The doctrine of the Jesuits : with a dedication to Monsieur Freppel, Bishop of angers

I ARBOR |

Presented to the

LIBRARY of the

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

from

the estate of
ROBERT KENNY

THE DOCTRINE OF THE JESUITS.

THE DOCTRINE

OF THE

JESUITS.

BY PAUL BERT.

ME MEEK OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.

PROFESSOR AT THE FACULTY OF SCIENCES.

— WITH A —

DEDICATION

TO MONSIEUR FREPPEL, BISHOP OF ANGERS.

BOSTON, MASS.:

B. F. BRADBURY & COMPANY,

443 WASHINGTON STREET.

The members of the Society are dispersed in every corner of the world,
and divided into as many nations and kingdoms as the earth has limits :
division, however, marked only by the distance of places, not of senti
ments; by the difference of languages, not of affection; by the dissem
blance of faces, not of manners. In that family the Latin thinks as the
Greek, the Portuguese as the Brazilian, the Hibernian as the Sumatran,
the Spaniard as the French, the English as the Flemish ; and amongst so
many different geniuses, no controversy, no contention; nothing which
gives you a hint to perceive that they are more than ONE. . . . Their
birthplace offers them no motive of personal interest. . . . Same aim,
same conduct, same vow, which like a conjugal knot has tied them
together. ... At the least sign, one man turns and returns the entire
Society, and shapes the revolution of so large a body. It is easy to move,
but difficult fro shake.

Imago primi sceculi Societatis Jesu ; published with the author
ization of Mutio Vitelleschi, General ; 1640.

These doctrines, the consequence of which would destroy natural law,
that rule of morality which God himself has implanted in the hearts of
men, and, consequently, would break all the ties of civil society, in author
izing theft, lying, perjury, the most criminal impurity, and generally
all passions and all crimes, by the teaching of secret compensation, of
equivocation, of mental restrictions, of probabilism and philosophical
sin; destroy all feelings of humanity among men, in authorizing homi
cide and parricide, annihilate royal authority, etc., etc. . . .

Decree of the Parliament of Paris, 5th of March, 1762.

Notice

FOR THE THIRTEENTH EDITION.

THE invitation that I have addressed in my preface (page 23),
" to my enemies" has been heard. They have been kind enough
to indicate a certain number of mistakes in the translation, which
I have corrected in the present edition. I may safely say besides,
that they were of no importance, except one, pointed out by
Monsieur 1'Abbe Danglas, who appears to have made a deep
study of my book.

We believe after so many criticisms, coming from men so compe
tent, and surely not blinded by their friendship for my person,
that my translation may henceforth be considered sufficiently per
fect and labelled ne varietur.

We will then let it stand as it is. However, it is my duty, in
offering to the reader this 13th corrected edition, to thank those
who have made themselves my fellow-workers, without inquiring
about the feelings that have inspired them. I hope that their
satisfaction will equal my sincerity in offering them the expression
of my gratitude.

Paris, the 18th of May, 1880.

PUBLISHERS' PREFACE.

In sending forth the present work, it will not be necessary
to say much by way of introduction. M. Paul Bert, who
translated Gury's works from the Latin into the French (from
which French this translation has in turn been made), was a
statesman of great ability, having the courage of his convic
tions. He saw the harm done to society by allowing the
Jesuits to become educators of the French youth, and strug
gled successfully to have them disqualified by law from man
agement of such education. This book is a terrible exposure
of the principles of- these would-be teachers of religion.
Their religious principles are simply statutable crimes, un
natural and repugnant to all good men ; and how we Ameri
cans can let them train our children, when the great French
nation across the water have decided that they are unfit to
control the instruction of its youth, it is not easy to tell.
Surely, we should have as much concern that our future cit
izens be not indoctrinated in crime, as the French.

The value of a book like that in the hands of the reader
is, that it settles a controversy as to the moral worth of the
principles of the Society of Jesus. Protestants have claimed
that those principles are abominable ; Rome, on the other
hand, has said that they are holy and good. The book tells
what those principles are : namely, murder, lying, stealing,
perjury, and the like. And thus, out of their own mouth
these bad men stand self-condemned.

As to the translation — there may be some errors ; it would
be wonderful if there were not. But we believe the seose at

x Publishers' Preface.

least of the original is preserved. However, if the reader
sees anything that should be changed to make it more exactly
accord with the original, we shall be happy to correct it in
future editions, upon notification. If the Jesuit does not
like the translation here given, we will print his own render
ing, provided we are satisfied it is true to the original text.

Hoping all will give aid as they are able to help extend
the circulation of this book, we remain

THE PUBLISHERS.

JietJtcation
To M. FKEPPEL, BISHOP OF ANGERS,

WHO HAS PUBLICLY CALLED ME A CALUMNIATOR AND A FALSIFIER

OF TEXTS.

MONSIEUR L'EVEQUE:

To you I dedicate this book ; and that is justice ; for without you
it would not have been born. On the morrow after my speeches
of July 1879, an avalanche of pamphlets, letters, articles, either
anonymous or signed with names more or less authentic, from
Jesuits, or from persons pretending to be so, fell on me. I cared
little about the vulgar insults, threatenings even, that were heaped
in them, and returned to my studies without otherwise heeding

"This lot of insulters howling at my breeches."

As for you, coming into line, you have bluntly called me a ca
lumniator and falsifier of texts. This, from a former colleague in
Sorbonne, paid by the State, and of about the same rank as I in the
administrative hierarchy, could not remain without an answer.
To that answer I gave the form of this present book. Why ? I
am going to give the explanation in a preface which will interest
others than you. And it is the public at large to whom I appeal,
who shall judge between you and me.

You have deeply offended me, Monsieur 1'Eveque ; but, let me
tell you, although that may be very indifferent to you, I bear you
no grudge. It is clear for me that you have not been able to
understand the value, applied to a man of science, of the expres
sions used by you.

Calumniator, falsifier, impostor, are, in fact, words of frequent
use in the language of the thaumaturgists ; and which they com
monly exchange between each other, without appearing to attach
any importance to them, by those who live on human credulity and

xii Dedication.

foolishness. Let them throw at each other's heads the famou.
"Mentiris impudentissime," nobody cares.

But, do j'ou not know, Monsieur 1'Eveque, what is a man o;
science ; with what a pure worship he devotes his life to the seek
ing of the Truth, the eternal and holy Truth, which he invokes
and pursues, in spite of the anathemas of bewildered super
stition? Do you not know that his respected word cannot be
impugned? Do you not know that the least suspicion of his
veracity inflicts on him the most deadly injury ; that lying is for
him, what prevarication is for the judge, and cowardice for the
soldier? No, surely, you are not accustomed to speak to men of
science.

And now here are the documents of the prosecution. Your
" eminent moralist," as you call him, — that Gury the text of whom
j'ou accuse me of having mutilated, and falsified the intentions, is
going to be appreciated by every one. I went to seek him in his
den ; I have stripped him of the impure Latin behind which he was
hiding ; I have reduced him to his simplest expression ; and I bring
him forth before the public, in the light of day, ashamed of his
nakedness and blinking in the rays of the sun.

Compare now my requisitions of the 5th and 7th of July with
the text of the Jesuit, the justificative document. Calmly I wait
for the judgment, having remained far beneath the truth.

Ah ! the Jesuits called me a falsifier, a calumniator ; and you put
yourself, Monsieur 1'Eveque, at their head or in their train. It
matters little ! Ah ! Bazile has veiled his face,Tartuffe has blushed
at last ! They who made of calumny a system, and of lying a
theory, they felt the whip, and cried : Imposture ! Who were the
impostors? Themselves!

Ah ! It is their usual game.

Who has not seen in the streets of our large cities, running
before a group, bound to overtake him, a frightened man, crying
louder than all: "Stop thief!" Who is he? The simpletons
alone are deceived. . . .

Monsieur 1'Eveque, to you I dedicate this book.

•» PAUL BERT.

Paris, the 27th of February, 1880.

PREFACE.

i.

AIM AND PLAN OF THE BOOK.

On the 21st of June, 1879, was opened, in the Chamber of
Deputies, the discussion of the scheme of law touching "Liberty of
Superior Education ; " a scheme in which the most important
clause (Article 7), interdicted teaching in all degrees to the
Jesuits, and other members of religious congregations not recog
nized by the laws of the State.

On that day I made a speech,* in which I tried to demonstrate,
from a purely political point of view, the dangers of an education
given by that sect, to the tranquility and moral unity of our coun
try. Where that sect has been tolerated, it has always carried
with it the germs of civil war ; that all those countries have ex
pelled and cursed it ; and that, according to the terms of exist
ing French legislation, its members ought to be immediately
expelled.

A few days later, the Minister of Public Instruction brought to
the tribune, to second the same proposition, some quotations drawn
from books of history by the Jesuits, which excited the indignation
of the Chamber, and clearly proved the imminence of the peril.

This called me again to the Parliamentary stage, and forced
me more deeply into the question. The historical judgments and
previsions are but one of the applications of morality ; it is, then,
the Jesuits' doctrine of morality that I attacked and summoned
to the bar of the Chamber, on the 5th of July, 1879. f Briefly, I
recalled the eloquent attacks of Pascal ; then, passing to a more

* See page 495. f See page 537.

xiv Preface.

recent time, I borrowed freely from the justificative documents of
the famous sentence rendered by the Parliament of Paris on the
5t>h of March, 1762 ; at last I came to modern times, and exposed
the persistence of those odious doctrines, together with their intro
duction into the teaching not only of youth, but even of the
smallest children.

From a devoted friend, I received next day some interesting
extracts* from the works of the Jesuit Gury, who was then com
pletely unknown to me. I must confess, I took advantage of
them, and inserted them in a reply to M. de la Bassetiere.f

The effect of my speech on the 5th of July was, I may say
without vanity, truly extraordinary. The emotion in the Chamber
was intense. A newspaper which published it in extenso, sold
more than 100,000 copies, solely on account of it. I received
numerous letters of felicitations and even of thanks ; friendly
hands were stretched towards me from all parts of France,
Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, and from all the countries invaded
by the sons of Loyola, under cover of silence and shadow.

It was not the fault of the Jesuits if the picture had no dark
side, and that the deep joy I felt in being the recipient of so many
marks of sympathy was not troubled by the violence of their
insults and threats. But their arrows fell short of the mark ;
scorn made me insensible to their attacks, t

The most moderate among my defamers said I had made use of

* Unfortunately an error of the copyist was found, for which I have
been harshly reproached, although in reality it was of no importance what
ever. See page 586.

t See page 582. Y

% Reasonable people who do not know the resources that hate furnishes
to the devotees of Rome, will never understand, cannot have an idea, of
the insults, of the vulgarities, that the Jesuits, as well as their natural
allies, poured over me. It was an impotent rage : spumat rabies vesana
per ora. A medical newspaper of Vienna, which had honored me in pub
lishing a long biographical notice, sums up all these products of Catholic
charity in the following terms : " The Catholic papers call him a libertine,
a shameless materialist, a man infected with all the vices and turpitudes of
Paris, a shame to the French tribune, a wretch, a rake, a mischief-maker!
One can see by this furious inundation, that Paul Bert has struck right
in the bull's eye." And I can affirm that the Austrian paper has remained
far beneath the reality. I mention also the more characteristic aggres
sions for which the Police Court of Paris has just punished the authors.

Preface. xv

falsified texts, that I had falsified some of them myself. Falsi-
ficators Pascal, Dumoulin, Pasquier, La Chalottais, and so many
others ! Falsificators, the Commissaries of Parliament ! I found
myself in good company.

I would not have been otherwise disturbed, if, among my
accusers, I had not found some ecclesiastical functionaries, besides
two or three bishops, one of whom, M. Freppel, called me directly
to account, using the harshest of terms.

I resolved to answer, and began a pamphlet threatening to
become very extensive. Jt was, up to this time, an exposure
of Jesuitical doctrines ; an accumulation of new citations drawn
from the very sources, accompanied by keen comments and
indignant tirades ; in brief, an imitation more or less happy of
the immortal Provinciales.

But my plan was suddenly changed, after a glance at the cata
logue of the National Library. I saw that after an ephemeral
success, my book, on that subject, would have the same fate, and
fall into the same abyss where so many books sleep the sleep of
forgetfulness. Numbers of those works are marvels of indepen
dent spirit, logic, erudition, eloquence, and the Provinciales them
selves have not escaped oblivion.

How are we to account for and justify such public and general
indifference? What can be the cause of it? How is it possible to
escape it? Whence comes the uselessness of so many efforts often
so powerful? I struggled with the problem, and I believe I have
solved it.

I suppose a book conceived such as the one I had at first made.
I adorn it with all imaginable qualities : the bitter raillery of Pascal,
the highly-strung indignation of La Chalottais, the sensitive elo
quence of Michelet, the winged poetry of Quinet. I hand it to a
wise, moderate, liberal man, in whom the Jesuits cause a certain
and secret apprehension, but who refrains from appearing an enemy
of religion : this species is not rare, it constitutes to-day almost the
totality of the French "bourgeoiseie ;" this man must be convinced
before anything is done, firstly, because it is his own opinion, the
public opinion ; then, because he has children, with prowling Jes-

xvi Preface.

uits around; and ifhis wife belongs to them, bis daughter is al
ready in the meshes, and his son threatened.

Our good man opens the book and reads it to the end ; I adm't
that he is at first interested, then indignant. Call on him a month
later.

''Well! You have read! What quotation ! It is odious, as
tounding !"

" Yes, yes," he answers ; " but, do you see, I have thought about
it-; it does not prove much. They are very old, those quotations.
Those men of the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth centuries even,
could not have on morality, any more than on politics, the same
ideas that we now have. To reproach the Jesuits of Lhomond Street
for the maxims of Tolet, EmmSa, Fagundez, Suarez, Filliucius
and so many others already dead in the time of Pascal, is to stretch
the rights of polemic ; it is to mix up a dead theology with the ac
tual, living morality. Periods of history would be systematically
confused ! As well compare the League with the French Revolution
and make the one responsible for the other.

"The language, moreover, is quite different : the gross vulgarities
of those times would in our days rouse indignation. One could riot
reprint Sanchez ! Think of Rabelias, of Brantone, the delight of
ladies at Court ! What princess to-day would pass the whole night,
like young Mary of Prussia, copying " La Pucelle," and would
boast of it? Those ignominies of old casuists have lost their
effect in these times of ours.

" Further, you can not put any confidence in those extracts. I
know well that the author has copied them accurately ; the rascals
who accuse their adversaries of falsifying the texts prove only
that they are mean enough to do it. Besides, one can hardly
verify them ; the books are rare, and can be found only in large
libraries. Then, the author belongs to a party, he is a soldier
a fighting man ; he had to write accordingly. The Jesuits have
written much, and a great many volumes ; hundreds in folio form.
One looks through them in every corner, with no distinction of
epochs, countries, characters ; one selects phrases, parts of phrases,
some odious things, I admit, that startled me. But what of it?
All that is artistically arranged ; lines w.vtMi centuries aparf are

Preface. xvii

brought to complete one another ; they are prepared and framed
in a skillful exposition. What is more serious, they are torn
from their former setting ; they are isolated from the principles
constituting their philosophical value, or from the application
which gave them tlieir practical utility. It is the difference
between a herbarium and a green field. Who knows if the rule
has not been taken oftentimes for the exception, the incidental
phrase for the principal, the reserve for the principle ; add to this
the unavoidable errors, the alterations of texts often quoted from
former cuttings, and at last, errors of translation, inevitable in
such arduous matters. . . . No, decidedly, I cannot be convinced ;
it is skillful arguing, I admit, and sincere, I am sure of it ;
at least, so far as it is possible for a party-man to be sincere. Bat
the more I think of it, the less I agree with it. It is again
the eternal Truth : 'Give me four lines from the hand of a man,
and I can have him hung/ Yours is a curious book, but it proves
nothing."

Such is his defence : many times did I hear such language.
Surely, this is not hard to refute ; but the book itself cannot do it.
Besides, you will very seldom be listened to ; the reader has made
up his mind ; he has got rid of an irritating problem ; perhaps lie
has found the means to avoid household quarrels ; to discuss with
him would be as wise as to pull out a nail by striking on its head
with a hammer.

What is to be done, then? Ask him, and he will answer you.

"What is necessary, you see, is to show me that the modern
Jesuits, those with whom we live, those to whose school my wife
wants me to send my son, teach actually the same doctrines,
speak the same language, that the old ones spoke. I readily admit
they were not worth much. We know truly that none of them can
publish a book without the consent of their Superiors, and so no
personal opinion can be entertained. I have even read some
where that they boast to have but one language and but one
thought, so that one of their generals said :

That they would be what they are, or they would not be.
tk But all these are general maxims, things written for effect, for

xviii Preface.

show, if yon wi'.l allow ir.e to say so. It is said also, lliat tlicy
aic so skilful, so conciliating, so insinuating, so supple! There
is contradiction in the two ways of looking at them. As for mo,
I believe they stand on the level of circumstances, and that they
are living up to the spirit of modern times.

" I know full well that it would not be difficult to clear up that
question. There are books q'lile recently written, in which
Jesuits, actually living, expose the compendium of their d ctrines.
This is what I would like to read! Their, I should have a true
idea of things, seeing them well set in order, without the interven
tion of a third party, always suspected. But they are big volumes,
very tiresome, they say, and I have no time. Besides, they arj
written in Latin ; and, between us, my consciones is pretty rusty,
and it has never been my forte.

"What I would like is a modern book, a complete book writ
ten by a Jesuit, having f ill authority, and having been translated
\\ithout any abridgment, cutting off only what does not interest
me; for I care little about metaphysics, and s-till less about
theology. That wou'd be indeed to render a great service to
myself "ami to many others. We would read and judge for our
selves, without needing help fiom fabricated phrases; we are a
people with common sense and honor."

The solution was found, and our bourgeois was right. Yes, the
authors who have written abjut Jesuits have put too much self into
their books. We must change all that, and replace the subjective
method by the objective one.

This was understood : I threw my work into the waste-basket,
after having gathered a small part relating to the alterations of
text of which I was accused,* and I set about to find a Jesuit who
might answer my purpose.

I found him easily ; indeed, Gury was all that could be desired.
He died quite recently, after having taught morals for a long time
in fin college Komain, the Jesuit's college in Rome. He has pub
lished two voluminous works in two large volumes, each represent-

*3f s falsifications: Letter to the Director of the RepuMique Franchise
(see 2'Jlh of August, 1879) published in a pamphlet by the Editor of the
Petite K'pnbliqnc Francaise.

Preface. xix

ing ten times the matter treated in tli3 present bojk, C ' )mpenduim
Theologice Moralis, and, a Casus Consdentue. Those books have
had several editions ; the Ja-t one being published in 1875 : they
are in the hands not only of all Jesuits, but also in those of a
large number cf piiests; and, by the testimony of M. Guibert,
archbishop of Paris, they have happi'y transformed, in the last
thirty years, the spirit of the French Cl-r^y.* So, in Gr.ry was
to be found the two prominent qualities required, actuality and
authority. Besides, it was from him I had quoted, about whom I
had committed an involuntary error, and him I was accused of
having calumniated. There could not be any possible hesitation.

I took then the four volumes of the last edition, f and be^an the
most ardous of works to compile the present book. I proceeded
thus :

The Compendium is a theoretical book, divided into a series of
treatises (on human actions, on conscience, on laws, etc., etc. )

The Casus Conscleittice is a compilation of cases, species, anec
dotes, which constitute as many problems on theological morality :
they are grouped by treatises corresponding to those of the Com
pendium. I began to dismember, so to speak, those two works,
and melt them into one, each treatise of the Compendium being
followed by the cases relating to them, each theoretical exposition
followed by its practical application. Different typographical
symbols help to recognizj them at a glance.

Let us see now the mode of abridgment.

For the Compendium, I have carefully preserved all the feneral
aspect of the book. Fach treatise is divided into parts, sections,
chapters, articles, paragraphs ; I have reproduced tlie same order ;
I have even kept the numbers which correspond to e:;ch new
idea, in each paragraph. In a word, the iud x is absolutely
intact. This done, I took care not to analyze anything whatever;
there is not, in the whole book, a single line written by myself.

* " There is no doubt that the two works of P. Gury have powerfully
contributed to extend ainon<^ the French Clenjv the easiest solutions of
probabilism." (P. Matignon S. J. : Etudes Eeligieuses, 18GG).

t Revised, corrected, augmented, put in order by Henri Dumas, S. J. -,
second edition. Lyon : liriday, 1875. Casus Conscieiitice, fifth edition.
Lyon, Briduy, 1875.

xx Pnface.

When the saying of the casuists seemed interesting, I translated it
textually and completely ; otherwise, I set it aside and replaced it
by a line of dots whose very changeable value is easy to measure
by the number of missing numbers.

In that distinction between what appeared to me worthy of
reproduction and what I thought better not to mention, I was
guided by very diverse considerations. At first, I systematically
omitted all that had but a purely theological interest or ecclesias
tical discipline. The treatise on Theological Virtues, Church Pre
cepts, Sacraments, (principally those of Baptism, Confirmation,
Eu-harist, Extreme Unction, Order,) Censures, Irregularities,
Indu'gences, have been very much shortened. In tlic other
treatises, I have retained only what may interest the liity, viz:
the general principles, and their most important deductions, tho
exceptions so often destructive of the rule, reserves, subterfuges ;
also, occasionally, the odd questions, the odious vices, that Gury
borrows from former casuists, or invents ; for he was a man of a
very fertile imagination. But bear in mind that I have not trans
lated only that which seemed tome reprehensible ; far from it, and
I am ready to take the responsibility of a great number of tl.e
propositions reproduced further ; those not mentioned seem also
to me very often blameless. My aim has not been to expose an
extract of bad or dangerous maxims ; but to give an outline, as
complete as the method permits, of the Jesuitical doctrines of
the present day.

As for the cases, a sort of Anas, often fastidious, but sometimes
strange and ingenious, whose multiplicity in the oral teaching
gave, it seems, to the Lectures of Rev. Father Gury, a parti
cular savor, the choice has been a great dual easier. I took
at first a good part of those on the Jesuitical solution not in
accord with the lay morality ; then, those which are interesting in
themselves; either because they reveal the crafty dodges that
often take place in the confessional between confessor and poni-
tent ; or because they set in action some grotesque superstitions ;
or because they show the proof of the eratic preoccupation which
haunts, in all circumstances and in all places, the imagination of

Preface. xxi

the Jesuit, and compels him to introduce Ihe " res venercae" in all
casuistical matters.

A certain number of notes are added to the text. Some of
them demonstrate the persisting accord that exists between the
ancient Jesuitical rules, and the aclual doctrine formulated by
Gury.* Also it will be clearly seen, that in spite of certain attenu
ations of form, imposed by the spirit of the times, the Jesuits
have renounced none of their ancient doctrines. Not even those

* The texts that I quote are borrowed from the celebrated " Extracts
of the dangerous, and as pernicious assertions of every sort of the
so-called Jesuits, veritied and collected by the Commissaries of the Parlia
ment of Paris 1762." 1 vol., 4to, of 544 pages." Prom this volume I
drew the numbers of my citations.

It is known that the Jesuits have tried to contest this formidable
accumulation of facts, in taking advantage of a certain number ot' errors
of no importance, which they have collected and compiled ; and this fear
ful number, 758, they zealously show up before the world. Hero is how
they were classified after the answer, in four voluminous books, edited by
the It. F. Grou and Sauvage :

In the Latin extracts.

Errors against the letter and the sense of the text of the author 41
Suppression of phrases in the text ..... 201

Mutilation of the text Gl

Mistakes :. '..'' 94 457

In the French version.

Grammatical errors in the Latin construction . . . 1G
Alteration of the sense in the words ..... 220
Alteration of the sense in the phrase ..... G5 301

758

In all justice, a defalcation of the errors in the French version ought to
be made ; the "Extracts of Assertions" give the Latin text in juxtaposi
tion to it. Then, looking more attentively, we see that the " Suppression
of phrase," and the "Mutilation of text" in Latin, have absolutely no sig
nificance in the immense majority of cases. The Jesuit, to sustain his
accusation, is obliged to drown himself in page after page of explanation ;
this indicates that his answer, which ought to have been so brief and so
simple, forms four large volumes, 4to.

Again, the Archbishop of Paris, thinking to be able to find twenty-
seven errors in those texts, the Parliament named in 17G4 a numerous
Committee, who carefully received the questions and answered these
allegations.

From all this, there remained only one more proof of the impudence
of the Jesuits. The seven hundred and fifty-eight falsifications are to be
added to the twenty-four with which I have been reproached, one among
these being the falsification of the namo of Casnedi, being written Cas-
sendi by the proof-reader of the "Official."

xxii Preface.

denounced by Pascal, which were condemned in 1679 by Pope
Innocent XI. Other notes show those doctrines used in the
teaching of childhood by recent catechisms, and especially in the
one by " Grand Vicaire Marotte." I took this catechism as a
type, being the official book of our primary and normal schools.
Many allusions to recent facts are found in them, and one may
safely consider these facts as logical applications of the Jesuitical
maxims.

The analysis of Gury's books under the conditions indicated
above, do not constitute the whole of the present volume.

At first, I added to it the analysis of a work (page 448) exten
sively spread amongst the clergy of the South of France, perfect
ing en one point the work of the Jesuit. It is a "Dissertation on
the 6th and 9th Precepts of the Decalogue," from the authorized
pen, so dear to the Jesuits, of Abbe Rousselot, professor in
the grand Seminary of Grenoble, and principal author (after
Mademoiselle de la Merliere) of that shameful comedy called the
apparition of " la Salette." Here I made numerous abbreviations
and left a good deal of Latin, for special reasons that every one
will understand. I beg pardon for having almost completely trans
lated, although softening the terms, the corresponding passages
of Gury ! I felt that it was necessary to show to everybody
what degree of aberration the casuistic mania may reach; and how,
in reality, the odious Sanchez is living still, if not perfected.
And when we know that this book is for the special use of young
confessors and pupils of grand seminaries, we may well ask our
selves what must be the effect of these descriptions and medita
tions on the mind of youth.

A second addition (page 486) is the list of the 65 propositions
condemned by Pope Innocent XI. on the 16th of March, 1679.
Pascal's calumnies, as the Jesuit's saying is, will have some prac
tical value; because most of these propositions had been taken from
the Jesuitical text, and denounced in his "Lettres a. un Provincial."
From that time the Jesuits have avoided condemnation with an
admirable skilfulness, and set on foot all those propositions that
might be of practical interest for them as soon as they were
overturned.

Preface. xxiii

At l-istl close thn book, by the reproduction, after the " Journal
Official," of the speeches which have been the cause of the
present conflict.

Such is this book. The common sense and the good judgment
of the reader will decide. Let me add only one last observation.

Errors of translations may have escaped me ; it could not be
otherwise in so tedious a work, done so quickly, with a Latin
so strange and oftentimes so obscure. I depend on my enemies
to point them out, and beg them instantly to set themselves to
work, in order that I may profit by their criticisms. My excellent
publisher has kept the stereotype plates in view of these correc
tions.

As for these errors, as well as for other similar ones, T can
do no better than to put myself under cover of a very reasonable
passage of the Jesuit publisher of the famous " Reponse aux
assertions du Parlement."

4 -Accuracy and precaution must be our first duty in such a work,
where it is difficult that no errors could escape us which will
not be infallibly pointed out and magnified by our enemies in
the eyes of the public, and treated as capital faults, no matter how
light they may be. We are convinced that t'ie work itself leaves
no ground for contest, and that all the resource that remains
to them will be to attack a few oversights which will not better
their cause."

This caution was singular from his pen. It answered in advance
all its complaints and the work of the Commissaries of Parlia
ment. I adopt it for myself in its true light.

The books of Gury are at the disposition of the public at a very
moderate price, so, those who are tormented by the critical spirit,
may easily alleviate their thirst for truth by comparing the
original with my extracts and translation.

II.

Sumntarg of tlje Boofu

The first impression felt by a lay realer, in looking over a
Jesuitical Compendium, is wonder and dread. This book is
all, or at least pretends to be all : canon law, civil law, penal law,
even commercial law, jurisprudence, and also divine and human
science, all may be found here. One feels that the disciple who
in the course of his studies has been thoroughly impregnated with
it, who carries it with him out from the Seminary, often into the
very heart of the country, where, by the side of the breviary, of
the Catechism and Confessor's Manual, it will form all his library,
must persuade himself that all is found there which will guide his
conduct towards men as well as his relations with Heaven. Noth
ing escaped the casuist, and on all things the priest will find the
ready prepared solution ; he will be able, book in hand, to
discuss the origin of morality, or the validity of trusts, the Sacra
ment of the Eucharist, or matters of Exchange. Society can have
no hold on him, nor teach him anything; everything has been
foreseen by his chiefs.

When from this he comes to the study of a part of that Ency
clopedia at once profane and sacred, the la}'man is struck by
the absence of any general principle, of any rule comprising a
considerable number of facts or ideas. Everywhere, on the con
trary, a need of curtailed definitions, and above all, of divisions
and classifications, which crumble the principle, shorten, chill, and
cause the bringing up of a large number of small aphorisms, that
will be later easily opposed to eaca other. Let us take for
instance, the chapter on conscience. Immediately after a defini
tion which seems the very negation of free will, we have the
divisions : Conscience is upright or erroneous, certain or doubtful,
etc., etc. (page 61) ; then the subdivisions and secondary divi-

'

xxvi Preface.

sions : vincibly erroneous or invincibly erroneous ; invincibly erron
eous which commands, vincibly erroneous which permits, etc.,
etc. As much as to say, the true truth, the doubtful tuith, the
fdse truth. These sublime words lose thus all elevated and holy
signification, and this is just what the casuist is aiming at: he will
soon have the best of it.

A third surprise for the reader not used to that sort of books is
the facility vith which, out of an excellent principle, he deduces
the most monstrous consequences. It is always the old sophism
about the splittii g of a hair. Circumstances, added one to the
other to the primitive truth, like water added drop by drop to gen
erous wine, transforms the one into a sour beverage an 1 the other
into scandalous error, without knowing at what precise moment the
transmutation happened. One feels full of anguish and drawn
towards a fatal declivity, the tufts of ^irass tearing < ff under our
crisped hands. It is the strength of the casuist, and the ne plus
ultra (f his art: he knows that, at last, tired and bruised, the pa
tient will roll into the abyss.

And what shall he timl there? The downiest of beds, soft as t'ie
mire : probabilism. This is the true pillow of doubt, but not in
the sense pointed out by Montaigne. No more principles ! Their
fragments alone fell into the abyss, and over each one of them a
casuist cavils and disserts. For any question, he holds the solu
tion well in hand; he offers it to the passer-by; and as he is, accord
ing to the formula of the Jesuits, doctor, honest man and savant, his
opinion becomes probable, and the passer-by may choose, in the
tranquility of his errii g conscience, what best suits him, practi
cally, between all these solutions handed to him by those doctoral
hands. Remark, that if he avails himself of one to-day, he may
hold to-morrow the contrary opinion, if it is his interest to do so
(pages G9, 77, etc.) The confessor, however, master in so many
things, can do nothing about it, and he nm.-t submit and absolve
when the penitent can refer to the opinion of a director, had
he sought him for a long time. (Pages 70, 75, etc.) How is it
possible not to rejoice at such a convenient doctrine, and echo
the thanksgivings of Escobar: "Verily, when I consider so
many diverse sentiments on the matter of morals, I think it is

Preface. xxvii

a happy dispensation of Providence, such a variety of opin
ions helping us to bear along more agreeably the yoke of the
Lord ! "

I do not insist on Pascal's revengeful imprecations, which vibrate
yet in all memories. But it will be sufficient to look over the present
book to see that the Jesuits havre in no point renounced the famous
doctrines of probabilism, (pages 65-72,) and of philosophical sin,
cause of the invincibly erroneous conscience (page 62-72.) This
may have burlesque or monstrous consequences.

See what becomes in the skilful hands of the Jesuits of this evi
dent and primordial principle: " When there is no wicked inten
tion there can be no error of conscience." While there is no fault,
says he, there is no obligation to compensate an evil committed
quite involuntarily. Then he brings the case of Adalbert, (page
56) who, wanting to kill his enemy Titius, kills his friend Caius ;
and he gravely declares that Adalbert, being in nothing culpable of
the homicide committed, can not be held to any restitution by the
heirs of the one he has assassinated.

A step further: let us take another principle, infinitely less sure
but admissible in practice under reserve, viz. : that one is not
obliged to denounce one's self for a wicked act that one has com
mitted ; and let us introduce it in the following category. We
have then the case of Julius (page 228), who inadvertently drinks
the poisoned wine offered to Didyme by Cursius in order to kill
him. Cursius, says the casuist, was not obliged to warn Julius,
for it would have been to denounce himself; and he is not held to
indemnify his heirs because he has no intention to kill him ; he has
been the occasion, not the efficacious cause of the death, and Julius
killed himself ! Stretching the point a little further, one can feel
that Cursius might sue for damages !

Another principle, better yet: "One is held to indemnify but
the wrong that one has really caused." Then, if Jacob (page 242)
has killed Marc, who was ruining his family through luxurious
living and drunkenness, he owes nothing to the family of his vic
tim, because he has not wronged it in any way. Moreover, he
has been of service to that family, having prevented a more com-

xxv iii Preface.

plete ruin ! If we draw the consequence, he might ask for a
reward !

We can see that nothing prevents such a way of looking at
these principles: of that method, frequent examples are given in
the present book. I shall not indicate any other ; I will content
myself to make here a remark of the highest importance.

Gury complains somewhere (page 246), with a charming
naivete, "of the difficulty that exists in harmonizing the laws of
conscience with those of the civil code." I will say that this is
easily understood ; and that, a priori, there must be very often
important differences between the decision of the judge of con
science, that is to sa}', of intention, such as the priest must under
stand, and the solution of the lay magistrate, in fact, otherwise
of the civil law in principle. But in what sense must we under
stand the difference? In the sense, it seems, of a greater severity
on the part of the religious judge. In fact, the civil magistrate
cannot condemn, except when the act is added to the wicked
intention, the commencement of its execution. Rightly, the civil
law, which has not for its mission to appease the conscience, but to
maintain order in society, is obliged to pass condemnation on
many acts that ought to be condemned by the religious judge.

Is it thus that the Jesuits view the question? Far from it;
examples abound. Here is a thief : he must indemnify, there is no
doubt of it, and the civil magistrate will constrain him by all ways
and means. But he consults the casuist, and he authorizes him
to defer the restitution, when he cannot do it "without losing a
position legitimately acquired," that is to say, acquired by theft
(page 201). Here is a simpleton, Simplicius, who let, foolishly,
his borrowed horse be stolen from him. *4 So much the worse for
you," will say the civil judge; "you shall pay for the horse." "Oh,
no," will say the soft casuist; "Simplicius is so stupid !" (page 230).
Here is Qtiirinus, who enters a store during the night to steal, hold
ing a candle : a cat jumps; the candle falls, and sets the house on
fire; everything is burned. What will be the decision of the civil
judge? I don't know ; I know, however, the lay morality in such a
case: as for the casuist, he does not hesitate: " Poor Quirinus !
He owes nothing; it is not his fault, it is the cat" (page 19G) !

Preface. xxix

Here is Zephirin, who digs a hole in his field; and who, knowing
that Andre is going to pass that way, takes care not to warn him.
Andre fulls and breaks his leg. The civil judge will lose his
suit in this case, but the moral judge! have no fear: Zephirin
owes nothing (page 225.) There is Phileas. a seminarist, who let
one of his comrades be expelled as culpable of a theft that he has
himself committed ; the consequences of which are grievous for
the poor Albin. Here again the civil judge can do nothing ; the
Je-uit, without hesitation, exempts Phileas from all indemnity (pngc
227.) Olympius, during an auction sale, went into coalition,
liable to fine and even imprisonment by the civil judge ; the casuist
absolves him (page 287.) At last, not to multiply the examples
to excess, we come back to Adalbert, the murderer of Caius : we
see that surely the civil judge will condemn him to pay damages
to the family of his victim ; and perhaps, as having attempted the
assasinatit n of Titius. The Jesuit washes his hands of all this:
Adalbert did not do it on purpose, that is sufficient.

I call the attention of the reader to this general observation :
he will find in the book a number of precepts or cases which are,
without doubt, in harmony with the spirit of the civil law, but to
that the law permits rather than approves, and which it com
mands, not on account of the hvjnesly of the act or formula, but
because there would be grievous social inconvenience to proceed
otherwise. I will mention only one : On his death-bed, a father
commands his son to make a certain gift. Truly, in civil procedure,
there is not here any will, and it is a case calling fur the judge of
conscience ; well, the casuist discharges the son of executing
the will of his dying father (page 278.) In a word, the casuist
always accepts the solutions of civil law when they are in favor of
moral culpability ; but when the guilty one is condemned by them,
the Jesuit strives to find a loop-hole through which he may
escape.

Jt is one of the features of Jesuitical casuistry to always take
the part of the sinner, and this is not the least cause of his definite
triumph over the Jansenist's rigorism. Between the thief and his
victim the Jesuit never hesitates : he takes the pait of the thief.
See the examples I have jufet related. When it is a question of

xxx Preface.

avoiding restitution, lie is nil honey for the thief ; lie mint not be
ft>rc"d t) he "deprived of his servants, or fr'unds;" but the
victim, meanwhile, may quietly die of hunger: he exempts
Simplice, without any compensation to the stableman who lose-*
his horse ; for the merchant, al hough innocent, burnt out by
Qu'riiius, he cares not a straw; neither for Andre and his broken
leg ; nor for the poor devil of whom Olympius has clogged the
sale ; neither for Albin, disgraced and ruined ; nor for the innocent
heirs of murdered Caius. No; his sympathies arc elsewhere.
Do you wonder that Parliaments have expelled him?

A great deal might be said about secret compensation, so
energetical! }' condemned by the civil law and by lay morality ; so
completely approved, and oftentimes so spiritually taught, by the
Jesuit (pages 88, 187, 272, 282, 291). The theory and practice
of this thieving art is found in many passages of the book, and
one shudders in thinking how many deluded persons such teaching
has sent before the criminal tribunals when it fell ou well-disposed
natures. What of the theory of theft, so-called? Its gravity is
according to the fortune of the victim ; and not, as in our codes,
according to the circumstances of escalade, infraction, etc., etc.
(page 183). And the light th ft, which is not passable for dam
ages! And indulgence for thievish servants (page 184) ! And
necessity excusing theft (page 184) ! And the possibility of in
teresting God for the success of a theft (page 103) !

What yet remains to be spoken of? Absurd superstitions (pages
111, 112) : the deviltry of turning tables, for instance (page 113);
diabolical possession (page 113); carnal intercourse with devils!
Political formulas : kings holding their power only from the church
(page 78) ! Doctrines of the most savage intolerance ; heretics
considered, though rebels, as subjects of the church, and under its
laws (pages 80, 356, 382); terrible phrase, which logically calls for
the auto ddfe; their children baptized in spite of them (pages 329,
34G) ; interdiction to notifying a Protestant minister that his co
religionist is dying and calls for him (page 108) ; audacious in
fractions of the prescriptions of civil law taught and justified
(pages 83, 311, 320) ; donation for causing death (page 253) ;
denial of the equality of shares (page 253) ; state and property

Preface. xxxi

of the monks (pigi 311, 325) ; substitution find trusts (pngc 254) ;
dissimulation of inheritance (page 253) ; fraud of duties (pages 91,
205) , etc ; the difference of gravity of sins according to their being
advantageous or not ; wonderful Jesuitical discovery (pages 127,
130) ; the murder of an innocent one, the excuse for which is hidden
under obscure and fearful conditions (page 137) ; the theory of
denunciation, commended by the constitution of Ignatius (Reg.
Comm. XX), introduced in the lay-world, and highly recom
mended (page 104) ; destruction of books under interdiction, and
their theft openly preached (page 106) ; contempt for paternal
authority, when it is a question of entering into religious orders ;
and ferocious heartlessness towards parents (pages 131, 133,
319) ; the art of cheating at play (page 297) ; the legitimacy
of slavery and the slave-trade (page 177) ; illeg il opening of
bodies (page 330) ; the most brazen-faced usury, hidden .behind
the prescription of the church which prohibits it (pages 255, 259,
261) ; * violation for money of a promise of marriage (pages 373,

* I cannot resist the pleasure of analyzing the interesting chapter
relative to usury, that is to say, lending at interest. We know that the
Catholic Church proscribes it absolutely, and we like to see here an appli
cation which, in spite of its exaggeration, is an honor to the Christi-ui
moralist exercising the principle of charity. Let us see how the casuist
has done away with the difficulty: this was important, for the Jesuits
were admirable manipulators of money. But that was difficult, in lace of
proposition 41, condemned by Innocent XL

So, it is forbidden to me to lend you a thousand francs that you must
give me back in ten years, to tell you : " Each year you will give me iifty
francs of interest."

But tirst, in lending you that money, I may suffer a certain loss; I
know not exactly what, but I have to foresee it. It is just then that I
should take my precautions, in stipulating, for instance, that in ten years
you will give me back, not a thousand francs, but two thousand francs;
for I deem the loss suffered by me worth a thousand francs.

Then, that borrowed money I cannot use any more in my business or
in my industry; I would have put it to good usage. I estimate at a
thousand francs the benefit I might have realized with it during ten years.
You have prevented me; it is then another thousand francs that you will
have to give me at the fixed time.

But this is not all. Who is guarantee that you will pay me back? Ten
years— it is a long time. I run a risk there; that is well worth five
hundred francs, in good conscience. Besides, you are not quoted as very
solvent.

Last, it is well understood that you will pay me at the fixed day. But
if that were not the case? 1 f you were late in your payment? Think that I
depend on that money at the precise moment. If you do not pay me then,

xxxii Preface.

404) ; the injustice of the civil marriage (page 380), the numerous
causes for the destruction of the marriage tie (pages 376,384) ;
scorn for the people, and crawling before the great (pages
103,384,400, 412) ; false witness (page 157) ; lies (page 165) ;
perjuiy, mental restriction (page 156) ; the nullity of marriage
with infidels or heretics ; distinction between the value of legacies
not under legal formalities ; void if profane, valid if pious (pages
252, 280) ; the chase in prohibited time (page 180) ; the auda
cious clerical impertinence of taking up the old thesis that the
clergy are not under the civil law (page 80), and setting in the
first rank of crimes, the fact of having (even as a child) struck a
priest, or violated the monastic claustration.

But it would take a long time to exhaust the matter, and the
reader will do me the justice that I did nothing but to graze the
subject. I leave him to his own reflections ; and he shall judge if
the condemnation of the Parliament of Paris, inscribed in epigraph
on this volume, can be applied justly to the modern Jesuits.

But yet, I bog to call his attention to the error with which
Guiy seems impregnated, like all the casuists who preceded him.
That lubric licentiousness of imagination is seen in two different
manners: first, in the study of what they call the "shameful
matters," that is to say, the Vllh and IXth Precepts of the Decalogue
(pages 142, 153), and the duties of married people (pages 388,
399, 425, 435) ;* it is manifested by a luxury of lascivious researches,
a love of obscene details, an invention of unclean circumstances,

it will be ten francs a day for the delay : take it or leave it at jronr pleasure !

This is more than necessary, it seems : and the poor borrower would pre
fer a good deal to pay 5 per cent out of his capital; so the Casuist's pupil
might be done for, in spite of all his ingenious foresight. But be easy : if
the civil law allows the loan at interest, that is to say, the limit, as this
takes place in France; immediately, that practice, solemnly prohibited by
the Church, "in virtue of natural, divine and ecclesiastical rights," becomes
permitted; and more, the lender may stipulate the interest of the inter
ests ; besides, he can exceed the allowance of the legal rate if his debtor is
not in great distress: at last let his mind be easy, if he is a banker, be
cause he may exact something from everybody in remuneration for his
trouble.

Here is, if I am not mistaken, a situation very much simplified ; but what
would Benoit XIV. say to it? and what would become of his " Bull Vix
pervenit" against the loan at interest?

* See also Rousselot, page 449-485.

Preface. xxxiii

which leaves far behind all that has been imagined by the authors
of Justin and of Gamiani.*

But what is far more interesting, is to see the genetic preju
dices haunting, in so constant a manner, the mind of the Jesuit,
that he is dominated by them in many cases where they have
absolutely nothing to do with the subject. Is it a question of
invincible ignorance? he takes for an example children " qui
egerunt de se illicita" (pnge 49) ; of the indirect will? it is Lubain,
with his carnal temptations (page 56) ; an effect of violence? it
is Suzanne (page 51), or Bertine and her master (page 57) ; of the
erroneous conscience? it is Ferdinand, George, Gustave, a child
ten years old, and his u tactus turpes" with his first cousin
(page 73) etc., (see especially the cases on confession). Is it a
question of the general theory of intentional sin ? the only example
that comes into his mind is, that "in confession one accuses one's-
self of fornication : it is necessary to declare the parental degree,
affinity, marriage, chastHy, which relates to the person in question "
(compendium, Vol. I., No. 167). Then, with what ingenuity he de
tails the reserved cases (pages 351 and fol.) , opposition to marriage
(page 412 and fol.), with the unclean story of Sudimille (page
412) ; together with hundreds of cases cropping out from all parts
of the book.

What sha!l we sa}* of the shameless way he treats the marriage
question; conjugal duty; marringe consummation, petition and
surrender to duty ? He thinks of nothing else. And what skillful
solutions, in order to have mastery over the husband through the
wife.

But the most interesting fact that is brought out in this part of
our study is, the deep scorn that the Jesuit has for woman. In
the daily practice of life, there is no kind of mystic caresses,
nor wheedling undulations of voice and gesture, that he does
not resort to, in order to seduce her. Here are the mysterious and

* Do not wonder, after this, that those who are impregnated with such a
doctrine are drawn to the most monstrous results. I have pointed out in
my report on the proposition of law of M. Barodet (primary instruction)
that in tlie last two years, our tribunals little suspected of partiality, have
condemned for crimes and attempts against morality, about four times
more (in proportion to number) congregational teachers than lay ones.

xxxiv Preface.

nocturnal meetings ; where they go, with eyes down- cast, under the
veil, and grazing the walls, with sighs, predications, music, incense,
intoxication of the inferior senses, in the depths of obscure and
sonorous chapels, where the step grows furtive, and where the
lustre, hung high, hypnotizes. Elsewhere, the propaganda or
charity societies confraternities, where the Jesuit knows how to
set in motion the multiple attractions of vanity in playing some
part — a need not satisfied by modern society, — even in the noblest
aspirations of the heart of feminine generosity. Everywhere
there are manifestations of respect, gratitude and love : they have
placed the woman upon the altar, and have exempted 4%the Mother
of God" not only from all sin, but even from original sin. Mari-
olatry dominates Christianity, and this after the sous of Loyola.

Very well ; this is for the world, for the outside, for policy, for
domination ; because the master of the woman is the master of
the man. But listen how they speak when they are together, far
from the mystic ears of the zealots and banner-bearers. They
take for themselves the harsh words of the ecclesiastic: "From
the cloak comes the scurf; through the woman, the evil to man."
(page 306). " Bear this truth well in mind," says Gury, " better
feel the evil will of a man, than the good will of a woman" (page
368). In all their dissertations, their deep scorn for the daughter
of Eve, the first corrupter, is often manifested under the most
vulgar form. I could show hundreds of examples that the reader
will meet along the way : let me quote only one — very curious in
man}- points of view. The casuist a^ks himself, if it is necessary
to baptize the children born of a beast and a human being. Yes,
he answers, if it is a question of a man with a beast ; Ao, if it is
of a woman and a beast ; for in the first case only the child
may be considered as a descendant of Adam ! (page 483).

So the woman is nothing to the Jesuit, but a kind of ground
where the human plant germinates : she belongs to mankind only
as a feeding receptacle. Do not ask the casuist, then, to under
stand anything about the noble sentiments which are the honor of
humanity. He knows not what is love ; he knows only forni
cation. He pollutes, with his unclean reveries, all that is most
holy, mobt pure in the world. It is n t o.ly the nuptial bed,

Preface. xxxv

the mysteries of which ho scrutinizes with an insatiable lubricity,
tormented by a quivering jealousy ; he surveys obliquely the
chaste conversation of a married couple ; the kiss of the sister
and brother, father and daughter, mother and little c'lild (page
144) ; he blights them with his impure suspicion, and also the first
quivering of the awakening soul, and the games of childhood, that
he hates and calumniates (Page 144). Over this joy, this tender
ness, these exquisite graces, we see his viscous trace, like the slime
of the snail on the most brilliant flowers.

If he does not know what is love, nor even decency,* no
more does he know what is delicacy, generosity, devoted ness, f
friendship, personal dignity, civic dutjr, love of country : he
ignores so thoroughly these noble things, that he does not know
even their name.

You will not find a single one of these word-? in Gir'y's volumes.
Everything that makes the heart of himinity palp;tit3, leaves
him cool. Do not speak to him of progress, of fraternity, of
science, of liberty, of hope ; he understands not : he rehearses, in
his obscure corner, erroneous consciences, secret compensations,
menial restrictions, shameful sins ; and with all that, he tries
to compose I know not what electuary, in order to stupify and
enslave human'ty.

For he degrades everything he touches. Suppressing conscience,
delivering free-will into the hands of a director, practising deceit
— even towards the confessor, who by h'm is suspected of being
tinged with secularism — a means for governing the souls of nun,
narrowing the horizons, cutting the wings, eternizing twilig'it
around thought and conscience, worse than the night, because all
becomes doubtful and takes a fantastic aspect : sec what he lias
done with all those he has set his hand on ! I say nothing of the

* See the incredible thesis' defended by the Jesuit, that for a girl to
abandon herself to others, and have children by them, is not to wrong her
affianced husband. (Page 404).

t Neither for his country, which is never mentioned among Jesuits,
they having no country of their own; neither for his fellow-men, for no
one is obliged to devote himself to others; nor even for a sick husband,
whose abandonment is excused, ordered even, in case of danger. (Page
529).

xxxvi Preface.

French clergy, whose actual members would take in bad part the
instituting of a contrast between themselves and their predeces
sors. But the French nobility, so bright, so proud, so generous,
in spite of their levity, regard it, though distasteful, as without
power, barbed not with iron, as of old, but with scapularies and
blessed nick-nacks. As for the bourgeoisie, with its strong and
wise spirit, loving wo:k, progress and liberty ; see it, powerless,
affrighted, the victim of reactions. And they were going to seize
the magistracy ; they were stretching their hands over the army ;
those two safeguards of a nation ! Ah ! it was time, truly, to open
our e}~es ; for, more skillful than Simon, the cursed magician, they
were selling for money, not only the holy things, but also material
properties, giving in exchange a few pious tomfooleries !

Happily, among those they brutify, they themselves may be
reckoned in the first line. During three centuries, it.has been often
remarked, they have not produced one man of the first, nor even
of the second rank ; but they do not seem to perceive it. To
Richelieu they oppose, impudently, Bellarmhi, Suarez to Pascal,
Rapin to Corneille, and Nonotte to Voltaire.

Ah! it is not with impunity that one submits one's heart and
mind to such a discipline! In reading the Jesuits, I have often
evoked before my mind the image of what would be a complete
specimen of their intellectual and moral fabrication. We can
almost see him, while I write, stealing on over there, discreetljr,
in the shadows of the wall. It is not that he always puts on the
mask of humility given to him in the corned}' : often, he is loud in
talk, and of arrogant bearing. But you will recognize him in this,
you can never see his eyes : the Constitution of his masters have
taught him "to look lower than the one to whom he speaks." His
secret thought will escape you, and his close-shut lips will not
betray him. But such as he is, young or old, if he is well impreg
nated with his authors, with Gury only, be on your guard, all of
you !

Trust him not, O young maiden ! do not say that thou art with
out fear, because he is betrothed to thee a half sacrament. If thy
fortune disappears, or if his increases, he will abandon thee with
out remorse, with authority from his director (pages 373, 404) ; it

Preface. xxxvii

is his right to do so, if between tbee and him there is a notable
difference of situation (page 400), and that whatever may have
been his previous protestations (page 4G3). Be on your guard ;
because, if warmed up by his immoral reading, he incites thee to
evil-doing, even after a solemn promise of marriage, he may aban
don thee with thy child (pag s 203, 267, 417).' Trust him not,
even if he marries thee ; for he can, by the simplest of processes,
sever the bond two months after marriage, if he declares its
requirements not to have been fulfilled (page 376), and leave thee
mercilessly, and dishonored. Trust him not ; because if, in pro
nouncing the sacramental words, he has had the intention not to
contract marriage, the act will be void : mind it (pages 407, 408).
Trust him not ; because he will not trust thee, knowing that, if
thou art a pupil of the same masters, thoti canst, without remorse,
and persuaded that thou dost him "no wrong," abandon thyself
to others before thy marriage, and hide from him the existence of
children born of thee (pages 375, 405).

Trust him not, ye his wife ! if some contagious sickness is upon
thee ; for his moral law does not oblige him to take care of thee
(page 468). Trust him not, as he will not trust thee; because
thou hast the right to abandon him in the same case; and besides,
the casuist authorizes thee to borrow from his purse recklessly
(pages 178, 215).

Trust him not, ye, his father! for if he dares not, in this 19th
century, denounce thee to the criminal judge when thou becomest
a heretic or an exile, he will be authorized to torment thy con
science at the supreme hour (page 129) ; for, in order to hide in
some convent unknown to thee, or in spite of thee (page 130), he
will abandon thee, old and miserable, persuaded that his at t is
agreeable to God (page 319). Trust him not; because, if he cnn
no more rejoice in the possession of his inheritance, after having
killed thee (page 100), it will be at least allowable to "rejoice
in the inheritance that his murder will have procured him" (page
100). Look out for him ; for if on thy death-bod thou entrust him
with a gift for a friend, he has the right to disobey thy last will
(pane 253).

Trust h m not, ye, his child ! for he is permitted to wi>h

xxxviii Preface.

for thy death, either in view of thy eternal happiness, in view
of diminishing the cares of his family, or of delivering thce from
the risks of a sinful life (pnge 109).

Trust him not, ye, his brother ! because he may, calumniating
thee at the death-bed of thy father, deprive thee of thy legitimate
inheritance, provided he does not do it through hate for thee
(page 227) ; because he may leave in misery thee and thy family,
without remorse, and carry his fortune to a neighboring convent
(page 319) ; because he will be authorized to make up skillfully
fiom the paternal inheritance for what he may consider an in
justice committed against him (page 208).

Trust him not, you, his friends! because he is authorized to
betray your secrets, even the most intimate, when he judges
that so to act is in the interest either of the Church, or of a
third person (page 407) ; trust not a letter into his hands ; because
he will always find some good reason to open it without sin (pages
164, 1G9) ; and if your secret is a bad action, remember that
he can divulge it to any one who is interested in knowing it (page
161). Do not lend him any books ; because, if he deems them
bad from his point of view, he is authorized not to give them ba<jk,
unless he is threatened with a good thrashing (page 106).

Tru-t him not, all of you ! who have with him business inter
course ; because, in case of a doubtful transaction, he can interpret
it either in one sense or the other, with all safety of conscience,
according to his interests (pages 69, 76). For instance, if he sur
renders his goods, he may secretly keep part for himself and family
(page 251), and even dissimulate his indebtedness (page 240) ;
yea, he may even invent ingenious secret compensations, grazing
the swindle (page 219). Because, if you make a will, he will
always find the means to have the benefit of it without executing
the clauses of it (pages 268, 280) ; and he will know, without
any heart-anguish, how to dissimulate the errors of form (page
91), and even to set right the material ambiguity (pages 277,
304) ; if you refuse, be careful to declare that he owes you
money; without that, he will find a reason not to give it back to
your heir (page 276). Because, if you lend him your horse, and
he should be stolen from him, he can refuse to pay you (page 283)

Preface, xxxix

Because, if you convey any mone}* to him, he will use it in trade,
and keep the benefit for himself (page 284.) Because he is
persuaded that he does no injustice in combining with others to
hinder your auction-sale (pages 262, 287.) Because he has a
thousand ways to dispense himself from paying back what he
owes you (page 192.) Because, — and this is worth a poem! —
he can wish you a temporal injury, and rejoice at it, with a good
end in view! (page 104.)

Do not bet with him ; because he is full of resources to make
dishonest bets without sinning (page 297.) Do not play with
him ; because he will conduct himself as an infamous Greek, with
all safety of conscience (pages 297, 298.)

Do not believe, under the thought that he is pious, in his
promises, nor in his oath, when he sells something to you : those
are little peccadillos permitted to merchants (page 261.)

Do not take him as a servant ; because he knows thoroughly the
theory of little thefts, thefts of article of food, with the conditions
of restitution (page 184) ; and if he judges that you do not pay
him enough, or make him work too much, he will find a way to
establish the just equilibrum (pag >s 188, 218.)

Look out for him, clerks of the toll-office, clerks of custom duty,
whoever you may be ! because he does not admit the legitimacy
of your tax, and he will avoid it by any means possible : do not
interrogate him, he will lie, under oath, if that is necessary : he is
authorized (pages 91, 205, 219) ; and watch him well, if he is a
notary, because he will help, in conscience, to defraud the tax-
gather (pages 244, 317.)

Trust him not, members of the council of revision ! because he
is held to no restitution, if he has somebody ready to take his
place (page 206.) Look out for him colonel! he will desert
legitimately, if he does not find in the regiment facilities for con
fessing (page 205.)

Beware of him, judge ! when he appears before you as plaintiff,
accused, or witness. In vain you compel him to lift up his hand
and give his oath before Christ, his God. Almost in all circum
stances he will find means to escape you (pages 157, 164, 165, 168,
272, 303, 316, etc.) ; and if you condemn him, he can, if he deems

xl Preface.

his conscience free, compensate himself secretly, to your condem
nation.

Beware of him, all of yon, and avoid him as the plague ! neither
your goods, nor }*our life, nor your honor are in safety with him.

Because, if lie advises and induces a thief to plunder your
house, he owes you nothing (pages 194, 198, 233) ; because if he is
a judge and renders against you, for complicity with his colleagues,
an unjust sentence bought with a bribe, he owes you nothing (page
234) ; because, if his children or his servants have destroyed some
of your property, he owes you nothing (page 235) ; because, if
he sees a thief take away your goods, and he receives money as a
bribe for his silence, he owes you nothing (pages 237, 249) ;
because, if he has set fire to your house, wanting an occasion to
steal, he owes you nothing (page 196) ; because, if he has
killed your cow, in firing wilfully at your donkey, he owes you
nothing (pages 56, 196, 247) ; because, if he has burned your
house, wanting to burn your neighbor's, he owes you nothing (pages
196, 228, 233) ; because, if he is the thief and you are accused
and condemned for his theft, he owes you nothing ; even should
he have committed that theft in order to have you suspected of it
(pages 195, 216) ; because, if you are the creditor of a man whom
he has assassinated, he owes you nothing (page 203) ; because, if
you are the wife or the child of a man murdered by him, and if
that man was leading a bad life (page 242), or even was soon to
die (page 203), he owes you nothing; because he in no case owes
you anything, if in killing your father he believed he was killing
another man (page 228) ; neither if, having voluntarily murdered
your father, he deems that you are able to provide for yourself
(page 203).

Because he can defame you freely, if he is skillful and has
profited well by his lessons (pages 161, 168) ; and even when the
defamation is without excuse and compels damages, he can avoid
paying them, if he deems the conservation of his good reputation
^useful to religion" (page 162) ; because he can seduce a young
girl, even under promise of marriage, and have children by her,
and then abandon her mercilessly, if he can argue a certain
inequality of situation either previous or subsequent to tue promise

Preface. xli

(page 463) ; and do not speak to him of coming to the help of
the poor girl, because he would answer you loftily, that "• the loss
of virginity can neither he estimated nor indemnified" (pages 204,
243) ; because, if you take in his house some poisoned nourish
ment destined for another, he is not bound to warn you, and
besides, after your death he will owe nothing to anybody (page
223).

Run away from him ; because he has at his disposal " the
largely mental restrictions and ambiguous words'' (page 156),
which allow him, in fact, to lie every time it is for his interest
to do so.

Run away from him ; because the doctrine of probabilism allows
him always to find out a grave doctor whose opinion will be suffi
cient to legitimatize his action, and will authorize him to act
according to his own welfare.

Avoid him ; because, once his opinion is grounded, he can
violate with safety of conscience all civil laws, and if condemned
by the judge, can extensively and quietly use secret reparation
(page 188) ; it is on this point that it is necessary to insist. In
virtue of the doctrine of intention, he comes to substitute his own
authority for all other. The laws exist no more for him ; neither
the civil law nor the sacred ties of the family ; neither the laws of
honor nor anything constituting that cement which binds together
the elements of society. He will do such a thing if he deems it
good, according to his point of view ; for, having on his side a
renowned doctor, he has a right to find it good. In all cases,
having performed the act according to a conscience invincibly
erroneous, as he has not committed any theological fault, he is held
to no reparation whatever ; and if the civil judge dares to order
one, he will compensate himself accordingl}*.

Such would be, in the maximum of development, the best pupil
of Jesuitical doctrines. Fortunately, the}7 have never, I believe,
formed one so complete. Honesty, which is in the depth of human
nature, takes the upper hand in the pupil, as well as in the teacher ;
and this above all in France, the abode of generosity. It is with
out doubt for this reason, that, for three centuries, not a single

xlii Preface.

Frenchman has been impregnated thoroughly enough with the
Jesuitical spirit to deserve the rank of General.

But is not such teaching, even mitigated by common sense and
native honor, a true social peril? Who can say how many strug
gling generations would pass away, before all the noble qualities
which yet exist would be blighted and vanquished for ever? As
for me, I cannot think of it without shivering. May the reading
of the present book communicate to all my sincere and profound
terror ! May liberals, the most compromised to-day by a generous
logic, understand that principles are not made for the sake of
those who act in opposition to principles, as the freedom of ex
change is not violated when pestiferous bales are seized in our
ports !

ANALYSIS

OF THE

Works of Father Gury, S. J.,

Professor of Moral Theology in the College Eomain,

A,- COMPENDIUM OF MOEiL THEOLOGY,

The art of arts is the government of souls.
(S. Gregory.)

B.- CASES OF CONSCIENCE.

Long is the way through precepts ; brief and
efficacious through examples.

(Seneca.)

MORAL THEOLOGY

CASES OF CONSCIENCE.

BOOK I.

TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTIONS.

Chapter I.

OF THE NOTIONS OF HUMAN ACTS.

1. Definition. The act, in general, is the determination of
power, or the faculty to act, consisting in exercise, or even the
use of this acting faculty. Power, in circumstances in which
it may become action, is ordinarily called first act, and its deter
mination, second act.

But the human act proceeds from the deliberate will of man, or
from his free will, turned towards good or evil. The human is
then a moral act. . . .

The human act differs from the act produced in man without
deliberation, such a*s the involuntary acts, or spontaneous move-
munts (primo-primi)) or the heedless acts of man, in sleep, delir
ium, folly, drunkenness, when he is not under the control of his
reason.

2. — Division. The human acts are multiple :

1. Spontaneous or commanded. . . .

2. Internal or external. . . .

3. Good, bad, or indifferent.

4. Natural or supernatural. . . .

5. Valid or void.

46 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CHAPTER II.

PRINCIPLES OF THE ACTS.

3. They are: knowledge, will, and libertjv

They constitute those acts, and are necessary for each one of
them, as it results from the definition of the human act. . . .

ART. I. — Of the voluntary act.

SECTION 1. — Of the voluntary act in general.

4. The voluntary act proceeds from the will with the intellectual
knowledge of the end. The reason of that definition results from
what has just been said, or from the necessity of a previous knowl
edge, so that the will could be induced to act.

It differs : first, from the wilful act which is only the object of
the will, and as such, does not proceed from nor depend on it ;
so the rain falling on a barren land will be called w.lful by the
farmer, but not voluntary; second, from the spontaneous act,
which is produced by a knowledge purely material and sensual,
and so imperfect, such as one may recognize in beasts.

5. — There are several wills :

1. Perfect or imperfect.

2. Simply voluntary, or dependent on something (secundam
quid). . . . Thus to throw goods into the sea when one is threat
ened with a wreck, is said to be an act simply voluntary, though
involuntaiy in relation to something, on account of the reluctance
without efficiency of the will.

3. Direct or indirect. . . .

4. Positive or negative. . . .

5. Formal or tacit. . . .

6. Actual, virtual, habitual and interpretative. . . .

6. — In the same act, there may be a direct will in itself, indirect
in its cause, and involuntary.

Example : Titius wanting to kill Caius, his enemy, attacks him,
risking to wound his comrade who is with him ; but the bullet,
besides the two men, strikes also Simpronius, that Titius could n >t
see, not knowing him to be there. Ca:us is struck by the direct

Cases of Conscience. 47

will of Titius, his comrade by the indirect will, and Sympronius
outside of any will.

SECTION 2. — Of the voluntary act in particular.

There is no particular difficulty in the other wills, we shall
speak only of the indirect will.

7. — That will, as it has been said, has not a direct aim in itself,
but results from something else directly thought of, as tiie eff ct
from the c;iuse. Who wants the cause, wants the effect which
follows it, if that effect has been foreseen. . . .

There are several sorts of causes :

1. Physical or moral. . . .

2. Immediate or mediate. . . .

3. Near or far off. . . .

4. Cause by itself (per se) or by accident (per accidens). . . .

The first one tends, by its nature, to produce the effect. Thus,
drinking too much is the cause in itself of drunkenness. The
second, although not being destined in its nature to produce the
effect, may, however, bring it out through circumstances. Thus
homicide may result from drunkenness.

8. — \ l).l(l effect proceeding from indirect will, that is to say,
from a cause indirectly willed, must not always be imputed as a
fault to its author.

In order that there should be fault, these conditions are neces
sary : That the author has forseen the effect, at least confusedly ;
that he may not have been able to produce the cause . . . ; that
he has been detained from producing the cause, or to have sup
pressed it, if it already existed. . . .

9. — It is permitted to produce a cause good or indifferent, from
which follows immediately a double effect, a good one and a bad
one, if the cause is serious and the intention honest, not directed
towards the bad effect.*

* Q. " Are we always ohlijred to abstain from an act from which we
foresee some bad ett'ect caused by the malice of a third person?

A. No, when we have a legitimate motive to do that, act, and when we
have a right to the advantage* it must brinjr <>ut, <>"« is llot obliged to
je tlio good that will result fruui it." (Petit Catcchime de Marotte.)

48 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Because if this was not allowed, the author would sin, either by
the intention of a bad effect, by the production of the cause, or
by the prevision of the bad effect. Nothing of this can be sus
tained. . . .

10. — Examples: . . .

A young girl sins gravely if she miscarries in order to avoid dis
honor. The reason of it is, that the miscarriage is directly a
means to liberate herself from infamy, and that she seeks good
through evil.*

Article II. Of free will.

11. — Free will is what proceeds from the will acting upon itself,
with power not to act. Then, liberty is the faculty to act or not,
or of choosing one thing rather than another. So, all that is free
is voluntary, but the converse is not true.

Although free will and will differ between themselves, neverthe
less, in the acts by which man travels upon this earth, tending to
his end, they are never separated in reality. . . .

There are several kinds of liberty :

1. Liberty without constraint, or of indifference, or of choice.

2. Liberty without an}T outweighing power, exempted from any
exterior violence.

3. Liberty of contradiction, faculty to act contrariwise.

4. Liberty of contrariety, by which one can choose either one
thing or its opposite.

5. Liberty of specification, faculty to employ one's self in
different things.

* This is indeed what decided Innocent XI. to condemn the following
proposition, on the 2d of March, 1079: "It is permitted to provoke
abortion before the animation of the foetus, for fear that the girl should
be exposed to death or infamy." (Prop. 34).

But, if we may be allowed to believe they have to make apology to-day,
the Jesuits did not always avow themselves vanquished by the decree of
the Papacy. Jean Marin wrote, in 1720: "One could perhaps admit
the doctrine of the condemned proposition, to avoid infamy, if no other
means is to be found to hide the crime and avoid the infamy. And
perhaps he would not be in the ca^e of the condemned proposition who
would say that abortion is permitted, not to avoid his own infamy, but that
of a religious community." <^Page 423).

Cases of Conscience. 49

ARTICLE III.

Obstacles to free will and to will.

Thero are four of them : Ignorance, concupiscence, fear and

violence.

SECTION I. — Of ignorance.

13. — Generally speaking, ignorance is the want of knowledge.
We distinguish : 1st, The ignorance positive or negative, from

what we ought to know or what we ought not. . . .

2. Of right or of fact. . . .

3. Superable or insuperable, that is to say, that one can over
come b}' one's efforts, or not ; physically, by any means, morally,
by any moral attention. . . .

4. Antecedent or consequent. . . .

We distinguish three superable ignorances : Firstly, Simply
such, when in order to conquer it we bring some attention, but
not enough ; Secondly, Vulgar, when no effort, or scarcely any, is
made to discover the truth ; Thirdly Affected, when one seeks,
directly and positively, to ignore, either to sin more freely, or in
order to have an excuse for sinning.

14. — Insuperable ignorance effaces the will.* Then no act
proceeding from it can be imputed to its author. . . .

Superable ignorance does not take away the will . . . but
diminishes it. ...

The vulgar ignorance and the affected ignorance diminish the
will a good deal less, and consequently the sin. . . .

EXAMPLES :

A husband sinning with a woman that he ignores in an insuper
able manner, as the sister of his wife, is culpable of adultery, but
not of incest.

Children* who have made an illcit use of their own bodies, with
out remorse of conscience, have not sinned in principle, though
having attained the age of reason. . . .

* Insuperable ignorance, that is to say, the one we are not able to over
come by ordinary means, takes away the will and excuses the sin ( Mar-
otte Petit Catechismc) .

50 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

SECTION 2. — Of concupiscence.

15. — Concupiscence is the movement of the sensual appetite
which incites the will to a sensual pleasure.

There are two of them ; the one antecedent which precedes the
voluntary act, the other consequent, which follows it. ...

Antecedent concupiscence, far from effacing the will, rather
augments it, if we hear in mind the inclination of the will ; but it
diminishes it, and even takes it away altogether, if we understand
the judgment of reason and the deliberation of will. . . .

SECTION 3. —Of fear.

17. — Fear js the agitation of the mind in presence of actual or
future danger,for one's self or relations.
Fear is subdivided thus :

1. Grievous or light. ... It may be grievous, absolutely or
relatively. . . .

2. Intrinsical or extrinsical. . . .

3. Just or unjust. . . .

18. — The act proceeding from fear, though grievous, is simply
and absolutely voluntary and free.

SECTION 4. — Of violence.

20. — Violence is a constraint brought by an exterior and free
force, in spite of the will. . . .

Violence is absolute and relative. . . .

EXAMPLES :

21. — 1. A woman who resists by all possible means what is
offered her does not sin, although the victim of a rape ; because
no one sins in spite of himself.

2. Women sin grievously in submitting to violence, without
resistance, through timidity or fear, for instance, in order not to
offend the aggressor, even in setting aside all danger of consent ;
because although they do not consent to the sensual pleasure,
however, not resisting as they might, they agree, which is equiva-
lent,to their own ravishment, and co-operate in the crime of the
man. — But a woman overcome by force, who does not cry for
help, for fear of death, does she sin ? There is controversy.

Cases of Conscience. 51

According to the probable opinion, one may say no, putting aside
the danger of consent. And so, the woman is not obliged to cry
if she runs the danger of suffering some notable injury, either to
lose her reputation, or to be called a prude; besides, if she has
resisted as much as she could, she is not held to fight against
violence, to expose herself to so great an injury. This is the
opinion of St. Liguori. However, as there is almost always the
danger of consent, in practice, the contrary is advocated.* . . .

CHAPTER III.
MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS.
ESSENCE OF MORALITY. ITS SOURCES.
ART. 1. — Of the essence of morality.

22. — The essence of morals consists in the relation of human
acts to the eternal Law, which is the divine reason, otherwise, the
will of God.f . . .

ART. 2. — Of its sources.

They are three : The object, the circumstances, the end.

SECTION I. — Of the object.

26. — The object is the immediate aim of the moral act, but to
which converges most nearly and naturally the will of the acting
agent.

It is good, bad, or indifferent. . . .

SECTION II. — Of circumstances.

* It is here that is found, in the ancient casuist, the case of the chaste
Suzanne, to the exaggerated rigorism of whom they do not spare criticism :
" Suzanne," says Jacques Tirin, "might have avoided her troubles if, fear
ing infamy and death, she had let the adulterers satisfy their lewdness,
without consent or co-operation, permitting only, and remaining neutral.
In fact, to preserve her chastity, she was not obliged to call for help,
and in so doing defame her reputation and even endanger her own life;
for the integrity of the body is of a less consequence than reputation or
life." (page 291.) It is also the opinion of Cornelius, Dicastille, etc., etc.

f All this passage may be summed up in these bold words of Jean Ger-
son : " God does not will certain actions because they are good ; but they
are good because He wills them. Just the same as others are bad because
He forbids them.

52 Tlte Doctrine of the Jesuits.

27. —Circumstances are the accidental determination of the
act, without which it nrght exist in its substance, but nevertheless
injure in some way, its morality. Circumstances are not the
object of the act, because will reaches them only in the second
degree. . . .

SECTION III. — Of the end.

28.— The end, in general, is the reason for acting. There are
two : The end of the act being the crowning of the act, and the
end of the agent, that is to say, that on which the agent directs
his intention.

ON THE MERITS OF THE ACTS.

33.— A meritorious act is a good work, worthy, through grace, of
reward or retribution. Acts are of two kinds : The meritorious
act de condigno, to which a reward is due in justice, that is to say,
by the promise of God ; and the act de congrtio, which has a right
to a reward, not by the justice of God, but by a certain agreement,
and through God's generosity. . . .

34. __ What is necessary in order that an act should be merito

rious de condigno ?

It should be: 1st, Free . . . ; 2nd, honest . . . ; 3d, produced
by grace . . . ; 4th, the agent must be in a state of grace. . . .

Casts of Conscience on f&uman Sets,

CASE I.
OF WILL.

ARNULFE, an honest man but imperious, meets his enemy ;
harassed by him with insults and blows, burning with a desire to
kill him, he seizes a dagger and springs upon him. Bat he
masters his anger and runs away. Then, becoming calmer, and
fearing he has committed an attempt against life, throws himself
at the feet of his confessor and avows his fault.

In another instance, knowing that when in a state of drunken
ness he is of a quarrelsome disposition, he takes good care not to
drink to excess. But it happens that, exciled by his friends to
drink more than usual, he gets drunk before thinking of his danger,
and becoming furious, he quarrels with the others. Coming to
himself, he hurries to do penance and goes to his confessor.

Ques. Has Arnulfe sinned in both cases?

Ans. Arnulfe does not seem to have sinned in any case, at least
grievously ; because he had not a knowledge full and perfect of
evil, and there was no premeditation, as we can see in the peru
sal of cases of conscience. Besides, Arnulfe, being subject to augur
in the first case, we may think that he has followed his first impulse
(ex motu, primo-primo egisse). As for the second case, he could
not sin if he did not think of all the perils of drunkenness.

CASE II.
OF WILL.

1. — Elpidius, a drunkard and fighter, who grows furious in a
state of drunkenness, quarrels with Titius, and decides to revenge
himself on him ; however, he pins off his project to another time.
Then, he repairs to a tavern in the neighborhood to drown his

54 TJie Doctrine of the Jesuits.

anger ; but coming out during the night in a state of drunkenness,
he meets Titius, and beats him fearfully, so that he (Titius) is
forced for many weeks to leave his work, and sustains great loss.

2. — Blazius, in order to cause injury to Cains, takes his gun, and
shoots at the donkey of the latter. B;it alas ! a double misfortune
happens. He misses the donkey, which escapes safe and sound,
and kills Titius' cow, resting quietly behind a hedge, and which he
had not seen.

Ques. 1. Must the injury caused to Titius during the drunkenness
of Elpidius, be imputed to the latter, and must he be held for dam
ages?

2. Quid, in the case in which, not being in the habit of drinking
to excess, he would have done it through inadvertence?

3. Can Blazius be held to a restitution for the donkey that he
missed, or for the cow which he killed?

Ans. Question 1. — Yes, the reason of it is, that the injury
is plainly voluntary, and foreseen in its cause, at least vaguely (in
confuso). Elpidius wanted, in fact, to wrong Titius; he drank
in danger of getting drunk, being, by nature, a drunkard. Besides,
he must have foreseen, iinpliedly at least, that he would cause some
wrong in such a state, being aware t:iat he becomes furious, and
that he may it jure some one. Elpidius cau not then be absolved
from a grievous sin against justice, nor dispensed from the obligation
to compensate the injury.

Ans. Question 2. — In this hypothesis, the evil committed by
Elpidius cannot 1 e imputed to him ; because he is not voluntarily
in the act (in actu), the reason missing, neither in the cause (in
causa) the evil not having been foreseen.

Ans. Question 3. — Blazius is bound to no restitution. Certainly
not for the donkey, which ran away safe and sound ; neither for
the cow, having not foreseen that misfortune, nor supposed it.
Then, in conscience,* and before the sentence of the judge, he can
not be constrained to any reparation for the injury. Quid, if the
donkey and cow had belonged to the same Cains? I answer, in
the widest acceptation of principles, that, not even in that case,

*" In conscience, one is exempted from restitution if the wrong, even
grievous, has been done without theological faults. " (Fruchala 175(J).

Cases of Conscience on Human Acts. 55

should Blazius be held to repair the injury, having done it
involuntarily.

CASE IV.
OF THE INDIRECT WILL.

Richard, an inn-keeper, happy in having a large patronage,
furnishes abundantly wine to the drinkers, incited by the love (f
lucre, and also by the desire to prevent blasphemous talk, though
foreseeing that many of them will get drunk ; in his conscience, he
is not sinning. lie harbors, even cheerfully, men who hold impious
or obscene conversations, and he does not reproach them for it,
because, says he, he is not responsible for their conduct.

Ques. 1. Does Richard sin gravely in furnishing wine to peo
ple who will get drunk, without any better reason than his love for
gain?

Ques. 2. Does he sin grievously in trying in such a manner to
prevent the drinkers from blaspheming?

Ans. Question 1. — 1st, Yes, in certain particular cases; for
instance, if it is a question of a toper almost drunk, who asks for
more wine. The reason for it is, that in this precise case, he is
only subject to a slight loss, in order to avoid a certain and
determined sin.

2d, Generally, in theory, No; because the inn-keeper is not
held to sustain a considerable loss in order to prevent the habitual
sin of drunkenness in his clients ; charity does not force upon us
such a sacrifice.

The love of gain, understood in a vague and general manner, is
sufficient for not opposing those sins. They are committed acci
dentally, and against the intention of the innkeeper ; besides, lie
cannot refuse to serve the drink called for without sustaining con
siderable loss, because it is hard to fiml a tavern where a large
number of clients do not drink to excess, quarrel, etc., elc. ISo
if the publican refuses what is asked for, his customers will go
somewhere else, and he will sustain great loss.

Ans. Question 2. — No ; the desire to prevent blasphemies is suffi
cient to allow drunkenness ; because, of two evils we must choo&e

5G T^e Doctrine of Cue Jesuits.

the least. Now the greatest is blasphemy ; for, according to Ilicr-
onymus, nothing is more odious than blasphemy.

CASE V.
OF THE INDIRECT WILL.

Lubanus, to amuse himself, is in the habit of going on horse
back. But often, during that exercise, he is subjected to carnal
temptations, and even oftentimes to pollutions. Al hough he
deeply regrets these sorrowful occurrences, he fears to soil his
conscience, and he asks his confessor if he must no more enjoy that
exercise.

Ques. Has Lubanus sinned?

Ans. Let not Lubanus be troubled. Though it is only for
amusement, it would be hard for him to renounce it forever. Jt
would be otherwise if it was a question of only one or two parti
cular cases.

CASE VI.

EFFECTS OF IGNORANCE.

Adalbert makes this confession : 1st, Wanting to murder my
enemy, Titius, I have killed my friend Gains ; 2nd, Firing on a
deer, I struck my enemy hidden in a bush, and whom I wanted to
kill; 3d, Ignoring that I was in the time of fasting, I ate meat;
but, through laziness, I had not been to mass on Sunday when t le
obligations for the week had been announced.

Ques. 1. Was there an ignorance excusing sin, and what was it?

Ques. 2. What must we t.n'nk of Adalbert?

Ans. Question 1. — 1st, Insuperable ignorance excuses from all
sin ; because it entirely prevents knowledge of evil, and suppresses
the will. In presence of that ignorance, the obligation or prohibi
tion of the law cannot be known, and so cannot compel; because
u Nothing is willed if not preconceived." 2nd, Insuperable
ignorance does not excuse from sin, not suppressing will ; and in
presence of that ignorance, there is a sufficient and vague know
ledge which obliges us to search for the truth.

Ans. Q lestion 2. — In tlio first case, Alalbert must be excused

Cases of Conscience on Human Acts. 57

from all sin for the homicide committed, if he has not foreseen
the death of Caius ; for instance, if he took good care to strike
any other than Titius. The reason of it is, that this outward
act does not constitute an injustice toward Caius, killed involun
tarily. So, he cannot be held for any restitution to his heirs, It
would be otherwise if he had omitted the precautions that In*
ought to take, or if he had vaguely foreseen the danger of killii.g
Caius.

In the second case, we must distinguish : either he has taken the
necessary precautions to avoid injuring another, or not. If he
took them, Adalbert cannot have sinned in the absence of will,
even trying to kill his enemy, because, although he wanted to kill
him, he was not ready to do it at that particular moment.

In the third case, we must also distinguish : if Adalbert, avoid
ing to assist at mass on Sunday, has had a grave doubt on the
obligation that would be imposed for the week, and if he has
neglected to inform himself, or to interrogate prudently others on
the subject ; because then, his ignorance has been superable, and
he has sinned against the commandment of the Church. But if,
neither at that moment nor later, he thought of the obligation in
question, though he has sinned in not going to mass, he has not
sinned in breaking the fast.

CASE IX.
OF FEAR AND VIOLENCE.

BERTINE, a servant fearing God and having a horror of sin, fre
quently solicited to do evil by her master, resists him every time.
Her confessor exhorts her to avoid the occasion of sin : she asks
him, she begs of him, to let her stay in the same house, because
her wages are well paid, and she could only with difficulty find
another situation. The confessor consents to it.

Soon after, her master presses her again to sin with him, and
she is ensnared. What will the unfortunate servant want to do?
She dares not cry, for fear of losing both her own and her mas
ter's reputation. Then, as she begins to cry out, her master,
blinded by passion, threatens her with death. But, however, find-

58 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

ing herself in her such embarrassment, she remains purely
passive, and from the bottom of her heart curses the sin.

Ques. 1. Was Bertine obliged to avoid the occasion of sin, and
be constrained by her confessor, and even if he refused her
absolution ?

Ques. 2. Did she sin grievously in not calling for help for the
reasons mentioned by her?

Ques. 3. Did she sin grievously in not defending herself to the
last, and in abandoning herself, passively, for fear of death?

Ans. Question 1. — Bertine ought to have been advised to avoid
the actual occasion of sin, if she could have found another situa
tion ; but, as it was a question only of a probable occasion, she
could not be constrained to leave her place.

Ans. Question 2. — There is controversy. According to some,
she has grievously sinned in principle ; first, in not calling out,
unless she is excused for her good intention. Because she had
an easy remedy against the danger thut her chastity incurred, and
her excuses have no weight. There was no risk of losing her
reputation ; because, only honest women cry out in such circum
stances. As for the reputation of her master, he could impute its
loss but to his own perversity.

Ans. Question 3. — There is controversy. But according to
Lacroix and others, she must be excused for the fear of death ;
inasmuch as there was, on her part, no co-operation whatever.

CASE X.
OF CONCUPISCENCE.

MARCHAND, 1st, reads different novels, foreseeing that he will
take pleasure in obscene subjects ; 2nd, occasionally, he looks at
the nakedness of statues, but resists the temptations caused by the
sight ; 3rd, he takes pleasure in shameful acts, but does not know
for certain if he was sleeping or awake ; 4th, obliged by his
position as a merchant, to have relations with persons of both
sexes, he finds that he takes a great deal more pleasure in the
society of women than of men.

Cases of Conscience on Human Acts. 59

Q;ies. What shall the confessor decide in each one of these
cases ?

Ans. 1. If he reads for an honest motive he does not sin, pro
vided he resists temptation, because the movements of concupis
cence are quite involuntary ; and besides, there is a sufficient
cause for permitting them. If he reads for curiosity things a lit
tle dangerous, he commits a sin, it is true, but venial, always
supposing that there was no consent. But if he reads without
cause some very obscene books, he sins grievously, at least, on
the ground of the danger of giving way to temptation, except
however the case where, reading f r pure curiosity, in considera-
of his o'd age, cold temperament, or for so:r.e other particular
reasons, he is not in grave danger of succumbing.

Aus. 2. He sins grievously if the statues are in a state of
complete nakedness, and if he looks at them designedly, closely,
and for a long time ; because, without reason, he exposes himself
to shameful temptations, and runs the risk of sinning grievously.
It would be different in principle if he sees them in passing by
from a distance, or even if the statues are of no artistic merit.
This is the opinion of St. Liguori on pictures, which may be applied
to statues.

Ans. 3. One may presume that it has happened during sleep ;
because the acts of a man awake are easy to recognize. Then,
in doubt, it must be thought that it happened during sleep.

Ans. 4. He has not sinned, provided he remains honest and
resists temptation. No matter if he is attracted more towards
women than men ; because this tendency does not come from the
heart nor from the will, but rather from nature : then, in princi
ple, there is no harm done. But it must be admitted, that
such a tendency is disagreeable for a chaste mind, and even
dangerous for an imprudent man. It is necessary to advise
Marchand to moderate that inclination, and repress it accord
ing to his strength.

CASE XL

OF THE OBJECT OF MORALITY.
Monigue, inn-keeper, ... in order to prevent quarrels and

60 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

blasphemies, a custom to which her husband is addicted, very
often tells white lies ; experience has shown her that this is quite
necessary to keep peace in the household.

Ques. Must we approve this way of correcting her husband ?

Ans. It is never permitted to lie, not even in view of an advan
tage ; for, we must not do evil in order to benefit by the good that
may come out of it. Now, lying is in very nature an evil,
although it may be only a venial sin ; but although Monigue
must abstain carefully from lying, she is not obliged to tell all
the truth to her angered husband. We will explain more fully in
treating the eighth precept of the Decalogue. »

CASE XIV.
OF THE INTENTION OF THE AGENT.

Blondine, vain-glorious, seeing other women of her own con
dition go very often to confession, communion, masses, etc.,
receives the same sacraments, and goes very devotedly to mass, in
order not to appear less pious than they. Learning that, her
Confessor declares that Blondine's confession and communions are
sacrilegious, and that the masses heard are useless for her own
eternal salvation, because good proceeds from a pure motive, evil
from an imperfection, whatever it may be.

Ques. Are Blondine's confessions meritorious? and what do we
think of her other actions?

Ans. The Confessor seems rather severe. Why should Blon
dine's confessions and communions be sacrilegious? The motive
of vanity has not been the prime idea ; at least, we may suppose
so. Now, if this is admitted, there is but a venial sin in each case ;
but a sacrilege does not result from a venial sin committed in the
reception of the Sacrament of Penitence or of the Eucharist, unless
such a hypocris}T should be the principal aim of the person. Acts
produced by vanity are not always without merit, because that
vanity is not the principal motive of the person. We may apply
the axiom : " Good is the product of a pure motive," because a
motive is pure : 1st, by its object, 2d, by its end, at least partially,
3d, by its circumstances. It would not be good if it had none of
these conditions of purity.

treatise on Conscience,

36. Conscience is the practical voice of reason, or the practical
judgment by which we think that we can or may do a thing,
because it is good or commendable ; or that we must not do it,
because it is bad. So it differs from reason, which gives only the
general principles.

It is subdivided thus :

1. Conscience is sound or unsound.

2. Conscience is certain or doubtful.

3. Conscience is scrupulous or lax.

4. Conscience is probable or improbable.

CHAPTER I.
SOUND AND UNSOUND CONSCIENCE.

37. The sound conscience represents the object such as it is in
itself ; otherwise it is called unsound ; and the unsound one is
called vincible or invincible, as to whether ignorance or error is
culpable or not.

The conscience invincibly unsound which commands, must be
obeyed in all cases.*

The invincible conscience which permits, suppresses all sins.f

* Do we not recognize several cases of conscience?

Ans. Yes, we recognize the true and the false conscience, the certain and
the doubtful, the probable and the improbable, the scrupulous and the lax.
(Pt.tit Catechisme de Marotte}.

f This is the origin of the doctrine of philosophical sin, the name of
which is hidden by the modern Jesuits, through prudence, but without
having renounced, in spite of the numerous condemnations of the Church,
any of the principles from which it is deduced. Jn order to have a com
plete idea of it, it is necessary to refer to what they wrote before our
unhappy epoch of distrust and free investigation. They have never
denied those odious doctrines, the trace of which is found in all the acts
of their pupils ; but they content themselves to-day with making it an

62 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CHAPTER II.

THE CERTAIN OR DOUBTFUL CONSCIENCE.
ART. I. — Of the certain conscience.

39. — The certain conscience judges, without any fear of mis
take, whether a thing is good or bad.

There are three sorts of certainties : 1st, Metaphysical . . . ;
2d, Physical . . . ; 3d, Moral . . . ; the latter subdivided into
perfect or imperfect. . . .

There are also the direct certainty and the indirect cer
tainty. . . .

The certain conscience is the only rule of morals. . . .

The conscience morally certain, even imperfect, is sufficient. . .

ART II. — Of the doubtful conscience.

40. — This is one which hesitates to pronounce on the honesty
of an action. . . .It differs then from the probable opinion and

object of oral teaching. We find it also in some of the cases of conscience
printed even in our days. Here are citations as odious as they are ludi
crous.

Sanchez: " In order that a man should sin mortally, he must consider
either that his action is bad, that there is danger from malicious intention,
or he must have some doubt or scruple. If nothing of that exists, ignor
ance, inadvertence, forgetfulness, ought to be acknowledged, as quite
natural and invincible." (page 107.)

De Lugo : "St. Paul said to the Corinthians : // you are adulterers, you
shall not possess the Kingdom of God. . . .

"But if the Corinthians had paid no attention to the offence to God
they would have committed a philosophical adultery, but not a theological
one, the latter being a mortal sin.

" Homicide becomes so grievous by the prohibition of God, that from a
philosophically moral evil, it becomes a mortal sin, if that prohibition is
known; because, if it was ignored, and that without any fault, it would
have but the philosophical gravity which comes from its nature." (page
109.)

Dicastille: "A theft, in default of deliberation, may be a venial sin. . . .
This may happen by the violence of the tempi ation; above all, when there
is such haste that there can be no time to deliberate."

Tambourin : " The one who through inveterate habit swears falsely,
without any attention, is generally excused. ... He may also be excused
from confessing it." (page 111.)

Georges de Rhodes : " As there is no sin where there is no attention to
the malice of the act, so, there cannot be any mortal sin when one does
not perceive the gravity of the malice, or the danger of that gravity.

"For instance, one man kills another, thinking, indeed, that it is an
evil, but thinking it only a slight evil : such a mail does not sin grievously ;

Treatise on Conscience. 63

conscience which does not suspend, but gives its assent, though
with fear, to the truth of the contrary opinion.

We distinguish several doubts :

1. Positive or negative.

2: Of right or of fact.

3. Speculative or practical. The speculative doubt is subdivided
into simple speculative and practical speculative.

41. — The practically doubtful conscience is not to be depended
on altogether, and we must follow the safest way. But one may
sometimes be satisfied with the speculatively doubtful con
science. . . .

A doubt purely negative, is held to be void. . . .

Ques. What is to be done is case of a perplexing conscience?

Ans. Consult a confessor, if possible.

because it is knowledge alone which applies to the will its malice or its
gravity. So malice is imputed in proportion to the knowledge that we
have had of it.

"If some one commits an adultery, or a homicide, knowing well, but
however, in an imperfect and superficial manner, the malice and the gravity
of these actions, that man, however grievous is the act, sins, nevertheless,
but lightly. The reason is, that, as the knowledge of malice is neces
sary for the sin, so, to commit a grave sin we must have a full and
clear idea of it, and consider it as such. . . . My opinion is, that there
will be only venial sin every time that one will think, in general, of the
malice of the act, without thinking that such an act may be mortal." (page
114.)

Platel : " A sin, however contrary to reason it may be, committed by a
man who ignores invincibly, or bears not in mind that there is a God, or
that God is offended by his sin, is not a mortal sin . . . ; it is a philo
sophical wrong."

Casnedi: "When, to a morally insuperable ignorance of the prohibi
tion and malice of the action, is added an invincible error upon the
honesty of the object or precept, the action made in consequence of that
ignorance and of that error, is always honest and meritorious, if the
other circumstances are to be found there." (page 119.)

Georgelin : "In order to sin, some consideration or attention, even
actual, to the moral malice, is necessary. . . . This is true of the venial
sin, as of the mortal." (page 120.)

Jesuits of the College of Caen: "There is no law, either natural or
positive, which commands us to attribute all and eacli of our actions to
an end naturally good and honest. Even if such a law existed, either
positive or natural, it could not be enforced, because it would not be
sufficiently promulgated." (114.)

Le Moyne, Professor at the College of Auxerre : "It is true that the
natural law teaches that one must not lie ; but this same law ordains us

64 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CHAPTER III.

THE SCRUPULOUS AND LAX CONSCIENCE.
ART. I. — THE SCRUPULOUS CONSCIENCE.

The scrupulous conscience is that which, for a vain and slight
motive, doubts the honesty of an action, and fears to sin, where
there is no occasion for sin. . . .

I. Causes of scruples.

They are :

1st. The divine permission. — It is God who permits false appre
hensions, by taking the light from us.

2nd. The operation of the devil. Because the devil is very

to follow conscience, which by an insuperable ignorance can teach that
one may lie." (page 129).

Mathieu Stoz : "To commit any sin, venial or even mortal, it is not
sufficient to have a habitual knowledge of the malice of the action ; that is
to say, it does not suffice to have had it yesterday, or a few days previous ;
but it is necessary that the advertence should be actual, and at the very
time when the will commits the bad action, or begins to commit it. More
over, one cannot say that a man sins at the moment when he has not an
actual knowledge of the moral malice of the action, although he had it a
little while before.

Then the actual and invincible inadvertence of the malice of the object
excuses the sin." (page 138.)

Busembaum and Lacroix : " Although we all know that, by the natural
law, lying is ordinarily forbidden, and also, that it is ordinarily permitted
not to kill anybody upon one's own authority; notwithstanding, such
circumstances may be found in which we think, invincibly, that these
things are permitted at the present moment.

This is the opinion of the saintly and learned Cassien. . . . And others
think that official lying is sometimes permissible. . . . Vasquez relates,
that a vulgar man thought that he could act honestly and piously by turn
ing over a sick man and occasioning a prompt death, and thus deliver
him from considerable pain. . . .

Sarasa, in his book, "Art de se rejouir toujours," relates, that another
man, through zeal for the glory of God, and for the salvation of souls,
baptized the children of the Moors brought to him by their parents, and
killed them immediately after; to make sure of their salvation, and for fear
that, carried back to their parents, they would not be taught the faith of
the church." (page 143.)

At last, the Petit Catechisme de Marottesets this beautiful doctrine before;
the eyes of little children, in the following terms :

" Ques. Is it permitted to follow a conscience invincibly erroneous?

*' Ans. Yes, it is permitted to act according to the inspiration of a false
conscience, when the error comes from an insuperable ignorance; because
that error, not being voluntary, cannot be removed, and the acting agent
does not wish to commit, and does not believe that he is committing, evil."

Treatise on Conscience. 65

skilful in discovering scruples, urging the course of the blood,
changing humors, and calling forth vain apparitions.

3. The melancholy and phlegmatic complexion. . . .

4. The weakness of the judgment. . . .

5. Too great uneasiness. . . .

6. Relations with scrupulous people. . . .

IT. Consciences inclined to be scrupulous.
in. Inconvenience of scruples.

IV. Remedies against scruples.

V. Rules for scrupulous people.

48.— They must obey absolutely and blindly their confessor, and
show in everytijing the greatest humility and confidence. . . .

ART. II. — THE LAX CONSCIENCE.

49. — This is the one which, for too slight a motive, believes that
to lie permitted which is cot so.

There are three kinds:

The conscience simply lax. . . . hardened. . . . pharisai-
cal. . . .

CHAPTER IV.
THE PROBABLE AND IMPROBABLE CONSCIENCE.

We must treat : 1st, of the nature ; 2nd, of the efficacy ; 3rd, of
the probability.

ART. I. — THE NATURE OF PROBABILITY.

50.— Opinion, in general, is the assent to either of two ideas, or
Hie adhesion to either of two contrary opinions, through feur that
the other may be the true one.

Probable opinion is based on a grave motive, although one
fears the truth of the contrary opinion. Improbable opinion is a
judgment that is not based on a solid reason.

Probability is subdivided thus :

1. Intrinsic or extrinsic, nccording as it is based either on rea
sons drawn from the thing itself, or from authority.

66 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

2. Of right or of fact, ba<*ed on the existence of a right and of
its application, or on some fact.

3. Speculative or practical, as we consider the thing in an
abstract manner, or in relation to the action.

4. Absolute or relative, whether it appears such to everybody,
or only to one or a small number.

5. Solitary or comparative, according as it appears such con
sidered in itself, or compared with the contrary opinion.

6. Certain, doubtful or slight, according to the motives on
which it is based.

We distinguish three kinds of comparative probabilities :

1. Major, 2. minor, 3. equal.

Any proposition may be wore, less, or equally as probable as the
contrary proposition, according to motives more, less, or as
steadfast on which it is based. But the more probable admits
different degrees ; for it is less or notably more probable than
those of the contrary opinion. It is called very probable, if it is
caused by a very serious motive. It is that, said St. Liguori,
which is based on a very serious foundation. The contrary
opinion is called probable in a slight or doubtful manner.

Moreover, an opinion is sure, if it simply favors the law, more
sure if it favors it more, less sure if it favors it less. Then, the
more probable opinion is not always more sure, because a greater
probability may favor liberty.

DIFFERENT SYSTEMS ON PROBABILITY.

1. Absolute tutorism or rigorousness, according to which one
must always follow the surest opinion ; that is to say, the one
which favors the law. (legi favens) ; unless there is certainty in
favor of liberty. This opinion has been disapproved by the
church.

2. Mitigated Tutorism, according to which it is only permitted
to follow the most probable opinion, which favors liberty.

3. Probabiliorism, by which one must follow the opinion
favoring the law, unless the contrary opinion be more probable.

4. ^Equiprobabilism, according to which it is not permitted to

Treatise

on Conscience. (37

follow the less sure opinion, unless it should bo as probable, or
nearly so, as the contrary opinion.

5. Probabilism, according to which one may follow the less sure
and less probable opinion, provided that its probability is true and
solid.

6. Laxism, according to which it is always permitted to follow
the slightly probable opinion ; but this system has been condemned,
as we shall see later.

