warsaw. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you know of any other special arrangements 
within the international Communist movement about one party help- 
ing the other, as the Polish party helped the Italians in certain areas? 
Have you learned from your experience in Poland, and your foreign 


assignments with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Z-2, of other 
arrangements involving Communist movements in other nations? 

Mr. Tykocinski. You mean in other Western nations ? 

Mr. McNamara. Yes. 

Mr. Tykocinski. Because between themselves, they have different 
arrangements, like every party helping the party ot East Germany 
because of its exposed situation and giving additional information, 
additional facilities for publicizing propaganda, and so on. But as 
for the Western nations, I do not know any other examples like that. 

I know only that there must have been some of the Communist parties 
in South America where the Polish helped, but I do not know exactly. 
I met only once in the central committee one representative of, I think, 
the Guatamalan party, who went there for help and to have a political 
conversation in the central committee, and so on. 

Mr. McNamar.\.. Did you find generally that the Italian Communist 
Party was a good source of information, that it was well informed ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. An excellent one. And their opinion about them- 
selves, when they boasted in internal convei*sations with us, the higher 
ranking officials, was that to split them, there would be necessary to 
split every Italian house, because everywhere they have a base for 
working. To give you concrete examples of that, there was, for in- 
stance, a very strongly guarded secret. 

I don't know how many high army officers they have who are clan- 
destine members of the party. Data about them are kept strongly 
secret. They have also a number of priests who are members of the 
party. Those two priests were the two most well-guarded secrets of 
the party. 

Mr. McNainiara. I believe you have some information about a Father 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. That you received some material that came from 
him. Will you state that for the record ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Father Tondi. That was a very welhknown 
Jesuit, who was a clandestine member of the Communist Party. He 
had high rank in the Jesuit order. Nobody suspected him. I once 
got through the Communist Party, through a professor, Donini,^ who 
is one of the members of the central committee of the party, is a pro- 
fessor in a university, I got from him information about the Jesuits 
for Warsaw because one of my assignments was to look at what hap- 
pens at the Vatican. 

Mr. McNamara. At the time you received this report, you did not 
know where it came from ; did you ? 

1 Profpssor Ambroeio Donlni was "CI Rep" (Comiminist International, or Comintern, 
representative) to the U.S. Communist Party durinj; the thirties and until he left this 
country in 1945. As such, he was the secret, or underground, boss of the party. While 
servinjr in that capacity, he was associated with U.S. Communist Party organizations and 
publications such as the International Labor Defense, the American Russian Institute, 
the Jefferson School of Social Science, and New Masses. He also served as an editor 
of L'Unita del Popolo, the Communist Italian-language newspaper formerly published in 
New Yorlv City. 

Subsequent to his return to Italy, he was named the Italian Ambassador to Poland. 
He was recalled in May 1948 because, in defiance of orders of Italian Foreign Minister 
Carlo Sforza, he had abandoned his post to campaign for a Senate seat in the then recently 
held Italian elections, returning to Warsaw after his defeat. During the early fifties 
Donini served as a member of the World Peace Council, Moscow's major international 
"peace" front. The U.S. theoretical Communist organ. Science and Societi/, in 1951 
featured an article by Donini, who was then associated with the University of Rome where 
he had taught comparative theology prior to coming to the United States. 


Mr. Tykocinski. No, I only know I received it from Donini. Later 
I learned that it came from Father Tondi. 

Mr. McNamara. How did you learn that? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Wlien Tondi got out in the open, when he got to 
the Communist Party in the open, so then Donini told me that. 

Mr. McNamar.\, Was Donini the one who informed you that the 
report had come from Tondi ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. What did you do with the report ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I sent it to Warsaw, to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, like other reports of Vatican. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you know Togliatti, the secretary of the 
Italian Communist Party? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Was he a source of information ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. He himself ; no. 

Mr. McNamara. Were people close to him sources of information? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, his secretary. 

Mr. McNamara. Pietro Secchia is that ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Secchia. 

Mr. McNamara. A-NHiile you were stationed in Rome, did a certain 
matter concerning the U.S. Embassy there come to your attention, a 
matter concerning a source of information used by United States 
Government ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. That means one of the clerks in the Polish 
Embassy wrote reports to one American institution. I do not know 
to which agency he wrdte these reports, but Donini gave me such a 
letter for to copy it and then to return to him immediately because he 
said he has to return it back. So he had to get it from an Italian clerk 
working for this agency. That was a report from a clerk who pre- 
pared himself to escape and later escaped. 

Mr. McNamara. He escaped where? 

Mr. Tykocinski, To the West. 

Mr. McNamara. He was then working? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In the Embassy. 

Mr. McNamara. In the Polish Embassy? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamailv. Did it come to your attention that the Italian 
Communist Party, during this period, was storing weapons ? 

Mr. Tykocinski, Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell us something about that ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. I heard at several instances from them, from 
their officials, that they did not give up their weaj^ons, that they have 
storage of them. And on which occasions, for instance when we spoke 
about different parties, so they said, the Italian Communists said, for 
instance, "The French were stupid because tliey give up their arms and 
now they do not have the source of strength. But we kept our 

Mr. McNamara. They were referring to the weapons they had dur- 
ing World War II ; is that right ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, during World War II. And on a second 
instance, one of the Communist officials told me that when they had 
transported grenades from one place to the other, they transported it 


on a motorcycle with sidecar, and the grenades somehow got spilled 
out, and he boasted that the population took them for their personal 
weapons; that they are sympathizing with the Communists and they 
had to go from house to house and collect again these grenades. So, 
I heard in discussions about arms. 

Mr. McNamara, I believe there is another incident concerning a 
member of the Italian Communist Party who had been used for intelli- 
gence purposes by the United States Government ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That was, yes, a case of a woman, and a woman 
working in the Polish trade representation and they — some U.S. 
agency, I don't know which one — put a young man there because this 
woman was lonely, to start a relation w4th her and then to start to work 
on her politically. Well, and maybe recruit her. And again the party 
was informed by this young man himself that he has such a task, and 
the party told us. 

Mr. McNamara. Wliat was the upshot of this? Wliat was the final 
outcome ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, she was recalled. She got home. 

Mr. McNamara. When you eventually left your assignment in 
Rome, was it just a routine reassignment ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. You had completed your normal term, of service 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. And you returned to Warsaw briefly ? 

Mr. Ttkocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. And your next assignment was at the United Na- 
tions in New York ; is that right ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. The United Nations. 

Mr. McNamara. When you served with the United Nations in New 
York, were you still working for Z-2 ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No, I had only once a task, a separate task, to 
watch one of the members of the Polish delegation, a Professor Man- 
fred Lachs, when we were traveling together on a ship, on Queen Mo.ry^ 
if he does not want to escape, because there were some reports there 
that he would escape and he knew several secret tilings. 

So I had to report to Z-2. I suppose they gave it later to the UB, 
but the UB could not tell me to do a thing. So I had this order, this 
unpleasant order from the Z-2. But that was only the separate 

Mr. McNamara. Except for that one assignment, since the time you 
left Rome you have had no connection at all with 2^2 or any other 
Polish intelligence operation ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is correct. 

Mr. McNamara. You served with the U.N. delegation in New York 
from November 1952 through December 1952? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell the committee what your precise 
assignment was during that period ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I was an adviser of the delegation, so I w^orked 
with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and with other members of the 
delegation preparing speeches, preparing materials for the sessions, 
and so on. And, also I had contacts with the Soviets then. 


Mr. McNamara. Now, in December of '52 you returned briefly to 
Warsaw and in March of '53 you again returned to New York, where 
you served with the U.N. delegation through April of 1953 ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you have the same position and duties ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, the same. 

Mr. McNamara. During the second tour ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Before coming to the United States to serve with 
the Polish delegation to the United Nations, did you receive any special 
instructions ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. There was a general briefing for all; that Ave 
should be very prudent; that we should not take any contacts with 
Americans ; that we should try not to go alone anywhere, and we should 
be generally disciplined because there will be people hearing what we 
are doing, and everything. 

Mr. McNamara. Now, between your service with the United Na- 
tions in New" York City and later in Korea, you served approximately 
11/^ years as a Polish representative in the United Nations. During 
this period, did you have considerable opportunity to meet the repre- 
sentatives of other Communist nations m the United Nations; the 
Soviets, Czechs, and so forth ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you, during these two periods and two dif- 
ferent places of service with the U.N., frequently discuss U.N. matters 
with them ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, but may I correct only one thing? I was 
altogether half a year in the United Nations, because in '52, 2 months, 
and in '53 at the beginning 

Mr. McNamara. Just about 4 months in New York, but you spent 
approximately 1 year with the U.N. in Korea altogether ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara, What would you say in general? Did you meet 
top Soviet leaders ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, I met with Vyshinskj^, Gromyko, and in gen- 
eral I would say that the Polish delegation received all orders from the 
Soviet delegation. 

