The Bolsheviki and world peace

THE BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

THE BOLSHEVIKI

AND
WORLD PEACE

BY LEON TROTZKY
INTRODUCTION BY LINCOLN STEIIENS.

BONI AND LIVERIGHT
NEW YORK 1918

Copyright
1e18
Bo & Liv,ç,

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION BY LINCOLN STEFFENS
AUTHORS PREFACE

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

PAG E
• 7

2O

THE BALKAN QUESTION . 39
AIISTRL-HIIN.RX" ...... 62
THE WAR AGAINST CZARISM . . 78
THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST 101
THE WAR Of DEFENSE 118
WHAT HAVE SOCIhLISTS TO DO W-ITH CPI-
TALIST WAS?

VII. THE COLLAPSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL.
VIII. SOCLLST OPPORTUNISM
IX. THE DECLINE OF THE
SRT
N. WORKING CLASS IMPERIALISM
XI. THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCFI.

IEVOLUTIONARY

144
172
183

2O3
211
221

INTRODUCTION

THE voice that speaks in this book is the
voice of Leon Trotzky, the Bolshevik Minister
of Foreign Affairs for Revolutionary Russia.
Itis expressing ideas and views whieh lighted
him on the course of his poliey toward the War,
Peaee and the Revolution. It throws light,
therefore, on that poliey; it helps to an under-
standing of if, if one wishes fo understand. :But
that isn't all. The spirit that flames and easts
shadows upon these pages is not only Trotzky's.
If is the spirit also of tbe Bolsheviki; of the red
left of the left wing of the revolutionary move-
ment of New Russia. It flashed from Petro-
grad to Vladivostok, in the first week of the
revolt; it burned all along the Russian Front
before Trotzky appeared on the seene. It will
smoulder long af ter he is gone. It is a hot Faet

8 INTRODUCTION
which has tobe picked up and examined, this
spirit. Whether we like it or don't, itis there
in Russia; itis elsewhere; itis everywhere to-
day. Itis the spirit of war; class war, but war.
Itis in this book.
Nor is that all.
The mind in this book--the point of view from
which it starts, the views to which it points--
Trotzky's mind is the international mind. We
bave heard before of this new intelligence; we
bave read books, heard speeches, witnessed acts
demonstrative of thoughts and feelings which
are not national, but international; not patri-
otic, but loyal only to the lower-class-conscious
war aims of the workers of the world. The
class warrior is as familiar a figure to us as the
red spirit is of the red left of revolution. :But
the voice whieh utters here the spirit and the
mind, not only of the Russian, but of the world
revolution is the voiee of one having authority.
And Trotzky, in power, has been as red as he

INTRODUCTION 9

is in this book. The minister of foreign affairs
practised in Petrograd what he preached in
Switzerland, where he wrote most of the ehap-
ters of his book. And he praetised also what
all the other great International Soeialist lead-
ers talked and wrote.
That's what makes him so hard to under-
stand, him and his party and the Bolshevik
poliey. VVe are aeeustomed to the sight of So-
eialists and Radieals going into office and being
"sobered by the responsibilities of power."
Freneh and Italian Soeialists in the Liberal
ministries of their eountries; British Labor
leaders in Parliament in F, ngland or in the
governments of their Colonies; and the whole
Soeialist party in Germany and A_ustria (ex-
eept Lieb "knecht in prison)--all are examples
of the effeet of power upon the International
Mind. The phenomenon of compromise and
surrender is so eommon that many radieals op-
pose the taking of any responsible office by any

10

INTRODUCTION

member of their parties; and some of the ex-
tremists are advocating no political action
whatsoever, nothing but industrial, eeonomie or
what they eall "direct action." (Our I.W.W.'s
don't vote, on prineiple.) This is anarehism.
Leon Trotzky is not an anarehist; exeept in
the ignorant sense of the word as used by edu-
eated people. :[-Ie is a Soeialist; an orthodox
:Marxian Soeialist. :But he has seen vividly the
danger of politieal power. The body of this
book was addressed originally fo the German
and A_ustrian Soeialists, and if is a reasoned,
but indignant reproaeh of them for letting their
politieal position and their nationalistie loyalty
earry them away into an undemoeratie, patri-
otie, politieal poliey whieh betrayed the weaker
nations in their empires, helped break up the
Second (Soeialist) International and led the
Socialist parties into the support of the War.
Clear upon it, Trotzky himself does not il-
lustrate his own thesis. He not only detests in-

INTRODUCTION II

telleetually the secrecy and the sordid wicked-
ness of the "old diplomacy"; when he came as
minister into possession of the archives of the
Russian Foreign Oflàee, he published the secret
treaties.
That hurt. And so with the idea of a peo-
ple's peaee. Ail the demoeratie world had been
talking ever sinee the war began of a peaee
made, hot by diplomats in a private room, but
by the ehosen representatives of all the peo-
ples meeting in an open eongress. The ]3olshe-
viki worked for that from the moment the Rus-
sian Revolution broke; and they labored for
the Stoe -kholm Conferenee while Paul Milyou-
kov and Aiexander ]ïerensky were negotiat-
ing with the allied governments. When the
]3olsheviki sueeeeded to power, Lenine and
Trotzky formally authorized and oflàeially pro-
posed sueh a eongress. M:oreover Trotzky
showed that they were willing, if they eould,

12 INTRODUCTION
to force the other countries to accept the peo-
ple's peace conference.
This hurt. This hurt so much that the gov-
ernments united in extraordinary measures to
prevent the event. And when they succeeded,
and it was seen that no people's peace could be
made openly and directly, Trotzky proceeded
by another way to get to the same end. I-Ie
opened negotiations with the Kaiser's govern-
ment and allies; arranged an armistice and
agreed tentatively upon terms of peace.
This act not only hurt; if stunned the world,
and no wonderI It was like a declaration of
war against a whole world at war. It was un-
believable. The only explanation offered was
that Trotzky and Lenine were pro-German or
dishonest, or both, and these things were said
in high places; and they were said with convic-
tion, too. Moreover this conviction colored, if
it did not determine, the attitude the Allies took
toward :New Russia and the peace proposais

INTRODUCTION 13

Trotzky got from the German goverrunent.
Was this assumption of the dishonesty of Trot-
zky the only explanation of his aet ?
This book shows, as I have said, that Trotzky
saw things from the revolutionary, interna-
tional point of view, which is hot that of his
j udges; which is incomprehensible fo them. He
wrote it af ter the Var began; he finished the
main part of if before the Russian Revolution.
If is his view of the War, its causes and its ef-
fects, espeeially upon international Soeialism
and "the" Revolution. These are the things he
holds in his mind all through all these pages:
"the" Revolution and world democraey. /klso
I have shown that, like the Russians generally,
his mind is literal. The Russians mean what
they say, exaetly; and Trotzky not only means,
he does what he writes. Putting these con-
siderations together, we tan make a compre-
hensible statement of the motive and the pur-
pose of his poliey; if we want fo eomprehend.

14 INTRODUCTION
To all the other secretaries of state or of
foreign affairs in the world, the Russian Revo-
lution was an incident, an interruption of the
War. To Minister Trotzky it was the other
way around.
The World War was an incident, an effect,
a check of "the" Revolution. Not the Russian
Revolution, you understand. To Trotzky the
Russian Revolution is but one, the first of that
series of national revolutions which together
will become the Thing he yearns for and proph-
esies: the World Revolution.
ttis peace policy therefore is a peace drive
directed, not at a separate peace with the Cen-
tral lowers; and not even at a general peace,
but to an ending of the War in and by "the"
Revolution everywhere.
:Especially in Germany and Austria. tte
said this. The correspondent of the London
Daily News cabled on January 2, right af ter
the armistice and the agreement upon peace

INTRODUCTION 15

terms tobe offered the Allies, that "Trotzky
is doing his utmost to stimulate a revohltion
in Germany .... Out only chance to defeat
German designs is fo publish terres (from the
Allies) . . . fo help the demoeratie movement
in Germany."
Trotzky is not pro-German. He eertainly
was not when he wrote this book. He hates
here both the Austrian and the German dynas-
ties, and his ill-will toward the House of Haps-
burg is so bitter that it sounds sometimes as if
there were something personal about it. And
there is. He shows a knowledge of and a living
sympathy with the small and subj eet nations
whieh Austria rules, exploits and mistreats. He
blames his Austrian eomrades for their alle-
gianee fo a throne which is not merely undemo-
eratie, but "senile" and tyrannieal. That he,
the literal Trotzky, would turn right around
and, as the Russian Minister of Y'oreign Af-

16 INTRODUCTION

fairs, do what he had so recently criticized the
Austrian Soeialists for doing is unlikely.
Trotzky is against all the present govern-
ments of urope, and the "bourgeois system"
everywhere in the world. He isn't pro-Allies;
he isn't even pro-Russian, tte isn't a patriot
at all. tte is for a elass, the proletariat, the
working people of all eountries, and he is for
his elass only to get rid of classes and get down
or up to--humanity. And so with his people.
The Russians have listened to the Soeialist
propaganda for generations now. They have
learned the chier lessons it has taught: liberty,
land, industrial demoeraey and the elass-war
the world over. This War was not their war;
it was the Czar's war; a war of the governments
in the interest of their enemies, the eapitalists
of their several eountries, who, as Trotzky says,
were foreing their states fo fight for the right
fo exploit other and smaller peoples. So when
they overthrew the Czar, the Russians wanted

INTRODUCTION 17
to drop his war and go into their own, the class
war. Kerensky held them at the front in the
name of "the" Revolution; he would get peace
for them by arrangement with the allies. He
didn't; he couldn't; he was dismissed by them.
Not by the Bolsheviki, but by the Russian peo-
ple who know the three or four things they
want." land and liberty af home; the Revolution
and Democracy for all the world.
I heard a radical assert one day that that
was the reason Trotzky could be such an ex-
ception fo the rule about radicals in power.
He came fo the head of the Russian Revolu-
tion when his ideas were the actual demands of
the lussian leople and that if was hot his
strenoh of character, but the force of a demo-
cratic public opinion in mob power, which made
him stick to his philosophy and carry out his
theories and promises. I find upon inquiry
here in New York that while he was living and
workng as a journalist on the East Side, he

18 INTRODUCTION •

left one paper after another because he could
not conform to their editorial policies and
would not compromise. He was "stiff-neeked,"
"obstinate," "unreasonable." In other, kinder
words, Trotzky is a strong rnan, with a definite
rnind and a purpose of his own, wlfieh he has
the will and the nerve to pursue.
_A_lso, however, Trotzky is a strong man who
is ruled by and represents a very simple-rninded
people who are aeting like him, literally upon
the theory that the people govern now, in Rus-
sia; the eommon people; and that, sinee they
don't like the War of the Czar, the Kaiser, the
Kings and the Emperors, their government
should rnake peaee with the peoples of the
world, a delnoeratie peaee against imperialism
and eapitalism and the state everywhere, for
the establishment in ifs stead of a free, world-
wide dernoeraey.
That inay be the true explanation of Trot-
zky's Bolshevik peaee poliey in the world erisis

INTRODUCTION 19

of the World War. That is the explanation
whieh is suggested by this book.
"Written in extreme haste," he says at the
close of his prefaee, "under conditions far
from favorable to systematie work . . . the en-
tire book, from the first page to the last, was
written with the idea of the New International
eonstantly in mind--the New International
whieh must rise out of the present world eata-
elysm, the International of the last eonfliet and
the final victory."
LINCOLN STEFFENS.

New York, January th, 1917.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THE forces of production which capitalism
has evolved have outgrown the limits of nation
and state. The national state, the present po-
litieal form, is too narrow for the exploita-
tion of these productive forces. The natural
tendeney of our eeonomie system, therefore,
is to seek to break through the state bounda-
ries. The whole globe, the land and the sea, the
surface as well as the interior, has beeome one
eeonomie workshop, the different parts of
whieh are inseparably eonneeted with eaeh
other. This work was aeeomplished by eap-
italism. But in aeeomplishing it the eapitalist
states were led to struggle for the subj eetion
of the world-embraeing eeonomie system to the
profit interests of the bourgeoisie of eaeh coun-
try. What the polities of imperialism has
20

AUTHOR'S PREFACE 21

demonstrated more than anything else is that
the old national state that was created in the
revolutions and the wars of 1789-1815, 188-
1859, 186-1866, and 1870 has outlived itself,
and is now an intolerable hindrance to eco-
nomic development.
The present War is at bottom a revoit of the
forces of production against the politieal form
of nation and state. It means the eollapse of
the national state as an independent eeonomie
unit.
The nation must continue fo exist as a cul-
rural, ideologie and psyehologieal faet, but ifs
eeonomie foundation has been pulled from un-
der its feet. All talk of the present bloody
elash being a work of national defense is either
hypoerisy or blindness. On the eontrary, the
real, objective signifieanee of the war is the
breakdown of the present national eeonomie
centres, and the substitution of a world eeon-
omy in ifs stead. But the way the govern-

I

22 AUTH01'S PREFACE
ments propose fo solve this problem of impe-
rialism is not through the intelligent, organized
co6peration of all of humanity's producers, but
through the exploitation of the world's eco-
nomic system by the capitalist class of the vic-
torious country; which country is by this War
fo be transformed from a great power into the
world power.
The çVar proclaims the downfall of the na-
tional state. Yet af the same rime if proclaims
the downfall of the eapitalist system of eeon-
omy. By means of the national state eapital-
ism has revolutionized the whole eeonomie
system of the world. It has divided the whole
earth among the oligarchies of the great pow-
ers, around whieh were grouped the satellites,
the small nations, who lived off the rivalry be-
tween the great ones. The future develop-
ment of world eeonomy on the eapitalistie
basis means a eeaseless struggle for new and
ever new fields of eapitalist exploitation, whieh

AUTHOR'S PREFACE 23

must be obtained from one and the same source,
the earth. The economic rivalry under the ban-
ner of militarism is aeeompanied by robbery
and destruction whieh violate the elementary
prineiples of human eeonomy. World produc-
tion revolts not only against the confusion pro-
dueed by national and state divisions but also
against the eapitalist eeonomie organization,
whieh has now turned into barbarous disorgani-
zation and chaos.
The War of 1914 is the most colossal break-
down in history of an eeonomie system de-
stroyed by ifs own inherent contradictions.
All the historical forces whose task if has
been to guide the bourgeois soeiety, to speak in
its name and fo exploit it, have deelared their
historieal ban-kruptey by the War. They de-
fended eapitalism as a system of hurnan eiv-
ilization, and the catastrophe born out of that
system is primarily their catastrophe. The first
wave of events raised the national governments

24 AUTHOR'S PREFACE

and armies to unprecedented heights never at-
tained before. :For the moment the nations
rallied around them. But the more terrible will
be the crash of the governments when the peo-
pie, deafened by the thunder of the cannon,
realize the meaning of the events now taking
place in ail their truth and frightfulness.
The revolutionary reaction of the masses will
be ail the more powerful the more prodigious
the cataclysm which history is now bringing
upon them.
Capitalism has created the material condi-
tions of a new Socialist economic system. Im-
perialism has led the capitalist nations into his-
torie chaos. The War of 191 shows the way
out of this chaos by violently urging the pro-
letariat on fo the path of Revolution.

:For the economic backward countries of
Europe the War brings to the fore problems of
a far earlier historic originuproblems of

AUTHOR'S PREFACE 25

democracy and national unity. This is in a
large measure the case with the peoples of Rus-
sia, Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Penin-
sula. But these historieally belated questions,
whieh were bequeathed to the present epoeh as
a heritage from the past, do not alter the fun-
damental eharacter of the events. It is not the
national aspirations of the Serbs, Poles, Rou-
manians or Finns that has mobilized twenty-
rive million soldiers and plaeed them in the bat-
tlefields, but the imperialistie interests of the
bourgeoisie of the Great Powers. If is imperi-
alism that has upset completely the l,uropean
status quo, maintained for forty-five years, and
raised again the old questions whieh the bour-
geois revolution proved itself powerless to
solve.
Yet in the present epoeh it is quite impos-
sible to treat these questions in and by them-
selves. They are utterly devoid of an inde-
pendent eharacter. The ereation of normal re-

26 AUTHOR'S PREFACE
lations of national life and economic develop-
ment on the Balkan Peninsula is unthinkable
if Czarism and Austria-Hungary are pre-
served. Czarism is now the indispensable mili-
tary reservoir for the financial imperialism of
France and the conservative colonial power of
England. Austria-Hungary is the mainstay
of Germany's imperialism. Issuing from the
private family clashes between the national
Servian terrorists and the Hapsburg political
police, the War very quickly revealed its true
fundamental character--a struggle of life and
death between Germany and :England. While
the simpletons and hypocrites prate of the de-
fense of national freedom and independence,
the German-:English War is really being waged
for the freedom of the imperialistic exploitation
of the peoples of India and Egypt on the one
hand, and for the imperialistic division of the
peoples of the earth on the other.
Germany began its capitalistic development

AUTHOR'S PREFACE 27

on a national basis with the destruction .of the
continental hegemony of France in the year
1870-1871. Now that the development of Ger-
man industry on a national foundation has
transformed Germany into the first capitalistic
power of the world, she finds herself colliding
with the hegemony of England in her further
course of development. The complete and un-
limited domination of the :European continent
seems to Germany the indispensable prerequi-
site of the overthrow of her world enemy. The
first thing, therefore, that imperialistic Ger-
many writes in her programme is the creation
of a Middle European League of Nations.
Germany, A_ustria-Hungary, the Balkan 1)e -
ninsula and Turkey, Holland, the Scandina-
vlan countries, Switzerland, Italy, and, if pos-
sible, enfeebled France and Spain and 1)ortu -
gal, are to make one economic and military
whole, a Great Germany under the hegemony
of the present German state.

28 AUTHOR'S PREFACE
This programme, which has been thoroughly
elaborated by the economists, political students,
jurists and diplomat of German imperialism
and translated into reality by its strategists, is
the most striking proof and most eloquent ex-
pression of the fact that capitalism has ex-
panded beyond the limits of the national state
and feels intolerably cramped within its bound-
aries. The national Great Power must go and
in its place must step the imperialistic World
Power.
In these historical circumstances the working
class, the proletariat, can have no interest in
defending the outlived and antiquated national
"fatherland," which has become the main ob-
stacle to economic development. The task of
the proletariat is to create a far more powerful
fatherland, with far greater power of resis-
tance--the republican United States of
Europe, as the foundation of the United States
of the World.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE 29

The only way in whieh the proletariat can
meet the imperialistic perplexity of capitalism
is by opposing to it as a praetieal progranmae
of the day the Soeialist organization of world
eeonomy.
War is the method by which eapitalism, at
the elimax of its development, seeks to solve
its insoluble contradictions. To this method
the proletariat must oppose its orn method,
the method of the Social Revolution.

The Balkan question and the question of the
overthrow of Czarism, propounded to us by the
Europe of yesterday, ean be solved only in a
revolutionary way, in eonneetion with the prob-
lem of the United Europe of to-morrow. The
imlnediate, urgent task of the Russian Social
Demoeraey, to whieh the author belongs, is the
fight against Czarism. ¥hat Czarism prima-
rfly seeks in Austria-Hungary and the Balkans
is a market for its political methods of plunder,

30 AUTH01'S PIEFACE

robbery and acts of violence. The Russian
bourgeoisie all the wy up to its radical intel-
lectuals has become completely demoralized by
the tremendous growth of industry in the last
rive years, and it has entered into a bloody
league with the dynasty, which had fo seeure fo
the impatient Russian capitalists their part of
the world's booty by new land robberies. Vhile
Czarism stormed and devastated Galicia, and
deprived it even of the rags and tatters of lib-
erty granted to it by the Hapsburgs, while it
dismembered unhappy 19ersia, and from the
corner of the Bosporus strove fo throw the
noose around the neek of the Balkan peoples,
it left to the liberalism whieh if despised the
task of eoncealing its robbery by sickening dec-
lamations over the defense of Belum and
France. The year 191J spells the complete
bankruptcy of Russian liberalism, and makes
the Russian proletariat the sole champion of
the war of liberation. It mkes the Russian

AUTHOR'S PREFACE 31

Revolution definitely an integral part of the
Social Revolution of the European proletariat.
In out war against Czarism, in which we
have never known a "national" truce, we bave
never looked for help from Hapsburg or Ho-
henzollern militarism, and we are not looking
for it now. We bave preserved a sufficiently
clear revolutionary vision to know that the idea
of destroying Czarism was utterly repugnant
to German imperia]ism. Czarism bas been its
best ally on the Eastern border. It is united to
it by close ries of social structure and historical
aires. Yet even if it were otherwise, even if it
eould be assumed that, in obedience to the logie
of military operations, it would deal a destruc-
tive blow to Czarism, in defianee of the logie
of its own political interests--even in such a
highly improbable case we should refuse to re-
gard the Hohenzollerns not only as an objec-
tive but as a subjective ally. The fate of the
Russian Revolution is so inseparably bound up

32 AUTHOR'S PIEFACE

with the fate of European Socialism, and we
Russian Socialists stand so firmly on the
ground of internationalism, that we cannot, we
must not for a moment, entertain the idea of
purchasing the doubtftfl liberation of Russia
by the certain destruction of the liberty of Bel-
gium and France, and--what is more impor-
tant still--thereby inoculating the German and
Austrian proletariat with the virus of impe-
rialism.
We are united by many ries fo the German
Social Democracy. Ve have all gone through
the German Socialist school, and learned les-
sons from ifs successes as well as from ifs fail-
ures. The German Social Democracy was to
us not only a party of the International. It
was the Party par eoecellence. We have always
preserved and fortified the fraternal bond that
united us with the Austrian Social Democracy.
On the other hand, we have always taken pride
in the fact that we bave made our modest con-

AUTHOR'S PREFACE 33
tribution towards wimfing suffrage in Austria
and arousing revolutionary tcndencies in the
Gernmn working class. It cost more than one
drop of blood to do it. Ve have unhcsitatingly
accepted moral and material support from our
older brother who fought for the saine ends as
we on the other side of our Vestern border.
Yet it is just because of this respect for the
past, and still more out of respect for the fu-
ture, which ought to unite the working class of
Russia with the working classes of Germany
and Austria, that we indignantly reject the
"liberating" aid which German imperialism of-
fers us in a Krupp munition box, with the bless-
ing, alas! of German Socialism. And we hope
that the indignant protest of Russian Socialism
will be loud enough to be heard in Berlin and in
Vienna.