Theologians, according to their opinion on probability, have
received different names: rigorists, tutorists, mitigatists, etc.

1. Probability, by its nature, excludes necessary moral certain
ty ; because it is in this only that it may differ from it.

2. Any probability, however great it may be, in the presence of
the contrary opinion having become certain, is destroyed.

3. One must surely accept as probable an opinion considered as
such by most theologians, or even looked upon as absolutely true
!>y five or six theologians, distinguished for their honesty, judg
ment and science ; unless there should be a sure reason against that
opinion.

4. An honest and learned man regards as surely probable an
opinion that he has carefully examined, and which he believes to
be true, or surely probable, for serious motives, when he judges it
aside from all irregular passion.

5. As to the intrinsic probability of right, only theologians,
very wise and well versed in morals, can -judge; because they
alone know that nothing certain can be brought against their
decision.

6. A man indifferently learned may judge of the extrinsic
probability of an opinion, if, knowing the question thoroughly, he
sees it affirmed by superior authority, that is to say, approved by
theologians.

7. A single authority above all exception, bringing a reason that
the others have not examined or sufficiently explained, and itself
explaining well the reasons of others, renders its opinion surely
probable, though opposed to the common opinion.

8. An ignorant man, hearing one whom he looks upon as honest,
>rudent and learned, say to another, that MI opinion is surely

68 T/\e Doctrine of llie Jesuits.

probable, may consider it as such ; because he cannot jndgc for
himself, and he has no other means of knowing the intrinsic
probability.

ART. II. — EFFICACY OP PROBABILITY TO FORM CONSCIENCE.

55. — This efficacy consists in the strength of probability to
make the voice of conscience practically certain. . . .

FIRST THESIS.

56. — It is not permitted to follow the probable, nor the more
probable opinion, leaving aside the more sure opinion, every time
that there is an absolute obligation to obtain, with efficiency, a
determined end, that could be compromised by the use of means
probablj" ill appropriate to that end. Then, we must follow the
more sure opinion. . . .

SECOND THESIS.

58. It is not permitted to follow an opinion slightly probable*,
leaving aside the more sure one. . . .

THIRD THESIS.

59. It is permitted to follow the most probable, and even the
more probable opinion, leaving aside the more sure opinion, if it is
a question only of the honesty of the action. . . .

FOURTH THESIS.

60. It is permitted' to follow an opinion truly and strongly
probable, leaving aside the more sure opinion, equally and even
more probable, if it is only a question of what is permitted or for
bidden.

This proposition is demonstrated by three kinds of arguments
drawn from: 1st, reason; 2d, authority; 3d, coiibequences of the
contrary opinion.

This is the demonstration by reason : there is no obligation to
obey a law the existence of which is not certain; a law has no
certain existence if a true and strong probability exists against it.
Then, there is no obligation to follow the more sure opinion, and
set aside the truly probably opinion, leaving aside the more sure,
even the more probable. . . .

Treatise on Conscience. C9

ART. III. THE USE OF PROBABILITY.

75 — Outside of the general principles which constitute the
theory of probabilism, viz : No obligation can be imptosed unless
one is sure of the thing ; or, a doubtful law does not oblige, there
are certain special rules, confirming those principles, to be applied
in particular cases.

I. In doubt, we must hold to what we presume. . . .

II. In doubt, we must judge after what ordinarily happens. . . .

III. In doubt, we must consider the value of the act. . . .

IV. In doubt, we must prefer what is favorable, and leave what
is odious. . . .

V. In obscure things, we must do what is the less onerous. . . .

VI. 1st, In doubt, one presumes not a fact ; it must be demon
strated. 2d, In doubt, one presumes as a fact what was to
be done according to rights ; 3d, In doubt, nobody is presumed to
be malicious, unless he is proved so.

VII. In doubt, one must follow the more sure opinion. This
rule must be applied only to practically doubtful cases. . . . As
for speculative doubts, it is no more a rule, but a simple advice.

80. — . . . Among several probable opinions, is it permitted to
follow sometimes the one, sometimes the other which is contrary
to it?

Yes!* ...

* Here is, in full, that doctrine of probabilism, " that miserable doctrine,"
said the Bishop of Khodez, "source of so much corruption in morals and
so opprobrious for religion, that the enemy of man (the Jesuit) had sown
in the schools during darkness and the sleep of the pastors, and which
has, at last, been banished forever. It has come back triumphantly to
day, in spite of the coalition of Popes and Bishops, Pastors, Theologians
and laymen, conspiring against it in order to destroy it."

It is easy, in fact, to see, by the preceding abridged chapters, and by
many following cases, that the Jesuits have renounced nothing of that
odious doctrine.

Moreover, in order to have it in all its splendor, it is good to have
recourse to the ancient casuists, expressing more freely their thoughts :

Henriquez said, in 1GOO : " A scrupulous man is safe, if he chooses against
his scruples what he judges to be probable, though he thinks that the
other opinion is more probable; and the confessor must, against his own
opinion, conform himself to that of the penitent, considering that it excuses
the latter before God." (page 9.)

of Conscience*

CASE I.
ERRONEOUS CONSCIENCE.

FLORINE makes this confession : I have lied, but I did not believe
I was sinning, because I was constrained by a very grave motive ;
it was to excuse my cousin, and save him from a severe
chastisement.

Ques. Can Florine be excused from sin, and is her action
commendable?

Jean ele Salas- " It is a true opinion, that it is not permitted to follow
the more probable sentiment, although the less sure; but one may even
take also the less sure opinion, when there is equality of probability.

"The most powerful motives are necessary to a person in the religious
orders to believe that a revelation is probably true, by which God exempts
him from contracting marriage, in spite of the common law; because
God has never given such a dispensation. If, nevertheless, he had a true
probability, he could, to avoid inconvenience, make use of a doubtful
and only probable dispensation."

Greo-oire de Valence : " It is asked if a judge may, without respect for
persons, determine, according to the interests of his friends, his judgment
in favor of a probability, indistinctly applicable to one or the other
opinion, when a point of law divides the jurists?

"I say: If the judge thinks that both opinions are equally probable, he
may legally, to favor his friend, judge according to the opinion which
authorizes the pretension of his friend. Moreover, he could even, to
serve his frieuct, judge sometimes by one opinion and sometimes by the
contrary o"e, provided no scandal results from his decision " (page 14).

Gilles of Coninck : "When the opinion of the Doctors is divided on
some point, we can follow the sentiment which most pleases us, though
the least sure and the least probable, provided it is truly probable."

Vasqnez: " It is sufficient for an ignorant man to follow the opinion
that he believes probable and which he sees taught by honest and learned
men though this opinion should be neither the more sure nor the best
known. Sylvester says, it is sufficient for an ignorant man to follow
the advice of his master and doctor. "

Layrnann : " A doctor may advise whoever consults him, not only accord-
in«- to his own opinion, but also according to the contrary and probable
opinion of others, if this last advice is more favorable or agreeable to the
one who consults him, . . . although the same doctor is persuaded that

Oases of Conscience. 71

Ans. She ought to be excused from the sin of lying, because of
an invincibly erroneous conscience.

Moreover, she has acted well. What might be opposed to this
decision is, that she might have had in view a formal evil : now
that cause does not exist, because it is sufficient, in order to be
meritorious, that the end in view shou'd be good in principle ; so

certainly his sentiment is speculatively false, and that he could not follow
it himself in practice . . . From this we conclude, thata learned man may
give opposite advices according to the probable sentiments opposed to
eacli other, observing, nevertheless, discretion and prudence."

Filliucius : " The authority of an honest and learned doctor makes a
probable opinion, because such an authority is no slight foundation for a
decision." (page 29).

Escobar: "Verily, when I consider so many diverse sentiments on the
matter of morals, I think it is a happy dispensation of Providence, such a
variety of opinions, helping us to bear along more agreeably the yoke of
the Lord.

" Then Providence has willed that there should be several ways to follow
in the moral actions, and that the same action might be found to be good,
either in acting according lo one opinion or its opposite.

" We are permitted to consult different doctors' authorities until we find
an answer in harmony with our desires . . . on condition of having right
intention in seeking a probable opinion which is in our favor, and in
being firmly resolved to do nothing contrary to the probable conscience."
(page 35)

Busembaum says, yet more claarly : " We must not condemn those who
consult different doctors until they find one in harmony with their way of
thinking, provided such a one is looked upon as prudent and pious and
not peculiar."

Tambourin: " Ignorant confessors, who always imagine they do good
in obliging their penitents to restitution, because it is more safe, ought to
be blamed. Assuredly, if those penitents had sought to know what is
more sure, they would not have wraited for their advice, but they would
have made the restitution themselves." (page 38.)

I)e Lugo : " If his advice is called for," in order to know if the penitent
is obliged to make restitution, the confessor must follow the opinion of
the penitent, if it is probable, and absolve him."

Louis de Scildere : " An inferior, who probably believes that his superior
has no jurisdiction, must not obey him, even if the superior is in possession,
of his office.

" Likewise, an inferior who thinks that his superior's command exceeds
the limits of his authority, must not obey him.

" Then, an accused person, who probably believes that the judge has no
legitimate authority to interrogate him, is not obliged lo answer."

Georges de Rhodes : " A good reason is sufficient to make an opinion
probable. Now, the authority of a renowned and pious doctor is a good
reason ; because, I suppose that lie is in the possession of a good reason;
as his opinion is not rejected by the doctors as too old and absurd. Then
the authority of one doctor is sufficient to make a probable opinion."

Terille : "Generally, in matters of faith as well as of morals, any man is
permitted to follow any opinion directly, the least probable and the least

72 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

that, in conscience, one should be convinced of its excellency.
Do not say that an object materially bad is opposed to the
divine will ; because, though it is opposed to the primary divine
will, it is not opposed to the secondary one, by which God
orders or permits us to do something, in supposing our ignorance
insuperable. God, indeed, by His consequent will, wants man to
do what he feels uncontrollably obliged to do.

sure, though he believes that the contrary opinion is the most probable
and the most sure, and that it really should be so. But what I say is re
stricted to the opinion whose practical probability is certain 1'or the acting
agent." (page 43.)

Gobat, who accepts and develops this doctrine, gives it yet more savor,
and suppresses the caution of Terille, in declaring with Oviedo, " that an
opinion speculatively probable is also probable in practice." (page 5G.)

Fabri : " Two contrary opinions, truly and certainly probable, are both
safe, materially and formally.

" It is allowable to follow a less probable moral opinion, provided that
its probability is certain . . . The opinion which permits one to follow
the lea>t probable, is in itself the most probable. Thus in following the
least probable, in actu ea^m'to, one follows really the most probable, m
actu signato" This is the quintessence.

Casiiecli: " It is always allowable, and in all matters, . . . to follow the
opinion the least sure and the least probable in practice, without taking into
account any stronger speculative probability attached to the contrary and
more sure opinion ; and this every time that the less sure and less probable
opinion certainly preserves its safety and its practical probability, though
less sure than the other." (page 67.)

Lacroix: " One is justified in acting according to what is probable,
although it Is evident that the contrary sentiment is more probable. . . .

" It is justifiable to follow what is less probable, not only in regard to
positive human rights, but also in regard to divine and natural rights. .
. . Because, if, with all respect to the human legislator, I can say to him :
' Although, according to the force of direct judgment, it is more probable
for me that your law exists, however, in virtue of my deliberate judgment,
less probable, I will not do its command.' Such language would
not be contrary to the respect clue to the author of the divine or
natural laws."

Muszka: "If we meet in the matter of morals two opinions certainly
probable, one is not always obliged to follow the one which is the most
probable and the most sure. Consequently, it is sometimes permitted to
act according to the least probable and the least sure opinion." _(page 103).

At last, to close by a recent and practical application, here is how the
Petit Catechisme de Marotte, the disseminator, par excellence, of these
doctrines, expresses itself on this subject :

" Ques. Can we act according to a conscience probable?

11 Ans. In what concerns faith, the validity of sacraments and in all,
cases when one is held to procure an effect that one is not sure to obtain,
without taking the opinion the more sure, we must choose that opinion;
but outside of this case, one may, without sin, follow the most probable,
though the least sure ; acting thus, is to act prudently."

Cases of Conscience. 73

Besides, a man can certainly sin in acting against a conscience
which is insuperably mistaken, then he may also deserve reward
in acting according to its orders.*

CASE II.
ERRONEOUS CONSCIENCE.

1. The mind of Ferdinand is often haunted by wicked desires,
for instance, to revenge himself on an enemy, to commit shame
ful attempts against decency, by contact or otherwise, or the
desire for fornication. But he has never acknowledged them in
confession, thinking that these acts, purely internal, were not
sins.

2. Georges, during childhood, has had for many years the habit
of polluting himself, but did not admit it in confession, not think
ing it was an evil. But later, knowing the truth, he doubts the
validity of those confessions, and asks himself if he is in duty
bound to make a general confession.

2. Gustave, a child ten years old, has abandoned himself to
obscene touchings on the person of his first cousin ; he has avowed
it in confession, but omitting the circumstance that it was his
cousin, because he was ignorant that a sin was more grievous on
that account. Later he recognizes his error, and inquires if he
must confess anew, indicating that circumstance.

Ques. 1. Had Ferdinand an erroneous conscience relative to
his wicked desires?

Ques. 2. Did Georges ignore invincibly the malice of pollution?

Ques. 3. Is Gustave obliged to recommence the confession of
his sin, — yes or no?

*Charli: "We discern in God two kinds of will, which constrain the
will of man, a will antecedent, pri nitive, which is such by itself; and a
will consequent, which comes after and accidentally. By the antecedent
will, God commands directly with a primary intention, that men should or
should not do a thing. Such is the will by which God . . . forbids
lying. The consequent will is the one by which God commands indirectly ;
and in the supposition of an error on man's side, that he should or should
not do a thing.

" Thus it is God who wills that a man should lie, if we suppose that by
an invincible error that man believes that it is good to lie in such circum
stance." (page 126.)

74 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ans. Question 1. — Many affirm it, as Elbel, Sanchez, Lacroix ;
but the contrary must be admitted, with St. Liguori.

Ans. Question 2. — Georges may have been in good faith at the
beginning. But it is difficult to believe that his good faith has
lasted so long.

Ans. Question 3. — Gustave is not obliged to a new confession
in order to add the omitted circumstance, if, at the moment when
he committed the sin, he was not aware that in such a case there
was a particular gravity, because the difference is not in the act
but in the principle. In principle, insuperable or absolute igno
rance excuses him from the sin of incest. Let not his peace of
mind be disturbed.

CASE III.
DOUBTFUL CONSCIENCE.

Faustine, a young lady, twenty years old, finds herself in an in
extricable embarrassment. She has made a vow of chastity at the
time of her first communion, but she doubts that there was suffi
cient deliberation, cither on account of her age, or of devotion, and
asks if she may accept an advantageous marriage that is proposed
to her.

Ques. How can we solve Faustiue's doubts?

Ans. With St. Liguori, the vow must be observed, even in doubt
of sufficient deliberation. That must be admitted in theory, because
the utterance of the vow is considered as having the value of an
act. But that doctrine does nor seem to be absolute ; it may hap
pen, in certain circumstances, that the necessary deliberation can
not be easily determined, and it may even be presumed that it was
missing altogether.

The advice of the bishop is necessary in this case.

CASE VII.
ON PROBABILITY.

Philibert, a professor of theology, after having discarded all the
systems on probability, has imagined a new one that he believes
will solve all difficulties in cases of conscience. Here is the

Cases of Conscience. 75

foundation of his opinion, ... a well-known law compels, an un
known law does not. Then, for the same reasons, a law imper-
fectl}' known obliges but imperfectly, more or less according to
the degree of knowledge ; but there is always a certain obligation,
because there is always more or less danger of materially violating
the law. Moreover, if a law constrains us more or less, according
to the degree of our knowledge, the motive which excuses us from
obeying the law, must be in proportion to the gravity of the
obligation. This is why a not very powerful motive excuses us
from an obligation imperfectly known.

Ques. What shall we think of the new system?

Ans. Philibert supposes, without foundation, that it is not allow
able to run the risk of materially violating the law when it is not
very well-known.

What evil is there in that material violation, if I ignore the
obligation? How can I commit a sin if I ignore what makes it a
sin ? Besides, this assertion would lead us to a condemned UUelege ;
for, if we admit it, it would not be possible, any more, t ) act from
an opinion, however probable it may be ; because we would be in
a perpetual fear of materially violating the law, if the surest way
was not chosen. Moreover, if that material violation exists, it is
not voluntary ; because, not knowing the law, there is no intention
but ignorance.

CASE IX.
AUTHORITY OF THE CONFESSOR RELATIVE TO OPINIONS.

The following dialogue takes place in confession between
Lucanus and the priest Aquiliuus :

Confessor. — Have you not made an usurious contract?

Penitent. — My father, it is true ; but I know that honest men
do so with the approbation of learned men.

Confessor. — That doctrine is not mine, and you must tear up
that contract, or at least indemnify your partner, in giving back
what you owe him.

Penitent. — I beg your pardon, my father, while honest and
learned men approve of such a contract, I think, at least probably,
that it is not forbidden.

76 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Confessor. — It is not my doctrine, and I profess the contrary
opinion. Go, my friend, I cannot absolve you ; look for another
confessor who will share your own opinion.

Lucanus goes to Pancrace, another confessor, and sets the
case before him: "Do not trouble yourself," said Pancrace, "your
opinion is not probable for me, but I know that it is looked upon
as such by many very learned men, you may set your conscience
at rest ; go in peace."

Qucs. May a confessor, looking upon an opinion as not probable,
but approved by renowned theologians, permit his penitent to
follow it?

Ans. The confessor cannot permit the penitent to follow false
opinion, because his duty is to lead him from error ; but if the penitent
wants to follow an opinion admitted as probable by well-known
theologians, the confessor has no right in the case, though he looks
upon that opinion as not probable. Because, if an opinion advo
cated by several theologians ; for instance, by five or six of them
recommended for their honesty, science and prudence, — if it has not
been condemned, if it is not in opposition to a law then in force,
if it has not against it evident reasons, that opinion may be admitted
as probable, and consequently, cannot be prohibited by a common
confessor.*

CASE XL
Ox THE CHANGE OF OPINION.

Lucien, an heir, recognized as valid a will made in his favor,
though in it certain necessary formalities are missing ; he relies
for that on the probable opinion of doctors. Another day,
changing his opinion, he asks for and obtains through the Court of

* It is exactly what was said more clearly by Jean cle Salas, as early as
1607: "Any confessor may, against his own sentiment, absolve the peni
tent who follows a probable opinion, though the least sure, no matter if
that opinion is, or is not prejudicial to others." (page 11.) And Sotus,
Vasquez, Busembaum, etc.: "Not only may he, but he must." The
Jesuits have never changed their opinion on this, any more than on
anything else.

But the confessor Aquilinus would have done much better by holding
his tongue, according to the pure doctrine of the Jesuits.

" When," says the celebrated Jean Marin, " the confessor believes with
probability that his advice will be rejected, he must not say anything;

Cases of Co/iscience. 77

Justice, the setting a^ide of a will equally irregular, made in favor
of Cams, in order that himself, the nearest of kin, shall inherit.

Ques. 1. Is it permitted to change one's opinion, and if so,
when?

Ques. 2. Same as Lucien's case.

Ans. to the first question. — It is permitted to change one's
opinion if there is no compability between that decision and a
true probability; that is to say, provided that in changing one's
mind, one follows another probable opinion, and that there would
be no contradiction either theological or practical. Because one
who follows one of two probable opinions, does not cease to look
upon the other as probable, and he remains, as before, in the
same uncertainty towards the other. Then, occasionally, if it is
for his advantage, he ma}T follow that other opinion, though pre
viously he had followed the contrary one, except in cases when
that change of opinion would suppress all probability.

Ans. to the 2d question. — Lucien, having always followed a
probable opinion, may have legitimately changed his mind in
practice on the validity of the illegal will, according to diverse
circumstances ; for, in keeping his inheritance, before the decision
of the judge and in spite of its irregularit}', ho has acted accord
ing to his rights, having followed a probable opinion ; but he has
not ceased for that to look upon the contrary opinion as probable,
and he has not renounced the right belonging to any citizen of
asking the setting aside of the other will if it is for his advan
tage to do so. Then he has used his right in asking for the annul
ling of the will before the court, and he must not be disturbed.*

even if the sin in question should be a continued action, injurious to
others. For instance, the pt nitent exercises usury, and is, on this matter,
in a state of invincible ignorance, on account of reasons given to him by
others whom he lias consulted. The confessor sees that his advice will
be of no avail, neither to make a restitution of illicit gains, nor to prevent
it for the future ; therefore, he must not say anything." (page 125.) It is
also the opinion of Suarez, Escobar, Gobat, Trachala, etc., etc.

* Tambourin was of that opinion when he wrote in ir>59 : " It is prob
able that one can be indemnified for the loss of one's reputation, by money ;
It is also probable that one cannot be indemnities at all. Can I, then, to
day, I, whose reputation has been blackened, exact from the defamer an
indemnity in money; and to-morrow, and even to-day, can I, myself, who
has defamed the reputation of another, refuse to indemnify him by that

^treatise on ILatos.

Law is the external rule for human acts, as conscience, the prac
tical voice of reason, is the internal rule for the same acts.

PART FIRST.
LAWS IN GENERAL.

NATITIIE AND QUALITIES OF THE LAW.

81 . — Law is a disposition of order in view of the common good,
promulgated by the one who has the c:ire of the community. . . .

We distinguish several kinds.

1. Divine or human. . . .

2. Natural or positive. . . .

3. Ecclesiastical or civil. . . .

4. Moral or penal or mixed. . . .

5. Affirmative or negative. . . .

6. Prohibitory, annulling, or tolerant. . • •

7. Favorable or odious. . . .

8. Written or transmitted by custom. . . .

82. — What are the qualities or conditions of the human law?
It must be: possible, honest, useful, just, permanent or stable,

and promulgated. . . .

CHAPTER II.

THE LEGISLATOR.

83. — We call the legislator, the sovereign who has the power,
independent and supreme, or subordinate, to make laws for the
community which he governs. . . .

same money, for the loss of his reputation? I am sure that one can legally,
in such a case, do the one or the oilier, according to one's own opinion."
(Page 38.)

Treatise on Laivs. 79

I. God alone is the supreme legisl-itor. . . .

II. The church has the power to make laws in order to accom
plish the end which she has in view. . . .

84. — III. Princes can make laws in view of the temporal
happiness of their subjects, . . . because they have received from
God the power to govern their subjects.* . . .

IV. We must always obey the just laws of legitimate superiors ;
their authority coming directly from Go 1, or from God through
the medium of the people. . . .

When honest and learned men are not agreed upon the injustice
of a law, we must look upon it as just.f

* But it is on condition that they shall govern according to the divine
law, that is to say, according to the will of the Catholic Church.

"Any Christian prince, "said Philopater, "as soon as he manifestly sets
aside the Catholic Faith, and wants others to do the same, forfeits all power
and dignity through human and divine rights; this is not only certain, bat
of faith, (page 445.)

Bellannine has clearly expressed this principle, in a passage of his Con
troversies which Father Clair qualifies as "immortal."

"Spiritual power is independent of temporal things, but it lets them
operate as they did before they were united, provided they are not an
obstacle, or are not necessary to the spiritual end in view. For if there is
at times a resemblance, the spiritual power can and ought to repress the
temporal one, by all means and expedients which it judges to be necessary.
... It has the right to transform kingdoms, to take them from one and
give them to another as a sovereign spiritual prince, if this is necessary
to the salvation of souls.

"It is not permitted to Christians to tolerate an infidel or a heretical
king, if that king tries to lead his subjects into heresy or infidelity; but
it is to the Sovereign Pontiff, who has the care and the charge of religion,
that belongs the right to judge if the king leads or not into heresy. It is
the Sovereign Pontiff who should judge if the king must be deposed,
or not. . . .

" If Christians have not formally deposed Nero, Diocletian, Julian the
apostate, Valens, Arian, etc., it is because they were not powerful
enough." (page 447.)

Jean Ozorius: "The power of the keys is given to Peter and to his
successors; this power is sufficient to make kings, and to depose them,
when they turn aside from the faith or oppose its doctrines.

" When the spiritual good demands it, the Pope can remove lords,
kings, and emperors, and deprive of their kingdoms those impious, dis
obedient kings who prevent the publication of the Gospel." (page 461.)

t What shall we think, according to this expression, of laws establishing
taxes?

Escobar explains the question in the following very easy terms for the
tax-payers:

" The subjects are excusable for not paying taxes, by reason that: as
the prince justly imposes the tribute according to the opinion which

80 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CHAPTER III.

OBJECT AND SUBJKCT OP THE LAW.
ART. 1 . — Object of the law.

88.— The object of the law is all that it can command or
forbid. . .

ART. II. — Subject of the law.

91. — I. Man is born under and remains subject to the natural
law . . .

IT. Those alone who have the habitual use of reason are under
submission to the h ;inan law. . . .

92. Children not having reached the age of reason, and the in
sane, are not under submission to the laws. Tuey may conse
quently, eat meat when the Church forbids it.

However, insane persons having the use of their reason at certain
intervals, people under the effects of drink, or when asleep, are
under the laws, because they usually possess the use of their rea
son ; they may be exempted occasionally when they are not under
the control of their reason. It is not permitted to give them meat
on the prohibited days.

Heretics, schismatics and others, being baptized, although not
Catholics, are subject per se to the ecclcs astical laws, because, al
though rebels, they do not cease to be subjects of the Church. . . .

93.— Ques. Are ecclesiastics obliged to obey the civil laws?

Ana. No ; not the laws in force which are contrary to their pro
fession, or to their sacred canons.* . . . •

assures with probability that it is jnst; in the same way, the subject may
justly refuse to pay the tribute, in following the opinion which attiring
probably that such tribute ife unjust. It is the sentiment of Sanchez,
Lessius, Lopez, Molina, Filliucius. I approve this sentiment." (page 35.)

* These are timid formulas, and such as are required by the rigor of the
time. But the truth, which oral teaching alone dares to proclaim in its in
tegrity, is contained in the words of Emm Sa : '-The revolt of an ecclesi
astic against the king is not a crime of high treason, because he is not a
subject of the king."

Ferdinand de Castro Palao said no less clearly : "An ecclesiastic, as such,
being exempted from the lay jurisdiction, it follows certainly that lie
cannot be condemned by a lay judge."

Jacques Gordon : "I assert here, that ecclesiastics are exempted from civil
authority. . . .

Treatise on Laws. 81

94. — Ques. Mast foreigners obey the laws of the country in
which they find themselves ?

Ans. Yes, they must fulfil contracts, and obey the laws neces
sary to the public good.

As for other laws there are three probable opinions :

The first exempts them, setting scandal aside, because the law
has its effect on subjects only.

The second obliges them to obey all the laws ; because the one
who enjoyes the advantages must also bear the burdens.

The third one makes a distinction : they mu^t obey all laws if

"It would be a great indecorum to aver that ecclesiastics are liable to
condemnation by civil laws. . . ."

Dicastille : "That the clergy must be exempted from lay authority, even
in temporal things, is evident, because nobody is under subjection to one
who has no jurisdiction over him. Now, the prince has no jurisdiction over
ecclesiastics, or clergy. . . . They are exempted from the lay power, not
only by canonical, civil, and human rights, but also by divine rights."

Jacques Platel : "Ecclesiastics and religious orders are, but indirectly,
under the civil laws; because, not being under the jurisdiction of secular
magistrates, they are not obliged directly and immediately to obey their
laws, but only in consequence of the law of nature, and with the pre
sumed consent of the Pope, on account of the conformity of these laws
to natural equity.

" The laws which dispose directly or indirectly of the properties or
persons of ecclesiastics are contrary to their immunities. ... It follows
then, that they are not obliged to obey the laws concerning the payment
of tributes and taxes." (page 514.)

J. D. Taberna : "Are the clergy under the jurisdiction of the civil
laws?

"As to the directive f >rce, the clergy are obliged, at least indirectly, to
submit to the common laws of the Republic in which they live, if the
object of these laws concerns them somewhat, and are in no way relative
to the clerical profession, the holy canons, or exemptions of the church.

" I have said, as for the directive force, because speaking absolutely,
aside from the prerogatives accorded to princes and the consent of the
Pope, secular princes have no compulsory power over the clergy; but
when the latter are culpable, they must be punished by their superiors
only." (page 525.)

Laymann : "Ecclesiastics are in submission to the laws of secular
princes according to the directive force . . . but not according to the
compulsory force, because they do not incur the judgment of the civil
law. . . .

" So the civil laws which annul a contract, a will, by incapacitating per
sons to contract, to make a will . . . have no power on ecclesiastics."

Busembaum : " The clergy being exempted by divine right from civil
authority, civil laws do not bind them directly or by the compulsory force ;
it follows that the secular prince cannot punish them.

" To strike an ecclesiastic, to arraign before a secular tribunal, is a
personal sacrilege.

82 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

that country is the end of their journey ; otherwise, only negative
laws. Such is the opinion of Suarez, who recognizes that the first
opinion is also probable. . . .

CHAPTER IV.

PROMULGATION AND ACCEPTATION OP THE LAW.
ART. 1 — Promulgation.

97 — This is the publication of the law by legitimate authorit}',
to impose its obligation on subjects. . . .

ART. 2 — Acceptation.

98 — This is the submission with which the subjects, at least
the best and wisest part of them, accept the law formally or
virtually.

I. By itself, for its power, the law does not depend in any way
on the acceptation of the people ; otherwise all legal authority
would disappear, and a subversion of social order would follow.

II. Accidently, a law that is not accepted has no power, by
the tacit or express consent of the superior, because of a privilege,
or of a tolerated custom.

99 — Ques. Is a law in force if the best and wisest part of the
people has not accepted it ?

Ans. There is controversy. . . .

Ques. Must we obey a law of the church which, prohibited by a
civil government, has not been accepted ?

Ans. Yes ; because the church has received her authority from
Christ, not from a civil power, from which she is quite independent.
Christ said : " Whatever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound
in heaven." (Math. 16: 19).

CHAPTER V.

OBLIGATION OP THE LAW.

ART. I — The force of the obligation. . . .
ART. II — Manner of satisfying the obligation of the law. . .
ART. Ill — Causes exempting from obeying the law.
Section 1 : Nature of these causes.

Treatise on Laws. 83

108. — These causes are either eximious or prohibitive.

The first exonerate us completely from the power of the
law ; for instance, if we retire into a country where the law is
not enforced. The second are those which prevent the sub
ject from remaining under the power of the law, or from fulfilling
it, or which excuses him from it. They are subdivided into
iynorance and impotency. . . .

SECTION 2. Yoluntary application of these causes.

110. — They may be applied directly or indirectly ; as to whether
the author wishes to escape the obligation of t:ie law or is impelled
by another motive, having foreseen, however, the impossibility of
obeying that law.

Besides, those causes may be near or removed ; near, if the law
constrains immediately ; removed, if it allows a certain interval of
time.

I. One may always apply eximious causes, and, according to the
opinion the most probable, in a direct and near manner. . . .

II. But one cannot apply directly prohibitive causes, near er
removed. . . .

III. Nor even indirectly prohibitive causes of the near manner,
if there is not any proportionate neressity besides. . . .

IV. According to the more probable opinion, one may apply,
even without motive, removed and indirectly prohibitive causes.

CHAPTER VI.
INTERPRETATION" OF THE LAW AND OF EPIKEIA.

SECTION 1. Interpretation.

112. — The interpretation of the law is its natural explanation
according to the legislative spirit.

It is authentical, doctrinal and usual, being made either by the
sovereign, by learned men, or by custom.

Strict or liberal. . . .

Simple, comprehensive or extensive ; if we give to the words
their proper sense, or a larger one.

SECTION 2. Moderation. (Epikeia).

84 ' The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

11 5. — This is the kind, but just interpretation of the law, by
which it is understood that the law does not include a case which
is not mentioned in the text ; as if the legislator, though prudent,
had not wished to foresee or mention it. For instance, the law
forbids the carrying of arms in the night ; I may carry some if I
am obliged to go out, and if I risk being attacked by my enemy,
who has sworn to take my life.

CHAPTER VII.
DISPENSATION OF THE LAW.
114. — Dispensation is the relaxation of the law in a particular

case.

It may be :

1. Legal or illicit, if the cause is just or not.

2. Valid or void, if it exempts us from obeying the law or not.

3. Absolute or conditional, if it is accorded with or without
conditions.

4. Surreptitious or obreptitious, if we mention exactly i
to be done, or if we present a case in a false light.

ART. 1. — Power which exempts. . . .

ART. 2. Causes required in order to be exempted. . . .

ART. 3. — End of the exemption.

It can cease for three reasons: 1st. When the cause is at an
end ; 2nd. Its annulment ; 3rd. Renunciation.

CHAPTER VIII.
CESSATION OF THE LAW.

PART SECOND.

Different Sorts of

Natural and divine law. — Ecclesiastical and civil law. — Annnl-
ing and penal law. — Unwritten or traditional law. — Favorable
law.

CHAPTER I.
NATURAL AND DIVINE LAW.
ART J. — Natural law.

122. — The natural law is the divine will manifested by a
natural light, commanding what is necessary to the preservation
of good order. . . .

ART. II. — Positive divine law.

There are two kinds, the ancient and the modern.

CHAPTER II.
ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL LAW.

ART. I — Ecclesiastical law.

125. — This law is established by the ecclesiastical power, for
the good government of the church and the eternal salvation of
souls.

The compendium of the ecclesiastical laws constitute the canon
laws, which make three volumes. . . .

126. — What are the Roman Congregations?

There are eight of them. . . .

5. The Congregation of the Index, founded by St. Pius V., com
prises the cardinals and several learned doctors. Its unique func
tion is of great importance for the good of society, ecclesiastical
as well as civil ; because it inspects all the published books, in
order that they should propagate nothing contrary to religion and

86 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

good morals. Those that are judged injurious to the faithful are
noted carefully, forbidden, and inserted in the Index, which is
called, for that reason, 4t The Index of Forbidden Books," to pre
vent the faithful from reading them. Sometimes, however, books
are condemned by the Congregation of the Holy Office, and by the
Sovereign Pontiff himself in brief and dogmatical particular con
stitutions, and especially if they are infected with heresy.

6. The Congregation of the Holy Office, or Sacred Universal
Inquisition, is called supreme, and is composed of cardinals, pre
lates and theologians.

They attend to heresy, and to doctrines suspected of heresy or
contrary to religion. It was founded by Paul III., and confirmed
by Sixtus V. ...

ART. II. — Civil law.

131. — The law, or civil rights, is the collection of laws and
decrees made by temporal princes in view of the good of society.

CHAPTER III.
PENAL AND ANNULLING LAW.

ART. I. — The Penal law.

133. — This is the one which obliges one to do something, or to
avoid it, only under threat of a temporal punishment, that is to say,
that such law should be accepted as just.

I. — There cannot be any purely penal law, that is to say, one
which does not oblige conscience at all ; because any order from
the sovereign must oblige in some way.

II. But a law simply penal can be established : it obliges in
conscience either to obey the law, or to suffer the penalty in cases
where the law is violated. . . .

ART. II. — The Annulling law.

135. — This is the one which establishes that an act is not vaUd
in its principles, or, that it may be invalidated by a judgment.
There are then annulling laws, ipso facto ; of others only after the
sentence of the judge.

Treatise on Laws. 87

CHAPTER IV.
UNWRITTEN AND TRADITIONAL LAWS.

137. — Custom, considered in its cause, is the way of acting
which is induced by the acts of the community, or of the majority ;
in its principle, it is a right constituted by morals, which is accepted
as law when the law is wanting.

There are : 1st. Custom according to rights, or according to
law. . . .

2. Outside of the law or right. . . .

3. Against the law or right.

CHAPTER V.

FAVORABLE OR PRIVILEGED LAW.

141. — Privilege is a constant and permanent favor accorded to
certain persons, or certain dignities, by the sovereign, against the
common law, or outside of that law.

It is : 1. Personal, local, or real.

2. Against the law, or outside of the law.

3. Agreeable or odious.

Cases of Conscience on tfte

CASE XII.*

ARE WE UNDER OBLIGATION BY A LAW, OR AN OPINION FOUNDED
ON A FALSE PRESUMPTION?

1. The shepherd Tityre watching prudently his flock, goes
inadvertently into a deep sleep. The. flock goes grazing in the
adjoining fields ; the rural constable appears, summons Tityre
before the justice, and the shepherd is fined and condemned to pay
damages. The latter, looking upon this judgment as unjust, does
not hesitate to indemnify himself, partly on private property and
partly at the expense of the public treasury.

2. One night his donkey is carried away by a thief ; but he
escapes into the neighboring fields, where he causes damages.
Titvre is again condemned ; but, indignant, has recourse to the
same compensation.

3. At another time, the unfortunate man is condemned to pay
a debt which he had already discharged. As he has no means to
prove it before the judge, he hastens to calm his grief by a new
secret compensation.

Ques. 1. Must we obe}' a law or a judgment founded on a false
presumption?

Ques. 2. Ought Tityre to have accepted the sentence ; or had he
any light to compensate himself in these three cases?

Ans. Question. 1. — First, No, if the judgment, that is to say
the law, is founded only on the presumption of a particular fact,
on error, fraud, or damage ; because if the truth of the fact does
not exist, the obligatory principle disappears also.

2. Yes, if the judgment is founded on the presumption of the
general danger of error ; because the common interest demands

* See my speech of the 7th of July, 1879.

Cases of Conscience on the Laws. 89

that all should be held by that obligation, on account of the danger
of temptation (liallucinatio), and because the judge can deal only
with exterior facts.

Ans. Question 2. — First, Tityre has acted badly in seeking
a secret compensation in the first case, because he has been
justly condemned. The damage exists really ; and, besides, the
shepherd has committed a fault at least judicial, which justifies
the sentence. The law, in fact, seeks to make men more prudent
and more vigilant in order to prevent damages : Tityre is then
obliged to make restitution.

2. In the case of the donkey, the presumption of the judge is
false, the shepherd having committed no fault; not even judicial.
He could not be punished for his lack of vigilance ; because he has
not been able to prevent the damage, which must in no way be
imputed to him. If he has be<jn condemned on presumption of
neglect, which he has not and could not commit, the judgment is
false and materially unjust. Then, as for Tityre, it is a case in
which he has no responsibility and he must be absolved. There is
no injustice on his part, and he has the right to exact compensa
tion.

3. If he has paid already, he cannot be obliged to pay over
again, because the motive of the judgment is false : then the
judgment, being based on a false principle, is materially unjust ;
and Tityre cannot be accused of injustice if he has sought a com
pensation, this being the only means to compensate himself.

CASE XVII.

LICENSE AT FIRST REFUSED AND LATER ACCORDED BY THE SAME
SUPERIOR, wno DOES NOT REMEMUEK THE FIRST REFUSAL.

Leopold, bound by a perpetual vow of chastity, wishes to marry
Sylvia. In order to obtain a dispensation, he writes to the Holy
Penitentiary, under the Hetitious name of Titius, for instance,
as is done in secret affairs. He alleges as a reason, the serious
temptation to which he is exposed, making his vow very difficult
to keep.

He is refused. Not being discouraged, he tries once more.

90 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

After a month or two, he writes again to the same Congregation ;
but using another name, Simpronius for instance, and without
speaking of the first refusal, mentioning however the same motive.
His ruse is successful this time, and he obtains the dispensation.

Ques. 1. What is it that we call an obreptitious or a surreptitious
dispensation, and when is it of no value?

Ques. 2. Is Leopold's request surreptitious and of no value?
Ans. Question 1. — We call obreptitious dispensation, the
one in which a false reason is alleged as the principal motive,
which reason, had it been known, would have prevented the dis
pensation.

We call it surreptitious, when a truth is hidden which ought
to have been indicated, according to the rights and regula
tions of the Curia, above all, if any ruse or fraud is used. It is
evident that such a dispensation is of no value. But if the false
reason is but a determining'motive, without which the dispensation
would have been accorded, but with greater difficulty ; or if we hide
a truth which is not directly and intrinsically related to the sub
ject of the dispensation, or that one is not obliged to declare after
the regulations of the Curia, the dispensation is valid ; because the
superior is supposed to have been willing to give it, provided the
principal motive is mentioned.

Ans. Question 2. — No, this dispensation is not at all surrepti
tious, though perhaps the superior would have refused it if he
had recalled to mind his first refusal ; the presumption that the
superior would have refused has no foundation. If he accords it
on account of the same reasons given before, it is a proof that
those reasons are sufficient for the dispensation. No matter about
the first refusal, because it has no relation to the case ; and to refuse
the dispensation for that reason only, would be a breach of common
sense. This is evident ; for if there is a just reason, it is better to
palliate the rigor of the first refusal that to confirm it. Then the
circumstances of the first refusal has no relation with the validity
of the subsequent dispensation. Leopold was not obliged to recall
it to the superior, and that dispensation, not being surreptitious, is
valid. Do not object, because Leopold, gave another fictitious
name ; no attention is paid to names by the Holy Penitentiary,

Cases of Conscience on the Law. 91

since pseudonyms are used so habituall}'. No matter whether the
name is Titius or Simpronius. Do not say that Leopold can be
accused of the criminal intention of deceiving the superior ; be
cause we cannot deceive when we use our rights.

CASE XIX.
THE ANNULLING LAW.

Thirsus having become an heir, perceives that the will made in
his favor lacks an essentially legal formality. However, without
saying anything about it, he receives the inheritance and enjoys it
quietly.

Ques. What should we advise Thirsus to do?

Ans. The most probable opinion commands that Thirsus should
not be troubled, if no judgment interferes ; because, according to
many theologians, an annulment of such a nature does not exist
(ipso facto), but must be declared by judgment.

CASE XX.
THE PENAL LAW.

Sapricius is accustomed to carry in his wagon, on his horse, or
in some other way, wheat, wine, and other goods under toll-duty.
He evades it whenever he can do so, without fear of a fine, either
iu passing during the night by an out-of-the-way road, avoiding the
custom officers, deceiving them by ruse, etc. He does not think
he is doing any harm; because the duty charged is considerable,
and of ten established uselessly for the public interests, and because
the law which establishes it is purely penal. However, going to
confession and feeling a scruple, he asks if he has done well.

Ques. 1. Do we establish simply penal laws?

Ques. 2. Has Sapricius sinned? is lie obliged to make restitution?

Ans. to the 1st Question. — 1. Laws of such a nature can be
established, that is to say, to be enforced in a disjunctive manner,
either to obey the law, or to pay the penalty if the offender has
been taken in the very act. A law has obligatory force only by
the will of the legislator; and the legislator can only enforce
the penalty if it is necessary to the common interest. Now,

92 The, Doctrine of the Jesuits.

this suffices for certain laws not very important for the good order
of society.

2. Certain purely penal laws seem to be established, at least in
certain localities, so think many theologians. St. Liguori says :
44 The laws of the cities interdicting the cutting of wood, grass,
etc., or fishing or hunting, do not create obligations under the
penalty of sin; such is the custom. — But what are the purely
penal laws in each locality? Learned and experienced men of the
place alone, can judge.

Ans. to the 2d Question. — There is controversy between the
theologians. Some say, Yes, others say, No. This is the opinion of
Sanchez and others, recalled by St. Liguori, who does not express
any personal opinion : ''Sanchez thinks that nobody, going straight
along on his way, is obliged to pay toll for passing a door or a
bridge es'ablished for the keeping of roads in order ; because it
would be hard to oblige strangers to know this regulation about
doors and bridges." And Sanchez, with others, looked upon that
opinion as probable, even if goods are hidden, or if one hid himself ;
because those cluiics established are only to be paid if they
are asked for. In a general way, speaking of all duties,
Lugo thinks that the people ouj;ht to be informed before
hand, in order to oblige them to pay. One cannot oblige
an individual to make a restitution for that of which he . has de
prived the treasury, if he is persuaded, in a probable manner,
that amongst a great number of duties, he has paid some unjust
ones, or that he has sufficiently contributed to the expenses of the
State.''

According to these authorities, Sapricius must not be disturbed.*

* See Treatise on Justice and Rights. No. 744.

Ereattse on Sins.

PART I.
SINS IN GENERAL, THEIR NATURE, GRAVITY AND DISTINCTION,

CHAPTER I.

NATURE OF SIN.

143. — Generally, sin is thus defined : It is a free transgression
of divine law, in other words, of any law which obliges in con
science.

There are several sorts of sins :

1. Present or habitual.

2. Mortal or venial.

3. By commission or by omission.

4. Against God, others, and one's self.

5. Of malignity, ignorance or weakness.

6. Formal or material.

For a formal sin, besides the objective malignity of the act, the
attention of the mind and the consent of the will are necessary.

I. Attention of the mind. ... 4

II. Consent of the will. . . .

145. — There is no obligation to positively resist the allurements
of the flesh, when such a resistance does nothing but excite them
more ; a material resistance is yet less necessary. . . .

Likewise, we are not compelled to oppose a positive resistance
to any temptation of long duration ; because it would be too diffi
cult, and we would be exposed to irnnumerable scruples.

94 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CHAPTER II.

GRAVITY OF SIN, AND ESPECIALLY OF MORTAL AND VENIAL
SIN. . . .

CHAPTER III.
DISTINCTIONS OF SIN.

ART. I. — Specific distinctions.

The specific distinction of sin comes from a particular malignity,
that is to say, from a different fault, by whicli a sin differs essen
tially from another one.

159. — Example: Four sins are committed by the one who,
bound by a vow of chastity, sins with a married relation ; because
he violates four different virtues: chastity, religion, piety and
justice. . . .

ART. II. — Numerical distinction.

We treat numerical distinctions in the same manner ; for it is
evident that sins distinguished by their kinds, may also, and for
better reason, be distinguished by their number ; so there is no par
ticular rule to give on that subject. . . .

160. — Example : A single sin is committed when, in view of
fornication, one indulges in sensual contact with a woman, kissing,
holding obscene talk, and then fornicating ; because all these acts,
in their nature, precede and bring out the completion of the final
act. But if in the beginning the touching only was intended, and
that later, blinded by passion, fornication had resulted, there would
have been two sins then, and to confess fornication only would
not be sufficient. . . .

Several sins are committed when more than one act is accomp
lished sucessively with the same woman ; because each act is final
in itself, and constitutes a complete intention.

Treatise on Sins. 95

PART II.
KINDS OF SINS.

CHAPTER I.
INTERNAL SINS.

167. — They are divided into three classes : 1st. The pleasure
in which one delights (delect atiomorosa*) when one delights freely
in the evil represented by the imagination, without desiring it.

2nd. The joy, when one takes pleasure, and with deliberation,
in thinking of the accomplished evil.

3rd. The desire, or act of the will, in view of obtaining, and later
of accomplishing, a bad action. It is called efficacious if there is
intention or absolute design in obtaining ; Inefficacious, if there is
but a feeble desire, or conditional consent ; for instance, if we say :
I would like to steal, if I only could ; I would like to possess that
woman, if I was not afraid of losing her or my reputation. . . .

170. — Does the pleasure in which one delights receive a par
ticular malignity from the circumstances in view, as the desire
and the joy ? f • • •

Ans. Controversy. . . .

Ques. Can we desire to do evil, if that evil is permitted ?

Ans. Controversy. . . .

172. — Ques. Can we rejoice at the voluntary omission of some
forgotten precepts? . . .

Ans. Controversy. . . .

173. — The doctrine of St. Thomas teaches that there is no
sin if a nocturnal pollution pleases us, as being a natural relief ;

* I do not find any expression to translate the morosus spoken of by the
casuist. It is a word of low Latin which has nothing in common with the
morosus of the ancient authors. In theological dialect, that morosus has
been deduced from morari. Delectio morosa signifies a pleasure in which
one delights.

t This is the right place to insert the ingenious species imagined by St.
Liguori and recalled by Moullet : "If any one takes delight in thoughts of
criminal relations with a married woman, not because she is married, but
because she is beautiful, abstracting the circumstance of marriage, such a
deliberation has not the malignity of adultery, but of simple fornication."
(Compendium, vol. 1, page 126, 1834).

96 T/ie Doctrine of the Jesuits.

but the pleasure inherent to the pollution, being shameful, is cul
pable in itself. This is the explanation of the holy doctor. St.
Liguori does not want even that it should be so understood for the
pollution resulting from touch or obscene dreams ; because, in this
manner, it is culpable objective!}'. It is otherwise if it is a question
of a purely natural pollution, when nature relieves herself. Besides,
in practice, we must avoid taking pleasure in it, although honest
in principle, for fear of the danger which may result. . . .

CHAPTER II.
CAPITAL SINS.

We call them thus, because they are as the source of the other
sins. Considered in general, they are rather vices, than sins,
properly so called.

There are seven of them : pride, avarice, luxury, envy, anger,
laziness, and gluttony. . . .

Cases of Conscience on Sins.

CASE I.
GRAVITY OF SIN.

Moevius, a kind-hearted and pious man, tormented and pursued
night and day by temptations, does not know if he has given
his consent or not. He is particularly troubled on account of
certain hallucinations, or even indecent actions, whose victim he
has been during a light sleep, so it seems to him.

Ans. Has Moevius grievously sinned?

Ans. He must be advised to be at peace, because he does not
seem to have given his consent ; at least, in a perfect manner, to
the temptation.

CASE II.

SPECIFIC DISTINCTION OF SINS.

Alexander confesses himself to have bad desires, but without
indicating either the object or the condition of the persons.

Ques. Ought he to confess all these circumstances?

Ans. Yes ; his confession is incomplete ; . . . if the woman he
was desiring was married, a relation of his, or bound by the vow
of chastity, he ought to have declared it.

CASE III.
SPECIFIC DISTINCTION OF SINS.

Nicolinus, on a Sunday, and also on a day on which he had
received the holy communion, sinned with Bertha his servant, who
is his cousin in the third degree ; in his confession he says, only,
that he has had relations (rem habuisse) with a woman.

Ques. Has he sinned against the integrity of the confession?

Ans. His confession is bad, having omitted the specific cir-

98 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

cumstancc of the sin committed with a relation. But he is not
obliged to declare that she was his servant ; because the sin does
not become, by this, a new kind ; unless it should be a question of
a young girl confided to a master by her parents ; in which case
the contract would have been broken.

CASE IV.
NUMERICAL DISTINCTION OF SINS.

Basile, induced by a grave temptation against chastity, gave his
intimate consent to a bad desire; he proposes to himself to sin
really (efficaciter), and looks out for the occasion all day long,
with his desire always present, and making no effort to overcome
it. At last, improving the occasion, after obscene talk and
indecent gestures, he accomplishes the external act of sin.
Repenting, he made this confession : " I have committed once, the
sin of fornication."

Ques. Is Basile's confession correct?

Ans. His confession is complete, because he has committed but
one sin. In fact, the antecedent acts had but the same bad aim,
and involve themselves with it in the same action.

CASE VI.
NUMERICAL DISTINCTION OF SINS.

Delphin, wishing to seduce a young girl, uses different means
for that purpose, unchaste and endearing talk, love letters, obscene
engravings, sensual contact ; but the sin, through fortuitous circum
stances, could not be consummated.

Ques. Has he committed several bins?

Ans. He has committed as many sins as there are bad acts of
different species, . . . because the sin not having been consum
mated, all its divers means, each one bad in itself, cannot be attrib
uted to a common aim, and be assimilated with the consummation
of the sin.

Cases of Conscience on /Sins* 99

CASE VIII.
INTERNAL SINS.

Blaise, a man of joyful disposition, experiences great pleasure
for several motives :

1. At the death of his brother, because he remains the only
heir.

2. At (he death of his boy five years old, on account of his
future happiness, and the diminution of the burden for the
family.

3. Because, on the day before not knowing that it was a fast clay,
he escaped that painful obligation without sinning.

4. For seeing women maltreating each other, blaspheming and
cursing ; and also in hearing of a theft skilfully accomplished.

Ques. What is to be thought of Blaise's joy in each one cf these
cases ?

Ans. Blaise, in several cases, ought to regret his joy, if that
joy was not spontaneous, but the result of fully deliberated act ;
in almost all the cases, he must be excused.

1. He sins grievously in rejoicing at the death of his brother,
if it is for the death itself, though he does not do it through hate,
but because he remains alone to inherit ; for it is not permitted to
rejoice at an evil happening to another, above all to a brother, on
account of the advantage which will result from it. This is estab
lished by the Xlllth and XlVth propositions condemned by Inno
cent XI.*

* These propositions, condemned on the 2nd of March, 1779, are the
following :

13- — "If it is done with moderation, one may, without sin, complain of
the life and rejoice at the natural death of a person, to ask for it and to
wish it with an inefficacious desire, not through hate for the person, but
in view of a temporal advantage."

!•* — " It is allowable to wish for the death of one's father; not in view
of the harm he will experience, but in virtue of the advantage which will
result from it, that is to say, some rich inheritance."

There was besides a proposition :

15.— "A son may lawfully rejoice for having, while drunk, killed his
father, on account of the riches coming to him by inheritance."

This last monstrosity emanates from the Jesuit Fagundez (Vol. IX in
Decalogum), The Jesuit Gobat, who accepts it, explains himself exten
sively on this subject.

100 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Because he could not wish for the death of his brother for that
reason, then he cannot rejoice at it. It would be otherwise if he
did not rejoice at the death of his brother, but only at the inheri
tance which comes to him from it.

2. Blaise must be excused in the second case ; because the
motive which directs him is not a transgression of the principle of
charity, thinking only of the good of his son and family. But he
must not be excused for the joy he feels from that death on
account of the relief which results at it for the family. This
would be, in reality, contrary to the principle of charity. . . .

" As it is supposed that the parricide has been innocently committed by
a lack of deliberation caused by drunkenness, and that there had been no
premeditation; besides, that parricide has for effect the gaining of great
riches, an effect which is good, or at least, certainly, not bad ; it follows
that the doctrine of F. Fagundez, which may seem paradoxical, is true in
speculation, although dangerous in practice." (page 437)

Tambourin multiplies the species, and makes a more complete cata
logue :

" May a son wish for the death of his father, ... in order to enjoy his
inheritance?

"May a mother wish for the death of her daughter, in order not to be
obliged to feed and endow her?

"Can a priest wish for the death of his prelate in the hope of succeed
ing him, or to be delivered from that prelate who is contrary to him, and
other such things?

"If you only desire or learn with joy of those events, viz. an inheritance,
the end of your grief, a prelacy, etc., the answer is easy; because it is
permitted to d<jsire these things and to receive them; because you do not
rejoice at the evil of others, but at the good which comes to you." (page
429.)

La Croix: " It is permitted to wish for the death of someone, or to rejoice
at it, when a great good, even a temporal one, results from it to the public
or to the Church."

Cardenas : " It is allowable to a son to rejoice at the inheritance which
comes to him through the death of his father, without rejoicing at the
death itself." (page 422.)

Casnedi : **I may wish for the death of my father, either as being for
him an evil, and that is not permitted ... or being advantageous to me,
and then we must distinguish : firstly, I can rejoice as much at the good
which comes to me through the death of my father as in my father's
death itself, which is the cause of that great good; . . . secondly, I can
rejoice fully at the good which comes through the death of my father,
and not at his death which procures to me that good.

" The first manner is not permitted . . . but the second one is; because
then I make an abstraction, but I rejoice only at the good.

" This doctrine must become familiar; because it is useful to all those
who wish for some good which they can have only through the death of
someone; as when it is a question of some profession or situations, in
peace or in war, or some ecclesiastical or secular dignity." (page 438.)

Cases of Conscience on Sins. 101

CASE XV.
ON DRUNKENNESS.

Gaudiosus, an inveterate drinker, remains for whole hours
drinking with his comrades, and especially on Sunday.

But though his head feels heavy and he staggers, he does not
lose his reason ; and swears, blasphemes, and sings obscene songs.

Ques. Has Gaudiosus grievously sinned?

Ans. Theologians generally admit, that drunkenness is not a
mortal sin if there is no voluntary and total loss of reason. Now,
in principle, Gaudiosus is not culpable of mortal sin, although he
drank more than the others ; I say in principle ; because he com
mits a grave sin when, in provoking others, he co-operates in
their sin, in inducing them to lose their reason.

CASE XVI.
ON DRUNKENNESS.

Gaudentius gets drunk on very little. Having many occasions,
he is often drunk. Most of the tune, when in such a state, he
goes to sleep ; but one day he grew furious, and broke a very
precious crystal vase, belonging to Titus.

Ques. 1. Does Gaudentius sin gravely?

Ques. 2. Is he obliged to pay for the vase?

Ans. Question 1. — Gaudentius cannot be excused from a
grave sin ; because he knows by experience," that, with the com
pany he frequents, and the little quantity that is necessary to

We see by these extracts and even by Gury's case, that the condemnation
pronounced by Innocent XI lias been easily evaded by the Jesuits.

But what is more shocking, is to see such an infamous doctrine preached
to little children, in our XlXth century. Open the Petit Catechisme of
Marotte, (fourth edition, 1870, page 181), and read :

" Ques. Is it allowable to wish for a bad action or to rejoice at it, on
account of the advantage which ought to result?

"Ans. It is never allowable to wish for a bad action, nor to rejoice at
it, whatever may be the advantage resulting from it; thus, a son cannot
rejoice at the murder of his father on account of the rich inheritance
which comes to him. But it is allowable to rej >ice at an advantage,
though it results from an evil; for instance, a sou may, with pleasure,
take possession of the inheritance which comes to him through the
murder of his father."

102 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

make him drunk, lie is liablo to becom3 mischievous. Ho ou^ht

O

either to have abstained totally, or have mixed a notable quantity
of water with his wine, an 1 shunned his habitual boon companions.
It would be otherwise if he seldom got drunk and against his will.
Ans. Question 2. — But he cannot be nude to pay for the dam
age ; it is evident that he has not foreseen the harm he has caused.
Then, this harm has been voluntary, neither in the act nor in the
cause; there is no theological fault; and in conscience, he is not
obliged to make a restitution.

CASE XVII.
ON DRUNKENNESS.

Hypacus, a physician, every tim3 ho performs a difficult surgical
operation, an amputation for instance, gives to his pitient a large
dose of intoxicating liquor, opium, or ether, to make him insensible.

Ques. What is to be thought of Hypacus?

Ans. According to St. Liguori, and the other theologians gen
erally, Hypacus sins gravely in administering an intoxicating
potion in order to procure insensibility ; because in acting thus he
seeks good from evil : now, we must never commit an evil deed
even if good is to result from it. But, according to some, Hypacus
doc's not sin, because he does not seek directly inebriety ; the
effect directly in view being insensi >ility, and the effect purely per
mitted the suppression of reason. Now, the suppression of reason
for a short time and for a grave motive does not seem to be an
intrinsic evil ; and, in reality, as 0112 uses opium and ether in such
a case, one may also use wine.

on Utrtue**

185. — Virtue is the habit of acting honestly, in other words,
according to good order.
We distinguish virtues as :

1. Natural or supernatural, if we acquire and preserve them by
our own natural strength or by supernatural grace.

2. Innate or acquired, if they are given by God or acquired by
repeated struggles.

3. Theological or moral, if they are immediately related to God,
or if they have honesty for their immediate object.

There are four moral and cardinal virtues : prudence, justice,
fortitude, and temperance.

We shall speak here chiefly of theological virtues : faith, hope,
and charity.

CHAPTER I.

FAITH.

186. — Faith, in general, is acquiescence in the authority of
a word. Relatively to our subject, and as a virtue so-called, it
is an inspired supernatural disposition, which calls on our intellect
to acquiese firmly in the truth revealed by God and proposed by
the church, in virtue of the authority of the divine revelations.

ART. 1.— Necessity of faith. . . .

ART. 2. — Object of faith. . . .

ART. 3. — Vices opposed to faith. . . .

CHAPTER II.
HOPE.

211. — Hope is a supernatural virtue, by which, according to the
promise of God, we look for future happiness, and the means of
attaining it.

104 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CHAPTER III.

CHARITY.

217. — Charity is a virtue by which we cherish God as the
sovereign Good, on account of himself, and our neighbor on
account of God.

ART. I. — Love to God. . . .

ART. II. — Love to our neighbor.

SECTION I. Precept for the love of our neighbors.

223. — Ques. Is it contrary to charity, to wish for a temporal
evil to another, or to rejoice at it, for a good end ?

Ans. 1. No, if the order desired through charity is not violated ;
in other words, if it is done in view of a greater good or a lesser
evil. It is then permitted : 1st, for the spiritual good of others ;
2nd, for the spiritual or temporal common good ; 3rd, for the good
of a large number and of greater importance, as for the good of
the family, or of the community.

2. Yes, when the order willed by charity is violated. Thus,
a woman cannot wish for the death of her husband, because she
is maltreated by him. . . .

225. — Ques. Can we wish for a public punishment for our
enemy, and even ask for it?

Ans. Yes, in principle, provided that any sentiment of revenge
be set aside ; but it is dangerous in practice.

Ques. Must the offender ask pardon for the offence?

Ans. Yes, in principle, if there are no other means of reconcili
ation. Except the case in which the offender would be the superior
of the offended ; or if the offended deemed it prudent to pardon the
offence. . . .

226. — . . . We must not, without examination, accuse of sin,
especially of a grave sin, penitents who confess that they hate
some one ; because they often confound the proper appelation for
enmity with hatred of abomination, or of rank, or of failure, where
they feel but a natural and overmastering aversion. However, it
is necessary to take care that the aversion for rank or for character
does not degenerate gradually into hate for the person.

Treatise on Virtues. 105

SECTION 2. Works of mercy, alms, and brotherly correction.

lirotherly correction: this is an admonition by which, in virtue
of charity, one endeavors to prevent others from sinning. . . .

231. — Ques. Does the precept of brotherly correction oblige
under grievous sin ?

Ans. Yes, in principle. . . .

232. Ques. What order must we keep in brotherly correction?

Ans. 1st, To reprimand secretly ; 2nd, Before witnesses, if the
first admonition is not sufficient ; 3rd, To report to a superior. . . .
Sometimes, one can and must change this order. . . .

233. — In regular communities, colleges, seminaries etc., it is
convenient that correction should be made by denunciation, either
directly or by an intermediate agent.* School-fellows and com
rades cannot be absolved if they do not consent to make such a
denunciation, when it is a question of great damage to the com
munity.

SECTION 3. Vices opposed to charity for our neighbors.

The principal are : hatred, envy, quarreling, scandal, and co
operation in the sins of others.

ART. I. — Scandal.

234. — Scandal is a speech, or an act scarcely honest, giving
occasion for a spiritual fall. . . .

237. — Ques. Is it permitted to advise some one to commit a
lesser evil, when he has resolved to commit a greater one?

Ans. Yes, more probably. . . .

* "When the sin of another is secret, we must warn the guilty one
secretly. If he shows himself intractable, he must be censured in the
presence of one or^two prudent persons; if he perseveres in his sin, his
superior must be warned. But it may happen that it is necessary to
change this order, and immediately denounce the offender to the superior."
— Marotte.

This is the theory of espionage between comrades which is the rule in
Jesuit's establishments, and contributes so powerfully to degradation of
character; it is known how tattlers are treated in our colleges.

The newspapers exposed recently to public indignation, an article of
the regulations in the military school of Saint Cyr, which is evidently dic
tated by the Jesuitical spirit :

"The pupils of the first division are in duty bound to inform the author
ities of any pupil of the second division, whose bearing, deeds, and ges
tures, when outside, might injure the good reputation of the school, for
which all pupils arc responsible."

106 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ques. Can we allow sin occasionally, in order to correct the
guilty one?

Ans. Yes ; because to permit it, is not to engage in it.
238. — Ques. Is it allowable for a just motive to create an
occasion for sin?

Ans. Controvers}'.-— The affirmative is more probable. . . .
Ques. What are we to think of the relations between the faith
ful and the Jews?

Ans. In order to guard safely the dignity of the Christian
religion, and to avoid the peril of perversion, it has been decreed
by the church : 1st, That Christians should not live with Jews ; 2d,
That they should not attend their feasts ; 3d, That they should not
have the same masters ; 4th, That they should not eat of their
unleavened bread ; 5th, Tuat Christian women should not suckle
Jewish children. . . .

On bad books. — Of all kinds of scandal, none is more
abominable than that resulting from impious and obscene books.
It is an invention of the devil, the most efficacious of all, to preci
pitate crowds of souls into the bottomless pit of hell. It is an
awful scourge, which infects not only a country or a generation,
but diffuses itself everywhere, in all time, making numberless
victims. Who could tell the frightful evils which have come out of
them, as from a poisoned source, to assail religion,— evils which
will be propagated and multiplied to the end of the world ?

Let the ministers of God, preachers and confessors, multiply
their efforts. Let them sacrifice themselves to oppose that torrent
of iniquity, and snatch from the infernal abyss the souls in danger. .
Permission to read, print, or publish books contrary to the Chris
tian faith and manners, must never bi given. . . '.

241. — Ques. Must such books, if borrowed, be given back to
their owners?

Ans. No ; unless some great inconvenience is to be feared. This
results from the principle we gave. There is a grave inconvenience
in quarrels, blasphemies, hate, and other similar things, which are
to be feared from the owner. A slight contrariety, or the fear of
losing his friendship, is not, most of the time, a sufficient reason. . .
ART. II. — Co-operation.

Treatise on Virtues. 107

248. — It is : 1. Mediate or immediate. . . .

2. Near or removed. . . .

3. Positive or negative. . . .

4. Formal or material. . . .

There is also co-operation direct or indirect, physical or
moral. . . .

250. — Ques. Is a servant allowed to open the door of a house
to a courtesan?

Ans. Controversy. St. Liguori concludes in the affirmative, if
there is some other person who would do it. . . .

In cities. . . it is allowable to let a house to courtesans, if no
other tenants are found, or if they could easily find some other
house. . . .

251. — Ques. Can a servant harness a horse for his master who
is setting out to commit a sin, and can he accompany him?

Ans. It does not appear to be forbidden to get the horse readj*,
because the servant no more co-operates in his master's sin than by
opening the door to the courtesan. But he c innot accompany his
master, unless in case of serious damage. ... Or if he is not certain
about the design of his master. . . .

Ques. Is a servant permitted to carry his master's love-letters to
a concubine?

Ans. No ; at least, not without a weighty reason. . . .

Ques. Is a servant permitted to carry gifts to a courtesan?

Ans. No ; unless there i^ a very weighty reason.

256. — Ques. Are inn-keepers permitted to give newspapers to
their customers, to read ?

Ans. They cannot subscribe to papers which are evidently and
ordinarily contrary to religion and good nuruls, even if tliuy run
the risk of losing their customers.

Cases of Conscience on Fittues*

CASE VII.
RELATION WITH HERETICS.

Leocadie, a nun, a hospital nurse, where Catholic and heretic
patients are received, is requested by Quirinus, a very sick
Protestant, to send for a minister of his sect, in order to receive
from him the consolations of religion.

Leocadie does not know if she must obey.

Ques. May Leocadie send for a Protestant minister?

Ans. No; it is evident that she cannot ; that would be communi
cation with heretics in a religious case, and co-operation also. Here
is the decision of the Holy Congregation of the Inquisition on the
15th of March 1848:

" Venerable Father,

" D. N. humbly informs your Holiness that, in the city

of M , tht-re is a hospital of which he is the chaplain, and

where the patients are under the care of nuns. Others than
Catholics are received, and often Protestant ministers are sent for.
It is asked if nuns are permitted to bring in ministers of the false
religion? Is it al^o allowable to call for a Protestant minister
when some heretic is treated in the private house of a Catholic?"

15th of March, 1848.

In the General Congregation of the "Roman, Universal and Holy
Inquisition, deliberating in Council, in presence ot'Their Eminences
and Reverences S. R. E. Cardinals, especially delegated by the
Holy See in order to fight heresy all over the world : After having
heard the reading of the above request, and the wish of the Doctors
consulted being known, their Eminences and Reverend Lords
have said : " According to what has been said, such a thing is
not allowable," and added : 'k Let them keep a passive attitude."

ANGELUS AKGENTI.

S. Rom. and Univ. Inquisit. Secretarius.

Cases of Conscience on Virtues. 109

CASE XII.

CHARITY TOWARDS OUR NEIGHBOR. MATERNAL AND CONJUGAL

LOVE.

Calpurnie, the mother of a large family, wishes for the death of
a new-born child, of another one five years old, deaf and dumb,
and also of another, nine years old, an invalid, in order that they
should enjoy happiness in heaven. She wishes also for the deatli of
her daughter, not being able to marry on account of her poverty
and homeliness, who if dead, would be prevented from sinning.
She desires also the death of her husband, an old and sickly
man always complaining. Sometimes, in a moment of passion,
she would send her children to the devil; and an instant after,
moved by piety, she would devote them to God and wish them
dead. But she"falls sick, and her husband, Culpurnius, runs to the
nearest monastery and prays for the death of his wife.

Ques. 1. — Did Calpurnie sin in these divers cases, and how?

Ques. 2. — What is to be thought of her husband?

Ans. Question 1.— 1. Calpurnie has not sinned in her first wish
about her three sons and daughter, because she is not influenced
by passion, but by the thought of a better state for them. She
did not sin against charity, or against the virtue of piety.

2. In wishing for the death of her husband, she sinned griev
ously against charity and piety ; because her motive is a perverse
one, and her wish is caused by annoyance, impatience, or hate for
her husband.

3. She committed a grave sin in devoting her children to the
devil, unless she acted through anger ; or again, what often hap
pens, not meaning seriously what she said. However, as the
movement of passion is seen, and the imprecations heard by the
children, it is difficult to avoid a grave scandal. But she did not
sin in wishing that God would gather her family and place it in
heaven, provided she was moved only by faith and piety.

Ans. Question 2.— It is evident that the husband has grievously
sinned against chanty and piety.

110 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CASE XIII.
ON DANCING .

Lucile, foreseeing that she would soon be obliged to dance at
her sister's wedding, and also at balls, public or private, when
introduced into society by her father, asks her confessor if she is
obliged to obey her father.

Ques. — What is the decision in Lucile's case?

Ans. — Lucile must be praised for her scrupulous and timid
conscience ; and also, because, seeing the peril, she comes to ask
the advice of her confessor. I advise that good girl to seek
for some means to avoid dancing ; but I do not impose that
obligation. If she cannot escape it, let her think, while dancing,
of death and divine justice.

Ereatise on tlje precepts of tfye Bccalogue*

I am the Lord thy God. . . . Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
(Exodus xx. 2, 3).

PRECEPT I.

CHAPTER I.
ACTS RELATIVE TO THE VIRTUE OF RELIGION.

ART. 1. — On Adoration.
ART. 2. — On Prayer.

CHAPTER II.

VICES OPPOSED TO RELIGION.
ART. I. — On superstition.

263. — Superstition is a vice contrary to religion by its excess,
and by which we render to God a worship we do not owe him, or
to creatures a worship we owe only to God.

SECTION 1. — On Idolatry. . . .
SECTION 2. — Forbidden worship. . . .

265. — It is a superstition to address prayers to St. Bridget, or
others, and expect from them an infallible effect. Notwithstanding,
we must not blame, but praise, those who wear medals, pious
images, or relics, with the hope of receiving divine help. . . .

SECTION 3. — On divination.

t266. — This is the searching of sacred things with the help of
he devil.
It is expressed if one invokes the devil expressly, and implied if
hat invocation consists only in forbidden practices.

112 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

We distinguish several kinds of divination, the principal are:

1. Judicial astrology, by the stars ;

2. Augury, by the songs of birds ;

3. Aruspicy, by their flight ;

4. Aruspicy, by the entrails of animals ;

5. Chiromancy, by the lines of the hand ;
G. Geomancy, by the signs of the earth ;

7. Presage, 1 y chance ;

8. Necromancy, by the invocation of the dead ;

9. Oneiromancy, by dreams;

10. Sorcery, by spell ;

11. Oracle, by idols ;

12. Prophecy, by soothsayer or cards; . . .

270. — Ques. Is it possible to foretell the future by dreams?

Ans. No, generally ; . . . because the dreams sent by God
are very rare, and present signs easily distinguished from natural
dreams or diabolical ones.

Ques. Is it permitted to use the divining rod ? . . .

Ans. We must not quite condemn that means of discovering
water and metals, provided the rod should move equally if we
search for them or not ; but we protest against any diabolical
intervention, and exclude all spirit of superstition.

SECTION 4. — On magic and witchcraft.

271. — In its strict sense, magic is the art of wonder-working,
which, though not supernatural, is above the strength of man,
and can be obtained implicitly or explicitly only with the help of
the devil who has been invoked.

Witchcraft is the art of doing injury with the intervention of
the devil. There is an amorous witchcraft and an envenomed
witchcraft. The first, the philter or love-charm, is a diabolical
art consisting in creating a sensual love or a violent hate for some
one. The second is the art of injuring by causing sickness, in
sanity, etc., etc.*

* Ques. What is magic?

Ans. It is the art of doing astonishing things above the power of man,
and consequently by the intervention of Satan.

Treatise on the Precepts of the Decalogue. 113

APPENDIX I. — Table turning. . . .

273. — Pious men, who had seen in turning tables a purely
physical phenomena, have recognized in it, with no doubt what
ever, an infernal divination.

274. — Is it possible to question marble or wooden tables and
expect answers from them? Nobody is foolish enough to believe
that ; so people think, generally, that spirits are moving the tables,
and they have been called spirit-rappers ; now, they cannot be
good spirits ; it would be blasphemy to affirm that angels and
saints enjoying an eternal happiness would intervene in such a
childish game of men, obeying them and giving satisfaction t^
their insane curiosity. Moreover, it would be impious to affirm
that God, who abominates divination and forbids it so severely,
should permit the inhabitants of heaven to interpret them. Spirits'
of that sort then are bad spirits, cursed by God for eternity, and
seeking to entrap men in their meshes. Now, shall we not refuse
with indignation to entertain relations with those unclean spirits,
to evoke them, or render to them a true worship? Is not this the
crime of divination forbidden by God as abominable?*

APPENDIX II.— Animal magnetism.

279. — The Roman Curia, questioned on the use of magnetism
in general, answered through the Congregation of the Holy Office
on the 21st of April, 1841: The use of magnetism, as it is
explained, is not permitted. . . .

APPENDIX III. — Consultation of Spirits, or Spiritualism.

282. — This is a new superstition, the worst of all, sent by hell
for the destruction of souls. . . .

Ques. What is witchcraft?

rlPvi!8' rJV? maf C a!llllns at inJurinS others by the intervention of tlic
It takes also the name of sorcery; because it consists in throwing

MarottI P °f Uie 'JCVil) °VCr °Ur e"emies.-pctf* Catec/iisme I.

^ ^™^ '" ^ 19th °entUry' iu face °f the U«ht of

modern senc

* Ques What is to be thought of turning and speaking tables?
Aus. ,e experiments on turning and speaking tables are nothing elso
tnau superstitious and diabolical practices.— PcM Catechitme de Mantle-

114 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

It is clear that it is a diabolical consultation, a so-called divina
tion, severely forbidden by the Church. Those who consult
spirits or spiritualists, in order to diffuse more easily their pesti-
lent'al error, have formed a sect, which grows from day to day in
large cities. . . .

ART. IJ. Irreligion.

This is a particular lack of respect which addresses itself to God,
either immediately, or through the medium of persons and sacred
things. The principal kinds are : temptation relative to God,
sacrilege, simony, and perjury.

SECTION I. Temptation relative to God.

283. — This is a word or an act by which one seeks to know if
God is powerful, wise, merciful, or gifted with some otherqualities.

SECTION II. Sacrilege.

284. — This is a violation, or an unworthy treatment inflicted on a
sacred thing. It is: 1, personal ; 2, local ; 3, real. . . .

285. — A personal sacrilege is committed : 1st. in laving violent
hands on one of the clergy, or on a monk ; 2nd. in luxuriously vio
lating persons devoted to God, even by simple sensual contact;
3id. in traducing ecclesiastics before a tribunal.*

SECTION III. Simony.

288. — Simony, so called from Simon the magician, is the desire
which seeks to sell, or to buy a spiritual benefit for a temporal
price. It is called, seeking will or deliberate will.

The canon laws recognize three sorts of temporal prizes: Gift
of the hand ; . . . Gift of the tongue ; . . . (praises, etc.,) Gift
of obsequiousness. . . .

Simony is subdivide! into mental ; . . . conventional ; . . .
actual. . . .

* St. Liguori has imagined a very ingenious species which makes it
doubly sacrilegious: " If a priest in administering sacraments or in the
act of saying mass, when clothed in sacred vestments or leaving the altar,
pollutes himself voluntarily, or delights in venereal pleasures, he commits
a sacrilege" (Book III., No. 3C3).

With a little imagination, one could invent a triple sacrilege. This is a
pretty problem, that I present to any one concerned in the matter.

Treatise on the Precepts of the Decalogue. 115

We distinguish the simony of divine rights (indulgences, sacra
ments) . . . and that of ecclesiastical rights (benefices). . . .

289. — Simony is a very grave sin.* It comprehends no trifling
reasons in natural and divine rights ; ... in ecclesiastical rights
it may.

290. — Ques. Is it simony, to give temporal things to conciliate
a superior in view of obtaining a favor?

Ans. No, if the principal intention is to give it gratuitously . . .
Ques. Is there simony if one exercises sacred functions especially

in view of his salary ?

Ans. No, at least according to the probable opinion ; because
one does not receive the salary as the price of the sacred functions,
but as something due to a person working for the good of others. . .

291. — Is there simony in giving or receiving something for enter
ing a religious Order?

Ans. It is evident that a poor convent is permitted to exact some
thing for the feeding, etc., of the new comer ; because then one does

* Do not be frightened by such a show of severe principles. Already
the exceptions indicated by Gury teach us, t :at there are ways and means
Of compromising matters with Heaven. The ancient Jesuits, even in pro
claiming the same theoretical horror, expressed themselves more clearlv
yet:

Emm. Sa : "It is not simony to give something to a man in order to
gnin his friendship, by means of which a benefice will be obtained:
neither to give a benefice secondarily, and not principally, for personal
(food; . . . nor with the agreed condition that the beneficiary shall resign
it when he shall have a better one ; nor with this other condition, that he
will remit a debt not valid in justice; nor with the equally express con
dition, but nevertheless without a contract, that he will give it to some
one else." (page 148.)

To let : "Any one promising money in order to receive a benefice, but
whose promise is insincere, taking the resolution not to keep it, if he
thus obtains the benefice, is he guilty of simony? No; because it is the
intention which determines the nature of exterior acts. This is the opin
ion of Lessius, Snare/, de Valence, Fabri, Laymann, etc., etc."

Gregoire de Valence: "It is not simony to render some service to a
bishop, or to present him with some temporal gifts, in the hope of obtain
ing from him, in gratitude, some spiritual benefice."

Filliucius : " If some sacred thing was given for an immodest pleasure
and this as the price of it, and not simply out of gratitude or kindness,
then this would be simony and sacrilege; as for instance, if the collect
ion, election, or presentation of a benefice was the price of levvdness
committed with the beneficiary's sister. I have said not out of gratitude ;
because in this case there would be neither sacrilege nor simony, but only
a sort of irreverence in rewarding a shameful and profane action by a
thing sacred and dedicated to God." (page 151)

116 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

not exchange a spiritual thing for a temporal one ; and besides,
equity demands something, so that the convent shall not be ruined
by expenses. . . .

It is evident that nuns are permitted to exact a dowry from the
new comer, as it is established everywhere by custom. . . .

292.— Ques. Is there simony when a priest offers a mass to a
layman for a stake, whilst his companion exposes a material stake?

Ans. No, in principle ; because a spiritual thing is not balanced
by a temporal one in this manner ; it is just as when a mass is said
for a specified price ; it is only offering a spiritual payment instead
of a temporal one. . . .

Ques. Is there simony when a priest exacts for a mass a price
above the habitual tariff, or that fixed by the bishop?

Ans. No, in conscience and before God, unless there is a
thought of simony ; as long as he has a right to exact a renumera-
lion, no exchange of a spiritual thing for a temporal one is in
tended. . . .

295.— One is not guilty of sinrmy when, through gratitude he
gives a temporal benefit for a spiritual benefit received, and vice
versa. Thus, there would be no sin on the part of a chaplain
who willingly puts himself at the service of a bishop out of grati
tude for former kindness; such things are not looked upon as a,
price. Moreover, it is honorable and praiseworthy to show one's
self grateful for past favors. . . .

Ques. Is it necessary to restore the price of simony which has
been received for a spiritual thing?

Ans. If the crime of simony only has been committed, and if
justice has not been violated, there is no obligation to pay back be
fore you are condemned to do it by a judgment ; unless the price
is above the estinvitbn of the temporal good given to the other in
exchange. . . .

Cases on tJje Jtrst precept of tfje

CASE IX.
ON DIVINATION.

Lazare has heard that a ring or a stone hung to a thread, held
between the thumb and the index in such a way as to strike a
glass, indicates the hour. Drawn b\T curiosity, he was going to
test it ; when some one told him that it is not allowable, because
it is a superstitious practice. He asks for the advice of his con
fessor.

Ques. Can he make the experiment? Is it a superstitious prac
tice?

Ans. Lazare must not make the experiment, as it is evidently
a superstitious practice. This is no natural cause for indicating the
hour, since such indications proceed neither from pulsation, nor
from the imagination, nor from the attraction of the stars.

CASE X.
MAGIC AND WITCHCRAFT.

Sabellus, betrothed to Sigolena, is on the point of marrying
her. But Dafrosa, the step-mother of Sigolena, and a fast woman,
hears of it, and does all she can to prevent it, but in vain. Then,
in anger, she said to Sigolena: " Let my curse fall upon thy
head !" After the marriage, Sabellus conceives such an aversion
for his wife that he cannot see her without disgust. Sigolena sus
pecting Dafrosa of having thrown a spell over her, complains to
Dafrosa of her husband's aversion, and asks if she knows a remedy,
"Yes," answers Dafrosa, "but I will not give it theo, until I
receive one hundred pounds."

Ques. Can we reasonably conjecture that in this case there is
intervention of magic, or witchcraft?

118 T,\e Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ans. Yes, this seems to be the result of all the circumstances.
Assuredly, a natural aversion may come between man and wife, as
we see many examples of it ; but it does not come, without a
known cause, with such rapidity an 1 viuljncje. Add to this the
threats of Dafrosa, a courtesan, and the remedy she claims to
have at her disposal, if she is pa:d for it. In the Scriptures, we
see there were magicians, witches, and sorcerers ; this is also
established in different passages of the canon laws, with abundant
proofs. So we cannot refuse to have faith in all the diabolical
facts of this nature, in general and in particular, when there are
unquestionable indications of it. In all ancient times there have
always been perverse men, selling themselves to the devil, in
order to have his intervention in revenging themselves on others
in a strange and frightful manner. Why, in so corrupt a time as
this, should there not be also magicians and sorcerers? But we
must avoid believing too easily everything that is related : most
of these are intentions, and the people, too credulous, often attrib
ute to witchcraft the calamities and plagues which result from
natural causes.

CASE XII.
TABLE TURNING.

Camille, mother of a family, drawn by feminine curiosity, has
often, of her own free-will, attended meetings in which the attend
ants, forming a circular chain by means of a light contact at the
extremity of the fingers, make tables tarn, stop them at will, make
them walk, go back, answer by conventional signs, ani even, oh
stupefaction ! make them write wil«h a pencil fixed to one of the
legs, all the answers asked of them. . . .

Ques. What must we think of these practices?

Ans. Assuredly, we must attribute to the devil everything that
is done in the form of divination, all that is relative to divination ;
and those questions asked of tables on things secret or future, and
the answers received by signs or characters. In reality, why
put questions to a wooden or marble table, and expect answers?
You are not foolish enough for that. You believe, then, that you
are in communication with an intelligent being, or some spirit, who

Cases on the First Precept of the Decalogue. 119

can move an inert table. Now, such beings cannot be good.
Who would dare to affinn that it is God himself, or an angel sent
by Him, who intervenes in these foolish games of men, and who
always zealously yields to their vain curiosities and impious
notions? It would be a horrible blasphemy. And it could not be
either from souls expiating in Purgatory that we can expect the
knowledge of sacred things ; because they can do it only accord
ing to God's will. Of course, it is the devil himself who is im
plicitly invoked ; it is he who is worshipped, in spite of God's
prohibition.

CASE XIII.
ANIMAL MAGNETISM.

There are three degrees in the effects of magnetism: 1. The
state of sleep, which consists only in the torpor of the senses ; 2.
The state of somnambulism, in which, in spite of the torpor of the
senses, one sees, one speaks, one answers; 3. The marvelous
knowledge of one's position and the requisite remedies necessary
to it, as well as the sight of things which happen far from there.
This granted :

1. — The third degree must certainly be condemned as forbidden,
and full of superstition. It is nothing else, in fact, than an evi
dent divination, which we must abominate in all cases.

2. — The second degree, the somnambulism, can in no way be
considered as natural, and must be attributed to the intervention of
the devil. Because nobody can see with his eyes shut. No one,
in a state of deep sleep, can answer clearly and distinctly any
question whatever.

3.— The first degree, if we consider only the state of sleep, could
be looked upon as natural ; but this cannot be admitted in any
way. . . .

Then the first degree must be called superstitious, and must
certainly be prohibited.

CASE XVI.
ON SACRILEGE.

Renatus went to church on a feast day, not to worship God^
but to meet and see his betrothed. During all the divine service,

120 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

he looked at her with unchaste desires ; he allowed his mind to be
filled with depraved thoughts, and did nothing else, but de se
toucher et polluer.* The mass being over, he invited the young
girl, by signs, to abandon herself to him (copulam habendam) in
some other place.

Ques. 1. — Has he committed one or several sacrileges?

Ques. 2. — Has the church been profaned ?

Ans. Question 1. — He has not committed any sacrilege by his
obscene thoughts . . . neither by his immodest looks . . . nor by
the signs to his betrothed.

But he has committed a sacrilege by polluting himself, even
secretly, and this as often as it took place ; . . . and also, at least
with probability, because of his self-contact.

Ans. Question 2. — The church has not been profaned by Rena-
tus' pollution, though he has committed a sacrilege ; because the
pollution was a secret one.

* The vilest phrases will remain untranslated.

precept of tfje liecalogue,

Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."

Exodus xx. 7.

CHAPTER I.

VAIN USURPATION OF THE NAME OP GOD, AND BLASPHEMY.
ART. I. — Vain usurpation of God's holy name.

296. — It is a vain usurpation of the name of God, when it is
pronounced without reasonable cause, and without the respect it
deserves.

ART. II.— Blasphemy.

299. — Blasphemy is a word, or an expression, insultino- to
God. . . .

CHAPTER II.

OATHS.

306. — An oath is an invocation of the divine Name to attest
the truth. . . .

ART. I. — The conditions of an oath.

SECTION 1.— Conditions required for the validity of an oath.

307.— There are two of them: 1st, The intention, at least
virtual, of taking an oath; because without this intention there
can be no valid oath. 2d, A formula for the oath ; in other words,
a sign by which we express sufficiently, either explicitly or
implicitly, that we take God as our witness. . .

122 The Doctrine of ilie Jesuits.

ART. IL— The obligation of the oath.

312. — That obligation must be strictly interpreted, and must
conform itself to the nature of the act or of the contract to which
it is added, as well as to all their conditions.

The first reason is, that the one who gives his oath, is regarded
as wishing to be bound the least possible ; the second reason is,
that the oath does not change the nature of the act, but only adds
to it a religious obligation ; and, consequently, must be under the
same conditions and be bound by the same limits. . . .

315. — One is not bound by an oath given in a promise of
marriage to a young lady, rich, healthy, a virgin, and of good
reputation, if she falls into poveilr, sickness, infamy, or fornica
tion ; because a simple promise does not oblige in this case.* . . .

APPENDIX ON ADJURATION.

316. Adjuring is a supplication, made with authority and
prayer in the name of God, of the saints, or of a sacred thing, in
order to induce som^ one to do or avoid something. . . .

318. Ques. Concerning what may we question the devil?

Aus. — Concerning everything related to his expulsion; for
instance, on the time and cause of his taking possession, etc. . . .

Ques. What are the signs of a true possession by the devil?

Ans. The principal are: 1. Speaking a language not known
before the possession ; 2. Divulging secret and strange things
not known by men ; 3. Obeying the purely internal orders of the
priest; 4. Experiencing greater suffering or greater tranquilit}',
induced by the devil, when ignorantly touching sacred things. . . .

In general, we must not believe easily that some one is pos
sessed ; because true possessions very seldom happen in our time.

CHAPTER III.
Vows.

319. — A vow is a deliberate promise made to God concerning a
a better welfare.

*The promissory oath does not oblige: 1st, when it cannot be kept
without incurring grave damages, etc. (Marotte).

Second Precept of (he Decalogue. 123

Vows are :

1. Solemn or simple. . . .

2. Selfish or real. . . •

3. Temporary or perpetual. . . .

ART. I. — Conditions required for vows.

There are two principal ones included in the definition: 1, a
true intention ; 2, a qualified motive.

SECTION I. The intention required by the vow. . . .

322. — Ques. Is one held by a vow if he doubts that he has
pronounced a vow or only a simple proposition ; or, that there has
been sufficient deliberation ?

Ans. — 1. No; in consequence of what has been said on the
subject of probability. But if, when promising, he believed that it
would be a sin not to fulfil the vow, it is to be judged that the
vow is valid.

Ans. — 2. No, for the same reason ; if we have positive and
serious doubts about a sufficient deliberation. Most of the time,
the question must be decided after the examination of the circum
stances. . . .

SECTION II. Motive for the vow.

324. — Ques. Is a vow valid, if it has a perverse aim, or evil
conditions ?

Ans. 1. — No, if the bad aim is attached to the vow; for
instance, if you vow to give alms in order to steal successfully.

Ans. 2. — Yes, if when the vow is made, one is influenced by
good sentiments ; it is valid then, though having a bad cause or
evil conditions : for instance, to vow to give alms if one is not
caught stealing. Because, if to steal is an evil, not to be cauglit
is not one , but certainly a gift of God ; now, the vow does
not bear upon evil, but on good, insomuch it is good by itself.

ART. II. Obligation of the vow.

124 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

ART. III. Cessation of the vow.

329. — The obligation of the vow may cease :

1. For intrinsic causes, for instance, by the cessation of the
aim or of the motive, the change of the motive, a moral or physi
cal impossibility.

2. For extrinsic causes, by annulment, dispensation or change.

SECTION I. Annulment of the vow. . . .
SECTION II. Dispensation from the vow. . . .
SECTION III. Change of vow. . . 0

Cases on tfje Scrontr precept of tjje IDecalogue*

CASE VII.
THE VALUE OF Vows.

Gervais, a youth, vowed : 1st, to preserve a perpetual chastity,
which he thought easy to do, but later difficult to keep ; 2d, not
to eat the heads of animals, in honor of St. John the Baptist, the
beheaded. . . .

Ques. Are these vows valid?

Ans. Yes, for the first. . . . No, for the second.

CASE VIII.
THE VALUE OF Vows.

Veronica, mother of a family, observing with grief that her
daughter Martine is pregnant by Titus, and fearing dishonor for
the family, vows before God and the holy Virgin to give a
hundred pieces of gold to the church if her daughter dies before
giving birth to the child.

Qnes. Is the vow valid?

Ans. Though valid as to the object of the vow, it is illicit as
to the end. . . . Indeed, though one cannot condemn a mother
who, to avoid such dishonor, wishes for God to take away her
daughter; however, as there is here an eternal injury for her
child, and as the desire of the mother is not subject to the condi
tion of her eternal salvation, but is absolute, that desire is illicit.

Efjtrtr Prrcrpt of tlj:

" II. member the Sabbath clay, to keep it holy." Exodus xx. 8.

CHAPTER I.

WHAT is COMMANDED ox FEAST DAYS.
ART. I. What is to be done, generally, on Feast Days.

338. — All the faithful having reached the age of reason, are
obliged, under penally of a grave sin, to atten I mass every Sun
day and feast day, unless there should be a legitimate reason. . . .

ART. II. The hearing of mass in particular.

341. — . . . One attends mass, according to the more probable
opinion, if one is in a house in the neighborhood from which one
can see, through the door or window, the altar or t!ie attendants,
provided a little space only separates t'.ie house from the church.
It would be otherwise if there was a hirgo spare or square. . . .

344. — In order to hear ma-s properly, at.ention, at lea>t ex
ternal, is required.

Some internal attention is also necessary, at least, the desire to
hear mass. . . .

One of the three following internal attentions is sufficient:
attention to the words and acts of the priest ; to the meaning of
the words and of the mysteries ; to God himself. . . .

347. — . . . Mass is sufficiently listened to, if one is invokiutari'y
diverted, even during the whole ceremony ; unless one should be so
much absorbed by other thoughts as to lend no attention what
ever. . . .

The one who goes to sleep from time to time does not commit a
grave sin, if once in a while his attention is called to what happens
around him.

Third Precept of the Decalogue. 127

Those who are diverted, do not commit a grave sin, if they lend
a virtual attention. That is to say, if, having had in the bogin-
ning the intention of listening, they have been disturbed during
all the time of the mass, without changing their first intention. . . .

353. — Ques. Can the realization of a notable gain be alleged as
a sufficient excuse for non-attendance at mass?

Ans. Yes, according to the probable opinion, because the pre
cepts of the Church do not oblige us to suffer a serious loss, as
has been said in the Treatise on Laws, No. 100. but such gain
must be extraordinary.

CHAPTER -II.
THINGS FORBIDDEN ON SUNDAYS AND FEAST DAYS.

ART. 1. Forbidden work on Feast Dnys.

355; — IQ principle, all manual labor (servilia) properly so called,
is forbidden to the faithful. . . .

But liberal works, common works, and the manual labors nec
essary to every da}" life, are permitted. . . .

357. — Ques. Is it permitted: 1, to write ; 2, to transcribe
anything, on a feast day?

Ans. 1. Yes, because it is a liberal art.

Ans. 2. Yes, according to the more probable opinion.

It is permitted then to draw, to copy music, to correct books.

Ques. Is it permitted : 1, to sculpture ; 2, to paint?

Aus. 1. No; sculpture is generally classified as a mechanical
art.

Ans. 2. For painting, controversy. . . .

358. — Ques. Are fishing and hunting permitted !

Ans. Yes, because they are not manual works, provided no
great noise, bustle, and great preparations are made. ...

Ques. What is the serious motive for woik done on a fast
day?

Ans. According to man}*, if it is a purely mnnn.il work, two
hours are sufficient; if it is scarcely manual, three hours. . . .

128 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ques. Is it a grave sin to order one's servants to work each
one one hour on a feast day?

Ans. No, in principle, and according to the more probable
opinion, whether the servants work together, or one after the
other; because their works do not form a totality, but they sin
only venially each one in particular ; then the master commits but
a venial sin in ordering them to do a work forbidden under venial
sin.

ART. II. Causes for which salaried works are permitted on
feast days. . . .

Cases on tfjc Cfjirfc Precept of tlje Brcalogite.

They are of special order, and not interesting, except as
indicating the cunning used by parishioners to deceive their
pastors, or elude the rules.

Precept of tfje decalogue.

Honor thy father and thy mother." Exodus xx. 12.

That precept aims primarily and in a direct manner at the
obligations of children towards their parents ; and secondarily, in
an implicit manner, at the obligations of parents towards their
children ; as well as at the reciprocal obligations of other superiors
and inferiors.

CHAPTER I.
OBLIGATIONS OF CHILDREN TOWARDS THEIR PARENTS.

363.— Children are bound towards their parents by wholly
special obligations. They have their duties to fulfil ; to love,
respect, and obey. . . .

SECTION I. Love.*

* Ques. In what consists the assistance which children owe to their
parents in their spiritual needs?'

Ans. It consists: 1, in respectfully recalling to them the truths of
the faith, the fear of God, and love and zeal lor religious duties, when
they see them indifferent to their salvation; 2, to warn them of their state
when they are dangerously sick, to exhort them to receive the sacra
ments, arid take care that they shall be administered at a propitious time,
and before they are at the point of death. — Petit Catechisme de Marotle.

One is astonished and indignant at hearing of so many odious scenes at
death-beds.

We must, however, recognize, that in Gnry no trace is found of the
infamous doctrine resumed by Escobar in the following terms : "A son is
and is not obliged to feed an intidel father who is in the greatest Heces-
sity, if the latter tries to induce him to abandon the faith."

" He is absolutely obliged to it. ...

" He is not at all obliged to it. ...

"This last sentiment must be held absolutely; because Catholic child
ren are obliged to denounce their fathers or relations guilty of heresy,
. . . even should they know that their fathers ought to be delivered to
the flames, according to the teachings of Tolet. . . . Then . . . they
may refuse them nourishment, and even let them die of hunger. Fagun-
dez . . . adds, that they may even kill them; keeping, however, the

130 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

SECTION II. Respect. . . .
SECTION III. Obedience.

367. — Children must obey their parents in all lawful and honest
things relative to them, so long as they are in their power. . . .
But in bad things, children neither must nor can obey ; this is
evident by natural right.

369. — Ques. Are children obliged to obey their parents in the
choice of a profession ?

Ans.- No, in principle ; because every mnn in view of sure
means of drawing himself towards God, his highest aim, or
in order to regulate his life fully and freely for such an end,
is quite independent of others. So parents sin gravely by
forcing their children directly, or even indirectly, to choose a
profession, either monastic, ecclesiastical, or conjugal ; and also, if
without any just motive, they prevent them from following one of
those profession.

I have said in principle, because it would be otherwise if, for
weighty or reasonable causes, the parents were opposing the will
of their children ; for instance, if, being in poverty, they were
obliged to have recourse to them, the children not being able to
succor their parents without remaining with them.

Ques. Are children permitted to -enter religious orders in spite
of their parents ?

Ans. Yes, in principle ; moreover, the child being attracted
by vocation to a religious profession, and believing that he will be
unjustly opposed by his parents, will act more wisely if he hides
his intentions from them, and obeys the Divine will. However,
this advice must not be given to minors when it is not an urgent
case, or when one is not sure of his vocation. In France espe
cially, good care must be taken not to advise minors thus, because
the parents, with the help of the secular power, can take them
from any institution, and carry them back home. . . .

moderation proper to a legitimate defence, as with enemies violating the
rights of humanity, if they want to force their children to abandon the
true faith; but nevertheless, they must not bind them to make them die
of hunger." (page 436.)

Fourth Precept of the Decalogue. 131

CHAPTER II.

OBLIGATIONS OF PARKNTS TOWARDS THEIR CHILDREN.
They owe them love and education.
SECTION I. Love. . . .
SECTION II. Education.
It must be material and spiritual.

372. — Material education requires a triple foresight on the part
of parents: for the life, for nourishment, and for profession.

374. — Parents must, above all, procure spiritual education for
their children ; because man, besides his material body, in com
mon with other animals, received from God a soul reasonable and
noble, created in the image of divinity ; he was born to draw
nearer to God through time and eternity. . . .

This education requires: 1, doctrine; 2, correction; 3, exam
ple. . . .

CHAPTER III.

CONJUGAL OBLIGATIONS.