Mr. McNamara. What, in general, was the attitude of all the Com- 
munist nations toward the U.N. ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. To use the U.N. for the Communist policy and 
to do it in a disciplined way. That means always before sessions 
there were briefings in the Soviet delegation seat in Glen Cove, where 
the lines of voting and a policy and the networks were exactly 
established, together with a graphic voting — how to vote exactly 
in order not to get lost. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you know of any case during the entire period 
of your service at the United Nations when a single representative of 
a Communist nation voted contrary to the wishes of the Soviet ITnion ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, it was involuntary because he did not see 
Vyshinsky's hand rise. That was so. The voting went very compli- 
cated. There were amendments to amendments to amendments, so 
there were not more instructions from the Soviets because it did not 
cover this situation. So the Polish Foreign Minister, Skrzeszewski, 


looked to see how Vyshinsky is voting and he did not see very well be- 
cause Vyshinsky was far away, so he voted — he made a mistake and 
he voted against Vyshinsky, and the Ukramians sat behind the Poles, 
so they looked at the Poles and they also voted against the Soviet 

But the Byelorussians were near Vyshinsky, so they saw how he 
voted and voted accordingly. 

Later it was proclaimed as the result of the voting that the Soviet 
Union and Byelorussia were pro and Poland and the Ukraine were 
counter. So that was the only instance — by mistake — where I know 
that it was such a voting like that. 

Mr. McNamara. The representatives of all these nations would 
meet regularly and would stay at the Soviet residence in Glen Cove ? ^ 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. And there they would plan, each day, just how 
they would vote ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Did the planning, and the Soviet directions, go 
beyond even the questions of voting ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Did it include, for example, the length of speeches? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, it did. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you give an example of that ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes; the Czechoslovakian representative, Jiri 
Nosek, once wrote a speech of 40 pages on one problem. I suppose it 
was the problem of the Battle Act and discrimination in trade, and so 
on. So they curtailed it to 20 pages. 

Mr. McNamara. Did the Soviet control go beyond even that and 
did it affect the wording of speeches ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. It did, generally, because the thesis of the speeches 
was established during such briefings. The line was established. 

Mr. McNamara. In addition to the general line, did it go so far as 
to dictate the exact words or expletives used in denouncing the United 
States ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. It did. 

Mr. McNamara. And how frequently they would be used ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes , for instance, at the end of the session, when 
there started to be a better atmosphere about finishing of the Korean 
Avar, they told us : "Drop a little bit of the expressions especially bad 
against the Americans." So we had from the projects of the different 
speeches, where there were plenty of bad names called under the 
address of the ITnited States, we had to curtail it to half at least, to 
show that the atmosphere went better. It went so far. 

Mr. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I might point out that Mr. 
Tykocinski's testimony on this point confirms that of another man, 
Dr. Marek S. Korowicz, a Polish representative to the United Nations. 
He was the number one alternate on the delegation who defected and 
testified before this committee in September 1953. He was a former 
professor of international law at the University of Krakow. 

^ A city on Long Island about 35 miles beyond the New York City limits. The U.S.S.R. 
owns a 36-acre estate there which is used as a residence for the personnel of its U.N. 


He testified that tlie Polisli delegation took its instructions on all 
occasions from the Soviet delegation, and these are his exact words : 

Every step, in fact, big or small, of the Polish delegation is made following 
instructions received from the Soviet Russia. 

The Polish delegation — and I wish to emphasize this point — is nothing but an 
extension of the Russian delegation. * * * 

You would agree, I take it, with that statement, Mr. Tykocinski? 

Mr, Tykocinski. Entirely. 

Mr. IcHORD. Going back to your testimony about the Polish dele- 
gate's not being able to see the Kussians and making the mistake in his 
voting, was there a later meeting held of the various delegations in 
regard to that mistake ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No, that was not. 

Mr. IcHORD. My point is, was there any lecturing or rebuking of the 
Polish delegate for his error that was taken up at any meeting that 
you attended? 

Mr. Tykocinski. As far as I know, no. Because in any meeting 
where I was, there was not taken up this subject. But there were also 
closed meetings only of the heads of delegations. 

Mr. IcHORD. How did you know about the mistake being made? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Because I was there. I sat near the Minister. 1 
was his adviser and I saw the whole thing. And I know later how he 
feared for his career. He is not a very brave man and he feared that 
the Russians will be really mad at him. 

Mr. IcHORD. Did you hear any statements being made where he ex- 
pressed fear or was it generally talked around the delegation or what? 

Mr. Tykocinski. He was generally very nervous about the whole 
thing. He tried to say, "Well I did not know how it is and it all was 
so quick," and so on. 

He expressed general nervousness. But I knew him already. I 
knew he was in a state of hysteria. That was his second mistake. 

Mr. McNamara. Isn't this man the former Polish Foreign Minister, 
Stanislaw Skrzeszewski, the same man who was involved in an incident 
in October 1952, when a loaded pistol was found under his pillow in the 
Beaux Arts Hotel in New York City ? Is that correct ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is correct. 

Mr. McNamara. In other words, because of this prior instance in- 
volving the loaded pistol, he was unusually nervous over his second 
mistake ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Was it normal for a high-ranking Communist rep- 
resentative such as he was to carry a loaded weapon with him? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Generally, no. It depended on the character of 
the person involved. Because they had always a guard. Skrzeszew- 
ski had also a guard with him, so he did not even need a pistol. The 
guard was armed, but the Minister was generally a very nervous 

Mr. McNamara. Generally, during the period 1951-52, and into 1953 
at various times, the Soviet Union made charges against the United 
States. These charges concerned mistreatment of prisoners of war in 
Korea, the use of biological or germ warfare in Korea. Would you 
have any comment to make? The United States denied these charges 
and called for an impartial investigation of them. We have every rea- 


son to believe the charges were false. Did you ever discuss these 
charges at your meetings at Glen Cove and whether they were tiiie or 

Mr. Tykocinski. These things were taken for granted, that they 
are a material for propaganda and that that is a political argument, so 
the question of tnith even did not arise because they were treated as a 
political argument. They were treated like that; now it is needed to 
sfend out a delegation of international jurists, lawyers who went there 
to make this investigation, and so on. And it Avas always treated as 
taking for granted that that is only a political argument. 

Mr. McNamara. Were the Soviets and other Communist represen- 
tatives ever concerned, when they made a patently false charge, that 
they would lose in the long ran when it was exposed as false? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No, because a lie oft repeated sticks in some way, 
and that is one of the methods of this propaganda. If it is made 
really massively, w^ith great costs, and it is publicized everywhere and 
it is taken to the public opinion of the world, so with massive propa- 
ganda, this means something remains standing later. 

Mr. McNamara. Is it true that, after making these charges, the 
Soviet Union — as you mentioned, I believe, a moment ago — did have 
one of its stooge organizations go out there and make a so-called 
investigation and confirm their charges? 

Mr. Tykocinski. It is true. 

Mr. McNamara. I might point out on this question, Mr. Chairman, 
that in 1953, April, the political committee of the United Nations, 
after this charge had been made over and over again by the Soviet 
Union, voted 53 to 5, to have an impartial investigation made of the 
charge, and Vyshinsky killed it. He had the power to do so, refusing 
unanimous consent. 

I think this illustrates the tactics Mr. Tykocinski has been describ- 
ing. They made the charge, then sent a group of Communist lawyers, 
a delegation, out to Korea. They claimed they made an impartial 
investigation ; they announced to the world that the charge was true. 
And then, when there was an attempt to really make an impartial 
investigation and the United States suggested it be made by the Inter- 
national Red Cross or the World Health Organization, Vyshinsky 
simply killed any possibility of any such honest investigation being 

Did you have occasion to meet Oscar Lange at any time? Did you 
know him, or of him ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I met him in Warsaw, not in the United States, 
at some occasion, social occasion in receptions made in the representa- 
tive house of the Foreign Service. What I know about his economic 
activity in Poland was that he was one of the economic reformers 
and Gomulka did not accept many of his projects. 

As to his political activity, his main tasks were during his stay in 
the United States and they were to organize there the political work 
and propaganda for Communist Poland, but I don't know the details 
about that. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you know whether or not he was a member 
of the Polish Communist Party? 

Mr. Tykocinski. He was. He was first Social Democrat and later, 
after the uniting of the parties of the Social Democrat and of the 
Communist, he was a member of the new party. 


Mr. McNamara, Mr. Chairman, on this point I would just like to 
state for the record that the reason I have asked about Mr. Lan^e, or 
Professor Lange, is that he was teaching at the University of Chicago 
here for quite a few years, active in Communist fronts and causes. 
There was considerable criticism of him and also defense of him. 
Some people claimed that he was not a Communist by any means. 
He eventually went back to Poland and subsequently served as Polish 
Ambassador to the United States and also as the Polish delegate to 
the United Nations. 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. Tuck. Where is he now ? 

Mr. McNamara. I believe he died in December of last year. 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is correct. 

