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* THE THEAETETUS 


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PLA E @: 


WITH TRANSLATION AND NOTES. 


BY 


BENJAMIN HALL KENNEDY, D.D. 


REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK, 
AND HONORARY FELLOW OF ST JOHN’S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE ; 
CANON OF ELY. 





EDITED FOR THE SYNDICS OF THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 





Cambridae : 
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 


London: CAMBRIDGE WAREHOUSE, 17, PATERNOSTER Row, 
Cambritge: DEIGHTON, BELL, AND CO. 
Leipsig: F. A. BROCKHAUS, 


1881 
[All Rights reserved.] 


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INTRODUCTION. 


I. THE dialogues of Plato, which I chose, from 
_ time to time, for the school work of my Sixth Form, 
were chiefly the Protagoras, the Euthydemus, and the 
Hippias Major; since this last, if not Platonic, is very 
amusing and instructive. But I seldom allowed any 
of my foremost boys to leave school without reading 
with them privately in the evenings the Theaetetus 
also, as the best preparative for their deeper study 
of Plato and of Greek philosophy in general: often 
adding to it the earlier books (I—4) of Aristotle’s 
Ethics. In the past year, 1880, I took it for the sub- 
ject of my Cambridge Lectures, reading a translation 
to my class, and commenting as occasion required. 
This was executed in the first instance quite indepen- 
dently, without reference to Professor Jowett’s ver- 
sion; but in revising my translation for the press I 
have compared the two, with frequent advantage, as 
might be expected, to the correction of my own work. 
Still the result is, that I have generally departed less 
widely from the literal Greek ‘than my confrére in the 
Sister University: and the reason of this is evident: 


as INTRODUCTION. 


the Master of Balliol has translated for the instruc- 
tion of all English-speaking students of Plato, whether 
Greek scholars or not: I for the special convenience 
of Greek students in Universities. 

II. The order of Plato’s writings, and the genu- 
ineness of many, are questions respecting which the 
varieties of opinion and ‘the controversies resulting, 
chiefly within the present century, have been so many 
and so discordant, as to prove that no certainty can 
be reached on either point. Schleiermacher’s trans- 
lation with its prefaces (first published 1804—1810) 
was the trumpet-call of the warfare which has gone 
on ever since. His elaborate attempt to arrange the 
dialogues on a systematic principle of nascent and ever 
growing philosophic doctrine has not been fully accept- 
ed by any of the scholars who have since published 
their views, Ast, Socher, Stallbaum, K. F. Hermann, 
Steinhart, Susemihl, Suckow, Munk, Bonitz, Ueberweg, 
Schaarschmidt and others: while Ritter Brandis and 
Zeller, historians of Greek philosophy, are less unfa- 
vourable to the principle of Schletermacher, though not 
admitting it in its details. Out of 35 or: 36 dialogues 
usually set down as Plato’s, Ast will only accept 14 
as genuine; viz. (1) Protagoras, Phaedrus, Gorgias, 
Phaedo: (2) Theaetetus, Sophista, Politicus, Parmeni- 
des, Cratylus: (3) Philebus, Symposium, Respublica, 
Timaeus, Critias: in this order. Thus he even rejects 
the Leges, though cited by Aristotle. This may be 
considered the extreme opinion on the sceptical side, . 
-as Grote in his work on ‘Plato and the other com- 
panions of Socrates’ represents the extreme credulous 


~ 


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> 











INTRODUCTION. ix 


view, supporting the Alexandrine canon of Thrasyllus, 


a grammarian of the Augustan age, cited by Diogenes 


of Laerta. This canon rejected ten dialogues, which 
Diogenes enumerates; and these have since then 
been universally treated as spurious. Some of them 
did not survive: seven are printed at the close of 


the Tauchnitz edition and by Bekker, along with 


the 13 Epistles (which Grote, differing from most 
scholars, accepts as genuine) and the Definitions (ὅροι). 
Thrasyllus distributed the dialogues of Plato into two 


classes; (1) d. of Investigation (ζητητικοῖ); (2) d. of 
_ Exposition (ὑφηγητικοί)δ. These he also subdivided 


variously: but his subdivisions have little interest. 
The chronological order of the dialogues, like the 


_ genuineness of many, is a much disputed question on 
- some points: strikingly so respecting the date of the 


Phaedrus, which Schleiermacher, as an essential fea- 
ture in his system, deems the earliest; while others, as 
Stallbaum and Steinhart, place it among the latest. 
Generally. it may be said that the shorter and 
slighter dialogues, when accepted as genuine, are 
ascribed to Plato’s youth; the Republic, Timaeus and 


_ Leges are universally admitted to be the latest: while 


the Theaetetus, Sophista and Politicus (usually too 


_ the Parmenides and Cratylus) are supposed to have 


been written by Plato during his travels or on his 
return—at all events before his 4oth year. 

The following arrangement is that of a critic who 
had evidently given much time and thought, with — 
great zeal, to the elucidation of these questions; I 
mean K. F. Hermann. He, in common with most 


Χ INTRODUCTION. 


writers on this subject, distributes the works which he 
accepts into three groups: (1) the earlier, composed 
partly before the death of Socrates B.C. 399, partly 
after it, before Plato quitted Megara: (2) those written 
under the influence of the Megarian dialectic, during 
or immediately after the years of travel: (3) the later, 
commencing with the Phaedrus, and going on during 
the second half of Plato’s career, while he was scho- 
larch of the Academy, from 386 (probably) till his 
death in 347. 


(1) (2) (3) 


Hippias 11. Cratylus e Phaedrus ¢ 
Ion Theaetetus Menexenus* 
Alcibiades I. Sophistes ὁ Symposium @ 
Charmides Politicus ¢ Phaedo ὁ 
Lysis Parmenides. Philebus ὁ 
Laches - Respublica e 
Protagoras _ Timaeus δ᾽ 
Euthydemus , Critias ¢ 
Apologia Socr.* Leges e. 
Crito ὁ 

Gorgias 

Euthyphro 

Meno 

Hippias I. 


Those to which e is appended are classed by Grote 
as dialogues of exposition; the rest are of investiga- 
tion (zetetic) except the two with asterisks, which are 
of neither kind. Grote accepts seven others which 
Hermann disallows. 


INTRODUCTION. xi 


It is satisfactory to gather from these notices that 
the Theaetetus is admitted on all hands to be a 
genuine work of Plato. It is almost universally as- 
cribed to his age of manhood, and to a time when 
(having imbibed before his 27th year the lore and 
- didactic skill of Socrates, having in the subtle dis- 
cussions of Megara had full opportunity of prac- 
tising the dialectic _method) he had enlarged his 
learning and experience by intercourse with the ma- 
thematicians of Cyrene and the Pythagorean school- 
men of Italy. The dialogues called Sophistes and 
_ Politicus are connected with the Theaetetus, and their 
genuineness is generally admitted, though the So- 
_ phistes is disallowed by Ueberweg. 
III. A preface to the Theaetetus would be in- 
_ complete without some account of antecedent Hellenic 
_ philosophy. But in a preface, even to Plato’s works, 
much more to a single dialogue, such an account 
must be brief and eclectic. Some topics must be 
placed in stronger light, and more fully considered 
than others. What are these? 

(1) In the first place, Socrates is an interlocutor 
in all Plato’s dialogues, excepting ‘the Laws’: and 
in most of them (though not in the Sophistes) we 
find him discussing, more or less, some principle or 
practice of those who are called Sophists. With 
Socrates himself therefore, with his method, and with 
the Sophists and their doctrines, a young student will 
do well to make acquaintance, before he enters upon 

-any of Plato’s writings. 
(2) Inseveral of Plato’s works (as in the Theaete- 





ΤΥ ἮΝ 


ΧΙ INTRODUCTION. 


tus) appears the contrast between (1) the physical 
teaching of the Eleatic School (Melissus, Parmenides, 
Zeno), the forerunner of pantheism, in which the 
universe is one Being (Ens) at rest, and (2) that of 
Heracleitus of Ephesus, who taught Becoming in the 
place of Being, Many rather than One, Motion and 
Change instead of Rest, ascribing such ‘motion to 
the flow of a prevailing fiery element (πάντα ῥεῖ). 


Distinct again from these were (1) the teaching of : 


Empedocles of Agrigentum, who took the concord 


of four elements (fire, air, earth, water) as the base 


of existence; (2) that of the Atomists, Leucippus 
and Democritus, who ascribed the origin of things to 
the fortuitous concurrence in space of small indivisi- 
ble particles (ἄτομα); (3) that of Anaxagoras, who 
assigned the arrangement of his ὁμοιομέρειαν to 
supreme Intelligence (νοῦς). All these philosophers 
had been preceded by two other famous schools in 
the 6th century B.Cc.: (1) the Ionian (Thales, Anaxi- 
mander, Anaximenes), who imagined the primary sub- 
stance of things to be—the first, Water, the second, 
Indeterminate Matter (τὸ ἄπειρον), the third, Air: 
(2) the Italic sect of Pythagoras, which lasted long, and 
formed a powerful order. This school ascribed marvel- 
lous organic properties to Number, and believed in 
the transmigration of souls. All the philosophers 
above-named, from Thales to Anaxagoras, flourished 
during the century and a half anterior to the age of 
_ Socrates (600—440 B.C.), though their exact dates are 
uncertain. ᾿ 

Zeller, whose views are welcomed by Professor 


INTRODUCTION. tt 





Jowett, maintains that all these various schools were 
engaged in teaching purely physical doctrines; for 
‘that even the seeming abstractions, assumed as primal 
Εν the Pythagoreans the Eleatics and Anaxagoras 
p Number, Being, Intellect), were not understood by 
: “them as absolutely incorporeal. See Zeller’s Preso- 
“cratic Philosophy (translated by Alleyne); also Preller’s 
Historia Philosophiae (for citation of passages), Schweg- 
-ler’s History of Philosophy (translated by Stirling), 
‘and the fuller work of Ueberweg (published by 
Messrs Hodder and Stoughton). 
- IV. Socrates is said by Cicero to have called 
down philosophy from heaven; by which is meant 
“that Socrates was the first to chee the direction 
of philosophical studies in Hellas; to divert them 
- from the universe to man himself, from cosmogony 
to anthropology. But this credit belongs rather 
to that school of thinkers with whom Socrates was 
most at war, to those who are called Sophists: espe- 
cially to Protagoras the eldest and most influential 
of their number—the author of the famous dogma 
‘man is the measure of all things, in other words, 
‘what seems to each is to each, Protagoras was born 
at Abdera in Thrace, and flourished B.c. 450— 30. 
Gorgias of Leontini was contemporary, but lived to 
a great age, dying 380. Prodicus of Ceos flourished 
435. Others of note were Hippias of Elis, Polus, 
Thrasymachus, and the brothers Euthydemus and 
- Dionysodorus. They professed to teach all subjects 
of liberal education; philosophy, rhetoric, language, 
logical eristic, &c.: and they travelled from city to 


ve = 


XIV INTRODUCTION. 


city, exacting and obtaining large fees for the in- 
struction given. This instruction was calculated, as — 
they declared, to acquaint their pupils with the pro- — 
gress of human civilization, to free them from preju- 
dices, to give breadth and strength to their mental © 
faculties, to make them wise thinkers and fluent speak- 
ers, to teach them how to form just opinions on public — 
affairs, how to manage their own property, and to 
deal with mankind in general. 

In mentioning this famous Sophistic school, so far 
as it deserves to be called a school, we may note the 
fate which has attended the name itself and its derived 
words. Sophist, sophistical, sophism, sophistry, so- 
phistication, are all of them terms used to designate 
what is delusive and false. A similar discredit in 
modern times attaches to the words jesuit, jesuitical, 
jesuitry, jesuitism. So the words heresy, heretic, 
heresiarch, heretical, are now never used except in a 
vituperative sense. Yet Sophist was a creditable: 
name originally: it is given by Herodotus to the 
Seven Sages and to Pythagoras. Jesuit simply means 
a member of the Society of Jesus, such title being 
allowed by the Pope (who calls himself ‘ Vicar of Jesus 
Christ on earth’) to the Order of Ignatius Loyola, for 
the enhancement of its dignity and credit. Heresy 
(αἵρεσις, choice) merely meant the Latin ‘secta, a sect: 
and Clement of Alexandria calls the Catholic Church 
itself ‘the best of all heresies’ (sects). Each of these 
terms therefore acquired its evil sense, partly, no 
doubt, by errors and faults of those who bore them, 
partly by the charges and invectives of powerful ene- 





INTRODUCTION. XV 


“mics. Undoubtedly the Sophists, as a class, found 
their most powerful enemy in Plato: and upon his 
dialogues (especially the Euthydemus, Gorgias, Hip- 
pias I. and Sophistes) the principal charges against 
‘them as a class originally rest. In the great historian 
‘of Greece, Mr Grote, they have found their most 
‘powerful champion and rehabilitater; their cause 
being likewise pleaded strongly by the late Mr Lewes 
‘in his History of Philosophy. All Greek students 
have in their hands Grote’s History; and they may 
be referred to that work for a general statement 
of the case on both sides; but more particularly to the 
facts and arguments urged by him as counsel (so to 
say) for the defendants in Part 11. Ch. Ixvii.t On the 
other side, as not fully agreeing with Mr Grote’s strong 
“championship, may be consulted Thirlwall’s History 
οἵ Greece, Ferrier’s Lectures, and Professor Jowett’s 
prefaces to the Platonic Dialogues, especially his 
‘preface to the Sophistes, 

_  V. Besides the Academic school of Plato and his 
“successors, philosophic schools of minor influence were 
founded by three other pupils of Socrates. These 
were Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Eucleides. Antis- 
‘thenes taught at Athens in the gymnasium called 
Cynosarges, whence his school was called that of 
‘the Cynics. He held that virtue alone suffices for 
happiness, anticipating the later Stoic doctrines. 
Diogenes of Sinope, whose interview with Alexander 
the Great is so famous, was the best known member of 























__} Grote’s views are supported by Mr H. Sidgwick in two able 
“papers printed in the Cambridge Journal of Philology (Nos. vull. Ix.). 


xvi INTRODUCTION. 


this school. Aristippus of Cyrene founded the Cyre- 


naic or Hedonic school, which taught that pleasure is 
the supreme good of man, thus forerunning the later 
teaching of Epicurus. Eucleides of Megara founded 
the short-lived Megaric school, which is said to have 
taught a fusion of Eleatic and Socratic doctrines, 
Dialectic was among its special studies, and was 
occasionally carried to the excess known as Eristic. 
Many curious puzzles of thought are ascribed to its 
disciples. Of these three schools see a brief account 


in Schwegler’s History of Philosophy (Transl. p. 53), _ 


and consult also the larger work of Ueberweg (Vol. 1. 
§$ 3438). It was to Megara that Plato retired after 
the death of Socrates, and resided there before his 
travels, probably exercising himself in dialectic dis- 
cussion. Susemihl thinks that in gratitude for this 


kindness he commemorates his Megarian friends in ~ 


the introduction to the Theaetetus, thus indirectly — 


dedicating the dialogue to them. 


VI. An analysis of the Theaetetus is given in — 


the headings of the several sections, noted in the 


Greek text I—XLIV., in the translation I1—44.. In — 


the notes at the close, as in the Greek text, the mar- 
ginal pages and alphabetic divisions of the first edition 


of Stephens are also referred to. These notes are 


chiefly designed to trace the chain of Plato’s reasoning 
in places where it is not easily discerned: but occa- 
_ sionally they refer to the commentaries of Professor 
Campbell and H. Schmidt. | 


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οὐκ ὀλίγιστον πλησιάζουσι, Kal δικαίως" ἄξιος" yap 
/ | v \ / “ > δὴ Φ \ 
τά | Te ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἕνεκα. εἰ δὴ οὖν TWLE 
, t Ul 
ἐνέτυχες ἀξίῳ λόγου, ἡδέως av πυθοίμην. OEO. Kai 
» “ ’ rn , 
μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνυ 





= 


κε 

᾿ 

ᾧ 

Ἵ 

v vA ¢ a A a / b , \ 
᾿ ἄξιον, οἵῳ ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μειρακίῳ ἐντετύχηκα. Kal 
᾿ς εὐ μὲν ἣν καλός, ἐφοβούμην ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καί 
, to δόξω ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι" viv δέ, καὶ μή μοι 

» 

ἱ ἄχθου, οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμό- 
. TnTa Kal τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων ἧττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ᾽ 
” 3 a \ 4 S xX \ Μ “ e \ U4 
 €yet. ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω. εὖ * γὰρ ἴσθι ὅτι ὧν δὴ πώ- 144 

Lee \ a / .] , 
᾿ς ποτε ἐνέτυχον---καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα---οὐδένα 
" = 9 
to ἠσθόμην οὕτω θαυμαστῶς εὖ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ 
i » - Μ ¢ v ’ a 3 > 
 εὐμαθὴ ὄντα, ὡς ἄλλῳ χαλεπόν, Tpdov αὖ εἶναι δια- 
φερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρεῖον παρ᾽ ὁντινοῦν, ἐγὼ 
‘ Vita, MN +7 / 0 v ¢ A 7 ᾿ " > 
᾿ς μὲν οὔτ᾽ ἂν mounv γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γυγνομένους" ἀλλ 
ἐ ς “Ὁ 
οἵ τε ὀξεῖς ὥσπερ οὗτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὡς 
ἢ \ \ \ \ \ > \ Pes re Ae ee 4 
_ Ta πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς Tas opyas ὀξύῤῥοποί εἰσι, Kal ἄτ-. 
7 Nin Se a 

᾿ς χτοντες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, Kai | μα- B 
» ΕῚ ΄ / 

νικώτερον ἢ ἀνδρειότερον φύονται, of τε αὖ ἐμβρι- 
> , a \ 
 θέστεροι νωθροί πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ 
: / , ς \ “ , πες , \ 

λήθης γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε Kal ἀπταίστως Kal 

᾽ ΄ ” \ 

ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις 





ae ΠΛΆΤΩΝΟΣ 


μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ῥεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ 
ῥέοντος, ὥστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα οὕτω ταῦτα 
διαπράττεσθαι. LO. Ed ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καί ἐστι 
τῶν πολιτῶν; ΘΕΟ. ᾿Ακήκοα μὲν τοὔνομα, μνημονεύω 


a A ¢ a 
C δὲ ov. ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐστι | τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὃ ἐν τῷ 


/ wv \ > oF nat / τ , ς a , / 
μέσῳ. ἄρτι yap ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἠλείφοντο ἑταῖροί TE 
bf n b] a / “ 2 
τινες οὗτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλει- 
U La) 37 2 εἶ , > / > 
ψάμενοι δεῦρο ἰέναι. adda σκόπει EL γυγνώσκεις av- 
ς a ae / 
τόν. LQ. Τιγνώσκω" ὃ τοῦ Σουνιέως Evdpoviov ἐστί, 
\ J > , 3 \ Ὁ \ \ an 
καὶ πάνυ ye, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἷον καὶ σὺ τοῦτον διη- 
a \ Υ ε t \ , \ b U , 
yel, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα 
; \ , \ 3 - ? 3 a / 
πολλὴν κατέλιπε. τὸ δ᾽ ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου. 


D@EO. Θεαίτητος, ὦ Σώκρατες, | TO γε ὄνομα᾽ τὴν 


’ > / an / > / , / 
μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποί τινες διεφθαρκέ- 
9 > ὦ \ \ \ A / 

ναι. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως Kal. πρὸς THY TOV χρημάτων ἐλευθε- 
ριότητα θαυμαστός, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΏ. Τεννικὸν λέγεις 
\ 7 / I ἌΝ > ' / 
τὸν ἄνδρα. καί μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθί- 
ζεσθαι. OEO. ἔσται ταῦτα, Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ 
Σωκράτη. ΣΏ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα κἀγὼ 
ἐμαυτὸν ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποῖόν TL ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον. 


\ \ t » ἄν Ἀν: : an » 
E φησὶ γὰρ Θεόδωρος. ἔχειν pe σοί |! ὅμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ 


145 


νῶν ἐχόντοιν ἑκατέρου λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι; 
ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ᾽ 
ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς ὧν λέγει; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Επεσκεψάμεθ᾽ 
ἄν. QO. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὑρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ᾽ ἄν, 


ἄμουσον δέ, ἠπιστοῦμεν; ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ. LO. Νῦν 


δέ γ᾽ οἶμαι, εἴ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν προσώπων ὁμοιό- 
τητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς * ὧν λέγει ἢ OV. OEAT. 
Δοκεῖ μοι. ΣΏ, Ἦ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος; OEAT. 
Οὐχ, ὅσον γ᾽ ἐμὲ εἰδέναι. LO, ἾΑρ᾽ οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός: 
ΘΈΑΙ. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΏ. Ἦ καὶ 





eee Ἂς 





we 


Pa LEO Ce 


ee ΠΑ ΤΑ ΨΥ Crees GE Oe eo Oe ee er re 


®EAITHTOS. 7 


ἀστρονομικὸς Kal λογιστικός τε καὶ μουσικὸς Kal ὅσα 
παιδείας ἔχεται; OEAI. “Epouye δοκεῖ. LO. Ei μὲν 
ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματός τι ὁμοίους φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν 
πη ἢ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως οὔ LO. Τί δ᾽ εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυ- 


᾿ ᾿ | > a \ > / \ ,ὔ . 5 9 > 
χὴν | ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε Kal σοφίαν; ap οὐκ 


” “ \ 3 Ud a , 7 
peor τῷ μὲν ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι 
τὸν δηἐνεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθυρων ἑαυτὸν. ἐπιδεικνύναι; 


4 @EAL. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. Un >. fils 


τοίνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ 
σκοπεῖσθαι" ὡς εὖ ἴσθι, ὅτι Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς 57 πρός 
με ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ ἀστοὺς οὐδένα πω ἐπήνεσεν 
ὡς σὲ νῦν 67. QOEAT. Ed ἂν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες" ἀλλ᾽ 
ὅρα μὴ παίζων | ἔλεγεν. ΣΏ. Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος 
Θεοδώρου. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὡμολογημένα σκηπτό- 
μενος παιζοντα λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀνωγκασθὴ 
μαρτυρεῖν πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψει αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ 
θαῤῥῶν ἔμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ. OEAI. ᾿Αλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα 
ποιεῖν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ. ΣΏ. Λέγε δή poe’ μανθάνεις που 
παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἄττα; OEAI. "Eyoye. 
ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ | ἁρμονίας καὶ. 
λογισμούς; @EAI. Ti potlupoupat γε δή. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ 
ἐγώ, ὦ παῖ, παρά γε τούτου καὶ παρ᾽ ἄλλων, ods ἂν 
οἴωμαί τι τούτων ἐπαΐειν. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔ ἔχω 


ιν / 
περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρὸν δέ TL ἀπορῶ, ὃ μετὰ σοῦ 


τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. καί μοι λέγε" Gp’ οὐ τὸ μαν- 
θάνειν ἐστὶ τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ ὃ μανθάνει 
τις; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; LQ. Σοφίᾳ δέ γ᾽ οἶμαι 
σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί OEAI. Ναί. YQ. 1! Τοῦτο δὲ μῶν 
διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης; OEAI. Τὸ ποῖον; SO. Ἢ 
σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί; 


σ 


D 


— 
[ΟῚ 


146 


8 | TIAATONO® 


, gt ay ἢ τ τέ 
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σο- 
a ,’ \ © 
dia; @EAI. Nai. 0. Τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὃ 
᾽ a \ ΡΣ δύ a ς a Ἐπ - a 
ἀπορῶ καὶ ov δύναμαι λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς Tap ἐμαυτῷ, 
> , “ / , BA 5 9 5 Ἁ »” xX 
ἐπιστήμη ὅ τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν. ap οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν 
, e Lal n 
λέγειν αὐτό; τί φατέ; Tis ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὁ δὲ 
> ) ? 
¢ 9 an / 
ἁμαρτών, καὶ ὃς dv ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ 
\ ¢ rn ς / ” Mee. oar. 
φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος" ὃς δ᾽ ἂν περι- 
, U ς a \ 
γένηται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν Kal ἐπιτάξει 6 
x / 2 / / lal v / 
τι av βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τί συγᾶτε; ov τί που, 
¢ ’ 
ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, mpo- 
θυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε 
3 / / / 
Kal προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθαι; OEO. Ἥκιστα 
μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη ἄγροικον, ἀλλὰ 
τῶν μειρακίων TL κέλευέ σον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν 
\ Ἀν a / / \ 20 3 
γὰρ ἀήθης τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ οὐδ᾽ αὖ συν- 
¢ lal , 3 lal 
εθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω" τοῖσδε δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο 
\ \ a 3 es a \ δ ς > 
καὶ πολὺ πλεῖον ἐπιδιδοῖεν᾽ TH yap ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς 
sae > / » 5 > ¢/ 4 Ν > / n~ 
πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ᾽, ὥσπερ ἤρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ 
Θεαυτήτου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐρώτα. IV) ΣΏ. ᾿Ακούεις δή, ὦ 
/ «ἃ r ¢ \ τ 
Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος, ᾧ ἀπιστεῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, 
v \ | 26 , bd / \ \ “ 3 ὃ ‘ 
οὔτε σὺ | ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ανὸρὶ 
nn 3 , , 9 a > a, \ 
σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλ᾽ εὖ καὶ γεν- 
, > & a 8 ? ASS 
vals εἰπέ" τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη; OEKAT. ᾿Αλλὰ 
, > ΄ a ’ / 
χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς κελεύετε. πάντως 
’ by \ ¢ ' 3 6 , ΣΩ, Tl fo 
yap, av τι καὶ ἁμάρτω, ἐπανορθώσετε. . Lave 


. μὲν οὖν, ἄν πέρ γε οἷοί τε ὦμεν. OEAT. Δοκεῖ τοί- 


7 τῆν \ , Γ΄ / 4 nA 

νυν μοι καὶ ἃ παρὰ Θεοδώρου av τις μάθοι ἐπιστῆμαι 
5. / \ \ a δὴ \ ὃ mr \ 
εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ as νῦν δὴ σὺ διῆλθες, Kai 
αὖ σκυτοτομική τε καὶ | αἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν 

n 9 ; 
τέχναι, πᾶσαί τε Kal ἑκάστη τούτων, οὐκ ἄλλο TL ἢ 
3 U 3 μ ἕν". 
ἐπιστήμη εἶναι. +O. Τενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 9 


























φίλε, ἕν αἰτηθεὶξὶ πολλὰ δίδως, καὶ ποικίλα ἀνθ᾽ 


Ὺ 


ἁπλοῦ. ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; 
Ae -4 \ oe a & , 5 , ¢ 

~~ 20. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν. ὃ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὁταν 
λέγῃς σκυτικήν, μή TL ἄλλο φράζεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην ὑπο- 
δημάτων ἐργασίας; OEAI. Οὐδέν. LO. Τί δ᾽ | ὅταν 
: 7 / ” a 9 , n A r 

 TEKTOVLKHY 3 μή TL ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων 
σκευῶν ἐργασίας; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτος LQ. Οὐκοῦν 
ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὗ ἑκατέρα ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτο ὁρίζεις; ΘΙΑΊ. 
Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε ἐπερωτηθέν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὐ 
TovTO ἦν, τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὁπόσαι τινές. οὐ 
\ 9 a oe AN t Ce 8 ᾽ \ a 
yap ἀριθμῆσαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἡρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνῶ- 
Ε- 2 , To Nan OF / 4,24 x IO\ , 

vat ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ 6 τί ποτ᾽ ἐστίν. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω ; 
ΟΘΕ,ΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς. YO. * Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ 
τόδε. εἴ Tis ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων ἔροι- 
το, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὅ τί ToT ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμε- 
θα αὐτῷ πηλὺς ὁ τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἰπνο- 
πλὰαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλινθουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι 
εἶμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως. LO. Πρῶτον μέν γέ που οἰόμενοι 
συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, 
ὅταν εἴπωμεν πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες 


συνίησί τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστιν; ΘΕΑΙ, Οὐδα- 
pos. LO. Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν 
& 


ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς. OEAI. Οὐ yap. LO. Σκυτικὴν 
ἄρα οὐ συνίησιν ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοῇ, οὐδέ τινα 
ἄλλην τέχνην. OEAI. "Ἔστιν οὕτω. ΣΏ. Terola ἄρα 
ἢ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμη τί ἐστιν, ὅταν 
οκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα. τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστή- 


147 


Εν a A 
εἴτε | ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν δημιουργῶν. ἤ οἴει, Tis TUB 


μην ἀποκρίνεται, οὐ τοῦτ᾽ ἐρωτηθείς. OEATI. "Eouxer. α 







ΣΩ. ᾿Ἐπειτά γέ που ἐξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀπο- 
ον , 7 , ͵ . , Ἢ 9 = 
A ρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν. οἷον Kai ἐν TH 


10 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


fal al 9 U a , \ se A > a [2 
τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαῦλόν που καὶ ἁπλοῦν εἰπεῖν, OTL 
RAL A a ‘ x 7 \ γ Ὁ 5A 4 
yn ὑγρῷ φυραθεῖσα πηλὸς av εἴη, τὸ δ᾽ ὅτον ἐᾶν χαίρειν. 
a / 
V. @EAI. Ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν ye οὕτω φαίνεται" 
ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτῶν οἷον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἔναγχος 
Ὁ εἰσῆλθε διαλεγομένοις, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σῷ ! ὁμωνύ 
ἰσῆχθε διαλεγομένοις, ἐμ τῷ σῷ ! ὁμωνύμῳ 
σι , 
τούτῳ Σωκράτει. LO. Td ποῖον δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε; 
ΘΈΑΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεών te ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὅδε ἔγραφε, 
na ΄ τα 7 
τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος, ἀποφαίνων ὅτι 
μήκει οὐ ξύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν 
ἑκάστην προαιρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἑπτακαιδεκάποδος" ἐν 
δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο. ἡμῖν οὖν εἰσῆλθέ τι τοιοῦτον, 
2 Ὧν ΕΣ \ a « / 5) / ; 
ἐπειδὴ ἄπειροι TO πλῆθος ai δυνάμεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειρα- 
an nm 7 4 
E θῆναι ξυλλαβεῖν εἰς ἕν, ὅτῳ πάσας ταύτας | προσαγο- 
, \ ὃ / bs °H \ “ 7 lal εἴ 
ρεύσομεν τὰς δυνάμεις. ΣΏ. καὶ εὕρετέ τι τοιοῦτον ; 
@EAI. *Epouye δοκοῦμεν. σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. XO. Λέγε. 
. \ 
@EAL. Tov ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν. τὸν μὲν 
, A \ 
δυνάμενον ἴσον ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ TO 
σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσόπλευρον 
προσείπομεν. ΣΏ. Καὶ εὖ γε. ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. Τὸν τοίνυν 
* Kal 
mas ὃς ἀδύνατος ἴσος ἰσάκις γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ πλείων 


\ , : \ \ 7 NY oa Age 
148 μεταξὺ τουτου, ὧν Kal Τα τρία καὶ TA ἽΕΡΤΕ 


2 / Ἃ > / / / / \ 
ἐλαττονάκις ἢ ἐλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ 
καὶ ἐλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προ- 
Ὁ , \ 
μήκει αὖ σχήματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμήκη ἀριθμὸν ἐκα- 
᾿ λέσαμεν. ΣΏ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἐπί- 
3 a ¢ , 
medov ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, μῆκος ὡρισάμεθα, ὅσαι 
Ν ᾽ 
Β δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ ' ξυμμέτρους 
ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται. καὶ περὶ τὰ 
στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ΣΏ. "Αριστά γ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, ὦ 
al cd ae 3 »” a 
παῖδες, ὥστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς Yrevdo- 





ee νὰννν ΝΝψνΝ 


πῶς " 
Ἦ 


x OEAITHTOS. 11 


νὰ ee oe r 7 
μαρτυρίοις ἔσεσθαι. ΘΈΑΙ. Kai μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅ γε 
>’ a \ b] / 9 * / ’ 
ἐρωτᾷς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ av δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι 
A A A / 4 
| ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως. καίτοι σύ γέ 
her. -“ “ n / / 
μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖν. ὥστε πάλιν αὖ φαίνεται 



























ae! a \ σ“ an a , > 
ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ οὕτω δρομικῷ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυ- 
δε ee. 

χηκέναι, εἶτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου 
- - ῇ - ’ x " ? a / δ᾽ > / 4 
᾿ἡττήθης, ἧττόν TL av oles ἀληθῆ τόνδ᾽ ἐπαινέσαι ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ 
γῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, σμικρόν τι οἴει εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ 
τῶν πάντῃ ἄκρων; OEAI. Νὴ τὸν Δί᾽ ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα 
γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων. LO. Oappes τοίνυν περὶ σαυτῷ καί 
- "» ὃ 4 | a) δὲ \ / 
τι οἴου Θεόδωρον λέγειν, ' προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ 
1 a " 7 δ Ὁ n / / 
σῶν Te ἄλλων wep καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν Rare? τί 
ποτὲ τυγχάνει ὄν. ΘΕΑΙ. ἸΠροθυμίας μὲν ἕμέξεμ ὦ 
Σώκρατες, φανεῖται. Vi ΣΏ. Ἴθι dy καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι 
ὑφηγήσω: πειρῶ μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων 
a a ὀκρισιν, ὥσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἑνὶ εἴδει περι- 
ἔλαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἑνὶ aero προσ- 
εἰπεῖν. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σάσρατεν," πολλάκις 
ὃ ) αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς mapa σοῦ 
ΒΕ τοφερομένας ἐρωτήσει»" ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς δύναμαι 
πεῖσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω, οὔτ᾽ ἄλλου ἀκοῦσαι 
λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύει, οὐ μὲν δὴ αὖ οὐδ᾽ 
orion. τοῦ μέλλειν. LO. ’Odivers yap, ὦ dire 
Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἀλλ᾽ ἐγκύμων εἶναι. OLAI. Οὐκ 
οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες" ὃ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω. +0. Εἶτα, 
ὦ Ἂ Βαταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὡς ἐγώ εἶμι υἱὸς μαίας 
a ara γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαιναρέτης; OEAT. 


148 c. Num legendum sit του pro τοῦ quaeri potest, non decerni. 





ψευδὴς ὁ Θεόδωρος. ΣΏ. Τί δαί; εἴ ce! πρὸς δρόμον o 


D 


0 


149 


12 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


͵ ἃ , ‘ 
Ἤδη τοῦτό ye ἤκουσα. ΣΏ. Apa καὶ ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν 
, > an Φ ᾽ 
αὐτὴν τέχνην ἀκήκοας; OEAI. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλ 

ΦΧ » ὦ " \ 7 / \ ‘ Υ 
εὖ ἴσθ᾽ OTe μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπῃς πρὸς TOUS ἀλλους. 
7 ἢ m. een r ” \ , < eos 
λέληθα yap, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταύτην ἔχων THY τέχνην" οἱ δέ, 
5 50. ἡ : a \ > / ee | an ff \ 
ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ 
, a \ 3 , > a 
ATOTOTATOS εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. ἢ 
καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας; ΘΕΙΑΙ. !Ἔγωγε. YO. Εἴπω οὖν 
΄ > 3 
σοι τὸ αἴτιον; OEAT. Πάνυ μὲν οὗν. YO. ᾿Εννόησον 
/ ς ” a 

δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ws ἔχει, Kal ῥᾷον μαθήσει 

«Ὁ ᾿ 3 / 4 3 / ᾽ a »” 
ὃ βούλομαι. οἶσθα yap που ὅτι οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἔτι 

“ / 

αὐτὴ κυϊσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, 


"ἀλλ᾽ αἱ ἤδη ἀδύνατοι τίκτειν. OEAI. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


D 


XQ. Airiavy δέ ye τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Αρτεμιν, 
“ vw > \ / + : \ 
OTL ἄλοχος οὔσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχε. στερίφαις μὲν 
Φ ” 3 | £5 , θ [ «ς 53 θ / , 
οὖν ἄρα οὐκ | ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις 
> / x Ἂ / ® x φὰς Ἢ va 
ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὧν av ἢ ἄπειρος" ταῖς 
δὲ δι’ ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε, τιμῶσα τὴν αὑτῆς. 
ὁμοιότητα. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός 
τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς κυούσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι 
μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαιῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων; OEAT. Πάνυ 
ye. XO. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια 
καὶ ἐπάδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὠδῖνας |! καὶ 

7] “Δ / lal \ / x 
μαλθακωτέρας, ἂν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ 

\ , \ ON 7 Ἂ , > 7, 

τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὃν δόξῃ ἀμβλίσκειν, 
ἀμβλίσκουσιν; ΘΕΛΙ. "Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΏ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν 
ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἤσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ προμνήστριαί εἶσι 
δεινόταται, ὡς πάσσοφοι οὖσαι περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι, ποίαν 
χρὴ ποίῳ ἀνδρὶ συνοῦσαν ὡς ἀρίστους παῖδας τίκτειν; 
@EAI. Οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἴσθ᾽ ὅτι ἐπὶ 


149 ν. νέον ὃν corruptum videtur. 











@OEAITHTOS. 13 






















σκειν εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποῖον φυτόν τε καὶ σπέρμα κατα- 
θλητέον: OEAI. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς. LO... Els 
γυναῖκα δέ, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἴει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἄλλην 
δὲ ξυγκομιδῆς; OEAI. Οὔκουν εἰκός γε. YO. * Οὐ 150 
γάρ. adda διὰ τὴν ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον ξυναγωγὴν 
ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἣ δὴ προαγωγεία ὄνομα, φεύγουσι 
“Kal τὴν προμνηστικὴν ἅτε σεμναὶ οὖσαι αἱ μαῖαι, φο- 
Ye ούμεναι μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέ- 
σωσιν᾽ ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὄντως palais μόναις που προσήκει 
καὶ προμνήσασθαι ὀρθῶς. OEAI. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τὸ 


ea 


ν τοίνυν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, ἔλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ 
δρώματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναιξὶν ἐνίοτε μὲν εἴδωλα 
--, ” > ¢/ [Σ 8 θ A a δὲ \ 5a 3 
τίκτειν, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε | ἀληθινά, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι B 
a. a n / 
διαγνῶναι. εἰ γὰρ προσῆν, μέγιστόν τε Kal κάλλιστον 
ἔργον ἦν ἂν ταῖς μαίαις τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ 
μή. ἢ οὐκ οἴει; ΘΈΑΙ. "Eyoye. VII, OQ. Τῇ δέ γ᾽ 
ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει, ὅσα 
a] -/ ’ὔ \ n v >] A \ Qn 
ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ TH τε ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναῖκας 
᾿μαιεύεσθαι, καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπι- 
‘¥ Aiki 3 \ ASAIN ' L δὲ n> » a 
σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ TA σώματα. μέγιστον O€ TOUT EVL TH 
μετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ | τρόπῳ, c 
aS ” \ n > , “ 7 ς UY 
τότερον εἴδωλον Kal ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει TOU νέου ἡ διάνοια 
ml , , δον , > , Νὰ τ ς , 
γόνιμόν τε Kal ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε ye Kal ἐμοὶ ὑπάρ- 
ta) F ” / ¢ 
yet, ὅπερ ταῖς palais’ ἄγονός εἶμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη 
a , ’ ΄ ς \ \ »” > an es 
πολλοί μοι ὠνείδισαν, WS τοὺς μὲν ἀλλοὺυς ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς 
5 ΩΝ > ͵ \ ’ \ ones VS 
Σ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ TO μηδὲν ἔχειν 
» ’ 
σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσι. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τέδε" 
᾿ , / ς Dt sai , a oe t 
pareverOai με 6 θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν. 


14 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


δον 3 > χ \ 5 ͵ , sar , 
εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ TL σοφός, οὐδέ TL μοι 
* lal \ f - fol 
Ὁ ἔστιν εὕρημα | τοιοῦτον, γεγονὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς Ex- 
/ \ a 
yovov" of δ᾽ ἐμοὶ Evyyuyvopevot τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται 
a / - 
ἔνιοι μὲν Kal πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊούσης τῆς 
x \ / / 
ξυνουσίας, οἷσπερ av ὁ θεὸς παρείκῃ, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον 
> , ς ς nan \ a BA a . 
ETLOLOOVTES, WS αὑτοῖς τε Kal τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι" Kal 
“ / 7 2 ’ 
τοῦτο ἐναργές, OTL Tap ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, 
᾽ > " \ 2 ς a \ \ \ ς ΄ 
aX αὐτοὶ παρ αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὕροντες TE 
/ 
καὶ κατέχοντες. τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὃ θεός τε Kal ἐγὼ 
lal ω \ 
Ε αἴτιος. ὧδε δὲ δῆλον πολλοὶ ἤδη τοῦτο | ἀγνοήσαντες 
ἴω 
καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ 
TRE eT ere ee ,  Ἃ ae 
αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων πεισθέντες, ἀπῆλθον πρωϊαίτερον 
τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τά τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν 
\ ς > ἴω 
διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν καὶ τὰ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα 
κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ 
, n > n Ὁ >] ¢ 
πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τελευτῶντες δ᾽ αὖ- 
rn a 7 Μ > lal 3 - 
τοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοξαν ὠμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὧν εἷς 


151 γέγονεν ᾿Αριστείδης * 


ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ. 
πολλοί οἷς, ὅταν πάλιν ἔλθωσιν δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς 
ξυνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γυγνό- 
μενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ" 
\ / 3 \ 2 U \ \ φ«. Ν 
καὶ πάλιν αὐτοὶ ἐπιδιδόασι. πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἀμ 

nm \ = , te 
ξυγγυγνόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν ταῖς τικτούσαις" ὠδί- 

/ 

vovot yap καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίπλανται νύκτας τε καὶ 

΄ , : \ “- ΕΥ " nr , ἊΨ Ν IAA 
ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖναι. ταύτην δὲ THY ὠδῖνα 

, , 

ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ 
by \ Ι \ a Site / 5 Θ «δ re 
Β οὗτοι μὲν | δὴ οὕτως. ἐνίοτε δέ, ὦ Θεαιτητε, of ἂν 
r 3 \ “ ᾽ 7 
μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν 
5 Qn / ͵ 5» A n ‘ \ nr 
ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνυ εὐμενῶς προμνώμαι, καὶ ξὺν θεῷ 
1505. ἣ αὐτοὶ ἣ ὑπ’ ἄλλων. Ita rectissime Heind. Stallb. alii, 
pro vulgato 7 αὐτοὶ um ἄλλων. ) 








ΘΕΑΙΤΉΗΤΟΣ. 15 



























L an / e A , x , ” 
εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς τοπάζω ols ἂν ξυγγενόμενοι ὄναιντο. 
ὃν πολλοὺς μὲν On ἐξέδωκα ἸΤροδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις 
a \ / 9 U “ , . 
Γ Ε΄ 52οἷ: τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. Ταῦτα on σοι, ὦ 
ἄριστε, ἕνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα, ὑποπτεύων σε, ὥσπερ καὶ 
αὐτὸς οἴει, ὠδίνειν TL κυοῦντα ἔνδον. προσφέρου οὖν 


/ 
| αὐτὸν βϑιειδιικρὶ, καὶ 


πρός με ὡς πρὸς μαίας υἱὸν καὶ 
ἂν ἐρωτῶ, προθυμοῦ ¢ ὅπως οἷος T εἶ, οὕτως ἀποκρί- 
: oo καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα PRON OU HENGE τι ὧν av λέγης, Ἴγή- 
Topas εἴδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀλῆθέν, εἶτα ὑπεξαιρῶμαι καὶ 
᾿ἀποβάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι πὲρὶ τὰ 
δ. δία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρός με οὕτω 
διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἕτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπει- 
“dav τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἴονταί με 
εὐνοίᾳ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόῤῥω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς 
fp... lige na δ ἃ , A 
θεὸς | δύσνους ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ᾽ ἐγὼ δυσνοίᾳ τοιοῦτον 
| οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλά μοι ψεῦδός Te ξυγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀληθὲς 
ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. VIII. Πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, 
ὦ Θεαίτητε, 6 τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν" ὡς 
τ > ‘ > “ / b " >\ \ \ 32 " 
© οὐχ οἷος τ᾽ εἶ, μηδέποτ᾽ εἴπῃς. ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλῃ 
καὶ ἀνδρίζη, οἷός τ᾽ ἔσε. OEAI. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ 
Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω παρακελευομένου αἰσχρὸν μὴ 
’ \ n “ / » | 
οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι ὅ τί τις ἔχει | Reyer. 
ἣν al € / , ? ’ a “ΔὉὍδ 
δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο, ὃ 
2 2  Ν \ , > Γ. 
ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν 
ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις. LO. Ed γε καὶ γενναίως, ὦ tat 
χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ 
ὑτὸ κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὄν. 
͵ / 
ἔσθησις, φῇς, ἐπιστήμη ; @EAI. Nai. 30. Κωδυ- 
; ύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, 
INN’ ὃν ἔλεγε * καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον 
εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων 


σ 


D 


E 


i 


τοῦτο | λέγεις; LO. "Eyd ἐρῶ καὶ par ov φαῦλον 


165: MAATONOS 





















, 3 3 a \ ” ς 5» a 
μέτρον ἀνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ 
᾿ς td Ε] ya ΟΝ. / 
μὴ ὄντων, WS οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας yap που; MEAT, 
᾿Ανέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις. LO. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, 
ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μέν ἐστιν 
ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ col, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί; ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε 
κἀγώ; ΘΈΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως. YO. Εἰκὸς μέντοι 
σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν" | ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ 
σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν' | ἐτ ἥσωμ b. 
/ fal Ε a ¢ 
dp οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν 
ῥιγοῖ, ὁ δ᾽ οὔ; καὶ o μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα; ΘΈΑΙ. 
Καὶ μάλα. ΣΏ. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ 
a ‘\ x > Ν μ“ ΩΝ , an 
πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ ov ψυχρὸν φήσομεν : ἢ πεισόμεθα TO 
͵ “ an \ € an /, n \ ‘ 
IIpwrayopa, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγοῦντε ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ 
’ lal 
οὔ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. YO. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως 
ἑκατέρῳ; OEAI. Ναί ΣΏ. Τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθά- 
νεσθαί ἐστιν; ΘΕΑΙ. "Eote γάρ. ΣΏ. | Φαντασία 
ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἔν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς 
τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ 
καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι. OEAI. "Ἑοικεν. ΣΏ. Αἴσθησις 
” a OD. ey diet Ae δέ ς 3 / > 
dpa τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστι Kal ἀψευδές, ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. ΣΏ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσ- 
΄ ct tae ; \ a ass \ ee, 
σοφός τις ἦν ὁ ἹΠρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο 
al A n a \ a 3 5 3. @25 
τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀποῤῥήτῳ 
τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν; OEAI. Πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, 


, ς 5» ἃ \ 3. ΟἋ 3 ἐδ σοῖς γὼ, > ’ 
λόγον, ὡς ἄρα ἕν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ 
Vv / ’ a mh ha) ὦ an ’ > Prue a | id 
av τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ᾽ ὁποιονοῦν τι, AAN ἐὰν ὦ 

, a \ 
μέγα προσαγορεύης, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ 

a , ΄ \ Μ \ 
κοῦφον, ξύμπαντα τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτ 
τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν' ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεω 


152 Β. ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, De hac lectione οἷ. Vers, 


®EAITHTOS. ry 






























: Bia, οὐκ ipo Serres ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέ- 


ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν ἸΠαρμενίδου ξυμφερέσθων, ἸΙρωτα- 
᾿ πόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν 
ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν 
᾿- ᾿Επίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος" εἰπὼν γὰρ 

2 ᾿Ωκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν 


πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ 
ποῦτο λέγειν; OEAT. Ἔμοιγε. IX. TO. Τίς οὖν ἂν 
ἔτι πρός γε τοσοῦτον * 
3 | 
Ὅμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ ov καταγέλαστος 
 πενέσθαι; OEAI. Οὐ ῥᾷδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες. YO. Οὐ 
7 ’ 3 r “1 \ , a , Ὧν τ ͵ 
yap, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ σημεῖα ἱκανά, 
ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρ- 
“΄, } δὲ \ 34 ak ἃ ς des \ \ 
ἔχει, TO δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία: τὸ γὰρ 


στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν 


Ν , Ν n Ὰ \ \ > lal VAs 

θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τἄλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτρο- 
Te , a \ 

_Wevel, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως" τούτω δὲ 


: "μὲν οὖν. LO. Καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τῶν 
αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται. ΘΈΑΙ. Πώς δ᾽ οὔ; ΣΩ. Τί δαί; 
ἡ τῶν αὐ μάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας 
διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 
πολὺ σώζεται; OEAI. Ναί. ΣΩ. ἯἩ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ 
ἔξις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως μὲν καὶ μελέτης; κινήσεων 
ὄντων, κτῶταί τε μαθήματα καὶ σώξεται καὶ γίγνεται 
βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ᾽ ἡσυχίας, ἀμεέλετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας 


ΘΒΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα. ΣΏ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις 


oe 
a 


1528. ξυμφερέσθων recte se habet pro vulg. fyupépec Bor. . 
BP, 2 


‘oT οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ | γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες Τὶ 


κινήσεις. ἢ οὐχ αὗται γενέσεις πυρός; OEAT. Αὗται! 


a 7 " θ cr a ’ θ ΕΣ θ ! t 
? . 
Ὁ ovons οὔτε TL MAVUAVEL A TE AV f£LaUN ἐπιλανθάνεται 5 C 


18 HAATONOS 


, A \ \ Lal \ δὲ 3 / ς 
κατά τε ψυχὴν Kal κατώ σώμα, τὸ O€ τουναντίον ; 
@EAI. Ἔοικεν. ΣΏ. "Ete οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε 

la) ll e \ ¢ 7 Ἷ 

καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σή- 
\ b ’ \ > 9 *. , ᾿ Ν ah , 

πουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δ᾽ ἕτερα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ του- 
A - 3 / , \ “ 

τοις τὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων, τὴν χρυσῆν 
3 / 4 \ 

σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ TOV ἥλιον “Ὅμηρος λέγει, καὶ 

an Ο Ι Ὁ \ Δ ς Ν > / \ ς 

Ὁ δηλοῖ OTe! ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὃ 

an e 5 

ἥλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε Kal av- 

la) ri , 3 

θρώποις" εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματ 
Ἃ 7 \ , 7 KN μι , ” / 

dv διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω 

πάντα; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα 

δηλοῦν, ἅπερ λέγει. X. LO. Ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ 

a “ὃ A 

ἄριστε, οὑτωσί. κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς 

a , \ > “ Ν a / ” a _ A 

κρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν TL ἔξω τῶν σῶν 

> n / / .] > / 

ὀμμάτων μηδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι μηδέ τιν᾽ αὐτῷ χώραν ' 
, 7 3 , / 

ἀποτάξης. ἤδη yap ἂν εἴη Te ὄν που ἐν τάξει Kal μένοι 

.. 3 κ “- 

καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο. ΘΈΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ πῶς; 
a ' , > \ 
XO. “Ἑπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἕν 


>| 


ie 7 se wie. Ie " , ᾿ \ κι 
ὃν τιθέντες" καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν TE καὶ λευκὸν καὶ 
ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων 
πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ 
δ \ ¢ ᾿ > ἐἢ Ἂ ” \ , ; 

ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε TO προσβάλλον 
154 οὔτε * τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκά- 

᾿ ἐπ , « 
στῳ ἴδιον γεγονός. ἢ σὺ διϊσχυρίσαιο ἄν, ὡς οἷον σοὶ 


ΨΥ Ν n lal Or ae 
φιίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον Kal κυνὶ Kal ὁτῳοῦν 


‘foo; OEAI. Μὰ A? ote ἔγωγε. LO. Τί δ᾽; “ἄλλῳ 
> ’ a9 ὦ \4 oN / ς ὩΣ ae, See: 
ἀνθρώπῳ ap’ ὅμοιον καὶ “σοὶ “φαίνεται ὁτιοῦν ; ἔχεις 
a > a x \ a : Ἂν O\ Vane > tam 
τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον, OTL Or δὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ 
ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν; 
.Β ΘΕΑῚ. Τοῦτο μᾶλλόν μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖνο. YO. Οὐκοῦν 
> VO A , θ a> he Pats ἢ θ ΄ oN 

εἰ μὲν ὃ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ οὗ | ἐφωπτόμεθα, μέγα ἢ 
λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἃ IAN T Ἢ 
ἢ θερμὸν ἦν, ovK ἄν ποτε ἄλλῳ τῷ προσπεσὸν 





Sean to 


@EAITHTOS. 19 


ἄλλο ἂν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον᾽ εἰ δὲ αὖ 
τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἕκαστον ἦν τούτων, 
οὐκ ἂν αὖ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἢ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ 
μηδὲν παθὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὦ φίλε, 
θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα 
λέγειν, ὡς φαίη ἂν Ἰ]ρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ 


r 


Ἂ an \ \ na 
ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν. OEAI. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα 
/ , 
λέγεις; LO. ! Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα Ο 
” «Ὁ ‘ 3 4 ’ - Ἃ \ 
εἴσει ἃ βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους yap που ἕξ, ἂν μὲν 
“- \ 9S -" 
τέτταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγκῃς, πλείους φαμὲν εἶναι τῶν 
τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἐὰν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ 
\ 5 
ἡμίσεις" καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν. ἢ. σὺ ἀνέξει; 
“, / 
OEAI. Οὐκ ἔγωγε. YO. Τί οὖν; ἄν ce pwraycpas 
Ὗ nr 
ἔρηται ἢ τις ἄλλος, Ὦ. Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ᾽ ὕπως τι μεῖζον 
ἢ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν; "τί ἀποκρινεῖ ; 
, \ lal ‘ 
@ERAI. Ἐὰν μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν 
a Phy | op > , ef ΓΕ rae δὲ \ 
νῦν ἐρώτησιν | ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν" ἐὰν δὲ πρὲς Ὁ 
χὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν. 
BQ. Ed γε νὴ τὴν “Ἥραν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ, ὡς 
3 \ 9 / ¢ 3 3 / , , 
ἔοικεν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἔστιν, Ἐ)ὐὑριπίδειόν τι ξυμβή- 
σεται ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, ἡ δὲ 
» > n fal 
φρὴν οὐκ avéreyxtos. OEAT. ᾿Αληθῆ. LO. Οὐκοῦν 
\ , 
εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε Kal od ἦμεν, πάντα τὰ 
τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἤδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας 
, / “Ὁ 
‘ ἀλλήλων ἀποπίειρώμενοι, ξύν ΘΟ τὸς σοφιστικῶς | εἰς E 
μάχην τοιαύτην, anne TOUS λόγους τοῖς λόγοις 
ᾧ ᾿ἐκροίομεν᾽ νῦν δὲ ἅτε ἰδιῶται πρῶτον βουλησόμεθα 


ΒΥ Ὁ μων δου ttle «ὦ "οὐω λυ χ ΨΥ. eee ΝΥ ee le ΚΕ ΤΥ Ὁ ΡΥ, 


᾿ θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτά, τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἃ διανοού- 
μεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ᾽ ὅπω- 
“στιοῦν. OEAT. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτ᾽ ἂν βουλοί- 
μην. ΧΙ. ΣΏΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε. ὅτε δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, 
2—2 





20 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


/ \ \ 
ἄλλο TL ἢ ἠρέμα, ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, 
155 πάλεν ἐπανασκεψόμεθα, οὐ * δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ 
ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἅττα ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ 
φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν, ὧν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, 
ς - ey “« 4 \ x n ae 
ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον 
γενέσθαι μήτε ὄγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἕως ἴσον εἴη αὐτὸ 
ἑαυτῷ, οὐχ οὕτως, ΘΕΑΙ, Nai. OQ. Δεύτερον δέ 
᾽ a fal 
ye, ᾧ μήτε προστίθοιτο μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε 
5.4. " θ , , θί ΝΣ δὲ x <3 
αὐξάνεσθαί ποτε μήτε φθίνειν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἔσον εἶναι. 
a 7 3 
B @EAI.- Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 0. *Ap’! οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, 
ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ 
γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον; ΘΕΔΙ. Δοκεῖ γε 
, ἴω Φ ς Ui / U 
δή. OQ. Ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται 
2. ΠΝ ¢ - > a ¢ / Αι «Ὁ \ - 
αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν 
’ / ΄ x “ - » \ / 
ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε 
. / 
ὄντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τοὐναντίον παθόντα, ἐν 
- A n an a 3 id 
ἐνιαυτῷ σοῦ Tod νέου viv μὲν μείζω εἶναι, ὕστερον δὲ 
ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ σοῦ 
> θέ } OLN ‘ δὴ σ Ἃ 4 3 3 
αὐξηθέντος. ' εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ὕστερον ὃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν, 


Q 


οὐ γενόμενος" ἄνευ yap Tod γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι advva- 
᾿ \ ee \ a 3 ” ᾽ 
τον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλὺς τοῦ ὄγκου οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγυγνόμην 
eats Na foie \ , 3 7 “ ” 
ἐλάττων. καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὕτως ἔχει, 
” \ “ Ud Φ UY 3 / 
εἴπερ Kal ταῦτα παραδεξόμεθα. ἕπει yap Tov, ὦ Θεαί- 
τητε δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἄπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι. 
3 ς A 
@EAI. Kal νὴ τοὺς θεούς ye, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφυῶς 
ς , ’ 7S \ n Ἧ ΦΥ͂ « 5 tal 
ὡς θαυμάζω, τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, Kal évioTe ὡς ἀληθῶς 
Ὁ βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινιῶς ΣΏ. 1 Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὦ 
/ [4 > al ’ Ν ad / , 
φίλε, φαίνεται ov κακῶς τοπάζεῖν περὶ τῆς φύσεως σου. 
a ’ \ 
μάλα yap φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, TO θαυμάζειν" 
οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ τὴν 
9 - a 
Ἶριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. 