378. — Married people owe each other reciprocally:

1. Mutual affection. . . .

2. Conjugal society and cohabitation. . . .

3. Nourishment, and what is necessary for an honorable
position. . . .

4. Conjugal duty, when it is seriously asked for, there being
no reason to refuse. . . .

379. — The husband's duty is particularly :

To see that his wife fulfils her religious duties, and follows the
precepts of the divine law and of the law of the church ; because
he is the head and the chief of the family, and so must attend to
the good direction of his wife and other members of the family.

To punish his wife when she commits a fault, when it is
necessary to correct her and prevent a scandal. . . .

381. — ... In the beginning he must gently reprove her, in

132 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

order to correct her ; or, if that is of no effect, to have recourse
to more severe punishments. . . .

The confessor must not immediately believe a woman who
complains of her husband, because women are habitually given to
lying. . . .

CHAPTER IV.

OBLIGATIONS OF OTHER SUPERIORS AND INFERIORS.
ART. I. Obligations of masters and servants.
SECTION I. Master's obligations.

382. — Masters must treat their servants well ; instruct, correct
and pay them sufficiently. . . .

ART. II. Obligations of masters and pupils. . . .

ART. III. Obedience and respect towards temporal author
ity. . . .

Cases on tfje JFourtfj ^recrpt of tfr

CASE III.
THE DUTIES OF SONS.

1. Agatha, a young girl born of honorable parents, is asked
in marriage by a noble and brave soldier, richer in qualities
than in temporal goods, and she accepts his proposal. But hei-
father opposes it, and protests that he never will give his consent
to the marriage of his daughter with that wandering soldier,
exposed to a thousand perils. But the indignation of that excel
lent father is of no avail with Agatha. On the contrary, after
having asked her father's consent in the legal way several times
in vain, she contracts the marriage in spite of him.

2. Eulalic, after deep reflections, decides to enter a convent.
Her father refuses his consent and a dowry. But Eulalie, distin
guished by her intellectual and moral qualities, obtains the privi
lege to be admitted free, and without warning her father, she takes
refuge in the convent.

Ques. 1 . Must children obey their parents, when it is a question
of vocation?

Ques. 2. What is to be thought of Agatha and Eulalia?

Ans. Question 1.— No, in principle; because a man is free to
choose his own profession. Parents, then, sin gravely by using
constraint to turn children away from their vocation ; they may,
however, oppose them when there are ju*t reasons for it.

Ans. to Ques. 2.-—1. In regard to Agatha, it is a difficult ques
tion. However, it would be well to advise her to obey her
father, or renew her supplications. If these two means were not
successful, she could not be accused of mortal sin in marrying an
honorable man.

Moreover, her father commits a great fault in refusing, without
reasonable motives, his consent to the marriage ; it would have

134 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

been a more grievous sin if she had become pregnant in her -rela
tions with the soldier.

2. We must excuse Eulalie ; because, having a vocation for it,
she has embraced the religious profession only after sufficient
deliberation, and after having respectfully asked for the consent
of her parents. She must be condemned for having secretly run
away, seeing no other way to obey the divine will. But the father
has committed a grave sin by unjustly opposing her vocation and
disappointing his daughter of her dowry.

CASE VI.
THE DUTIES OF PARENTS.

Mathurin, a godless father of a family, takes suitable care of
his sons, in a temporal point of view, but seems very unconcerned
about their education. The oldest, almost deprived of Christian
instruction, he employs in his own trade ; the second is appren
ticed in a shop to learn a trade in company with dissolute young
men ; the third is sent to a college very little recommended for its
teaching of morals and the faith.

Ques. What is to be thought of Mathurin ?

Ans. Mathurin has committed a mortal sin about each one of
his sons. . . . Alas ! How many such men we see in our days !

CASE VII.
THE DUTIES OF MASTERS.

Titius, careless of his own salvation, is unconcerned about the
morals of his servants. . . .

They do not go to mass on Sunday and at Easter-time ; they
neither go to confession, nor to communion. Titius sees all that,
and does not reprove them.

Ques. What is to be said of Titius?

Ans. Titius is a bad, detestable master, and has committed a
sin in each one of these cases. . . . Alas ! How many masters in
our days are just like Titius !

precept of tlje ®ecalotjue<

"Thou shalt not kill." Exodus xx. 13.

CHAPTER I.

SUICIDE.

389. — One is not permitted to kill himself directly; that is to
say, with intention, without the intervention of divine authority.

390. — Ques. Ought a virgin to prefer death to dishonor?

A. No, according to the probable opinion, provided her will
protests, and that there is no peril in consent, because that
permission is not formal co-operation, but only material, to the
sin of another, and there is a just motive for permission, the
danger of death. But this practice must not be advised when one
may prudently fear the peril of consent. . . .

391. — .... A virgin is not obliged fo undergo an operation
at the hands of a doctor, even in danger of death, if through
modesty she looks upon it as very grave, and has more horror of
it than of death itself

CHAPTER II.

MURDER.
ART. — The murder of a guilty person, or of a criminal.

394. — Ques. Is it allowable to kill a tyrant? *
Ans. Upon the whole, No.

* Here is one of the few questions on which Jesuits have completely
changed their opinion. Formerly there was no doubt in their mind as to
the legitimacy of killing a tyrant or usurper. It is interesting to notice
that this change took place at the time of the first Empire, when they dis
owned their former doctrine. And this doctrine was not left as a
theoretical teaching. Practically, they sustained their assertion. Listen
to Mariana, speaking of the murderer of Henry HI., a l

136 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

ART. II. — Murder of an unjust aggressor.

395. — May one defend his own life, even by killing an unjust
aggressor ? *

396. — Qucs. Is it permitted to kill an unjust aggressor for the
preservation of one's limbs ?

Ans. Yes, according to the common opinion. f

Ques. Is it permitted to kill one who steals considerable
property, if there is no other way of keeping it?

"Jacques Clement, a Dominican, born in Serhonne, a little village of
Autumois, was studying theology in a college of his Order, when,
instructed by the theologians that it was permitted to kill a tyrant,
he mortally wounded the king, striking him in the stomach with a poisoned
knife he kept hidden in his hand. A hold and memorable action. . . .

" The murder of the king gave him a world-wide reputation. . . .

"Thus perished Jacques Clement at 24 years of a«£e, a young man of
simple character and weak constitution; but a great virtue sustained his
strength and his courage." (p. 452.)

* Theologians battled a great deil on this point, especially when the
murderer was a priest or a monk. We shall not speak of these quarrels :
legitimate defense in a case of actual necessity, has been justly admitted
by our Code (Art. 328) ; but the Jesuitical spirit has placed the application
very far from the principle.

Valere Reginald sets down the following case : " Yon bear false witness
against me, and a sentence of d^atli will result, and I cannot escape any
other way, I am permitted to kill you." (p. 399.)

Lessius : " You have resolved to arm your servant or a murderer to kill
me; if I have no other hope of escaping death than by anticipating your
intention, I am permitted to do it, let tae danger be present ... or far
off. . . ." (p. 401.)

De Lugo: "Can you kill one who, by calumnies and false witness,
causes you to be sentenced by the judge ?

" The affirmative is probable enough." (p. 415.)

Escobar : " It is quite allowable to kill one bearing false against you, if
such act compromises your life or y )ur honor. ... It maybe done also
if the false witness has temporal gjo-.l in view. (p. 416.)

" One may secretly kill a calumniator, if there are no other means of
warding off the peril." (p. 419.)

Busernbaum adds: " Every time that some one has the right to kill
another, according to what his been said on the question, some one else
can do it for him and in his place, seeing that charity allows it." (p. 441.)

t Our penal laws are more severe. But we shall not insist. Only it is
marvelous to see what consequences the Jesuits have drawn for this
dangerous principle.

Ht-nriques, for instance, supplied the ingenious case following: "If an
adulterer, even a priest, well aware of the danger, has called at the
adulteress' house, and, surprised by the husband, he kills the latter
to save his own life and limbs, it does njt seem that he incurs irregu
larity." (p. 396.)

Fifth Precept of the Decalogue. 137

Ans. Yes, at least more probably. Every one has the right to
keep considerable property for his own enjoyment.*

398. — Ques. Is a woman permitted to kill the one who makes
an attempt on her modesty?

Ans. Yes, according to the more probable opinion; because it
is a property more precious than riches ; then, if it is allowable to
kill to defend our property, there is more reason for it when it is
to defend modesty.

399. — A young girl is not permitted to kill, after the crime, the
one who attempted to destroy her honor. She may, however,
strike him, and treat him with the greatest harshness ; because, in
not showing her perseverance and repugnancy in this way, the
guilty man would not go away, or might be induced to repeat the
crime.

ART. III. Murder of an innocent person.

400. — 1. It is never allowable to kill directly an innocent per
son, by private or public authority, even in view of the common
good ; because it is an intrinsically guilty action, positively for
bidden by the divine law.

2. It is allowable, for a grave reason, to do an action good in
itself, from which, against our intention, results the death of an
innocent person. f

* This is more serious, and quite contrary to the doctrine of our penal
Code.

The Jesuits had gone very far in this, they having said that one can
regularly kill a thief to save a crown; a proposition rightly condemned by
Innocent XI.

i)e Lugo, a cardinal, wants the stolen sum to be at least one ducat, and
that there should be no violence, (p. 422.) But most of them take
refuge in appreciations, vaguely formulated on this point.

Marotte does not hesitate to preach, in his Petit Catechisme, the Jesuitical
doctrine, little disturbed about its unlawfulness.

" Ques. Can we kill a thief to save the property he tries to take away
from us?"

"Ans. No, we are not permitted to kill a thief to save temporal
property, inferior to the life of man; but if the thief tries to take away
property of a very considerable value, its owner would have the right to
resist him by violence, even to striking and wounding him."

fit is, in fact, Escobar's doctrine of saying* "The murder of an
innocent person is absolutely forbidden, unless in some case it should be
necessary for the good of t -e Republic."

Marotte does not fear to offer it to the meditation of little children.

138 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

3. One is not guilty of homicide when, even without motive,
but acting carefully, one does an action, not causing death by
itself, but from which results homicide by accident, because that
homicide is quite fortuitous and involuntary. . . .

ABORTION.

403. — ... In no way can physicians be excused from homi
cide, who, in order to save the mother in childbirth, being in
danger of death, as well as the child, have recourse to cepha-
lotomy or embryoctony; in other words, by the help of forceps, to
crush the child's cranium in the mother's womb, and then take out
the dead fcetus. . . .*

CHAPTER III.

DUELING. f

Dueling is never permitted by private authority. . . .

405. — One cannot accept a duel, even to revenge an ignominious
offence. . . .

A soldier cannot accept a duel, even if his refusal leads to his
losing a commission necessary for the support of his family.

It is not allowable to engage in a duel on condition that the fight
will cease at the first blood drawn, or after a determined number
of wounds. . . .

Qnes. " Is it sometimes permitted to kill an innocent person? *
Ans. " It is never permitted to kill, directly, an innocent person, even
in view of public interest : but one can, in a grave and urgent case, do an
action good in itself, although liable to cause the death of one or several
innocent persons, provided the one who does the action should have
nothing else in view than the good which *vill result from it, and does
what is possible to remove the bad effect dreaded." — Petit Catechisme.

* " It is forbidden, under penalty of a very grave sin, to surgeons and
midwives, to cause the deatli of a child in his mother's womb, in order to
deliver the mother from a dangerous situation, uuavoidable without that
action." (Marotte.)

f " Of all kinds of homicides, dueling is the most criminal." (Marotte.)

The horror of dueling was so great with the Jesuits, that we read in
Navarre, Sanchez, Escobar: " One is obliged to refuse the duel, if one can
secretly kill the calumniator; because then, one does not expose one's self
to loss of life, and the other is prevented thereby from committing a new
sin in accepting the duel or offering it." (p. 419).

This has not prevented the Je-uits from having, in all times, and even
to-day, bravos and bullies in their employ.

Fifth Precept of the Decalogue. 139

CHAPTER IV.
WAR.

407. — War is the strife of a multitude of men with another
foreign multitude, to avenge or defend the State. . . .

408. — Ques. . . . May the soldiers fight, if they doubt the
justice of the war?

Ans. If it is a question of a soldier not yot enlisted, he must
inform himself about it, and, if he doubts, he cannot enlist;
because no one must aid in the despoiling of others, if he is not
sure that the possession has been unjustly acquired. . . .

Q ics. Can a victor kill the innocent, as well as the guilty?

Ans. The guilty, that is to say, the soldiers who have fought,
can sometimes be killed, if it is necessary for the establishment of
peace, for security, or to avenge an injustice, unless they should
have surrendered with the condition of having their lives spared.

As for the innocent women, old men, foreigners, priests,
monks, etc., — they can not be killed directly, unless it should be
proved that they co-operated in the war. But they can be killed
indirectly, before the end of the fight, if they are mixed with the
guilty, and in such a way that, if they were spared, soldiers could
escape.

409. — Soldiers cannot kill the enemy in an unjust war, even in
self-defence. If they cannot run away, they are to take care not
to strike the enemy ; because they are the unjust aggressors, and
in one cause there cannot be two contrary right. . . .

It is sometimes permitted to pillage a captured city, but only for
very weighty reasons.

Casts on tjje JHftl) Precept of tfje Becalogue,

CASE III.
ADMIRABLE EXPEDIENT OF A VIRGIN.

Eulalie, a pious virgin, very careful of her chastity, being
pressed by a soldier, and threatened with lust without means of
escape, spoke thus to her would-be seducer: " Listen, and I will
teach you a marvelous thing." He desisted. " Here it is ; spare
me, and I will tell you a way to risk nothing in battle. See, I rub
my neck with this ointment; now take your sword, strike my
neck, and you will see the virtue of my art." The soldier,
induced by curiosity and love of novelty, makes the experiment,
and cuts off the head of Kulalie, who, by this means, was saved
from the danger of losing her virginity.

Ques. 1. Did Eulalie act lawfully? Was it necessary to resort
to death, in order to save her chastity?

Ques. 2. Could she throw herself through a high window to
esctipe violence and preserve her virginity?

Ans. Question 1. No, in principle ; except in case of celestial
inspiration, or of good faith. The reason is, that she directly
procured her own death.

Ans. Question 2. Yes, because death, although the conse
quence of the fall, was not directly desired.

CASE IX.
AB ORTI ON .

Gaspard, a physician, making a general confession, avows to
his confessor that : 1, to a pregnant woman, on the point of death,
he gave a remedy that was a sure cure, but foreseeing that the
fretus would perish ; 2, to another one, on the point of certain
death, he had given a remedy the effect of which was to kill the

Oases on the Fifth Precept of the Decalogue. 141

foetus and expel it, in order that the woman delivered should
get cured.

Ques. What is to be thought of Gaspard ?

Ans. In the first case, he is not reprehensible. . . .

In the second one, he has gravely sinned, by committing a direct
homicide. In fact, though the intention was good, he obtained
the result by unlawful means.

CASE X.
ABORTION.

Cure of a mother through the death of her child.

Pelagic, pregnant for four or five months, is dangerously sick,
and on the point of death. Besides the family doctor, three
others are called in consultation. After deep deliberation, here
is the decision : If the art of the physician can procure the
expulsion of the foetus, the latter will perish, but may probably
be baptized before death, and the mother will be saved from
certain death. Otherwise, mother and child will both die, and
the child will be deprived of the benefit of baptism. After this
decision, they prepared to effect the expulsion. The result con
firmed their prevision ; the child was expulscd, and after having
been baptized died immediately, and the mother was saved.

Ques. Is this justifiable? In this case can one procure an
abortion ?

Ans. No, absolutely ; because abortion is in its nature cer
tainly a homicide. It is employed, and is destined in itselj, so
say the doctors, to effect the cure of the mother and the baptism
of the child. Nevertheless, though they apply it to a useful end,
they directly seek arid procure homicide.

Sixtfj antr Nintfj precepts of tfje Becaiogite.

" Thou shalt not commit adultery. Thou shalt not' covet thy neighbor's
wife." Exodus 20 : 14, 17.

410. — Let us repeat the words of St. Liguori : . . . "As this is
a matter most frequently and abundantly treated in confession, I
have been obliged, for the instruction of those studying moral
science, and in order to be clear, to discuss particular cases. But I
beg of the students who are preparing themselves to be confessors,
in reading this treatise and the other one on conjugal duty, to reject
all curiosity, to often lift up their souls to God, and to recommend
themselves to the immaculate Virgin." * . . .

411. — Lust is an unruled appetite in love, and consists in a
carnal pleasure (delectatio venerea) tasted voluntarily outside of
marriage. Now, that pleasure is produced by the excitation of
the genital organs, and must not be confounded with a purely
sensual pleasure from the contact of a sensible object on someone
of the senses ; for instance, from a visible object on s'ght. Lust
and sensuality have then a different object. A sensual pleasure
either is not guilty, or does not exceed, most of the time and in
principle, a venial sin.

There are several sorts of lust. There is a difference between
bodily contact and immodest looks, between solitary acts and
those done with others, between consummated acts and those

* This is a good precaution ; but we must also remember how the ancient
(?) Jesuits, while condemning lustful sins with indignation and a chaste
horror, found, nevertheless, that there are practical accommodations.

Escobar, quibbling on the sins which Pius V. saw himself obliged to
prohibit to priests addicted to sodomy, makes very clevc.r distinctions,
which a low an excuse: "1, Priests who have unnatural relations with
women; 2, who are patients ; ... 3, who have co nmitted the prohibited
act but one, two and three times ; 4, who commit the crime of bestiality."

And as the rape of a woman is punished with death, he concludes that
the rape of a young man by a man. (causa libidinis) is not punishable,
(p. 290.)

Sixth and Ninth Precepts of the Decalogue. 143

which are not, between acts done according to nature and those
done against nature. These species are yet subdivided, as we
shall see later.

There is lust directly sought out, and lust indirectly sought out.
The first one exists where one has precisely in yiew a carnal
pleasure ; the second one is, when something else being sought out,
the pleasure comes against our intention, as immodest reading
done through curiosity, or for any other motive.

412. Lust of every kind and species, is, in principle, a grave
sin. . . .

Lust, directly voluntary, never admits of light matters. . . .

CHAPTER I.

LUSTFUL SINS NOT CONSUMMATED.

ART. I. Immodest kisses and bodily contact.

413. — 1. Unchaste contact, made without motive, with a per
son's shameful parts, are almost always under the penalty of
mortal sin, even leaving aside the sensual pleasure, on account of
a grievous indecency, and the clanger of debauchery brought
thereby.

However, it is more easily excused from mortal sin, if it is per
formed on a person of the same sex.

2. Kissing, or feeling of the honorable or slightly dishonorable
parts, constitutes mortal sin, if carnal pleasure is the motive of
these acts; venial, if there is nothing more than lightness, joking
or curiosity, etc. They are not guilty if it is the custom, or if it
is done out of politeness or benevolence.

414.— 3. Kissing or touching even the honorable bodily parts
cannot be easily excused from mortal sin, if it t-iki-s plncj in
a protracted manner among young people, especially of d.flfcrent
sexes, without any necessity, because those repeated and pro
longed acts produce an excitation and a carnal pleasure.

4. Kissing, touching, embracing for a carnal pleasure, in view
of carnal desires, are evils of different gravity, according to the
person's circumstances, because they are supposed to be of the
same species as the consummated act, to which they lead by their

144 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

nature. So, in confession, it is necessary to specify with what
persons they have been practiced, — if it is the same sex or of a
different one, married or not, etc., etc.

415. — 1. There is no fault in the kisses given by mothers and
nurses to little children. Neither with those who kiss those chil
dren, even of another sex, setting aside any depraved sentiment.

2. We must not readily accuse of a grave sin young people
who, in certain games, without any bad intention, kiss each other
decently ; although it is prudont to advise them not to play those
games, on account of the perils which they bring.

3. The opinion of Sanchez, Salmant and others, affirming that
there is no sin in the chaste kisses and embraces of young people
betrothed to each other, though they seek a carnal pleasure, and
there exists a slight excitation of the genital organs, setting aside
the peril of pollution and of consent to the sexual union, is looked
upon as little probable in practice by St. Liguori, who thinks
much more probable, even in theory, the opinion after which such
acts are forbidden to engaged young people, just as much as to
other free persons. The reason is, that betrothed people have
yet neither reciprocal rights on their bodies, nor a right to sexual
union to which such acts generally tend.

4. But kissing other more hidden parts of the body, for
instance, the bosom, must be looked upon as a mortal sin,
especially between persons of different sex ; and also protracted
kisses on the mouth, especially if the tongue is brought into piny.

416. — 5. One does not sin in principle, when one is obliged to
touch one's self in order to wipe out the bodily filth, to appease
pruriency, or attend to some infirmities ; however, if the itchings
is supportable, one must abstain from touching one's self. But if
one touch his body without motive, only a venial sin is committed,
provided the carnal pleasure is set aside, as it is done only with
out reflection, through lightness or pure curiosity, when one does
not run the risk of inflaming the passion.

6. Feeling of the shameful parts or about, even over the
clothes, constitutes a grave sin : unless it is done only through
petulance, joke, lightness, or in passing by. The same may be
said of women touching each other's bosoms, on account of the

Sixth and Ninth Precepts of the Decalogue. 145

sympathy of those parts with the sense of touch. There is a near
danger, or carnal pleasure.

7. More than that, unless in a case of necessity, there is a
mortal sin in touching the shameful parts of a person of a different
sex, even for a little time, because it is done only through errotic
passion ; and besides, it is a gross attempt on decency, leading to
the danger of pollution and carnal pleasure. However, servants
coming in contact with the shameful parts of children while
dressing them, must not be accused of a great sin, unless it is
clone in a protracted manner, and feeling sensual pleasure in
doing it.

8. There is a venial sin, in principle, in touching slightly, and
in passing by, the fingers, hands, or face of a person of a different
sex, putting aside all thoughts of a bud aim, all sentiments and
danger of debauchery, if this is only through pure curiosity, there
being no danger for us or others.

Besides, as in so lubric a matter, it is not always easy to see
clearly what is venial or mortal ; and as there is often a grave
danger of sinning, even in cases which do not exceed in principle
a light sin ; for instance, if this takes place frequently and in a
protracted manner between persons addicted to debauchery, the
confessor ought to make an effort to prevent the penitent, espe
cially the 3'oung one, from indulg ng in sensual contact with
persons of the different sex.

ART. II. Looking on obscene things.

417. — 1. Looks cast without motive on shameful things, con-
stiaite grave or light sins, according to the intention of the person,
the degree of turpitude, and the danger of consent to debauchery.
The sin is not so giievous when acting on our own person as
when it is a question of somebody else, because there is less
excitation ; it is also less grave when it is a question of a person
of the same sex.

2. Looks gravely immodest, without serious motives, especially
on persons of another sex, constitute, in principle, a mortal sin,
even in the absence of all carnal passion ; because ordinarily, there

146 Tiie Doctrine of the Jtstu'ts.

is a near danger of debauchery, as it has been said above about
guilty bodily contacts.

Ques. Is it necessary, in looks as in contacts, to take account
of the circumstances of persons looked at in an obscene manner?

Ans. No, according to the more probable opinion, if there is
no desire ; because they are not supposed to tend to the consum
mation of the act ; so the act of looking in such a manner at
parents, married people, or sacred persons, do not constitute a
fault dependent on adultery, incest, or sacrilege.

418. — 1. There is no mortal sin, in principle, when persons
of the same sex lonk lightly at each other being naked, bathing,
or swimming, especially when they have not reached the age
of puberty.

2. To look at the shameful parts, or near to them, of a person
of another sex, constitutes a mortal sin, unless it is from afar, or
for a short time ; because these looks excite passion, or load to
sin. One is not excused even if they are seen through a very
light and transparent veil ; in this case, passion, far from being
diminished, is increased thereby. Except: 1, if it is a question
of a child, or of an old man, quite passionless, because they are
not much excited; 2, if one looks at a very young chid, there
being not much of excitation. So servants and nurses do not
commit a grave sin in looking in this way at the children confided
to their care, unless the}' do it in a protracted manner, at differ
ent intervals, or v\ith a guilty sentiment.

3. To look at the honoiable parts of a person of another sex,
even being beautiful, is not a sin in principle, if it is not done
through curiosity or with persistence ; the sin is generally venial,
but it is a mortal one when one looks for a long time, running
the near danger of a shameful concupiscence or of a protracted
pleasure, especially if the mind is excited, and with more reason
if one loves the person inordinately*

4. To look at the parts slightly dishonorable, but not shameful,
of a woman, as the bosom, aims, limbs, do not constitute a
mortal sin in principle, putting aside h< wever, the near danger
of a guilty satisfaction, which would easily be produced if the act
was protracted. Bu' generally, those who look without motive at

Sixth and Nlnli Precepts of the Decalogue. 147

the bare bosom of a beautiful woman, with a notable insistance,
are generally guilty of mortal sin ; because of the peril encoun
tered by the sight. But there is not a grave sin when, leaving
aside all special peril, one looks at mothers and nurses suckling
children, also, by looking on the uncovered bosom of an old
woman, or of one too young to be physically developed.

5. To look at obscene paintings through pure curiosity is not
a mortal sin, if there is no shameful pleasure, nor any near
danger. But in practice, it would be difficult to excuse of mortal
sin a man who would look at the shameful part of a woman in a
painting ; because he could riot avoid very well experiencing
shameful pleasure at the sight, unless for a short time, from
a distance, or that the state of decay of the painting should
attenuate the strength of the temptation. Billuard, with others,
excuse from mortal sin those who look slightly, passing by,
through curiosity, or if the paintings represent ouly children,
because painted pictures do not excite as living things do. This
opinion seems probable, unless it should be necessary to judge
otherwise, on account of the weakness of the looker-on.

ART. III. Immodest reading and conversation.

410. — 1. To say, sing, and listen to obscene things with the
inU'iilion of finding in them a carnal pleasure, or run the danger
of consent, is a great sin. But if there is no guilty intention,
no peril of consent, and there being a legitimate cause to say,
write, or listen to them, there is no sin.

2. To read obscene books without a legitimate reason is a
grave sin, even if it is done out of curiosity or for distraction,
in principle, such reading leading to debauchery. Except occa
sionally, and taking into consideration the case where the readers,
out of personal curiosity, advanced age, cool temperament, and
their knowledge of these things, would not run into the grave
clangor of giving way to passions.

3. To read books about love, or that are slightl}' obscene, is
not a mortal sin in principle, though it is very dangerous in
practice, especially for young people. As for obscene books up
to a certain point being also scientific, it is not, in principle, a sin

148 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

to read them, in order to instruct one's self or for a beneficial
purpose, setting aside the peril of carnal pleasure always to be
feared in young people.

420: 1. It is a grave sin generally, to speak even in joke of

the conjugal act, or what is permitted or forbidden between
married people, of the means to prevent conception, or to procure
pollution, especially if it is between young people of different
sex.

2. It is a grave sin to tell shameful things for the only
pleasure that is found in thinking of them. There is no excuse
for those who, in joking, have recourse to equivocal, but clear
sayings, meaning to tell the thing in order to amuse themselves.

3. It is a grave sin to boast of one's own shameful sins, and
generally for three reasons : Because one finds pleasure in it, on
account of the scandal, and also the sin of pride.

4. In principle, it is not a sin to tell shameful, but slightly
obscene things, if it is for joke or to console one's self ; unless the
hearers are weak-minded enough to be scandalized about it.
Thus, usually, there is no grave sin in the shameful talk of the
reapers, vintagers, and waggoners, because generally they say it
only for a joke.

5. Gallant conversations between persons of different sex must
not always be considered as mortal sins, although they are full of
danger-, unless they are repeated, prolonged, or held in solitary

places.

What shall we think of love-miking, as it is called, especially
among young people? It is not to be called mortal sin, without
distinction ; though generally there is in it a near danger of mortal
sin, at least in its progress and circumstances ; for instance, if the
lovers are left alone too lon<j, or during the night, etc., c!c.

6. There is no great sin to read light books out of curiosity,
because they do not excite passion very much, and do not expose
the reader to great danger, such as many comedies and poems do.
But if that reading has for object instruction, or the study of elo
quence, there is no sin in it.

Sixth and Ninth Precepts of the Decalogue. 149

CHAPTER II.
LUSTFUL SINS CONSUMMATED.

ART. I. Sins consummated according to nature.
SECTION 1. FORNICATION.

421. — Fornication is the sexual union (copula) of a free man
with a free woman, by mutual consent. . . .

SECTION 2. ADULTERY.

422. — Adultery is the sexu:d union with the husband or wife of
another ; it is to enter into a bed that is not one's own . . .

SECTION 3. INCEST.

423. — This is the sexual union with parents or relations, of
degrees forbidden by the Church. . . .

SECTION 4. SACRILEGE.

424. — According to the sin of lust, it is the violation of a
person or of a secret place by a carnal act. . . .

SECTION 5. DEFLORATION.

425.— 1. In the large sense of the word, it means all forbidden
venereal commerce ; theologians, in its proper meaning, and as
far as its particular species is mentioned in the canon law, describe
it thus: it is the defloration of a virgin, which happens when she
is soiled for the first time by the contact and the consummated act
of a man.

Defloration violently consummated, besides the sin against
chastity, contains another one against justice, which must be
acknowledged in confession.

426. — 1. It is defloration to fornicate with an' insane virgin
drunk or asleep, because she is violated against her consent, ai,d
then receives a great injury.

2. According to the opinion more common and more probable,
it is not defloration to fornicate with a young girl formally con
senting to it, who is in nowise constrained, though she is soiled for

150 T,\e Doctrine of iJte Jesuits.

the first time ; because the defloration, on account of the formal
outrage made to the honor of a virgin, m:iy be looked upon as a
special sin against chastity. Then, in this case, a virgin being
the mistress of her own body, can use it freely, and cedes her own
right. Then ... it follows that. . . .

3. The defloration of a virgin, if she consented to the act, is
not forcibly to be declared in confession, according t > the more
probable opinion ; because, in principle, it is not to be looked upon
as a defloration, but as a simple fornication.

4. However, and though physical strengtli or violence are not
required as a condition for the defloration, it is sufficient that a
girl is induced to consent, in spite of herself, through craft, threats,
repeated prayers, which triumph over her constancy.

Besides, Lessius warns us very wisely, that the violation of a
young girl who gives her full consent, though not containing the
special malignity of defloration, may contain a grave fault, a
special one, which it is necessary t-> declare in confession, because
of the grief and shame resulting from it for the parents.

SECTION 6. RAVISIIJIENT.

427. — Ravishment ... is defined : a violent act performed on
a person, or on those on whom she depends, in view of satisfying
a lustful desire. . . .

If, after the ravishment, the passion is satiated, not only the
sin of lust, in other words, fornication, adultery, or sodomy, etc.,
but the ravishment itself must be expressly declared in con
fession.

ART. II. Sins committed against nature.

There are three kinds : pollution, sodomy and bestiality. We
must add onanism, or Onan's sin ; which is the sexual act com
menced but consummated outwardly, to avoid conception, either
between married people or other persons. We shall speak of it
apropos to marriage.

SECTION 1. ON POLLUTION.

428. — Pollution consists in expending one's sperm without any
commerce with another.

Sixth and Ninth Precepts of tlie Decalogue. 151

The voluntary pollution, the only one with which we occupy
oursclf, is sought for directly or indirectly. It differs from the
distillation, in which a more liquid fluiil is expended. In pollution,
the sperm is ejaculated with intrude pleasure and great commotion.
Distillation takes place without any pleasure, or with a slight one.

429. — 1. Direct and perfectly voluntary pollution is always a
mortal sin. . . .

2. The indirect pollution, or only voluntary, in its cause, is a
great sin if ... and venial sin if ...

3. The voluntary indirect pollution leads to no sin, when there
is no sufficient reason to expose one's self to it ; . . . because,
when two effects must follow an indifferent cause, a good one and
a bad one, it is permitted to expose one's self to the cause, having
the good in view though permitting the bad.

430. — Involuntary pollution is, in no way, a sin. Thus, there is
no fault in the pollution felt by a doctor, a surgeon, or a con
fessor, in fulfilling the duties of their charges, provided their
intention is pure, and gives no consent to pleasure. . . .

431. — 4. Any spermatic effusion done deliberately, and how
ever weak it may be, is a pollution, and consequently a mortal
sin. Such is the case if one gives his consent to the pleasure of
pollution, even for a little time, even if it is produced without any
intention, spontaneously, for some motive ; so much the more if it
is called forth by some effort. . . .

G. It is not a sin, in principle, to go on horseback in order to
amuse one's self reasonably, to lay down in a certain position, to
nourish one's self with heating food, to speak with a person of
another sex for an honest motive, to be in the service of sick
persons, to help them in bath, to practice surgery and other
things, though one foresee that a pollution will result from it, pro
vided there is no intention, that one should be decided not to
consent, whatever the case may be, and that there should be no
danger of consent.

432. — 7. The voluntary distillation, even indirect, if it is
notable and accompanied by a commotion of the genital organs,
may be a mortal sin, because it is a grave disorder, which leads to

152 TJie Doctrine of the Jesuits.

the near clanger of pollution. But if it is a weak one and without
any notable commotion, it is to be distinguished: 1, if it is
directly voluntary there is a mortal sin, because all seminal loss
brings with it some commotion and effusion ; 2, if it is indirectly
voluntary, one may easily excuse it from all sin, because it is
nothing else but an excretion.

8. Unruled movements, accompanied by venereal pleasures,
whether grave or light, are mortal sins if ... venial sins if ...
and sinless if ...

9. When a violent itching is felt in the shameful parts, it is
permitted to soothe it with the lu-lp of the hand, though a
pollution should result from the act ; provided that such itching
is caused by the acrity of the blood, and not by lustful passion ;
because, if pollution is produced, by setting aside the peril of
consent it is accidental, and so there is no fault in it.

SECTION 2. On Sodomy.

433. — The horrible crime of sodomy consists in cohabitation
with a person of the same sex or of the different one, but in a
manner against nature (in vase indebito.) There is then perfect
sodomy, which consists in having relations with a person of the
same sex; and the imperfect sodomy, with a person of different
sex, but outside of the natural laws, (extra vas naturale}, or with
a passion contrary to nature (affectus ad vas innaturale.) . . .

434. — 1. Perfect sodomy is not of the same species as the
imperfect one, because in the first, one man is drawn towards
the same sex and against nature ; in the second one, he is
attracted only against nature.

2. The act of a man with a woman against nature, is an
imperfect sodomy, distinct in species from the perfect one.

3. One could not call sodomy si fieret tantum applicatio manus,
aut pedis, ad partes genitales alterius, because there would be
no sensual connection.

4. More probably, one must not declare in confession who has
been the agent or patient, because the species of sin is the same.
But pollution, if there has been any, as it happens more easily to
the agent, must be fully related.

/Sixth and Ninth Precepts of the Decalogue. 153

SECTION 3. On Bestial it}'.

435. — The infamous and abominable crime of bestiality con
sists in having relation with a beast. . . .

436. — Unclean handling of a beast, though not a sin of bestial
ity, so called, must be declared in confession, if carnal pleasure
has been in view. But the circumstances must not be necessarily
declared, si quis mediante lingua jmnenti, aut alter ins besti(&9
voluptatem veneream aut pollutionem in se excitet. It is not neces
sary to declare in confession what kind of beast it was, if it was
a male or a female.

on tlje Sixlf) anti Nintfj precepts of tfje
Decalogue.

Gury does not think it is urgent to study any particular case,

because "if every thing pertaining to this lustful matter is

extremely frequent in practice, there is no serious difficulty in
explaining them."

on tlje Scbcntf) antr 5Tcntfj Precepts of tlje
JDecalogiie.

"Thou shalt not steal." Exodus 20: 15-17.

The Seventh Precept of the Decalogue forbids any attempt en
the property of others.

The Tenth Precept forbids the internal sin of concupiscence, in
other words, the desire for others' property find unjust action
towards them. We shall speak of the different sins of injustice
legarding goods, in the treatise on justice and rights.

Casrg on tjje Sc&entl) antr ftcntfj precepts of tfje
Decalogue*

They are to be found in the special treatise on justice and
contracts.

precept of tlje Eccalogue.

'Thou shalt not bear false \vitness." Exodus 20 : 16.

CHAPTER I.
LYING.

ART. I. Lying in general.

438. — A lie is a word or a sign contrary to the thought,
with the intention of deceiving. If it is made by sign or
by action, it is called pretence ; pretence in its turn takes the
name of hypocrisy, when one simulates to be other than one is ; for
instance, a sinner who pretends to be just.

There are three kinds of lies : prejudicial lies, by which one
wrongs another ; officious lies, by which one helps one's self or
another ; and joyous lies, to make people laugh.

439. — Lying, properly so-called, is always an evil. . . . the
prejudicial lie has a gravity proportioned to the wrong done, and
which one is obliged to compensate.

The officious lie is a venial sin, in principle ; because it does not
occasion a grave disorder ; for better reason, the same may be
said of the joyous lie. . . .

ART. II. Mental restriction.

441. — This is an act of the mind turning aside, or restricting the
true meaning of words about some subject, to another sense than
the natural one ; whence it follows that it is not true, unless it is
taken in the same sense given by the speaker.

Mental restriction is : 1, purely and strictly mental, if the sense
attributed by the speaker can in no way be understood, whence it
is called properly mental; 2, largely or improperly men'al, if the
sen^e cm be understood by what is added to it. Mental restiic-

156 TJie Doctrine of the Jesuits.

lion comprises equivokes or amphibologies, words with two mean
ings, the one more natural, and the other less *

442. — 1. It is not permitted to make use of the purely and
properly mental restriction.

443. — 2. It is sometimes permitted to make use of the.restriction
largely; that is to say, improperly mental, and also of equivocal

* Jacques Platel has explained this difference in the most luminous
terms, (1G80) :

"God cannot (and this is never permitted to men, for any cause what
ever) use purely mental restriction, in other words a restriction which in
no way lets itself be perceived, neither by circumstances nor by any
external marks. '

"God can, however (and this is also permitted to m^n for a just cause),
use the restriction which is not purely mental, when the words externally
pronounced are joined with external circumstances, which gives such help
to the sense of words that an intelligent hearer is able to understand the
restriction internally retained, or at least suspect it." (Page 322.)

Pope Innocent XI. had condemned amphibology; but the Jesuit* had
victoriously answered. Jean de Cardenas, who published iji 1702 a special
dissertation on the Papal decreee, expresses himself in such a way as to
take all scruples away :

-•Thomas Sanchez," says he, "proposes two kinds of amphibologies
which he looks upon as certainly allowable, supposing there is a justcau-e
for seeking for the truth ; the first one is, when the words used are equivo
cal, and that the one who speaks uses it in one sense, while the hearer
thinks he is speaking in another sense. In this case, if there is no just
cause for hiding the truth, such an amphibology is not allowable, but it is
not a lie. For instance, if any one had killed a inan of French nationality,
in Latin Gallum, he says, without lying, that lie did not kill Gallnm,
meaning that Latin word Gallum, which means a rooster. It is such an
amphibology that is mentioned in the reflection on the chapter Ne qnis
22, question 2, in these terms : Let the one who is interrogated acutely
deceive his interrogator, by answering in Latin, He in not here, meaning
he eats not here, being favorised by the equivocation of the Latin word is,
which means equally he is, and he eats.

"It is certain that this kind of amphibology is not condemned by Inno
cent XL; because he condemns only the amphibologies which are made
by means of a mental restriction adding to the spoken words a thought
inwardly retained.

"Now in the kind of amphibology of which it is questioned here, no
inward thought is added to the uttered words; because these different
significations are equally proper to the equivocal words in themselves."
(Page 324.)

Here is the precious doctrine offered to the meditation of little children :

Ques. " Is it justifiable to use equivocal words, or mental restrict^ ns?"

Ans. "It is not justifiable to use them, when they are such that the
sense cannot be understood by the hearers; because then, they are actual
lies. But when, according to custom or circumstances, the true meaning
can readily be understood by the hearers, they may be used, if there is a
legitimate reason for doing so." (Petit Catecliisme de Marotte.)

Eighth Precept of ihe Decalogue. 157

words, when the meaning of the speaker can be understood. The
reason is, that in itself it, is not an evil, others not being properly
deceived ; but for a just motive, they are placed in a situation to
deceive themselves. Besides, the good of society demands that
there should be a means to lawfully hide a secret ; now there is no
other way than by equivocation or restriction, largely and
improperly mental.

One is permitted to use this restriction, even under oath. . . .

444. — A culprit interrogated judicially, or not lawfully, by the
judge, may answer that he has done nothing, meaning: "about
which you have the right to question me ;" or, " that I am obliged
to avow." *

* This is Emmanuel Sa's own formula, in the year 1000 : "Any one not
legitimately interrogated, may answer that he does not know anything
about what is asked, understanding mentally, in such a manner that he is
obliged to tell it." (Page 295.)

Lessius speaks in the same way : "If a judge interrogates on an action,
which must have been committed without sin, at least a mortal one, the
witness and the culprit are not obliged to answer according to the judge's
intention."

We see that the doctrine has remained intact till our day. We find the
proof of it in more recent facts, when a civil judge allows himself
to question a clerk about matters about which the latter believes that he
need answer nothing to the civil authority.

For instance : On the llth and 18th of December 1870, the priest Vincent
was arraigned before the police court of St. Julieii (tiaute-Savoie),
incriminated for having illegally opened a free school. The sitting was
marked by a curious incident, reported as follows by the Patriote

" Bad faith, lies, concealments of all kinds, have not been lacking to the
culprit and professors of the school called as witnesses.

" At the beginning of the examination of a young priest, the president
of the court deemed it useful to recall to him the importance of the oath,
on account of his sacerdotal character.

" The reserved bearing of this witness, his efforts to escape the incisive
and precise questions of the magistrate, brought him this sharp and witty
reprimand :

"[ was not wrong, sir, to recall to you the importance of your oath
before justice; I see, with grief, that your calculated concealments show
me that I was entirely right."

"The attorney of the .Republic, in his turn, did not fear to tell the
culprit: 'As a magistrate, I am indignant at your attitude ; and as a
Catholic, I am ashamed of it.'"

Those words, from the mouth of a good communicant Catholic
magistrate, have a signification understood by everybody.

If the words cf the worthy magistrate have been understood, it seems
that those of the priest have not. The latter remained in the strict right,
and obeyed Gury. The right to teach belongs to the Church and to the

158 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

This mode of restriction may be used by all public functionaries
questioned on things confided to their discretion ; or secretaries,
.ambassadors, generals, magistrates, lawyers, physicians, and all
those who have reasons, to hide some truth relative to their charge.
Because, if the secrets confided to those persons were violated,
grave inconvenience would result for society.*

Church alone; the civil law, in this matter, is purely penal; the incrimi
nated act was nothing else than a sin. Then the judge had truly no right
to interrogate, and the priest could answer whatever he liked, even being
under oath. He would have, if he had dared to do it (hut the revolution
ary spirit has mollified the strongest courages,) answered with Taherna :

" A priest cannot be obliged to bear witness before a secular judge ;" or
with Tambourin :

"The culprit, if he is a priest, may swear equivocally before a secular
judge, that he has not committed the offence; . . . because the judge is
incompetent towards ecclesiastics. . . ." Or better yet, with Fagundez :
" If the judge questions an action done without sin, at least a mortal one,
the witness and culprit are not obliged to answer according to the judge's
intention, in a case where the judge might believe that there is fault on
the part of the accused one, and for that reason would think that lie is iii
duty bound to punish him severely." (Page 315.)

"He might have even victoriously sustained the same thesis, in a far
more important matter than the illegal opening of a school, Has he not
with him, besides other illustrious doctors, Georges Gobat, (1701)?

" If you have killed Peter in self defence, you can swear before the judge
that you did not kill, restricting mentally unjustly, if you cannot prove
what is true, nevertheless, that your defence has been really legitimate.
. . . In the same way, when it is more probable that the profit on certain
goods is too low, and that on account of this you use false weights
secretly, you can, in presence of the judge, ilrny under oath, that you have
been using false weights, (adding mentally,) from which the buyer has
unjustly suffered." (Page 322.)

* The hardness of the times and the sarcasms of infidels have com
pelled the Good Fathers to attenuate very much, in theoretical exposition,
the compliances of their doctrines. Doubtless the ground work has
remained the same, as is easily recognized by a perspicacious eye, and
as facts of experience demonstrate, but they speak with less clearness.
Ah ! what a good time when the true doctors could speak freely ! Li.- ten :

Tolet : *' A culprit is not permitted to tell a lie. . . . However, he can
say: I have not done it; or, I have not had any accomplices. But lie
must take good care to say these words in a sense true and conformable
to the intention he has in his mind. For instance, if he answers : [ have
not done it, it is necessary that his thought should be to say, I have not
done it since I am in prison! If he answers : I have not had any accom
plices; he must mean by that answer, in some other crime than the one
about which he is interrogated, or some other similar intention; other
wise he would tell a lie, wuilst he does not tell any in this way ; because,
in this case, the words must be considered not according to the judge's
intention, but according to that of the culprit " (Page 297.)

Suarez : "A lie is something said against the very thought of the

Eighth Prtcept of iJie Decalogue. 159

CHAPTER II.

DEFAMATION.

ART. I. On the Sin of Defamation.

445. — Defamation is the unjust violation or reviling of another's
reputation by words not expressed in public . . .

speaker himself; because it is the one who speaks who is obliged to
conform his words to his own intention, and lie is not always obliged
to conform them to the listener's intention. Now one cannot say tluit
such a one speaks against his thoughts who uses equivocal terms in a
sense conformable to his own intention. Then he does not lie; then he
does not utter an untruth ; then, to speak thus is not intrinsically an evil;
because it would be only on account of the lie that evil could exist.
Whence another conclusion would be, that there is no perjury in affirming
under oath what is said in such a manner; because by that oath one does
not take God as a witness for a lie, there being no lie." (Page 300.)

"If some one who has promised, or externally contracted without inten
tion of promise, is questioned by the judge, and is called upon to declare
under oath if he has promised or contracted, he may simply sav, No;
because that may have a legitimate sense, viz. : / have not promised by a
promise which binds me; and he has a legitimate reason for answering
thus; because otherwise, not being able to prove the lack of intention,
he would be condemned to pay what he does not owe in fact, or to
cohabit with a person with whom he has not truly contracted. Navarre
teaches tins thoroughly.

Filliutius : "We must distinguish two ways by which persons with
judgment may use amphibology. The first one consists in having the
intention to say outwardly but material words; and for greater safety,
when one commences by saying: 'I swear,' must add inaudibly, 'that £
say; ' and answer aloud, ' that I have not done this or that; ' because the
saying is true in this way. The second one consists in having the intention
not to finish the sentence by external words only, but aLso with a mental
restriction; every one being free to express his thought fully or in part.
As for ignorant people, who do not conceive of amphibology in particu
lar, it is sufficient that they should have the intention of affirming or
denying in a sense true in itself, and for that, it is necessary that they can
also deny in some truthful sense, otherwise they could not speak in a
sense conformable to the truth." (Page 3di).)

F. de Castro Palao, shows in this a spirit of foresight and prudence
above all praise : "Every time that a, just subject for disguising the truth
presents itself, one can, without sin, give an amphibological oath, as is
proved by the examples quoted, and the reasons alleged; because such an
oath contains justice an<t truth; ami inasmuch as the oath is useful it
does not invalidate the judgment. It is then in no way vicious. • • • So,
even if the questioner should exclude all equivoke, and if, besides the
oath taken, he should ask for another oath not to calumniate, and should
exact you to swear to tell the truth sincerely and without equivocation,
you would, even then, use an amphibological oath, mixed up with restric
tion; because you can mentally reserve that you swear without tiny unjust

160 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Defamation is called simply such, if the reputation of a person is
violated by the revelation of a true crime ; it is called calumnious
if a false crime is invented. Defamation can be direct or indirect.

446. — Any direct defamation, simple or calumnious, is mortal
in itself; because it is a graver sin than theft. But the gravity or
slightness of defamation ought to be estimated especially in con
sideration of the gravity of the damage caused, and not of that of
the crime attributed to the defamer. One must then take into
account the value of the defamer, and that of the defamed.

equivoke. There is, in fact, no proposition in whatever large spirit it is
taken, which is not susceptible of some mental restriction." (page 313.)

Busenbaum: "It is not a mental restriction if some one answers
according to the thought of the questioner, though the words he utters in
the answer are false in themselves, if they were not said regarding such
circumstances. For instance, if some one asks me if I have killed Caius,
I answer : I have not killed him. Though 1 did kill him, i do not lie, I
do not sin." (Page fr39.)

But Charles Antoine Casnedi carries the day by having profited by the
experience of his precl ces>ors, so far as the judgment of an humble lay
man, incompetent in morals, can iro.

"Now," says this givat man, •• I am going to examine a new manner of
telling no lies while hiding the truth; and this, not in shutting one's
mouth, but by the speaking itself.

" This manner consists in speaking but materially, and in pronouncing
words with the intention of giving them no signification, as if, in fact,
they had no meaning whatever; just as when I pronounce the word blictri,
or as when some one pronounces words which he does not hear. Because
words drawing, so to speak, their life Irom the intention that one has of
giving them a signification, it follows that without that intention, the
proffered words are like dead words, or some kind of skeletons of words;
they have then no formal siMi^e to mean what they ought to signify by
their institution. (Page 325.) . . .

"But supposing once that these words : I do not know, I have not done
it, or other similar ones, do not signify anything, in a case when speak
ing is necessary, and notwithstanding, at the same time hide the heart's
secret, one explains how easily : " Not only is there none, but even these
cannot be any lie in the one who speaks, because no one lies but by
words which signify something opposed to what is in the mind.

" The one who swears materially does not swear, because, in order to
swear, the use of the words "I swear*' is necessary, as signification
of the oath. Then the one who uses the words "I swear" as not being
significant, does not swear." (page 327.)

Gregoire cle Valence (that illustrious man), says the Jesuit Glair, who
was taken in the flagrant offence of falsifying texts before the Pope,
Clement VIII., (See La Fuwe d'un Jesuite, by Lanjuinaie, 1879, page Gl)
hail the same idea, but did not express it so clearly. He proposed to give
to the word home, the value of the word man, to obolax the value of ducat,
etc. But it was not very practicable."

Eigldh Precept of the Decologue. 1G1

447. — It is never allowable to attribute a crime to some one
without cause, as results from the 44th proposition condemned by
Innocent XI. But one can reveal the tiue and hidden crime of
some one, when he has a just cause. These just causes are: 1,
The notable interest of the revealer, for instance, in order to ask
for aid and advice in a grave matter, but taking care not to have
the desire to defame ; 2, the interest of the delinquent, for his
instruction, his correction, etc. ; 3, the public interest, to prevent
some evil threatening the State, religion, or some community;
4, the grave, even private interest of the one who listens, or of
somebody else.*

448. — Ques. Is it a grave sin to reveal the one mortal sin of
another ?

Ans. It is not always a mortal sin, even, when it has been
revealed to several persons.

449. — Ques. Can one reveal a published crime to those who
are ignorant of it?

Ans. Yes, without an^ grave sinS

Ques. Can one reveal a published crime i# & p&ce where it is
ignored?

Ans. Yes, more probably to one's self, and without any grave
sin, if it is a question of a neighboring place. . . .

455. — . , . It is not sinning mortally to speak evil of some one
unknown and indeterminate ; to say, for instance : there are in
such a place many thieves, drunkards, and immodest persons ;

* The Petit Catechisme de Marotte does not fail to reproduce this excep
tion which destroys the whole rule, taking- care to pick out some admissi
ble species, in ord'er to make the principles pass :

Ques. "Is it never permitted to publish the faults or defects of
others?

Ans. " It is permitted to publish them when there is a necessity for it;
in other words: 1, when it is for the good of religion or the State; 2,
when the one who reveals the faults or vices of another does it for his own
advantage; for instance, to defend himself against calumny, to ask for
advice or aid in an important affair; 3, when the good of the one who
committed the fault, or who has secret defects demands that his conduct
should be known to those being in position to correct him; 4, at last,
when other persons have an interest in knowing the life and manners of
the offender, in order to guard themselves against the damage they can
receive from them."

162 The Doctrine of /.he Jesuits.

because nobody suffers a grave injury. In the same way, it is not
a grave matter to report the crime of some one whom the hearers
do not know and will never be acquainted with, even if his name
is mentioned : even this contains no fault in itself. . . .

456. — There is no sin, at least grievous, if, in order to soothe
one's self, leaving aside any reviling intention, one relates to a
friend the injury which has been done him, though dishonor may
result from this to the author. So, according to the probable
opinion, servants relating injuries done them bv their masters,
wives those by their husbands, children by their fathers, ecclesias
tics by their prelates, etc., are excused at least from mortal sin ;
because the author of the injustice cannot reasonably get angry
about it, and exact so difficult a thing that the injured persons
shall be deprived of consolation and necessary advice. . . .

ART. II. Reparation for outraged honor.

457. — The defamer is obliged, by justice, as much as possible :
1, to make a reparation for the honor unjustly defamed ; 2, to pay
all damages resulting from the defamation, and foreseen in some
way.

460. — Ques. What are the reasons exempting from that repa
ration ?

Ans. — 1. If the fault divulged by you to one or several persons
has got abroad to the public in some other way, or if the repara
tion has been made in another manner ; for instance, by a judg
ment.

2. If one prudently judges that the remembrance of the crime
is effaced in the course of time.

3. If the reparation cannot be made without endangering the
life of the defamer ; because life is a gift preferable to reputation.
In the same way, if the honor of the defamed one is of less
importance than the injury to which the defamer would be liable;
for instance, if the reparation had to be made by an honorable
man, very useful to society and religion.

4. If the reparation is morally impossible, on account of dis-

Eiijldli Precept of the Decalogue. 163

tance or other difficulties ; for instance, if those who heard the
defamer could be brought to change their opinion.

5. If it is judged that those who heard have not given faith to
the defamation, as it often happens when done in a moment of
anger.

6. If the reviled person has remitted the reparation expressly
or tacitly, provided she can do so, even this presumed pardon is
oftentimes satisfactory.

461. — Ques. Is one obliged to give money for compensation, if
the reparation of honor cannot be made?

Ans. No, according to the more probable opinion ; because
justice demands a return of only what has been taken, or the
equivalent of it. Now, one has not taken money by reviling, and
it is not the equivalent of honor, since it belongs to another
order.

CHAPTER III.
OUTRAGE.

462.— Outrage is an attempt on the honor of a person present,
and knowing it ....

CHAPTER IV.
RASH JUDGMENTS, SUSPICIONS AND RASH DOUBTS.

Appendix : On Violation of Secrecy.

468. — Secrecy, in general, is all that is hidden : as for what
concerns us, it is all that ought to remain hidden by its nature, or
by special convention.

There are three kinds of secrets :

The natural. . . .

The promised. . . .

The confided. . . .

470. — Ques. What are the just causes for divulging a secret?

Ans. — 1. The well-presumed consent of the person who is
interested in hiding that secret ; 2, If it has been divulged already

104 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

elsewhere; 3, the damage which may be caused by the secret to
the public good, or to private interests.

Ques. Can one reveal a secret if he has promised to keep it,
even at the risk of his life?

Ans. Yes, if the public good demands it : because any promise
contrary to the public good is void. . . .

471. — Ques. Do we sin gravely by divulging a secret to one or
two honest persons, enjoining them to keep it?

Ans. No, in principle, according to the probable opinion ;
because in this case one does not do a great wrong.

Ques. Is it a grave sin to open or read the letters of another?

Ans. Yes, in principle . . .

Except in the following cases :

1, If there is a tacit or presumed consent of the writer, or of the
one to whom it is written ; 2, if one knows or presumes that the
letter does not contain anything of importance ; 3, if one has a
legitimate reason ; for instance, to prevent a public or private
misfortune, provided one reads only what is necessary for that
purpose ; 4, if one opens it carelessly, or through inadvertence.*

472. — You must keep a confided secret, even if }*ou are ques
tioned about it by a superior, a judge, etc. You must answer
them : u I do not know anything about it;" because that knowl
edge is for you absolutely as if it did not exist ; and this, should
the secret be confided expressly or tacitly. . . .

* Marotte has not failed to present these elegant formulas to children :
Ques. "Is it permitted to open and read sealed letters addressed to
someone else?

Ans. No, it is forbidden under penalty of a grave sin to open letters
sealed and addressed to another: and even to read those found unsealed
and placed on a desk or some other place of that kind ; unless we have
reason to believe in the consent of the author of the letter, or of the
person to whom it is addressed."

Cases on tjje IStgljtfj precept of tfje JUecalogue*

j CASE II.

MENTAL RESTRICTION.

1. Theofrido, having received an inheritance and hidden his
riches in order not to pay his creditors, answers that he has
hidden nothing. Another time, having returned some money he
had borrowed, interrogated by the judge, he denies having received
it. At a third time, questioned by an officer of customs if he
was carrying goods liable to duty, he answered negatively.

2. Anna, guilty of adultery, as her suspicious husband was
questioning her, answered him at first that she had not broken
her marriage vow. Then, having received absolution for her sin,
she answered : "I am innocent of such a crime." A third time,
to the entreaties of her husband, she absolutely denied the fault :
"I have not committed it," said she; meaning "adultery such
as I am obliged to reveal;" in other words, "I have not com
mitted an adultery."

Ques. 1. Must Theofride be condemned as a liar?

Ques. 2. Must Anna be condemned?

Ans. Question 1. Theofride has not sinned against truth in
the first case ; because, in reality, he has hidden nothing, accord
ing to the sense of the questioner,* or in the sense in which one

*This is exactly, in spite of the reticence of the Compendium, the true
and primordial doctrine. Listen to Emm. Sa:

"It is not a mortal sin to swear falsely as to the words, when your oath
is true as to the, intention of the one who interrogates you; as, if you
swear in pestiferous times that you do not come from such and such a
place, adding mentally, where the plague exists ; or that you have not
spoken to a certain man of the things that your interlocutor suspects.
In this way many think with probability what d >es not seem to me quite
sure, and which I would not advise anyone to do; without, nevertheless,
disapproving one who would do it. According to the same doctors, you
can swear before the judge that you have not done a thing, viz. : in his

166 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

could justly interrogate him. So by answering that he has hidden
nothing, it is as if he said : I have committed no injustice against
my creditors ; this being the only sense in which the judge and
creditors can interrogate him.

And he has not sinned in the second case, for the same reason ;
because he is questioned only on his debt, whether he has received
the borrowed money, and if he has not returned it.

Neither in the third case,* at least according to the probable
and common opinion, which looks upon those laws concerning the
transfer of objects from one place to another as purely penal.
So to say " I have nothing," it is as if one was saying, " I have
nothing to declare of myself; it is your duty to look for it your
self, instead of questioning." But we advise ecclesiastics to tell
the truth, to avoid a scandal by denying the thing, if it comes to
be known.

Ans. Question 2. — In the three cases Anna may be excused
from any lie ; because :

In the first case, she could say that she had not broken the mar
riage bond, it being existent yet.t

own way of thinking; and to answer one who would constrain you to
do something not permitted, or which you are not obliged to do, that
you will do it; viz. : if that is permitted, or if you are forced to it; and
also to one who tries unjustly or by force to draw a secret from you,
that you are ignorant of it, viz. : in such a way that you are obliged to
reveal it.

" Moreover, they say that when you are not obliged to swear conform
ably to the intention of your questioner, you can swear relatively to your
own; this others deny, saying that such a way of understanding one's
own intention does not exclude absolutely false expressions. But both
parties are learned men, who, respectively, think with probability."

* Gury reproduces here the case already imagined by Sanchez, (1614).
And even Sanchez's man is more excusable than Gary's, according to lay
morality. "The one who has hidden some property for fear that it
should be stized by his creditors and he should be reduced to poverty,
such a man, I sav, questioned by the judge, can swear that he has hidden
nothing. And those also who know of it, may swear to the same thing,
provided they are assured that he lawfully hid that property for such an
aim, understanding mentally that he hid nothing about which he is
obliged to declare to the judge." (Page 302).

t This is almost as good as the Case of Fegeli : "A man being asked if
the thief has passed that way, can answer, lawfully, putting his foot upon
a paving-stone : He did not pass this way ; meaning, on this paving stone.

Cases on the Eighth Precept of the Decalogue. 167

In the second case, she could call herself innocent of adultery ;
because, after having been to confession and having received
absolution, her conscience is at rest, having the moral certainty
that her sin was pardoned. She could even, according tj St.
Liguori, affirm it under oath.

In the third case, she could deny her sin, according to the
probable opinion, meaning: "In such a way that she was not
obliged to reveal it to her husband ; " as a culprit may say to a
judge who does not question him legitimately : " I have not com
mitted any crime," adding mentally, "in such a manner that I
should reveal it." This is the opinion of St. Liguori, and of
many others.

CASE V.

DEFAMATION.

Pascal, knowing of a crime committed very secretly by Peter,
reveals it to Paul, and uses an oath to enforce the belief on Paul's
mind. But he makes Paul promise also, under oath, that he will
never divulge it to anyone. Soon, however Paul violates his oath,
and reveals Peter's crime. . . . Later, Paul repents, . . . and
forms the resolution to acknowledge that he has been mistaken,
when he learns that Peter has previously defamed him (Paul) ;
then he decides not to retract anything until Peter sets the
example.

Ques. 1. Has Pascal sinned equally by revealing Peter's crime
to one man only?

Ques. 2. Has he sinned against religion, by making an oath to
confirm Peter's crime?

Ques. 3. What is the sin of Paul in violating his own oath?

Ques. 4. Does the obligation to repair the honor cease; or is
it only postponed, if the defamed one has equally defamed his
def amer ?

Ans. Question 1. Pascal sinned gravely if he has foreseen,
even confusedly, that Paul would reveal the secret. In the con
trary hypothesis, there is controversy; most of the theologians
say, Yes ; more, probably ; because there is no actual defamation
in relating the crime to one man only ; however, more trustworthy

168 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

authors deny this probability, reputation being dependent on the
opinion of the generality of men.

Ans. Question 2. Pascal has sinned against religion by taking
an oath to confirm his saying, because he swore without a cause,
and uselessly invoked God's name. . . .

Ans. Question 3. Paul has sinned gravely against religion and
against justice.

Ans. Question 4. There is controversy to know whether the
defamer is exempt from retracting until the one who has defamed
shall retract. Both opinions are probable, according to St.
Liguori.

CASE VI.

DEFAMATION.

Sylvia, a servant, leaves her master, an honorable man, and
learns that Veronica, an honest girl, has entered his service ; she
tries all means to induce her to leave him, affirming that he is a
hard and fussy master. As she was not believed by Veronica, she
adds that he is an immoral man, and very dangerous to the virtue
of his servants.

Ques. Did Sylvia sin by defaming her master?

Ans. Not at all ; because defamation includes an unjust revil
ing of another. Now, Sylvia's defamation has not been unjust,
having been done for a grave and just motive, for the good of the-
soul, or the salvation of Veronica. . . . Then . . .

CASE X

Amand, promised, under oath, toMarinus, that he would never
reveal a theft committed by the latter, and about which Marinus
told him, making him promise the secret under oath. But, as the
thing was not suspected, Amand was called as a witness before
the judge, and revealed the secret, after interrogation.

Ques. Was Amand right, and was it his duty to reveal the
confided secret ?

Ans. He ought not to have revealed the theft known secretly
under oath; but he ought to have answered: "I do not know

Cases on the Eighth Precept of the Decalogue. 169

am thing," understanding, "nothing that I am obliged to reveal,"
1 y using a mental restriction. Because such a secret constrains
in jtll cases, by natural rights, except in a case of public interest.
A superior or a judge cannot compel one to violate natural rights :
then . . . and here, the reason of common interest does not exist ;
because society does not run so great a danger from a theft not
brought to light. So Amand has committed a grave sin against
religion and justice, by revealing publicly, before the court, a
confided secret which, under oath, he had promised to keep.

CASE XI.
OPEN LETTERS.

Olivier, having fallen in love with Rosa, committed several
times with her shameful acts. Sometime later, Rosa declares that
she is pregnant, and that she will divulge his conduct towards her,
if he does not give ber two hundred pounds to provide for future
expenses. Olivier was going to let her have the money, when he
learns that the girl keeps company with Titius. Then he begins
to doubt if she is not pregnant of Titius. What is to be done in
order to know the truth ? Suspecting that the lovers keep up a
correspondence, he profits by an opportunity to secretly open
Rosa's trunk ; he takes some letters and reads them, and finds one
in which Titius avows himself to be the father of the child, and
declares himself to be ready to take care of him, and pay all
expenses. Olivier decides to show the letter, in order to reveal
Rosa's trickery and falsehood ; but before doing this, he asks for
his confessor's advice.

Ques. 1. Is it a grave sin to open and read somebody's letter?

Ques. 2. Has Olivier sinned gravely in reading letters addressed
to Rosa, and can lie make use of them for his defence?

Ans. Question 1. Yes, in principle ; because natural rights and
the rights of nations command us to respect the secrecy of letters,
for public security and common confidence ; otherwise, social
relations would be absolutely compromised.

Except in the following cases : 1, when there is a tacit or pre
sumed consent of the writer, or of the one addressed ; 2, when

170 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

there is a reasonable motive ; for instance, to prevent a public or
private misfortune ; 3, if it is supposed that the matters treated
in the letter are of very little importance. In these cases, the
reader of the letters would not commit a very grave sin.

Ans. Ques. 2. Olivier has committed no sin, either grave or
slight, by taking Rosa's letters and reading them ; because he did
it for a grave and just motive, in other words, to avoid a consider
able loss. Theologians generally teach, that one is justified in
reading another's letters, or in revealing a secret, when there is
necessity for it, in order to defend one's self or another person
for a just motive.

ise on flje precepts of tfj* Cfjurdj,

473. — When there is a grave motive, the Church has the power
to establish precepts obligatory on the faithful, for Christ himself
has given legislative powers to her, as has been said in the
Treatise on Laws, No. 83.

PRECEPTS I, II.
ON THE KEEPING OF FEAST DAYS.

PRECEPT III.
ON ANNUAL CONFESSION.

PRECEPT IV.
ON COMMUNION AT EASTER.

PRECEPT V.

ON ABSTINENCE FROM MEATS, OTHER THAN DURING THE TIME OF

FASTING.

486. — Qnes. Is it a mortal sin to eat pies, etc., prepared with
meat and butter ?

Ans. Yes, if that dish contains a notable sauce ; otherwise
there is only a venial sin. It is a mortal sin if the sauce has been
prepared with a large quantity of meat. . . .

172 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

PRECEPT VI.
ON THE ECCLESIASTICAL FAST.

CHAPTER I.

THE ESSENCE AND OBLIGATION OF THE FAST.
ART. I. On the one meal and lunch.
499. — Ques. Is fish permitted at lunch?

Ans. Yes, if it is a question of small fishes, and especially of
preserved ones; also, according to the probable opinion, larger
fishes are allowed. However, St Liguori thinks that those fishes
must not weigh more than two or three ounces. . . .

ART. II. On abstinence from meat in fasting. . . .
ART. III. Hours for meals. . . .

CHAPTER II.

ON CAUSES WHICH EXEMPT FROM FASTING.

Cases of Conscience on tfje Precepts of tfje Cfjitrcfj.

They are numerous, but of little interest to lay readers. I will
quote only a few of them as examples ; such puerilities are curious
only for the craftiness they inspire in the faithful, and this with
the intention to deceive their priests and their God.

CASE VIII.
ON FASTING.

Castor, not once, but on several occasions, drinks copiously of
wine, beer, etc., on days of fasting, putting into practice the
axiom: "Liquid does not break the fast;" and, consequently,
passes the whole of fast-time with scarcely any suffering. More
than this, from time to time he dips a small piece of bread in
wine, and eats it, saying: "In this way the drink will not hurt
me." Also, in the morning, he takes some chocolate, tea, coffee,
sugar, with a piece of bread, saying: "That these things are
taken as a remedy "

Ques . What is to be thought of Castor ? . . .

CASE XII.
ON EXCUSING FROM THE FAST.

Strigonius would not be willing to violate the fast, though he
finds it different in practice. Then he imagines a way of satisfy
ing his appetite, without the risk of sinning. . . . 1, He under
takes very heavy work, in order to profit by the dispensation from
fasting in such a case, on account of extreme fatigue ; 2, with
the same aim in view, he passes the whole day hunting up hill and
down dale ; 3, he sets out on a pious pilgrimage, obliging him
to walk fifteen or twenty miles, always with the same object
in view.

Ques. What shall we think of Strigonius? . . .

174 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CASE XIII.
ON ABSTINENCE FROM MEAT.

Nicodemus eats, without any scruples, on prohibited days, one
or two small pieces of meat; because, sa}*s he, "so very little
cannot be of any account." At other times he eats readily of
stews, of pies, of vegetables, seasoned with meat-gravy, lard,
etc. ; and in so doing he does not think he sins grievously,
because meat alone is forbidden by the church.

Ques. 1. What is a light and a grave matter in this law?

Ques. 2. What are the prohibited meats?

Ques. 3. Quod, of Nicodemus?

Ans. Question 1. There is controversy. St. Liguori says that
it is a matter of gravity, when we eat the eighth part of an
ounce. Voit thinks that a slight matter is the equivalent of a
large hazel nut.

Ans. Question 2. The prohibited meats are those of all animals
living on the earth. 80 fishes, frogs, snails, etc., are not pro
hibited.

Ans. Question 3. Nicodemus sinned gravely, if the little piece
of meat was larger than that above indicated.

He has sinned mortally, in principle, by eating of pastry, pies,
etc., and of dishes prepared with meat gravies, grease, lard, etc.,
unless very little of this has been used.

treatise on Susttce anti

PART I.
NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND RIGHTS.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL NOTIONS ON JUSTICE AND RIGHTS.

ART. I. Nature of Justice.

517. — The word justice seems to be a derivation of just. That
is called just which is adequate, and measured with the rule.
Whence justice, in general, is that tendency of the soul which
strives for that adequateness and that measure. . . .

518. — We distinguish four kinds of justice : legal, distributive,
vindicative, communicative. . . .

ART. II. Nature of Rights.

521. — We distinguish especially, the right in the thing and the
right to the thing. . . .

ART. III. General Principles of Rights and Justice.

SECTION 1. General principles of Rights.

522. — Proposition 1. God alone is truly and absolutely the
Master of all. . . .

523. — Proposition 2. Man may be a proprietor to another
man. . . .

524. — Propositions. If a man has acquired some property
legitimately, he has acquired an inviolable right in himself to
the said property. . . .

SECTION 2. General principles of Justice.
532. — Proposition 1. Commutative justice obliges under a
grave penalty, and at the same time imposes restitution.

176 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

533. — Proposition 2. Othe.* kinds of justice oblige under grave
penalty, but do not compel restitution. . . .

CHAPTER II.
PRINCIPAL KINDS OF RIGHT.
They are : Ownership, usufruct, usage, servitude.
ART. I. Ownership.

536. Ownership is the legitimate power of disposing of a thing
as of yourself.

There is the perfect ownership and the imperfect one, according
to the right that we have of disposing both of the thing itself and
of its benefits, or of either the one or the other only.

The imperfect one is subdivided into direct and indirect, or
useful.

There is also high ownership and low ownership. The first one
is the right of the supreme power to dispose sometimes of private
properties for the good of the community. The second one is
individual ownership.

SECTION 1. Object of ownership.

537. — 1. Man has the useful ownership of what belongs to him
intrinsically, viz. : the soul and the body. So he may, without
doing wrong to anyone, use them for his own benefit, for any pur
pose not interdicted by law.

However, the Holy Scriptures establish that he has not the
direct ownership of them.

538. — 2. Man may have the useful and direct ownership of*
external goods legitimately acquired. . . .

539. — Ques. Can a man have the right of ownership of another
man? . . .

Ans. 1. A man can, by natural rights, sell himself for life to
another man as useful property. Because, if he can do it for a
time, he can do it for life, being able to cede that which he
possesses. . . .

2. Slavery, or perpetual subjection, by which one disposes of

Treatise on Justice and Rights. 177

all of one's work to another, in exchange for food, is not, in prin
ciple, contrary to natural rights.*

540. — Q es. What ar^ the titles to slavery?

Aus. Slavery may come ... 4, from birth in slavery;
because, by right, those born from slaves are slaves themselves.
It is thus, by the rights of nations, according to the common
opinion.

541. — Ques. Is the slave trade permitted ? f

Ans. It is absolutely forbidden and contrary to all rights. . . .
But if it is a question of negroes, or others, being in legitimate
slavery, in principle, it is not absolutely forbidden ; because,
admitting slavery to be legitimate, the master has a legitimate
right over his slaves and their work, and so it follows that he may
transmit it to others. I said, in principle, because circumstances
may be in opposition to it; for instance, if it is necessary to
separate a woman from her husband, or if the civil law forbids it;
since slavery is generally forbidden in Europe.

SECTION 2. The subject of ownership.

542. — The master of a thing is the one to whom it belongs.

1st point : — Ownership of the sous of the family. . . .

2d point: — Ownership of wives. . . .

554. — A wife does not sin in stealing something for the food
and clothing of her family, whose husband does not employ
himself, after having asked him in vain.

Jf a husband wastes or squanders his property, to the prejudice
of his family, his wife may hide and keep what she can for the use
of the family. J

*" Slavery does not constitute a crime before any law, divine or
human. . . . What reason can we have for undermining the foundations
of slavery with the saint; zeal that ought always to animate us in over
coming • ev\\? " (Observations on Slavery, by Rigord, Priest, Fort Royal,
Martinique.)

t " When one thinks of the state of degradation in which the hordes of
Africa live, the slave trade may be considered as a providential act, and
one almost repudiates that philanthropy which sees in man but one thing-,
material liberty." v Kigord, 1 riest, Fort Koyal Martinique.)

t"If the wife apprehends trouble with the heirs of her husband,
because of the dissipation of the lattt r, she can, if she survives him, com
pensate herself honestly and secretly." (J. Gordon, 1G34.)

178 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

The wife does not act unjustly, if, without the knowledge of her
husband, she takes something which the latter would readily
accord if it was asked for ; because she has the presumed permis
sion, and oftentimes a legitimate reason ; she must not conduct
herself as a servant.

The wife can, in the absence of her husband, pay, out of the
common property, what is necessary to avoid a gross injury to the
family. . . .

555. — Ques. May the wife give alms out of the common
property ? ,

Ans. Yes,* even when she has property of her own. . . . The
husband is presumed to consent to everything his wife does, pro
viding it is conformable to her habits and position ; it would be
wholly unreasonable for him to oppose it. ...

556. — Ques. Is restitution obligatory to the husband who has
squandered, or unwisely spent, a notable part of the common
property ?

Ans. Yes, probably ; no, probably : controversy.

557. — Ques. Is it a sin for a wife to subscribe something from
the common fund, or from the interest of her dowry, and apply it
to the maintenance of her parents, or of children by a first
marriage ?

Ans. No, if she has no property of her own, and if her
husband refuses to give her the necessary money; because, by
natural right, she must feed her parents, and tlie husband must
consent to it.

Ques. Js the wifo obliged to make restitution for this, if it
happens that she shares an inheritance with the husband, or
recovers her dowry ?

" If a husband, at his death, leaves his property indebted for more than
its value, his wife can subtract what is necessary for her maintenance and
that of tne family. . . . This is the reason why, it' she is called to swear
that she has taken nothing, she can do it lawfully; because the sense of
the question asked would bo to know if she had ifot subtracted something
that does not belong to her." (Keuter, J., 1758, page 389.)

* "A wife may give alms either for her husband's spiritual needs,
(because, then she makes of her husband's property a use beneficial for
him) or in following the custom of women of her rank; if her husband
forbids it, he is supposed to forbid only the excess. (J. Gordon, 1G34.)

Treatise on Justice and Rights. 179

Ans. No, if those subtractions are not considerable: because,
then, they are considered as common alms which need no restitu-
tution.

Several say equally no, even if the wife has taken a consider-
ble part ; because the burden and charges of the family are to be
borne by both.

3d point : — Ownership of the Clergy.

562. — Ques. Ought pensioned ecclesin sties to give to the poor
what they possess in excess of their need?

Ans. No ; because the Holy Father, for a legitimate reason, by
paying these pensions out of his own money, already makes use of
it for a pious end ; they are not obliged then to use it for another
pious purpose.

5G3. — Ques. Ought the pension paid in France to ecclesiastics
to be likened to ecclesiastical property?

Ans. Yes; because after the Concordat of 1801, the above
pension was established as a compensation for the property
taken during the Revolution. Then, it is of the same nature as
that property of which it takes the place. . . .

4th point : — Ownership of Authors.

566. — It is certain that every man ought to enjoy the fruit of
his work ard talent by natural right. . . .

568. — Ques. Has the publisher of a book the right to prevent
the sale and printing of it, to the injury of the author or bookseller
to whom the author has transmitted his right?

Ans. 1. Yes, according to positive right in force in France and
in some other countries.

1. If it a question of natural right, there is controversy. . . .

SECTION 3. The Acquisition of Ownership.

It may take place :

1, By occupation ; 2, discovery; 3, prescription; 4, occasion;
5, by contracts, of which we shall speak in a particular treatise.

First point. — By Occupation.

569. — Occupation consists in taking possession of something
belonging to nobody, with t'ic :ittMiition of appropriating it to

180 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

one's self. It is a legitimate way of acquiring property, provided
there are the required conditions, viz. : 1, the object must be
susceptible of private proprietorship, and must not belong to any
body ; 2, the first occupant must have the intention to appropriate
it when he takes it; 3, there must be no law reserving it to a
determined master, as for example, the State, as something
previously occupied.

The most frequent cases, relating to the possession of animals,
we will mention only this one :

We distinguish three kinds of animals : wild ones, . . . domes
tics, . . . and the tamed ones. . . .

571. — Ques. Do we sin, and how, by hunting and fishing in
spite of the prohibition of the law?

It is a question only of those who hunt or fish in a prohibited
time or place, without a permit.

Ans. The probable opinion denies that there is any sin against
justice, or even against obedience ; because, according to custom
and the common opinion of men, such law seems to be a penal
one only. . . .

572. — Ques. Do we sin against commutative justice ly hunt
ing on another's property without his permission?

Aus. 1, No; if tluit property is accessible there is no sin,
unless some other dimnge result; because beasts ought not to be
considered as the production of the land.

2. No ; if the property, though inclosed, for instance, a forest
by a hedge-row, was very large, in such a way that the animals
may easily escape from the hunter or fisher; because, not being
seized and used by the proprietor, they do not belong to him.

574. — A Rwnrm of bees, escaped from your bee-hive, belongs
to vou so long as you can see and pursue it easily. Otherwise, it
belongs to the first occupier. By French law, it belongs to the
mister of the land on which it alights.

Those who buy from the Staie the right of fishing, cannot be
deprived of that right without injustice ; but those who would
take or destroy such a quantity of fishes as to cause a notable
wrong, may be called upon to compensate it. It is different if

Treatise on Justice and Rights. 181

only a small quantity is taken ; because then, the riuht of the
proprietor of the place does not suffer, as the fishes can escape,
and it is not certain that they cm be caught in that place. . . .

2d Point. — By objects that are found.

575. — There are four kinds: treasures, recently lost objects,
abandoned property, and unoccupied property. . . .

577. — Ques. Is a workman, working about a house, and
finding a sum of money hidden in a wall, or in an old coffer,
permitted to keep part of it?

Ans. It is necessary to distinguish. If there are indications
that it belongs to some member of the family, it must be given
up to him, the property being considered as recently lost ; other
wise, the workman may keep half of it, because it is like finding a
treasure.

3d Point. — By prescription. . . .
4th Point. — By accession. . . .
ART. II. Of usage and usufruct.

593. — Usage is the right of using another's property in sparing
their substance. Usufruct is the right to make use of and gather
the fruits of another's property, sparing also their substance. . . .

ART. III. By servitudes. . . .

PART SECOND.
VIOLATION OF RIGHT, OR INJUSTICE.

CHAPTER I.

INJUSTICE IN GENERAL.

599. — Injustice is the violation of the rights of another. It
is formal or material, according to its being done knowingly or
willingly, or outside of the knowledge of our will.

Grave or slight, according to the injury caused to others.

182 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Direct or indirect, if we seek it deliberately, or only permit and
foresee it in its cause.

603. — Ques. Can an internal act make an external one bad?

Ans. 1. No, if the external act does not wrong materially, in
principle, the rights of another, notwithstanding the guilty inten
tion of injuring by the act. It is because, where there is no right
injured, there is no injustice. So, one does not sin against justice
by refusing, through hate, to succor another, unless one is com
pelled to it by right.

Ans. 2. No, again, when the author has the right to do directly
an external act injurious to another, even with the intention to
injure ; because a guilty intention cannot make unjust what is just
in itself, not being able to change the nature of the external act.
So, a judge does not sin by an external act against justice, by
condemning, through hate, to a capital punishment well deserved;
nor a merchant selling at low prices, to do wrong to others. . . .

604. — Ques. What will be the decision, if the external act was
proceeding from a bad intention, but with uncertainty as to the
evil which will result?

Ans. There is controversy between the most serious theolo
gians. Examples will help to clear up the question : 1, some one
places poison or a trap in a place very little frequented by his
enemy, but with the intention to kill him if he happens to pass
that way; 2, a physician prescribes for his hated patient just
what he is obliged to, nothing more, because he hates him ; and
the patient dies. Have they caused these unjust deaths?

There are two opinions : the first one, which seems the more
common, answers No ; because in one way, the external act is not
unjust, since, in human acts, we must not think of the real possi
bility of doing wrong to another. Besides, the internal act does
not contain any injustice on account of the intention, the intention
having no influence over the efficiency of the cause ; mother words,
over the risk of damage. Thus, it is a purely accidental cause,
and the guilty intention does not change its nature.

The second opinion answers, Yes. . . .

Treatise on Justice and Rights, 183

CHAPTER II.

INJUSTICE IN ITS KIND, on, SINS AGAINST JUSTICE.
ART. I. Nature of Theft.

605. — Theft consists in taking what does not belong to you, in
spite of the reasonable will of the master.

We distinguish :

Simple theft, committed in secret.

Rapine plunder, done with open violence.

Sacrilegious theft, if it is a question of a sacred thing.

Theft, in its species, is a very grave sin ; because it is, in prin
ciple, quite contrary to natural law. . . .

GOG — Ques. When is there a grave matter in a theft?

Ans. 1. It cannot be determined. . . .

607. — Aiis. 1, In order that a theft should be looked upon as
grave, relatively, ... it must be of the value: 1, of one franc
for the poor, and a little less for the very poor : 2, about two or
three francs for workmen who live day by day ; 3, about three or
four francs for moderately rich people ; 4, about six or seven
francs for rich people.

In order that the matter should be absolutely grave, two or
three pieces of gold, of the value of one dollar each, are necessary.
But we must remember that the more scarce the mone}*, the greater
is its value.*

*In all times the Jesuits have established criminal degrees of theft;
not according to the circumstances, as does the lay laws, hut according to
the; amount of the stolen sum and the position of the victim. It is the
opinion of Tolet, Navarre, Sotus, Gordon, etc., quoting only the most
eminent ones.

Such a preoccupation of the stolen sum lead them to very curious con
sequences:

Vasquez says, "that the theft of thirty pieces of gold is a graver sin
than sodomy;" and Guimenius explains'this very learnedly, thus: "The
gravest sin is the one which violates the greatest virtue. Now, theft is
the contrary of justice, one of the greatest virtues; the sodomy of
chastity being least, it follows . . . (page 3C>5)

Such a doctrine is accepted and taught to little children.

Ques. "What is the quantity required, in a matter of theft, for a mortal
sin?

Ans. «« It is difficult to determine, with reasonable precision, the
required quantity necessary to constitute a mortal sin ; this depends, not

184 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

60S. — Ques. When is the thefts committed by wives, children
and servants, a grave mutter?

Ans. It is ad mitt d by everybody that more is necesary to
establish a grave matter in thefts by wives, children and servants,
than by strangers. . . .

More probably, the sum must be double ; but there is no general
rule indicated.

For servants, it depends also on the severity or liberality of
the masters, on the quality and nature of the stolen object ; for
instance, if it is eatable or not, kept under key or not ; according
to many authors, small thefts of food or beverage never become
mortal sins. . . .

560. — Ques. Can small thefts become a grave matter by their
totality ?

Ans. 1. Yes, absolutely, if it is a question of small thefts to
the injury of the same person. . . .

2. Yes, according to common opinion, if it is a question of
small thefts to the injury of different persons.

610. — Ques. Are small thefts united to form a whole, if they
are separated by a long interval of time?

Ans. 1. No, according to the common opinion ; because after
a certain lapse of time, small thefts are not supposed to unite, and
so, do not constitute a common object in morality. Besides, one
does not see grave prejudice done to the owner, not being aware
of it, and he is not supposed to be gravely opposed to it.

Ques. What is the time which must elapse between the thefts?

Ans. According to the more probable opinion, no more than
two months ; according to others, one year is necessary. . . .

6H. — Ques. When is there a grave matter in small thefts?

only on the stolen object considered in itself, but also on the condition
and need of the theft's victim, on the damage suffered by that person, etc.
So, a theft of ten francs' value, even to the prejudice of the richest, is
always a mortal sin ; but, relatively, to the poor, to workmen, to those who
have a competency, a theft of one, two, three, four or five francs, is also
a mortal sin.

Ques. Can several little thefts constitute a grave matter, sufficient
enough for a mortal sin?

Ans. Yes; and also when these little thefts are morally united, and a
notable damage results from them." — Petit Catechisme de Marotte.

Treatise on Justice and Itirjhte. 185

Ans. 1, If thoy take place at different intervals to the preju
dice of the same person, the matter will he grave when they con
stitute the half the sum necessary for a mortal sin.

2, If they take place to the prejudice of several, there is a
grave matter, in principle, when the stolen sum is twice as large.

QIK s. Does a retraction of the will prevent subsequent thefts
from uniting with the preceding ones?

Ans. 1, Yes, if the retraction has been efficacious, in other
words, if restitution has b .-en made for the first thefts ; because,
restitution being made, they do not exist any more.

2, Yes, even if the retraction has not yet bee,n efficacious, if
the second theft is done for a particular motive.

612. — Ques. Is it a grave sin to steal some small objects, after
having committed a theft liable to be considered grave?

Ans. Controversy. . . .

613. — Ques. Is it a grave sin to complete by a small theft the
grave matter commenced by other persons to the prejudice of the
same owner?

Ans. 1, No, if one is ignorant of the first theft; because, one
has no knowledge of the prejudice done to the owner.

2. No ; accordii'g to the more probable opinion, even if one
is aware of that prejudice, lut setting aside the case of con
spiracy. . . .

614. — Ques. If several persons, without agreeing with one
another, but induced by example, commit slight 'thefts, consti
tuting a grave totality, does each one sin gravely?

Ans. No ; according to the more probable opinion, from the
point of view of the prejudice done.*

*A11 that is summed up in a misterly manner by Trachala (1759) :
" Observe that it is a greater quantity of small thefts that are necessary
to constitute a mortal sin, when they fall on different persons, than when
one and the same person is the victim. Thus, says Lay maun, if there are
thirty merchants, from each one of whom you steal a small quantity, it
may happen that you do not sin mortally; because you are not doing
considerable wrong to any of them individually. In the second place,
if you steal from one or several persons, when the thefts are clo.te at
long intervals of time, a greater quantity is necessary to constitute a
mortal sin. So, when a servant steals each time one cent, which amounts
after four years to a golden ducat, I do not think, says he, that one
must look upon him as guilty of a mortal sin. In the third place, if you

186 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

ART. II. On causes excusing from theft.

There are two of them : 1, necessity ; 2, occult compensation.

SECTION 1. Necessity excusing from theft.

Necessity is extreme, grave, or common. Extreme, if there is
a danger of death, or threatening of a very serious evil ; grave,
when life is full of inconvenience ; common, as in the habitual
case of poor beggars.

616. — Man can, in a case of extreme need, use the property of
others, so far as it is necessary to get himself out of that posi
tion ; because there is here no derogation to natural rights when
one shares and 'takes for one's self what is necessary in a case of
absolute need. In this case, everything becomes common ; and
the one who takes the property of another in a case of need, takes
the common property, which he appropriates to himself, as this
took place before the division of property. Then he does not
commit any theft.

617. — . . . What is said of extreme need, may also be said of
very grave necessity.*

steal to-day from Caius six cents, him from whom you have already
stolen many times, but to whom you have made restitution, the last six
cents have no relation to the first ones, and consequently do not consti
tute a mortal sin. In the fourth place, when several persons commit,
successively several thefts from some one, which, taken together, doe>*
that person a considerable wrong, then, if each thief is ignorant of the
thefts of the others, no one sins grievously. It' they formed together the
same thieving project, each one of them sins grievously; finally, if
respectively they know of their thefts, but if no one of them should be
the cause of the theft of the other, it is more probable that there is 110
mortal sin committed." (Page 392.)

* The excusing of theft is also a very old Jesuitical doctrine. We read
in Pierre Alagon (1620): <-Is one permitted to steal on account of the
need in which he finds himself?

"lie is permitted, either secretly or openly, if he has no other moans
of providing for himself. It is neither theft nor rapine; because then,
according to natural rights, everything is in common. A third person
is al&o permitted furtively to take property and give it to some needful
person, as in the above case." (Page 357.)

Longuet: "When one man finds himstlf in such indigence, and an
other one in such affluence that the latter may be obliged to help the
former, the poor man can take secretly, in a right way, from the rich
one without sinning, or being obliged to mnke restitution." (Page 3G3.)

Doubtless it is to this way of stealing that Casm-di referred, when he
wrote the following obscure sentence : «'• God forbids stealing only when

Treatise on Justice and Rights. 187

G18. — Ques. May one take some of the property of another,
not only to help one's self, but also others.

Ans. Yes, according to the common opinion ; because, in a
way, one substitutes himself for the indigent, and shows by the
act that one loves his neighbor ay himself.

619. — In a case of extreme need, or nearly so, whatever may
be the cause of it, can we steal an object of great value, or a large
sum, if we are in need of it?

Ans. There are two opinions : the first one answers No ; the
second one, more probable and more common, answers Yes,
provided the rich one is not brought by that theft to an equal
needful situation, and the poor one takes only what he needs.*

STCTION 2. Secret compensation.

it is looked upon as bad in itself, but not when it is acknowledged good."
(Page3<58.)

Busembaum is clearer, and more complete: "One who is very poor
may take what is necessary for his maintenance, etc. ; and what a man
can do for himself, he can do also for another who is iu extreme
povertv "

])e Coninek, Lessius, Dicastill", Tambourin, add that "a poor man
could even kill one who would prevent him from taking the thing need
ful to him; as one can kill a thief who takes a\vay something of great
importance, or at least needful, or who retains them by violence."
(Page 385.)

Marotte culminates in an answer admirably laconic, the theory of
excusing theft, and of occult compensation :

Qnes. "Are we always guilty of theft when we take other's property?

Ans. "No; it may happen that the person from whom the property
is taken has not the right to oppose the theft. This takes place, for
instance, when the one who takes is in a state of extreme need, and
takes only what is necessary to get out of that state; or, when he takes
secretly from another by way of compensation, not being able otherwise
to get what is justly due him." — Petit Catechisme de Marotte.

* Besides, if those thefts were to result in quarrels and wars, we must
not be frightened about it, according to Busembaum : " It is more prob
able that a person cannot, in a case of extreme need, take a thing of great
value; for instance 3,000 crowns . . . ; as however, the contrary senti
ment is also probable, the indigent can, by holding this last sentiment as
probable for him in his situation and at the last moment, take even some
precious things, and the rich one could also oppose it by holding the
other opinion. From this it -vill not follow that the war declared would
he materially and absolutely just, but only a war formally just, and in
the supposition of two contrary opinions, being both probable, which
is without any inconvenience." (Page 385.)

188 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

620. — It consists in recovering a thing belonging to us by
taking something which is not our own.

621. — Seci\t compensation may be just and permissible, if it
presents the required conditions. . . .

622. — These conditions are the following: 1, that the debt is
certain ; . . . 2, that it cannot be recovered in any other way ;
... 3, that the thing must be recovered by taking natural prop
erty, if possible ; . . . 4, that a damage is not inflicted on the
debtor ; for instance, that he is not obliged to pay twice. . . .*

623. — Ques. Can servants, judging that they are not paid
enough, have recourse to secret compensation ?

Ans. No, in general ; because that proposition has been con
demned by Innocent XI. . . . Except, after manyf . . . 1, If

* There is absolutely nothing changed in the famous doctrine of occult
compensator!. Already, in 1601. Tolet said: "When someone takes what
is due him from another who is not willing to pay back; for instance, if
a person was taking from his debtor the sum owed him, he does not steal
in that case, and is not obliged to make restitution.

"He does not sin if lie observes certain conditions :

' The first one is, that he must be very sure that the sums are due to
him.

'•The second is, that he cannot easily obtain the payment by way of
justice; either because his debtor is a man of power, or that he can show,
no proof of the debt, or that he iears some harm from the debtor, or that
it may cause scandal.

"The third is, that no damage or scandal will result for others.

"The fourth is, he must take all possible precautions, so that the debtor
from whom he has already taken the amount of the debt, and so made
linn pay it in spite of himself, should not pay it a second time.

"The fifth is, he must take nothing more than what was owed him."
(page 849.)

J)e Lugo, who accepts that doctrine with all the Jesuits, has, besides,
found a very ingenious species, which allows him to ally the occult com
pensation with mental restriction : "If I know that you are not disposed
to pay me in one month, and that I cannot avoid the wrong you are doing
to me without anticipating you and taking what belongs to you in order
to defend myself, I can t*ike it, and there is nothing in this that exceeds
what I can do for the defense of my property ; because if I know that you
are to come tomorrow to steal one hundred pounds from me, who can 'say
that I cannot take as much from you to-day, to indemnify myself of the
wrong you are to do me to-morrow?

"From this, we conclude . . . that if the judge questions, and even
exacts the oath, from one who compensated himself, he can deny ; because
the sense of his oath is, that he has not taken or does not retain anything
unjustly, and in such a way as to oblige him to restitution." (page 3G1.)

t This beautiful maxim was familiar to the Jesuits of old. Thus*
Fernaud Rebelle says clearly : 'Tf, for a service rendered by a servant, a

Treatise on Justice and Hijhts. 189

under the pressure of need, the servant has accepted the low price,
in a time when the master coul 1 not have found anyone at the same
rate, or if he has not taken him through pity, the servant begging to
enter his service; 2, if the servant is overwhelmed with work that
he ought not to do.

Ques. Can a servant compensate himself, if he does more than
he ought to ?

Ans. Yes, if it is by the express or tacit will of the master
that he works excessively ; because one who works must be paid
in proportion to his work, by rights. . . . The value of this just
compensation may be left to the judgment of the servant, provided
he is prudent, careful, and distrustful of self, a thing which seldom
happens.

624. — Ques. Can we have recourse to secret compensations, if
we are condemned by judgment to pay a debt which we have not
contracted, or which we have already paid?

pecuniary salary was due him larger, according to the common estimation
of the ';ime when the contract between that servant and his master was
signed, and if lie could not recover it easily by rightful ways, in this case
lie will be permitted to subtract secretly, and without scandal, the surplus
over the lowest price owed legitimately."

S. de Lessau: "Servants, or others, do not sin by taking something,
presuming the master's consent; because they persuade themselves,
according to the light of reason, that t.ieir master will not be unjust."
(Page8«J3.)

The Jesuits had, at least one time, to repent of their teaching. In 1G47,
a man, Jean d'Alba, who was in their service, stole from them, pretending
they owed him, thirty pounds. Traduced before the Chatelet, he argued
from the teachings he had received from his masters, viz : "That a'per-
sou can pay himself for his wages." The judge, on the 4th of April, set,
him at liberty, with a simple admonition . (Page 360.)

After Innocent XL had condemned them, they were compelled to give
in ; but soon, however, they set about quibbling.

J. de Cardenas says: "The sovereign Pontiff, in this condemnation,
docs not speak of the rase in which it is clear as daylight that masters
commit an injustice, either by diminishing the salary 'that justice obliges
them to give, or by not paying the pri e agreed upon.

"In fact, in so evident a case of injustice, it is permitted to servants or
others, to get through justice the remainder of the salary due them; or,
if not possible, to take justice into their own hands, and use secret
compensation." (Page 306.)

And J. Taberna, while bowing respectfully, does not hesitate to write:
"The one who judges that he is not paid enough, may compensate himself
secretly, if he is justly sure that more is owed him." (Page 374.)

Is not this the very condemned proposition?

190 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ans. Yes ; because the ju Igtnent is unjust, being based on the
false presumption of a fact, and does not oblige in conscience. In
matters of right, we must always obey the judgment; unless tiie
law or the judgment should be evidently false.

However, it would be different, setting aside the scandal, if the
judge is certainly decided about a fact upon which he looks as
true ; moreover, the judge has not the power to change the prop
erty, and the one who gained the suit, after having discovered
the error, cannot keep that which has been paid over again to him.

625. — Ques. Is it a grave sin and against justice, to compen
sate one's self, without first having recourse to the judge?

Ans. 1. No, not against justice, in principle, provided one
takes nothing more thaa what is owed ; and so, one is not under
obligation to m ike restitution. The reason is that, after this
compensation, equality is re-established. I have said, in principle ;
because a prejudice on the subject of a thing determined might
result to the debtor.

2. In general, there is no grave sin ; because no scandal results
from it ordinaril}', nor any grave disorder for the State.

3. There is no sin, if it is difficult to have recourse to the
judge, if there is danger of scandal, or extraordinary expenses,
etc. ; because then the recourse is morally impossible.

THIRD PART.
ON RESTITUTION
SECTION 1. Restitution in general.

CHAPTER I.

OBLIGATORY RESTITUTION.

Restitution consists, so far as tho name is concerned, in replacing
n tiling in its first state ; its object is, t ) repair the wrong done lo
others' property.

Treatise on Justice and Rights. 191

626. — Restitution for itself, or at least in the desire, is abso
lutely necessary to salvation, in principle, if it is a a question of a
grave matter. . . .

Ques. Can we make restitution with a different kind of prop
erty ?

Ans. No, according to the more probable opinion ; because
there is no comparison between properties of a different order, and
no compensation can then be given. One could never arithmeti
cally compute what ought to be restored, there being no common
measure between properties of different orders. . . .

However, by vindictive justice, it may happen that a judge or a
superior requires that, for an injury to a certain property, one should
give something of a different kind ; but according to the more
probable opinion, this is a penalt}*, and not justice. Besides, the
wronged person has the right to denounce his offender, and to
receive money for not denouncing him ; for instance, a violated
woman can traduce before the Court the gu:lty person, or exact
money from him in order to renounce her rights. . . .

631. — Ques. Is a thief, having stolen a large sum of money,
obliged, under heavy penalty, to make restitution of the whole sum?

Ans. No, he must restore only what constitutes a grave matter ;
because after this, the amount retained is no more a grave matter.
One may be obliged, under heavy penalty, tj restore a slight mat
ter, but the obligation does not come from the slightness of the
thing, but from the grave quantity. . . .

CHAPTER II.

THE ROOTS OF RESTITUTION.

633. — They are the causes for which one is obliged to mako
restitution. They have a treble origin : 1, the acceptance of an
other's property ; 2, for a wrong unjustly done ; 3, for an unjust
co-operation. The last can be assimilated with either of the pre-
ceeding ones ; but it shall be treated by itself, in order to establish
a greater distinction between what is lo be said about each one.