Mr. McNamara. Have you ever had occasion to meet Professor 
Leopold Inf eld ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Not personally, but I heard pretty much about his 
activity in different Communist- front organizations. He was a very 
active member of the peace committee, of several others. He was 
used as a front figure for different Communist-front activities, because 
of his name as a very well-known physicist. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you know whether he was a member of the 
Polish Communist Party or not ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. He was ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Professor Infeld, Mr. Chairman, I might point out 
for the record, came to this comitry in the thirties; he worked for a 
considerable period of time at the Institute for Advanced Study in 
Princeton, New Jersey, with Albert Einstein. He was a leading 
theoretical physicist. He went from there up to Canada, to the Uni- 
versity of Toronto, worked for a short time on the Canadian atomic 
project. In the summer of 1949 he made his first trip to postwar 
Poland and, on his return, announced that he intended to ask for a 
leave from the University of Toronto to go there for 1 year. 

That provoked quite a bit of discussion in the Canadian Parliament. 

One Member suggested that "appropriate steps be taken to ascertain 
the circimistances under which Dr. Infeld plans to return to Poland 
armed with certain atomic knowledge." 

No steps were taken, however, and he did go to Poland. There he 
established a research center on theoretical physics at the University 
of Warsaw and trained a number of scientists in field theory and 
theoretical nuclear physics. This is from Current Biography. 

Another interesting angle is this : Shortly after he returned to Po- 
land, he was joined there by liis wife. Dr. Helen Mary Adams Schlauch, 
former instructor of mathematics at Hunter College m New York City 
and at the University of Toronto, and also by her sister, Dr. Margaret 
Schlauch, former professor of English at New York University, who 
during her life in the United States was very active in Communist 
fronts and causes. Both these women, by the way, have been identified 
as members of the U.S. Communist Party by Dr. Bella Dodd, a former 
Communist Party member and member of the party's national com- 


Before leaving the subject of the United Nations, Mr. Tykocinski, 
in view of your extensive association with Communist representatives 
in that body, I would like t-o read to you the declared purposes of the 
United Nations Organization. And I am quoting now the Charter 
of the United Nations : 

The Purposes of the United Nations are : 

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end : to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression * * * ; 

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the prin- 
ciple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appro- 
priate measures to strengthen universal peace ; 

3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of 
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms * * * : and 

4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attaimnent of 
these common ends. 

Based on your experience in the United Nations and your knowl- 
edge of Communist representatives to the United Nations, would you 
say that the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other Com- 
munist governments represented in that body subscribed to, and be- 
lieved in, those purposes ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No. I would say that for them it is a question of 
tactics. They do whatever is in the interest of the Soviet Union at 
this moment, at the given moment. But they are not guided by these 

Mr. Senner. What about the proposition of universal peace? Do 
they believe in that, or do they advocate something different, a bunch 
of little small fires and wars ? 

Mr, Tykocinski. That is only also a tactical move. That means at 
certain periods they declare, as you know, some kind of peaceful co- 
existence without ideological coexistence. 

That is here the main point, because that means wherever there is 
trouble in the West, they can help in this trouble because that is ideo- 
logical war and that does not have anything to do with peaceful coex- 
istence. So, speaking about universal peace and other things, that is 
also a question of tactics of the giA'en moment. We speak about the 
United Nations 

Mr. Senner. Universal peace to them means beginning their ideo- 
logical programs by setting forth war in small scales here and there ; 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That means if this war, if there are good condi- 
tions for stirring trouble, they will lielp them. If they start trouble 
in South America, they will help tliem. And so all around. 

It does not mean they consider the situation right now, that it can 
be universal war because of the atomic weapons. But they consider 
they are free to step in where there is trouble. 

Mr. McNamara. Subsequent to serving with the United Nations in 
New York City, you also served two stretches in Korea; is that true? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. From June or July 1953 to January 1954 as a 
member of the Polish delegation to the Neutral Nations Repatriation 
Commission. Could you tell the committee your exact position on 
that delegation? 


Mr. Tykocinski. I was the diplomatic substitute to the chief of the 
Mission. I was his vice chief for diplomatic and political questions. 
That means I represented the Foreign Affairs Ministry there in this 

Mr. McNamara. Wliat was the name of the chief of the Mission? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Gajewski. 

Mr. McNamara. Later, from June 1955 to December 1955, you 
served on the Polish delegation to the Neutral Nations Supervisory 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is correct. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you have the same duties on that commission? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is true. 

Mr. McNamara. Was the Polish delegation to both of these com- 
missions free and independent, or did it take directions from other 
Communist powers, as the Polish delegation to the United Nations in 
New York did ? 

Mr. Tykocinski, The Polish delegation was entirely "un-f ree"' and 
it took orders from the Chinese. The Chinese were left there as the 
ones, by Russians, as the ones who are competent to give orders in 
this particular area. 

Mr. McNamara. On the Repatriation Commission, Poland, Czecho- 
slovakia, India, Sweden, and Switzerland were represented; on the 
Supervisory Commission, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is correct. 

Mr. McNamara. The Chinese were not represented on either of 
these commissions, and neither were the Russians. 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is correct. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell us how the Chinese conveyed their 
instructions to the Polish delegation? 

Mr, Tykocinski Yes. They had an entire leading group in the 
city of Kaesong, That is a city near Panmunjom and there they were 
there with some very high-ranking officials and military-ranking men, 
under this guise. 

It was easy to disguise because they did not have any ranks, so they 
were there in the uniforms of soldiers. And they had to supervise — 
this group had to supervise all what we did and the general situation 
in this commission and in the area of Panmunjom and to the demar- 
cation line. 

We got our orders on briefings, which were almost daily or nightly — 
because the Chinese like to work during the night — from several Chi- 
nese higher officials. Between them our standing adviser was one wiio 
was named Ma Mu-min. 

Mr. McNamara. Where is he now ? 

Mr. Tykocinski, He went, as I heard later, to North Vietnam and 
was the principal secret adviser of Ho Chi Minh. 

Mr, McNamara, You say they were uniformed. Were they Chinese 
or North Korean uniforms? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Chinese. 

Mr. IcHORD, How do you know this was the way orders were being 
given and taken? 

Mr, Tykocinski, Because I received them myself, I was on all 
these briefings. Tlie chief, me, and, in the Supervisory Commission, 


also the military adviser, the military substitute, who is now a general, 
Marian Graniewski, so we were the standing ones who received the 

Mr. IcHORD. From whom did you receive the orders ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. From the Chinese. 

Mr. IcHORD. And this was the individual who is now, or who went to 
North Vietnam as, an adviser to Ho Chi Minh ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. MoNamara. From the Communist viewpoint, what was your 
main task on the Repatriation Commission? That is the commission 
that supervised the exchange of the prisoners of war when the truce 
was declared in Korea. 

Mr. Tykocinski. The orders of the Chinese were to make as much 
trouble as possible in order to create a situation where the defeat, the 
political defeat of the East — namely, that most of the prisoners did not 
want to go home — that it should be covered by such arguments as that 
the Americans and the South Koreans are disturbing the real action of 
persuading those prisoners. 

You know that was an action decided, that there should be repre- 
sentatives of China and of North Korea who could persuade the pris- 
oners under the Supervisory Commission. 

So that there should be such trouble created at the commission say- 
ing, for instance, always criticizing the Americans for hampering the 
work of the commission, and so on, in order to make the picture un- 
clear. That is a major political defeat, the prisoners reall}' did not 
want to go back to North Korea and Red China. 

Mr. McNamara. Operation Little Switch, which was the first ex- 
change of prisoners, took place in April of 1953. At that time, a 
Peking radio broadcast describing the Chinese prisoners of war re- 
turned to the Chinese forces from the U.S. side stated that "Ghosts of 
men tottered straight from the horrors of Koje Island * * * they 
looked as though they had come from Belsen." That is the Nazi con- 
centration camp. They were "emaciated," "stai'ved," "maltreated"; 
Allan Winnington of the London Daily Worker played up these 

A Kaesong dispatch claimed that among the prisoner of war re- 
leased by the U.S. there was an excessive number of amputees. And 
the line was that the U.S. was following Hitler's tactics ; when you had 
someone who is seriously injured, it is easier to cut off an arm or leg 
than to try to cure the man. The claim was that the U.S. had indulged 
in tliis kind of treatment of prisoners. 

Winnington wrote, after mentioning some double amputation cases, 
"amputation — as the German Army discovered — is cheaper than 
medical attention." 

Were you there at the time these prisoners were exchanged ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No. 

Mr. McNamara. Were you there at the time of Big Switch, which 
was later, in August of 1953 ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you see the prisoners as they came over the 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 


Mr. McNamara. Were they emaciated, starved; did they look as 
though they came from a Nazi prison camp ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Not at all. 

Mr. McNamara. Generally, what was their physical condition? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Their physical condition was good, but they were 
told it was all part of a propaganda action. They were told to tear 
the clothes which they received in the camp, and so on, in order to look 
more pitiful and that they do not want to have anything from Amer- 
ica, but I have seen the clothes torn off, and so on ; they were quite neAV 
and good, in a good shape. 