The collapse of the Second International is
a tragie fact, and it were blindness or cow-

34

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

ardice to close one's eyes to it. The position
taken by the French and by the larger part of
English Soci,lism is as mueh a part of this
breakdown as the position of the German and
Austriau Social Democracy. If the present
work addresses itself chiefly to the German So-
cial Democracy it is only because the German
l»arty was the strongest, most influential, and
in principle the most basic member of the So-
cialist world. Its historie capitulation reveals
most clearly the causes of the downfall of the
Second International. At first glance it may
appear that the social revolutionary prospects
of the future are wholly deceptîve. The hasolv-
ency of the old Socialist parties bas become
eatastrophically apparent. Why should we
bave faith in the future of the Socialist more-
ment? Such skepticism, though natural, never-
theless leads to quite an erroneous conclusion.
It leaves out of account the good will of his-
tory, j ust as we bave often been too prone fo

AUTHOR'S PREFACE 35

ignore its iii will, which has now so cruelly
shown itself in the fate that has overcome the
International.
The present War signalizes the eollapse of
the national states. The Soeialist parties of
the epoch now concluded were national parties.
They bad becolne ingrained in the national
states with all the different branches of their
organizations, with 11 their aetivities and with
their psyeholog3.*. In tbe fee of the solemn
deelarations af tbeir eongresses they rose to
the defense of the eonservative state, when im-
perialism, grown big on tbe national soil, began
to demolish the antiquated national barriers.
And in their historie crash the national states
have pulled down with them the national So-
eialist parties also.
If is hot Soeialism that has gone down, but
ifs temporary historieal external form. The
revolutionary idea begins ifs lire anew as if
easts off its old rigid shell. This shell is ruade

36 AUTHOR'S PREFACE

up of living human beings, of an entire gen-
eration of Socialists that has become fossilized
in self-abnegating work of agitation and or-
ganization through a period of several decades
of political reaction, and has fallen into the
habits and views of national opportunism or
possibilism. Ail efforts to save the Second In-
ternational on file old basis, by personal diplo-
matie methods and mutual concessions, are
quite hopeless. The old mole of history is now
digging its passageways all too well and none
has the power to stop him.
As the national states have become a hin-
dranee to the development of the forces of pro-
duetion, so the old Soeialist parties have be-
eome the main hindranee to the revolutionary
movement of the working elass. It was neees-
sary that they should demonstrate to the full
their extreme baekwardness, that they should
diseredit their utterly inadequate and narrow
methods, and bring the shame and horror of

AUTHOR'S PREFACE 37

national discord upon the proletariat, in order
that the working class might emancipate itself,
through these fearful disillusionments, from
the prejudices and slavish habits of the period
of preparation, and become at last that which
the voice of history is now calling if fo be--the
revolutionary class fighting for power.
The Second International has not lived in
vain. If has accomplished a huge cultural
work. There has been nothing like it in history
before. If has educated and assembled the op-
pressed classes. The proletariat does hot now
need to begin af the beginning. If enters on
the new road not with empty hands. The past
epoch has bequeathed to it a rich arsenal of
ideas. It has bequeathed toit the weapons of
criticism. The new epoch will teach the pro-
letariat fo combine the old weapons of criticism
with the new criticism of weapons.
This book was written in extreme haste, un-
der conditions far from favorable to systematie

38 AUTHOR'S PREFACE

work. A large part of it is devoted to the old
International which bas fallen. But the entire
book, from the first fo the 1,st page, vas writ-
ten with the idea of the New International con-
stantly in mind, the New International which
must fise up out of the present world cata-
clysm, the International of the last conflict and
the final victory.
LEo TaoTzx T.

THE BOLSHEVIKI AND
WORLD PEACE

CHAPTER I

TttE BALKA:N QUESTION
"THE Var af present being waged agaînst
Russian Czarism and its vassals is dominated
by a great historic idea. The impetus of this
great historic idea consecrates the battlefields
of :Poland and of :Eastern Russia. The roar
of cannon, the rattling of machine guns, and
the onrush of cavalry, all betoken the en-
forcement of the democratic programme for
the liberation of the nations. Had Czarism,
in league  ith the French capitalistic pow-
ers and in league with an unscrupulous 'na-
tion of shopkeepers,' not succeeded in sup-
pressing the Revolution of 1905, the'present
39

40 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

slaughter of the nations would have been
avoided.
"A demoeratie Russia would never have
eonsented fo wage this unserupulous and fu-
tile Var. The great ideas of fl-eedom and
justice now speak the persuasive language of
the machine gun and the sword, and every
heart susceptible of sympathy with justice
and humanity tan only wish that the power
of Czm-ism may be destroyed once for ail,
and that the oppressed Russian nationalities
may again secure the right fo decide their
own destinies."

The above quotation is from the Nepszava
of August 31, 1914, the oflïcial organ of the
Socialist party of Hungary. Hungary is the
land whose entire inner life was erected upon
the high-handed oppression of the national
minorities, upon the enslavement of the labor-
ing classes, upon the official parasitism and

THE BALKAN QUESTION 41
usury of the ruling caste of large landowners.
It is the land in which men like Tisza are mas-
ters of the situation, dyed-in-the-wool agrari-
ans, with the manners of political bandits. In
a word, Hungary is a country closest of kin
to Czar-ruled Russia.
So what is more fitting than that the Neps-
zava, the Socialist organ of Hungary, should
bail with outbursts of enthusiasm the liberating
mission of the Gernmn and Austro-Hungarian
amies? Vho other than Count Tisza could
have felt the call to "enforce the democratic
programme for the liberation of the nations"?
Vho was there to uphold the eternal principles
of law and justice in Europe but the ruling
clique of Budapest, the discredited Panamists ?
¥ould you entrust this mission to the unscru-
pulous diplomacy of "perfidious Albion," to
the nation of shopkeepers ?
Laughter turns away wrath. The tragic in-
consistencies of the policies followed by the In-

42 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD :PEACE

ternational not only reach their climax ha the
articles of the poor Nepszava; they disarm us
by their humor.
The present series of events began with the
ultimatum sent to Servia by Austria-Hungary.
There was not the slightest reason why the in-
ternational Social Democracy should take un-
der ifs protection the intrigues of the Serbs or
any other of the petty dynasties of the :Balkan
t'eninsula. They were all endeavoring to hide
tbeir politieal adventures under the cloak of
national aspirations. ¥e had still less cause
fo lash ourselves into a state of moral indigna-
tion because a fanatie young Serb responded to
the eowardly, crinfinal and wily national poli-
ries of the Vienna and :Budapest govermnent
authorities with a bloody assassination.*

* If is noteworthy that these opportunistie Austrian and Ger-
man S'oeialists are now writhing with moral indignation over
the "treacherous assassination af Sarajevo." And yet they
always sympathized with the Russian terrorists more than we,
the Russian Social Democrats, did, who are opposed on prin-
eiple to the terroristie method. Lost in the mist of ehauvinism,

TI-[E BALKAN QUESTION 43
Of one thing we have no doubt. In the deal-
ings between the Dalube Monarchy and the
Servian goverrunent, the historic right, that is
to say, the riglt of free development, rests en-
tirely with Ser,'ia, j ust as Italy was in the right
in the year 1859. Underneath the duel between
the ilnperial police scoundrels and the terrorists
of Belgrade, there is hidden a far deeper lnea,-
ing than merely the greed of the Kareorgoie-
vitches or the crimes of the Czar's diplolnacy.
On one side were the imperialistic clailns of a
national state tlat had lost ifs vitality, and on
the other side, the strivings of the dismembered
Servian nation to reintegrate itself into a ha-
tional whole and become a living vital state.
Is it for this that we have sat so long in the
they can no longer see that the unfortuate Servian terrorist,
Gavrilo Prinzip, represents precisely the saine national prin-
ciple as the German terrorist, Sand. Perhaps they will even
ask us to transfer our sympathies from Sand fo Kotzebue? Or
perhaps these eunuchs will advise the Swiss to overthrow the
monuments erected to the assassin Tell and replace them with
monuments to the Austrian governor, Gessler, one of the spir-
itual foreru,ners of the murdered archduke?

44 BOLSHEVIKI AND W01LD PEACE
school of Socialism to forger the first three let-
ters of the democratic alphabet ? This absolute
lapse of memory, moreover, made its appear-
ance only after the fourth of August. Up to
that fatal date the German Marxists showed
that they knew very well what was happening
in Southeastern Europe.
On July 1, 1914, after the assassination at
Sarajevo, the Yorwiirts wrote:

"The bourgeois revolution of the South
Slavs is in full swing, and the shooting at
Sarajevo, however wild and senseless an aet
in itself, is as mueh a ehapter of this revolu-
tion as the battles by whieh the Bulgarians,
Serbs and Montenegrins liberated the peas-
ants of Maeedonia from the yoke of Turkish
feudal exploitation. Is if a wonder that the
South Slavs of Austria-Hungary look with
longing to their racial brothers in the king-
dom of Servia? The Serbs in Servia have

THE BALKAN QUESTION 45
attained the highest goal a people can attain
in the present order of society. They bave
attained national independence. Whereas
in Vienna or Budapest they treat every one
bearing the name of Serb or Croatian with
blows and kicks, with court-martial justice
and the gallows .... There are seven and a
half million South Slavs who, as a result of
the victories in the Balkans, have grown
bolder than ever in demanding their political
rights. And if the imperial throne of Aus-
tria continues fo resist their impact, it will
topple over and the entire Empire with which
we bave coupled our destiny will break to
pieces. :For it is in line with historic evolu-
tion that such national revolutions should
march onward to victory."

If the international Social Democracy to-
gether with its Servian contingent, offered un-
yielding resistanee to Servia's national elaims,

46 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

it )vas certainly hot out of any consideration for
the historie rights of Austria-Hungary fo op-
press and disintegrate the nationalities living
within ber borders; and most eertainly not out
of eonsideration for the liberating mission of
the Hapsburgs. Until August, 191, no one,
exeept the black and yello)v hirelings of the
press, dared fo breathe a )vord about that. The
Soeia]ists were influeneed in their course of
eonduet by entirely different motives. First of
all, the proletariat, although by no means dis-
puting the historie right of Servia fo strive for
national unity, eould not trust the solution of
this problem fo the po)vers then eontrolling the
destinies of the Servian kingdom. And in the
second place--and this )vas for us the deciding
factor--the international Social Demoeraey
eould hOt sacrifice the peaee of Europe fo the
national cause of the Serbs, reeognizing, as it
did, that, exeept for a European revolution,

THE BALKAN QUESTION 47
the only way such unity could be aehieved was
through a European war.
But from the moment Austria-Hungary car-
ried the question of her own fate and that of
Servi to the battlefield, Socialists could no
longer bave the slightest doubt that social and
national progress would be hit nmch barder in
Southeastern Europe by a Hapsburg victory
than by a Servian victory. To be sure, there
xvas still no reason for us Socialists to identify
our cause with the aims of the Servian army.
This was the idea that animated the Servian
Socialists, Ljaptchevitch and Katzlerovitch,
when they took the manly stand of voting
against the war credits.* But surely we had
* To appreciate fully this action of the Servian Socialists we
must bear in mind the political situation by which they were
confronted. A group of Servian conspirators had murdered a
member of the Hapsburg family, the mainstay of Austro-Hun-
garian clericalism, militarism, and imperialism. Using this as
a welcome pretext, the military party in Vienna sent an ulti-
matum to Servia, which, for sheer audacity, has scarcely ever
been paralleled in diplomatic history. In reply, the Servian
government ruade extraordinary concessions, and suggested that
the solution of the question in dispute be turned over to the

48 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
still less reason to support the purely dynastic
rights of the Hapsburgs and the imperialistic
interests of the feudal-capitalistic cliques
against the national struggle of the Serbs. At
all events, the Austro-Hungarian Social De-
mocracy, which now im-okes its blessings upon
the sword of the Hapsburgs for the liberation
of the Poles, the Ukrainians, the Finns and
the Russian people, must first of all clarify its
ideas on the Servian question, which it bas got-
ten so hopelessly muddled.
The question at issue, however, is not con-
Hague tribunal. Thereupon Austria declared war on Servia.
If the idea of a "war of defense" bas any meaning af ail, if
certainly applied to Servia in this instance. Nevertheless, our
friends, Ljaptchevitch and Katzlerovitch, unshaken in their
conviction of the course of action that they as Socialists must
pursue, refused the government a vote of confidence. The
writer was in Servia af the beginning of the War. In the
Skuptchina, in an atmosphere of indescribable national enthu-
siasm, a vote was taken on the war credits. The voting was
by roll-call. Two hundred members had ail answered "Yes."
Then in a moment of deathlike silence came the voice of the
Socialist Ljaptchevitch--"No." Every one felt the moral force
of this protest, and the scene bas remained indelibly impressed
upon my memory.

THE BALKAN QUESTION 49
fined to the fate of the ten million Serbs. The
elash of the European nations has brought up
the entire Balkan question anew. The Peace
of Bucharest, signed in 19013, has solved neither
the national nor the international problems in
the Near ]ast. It bas only intensified tle
added confusion resulting from the two unfin-
ished Balkan XVars, unfinished beeause of the
eomplete temporary exhaustion of the nations
partieipating in it.
l{oumania had followed in the path of
Austro-Hungarian polities, despite the lto-
manesque sympathies of its population, espe-
eially in the cities. This was due hot so much
to dynastie causes, to the fact that a .Hohen-
zollern prince oeeupied the throne, as to the
imminent danger of a l{ussian invasion. In
1879 the ltussian Czar, as thanks for ltou-
mania's suppoloE in the l{usso-Turkish war of
"liberation," eut off a slice of l{oumanian ter-
ritory, the province of Bessarabia. This elo-

50 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

quent deed provided a suflïcient backing to the
dynastie sympathies of the Hohenzollern in
]3ucharest. But the Magyar-Hapsburg clique
succeeded in incensing the Roumanian people
against them by their denationalizing policy in
Transylvania, which has a population of three
million Roumanians as against three-fourths of
a million in the Russian province of Bessarabia;
and they further antagonized them by their
commercial treaties, which were dictated by the
interests of the large _A_ustro-Hungarian land-
owners. So that Roumania's entrance into the
Var on the side of the Czar, despite the cour-
ageous and active agitation against participa-
tion in the Var on either side, carried on by the
Socialist party under the leadership of my
friends Gherea and Rakowsky, is to be
laid altogether af the door of the ruling class

of Austria-Hungary, who are reaping the
harvest they have sown here as vell as else-
where.

THE BALKAN QUESTION 51
But the matter is not disposed of by fixing
the historical responsibility. To-morrow, in a
month, in a year or more the War will bring to
the foreground the whole question of the des-
tiny of the Balkan peoples and of Austria-
Hungary, and the proletariat will have to have
ifs answer to this question. European democ-
racy in the nineteenth century looked with dis-
trust af the Balkan people's struggle for inde-
pendence, because it feared that Russia might
be strengthened at the expense of Turkey. On
this subject Karl Marx wrote in 1853, on the
eve of the Crimean War:
"It may be said that the more firlnly estab-
lished Servia and the Servian nationality is
the more the direct influence of Russia on the
Turkish Slavs is shoved into the background.
For in order tobe able to assert ifs peculiar
position as a state, Servia had fo import its
political institutions, ifs schools ... from
Vestern Furope."

52 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

This prophecy has been brilliantly fulfilled
in what has actually happened in Bulgaria,
which was created by Russia as an outpost on
the Balkans. As soon as Bulgaria was fairly
well established as a national state, if developed
a strong anti-Russian party, under the leader-
ship of Russia's former pupil, Stambulov, and
this party was able to stamp ifs iron seal upon
the entire foreign policy of the young country.
The whole mechanism of the political parties
in Bulgaria is so constructed as fo enable if fo
steer between the two European combinations
without being absolutely forced into the chan-
nel of either, unless if chooses to enter it of ifs
own accord. Roumania went with the Austro-
German alliance, Servia, since 1903, with Rus-
sia, because the one was menaced directly by
Russia, the other by Austria. The more inde-
pendent the countries of Southeast Europe are
from Austria-Hungary, the more effectively

THE BALKAN QUESTION 53
they will be able to protect their independence
against Czarism.
The balance of power in tbe Balkans, created
by the Congress of Berlin in 1879, was full of
contradictions. Cut up by artificial ethno-
graphical boundaries, placed under tbe control
of imported dynasties from Gerlnan nurseries,
bound hand and foot by tbe intrigues of the
Great Powers, the peoples of the Balkans eould
not eease their efforts for further national free-
dom and unity. The national polities of inde-
pendent Bulgaria was naturally direeted to-
wards Maeedonia, populated by Bulgarians.
The Berlin Congress had left it under Turkish
rule. On the other hand, Servia had praetically
nothing to look for in Turkey with tbe excep-
tion of the little strip of land, the sandbag
Novy Bazar. Its national interests lay on the
other side of the Austro-Hungarian boundary,
in Bosnia-Iterzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia and
Dalmatia. Roumania had no interests in the

54 BOL.SHEVIKI AND W0RLD PEACE

south, where itis separated from European
Turkey by Servia and Bulgaria. Roumania's
expansion policy was directed towards the
northwest and east, towards Hungarian Tran-
sylvania and Russian Bessarabia. Finally, the
national expansion of Greece, like that of Bul-
garia, co]lided witb Turkey.
Austro-German politics, aiming at the arti-
ficial preservation of European Turkey, broke
down not on account of the diplomatic in-
trigues of Russia, although these of course
were not lacking. It broke down because of
the inevitable course of evolution. The Balkan
Peninsula had entered on the path of capitalist
development, and it was this fact that raised
the question of the self-determination of the
Balkan peoples as national states to the his-
torical issue of the day.
The Balkan War disposed of European
Turkey, and thereby created the conditions
necessary for the solution of the Bulgarian and

THE BALKAN QUESTION 55
Greek questions. But Servia and Roumania,
whose national completion could only be
achieved at the expense of Austria-Hungary,
found themselves checked in their efforts at ex-
pansion southwards, and were compensated at"
the expense of what racially belonged to Bul-
gariaDServia in Macedonia, and Roumania in
Dobrudja. This is the meaning of the second
Balkan War and the Peace of Bucharest by
which it was concluded.
The mere existence of Austria-IIungary,
this Turkey of Middle Europe, blocks the way
to the natural self-determination of the peo-
ples of the Southeast. It compels them to keep
c0nstantly fighting against each other, to seek
support against each other from the outside,
and so makes them the tool of the political com-
binations of the Great Powers. It was ofly in
such chaos that Czaristic diplomcy was en-
abled to spin the web of its Balkan politics, the
last thread of wh[ch was Constantinople. And

56 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

only a federation of the Balkan states, both
economic and military, can interpose an in-
vincible barrier to the greed of Czarism.
Now that European Turkey bas been dis-
posed of, if is Austria-Hungary that stands in
the way of a federation of the Balkan states.
Roumania, Bulgaria, and Servia would have
found their natural boundaries, and vould
bave united with Greece and Turkey, on the
basis of conmmn economic interests, into a
league of defense. This would finally bave
brought peace to the Balkan Peninsula, that
witches' cauldron which periodically threatened
Europe with explosions, until it drew it into
the present catastrophe.
Up fo a certain rime the Socialists had fo
reconcile themselves to the routine way in which
the Balkan question was treated by capitalistic
diplomats, who in their conferences and secret
agreements stopped up one hole only fo open
another, even wider one. So long as this dil-

THE BALKAN QUESTION 57
atory method kept postponing the final solu-
tion, the Socialist International could hope that
the settlement of the IIapsburg succession
would be a matter not for a European war, but
for the European Revolution. But now that
the War has destroyed the equilibrium of the
whole of Europe, and the pred.atory Powers
are seeking to remodel the map of Europe N
hot on the basis of national democratic princi-
ples, but of military strength--the Social De-
mocracy must corne to a clear comprehension
of the fact that one of the chief obstacles to
freedom, peace and progress, in addition to
Czarism and German militarism, is the Haps-
burg Monarchy as a state organization. The
crime of the Galician Socialist group under
Daszynski consisted not only in placing the
Polish cause above the cause of Socialism, but
also in linking the fate of Poland with the fate
of the Atstro-Itungarian armies and the fate
of the Hapsburg Monarchy.

58 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

The Socialist proletariat of Europe cannot
adopt such a solution of the question. :For us
the question of united and independent Poland
is on a par with the question of united and in-
dependent Servia. Ve cannot and we will not
permit the Polish question fo be solved by
methods which will perpetuate the chaos af
present prevailing in Southeastern Europe, in
fact through the whole of Europe. :For us
Socialists the independence of Poland means
its independence on both fronts, on the Roman-
off front and on the Hapsburg front. Ve not
only wish the Polish people tobe free from the
oppression of Czarism. Ve wish also that the
fate of the Servian people shall not be depend-
ent upon the Polish nobility in Galicia.
For the present we need not consider what
the relations of an independent Poland will be
to Bohemia, Hungary and the Balkan :Federa-
tion. But if is perfectly clear that a complex
of medium-sized and small states on the Dan-

THE BALIçAN QUESTION 59
ube and in the Balkan Peninsula will consti-
tute a far more effective bar to the Czaristic
designs on Europe than the weak, chaotic Aus-
tro-Hungarian State, which proves its right to
existence only by its continued attempts upon
the peace of Europe.
In the article of 1853, quoted above, ]Iarx
wrote as follows oa the Eastern question:
"Ve bave seen that the statesmen of Eu-
rope, in their obdurate stupidity, petrified
routine, and hereditary intellectual indolence,
recoil from every attempt at answering the
question of what is fo become of Turkey in
Europe. The driving force that favors Rus-
sia's advance towards Constantinople is the
very means by which if is thought fo keep
her away from it, the empty theory, never
carried out, of maintaining the status quo.
What is this status quo? For the Christian
subjects of the Porte if means nothing else

60 BOLSHEVIIçI AND WORLD PEACE
than the perpetuation of their oppression by
Turkey. As long as they are under the yoke
of the Turkish rule, they look upon the head
of the Greek Church, the ruler of 60 million
Greek Church Christians, as their atural
protector and liberator.'"

What is here said of Turkey now applies in
a still greater degree to Austria-Hungary.
The solution of the Balkan question is un-
thinkable without the solution of the Austro-
Hungarian question, as they are both com-
prised in one and the same formula--the Demo-
cratie Federation of the Danube and Balkan
Nations.
"The governments with their old-fashioned
diplomacy," wrote Marx, "will never solve the
difficulty. Like the solution of so many other
problems, the Turkish problem, too, is re-
served for the :European Revolution." This
statement holds j ust as good to-day as whea if

THE BALKAN QUESTION 61
was first written. But for the Revolution to
solve the difficulties that have piled up in the
course of centuries, the proletariat must have
ifs ow progranune for the solution of the
Austro-IIungarian question. And this pro-
gramme if must oppose just as strenuously fo
the Czaristic greed of conquest as fo the cow-
ardly and conservative efforts fo maintain the
Austro-IIungarian statu quo.