@OEAITHTOS. 21 


ἀλλὰ πότερον μανθάνεις ἤδη, διὸ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν 
ἐξ ὧν τὸν Πρωταγόραν ᾧαμὲν λέγειν, ἢ οὔπω; OEAT. 
Οὔπω μοι δοκῶ LO. Χάριν οὖν μοι εἴσει, ἐάν σοι 
2 ὃ “ δὲ 2 5 ω > n lal ὃ / | \ 
GAVOPOS, μᾶλλον OE AVOPWY OVOMATTMV τὴς διανοίας | τὴν E 





ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμανι αὐτῶν ; 
ΘΈΑΙ. ἸΤῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πάνυ γε πολλήν ; 
XII. YO. ἤλθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν, μή tis τῶν ἀμυήτων 
2 / τ Ν bd e δὲ μὰ 9} 5" 
| ἐπακούῃ. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι 
ἢ οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρὶξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις 
δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι 
ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρε. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, 


* ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους. LO. 156 


: , /f \ 
σκληροὺς γε λέγεις καὶ 
Εἰσὶ γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ᾽ εὖ ἄμουσοι. ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ 
κομψότεροι, ὧν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ἀρχὴ 
δέ 3 κ ΟΕ. a δὴ x ἡ 53 nO 
ἐ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται, ἥδε 
αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πῶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο 
55, a \ , é / 7 / \ ” 
οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον 
ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. 
ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα 
i: » 10 \ 4 | διὸ δέ \ \ 
ylyvera ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, | δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν B 
αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεν- 
ψωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ 
τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ 
Ὗ 7 / \ / \ ¢ / ‘ 
ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε Kal καύσεις Kal ἡδοναί ye δὴ 
καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι καὶ 
ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ 
 ὠνομασμέναι" τὸ δ᾽ αὖ αἰσθητὸν γένος τούτων ἑκάσταις 
"ἢ ὁμόγονον, ὄψεσι μὲν χρώματα παντοδαπαῖς | παντο- αὶ 
| barra, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναί, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ai- 
᾿ σθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ cupyery: γιγνόμενα. Τί δὴ 
 ovv ἡμῖν βούλεται οὗτος ὁ μῦθος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ 


/ 


22 ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


πρότερα; ἄρα ἐννοεῖς; OLAI. Οὐ πάνυ, ὦ Σώκρατες. 


ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἄθρει ἐάν πως ἀποτελεσθῆ. βούλεται yap 


D 


157 


la) , 7 / a 
δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μέν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, κινεῖται, 
τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτὴς ἔνι τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν. ὅσον μὲν 
> tans a aC \ \ \ ͵ ᾿ 
οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν 
\ a ‘ 
κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ | γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα 
“ \ , r 4 παν δὲ > , \ \ 
οὕτω δὴ [βραδύτερά ἐστιν ὅσον δὲ αὖ ταχύ, πρὸς τὰ 
er nr \ 
πόῤῥωθεν τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει Kal οὕτω γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ 
“ \ , > Λ , ‘ Aas 
γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ] θάττω ἐστί φέρεται yap Kal ἐν 
a lal Ν 
φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ὄμμα καὶ 
” a ’ 7 , ; ͵ Ὕ 
ἄλλο TL τῶν τούτῳ ξυμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν 
7 A ΩΣ 
λευκότητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, ἃ οὐκ ἄν 
Sans c r ee, \ ” ' 
MOTE ἐγένετο ἑκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἀλλο ἐλθόντος, 
! δὴ ‘ 2 / fal \ v \ a 
τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὄψεως πρὸς τῶν 
> θ Yt “ a δὲ | \ a / 
ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος | mpcs τοῦ συναποτί- 
\ lal ¢ \ δὴ \ v 7 μὴ 
KTOVTOS τὸ χρῶμα, ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς apa ὄψεως ἔμπλεως 
2 MEE \ ¢ A δὴ 4 \ a v ” b>) \ 
ἐγένετο καὶ ὁρᾷ On τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὗ TL OWLS ἀλλὰ 
’ \ ¢ Lal \ \ al \ “Ὁ , 
ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν, τὸ δὲ ξυγγεννῆσαν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος 


“περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ ἀλλὰ λευκόν, 


εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὁτιοῦν ξυνέβη χρῆμα χρω- 
A n , 3 
σθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. Kal τἄλλα δὴ οὕτω, 
σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑπο- 
7 “ιν \ by δον \ 5 “Ὁ \ \ 
ληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ 
/ an , 
τότε * ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ TH πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα 


~ , > 
- γίγνεσθαν καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ Kal TO 


fal ‘ \ “ 
ποιοῦν εἶναί τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὖ τι ἐπὶ ἑνὸς νοῆσαι, 


156 ν. βραδύτερα et quae in uncinis sequuntur, omissa in codd., 
supplevit Stephanus e Cornarii eclogis: et sine uncinis edidit Bekker, 
sensu, ut videtur, exposcente; respuunt tamen Campb., Jowett. 

E. ὁτιοῦν---χρῆμα ex correctione Cornarii receperunt Heind. 
et Bekker. pro vulg. ὁτουοῦν---χρῶμα. 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 98 






























᾿ Ε 53 ΄ ; U \ 5 
ς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. οὔτε yap ποιοῦν ἐστί τι, 
Ag \ e , / ᾿ 

ρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν 
τῷ ποιοῦντι τό τέ τιν. ξυνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῳ αὖ 
προσπεσὸν πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων τού- 
4 O\ “ ἃ 1 boa. > 
“Tov, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἕν αὐτὸ καθ 
πε; > , πο 7 \ age: 
TO, ἀλλά τινι ἀεὶ year Cas, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι παντα- 
ip χόθεν | ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγ- DB 
“καάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι 
αὐτῷ. τὸ δ᾽ οὐ δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι 
* "γχωρεῖν οὔτε του OUT ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνο οὔτε 
ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα, 6 Te av ἱστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν 
FRY, , \ t Νὰ ῬΑ , 
φθέγγεσθαι γυγνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα 
ι a ΡῚ , ᾿ ς δ 7 , tal / +7 
. eee ype ὡς ἐὰν TL TIS OTHNON τῷ λόγῳ, EVE- 
eYKTOS ὃ τοῦτο ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ Kal κατὰ μέρος οὕτω 
Ἂ εἰν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν REPT OTOH ᾧ Ἃ δὴ ἀθροίσματι 


' καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶον τε C 


Ψ 
ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται 
ἢ καὶ εἶδος. Ταῦτα δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ap ἡδέα δοκεῖ σοι 
εἶναι, καὶ γεύοιο ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσκόρτῶν.; ; OEAI. Οὐκ 
οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες" καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ Surges 
κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά cot Aopen αὐτὰ ἢ ἐμοῦ 
᾿ οτειρᾷ. ΣΩ. Οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὦ φίλε, ὅτε ἐγὼ μὲν 
" κι -“ , 

᾿ οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι THY τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ᾽ 
εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ὥγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα 
ς΄ Ud a a > 
ἐπάδω τε Kal παρατίθημι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπο- 
γεύσασθαι, ἕως ἂν εἰς ' φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα ξυνεξαγαγω" Ὁ 
ol a , / bh. .? v , y > “Ὁ 7 
ἐξαχθέντος δέ, ToT ἤδη σκέψομαι εἴτ ἀνεμιαῖον εἶτε 
4 a an ἊΨ 
γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται. ἀλλὰ θαῤῥῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ 
Skat ἀνδοεί ᾽ , ἃ ἃ t t i dv ἃ 
καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἂν φαινηταὶ got περὶ ὧν ὧν 
ΒῸΝ / 7 
ee @EAI. Ἐρώτα. δή. XIII. ΣΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν 
πάλιν, εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι 
ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα, ἃ ἄρτι διῇμεν. 


94 ᾿ TIAATONOS 


ΘΈΑΙ, ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἔμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω διεξιόντος 
θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑποληπτέο 
Ἑ ἧπερ διελήλυθας. ΣΏ. ! Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσο 

ἐλλεῖπον αὐτοῦ. λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ 
νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν 
ἢ παρορᾶν ἢ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι réyeTar. οἶσθα 
γάρ που, ὅτι ἐν πῶσι τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι 
δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι διῇμεν λόγον, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἡμῖν 


* 


158 ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν * αὐτοῖς γιγνομένας, καὶ πολλοῦ 


ὃ a \ / e , a \ ~ 3 \ a 
εἰν τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἰναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν 







τοὐναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶνα. OEAT. ᾿Αληθέ- 
στατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. LO. Tis δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, 
λείπεται AC ᾧ τὴν αἴσθ ἐπιστή ιθεμένῳ 
γος τῷ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένᾳ 
a 2 
καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ, @ 
φαίνεται; OAL. ᾿Εγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀκνῶ εἰπεῖν, 
e/ 3 » Ul / ’ a Y. 3 / > / 
OTL οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότε μοι Viv δὴ ἐπέπληξας εἰπόντε 
D ’ ‘ 3 \ ¢€ 3 r » Ὁ ὃ f | > 
Bavto. ἐπεὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ye οὐκ av δυναίμην ᾿ ἀμφισβη- 
“a ’ 
τῆσαι, WS οἱ μαινόμενοι ἢ οἱ ὀνειρώττοντες οὐ ψευδῆ 
δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἷναι, οὗ 
> ? μ 2 
, ae a 
δὲ mrnvol τε, Kal ὡς πετόμενοι ἐν TH ὕπνῳ διανοῶνται. 
, , Ud 2 Co 
ΣΩ. ?Ap’ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς 
A “ιν » δ 
περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄναρ τε καὶ ὕπαρ; 
nan εἷ > τ 
@EAI. Τὸ ποῖον: ΣΏ. Ὃ πολλάκις σε οἶμαι ἀκη- 
Ul 3 lal 
Koévat ἐρωτώντων, τί ἄν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδεῖξαι, 
εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον κα- 
ε bd 4 a 
θεύδομεν καὶ πάντα, ἃ διανοούμεθα, ὀνειρώττομεν, ἢ 
͵ , - 
C ἐγρηγόραμέν te καὶ ὕπαρ ἀλλήλοις | διαλεγόμεθα. 
t ΓΝ \ 
ΘΕΑΙ. Kal μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄπορόν ye, ὅτῳ χρὴ 
an 7 3 τὶ \ 
ἐπιδεῖξαι τεκμηρίῳ. πάντα yap ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ 
a / O\ 
αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. ἅ τε yap νυνὶ διειλέγμεθα, οὐδὲν 
a al 4 / / ΩΝ 
κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ δοκεῖν ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι 


©EAITHTOS, οὗ 



























af : Ϊ ᾿ 
i ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ὀνείρατα δοκῶμεν διηγεῖσθαι, ἄτοπος 

ee -: , , Sauk ε A ἀν of ; 
ὁμοιότης τούτων ἐκείνοις. LO. “‘Opds οὖν, ὅτι τό γε 


ΠῚ A 3 , “ \ , ’ > “ 
μφισβητῆσαι ου NANET OV, OTE Kab TTOTEPOV εστιν uTrap 


᾿ καθεύδομεν © ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ διαμάχεται 
n ς \ V5 Sy / / \ a 

ν ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ἀεὶ παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον 
5 ᾽ ie ” \ , , \ ” 
yat ἀληθῆ, ὥστε ἴσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμὲν ὄντα 
ἦναι, ἴσον δὲ ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέροις διϊσχυ- 
ifoueOa. OAL. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. YO. Οὐκοῦν 
αὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ 
ρόνου, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἴσος; ΘΈΑΙ... ᾿Ορθῶς. LO. Τί οὖν; 
he / / \ 5 / ‘ > \ «ς , 

λήθει χρόνου Kal ὀλιγώτητι TO ἀληθὲς ὁρισθήσεται; 
ΔΙ. ' Τελοῖον μέντ᾽ ἂν εἴη πολλαχῇ. ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλά 
ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, ὁποῖα τούτων τῶν 
ξασμάτων ἀληθῆ; @EAI. Οὔ μοι δοκῶς XIV. ΣΩ. 
ἡμοῦ τοίνυν ἄκουε, οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἂν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ ἀεὶ 
iy la ¢ , “Ὁ ἴω Φ 3 a , 
KobvTa ὁριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. λέγουσι 
πε ᾿ς τς 4 “ ἢ nA 3 , A on 
» ὡς aa οἶμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτῶντες, Ω Θεαίτητε, ὃ ἂν 
repov ἦ παντάπασι, μή πῇ τινα δύναμιν͵ τὴν αὐτὴν 
τῷ ἑτέρῳ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταὐτὸν εἶναι 
ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἕτερον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως ἕτερον. OEAI. 
ιἰδύνατον τοίνυν ταὐτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει * ἢ ἐν 
‘Aw ὁτῳοῦν, ὅταν ἢ κομιδῇ ἕτερον. LO. *Ap’ οὖν 
Kal ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁμολογεῖν ; 
δ al, Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ΣΏ. Ἐπ ἄρα TL ξυμβαίνει ὅμοιόν 
Ὁ γίγνεσθαι ἢ peieotay, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοι- 
ενον μὲν ταὐτὸν φήσομεν cabyiee θαι ἀνομοιούμενον 
δ τερον; @OEAL. ᾿Ανάγκη. YO. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν 
γομεν, ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἴη τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἄπειρα, 


᾿ 2 UTws δέ ye Ta πάσχοντα; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. +0. Kai 


ἢ ὄναρ ἀμφισβητεῖται, | καὶ δὴ ἴσου ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου Ὁ 


159 


20 TIAATONO® 





















μὴν ὅτι ye ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμιγνύμενον Kal ἄλλῳ οἱ 
Β ταὐτὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερα γεννήσει; ΘΕΙΙ. ! Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τἄλλ᾽ ἤδη κατὰ 
τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη 
αὖ ἀσθενοῦντα. πότερον ὅμοιον τοῦτ᾽ ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἀνό 
μοιον φήσομεν; OAT. ἾΑρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σω- 
κράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο «λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι 
Σωκράτει; ΣΏ. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες" αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγ 
@EAI. ᾿Ανόμοιον δήπου. =O. Καὶ ἕτερον ἄρα οὕτως, 
ὥσπερ ἀνόμοιον; ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. ᾿Ανάγκη. ΣΏ. Kal καθεύ: 
C δοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα, ἃ νῦν ' διήλθομεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις 
ΘΕΑΙ. "Eywye. ΣΏ. “ἕκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων 
ποιεῖν ἄλλο τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτ 
ὡς ἑτέρῳ μοι χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἑτέρῳ 
@OEAI. Τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει; SO. Καὶ ἕτερα δὴ ἐφ 
ἑκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγώ τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὶ 
ποιοῦν; ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. Τί μήν; QO. Ὅταν δὴ οἶνον. πίνε 
ὑγιαίνων, ἡδύς μοι φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς; ΘΕΑΙ. Nat 
LO. ᾿᾿γέννησε yop δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων 
Ὁ τε ποιοῦν καὶ TO! πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν 
ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς το 
πάσχοντος οὖσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶσσαν ἀπειρ 
γάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου “ερὶ αὐτὸ 
᾿ς φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ γλώττ' 
ἐποίησε καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲ 
οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως ὡμολόγητο. LQ. “Ore 
δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸ 
αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθεν. OE 
ENai, ΣΏΩ. ἽἝτερα δὴ αὖ | ἐγεννησάτην 6 τε τοιοῦτε 


159 a. καὶ ἄλλῳ ov, Fortasse legendum Καὶ ἄλλῳ av οὐ. 






















κράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτ- 
wy αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην 
ΠΝ οὑ μένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα 
λὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἀλλ᾽ αἰσθανόμενον ; 
BAT. Κομιδῇ. μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγώ τε οὐδὲν 
NO ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος" τοῦ γὰρ 
λου ἄλλη αἴσθησις, καὶ ἀλλοῖον * καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ 
᾿ αἰσθανόμενον" οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μή ToT 
Aw συνελθὸν ταὐτὸν γεννῆσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται" ἀπὸ 
ip ἄλλου ἄλλο γεννῆσαν ἀλλοῖον γενήσεται. ΘΕΙΑΙ. 
3 a IO\ \ » 5 a a 
στὶ ταῦτα. YO. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, 
εἶνό τε ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται. OEAT. Οὐ γὰρ 
γν. ΣΏ. ᾿Ανάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν 
ὑσθανόμενος γίγνωμαι" αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ 
σθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι ἐκεῖνό τέ τινι γίγνε- 
lat, ὅταν γλυκὺ | ἢ πικρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται" 
KD γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. 
9 / \ 9 / / > ¢ Ὁ“ 
ἅπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. Λείπεται δή, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν 
I ἊΨ οι ν 7 5 »” ’ / 
ληήλοις, εἴτ᾽ ἐσμέν, εἶναι, εἴτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, 
: ἢ. “ a a 
ἵπερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μέν, συνδεῖ 
᾽ a a " 
γὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὴ 
Εις / “ ” Φ / 3 , 
πεται συνδεδέσθαι. ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναί τι ἐνομάζει, 
εἶναι ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρός TL ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνε- 
ΗΑ > δ 4. Re ς n Sie DI f v 
“ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ᾽ αὑτοῦ τι ἢ ὃν ἢ γιγνόμενον οὔτε 
τῷ ' λεκτέον οὔτ᾽ ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ὃ 
τ ἃ 
ὃν διεληλύθαμεν σημαίνε. OEAI. Παντάπασι 
οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. XO. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ 
fal 5 F ..9 Ν 5 bls > > , 
VY ἐμοί ἐστι Kal οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ Kal αἰσθάνομαι 
οὔ, ἄλλος δ᾽ οὔ; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; YO. ᾿Αλη- 
[4] [4] , , 
ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἴσθησις" τῆς yap ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεί 
. καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε 


OEAITHTOS. 27: 


160 


B 


Cc 


28 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 























v 93 / ς 59 ὶ Lal A ε ’ ΕΙΣ 
ὄντων ἐμοί, ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιι 
D OEAI. Ἔοικεν. XV. ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν ! οὖν ἀψευδὴς ὦ 
καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενι 
4 
οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἴην ὧνπερ αἰσθητής; ΘΈΑΙ. Οὐ 
δαμῶς ὅπως οὔ. YO. Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται, ὅτ 
5 , ᾿ “ ΡΟΝ Ey y Ν 2 3 
ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸ 
ῇ \ \ ¢ Ate ᾿ 
συμπέπτωκε, κατὰ μὲν “Ὅμηρον καὶ “Ἡράκλειτον Ke 
πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντε 
κατὰ δὲ IIpwraydpav τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτω 
Bld / . \ 
ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτα 
Ἑ οὕτως | ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. 
U Φ ΄ a a \ \ S 
yap, ὦ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν. τοῦτο σὸν μὲν εἶναι οἷο 
\ / 
veoyeves παιδίον, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίευμα; ἢ πῶς. λέγεις 
, -“ ϊ 
OEAI. Οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες. LO. Τοῦτο μὲ 
͵ / ’ 
δή, ὡς ἔοικε, μόγις ποτὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν, ὅ TL δὴ TO 
\ U / \ \ \ / \ 5 Ul 
καὶ τυγχάνει ὄν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον τὰ ἀμφιδρόμι 
? “ ¢ 9 “ > / rd “Ὁ / 
αὐτοῦ ws ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον τῷ Hoya 
, \ , ¢ “ ’ Bd xn a 
σκοπουμένους μὴ λάθῃ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄξιον ὃν τροφῆς 


161 γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ * ἀνεμιαῖόν τε καὶ ψεῦδος. ἢ 


μι 


" ἢ 5 pe \ , \ Αγ 9 7 
οἴει πάντως δεῖν τό γε σὸν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθένα 
Ἃ \ 5 / > , ¢ n \ 39 / 

ἢ καὶ ἀνέξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὁρῶν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπί 
- i ἡ a ς U δ ὙΠ ΤΝ ε an 

vels, ἐάν TLS σοῦ WS πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῇ; ΘΕᾺ 

᾿Ανέξεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος" οὐδαμῶς γὰρ δύς 

ι 3 \ \ “a ᾽ / > ἣν ? “ » 
Κκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ, ἢ αὖ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχε 

“ ‘ > 
XQ. Dirordyos γ᾽ εἶ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ Θεόδωρ 
OTL με οἴει λόγων τινὰ εἶνάαν θύλακον καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἐξ 
> a uf μι S. oP e/ A \ δὲ Ι 
Β λόντα ἐρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ αὖ ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα. τὸ dé! γι 
μενον οὐκ. ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρχεται Tray 
ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγομένου, ἐ 
ἡ 
δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον oy 
la) hash 9 
παρ᾽ ἑτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίω 


= 


@EAITHTOS. 29 

























ub νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦδε πειράσομαι, οὔ TL αὐτὸς 
ἐπεῖν. ΘΕΟ. Σὺ κάλλιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις" καὶ 
role, οὕτως. XVI. ΣΩ. Οἷσθ᾽ οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὃ 
lavpatw τοῦ ἑταίρου σου ἸΠρωταγόρου; ΘΕΟ. ! To 
τοῖον; ΣΏ. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἡδέως εἴρηκεν, ὡς 
ὁ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἔστι' THY δ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ 
Oyou τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς ᾿Αλη- 
. / 

lelas, ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὗς ἢ κυνο- 
ἔφαλος ἤ TL ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν, 
ja μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς ἤρξατο 
μῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ 
ΕᾺ ἢ ἢ γ΄ Ν , cw » 2 7 Ὰ 
ὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὁ δ᾽ ἄρα ἐτύγχανεν ὧν 

, ; XOX / | , / \ ὅ 

is φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων | βατράχου γυρίνου, μὴ ὅτι 
λλου του ἀνθρώπων. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν, ὦ Θεόδωρε; εἰ 
jap δὴ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι αἰσθήσεως δοξάξῃ, 
ai μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε 
‘ / , 4 > / v4 \ 
ἣν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν 
τέρου, ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς 
αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ 
3 θῇ / ὃ / 3 e a , \ 
ἀληθῆ, τί δή ποτε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, Ilpwrayopas μὲν 


ἃ μεγάλων μισθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ 
οἰτητέον ἡμῖν ἣν Tap ἐκεῖνον, μέτρῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἑκάστῳ 
ἧς αὑτοῦ σοφίας ; ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημούμενον 
éyew τὸν Πρωταγόραν; τὸ δὲ 57 ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς 
μῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς συγῶ, ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφλι- 
σκάνομεν᾽ οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι 
ματεία. τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐλέγχειν 
ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἑκάστου 
ἴσας, οὐ μακρὰ ἕ μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀλη- 
Is ἡ ἀλήθεια ἸΤρωταγόρου, ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ 


~~ 


C 


--ι 


σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος ἀξιοῦσθαι | δικαίως EF 


6 


30 ΠΛΆΤΩΝΟΣ 


D 


9 \ 5 ΔΝ ἴω , \ fal U \ | 5 a 
Ἑ οἵς ἐγὼ ἐκ TE τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ | αὐτῶν 






























ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο; ΘΈΟ. Ὦ Σώκρατες 
/ ¢ / “ \ an δὴ 3 ᾽ BD) 3 ὃ 
φίλος ἁνήρ, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἶπες. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαί 
a na / 
μην δι’ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Ipwtayopat 
~~ ἐν Ν Vas RS , \ > / 
οὐδ᾽ av σοὶ παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτείνειν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητοϊ 
πάλιν λαβέ. πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴὶ μάλ᾽ ἐμμελῶς σς 
ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν. ΣΏ. “ipa κἂν εἰς Λακεδαίμον 
ἐλθών, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ! πρὸς τὰς παλαίστρας ἀξιοῖς ἃ 
ἄλλους θεώμενος γυμνούς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτὸς 
ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδυόμενος: ΘΕΟ. ᾿Αλ 
, \ n " / / ἢ / \ 
τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν Kal Tel 
σεσθαι; ὥσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐᾶ 
A \ : 
θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἕλκειν πρὸς TO γυμνάσιον σκληρὸ 
ἠδ᾽ ” na δὲ ὃ \ / \ ¢ 7 pr. 
ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε Kal ὑγροτέρῳ ᾿ ὃν 
ΕῚ . 
προσπαλαίειν. XVII, ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ οὕτως, 6 Θεόδωρ 
σοὶ φίλον, οὐδ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασὶν | οἱ παροιμιαζόμενο; 
“ \ 53 ΕΒ." ‘ \ / OEE / 
πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ tov σοφὸν Θεαίτητον itéov. Aé 
ἤ a «Ὁ an / 
δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἃ νῦν διήλθομεν, apa 
/ >] bp Ui c/ > / ᾿ 
συνθαυμάζεις, εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσει μηδὲ 
χείρων εἰς σοφίαν ὁτουοῦν ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ θεῶν ; 
ἧττόν τι οἴει τὸ ἸἹΠρωταγόρειον. μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ ε 
/ 
ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι; ΘΕΔΙ. Ma Δί οὐκ ἔγωγε. κα 
> a U / ἃ ἘΝ ς \ a 
ὅπερ ye ἐρωτᾷς, πάνυ θαυμάζω. ἡνίκα γὰρ διῇμ 
¢ , A an 
Ov τρόπον λέγοιεν TO δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο Kal ! εἶνα 
a A , 3.5 / I ΣΝ 
τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ μοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι" νῦν 
> , , , ys , \ > 
τοὐναντίον Taya μεταπέπτωκεν. XO. Νέος yap εἶ, 
φίλε παῖ: τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις κι 
72) \ ‘ , lal > “Ὁ , I ov 
πείθει. πρὸς yap ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Ilpwrayopas ἢ τις aX 
‘ tJ an a a 
ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, Ὦ, γενναῖοι παῖδές τε Kal γέροντες, Snua 
γορεῖτε ξυγκαθεζόμενοι, θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντε 


ς 2 N Ἂ ς 2 a ὮΝ ς 
ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, ἐξαιρῶ" καὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. ᾿ 91. 




















4 , 93 la a ε \ b \ 
οδέχοιντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲν 
ίσει εἰς σοφίαν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος 
me vi ἴω “ i \ \ ? / VRP" 6 a / 
ουοῦν᾽ ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν λέγετε, 
Ma τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ᾧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος 
“TOV γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδενὸς 
you ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος, εἰ 
τοδέξεσθε πιθανολογίᾳ τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ * τηλικού- 
Ψ λεγομένους λόγους. OEAT. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐ δίκαιον, ὦ 
Kpates, οὔτε σὺ οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν. YO. "Αλλῃ 
. / ξ ” ¢ “ \ \ ¢ 4 
σκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὡς 6 τε σὸς Kal ὁ Θεοδώρου 
γος. QOEAI. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ. ΣΏ. Τῇδε δὴ 
"πώμεν, εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἴσθησις 
ὑτὸν ἢ ἕτερον. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτό που πᾶς ὃ λόγος ἡμῖν 


᾿ Ὁ 5 ’ὔ , nr [74 π \ >] , 
τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι; οἷον 
y βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον οὐ 
= ’ 7 
σομεν ἀκούειν, ὅταν φθέγγωνται, ἢ .ἀκούειν τε Kal 
στασθαι ἃ λέγουσι; καὶ αὖ γράμματα μὴ ἐπιστά- 
/ >, 5 \ , ,’ ε lal x 4 / 
ot, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἐπί- 
σθαι, εἴπερ ὁρῶμεν, διισχυριούμεθα; @EAI, Αὐτό 
ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ὁρῶμεν, τε καὶ 
ὕομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν" τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα 
τὸ χρῶμα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν | ὀξύ- Cc 


γραμματισταὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἑρμηνεῖς διδάσκουσιν, 
4 
"Αριστά γ᾽, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι πρὸς 


τα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. XVIII. ᾿Αλλ’ 
; δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκόπει, πῇ αὐτὸ 


Ε΄. \ \ ἈΠ Ἢ a 
uve, Kal τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα͵ 
ἥσαμεν. οὐ γάρ; OEAI. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 


ψ καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν τε ἅμα καὶ εἰδέναι" ἃ δὲ οἵ 


“" / an δ λας x > / ” 5 / 
αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι. 


163 


Ὕ > «Ὁ an a 
1. '°H οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, ἃ TO ὁρᾶν αἰσθανόμεθα B 


B@EAI. Ναί QO. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὁρᾷ οὐκ | ἐπίστατ 


92 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


























διωσόμεθα. OEAI. Τὸ ποῖον δή; ΣΏ. Τὸ τοιόνδε, 
τίς ἔροιτο, ἄρα δυνατόν, ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοι 
ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα | μνήμην αὐτοῦ τούτου καὶ σωζόμενι 
τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὃ μέμν! 
ται. μακρολογῶ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι, 
μαθὼν τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἶδε. ΘΕΑΙ͂, Καὶ πῶ 
ὦ Σώκρατες ; τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὃ λέγεις. LO. Μὴ 
ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δέ. ἄρα τὸ ὁρᾶν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθ 
λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἴσθησιν; OEAI. "Eyoye Σ 
Οὐκοῦν 6 ἰδών τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν ὃ εἶδε. κα 
τὸν ἄρτι λόγον; ΘΈΑΙ. Ναί ΣΏ. ! Τί δαί; pon 
οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι; OEAT. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πότερον 
δενὸς ἢ τινός; OEATI. Twos δήπου. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν & 
ἔμαθε καὶ ὧν ἤσθετο, τοιουτωνί τινων; OEAT, ' 
μήν; ΣΩ. Ὃ δὴ εἶδέ. τις, μέμνηταί που ἐνίοτ 
ΘΕΛΙ. Μέμνηται. ΣΏ. Ἦ καὶ peas ; ε τοῦτο ὃβρ 
σας ἐπελάθετο; @EATI. ᾿Αλλὰ δεινόν, ὦ Σώκρα 
τὸῦτό γε φάναι. LO. * Δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσοιμεν 
πρόσθεν λόγον" εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεται. ΘΙΑΙ. Καὶ 
νὴ τὸν Ai’ ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἱκανῶς γε συννοῶ" aX 
εἰπὲ πῇ. LO. Tide ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐπιστήμων, ga 
τούτου γέγονεν, οὗπερ ὁρῶν" ὄψις γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησ 
καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτὸν ὡμολόγηται. OEATI. Ilavu 
20. Ὁ δέ γε ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων. γεγονὼς οὗ ἑώρ 
ἐὰν μύσῃ, μέμνηται μέν, οὐχ ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτό. ἢ ya 


ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾷ ἐπίσταται. OAT. ᾿Αληΐ 
>. Συμβαίνει ἄρα; οὗ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, 
μεμνημένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρᾷ" 
πέρας ἔφαμεν ἂν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοιτο. ΘΕΙΑΙ. ᾿Αληθὲ 
tata λέγεις. LO. Τῶν ἀδυνάτω» δή τι EvpBai 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 33 




















Γ φαίνεται, ἐάν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταὐτὸν φῇ 
᾿ εἶνα.. ΘΕΑῚ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΏ. "Addo ἄρα ἑκάτερον oa 
ἡ τ τέον. ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύε. YO. Τί οὖν δῆτ᾽ ἂν εἴη 
ἐπιστήμη; | πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἔοικε, λεκτέον. Καίτοι α 
4 ποτε μέλλομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, δρᾶν; ΘΈΑΙ. Tivos 
πέ ἐρι; ΣΏ. Φαινόμεθά μοι ἀλεκτρυόνος ἀγεννοῦς δίκην, 
ἶ ; piv νενικηκέναι, ἀποπηδήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ade. 
MEAT. Πῶς δή; YO. ᾿Αντιλογικῶς ἐοίκαμεν πρὸς τὰς 
τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ 


j 
} 
} 
\ 
a] 
} 
| 
Ϊ 
Ι 


τινὶ περιγενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες 
ἀγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταὐτὰ ἐκεί- 

1 οἷς | τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι ποιοῦντες: OEAI. Οὔπω D 
μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις. YO. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δη- 
ὅσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὅ γε δὴ vod. ἡρόμεθα γὰρ δή, εἰ 
μαθὼν καὶ μεμνημένος τίς Te μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν 
ἰδόντα καὶ μύσαντα μεμνημένον, ὁρῶντα δὲ οὔ, ἀπο- 

ἢ δείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἅμα μεμνημένον" 
τοῦτο δ᾽ εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο 

ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σὸς ἅμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ 
αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι. ΘΈΑΙ. |! Φαίνεται. ΣΏ. Ε 
Οὔ τι ἄν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἑτέρου 

Π μύθου &€n, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε νῦν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτὸν 
ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ᾽ οἱ ἐπίτροποι, ods 
Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπε, βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ὧν Θεόδωρος 
εἷς όδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ᾽ 
αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν. OHO. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ 
μᾶλλον Καλλίας ὁ “Ἱππονίκου τῶν * ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος: 165 
ἡμεῖς δέ πως θᾶττον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν 
μετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι ἕξομεν, ἐὰν 
IT@ βοηθῇς. XQ. Καλώς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι 
τήν η᾽ ἐμὴν putes τῶν yip ἄρτι δεινότερα ἄν 

Κ, Ρ, 3 


| 


34 | TIAATONOS 
























/ val , 
τίς ὁμολογήσεις μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, 
ἣ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. σοὶ 
nN 
λέγω ὅπῃ, ἢ Θεαιτήτῳ; OHO. Eis τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, 
> ἢ θ δὲ ς r 3 Pan bee rer ᾽ ᾿ 
Β ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ 6 νεώτερος" σφαλεὶς | γὰρ ἧττον acy 
μονήσει. XIX. YO. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτη 
” , 4 ἢ . 3 , \ > \ 29! 
ἔστι δέ, οἶμαι, τοιόνδε Tu’ ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα 
TL τοῦτο ὃ olde μὴ εἰδέναι; OEO. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀἁποκρ 
νούμεθα, ὦ Θεαίτητε; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αδύνατόν που, οἶμα 
ἔγωγε. ΣΏ. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ ὁρᾶν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις 
τί γὰρ χρήσει ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον 1 
φρέατι συνεχόμενος, ὅταν ἐρωτᾷ ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνήρ 
καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἕτερον ὀφθαλμον, εἰ ὁρᾷς 
ἢ ΧεΡΡ ρς HOY, et aa 
e / n , 
CTO ἱμάτιον τῷ |! κατειλημμένωῳ; OEAI. Οὐ φήσω 
> , ~ , ε , » n ς a 
οἶμαι, τούτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι ἑτέρῳ: LO. Οὐκοῦν ὁρᾷς 
τε καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἅμα ταὐτόν; OEAI. Οὕτω γέ πως 
ων 30. > , , fal ΕἾ) v9 >. ue 
XQ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὔτε τάττω οὔτ᾽ ἠρόμην 
Δ vig) 3 > 3 Pe a \ ’ as 
τὸ ὅπως, GAN εἰ ὃ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο Kal οὐκ ἐπίστα 
n ae ee, ς «κα ¢ on / ¢ \ 
σαι. νῦν δὲ ὃ οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὁρῶν φαίνει. ὡμολογηκὼς 
δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν μὴ 
> / 3 3 / 7 , 
ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζου τί σοι συμβαίνει. 
Ὁ @EAI. ! ᾿Αλλὰ λογίζομαι, ὅτι τἀναντία οἷς ὑπεθέμην. 
LQ. Ἴσως δέ γ᾽, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ᾽ ἔπαθες 
εἴ τίς σε προσηρώτα, εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν ὀξύ, ἔστε 
δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πόῤῥωθεν δὲ 
, \ / \ > τ΄. \ ees \ ” , 
μή, Kal σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα TO αὐτο, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία 
ἃ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις 
ἐρόμενος, ἡνίκ᾽ ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταὐτὸν ἔθου 
ΕῚ \ A > ων». Ns 9 ν᾿, 
ἐμβαλὼν ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς 
τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις, ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς 
{ \ G / \ / , δί θ b 
E! πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν ξυνεποδίσθης 
lal , 
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ov δή σε χειρωσάμενός τε Kai ξυνδήσας ἠδὴ 


a @OEAITHTOS., 35 
4 

| ἂν τότε ITE ἐλύτρου χρημάτων, ὅσων σοί τε κἀκείνῳ ἐδόκει. 
ig W οὖν δὴ 6 Ilpwtayopas, φαίης ἂν ἴσως, λόγον ἐπί- 
| κουρον τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ; ἄλλο TL πειρώμεθα λέγειν ; 
ORAL. Πάνυ μὲν οὖ. XX. LO. Ταῦτά τε δὴ πάντα, 
ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐπαμύνοντες αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, οἶμαι, 
* χωρήσεται, καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων, Οὗτος δὴ 
ὃ Ὁ Σωκράτης ὃ χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθὲν 
ἔδεισεν, εἶ οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μεμνῆσθαι ἅμα 
Γ aul μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησε διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι 
προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε. 
τὸ δέ, ὦ ῥᾳθυμότατε Σώκρατες, τῇδ᾽ ἔχει ὅταν τι τῶν 
᾿ a δι᾽ ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῆς, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἷάπερ 
ἂν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναΐμην iets ase σφάλληται, ἐγὼ 



























γὰρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι ξυγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρεῖναί τῷ 
ὧν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι οὖσαν πάθος, οἷον ὅτε ἔπασχε, 
κέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἢ αὖ ἀποκνήσειν 
“Ὁ , » > 50.) \ \ 50." ‘ ᾽ \ 
ὁμολογεῖν οἷόν T εἶναι εἰδέναι Kal μὴ εἰδέναι Tov αὐτὸν 
τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἐάνπερ τοῦτο Selon, δώσειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν 
4 n ? - 
εἶναι τὸν ἀνομοιούμενον τῷ πρὶν ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὄντι; 
μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναί τινα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ τούς, καὶ τούτους 
γυγνομένους ἀπείρους, ἐάνπερ ἀνομοίωσις γίγνηται, | εἰ 
δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δεήσει θηρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἀλλή- 
v3; ἀλλ᾽, ὦ μακάριε, φήσει, γενναιοτέρως ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ 
? ἐλθών, ὃ λέγω, εἰ δύνασαι, ἐξέλεγξον, ὡς οὐχὶ ἴδιαι 
ἰσθήσεις ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίγνονται, ἢ ὡς ἰδίων γιγνο- 
’ IOs A n \ ἢ , ΛΝ 
μένων οὐδέν TL ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ 
ἐς ἢ bd > ἐν a 3 , e 7 
γίγνοιτο, ἤ, εἰ εἶναι δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, εἴη, ᾧπερ φαίνεται. 


ἱλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ adds: 
Tad μου ἀναπείθεις, οὐ καλῶς | 
͵ 3—2 


166 


Bey xopat, εἰ δὲ addola,' αὐτὸς 6 ἐρωτηθείς. αὐτίκα Β 


σ 


ὗς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκεφάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑηνεῖς, 


ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ D 


90 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


\ \ \ pe » ς ᾿ ᾿ , \ 
φημὶ μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ws yeypapa’ μέτρον yap 
a 3 a , 
ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν TE UVTMY Kal μή" μυρίον μέντοι 
διαφέ ε ἕ Ἐν ITO , e a \ TAX ’ 

pew ἕτερον ἑτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, OTL τῷ μὲν ἄλλα 

3 Γ an 
ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. Kal σοφίαν καὶ 

fa) 5 
σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω TO μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸν 
a) Ζ “Ὁ "» a 
τοῦτον Kal λέγω σοφόν, ὃς ἂν τινι ἡμῶν, ᾧ φαίνεται 
ἢ , 
καὶ ἔστι κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαί 
Ν ἣν \ δὲ λό Ψ \ a ΚΝ, / 
τε καὶ εἶναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ TO ῥήματί μου. 
Qo 
E δίωκε, | ἀλλ᾽ ὧδε ἔτι, σαφέστερον μάθε, τί λέγω. οἷον 
\ 3 cal / / » ‘ d lal \ 
yap ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, OTL τῷ MEV 
3 θ fa) \ / Ay ὦ / Ng eee δὲ 
ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει, καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ 
\ 

ὑγιαίνοντι τἀναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. σοφώτερον μὲν᾽ 
οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι" οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν" 

oe * / ς ς \ / ͵ 3 θ ͵ {4 

167 οὐδὲ * κατηγορητέον, ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμνων ἀμαθὴς, OTL 

τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφός, ὅτι ἀλλοῖα" 
, 9) 5298 , ἀξ ΤΑΣ ͵ \ ene Ψ 

μεταβλητέον δ᾽ ἐπὶ θάτερα ἀμείνων γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ἕξις. 

“ \ \ 3 a ¢ ’ \ ς 7 C/G b) \ \ 

οὕτω δὲ Kal ἐν TH παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν 
Ε] ς > ’ / 

ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον. ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς φαρμάκοις 
\ ~ 3 Ν / 

«μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς Royo. ἐπεὶ οὔ τί YE 

“Ὁ / / , [ 3 An 9 , 

ψευδῆ δοξάζοντά τίς twa ὕστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε 





δοξάζειν" οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε 
ἄλλα παρ᾽ ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ, ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ᾽ 
[4] Lal , ἊὉ > ἴω 

Β οἶμαι, πονηρᾷ ψυχῆς ἕξει | δοξάζοντας συγγενῆ αὐτῆς 
a «Δ᾽ \ 

χρηστὴ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δή τινες τὰ 

͵ ¢ \ 5 / 3 n “ > \ \ 
φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ 
, \ A, de ta ene A > θέ δὲ 9, 8 
βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν. 

a 4 

καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοῦ δέω βατρά- 
χοὺυς λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, 
κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς. φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς 
al Ὁ ’ lal al 
φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῇ, 
α χρηστὰς Kal! ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐμ- 





ὡς. 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 97 





























ποιεῖν, τοὺς δέ γε σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς 
πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν 
εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἷά γ᾽ ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ 
καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίξῃ. 
3 λ’ ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ σανηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἑκάστων 
χρηστὰ Ἐποίησε εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν 
“λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευομένους οἴτω δυνά- 
μενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφός τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν Χρη- 
μάτων τοῖς | παιδευθεῖσι. καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τέ εἰσιν 
ἕτεροι ἑτέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ δοξάζει, καί σοι, ἐάν 
τε βούλῃ ἐάν τε μή, ἀνεκτέον ὄντε μέτρῳ σώζεται γὰρ 
ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ᾧ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς 
Π ἰφισβητεῖν, ἀμφισβήτει, λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών, εἰ δὲ 
δι᾽ ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, δ ἐρωτήσεων" οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο 
φευκτέον, ἀλλὰ πάντων μέλιστα διωκτέον Ἂν νοῦν 
ἔχοντι. ποίει μέντοι οὑτωσί" μὴ ἀδίκει ἐν τῷ | ἐρωτᾶν. 
“καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι 
Fy μηδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδικεῖν 
δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς 
a ὠνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῆται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλε- 
=9 όμενος,. καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίξῃ τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ᾽ 
ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, dy δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε 
“καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλαγόμενον € ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ 
ἐνδεικνύμενος τὰ σφάλματα, ἃ αὐτὸς ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ 
τῶν * προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο. ἂν μὲν γὰρ 
τω ποιῇς, ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντές 
σοί τῆς αὑτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σέ, καὶ 
ot μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσων, αὑτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσι, 
ab φεύξονται ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ἵν᾽ ἄλλοι 
γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν οἱ πρότερον ἦσαν ἐὰν δὲ 
τἀναντία τούτων δρᾷς, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τἀναντίᾳ 


\ 


D 


E 


168 


38 TIAATONOS 

























i , \ , ᾽ Α 
ξυμβήσεταί σοι καὶ τοὺς ξυνόντας ἀντὶ φιλοσόφω 
“ a > al 
Β μισοῦντας τοῦτο TO' mpdyua ἀποφανεῖς, ἐπειδὰν mpec- 
“Ὁ 
βύτεροι γένωνται. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθη, ὃ καὶ πρότερον 
ι΄ δ > "Ὁ 5 \ “Ὁ ’ > iy « 
ἐῤῥήθη, οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἵλεῳ TH 
διανοίᾳ ξυγκαθεὶς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει, τί λέ 
a Evy is ws ἀληθως vet, TL ποτε λέγομεν, 
a 3 \ lel 
κινεῖσθαί τε ἀποφαινόμενον τὰ πάντα TO τε δοκοῦν 
ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἷναι ἰδιώτῃ τε καὶ πόλει, καὶ ἐκ 
ἤ > , + Pap ΜΝ \ ” > , 
τούτων ἐπισκέψει, εἴτε ταὐτὸν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμη 
\ » 3 3 3 ¢/ wv b] / e , 
καὶ αἴσθησις, aXX οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ συνηθείας ῥημά- 
’ e\ ig 3 
CTwv Te Kal ὀνομάτων ἃ οἱ | πολλοὶ ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσιν 
5 / > 4 \ / 
ἕλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς παρέχουσι. 
nq , a 7 , 
Ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἑταίρῳ σου εἰς βοήθειαν προσ- 
> , a 
ηρξάμην κατ᾽ ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρὰ ἀπὸ σμικρῶν" εἶ 
δ᾽ - ee » / x a ς a > / 
αὐτὸς ἔζη, μεγαλειότερον av τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν. 
/ - \ 
XXI. OEO. Ilaifeus, ὦ Σώκρατες" πάνυ yap νεανικῶς 
> / a 
τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας. XO. Ἐ λέγεις, ὦ ἑταῖρε. καί 
/, nr / 
μοι εἶπέ ἐνενόησάς που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Ilpwrayopou 
ἃ 9 δί eon v4 ] \ δέ \ t : 
Ὁ καὶ ὀνειδίζοντος ἡμῖν, ὅτι | πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους 
, “ a \ , ’ / > Ν 
ποιούμενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζοίμεθα εἰς τὰ 
fa) a > , 
ἑαυτοῦ, Kal χαριεντισμόν TWA ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύνων 
, 
δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο 
Ὁ“ el ᾽ 
περὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ λόγον; ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, 
/ / . 5.3 ΩΝ 
ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΏ. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ; 
ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΏ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα 
A ΤᾺ , 3 / > = , -“ > ’ > \ 
πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἐστίν; εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρί, ἐμὲ 


| ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις 


E καὶ σὲ δεῖ ἐρωτῶντας τε καὶ 
4 » nr ᾽᾿ 
σπουδάσαι περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἵνα μή TOL τοῦτό γ 

3 2 a ¢ / \ / / > 
ἔχη ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παίζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψιάμεθ 
αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. ΘΕΟ. Τί δ᾽; οὐ πολλῶν Tot 
Θεαίτητος μεγάλους πώγωνας ἐχόντων ἄμεινον ἂν ἐπα- 


κολουθήσειε λόγῳ διερευνωμένῳ; ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὔ τοι 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 99 

























eee 


σοῦ γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον. μὴ οὖν οἴου ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ 
σῷ ἑταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, 
σὲ * δὲ μηδενί, ἀλλ᾽ ἴθι, ὦ ἄριστε, ὀλίγον ἐπίσπου, 
ἰέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἂν εἰδῶμεν, εἴτε ἄρα σὲ δεῖ 
αγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὁμοίως 
σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἴς τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τἄλλα, ὧν 
gy 
ὦ Σώκρατες, col παρακαθήμενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ 


ἦν 


i: 


ποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν καθάπερ Aaxedat- 
μόνιοι' σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίῤῥωνα μᾶλλον 


κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ Kat ᾿Ανταῖόν τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς 
τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ. ἀνίης πρὶν 
ἀναγκάσῃς ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαῖσαι. 
BO. "Αριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπείκα- 
ρ Y » Τῇ μ 

: / 

Cas’ ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. μυρίοι yap ἤδη 
wot Ἣρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυγχάνοντες Kaptepol 
πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ᾽ εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν, adr ἐγὼ οὐδέν 
τ 5 2 5 “ ” \ 2 Os 
Tl μᾶλλον ἀφισταμαι οὕτω Tis ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε 
ΠΝ 
“ , / “ \ > \ + PT 
προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν te ἅμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὀνῆσαι. 
OEO. Οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε ὅπῃ ἐθέχεις" Tav- 
τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἱμαρμένην, ἣν ἂν σὺ ἐπικλώσῃς, 
δεῖ ἀνατλῆναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω ye 
ὧν προτίθεσαι οἷός τ᾽ ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι. 
. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καί μοι πάνυ 
ρ χ 

Ἢ \ , / / [4 a 
“TNpet TO τοιόνδε, μή που παιδικόν TL λάθωμεν εἶδος 
τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καί τις πάλιν | 
εὐδίση. ΘΕΌ. ᾿Αλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαί γε καθ᾽ ὅσον 
δύνωμαι. XXII, YQ. Τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν 


τόρ 


σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν. OEO. Οὐ ῥάδιον,. 


π΄, 
τείνειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ' γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι B 


ς ' περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς α 


ἡμῖν αὐτὸν 


170 


B 


᾿αὖ ἱκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, ἱκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. Kab 


'ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλος ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν 
ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν; 


'ρονος διαφέρειν τινάς, ods δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφούς. οὐχί 
@EO. Ναί ΣΩ. Ei μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὡμολόγει 


οὐδὲν ἂν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι vo 


τοίνυν δι’ ἄλλων, GAN ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου ὡς δι 


mov ᾧ δοκεῖ; ΘΕῸ. Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν, 


40 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
















ἀντιλαβώμεθα, οὗπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν, ὀρθῶ 
ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ, O 
αὐτάρκη ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχ 
pnoev 6 IIpwrayopas, περί τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χε 


ἀλλὰ μὴ ἡμεῖς | βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ξυνεχωρήσαμεν 


δὲ τάχ᾽ ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνο 
¢ / \ / 5) / \ / 

ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τούτο 
αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττε 
οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως. ΘΕΟ. Λέγεις ἀληθῆ. LO. Μ 


βραχυτάτων * λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν. OKO. Πῶς 
XQ, Οὑτωσί. Τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί φησ 


a ’ n 
IIpwrayopa, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντω 
3 , / 7 \ \ 3QO7/ Ψ 4 
ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ φαμὲν οὐδένα ὅντινα οὐ 
\ \ ¢ \ ε a a ν᾽ / \ 
τὰ μὲν αὑτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερον, TA 
ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἔν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν 
/ / ¢ 
ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, 
/ \ \ 
ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντας, 
σωτῆρας σφῶν | προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαφέ- 
Dy n \ 
povTas ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι. Kal πάντα Tou μεστὰ τἀνθρώ- 
“ a 
mua ζητούντων διδασκάλους Te Kal ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν 
᾿ \ [4] Μ al (al 
τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν TE ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων TE 


7 
ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τί ἄλλο φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώ- 
, a t 4 
mous ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν; 


ΘΕΑΛΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 41. 






