Anyhow, that was a part of this harassing propaganda, this as- 

Mr. McNamara. At the time of Big Switch, the major excliange of 
prisoners, there were a number of American POW's who refused to 
come back to this comitry. They chose to remain there. Do you know 
anything about any efforts made by the Communists to influence them 
and other POW's? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. There were made intensive efforts at in- 
doctrination. When they got already nearer on this idea, they were 
better treated, and then there was a journalist, a Communist, British- 
Australian journalist 

Mr. McNamara . Wi 1 f red 

Mr. Tykocinski. Wilfred Burchett, who played also a role in in- 
doctrinating them and in persuading them to remain. 

Mr. Senner. Was there a reward made to prisoners, such as educa- 
tion, and so forth ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I do not know. 

Mr. Senner. You say Burchett was a Communist. How do you 
know this ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I know from some of the Chinese and from Bur- 

Mr. Senner. What did the Chinese tell you ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That he is a good man ; that he is ideological, good, 
and he is very helpful. The general atmosphere when we met in the 
Chinese camp was of great reverence to him and so on. 

Mr. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I state for the record that Wilfred 
Burchett is now the Moscow correspondent for the National Guardian, 
a weekly Communist newspapei' published in New York C>ity. He 
has written articles for NeiD Times and the Moscow Daily News, both 
published in Moscow. He has made broadcasts on Moscow radio. He 
has written articles for the Neto World Review^ published in New York 
City, and other Communist magazines in this comitry. International 
Publishers, the Communist Party publishing house in the United 
States, has published two of his books. 

He is writing very much on Vietnam. The two books are Vietnam — 
Inside Story of Guerilla War and The FuHloe War; The United 
States in VietTU/m and Laos, both about Vietnam. And The Worker 
is offering his book, Vietnam — Inside Story of Guerilla War as a 
premiimi for subscribing to The Worker. 

Going back to Korea, at the time he was there working on the pris- 
oners, as Mr. Tykocinski has testified, he was also active as a corre- 
spondent in spreading the charge that United States was engaged in 
fferm warfare in Korea. 


Would you have any comment on the fact that Burchett is some- 
times quoted in the U.S. press as a man who is perhaps an authority, 
or to be listened to ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No, there is nothing additional I can think of. 

Mr. McNamara. During the time you were in Korea, your two 
stays there, did you ever see any evidence of United States use of germ 
warfare or bacteriological warfare ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Nothing whatsoever. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you ever hear it discussed by any Chinese or 
other Communist representatives there? Were they saying that they 
had such evidence or could produce it ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No, the only mentions were when political actions 
of different kinds were discussed, so this was mentioned as one of the 
political arguments which should be used. Only in this context. 

Mr. McNamara. To the best of your knowledge and based on your 
experience in Korea, did the Communist forces sincerely believe in 
the truce agreement and intend to observe it faithfully and strictly? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Observe it faithfully and strictly, no, they did not 
observe it. They made several violations. For instance, by putting 
new MIG's into the north from China without control of the commis- 
sion. But they told us to accuse always the Americans of violations of 
the truce, and that brought some sessions between us and the Chinese 
because we thought this goes too far. Because they are using the Poles 
and the Czechs like stooges. They are telling them to block controlling 
the North at all, and to accuse the Americans in the South and to try 
to get more control in the South. So they were exposing us as their 

Now, I suppose that was done by purpose, that they wanted it as 
one of the things to also, to discredit some wide representatives of par- 
ties. That was also a nationalist undertone. But they brought some 
sessions between us. 

Mr. McNamara. Did this become such a big issue that it was even- 
tually brought to Chou En-lai ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. It was. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you discuss this with him personally ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, I did. 

Mr. McNamara. Where did this take place ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In Peking. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you make a number of visits to the Chinese 
mainland ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, I did. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you meet while there, in addition to Chou En- 
lai, a number of other Communist leaders ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Did they, at any time in conversation with you, 
give you any indication of Avhat their aims were? I am talking now 
in a broad sense, as regards the United States and Asia generally. 

Mr. Tykocinski. In a very broad sense, no. In the global sense, 
the world sense, no; but in the teclniical, as to Asia and as to Korea, 

Mr. McNamara. What did they indicate ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. They said that we should attack always the Amer- 
icans in order to make their position on the Asian mainland.and Korea 


weaker and they gave us such, for instance, examples, that they, during 
the truce negotiations, although every day many people perished and 
they were already prepared to make a truce, but they did not want to 
give too much concessions to the Americans, so they always tried that 
the Americans should make concessions first because that makes them, 
as they say, "lose their face," and it makes their position weaker. 
And so they say when such a situation existed, when people perished, it 
would be easier now to discredit Americans, to work in this direction, 

Mr. McNamara. Did they also instruct you — that is, the Chinese 
representatives — to quarrel witli the neutral members of the commis- 

Mr. Tykocinski. They did. 

Mr. McNamara. What was the psychology in this ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. The psychology of this was to play out the ones 
against the others. That means by attacking sharply — for instance, 
that I come back to the Repatriation Commission and by attackmg 
sharply the Swiss and the Swedes, make the Indians afraid. 

Mr. McNamara. Did they tell you a little story or anecdote to illus- 
trate that ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. Wliat was that ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. They told many, but one they said, that the Chinese 
emperors liked very much trained apes. But an ape is very hard to 
train. It only fears blood. So in order to make it more easy to 
train, they killed a hen ; they killed a hen before the eyes of the ape. 
There was fresh blood, and the ape was easier to train because it feared 
the blood. So in order to train the Indian ape, the Chinese said, we 
must kill before their eyes the Swiss and Swedish hen, so we must 
attack them so that the Indians get afraid and will be easier to train. 

Mr. McNamara. During the early period of the Korean war, when 
the Communist forces were on the offensive and winning, nothing was 
ever heard from the Commimists in this country, or anywhere else in 
the world, about negotiating a truce in Korea. And it was not until 
we had built up our forces there and General MacArthur was obviously 
winning that Commimists throughout the world, and the U.S. Com- 
munist Party here, had a very intensive campaign of agitation and 
propaganda on the theme of negotiation of a peaceful solution to the 
Korean conflict. 

Would you have any comment to make on this tactic, based on your 
experience in Korea and your experience in general? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, there was this Communist solidarity with 
Korea which requested always common action with Korea, politically 
also. That means that the political tune of all the Communist parties 
had to be coordinated by different means of propaganda, by political 
meetings, and so on, these were what was needed for Korea at this 

So when they were almost sure to win, of course the tune, the po- 
litical tune of other Communist parties was the same, that they did not 
speak anything about negotiations because the North Koreans were 
almost sure to win. 

But when they started to lose and when the war took other dimen- 
sions and so on, then the tune was the negotiation and all the Com- 
munist parties switched on that. 


Mr. McNamara. As far as the negotiations to end the conflict in 
Korea were concerned, did they have certain objectives that they 
wanted to attain in those negotiations — or limitations of purpose in 

Mr. Tykocinski. A special objective? 

Mr. McNamara. Yes. Was the view expressed to you, for example, 
that the United States could not possibly be allowed to win the nego- 
tiations ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, 

Mr. McNamara. What was the Chinese view of the Korean war? 

Mr. Tykocinski. The Red Chinese officially recognized that the 
Soviet Union is the older "brother," that they have only to play the 
first role on the Asian mainland as a sort of task which they received 
"by the Communist camp with the Soviet Union heading it." They 
stressed then by every occasion the leading role of the SU, but added 
that here in Asia we must work close with them, the Chinese, "for the 
common goal." And that is why our close consultations with the 
Chinese are needed. They were outwardly very polite. But the 
orders were very hard. 

Mr. McNamara. In addition to that, did they feel, the Red Chinese, 
did they express the view that the European Communist nations 
should be grateful to Red China ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Not overtly. There still is not so that they should 
speak such things when they do not want purposefully to offend some- 
body. So they spoke very broadly about sucli things. They under- 
lined their role and their strength and their toll of blood and of losses 
in tne ivorean war; tJiat, yes; Dut they said also that maybe w-e saved, 
by the Korean war, the world from imperialism because the defeat, 
they called it, always the defeat of the Americans will make it more 
hard for the Americans to undertake action in other places and so we 
are stronger now on the Asian mainland, but only in such terms. 

Mr. McNamara. Off the record. 

('Di'7'»'i'-'-^rvn off the record.) 

Mr. McNamara. Did you ever hear Chinese leaders express the view 
that by fighting the United States in Korea they were saving other 
Communists from a war with the West in some other part of the world ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, sir. They said that the Korean conflict is 
saving the effort, of the other Communist countries because the im- 
perialism, as they said, imperialism there had a defeat and that would 
save efforts and cost of human life for other Communist countries. 

Mr. Senner. Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. Senner. Was there a third side to the Communist Party rela- 
tive to the utilization of any other Communist group to achieve the 
overall Communist objective? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Well, you see there was a third side, that was our 
instructions which we received from the Chinese in the commissions. 
They were compromising for us. They were so hard, we had to have 
such a stand against other commission members that we could not 
possibly look otherwise than Chinese Communist stooges, so that was 
also one aspect of their very involved policy. 