192 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

ART. I. The acceptance of another's property. . . •
SECTION I. The owner in good faith. . . .
SECTION II. The owner in bad faith. . . .

646. — Qaes. Must a thief make restitution for having stolen a
thing which would have been lost anyhow ?

Ans. Yes, deducting however the expenses and the price of the
work done to save it ; because, though being in peril, that thing
had not ceased to belong to its master.

Except, according to many, by the probable opinion, if the thief
consumes the thing in peril ; for instance, some food or drink, which
were going to be destroyed in a fire ; because the thing unsaved
would be of no more value to the master.

Several extend this exception to the case in which the property
snatched from peril is consu ned right off; for instance, if one takes
wine which is going to fall i;ito the possession of the enemy, and
drinks it among the family and friends.

647. — 'Ques. Is a tliief obliged to make restitution if the stolen
thing is lost in his own house?

Ans. 1. Yes, absolutely. . . .

3. No, if the property would have been lost as its master's, in
the same time and in the same case, by some intrinsic d f ect ;
because there is then no prejudice to the owner. According to
the more probable opinion, it would be the same case, if the prop
erty came to be lost in the same tim.3 and was exp >sed totliesame
danger as when in the thief's possession ; for instance, in the same
fire, or public calamity. The reason is, that the theft has not been
the cause of the damage, the thing being fated to be lost in the
same way and at the same moment.

By the French and Roman code, in whatever way the tiling is
lost when in the hands of the dishonest possessor, the latter is
obliged to make restitution ; but it does not seem that he should
be obliged to do it before a judgment ; unless, by natural rights,
he is evidently under the obligation to do it. ...

649. — Must a thief, besides the capital, restore also the interest?

Treatise on Justice and Rights. 1.03

Ans. Yes, if he is sure, or if it is presumable that the possessor
would have madv3 that gain ; because he must be in lemnified. It
is different, according to the probable opinion, if one is not sure
of it. ...

SECTION 3. The owner of doubtful fai.h. . .

ART. II. Unprofitable Wrong-doing.

657. — This is doing wrong to others, injuring the property of
others, without any profit to -one's self by the act.

In this act, there are two f unite : the theological fault, which
includes an offence towards God, in other words, which contains a
formal sin, mortal or venial; and the judicial one, which consists
in negligence, the cause of the wrong, whether it is formal sin or
not. . . .

658. — I. The author of the injury must restore: 1, the entire
equivalent of the wrong done ; for instance, if lie has set fire to a
house, the value of the house; 2, the full equivalent of the dam
age foreseen, besides the prejudice caused. . . .

659. — II. Three conditions are required in order that the pre
judicial act should compel restitution : that it is unjust; that it is
the efficacious cause of the damage ; and that it should be theologi
cally condemnable, in other words, that it should be unjust ; in a
manner true, efficacious, formal. . . .

660. — A cause only occasional of prejudice, is not sufficient to
compel to restitution ; because it is not an efficacious cause, but
only the occasion of an efficacious cause. Thus, if, on the occa
sion of a theft committed by yourself, another is accused and
condemned, you are not obliged to make reparation for that wrong.

661. — Ques. Is a theologic.il fault sufficient to oblige to resti
tution for a wrong caused to another by detaining his property, by
virtue of a contract, for instance, a lease, a deposit?

Ans. The opinion which seems more probable absolutely
affirms it. ...

662. — Ques. Is a theological fault sufficient to oblige to restitu
tion for the wrong done to another in fulfilling the duties of one's
charge, as in the execution of a quasi-contract ; for instance, if a
physician gives by mistake an injurious potion to his patient?

194 The Doctrine nf the Jesuits.

Ans. Yes, according to the more probable opinion. . . .

GG3. — Ques. If, doing some forbidden work, we cause an injury
accident!}7, are we obliged to make reparation for that injury?

Ans. No, bi cause that injury is not voluntary, not having been
foreseen. NO matter if the act is illicit, justice has nothing to do
with it. If an ecclesiastic, in hunting, in spite of the church's de
fence, kills a man instead of a beast, he is no more reprehensible
than a layman. And even the prejudice caused hy accident must
not be repaired, though it results from an unjust action, it having
no relation to it. So, we owe no reparation if we kilted Titius,
not seen by us and not known to be there, instead of Caius, the one
we wished to kill.

G64. — Ques. Are we obliged to make reparation for the wrong
done by mistake, wishing to injure another ; for instance, by set
ting fire to Caius' house, mistaking it for that of Tit'us?

Ans. Yes, seerns the right answer ; because the three conditions
required for restitution are here. Do not say that your action
was not unjust, relatively, to Caius, because you wanted to destroy
a determined thing. Now, by destroying it, you impose on your
self the obligation to compensate for the dam-ige. No matter to
whom it belongs ; the question is not about the name, but about
the object. Some deny it, however, (St. Alphonse, l<ngo,
Lacroix) because the act has not been voluntarily perpetuated
towards the wronged person, coming from an involuntary ignor
ance of right. This reason seems to have but little value.

665. — Ques. What is the case of one having caused a grave
prejudice through a slight fault ; for instance, through careless
ness ?

Ans. He is liable for nothing, according to the more probable
opinion. He cannot, in fact, be under obligation of a grave
penalty ; because a grave penalty would not be in proportion to a
slight fault ; nor under a light penalty, because a light obligation
is not in proportion with something of gravity. . . .

666. — Ques. If one thinks, by unconquerable error, that the
prejudice caused is much more considerable than it really is, are
we under obligation to restore the whole, if later, the true
value is known ; for instance, if we throw into the sea a precious

Treatise on Justice and Rights. 1 95

stone worth a hundred francs, thinking it is worth only ten
francs?

Ans. According to the prob.ible opinion, we must mfike repar
ation only for th.it which one thought to destroy ; because, what
is ignored in an invincible manner, is not supposed to be a wrong
willingly done.

667. — Ques. Must a master make reparation for the damage
caused by his animals?

Ans. 1. Yes, if by theological fault he has neglected to look
after his animals. Because, every one, by natural right, ought to
watch and prevent them from damaging another's property.

2. But if there is no theological fault, he is not obliged to do
so before a judgment.

Ques. Ought we to make restitution if, showing bad example,
we induce others to wrong doing, having foreseen the evil?

Ans. The more probable opinion denies it, because example is
not the cause, but the pure occasion of the wrong. Because the
bad action does not tend, in principle, to excite others to imitate
it. Then the others determine themselves to commit the evil
deeds. . . .

668. — Ques. 1. If we are in doubt that we have been ourselves
the cause of the prejudice, is restitution obligatory?

Ans. 1. If the existence of the prejudice is doubtful, more
probably there is no obligation.

2. If the influence of the action over the evil done is doubtful,
there is controversy, and two probable opinions. . . .

669. — Ques. Must we make reparation for the wrong done to
some one, occasioned by an unjust action of our own; for
instance, if you had stolen something and he should be accused of
the theft?

Ans. 1. No, certainly, if the wrong has not been foreseen.

2. No, according to the more probable opinion, even if it has
been foreseen ; because your action, done with the only prevision
of the wrong done, is not the cause, in principle, but only by
accident.

3. No, according to the probable opinion, even if you have
done so with the intention that he should be accused of it ;

196 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

because that action is only the accidental, not the original cause of
the wrong, since it had no dlicacious influence on it, by its
nature. . . .

C 72. —Case I. Didacus places in a corner of his house, where
nobody was to pass, a very precious vase, belonging to Cains,
expecting to put it the next morning in a safer place. But
Bazile, entering during the night without any light, knocks the
vase down and breaks it. Quid juris? — Ans : Neither Didacus
nor Bazile are to be held for reparation ; because there is no
theological fault from them ; neither thought of harm or danger.
They would not be under obligation even if they had thought of a
remote danger ; because, in matters of morals, we must not mind
pure possibility.

Case II. Quirinus, wanting to steal some cloth, enters a store
during the night and lights a candle, taking good care, however,
to prevent a fire ; but a cat upsets the candle, which, falling on
straw, sets it on fire, and the house is burned ; the thief runs away
and escapes.— What is to be thought of Quirinus' case?

He is under no obligation to make restitution ; because he has
not foreseen the danger. He is not even obliged to pay for the
clothes he wished to steal, even had he ran away with the goods;
because the damage is involuntary, since the fact of stealing the
cloth is not the cause of the damage, and the fact of carrying the
candle does not induce the danger of fire, when reasonable pre
cautions are taken.

Case III. Pomponius, blinded by revenge and not being seen
by anyone, shoots at Maurus' goat, quietly browsing; but he
misses it, and instead, kills Mairus' cow, resting behind a hedge.
What of this case? He owes nothing. Nothing for the goat,
having missed it ; nor for the cow, not foreseeing the misfortune.
—Quid, If the cow had belonged to the same master? The diffi
culty is increasing, the aggressor truly striving to wrong the
person ; because, though he does not destroy the animal he had in
mind to kill, as in principle he seeks to injure his enemy, his
action causes him a formal prejudice. However rigorously, in prin
ciple, he may be excused, according to the more probable opinion,
if he has not at all foreseen that evil, not even confusedly, one

Treatise on Justice and Rights, 197

can pay that it happened purely through accident, and the inten
tion to do injury t.> some man d jes not make the prejudice caused
on the subject of a thing unknown become voluntary.

Case IV. Babin, by dint of prayers and flattery, but without
having recourse to any knavish tricks, prevails over Roger, on hU
death- bed, to tear up a will m ida in favor of Paul, in order that
he (Babin), or some relations of his, should become the heir.
Now, Babin not only does this for his own or his friend's advan
tage, but also from hate for Paul. — Qucs. Is he guilty of
injustice? — Ans. Not at all; because, though he has sinned
gravely against charity, he did no violence or injustice, not having
violated any strict rights of Roger. So would it be for the one
who, through hate, would have prevailed on Roger to change his
mind and make his will in favor of another one than Paul, *or
choose another heir in his stead.

ART. III. On unjust co-operation.

SECTION 1. One who orders evil.

673. — He must make reparation for all the wrong he com
manded to do : it would be different, if he had only approved of
the evil done in his name. . . .

674. — Ques. Must the one who gives the order make repara
tion, if he changed his idea before the prejudice has been caused?

Ans. No, if the proxy knew of it before the execution of the
mandate; it would be different if he did not know of it, or if it
curne too late to his knowledge ; because, in the first case, the one
who gave the order did not have any influence on the evil, whilst
in the second case he had some.

Ques. Must the one who gives the order make reparation for
the injustice which the proxy caused to another by an invincible
error ?

Aris. No, because the true cause of the prejudice is the error
of the proxy. This is the common opinion, unless it proceeds
from the nature of the prejudicial action itself, or from its neces
sary results, so that he has been forced into an error which he
could scarcely foresee ; then the one who gave the order has been
the cause of the error, and the prejudice resulting from it. . , .

198 T/te Doctrine of the Jesuits.

SECTION 2. One who advises evil.

G76. — . . . The counsellor is not obliged to make restitution,
if tlie author of the evil would have caused the prejudice in the
same manner without his advice ; because that advice has not
been efficacious for the prejudice.* . . .

678. — Is the one who only advises the means of injuring an
other obliged to make reparation?

Ans. No, if the means are purely accidental, such are, gener
ally, the circumstances of time, place, and manner.

Ques. Ought one to make reparation, if he advises that the
injury be done more quickly?

Ans. No, if it is certain that the other was determined to do
wrong. f

SECTION 3. The one who gives consent.

G81. — He must make reparation for each time he hns given,
knowingly and freely, his consent or advice, from which directly
resulted the wrong done to another ; in other words, ever}* time he
gives an efficacious consent causing prejudice to others. If his
consent was not efficacious, he could not be held to make repara
tion, having given his consent to the evil in an affective, and not
effective manner. . . .

SECTION 4. The flatterer. . . .

* Escobar: "Can you advise Antonio, getting ready to steal some
wheat, to steal rather, through friendship for you, a sum of money, be
cause you desire to buy that wheat from Antonio? or could you advise
somebody who wishes to steal something from Peter, or from John, not
being decided to steal from one rattier than from the other, to steal from
Peter, because John is your friend? . . .

" I believe more probably that such a counsellor, would not be obliged
to make restitution, — such is Sanchez's opinion." (Page 365),

t Trachala : "You ask me if you are obliged to make restitution in a
case in which some one, being disposed to commit a theft, receives en
couragement from you, by advice or exhortation, to commit that crime
with more promptness and ease?

I answer negatively, with probability.

But what would have been the answer if you had been only the material
cause of the damage? For instance, if you had held the ladder while the
thief was stealing, though lie could have gone up the ladder just the same
if you had not held it. I answer, that you are under no obligation. It is
also the opinion of Lay maim." (Page o91.)

Treatise on Justice and Rights. 190

SECTION 5. The receiver of stolen goods. . . .
SECTION 6. The participator.

There are two kinds : the one participates in the plunder ; the
other, in the guilty act which procures it.

686. — The first one must restore what he has received and what
Le detains.

The second one, who co-operates with others, in a mediate or an
immediate manner to do the evil, must restore, in general, every
time that his co-operation has had a real influence on the sub
stance of the prejudice. . . .

687. — Qius. .In the matter of justice, does one permit, and
at what moment, an immediate co-operation to the prejudice?

Ans. . . . For temporal fortunes, three cases are admitted, in
which, in consequence of a giave fear, co-operation is permitted ;
because the owner is not supposed to oppose it reasonably : 1, if
the co-operator can and will make reparation for the prejudice ;
2, if the grave prejudice would have been caused just the same
by the principal author without that co-operation ; 3, if the loss
is slight for the owner, wLo, by charity, ought to surfer it will
ingly. . . .

SECTION 7. Those who keep silent, make no opposition, do not
divulge ; or, negative co-operators.

692. — Ques. Must a superior make reparation for the wrong
done by his inferiors?

Ans. 1, Outwardly: Yes, after the Roman and French codes.

2, Inwardly : 1, Yes, if the silence of the superior is the equiva
lent of a tacit advice; 2, No, if there is no theological fault; 3,
No, according to the probable opinion, although he has sinned
gravely by not preventing the wrong, if his silence had no in
fluence, above all when it is a question of wrong done to others
than to his inferiors.

693. — Ques. Is restitution obligatory if one receives monev
from a thief to keep silent, when duty does not command him to
call fur hel?

2jOO The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ans. No, according to the more probable opinion, at least in
principle ; because justice does not oblige you to call for help.
Likewise, if they give or promise some gift to keep you quiet.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF RESTITUTION.
AKT. I. How much it is necessary to restore.

694. — The quantity to be restored must be measured by the
quantity of the stolen object, of the wrong committed, or of the
influence on the wrong caused to others. . . .

695. — Any co-operator concurring in an efficacious manner in
the wrong done, so that one could morally impute to him all the
evil, must make restitution for the whole.

696. — Ques. Is one obliged to make restitution for all when
the co-operation has influence on the individual wrong, but is not
sufficient or necessary, or does not come from a direct plot; for
instance, if four carry away a beam which three might have
carried ?

Ans. No, because the only reason for the obligation is the
influence on the wrong act.

,697. — Ques. Are you obliged to restore the whole, if your
action has been sufficient to cause till the prejudice, but not at all
necessary, nor coming from a plot? For instance: if you and
several others set fire to a house at the same time?

Ans. There is controversy : yes, according to the probable
opinion, and even more probable, of many ; no, according to the
probable opinion of others. . . . St. Liguori finds both opinions
probable.

ART. II. To whom is it necessary to make restitution? . . .
ART. III. In what order is it necessary to make restitution?

That order may be considered either in rela ion to those who
miist restore, if several have co-operated ; or relatively to those to
whom the restitution must be made. . . .

Treatise on Justice and Rights. 201

703. — . . . The one who advises and the one wlio consents,
are not obliged, in principle, to restore before the one who exe
cutes : this one is the first to make restitution ; because, outside of
the one who gave the order, he is the p inc'pal cause of the preju
dice. . . .

ART. IV. How is the restitution to be made ? . . .

708. We may say, in general, that it is necessary and sufficient
if the restitution be made in such a way that .justice shall be satis
fied and the injured party indemnified. . . .

ART. V. When is the restitution to be made?

713. — As for the things owed, they must be restored as soon as
possible without any great inconvenience. . . .

CHAPTER IV.
CASES WHICH EXEMPT FROM RESTITUTION.

715. — Excuse for a time : 1, physical powerlessness, or impossi
bility of all sorts, which hnppen in extreme or even very grave neces
sity to the debtor or to his family ; 2, moral powerlessness, or grave
difficulty to make the restitution, when it cannot be done without
great inconvenience ; for instance, without losing a situation justly
acquired; because then, there is a true impossibility to make resti
tution : since, in moral things, we call impossible what is difficult,
and that which cannot be done decently and honorably. Thus, if
a man of the nobility cannot restore without depriving himself of
his servants, horses, arms ; or one of the first citizens, without
taking a manual trade to which he is not accustomed, they may
postpone the restitution, and pay little by little what they owe.*

*Marotte, in his "Petit ChatecMsme," reproduces, for the use of little
children, these dangerous distinctions, all in favor of the thieves :

Ques. "What are the causes which permit one to postpone restitution?

Ans. "These causes are : 1 , physical powerlessness ; in other words, the
condition of the debtor, who is in extreme need; 2, moral powerlessness,
in other words, the situation in which the debtor could not make re->titu-
tion without notably falling from a position justly acquired, without
plunging himself and family ill to poverty, or exposing himself to the danger
of losing his reputation."

202 The Doctrine of the Jwuits.

716. — Excusing forever; . . . remittance of the debt, . . •
compensation ; . . . thirty years' prescription.

718. — Ques. Could some one, overwhelmed with debt, enter a
monastery ; and has he got rid of his debts, once he has entered it?

Ans. 1. No, if the payment can be promptly effected. It
would be different, according to the more probable opinion, in
principle, if a notable time must elapse. However, if the debt-*
are considerable, such an instance, though valid, is forbidden by
the Canon Law.

2. The Church is not obliged to pay those debts out of her
own property. A monk is obliged to pay his debts out of the
property he had before his entrance into religion ; or out of what
he inherits by will, if he took only simple vows. It would be
different, if he had taken solemn vows. . . .

722. — Ques. Does a reasonably presumed allowance excuse
from all restitution ?

Acs. Yes, at least, according to the more probable opinion;
because, to detain the property of others, or not to make restitu
tion for it, is an unjust action only if it is against the will of the
owner.* The allowance does not occur in spite of him, if it is
done by his permission reasonably presumed. But it is necessary
to guard against abuse, in order to prevent great injustice.

SECTION II. Different kinds of restitution.

CHAPTER I.

RESTITUTION FOR INJURY DONE TO THE WELFARE OF THE SOUL.

In his Cours Complet, he imagines anew cause, not lacking in originality :
"Another legitimate cause for 'postponing restitution, is when one foresees
that the creditor will make an abuse of it for his own harm, or to the
detriment of another."

What a touching solicitude of the thief for the interest and salvation of
his victim !

* "It is not a mortal sin to take secretly from some one what he would
give if it was asked of him, though he 'does not wish it to be taken in
secret j and it is not liable to restitution." — Emm. Sa.

Treatise on Justice and RiyJtts. 203

CHAPTER II.

RESTITUTION FOR INJURY TO THE BODY.
ART. I. Restitution for homicide.

725. — Homicides (those who have wounded somebody), and
their heirs, must make restitution to the mutilated or wounded
ones, for all loss resulting from that mutilation or homicide before
his death. But, according to the more probable opinion, they
ought to compensate nothing for life or limbs ; because, in strict
rights, those things cannot be subject to any estimation.*

If the person died before, the restitution must be made to his
heirs ; or, if there are none, to the poor. . . .

726. — Ques. Is a homicide obliged to make res'itution to the
wife and children of his victim, even for future prejudice, if they
can shift for themselves?

Ans. There is controversy. The more common opinion says
Yes ; t':e probable opinion says No.

Qties. Must we pay something to the creditors of one's victim?

Aus. No, according to the more probable opinion ; though the
murderer should have foreseen it, provided he has had, direc'lv,
no intention of wronging them, since this wrong is but an acci
dental consequence. . . .

Ques. Must one who kills another in a duel make reparation ?

Ans. No, according to the more probable opinion, no matter
whether he is the provoker or the provoked one. . . .

ART. II. Restitution for rape and fornication.

728. — For a purely natural injury — for the destroying of the
body's integrity — for having caused the loss of purhy, restitution
is not obligatory, at least, according to the more probable
opinion ; because such injury cannot be compensated with money.

729. — Ques. Must the ravisher marry the young girl he violated
under promise of marriage?

* It is in deduction of these principles that, in the opinion of Lacroix,
Casuists agree that: " The one who killed a man who was soon to die a
natural or justly deserved death, is not obliged to make restitution, since
he is not supposed to have done any great damage." (Page 368. )

204 The Doctrine of (he Jesuits.

Ans. The first opinion affirms it. ...

The second, followed by a very few, denies it.

The first is common, and must be followed ; however, it admits
several exceptions discussed by St. Liguori. Thus, there will bo
exemption : if sorry consequences from that marriage are appre
hended ; if a great dishonor results for the family from the differ
ence of condition, etc. But then, one is obliged to give a dowry
to the girl.

Ques. Does the ravir-her owe something to the girl's parents, if
she freely consented to the act ?

Ans. No, according to the more probable opinion ; because
none of their strict rights have been violated, and they cannot
prevent their daughter from giving up her right, relatively, to
temporal injury.* . . .

ART. II. Restitution for adultery.

The obligations of both adulterers ought to be examined accord
ing to different circumstances, as to whether the adultery has been
fully voluntary in bot'i participants, or not ; and if it has caused
injury to the family, or not. . . .

732. — Ques. Is a woman obliged to reveal her crime, if there
is no oilier way of repairing the evil?

Ans. No, in gem ral. . . .

733. — Ques. What is to be done when there is doubt if the
child is legitimate, or illegitimate ; or if he proceeds from this
adultery, or from another one?

Ans. According to the more probable opinion, adulterers are
under no obligation ; because they have no knowledge of the
injury caused. Other say, that reparation must be mado propor
tionally. . . .

Ques. Must a son believe his mother, who tells him, under
oath, that he is illegitimate?

Ans. No, because, by right and common sense, no one is

*Ques. ''What is to be expected as a restitution from one who has
caused the defloration of a virgin ?

Ans. "If the girl lias consented, nothing but to do penance; because
she had the right to concede the use of her body, and the parents cauuot
prevent it."— F. X. Eegeli, 1750, (Page 204.)

Twatise on Justice and Rir/lits. 205

obliged to believe one witness, even if there is no doubt whatever
of his good faith. . . .

734. — Ques. If the children of rich adulterers or fornicators
are sent to the House of Refuge, must they pay for their ex
penses?

Ans. There is controversy. The first opinion, more probable
and more common, affirms it. The second one denies it. ...

CHAPTER III.

ON RESTITUTION FOR THE INJURY CAUSED TO TEMPORAL
FORTUNE IN PARTICULAR CASES.

ART. I. Of Taxes.

736. — Subjects pay an income-tax, out of their own properties,
to the government or sovereign, to cover the public expenses
of the St'ite.

There is the direct tax, and the indirect one. . . .

737. — 1. The action of establishing the income-tax is incum
bent on the legitimate and supreme authority ; which alone has
the right to exact from the citizens what is necessary to the
public good.

2. The sovereign has the right to establish taxes ; because his
power extends to everything relative to t.ie public good. . . .

4. Laws relating to taxes, considered in general, are not
purely penal, but oblige in conscience. . . .

738. — Ques. Must one constrain the people to pay indirect
taxes, and compel restitution for frauds committed?

Ans. The solution is difficult.

744. — Ques. Is it a sin, and is reparation obligatory, if one
imports prohibited goods?

Ans. 1. As for the restitution, no, absolutely; because no
strict rights are violated, neither the sovereign's rights who did
not reserve these goods, ncr impose duty on them, nor any par
ticular rights, nobody having the privilege to sell them.

2. As for the sin, there is controversy. . . .

206 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

ART. II. Of injury caused on the occasion of military service.

747 — Ques. Under what obligation are refractory conscripts?

Ans. 1. By obedience, or legal justice, they must join their
corps. Except: 1, if there was a grave danger for their salva
tion ; for instance, if they had not the facility of confessing, as
it happens in some pi ces ; 2, if, when reintegrated, they were
going to suffer the penalty of death, imprisonment, or some other
grave penalty ; 3, if the war is evidently unjust.

2. Deserters are under no obligation to make restitution, if
the law takes nobody in their place ; because th<-y do not wrong
commutative justice, since they do wrong to no one.

749. — Ques. Under what obligation are conscripts who run
away, or obtain exemption under false pretence?

Ans. If the law does not fill their places, they sin against
legal justice, but they owe no reparation ; but if the law takes
somebody :

1 . Those who bribe magistrates or doctors, in order to be declared
improper for service, must make reparation.

2. And also, according to the more common opinion, those who
deceive magistrates with lies, frauds or deliberate mutilations done
beforehand.

However, several authors, whose opinion seems probable enough,
deny it ; because these conscripts are not the efficacious cause of
the departure of others, their dupery inducing neither physically
nor morally the magistrates to take others. . . .

ART. III. On confiscation of property in the revolutions in
France.

SECTION I. Ecclesiastical property.

750.— The Church's property has been pillaged (direspta), some
by the governments, some by individuals. . . .

751. — Those, who have usurped the Church's property, have
committed a grave sin, if they did it of their own authority, and
are obliged to restore it ; for they are thieves, and have never been
pardoned. . . .

SECTION II. Individual property.

Treatise on Justice and Riyhts. 207

752. — The property of emigrants, unjustly expelled, has, like the
Church's property, been confiscated by the State and by individu
als. . . .

753. — Individuals who, of their own authority, have confiscated
this property, are under obligation to make restitution, and cannot
invoke prescription, since they have been possessors in bad faith.

of Conscience on Susttce antt

Ox PATRIMONY.

CASE I.
OF THE PROPERTY OF CHILDREN.

Leopold, a merchant's son, after the death of his father,
remains in the paternal home, and conducts business so skilfully,
that in eight years lie gains two thousand pounds. At this time
his mother dies without making a will, and he wants the largest
part of the fortune. But two young and invalid sisters of his, who
had gained nothing themselves, object to his greed, and ask for
an equal share ; as, by the law, when there is no will, the rights of
children are equal. Leopold, having protested in vain, keeps
secretly for himself an important sum of money he had in his pos
session.

Ques. Is Leopold right in coveting the greatest part of the
inheritance ; and, after the refusal of his sisters, can he justly
compensate himself?

Ans. Natural right commands that Leopold can demand the
greatest part of the money he gained himself, for this seems con
formable to equity; because that enormous gain realized does not
proceed only from the money belonging to the family, but from
the particular skill and extraordinary work of Leopold, and not
from the sisters. Besides, the aasociation of brother and sisters,
at their father's death, relative to the paternal inheritance, left
intact in order to continue the business, seems to be likened to a
contract of commercial association. Then, it is equitable that the
one who, in the contract, brings more money and work, should
also have a larger part in the profit. Then, Leopold, having
brought not only a larger turn, but also more work and skill,

Cases of Conscience on Justice and Right. 209

should have a larger share in the gain in question ; for, although
civil law does nut make any difference in such a case, at least it
seems to authorize a certain compensation, in proportion to the
unpaid extraordinary work of one of fie associates, as estimated
by an honest third party. Then, Leopold can ask a compensation
from his sisters. Now, if he has evidently a right to a compensa
tion, rigorously he can procure it ; secretly, if he has no other way
of claiming it.

CASE II.
OF THE PROPERTY OF CHILDREN.

Marius, a wine-merchant's son, is sent by his father, an aged
man, to many places, to buy wines. But Marius, a clever man,
buys at a very low price, and makes his father believe that he has
paid a good deal more for it. So, with the gain thus realized,
and also with the economies he made in his travels, he buys a
barrel of wine on his own account, which he sells secretly on his
return, and realizes a profit of fifty pounds.

Ques. Is Marius obliged to make restitution for that money, or
part of it?

Ans. 1. Marius is under obligation to restore the money he
made by deceiving his father on the price of the wine ; because in
no way can he keep it justly ; for, if he had the luck to buy at a
low rate, being his father's representative, he owes him the benefit
of it, being already paid to make the business prosperous ; except
the case in which he would have shown an extraordinary amount
of work and skill.

He is not obliged to give back the money he made by economy ;
because his father owes him an honorable living proportionate to
his condition. But if he saved something on it, and took better
care of his purse than his stomach, his father cannot reasonably
find fault with it. For, if a merchant's son, for instance, meets
along the way a traveling companion willing to pay for his
expenses, lie is not obliged to give back to his master the money
he would have had to spend for general expenses. Then, even
so, a son of a good family is not obliged to remit to his father the
money he saved by living with economy.

The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

3. He is not obliged to give bick the fifty pounds. . . .

CASE VI.
OF OCCUPATION.

Fortunatus, after the taking and pillage of a city by the soldiers,
buys for a sonsj from one of them a lot of clothing. But
later, looking at them carefully, he finds a considerable sum ot'
money sewed up in the lining of a oat; attributing this Incky
discovery to the goodness of Providence, he keeps it without any
remorse of conscience.

Ques. Can Fortunatus keep the money found in the coat ; or
must he give it back to the soldier, or to the owner, if he knows
him?

Ans. 1. Fortunatus is not obliged to give the money back to
the soldier ; because even if the latter has justly acquired the
clothing, for instance, in a just war, he has not acquired the po-»-
session of the money hidden in them, and it has no relation with
their price; since the soldier, being ignorant of its existence, can
not pretend to the possession of the money. Now, what you
fgnore you do not desire, nor consequently possess. 2. If he
should find the true possessor, he ought to give him back the
money ; for the owner has never renounced the possession of his
property. The soldier's booty exists rather in practice than in
principle, and does not include the hidden money, and it is not
opposed to the civil possession by the first master. However, one
would not be obliged to give back the money even to the proprie
tor, were he known, if the coat had been taken in a jiibt war;
because, in this case, the possession having been acquired through
the enemy was not an unjust one.

CASE VIII.
OF OCCUPATION.

The hunter Attilius kills a hare in Caius' open field. The pro
prietor, present by chance, prevents the hunter from carrying away
his game, and takes it himself, and disposes of it with his friends.

Ques. To tvhom belongs the game?

Cases of Conscience on Justice and Hicjld. 211

Ans. The game belongs to the huntsman who acquired, by
killing, the property of it, although he took it in an illicit manner,
without the owner's permission. Then the latter acted unjustly by
taking and eating the game ; for it was not a production of his
field, and he must restore the value of it. His permission was
necessary, but it was his duty to give it ; and if Attilius has
caused some damage in Caius' field, he must indemnify him.

CASE XII.
OP THINGS.

Gaudentius learns that a treasure is hidden in a certain field ; lie
buys it at the ordinary rate, digs in the earth, and, O happiness !
he discovers the treasure, and keeps the whole of it for himself.

Ques. Did Gaudentius act unjustly in buying the field at the
ordinary price, though he presumed, and even was certain, that a
treasure was hidden in it ?

Ans. Gaudentius can keep the treasure, because, in realitv, ho
found it in his own field; and he was not obliged to pay more
for it, because the treasure is not assimilated to any production of
the field. Do not object the presumption, nor even the certainty
of the thing, because this is quite accidental, and does not cause
any injury to the seller ; just as an apothecary need not pay more
for a load of hay because some medicinal plants are in it.

CASE XVII.
OF THE PRESCRIPTION.

1. Sylvain has, for nine years, enjoyed the half of a field,
through inheritance ; the field belonging to two masters, Peter
and Paul.

Peter discovers, looking over some documents, that he has a
right to a part of the field, claims and obtains it before justice.
Six months later, Paul claims it also ; but he is opposed by a
right of prescription.

2. Hippolyte occupies, in good faith, a house belonging to two
brothers, John and Jacob. After nine years, John claims posses
sion with a document altered with erasure, but obtains nothing

212 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ten years later, by a lucky chance, Jacob discovers the authcn-
tical document without erasure, which proves the validity of the
deed. Immediately he claims the house ; but Hippolyte opposes
the prescription.

3. Medard possesses in good faith, for nine years, a field,
which he gives to his heir Gustave, when he is at the point of
death. Two years later, Victorin proves that the field belongs
to him, and claims it. Gustave refuses to give it back, invoking
the prescription.

Ques. 1. Is Sylvain's prescription valid, in the first case?

2. What of Ilippolyte's in the second?

3. And Gustave's in the third?

Ans. Question 1. That depends: if the right of both masters
is founded on the same common deed, Sylvain cannot oppose
prescription, because his bad faith ought to be proved in judg
ment. But if they have two different deeds, it may happen that
Sylvain is in good faith, and opposes prescription.

Ans. Question 2. Hippolyte is right in opposing prescription,
for, in principle, his possession has not been interrupted ; because,
although there has been a suit at law, the adversary has lost it.
Add to this, that the uuthentical document brought in by Jacob
has been found too late, the time fixed by prescription being
elapsed.

Ans. Question 3. The prescription of the heir Gustave is
valid, because it continues and completes the legal time, which
commenced with the first possession.

Such would be the case also if Gustave had acquired his field
by a deed of sale ; for one may add together the time of the
different possessors in order to have prescription, provided all
were in good faith iii detaining it.

Cases of Conscience on Injustice ' antr Efjcft

SECRET COMPENSATION.

CASE I.
THE GRAVITY OF THEFT.

Nestor, in his passion for stealing, takes advantage of every
occasion, and, tempted by the devil, steals either from the rich or
from the poor, three, four, five, or six francs. One day he takes
twelve francs from a very rich prince ; but, a little after, having
heard an eloquent sermon, he makes a sincere confession, and
asks if he has sinned grievously in each case.

Ques. 1. When is there a grave matter in a theft?

Ques. 2. Did Nestor sin gravely in these cases, especially by
stealing twelve francs from a prince?

Aus. Question 1. According to the common opinion, the mat
ter in a theft is relatively grave, but not absolutely in relation to
all; in oiher words, the matter may be grave or slight according
to the superior or inferior condition of the victim. A theft of
five or six francs constitutes, according to the probable opinion,
rigorously, a grave matter in relation to the rich ; but a less grave
matter is sufficient for a mortal sin if the injured individual is of
inferior condition. Thus a theft of a franc, or half a franc, in
relation to a poor person, may constitute a grave matter.

Theologians generally pretend, says St. Liguori, that there is a
grave sin when the stealing is sufficient to feed a family for a day,
according to their condition, including food, clothing, and lodg
ing. But this very obscure and vague rule could not be applied
to all thefts. It is necessary to determine a relatively grave
matter according to the different conditions of men. ... It
seems that one franc in relation to the poor, and sometimes less

214 The Doctrine of (lie Jesuits.

for very needy persons ; two or three francs in relation to work
men who earn their living by working by the d:iy ; four or five
francs in relation to people with a competency; six or seven
francs for ordinarily rich ones ; and a little more in relation to
very rich people. This is the common doctrine.

Ans. Question 2. We can determine by this the gravity of
Nestor's sins. He has committed a mortal sin each time he stole
six or seven francs, even from the rich, and ten or twelve francs
from a prince. As for his other thefts, he must be questioned, in
order to clear up the matter, and to be able to apply the above
rules concerning the grave matter. Moreover, in practice, often
this gravity cannot be determined, and the confessor cannot
know if his penitent's sin is grievous or light. He must then
depend on Divine justice.

CASE II.
OF SMALL THEFTS.

Damase, a peasant, living on Gerard's patrimony, stole from
him during several years, and at several times each year, either a
little wheat in the harvest time, or a few grapes in the vintage
time. However, he never had the intention of keeping up his
evil course ; but reflecting that these little thefts constitute a
grave matter, he asks of his confessor if he has grievously sinned,
and if he must make restitution undc-r grave penalty.

Ques. What is to be decided about Dumase's case?

Ans. He has not sinned grievously if he had no intention of
causing a grave injury ; but he must restore, under grave penalty,
for he has committed a grave wrong, unless the intervals between
these thefts are such that they are not supposed to constitute
a grave matter. This supposition may be applied in his case.

CASE III.
THE THEFTS OF CHILDREN AND SERVANTS.

!<, Romaritus, the son of a good family, stole from his father,
a pretty wealthy man, once eight francs, and after a certain

Cases of Conscience on Injustice and Theft. 215

interval, ten francs, by different small thefts : he spent the whole of
the money in gambling and drinking.

2. Quirinus, a servant, stole six franco from his master, a rich
man, and several months later he committed several little thefts,
of food and drink. In the same month, he stole the value of about
eight francs.

Ques. Did Romaricus and Quirinus sin gravely?

Ans. As to Romaricus, he must not be accused of a grave sin,
either in the first or in the second case. Not in the first, because,
according to the more probable opinion, the grave matter for the
child of an honorable family must be ten francs ; neither in the
second case, because, if ten francs constitute a grave sin for
Romaricus, when he steals thut sum at one time, the value of fif
teen francs in little thefts is necessary.

As for Quirinus, he has sinned gravel}' by stealing six francs
from his master, it is the common opinion of theologians ; but not
by committing small thefts of f jo.l, in principle, as results from
what has been said.

CASH IV.
THEFTS OF WIVES.

Gerasine, the wife of Ludomire, a rich man, but close-fisted and
grasping, not to say avaricious, often steals little sums from her
husband to keep her poor and unfortunate mother, though she well
knows that her husband would get angry if he knew of it. Sue-
steals also to provide for future need ; fort a? she brought bul a very
small dowry and has had no children by Ludomire, she foresees
that, in the case of her husband's death, she will want the neces-
saiT means for keeping her rank in society.

Ques. Did Gera>ine sin gravely?

Ans. The prudent wife must not be easily excused, for she has
overstepped the limits of human prudence, and has not trusted
enough in the goodness of divine Providence. For why such cal
culation in view of an uncertain future time? Why does she thus
gather riches which does not belong to her? II )\\ does she know
that she will not die before her husband, but a long time after?
However, up to a certain point she must be pardoned, if her husband

216

The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

is old and an invalid, and if it is evident that he will leave nothing
at his death to his almost penniless wife ; because, in such circum
stances, the husband ought to think of his wife. Moreover, it
would not be just to condemn a wife who, while her husband would
squander his patrimony, would steal some money which she would
keep for the future need of her children or of herself, if she held
the property in common with the husband.

CASE V.
A TAILOR'S CLEVERNESS.

Genesius, a tailor, very skilful in his craft, knows how to make
suits with less cloth than others, and keeps the remainder to
pay for his skill. Having an order, from a man of nobility, to buy
ten yards of cloth for the making of a suit, he goes to the dealer
and agrees with him for a price. But unfolding the cloth, he dis
covers a few tears ; but calculating that, in spite of these, he can
make the suit just the same, he obtains a reduction of a third on
the price from the dealer, and asks the same pay from his
customer for the work.

Ques. What is to be thought of Genesius?

Ans. Our tailor can congratulate himself for his cleverness,
without any remorse of conscience ; because he has obtained a just
reduction from the dealer, and it is owing to his skill that, in spite
of the tears, it can make a splendid suit. He does not cause any
injury to his customer, for he uses a cloth of good and solid
quality.

CASE VII.

THE INNOCENT CONDEMNED, INSTEAD OF THE GUILTY ONE.

Audifax, in the absence of Rudolph, secretly breaks into his
house, forces open the safe, takes three hundred pounds, and runs
away. Rodolph, coming back, is struck with astonishment at
seeing his safe open, and asceitaining the theft he gets angry. But
who is the thief? He does not know. Soon he begins to suspect
Titius, his servant. The servant is arrested and put into jail.
Through unfortunate circumstances, grave suspicions weigh upon
him. Witnesses are found, saying that, in the absence of his

Cases of Conscience on Injustice and Theft. 217

master, he was alone in the house. Titius, frightened, makes inco
herent and even contradictory answers to the judge. Accused of
thrft, he is condemned to perpetual imprisonment. Audifax,
tormented by remorse of conscience, goes to a priest, avows his
crime, and asks of him what is to be done in such a direful
emergenc}*.

Ques. 1. Must Audifnx deliver himself to justice. Was it his
duty to do it before the judgment?

Ques. 2. Is he under obligation to make reparation for the
wrong done to the servant?

Ques. 3. What must be the confessor's answer?

Ans. Question 1. Here he is brought by repentance to his con
fessor's feet, waiting, full of tears, for his sentence. What is the
duty of the priest? Shall he oblige his penitent to restore integ
rally for the evil? Shall he command him not only to give back the
stolen money, but also to deliver himself to the judge? Not at all.
It is sufficient that he should secretly indemnify Rodolph, and do
penance for his sin. I say that Audifax is not under obligation to
deliver himself, even before the servant's sentence was pronounced,
even though he could have, by this means, prevented the condem
nation of the innocent. The reason is, that Audifax has not been
the efficacious cause of the condemnation, but simply the occasion,
the occasional cause, or the removed cause. Now, no one is held to
repair an evil, if ho has not been the true and efficacious cause of it.
Then . . . The misfortune of the servant must be imputed to the
witnesses' and judge's error ; but Audifax has not been the effica
cious cause of that error ; then he is not obliged to deliver him
self in order to prevent or repair that evil. Except in the case
when Audifax would have foreseen that unhappy result in such
circumstances, that the accusation and condemnation were very
probably to strike the servant ; which does not happen usually.

Ans. Question 2. No, according to what has been said,
Audifax has not been the cause of the servant's sentence,
but it is the error of the judge. Then, he is not obliged to make
reparation. However, charity commands him to deliver an inno
cent one from a grave penally, if he can do it easily, without giv
ing himself up.

218 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ans. Question 3. Generally, in so great an embarassment, the
confessor's advice will he of little avail ; but it would be prudent to
advise him to take steps by himself, or through others, to interest
some influential person, who, without divulging the case, could,
from the Chief of the State, obtain the release of the innocent one.

CASE IX.
A SERVANT'S RUSE.

Ursani, a gourmand, wants for his table the best of dishes, but
he does not want to pay the right price for the necessary pro
visions. Being quick- tempered, he has the habit of getting angry
and blasphemous at everything, if he is not quickly obeyed in
whatever he desires. His cook is continually between the hammer
and the anvil. At last, she finds the means to settle the matter.
She buys of the best the market offers at a reasonable price, and
feigns to her master that she has bought them cheaper. In order
to act so, she takes care to carry about her the necessary money,
without her mister's knowledge.

Ques. Does Suzanne act unjustly towards her master?

Ans. Suzanne commits no injustice towards her master, for
she cannot act otherwise in her situation. However, we advise
her to cease the deception as soon as possible ; for it is not with
out danger and seduction ; especially, let her avoid lying.

CV-E X.
SECRET COMPENSATION.

I. Angustin is compelled by the judge to pay to Antony a
debt which he has already paid. He obeys the sentence, but com
pensates himself secretly, by taking something from Antony when
the occasion offers itself.

II. Albert, a servant, is engaged by Medard to enter his ser
vice ; he accepts without any agreement as to salary, trusting in
Medard's honesty. The year over, he receives wages inferior to
those of servants of the same kind.- So Albert, without any scru
ples, has recourse to secret compensation, to make up for the
difference between his wages and the leaut ones of the same order.

III. Marc, another servant, attending to the work of his charge,
breaks unintentionally a crystal vase. HU master, angiy of it,

Cases of Conscience on Injustice and Theft. 219

retains from his wages the value of the vase. Marc indemnifies
himself secretly.

Ques. 1. Is Augustin warranted in having recourse to such a
compensation?

Ques. 2. Also Albert, to complete the least wages given to
such servants ?

Ques. 3. And Marc, could he make up secretly for the reduc
tion on his wages?

Ans. Question 1. By natural right, Augustin can have recourse
to secret compensation, if he has no other way t> get back what
belongs to him. He causes no injury to Antony, doing nothing
else but taking back his own. Do not reproach the judge's sen
tence. The judge has no power to give to some one what does not
belong to him ; and his sentence, founded on an error of facts, is
materially unjust. Now, right cannot proceed from injustice,
though material.

Ans. Question 2. Rightly speaking, Albert cannot be con
demned ; for, though there is no agreement, he has perfect right
to the lowest wages paid to other servants. So, he claims noth
ing but his just due.

Ans. Question 3. He is not to be condemned if he has had
recourse to secret compensation to indemnify himself, in the case
of the involuntary breaking of the vase, without committing any
theological fault ; because no one is obliged to repair an involun
tary misfortune, except inwardly, after the judge's sentence, as we
bhall see later about unjust condemnation. Then, the master has
no r'ght to exact reparation, and the servant is warranted in tak
ing back what he was not obliged to pay for ; for Marc could only
be obliged by his conscience, or by a judgment. Now, there is no
judicial obligation in this hypothesis, there having been no judg
ment, nor any obligation of conscience ; for one is obliged in con
science to make restitution only when the fault has been committed

with guilty intention.

CASE XL

SECRET COMPENSATION.

Ferdinand owed one hundred pounds to Anrelius. Before the
day of the payment, Ferdinand made a friendly call at his debtor's,

220 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

and told him he was to send his servant with the money on the
next day. Aurelius, full of confidence, gives a receipt to Ferdi
nand. Having received it, Ferdinand rejoices in having found a
good occasion to repay himself one hundred pounds owed by Aur
elius' father to his own, and which he had never been able to
prevail upon him to pay. Then, as Aurelius claims his money,
Ferdinand absolutely refuses it, affirming that he will keep that
sum to acquit the debt of Aurelius' father. The creditor claimed
injustice the sum, but the debtor Ferdinand said he had paid it,
and proved it by showing the receipt; the unfortunate creditor
lost the suit, and was condemned to pay expenses.

Ques. 1. Had Ferdinand any right to keep the borrowed money
and use the receipt as he did?
Ques. 2. Could he swear that his debt was paid?
Ques. 3. Is he under obligation to pay to Aurelius the expenses
of judgment?

Ans. Question 1. Yes, Ferdinand was right in keeping a bor
rowed sura, and in using the receipt, so skilfully obtained, in order to
prove he was clear with Aurelius, because the debts of both parties,
being equal, destroy each other. Ferdinand did not act wrongfully
by showing the receipt, for it proves nothing else than that the
money borrowed by Ferdinand from Aurelius has been paid off,
which is quite conformable to the truth.

Ans. Question 2. Yes, also, according to St. Liguori's doctrine,
Ferdinand can swear that he has paid the debt, having no other
means to get it without wronging some one. For he swears accord
ing to the truth and for a grave motive, affirming under oath that
he owes nothing, this being the truth, both debts cancelling each
other. Then, nothing prevents that affirmation for a grave motive
from being confirmed under oath.

Ans. Question 3. No, the expenses must be paid by the one
who unjustly arraigned the other before justice, and not by the
gainer. Then, Aurelius alone must pay them.

Cases on institution in General

CASE III.
OBLIGATORY RESTITUTION.

Carpopborius has contracted many debts, by his high living and
his luxurious table ; and his wife Bertha has contributed to it a
great deal. But the husband died suddenly, and tho creditors
swooped down from all parts on the unfortunate widow, who
possessed nothing from her husband but a large family and a
very small fortune. She asks, in tears, of her confessor, if she
is obliged to satisfy so many creditors with so small a fortune.

Ques. Is Bertha obliged to pay the creditors out of what
remains?

Ans. In principle, Bertha should be obliged to satisfy the
creditors, even with the little remainder left by her husband ;
because, by natural equity, she must indemnify them. However,
as she has a large family and a very small fortune, she must be
exempted from the obligation of restitution, at least for a time,
until she has become richer ; because the moral powerlessness in
which she finds herself furnishes her a pretext for deferring that
restitution. Except in a case in which the creditors, or one of
them, should be in the same need ; because then the condition
of debtor would be the best.

CASE V.
A BAKER TAKEN IN His OWN MESHES.

Monica, having got some bread at the house of the baker
Rufus, carries it home, and perceives with astonishment that it is
not of the usual quality and quantity. She goes to the chief of
police and explains her case. They proceed to the baker's, but

222 The Doctrine of lite Jesuits.

he pretends that he never paw Monica before. "Yon know me
very well," says Monica; " do you not remember that I owe you
eighty francs. Here is a bill you sent me a few days ago."
The baker denies again. "That is all right," said the police
officer, "you do not owe him anything." So snying, the latter
takes the bill and tears it tip. Then they come out of the shop,
leaving in it a crestfallen baker.

Ques. 1. Is Monica acquitted?

Ques. 2. Had the police-officer the right to punish the baker
in such a way?

Ans. Question 1. Yes, Monica must not be disturbed, because
the remittance took place, at least implicitly, on the baker's part.
He does not wish to recognize Monica ; then he denies that she
is his debtor : thus he implicitly acquits her debt. He can better,
indeed, lose the money due, than submit to a greater injury by a
judgment. For it is sufficient, in order that there should be a
true remittance, that the creditor should have the integral posses
sion of the thing and be willing to remit it. This is just what
happened in this case ; and do not say that the baker acted by
compulsion, and that his remittance is not valid : he acted freely,
under the influence of a legitimate fear, for he was always able
to choose some after means : in other words, avow his fault, and
be punished for it. Then he has really the tacit intention of
implicitly discharging that debt.

Ans. Question 2. The officer acquitted Monica in a valid and
just manner, for he had the right either to punish the baker or
denounce him to the judge ; but the baker prefers to escape a
just vexation by remitting the debt, rather than suffer the penalty.
Then the officer, satisfied with such a punishment, gives up his
right to have a greater one imposed upon him bjT a judgment,
and leads the guilty one to inflict a punishment on himself by
remitting the debt.

on tfje Jjolrjcrs of ©Hjc.s' JJropcrtg,

CASE VI.
THE DISHONEST HOLDER.

Agathon makes this confession : He stole a horse, bought for
two hundred francs by his master, and sold the animal for two
hundred and fifty francs.

Ques. Is it sufficient for him to pay two hundred francs to the
horse's master, and keep fifty francs as payment for his sharp
ness ?

Aus. Agathon must pay to his master the money he has
received ; unless he can attribute the benefit he realized to his own
Ability.

CASE VII.
THE POSSESSOR DISHONESTLY.

I. Zachary stole a hundred pounds from Charles. As he is a
very clever man, he used them so effectively in business transac
tions that he soon realized a notable gain. But later, wishing to
make reparation for the wrong he has caused, he asks of his con
fessor if it is sufficient for him to give back the stolen sum ; or
if he is also obliged to give up the profit made with it.

II. Sisinus stole from Titius a hen, worth fifteen cents ; from
the hen he gets a large number of eggs. Having some of these
eggs hatched, he became the owner of a number of chickens. He
sold some of them, and kept the others, in order to have more eggs
and more chickens. Indeed, his theft was a very profitable one.
But later, in confession, having accused himself of it, he is
sentenced by the confessor to give back hen, money, eggs and
chickens, or their estimated value.

224 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Qtics. 1. Is Zachary obliged to restore the whole of the profit
made with the stolen money?

Ques. 2. And Sisinus, besides the hen, must lie give back the
profit?

Ans. Question 1. Znchary is under obligation to give back the
whole of the profit, if the master of the money would have realized
a profit equal to it ; for instance, if he had used that money in
business, which is presumable when the owner of the money is a
merchant ; or some one using his money in that way. In the con
trary case, Zachary would not be obliged to restore the gain,
because it might be called the result of his cleverness.

Ans. Question 2. It is sufficient for Sisinus to give back the
value of the hen. In an absolute manner, rigorously, he ought to
restore the whole of the profit, deducting expenses ; because the
thing is profitable to the master, and the latter might have made
all the profit himself from his hen. However, moraliter loquendo,
when it is a question of the theft of a common object of little
importance, it is sufficient to restore its value ; for, according to
the common appreciation, the master suffered no other wrong than
the value of the hen belonging to him ; for, if he had the intention
of getting another hen, he could procure it very easily.

Cases on ffiBnmg JSnjustlg Bone.

CASE I.
A GUILTY MAN, THOUGH BEING IN THE RIGHT.

Zephirin made a deep excavation in his field, in order to get
sand therefrom. He knows that Andrea very often passes that
way duriug the night, but he does not warn him of the danger.
Andrea falls into the hole and breaks his leg ; so he cannot attend
to his work for two or three months.

Ques. Is Zephirm obliged to pay ?o*£he atfCKietit?

Ans. Zepbiiin has sinned gravely against charity bj not
warning Andrea, but not at all against justice ; for he had d just
motive for digging a hole in his field. (Then, he owes no repara
tion.)

CASE II.

THREAT TO DENOUNCE A GUILTY ONE.

Eligius surprises Caius in the very act of committing a theft.
He threatens to denounce him, if the latter does not give him one
dollar. Caius pays it, in order to avoid the denunciation.

Ques. Can Eligius keep that money either: 1, if he meant
seriously to denounce Caius ; or, 2, if it was only to frighten him?

Ans. 1. Yes, if he means to denounce him; because any citi
zen has the right to denounce an offender for the public interest,
and consequently to receive something to give up that right.

2. Yes, according to the more probable opinion, though Eligius
only made believe. The reason here is, that he has the right to
accuse him, and gives up that right, which is payable. Then,
Eligius has justly received the money.

226 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CASE JII.
THE OXE DOING WRONG ix SPITE OF HIMSELF.

Medard enters a shop, with two friends of his, to buy something.
While lie is bargaining, he steals a gold watch from a tray,
believing it was a copper one. Coming home, he looks at it and
perceives that it is gold. However, he does not keep it long ; for
the very same day he lost it, taking a walk about town. A little
later, Medard, struck by repentance, wishes to make restitution,
but only of the value he put on the watch when he stole it.

Ques. 1. Are we obliged to make restitution for the whole
value of a stolen object, if we thought, by an invincible error, that
the object was of a less value when it was stolen ?

Ques. 2. What must Medard do in this case? Must he restore
the full value, or only part of it?

Ans. Question 1. There is controversy. According to the
more probable opinion, the one who caused the wrong is obliged
to repair only the wrong he thought he had done, provided there
is an invincible error ; inasmuch as there is no theological fault
relatively to the surplus of the wrong, that is to say, of an ignored
wrong, such a surplus not being at all voluntary, and not being
likened to an injustice properly so called.

Ans. Question 2. Medard is under obligation to restore the
full value of the gold watch ; because it is hardly presumable that
he thought it was certainly a copper one ; for there was too much
haste in the theft to form a sure conviction on that subject. . . .

But if Medard had been, from the first, in a truly invincible
error on the subject of the watch's value, and if, later, having
recognized its full value, and having formed the resolution to
restore it immediate!}', he was prevented by some involuntary
cause ; and if, during this time, he had lost it, — in this hypo
thesis, according to the probable opinion, Medard should . be
dispensed from refunding the surplus value unknown at the time
of the theft ; for he would have exposed on his side the probable
opinion in the answer to the first question.

Cases on Wrong Unjustly Done. 227

CASK V.
PREVENTED BENEFACTION.

Gaston had made a will in favor of Fabien, his nephew. But
another nephew, Florian, tells the uncle that Fabien has on
several occasions spoken very irreverently of him. The angry
testator tears up his will, makes Florian his heir, and dies soon
after.

Ques. Must Florian restore the inheritance to Fabien?

Ans. Yes, in principle ; because Florian, through unjust means,
defamation and calumny, has deprived Fabien of his inheritance ;
for Fabien, as it appears, would have certainly obtained it, being
already made the heir ; and his uncle, dying soon after, it is not
to be presumed that he would have changed his mind. But the
answer would be different if Florian, instead of being induced by
hate or cupidity, had shown to Gaston, equitably, or for a reason
able motive, grave defects, which would have demonstrated that
Fabien was to be judged quite unworthy of the inheritance.

CASE VII.
LAMENTABLE ERROR.

Phileas, a seminarist, blinded by human weakness, commits a
grave larceny in the seminary ; Albin, his comrade, suspected
and accused of it, is turned out of the seminary. Another mis
fortune befalls him ; drawing an unlucky number, he is obliged
to go to the army ; however, he buys a substitute for two
thousand francs. As for Phileas, as soon as he knew of the
accusation intended to Albin, full of repentance, he secretly
restores the stolen money, and confesses his fault to another
priest than his usual confessor, without mentioning Albin's case.
Later, a remorseful conscience induces him to tell everything
to his usual confessor, who obliges him to repair all the wrong
done to Albin, obliged to pay for a substitute ; because Phileas
might have easily overcome the difficulty, even in not denouncing
himself, by informing the superior of his fault, either through his
confessor or some other prudent person.

228 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ques. 1. What ought to be said about Phileas' first con
fession ?

Ques. 2. Has Phileas sinned gravely against justice and
charity?

Ans. Question 1. There is nothing to reprove in Phileas' first
confession. . . . No matter if he has kept silence concerning the
circumstance relating to Albin. . . .

Ans. Question 2. Phileas has sinned gravely ngainst charity,
in principle, if 'he has thought this the easy way to defend his
fellow-student. For one is held by charity to prevent the wrong
experienced by another, when one can do so easily.

But he has not sinned against justice ; because he has not been
the efficacious cause, but only the occasion of Albin's misfortune.
Then he has been unjustly condemned by his confessor to make
reparation. ... It results upon the whole, that he has sinned
against charity, but not against justice.

CASE IX.
MISTAKE IN THE WRONG DONE BY SOME ONE.

I. Codes, rising up during the night, with the intention of
ravaging his enemy's vineyard, makes a mistake, in the darkness,
and ravages that of his friend Lucius.

II. Curtius gives to Didyme, who asks drink of him, a poisoned
bevernge, with the intention of killing him. Julius, who was
present, in joking, took the cup, drank the whole of it, and died
soon after.*

Ques. 1. Shall the one who does the injury be held to make
reparation for the evil he has committed without any intention ?
Ques. 2. Must Curtius indemnify Julius' unhappy family?

* Gury lias not even had the deplorable merit of inventing this infamy.
He took it from Lacroix : "If Gains has poisoned wine, and put it before
Sempronius with the intention of killing him ; and supposing that Titius,
having no knowledge about it, drinks the wine and dies, and that Gains
allows him to do it through fear of revealing his crime, — in this case
Cains is not a murderer, and he is not obliged to repair the harm which
resulted in the death of Titius; because the death of Titius is not the
voluntary work of Cains, who could not foresee the case, and was not
obliged to advise Titius that the beverage was poisoned." (Page 443.)

Cases on Wrong Unjustly Done. 229

Ques. 3. Should Codes be held to repair the damage which he
has caused to Lucius' vineyard?

Ans. Question 1. 1. No, if he has not foreseen the evil, even
confusedly ; because then the evil committed is not a voluntary act
of the author, and cannot be imputed to him. For instance,
Titius wishes to kill Peter, his enemy, whom he believes is alone ;
but without injuring Peter he kills Paul, whom he did not see, and
whom he had no suspicions of finding there. Titius is not obliged
to indemnify the family of Paul ; because the homicide was only
fortuitous, and not at all voluntary.

2. But if he wishes only to destroy an object, or to deface it,
thinking it belongs to his enemy Paul, when it is Peter's property,
in this case he is held to repair the damage ; because he was
willing to destroy a determined object.

However, St. Liguori looks upon the contrary opinion as prob
able, with Lugo, etc.

Ans. Question 2. Codes seems to be held to repair the damage,
at least according to the common and probable opinion, as it was
said above. However, according to St. Liguori's opinion, we can
not constrain Codes to make reparation.

Ans. Question 3. Curtius is not obliged to repair the evil, if he
was able to prevent Julius from drinking the poisoned wine ;
neither to avow his crime, nor to run the danger of death. The
reason of that is : Julius' death was not the effect of Casius' will ;
because he has not foreseen the case, and he was not obliged to
run into danger of sure death to prevent a wrong which he did not
foresee. Then it is only by accident, and against Curtius' will,
that Julius' death has happened. Therefore, Curtius has not been
the efficacious cause, but the simple occasion ; since Julius killed
himself in drinking a beverage which was not prepared for him.

CASE X.
MISTAKE IN THE WRONG DONE BY SOME ONE.

Lupien, in seeking for a way to wrong his enemy Sylvain, finds
Sylyain's calf feeding in his master's field, and immediately shoots

230 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

at him ; but instead of the calf, he kills the marshal's ox grazing
behind a hedge.

Ques. Must Lupien repair the damage he has done by uninten
tionally killing the ox? Quid. — If the ox and calf were the
property of the same person ?

Ans. Lupien cannot be held to repair the damage resulting
from the death of the ox ; because he had no intention of killing
him, and by no means could he foresee this misfortune. He owes
nothing, either for the calf which is uninjured, or for the ox;
because he killed him unintentionally, and without foreseeing.
But, what if both animals had belonged to the same master? The
solution ought to be the same ; for it would remain true that the
evil was not foreseen.

CASE XL
THE FASHIONABLE NOVICE.

Simplicius, young, fashionable, beardless, joyful, arrives at
Paris, with the intention of amusing himself. Everything pleases
him, and in his happiness he smiles at everything. He had not
yet, the imprudent youth, experienced the uncertainty of human
things. One day he hires a beautiful horse, in order to give him
self a ride on horseback, his greatest pleasure. All yield to him
instantly ; everybody looks and admires him. But alas ! he
scarcely arrives in the suburb, when two men, dressed in black
suits, like sheriff's officers, summoned him, by saying: "-Hallo!
friend, stop, that horse does not belong to you." '-That is true,"
answers Simplicius, astonished ; "he does not belong to me : I
hired him." '-Well, well," reply the men dressed in black, 'kwe
know it ; we must seize him on account of a judgment, with all his
master's goods, in order to pay the creditors." At these words
the men take the horse, and run away. Sheepish and raging, our
fashionable comes back on foot, and tells the stor}' to the owner of
the horse ; who, astounded, gets out of temper, and exacts from
Simplicius the price of the horse.

Q!ies. Is Simplicius obliged to pay, before judgment, the
value of the horse?

Cases on Wrony Unjustly Done. 231

Ans. What must we decide on the subject of our fashionable?
Shall we condemn him to pay for the horse? Do not hasten to
resolve the difficult}'. You see this poor fellow punished enough
bv his misfortune. A young man wi'.hout any experience, deceived
by so much knavishness ; does it not appear to you that our pity
will be better for him than condemnation? But will 3*011 acquit
him? You hear the indignant master cry out, complain, vocifer
ate, and protest against your sentence. Then, there is a grave law
suit to debate. "What will Themis do, who is impartial? Who
shall be favored? And you, what do you decide? If }~ou will
believe me, before the sentence of the judge, we must forgive
Simplicius. You are astonished at it, looking for the justice in
this solution. Listen a little. The solution is derived by itself
from principles. Because one cannot constrain to make repara
tion, in conscience, only when a theological and grave fault exists,
in a grave matter. Now, who will accuse Simplicius of a grave
theological fault? Nobody, assuredly; then his cause is gained.
But, will you say he is foolish because he acted foolishly? Then,
if he is silly, he has not sinned gravely, and he is not held to make
reparation. But, sa}* 3'ou, he ought to have paid attention to the
knavishness of the thieves ; then he is guilty.

lie ought, that is true, if he had been thinking of it, and if he
suspected the ruse before a certain point ; now, it is contrary to
the hypothesis. Therefore we must acquit Simplicius : at least,
according to the more probable opinion.

CASE XIJ.
A HAKE FOR ONE Sou.

Georgias, a peasant, meets two soldiers in his way, and offers to
sell them a hare that he has just killed. For a joke, the soldiers
pretend to be willing to buy such beautiful game. Immediately
they show to the hunter a new sou, brilliant as a louis. Deceived
by its appearance, and thinking it is a louis, Georgias is ready to
give them back the remainder of the value in change. "Keep all,
friend," say the soldiers. The peasant, leaping with joy, immedi
ately runs awa}\ "Hi ! down there, come, come," cry out the

232 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

soldiers with all the strength of their lungs. But the peasant turns
a deaf ear: the more he hears them cry, the faster he runs, and
the soldiers cannot stop him, nor catch him by any means. What
is to be done with the hare? It is easy to settle the difficulty ; we
will eat him, so it will not be lost. The hare was scarcely swal
lowed, when the poor peasant, having perceived his mistake, comes
to the barracks and claims more money. "My friend," say the
soldiers, "you are come too late ; we had no intention of buying a
hare, we had not money enough ; we have eaten him to }*our health.
You were not willing to hearken to our call ; then, leave us in
peace."

Ques. Should the soldiers be held to make restitution?

Ans. No, in principle. In this case we must apply the rules of
the possessor of good faith. Because, in this hypothesis, the sol
diers being unable to find, and not able to wait for him, regarded
the hare as an abandoned object, and ate him. Therefore they
have neither the hare nor the price of him, and are no richer than
before. They must make no restitution.

Cases on Cooperation in ©rtier to Injure

CASE I.
THE ONE WHO COMMANDS. — THE EMPLOYER.

I. Castor has commanded Pestus, his servant, to steal some
money from Jacob ; the servant takes more, and keeps the surplus
for himself.

II. Another time, moved by a desire to revenge himself, he
commands Caius, another servant, to crush the shrubbery in
Paul's field. Caius goes out in order to obey, but he makes
a mistake and spoils John's field, which is adjacent to Paul's.

Ques. 1. Should Castor be held to make restitution for the
.surplus of the theft committed by his servant?

Ques. 2. Should he repair the damage made by his proxy's
error in the second case ?

Ans. Question 1. Castor cannot be held to give back anything
for the surplus of the theft, because that surplus results not from
the efficacy of the order, but from the proxy's own will. Except
ihe case where he should have foreseen that his servant would
exceed his orders; because then, in employing as proxy such a
man, he is supposed to be responsible for the damages caused
by him.

Ans. Question 2. No, because the damage must be attributed
to the proxy only, and not to the employer ; there is no mistake, *
only on the part of the proxy, who, consequently is obliged to
repair the damage .

CASE II.
THE EMPLOYER.

Leon commands Titius to steal at night some fruits from
Baudouin's Ik Id ; but the poor fellow, caught by the proprietor's

234 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

servants, is beaten, robbed, barely escapes, falls into a ditch and
breaks his arm.

Qiu's. Ought Leon to repair the injury which has happened to
Tilius?

AMS. Leon is responsible for the injury felt by Titius, by the
blows of Baudouin's servants, because he could have easily fore
seen this evil in a confused manner. But he is not held to repair
the other injuries suffered by Titius being robbed, and breaking
his arm by falling into a ditch, because he could not have fore
seen them.

CASE IV.
THE ONE WHO ADVISES.

Rifax, seeing Bazile's shop open, in the absence of his
master, says to Lucius: "If you were to steal something from
Bazile, nobody would see you." Upon this, Lucius immediately
steals several articles.

Ques. Is Rifax obliged to make restitution, if Lucius does
not?

Ans. No, according to the more probable opinion. Rifax is
not held to make restitution, because he has been only the occa
sion and not the cause of the wrong, for he has given neither
order nor advice ; one cannot explain what kind of influence he
has had, for he simply indicated the thing, without attempting to
induce his comrade to steal. Therefore, he has not had any
efficacious influence in the wrong.

CASE V.
THE ONE WHO CONSENTS.

Philetus brings an action against Rufus. The judges, five in
number, bribed with the presents of Philetus, gives him the case,
contrary to equity. But two judges who did not vote in the last
plaee, maintain they are not obliged to make restitution ; because,
as they say, although the}7 gave their consent to the injustice, their
influence was not the cause of it.

Ques. Are the said judges held to make restitution?

Cases on Go- Operation in Order to Injure Others. 235

Ans. The last two judges, like the others, sinned gravely
against justice, and are held to make reparation jointly and
severally, if they have voted secretly ; because, in that case, there
lias been only one unjust common action, and we do not distin
guish the former from the latter. Yet, if they have voted pub
licly, openly, they ought to be dispensed, according to the probable
opinion, of an injustice effective and efficacious; because it does not
appear that they are the cause of the injustice already sufficiently
prepared and determined by the others.

CASE VI.
THE ONE WHO CONSENTS.

Sylvie, Harms' wife, approves the conduct of her husband when
he mingles wheat of an inferior quality with a superior one. The
mistake cannot be perceived, and he sells the whole as wheat of
first quality.

Ques. Does Sylvie take part in the injustice committed by her
husband ?

Ans. No, if she has only sanctioned or ratified this injustice ;
provided she does not incite her husband to do so again.

CASE XI.

NEGATIVE CO-OPERATION.

1. Baldus, the father of a family, either by a grave careless
ness or by silence, though seeing the wrong, or by indolence, did
not prevent the injury done to his neighbors, by his wife, children,
or servants, although he could easily have prevented it.

When asked to make reparation for the damage done, he
answers calmly : "I have not wronged any one." His youngest
son having broken a precious vase which belongs to Caprasius,

he latter calls at Baldus' in order to claim the price of the vase.

>aldus turns him out of his house with a pitchfork.

2. Sabellus had intrusted his flock to the care of the shepherd
Tityre. At one time the shepherd being sound asleep, at another
having been tied to a tree against his will, by his comrades, who

236 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

were amusing themselves, the flock spoil the field of Hilarius,
who asks Sabellus to make reparation.

Qnes. What must we think of Baldus and Sabellus?

Ans. 1. Baldus is not held to repair the damages committed
by his family, before the judgment, although he is gravely culpable.
But the manner in which he turned Caprasius away will appear
justly too boorish.

2. Sabellus is not held in any case, before the judgment, to
repair the damages caused to Hilarius. More than that, for the
damage committed in the last case, the judges can condemn neither
Tityre nor Sabellus ; because the shepherd was not free at all.

CASE XIII.
NEGATIVE CO-OPERATION.

Janvier, a tailor workman, laboring in his master's shop with
two comrades younger than himself, steals some golden and silver
remnants, coming from the clothing of a nobleman, unconscious
that his master sees him. The other two workmen seeing this,
immediately follow his example. Although their thefts, considered
separately, do not constitute a grave matter, on account of Jan
vier's theft, however, united together, they doubtless make a
notable matter.

Ques. 1. Have the youngest workmen sinned against justice?

Ques. 2. What should we say about the older one, Janvier?

Ans. Question 1. The two youngest workmen have not sinned
gravely, but only slightly against justice ; because each one of
them has committed only a slight theft. . . .

Ans. Question 2. And Janvier also has not sinned gravely
against justice, at least has not caused an unjust injury, and con
sequently he is not held jointly and severally to make restitution ;
because, like the others, he has only committed a slight theft, and
is not the efficacious moral cause of the theft of the others, but
only the occasion, at least, according to the more probable opinion.

Cases on Co- Operation in Order to Injure Otiiers. 237

CASE XIV.

THE ONE WHO SAYS NOTHING. *

Canut sees a thief taking away some wheat from Paul's field.
He does not oppose it nor cry out, though it is easy for him to
prevent the theft. More than that, far from stopping or denounc
ing the thief, he receives money from him, in order to keep
silence in the matter. But when lie goes to confession his confes
sor accuses him of a grave sin, and obliges him, at the same time,
to give to the poor the money he has received, and to repair the
wrong done to Paul.

Ques. 1. Has Canut sinned gravely in not preventing the theft?

Ques. 2. Is he obliged to make restitution to Paul?

Qucs. 3. Shall he give the money he has received from the
thiel to the poor, give it back to the thief, or keep it for himself?

Ans. Question 1. 1. Canut assuredly has sinned gravely
against charity in taking care not to cry out or stop the thief,
although duty would not require him to defend Paul's field ;
because every one of us is held by the general precept of charity
to prevent evil to another, whenever we can do it easily without a
serious prejudice for us.

2. But Canut has not sinned against justice in accepting money
for his silence, if the theft was already consummated ; because, in
promising to be silent, he has not been the efficacious cause of the
theft ; he has not defended the thief, but has only defended him
against an accusation of theft, against the danger of incurring a
penalty, and consequently he cannot have an influence upon the
theft, as an efficacious cause. It would be otherwise if he had
received some money before the execution of the theft, so as to
protect the thief.

Ans. Question 2. Canut must make restitution to Paul, as hav
ing participated of an efficacious manner in the theft, if he has
received money from the thief before the act, in order to protect
him to such a degree that he may have a stronger passion for
stealing. And in this case Canut must repair the wrong, instead
of the thief. With still more reason one would accuse him of

238 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

having participated in the theft, if he had received some money in
order to keep watch, or to protect the escape of the thief.

Ans. Question 3. If Canut has not contributed t > the theft, —
for instance, if he has received the money after the theft was
accomplished, for his silence, and not to denounce the thief, — he
can keep back the money; because a contract weighing upon an
indifferent thing is valid. But if, in receiving some money before
the theft, he has protected the thief, and has made him more
ardent, according to a great many theologians, he ought to give
back the money to the thief himself ; because then the contract is
void, as countenancing an unjust tiling. But, according to very
many others, Canut would participate in the theft, even in prom
ising to keep silence; nevertheless he could keep the money after
the theft, as a reward for the service given to the thief.

Cases on tfje Circumstances of Destitution*

CASE I.
JOINT RESPONSIBILITY.

Meliton, seeing two men stealing a bale of goods, joins hi-nself
to them, helps them to carry the load, an.l receives his part of the
plunder. Another time, knowing that three men go in order to
set Damien's barn on fire, he also goes, and sets the fire with
them.

Ques. Ought Meliton to make restitution of the whole if the
others do not return their shares, in the matter of the bale and
fire?

Ans. One ought to dispense Meliton from a joint and sevend
liability restitution: 1, He is not to be held to it for the bale,
because then his co-operation was not necessary for the cause of
the prejudice, inasmuch as the other thieves were carrying away
the bale without his aid. 2, Nor for the fire, at least according to
the probable opinion ; because, although his action might have been
sufficient to occasion the damage, it was, however, only a partial
influence, seeing that it cannot be called either necessary or
common.

CASE V.
TIME OP RESTITUTION.

Mirocles, on account of being obliged to provide for his parents,
has postponed for a notable time the payment of certain damages
and debts which he has contracted. At the death of his parents,
as he goes to pay his creditors, he learns that, in consequence of
this delay, they have suffered a loss of gain, and that a great
injury has resulted from it. ...

210 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ques. Should Mirocles repair the injury caused to his creditors
by this delay?

Ans. 1. No, he ought not to repair it, because this delay was
neither voluntary nor culpable.

2. And lie even ought not to repair the injury resulting from
the delay in the payment which he was to make for damages, be
cause this prejudice did not result, properly speaking, from an
offence, and was not foreseen.

CASE X.

CAUSES WHICH DISPENSE WITH RESTITUTION.

Mayloire, overwhelmed by debts, in consequence of hard times,
has not more than six thousand francs, which he needs to support
himself and farnil}-, especially an insane son.

Ques. Is Mayloire released from obligation to pay his debts?

Aus. Mayloire ought to be easily excused from making resti
tution. But in this case it is difficult in theory to give a sure and
precise solution ; that depends upon circumstances.

CASE XIV.
RELEASE OF PROPERTY.

Olibrius, is overwhelmed by debts, and he is utterly unable to
pay ; therefore he is obliged to sell all his properties. But the
unfortunate man, to support his wife and a numerous family,
threatened with poverty, secretly puts aside a certain sum, and
hides it carefully. At another time he omits to declare a very
secret debt that Titius owes to him ; and he advises his debtor to
keep profound silence on this subject.

Ques. What must we think of Olibrius? Ought he to make
restitution ?

Ans. Olibrius must not be disturbed in those two cases, if the
money which he has put aside is very necessary to avoid pov
erty.

CASE XV.
EMBARRASSED DEBTORS.

Adrien, being unable to pay a debt, obtains from the Court a

Cases on tJte Circumstances of Restitution. 241

division of the properly between himself and his wife, in order
that their common property may not be seized by the creditors.

Ques. What must we think of Adrien ?

Ans. Adrien must not be molested, in principle; for his wife
has the right to ask this division, provided she does it without
knavery, or did not participate in anything to the injustice of her
husband, for instance, relatively to debts contracted with injustice
or prodigality.

Cases on Special institutions.

CASE II.
RESTITUTION FOR HOMICIDE.

Jacob has killed Marc, who was raining his family by his
luxury and habits of drunkenness. His Confessor orders him to
give a sura of money, as. an indemnity, to Marc's family. Jacob
answers, that the death of Marc, instead of being a misfortune,
is a profit to his family. The Confessor insists ; and as Jacob
persistently refuses to obey, the Confessor sends him away with
out giving him absolution.

Ques. Ought Jacob in reality to indemnify the family of Marc
whom he has killed? Should the Confessor order him to give this
compensation ?

Ans. No ; for Jacob has not caused any damage to the family,
and he has even prevented it from being more ruined. Then tlie
confessor, by reason of justice, could not order him to indemnify
the family, threatening him with a refusal of absolution. He
could only impose on him a penance, either of giving some money
to the family, if it was in need, or of giving it as alms to the
poor.

CASE III.
RESTITUTION FOR RAPE.

Sylvie, a girl of good morals, was seduced, or rather violently
seized by Lupin, under unfortunate circumstances. Deploring
the loss of her virginity, and almost in despair, she goes two or
three months later to Lupin, and assuring him that she is preg
nant by him, demands of him two thousand francs ; as much for
the loss of her virginity, as in order to avoid dishonor and bring
her child up elsewhere ; if not, she threatens to sue him at law,

Cases on Special Restitution. 243

and publish his fault everywhere. Lupin, in order to avoid
dishonor and to bring up the child, reluctantly gives her the
money asked for, although with regret. But going to confession,
she asks if she can keep that money. The Confessor declares that
she ought to return it to Lupin.

Ques. Can Sylvie keep the money obtained by a knavery, as
a compensation for the loss of her virginity, or for some other
claim ?

Ans. 1. Sylvie cannot keep any money for the loss of her
virginity, — a loss that one cannot estimate, and that no one can
indemnify.

2. Neither under the pretext of bringing up her child ; because,
as soon as there is an error in the principal motive which impels
us, — error which is the cause of the contract, — this contract
becomes null. Now, the final cause, at least partial!}', does not
subsist, inasmuch as there is no child to bring up. Then the
contract, as far as something has been given to Sylvie to bring
up her child, is null by natural right. Therefore, Sylvie cannot
keep anything for that reason.

3. But she can keep part of the money for relinquishing her
right to denounce Lupin, or to disclose his fault.

CASE IV.
RESTITUTION FOR FORNICATION.

Laban, by dint of prayers and caresses, has induced the young
Romelie to sin with him. She resists at first ; and at last con
sents. A child is the result of it, who dies at his birth. But the
fault having been divulged, Romelie cannot find any honest man
who will marry her. Consequently, indignant, she claims, with
a great outcry, a compensation from Laban.

Ques. Does Laban owe anything to Romelie?

Ans. Laban owes nothing, in principle, unless he may have
divulged the matter himself. For, from what has been said, from
the moment when the woman consents to sin, the man owes
nothing, except his part in the expense of bringing up the child.
Now, in this case, there is no expense, the child having died

244 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

immediately. Then Romelie shall attribute to herself only the
misfortune which results from her fault. She ought to have
foreseen it before she committed that fault. How many tears
flow too late from her eyes !

CASE X.
FRAUD TO TOE PREJUDICE OF THE TREASURY.

Severin, a priest, carefully questions his penitents, in order to
know if they have not committed some fraud in order to avoid
paying the duty in the purchase, sale, or transportation of goods ;
if they have evaded the custom officers ; if they have refrained
from reporting their goods themselves when not questioned.
When the penitents confess to either of these frauds, Severin
obliges them to make restitution to the custom officers, and exacts
from them a serious promise, even under refusal of absolution, not
to sin in the future on this matter.

Ques. What should we think of Severin's way of acting?

Ans. The indiscretion of Severin ia all his conduct is clearer
than noon day. He must refrain in the future from tormenting
his penitents who say nothing on this subject. It will be safer
for him to keep silence on this matter. If one of his penitents
interrogates him, he can exhort him to pay the duties. But let
him keep himself from solving difficulties that more learned men
than him cannot determine about.

CASE XL
FRAUD TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE TREASURY.

Forbin sells to Gilbert a field for thirty thousand francs. But
they do not want to pay the tax established by the government
upon the sale of properties. What shall they do? The way
is well known, and used. They agree to declare only twenty
thousand francs on the deed, and they go to the notary's. Attliis
declaration, the notary, smiling, because he knows the true value of
the field, says to Gilbert: " It will be a good bargain for you,
rascal ! " and without saying anything more, he draws up the
deed.

Cases on Special Restitution. 245

Qties. 1. Is it sinning gravely against justice to feign an
inferior price in the purchase of a field, in order to pay less taxes?
Ques. 2. Should the notary make restitution in this case ; for
he knows the fraud, and yet draws up the deed?

Ques. 3. Quid. — If he had himself advised the contracting
parties to do it?

Ans. Question 1. There is controversy. . . . The opinion
which seems the more probable, exempts the contracting parties
from the obligation to declare the true price ; because the law does
not appear to seek more than to be assured of the validity of a
public contract, and the delivery, like as the payment, of the thing
sold, and to give some securities in case of suit in law ; for
instance, if there was an eviction. This is why it does not appear
that there is, in conscience, any obligation to declare either the
price paid or the value of it, at least, the smallest that one can
assign to the thing. But those who diminish this value beyond
reason, expose themselves to the danger of paying a fine. As for
inheritance, it shall be sufficient to declare the value based upon
the annual income, as one does usually.

Ans. Question 2. No ; because the notary is not obliged by
his duty to enforce the payment of the tax, like government
employees, but to draw up the valid deeds.

Now, the declaration of the price has not any relation with the
validity of the deed. Moreover, he does not participate in the
fraud, and does not sin against justice ; because, according to the
probable opinion, the contracting parties do not sin themselves.

Ans. Question 3. The difficulty is greater. Some assert that
the notary, in this case, ought to repair the wrong done to the
Treasury ; because if he is not held to prevent the fraud, at least
he is held not to participate in it in a positive manner. But others
excuse him; because, if the contracting parties do not sin, the
notary does not sin either, even in co-operating in a positive man
ner. For the notary has not change of the taxes, and is not held
by his duty to colljct them. Then, in regard to this, he must be
likened to a private person.

on ffontracts.

The science which treats of contracts, especially at the pres
ent, time, ought be regarded as necessary. For trade extends
itself so far — arts, not liberal, improve themselves so much — that
for the equity of contracts, one has recourse more and m >re often
to the sacred tribunal. But it is there especially that appears the
difficulty to conciliate the laws of conscience with the civil
code. However, with the help of God, as we hope, we will pro
ceed with so much prudence that, guided by the most renowned
doctors, we will be accused neither of supreme severity nor of
supreme indulgency.

PART FIRST.
CONTRACTS IN GENERAL.

754. One calls a contract a covenant, by which one or several
persons agree with one or several others to give, to do, or not to
do something.

One distinguishes contracts as :

1. Unilateral or reciprocal. . . .

2. Gratuitous or onerous. . . .

3. Solemn or simple. . . .

4. Named or unnnmed. . . .

5. Bare or covered. . . .

6. Formal, express ; or virtual, tacit. . . .

7. Absolute or conditional ; pure or not pure. . . .

In all contracts, one distinguishes three things: the essence, the
nature, and the accidents.

Treatise on Contracts. 247

CHAPTER I.

CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR THE CONTRACT.

There -are three of them : the qualified reason, the capable
person, the legitimate consent.

ART. I. The reasons for the contract.

These are, in general, the properties and the points in question ;
that is to say, all that may become the property of the man, and
all of which the contracting parties have the free administration.

The reason ought to be : possible . . . existing . . . honor
able . . . belonging to the contracting parly . . . certain . . .
and able to be appraised. . . .

760. — Ques. Should the thing accepted in virtue of a shame
ful contract, be always given back?

Ans. 1. Before the accomplishment of the act, yes.

2. After, there is controversy. The more common opinion
says : that the price can be accepted ; more than that, the price is
merited in conscience, . . . because the shameful act, although
unworthy of price, as well as illicit, deserves as much for it as
laborious, repugnant, perilous or useful acts.*

* Here takes place the elegant dissertation of Tamhonrin, in his explana
tion of the Decalogue: "How much can a woman," asks to himself the
famous Jesuit, "exact justly for the u^e of her body?"

"The ordinary answer," says lie "is that it is necessary to keep count
of all the circumstances, viz: Nobleness, beauty, age, honesty, etc. For
an honest woman, to whom everybody is not admitted, is worth more
than one who abandons herself to every one. But that is not satisfac
tory.

"Some distinguish between a courtesan and an honest woman. The
courtesan can, in fact, neither claim nor accept only what she is accus
tomed to ask of oiher persons; because there is a contract of purchase
and cale between her and the man: he gives the price, and she, the use
of her own body. . . .

"As for the honest woman, she can ask and accept as much as she is
willing to ... because an honest girl can estimate dearly her honesty
. . . This is why the courtesan can sell herself dearer at her first steps.
. . . (Page 290.)

It is also convenient not to forget Doctor ./. Gordon, who, after
having shortly recalled Tambourin's principles, raises up a particular
species, full of interest: "When the courtesan is married, to whom be
longs the product of her debauchery, prostitution," as he says in precise
terms. "She ought," answers he, "to count the sums received, into the
community, up m which her husband shall have his right.'1 (Page 2S«J.)

248 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

The second opinion denies it, and declares the contract invalid.

ART. II. Subject of the contract.

SECTION 1. Minors. . . .

SECTION 2. Wives. . . .

SECTION 3. People dead in law. . . .

SECTION 4. Interdicted persons and spendthrifts. . . .

ART. III. Required consent.

SECTION 1. Qualities of the legitimate consent.

772.— This consent shall be: external, internal, reciprocal,
free and deliberate. . • .

774.— Ques. Is a contract valid if it is made with the intention
of contracting, but not of binding one's self to fulfil it?

Ans. According to the more probable opinion, no; because
one has added a contrary condition to the substance of the con
tract. From some others, it is according as the will of the con
tract prevails or not.

SECTION 2. Faults opposed to the consent.

The principal are : Error, ruse, violence and fear.

777. — Ques. Gun error or ruse on the subject of the quality,
which is the cause of the contract, annul an onerous contract?

Aus. No, according to the more probable opinion. . .

But when the error comes from a ruse of which one of the con
tracting parties is the author or co-operator, some have judged
that natural right, others that positive right, annuled the con
tract ; but the common and more probable opinion establishes that
it is valid according to the one or other right, although it might
be torn up by the one who has been deceived ; for the substantial
and voluntary consent has not failed. On the other hand, the de
ceiver is held to repair the wrong which he has done, which cannot
be done unless in re-establishing the thing wholly, or unless the
contract be broken. If the ruse has been used by a third party,
without the fault of the second one, necessarily the contract is
valid ; but some pretend that one can tear it off, the others no,
yet, that the deceived party has a recourse against the deceiver in
orcjer to obtain reparation. ...

Treatise on Contracts. 249

778. — Qncs. Can error or ruse on the subject of the motive
annul a contract?

Ans. 1. Yes, if the errors fall upon final motive ; for instance1,
if one bestows charity on Titius, believing he is poor, when he is
rich.

2. No, if the error falls only on the engaging motive; for in
stance, if one bestows charity on Peter who is poor, whom one
believes very honest, when he is only a little so, for that error is
purely accidental.

779. — If wishing to buy some Bordeaux wine, you receive
some Burgundy, the contract is valid in principle, in spite of
the error or ruse ; because the error is not a substantial one.

780. — 1. A contract, in consequence of an intrinsic fear or of a
natural or necessary cause, is not deprived of value and cannot be
torn up, unless the one who has contracted through fear may not
have been the master of himself. No injustice has been done to
the contracting party who keeps a sufficient liberty.

2. It is the same if the fear comes from a free cause, or has
been inspired by a man for a legitimate motive. . . .

782. — Ques. Can one rescind a contract made under the influ
ence of a reverential fear?

Ans. No, according to the more probable opinion ; because
that does not appear a sufficient cause for tearing up a contract,
unless one may understand by it the fear of a serious evil, for in
stance, a long indignation. Likewise prayers, the most importune,
do not constitute a grave fear, unless there may be joined to the
prayers a reverential fear towards a superior.

Ques. Is a contract void, or can it be torn up by private
authority, if a grave and unjust fear has been inspired only by a
third party, without the second one participating: in the injustice?

Ans. There is controversy. The first probable opinion affirms
it. ...

The second one, also probable, denies it. ...

783. — Ques. And if a grave fear has been inspired unjustly,
but not in order to extort the contract?

Ans. There is controversy. . . .

784. — If you threaten a thuf, surprised while stealing, to

250 The Dwtrme of the Jesuits.

denounce him to the wronged proprietor, or to the police or judge,'
unless he promises you a certain gift, his promise has some value,
and you are not held to give back the gift received, unless that
gift appears extreme in the judgment of a prudent man. This is
true, even if you did not have the intention to denounce him, hut
only to frighten him ; because you yield a part of your rights,
the value of which can be estimated. . . .

If some one meditates wronging you, out of pure malice, and
asks nothing from you, and if you yourself promise money to him
in order to have nothing to fear from him, you are not held to
keep your promise ; because, although fear constrained you to
that contract, its only object was, however, to prevent the wrong
that would have been done to you. Now, the one who seeks to
wrong you cannot sell his withdrawal ; consequently, all that he
is acquiring in that manner he receives as a possessor in bad
faith, and ou^ht to restore it.

CHAPTER II.

ODLIGATION OF THE CONTRACT.

This is the tie by which one is constrained, by the strength of
the contract, to give, to do, or not to do something.

786. — Qucs. Are contracts valid and obligatory, in conscience,
in which the formalities required by law are missing?

Ans. There are three probable opinions :

The first one affirms it ; because, by natural right, nothing less
than the consent of the parties is sufficient to oblige, and the
human law does not suppress the natural obligation between
persons elsewhere capable, though it renders the civil action void.

The second one denies it ; because the laws annuling contracts
rest upon the presumption not only of ruse, but also of common
danger, inasmuch as the common interest requires that one sup
press the occasion of no matter what fraud ; and, consequently, the
law can and ought to suppress, in the spiritual tribunal, the
obligation of an annuled contract.

The Uihd opinion requires, that in those contracts cne should

Treatise on Contracts. 251

favor the possessor, until he is condemned to make restitution by
a judgment. . . .

788. — Ques. Can. one, in ceding his property, secretly reserve
something for himself?

An<. If one finds himself in great need, he does not sin
against justice in reserving for himself enough to provide for his
family until the judge may provide for it. Even after the judg
ment, one must not trouble those who have reserved for themselves
things really necessary, and of little value. . . .

CHAPTER III.

MODIFICATION OF THE CONTRACTS.
ART. I. The oath joined to the contract.

793. — Ques. Are oaths valid which are extorted by fear, in
order to consolidate some contracts not valid, in principle, on
account of fear?

Ans. The first opinion, more common, affirms it ; because, for
a religious motive, one should be faithful to one's oath, whenever
one can do it without sin.

The second opinion denies it. ...

ART. II. Some specified modes of contract.
ART. III. Conditions of the contract.

PART SECOND.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONTRACTS.

There is the gratuitous contract and the onerous one.
SECTION 1. Viz. : Promise, donation, loan, deposit and seques
tration, Commission, administration of property, exchange.

252 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CHAPTER I.

PROMISE.

797. — This is a contract by which one engages freely and
spontaneously, to do or not to do, gratuitously, something in
favor of another.

CHAPTER II.

GIFTS.
ART. I. Gifts in general.

801. — A gift is the free transfer of a thing, in favor of
another. . . .

ART. II. Different kinds of gifts.

812. — Ques. Is a gift valid if the giver dies before its accept
ance?

Ans. The negative is more probable ; the affirmative is not
improbable.

Ques. Can the heir of the receiver accept the gift at the death
of the above-mentioned?

Ans. The negative is more probable.

Qnes. Is a gift binding, which is solemnly promised, but not
ace* pled ?

Aus. No, says St. Liguori ; Yes, says Laynumn.

SECTION 2. Wills.

817. — . . . Ques. Are wills valid, in the spiritual tribunal,
which have profane causes for the motive, and lack some of the
required formalities?

There are three probable opinions : the first one declares them
valid ; the second one, null ; the third one, preferred by St. Lig
uori, is in favor of the possessor until the judge may have decided.

818 — Are wills valid which have pious causes for the motive,
even if the legal formalities are missing?

Aus. Yes ; and this opinion is very common an 1 certain. . . .

Treatise on Contracts. 253

827. — Ques. Is there sin against justice, in the spiritual tribu
nal, when parents wrong their legitimate children by a will, or by
gifts during the lifetime of the parents, or by feigned contracts ?

Ans. Yes, in principle.

But, there is no sin when, for a legitimate reason, they partially
wrong their children, in some particular cases. For then the law
has no more bearing, not seeking to extend itself to those particu
lar cases which are useful to the family, and that do not injure the
common interest ; for instance, if a father made a gift as a reward
to an honest child, to the detriment of a spendthrift one.

According to this, fiose children who have received the larger
part of the inheritance, to the detriment of the other heirs, must
not be disquieted, when one can conjecture, from the circum
stances, that the parents wished to favor them for a just reason ;
especially if they are of good faith, and if one can fear with reason
why they refuse to fulfil their obligations. Many theologians even
think that the civil law cannot oblige parents to keep equality be
tween children. Therefore parents are exempt, in principle, from
all fault, if they have provided besides for the wants of their chil
dren, and if they are not impelled by a guilty motive.

828. — Ques. Can parents make gifts from hand to hand to one
of their children, to strangers, or to some pious causes?

Ans. Yes, all kinds of gifts in principle, with the income only,
leaving intact the capital, which constitutes the patrimony, prop
erly so called; because parents are by no means obliged, in
principle, to increase the patrimony, by their income or their
work. . . .

830. — Ques. Ought a legacy, given by natural right to a
young girl in order that she may marry, to be given to her if she
enters a convent?

Ans. Yes, if the legacy has been left to a determinated per
son. . . .

SECTION 3. The gift by reason of death.

835. According to French law, the gift by reason of death is
not allowed. For Article 893 declares, that : nobody can freely
dispose of his properties, only by gifts during the lifetime of the
donor, or by will in the legal form. . . .

254 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

83G. — Ques. Can one to whom has been given a piece of per
sonal property, in consequence of death, take it after the death of
the giver?

Ans. Yes, at least according to the more probable opinion,
provided that, he is sure of the gift, and the last will of the de
ceased. For he has the right to it, and he is only using his right.
Then, the thing was not given in order to be paid for, but in order
to be received by him.

Ques. Is a gift from hand to hand valid, if made by a sick
person, on condition that the gift will be restored to him if he re
covers ?

Ans. Yes; 1, Because the gift is valid as made in case of
death, even according to French law, which does not oppose itself
to the gift from hand to hand ; 2, It is valid as a gift daring the
lifetime of the donor, if it is not revocable by the will of the giver,
but only if he recovers ; because then, it may be looked upon as a
conditional gift during the lifetime of the donor.

Ques. Is the gift valid if made on condition that it shall be
restored if one asks for it?

Ans. Yes, according to the more probable opinion, although
it may not be valid as a gift during the lifetime of the donor ;
because then the donor ought to deprive himself irrevocably of
his property ; however, it can be valid as a gift in case of death,
on account of the actual delivery of the thing, which ought not
to have less force, although one may make no mention of the
death.

SECTION 4. Entailment and trust.

840. — Ques. Are secret trusts valid, in the spiritual tribunal,
for some pious causes, under form of a feigned gift, a will, or a
legacy, in favor of a private person ?

Ans. 1. Yes, if it is a question of a gift from hand to hand,
or of things which cannot be preserved for a long time before the
transfer, or which ought not to be preserved until the death of
the donor, and ought to be regarded for that as things bequeathed

Treatise on Contracts. 255

for a time or on a condition, because that it is not forbidden by
the law.

2. As for what concerns the other gifts, it must be answered
the same as for the wills in favor of the pious causes, where the
legal formalities are missing.

CHAPTER ITT.

LOAN TO CUSTOM.

CHAPTER IV.
DEPOSIT, AND DEPOSIT BY SEQUESTRATION.

CHAPTER V.

COMMISSION AND ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY.

CHAPTER VI.

LOAN.
ART. I. Nature of the contract of the loan.

ART. II. Interest or gain received from the loan.

Interest (usura) understood in a broad sense, is the gain
received from the loan or on its occasion, with or without legit:-
mate title. In its strict meaning, and understood in bad pa it,
it is an unjust profit proceeding immediately from the loan ; that
is to say, from its intrinsic strength, and without other joint
title. ,

256 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

853. — All interest, properly speaking, in putting aside all exter
nal title, is prohibited by natural, divine, and ecclesiastical law.
"• Such was, and is, the perpetual doctrine of the Catholic Church,
confirmed by the unanimous approval of all councils, fathers, and
theologians." (Benoit XIV.)

Interest may be excused from all injustice, if there is a just
title; for instance, in consequence of a wrong; because, then the
gain does not come from the loan, but from the external title,
for it is permitted for you to receive as much as you have given.
Now, then, if lending one hundred francs you are losing ten
francs by it, you lend really one hundred and ten francs. Then
you shall receive one hundred and ten francs. . . .

854. — Ques. Can the lender retain what the borrower has
given to him out of dread, fearing to meet with a refusal some
where else?

Ans. Yes, according to the more probable opinion ; because
one requires for the interest, that this interest shall come from the
strength of the contract itself, as being due from justice. . . .

Ques. Can one insert in the agreement a gift, in return (anti-
dorale), that one makes out of gratitude?

Ans. No ; because same agreements are a title of justice, and
not a gift given purely out of gratitude.

ART. III. Titles which excuse the interest.

There are five principal ones : 1, loss experienced ; 2, depriva
tion of a gain ; 3, risks of loss ; 4, conventional penalty ; 5, the
civil law.

I. Loss EXPERIENCED.

856. — This is the detriment that the lender undergoes from the
occasion of a loan made to another.

If the lender sustains a prejudice on account of his loan, there
is a legitimate title for receiving more money.

857. — Ques. Is it permitted, from the very first of the loan,
to agree to a certain benefit, if the resulting loss is only probable
in the future ?

Ans. Yes.

Treatise on Contracts. 257

II. DEPRIVATION OF A GAIN.

858. — This is the loss of what the lender might have gained if
he had kept his property or money, and had used it in another
legal contract. . . .

Qties. Can one exact something for the deprivation of a gain,
on account of a loan, if the lender might not have used his own
money for anything?

Ans. 1. Yes, if one had reserved it for the wants of his family,
or in order not to compromise his own position ; because one is
not obliged to neglect his own affairs on account of making a
loan.

2. Yes, according to the probable opinion, in all other causes ;
because the loan is the true cause of the deprivation of the gain.

III. RISK OF Loss.

859. — This is the reasonable fear that one feels in apprehend
ing that he may not be able to retrieve what he has lent.

This risk constitutes a just title for gain. For, if one can
estimate the value of the expectation, a fortiori, one can estimate
the risk of a probable damage.

IV. CONVENTIONAL PENALTY.

861. — This consists in what the borrower binds himself to pay
in addition, if he does not return the loan at the fixed time.

It is a legitimate title to accept something more than the
borrowed money, by which one secures himself against the negli
gence of the borrower.

V. TITLE COMING FROM THE CIVIL LAW.

862. — Laws authorizing a certain profit on loans, exist among
almost all people to-day. In France, the law enacted on the 3d
of September, 1807, fixed at 5 per cent, the interest on civil
matters, 6 per cent, in the commercial ones.