La 
ΕΟ. ! Τί μήν; YO. Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; xpnad- C 
μεθα τῷ λόγῳ; “πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώ- 
ους δοξάξειν, ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ , ἐξ 
ἐμ μ φοτέρων γάρ που ξυμβαίνει μὴ. ἀεὶ ἐληθή ἀλλ᾽ ἀμ. 
horepa αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ 
θέλοι ἄν τις τῶν ἀμφὶ Npermyopay-4 ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς δια- 
Ἰάχεσθαι, ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡγεῖται ἕτερος ἕτερον. ἀμαθῆ τε 
vat καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. ΘΕΟ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἄπιστον, ὦ 
Σώ ὕὄκρατες. ΣΏ. Καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτό γε ἀνάγκης ' 6D 
ἰόγος ἥκει ὃ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον λέγων. 
0. Πῶς δή; YO. “Ὅταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ 
“pos x ἀποφαίνῃ περί τινος δύξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο 
ατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς 
OLS περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστι κριταῖς 
γενέσθαι, ἢ ἀεί σε κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάξειν; ἢ μυρίοι 
κάστοτέ σοι Ῥόχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἡ ἡγούμενοι διό 
ἢ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι; OEO. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώ- 
ates, μάλα | μυρίοι δῆτα, φησ Ὅμηρος, οἵ γέ pot E 
ὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πρδηματα παρέχουσιν. ΣΏ. Τί οὖν; 
οὕλει λέγῶμεν, ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληϑῆ δοξάαζξεις, 
οἷς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ; ΘΕΟ. ἴβοικεν ἔκ γε τοῦ re 
νάγκη εἶναι. XO. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ; ἄρ᾽ οὐχὶ 
vaykn, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾧετο μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον 
δὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι 
wry τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν ; εἰ δὲ * αὐτὸς 171 
ere τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ea συνοίεται, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι πρῶτον 

y ὅσῳ πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσούτῳ 
Ἵ) λον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν; OEO. ᾿Ανάγκη, εἴπερ γε 
a ᾿ ἑκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται. LO. "Ἐπειτά 

: τοῦτ᾽ ἔχει κομψότατον᾽ ἐκεῖνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὑτοῦ 
Τί ήσεως. τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἴησιν, ἣ ἐκεῖνον ἧ- 


49 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 



























οπφοῦνταν Ψεύδεσθαι, ξυγχωρεῖ ππου ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολο- 
γῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας. OEO. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν 
BQ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ | ξυγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴ 
Ὁ ς ,ὔ Sid 7 ¢ a ᾽ A = 4 
TOV ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι 
ΘΕΟ. ᾿Ανάγκη. ΣΏ. Of δέ γ᾽ ἄλλοι οὐ ξυγχωροῦσι 
ἑαυτοὺς ψεύδεσθαι; ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. YO. Ὁ ὃ 
y αὖ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἐξ ὦ 
γέγραφε. ΘΕῸ. Φαίνεται. LO. “EE ἁπάντων dp 
’ \ U > / 3 a 
ἀπὸ IIpwrayopov ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλο 
δὲ ὑπό γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τάναντί 
λέγοντι ξυγχωρῇ ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ 
c Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς | ξυγχωρήσεταν μήτε κύνα μή 
τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἑνὸ 
οὗ ἂν μὴ μάθη. οὐχ οὕτως; ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως. YO. Οὐ 
a > x 4 a ς \ “ ? Ve »” 
Kooy ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴ 
ἡ Πρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθής, οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ οὔτ 
αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ. OEO..”"Ayav, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν éraipor 
pov καταθέομεν. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλά τοι, ὦ φίλε, ἄδηλον, 
καὶ παραθέομεν τὸ ὀρθόν. εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνον πρεσβ 
Ὁ τερον ὄντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα | é 
a ’ / / a ’ / a > Pe 
τεῦθεν ἀνακύψειε μέχρι TOD αὐχένος, TOAAG ἂν ἐμὲ 
/ “a «ς \ ’ / \ \ e “ 
ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, καὶ σὲ ομολογοῦντ. 
καταδὺς ἂν οἴχοιτο ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀνάγκ 
οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ὁποῖοί τινές ἐσμεν, K 
τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ar 
TL φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό γε ὁντινοῦν, τὸ εἶνε 
’ Ψ ee > \ \ > / 
σοφώτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερο 
@EO. Ἔμοί γ᾽ οὖν δοκε. XXIII. ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ ταύ 
Ὁ , “4 \ / ς a ¢ , 
ἂν μάλιστα ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ἣ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψα 
E βοηθοῦντες | Πρωταγόρᾳ, ὡς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἡ δοκε 
Ul 
ταύτῃ καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάν 


αν τρο a J 
a} " 


= 


@EAITHTOS. 43 


nh 























; af ἢ re? SE + ἢ 
σα τοῦ τύπου τούτου" εἰ δέ που ἔν τισι ξυγχωρήσεται 
᾿αφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη 
" ἢ Ἁ a 
θελῆσαι av φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον Kat 
θηρίον δὲ ἱκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι αὑτὸ γιγνῶσκον ἑαυτῷ 
ὃ ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλου διαφέρειν, 
Lal ’ ᾿ 
ep που; ΘΕΟ. Ἑμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. LO. * Οὐκ- 172 
W- καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ 
77 »” νι ὦ Ν ἢ Ἂ ὃν ὁ 
καία καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν ἑκάστη 
γόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι 


τ στο - τ Ὁ 


3 , e ἢ Red 4 \ γῶν ἂν 
ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώ- 
if » Ὁ 7 νο ἢ ” , , : 
pov οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι 
“δὲ τῷ ξυμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ ἡ μὴ ξυμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, 
νταῦθ᾽, εἴπερ που, αὖ ὁμολογήσει ξύμβουλόν τε ξυμ- 
Πθούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας πρὸς 
ΓΝ ,θ \ ’ A , , Ι a NON 

λήθειαν, Kai οὐκ av πάνυ τολμήσειε ' φῆσαι, ἃ ἂν Β 
4 , > a ας. ὦ x a 

at πόλις ξυμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὑτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον 
: \ ἢ ΡΥ ΝΣ παι a aN 4 n " 
a καὶ ξυνοίσειν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖ, οὗ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις 
207 “LS, , mea , As > ; 
ἀδίκοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρί- 
σθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ 
ον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε 
χν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον. καὶ ὅσοι γε δὴ 

‘ \ / ’ ear 

) παντάπασι tov IIpwraydpov λόγον λέγουσιν, ὧδέ 
τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι. Λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Θεόδωρε, 
ὄγου, μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττονος, ' καταλαμβάνει. ΘΕΟ. o 
κοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΏ. Φαινόμεθα. 
πολλάκις μέν γε δή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατε- 
ale as a ε shy δἰ > aA , 
Wonca, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις 
a ΄ 
ολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἰόντες 
οἷοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες. ΘΕΌ. Ts δ οὖν λέγεις 3 
. Κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιού- 
ς ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ 


44 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 




















Ὁ τῇ τοιᾷδε διατριβὴ | τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκέται πρὸ 
τῇ τοιξ ριβῇ | τεθραμμ au mp 
/ / “~ / \ 
ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι. OEO. Πῃ δή; YO. ἯΙ roi 
μέν, τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες, ἀεὶ πάρεστι σχολὴ καὶ τοὺ 
λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται ὥσπερ ἡμεῖ 
νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, ovTE 
κἀκεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου par 
/ ¢ lal 5» ’ Ἀ \ n x / 
λον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ, καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέω 
μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος. οἱ ὃ 
ἐν exes τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι; κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέο 
'Ἑ καὶ οὐκ ᾿ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγου 
ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκε, κα 
ὑπογραφὴν παραναγυγνωσκομένην, ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον 
δ ’ / a τ Ba , >\ § iG 
(ἣν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν.) οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἀεὶ περὶ ὁ 
δούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ τὴν δίκη 
” 7 e ’ Lal > / \ " μ > > 
ἔχοντα; καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε dig ἄλλως αλλ, 
Ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ" πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμε 
173 ὥστ᾽ ἐξ * ἁπάντων τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίγνο 
Tat, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεῦσαι 
5 / Ν \ \ 3 2 \ \ 
ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχά 
\ \ ,} \ \ 3 ‘ \ Xr 10 ¢ 
τὴν yap αὔξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε Kal TO ἐλεύθερον ἡ 
7 7 5 / 3 / / 
νέων δουλεία ἀφήρηται, ἀναγκάξζουσα πράττειν σκολ, 
μεγάλους κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτε ἁπαλαῖς ψυχά 
3 , A , U \ lal / 
ἐπιβάλλουσα, os οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου 
ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδός τε καὶ 
9 ἢ , A , Sines 
ἀλλήλους ανταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται 
Re | a or \ 2O\ ” fal ὃ / ᾿ 
Β συγκλῶνται, | ὥσθ᾽ ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας « 
ἄνδρας ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοί τε καὶ cod 
γεγονότες, ὡς οἴόνται. Kal οὗτοι μὲν On τοιοῦτοι, 
, nr Qn f 
Θεόδωρε: τοὺς δὲ Tod ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλ 
διελθόντες ἢ ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τραπώμεθ 
ἵνα μὴ καί, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν TOAD τῇ ἐλευθερ 


OEAITHTOS. 45 

























μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα; ‘ ΘΕΟ. ἈΠῸ 
ὃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες. πάνυ γὰῤ εὖ 
ὁ εἴρηκας, ὅτι ' οὐχ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε χορεύ- 
, a , ¢ / 3 ? ¢ , δι δ᾽ τ ν 
ITES τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται. αλλ οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἡμέτεροι 
σπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν περιμένει ἀποτελε- 
σθῆναι, ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ" οὔτε γὰρ δικαστὴς οὔτε θεατής, 
σπερ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ 
ap ἡμῖν. XXIV. ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ 
Ὅ γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν Kopudaiwv' τί γὰρ ἄν τις τούς 
᾿ , / 5) / , i e 
€ φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; Οὗτοι 
ποῦ ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν 
\/ δὲ | [7 ὃ , ax δ΄ wv Ν 
jov, οὐδὲ | ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἤ TL κοινὸν 
λλοὸ τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον" νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα 
γόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὁρῶσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι. 
: _——- \ ᾿ς Tm 1 a 41 ἐῷ ᾿] \ \ , \ al 
Tovoal δὲ ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα 
αἱ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσ- 
J - - \ tal . / 
TATAL αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἢ κακῶς TLS γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, 
Tt τῳ κακόν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς 
νδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν a οἱ τῆς 


Jk οἶδεν, oldev" οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται Tod εὐδοκι- 
εἶν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει 
tras αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα 
᾿ Φ - 
ἡσαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ 
~ ε 7] 
αι κατὰ Πίνδαρον, τά τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ 
la) la] UA > nr 
eda γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὕπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα, 
i πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν * ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἑκά- 
‘om {. ᾽ A ᾽ \ ΩΝ CANS » 
του ὅλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὑτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα. 
D a f 7 
40. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; LO. “Ὥσπερ 
|} Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέ- 
Ξ / > / n / - > \ \ 
Ta, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Θρᾷττα τις ἐμμελὴς καὶ 


D 


ATTNS λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ᾽ !' οὐδ᾽ ὅτι αὶ 


174 


40 TIAATONOS 






















/ \ > a A 4 ‘ 
χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέγεται, ὡς τὰ 
, ἴω a \ > } 
ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δ᾽ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτι 
\ U U Pe + ES 3 3 
καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι αὐτόν. ταὐτὸν δὲ ἀρκ 
a > \ U ὅ > “ U | 
Β σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας, ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι. 
γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὃ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτα 
᾽ > 
λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὅ TL πράττει, ἀλλ᾽ ὀλίγου Kab 
” ΄ ᾽ δ YA Α 7 7 9.29 \ 
ἄνθρωπος ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα τί δέ ποτ᾽ ἐστ 
ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει Siadhope 
τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγμα 
ἔχει διερευνώμενος. μανθάνεις γάρ που, ὦ Θεόδωρε. 
ν᾽ nN , Η 
οὖς ΘΕΟ. "Ἔγωγε᾽ καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγει. ΣΏ. Tovyapre 
ὦ φίλε, ἰδίᾳ τε TEE ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑκάστῳ K 
σ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος | ἔλεγον, ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίξ 
ἢ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας κι 
τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει 
μόνον Θρᾷτταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατ 
τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ 
> , / / ’ / / 
ἀσχημοσύνη δεινή, δόξαν ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη. 
Ν a , " 5 ΩΝ 5 ἢ 
τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἴδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα 
δορεῖν, ἅτ᾽ οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ 
/ Ἔ 2 Ἂ ϑ a / 4 Or | 
Ὁ μεμελετηκέναι" ἀπορῶν οὖν γελοῖος φαίνεται" ἐν 
τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις,. 
προσποιήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γελῶν ἔνδηλος γιγνόμενε 
ρ ἥτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γ NOS γυγνόμενε 
‘ » , 
ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύραννόν τε γὰρ ἢ βασιλέα ἐγκα 
μιαζόμενον ἕνα τῶν νομέων, οἷον συβώτην, ἢ ποιμέν 
ἢ τινα βουκόλον ἡγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πτο 
βδάλλοντα: δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῶον καὶ ἐπ 
ουλοτερὸν sks site τε Kal naeasensiee νομίζει avro ἢ 
ἄγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν HT 
Ἑ τῶν νομέων τὸν ' τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, σηκὸ 
~> 9 \ a / a ᾿δὲ WA 
ἐν ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὁταν μυρ 


@EAITHTOS. , 47 























i + , 4 Ὁ / 
λέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὥς TIS ἄρα κεκτημένος 
Γ θαυμαστὰ πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς 
ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνούν- 
τῶν, ὡς γενναῖός τίς ἑπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων 
KS an ’ > \ ray \ ς , 
ποφῆναι, παντάπασιν auBr καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν ὁρώντων 
ὩΣ Ω \ % , 
᾿ ἡγεῖται τὸν ἔπαινον, ὑπὸ * ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ δυναμένων eis 
ὃ πᾶν ἀεὶ βλέπειν, οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι πάππων καὶ 


is πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ δοῦλοι βάρ- 
θαροί τε καὶ “ἕλληνες πολλάκις μυρίοι γεγόνασιν 
τῳοῦν, GAN ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων 
ἐμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων. εἰς Ἡρακλέα τὸν ᾿᾽Αμ- 
ρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, 


Be > 7 i Fs ’ ς 

οἰοῦτος ἦν, οἵα συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκο- 

\ o> So. a > / / , \ 

TOS ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, γελᾷ ov δυναμένων λογίζεσθαί τε Kal 
, " / lal > / 3 (cd \ 

QUVOTHTA ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἅπασι δὴ 

ὕτοις ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελᾶται, τὰ 

e / » ς ὃ a“ \ δ᾽ > \ 3 a 

ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν 

καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ἀπορῶν. ΘΕῸ. Παντάπασι τὰ 

όμενα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΧΧΥ͂, ΣΩ. Ὅταν δέ 

a? , wv 

twa αὐτός, ὦ φίλε, ἑλκύσῃ avo, καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις 

Ἂ a ἂὰ / \ Lo / e / 

ιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε Kal ἀδικίας, τί τε ἑκάτερον 

a n δ / 

τοῖν καὶ τί TOY πάντων ἢ αλλήλων διαφέρετον, ἢ ἐκ 

7 ° 

) Βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων κεκτημένος T αὖ πολὺ χρυσίον, 

By ’ , | eae “ ᾽ ͵ \ 

:σίλείας πέρι Kai ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ 

/ / 

τητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποίω τέ τινε ἐστὸν Kal τίνα 

7 , / \ 

ὅπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει TO μὲν κτήσασθαι 

Ἂν \ > a , ¢ , “ 
τοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν, ---- περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων ὅταν 


175 


q > . ΩΝ 
; δὲ ὁ ἀπ᾽ ᾿Αμφιτρύωνος εἰς τὸ | ἄνω πεντεκαιεικοστὸς B 


a | > a > n γ,......9 \ \ 2 a ἊΝ » Sah ἌΡ ae 3 
τῷ ᾿ ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ Τί ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ EME; ELS C 


) δέῃ λόγον διδόναι τὸν | σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν Ὁ 


aia ΠΛΆΤΩΝΟΣ 

























καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικόν, πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφ 
ἀποδίδωσιν" ἰλιγγιῶν τε ἀφ᾽ ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς 
βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἀδημονῶν τε 
3 n \ / / / \ > 
ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων γέλωτα Θρᾷτταις μὲν ov Ta, 
/ 5.) OW ’ , b>] / > \ ᾿] , , 
έχει οὐδ᾽ ἄλλῳ ἀπαιδεύτῳ οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνοντα 
n ? ᾿] “Ὁ ¢ 9 / an dA 
τοῖς δ᾽ ἐναντιως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖοιν ἅπασι 
, , ε a 
Οὗτος 57 ἑκατέρου τρόπος, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι 
3 7 \ a , | Ἃ \ , 
E ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, | ὃν δὴ φιλοσοφ 
a Sirs , “he a \ 5) .. wa 
καλεῖς, ᾧ ἀνεμέσητον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶνε 
ὅταν εἰς δουλικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον στρωματι 
δεσμον μὴ ἐπιστάμενος συσκευάσασθαι μηδὲ 6 
COA x A U ω ς ᾽ io Ν n sy 
ἡδῦναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους" 6 δ᾽ αὖ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα Ta 
δυναμένου τορῶς τε καὶ ὀξέως διακονεῖν, ἀναβαλλεσθδ 
δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια ἐλευθέρως οὐδέ γ᾽ appovi 
176 λόγων λαβόντος * ὀρθῶς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ avdpe 
εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ. ΘΙΟ. Ei πάντας, ὦ Σώκρ, 
/ “Ὁ ’ “ > / / Ων , / 
τες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις, ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη 
κακὰ ἐλάττω Kat ἀνθρώπους εἴη. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ov 
ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε" ὑπεναντίον ¥ 
a 3 an t ae. 3 ° ’ 4 WP > LA ’ 
TL τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη" οὔτ᾽ ἐν θεοῖς av 
ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τό 
περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθέι 
ιν. Ὁ “ , \ | δὲ are g 
Β ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅ τι τάχιστα. φυγὴ ' δὲ ὁμοίωσις 
’ 7 
κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν" ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μ 
, 4 5 \ / Ss » > ’ 
φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ yap, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ 
« ὃ “ ¢ ΕΙΣ 5 - “ ς Xx / 
ῥαδιον πεῖσαι, ὡς dpa οὐχ ὧν ἕνεκα οἱ πολλοί φασι δὲ 
/ 
πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάβρ 
\ \ > 7 \ > tes \ \ \ \ 
TO μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, TO δ᾽ οὔ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ 
a n ς , ‘ 
ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἷναι, ταῦτα yap ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος ypa 
3 Ξςἷ 
ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται" τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμ 
a ’ n «ς , , 
C θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, GAN ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότ 

























®EAITHTOS. 49 


Ε΄ ὶ οὐκ. ΓΝ ἐς: ΝΣ ΤΟ nk ¢ on 
9S, Kal οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν 
5. Ce 
Ὁ γένηται ὅ TL δικαιότατος. περὶ τούτου Kal ἡ ὡς 
Ἂν an , 5 \ > ’ \ 3 / 
θῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ ovdevia τε καὶ ἀνανδρία. 
ΟΝ \ , a , ΧΗ εκ mah ον δὰ 
ν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ 
> , \ pil ey rae a oe r , 
ora ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής" αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι δεινότητές 
i na lal / 
Ἑ δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφίαι ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις 
4 , A 
ὄμεναι φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάναυσοι. τῷ οὖν 
aN a / Δ a 
δικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἢ | πράττοντι μακρῷ 
4 \ a 
plot ἔχει TO μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας 
» > / ‘ lal > / \ 7 > / 
εἰναι. ἀγάλλονται yap τῷ ὀνείδει, καὶ οἴονται ἀκούειν, 
4 » - > 
τί OV λῆροι εἰσί, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνδρες, οἵους 
m3? ͵ \ ἢ ΄ 3 ’ , 
εἰ ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους. λεκτέον οὖν ταληθές, 
4 , a / ᾽ > " “ νη ἢ 
ὅτι τοσούτῳ μῶλλόν εἰσιν οἷοι οὐκ οἴονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ 
ἊΣ ? n \ δ 4 
ἴονται' ἀγνοοῦσι yap Enmiav ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα 
q a > ἢ . n 
“ἀγνοεῖν. οὐ yap ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί Te Kal 
Ὶ 7 - Φὺΐ ; ΩΝ ᾽ a > ‘ 
ἄνατοι, ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ 
9 - 
ἣν ἀδύνατον | ἐκφυγεῖν. ΘΟ. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις; ΣΏ. 
Γ᾽ , 3 , > a ς a \ 
ἸΤαραδευγμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων, TOD μὲν 
ν ’ nr LS ’ / ’ , 
€lov εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ 
ρῶντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἠλιθιότητός τε καὶ τῆς 
ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ 
he * 25, rae ee 5 δὴ 
as * ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι. οὗ δὴ 
4 5 , a 
ἔνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁμοιοῦνται. 
2 oo oA * ἡ τὰν a a t 
av δ᾽ εἴπωμεν, ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς δεινότητος, 
αἱ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τῶν κακῶν 
\ / ’ / > , \ ‘ ¢ a ¢ 
αθαρὸς τόπος ov δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ THY αὑτοῖς ὁμοιο- 
" \ - 
a τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἕξουσι, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες, 
ξ \ ‘ ¢ a 
ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανοῦργοι 
, 3 , / 
Wwontov τινῶν ἀκούσονται. OKO. Kal para δή, ὦ 
wand κ᾿ U a a / 
Σώκρατες. XO. Oida τοι, |! ὦ ἑταῖρε. Ev μέντοι τι 
ε ΄ / A / / n / 
Trois συμβέβηκεν, OTe av ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέῃ δοῦναί τε καὶ 
π΄ κ.}, 4 


D 


10] 


B 


0 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


Cr 






















9 
δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικ 
a ’ ; 
πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι Kal μὴ ἀνάνδρως φεύγειν, TO 
ἀτόπως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν avTE 
> 
αὑτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπο: 
/ “ / \ a f 
μαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. ΠΕρ 
/ 
μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ Kal πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα 
C ἀποστώμεν᾽ εἰ δὲ μή, πλείω ἀεὶ ἐπιῤῥέοντα | καταχώσε 
ς α Raa oA > A / ad Fase δὰ ἊΝ θ " 
ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἴωμε 
εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκε. ΘΕΟ. Ἔμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, 
Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν paw γὰρ τηλικῷδι 
ο΄ ὄντι ἐπακολουθεῖν" εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίωμειϊ 
΄σ ΧΧΥῚ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθά που ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου, 
ἡ αι Ἂν Ἁ Ν / 3 / λέ \ 
ᾧ ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ 
ἀεὶ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ, 
μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν διισχυρίζεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἥκισ 
D περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς παντὸς | μᾶλλον, ἃ av θῆται πόλι 
δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θεμένῃ, ἕωσπει 
ΩΝ / \ \ , fal a7 9 tal “sp A 
ἂν κέηται περὶ δὲ τἀγαθοῦ οὐδένα ἀνδρεῖον ἔθ᾽ οὔτ 
«Ὁ 
εἶναι, ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ ἃ ἂν ὠφέλι 
οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἑαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνο 
Ὁ“ a , κι / \ ΝΜ | ς , 
ὁσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν εἰ TLS τὸ ὄνομα eyo 
a / A ¢ 
τοῦτο δέ που σκῶμμ᾽ ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν. οὐχ 
5 ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ ye. YO. Μὴ ! λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ 
πρᾶγμα, ὃ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖτα. OKO. Μὴ yag 
XQ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάζῃ, τούτου δήπου στοχά 
ζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ᾽ ὅσο 
” / \ , ς ᾽ , « A / 
οἴεταί Te καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὠφελιμωτάτους ἑαυτῇ τίθετα 
178.4) πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται; ΘΕΟ. * Οὐ 
a 2 ax x 
δαμῶς. YO. Ἦ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἀεί, ἢ πολλὰ κα 
διαμαρτάνει ἑκάστη; OHO. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ διαμαρ 
a 
rave. ΣΏ. "Ere τοίνυν ἐνθένδε adv μᾶλλον πᾶς τι 


ΘΕΛΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 51 






















ς n , a 
Hoporoyncee ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντός τις TOD εἴδους 
a ͵ 2 ®@ Ne Cn ya ἢ v » , 
Πέρωτῴη, ἐν ᾧ Kal τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὄν. ἔστι δέ 
καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομο- 
a ¢ 2 , ς i ᾽ 7, 
θετώμεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ὠφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέ- 
Ὡ Qn 5 “Ὁ 
“εθα εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. τοῦτο δὲ μέλλον ὀρθῶς 
Ψ λέγοιμεν. OHO. ! Πάνυ γε. YO. Ἴθι δή, οὑτωσὶ 
7 A ἢ A» \ Cy wee, \ 
οωτῶμεν IIpwraydpav ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνῳ τὰ 
> \ ἢ Ν , " , ᾽ ς 
ἃ λεγόντων ἸΙάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὡς 
até, ὦ IIpwrayopa, λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς 
του οὐ τῶν τοιούτων. ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον 
αὑτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἴεται 
τῷ καὶ ὄντα. οὐχ οὕτως; OEO. Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἦ 
καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὦ ἹΤρωταγόρα, 
Heyer τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὑτῷ, καὶ οἷα | ἂν οἰηθῇ ἔσεσθαι, 
avTa καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι ; οἷον θερμά: 
p ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ἰδιώτης αὑτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεσθαι 
ταὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἕτερος, ἰατρὸς 
δέ, ἀντοιηθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον 
ἱποβήσεσθαι, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ 
a \ ΟΝ 7] / e n \ > , 
v θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα; 
val / 3 3 
EO. Γελοῖον μέντ᾽ ἂν εἴη. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλ᾽, οἶμαι, περὶ 


θαι ἡ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ ἡ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ, 
υρία. ΘΕΟ. Τί μήν; >. Οὐδ᾽ ἂν αὖ περὶ apap 
"όστου τε Kal εὐαρμόστου ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἂν 
βέλτιον δοξάσειε μουσικοῦ, ὃ καὶ ἔπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ 
γαιδοτρίβη δόξει εὐάρμοστον εἶναι. OEO. Οὐδαμῶς. 
20. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἑστιάσεσθαι μὴ μαγει- 
ἱκοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἡ κρίσις 
τοῦ ὀψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν 
ap τοῦ ἤδη | ὄντος ἑκάστῳ ἡδέος ἢ γεγονότος μηδέν 
4—2 


σ 


D 


E 


179 


Β 


Q 


52 TAATONOX 


























΄- , , 3 A \ A / ' 
πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντο 
4 / / > \ ¢ 
ἑκάστῳ καὶ δόξειν καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον αὐτὸς avT 
, / 3 
ἄριστος κριτής; ἢ σύ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τό γε περὶ λέ 
“ -“ , > , > 
yous πιθανὸν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήρια 
βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὁστισοῦν 
ro Ψ ς 
©EO. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε σφόδρα bre 
a ᾽ / 
σχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός. +O. Νὴ Ada, 
3 x 7 
μέλε: ἢ οὐδείς oy ἂν αὐτῷ διελέγετο * διδοὺς πολι 
id 
ἀργύριον, εἴ πῃ τοὺς συνόντας ἔπειθεν, OTL Kai TO μέν 
λον ἔσεσθαί τε καὶ δόξειν οὔτε μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλο 
ἄμεινον κρίνειεν ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς αὑτῷςἁἨ OEO. ᾿Αληθέστατα 
XO. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαν καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον περὶ 
τὸ μέλλον ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθ ἔ 
μ , ς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετουμένην 
/ / 5 U 3 lal > , ΕῚ 
πόλιν πολλάκις ἄναγκην εἰναν τοῦ ὠφελιμωταάτου ἀπο 
τυγχάνειν; ΘΕΟ. Mada ye. ΣΏ. Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖ 
\ ᾿ , f 
πρὸς Tov διδάσκαλόν σου εἰρήσεται, OTL ἀνάγκη | αὐτᾷ 
fal A 3 
ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μ 
a / Lal ’ 
τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ TO ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδ 
ε [ a Pie 3 , , ε " 
ὁπωστιοῦν ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρῳ γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι μ 
διε ἘΠΕ \ > ae , φὩ.9...9 , Ε ᾿ 
ἠνάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτ᾽ ἐβουλόμην εἴτε μή 
n > - 
τοιοῦτον εἶναι. OEO. ᾿Εἰκείνῃ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. 
ΠΝ c.f 5 ς , ¢ ͵ Ν t 
μάλιστα ἁλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἁλισκόμενος Kal ταύτῃ 
e \ An tal 
ἣ Tas τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὗται δὲ eda 
\ 3 / 7 LU ’ n > a ς , 
νησαν τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἡγούμεναι 
XQ. | Πολλαχῇ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό γε τοιοῦτοι 
ς , \ A . 3 a ͵ 3 ᾿ \ 
ἁλοίη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθὴ δόξαν εἶναι περὶ 
\ \ «ς , ’ 3 τ e 2: , 
τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστῳ πάθος, “ἐξ “ὧν «αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ 
, ! f an 
κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἑλεῖν, 
οὐκ ἀνηθεῖς. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω: ἀνάλωτοι γάρ, ε 
> ΄ 
ἔτυχον, εἰσί, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς τε εἶνα 
/ \ : 
καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἂν ὄντα λέγοιεν, καὶ Θεαίτητος 


OEAITHTOS. 53 
























Ἂ , “ a 

δε οὐκ ἅπο σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν αἴσθησιν Kal ἐπιστήμην 
ὐτὸν θέμενος. προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, | ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ Ὁ 
Ἰρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον τὴν φερο- 
: νην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακβρούοντα, εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν 
θέγγεται. μάχη δ᾽ οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ φαύλη οὐδ᾽ 
yous γέγονε, XXVIT. ΘΕῸ. Πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ 
Ἢ \ \ \ Wo; 5 , ee / ς 
αὐλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν ᾿Ιωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι 
ἀμπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἑταῖροι χορηγοῦσι 
οὕτου τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐῤῥωμένως. LO. Τῷ τοι, ὦ 
Sf: 4 n Ww Ὁ ‘ »] 5 - ey 
jhe Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ 
"τοὶ | ὑποτείνοντα. ΘΕῸ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ Ἐ 
"x ὦ , : \ U A ς / x 
ip, Σώκρατες, περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων, ἣ 
ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις Ομηρείων, καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρων, av- 
οἷς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν “Edecov, ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται 
ἡπειροι εἶναι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἷόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ 
οἷς οἰστρῶσιν. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα 
ἔρονται, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιμεῖναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ 
, ες , 9 / ‘6. \ 9. fs 0 & ἐκ 
χίως ἐν μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἧττον * 180 
ὑτοῖς Evt ἢ τὸ μηδέν᾽ μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ᾽ 
᾿δὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἡσυ- 
πος .. er, , » “ ᾽ t ε 

ας ἀλλ᾽ ἄν τινά τι ἔρῃ, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥη- 
τίσκια αἰνυγματώδη. ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, κἂν 
Ul a a 

του ζητῇς λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴρηκεν, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξει 
UVOS μετωνομασμένῳ, περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς 

΄ συν, τὸ Os . CR on > \ \ 3 , > > 
δένα αὐτῶν" οὐδέ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλ 
πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον ἐᾶν εἶναι | μήτ᾽ Β 
poy μήτ᾽ ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ 
δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι" τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ πολεμοῦσι, 
καθ᾽ ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκβάλλουσιν. YO. 
ὡς, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους ἑώρακας, 
a } b) val 

vevovat δὲ ov συγγέγονας" ov γάρ σοι ἑταῖροί εἰσιν. 


D 


E 


181 


“ταῖς παλαίστραις διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ 


54 TIAATONOS 





























Ar’ ° \ a a 6 a é \ λῇ 
ἀλλ᾽, οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆ 
/ \ x ’ ¢ / ς n a 
φράζουσιν, os ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὑτοῖς ποιῆσο 

a f ᾽ U 
@EO. ΠΟοίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε οὐδὲ γίγνεται τῶ 
Yd Ψ ΦΥΤΌΝ θ , Ι ’ > ’ / , 
τοιούτων ἕτερος ἑτέρου μαθητής, | ἀλλ᾽ αὐτόματοι ave 
φύονται, ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας 
ς “ ς - 
καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὃ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται εἰδέναι. παρ 
\ > , [74 ᾿ 5 Ὁ" ᾿] vv tA 
μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ Ya ἐρῶν, οὐκ av ποτε λάβοϊ 
, U Φ ἴα 
λόγον οὔτε ἑκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων" αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παρ 
Ὁ ϑ 
λαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ΣΏ. Καὶ 
. \ / ᾿ 
μετρίως γε λέγεις. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι πᾶ 
\ lal > Ι / 
ρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων, μετὰ ποιήσεω 
\ , ¢ Φ A ᾿ 
ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς | πολλούς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις τῶν a 
, 
λων πάντων ᾿Ὠκεανός te καὶ Τηθὺς ῥεύματα τυγχάνε 
\ ΟΝ [2 \ \ A id / ¢/ / 
καὶ οὐδὲν ἕστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων, ἅτε. σοφωτέ 
A 
pov, ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα Kal ob σκυτοτόμα 
A 5 
αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωντα 
᾽ , 3} \ \ e U Ν Ν rn 
ἠἡλιθίως οἰόμενοι TA μὲν ἑστάναι, Ta δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶ 
, ᾽ ral A } 
ὄντων, μαθόντες δ᾽ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὖ 
Tous; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι 


5 , > , Ω | 
TAVAVTLA TOUTOLS ἀπεφήναντο, οιον 


ἀκίνητον τελέθε 
τῷ πάντ᾽ ὄνομ᾽ εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί. τε κα 
Tlappevidar ἐναντιούμενον πᾶσι τούτοις διισχυρίζοντα, 
ὡς ἕν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ, οὐκ exo 
χώραν, ἐν ἡ κινεῖται. 'Τούτοις οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πᾶσι 
χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες Reha 
ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἂν μή 
ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν, * δίκην δώσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ 


> / 

ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἕλκωνται eis τἀναντία. So 
Lg \ 4 
οὖν μοι τοὺς ἑτέρους πρότερον σκεπτέον, ἐφ᾽ οὕσπε 
ς “4 \ . 
ὡρμήσαμεν, τοὺς ῥέοντας. καὶ ἐὰν μέν τι φαίνωντα 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. δῦ 

























--. , Brose Rt Cc oA ? ’ : \ es 
EYOVTES, TUVENEOMEV μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἑτέ- 


͵ rn A 5 7 , » , | 3 
τούτων τῶν Kal τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. ἀμφότεροι ! ὃ 
ἣν φανῶσι μηδὲν μέτριον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα 
ἡγούμενοι ἡμᾶς μέν τι λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παμπα- 
λαίους δὲ καὶ ) v6 ἱποδεὸ ) 

σίους δὲ καὶ πασσόφους ἄνδρας ἀποδεδοκιμακότες. 
P 3 3 / > a , fa! wf 
pa οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προΐέναν 
τίνδυνον. ΘΕΌ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, 
μὴ οὐ διασκέψασθαι, τί λέγουσιν ἑκάτεροι τῶν ἀνδρῶν. 
CXVIIT. 20. Σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυ- 
μουμένου. Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κινή- 
᾿ A v ‘ 
σεως. πέρι, | ποῖόν τί ποτε ἄρα λέγοντες φασὶ τὰ πάντα 
κινεῖσθαι. βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε πότερον ἕν 
᾿ 3 Ἂν" A , ᾿ς ἢ > \ / f \ 
t εἶδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο: μὴ 
Ἐπ ; 5 ὃς , ἢ , \ to 
€VTOL μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκείτω, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σύ, ἵνα 
κοινῇ πάσχωμεν, ἄν τι καὶ δέῃ. καί μοι λέγε dpa 
Ἢ a mn of ᾿ ἢ ἢ ἢ , 
ἐνεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν TL χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ 
καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται; ΘΕΟ, ἔγωγε. ΣΏΩ. 
Τὶ \ , A» δ ¢ δὲ δι" 26 ἃς 
Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἕν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ 7 μὲν ἐν τῷ 
ae , , A ἢ , ᾽ nA ΤᾺ \ > 
αὐτῷ, γηράσκῃ δὲ ἢ | μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρὸν ἐκ 
7 An 9 / an 

“λακοῦ γίγνηται, ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιῶται, 
1 U , 
ἦρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος φάναι κινήσεως; ΘΕΟ. 
"Epovye δοκεῖ. ΣΏ. ᾿Αναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δύο δὴ λέγω 

\ 
τούτω εἴδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν. 
@EO. ᾿Ορθῶς γε λέγων. YO. Τοῦτο τοίνυν οὕτω διε- 
λόμενοι διαλεγώμεθα ἤδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσι 

a “ / lal , 
veto Oat, καὶ ἐρωτῶμεν, Πότερον πᾶν φατὲ ἀμφοτέρως 


181 ν. τὴν δὲ περιφοράν. Latere videtur corruptio, Cf. Vers. 
Bool. 


σ 


ψείσθαι, φερόμενόν τε καὶ | ἀλλοιούμενον, ἢ τὸ μέν TLE 


182 


/ 5 ” 
B μερη OUV QAKOUVE. 


C 


δύ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 























ἀμφοτέρως, τὸ δ᾽ ἑτέρως; ΘΕΟ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὰ Ai’ ἔγω 
ΟΝ eM le 2 , ἢ ΄ 
οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν" οἶμαι δ᾽ av φάναι ἀμφοτέρως. YO. F 
δέ γε μή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κινούμενά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑστῶτ 
n \ ΕΝ a 3 lal Ψ 3 lal “ 
φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ἕξει εἰπεῖν, ὅτι κινε 
ται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἕστηκεν. OEO. ᾿Αληθέστατ., 
λέγεις. LO. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μ 
* κίνησ 
ἀεὶ κινεῖται. ΘΕΟ, ᾿Ανάγκη. ΣΏ. Σκόπει δή μοι τό 


lal \ -“ lal 
κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνεῖναι μηδενί, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν 


αὐτῶν" τῆς θερμότητος ἢ λευκότητος ἢ ὁτουοῦν γένεσι 
5 ef 5 | 7 / ' 5» , / - 
οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν φάναι αὐτούς, φέρεσθαι ἕκαστο 
τούτων ἅμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιοῦντός τε K 
/ \ \ \ , > \ ϑ > 3 
πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητὸν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ 
” ” , \ \ na 7 > > ’ 
αἴσθησιν ἔτι γίγνεσθαι, TO δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν TL ἀλλ᾽ ὁ 
/ " 3 ς Ι “ 3 / ‘om. /. 
ποιότητα; ἴσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνε 
Tat ὄνομα, καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον κατ 
' σὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτ 
/ 
λευκότης, θερμὸν δὲ Kal λευκὸν γίγνεται, Kal τἄλλ 
iA “4, ’ 
οὕτω. μέμνησαι yap που, ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν OTL οὕτω 
7 ἃ \ b See | 5 ¢ \ > > > A 
ἐλέγομεν, Ev μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἶναι, pnd av τὸ 
ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλλη 
Ι ᾽, 
συγγιγνομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκ- 
τοντα τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα. 
“Ὁ >] 
@EO. Μέμνημαι" πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; LO. Ta μὲν τοίνυν ar 
, 27 ” ” | 54 “ / . 4, 
χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν, εἴτε ἄλλως ᾿ἱ εἴτε οὕτως λέγουσιν οὗ 
/ a Ὁ 
δ᾽ ἕνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτώντες" 
n a > / 
Κινεῖται καὶ ῥεῖ, ὡς φατέ, τὰ πάντα; ἢ yap; OEO. 
A” «Δ / Γ 
Nai. +0. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας, ἃς διειλόμεθα, κινήσεις, 
φερόμενά τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα; OEO. Ids δ᾽ οὔ; 
182 8. ἀποτίκτοντα suspectum facit sequens τά, Conici potest 


amorixroueva. Quod si nihil mutetur, statuenda est accusativi ab- 
soluti constructio, 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 57 



















A \ , , 
rep ye δὴ τελέως κινήσετα. LO. ἘΠ μὲν τοίνυν 
i ,ὔ > an , A 
EPETO μόνον, ἡχλοιοῦτο δὲ μή, εἴχομεν ἄν που εἰπεῖν, 
“ n ‘ na : 
ἅττα pet τὰ φερόμενα. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν: OEO. 
fy * . > \ fa) 
Οὕτως. YO. ᾿Επειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ | τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν 
c ey Κ᾽ 2 9 \ / fal 
TO peov, ἄλλα μεταβάλλει, ὥστε Kal αὐτοῦ τούτου 
» ; , -“ / 5" 
αν ῥοὴν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην 
2 , “4 § ¢ al / / 3 ὔ΄ er / 
0aV, WA μὴ ἅλῳ ταύτῃ μένον, Apu πότε οἷόν τέ τι 
- lal Lal sf » a ’ 
ὑσειπεῖν χρῶμα, ὥστε Kal ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν; 
5 \ / / 3 δ U lal 
EO. Kai ris μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες ; ἢ ἄλλο γέ TL τῶν 
, +” IN / ες , [4 \ es 
γιούτων, εἴπερ ἀεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ἅτε δὴ ῥέον. 
). Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὁποιασοῦν, οἷον τῆς 
Ὁ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν ; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ | ὁρᾶν 
ἀκούειν: OEO. Οὔκουν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται. 
: ” "᾽ Coa 7ὕ a BY Ni tie 
0. Οὔτε dpa ὁρῶν προσρητέον Te μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὁρᾶν, 


ὃς κινουμένων. ΘΕῸ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΏ. Καὶ μὴν 
θησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὡς ἔφαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος. 
Ο. Ἦν ταῦτα. ΣΏ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον 
μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι, ὅ τί ἐστιν 
τιστήμη. OHO. *’Eolkate. ΣΏ. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν 
a > 

"μβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμη- 
σιν ἀποδεῖξαι, ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ 
a 7 > \ an \ % ¢ v > ’ > / 
γόκρισις ὀρθὴ φανῇ. τὸ δ᾽, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα 
tral, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅτου ἄν τις ἀποκρίνηται, 
ε- , 3 \ = “ ae 4 , \ \ “ > 
piws ὀρθὴ εἶναι, οὕτω τ᾽ ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτως, εἰ 
P > a 
βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, iva μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ. 


q 3 ? or a \ OA a) “ 

τῶ τε εἶπον καὶ οὐχ οὕτω. δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο οὕτω 
EN Bay Ying: | A pe, = Rede, hee Re 

w* οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι | κινοῖτο οὕτω" οὐδ᾽ αὖ μὴ οὕτω 

fal i 

δὲ yap τοῦτο κίνησις" ἀλλά τιν᾽ ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον 

A an ε “ \ \ 

ig τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν 


D 


EO. ᾿Ορθῶς λέγεις. ZO. Πλήν ye, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτε 


Β 


58 TAATONOS 
























ἘΣ ὟΝ ΠΣ 7 3 » eon > ΔΨ \ ; 
αὑτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα TO οἱ 
ὅπως. μάλιστα δ᾽ οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῖς ἁρμόττοι, ἄπειρι 
λεγόμενον. OEO. Οἰκειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὖ 
αὐτοῖς. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἑταίρ 
ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὔπω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ Ta 
v7 / ’ / 53 δὰ Ν | , 
C ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, av μὴ ' φρόνι 
τις ἢ ἐπιστήμην τε αἴσθησιν οὐ συγχωρησόμεθα κα 
γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον. εἰ μή τί mr 
ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὅδε λέγε. OEO. "Αριστ᾽ εἴρηκε 
ὦ Σώκρατες" τούτων γὰρ περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεῖ amy) 
λάχθαι σοι ἀποκρινόμενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδ 
τὸ περὶ τοῦ IIpwrayopou λόγου τέλος σχοίη. XXI 
@EAI. Μὴ πρίν γ᾽ ἄν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, Σωκράτης τε καὶ 
D τοὺς φάσκοντας αὖ τὸ |! πᾶν ἑστάναι διέλθητε, ὥσπ' 
ἄρτι προὔθεσθε. ΘΈΟ. Νέος ὦν, ὦ Θεαέτητε, τοῖ 
πρεσβυτέρους ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαΐνο 
5 \ / “ a 3 t 
Tas; ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκρ 
te. δώσεις λόγον. ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ, Ἔν πέρ ye βούλητο 
ἥδιστα μέντ᾽ ἂν ἤκουσα περὶ ὧν λέγω. ΘΕΟ. Ἵππέι 
5) / 7D ἢ ᾽ ; 
εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ “ΞΣωκράτη εἰς λόγους προκαλούμενα 
ἐρώτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσει. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλά μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Θε 
/ e , Θ Aas ye: , θ | 9" 
E δωρε, περί γε ὧν κελεύει Θεαίτητος οὐ πείσεσθαι | αὐτ 
ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι; YO. Μέλισσον 
Ν \ v A aA ς Ν / Ν Ὁ » , 
Kal τοὺς ἄλλους, OF EV ETTOS λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνὸ 
νος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν, ἧττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ 
ὄντα ἸΤαρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ το 
Ὅ A) ant , ef ὃ / , , 
μήρου, αἰδοῖός τέ μοι ἅμα δεινός τε. ξυμπροσέμιξ 
γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτῃ, καί μ 
184 ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. * φοβοῦμι 
οὖν, μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμ 
εἶπε πολὺ πλέον λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ. μέγιστον, οὗ ἕνεκ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 59 


























λόγος ὥρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι, τί ποτ᾽ ἐστίν, ἄσκεπ- 
γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις 
| ots πείσεται ἄλλως τε Kal ὃν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει 
ἀμήχανον εἴτε τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, avaki ἂν 
ἄθοι, εἴτε ἱκανῶς, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀφα- 
εἰ. δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὧν | κυεῖ περὶ Β 
¥ ἢ a n A A ? 
πιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς TH μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπο- 
doa. OEO. ᾿Αλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν. LO. 
Ere τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων 
ἐπίσκεψαι. αἴσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω. 
) γάρ; OEAL. Nal. ΣΩ. Ei οὖν τίς σε ὧδ᾽ ἐρωτῴη: 
ὃν \ \ 4 ͵ com  ὖνν \ a \ Sgr 
τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ὁρᾷ ἄνθρωπος Kal τῷ τὰ ὀξέα 
“Kal βαρέα ἀκούει; εἴποις ἄν, οἶμαι, ὄμμασί τε καὶ ὠσίν. 
ΘΈΛΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΏ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν | ὀνομάτων te C 
Εις +e , a als , 3 , WS hs ae 
cal ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ ov ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν 
πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον 
πνελεύθερον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη 
Ἶ , a 3 / A. 1.9 / e 9? > ', 
πιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ἣν ἀποκρίνει, ἣ οὐκ ὀρθή 
γκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρα, ᾧ ὁρώμεν, 
"Sz, Φ 3 , x > ΕΜ, lees, a r 
οὔτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι’ οὗ ὁρῶμεν, Kal ᾧ ἀκούομεν, 
ὦτα, ἢ δι’ οὗ ἀκούομεν; OEAI. A’ ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθα- 
όμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς. ΣΏ. 'D 
; \ , an > , ar eh ie “ 
λεινὸν yap που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ 
7 vf > / > U ᾽ \ \ ΕῚ 
y δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς 
wy ἂν 3297 Ν Ν » ¢ “ “Ὁ 
ιἱαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα 
“ Ν , b , > / 
‘atta ξυντείνει, ἧ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανό- 
"ιεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά. OHAI. ᾿Αλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω 
irrov ἢ ἐκείνως. LO. Tod δέ τοι ἕνεκα αὐτά σοι 
a € al ,’ lal a al 4 
taxpiBovpar; εἴ τινι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν 
᾿φθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ 
δ, * ey > a ἌΡ ΜΠ . ἢ 
ὧν ἄλλων ἑτέρων αὖ τινῶν, καὶ | ἕξεις ἐρωτώμενος E 


60 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 






















, χὰ a ἢ \ a > , δ τ \ 

πάντα TA τοιαῦτα εἰς TO σῶμα ἀναφέρειν ; ἴσως δὲ Pex 

Ν / τ Ν 3 t a x a «Ἂν ¢ 
τίον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ UTE 
σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καί μοι λέγε θερμὰ καὶ σκληρ 
\ n \ ͵7 ᾽ - > ͵ 3 ᾿] -»" ͵ 
καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι’ ὧν αἰσθάνει, dpa οὐ τοῦ σώΞ 
ματος ἕκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινός; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδενδι 
ἄχλου. ΣΏ. Ἦ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν, ἃ δι’ ἑτέρα 
185 δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι * δί ἄλλης ταῦτ 
αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι’ ἀκοῆς, δ ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι’ ὄψεως, δὲ 
ἀκοῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω; ΣΏ. ἘΠ 
ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν διά γε τοῦ ἑτέροι 
ὀργάνου, οὐδ᾽ αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων aicbavor 
ἄν. ΘΕΔΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΏ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περ 
χρόας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, 
ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν; ΘΕΑ͂Ι. "Eyoye. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν 
καὶ ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ταὐτόν; 
ΒΘΕΑΙ. ᾿ Τίώμην; ΣΏ. Kal ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἑκάτε 
pov δὲ ἕν; OEAT. Καὶ τοῦτο. YO. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε 
ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν, δυνατὸς εἶ ἐπισκέψασθαι; 
@EAI. Ἴσως. ΣΏ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περ 
’ a a of \ 2. oe Ὁ Ε Ὁ , 
αὐτοῖν διανοεῖ; οὔτε yap δι’ ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι’ ὄψεως οἷόν 
\ \ f \ 2 A » \ \ a 
τε TO κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδ 
τεκμήριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἴη aud 
/ / HF \ ς AR bs 5 5. “ἢ “ : 
τέρω σκέψασθαι, dp ἐστὸν ἁλμυρὼ ἢ οὔ, οἷσθ᾽ ὅτι ἕξεις 
Cele ᾧ ἐπισκέψει, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε | ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοὴ 
φαίνεται, ἀλλά τι ἄλλος OEAT. Τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει, ἥ γε 
διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις; YO. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἡ δὲ 
δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό τ᾽ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ 
/ ὃ 5 δ -\ 9 2 , τ εν Ly 
τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ᾧ TO ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ TO οὐκ 
ἔστι καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἠρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσ 
a 4 n \ 
ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα, δι’ ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ 
αἰσθανόμενον ἕκαστα; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ 


@EAITHTOS, ge 
























a. 5 e , ° , 
εἶναι, Kal ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν 
; \ Y \ 0 
Kal τὸ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ Ev! τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν 
ὅ ᾽ “Ὁ / 7 
spl αὐτῶν. δῆλον δέ, ὅτι Kal ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν 
γωτᾷς, καὶ τἄλλα, ὅσα τούτοις ἕπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ 
ἢν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα. 0, Ὑπέρευ, 
᾿Θεαΐτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. 
. 3 
Al. ᾿Αλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι 
Ε΄, , 2 ὦ Aiea Moe. 35 \ 269 5 aA 
πεῖν, πλήν γ᾽ OTL μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ᾽ εἶναι τοιοῦ- 
Ps 5 / ᾽ 
οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ᾽ 
᾿ς ὃ > con ς \ er ' , \ 
ἡ Ov αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ' Kowa μοι φαίνεται περὶ 
Tov ἐπισκοπεῖν. ΣΏ. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, 
5 ς »” / > OF ς \ n 
οὐχ, ws ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός" ὃ γὰρ καλῶς 
/ ᾽ , \ / “A a S's > / / 
wv καλός Te κἀγαθός. πρὸς δέ TO KANO εὖ ἐποίησἀς 
i” ᾿ς , 
€ μάλα συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, “εἰ φαίνεταί σοι τὰ 
| wha! > ¢ a ς ™ 9 -“ 9. \ a 
αὐτὴ dv αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν 
/ , an > \ A 
σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο yap ἦν, ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι 


φαίνεταί ye. XXX. YO. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης 
οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέ- 
tat. ΘΙΕΑΙ. ᾿Εγὼ μὲν ὧν αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν 
ε , s δον το \ \ 2 
ὀρέγεται. YO. Ἦ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, 
χὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον; OEAI. Ναί ΣΏΩ. Τί 
καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν; OEAT. 
n>? a t \ " 
τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἄλληλα 
εἶσθαι τὴν οὐδίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ 
γονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα | πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. LO. 


ἃ, τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν 
KO Bey NENT OOS @EAI. Nai. ΣΩ. Τὴν δέ γε 
lav καὶ ὅ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλ- 
hw καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ 


͵΄ 


ὄκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι. ΘΕΈΑΛΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ 


D 


Ξ 


186 


02 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 























ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πει 
ρᾶται ἡμῖν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν 
Ξ \ 2Q\ , ; t , Ι > t 

C μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει | αἰσθάνεσθα 
ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος Ta 
θήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει, τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἄνα 
λογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγις καὶ 
χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγί 
yvetat οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται; ΘΈΑΙ, ἸΠαντάπαας 
μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ,. Οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ᾧ μηδὲ 
οὐσίας; @EAI. ᾿Αδύνατον. ΣΏ. Οὗ δὲ ἀληθείας τι 
ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται; ΘΕΑΙ, Κα 
Ὁ πῶς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες; YO. Ἔν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς πᾶ 
θήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλ 
x a, > / \ \ aN Q / b] 00 / 
ογισμῷ" οὐσίας yap Kat ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μέν, 
ἔοικε, δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον. ΘΕΑΙ. Dak 
νεται. ΣΏ. Ἦ οὖν ταὐτὸν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖ 
τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε; ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. Οὔκουν δὴ δίκαι 
γε. ΣΏ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ Opa 
ἀκούειν, ὀσφρωινεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι; OKA 
π᾿ Αἰσθάνεσθαι | ἔγωγε τί γὰρ ἄλλο; LO. ξύμπαν a 
αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἴσθησιν; OEAT. ᾿Ανάγκη. ΣΏ. Ὧ; 
φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἅψασθαι" οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίε 
@EAI. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. YO. Οὐδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐπιστήμης. OKA 
3 
Οὐ γάρ. YO. Οὐκ ap’ ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητ 
αἴσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτόν. ΘΕΛΙ. Οὐ dat 
ται, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ μάλιστά γε νῦν καταφανέστα 
γέγονεν ἄλλο ὃν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ 
* \ δὴ , Ψ ’ , , rf 

187 Te ἢ μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἕνεκα ἠρχόμεθα διαλεγόμενοι, 
or , ᾽ 3 »” ΕῚ ΡῚ > \ ἌΝ 
εὐρωμεν TL ποτ οὐκ ἔστ ἐπιστημὴ, ἀλλὰ τί ἔσο 

cd δὲ A / / 4 Ν 

ὅμως ὃὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητ 

Ε] Ν 5 5 \ Ud 9. > > > / 
αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, adr ἐν ἐκείνῳ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 09 




















4 e/ , > +7 e ee Ls 4 yO . θ᾽ e \ 
ὅματι, ὁ τί ToT ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν 
ραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα. ΘΈΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό 
Ye καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγῴῷμαι, δοξάζειν. ΣΏ. 
Ορθώς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ φίλε. καὶ ὅρα δὴ νῦν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, 
I Ν , 2 / 7 a a 
ἄντα τὰ πρόσθεν | ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾷς, B 
εἰδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας. καὶ λέγε αὖθις, τί ποτ᾽ 
τὶν ἐπιστήμης XXXI, OEAI. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰ- 
᾿ 3 / 3 , 3 ὃ bl \ ὃ , > 
W, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ Kal ψευδής ἐστι 
Ἂ A) Ten Bee \ / ? sel 3 7 
ca’ κινδυνεύει δὲ. ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καί 
ον τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω: ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ φανῇ προϊοῦσιν, 
Tep τὸ νῦν, ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν. LQ. Od- 
᾿ / > 4 , , A 
μέντοι χρή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν, προθύμως μᾶλλον, 
ὡς τὸ πρῶτον wKVELS ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτω 
ὦμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ εὑρήσομεν ἐφ' ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, lo 
ἧττον υἱησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῇ ἴσμεν" καίτοι οὐκ 
εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος" καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί 
; δυοῖν ὄντοιν εἰδέοιν δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευ- 
) NS; μ ω) 
δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου, τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὁρίζει : 
Al. "Eywye τοῦτο γὰρ αὖ νῦν μοι φαίνεται. XO. 
᾽ οὖν ἔτ᾽ ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν ; ΘΕΑΙ. 
ποῖον δὴ λέγεις; YO. Θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ 
χλοτε δὴ πολλάκις, ὥστ᾽ ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ' Ὁ 
τυτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί 
᾿ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον 
όμενον. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή; ΣΏ. Τὸ δοξάζειν 
ἃ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι διστάζων, πότερον 
παν A. .9 , » ’ x 3 / 
ὦμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον 
τερον. ΘΕ ΑΙ. Τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε καὶ 
jovv φαίνεται δεῖν ; ἄρτι yap οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ 
A , ¢ O\ 3 an n 
wpos ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε 
ἐπείγει. ΣΏ. | Ὀρθῶς ὑπέμνησας. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ E 


- 


—————— ττὐὔὐὔὐὔἥὄὄὄΟΌΟΑ ΣΕ Ὁ 
—> 


.- ee ee τ, --- 


04 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 




















ἀπὸ Καιροῦ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἴχνος μετελθεῖν. κρεῖττον γά 
που σμικρὸν εὖ 1) πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι. OEAT. T 
μήν; ΣΏ. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν ; ψευδῆ φαμὲ 
ἑκάστοτε εἷναι δόξαν, καί τινα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδῆ 
τὸν δ᾽ αὖ ἀληθῆ, ὡς φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων; OHA 
Φαμὲν γὰρ δή. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν τόδε γ᾽ ἔσθ᾽ ἡμῖν πε 
188 πάντα * καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ἤτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι 
μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὦ 
ὄντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ πάρόντι' νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸ 
λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν. OEAT. ᾿Αλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατε 
ἄλλο γ᾽ οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὶ 
εἰδέναι. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα ὃ 
ξάζειν ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν; BEAT. ᾿Ανάγκ 
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ εἰδότ' 
Β εἰδέναι | ἀδύνατον. OEAI. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; LO. *Ap’ οὗ 
ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων, ἃ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἴεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶνα 
ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἄττα ὧν οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφότερα εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ α 
ἀμφότερα; ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες. > 
"ANN ἄρα, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἕτερα ATT 
ὧν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τῷ μήτε Θεαίτητον μή 
Σωκράτη εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὡς ὃ qe 
C @eaitntos ἢ 6 Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης; OEAT. Καὶ 
πῶς av; ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ov μήν, & γέ τις οἷδεν, οἷεταί π 
ἃ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ αὖ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ ob 
@EAI. Tépas γὰρ ἔσται. ΣΏ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν τις ἔ 
ψευδῆ δοξάσειεν ; ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατόν που bok 
ζειν, ἐπείπερ πάντ᾽ ἢ ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτο 
οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται δυνατὸν ψευδῆ δοξάσαι. ΘΕᾺ 
᾿Αληθέστατα. ΣΏ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐ ταύτῃ σκεπτέον 
υγτρῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰόντας, aN 
ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι | καὶ μή; ΘΈΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις; Σ 


ΘΕΑΊΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 65 





















ἢ ἁπλοῦν ἢ, ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὁτουοῦν δοξάζων 
Ke ἔσθ᾽ ὡς οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάσει, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως τὰ 
διανοίας ἔχῃ. OEAI. Εἰκός γ᾽ αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. 