Mr. Senner. Thank you. 


Mr. McNamara. In January 1956, a man named Seweryn Bialer 
defected in East Berlin, asked for political asylum in the West, and 
eventually came to this country. Bialer had been working with the 
Polish militia until 1951 and after that in the propaganda division of 
the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party. When he 
came to the United States, he testified that the Polish members of the 
Korean and also the Indo-Chinese Truce Commission or truce teams 
had received money which they were to use in an effort to develop intel- 
ligence sources among the other nations represented on the teams. 
That is, the neutral nations, the non-Communist nations. 

Did you know of anything like this while you were in Korea ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I knew several of the intelligence officers who — 
even high-ranking ones — who worked there. I knew some of their 
interests, what they were interested in. For instance, naval opera- 
tions of the U.S.A. Then they were interested in the organization of 
an American division and some other things. 

Mr. McNamara. Bialer testified he had learned this from the highest 
sources and he named as his informant General Albert Morsky who, he 
said, was chairman of the Polish Truce Team in Korea. 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you know anything about General Morsky ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, sir; I know him and I worked for a certain 
time witli him, namely, in my last month in Korea, when one chief 
went away. Then I was for several months the acting chief and then 
Morsky went as the chief of the Polish Team in the Supervisory Com- 
mission. I worked with him for several months. 

Mr. McNamara. Would Morsky be in a position to give this infor- 
mation to Bialer ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. He would, because he was a high-ranking Commu- 
nist official. His background — he is a Polish Communist from Canada, 
an old Communist. And he worked at the Polish Foreign Service 
on different high posts. He was a counselor in Great Britain. He was 
an Ambassador in Norway and he had several other posts. He had 
also high connection in the party apparatus, because of liis activities 
also in Canada, political activities. So he would be in a position to 
tell such things. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you identify any of the persons on the Polish 
delegation or team who, to your knowledge, had intelligence assign- 
ments and connections ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. There was, for instance, the deputy chief, the 
now deputy chief of the Z-2 — General, then he was a colonel, Jedynak. 
He is now General Jedynak. Then there was a colonel from the Z-2 
by the name of Lieberman. And then there were several younger of- 
ficers from the Z-2. 

Mr. McNamara. Was there a Colonel Graniewski ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, sir; he is now a general. 

He worked there also in the commission, and he is now the deputy 
chief of the Polish General Staff. 

Mr. McNamara. Was he a member of the Repatriation or Truce 
Supervisory Commission ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. He was a member of the Repatriation Commission. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you recall an incident in September of 195S 
when a Polish member of one of the teams in Korea defected ? 


Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MgNamarx\. The man's name was Jan Hajdukiewicz. 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McNamara. Could you tell us anything about that defection? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, sir. When he defected, his chief, General 
Vongrowski, and his advisers thought it politically wise to try to tell 
that he was abducted by the Americans and, of course, that was the 
most stupid thing to do, because he was not abducted at all. So the 
Americans replied patiently that he Avas not abducted, he came by his 
own free will. But his chiefs persisted in this assertion, and so the 
press had something to write. 

So, we were cabled from Warsaw, from the Foreign Office, that we 
should go to this chief of Hajdukiewicz and tell him something; that 
lie should stop this nonsense, because he is making only propaganda 
against Polish official sources; that he is telling too plain a lie. That 
was the atmosphere. 

Mr. McNamara. (^an you think of anything at the moment, Mr. 
Tykocinski, relating to your experiences in Korea, anything additional, 
that would be of interest to the committee? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I cannot at this moment. 

Mr. McNamara. After your service in Korea you returned to AVar- 
saw for a time ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. That is correct. 

Mr. McNamara. And then in August of 1956 you went to Canberra, 
Australia ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McNamara. And you remained there until the end of that 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McNamara. What was your position? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I was the deputy head of the delegation to estab- 
lish diplomatic relations with Australia, diplomatic and trade re- 
lations. The head was from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and I was 
the representiative of Foreign Affairs. He had to establish trade re- 
lations, and I had to establish diplomatic relations with Australia. 

Mr. McNamara. Did you accomplish that mission ? 

Mr. TYitociNSKi. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McNamara. AAHiile yoii were in Australia, was there any Soviet 
influence exerted on your mission or delegation ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No, because that was after the affair of Petrov ^ 
and the Soviet Embassy was closed. That was also the reason why the 

1 Vladimir Petrov was third (^ecretai-y of the Soviet Embassy and head of the Soviet 
espionage apparatus in Australia in April 1954. when he and his wife, Evdokla (also a 
career MVD officer), broke with communism and asked for political asylum. Petrov dis- 
closed the existence of a Communist espionage net in Australia that included both Austra- 
lian citizens and Soviet agents. 

The Soviet Union charged that Petrov had embezzled funds, that the documents he 
turned over to Australian authorities were forgeries, and that Mrs. Petrov had been 
kidnaped. It demanded that both Petrovs be handed over to the Soviet Embassy 
in Canberra. Australia rejected the charge that Mrs. Petrov had been kidnaped and asked 
detailed particulars of Petrov's embezzlement. The U.S.S.R. failed to supply them. Both 
Soviet requests were therefore denied by Australia. On April 23. 1954, the U.S.S.R. 
suspended diplomatic relations with Australia. 

A Royal Commission on Espionage was appointed by the Prime Minister of Australia to 
investigate the Petrov case. The Commission sat intermittently from October 18, 1954. 
to March .31, 1955. It issued its report on August 22, 1955. One of the 29 general 
conclusions contained in its report read, in part, as follows — 

"it plainly appears that for many years the Government of the U.S.S.R. had been using its 
Embassy at Canberra as a cloak under which to control and operate espionage organizations 
in Australia." 


Australians agreed to establish consulates, but not full Embassies. 
They said the atmosphere is too heated because of the affairs of Petrov. 

Mr. McNamara. And you next assignment was in Berlin in 1957 ; 
is that correct ? 

Mr, Tykocinski. Yes, but between that I worked as Chief of Cabinet 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

Mr. McNamara, Now, was it during this period that you were in- 
volved in the Soviet redefection campaign, or return to the homeland 
campaign, wliich took place in the mid-1950's? 

Mr, Tykocinski, Yes, sir, 

Mr, McNamara. Could you tell us what role you played in this, 
what you know about it, and the purpose of this campaign ? 

Mr, Tykocinski, I took part in a session between representative of 
different Ministries involved in this campaign, and we were told that 
we should try to get some Poles from abroad to come back to their 
homeland to make the emigration politically less aggressive and less 
active. We should try to get some acti^^e elements to return back to 
Poland and we should start a propaganda campaign and so on. 

Mr. McNamara. Was the purpose to try to offset, propagandawise, 
the effect on commmiism, the adverse effect, stemming from the fact 
that there were thousands of people leaving the Communist nations of 
Eastern Europe? 

Mr, Tykocinski, That is correct, 

Mr, McNamara, Was this redefection campaign successful? 

Mr, Tykocinski, No, It brought very higli costs and it brought 
very little results. Only a very few people came back as a result of 
this campaign, 

Mr, McNamara, Could you tell us Avhich agencies of the Polish Gov- 
ernment took part in this conference on the redefection campaign? 

Mr, Tykocinski, Yes, the Ministry of Interior^ — because they play 
a very big role with the Poles abroad ; then also the Central Commit- 
tee of the Communist Party was represented. 

Mr. McNamara, That is the Ministry that controls the secret police ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes; and different representatives of the secret 
police are undercover in different organizations which occupy them- 
selves with the Poles abroad and then the Central Committee, the 
Central Committee of the Polish Worker's Party. 

Mr. McNamara, Could you tell us anything about the devices, the 
strategy, the tactics used in this campaign ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. There was an intensive propaganda, and trying 
to get some of the active elements to work for this action. That means 
to get in contact with Poles abroad in different organizations, in such 
organizations which did not collaborate with the Polish Government 
and try, through them, to get to other less active elements, that they 
should work also for this action. 

Mr, McNamara. Was there a literature campaign, a mail campaign, 
instituted to get the message, if ]:)Ossible, to Poles in the United States 
and other Western nations ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes ; in different forms. 

Mr. Senner. Was this done on a family-to-family basis, relative- 
to-relative ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. On family-to-family and to organizations also. 
They tried to get contact with different organizations, tried to get 


their delegations to Poland, and so on, to speak with them and send 
them material; on family -to-family, too. 

Mr. Senner. Would you suggest that the family in Poland in writ- 
ing to the relative outside of Poland, maybe mentioned some hardship 
or some disadvantage that might befall them if they did not come 

Mr. Tykocinski. It is possible. I don't know about such instances, 
but it is possible. 

Mr. Tuck. Do they censor all of the mail that goes? Does the 
Government censor the mail ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, they send mail. 

Mr. Tuck. Censor it? 

Mr. Tykocinski. The mail is censored ; yes. The mail is censored. 
I think this censor now is the sharpest from all Eastern European 
countries, the most extensive, although it is mostly undercover, but 
it is very extensive. 