As for knowing whether the civil law creates a legitimate title
in the spiritual tribunal, in order to get some gain from a loan,
there is controversy. The opinion which answers yes, is the more
probable and common. It follows, then, that :

258 The Doctrine of /Jte Jesuits.

The title of the civil law, according to the more probable
opinion, is a just and honest reason for exacting something in
addition, even in the absence of any other title. . . .

872. — Ques. Is one permitted to exceed the legal rate, on
account of loss experienced, or the deprivation of a gain?

Ans. If the money is given for the profit, and not for Hie
necessity of the borrower, there is controversy, and two opinions.
The first one affirms it by reason of indemnity, or just compensa
tion ; so thinks Pages de Lyon, in spite of his severity, so known
in matters of usury. . . .

873. — -Ques. Is it permitted to receive interest on interests?

Ans. Yes, in the civil law. . . .

1. Yes, also, in the spiritual tribunal, if there has been ante
rior, explicit, or implicit agreement.

2. If, in consequence of a delay in the payment, the creditor
experiences a loss.

Ques, Is it permitted, to collect the legal interest when it
exceeds 5 or 6 per cent. ?

Ans. Yes, if the law seems just when one has considered all
the circumstances ; that is to say, if one sees there is equality
between the interest permitted by the law, and the value of the
use of the money. . . .

875. — One can, and even ought, to absolve those who do not
exceed the legal rate of interest, seeing that they commit no
injustice, and one cannot constrain them to make restitution. . . .

876. — One must not accuse of injustice those who draw the
interest of the money lent to a poor man who does not find
himself in a grave necessity. . . .

877. — The one who borrows at the legal rate, should not exact
10 per cent, in lending in his turn to another person ; because he
has no title to exact 5 per cent. more. However, many permit
bankers, who borrow often to lend in their turn, to exact some
thing more than the legal rate ; for instance, one per cent, on
account of their work, time, and expenses ; according to the
bankers, they could ask 7 per cent., for they are considered as
merchants, and as such could already ask 6 per cent. The
custom of many count. ies authorizes them. Likewise, it is not

Treatise on Contracts. 259

contrary to natural or civil law to borrow at 3 or 4 per cent.,
and to lend at 5. . . .

Appendix : On Loan-Banks.

879. — . . . This institution is permitted, and is not a usurer,
independently of any other title to gain. . . .

880. — Ques. Can a private person establish a loan-bank?

Ans. Yes, according to the more probable opinion, because it
matters little for the interest whether it may be a public or private
institution, provided the principal person exact only what is
necessary in order to indemnify himself.

SECTION 2. Onerous contracts.

Of sale and purchase, society and trinnire contracts, letting and
hiring, exchange, quit-rent, security, pledge and mortgage, assur
ance, promise, lottery, game.

CHAPTER I.

SALE AND PURCHASE.
ART. I. Nature of the sale and purchase.

881. — The contract of sale and purchase is thus defined: the
exchange of money for merchandise, or vice versa ; or : an onerous
contract by which one engages one's self to give a just and
determined price for merchandise, and vice versa.

882. — Ques. Is the seller obliged to declare the defects in his
thing ?

Ans. It is necessary to distinguish : according as those defects
are substantial or accidental, manifest or hidden, and if the seller
is questioned or not on the subject.

If the defects are substantial, he is held to reveal them. . . .

Interrogated, he shall reveal all the hidden defects. . . . Not
interrogated, no. ... He is not held to reveal the accidental
defects. . . .

ART. II. Fair price.

260 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

889. There is the price legal, or determined by the law, and the
natural and popular price, fixed by the common opinion of men.

890. — The legal price, or the one fixed by civil authority,
ought to be considered as adequate to the value of the thing, and
kept on condition of restitution.

Sometimes it is permitted to deviate from it :

1. If the majority itself deviates.

2. If, the circumstances changing, the price becomes unjust.

3. If the goods are notably dear, more or less, than the cus
tom.

In the absence of a legal price, one should consider as only just,
the price determined by common opinion, if one is capable of esti
mating it; because this price, adequate for the things of same
species, is deduced by their utility for common uses, and could
not be better estimated than by the common opinion. . . .

891. — Qties. Can a seller sell an object dearer, on account
of a particular attachment he has for it, or of the advantage that
he receives from it?

Ans. 1. Yes; because that attachment can be appraised, inas
much as the privation of it is more laborious.

2. Yes, with more reason, if the privation of a special advan
tage makes the thing much more precious to the seller ; it is just
that he increase the price of it, by reason of the loss which ho
undergoes.

893. Ques. Can one buy at a low price in order to please a
seller who seeks a buyer?

Ans. Yes, for the things are undervalued by a voluntary offer;
and the price diminished, when the thing is of little use to the
buyer, and the latter buys it only out of kindness towards the
seller.

Qnes. Can one buy at a low price when the sale takes place on
account of poverty?

Ans. Yes, according to the probable opinion ; because the
article loses its value in the common estimation. The poverty of
the seller does not change the common estimation. However,
others deny it, with probable opinion.

Treatise on Contracts. 261

894. — Qnes. Can one buy a promissory note, or a claim upon a
person, at a low price, on account of an anticipated payment?

Ans. 1. Yes assuredly, if the payment is uncertain or difficult;
because the claim loses a great deal of its value.

2. Yes, according to the probable opinion ; even if the pay
ment of this promissory note or claim is certain and easy ;
because: 1, one buys not the money itself, but the action upon
him, and, consequently, the price given for such promissory notes
is supposed fair; 2, because there is equivalence in the money
lent ; but also, for the same reason, it is permitted, with the loan,
to realize a moderate gain, at the legal rate.

895. — Ques. Can one buy at a greatly inferior price some
debts very difficult to collect, on account of special circumstances
which renders the collection easy to you ?

Ans. Yes, according to the more probable opinion ; because
easiness to obtain the payment does not depend on the thing sold,
but on the buyer himself. Now, the value of a thing is not deter
mined by a particular circumstance to the buyer, but by the com
mon estimation.

896. — Ques. Can one sell at the current price a merchandise
mingled with another of inferior quality ?

Ans.. ... 1. If your merchandise is of an extraordinary qual
ity, you can probably, after having mixed it, sell it at the common
price ; 2, If you mix inferior merchandise with superior, in such a
manner that the value of the superior one is diminished, you can
sell it at the customary price. . . .

897. — Ques. Are dealers held to make restitution when, by
their lies, they induce the buyers to pay for their goods dearer
than they ought to do, however, without exceeding the highest
price?

Ans. In principle, it may be necessary to declare it ; because
there has been a cause of da-nage. However, ordinarily, the lies,
or even perjuries, by which dealers affirm that their goods cost so
much to them, or that such a price was offered to them, otigiit not
to be considered as frauds really prejud'cial ; because these frauds
are so frequent with them, that almost nobody trusts in them.

262 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

900. — Ques. Does one sin against justice in buying, at a low
price, some precious objects exposed for sale by dealers of an
tiquity ?

Ans. No ; because those things are supposed to have lost their
former price, for another price admitted by custom and the agree
ment of the contracting parties. Consequent!}', there exists the
greatest latitude in the price of these objects. It is for that rea
son that one buys for a few francs some books which might have
been sold for five or ten francs. Likewise, in the purchase of
second hand pieces of ancient furniture, which are commonly
regarded as having an inferior value.

ART. III. Principal kind of sales.
SECTION 1. Hetrovendition and mohatra.

903. — Eetrovendition is a contract by which the seller reserves
the right to buy his property back, under condition that he will
take account of the improvements, outlays, etc.

Mohatra is a sort of re-sale, or contract, by which one sells a
thing at a higher price, under condition that the buyer sells it
again at an inferior price after having paid for it. ...

906.— Ques. What must we think of the mohatra contract.

Ans. It is a usurious and illicit contract, in principle, which
was condemned by Innocent XL Prop. 40th.

However, we must not condemn this contract, if the gain does
not exceed the legal rate of interest for the lent money.

There is a recent commercial transaction, included in the re-sale,
called Report. . . . This kind of re-sale should not be condemned,
in principle, provided the overplus does not exceed the legal rate ;
for one would fall easily into usury and mohatra, if one did not
keep himself within those just Minus.

There are some, however, who enlarge those limits, and that
from an opinion not improbable.

SECTION 2. Auction sale. . . .

910. — Ques. Can a pu: chaser make an agreement with others
not to outbid him, or offer more than he?

Ans. No, at least in the case of a forced auction sale, because

Treatise on Contracts, 2G3

the seller has the light to require that the purchasers be perfectly
free, in order to increase the bids. However, Cardinal Lugo, with
Diana and others, seem to have the contrary opinion, at least, as
to the sin of injustice.

911. — Ques. Can a purchaser request others not to bid in the
auction ?

Ans. Yes, because in so doing, the right of the seller is not
violated, inasmuch as the liberty of outbidding is not suppressed,
and the purchaser only watches his own interests. However, the
requests should not be importunate.*

SECTION 3. Monopoly.

914. — Ques. Do merchants sin against justice or charity when,
at tho time of the harvest or vintage, they buy at low and current
prices all the wheat or wine of the country, in order to sell them
dearer?

Ans. 1. No, according to the more probable opinion, as to
the justice, provided they do not exceed the maximum price that
one can obtain outside of the monopoly ; for they do not violate
ai>y law.

2. No, according to the probable opinion, as to charity, pro
vided they do not induce others to sell dearer, nor exceed the
maximum price ; for merchants use their rights, and no one is
held to neglect his own interests in order to avoid a loss to others,
inasmuch as one is not constrained to it.

SECTION 4. Sale by middle-men. . . .

CHAPTER II.

PARTNERSHIP AND TREBLE CONTRACTS.
ART. I. Partnership.

917. — A partnership-contract is an agreement concerning a
thing to be possessed in common for the common interest, or lor
a proportional gain.

* See the Penal Code, Art. 412, which punishes such actions with im
prisonment, from fifteen days to three months, and a line of from one
hundred to live thousand francs.

264 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

ART. II. Treble contract. . . .

CHAPTER III.
RENTING.

• •••«* • •••»•

CHAPTER IV.

929. — Ques. Ought the exchange, commonly called of Frank
fort, to be allowed, in which the money-changer lends money that
one ought to pay back at the next stock-market, so that the profit
increases in proportion to the delay?

Ans. Yes, if it is in virtue of a discontinuance of gain, conse
quent loss, etc., etc. Otherwise, there is controvers}*.

CHAPTER V.

QUIT- RENT.

• ••••••••••'A

•

CHAPTER VI.

SUBSIDIARY CONTRACTS.
ART. I. The Bondsman. . . .
ART. II. The Security. . . .
ART. Ill, The Mortgage. . . .

CHAPTER VIII.

CONTINGENT CONTRACTS.

940. — These are of different kinds: insurance, betting, the
lottery, and gambling. They are called contingent, because they
are exposed to the vicissitudes of fate.

ART. I. Insurance. . . .
ART. II. Betting. . . .

Treatise on Contracts. 265

ART. III. The Lottery. . . .
ART. IV. Gambling. . . .

There are three kinds of gambling : Ingenious, where the suc
cess depends upon the skill of the gambler ; Contingent, which
depends especially on chance ; Mixed, where cleverness and hazard
mix themselves.

945. — Any one of them is illicit in itself, under certain con
ditions. . . .

948. — Ques. Is the winner in a prohibited game obliged to
make restitution to his victim?

Ans. No, because this contract is not declared void, but illicit
only. . . .

Cases on Contracts in ffieneral.

CASE I.
MOTIVE OF THE CONTRACTOR.

Marius says to Antoine : "I will deliver you of your enemy
Titius, if you will promise me one himdredlouis, fifty immediately,
the remainder alter the death of Titius." Antoine consents to it.
Marius receives fifty louis, and kills Titius.

Ques. Can Marius, the homicide committed, keep the money
which he has received, and claim the rest which is promised to
him ?

Ans. There is controversy ; according to the probable opinion,
Marius can keep what was promised to him by contract. This is
the opinion of St. Liguori, contrary to those of many others ;
because, although the contract may not be valid on account of its
shameful and bad object intrinsically, nevertheless, after the crime
is committed, it seems to have been a contract whose nature
exacts that, whenever one of the two contracting parties has kept
his word, the other ought to keep his, if he can do it justly. For,
although this shameful action may be unworthy of an}r reward, yet
it deserves some recompense, as difficult, perilous or shameful for
the author. Then, after the crime, there is no sin if the party
who has promised the money gives it. Then, Marius, according
to the probable opinion, can keep what he has received, and claim
what Titius has promised him.

CASE II.
MOTIVE OF THE CONTRACT.

Armeline, a young girl, having received some money from
Lo?lius, who urges her to sin with him, after having refused to
commit the shameful act, keeps the money.

Cases on Contracts in General. 267

Ques. Can Arraeline keep the money received from Loelius?

Ans. Yes, without any injustice ; for there was no agreement
to commit the sin, inasmuch as the money was used only to solicit
the young girl.

CASE III.
CONTRACTS FOR A SHAMEFUL OBJECT.

1. Valfrid has induced Elodie to sin with him, on condition
that, if she yields to his wishes, he will marry her. But, after the
crime, he refuses to keep his promise ; because, says he, no child
will come, and, consequently, he has no damage to repair.

2. Leonce induced Camille to sin with him, by promising
money to her ; but after the sin, the rogue gives nothing to the
unhappy woman. Having declered this to his confessor, he is
constrained by the latter to give money for a grave motive.

Ques. 1. Is Valfrid held to marry Elodie?

Ques. 2. Has Leonce sinned gravely in not giving the promised
money? If he had given it, could Camille keep the money?

Ans. Question 1. Valfrid, according to the more common
opinion, ought to marry Elodie ; because there has been a contract
having no special denomination du ut des. . . . However, others
more recent oppose the plea of nullity drawn from the shameful
contract.

But St. Liguori, and the majority of doctors, make some excep
tions : 1, if one fears that the marriage may have a disagreeable
result; ... 2, if, when Valfrid made the acquaintance of Elodie,
he believed that she was a virgin and discovered that she was not ;
3, if, from the marriage, shame should reflect upon the family; 4
more probably, if the condition of the man is very superior to that
of the woman.

Ans. Question 2. Leonce, according to the probable opinion, is
not held to pay the promised money, if there is no wrong to repair,
as most frequently happens ; because a contract having for its
subject a shameful object has no value, and there is evidently no
obligation coming from another motive. But if the woman had
received the money, according to the probable opinion, she would
not be obliged to give it back, from what was said above.

268 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CASE XI.
CONDITION ix THE CONTRACT.

Frederic, a rich man, without children, on the point of death,
makes the following will : 1, he gives to Rose, a poor young girl,
one thousand louisif she marries ; 2, to Rosalie, his God-dauo:hter,
one hundred louis if she enters a convent. But after his death,
Rose wishes to enter a convent, and Rosalie to marry.

Ques. 1. Can Rose keep the legacy, although she may not have
fulfilled the condition?

Ques. 2. Has Rosalie a right to the legacy which has been left
to her?

Ans. Question 1. Rose has a right to the legacy, because the
testator wished evidently to favor her in forcing her to embrace an
honorable condition, where the body and soul would encounter no
peril. Moreover, the religious state is a true spiritual marriage ;
and if it was excluded by the testator, it would be a shameful
condition, which would not be considered as having been added.
Thus the testator is presumed to have wished to protect Rose, who
could thus make an honorable marriage, or choose another honor
able condition. However, it is necessary to examine the circum
stances ; for if the testator had said : tfcl leave one thousand louis
to Rose if she marries my cousin Peter," the disposition falls if
the marriage does not take place ; for the testator wished to favor
not only Rose, but also his cousin Peter.

Ans. Question 2. The legacy is owed also to Rosalie ; because,
from the circumstances, one can presume that the testator had
wished to favor her in a a special manner, inasmuch as she is his
God-daughter ; and he is not considered as having wished to
deprive her of this legacy if she felt no vocation for the religious
state.

CASE XIV.
THE DISEMBOWELED DOG.

Fulgence lends one thousand francs to Drusille. At the fixed
time the latter goes to Fulgence, in order to pay his debt. He
finds him taking his breakfast with his family. Received with affa
bility and invited, he takes a seat at the table. He leaves on the

Cases on Contracts in General. 269

table a one-thousand-franc bill, without thinking of what will bap-
pon. While the guests give themselves up to mirth, a gust of wind,
coming unexpectedly, raises the bill and dashes it into a dish full
of sauce. Fulgence pulls it out immediately, and holding it by
one corner, drains it at the end of the table. But, alas ! there is
a dog who, seeing the bill covered with sauce, seizes and swallows
it. Immediately it is decided to kill the dog ; but the animal runs
away, and comes back only in the evening. He is soon disem
boweled, but too late, the bill was entirely digested. From this
proceeds a suit in law between Fulgence and Drusille.
Ques. Which one of these two should suffer the loss?
Ans. Here is a dog uselessly killed ; his death cannot present
a very grave suit in law. It is necessary to solve the question ;
but in favor of whom, creditor or debtor? Will the two parties be
compelled to divide the loss? I think that Drusille, the debtor,
should be exempted from the obligation to pay the sum. You will
yield the right to me, if ever so little you examine the matter ; for
Drusille has shown the bill before all the guests, and placed it on
the table before Fulgence, who saw it. Who of the guests doubted
that the payment was made? Nobody, assuredly. Then, the
creditor is considered as having received what was owed to him.
Then, if the bill comes to be lost, it is lost for its owner, Fulgence.
Besides, was the bill not lost in his own hands, rather by his dog,
when he held it? Therefore, Fulgence alone ought to undergo the
loss of the money and dog.

Cases on promises ant» Honattons.

CASE I.
PROMISE.

1. Marcel has promised to give three hundred louis dowry to
Appolonie, if she consents to marry Albert. For a while, the young
girl does not know what to do ; but her father gladly accepts in
her behalf. However, Marcel, changing his mind, promises to
give that money partly to a hospital, partly to the poor, and
partly to a cousin of his, five years of age. But he changes his
mind once more, and finally keeps the money for himself.

2. Victorin, a priest, promises to his friends, besides a sp- cial
mention in his daily prayers, that he will celebrate a mass for
them ; but he often neglects to keep his promise.

Ques. To what extent has Marcel or Victorin sinned?

Ans. Marcel has not sinned by refusing the money promised to
Appolonie ; because, as it was a question of an onerous contract,
the young girl's father could not very well accept in her behalf.
And he has not sinned by changing his mind a second time ;
because no acceptation resulted from these various promises.

Victorin has, in fact, committed but a venial sin, had he strictly
promised ; but in most instances such promises are simply an
intention suggested, and are not strict promises. However, you
will notice that the most part of the time, the acceptation, which
should be given, is missing.

CASE III.
DONATION BETWEEN LIVING PARTIES.

Benno, on his death-bed, resolves to give one thousand francs
to Margaret, his wife, as a reward for her kindness, care and
services to him, and also that she should not be disrespectfully

Cases on Promises and Donations. 271

r

treated, and even scorned, by his only son. lie therefore requests
her to take the money, which is placed in a safe. She accepts;
but thinking more of relieving her husband than of looking after
her own interests, she only takes that money after the doiiator's
death.

Ques. Is the donation valid? Is a wife allowed to tako the
money after her husband's death? Would the son be entitled to
contest the donation ?

Ans. The donation made to Margaret by her dying husband is
quite valid, for there are all the required conditions: it was freely
made, clearly determinated, accepted and made between living
parties, by a man fit to make a gift : so it is to be supposed that
the son's legitimate rights can not be wronged. The transfer of
the money has therefore been made in favor of the wife when her
husband was still living. Consequently, the wife is at liberty to
take the money as she thinks fit, either before or after her husband's
death. The question of circumstances makes no difference in such
a case. The son, therefore, cannot contest the donation, inasmuch
as it is entirely valid, having been made between living parties.

CASE IV.
CONDITIONAL DONATION.

Quidonius, a merchant, had promised three thousand francs to
his niece, Bibiane, who was upon being married ; but a few
years later, having sustained misfortunes, and besides, Bibiane's
husband not giving him satisfaction, he thinks he is released from
his promise.

Ques. Is Quidonius discharged from his promise?

Ans. If it is question of a simple promise, Quidonius, for the
two alleged reasons, is exempted from any obligation ; for had he
foreseen what happened, he would not have promised anything.
But if it is a question of a donation between living parties, it is
much harder to withdraw it ; for the decrease of his fortune is not
a sufficient cause to cancel the donation, and the other reason is of
no value, if it were merely based on the bad conduct of the niece's

272 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

husband ; unless Quidonius had been most outrageously ill-treated
by his son-in-law.

CASE VI.
DONATION FOR CAUSE OF DEATH.

Privatus, very sick, calls his servant, and says to her: "If I
happen to die, you will take from my safe a box containing one
hundred francs, that I wish to give you after my death." Beliue,
exalted with joy and sorrow, gives many thanks to her master.
But the heirs were present, anxiously waiting. As soon as Priva
tus had passed away, all his propert}' is put under seal, and conse
quently the unfortunate servant cannot take hold of the said
box. She makes a claim, but without result, and is rebuked by
the heirs. What is she to do? She catches a good opportunity
to secure a secret compensation.

Qties. Has she misused secret compensation?

Ans. Beline had a right to take such a compensation ; because
she was entitled to receive the present, and it happened but acci
dentally that the heirs had refused it to her, as they were not
certain about the fact. A secret compensation is allowed by
theologians when the debt is positive, and the creditor cannot
obtain payment by any other means.

CASE VII.
DONATION FOR CAUSE OF DEATH.

Galdinus, being without children and severely sick, gives to
Monique, his wife, one hundred francs, and his word that she
should receive three hundred francs after his death. When he is
deceased, his wife hastens to comply with his last wishes. But
soon after, Pontius, the heir to all the estate, sues her in court,
requesting her to swear that she has not taken anything from the
dead man's property,

Ques. Shall Monique swear she has not taken anything?

Ans. Yes ; because she has only taken what belonged to
her; for at the death of the husband, the property of the given
money is granted to the wife ; the money, therefore, belonged

Cases on Promises and Donation*. 273

to her. Consequently, she has not taken what did not belong
to her. Nobody has a right, to ask her questions on the man
ner she disposed of her property. She is therefore right in swear
ing that she has not reeeived anything of the estate of thj deceased ;
that is to say, nothing which was belonging to him. Do not sav
the donation for cause of death is declared null by the French law';
for it is only rendered void by a judgment, but not, probably, ipso
facto, as will be further stated regarding wills having a lack of
legal formalities. Moreover, as it has been above mentioned, the
donations made from hand to hand are not considered as void.

CASE VIIL
DONATION FOR CAUSE OF DEATH.

Philemon, being dangerously sick, snys to Anna, his wife: "I
give you one thousand francs, which you will find in our safe, in
order to reward your good care and solicitude towards me."
Anna accepts with thankfulness. But the sons that Philemon has
had from a former marriage, endeavor to persuade their father to
give up his decision, but without success. Consequently, after
his death, they contest the donation as being prejudicial to their
interests.

Ques. Shall Anna receive and keep the given money, at least
before the judge's verdict ?

Ans. Anna could, without any remorse of conscience, keep the
noney, at least before the judgment: unless she may have
encroached on her legitimate rights. In the latter case, she should
keep only a fixed sum in proportion to the surplus. For a legiti
mate donation transmits the disposable property from one party to
another. Now, this donation was legitimate.

CASE IX.
DONATION MADE BY A DYING MAN, AND DENIED BY His HEIR.

Gennadius had lent to his brother Henry, a dealer, one thousand
louis, without interest, for two years, in order to help him out of a

271 The D >ctruie of tJie Jesuits.

great misfortune. One year later, Gennadius is taken very sick,
and is in great danger of death. Henry, giving him a call, ui gently
asks his brother to give him discharge of his debt. " I gladly give
you that money," answers Gennadius, "as my only son has enough
for himself. However, I desire you to say nothing to anybody about
it." After the death of Gennadius, his son Nestor finds a letter in
which his Uncle Henry thanked Gennadius for the money which
the latter had lent him for two years without interest. When the
time is over, the son claims the amount. Henry, astonishel,
refuses to pa}*, declaring that Nestor's father had given him this
money. But, not being able to prove that assertion, he is con
demned to pay.

Ques. Will Henry have a right to secure a secret compensa
tion after the judgment is over?

Ans. Yes, that is clear, from what has been said ; for Henry
was no longer Gennadius' debtor before God, as he had obtained
the remittance of his dc-bt. Therefore, the judgment is, at least
materially, unjust and null, as based on a false presumption of a
peculiar fact, that is to say, of a debt contracted and not paid or
given up. Now, as soon as the judgment is materially unjust, one
is not obliged to obey it in conscience. Henry, therefore, was
unjustly forced to pay ; consequently he is entitled to take back
what he has paid by constraint. In fact, Nestor has received what
was not belonging to him. Therefore his uucle would not wrong
him, if he were to take back, without saying a word, the money he
had to pay by foice.

CASE X.
PARENTS' DONATION.

Augustus has two sons ; one is endowed with remarkable
qualities, the other is a coarse drunkard and a spendthrift. Besides
the third of his property, left by a will to the first one, Augustus
gives him some notible gifts, while recommending to him to
relieve, in the future, his brother from poverty.

Ques. What must we think of Augustus?

Cases on Promises and Donations. 275

Ans. Augustus, far from having committed the sin of injustice,
has shown very praiseworthy prudence and wisdom ; as by so
dealing he has thought of the future of his spendthrift son, so that
lie might be able to secure some bread, after having squandered
all his share. Therefore, we must not blame him.

on JUilte antr

CASE II.
VALUE OF THE WILL.

Sabas, having no consideration for his brother Potamius,
appoints Placide, his second cousin, as his heir ; but before he can
sign the will, Sabas suddenly dies, and Potamius receives the
inheritance. Placide, frustrated, keeps, without saying a word,
one thousand francs, which the testator had lent him.

Ques. Has Placide a right to keep the above sum?

Ans. Yes, most probably. For, the party appointed heir by
an illegal will is entitled to keep the inheritance by natural right,
until he may be deprived of it by a judgment ; moreover, he has a
right to keep a part of it. For, in this case, no judgment inter
feres. Therefore, Placide may quietly retain the money which was
lent to him.

CASE III.

VALUE OF THE WILL. — NOCTURNAL SPECTRE.
Vulpin, a cunning man, having two marriageable daughters, and
not being able to give them a dowry, imagines a good scheme to
get out of his trouble. Not far from the borough was a beautiful
cottage, where was residing Euphemie, an old lady, without any
near heirs. Desiring to secure the succession, Vulpin conceives a
plan to secure it for himself or his daughters. During a very dark
night, a great noise was heard in her IK use. Euphemie, fright
ened, trembling, cries out. Same noise takes place for many
nights, with the same anguishes of the old lady. But Vulpin, who
was the author of it, calls upon her, under some pretext, learns
from her what he well knew, comforts her, and gives her the advice
to leave this cursed house and to shelter in his own. She consents,

Cases on Wills and Legacies. 277

and is welcomed. Treated with the greatest care and consideration,
in return, she makes a will in favor of Vulpin's daughters, and
dies soon after.

Ques. 1. Ought Vulpin's daughters, having inherited in good
faith, to give back the money, if they learn in course of time the
trick of their father?

Ques. 2. Should Vulpin return the money in behalf of his
daughters? Quid, or in case he had been appointed heir himself?

Aus. Question 1. Vulpin's daughters, who became heiresses in
good faith, bhould be dispensed of any restitution. They have
not acted unjustly in any way ; on the contrary, with true charity,
they have shown themselves very serviceable to Euphemie, and
they do not possess what does n*.t belong to them, as they have
received it through a legitimate will.

Ana. Question 2. Vulpin should not make restitution for his
daughters ; because he was not the cause, but only the occasion of
the will made in their favor; inasmuch as f t ar had no influence,
in a direct and efficacious manner, upon the deed which has
appointed his daughters heiresses ; for Euphemie was free to do it
or not ; to revoke it, or pay the young girls' services by some other
gifts. If he had himself inherited, the case should be resolved in
the same manner, for the same reasons would be valid.

CASE VI.
WILL DESTROYED BY HAZARD, AND RECONSTRUCTED BY ARTFULNESS.

Chrysanthe, before dying, leaves to Adrian a will written by his
own hand, in, his favor. After Chysanlhe's death, the happy
Adrian reads over the will with delight, then places it on a table,
and goes to blow the fire. Unluckily the door opens itself, and a
draught throws the sheet of paper in the fire. Adrian hastens and
endeavors, but without success, to save it from the flames. But
it is entirely burnt. Adrian, in despair, thinks to use a queer
process. He imitat s perfectly the dead man's handwriting and
signature, and thereby reconstructs the whole will.

Ques. Should he by right make restitution to the natural
heirs?

278 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ans. No, as having been appointed legitimate heir, through a
valid will, immediately after the death of the testator, he, there
fore, has evidently acquired a certain and strict right to the
inheritance. Now, this right once acquired, cannot be lost by the
destruction of the deed, but only by a voluntary assignment, or a
legitimate transfer of property. Consequently, Adrian has not
lost his right ; for, why should the right in itself, or the strict
right, be burnt and reduced to ashes, like the paper-title which
is the proof of it? Not at all.

Now, if Adrian has a strict right to the inheritance, he cannot
act unjustly by using such means, although they may be unlawful,
in order to secure his rights, and lie does not wrong the other
relatives by shrewdly preventing their inheriting, as they have no
right to it.

CASE XI.
LEGVCIES.

Mercorus had promised to leave one hundred louis to Publius, in
his will. But being suddenly taken ill, and in danger of death, he
calls his son Andrea, and says to him : " I wish 3*011 to give one
hundred louis to Publius." Just after these words he die;-, without
leaving any written will.

Ques. Should Andrea give the money to Publius?

Ans. Probably, he is not held, at least on principle, to settle
his father's legacy ; because this manner of disposing of his
property is not in accordance with the law ; for probably a legacy
is effective when it is based on a valid will, except in case the son
should have promised his father to comply with his desire ; as
tlu re would have been tacit contract, by which the son would be
bound to settle the legacy ; for the father, trusting in the promise
of his son, abstains from transferring the legacy in a safer way.
I said probably-, as there exists a great controversy before the
judgment ; for there are two probable opinions. Some bind the
heir, by natural right, to fulfil the dead man's desire ; and others
are opposed to it, by maintaining the regular disposition of the
law.

Cases on Wills and Legacies. 279

CASE XII.
CONDITIONAL LEGACIES.

Calopodius, before dying, without children, thus disposes of his
propei ty by a will. First, lie leaves his mansion to his wife, and
the value of this house to his niece, providing botli live in the
greatest chastity. Second, he leaves one thousand francs dowry
to a young orphan giil, to be named by the parson.

But after a few years of widowhood, hi** wife marries again.
His niece secretly commits the crime of fornication. The parson
chooses a young girl having yet father and mother, very poor, old
and infirm, intending to give her the above dowry.

Ques. 1. Muy Calopo lius' wife and niece enjoy the above-
named legacy without remorse of conscience?

Ques. 2. Should the down- be given to the young girl having
parents miserable and infirm?

Ans. Question 1. Yes, regarding the wife, she was able to
marry again without losing the legacy. She has not violated the
condition to live chastely; as, properly speaking, chastity is not
lost by this marriage, inasmuch as a second marriage is chaste.
As for the niece, it set-rns that there must also be shown some
indulgence towards her, although she may have sinned, for the
fault was kept secret, and she is commonly considered as a
virgin. And it imi.->t not be presumed that the testator has wished
to cast avvny his niece, in case she should secretly commit a sin
against purity. And she does not appear herself to be obliged
to confess that sin, while renouncing ih.j inheritance.

Ans. Question 2. The priest is not to blame. The }'oung girl
he has chosen may enjoy the dowry, although she may not he a
true orphan ; because she has an equivalent situation. As the
testator has wished to give the dowry to an unfortunate girl, in
order to save her from dang T, therefore his intentions are
fulfilled.

H »wever, in accordance with many theologians, if there was
another young girl equally miserable, and a true orphan, she
ought to )>e preferred ; as, in case the intentions of the testator
may possibly be fulfilled in their proper meaning, they should not

280 The Doctrine of Ike Jesuits.

be fulfilled in a larger sense. But a great many think otherwise.
For the girl who has infirm an 1 incapable parents is more unfor
tunate than the one who has not any. Her soul and body run
more dangers ; and, consequently, the aim which the donator
proposed to attain, is indeed properly fulfilled.

CASE XIF.
PROFANE LEGACIES SHOWING A LACK OF LEGAL FORMALITIES.

Hector, heir of Matthew, by the latter's will, learns through
trustworthy witnesses, or notes received secretly, that he has to
settle certain profane legacies. He refuses to do so, because the
law does not bind him.

Ques. Should Hector pay these legacies?

Ans. No, according to the probable opinion, Hector is not
held to pay these legacies ; unless he has made previous agree
ment or special promise. The reason is, that these dispositions,
made by the testator's desire, are not valid, according to
the probable opinion, even before the judgment, as they contain
quite a lack of legal formalities ; therefore, they ought to be
considered as not existing. And do not make the objection that
the heir knows the testator's wishes regarding these conditions ;
because such desire, although binding by the natural law, become
null before the civil law, according to the probable opinion, as
lacking the legal conditions required.

CASE XIV.
Pious LEGACIES HAVING A LACK OF LEGAL FORMALITIES.

Toussaint, a pious man, before dying, recommends urgently to
his son Germain, to whom he leaves a rich legacy, to have two
hundred masses celebrated for the repose of his soul, and to give
one thousand francs for the relief of the poor, and other pious uses.
Germain, after his father's death, pays for ten masses, but
neglects the other prescriptions of the dead man, as they are not
in accordance with the conditions required by the law, and that
consequently he is not held, in conscience, to fulfill them. His

Cases ou Wills and Legacies. 281

confessor learning that, refuses to give him absolution, until he
may have accomplished the prescriptions of his father.

Ques. 1. Should one, in conscience, pay pious legacies, even
when they bear a lack of legal condition ?

Ques. 2. Would the priest in this case be able to give absolu
tion to Germain ?

Ans. Question 1. Yes, this opinion is positive, whatever con
troversy may have existed formerly on this subject. It is the
common opinion, followed by St. Liguori ; because pious motives
are relative to the church, and are submitted to her jurisdiction.
No ; the church is free and independent from any civil power for
all cases submitted to her jurisdiction. . . .

Ans. Question 2. From what has been said, it is clear that the
priest must not show any indulgence towards Germain, and that
he cannot be granted absolution. . . .

Solution 1. If the heir is certain that the testator's desire was
to spend some money for pious use, although it may not be proved,
practically, however, he is bound in his conscience to comply
with the desire of the testator ; for one does not seek the proof
when sure of the truth.

2. If the priest, after the death of his parishioner, shows a
note in which are written various pious legacies, then, if one recog
nizes, or if two witnesses are able to prove the}* are written in the
handwriting of the deceased testator, the son must obey his
pious will. But if the priest has simply t-iken note of the lega
cies he will not be believed, unless there is another witness.
M >reover, priests or confessors shall not receive such pious lega-
c es until having called two witnesses, male or female. However,
one witness only will be sufficient in addition to the priest.

3. Pious legacies are valid, and should be executed, even when
they are stated in a will having no value among profane matters.

4. If the dead man, having commenced to write his wi 1, is sur
prised by death, and has no time to finish it, this will, though null
for other matters, has some value regarding pious legacies, in spite
of its imperfect dispositions.

282 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CASE XV.
Pious LEGACIES.

Philibert, a rich and pious man, without necessary heirs,
appoints as heirs, by a will in due form, three nephews of his,
Marius, Marin and Marien, providing that each one of them shall
spend one thousand francs for pious uses. But, after Philihert's
death, Marius and Marien, more avaricious than pious, secure by
a judgment annulation of the pious legacies. Marien does not
know what to do. He asks for advice, and is answered in various
manners.

Ques. 1. Have the heirs of Philibert a right to put aside the
pious legacies by a judgment?

Ques. 2. Is Marien entitled to get a benefit from this judgment,
without hurting his conscience?

Ans. Question 1. No; as these pious legacies are stated in a,
valid will. Jf they accept this will which favors them, they
should also accept the burden which results from it. ("That he
who looks for &n advantage should also think of the trouble.")
Do not say that these legncies may injure the rights of the heirs ;
for they are not necessarily heirs, and have no legal right to the
legacy but through the will. Even if there were necessary heirs,
their legitimate rights would not be wronged by these legacies, as
might be supposed in this case. Are pious matters inferior to
worldly things? If Philibert, by a lawful will, had left fifteen
thousand francs b) Bertha, a courtesan, could one contest and
break this legacy? Why then should it be broken when it is in
favor of the poor and orphans? Moreover, from what has been
said in the former case, pious legacies must be paid even when
showing a lack of legal conditions ; especially if they are stated
in a valid will, and do not injure the right of the heirs. Therefore,
those heirs ought to pay those pious legacies, or renounce the
will.

Ans. Question 2. Marien cannot enjoy the benefit of the judg
ment which breaks the legacies, although he may not have pro
voked it, it is clear from what has been said ; he, therefore, should
execute the lrgac}r for what concerns himself.

on Commotiate, Bepstt, IHantrate antr Hoan,

CASE I.

COMMODATE.

Exupere has lent to Tibule some carpets, to improve rooms
where he shall receive a guest of high rank. After the latter's
departure, as Tibule was taking up the carpets to return them, his
house is burnt out by a thunder-stroke, wiih all tilings borrowed.
He would nevertheless have been able to save them, if he had not
been exclusively thinking to save his own furniture. Exupere
claims of Tibule the price of these his carpets, who refuses to
make up for the damage. From that, a suit in law takes place
between them.

Ques. 1. Should Tibule make up for the damage?

Ques. 2. Should the tenant restore, it' the carpets were stolen,
without fault of his?

Ans. Question 1. Tihulc should not give anything, if he was
not able to save the carpels, because the cUmnge ought to be
attributed to the hazard, and that nobody is responsible for, not
even before the law.

Ans. Question 2. No; because as there is no theological fault,
there is consequently no obligation to make restitution.

CASE II.
UNFORTUNATE BORROWER.

Pibert, a dealer, one morning discovers, with surprise, that
the most of his goods has been stolen during the night. One or
two days later, he learns that the thief lias started away with his
goods for another town, distant about fifteen miles. Immediately
he asks Marc, his neighbor and debtor, to lend him a horse to run
after the thief. Riding on his Bucephalus, he speedily arrives at

284 The Doctrine of Ike Jesuits.

the directed place. But, alas! during the night, while lodging at
the hotel, a new misfortune happens to him. The next morning
he discovers, with astonishment, that his horse is stolen. Losing
all hope to recover either hi» goods or his horse, he is obliged
t> return home without having done anything.

Qnes. 1. Should Pibert pay the price of the horse to Marc?

Ques. 2. If Pibert, with the help of the horse, had recovered
his goods, would he be entitled to keep the horse, not being able
to secure otherwise the payment of what Marc owes him?

Ans. Question 1. Pibert is not held to pay for the horse,
before a judgment, if he has placed him in a safe stable, closed to
strangers ; because the borrower, in his conscience, is not held to
repair the damage happening to loaned things, if he has not
made a gross theological mistake. Now Pibert, in this case, has
not committed such a fault. Therefore, in his conscience, he is
not held to any compensation for the loss of the horse.

Aus. Question 2. Yes, in his own judgment, the borrower
could retain the horse as long as the proprietor of the horse has
not paid his debt. Therefore the confessor could not overlook a
compensation of that kind, unless he foresees greater inconven
ience resulting from it. For the creditor who is not able to
obtain payment, has a right, by the natural law, to pay himself in
taking some of the debtor's property, at least in principle, unless
provoking a scandal, or other inconveniences which would result
from it.

CASE VI.
DEPOSIT.

Canut, treasurer for a prince, invests in private speculations
the money trusted to him, without his master's knowledge, and by
so doing secures a very fair profit.

Ques. May Canut consider the benefit as belonging to him, or
should he make restitution of it?

Ans. Canut has a right to keep the profit secured with the
help of the prince's money, because there results from it no
wrong to the latter, since that money would not otherwise have

Cases on Commodate, Deposit, Mandate, and Loan. 285

been made use of . The gain which results from it ought simply
to be attribueed to the cleverness of that one who uses it.

CASE VIII.
MANDATORY.

Saluste, steward for a rich man, has orders every year to buy
at a certain price all the clothes needed Ly the family, from a
dealer named Cyrille. But Saluste buys cheaper from another
dealer. Sometimes he even goes to another town in order to buy
the cloth cheaper. He keeps for himself the surplus of the sum
allowed by his master, and which he has not spent.

Ques. Is Saluste entitled to keep what he economizes by buy
ing in another town ?

Ans. Yes, because the gain he secures by going somewhere
else and buying cheaper, is to be credited to his work, and pecu
liar cleverness. He therefore must not be blamed.

CASE XIV.
REASOX WHICH EXCUSES USURY.

Lucillus, had bought a large quantity of wheat, expecting to
find a favorable opportunity to sell it with a large profit. In the
meantime, Bibanius requests him to loan him fifty francs. '"That
is all I have," says he, uto buy some wheat ; but if you agree to
terms, I will give them to you, providing you pay me the interest
over the legal rate, proportionately to the profit I would have had
with the wheat." Bibanius consents, and later on he is obliged
to pay twelve or fifteen per cent, on account of the profit he has
prevented Lucillus from realizing.

Ques. What should we think of Lucillus?

Ans. Lucillus should not be bathercd, as he has sustained this
loss by lending his money. But he must carefully look out for
the danger of the gambling passion.

Cases on Sale antr its Speetes*

CASE VII.
REMARKABLE PICTURE BOUGHT AT A Low PRICE.

Basile, a parson, buys for five francs of a peasant, a picture
representing the Blessed Virgin Mary, blackened by smoke. The
peasant rejoices, as he was never able to sell that picture, even at
a lower price. The parson hastens to clean it, and place it in his
church. Ten d-tys later, a renowned English painter, walking by
chance in the church, examines the picture and offers six thou
sand francs for it, for he has recognized a master-piece of Raphael.
The parson is perfectly astounded. However, he thinks that it is
necessary to inquire carefully about the price of the picture, and
he conseqi e 1'ly obtains twenty thousand francs from the English
man, which money he devotes to some repairs in his church. But
soon after, while thinking, he doubts whether he should give all
his benefit to the peasant, or keep it for himself.

Ques. Shall the priest, in this case, give the money to the
peasant?

Ans. Bazile must not be annoyed, as that precious picture was
not estimated at more than five francs by both contracting parties,
and there was neither swindling nor artfulness in the contract.
You might make an objection perhaps, that this error is substan
tial? No, the error does not bear on the substance, but only on
the value of the matter. The present contract is therefore almost
insignificant, and he who is protected by Providence can keep his
gain with full justice.

CASE XIV.
CUNNING SELLER.
Valerius, a dealer, has imagined various smart tricks to secure

Cases on /Stile and -its Species 287

an advance on the price of his goods, without however getting
much beyond the limits of a fair price. Often he tells lie after lie,
oath after oath, while declaring to his customers that he cannot
sell cheaper, that he has sold at higher figures to others, or that
he loses on his goods.

Ques. Does Valerius act unjustly?

Ans. Valerius does not sin in principle, or according to the
common opinion ; for although by his lies and oaths lie induces
the customer to buy dearer, he is not however held to make resti
tution, because everyone knows that it is customary with dealers
to tell such lies. Consequent'y, customers who would be caught
by these words, should impute to themselves only the wrong which
they suffer.

I have said, in principle ; because, after what St. Liguori says,
if the seller noticed that in one special instance the buyer is partic
ularly deceived in paying too high prices, the seller would nomuiit
au injustice which should not be excused.

CASE XVIII.
AUCTION SALE.

I.— Olympius, at an auction sale, desires to buy a picture, and
requests his friemls to abstain from increasing his bid, so that he
can secure it at a low price. His friends comply with his request.

II.— At an auction sale of books, from the library of a deceased
man, three priests agree that each time one of them wishes to buy
a book, the others will abstain.

Ques. 1. Has Olympius acted unjustly?

Ques. 2. Might the priests, without injustice, make that agree
ment?

Ans. Question 1. No; because he has wronged nobody: not
his friends, who have ceded to him their right willingly, nor to the
seller has he put any obstruction to the liberty of bidding, and
the buyer may take this course, which is neither base nor unjust.
However, his request should not go so far as to hinder other buy
ers.

Ans. Question 2. The priests have not committed any injus^

288 The Doctrine oj /lie Jesuits.

tice, if there does not exist between them a regular agreement,
but only an intention of not injuring one another. This case is as
the former one, as there is no contract, so t > speak. Otherwise,
that will become injustice, because the seller may compel the bu}--
ersto remain perfectly independent, and that no one should prevent
the higher bid. However, according to the probable opinion,
there might be made an exception to this rule, in favor of relatives
and partners in trade, because they act morally as one and the
same person only, and they cannot be compelled to make a higher
bid against themselves. Friends also would be, according to
many theologians, excepted from this rule, being practically con
sidered as partners.

CASE XIX.
MIRACULOUS IMAGE OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN.

Gertrude, a godly woman, but very poor, was not able to pay
her creditors. The result was, that all her furniture was sold by
auction, on a public square. There was, among the lot, a picture
of the Blessed Virgin Mary, badly painted, and covered with dust.
The woman cries out that she has a g-eat devotion for that
picture, because it can perform miracles ; she insists that the
picture might not be sold. The auctioneer anck creditors reply
that miracles exist no longer, and that the Virgin is smothered
with dust. Witness to this, the priest Launanus, who was
there by chance, feeling indignant, conceives a scheme to punish
them for their impiousness. He looks carefully at the picture,
wipes off the dust, admires it ; and consequently the price soon
becomes higher and higher, until the debts were entirely covered
by the price of the picture alone. Buyers, surprised, and believ
ing it a precious picture, outbid also. Then the priest says to
them: "It is a new miracle, Blessed Virgin Mary has sentenced
to a great fine her detractors, and with an image of no value she
has paid all the debts of the poor woman, and saved her furni
ture."

Ques. Has the priest Laurianus acted unjustly, and should lie
make restitution?

Cases on Sale and its Species. 289

Ans. "Must we accuse of injustice this pious priest, who, by
charity and piety, came to help this poor woman, almost reduced
to poverty? Must we condemn that, by the intermediary of which
the Blessed Virgin Mary has worked a miracle? Decidedly, when
considering his good faith, he must be excused. But what are we
to think of the case in itself? I affirm, that when examining the
matter as it stands, I find the priest blameless. For one is not
unjust when using one's own right, and in this case Laurianus
lias used his right ; he has not made use of any artful means to
deceive anyone; he has not had any partners to make a ficli-
tious higher bid; he has not made an agreement with anybody;
but alone he has shown up the price in competition with many
others. Therefore, he has not acted fraudulently. Do not say,
the priest has made use of artfulness, by shamming, to outbid, as
this outbidding was not a sham, but quite true: he ran the risk
of it ; he should have been compelled to keep the picture if the
others had stopped. And do not say he has deceived others by
admiring the image, as he has not shown himself at all as a
connoisseur, and often ignorant amateurs seem to show admira
tion more than otheis.

CASE XXII.

C O M P R O M I S E .

Bcrtulfe, having a discussion with Paulus regarding a meadow,
and not being able to settle the difficult}*, decided to bring the
affair before the judge, when his adversary proposed to him to
settle everything amicably, so as to avoid the costs and scandal
of a suit at law. They consequently conclude a compromise,
from which Bertulfe will have the meadow, but will have to pay
one thousand francs to the other party. After the affair was so
arranged, and Paulus had received the money, Bertulfe fit.ds a
deed which clearly proves that the meadow had been sold by his
grandfather to Paulus' father, and that it therefore belongs to
Paulus ; but, without saving a word, he destroys the title and
keeps the meadow.

Ques. Has Beitulfe n right to keep the meadow?

290 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ans. Yes, because the compromise is a peculiar contract which
favors equally both parties, compels them to fulfill similar
obligations, as it is supposed that the matter is doubtful on both
sides ; consequently each one abandons his rights, to avoid prob
able damages ; that is to say, each one cedes the half of a doubt
ful right, in order to guarantee the other half. Therefore, the
compromise once seriously made, nothing shall be restored by
the one who learns later on that the land belonged to the other,
and nothing can be claimed by the other party. Consequently,
Bertulfe is entitled to keep the meadow as belonging to him, on
the strength of a contract by which Paulus has abandoned his
right, in consideration of the thousand francs obtained for so
doing.

CASE XXIII.
COMMERCIAL DEALINGS.

Armand, a merchant, when buyers refuse to him what he asks
for, has the custom to lie, by declaring that he has bought these
goods at such a price. It results from this that the buyers pay too
high a price.

Ques. Has Armand a right to receive and keep that price
increased by his lies?

Ans. Armand does not seem under obligation to make restitu
tion, as he simply sins against truth, and not against justice, as
long as he does not exceed the highest price ; for he agrees on the
price with his customers, and only receives what belongs to him.
Besides, everybody knows that the dealers are accustomed to state
such claims.

Cases on i&enttng, antr ©tfjer ©nerous Contracts*

CASE IV.
LONG-TERM LEASE.

Farmer Marculfe has hired for ten years, by a long-terra
lease, the estate of Palmatius, at a comparatively low rent. After
the owner's death, his son, Narcisse, thinks immediately of putting
up the rent, and suggests to the farmer that, if he will not pay
one hundred and fifty louis, instead of one hundred, he must
give up the place to another who is willing to pay a still higher
rent. What shall the unfortunate man do? Caught between the
hammer and the anvil, he consents, although reluctantly, and gives
the price asked for.

Ques. Has the farmer a right to secure a secret compensation,
if he has consented in spite of all to pay too high a rent?

Ans. That is not allowed to him, if he can prove his right through
a judgment ; because theologians permit a secret compensation
only when one cannot recover his property by other means. It
should he otherwise, if he could not prove his right ; for instance,
if the contract was not made under a form of authenticul deed, or
if the deed was lost. However, this compensation should not be
blamed as being unjust.

CASE VII.
EXCHANGE.

Albin, a Frenchman, on his way to Spain, arrived at Bayonne,
asks Lampinius, a money-changer, to give him Spanish money for
French gold. The latter consents; but as Spanish money has
decreased in value in France, Albin, who asked for a great quantity
of it, undergoes a great loss, and the money changer secured by it a
large profit. But as soon as he arrives in Spain, Albin, for an

292 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

urgent matter, is compelled to return home. He calls again at the
same money-changer's to make another exchange, and he has to
sustain once more a great loss.

Ques. 1. Are these two exchanges in accordance with justice, as
regards the money-changer?

Ques. 2. If Lampidius knew, by some private information, that
Spanish money would 'soon lessen in value, should he righteously
reckon to a foreigner, who ignores this fact, that the money is at
its actual value?

Ans. Question 1. Yes; because as long as the merchant does
not exceed the limits of a fair price, he does not sin against
justice. The money-changer, who is only a money-dealer, is in the
same case. Now, Lampidius did not exceed these limits, although
he may have accepted French money at its least value, and by
exchanging it for Spanish money at its greatest value. For, if one
exchanged bread at lowest price for wine at highest price, there
would b°e no injustice. Therefore, Lampidius is not guilty ; because,
while accepting French money at its mean value, he has given in
exchange Spanish money at its highest value. Now, if he was
entitled to do so a first time when Albiu was starting, he had a
right to do it again when he came back. No matter whether
AU)in may have lost a great deal by it, that merely took place
accidentally, and Lampidius, in this loss, has only acted passive!}'.
Therefore he has not behaved unjustly, and he must not be
hindered nor blamed.

Ans. Question 2. Yes ; because that money, according to the
common appreciation, has preserved its material value. It would
be quite different if it were stated that this money has lost some of
its former value : because, in this case, the money-changer should
not have paid for the money at its true actual value.

CASE XL
MONEY DEALINGS.

Candid, a merchant, often borrows money from Vulpin, and sub
scribes promissory notes in acknowledgment of the debt; but
Vulpin enters Candid's account in his books, not as a simple bor-

Cases on Renting, and Other Onerous Contracts. 293

rower, but as if it was between them a statement of account. He
proceeds in the fallowing in-inner : if, for instance, CancVd bor
rows ten thousand francs, reimbursable within six months, he
requests him to subscribe a note for ten thousand three hundred,
in order to be able, when tho bill becomes due, to claim not only
Hie principal, but also the interest for six months. Then, he enters
to Candid's debit ten thousand three hundred francs, and to his
credit nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-one (as credit for the
amount of the note, with deduction of six months' interest).* He
considers both amounts productive of interest, in such a way that
Candid finds himself debtor for the interest on the difference
between ten thousand three hundred francs and nine thousand nine
hundred and ninety one. Now, at the end of three months, he
claims the interest on that difference, besides one per cent, com
mission on the sum loaned, declaring that, in case of non-immediate
payment, the sums claimed for will constitute a new principal.

Ques. 1. Was Vulpin entitled to add on the note the interest
to the principal ?

Ques. 2. Had he a right to claim interest on the difference of
the two amounts entered in his book?

Ques. 3. Could he claim a right of commission for the money
loaned ?

Ques. 4. Could he righteously add to that difference the com
mission, and thereby constitute after three months a new principal ?

Ans. I answer affirmatively to the first question. The notes,
in fact, are productive of interest only at maturity and from the
day of protest. Thus, he has been able to repay the loaned sum
productive of interest from the very day of the loan. In fact,
interests being effectively considered as part of the principal, they
will produce interest through being due for less than a year. This
inconvenience would be done away with by simply specifying on
the note the principal really loaned, with obligation from the
borrower to pay interest from the day of the loan. But such

* I recall this case, not to criticise its solutions, but to show with what
care questions of usury have been deeply examined by those Jesuits hav
ing pretended to reject with horror and in principle even the simple loan
with interests. There is another case, yet more curious and complicated,
the Case IX of Ouophrius and Argyrophilus.

294 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

method of proceeding, unusual in business, would render harder
the circulation of drafts. It therefore seems reasonable to pre
sume that debtors submit willingly to such a prejudice in order to
facilitate business transactions, inasmuch as they are to avoid it
by paying off at the appointed time, or by renewing the note.

I answer negatively to the second question ; for, in that way,
Vulpin has capitalized, the very day of the loan, the interest not
yet due on ten thousand francs, and even the interest on that
interest. In fact, the difference, whose interests lie claims, is
composed: 1, of the sum of three hundred francs, interest of the
loaned principal, and which have been fictitiously added to it,
though not being included in the loan ; 2, of the sum of nine francs
interest on these same three hundred francs.

I answer negatively to the third question ; because the loan has
not been preceded by any promise compelling Vulpin to procure
the sums to be put at Candid's disposal. It was therefore a question
here of a simple loan only, on the strength of which the loaner,
although a banker, has no further right but to claim legal
interest.

I answer to the fourth question, by saying, that those sums, not
being due, cannot be productive of interest.

CASE XIII.
ON SECURITY.

Ques. Is a wife entitled to become security without her husband's
knowledge?

Ans. Yes, by natural right, if she has property which she is able
to dispose of. As regards positive right, it is necessary to study
the laws of each country. In France, she cannot do so in princi
ple, because the wife is not granted the management of her estate,
neither can she make a contract or sign a deed without the author
ization of her husband. There are, however, some cases in which
the wife would be held, in conscience, to give this security, at
least after the death of her husband, or after separate maintenance ;
for instance, when applying urgently to borrow for her husband,
overwhelmed by debts, she could not obtain money unless she

Cases on Heating, and Other Onerous Contracts. 295

promises to pay herself in case of need, in place of her husband,
and she should have to promise to pay in reality.

CASE XV.
GUARANTY.

Menesippe, expecting goods from England, and fearing they
might be lost at sea, writes to Gratien to look specially after them.
The latter replies, that he will hold himself responsible for the whole
cargo, providing Menesippe will give him one thousand francs.
The goods were worth ten thousand francs ; and Gratien possessed
but five hundred francs. The goods arrive in good order all right,
and Gratien receives one thousand francs.

Ques. Is Gratien entitled to keep these one thousand francs,
though he would not have been able to repair himself all the
damage, if the goods had been lost at sea?

Ans. It seems that he has a right to keep half of it, and nothing
more ; because, in case of wreck, he would not have been able to
pay more than half of the loss by giving away all he had of his
own. Therefore, it seems fair that he keep half of the money.
Others would answer, that Gratien has a right to keep the whole ;
because, in case of misfortune, he would have lost a great deal more.
Others would say, that he should not keep anything ; because the
contract was null, because he was able to guaranty only half of
the value of these goods.

CASE XVI.
MORTGAGE.

1. Eusebe, Gaspard's heir, having noticed that the succession
was encumbered with mortgages, will accept the inheritance only
on condition of not paying debts beyond the amount of assets, in
order that one might not compel him to pay more than he would
have to receive. After having received the inheritance, he pays
in full the different creditors on note of hand. But later on,
Hilaire, a mortgagee, calls upon him and claims what is owed to
him. "You come too late," says Eusebe, ''all the succession has

29(5 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

been used up to pay the debts." "You have acted badly," says
Hilaire ; "I, the mortgagee, had a right to precede all others.
So you should be responsible with your own property."

JI. Barberin and Barberius, Antoine's creditors, had secured a
mortgage on his property. Florus and Florence had only obtained
written promises to prove the value of their debts. After
Antoine's death, Philon, his heir, not knowing the amount of
debts and neglecting to draw a statement of the estate, takes hold
of the inheritance. The two mortgagees immediately claim what
is owed to them. But the legacy being already spent, they
do not obtain full satisfaction. Consequently, Barberin and Bar
berius, putting forward their right of precedence of others, ask to
be paid with the heir's own property, before the creditors holders
of notes of hand.

Ques. 1. Should Eusebe, in the first case, pay Hilaire with his
own property?

Ques. 2. Should the mortgagees, in the second case, be piid
before others, not only with the dead man's property, but in the
absence of it, with the heir's property ?

Ques. 3. Should the heir, who has neglected to draw a state
ment of the estate, give satisfaction to the creditors with his own
property, even in his conscience?

Ans. Question 1. The mortgagee ought to be paid with the
heir's property, as he has the strict right to be preferred, at least in
a worldly point of view. But in a true spiritual sense of justice,
the heir must not be compelled to do so, if he has not made a grave
theological error.

Ans. Question 2. The mortgagees ought to be preferred to
others on the strength of their mortgage only. Therefore, when
the succession encumbered with mortgagees is dissolved, their
rights do not exist any longer, as the title of their privilege has dis
appeared. Therefore, they ought to be treated as other creditors.

Ans. Question 3. The heir who takes hold of the inheritance
without drawing a legal statement of the estate, is compelled, in a
worldly point of view, to pay the debts with his own property, if
the legacy funds are not sufficient. But, most probably, he is not
held to do so in his own conscience ; because nobody can compel

Cases on Renting, and Other Onerous Contracts. 297

him, by natural riglit, to pay the testator's debt, unless he has
received a gift from him. Therefore, if the debts exceed the
amount of the legacy, the latter funds being exhausted, he owes
nothing more.

CASE XVIT.
ON BETTING.

Nicon knows three candidates for a government office ; there are
no others ; one of them- must be chosen, but which, nobody knows.
Nicon bets ten francs with each, that he will not be elected. He
is sure, in this case, to win against two and to lose witli tiie other,
and so to win twenty francs, and to lose tea only. He thinks he
can make this bet, because he has no certainty for any one
separately. However, later on, he wonders whether he has acted
according to justice.

Ques. Has Nicon a right, in this case, to bet and to keep the
money?

Ans. Yes, probably ; because there are just three contracts
separately ; for one is placed in a different situation on account of
the other, and in each one Nicon runs the risk of losing; as with
every one who bets, he doubts of the result. Therefore, as he
may lose with one, he may on the other hand win against another.
Moreover, every one of these contracts considered separately is
lawful ; because one does not prevent the other being just, and one
cannot say which of the three contracting parties will be wronged.

CASE XXII.
ON GAMBLING.

Lucas, a passionate gambler, but playing badly,, asks Sylvius,
whom he knew as being very smart, to play a game with him for a
big stake. Sylvius declines, considering as illicit the gain which
would result from a disproportionate game. ''Well," says Sylvius,
"if you like to amuse yourself, let us gamble for fun only, or let
us be gambling for prayers, which the loser will have to say in be
half of the winner." Lucas declines, and still insists once more,
with Sylvius, but at last consents. First, the latter is very lucky ;

298 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

but later on, getting tired of playing, he takes so little
care about the game that he often forgets to take up a counter, so
i'avoring, without knowing it, his fellow-gambler. Lucas, who
notices the fact, does not mention it. Consequently, carrying the
day against his adversary, he wins a large sum out of him.

Ques. Has Lucas been acting badly by keeping silent on the
omission of his adversaiy, and should he make restitution ?

Ans. No ; because each had no other duty but to look at his
own cards : therefore the gambler who is noticing that his adver
sary is mistaken in marking or counting, is not liable for it if he
does not caution him, as he does not commit any fraud, nor does
he deceive his companion ; but it is the latter, who by his careless
ness, or absence of mind, wrongs himself. Then he, therefore,
ought to undergo this loss as a punishment for his carelessness.

CASE XXIII.
FOR THE WANT OF ONE TRICK, MARTIN LOST His DONKEY.

Martin, a very shrewd peasant, riding on his donkey, was go
ing down town on business. Having stopped at an inn, he meets
there with strangers busy at gambling. Invited by Bernard to
play a game he consents, knowing he was clever enough. First,
luck smiles upon him ; but next, it turns against him so badly,
that he loses all his money. With the hope of getting back what
he had lost, he decides to continue. Having only his donkey left,
he plays on it. The gamblers strive with nervousness. The
chances are even. Bystanders are waiting for the end with anxi
ety. Cards are dealt for the last time. But, alas ! Martin, in de
spair, is beaten for one trick. From this story is the saying : "For
want of one trick, Martin lost his donkey." Then he came back
home on foot, sorrowfully, and had t> listen to the lamentations of
his wife. But where would be the trouble in this case? There
would not be any, if it had not happened that Bernard, noticing
Martin did not hide his cards properly, had looked at them by
chance.

Ques. Shall Bernard give back the donkey?

Ans. No ; if he has looked at his adversary's cards on account

Cases on Renting, and Other Onerous Contracts. 299

of the carelessness of the latter, and if he has not sought to know
them before, and if he has not marked them ; because this act of
looking at the cards, without malice, is not considered as swind ing,
but as a sort of smartness, commonly approved by gamblers. It
would be the same if he had learned to know the back of the cards
of his adversary, without having marked, or known them before
hand.

BOOK SECOND.

Erratise on peculiar Situation**

I, LAICS. — II. ECCLESIASTICS. — III. REGULAR FRIARS.

PART FIRST.

LAY SITUATIONS.

Already, in reference to the fourth precept of the Decalogue, we
Lave spoken of the various and reciprocal duties of superiors and
inferiors. In the following treatise, we will talk on the duties
which are connected without mutual interest, especially concerning
public officers.

CHAPTER I.
JUDGE'S DUTIES.

1. The judge is held to pass a judgment in accordance with the
law and the regulations stated by the law. . . .

In criminal affairs, the person accused must be favored, unless
the crime is evident.

When in doubt regarding the property, and also the possession
by right or by fact, it is necessary to judge from the more proba
ble reasons. . . .*

* The contrary proposition, imagined by the ancient Jesuits, had been
condemned by Innocent XI.

But Gury remains silent on the question of what it is advisable to do in
case two opinions are equally probable, and when one of the parties would
be a friend of the judge. Without any doubt, he accepts the solution of a
man of the highest intellect belonging to the Company of Jesus, Gregoire
de Valence, <%the illustrious man" of the Jesuit Clair.

"One asks if a judge may, without showing a personal preference,
decide on his judgment according to his friend's interest, on the strength

Treatise on Peculiar Situations. 301

When in doubt regarding the property alone, it is necessary to
judge in favor of the true possessor. . . .

2. — Q'ies. Should the judge condemn: 1, a person accused,
that he considers guilty, only on his private information ? and, 2, a
man whom he knows to be innocent, but who is legally declared
guilty?

Ans. 1. Certainly not, after all theologians. . . .

2. There is controversy. St. Tiiomas affirms it. St. Bonaven-
ture denies it. ...

3. — Ques. Is a judge held to make restitution of what he has
received by an agreement, in order to pass a judgment?

Ans. 1. Yes, if he has received it, to pass a just judgment.

2. If it is for an unjust judgment, he should restore before he
has passed his judgment ; but after that there is controversy, from
what has been said on the subject of the contract for a shameful
matter. (Book First, No. 760 )

Ques. Is one held by a judgment: 1, on the justice of which
one doubts ; or 2, of the injustice of which one is certain?

Ans. 1. Yes, positively; for the presumption is in favor of
the superior, or tHe judge. . . .

2. No, by principle ; unless if there results from it some scan
dal or disorder in the state. . . .

Appendix First. On jurors.

Appendix Second. O.i arbiters.

CHAPTER II.

OBLIGATIONS OP THE ADVOCATES AND ATTORNEYS.
13. — Ques. Does an advocate sin, and how, when defending a

of a probability applicable indistinctly to one or another opinion, where a
point of right divides the jurisconsults.

"I say, firstly : if the judge considers that both opinions may be equally
probable, he may lawfully, in order to favor his friend, judge in accordance
with the opinion which authorizes the pretension of his friend. More
over, he might, for the purpose of serving his friend, judge s-ometimes
according to one opinion, and sometimes following the contrary opinion, pro
vided, nevertheless, lhat scandal may not result from this." (page 14.)

302 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

just cause by unjust means ; for instance, by substituting a new-
promissory note for a lost one?

Ans. 1. He sins against fidelity and truth, morj or less, pro
portionately to the injustice of the means used.

2. In principle, he does not sin against justice, as one sup
poses a just cause. . . .

CHAPTER III.

SOLICITOR'S DUTIES.

CHAPTER IV.
DUTIES OF REGISTERS AND NOTARIES.

22. — Ques. Should a notary make restitution to the treasury,
if, when drawing up a deed of sale or an inventory, on the request
of the parties, or even of his own consent, he does not insert the
true price of the matter, but an inferior quotation, in order to pay
a lower tax.

Ans. There is controvers}T.

CHAPTER V.

DUTIES OF PROSECUTORS AND DEFENDANTS.

25. — Ques. Is the defendant, when questioned by the judge,
held to confess the truth ? *

Ans. 1. No, if he is not questioned legitimately; as happens
when the judge is not legitimate, or when he does not follow
legal proceedings; for instance, if he were questioning without
preliminary accusation, or even when the offence appears to be
only half proved.

2. Yes, if he is questioned legitimately ; because he should
obey the just orders of the judge. Except, according to the prob-

* See note, pa^e 157.

Treatise on Peculiar Situations. 303

able opinion, if it is a question for him to suffer a severe punish
ment.

26. — Ques. Is it allowed for an innocent defendant to run
away, or resist the armed force?

Ans. Yes, it may be allowed for him to run away, or escape
from the hands of the armed force.

Ques. Has a defen-lant, truly guilty, a right to run away?

Ans. Yes, if he is not yet sentenced by a ju guu-nt ; because
no one is held to 'submit to a penalty before the sentence. It is
the same if he is sentenced to a very severe punishment, and if
he should be imprisoned until he gets through.

But the more common opinion denies it, if he has been already
sentenced to imprisonment : because the guilty man is held to
submit to a righteous judgment. Except, however, according to
a few, if he is not given his necessaries, or if the prison regula
tions are very hard.

Ques. Has the guilty party a right to run awa}', even by doing
some harm to his jailers?

Ans. Yes, because he uses his right, and does not wrong any
one ; unless charity suggests to him tlie use of another scheme,
not causing too great harm to his guardians. However, he is not
allowed to seduce them with money, because the latter, being
under obligation not to release the prisoner, would co-operate in
the bin.

CHAPTER VI.

, WITNESSES' DUTIES.

28. — Ques. To what is a witness held who has not told the
truth by ignorance, accident or omission, and unwillingly?

Ans. He should confess his falsehood, and repair the wrong
the best he can ; however, he is not bound to repair the prejudice
already accomplished, because he has not made any theological
error. The same should be said, even if he had committed a
venial sin, as has been said regarding Restitution, No. G62.
/ Ques. What are we to think of those who make up or alter deeds

304 The Doctrine of tJte Jesuits.

or notes, to replace lost titles, or to protect their true, good
right ?

Aus. 1. There is a venial sin of lying, because the promissory
note, whatever it may be, is different from that which proves
good faith in justice.

2. One is occasionally liable to sin grievously against charily,
even with respect to one's self, by running in danger of
suffering a very severe punishment, if one was arrested as a
forger.

3. One sins by no means against commutative justice, and
consequently, is not compelled to make any restitution.

29.— Ques. Is a witness held to reveal a crime kept entirely
secret, in case he is the only one who knows it?

Ans. 1. Yes; according to the law in force in France. . . .

2. No ; most probably, by the Roman right, which requires
two witnesses to declare the defendant guilty, even if he confes
ses the crime : thereby the axiom : tkOnly witness, witness nul."

30. — Ques. Does a witness sin, and how, by hiding himself,
not to be summoned to appear in Court?

Ans. 1. He does not sin agiinst legal justice, that is, against
obedience ; because no one is held to comply with the order of a
superior before being compelled to do so ; 2, nor against
commutative justice, as he behaves in a merely negative manner.
He however is likely to sin against charity owed to his fellow-
brother.

Ques. If a witness, who is legitmately questioned, hides the
truth, without telling a lie, should he make restitution?

Ans. No, probably ; because in this case tho witness behaves
in a merely negative manner, and is not held to tell the truth, un
less by order of the judge ; and consequently, by hiding it, lie sins
solely against the obedience owed to the judge, or against religion,
because of the oath taken.

CHAPTER VII.

ON DUTIES OF PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS AND PHARMACISTS.
81. : . ; They are compelled to follow the sure and founded

Treatise on Peculiar Situations. 305

prescriptions of doctors, at least ordinarily, as the danger of the
disease cannot be injured by probabilities.

A physician sins grievously ... if he uses non-tested medicines
to make a trial, . . .

33.— Ques. To what is a physician especially held, regarding
the soul of the patient under his care?

Ans. He should, in principle, and under heavy penalty, caution
him of the danger he is running into, and of the necessity for him
to receive the sacraments, in order not to die without absolution,
the viaticum, and extreme unction. . . .

34.— Ques. ... Is the physician entitled to use doubtful reme
dies?

Ans. No; but in this case he should wait, and leave the
patient to the influence of nature. This is the opinion of St. Anto-
nin, who said: "If the physician doubts whether the medicine
will be useful or injurious, he is doing wrong in giving it, because
if in doubt, he should preferably leave the patient in the hands of
the Creator."

CHAPTER VIII.
ON DUTIES OF RURAL CONSTABLES.

36. — Ques. Should rural constables always prosecute offenders ?

Ans. Yes, in every instance that the damage is important, un
less the offenders themselves offer a secret compensation. They
may occasionally not act so severely towards the offenders, if the
damage is of slight importance, if it is not customary, or if it
should be presumed that the proprietor did not wish to prosecute
the offender, because the latter is very poor, and is not in the
habit of doing wrong. But rural constables must be careful not
to show more lenience than is necessary.

CHAPTER IX.
ON ARTISTS AND LABORERS.
37. — The confessor should question them carefully. For the

306 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

most part of the time they do not mention in their confession
wrong doings and sins concerning their condition.

PART SECOND.

SITUATION OF CLERGYMEN.

CHAPTER I.

COMMON, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE OBLIGATIONS OF CLERGYMEN.
ART. I. Positive obligations.

They are bound: 1, to sanctity of life: 2, to celibacy; 3, to
ecclesiastical robe and tonsure ; 4, to canonical hours.

42. — Ques. Is the obligation of celibacy universal in the
church?

Ans. The church tolerates some exception, in those among
Orientals. In Eastern countries, priests can never marry after the
sacerdotal ordination and even after the deaconry ; but those who
are married before the deaconry can attain to the ultimate orders,
and also live with their wives.

ART. II. Negative obligations of clergymen, or what is for
bidden to them.

98. — As a general rule, priests are forbidden to practice what
is not suitable to the ecclesiastical state ; for instance, to be
dealers, inn-keepers, physicians, surgeons, except under extraor
dinary circumstances ; to be judges in criminal cases, attorneys,
defenders, notaries in secular agreements, to go out with arms, to
enter saloons and many other places; but above all: 1, to reside
with women ; 2, to take a part in games of hazard ; 3, to hunt or
carry arms ; 4, to engage in commercial transactions.

99. — Do not stay among women. FROM THE GARMENT COMES
THE SCURF, FROM WOMAN THE INIQUITY OF MAN.

Treatise on Peculiar Situations. 307

105. — Quos. Is it allowed to clergymen to buy shares from
joint-stock companies?

Ans. There are three different opinions :

The first one affirms it in all cases.

The second one denies it in all cases.

The third one makes a distinction between companies called
commercial (banks, trusts, commercial companies), and industrial
societies (railroads, mines, factories) ; shares of the former
should not be bought by clergymen, but they may purchase some
of the latter.

CHAPTER II.

SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CLERGYMEN.
ART. I. Obligations of bishops.

• ••>•••
ART. II. Obligations of parsons.

• •
ART. III. Obligations of prebendaries.

••«•«.. o.«

Appendix 1. Privileges of priests.
Appendix II. Advantages of priests.

PART THIRD.

SITUATION OF FRIARS.

CHAPTER I.
ON THE NATURE OF THE RELIGIOUS STATE.

140.— Ques. To what is a bishop held towards the young
ladies who wish to enter a religious order?

308 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ans. He is held, under a heavy penalty, by a statute of the
Council of Trent, to examine himself, or if he is prevented, by a
vicar or a delegate, the intention of these young ladies, before their
taking the veil, also before the profession. But the omission of
one of these two examinations would not be considered a serious
matter. Moreover, the profession would be valid if both examin
ations were omitted, provided the young ladies may have been
free of mind when making their profession. Such an examination
is required, even if the convent in which the young ladies should
enter has been deprived of the episcopal jurisdiction ; because the
bishop acts, in this case, as the delegate of the Holy See.

CHAPTER II.
ON RELIGIOUS VOCATION.

151. — Bo parents and guardians grievously sin, by leading away
their children or pupils from the religious state?

Ans. 1. Yes, if they lead them away unjustly, by threats, vio
lence, artfulness or intrusive requests ; because they so prevent
them from obtaining a great blessing to which they have a right,
and they expose them to the great danger of losing their eternal
salvation.

2. Yes, for the most part of the time, even if they lead them
away only by requests or promises ; because they can not do so
without causing them a great prejudice.

Ques. Do children sin, by entering a religious order in spite of
their parents, or without their knowledge?

Ans. No, in principle, though this behavior may not be gener
ally profitable in practice ; unless the children may have a good
reason to fear unjust vexations or impediments ; because, unless
parents may be opposed to it for a legitimate purpose, children
are entirely free to choose their profession.*

*Marotte does not da.re, on this delicate point, explain himself so
plainly. But the reader will readily understand the meaning of the
following words :

"Ques. In which instance should children especially show respect and
obedience to their parent^?

Treatise on Peculiar Situations. 309

CHAPTER III.
ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF Vows.
ART. I. Vow of poverty.

153. — A friar, bound by a solemn vow of povert}*, that is to say,
having made a solemn profession to an Order approved by the
Holy See, at least from the strength of the ecclesiastical law, and
putting aside all Pontifical dispense, is completely incapable in par
ticular, that is to say personally, of possessing any temporal goods
whatever, property which might be valued, even with the permis
sion of his superior. (Statutes of the Council of Trent, Session
xxv., c. ii.) But the community may, either by itself or by its
members, acquire and possess properties, unless its statutes may
be so opposed. Wheref rom is the well known axiom of the Canon
right: '"All that a monk acquires, he acquires not for himself,
but for the monastery."

Consequently, a friar having made profession, is perfectly incap
able to make or assign any deed of property concerning a
property belonging either to the monastery, or to his parents, or
to strangers; therefore he is not entitled, without permission,
general or special, of his superior, to dispose of anything, either
legally, or in due form, by acceptation, donation, sale, borrowing,
etc. . . .

157. — Ques. Is a friar allowed to give what he has saved out
of what he is supplied by the monastery with for his own use ?

Ans. No, as a general rule. . . .

Ques. Does a friar sin by receiving from a stranger money to
spend as he chooses for pious use ?

Ans. Yes, if he receives it as solely for himself, to give it in
his own name.

158. — Does a friar sin against the vow of poverty by refusing
what is offered to him by strangers?

''Ans. It is when it is a question to choose a situation of life; they
should then ask and follow their parents' advice, unless it may b« recog
nized that the desire of their parents is opposed to the will of God."
(Petit Catechisme). Who will have ability to recognize the will of God?
The confessor !

310 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ans. Yes, if it is a question of things already acquired ; for
instance, legacies, salaries as a reward for his work, gifts already
accepted, etc., because the monastery immediately acquires a right
in those things, according to the above-quoted axiom. . . .

161. — A friar sins against the vow of poverty, if, without the
consent of his superior, in the monastery or outdoors, even for
what concerns clothing or food, he accepts, retains, exchanges,
gives, or lends something. Also if, without permission of his
superior, he borrows or lends money to strangers.

He sins against the vow of poverty by eating or drinking with
strangers without permission of the prelate ; because by receiving
something without permission he acts as proprietor. In general,
however, there is no mortal sin.

He sins against the vow of poverty, by retaining beyond the
appointed time a thing which he was allowed to make use of, b}r
using it for another purpose, or by spoiling it ; by keeping it with
a spirit of master, that is to say, with intention to spare it from
the free disposition of his superior ; for instance, by hiding it so
that it may not 1 e seen ; and he cannot be excused because he
was previously granted the permission to use it.

He sins against the vow of poverty by buying anything, even
for the community, without permission of the superior, because by
so doing he is acting as a proprietor.

ART. II. Vow of chastity.

164. — The vow of chastit}T should be considered as more impor
tant than the vow of poverty.* . . .

ART. III. Vow of obedience.

It is the most important of all religious vows, for it is through
it that the friar offers and consecrates absolutely to God his most
intimate and most excellent gilts, his independence and intellect.

* In his general theory on vows made " with intention to make a
promise, but with intention not to he bound to it," J. Gordon draws up
a very pretty illustration concerning the vow of chastity : " The priest,"
says the learned man, "who, when being sworn to a sacred order, pur
poses expressly not to bind himself to chastity, (I mean the obligation,
not the execution), is not held on the strength of the vow connected to it,
to keep to chastity." (Page 310).

Treatise on Peculiar Situations. 311

CHAPTER IV.

PRIVILKGE OF REGULARS.

....

Appendix: On the actual state of Regulars in France.

At the end of the 18th century, there was in France a great
number of monasteries for men and women. But in the awful
revolution of all things which followed, all were dissolved. . . .

184. Q-.ies. Should vows of friars in France be considered

now as solemn?

Ans. Yes. . . .

186. — First objection. Civil law is opposed, in fact, to a
solemn profession ; for it declares that all citizens are qualified to
make contracts, or receive legacies. ^

Ans. Civil law cannot oppose, by any means, either solemn
or perpetual vows, because the nature of the vow being perfectly
spiritual, cannot be attained by civil law, not even indirectly ; for
if it were otherwise, civil power could abrogate the laws of the
church, which would be contrary to reason. . . .

Second objection. It is not permitted by the law to renounce
a succession which has not yet commenced. Therefore, a friar
can not renounce, before his profession, his future properties ;
for instance, to a filial inheritance, when his father is still living.
But he could not do so after his solemn profession when the
succession has commenced, as he has become incapable to dispose
of anything whatsoever. Therefore, this law makes impossible the
solemn profession.

Ans. 1. A friar, even after a solemn profession, may, with his
superior's consent, accept an inheritance, gift, or legacy for the
monastery, as is permitted by the statutes of the canon right,
although he has no right to accept anything for himself; except in
a small number of religious orders, the regulations of which are
opposed to it.

Ans. 2. A friar, before his solemn profession, may, without
fearing that the civil law may be opposed to it, dispose of his
future property to parties, for instance, to his brothers. . . .

on Special Situations.

LAY PERSONS.

CASE I.
THE JCTDOE.

Judge Lambert, although knowing quite well that Casimir is
innocent, though under a terrible accusation, sentences him never
theless to imprisonment for life ; because, on account of allega
tions judicially proved, it appeared to him that the man was
really guilty. In course of time, deeply anxious, he asks whether
he has acted rightly, and what he should do.

Ques. May or should a judge sentence him whose crime is
juridically proved, but whom, through private information, he
considers perfectly innocent ?

Ans. Theologians are divided in their opinion. St. Thomas
says yes, because the judge should pass judgment in view of
the common good, from allegations and proofs. But St. Bona-
venture denies it, because the judge should never condemn an
innocent person. This last opinion must be followed, according
to St. Lignori, in great criminal cases ; especially if an innocent
man is liable to be sentenced to death.

CASE II.
THE JUDGE.

Judge Pestus, greedy for money, receives gifts from his clients,
being convinced that this is permitted to him, whereas he is
always disposed to render justice to every one. One day, Pinion
calls upon him: thinking his suit a bad one, he brings him a
present, in order to win his benevolence. Pestus, after having

Cases on Special Situations. 313

thoroughly examined the case, finds that it is a good suit, pro
nounces a judgment in favor of Philon, and retains the present.
Another time, doubting whether he ought to judge for Titius or
for Caius, whose arguments are equally good, he decides in favor
of Titius, from whom he had received a gift.

Ques. 1. Is it allowed, is it just, that a judge should receive
presents from the defendant?

Ques. 2. Is lie entitled to keep the presents which he has
accepted in a suit, either just or unjust?

Ans. Question 1. The judge surely sins by accepting those
presents ; it is contrary to all rights that justice should be bought
so easily by means of tips. However, most probably, he does not
sin against justice, and he is not compelled to restitution, because
the gifts are freely made to him.

Ans. Question 2. He cannot keep at all the presents received
to pass a righteous judgment, because that cannot be the object of
a contract, as being justice, which is priceless. But probably ho
may keep the presents received to pass an unrighteous judg
ment.*

CASE IV.
THE BARRISTER.

Florimond, a lawyer, was defending a cause probably good, but
in the debate he notices, that all the chances, even the strongest,
are against it. However, he continues to defend it.

* Busembaum explains more plainly this very delicate case:
" Ques. Is a judge compelled to make restitution of the price he has
received to pass a sentence?

"Ans. If he has received it for the purpose of a just sentence, he
should make restitution; because it was his mere duty to render justice
to the defendant, independently of what he received; and consequently
the defendant lias had nothing for his money but what was already his
own right. But if the judge has received the gift for an unjust sentence,
lie is not held, by natural right, to make restitution, as per the teachings
of Sanchez, Soto, Navarre, G. tie Valence, Molina, Tolet, Lessius,
de Lugo, and a great number of other theologians, among whom are
Moya, the apologist de Taberna, etc. The reason is, that the judge was
not'held to pass this unjust sentence : it turns to the defendant's benetit,
and through this injustice the judge is exposed to a great danger, espe
cially with regard to his reputation, in case he happens to be caught at
such a dealing. Now, to run such a risk at the service of another man,
is a matter really worth a big pecuniary reward." (Page 348).

314 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ques. Should Florimond have kept silence when he found out
that the opposite party had better arguments than his own client?

Ans. Florimond has not sinned, neither against justice nor
charitv, by continuing a cau«e yet really probable, although he
considers the adversary's cause as more probable, because he
hopes that the truth will be brought to light. Lawyers are not
compelled, like judges, to follow only the opinion which seems to
them to be most probable.

CASE VI.
THE DEFENDANT BEFORE THE COURT.

Palemon, having previously committed secretly a most grievous
theft, is easily suspected to be the offender, on account of his bad
antecedents. Consequently, being seized by policemen, he is
taken to jail. He tries to escape several times, but without
success. On being questioned by the judge, he denies his crime
several times. He is therein' sentenced to imprisonment for life.
However, he does not stay long in his cell, for he makes a hole
in the wall, with tools furnished him by Paul, his friend, and so
escapes. Arrested anew, he defends himself by knocking down
the policemen, tearing off their clothes ; he luckily escapes from
their hands, and hastily runs away, until he has crossed the
frontier.

Ques. 1. Had Palemon a right to den}' his crime?

Ques. 2. Was he entitled to escape from prison, either before
or after the sentence, even by making a hole in the wall, or by
breaking in the doors?

Ques. 3. Has his friend Paul sinned grievously by supplying
him with tools, which helped him to escape?

Ques. 4. Has the culprit sinned by defending himself against
the policemen while escaping from their hands?

Ans, Question 1. Yes ; the reason is, according to the common
opinion, that the prosecuted party is not compelled to confess his
crime, if there is not against him at least a half proof. Now,
when questioned by the judge, he does not seem yet to be con
vinced of his crime, for he is only suspected on account of the

Cases on Special Situations. 315

theft lie had previously committed, but this suspicion is not suffi
cient to irnke up at least a half proof. Moreover, according to a
great number of theologians of the highest authority, a guilty
party is not held to confess the truth, even after a half proof,
when it is a question of a death penalty ; because it is a heroic
act, so it seems, to acknowledge one's self guilty ; and the judge
is not supposed to insist on this point rigorously. During the
examination, he tries especially to judge the culprit from his own
declarations, and to declare him guilty out of his own words.
St. Liguori admits the probability of this opinion, which has the
more authority, because of the new method of examining now
used in France and in other countries. The defendant is not
questioned directly on what he has done, but on the various
circumstances alleged by the witnesses.

Ans. Question 2. 1. It is allowed to the culprit to run away,
according to the common opinion, if he has not been sentenced
yet ; because no one is compelled to undergo his penalt}' before
the judgment. Some affirm it, even if the guilty party has been
sentenced to a very severe penalty, and if he is sentenced to
imprisonment preventively, until he has undergone his indictment.
2. But the most part of them deny it, if the imprisonment has
been fixed by the judge's sentence, because a just sentence must
be obeyed, unless, however, if the prison-life is very hard, because
it would be a heroic act to suffer a very severe penalty, when one
can easily escape it. 3. Now, considering that it is not for
bidden the guilty party to escape, he does not sin by breaking in
the doors or by making holes in the walls ; because, if the end is
permitted, the means, insignificant by themselves, are permitted
also. It is St. Liguori's probable opinion.

Ans. Question 3. No ; because, if it is occasionally allowed to
the culprit to run away, it is not forbidden to help him in his
escaping, not only by good advice, but also with tools ; for
instance, with ropes, as long as such escape is not dangerous to
society.

Ans. Question 4. Palemon sinned by resisting justice's agents,
and tearing off their clothes ; because it is never permitted to
resist authority. However, his sin might be excused, if he had

316 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

escaped without resistance from the hands of the policemen.
Even the action of knocking down a policeman, and other facts
of that kind, for the purpose of an escape, when it is a question
to avoid so great a penalty, should be looked upon as a trifle, and
even as nothing. At least the sin is not a great one, if he has
done them a slight harm to escape a great evil, and in case his
resistance has not been serious.

CASE VII.
WITNESS CALLED BEFORE THE COURT.

Barbaut, having secretly stolen some silver plate from ArmancVs
house, is summoned before justice, being suspected of the theft,
and he denies having committed the offense. Two friends of his
are called, who have witnessed the theft, and are perfectly aware
where is hidden the cause of the offence. One of them runs away
to a far off country and does not appear ; the other presents him
self before the court, but affirms, under oath, that he knows abso
lutely nothing about it. Consequently Barbaut is discharged, and
Armand is forever beyond possibility of recovering his property.

Ques. 1. Should restitution be demanded, in this case, from
this liar and perjured witness?

Ques. 2. Is a witness compelled to declare the truth, if he has
learned the fact by a secret opportunity, or by a natural secret?

Ques. 3. Is a witness held to denounce a crime which has been
kept perfectly secret?

Ans. Question 1. The witness who has remained silent, or
maintained that he knew nothing, has committed a grievous sin
against the obedience he owed to the judge, and a great perjury ;
however, in a probable manner, he has not sinned against justice,
because he has kept a perfectly negative attitude, and he is not
the cause of the damage which happened to Armand. For a
witness is compelled to declare the truth, only by the judge's
order ; and consequently, by hiding it, he sins only against legal
justice ; therefore he is not obliged to make restitution.

Ans. Question 2. No, if mutual interest does not compel him ;
for a witness is not held by himself to obey the judge, when the

Cases on Special Situations. 317

knowledge of the truth comes from a natural secret or a con
fidence ; because, putting aside the special reason of the common
interest, the judge cannot compel us to violate a principle of
natural law. Therefore, in this case, the witness is entitled to
say that he knows absolutely nothing about it.

Ans. Question 3. No, is the more probable opinion, drawn
from the common right, if the witness is quite certain that the
crime is known only by himself, because, before declaring a man
guilty, two witnesses are necessary. From this the axiom : Testis
unus, testis nullus.

CASE IX.
THE NOTARY.

Darius, a notary, in drawing up a deed of sale, notices that the
contracting parties are not declaring the true value of the estate,
but a price much inferior, in order to pay less to the register office ;
in spite of which, he makes up the deed.

Ques. 1. Should Darius make restitution to the State for
having so deprived the Treasury of its lawful income?

Ques. 2. Q/,u'cZ., if he has himself suggested to the contracting
parties to make such a reduction ?

Ans. Question 1. It does not appear that Darius should be
blamed ; firstly, because by his situation he is not obliged to
collect taxes ; and next, because the collecting of taxes has no
relation with his profession.

Ans. Question 2. The notary Darius must not be charged
either with injustice or sin, even if. he has suggested to the
contracting parties to reduce the price ; because, if the contract
ing parties do not sin, as has been above said regarding taxes, it
is at least probable that the notary will not sin by helping them,
as he is not held by his profession to oppose their action. For
the notary, although a public officer, is not commissioned to look
after the taxes, and consequently is not held by his situation,
either to collect them or to prevent frauds. Therefore, in regard
to taxes, he must be treated as another private person.

318 The Doclt'ine of the Jesuits.

CA^E X.
THE RURAL CONSTABLE.

Barbalien, a rural constable, fulfills bis duty quite well. But h
it so in all cases? That is the question. Frequently lie receives
money from off mlers, and often is even invited to dine with them,
and loaded with presents, he then to show himself very lenient,
to the prejudice thereby of t'ie proprietors, who are not indemni
fied ; and of the Treasury, which should have received a fine, and
so is deprived of this benefit. Moreover, while preventing others
from committing offences, he has committed some himself; and
did not disclose the above circumstances of his professional func
tions, when confessing to the priest.

Ques. 1. Should he indemnify the Treasury for the fines of
which it was deprived, by not reporting the offences?

Ques. 2. Should he, when confessing his own off*. nee, have
disclosed his professional circumstances?

Aus. Question 1. After the more probable opinion, he is not
compelled to mnke restitution for the fines which should have
been paid by the offenders if he had prosecuted them ; because
lie is not commissioned to supply the public treasury.

Ans. Question 2. After the probable opinion, he has made a
full confession while omitting the above circumstances ; because,
by stealing, he has not committed a double sin, but only a single
one, that is to say, the theft ; for he is not compelled to oppose
his own offences, but those of other people.

Cases on tfte lUUgtoug State.

CASE V.

RELIGIOUS VOCATION.

Florent, a noble and intelligent young man, followed a lucrative
profession, and was wisely preparing to marry. In the meanwhile,
he is taken very sick, and being threatened by death, struck
by fear of the divine judgment, he makes a vow to become a monk
if he survives. Being cured, he advises his father of his .desire
to fulfill his vow. But the father, who is ruined, living in distress,
and having placed all his hope on his son, tries to influence him,
and to convince him not to follow his idea. " See," says he to
his son, "lam old, my condition of fortune is miserable; your
elder brother, from want of ability, has so badly managed his
business that he is not able to provide either for his own wants
or for those of his numerous family, and he needs your help."
But Florent, not moved at all by these arguments, and thinking
only of his soul's salvation, turns friar, and after his novitiate
makes the solemn vows. However, his old father, having ex
hausted his last resources, is obliged to become book-keeper in a
lawyer's office ; and his brother, in order to provide for his family,
hires himself as servant to a rich man, to the great scandal of his
family. Learning this, Florent, who was serving God with much
piety and joy, is struck with anxiety, and doubts whether he
should give up his vocation, in order to c>>me to the help of his
father and brother.

Ques. 1. Is a son allowed to enter a religious Order when
abandoning his needy father and sisters ?

Ques. 2. Is it permitted to abandon brothers and sisters in
need, to enter a convent?

Ques. 3. Under what obligation is Florent?

320 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ans. Question 1. A son ought not, by principle (per se), to
enter a religious order, if he leaves his parents in great need. It
is different if they are only in slight want. . . .

I say per se; because, if the son's salvation is running too great
a danger in worldly society, he is not compelled to stay there
for the sake of assisting his parents. . . .

Ans. Question 2. It is not allowed to abandon brothers and
sisters in great need ; but it is permitted to do so for capital
reasons. . . .

Ans. Question 3. Florent is not held to come out from a
religious Order to assist his brother, as the latter is only in great

need Strictly speaking, he is not compelled to come out

from a convent to assist his father ; because he should do so only
in case of extreme want. ... He may leave the convent, but he
is not strictly compelled to do so.

CASE VI.
ON THE PARENTS' CONSENT.

Laurence, a young ladv of good morals, educated from her
youth in a convent, having attained the age of eighteen, and
being requested to return home, beseeches her parents to permit
her to stay, and embrace the religious vocation. But they
take no notice of her desire. Sorrowful, afflicted, Laurence
comes home, and so is compe led to live among tlrs worldly
society she despises. But far from weakening, her desire for
the religious life increases every day. For three years she does
not discontinue to beseech her parents for their consent, with
tears and prayers, but in vain. The father was about to give
way to his daughter's supplications, but the mother urged him to
resistance. At last, the poor girl, seized with a fatal sickness,
comes to an extreme state ; and before dying, she says to her
weeping and despairing mother: "You were not willing that I
should be on earth the spouse of Christ ; but lo ! here is my
heavenly Betrothed, who calls me to Him." And after having
said this, she gave up her innocent soul.

Cases on lite Religious State. 321

Ques. 1. Do the parents comnrt a grievous sin by being
opposed to the religious vocation of their children, or by lead
ing them away from it with threats, artfulness, ruse, or earnest
requests?

Ques. 2. Have sons, in spite of their parents' authority, a
right to enter a religious Order?

Ques. 3. Quid, in this case?

Ans. Question 1. Yes, parents sin grievously by leading their
children away for no right purpose, by threats, violence, or ait-
fulness. "No excuse can exempt from a mortal sin," says
St. Liguori, "parents who lead them away by requests or prom
ises." "We should go by," says St. Alphonsius, u the common
opinion of doctors ; after which, parents commit a grievous sin."
The reason is, that it is to cause a great harm to him who is taken
away from religious orders. Therefore, either by violence, artful
ness, or requests, there is grievous sin which cannot be excused.
Moreover, many theologians charge with a mortal sin, not only
parents, but also strangers who lead any one away from the
religious vocation ; because it is quite contrary to charity. But
parents, by leading their sons away from religion, commit two
grievous sins, one against charity, and the other against piety ;
because their duty compels them to take care of the education and
spiritual progress of their sons. " However," concludes the holy
doctor, " it must not be denied that man}r parents should be
excused from a mortal sin, at least for a time, on account of the
ignorance or carelessness so natural in such a case, and which are
caused by the deep natural affection they have for their sons."

Ans. Question 2. Yes, by principle ; because sons are perfectly
free to choose their profession. This reason is valid above all,
regarding the religious state. Therefore, when choosing the reli
gious state, sons are not held to wait for the consent of their
parents ; and there is no advantage even to expect it, because
I in that parents have not only a lack of experience, but they
become adverse to their own interest. However, if the son is able
to wait easily and safely for his parent's consent, it is more
proper that he should wait a while, in order to secure it. But, if
he f'ears that his parents may be opposed to his religious vocation,

322 T/te Doctrine of the Jesuits.

he is free from all blame, if, without their knowledge, he abandons
his parents home to consecrate himself to religion.

Ans. Question 3. Laurence's parents have not acted right
eously, especially her mother, by opposing so unkindly the vow
of their daughter ; and without any doubt they have committed a
grievous sin. . . . How many such parents, by being unjustly
opposed to the vocation of their children, have been punished by
their death! "Why weep, impious mother, over the body of
thy daughter? Is it not thyself who has killed her? " *

CASE VIII.
Vow OF POVERTY.

Damaris, a professional nun, learning that her father was just
deceased, would like to dispose of the share of the inheritance
belonging to her, not having renounced it before her profession,
and desiring to do so partly for pious use and partly in favor of

* It is interesting to bring together with this illustration, where the
ferocity of fanaticism is displayed, this other, that we read in the Annals
of Holy Childhood, 1877: "... The devil, furious, has tried to take two
souls away from us, to avenge himself of those he had just been missing.

" In the orphan asylum, we had two children, one four years of age,
the other two months old. I had baptized in extremis, the mother of
those two poor young creatures, who became orphans shortly after.
Before dying, and in presence of several witnesses, the mother had given
ht-r children away to our nuns. But she had not signed a regular deed,
which would, in case of need, prove in court the right of the nuns over
those two children.

" It therefore might be feared the children should be taken away from
the orphan asylum, "if they were claimed by near relatives. The grand
mother calls at the above place and insists upon taking back her two
grand-children to her home.

" First, this was refused to her.

"She went out greatly excited, and threatening to bring an action
against the convent. In the meanwhile, all the nuns were in prayer;
tliey asked God to call back to Him these two souls, rather than to see
them thrown back into paganism.

"One month later, a police inspector called in to take some informa
tion for an official report against the nuns charged with theft of children,
a crime punishable by hard labor.

" They showed the inspector a register of the deceased inmates, legally
signed by the civil commissioner, in which he could read that the two
young orphans had taken their flight to heaven the same week. God had
heard favorably the prayers of our holy nuns, and consequently the devil
had to ackuov\ ledge that he vuis vanquished once more ! ''

Cases on the Religious Slate. 323

her brother. But having asked her superior's permission in order
to act in accordance with her vow. " Great God," says the latter,
astounded, "what are you asking for, sister? Don't you know that
this is not possible, even with a dispensation from the Bishop, or
from the Pope, but only with the permission of God Almighty, to
whom you have made a solemn profession?"

Ques. 1. What is the effect of the vow of poverty, either simple
or solemn ?

Ques. 2. Quid of Damaris?

Ans. Question 1. The solemn vow of poverty renders a man
incapable of possessing, personall}T, anything of value. As re
gards the simple vow, it does not make nuns incapable of pos
sessing under the form of a direct possession ; but it does not
allow them to use or dispose of anything without the permission,
of their Superior.