CHAPTER II

AUSTRIA-I-IUNGARY

RUSSlAN Czarism undoubtedly represents a
cruder and more barbarian form of state or-
ganization than does the feebler absolutisln of
Austria-Hungary, which bas been mitigated by
the weakness of old age. But Russian Czar-
ism and the Russian state are by no means iden-
tical. The destruction of Czarism does not
mean the disintegration of the state. On the
contrary it means its liberation and its strength-
ening. All such assertions, as that it is neces-
sary fo push Russia back into Asia, which
round an echo even in certain Social Demo-
cratic organs, are based on a poor knowledge of
geography and ethnography. Vhatever may
be the rate of various parts of present Russia
--Russian Poland, Finland, the U-aine or
62

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 63

Bessarabia--European Russia will not cease fo
exist as the national territory of a many-mil-
lioned race that has ruade notable conquests
along the line of cultural development during
the last quarter century.
Quite different is the case of Austria-Hun-
gary. As a state organization it is identical
with the Hapsburg Monarchy. It stands or
falls with the Hapsburgs, just as European
Turkey was identical with the feudal-military
Ottoman caste and fell when that caste fell. A
conglomerate of facial fragments centrifugal
in tendency, yet forced by a dynasty to stick
together, Austria-Hungary presents the most
reactionary picture in the very heart of :Europe.
Its continuation af ter the present :European
catastrophe vould not only delay the develop-
ment of the Danube and Balkan peoples for
more decades to corne and make a repetition of
the present SVar a practical certainty, but it
would also strengthen Czarism politically by

64 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
preserving ifs main source of spiritual nourish-
ment.
If the German Social Demoeraey reeoneiles
itself to the ruin of France by regarding it as
punishment for Franee's alliance with Czarism,
then we must ask that the same eriterion be
applied to the Gerlnan-Austrian alliance. And
if the alliance of the two Western demoeraeies
with a despotie Czarism gives the lie to the
Freneh and lnglish press when they represent
the War as one of liberation, then is if not
equally arrogant, if not more so, for the Ger-
man Social Democracy fo spread the banner of
liberty over the Hohenzollern army, the army
that is fighting not only «gainst Czarism and
its allies but also for the entrenchment of the
Hapsburg Monarchy?
Austria-Hungary is indispensable fo Ger-
many, to the ruling class in Germany as we
know it. When the ruling Junker class threw
France into the arms of Czarism by the force-

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 65

fui annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and sys-
tematically embittered the relations with Eng-
land by rapidly increasing naval arlnaments;
when if repulsed ail attempts af an understand-
ing with the Vestern democracies because such
an understanding would have implied the de-
mocratization of Germany--then this ruling
class saw itself compelled fo seek support from
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a reserve
source of military strength against the enemies
in the East and the Vest.
According fo the German point of view the
mission of the Dual Monarchy was fo place
Hungarian, Polish, Roumanian, Czech, Ruthe-
nian, Servian and Italian auxiliaries in the
service of the German military and Junker
policy. The ruling class in Germany had
easily reconciled itself fo the expatriation of
ten fo twelve millions of Germans, for these
twelve millions formed the kernel around which
the Hapsburgs united a non-German popula-

66 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

tion of more than forty million. A democratic
federation of independent Danube nations
would bave made these peoples useless as allies
of German militarism. Only a monarchy, in
Austria-Hungary, a monarchy enforced by
militarism, would nake that country of any
value as an ally to lunker Germany. The
indispensable condition for this alliance, sanc-
tified by the Nibehmgen troth of dynasties,
was the military preparedness of Austria-I-Iun-
gary, a condition to be achieved in no other way
than by the lnechanical suppression of the cen-
trifugal national tendencies.
Since Austria-Hungary is surrounded on ail
sides by states composed of the saine faces as
are within its own borders, its foreign policy
is necessarily intimately connected with ifs in-
ternal policy. To keep seven million Serbs
and South Slavs within the frame of its own
military state, Austria-Hungary is compelled
to extinguish the hearthfire that kindles their

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 67

political leanings--the independent kingdom
of Servia.
_A_ustria's ultimatum to Servia was the de-
eisive step in this direction. "Austria-I-Iun-
gary took this step under the pressure of ne-
cessity," wrote Eduard Bernstein in Die So-
zialistiscle Monatsl, efte (No. 16). To be sure
it was, if politieal events are eonsidered from
the viewpoint of dynastic neeessity.
To defend the Hapsburg poliey on the
ground of the low moral standard of the Bel-
grade rulers is fo close one's eyes fo the faet
that the I-Iapsburgs did make friends with
Servia, but only when Servitt was under the
most despieable government that the history of
the unfortunate Balkan Peninsula has known,
that is, when if had af ifs head an Austrian
agent, Milan. The reekoning with Servia came
so late beeause the efforts ruade af self-preser-
vation were too weak in the enfeebled organism
of the Dual Monarehy. But after the death of

68 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

the Archduke, the support and hope of the
Austrian military partyfand of Berlin--Aus-
tria's ally gave ber a sharp dig in the ribs, in-
sisting upon a demonstration of firmness and
strength. Not only was Austria's ultimatum
to Servia approved of in advanee by the rulers
of Germany, but, aceording to all information,
it was aetually inspired from that quarter. The
evidenee is plainly set forth in the very saine
Vhite Book which professional and amateur
diplomats offer as a document of the ttohen-
zollern love of peaee.
After defining the aires of Greater Servian
propagand and the machinations of Czarism
in the Balkans, the Vhite Book states:

"Under such conditions Austria was
forced to the realization that it vas hot com-
patible with the dignity or the self-preserva-
tion of the Monarchy to look on at the doings
across the border and remain passive. The

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 69

Imperial Government informed us of this
view and asked for our opinion. Ve could
sincerely tell our ally that we agreed with
his estimate of the situation and could as-
sure him that any action he might find neces-
sary fo put an end to the movement in Ser-
via against the Austrian Monarchy would
meet with our approval. In doing so, we
were well aware of the fact that eventual war
operations on the part of Austria-Hungary
rnight bring Russia into the field and rnight,
according to the terres of our alliance, in-
volve us in a war.
"But in view of the vital interests of Aus-
tria-Hungary that were af stake, we could
not advise our ally to show a leniency incom-
patible with his dioaaity, or refuse him our
support in a moment of such grave portent.
Ve were the less able fo do so becanse our
own interests also were vitally threatened by
the persistent agitation in Servia. If the

70 BOLSHEVIKI AND W0RLD PEACE

Serbs, aided by Russia and France, had
been allowed to go on endangering the sta-
bility of our neighboring Monarchy, this
would have led to the gradual breakdown of
Austria and to the subjection of all the
Slavic rates fo the Russian rule. And this
in turn would have ruade the position of the
Germanie race in Central :Europe quite pre-
earious. An Austrit morally weakened,
breaking down belote the advanee of Rus-
sian lan-Slvism, vould not be an ally with
whom we could reckon and on whom we
could depend, as we are obliged to depend,
in the face of the increasiagly threatening
attitude of our neighbors to the East and the
West. We therefore left Austria a free
hand in its action against Servia."

The relation of the ruling class in Germany
to the Austro-Servian conflict is here fully and
elearly defined. It is hOt merely that Ger-

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 71

many vas informed by the Austrian Goven-
ment of the latter's intentions, not merely that
she approved them, and not merely that she ac-
eepted the eonsequenees of fidelity to an ally.
No, Germany looked on Austria's aggression
as unavoidable, as a saving aet for herself, and
actually ruade it a condition of tle continuance
of tlre alliance. Otherwise, "Austria would not
be an ally with whom we could reckon."
The German Marxists were fully aware of
this state of affairs and of the dangers lurking
in it. On June 29th, a day after the murder of
the Austrian Archduke, the Vorwiirts wrote
as follows:

"The fate of our nation has been ail too
closely knit with that of Austria as a result
of a bungling foreign policy. Our ru]ers
have ruade the alliance with Austria the basis
of our entire foreign policy. Yet it beeomes
clearer every day that this alliance is a source

72 BOLSHEVIKI AND W0RLD PEACE

of weakness rather than of strength. The
problem of zl ustria threatens more and more
to become a menace to the peace of Europe.'"

/k month later, when the lnenace vas about
to culminate in the dread actuality of war, on
July 28th, the chief organ of the German So-
cial Democracy wrote in equally definite terres.
"tIow shall the German proletariat act in the
face of suda a senseless paroxysm ?" it asked;
and then gave the answer: "'The German pro-
letariat is not in the least interested in the pres-
ervatio of the A ustrian national chaos.'"
Quite the contrary. Democratic Germany is
far more interested in the disruption than in
the preservation of Austria-Hungary. A dis-
rupted Austria-Hungary would mean a gain
to Germany of au educated population of
twelve million and a capital city of the first
tank, Vienna. Italy would achieve national
completion, and would cease to play the rôle

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 73

of the incalculable factor that she always has
been in the Triple Alliance. An independent
Poland, Hungary, Bohemîa, and a Balkan
Federation including a Roumania of ten mil-
lion inhabitants on the Russian frontier, would
be a mighty bulwark against Czarism. And
most important of all, a demoeratie Germany
with a population of 75,000,000 Germans eould
easily, without the Hohenzollerns and the rul-
ing lunkers, eome to an agreement with
France and England and eould isolate Czar-
ism and eondemn its foreign and internal pol-
ieies to eomplete impotence. A poliey direeted
towards this goal would indeed be a poliey of
liberation for the people of Russia as well as
of Austria-Hungary. :But sueh a poliey re-
quires an essential preliminary condition,
namely, that the German people, instead of
entrusting the Hohenzollerns with the libera-
tion of other nations, should set about liberat-
ing themselves from the Hohenzollerns.

74 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD I:'EACE

The attitude of the German and Austro-
Hungarian Social Democracy in this war is in
blatant contradiction to such aims. At the
present moment it seems convinced of the ne-
cessity of preserving and strengthening the
Hapsburg Monarchy in the interests of Ger-
many or of the German nation. And it is ab-
solutely from this anti-democratic viewpoint--
which drives the blush of shame to the check of
every internationally minded Socialist--that
the lViener Arbeiter-Zeitung formulates the
historieal neaning of the present ¥ar, when if

deelares "it is primarily a war
against the German spirit."
"XVhether diplomaey has

[of the Allies]

acted wisely,

whether this has had to corne, rime alone can
decide. :Now the rate of the German nation
is af stakel And there ean be no hesitation, no
wavering! The German people are one in the
inflexible iron determination hOt fo bend fo the
yoke, and neither death nor devil ean sueeeed"

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 75

--and so forth and so on. (Wiener 4rbeiter-
Zeitung. August 5th.) We will not offend the
politieal and literary taste of the reader by eon-
tinuing this quotation. Nothing is said here
about the mission of liberating other nations.
Here the objeet of the war is to preserve and
seeure "German humanity."
The defense of German culture, German
soil, German humanity seems to be the mis-
sion not only of the German army but of the
Austro-Hungarian army as well. Serb must
fight against Serb, Pole against Pole, U-kra-
nian against Ukranian, for the sake of "'Ger-
,an humanity." The forty million non-Ger-
man nationalities of Austria-Hungary are eon-
sidered as simply historieal manure for the field
of German culture. That this is not the stand-
point of international Soeialism, it is not neees-
sary fo point out. If is not even pure national
demoeraey in its most elementary form. The
Austro-Hungarian General Staff explains

76 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

this "humanity" in its communiqué of Septem-
ber 18th: "All peoples of out revered mon-
arehy, as out military oath says, 'agaillSt any
enemy no marrer whom,' must stand together
as one, vying with one another in courage."
The IViencr lrbeiter-Zeitung accepts in its
entirety this Hapsburg-Hohenzollern view-
point of the Austro-Hungarian problem as an
unnational lnilitary reservoir. It is the saine
attitude as the militarists of France have to-
ward the Senegalese and the Moroccans, and
the English have toward the Hindus. And
when we consider that such opinions are hot a
new phenomenon among the German Socialists
of Austria, we have found the main reason why
the Austrian Social Democracy broke up so
miserably into national groups, and thus re-
duced its political importance to a minimum.
The disintegration of the Austrian Social
Demoeraey into national parts fighting among
themselves, is one expression of the inadequaey

AUSTRIA-HUNGAR¥ 77

of Austria as a state organization. At the same
rime the attitude of the German-Austrian So-
cial Demoeraey proved that if was itself the
sorry vietim of this inadequaey, fo whieh it ca-

pitulated spiritually, lVhen if proved itself
impotent fo unite the many-raeed Austrian
proletariat under the prineiples of Interna-

tionalism, and finally gave up this task alto-
gerber, the Austro-German Social Democracy
subordinated all Austria-ttungary and even
its own policies to the "Idca" of Prussian
Junker Nationalism. This utter denial of prin-
ciples speaks to us in an unprecedented man-
ner from the pages of the lViener Arbeiter-
Zeitung. :But if we listen more carefully fo
the tones of this hysterical nationalism we can-
not fail to hear a graver voice, the voice of his-
tory telling us that the path of political prog-
ress for Central and Southeastern Europe
leads over the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy.

CHAPTER III

THE WAR AGAINST CZARISh

:BuT |low about Czarism ? Vould not Ger-
many's and Austria's victory mean the defeat
of Czarism? And would not the beneficent
results of the defeat of Czarism greatly outbal-
ance the beneficent results of a dismembered
Austria-Hungary?
The German and Austrian Social Democrats
lay much stress upon this question in the ar-
guing they do about the lVar. The crushing
of a small neutral country, the ruin of France
--all this is justified by the need to fight Czar-
ism. Haase gives as the reason for voting the
war credits the necessity of "defense against
the danger of Russian despotism." Bernstein
goes back to Marx and Engels and quotes old
texts for his slogan, "Settling with Russia I"
78

•
THE WAR AGAINST CZARISM

79

Sfidekum, dissatisfied with the result of his
Italian mission, says that what the Italians are
to blame for is not understanding Czarism.
And when the Social Delnocrats of Vienna and
Budapest fall in line under the Hapsburg ban-
ner in ifs "holy war" against the Servians
struggling for their national unity, they sacri-
fice their Socialistic honor fo the necessity for
fighting Czarism.
And the Social Democrats are not alone in
this. The entire bourgeois German press has
no other aires, for the moment, than the anni-
hilation of the Russian autocracy, which op-
presses the peoples of Russia and menaces the
freedom of Europe.
The Imperial Chancellor denounces France
and England as vassals of Russian despotism.
Even the German Major-General von Mor-
gen, assuredly a true and tried "friend of lib-
erty and independence," calls on the Poles to
rebel against the despotism of the Czar.

80 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
But for us who have gone through the school
of historical materialism it would be a disgrace
if we did not perceive the actual relations of the
interests in spire of these phrases, these lies,
this boasting, this foul vulgarity and stupidity.
No one can genuinely believe that the Ger-
man reactionaries really do cherish such a
hatred of Czarism, and are aiming their blows
against it. On the contrary, af ter the XVar
Czarism will be the same to the rulers of Ger-
many that it was before the XVarpthe most
closely related form of government. Czarism
is indispensable to the Germany of the Hohen-
zollerns, for two reasons. In the first place, if
weakens Russia economically, culturally and
militaristically, and so prevents its develop-
ment as an imperialistic rival. In the second
place, the existence of Czarîsm strengthens the
Hohenzollern Monarchy and the ffunker oli-
garchy, since îf there were no Czarism, German

THE WAR AGAINST CZARISM 81

absolutism would face lurope as the last main-
stay of feudal barbarism.
Gerinan absolutisin never has eoneealed the
interest of blood relationship that it has in the
Inaintenanee of Czarisin, whieh represents the
saine social rotin though in Inore shaineless
ways. Interests, tradition, syinpathies draw
the Gerinan reaetionary eleinent to the side of
Czarisin. "Russia's sorrow is Gerinany's sor-
row." _Af the saine rime the Hohenzollerns, be-
hind the back of Czarisnl, ean make a show of
being the bulwark of culture "against barbar-
isin," and ean sueeeed in fooling their own peo-
ple if not the rest of Vestern Europe.
"With sineere sorrow I see a friendship
broken that Germany has kept faithfully,"
said Villiain II. in his speeeh upon the dee-
laration of war, referring neither to France
nor to England, but to Russia, or rather, to
the Russian dynasty, in aeeordanee with the

82 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

Hohenzollern's Rssian religion, as Marx
would bave said.
¥e are told that Germany's political plan
is to create, on the one hand, a basis of rap-
prochement with France and ]gngland by a vic-
tory over those countries, and, on the other
hand, to utilize a strategic victory over France
in order to crush Russian despotism.
The German Social Democrats must either
bave inspired Villiam and his chancellor with
this plan, or else must have ascribed this plan
to Villiam and his chancellor.
As a marrer of fact, however, the political
plans of the German reactionaries are of ex-
actly the opposite character, lnust necessarily
be of the opposite character.
For the present we will leave open the ques-
tion of whether the destructive blow at France
was dictated by strategic considerations, and
xvhether "strategy" sanctioned defensive tactics
on the Western front. But one thing is cer-

THE WAR AGAINST CZARIS,I 83

tain, that not to see that the policy of the ,lun-
kers required the ruin of France, is fo prove
that one has a reason for keeping one's eyes
closed. Franee--lrance is the enemy!
/duard Bernstein, who is sineerely trying to
justify the politieal stand take by the German
Social Democracy, draws the folloving con-
clusions: Were Germany under a democratic
rule, there would be no doubt as to how fo set-
tle accounts with Czarism. A democratic Ger-
many would conduct a revolutionary var on
the East. If would call on the nations op-
pressed by Russia fo resist the tyrant and
vould give them the means vherevith fo vage
a powerful fight for freedom. [Quite right!]
However, Germany is nota demoeraey, and
therefore if would be a utopian dream [/x-
aetly!] fo expeet any sueh poliey with all its
eonsequenees ri'oto Germany as she is. (Yor-
.éirts, August 28.) Very well then! But
right here Bernstein suddefly breaks off his

8 I0LSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

analysis of the actual German policy "with all
ifs consequences." After showing up the
blatant contradiction in the position of the Ger-
man Social Democracy, he closes with the un-
expected hope that a reactionary Germany
may accomplish what none but a revolutionary
Germany could accomplish. Credo quia ab-
Nevertheless, if might be said in opposition
fo this that while the ruling class in Germany
has naturally no interest in fighting Czarism,
still Russia is now Germany's enemy, and,
quite independently of the will of the Hohen-
zollerns, the victory of Germany over Russin
might result in the great weakening, if not the
complete overthrow of Czarism. Long live
IIindenburg, the gret unconscious instrument
of the Russian Revolution, we might cry along
with the Chemnitz Volksstimme. Long live
the Prussian Crown Prince--also a quite un-
conscious instrument. Long lire the Sultan

THE WAR AGAINST CZARISM 85

of Turkey who is now serving in the cause of
the Revolution by bombarding the Russian
eities around the Black Sea. Happy Russian
Revolution--how quickly the ranks of her
army are growing!
However, let us see if there is not something
really tobe said on this side of the question.
Is it not possible that the defeat of Czarism
might aetually aid the cause of the Revolution ?
_As to such a possibility, there is nothing to
be said against it. The Mikado and his Sa-
murai were not in the least interested in freeing
Russia, yet the Russo-Japanese Var gave a
powerful impetus to the revolutionary events
that followed.
Consequently similar results may be ex-
peeted from the German-Russian War.
But to place the right politieal estimate upon
these historical possibilities we must take the
following eireumstanees into eonsideration.
Those who believe that the Russo-Japanese

86 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

Var brought on the 1Revolution neither know
nor understand historical events and their re-
lations. The war merely hastened the out-
break of the tRevolution; but for that very rea-
son it also weakened it. For had the 1R.evolu-
tion developed as a result of the organic growth
of inner forces, it would have corne later, but
would have been far stronger and more sys-
remarie. Therefore, revolution bas no real in-
terest in wàr. This is the first consideration.
And the second thing is, that while the 1Russo-
Japnese ¥ar weakened Czarism, it strength-
ened Japanese militarîsm. The saine consid-
erations apply in a still higher degree to the
prescrit German-Russian ¥ar.
In the course of 1912-1914 Russia's enor-
mous industrial development once for ail
pulled the country out of ifs state of counter-
revolutionary depression.
The growth of the revolutionary movemen
on the foundation of le economie and politieal

THE WAR AGAINST CZARISM 87
condition of the laboring masses, the growth of
opposition in broad strat of the population,
led to a new period of storm and stress. But in
contrast to the years 1902-1905, this movement
developed in a far more conscious, systematic
manner, and, what is more, was based on  far
broader social foundation. It needed rime to
mature, but it did not need the lances of the
Prussian Samurai. On the contrary, the Prus-
sian Samurai gave the Czar the opportunity of
playing the r61e of defender of the Serbs, the
Belgians and the French.
If we presuppose a catastrophal Russian de-
feat, the war 7nay bring a quicker outbreak of
the Revolution, but at the cost of ifs imer weak- •
ness. And if the Revolution should even gain
the upper hand under such circumstances, then
the bayonets of the Hohenzollern armies would
be turned on the Revolution. Such a prospect
can hardly fail to paralyze Russia's revolution-
ary forces; for it is impossible to deny the fact

88 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
that the party of the German proletariat stands
behind the Hohenzollern bayonets. :But this
is only one side of the question. The defeat of
Russia necessarily presupposes decisive vic-
tories by Germany and Austria on the other
battlefields, and this would mean the enforced
preservation of the national-political chaos in
Central and Southeastern Europe and the un-
limited mastery of German militarism in all
Europe.
An enforced disarmament for France, bil-
lions in indemnities, enforced tariff walls
around the conquered nations, and an enforced
commercial treaty with Russia, all this in con-
junctiin would make German imperialism
master of the situation for many decades.
Germany's new policy, which began with the
capitulation of the party of the proletariat to

nationalistic militarism,
ened for years to corne.
elass would feed itself,

would be strength-
"Ille German working
materially and spir-

THE WAR AGAINST CZARISM 89

itually, on the crumbs from the table of vie-
torious imperialism, while the cause of the So-
cial Revolution would have received a molCal
blow.
That in such circumstances a Russian revolu-
tion, even if temporarily successful, would be
an historical nfiscm'riage, needs no further
proof.
Consequently, this present battling of the
nations under the yoke of nfilitarism laid upon
them by the capitalistic classes contains within
itself monstrous contrasts which neither the
War itself nor the governments directing it
ean solve in any way to the interest of future
historieal development. The Social Demo-
erats eould hot, and ean hot now, combine their
aires with any of the historieal possibilities of
this War, that is, with either the victory of the
Triple Alliance or the vietory of the Entente.
The German Social Demoeraey was once
well aware of this. The Yorziirts in ifs issue

90 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
of ,luly 28, discussing the very question of the
war against Czarism, said:

"But if it is not possible to localize the
trouble, if Russia should step into the field?
¥hat should our attitude toward Czarism
be then? Herein lies the great diflàculty of
the situation. Has hot the moment corne
fo strike a death blow at Czarism? If Ger-
man troops cross the Russian frontier, will
that not mean the victory of the Russian
Revolution?"