Mr. Senner. What brings about this great deal of extensive censor- 

Mr. Tykocinski. What brings it about? Once in Poland the lib- 
eralization, after '56, got too far, as Gomulka feared from the be- 
ginning, and people started to get too much personal contact with the 
West, and to inform the West to a large extent about different real 
aspects of the life in Poland ; and so several materials got out to the 
West which the Polish authorities did not want to get out. They were 
published in the West, and so on, so they clamped down sharper the 

Mr. McNamara. In the literature that was sent to the United States 
as part of this campaign, very glowing promises were made. People 
were told if they went back to Poland they would have security, good 
jobs — better than they had here — fine food, clothing, everything they 
could want in the material sense. Do you know, from your experience, 
whether or not these promises were lived up to? Did those who re- 
turned get good jobs ? Was their standard of living higher than what 
they had known in the United States and Latin America, Western 
Europe, wherever they had lived ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Certainly not. 

Mr. McNamara. Generally speaking, how were these people treated 
when they did return, those who responded to the appeal ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. From the beginning they were taken into some 
kind of protective custody by several of these organizations who 
worked for the repatriation in this action. Between them were several 
secret policeman. Some job they would get, some kind of location they 
would get, but not so as the promises told. That is why several of 
those are very discontented ; they are disillusioned. 

Mr. McNamara. The propaganda material also stated that an 
amnesty had been declared and that anyone who had fled Poland and 
had been convicted of any crime would have his conviction erased ; he 
would pay no penalty if he returned. 

Was this promise lived up to ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I don't know if many of those returned, of such a 
kind of people, because as a result of this campaign very few people 
returned. So, that must have been only a very small quantity of peo- 
ple of such a category. I do not think that they did not live up to this 


promise, because it would not pay if they would put one or two 
persons of such a category that returned in jail. That would upset the 
whole campaign and everything. 

Mr. MoNamara. Do you know whether or not the United Nations 
people in New York, for example, were used to promote this campaign 
in the United States ? 

Mr. Tykoginski. I heard something about that, but I do not know 
the details. There were people in their consular branch w^ho worked 
also for the UB and who were involved in contacts with Polish emigra- 
tion, but which concrete tactics they use at this moment here, in this 
country, I do not know. 

Mr. MoNamara. Basically, what would you say is the attitude of the 
Polish Government to emigre, refugee, and exile groups in this coun- 
try, that is, Polish groups ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. They are ti'y ing to get this contact with the organi- 
zations here as broad as possible. They invited also — they went also 
to Poland, such people who are against Communists — but werejjivited 
several times. They first refused, but later they came there-^ike the 
^<c visit of President [Qharles] Rozmarek from a huge Polish anti-Com- 
munist organization] They [the Polish Communist Government] 
wanted to create the impression between Poles that even such kind of 
organizations are working with Poland, as patriots, and they, of course, 
appreciated the quantity and quality of the Polish citizens here in 
America so they wanted these organizations to have at least neutral- 
ized if not a friendly basis. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you know whether or not they have had much 
success in this area? My offhand observation is that they have not. 

Mr. Tykocinski. Very little. 

Mr. MoNamara. At least as far as the Polish national groups in the 
United States are concerned ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Veiy little. 

Mr. MoNamara. They are for the most part very anti-Communist ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. MoNamara. It is quite obvious that Poland today, having failed 
in the redef ection campaign, is doing what it can to promote tourism in 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. MoNamara. Could you tell us whether or not people who travel 
to Poland, in response to invitations and on guided tours that are sold 
in the United States, actually travel wherever they want to and see 
whatever they want to? Are they controlled in any way ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. They are controlled in a way. They are con- 
trolled, but very discretely. That is made in a way as to not to provoke 
any attention of them, and they are traveling mostly to the most at- 
tractive parts of Poland. I want here to explain one thing. I took 
part in discussions about organizing this mass tourism, because I 
wanted something like that also from West Geraiany ; that West Ger- 
mans could also go to Poland as tourists, like they go to Czechoslo- 
vakia. But I was told then that the Russians do not want the Ger- 
mans to go all around Poland, because they could see also some mili- 
taiy esitablishments in Silesia and in some other parts. 

So that is why this question of mass tourism was a difficult one, 
especially for the Germans. And, as Poland is not very well prepared 

^ Corrected^ print ibSuecL later ^ 0^i^**nQ 
ivA'forma'tion }n bract e^ . 


for mass tourism, there is no doubt that the tourist will not go 
wherever he wishes, because certain parts of Poland are not prepared 
at all for mass tourism. There is no hotels there. There is no accom- 
modations and so there is no doubt that they will not roam through all 

And in this area where the tourists are going, several precautions 
are taken to supervise them discretely. 

Mr. McNamara. Is there any screening of people who are permitted 
to enter Poland for tourist purposes ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. How is this done ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. There are several lists of undesirable persons which 
are sent out. They are prepared in the Ministry of Interior. They 
go to the Consular Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where 
also UB people are working, and then they are sent out abroad 
to different Missions. And so when somebody applies for visas or 
something like that, in several consular divisions, at consulates, they 
are checlnng against these different secret lists; if this person is not 
on some kind of a blacklist, that is one way. 

Mr. McNamara. What makes a person undesirable, gets him on this 

Mr. Tykocinski. Several things. Political 

Mr. McNamara. It is primarily political ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. There is primarily political, but there are also 
many of economical. That means people who are making economical 
transactions which would be undesirable in Poland or who have fami- 
lies which are considered as insecure in Poland and they are afraid 
that they will have contact with them ; like that. 

Mr. McNamara. I would like to ask you now, Mr. Tykocinski, a few 
more or less general questions about subjects that the Communist 
Party stresses a lot here in the United States in its propaganda and 
through its fronts. 

One, for example, is the question of Red Chinese admission to the 
United Nations. What we are faced with now is the fact there is a 
split between Moscow and Peking. In spite of that fact, the U.S. 
Communist Party, which follows Moscow and opposes Peking in this 
difference of opinion, is plumping 100 percent for Red China's admis- 
sion to the United Nations. 

Would you have any comment to make on this fact ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes; namely, that Moscow will also further take 
the same position that China should be admitted to the United Nations, 
because they wanted always to show that whatever the matter of their 
real split is, in such a question as the representation to the United Na- 
tions they are showing their view is very open, and they think that 
that should be done. If they want it or not, that is another question. 

China accuses them, that they do not really want it, but they are 
officially further taking this view. So that is a question of tactics, of 
saying that such problems as China's representation in the United Na- 
tions, as a big nation, does not have anything to do with the split. 

Mr. McNamara. There is no question in your mind but that they 
truly want Red China in the United Nations? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I think they don't want it really, but they think 
that the danger is remote, because even in the United Nations they 


will not vote against Chiang Kai-shek, that they should be ousted, and 
Red China will not agree to sit in the United Nations together with 
National China. So the danger is considered as remote that some- 
thing like that can happen. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you have any comment to make on the Peking- 
Moscow split? How deep, how permanent it is? 

Mr. Tykocinski. It is a power struggle between two big countries 
who have their own national problems and ideological problems. But 
the ideological problems are used by China only to cover up that it is 
really a power struggle. That is, a struggle to create two empires, the 
white and yellow one, and Communist China wants to have its share 
of satellites and its share of clients outside of their sphere of influence. 
That is why they provoked this struggle at all. 

Some examples of how deep it goes: I heard from many officials 
when I was there on the other side, even then, that on the border of 
China, the Soviet Union, the incidents are very heavy indeed. There 
is going on a small war on all this frontier. And the Soviets are 
reinforcing their troops. 

Now it goes out from the secret stage. There are some information 
about it in the press, but at this stage, when I heard about it, it was 
kept pretty undercover. 

Then, the other thing is that the Chinese do not want now to get 
into better relations with the Soviets, because they want their own 
sphere of influence. 

As to the ideological side of the problem, that would be a very long 
story about the Communist ideology now. It is really deteriorating. 
Everybody has its own interpretation of the ideology of communism, 
so that creates a situation where there are several interpretations of 
the Communist ideology, but there are two centers of power, Moscow 
and Peking. 

How it will develop, that will depend on many things, but one thing 
is sure, that it is a power struggle and the ideological aspects of that 
is only a cover. 

Mr. McNamara. Would it be your estimate that Peking will succeed 
in establishing satellites, probably in Asia, and in this sense gain some 
additional power ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. It will succeed in establishing her strong position 
in Korea, for instance. In Viet Nam, there is, between the Soviet 
Union and China, the Soviet Union does not want the Chinese to 
involve the Russians in war with Americans. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you think China has the power, actually, to 
i argely oust Soviet influence in Asia ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. In Asia, certainly the impact of China on Asia 
will remain a great one, and the Soviets are aware of that. 

In Latin America, they have some possibilities. In Africa they 
suffered many setbacks. 