Ans. Question 2. Damaris, by common rights, cannot dispose
of her share of inheritance, neither in pious intention nor in the
interest of her brother ; because her religious profession has ren
dered her incapable of disposing of her property. And this in
capacity cannot be taken off, either by her Superior, or the
Bishop, but by the Pope only, as has been said above. It would
be different if Damaris were living in some community in France ;#
because, in that country, on account of modern hard times, the
Holy See does not acknowledge the solemnity of vows. This is why
nuns in France, under the present circumstances, are not called
nuns in the strict meaning of the word ; however, in the true and
proper sense, they are nuns, but not such in the strictest sense?
as seems to result from various answers by the 5th Penitentiary.

CASE IX.
Vow OF POVERTY.

Florin, a French monk, had scarcely made his profession, than
an omission he had made in the disposition of his property comes
to his mind. But he thinks that, with the permission of his Supe
rior, he will be able lo make up for this act of carelessness, at least,
if he disposes of it according to what may be interpreted from his

324 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

intention, especially while following this opinion, by which it is
acknowledged that, in France, there are solemn vows. But the
Superior, having a contrary opinion, refuses decidedly to give his
consent.

Ques. 1. Must we acknowledge the solemn profession of nuns,
in France, under the actual circumstances?

Ques. 2. Must we acknowledge it for monks and friars?

Ques. 3. What is to be done in this case?

Ans. Question 1. No; this has been declared very often by
the church through the medium of the St. Penitentiary ; namely, in
answer to the bishop of Limoges, 1820. However, nuns living
in Savoy still make a solemn profession, although that country
has been annexed to France, because religious affairs are not
controlled by civil supervision.

Ans. Question 2. Yes, although in spite of what man}T have
said, without any authority, when foolishly declaring that monks
and nuns ought to be assimilated.

In fact : 1. Nothing has been changed by the ecclesiastical
power regarding the vows of monks in France ; therefore they
remain bound by solemn vows, as before the political troubles.
For religious affairs do not follow the fluctuations of political
revolutions, and remain unalterable until they may be changed by
the Apostolic Holy See. Now, no change has been made by the
Holy See with regard to the vows of monks, but only concerning
those of nuns.

2. It results from a declaration of the Holy Congregation of
Bishops and Regulars, that the Benedictine monks of the monas
tery of Solesmes, in France, make solemn vows. Therefore the
new civil legislation of that country does not oppose solemn vows,
and, consequently, the same thing may be said regarding other
religious Orders making a solemn profession.

Ans. Question 3. It is too late for Florin to make up for his
act of carelessness ; his profession has rendered him perfectly in
capable of possessing anything whatsoever. He therefore should
act as if he were dead. Neither with a dispensation of the Super
ior, nor of the Bishop, can he recover his capacity in this case ;
and he cannot rely upon the opinion of a few, who pretends that

Cases on tJie Religions State. 325

the vows of Regulars are not solemn in France, because this opin
ion is not probable, not being based on any positive fact.

CASE XII.
Vow OF POVERTY.

Florine, a nun, earnestly keeping to her vow of poverty, but not
losing any opportunity to do acts of charity and mercy, by
living too parsimoniously, often deprives herself of food, or other
things supplied to her for her own use, in order to give them to
the poor, or to young girls educated in the convent. One day,
being obliged to go on the road, she makes the whole trip on foot,
without stopping at any hotels, and uses the money she had so
economized for pious purposes. She hurries up her duties, in
order to have some time to spare, when she can work for her
nieces educated in the convent. Florine rejoices because she may
occupy herself in some pious work without any prejudice to hsr
vow of poverty, and without being obliged always to depend upon
her Superior.

Ques. 1. What are we to think of Florine's conscience, gen
erally ?

Ques. 2. And in each special case?

Ans. Question 1. Florine's conscience is mistaken. It is false
that a nun may, without prejudice to her vows of poverty and obe
dience, occupy herself so easily with works of charity. But is
Florine placed in a vincible or invincible ignorance? This cannot
be determined in general. That depends on various circumstances,
if she has been well instructed upon her vow of poverty. Why
does she not question her confessor, if he is capable ; or any other
person well skilled in religious affairs? She seems not only to be
inclined to acts of charity and mercy, but also desirous of
following her own fancies, while she rejoices so much, being able,
so she thinks, to act independently of her Superior's authority.

Ans. Question 2. Florine acts contrary to her vow of poverty
in each of the following cases : 1. When she distributes to the
poor, or to young girls educated in the convent, what she deprives
herself of by living parsimoniously ; because these things are given

326 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

to her for her own use, and not for another purpose. 2. It is the
same regarding the money she economized in the course of her
trip, reserving it for the same purpose. 3. Neither can she keep
what she gains by working quickly, or b}' attending to her nieces
during the time she has to spare. This may be said in general ;
but there may be some exceptions in some monastic orders, where
the vow of poverty is not so strictly interpreted.

CASE XV.
ON THE PROPERTY OF MONKS.

Ques. Has a monk, in France, the right to dispose of his
property ? And how ?

Ans. There is a disposition in civil law interfering with relig
ious obligations. No matter if it acknowledges or not the re
ligious state. The canonical law has its obligations outside of the
civil law ; for, if the dispositions of the latter are contrary to the
canonical law, they are void for the conscience. Thus, monks and
religious communities keep their rights. Therefore, civil French
law does nut suppress either obligations or faculties which are
denied from common right. There is nothing to take away, noth
ing to cut off. Therefore a monk, in France, as elsewhere, should
dispose of his properties irrevocably, although he might be con
sidered as proprietor by the law, or as a man having a right to
possession. Civil law, to him, is neither prejudicial nor favorable.
Then, he cannot be compelled to act as a proprietor.

CASE XVIII.
Vow OF OBEDIENCE.

Ques. What is to be done if doubts arise against the legitimacy
of the Superior's orders? Is then the use of probability permitted?

Ans. In doubt, we. must side with the Superior. The pre
sumption is on his side, to demand good order and the inter
ests of religion ; if it were otherwise, the inferiors might easily
express doubts on Hie opportunity and value of the orders, to
the great disadvantage of authority. Thus, in this case, the
use of probabilism must be prevented in practice ; because, from
what has been said, we deny the supposition, in other words, we
deny that probability exists against the Superior's orders.

fficncral Ercattsc on tije Sacraments.

CHAPTER I.
DEFINITION, NUMBER AND DIVISION OF THE SACRAMENTS.

CHAPTER II.
MATTER AND FORM OF THE SACRAMENTS.

CHAPTER III.

MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENTS.

ART. I. Required conditions for administering the Sacra
ments ; or of the attention, intention, good faith and honesty of
the Minister.

ART. II. Du'y of the Minister. . . .

CHAPTER IV.

PERSON WHO RECEIVES THE SACRAMENTS.

ART. I. Required conditions in order to receive the sacra
ments in a valid manner.

ART. II. Required conditions in order to receive the sacra
ments in a lawful manner.

Ereatfee on Baptism*

CHAPTER I.
NATURE, PROPRIETY AND NECESSITY OF BAPTISM.

CHAPTER II.
MATTER AND FORM OF BAPTISM.

ART. I. Matters to be avoided, and matters preferred, concern
ing baptism.

236. — The only valid matter is natural water, or elemen
tary. . . .

237. — Valid matters are: 1, Water from springs, wells,
brooks, seas, ponds, swamps, cisterns, lakes; 2, water coming
from ice, snow, or melted hail; because it retains its own sub
stance, though its color, savor or smell may be modified acciden
tally ; 3, sulphurous or mineral water, coming from steam, dew,
wateriness of walls, of leaves, etc. ; 4, troubled water, adulter
ated, mixed with another substance, as long as water is really the
true predominant matter, so that according to custom and the
common opinion of men, it may be called water.

2. Invalid matters are : 1, milk, blood, tears, sweat, sa
liva, pus, urine ; 2, wine, oil, beer, thick fat, gravy, etc.; 3d.
mud, ink ; 4, snow, ice, frost and similar things not melted, be
cause in such a state they are not natural water.

3. Doubtful matters are : 1, very thin gravy, laundry suds, light
beer, water coming from melted salt ; 2, the liquid which comes
out from the vine and other plants.

Treatise on Baptism. 329

ART. II. Formula of baptism.

241. — The formula of baptism is: "I baptize thee in the name
of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." . . .

Ques. Is the formula valid, if one says : "I baptize thee : 1, in
the name of the Holy Trinity?" or 2, ''in the name of Christ?"

Ans. 1 . No; at least according to the more probable opinion. . . .

Ans. 2. No ; for a still better reason.

CHAPTER III.

MINISTER OF BAPTISM.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE SUBJECT OF BAPTISM.

248. — Ques. Can one lawfully baptize the children of infidels?

Ans. 1. Yes, in the following cases : 1, if they have reached
the age of reason, and if they consent ; even in spite of their par
ents ; 2, if their parents have forsaken the Catholic religion, like
heretics ; because the Church has a right to repress parents : 3, if
such children are on the point of death ; because there is an urgent
necessity, and no danger to fear ; 4, if one of the parents has con
sented, in spite of the opposition of the other.

2. No, in all other cases ; for instance, if both parents are op
posed, and if the children are to be under dependence upon their
parents. The reason is drawn from the danger of perversion.

CHAPTER V.

ACCESSORY SOLEMNITIES OF BAPTISM, GOD-FATHERS, AND
CEREMONIES.

330 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

ART. I. God fathers.

;.k . . . . . • • • *

ART. II. Ceremonies of baptism.

Appendix on Caesarian operation, to baptize a child who is not
yet born.

258. — Should it be performed, and when?

Ans. 1. After the death of the mother, it must be decidedly
performed, under severe penalty ; even if her relatives refuse, or are
opposed, in case it can be performed.

It is necessary to use all possible means to retain the warmth
in the womb of the deceased mother, until the operation is per
formed ; if not, the child would easily perish before having been
baptized.

2. It is necessary to perform the operation, even if the mother
is yet alive; if, according to the opinion of expert persons, the
child cannot be baptized by any other means. The mother is
held by principle-, speaking in a speculative manner, to suffer it,
under severe penalty, if it may be done without directly causing
her death.

on Confirmation,

CHAPTER I.

MATTER AND FORM OF CONFIRMATION.
ART. I. Matter of confirmation.

261. — The remote matter of confirmation is the chrism, made
with olive oil and balm, and blessed by a Bishop.

262. — Qnes. Is balm necessarily required for the sacrament?

Ans. Yes, according to the most probable opinion.

Ques. Should the oil necessarily be made of olives, to render
the sacrament valid ?

Ans. Yes, because olive oil is the only true kind of oil ; thus
oil made of any other substances, for instance, of nuts, is not a
valid matter ; because it is not sold under the simple name of oil
only.

ART. II. Form of Confirmation.

CHAPTER II.

MINISTER OF THE CONFIRMATION.

CHAPTER III.
PERSON WHO RECEIVES CONFIRMATION.

on tfje 1Eiicl)artst

PART FIRST.
THE EUCHARIST AS A SACRAMENT.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE AND EFFICACY OF THE EUCHARIST.

271-9. — How long does Christ really remain present within the
Eucharist ?

Ans. So long as the elements of bread and wine are intact ;
but He ceases to be therein when the elements are altered so
much that, according to the opinion of men, there does not seem
to be any more bread and wine left. But, then, after the law es
tablished by God, their elements are replaced by the same matter
which replaces altered bread and wine.

Ques. How long are sacred elements supposed to remain in
tact, after one has received the sacrament?

Ans. There is nothing agreed on this point ; some say one
minute; others, five; and others, seven. But they remain intact
longer with a priest, who takes the communion with the two ele
ments and with a larger consecrated wafer, than with a layman,
who receives only a small one ; although it seems certain that
fifteen minutes after the communion, even with a priest, provided
he is in good health, the elements are dissolved.

CHAPTER II.

MATTER AND FORM OF THE EUCHARIST.

ART. I. Matter of the Eucharist.

276. — . . . Wheat bread and grape wine are the only matters
fit for the Eucharist

Treatise on the EucJtarist. 333

278. — Ques. Is bread made of barley or rye a valid matter?

Ans. There is controversy. Some affirm it ; but others, ac
cording to the more common and probable opinion, den}T it.

Ques. Is bread made of spelt, or fine wheaten meal, a valid
matter?

Ans. There is controversy, also, on this point.

ART. II. Form of the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

CHAPTER III.

MINISTER WHO GIVES THE EUCHARIST.
ART. I. Power of this minister.

ART. II. Obligation to administer the Eucharist.

ART. III. Special conditions required to properly administer
the holy Eucharist.

ART. IV. Manner of giving the Eucharist to the sick.
ART. V. Manner of keeping the holy Eucharist.

CHAPTER IV.

THE PERSON WHO RECEIVES THE EUCHARIST.
ART. I. Obligation to receive the Eucharist.

ART. II. Required dispositions for receiving the Eucharist.

334 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

330. — Ques. Does the absorption of the remains of aliments,
sticking to the teeth, break the fust?

Ans. No, if it is involuntary. . . .

There would be controversy, if it were done voluntarily. . . .

331. — Ques. Does a pinch of snuff break the fast?

Ans. No, even if part of it goes into the stomach ; because,
although such a matter may be nourishing, one does not take it as
food. . . .

Ques. Does the smell of tobacco, or similar matters, break the
fast ?

Ans. No, according to the more common and probable opin
ion, because smoke is neither an aliment nor a drink. . . .

PART SECOND.

THE EUCHARIST AS A SACRIFICE.

CHAPTER I.
NATURE AND VIRTUE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS.

CHAPTER II.

APPLICATION OF THE SACRIFICE OP THE MASS.

354. — This is the intention with \vh'ch the priest wishes this
Sacrifice to be useful to a determined person.

CHAPTER III.

OBLIGATIONS TO CELEBRATE THIS SACRIFICE.
ART. I. Obligation to celebrate it, created by priesthood.

ART. II. Obligation created by duty.

Treatise on the Eucharist. 335

ART. III. Obligation created by salary.

367. ... A priest mny lawfully receive a salary, or aim, for a
mass which he is compelled to say, for another person's sake.

Appendix. For the priests of the Society of Jesus.

378. — A priest belonging to this society must not accept, either
for himself or for another, a salary for masses said by him. ISo
also is it for all charges of the sacred ministry. . . .

He may accept money offered liberally, and generously promise
in return to say masses; but in such a manner that this promise
should not be like a compensation or a manner of discharging him
self for the money received ; but it is necessary that such inoney
should be given as a simple aim, in such a way that the donor
should understand that it cannot be received under any other con
sideration, and that he is giving it himself as a matter of ali»
only.

CHAPTER IV.
TIME AND PLACE OF THE CELEBRATION.

ART. I. Time of the celebration.

ART. II. Place of the celebration.

386. — It is generally allowed to celebrate a mass only in a dedi
cated church, or at least a blessed one.

CHAPTER V.

MKTHOD OF THE CELEBRATION.
ART. I. Required conditions for celebrating mass.

ART. II. Rubrics.

ise on tfje Sacrament of penance.

PART FIRST.

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE; ITS MATURE,
MATTER AND FORM.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE OF PENANCE.

• •••••••••••

CHAPTER II.

MATTER OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE.

CHAPTER III.
FORM OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE.

PART SECOND.

THE PERSON WHO RECEIVES THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE ; OR ON
THE PENITENT'S DUTIES.

CHAPTER I.

CONTRITION.
ART. I. Contrition, properly so called,

ART. II. Pu.pose.

Treatise on the Sacrament of Penance. 337

CHAPTER II.
ON CONFESSION.
ART. I. Necessity of Confession.

ART. II. Quality of Confession.

ART. III. Repetition of Confession.
...... . •

ART. I. Assessment of Penance.

ART. II. Accomplishment of Penance.

PART THIRD.
MINISTER OP PENANCE.

CHAPTER I.
POWER OF THE MINISTER.
ART. I. Approbation.

ART. II. Jurisdiction.
ART. III. Reserved Cases.

Appendix First: On the absolving of an accomplice to a
a shameful sin.

584. — No confessor can absolve his accomplice in a shameful
sin ; and whoever has the presumption to do so, incurs, by the
fact itself, Papal excommunication.

585. Ques. What is to be understood under the name of

a shameful sin ?

Ans. All grievous sins against the sixth precept of the Deca
logue, though the shameful act may not have been consummated ;
even a single shameful touching . . .

338 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ques. Does one understand by accomplice, not only women,
but even men ?

Ans. Yes, because the text of the Bull is taken entirely in
general. It is said therein : ' 'That whosoever dares to receive the
sacramental confession of an accomplice, against the sixth precept
of the Decalogue, for a shameful sin." The application of the
statute is not confined to the feminine sex only.

586. — Ques. Can a priest absolve his accomplice when in danger
of death, if another priest cannot be called in, or cannot come at
once without causing dishonor and scandal?

Ans. Yes, in a lawful and valid manner. However a guilty priest
is held to prevent such dangers of dishonor and scandal, if he can
help it ; for instance, by retiring, under some pretext. Otherwise,
he can not escape the established penalties, although his absolution
is valid.

Ques. Is a priest entitled to absolve his accomplice, when in
danger of death, and refusing to confess to another priest?

Ans. Yes, as in the former case, if the penitent has been pre
pared for it in some other way, so that he should not perish, or at
least that his eternal salvation should not be compromised.

587. — Ques. Can a priest absolve his accomplice for other
sins which do not concern his own offence, after the penitent has
been absolved by another confessor?

Ans. Yes ; because he is only deprived of the jurisdiction on
this penitent for what concerns the sin in which he had a part ;
therefore, when the latter sin has been redeemed by the absolution
allowed to be given by another confessor, the prohibition ceases,
and jurisdiction is no longer taken away from him. . . .

Appendix II. — Solicitation to sin in course of the confession.

It never could be regretted enough, that within the sheep-house
of Christ there are occasionally unscrupulous wolves, who, estab
lished as being appointed guardians of Israel's home, degrade and
break into it most cruelly.

593. — Ques. Should a priest be prosecuted because while hear
ing the confession of a lady, he solicits her to sin?

Treatise on the tfacmment of Penance. 339

Ans. Yes, if the solicitation takes place in the confessional, or
where the confession is made. No, if it is outside of that place,
and under another pretence than confession.

595. — Ques. Should one prosecute a priest, who, having learned
through confession the weakness of a woman, solicits her to sin tit
her home ?

Ans. Yes, if he has so solicited her as a person of whom lie
has learned through confession the character and frailty, and if he
impresses the fact upon her mind, either by a word or otherwise.

Ques. Must we always believe women who accuse a priest of
having solicited them to sin ?

Ans. No ; because it has often been heard of women ; who
calumniate innocent clerks through jealousy, hate, zeal, or some
other perverse motive. . . .

When superiors have acquired the certainty of such a crime,
they should proceed with prudence, and punish the guilty priest
according to the extent of his sin, without placing on the same
level a fault already forgotten, or caused by human frailty, with a
fault recently committed, and which is his customary sin.

597. — Ques. What are the penalties pronounced against those
who solicit to sin ?

Ans. According to the Bull of Gregory XV., they are: Sus
pension from the exercise of the sacred ministry ; deprivation of
any benefits, dignities and pensions whatever ; and a perpetiud
incapacity to obtain such privileges ; besides, regarding priests
belonging to religious Orders, the deprivation of all active and
passive voices.

CHAPTER II.

DUTY OF THE MINISTER DURING AND AFTER THE CONFESSION.
ART. I. Duty of the minister in course of the Confession.
Parag. 1. Confessor's part.

He should practice the quadruple part of father, doctor, physi
cian and judge.

340 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

ART. II. Duty of the minister after confession.

663.— Ques. Can a confessor order a penance to an accomplice
(with the permission of the penitent) ; or must he leave the care
of so doing to another confessor?

Ans. Yes, because the accomplice has not acquired, by the con
fession of the other accomplice, any right to sacramental secret,
for this secret was instituted in favor of penitents only ; conse
quently the right to the secret is acquired only by the one who
gives it up confidentially.

But, ordinarily, it is not proper that the confessor should take
such a liberty.

treatise on Extreme Unetton,

CHAPTER I.

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF EXTREME UNCTION.

CHAPTER II.

MATTER AND FORM OF EXTREME UNCTION.
ART. I. Matter.

ART. II. Form.

CHAPTER III.
MINISTER OF EXTREME UNCTION.

CHAPTER IV.
PERSON WHO RECEIVES EXTREME UNCTION.

on ©rfcer*

CHAPTER I.

NATURE AND DIVISION OF ORDER.

CHAPTER II.
MATTER AND FORM OF ORDER.

CHAPTER III.

MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER.

CHAPTER IV.
PERSON WHO RECEIVES THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER.

(Cases of Conscience on Sacraments in fficnrral*

These cases are of no interest for a layman, and treat of trifling
matters. In order to give an idea of the childish subjects, we
will give a few examples :

CASE III.
CHANGE OF MATTER.

Trophime, a midwife, hearing for the first time Sabin, a }*oung
priest, singing the mass, exclaims enthusiastically of his beautiful
voice : " Very good, indeed ! How much he has improved ! I am
not surprised. I baptized him myself, and I mixed some milk
with the water."

Ques. What are we to think of Sabin's baptism?

Ans. In order to know if it is valid, it will be necessary to ask
Trophime if the milk was in less, equal, or superior proportion
to the water. In the first case, the baptism is valid ; in the
sicond, it is not; therefore Sabin should receive a new baptism,
and sacred orders.

CASE IV.
" LAPSUS LINGUAE."

Sidon, a priest, instead of " Hoc est enim corpus meum, " says,
when consecrating : "• Hcc est corpus meus, " or " Corpus men."
Ques. Is the consecration vrtlid? etc., etc.

CASE VI.
INTERRUPTION.

Cornelius, a priest, baptizing a child, said: " I baptize thee,"
— then he says to some children who are playirg : " Silence ! bad

344 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

boys, stupid children!" — and he adds: "In the name of the
Father, of the Son, and of the Holy — at this moment he sneezes
and coughs — Ghost. "

Ques. Is this baptism valid? etc., etc.

The following may be a more grievous fact, from a social point
of view :

CASE XVIII.
THE PERSON WHO RECEIVES THE SACRAMENT.

Florian, a priest, requested to call on Titius, a dying man, hears
his confession, and administers to him the holy Eucharist, which
he freely accepts. But when he tries to administer Extreme
Unction, Titius refuses to receive it, declaring that he is not in
danger of death. But the priest, noticing that Titius is losing all
consciousness, begins to anoint him with the holy oil, and adminis
ters the sacrament till the end, although the dying man, opening
his eyes and seeing what is being done upon him, shows his ill will
by shaking his head.

Ques. Has Florian acted validly and lawfully?

Ans. Yes, he has acted validly, because the consent of Titius
was not lacking.

And lawfully, because every time it is possible to administer the
sacraments it must be done, when there is necessity. . . .

Therefore Florian should not only be absolved, but praised
for it.

Cases of Conscience on Baptism*

CASE I.

THE MATTER OF BAPTISM.

Ques. Is baptism valid when a woman weeps upon the head of
the child, while saying the sacramental words?
Ans. No ; because tears are not natural water.

CASE VI.
MINISTER OF BAPTISM.

Ameline, a Catholic woman, married to a Protestant, desires to
take her new-born child to the curate to have it baptized ; but her
husband commands her to take the child to a priest of his creed.
The pious mother laments and weeps, not being able to satisfy her
heart's desire. But an idea comes to her mind, as a remedy to
this situation ; she herself baptizes her child at home, before she
carries it to the minister.

Ques. What must we think of Ameline?

Ans. Ameline has acted badly ; for she was the cause of the
child being baptized twice. And there is less grievance in having
a child baptized by a heretic, than in having it baptized twice. . .

CASE IX.

A CHILD BAPTIZED FOUR TIMES.

Honorine, a midwife, requested to call for a delivery, and fear
ing the foetus would perish with the mother, who is in danger of
death, baptizes it with a surgical instrument in its mother's womb ;
later on, an arm of the child showing out, and the danger being
thereby increased, she baptizes it upon this member. Then, not
feeling satisfied about the validity of these baptisms, and the child
being nearly dead at his birth, she baptizes him once more. Final-
ly, the priest arrives, and doubting the validity of these ceremo
nies, performs the sacrament for the fourth time, under conditions.

346 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CASE X.
BAPTISM OF THE CHILDREN OF HERETICS.

1 . The priest Faustus receives for baptism a child born from
Protestant parents, and christens it solemnly with the holy water,
but under condition that the god-father be a Catholic, although he
well knows that his parents will educate their son in heresy.

2. Another time, a Jewish married couple who had come to
reside in his parish, with intention to stay a short time on account
of their business, leave in trust of the servant of the house where
they had stopped their two children, a son seven years of age, and
and a daughter three years old. One day the priest learned,
through this servant, that the Jewish young girl is seriously sick
and in danger of death, and that her brother, whom she had initia
ted into the Catholic religion, had eagerly asked, in many instances,
to be baptized. What should he do then? The good priest calls
at the indicated house during the absence of the parents, and bap
tizes secretly the two Jewish children. The little girl recovered
alter a short time, and the parents, having settled their business,
went to another country, in consequence of which the priest is
greatly anxious regarding the fate of the young baptized children.

Ques. 1. May children of heretics be baptized by a Catholic,
either with the consent of or unknown to their parents?

Ques. 2. May the children of infidels be baptizc-d unknown to
their parents, or in spite of them ? Quid. If the mother consents,
when the father is opposed? or if the grandfather consents, while
the parents refuse ?

Ques. 3. What should be done with a child, if the use of rea
son is certain? and what is to be done if it is doubtful?

Ques. 4. What must we think of Priest Faustus' behavior?

Ans. Question 1. Children of heretics mny be baptized with
the consent of their parents ; or else, parents who admit baptism
in their creed, would have their children baptized by a heretical
minister. But it is not allowed to baptize the children of heretics
without the knowledge of their parents, except in case of neces
sity, when the parents are going to have their children baptized
according to their creed, so that they should not be obliged to be
baptized again.

Cases of Conscience on Baptism. 347

Ans. to Question 2. It is not allowed to baptize the children of
infidels in spite of parents, except in case of necessity, or unless
the children, enjoying their full reason, request themselves to be
baptized. The excuse is found in the danger they are running of
losing their salvation.

If one of the parents is in favor of baptism and the other against
it, the priest should side with the one who is favorable to the bap
tism and the salvation of the child, providing* the latter is to be
afterwards educated in the true religion. It would be the same if
the father, being deceased, the grandfather was in favor of the
baptism and the mother against it.

Ans. to Question 3. In case the use of reason is certain with
an infidel's child, if he seems to be sufficiently educated and asks
to be baptized, and if he is not running the danger of perversion,
even in spite of parents. If the use of reason is doubtful, the
child having reached the age of seven, it is commonly said that
the priest must presume the use of reason, because it must be
judged from what commonly happens. If the child has not reached
the age of seven, there is controversy. But, according to St.
Liguori, it is better to wait until it may be ascertained regarding
the perfect use of reason.

Ans. to Question 4. Faustus has acted well by baptizing the
child presented to him by heretical parents ; for if it had not been
redeemed by him, and had been baptized by a Protestant minister,
it would not have secured the advantage of being sanctified by the
Catholic doctrine.

2. Faustus might and should baptize the Jewish young girl in
danger of death. If she has recovered, the good priest must not
be charged with impudence because he has given help to her poor
little soul in a great danger. And there is no occasion to accuse
him for the seven-year-old boy enjoying his full reason, well ac
quainted with religion, and asking the sacrament of redemption.
For, if led away by his parents, he is later on exposed to perver
sion, there is, however, good hope to presume that, with the grace
of baptism, he will remember so great a blessing, and will so obtain
eternal salvation.

Cases of Conscience on Confirmation,

(They are of no interest.)

Cases of Conscience on tfje lEucfjartst

CASE I.

SUBSTANCE WITH WHICH THE FIRST CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE

MADE.

The priest Vitalis, living in a country where wheat does not
grow and is not easy to be had, uses for the sacrament of the
Eucharist consecrated wafers, made sometimes of spelt, of rye or
of barley, and at other times of all these substances mixed together.

Ques. 1. What is the substance with which the first consecra
tion should be made ?

Ques. 2. Is Vitalis' consecration valid?

Ans. to Question 1. The substance with which wafers should
be consecrated is wheaten bread ; in other words, such bread as is
generally considered as bread, properly so called.

Ans. to Question 2. Vitalis' consecration is not valid with bar
ley bread ; because it is not bread properly so called. This sub
stance, being doubtful, should therefore be prohibited in this case.
For the same reason, also, spelt or meal. However, in some places,
a sort of wheat is supplied under the name of spelt, and of it is
made bread, properly so called.

The mixture made by Vitalis is also doubtful, and even if the
proportion of barley is larger, the substance is not, valid.

CASE VIII.

MINISTRY OF THE EUCHARIST.
Nicaon, a priest, having a sore hand, and not being able to use

Cases of Conscience on Confirmation. 349

his fore-finger at the communion, takes and offers the consecrated
wafer between the thumb and middle-finger.

Ques. What are we to think of Nicaon?

Ans. It is not allowed to give the Eucharist with other fingers
than the thumb and fore-finger. . . . And consequently, Nicaon
has sinned grievously, in principle.

CASE XXI.
THE HOLY VIATICUM.

The priest Lucain, learning that Romarin, a nobleman, is se
verely sick, calls in haste upon him. First, he is refused admis
sion by the patient's family. After his earnest entreaties, he is
permitted to enter the chamber on condition that he shall speak
neither of death nor of the sacraments, in order not to frighten the
patient. In spite of this, the priest endeavors to prepare the sick
man, and manages it so cleverly that he soon receives his confes
sion. But, later on, when it is a question to administer to him the
Holy Viaticum, the priest finds the wife very sick also ; for that
reason he is sent away as an unlucky visitor, and it so happens
that Romarin dies the same night without having received the
Viaticum.

Ques. Is one obliged to give and receive the Holy Viaticum?

Ans. Yes ; the two obligations are grave, by themselves, ac
cording to all authorities ; for : 1, The pastor of souls is held by
duty to administer the Eucharist to his parishioners during their
life, every time they request it reasonably, and with more reason
when there is danger of death ; because it is his duty to supply all
things necessary or helpful to salvation ; 2, the faithful, after the
recommendation of Christ and the Church, should often receive
communion in the course of their life, and with more reason are
they obliged to do so when in danger of death, in order to be
strengthened against spiritual enemies by such divine help.

Cases of Conscience on tfte

CASE XII.
CHANGE OF APPLICATION.

Titien, a parson, has received from a noble and very pious lady
a piece of gold, to say, on Saturday, a mass in her behalf at the
Virgin's altar. But the same day, he has to say a mass to the in
tention of a deceased man. What should he do? He asks Tiburce,
a priest, his friend : " Will you celebrate a complimentary mass to
my intention next Saturday; and on Monday, in return, I will
celebrate one to your intention?" Tiburce accepts, and by so
doing the parson has complied with both of his obligations, and
has been able to keep the piece of gold.

Ques. What are we to think of Titien?

Ans. Titien has acted lawfully, according to the most probable
opinion.

of Conscience on Confession,

CASE XI.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SINS.

Young Paschasius has committed the shameful sin with his own
sister, his first cousin, and his brother's wife. Having returned
to better ieelings, he goes and throws himself at his confessor's
feet, and, with the greatest repentance, declares he has acted
shamefully with three women of his relatives.

Ques. Has Paschasius so made a plenary confession ; or should
he have named the degrees and species of relationship?

Ans. 1. Paschasius has not made a plenary confession, as he
has omitted to state the circumstance of adultery with his brother's
wife. He^should have at least added that one of those three
ladies was a relation of his by marriage.

2. He should have even named the incest with his own sister ;
that is to sa}T, with a relative of the first degree in collateral line.
The reason is, that the respect which is due to sisters and brothers
is of another kind than that due to other collateral relatives.
This results from the fact that the Church never grants a dispen
sation for marriage with that degree of relationship. It is the
common opinion of Lugo and Lacroix. But St. Liguori professes
a contrary opinion as probable ; because such an union (talis
copula) is not forbidden by natural right; as follows, says he,
from the example given by Adam's children. But it may be re
plied to this, that this union is forbidden, at least, by natural
right in the largest sense, and more yet than polygamy, the only
exception being when compelled by necessity.

3. The more probable opinion is, that Paschasius could not
very well name the degree of relationship as regards his cousin,
because other degrees produce but an aggravated circumstance ; bt.

352 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Liguori and others, according to the more common opinion ; on
the contrary, Concilia, etc. And he was not compelled to state
the degree of relationship of his sister-in-law ; because, with the
exception of the first degree, — in almost direct line in other
words, — between father-in-law and daughter-in-law, and between
son-in-law and mother-in law, the more probable opinion is, that
the sin of lust does not change of nature according to the various
degrees, and it is not necessary to make a distinction between
relationship by blood and relationship by marriage. St. Liguori
proves that this is the common opinion of theologians.

CASE XIII.
DENUNCIATION OF THE ACCOMPLICE.

I. Bertoldus has committed the horrible crime of incest on his
own sister, who is well-known by the priest of the parish, whose
nephew she is shortly to marry. Paschal-time is near, and the
unfortunate man can confess only to his pastor. He hesitates a
long time whether he should and may declare the incest committed
on his own sister, dishonoring her in the priest's eyes. He was
ready to omit his sin ; but, while thinking over it, he hits upon a
scheme to get out of his trouble, and so makes the following con
fession : "1 once committed incest on a relative of mine."

II. CEgidtus, noticing that his sister is pregnant from Caius,
her lover, becomes furious, strikes her severely, and so causes her
to have a miscarriage. Repenting of his action, he confesses that
he has severely struck his sister ; but he neither states that she
was pregnant, nor that she had a miscarriage, in order not to declare
this crime to his confessor, by whom he is well known, together
with all his family.

Ques. 1. Should one confess a sin that one cannot tell without
naming the accomplice?

Ques. 2. Must one declare the sin to the confessor who knows
the accomplice, if able to secure another confessor?

Ques. 3. Is there obligation to declare a mortal sin of which
one cannot accuse one's self without dishonoring another party
who was the object or occasion of such a sin ?

Ques. 4. What should be done in these two cases ?

Cases of Conscience on Confession. 353

Ans. Question 1. Yes, it is the more common and probable
opinion, as there is no legitimate reason which excuses us from
confessing a sin. For the prejudice which results from the denun
ciation of an accomplice is inherent to the confession itself.
Otherwise, in many places, where all the faithful are known by the
parsons and deacons, confession would not be in force ; as parents,
sons, husbands and wives would be dispensed in many instances
from declaring their sins, which would be absurd. However,
quite a number of other theologians deny it, after a probable
opinion.

Ans. to Question 2. No, if one is able to secure easily another
priest ; but one finds out easily some motives for dispensation.
Moreover, putting aside these motives for dispensation, the sin
would not generally be very great if one kept to the usual confes
sor.

Ans. to Question 3. Yes, this is what follows from the answer
to the first question, as the reason drawn from the integrity of the
confession does not dispense any one from denouncing the person
who is not an accomplice as well as he who is such, when the in
tegrity cannot otherwise be respected.

Ans. to Question 4. In the first case, Bertoldus is compelled to
confess that he has committed incest with a relative of the first
degree in collateral line, or more direct, on his own sister, which
results from the answer to the first question. However, according
to St. Liguori, it would he satisfactory to simply state : " I have
sinned with a relative of mine." This opinion is not mine at all ;
but while it is that of so great a doctor, I must not oppose it.

In the second case, how does it seem to you about (Egidius?
This is a delicate matter. On one side, it does not seem likely
that he was able to declare his sin without stating the above cir
cumstances. However, according to many, he might confess these
two sins separately ; that is, of having first struck his sister, and
having caused a woman to have a miscarriage. Do not say he
would omit thus the special circumstance of relationship concern
ing the foetus* murder ; as, most probably, ill-treatment of relatives
does not constitute a new kind of sin, unless it is a question of
parents in direct line, to first and second degrees. Now the mur-

354 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

dered child, the sister's son, is a relative to the third degree in col
lateral line ; therefore, with regard to him, (Egedius did not vio
late, in any special manner, the virtue of piety. Consequently if
instead of his sister, CEgedius had struck his widowed mother,
criminally pregnant, he could not find any means to get out of the
difficulties, and he then should be compelled to declare all the
above-named circumstances.

CASE XIV.
INQUIRIES ABOUT THE ACCOMPLICE'S NAME.*

I. Thersile calls on Rufin, her confessor, and declares she has
committed the grievous sin of lust with a man. " Is lie your rel
ative?" asks Rufin. u Yes, by Adam." " Is he your neighbor?"
44 More or less." " Who is he, then? What is his name?" " He
is called by his Christian name." " Impudent woman ! I cannot
give you absolution, as I am not able to know the opportunity and
extent of the sin you have committed."

II. Jules, a man of importance in his county, comes to confess
to the same Rufin, and charges himself with havii g committed the
shameful sin with a woman several times. But Rufin, remember
ing that Jules had formerly led a bad life with his servant, whom
he was obliged to send away, strongly suspects him to have hired
another, and so to have a new opportunity near at hand. He asks
him : "Is she a slave?" 4t She is free." " Is she a servant? "
44 She is a servant of God, Eve's daughter." "Does she live in
your house?" 4t But, Father, that has nothing to do with confes
sion." The confessor, not being able to get more out of him, ab
solves him, and sends him away.

CASE XXI.
ABSOLUTION OF A DYING HERETIC.

Oliver, the priest, travelling in heretical countries, stops at a
hotel, and there meets with a heretic, who is unconscious -and near
to death. Oliver is unaware whether he is a heretic by practice

* I quote these two cases only, as a matter of curiosity ; they throw a
good light on the little comedies of the confessional.

Cases of Conscience on Confession. 355

(materialis), or by piinciple (formalin), and whether or not he has
the use of reason. What should be done? At first he is in great
uncertainty ; but as there is danger in waiting longer, soon pre
suming and accepting his act of contrition, and his desire to con
fess, he absolves him under conditions.

Ques. Does he act properly?

Ans. Oliver must be praised for having thought of the here
tic's salvation, as much as he could. He had not assurance that
he was a heretic in piinciple, and therefore could entertain hope,
although very slight, of giving him a valid absolution.

CASE XXII.
ABSOLUTION OF A DYING HERETIC.

Cesarin, a heretic, but a man of good morals and who seemed
to be only in material error, is taken severely sick, and is in danger
of death, without having lost the use of his reason. Sylvien, the
parson of the parish, calls on him immediately, to prepare him for
eternal salvation, and speaks to him in the following manner:
"My friend, I guess you adhere to the Lutheran religion
merely because you consider it the true religion ? Would you not
forsake it immediately, if you thought it bad? Do you not con
fess to God that you have sinned ? and will you confess it to a
man who is able to give you absolution? Would you not confess
to me, if you knew it to be your duty to do so?" To each ques
tion, the patient answers "Yes;" and the priest then says to
him: "If this confession is sufficient, I will give you absolu
tion," etc., etc.

Ques. 1. May absolution be given to a practical heretic, he
being quite conscious, and refusing in good faith to embrace the
Catholic religion?

Ques. 2. Has the confessor acted properly, in this case?

Ans. Question 1. Theologians deny it generally. . . . But
Lacroix, Reuter and others affirm it, in case of extreme neces
sity, because the conditions absolutely required for the sacra
ment of penance are to be found here implicitly, by some means.
In fact, this heretic may very well repent of his sins and desire

356 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

implicitly the confession ; for instance, if he declares to the priest
who questions him, that he would like to confess were he a be
liever in the Catholic religion as the true religion. This opinion
should be adopted in practice, so it seems. ... So it happens
often in some parts of Switzeiland and Germany, where such
heretics are absolved just before their cL-ath.

Ans. Question 2. Sylvien must not be blamed for having given
absolution to a heretic (in practice) who was perfectly conscious.
He has acted with prudence, if, in this extremity, he had no time
to instruct and convince the heretic. For, if he bad said to him
that his religion was false, he would have run the risk of spoiling
his good faith, without any chance of bringing him to the true
religion.

Objection : To secure a valid absolution, an act of faith is
required : now, from a heretic, one cannot expect a supernatural
act of faith ; therefore absolution should not be given to a heretic.

Ans. An act of faith cannot be expected from a heretic by
principle, but it may be from a heretic by practice. The reason
is, that a heretic by practice belongs to the soul of the Church,
although he is separated from its body ; * he therefore may per
form an act of hope, of charity, and of contrition, based on this
act of faith.

*This terrible doctrine, which set on fire so many stakes in the
good old time, is exposed by Marotte to the young children in the follow
ing terms :

" Ques. Are heretics subject to the laws of the Church ? "
" Ans. Heretics, although unfaithful to the Church, remain subject to
her authority, and consequently are compelled to observe her laws, unless
exempted from so doing. " (Petit Catechism).

Cases of Conscience on Scberal Cases*

CASE II.
CAUSE OF RESERVE.

Laurien, travelling outside his diocese, confesses to the priest
Justin a sin of incest committed on his cousin, of the second de
gree. Immediately Justin warns him that this sin is a reserved
one, and that he cannot give him absolution for reserved sins.
Laurien answers, as a man who is not ignorant regarding religious
affairs, that such a sin is not reserved in his diocese, as he knows
well. "But," says the priest, "it is reserved here where you
make }'our confession." " I don't care," says the penitent, "I
have not sinned here, but elsewhere ; I therefore have not com
mitted a reserved sin." "Go, my friend, and confess where you
have sinned ; I cannot give you absolution."

CASE XIV.
ABSOLUTION OF AN ACCOMPLICE.

I. Titien, the priest, taking advantage of an opportunity to
satisfy his passion, has committed with Anna a grievous sin against
the sixth commandment. Soon afterwards, the two guilty ones
repent of their fault. As no other priest is near, Titien goes to
another town to confess. But Anna, retained at home by sickness,
cannot go out to find another priest. Overwnclmed with sadness,
she earnestly requests Titien to hear her confession. The latter
at £ rst hesitates, as on one hand he is prevented by the law of the
church, which forbids to give absolution to an accomplice ; on the
other hand, lie desires to help this unfortunate woman, who runs
the risk of having no confessor for a long time. Presently, moved
with compassion, he hears Anna's confession, and gives her abso-

358 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

lution, feeling convinced that he is not held by the inhibition of
the church in this difficult case.

II. Calliste, a priest, commits the shameful sin with Julia ; he
receives her confession as accomplice, but refuses to give her abso-
tion. Later on, he does not know whether he has incurred Papal
excommunication .

CASE XV.

ABSOLUTION OF AN ACCOMPLICE.

Hermodore, a priest, gives absolution to Rosalie, his accomplice,
who is at the point of death, u ged by the following reasons : 1,
he is entitled to give absolution for reserved sins ; 2, at the point
of death all reservations cease ; 3, there is no other priest except a
young vicar, who surely Would be much shocked ; or a new priest
not yet approved, and who would excite the astonishment of the
people were he to hear Rosalie's confession.

CASE XVII.
ABSOLUTION OF AN ACCOMPLICE.

Dydime, a priest, dressed in lay clothes, meets Eulalie during
the night, with whom he does not hesitate to commit the shameful
sin. Next morning, Eulalie calls on Dydime, and confesses the sin
that she committed the previous night with a man entirely un
known to her. From what she adds, Dydime understands clearly
that the woman is his accomplice. What shall the unfortunate
man do ? What a trial for him ! . . . If the penitent woman knew
it, she would cry out in her sorrow : --You are the man ! " . . . But
she is unaware of the fact, and Dydime dares not tell her. Besides
he has no pretext to refuse her absolution. What shall he do
then? In his uncertainty he gives her absolution, and later on in
quires whether the absolution is valid or not. . . .

Cases of Conscience on Several Cases. 359

CASE XVII.
ABSOLUTION OF AN ACCOMPLICE.

I. Lelius, a parson, while hearing a confession, learns from a
woman that she has committed the shameful sin with a priest. He
does not know what to think, as he recollects having sinned one
night recently with a woman with a voice almost like hers. How
ever, he dares not tell her of his doubt, and absolves his accom
plice.

II. Narcisse, a simple priest, hears the confession of Leonie, on
whom he had tried to satisfy his passion. She had resisted exter
nally, but consented inwardly. A few days later she asks him to
hear her confession, and declares her sin committed internally.
Narcisse does not know whether he should absolve her, but finally
grants her the blessing of absolution.

1. If a priest has taken advantage of a woman drunk or asleep,
to satisfy his passion, he does not lose by it the right to absolve
her, because she cannot be considered as his accomplice.

2. If a priest has persuaded and led a woman to believe that
she does not sin by allowing him shameful contact ; and the woman,
thus deceived, lets him do what he pleases, she is not his accom
plice, and the priest may absolve her for her other sins.

CASE XVIII.
ABSOLUTION OF AN ACCOMPLICE.

I. Remain, a priest, having committed the shameful sin with
Rntilie, and knowing that he cannot absolve her, . . . sends her
to another priest.

II. Julie, who had had shameful relations with her parson, was
taken severely sick. She knew her accomplice could not absolve
her, and might easily have requested the visit of another priest.
But the unfortunate woman, fearing to disclose her shame to an
other priest, uses the following strat- gem : She requests hastily
her parson to bring her the holy viaticum, as she had received
absolution from another priest. The parson, not su^pectii g any-

360 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

thing, arrives. Then Julie confesses to him before the commun
ion, and is absolved in good faith by him, as beii:g at the point of
death.

CASE XIX.

ABSOLUTION OF AN ACCOMPLICE.

I. Geline, a courtesan, who Lad committed shameful sins with
the priest Valere, despinng her infamous life from the bottom of
his heart, comes back sincerely to a better course. IShe makes an
exact confession of her whole life to Albert; but, by an innocent
act of forgetfulness, she omits to state the sin committed with
Valeie. Later on, she confesses to her accomplice, declares this
sin to him, and receives absolut'on.

II. Therese was almost dead. Near her death-bed is Flavien,a
suspended priest, who is disposed to absolve her. But Albin, who
was the accomplice of Therese in her shameful sin, takes the place,
receives the confession of the dying woman, and absolves her.

CASK XX.
ABSOLUTION OF AN ACCOMPLICE.

Lucienne, accomplice of the priest Komaiu in libidinous sins,
threatened with death, calls for a priest, and loses the use of
speech. Romain arrives, questions her, and she answers him by
gestures. But it happens that, after & short time, Lucienne gets up
again and is better ; her apoplexy was a feebleness only, Remain
does not know whether he should terminate the* confession.
Finally, he gives the absolution.

CASE XXI.

ABSOLUTION OF AN ACCOMPLICE.

Marcel, the priest, has used obscene words, and the most shame
ful touching with Aurelus, his boy-friend. While hearing confes
sions of pen'.tents Aurelus ariivcs, and confesses the tins committed

Oases of Conscience on Several Cases. 361

with Marcel not yet confessed. Marcel doubts at first whether he
should absolve him ; but he soon throws away all scruples, because
reserved cases do not include either words or touchings alone, nor
sins committed with a man. Besides, says he, in absence of aU
jurisdiction and before a common error, the Church will make up
for it.

CASE XXII.

ABSOLUTION OF AN ACCOMPLICE.

Liborius, a candidate for the priesthood, before taking Orders,
has committed a grievous sin against chastity with young Flavie.
. . . Having become a priest, Flavie calls on him, declares to
him that she has hidden in her previous confessions the sin she had
committed with him, and asks him to receive her confession.

Liborius hesitates at first ; then he decides to hear and absolve
his accomplice.

CASE XXIII.
ABSOLUTION OF AN ACCOMPLICE.

I. Bruno, a priest, having committed a shameful sin with
Martha, has recourse to the Bishop, hiding his name, and obtains
the privilege to hear and absolve his accomplice.

II. Elegius, another priest, has unfortunately committed a
grievous sin against the sixth commandment; and, more unfor
tunately, absolves his accomplice, and by so doing incurs Papal
excommunication.

CASE XXIV.
SHAMEFUL SOLICITATIONS.

Viliane, a woman of light morals, has committed several shame
ful acts with her confessor, by whom she had been solicited, as
much during confession as outside it. She has hidden these sacri
leges in several confessions. Finally . . .

362 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CASE XXV.
SHAMEFUL SOLICITATIONS.

Cornelie declares in confession, to parson Sulpice, while weep
ing, that she has committed the shameful crime with Evrald, her
confessor, whom she was pursuing with her guilty love. Sulpice
questions her. . . .

CASE XXVI.
SHAMEFUL SOLICITATIONS.

Rufine, solicited to sin by Sylvain, her confessor, has yielded to
him. But, during fifteen years, she has not dared to declare her
crime in confession. Finally, she states it to a new confessor,
who requests her to name her accomplice. She refuses. 1. ...

CASE XXVIII.
SHAMKFUL SOLICITATIONS.

I. Brixius, the priest, in course of a confession, has solicited
from Rutilie some slight immoralities. Rutilie calls on another
confessor, and declares to him the facts. The latter, having heard
the confession, compels her to name the seducer ; and, on her re
fusal, sends her away without absolution, until she denounces him.

III. Sigolena, tells confidentially to Valf ride, that she was ex
cited to immoral actions by her confessor Paulin, during confes
sion. Valf ride, anxious, tells the whole affair to her confessor ;
when the latter compels her to denounce Paulin, in spite of the
promised secrecy, threatening her with a refusal of absolution.

III. Priest Ripasius, solicited by Bertha to receive her confes
sion on the morrow, excites her immediately to sin. She calls on
another confessor, who compels her to denounce Ripasius.

Ques. 1. Should we denounce a confessor who urges us to
slightly immoral acts?

Ques. 2. Should a penitent make this denunciation ; not only
the one who has b^en excited to debauchery, but also the one who
hears of it?

Cases of Conscience on Several Cases. 363

Ques. 3. What is to be done, if he had learned the excitation
to debauchery in confidence ?

Ans. Question 1. No; at least in the most probable manner.
The reason is : that to denounce a seducer, it is required that the
act of excitation be a grievous sin, so that one should think he has
sinned gravely in this case. For Benedict calls this crime of exci
tation a sacrilegious trick, because it certainly denotes a grave sin.

Besides, an act contrary to chastity in itself, does not become
grave because it took place during confession, or on the occasion
of confession ; as otherwise, all venial sins, in matter of veracity,
humility, patience, etc., would become grave in this sacrament,
which nobody affirms. And it should not be objected that a slight
fault should become grave on account of the respect due to this
sacrament ; as otherwise, all sins would become grave in confes
sion, for want of respect to this sacrament ; which is false. More
over, the outrage does not exist so far, since this sacrament is
given with a bad intention ; therefore, if the action is but slightly
bad, the outrage made to the sacrament would be only slight.
(St. Liguori.)

Ans. Question 2. Yes ; the reason is, it matters little that it
might be a question of the person excited to debauchery, or of
another acquainted with the whole affair ; for the object itself of
the law remains adequate, viz., that the seducer be punished. In
fact, this case is a rare one ; because, most of the time, the excita
tion is known to the excited penitent only.

Ans. Question 3. A person who knows of the excitation con
fidentially, is nevertheless held to make denunciation of it. The
reason is, that nobody is held to keep a secret, even promised
with an oath, when this secret brings a common prejudice. However,
it is right to except a case when confidence is reposed in order
simply to ask advice ; for the divulgence of the secret would be
contrary to the relations of men, and even to the general welfare,
which intervenes when asking advice.

Cases on tfje liittg of (Confessors.

CASE VI.
OCCASION OF SINNING.

Goodman, a confessor, absolves, without any objection, the
following penitents: 1, a stranger \vho is still keeping his concu
bine at his home ; 2, a merchant who goes every year to the fair
of Beaucaire, and sins each time with the same woman ; 2, a lady
who has ceased to sin for a year, but however meets her lover
from time to time without sinning, writes to him honest letters,
and keeps his portrait at her house.

CASE VII.
OCCASION OF SINNING.

Young Julienne sinned often with Caius, her father's servant,
and a family relative. She confesses with great repentance ; and
she is given absolution once, twice, three times. However, she
fulls again ; and throwing herself at her confessor's feet, in weep
ing, she avows her fault. The confessor hesitates ; but, moved
with compassion, he absolves Julienne for the fourth time, and
even many others.

CASE VIII.
OCCASION OF SINNING.

I. Lampridius has sinned once or twice with his servant ; he
confesses it three months later, affirming that he repents from the
bottom of his heart, and that he will try all means to avoid a repe
tition ; but he cannot discharge his servant, who is very useful to

Cases on the Duty of Confessors. 365

him. After having considered all these reasons, the confessor
absolves him.

II. Priest Radulphey obstinately declines to send away his
servant, with whom he has used too great familiarities many
times, and even very often : 1, because, if he were to do so, what
had been reported would be confirmed ; 2, because, with another
servant, he would, perhaps, be exposed to a greater danger; 3,
because, in the spiritual exercises he followed lately, he was advised
to act so by his confessor.

CASE IX.

OCCASION OF SINKING.

I. Ludimille, for the last ten years, is in the service of Ulderic,
a bachelor of doubtful morals. The public opinion is that they
are living in concubinage. She calls on a missionary, who was
conducting some revivals in her town. She denies having bad
shameful intercourse with her master, and asks to be granted the
sacraments.

II. Young Olympia, having the intention of marrying Baldins,
though she notices that her presence and his conversation furnish
her betrothed the opportunity of numerous internal sins, refuses to
avoid him, because she fears that by keeping him away, she may
lose the chance of getting married.

CASE X.

OCCASION OF SINNING.

I. Bertha, a servant, also sins with her master. Her confes
sor insists upon her leaving him, but she refuses to obey ; because
her master has promised to amend ; because, for many years, he
has not paid her, and if she were to leave her situation he would
not pay her at all. The confessor gives her absolution. Six
months later Beitha calls again, having sinned again, and giving
the same reasons ; she is absolved once more by her confessor.

II. Youn" Pascasius is fond of frequenting a neighboring

366 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

house, where he spends many hours with young girls, and beauti
ful, spiritual and graceful women, joking and laughing, although
he meets with frequent temptations against chastity, movements
entirely dissolute, and even, sometimes, pollutions. The con
fessor having insisted on his abstain!; g from going to these meet
ings, Pascasius declines to obey, because, says he, he is not giving
his consent to temptations, at least, for the most part of the time.

CASE XI.
HABITUAL SINNERS.

Maurice, a confessor, is well-known for his kindness in absolv
ing penitents who repeat the same fault. . . . Thus, he absolved
the following penitents: 1, Nigritius, a young man, who has
been deep in shameful living for ten years, and his concubine's
death brings forth better feelings ; 2, Gaudeus, a drunkard, who
has not made a confession for forty years ; 3. Jucunda, a young
girl, who is going to get married the following day, and for the
last six months has sinned against purity with her betrothed.

CASE XIII.
RELAPSES.

Caprasius, for a long time, has the bad habit of polluting him
self. Often sent away without absolution, he comes finally, not cor
rected at all, and even guilty of a greater number of relapses, but
deeply moved by the unexpected death of a friend of his, who has
died without confession.

CASE XVI.
THE CONFESSOR BEFORE DYING PERSONS.

Alinus, a new priest, is appointed vicar, as assistant to Parson
Gerondius, who is getting old. Just after his arrival, Gerondius
learns that Titius, who had been living in concubinage with a
C' urtesan for years, is dying. 4i Go," says Gerondius to his new
vicar, u you are young, and will get there sooner than I would;

Cases on tlie Duty of Confessors. 367

so as to assist the young man who is in danger. Do not be arraid
if this case, which comes unexpectedly, is very grave ; for it is
just the way, n.y friend, to acquire experience." The young
vicar hastens to the house, though trembling with fVar. Immedi
ately he gives orders to send away the concubine ; Titius refuses
to obey: 1, because this woman is necessary to him, and 1 > his
family; 2, because he has had several children from her; 3, be
cause, during a whole year, he has not sinned with her, and that
he will soon leave this world. Albiiius does not know whither he
should give him absolution, strengthen him with the Eucharist,
and administer to him Extreme Unction. Finally, he decides not
to admit him to the sacraments, and comes back to the presbytery
filled with sadness. Titius gave up the ghost, to appear before
the tribunal of the redoubtable Judge.

Ques. What should be done if the concubinage was secret ; in
other words, if the servant had secret relations with her master?

Ans. If the concubinage is secret, it is not necessary to insist
upon the separation itself, by refusing absolution, on account of
the scandal which would generally result by sending away a con
cubine under such circumstances, for the secret relations would
thus be brought to light. But it is necessary to obtain from the
dying man the promise to send away his servant if he recovers;
and in the meantime, to watch that their vo( ms be separated, and
the servant approaches her master only in case of necessity. It'
death was not certainly expected, the sick man should not be ab
solved regularly, until the separa;ion had taken place, if
convenient.

CASE XVII.

THE CONFESSOR WITH LADIES.

Urban, a priest, with a sweet temper and tender heart, . . .
welcomes all his lady penitents with the greatest amiability ; makes
the kindest remarks to them ; encourages them to speak ; and,
above all, lets them babble as long as they like, listening to their
tales with the greatest patience and most perfect gentleness. As

368 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

the feminine sex is by its nature talkative and loquacious in the
highest degree, this method was very pleasant to them.

St. Augustine says: "It is necessary to keep a short and
severe language with women, and the most pious are not the least
to be fea.red ; for the more pious they are, the more attraction
they have."

Concina says : "The Confessor, when hearing women, ought
to be armed and supplied with a divine help, as if going to dare
the hissing of serpents."

Impress this truth in your rnind : " The wickedness of a man,
is better than the kindness of a woman."

CASE XXIII.
CONFKSSOU'S ERROR.

Sylvia asks the confessor Didymc, whether she can marry
Sabin ; she alleges the following reason : She has sinned often
with Sabin's second cousin, although she was never pregnant.
Didyme tells her that she ctin marry, thinking the obstacle to mar
riage, on account of shameful relations (ex copula illicita) , does not
extend beyond the first degree ; and besides, he believed the
shameful act consummated only when the woman becomes preg
nant. Later on, anxious about the correctness of his decision, he
does not know what he should have done.

(fasts on tfje Secret of Confession.

CASE III.
EXTERIOR USE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF CONFESSION.

Parson Camille, hearing the confession of Bertha, his servant,
who is sick, learns she is pregnant as a result ( f shameful rela
tions. Astounded, and full of sorrow, he does not know what to
do, in presence of the danger of such a dishonor. He puts off to
another day the solution of so delicate a case until he maybe
enlightened upon it. But in the meantime Bertha recovers. Light
comes into Camilla's mind. A few days later he sends his servant
away, saying, it is because of her bad health. Then, having de
cided to take Rosine as servant, and after having heard her con
fession, he learns that she has been seduced recently. Thus,
instructed by a fatal experiment, he comes back to his first decis
ion, in order not to be obliged to send his servant awav again.

CASE IV.

EXTERIOR USE OF CONFESSION.

Priest Ugolin, hearing the confession of young Adrienne, at the
point of death, learns that she is ju-t about being confined. The
jiood priest advises her to tell her condition to a doctor or mid
wife, so as to save her offspring. But she will not listen to him,
and, fearing dishonor, declares that she will not speak of it to any
body. The priest, full of sorrow, leaves the unfortunate woman
without giving her absolution. Soon after Adrienne dies, and she
is buried, with her offspring unbaptized.

370 The Doctrine of (he Jesuits.

CASE VII.
ACCOMPLICES BEFORE THE SAME CONFESSOR.

Ranulfe and Florine, betrothed to each other, jnst before their
marriage, come to confess to Lampridius. Florine is first, and
confesses, among other things, that she has sinned often with her
betrothed. Ranulfe comes next, and completes his confession
without mentioning the sin, and asks for absolution. The confes
sor, in great trouble, interrogates him, both with general questions
and particular ones. He urges and plies his penitent, who still
denies ; and while tormenting him, Lampridius is himself the prey
of the greatest torments. What shall the unfortunate confessor
do? If he absolves his penitent, the result is a horrible sacrilege ;
if he sends him away without absolution, he violates the secret of
confession !

CASE VIII.
THE SECRET FOR A LAYMAN.

Ferfellius, recently married, confessing immediately after his
wife, said, among other things: '* Father, 1 am very unhappy!
Just now I heard my wife charging herself with having committed
fornication with my brother before her marriage. I have made up
my mind to send her away. I will not acknowledge her any longer
as my wife. The confessor, surprised, does not know what he may
or should answer, without either betraying the secret of confes
sion, or telling a lie. To get out of the difficulty, he blames his
penitent much for having listened to his wife's confession. Fer
fellius, indignant, retires ; sends Lis wife away, after having cursed
her ; and tells the story to her parents, who were astonished at her
return.

Cases 0f Conscience on (Extreme Junction, antr
on ©rtrer.

(These do not present any interesting features.)

&reattse on JHarrtagc*

The faithful must be taught carefully on the excellency of mar
riage and its sanctity, although the virtue of chastity * must be ex
tolled above all.

* Marotte does not fail to expose this doctrine to the faithful of ten
years :

" Qnes. Is marriage a proper and holy state? "

" Ans. Yes, marriage is a proper and holy state. . . .

" Ques. Is there not a more perfect state than marriage?

"Ans. Yes; Christian viryiiiity is a state more perfect, and more ayree-
able to God than marriage." (Petit Cutcchisme.)

There are authors who insist more on the subject:

*' Ques. Is it possible to keep virginity?

"Ans. Yes, it is possible to keep virginity, with the help of grace.

(Catechism of the Diocese of Nevers, 1877.)

In fact, writers of that school take and t-eem t > look lor every oppor
tunity of attracting the attention of young children to these dangerous
questions; and, consequently, provoking the most shocking explanations.
1 had the meritorious patience to read over a numerous series of small
tracts, all very silly, which are published by Maine's, under the title of
"Library of Pious Children." As frequently as opportunity offers, there
is a question of virgins and virginity.

I will quote at random :

Saint Rose of Lima, made a vow to remain a virgin, but her friends
urged her to marry; and in order to get rid of their solicitations, and to
accomplish her vow more easily, she entered a convent. Saint Euphrasle,
VIRGIN, SEVEN YEARS OLD, exclaims : " I will not have any other spouse
but you." Saint Julienne, a virgin, "makes a vow of virginity." That
is one book. Let us take some others : Saint Gen<vieve, seven years of
age, declares : " For a long time, she had been wishing to live in perpet
ual virginity." Saint Catherine of Siume, same age, "promised to re-

372 The I) ctrtne of the Jesuits.

CHAPTER I.
AFFIANCINGS.

ART. I. Nature of afflancings.

722. — Affiancings are a deliberate promise (with a sufficient
deliberation to involve a mortal siu), reciprocate, and expressed
by a sufficient token, of future marriage between capable persons.

723. — In order that the affiancings may be valid, there are re
quired all the conditions named in the application, so that, if one
of the conditions fails to be executed, the affiancing contract
should be considered as void.

725. — Ques. Should the promises made to contract marriage be
considered as tiue affiancing?

Ans. It seems not; for, very often, such promises are consid
ered as a mere project, and not as a true promise. In practice, it
is necessary one therefore should be very careful regarding the
particular intention of those who are affianced.*

main a virgin forever;" but God allawecl her resolution to be subjected to
a severe test. When she had scarcely reached twelve years of age, her
parents thought to engage her in the state of marriage. In vain Catharine,
refusing to obey, tried to maintain her reasons, — her reasons for remain
ing a virgin, at twelve years of age ! ! After that, you need not be as
tonished that this precocious young girl saw the devil "attacking her
heart with the most humiliating temptations for a virgin! " Saint Mary
Magdalen of Paris, "when ten years of age, made a vow to remain all
her life united to the celestial Spouse by the ties of virginity." A year
later, her parents wished her to marry: "She then declared to them her
vow of virginity, affirming that she never would have any other spouse
but Jesus." Saint Victory, "in order to unite tiie crown of martyrdom to
the beautiful lily of virginity, offered to God the sacrifice of her own,"
and jumped through a window so as to run away, the very day of her
marriage. Saint Lucie, long before having reached the age to be married,
"completely absorbed with the charms of virginity, promised to God to
have Him only as spouse " Saint Lahelle, when a mere child, engaged
herself "by a vow of chastity." Saint Radeyonde would have given up the
world "to live in a perpetual virginity." Saint Cecil e, from childhood, "had
made a vow to embrace the holy state of virginity, and declined all mar
riage proposals. . . . Finally, obliged to marry a young, noble, and wealthy
lord, she obeyed; but nevertheless remained faithful to the vow she had 'vude
to God." Saint Ursule, . . . But that is enough !

* For the oral instruction is reserved the more delicate studies on rela
tions between the afliauced, to which Sanchez devotes, in his classical

Treatise on Marriage. 373

ART. II. Obligations and Purpose of Affiancings.

72G. — Affiancings, from civil justice, compel, under penalty of
a grievous sin, to contract marriage within a limited time ; either
fixed, or as soon as one of the two parties requests it reasonably ;
because, where there have been true affiancings, there also exists
a true contract in a grave matter ; and, consequently, a grave
obligation.

730. — Ques. Can it be accepted as true affianciugs, the marriage
being merely civil, such as takes place in France before a magis
trate?

Ans. Some authors affirm it, if the contracting parties have
the intention to apply to the Church afterwards. . . . But it is
better to say that this contract contains no promise, and cannot
be accepted as affiancings.

ART. III. Dissolution of Affiancings.

731. — Ques. Is it a sufficient cause for dissolution, if a rich
inheritance falls to the fiance?

Ans. There is controversy : many theologians deny it, because
nothing is changed in regard to the y< ung lady; others affirm it,
because between them the same condition of wealth no longer
exists, and if the fiance had foreseen such a change, he would nol,
have engaged to the same person. This opinion is approved by
St. Liguori, in a case where the fiance having become richer, he
was offered in marriage a young lady much richer than the former.

Ques. Are affiancings broken by the vow of chastity, or the
vow to enter Holy Orders ?

treatise De mafrimonii sacramento, several dissertations, the titles of
which, by a lucky chance, can be translated into the French language:

"Are shameful gestures, glances and speeches permitted between per
sons betrothed? (There are upon that subject 55 Articles!)

•'Is it permitted to the atn'anced to take delight by anticipation, in think
ing of the enjoyment they will obtain in their future s xual relations?"
etc., etc. (Lib'. IX., Disp. XLVI., XL VII.)

374 The Doctrine of tJie Jesuits.

Ans. 1. If the vow precedes the affiancings, it is evident that
they become void ; because the promise of marriage is then an
unlawful act, and consequently does not bind.

2. If the vow follows the affiancings, according to the more
probable opinion, they are broken also ; because such a promise is
supposed to be contracted on the following tacit condition,
" unless I may choose a better state." *

732. — . . . Ques. Should one of the contracting parties
having a hidden physical defect, declare it before the affiancings ;
or if they are made, before the marriage?

Ans. No, if this defect does n t render the marriage prejudicial,
but only less attractive ; for instance, if the young girl who is
considered a virgin is not so ; because, as has been established by
custom, nobody is he'd to disclose to another any stu-h things.
Beside, no one is held to disclose his defects, at the risk of dis
honoring one's self, when it does not injure any grave right of
another person. . . .

CHAPTER II.

PUBLICATION OF BANS.
ART. I. Necessity of bans.

ART. II. Circumstances of bans.
ART. III. Dispensation of bans.
ART. IV. Revelation of the impediments

* Sanchez: "Every time a man, who has made, either sincerely or in
a simulated manner, a promise of marriage, is dispensed by some motive
from fulfilling his promise, he may, when summoned before a judu'e. aftirm
on oath that he has promised nothing, with the understanding, so as he
should be compelled to fulfil this engagement, (p. 303.)

De Castro Palao, aiul other casuistic Jesuit.*, speak in the same way.

Treatise on Marriage. 375

CHAPTER III.

THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF MARRIAGE.

ART. I. On the nature of marriage.

744. — . . . Marrin ge, so far as it is a contract, is an agree
ment by which the man and wife give to each other, reciprocately
and legitimately, the use of their body, for all acts proper to gen
eration ; and engage themselves to live together.

As far as it is a sacrament, it is defined thus : Sacrament of the
new law, sanctifying the legitimate union of man and woman, so
as to bring up piously and holily their children.

There is a distinction between the marriage, legitimate . . .
concluded . . . consummated : when the conjugal acts have been
completed.*

* Justice must be granted to Gury, that lie shortens singularly the disser
tation so dear to casuistic Jesuits on the consummation of marriage. It is
reserved for oral instruction. This is progress, from the laymen's point
of view, who are, in fact, incompetent in matters of morality. But times
uiu<t be hard, that one no more dares to speak with the same holy
straightforwardness wliicli old Sanchez used with regard to this. Here
are, in Jact, the titles of some delicate circumstances wiiich he names,
with full details, in Part TI. of his famous work :

I, " Disp. XXI. Quanclo conseatur matrimonium consummatum?

"2. QuanUo semen 11011 recipitur in vase uaturali, noil est consumma-
tum.

3. Quacunque arte, aut doemonum ministerio is vase recipiatur, est
coitsummatum.

4. Quid, si vir penetret vas faemineum, non tamen mtra vas semmetJ*
Quid, si fremina sola seminet?

10. Utruiu satis sit vinun seminare intra vas, faemina non sernmate?

II. An semen faemineiuri sit necessarium ad generationem, et pvssit
din Virginem il/ml mimstrasse in (Jhristi incarnation? ?"

This last illustration, which should raise the indignation and reproba
tion of all worshippers of the Immaculate Virgin, was specially dear to the
Jesuits. Sanchez comes back to this subject in another part of Book II :

"Suarez fatetur cum aliis esse probabile adfuisse semen in Virgine,
ab*que omiii prorsus ordinatione, nt minisn-aret conception} Ciiristi
materiam. . . . Quod idem defend it P>r<> Man> in append, at tract, d* sem-
ine. §An vero Maria virgn, et probat absque omni inordinatione et concu-
piscentia posse clecidi semen.

"Quare concludo, esse probabile non consummari matrimonium n
etiam ftemina seminet, quia ad matrimonii eonsummationem requisitur
copula ex qua sequi protest generatio, etc., etc." Disp. 21.

Note, that it is absolutely necessary to be instructed on these different
points, because, if the marriage is or is not consummated, it can or can
not be dissolved by the Pope, or by the religious profession.

376 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

ART. II. Purpose of Marriage.
SECTION 1. — Its Unity.

757. — Unity of marriage consists in marriage being the union
of one man only with one woman only.

SECTION 2. — DURATION OF MARRIAGE.

There are distinctions regarding duration, viz : As to the tie,
and as to the bed.

1st Point. As for the tie.

758 — Marriage is indissoluble ; that is to say, when it is once
contracted, it cannot be dissolved by divorce in regard to the tie,
according to the positive, divine law.

759. — However, three exceptions should be made:

1. The marriage of Christians, concluded but not consummated,
can be dissolved for a grave cause, through a dispensation from
the Pope, the representative of the Divine Power.

2. Marriage concluded and not consummated, can be dissolved
by a solemn Religious Profession, made by one of the married
couple.

But in order that the newly married couple might think over the
use of this privilege, it is granted to them, by right, two months
after their wedding, during which they are not compelled to fulfil
their conjugal duty. Even after that time, if marriage has not
been consummated, on account of an unlawful refusal of the con
jugal duty, this privilege still exists. In fact, it is not destroyed
by fornication between nances before the celebration of marriage.

3. The marriage of ivjidels, even consummated, can be dis
solved by Divine permission, when one of the married couple is
converted to the Christian faith by baptism, and the other refuges
to live in peace with the former ; or does so, insulting the Creator,
despising the Christian religion, and trying to lead the faithful one
to sin. ...... . ...

2d Point : As for the bed :

7GO. — Divorce, so far as separation of bed and residence, may
be requested for just causes, though the conjugal tie still exists, so

Treatise on Marriage. 377

that neither of the spouses can marry again before the death of
the other.

Causes which excuse divorce are : a mutual consent ; a grave
danger for soul or body ; or adultery by one of the married couple.

764 — Ans. Is divorce by private authority to be considered
valid ?

Ans. 1. Yes, as for the bed: if there is a legitimate reason,
and especially adultery.

2. As for residence : 1, Yes, in case of adultery But

the crime must be certain ; and that the separation should not
cause a scandal which could not be mended otherwise. 2. Yes,
also, if there is danger to soul or body, providing that danger is
very grave. But in practice, it is proper to ask the advice of a
prudent man, especially of a confessor. The latter should pro
ceed with great prudence, and not believe too easily wives
complaining of their husbands.

CHAPTER IV.
MATTER AND FORM OF MARRIAGE.

765.— The matter, far form the sacrament of marriage, is the body
of the fiances, that they reciprocately give up to each other in the
execution of the contract.

The nearer matter is the delivery itself of these bodies, which
is made by words or signs expressing their consent.

7 GO. — The form consists in the reciprocate acceptation of the
contracting parties, expressed by words or signs.

CHAPTER V.

MINISTER WHO GIVES AND PERSON wno RECEIVES MARRIAGE,

ART. I. Minister.
ART. II. Person.

378 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

CHAPTER VI.
OBSTACLES TO MARRIAGE.

They are of two kinds : some prohibit only ; others nullify the
marriage. The former render the marriage unlawful ; the latter
make it invalid.

ART. I. PROHIBITIVE OBSTACLES.

,776. — There are four, viz: 1, prohibition by the Church for
different causes ; 2, prohibition by the Church to celebrate the
ceremony of marriage during a particular time; 3, contiact
of affiancings made with another person and not legitimately
broken off; 4, a vow which, on account of its nature, can not be
fulfilled in the contract or in conjugal society. . . .

779. — There are four kinds of vows forbidding marriage: 1,
the vow of chastity ; 2, the vow not to marry ; 3, the vow to enter
a religious Order ; 4, the vow to receive Holy Orders.

780 — Vow of chastity. After marriage, whoever has made such a
vow can neither ask for nor do his conjugal duty the first two months ;
because, by a Divine privilege, husband and wife are dispensed
from this obligation during that time.

Later on, he or she can fulfill this duty and give satisfaction to
the other's right ; but cannot ask for it without having been
dispensed from his or her vow.

The latter should entirely abstain, if the other consents, or has
lost the right to it ; for instance, because of adultery, or incest. If
too hard to live without it, he or she should make an early appli
cation for a dispensation.

781. — Vow not to marry ; or vow of virginity. After marriage,
one may, in this case, do and ask for the conjugal duty, because
the observance of this vow is impossible.

782. — Vow to enter a religious Order. . . . Before marriage is
consummated, the one who has made such a vow is held to ful
fill it. He sins mortally if he consummates marriage, by asking
for or doing the conjugal duty ; because the vow ought to be
accomplished when it is possible. Now, one can fulfill it by not
consummating marriage the first two months; while, by a divine

Treatise on Marriage. 379

privilege, one can enter a religious Order, and the other spouse is
then free from the marriage tie, after the solemn profession has
been made.

After the marriage's consummation, one can ask for and do the
conjugal duty ; because the fulfillment of the vow has become im
possible, and the request for the conjugal act is not contrary to
this vow, as one has not made a vow of chastity, but a vow to
enter a religious Order,

783. — Vow to receive Holy Orders. . . . He who has made this
vow, after the marriage celebration, can consummate it, if he can
not longer fulfill his vow.

ART. II. Detrimental obstacles.

The Holy Church alone is able to state these obstacles, and
consequently, secular princes cannot do so for their Christian sub
jects, except as regards mere civil matters.

787.— Ques. Is a contracted marriage annulled for an obstacle
not perceived at the time of contract?

Ans. Yes, because the law stating such an impediment has
been made for the purpose of cancelling the contract itself.

If, after marriage, the wife perceives a detrimental obstacle which
annuls marriage, she cannot, even under threats of death, either
ask for or do her conjugal duty ; because such a union would be a
fornication, which is nut permitted in any case ; except, according
to a few authors, the wife were to keep merely passive, so as to
give but a material co-operation to this act; but one cannot make
such a concession, as it is a question of a regularly bad thing, un
it, as, according to the probable opinion, the wife should be forced
to comply with it under threats of death, avoiding with care the
danger of consenting.

790. — Ques. Is it allowed to spouses to make use of marriage,
if, after their wedding, they have doubt regarding a certain imped
iment?

380 The Doctrine nf the Jesuits.

Ans. to Question 1. No, until they have made sufficient investiga
tion for the truth. However, if only one of the spouses is in duu .it,
he may, although not being able to ask for the conjugal duty, do
it t > the other, who is so requesting in good faith.

Ans. to Question 2. Yes, if alter having used every effort to
obtain the truth, one is still in doubt; because, in tloubt, the act
must be considered as valid.

71)1. — Ques. Is a marriage valid, when contracted with an ob
stacle presumed but not real?

Ans. Yes, if the contracting party is not certain of the
impediment, but if he has merely a doubt on the subject. . . .

If he believes with certainty in this impediment regarding it as
a secondary matter, and decides to live in concubinage, the mar
riage is evidently not valid ; because the intention to contract
marriage is not the main object.

793. — Among Christians, any union of man and woman outside
the Sacrament, and made on the strength of no matter what civil
law, is nothing else but a shameful and fatal concubinage,
condemned by the Church ; and, consequently, the conjugal con
tract cannot exist outside this sacrament, and has entirely to do
with the power of the Roman Church.*

VARIOUS KINDS OF OBSTACLES.

794. — There are fifteen, expressed in four Latin verses :

Error, condition, vow, relationship, crime ;

Difference of worship, violence, Order, connection, honesty;

Age, alliance, secrecj*, powerlessness, elopement of the woman,
not placed in the hands of a trustworthy person :

Ail these impediments prevent marriage, and cancel it if it has
taken place.

*"Ques. Are clandestine marriages void?

"A. Yes. Marriages which are celebrated otherwise than in presence
of the priest and two witnesses are entirely void; thus, in France, any
marriage contracted solely before an officer of the state, is by right perfectly
void, and is but a phantom ff marriaye. ( Petit Catechixme oj Marottt.)

" Q ics. Is the union called civril in ima^ ; legitimate?

" Ana. No; this union is void and criminal before God.'' (Catechism
of Xevers, 1SS7.)

Treatise on Marriage. 381

795. — All errors regarding personal identity cancel the marriage,
by natural right.

An error relative to the servile condition prevents marriage by
ecclesiast:cal rig' t. But that cause exists no longer in Europe
and the United States, where slavery is abolished.

OBSTACLE FOR CAUSE OP ALLIANCE.

810. — Alliance is a tie established with the relatives of the per
son with whom one has a carnal connection ; or, further, a tie
arising from a carnal connection between one and the other.

o

There is consequently alliance between the husband and wife's
cousins ; and vice versa.

Alliance is acquired through either lawful or conjugal connec
tion ; or through an unlawful one, like fornication, adultery,
incest.

811. — Alliance coming from a lawful connection prevents mar
riage until the fourth degree, inclusive ; if from an unlawful
connection, until the second degree only.

An alliance is contracted solely through a sexual act, thoroughly
accomplished and consummated, in such a way that generation
may be the result of it. ...

812. — . . . He who has sinned with two sisters, or two cousins,
or mother and daughter, cannot marry any one of them.

The husband who has sinned with his wife's sister, cousin, or
aunt, is compelled to do, but cannot ask for the conjugal duty ;
because, as it is a question of a merely prohibitory law, the
innocent party should not suffer for the fault of the guilty.

A husband is not deprived of the right to ask for the conjugal
duty for having sinned with his own cousins ; because he does
not contract thereby any alliance with his wife's relatives.

]f one of the married couple has formed an alliance wiih the
other's relatives, in consequence of an incest, neither of them is
entitled to claim the conjugal duly any more; because they have
both lost their right, and, consequently, neither of them is held
nor even has a right, to ask the other for it.

382 Tlte Doctrine of the Jesuits.

OBSTACLE FOR DIFFERENCE OF WORSHIP.

824. — Difference of worship existing between a baptized person
and an infidel, renders the marriage invalid.

OBSTACLE FOR CAUSE OF CLANDESTINITY.

836. — A clandestine marriage is that which is contracted with
out the required religious solemnities; that is to say, without the
attendance of the parson, and two witnesses at least.

837.— The Council of Trent has decided: "Those who try
to contract marriage otherwise than in presence of the parson or
another priest, with authorization of the bishop or the parson, and
two or three witnesses, such persons are declared by the Holy
Synod to be absolutely incapable of contracting marriage, and the
cobtract is cancelled." Moreover, it declares that t% this decree
shall be in force in each parish after thirty days ; which must be
reckoned from the day of the first publication of it in the same
parish."

839. — Ques. Is a marriage valid, when the contracting parties
leave a place where the decrees of the Council of Trent are in
force, so as to go to another place where they are not?

Ans. It is not valid.

Ques. Is it valid, when one leaves a place where these decrees
arc not in force, so as to contract marriage clandestinely in another
place ?

Ans. No, even if contracted while passing through this place
only. . . .

841. — Ques. Should heretical marriages be considered as valid,
in places where those decrees are not in force ?

Ans. Positively no ; for the following reasons :

1. Because in all countries where decrees have been proclaimed,
they oblige all people indiscriminately, heretics or Catholics, as
the former are subject also to the jurisdiction of the Roman
Church.

Treatise on Marriage. 383

2. Because, if heretics were excluded from this general law of
the Roman Church, they would so be granted a privilege for their
rebellion, which would be absurd.

8f>2. — Qnes. May a priest, constrained by violence and fear,
grant a valid attendance?

Ans. Yes ; because it is sufficient that lie is present and knows
what is done, either willingly or unwillingly, even if he pretends
not to understand ; for instance, by closing his eyes, or by stop
ping his ears.

OBSTACLE TIIKOUGH POWERLESSNESS.

855. — Powerlessness to fulfill the marriage duties, or capacity to
accept the carnal act efficaciously, with the result of generation,
is of various kinds, viz :

1. Certain, or doubtful.

2. Antecedent, or consequent, with regard to marriage.

3. Temporary, or perpetual.

4. Natural, or accidental.

5. Absolute, or relative, as existing between the man and all
women ; or between the mm and a special woman, or vice versa.

855. — 1. Antecedent and perpetual powerlessness, either abso
lute or relative, renders marriage invalid, by natural right, because
the purpose of the conjug il contract does not exist any longer
when sexual intercourse is impossible.

2. Consequent powerlessness, and antecedent temporary pow
erlessness, do not cancel the marriage; because the actual use of
marriage lias no connection with its essence, and it is sufficient
that the perfoimance might have been possible at the moment of
the contract, or ma}' be so in future.

3. Powerlessness, positively ascertained, renders unlawful the
use of marriage, even for a single trial; because, so long as the
sexual intercourse cannot be perfect, the end which renders lawful
this connection does not longer exist.

38<1 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

856. — Are ennuchs, deprived of the two testicles, considered
powerless, and not those who have only one?

When in doubt regarding antecedent powerlessness, one should
consider the marriage as valid, and allow a trial of the sexual act.
Even three years are granted, in spite of the greater probability,
for perpetual powerlessness.

When in doubt regarding consequent powerlessness, trials also
are allowed, until certainty is reached that they cannot be effec
tive.

Distinction must be made between 'powerlessness arid sterility ;
for barren women are not powerless for the conjugal act ; they con
sequently have the right to marry old men able to perform such
acts. It is the same for women who can receive the semen without
being able to keep it.

OBSTACLE FOR CAUSE OF ABDUCTION.

857. — Abducti-m consists in violently leading away a woman
from a safe place to another where she is in the power of the
seducer, with the purpose of marriage.

Abduction annuls the marriage between the seducer ; that is, the
man for whom the woman is curried away, and the woman who is
carried away.

8GO. — There is no obstacle when one leads away the woman
from one room to another in the same house, because she is not
really under the power of the seducer ; but to constitute an abduc
tion, she must be led away from one house to another.

There is no obstacle when the woman is carried away for another
purpose than marriage ; for instance, in order to satisfy the carnal
passion, etc. ; because the Council of Trent had mainly in view,
by this impediment, to favor the freedom of marriage,

III. Dispensation for Invalidating Obstacles.

THE DISPENSING POWER.
861. — The Pope can remove all obstacles, of ecclesiastical right.

Treatise on Marriage. 385

A "Bishop cannot ordinarily and by his own right remove invalida
ting obstacles.

'866. — 'Q-ies. What are the legitimate motivjs for removing
such obstacles?

Ans. Smallness of the place, if there is fear that on this
account the 3*011 ng girl cannot get suitably married to another ;
that is, such a place as does not contain more than 300 families,
(this reason is valid, although the betrothed woman intends to go
and live elsewhere) ; 2, absence of a sufficient dowry, when a
dowry is offered by a cousin or a stranger on condition that the
young girl shall marry her cousin; 3, advanced age, above an
adult, of the woman ; when she is over twenty-four years of age,
and has not the means to marry a man of her rank ; 4, carnal con
nection already, with a cousin or another person, causing an obsta
cle, aid also the danger of dishonor, as a result of it; 5, too
great familiarit}' between parties, leading to fear of a scandal,
in case they were not to contract marriage ; 6, a child to legitima
tize, born or conceived of fornication • 7, to nrike peace between
parents, cousins or relatives, by the marriage of applicants ; 8,
Christian virtues, which, perhaps, could not be secured any other
way; 9, the excellency of merits towards the Church; 10, the
preservation of property in a noble family ; 11, abundant alms for
pious work; 12, the poverty of a widow, having many children,
which the husband promises to provide for.

871. — Ques. Is a new dispensation required for the one who,
after having been granted a dispensation for an alliance obstacle,
on account of a forbidden connection, for instance, with his fian
ce's cousin, sins again with the same woman before marriage?

Ans. 1. No ; if the dispensation was not trusted for execution
by the delegate ; because such dispensations become effective only
from the day of execution, and not from the date of issue.

2, No, even if the dispensation was trusted for execution ;
because the obstacle of alliance was already removed by dispensa
tion, in view of marriage.

386 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

But if, after marriage, he has sinned ngain with the same
cousin of his wife, he is deprived of the right to ask for the con
jugal dut\', because this dispensation, according to the Curia's
style, was granted, "for the purpose of contracting marriage,"
and not of sinning more freely.

But another dispensation would be necessary, if he had sinned
with another cousin before his marriage, even after the issue of
the dispensation ; because, by so doing, he would have contracted
a new alliance.

871. — Qucs. Is a new dispensation necessary, when, after
having obtained a dispensation for relationship's obstacle, incest
uous connection has taken place between the fiance's?

Ans. 1. Yes, if the connection has taken place before the
execution of the dispensation. It is the common opinion, accord
ing to the Curia's style, which requires the declaration of an incest
of that kind ; for when it is declared, the Pope sentences the
supplicant to a more severe penance.

2. No, if the connection has taken place after the execution
of the dispensation ; because it being granted, and prohibition
removed, the crime of incest thereby ceases.

873. — Ques. Is a new dispensation required for relatives who,
after having been granted pardon, repeat sexual acts?

Ans. No, because the incest is morally the same, and the
number of acts need not be declared. So a now sexual act does not
render the dispensation void, whether it has taken place before
or after the issue of this dispensation.

It is not necessary to tell in the request how many times sexual
connection had taken place with the fiancees cousin, because these
different relations form but a single alliance. But it should be
declared, if suc'i is the case, when such a connection has taken
place with several cousins of the fiance, because there w< uld h:ive
been, then, several alliances ; and, although these obstacles are of
the same nature, it is necessary to be precise as to their number.

Treatise on Marriage. 387

CHAPTER VII.
MARRIAGE MADE VALID AGAIN.

890. — Marriage may be invalid : 1, for lack of consent ; 2, for
lack of the prescribed forms ; 3, for incapacity of the parties.

ART. I. Marriage made valid again, in case of lack of con
sent.

ART. II. Marriage made valid again, in case of lack of the
prescribed forms.

ART. III. Marriage made valid again, in case of incapacity of
the parties.

CHAPTER VIII.
ON CONJUGAL DUTY.

Let us hear St. Liguori touching this question : "I am ashamed
to speak upon this subject, full of repulsive matters, and of which
the name alone disturbs chaste souls. But would that this matter
were not so frequent in confession, and that the confessor had
simply to know merely the main points. The chaste reader will
forgive me, if I remain long on this subject, and even proceed into
particular cases, which bring to light so much vileness.

388 Tlte Doctrine of (he Jesuits.

[The following paragraphs are too indecent to appear in Eng
lish ; so they are left in the original French. — THE PUBLISHERS.]

ART. I. — DE LA LEGITIMITE DE L'ACTE CONJUGAL: 1° EN soi,

2° PAR RAPPORT AUX CIRCONSTANCES.

§1. Legitimit6 de 1'acte conjugal en soi.

907. — L'acte conjugal entre £poux le"gitimes est honnete et
licite par lui-meme ; car c'est le moyen e'tabli et re"gle par le Crea-
teur pour la propagation legitime de 1'espece humaine.

Les fins qui rendent cet acte honnete sont : 1° la generation,
1'une des principales ; 2° le moyen de satisfaire a ses obligations
envers 1'autre epoux ; 3° le moyen d'eviter 1'incontincnce cliez soi
et chez 1'autre ; 4° le desir de ranimer ou de faire nnitie un amour
honnete, de montrer ou de provoquer 1'affection conjugale.

908. — L'usage du manage est illicite s'il a lieu en vue du seul
plaisir, ce qui lesulte de la 9e proposition condamne"e par Innocent
XL, proposition ainsi concue : " L'acte conjugal accompli en vne
du pluisir seulemcnt est exempt de faute et de peche veniel." En
principe, cependant, il n'y aurait qu'un peche* veniel, comme lors-
qu'ou mange en vue du plaisir seul qu'on ^prouve. Mais il n'y a
pas de faute si c'est pour remedier a la concupiscence ou pour une
antre fin honnele que Ton cherche le plaisir, soit expressemeut, soit
implicitement.

L'usage du mariage est gravement illicite s'il a lieu dans un
esprit d'adultere, de telle sorte qu'en s'approchant de son Spouse,
on se figure que c'est une autre temme.

L'usnge du mariage e&t permis aux gens studies, et parce qu'au-
cune loi qui ne s'y oppose et parce que les gens steriles sont aptes
a 1'acte conjugal ; si aucune generation n'en requite, c'est tout a
lait accidentel ; et, en dehors de la generation, il y a d'autres fins
honnetes qui legitiment cet acte.

Meme les vieillards, dont la semence n'est plus prolifique, peu-
vent user du mariage, pourvu qu'ils puissent accomplir suffisam-
ment 1'acte ou qu'ils aient un espoir fonde de 1'accomplir, pour les
nieincs raisonsque nous avons expos^es a propos des gens steriles ;
ce qui est confirme par la pratique de 1'Eglise, qui beuit le maiiage
des vieillards.

Treatise on Marriage. 389

§ II. Legitimile do 1'acte conjugal par rapport aux circonstances.
I. — Circonstances de personne.

II y a trois circonstances ou empechements de personne qui peu-
vent s'opposer a l;i demande du devoir conjugal : 1° voeu de chas-
tete, 2° alliance par suite d'inceste, 3° impuissance corporelle.

Quant a la parente S| intuelle, il y a controverse.

909. — Tout epc ux le par un voeu de chastt'te, ou empeche" par
une alliance, ne pent demander le devoir conjugal sous peine de
peclie grave ; mais il pent le rendre a 1'aulre qui le lui demande,
et meme il y est tenu, puree que 1'autre partie ne doit pas etre pri-
vee de son droit.

Aucun des deux ne pent le demfinder, s'ils sont lies tous lesdeux
par un vceu de chastete ou empeches par une alliance.

910. — On doit rendre le devoir conjugal et meme on y est tenu
si, non seulement avant lo manage, mais encore apres le mariage,
ou a fait un voeu contraire au droit de 1'aulre ; car, bien qu'on ait
pec-he en contractant le mariage, on a remis cependant d'une man-
iere valable a 1'autre epoux, ce qu'on avait p-omis a Duu; d'ail-
leurs 1'autre, ignorant le voeu, a acquis le droit a la chose eii vertu
d'uu contrat valable.

Ou pcut le dcuiander et le rendre, si apres le mariage, on fait
vceu d'entrer en religion ou de recevoir les Ordres sacres apres la
niort de 1'autre e*poux ; et Ton n'a pas besoin de dispense, car ces
vceux u'obligent qu'apres la dissolution du mariage.

Selon 1'opinion [)lus commune et plus probable, un e*poux, lie
par un vceux ou empeche par une alliance, petit demander le devoir,
s'il remarque que 1'autre n'osant pas le demander est en danger
d'incoutinence ; il le peut, meme toutes les fois que 1'autre le
demande, d'une maniere interpretative par exemple, lorsque la
fcrnine est retenue par la houte et que le mari sent sa volonte de
le demander, parce qu'alors cela est plutot rendre que demandjr.

Mais l'e"poux emiiech^ par un lien ne peut exiger le devoir, pas
meme pour 6 viter I'mcontinence, car ce danger d'incontinence est
une raison d'obtenir une dispen e ou une suspension du voeu, et
non de demander le devoir. — Excepte", seion 1'opinion probable,
s'il s'agit d\mpechernents imposes par 1'Kglise, et si la dispense

390 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

ne pouvnnt etre obtenue proraptement, il y a un grand danger
d* incontinence en attendant.

II. DES ClRCONSTANCES DE POSITION.

911. — La position tout a fait licite est celle que la nature
enseigne, c'est-a-dire la femme couchee dessous, et 1'homme
dessus, parce que les autres positions sont contraires a 1'ordre de
la nature et consequemmcnt, portent quelque attuinte a cet ordre.

Aucune position, quoique centre nature, n'est en principe
gravement def endue, pourvu que Tacte conjugal puisse etre accom
pli, parce qu'il n'y a pas d'obstacle a la generation.

T* ute position centre nature, pour un motif le'gitime, est
exemptee de faute, car parfois ces positions sont plus commodes
ou seules possibles ; et toule commodit^ ou necessite" pent rendre
le"gitime cette derogation a 1'ordre, legere en elle-merne.

912. — II n'y a aucun peche a changer la position a cause dti
danger d'avortement au moment de la grossesse, a cause de 1'em-
bonpoint (pinguedinem vel curvitatem) de 1'homme, ou de la fatigue
de la femme, ou meme de la iroideur, lorsqu'on est plus excite"
dans cette position.*

La position qui seule est possible, n'est condamne'e en aucune
fa$on quelle qu'elle soit, bien qu'il en resulte une perte notable de
semence, parce que cette pnrtie de semence n'est pas ne"cessaire
a la generation, et se perd accidentellement, malgre* les epoux.

III. DES ClRCONSTANCES DE TEMPS.

Elles ont rapport aux temps de la grossesse, de 1'allaitement,
des menstrues, de la maladie, des fetes, et de la sainte communion.

913. — 1° Dans aucun temps, 1'aete conjugal n'est interdit en
principe sous peine de peche grave, parce qu'il n'y a aucune loi
empechant cot acte pour raison de temps. J'ai dit en principe^
parce qu'a cause des circonstunces il pent y avoir un proche danger
d'avortement ou de maladie ; ce qui est ties -rare et ne peut etre
pi evu dans certains cas.

* Si rhmnme ne pent etre amenS a connaitro sa fernnip, liormi^ dans nne
certaine position, qui dontera que la funino e^t loiiue Ue Li preiidre?
'Z, dv mjtrinivni, (Lib. vn, Disp. xcii.)

Treatise on Marriage. 301

Bien plus, selon bcaucoup cle theologiens, 1'acte conjugal n'est
pas me me legereinent defendu pour raison de temps, parce qu'il
i) 'y a aucune loi pouvant 1'interdire me me sous peine de peVhe
leger. Cependant saint Liguori admet plutot 1'opinion qui trouve
mi pec-he veniel dans 1'acte sexuel an moment de la grossesse, a
moins qu'il n'y ait danger d'iucontineuce, on quelqu'autre raUou
bonne te.

D'apres 1'opinion plus commune, 1'acte sexuel an moment des
menstrues est nn peche \6niel, i\ cause de 1'indecenee qu'il cause,
a moins qu'il n'y ait quelque raison qui le rende legitime. ... 11
faut en dire autant de 1'acte sexuel dans les jours qui suivent
1'accouchement.

914. — L'acte conjugal n'est pas defendu an moment de 1'allaite-
ment, parce qu'il n'y a aucune loi qui 1'empeche et aucun danger,
d'apres 1'experience, de snpprimer le lait. Les e"poux u'ont done
aucune raisou de s'abstenir de cet acte a ce moment, en craignaut
de peelier.

L'acte conjugal an moment de la maladie n'est defendu ni sous
peine d'un peche grave, ni sous peine d'un pec 16 ledger, parce qu'il
n'en re" suite aucun prejudice pour les epoux ; 1'eftVt qui accom-
pagne 1'acte ne peut avoir, au moius ordinairement, d'influence sur
la maladie.

Selon 1'opinion plus probable, il n'est pas defendu les dimanches
ct jours de iete solennelle, et parce qu'auc-un droit ne s'y oppose,
et parce que cet acte n'empeehe pas les ep ux d'observer les fetea.
La plupartdes 88. Peres qui font des objections a ce sujet, parais-
sent plutot donner des couseils que des preceptrs. On peut en
cone-lure que cet acte n'est pas defeudu non plus en temps d'Aveut
on de Caieme.

Eufin, en principe, il n'est pas defendu, meme sous peine de
peche l^ger, le jour de hi saintc communion, bion que les epoux
commimient seulement par piete, pourvu qu'ils accomplissent cet
acte pour une tin lionneie ; parce que 1'indecence qui uait de la
volupt^ charnelle est compens^e par 1'honnetete d'une foi droite et
voulue par Dku, fin q'.;e se proposent les ei)oux. . . . Voir
Sanchez, L. IX, D. XIII., qui a traite cette question avec soin,
ct mieux que persoune.

392 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

ART. II. — DE L'OBLIGATION D'ACCOMPLIR L'ACTE CONJUGAL.

915.— II y a une obligation de justice, grave en principe, de
rendre le devoir conjugal a 1'autre epoux qui le demande serieuse-
ment et raisonnablement, parce quo, d'apres la nature du contrat
conjugal, les epoux se donnent mutuellement la puissance sur leur
corps, pour 1' us age conjugal. . . .

II. En principe il n'y a aucune obligation de demander le devoir
conjugal, parce qu'aucun des epoux n'est tenu d'user de son droit,
et tous deux peuveni en faire reraise. Cependaut, accidentelle-
ment, il y a obligation de le demander par charite ou a cause d'une
.•nitre vertu, surtout de la part de 1'homme, par exeinple s'il juge
quo sa c;>mpagne est en danger d'incontinence parce qu'elle n'ose
le lui demander, ou si la demande est uecessaire pour eutretenir
ou ranimer 1'amour conjugal.

III. L'obligation de le rendre cesse pour I'un des e*poux
lorsqne cesse pour 1'autre le droit de 1'exiger, ce qui arrive dans
les cas suivants ; 1° si I'un des epoux a commis un adultere ; 2°
si celui qui le demande n'a pas 1'usage de la raison, parce que sa
demande n'est pas humaine ; 3° si celui q-.ii le rend pent crain.lre
raisonnablement uu prejudice ou un clanger pour sa saute* ; car les
epoux ne sont pas censes s'obliger a ivndre le devoir en subissant
un si grand prejudice ; 4° si celui qui le demande a perdu ce droit
a cause d'un inceste avec les parents de 1'autre epoux an premier
ou au deuxieme degre, ou pour une autre cause.