And the Vorwiirts cornes to the following
conclusion:

"Are we so sure that if oeill mean victory
fo the Russian Revolution if Gerlnan troops
cross the Russian frontier? If nmy readily
bring the collapse of Czarism, but vill not
the Gerlnan armies fight a revolutionary
Russia with even greater energy, with a

THE WAR AGAINST CZARISM 91
keener desire for victory, than they do the
absolutistic Russa?"

More than this. On August 3, on the eve of
the historical session of the Reichstag, the Vor-
wiirts wrote in an article entitled "The Var
upon Czarism":

"$Vhile the conservative press is accusing
the strongest party in the Empire of high
treason, to the rejoicing of other countries,
there are other elements endeavoring to
prove to the Social Democracy that the im-
pending war is really an old Social Denlo-
cratic demand. SVar against Russia, war
upon the blood-stained and faithless Czar-
ism--this last is a recent phrase of the press
which once kissed the -knout--isn't this what
Social Democracy has been asking for from
the beginning? . . .
"These are literally the arguments used
by one portion of the bourgeois press, in fact

92 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
the more intelligent portion, and if only goes
to show what importance is attached fo the
opinion of that part of the German people
which stands behind tbe Social Democracy.
The slogan no longer s 'Russia's sorrow is
Germany's sorrow.' Now itis 'Down with
Czarism !' But since the days when the lead-
ers of the Social Democracy referred to
[Bebel, Lassalle, Engels, Marx] demanded
a democratc war against Russia, Russia has
quite ceased tobe the mere palladium of re-
action. Russia is also the seat of revolution.
The overthrow of Czarism is now the task of
all the Russian people, espec]ally the Rus-
sian proletariat, and it is just the last weeks
that lmve shown how vigorously ths very
working class in Russia is attacking the task
that history has laid upon it .... And all
the nationalistic attempts of the 'True Rus-
sians' to turn the hatred of the masses away

THE WAI AGAINST CZAIISM 93

fl'om Czarism and arouse a reactionary
hatred against foreigaa countries, particularly
Germany, have failed so far. The Russian
proletariat knows too well that ifs enemy is
not beyond the border but within ifs own
land. Nothing was more distasteful fo these
nationalistie agitators, the Tme Russians
and Pan-Slavists, than the news of the great
peaee demonstration of the German Social
Demoeraey. Oh, how they would have re-
j oieed had the eontra T been the case, had
they been able fo say to the Russian prole-
tariat, 'There, you see, the German Social
Demoerats stand at the head of those who
are ineiting the war against Russia!' And
the Little Father in St. Petersburg would
also have breathed a sigh of relief and said,
'That is the news I wanted to hear. Now
the baekbone of my most dangerous enemy,
the Russian Revolution, is broken. The in-

94 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
ternational sol]darity of the proletariat is
torn. Now I can unchain thê beast of na-
t]onal]sm. I ara saved!' "

Thus wrote the lrorwiirts after Germany
had already declared war on Russia.
These words characterize the honest manly
stand of the proletariat against a belligerent
j ingoism. The lror,iirts clearly understood
and clevcrly stinatized the base hypocrisy of
the knout-loving ruling class of Germany,
which suddenly becalne conscious of its mission
to free Russia from Czarism. The Yorwiirts
warned the German working class of the po-
litical extortion that the bourgeois press would
practise on their revolutionary conscience.
"Do not believe tbese friends of the -knout,"
the Yorwiirts said to the German proletariat.
"They are hunga'y for yor souls, and bide their
imperialistic designs behind liberal-sounding
phrases. They are deceiving you--you, the

THE WAR AGA]:NST CZARISM: 95
cannon-fodder with souls that they need. If
they succeed in wiming you over, they will
only be helping Czarism by dealing the Rus-
sian Revolution a fearful moral blow. Ad if,
spire of this, the Russian Revohtion should
raise its head, these very people will help Czar-
ism to crush it."
That is the sense of what the l'orwh'rts
preached to the working class up to the ¢th of
August.
And exactly three weeks later the saine Vor-
wëirts wrote:
"Liberation from Muscovitism (?), free-
dom and independence for Poland and Fin-
land, free development for the great Russian
people themselves, dissolution of the unnat-
ural alliance between two cultural nations
and Czaristic barbarism--these were the
aires that inspired the German people and
made them ready for any sacrifice,"

96 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

and inspired also the German Social Democ-
racy and ifs chief organ.
Vhat happened in those three weeks fo cause
the Yorwiirts to repudiate ifs original stand-
point?
Vhat happened? Nothing of importance.
The German armies strangled neutral Bel-
gium, burned down a number of Belgian towns,
destroyed Louvain, the inhabitants of which
had been so crhninally audacious as fo tire af
the armed invaders when they themselves wore
no helmets and waving feathers.* In flaose
three weeks the German armies carried death
and destruction into French territory, and the
troops of their ally, Austria-I-Iunga17¢ ,
pounded the love of the Hapsburg Monarchy
into the Serbs on the Save and the Drina.
These are the facts that apparently convinced

* "How characteristically Prussian," wrote Marx to Engels,
"to declare that no man may defend his 'fatherland' except in
uniform !"

THE WAR AGAINST CZARISM 97
the 'orwiirts that the Hohenzollerns were wag-
ing the war of liberation of the nations.
Neutral Belgimn was cmshed, and the Social
Democrats remained silent. And Richard
Fischer was sent to Switzerland as special en-
voy of the Party to explain to the people of a
netral country that the violatio of Belgia
neutrality and the ruin of a small nation were
a perfectly natural phenomenon. Vhy so
much excitement? Any other Eropean gov-
ernment, in Germany's place, would have
acted in the saine way. It was just at this rime
that the German Social Democracy not only
reconciled itself fo the Var as a work of real
or supposed national defense, but even sur-
rounded the Hohenzollern-Hapsburg armies
with the halo of an offensive campaign for free-
dom. Vhat an tnprecedented fall for a party
that for fifty years had taught the German
working class to look upon the German Gov-
erment as the foe of liberty and democracyl

98 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

In the meantime every day of the War dis-
closes tbe danger fo Europe that the Marxists
should have foreseen af once. The chier blows
of the German government were not irned af
the :East, but af the rest, af Belgium, France
nd :England. :Even if we aeeept the improb-
able premise that nothing but strategie neees-
sity determined this plan of eampaign, the logi-
cal politieal outcome of this strategy remains
with all ifs eonsequences, that is, the neeessity
for a full and definite defeat of Belgium,
France and the F, nglish land forces, so that
Germany's hands might be free fo deal with
Russia. ]¥asn't if perfectly clear that what
was af first represented as  temporary meas-
ure of strategic necessity in order to soothe the
German Social Democracy, would become an
end in itself through the force of events ? The
more stubborn the resistance ruade by France,
whose duty it has actually become fo defend
ifs territory and ifs independence gainst the

THE WAR AGAINST CZARISM: 99
German attack, the "more certainly will the
German arnes be held on the Western front;
and the more exhausted Germany is on the
Western front, the less strength and inclina-
tion will remain for her supposedly main task,
the task with which the Social Democracy cred-
ited her, the "settling with Russia." And then
history will witness an "honorable" peace be-
tween the two most reactionary powers of
Europe, between Nicholas, fo whom fate
ranted cheap victories over the Hapsburg
Monarchy, * rotten fo its core, and Willam,
who had his "settling," but with Belghm, not
wth Russa.
The alliance between Hohenzollern aad
Romanoff--after the exhaustion and degrada-
 "Russian diplomacy is interested only in such wars," wrote
]ngels in 1890, "as force her allies fo bear the chief burden of
raising troops and suffering invasion, and leave to the Russian
troops only the work of reserves. Czarism makes war on ifs
own account only on decidedly weaker nations, such as Sweden,
Turkey and Persia." Austria-Hungary must now be placed in
the same class as Turkey and Persia.

100 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

tion ofthe Western nations--will mean a
period of the darkest reaction in :Europe and
the whole world.
The German Social Democraey by ifs pres-
ent policy smooths the way for this awful
danger. And the danger will become an aetu-
ality unless the European proletariat interferes
and enters as a revo]utionary factor into the
plans of the dynasties and the eapitalistie gov-
ernments.

CHAPTER IV
THE VAR AGAINST THE rEST
Or his return from his diplomatic trip to
Italy, Dr. Siidekum wrote in the lrorwiirts
that the Italian comrades did not sufficiently
comprehend the nature of Czarism. We agree
with Dr. Siidekum that a German can more
easily understand the nature of Czarism as he
experiences daily, in his own person, the na-
ture of Prussian-German absolutism. The two
"natures" are very closely akin to each other.
German absolutism represents a feudal-
monarchical organiza.tion, resting upon a
mighty capitalist foundation, which the devel-
opment of the last half-century has erected for
it. The strength of the German army, as we
have learned to know it anew in its present
bloody work, consists not alone in the great
101

102 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

material and teehnical resources of the nation,
and in the intelligence and preeision of the
worlnan-soldier, who had been drilled in the
school of industry "and his own elass organi-
zations. It has ifs foundation also in ifs Junker
oflïeer caste, with ifs toaster elass traditions, its
oppression of those who are below and ifs sub-
ordination fo those who are above. T|le Ger-
man army, like file German state, is a feudal-
monarehieal organization witb inexhaustible
capitalistie resourees. T]le bourgeois serib-
blers may ehatter all they want about the su-
premaey of the German, the man of duty, over
the lrenehman, file man of pleasure; the real
differenee lies not in the facial qualities, but
in the social and politieal conditions. The
standing army, that elosed corporation, that
self-suflïeing state within the state, remains,
despite universal military service, a caste or-
ganization t]lat in order to thrive must have

THE WAR AGAINST (i?HE WEST 103
artificial distinctions of rank and a monarchical
top fo crown the commanding hierarchy.
In his work, "The New _A_rmy," laurès
showed that the only army France could have
is an army of defense built on the plan of alan-
ing every citizen, that is, a democratie army, a
militia. The bourgeois French Republie is
now paying the penalty for having made her
army a counterpoise fo her democratic state
organization. She created, in laurès' words,
"a bastard régime in which antiquated forms
clashed with newly developing forms and neu-
tralized each other." This incongTuity between
the standing army and the republican régime is
the fundamental weakness of the French mili-
tary system.
The reverse is true of Germany. Germany's
barbarian retrograde political system gives her
a great military supremacy. The Gernmn
bourgeoisie may grumble now and then when
the pretorian caste spirit of the oftlcers' corps

104 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
leads to outbreaks like that of Zabern. They
may make wry faces at the Crown Prince and
bis slogan, "Give it to them! Give it to them !"
The German Social Democracy may inveigh
ever so sharply against the systematic personal
ill-treatment of the German soldier which has
cmsed proportionately doble the number of
s,icides in the German barracks of that in any
other country. But for all that, the fact that
the German bourgeoisie has absolutely no po-
litical character and that the German Socialist
party has failed to inspire the proletariat with
the revolutionary spirit has enabled the ruling
class to erect the gigantic stncture of militar-
ism, and so place the efficient and intelligent
German workmen under the command of the
Zabern heroes and their slogan, "Give it to
them!"
Professor Hans Delbriick seeks the source
of Germany's military strength in the ancient

THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST 105
model of the Teutoburgerwald, and he is per-
feetly justified.

"The oldest Germanic system of warfare,"
he writes, "was based on the retinue of
princes, a body of speeially seleeted warriors,
and the mass of fighters eomprising the en-
tire nation. This is the system we have to-
day also. How vastly different are the
methods of fighting now from those of our
aneestors in the Teutoburgerwald! We have
the teehnical marvels of modern machine
guns. We have the wonderful organization
of inunense masses of troops. And yet, our
military system is at bottom the saine. The
martial spirit is raised to its highest power,
developed to its utmost in a body whieh once
was small but now numbers many thousands,
a body giving fealty to their Var Lord, and
by hiln, as by the princes of old, regarded as
his eolnrades; and under their leadership the

106 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

whole people, educated by them and disci-
plined by them. Here we have the secret of
the rzarlike character of the German nation."

The French Major, Driant, looks on at the
German Kaiser in his White Cuirassier's uni-
form, undoubtedly the most imposing military
uniform in the world, and republican by con-
straint that he is, his heart is filled with a lover's
jealousy. And how the Kaiser spends his rime
"in the midst of his army, that true family of
the Hohenzollerns!" The Major is fascinated.
The feudal caste, whose hour of political and
moral decay had struck long ago, round its
connection with the nation once more in the fer-
tile soil of imperialism. And this connection
with the nation has taken such deep root that
the prophecies of Major Driant, written sev-
eral years ago, have actually corne true---
prophecies that until now eould only have ap-
peared as either the poisonous promptings of

THE WAI AGAINST THE WEST 107

secret Bonapartist, or the drivellings of a
lunatic.

"The Kaiser," he wrote, "is the Com-
mander in Chief . . . and behind him stands
the entire working elass of Germany as one
man .... :Bebel's Social Demoerats are in
the ranks, their fingers on the trigger, and
they too think only of the welfare of the
Fatherland. The ten-billion war indemnity
that France will have to pay will be a greater
help to them than the Soeialist ehimeras on
whieh they fed the day belote."

Yes, and now they are writing of this future
indemnity even in some Social Democratic (I)
papers, with open rowdy insolence--an indem-
nity, however, not of ten billions, but of twenty
or thirty billions.
Germany's victory over France--a deplor-
able strategie necessity, according to the Ger-
man Social Democrats--would mean not only

]08 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

the defeat of France's standing army; it would
mean primarily the victory of the feudal-mon-
arehieal state over the demoeratie-republiean
state.
For the aneient race of Hindenburgs,
Moltkes and Klueks, hereditary speeialists in
mass-murder, are just as indispensable a con-
dition of German vietory as are the 4- ° eenti-
meter guns, the last word in human tëchnical
skill.
The entire capitalist press is already talking
of the unshakable stability of the German
Monarchy, strengthened by the war. And
German professors, the same who proclaimed
Hindenburg a doctor of Ail the Sciences, are
already declaring that political slavery is a
higher form of social life.

"The demoeratie republies, and the so-
ealled monarehies that are under subj eetion
fo a parliamentary régime, and all the other

THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST 109

beautiful things that were so extolled--what
little capacity they have shown to stand the
stornl !"

These are the things that the German pro-
fessors are writing now.
It is shameful and humiliating enough fo
read the expressions of the French Socialists,
who had proved themselves too weak fo break
the alliance of France with Russia or even to
prevent the return to three-years' military serv-
ice, but who, when the lYar began, neverthe-
less donned their red trousers and set out to
free Germany. But we are seized with a feel-
ing of unspeakable indignation on reading the
German Socialist party press, which in the lan-
guage of exalted slaves extols the brave heroie
caste of hereditary oppressors for their armed
exploits on Freneh territory.
On August 15, 1870, when the victorious
German armies were approaehing Paris, En-

110 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

gels wrote in a letter to Marx, af ter describing
the eonfused condition of the Freneh defense:

"Nevertheless, a revolutionary govern-
ment, if it cornes soon, need not despair. But
it must leave Paris to its rate, and continue
to earry on the war from the south. If is
then still possible that sueh a government
may hold out until arms and ammunition
are bought and a new army organized with
whieh the enemy ean be gradually pushed
baek to the frontier. That would be the
right ending fo the war--for both eountries
to demonstrate that they eannot be eon-
quered."

And yet there are people who shout like
drunken helots, "On to Paris." _And in doing
, so they have the impudence to invoke the names
of Marx and ngels. In what measure are
they superior to the thriee despised Russian lib-
erals who erawled on their bellies before his

THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST 111

:Excellency, the militai T Commander, who in-
troduced the Russian knout into East Galicia.
It is cowardly arrogance--this talk of the pure-
ly "strategie" character of the War on the
Western front. Who takes any account of it ?
Certainly not the German ruling classes. They
speak the language of conviction and of main
force. They call things by their right names.
They know what they want and they know how
to fight for it.
The Social Democrats tell us that the War
is being waged for the cause of national inde-
pendence. "That is not true," retorted tterr
Arthur DLx.

"Just as the high politics of the last cen-
tury," wrote Dix, "owed its specially marked
character to the National Idea, so the politi-
cal-world events of this century stand under
the emblem of the lmperialistie ldea. The
imperalistie idea that is destined to give the

112 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

impetus, the seope and the goal fo the striv-
ing for pover of the great (Der llreltwirt -
schaftskrieg, 191, p. 3).
"It shows gratifying sagacity," says the
saine Herr Arthur Dix, "on the part of
those who had charge of the military prepa-
rations of the Var, that the advance of our
arlnies against France and Russia in the
very first stage of the Vrar took place pre-
cisely where it was most important fo keep
valuable German mineral wealth free from
foreign invasion, and to occupy such por-
tions of the enemy's territory as would sup-
plement our own underground resources"
(Ibid., p. 38).
The "strategy," of which the Socialists now
speak in devout whispers, really begins ifs ac-
tivities with the robbery of mineral wealth.
The Social Democrats tell us that the ]Var
is a war of defense. But Herr Georg Irmer
says clearly and distinctly:

THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST 113

"People ought not fo be talking as though
the German nation had corne too late for ri-
valry for world economy and world domin-
ion,--that the world has already been di-
vided. Has not the earth been divided over
and over again in ail epochs of history?"
(Los vom englischcn lVeltjoch, 1914, p. 42.)

The Socialists try fo comfort us by telling
us that Belgimn has only been temporarily
crushed and that the Germans will soon vaeate
their Belgian quarters. But Herr Arthur Dix,
who knows very well what he wants, and who
has the right and the power fo want if, writes
that what England fears most, and expressly
so, is that Germany should bave an outlet to
the A tlantic Ocean.
"For this very reason," he continues, "we
nmst neither let Belgium go out of our hands,
nor nmst we fail fo make sure that the toast line
from Ostende fo the Sonune shall not again fall

114 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

into the hands of any state vhich ma.y become a
polit]cal vassal of England. SVe must see to
it that in some form or other German influence
is seeurely established there."
In the endless battles between Ostende and
Dunkirk, sacred "strategy" is now earrying
out this programme of the Ber]in stock ex-
change, also.
The Socialists te]] us that the 1Var between
France and Gernmny is merely a brief prelude
to a lasting alliance between those eountries.
But here, too, Herr Arthur Dix shows Ger-
many's cards. Aeeording to him, "there is but
one ansver: to seel« to destroy the English
world trade, a,nd to deal deadly blows at Eng-
lish ,national econom g.'"
"The aire for the foreign policy of the Ger-
man Empire for the next decades is clearly
indicated," Professor Franz von Liszt an-
nounces. " 'Protection against England,' that

THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST 115
must be our slogan" (Ein 7nitteleuropiischer
Staatenverband, 1914, p. 24).

"Ve must crush the most treacherous and
lnalicious of our foes," cries a third. "Ve
nmst break the tyranny which England ex-
croises over the sea with base self-seeking and
shameless contempt of justice and right."

The Var is directed hot against Czarism,
but primarily agaiust England's supremacy on
the sea.

"It may be said," l'rofessor Sehiehmann
confesses, "that no success of ours has given
us such joy as the defeat of the English af
Maubeuge and St. Quentin on August 28."

The German Social Democrats tell us that
the chief object of the Var is the "settlement
with Russia." But plain, straightforward
Herr Rudolf Theuden wants fo give Galicia to

116 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

Russia with North Persia thrown in. Then
Russia "would have got enough to be satisfied
for many decades to corne. We may even make
her out friend by if."
"Vhat ought the lVar to bring us?" asks
Theuden, and then he answers:

"'The chief pa!tmcnt nust be nade us by
Frànce.. . France nmst give us ]3elfort,
that part of Lorraine which borders on the
Moselle, and, in case of stul)born resistance,
that part as well which borders on the Maas.
If we make the Maas and the Moselle Ger-
man boundaries, the French will some day
perhaps wean themselves away from the idea
of making the Rhine a French boundary."

The bourgeois politicians and professors tell
us that England is the chier enemy; that Bel-
gium and France are the gateway to the Atlan-
tic Ocean; that the hope of a Russian indem-
nity is only a utopian dream, anyway; that

THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST 117

Russia would be more useful as friend than as
foe; that France )vill have to pay in land
and in gold--and the Yorwiirts exhorts the
Gemu workers to "hold out until the decisive
victory is ours."
And yet the l'orwiirts tells us that the Var
is being waged for the independence of the
German nation, and for the liberation of the
Russian people. Vhat does this mean? Of
course we must not look for ideas, logic and
truth where they do hOt exist. This is simply
a case of an ulcer of slavish sentiments burst-
ing open and foui pus crawling over the pages
of the workingmen's press. If is clear that the
oppressed class which proceeds too slowly and
inertly on ifs way tovard freedom must in the
filial hour drag ail its hopes and promises
through mire and blood, belote there arises
in its soul the pure, unimpeachable voice--the
voice of revolutionary honor.

CHAPTER V

THE 1VAR OF DEFENSE

"TiE thing for us to do nov is to avert
this danger [Russian despotism], and to se-
cure the culture and the independence of our
land. Thus we will make good out word,
and do what we bave ahvays s.aid we would.
In the hour of danger we will hot leave our
Fatherland in the lurch .... Guided by
these principles we vote for the war credits."

This was the declaration of the German So-
cial Denlocratic fraction, read by Haase in the
Reichstag session of August $.
ttere only the defense of the fatherland is
mentioned. Not a word is said of the "liberat-
ing" mission of this Vffar in behalf of the peo-
ples of Russia, which was later sung in every
118

THE WAR OF I)EFENSE 119

key by the Social Demo.cratic press. The logic
of the Socialist press, bowever, did not keep
pace witb ifs patriotism. For wbile it nmde
desperate efforts to represent the SVar as one
of pure defense, to secure tbe safety of Ger-
many's possessions, it at the saine rime pictured
it as a revolutionary offensive war for tbe lib-
eration of Russia and of Europe from Czarism.
We bave already shown clearly enough wby
the peoples of Russia had every reason to de-
cline with thanks tbe assistance offered them

at the point of the Hohenzollern bayonets.
But how about the "defensive" character of
the Var?