Mr. McNamara. Another major theme in U.S. Communist Party 
propaganda, and also international Communist propaganda, is the 
trade theme. What the Communist Party tries to tell the American 
people and the Congress and the administration is that we should 
end all trade barriers and restrictions with Communist nations, in- 
cluding even Red China; there should be free, open trade. And 
if we just follow this policy with China with its 650 million people, 


we will make so much money our factories will be booming, we will 
create all kinds of new jobs, and we wnll increase our national wealth. 

Based on your knowledge of the economic conditions of the Commu- 
nist-bloc nations, would you say this claim is true ? 

Mr. Tykocinski, No. I know from several instances, and I took 
part in several discussions about that, they are interested in trade 
with the West because of their economic difficulties. And these eco- 
nomic difficulties are aggravated by the Soviet economic difficulties. 
The Soviets, after Khrushchev, received a chaos in their economy 
which could not be imagined, and that was several times discussed by 
Polish high officials. "What do we do now ? We must close at least 
some gaps in our services and commodities, industrial production, and 
trade in general. We have, at least to some extent, to increase the 
trade with the West." The same picture prevails in other Communist 

They want this trade for trade purpose, but they make out of that 
a political argument, that that is for peace only. That is for their 
needs ; that is basically for their needs. 

Mr. McNamara. To pull their economic chestnuts out of the fire? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, sir. 

Mr. McNamara. Do you have any reason to believe that the cul- 
tural exchange program has been instituted and promoted by Com- 
munist-bloc nations for the purpose of intelligence, or is used for 
intelligence ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, sir. For instance, for receiving economic 
and technical intelligence, such kind of things. So always in the struc- 
ture of this program they are trying — and I took part also in such a 
conference where that was discussed — that means the cultural-scientific 
exchange with the major Western countries. They try always to put 
people in key positions. For instance, in interesting technological 
institutes, and so on, operated by big factory complexes, and so on, 
in order to gain not only knowledge, but certain degree of intelli- 
gence also. That is one aspect. 

Of course, they are always trying to recruit people wherever pos- 
sible. For instance, in the present exchange and cultural exchange. 

Mr. Senner. Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. McNamara. Do you know whether or not Communist gov- 
ernments attempt to control people who enter their borders on the 
exchange program? That is, prevent them from hearing or seeing 
certain things and, on the other hand, make sure that they do see 
other things that they want them to see ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. They try, they certainly try. 

Mr. McNamara. Based on your overall experience, in both Z-2 and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, your intelligence and diplomatic 
activities combined, what would you say, in general, about the pre- 
paredness and the know-how of American representatives who serve 
this Nation abroad in dealing with Communist nations ? I am speak- 
ing here of diplomatic personnel, military, and civilians who go abroad 
on trade missions, and so forth — from the view point of the struggle 
between the East and West, or the Communist and the free nations. 

Mr. Tykocinski. What I have seen, there is a marked improvement 
in the quality of American diplomatic personnel in the last time. As 


to the security personnel, what I have seen later when I came over, 
they are of a very high class because they knew everything about the 
Polish Mission and about the Polish policy there in Germany, Every- 
thing including me, personally, also. And they were hard working and 
they knew everything which they should. 

As to businessmen, the ones which I met, they were not very in- 
terested in politics, so I cannot say about their political profile, or 
something like that. They were not really interested. 

For the diplomatic personnel, the first years of my service they were 
a little bit — for instance in the European affairs, not very well oriented. 
They did not have much experience in that, but in the last time there 
is a marked improvement. There come people who know the problems 
and so on. 

Mr. McNamara. Going beyond the purely technical diplomatic 
functions — languages and things such as that — and considering pri- 
marily a thorough knowledge of communism, its aims, objectives, 
strategy and tactics, tricks and devices, do you feel they are well pre- 
pared in this area? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I would say that there is some margin for im- 
provement because these things are not generally known. Some of the 
diplomatic personnel are very well acquainted with that. But others 
do not know that especially. That would be a margin for some im- 
provement in that. As to the security people, they know that very 

Mr. McNamara. Would it be your estimate that the position of the 
United States, generally, would be a better and stronger one if, say, 
leaving out the security personnel who do receive a lot of training, 
all other people sent abroad to represent the United States were to re- 
ceive much more training and instruction in this general area ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I certainly do think so, that that would be very 
useful. Especially because the Communist countries have a very heavy 
propaganda barrage which is able, from one time to the other, to really 
cover up their real situation. So that is very hard to understand some- 
times, which is the real situation. When they have difficulties they 
are able, by a propaganda barrage, to cover up them at least for a very 
long time. 

Mr. McNamara. What would you say is the Communist estimate of 
our own security and intelligence agencies? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I would say they think them technically on a very 
high level. That means using every possible modern method, device, 
and everything. And then that they are able to work by showing the 
meaning aspects of the life in the West, which are attractive to people 
in Poland. That is why they are fearing some students from the West. 
For instance, that they can influence Polish students in a political sense. 

Mr. McNamara. Would you give us your estimate, Mr. Tykocinski, 
of conditions in Poland today ? That is the strength of the Communist 
Party, how the people consider it, wliether the government has their 
support, whether there is widespread unrest, and the picture of the 
general situation. 

Mr. Tykocinski. It is like this. The party is, by Gomulka's will, 
the main instrument of power, ruled by him. But it is ideologically 
almost dead. Because of the different struggles in the Communist 
camp and of several known events, the party cannot now be a guiding 


ideological center. She is only a power center. Gomulka wants to 
revive it, but it does not go. There is a general apathy also between 
the party members. 

In the party, the hard-liners are taking the upper hand clearly. 
They have taken over several Ministries almost entirely as to the lead- 
ing positions. They have taken over propaganda almost entirely. 
They have taken over many of the important economical centers, and 

The liberals are on the decline. They are the ones who, like the 
former Social Democratic members, Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Min- 
ister, or even its Premier Cyrankiewicz, who is a cynical man but who 
belong to the liberals, and others who want a little bit of more liberal 
conditions in Poland. Their influence is on the decline. 

As to the general position of the Polish population, I would say 
that it is a general feeling of grim despair, that nothing is done to 
better the life in Poland. The first stage of industrialization was 
achieved by very great efforts and by imposing a low standard of 
living for years and years in Poland, and it is not possible to force 
it further on by the same pace. That means it is not possible now to 
do further forced industrialization. Something must be done; some 
economic reforms, some liberal reforms, in order to give the Polish 
economy some respite. But Gomulka does not want it because he is 
an old Communist and that is against his ideas. 

So, there is no prospective for the population of a general improve- 
ment of the situation. And the population is not feeling like taking 
a very active part in all this work. They are doing so much as they 
must and they are paid also symbolically. There is a Polish saying 
that the government is only pretending to pay the workers, so the work- 
ers are only pretending to work. 

As to the government, the Polish population does not see any alter- 
native because of the Polish geographical situation ; that the Russians 
would not permit any real liberal government. So Gomulka still — 
with all that the people in Poland really do not consider him as the 
hope of Poland. He is more and more isolated and disliked, even 
loathed by many — but he remains for the time being a token of the one 
possibility that he is better than somebody else who could come because 
it could come only one even stronger for Russia. That is such a feel- 
ing. But I would say that this quiet and grim despair can, under 
favorable conditions, take forms of more active actions against the 
rulers of Poland. That means, by further falling apart, of the Soviet 
empire, if the Rumanians will succeed with their independence to 
assert itself, and by several other conditions, it can take the form of a 
more strong, active movement for improvement of relations in Poland, 
of actions like strikes, like protests, and so on. And Gomulka fears it. 
He fears the revival of such an organized form of protest against con- 
ditions in Poland, both economical and political. 

That is why he encourages the return to power of the strong men 
and he gives them over the army, the secret police, and so on. That 
would be in general. 

Mr. McNamara. A number of persons who have left Poland in 
recent years have stated their belief that in government circles, high 
circles, military circles, and even party circles themselves, there are 
many people who really despise the government. They are, in effect, 


bread-and-butter Communists, people in the party only because it is 
the only way to have a decent job, to live fairly well, and so forth. 
Would you agree with this estimate? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. The party became an organization purely 
for opportunists, because nobody can believe now in anything the party 
says. But it is necessary to be a member of the party to get a good 
job, to get better conditions, and so on. 

So, I loiow myself several higher officials, and so on, who are rather 
of liberal views and who detest everything which is happening now and 
who would gladly change something, but they are powerless to do it. 
I would agree with, this view. 

Mr. McNamara. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. Tuck. "VVlien the Communists took over Poland, did they take 
it over by force or infiltration, or both? 

Mr. Tykocinski. By force and by infiltration. Both forms were 

Mr. Tuck. Do you think substantial numbers of inhabitants of 
Poland were sympathetic to them? 
Mr. Tykocinski. To the Communist Party ? 
Mr. Tuck. Yes. 