916.— Les epoux sout tenus d'habiter ensemble, et I'un ne pent
s'absenter longtemps sans le consentement de 1'autre ou sans
necessite ; car cette obligation d^coule de celle de rendre le devoir
conjugal. Or, fes causes legitimes de s'absenter pour longtemps
sont 1'inteiet public, la subsistance ou le salut de la famille, un
mal a eviter de la part de ses ennemis, etc. Mais le mari qui
va habiter longtemps ailleurs, doit emmener son epouse, pour
qu'elle habite avec lui.

Un epoux qui refuse le devoir conjugal peche gravement, s'il y
a danger d'incontinence ou d'un grave ennui chez 1'autiv; de
meme s'il le refuse a 1'autre qui le demande seneuserneut. M;iis
il en est autrement si celui-ci ii'insiste pas, ou ne le demande que
mollernent.

Treatise on Marriage.

393

II nc peche pas en le refusant lorsque 1'autre lo demande avec
exec-*, par exernple trois on quutre fois dans la meine ntiit ; ni s'il
le remet & un temps rapproclie, par exemple a la milt, on du soir
au matin, en mettant de cdte" le danger d'incontinence.

II faut blamer les Spouses qui refusent le devoir sans raison
suffisante a leurs maris qui le demandent meine molleraent, on qui
»e cedent que contraiutes, on qui leur reprocheut GJS demands
avec d ure te\

Une Spouse n'est pas dispense de rendre le devoir & cause des
inconvenients ordiuaires de raccoucliement, de la grossesse, de
I'allaitement, ni a cause de douleurs vives, mais courtes, ni a" cause
de douleurs longues miis moderees, par exemple de douleurs dj
tete pendant plusieurs mois apres raccoucliement, ni a cause d'un
petit affaiblisseraent dans la sanle, parce que tons ces incouve'n-
ii'iits sont iuh^rents a la condition du mariage ; il en serait autre-
mctit s'il y avait un grave danger dj mort on d'une maladie seiie-
use, d'apr^s le jugement d'un medecin prudent.

Un 4poux n'est pas oblige de rendre le devoir conjugal d 1'autre
souffrant d'une grave maladie contagieuse, par exernple, de la
peste, d'une maladie v^uerienne. DJ meine, a cause da notable
affail>lissement du corps, on en dispense ceux qui sout alteints
d'une forte fievre on d'une grave maladie.

Un ^poux u'est pas dispense de le rendre, parce qu'il craint
d'avoir trop d'enfants, car la pr<>c eation des enfauts est la fin
piincipale du mariage, et n'est pas 1111 inconvenient intrinseque
pour ce meme mariage.

ART. III.— DES PECIIES DES EPOUX.

917. — Tl y a les peclies venant do 1'acte conjugal accompli par
exces, c'esl-a-dire avec des acles inutiles a la genei'ation, et les
peches venant de 1'acte conjugal par defaut, lorsque 1'jicte essen-
liel manque, ou lorsqu'on souille le lit conjugal par le crime de
1'Onanisme.

§ 1 . Des peclies des 6poux par exces.

II y en a trois soites :

1° Ceux qui soi^t nuisibles a la generation, comme la sodomie, la
pollution ;

394 The Doctrine oj the Jesuits.

2° Cenx qui sont utiles, comme les attouchements qui cntretien-
nent et excitent rumour ;

3° Ceux qui rie sont ni nuisibles, ni utiles, sont dits en duhors de
hi nature.

• 918. — I. Tout ce qui est necessaire pour accomplir 1'acte conju
gal ou pour le rendre plus facile, plus prompt on plus parfait, est
absolument permis aux epoux ; parce que cclui qui a droit a hi
chose a droit aux moyens necessaires, utiles et non defendus, pour
y arriver ; et si Ton permet la chose principale, on permet ausbi la
chose accessoire, ou le moyen qui y conduit.

II. Tout ce qui est nuisible a la generation d'ins 1'acte conjugal,
tout ce qui procure une pollution en dehors de 1'union naturelle, est
gravement defendu, parce que 1'effusion volontaire de la sernence
n'est pennise qu'en vue de la generation, et par suite le mar.
i;ige ne donne aux epoux le droit que de repandre la semence utue
a la generation. Autrement si les homines pouvaient jouir de ce
plaisir sans avoir la charge subsequente de nourrir et d'elever leurs
cnfants, on ne songerait guere a la generation des enl'ants, meme
on I'eviterait, et la soeie"te inclinerait vers sa fin.

III. Tout ce qui est inutile ou indifferent a la generation, meme
d'une maniere indirecte ou eloignee, ou a 1'amour conjugal qu'on
veut exciter, est un pe"che, maisseulement veniel : l°c'ebt un pe"che,
parce qu'on ne cherche que le plaisir, et qu'il y a une subversion
de la fin et une jouissance dereglee, dans line chose permise en
elle-meme, aux epoux ; 2° il n'y a qu'un pecheveniel, parce qu'on
ne cherche pas la volupte en dehors du manage et que 1'acte, par
sa nature, vise a des rapports permis. II est vrai que la circon-
stance de la fin legitime manque, muis ce defaut n'amene qu'un
dereglement leger et, par suite, sculement un peche veniel.

On peut done ainsi resumer ces trois regies : tout ce qui est pour
est permis, tout ce qui est contre estA>eche rnortel, tout ce qui est
en dehors est peche veuiel.

919. — II n'y a pas de faute dans des baiscrs honnetes, dans des
attouchemenlssur les parties honneiesou in )ius honnetes, destines
a montrer 1'affection conjugale ou a entreteuir 1'amour, meme si
accidentellement il en resulte une pollution invdoutcure } parce que
toute nun que honnetu d'amour, meme tendre, est permise a ceux

Treatise on Marriage.

395

qui, d'apies le lien du mariage, ne doivent fuire qu'un seul coeur,
une seule chair.

II n'y a pas de faute en principe dans IPS attouchements et les
regai'ds peu konnetes, s'ils visent immediatement a 1'acte scxcul. II
en est de me me, s'ils sont simplemeiit deshouuetes, mais neces-
saircs. on utiles pour exciter la nature ; car alors ilssontcomme une
preparation a 1'acte, comme des preliminaires. 11 n'y a que dcs
peches veniels, si Ton cherche seulement le plaisir, meme si ces
actes precedent immediatement 1'acte ; mais il y a pe"che mortel
s'ils exposent 1'un des deux epoux ou tons les deux au danger
d'une pollution avant 1'union cliarnelle, ce qui arnvera facilement
si on les prolonge avant 1'acte conjugal.

II y a peche veniel dans les attouchements, les regards et les
propos honteux qui ne visent pas immediatement 1'acte sexuel, et
n'ont pas pr^ur but d'entretenir 1'amour legitime d'une maniere
moderee et raisonnable.

II n'y a pas peche grave, meme si ces attouchements sans inten
tion d'uniou coujugale amenent un ebranlement des esprits ou des
membres propres a la generation, ou s'il en resulte des pertes se*m-
inales, bien que ces acles soient peche mortal chez les personnes
libres ; parce qu'en dehors du crime de pollution voloutaire ou de
sodomie, on ne fait rien de contraire au mariage.*

Mais on doit prendre garde de ne pas counr le danger de pollu
tion, ce qui arrivera facilement si les mouvements sont deregle"s.
Aussi, bien qu'en principe les cpoux ne commettent pas de p6che
mortel qui, ayant commence 1'acte conjugal, s'cntendent pour ne
pas le terminer, et ne se mettent pas en danger de pollution, saint
Alphonse fait remarquer avec raison qu'ordinairement il y a p^che
mortel, parce que, ordinairement, ce danger existe.

* Sanchez, Lib. IX., Disp. XLV., traite exprofesso et avec un luxe inoui
de details, ces graves questions :

'•Utrurn conjuuibus liceant delectationes morosae, tactus, aspectus, ver-
biiturpia, cum pollutiouis pra3visti3, sed non intentte periculo? Et geii-
eraliter quando pollutionis periculuin etticiat uovam culpam uiortalem, vel
talein, quae autea niortalis minime oral?"

II y la de>sus quarante et uu articles; je me contente d'extraire le prob
lems pose par 1' article 34. La solution importe pen ; tout le geine coiisis
a avoi r i marine le probleme :

"Q lid, si vir a fsemina petat, ut ejus virilia attrectet, moveatqne,
vdit dittos in uxoris vas intromittere, ib'qn.i pcraistere, qiui>i cupulain
excrceudo, uteus digitis instur ajcmbri '

396 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

920. — Tl n'y a pas de pe'che' grave et meme leger, scion Popinion
plus commune et plus probable, de In, part d'une epouse qui s'ex-
cite par des attouchements a repandre la semcnce aussilut apies
1'acte dans lequel le mari seul 1'a repandue : 1° parce que cetLe se-
mence est destine"e a accomplir 1'acte conjugal, pour que les epoux
ne soient proprement qu'une seule chair et, de merne que 1'epouse
peut se pie"parer LI 1'acte par des attouchements, elle pent egale-
ment le terminer par des attouchements ; * 2° parce que, si les
femmes, apres une telle excitation, e"taient tenues de reprimer les
mouvements naturels, elles nsqueraient de p^cher gravement.

Les attouchements sur soi-meme, en vue du plaisir venerien, en
1'absence de 1'autre epoux, selon 1'opinion de plusieurs, constituent
nn pe"ch6 grave, meme en mettant de cdte le danger de pollution,
parce que 1'epoux n'a pas le droit de se servir de son propre corps
pour son plaisir, mais fceulement pour 1'acte conjugal. Cependant^
beaucoup d'autres, d'apres saint Alphonse, ne voierit la qu'un peehe
ve"niel. Saint Alphonse regarde la premiere opinion conmie plus
probable, et comine devant etre suivie en pratique.

*0n doit meme le Ini conseiller: "Conjugi tardiori ad seminandum con-
sulendum est ut ante concubitum tactibus veiierem excitet, ut vel sic
possit in ipso concubitu simul eff'undere semen." Cependant "non est
necessario et conjnx prius seminnns non lonetur alium exspectare." Ainsi
parle Sanchrz, et il se pose a ce propos une serie d'incroyables et intradu-
isibles questions, anxquelles il repond avec les plus minutieux details :
"An sit mortale, quoties non simul conjures semen consulte effiindunt?
. . . Quid, si vir se provocet ad prins seininandum? . . . Nuin fas viro
sit continuare concubitnm, ubi prius seminaverit, ut faemina seminet?
. . . An sit culpa lethalis, sive conjuges, sive soluti, a copula inchoata
desistant ante utriusque semiuationem, maxime si alter seminarit? . . .
Quando sit licitum, et quando culpa, et qualis si vir, fsemina non semi-
nante, nee seininandi periculum patiente, de ejus consensu ante consum-
mationem se retrahat a copula incepta? . . . Quid, si jam faemina semina
verit, ant serninandi periculum subeat? . . . Quid, si e contra vir semina
rit, et fsemina non seminet, sed se retrahat, nitaturque non seminare? . . .
An ubi sola fa3inina seminarit, possit vir se retrahere, si advertat sibi
mortis periculum imminere, si seminet; vel quia supervenit hostis aut
fera.

"Conjugibus inhoneste coeuntibus subito adessent aliqui, non damnan-
dus esset vir, qui post fa^minse seminationern, ante propriarn, ex his
unjentissimis causis recederet, quainvis ita Venus in eo irrita esset, nt
membro virili ex vase faBminajo extracto, fore animadverteret, ut ipso
iuvito semen extra flueret. Quare. . . .

"Quid, de conjuge semetipsum tangente? Quid si se tangat, sciens fore
ut praeveniat semen fgemiuenm, vel faamina, ciuae nondum semiuarat, se
tactu provocet, ubi vir rnembrum contraxit," etc., etc.

Sanchez, De mairimonio, Lib. JX., Disp, XVII., XIX et XLIV.

Treatise on Marriage. 397

S^ To:i preiul plaisir d'une maniere prolongee a pcnscr a tin acle
sc x:iel passe ou qui doit avoir lieu a un moment eloignc, en dehors
du danger de pollution, il u'y a qu'un pe'che' \eniel selon 1'opinion
commune : 1° II y a un pe"che, car ce plaisir, n'etant pas rapporte
a un acte proche, est un dereglement, puisqu'il u'a pas de fin hon-
iiete et qu'on excite inutilement les esprits genitaux ; 2° uu pcchc
veniel, car 1'acte etant pcrmis en principe aux epoux, il ne pent
elre gravement defendu d'y penser avcc plaisir. Mais il n'y a pas
de faute dans une simple pcnsee sur les rapports passes ou futurs.
Memo, ni le desir au sujet d'un acte futur, ni le plaisir a penser a
ui^aete passe", ne sont illicites en principe, a moins qu'ils ne soient
rapportes qu'au seul plaisir de 1'unioii charnelle, car le desir au
sujet d'une chose permise ne peut etre defendu.

§ 2. De 1'Onanisme en particulier.

921. — L'Onanismc consiste en ce que I'liommo, lorsqne 1'acte
sexuel est commence, se retire avant devoir repandu sa semence
qui se perd en dcliors, afin d'cmpcchcr la generation. Tout le
monde voit que c'est chercher le plaisir, suns vouloir assumer les
charges du manage.

11 tire son uom d'Onan, deuxieme fils du patriarchc Juda qui,
apr6s la mort de son fro re Her, fut force, selon la coutume,
d'epouser sa veuve Thamar, \v urdonner une posterite a son frere ;
mais "s'approchant de l'e"pouse de son frere, il repandait sa
semence a terre pour que des enfant* ne naquissent pas sous le
nom de son frere. Aussi le Seigneur le f rappa parce qu'il faisait
une chose abominable." Genese, XXXVIII, 9 et 10.

922. — L'Onanisme volontaire est toujours un p^che mortel, en
tant que contraire a la nature ; aussi il ne pent jamais etre permis
aux 6poux, parce que; 1° il est contraire a la fin principale du
manage, et ten 1 en principe a I'extinction de la societ6, et par
suite renverse 1'ordre naturel ; 2° parce qu'il a et6 defendu stride-
merit par le Legislateur supreme ct Createur, comme il resulte du
texte de la Genese cite tout a 1'heure ; 3° parce qu'il a etc
condamne par Innocent XI.

Le mari Onaniste com met toujours un peche grave et ne pent

398 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

etre absous, a moins cle regretter sincercment son peche ct cle se
proposer de 1'eviter a 1'avenir.

L'epou c pent etre excusee du peche si, pour de graves raisons,
ell'.i est forcec de rend re le devoir conjugal, pourvu q ('en elle-
meme, elle ne donne pas son assentiment a ce peche, et qu'a
* 1'exterieur, elle manifeste sa repugnance par des avertissements
serieux et par des marques de mecontentement. La raison est
que : 1° elle accomplit un acte licite, et use d'un droit dont elle
ne pent etre privee par la faute de son mari ; elle ne coopere pas
proprement a son peche puisqu'elle reste passive, et que 1'action
coupable intrinfeequement ne consiste que dans 1'acte du raari se
retirant centre la nature ; 2° pnrce qu'elle n'est pas obligee par la
charite" d'empecher le peche de son mari en subissant un grave
prejudice; 3° parce qu'il est etabli par les r£pouses du Saint-
Peuitentiaire, qu'il ne faut inquie er aucune fernrne a ce sujet.

923. — Une espouse peche gravcment quand elle pousse son mari
a mesuser de maringe, meine indirecterncnt ou tacitement, par
exemple en se plaignant du grand nombre de ses enfa:its, des
douleurs de 1'enfantement, ou en repetant qu'elle a failli mourir
dans ses dernieres couches. A plus forte raison, elle peche grave-
men t si, malgre" son mari, elle se retire avant I'effusion de la
semence.

Elle peche gravement aussi en consentant elle-meme a 1'acte
detestable du mari, tout en manifebtuut sa repugnance exterieure-
inent. Si, cependant, il n'y a de sa part qu'une satisfaction
incfficace, non an sujet de 1'acle cou[>able en soi, mais de ses
consequences, par exemple des inconvenients de la grossesse, des
dangers de Tacconcliemeut, en principe elle ne peche pas, bien que
cette satisfaction ue soit pas sans peril. Mais elle doit evitcr tout
a fait qu'en la manifestant a son mari, elle ne le rende plus
ardent a pecher plus librement et plus souvent.

L'epouse est tenue, du moins oidiuainment, d'avertir 1'epoux
de 1'obligation d'agir selon la regie, et de le detourner, autant que
possible, de sa manieie d'agir coupable. Elle ne doit pas se
contenter de 1'avertir une fois, mais reiterer ses avertissements,
a moins qu'elle ne soit assuree que cela ne servira de rien.
Cependaut elle doit, merne dans ce cas, montrer sa repuguauce de

Treatise on Marriage. 399

qnelqne maniere, pour ne pas parailre donner son assentiment au
pceli6 tie son mari.

Le devoir do I'e'pouse est aussi d'engagrr son mari par des
caresses, par <liff6 rentes marques d'anumr, par des prieres, dcs
exhortations, & aceoniplir 1'acte conjugal selon la r&gle, ou £ s'en
abstenir absolurnent. L'expe>ience montre que beau coup de maris
onanistes, ainsi engages par leurs femmes, se sout corrige's.

925. — D. Une Spouse peut-elle demander le devoir conjugal
& son mari Onanibte?

R. Oui, selon Toj'inion plus probable, pourun motif grave, par
exernple, si elle est expo^ee au danger d'iucontiueuce ; en ett'et
elle a droit au rapport sexuel.

926. — D. Une Spouse pecbe-t-elle en dormant son consente-
ment interne a la voluple, lor&qu'elle peut permettre 1'acte conjugal
d, son e"poux onaniste?

R. Non, pourvu qu'elle ne donnc pas son assentiment au
pech^ du mari. Car, puisqu'elle ne peche pas en permettant cet
acte, elle ne p6che pas en consentant au plaisir qui en r^sulte, bien
qu'elle sache que son mari ne terminera pas 1'acte conjugal ; car
cet acte est en soi bonnet e et permis a la femme, et il ne depend
pas d'elle qu'il soit accompli selon la regie.

Cases of Conscience on Affiances.

CASE II.
VALUE OF PROMISES.

Quirinus, a .young man of noble birth, having fallen blindly in
love with Rosalie, a young girl of common extraction, promised
to marry her without the knowledge of his parents. The latter,
learning of his foolish promise, lost no opportunity of opposing
biu-h a scandalous marriage. Quirinus, seeing his parents so
afflicted, and being unwilling to crush them with sorrow, is himself
iii great trouble. What shall the unfortunate man do? He begins
by showing less affection to Rosalie, and finally comes down to
coldness; then, pleading the opposition of his parents, he breaks
off the engagement with his betrothed.

Ques. 1. What value have promises made without the approval
of one's parents?

Ques. 2. May promises be made in spite of parents?

Ques. 3. Had Quirinus the right to persuade Rosalie to cancel
her promises?

Ans to Question 1. They have some value in themselves. The
reason is, that the choice of a situation or state should be free and
independent of any foreign influence. Marriage contracted with
out the approbation, and in spite of the wish of parents, being
valid ; so are, with more reason, the promises leading to marriage,
although they are less subtanlial.

I have said " in themselves," because there are some cases in
which promises made in spite of parents would be worthless ; for
instance, if a grave scandal should result from the marriage, serious
quarrels between parents, etc. Justice does not compel to an act
which cannot be done without sinning. However, difference of
rank does not necessarily invalidate promises, if the affianced are
aware of its importance.

Cases of Conscience on Affiances. 401

Ans. to Question 2. No, in a general manner, because sons are
hob I to respect their parents, and in so grave a matter to ask their
consent or advice; except in cases in which sons foresee that their
pti rents would be opposed to an honorable and suitable marriage.
But, above all, one should be careful not to trust one's own judg
ment.

Ans. to Question 3. There is controversy between theologians
as to whether the opposition of parents is a suflicient cause
for breaking off a promise of marriage. But it is necessary to make
a distinction, after St. Liguoii: if parents are making an unjust
opposition to marriage, promises cannot be broken ; it is different
if the opposition is justifiable : for instance, if the marriage would
bring dishonor on the family. Therefore, in this case, Quiriuus
was right in breaking off these promises, though they may have
been valid at the start ; because the opposition of his parents was
justifiable. But it was useless for him to try to persuade his
betrothed, through hardhearteduess, to retract her promise ; it would
have been sufficient for him to retire, pleading the just and very
grave opposition of his parents.

CASE VI.
CONDITIONAL CONSENT.

Odilon and Odilia, cousins of the second degree, are affianced,
upon condition that they can obtain a dispensation from the Pope.
On that understanding, by common agreement, they send a sup
plication to Rome, in order to obtain the said dispensation. In the
meantime Odilon, having become acquainted with another young
girl, more beautiful, named Virginia, with a larger dowry, who has
uot heard of his first promises, makes her new proposals. A
little while after, on the eve of the marriage between^ Odilon and
Virginia, Odilia receives the dispensation, and immediately claims
from Odilon the fulfillment of his promises. Odilon, perplexed,
asks his confessor what he should do. The latter does not know
what advice to give.

402 The Doctrine of lite Jesuits.

Ques. 1. What must we thiuk of the first and last promises of
Odilon?

Ques. 2. What should he be advised, or ordered to do?

Ans. lo Question 1. His first promises were worthless; for, in
the first place, they were conditional, and the betrothed's consent was
given before the realization of the condition ; in the second place,
they had been made when an obstacle existed, as follows from
what has been said.

Ans. to Question 2. As regards the promises made to Virginia,
it is not a very clear case. The opinion of a theologian considers
it of no value. The reason is : although Odilon was not tied to his
espoused by the regular obligations of betrothal, he was engaged to
her by true obligations of affiances, on the strength of the promise
made to her, and by which he was held to wait for the result of
the request for a dispensation. He therefore was not at liberty to
make a new promise without violating this grave obligation. Con
sequently, this new promise cannot be authorized ; and moreover it
is entirely worthless, as he made it to the prejudice of his first
betrothed.

Another opinion, probable in a positive manner for me, acknowl
edges that this last promise is of some value ; for, from what has
been said, if the former is worthless, the latter is valid ; as the first
engagement being void, cannot oppose the validity of the second
one ; and the consent given by Odilon to wait for the result of the
request to the Pope cannot be in opposition to tl^e validity of the
second. For it wen Id result that the engaged man sinned only by
breaking his engagement ; that is to say, he has violated the prom
ised faith ; but the new promise he contracted is not worthless.

Ans. to Question 2. In presence of the above controversy, one
cannot compel O.lilon towed Odilia ; but he may be allowed to
marry Virginia; as, from what has been said, in a probable man
ner, the promise made to her is valid, and he is tied to her. He
must, therefore, be left in peace.

CASE VII.

BREAKING OFF AFFIANCES.
Leopold, a law student, made a promise of marriage to Domi-

Cases of Conscience on Affiances. 403

tilln, a most honorable young girl, after lie bad graduated and
become a lawyer. Within tbe space of three years her met her fre
quently, and renewed to her the word given ; which attached her
to to him that she did not hesitate to decline another very honor
able offer. But Leopold, having heard an eloquent sermon on the
vanity of worldly things, decided to bid farewell to the seductions
of this world. Hence, to act with more prudence, he wished to
take spiritual exercises in a convent of Regulars ; after which, with
his confessor's consent, he makes a vow of chastity, and enters the
Order. Without delay he wears the religious dress, receives minor
orders, and for a whole year he occupies himself studying theol
ogy. Learning this, Domitilla charges him with having broken
his promise, while she, on the contrary, had kept faithful, even to
the refusing of another offer. By numerous letters and unceasing
complaints, she endeavors to make him change his mind. Leopold,
in his perplexity, asks advice of his confessor.

Ques. 1. How m:iy valid promises be broken off?

Ques. 2. What must Leopold be advised, or ordered to do?

Ans. to Question 1. Valid promises may be broken off, if one of
the affianced chooses a more perfect state ; because, while contract
ing a promise, he is not deemed to renounce forever the option
of a more perfect situation.

Ans. to Question 2. Leopold should be advised to fulfill faith
fully his two vows, and to recommend his affianced to God by ear
nest prayers. If she has refused another favorable engngcment to
keep true to Leopold, it is an incidental case, a misfortune, which
she should endure peaceably, until she linds another parly to suit
her.

CASE VIII.

BREAKING OFF AFFIANCES.

Corneille, betrothed to Eleonore, has the weakness to indulge in
fornication. A short time afterwards, Eleonore soils herself with
the same crime. Corneille, already sorry for not having chosen a
richer woman, seeks this opportunity to break off from her, in spite
of her claims.

Ques. Quid, in this case?

404 The Doctrine of fhe Jesuits.

Ans. Corneille was free, more probably, according to St. Liguori,
to disengnge himself, on account of the fornication of his fiance,
although he had also himself committed the same crime.

CASE IX.
BREAKING OFF AFFIANCES.

Edmund became engaged to Ellen, a young girl of the same rank
and fortune as himself. But on the eve of their marriage, he
comes into the inheritance of a deceased uncle. He consequently
takes his leave of Ellen, to marry another woman as rich as him
self.

Ques. 1. Is the change of fortune of one of the affianced, suffi
cient to break off promises?

Ques. Quid, in this particular case ?

Ans. to Question 1. If one of the affianced loses considerable
money, it is a sufficient reason for the other to withdraw on account
of this change of fortune. But if one of them becomes much
richer, for instance, by receiving a good inheritance, is that one
at liberty to withdraw? One is disposed to answer in the affirma
tive ; because, in fact, the result is a great difference of fortune
between the two parties. St. Liguori, Voit, etc;., proves that this
this is the opinion of the greater number. However, there is a
common opinion which affirms the contrary ; because nothing
being changed regarding the other party, the fortunate fiance"
should not abandon her.

Ans. to Question 2. Edmond must not be molested, such, at
least, is the probable opinion, for having broken off his promise
afier he had received a large inheritance ; because there follows
from this a great difference of wealth between him and his betrothed.
This reason is valid only, if the inheritance was not expected, as
it is supposed to be in this case.

CASE X.

BREAKING OFF AFFIANCES.
Bibiane, a young lady endowed with the finest physical and

Cases of Conscience on Affiances. 405

intellectual qualities, attracts the attention of many young men.
Several ask her in marriage ; but she prefers Sidonius, to whom
she is engaged. The wedding-day being near, Bibiane goes to
confess, and, among other sins, she declares that: 1, she has lost
her virginity", by repeated fornication ; 2, she is one month on in
pregnancy, through shameful relations with the latter young man ;
3, she has had a child alread}', without anybody knowing it except
the midwife, who took it to an orphan asylum. Hearing these
words, the confessor, astounded, is perplexed to know whether he
must compel her to declare these facts to ner betrothed, or break
off her promise. But, he thinks, after all, that it is better to
keep perfectly silent ; he therefore gives her absolution, and she
is married on the morrow.

Ques. 1. Should engaged persons declare grave sins committed
by them before the celebration of marriage ?

Ques. 2. Was Bibiane under obligation to declare the sii.s?

Qwes. 3. What must we think of her confessor ?

Ans. to Question 1. 1, Yes, if such sins are likely to be prejudicial
to the other betrothed, to or cause dishonor to him or to her ; for
instance, if the affianced man has a venereal disease, or if the
affianc d woman is pregnant from another man. In such a case
the affianced is obliged to confess the truth to the other, or, to with
draw. The reason is, by contracting marriage under such cir
cumstances the affianced would cause prejudice to the other party.

2. No, if such sins are not gravely prejudicial to the other
betrothed, or do not cause him particular harm : for instance, if the
affianced woman has lost her virginity, if she is quarrelsome, etc.,
etc. The reason is, that no one is held to degrade one's self by
confessing publicly sins not gravely prejudicial to others.

Ans. to Question 2. 1, Bibiane is not held per se to confess that
she has committed fornication and lost her virginity, because this
sin is not prejudicial to her betrothed. Although, when learning the
truth, he may have the right to withdraw ; however, as Ion* as he
does not make any opposition, the betrothed woman can maintain
her rights to affiances. And, although she should not deceive a
man by making him believe she is free from reproach, she is not
held to confess her sin to him ; anil she may, if questioned about

406 The Doctrine of t.'te Jesuits.

it, even dissimulate, and answer equivocally : as, by so doing, she
does not lie, but only conceals a sin she desires to keep secret.

2. Nor is she held to confess to her betrothed that she has had a
child ; and that she sent it to an orphan asvlu u or some other
secret place, providing she pays for and has the means to provide
for her child, in case a charge is made on this account. The
reason -is, that in such a case he does not wrong her betrothed, as
no prejudice will result to him therefrom. It would be different
if the fact could not be kept sufficiently secret to be concealed
from her betrothed forever ; because, from the knowledge of such
sins, very grave quarrels might follow after marriage.

3. But she is held in principle, per se loqnendo, to confess to her
betrothed that she is actually pregnant, or to withdraw her promise ;
because, otherwise, she would greatly wrong him, by introducing a
stranger child into his family ; that is, a child for which he would
have to provide and to make his heir, in common wiih his legit
imate children. There is to be added, the grave inconveniences
which would result should the matter be innde public; which
might easily occur should the child be born in the eighth month
after marriage. Several make an exception, in case on the eve of
the wedding the young girl could save her honor only by marriage ;
because she is not expected to incur so great a prejudice as the
loss of her honor for the sake of sparing her betrothed such a passing
prejudice. This exception seems to be approved by St. Liguori.

Ans. to Question 3. What should we think of the confessor?
From what has been said, it is clear enough that Bibiune's con
fessor has dealt with the matter very lightly indeed, by keeping
completely silent. In principle, he could not grant her absolution
without compelling her to declare her situation to Sidonius, or to
retract her promise, as has been aforesaid. However, the trouble
of this unfortunate woman might have been such, that, in order to
save her reputation, or the honor of a noble family ^ and avoid a
great scandal, the confessor may have, and even should, let her go
in peace. Would to God that such situations were met with less
frequently ! How many betrothed persons deceive one another !
Before their marriage, it should be repeated to them: " Niniium
ne crede colori" Do not trust appearances!

Cases on Publication of iije

CASE IV.
OBLIGATION TO DECLARE OBSTACLES TO MARRIAGE.

Codes, at the point of marrying Marine, after the publication
of the bans, declares to his intimate friend, Fabius, whom he re
quests to swear to keep the secret, that he has had shameful relations
with Marine's slater. Fabius, much exercised, is doubtful whether
he should be faithful to his word, or to the Church, which requires
witnesses to make known all obstacles to marriage.

Ques. Is Fabius excusable for not declaring the above obstacle ?

Ans. No, because the secret, either promised or intrusted, even
sworn to, does not bind, in itself, when a great damage is likely to
result therefrom either to the community or to a third person.
Now, the making known of such an obstacle is useful to the
Church, and to the contracting parties themselves, etc.

CASE V.

OBLIGATION TO DECLARE OBSTACLES TO MARRIAGE.

I. Lescadie confesses to having sinned formerly with Antoine,
her sister's betrothed. Hubert, her confessor, urged by his zeal,
after having admonished her seriously, orders her to declare imme
diately to her parson, outside of confession, the obstacle to marriage
caused by her fault.

II. Siagrius and Melitina are soon to be married ; Valerius is
positive that Siagrius has sinned with Melitina's sister. He
declares the fact to the parson ; but he cannot furnish any positive
proofs, and desires that his name should not be mentioned. The
priest docs not know what to do, etc., etc.

Cases of Conscience on tlje Nature of JHarrtacje.

CASE II.
CONSENT OF THE SPOUSES.

Jorinius, a married man, leaves his country on business, and has
guilty relations with Therese. Representing himself to be a single
man, he marries her ; but soon after abandoning her, he returns to
his own country. Upon his arrival, he learns that his wife was
dead at the time he married Therese. He thinks of going to fetch
Therese to bring her back with him, when he learns that Etnilie, a
very rich widow, intends to marry again. Seizing the opportunity,
he makes proposals for her hand. This new wedding over, com
ing to better feelings, he goes to the priest and confesses the whole
matter. The confessor doubts the validity of the two marriages,
the former with Therese, and the latter with Emilie. His doubts
comes from the fact that Jorinius could not be considered as being
seriously married, he knowing in each instance that he was not
free, as this had happened in both cases.

Ques. 1. Is the marriage of Jorinius with Therese valid?

Ques. 2. Is his marriage with Emilie valid?

Ans. to Question 1. No ; for having no doubt of the existence of
his wife, he was not able to give a true consent. His consent was
but fictitious in his marriage with Therese. That is to say, he had
simply intended to live with her in concubinage, under the pretense
of marriage ; which is clear from all the circumstances of the
case : this marriage therefore was of no value. But there was no
obstacle on the ground of criminality; firstly, because Jorinius'
wife was dead when he had relations with Therese, and had
promised to marry her; next, because, even if he had committed
adultery by promising marriage to Therese, this adultery would

Cases of Conscience on Mature of Marriage. 409

not have existed in principle on either side, an<l one of the con
ditions required to constitute an obstacle by crime was lacking.

Ans. to Question 2. Yes, as it results from what has been said ;
for, if something was opposed to the validity of this marriage,
there would be the marriage contracted with Therese; but that
was worthless. Therefore, . . . And there cannot exist any
difficulty through Jorinius having married Emilie, while considering
himself tied to Therese ; for, not knowing whether his wife was
living cr not, he was not certain of the validity of his marriage
with Therese ; and, consequently, he married Emilie, as he had
the right to do, for there was no obstacle in this case. There
fore his union with Emilie is valid, and he ought to be left in
peace.

CASE III.
CONDITIONAL CONSENT.

Patricius,a young man belonging to a noble family, but himself
poor, has a very rich aunt, who will make him her heir providing
he marries a person to her liking. Travelling in a foreign port,
and having the oppoitunity, he dishonored Martine, through prom
ise of marriage, and even caused her to be pregnant. Threatened
by the young girl's father, he marries her, upon condition th»t
his aunt will consent to it, because he cannot contract marriage in
spite of her without losing a great inheritance. But he was posi
tive that his aunt would never consent to it. Marline's father,
however, assisted by a friend, takes such successful stops that
the aunt at last consented. Patricius learning this, runs away,
comes back to his own country, and gets married to another young

lady.

Ques. What are we to think of this case? and what ought

Patricius to do?

Ans. Patricius' first marringe is worthless, in the absence
true consent; for, not wishing in fact to marry Martine, he gave
but an insincere consent. The reason is, that when giving a c«
ditional consent, he was sure that the condition would not be i
ized. Therefore, this consent in fact is void ; and consequently tl

410 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

m;irriage contract is void also. The best proof is that, when 1 arn-
ing that the condition was realized, contrary to his expectations,
he ran away, not considering himself bound by the marriage.

As for Ihe second marriage, it is valid ; . . . therefore, he miiy
live in peace with his second wife.

CASE IV.
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE.

Benjamin, a Jew, had contracted and consummated marriage
with Anna. About two years later, converted, through the zeal of
a Catholic priest, and initiated into the mysteries of the Christian
religion, he embraced this religion with greatest sincerity. He
uses his earnest efforts to bring his wife to acknowledge the truth,
but without success ; for Anna, although not refusing to live in
peace with him, declares that she will remain faithful to the Jew
ish law forever. What shall Benjamin do? Deserting his wife,
he bids farewell to society, and to serve God in a more perfect
manner he enters a religious community, where he makes his vows,
after one year of noxiciate. Several years later, Anna, who
had not married again, receives baptism, and expresses a desire to
live with her husband. Benjamin is uncertain whether this is
allowed, or if he may return home.

Ques. 1. What are we to think of this case? and what should
Benjamin do?

Ques. 2. Might Benjamin have contracted another marriage, if
he had not entered into rei gious Orders?

Ans. to Question 1. Benjamin has the right to desert his wife,
enter a religious Order, and make valid vows.

Ans. to Question 2. There is controversy. Many answer neg-
ativel}^. ... A great number answer in the affirmative. Si.
Liguori considers the latter opinion as more probable.

CASE V.

DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE.
Felicicn having married Sylvie, the marriage not being yet

Cases of Conscience on Nature of Marriage. 411

completed, says farewell to his wife and the world to enter a
religious Order, and makes solemn vows. Sylvie herself enters a
nunnery, and in presence of the bishop makes a simple vow of
chastity. Soon after, her fervor decreasing, S\lvie leaves the con
vent and returns to society. Then she goes to a foreign country,
where she marries Hermann, from whom she hides her former life.
But, acquainted with the facts, Hermann, consider n^ his marriage
void, sends Sylvie away, and decides to contract another mar
riage. But before so doing, he asks the advice of his confessor.

Ques. 1. Do solemn vows cancel marriage?

Ques. 2. Is Sylvie's marriage with Hermann valid and permis
sible? What is to be thought of Hermann's intention of marry
ing again ?

Ans. to Question 1. Yes, provided the marriage is only con
cluded, but not consummated.

Ans. to Question 2. This marriage is valid. But Sylvie sinned
gravely by marrying again, because she broke her vow of chastity,
by which she was bound. She should have requested a dispensa
tion from the Pope. As regards Hermann, whose marriage is
valid, he cannot marry again. He must be advised to live in peace

with Sylvie.

CASE VI.

SEPARATION OF BED AND RESIDENCE.

Marcellin obtains separation from his wife, convicted in adultery
by a court of justice ; he makes up his mind to enter a monastery,
and successively he receives the sacred orders. But scarcely has
he received ordination, before his wife proves her innocence in
court, and requests her husband to return home.

Ques. Is Marcellin IK Id to come back to his wife, and live
with her as man with wife?

Ans. Yes ; because his wife, unjustly deprived of her rights,
can re-claim them. Then, if she does so, th;>y must be given back
to her. Marcellin, therefore, should return to lay life. But as he has
made a vow of chastity, he cannot ask for the conjugal duty, but only
rendir when requested. But, so as to pay to the priesthood the
respect which is due to it, he should request his wife, and never
try to persuade -her, to give up her rights and leave him alone.

Cases on Obstacles to Jttarrtage.

CASE I.
VALUE OF OBSTACLES.

Celine, a young girl, under peculiar circumstances, being invol
untarily in a state of drunkenness, was dishonored by Titius, being
unconscious of the fact. Several years after, Celine marries Caius,
Titius' brother. Later on, having learned of the event from Titius'
own mouth, she has doubts about the validity of her marriage. In
haste she runs to Parson Germain, and explains the circumstances.
But he tells her : "Have no fear, my daughter, there is no penalty
where there is no sin ; and besides, an unknown law does not bind
any one."

Ques. Quid.

Ans. Germain made a pcnndalous and very gross error; in fact,
it is not question of penalty, but of the law of the Church, which
annuls such a marriage ; therefore, Celine's marriage is not valid,
and cannot become so without a dispensation. Germain should be
sent back to the study of Moral Theology.

CASE XIII.

A WOMAN wno is SISTER, DAUGHTER AND WIFE OF HER
HUSBAND.

Ludimille, a widow of a noble familj', who had fallen in a shame
ful love with her own son, Jules, finds out that during the night
he goes to sleep with the servant. Then she imagines an abomin
able scheme. She finds a pretext to send her servant away, and
slips into the latter's bed. Jules, without the least suspicion,
arrives at the appointed time, and unknowingly commits with his
mother the most horrible incest. However, her son resides for

Cases on Obstacles to Marriage. 413

about fifteen years in far-off countries, engaged in business trans
actions. During his absence from homo, Ludimille secretly gives
biith to a girl, who at first she places under the care of a nurse,
and later on takes back with herself as an orphan child. Jules,
coming back home, falls in love with this young girl. He asks
his mother as to her rr.nk and birth-place. His mother replies that
she is a child of the lowest extraction, whom she has taken home
and brought up for charity's sake. Jules, feeling his passion
increasing, declares to his mother that he will many her.
The mother steadfastly refuses, because such an alliance would
bring dishonor upon the family, for the young girl has neither for
tune nor family. Jules, becoming obstinate, in spite of his mother,
marries the young girl. Consequently, the true and natural father
has married his own daughter, and the step-brother his own step
sister.

Ques. Can a dispensation be obtained from the Pope? Should
the spouses be admonished to separate from each other?

Ans. (The answer is of little interest. The interesting fact is
this little romance of clerical lubricity ; and in all this, there is not
a single word of indignation ; but the casuist recommends perfect
silence.)

CASE XIV.

SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP.

Silver, a married man, had adulterous relations with Lucie,
his servant, and the birth of a child was the result. Fearing scan
dal, he had it baptized secretly, and left it at the door of an orphan
asylum. His wife being dead, he marries Lucie.
Ques. What are we to think of this marriage?
Ans. It is void ; for Silvie, by baptizing the child he had with
Luc e, contracted with her spiritual relationship.

CASE XVI.

AFFINITY.

Albin, engaged to Blandine, had shameful intercourses with
Catherine, Blandine's cousin of the second and thiid degrees,

414 The Doctrine of tJie Jesuits.

mixed. In spite of that, he marries Blandine. The latter having
di ceased, be marries Agathe, second cousin of Catherine, and third
cousin of Blandine.

Ques. 1. What are we to think of this double marriage?

Ques. 2. Quid, if Albion had not fulfilled the first one?

Ans. to Question 1. The lirst marriage is valid, because illegiti
mate relations constitute an obstacle up to the second degree o:ily.

The second marriage is void for two reasons, if considered either
with reference to proper or improper relations : 1, as Agathe was
Blandine'a relative of the second degree ; 2, proper relations hin
der marriage up to the fourth degree.

Ans. to Question 2. This marriage would not be valid, for the
first reason. . . .

CASE XVIII.

HONESTY.

I. Kilian, calling on Rosalie, his betrothed, who had been
seduced by him, takes some liberties with Euphemia, his sister,
who presently becomes pregnant. However, Rosalie is taken sick
and dies. In order to hide his crime and avoid dishonor, Kilian
immediately marries Euphemia.

II. Daniel, engaged to Eulalie, has sinned with Anna, her sis
ter. Eulalie, learning that her sister is pregnant from Daniel,
gives up her rights, so that her betrothed might marry Anna, and
save the honor of the family.

Ques. 1. Is the marriage of Kilian with Euphemia valid?

Ques. 2. Quid, the marriage of Daniel with Anna?

Ans. to Question 1. The marriage of Kilian with Euphemia is
not valid, for two reasons: first, an obstacle caused by alliance;
next, an obslacle arising from public morality.

Ans. to Question 2. The marriage of Daniel with Anna is not
valid on account of the obstacle of public morality, in consequence
of the preceding promise to Eulalie.

CASK XX.
MURDER.
Martial, during his wife's sickness, commits ndulle-y with Flor-

Cases on Obstacles to Man-lay e. 415

ine through promising to many her, she not suspecting him to be
mumed. His wife being dead, and the promised marriage with
Fiorine fulfilled, Martial commits adultery again with Hoe via. See
ing the latter pregnant, he poisons his second wife to marry Alre-
via, and to keep his good reputation.

Ques. Are these two marriages valid?

Ans. Martial's marriage with Fiorine is valid, because, not
knowing that her husband is married already, she had not commit
ted adultery in principle, but only in practice. . . . His further
marriage with Moevia is valid also, as there existed no obstac e.
None has been caused by the adultery alcne, as he had not made
her a promise of marriage. Nor has there any obstacle arisen from
the murder alone, there being no mulu.il co-operation. Neither is
any obstacle caused by both of them, as Martial had not informed
his accomplice of his intention to marry her, and such previous
information must be considered as probably required to make her
his accomplice.

CASE XXI.
MURDER.

Leonilla, disgusted with her husband, a very old man. full of
disease, wished hundreds of times he would die. One day, 1« eked
in her chamber alone, she exclaimed : " Good God ! Jf, at la>t, I
should be delivered from this terrible plague, with what pleasure
I would replace this disgusting old man by marrying my young
servant !" The latter, hearing this, goes at once to the bedside of
the poor sick man, and causes his speedy death, by givitg him an
extra dose of strong drugs. Then, the mourning time over, he
marries Leonilla.

Ques. Is this marriage valid?

Ans. This marriage is valid ; because there has been neither
plot to put to death, nor mutual consent to kill, the unfortunate old
man. For, although Leonilla had uitered complaints heard hy her
servant, and had expressed the drsire-of marrying again, no mu
tual consent had been exchanged to cause the death of her hus
band ; and in fact t -e servant killed his master without the knowledge

416 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

of his mistress ; consequently, there is no obstacle caused by the
crime, and their marriage is valid.

CASE XXII.
CRIME.

Melany, a married woman, is induced to commit adultery with
Donat, he artfully promising her marriage. Her husband dies
soon after, and leaves her the inheritance of the whole of his prop
erty. Donut, in the hope of possessing the fortune, fulfills his
promise of marriage; but soon, quarrelling with his wife, he aban
dons her; and learning that marriage is often cancelled by a crime,
he asks the advice of his confessor, and inquires of him if he can
marry another wife.

Ques. Is there any obstacle to his second marriage?

Ans. No ; the second marriage is valid, because the promise to
the first wife was sincere, and such a promise does not bind.

CASE XXIII.
CRIME.

I. Evrald, a married man, not aware that Julia is married also,
induces her to commit a crime through promise of marriage as
soon as he is free from his present relation. Julia accepts. Soon
after both become free, and are united in marriage.

II. Leofrild, a bachelor, urges Tarsile a married woman, to
commit adulterj' with him, and promises to marry her when her
husband dies. Tarsile is seduced thereby ; but promises nothing,
and remains silent. Soon after her husband dies, and the
marriage takes place.

Ques. 1. Is there an obstacle through crime, in the first case?

Ques. 2. Qui'd, of the value of the marriage, in the second case 'f

Ans. to Question 1. An obstacle has been caused by crime, as
there was positive adultery, and an accepted promise of marriage.

Ans. to Question 2. The marriage is valid. . . . Tarsile did
not consent, though yielding her body. It must not be inferred,

Oases on Obstacles to Marriage. 417

from her silence, that she was accepting ; she was simply excited,
and led away through sensiril desire.

CASE XXIV.
CRIME.

Chrysante promised Flavio, who is married already, to marry
her after the death of her husband. Then, falling in love with
Rufine, he marries her. Nevertheless Chrysante commits adultery
with Flavie. Later on, it happens that Chrysante's wife dies, and
Flavie loses her husband. They take consolation in their mourn
ing, through the pleasure of preparing for a new marriage.

Ques. Is this marriage valid?

Ans. There is no obstacle to this marriage ; an adultery and a
promise of marriage did not happen in this case ; the promise
made by Chrysante to Flavie having been withdrawn before the
adultery, at least in effect, when he married Rufine, after having
made a promise to Flavie, and before the adultery was committed.
Consequently, there was no united adultery and promise of mar
riage : so the marriage is valid.

CASE XXVI.
FEAK.

Leonard, after having made a vow of chastity, dishonored
Veronique, under promise of marriage. Then he refuses to fulfill
his promise, pleading his vow. Alberic, brother of Veronique, a
student in theology, says that Leonard should make application
fora dispensation, Leonard being no more bound by his vow of
chastity. But the other two brothers of Veronique, not being
acquainted with theology, have recourse to another kind of argu
ment : the most terrible threats are made against Leonard if he does
not marry Veronique right off. What shall the unfortunate young
man do? He marries Veroniqne, so as to avoid greater misfortune.

Ques. 1. Was Leonard, in spite of his vow, compelled to marry
Veronique?

Ques. 2. Is the marriage valid? and what should be done?

Ans. to Question 1. No, for two reasons : 1, The promise of
marriage made after his vow was of no value ; and consequently

418 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

was not bin 'ing upon him. 2, Leonard could not promise to a
human being, what he had already promised to God by vow.

Ans. to Question 2. This marriage seems worthless. If Leonard,
constrained by threats, gave only an insincere consent while simu
lating the celebration of marriage, it is clear that it is worthless ;
for, in the absence of consent, a contract does not exist. If
Leonard had given a true consent, the marriage is likewise worth
less as being contracted under the excitement of a violent fear ;
for the threats made by Veronique's brothers, to urge Leonard to
marry, form a grave and unjust proceeding, at least as means of
reparation. It would be a different case if the young girl's brothers
had threatened Leonard, not in view of marriage, but to revenge
their honor ; and if Leonard had seriously consented to the mar
riage to appease them. Then, the fear would not be unjust, not
having for its aim the compelling him to marry.

CASE XXXIII.
MARRIAGE OF HERETICS.

Tarsille, a heretical woman, married to Drusille, also a heretic, in
a place where the law of the Council of Trent is in force, is struck
by divine grace and embraces the true faith, in spite of her hus
band, who remains in his error. Anxious, she calls on Bernard,
her confessor, and asks him what she should do. The priest
answers : " Thou shouldst desert thy husband for the sake of thy
salvation, and because thy marriage is cancelled. Thou canst also
many another man."

Ques. Can Tarsile continue to live in marriage relationship
with Drusille?

Ans. In principle, the confessor's answer is to be admitted. . .

CASE XXXIV.
ATTENDANCE OF THE PRIEST.

I. Sabin had promised Sabine to marry her, in spite of his
parents. The priest, called by them to celebrate iheir marriage,
and at the same time requested by Sabin's father not to assist

Cases OR Obstacles to Marriage. 419

them, declines to comply witli their request as long as the father
is opposed to their marriage. But during the celebration of the
mass, while the priest turns towards the people, the betrothed step
to the altar, with two witnesses, and declare that they take each
other f-jr man and wife. Then they retire, and thereafter live
together.

II. Getule, having made a promise to Clara, abandons her, to
nrirry Blandine. Learning this, Parson Abundius refuses to help
them. .Wnat shall Getule and Blandine do? They ask an inti
mate friend to invite the parson to dinner, with two other friemls,
who will stand as witnesses. During the repast, Getule and
Blandine present themselves, and declare before all, in a loud and
clear voice, that they take each other as man and wife on the spot.
The parson, astounded, exclaims that he was not thinking to attend
a marriage ceremony, and that a marriage is not celebrated during
the progress of a dinner. On his refusal, the betrothed retire,
and commence living together.

Ques. Are such marriages valid?

Ans. The marriage is valid, in the first case. For it was suffi
cient that the priest had been notified that the betrothed wished
to contract marriage in his presence, and had knowledge that their
consent was reciprocate.

In the second case, the marriage is valid also ; because it is
evident, under the circumstances, that the priest was a witness,
and in fact has witnessed, knowing and having seen the marriage.

CASE XXXVI.

ATTENDANCE OF THE PRIEST.

Bertold, a wealthy man and a bachelor, is in the habit every
year of speeding the month of September in a distant province.
Improving an opportunity, although a septuagenarian, he Decided
to marry Flavienne, in spite of his relatives, who coveU-d his
inheritance. He desired the marringe to take place in his country
mansion, while residing there, so as to celebrate it with splendor.
The parish priest is called ; he blesses the marriage, and takes

420 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

pait in the joyful feast. Later on, Bertold dies childless, leaving
by will all his property to his wife. But his legitimate heirs pre
tend that Flavienne was not Bertold's legitimate wife, because the
priest had given an unlawful assistance to the marriage, and that,
consequently, it was worthless.

Ques. Is the marriage valid?

Ans. This marriage is not lawful ; because one month's resi
dence is required for contracting legal marriage in French provinces.

Cases on ^Dispensation for JHamage.

CASE II.
EXPOSITION OF THE CASE.

Nicetas has committed the crime of incest with two sisters,
Rutine and Lawrence, his third and fourth cousins. Later on,
wishing to marry Rufine, lie requests of the Pope the necessary dis
pensation, naming only the fourth degree condition, but not men
tioning either his third cousin, or his criminal relations with his
betrothed and her sister. In another request, he mentions only
the obstacle resulting from alliance. Once married, he tells the
whole story to his confessor, who does not know what to think
touching the validity of the marriage.

Ques. Is this man-in ge void on account of the omission in the
request of the circumstances relative to the improper connection
between the betrothed?

Ans. Yes ; . . . Nicetas, therefore, must make a new applica
tion for a dispensation, and, while awaiting the answer, must ab
stain entirely from giving or asking for the conjugal duty.

CASE II.
EXPOSITION OF THE CASE.

Gilbert has sinned with Delphin, his third cousin ; both had the
intention to do so for the purpose of obtaining more easily the
required dispensation from the Pope. He asks for the dispensa
tion by reason of relationship, confessing the sexual intercourse,
but omitting the true motive which had prompted it. After his
marriage, Gilbert, exercised by scruples of conscience, confesses
that motive. His confessor does not know if a new dispensation
is necessary to perfect the marriage.

Ques. What is the value of this dispensation?

Ans. It is without any value, and the mani.Mge is void. . . .

422 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

If only one of the betrothed has had, when committing the sex
ual act, the hope of obtaining the dispensation more easily through
this very fact, there would be controversy about the validity of the
marriage.

CASE IV.
SURREPTITIOUS DISPENSATION.

Fabius and Agnes, second and third cousins, send a request to
Rome for a dispensation to get married. They affirm in the request,
l hut they never had between themselves any sexual intercourse.
The dispensation is granted and forwarded to the parson, who
jeceives instructions to dispense them if their request is bused on
the truth. The priest has a talk with the betrothed, and questions
them, to ascertain if they have positively had no criminal inter-
Ci urse together. They both answer in the negative with reference
to the time before their application, but they acknowledge their
guilt since sending the said request. The priest is very undecided
as to whether the dispensation is valid. Besides, seeing all the
preparations for the expected marriage, and the relatives already
arrived and waiting, he feels in the gieatest trouble.

Ques. Is a new dispensation required?

Ans. It is necessary, if the relations took place before the
is-sue or execution of the dispensation. ... It would be a differ
ent case if the act had taken place after; because, once the dis
pensation is granted, there is no more incest to fear.

CASE V.
SURREPTITIOUS DISPENSATION.

Quirinus and Germaine, not aware that they are fourth cousins,
have committed the shameful sin. Subsequently, learning of their
relationship, they still renew the incest several times. After their
betrothal and the publication of the bans, this obstacle prevents
their marrying, and they petition for a dispensation from the Holy
See. Bat they mention only having h- d improper connection not
kaowing their relationship, and keep bi.uit as to the further

Cases on Dispensation for Marriage. 423

sins committed after they knew of their alliance; they conse
quently are lijd to doubt the validity of their marriage.

Ques. What is the value of this dispensation?

Ans. It is of no value.

CASE VI.
SURREPTITIOUS DISPENSATION.

Longin and Pelagic, thiid cousins, became engaged, with the
invention of asking for the required dispensation. The party
appointed by them to draw up the petition mentions in it that the
betrothed have had connections together, . . . which was not
tiue. The priest considers the dispensation as obreptitious and
void, and postpones the marriage to a later date. But it happens
that the betrothed fall into crime, and a child is the result. Then
they ask again for a dispensation, so as legitimatize their child. But
the child dies just on the receipt of the document, and the mar
riage celebration.

Ques. What was the value of those two dispensations?

Ans. Both were valid.

CASE VII.
DISPENSATION FOR GUILTY RELATIONS, WITH RELAPSE.

I. Reculfe, wishing to marry Marline, asks, for a dispensation,
because he lias sinned carnally several times with his betrothed's
second cousin. But, before the receipt of the document, Reculfe,
under the impulse of human frailty, falls again into the same act
with the same person. The confessor is in doubt whether he should
give the d spensation its true value.

II. Marius and Anne, cousins, request the Holy See for a dis
pensation to marry, confessing that they have committed incest
together. But after having obtained the dispensation they fall
again ; thus they committed the act before and after its receipt.
Hearing the facts, the priest does not know whether a new dispen
sation is necessary. However, presuming it. validity, he blesses
t.ieir marriage.

424 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ques. 1. Is the dispensation valid in the first case, notwith
standing the repeated sexual relations?

Ques. 2. Would it be valid if Reculfe had sinned after the issue
of the dispensation ?

Ques. 3. Has Marius and Anne's dispensation been valid,
although the}T have committed incest again and again, before and
after the issue of that dispensation?

Ans. to Question 1. The dispensation is valid, in spite of the
repeated sexual acts. The reason is, that Recu'fe, by renewing
the crime with the same relative, has not made a second obstacle
to his marriage. . . .

Ans. to Question 2. Yes, also. . . .

Ans. to Question 3. Yes. . . .

CASE X.

THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE RESTORED.

Ranulfe and Tarsile contracted a clandestine marriage ; in other
words, a civil marriage only; and remained for many years in that re
grettable state. At last, while attending spiritual exercises in her
parish church, Tarsile, deeply impressed by a sermon on God's
judgment, comes to a better mind, and earnestly desires to receive
the matrimonial blessing. But Renulfe, though urged by his wife,
declines to go to church, where he has not been for twenty years.
The priest, with two missionaries, calls on the man, to advise him
to change his mind, but in vain. u Leave me alone," said he, "• I
am sufficiently married ! I live happy and satisfied with my wife,
and do not wish for anything else." Having received this unsatis
factory answer, the priest and his company leave the house.

Ques. What are we to think of the prie&t's behavior? and what
was his duty?

Ans. He should have advised Ranulfe to renew his consent in
his presence, and in that of his two missionary friends, as wit
nesses of his declaration; which might have been easily obtained,
considering his words, '"I-live happy and satisfied with my wife."
Why did they did not think of it? They showed a lack of wisdom.
But, if Ranulfe had refused to renew his consent? He then should
have been induced to do so in some other way, either by proxy, or
to make request for a dispensation.

Casrs on Direction of fHamefc persons.

[The following is too suggestive to translate. — PUBLISHERS.]

CAS I.

OBLIGATION DE RKMPLIR SES DEVOIRS.

I. Ursule, femme marine, craignant les douleurs cle 1'enfaute-
ment et les ennuis de 1'allaitoment, se decide a refuser a son mari
d'accomplir le devoir conjugal. Nevoulant pas changer de resolu
tion, elle ne peut obtenir 1 'absolution de son coufesseur.

II. Germaine, mere de famille, refuse (jgalment, parce qu'elle a
deja une famille trop nombreuse, et qu'elle est fort pauvre. 11
vaut mieux, dit-elle, ne pas mettre au monde des enfants que de
les vouer a la misere.

III. Agnes refuse aussi, parce qu'elle sait, et par sa propre
experience, et par une consultation des rnedecins, qu'elle ne peut
enfanter sans s'exposer a un danger de mort.

IV. Victoire est fort affligee parce que tous ses enfants sont
morts : elle ne veut plus en mettre au monde, et refuse a son mari
le devoir conjugal.

V. Teele a la conscience fort tourmente'e parce que son mari
s'acquitte souvent du devoir conjugal d'une rnani^re veuiellement
coupable, par t-xemple, en se placunt dans une position coutraire
a la nature.

D. Que faut-il penser dans ces diffeVents cas?

1° Ursule n'est pas exernple de peche', et de peche' grave ; son
confesseur a bien fait de lui refuser 1'absolution. Car uneepouse
ne peut etre excus6e de rendre le devoir a cause des incommodites
ordinaires de Taccouchcment ou de 1'allaitement, ni par des dou
leurs me"diocres, on meme fortes, mais non continues, par exemple
des maux de te:e pendant plusieurs mois apies les couches, ni a-
cause de Faffaiblissemeiit de sa sante, parce que tout cela fait
partie des c'laiges du maringo. Et la ftinme, par la puissance du

426 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

contrat, en livrant son corps dans le but de la ere Deration, a e*!e*
cens^e s'obliger a supporter toutes les iucoinniodites qui accom-
pasncnt ou suivent la ge"ne"ration.

2° Germaine ne peut etre dispensee du devoir conjugal que par
le consentement de son inari. La raison en est que la procreation
des enfants est le but principal du inaringe, et qu'il comprcnd tons
les inconve'nients qui ne sont pas extraordinaires. Autrement, la
femme pourrait trop fadlement et trop souvent decliner le devoir,
au grand ennui du mari, et au risque pour lui (^incontinence.
Germaine devait penser a ces inconve'nients avant de se marier ;
maintenant elle doit les supporter. Qu'elle se confie a la Prov
idence.

3° II faut pardonner a Agnes. Une femrae reduite a de telles
extiemil^s, n'est pas tenue de rendre le devoir, car son accom-
plissemcnt ne peut pas eLre exige en face d'un grave dommage ;
car la femme qui se marie n'est pas censee s'obliger a des charges
tout a fait extraordinaires, et a risquer sa vie pour obe*ir a sou
mari. Mais le plus souvent, il ne faut pas tenir compte des
douleurs du premier accouchement, qui sont habituellement tres
fortes.

4° II ne faut pas inqui6ter Victoire en principe, si ce malheur
re*sulte de quelque vice de c mstitution qui rende 1'accouchcment
difficile, compromette la vie du foetus avant qu'il vienne au
monde. . . . Mais il faut faire exception, si le refus du devoir
doit entrainer des querelles entre les e*poux.

5° Que re"pondre a Tecle? En principe elle doit etre dispensde
de son devoir, parce que 1'acte conjugal pratique de la sorte est
illegitime. Or, un rnari ne peut exiger im acte ille'gitime. Cepen-
dant on peut permettre a Tepouse d'accomplir sen devoir de la
sorte, par quelque motif raisonnable, par exernple, si le refus en-
traine des de'sagie'ments notables ; parexemple, outrage de la part
du mari (Saint Liguori).

CAS IT.
OBSTACLE AU DEVOIR CONJUGAL.

I. Le"onie, jeune fitle de vingt ans, a pronom-e* un voeu perp^t-
uei de chastet6. Plu ieurs auhees apie.-, [)oussee par ses parents,

Cases on Direction of Married Persons. 427

elle accepte de tout cceur un mariage favorable qui se presente.
Mais clle songe a son voeu, et n'ose en parlcr & personne. Nouob-
stant, clle se marie ; mais alors commence son embarras. Elle se
decide a cliercher un moyen de se delier de son engagement ; mais
en attendant, elle est forcee d'accomplir son devoir conjugal, et
meme, pour plaire a son mari, elle le reclame quelquefois. Enfiri,
tourmenlee par sa conscience, elle va trouver son confesseur et
avoue tout.

II. Rosalie, maride de bonne foi, a bienlot des doutes au sujet
de quelque empechement venant d'une alliance. Elle continue
cepeudant a habiter avec son mari, ju-qu'a ce qu'elle soit a.ssuree
de la nullile de son mariage. Loi>qu'elle en a la certitude, elle
demande ^ son confesseur ce qu'elle doit faire : " Lui refuser tout
commerce, repond celui ci, jusqu'a ce que vous ayez obtenu une
dispense." Mais ce conseil a un resullat deplorable. Rosalie est
amenee a accorder le devoir conjugal a son mari furieux ; elle est
menaeee de violences terribles, meme de mort, et, pour sortir d'un
tel embarras, elle obeit a son mari.

D. lre. Que doit faire le confesseur dans le premier cas? Doif-
il permettre a Leonie de demander et de remplir le devoir conjugal,
sur les instances de sou mari, jusqu'a ce qu'elle soit dispensed de

son vosu? .

D. 2e. Rosalie doit-elle remplir le devoir conjugal pour evit<
un mauvais traitement ou meme un danger de mort?

D. 3e. Peut-elle du moiiis avoir une attitude passive?

R. a la lre D. 1° Leonie ne peut demander ni remplir le devoir
conjugal pendant les deux premiers mois, depuis la celebration du

conjugal, afin de voir s'ils voudraient embrasser 1'etat religieux.
2° L^onie peut remplir son devoir apies cet espace de temps, pour
satisfaire aux droits de son 6poux ; mais elle ne peut le demander
jusqua ce qu'elle soit dispensee de son van, parce qu'elle le viole-
rait. 3° Mais elle doit s'abstenir si 1'autre y consent, ou a perdu
le droit de 1'exiger, par exemple a la suite d'un adultere ou d'un
inceste.

428 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

II. a la 2e D. Non, absolument ; parce que la nullite* du
mariagc etant rcconnue, 1'acle conjugal serait line fornication, ce
qui cst un mal intrinseque, et ce qui n'est jamais perrnis, meine
pour evitcr la raort. Et peu iinporte que le mari ignore 1'empeehe-
ment de bonne foi et pense etre dans son droit, parce que le
manage etant nul, il n'a aucun drcit, bien qu'il croie en avoir.

11. a la 3e D. II y a controverse. Ce qui revient a examiner
si une femme accablee par la violence doit plut6t se laisser tuer
que violer. 31 y a deux opinions probables : La premiere re" pond
non, parce que la femme, en restant passive coopere a; uu acte
inauvais, iutrinsequement. La deuxieme re"pond oui, parce que la
femme restant passive, n'agit pas, mais seulement pour un motif
tres grave, par crainte de la mort, ne fait aucune resistance
exterieure et refuse tout consentement interieur ; en laissaut faire
elle ne coopere pas en principe, mais seulement en fait, et se
trouve suffisamment excuse"e par la crainte de la mort. Mais on
doit supposer toujours qu'elle ne court aucun danger de consentir
au plaisir charnel.

Objections. — Si la femme peut rester passive d'apres cette opin
ion probable, elle peut simplement accomplir le devoir conjugal,
puisque pour la femme c'est rester dans une situation passive.

Je nie la consequence et la similitude, parce que comme on dit
commune'ment, accomplir son devoir n'est pas du tout la meme
chose que rester passif , car en accomplissant son devoir on coopere
a 1'acte, puisqu'on donne son conseutement a 1'acte du mari et
qu'on soumet f ranchement son corps a sa volonte" ; tandis qn'une
femme restant passive, d'apies ce qu'on a dit: 1° Ne donne pas
son consentement a 1'acte du mari ; 2° refuse toujours de con
sentir au plaisir; 3" ne cede qu'a la force, et, seulement a cause

d'une crainte tres grave, ne fait aucune resistance exlerieure.

•

CAS III.
OBSTACLE AU DEVOIR CONJUGAL.

Basilisse, femme pieuse, s'e"tant mariee, resolut de rester
chaste, autant que possible, sans porter atteinte aux droits de son
mari. Elle pronome un voeu a ce sujet. Mais ensuite, elle se

Cases on Direction of Married Persons. 429

demande comment clle pent, et si elle doit, y rester fiddle ; peut-
elle se moutrer caressante envers son mari et lui fournir ainsi
lf occasion de reclamer le devoir conjugal? Mais elle est si attached
a sou voeii qti'elle ne vent le retracteren aucune facon. Hiparque,
son mari, prenant le chemin contraire, se souille en secret pur
1'adultere et meme par 1'inceste, avec la cousine de sa femme
Basilisse.

D. lre. Comment peut-on perdre le droit de reclamer le devoir
conjugal ?

D. 2e. Un epoux peut-il se Her par le voeu de ne point reclamer
ce devoir?

D. 4e. Que penser de ces cas?

R. a la lre D. On perd le droit de reclamer ce devoir :

1" Par 1'adultere. Un epoux innocent n'est pas tenu d'accom-
plir le devoir conjugal envers son conjoint, coupahle d'adultere.

2° Par une alliance survenant pendant le manage, c'est-a-dire
quand Tun des 4poux a commis un inceste avec un parent de
1'autre, au premier ou au second degie.

3" Par le voeu de chastet^ e" mis soit avant, soit apres le manage.

R. a la 2e D. II faut distinguer. L'un et 1'autre epoux ue
petivent se'pare'ment e*mettre le voeu de ne point re'clamer le devoir
conjugal, simplement, sans restriction, parce que ce voeu pourrait
eire un jour genant pour 1'autre, et porter atteiute & ses droits.
Ainsi le mari qui a I'liabitude de reclamer ce devoir comme c'est
1'habitude des maris, ne peut e"mettre le voeu de nepas le reclamer,
parce qu'il creerait un ennui notable a son £pou-e. L'epouse peut
emettre beaucoup plus facilement ce voeu, parce qu'elle n'a pas
coutume de le reclamer, ou en ne le reclamant pas ne ciee pas
d'ennui a son mari. La icponse depend done des circonstances
seules oi\ se trouvent les gens.*

R. & la 3e D. Le voeu de Basilisse est valable, parce qu'il n'est
pas genant pour son mari et ne porte pas atteinte a ses droits.
Elle ne peut done pas re'clamer le devoir conjugal, mais elle doit
le rendre jusqu'a ce que son mari perde son droit. D'ailleurs, elle

*I1 existe dans plusieurs villes de France des societes de femines qui
font de semblables voenx; les homines y t-ont admis du couseutenient de
leurs epouses et prenueiu le meme engagement.

430 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

peut se coniluire envers son raari comme d'autres femmos honnetos
qui donncnt il lours maris les marques d'affection convenables, ot
se montrent carossantes ponr rechauffe r lour affection. Mais
lorsque le mari a perdu son droit par 1'adultere ou par Tincosto,
elle ne peut plus rendre le devoir conjugal ; car elle a fait vceu de
garder sa chastete aussi bien qu'elle le pourrait, sans porter
atteinte auxdroitsde son mari, et en refusant ce devoir elle ne
viole aucun droit, puisque le mari n'en a plus. Done. . . .

CAS IV.
OBSTACLE AU DEVOIR CONJUGAL.

I. Narcisse, mari d'Agathe, a commis un triple inceste : 1° avec
la seen r d'Agathe, Blandine, un jour q Yil e'tait ivre ; 2° avec la
fille de Blandiue, qu'il prenait pour une autre, la nuit ; 3° avec
Sylvie, sa cousine au second degre. S'etant confess^ de ces fautes,
il apprend de son confesseur qu'il se trouve dans un triple empe-
chement pour reclamer le devoir conjugal.

II. Rosalie, femme de Rafin, sous I'impression d'une crainte
violente, peche avec Vi'lpin frere de son mari. Aussi son ron-
fesstur lui signifie un empechement de redamer le devoir conjugal,
ju-qu'a ce qu'il ait re£u une dispense levant cet empechement.

D. lre. L'ignorance des lois de TEglise on des personnes est-
elle un obstacle a la privation des droits de 1'epoux?
D. 2e. Quid, d'une crainte violente?
D. 3e. Que peuser des deux cas?

R. a la lre D. L'ignorance du fait excuse certainement, lorsqn'on
ignore quo la personue avec laquelle on peche est uue paionte,
parce que la privation du droit conjugal est une peine innigee a
I'inceste ; ou il n'y a pas d'inceste, il ne peut y avoir de peine.

L'opinion plus probable est qne 1'ignorance du droit excuse,
lorsqne le p4cheur ignore la loi de 1'Eglise elablissant cette peine ;
parce qne, qnand une poine est imposee par une loi humaine, celui
qui par ignorance la transgresse est exempte de la peine, comme
du pcche d'avoir transgresse la loi. Car il faut d'abord manqner
a la loi avant de manq-ier a la j)eine qu'elle impose. C'est 1'opin-
ion plus commune suivie par saint Liguori.

Cases on Direction of Married Persons. 431

R. a la 2e D. Oui, snivant 1'opinion plus probable, bien qne la
crainte n'excuse pas du peche. C'est qu'une crainte violente ex-
empte de stiivre les lois luunaines, sans nous cxempter de suivre la
loi naturelte. Opinion plus commune suivie par saint Liguori,
contrairement a d'autres.

R. a la 3e D. Quant a Narcisse, il n'a pas perdu son droit, con
jugal dans le premier cas, n'ayaut pas peche en principe, comme
etarit prive" de raison ; il ne 1'a pas perdu dans le second cas, car il
n'a com mi 8 1'inceste qu'en fait et non en principe, ignorant que sa
complice etait cousine de son epouse ; ni dans le troisieme cas,
parce qu'il n'a pu former une alliance incestueuse en pechant avec
sa propre cousine, ce qtii n'existeque par le commerce d'un homrne
avec les cousines de son epouse et vice versa.

Quant a Rosalie, elle n'a pas pardu son droit conjugal si elle a
subi une violence absolue, comme il est evident, puUque, s'il n'y a
pas de pe"che, il n'y a pas de peine. Meme, d'upres 1'opinion plus
probable, elle n'est pas privee du droit d'exiger le devoir conjugal,
quoi-qu'ayant peche gravement puisque, par suite d'une crainte
violente, elle est censee exernptee de la peine ecclesiastiq-ie infligee
pour 1'inceste, comme on a dit plus hatit. Done le confesseur a eu
tort d'empecher Rosalie de demander le devoir conjugal, jnsqu'a ce
qu'elle ait obtenu la dispense, car elle n'avait besoin d'aucune dis
pense.

CAS V.

INSTRUCTION POUR LES FIANCES ET LES EPOUX.

I. Domitille, jeune fille, va se confesser : " Mon pere, dit-elle,
je vais me marier. J'ignore completement les obligations du mar-
inge. J'ai entendu dire qu'on y trouvait de grands peVils pour
notre salut eternel, c'est-ii-dire de f lequentes occasions de peY-her.
Je veux cependant sauver mon ame Veuillez done, mon pere,
m'indiquer ce qui est defendu sous peine de peche mortel ou v6n-
iel."

II. Venefride, mariee depuis peu de jours ou pen de mo's, va
se confesser, fort embarrassee au sujet de ce qui est pmnis ou
defendu dans le mari;ige, et elle demande iustummeut a en etre
instruite.

432 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

D. lre. Qae r6pondre a Domitille? Couvient-il de 1'instruire
en detail?

D. 2e. Que faire avec Venefride?

II. a la lre D. Le confessenr doit proeeMer avec prudence et de
grandes precautions en instruisant Domitille d'une maniere g6ne-
rale, sans aborder en rien les details : il doit 6 viter de scandaliscr
sa pe"nitente, en lui expliquant en detail les devoirs des 6poux.
Voici ce qu'il peut dire : "• Le manage est saint l'Ap6tre 1'appclle
grand dans le Christ et dans 1'Eglise, et il faut vivre saintemcnt
dans cette liaison sacre"e. Tout n'est pas permis dans le manage,
ma is seulement ce qui a rapport a son but. En ge'ne'ral tu dois
obeir a ton man, a moins que tu ne comprennes clairement qu'il
te cornmande on te reclame quelque chose de mal. Alors viens
vite an tribunal de la penitence, et si tu te trouves embarrassed,
dis-le franchement a ton confesseur."

R. a la 2eD. II faut user de la merne prudence envers Venefride
re*cemment marine. En general, que le confesseur n'interroge pas,
mais reponde d'une maniere generale aux demandes de la peni-
tente, a savoir qu'il est permis aux e"poux de faire tout ce qui a
rapport a la procreation des enfauts, mais rien de ce qui s'oppose
a cette fin du manage ; qu'il faut tout faire honnetement, en sui-
vant 1'ordre indique par la nature. Qu'il ne descende pas aux d6-
tails, mais laisse la femme lui exposer ses ernbarras, si elle en a,
qui la tourmentent, et qu'il lui re"ponde en peu de mots.

CAS VI.

L'ONANISME.

Romaine a un mari impie qui veut non pas procre*er d'enfants,
mais satisfaire sa passion, et que accomplit toujours le crime
affreux d'Onan. Romaine le sait fort bien, et la pieuse femme en
est tout nffligee. Si elle avertit son mari de Pirre'gularite de son
acte conjugal, ou si elle lui refuse paice qu'il en abuse, elle est
accablee d'outrages et de coups. Craignant d'offenser Dieu, elle
ne sait que faire, elle est fort embarrassee. Elle va trouver son
confesseur pour lui demander conseil. Peut-elle rendre le devoir,
conjugal a son mari lorsqu'il lui demande, peut-elle le demauder

Cases on Direction of Married Persons. 433

sans commettre un crime? Le confesseur affirme que ces deux
choses sont criminelles, parce que le crime d'Onan est un mal
intrinseque, meme de la part de 1'epouse qui y coopere. Aussi
elle doit souffrir tons les maux, et meme la mort plut6t que de se
souiller par ce crime. Romaine revient toute triste et, dans sa
douleur, souhaite la mort.

D. Que faut-il faire et penser dans ce cas?

R. II ne faut pas inquieter Romaine, qui est forcee pour un
grave motif d'obeir a son mari, coupable d'Onanisme. Le con
fesseur a fait une erreur grave en la condamnant pour pe'cke' mor-
tei et cooperation intrins^quement criminelle. Beaucoup de the*o-
logiens 1'affirmaient autrefois ; mais les derniers, ayant mieux
examine la chose, affirment que la femme ne commet pas un crime
intrinseque en obeissant pour un grave motif a son mari Onaniste.
Ce confesseur doit done changer d'opinion et consoler aussit6t
Romaine, de peur qu'elle n'invoque la mort dans son affliction.

CAS VIII.
ONANISME.

Humbert, confesseur, examine les cas suivants :

1" II est persuade qu'il est difficile de croire les maris qui pro-
mettent de se corriger dans 1'usage du mariage, et il leur refuse
ge"ueralement 1'absolution, jusqu'a ce qu'il ait la preuve de leur
perseverance apres un long espace de temps.

2" II ne donne 1'absolution aux Spouses que lorsqu'elles opposent
une resistance exterieure et tres violente a leur mari coupable
d'Onanisme, et lorsqu'elles craignent les plus deplorables suites en
refusant le devoir conjugal.

3° II condamne l'e"pouse a un p^che mortel lorsqu'elle consent
avec un plaisir sensible a cet abus du mariage, bien qu'elle ait iior-
reur du pech6 de son mari et lui temoigne sa repugnance.

4° Jl blame vivement les epouses qui desirent interieurement ne
pas avoir d'enfants, tout en voulant remplir leur devoir conjugal
regulierement, et en ayant horreur du p4che.

D. lre. Pcut-on absoudre les maris Onanistes s'ils promettentde
se corriger?

434 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

D. 2e. Qnc faire a 1'egard de leurs Spouses qni ne voudraient
pas offenser Dieu, mais voudraient ne pas avoir d'enfants ?

D. 3e. Que penser de la doctrine et de la conduite d'Humbert
dans chaque cas?

R. a la leo D. II fant traiter les Onanistes recidivistes comme
les autres qui retorabent dans les autres pechcs. Les regies qu'on
a etablies pour les autres doivent leur etre appliquees. Aussi, s'ils
paraissent affliges de leurs peches et proraettent de se corriger, il
i'aut les absoudre.

R. a la 2° D. On trouve beaucoup d'epouses ainsi embarrassees ;
elles out horreur du peche mortel, ne voulant pas encourir la dam
nation eternelle, mais elles craignent de procreer des enfants. En
pratique on demande : 1" qu'elles ne cooperent au p£che du mari
par aucun acte positif, par aucune parole, par aucun signe, pas
merae par des plaintcs au sujet de leurs enfants trop nombreux
deja, etc. ; 2° qu'elles manifestent un deplaisir exte"rieur pour le
peche' de leur mari. A ces conditions, il ne faut pas les inquieter
au sujet de I'Onamsme, bien qu'elles eprouvent une repugnance, un.
eloignement notables pour faire des enfants ; car cette repugnance
est naturelle, a cause des douleursde 1'enfantement etde la crainte
de la mort qui peut re"sulter de 1'enfantement. Et il ne faut pas
blamer les femmes mariees de ce qu'elles ne de"sirent pas avoir
beaucoup d'enfants, puisque ce d£sir n'est pas criminel par lui-
merue, pourvu qu'elles ne cooperent pas au peche de leur mari et
ne s'y complaiseut pas. II faut meine faire cesser les scrupulcs
des Spouses timorees qui craignent de trouver un plaisir inte'rieur
dans la mauvaise action de leur mari, en desirant n'avoirs pas d'en
fants ; parce que, comme la plupart du temps elles ont horreur de
ce grave p£che, elles ne sont pas censees s'y complaire, et il faut
les absoudre sans difflculte.

R. a la 3e D. lcr cas. Humbert s'est montre trop ser6re pour
les maris qui promettent de se corriger ; s'ils trompent le confes-
seur, c'est leur affaire. Celui-ci doit avoir la conscience trnnquille,
en [)Hncipe, du moment qu'ils afRfment qu'ils sont affl:ges de leur
peche pass4 et promettent de se cornger a 1'avenir ; on n'a rii-n de
plus a leur demander. II ne faut pas admettre non plus la con
duite d'Humbert au sujet des preuves de perbeverance qu'il

Cases on Direction of Married Persons. 435

demande pour un long esp-^ce de temps, parce qu'une rochute ne
prouve pas du tout que 1'intention n'y 6tait pas, puisque meine
ceux qui montrent 1'mtentioa la plus ferme de ne plus pecher, y
retombent.

2e cas. Sa conduite est encore trop severe, car il n'est pas ne"c-
essaire que les epouses manifestent chaque fois leur deplaisir a
leur marl ; il suffit de le faire de temps en temps, afin que le mari
saclie bien que sa maniere de faire deplait a son Spouse. Et il
n'est pas ne*cessaire que 1'epouse craigne des suites d6plorables, en
ref usant le devoir conjugal ; mais il suffit qu'elle craigne un grave
inconvenient quelconque, par exemple, si son mari cessait de lui
temoigner des marques d'affection en se montrant fort offense" ; car
alors leurs relations deviendraient d^sagreables et il en resulterait
de grands inconv6nients pour 1'epouse. »*•

3e cas. Humbert se trompe evidemtment. Car 1'epouse pent
ton jours, dans Tacte conjugal, admettre un plaisir sensible, tout en
prevoyant que son mari commettra le peche d'Onan ; car cet acte
est en lu-meme honnete et permis a la femme, et il suffit qu'elle ne
donne pas son consentement au podie" de son mari.

4e cas. Nouvelle erreur du confesseur, hlamant les Spouses qui
souhaitent interieurement n'avoir pas d'enfants ; car il suffit, cornme
il a etc" dit plus haut, qu'elles ne cooperent par aucun acte positif
a Tabus de leurs maris et ne consentent pas a leur peclie. Cepeu-
dant, que ces femmes prennent garde de ne pas avoir trop long-
temps ce desir, d'ailleurs permis. Car cette consideration facheuse
trouble parfois leur esprit, et devient pcrilleuse pour quelques-
unes.

Ereatfee on Censures.

CHAPTER I.
OF CENSURES IN GENERAL.

ART. I. Nature, Division, and Conditions of Censures.
I. Of the Nature of Censure.

932. — Censure is a spiritual punishment with the intention
of correcting a baptized man, offending and contumacious, by
which he is deprived of the use of certain spiritual advantages.

i ART. II. The originator or promulgator of the censure.

935. — Excommunication against noxious animals, for instance,
grasshoppers, is not excommunication properly so called, but an
adjuration, in view of their destruction, in order to prevent them
from bein<>; hurtful.

ART. III. The one who undergoes the censure.

ART. IV. Removal of the censure.

. .. ... . . , -. i.' r. .

!
CHAPTER II.

DIFFERENT SPECIES OF CENSURES.
ART. I. Excommunication.
956. — There is the major excommunication, which deprives of

Treatise on Censures. 437

all the blessings of the Church ; and the minor excommunication,
which deprives of certain blessings only.

Among the persons subjected to the major excommunication,
some are called tolerated, and the faithful are not obliged to avoid
these ; others are called non-tolerated, or to be avoided, and the
faithful must avoid them.*

959. — . . . There are eight effects from excommunication :
1, Deprivation of the sacraments ; 2, deprivation of divine ser
vices; 3, deprivation of the suffrages of the Church; 4, depriva
tion of ecclesiastical burial; 5, deprivation of ecclesiastical juris
diction ; 6, deprivation of benefices ; 7, deprivation of communi
cation with justice ; 8, deprivation of civil society.

960. — Unless he is excused by an invincible ignorance, or a
grave fear, .... an excommunicated person, who is to be
avoided, or simply tolerated, sins gravely by receiving the sacra
ments, because he is violating a grave law of the Church.

DEPRIVATION OF ECCLESIASTICAL BURIAL.

965. — Ecclesiastical sepulture is that which takes place in a
sacred and blessed place, set apart for the burial of the faithful.

An excommunicated person, who is to be avoided, cannot be
buried in a sacred place ; if he has been put there, his dead dody
should be exhumed, if it is yet possible to do it, and the blessed
place, polluted by such contact, purified. . . .

DEPRIVATION OF COMMUNICATION WITH JUSTICE.

9G8. — This is that which has connection with things concerning
civil or ecclesiastical justice.

The excommunicated person, who should be avoided, is de
prived of his right to acts relating to civil justice. He cannot be
judge, lawyer, witness, notary, etc. ; neither tutor, curator nor
executor. But to-day this disposition of rights is no longer in
force in many places.

* We do not judge as homicides those who, burning with zeal for their
mother, the Catholic Church, against the excommunicated, slaughter s<
of them. (Decretals, Part 2, Caus. 23, Ques. 5, Cap. 47.)

438 Ike Doctrine of the Jesuits.

With more reason, he is deprived of all communication with
ecclesiastical justice. However, he can appeal to the supreme
court, and prosecute his appeal. The excommunicated person
who is tolerated, is not deprived of communication with justice,
but may use it in a valid manner ; however, his adversaries can
reject him juridicially, by pleading the exception.

DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

969. — Those civil acts in which one cannot have any relations
with an excommunicated person, who ought to be avoided, are
contained in a Latin verse :

Os, orare, vale, comraunis, mensa negatur.

To such are refused : 1, the mouth ; in other words, conversa
tion, letters, marks of kindness. 2, prayers; in other words, all
communication in divine things; for instance, mass, services. 3,
salutations; even quite private. 4, intercourses ; or all partner
ship in trade, habitation, contracts, etc. 5, table ; or reciprocal
invitations to be a guest at a dinner.

The excommunicated are . . .

995. — Those who do violence, under the devil's direction, to
ecclesiastics, or religious of both sexes.

996. — Ques. What do we mean by doing violence?

Ans. It is to strike, in a violent manner, either with feet, hands,
stick or sword, etc., an ecclesiastic or a religious, or injuring him
in such a manner as wounds his person outwardly.

Those are excommunicated who fight a duel, who provoke or
accept it, or are even accomplices ; likewise, all those who assist
and are interested in it, who permit it, or even do not prevent it
as much as possible, whatever their dignity, even though royal or
imperial.

998. — Ques. Is a duel a reason of excommunication, which,
through agreement, ceases when one of the fighters is wounded ?
Ans. Yes ; by the Bull of Clement VIII., illius vices. . . .

Treatise on Censures. 439

Those are excommunicated who are members of the order of
Free Masonry, Carbonari, and other like societies, which plot
openly or secretly against the church or the lejitimate power ;
also those who are members of other societies favoring them.

Those are excommunicated who command the rash violation, or
who themselves violate the immunity of the ecclesiastical asylum.

1002. — Ques. What ought be understood by this immunity?
and is it obligatory everywhere?

Aus. It consists in this, that certain offenders, protected by
canon rights, cannot be expelled violently, in a lawful manner, from
a sacred place, especially from churches.

It is beyond doubt that this immunity has not been abolished
by the Church ; which, on the contrary, maintains it yet by penal-
lies inflicted on transgressors ; and it cannot be abolished legit
imately by the civil power, inasmuch as this immunity of the church
and of ecclesiastics was established and regulated by God, and is
sanctioned by Church canons.

Those are excommunicated who violate the monastical claustra-
tion.

1004. . . . Ques. Who have the right to enter a monastery?

Ans. The Bishops, in a circumstance outweighing power, pas
toral visitation accompanied by several serious persons; 2, regular
prelates, once a year, in order to visit them ; 3, the ordinary con
fessor, to administer the sacraments, but clothed in surplice and
stole; 4, the ordinary physician, who should have his permission
renewed every quarter ; 5, workingmen and other indispensable
people who cannot do their work outside the monastery.

Those making a traffic of indulgences, or other divine bless
ings, are under the ban of excommunication by the Constitution of
St. Pius V., Quam Plenum (2d of January, 1569.)

1008.— Ques. Ought all those making such a traffic to be ex
communicated?

440 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Ans. No. St. Pius V.'s Bull excommunicates only those infe
rior to bishops ; as for bishops, cardinals, etc., they are under the
penalty of suspension of right to enter the church and receive the
revenues, a penalty which is imposed on them by the Sovereign
Pontiff, and from which they cannot be absolved until they have
made satisfaction.

ART. II. Suspension.

1032. Suspension is a censure by which an ecclesiastic is de
prived, for a certain time, either partially or wholly, of the use of
the power conferred on him by Holy Orders, of his function, or of a
benefice.

APPENDIX OF DEPOSITION AND DEGRADATION.

ART. III. Interdict.

1051. — Interdict is the censure by which, as punishment for a
crime, the use of divine services, certain sacraments, and ecclesi
astical burial is forbidden to certain persons and in certain places.

APPENDIX I. Interdiction of divine things.

1057. — It is prohibiting an ecclesiastic from celebrating divine
services, administering sacraments, or giving ecclesiastical burial in
certain places.

APPENDIX II. On ecclesiastical sepulture.

1058. — The bodies of the faithful deceased, ought, according to
the precept of the church, to be buried in a holy place, blessed and
consecrated, or even in the church. Those who are not members
of the church cannot be buried, either in an ecclesiastical manner
or in a holy place. Ecclesiastical sepulture must be refused even

Treatise on Censures. 441

to the faithful who have appeared unworthy of it, either because of
having forsaken the faith, or having died in a state of contumacy
or impenitence ; likewise if they have been rebellious children.

1052.— When one blesses a cemetery, the farthest part should
be left unblessed, to serve for the sepulture of children who die
un baptized, for unbelievers who die in a Christian country, and for
all those to whom ecclesiastical burial must be refused. It is not
absolutely required that this part be separated from the cemetery
by a wall, bush, ditch, etc., but it is sufficient that the place should
be set off some way or another.

SCreatfee on Irregularities,

CHAPTER I.
IRREGULARITIES ix GENERAL.

1063. — Irregularity, in its strict meaning, is a canonical imped
iment, specifying that a person can neither become an ecclesiastic,
reach a superior grade, nor exercise the sacred functions conferred
on him. . . .

CHAPTER II.

IRREGULARITIES IN PARTICULAR.

ART. I. Irregularities through defects.

There are eight of them : 1, of soul ; 2, of body ; 3, of birth;
4, of age; 5, of freedom ; 6, of sacrament; 7, of kindness ; 8, of
reputation. . . .

THROUGH DEFECT OF BODY.

1071. — This irregularity has two causes: 1, un fitness for the
service of Orders ; 2, some unbecoming and notable deformity.
Those considered irregularities are :

1. Mntilated persons, who have no use of their hand, thumb or
index finger ;

2. Blind persons, or shortsighted, not being able to read eas
ily the Missal ;

3. Deaf persons, who cannot hear the clerk's voice ;

4. Dumb persons, or stutterers, who cannot distinctly pronounce,
at least without great difficulty; provoking laughter, or scorn from
attendants ;

5. Lame persons, who cannot stand up without a cane ;

6. Those who are noseless, twisted, flattened or lengthened in
an exaggerated manner;

7. The deformed ; for instance, those who are hunchbacked.
1072. — Ques. Is a one-eyed man irregular?

Treatise on Irregularities. 443

Ans. No, if he is deprived only of his right eye, which is less
necessary for the celebration of the Mass ; providing that no de
formity results from it.

Yes, if he is deprived of his left eye, called the canonical eve ;
because this is necessary for the reading of the Canon of the
Mass. . . .

THROUGH DEFECT OF KINDNESS.

1076. — Irregularities by defect of kindness, are all those co-
perating, voluntarily, actively, and in an efficacious and near
manner, in the death or mutilation of some person ; although
according to justice, by an action having relation to it.

So are executioners irregulars ; also judges, and all participating
in judgments.

The following are excepted : 1, constrained witnesses ; 2, those
who bring accusation for reparation for a wrong or prejudice
suffered. . . .

THROUGH DEFECT OF REPUTATION.

1078. — ... Ques. Are innocent persons, condemned by false
witnesses to ignominious penalties, irregulars?

Ans. Yes ; because, by this fact, they are infamous.

Ques. Are executioners' sons irregulars?

Ans. No, in principle. But they must be sent to another dio
cese, for fear the Church should suffer dishonor from them.

ART. II. Irregularities through defect. . . .
Appendix : On Indulgences and Jubilee.

CHAPTER I.

INDULGENCES.

CHAPTER II.

JUBILEE.

Casts on Censures anti Irregularities,

These are of little interest. I will quote only two of them, for
very diverse reasons, which the reader will easily understand :

CASE VII.

CE NSURES.

RELIGIOUS CLAUSTRATION.

1. Justine, a nun, moved by thoughtlessness, places herself in
the turning box, which is inside the convent ; then she let herself
ride outside ; after this, without leaving the turning box, she went
back into the convent.

II. Damaris, a nun, standing on the threshold of the convent
door, which is open, puts one of her limbs outside the door.
Another time she exposed her head and bust outside the door.

Ques. Have Justine and Damans incurred excommunication?

Ans. 1, Justine has incurred censure; because she went out
side the limits of the convent, as she went into a place where laics
could pass by.

2. Damaris has not incurred censure, either in the first or the
second cases. She should therefore be exempted from the penal
ty of excommunication.

CASE I. — IRREGULARITIES.
IRREGULARITIES IN GENERAL.

Anatole, a child twelve years of age, in order to become the only
heir of his parents, chokes his brother, a little chiid, by putting his
own finger into his mouth. Later, having done penance for his
crime, he studies to become a priest. Already ordained, he reads
that homicide is a cause of irregularity. What will the unhappy
man do ? He does not know who to ask for advice, and what must

Cases on Censures and Irregularities. 445

be done? In expectation of being able to consult some theologian,
he continues saying mass.

Ques. 1. Can children under age incur irregularity through a
fault?

Ques. 2. 'Did Anatole sin by celebrating mass with a doubt
concerning his regularity?

Ans. to Question 1. There is controversy. Some affirm it,
with Sanchez ; because, by right, no one is excepted but children
under seven years of age ; many, with Castro Pa]ao excuse from
all faults all persons under age, except the one who strikes a
clerk, or violates religious clan str at ion.

Aus. to Question 2. Probably Anatole is not in the condition
of irregularity, because he committed the fault when under age. No
matter if it is a question of homicide. . . . Moreover, as has been
said, many think that persons under age are free from all penal
ties, excepting those incurred for having struck a clerk, or forced
an entrance into a monastery. . . .

J. G. SETTLER

OX THE

6th Precept of the Decalogue.

(Obligations of $pouses anD some ©iicsttons rclatibe to

Extracts from his " Universal Moral Theology, Enlarged by Notes and
New Questions."

ROUSSELOT,

(Professor of Theology at the great Seminary of Grenoble.)

FOR THE USE OF NEW CONFESSORS AND PUPILS.

NEW EDITION.
GRENOBLE, 1844.

SUR LE SIXIEME PRECEPTE DU DECALOGUE

Sur its ©bligations trts Epoux

ET SUR

QUELQUES QUESTIONS RELATIVES AU MARIAGE,

CHAPITRE PREMIER
SUR LE SIXIEME PRECEPTE DU DECALOGUE.

Question I.* Comment sont con9us le sixieme et le neuvieme
precepte du Decalogue, et ce qu'ils defendent. — II. Ce qu'est
la chastete.

Le sixieme prccopte dit: Tu re forniqnoras pas, le neuvieme :
Tu ne desireras pas la femine de ton procliahu . . •

'* II y a trois sortes de chasU te • coi jugnle, viduale, virginale.

4k La conjugate defend, en etat de mannge, les voluptes illicites
de hi chair, et ordonnc d'user inediocrcment des voluples licites..
La vfduale defend d'user apies hi dissolution du manage, tant des
licites que dc-s illicites. La virginale, chez les personnes qui n'ont.
janiMis eprouve les volupt6s churuelles, en enlruine rub^tinence
perpetuclle et g^nerale, taut des licites que des illicites."

La virginite" est une verm speciale, meilleure et plus excellente
que le manage."

Suit une substantielle dissertation snr les conditions dans les-
queiles se perd la virgiuite : sur la perte reparable, alors qu'elle n'a
eu lieu u que par le simple cousentement a 1'acte vendrieu, pourvu
que ce consentemont soit tel qu'il ne s'en soit pas suivi et n'ait pu
s'ensuivre de pollution, "et sur la perte irreparable upar pollution,

* J'ai consent tonte 1'apparenro ot, la disposition rin livre et reproduit
toutes les questions posCu.-*, al»rs iiiGine quo la rei)oii>e no ni'a pa^ puru
uitritcr do.ro hiy'iialce. '•

450 TJie Doctrine of the Jesuits.

et par tout acte libidincux volontaireraent sans pollution, commis
par celui qui cst, en vertu de son age, capable de semination."

Puis, cette remarque re"pugnante, qui prepare aux monstruosites
du livre: " Comme les pelites filles sont capables de semination
avant Tage de la puberte, et merae des l'age de six ans, elles pen-
vent plutot perdre irreparablement leur virginite qne 1 >s gallons"
(p. 9). Ceci entruiuera des interrogations speciale», des 1'age de
six ans !

ART. I. — DE LA LrxuRE EN GENERAL ET DES ESPECES DE

LUXURE CONSOMMEE.

Ques. I. Ce qn'est la Insure, et de ses especes.

" La luxure est un appetit deregle, ou nn usage immodere des
clioses veneriennes, c'est-a-dire des voluptes veneriennes.

" Elle est parfaite et consommee, qua? consi>tit in voluntaria
semiuis efLisione, on imparfaite, quae fit sine effusione seiuinis.
On la dit aussi naturelle, lorsque sonfconservees toutes les con
ditions qne demande la nature pour la generation de 1'homme, ou
innaturelle dans le cas contraire."

II. Combien 11 y a de sortes de delectation dans la luxure ou
voluple et delectation.

tl II y a trois soites de delectation: spirituelle, organique et
venerienne."

Le ]>rofessenr insi^te sur cctte derniere "qua? sentitnr circa
parte veneras, ( t orilur ex oonnnotione spirituum, sen huinorum
speimnticonnn generatiom inservientium." II la divisc de nouvcaii
en legere : k% levis est spiritnum. sen hmnoruni spermaticorutn gen-
crationi iuservientium commolio quaeilam levis tantiun, ac ex luin-
bis decisio, ad hue longe distans ab effusione seminis. . . .," et en
vebemente : u spirituum spermnticorLim comrnotio fortis et notabi-
lis, qnae in homine sano pn ximum seminis effundendi periculum
continet* . . ."

*Sanchez sera tonjoura en cos matieres un maitre qu'on pent imiter,
mais non surpasser. Rousselot paratt fade A, cote de cette phrase ardent e
et eiiiue, ou iseniblent se traliir ensemble et 1'experience et les regrets;
" Adeo vehcmens in seminis eft'nsione delectatio seiititur, ut illam homines
tanqnam. sinnmum bonnm prosoquantur, illique, velnti saa3 fulicitaii
adluuieuiit." Et pourtaiu lious^elot devait s'y coiiuaitre !

Cases on Sixth Precept of Decalogue. 451

TIL Combien il y a tie causes cle delectation et d'emotion
churnelles.

II y a deux causes: per se, et per acddens ; on pourrait dire
directe on indirccte, celle-ci pouvant etre legere ou grave, suivant
ses consequences sur les sens du patient. Ce dernier point est
assez difficile a determiner, car " sic dantur, qui ex solo mulieris
aspectu vel fcactu, etiara honesto, motus inordinatos experiuntur :"
tel etait Tartuffe ; " alii e contra, qui ex mulieris etiam nudse cou-
spectu vix commoventur :" telle e"tait Doriue.

IV. Combien il y a d'especes de luxure naturelle consomm^e.
Quel pe"clje e^t la simple fornication.

" II y a sept sortes de luxure naturtlle consommee : la simple
fornication, le stupre, 1'adultere, 1'inceste, le rapt, le sacrilege, le
proxenetisme.