XVhat surprises us even more than what is
said in the declaration of the Social Democracy
is what if conceals and leaves unsaid. Af ter
Hollveg had already announced in the Reichs-
tag the accomplisbed violation of the neutral-
ity of Belgium and Luxemburg as a means of
attacking France, Haase does hot lnention this

120 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

fact in a single vord. This silence is so mon-
strous that one is tempted fo read the declara-
tion a second and a third rime. But in vain.
The declaration is written as though such coun-
tries as Belgium, France and England had
never existed on the political map of the Ger-
man Social Demoeracy.
But facts do hOt cease fo be facts simply be-
cause political parties shut their eyes fo them.
And every nlember of the International has the
right to ask this question of Comrade Itaase,
"What portion of the rive billions voted by the
Social Delnocratic fraction was lneant for the
destruction of Belgiuln?" If is quite possible
that in order fo protect the Gernmn father-
land from Russian despotisln if was inevitable
that the Belgian fatherland should be erushed.
But why did the Social Democratie fraction

keep silent on this point .
The reason is clear. The English Liberal
government, in ifs effort fo lnake the Var

THE WAR OF DEFENSE 121

popular with the masses, ruade its ple exclu-
sively ou the ground of the necessity of pro-
tecting the independence of Belgium and the
integrity of France, but utterly ignored its al-
liance vith Russian Czarism. In like manner,
and froln the saine motives, the Gernmn Social
Democracy speaks fo the nmsses Olfly about
the war against Czarism, but does hot mention
even by naine Belgiuln, France and England.
All this is of course hot exactly flattering to
t]pe international reputation of Czarism. Yet
it is quite distressing that the German Social
Democracy should sacrifice its own good name
to the call fo arms against Czarism. Las-
salle said that every great political action
should begin vith a statement of things as they
are. Then why does the defense of the Father-
land begin with an abashed silence as to things
as they are? Or did the Gerlnan Social De-
mocracy perhaps think that this was hot a "big
political action" .

122 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

Anyway, the defense of the Fatherland is a
very broad and very elastic conception. The
world catastrophe began with Austria's ulti-
matum to Serbia. Austria, naturally, was
gided solely by the need of defending her bor-
ders from her uneasy neighbor. Austria's prop
was Germany. _And Germany, in turn, as we
already know, was prompted by the need to
secure ber own state. "If would be senseless
to believe," writes Ludwig Quessel on this
point, "that one wall could be torn away from
this extremely complex structure (Europe)
without endangering the security of the whole
edifice."
Germany opened her "Defensive Var" with
an attack upon Belgium, the violation of Bel-
gium's neutrality being allegedly only a
means of brea-king through to France along
the line of least resistance. The military de-
feat of France also was to appear only as a

THE WAR OF DEFENSE 123

strategic episode in the defense of the Father-
land.
To some German patriots this construction
of things did not seem quite plausible, and
they had good grounds for disbelieving it.
They suspeeted a motive whieh squared far
better with the reality. Russia, entering upon
a new era of military preparation, would be a
far greater menace to Germany in two or three
years than she was then. And France during
that rime would have completely carried out
her three-year army reform. Is if not clear,
then, that an intelligent self-defense demanded
that Germany should not wait for the attack
of her enemies but should anticipate them by
two years and take the offensive af once ? And
isn't it clear, too, that such an offensive war,
deliberately provoked by Germany and Aus-
tria, is in reality a preventive war of defense?
Not infrequently these two points of view

124 BOI,.SHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
are combined in a single argument. Granted
that there is some slight contradiction between
them. The one declares that Germany did not
want the Var now and that it was forced upon
her by the Triple Entente, while the other im-
plies that war was disadvantageous fo the En-
tente now and that for that very reason Ger-
many had taken the initiative to bring on the
Var at this rime. But what if there is this
contradiction? It is lightly and easily glossed
over and reconciled in the saving concept of a
war of defense.
But the belligerents on the other side dis-
puted this advantageous position of being on
the defensive, whieh Germany sought fo as-
smne, and did it sueeessfully. France eould
not permit the defeat of Russia on the ground
of ber own self-defense. England gave as the
motive for her interferenee the imlnediate dan-
ger to the British Islands whieh a strengthen-
ing of Germany's position at the mouth of the

THE WAR OF DEFENSE 125
Channel would mean. Finally, Russia, too,
spoke only of self-defense. If is truc that no

one threatened Russian territory. But na-
tional possessions, mark you, do hot consist
merely in territory, but in other, intangible,

factors as well, among them, the influence over
weaker states. Sewia "belongs" in the sphere
of Russian influence and serves the purpose of
maintaining the so-ealled balance of power in
the Balkans, not Olfly the balance of power be-
tween the Balkan States but also between Rus-
sian and Austrian influence. A sueeessful
Austrian attaek on Servia threatened fo disturb
this balance of power in Austria's fayot, and
therefore meant an indirect attaek upon Rus-
sia. Sasonov undoubtedly round his strongest
argmnent in Quessel's words: "'It would be
senseless fo believe that one wall could be torn
away from the extremely eomplex structure
(Europe) without endangering the seeurity of
fle entire edifiee."

126 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

Itis superfluous to add that Sewia and
Montenegro, Belgium and Luxemburg, could
also produce some proofs of the defensive char-
acter of their policies. Thus, ail the countries
were on the defensive, none was the aggres-
sot. But if that is so, then what sense is there
in opposing the claims of defensive and offen-
sive war to each other? The standards applied
in such cases differ greatly, and are not fre-
quently quite incommensurable.
What is of fundamental importance to us
Socialists is the question of the historical rôle
of the Var. Is the Var calculated to effec-
tively promote the productive forces and the
state organizations, and fo accelerate the con-
centration of the working class forces? Or is
the reverse true, will it hinder in this? This
materialistic evaluation of wars stands above
ail formal or external considerations, and in
ifs nature has no relation to the question of de-
fense or aggression. And yet sometimes these

THE WAR OF DEFENSE 127

formal expressions about a war designate with
more or less truth the actual significance of the
war. When Engels said that the Germans
were on the defensive in 1870, he had least of
all the immediate political and diplomatie eir-
eumstances in mind. The determining fact for
him was that in that war Gerlnany was figbting
for her right fo national unity, wllich was a
neeessary condition for tbe economie develop-
ment of the country and the Soeialist consoli-
dation of the proletariat. In the saine sense
the Christian peoples of the Balkans waged a
war of defense against Turkey, fighting for
their right to independent national develop-
ment against the foreign rule.
The question of the immediate international
political conditions leading to a war is inde-
pendent of the value the war possesses from the
historico-materialistic point of view. The Ger-
man war against the Bonapartist Monarehy
was historieally unavoidable. In that war the

128 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

right of development vas on the German side.
Yet those historical tendencies did not, in them-
selves, predetermiue the question as fo which
party was interested in provoking the war just
in the year 1870. We know now very well that
international politics and military considera-
tions induced Bisnmrck to take the actual in-
itiative in the war. It might have happened
just the other xvay, hovever. Vith greater
foresight and energy, the government of Na-
poleon III could have anticipated Bismarck,
and begun the war a few years earlier. That
vould bave radically changed the inunediate
political aspect of events, but it would bave
lnade no difference in the historic estimate of
the var.
Third in order is the factor of diplomacy.
Diplomacy here has a two-fold task to perform.
First, if nmst bring about war af the moment
most favorable for ifs own country from the
international as well as the military standpoint.

THE WAR OF DEFENSE 129
Second, if must employ methods which throw
the burden of responsibility for the bloody con-
flict, in public opinion, on the enemy govern-
ment. The exposure of diplolnatic trickery,
cheating and knave T is one of the most im-
portant functions of Socialist political agita-
tion. But no marrer to what extent we suc-
ceed in this af the crucial juncture, it is clear
that the net of diplomatic intrigues in them-
selves signifies nothing either as regards the
historic rôle of the war or ifs real initiators.
B ismarck's clever manœuvres forced Napoleon
III fo declare war on Prussia, although the
actual initiative came from the German side.
Next follows the purely military aspect. The
strategic plan of operations can be calculated
chiefly for defense or attack, regardless of
which side declared the war and under what
conditions. Finally, the first tactics followed
in the carrying out of the strategic plan not in-

130 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

frequently plays a great part in estimating the
war as a war of defense or of aggression.
"If is a good thing," wrote :Engels to
Marx on July 31, 1870, "that the French at-
tacked first on German soil. If the Germans
repel the invasion and follow if up by invad-
ing French territory, then if will certainly
hOt produce the same impression as if the
Germans had marched into France without
a previous invasion. In this way the war
remains, on the French side, more Bona-
partistic."

Thus we see by the classic example of the
Franco-Prussian War that the standards for
judging whether a war is defensive or aggres-
sive are full of contradictions when two na-
tions clash. Then how much more so are they
when it is a clash of several nations. If we
unroll the tangle from the beginning, we ar-
rive af the following connection between the

THE WAR OF DEFENSE 131

elements of attack and defense. The first tac-
tical move of the French shouldmat least in
Engels' opinionmmake tlae people feel that the
responsibility of attack rested with the French.
And yet the entire strategic plan of the Ger-
mans had an absolutely aggressive character.
The diplomatic moves of Bismarck forced Bo-
naparte to declare war against his will and thus
appear as the disturber of the peace of Europe,
while the military-political initiative in the war
came from the Prussian government. These
circumstances are by no means of slight impor-
tance for the historical estimate of the war, but
they are hot at all exhaustive.
One of the causes of this war was the grow-
ing ambition of the Germans for national self-
determination, which conflicted with the dynas-
tic pretensions of the French Monarchy. But
this national "war of defense" led to the an-
nexation of Alsace-Lorraine and so in its sec-

132 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

ond stage turned into a dynastic war of con-
quest.
The eorrespondenee between Marx and :En-
gels shows that they were guided ehiefly by his-
torieal eonsiderations in their attitude towards
the ¥ar of 1870. To them, of course, it was
by no means a matter of indifference as to
who conducted the war and how it was con-
ducted. "1¥ho would have thought it pos-
sible," Marx writes bitterly, "that twenty-two
years after 1848 a nationalist war in Germany
could have been given such theoretical expres-
sion." Yet what was of decisive significance to
Marx and ]ngels was the objective conse-
quences of the war. "If the Prussians triumph,
it will mean the centralization of the state
power--useful to the centralization of the Ger-
man working-class."
Liebknecht and Bebel, starting with the
saine historical estimate of the war, were di-
rectly forced to take a political position to-

TItE WAR OF DEFENSE 133

ward it. It was by no means in opposition to
the views of Marx and Engels, but, on the con-
trary, with their perfeet aequieseenee that Lieb-
kneeht and Bebel refused, in the Reiehstag,
to take any responsibility for this War. The
statement they handed in read:

"We cannot grant the war appropriations
that the Reichstag is asked fo make because
that would be a vote of confidence in the
Prussian government .... As opponents
on prineiple of every dynastie war, as Social
Republieians and members of the Interna-
tional Labor Association, whieh, without dis-
tinetion of nationality, fights ail oppressors
and endeavors to unite all the oppressed in
one great brotherhood, we eannot deelare
ourselves either direetly or indireetly in fa-
vor of the present war."

Sehweitzer aeted differently. He took the
historieal estimate of the war as a direct guide

134 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

for his tactics--one of the most dangerous of
fallacies!--and in voting the war credits gave
a vote of confidence to the poliey of ]3ismarek.
And this in spire of the faet that it was neees-
sary, if the eentralization of state power aris-
ing out of the War was to turn out of use to
the Social Demoeratie cause, that the working-
class should from the very beginning oppose
the dynastie-Junker eentralization with their
own elass-centralization filled with revolution-
ary distrust of the rulers.
Sehweitzer's politieal attitude invalidated
the very eonsequenees of the War that had in-
dueed him to give a vote of confidence to the
makers of the War.
Forty years later, drawing up the balance
sbeet of his life-work, ]]ebel wrote:

"The attitude that Liebkneeht and I took
af the outbreak and during the eontinuanee
of the war has for years been a subjeet of

THE WAR OF DEFENSE 135

discussion and violent attack, at first even
in the Party; but only for a short rime.
Then they aeknowledged that we had been
right. I eonfess that I do not in any way
regret out attitude, and if at the outbreak of
the War we had known what we learned
within the next few years from the oflïeial
and unoflàeial diselosures, out attitude from
the very start would have been still harsher.
We would not merely have abstained, as we
did, from voting the first war eredits, we
would have voted against them." (Autobi-
ography, Part II, p. 167.)

If we compare the Liebknecht-Bebel state-
ment of 1870 with Haase's declaration in 191,
we must eonelude that Bebel was mistaken
when he said, "Then they aeknowledged that
we had been right." For the vote of August 
was eminently a eondemnation of ]3ebel's pol-
iey forty-four years earlier, sinee in Haase's

136 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEA(]E
phraseology, Bebel had then left the Father-
land in the lurch in the hour of danger.
What political causes and considerations
bave led the party of the German proletariat
to abandon its glorious traditions? lot a sin-
gle weighty reason has been given so far. All
the arguments adduced are full of contradic-
tions. They are like diplomatic communiqués
which are written to justify an already accom-
plished act. The leader writer of Die Neue
Zeit writes--with the blessing of Comrade
Kautsky--that Germany's position towards
Czarism is the same as it was towards Bona-
partism in 1870! He even quotes from a letter
of Fngels: "All classes of the German peo-
ple realized that it was a question, first of all,
of national existence, and so they fell in line at
once." For the same reason, we are told, the
German Social Democracy has fallen into line
now. It is a question of national existence.
"Substitute Czarism for Bonapartism, and

THE WAR OF DEFENSE 137
:Engels' words are true to-day." And yet the
fact remains, in ail ifs force, that Bebel and
Liebknecht dcmonstratively refused fo vote
either money or confidence to the government
in 1870. Does if not hold just as well, then,
if we "substitute Czarism for Bonapartism"?
To this question no answcr has been vouch-
safed.
But what did Engels really write in his let-
ter concerning the tactics of the labor party?
"If does not seem possible fo me that under
such circumstances a C, erman political party
can preach total obstruction, and place all sorts
of minor considera-ions above the main issue."
Total obstructiou!--But there is a wide gap
between total obstruction and the total capitu-
lation of a political party. And if was this gap
that divided the positions between Bebel and
Schweitzcr in 1870. 5[arx and :Engels were
with Bebel against Schweitzer. Comrade
Kautsky might hav¢ informed his leader

138 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

writer, ttermann ¥endel, of this fact. And
if is nothing but defamation of the dead for
Simplicissimus now to reeoneile the shades of
:Bebel and :Bismarek in Heaven. If Simplicis-
simus and Wendel have the right to awaken
anybody from his sleep in the grave for the en-
dorsement of the present taeties of the German
Social Demoeraey, then it is not :Bebel, but
Sehweitzer. It is the shade of Sehweitzer that
now oppresses the politieal party of the Ger-
man proletarit.

:But the very anlogy between the Franco-
lrussian War and the present War is super-
fieial and misleading in the extreme. Let us
set aside all the international relations. Let us
forger that the ¥ar meant first of all the de-
struction of :Belgium, and that Germany's mahl
force was hurled not against Czarism but re-
publiean France. Let us forger that the start-
ing point of the ¥ar was the crushing of Ser-

TttE WAR OF DEFENSE 139

via, and that one of ifs aims was the strength-
ening and consolidation of the arch-reactionary
state, Austria-Hungary. We will not dwell
on the fact that the attitude of the German
Social Democracy dealt a hard blow af the
Russian Revolution, which in the two years
before the War had again flared up in such a
tempest. We will close our eyes fo ail these
facts, just as the German Social Democracy
did on August 4th, when if did not sec that
there was a Belgium in the world, a France,
England, Servia, or Austria-Hungary. We
will grant only the existence of Germany.
In 1870 if was quite easy to estimate the his-
torical significance of the war. "If the :Prus-
sians win, the centralization of state power will
further the centralization of the German work-
ing class." And now? What would be the re-
sult for the German working class of a lrus -
sian victory now?
The only territorial expansion which the

140 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEA(E
German working class could welcome, because
it would complete the national unity, is  union
of Gel-man Austria with Germany. Any other
expansion of the German fatherland means
another step towards the transformation of
Germany from  national state fo  state of
nationalities, and the consequent introduction
of all those conditions which render more difl-
cult the class struggle of the proletariat.
Ludwig Frank hoped--and he expressed
this hope in the language of  belated Lassal-
lian--that later, af ter a victorious war, he
would devote himself fo the work of the "inter-
nal building up" of the state. There is no
doubt that Germany will need this "infernal
building up" after  vietory no less than before
the War. But will a vietory make this work
easier ? There is nothing in Germany's histori-
cal experienees any more than in those of any
other country fo justify sueh a hope.

THE WAR OF DEFENSE 141

"¥e regarded the doings of the rulers of
Germany [after the victories of 1870] as a
matter of course," says Bebel in his Autobi-
ography. "It was merely an illusion of the
Party F, xecutive to believe that a more lib-
eral spirit would prevail in the new order.
And this more liberal régime was to be
granted by the same man who had till then
shown himself the greatest enemy, I will not
say of democratic development, but even of
every liberal tendcncy, and vho now as vic-
tor planted the heel of his Cuirassier boot on
the neck of the new Empire." (Vol. II, p.
88.)

There is absolutely no reason to expect dif-
ferent results now from a victory from above.
On the eontrary. In 1870 lrussian Junker-
dom had first to adapt itself to the new im-
perial order. If eould not feel seeure in
the saddle all af once. If was eight years af ter

142 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

the victory over France that the anti-So-
cialist laws were passed. In forty-four
years Prussian ,lunkerdom has become the
imperial Junkerdom. And if, after half a cen-
tury of the most intense class struggle, Junker-
dom should appear at the head of the victo-
rious nation, then we need not doubt that it
would not bave felt the need of Ludwig
Frank's services for the internal building up of
the state had he returned safe from the fields
of German victories.
But far more important than the strength-
ening of the class position of the rulers is the
influence a German victory would have upon
the proletariat itself. The war grew out of im-
perialistic antagonisms between the capitalist
states, and the vietory of Germany, as stated
above, ean produee only one result--territorial
acquisitions af the expense of ]3elgium, France
and Russia, commercial treaties foreed upon
bel' enemies, and new colonies. The elass strug-

THE WAR OF DEFENSE 143

gle of the proletariat would then be placed
upon the basis of the imperialistic hegemony
of Germany, the working elass would be inter-
ested in the maintenance and development of
this hegemony, and revolutionary Soeialism
would for a long rime be eondemned fo the rôle
of a propagandist seet.
Marx was right when in 1870 he foresaw, as
a result of the German vietories, a rapid de-
velopment for the German labor movement
under the banner of seientifie Soeialism. But
now the international conditions point fo the
very opposite prognosis. Germany's vietory
would mean the taking of the edge off the rev-
olutionary movement, its theoretie shallowing,
and the dying out of the Marxist ideas.

CHAPTER ri

VttAT ttAYE SOCIALISTS TO DO VITtt CAPITALIS'r
WASS?

BUT the German Social Democracy, we shall
be told, does not want vietory. Our answer
must be in the first place that this is not true.
What the German Social Democracy wants is
told by its press, lVith two or three excep-
tions Socialist papers daily point out fo the
German workingman that a victory of the Ger-
man arms is his victory. The capture of Mau-
beuge, the sinking of three English warships, or
the fall of Antwerp aroused in the Social Dem-
ocratic press the saine feelings that otherwise
are excited by the gain of a new election dis-
trict or a victory in a wage dispute, lVe must
not lose sight of the fact that the German labor
press, the Party press as well as the trade union
144

CAPITALIST WARS 145

papers, is now a powerful mechanisln that in
place of the education of fle people's will for
the elass struggle has substituted the edueation
of the people's will for military vietories. I
have not in mind the ugly ehauvinistie ex-
cesses of individual organs, but the underlying
sentiment of the overwhelming majority of the
Social Demoeratie papers. The signal for this
attitude seems to have been given by the vote
of the fraction on August 4th.
But the fraction wasn't thinking of a Ger-
man vietory. It ruade it its task only to avert
the danger threatening from the outside, to
defend the latherland. That was ail.
And here we eome baek fo the question of
wars of defense and wars of aggression. The
German press, ineluding the Social Demo-
eratie organs, does not eease to repeat thaç iç
is Germany of all countries that finds itself on
the defensive in this War. We ha.ve already
diseussed the standards for determining the

146 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEA(3E

difference between a war of aggression and a
war of defense. These standards are numer-
ous and contradictory. Yet in the present case
they testify unanimously that Germany's mil-
itary acts cannot possibly be construed as the
acts of a war of defense. But this has abso-
lutely no influence upon the tactics of the So-
cial Democracy.
From a historical standpoint the new Ger-
man imperialism is, as we already know, abso-
lutely aggressive. Urged onward by the fever-
ish development of the national industry, Ger-
man imperialism disturbs the old balance of
power between the states and plays the first
violin in the race for armaments.
And from the standpoint oÏ world politics
the present moment seemed fo be most favor-
able for Germany fo deal her rivals a crushing
blow--which however does not lessen the gui]t
of Germany's enemies by one iota.
The diplomatic view of events leaves no

CAPITALIST WARS 147
doubt concerning the leading part that Ger-
many played in Austria's provocative action
in Servia. The fact that Czarist diplomacy
was, as usual, still more disgraceful, does not
alter the case.
From the standpoint of strategy the entire
German campaign was based on a monstrous
offensive.
And finally from the standpoint of tactics,
the first move of the German army was the
violation of Belgian neutrality.
If all this is defense, then what .is attack.
But even if we assume that events as pictured
in the language of diplomacy admit of other
interpretations--although the first two pages
of the W]aite Book are very clear as to this
meaning--has the revolutionary æarty of the
working class no other standards for determin-
ing its policy than the documents presented by
a government that has the greatest interest in
deceiving it?

148 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

"Bismarck duped the whole world," says
Bebel, "and knew how to make people be-
lieve that if was Napoleon who provoked
the war, while he himself, the peace-loving
Bismarck, found himself and his policy in
the position of being attacked.
"The events preceding the war were so
misleading that France's complete unpre-
paredness for the war that she herself de-
clared was generally overlooked, while in
Germany, which appeared fo be the one at-
tacked, preparations for war had been com-
pleted down to the very last wagon-nail, and
mobilization moved with the precision of
clockwork." (Autobiography, Vol. III,
pages 167-168.)