Mr. Tykocinski. No, not that, but the organizational strength and 
the purposeful tactics and the baclring of Soviet strength, that made 

Mr. Senner. 0& the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. McNamara. To go back to the redefection campaign, Mr. 
Tykocinski, is it true that certain material and literature were pre- 
pared in Poland and then sent to the United States to the Polish U.N. 
delegation ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. It was sent to different posts abroad. 
Mr. McNamara. And was it translated there from Polish, do you 

Mr. Tykocinski. I know only that there was a specialist, a re- 
search man and translator, a member of the American Communist 
Party, who worked in the delegation. He was an ex-conductor of the 
theoretical organ of the Communist Party of America. 

Mr. McNamara. And he did some translation work in connection 
with the redefection campaign ? 
Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. You do not, however, recall the name of that 
person ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. No, I do not recall his name and I do not know 
details of his work, because I only met him three or four times in the 
delegation, and I knew that they needed several translations and some 
research. I did not know any more. 

Mr. Senner. But the Communist Party of the United States does 
seek, and does receive help, in one form or another, to further carry 
out the communistic ideologies in the United States, based upon that 
advocated by Communist Poland and Communist Russia ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. I do not know details, but I know that such con- 
tacts exist between all the parties, and there is a whole apparatus 
working for this purpose of helping them in their work. So I do not 
see why the American party would be possibly an exception to that. 


Mr. Senner. At least, to the extent of propaganda purposes, you 
know that this has actually happened with the Polish delegation and 
the Communist Party of the United States ? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes. 

Mr. McNamara. It is also the policy of the Polish Foreign Ministry 
and other representatives serving abroad to cooperate with local or 
native Communist parties by appearing as speakers at functions, party 
front meetings, and things like that? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Yes, it is. It certainly is. 

Mr. McNamara. We have seen evidence of that in the United States. 
Do you have anything to say on that — how these arrangements are 
usually made, between the front, or the party, and the man who is 
stationed in an Embassy in the United States? 

Mr. Tykocinski. Tlie party has always a representative in the Em- 
bassy, or something like that, as a contact man to the other parties. 
I was such a contact man between the Polish and the Italian parties, 
for instance. So they have from the central committee some sugges- 
tions or orders what they should do with the other party, the contact 
man from the other party is coming to this one, and they establish 
between themselves such things. 

Mr. McNamara. You have no specific knowledge as to the identity 
of any such contacts between the U.S. Communist Party and the 
Polish delegation to the U.N., or any of the other U.N. delegations? 

Mr. Tykocinski. As to the identity, who it is, no. 

Mr. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, do you have any further questions ? 

Mr. Tuck. I don't think I have time. 

Mr. McNamara. I have finished my interrogation. 

Mr. Tuck. We thank you ever so much for your cooperation and 
we thank those who are responsible for your being here with us today. 
You have brought us a great deal of information that will no doubt 
prove helpful to this committee in its studies. 

I take it if we want you to come back later you would be glad to 
do that, I hope. 

Mr. Tykocinski. I would. 

Mr. Tuck. Thank you, sir. 

(Wliereupon, at 5 :15 p.m., Wednesday, April 6, 1966, the committee 





Anders, Wladyslaw 867 

Baranowski, Feliks 858 

Bialer, Seweryn 898 

Burchett, Wilfred 89i, 895 


Chiang Kai-shek 904 

Chou En-Iai 895 

Clay (Lucius D.) 864 

Cyrankiewicz (Josef) 907 


di Vittorio, Giuseppe 882 

Dodd, Bella V 890 

poT^in! Ambrogio 883, 884 

Diirenstein 878 

Einstein, Albert 890 


Fidler 881 

Frenzel, Alfred 860 


Gajewski 892 

Gaska, Czeslaw 863 

Gomulka (Wladyslaw) 853, 860-862, 865, 889, 901, 906, 907 

Graniewski, Marian 893, 898 

Gromyko (Andrei A.) 865,886 


Hajdukiewicz, Jan 899 

Hitler (Adolf) 866, 893 

Ho Chi Minh 852, 892, 893 


Infeld, Leopold 890 

Infeld, Mrs. Leopold. (See Schlaueh, Helen Mary Adams.) 

Jedynak, Tadeusz 874, 898 


Kalanski, Czeslaw 863 

Kaufmann 878 

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich 851,853,857,864,905 

Komar, Waclaw 874 

Korczynski, Grz^orz 874, 880 

Korowicz, Marek Stanislaw 887 

Kucza, Ernest 863 





Lachs, Manfred 885 

Lange, Oscar 889, 890 

Levitski 877 

Lieberman 898 

Lik, Luejan 863 

Longo, Luigi 882 


Ma Mu-min 852, 892 

MacArthur, Douglas 896 

Mantel, Felix 877 

Markowski 877,878 

Moczar, Mieczyslaw 851, 857, 862 

Morsky, Albert 898 

Mussolini, Benito 852, 873, 879 

Nosek, Jiri 887 

Petrov, Evdokia (Alexeyevna) (Mrs. Vladimir M. Petrov) 899 

Petrov, Vladimir (Mikhailovich) 899 

Pilsudski 866 


Rapacki, Adam 865, 907 

Roszkowski 863 

(Rozmarek, Charles 902 


Schlaueh, Helen Mary Adams (Mrs. Leopold Infeld) 890 

Schlaueh. Margaret 890 

Secehia, Pietro 884 

Sforza, Carlo 883 

Sienkiewicz, Witold 872, 874 

Skrzeszewski, Stanislaw 886-888 

Sokolak, Henryk 875 

Stalin, Josef 851, 857, 864 

Strobl 878 


Togliatti (Palmiro) 879, 884 

Tondi 883 

Tykocinski, Wladyslaw 851-853,856-909 (testimony) 

Vedmed (Polish transliteration : Wiedzmiedz) 873,874 

Vongrowski 899 

Vyshinsky (Andrei Y.) 886, 887, 889 


Warzynski 880 

AViedzmiedz. ( See Vedmed. ) 

Winnington, Allan 893 


Advance 863 

American Russian Institute (for Cultural Relations with the Soviet 
Union) (New York) 883 

INDEX iii 



Communist Party, Austria 874, 878 

Communist Party, Italy 873, 879, 882-885, 909 

Communist Party of tlie United States of America 863, 896, 904, 908, 909 

Communist Party, Poland. (See United Polish Workers' (Communist) 

Hunter College (New York, N.Y.) 890 


Indo-Chinese Truce Commission 898 

Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, N.J.) 890 

International Labor Defense 883 

International Publishers 894 

Jefferson School of Social Science 883 


Komsomol. ( See Young Communist League, Soviet Union. ) 


NATO. {See North Atlantic Treaty Organization.) 

New York University (New York City) 890 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 852, 880 

Poland, Government of : 

Army 867,868 

Military Mission (West Berlin) 851, 856, 858-861, 863, 906 

Ministry of Defense 867, 870, 875 

General Staff 867, 869-871, 875, 898 

Division 2 (Z-2, military intelligence agency) 851. 

852. 863, 870-878, 880-883, 885, 898, 905 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 851, 

856, 857, 861, 863, 865, 869, 870, 875. 876, 880, 883, 884, 892, 899, 
900, 905, 909. 

Consular Department 882, 903 

Department IV 876, 880 

Department of Communications 882 

Information Department 882 

Personnel Department 882 

Press Department 882 

Ministry of Foreign Trade 863, 875, 899 

Ministry of Interior 862,871,873,900,903 

Department VII (OflSce of Security — U.B., Urzad Bezpie- 

czenstwa ) 851, 8.52, 858, 860, 862, S63, 871-875, 877, 880, 885, 902, 903 

Ministry of Merchant Navy 875 

U.B. {See Ministry of Interior, Department VII.) 
Z-2. {See Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Division 2.) 
Polish Academy for Foreign Service 862 


Radio Free Europe 860 

Radio Prague 882 




United Nations 852, 856, 885, 886, 889-891, 903, 904 

Byelorussian mission 887 

Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (Korea)— 852,892,893,896,898 

Czeclioslovakian delegation 852 

Indian delegation 852 

Polish delegation 851, 852, 891 

Swedish delegation 852 

Swiss delegation 852 

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (Korea) 852,893,898 

Polish delegation 851, 892 

Polish mission 851, 885-888, 892, 908, 909 

Soviet mission 886, 887, 888 

Ukrainian mission 887 

United Polish Workers' (Communist) Party 868, 869, 882, 909 

Central Committee 851, 858, 868, 898, 900 

United States Government 

Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) 863 

University of Chicago (Chicago, 111.) 890 

University of Toronto (Toronto, Ontario) 890 

University of Warsaw (Poland) 890 


World Peace Council (also known as World Council of Peace) 883 


Young Communist League, Soviet Union (Komsomol) 865,866,868 



Furtive War; The United States in Vietnam and Laos, The (Wilfred 

Burchett) ^ 894 

Kultura (Polish monthly) 860,861 

L'Unita del Popolo 883 

Moscow Daily News 894 


National Guardian 894 

New Masses 883 

New Times 894 

New World Review 894 


Science and Society 883 

Vietnam — Inside Story of Guerilla War (Wilfred Burchett) 894 

Worker, The 894 



3 9999 05706 3057