. Πώς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τις ἡμᾶς 
1 axpivy Δυνατὸν δὲ ὁτῳοῦν ὃ λέγεται, καί τις ἀνθρώ- 
ὧν τὸ μὴ ὃν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του εἴτε αὐτὸ 
ta αὑτό; Kal ἡμεῖς δή, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν 
“Ὅταν γε ἀληθῆ μὴ οἴηται οἰόμενος. ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν ; E 
SEAT. Οὕτως. ΣΏΩ. Ἦ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦ- 
"τόν ἐστι;  @EAI. Τὸ ποῖον; ΣΏ. Ei τις ὁρᾷ μέν τι, 
Opa δὲ οὐδέν. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς; ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν εἰ 
ν γέ τι ὁρᾷ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾷ. ἢ σὺ οἴει ποτὲ τὸ ἕν ἐν 
οἷς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι; OEAI. Οὐκ ἔγωγε. YO. Ὁ ἄρα 
ν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὄν τε ὁρᾷὨ OEAT. Φαίνεται. TO. * Καὶ 189 
ἄρα τι ἀκούων ἕν γέ τι ἀκούει καὶ ὃν ἀκούει. OEAT. 
Nai. SO. Καὶ ὁ ἁπτόμενος δή του ἑνός γέ του ἅπτεται 
αὶ ὄντος, εἴπερ ἑνός; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτος. YO. ‘O δὲ 
δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἕν τι δοξάζει; ΘΈΑΙ. ᾿Ανάγκη. ΣΏ. 
δ᾽ ἕν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐυγχωρώῶ. 

. Ὁ ἄρα μὴ ὃν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ 
αίνεται. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ 
παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει. OEAI. Δῆλον, ὡς ἔοικεν. YO. 
Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸ μὴ ὃν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν 
ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτός OEAI. Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. 
Ἄλλο τι ἄρ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα 
δοξάζειν. ΘΕΛΑΙ. ΓΑλλο ἔοικεν. YO. Οὔτ᾽ ἄρ' οὕτως 
ὕτε ὡς ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδής ἐστι δόξα 
ἡμῖν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δή. XXXII. =O. "AAW 
pa ὧδε γυγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύομεν; OEAI. 

; YO. ᾿Αλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῆ φαμὲν εἶναι 
ξαν, ὅταν τίς τι τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο ad | τῶν. ὄντων, C 
Se . 5 


00 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


















a a9 “ wer La 
ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ, φῇ εἶναι. οὕτω yap ὃν μὲν 
ἀεὶ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ᾽ ἑτέρου, καὶ ἁμαρτάνων οὗ 
ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδῆ δοξάζων. OAT. 
’ a aA 7 \ 
᾿Ορθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν yap τις ἀντὴ 

n 3 \ x τς \ > “ \ ὃ / Ul c= 
καλοῦ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξαξῃ, τότε ὡς 
ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῆ. YO. Δῆλος εἶ, ὦ Θεαέτητε, 
καταφρονῶν μου καὶ οὐ δεδιώς. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μάλιστα; 
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄν, οἶμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους 
᾽ , ΠΕ Εν > ς᾽ \ Sg 
Ὁ ἀντιλαβέσθαι, | ἐρόμενος, εἰ οἷόν τε ταχὺ βραδέως 
fal ῇ Ἃ v > / \ \ \ e A 
κοῦφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὗτο 
φύσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ 
n > 
ἐναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μάτην Oappnons, 
ἀφίημι. ἀρέσκει δέ, ὡς φής, τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζει 
ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι; ΘΕΑῚ, "Ἔμοιγε. ΣΏ. "ἔστιν ἄρα 
κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἕτερόν τι ὡς ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκεῖνο, 
τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι. OEAI. "ἔστι μέντοι. ΣΏ 
Ὅ Φ. any? ¢ U , A 3 \ Ι ? 4 3 \ 3 
Ε΄ Ὅταν οὖν τοῦθ᾽. ἡ διάνοιά του δρᾷ, ov καὶ | ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν 
bd n 
ToL ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον διανοεῖσθαι; ΘΈΑΙ. 
3 δ 
Ανάγκη μὲν οὖ. ΣΏ. Ἤτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Κάλλιστα. YO. Τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ᾽ ὅπερ 
5 Α “ a e 
ἐγὼ καλεῖς; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν; ΣΏΩ. Λόγον, dv αὐτὴ 
Ν Φ' x 
πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὥ 
\ a 
γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο yap μοι ἰνδάλλεται 
, 3 
διανοουμένη, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ Sane σαν αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴ 
190 ἐρωτῶσα * καὶ ἀποκριψομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ 
φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὁ ὁρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ 
ὀξύτερον ἐπαΐξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, 
‘ Υ̓͂ 
δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ᾽ ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν 
, a \ ‘ 
λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι 
Ν a 
πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ συγῇ πρὸς αὑτόν. σὺ δὲ 
a > 
τί; ΘΕΑ͂Ι. Kayo. YO. Ὅταν dpa τις τὸ ἕτερο 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 67 



























τερον δοξάξζῃ, καὶ φησίν, ὡς ἔοικε, «τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον 
vat πρὸς ἑαυτόν. OEAT.!' Τί μήν; YO. ᾿Αναμιμνή- Β 
σκου δή, εἰ πώποτ᾽ εἶπες πρὸς σεάυτόν, ὅτι παντὸς 
ov τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον, 
ἣ καὶ τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον σκόπει, εἴ ToT’ ἐπεχείρησας 
σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν 
ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὐδ᾽ ἐν ὕπνῳ πώποτε ἐτόλμησας 
εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτόν, ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ 
ἄρτιά ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις. 
0. Αλλον δέ τινα οἴει | ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον TOA- C 
μῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀναπείθοντα αὑτόν, 
ἧς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ἵππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἕν; OEAT. 
Ma Av’ οὐκ ἔγωγε. YO. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς 
αὐτὸν δοξάζειν ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφότερά γε λέγων καὶ 
δοξάζων καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ 
ξάσειεν, ὡς τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ 
τὸ ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου. λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇδε, μηδένα 
δοξάζειν, ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ ἄλλο TL! τῶν τοιούτων. Ὁ 
DEAT. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐῶ τε καί por δοκεῖ ὡς 
εἰς. ΣΏ. Αμφω μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τὸ 
Τερον. ἕτερον δοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. "Ἔοικεν. YO. ᾿Αλλὰ 
μὴν τὸ ἕτερόν γε μόνον δοξάξων, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον μηδαμῇ, 
οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι. ΘΈΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ 
εἰς) ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὗ μὴ 
δοξάζει. LO. Οὔτ᾽ dp’ ἀμφότερα οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον δο- ᾿ 
ξάξζοντι ἐγχωρεῖ ἀλλοδοξεῖν. ὥστ᾽ εἴ τις | ὁριεῖται δό- Ἐ 
Fav εἶναι ψευδῆ τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι" οὔτε 
γὰρ ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδὴς ἐν 
ἡμῖν οὖσα δόξας. ΘΕΔΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν. XXXIIE ΣΩ. 
Αλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φανήσεται ὄν, 
τολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄτοπα. ΘΕΑῚ. 
5—2 


191 


To) 


D 


TIAATONOS 
68 | 


lv ἃ νταχ 
Δ, Ὁ WwW ἂν Ta ud 
43 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἐρῶ cot, mp SE 
ms a ὃ . . Α ᾿ > ἡμῶν, 
Ta ποῖα δη; ς μην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ i 
aA OV αυσχυνοιμη ἊΝ : ré m ἀλλ᾽ 
πειραθῶ σκοπῶν. νων ὁμολογεῖν οἷα λέγω. 
47 4 εν ” 4 
ᾧ ἀποροῦμεν, ἀναγκαξομ ενώμεθα, τότ᾽ ἤδη περ n 
F “ ὶ ἐλεύθεροι Hf > hs ΟΝ 
ἐὰν * ΞΕ , ἄ, ἐκτὸς 
ἐαἂν ™ εὐρωμ aie ¢ TATKXOVTMY AUTA, 
τῶν ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν steht ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινω 
4. ἊἋ 
ἜΑ ΒΕΔ € TAaVTN 
γελοίου ἑστῶτες δὶ : ‘Eomev ὡς VAVTLOVTES ΤΌΠΟΝ 
δ οἶμαι, τῷ λόγῳ pein e οὖν ἔτι πόρον TWa 
θέντες, ς ὅ τι ἂν βούληται. ἣ ΔΩ 
τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὃ τι εν. ἄκουε. Δ ΕΝΑΤ, δὶ 
φ ΄ LV Σ a δὲ Ἢ 
εὑρίσκω τοῦ ὕγτήματον τὸν ὀρθῶς ὁμολογῆσαι, tis 
) ( as 7 «Ὁ 
μόνον. 20. Οὐ φήσω ne ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ “ 
¢e/ V 
ae err? , ov. 
ὡμολογήσαμεν, a ae | ψευσθῆναι ἀλλά 7) δυνᾶπα > 
} at 
οἶδεν εἶναι αὐτά, καὶ ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα ἡνίκ 
@EAI "Apa EELS ο Kab ais 3 aa ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων 
᾿ 5 τ : ἐνι 
OV εἰναΐ, OT : : ; 
͵ ἠῤῥωθεν δὲ ὁρῶν a , ἡ δ ἢ 
Sox ΑΤΏΉ.: πορρω € 5 , αι γὰρ δὴ ἐν TG 
ae ἢ Σωκράτη, ὃν οἶδα ; γίγνετ : τοῦ 
See Ge Sena Οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν avr 
: Υ̓ i λέ εἰς. aad; “9 : OEAI. 
τοιούτῳ οἷον λέγ pe ‘ εἰδέναι; 
vi ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ 1x? ὧδε 
ὅτι ἃ ἴσμεν, ἐποίει nw ) γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὧδε. 
: ev οὖν. ΣΏ. Μὴ yap o S$ ἀντιτενεῖ. 
Ilavu μὲν οὖν. ἥσεται, lows. Seeder 
σις, > ‘> 
συγχω : 
καὶ lows πῃ ἡμῖν ἤγαγεν εθα, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη πάντα 
Deka ke ἐὺ χῷ τοιούτῳ ἔχομ ’ e σοῖς ot ΝΑ 
Ιαλλὰ yap fs Ἢ σκόπει οὖν, 
g λόγον βασανίζειν. θεῖν- 
sy ὡς antl ay τερον ὕστερον μαθεῖν; 
: ipa ἔστι μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερ L αὖθις ἕτερον 
λέγω. ἄρα y QO. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὖθις ge 
EAL. Ἔστι eng : ἢ TO. Θὲς δή μοι Oe 
Β . υ 2 a 
καὶ ἕτερον; ΘΕᾺ is ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ 
ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχ ᾿ L τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρ 
\ a lal ἊΝ ἔλαττον, Kat vi 7 ἐνίοις 
μὲν μεῖξον, τῷ , καὶ σκληροτέρου, 

D τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκλ os. ΘΕΑ͂Ι. 
ΚΉρου, ἐ ” δ᾽ -ε ετρίως εχοντ © Ἢ ie 
δὲ ou épov, | ἔστι δ᾽ οἷς μ ἐν Τὴν τῆς ΤΩΣ 

€ ὕγροτέρου, / ITO φῶμεν εἶνα 

2 OLVUV AUTO Pw" ‘ ‘ 
Τίθημι. ΣΩ. Adp <a , b εἰς τοῦτο, ὁ TL ἂν 
Μουσῶν μητρὺς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ 





ΘΕΔΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 69 



























᾿ a 3 } 2 ἢ δεῖν sk A > ἢ 
ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντες αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι 
< / > lal al 
᾿ καὶ ἐννοίαις, ὠποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα 
ΓΞ ΄ \ aA \ DS > a 
ἐνσημαινομένους. καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῇ, μνημονεύειν 
Ι Ν “3 / θ a x a). παν \ 7 ᾽ a “ 
σε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἕως ἂν ἐνῇ τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ. ὅταν 
? a Ἃ \ er / a 
δὲ ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε γένηται | ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπι- 
“λελῆσθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ΘΈΑΙ. "ἕστω οὕτως. 
ς / , a 
0. Ὃὧ τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δέ τι 
: φ ¢ a x 3 ’ 10 > » a ’ “ 
| ὧν ὁρᾷ ἢ ἀκούει, ἄθρει εἰ ἄρα τοιῷδε τρόπῳ Ψευδὴ 
. ΨΩ , 
ἂν δοξάσαι. ΘΈΑΙ. Ποίῳ δή τινε; YO. “A οἶδεν, 
> \ s .Ν δ « a 
οἰηθεὶς εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ἃ olde, τοτὲ δὲ ἃ μή. ταῦτα 
᾿ς 2 a , θ 3 a ¢ Ke ς 
| yap ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλὼς ὡμολογήσαμεν ομολο- 
γοῦντες ἀδύνατα. OEAI. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις; ΣΏΩ. 
ΜΙ a 7 a a 
Act ὧδε * λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομέ- 
° ‘f \ “ “Ὁ “~ 
‘vous, ὅτι ὃ μέν τις οἶδεν ἔχων αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ 
b \ n “a 
Ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μή, τοῦτο οἰηθῆναι ἕτερόν 
5 , 
TL ὧν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπον, αἰσθανόμενον 
δὲ , tov er φ > > “ s “Ὁ 
δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὅ γε oidev αὖ, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι ὃ 
\ ἊΨ, > fo) a ~ € > 
μὴ οἷδε μηδ᾽ ἔχει αὐτοῦ cdhpayida’ καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ 
\ >, A ¢ Ἶ ἃ 
μὴ οἷδεν αὖ' καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ ode καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεταί 
' Ψ 7 e aad > An 5 A Σ A die 
γε, ἕτερόν τι ὧν αἰσθάνεται, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι" Kal ὃ αἰσθα- 
a = \ ἢ ν 
petal, ὧν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται: καὶ ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν 
\ 2 od Ὲ soa \ 2d | 2 ed 
μὴ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, | dv αἰσθάνεται. 
} » 3. ®@ 75 ) > , A ES \ 
καὶ ἔτι ye av ὧν οἷδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχεν TO 
a \ \ yy ? 6A ΑΝ; ΟΣ 4 Ὁ 
σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οἰηθῆναι αὖ ἕτερόν τι ὧν 
ὃ ᾿ 
οἷδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὖ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον 
᾿ ἃ \ " ΕῚ , » 2 7 > to 
κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ETL ἐκείνων, εἰ οἷον 
¥ ’ » δὰ 
σε, καὶ ὃ olde καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον 


ὀρθῶς, ὃ οἶδεν οἰηθῆναι ἀδύνατον" καὶ ὃ οἷδε καὶ αἰσθά- 


1191p. ὑπέχοντες. Multi codd. et edd. habent uméxovras. Cf, 
Vers. Angi. 


E 


- 
© 


B 


aes ITAATONOS 


νεταί ἔχων κατὰ ταὐτά, ὃ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὃ αὖ μὴ οἶδε 
Cc μηδὲ " αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ olde μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὃ 
μὴ οἷδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ ὃ μὴ οἶδε: καὶ ὃ μὴ οἷδε μηδὲ 
αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται. πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει 
ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψευδῆ τινα δοξάσαι. λείπεται 
δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γε- 
νέσθα. Q@OEAI. Ἔν τίσι δή; ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι 
μᾶλλον μάθω: νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕπομαι. ΣΏ. Ἔν οἷς 
οἶδεν, οἰηθῆναι αὐτὰ ἕτερ᾽ ἄττα εἶναι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθά- 
D νεται ἢ ὧν μὴ older, αἰσθάνεται δέ ἢ ὧν | οἷδε καὶ 
αἰσθάνεται, ὧν οἷδεν αὖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται ΘΈΑΙ. Nov 
πολὺ πλεῖον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε. XXXIV. ΣΩ, Ὧωδε 
δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ 
μεμνημένος οἷός ἐστι, καὶ Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταὐτά, ἄλλο, 
τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁρῶ αὐτούς, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ, καὶ ἅπτομαί 
TOT αὐτῶν, τοτὲ δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ ἀκούω ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθη- 
σιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δ᾽ αἴσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ 
ὑμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι 
E αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ; ΘΕΔΛΙ. Πάνυ ! μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. Τοῦτο 
τοίνυν πρῶτον μαθὲ ὧν βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ὡς ἔστι μὲν 
ἃ οἷδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι. ΘΈΑΙ. 
᾿Αληθῆ. LO. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν 
ἔστι μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον; 
ORAL. Ἔστι καὶ τοῦτος YO. ᾿᾽Ἰδὲ δὴ ἐάν te μᾶλλον 
193 νῦν ἐπίσπῃ. Σωκράτης ἐπιγιγνώσκει * Θεόδωρον καὶ 
Θεαίτητον, ὁρᾷ δὲ μηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἴσθησις αὐτῷ 
πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν' οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειεν 
ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητος ἐστὶ Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἢ οὐδέν; 
ΘΕΑΙ. γὼ ἀληθῆ γε. LO. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων 
πρῶτον ἦν ὧν ἔλεγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γάρ. ΣΩ; Δεύτερον 
τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκων ὑμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γυγνώ- 




























ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. ae ο 


7 τὸ , \ , ᾽ ” 5 
σκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέτερον, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ad 
οἰηθείην, ὃν οἶδα, εἶναι ὃν μὴ οἶδα. ΘΕΙ. Ὀρθώς. 
QO. Τρίτον δέ, μηδέτερον γυγνώσκων μηδὲ αἰσθανό- 
| > aA > θ / «' \ 10. Ὁ 4 > “. 
μενος ' οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείην, ὃν μὴ οἶδα, ἕτερόν τιν᾽ εἶναι 
ὧν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τἄλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ᾽ ἑξῆς νόμιξε 
U 3 / > γὼ. ἡ > > \ \ a \ 
ἅλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτ᾽ ἐγὼ περὶ cod καὶ 
- , \ A , v r ” 
Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσω, οὔτε γιγνώσκων οὔτε 
ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μέν, τὸν δ᾽ οὐ γυγνώσκων. 
αὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταὐτά, εἰ ἄρα ἕπει. ΘΈΑΙ. 
*Erropat. YQ. Λείπεται τοίνυν τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι ἐν 
50 ¢ / \ Ν Θ ὃ OEY 3 
᾿ τῷδε, ὅταν γιγνώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν 


| 
a 
| 
| 
| 


73 ΄ a / | «7 ὃ λέ A bl] “ \ 
ἐκείνῳ τῷ κηρίνῳ ' ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σφῷν ἀμφοῖν τὰ 
a a A ς A ς A U 

σημεῖα, διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἱκανῶς ὁρῶν ἄμφω mpobv- 
. a vad \ A 

#90, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἑκατέρου σημεῖον ἀποδοὺς τῇ οἰκείᾳ 
ww 3 / / > \ «ε A »” 
ὄψει, ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἴχνος, 
é > / , Ε] \ 

ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἶτα τούτων ἀποτυχὼν καὶ 


τὴν ἑκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἢ καὶ 
οἷα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ 
εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταῤῥεούσης, ταὐτὸν | παθὼν διαμάρτω' 
τότε δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἑτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. 
@EAI. "Ἕοικε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμασίως ᾧ λέγεις 
τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος. YO. "Ets τοίνυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφο- 
“répous γιγνώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γιγνώσκειν αἰσθά- 
vopat, τὸν δὲ μή, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου μὴ κατὰ 


‘ “Ὁ 


ν αἴσθησιν ἔχω, ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον 
> 
Kai μου τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανες. OEAI. Ov γὰρ οὖν. 
; re \ 
EQ. Τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γιγνώσκων τὸν ἕτερον καὶ 


5 ° Φ / 

τοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οἰήσεται εἶναι αὐτὸν ἕτερόν τινα 
\ \ al > 

ὧν γιγνώσκει τε Kal αἰσθάνεται καὶ THY γνῶσιν αὖ 


ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω᾽ 


Β 


Cc 


D 


, a \ \ ΜΝ ᾿ 
' αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν av- E 


72 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ : 

























καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο; 
@EAI. Ναί. ΣΩ. Παρελείπετο δέ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγός 
μενον, ἐν ᾧ δὴ φαμὲν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν γέννα τὸ 
ἄμφω γιγνώσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὁρῶντα ἢ Tia ἄλληξ 
104 * αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἀμφοῖν τὼ σημείω μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὖ- 
τοῦ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον 
ἱέντα παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ 
ψεῦδος ἄρα ὠνόμασται. OEAI. Ἑκότως γε. ΣΏ. Καὶ 
ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῇ αἴσθησις τῶν σημείων, τῷ δὲ 
μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως τῇ παρούσῃ προσ- 
appocn, παντῃ ταύτῃ ψεύδεται ἡ διάνοια. καὶ ἑνὶ 
λόγῳ, περὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ οἷδέ τις μηδὲ ἤσθετο πώποτε, 
οὐκ ἔστιν, | ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε ψεύδεσθαι οὔτε ψευδὴς 
Β δόξα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ὑγιὲς λέγομεν περὶ δὲ ὧν ἴσμεν 
τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται καὶ 
ἑλίττεται ἡ δόξα ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς γιγνομένη, κατ 
ταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεῖα συνάγουσα 
ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους, ἀληθῆς, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ 
σκολιὰ ψευδής. ΘΙΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, 
λέγεται; LO. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας | μῶλλοι 
Οαὐτὸ ἐρεῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τἀληθὲς δοξάζειν καλόν, τὸ “δὲ 
ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; LQ. Ταῦτα 
τοίνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίγνεσθαι... ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρός TOU 
ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως 
ὠργασμένος ἢ, τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαι- 
νόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη “Ὅμηρο 
αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν K 
τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ | σημεῖα ἐγγυγνόμενα καὶ ἱκανῶς 
D τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνιά τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶ 
οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἶτ᾽ 
οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα, ἀλ 


\ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗ͂ΤΟΣ. ᾿ 79 
















͵οξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα 
: Bex? διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστα ἐκμαγεῖα, ἃ 
δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται. καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ 
ww δοκεῖ σοι; ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. “ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ὅταν 
τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ἢ, ὃ δὴ ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάντα 
σοφὸς ποιητής, ἢ ὕταν κοπρῶδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ 
ζηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληρόν, ὧν μὲν ὑγρόν, 
εὐμαθεῖς μέν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίγνονται, ὧν δὲ σκληρόν, 
τἀναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχὺ λιθῶδές τε ἢ 
γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης ἔμπλεων ἔχοντες ἀσαφῆ τὰ 
ἐκμαγεῖα ἴσχουσιν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά; βάθος 
yap οὐκ ἔνι. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά" ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ 
συγχεῖσθαι ταχὺ * γίγνεται ἀμυδρά. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι 
τούτοις ἐπ᾿ ἀλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ἢ ὑπὸ στενοχω- 
δίας, ἐάν του σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἔτι ἀσαφέστερα 
celvov. πάντες οὖν οὗτοι γίγνονται οἷοι δοξάζειν 
ψευδῆ. ὅταν γάρ τι ὁρῶσιν ἢ ἀκούωσιν ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν, 
ἄστα ἀπονέμειν ταχὺ ἑκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς 
εἰσι καὶ ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσί τε καὶ παρα- 
| κούουσι καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλεῖστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὖ οὗτοι 

















θότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. LO. Φῶμεν 
ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι; OEAI. Σφόδρα γε. 
SO. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δή; OEAI. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς. LO. Ἤδη 
ty οἰόμεθα ἱκανῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι, OTL παντὸς μᾶλλον 
τὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτω τὼ δόξα; ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς 
ey οὖἦ. ΧΧΧΥ. ΣΩ, Δεινόν τε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς 
ἰληθῶς κινδυνεύει καὶ ἀηδὲς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολέσχης. 


ῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. 
γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλο θεῖτο ὄνομα, ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς 


- 


E 


195 


ἐψευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων Kal ἀμαθεῖς. OEAI.!’Op-B 


EAI. Τί δαί; πρὸς τί τοῦτ᾽ εἶπες; ΣΏ. ' Τὴν ἐμαυ- Ο 


74, ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 





























λόγους ἕλκῃ τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, 
καὶ ἢ δυσαπάλλακτος ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστου λόγου; ΘΕΙΑΙ. Σὺ 
δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις; ΣΏ. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα 6 τι' ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἄν τις ἔρηταξ 
Ὦ Σώκρατες, εὕρηκας δὴ ψευδῆ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε 

ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσίν ἐστε πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ᾽ ἐν ταῖς 
Ὁ διανοίαις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν TH! συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς Sid= 
νοίαν; Φήσω δὲ ἐγώ, οἶμαι, καλλωπιζόμενος ὥς TL 
εὑρηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν. ΘΈΑΙ. "Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώ-" 
κρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον. ΣΏ. 
Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις, ὅτε αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃν δια- 
νοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρῶμεν δ᾽ οὔ, ἵππον οὐκ ἄν ποτε 
οἰηθείημεν εἶναι, ὃν αὖ οὔτε ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἁπτόμεθα, 
διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἄλλ᾽ οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ 
αὐτοῦ; Ταῦτα, οἶμαι, φήσω λέγειν. ΘΈΑΙ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς 
Eye. ΣΏ. Τί οὖν; | φήσει: τὰ ἕνδεκα, ἃ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ 
διανοεῖταί τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ av 
ποτε οἰηθείη δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μόνον αὖ διανοεῖται; ἴθι 
οὖν δή, σὺ ἀποκρίνου. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ’ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, 
ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ἄν τις ἢ ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθείη τὰ ἕνδεκα 
δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἄν ποτ 
περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσειεν οὕτω. ΣΏ. Τί οὖν; οἴει 
τινὰ πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὑτῷ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, λέγω δὲ 
196 * μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἑπτὰ καὶ πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν 
μηδ᾽ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, & dap 
ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς 
οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων 76 
πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν, πόσα 
ποτ᾽ ἐστί, καὶ ὁ μέν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς ἕνδεκα αὐτὸ 
εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα: ἢ πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἴονται 
δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι; OEAI. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 75 














τολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἕνδεκα. |! ἐὰν δέ ye ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ 
τις σκοπῆται, μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι yap σε περὶ 
γαντὸς μᾶλλον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν. ΣΏ. ᾿Ορθῶς γὰρ οἴει. 


δεκα Ta ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ἕνδεκα οἰηθῆναι. ΘΈΑΙ. 
, ᾽ a ? \ / / > / 
ovKée ye. YO. Οὐκοῦν eis τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει 
ous; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθών, ὃ οἶδεν, ἕτερον αὐτὸ οἴεται 
; ne oS 4 A ἡ \ , SNe 
Wat ὧν av οἶδεν, ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, Kal τούτῳ αὐτῷ 
γναγκάζομεν μὴ εἷναι | ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ 
τὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἅμα. OEAT.’Adn- 


ψευδῆ δοξάξειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἴσθησιν παραλ- 
nv. εἰ yap τοῦτ᾽ ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς 
ανοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα" νῦν δὲ ἤτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς 
ofa, ἢ & τις οἶδεν, οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων 
oTepa αἱρεῖ; ΘΕΑΙ. ΓΑΛπορον αἵρεσιν προτίθης, ὦ 
Σώκρατες. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά | γε κινδυ- 
εὐει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσειν. ὅμως δέ, πάντα γὰρ τολμη- 
€ov, τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν; ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς: 
. ᾿Εθελήσαντες εἰπεῖν, ποῖόν τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπί- 
τασθαι. ΘΈΑΙ. Καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον; =O. 
Loukas οὐκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος 
THOS γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσι, τί ToT 
στίν. ΘΈΑΙ. Ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν. LO. "Ever οὐκ 


3 a / \ 
yardes δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ 











γμὲν ἀνάπλεῳ τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις 
ἂρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γιγνώσκομεν καὶ οὐ γυγνώσκομεν, καὶ 
ἰστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὥς τι συνιέντες ἀλ- 
λων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, 
νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθ᾽ αὖ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν τε 


Β 


D 


ἰίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ yap, ὦ Θεαίτητε, | πάλαι E 


-ν 


76 | ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 




















καὶ συνιέναι, ὡς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, εἴπερ στε: 
ρόμεθα ἐπιστήμης. ΘΈΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ τίνα τρόπον dia 
197 λέξει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος ; +O. * Οὐδένα 
ὧν ye ὃς εἰμί εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός, οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ 
καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τ᾽ ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμ 
σφόδρ᾽ ἂν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμὲϊ 
φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστα 
σθαι; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προὔργου τι ἂν γενέσθαϊ 
ΘΕΑΙ. Τόλμα τοίνυν νὴ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχο: 
μένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη. XXXVI. LO. ᾿Ακή 
κοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; ΘΈΑΙ. Ἴσως" 
οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι pynuovevo. ΣΏ. Ἔπι 
Β στήμης που | ἕξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι. OAT. ᾿Αληθ 
20. Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἴπωμ' 
ἐπιστήμης κτῆσιν. ΘΈΑΙ. Τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτ 
ἐκείνου διαφέρειν; ΣΏ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν᾽ ὃ δ᾽ οὗ 
δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας συνδοκίμαξε. ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. Ἐάν πέρ ye οἷός 
τ ὦ. ΣΏ. Οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τὸ κεκτῆσθαι 
τῷ ἔχειν. οἷον εἰ ἱμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατὴ 
ὦν. μὴ φοροῖ, ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαι 
co δέ γε φαῖμεν. OEAI. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε. ΣΩ. Ὅρα ! & 
καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν 
ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὄρνιθας ἀγρίας, περιστερὰς ἤ 
ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκοι κατασκευασάμενος περιστερεῶνᾶ 
τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἄν πού τινα φαῖμεν αὐτὸὶϊ 
αὐτὰς ἀεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται. ἢ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί 
ΣΏ. Τρόπον δέ γ᾽ ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμι 
μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείᾳ 
περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖ 
D ἐπειδὰν βούληται, | θηρευσαμένῳ ἣν av ἀεὶ ἐθέλῃ, κα 
πάλιν ἀφιέναι" καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν, ὁποσάκις 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. | v7 






















αὐτῷ. OAT. "Ἔστι ταῦτας. YO. Πάλιν δή, 
ερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρινόν τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς 
iy t 3 5.0) ὦ 7 a BH ΘΗΝ. 
ατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ ofd ὅ TL πλάσμα, νῦν ad ἐν ἑκά- 
τῇ Ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα παντοδαπῶν 
/ \ \ a ST v \ a 5. 
ἔθων, τὰς μὲν Kat ἀγέλας οὔσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, 
ws δὲ κατ᾽ ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν, ὅπῃ 
y τύχωσι, πετομένας. ΘΈΑΙ. !| Πεποιήσθω δή. ἀλλὰ 
τοὐντεῦθεν; ΣΏ. ἸΠαιδίων μὲν ὄντων φάναι χρὴ 
Wal τοῦτο τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων 
ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι" ἣν δ᾽ ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος 
αθείρξη εἰς τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι 
εὑρηκέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ 
ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι. ΘΈΑΙ. Ἔστω. SO. Τὸ 
ί / Δ Ἃ ΕΘ U a 3 - ; 
οίνυν πάλιν ἣν ἂν * βούληται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν θηρεύειν 
αὶ λαβόντα ἴσχειν καὶ αὖθις ἀφιέναι σκόπει τίνων 
εἴταν ὀνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτε 
a »” es U > > a [4 
το, εἴτε ἑτέρων. μαθήσει δ᾽ ἐντεῦθεν σαφέστε- 
ον, τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις τέχνην ; 
ΕΑΙ. Ναί ΣΩ. ταν τὴν δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστη- 
ὧν ἀρτίου τε καὶ ἐξάρέγτοῦ, παντός. @EAI. ὝὙπο- 
“4 
apBave. +0. Ταύτῃ δή, οἶμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε 
Ὁ a 4 
Moxetplovs τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν | ἔχει καὶ 
λλῳ παραδίδωσιν 6 παραδιδούς. OEAI. Nai. ΣΩ. 
ζαὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παρα- 
μβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι 
3 rn / 
J τῷ περιστερεῶνι ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι. ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. avy 
ες ᾿ς \ 
οὖν. OQ. Τῷ δὲ δ᾽) ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη πρόσσχες τὸν 
i 3 \ ‘ * , v , 
wv. ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὧν τελέως ἄλλο TL πάντας 
‘ ? lal Fin > A“ 
OQwovs ἐπίσταται; πάντων yap ἀριθμῶν εἰσὶν αὐτῷ 


E 


B 


ITH ψυχῇ ἐπιστῆμαι. OEAI. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Ἦ ! οὖν 


78 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 






















ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω, ὅσα ἔχει ἀριθμόν; OEAT. Πώς ya 
οὔ; 0. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἄλλο TL θήσομεν To 
σκοπεῖσθαι, πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὦν. ΘΙΕΑΙ 
Οὕτω. +O. Ὃ dpa ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνετα 
ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς, ὃν ὡμολογήκαμεν ἅπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέ 
vat. ἀκούεις γάρ που Tas τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις. 
OEAI. "Eywye. XXXVII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπει 
Ὁ κάζοντες τῇ τῶν | περιστερῶν κτήσει τε καὶ θήρ 
ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα, ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι το 
κεκτῆσθαι ἕνεκα, ἡ δὲ κεκτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχει 
ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἃ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὦ 
πάλαι ἐπιστῆμαι ἦσαν αὐτῷ μαθόντι καὶ ἠπίστατ 
αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀν 
λαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἑκάστου καὶ ἴσχοντα, ἣ 
ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ᾽ οὐκ εἶχε τῇ δια 
voia; OAT. ᾿Αληθῆ. LO. Τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἠρώτων 
Ε ὅπως | χρὴ τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν 
ὅταν ἀριθμήσων ἴῃ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενο 
ὁ γραμματικός. ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτ 
πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ἃ ἐπίσταται. 
ΘΕΑῚ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἄτοπον, ὦ Σώκρατες. TO. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἃ οὐ 
ἐπίσταται φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώσεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμή. 
σειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν γράμματα, πάντα ὃ 
199 ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι; ΘΈΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ * dro 
γον. ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν, ὅτε τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτω 
οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπῃ τις χαΐρεε ἕλκων τὸ ἐπίστασθα 
καὶ μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὡρισάμεθα ἕτερον μὲν τι T 
κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μέ 
τις ἔκτηται μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι, ὥστ. 
οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὅ τις οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῆ pévt 
δόξαν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν; μὴ yap ἔχε 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 79 









> 
ἣν ἐπιστήμην ' τούτου οἷόν τε, GAN ἑτέραν ἀντ᾽ ἐκεί- Β 

ἡ “ 
ms, ὅταν θηρεύων τινὰ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην διαπε- 
τομένων ἀνθ᾽ ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἁμαρτὼν λάβῃ, ὅτε ἄρα τὰ 
4 , 27 5 \ a 
woeka δώδεκα φήθη εἶναι, THY τῶν ἕνδεκα ἐπιστήμην 
Ἑ “ lal / Ἂ 
ντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβών, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον φάτ- 
ταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς. OEAI. "Eyes γὰρ οὖν λόγον. 
Ὦ, Ὅταν δέ γε ἣν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβῃ, ἀψευδεῖν 
καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ 
τε καὶ ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς | πρόσθεν ἐδυσ- Cc 
χεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν γίγνεσθαι; ἴσως οὖν μοι 
συμφήσεις. ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις; OEAI. Οὕτως. XO, 
Va ὶ \ a re Dee eee Pe ᾽ 

γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἃ ἐπίσταται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἀπηλ- 
μεθα" ἃ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτῆσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι 

/ ΝΜ Cpa - " / / 
υμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευσθεῖσί τινος οὔτε μή. δεινότερον 
ἱέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ. ΘΈΑΙ. 
0 ποῖον; ΣΏ. Ei ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ 
γευδὴς γενήσεταί ποτε Sofa. OEAI. Πῶς δή; ΣΏ. 
Πρῶτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ Ὁ 
ἡγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνῃ ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ, 

Ψ "" ὦ an / \ ᾽ a A 

πείτα ἕτερον αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον τοῦτο, 
tal > \ > / > / / ἴω 
[OS οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γνῶ- 
αν μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ 
τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἄγνοιαν παραγε- 
ένην γνῶναί τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ 
ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαί ποτέ τινα ποιήσει. OEAT. 
Γ 53 ἥ > a ἀν θ 2/7 
gas yap, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς ' τὰς ὄρνιθας éri- E 
ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστη- 
vas τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομένας ἐν τῇ Wuyi, 
τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, 
τὲ δ᾽ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρε ψευδῆ μὲν 
I a P: f 
ξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. 





















= 


80 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 



























“ \ 3 A 
SO. Od ῥάᾷδιόν ye, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν ce. 
/ 4 \ \ « 
μέντοι εἶπες, πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς 
\ \ 3 ἐς \ ᾽ 
200 λέγεις" 6 δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην * λαβὼν ψευδῆ 
, 3 ΕΝ , ) 
μέν, φής, δοξάσει. ἡ yap; @EAI. Nai. ΣΩ. Οὐ 
% ie / a 
δήπου καὶ ἡγήσεταί ye ψευδὴ δοξάξειν. ΘΕΑΙ, Ilas 
fal \ ς > \ / 
yap; ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσετα 
/ ͵ 3 / 
περὶ av ἔψευσται. ΘΕΑῚ. Τί pny; +0. ᾿Ἐπιστήμην 
7 3 ᾽ > 
dpa οἰήσεται τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν, GAN οὐκ ἀνεπιστημο 
lel lal \ 
σύνην. ΘΈΑΙ. Δῆλον. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιεν 
, 3 / 
θόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ὠπορίαν. 
lp ἐλ ds ἐκεῖ Na rae’ | Πότερον 
Β γὼρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φησει ερον, 
, / f \ 3 
βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας τις εἰδώς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνε- 
U ¢ ͵ > 
πιστημοσύνην, ἣν oldev, ἑτέραν αὐτὴν οἴεταί τινα εἶνα 
’ n ¢ / 
ὧν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐδετέραν αὐτοῖν εἰδώς, ἣν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάξε 
Civ @ b] 7. AS. \ \ PS , \ δ᾽ 4“. ἂν 
ἑτέραν ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, τὴν δ᾽ οὔ, ἣ 
nD) Ὁ A. 7ὃ a Xv ek \ 26 «Ὁ Τὸ 5 ς a - 
οἶδεν, ἣν μὴ οἶδεν; ἢ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν, ἣν οἶδεν ἡγεῖται; 
πάλιν αὖ μοι ἐρεῖτε OTL τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστῆ- 
μοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἑτέ 
ροις τισὶ γέλοίοις περιστερεῶσιν ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασ 
ο καθείρξας, | ἕωσπερ ἂν κεκτῆται, ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰϊ 
μὴ προχείρους ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκα: 
σθήσεσθε εἰς ταὐτὸν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πίλέο; 
ποιοῦντες; Τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινο 
εθα; OEAI. ᾿Αλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐ 
»ὦ ρ » EYoY 
” / \ , - a ᾿ 
ἔχω, τί χρὴ λέγειν. LO. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶ 
¢ / f 
0 λόγος ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται, ὅτε οὐκ ὀρθά 
a / n ; 
ψευδῆ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνη 
> / at \ δ᾽ > \ Ω ἢ a \ 3) 
D agevtes; ᾿ τὸ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι, πρὶν ἄν τ' 
> , ς fal , ; 
ἐπιστήμην ἱκανῶς λάβῃ, τί ToT ἐστί. OEAT. 7A 
/ 3 > ; > a ; ¢ , ” 
vaykn, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ws λέγεις οἴεσθα 


ΧΧΧΎΠΙ. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστή 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 81 


















5 > A 
nV; οὐ yap που ἀπεροῦμέν γέ TH. OEAT. Ἥκιστα, 
U > ᾿ , 
lav περ μὴ σύ ye amayopevons. LO. Λέγε δή, τί ἂν 
ὑτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιω- 
a a a , 
εἶμεν; OEAI. “Ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, | ἐν 
τῷ πρόσθεν οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν. LO. Τὸ 
tal \ % a 
ποῖον; OEATI. Τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. 
ΑἹ , , i “.-. \ , 3 tal \ \ 
αμάρτητόν γέ πού ἐστι τὸ δοξάξειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ 
δι ° lal 
αὐτοῦ γυγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται. 
Ὅ \ \ θ , ἫΝ. Θ ff. ” 
i τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔφη 
ipa δείξειν αὐτό" καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἰόντες ἐρευνῶμεν, τάχ᾽ 
ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ * φήνειε τὸ ζητούμενον, 
ἔνουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν. OEAI. ᾿Ορθῶς λέγεις" ἀλλ᾽ 
/ \ A + O ’ fal La) / 
μέν ye καὶ σκοπῶμεν. Σ(). Ουκοῦν τοῦτό γε Bpa- 
νείας σκέψεως" τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι 
. a “ 
στήμην αὐτό.ςὡἩ ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή ; καὶ τίς αὕτη; ΣΏ. 
τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, ods δὴ καλοῦσι ῥήτοράς 
καὶ δικανικούς. οὗτοι yap που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ 
elOovow οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν 
( I x \ » ἊΨ “ , 
SovAwyTalt. ἢ σὺ οἴει δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους 





201 


“ 
ivat, ὥστε οἷς | μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες ἀποστερουμένοις B 












χρήματα ἤ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς 
Sop σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλή- 
Jecav;. ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι 
“ἐν. +O. Τὸ πεῖσαι δ᾽ οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι; 
ΈΑΙ. Τί μήν; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι 
ἱκασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ 
νή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν | λα- 
δόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἴπερ 
ἐδίκασαν; OEAI. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. Οὐκ 
ὦ φίλε, εἴ ye ταὐτὸν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθὴς [καὶ δικα- 
τήρια] καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθά ποτ᾽ ἂν δικαστὴς ἄκρος 
τ Ῥ' 6 


D 


Eyap av “Beebe ἀκούειν τινῶν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν | TPOT 


























82 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης" νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἑκά- 
τερον εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ͂. Ὅ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντο 
του ἀκούσας ἐπιλελήσμην, νῦν δ᾽ ἐννοῶ. ἔφη δὲ τὴ 
μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, | τὴν ὃ 
ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης" καὶ ὧν μὲν μή ἐστι λόγος 
οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ᾽ ἔχε 
ἐπιστητά. ΣΏ. Ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητ. 
ταῦτα καὶ μὴ πῇ διήρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ σύ τ 
κἀγὼ ἀκηκόαμεν. ΘΕΙΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐκ οἶδα, εἰ ἐξευρήσω 
λέγοντος μέντ᾽ ἂν ἑτέρου, ὡς ey pHa, ἀκολουθήσαϊβ 


XXXIX. ΣΩ. "Axove δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ἀβοηεον ἐγ 


οἱονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα κα 
3 ’ 3 », ὌΝ \ > « \ Ὁ 
τἄλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἕκαστο 
> , r " a \ 2Q\ bf 4 
ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, πρροσευπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν 
vf? « » 4 Δ ε 3 »᾽ ᾿ 3) \ Ἃ 5 , 
οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσία 
* 7) μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσ 
φέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τ 
ΒΨ 2O\ \ b] a ΟΝ \ @¢ O\ \ , 
αὐτὸ οὐδὲ TO ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ TO ἕκαστον οὐδὲ TO μόνο 
3 “Ὁ a 
οὐδὲ TO τοῦτο προσοιστέον; οὐδ᾽ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτ. 
ταῦτα pee yap περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι; € ἕτερι 
ὄντα ἐκείνων, οἷς + setae δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἢν. δυνατὸ 
αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὑτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ TO 
Μ ε , / n we ᾿ > ς 
ἄλλων ἁπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὅτιο 
τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι ' λόγῳ, οὐ γὰρ εἶ IT@ GAN 
p pnOnv Yo" οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ a 
9 “ / 
ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον' Cvowa γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν, Ta δὲ € 
, ἡ / "ἊΨ 
τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕ 
\ Ἐν. iy: tal 
καὶ τὰ ονόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονένα, 
. ἢ / \ 
ονομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. OUT 
\ \ Ν a wv 
δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, aicOn 
‘mR \ Ἷ 
δέ τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθ. 






















ΘΕΑΙΤΉΤΟΣ. 89 


δόξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ 
δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ᾿ ψυχὴν 
ερὶ αὐτό, γυγνώσκειν δ᾽ οὔ τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον 
᾿ δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ 
τούτου προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα 
᾿ γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. Οὕτως σὺ 
τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας; OEAI. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν 
αντάπασιν. ΣΏ. ᾿Αρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτῃ, 
δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἷναι; OEAL. 
Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. *Ap’, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ' νῦν οὕτω 
τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰλήφαμεν ὃ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν 
σοφῶν ζητοῦντες πρὶν εὑρεῖν κατεγήρασαν; OEAI. 
Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν 
ῥηθέν. YO. Καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν" 
ίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς λόγου τε καὶ 
᾿ ὀρθῆς δόξης; ἕν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή; ΣΏ. Ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι 
κομψότατα, ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν 
συλλαβῶν γένος | γνωστόν. OEAI. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς ; 
EO. Ἰστέον δή" ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου 
τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα. 
@EAI. Ποῖα δή: FQ. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά 
τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἢ οἴει ἀλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα 
εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα, ἃ λέγομεν; OEAI. Οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς 
ταῦτας. XL. ΣΩ. Βασανίζωμεν * δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβά- 
νοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως 
γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον ἄρ᾽ αἱ μὲν συλ- 
αβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα; OEAL. 
Ἴσως. ΣΏΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκρά- 
Us γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὑτωσί, 
Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι To, τί ἀποκρινεῖ; OEALI. 
6—2 


D 


20 3 


84 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 




























͵ 
"Ore σῖγμα καὶ © ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον 
τῆς συλλαβῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΏ. Ἴθι δή, οὕτως 
Ῥ εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ |! σῖγμα. λόγον. OEAI. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ 
στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, 
τό τε σῖγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον 
συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης τοῦ δ᾽ αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ 
οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ 
εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὧν γε TA ἐναργέστατα 
αὐτά, τὰ ἑπτά, φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ᾽ ὁντινοῦν. 
ΣΩ. -Τουτὶ μὲν dpa, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ ἐπι-᾿ 
α στήμης. OEAI. Φαινόμεθα. YO. Τί dé! δή; τὸ μὴ 
γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν ap 
ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός ye. ΣΏ. Φέρε 
δή, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοι- 
χεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ἢ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν 
γεγονυῖαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν; QOEAI. Τὰ ἅπαντα 
ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. ΩΣ Opa δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σῖγμα καὶ 
@. ἀμφότερά ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνό- 
ματος. ἄλλο Te ὃ γιγνώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα : 
Ὁ γιγνώσκει; OEAI.!' Τί μήν; YO. To otypa καὶ τὸ 
ὦ ἄρα γιγνώσκει. OEAI. Nai. SO. Τί δέ; ἑκάτερον. 
ἄρ᾽ ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδὼς ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει; 
@EAT. ᾿Αλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ 
᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι εἴ 7" ἀνάγκη ἑκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἴπερ 
ἀμφότερά τίς γνώσεται, προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα 
ἅπασα einige TO μέχλοντί ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλα- 
βήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχή- 
Ἐ σεται. OAT. Καὶ μάλα ye | ἐξαίφνης. OQ. Οὐ γὰρ 
καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλα 
βὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, GAN ἐξ ἐκείνων ἕν τι 
γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον. 


ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 85 





















τῶν στοιχείων. ΘΈΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ τάχα γ᾽ 
ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἔχοι. YQ. Σκεπτέον, καὶ 
οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν 
“λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΏ. ᾿Εχέτω δή, ὡς νῦν 
φαμέν, μία * ἰδέα ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων 
στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἡ συλλαβὴ ὁμοίως ἔν τε γράμ- 
ασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι. ΘΈΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
EQ. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι. OEAI. Τί δή; 
E02. Ὅτι οὗ ἂν ἦ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα 
μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὕλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς 
| ἕν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν; ΘΕΙΙ. ἔγωγε. 
©. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταὐτὸν καλεῖς 
ἢ ἕτερον | ἑκάτερον; OEAI. Ἔχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, 
Ore δὲ κελεύεις προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυ- 
νεύων λέγω, ὅτι ἕτερον. ΣΏ. Ἣ μὲν προθυμία, ὦ 
Θεαίτητε, ὀρθή" εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον. 
ORAL. Δεῖ δέ γε δή. ΧΙ]. 20. Οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἂν 
“πὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος; ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. Nai. 
ΣΩ, Τί δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθ᾽ ὅ τι δια- 
φέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ἕν, δύο, τρία, τέτταρα, 


᾿ αἱ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις 
τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον λέγομεν; ΘΕΙΙ. Ταὐτόν. ZO. *Ap’ 
τι ἢ ἕξ; OEAT. Οὐδέν. YO. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ᾽ ἑκά- 
ms λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν; OEAT. Ναί. 
ΘΈΑΙ. ᾿Ανάγκη. ΣΏ. Ἦ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἕξ; ΘΈΑΙ. 


οὔ ἐστι τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα; 


2040. πάντα τὰ ἕξ. Heindorf. legit πᾶν τι τὰ ἕξ, 


204 


, 
πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἐὰν Sis τρία ἢ ' τρὶς δύο ἢ τέτταρά Te C 


Οὐδέν. LO. Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ |! api-D 


80 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 

























@EAI. Φαίνεται. YO. Ὧδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγομεν. 
ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταὐτόν. ἦ yap; 
@EAI. Nai. ΣΩ. Καὶ 6 τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως; 
@EAI. Ναί ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὃ τοῦ στρατον "δα 
γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίωθῃ 


ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὃν πᾶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστί. 
OEAL Ναί ΣΩ. ‘O δὲ ἑκάστων ἀριθμὸς μῶν ἄλλο 
Ett ἢ μέρη ! ἐστίν; OEAI. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. Ὅσα ἄρα ἔχει, 
μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη; OEAI. Φαίνεται. YQ. Τὰ δέ 





γε πᾶντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται, εἴπερ καὶ ὃ 
πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἔστα. ΘΈΑΙ. Οὕτω. FO. Τὸ 
ὅλον ἄρ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, τὰ 
πάντα ὃν μέρη ΘΈΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικε. ΣΏ. Μέρος δ᾽ 
ἔσθ᾽ ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὅλου; -OEAT. 
205 Τοῦ παντός γε. ΣΏ. * ᾿Ανδρικῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, 
μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῇ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο 
πᾶν ἐστίν; ΘΈΑΙ. ᾿Ανάγκη. ΣΏ. “Ὅλον δὲ οὐ ταὺὐ- 
τὸν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὗ ἂν μηδαμῇ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ ; ὁ 
δ᾽ ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν, ἅμα γενόμενον 
ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό; OEAI. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν 
διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον. LO. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι 
οὗ ἂν μέρη ἢ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρ ) 
ἔσται; ΘΕΛΙ. Πάνυ γε. >Q. Πάλιν δή, ἢ ὅπερ ἄρτι 
ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, ep ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ 'στοιχεῖᾷ 
Β ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς ! μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ 
στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταὐτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνω- 
στὴν εἶναι; ΘΕΔΙ. Οὕτως. ΣΩ, Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα 
μὴ γένηται, ἕτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα; ΘΈΑΙ. Ναί 
ΣΩ, Τί &; εἰ ea) TQ: στοίεια eurasis μέρη ἐστίν 
ἔχεις ἀλλ᾽ ἅττα εἰπεῖν, ἃ μέρη μέν ἐστι συλλαβρήθια : 
μέντοι στοιχεῖά γ᾽ ἐκείνης; ΘΈΔΙ. Οὐδαμῶς’ εἰ γάρ; 




























@EAITHTOS. 87 


ὃ 3 , ’ , a 
ὦ Σώκρατες, μόρια ταύτης συγχωροίην, γελοῖόν που 
τὰ Κτοέχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα ἰέναι. ΣΏ. Παντάπασι 
δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, | κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέ- 
ρίστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη. ΘΈΑΙ. Ἔοικε. LO. Μέμνησαι 
οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτε ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα 
e ,ὔ > , θ “ Ἂ ῳ > ” ῇ 
ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι, ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἴη λόγος, 
3 Ξε \ BA / / eee > ¢ \ @ 
ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον 
: »Μ > , \ 9..." \ 5S \ Ὗ ὭἜἪὋΟ - ” 
εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι 
a f te. 7O\ a Φ. Ψ irs , 
προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια 
7 , [2 \ ¢ > Oe v , ‘ ” 
“λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνω- 
στον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ; OEAI. Μέμνημαι. ΣΏ. ! Ἦ οὖν 
ες Δ ¢/ e 7 eR la) , \ ᾽ ;» 
ἄλλη τις ἢ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοειδές TL καὶ ἀμέρι- 
στον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὁρῶ ἄλλην. OEAT. 
Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν 
> / ς \ 4 > , ” t 
ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἴπερ μέρη TE 
μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα; ΘΈΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν 
οὖν. ΣΏ. Ei μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβή 
»- ΕῚ \ vA , > > nf na ¢ ζ vd 
oTt καὶ ὅλον TL, μέρη δ᾽ αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἵ τε 
συλλαβαὶ γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ 
τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὕλῳ ταὐτὸν ἐφάνη. OEAT. | Καὶ 
para +O. Ei δέ γε ἕν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν 
συλλαβή, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνω- 
στον ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα. ΘΈΑΙ. 
, an ἴω Ψ, \ 5 
Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν. LO. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀπο- 
5 ‘ \ Ν 
ἐδεχώμεθα, ὃς ἂν λέγῃ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ 
ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τοὐναντίον. ΘΕΑΙ. My γάρ, εἴ- 
1 EP τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα. ΣΩ. Τί δ᾽ αὖ; τοὐναντίον 
λέγοντος dp’ οὐ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς 
Ὁ a a , / * 
σύνοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν ηραμμάτων μαθήσει ; 
“ς΄ “- / 
@EAI. Τὸ ποῖον; YO. ‘As οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων 
- a -~ 9 4 
-τέλεσας ἢ TA στοιχεῖα ἔν τε TH ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν 


88 MAATONO® 


, Ἢ ΑΚ An , An 9%, \% θ᾽ δ΄. ie “ 
πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ avTO ἕκαστον, ἵνα 
΄ Ν / 
μὴ ἡ θέσις σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε Kal γραφομένων. 
> \ lo) 
@EAI. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις. YO. Ἔν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ 
a 3 Δ \ A / 
τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν ἄλλο TL ἦν ἢ τὸ TO φθόγ- 
, an / aA ν» ἢ 
Bye | ἑκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἴη 
€ “ “ Lal / 
ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι; 
@EAI. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. TO. Ὧν μὲν ἄρ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροί 
-“ n ᾿] \ 
ἐσμεν στοιχείων Kal συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων 
τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων. 
γένος ἐναργεστέραν τε τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ 
΄ a A \ \ a / Ὁ 
κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τέλέως ἕκα- 
Ν 37 “ \ \ , 
στον μάθημα, καὶ ἐάν τις φῇ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, 
ἄγνωστον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα. 
’ A S 
παίζειν ἡγησόμεθ᾽ αὐτό. OEAT. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 
cXLII. ΣΩ. ! ᾿Αλλὰ 8) τούτου μὲν ἔτι κἂν ἄλλαι 
A 9 / ¢ rp ey ΝΥ A δα , 
φανεῖεν ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ; τὸ δὲ προκείμενον 
μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα Ov αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅ τι δήποτε καὶ λέγεται 
\ \ ; 3 A / t \ , 
τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεω- 
£ > U4 / 3 a 4 eo 
τάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι. OKAI. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὁρᾶν. 
XQ. Φέρε δή, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σημαί- 
νειν; τριῶν γὰρ ἕν τέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Τίς, 
Ὥνων δή; ΣΏ. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἴη | ἂν τὸ τὴν αὑτοῦ 
/ a A al 4 
διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε 
3 ¢ 
καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν 
, a al 
ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ TOD στόματος ῥοήν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ 
\ a na 
σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ͂. "Epouye. τὸν γοῦν ᾿ 
7 \ a ὦ A 
αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν. LO. Οὐκοῦν αὖ τοῦτο ye 
πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θᾶττον ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ 7 
f a δή if oe rd 3 Nay prey XA \ 
ξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἑκάστου αὐτῷ, 6 μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς 
ἐῶ τ a ye Wrens “ 5) \ / τ 
ἀπ ἀρχῆς" καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι τι ὀρθὸν δοξάξουσι, πάντες 
᾽ \ U 
Ἑ αὐτὸ peta | λόγου φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ 


—— a . 





ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 89 























ὀρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. 
'ληθῆ. ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως καταγυγνώσκωμεν τὸ 
"δὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην, ὃ νῦν 
κοπτοῦμεν. ἴσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ 
ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν 
ἃ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι * τῷ ἐρομένῳ. OEAT, 207 
ἴον τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; LO. Οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος 
ερὶ ἁμάξης λέγει τὸ ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούραθ᾽ ἁμάξης. ἃ 
μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ" ἀλλ᾽ 
ἀγαπῶμεν ἂν ἑρωτηθέντες ὅ τί ἐστιν ἅμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν 
͵ πεῖν τροχοί, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγόν. ΘΕΑΙ. 
Wu μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. ὋὉ δέγε ἴσως οἴοιτ᾽ ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ 

, τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ 
υλλαβήν, yerolous εἶναι | ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ Β 
οντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι 
ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεαιτήτου 
νόματος λόγον. τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, 
πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης 
χστον περαίνῃ τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν που 
δήθη. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔῤῥήθη yap. ΣΏ. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ 
spt ἁμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ 
ν ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνάμενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν | οὐ- Ο 
, προσλαβόντα τοῦτο, λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ 
θεῖ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπι- 
ἥμονα περὶ ἁμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων 
ὅλον περάναντα. OEAI. Οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ 
κρατες ; ΣΏ. Ei σοί, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει 

» διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον 
τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἔτι 
lav, τοῦτό μοι λέγε, W αὐτὸ |! ἐπισκοπώμεν. Ὁ 


90 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
























ΘΕΑ͂Ι. ᾿Αλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι. ΣΩ. Πότερον. ἡγού- 
μενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὁντινοῦν ὁτουοῦν, ὅταν τὸ αὐ ᾿ 
ὁτὲ μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρου, ἢ 
ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον δοξάζξῃ: 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ma A? οὐκ ἔγωγες ΣΏ. Εἶτα ἀμνημονεῖς ἐ 
τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ 
τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας αὐτά; OEAI. ἾΆρα λέγεις 
Ἑ αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ | ἕτερον 
ἡγουμένους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προα 
ἤκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβήν; TL 
Ταῦτα λέγω. ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ A? ov τοίνυν ἀμνημονῶ 
οὐδέ γέ πω ἡγοῦμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας 
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ Θεαίτητα 
ηράφων τις θῆτα καὶ ε οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν κα 
208 γράψῃ, καὶ αὖ * Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦ 
€ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψη, dp ἐπίστασθε 
φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτα 
συλλαβήν; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὸν ov. 
τως ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι. LO. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περ 
τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβὴν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτα 
ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν; ΘΕΑΙ͂. Οὐδέν γε. ΣΏ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν τό 
τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράψει Θεαίτητε 
μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἑξῆς γράφη; ΘΕΔΑΙ. Δῆλον & 
Β ΣΩ. ' Οὐκοῦν ἔτε ἀνεπιστήμων ὦν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξάζων 
ὡς φαμέν; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. ΣΩ. Λόγον γε ἔχων 
ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχα 
ἔγραφεν, ἣν δὴ λόγον ὡμολογήσαμεν. OEAI. ᾿Αληΐ 
ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, 7, 
οὔπω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν. @EAI. Κινδυνεύει. XLIL 
=. Ὄναρ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν οἰηθέντες 





ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 91 

















ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λίγον. ἢ μήπω κατηγο- ’ 
; ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτό τις αὐτὸν ὁδριεῖται, ' ἀλ- 
| τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὧν ἕν γέ τι ἔφαμεν 
yov θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὁριζόμενον δόξαν 
at ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγουι ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ορθῶς ὑπέμνησας" 
γὰρ ἕν λοιπόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῆ 
περ εἴδωλον, τὸ δ᾽ ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου odds 
ἢ τὸ ὅλον τὸ δὲ Sy τρίτον τί λέγεις: ΣΏ. Ὅπερ 
| οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τῶν 
γάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν. ΘΈΑΙ. Οἷον τίνα τίνος 
fets pot λόγον εἰπεῖν; LQ. ' Οἷον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου D 
ἔρε ἱκανὸν οἶμαί σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρό- 
ὧν ἐστε τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν. 
EAI. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. Λαβὲ δὴ οὗ χάριν εἴρηταε. 
t δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἑκάσ- 
)}υ ἂν λαμβάνῃς, ἡ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὥς 
iat τερες, λήψει ἕως δ᾽ av κοινοῦ τινος ἐφάπτῃ, 
: πέρι σοι ἔσται ὃ λόγος, ὧν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ἡ. 
. MavOavw ' καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον E 
τοιοῦτον καλεῖν. ΣΏ. Ὃς δ᾽ av μετ᾽ ὀρθῆς δόξης 
ipl ὁτουοῦν τῶν ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσ- 
ἔθη, αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς ἔσται, οὗ πρότερον Hv 
9s. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν ye μὴν οὕτω. ΣΏ. Νῦν 
ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἔγωγε, ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς 
ρ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξυνίημε 
ἐ σμικρόν. ἕως δὲ ἀφεστήκη πόῤῥωθεν, ἐφαίνετό τί 
λέγεσθαι. @EAI. Πῶς τί τοῦτο; aa. 5 Seis 209 
ν οἷός Te γένωμαι. ὀρθὴν ἔ ἔγωγε ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, 
y μὲν προσλάβω τὸν σὸν λόγον, γυγνώσκω δή σε, εἰ 
μή, δοξάξω μόνον. ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. ΣΩ. Λόγος δέ γε 
























92 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἑρμηνεία. OEAT. Οὕτως, 
ΣΩ. Ἡνίκ᾽ οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ᾧ τῶν ἄλλ 
διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ; OKAT 
Οὐκ ἔοικε. YO. Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διενοούμην, ὦ 
B οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει. ΘΕΑΙ, | ᾿Ανάγκη 
XO. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σ 
μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν; θὲς yap με διανοοῦ 
μενον, ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἂν ἢ τε ἄνθρ 
πος καὶ ἔχη ῥῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμω καὶ οὕτα 
δὴ ὃν ἕκαστον τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθ᾽ ἢ 
TL μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, 
ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον, Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον; OEAI. Τί yap: 
SO. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλ 
c μοὺς διανοηθῶ, | ἀχχὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλμον, 
μή τι σὲ αὖ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἐμαυτὸν ἢ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι: 
OEAT. Οὐδέν. ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἷ 
Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης abt 
τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορόν 
μνημεῖον παρ’ ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη καταθῆται, καὶ 
τἄλλα οὕτως ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ, ἣ ἐμέ, καὶ ἐὰν αὔριον ara 
τήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περ 
Dood. ΘΙΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθέστατα. YO. Περὶ τὴν | διαφο 
ρότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου πέρι. 
ΘΕΑῚ. Φαίνεταί γε. LO. Τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον 
τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσα 
λέγει ἧ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίγνετα 
ἡ ἐπίταξις. OEAT. Πῶς: SO. Ὧν ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομει 


= 


el BA 7 na ᾿ 
7 τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύε 


209 σ. # gue. Si ἢ Platonis est, neglegentius seriptum videtu 
Sed nescio an debuerim vel cum Heindorfio ὃ vel ἃ reponere. ᾿ 






















ΘΕΑΊΤΗΤΟΣ. 93 
Las ὀρθὴν δόξαν, ἣ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως 


ρὸς | ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ 
ἀρακέλευσις ἂν καλοῖτο δικαιότερον" τὸ γὰρ ἃ ἔχομεν 
pra προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, 
ἄνυ γενναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκοτωμένῳ.-. OEAT. Εἰπὲ δή, 
i νῦν δὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου; ΣΏ. Ei τὸ λόγον, ὦ παῖ, 
ροσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κελεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν 
Ἰαφορότητα, ἡδὺ χρῆμ᾽ ἂν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν 
Ἱπερὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγους, τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην 
του λαβεῖν ἐστίν. * ἦ γάρ; OEAI. Nai. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν 
ρωτηθείς, ὡς ἔοικε, τέ ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται, 
lore δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ 
πρόσληψις τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον. OEAI. "Eouxe. 
©. Καὶ παντάπασί γε εὔηθες, ξητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπι- 
τήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ᾽ ἐπιστήμης εἴτε 
αφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν. οὔτε ἄρα αἴσθησις, ὦ Θεαί- 
ἴχητε, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθὴς οὔτε μετ᾽ ἀληθοῦς δόξης λό- 


ouxev. ΣΏ. Ἦ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ 
ἰφιλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν; OEAT. 
at ναὶ μὰ Δί᾽ ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ 

\ y ἃ > a “ \ tz ς 
σὲ εἴρηκα. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ἅπαντα ἡ 
ἱμαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀνεμιαῖά φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ 
UK ἄξια τροφῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. XLIV. 


. Eav τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρῇς 
πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, ἐάν τε κενὸς ἧς, ἧττον 


7 « \ s A \ , ς 
Ὄμενος εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον yap μόνον ἢ 


get , A) Oo See \ ¢/ \ , : Ἢ 
μὲν σκυτάλης ἢ ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δὴ λέγεται TEP{TPOTN 


—E 


210 


| προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη av εἴη. OEAI. Οὐκ Β 


εσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τε ' γίγνῃ, βελτιόνων ἔσει C 






94 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 


ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ τι οἶδα ὧν 
ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσί τε: 
γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μαιείαν ταύτην ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ μή 
ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ τ 
Ὁ νέων τε | καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι καλοί. νῦν μὲν ὁ 
ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τ 
Μελήτου γραφήν, ἥν με γέγραπται ἕωθεν δέ, ὦ ( 
δωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαντῶμεν, 


9.5 


TRANSLATION 


\ ITH NOTES EXPLANATORY AND ILLUSTRATIVE. 








TRANSLATION. 





[Zuclides, founder of the Megarie School, and his friend Terpsion, both1 | 
of them pupils of Socrates, meet in one of the streets of Megara. The 

former mentions that on his way to the harbour he had met Theae- 

telus, wounded and dangerously sick, being carried to Athens from 

the Athenian camp near Corinth. A conversation ensuing on the 

noble character of Theaetetus, and the estimation in which he was held 

by Socrates, Euclides says that he has at home in manuscript a. 
dialogue, which Theaetetus took part in with Socrates. As Terpsion px — .. 
expresses a wish to hear this dialogue, the friends adjourn to the house 

of Euclides, where a slave reads it aloud to them as they reposeé.] 


Ἐπ. Wa, Terpsion! long in’ from the country’? 
Ter. A good while. And you*—I was looking for 
you in the Agora, and wondering that I could not find you. 
£u. Iwas not in the city. 
Ter. Where then? 


1. 1 “Aprt...7 πάλαι; English idiom would say ‘just in?’ or ‘long in?’ 

β but a both. The translation therefore omits one alternative. 

2°EE ἀγροῦ. Terpsion has a country εἰπε γλθυρ whether a town 
~ house also, there is nothing to show. 

: 3 Kal σέ ye. This emphasis implies a question as to the cause of 

_ Euclid’s absence. The ἀγορὰ or market-square was a promenade, 
where a friend might be logked for at a certain time of day, as in the 

. Cascine at Florence. 

: 


ΕΟ ose 


~ 



















98 THEAETETUS. 


Eu. As Iwas going down* to the harbour I met with — 
Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp δὲ. 
Corinth. 

Ter. Alive or dead ? 

Eu. Alive, but only just’. Besides being very ill from 
wounds, he is more seriously affected® by the malady which 
has broken out in the army. 

Ter. You mean the dysentery ? 

Eu. Yes. 

Ter. In danger, you say, such a man as that! 

Eu. Ay, a gallant and good one’, Terpsion. It was but 
just now I heard some people praising him highly for his 
behaviour in the battle®, . 

Ter. Nothing strange in that. It were far more sur- 
prising if he had not behaved so. But how came he not to — 
put up here at Megara’? 

Zu. He was in haste to get home. For all my entrea- 
ties and advice, he would not stay, So after accompanying © 
him some way, as I went back I bethought me of the mar- 
vellous divination shown by Socrates in so many cases, 
especially in that of Theaetetus. I think it was but a little 

4 Καταβαίνων. The preposition κατὰ compounded with verbs of 
motion often implies coastward movement, the: converse being ἀνά. 
The harbour was Nisaea. 

Ὁ Καὶ μάλα. The intensive καὶ is largely used by Plato. 
6 Aipe?. A technical verb for morbid affection. 


7 Καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν. Kadoxayaéia is the Athenian term fq — 
heroic ideal of a gentleman. . 
8 Μάχην. What battle is here meant we cannot absolutel\ 
termine. The great battle near Corinth, in which the Lacedaem 
defeated the Athenians, was in July, 3948B.c. Grote, H. Gr. 
ch. Ixxiv. Demosth. Lept. 41. But Plato -Imay point to some 
affair before 387. 
9 Αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ, two local adverbs=év αὐτοῖς τοῖς Meyd; 
Megara itself; at the very place he had reached, viz. Megara. 


᾿ἴυσέ: 





z TION. 99 

























his own deat he met him, a mere lad at 
ter conversing and arguing with him, admired 
tly. When I went to Athens, he repeated 
ments he had held with him—well worth 
ere—and said this youth must inevitably be- 
shed, if he should reach. man’s estate. 
spoke the truth, manifestly. But what were 
> Can you repeat them ? | 
indeed: not from mere recollection. But, 
ed home immediately, I jotted down’ some 
and, afterwards taxing my memory at leisure, 
ting; and, every time I visited Athens, I used 
55. anything I had not remembered, and to 
ons on my return here. So that I have got 
he Whole conversation in writing. 
. True: I heard you say so once before; and I 
ave always been meaning to bid you show it me, but have 
oitered till this moment. What hinders us from perusing 
Jit now? Especially as I am in real want of rest, after com- 
} ing from the country. 
_ £u. Well, and I too escorted Theaetetus as far as 
} Erineum”’; so I should not dislike a siesta. Let us go then; 
‘and while we repose, the attendant shall read to us. 
Py Ter, A good suggestion. 
[ Zhey go to Euclid’s house. | 

"u. Were is the manuscript, Terpsion. I must observe) 
, 11 wrote out the conversation in my own way:—not in 
but nlarrative form as Socrates related it to me, but asa 
)  * sue between him and his fellow-disputants, whom he 
£ house ae 
* 3 Ἰυγραψάμην. The use of the middle voice here, as compared with 
| Euclid’ afterwards, is notable: perhaps it implies the act of writing at 
_ where nent from recollection and for his own future revision. 


Scincineum: a locality on the way from Megara to Athens. 
I 7—2 


ee 
































100 μὰ ΒΝ. \ 


stated to be Theodorus the. geometrician and 
And, in order to escape the troublesome nog 
the speeches in my manuscript (such as, when 
speaker, ‘I spoke,’ ‘I said,’ and, in case of a 
agreed’ or ‘he disagreed’) I wrote as if he 
talking with them, and got rid of such interp¢ 

Ter. Well, no harm in that, Euclid. 
£u. Now, boy, take the volume, and re 
[Zhe slave reads aloud all that foll 


2 [The interlocutors in the following dialogue are: Soa 
geometrician of Cyrene, and Theaetetus. Two 
latter are also present, one of whom is called So 
them is made to speak. Socrates, meeting Theodoru. 
at Athens, asks him tf he has encountered any youths of promise. 
Theodorus names Theaetetus with high praise, adding that in some of 
his features he resembles Socrates.. Theaetetus, then approaching with 
his two friends, ts invited to sit beside Socrates, who engages him in a 

conversation about their personal resemblance. The purpose of it 


seems to be, partly to test the dialectic c faculty of Theaetetus, partly : to 


embolden him by relating the 2 praise he has aie! rom $0 jb comp. - 
iént.a judge as Pnesiloris.| 


Te A se ee : 
So. If I had a peculiar interest in Cyrene and its 
affairs, Theodorus, I would ask you about things there, and - 
about its people, whether any of the young men in those 
parts are studying geometry or other scientific subjects. But 
I really care for them, less than I do for our youth here, 
_and would rather know which of our own young men are 
expected to become scholars. ‘This therefore I observ 
for myself as well as I can, and inquire about it from 
every body else, with whom I see the young men des} 
to converse. Now the largest number of hy af 





/ 


TRANSLATION. 101 

























) your lectures; and justly: for you deserve it on many 
|} grounds, but especially for geometry. So I shall be glad to ~ 
hear if you have met with any one worth naming. 

: Theo. Yes, Socrates; among your citizens I have met with 
a youth, whose character I can cite as well worthy of your 
“attention. If he were handsome, I should be much afraid 
} to mention him, lest any one should fancy I am in love with 
} him. But in fact (don’t be vexed with me) he is not hand- 
} some; he has a flat nose and protruding eyes like you: but 
| : less marked in his case than in yours. I speak then with- 
ἡ Out scruple. And I can assure you that of all the persons 
‘T ever met (and I have associated with a great number) I 
‘never found any of a nature so wonderfully excellent. Apti- 
‘tude for learning such as few attain, combined with a 
ἢ temper singularly mild, and furthermore with unrivalled 
} courage, I could never have expected to find, nor have I 
ever seen any similar instances. ‘Those who, like him, are 
“quick and ready-witted and gifted with a good memory, are 
‘liable to keen emotions; they rush impetuously like unbal- 
} lasted vessels, and grow up with more of madness in them 
} than of valour: whilst others of more solid temperament 
“usually approach studies in a somewhat sluggish mood, and 
laden’ with forgetfulness. But he comes to all his studies 
| "and investigations with perfect gentleness, like a current of 
§ oil flowing without sound, so smoothly, firmly and success- 
fully, that we marvel to see one of his age perform these 
things as he does. 

So. Good news indeed. Pray whose son is he? 

a Theo: 1 have heard the name, but do not remember it. 
} However, he is the middle one of those who are now ap- 
‘proaching us. He and these friends of his were anointing 
: +i 1 Téuovres, A word properly applied to laden vessels, and here 
opposed to ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα. 


103 THEAETETUS. 


themselves just now in the outer race-course. They have 
finished, I suppose, and are coming this way. So see if you 
know him. 

Sv. Ido. He is the son of Sophronius of Sunium, il 
such a man, my friend, as you describe this one to be, of © 
good repute generally, and, I can tell you, aman who left a : 
considerable property. But I do not know the name of the 
youth. 

Theo. Theaetetus is his name, Socrates: the property 1 
fancy certain trustees have wasted: yet even in money mat- 
ters he is wonderfully liberal. 

_ So. A noble character you give him. Bid him come 
and sit down by me here. 

Theo, Iwill. Theaetetus, come and sit here by Socra- 
tes. 





, 
: 
So. Do by all means, Theaetetus, that I may view my-_ | 
self, and see what kind of face I have. Theodorus says it’s | 
like yours. Now if each of us held a lyre in his hand, and - 
he said they were tuned to the same pitch, should we believe 
him at once, or should we have takea note whether he 
spoke as a musician? | 

Theae. We should have taken note. 

So. And if.we found him such, should we not believe 
him, if ignorant of music, we should disbelieve ? 

Theae. ‘True. 

So, And in the present case, I suppose, if we care at 
all for resemblance of faces, we must consider whether he 
speaks with a painter’s skill or not. | 

Theae. I think so. 

So. Is then Theodorus skilled in portrait-painting? 

Theae.,. Not to my knowledge. 

So. And is he not skilled in geometry ἢ 

Theae. Without doubt, Socrates. 


TRANSLATION. 103 



























_ §o. And in astronomy and calculations and music? 

ind every subject of education? 

Theae. 1 think so. 

So. If then he says, either by way of praise or dispraise, 

| that we are alike in some bodily feature, it is not very well 

- worth while to attend to him ? 

᾿ς heae. Perhaps not. 3 
So. But how, if he were to praise the soul of one or 

the other for virtue and wisdom? Would it not be worth 

while for the one who heard the praise to observe him 

who was praised, and for the other to exhibit himself with 

acrity ὃ | 


Theae. Quite so, Socrates. 


(Socrates, after telling Theaetetus of the high praise given to him by 8 
Theodorus, and, questioning him about his studies, leads him to 
admit that the end to be gained by them is ‘wisdom,’ and that this 
ts the same thing as ‘knowledge.’ He goes on to confess the difficulty 
he finds in defining what knowledge is, and invites the company to 
discuss the question. Theodorus declines for himself, pleading age 
and wani of dialectic practice, but suggests that Theaetetus should be 
invited to carry on the discussion with Socrates.] 


So. It is time, then, my dear Theaetetus, for you to 
exhibit and for me to observe. For I must tell you that, 
although Theodorus has often spoken to me with praise of 
many persons, both foreigners and citizens, he never gave 
such praise to anybody as he did to you just now. 

_ heae. {am glad to hear it, Socrates; but see to it,’ 
that he did not speak in jest. 

3 Μουσικός. This word can either mean ‘musical,’ or ‘literary.’ 
The former is more probable here. : 


f 


104 THEAETETUS. 






So. That is not the way of Theodorus. So do ἢ 
retract your admissions on the plea that our friend here 
speaks in jest, lest he be compelled to add an affidavit. 

- am sure nobody will indict him for perjury’, So stand 
your confession boldly. 

Theae. Yes, I must, if you think 50. 7 

So. Tell me now: you learn, I suppose, from Theodo- 
Tus some lessons of geometry ἢ 

Theae. I do. | 

So. And of astronomy and harmony and calculations? 

Theae. use my best endeavour, | 

So. So do I, my boy, both from him and from all 
others whom I suppose to have any acquaintance with the 
subjects. Nevertheless, though I am in general pretty well 
versed in them, I have one little difficulty, which I must 
examine with your help and that of our friends here. Tell 
me, does not ‘to learn’ mean to become wiser in that which | 
one learns? | 

Theae, Certainly. : 

So. And by wisdom it is, I suppose, that the wise are 
wise ἢ : 
: Theae. Yes. 

So. Does this differ at all from knowledge ? 

Theae. Does what differ ? 

‘So. Wisdom. In things whereof we are knowing, are 
we not also wise ? 

Theae. Can it be otherwise ? 


ες So. Are then wisdom and knowledge the same thing ? 
Theae. Yes. 


3 1 ᾿Επισκήψει.  Heindorf tightly says: ἐπισκήπτειν h. 1. est i. 4. 
ἐγκαλεῖν ψευδομαρτυριῶν. The verb in this sense is usually middle; but 
Aeschines Tim. 142 has the active, qv οὐδὲ ψευδομαρτυριῶν ἔστιν 
ἐπισκῆψαι. See below 5; also Dict. Ant. (Martyria, ᾿Επίσκηψι5). 


TRANSLATION. ) 105 


a 


So. Now here is precisely my difficulty, and I cannot 





















ally is. Are we then able to define it? What say ye? 
Vhich of us will speak first? Whoever misses the mark on 
ach trial, shall sit down, as boys playing at ball say, for 
lonkey: and whoever goes through to the end without miss- 
ag, shall be our king*, and shall command us to answer 
2 nything he likes to ask. But perhaps, Theodorus, my love 
of discussion leads me to be rude in trying so hard to make 
15 argue, and become friendly and chatty with one another. 
Ὶ Theo. No, Socrates, such a wish is the reverse οὗ rude- 
mess. But call on one of the youths to answer you. I am 
unaccustomed to this kind of debate, and too old to acquire 
the habit. It would suit our young friends, and they would 
get on much better: for it is a fact that in all things youth 
the gift of progress. So, as you had Theaetetus in hand 
at first, do not let him go, but continue to question him. 


Theaetetus, having modestly consented to take his share AG Ὁ the Seen 
endeavours to define ‘knowledge’ 2 


a τς, 


(elenctic question 
tempts to define, which contain the term itself proposed for definition.] 


So. You hear then, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says ; 
and you will not, I think, wish to disobey him. In such 
matters a wise man’s injunctions cannot be lawfully dis- 
obeyed by his junior. Speak then well and nobly. What 
do you think that knowledge is? _ 

_ Theae. 1 must, Socrates, since you both require. No 
oubt, if I make any blunder, you will correct me. 


2 Βασιλεύσει. See Hor. Epist. 1. 1, 59: pueri ludentes, Rex eris, 
aiunt, si recte facies, 


ὙΠ, είς manner, exposes the futility of all at- 


100 THEAETETUS. 


So. Certainly, if we are able. 

Theae. Well then, I think that all the things one c 
learn from Theodorus are knowledge; geometry for instance 
and the others which you enumerated just now: and agai 
leather-dressing’, and the trades of the other craftsmen, a 
and each, I consider nothing else than knowledge. 

So. In a truly noble and bountiful style, my frien 
when asked for one thing you give many, and various thin 
instead of a simple one. 

Theae. Why, what is the sense of your words, Socrates 

So. Perhaps none at all?: however, I will explain what 
I mean. When you name leather-dressing, do you inten 
anything else than the knowledge of the manufacture o 
shoes ? 

Theae. Nothing else. 

So. Or when you name carpentry, do you intend any- 
thing but the knowledge of the manufacture of wooden im 
plements ? 

᾿ς Theae. No, nothing. 

So. In both cases then, you express that thing of whic 
each is the knowledge? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. But the question put, Theaetetus, was not concern 
ing the various subjects of knowledge, or their number. W 
did not ask with a wish to count them, but to know wh 
the nature of knowledge itself is. Am I talking nonsense? 

Theae. No, quite correctly. | 

So. Consider this also. Should some one ask us an 
trivial and obvious question, such as, what is clay? if w 















\ 


4 1 Σκυτοτομικὴ and σκυτική, σκυτοτόμοι and oxvreis are indifferent] 
used for the shoe-trade. 

2 Οὐδὲν (λέγω)... Aéyew οὐδὲν, to speak unreasonably (wrongly) ; 3 

λέγειν τι to speak reasonably (rightly). 





΄ 























TRANSLATION. 109 


d in reply, the clay of the potters, and the clay of the 

tove-makers, and the clay of the brickmakers, should we 

ot deserve to be laughed at? 

' Theae. Probably. 

_ So. In the first place because we thought the questioner 

}would understand us from our answer, when we introduce 

ithe word ‘clay,’ whether we add that of the doll-makers, or 

Pof any other craftsmen. Does anybody, think you, under- 

| stand any name of pening; when he does not know its 

correct meaning ? 

Theae, Not at all. 

| So. Then he who is ignorant of ‘knowledge,’ does not 

understand ‘knowledge of shoes.’ 

Theae. He does not. 

' So. And he who is ignorant of knowledge does not 
inderstand leather-dressing or any other art? 

Theae. ‘True. : 

_ §o. Then an answer made to the question—What is 
nowledge ? is ridiculous, when a person gives in his reply 

the name of some art. For he names ‘the knowledge of 

something,’ when that was not the thing asked from him. 

᾿ς heae. Apparently. 

So. In the next place, when he might have answered 

| easily and briefly, he goes an infinite way round. For in- 

/stance, in the question about clay, it was easy and simple to 
say, that clay is moistened earth, and to abstain from add- 

| ing whose it is. 


* _ 


[Theaetetus now accepts the principle of definition laid down by Socrates, 
_ and illustrates it by citing certain mathematical terms adopted by 
himself and his fellow-student, young Socrates, to distinguish rational 
_ and irrational numbers. These terms are (a) τετράγωνος ἀριθμός, 
square number (4, 9, 16, 25.27); (8) προμήκης ἀριθμός, oblong 























106, THEAETETUS. 


number (the rest exe. 1); (γ) μῆκος, length (all integral numbers after 1 
which may be represented by straight lines, and used to form squares. 
(δ) δυνάμεις (érrational roots, ν΄, Vs, NO Gc.) which are incom 
mensurable with the unit of length (ποδιαία), but can become side 
of figures commensurable in area with squares. Socrates applaud, 
this indention, and exhorts Theaetetus to apply his mind in the sam 
way to discover a definition of knowledge.] 


Theae. Yes, Socrates; this method now indeed appez 
easy.. You seem to be. asking the same sort of question 
that occurred some time since to us in our discussions ; 
to myself I mean, and your namesake, Socrates here. 

So. What was that, Theaetetus ἢ 

Theae. Theodorus was writing out for us something 
about ‘powers,’ proving, as to the ‘tripod’’ and the " pente 
pod,’ that in length they are not commensurable with the 
foot-unit: and so proceeding one by one as far as seventeen: 
but here he somehow came to a pause. We then bethough 
us of such a notion as this: since the ‘powers’ were evidently 
infinite in number, to try to comprise them under one term, 
by which we should entitle all these ‘ powers.’ 

So. Did you find any such term? 

Lheae. 1 think we did. Consider it yourself. 

So.. Speak on. | 

Zheae. We divided number generally into two classes, 
one, that which is capable of being formed by the multipli- 

_ cation of equal factors into one another, we likened i 
form to the square, and called it square and equilateral. 

So. Very good. 


5 1 Tpimovs, as Heindorf Says, is εὐθεῖα δυνάμει τρίπους, i.e. PS me 
which is irrational (not commensurate with the foot-unit, not integral), 
but potentially rational (becoming so when squared: J 3Xn/3=3)e 
So πεντέπους and the rest. The use of δύναμις is therefore differ 
ent from the modern mathematical term “Hower (15,2... : 


TRANSLATION. 109 


Theae. AY. intervening numbers, to which belong 3 and 
5 and every one that is incapable of being formed by the 
Multiplication of equal factors, but is formed either by a 
Targer number having a smaller—or by a smaller number 
having a larger—as its multiplier, we likened on the other 
fiand to the oblong figure, which in every instance has 
eater and lesser sides, and called it oblong number’. 

So. Excellent. What next? 

| Zheae. All lines which being squared form an equi- 
Jateral plane figure we defined to be ‘length’; all which 
| orm an oblong, we comprised under the name ‘powers’ 
(1.6. irrational roots), as not being commensurable with 
ithe others except through the surfaces which they have 
power to form*, And similarly with respect to the solids 
cubes). ! 

_ So. Nobody in the world could do better, my boys. So 
Ἢ do not think Theodorus will incur the guilt of perjury. 

_ Theae. But as to your question about knowledge, 
ates, I could not answer it in the same way as that 
bout length and power. Yet you seem to me to be look- 
ng for some such answer. So that now Theodorus again 
Jappears to be a false speaker. | 

_ So. Well, but if he had praised your running, and said 
> had never met with any young man so fleet, and then in 

























_ ® This appears as a general expression in the form 


I I 
nxit(=tixn)=n4t. 


xample: 2x 14(=14x2)=3. As 72 is any integer, this includes all 
mbers greater than unity, τετράγωνος as well as προμήκης ἀριθμός. 

ὃ Tots δ᾽ ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται. Thus s/12 being 3°464 (nearly), 
[2 x ,/12=12=2*6=3 x 4=(geometrically represented) a rectangle 
ith sides respectively either 2 and 6, or 3 and 4, or an imaginary 
ware with side 3.464 (nearly). 


110 THEAETETUS. 


a racing-atch you had been defeated by one in the prim 
of life, and very fleet, do you think his praise would hay 
been any the less true? 

Theae. I do not. 

So. And, as to knowledge, as I was saying a little whi 
since, do you think it a small thing to discover its nature 
and not one of the highest achievements ? 

Theae. Nay indeed, Socrates, I do place it among the 
very highest of all. 

So. Then be at ease about yourself: and consider thai 
Theodorus speaks truly, and shew desire in every way t 
obtain a right definition of knowledge, as of all other things 

Theae. As for desire, Socrates, it will not be founc 
wanting. 7 






6 [ Theaetetus, though he has not yet succeeded in finding a definition Ὁ 
knowledge, confesses a mental feeling that he is always on the verge Ὁ 
success. Socrates likens this feeling to the throes of impending child- 
birth in women: and reminding Theaetetus that he himself (Socrates) 
ts the son of an excellent midwife, he claims the analogous function ὁ] 

_ assisting the labour. of intellectual parturition in the minds of youn: 
' men ; and describes the obstetric art in many of its details, with ¢ 
| view to illustrate and justify his own method as an educator.] 
So. Come then: you made a ae suggestion just now, 

*  Imitate your answer about the ‘powers’. As you comprisec 

their vast number under one term, so also try to describe 

the many kinds of knowledge by a single definition. 

7) heae. 1 assure you, Socrates, I have often endeavourec¢ 
to gain insight into that matter, while listening to the ques 
tions you put. But, though 1 cannot persuade myself thai 

I have anything important of my own to say, or that I ha e 

heard from some one else any such statement as you require 






































TRANSLATION. 111 


ertheless I cannot rid myself of the feeling that I am on 

(the point of doing so’. 

_ So. Oh! you are in the throes of labour, dear Theae- 

tus, through being not empty, but pregnant. 

_ Iheae. 1 do not know, Socrates. I tell you my feeling, 

Fat all events. 

| So. Have you not heard then, simpleton, that I am 

ithe son of a very famous and solid midwife, Phaenarete ? 

Theae. I have heard it before now. 

So. Have you heard too that I practise the same art ἢ 

Theae. Never. 

So. Idoreally. But don’t tell of me to other people. 

)T am not known, my friend, to have this skill. And others, 

i eing unaware, do not say this of me, but only that lama 

Hyery strange person, and that I perplex people. Have you 
eard this too? 

Theae. I have. 

ἢ So. Shall I tell you the reason? 

= Theae. Pray do. 

_ So. Reflect then -upon the general situation of midwives, 

nd you will more easily learn what I mean. You know, I 

|suppose, that none of them practise while they are still con- 

iving and bearing children, but those alone who are past 

| child-bearing. 

| TZheae. Certainly. 

So. This custom is said to be derived from Artemis, for 

that she, though a virgin, has the charge of parturition. Ac- 

ordingly, she did not indeed allow barren women to become 

idwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an 

# art of which it has no experience: but she assigned it to 


i Μάλλειν is undoubtedly the true reading, giving the cue to the 
wable of the midwives. Μέλειν would fail to do this. 


112 THEAETETUS. 


those who are past the age of childbearing, in honour 
their resemblance to herself. 

Theae. Naturally. 

So. Is not this also natural, that those who concei 
and those who do not are better known by midwives th 
by others ? | 

Theae. Quite so. 

So. Moreover also midwives, by giving drugs an 
chanting incantations, are able to excite the throes and t 
quell them, if they will, and to make those who have 
hard time bring forth: and they produce abortion’, if t 
case require it. 

Theae. ‘True. 

So. Have you furthermore noted this in them, that th 
are also very clever match-makers, being well skilled 
know what woman uniting with what man must bear th 
finest children ? 

Theae. I was not quite aware of that. 

So. I assure you they pride themselves on this muc 
more than on their special practice*. Just consider. Di 
you think the care and collection of the fruits of the ear 
belongs to one art, and the knowledge of what soil you mus 
plant or sow to another ? 

Theae. No, to the same. 

So. And do you consider it different in the case of 
woman ἢ Sets 

Theae. Seemingly not. 

So. No, truly. But on account of the unlawful an 

1 Νέον ὄν. Prof. Campbell writes, ‘Sc. τὸ βρέφος, said here 
the embryo “at an early stage,” i.e. before it is dangerous to do 
But most commentators do not believe that νέον would be used of 
κύημα. Heindorf conjectures δέον for νέον ὄν. “The words may be 


gloss, and in translation no point is lost by neglecting them, as above: 
2 Gr. ὀμφαλητομίᾳ, 












κἀς. 
---- 




























TRANSLATION. 113 


cientific conciliation of man and woman, which is termed 
procuration,’ midwives, being a respectable body, shun 
natch-making, fearing lest by this they should incur the 
other charge. For it is only to genuine midwives, I suppose, 
hat the art of correct match-making belongs. 

Theae. Apparently so. 

So. Thus highly important is the function of midwives ; 
but less so than my procedure. For, it does not happen to. 
"women at one time to bear idols, at another true children, 
$0 that it shall not be easy to distinguish them. Had they 
‘been liable to this, the greatest and noblest task for mid- 
yives would have been to decide between the true child 
sand the untrue. Do you not think soe 

Theae. 1 do. 


The parable of the application of the obstetric art to the labours of the Ry. 
intellect is carried on and concluded.) 


So. But my art of midwifery, though it has in other 
respects the same conditions as theirs, differs in these points, 
at I attend men, not women, and that I t Tinspect - the labour—— 
their r souls, not of their bodies. ‘The most important 
ΠΝ our art is, the being able to test_in every way 
hether the young man’s mind is bringing forth an idol and _- 
" unreality, or a genuine and true progeny. For to meas _ 
well as to the midwives belongs the following condition. I 
tt peerable of producing wisdom,.and the.reproach which _ 
lany ere now have cast on me, that, while I question others, 
myself give no answer about anything,-because I have no 
sdom in me, is a just reproach. The reason of it is this: 
e god compels me to act the midwife, but hindered me 
mr engendering. I then am not indeed perfectly wise 
self, nor have I brought to birth any discovery of that 
K. P. δ 








. a ΟῚ 


7 


_ not-by-any learning they have gained from me, but because 


them to, valuing unrealities and idols more than truths; and 


114 THEAETETUS. ° 





















kind, as the outcome of my own soul. But of those who 
resort to me, some indeed appear in the outset utterly igno-— 
rant, but all, as the intercourse proceeds, and the god gives” 
opportunity, make wonderful progress, in their own opinion 
and in that of others. And it is evident that they do so” 


they have of themselves discovered many excellent things, 
which they-retain. Of that midwifery however I and the 
god are authors. The proof is this. Many persons ere now, | 
not knowing that fact, and imputing all to themselves while ™ 
they despised me, quitted me earlier than they ought, either 
of their own will or by the persuasion of others’. . After this, — 
they baulked all subsequent conceptions by evil intercourse, 
and lost by ill nurture the offspring which I had helped” 





ended by seeming to themselves, as to everybody else, mere 
Liockheads. One of these, though there are many more, is 
Aristeides* son of Lysimachus. When these truants come 
back and pray for admission to my society, and move heaven 
and earth to gain it, with some of them my familiar genius 
forbids me to consort, with others it allows me: and these 


14 αὐτοὶ ἢ vm ἄλλων πεισθέντες, The translation follows this 
conjecture; MSS. omit the second ἢ, by the absence of which αὐτοὶ be- 
comes void of sense and propriety. Is it not possible that Plato wrot 
kal ἢ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς (μὲν) αἰτιασάμενοι ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες ἢ ὑπ᾽ 
ἄλλων πεισθέντες κιτιλ. ‘Many ere now, being ignorant of this, an 
either imputing all to themselves, while they contemned me, or per. 
suaded by others ἄς. &c.’? This would give a still better sense than th 
adopted reading, viz. Many forsook the teaching of Socrates: σζ dic 
so in ignorance of his divinely given power (τοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες) ; but 
some through self-conceit’ (ἢ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι), some throug 
yielding to persuasion (ἢ vm’ ἄλλων πεισθέντες). Also the passage 
would be more perspicuous if ἑαυτοὺς μὲν were written. 

2 ’Apioreldys, a descendant of the great Aristeides, 


δ" 
™ 
~ 


™ 


TRANSLATION. af | 





























latter improve again. And this affection also they that as. 
-sociate with me have in common with women in lakour: 
they feel throes and are full of worry day and night much 
more than the women. And my art has the power to excite 
and allay that throe. So much then for them. And some- 
times, Theaetetus, when any do not seem to me to be preg- 
nant, perceiving that they do not need me, I very kindly δ 
make a match for them, and, with the blessing of heaven, 
T-guess very aptly by whose conversation they will profit. 
* Many I have made over to Prodicus*, many to other wise 
and inspired men. I have spoken at this length to you be- » 
cause I suspect, in conformity with your own opinion, that ἢ 
you are suffering throes from some inward conception. Deal 
' with me then as the son of a midwife, and a practitioner 
myself, and try to answer my questions as well as you are 
‘able. And if, on examining anything you say, I consider it 
an idol and not a true progeny, and so remove it quietly 
and put it away, don’t be angry as women at their first lying 

in are about their infants. For many, my good friend, 
7 have felt towards me so that they are actually ready to bite 
-me when I take from them any cherished trifle: and they 
imagine I am not acting kindly; so little are they aware 
" that no god is unkind to men, and that I do nothing of this 
sort from ill will. But my sense of duty will in no wise 
allow me to accept falsehood and stifle truth. 


— 


¢ 














[ Theaetetus, again exhorted by Socrates, takes courage, and suggests as.a 8 


τ 4 . eeereraeasemesnal 
«defining term for knowledge (sensation, sensuous 
perception). Socrates at once identifies this definition with the famous 


doctrine of Protagoras, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, ‘man is 


᾿ 8.᾿Ἐξέδωκα Προδίκῳ. ᾿Εκδιδόναι (θυγατέρα) means ‘to give a daughter 
ἴῃ marriage.’ Prodicus of Ceos was a famous Sophist, learned in his- 
ory, mythology, and legend. 


8—2 


AC 
Pe wv 


116 THEAETETUS. 


the measure of δ things.’ He goes on to argue that this implies 





‘what 


x true to each ἢ and after illustrating by an — 


example he rors proceeds to connect this view with that of HHera-— 


cleitus and his school (to whom he adds Homer) respecting a per- 
petual motion or flux of all things—mdyra pet. This doctrine ais, 


not suffer a fixed term of being to be given to anything, such as ‘one,’ 
‘some, ‘of some quality,’ ‘great,’ ‘small, ‘heavy,’ ‘light,’ &c. 


Nothing ‘is’ any of these, but by motion and commixture all things © 


‘become’ ¢his or that. There is no ‘being,’ only ‘comme tabe,’| 





So now again, returning to the point, Theaetetus, endea- 


vour to say what knowledge is: and never reply that you 


are unable: for if the god please and you play the man, you 
will be able. 

Theae. Well, Socrates, when you thus exhort, I must 
own it were disgraceful not to use one’s utmost endeavour 
to state what suggests itself to the mind. It seems to me 


then that he who knows anything perceives what he_knows;_ 


and, in ἘΝ present view, , knowledge is nothing else than 
ne 





a a 
PERCEPTION‘ 


ἄμμο 





8 


0. Well and nobly said, my boy. It is quite proper to 
speak with such open frankness. But now let us examine 
the doctrine in common, to see whether it is a genuine 
product or a wind-egg. Knowledge, you say, is per- 
ception ? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. I really think you have given an account of know- 
ledge which is not insignificant, being one which Protagoras 
also gave. But he has said the same thing in a different 


way. He says, I fancy, that ‘man* is the ee of all 
; ——— 





1 Αἴσθησις. Sensation ; perception ; or rather, ‘sensuous percep- 
tion,’ which must be understood when either of the two former terms 

















is used in this translation. 
2 “AvOpwirov, i.e. the human mind ; tn mind of each percipient. 


ie ie OR, a 
a oe ES - 





TRANSLATION. 19 








































3; of things existing, that they do exist; of non-existing | 
at_they do not exist. Have you perhaps read 

Theae. Yes, I have read it often. 

So. He speaks then to this effect, that_such_as things 


mppear to me, they severally are to me; and_such_as_they 


ξ ppear to you, they severally are_ io your. The term ‘man’ 
‘includes you and me. 


Theae. He does speak so. 

- So. Yes; and it is probable that a wise man is not 
talking nonsense: so let us follow his track. Does it not 
sometimes happen that, when the same wind is blowing, 
one of us is cold, the other not; and one is slightly cold, 
the other exceedingly ? 

Theae. No doubt. 

‘So. Shall we then in that case say the wind in itself®* is 
cold or not cold; or shall we assent to Protagoras that_to 
» one who feels it cold it is cold, to one who does not feel it, 
not? 
~ Theae. The latter, I should say. 

_ So. And this is apparent to each ee 

Ε Theae. Yes. Nae πῃ 

So. And the et uanpesen ate ἀν Ἐπ τς 
Theae. It does. 

So. Appearance then and perception concur in things 
yarm and the like generally. For such as each perceives 
them, they probably are to each, 

᾿ς Theae Yes. 

So. Perception then is always of that which ‘is’; and it 


unetring, since it is knowledge. 








_ 3 Τὴ itself. Codd. have ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτό, which Prof. Campbell supports 
yy examples. Bekker reads ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ. But ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ is most usual 
in this sense. ὁ 


- 


Zn ΩΣ THEAETETUS. 


Theae. Manifestly. 

So. In the name of the Graces, then, wa’; Protagoras a 
man of consummate shrewdness, and did he hint this darkly 
to us of the common herd, while to his disc'ples he spoke 
‘the truth’ in secret confidence*? | 

Theae. What do you mean by this, Socrates ? 

So. I will state to you a doctrine of no slight import- 
ance: namely, that nothing in itself ‘is one,’ nor can you 
rightly call a thing ‘some’ or ‘of some kind,’ but, if you 
style it great, it will turn out also small, and if heavy, light, 
and so in every case; since nothing ‘is’ ‘one’ or ‘some,’ or 
‘of some kind’: but from vection and d mixture 
with each other all things ‘come to be,’ of which we say 
that they ‘are,’ using a wrong term; TOPHOUSIGe-AE any Wane 
‘is,” but always ‘comes to be.” And on this point let all 
philosophers except Parmenides® be compared in their 
order, Protagoras and Heracleitus and Empedocles*: and 
of the poets those that are consummate in each poetic kind, 









* The work in which Protagoras expounded his doctrine was called 
᾿Αλήθεια, Truth. To this circumstance Plato here alludes, but perhaps, — 
as Prof. Campbell says, he means that Protagoras “" told the real truth, 
not in his book which is so entitled, but privately to his disciples.” 

> Πλὴν Παρμενίδου. Parmenides, the greatest name to the Eleatic” 
School and here made its representative (though Xenophanes before 
him, and Zeno after him, taught similar principles), held the doctrine 
directly opposed to the Heracleitean, namely, that the universe is one, 
continuous, stable: that only ‘being’ is; ‘non-being’ is not; there is 
no ‘ becoming,’ 

6 ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς. Prof. Campbell justly says that Plato introduced 
the words κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα in order to include Empedocles of 
Agrigentum, who, without accepting the doctrine of Heracleitus, that 

* οὐδὲν ἔστι, πάντα γίγνεται, denied the Eleatic unity, continuity and 
stability of substance, teaching that phenomenal changes are caused by 


the intermixture of four elements (fire, air, water, earth) which are. 
themselves alone unchangeable. 





Ἷ 


Ἵ 




























TRANSLATION. © 119 


in the comic, Epicharmus’, in the tragic, Homer*; for in 
“saying | 
. Ocean of gods progenitor and Tethys mother 








he has said that all things are born from flux and motion. 
- Does he not seem to say so? : 
Theae. 1 think he does. 


ἢ [Zhe leracleitean doctrine (πάντα pet) ts further expounded and seemingly 9 
efended.. But, as it ts confuted afterwards (28), we must explain 
this defence as an instance of the Socratic eipwveia.] 


_ So, After this then, who that disputes with so great a 
"host, and Homer its captain, can avoid making himself 
idiculous ? © 
Theae. It were not easy, Socrates. 
‘So. No indeed, Theaetetus. Since our statement— 
_ that motion produées the semblant? ‘ being,’ and the ‘coming 
to be,’ while ‘non-being’ and ‘perishing’ are produced by 
_rest—has in its favour many competent proofs. The heat 
of fire, which engenders and protects other things, is 
_ itself engendered by vection and attrition. And these are 
motions*®. Are not these the parents of fire? 


_ Τ᾽ Ἐπίχαρμος. Diogenes Laertius, 111. 10, quotes verses from Epi- 
‘charmts, the comic poet of Syracuse (490 B.c.), which contain the 
doctrine of perpetual mutation. 
8 πιραγῳδίας 5é”Ounpos. Plato recognizes only two forms of poetry, 
fiz. Comedy and Tragedy, including in the latter Epic poetry, and its 
great master Homer. See Rep. X. 495 Ὁ, ἐπισκεπτέον τήν τε τραγῳδίαν 
Kal τὸν ἡγέμονα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον. 
1d μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν. As he is professing to expoundgthe Hera-@ 
cleitean theory, which does not admit τὸ εἶναι, he evasivély says τὸ 
vat δοκοῦν, ‘ the semblant being.’ 
2 Tovrw δὲ κυήσεις. This is the reading in most codd., for which 
a 


. 


190 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. ‘They are. q 

Sv. Moreover the race of animals is produced from 
them ? 

Theae. ‘To be sure. | 

So. Again: is not the habit of bodies ruined by rest — 
and laziness, and preserved in general* by exercise and 
motion ἢ 

Theae. Yes. . 

So. And does not the habit of the soul by learning and | 
study, which are motions, acquire doctrines and preserve* — 
them and become better, while through rest, which is the — 
absence of study and learning, it both learns nothing, and ~ 
forgets what it has learnt ? 

Theae. Decidedly. 

So. The one then, namely motion, is a good both in 
soul and body, the other is the reverse. 

Theae. Seemingly. 

So. Must I farther mention to you calms and serenities 
and such-like things, showing that quietudes rot and destroy, ~ 
while their opposites preserve? and besides these must I 
clinch the matter’, and evince that by the golden cord° 
Homer means nothing but the sun, and indicates that, as 
long as the revolution continues, and the sun keeps moving, 





κινήσει (dual) is suggested. But some have τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις, which 
Bekker edits, and Campbell approves. 

3 In general, ws ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, read in many codd. and by Stobaeus. | 
Professors Jowett and Campbell prefer ἐπὶ πολὺ ‘for a long time,’ as in 
cod. Bodl. 

* Σώξεται. The middle voice of σώζω is specially used of ‘memory.’ 

ὅ Tov κολοφώνα ἀναγκάζω προσβίβαζων ; ‘must I bring up my crowning 
reason and prove conclusively (dvayxd{w)’? See Strabo’s explanation © 
of κολοφὼν in Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon. Others have been given, 
for which see Heindorf’s note. 2 


® For Homer’s χρυσῇ σειρά see IL viti. 47. 


TRANSLATION. 121 


























ll things in heaven and earth exist and are preserved; but 
hould this stand still as if fettered, all things would be 
poilt, and, as the saying is, turned upside down ? 

_ Theae. In my judgment, Socrates, he does indicate 
what you say. 


_ or existence within or without you. Tt ἐς the result of a passing col- 
| Lision between your eyes and the flux of things suited to act on them. 
_ St is neither in the agent nor in the patient, but generated in passage 
᾿ς between them. Tt will not be the same to two subjects nor to the same 
subject at different times. The object measured or touched cannot be 
in itself great, white, hot or anything else; if it were, it would not 
| appear different to another subject. The subject touching or measuring 
| cannot be any of these, for, if so, it would be so always, and would not 
be modified by application to another object. | Socrates illustrates by six 
| dice, which, as compared with four, are more, and half as many 
_ again (i.e. 3:2), but fewer and half compared with twelve (i.e 
1:2). Can then anything become more without being increased ; 
| or fewer without being diminished? Theaetetus ἐς puzzled; and 
_ Socrates merrily suggests that they are amusing themselves with mere 
quibbles, like Megarian disputants.] 


_ So. Conceive the matter in this way, my good friend. 
5. to vision first: that what you call white colour is not 
1 itself something outside your eyes or in your eyes. And 
do not assign to it any place: for then, being somewhere 
in position, it would ‘be’ and remain, and would not by 
neration ‘come to be.’ 

_ Theae. How so? 

So. Let us follow the doctrine we were lately stating, 
tt nothing exists as an independent unit; and in that 
y we shall see that black and white and every other 
our have ‘come to be’ from the coincidence of the eyes 
h the suitable motion; and tha. what in each case we call — 


A ρ.....ὸ.. ..---΄- en ae 











The relativity of the facts of sensation ts illustrated by the phenomena of 10 
_ colour, number and size. at you call colour has no definite place 


———— 0.0 


τ “ie 


199 THEAETETUS. 


colour, is neither that which makes nor that which receives 
the impact, but something between, which is peculiar to 
each. Or would you insist that what each colour appears 
to you, such it appears also to a dog or any other 
animal ? 
Theae. No indeed, I would not. 
So. Again: does anything appear to another man like 
what_it appears tO you? Are you strongly ‘convinced-it’ 
does, or are you much rather sure that even to yourself it is 
not the same, because at no two times aré you exactly the 
same? 
Theae. ‘The latter seems to me truer than the former. — 
So. Accordingly, if a thing beside which we measure 
qurselves;or which we handle, were large or 1 - white vhite_or_hot,. 
it would fever-havebecome different. by.contact. with_some. 
other, unless it underwent a change in itself, And if again 
the measuring or handling subject had been any of these, 
it would not have become different when another approached 
or suffered any affection, if there were no affection in itself. 
For now, my friend, we are compelled in a careless sort o 
way to say marvellous and ridiculous things, as Protagor 
would affirm, and every one who ventures to propound th 
same that he does. 
Theae. Wow do you mean? and what kind of things ?- 
So. Take a small sample, and you will know what 
mean. Six dice, if you place four beside them, we say 
more in number and half as many again. If you -brin 
twelve, we say the six are fewer in number, and half the 
second set. ‘To say otherwise were intolerable. Will yot 
tolerate it? 
Theae. No, I will not. 
So. Well: suppose Protagoras 0 or some one else wer 
to ask you:—Theaetetu:. is it possible for anything 
{\nencnasiianestsioGrenuisiens ¢.... ica aiieiesceceetins 













































TRANSLATION. 123 
become greater or.more, except by being increased ?__What 


nswer would you give? 
—Lheae.—Tf T ΜΈΣ to answer what I think in reply to 


our present question, Socrates, I should say ‘no’: but if with 
reference to the former one, to avoid self-contradiction, I 
should say ‘ yes.’ 