Af ter such an historical precedent one rnight
expect more critical caution from the Social
Demoeraey.
If is quite true that ]3ebel more than once

CAPITALIST WARS 149
repeated his assertion that in case of an attack
on Germany the Social Democracy would de-
fend ifs Fatherland. At the convention held at
Essen, Kautsky answered him:

"In my opinion we cannot promise posi-
tively to share the government's war enthusi-
asm every rime we are convinced that the
country is threatened by attack. Bebel
thinks we are much further advanced than
we were in 1870 and that we are now able to
decide in every instance whether the war
which threatens is really one of aggression
or hot. I should not like to take this respon-
sibility upon myself. I should not like to
undertake fo guarantee that we could make
a correct decision in every instance, that we
shall always know whether a government is
deceiving us, or whether it is not actually
representing the interests of the nation
against a war of attack .... Yesterday it

]50 BOLSHEVIKI AND W0RLD PEACE

was the German government that took the
aggressive, to-morrow it will be the French
government, and we cannot -know if the day
after it may not be the English government.
The governments are constantly taking
turns. As a marrer of fact what we are con-
cerned with in case of war is not a national,
but an international question. :For a war
between great powers will become a world
war and will affect the whole of Europe, not
two countries alone. Some day the German
government might make the German prole-
tariat believe they were being attacked; the
French government might do the same with
ifs subj ects, and then we should bave a war
in which the French and German working
men would follow their respective govern-
ments with equal enthusiasm, and murder
each other and cut each other's throats.
Such a contingency must be avoided, and it
will be avoided if we do not adopt the cri-

CAPITALIST WARS 151
terion of the aggressive or defensive war,
but that of the interests of the proletariat,
which at the same rime are international in-
terests .... Fortunately, it is a miscon-
ception to assume that the German Social
Democracy in case of war wanted to judge
by national and not by international consid-
erations, and felt itself to be first a German
and then a proletariat party."

With splendid clearness Kautsky in this
speech reveals the terrible dangers--now a still
more terrible actuality--that are latent in the
endeavor to make the position of the Social
Democracy dependent upon an indefinite and
contradictory formal estirnate of whether a war
is one of defense or one of aggression. ]3ebel
in his reply said nothing of importance; and
his point of view seemed quite inexplicable,
especially after his own experiences of the year
1870.

152 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

Nevertheless, in spire of ifs theoretical in-
adequacy, Bebel's position had a quite definite
politieal meaning. Those imperialistie ten-
deneies which the danger of war begat exeluded
the possibility for the Social Demoeraey's ex-
peeting salvation from the vietory of either of
the warring parties. For that very reason its
entire attention was direeted to the preventing
of war, and the principal task was to keep the
governments worried about the results of a

Waro
"The
oppose
itiative

Social Democracy," said Bebel, "will
any government which takes the in-
in war." He meant this as a threat
fo William II.'s government. "Don't reekon
upon us if some day you deeide fo utilize your
eannon and your battleships." Then he turned
fo letrograd and London." "They had better
take eare not fo attaek Germany in a miseal-
culation of wekness from within on aeeount of

CAPITALIST WARS 153
the obstructionist policies of the powerful Ger-
man Social Democracy."
Without being a political doctrine, Bebel's
conception was a political threat, and a threat
directed simultaneously at two fronts, the in-
ternal front and the foreign front. His one
obstinate answer to all historical and logical
objections was: "We'll find the way to expose
any government that takes the first step to-
wards war. We are clever enough for that."
This threatening attitude of not only the
German Social Democracy but also of the In-
ternational Party was not without results.
The various governments actually did make
every effort to postpone the outbreak of the
Var. But that is not all. The rulers and the
diplomats were doubly attentive now to adapt-
ing their moves to the pacifist psychology of
the masses. They whispered with the Socialist
leaders, nosed about in the office of the Inter-
national, and so created a sentiment which

154 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

made it possible for Saurès and Haase to de-
clare at Brussels, a few days before the out-
break of the War, that their partieular govern-
ments had no other objeet than the preserva-
tion of peaee. And when the storm broke
loose, the Social Demoeraey of every country
looked for the guilty party--on the other side
•
of the border. ]3ebel's utteranee, whieh had
played a definite part as a threat, lost all mean-
ing the instant the first shots were fired af the
frontiers. That terrible thing took place whieh
Kautsky had prophesied.
What at first glanee appears the most sur-
prising thing about if all is, that the Social
Demoeraey had not really felt the need for a
politieal eriterion. In the catastrophe that has
oeeurred to the International the argtunents
have been notable for their superfieiality. They
eontradieted eaeh other, shifted ground, and
were of only seeondary signifieanee--the gist
of the marrer being that the fatherland nust be

CAPITALIST WARS 155

defended. Apart from considerations of the
historical outcome of the War, apart from con-
siderations of democracy and the class strug-
gle, the fatherland that has come down to us
historically must be defended. And defended
not because our government wanted peace and
was "perfidiously attacked," as the interna-
tional penny-a-liners put if, but because apart
from the conditions or the ways in which it was
provoked, apart from who was right and who
was wrong, war, once if breaks out, subjects
every belligerent to the danger of invasion and
conquest. Theoretical, political, diplomatic
and military considerations fall into nlins as in
an earthquake, a conflao'ration or a flood. The
government with ifs army is elevated fo the po-
sition of the one power that can protect and
save ifs people. The large masses of the peo-
ple in actuality return fo a pre-political condi-
tion. This feeling of the masses, this elemental
reflex of the catastrophe, need hot be criticized

156 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
in so far as it is only a temporary feeling. :But
it is quite a different marrer in the case of the
attitude of the Social Democracy, the respon-
sible political representative of the masses.
The political organizations of the pogsessing
classes and especially the power of the govern-
ment itself did not simply float with the stream.
They instantly set to work most intensively
and in very varied ways fo heighten this unpo-
litical sentiment and fo unite the masses
around the army and the government. The
Social Democracy not only did not become
equally active in the opposite direction, but
from the very first moment surrendered to the
policy of the government and to the elemental
feeling of the masses. And instead of arming
these masses with the weapons of criticism and
distrust, if only passive criticism and distrust,
it itself by its whole attitude hastened the peo-
ple along the road to this pre-political condi-
tion. It renounced ifs traditions and political

CAPITALIST WARS 157

pledges of fifty years with a conspicuous read-
iness that was least of all calculated fo inspire
the rulers with respect.
:Bethmann-Hollweg announced that the
German government was in absolute agree-
ment with the German people, and af ter the
avowal of the rorwiirts, in view of the position
taken by the Social Democracy, he had a per-
fect right to say so. :But he had still another
right. If conditions had not induced him to
postpone political polemics to a more favorable
moment, he might have said at the Reichstag
session of August 4th, addressing the repre-
sentatives of the Socialist proletariat: "To-
day you agree with us in recognizing the dan-
ger threatening our Fatherland, and you join
us in trying to avert the danger by arms. :But
this danger has not grown up since yesterday.
You must previously have known of the ex-
istence and the tendencies of Czarism, and you
knew that we had other enemies besides. So

158 BOLSHEVIKI AND W0RLD PEACE

by what right did you attack us when we built
up our army and our navy? By what right
did you refuse to vote for military appropria-
tions year af ter year? Was it by the right of
treason or the right of blindness? If in spire
of you we had not built up our army, we should
now be helpless in the face of this Russian
menace that bas brought you to your senses,
too. No appropriations granted now could
enable us to make up for what we would bave
lost. We should now be without arms, without
cannons, without fortifications. Your voting
to-day in favor of the war credit of rive billion
is an admission that your annual refusal of the
budget was only an empty demonstration, and,
worse than that, was political demagogy. For
as soon as you came up for a serious historical
examination, you denied your entire past I"
That is what the German Chancellor could
bave said, and this rime his speech would bave

CAPITALIST WARS 159

carried conviction. And what could ttaase
have replied ?
"We never took a stand for Germany's dis-
armament in the face of dangers from without.
Such peace rubbish was never in our thoughts.
As long as international contradictions create
out of themselves the danger of war, we want
Germany to be safe against foreign invasion
and servitude. What we are trying for is a
mihtary organization which cannot--as tan an
artificially trained organization--be made to
serve for class exploitation at home and for im-
perialistic adventures abroad, but will be invin-
cible in national defense. We want a militia.
We cannot trust you with the work of national
defense. You have ruade the army a school of
reactionary training. You have drilled your
corps of officers in the hatred of the most im-
portant class of modern society, the proletariat.
You are capable of risking millions of hves,
not for the real interests of the people, but for

160 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

the selfish interests of the ruling minority,
which you veil with the names of national ideals
and state prestige. We do not trust you, and
that is why we have deelared year after year,
'Not a single man or a single penny for this
elass government !' "
"But rive billions!" voiees from both the
right and the left might interrupt.
"Unfortunately we are now left no ehoiee.
We have no army exeept the one ereated by the
present masters of Germany, and the enemy
stands without out gares. We eannot on the
instant replace William II.'s army by a peo-
ple's militia, and once this is so, we cannot re-
fuse food, clothing and materials of war to the
army that is defending us, no mat-ter how it
may be constituted. We are neither repudi-
ating our past nor renouncing our future. We
are forced to vote for the war credits."
That would have been about the most con-
vincing thing that ttaase could have said.

CAPITALIST WARS 161

Yet, even though such considerations might
give an explanation of why the Socialist work-
ers as citizens did not obstruer the military
organization, but simply fulfilled the duty of
eitizenship forced upon them by eircumstanees,
we should still be waiting in vain for an answer
fo the principal question: Why did the Social
Demoeracy, as the political organization of a
elass that has been denied a share in the gov-
ernment, as the implacable enemy of bourgeois
society, as the republiean party, as a branch of
the International--why did if take upon itself
the responsibility for acts undertaken by ifs
irreeoneilable class enemies?
If if is impossible for us immediately fo re-
place the ttohenzollern army with  militi,
that does not mean that we must now take upon
ourselves the responsibility for the doings of
that army. If in rimes of peaeeful normal
state-housekeeping we wage war against the
monarehy, the bourgeoisie and militarism, and

].62 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

are under obligations to the masses .to carry on
that war with the whole weight of our author-
ity, then we conmit the greatest crime against
our future when we put this authority at the
disposal of the monarchy, the bourgeoisie and
militarism at the very moment when these
break out into the terrible, anti-social and bar-
barie methods of war.
Neither the nation nor the state can escape
the obligation of defense. But when we refuse
the rulers out confidence we by no means rob
the bourgeois state of its weapons or its means
of defense and even of attack--as long as we
are not strong enough to wrest its power from
its hands. In war as in peace, we are a party
of opposition, nota party of power. In that
way we can also most surely serve that part of
our task whieh war outlines so sharply, the
work of national independence. The Social
Demoeraey cannot let the fate of any nation,
whether its own or another nation, depend upon

CAPITALIST WARS 163

military successes. In throwing upon the cap-
italist state the responsibility for the method
by which it protects its independence, that is,
the violation of the independence of other
states, the Social Democracy lays the corner-
stone of true national independence in the con-
sciousness of the masses of all nations. By
preserving and developing the international
solidarity of the workers, we secure the inde-
pendence of the nation--and make it indepen-
dent of the calibre of cannons.
If Czarism is a danger to Germany's inde-
pendence, there is only one way that promises
success in warding off this danger, and that
way lies with us--the solidarity of the working
masses of Germany and Russia. But such soli-
darity would undermine the policy that Wil-
lîam II. explained in saying that the entire
German people stood behind him. What
should we Russian Socialists say to the Russian
workingmen in face of the fact that the bullets

164 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
the German workers are shooting at them bear
the political and moral seal of the German So-
cial Democracy ? "We cannot make our policy
for Russia, we make it for Germany," was the
answer given me by one of the most respected
functionaries of the German party when I put
this question to him. And at that moment I
felt with particularly painful clearness what a
blow had been struck af the International from
within.
The situation, it is plain, is not improved if
the Socialist parties of both warring countries
throw in their fate with the fate of their gov-
ernments, as in Germany and :France. :No out-
side power, no confiscation or destruction of
Socialist property, no arrests and imprison-
ments could have dealt such a blow to the In-
ternational as it struck itself with its own hands
in surrendering to the Moloch of state just when
he began to talk in terms of blood and iron.

CAPITALIST WARS 165

In his speech af the convention af ]ssen
Kautsky drew a terrifying picture of brother
rising against brother in the naine of a "war of
defense"--as an argument, by no means as an
aetual possibility. Now that this pieture has
beeome a bloody aetuality, Kautsky endeavors
to reeoneile us toit. He beholds no eollapse of
the International.

"The difference between the German and
the Freneh Socialists is not tobe found in
their standards of judgment, nor in their
fundamental point of view, but merely in the
differenee of their interpretation of the pres-
ent situation, whieh, in its turn, is eondi-
tioned by the diff erence in their geographical
position [ !]. Therefore, this difference tan
scarcely be overcome while the war lasts.
Nevertheless itis not  difference of princi-
ple, but one arising out of a particular situ-
ation, and so if need not last af ter that situa-

166 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
tion has ceased to exist." (Neue Zeit,
p. 8.)

When Guèsde and Sembat appear as aides
to 19oincaré, Delcassé and Briand, and as op-
ponents to Bethmann-Hollweg; when the
French and German workingmen eut each
other's throats and are not doing so as enforced
citizens of the bourgeois republie and the Ho-
henzollern Monarchy, but as Socialists per-
forming their duty under the spiritual leader-
ship of their parties, this is not a collapse of the
International. The "standard of judgment"
is one and the same for the German Socialist
cutting a Frenchman's throat as for the
French Socialist cutting a German's throat.
If Ludwig Frank takes up his gun, not to pro-
claire the "difference of principle" to the
French Socialists, but to shoot them in all
agreement of principle; and if Ludwig Frank
should himself fall by a French bullet--fired

CAPITALIST WARS 167
possibly by a comrade--that is no detriment to
"standards" they bave in common. If is mere-
ly a consequence of the "difference in their
geographical position." Truly, it is bitter fo
read such lines, but doubly bitter when they
come from Kautsky's pen.
The International was opposed to the war.
"If, in spire of the efforts of the Social
Democracy, we should bave war," says
Kautsky, "then every nation must save its
skin as best it can. This means for the Social
Democracy of every country the same right
and the same duty to participate in ifs coun-
try's defense, and none of them may make of
this a cause for casting reproaches[ I] at each
other." (Neue Zeit, 887, p. 7.)

Of such sort is this common standard to save
one's own skin, to break one another's skulls
in self-defense, and not to "reproach" one an-
other for doing so.

168 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

But will the question be answered by the
agreement in the standard of judgment? Will
it not rather be answered by the quality of this
common standard of judgrnent? Among
Bethmann-Hollweg, Sasonov, Grey and Del-
cassé you also find agreement in their stand-
ards. Nor is there any difference of principle
between them either. They least of all bave
any right fo cast reproaches af each other.
Their conduct simply springs from "a differ-
ence in their geographical position." Had
Bethmann-Hollweg been an :English minister,
he would have acted exactly as did Sir :Edward
Grey. Their standards are as like each other
as their cannon, which differ in nothing but
their calibre. But the question for us is, can
we adopt their standards for our own?

"lortunately, if is a miseonception fo as-
sume that the German Social Democracy in
case of war wnted fo judge by national and

CAPITALIST WARS 169

not by international considerations, and felt
itself tobe first a German and then a proie-
tariat party."
So said Kautsky in Essen. And now when
the national point of view has taken hold of ail
the workingmen's parties of the International
in place of the international point of view that
they held in eommon, Kautsky not only reeon-
eiles himself to this "miseoneeption," but even
tries to find in it agreement of standards and
a guarantee of the rebirth of the International.
"In every national state the working elass
must also devote its entire energy to keeping
intact the independenee and the hategrity of
the national territory. This is an essential of
democraey, that basis neeessary to the strug-
gle and the final vietory of the proletariat."
( Neue Zeit, 337, p. 4. )
But if this is the case, how about the Aus-
trian Social Demoeracy? Must it, too, devote

170 BOLSHEVIKI AND W01LD PEACE

its entire energy to the preservation of the non-
national and anti-national Austro-Hungarian
1V[onarehy? And the German Social Demoe-
raey? ]3y amalgamating itself politieally with
the German army, it not only helps to preserve
the Austro-Hungarian national chaos, but also
faeilitates the destruction of Germany's na-
tional unity. National unit! is enàangered hot
onl/ b/ defeat but also b/ vietor!.
From the standpoint of the European pro-
letariat itis equally harmful whether a sliee
of Freneh territory is gobbled up by Germany,
or whether France gobbles up a sliee of Ger-
nmn territory. Moreover the preservation of
the European status quo is nota thing af all for
our platform. The politieal map of Europe
has been drawn by the point of the bayonet,
at every frontier passing over the living bodies
of the nations. If the Social Demoeraey
sists its national (or anti-national) govern-
ments with all its energy, if is again leaving

CAPITALIST WARS 171

to the power and intelligence of the bayonet to
correct the map of Europe. And in tearing
the International to pieces, the Social Democ-
racy destroys the one power that is capable of
setting up a programme of national independ-
ence and democracy in opposition to the ac-
tivity of the bayonet, and of carrying out this
programme in a greater or less degree, quite
independently of which of the national bayo-
nets is crowned with victory.
The experience of. old is confirlned once
again. If the Social Democracy sers national
duties above its class duties, it commits the
greatest crime not only against Socialism, but
also against the interest of the nation as rightly
and broadly understood.

CHAPTER VII

TttE COLLAPSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
AT their Convention in Paris two weeks be-
fore the outbreak of the catastrophe, the
French Socialists insisted on pledging all
branches of the International to revolutionary
action in case of a mobilization. They were
thinking chiefly of the German Social Democ-
racy. The radicalism of the French Socialists
in matters of foreign policy was rooted hot so
much in international as national interests.
The events of the War have now definitely con-
firmed what was clear to many then. What
the French Socialist Party desired from the
sister party in Germany was a certain guaran-
tee for the inviolability of France. They be-
lieved that only by thus insuring themselves
with the German proletariat could they finally
172

COLLAPSE OF INTERNATIONAL 173
free their own hands for a decisive conflict with
national militarism.
The German Social Democracy, for their
part, flatly refused to make any such pledge.
Bebel showed that if the Socialist parties signed
the French resolution, that would hot neces-
sarily enable them to keep their pledge when
the decisive moment came. Now there is little
room for doubt that Bebel was right. As
events bave repeatedly proved, a period of
mobilization almost completely cripples the So-
cialist Party, or at least precludes the possi-
bility of decisive moves. Once mobilizatioh is
declared, the Social Democracy finds itself face
to face with the concentrated power of the
Government, which is supported by a powerful
military apparatus that is ready to crush all
obstacles in its path and has the unqualified
co-operation of all bourgeois parties and insti-
tutions.
And of no less importance is the fact that

I BOLSHEVIIçI AND WORLD PEACE

nlobilization wakes up and brings to their feet
those elements of the people whose social sig-
nificance is slight and who play little or no po-
litical part in rimes of peace. I-Iundreds of
thousands, nay millions of petty hand-workers,
of hobo-proletarians (the riff-raff of the work-
ets), of small farmers and agricultural labor-
ers are drawn into the ranks of the army and
put into a uniform, in which each one of these
men stands for just as much as the class-con-
scious workingman. They and their families
are forcibly torn from'their dull unthinking in-
difference and given an interest in the fate of
their country, bIobilization and the declara-
tion of war awaken fresh expectations in these
circles whom our agitation practically does not
reach and whom, under ordinary circumstances,
it will never enlist. Confused hopes of a
change in present conditions, of a change for
the better, fill the hearts of these masses
dragged out of the apathy of misery and servi-

COLLAPSE OF INTERNATIONAL 175

rude. The same thing happens as at the begin-
ning of a revolution, but with one ail-impor-
tant differenee. _A revolution links these newly
aroused elements with the revolutionary elass,
but war links themwwith the government and
the armyI In the one case all the unsatisfied
needs, all the aeeumulated suffering, all the
hopes and longings find their expression in
revolutionary enthusiasm; in the other case
these same social emotions temporarily take
the form of patriotie intoxication. SVide
eireles of the working elass, even among those
touehed with Soeialism, are earried along in
the same eurrent. The advanee guard of the
Social Demoeraey feels itis in the minority;
ifs organizations, in order to eomilete the or-
ganization of the army, are wreeked. Under
sueh conditions there ean be no thought of a
revolutionary more on the part of the Party.
And all this is quite independent of whether
the people look upon a partieular war with

176 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

favor or disfavor.
eharacter of the
its unpopularity

In spite of the colonial
Russo-Japanese war and
in Russia, the first half

year of it nearly smothered the revolutionary
movement. Consequently itis quite clear that,
with flac best intentions in the world, the So-
cialist parties cannot pledge themselves to ob-
structionist action at the rime of mobilization,
ata rime, that is, when Socialism is more than
ever politically isolated.
And therefore there is nothing particularly
unexpected or discouraging in the fact that the
working-class parties did not oppose military
mobilization with their own revolutionary mo-
bilization. Had the Socialists limited flaem-
selves to expressing condemnation of the pres-
ent war, had flmy declined all responsibility
for it and refused the vote of confidence in
their governments as well as the vote for the
war credits, they would bave donc their duty at
the rime. They would have taken up a posi-

COLLAPSE OF INTERNATIONAL 177

tion of waiting, the oppositional character of
which would have been perfectly clear to the
goverimaent as well as fo the people. Further
action would have been determined by the
match of events and by those changes which
the events of a war must produce on the peo-
ple's consciousness. The ries binding the In-
ternational together would have been pre-
served, the banner of Socialism would have
been unstained. Although weakened for the
moment, the Social Democracy would have
preserved a free hand for a decisive interfer-
ente in affairs as soon as the change in the
feelings of the working masses came about.
And if is sale fo assert that whatever influence
the Social Democracy might have lost by such
an attitude at the beginning of the war, would
have been won several rimes over once the in-
evitable turn in public sentiment had corne
about.
But if this did not happen, if the signal for

178 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

war mobilization was also the signal for the fall
of the International, if the national labor par-
ties fell in line with their governments and the
armies without a single protest, then there must
be deep causes for it common to the entire In-
ternational. It would be futile to seek these
causes in the nfistakes of individuals, in the
narrowness of leaders and party eommittees.
They nmst be sought in the conditions of the
epoeh in whieh the Socialist International first
came into being and developed. qot that the
unreliability of the leaders or the bewildered
ineompetence of the F, xeeutive Committees
should ever be justified. :By no means. :But
these are not fundamental factors. These must
be sought in the historieal conditions of an en-
tire epoeh. :For if is hOt a question--and we
must be very straightforward with ourselves
about this--of any partieular mistake, not of
any opportunist steps, not of any awkward
statements in the various parliaments, not of

COLLAPSE OF INTERNATIONAL 179
the vote for the budget cast by the Social Dem-
ocrats of the Grand Duchy of Baden, not of
individual experiments of French ministerial-
ism, not of the making or unmaking of this or
that Socialist's career. Itis nothing less than
the complete failure of the International in the
most responsible historical epoch, for which all
the previous achievements of Socialism can be
considered merely as a preparation.
A review of historical events will reveal a
number of facts and symptoms that should
have aroused disquiet as to the depth and solid-
ity of Internationalism in the labor movement.
I am not referring to the Austrian Social
Democracy. In vain did the Russian and Ser-
vian Socialists look for clippings from articles
on world politics in the Wiener ,4rbeiter Zei-
tutg that they could use for Russian and Ser-
vlan workingmen without having to blush for
the International. One of the most striking
tendencies of this journal always was the de-

180 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

fense of Austro-German imperialism, not only
against the outside enemy but also against the
infernal eaemynand the Yoroeiirts was one of
the internal enemies. There is no irony in say-
ing that in the present crisis of the Interna-
tional the l/Viener Arbeiter Zeitung remained
truest to ifs past.
French Socialism reveals two extremes--an
ardent patriotism, on the one hand, hOt free
from enmity of Germany; on the other hand,
the most vivid anti-patriotism of the Hervé
type, which, as experienee teaches, readily
turns into the very opposite.
As for F, ngland, Hyndman's Tory-tinged
patriotism, supplementing his seetarian radi-
ealism, has often caused the International po-
litieal difficulties.
If was in a far less degree that nationalistie
symptoms eould be detected in the German So-
cial Demoeraey. To be sure, the opportunism
of the South Germans grew up out of the soil

COLL_APSE Ot0 INTERNATIONAL 181
of particularism, which was German national-

ism in octavo form. But the
vere rightly considered the
portant rearguard of the

South Germans
politically unim-
Party. Bebel's

promise fo shoulder his gun in case of danger
did hOt meet with a single-hearted reeeption.
And when Noske repeated Bebel's expression,
he was sharply attaeked in the 1)arty press.
On the whole the German Social Demoeraey
adhered more strietly fo the line of internation-
alism than any other of the old Soeialist par-
ties. But for that very reason if ruade the
sharpest break with ifs past. To judge by the
formal announeements of the Party and the
articles in the Soeialist press, there is no eon-
neetion between the Yesterday and To-day of
German Soeialism.
But if is elear that sueh a catastrophe eould
hOt have oeeurred had hOt the conditions for it
been prepared in previous rimes. The faet that
two young parties, the Russian and the Ser-

182 BOLSIIEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

vian, remained true to their international
duties is by no means a confirmation of the
Plilistine philosophy, aeeording to whieh loy-
alty to prineiple is a natural expression of im-
maturity. Yet this faet leads us fo seek the
causes of the eollapse of the Second Interna-
tional in the very conditions of ifs development
that least influeneed ifs younger members.

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIALIST OPPORTUNISM

TItE Communist Manifesto, written in 1847,
closes vith the words: "Workingmen of all
countries, unite !" But this battle cry came too
early to become a living actuality at once. The
historieal order of the day just then was the
middle class revolution of 1848. _And in this
revolution the part that fell to the authors of
the Manifesto themselves vas not that of lead-
ers of an international proletariat, but of fight-
ers on the extreme left of the national Democ-
racy.
The Revolution of 188 did not solve a sin-
gle one of the national problems; it merely re-
vealed them. The counter-revolution, along
with the great industrial development that then
took place, broke off the thread of the revolu-
183

184 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

tionary movement. Another century of peace
went by until recently the antagonisms that
had not been removed by the Revolution de-
manded the intervention of the sword. This
rime if was not the sword of the Revolution,
fallen from the hands of the middle class, but
the militaristic sword of war drawn from a
dynastie scabbard. 'lhe wars of 1859, 186,
:1866, and 1870 created a new Ita]y and a new
Germany. The feudal caste fulfilled, in their
own way, the heritage of the Revolution of
1848. The political bankruptcy of the middle
class, vhich expressed itself in this historie in-
terchange of rôles, beeame a direct stimulus to
an independent proletarian movement based
on the rapid development of capitalism.
In 1863 Lassalle founded the first political
labor union in Germny. In 186 the first In-
ternational was formed in London under the
guidance of Karl MaloE. The closing watch-
word of the Manifesto was taken up and used

SOCIALIST OPPORTUNISlV[ 185

in the first circular issued by the International
Association of ¥orkingmen. Itis most ehar-
aeteristie for the tendeneies of the modern La-
bor Movement that its first organization had
an international eharaeter. Nevertheless this
organization was an anticipation of the future
needs of the movement rather than a real steer-
ing instrument in the elass-struggle. There
was still a wide gulf between the ultimate goal
of the International, the eommunistie revolu-
tion, and its immediate aetivities, whieh took
file form mainly of international eo-operation
in the chaotie strike movements of the laborers
in various eountries. Even the founders of the
International hoped that the revolutionary
match of events would very soon overeome the
contradiction between ideology and praetiee.
¥hile the General Couneil was giving money
to aid groups of strikers in England and on the
Continent, it was at the same rime making
elassie attempts fo harmonize the eonduet of

186 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

the workers in all countries in the field of world
politics.
But these endeavors did not as yet have a
sufficient material foundation. The activity
of the First International coincided with that
period of wars which opened the way for capi-
talistic development in Europe and North
• America. In spire of its doctrinal and educa-
tional importance, the attempts of the Interna-
tional to mingle in world politics must ail the
more clearly have shown the advanced work-
ingrnen of ail countries their impotence as
against the national class state. The Paris
Commune, flaring up out of the war, was the
culmination of the First International. Just
as the Communist Manifesto was the theoreti-
cal anticipation of the modern labor movement,
and the First International was the practical
anticipation of the labor associations of the
world, so the Paris Commune was the revolu-

SOCIALIST OPPORTUNIS[ 187
tionary anticipation of the dictatorship of the
proletariat.
But only an anticipation, nothing more.
And for that vew reason it was clear that it is
impossible for the proletariat to overthrow the
machinery of state and reconstruct society by
nothing but revolutionary improvisations.
National states that emerged from the
wars created the one real foundation for this
historical work, the national foundation.
Therefore, the proletariat must go through the
school of self-education.
The First International fulfilled its mission
of a nursery for the National Socialist Par-
ries. Af ter the Franco-Prussian War and the
Paris Commune, the International dragged
along a moribund existence for a few years
more and in 1872 was transplanted to America,
to which various religious, social and other ex-
periments had often wandered before, to die
there.

188 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

Then began the period of prodigious capital-
istic development, on the foundation of the na-
tional state. For the Labor Movement this
was the period of the gr.adual gathering of
strength, of the development of organization,
and of political possibilism.
In England the stormy period of Chartism,
that revolutionary awakening of the English
proletariat, had completely exhausted itself ten
years before the birth of the First Interna-
tional. The repeal of the Corn Laws (1846)
and the subsequent industrial prosperity that
made England the workshop of the world; the
establishment of the ten-hour working day
(187), the increase of emigration from Ire-
land to America, and the enfranchisement of
the workers in the cities (1867), ail these cir-
ctunstances, which considerably improved the
lot of the upper strata of the proletariat, led
the class movement in England into the peace-

SOCIALIST OPPORTUNISh'I 189
ful waters of trade unionism and its supple-
mental liberal labor policies.
The period of possibilism, that is, of the con-
scious, systematic adaptation to the economic,
legal, and state forms of national capitalism
began for the English proletariat, the oldest
of the brothers, even before the birth of the
International, and twenty years earlier than
for the continental proletariat. If nevertheless
the big F, nglish unions joined the Interna-
tional af first, it was only because it afforded
them protection against the importation of
strike breakers in wage disputes.
The Freneh labor movement reeovered but
slowly from the loss of blood in the Commune,
on the soil of a retarded industrial growth, and
in a nationalistie atmosphere of the most nox-
ious greed for "revenge." Wavering between
an anarchistie "denial" of the state and a vul-
gar-democratie capitulation to it, the French
proletarian movement developed by adapta-

190 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
tion to the social and political framework of
the bourgeois republic.
As Marx had already foreseen în 1870, the
center of gravity of the Socialist movement
shifted to Germany.
Af ter the Franco-Prussian XVar, united
Germany entered upon an era similar to the
one :England had passed through in the twenty
years previous: an era of capitalistic prosper-
ity, of democratic suffrage, of a higher stand-
ard of living for the upper strata of the pro-
letariat.
Theoretically the German labor movement
marched under the banner of Marxism. Still
in its dependence on the conditions of the
period, Marxism became for the German pro-
letariat not the algebraic formula of the revo-
lution that it was at the beginning, but the
theoretic method for adaptation to a national-
capitalistic state crowned with the Prussian
helmet. Capitalism, which had achieved a rem-

SOCIALIST OPPORTUNISM 191

porary equilibrium, continually revolutionized
file economic foundation of national lire. To
preserve the power that had resulted from the
tranco-lrussian ¥ar, it was necessary to in-
erease the standing army. The middle elass
had eeded all its political positions fo the
feudal monarehy, but hd intrenehed itself all
the more energetically in its economic positions
under the protection of the militaristic police
state. The main currents of the last period,
covering forty-five years, are: victorious capi-
talism, militarism ereeted on a eapitalist foun-
dation, a political reaction resulting from the
intergrowth of feudal and capitalist classes--a
revolutionizing of the economic lire, and a com-
plete abandonment of revolutionary methods
and traditions in political lire. The entire ac-
tivity of the German Social Democraey vas
direeted towards the awakening of the baek-
ward workers, through a systematie fight for
their most immediate needs--the gathering of

192 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

strength, the increase of membership, the filling
of the treasury, the development of the press,
the conquest of ail the positions that presented
themselves, their utilization and expansion.
This was the great historical work of the awak-
ening and educating of the "unhistorical"
class.
The great centralized trde unions of Ger-
many developed in direct dependence upon the
developlnent of national industry, adapting
thelnselves to its successes in the home and the
foreign markets, and controlling the prices of
raw materials and lnanufactured products.
Localized in political districts to adapt itself to
the election laws and stretching feelers in ail
cities and rural colnmunities, the Social De-
mocracy built up the unique structure of the
political organization of the German prole-
tariat with its many-branched bureaucratic
hierrchy, its one million dues-paying mem-
bers, its four million voters, ninety-one daily

SOCIALIST OPPORTUNISM 193

papers and sixty-five Party printing presses.
This whole many-sided activity, of immeasur-
able historical importance, was permeated
through and through with the spirit of possi-
bilism.
In forty-five years history did not offer the
German proletariat a single opportunity fo re-
more an obstacle by a stormy attack, or to cap-
ture any hostile position in a revolutionary ad-
vance. As a result of the mutual relation of so-
cial forces, it was foreed to avoid obstacles or
adapt itself to them. In this, Marxism as a the-
ory was a valuable tool for politieal guidance,
but it eould hot change the opportunist charae-
ter of the class movement, whieh in essence was
at that rime alike in England, France and Ger-
many. For all the undisputed superiority of
the German orgmfization, the tactics of the
unions were very much the same in Berlin and
London. Their chief achievement was the sys-
rem of tariff treaties. In the political field the

194 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

difference was much greater and deeper.
While the :English proletariat were marching
under the banner of Liberalism, the German
workers formed an independent party with a
Socialist platform. Yet this difference does not
go nearly as deep in politics as if does in ideo-
logic forms, and the forms of organization.
Through the pressure that :English labor ex-
erted on the Liberal Party it achieved certain
limited political victories, the extension of suf-
frage, freedom fo unionize, and social legisla-
tion. The saine was preserved or improved by
the German proletariat through its independ-
ent party, which if was obliged fo form because
of the speedy capitulation of German liberal-
ism. And yet this party, while in principle
fighting the fight for political power, was com-
pelled in actual practice to adapt itself fo the
ruling power, fo protect the labor movement
against the blows of this power, and fo achieve
a few reforms. In other words: on account of

SOCIALIST OPPORTUNISM 195

the difference in historical traditions and politi-
cal conditions, the F, nglish proletariat adapted
itself fo the eapitalist state through the me-
dium of the Liberal 19arty; while the German
proletariat was foreed fo form a party of ifs
own to aehieve the very saine politieal ends.
And the politieal struggle of the German pro-
letariat in this entire period had the saine op-
portunist eharaeter lîmited by historieal con-
ditions as did that of the F, nglish proletariat.
The similarity of these two phenomena so
different in their forms cornes out most elearly
in the final resuRs at the dose of the period.
The F, nglish proletariat in the struggle to meet
its daily issues was foreed fo form an inde-
pendent party of ifs own, without, however,
breaking with its liberal traditions; and the
party of the Gerrnan proletariat, when the
War forced upon if the necessity of a decisive
choice, gave an answer in the spiri t of the

196 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

tional-liberal traditions of the English labor
party.
Marxism, of course, was not merely some-
thing accidental or insignificant in the German
labor movement. Yet there would be no basis
for deducing th social-revolutionary character
of tbe Party from its official Marxist ideology.
Ideology is an important, but not a decisive
factor in politics. Its rôle is that of waiting on
politics. That deep-seated contradiction,
which was inherent ha the awakening revolu-
tionary class on account of its relation to the
feudal-reactionary state, demanded an irrec-
oncilable ideology which would bring the whole
movement nnder the banner of social revolu-
tionary aires. Since historical conditions
forced opportunist tactics, the irreconcilability
of the proletarian class found expression in the
revolutionary formulas of Marxism. Theoreti-
cally, Marxism reconciled with perfect success
the contradiction between reform and revolu-

SOCIALIST OPPORTUNISM 197
tion. Yet the process of historical develop-
ment is something far more involved than
theorizing in the realm of pure thought. The
fact that the class which was revolutionary in
its tendencies was forced for several decades
to adapt itself to the monarchical police state,
based on the tremendous capitalistic develop-
ment of the country, in the course of which
adaptation an organization of a million mem-
bers was built up and a labor bureaueraey
whieh led the entire movement was edueated--
this faet does not eease fo exist and does not
lose its weighty signifieance beeause Marxism
anticipated the revolutionary eharaeter of the
future movement. Only the most na'ive ide-
ology eould give the same place fo this foreeast
that if does to the politieal aetualities of the
German labor movement.
The German Revisionists were influeneed in
their eonduet by the contradiction between the
reform praetiee of the Party and its revolution-

198 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEA(JE
ary theories. They did not understand that
this contradiction is conditioned by temporary,
cven if long-lasting circumstances and that it
can only be overcome by further social develop-
ment. To tbem if was a logical contradiction.
The mistake of the Revisionists was not that
they confirmed the reformistic character of the
Party's tactics in tbe past, but that they wanted
fo perpetuate reformism theoretically and
make it the only method of the proletarian class
struggle. Thus, the Revisionists failed to take
into account the objective tendencies of capi-
talistic development, which by deepening class
distinctions must lead fo the social revolution
as the one way to the emancipation of the pro-
letariat. Marxism emerged from this theoreti-
cal dispute as the victor ail along the line. But
revisionism, although defeated on the field of
theory, continued to live, drawing sustenance
from the actual conduct and the psychology of
the whole movement. The critical refutation

SOCIALIST 0PPORTUNISM 199

of revisionism as a theory by no means signified
its defeat tactically and psychologically. The
parliamentarians, the unionists, the comrades
continued to live and to work in the atmosphere
of general opportunism, of practical specializ-
ing and of nationalistic narrowness. Reform-
ism made its impress even upon the mind of
August Bebel, the greatest representative of
this period.
The spirit of opportunism must have taken
a particularly strong hold on the generation
that came into the party in the eighties, in the
rime of Bismarck's anti-Socialist la.ws and of
oppressive reaction all over Europe. Lacking
the apostolic zeal of the generation that was
connected with the First International, hin-
dered in its first steps by the power of victori-
ous imperialism, forced to adapt itself to the
traps and snares of the anti-Socialist laws, this
generation grew up in the spirit of moderation
and constitutional distrust of revolution. They

200 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
are now men of fifty to sixty years old, and
they are the very ones who are now at the head
of the unions and the political organizations.
Reformism is their political psychology, if not
also their doctrine. The gradual growing into
Socialism--that is the basis of Revisionism--
proved to be the most miserable Utopian dream
in face of the facts of capitalistic development.
But the gradual political growth of the Social
Democracy into the mechanism of the national
state has turned out fo be a tragic actuality--
for the entire race.
The Russian Revolution was the first great
event fo bring a fresh whiff into the stale at-
mosphere of Europe in the thirty-five years
since the Paris Commune. The rapid develop-
ment of the Russian working class and the un-
expected strength of their concentrated revo-
lutiona T activity ruade a great impression on
the entire civilized world and gave an impetus
everywhere to the shar.pening of political dif-

SOCIALIST OPPORTUNISM 201
ferences. In :England the Russian Revolution
hastened the formation of an independent labor
party. In Austria, thanks to special circum-
stances, it led to universal manhood suffrage.
In France the echo of the Russian Revolution
took the form of Syndicalism, which gave ex-
pression, in inadequate practical and theoretical
form, to the awakened revolutionary tenden-
cies of the French proletariat. And in Ger-
many the influence of the Russian Revolution
showed itself in the strengthening of the young
Left wing of the Party, in the rapprochement
of the leading Center to it, and in the isolatîon
of Revisionism. The question of the Prussian
franchise, this key to the political position of
Junkerdom, took on a keener edge. And the
Party adopted in principle the revolutionary
method of the general strike. But all this ex-
ternal shaping up proved inadequate to shove
the Party on to the road of the political of-

202 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

fensive. In accordance with the Party tradi-
tion, the turn toward radicalism found expres-
sion in discussions and the adoption of resolu-
tions. That was as far as it ever went.

CttAPTER IX

THE DECLINE OF THE RE¥OLUTIONARY SPIRIT
Sx or seven years ago a political ebb-tide
everywhere followed upon the revolutionary
flood-tide. In Russia the counter-revolution
triumphed and began a period of decay for the
Russian proletariat both in politics and in the
strength of their own organizations. In Aus-
tria the thread of achievements started by the
working class broke off, social insurance legis-
lation rotted in the government offices, nation-
alist conflicts began again with renewed vigor
in the arena of universal manhood suffrage,
weakening and dividing the Social I)emocraey.
In England, the Labor Party, after separating
from the Liberal Party, entered into the closest
association with if again. In France the Syn-
dicalists passed over to reformist positions.
203

204 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

Gustav Hervé ehnged to the opposite of him-
self in the shortest rime. And in the German
Social Demoeraey the Revisionists lifted their
heads, eneouraged by history's having given
them sueh a revenge. The South Germans
perpetrated their demonstrative vote for the
budget. The lIarxists were eompelled to
change from offensive to defensive taeties. The
efforts of the Left wing to draw the Party
into a more active poliey were unsueeessful.
The dominating Center swung more and more
towards the Right, isolating the radieals. Con-
servatism, reeovering from the blows it re-
eeived in 1905, triumphed all along the line.
In default of revolutionary aetivity as well
as the possibility for reformist work, the Party
spent its entire energy on building up the or-
ganization, on gaining new members for the
unions and for the 19arty, on starting new pa-
pers and getting new subseribers. Condemned
for deeades to a poliey of opportunist waiting,

THE DECLINE OF SPIRIT 205

the Party took up the cuit of organization as
an end in itself. Never was the spirit of inertia
produced by mere routine work so strong in the
German Social Democracy as in the years im-
mediately preceding the great catastrophe.
And there tan be no doubt that the question of
the preservation of the organizations, treas-
uries, People's Houses and printing presses
played a mighty important pm't in the position
taken by the fraction in the Reichstag towards
the SVar. "Had we donc anything else we
would have brought ruin upon out organization
and out presses" was the first argument I heard
from a leading German comrade.
And how characteristic it is of the oppor-
tunistic psychology induced by mere organiza-
tion work, that out of ninety-one Social Demo-
cratic papers not one round it possible to pro-
test against the violation of Belgium. Not onel
After the repeal of the anti-Socialist laws, the
Party hesitated long before starting its own

206 BOLSHEVIKI AND W0RLD PEACE

printing presses, lest these might be confiscated
by the government in the event of great hap-
penings. And now that if bas ifs own presses,
the Party hierarchy fears every decisive step
so as not fo afford opportunity for confiscation.
lIost eloquent of ail is the incident of the
lrorriirts which begged for permission fo con-
tinue fo exist--on the basis of a new pro-
gramme indefinitely suspending the class con-
flict. Every friend of the German Social De-
mocracy had a sense of profound pain when he
received his issue of the central organ with ifs
humiliating "By Order of Army Headquar-
rets." Had the lrorriirts remained under in-
terdiction, that would bave been an important
political fact fo which the Party later could
have referred with pride. Af any rate that
would bave been far more honorable than fo
continue fo exist with the imprint of the gen-
eral's boots on its foreheoe.
:But higher than ail considerations of policy

THE DECLINE OF SPIIIT 207
and the dignity of the Party stood considera-
tions of membership, printing presses, organ-
ization. And so the Yoriirts now lives as two-
paged evidence of the unlimited brutality of
$unkerdom in Berlin and in Louvain, and of
the unlimited opportunism of the German So-
cial Democracy.
The Right wing stood more by its principles,
which resulted from political considerations.
Wolfgang I-Ieine crassly formulated these
principles of German Reformism in an absurd
discussion as to whether the Social Democrats
should leave the hall of the Reichstag when the
members rose to cheer the Emperor's name, or
whether they should merely keep their seats.
"The creation of a republic in the German Em-
pire is now and for some rime to come out of
the range of all possibility, so that it is hot
really a marrer for our present policy." The
practical results still not yet achieved may be
reached, but only through co-operation with

208 BOLSHEVIIçI AND WOILD PEACE

the liberal bourgeoisie. "For that reason, not
because I am a stickler for form, I have
ealled attention to the faet that parliamentary
eo-operation will be rendered diffieult by dem-
onstrations that needlessly hurt the feelings
of the majority of the House."
But if a simple infringement of monarehieal
etiquette was enough to destroy the hope of
reformist eo-operation with the liberal middle
elass, then eertainly the break with the bour-
geois "nation" in the moment of national "dan-
ger" wonld have hindered, for years to corne,
not only all desired reforms, but also all re-
formist desires. That attitude that was die-
tated to the routinists of the Party eenter by
sheer anxiety over the preservation of the or-
ganization was supplemented among the Re-
visionists by politieal eonsiderations. Their
standpoint proved in every respect tobe more
eomprehensive and won the vietory all over.
The entire Party press is now industriously ae-

THE DECLINE OF SPIRIT 209

claiming what it once heaped scorn upon, that
the present patriotic attitude of the working
class will win for them, af ter the war, the good
will of the possessing classes for bringing about

reforms.
Therefore,
did hot feel

the German Social Democracy
itself, under the stress of these
great events, a revolutionary power with
tasks far exeeeding the question of widening
the state's boundaries, a power that does hot
lose itself for an instant in the nationalistic
whirl, but calmly awaits the favorable moment
for joining with the other branches of the In-
ternational in a purposeful interferenee in the
course of events. No, instead of that the Ger-
man Social Demoeracy felt itself tobe a sort of
cumbersolne train threatened by hostile eav-
alry. For that reason it subordinated the en-
tire future of the International to the quite
extraneous question of the defense of the fron-
tiers of the class state--beeause it felt itself