So. Well said, my friend, by Hera, and divinely. But 
) if you answer ‘yes,’ something will occur like the case in 
) Euripides’: our tongue will be unconvicted, but our mind 
not unconvicted. 

me  Zheae. ‘True. 

| So. So then, if you and I were clever and wise folk 
| who had intimately studied the whole sphere of mind, and 
rom that time forth amused ourselves with trying one 
another’s powers, we should have engaged in a sophistical 
conflict of this kind, and be bandying arguments with each 
| other*. But now, as we are not professors, we shall wish to 
᾿ look at the statements comparatively, and see what it is 
we mean; whether they are consistent with each other or 
aconsistent. 

᾿ς heae. Certainly that is what I should wish. 


] 
1 


The contradictions and difficulties implied in these statements are now 11 
| so set forth. It cannot possibly be true that anything becomes greater or 
᾿ less while it ἐς equal to itself, or ἐς increased without addition or 
) diminished without subtraction, or that tt ἐς what it was not before 
without having ‘come to be. And yet the case of the six dice, and the 
case of an old man who was taller than a growing youth and in the 
_ course of one year is shorter without having ‘come to be’ different, 
seem to clash with these indubitable propositions. What are we to 


a Εὐριπίδειόν τι. See Hippol. 612, ἡ γλῶσσ᾽ ὀμώμοχ᾽ ἡ δὲ φρὴν 
ὥμοτος. 

5 Τὴ this passage Plato censures the pseudo-dialectic (eristic) prac- 
6 of certain sophistic teachers as idle waste of time. 


126 THEAETETUS: 


Others there are much more refined, whose mysteries I a 
going to describe to you. Their principle is, and upon i 
we were just now saying depends—that the whole univ 
is motion, and nothing else but this, and of motions two 
kinds, δα ἢ in number infinite, but, in respect of power, th 
one involving action, the other suffering. From the ass 
ciation and attrition of these with each other are forme 
products in number infinite, but of two sorts, one percepti 
ble, the other perception, which continually breaks forth an 
is born with the perceptible objects. Perceptions, we find, 
have the following names; sight, hearing, smell, feelings of 
cold and heat, pleasure and pain and desire and fear and 
others: infinite are those without names; and those with 
names very numerous. And the objects of perception 
again are born with each of these, colours of all kinds with 
all kinds of vision, sounds with hearing similarly, and with 
the other perceptions other objects of perception are con- 
nate and ‘come to be.’ What meaning has this tale for us, 
Theaetetus, in reference to the former questions? do you 
perceive ? 
Theae. No, Socrates. 
So. See then if it can be brought to its closing point. 

It means that all these things, as we say, are in motion, and 
in their motiom are found swiftness and slowness. That 
which is slow has its motion in the same place and in refer- 
ence to things near, and so engenders: and the things thus 
engendered [are slower. But that which is swift has its 
motion in reference to things at a distance, and so engen- 
ders, and the things thus engendered]? are swifter, for they 










é 

* The words in brackets are not found in codd., but introduced by 
Stephens from the Eclogae of Cornarius. Bekker is so, 1 ced 
of their being Plato’s, that he prints them without bracket! Ἱ 6. ad 
Heindorf maintains them. But Professors Jowett and Cam eek 


᾿ 


i 
TRANSLATION. 127 


























re conveyed, and their motion naturally consists in vection. 
en then the eye and any other of its suitable objects 
approach and beget whiteness and its kindred perception, 
) which could never have ‘come to be’ if either of them had 
) gone to something else, then, while the sight on the part of 
the eyes and the whiteness on the part of that which co- 
engenders the colour are moving in mid space, the eye 
becomes full of sight, and at length sees and ‘comes to be,’ 
nowise sight, but a seeing i ὅν that which co-engen- 
) dered the colour is filled full with whiteness, and ‘comes to 
» be’ not whiteness but a white thing, whether it be wood or 
» stone or anything else that happens to have been coloured 
with this hue. And other things similarly, hard_and_ warm 
and all the rest, we must understand in the same manner 
‘to be’ nothing by themselves, as we heretofore said, but 
in their mutual intércourse™*to become’ all and of all kinds 
om motion: since of agent and patient, as they affirm, 
taken apart (ἐπὶ ἑνός) it is impossible to form any definite 





‘them, holding that τὰ Bpadvrepa mean τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον, and 
‘ri θάσσω the αἰσθήσεις and αἰσθητὰ engendered by them. I have been 
unable to convince myself that this latter view is right. The words 
| πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει seem intended to describe the 
rgans of touch and taste, as distinguished from those of sight and 
hearing, which can be employed on distant objects. It may be replied 
that the example given is that of sight and its object, and the latter is 
spoken of as πλησιάσαν to’ the eye: which may seem to prove that 
anything on which τὸ ποιοῦν can act may be said πλησιάζειν αὐτῷ, 
vhether more or less distant. Weighty as this reply is, it does not 
emove my difficulty; for I am unabie to discern the use of discrimi- 
ating between agent-patient and their products as to slowness and 
wiftness. The act of generation: between the eye and a very distant 
ect must surely have been r-garded by Plato (whatever later mathe- 
icians may say of it) as a swift act. I admit however that the 
uestion at issue is difficu'’s.and doubtful: but it does not embarrass 
ito’s general meaning here. See note at the close of the Translation. 


.---- --α-κ)όΉ 


128 THEAETETUS. 


notion: for nothing is an agent till it concurs with a patient, 
nor a patient till it concurs with an agent: and that which 
concurs with one thing and is an agent, if it lights upon 
another, proves to be a patient, so that, as we before said, 
nothing is ‘one by itself,’ but always ‘comes to be’ to some 
other; and the term ‘being’ must be removed on all sides, 
although we are often, even in our present discussion, com- 
pelled to use it from habit and ignorance. But it is not 
proper, as the wise lay down, to allow the use of the word 
‘some,’ or ‘of some’ or ‘me’ or ‘this’ or ‘that’ or any 
other term which ‘fixes,’ but-in accordance with nature to 
speak of things as ‘coming to be’ and ‘being created’ and 
‘perishing’ and ‘taking new forms.’ Since if any one fixes 
anything in speech, he who does so is easily confuted. And — 
we, ought to speak in this way both of individuals and of © 
ail in the aggregate, by which aggregation we determine — 
‘man’ and ‘stone’ and each class of animals. Do these — 
views seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and will you find ἃ 
taste of them agreeable ? ; 
Theae. I don’t know, Socrates; for about you too I 
cannot discern, whether you are ἘΠῚ ΤΣ these as your own | 
Opinions, or trying me. 3 
Soe. Do you not remember, my friend, that I indeed 
neither know nor:adopt any of such things as mine? but I 7 
am barren, and act as midwife to you, and on that account 
I charm, and offer you, to be tasted, wise things of various 
sorts, until I can help to bring to light your opinion; and 
when it is brought forth, then and not before I will exa- 
mine if it shall prove a wind-egg or a genuine offspring. 850. 
then with courage and patience answer well and manfully 


whatsoever appears to you to be night concerning my several 
questions. 


Theae, Ask then. τς 











TRANSLATION. 129 























᾿ [Arguments against the Protagorean doctrine Srom dreams, fevers and 13 { 
madness are suggested and answered. Persons so affected perceive 
different things from those perceived when they are awake and in 
health. Are these contradictory perceptions in each case equally true. 
Lo the percipient 9] 


So. Say then again, whether you are satisfied that 
nothing should ‘be,’ but ever ‘come to be,’ good and noble 
and all things which we were lately recounting. 

Theae. Yes; since I have heard this recital of yours, it 
appears to me marvellously clear that it is reasonable, and 
that we must accept the principles as you have stated them. 

So. Let us then not abandon what remains of our 
question. ‘There remains the topic of dreams and diseases, 
madness especially, and all that is called mis-hearing or 
_ mis-seeing or any other wrong perception. For you know, 
I suppose, that in all these cases the principle we lately 
_ explained seems by admission to be confuted, since un- 
_ doubtedly false perceptions occur to us in them, and things 
that appear to each are far from ‘being,’ but, quite con- 
_trariwise, none of the things that appear ‘are.’ 

Theae. You speak most truly, Socrates. 

So. What reason then is left, my boy, to him who lays 
down that perception is knowledge, and that things which 
‘appear to each ‘are’ in every such case? 

j Theae. For my own part, Socrates, I shrink from 
answering that“I have nothing to urge, because just now 
you rebuked me for saying so. Yet in very truth I cannot 
contend that maniacs or dreamers do not imagine falsities, 
when some of them think they are gods, and others suppose 
hey are fowls, and imagine they are flying in their sleep. 
So. Have you not in mind then a certain difficulty 
aised about them, especially as to the sleeping and waking 
ision ? 

K. P. | 9 


130 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. What difficulty ? | 

So. A question which I think you have often iced 
people ask, what proof one would have to give, if somebody 
were to ask at this moment, whether we are sleeping and 
dreaming all that we imagine, or are awake and talking to 
one another in that state. 

Theae. Indeed, Socrates, it is a perplexing thing to say 
by what proof we could establish it: for all the facts succeed 
one another as counterparts. Even the whole discussion we 
have now held there is nothing to prevent our seeming to 
have held ina dream. And when in a dream we seem to 
be relating dreams, the similarity between ‘the cases is 
marvellous. 

So. You see then that it is not difficult to raise a ques- 
tion, since it can be questioned even whether we are waking or 
dreaming. And as the time during which we are asleep 15 
equal to that in which we are awake, our soul in each state 
contends that the fancies which from time to time occur 
are true, so that for half the time we say that the one are 
existent, for half the other, and we are equally confident 
in regard to each. 

Theae. Yes, unquestionably. 

So. And is not the same true of diseases and madness, 
except that the times are not equal ? 3 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Well, shall truth be determined by length or shorts 
ness of time? 

Theae. ‘That were ridiculous on many grounds. 


‘So. Have you then any other clear sign to show which ἢ 
of these fancies are true ? 


Theae. I think not. 

































_ edrdinal principle sé Pethibits itself ina perpetual series of 


ς definite manifestations. To say that 7 the subject-perceive-ts.to.say that 
_ tL perceive some object: to perceive, and perceive nothing, is a contra- 
ictton. Again, if an object be sweet, it must be sweet to some per- 
_ cipient subject: sweet, butsweet to no one;ts-an-impossibility. Necessity 
_ binds the percipient to a thing perceived. Every term applied to one 
implies some reference to the other: no name can be truly predicated 
of the one which implies ‘being’ or ‘coming to be’ apart from the 
other. | 


joint, who lay it down that what from time to time ‘ seems,’ 


is’ true for him who so beholds it. Their opinion, I think, 
expressed by this question: ‘O Theaetetus, of two things 


Ἢ question are in one respect the same, in another different, 
ut that they are wholly different. 
_ Theae. It is impossible that they should have anything 
the same, either in power or in aught else, when they are 
holly different. 
' So. Must we not also perforce confess the two things 
to be unlike? 
 Theae. I think so. . ͵΄ 
_ So. If, then, anything happens ‘to become’ like, either 
itself or to another, shall we say that when made like it 
becomes’ the same; when it gets unlike, different ? 
Theae. Necessarily. | 
So. Were we not previously saying that agents are 
any and infinite, and patients likewise ἢ 

Theae. Yes. 


.ὃ-- 


TRANSLATION. 1323 


So. Hear then from me what they will say on this ᾿ς 


vhich are totally different, can the one and the other have | 
any identical powers?’ We must not assume that the things © 


“τ 


130 










89 THEAETE ie 


So. And also that a thing consbining first with one, 
then with another, will not produce the same things, bu 
different ? 
Theae. Certainly. 
So. Let us now specify myself, or you, or anything else, 
in the same relations. Say Socrates in health and Socrates 
out of health. Shall we say the latter is like the former, 
or unlike ? 
Theae. Socrates out of health, you say; do you com 
ag this as a whole with the former as a whole, with 

‘Socrates in health? 

So. Very well put: that is my meaning. 

Theae. Unlike, of course. 

So. And different, as being willed ? 

Theae. Necessarily. 

So. And you will say the same of Socrates sleeping, an 

in all the states we cited ἢ 

/ Theae. I would. 

_ So. And will not each of the things which have a 
/ active nature, when they find Socrates in health, dea 
/ with me as one thing; when out of health, as a differen 

one? 

Theae. They must. 

So. And 1, the patient, and that asche will in eac 
case produce different things ? 

Theae. To be sure. 

_ So. When I drink wine in health, does it appear to m 

agreeable and sweet ? 

Theae. Yes. 


So. True; for, by our admissions, the agent and th 
patient produced sweetness and perception, both of the 
in motion together; and perception on the side of 
patient made the tongue percipient, and sweetness on th 


TRANSLATION. 133 






















art of the wine, moving about it, made the wine to be and 
Ὁ appear sweet to the healthy tongue. 

Theae. Such certainly were our previous admissions. 

So. But when it finds me out of health, does it not in 
the first place find one who is not the same? It comes 
Ὁ an unlike object. 

| Theae. Yes. 

So. Such a Socrates, then, and the draught of wine, 
produce different things; in regard to the tongue a per- 
‘ception of bitterness, in regard to the wine ἃ. bitterness 
* beginning to be and moving; and the wine it makes not 
W bitterness, but bitter, and me not perception, but one that 
) perceives. 

_ .Theae. Assuredly. 

So. I then shall never become percipient of anything 
else in the same way ; for perception of another is another 
thing, and makes the percipient different and another ; nor 
will that which acts on me, if it concur with another, ever 
engender the same and become similar: for from another 
it will engender another and become different. 

_ Theae. ‘That is true. 

So. I then shall never become similar to my former 
self ; nor will the object become similar to its former self. 

᾿ς Theae. No, surely not. 

_ So. When I perceive, I must needs become percipient 
of something: for to become percipient, yet percipient of 
jothing, is impossible; and the object, when it becomes 
sweet or bitter, or anything of the kind, must become so to 
some one: for to become sweet, yet sweet to no one, is 
impossible. 

 ‘Theae. Assuredly. 

So. Then, I think, the inference remains, that to each 
er we ‘are,’ if we are, or we ‘come to be,’ if we come ~ 


130 184 | THEAETETUS. 











to be: since necessity binds our essence indeed, b 

binds it to nothing else, nor yet to ourselves individually 

/it remains then that we are bound to one another. . So th 

/ if a person says that anything ‘is’ or ‘becomes,’ he mus 

/ say that it ‘is’ or ‘becomes’ ‘to something,’ or ‘of some 

| thing,’ or ‘in relation to something’; but, if we have com 

to a right conclusion, he must not say or allow of any. 

one else saying, that anything ‘is’ or ‘comes to be 
absolutely. 

Theae. Undoubtedly, Socrates. 

So. And so, when that which acts on me is to myse 
and not to another, I perceive it, and no one else does. 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. Then my perception is true to me: for it balongl 
always to my being; and, according to Protagoras, I a 
judge of things which are to me, that they are, and of thing 
which are not, that they are not. 

Theae. So it seems. 


15 [Having thus by a series of plausible arguments brought to birth the 
suggestion of Theaetetus, that knowledge is sensuous perception, Socrat 
asks of he can bear to learn that the bantling after all is not wort 
rearing. Theodorus interferes, and pledges himself for the tolera 
temper of his pupil. LHe is reminded that Socrates only professes 
draw out the thoughts of those who converse with him.] 


So. How then, being ree and unerring in mind a: 
regards things which ‘are’ and ‘come to be,’ can I be un 
knowing of things whereof I am percipient'? 

Theae. In no sort of way. 


‘So. ‘Therefore you have said very well that knowledg 


15  Αἰσθητής, a novel word, but here pretty certainly the true one. 


TRANSLATION. 135 



















5 nothing else than perception ; and it turns out to be one 
nd the same thing, that (as Homer and Heracleitus, and 
heir whole tribe, affirm) all things move like streams, and 
that (after the opinion of the consummately wise Protagoras) 
man is the measure of all things, and that (as Theaetetus 
infers from these premises) τ ee oe arg 
edge. Is it so, Theaetetus? ust we say, that this, as 
it were, is your newborn child, and the product of my 
midwifery ? What say you? 

| Theae. It must be so, Socrates. 

So. This then, seemingly, we have with much difficulty 
brought to birth, whatever it prove to be. And now, after 
} its birth, we must, in good sooth, run round the hearth with 
} it in our discourse’, not failing to observe whether the child 
worth nurture, and not a wind-egg and an unreality. Or 
do you deem it absolutely necessary to rear your offspring, 
nd not to put it away? Can you bear to see it confuted, 
} and not be greatly out of temper if some one should filch 
} from you your firstborn ἢ 

ΓΟ  §7Zheo. Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates. He is not 
the least ill-tempered. But in heaven’s name tell me, is not 
is then true? 

So. You are a very gourmand of discussion, Theodorus, 
and a good creature, in that you take me to be a sack of 
arguments, and think I can pull out another, and aver that 
vhat we have said is untrue. But you do not note what is 
taking place: that none of the arguments proceed from 
myself, but from him who is conversing with me at the time; 
‘and that I know nothing more than this little feat, how to 
obtain an argument from another wise person and to treat 


2 The fifth day after a child’s birth the festival was called "Auge 
| om when the neues was carried round the ἑστία and received its 


130 192 ' THEAETETUS. 












to be: since necessity binds our essence indeed, bt 
binds it to nothing else, nor yet to ourselves individually 
/it remains then that we are bound to one another. . So that 
/ if a person says that anything ‘is’ or ‘ becomes,’ he mus 
/ say that it ‘is’ or ‘becomes’ ‘to something,’ or ‘of some 
| thing,’ or ‘in relation to something’; but, if we have com 
' to a right conclusion, he must not say or allow of any: 
one else saying, that anything ‘is’ or ‘comes to be 
absolutely. : 

Theae. Undoubtedly, Socrates. 

So. And so, when that which acts on me is to myself 
and not to another, I perceive it, and no one else does. 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. Then my perception is true to me: for it bélongl 
always to my being; and, according to Protagoras, I am 
judge of things which are to me, that they are, and of things 
which are not, that they are not. 

Theae. So it seems. 


15 sited thus by a series of plausible arguments brought to birth the 
ugsestion of Theaetetus, that knowledge is sensuous perception, Socrate 
aa if he can bear to learn that the bantling after all is not worth 
rearing. Theodorus interferes, and pledges himself for the tolerant 
temper of his pupil. He is reminded that Socrates only professes 

draw out the thoughts of those who converse with him.] 


So. How then, being Mier and unerring in mind as 
regards things which ‘are’ and ‘come to be,’ can I be un- 
knowing of things whereof I am percipient'? 

Theae. In no sort of way. | 

So. Therefore you have said very well that knowledge 


15 } Αἰσθητής, a novel word, but here pretty certainly the true one. q 




























TRANSLATION. 135 


| is nothing else than perception ; and it turns out to be one 
and the same thing, that (as Homer and Heracleitus, and 
their whole tribe, affirm) all things move like streams, and 
| that (after the opinion of the consummately wise Protagoras) 


infers from these premises) nt a el 
‘ledge. Is it so, Theaetetus? ust we say, that this, as 

it were, is your newborn child, and the product of my 
‘midwifery ? What say you? 
᾿ Theae. It must be so, Socrates. 
So. ‘This then, seemingly, we have with much difficulty 
‘brought to birth, whatever it prove to be. And now, after 
‘its birth, we must, in good sooth, run round the hearth with 
Η t in our discourse’, not failing to observe whether the child 
be worth nurture, and not a wind-egg and an unreality. Or 
‘do you deem it absolutely necessary to rear your offspring, 
and not to put it away? Can you bear to see it confuted, 
_ and not be greatly out of temper if some one should filch 
‘from you your firstborn ἢ 

Theo. ‘Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates. He is not 

| the least ill-tempered. But in heaven’s name tell me, is not 
this then true ἢ 

So. You are a very gourmand of discussion, Theodorus, 
d a good creature, in that you take me to be a sack of 
| arguments, and think I can pull out another, and aver that 
| what we have said is untrue. But you do not note what is 
taking place: that none of the arguments proceed from 
| myself, but from him who is conversing with me at the time; 
| and that I know nothing more than this little feat, how to 
| obtain an argument from another wise person and to treat 
| 2 The fifth day after a child’s birth the festival was called ᾿Αμφι- 


ρόμια, when the babe was carried round the ἑστία and received its 
ame. ὅ 


Ὺ“ΚΝ 


oo 


as has been often said, each person singly shall form his 
‘own opinions, and all these shall be rig τῇ and true—why 


136 THEAETETUS. 


it fairly. And I will now try to obtain one from our frien 
and not to say something of my own. 
Theo. You put the thing well, Socrates: so be it. 





[Socrates now assails the doctrine of Protagoras. If man ts a measure, 
why not an ape or a frog? Lf his own sensation is true to every man, 
what makes Protagoras superlatively wise? or what is the good ὁ 
arguing on any subject? Theodorus, who was challenged as a frie | 
of Protagoras, declines to take up his defence, and refers Socrates back 
to Theaetetus.] ; 


















So. Do you know then, Theodorus, what surprises me 
in your friend Protagoras ? 

Theo. What is that? 

So. I am much pleased with everything else he has 
said, how what ‘seems’ to each ‘is’ to each. But the com 
mencement of his treatise does surprise me. I wonder 
that in the outset of his ‘Truth’ he did not say that a pig, 
or a dog-faced baboon, or any other more monstrous spe 
cimen of things that have perception, is the measure of all 
things, that so he might have spoken to us at once in ¢ 
magnificent and very disdainful style, ostentatiously shewing 
that, while we were marvelling at his wisdom, as if he were 
a god, he was all the while not a whit superior in judgment 
to a tadpole, not to say, to any of his fellow-men. Or 
how are we to put the case, Theodorus? For if that opi- 
nion shall be true to each man which he gets by percep 
tion, and nobody’s affection shall be better determined by 
another person, nor one be more entitled than another to 
review opinion, and to say whether it be true or false, but, 





TRANSLATION. 137 


omparison, wh t_go to school to him, though each of — 
js is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not say 
that Protagoras speaks thus to “amuse the vulgar? while as 
“0 my case, and that of my art of midwifery, I forbear to 
jSay what ridicule we incur: so indeed does the whole 
jpractice of dialectic. For, as to reviewing and criticising 
each other’s fancies and opinions, when each man’s are 
fight, is it not a tedious and monstrous folly, if the ‘Truth’ 
fof Protagoras is true, and he did not proclaim it in jest 
from the shrine of his book? 

) Theo. We was my friend, Socrates, as you said just 
: Ow. I cannot therefore allow Protagoras to be confuted 
y my admissions, nor yet resist you contrary to my opinion. 
So take in hand Theaetetus again. For certainly he ap- 
eared some time back to follow your lead very prettily. 

So. If you went to the wrestling-courts at Lacedaemon, 
heodorus, and there beheld naked people, some your in- 
feriors, would you refuse to strip yourself beside them, and 
thibit your own form competitively ? 

| Zheo. Why do you think I would not refuse, Socrates, 
With their permission and consent? So now I shall try to 
] ersuade you to let me look on, rather than be dragged to 
the play-ground in my present stiff condition, and to wrestle 
it out yourself with one who is younger and more supple. 



























| ates asks Theaetetus if his faith in the Protagorean doctrine is shaken 17 
| by what has been said. When he admits that it is, he is rallied by 

| Socrates for his facility, and recalled to the question, ‘Knowledge ἦς 

| sensation.’ Are we to say we know the barbarian tongues because we 
hear them spoken, or letters because we see them? Theaetetus replies 
peat we know them in some respects, not in others.) \ 


So. Ifsuch is your will, Theodorus, I don’t say. ‘ nill,’ 
proverbialists have it. So I must turn again to the wise’ 


> 


~ 


ἜΣ 


‘all of a sudden. you shall turn out to be no wise inferio 


to gods than to men? 


" tagoras, or some one on his part, will say in reply: My fi 


138 THEAETETLOS. 




















Theaetetus. Tell me then, Theaetetus, first of all, as to ὁ 
late discussions; do you not share my surprise if th 


in wisdom to any man or even any god? Or do yo 
suppose that the ‘measure’ of Protagoras is less applicabl 


Theae. Upon my word [ do not. And as to yo 
question, I am much surprised. For when we were engag 
in showing how that which ‘seemed’ to each ‘was’ als 
to him who thought it, the statement appeared to me ve 
good ;' but now another view has taken its place all of 
sudden. 

So. Yotjare young, my dear boy: you quickly succum 
to popular declamation, and become a convert. For P 


gentlemen, young and old, ye sit together and declaim 
bringing gods into question, whom I, after speaking an 
writing about them, as to their existence or non-existenc 
set aside: and you say just’ what the populace woul 
hear with approval, that it is too bad for mankind not t 
differ in wisdom from every kind of beast: but you off 
no convincing proof whatever; you resort to probabilit 
which if Theodorus or any other geometrician sought 
use in geometry, he would be good for nothing. Ju 
consider then, you and Theodorus, if on such importa 
subjects you will accept arguments relying on mere pe 
suasion and probability. 


Theae. No, Socrates, we should not any more th 
Durseis affirm that to be just. 

So. We must view it then in some other way, as y 
and Theodorus suggest. « 

Theae. Insome other way certainly. » | 

So. In this way then let us consider it: whether knot 


TRANSLATION. 139 
























dge and perception are the same or different. For to this 
xint, I ween, our whole argument tended; and for this 

pose we stirred all these many strange questions. Did 

6 not? 

\Theae. Assuredly. 

So. Shall we then admit that all the things which we 

srceive by sight and hearing we at the same time know? | 

Or instance, before we have learnt the language of the 
rbarians’, shall We say that we do not hear them when 

they speak, or that we both hear and understand what they \ 

fay? And again, if we do not know letters, shall we, when 

we look at them, say we do not see them, or shall we insist | 
at we know, since we see them ?* > 

| Zheae. So much of them, Socrates, as we see and hear, 

s shall say we know; we shall say we both see and know 

le figure and the colour, and that we both hear and know 

le sharp and flat sound: but what grammarians and inter- 
eters teach concerning them we shall say we neither per- 

sive by sight and hearing, nor know. 

_ So. Excellent, Theaetetus. And it is not worth while 
dispute these positions of yours, that you may grow. 


ocrates now bri ings an argument against the Protagorean doctrine which 18 
he afterwards acknowledges to be captious and eristic. He says that 
Theodorus ought to champion the cause of his friend’s children, as their 
| guardian. Theodorus naively says that Callias holds that office, not 
himself] 


Bu t look at this other question also which approaches, 
and consider how we shall repel it. 


2 All who spoke another language than Greek were by the Hellenes 
led βάρβαροι. Hence Prof. aba renders this word in 5 ee 


140 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. What is that? 

So. This. If any one shall ask—‘Suppose a man 
become cognisant of anything, is it possible that, havi 
and preserving memory of this thing, at the time when 
remembers he should not know the very thing which 
remembers?’ But I am verbose, apparently, when I wi 
‘to ask if a man remembering anything he has learnt d 
not know it. | 

Theae. Wow could that be, Socrates? The thing y 
suggest would be a miracle. 

So. Perhaps then I am trifling: but consider. Do y 
not call seeing perceiving, and sight perception ? 

Theae. Ido. 

So. Has not then one who has seen something beco 
cognisant of the thing he saw according to your last state 
ment P 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Well; do you not grant there is such a thing 
memory P 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Memory of something or of nothing ? 

Theae. Of something, certainly. 

So. Of what one has learnt then, and of what one h 
perceived ; of such things, is it not ? 

Theae. Undoubtedly. 

So. What a man has seen, he remembers at times, 
suppose ἢ 

Theae. He does. 

So. Even when he has shut his eyes? or on doing 
has he forgotten ? 

Theae. It were monstrous to suppose that, Socrates. 

So. We must, I can tell you, if we are to maintain o 
former argument. Τῇ not, there is an end of it. 







TRANSLATION. 141 


| Theae. I really suspect so myself; but I cannot quite 

ake up my mind. Tell me how. ᾿ 

) So. In this way. One who sees becomes, we say, 
isant of what he sees. For sight and perception and \ 

nowledge are admitted to be the same. 

Theae. Quite so. 

᾿ §o. And he who saw and became cognisant of what | 

Ihe saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers, but does not see 

the thing. Is it so? 








Theae. Yes. 
“Ὁ. Απα not seeing means not knowing, if seeing means Ϊ 
nowing. 
 Theae. ‘True. 


) So... The inference then is, that, while a man remembers _ 
Something of which he has become cognisant, yet, since he \ 
065 not see, he does not know it: and this we said would ἃ 
ibe a miracle. 

Theae. All quite true. 

So. If then anybody says that So τς and percep- 
ition are the same, there results an evident impossibility. 

_ Theae. So it seems. . 

} So. Therefore we must distinguish one from the other, 

_ Theae. I suppose so. 

| So. What then will knowledge be? We must begin 

ur statement over again, it seems. Yet what are we going 

Ὁ do, Theaetetus ἢ 

Theae. About what? 

So. Weseem to me, like an ignoble cock, to hop away 
from the argument and crow, before we have gained the 
Ory. 

_ Theae. Wow so? 

So. Like rhetorical disputants we seem to be content 
that we have come to a mutual agreement as to the admitted 


142 THEAETETUS. 


uses of words, and by some such method mastered the qu 
tion. And though we say we are not Eristics but philo 
phers, we unconsciously imitate the practice of those cle 
fellows. 

Theae. I do not yet understand your meaning, 

So. Well then, I will try to explain my view of t 
matter. We were asking whether a man who has learnt a 
remembers something does not know it; and taking thec 
of one who had seen, and after shutting his eyes remember 
though he did not see, we shewed that he did not know 
the same time that he remembered ; and this, we said, w. 
impossible. And so the Protagorean fable came to rui 
and yours with it, as to knowledge and perception being t 
same. 

Theae. Apparently. : 

So. But it would not, my friend, if the father of t 
former fable had been alive. He would have made a stro1 
defence for it: but now that it is an orphan, we insult i 
For even those trustees, whom Protagoras appointed, one 
whom was Theodorus here, do not come to the rescu 
Well, in the interest of justice, I will run-the risk of helpi 
him myself, _ 

Theo. No, Socrates, I was not his children’s truste 
but rather. Callias son of Hipponicus. I diverged som 
what earlier from abstract studies to geometry. But 
shall be much obliged to you if you will succour him. 

So. Well said, Theodorus. Have an eye then to 
succour. Fora man would have to make stranger admi 
sions than we lately made, if he did not attend to the t 
in which we are generally wont to affirm and deny. Shall 
explain how to you or to Theaetetus? 

Theo. ‘To the company generally, but let the young 
one answer. For he will incur less disgrace by defeat. 












TRANSLATION.  \ 143 




















t a 
) ἊΝ 5 
) 


Ὶ ΓΝ νὰν 7 
[Socrates produces some more eristic puzsles.] τὰ 


I put now the most startling question. To this 
‘think. Is it possible for the same man knowing a 
ling not to know what he knows? 

Theo. What answer shall we give, Theaetetus ? 

Theae. Umpossible, in my opinion. 

f δ0. +Not if you lay it down that seeing is knowing. 
For how will you deal with that inevitable question, when, 
is they say, you are caught in a well, and an unabashed 


fith the closed eye you see your cloak. 

| Zheae. Not with that one, I suppose I shall say, but 

}with the other. 

So. Then you see and do not see the same thing at 

ithe same time ? 

᾿ς Theae. Ina sort of way. 

So. I do not, he will say, define anything, nor did I 
fask how, but only whether you know that which you do 


Ἰοΐ see; and you have admitted that sgcing is knowing 
: a nd not seeing not knowing. Consider the inference from 
uf these premises. - 

Theae. 1 consider that it directly contradicts my former 
sertion. . 

So. Probably, my fine gentleman, you would have had 
more such experiences, if somebody had further asked you 
whether it is possible to know keenly or to know bluntly, 
and to know near and not at a distance, and to know the 
ame thing intensely or moderately, and other questions, 
countless in number, which a light-armed mercenary am- 


bushed in the arguments might have asked, when you laid 










nan claps his hand to one of your eyes and asks, whether © 


not know. And now you are shown to see what you do. 


144 THEAETETOS: 


























it down that knowledge and perception are the same; an 
attacking your senses of hearing and smelling and the lik 
he might have worried you with incessant confutation, unti 
admiring his accursed wisdom, you were entangled by hit 
so far, that after mastering and binding you tight he migh 
then have ransomed you for what sum you and he agree 
on. Now what argunent, perhaps you may say, will Pro 
tagoras advance in aid of his doctrine ? Must we aot tr 
to state it? 

Theae. Certainly we must. 


20 [Socrates, having obtained from Theaetetus an admission that Protagora, 
ought to be heard in his own defence, undertakes to plead his causé, 
and does so in the assumed person of Protagoras himseélf.| 


So. Besides all this that we urge in his defence, he wil 
also, methinks, come to close quarters, contemning us, an¢ 
saying: Here’s this good creature Socrates, who—when 8 
lad got frightened on being asked whether it is possible foi 
the same person at once to remember some particular thing 
and not know it, and in his fright said ‘no,’ because he 
could not see before him,—made a laughing-stock of me ir 
the course of his arguments. But the fact, my easy-going 
Socrates, stands thus: when you examine any of my doc 
trines by the method of interrogation, if the person ~ques- 
tioned give such answers as I should, and be defeated 
I am confuted; but if they differ from mine, then the 
person questioned is confuted. For instance, if mutual 
word-catching is the thing to guard against, do you think 
anybody will concede to you that the memory of a. pasi 
feeling is anything like what the feeling itself was at th 
time when it was experienced? Far from it. Or again 
that he will shrink from admitting that it is pssible fo 



























TRANSLATION. .* 145 


he same person to know and not to know the same thing ? 
Dr, if he dread this—that he will grant an altered person 
Ὁ be the same he was before he was altered? Or rather— 
(that anybody can be called ‘one’ and not ‘many’—infi- 
|nitely multiplied, if alteration goes on.” But, O my good sir, 
Whe will say, encounter my main doctrine more generously, 
jaf you can, and prove against it that individual perceptions 
ΓΟ not ‘come-to-be’ to each of us, or that, supposing they 
Ido, it does not follow that the appearance will ‘come-to-be’ 
}({or ‘be,’ if that is the proper term) to that person alone, 
unto whom it appears. When you talk of swine and dog- 
eaded baboons, you are not merely swinish yourself, but 
jyou likewise induce your hearers to act as such towards my 
jtreatises without any decency. For I say that the Truth 
Jas as I have written: that each of us is a measure of 
es-that-are..and_are not: but that, nevertheléss;~one- 
an. differs vastly from another in this very respect, that 
ito one man some things are and appear, to another other 
things. And I am far from denying that wisdom anda 
Wise man exist, Bit the man I call wise is he who, by 
vorking changes}! makes things to appear and to be good 
a “any one of us, to whom they appear and are evil. And 
again, do no Ο not press my argument literally ; but understand 
om the following explanation more clearly what I mean. 
Recollect how it was formerly said, that to a sick man 
“Bhis food appears to be and is bitter, but to a man in health 
ithe opposite is the fact and appears so. Neither of these 
ons ought we to make wiser than the other; that is 
impossible ; nor- nor-may we declare that the sick man_is igno- 
ant for holding such _an_ opinion, _or_the-man-in- health — 
wise for holding ano another. We must effect a change to’ 
€ opposite state : for the one habit is better than the 
sther. So also i in education we must cause a change from 
mB, Pa δ] 10 


4 





at ὃν, ex » \ \ 


always true. But, I suppose, when through a bad habi 


evil to each, makes the good both to be and te seem rig 


146 THEAETETUS. 

























the one habit to the better. Now the physician changes by 
medicines; the wise teacher by arguments. Never indeec 
did anybody make one who had false opinions afterwards 
to hold true ones. For it is not possible either to think 
what is not, or anything but what one feels; and this i 


of mind a man has corresponding opinions, a good habi 
makes him hold opinions resembling it; phantasms whick 
some persons from inexperience call true: put I call some 
better than others, not truer.. And wise men, dear Socrates 
I*am far from calling frogs : but in relation to bodies 
call them physicians, in relation to )_plants husbandmen : 
For I say that these last also produce in plants, insteac 
of evil sensations when any of them are sickly, good ané 
healthy: sensations and truths, while wise and good rheto 
ricians make good things instead of evil seem just to states 
Since whatever things seem just and good to-each state 
are such to it, as long as it deems them lawful; but thi 
wise man, in the place of those things which are severall, 





And on the same principle the sophist a a | 50, who is able t 
instruct his pupils thus, is both wise and worthy of high fee 
at : their hands. And thus somé are wiser - than others, an 
nobody thinks falsities: and you, whether you will or no 
must submit to be a measure. ὃ For on these grounds th: 
doctrine is maintained. And, if you wish to revive yo 
dispute with it, dispute by counter-arguing at full; or if yo 
prefer the method of questioning, adopt it; for no person 
sense will avoid this method, but will pursue it most wi 
lingly. Mind this however ; you must not question unfairl 
For it is most unreasonable in one who.professes esteem fi 
virtue to be constantly pursuing an unfair method of arg 
ment. Now unfairness is shown, when —"*" to co 


- ΟΝ 
-- fh, v 
ἀν 





i] 


















TRANSLATION. ee 


“duct his arguments diversely; in one way as a combatant, 
‘in another as a dialectician: in the former case rallying 
‘and tripping up as much as he can, in the latter being 
"serious, and correcting his respondent, showing him only 
‘those errors into which he was led by his own fault or in 
consequence of former discussions. If you act thus, your 
fellow-debaters will impute to themselves the fault of their 
own confusion and perplexity, not to you; and they will 
jollow and love you, and fly from themselves to philosophy, 
/ that they may become different, and get rid of their former 
selves. But if you take the contrary course, as most do, 
you will find an opposite result, and your pupils instead of 
| philosophers will turn out haters of philosophy, when they 
}grow older. If then you will follow my advice, as was 
[before' said, you will, in no hostile or contentious spirit, 
Sut with a really mild and condescending temper, consider 
)what we mean, when we declare that all things are in 
motion, and that what seems ‘is’ also to each, individual 
5 well as state. From these considerations you will discern 
whether knowledge and perception are the same: but not, 
as you lately sought, from the use of words and names, 
which most people pervert in every sort of way, causing 
ach other all kinds of perplexity. Such, Theodorus, is 
the slight assistance which, from slight resources, I have 
‘supplied, as I best could, to your old friend. Had he 
} been alive, he would have helped his own cause in grander 


anguage. 
















Protagoras had been made in the pleading of Socrates to complain that 21 
admissions hostile to his doctrine had been wrung from the mouth of a 

a terrified lad. Socrates now constrains Theodorus to submit, very re- 
luctantly, to a dialectic argument on the general question at issue.] 


10—2 




















148 THEAETETUS. 


Theo. You are joking, Socrates: for you have helped 
him most valiantly. 
So. You are very obliging, my friend. Allow me one 
word. You noticed probably that Protagoras in what he 
said reproached us for holding our discussions with a boy, 
and using that boy’s alarm as a weapon of contention 
against his propositions: and while he represented this 
as mere amusement, he called ‘the measure of all things” 
a grave topic, and urged us to deal seriously with his 
argument. ἢ 
Theo. Of course I noticed it, Socrates. 
So. Well: do you bid us take his advice? 
Theo. Very earnestly. { 
So, Do you see that all here are boys except you?) 
If then we are to take his advice, you and I must dea Ι 
seriously with his doctrine by mutual questions and answers, 
that he may not have to reproach us with considering this) 
subject in a jocular manner with lads. 
Theo. Nay, but would not Theaetetus follow the inves- 
tigation of a doctrine better than many who have great 
beards ἢ 3 
So. Not better than you, Theodorus. Do not suppose 
that I am bound to defend your deceased friend in eve 
manner, and that you are bound in no manher. But 
come, good sir, follow the argument a little way, till such 
time as we know whether you are to be the measure of 
diagrams, or if all are competent in themselves, equally with 
you, to treat of astronomy and the other subjects wherein 
you are reported to excel. 
Theo. When one sits beside you, Socrates, it is not easy 
to decline discussion. Indeed I spoke nonsense just now 
when I said you would allow me not to strip, and that you 
would not compel me as the Lacedaemonians do: you seem 


TRANSLATION. 140 



























ather to tend in Sciron’s’ direction. The Lacedaemonians 
indeed bid one depart or strip, but you seem to me to act 
your part like Antaeus’: you will not let one who comes to 
you go away before you have forced him to strip and wrestle 
with you in argument. | 

So. You have found very good precedents for my 
malady, Theodorus: but I am more robust than they were. 
‘Many a Hercules and Theseus strong in argument have ere 
mow met and thumped me very hard; but I do not flinch 
) for all that: with such a wonderful love of this kind of 
= exercise am I possessed. Do not then refuse to benefit 
| yourself as well as me by trying a fall with me. 

) Zheo. Be it as you will: I refuse no longer. I must 
finevitably endure by cross-examination whatever destiny 
you spin for me in this discussion. I shall not however be 
able to put myself in your hands beyond the limit which 
you have proposed. 

So. «That limit is sufficient. And pray help me to be 
careful of this, that we do not unawares, carry on any 
childish kind of argument, and incur reproach again for 
doing so. : 
Theo. Very well, 111 try my best. 


The argument of Socrates against the doctrine of Protagoras, that ‘man 22 
is a measure to himself, may be briefly summarised thus. That doc- 
trine means, ‘what seems to each is to each.’ Now to the mass of ἢ 
mankind this doctrine seems to be untrue, because ἐξ ts certain that 

_ men in general do consider some to be wiser than others, and look up — 

_ to the wise as teachers and guides. Therefore to them it is untrue. 


1 Sciron, or Scirrhon, the legendary robber, who flung travellers 

rom rocks. He was slain by Theseus. 

' 3 Antaeus, the gigantic wrestler, who slew his opponents: but was 
rimself defeated and slain by Hercules. 


150 THEAETETUS. 


EE 
And Protagoras, on his own principle, must allow that they ar 
right ; from which tt necessarily follows that he is wrong, even in his 
own opinion. In short ‘the Truth’ of Protagoras is not true to him- 
self or to any body else.] 


So. Let us first revert to the objection we took before, 
and see whether we were right or wrong in being out 
of humour and censuring the doctrine, in that it made every 
one competent in wisdom; and whether Protagoras rightly 
conceded to us, παῖ ἢ respect of better and worse, some 
do surpass, and they are wise. Is it not so? 

Theo. Yes. 

So. Now if he had himself been present and made this 
admission, instead of our making it in his defence, we need 
not have strengthened ourselves by recurring to the subject : 
but now perhaps some one may allege that we are in- 
competent to make the confession on his part. It is 
better to come to a clearer mutual understanding on this 
special point. For whether it is so or not makes a great 
difference. 

Theo. Very true. | 

So. Let us obtain the admission not through others, 
but from his statement, as briefly as we can! | 

Theo. How? 

So. In this way. He says, does he not, that what 

( seems to every one ‘is’ also to him unto whom it seems? 

Theo. Yes, he does. 

So. Do not we also, Protagoras, state a man’s opinion, 
or rather the opinions of all men, when we say that 
there is nobody who does not deem himself wiser than 
others in some respects, and others wiser than himself in 
other respects ; and, moreover, _that in the greatest perils, 
when they are distressed in war or disease or at sea, me 
regard their rulers on such occasions as gods, expectin 





TRANSLATION. | 151 























em to be their saviours, though they differ from them in 
nothing but knowledge? And all human life teerhs with 
people who are seeking teachers and rulers of themselves 
and of other living creatures and of the various trades; 
and teems, again, with other people who deem themselves 
competent ch and_ competent to rule. And in all 
thesé cases what else can we say than that men_themselves 
think there exists am among them wisdom and ignorance ? 
~fiev. Nothing else. 

So. Do they not deem wisdom to be true οὐράν νον; and 
ignorance’false opinion? — | - — 
Theo. Certainly. 

So. Well then, how shall we deal with the argument, 

Protagoras? Must we say that men always.havetrue_ 
opinions, or sometimes true, sometimes false? From both 
views it results that they do not always think true things, 
but at_times it at_times true things, ‘at times false. For considér, ~~~ 
Theodorus, whether any Protagorean, or you yourself, would 
wish to contend that no one person considers any other 
to be unlearned and to have false opinions. 
Theo. ‘That is incredible, Socrates. 
So. And yet the doctrine which says that man is the 
measure of all things is brought to this unavoidable con- 
clusion. ae 
Theo. How so? 
So. When you, after forming some judgment in your 
“own mind on any point, declare to me your opinign, be it 
granted according to his doctrine that this is true to you: 
but is it not allowed to the rest of us to become judges 
respecting your judgment? must we always judge that you 
have true opinions? do not a countless number in each 
‘instance contend against you with contrary opinions, be- 
lieving that you judge and think falsities ? 





΄ 


152 THEAETETUS. 


Theo. Yes verily, Socrates, countless myriads indeed, 
as Homer says, who give me all the trouble in the world. 

So. Well? would you have us say that in that case you 
have opinions true to yourself but false to the countless 
myriads ἢ 

Theo. Such seems to be the necessary inference from 
the statement. 

Se. And how as to Protagoras himself? Supposing ~ 
he did not think man a measure, and the public did not + 
think so, (as indeed they do not), would it not necessarily © 
follow that what he delivered in writing as Truth, is Truth © 
to nobody? or if he thought so, and the public does not 
agree with him, do you see that in proportion as those who ~ 
deny are more numerous than those who affirm, so much ‘ 
more decidedly it is or is not so? 

Theo. Of necessity, if according to each individual ~ 
opinion it will be or will not be so. 

So. In the next place it involves this very queer result, 
that he on his side, by confessing that all men hold true — 
opinions, admits that the opinion of the opposite party | 
about his opinion (which they deem false) is a true one. | 

Theo. Certainly. 

So. Will he not admit that his own is false, if he 
confesses that the opinion of those who suppose him to 
think falsely is true? 

Theo. Of course. 

So. But the others on their side do not admit that they 
think falsely. | 

Theo. No, they do not. | 

So. And he again confesses also this Option to be true — 
according to his written doctrines. | 

Theo. Evidently. 


So. By all parties then it will be ἀλέαν including | 



















TRANSLATION. 153 
rotagoras (by him it will rather be confessed, for when he 
rants to a gainsayer that the latter thinks what is true, then 
oes Protagoras himself confess), that no dog or man he 
meets with is a measure concerning anything which he has 
ot learnt. Is it not so? 
mB Theo. Yes. 
So. Since this is the contention of all, to nobody — 
will the Truth of Protagoras be true, neither to himself nor 
Ὁ anyone else. 
| Zheo. We run down my friend very hard, Socrates. 
So. But it is doubtful, my friend, if we are outrunning 
the fact. It is likely that he being older is wiser than we: 
nd if he could at once pop up his head where we are, 
he would not sink down and run away again, until, pro- 
ably, he had convicted me of talking much nonsense, and 
fou of agreeing to it. As it is, we must needs, I think, 
nake the best of ourselves, such as we are, and state our 
al opinions for the time being. And must we not now 
ay that everybody will confess this—that one man is wiser, 
one more ignorant, than another? 
_ Zheo. Yes, I think so. 


Tf we admit, Socrates goes on, that each may judge for himself with equal 23 
truth as to some sensible things, as ‘hot’ and ‘cold; this is not unt- 
versally applicable. For instance, all do not know with equal truth 
what is ‘wholesome’ for them. Again, if we admit that states and 
persons may judge with equal truth of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ ‘holy’ 
_ and ‘unholy,’ they certainly cannot equally well decide what is and 
will be ‘expedient’ and ‘inexpedient’ for them. But, he adds, this opens 
new questions. Well, says Theodorus, have we not leisure for them? Yes, 
replies Socrates, we have; and this ts the reason why philosophers 
make such a poor figure in the law-courts. Their habits are those of 
freemen; those of lawyers are in a manner slavish. Then follows 
the Socratic picture of an Athenian lawyer's habits and character. 


154 THEAETETUS. 


He asks if Theodorus wishes to hear its contrast in the habits an 
character of the true philosopher. Theodorus ts very desirous | 
hear this.] 


































So. Must we not also say that our argument is mos 
stably conducted on the lines we prescribed in our defence 
of Protagoras, averring that most things are as they seem 
‘each, hot, dry, sweet, all such-like’? but that, if he will gran 
that one excels another in anything, he will be ready to sa 
so in judgments upon health and disease: not every womai 
or child or beast, he will admit, knows what is wholesome 
in its own case, and is competent to cure itself: here, iff 
anywhere, one excels another. . 

Theo. I think so. | 

8 a ὁ- SO. Ι In politics, too, will he not say, that of thing 
| honourable and dishonourable, just and unjust, holy and un 
holy, whatsoever each state shall deem and enact to be lawft 

for itself are also lawful in truth for each, and that in thes 

no individual or state is wiser than another? but in enacti 

things expedient or inexpedient, here, if anywhere, he wil 

confess that counsellor differs from counsellor and the 

᾽ opinion of one city from that of another in respect of truth, 
and he will certainly not venture to affirm, that whatever 

a state shall deem and enact to be expedient for itself wil 

most assuredly be expedient. {{ But of the former things 1 

named, justice and injustice, holiness and unholiness, the} 

(the Protagoreans) are ready to insist that none has an 
essential nature, but that whatever has seemed good b: 

public consentis true when it has seemed good, and as lon 

as~it seems good’. And those who do not altogether ech 

_23 1 Such-like, ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου, lit. all that are of this type, i-¢ 

(as Prof. Jowett says) ‘immediate sensations.’ % 
In the first two speeches (§ 23) assigned to Socrates the subject 
who express or allow opinions are very indistinctly stated. The reasc 


TRANSLATION. 155 


‘ 

































6 doctrine of Protagoras, take some such philosophic 
jew. But now, Theodorus, we have question growing out 
f question, greater out of less. 
Theo. Are we not at leisure, Socrates ? 
_ So. We appear to be. On mariy occasions, my good 
ir, I have noticed, but especially on this, how natural it is 
those who have spent much time on philosophy, when 
they go into the law-courts, to shew themselves absurd 
} orators. 
| Zheo. Wow do you mean? 
So. People who from their youth have been knocking 
out in law-courts and such like scenes, as compared with 
‘those who have been reared in philosophic and literary 
society, seem to have had a breeding like that of slaves 
compared with freemen. 
Theo. In what respects? ' 
So. In that (referring to your last observation) philoso- 
hers have leisure at all times, and hold their discussions 
peacefully and with leisurely ease, and as we have now been 


of this seems to be, that he is referring throughout to what was said in - 
defence of Protagoras made in the name of Protagoras (§ 20). The 
ratio obliqua with which the first speech begins is dependent (as the 
translation indicates) on the ἄλλο τὶ φῶμεν (must we not say?) at the 
close of the previous speech in §22. Of ξυγχωρήσεται and ἐθελῆσαι ἂν 
φάναι, according to Heindorf and Stallbaum, τις τινὰ understood are 
verally the subjects. Iam rather disposed to understand Ipwrayépas 
md IIpwrayépav, as Protagoras had been mentioned just before, and 
lis confession would be appropriate here. For the same reasons I sup- 
pose him to be the subject on whose statement or admission the oratio 
Sobliqua depends in the first paragraph of the second speech (οὐκοῦν 
«.T.A.), after which ὁμολογήσει comes, where Protagoras is the natural 
ubject. In the next sentence, where he recurs to τὰ καλὰ κ.τ.λ., 
Plato uses the plural ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. We cannot doubt that 
le speaks of the scholars of Protagoras, who still profess their master’s 
doctrine on the question specified. 


156 _THEAETETUS. 



























pursuing three arguments in succession, so do they also 
if one which follows pleases them better than the preced 
ing; nor do they care whether they speak briefly or 2 
length, if only they can attain truth. The other class@ 
always speak in haste ; for the flow of water* quickens them,§ 
and they are not allowed to make their speeches on any- 
thing they desire; and the opponent stands over them 
holding compulsion in the shape of a prescribing document 
read in the ear, beyond the limits of which they must ποῦ 
speak, yclept an affidavit*: and the arguments are always) 
about a fellow-slave addressed to a master on the bench,j 
who holds justice between his finger and thumb; an ‘ 
the contests are never away from the point®, but to the 
point of self-interest ; and often too the race is for life. So 
that on all these grounds they become keen and shrewd, 
knowing how to wheedle the master by word and gratify him 
by deed, being stunted and crooked in soul. For their 
slavery from childhood has robbed them of growth and 
uprightness and freedom, compelling them to act tortuously, 
setting before their yet tender souls great perils and fears. 
And as they cannot bear up against these with the help of 
justice and truth, they have recourse at once to falsehood 
and mutual injury, and twist themselves in many ways, and 
become warped; and so they pass from, youth to manhood 
‘without any mental soundness, becoming, as they imagine, 


3 Flow of water. The κλεψύδρα or water-clock, used to measure 
the time allowed to each orator, and placed within his view. 
4 Affidavit, ἀντωμοσία, literally counter-affidavit. The pleas o 
each party in a cause were affirmed by their several oaths: and by the ; 
affirmations they or their advocates would be bound, and could not 
stray from them. : 
5 Away from the point, τὴν ἄλλως (ὁδόν), a proverbial phrase. Suck 
also is περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος. 


























TRANSLA TION. 157 


ever and wise. Such is this class of men, Theodorus. 
Would you wish us now to describe those of our circle, or 
Ὁ pass them by and return to our argument, that we may 
lot, as we just now said, abuse too far our freedom in the 
thange of topics? 
| Zheo. Not so, Socrates; finish the description, For 
ou have said with great truth that we who form a circle 
ike this are not servants of our discussions: our discussions 
are, as it were, our servants, and each of them waits to be 
completed when we think fit. For amongst us there is no 
presiding authority; neither dicast to rule, nor spectator, as 
nh the case of poets, to censure. 


ὁ habits and character of the true philosopher are depicted in this and 4 24 
; the succeeding chapter.] 


_ So. We must speak then, seemingly, since you think 
proper, concerning the leaders of such a circle ; for why need 
yne mention the inferior students of philosophy? This 
class from their youth, in the first place, do not know 
he way to the agora, nor where a law-court is or a council- 
jall or any other political meeting-room: laws and decrees 
spoken or written they neither see nor hear. Societies 
witating for office and clubs and dinners and wine-bouts 
with flute-girls—these are practices which even in dreams 
Jo not occur to them. . Whether any one in the city is well 
ill born, whether a person has inherited any disgrace 
rom ancestors on the male or female side, he knows no. 
more than he does of the proverbial ‘gallons in the sea.’ 
Te does not even know that he is ignorant of all these 
nings; for it is not for credit’s sake that he stands aloof 
rom them, but in point of fact it is only his body that 
eposes and resides in the city, while his mind, deeming 


158 . * THEAETETUS. 

























all these things petty and insignificant, moves in every 
direction, as: Pindar says, measuring things beneath th 
earth and on its surface, and star-gazing above the heaven, 
and searching out everywhere the nature of each class of 
existing things, condescending to none of those which 8 
near it. 

Theo. How do you mean, Socrates ? “A 

So. Compare the case of Thales, O Theodorus. While 
he was astronomising and gazing upward he fell into a well 
and a clever and witty Thracian maidservant is said to 
have taunted him with desiring to know what was in heaven,! 
but not seeing what was before him and at his feet. ~The 
same taunt is good for all who are devoted to philosophy. 
For in fact such a student is not only unaware of what his 
next neighbour is doing, but does not even know whether 
he is a man or some other creature. But what man is, and 
what it belongs to such a nature to do or to suffer different] 
from all others, this he inquires, and takes pains to search 
out. You understand, I hope, Theodorus, do you not? 

Theo. 1 do, and your words are true.. 

So. Therefore, my friend, a man like this, in his 
associaticns private and public, as I said at first, when ir 
a law-court or elsewhere he is compelled to discourse o; 
things at his feet and before his eyes, becomes a laughing 
stock not only to Thracian maids, but to the general public 
falling into wells and perplexities of every kind from inex 
perience ; and his awkwardness is marvellous, raising a sus | 
picion of imbecility. For when personal reviling is the orde: 
of the day, he has no scandalous charge to bring, knowingil 
no evil of anybody, because he has never taken the trouble 
So he gets laughed at for his helplessness. And wher 
eulogies and glorification of others are the theme, he is 
seen to laugh in right earnest without any affectation; 



























TRANSLATION. 159 


) he seems to be silly. When a tyrant or a king is ex-. 
led, he thinks he hears one of the herdsmen, ‘swineherd 
shepherd or cowherd, congratulated for his large milking: 
ut he considers that the royal proprietors in their tending 
ad milking have to deal with a more untoward and insidious 
fanimal than the others have,’ and that any one of them \ 
fmust, for want of leisure, perforce prove quite as rude and | 
minstructed as the real herdsmen,- having his fortifica- 
ftion built round him like a stall upon the mountain. αν 
en he hears it said that somebody, who has got ten: 
afzhousand acres of land or more, has a wonderfully large 
state, he thinks the quantity named a very small one, from 
being in the habit of contemplating the whole earthy And 
hen they extol birth, and say that some one is a gentleman 
being able to show seven rich ancestors, this he regards 

5 praise emanating from very dull and short-sighted persons, 
tho through want of education can never take.a comprehen-_ 
ive view, so as to see that every man has had countless 
ayriads of forefathers, among whom in every case are found 
many rich and poor, kings and slaves, both Greeks and 
arbarians, recurring again and again. He is amazed at the 
nanifestly narrow conception of those who pride themselves 
Ἢ a list of twenty-five ancestors, carried back to Heracles, 
on of Amphitryon ; and he laughs at men who cannot bear 

ἢ mind that»the twenty-fifth ancestor, counting back from 
phitryon, and again the fiftieth before him, were just 
hatever they might happen to be—and by suchi-reflection — 
et rid of their foolish vanity.¥ On all these occasions 
y}such a man is scorned by the multitude, partly, it would 
sem, on the charge of arrogance, partly for not, know- - 
¢ what stares him in the face, and for helplessness in 
meral. 

_ Theo. Ut certainly does happen as you say, Socrates. 


a 


7160 THEAETEIUS, 


25 [When Socrates has completed his description of the true philosop 
Theodorus, assenting, says there would be less evil in the world if a 
men felt as he did. Socrates says that evil must remain as the ant 
thesis of good; and, in a beautiful digression, he exhibits the contra. 
between justice and holiness on the one hand, which are blessed an 
godlike, injustice and unholiness on the other, which are wretched an 
godless. The unrighteous are apt to pride themselves on their ow 
wickedness; but their self-satisfaction ts unreal, and collapses at th 
last. | 


















So. But when he himself, my friend, leads any mé 
to take a higher view, and that man consents to quit his} 
‘How do I wrong you er you me,’ for the consideratio: 
of justice and injustice—what each is in itself, and whereit 
they differ from all other things or from each other,—or t 
turn from the maxim ‘ Happy the king, happy the possesso 
of much gold,’ to the consideration of kingship itself an 
human happiness and misery generally—what they are an 
how it befits human nature to attain the one and escap 
the other—on all these subjects, I say, when that pett 
narrow-minded legal personage i s required to render reasor 
he presents a counterpart ὁ of the philosopher... Statione 
upon a height and gazing down: from his elevated pos 
tion, he turns dizzy from inexperience, and, uneas 
perplexed and stuttering, he is a laughing-stock, not t 

Thracian girls or any uneducated person, for they do πὸ 
see the absurdity, but to all whose training has not bee 
that of slaves. Such are their several characters, Theodoru: 
One is that of the man really bred in freédom and leisu 

, whom you call philosopher; who may without reproac 
seem simple and be incompetent when he is engaged 
menial services ; when he does not, for instance, know ho 
to pack a trunk of linen, or to season a dish or a flatteri 
speech. The other is that of him who can perform all suc 


TRANSLATION. 161 
































ervices thoroughly and briskly, but who does not know 
iow to don his cloak like a gentleman, or, by acquiring 
larmony of language, to sing well the true life of gods and 
lessed men. 
Theo. Vf you could bring home what you say to all 
aen, Socrates, as you do to me, there would be more peace 
ind less evil in the world. 
ΟΠ So. Nay, Theodorus, evil cannot, on the one hand, 
Pperish altogether, for something opposite to good there 
must ever be; nor, on the other, can it find a seat in heaven : 
‘Dut our mortal nature and this lower region it haunts per- 
orce. * Wherefore we must endeavour to fly from this world . 
to the other as soon as we can. Now that flight means 
he becoming like to God as much as possible ; and the 
yay to be like God is to become just a and holy δι and wise. 
Sut indeed, my excellent friend, it is by no means an easy 
ask to convince the world that the reasons on which most 
people found the duty of shunning vice and pursuing 
irtue are not the just motives for practising the latter and 
avoiding the former: in order, to wit, that a man may not 
sem to be wicked, and that he may seem to be good.- 
hese views, in ἜΝ clear opinion, are what is called an 
jd woman’s fable: the real truth we may state as follows. 
Sod is in no way and in no degree unjust, but just in the 
pehest extreme ; and nothing is more like to him than one 
us who in his own aah shall become as just as possible, | 
dereby-is shown a man’s veritable power, in the one: case ; 
n the other, his worthless and unmanly character. For 
| he cognition of this truth is genuine wisdom and virtue, 
thile the ignorance of it is manifest unintelligence and 
riciousness. Everything else which is taken for mental 
power and wisdom is in political government vulgar, in art 
gnoble. It is by far the best way then not to allow for a 


K. P. 11 


i) 


162 THEAETETUS. 





















moment that one who acts unjustly and speaks or practise! 
impiety is a man of powerful mind because he is a rogue 
Such people pride themselves on the reproach, and suppo 
it to mean that they are no whipsters, no mere lounger 
about the streets, but the sort of men they ought to be tc 
hold their own in the state.,, They must be told the truth 
therefore; namely—that. their belief of not being wha 
they are makes them what they are so much the more. 
For they do not know the penalty of injustice, a thing of a 
others which it is most proper to know. It is not what they 
suppose, stripes and capital punishments, which men some=| 
times do not incur when they act unjustly, but one from 
which it is impossible to escape. 

Theo. What do you refer to? 

So. There are, my friend, established in the world two 
types ; of supreme happiness in the godly nature, of supremé 
misery in the ungodly: and these men, not seeing this truth, 
in their weakness and utter folly do by their unjust deed 
insensibly become like the latter nature, unlike the former. 
The punishment they suffer is that of living a life corre 
spondent with that nature to which they become like, 
And if we tell them that, unless they get rid of thei 
wondrous wisdom, when they are dead, yon place pur 
from evil will not receive them, and they will ever continu 
to live in this world a life resembling themselves—evi 
amidst, evil associations—such language they will un 
doubtedly hear as clever and cunning rogues listening t 
a pack of fools. 

Theo. To be sure they will, Socrates. 

So. I know it well, my friend. There is however on 
thing that befalls them. If in private they are required t 
give a reasonable account of their censures, though’ for 
long time they are willing to abide the brunt manfully an 


~ 






























TRANSLATION. 163 


| not to flee like cowards, at last, my good ‘sir, they are 
“strangely dissatisfied with their own reasoning; and that 
| rhetoric of theirs dies out, somehow or other, so that: 
| they seem no better than children. As to these people, 

however, since the topic is a mere digression, let us drop 
the conversation: or else further considerations will con- 
‘tinue to stream in and stifle our original argument. Let 
} us return to the previous question, with your leave. | 
| Theo. For my own part, Socrates, I lend an ear to such 
᾿ digressions with quite as much pleasure, as they are easier 
| for a man of my age to follow. But, if you prefer it, let us 
| return to our subject. : 


Τ᾿ [Returning to his subject, Socrates says that the laws of a state have 26 
expediency (ro ὠφέλιμον) for their end ; but they often fail to attain 
wt. Lxpediency is tested by the future. Does Protagoras pretend to be 
a measure of this? Well not a medical man judge better than he of ' 
the probability of a fever, a vine-grower of the expected quality of a 
wine, and so on, even as Protagoras himself could judge better than 
they of the arguments likely to prevail in a court of law? This was 

᾿ς, fis forte and profession. He got a fortune by it. Would he have done 
so if he had told those who consulted him that they could judge as well 

( as he? No: and it ἐς hence evident that the more intelligent man ts a 
measure, the unintelligent has no claim to be socalled. True, says 
Theodorus ; and my friend’s doctrine ts overthrown by this argument 
as well as by the former which showed that, while he admitted the 
opinions of all men to be true, most men denied this opinion of his to 
be true: which leaves him self-confuted. Yes, says Socrates, and 
many other confuting reasons might be added. But the momentary 
affections, from which arise sensation and opinion, are not so easily 
shown to be untrue. There is great disputation on this subject.} 


᾿ rs So. We had, I think, reached this point in our argu- 


11—2 


164 THEAETETUS. 


essence, and who aver that what at any time seems to each is 
for him to whom it seems, we said that—while on other points, 
and specially with respect to justice, such men would insist 
strongly, that what a state enacts as its pleasure, is just for 
the enacting state as long as it remains enacted—yet with 
respect to good, none are so bold as to contend that what 
a state enacts considering it useful, is useful so long as it 
remains enacted, unless one choose to lay. stress on the 
mere term; and that would be quibbling as to our real 
question, Would it not? 

Theo. Certainly. 3 

So. He should not dwell on the term, but on the thing 
which under that term is considered. 

Theo. ‘True. | an 

So. Whatever term the state give to it, that which the 
state aims at in its legislation is, I suppose, this: all its laws, 
so far as its opinion and power extend, are framed in order | 
to be as useful to itself as possible. Does it legislate with 
any other view? 

Theo. None. ' 

So. Does it always succeed? or do all states err in 
many cases Ὁ 

Lheo. 1 think they sometimes err. 

So. Ay, and one may be led to this same admission 
more readily, by putting the question as to the whole class, 
of which the useful is a part. I suppose it relates to future 
time as well as to present. ἢ When we legislate, we enact 
our laws as intended to be useful for the time that is to 
follow. This we should rightly term ‘ future’? 

Theo. Certainly. 

So. Well then: let us ask Protagoras, or any of those 
who adopt his doctrine, this question. Man is the measure 
of all things, as ye say, O Protagoras ; of things white, heavy, 




























TRANSLATION. 165 


light, all such-like. For, having the test in himself, thinking 
| what he feels, he thinks what is, and what is to himself true. 
| Is it not so? 

Ὶ Theo. It-is. 

— So. And of things which are niveaties to be, we 
' shall say, O Protagoras, has -he the test in himself, and 
(Ὁ they turn out to him such as he thinks they will be? 
Heat, for instance: when an unskilled person thinks that 
he will be seized with fever, and that this state of heat will 
- occur, and another, who is a medical man, has an opposite 
opinion, shall we say that the future will turn out according 
_ to the opinion of one of the two, or according to that of 
both, and that to the medical man he will not be hot or 
feverish, but to himself both these ? 

Theo. ‘This would be absurd. 
So. And, I suppose, with respect to the future sweetness 
or harshness of wine, the vine-grower’s A esi, not that of 
the harp-player, will prevail ? 
_ Theo. Of course. 
So. Again, as to good and bad music, a gymnast cannot 
| judge beforehand so well as a musician, even of that which, 
_ after he has heard it, the gymnast himself will deem to be 
good music. 

Theo. Certainly not. 
So. The judgment also of one who, without culinary 
skill, is preparing to feast, will, while the banquet is in 
“preparation, be less valid concerning the future pleasure 
_ than the judgment of the cook. We must not in our 
present argument inquire as to that which now is or 
which has been pleasant to each, but as to that which 
is about to seem and to be pleasant,—whether each 
individual is the best judge for himself. For example, 
would not you, Protagoras, form beforehand a better opinion 


| 


\ 


166 THEAETETUS. : 


than an untutored person of the arguments which each of : 
us would find persuasive in a court of law? 

Theo. The very point, Socrates, in which he used to 
declare strongly that he had no rival. 

So. To be sure he did, my dear friend ; and nobody 
would have paid large sums of money to converse with him, 
if he had tried to persuade his pupils that no person, 
prophet, or other, is a better judge of what in the future will 
be, and’seem to be, than a man’s own self’, 

Theo. Very true. 

So. Are not legislation and expediency concerned with 
the future, and will not every one confess that a state, 
when legislating, must of necessity often fail to attain that 
which is most useful ? 

Theo. Certainly. 

So. Then it will be a fair thing to say to your master,— 
he must perforce confess that one man is wiser than another, 
and that such a man is indeed a measure ; while for me, who 
am unknowing, there is no kind of necessity to become a 
measure, compelled though I was -just now to be one, 
whether I would or not, by my argument in his defence. 

Theo. In my judgment, Socrates, that is the best way 
of confuting his doctrine, though it is also confuted by this 
consideration, that it makes other people’s opinions valid, 
and by these opinions (as was shown) his statements are 


— 





_ deemed to be anything but true. ἢ ἢ 


(c 


26 


such as this, that every opinion of every person is true, 
can be confuted. But, in respect to momentary affections, ἢ 
from which arise perception and correspondent opinion, 
it is more difficult to convict these of untruth. I am 
very likely wrong, however: possibly they are irrefragable ; 


So. In many other ways, also, Theodorus, a doctrine 


1 See Notes appended. 


ns 























TRANSLATION. © 167 


ind those who assert them to be clear, and to be cognitions, 
|may perhaps tell the truth, and our friend Theaetetus may 
"not have missed the mark in laying down that perception and 
\knowledge are the same. We must come closer then and 
examine this moving essence, by tapping it to see whether 
i sounds whole or cracked. No slight war is waged about 
this between combatants not a few. 


WZheodorus gives a half serious, half jocular, character of the Heracleitean 27 
champions of the Flux. Socrates supports it by citing Homer's words 
as a veiled philosophy, openly professed by Heracleitus. He then refers 
to the antagonistic School (Eleatic), of which are Melissus and Par- 
menides, who teach the doctrine of Rest and Oneness of Being. Be- 
tween the two, he says, we may find ourselves perplexed like outsiders 
b.tween the two contending parties in the game called διὰ γραμμῆς.} 


| Zheo. Far indeed from being a slight one ; in Ionia the 
‘doctrine makes great strides. The followers of Heracleitus 
pport it very vigorously. — 

So. On that account, dear Theodorus, we must examine 
it more fundamentally, as they suggest. 
_ heo. Decidedly. For indeed, Socrates, as to these 
followers of Heracleitus, or, as you say, of Homer, and of 
others still more ancient, if we take their leading men about 
Ephesus, who pretend to be learned in the doctrines, there 
no possibility of holding an argument with them any more 
than with lunatics. They are always in motion after the 
manner of their writings, and as to pausing on one sub- 
ject, and inquiring and answering quietly in turn, their 
power of doing this is below zero. An infinite minus 
quantity goes nearer to expressing that these men have 
not in them the least particle of quietness. If you ask 
them any question, they pluck as it were out of their quiver 


168 THEAETETUS. 


a little riddling phrase or two and shoot them at you, and if 
you try to get any account from the man of what he has 
said, you will be smitten with another under some novel 
change of name, and so you will never reach a conclusion 
with any one of them. Nor indeed will they themselves do 
so in their mutual discussions. They carefully guard them- 
selves from allowing any certainty to appear either in an 
argument or in their own souls, deeming this, I suppose, a 
stable principle. Any such they are at war with and repel, 
as much as they can, on every side. 

So. Probably, Theodorus, you have seen these men in 
battle, and never met with them in a pacific state, as they 
are no companions of yours. But, I suppose, they do teach 
certain principles at leisure to their scholars, whom they wish 
to make like themselves. 

Theo. What do you mean by scholars, my good sir? 
These folk are not scholars one of another; they arise by 
spontaneous growth, each from some casual inspiration, 
and there is not one of them that supposes another to know 
anything.. From these men, as I was going to say, you can 
never get a reason with or against their will. We must 
ourselves receive their doctrine, and examine it like a 
mathematical problem. 

So. Very fairly suggested. We have however received the 
problem in another shape, from the ancients first, who hide it 
from the multitude in poetry, how that Oceanus and Tethys, 
the progenitors of all things, are streams, and that nothing 
stands still: from later writers secondly, who, being 
wiser, proclaim their views openly, that even a cobbler 
may hear and learn their wisdom, and cease to suppose 
some existences stand still while others are moving, 
and so, having been taught that all things move, may 
honour his teachers. I almost forgot, Theodorus, that 


TRANSLATION. 169. 




















hers again put forth the doctrine opposite to this: for 
istance, 
‘Unmoved is that they call the universe,’ 


nd other dogmas, which, in opposition to all the preceding, 
ch men as Melissus and Parmenides’ insist upon, how that 
1 things are one, and that this one stands self-supported, 
)having no region wherein it moves. How shall we deal 
Pwith all these, my friend? for we have gone on little by 
little till we find ourselves unexpectedly thrown midway 
)between them, and if we do not struggle to find an escape, 
Sve shall be punished like those who play across a line in 
restling-grounds, when they are seized by both parties and 
ragged in opposite directions. So I think we must begin by 
Peonsidering the one party, to whom we first addressed our- 
elves, the fluent gentlemen. And if they appear to have 
90d reasons, we will help them to drag us over, and try to 
scape from their opponents ; but if the standard-bearers of 
)*the Whole’ seem to give the true account, to them will 
ye fly from those who move even the immoveable. If we 
nd that neither of them have any satisfactory account to 
ive, we shall get laughed at for supposing that poor 
eatures like us have anything of weight to say, and for 
savowing men of the highest antiquity and wisdom. 
Sonsider, Theodorus, whether it is our interest to incur so 
great a risk. 
Theo. Way, Socrates, it cannot be endured that we 
iould refuse to consider what each of these parties has to 


1 The Eleatic School; see p. 118, 


170 THEAETETUS. 










28 [Socrates now disproves the doctrine that perception. 2, cde on Hera- 
cleitean principles. Motion is of two kinds, locomotion (including 
SOL OT bariation, And, as all is in flux, everything must 
have both these motions. Referring now to the account previously 
given of the manner in which sensation ἐς generated, he shews that no 
object can be called by any name: for before you can say that it is this 
or that (white for instance) the flux has proceeded, and the object is 
now something else. Perception therefore can be no more said to b 
knowledge than to be not knowledge, and the doctrine of Protagoras' 
falls to the ground. Socrates sums up by saying that he therefore 
does not allow that man is the measure ofall things, unless it be @ 
wise man; nor yet that, according to the Heracleitean doctrine (πάντα 
ῥεῖ), knowledge ts perception.| 


So. We must consider them, as you urge it so strongly. 
‘I think the first step in our consideration is concerning 
motion, to see what they intend by saying that all things 
move. What I mean to say is this. Do they speak of 
one kind of motion, or, as I think evident, two? But let 
it not be my sole opinion; share it with me yourself, that 
we may abide in common any result. Do you say a thing 
is moved when it changes from place to place, or revolve: 
in the same place? 

Theo. 1 do. 

So. Let this be one kind, Now, when it stays in the 
same place, but grows old, or becomes black from being 
white, or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other varia 
tion, is it not proper to say this is another kind of motion ? 

Theo, 1 think so. 

So. You cannot help it. These then I name are twe 
kinds of motion, variation one, revolution another’. 





28 1. περιφοράν. But we should have expected φοράν, as Plato says 
immediately φερόμενόν τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον. Prof. Campbell thinks the 
motion of the heavens is regarded as embracing all other kinds. Is this 
quite satisfactory, or must we assume that περιφυράν is corrupt here? — 


ΤΑΑΝΘΦΑΤΙ͂ΟΝ, 171 

































Theo. You name them rightly, . 
' So. Having made this division, let us now argue 
h those who say that all things move, and put to them 
§ question: do you say that all things move in both 
ys, by local movement and by variation, or that one 
ng moves in both ways, another in one of the two? 
‘Theo. Nay, upon my word I cannot pronounce. I 
nk they would say all things move in both ways. 
So. Yes; for if not, my friend, they will evidently make 
fem to be both in motion and at rest, and it will be no more 
Fight to say that all things move than that they stand still. 
Theo. Most truly stated. 
» So. Accordingly, since they must move, and it is im- 
ossible for anything not to be moving, all things are 
ays moving with every kind of motion. 
Theo. Necessarily. 
So. Now consider this point. in their statements. 
id we not say that they state the generation of heat or 
iteness or any other perception in some such way as 
that each of these things at the moment of perception 
ves between the agent and the patient, and that the 
fient comes to be a percipient? but not perception, 
1 the agent a qualified thing but not a quality? 
lerhaps however quality seems to you to be a strange term, 
nd you do not understand it when named in the general. 
sar it then in particulars. ‘The agent comes to be neither 
nor whiteness, but a hot thing and a white thing, and so 
h everything else. You remember, I suppose, that in 


2 The ms. word αἰσθητὸν here must be corrupt. Buttmann’s con- 
ure αἰσθητὴν (though not elsewhere found) has been largely received. 
f. Campbell prefers αἰσθανόμενον, chiefly on account of gender. 
, as the patient is conceived of as a man, the synesis is surely 


172 THEAETETUS. 















our former statements we laid it down thus; that noth 
‘is’ one by itself, so also neither agent nor patient; 
that from both ‘coming to be’ together in mutual relati 
sensations and sensible things are engendered, and the ¢ 
comes to be of some quality and the other percipient*. 

Theo. 1 remember, of course. 

So. Let us now spare ourselves the pains of consi 
ing their other various propcsitions, and, noting the 
which is the subject of our discussion, let us put to them th 
question : ‘ All things, you say, move and are in flux.’ 
this right ? 

Theo. Yes. 

So. Do they then move with both kinds of moti 
which we distinguished, locomotion and variation ἢ 

Theo. Of course they do, if they are to move cc 
pletely. 

So. If they moved only, and were not changed, 
suppose we should be able to say what kinds of thi 
they are that move in flux. Should we not? 

Theo. Yes. 

So. Since it is not even an abiding fact, that what is 
flux flows white, but it changes, and so there is a flux 
this very thing, whiteness, and a change to another cole 
that it may not be convicted of abiding in this one—is 
ever possible to name any colour so as to give a CO 
name ? 

Theo. What possibility can there be, Socrates, in t 
or any other such thing, if it always slips away as one 
speaking, being in constant flux? 

So. And what shall we say of any kind of perceptic 
such as sight or hearing? Shall we say that it ever abic 
in the act of seeing or hearing ? 


3 On this corrupt place see the appended Notes. 





TRANSLATION. 173 
eo. Certainly it must not, seeing that all things are 


; 
gis 
= 


So. We cannot therefore aver that we see a thing more 




















n that we do not see it, or that we have any perception 
more than that we have it not, since all things are in every 
moving ? 
Γ Zhe. We cannot indeed. 
So. And yet knowledge is perception, as I and Theae- 
Reus settled it. 
i Zhe. So it was. 
m So. Accordingly, when asked what knowledge is, in 
if reply we no more stated what it is than what it is not. 
fh Zhe. Seemingly not. 
| S0. A fine issue to the supplement of our answer, when 
me were so eager to show that all things move :—for the 
056, forsooth, of proving that answer right. Now the 
ig proved seems to be, that, if all things move, every 
wer on every possible subject is equally right—to say it 
? so and it ‘is’ not so, or if you prefer the term, ‘comes 
ibe,’ that our terminology may not make them‘ stationary. 
Theo. You say rightly. 
fe So. Except, Theodorus, that I said ‘So’ and ‘ Not so.’ 
ought not to use this word ‘So,’ for no motion would be 
(pressed by it; nor yet ‘Not so,’ for here again is no 
tion. But we must supply some other language to those 
lho state this doctrine; since now in fact they have no 
ids to convey their own hypothesis, except perhaps 
ise” This might suit them best, being an indefinite 


Yes, that style of speech would be most natural 


ΤΡ ee twas κὸν δ να; anh Gt 
ταὶ suits better: but abrets may stand, refered to τοῦς ῥέοντας, ; 


= 


174 THEAETETUS. 



















So. Thus, Theodorus, we have got rid of your frier 
and do not yet concede to him that every man is t 
measure of every thing, if he be not a wise man; nor y 
will we concede that’ knowledge is perception, at least 

\ the supposition of ali things moving. 

Theo. A good hearing, Socrates: for, as this topic 
concluded, I must be rid of the task of answering you, 
by our compact I was to be, when the question about t 
doctrine of Protagoras should come to an end. 


29 [ Theodorus rejoices that, according to the bargain, he was to be let oF 
Srom the argument at this point. Theaetetus thinks he should go\ 
to discuss the opposite theory of fest, Theodorus jocularly scolds hi 
and insists on his taking his turn. He consents. But Socrates, pi 
Jessing the highest respect for Parmenides, and alluding to the difficult 
which his writings present, prefers adhering to the question at ts. 
the definition of knowledge. Returning to his dialectic process, 
leads Theaetetus to admit that it is more proper to say we perce 
through the senses than with the senses, thus pointing to a cen 
percipient (the soul). Next he makes him admit that the senses belo 
to the body, and that things perceived by one organ are not percetd 
by another. Hence any common notion acquired about things whiché 
perceived by two different organs is not acquired through either orga 
as existence, sameness, difference, likeness, and so on. What are t 
organs through which all these and other abstract notions are ¢ 
quired? Theaetetus thinks they have no peculiar organs assigned 
them ; but that the soul by tts own powers observes these common 27 
perties, Socrates commends his conclusion as agreeing with his o 


Theae. Nay, Theodorus, not before you and Socrat 
have discussed, as you just now proposed, the doctrine 
those who on the other hand affirm that the universe is 
rest. . 

Theo. What? you, Theaetetus, a mere youth, teachi 
your elders to commit the sin of violating compacts! Com 
gird yourself up to debate with Socrates that which remai 




















TRANSLATION. 175 


_Iheae. Oh, certainly, if he wishes. But I should have. 
sen delighted to hear the other topic discussed. 
_ Lheo. You: challenge cavalry to the plain when you 
lallenge Socrates to argument. Ask him, and you will 
ar his answer. . 
_ So. Ay, Theodorus; but I do not think I shall obey 
e call which Theaetetus makes. 
_ Zheo. Why not obey it? 
_ So. As to Melissus and the others who represent the 
Imiversé as one and at rest, I respect them too much 
fo treat their views cursorily ; but in still greater respect do 
hold the single name of Parmenides. He appears to me to 
eet Homer’s definition, ‘ venerable and likewise awful!’ I 
§was brought into contact with him when I was very young 
nd he very old, and he struck me as possessing a depth 
Hof character pre-eminently noble. I fear that we may not 
iderstand his language, still more that we may fail to 
chieve his meaning: above all, I am afraid that our original 
uestion, the definition of knowledge, may cease to be con- 
dered, if a fresh crowd of arguments rushes in, and gains 
jur attention. In particular, this hopelessly large argument 
hich we are awakening, if considered as a digression, 
νου be unworthily treated; or, if pursued adequately at 
Bull length, it will swamp the question of knowledge. We 
hould do neither one nor the other, but endeavour by our 
rt of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions 
out knowledge. 
_ Theo. Very well; we must, if you please. 
_ So. Once more then, Theaetetus, consider this part of 
Ur previous discourse. You said in reply to me that 
10wledge is perception. Did you not? 
Theae. Yes, 


1 7]; 11. 172. 


176 THEAETETUS. 


So. If anybody were to ask you the question, wi 
what a man sees white things and black, and with whi 
he hears sharp. things and flat, you would say, I suppos 
with the eyes and with the ears. 

Theae. 1 should. 

So. The easy acceptance of names and terms, and tl 
non-exaction of strict accuracy, is indeed generally not o 
of place in a well-bred man; we may rather say the revers 
is vulgar, yet is it occasionally necessary. “And so in the 
present instance I must perforce take exception to th 
answer which you give, in so far as it is wrong. Consid 
which answer is more correct, that the eyes are that wit 
which, or that through which we see, and the ears 
with which, or that through which we hear. 

Theae. ‘Through’ which in each case, I think, Socrate 
rather than ‘ with’ which. 

So. Yes, my boy; it is strange, I ween, if in us, 
though we were ‘wooden horses’,’ many independent sensé 
are seated, instead of all these tending in common to som 
centre, whether we call it soul or anything else, whereb 
through these senses as instruments, we perceive all thi 
perceptible. 1 

Theae. J think this latter view the truer one. 

So. Why am I putting these minute questions to yo 
If with some one and the same part of ourselves we throug 
the eyes apprehend things white and black, and through 
other organs other things, and you will be able, on being aske 
to refer all such perceptions at once to the body...perha) 
however it is better you should specify them in answer 
me than that I should save you that trouble. Now tell m 
The organs through which you perceive hot things and ha 


2 Plato alludes here to the famous wooden horse of the Troj 
legend. ; Ὶ 









































TRANSLATION. eS: 


Jand light and sweet—do you not state them to belong 
Iseverally to the body, or do they belong to anything else? 
| Zheae. 'Tonothing else. 
| So. Will you also be ready to admit, that what you per- 
seive through any one organ, you cannot possibly perceive 
ough another ; for instance, what you perceive by hearing, | 
jyou cannot perceive by sight, or the converse ἢ | 
Theae. I most readily admit it. 
‘So. If you have any common notion about both, you } 
jwould not acquire it from the one organ or from the other / 
concerning both ἢ 
| TZheae. 1 should not. 
} So. As to sound and colour, in the first place, have you ' 
jthis same notion respecting both, that both ‘are’? 
| Zheae. 1 have. 

_ So. You suppose also, that each is different from each, \ 

und the same with itself? ᾿ 
ΓΤ TZheae. Τὸ be sure. 
So. And that both are twain, but each is one? 
Theae. Yes. 
t So. Are you not also able to observe whether they are |} 
ke one another or unlike? 
| Theae. Probably. 
_ So. Through what do you form all these notions con- 
serning both? For neither through hearing nor through | 
ght is it possible to obtain a common notion of them. 
|} Here again is another instance in point. If it were pos- 
Isible to examine, whether both are briny or not, you 
Ϊ snow that you will be able to say with what you will 
xamine, and this is evidently neither sight nor hearing, but 
something else. 
| Zheae. No doubt it is; namely, the power exercised 
| through the tongue. 
ΝΠ -». 13 


178 THEAETETUS. 























So. Well said. Now, through what does the power 8 
which makes manifest to you what all things generally hay 
in common with these particularly—what you mean, to w 
in saying ‘is,’ ‘is not,’ and all else comprised in our lat 
questions? What organs will you assign 85 those throug 
which our percipient faculty perceives all these severally ? 

Theae. You mean being and non-being, and likenes 
and unlikeness, and sameness and difference, and more 
over unity and any other number applicable to thing! 
perceived? Evidently too your question includes the eve 
and the odd, and all other such notions; asking throug 
what bodily organ we perceive them with the soul. 

So. You follow me admirably, Sete and thes 
are the very questions I ask. 77 

Theae. Well, Socrates, I really can give no other answé 
than this, that in my opinion these have originally no orga 
peculiar to them, such as the sensible objects have, but th 
soul through its own individual power appears to me t 
observe the common properties of all. 

So. Yes, Theaetetus, you are a beauty, and not, 
Theodorus said, ugly: for he who speaks beautifully 
beautiful and good. And besides your beauty, 1 am muc 
obliged to you for releasing me from a world of talk, if th 
soul appears to you to observe some things through itse! 
and other things through the bodily organs. ‘This was m 
own opinion, and I was wishing it to be yours. 

Theae, Yes: to me it is apparent. 


30 [Socrates now draws from Theaetetus the admission that while certa 
properties, as hardness and softness, are percetved through the sen. 
common to men and beasts, essence, difference, use, and the like ¢ 
matter of reflection by the soul attained through education. Witho 
attaining essence, truth ts not attained, nor without truth knowleds 


TRANSLATION. 12 






ee whith cannot therefore attain 
essence or truth or pe on OY Fence it follows that perception and 
_ knowledge cannot be the same thing. Theaetetus admits the failure of 
this theory. Socrates reminds him that the search is not to find what 
knowledge is not, but to find what it is, and then begs him to consider 
what it is that the soul ἐς said to do, when it forms a judgment on 
existing things. Theaetetus replies: It is said to opine—to form an 
opinion. Socrates now asks if he can give a new answer to the 
question, What is knowledge 93] 












' So. To which of the two classes do you assign 
*being’? For this is the notion most universally present. 
ΓΤ  ## Theae. Lassignit to that class which the soul attains to 

} by itself. | 
So. Do you say the same of likeness and unlikeness, of 
sameness and difference ? 
Theae. Yes. 
f So. And again of nobleness and baseness, good and 

evil Ὁ 
| TZheae. Yes; these are things the essence of which, 
above all others, I believe that the soul observes in their 
} mutual relativity, comparing within itself the past and the 
resent with the future. 

So. Waitamoment. Will it not perceive the hardness 
} of a hard object through the touch, and so again the softness 
} of a soft one? 
Theae. Yes. 
So. But their being, and what they are, and their 
mutual opposition, and again the being of that opposition, 
the soul itself, by reflecting and by comparing them with 
“ach other, endeavours to determine for us? 
" Lheae. Quite so. | 

So. Men and beasts then, as soon as they are born, are 
12—2 


} 


180 THEAETETUS. 


able by nature to perceive some things, those affections 


mean which reach through the body to the soul. But th 
reflections concerning these in regard to essence and use are 
acquired, by those who do acquire them, painfully an 
gradually through the troublesome process of education. 

Theae. Undoubtedly. 

So.. Can any one attain truth, who does not attai 
being? 

Theae. He cannot. 

So. And if he fail to attain the truth of a thing, will he 
ever have knowledge of it? 

Zheae. Impossible, Socrates. 

So. Knowledge, then, does not lie in the affections o 
sense, but in the reasoning concerning them: for in this i 
seems possible to grasp essence and truth, and not in th 
affections ἢ 

Theae. Evidently. 

So. Do you call two things the same which are in s 
many respects different ? 

Lheae. ‘There were no justice in doing so. 

So. What name do you give to the one class—seein 
hearing, smelling, being cold and hot? 

Lheae. ‘Perceiving’ I would certainly call them. 

So. Their common notion then you would call percep 
tion ἢ 

Theae. Of course. 

So. And this, we say, has no share in the attainmen 
of truth, having none in the attainment of being. 

Theae. It has none. 

So. Nor yet in the attainment of knowledge ? 

Theae. No. 

So. Then, Theaetetus, Petey and knowledge 
not be the same? 7 





ithe 
Say 
SRN 


TRANSLATION. 181) 











Theae. Evidently not, Socrates. Now especially has 
knowledge been very clearly proved to be a different thing 
from perception. 

So. But it was not by any means with this view that 
we began our argument, to find what knowledge is not, but 
to find what it is. Nevertheless we have so far advanced 
as not to seek it in perception at all, but in that name 
which, whatever it be, is applicable to the soul’s action 
when by itself it deals with existing things. 

| Theae. This, I imagine, Socrates, is called ‘ opining’ 
Ρ (forming opinion). 

| So. You imagine rightly, my friend. Now go back 
} again and, erasing all that went before, see if you have any 
) Clearer view, after having advanced to this point. Tell me 
|, Once more what knowledge is. 


knowledge—being thus overthrown by the elenchus concluded in § 30, 
he is invited to attempt a second. He hopes now to find one in that 
realm of pure thought which consists in believing, judging, or opining 
(forming opinion). But as it occurs to him that opinions formed 
are not always true, he sees that he must limit his definition ; and, 
accordingly, ἐς eters fe ge aban dnl 
Against this doctrine Socrates opens a battery of mph without 
delay. It implies that such a thing as ‘false opinion’ is possible: 
and that possibility Socrates is not prepared to admit. All things 
subject to opinion are, he says, such as a man eilper Lnows or does 
not know.» Lf he opines, he either knows or does no know that about 
which he opines: he cannot know, and not know, one and the same 
thing. Can he then (when he opines falsely) mistake one known 
thing for another known thing ?—No.—Or a known thing for an 
unknown ?—No.—Or an unknown for a known ?—No.—Or one 
unknown for another unknown ?—Impossible.—But tf he forms a 
false opinion, he must err in one of these four ways :—all which are 
impossible, Therefore to form false opinion is impossible. But 
perhaps, adds Socrates, we should regard ‘being’ and ‘ not-being’ 


| ga he jirst definition proposed by Theaetetus—that sensuous perception is 81 


7 
/ 


182 - THEAETETUS. 


rather than knowing and not-knowing. May not aman opine wh 
is false, if he opines ‘what is-not’? But he goes on to argue th 
nobody can opine ‘what is not’ any more than he can see or hear 
what is not: to opine ‘what is not’ is to opine ‘ nothing : that is, not 
to opine at all. Therefore false opinion is no more possible from this 
point of view than it was from the former.) 



















Theae. Το say that it is opinion generally, Socrates, is 
impossible, since there is false opinion. But true opinion 
probably is knowledge: so let this be my answer. If it 
shall be disproved while we proceed, as in the last case, we 
will try some other statement. 

So. Your present forwardness to speak, Theaetetus, is 
more to the purpose than your original reluctance to an- 
swer. For in this way, we shall secure one of two ad- 
vantages: we shall either find what we are in quest of, or 
our conceit of knowing what we. do not know will be di- 
minished. And this will be no despicable reward. Now 
let us see what it is you say. There being two kinds o 
opinion, the true and the false, do you make TRUE OPINION 
the definition of knowledge ? 

Theae. I do, according to my present view. 

So. Is it worth while to resume the question of opi- 
nion ἢ 

Theae. Which do you mean? 

So. I am somewhat disturbed now, as often before, 
and have found myself sorely perplexed in my own mind 
and in conversation, from my inability to say what this con- 
dition is in us, and in what way engendered. 

Theae. What condition ? 

So. The holding of false opinion. Now again I a 
still considering and doubting whether we should leave it, 


or review it in a way different from that we took some 
little time ago. 


TRANSLATION. 183 






















Theae. Why not review it, Socrates, if there is any 

ear gain in doing so? For, as to leisure, you and Theo- 
Jorus said very justly, that there is nothing to hurry us in 

ch cases. | 
So. Well reminded. And perhaps it is not unreason- 
ble to return upon our tracks. It is better, you'll allow, 
to achieve a little well than much inadequately. 
- Iheae. Of course. 
' So. Well then? What do we in fact affirm? do we 
Say that there is in each case false opinion, and that some, 
-one of us opines falsely, another again truly, as if such| 
were the natural rule? ὶ 
Theae. Yes, we do. on 
So. Does not this occur to us.in respect of all things 
generally, and of each particularly—either knowing or 
not-knowing? for learning and forgetting, which lie between 
hese, I set aside for the moment, as having no reiation to 
“our present argument. 

Theae. In fact, Socrates, nothing else remains in each 

ase but knowing and not-knowing. | 
So. Is it not a necessary consequence that he who 
‘Opines must opine about one of the things which he 
knows, or one of those which he does not know? 
Theae. It is. | 
So. And it is impossible, if he knows a thing, not to 
‘know it, or, if he knows it not, to know it? 

Theae. Quite impossible. 

So. Does then he who holds a false opinion think 
at things which he knows are not what they are, but some 
other things within his knowledge, and knowing both, is he 
ignorant of both ἢ 
_ Theae. It cannot be so, Socrates. 

So. Or does he suppose things which he does not 


el 


184 THEAETETUS. 






know to be some other things outside of his knowledge? 
Does it happen to one who knows neither Theaetetus nor 
Socrates to imagine that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaete- 
tus Socrates ? 

Theae. How can that be? 

So. But surely δ' man does not think that what he™ 
knows is what he does not know, or that what he does 
not know is what he knows. 

Theae. ‘That were a miracle. 

So. In what other way then can any one hold false | 
opinions? Except under the conditions stated it is impos- 
sible, I suppose, to have opinion. In every case we either 
know or do not know, and so situated, it is manifestly im-— 
possible for us ever to have false opinions. | 

Theae. Very true. 

So. Perhaps we ought to examine our question withi 
reference not to knowing and not-knowing, but to being 
and not-being. 

Theaé: How do you mean? 

So. Consider if 1 be not a simple truth that one who 
thinks concerning anything that which is not, will inevitably 
think what is false, whatever the condition of his mind in 
other respects. 

Theae. ‘This again is probable, Socrates. 

So. How then? What shall we reply, Théaetetus, if) 
any one examine us: ‘Is what you say possible for any 
one, and will any human being think what is not, either 
about some existing thing, or in the abstract ?’ Seemingly | 
we shall say in reply: ‘Yes, when he thinks, and does not 
think what is true.’ Or how are we to speak? 

Theae. As you say. | | 

So. Does the like happen in any other case ? 

Lheae. What do you mean? 


Di es 


TRANSLATION. 185 


"So. That a person sees something, yet sees nothing. 
Theae. How can that be? 
So. If he sees some one thing, that ‘something’ is 
nong things that are. Ordo you think ‘the one’ is ever 
nong the things that are not? 
 Theae. Not I. 
_ So. He then, who sees some one thing, sees some 
Mthing that is. 

Theae. Evidently. 
ΓΞ So. And he who hears something hears some one thing, 
}and a thing that is. 
® Theae. Yes. 
So. And he who touches, I suppose, touches some one 
ling, and a thing that is, since it is one. 
Theae. Yes. 
\ So. And does not he who opines form opinion of 
ome one thing? ; | 
Theae. He must. ? 
So. And does not he who forms opinion of some one 
hing form it of some thing thats? 
Theae. 1 grant this. 
So. He then who opines what is not opines nothing. 
_ Theae. Evidently. 
' So. Well, but he who opines nothing does not opine 
at all. 
Theae. ‘That seems clear. 
So. Therefore it is not possible to think what is not, 
‘ither about things that are, or in the abstract. 
_ Zheae. Manifestly not. 
_ So. Thinking falsities is therefore different from hinds 
g what is not. 
_ Theae. It seems different. 
So. And thus neither from our present consideration 











82 [Socrates asks, whether false opinion may not possibly be found in whi 


186 — THEAETETUS. 



















(of being and not-being), nor from our previous one (¢ 
knowing and not knowing), do we find false opinion t 
exist in us. 

Theae. No, we do not. 


he calls “ gllodoxy,’ the mental exchance of ole existing thing fo. 
another : Theaetetus would like to accept this expla 
nation. But Socrates disappoints him. A short dialectic elenchus (i 
the course of which Socrates describes opinion as the result of a co 
versation which the soul holds with itself) leads to the conclusiony 
that, assuming two different things—the noble and the base—t. 
just and the unjust—a horse and an ox, &¢., nobody can mistake om 
jor the other, either if he has formed an opinion of both, or if ἢ 
has formed an opinion of one, but not of the other: so that allodo 
(which he now terms heterodoxy) does not supply any rational defint. 
tion of false opinion. 


So. But can we not speak of it as happening in this 
way ἢ 
Theae. How? 
So. We can say that an opinion which may be callec 
an ‘ allodoxy’ | is false when | anybody» says that some one 
existing thing is another existing thing, exchanging them in 
his mind. ~For-thus he always thinks of what exists, but of 
one thing instead of another, and, as missing that which he 
had in view, he may be said to have false opinion, 
Theae. Your present statement seems to me very cor 
rect. For when any one opines that a thing is ugly instea¢ 
of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he very t 
has false opinion. 
So. Evidently, Theaetetus, you speak in contempt ὁ 
me, and without fear. 
Theae. Pray why? 





TRANSLATION. 187 



























So. You do not expect, I fancy, that I shall lay hold 
your term ‘truly false’, and ask if it is possible for the 
ift to ‘come-to-be’ slowly, or the light heavily, or for any 
her opposite to come-to-be—not according to its own 
Mature, but according to the nature of its opposite—in a 
Manner opposed to itself. This however—that your con- 
fidence may not be fruitless—I pass over. You say you 
are pleased with the notion that opining falsities is <allo- 
yOxy.’ 

| Theae. Tam. 
So. Then in your opinion it is possible to determine 

ἢ your mind that one thing is another, and not itself. 
» TZheae. Itis. 
} So. When therefore the mind does this, must it not 
pperforce think either of both things, or of one of the two? 
Theae. Yes, it must. . 
So. At the.same time, or else by turns. 

Theae. Very good. 
So. Do you employ the term ‘thinking’ in the same 
ense that I do? 

Theae. How do you define it? 
So. A discourse which the soul holds with itself 
bout what it considers. JI am representing this to you 
not as a fact that I know. In the exercise of thought, the 
soul, as I fancy it, is simply engaged in conversation, 
questioning itself and answering, affirming and denying. 
ind when, having reached a definition, whether slowly 
x by a more rapid impulse, it at length agrees and affirms 
‘undoubtingly, we stat/: this to be its opinion. So that 
{ call opining the soml’s speaking, and opinion its spoken 
rord, not addressed τὸ another or uttered by the voice, but 
ilently to itself. 
Theae. Sodol. 


188 THEAETETUS. 


So. Therefore, when any one opines that one thing i 
another, he says to himself, it would seem, that one thin 
is another. 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. Try to remember whether you ever said to you 
self, ‘Assuredly the noble is base,’ or, ‘The unjust 1 
just.’ Or, to sum up, consider if you ever attempted t 
convince yourself that assuredly one thing was another: ΟἹ 
if, on the contrary, you never even in sleep ventured ἔς 
say to yourself, Undoubtedly the odd is even, or any 
such thing? 

Theae. You say the truth. 

So. Do you think any body in or out of his senses 
ever ventured seriously to say to himself, trying to make 

himself believe, that an ox must needs be a horse, or two. 
- things one? 

Theae. No indeed, not I. 

ἡ So. If then to speak to oneself is to opine, nobody whe 
speaks and thinks of both things, and apprehends both 
with his soul, can say and think that one is the other 
But you must avoid the terms ‘one and other.’ 1] state 
the point in this way: Nobody thinks that the noble is 
base, or anything of the sott. 

Theae. Well, Socrates, I give up the terms, and I agree 
with you. 

So. That one who thinks of both cannot possibly 
opine that one is the other? 

Theae. Seemingly not. . 

So. Again, if he thinks of the one alone, and of the 
other not at all, he will never opine that one is the other. — 

Iheae. True: for so he would be:forced to apprehend 
that of which he has no thought. | 

So. Accordingly allodoxy is inadmissible for any one 











TRANSLATION. 189 


10 thinks either of both or of one. So that whoever shall 
fine false opinion to be heterodoxy will talk nonsense: 
r it is shown by this method as well as by the former that 
Ise opinion cannot exist in us. 

᾿ Theae. Seemingly not. 


Socrates seems, or feigns, to be driven to despair by the failure of his 38 
three attempts to find the habitat of false opinion. 72 ts not in the 
_ region of knowledge, nor in that of being, nor in that confusion of 
| j phenomena, which he terms allodoxy. Surely it must be somewhere. 

Surely mistakes are made. May not a person know something, and, 
seeing something else which he does not know, mistake it for that 
thing which he knows? At this point in the dialogue Plato in- 
' troduces two parables or myths. He supposes first, a_memorial 

waxen block, and, later on, a bird-cage or aviary, to be situated in the 
human mind. (In figments of this kind Plato takes great delight: 
he has scattered them with profusion throughout his works. They do 
not supply to the pure intellect that verification which it demands in 
order to accept a philosophic theory. But the literary composer finds 
them avery convenient resource. They fill up gaps in serious argu- 
ment. They rouse the imagination, they charm the fancy: they 
attract and amuse the general reader, when fatigued with dry 
dialexis. In short, they are a valuable part of that puxaywyia, which 
Plato, who has a rhetoric of his own, ts far from disdaining for his 
own use. See Dr Thompson’s Introduction to his edition of the 
Phaedrus, especially pp. xxi—tt, also 2. 141.) In this section a general 
description is given of the waxen block or tablet, as Mr Grote calls it 
(ἐκμαγεῖον). The wax varies in various cases, in some being larger, 
jirmer, cleaner, and in every way better than in others. The recep- 
tacle also is more or less wideand convenient. The tablet is a gift of 
Mnemosyne (memory) for impressing by seals every one’s sensations 
and thoughts. These are remembered and known while the impressions 
remain: when these fade, they are forgotten and no longer known. 
Socrates goes on to state when false notions cannot be formed, and 
when they can.} 


So. And yet, Theaetetus, if this shall be proved im- 


4 














190 THEAETETUS. 


possible, we shall be compelled to admit many abs 
consequences. 

Theae. What are they? 

So. I will not say till I have tried every point of vie 
For I should blush for us if, in ἃ moment of perplexity, 
were forced to admit such things as I allude to. But 
we find a way to get free, then and not before we will spe: 
of others as thus perplexed, standing clear of ridicule ou 
selves. But, if we find ourselves posed on every side, the 
in a humble frame, I suppose, like sea-sick men, we sha 
allow the argument to trample on us and treat us as ij 
will. Listen, while I tell you how I may still find a wa 
of escape from our inquiry. 

Theae. Pray tell me. | 

So. I will say we were wrong in admitting that it 1 
impossible to opine that what one knows is what one doe 
not know, and so to be deceived: for it is in a certain wa 
possible. § 

Theae. Do you mean what I myself suspected at the 
time we made the assertion—a case occurring sometimes 
like this, that I, knowing Socrates, and seeing at a distance 
another whom I do not know, think it is the Socrates 
whom I know? For in such a case something like wha 
you say comes to pass. 

So. Did we not abandon that view, because it made 
us, while knowing, not to know what we do know? 

. Theae. Certainly. 

So. Suppose we do not state it thus, but in the follow- 
ing manner. Perhaps it will give way to us, perhaps resist. 
But indeed we are in such a strait, that we must perforce 
turn about and examine every argument. See if I ask a 
rational question. Is it not possible to learn something 
which you formerly did not know? | 


TRANSLATION. 191 


 Theae. Yes, it is. 

So. And one thing after another? 

Theae. Why not? 

So. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there 

in our souls a waxen block, in one soul larger, in 

another smaller, of purer wax in one, in another of less 

#ipure, harder in some, moister in others; in some of medium 
iquality. 

| | Theae. Well. 

} So. Let us say it is a gift of Mnemosyne, mother of 

fthe Muses, and that on this we strike off, as if we were 

mpressing ring-seals, any thing we wish to remember among 

ithose we sce or hear or imagine, submitting the block to our 

Wsenses and imaginations; and that whatever is impressed, 

6 remember and know as long as its image subsists; but 

iat, when it is obliterated or fails to be impressed, we have 

srgotten and do not know, 

Theae. Be it so. 

So. See then if he who knows things, and considers 

nything he sees or hears, may have false opinions in some 

ch way as the following: 

Theae. In what way? 

So. By thinking sometimes that what he knows is 

what he does know, sometimes what he does not know. In 

/Our previous statements we were wrong in denying this to 

ye possible. 

Theae. Wow do you state it now? 

So. Our statement on the subject must be this. We 

rst determine, that what a person knows, having a record 

Mf it in his soul, but without perceiving it, he cannot pos- 
ibly think to be some other thing which he knows, having 

mn image of this also, but not perceiving it. And.again 

is impossible to think that what he knows is what he 


















192 THEAETETUS. 


knows not and has no 568] of: and that what he knoy 
not is [something else] which he knows not: and that wh 
he knows not is what he knows: and to think what h 
perceives is some other thing which he perceives; and wha 
he perceives, a thing which he does not perceive; ar 
what he does not perceive to be another thing which h 
does not perceive; and what he does not perceive to Ὁ 
a thing which he perceives. And again to think that 2 
thing which he knows and perceives, having the seal Ὁ 
it according to perception, is some other thing which h 
knows and perceives having its seal also according to per 
ception—this is, if it can be, still more impossible tha 
the preceding suppositions. And what one knows an 
perceives, having its record correctly, it is impossible ἴδ 
think [something else] which one knows: and what on 
knows and perceives under similar conditions, to be [some 
thing else] which one perceives: and what one neithe 
knows nor perceives to be [something else] which on 
neither knows nor perceives: and what one neither know 
nor perceives, to be [something else] which one does Π6 
know ; and what one neither knows nor perceives, to b 
[something else] which one does not perceive. ΑἹ] these 
things involve the very utmost impossibility of having an 
false opinion about them. There remain the followin 
cases, in which, if anywhere, such a thing may happen. 
Zheae. What are they? perhaps they may help me 
understand. At present I do not follow you. 4 
So. In the case of things which a person knows, to thinl 
that they are some other things which he knows and pe 
ceives ; or some other things which he does not know, bt 
perceives : or that [some things] which he knows and pel 
ceives are [some others] which he also knows and perceive 
Lheae. Jam more in the dark now than before. 


















TRANSLATION. ic ag 


this section it is shewn how, by the misuse of the waxen tablet, false 34 
opinion may be supposed to occur ; namely, by an erroneous union of 
sensation and impression. Mr Grote states it as follows: *‘A man, 
_- having sealed on his memorial tablet the impressions of two objects 
A and B, which he has seen before, may come to see one of these objects 
again: but he may by mistake identify the present sensation with 
the wrong past impression, i.e. with that past impression to which it 
does not belong. Thus, on seeing A, he may erroneously identify it 
with the past impression B, instead of A; or vice versa. And so 
false opinion will lie, not in the conjunction or identification of sensa- 
tions with sensations, nor of thoughts (or past impressions) with 
thoughts, but in that of present sensations with past impressions or 
thoughts.” Such an occurrence Socrates imputes to defects in the 
waxen block; which may be too shallow or too hard or too soft or too 
narrow, or impure, or inclosed in too small a space.] 














So. Listen to this restatement. Do not I, knowing 
Theodorus and remembering in my mind what sort of man 
he is, and Theaetetus similarly, sometimes see them, some- 
times not, and sometimes touch them, at other times not, 
and hear them or have some other perception of them, and | 
gain have no perception of you, but not the less remem- | 
ber you and know you in my mind? 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. This is the first lesson which I wish to make 
known to-you, that a man may not perceive, or may per- 
eive, things which he knows. 

Theae. True. 

So. Things too which he does not know, a man may 

' often not perceive, often perceive merely? 

_ Theae. This too is possible. 

~ (So. Now see if you follow me more easily. Socrates 
knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither, and has 
no other present perception about them, He could never 


Kk P. 13 





















104 THEAETETUS. 


form an opinion in his mind that Theaetetus is Theode 
rus? Do I speak sense or not? 

Theae. All quite true. 

So. This was the first of the cases spoken of. 

Theae. It was. 

So. The second was, that knowing one of you, an¢ 
‘not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, I can never 
suppose the one I know to be the one I do not know. 

Theae. Right. 

So. Thirdly, knowing and perceiving neither, I canno 
suppose one whom I do not know to be some other) 
whom I do not know. -And as to all my former sup- 
positions, imagine that you have heard them stated again 
in order, wherein I can never have false opinions about 
you and Theodorus, either if I know or if I do not know 
_ both, or if I know one, but not the other. And similarly 
with regard to perceptions, if you follow me. 

Theae. Ido. 

So. False opinion remains possible in a case like 
this: when, knowing you and Theodorus, and having in 
that waxen block the seals of both of you as from rings, 
then, seeing both at a distance and indistinctly, I strive to 
assign the proper seal of each to its proper visage, and to 
introduce and adapt this to its own mould, in order that 
recognition may take place: but if, failing in the attempt, 
and interchanging, like those who put on the wrong shoes, 
I apply the visage of each to the other’s seal; or again, if 
I go wrong by an affection like that of sight in mirrors, 
when it flows from right to left :—then neler and false 
Opinion occur. 

Theae. You describe with marvellous truth, Socrates, 
the conditions to which opinion is liable. 

So. Moreover [false opinion happens] when, knowing 


TRANSLATION. gg 


























oth, I perceive one, as well as know him, but not the 
ther, and so my knowledge of the second of the two is 
ot according to perception—a case put in my former 
atement, which you did not then understand. 

~Theae. 1 did not. 

So.. Well, I meant to say that a person knowing and 
yerceiving the one, and having his knowledge according to 
erception, will never think that he is some other whom he 
nows and perceives, and of whom his knowledge is also 
according to perception. Was it so? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. There remained, I think, the case we now deal 
vith, in which we say that false opinion happens when a 
Xerson knowing and seeing both, or having any other 
Serception of both, does not keep each of the seals in 
accordance with his perception, but like a bad archer 
shoots beside the mark and so errs; and such error is 
alled a falsity. 

Theae. And reasonably. 

So. And so, when to one of the seals perception is 
present, but not to the other, and the mind adapts the seal 
which is without perception to the perception present, in 
ery such case it is deceived. In one word, about things 
which a person knows not and never perceived, error and 
false opinion seem out of the question, if there is any 
‘soundness in our present argument: but’ in those things 
about which we have knowledge and perception, opinion 
rns and twists about, becoming true or false; true, when 
brings the proper impressions and forms to meet oppo- 
sitely and straightly; false, when it brings them crosswise 
and crookedly. 

Theae. Is not this a noble statement, Socrates? 
So. You will say so with more assurance after hearing 
135—2 


196 THEAETETUS. 


what I have further to state: for to think the truth 
noble, to be deceived is base. 