210 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

first and foremost tobe a conservative state
within the state.
"Look at Belgium!" cries the F'orwiirts to
encourage the workmen-soldiers. The :Peo-
ple's Houses there have been changed into
alany hospitals, the newspapers suppressed, all
Party life crushed out.* _And therefore hold
out until the end, "until the decisive victory is
ours." In other words, keep on destroying, let
the work of your own hands be a terrifying les-
son fo you. "Look at Belgium," and out of
this terror draw courage for renewed destruc-
tion.
Vv'hat has j ust been said refers not to the
German Social Democracy alone, but also to
ail the older branches of the International that
have lived through the history of the last half
century.
 A sentimental correspondent of the Vorwèirts writes that he
was looking for Belgian comrades in the Maison du Peuple and
round a German army hospital there. And what did the Vor-
wëirt« correspondent want of his Belgian comrades? "To wir
them to the cause of the Cferman people--just when Brussels
itself had been won 'for the cause of the German people I'"

CHAPTER X

i'ORKING CLASS IMPERIALISII
THERE is one factor in the collapse of the
Second International that is still unclarified.
It dwells at the heart of all the events that the
Party has passed through.
The dependence of the proletarian class
movement, particularly in its economic con-
flicts, upon the scope and the successes of the
imperialistic policy of the state is a question
wlfich, as far as I ow, has never been dis-
cussed in the Socialist press. Nor can I at-
tempt to solve it in the short space of this work.
So what I shall say on this point will neces-
sarily be in the nature of a brief review.
The proletariat is deeply' interested in the
development of the forces of production. The
national state created in Europe by the revolu-
211

212 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

tions and wars of the years 1789 to 1870 was
the basic type of the economic evolution of the
past period. The proletariat eontributed by
its eltire eonseious poliey to the development
of the forces of production on a national foun-
dation. It supported the bourgeoisie in its
ionfliets vith alien enemies for national libera-
tion; also in its coffliets with the monarchy,
with feudalism and the ehurch for politiÇal de-
mocraey. And in the measure in which the
bourgeois turned to "law and order," that is,
beeame reaetionary, the proletariat assumed
the historieal task it left uncompleted.
championing a policy of peace, culture and de-
moeracy, as against tbe bourgeoisie, it eontrib-
uted to the enlargement of the national mar-
ket, and so gave an impetus t0 the development
of the forces of production.
The proletariat had an equal eeonomie inter-
est in the denloeratizing ald the eultural prog-
ress of all other countries in their relation of

WORKING CLASS IMPERIALISM 213

buyer or seller toits ovn country. In this re-
sided tbe most important guarantee for tbe
international solidarity of the proletariat both
in so far as final aires and daily policies are con-
cerned. The struggle against the remnants of
feudal barbarism, against the boundless de-
lnands of lnilitarism, against agrarian duties
and indirect taxes was the main object of work-
ing-class politics and served, direetly and indi-
rectly, to belp develop tbe forces of production.
That is t]e very reason why tbe great majority
of organized labor j oined political forces with
the Social Democracy. Every hindrance to
tbe development of file forces of production
touches the trade unions most closely.
As capitalism passed from a national to an
international-imperialistie ground, national
production, and with it the economie struggle
of the proletariat, came into direct dependence
on those conditions of the world-market which
are secured by dreadnaughts and eannon. In

214 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

other words, in contradiction of the fundamen-
tal interests of the proletariat taken in their
wide historie extent, the immediate trade inter-
ests of various strata of the proletariat proved
to have a direct dependence upon the successes
or the failures of the foreign policies of the gov-
ernments.
England long before the other eountries
plaeed her eapitalistie development on the basis
of predatory imperialism, and she interested
the upper strata of the proletariat in her world
dominion. In ehampioning its own class inter-
ests, the English proletariat limited itself to
exereising pressure on the bourgeois parties
whieh gTanted if a share in the eapitalistie ex-
ploitation of other eountries. If did hot begin
an independent poliey until England began to
lose her position in the world market, pushed

aside,
many.
:But

arnong others, by her main rival, Ger-

with Germany's growth to industrial

WORKING CLASS IMPERIALISM: 215'

world-importance, grew the dependence of
broad strata of the German proletariat on Ger-
man imperialism, not materially alone but also
ideally. The Yorwiirts wrote on August l lth
that the German workingmen, "eounted among
the politiea]ly intelligent, to whom we have
preaehed the dangers of imperialism for years
(although with very little success, we must con-
fess)" scold at Italian neutrality like the ex-
tremest chauvinists. But that did not prevent
the Yorwiirts from feeding the German work-
ingmen on "national" and "democratic" argu-
ments in justification of the bloody work of
imperialism. (Some writers' backbones are as
flexible as their pens.)
However, all this does not alter facts. V¢hen
the decisive moment came, there seemed to be
no irreconcilable enmity to imperialistic policies
in the consciousness of the German working-
men. On the contrary, they seemed to listen
readily to imperialist whisperings veiled in na-

216 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

tional and democratic phraseology. This is not
the first rime that Socialistic imperialism re-
veals itself in the German Social Democracy.
Suffice it fo recall tlle fact that af the Interna-
tional Congress in Stuttgart if was the major-
ity of the German delegates, notably the trade
mfionists, who voted against the Marxist reso-
htion on the colonial policy. The occurrence
ruade a sensation af the rime, but ifs true sig-
nificance cornes out more clearly in the light of
present events. Just now the trade union press
is linking the cause of the German working
class fo the work of the Hohenzollern army
with more consciousness and nmtter-of-factness
than do the political organs.
As long as capitalism remained on a national
basis, the proletariat could not refrain from co-
operation in democratizing the political rela-
tions and in developing the forces of produc-
tion through its parliamentary, communal and
other activities. The attempts of the anarchists

WORKING CLASS IMPERIALISM 217

to set up a formal revolutionary agitation in
opposition to the political figbts of the Social
Democraey eondemned them to isolation and
gradual extinction. But when the eapitalist
states overstep their national form to become
imperialistie world powers, the proletariat ean-
hot oppose this new imperialisln. And the rea-
son is the so-called nfinilnal progralnme which
fashioned its policy upon the framework of the
national state. Vhen its main concern is for
tariff treaties and social legislation, the prole-
tariat is incapable of expending the saine en-
ergy in fighting imperialism that it did in fight-
ing feudalism. By applying its old methods
of the class struggle--the constant adaptation
to the movements of the markets--to the
ehanged conditions produeed by imperialism, it
itself falls into material and ideological de-
pendence on imperialism.
The only way the proletariat ean pit its revo-
lutionary force against imperialism is under the

218 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

banner of Socialism. The working class is
powerless against imperialism as long as its
great organizations stand by their old oppor-
tunist tactics. The working class will be all-
powerful against imperialism when it takes to
the battlefield of Social Revolution.
The methods of national parliamentary op-
position not only fail to produce objective re-
sults, but the laboring masses lose ail interest in
them because they find that their earnings and
their very existence are not affected by what
is done in parliament. Behind the backs of
the parliamentarians imperialism wins its suc-
cesses in the world market.
The methods of national-parliamentary op-
position not only fail to produce practical re-
sults, but also cease to make an appeal to the
laboring masses, because the workers fmd that,
behind the backs of the parliamentarians, im-
perialism, by armed force, reduces the wages
and the very lives of the workers to ever greater

WORKING CLASS IMPERIALISM 219
dependence on its successes in the world mar-
ket.
It was clear to every thinking Socialist that
the only way the proletariat could be made to
pass from opportunism to Revolution was not
by agitation, but by a historical upheaval. But
no one foresaw that history would preface this
inevitable change of tactics by such a catastro-
phal collapse of the International. History
works with titanic relentlessness. What is the
Rheims Cathedral to ttistory? And what a
few hundred or thousand political reputations ?
And what the life or death of hundreds of
thousands or of millions?
The proletariat has remained too long in the
preparatory school, much longer than its great
pioneer fighters thought it would, ttistory
took her broom in hand, swept the Interna-
tional of the epigone apart in ail directions
and led the slow-moving millions into the field

220 BOLStIEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

where their last ilhsions are being washed away
i,a blood. A terrible experiment! On its re-
sult perhaps hangs the fate of European civil-
ization.

CHAPTER XI

THE REVOLUTIO:NARY EPOCH

AT the close of the last century a heated con-
troversy arose in Germany over the question,
Vhat effect does the industrialization of
a country produce upon its military power?
The reactionary agrarian politicians and
writers, like Sehring, Karl Ballod, Georg Han-
sen and others, argued that the rapid increase
of the city populatious at the expense of the
rural districts positively undermined the foun-
dation of the Empire's military power, and
they of course drew from if their, patriotic in-
ferences in the spirit of agrarian protectionism.
On the other hand Lujo Brentano and his
school championed an exactly opposite point of
view. They pointed out that ec'onomic indus-
trialism not only opened up new financial and

222 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

technical resources, but also developed in the
proletariat the vital force capable of making ef-
fective use of ail the new means of defense and
attaek. He quotes authoritative opinions to
show that even in the earlier experienees of
1870-71 "the regiments from the preponder-
antly industrial district of Vestphalia were
among the very best." And he explains this
faet quite eorreetly by the far greater ability
of the industrial worker fo find his bearings in
new conditions and to adjust himself to them.
Now whieh side is right? The present XVar
proves that Germany, whieh bas ruade the
greatest progress along eapitalistie lines, was
able to developthe highest military power.
And likewise in regard to all the eountries
drawn into if the War proves what colossal and
yet eompetent energy the working elass de-
velops in its warlike aetivities. Itis hot the
passive horde-like heroism of the peasant
masses, welded together by fatalistie submis-

THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH 223
siveness and religious superstition. It is the in-
dividualized spirit of sacrifice, born of inner im-
pulse, ranging itself under the banner of the
Idea.
But the Idea under whose banner the armed
proletariat now stands, is the Idea of war-
cra.fty nationalism, the deadly enemy of the
true interests of the workers. The ruling class
showed themselves strong enough to force their
Idea upon the proletariat, and the proletariat,
in the consciousness of what they were doing,
put their intelligence, their enthusiasm and
their courage at the service of their class-foes.
In this fact is sealed the terrible defeat of So-
cialism. But it also opens up all possibilities
for a final victory of Socialism. There can be
no doubt that a class which is capable of dis-
playing such steadfastness and self-sacrifice in
a war it considers a "just" one, will be still
more capable of developing these qualities when

224 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

the narch of events will give it tasks really
worthy of the historical mission of this class.
The epoch of the awakening, the enlighten-
ment and the organization of the working-class
revealed that if has tremendous resources of
revolutionary energy which found no ade-
quate employment in the daily struggle. The
Social Democracy summoned the upper strata
of the proletariat into the field, but if also
checked their revolutionary energy by adopt-
ing the tactics if was obliged fo adopt, the tac-
ries of voaiting, the strateo T of letting your op-
ponent exhaust himself. The character of this
period was so dull and reactionary that if did
hOt allow the Social Democracy the opportu-
nity to give the proletariat tasks that would
bave engaged their whole spirit of sacrifice.
Imperialism is now giving them such tasks.
And imperialism attained ifs object by pushing
the proletariat into a position of "national de-
fense," which, to the workers, meant the defense

THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH 225
of all their hands had created, not only the
mense wealth of the nation, but also their own
class-organizations, their treasuries, their press,
in short, everything they had unwearngly,
painfully struggled for and attained in the
course of several decades. Imperialism vio-
lently threw society off its balance, destroyed
the sluice-gates built by the Social Democracy
to regulate the current of proletarian revolu-
tionary energy, and guided this current nto its
own bed.
But this terrific historical experiment, which
at one blow broke the back of the Socialist In-
ternational, carries a deadly danger for bour-
geois society itself. The hammer is wrenched
out of the worker's hand and a gun put into
his hand instead. And the worker, who has
been tied down by the machinery of the capital-
ist system, is suddenly torn from his usual set-
ring and taught to place the aims of society
above happness at home and even life tself.

226 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

With the weapon in his hand that he himself
has forged, the worker is put in a position
where the politieal destiny of the state is di-
reetly dependent upon him. Those who ex-
ploited and seorned him in normal rimes, fiat-
ter him now and toady fo him. Af the saine
time he cornes into intimate contact with the
eannon, whieh Lassalle ealls one of the most
.important ingredients of all eonstitutions. I-Ie
erosses the border, takes part in forceful requi-
sitions, and helps in the passing of eities
from one party to another. Changes are taking
place sueh as the present generation has never
before seen.
Even though the vanguard of the working-
elass knew in theory that Might is the mother
of Right, still their politieal thinking was eom-
pletely permeated by the spirit of opportunism,
of adaptation fo bourgeois legalism. Now
they are learning from the teaehings of faets
to despise this legtrlism and tetrr if down. Now

THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH 227

dynamic forces are replacing the static
forces in their psychology. The great guns are
hammering into their heads the iden that if it
is impossible to get around an obstacle, itis
possible to destroy it. _A_lmost the entire adult
maie population is going through this school
of war, so terrible in its realism, a school which
is forming a new human type. Iron necessity
is now shaking its fist at ail the rules of bour-
geois society, at its laws, its morality, its re-
ligion. "Necessity knows no lnw," said the
German Chancellor on August th. Monarchs
walk about in public places calling each other
liars in the language of market-women; gov-
ernments repudiate their solemfly acknowl-
edged obligations, and the national church ties
its God to the national cannon like a criminal
condemned to hard labor. Is it hOt clear that
ail these circmnstances nmst bring about a pro-
found change in the mental attitude of the
working-class, curing them radically of the

228 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

hypnosis of legality in which a period of politi-
cal stagnation expresses itself?
The possessing classes, to their consterna-
tion, will soon have to recognize this change. A
working-class that has been through the sehool
of war will feel the need of using the language
of force as soon as the first serious obstacle
faces them within their own country. "Neees-
sity knows no law" the workers will cry when
the attempt is made fo hold them back af the
eommand of bourgeois law. And poverty, the
terrible poverty that prevails during this war
and will continue after ifs close, will be of a
sort to force the masses to violate many a bour-
geois law. The general eeonomic exhaustion
in Europe will affeet the proletariat most im-
mediately and most severely. The state's ma-
terial resourees will be depleted by the war,
and the possibility of satisfying the demands
of the working-masses will be very limited.
This must lead to profound politieal eonflicts,

THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH 229

whieh, ever-widening and deepening, may take
on the eharaeter of a social revolution, the
course and outeome of whieh no one, of course,
can now foresee.
On the other hand, the Var with its armies
of millions, and its hellish weapons of destruc-
tion ean exhaust not only soeiety's resourees
but also the moral forces of the proletariat. If
it does not meet inner resistance, this War may
last for several years more, with changing for-
tunes on both sides, until the chief belligerents
are completely exhausted. But then the whole
fighting energy of the international proletariat,
brought to the surface by the bloody conspir-
acy. of imperialism, will be completely con-
sumed in the horrible work of mutual annihila-
tion. The outcome would be that our entire
civilization would be set back by many decades.
A peace resulting not from the will of the
awakened peoples but from the mutual exhaus-
tion of the belligerents, would be like the peace

2.0 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

with which the Balkan War was concluded; it
would be a Bucharest Peace extended fo the
whole of Europe.
Such a peace would seek to pateh up anew
the contradictions, antagonisrns and deficiencies
that have led fo the present V¢ar. _And with
inany other things, the Soeialist work of two
generations would vanish in a sea of blood with-
out leaving a trace behind.
¥hich of the two prospects is the more prob-
able? This cannot possibly be theoretieally de-
terrnined in advanee. The issue depends en-
tirely upon the activity of the vital forces of
soeiety--above all upon the revolutionary So-
cial Dernocracy.
"'Imediate cessation of the lYar'" is the
watehword under whieh the Soeial Demoeraey
ean reassernble its seattered ranks, both within
the national parties, and in the whole Interna-
tional. The proletariat eannot rnake its will
to peaee dependent upon the strategie eonsid-

THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH 231

struction.
serve the
tariat.

erations of the general staffs. On the contra1 T,
it must oppose its desire for peace to these mili-
tary eonsiderations. What the warring gov-
ernments eall a struggle for national self-pres-
ervation is in reality a mutual national anni-
hilation. Real national self-defense now eon-
sists in the shggle for peace.
Sueh a struggle for peaee means for us hot
only a fight to save humanity's material and
eultural possessions ff'oto further insane de-
It is for us primarily  fight to pre-
revolutionary energy of the prole-

To assemble the ranks of the proletariat in
a fight for peaee means again to place the
forces of revolutionary Soeialism against rag-
ing, tearing imperilism on the whole front.
The conditions upon whieh peaee should be
eoneluded--the peaee of the peoples them-
selves, and not the reeoneiliation of the diplo-

232 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PE,CE

mats--must be the same for the whole Inter-
national.

NO CONTRIBUTIONS.
THE RIGHT OF EVER¥ NATION
TO SELF-DETERMINATION.
THE UNITED STATES OF EU-
ROPE--WITHOUT MONARCHIES,
WITHOUT STANDING ARMIES,
WITHOUT RULING FEUDAL
CASTES, ¥ITHOUT SECRET DI-
PLOMACY.

The peace agitation, which must be con-
ducted simultaneously with all the means now
at the disposal of the Social Democracy as
well as those which, with a good will, it could
acquire, will not only tear the workers out of
their nationalistic hypnosis; it will also do the
saving work of inner purification in the pres-
ent official parties of the proletariat. The na-
tional Revisionists and the Socialist patriots in

THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH 233
the Second International, who have been ex-
ploiting the influence that Socialism has ac-
quired over the working masses for national
militaristic aims, nmst be thrust back into the
camp of the enemies of the working class by
uncompromising revolutionary agitation for
peace.
The revolutionary Social Democracy need
not fear that it will be isolated, now less than
ever. The War is making the most terrible
agitation against itself. Every day that the
Var lasts will bring œew masses of people to
our balmer, if it is an honest banner of peace
and democracy. The surest way by which the
Social Democracy can isolate the militaristic
reaction in :Europe and force it to take the of-
fensive is by the slogan of Peace.
Ve revolutionary Marxists have no cause
for despair. The epoch into which we are now
entering will be our epoch. Marxism is not de-

234 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

feated. On the contrary: the roar of the can-
non in every quarter of Europe heralds the
theoretical victory of Marxism. What is left
now of the hopes for a "peaceful" development,
for a mitigation of capitalist class contrasts,
for a regular systematic growth into Social-
ism?
The Reformists on principle, who hoped to
solve the social question by the way of tariff
treaties, consumers' leagues, and the parliamen-
tary co-operation of the Social Democracy with
the bourgeois parties, are now all resting their
hopes on the victory of the "national" arms.
They are expecting the possessing classes fo
show greater willingness to meet the needs of
the proletariat because it has proved its pa-
triotism.
This expectation would be positively foolish
if there were not hidden behind it another, far
less "idealistic" hope--that a military victory
would create for the bourgeoîsie a broader im-

THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH 235

perialistic field for enriehing itself at the ex-
pense of the bourgeoisie of other countries, and
would enable it to share some of the booty with
its own proletariat af the expense of the pro-
letariat of other countries. Socialist reformism
has actually turned into Socialist imperiatism.
We bave witnessed with our own eyes the pa-
thetic bankruptcy of the hopes of a peaceful
growth of proletarian well-being. The Refolzn-
ists, contrary to their own doctrine, were forced
to resort to violence in order to find their way
out of the political cul-de-sac--and not the vio-
lence of the peoples against the ruling classes,
but the military violence of the ruling classes
against other nations. Since 1858 the Ger-
man bourgeoisie has renounced revolutionary
methods for solving its problems. They left it
to the feudal class to solve their own bourgeois
questions by the method of war. Social devel-
opment confronted the proletariat with the
problem of revolution. F, vadîng revolution,

236 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

the Reformists were forced to go through the
same process of historical decline as the liberal
bourgeoisie. The Reformists also left it to
their ruling classes, that is the same feudal
caste, to solve the proletarian problem by the
method of war. But this ends the analogy.
The creation of national states did really
solve the bourgeois problem for a long period,
and the long series of colonial wars coming
after 1871 finished off the period by broaden-
ing the arena of the development of the capi-
talistic forces. The period of colonial wars car-
ried on by the national states led to the present
War of the national states--for colonies. After
all the backward portions of the earth had been
divided among the capitalist states, there was
nothing left for these states except to grab the
colonies from each other.
"People ought hot to talk," says George Ir-
mer, "as though it were self-evident that the
Gernmn Empire has corne too late for rivalry

THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCtt 237

for world economy and world markets, that the
world has already been divided. Has not the
earth been divided over and over again in all
epochs of history ?"'
But a re-division of colonies among the capi-
talist countries does not enlarge the foundation
of capitalist development. One country's gain
means another country's loss. Accordingly a
temporary mitigation of class-conflicts in Ger-
many could only be achieved by an extreme in-
tensification of the class-struggle in France and
in England, and vice versa. _An additional fac-
tor of decisive importance is the capitalist
awakening in the colonies themselves, to which
the present War must give a mighty impetus.
Whatever the outcome of this War, the impe-
rialistic basis for European capitalism will not
be broadened, but narrowed. The War, there-
fore, does not solve the labor question on an
finperialistic basis, but, on the contrary, it in-
tensifies it, putting this alternative to the capi-

238 BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE

talist world: Permanent War or Revolutian.
If the War got beyond the control of the
Second International, its immediate conse-
quences will get beyond the control of the bour-
geoisie of the entire world. ¥e revolutionary
Socialists did not want the War. But we do
hot fear it. We do not give in to despair over
the fact that the War broke up the Interna-
tional. History had already disposed of the
International.
The revolutionary epoch will create new
forms of organization out of the inexhaustible
resources of proletarian Socialism, new forms
that will be equal to the greatness of the new
tasks. To this work we will apply ourselves
at once, amid the mad roaring of the machine-
guns, the crashing of cathedrals, and the pa-
triotic howling of the capitalist j ackals. Ve
will keep out clear minds amid this hellish death
music, out undimmed vision. Ve feel our-
selves to be the only creative force of the fu-

THE REVOLUTIONAR¥ EPOCH 239

ture. Already there are many of us, more than
it may seem. To-lnorrow there will be more of
us than to-day. And the day after to-morrow,
millions will rise up under our banner, millions
who even now, sixty-seven years af ter the Com-
munist Manifesto, have nothing to lose but
their chains.

TOTSKII, LEV

AUITHOR
The Bolsheviki and

D
639
• $6T7

TITLE
world peace.
ROOM
DAITE BORROWER'S NAME NUMBER

TROOEII, LEV
The Bolsheviki and world
peace.

D
639-
• $6T7