Theae. No doubt. | 

So. These things are said to happen as follows. When 
the wax in any person’s soul is deep and abundant anc 
smooth and nicely wrought, the impressions become durable 
which pass through the senses and are sealed. on this 
(waxen) heart of the soul, as Homer called it in allusion 
to the resemblance of wax; for then, and in all such cases, 
they are formed in it pure, and have depth enough. Ané 
such persons are in the first place quick to learn, in the] 
next retentive, and finally they do not interchange the seals 
of the perceptions, but form true opinions. For as their 
impressions are distinct and have ample room, they rapid] 
distribute. them to their several niches; and such impres- 
sions are called ‘real:’ and these persons are termed ‘wise. 
Do you not think so? 

Theae. With entire conviction. 

So. When any person’s heart is shaggy, as that all- 
wise poet sang, or when it is miry and of impure wax, o 
exceedingly soft or hard—they whose heart is soft, are 
quick to learn, but forgetful ; they whose heart is hard, the 
opposite: and they who have a shaggy and rough and 
gritty heart, or one defiled with a mixture of earth or 
mire, have their impressions indistinct. In those who 
have hard hearts, they are indistinct too, for depth is 
wanting: likewise in those who have soft hearts, for 
through confusion they soon become faint. And if besides” 
all these faults they are furthermore crushed one upon 
another for want of room, when a man’s soul is small, they 
are still more indistinct than in the former cases. All these 
people are capable of having false opinions. For when 
they see or hear or imagine anything, being unable to 


























TRANSLATION. 197 








ssign each thing quickly to its proper impression, they 
go tardily to work, and, assorting erroneously, they see 
and hear and conceive most things wrongly. And of these 
persons again we say, that they have false notions of things, 
and are ignorant. 
| Theae. Never was a truer statement, Socrates. 

So. May we say then that false opinions exist in us? 

Theae. Decidedly. 

So. And true? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Now we think it sufficiently agreed that both these 
kinds of opinion certainly exist ? 
Theae. Beyond all question. 


[Socrates has no sooner reached his conclusion as to the formation of false 35 
opinion, than he proceeds to confute it. There are phenomena for 
which it does not account. Errors occur in the identification of one 
past impression with another: an 2s leads to the dilemma that 
either false opinion ts impossible, or it is possible for a person : not to 
know what he does know. This dilemma Theaetetus cannot solve. 
And Socrates remarks that this discussion has become impure, in that 
they have constantly used the terms ‘knowing, ‘knowledge,’ and 
‘ignorance’ before they have reached a definttion of these terms. As, 
however, he admits that he cannot carry on the discussion without 
using them in some sense or other, he declares himself willing to 
make the attempt, and Theaetetus applauds his resolution.) 











So. What a truly terrible and disagreeable creature, 
Theaetetus, a chattering man appears to be. 
Theae. Uowso? What do you say this for? 
| So. Because I am so annoyed by my own dullness and 
manifest garrulity. For what else can one call the conduct 
of a man, who wears every argument threadbare, and cannot 
be made to quit it, because he is too stupid to be convinced? 
| Theae. What vexes you? 
So. Iam not only vexed, but at a loss how to answer, 
should any one question me and say: ‘Have you now, 


198 THEAETETUS. 

















Socrates, discovered that false opinion lies neither in the 
mutual relation of perceptions, nor in that of thoughts, bu 
in the union of perception with thought?’ I shall say, 
‘Yes,’ I suppose, with a triumphant air, as if we had made 
some beautiful discovery. 

Theae. 1 see nothing the reverse, Socrates, in what has 
now been proved. | 

So. Do you mean, he will say, that we can never sup- 
pose the man, whom we think of but do not see, to be a 
horse, which again we neither see nor touch but only think 
of, and in no way perceive? I suppose I shall say that} 
I do mean it. a 

Theae. Yes, and rightly. 

So. Well, he will say, as to the number eleven, which” 
is an object of thought only, must it not follow from” 
this statement that nobody could ever suppose it to be” 
twelve, which is also an object of thought only? Come 
now, reply yourself. ᾿ 

Theae. 1 shall reply that any one who saw and touched | 
them might think eleven to be twelve, but so far as he 
had them in thought, he could never conceive such an_ 
Opinion regarding them. 

So. Well, take the .case of one who set before him- q 
self and regarded in his own mind five and seven. I 
don’t mean seven and five men or anything of the sort,” 
but the notions of five and seven, of which we say that 
they are recorded there on the waxen block, and that as to” 
them it is impossible to have false opinion. Of these 
things I ask if it never chanced, that while people were 
considering them, and conversing with themselves, and 
inquiring how many they come to—one person would think © 
and say they were eleven, another twelve:—or would all 
say and think that they make twelve ? | 

Theae. No, indeed, not all; many will say, eleven. 







TRANSLATION. 199 


And if a person has higher figures under consideration, he 
is still more liable to error. I suppose you are speaking 
of number generally. 

So. Your supposition is right. Consider whether any- 
thing happens in such a case but imagining the number 
twelve, in the block, to be eleven. 

Theae. Nothing else, seemingly. 

So. We are thus carried back to our former discussion. 
The person in such a case supposes a thing which he 
knows to be another thing which he knows. This we 
‘said was impossible; and on this very ground we forced 
the conclusion that false opinion does not exist, in order 
that the same person might not be compeiled to know and 
‘not know the same things at the same time. 

Theae. Very true. | 
So. Therefore we must declare that holding false 
“Opinion is something else than a discrepancy between 
thought and sensation. For, if it were this, we could 
never be deceived in our mental concepts themselves. But 
now either there is no false opinion, or it is possible for a 
“person not to know what he knows. Which alternative 
do you choose? 

Theae. You offer an impossible choice, Socrates. 

So. Ay, but the argument will hardly allow both. 
Nevertheless, as we must risk the utmost, suppose we 
venture to be shameless? 

Theae. Wow? 

_ So. By making up our minds to say what ‘to know’ 
means. 

Theae. Why is this a shameless act? 

So. You seem not to bear in mind that all our dis- 
‘cussion from the first has been a quest of knowledge, as- 
suming that we do not know what it is. 


200 THEAETETUS. 




















Theae. 1 do bear this in mind. 

So. Is it not then shameless, if we do not know know. 
ledge, to proclaim what knowing means? But in fact 
Theaetetus, we have been long infected with an impur 
method of discussion. Over and over again we have used 
the terms ‘we know,’ and ‘we do not know,’ ‘we have 
knowledge’ and ‘we have not knowledge,’ as if we could 
understand one another, while we are yet ignorant of know- 
ledge. If you remark, at this very moment we have again 
used the terms ignorance and understanding, as though it 
were fit for us to use them, if we are destitute of knowledge. 

Theae. But in what way will you argue, Socrates, if you 
abstain from these terms? 

So. In no way, while I am the man I am: butI could 
if I were a votary of contention. Were a man of that 
school now present, he would profess to abstain from such 
terms, and would rebuke us sternly for our conduct. Since 
however we are such poor creatures, will you let me ven- 
ture to say what ‘knowing’ is? For I am clear that it will 
be of some help to us: 

Theae. ΟἿ yes! pray venture. You will have great 
excuse for not abandoning these terms. 


[Having consented, for the sake of discussion, to use the term ‘knowing,’ 
though still undefined, Socrates now observes that most people suppose 
it to mean ‘ the having of knowledge. For his own part, he would 
rather say ‘the possessing,’ than ‘the having : for a person cannot 
justly be said ‘ to have’ what he never uses, though he may ‘ possess” 
it, like a coat kept ina wardrobe but never worn. This distinction 
he illustrates by his second parable, that of the mental dove-cage. 
A person may be supposed to have caught a number of doves (i.e. to 
have acquired sciences or cognitions) which he has turned into his cage 
or aviary, and so ‘ possesses.’ But, if he wants to catch one of his 
doves (1.6, to recall and use one of his acquired cognitions), he has 


, TRANSLATION. - 901 


‘0 pursue another chase in: his mental aviary; and this may not 
ne@/ways be successful, He muy fail to catch the dove he wants (i.e. he 
may find that he has forgotten the science he had once acquired) or he 
may get hold of a wrong dove (i.e. he may confuse things which he 
could accurately distinguish at a former time).] 








ta 


So. You have heard then what people now mean by 
‘knowing ?’ 
Theae. Possibly: but I do not remember at the mo- 


So. They say it is a having of knowledge. 
Theae. ‘True. 
So. Let us make a slight change and say, possession of 
knowledge. 
Theae. What will you say is the difference between 
them ἢ 
So. Perhaps none: but you may as well hear, and 
help me to test my opinion. 
᾿ς Theae, I will if I can. 
$0. ‘Having’ does not appear to me the same thing 
as ‘possessing.’ For instance, if any one bought a coat, 
and being master of it did not wear it, we should not say 
he had, but possessed it. 
Theae. Right. 
So. Now see if it is possible in the same manner to 
possess knowledge without having it. Suppose a person 
_had caught wild birds, doves or any other sort, and built a 
- dove-cage in his dwelling and fed them. In a certain way 
_we should say he always has them, because he possesses 
them. Should we not? 
Theae. Yes. 
So. In another sense we should say he has none of 
them, but he has got a power over them, since he has made 
them subject to him in a domestic inclosure of his own. 








202 ο΄ - THEAETETUS. % 


He can take and hold them when he likes, catching any 


one he wishes, and he can let it go again. And it is προ to 


him to do this as often as he thinks a ὃ 
Theae. It is. 


So. So then, even as in the previous part of our dis. 
course we framed in human souls a strange sort of waxen’ 
figment, let us again make in every soul a certain cage of 


various:kinds of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest; 
others in small groups; others alone, flying among a 
wherever they may chance. 

Theae. Suppose it made, What next? 

So. While we are children (we must. say) this struc- 


ture is empty: and we must think of sciences instead of | 
birds: and whatever science any one has acquired and © 
shut up in his inclosure, we must say that he has learnt or” 


discovered the thing of which it is the science: and this is © 


‘knowing.’ 
Theae. Beit so: 


So. Again, as to catching any one of the sciences ἃ 
person chooses, and taking and holding it, and letting it 
_ go again,—consider by what terms these acts should be 
described, whether by the same as when he was first ac- 
quiring the sciences, or by others. You will learn what I ; 
mean more clearly from the following illustration. There 


is an art you call arithmetic? 
Theae. Yes. 


So. Suppose this to be a. canine of the knowledge of | 


odd and even. 
Theae. Well, I do. 


So. By this art, I imagine, a person both has the 





cognitions of all numbers in his power, and transmits them 


to another. 
Theae. Yes. 


& 





TRANSLATION. 203 












So. And we say that one who transmits teaches, and | 
ne who receives learns, and one who has them by possess- { 
ng in that cage ‘knows?’ 

Theae. Quite so. 
_ So. Attend and see what next follows. Does not a 
rfect arithmetician know all numbers? For he has in his 
oul the science of all numbers. 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. Could not such a person count any sum mentally, 
r any outward objects capable of numeration ? 

Theae. No doubt he could. 

‘So. And shall we say that counting means anything but 
onsidering how great.any number is? 

Theae. Such is its meaning. 
_ So. Then what a person ‘knows,’ he is shown to con- 
ider as if he did not know, though we have allowed that he 
nows all number. You have heard, I suppose, of these 
exed questions ? 
Theae. J have. 


[Socrates now confutes his own hypothesis. Catching a dove which you 37 
acquired and possess, seems to mean learning from yourself what you 
know already. This Theaetetus sees to be absurd. And the confusion 
of two known things appears to be not less absurd. For this knowledge 
zs shewn to produce the effect of ignorance. Why may not ignorance 
as well be shewn to produce the effect of knowledge, and blindness that 
of sight ? May we not imagine, says Theaetetus, that the cage contains 
nesciences (non-cognitions) as well as sciences (cognitions) and that false 
opinion may take place when a person, hunting for a science, gets hold 
of anescience in its stead? By a short elenchus Socrates shews that 
this hypothesis implies consequences which have been already acknow- 
ledged to be impossible. For the man who has thus got held of nes- 
cience mistakes tt for science, doeshe not? Yes, says Theaetetus. But 
how can anybody, knowing two things, take one for the other, or, 
knowing neither, take what he does not know, for something else that 


204 THEAETETUS. 


he does not know: or knowing one but not the other, take what 
does know for what he does not know, or the converse. All these a 
impossibilities: and so we, until we know what knowledge is, canno 
know what false opinion is.] 


So. We then, following the similitude of the possessio 
and chase of doves, will say that the chase was double; on 
before acquirement, with a view to possession: the other 
after possession, in order to take and hold in hand what the 
owner had long ago acquired. So even those same things 
of which a person had the knowledge long since by learning, 
and which he then knew, he may again thoroughly learn. 
by resuming and holding the knowledge of each, which) 
he had indeed long ago acquired, but had not within his: 
mental grasp. 

Theae. ‘True. 

So. Iwas just now asking what terms we must use to 
speak of such cases, as when the arithmetician proceeds to” 
count or the grammarian to read. Does he in this case,” 
although he knows, come to learn from himself what he 
knows? j 

Theae. ‘That were absurd, Socrates. 

So. But must we say that he will read εὐ count 
what he does not know, after allowing him to know all” 
letters and all number ? 

Theae. ‘This again is unreasonable. 4— 

So. Would you have us state that, as to terms, we 
do not care at all in what way anybody likes to twist the 
words ‘knowing’ and ‘learning;’ but that since we de- 
fined ‘possessing’ knowledge to be one thing, ‘having’ it 
another, we say it is impossible for any one not to possess 
what he has acquired ; so that it never happens that any one’ 
does not know what he knows, but it is possible to get hold 
ofa false opinion concerning it: for it is possible not to” 

























TRANSLATION. 205 






ave the knowledge of this one, but of another in its stead, 
hen chasing any of the sciences which flit from him, he 
istakes and lays hold on one instead of another, as in the 
case when he thought eleven to be twelve, getting hold of 
the knowledge of eleven, instead of that of twelve, the 
ring-dove as it were within him instead of the pigeon ? 

Theae. Yes, that is reasonable. 

So. But when he gets hold of that which he tries to 
take, shall we say, that then he is free from error and 
opines realities, and that in this way there is true and 
false opinion, and that none of the difficulties which we 
found in our foregoing arguments come in our way? Per- 
haps you will endorse my statement. Will you? 

Ε΄ Theae. 1 will. 

_ So. Then so far we are rid of the notion that people 
do not know what they know: for it no longer happens in 
“any case not to possess what we do possess, whether de- 
ceived about it or not. And yet there seems to glance 
| sideways on me a trouble still more formidable. 

Theae. Of what nature? 

_ So. Whether the interchange of cognitions will ever 
come to be false opinion. 

Theae.. How do you mean? 

So. First, as to the notion of anybody’s having know- 
ledge of a thing, and at the same time being ignorant of it, 
not by inacquaintance, but by his own knowledge: next, as 
to opining this to be one thing, and the other thing to be 
this—is it not the height of unreason, that, when know- 
ledge is present the soul should recognize nothing, and be 
ignorant of everything? for on this principle there is no- 
thing to prevent ignorance being present and causing one to 
know something, and blindness causing to see, if knowledge 
shall ever cause any one to be ignorant. 





206 THEAETETUS. 













Theae. Perhaps, Socrates, we did not arrange the bir¢ 
well in placing sciences only, but we ought to have plac 
also nesciences flying about with them in the soul; and th 
chaser, at one time getting hold of a science, at another 
a nescience, has about the same thing opinions false ἢ 
nescience, true by science. 

So. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to avoid praising yo 
But review your proposition. Suppose it as you stat 
He who lays hold on nescience, you say, will have fal 
opinions. Is it so? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. He will not, I suppose, think he has false opi 
nions ? | 

Theae. Wow can hee 

So. He will think he has true ones then, and as to 
things in which he is deceived, he will be in the sam 
condition as if he knew them? 

Theae. No doubt. 

So. He will think that he has chased and got science, 
not nescience ? 

Theae. Evidently. 

So. Accordingly, after a long circuit we have reached 
our original perplexity. Our critic will again laugh and 
say: ‘My right worthy friends, will one who knows them 
both, science and nescience, suppose that which he knows 
to be the other which he knows? or knowing neither of 
them, does he imagine what he knows not to be the other 
which he knows not: or, knowing one but not the athe 
does he suppose the one he knows to be the one he knows 
not, or the one he knows not to be the one he knows? 
Or will you tell me again that there are also sciences | 
of sciences and of nesciences, which he who possesses - 
has shut up in some other ridiculous dove-cage or waxen 


la al ..-. 


| TRANSLATION. 207 
» mt, and knows as long as he possesses them, even if 
have them not ready to hand in his soul? and so will 

ut gaining anything by it?’ What answer shall 
enc » ese questions, Theaetetus ἢ 

>, ΕΣ . eally, Socrates, I do not know what we ought 

oe Na ee 
which 2,6 
“> .qjq poes not the argument, my boy, rebuke us justly, 
and she hat we are wrong in leaving the question of 
knowledge, and investigating false opinion first? It is 
impossible to know this latter, before we have adequately 
settled what knowledge is. 

Theae. At this point, Socrates, I must accept your 
view. 


\g »pmpelled to run round and round to the same 
re | 


— 
J 





[Are we then to abandon the inquiry—‘ what is knowledge ?? Theaetetus 38 
will not do so, tf Socrates is ready to continue ἐξ; but he reverts to 
his second definition, that true opinion ts knowledge. Socrates says that 
the whole profession of lawyers and orators gainsays this doctrine : for 
their whole business is to persuade dicasts that certain things which 
the dicasts did not personally witness, are true, and that they ought to 
decide accordingly. If they do so decide, and that rightly, they have 
Sormed a true opinion, which cannot be called knowledge, but the result 
of persuasion. Therefore true opinion and knowledge are not iden- 


tical. Theaetetus now remembers that he once heard it said, that true 
. Ϊ ETT ὁ τς 


opinion with rational explanation λόγος) zs knowledge, Things are 


unknowable, 7 cannot be rationally defined: if they can, they 
are knowable. | 





So. Returning to the original question, what is one 
to say that knowledge is? For we shall not give in yet, 
I suppose. 

Theae. Certainly not, if you do not set the example. 

So. Say then how we must define it in order to escape 
best from self-contradiction. 














208 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. As we proposed in our foregoing discussio 
Socrates. I have no other suggestion to make. 

So. What was the definition ἢ 

Theae. That true opinion is knowledge. ‘True oping, 
is, I suppose, free from error, and its results are all ‘Mse 
and good. γ᾽ 

So. The man who led the way into the TiveWising yo 
tetus, said ‘the trial will prove;’ and if we sear yor -ullls 
as we go, perhaps the fact will stop us and exhiyj1. what we _ 
are looking for. If we stand still, we shall see nothing. 

Theae. Right. Let us proceed and look out. 

So. This look-out of ours will be a brief one: for 
a whole profession indicates that true opinion is not know- 
ledge. 

Theae. Howso? What is that profession ἢ 

So. The profession of the mightiest in wisdom, who 
are called orators and lawyers. These men in their art 
persuade, not by teaching, but by making men opine 
whatever they will. Do you suppose there are any 
teachers clever enough, within the flowing of a little water, 
| to teach adequately the truth of facts to certain persons, 

who were not present when they were robbed of money, or 
when they received some other violence? 

Theae. I do not suppose they could; but they would 

persuade. 
| So. By persuading you mean, ‘causing to form ar 
) opinion ?’ 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. When therefore dicasts are justly persuaded abou 
things which can be known by seeing only, not otherwise — 
in that case, judging the things by what they hear, the 
judged without knowledge, howe persuaded rightly, if thei 
verdict was good 9, 


TRANSLATION. | 209 


Theae. Unquestionably. 

So. If, my friend, true opinion and knowledge were 
the same, a perfect dicast would never form a right opinion 
without knowledge. But now it seems they are not one 
and the same. 

Theae. As to this I had forgotten, Socrates, a thing , 
which I once heard somebody say: but I now recollect it. | 
He said that true opinion accompanied with rational expla- 
nation was knowledge, but unexplained opinion ‘out of the 
sphere of knowledge: things of which there is no explana- 
‘tion are, he said, not knowable, using that very term; but 
those which have explanation are knowable. 

So. Well said. But what distinction did he draw be- 
tween these knowable and unknowable things? ‘Tell me, 
that I may see whether you and I have heard the same 
version or not. 

Theae. I am not sure that I can recall it: but, if an- 
other told it, I think I could follow him. 


[Socrates says that he too has heard a similar definition, which he proceeds 39 
to explain by the analogy of words and letters. The primordial elements 
of things are not matters either of knowledge or of true opinion, or of 
rational explanation, but of sensible perception merely. An element 
can only be perceived and called by its name. Youcan give it neither 
predicate nor epithet: you cannot speak of it as " being,’ as ‘this’ or 
‘that’ or ‘ each, or ‘single: for so you add to it something foreign 
to itself, and it is no longer an element. But the compounds of these 
elements may be known and explained by enumerating the elements of 
which they are composed. And to do this ‘is to furnish a rational 
explanation (Λόγος) of them. Theaetetus accepts this statement, and 
repeats the new definition of knowledge stated in the preceding section. 
Socrates intimates that he is dissatisfied with the statement that 

elements are unknowable, while their compounds are knowable. He 
Surther proposes to discuss this question in reference to syllables and 
the letters or elements of which they are composed.) 


Ey ie 14 


210 THEAETETUS. 


So. Hear then dream for dream. Methought I heard 
some say that the primal elements, as it were, of which we 
and all other things are compounded, have no reason : for 
it is only possible to name each by itself, not to predi- 
cate anything else of it, either that it is or is not, as in 
such case ‘being’ or ‘not-being’ is attached: while it is 
wrong to ascribe either, if one is to speak of the thing 
itself alone. We must not, they say, ascribe the term ‘self’ 
or ‘ that’ or ‘each’ or ‘single’ or ‘this,’ or many other like 
expressions: for these run about and are applied to all 
things, being different from the things to which they are 
attached. If the primal element were capable of being 
described, and had a proper description of its own, the 
fitting course would be, that it should be described apart 
from all others. Since, however, it is impossible for any one 
of the first rudiments to be defined in words, there is 
nothing for it except to be named only: name is all it has. 
But, as to the things compounded of these, as they are 
themselves complex, so also their names being combined 
constitute definition : for a complex of names is the essence 
of definition. Thus I dreamed that the elements are un- 
described and unknown, but perceptible ; while their com- 
binations are known and expressed and conceived by true 
opinion. Whenever any one gains the true opinion of any- 
thing without definition, his soul is truthful with regard to it, 
but does not know it, for one who cannot give and receive 
a spoken account of anything is incognisant of it. But 
after adding such an account, he is capable of becoming 
all this, and is perfect in knowledge. Have you heard the 
dream thus or otherwise? 

Theae. Exactly thus. . 

So. Are you content with it, and do you lay it down 
that true opinion combined with explanation is knowledge ? 








TRANSLATION. 211 


Theae. Quite so. 

So. Have we to-day, Theaetetus, in this manner found 
at last what from ancient time so many wise men have 
grown old without finding ? 

Theae. At all events, Socrates, I think our present 
statement a good one. 

So. It may naturally seem so. For what can be called 
knowledge apart from definition and right opinion? Yet 
I am displeased with one of the things we said. 

Theae. What was that? 

So. One that seems to be stated very neatly, how 
that the elements are unknown, but the class of combina- 
tions known. 

Theae. Is not that true? 

So. We must see. For we have as hostages all the 
examples which he used in saying what he did. 

Theae. What are they? 

So. Letters and syllables. Do you think the speaker 
had anything but these in view when he said what we cite? 

Theae. No: he thought of these. 





[Assailing the new definition with reference to letters and syllables, and 40 
taking as an instance the first syllable of his own name, dw, Socrates, 
by a short elenchus, proves that the syllable ts not known, unless the 
letters sigma and dmega are known also. But, starting a fresh 
argument, he suggests that possibly a syllable is a general notion 
having a nature independent of its letters. Theaetetus is willing to 
accept this view. Then, says Socrates, it can have no parts. Why? 
Because ‘a whole’ must mean ‘all its parts.’ Cah a whole be a 
notion distinct from all its parts? Theaetetus ventures to say it can. 
Socrates asks if ‘the all and the whole’ are different. Theaetetus 
risks the answer: ‘they are different:’] 


e 


So. Let us then take and test them; or, rather test 
ourselves, whether we learnt letters on this principle or any 


14—2 


212 THEAETETUS. 


other. To begin: can syllables be defined, but letters 
not ? 

Theae. Probably. 

So. I take the same view. If some one asked about 
the first syllable of Socrates for instance and said, ‘Tell me, 
Theaetetus, what 50 is: how would you answer? 

Theae: Sigma and Omega. | 

So. This then you hold to be the definition of the 


syllable ? 

Theae. I do. 

So. Well now, tell me similarly the definition of 
Sigma. 


Theae. How can one tell the elements of an element ? 
For indeed, Socrates, Sigma is one of the consonants, a 
sort of noise only, as when the tongue hisses; Beta again 
has neither sound nor noise: nor have most of the letters. 
So they may very well be called undefined, as the clearest 
of them have sound alone, but no definition at all. | 

So: So much then, my friend, we have nightly deter- 
mined concerning knowledge? 

Theae. Apparently. 

So. Well now? Have we rightly admitted that the 
letter is not known, but only the syllable? 

Theae. Seemingly. 

So. Do we' now say that the syllable is both letters, 
or if there be more than two, all these, or some one idea 
arising from their combination ? 

Theae. I think we should say, all of them. 

So. Take the case of two, Sigma and Omega. ‘These 
two form the first syllable of my name. Does not one who 
knows the syllable know both ? 

Theae. ‘To be sure. 

So. He knows Sigma and Omega? 


TRANSLATION. 213 


Theae. Yes. 

So. How then? is he ignorant of each, and, knowing \ 
neither, does he know both? 

Theae. ‘That were strange and unreasonable, Socrates. 

So. And yet, if a person must perforce know each, in 
order to know both, it is absolutely necessary for one who is 
ever to know a syllable, to know the letters first. And thus 
our beautiful argument will have run clear away from us. 

Theae. Ay, and in a very sudden way. 

So. We do not keep a good watch on it. Perhaps we 
ought to have laid it down that a syllable is not the letters 
themselves, but some notion arising from them, having one 
form belonging to itself, while another belongs to the sepa- 
rate letters. 7 

Theae. Quite so. And perhaps this statement may be | 
truer than the other. 

So. We must consider the point, and not abandon in 
this cowardly way a great and dignified theory. 

Theae. Surely not. . 

So. Suppose it be as we now say. ‘The syllable is one 
general form arising from the harmonious adaptation of the 
several elements; both in grammar and everywhere else. 

Theae. Very well. 

So. Then there must be no parts of it. 

Theae. Why? 

So. Because, if a thing has parts, the whole must ne- 
cessarily be all the parts. Or do you say that a whole 
formed of parts is a notion distinct from all its parts ? 

Theae. Yes, I do. 

So. Do you call the all and the whole the same or 
different ? 

Theae. I have no clear view: but as you bid me. 
answer readily, I take the risk of saying they are different. 


914 THEAETETUS. 


So. Your readiness, Theaetetus, is right. Whether the 
answer is so too, we must consider. 
Theae. We must. 


41 [ The first eighteen questions of this section comprise an elenchus, by which 
, Socrates compels Theaetetus to admit, that there ts no difference be- 
Η͂ΒΒ ‘the all’ and ‘the whole, and that both terms, in a thing that 
vhas parts, mean ‘all the parts. He then puts this alternative, which 
Theaetetus grants: if the syllable is not the letters, they are not its 
paris: if it ts the same with them, both must be known equally, 
And it was to avoid this latter consequence that it was taken to be 
different. But what are the parts of syllables, if the letters are not? 
Theaetetus admits, that, if syllables have parts, these must be the 
letters. In that case, says Socrates, according to the doctrine as- 
sumed, a syllable must bea single form without parts. And in that 
case, he now proves, it must be elementary, and so undefinable and 
, unknown. Lt ts not true, therefore, that the syllable can be defined 
| and known, unless the letters can be so likewise. This proof Socrates 
\strengthens by the testimony of experience. In learning to read, did 
not Theaetetus endeavour to distinguish each individual letter? In 
learning music, did he not strive to distinguish each particular note ; 
and are not the notes the elements of music? All this Theaetetus 
, admits. And Socrates draws the conclusion, that elemenis may be 

ν᾿ | &nown even more clearly than compounds (syllablesy-T ΤΟΝ 








So. Will not the whole differ from the all, according to 
your present argument ? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Well now, is there any difference between all (plu- 
ral) and the all (singular)? For instance, when we say, one, 
two, three, four, five, six, and if we say twice three or 
thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, 


do we in all these cases speak of the same or something 
different ? 


Theae. Of the same. 


TRANSLATION. 215 


So. That is, six; is it not? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. In each form of speech we have spoken of all 
the six? 

: Theae. Yes. 

So. Again, when we speak of all, do we not speak of 
one thing’? is 

Theae. We must. 

So. Is it not of the six? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Do we predicate the same unity of all things 
consisting of number, whether under the term πᾶν or ta 
πάντα (in singular or plural form) ? 

Theae. Evidently. 

So. Let us now state the question as follows: The 
number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they 
not? 


Theae. Yes. 
So. And so of the furlong ? 
Theae. Yes. 


So. Again, the number of the camp and the camp, and 
all such things similarly? For the whole number is the 
essential whole in each case? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. And is not the number of each the parts of each ? 

Theae. Yes. | 

So. And all things which have parts will consist of 
parts P 

Theae. Evidently. 

So. And all the parts have been admitted to be the all, 
if the entire number is to be the all. 


1 Reading, with K. F. Hermann, δ᾽ οὐχ ἕν for Ms δ᾽ οὐδέν. 


41 


216 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. ‘True. 

So. Then the whole does not consist of parts. For it 
would be the all, being all the parts? 

Theae. Seemingly not. 

So. But can any thing which is a part, be a part of 
any thing except of a whole? 

Theae. Yes, of the all. 

So. You show fight manfully, Theaetetus. But is it 
not in the very case when nothing is absent that the all 
is all? 

Theae. Necessarily. 

So. And will not the whole be the very same thing— 
that from which nothing is anywhere absent? For that 
from which anything is absent, is neither a whole nor an 
_ all, each of these being equally constituted by the same 
combination of parts. 

Theae. 1 now think there is no difference between an 
all and a whole. 

So. Did we not say, that whenever a thing has parts, 
the whole and all will mean all the parts? 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. Again: to resume my late essay, if the syllable is 
not the letters, does it not follow that it has not the 
letters for its parts, or if it be the same with them, it must 
be known equally with them ὃ 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Was it not to obviate this result that we defined it 
to be different from them ? 

Theae. Yes. 

So. Well, if the letters are not parts of a syllable, have 


you any other things to name, which are parts of a syllable, | 


besides its letters ? 
Theae. By no means. For if I allowed it to have 


TRANSLATION. 217 


parts, it would be ridiculous to abandon the letters, and 
seek anything else. 

So. Decidedly, Theaetetus, according to the present 
view a syllable must be a single generality without parts. 

Theae. Seemingly. 

Se. Do you remember, my friend, that a short time 
back we accepted the statement, deeming it a good 
one, that of the primal elements, of which all things are 
composed, there is no definition, because each by itself is 
uncompounded, and that it is not right to apply to it the 
term ‘is,’ nor yet ‘this,’ which are alien and foreign to it ; 
and this cause makes such element undefinable and un- 
known ? 

Theae. I remember. 

So. Is there any other cause than this of its being 
simple and indivisible? I see no other. 

Theae. Apparently none. 

So. Accordingly, the syllable is shown to belong to the 
same class as the element, if it has no parts, and is one 
general notion? 

Theae. Undoubtedly. 

So. If then the syllable has many letters, and is a cer- 
tain whole, and they are its parts, syllables and letters are 
alike knowable and utterable, since ‘all the parts’ were 
shown to be the same with the whole? 

Theae. Assuredly. 

So. But if it is one and indivisible, both syllable and 


letter are equally undefinable and unknowable: for the’ 


| 4 
, εἶ 7 
ak. * Ψ 
y , 
. " 
‘ 


same cause will make them both so ? 

Theae. I cannot contradict you. 

So. Let us not accept this statement from anybody, 
that a syllable can be known and expressed, but not a 
letter. 


218 THEAETETUS. 


Theae. We must not, if we concur with the argument. 

So. Yet further: would you not rather accept the 
opposite view, from knowing what happened to ORE 
when you learnt to read? 

Theae. What is that? 

So. That all you went on doing in the course of 
learning was, to try to distinguish each individual letter as 
you saw and heard it, that their order might not confuse 
you when they were spoken and written. 

Theae. Very true. 

So. And did not a complete instruction at your music- 
master’s mean the being able to follow each note, and 
say what string answered to it? ‘These everybody would 
own to be properly called the elements of music. 

Theae. Yes. 

So. So far then as we have experience of letters and 
syllables, if from these cases we may draw inferences as to 
others, we shall say. that the class of elements admits of a 
knowledge much clearer than the syllable, and more 

important for the perfect mastery of each study; and, if 
_ any one shall say that the syllable is naturally known, but 


\the element unknown, we shall think he is joking or 
talking nonsense ? 


Lheae. Undoubtedly. 


42 [Recurring to the third definition of knowledge proposed by Theaetetus 


—true opinion with rational explanation. (oyos)—Socrates now 
criticises this adjunct. at does it mean? Three answers may 


be given. (1) limay simply mean—speech. Well ; but all who, are 
not born deaf and dumb speak sooner or later ; and ail true opinion 
will carry speech with it; and so it can never be separate from know- 


ledge. (2) Λόγος may mean the power of describing anything by the 
elements of which it consists. Hesiod says: ‘a wagon has a hundred 








TRANSLATION, | 219 


planks.” But you and I, says Socrates, cannot detail these: we 
describe a wagon by certain known parts: axle, wheels, body, yoke, 
&c. Thus we have a right opinion about it: but, as we cannot 
enumerate the elements, we have not the full knowledge. Or again, 
in the case of spelling: perhaps somebody can spell the name Theae- 
tetus quite correctly, having a true opinion about it, and being able 
to enumerate its syllables correctly: but, when another name, Theo- 
dorus, ts in question, he is found to spell it wrongly (writing Te 
for Ge) This proves that his true opinion in the former instance 
did not amount to knowledge: and thus again we find ‘ true opinion 
with rational explanation’ to fall short of knowledge.] 


So. Other proofs of this fact might be shewn, I 
think ; but let us not for their sake forget to keep in view 
the proposed topic, namely, what is meant by saying 
that true opinion combined with rational explanation is 
the most perfect knowledge. 

Theae. We must keep it in view. 

So. Well now, what does the term explanation indicate 
tous? I think it means one of three things. 

Theae. What are they ἢ 

Se. The first will be — making one’s meaning clear 
through the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging opinion 
in the stream through the voice as in a mirror or in 
water. Do you not consider explanation to be something 
of this sort ? 

Theae. Ido. We say therefore that one who does so 
explains. 

So. ‘This however is not everybody able to do sooner 
or later,—to shew what he thinks about anything—if he is 
not born deaf or dumb? and so all those who have any 
right opinion, will appear to have with it the faculty of 
explanation, and right opinion will thus nowhere be formed 
without knowledge. 

Theae. True. 


220 THEAETETUS. 


So. Let us not however lightly pronounce sentence on 
him who defined knowledge in the way we are now con- 
sidering—that he is guilty of talking nonsense. Perhaps 
he did not mean to say this, but rather the being able, 
when asked what anything is, to make answer to the 
questioner in terms of its elements. 

Theae. Instance what you mean, Socrates. 

So. As Hesiod speaking of a wagon says, ‘A wagon 
consists of a hundred planks.’ I cannot describe them, 
probably you cannot. If we were asked what a wagon is, 
we should be content if we could say, wheels, axle, body, 
seat, yoke. 

Theae. Quite so. 

So. The questioner might perhaps think us ridiculous, 
as he would if being asked your name and making answer 
by syllables,—while all we thought and said was right— 
we deemed that as skilful grammarians we had in mind 
and stated grammatically the definition of the name Theae- 
» tetus; though the fact is that nobody can define any- 
thing with knowledge, until he fully describe it in its 
elements with true opinion; as was before, I think, laid 
down. 

Theae. It was. 

So. So too he might consider, with respect to a 
wagon, that we have right opinion indeed, but that one 
who was able to detail its nature by those hundred planks, 
had, through this addition, joined explanation: to true 
opinion, and instead of opinion had got technical know- 
ledge about the nature of a wagon, having fully described 
the whole in its elements. 

Lheae. Do you not think his opinion good, Socrates ? 

So. If you think so, my friend, and accept this view, 
that the full description of everything by its elements is 


TRANSLATION. 221 


explanation, but the description by syllables or anything 
more comprehensive is failure of explanation, tell me so, 
that we may criticize it. 

Theae. I quite accept that view. 

So. Do you accept it under the belief that a person is 
cognisant of anything when he thinks that the same thing 
sometimes belongs to the same, sometimes to another, or 
when he thinks that to the same thing at one time one 
thing belongs, at another time another ? 

Theae. I believe nothing of the sort. 

So. Do you forget that, when you learnt your letters 
at first, you and the other scholars did such things ? 

Theae. Do you mean that we thought first one letter, 
then another, belonged to the same syllable, and that we 
assigned the same letter sometimes to its proper syllable, 
sometimes to another ? 

So. That is what I mean. 

Theae. No, I do not forget; nor do I consider 
that they who are in this condition have yet acquired 
knowledge. 

So. Well, when a child of that age writing ‘ Theaetetus,’ 
thinks he ought to write, and does write ‘theta’ and 
‘epsilon,’ and again attempting to write Theodorus thinks 
he ought to write and does write ‘tau’ and ‘epsilon,’ 
shall we say that he knows .the first syllable of your 
names ἢ 

Theae. It has been just allowed that such an one does 
not yet know. 

So. Is there anything to hinder the same child from 
making a similar error in respect of the second, third, and 
fourth syllables ἢ 

Theae, Nothing at all. 

So. Will one who has in mind the description by 


222 THEAETETUS. 


elements write ‘ Theaetetus’ with true opinion, whensoever 
he writes it in just order? 
Theae. Evidently. 


opinion, do we say? 


So. Being still without knowledge, though having right 


Theae. Yes. 

So. And yet he unites explanation with right opinion : 
for he wrote that description by elements which we admitted 
to be rational explanation ? 

Theae. ‘True. 

So. And thus, my friend, there is a right opinion with 

explanation, which we cannot yet call knowledge. . 

Theae. Apparently. 


43 [There remains (3) a third meaning of λόγος, viz. a mark of di, 


by which ng is shewn to be disti; thing else. It 
ts said that, while you perceive only those features which the thing 
has in common with others, you have true opinion of tt only: but 
that, when you add those which are peculiar to tt and characteristic, 
then you have the knowledge of it. Socrates proves this to be falla- 


cious. You h ot ay or ne, 
until you are cognisant of the peculigzvities i your object. Hence it 





Jollows that such a λόγος ἧς already included in true opinion, and 


J that, if an adjunct to this, it is merely superfluous and absurd. So 


then, says Socrates, all our three attempts to define knowledge have 
Jailed. Have you any other conception, Theaetetus? No, says the 
youth: you have already helped me to say much more than was in my 
own mind. | 


So. So we seem only to have dreamt we were rich in 
thinking we had the truest explanation of knowledge. Or 
must we suspend this charge? Somebody, perhaps, will 
not define ‘explanation’ thus: but rather as the remaining 
form of those three, one or other of which we said would 


TRANSLATION. 223 


be taken as ‘explanation,’ by one who defined knowledge 
to be ‘true opinion with explanation.’ : 

Theae. You justly remind me. There was one form / 
left. The first was the image, as it were, of thought in 
utterance: the second, now discussed, was the road to the 
whole through the elements. What do you call the| 
third ἢ 

Soa. That which most people would define as being 
able to mention some sign by which the thing in question 
differs from all others. 

Theae. Can you give me an instance of any such ex- 
planation of anything ? 

So. Yes, one which, if you like, I think you may com- 
petently accept concerning the sun, that it is the brightest 
of the bodies which travel in the heaven round the earth. 

Theae. Certainly. 

So. Now learn why this is said. The fact is, as we 
were lately saying, that,if you take the difference between 
each individual and all others, you will get a definition, as 
some say: but, as long as you lay hold of some common 
feature only, your account will be about those things which 
have that community. 

Theae. 1 understand. And I think it right to call such 
a process definition. 

So. But whosoever with right opinion about any thing 
learns furthermore its difference from others, will have gained 
_ knowledge of that of which before he had opinion. . 

Theae. Yes, we state it so. 

So. Now then most decidedly, Theaetetus, since I have 
come near to our proposition, as it were to a drawing, 
I do not understand it in the least. As long as I stood 
at a distance from it, there appeared to be some sense 
in it. 


224.  THEAETETUS: 


Theae. What do you-mean by this? 

So. Iwill tell you, if Ican. Having a right opinion 
of you, if I add to this your definition, I know you; if not, | 
I have opinion of you only. 

Theae. Yes. 

So. And the definition was the interpretation of your 
distinction. 

Theae. Even so. 

So. When I was opining only, was it not the case that 
I did not grasp with my mind any of the points in which 
you differ from others ? 

Theae. Seemingly. 

So. Then I was taking note of some of the common 
features, which belong no more to you than to other 
people ? 

Theae. Of course. 

So. Now do pray tell me: in such a case how will 
you more than anybody else have been*conceived by me? 
Suppose me to imagine that this is Theaetetus, whoever 
is a man, and has a nose and eyes and mouth, and any 
other individual member. Will this imagination cause me 
to conceive ‘Theaetetus more than Theodorus, or, pro- 
verbially speaking, any rapscallion whatever ? 

Theae. How can it? 

So. Or, if I imagine him having not only nose and 
eyes, but also as the one who has a flat nose and prominent 
eyes, shall I have a notion of you more than of myself, or 
of any other with these features ? 

Theae. No. 

So. Theaetetus, I fancy, will not be conceived in my 
mind until this flatness of nose shall have stamped and de- 
posited in my heart some memorial different from all other 
snubnesses of nose seen by me (I might say the same of all — 





TRANSLATION. "225 


your other features), which shall bring you to my mind, if I 
meet you to-morrow, and make me to have right opinion 
_about you. 

Theae. Most true. 

So. Right opinion then in each case will be concerned 
with differentiation. 

Theae. Evidently. 

So. What then will be ‘ the adding explanation to right 
opinion? For if it means, to add an opinion of the manner 
in which one thing differs from all others, this direction - 
becomes utterly ridiculous, 

Theae. How? 

So. Of things whereof we have a right opinion as to the 
nature of their difference from others, it bids us add a right 
opinion of the nature of their difference from others. And 
thus the proverbial twirl of the scytal or the pestle or any- 
thing else would be a mere trifle compared with this direction: 
nay it might more fairly be called a blind man’s direction: 
for to bid us add what we have got already, that we may 
learn what we think already, is a splendid illustration of a 
man groping in the dark. 

Theae. Tell me now what answer you meant to give to 


~ your last question. 


So. If bidding us to add explanation is bidding us to γ᾽ 
know distinction,—not to have an opinion of distinction— * 
the finest of our definitions of knowledge will turn out to be 
a nice sort of thing. For to know is, I suppose, to get 
knowledge. Is it not? 

Theae. Yes. ΟΣ τὰ 

So. Then, if asked, it seems, what knowledge is, ἃ 
person will reply that it is right opinion with a knowledge 
of difference: for the addition of explanation will mean this 
in his view. | | 

K. P. 15 


226 THEALRTETLTCS,. 


Theae. Seemingly. 

So. Yet it is utterly silly, when we are seeking know- 
ledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge whether 
of difference or of anything else. So, Theaetetus, neither 
sensible perception, nor true opinion, nor explanation ac- 
companying true opinion will be knowledge. 

Theae. Seemingly not. 

So. Do we still conceive anything and feel throes, my 
friend, about knowledge, or have we given birth to every- 
thing ? 

Theae. By all that’s sacred, Socrates, with your help I 
have said more than I had in my own mind. 

So. And does not our art declare that all these products 
have turned out to be wind, and not worth rearing? 

Theae. Decidedly so. 


44 [Well, Theaetetus, says Socrates in conclusion, the discussion of to-day 
will have done you good service in every way. You will cease to 
think you know things which you do not know, and your future 
conceptions will be consequently truer. Also you will be a more 
amiable companion, more willing to tolerate the mistakes of other 
disputants. I must now leave you, to keep an appointment with my 
accuser Melitus. To-morrow, Theodorus, let us meet here again.] 


So. Well, Theaetetus, if you seek to become, and do 
become, pregnant with other thoughts hereafter, the present 
enquiry will have improved your conceptions ; and, if you 
do not, you will be less severe to your associates, more 
mild and temperate, not supposing that you know what 
you do not know. So much only as this my art can do, no 
more. Nor do I know any of the things which others 
do, who are—and have made themselyes—great and 


TRANSLATION. 227 


ΑΜ 
wondrous men. ‘This midwifery I and my mother received Es 
as our function from God, she to practise it on women, I 
on young, noble and beautiful men. 

Now, however, I must encounter Melitus and his in- 
dictment against me at the Porch of the King’, In the 
morning, Theodorus, let us meet again here. 


44 1 The indictment against Socrates for impiety was brought by his 
accusers Anytus and Melitus in the court of the dpywv βασιλεύς, situated 
at the oréa thence called βασιλική, the Porch of the King. 





APPENDED NOTES. 


[Zhe references are (1) to chapters in translation ; (2) to pages in text and 
translation ; (3) to pages in Ed. I. of Stephens, as shewn in margin 
of text.] 


pp- 10, 109. St. 147. ἢ. περὶ δυνάμεών τι ἡμῖν Θεύ- 
δωρος ὅδε ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος ἀποφαί-: 
νων ὅτι μήκει οὐ ξύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαΐίᾳ, “Theodorus was descri- 
bing to us something about powers, proving as to the root 
of 3 and root of 5, that they are not in length commensur- 
able with the foot-unit:’ i.e. shewing that »/3 is greater than 
r and less than 2, and that /5 is greater than 2 and less 
than 3; that therefore they do not contain unity so many 
times; that they are fractions, not integers. With ποδιαίᾳ 
understand γραμμῇ. 

H. Schmidt in his Exegetic Commentary tries to shew 
that what Theodorus taught was a corollary to the Pythago- 
rean Theorem (Euclid 1. 47); that δυνάμεις mean the powers 
a’, δ᾽ &c. as in modern algebra, and that ποδιαία here is a 
unit square a’, by which the squares of a series of hypote- 
nuses of right-angled triangles, having for their kathetes @ 


and the fone hypotenuse, are all commensurable: since 
. 15—3 


9320 THEAETETUS. 


5 = γα", εἶ = 30°, 45 -- 4a", &c. Theodorus may have taught 
this truth, but it is certainly not introduced here, as the 
word μήκει proves, shewing ποδιαία to be the linear foot-unit. 
And that δυνάμεις mean roots, not the modern ‘powers,’ is 
clear from what follows 148 A, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, © 
ὡς μήκει μὲν ov ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται, 
ie. V3, V/s &c. are called ‘powers,’ because they have 
power, when squared, to form areas which are commensur- 
able with the squares 4, 9, 16, 25, &c. So Professors 
Jowett and Campbell. 

pp. 15, 116. Sti 151 E. ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. 
The words in which Plato recites the famous doctrine of 
Protagoras on the relativity of knowledge (μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, 
homo mensura) are probably cited from that philosopher’s 
treatise called ᾿Αλήθεια, Truth. But the identification of it 
with the suggestion of Theaetetus that knowledge is 
sensuous perception, I suppose with Grote, (Plato, 1. p. 323 
note) to be Plato’s own view, which Grote considers 
unjust, contending at some length against it (322—336). 
His main argument is, that implication of object and sub- 
ject is universal, affecting Noumena as well as Phaenomena: 
‘cogitata’ suppose a ‘cogitans,’ as much as ‘sensibilia’ 
suppose a ‘sentiens.’ Therefore Protagoras would not have 
limited the application of his maxim to αἴσθησις alone. We 
must concur with Grote in lamenting that we get the statements 
and arguments of Protagoras at second hand only; and that 
the views of others, as of Heracleitus and his great opponent 
Parmenides, are known to us only in fragments and citations, 
and from the late biographies of Diogenes Laertius. 

pp- τό, 117. St. 152 A. “AvOpwros δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ; 
Socrates means: as Protagoras applies his doctrine to man 


generally, he applies it to you and me, seeing that we are 
men. 


APPENDED NOTES. 231 


pp. 16, 117. St. 152 B.C. By the illustration here used 
Socrates proves that the maxim of Protagoras means that 
what appears to any one ‘is’ to him: and, as appearance 
_ implies perception, it follows that perception is knowledge. 

pp. 16,118. St. 152 C. “Ap οὖν κιτιλ. Why this out- 
burst? Socrates has just drawn from Theaetetus the ad- 
mission that αἴσθησις τοῦ ὄντος ἐστί, perception is of the 
existent, of that which ‘is.’ But the Heracleitean doctrine 
does not allow that anything ‘is’ (éor’) but says that all 
things γίγνεται ‘come to be.’ And Protagoras in his ᾿Αλή- 
θεια adopts this: so we must infer from what follows. What? 
says Socrates: did Protagoras then teach an obscure exoteric 
doctrine (ἠνίξατο) to the multitude, and tell the truth in 
esoteric confidence (ἐν ἀποῤῥήτῳ ἔλεγεν) to his disciples? 
Did he teach the one to believe in ovra, the others in 
nothing but γιγνόμενα Αἰνίττεσθαι, ‘to speak in riddles,’ is 
used of obscure or purposely veiled language. That Plato 
considered the doctrines which now follow to be involved 
in the teaching of Protagoras, is evident; indeed he dis- 
tinctly says so; nor can we doubt that he had foundation 
for his statement in the writings of that sophist. But it is 
evident also that he does not here quote his precise words: 
and it must always be doubtful how far Protagoras was com- 
mitted to all the refinements of the Heracleitean school, 
which appear in the next passage and afterwards. 

pp. 17, 119. The Platonic complication of the three 
doctrine; (1) the Heracleitean (οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ 
πάντα) (2) the Protagorean (πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον 
εἶναι) ard that put forth by Theaetetus (αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην 
γίγνεσθοι) is summarised below, 15, pp. 28, 135. The fol- 
lowing , observations of Grote (Plato, 11. p. 324) deserve 
special,attention, and supply a valuable key to the difficulties 
occurring in Plato’s treatment of this subject from 9 to 15 


292 THEAETETUS. 


and again from 15 to 30, where the definition αἴσθησις is 


finally abandoned. ‘Upon all the three opinions, thus - 


represented as cognate or identical, Sokrates bestows a 
lengthened comment (occupying a half of the dialogue)... 
His strictures are not always easy to follow with assurance, 
because he often passes with little notice from one to the 
other of the three doctrines which he is examining: because 
he himself, though really opposed to them, affects in part to 
take them up and to suggest arguments in their favour: 
and further because, disclaiming all positive opinion of his 
own, he sometimes leaves us in doubt what is his real 
purpose—whether to expound or to deride the opinions 
of others—whether to enlighten Theaetetus, or to test his 
power of detecting fallacies. We cannot always distinguish 


between the ironical and the serious. Lastly, it is a still. 


greater difficulty that we have not before us any one of the 
three opinions as set forth by their proper supporters.’ 

pp. 21, 125. St. 155 E. τῶν ἀμυήτων. Prof. Camp- 
bell in his learned Introduction to this dialogue ex- 
amines at large the question, who are the men whom 
Plato glances at here in such uncomplimentary language. 
Had he in mind Antisthenes and the Cynics? or Demo- 
critus and the Atomists? If Plato had either of these two 
schools in view, it seems more probable that these were 
the followers of Democritus. The γηγενεῖς mentiened in 
the Sophistes (p. 246 &c.) are evidently the same as the 
σκληροὶ καὶ ἀντίτυποι (εὖ μάλ᾽ ἄμουσοι) in this ates See 
Campbell, pp. xx, xxx. 


pp. 22, 126. St. 156 D. I must retract the partial — 
favour which my notes in the text and translation shew to 


the interpolated words of Cornarius. I find the view taken 
by Prof. Campbell and Prof. Jowett supported also by 
Hi. Schmidt (though Miiller in his German translation 


APPENDED NOTES. 233 


-renders the words of Cornarius, and Steinhart does not 
contradict him): to which authorities I have to add an 
_ opinion which I highly value, that of my friend and former 
pupil Mr R. Ὁ. Archer-Hind, Fellow of Trinity College, 
Cambridge. I had never felt disposed to follow Bekker 
in printing the passage as an unquestioned portion of the 
text; yet I hardly know that I regret having given my 
readers the opportunity of seeing and estimating that which 
conciliated the favour of so many eminent scholars. My 
own judgment in a case of this kind I regard as of little or 

- no value. 

) pp. 35, 144. St. 166 A. Socrates, who up to this 
point has seemed to play with the doctrine of his intended 
victim Protagoras, as a cat with a wretched mouse, some- 
times expounding and apparently supporting it, but only 
to strike it immediately with a harder blow, now professes 
to make a formal defence of it in the name of its author, 

for the express purpose of obliging Theodorus to take 
his turn in the dialogue, instead of Theaetetus, and submit 

‘to an elenchus, in defénce of his old friend Protagoras. 

\ Τὸν ἐμὲ is an assumption of dignity: ‘a man like me.’ 

| \pp. 52, 166. St. 179 A. of he had tried...a man’s 
own self’? In this translation we follow the reading εἴ πῃ 
τοὺς ουνόντας ἔπειθεν instead of the vulgate εἰ μὴ. Prof. 
Campbell, though he keeps εἰ py) in the text, accepts 
emendation in his note, but prefers εἰ δὴ. I can have 
no doubt that αὐτὸς must not be referred to Protagoras 
by reading αὐτῷ after it, but that the sense must be as I 
have given it, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, ‘a man’s own self” So Prof. 
Jowett (who also reads 8y) ‘every one for himself’ 

 ῸΡΡΡ. 56, 172. St. 182 B. ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων «.r.d. 
The meaning of this passage can be none other than what 
is given in my translation, which is the same as Prof. | 


294 THEAETETUS. 


Jowett’s in effect. But how the Greek construction is to 
be explained is doubtful. Prof. Campbell’s note gives very 
faint assistance, and neither Heindorf’s ἑαυτῶν for ἀμφοτέ- 
ρων, Nor ἀποτικτόμενα for ἀποτίκτοντα, fully satisfy. All we 
can say of the place is—medicam manum expectat. 

88 pp. 82,209. St. 201, C. It is commonly supposed that 
the words εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας refer to Antisthenes. 

44 As respects the definition of knowledge, this dialogue 
only arrives at certain negative conclusions; namely, that 
knowledge is neither perception, nor true opinion, nor 
true opinion combined with rational explanation. Yet, in 
the course of it, Plato has achieved certain objects, which 
he had in mind, and which he valued. For (1) he has paid 
a debt of gratitude to his Megarian friends and hosts, 
Eucleides and Terpsion; (2) he has shewn what he afters 
wards declared by his inscription on the Academy, μηδεὶς — 
ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω, that mathematical studies (Δ 4. exact | 
science) are a necessary avenue to mental studies (2.4 to 
transcendental or abstract science); (3) he has shewn that 
minds capable of pursuing the former with success are 
not necessarily capable of mastering the latter: this he 
indicates by the nature of Theodorus, which is unphillo- : 
sophic, as compared with that of Theaetetus, who is an apt — 
student of philosophy ; (4) he has confuted doctrines (Pro- — 
tagorean and Heracleitean), which he considers erroneous . 
and mischievous, and has exhibited the errors of the great : 
leader of that sophistic band, which he had, from his — 
master Socrates, a mission to combat and defeat; (5) he 1 
has found a noble opportunity to develope those moral and j 
political doctrines, as to the struggle of philosophic truth 
against fallacious rhetoric, which he mooted in the: Gorgias, — 
and developed more fully in the Republic at-a later 
time ; (6) he does achieve a positive result by the victorious. 





2. ἐσ ἂν Ὁ Ὁ. ΠῚ ν αν i δέ χε 







APPENDED NOTES. . 935 


assertion of a central seat of thought, to which all percep- 
tions are conveyed, and so converted into ideas: this is' 
ψυχή, the soul of man. The subsequent elenchi, which 
{confute the second and third definitions attempted by 
Theodorus, seem to me little more than gladiatorial word- 
fights, intended by Plato to exercise and display the dia- 
lectic skill which he had acquired at Megara, and at the 

Same time to amuse and puzzle the minds of his readers 
[by the parables or myths of the waxen tablet and the dove- 
age. But he may have had more serious aims in these 
lenchi than are obvious to my mind. 





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