" La fornication simple est le rapport liumain et naturel de deux
personnes libres." On la divise en trois sorks: simplement elite,
concubinage et prostitution.

Suit une longue dissertation.

V. S'il y a quelque malice particuliere dans la fornication :
1° d'un fiance avec une tierce personne ; 2° d'un baptise avec uu
non-baptise ; 3° d'un catholique avec un non-catholique ; 4" d'un
tuteur avec sa pupille ; 5° avec un eunuque, un impuissant, une
veuve ; 0° d'une servante avec son mnitre.

De cette ties instructive elude, et tre.s detaillee, je nc retiens
qu'une rei)on:?e, qui montre bion le point de vue tout grossier
auquel &e place le casuiste.

k* Copula ab eunncho vel frigido habit a specialem continet mali-
tiam, quia, cum semen non liabeat, intervenit finis naturalis frus-

tratio."

VI. Comment le confesseur doit se conduire avec les concubines.

VII. Si les prostitutes peuvent etre tole"re"es, et s'il est permis
de leur louer sa maison.

On peut les tourer, pour eviter un plus grand mal ; on peut leur
louer sa maison, si tout le monde leur refuse et que leur absence
occasionne un plus grand mal.

VIII. Quel peV.hd est le stupre.
uSfeupru:n ett defloratio virgiuis invitae."

452 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Suit la longue description de la valeur de chacun de ces trois
mots, definition sans doute pleine d'interet pour le ujeuue con-
fesseur et disciple :"

kt 1° Defloratio est virginalis claustri illicita corruptio per pri-
mam copulam carnalem ; 2° nomine virginis venit omnis persona
quse necdum ullam cum altera copulam babuit, et quidam etiamsi
ea se per mollitiem polluisset, aut turpibus desideriis consensisset,
vel signaculi virginalis integritatem casu, aut arte viohisset, quia
nempe his non obstantibus retineri censetur curnis iutegritas. . . '

IX. Quel peche" est le rapt.

Voici line question fort inte"ressante et f requemment agitee par
les casuistes, a propos de Taventure de la chaste Suzanne, dent ils
blarnent presque tons 1'excessive susceptibilite".

kt D. Que doit faire la femme enleve'e pour ue pas pecherdevant
Dieu? — 11. 1° Resiater iuterieurement a la jouissance, et ne pas
du tout y consentir. ... 2° Register cxte"neurement a Taggres-
seur, se defendre des pieds, des mains, des ongles, des donts. . . .
en remuant le corps, et meme en appelant s'il y a chance de se-
cours. . . .

'• Mais elle n'est pas tenue de crier, qnand il y a danger pour sa
vie ou sa renoumiee. . . . Cependant, si elle e^t en peril de con-
sentir, ce qui, selon Billuart, ne manque pre^que jamais, elle doit
alors crier.

" Peut-c'lle tuer son aggressenr? Settler le nie, avec la plupart,
disant que la pudicite est un moindre bien que la vie temporelle et
la vie eternelle, lesquelles perdrait Taggresseur, s'il etait tue. . ."

X. Quel peche est 1'adultere.

4-Il y a trois sortes d'adulteres : homme libre avec femme
marine ; homme marie avec femme libre ; homme marie avec
femme mariee : d'ou aduhere simple et adultere doul)le."

Un botaniste n't-ut pas fait une meilleure classiticution.

XI. Quel pe"che est 1'inceste.

XII. Quel peche est le sacrilege.

uLe pet-he" sacrilege de luxure estcelui dans lequel une personne
sacree, un litu sacie, une chose sacree, est profane. D'ou trois
sories de sacrileges."

loses on Sixth Precept of Decalogue. 453

Quel besoin tie classification ! Et chaque sorte se di\ ise a son
tour.

Pour la personne sacre'e, il faut distinguer. " 1" Si la personne
sacree pec-he luxurieusement ou desire pecher avcc une personne
lion sacree, ou pejhe avec elle-metne, se polluendo, ta^tus, vel
aspectus turpes kabendo, etc. — 2° !Si une personne non saere"e,
peche luxurieusement avec une personne sacre'e, ou le desire ; 3" Si
une personne sacree peche luxurieusement, ou desire pecher avec
une autre personne egalement sacree: le sacrilege est double alors."

Pour le lieu, les distinctions sont plus subtiles encore, et plus
Granges surtout. 11 faut savoir ce qu'est le lieu sacre, et definir
les actes coupables. Pour donner un echantillon des difficultes de
la question, je citerai cet exemple : " Violatur ecclesia per effu-
sionem seminis, quae quidein debet esse voluntaria in se ; . . .
proinde ecclesia non polluitur per pollutionem nocturnam, etsi
voluntariam in sua ciusa. Nee, si fiat aliquot solum guttaruin
effusio. . . . Effusio non si fficiens ad violationem templi, sufficit
tamen ad sacrilegium : " admirable sujit de reflexions et de
dissertations !

La question de la chose sacree n'est pas moins remarqnable-
ment traitee. Le disciple y apprendra qu'il sera sacrilege si
"rebus sacris vel alios vel seipsum impudice taugit ; si ipsnm
polluit, dum sacram Eucharistiam circumfert . . . ; si sncris
vestibus indutus turpia exterius perpetrat (lire tamen vestes non
ideo benedictionem suam arnittunt), etc." Mais s'il u commet
quelque turpitude en portant des reliques sacrees, il n'est pas
sacrilege, parce qu'il n'a pas Tintention de mepriser les reliques
... ; si cependant il a employ^ ces reliques a une fin dcpravee,"
etc., etc.

XIII. I. Quelles sont les especes de luxure consomrn^e centre
la nature. II. Ce que sont mollities et distillatio : pour quoi on
les prohibe, et quel pech6 est mollities.

La rdponse a la lre question ^numere: "mollities bestialitas
sodomia, et modus coeundi qui generationem impedire queat."

Et quelle admirable precision dans le detail ! Ecoutez : " Or 1o
a natura prsescriptus exigit : 1" ut fiat commixtio duorura ; 2° ut hi
duo sint ejusdem naturae, seu speciei ; 3° ut shit diversis sexus, et

454 The Doutrine of fJie Jesuits.

coeant in vase dehito ; 4° ut coeant eo modo, qui generationem
promovere valeat, et non impedire.

Reponse non moins topique et toute experimentnle a la seconde
question : " Mollities, vulgo dici solita pollutio, est fluxus, sen
eflf'usio seminis humani voluntarie procurata extra copulam et
concubitum. Distillatio est fluxus humoris cujusdarn medii inter
semen et urinam, qui nempe differt ab urina, eo qnod sit mugis
viscosus et glutinosus, vero autem sernine, eo quod sit illo minus
viscosus et minus mordax. . . . Mollities commilti potest turn a
m;iribus turn a femines ; a maribus quidcm extra vas, a feminis
vero turn extra vas, sed raro, turn et communius in ipso vase." *

Suit une pag;e de details sur les divers moyens de produire
mollities et distillatio, sur les circonstances qui peuvent servir
d'excuses, sur les moyens de 1'arreter en chemin, etc.

Le professeur fait montre dans cette dissertation, non seulement
de science, mais de lettres latines, en citant Martial :

Ipsam crede tibi naturam dicere verum :
Istud quod digitis, Poiitice, perdis, liomo est.

11 n'y fait pas moins preuve d'imaginat'on et de haute exp6-
rience: " Liceret tamen in fornicationis actu copulam abrumpere,
ex odio et displicentia peccati, quamvis sit necessario tune semen
effundere extra vas." |

XIV. Quand la pollution est censee volontaire dans sa cause ;
quand et comment elle est coupable.

Jl y a quatre regies ponr decider sur ces graves questions.

* " Indicium est istius, si scilicet mulier sentiat seminis solutionem cum
magno voluptatis sensu, qua completa, passio satiatur ( Billuart).

Kousselot passe tres rapidement sur la pollution chez les femmes. Le
K. P. Debreyue le lui reproche et s'ecrie: " Est-il etonnant, apres cela, de
voir taut de jeunes pretres ignorants sur cette matiere?" Aussi, afin de
combler cette lacune, il entame une savante dissertation en ces termes :
"Tresapud nos masturbationis species vel potius forma? in feminis dis-
tinguntur : 1° masturbatio clitoriua; 2° vaginalis ; 3° uterina." (Mcechia-
logie, p. 65, 1874.)

t Cependant il ne faiadrait pas attribner a Kousselot le merite de 1'inven-
tion de cette interessante espece. Deux cents ans avant lui, Diana, dans
son petit, mais succulent livre des Snlutbnis pratique*, avait clit: '"Qui
fornicatur teneturte retrahere ante spermaticum, etsi complex jam seminal :
imo etsi ex vi prioris commotionis post retractionem esset futura sernina-
tio." Et il avait montre la rai*on de main de maitre : " Quia omui
momento tenetur opus pravurn abrumpere." (P. 385).

Canes on SixUt Precept of Decalogue. 455

Dans In qnatriemc, il est question de la pollution sans vrai
pe"ehe, puree que kt si l:i cause n'est pas peche par ellememe, et
qu'il y ait uue raison legiiime de necessil^ on d'utiliie" de s'y
Hvrer, on d'v perse" veYer, la pollution q>ii s'cnsuit n'est pas un
peche elle-meme, bien que prevue pourvu qu'elle ne soit pas
voulue."

Aces conditions fmbrouillees repondent: " le cas des confos-
seurs" qui n'est pas sans danger, cormne on voit ; celui de
'•I'etudiunt en nu»t'.eres honteuses;" il en est de me me pour
"celui qui monte a cheval, qui mange avec moderation des mets
echauffants, qui regarde ou touclie impudiqueinent une autre
personne pour hi soigner ou la laver, qui cause honnetement avec
une femme, ou 1'etnbrasse honnetement suivant la coutume.''
Quels gaillards susceptibles, et prompts a la teutation.*

XV. I. Si les pollutions nocturnes sont un pe^he" et quel.
IT. S'il est permis de les d6sirer et de s'en rejouir. HI. Si la
distillation est un peche", et quand.

II faut bien de la souplesse pour se tirer de telles difficul'e's ;
mais que ne pent 1'habilete? La reponse definitive a la deuxieme
question est: tk Licet, detestando pollutionem, gaudere de felici
etfectu quern ipsa habuit."

Mais le prof esseur parait fort empeehe de repondre a la troisieme
question : " Si fiat praeter intentiouem et sine commotione spirituum
vitalium ac sen^uum carnis, aut cum sensu tantum levissimo, non
est peccatum ; si vero fiat cum commotione spirituum vitalium aut
voluutario sensu carnali ac venereo, est peccatum. "II est diffi
cile de ne pas se declarer satisfait.

XVI. Si les meustrues des femmes, la pollution, les actes
conjuganx, sont des empechernents a la sainte communion.

La reponse a la troisieme question est particulierement int6res-
sante ; elle donne des conseils aux femmes sur la grave question
de savoir: uAn maritas debitum reddere debeant eo die, vel pridii',

* Sanchez, le mattre, offre encore une resource que Rousselot ne refuse
pas, ressource precieuse, car elle peut servir alors ineme qu il y a 1;
niaiiifeste de la part du patient:

>« Ubi pollutio coepit culpa patientis, si in ipso fluxu piwteritw colpaa
enni pceniteat, non tenetur flnxiim repriinere quia jam pCBHitentia Inter-
rupit actionein prseteritam, mine ant«in soln.n patitur." On n est pas plus
accommotlant, et il devkiit viaiii.eiit difllcile de peclier en cette mauere.

456 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

quando communicaturse sunt." Elle tient sagement compte des
intentions et des habitudes.

Jl est enjoint an confesseur d'expliquer aux femmes ces regies
sulitiles, et d'exhorter les muris a, b/ubstenir de 1'acte, par respect
pour la saciee communion.

XVII. Quels peche"s sont la bestialite, la sodomie, et modi
coeundi innaturales.

Definitions savantes ; distinction sagace de " sodomia perft'c'a*
id est concubitus personarum ejusdem sexus, et imperfect:!. . . ."
Le sodomiste devra douner a son confesseur maints details lon-
guement enumere's., et entre autres " an agens fuerit an patiens,
. . . quia conditio agentis longe turpior est quam conditio
patientis." *

II ne faut cependant pas etre trop curieux : "Qui coi'tum habuit

* Les Casuistes sont d'accord sur ce dernier point, et anssi sur ceci:
"Gravius est sodomiam habere cum foeinina quarn cum mare."

L'abbe Craisson, auteur d'un de Rebus venerris fort estime, et pu
blic a Paris en 1870 dans le but, principalement, de cornier les ou-
v rages anterieurs sur le meine sujet, parce que ces ouvrages " ne sont
pas sufflsamrnent debarrasses clu rigorisme introduit par les jansenistes,
et presentent line severit6 qui rend trop difficile la fonction de confes
seur." 1'abbe Craison, dis-je, fait montre ici de Firnagination la plus
raffin6e.

II se demande s'il y a sodomie, " si vir coierit extra vas, v. #. inter
crura, brachiaaut alias mulieris partes," et consacre un paragraphe spe
cial a la question de savoir: "An pollutio in ore sit divei>ae specie!?
AfRrmant nonnulli, dit-il, vocantes hoc peccattnn irruniationem. 1'roba-
bilius habet S. Liguori, quod sit pollutio cum inchoata fornicatione si
vir polluatur in ore f cemina3 ; si vero pollutur in ore maris, hoc est sodomia
proprie dicta."

C'est encore a ce grand saint que revient 1'honneur d'avoir decouvert
pourquoi c'est un pech6 mortel "si vir immitat pudenda in os fueminge."
La raison est que " ob calorem oris, adest proximurn perlculum pollu-
tionis." (S. Liguori, t. VI.)

II y a encore des choses interessantes, par exemple de savoir " si la
sodomie eutre parents est un inceste." Diana, que nous connaissons deja,
le niait tout a fait : "Quia ad incestum requiritur coitus in vase debito
cum mixtione sanguiuis." La dissertation sur ce point est longue et ins
tructive.

Craisson rapporte ensuite les peines 6dictees par S. Pie V contre les
clercs sodomistes et declare, comme le t'aisait jadis Escobar (V. ci-des-
sus, p. 131) que pour les encourir, les clercs devront s'en etre frequem-
ment rendus (;oupables : " celui qui n'a peche qu'une ou deux fois sera
excus6" (p. 104). 11 convient aussi de rechercher si ces peines s'appli-
quent aux clercs sodomistes patients, a ceux " qui bestial! tatem exercent;"
pour les premiers il y a controverse, mais non pour les derniers, que saint
Liguori exempte, parce qu'en matiere peuale on ne peut pas proceder par
analogic.

Cases on Sixth Precept of Dtcaloyue. 457

cnm bruto, non tenetur exprimere cejus speciei illud fuerit, nisi
forte adeo turpe sit ac sordidum, ut in ejits congressu sese prodat
libido qucedam singulariter humanitatem dedecens. Nee neeesse est
dcclarare an cougressus factus fuerit in alvo, an vero in alia parte
corporis bruti. . . ." Queldevergondage d'imagination monacule,
hantee par des reveries solitaires ! *

11 y a aussi un article pour le "coitus cum daemon e, qui, en
outre de I'liorreur de la bestialite, contient tine malice particulieTe,
un pe"che centre la religion, puisque c'est un commerce avec le
plus furieux ennemi de Dieu." |

Mais voici qui depasse toutes choses : "Reperire est etiam
mulieres et puellas quae, cum veneream voluptatem ex minoris
bestioe lingua lambente ceperint aut pollutionem sint expert ae,
valde cruciantur, nee illnd dtclarare audent. . . . Expedit igitur
prudenter ... a mulieribns et etiam a puellis, quaere re utrura
cum be^tia aliquid inhonesle egerint, v. g., bestiam in lectum intro-
mittendo seque ab ea lambente tangi procurando." Et la pratique
est favorable : lk Ita exonerari conscientias non semel experieutia
docet ! "

Remarquez que ce paragraphe est tout moderne, signe* Rousselot.
Et maintenant, oyez, peres de famille, c yez ce qu'au fond du
confessionnal obscur et redoute, dans la ctiapelle embaum6e et
silencieuse, un jeune et vigoureux vicaire pourra et devra deman-
der a vos filles, . . . des I'age de six ans ! I

Enfin, pour tirer 1'echelle : u Quseritur ad qnam speciem pertineat
horrendus cum muliere mortua concubitus ! " §

* II y a cependant une sanction pratique A, ces monstrnosit6s, s'il faiit
en croire Billuart, qui " non reputat eonsummatam bestialitatem nisi Hat
intra vas bruti, proinde, saltern ut plurimura, consummari nequit a mttlier-
ibus !"

tCettememe insanit6 des rapports avec le d6mon, succnbe oil incnbe,
est encore gravement etudiee IMI 1870 dans le livre de Craisson, et avec uii
etrange luxe de details, (p. 100).

I II faut pourtant rend re a Rousselot cette justice qn'il passe sons
silence la " sodoinia fceininarum," tant etudiee par les aucieus jesuites, et
si savamment distinguee par eux du " tribadismus."

§ Saint Liguori discnte tres posement la question de savoir si rette
horrible invention doit s'appeler " pollutio, fornicatio, sodoinia. aut bes-
tialitas;" et Billuart tranche la question en declarant que cela d6pen<l
" secundum varias conditiones qua? coucumbens appreheiidit m cadavere,
et de quibus delectatur."

458 The Doctrine of (he Jesuits.

XVIII. Qnel peclie" est le proxenetisme (Icnocininm).

XIX. Comment doivcnt cire interrog6s les penitents qui se
confessent de quelque pe"clie de luxure consomme.

Li taclie n'est pas facile, et les questions scabreuses sont innom-
brahles a poser.

La premiere est de savoir " ut rum ex metu prolis semen effuderit
extra vas . . .? Ipsa muliere interrogetur num semen, complete
copula, ejicere conata sit?" Et, ne crnyez pas que cette curiosi'.e
ne puisse servir anx progres de la science morale. D. Vernier,
thelogien experiment^, a remarque ce fait curieux qne les femmes
mariees commettent plus souvent ce supplement de faute quo les
simples " fornicarise ; " et notre auteur s'etonne assez judicieuse-
ment de ce resultat.

" Interrogandus, interrogandus," etc. ; 1'imagination jesuitique
met toutes voiles dehors : un mousquetaire s'y pourrait instrmre.

Un seul de ces cas est interessant: "Interrogandus poenitens
an actus sodomiticos exerctierit, quod non raro contingit hbidini
valde d -ditis." Les medecins legistes sont un inimemcnt d'uti
avis oppos6, ce qui indique dans la clientele des confessionnaux e^
chez les confesseurs eux-memes uu point de vue tout special.

XX. Comment doit se conduire le confesseur avec un penitent
pollutionis consuetudine misere irretitum.

Pour les enfants impuberes, mais qu'il y a lieu de soup gonner
et ccla, des 1'age de dix ans pour les garcons, et pour les lilies
meine d5s Tage de sept ans, car alors deja on en trouve qui
" voluptalem carnalem venereosque motus sibi par tact.us, situm
corporis, femorutn compressionem, til)iarum exLensionem j)!'*)^!!-
rant," il faut agir tr^s prudemment, et [)ar des questions progres
sives, "en proceMant du plus connu an moins connu." Voici uu
exemple de ces interrogations prudentes et progressives, a adresser
aux petites filles : " Utrum honesto situ cubent ; vestes modeste
induant vel exuant ; utrum seipsos nudos aspiciant, tangantve ;
ulrum ab aliis aspici se et tangi passi sint ; . . . utrum ex tactu
proprio vel alieno motus inhonestos et delcctationem maguaui
experti sint; utrum factus saepius repetiti et diuturni fm-rint ;
utrum, percepta maxima voluptate, motus a s^ipsis cessaverint et

Cases on Sixth Precept of Decalogue. 459

ipsimot quieverint; . . . ntrnm madefacti fuerint." Quelle
delicate gradation, et quelle discretion exquise !

Puis viennent les petits garcons, puis les adultes, homines et
femmes, et cela dure pendant quatre pages !

ART. II. DES ESPECES nu LUXURE NON Co \SOMMEE, DES

CONSEQUENCES, PfilNES, ETC., DE LA L.UXUKE.

Q. I. 1° Qnelles sont les especes de luxure non consommees.
2° Si les baisers sont des peclies, et quels.

Ces especes sont les baisers, les regards, les contacts, les paroles,
Ventures, lectures, compositions, peintures, etc., honteuses, les
pen«ees, desirs, delectations, etc., impures.

Quant aux baisers, quand ils sont libidineux, et comme il est
bon de preciser, "sive inter ejusdem, sive inter diversi sexns
personas fiant * ... etiamsi non subsit periculum ulterions
consensus in copulam."

II. Si les peche"s peuvent etre commis, quand et de quelle
S'Tte, par les regards, les contacts, les tableaux et statues, les
paroles, etc.

Quelle experience ou quelle erudition ! Les cas particuliers s'y
comptent p-ir centaines, et quelques-uns bien curieux, et bien
dignes de fixer 1'attention des jetines etudiants en theologie ! Ils
apprendront, par exemple, qne '' si matres liberos suos in partibus
mhonestis tangunt, ant deosculantur ex amore stulto, potius quam
obsceno, ut non raro evenit, peccant leviter." Q ic *• graviter
peccant qui seipsos in partibus inhonestis tangunt cum delectatione
venerca . . . ; qui vero id faciunt solum ex levitate, aut causa
manu calefncicndi, peccant venialiter. . . . Quod si vero se
tangant morose et repetitis vieibus, etiam peccant mortaliter,
quamvis non agant ex affectu libidmoso." On voit qu'il n'est pas
facile de s'y reconnaitre. Ils apprendront encore que "qui
animalium ut canis, felis, etc., genitalia aspicit, tangit, fricat,
usque ad effusionem seminis, mortaliter peccare videlur. . . .
Quod si autem uon usque ad seminis effusionem tangantur. . . .
non est nisi peccatum leve." Cependant " peccato excusandus

*In pectus. in mamillas, vel more columbarum, lin^uam in os intromit
tendo." (Bouvier, Uissertatio in sextum Decalogi prttceptuin).

4GO The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

videtur, qui ea usque ad seminationis effusionem fricat, ut sic
eorum naturam et c nstitutionem melius agnoscat."

Et bein d'autres clioses encore qui expliqucnt 1'experience pr£coce
et quasi-spontanee qu'on a remarque'e dans tant d'affaires de cor-
rectionnelle et d'assises ! ]1 y en a six pages. *

III. Comine il faut se condnire par rapport aux mouvements
qui naissent dans les parties inferieures.

Je renonce ici a la citation trop longue, et a 1'analyse impossi
ble.

IV. Quels peches sont les desirs, les delectations et les pen-
se"es.

V. S'il petit y avoir matiere peu grave dans la luxure.

VI. Quels pe'ches sont fils de la luxure.

VII. Quelles peines contre la luxure sont etablies par les lois
humaines.

VIII. Quelles sont les excitations de la luxure.

IX. Ce qu'on doit dire des spectacles et des livres erotiqnes.

X. Ce qu'on doit penser des danses.

XI. Quels sont les lieux et les temps ou les bals sont particu-
lierement inconvenants. — Dans quels cas les bals peu vent avoir
uue fin honnete.

Pour la deuxieme question, il est une circonstance qui, puis-
qu'elle donne une fin honnete i\ la danse, suffit a elle seule dans
presque tons les cas: '^"quand on est invite et qu'ou ne pout
s'excuser convenablement."

XIT. Quand les bals peuvent etre permis ou frequents

XIII. Ce que doivent specialement observer par rapport aux
danses les confesseurs et les cure's.

XIV. Ce qu'il faut penser de la toilette des femmes.

Grave question, et jadis fort agitee par les jesuites, qui y ont

* Et cepenclant il faut avouer que Rousselot est reste bien au-dessous
de Bouvier qui invente 1'espece monstrueuse d'un Ills "qui pudenda
niatris suae libidinose conspexisset! " Et surtout au-dessous de Bur-
chard, eveque de Worms, qui me paratt avoir decidement g«»g:n6 la
palme de 1'ignominie par cette question qu'il enjomt d'aclresser aux pe-
nitentes: " Fecisti quod quasdam mulieres facere solent, ut cum filio
tuo parvulo fornicationem faceres, ita dico ut filium tuum supra tur-
pitudinem tuam poneres ut sic imitaberis fornicationem?" (Ciie par le
P. Chiiiiquy, 1880).

Cases on Sixth Precept of Decalogue. 461

g^gne* le nom de theologiens mammillaires ; notre autcnr ne Ini
consacre que trois pages ; mais c'est une quintessence. Le jt-une
pi etre saura a quelle region commence c-t finit le peche, tk quse ila
nil lant pectus ut media ubera nuda appareant, aut quae tenui adeo
velo pectus obtegunt ut ubera adbuc remaneant translucida, pec
cant mortaliter." II est facheux que le dernier point, qui manque
de precision, pi etc a 1'interpi elation, et appelle une etude de fait
qui peut etre p4rilleuse. Le confesseur debutant est mieux
renseigne" pour le peche v6niel que coimnettent les jeunes fillips "qua?
turgentes sibi addunt mammas." Pourquoi mammas seulemeut?
II v a la une lacune.

XV. Quels remedes existent contre la luxnre en ge'ne'ral.

XVI. Quels moyens le cure peut ou doit employer contre elle
et ses causes.

Le principal moyen recommande' qnand il s'ngit des enfants, et
recommande e" videmment de bonne foi, est pre'cisement celui qui,
de 1'aveu unanime des moralistes h-iqnes, est le plus capable de
fairc naitre dans les jeunes imaginations les idces et les de"sirs dan-
gereux. uLe pretre, au cat^chisme, s'effbicera de saisir des occa
sions fr6quentes d'inspirer Thorreur de ce peclie, de mettre devant
les yetix des enfants ses debuts, ses progies, ses suites fnnestcs,
d'en citer des exemplcs trngiques. ... II montrera les innornbrn-
bles manieres dont on peut etre induit a y tomber; il en decrira
les diverses esj)eces non pas en detail, mais avec une demi-obscur-
ite (sub obscure insiuuare), qui ne puisse scandaliser les ames
innocentes. . . ."

Les i)redications et, bien mieux, les livres d'education et de lec
ture de la secte portent en effet la marque de cette preoccupation
deplorable, et qui souvcnt se traduit de la maniere la plus gros-
siere. Un de mes amis, professeur d'une de nos Faculles de m^le-
cine, entrant un jour par basard dans une eglUe d'une vill • du
Midi au moment du cate"chisme, entendit le vicaire dire aux petites
lilies : 4* II est un autre peche que vous apprendiez a connuLre, (t
qu'on nomine le peche mignon.' *

* II s'airitbicn l:\cTnne m^thodc goiioralc d'enseigncmcnt ; j'cn citcrai
detix prefives nitre inille.

J'ui &ous les 3<jux mi cuhicr d'luxtractloil rJigieusi- rCiligC J)ar un clcve

462 The Doctrine nf the Jesuits.

Qu'on se rappelle les affaires toutcs recentes de I'abbc Galbin ct
de 1'abbe Regnier, et I'embarras de la nuigistrature devant cc-tte
excitation a la debauche que n'avait pas pievue la loi penale.*

(In college d'Etain (Mense) ; la mention tres bien y est frequemment ecrite
de la main de 1'aumonier.

Aux lie et <Je commandements, je lis : art. ler, line definition des peches
de luxure; art. 2e une 6tude sur la gravite de ces peches, oil sont Studies
sucressivcment les regards, les baisers les attouchements et la delectation.
Kuh'n, la definition fort claire de la fornication, de 1'adultere, du sacrilege
et de 1'inceste. "L'espece du peche, est-il dit savamineut, varie egalemc-nt
pour les pensees, les desirs, les regards, les attouchements et les baisers,
sui van t qu'ils ont lieu avec quelqu'une de ces diverses circonstances." Le
pauvre petit garc/>n qui Scrivait ces belles choses avait Li ans!

Voila pour les gallons, void pour les lilies • ici le pittoresque se mele a
Todieux. Je possede une belle carte manuscrite, dessinee noii sans grand
travail par une jeune fille agee de 15 ans, eleve de 1'ecole communale
d'Are>ches. Elle a pour titre 1'Ernpii e du vice. On y voit le dit empire,
confinant aux royaumes, de la Justice et de la Societe, enveloppe par les
Mers de rinl'amie et de 1'Ennui, et 1 Ocean de la Tristesse, separe du pays
de la Vertu par le detroit des Soupirs, etc.

II i-st divise en sept provinces, qui sont les sept peche capitaux. La
Luxure y etale une surf ace pr6ponderante; elle est arrosee par une riviere,
la fange; sou chef-lieu est 1'impudicite; elle compte neuf chefslieux il'ar-
rondissement (sic), qui sont: la debauche, la volupte, limmoralite, 1'adul-
tere, Tinceste, la prostitution, le cynisine, le viol, I'impurete, et onze
communes, a savoir la seduction, les mauvais desirs, le relachement, la
turpitude, la fornication, U depravation, les faux plaisirs, 1'orgie, la scnsu-
alite, 1'irnpudeur, 16 rapt.

La pauvre jeune fllie a du non seulement bien mettre en place les el<3-
ments de cette stupide et ignoble geographie, mais reprendre en un tab
leau soigne, sur trois colonnes, avec accolades et soins calligraphiques,
cette enumeration, produit d'uue cervelle monacale en delire erotique.

J'ai appris qu'une carte analogue avait etc saisie par 1'inspecteur
d 'Academic de Vaucluse.

*Reproduisons ici quelques considerants du jugement du tribunal de la
Fleclie, acquittant 1'abbe lialbin (18 Juin 1870) ; et aussi quelques-uns de
ceux du tribunal d'Auxerre, acquittant 1'abbe Kegnier (Septembre 187D) :

Ce dernier d'abord :

'•Attendu qu'il resulte de 1'instruction et des debats qu'a differentes rr-
prises, dans le cours des annees 1877, 1878 et 1871) au confessional ou dans
1'eglisede Lucy-isur-Yonne, 1'abbe Kegnier, s'adressant aux petites fllles du
catecliisme, leur a pose des questions et tenu des propos clout le caractere
licencieux ne pent eire contesie;

'•Que ces questions et propos etaient do nature a. surexciter I'irnagina-
tion de tres jeunes eufants, et a clevelopper dans leur esprit des ideos m^l-
saines;

"Que cela est d'autant plus regrettable que deja, en 1873, une instruc
tion judiciaire a releve a la charge du preveuu des fails absolument analo
gues."

Et maintenant, 1'abbe Galbin :

"Con^iderant que l'al)be Galbin, dans cle^ conversations pnrHculieres,
dans sa cliambre, dans le jardiu du presb^ tere et clans la sacriste, voiiiut

Restitution on Account of Lustful Sins. 463

CHAPITRE II.

De la Restitution a cause des p£ch6s de luxure, principalement a
cause du stupre et de I'adulleie.

ART. I. DE L'OBLIGATIOX DE RESTITUER ex stupro (p. 78).

Q. I. A quoi est tenu le sluprator.

1° "Celui qui, sans violence, fraude, dol, priere, imposture et
promesse de manage, a deflore" line viergequi consentait librement,
n'est tenu a rien envers elle, d'apres la justice et dans le for inter-
ieur, en principe ; parce qu'aucun dommage ne lui a e,e fait, a elle
sachant et voulant."

O seducteurs, quel tranquille maxime ! pauvre fille, naive et
amoureuse !

Mais si rien n'est du a la pauvre fille, il en est autrernent pour les
parents k*s'ils ont connu I'affaire c-t s'en offensent ; car alors il fau-
dra leur donner quelque satisfaction d'honneur pour les apaiscr."
Le passage meVite d'ede rapporte en entier, parce qu'il inontre
Men avec quel grossier dcklain de tout sentiment de pudetir et de
dign'te humaine les casuistes traitent ces questions, qui touchont a
ce qu'il y a de plus delicat pour nous autres laiques : " Plus prob-
ablement, le seducteur n'est pas tenu a donner aux parents de 1'ar-
gent bien qu'ils soient fortes d'augrnenter la dot de leur fille pour
pouvcir la marier suivant sa condition. Car la (ille, en consentant
a sa defloration, a consenti en uieine temps soil a ne pas se mai ier*
soit a se marier au-dessous de sa condition; par suite, ses parents
ne sout pas force's de la marier suivant sa condition, et s'ils le veti-
lent faire, et augmenter sa dot dans ce but, ils le font librement,

d'abord gainer la confiance des enfants : qu'il a reconnu avoir embrasse im
certain nomhre de petites lilies, inais qu'il e^t demoiure que ces caresses,
dans la pensee du j)retre, n'avaieut rien d'immoral;

"Considerant que, pour premunir les jeunes lilies contre les attentats
clont elles pouvaient etre 1'objet, 1'abbe Gali)in leur a parle souvent il actefl
contrain s a la pucleur, qu'il k-s a engages a ne pas se laisser corrompre
par les petits garcons, et que, pour inieux se faire eo nprendre, il a pu
iudiqner aux enfants, par-dessus leurs vetements, les parties du cnrprt
qu'elk-sne devaient pas toucher; inais qu'en somme, dans tous les 1 aits
incrimines il nVxiste aiu-un acte sufflsamment caracteriso pour constltuer,
soit le delit d'attentat aux mcjLH.rs, soit le delit d'outrage public a lu pu-
deur."

464 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

et nc peuvcnt par suite rien exiger du seMucteur dans ce but. Cela
d'autant plus que la fille a pu abuser de son corps saus commettre
une injustice envers ses parents, et par suite n'est tcnue a rien
envers eux, d'apres la justice; done le sdducteur pas davantage,
puisqu'il n'est pas le cooperateur d'un acte injuste en soi."

2° " Le se"ducteur qui, par force, crainte, dol, menaces, prieres
trop importunes, fausses promesses, mais sans promesse de ma-
riage, a deflore une vierge, . . . doit I'mdemuiser de son dommage,
et indemniser scs parents, en la dotant assez pour qu'elle se marie
bien, ou meme en i'epousant, si le dommage ne pent etre autre-
ment re" pare."

3° Celtii qui a deflore une vierge. . . . sous promesse de
manage, est tenu en principe (per se loquendo) de 1'epouser, que
la promesse ait eie" sincere ou non. . . ."

Voila qui est bien. Mais Lyonnet, celebre casuiste, dans son
Traite de justitia et jure, public a Lyon en 1836, declare que " le
seducteur sous promesse sincere de manage n'est tenu a rien.' 'Et
la raisonnement est vraiment admirable :•*• 11 n'est pas tenu en
raison d'une fraude, pui^qu'il eiait de bonne foi ; ni en raison de
la promesse, car un contrat sous condition honteuse n'oblige pas,
alors meme que la condition est remplie." Or, 1'autorile tie Lyonnet
est certes suffisante pour rendre son opinion probable, en telle
sorte que le seducteur pourra la suivre s'll y trouve sou avantage"
(voir ci-dessus, page 33).

Mais, il aura d'autres moyens de se tirer d 'affaire. Car il n'est
tenu d'epouser qu'en principe, et les exceptions ne lui feront pas
faute.

En effet " il ne sera pas tenu d'epouser: 1° Quand il decouvre
ou s'll sui vicnt une cause snffisante pour rompre les fianyailles,
comme si la jeune fille s'abandonne a un atitre ou si elle est de
moeurs C(J»rromi)iies, bien qu'elle se fut donnee pour vierge, ou si
die s'est fait ptisser pour noble on pour riclie, sans 1'etre ; .2° Si la
promesse etait fcinte et que ce mensonge ait du etre presume a
cause de l'ambiguite des paroles, ou de la maniere de les pronon-
cer, de leur ex;igeration, on du caractere leger (inconstantiam) du
jeune homme, de la graude disparite des conditions ou des rich-
essea conuue de la jcime fi!k', ou d'auties iiidicus semb'alilos.

Restitution on Account of Lustful Sins. 465

car elle ne pent imputer sa ' deception qu'a elle-meme. Bien
plus : 3 Quand meme la jeune fille n'aurait pu etre avertie du
mmsonge, soit qu'elle n'ait pas counu 1'inegaliie des conditions,
soit que le jeune homrae ait proteste que cela n'empecherait pas le
manage, il n'est cependant pus tenu d'epouser s'il doit resulter du
mariage des consequences rnauvaises, de graves inconve"nients, des
scandales, des rixes, des discordes de famille," etc.

Voila la situation bien facile pour les seducteurs, meme sous
proraesse de mariage.

II. Si le stuprator est tenu de reparer le dommage qu'il a cause,
si ayant offert le mariage a celle qu'il a seduite, elle le refuse, on
si, ayant de legitimes raisons de ne pas i'epouser, il refuse de le
faire. S'il est tenu d'epouser celle qu'il a s<kluite sous promesse
de mariage s'il a fait vo3U de chastete, ou s'il est au degre proliibe"
de pareule.

III. A quoi est tenu le stuprator par rapport a 1'enfant. A
quoi sont tenus les parents qui ont expose" leurseufauts a I'hopital.

ART. II.

DE I/OBLIGATION DE RESTITUER VENANT L'ADULTERE (p. 85).

Q. I. A quelle restitution sout tenus la femme adultere et son
complice.

uS'il n'est pas survenu d'enfant et que la chose soit reste'e
cnchce, ils ne sont tenus a rien, sinon a penitence. S'il n'est pas
ne d'enfant, mais si le mari apprend le crime, le complice devra
demander le pardon du mari en lui offrant une satisfaction honor
able (houorariam satisfactionem) ou en donnant d'autres signes de
douleur, si le mari est suppose 1'exiger.

44 S'il est ne un enfant, la mere devra le-nourrir pendant trois
ans, et ensuite le pere."

Mais si Ton peut douter justement ( !) si 1'enfant est du mar ou
de I'adult&re, celui-ci doit-il quelque chose? Non,disentbeaucoup
d'auteurs, parce que dans le doute on doit prendre la solution la
plus favorable. Saint Liguori trouvecette opinion assez probable,
mais le contraire lui serable ties probable. Ce qui sign i fie, en
langage de jesuite, qu'on peut faire ce qu'on veut, exiger ce qu'on
veut , suivant son interet : cela est fort commode.

466 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

II. Ce qu'il fant rcstituer pour le dommage cause* par 1'adultere.

III. Comment la femme adultere pent et doit s'opposer an
prejudice que son enfant causerait a son mari ou a ses Lenders, et
comment elle pourra le re'parer.

Un des inoyens indiques, et ce n'est pas le moins original, con-
siste en ce que la femme adultere conseillera a son enfant de rester
celibataire, afin qu'apies sa mort ses biens retournent aux heritiers
legitimes.

CHAPITRE III.
De plusieurs questions relatives au mariage.

ART. I. — DES TEOIS EMPECHEMENTS DU MARIAGE ; C'EST-A-DIRE
DU CRIME, DU RAPT ET DE L'IMPUISSANCE (p. 92).

Q. I. Ce qti'est 1'empechement du crime.

II resulte de 1'adultere ou de I'homicide.

Mais il faut s'entendre :

" Debet adulterium esse non attentatura modo, sed consumma-
tum ; videtur tamen sufficere sola vasis penetratio, quia liaec ad
adulterium sufficit, et alias per novum seminis extra vas effundendi
peccatum facile eluderentur Canones."

Mais les docteurs sont partages, et Saint Liguori affirme,
"nequaquam incurri impedimentum, si vir vere non seminet in
vase muliebri." C'est line question d, Tetude.

II. Si 1'empechement du crime est reconnu par le Code civil.

III. Ce qu'est 1'empechement venant de 1'impuissance.

" L'impuissance est 1'incapacite de consommer le mariage, id est
habendi copulam perfectam, quae nempe per se sufficiat ad genera-
tionem : vocatur etiam impotentia coeundi, et differt ab impotentia
generandi. Porro ad veram copulam, quse ad generationem
sufficiat, requiritur, nt veri nominis semen a viro in vas timliebre
hnmittatur et in hoc recipiatur." Voila une savante definition,
moins savante encore que renume'ration qui suit des causes phys
iques de 1'impuissance, choz I'liomme et chez la femme.

Puis vient une s^rie d'ingenieuses distinctions entrerimpuissanoe
naturelle ou accidentelle, absolue ou relative, perpetuelle ou tem-
poraire, anterieure ou posterieure au mariage.

Questions Relative to Marriage. 467

Aux causes physiques, il faut ajmiter les malefices, "per daemon-
is attiticium," auquel cas I'evequc interviendra.

IV. Si rempecheinent d'impuissance est reconnu par le Code
civil.

V. Si la femme est tenue de subir nne incision, ut viro fiat apta.
Admirable sujet de meditations pour nn celibataire de 20 ans !
Rousselot distingue suivant que 1'operation doit ou non etre

grave. Si elle doit entralner risque de la vie, le manage est nul,
et apres la gueVson la femme pourra convoler a d'uutres noces.*

VI. Ce qu'est Tempechement tire du rapt.

VII. Ce qu'il advient en droit civil de I'empechement tire
du rapt.

ART. II. DES OBLIGATIONS DES EPOUX. (p. 102).

§ I. — De Pobligation des e"poux relativement a la cobabitation
et de la reparation de lit et d'babitation.

I. Quelles sont les obligations des £poux.
Elles sont rangees sous six cbefs :

1° Cohabitation, communaute de table et de lit.

6° "Uterqne conjux tenetur alteri rationabiliter petenti reddere
debitum conjugale, hoc est, corpus suum dare, ad copulam cou-
jugalem."

II. Devoirs speciaux aux con joints, touchant la cohabitation
et 1'entretien.

* Sanchez semble tres superieur, car il etudie le droit du mari de faire
operer sa femme, et le devoir par la femme de se laisser operer.

1° An possit vir claustrum mrginis aliquo instrumento reserare, ut sibi
retldatur apta. .

2° An fcemina virgo vel arcta, ac nupta, teneatur incisionem pati, ut

a-PI? distingue deux cas! 1° Quando mulier naturaliter est prae cseteris
arcta. 2" Quando arcta non est, sed solum naturale virginuum sijrnaculum
coni^ressui virili obatat. (De Matrimonto, Lib. VII, Disp. XLJ

Et Diana fait intervenir ici une distinction des plus lumineuses entre 1
casouil v a disproportion entre 1'homme et la femme " quia uxor
nimis arcta" et celui ou la cause en est " quia vir mciubrnni habet mm
improportionatum." Dans le premier cas, operation obhgatoire bi
n'est pas trop dangereuse; dans le second, 11011.

468 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Entre autres re"ponses, je relive celle-ci : "1° Si 1'un des con-
joints est atteint de maladie coutagieu.se, 1'autre n'est pas tenu de
rester avec lui, ou de s'en aller avec lui, quand il y a peril probable
d'infection. . . . Cela lui est meme interdit s'il y a peril de mort,
car il n'a pas le droit de s'exposer ainsi, n'etant pas maitre de sa
vie." Le texte dit : " Quia non est vitse stiae domina-"

Et remarqucz combien cette belle formule promet de de* voue-
mcnt en 'cas de cholera !

III. Quelles sont les prescriptions du Code civil a 1'egard des
obligations mutuelles des conjoints.

IV. Si la dissolution du mariage peut jamais avoir lieu, en
tant que lien (quoad vinculum).

Jamais, entre catholiques, quand il est consomme* ; mais jupqne-
la il peut 1'etre, seulement pour entrer en religion. "Ratum
dissolvi potest per professionem in religione approbata. . . ."

Mais ici interviennent une foule de precautions sur lesquelles
doivent s'exercer 1'esprit inventif du casuiste et 1'esprit invest-ga
teur du confesseur.

" Le conjoint qui veut entrer en religion pent, pendant deux
mois, refuser le devoir conjugal a son conjoint, qui se rendrait
coupable de pe\'he en insistant (si copulain ei invito extorqueat).
Le bimestre accompli, s'il n'entre pas en religion, il doit rend re le
devoir; mais s'il ne le rend pas et veut entrer en religion, il le
peut, meme malgre son conjoint. S'il y entre, le conjoint attendra
qu'il ait fait profession, et alors le mariage etant dissous, il peut
convoler a d'autres noces ; mais, s'il quitte apr&s son noviciat,
il est tenu de consommer le mariage. ... Si le conjoint, pendant
qu'il de"liberait, " copulam extorserit," le mariage est consomme"
et ne peut plus etre dissous ; si 1'extorsion a eu lieu apr^s le pre
mier bimestre, il ne peut plus entrer en religion sans 1'assentiment
du conjoint, parce que desormais il lui doit le devoir conjugal, et
qu'on le lui extoi quant on ne lui a pas cause de dommage ; mais si
1'extorsion a eu lieu pendant le premier bimestre, alors il y a eu
dornmage, . . . et il peut entrer en religion, le conjoint ne pou-
vant plus desormais se remarier."

V. Si la dissolution du mariage peut avoir lieu, au point de vue
de la cohabitation (quoad torum et coliabitalionem) .

Questions Relative to Marriage, 469

Elle peut avoir lieu: 1° Pour cause d'adultere " moraliter cer-
tum, et consummatum per copulam perfectam," et aussi, car les
confesseurs n'oublient jamais ces points que le Code pe"nal a volon-
tairement passes sous silence, a cause de " sodomia completa
exercita cum persona aliena, sive masculo sive femina ; item bes-
tialitas consummata."

2° Par l'entre"e en religion.

3° Par la chute en here"sie ou en apostasie.

4° Par la sollicitation au crime, y coinpris 1'heresie et l'ine"vi-
table " congressum sodomiticurn."

5° Par les embfiches et menaces ; si 1'un des con joints estatteint
d'une maladie contagieuse qu'il y ait chance de contractor par la
cohabitation.'*

6° Par les coups, rixes, traitements cruels, etc. . . .

VI. Si pour les causes sus-enoncees la separation non seule-
ment peut, mais doit avoir lieu.

VII. Si la separation peut etre faite d'autorite" prive"e.

r VIII. Si, apres la separation, les 6poux peuvent changer
d'etat ; s'ils peuvent ou doivent se r6concilier.

IX. Aupies de qui et aux frais de qui doivent etre Sieve's les
enfants.

X. Quelles sont les causes de separation dans le Code civil.

§ 2. — Des Obligations des Epoux Toucluint le Devoir
Conjugal.

Q. I. Quelle obligation incombe aux epoux de demander et de
rend re le devoir conjugal.

ILs ne sont pas tenus en principe a le demander, puisqu'ils peu
vent y renoncer; mais en fait "per acculens " ils peuvent
y etre" tenus par charite". ..." 1° Lorsque cela est n6ccssaire
pour ^carter le peril d'incontinence ; 2° qtiand il convient de
rechauffer 1'amour mutuel des £poux ; 3" quandl'engendrementest
n6cessaire a la paix de la famille ou au bien public, comme chez
k-s princes ; 4° quand il est Evident que le conjoint le desire, ou
souffre d'en etre prive, bien que n'osant, ]>ar pudeur, le reclamer.

" Si Tun des conjoints reclame seneusement le devoir conjugal,
1'autre est tciiu, eii justice de le rendie, a niuins d'excuse k'gitime.

470 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Les e*poux doivent done prendre garde de se rendre impuissants. . .

" Le conjoint peche done gravement qui refuse, meme une seule
fois, le devoir a son conjoint qui le reclame raisonnablement et
se"rieusement, . . . et cela, qu'il le demande soit explicitement,
soit implicitement, seuleraent par des caresses et autres signes qui
sont connus pour exprimer ce de"sir, corame cela arrive frequern-
rnent aux femmes qui n'osent le demander autrement."

Suit une longue dissertation, fort instructive, sur ce que doit ou
peut faire le conjoint passif, lorsque 1'actif est ivre, ou demi-ivre,
fou, ou demi-fou, avec ou sans intervalles lucicles, ou malade.
L'apprenticonfesseury apprendra,entre autres chosesinleressantes,
que si le mari seul est fou, la femme peut lui rendre et hii reclamer
le devoir, mais n'y est pas tenue ; que le mal de dents ne peutser-
vir d'excuse pour refuser le devoir ; qu'on peut le refuser pendant
le premier bimestre du manage ; et aussi s'il est reclame trop sou-
vent, " comme trois ou quatre fois dans la meme nuit ;" que le droit
de le reclamer se perd par 1'adullere aussi, etc Admirables sujets
a trailer par le menu, avec une jeune femme, au fond d'un con-
fessionnal. II y en a comme cela cinq pages pleines.

IF. Q'lelles conditions sont exigees pour que 1'usage du mariage
soit licite, et quelles doivent spe'cialeineut elre observers relative-
ment a la fin.

II faut : 1" que les epoux ne soient lies par aucun empechement;
2° qu'ils se proposent une fin honnete ; 3° " ut servcnt mod urn
debit um coeundi turn quoad subslantiarn, turn quoad situm, locum
et tempus."

II I. Quelles conditions sont exigees pour que 1'usnge soit licite ;
et quelles doivent etre sp&cialement observers relativement au mode,
a la substance, & la position, au lieu et au temps.

Ici, il faut citer tcxtuellernent, et se garder de traduire. Le
pauvre jeune s£minariste fera bien, suivant la recommaudation de
liousselot, de reciter maintes pneres a la Vierge !

*' 1° Modus debitus quoad substantiam est, quod servetur vas
naturale, et semen in illud immitatur ac retineatur ; hicque modus
servandus est sub mortali.

Hinc graviter peccant: 1°4 conjuges acttim conjugfilem in vase
noil naturali consummantes, vel inchoantes eliam cum inlentione

Questions Relative to Marriage. 471

enm consummandi in vase natural!. 2° Vir seminationem ante
copulam iachoando, vel hac habita se retrahendo, antequara semi-
navcrit ; probabilius tamen potest sese post seminationem retra-
here, non exspectata seminatione mulieris, quia hsec non est ad
generationem necessaria. Quod si intendens legitime congredi,
ante congressum extra vas praeter intentionern seminet ob senium
vel uxoris indispositionern, non peccat, quia hoc ex corruptse nat
urae festinatione provenit. 3° Mulier semen receptum ejiciens, vel
ojicere enitens, vel copulam abrumpens ante viri seminationem,
licet ipsa jam seminaverit. Quod si vir post suam seminationem
sese retrahat, et mulier nondum seminaverit, seautcm postmodurn,
attamcn sine mora, ad id excitet ac seminet, a peccato excusari
solet, quia lisec ejus semiuatio censetur esse ejusdem actus conju-
galis consummatio.

44 2° Situs magis naturalis et ordinarius est, ut jaceant con-
juges, et vir mulieri incumbat.*

Hinc graviter peccant conjuges, si stantes rem habeant, vel
mulier viro incumbat, aut vir a tergo accedat,f cum periculo, ne
semen effundatur, vel a muliere retmeri nequeat (rarum tamen est,
quod retineri nequeat),vel ne procuretur abortus, aut grave saltern
incommoduin fetus in utere latentis. Seposito veroomni ejusmodi
periculo, peccant venialiter, si id faciant ex voluptate, vel majoris
prsecise commoditatis gratia ; nullatenus autem, si cjusmodi situm
exigat necessitas, vel suadet rationabilis causa, quin, v. g., ordina-
rium situm non patitur dispositio corporis mulieris gravidse. j . . .

<k 3° Actus conjugalis exerceri debet in loco profano et secrete.

*S. Liguori donne la raison physiologiqne (physiologic de jesuite) de ce
prScepte : " Hie modus est aptior effusioni semiuis virilis et receptioui in
vas femineum."

t Craisson est plus varie : " Si coitus flat sedendo, stando, de latere, vel
prtepostere more peeudum, vel si vir sit succubus et mulier incuba, innat-
uralis est." (p. 155.)

t Sanchez, Lib. IX., Disp. XVTI. Utrtim sit culpa lethalis, quotics in
actu conjugal!, vase natural! omisso, innaturale usurpatnr, ant utritisque
conjugis semen data opera non si mill, vel extra legitimum congressum
erniuitur: aut ex impotentia supervenient!, extra vas elt'unditur.

i.^o 4.— Quid, si maritus velit sodomaicecopulam iuchoare, non animo
consummandi, nisi intra vas naturale?

"Qualis culpa sit, si vir volens leiritime nxori copnlari, quo se excitet,
vel majoris voluptatis cuptaiuhu gratia inclioet copulaul cum OU sodoinit-

472 The Doctrine of tJte Jesuits.

4° Tcmpus aptum est tcmptis nocturnum. . . ." Avcc dis
sertation sur 1'etat de grossesse, de lactation, tie menstrues, la
communion, le jeii ic, etc.

Est-ce assez immonde? Et qnel mari ne fremira a l'ide*e d'une
interrogation devant reveler a un horn me tons ces secrets de la
couche nuptiale, que les plus cyniques ne s'avoueraient pas a eux-
memes?

IV. Comment les e"poux peuvent encore pe"cber dans Pacte de
mariage. Si demander ou rendre le devoir est licite, quand il y a
doute sur la validite" du mariage, etc.

"Graviter peccat, qui actum conjugalem exercet cum affVctu
fornicario, ad conjugem nempe accedendi, quamvis non esset con-
jux ; vel cum affectu adulterino ad alienam personam, hanc scilicet
optando, aut turpiter dilectam sibi repi aesentando ; quod si sim-
pliciter ejus pulchritudine delectetur, non est peccatum, periculosa
tamen res, et serio dissuadenda."

La seconde question est longuement traitee en trois pages, pleines
de tours et detours au milieu des plus subtils details ; on sent que
clans chaque cas particulier des series de questions devront etre
posees au p6nitent pour arriver a la solution. II faut distinguer
soigneusement entre la petitio et la redditio du devoir, Tune pou-
vant etre licite quand 1'aulre est defendue. II faut s'informer " si
actus conjugalis exercendus sit modo qui repugnat illius substan-
tise, vel in circumstantia actum ipsum viliante, v. g., in vase
indebito," ... ou bien "si petens agat ex pravo affectu vel

ioam, non animo consummaudi, nisi iutra vas legitimum, nee cum periculo
effusionis extra illud. . . .

" Tactus hie, insta tactuum membri virilis cum manibus, aut uxoris
cruribus, reliquisque partiLms potest ad eopulani eonjugalem referri. . . .
esset culpa venialis. '

Lib. JX., Disp. XVI. An concnbitns conjugalis vitiosus sit ratione mo
di, quando variatur situs, servato tarnen vase iegitimo.

Modus naturalis is est, si mulier sueeuba, vir autein incubus sit. Quia
modus hie ap ior esteffusioni virilis seminis, receptionique in vas foaini-
neum, ac retention}; et eongruentior est reruin naturae, cum vir agens,
Joemina vero sit patiens. Quamobrem omnis deviatio ab hoc modoadver-
satur aliqualiter naturae: eoque magis, quo tini huic situs contrarius est.
Unde minor est deviatio, cum conjuges a latere, aut sedendo, standove,
conjunguntur: pessima tamen clUm praepostere, pecudum more, aut viro
succumbente."

On voit line fois de plus que les jesuites d'aujonrd'hui n'ont rien change
aux doetriius, ni au Jangage, de lours atnes du xvi" siecle.

Questions Relative to Marriage. 473

intcntione," on encore " si vir debitum petat ex affeclu adulterine
aut formcario," et si, dans ce cas, il y a peril d'incontinence : car,
suivant lareponse de la femme, le confesseur declare la redditio
obligatoire ou non ; ou encore "si conjux soleat semen frustare,
v. g., vir sese retrabere ante seminationem, vel uxor semen recep-
tum ejicere," cas graves, dans lesquels il faut distinguer suivant
que ces deplorables actes sont habituels ou non, car la solution est
differente. Encore intervient ici la consideration des mconv6n-
ients de sante, d'incontinence, etc., veritable dedale de reveries
malsaines au milieu dosqnelles il importe que la jeune confesseur
ne perde pas le fil delie qui le conduit et ne s'egare pas & regarder
trop longtemps en route. Ou encore " si petatur ex affectu ant
fine, vel cum circumstantia aut modo venialiter tantum culpabili,
v. g., stando, a'tergo, attamen citra pollutionis periculum, vel ex
sola voluptate/' Enfin, tout un paragraphe sur les vieillards et
leur impuissance douteuse, dont les pre"ceptes sont une merveille
d'application de la methode experimentale.

V. S'll est licite de demander et de rendre le devoir, quand les
e*poux sont lies par le voeu de chastete, d'entr^e en religion, de
prise des ordres- sacre"s, ou de non-rnanage : ly si ce voeu a e"te
6mis avant le manage ; 2° s'll 1'a etc pendant le manage, rnais
sans Tassentiment du conjoint ; 3° s'll 1'a 6te avec cet assentiment.

Encore et partout, dans les cinq pages du long developpement
de ces questions, cet amour des details penlleux, des distinctions
savantes et subtiles, qui devront rendre bien souvent nfoessaire
Tin vocation protectrice a la vierge Deipara.

VI. 1° Ce qu'on doit dire des attouchernents obscenes, dos
regards, des baisers entre epoux. 2° An peccet conjugatus, qui
in absentia compartis seipsum impudice tangit, vel delectatnr de
copula habita vel habenda ; 3° An peccent soluti, ipsique adeo
sponsi, qui de copula post initum matrimonium habenda, vel vidui
qui de copula tempore matrimonii habita delectantur.

Nous retrouvons ici les descriptions immondes de la question
III. ; et la gravite* en est ici augmentee par ce fait qu'il n'y a pas
seulement description d'actes obscenes, mais appreciation de 1'in-
teution de ceux qui les commettent.

474 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

u Si talia fiant cum proximo pollutionis periculo sive utriqne,
sive alterutri conjugtim imminent!, semper sunt mortaliter peccum-
inosa, quia pollutio est grave peccatum. ... Si tales actus ex se
ad cop u lain orclinati sint, et fiant in ordine ad earn nee solius volup-
tatis causa, culpa vacant, quia licita est copula. ... Si vero hi
actus, etiam ad illam ordinal!, ex sola voluptate f ant, sunt peccata
venialia. ... Si conjuges invicem exerceant actus inhonestos,
con tamen singulariter infames, sine animo et ordine ad copulam
hie et nunc habendam, seposito tamen pollutionis periculo, est
peccatum. . . . Quod si tamen inter conjuges exerceantur ejus-
modi actus omnino turpes ac singulariter infames, ita ut inter
membrum tangens et tactum sit summa disproportio, sunt peccata
mortalia, quamvis etiam conjuges intendant eos ordinare ad copu
lam, ut si maritus membrum virile immittat iu»os mulieris, vel
ejus verenda osculetur, vel propria verenda perfricet circa vas ejus
prseposterum.* Ratio est. . . .

Cependant, me'me en ces circonstances extremes, tout n'est pas
perdu, car " 1'opinion contraire a aussi ses defonseurs."

Du reste : ''Conjuges non eiunt peccati mortalis arguendi, si
bona fide asserant fee his iufamiis non commoveri, nee ad pollution-
em excitari. Saltern peccati venialis damnanda non videtur pia
uxor quse ex metu, timiditate, vel servandse concordise causa, hos
tactus in se a marito fieri permittit, simulque asserit ex illis aut
uullos aut leves tantum carnales motus se experiri."

Pour les deux autres questions, 1'auteur repond qu'il y a pe'ehe*
niortel, parce que ces desirs et souvenirs comportent: " 1" reprse-
sentatiouem coitus habenui vel habit! ; 2° gandium ex tali rep-
rsesentatione actu profluens : igitur coitum apprehendunt ut actuin
delectabilern."

Mais an moment de quitter ce sujet, cisel'e avec tant d'art et
d'amour, le savant professeur s'apercoit que tous ces crimes et

* Ces ignommles datent de loin : " Quid, si vir intromittat membrum'
in os fceminae, vel in vas prseposterum, non animo ibi cousummaudi, vel
tangat mernbro superflciem illius vas«is? (Sanchez, lib. IX.) Et tous les
casuistes les out recueillies pieusement, tout en y apportant chacun d'in-
genieuses vari antes. Le rneine Sanchez, a lui seul plus inventif que tous,
condamne le mart qui "in actu copnlse. immiteret digitum in vas prajpos-
terum uxoris." S. Liguori considore qu'il y a la, en cffet, des rapporta
avec la sQclomie.

Questions Relative to Marriage. 475

p6cbes commis entre e"poux peuvent etre des supplements dc crimes
pour les relations illicite's, oti, com me il dit delicatement, " in
coitu extra matrimonium." Aussi, recommande-t-il au confesseur
de demander a ses penitents, lorsqu'ils s'accusent de fornication,
" an copulam perfecerint eo modo, quo licita est in matrimonio, an
vero in ea admiserint inordinationem in ipso matrimonii usu non
permissam" et, dans ce dernier cas, de rechercher " qusenatn fuerit
ea inordinatio." *

Mais ecoutez comment apres avoir scandalise* les 6ppux, souilI6
le lien conjugal, traine" au plein jour les secrets de I'alc6ve, 1'imag-
ination de'prave'e du casuiste tient en suspicion les chastes e"lans de
ramour des fiances, et comment il va, dans ces moments sublimes
on. tout s'epure, vautrer Tame innocente de la fiancee dans ses
fangeuses dissertations sur ules attouchements, regards et baisers
de'shonnetes."

tkLes fiance's que se confesseront seront avertis que tout ne leur
est pas permis, et il faudra leur exposer particulierement ce qui
leur est gravement interdit." Cependant, pns de quelque pudeur,
il ajoute : "S'ils ont vecu cbastement ju«que-k\ . . . il sufflrti d'une
indication generale, et de 1'ordre don 116 d'exposer, apres le ma-
riage, leurs doutes au confesseur, et d'en implorer une instruction
plus etemkie: instruction que le confesseur ne devra pas avoir
honte de donner, bien q'i'avec modestie et prudence." Avec modes-
tie : "an maritus membruin virile, etc. ! '

§ 3.— De la maniere dont les confesseurs doivent se conduire avec
les epoux et les fiances.

Ce paragraphe est tout entier de la main de M. Rousselot. II
est destine a de" velopper le dernier membre de phrase que nous
venons de citer. Voyons comment le professenr de Grenoble, qui
ecrit en 1844, se sera efforce de refrener les ardeurs du zele ques-
tionneur, que toutes les immondices prece-lentes auront allume
dans lescceurs des ^neo-confesseurs et disciples." Aussi ten,

* (Test bien cet ordre de preoccupations qui inspirait Sanchez, lorsqu'll

86 "utmm abusus nxoris contra naturam, sive sodomi* sive soling nml,
llti« culpam ad.nittendo, .it .u'ravior cnlpa quam inter solutos, habeat que
circuBistautiain adulte'iii ucces.-ario

47G The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

avec quelque prudence on peut, sinon empecher le mal, du moins
degager sa responsabilite professorate. Voyons done:

ler POINT. — AVEC LES EPOUX.

Q. I. Comment doit se conduire le confesseur: 1° en ge'ne'ral ;
2° specialement avec ceux qui se souillent du crime d'Onauisme.

Vcila deja qui pro met. Le confesseur devra d'ahord apprendre
a fond, "percalleat," les obligations des £pouxci-dessus expose* es,
et les fera serieusement p6netrer dans 1'esprit "ssepius inculcet,"
de ses penitents. II les interrogera sur leurs violations en matiere
grave, mats avec prudence et chastete, "caute et caste."*

Mais quittons ces formules generales, et voyons le cas particu-
lier, pris comme modele, des questions a adresser aux epoux soup-
9onn£s de commettre le crime d' '"Onan, le plus execrable, et dont
se souillent tr&s frequemment les e"poux, surtout les plus jeunes,
non seulement dans les villes, mais aux champs."

Le confesseur mettra tous ses soins a de*couvrir 1'existence de ce
vice. Mais de peur de 1'enseigner a ceux qifil veut confesser, il
demandera avec adresse, ''caute," au penitant: "s'il n'a aucun re-
inords relativement a 1'acte conjugal, s'il craint d'avoir .beaucoup
d'enfants, s'il se pollue en dehors de 1'acte, etc." "II faudia inter-
roger sur ces points les femmes, qui sont tres souvent causes du
vice Onanique, dont se souilleut leurs maris, et les avertir serieuse-
inent, etc."

Voila, je pense, qui est adroit, et d61icat, et j'espere que ce seul
rxemple va rassurer uos lecteurs sur la maniere dont les jeunes
pietres peuvent faire passer et rend re innoceutes dans la pratique
ces mutieres de speculation perilleuse.

II. Ce que doit faire le confesseur a regard de la femme dont
le mari est Onaniste.

'•II reste une grande diffloull6 ; si la femme sait avoc certitude
que son mari, dedaigneux de ses prieres, copulam abruplurum
csse, ut semen extra vas f undat, peut-ulle en conscience sure lui
rendre le devoir? "

11 y a la-dessus quatre solutions, et tout les ca^uistes sont entr^s
en ligne. C'est que ce point a toujours tenu a coeur aux je^uites.

* Voir la note de la :»e 547.

Questions Relative to Marriage. 477

Le crime d'Onan, de"fini comme il vient d'etre dit, est en effet ex-
tiemement frequent. L'aveu obtenu, le confesseur a desormais
main mise sur la femme ; il en devient le maitre obsolu ; mais cela
ne lui suffit pas, il veut 1'etre du mari, il veut f avoir, lui aussi,
dans sa main, et le tenir par le lieu merne du mariage, dont il auto-
risera ou prohibera le noeud.

Aujourd'hui, du reste, la question semble tranchee. La Sacre"e
Penitencerie romaine, interrogee par les professeurs du seminaire
de Besancon, que tourmentait cet interessant probleme, a rEpondu.
Et il est fort curieux de voir quelle solution elle a consacr^e.

Les solutions extremes desarmaient le confesseur, tant6t par
leur indulgence complete, tant6t par leur 8e" verite" excessive. Rome
adopte une re"ponse intermediaire, qui pourra servir pour tous les
cas, et permettra 1' indulgence lorsqu'il n'y aura rien a gaguer
a la se've'rite' ; "la femme ne peut ni demander, ni rendre le devoir,
a moins d'une raison grave, qui 1'excuse d'une cooperation ne"ga-
tive et mate"rielle dans le pe"che de son mari." Quant aux raisons
graves, il n'y a que 1'embarras du choix, ne fut-ce que la crainte
de voir le mari ^blasphemer Dieu, la religion, injurier les confes-
seurs et les pret: cs, etc."

III. Quels avertissements et renseignements le confesseur doit
en outre donner aux epoux.

Je ne trouve a signaler d'inte"ressant sur ce chapitre que cette
formule gene" rale du moraliste : tkll y a lieu de s'etonner de la sag-
acit6 des enfants meme d'un ^ge tendre, en matiere de luxurc."

Pauvres petits ! Cceurs purs et dmes candides, nous le savons,
nou<, peres de famille ! Qui leur excite et leur pervertit rimagina-
tion, sinon ces Hvres idiots ou obsceues ou il n'est question que de
saintes vouant ati Seigneur leur virginit6 des I'^ge de six ans,
resistant au mariage afin de conserver leur chastet^, se faisant en-
fermer dans des lupanars, et en sortant plus vierges que jaraais ;
sinon ces livres OVA on les invite & meMiter, en les aidant par des
descriptions color6es, sur la circoncision, 1'incaruation, la concep
tion immaculee, la situation de Jesus dans le sein de sa mere ;
sinou ces cautiques aux mystiques Ejaculations,* que toute mere

*Jeprendrai comme unique exemple la pretcndue priere suivante, qui
termine un volume du a 1'uu des ecrivaLns religieux actuels les plus en

478 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

de famille jctlerait avcc horreur, si quelque plaisant y subtituait
Arthur a Jesus? Pauvres enfants ! que ces celibataires veulent
instruire, et qu'ils poursuivent sans cesse de leurs honteux soup-
£ons, et de leurs suggestions lubriques ! N'est-ce-pas notre Rous-
selot lui-meme qui, dans ce manuel que j'analyse le dugout aux
levres, s'enquiert a quel &ge les petites filles peuvent perdre irre"-
parablement, c'est-a-dire "par un acte lihidineux volontaire" leur
virginit^, et le fixe des six ans. "Cum sint capaces seminationis
. . . etiara in sexto setatis anno"? C'est sans doute aussi 1'dge
auquel le confesseur pent leur poser 1'iramonde question : "Utrum
cum bestia aliquid inhoneste egerint, v. g., bestiam in lectum
intromittendo, seque ab ea lambente tangi procurando? (F. ci-
dessus, p. 518)."

vogue, au confident de saint Joseph, le R.-P. Huguet : "Les perles de
saint Francois cle Sales." Lyon-Paris, 1865 (F. Girard ed.) Elle est inti-
tulee "Vive Jesus!" et n'occupe pas moiiis de 11 pages.

AUX CHERES FILLES DE SAINTE MARIE, ETC.

Vive Jesus, vive sa loi !
Vive Jesus, ma douce vie;
Vive J6sus, ma seule amie;
Vive Jesus, de qui raniour
Me va cousumaiit uuit et jour;

Vivent ses liens precieux,

Qui tiennent inon coeur amoureux;

Vive Jesus et son empire,

Vive la douceur qu'il m'inspire;

Vive Jesus, viveut ses traits?

Vivent ses aimables attraits.

Vive Jesus qui me possede,

Et donne a mes inaux le remede ;

Vive Jesus, vive sa force,
Vive son agreable amorce ;
• . . . . . • >

Vive Jesus en ma poitrine, -j
Vive son linage divine;
Vive Jesus en tous mes pas,
Vivent ses amoureux appas ;

Vive Jesus quand nuit et jour,
II me remplit de son amour;

Questions Relative to Marriage. 479

POINT 2" : AVEC LES FIANCES.

Q. I. Combien de fois et comment les futurs £poux doivent
etre entendus en confession avant le manage.

Quand ils doiveut etre ahsous.

La confession doit etre repetee trois fois. "Le confessenr ne
devra parler de ce qui louche au devoir conjugal qu'a la derniere
confession, qui precede immediatement les noces."

II. Quand et comment ils doivent etre avertis d'un empeche-
ment cache" decouvert par la confession.

III. Comment les fiances doiveut etre instruits du but du mar
iage."

Vive J6sus quand il m'enivre
D'une douceur qui me fait vivre;

Vive Jesus, lorsqite sa bouclie,
D'un baiser amoureux me touche;

Vive Jesus, quand son oeillade
Me rend heureusemeut malade;

Vive Jesus, lorsque, pamee,
. Je me trouve en lui transformed;
Vive Jesus, quand ses riuueurs,
Keduisent mon ame en langueur;
Vive Je>us, quand il m'attire
Si fort, qu'il sernble que j 'expire;
Vive Jesus, quand le tounneiit,
Me fait perdre le sentiment;
Vive Jesus, quand tout 4 1'aise,
II me permet queje le baise ;

Vive J6sus, quand il m'appelle,
Ma soeur, ma colombe, ma belle;

Vive Jesus, quand sa bont<3,
Me reduit dans la nudite;
Vive Jesus, quand ses blandices,
Me combleiit de cliastes delices;

Enfin vive et regne toujours,
Jesus 1'objet de uos amours!

Et combien d'autres, encore moins preseutables, et souvent odieuse-
meut grossiers !

480 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

"Dans la derniere confession avant le manage, les fiancds doi-
vent etre instruits du but du mariage."

Suit une serie de preceptes fort sages sur les precautions a pren-
dre avec ceuxqui out bien vecu jusque-la. Mais bient6t le nature!,
ou mieux 1'habitude, 1'emporte, et les questions ou plut6t les en-
seignernents perilleux commencent.

Le confesseur parle a IM jeune fiancee:

"Le but du manage est la generation et la multiplication des
creatures. . . . Pour y arriver, bien des cboses te seront perrnises
qui t'ont ete jus-qu'ici interdites et qui font fait horreur, 6 cliaste
jeune fille ; d'autres seront toujours illicites. Pour les distinguer
les unes des autres, je vais t'indiquer trois caracteres : Tout ce qui
tend a la fin voulue par le Createur, c'est-a-dire a la generation
des enfants, te sera permis avec ton mari, et tu y coopereras licite-
ment. Tout ce qui est contre cette fin, c'est-a-dire contre la gene
ration, est illicite et defendu sous peche mortel. Tout ce qui n'est
ni favorable ni defavorable a cette fin, comme les embrassements,
les baisers, les familiarity's, etc., . . . ou bien est pe'che v£niel, si
cela est fait uniquement par sensualile, ou bien n'est pas peche,
s'il provient d'amour honnete et licite entre epoux. Confie done £i
ta me" moire ces trois mots : pour la fin, permis ; contre la fin, peche"
mortel ; ni pour ni contre, veniel ou non pecli6. Veux-tu me repe-
ter cette explication, pour que je sache si tu 1'as bien comprise?

"Je veux maintenant t'avertir d'une cbose encore: Dans la con
fession prochaiue et dans les suivantes, tu ne rougiras pas de me
questionner sur ce que tu n'aurais pas bien compris aujourd'hui, ou
sur les doutes qui te seraient survenus, ou sur tout ce qui te trou-
blcrait ou te cbagrinerait. P^t si tu obeis a mes conseils, tu auras
le bonheur en mariage, la saintete dans la vie, la predestination a
la mort, la beatitude an ciel."

Ainsi, tu croyais 6 jeune epoux, que ta chaste fiance'e ne devait
recevoir que de sa mere les instruc ions supremes. Apprends que
c'est 1'homme du confessionnal, le celibataire, qui les lui donnera,
et qu'il s'arrangera de maniere a savoir dansquelques jours ce que
tu veux cacher a tons, ce dont tu n'oserais parler meme & ta nou-
velle Spouse ; car dorenavant I'alc6ve nuptiale n'aura pas de ride-
aux pour lui. Et toutes ses precautions sont prises :

Abortion and Sacred Embryology. 481

"Le confesseur ne devra pas renvoyer les fiance's pour ces
instructions a leur pere ou a leur mere ; car ou bien ceux-ci n'ose-
raient les interroger, ou bien ils seraient mal instruits par des mal-
tres mal intruits eux-memes "a male edoctis male edocebuntur."

CHAPITRE IV.
De 1'avortement el de Fembryologie sacre"e.

ART. I. — DE L'AVOKTEMENT.

Q. I. Ce qu'est 1'avortement et s'il est permis de le procurer.

II n'y a rien a reprocher aux solutions donne"es dans la premiere
partie de 1'article. Cependant, on ne peut s'empecher de remar-
quer avec quelle se"cheresse d'ame sont traite"es ces matieres. Aucun
appel a un sentiment genereux, a 1'amour maternel. La femme
est traitee exclusivement comme une machine a fabriquer 1'homme,
machine qui n'a pas le droit de s'arreter dans sa fabrication. Pas
davantage d'id^es generates, tirees du bien de 1'Etat etde la soci-
6te.

Je releve en outre, des maximes singulierement dangereuses en
pratique : "Si une jeune fille enceinte se montre absolument d6ter-
minee a detruire elle et son fruit, et ne puisse en etre de"tourne*e
autrement, il est permis de lui conseiller de detruire le foetus seul,
et de se conserver vivante."

II. S'il y a des peines et ce qu'elles sont, contre 1'avortement,
en droit canonique.

"Relativement a 1'avortement d'un foetus non anime*, il n'y a
dans le droit canon aucune peine, pas plus que contre la sterilite"
procuree."

Genin,* qui cite ce passage, le commente fort sagement par
ces paroles: "La cour d'assises a plus d'une fois constate" que des
pietres traduits devant elle pour attentat aux mo2urs avaient fait
avorter leurs mattresses ; n'est-il pas possible de penser que les
malheureux s'autorisaientpeut-etre en conscience de leur cours de
theclogie morale?"

Quant a T^poque de 1'animation du foetus, rien de moins precis,
en telle sorte qu'on peu.t avoir jusqu'au quatre-vingtieme jour a ne

*Ses Jesuites et 1'Universite— Paris 1S44.

482 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

pas pe"cher, s'il s'agit d'un foetus femelle, car pour un male, on n'a
quc jusqu'au quarantieme.

III. Quelles peines frappent 1'avortemeDt, d'apres le droit
civil.

IV. Comment le confesseur doit interroger en cas d'avorte-
ment.

ART. II. — EMBETOLOGIE S AGREE.

C'est unc science qui "traite de 1'octroi du bapteme anx foetus
arrives piematur^ment au monde, a ceux qui sont encore dans le
sein de leur mere, ou a ceux qui ne peuvent naitre naturellement,
question de la plus haute importance, car il est de foi que le bap
teme est ne"cessaire au salut de tout etre posse"dant une ame rai-
sonnable."

Q. I. De ceux qui peuvent etre baptises, et parti culierement
si les enfants qui n'ont pas encore vu le jour peuvent etre bap
tists.

R£ponse : " Nul ne pent etre baptise quand il est renferme dans
1'uterus maternel." Mais si 1'enfant a passe" la tete ou un membre,
ou si Ton peut lui porter de 1'eau soit avec la main, soit avec un
instrument, on doit le baptiser.

II. Si le foetus venu prematurement au monde peut etre
baptise".

Oui, "s'il a deja la figure et les premiers lineaments du corps
humain." Mais il y a ton jours la de grands embarras : a quelle
e"poque de la vie intra-uterine 1'ame descend-elle s'incarner dans la
chair foetale?

III. Si les foetus qui ne donnent aucun signe de vie peuvent
etre baptises.

IV. Si le foetus ne peut venir au monde, est-il permis de faire
reparation dite ce"sarienne ?

La re"ponse peut se resumer par ces deux propositions : 1" Si la
mere est morte, il faut faire reparation. La loi 1'ordonne ainsi
dans le royaume de Naples et de Sicile, meine pour les femmes
enceintes depuis pen de jours; et cela est tres bien, parce qn'on
n'est pas sur de 1'epoque ou le foetus est amine" et a besoin du

Abortion and Sacred Embryology. 483

bapteme. 2° II le faut aussi, alors qu'elle vit encore, s'il n'est pas
moralement sur que reparation la tuera.

V. S'il faut et si Ton peut baptiser les monstres.*
Oui, avec des reserves prudentes.

Signalons une espece inte>essante : " Un monstre etant ne" de la
bestialit^ et ayant apparence bumaine, on le baptisera s'il est
le produit d'un homme et d'une bete, mais s'il provient d'une
femme et d'une bete, il ne faut pas le baptiser. C'est que dans le
premier cas, mais non dans le second, il peut etre homme descend
ant naturellement d'Adam."

En dehors de I'absurdite de Phypothese, il est curieux de retrou-
ver ici tonjours le me'pris de la femme, qui ne peut communique!*
seule & son fruit la qualite humaine.

VI. Si les enfants exposes doivent etre baptises.

Jnsqu'ici, ces questions n'ont qu'une valeur theologique, mais
voici qui est plus s6rieux et entre dans le domaine des faits.

VII. Quel est le devoir des cures et des confessenrs relative-
ment au bapteme du foetus, aux avortements, a reparation cesar-
lenne.

"Us devront enseigner aux femmes, aux accoucheuses, etc.,
qu'il est de leur devoir strict d'ouvrir la femme enceinte aussit6t,
apres sa mort, pour baptiser 1'enfant qu'ou en tirera le plus souvent
en vie.* . . .

4 'Us devront meme apprendre a faire reparation ce"sarienne,
pour pouvoir 1'enseigner si l'occasi< n s'en pr6sente."

Suit le manuel ope>atoire : "Avec un scalpel ou un rasoir, sur la
partie la plus proe'minente du ventre, etc. . . ."

Peuvent-ils faire eux-memes 1'operation? Tons les cisuistes
impendent affirmativement, mais Rousselot ne s'avance pas autant.

*Craisson rapporte ici une amusante preuve de 1'incroyable ignorance
de ces clissertatenrs en matiere embryologique • " Un enfant naquit sous
la forme d'un poisson; une servante, qui avait etc charge _cle faire
paraitre un tel monstre, eut I'inspiration heureuse d'ouvrir renyeloppe
poissonneuse, qui lui fit decouvrir un tres bel enfant, plein de vie, qui put
etre baptise, et qui devint plus tard un docteur illustre." (p. 191).

*A defaut de medecin et de sajre femme, "toute personne pent et
merne doit faire cette operation, si elle n'est pas tout a fait Incapable.
(Craissun, p. 205) et 1'operation devra etre faite "en hate, aussitot la
mort constatee." Mais coiistatee comment, et par qui?

484 The Doctrine of fhe Jesuits.

"On devra, dit-il, se conduire d'apres les ordres de I'e'veque, qui
de'terminera comment cette obligation peut s'accorder avec les lois
actuelles et les moeurs."

Et maintenant, que tons cenx qui se sont tant indignes aux
recits re'cents (1878) de la femrae de Champoly (Loire) 6ventree
par le charcutier du village, et de celle de Neaulphe sous-Essai
Orne ouverte avec un canif par une voisine aussitdt apres la
mort, dans les deux cas sur 1'ordre du cure*, se taisent et cornpren-
nent ! Leur indignation prouve d'abord leur ignorance ; mais elle
prouve encore, helas ! que la diirete* des temps et 1'mcredulite du
siecle ont rendu fort rare, et par suite fort remarquee, I'execution
d'une loi canonique.

Ce qu'il y a de plus int6ressant dans tout ceci, c'est que la
preoccupation de sauver la vie soit & la mere, soit a 1'enfant,
n'entre pour rien dans 1'esprit des casuistes. On devra ouvrir le
ventre, alors que 1'enfant ne sera certainement pas viable ; il suffit
qu'il puisse etre vivant.*

APPENDICE (p. 168). — DES CLERCS COUPABLES DE TURPITUDES
EN PECHANT CONTRE LA CHASTETE.

Chapitre prudent, et qui doit etre consider^ comme la morale de
ce livre, si instructif en ces matieres, pour les neo-confesseurs et

les disciples. f

* C'est qu'en effet il n'y a d'interessant que le saint 6ternel cle 1'enfant.
Cette preoccupation dorninante s'est manit'estee 1'annee derniere dans des
conditions extrernememt dramatiques. La cour d'assises du Calvados a
condamne deux femmes, la mere et la fille, qui avaient tu6 le nouveau-ne
de celle-ci; auparavant, ces deux ferventes catholiques avaient eu le soin
de le baptiser, afln qu'il put devenir un ange.

t Voir a ce propos le tout recent et tres curieux livre du P. Chiniquy :
Le pretre, la femme et le confessionnal. Paris, 1880.

NOTE SE RAPPORTANT A LA PAGE 538.

1. Je cite ici, pour montrer que ces odieuses pratiques ne sont pas
speciales a Rousselot, un extrait d'un autre livre du meme genre, les
Instructions pratiques siir le mariage, par M. 1'abbe RABKYKOLLE. vicaire
general, official de M. 1'Eveque de Mende. — Ouvrage publie avec 1'appro-
bation de 1'Eveque de Meude; enseigne au Grand-Serainaire de Meiide.
Toulouse, 1843.

Appendix. 485

DEUXIKME PARTIE.

Devoirs des epoux.

" Commes les personnes mariees se determinent difficilement a faire
part au confesseur des pdclies qu'elles cotnmettent coutre la saintete du
manage, il, suit qu'un confesseur ([\\ipar une pudeur mal entendue, pren-
drait le parti de ne faire aucune interrogation sur cette matiere, serait
cause que plusieurs de ses penitents croupiraient toute leur.vie dans une
foule de peche.s, quMls tachent meme de se dissimuler, cherchant a se per
suader que le mariage donne droit a plusieurs actions que la loi de Dieu
condamne."

Si chaque mari d'une femme devote interrogeait sa femme sur ce point,
et eu obtenait 1'aveu de la verite, on verrait d'etranges scenes !

PROPOSITIONS CONDEMNED BY INNOCENT XL, ON THE 16th OF
MARCH, 1679.

It is hardly possible to have a full idea of the height of cynicism
the Jesuitical doctrine had attained in the old time, without having
read the sixty-five propositions condemned by Innocent XI., all of
them supported by the old Jesuit casuists. The reader has been
able to judge, in a great number of particular cases, of the mighty
efforts of imagination the modern Jesuits have made to preserve
the benefit of these easy and convenient doctrines, while avoiding
open contradiction of the Papal interdiction.

Here are those propositions, several of them being merely of a
theological nature, seemingly not of much interest in pur day ;
besides these are others, which belong to general morals, and
which do not need any explanation.

1. It is not incorrect for the collation of sacraments to follow
a probable opinion on the value of the administered sacrament,
putting aside a more positive opinion, in case it is not forbidden
by a law or regulation, or there is not a grave prejudice to be feared.
This is why only the collation of baptism, of the sacerdotal, or of
the episcopal order must not be made, according to a probable
opinion.

2. I presume, with probability, that a judge may give sentence
after a least probable opinion.

3. In general, as long as we take for guidance a probability,
either intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight it may be, providing
we do not go bej^ond the limits of that probability, we act always
with prudence.

4. The infidel will be forgiven for his lack of faith, if his in
credulity is caused through his following a less probable opinion.

Appendix. 487

5. He who performs but one act of love towards God in his
whole life, is he in a state of mortal sin? We dare not condemn
him.

6. It is probable that the precept of love towards God does
not oblige strictly by itself to do so every five years.

7. There is obligation only when we are compelled to justify
ourselves, there being no other possible means of justification.

8. Eating and drinking to satiety, for the alone pleasure of
eating and drinking, is not a sin, so long as health does not suffer
from it ; because natural appetite may legitimately take enjoyment
from those acts proper to its nature.

9. The matrimonial act, practiced in view of pleasure alone, is
entirely free from sin, even venial.

10. We are under no obligation to love our neighbor by any
inward and earnest acts.

11. We may fulfill the precept of love to our neighbor, by mere
outward acts.

12. There is scarcely any obligation to give alms, as we are
held to give away only the superfluous part of our fortune. The
reason is, that rich persons, and even kings, have seldom any su
perfluous fortune to dispose of.

13. Keeping the required moderation, you can, without mortal
sin, feel grieved about the life of a person, rejoice at his natural
death, wish it, hope for it, with an inefficacious desire, not through
hate for that person, but in view of a material advantage result
ing to yourself.

14. It is allowed to wish, with an absolute desire, for the death
of your father, not as an evil for him, but as an advantage to the
wisher ; for instance, if a large inheritance is to result from that
death.

15. It is permitted to a son, who has killed his father while in
a state of drunkenness, to rejoice at his death, when a considerable
inheritance results from his murder.

16. Faith is not to be regarded as lying under the regulation
of a special and particular precept.

17. One act of faith is sufficient in a life- time.

18. I approve that when answering the questions of a public

488 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

officer, a man confess openly his faith, as it is a praise-offering
to God and faith ; but silence does not seem to me condemn able
as being in itself a cause of sin.

19. The will cannot make the assent given to faith have in
itself more strength than the value of the reasons by which such
assent is determined.

20. It follows from this, that one ma3T prudently throw aside an
assent which has been considered supernatural.

21. The supernatural assent, needed for the salvation which is
granted to faith, is consistent witli a merely probable knowledge
of revelation, and also with the idea of those fearing +,hat God
may not have spoken.

22. The belief in a sole God is the only point which seems to
require a certain limit ; but it is different when there exists an ear
nest belief in a future judgment.

23. Faith, in a large sense, based on the testimony of creat
ures, or some such motive, is sufficient for justification.

24. To invoke God as a witness for a slight lie is not such a
great irreverence as that a man should be condemned for it.

25. It is allowed to take an oath when there is a certain reason
for it, without having the inward intention to swear, whether the
matter be light or grave.

26. If alone, or in presence of witnesses, to answer a question
of one's own accord, for a joke or for any other reason, one swears
he has not done what has been really done, inwardly thinking of
something else which has not been done, or of different means than
those actually used, one does not lie, and is not a perjurer.

27. A person has always a just reason to make use of such
equivocations when it is necessary or useful for personal safety,
the preservation of honor or fortune, or for any other act of such
a nature that dissimulation of the truth may then be considered as
advantageous and worthy of our zeal.

28. Anyone on whom has been conferred a magistracy or office
by means of a reference or a present, may, with mental restriction,
take the oath required by the king for such functions, without tak
ing into consideration the intention of the person to whom the oath
is made, because he is not compelled to confess a hidden crime.

Appendix. 489

29. A pressing and grave fear is a just motive for seeming to
administer a sacrament.

30. An honorable man is allowed to kill the offender trying to
ruin his character, if the injury cannot be repaired in any other
way ; the same may be said if receiving a slap in the face, or a
blow with a stick, when the assaulter runs away after having com
mitted the offence.

31. Rightly, I can kill a thief, for the preservation of a single
dollar.

32. Manslaughter is not only allowed to preserve what we act
ually possess, but also anything to which we have positive right
and which we hope to possess.

33. The same means may be used, either by the heir or testa
tor, when unjustly prevented from getting an inheritance or receiv
ing a legacy ; the same may be said of any one when unjustly
prevented from getting possession of a seat or an advantageous
situation.

34. Abortion is allowed before the animation of the foetus, to
save the life or reputation of a young girl who is pregnant.

35. It is probable that every foetus (as long as it remains in
the uterus), lacks a reasonable soul, and that the soul takes posses
sion at the time of birth ; consequently, it may be said that no
homicide is committed by the act of abortion.

36. Theft is' allowed in a case of extreme necessity, or great
need only.

37. Servants may steal secretly from their masters what they
deem a compensation for extra work not sufficiently rewarded by
their wages.

38. One is not obliged, under penalty of mortal sin, to restore
what has been stolen in successive small thefts, whatever may be
the amount of the total sum thus stolen.

39. Any one who advises or induces another to cause a grave
prejudice to a third party, is not under obligation to compensate
the latter for the damage.

40. A usurious contract is lawful, even when made without an
intermediary, and with a contract concluded in advance author
izing another sale, with the intention of getting an extra profit.

490 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

41. As ready cash is better than money in prospect, and as
every one prefers the former to the latter, the creditor may exact
from his debtor more than the capital, and, on the strength of this
argument be excused of usury.

42. It is not usury when more than the capital is exacted, not as
a mark of kindness and gratitude, but only in the name of justice.

43. How could it be otherwise that, when making false state
ments to destro}T a 'great authority who does you harm, you
should be free even from venial sin?

44. It is probable that mortal sin is not committed when one
falsely accuses a person to protect his rights and honor. And if
this is not probable, there should be, so to speak, no probable
opinion in theology.

45. To give temporal goods for spiritual, when the former is
not meant to be a price paid for the latter, is not simony, but
only a reason to confer or produce the spiritual ; or even when the
temporal would be but a gratuitous -compensation for the spiritual,
and vice versa.

46. The same may be said when the temporal is looked upon
as the principal motive to decide upon the donation of the spirit
ual, or even as the aim of the spiritual, so far as leading one to
estimate the former as worth more than the spiritual.

47. When the Council of Trent says that one has fallen into a
state of mortal sin by communicating of the sins of others, if one
confers ecclesiastical dignities on other persons than those judged
more worthy and useful to the Church, either : 1, the Council
seems to imply by these words more worthy, simply the merit of
those worthy to be chosen, by taking the comparative for the posi
tive ; or 2, an improper expression is used, more worthy, so as to
exclude the unworthy ones, but not those who are worthy ; or,
also, in the third place, the Council means a competition.

48. It seems evident that fornication in itself is not stained by
evil, and that it is bad only because it is forbidden ; the contrary
seems quite unreasonable.

49. Masturbation is not prohibited by natural r'ght. It follows
that, if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good, and
sometimes obligatory, under penalty of mortal sin.

Appendix. 491

50. Connection with a married woman, when the husband
consents, is not adultery ; and this is the reason why, in confes
sion, it is sufficient to accuse one's self of having committed for
nication.

51. The servant who, by bending his shoulders, knowingly
helps his master to reach a window in order to violate a young
girl, and frequently assists him by bringing him a ladder, opening
a door, arid furnishing him cooperation in a similar manner, does
not commit a mortal sin if he so acts through fear of a grave dam
age ; as, for instance, to suffer ill treatment from his master, to
be considered as a fool and discharged.

52. The precept of the celebration of feast days does not oblige
under penalty of mortal sin, aside from scandal, if there is no
scorn displayed in regard to it.

53. The precept of the Church ordering the hearing of the
mass, is complied with when two parts of it are heard, and even
four said by several priests at the same hour.

54. One who is not able to remember matins and lauds, but is
able to say the rest of the prayers, is under no obligation, because
the more covers the less.

55. The precept of the annual communion is complied with by
eating the Lord in a sacrilegious manner.

56. Frequent confessions and communions are a mark of pre
destination, even in those who live irreligiously.

57. It is probable that natural attrition is sufficient, providing
it is earnest.

58. We are not compelled to confess to a questioning confes
sor that we are in the habit of committing a particular sin.

59. It is allowed to grant sacramental absolution to persons
who have made but half their confession, by reason of a large
number of penitents, as may happen, for instance, on a festival, or
indulgence day.

60. One must neither refuse nor defer absolution to a penitent
in a state of habitual sin against the laws of God, nature or the
Church, even when there is no hope of amendment, providing he
openly declares he repents, and shows his intention to lead a bet
ter life.

492 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

61. One may sometimes absolve a person who is in a near
opportunity of falling into sin, being able but not willing, to resist
temptation, or who even directly seeks it with premeditation, or
cooperates with it.

62. One must not avoid a near occasion of sin, when there is
a useful or honest reason not to avoid it.

63. It is allowed to seek directly a near opportunity to sin for
our spiritual or temporal good, or for the good of our neighbor.

64. A man may receive absolution, although he be ignorant of
the mysteries of the Faith, even if it be through blameable neglect
that he is without knowledge of the mysteries of the Holy Trinity
and of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.

65. It is sufficient to have at least once believed those myste
ries.

All these propositions are condemned and forbidden by the
Popes, as being at least scandalous, and harmful in practice.

SUPPLEMENT.

SPEECHES

DELIVERED BY

M. PAUL BERT,

IN THE

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES,

Sittings of tjje 2\&i of Suite, anU 6tij aim 8flj of

3ul2, 1879,

AT THE

Debate on the Law Kelative to the Liberty of Higher
Teaching.

SPEECH

at fyt Sitting of tfje 21st of
3une, 1879.

OPENING OF THE GENERAL DISCUSSION.
M. Paul Bert, President of the Commission : —

Gentlemen : It is, I believe, superfluous to call the attention of
the Chamber to the importance and gravity of the questions sub
mitted to it by the new Bill suggested by the Government. Per
haps it would be more correct to confine such debate within the
limits nearest the truth of facts. A sort of tumultuous agitation
has already manifested itself throughout the country. Cries of
oppression, of martyrdom, have been heard ; and even in the
speech of the honorable orator who occupied the tribune at the
beginning of this discussion, such fears constantly appear. It
seems that the very foundations of society are shaken ; that the
question itself has to be debated anew. . . .

M. de Baudry d'Asson — That is true.

M. Paul Bert — It seems that the liberty of teaching, written in
our laws since 1833 for primary instruction, since 1850 for second
ary teaching, since 1875 for higher education, is compromised;
it seems that this libeity of conscience for which we, the sons of
the Revolut'on, — of tlie Revolution that proclaimed it, of the
Revolution, unpardonable in the mind of many for having pro
claimed it,— it seems that this liberty of conscience itself is
threatened.

Well, I think there exists nothing of the kind ; I think that the
question, although really important, is not connected with these
grent principles.

496 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

In my opinion, and according to the feelings of the Commission
who did me the honor of electing me its president, the law sub
mitted to you is neither a law of doctrine, nor a law of organiza
tion. . . .

M. de Baudry d'Asson — It is a law of disorganization !

Speaker — Please don't interrupt, or I shall have to call you to
order.

M. Paul Bert — It is simply a law of social defence. . . .
(Good, from the Left). It is not a law of doctrine ; for it does not
interfere with the principle of liberty of teaching : moreover, it
restores it to its true meaning and its true authority ; it suppresses
from former laws the despotical regulations which had destroyed
freedom of teaching for all citizens ; it only regulates it upon a
new basis ; it creates, so to speak, a new incapacity for a class of
citizens.

It is not a law of organization ; because it does not alter in any
way the regulations which the law imposed by vote of the National
Assembly of 1875, relative to the opening, qreation, and main
taining of establishments for higher instruction.

It does nothing else but take away from them a title constitut
ing a regular usurpation. (Marks of approbation from the Center
and the Left. — Eeclamaiions from the Right).

M. 'de la Rochefoucauld, Duke of Bisaccia — Then this is a law
of usurpation !

M. Paul Bert — Finally it is a law of social defence ; and this
for two reasons : the first is, that it restores to the State the full
possession of a prerogative, . . .

M. de la Bilials — Of a monopoly !

M. Paul Bert — . . . which could never be seriously disputed
— that of freely choosing the jurymen commissioned for the dis
tribution of the required grades, either for the obtaining of certain
State functions, or giving access to certain professions, entrance
into which require proofs of capacity.

The second reason is, that it requests you to take away the
right of teaching at all degrees, — primary, secondary, and supe
rior, — from a body of men which it judges (rightly or wrongly,
we will discuss this point presently) is using this right simply to

Speed i of M. Paul Bert. 497

fight against our liberties ; to attack the very foundations on which
rests our civil, democratic, and lay society! (Applause from the
Left and Center — Reclamation from the Right.)

M. Ernest de la Rochette — There are two ministers here who
luive been educated by the Jesuits !

The Speaker — Do not interrupt; please listen to M. Paul Bert,
as M. Boyer has been listened to.

M. Huon de Penanster — They did not listen to him !

The Speaker — I beg your pardon, lie has been listened to, as
lie deserved to be, for the talent he displayed.

M. Paul Bert — And it is not only for reasons of doctrine that
the suggested bill takes away from that class of men the right
of teaching granted to them by existing laws ; it is besides,
because those men pretend to live in the bosom of our society in
a state of secret association, without having presented their
statutes for the approbation of the State. (Good ! good ! from
Left and Center).

M. de la Bassetiere — Their statutes are public ; they have been
published, and everybody knows them.

The Speaker — M. de la Bassetiere, your name is down, you
shall have your turn ; in the meantime, please do not interrupt.

M. Paul Bert — And among those groups of men there is one,
— among those companies there is one, — whose name is so cele
brated, whose performances arc so well known, who so many
times have incurred, in our country as well as in many others, the
judgments of tribunals, the legitimate proscriptions of govern
ments, that the law seems directed solely against it ; so that, in
the public mind, in the national opinion, according to our electors,
the law submitted to you has for its aim to take away from the
Jesuits the right to teach the French youth ; and the vote for or
against it will be equivalent to voting for or against the existence
and the right of teaching accorded to the Society of Jesus. (That's
it ! good ! from the Left).

M. Huoii de Penanster — That is a proof that you are afraid of
them.

M. Paul Bert — U is for that reason, Gentlemen, that your
Commission, with an unanimity disturbed only by the dissident

498 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

voice of our honorable colleague M. Gasloncle, has rejected the
amendments proposed before the submitting of the report, and has
discouraged those members who had some intention to suggest
others. It is for that reason that its president has voluntarily
withdrawn a previous proposition of law on the same subject, and
on which he cannot help throwing now and then a glance of pater
nal regret. (Smiles from the Left). It is for that reason that we
declined to ascertain whether it was possible to do more, and even
better ; that we declined to amend the GoA^ernment's proposed bill ;
and that we present it to you, apart from some details of no impor
tance, exactly as it has been submitted to us.

We thought that the moment when the Government we put at
our head was taking position, — the moment when the Government
which the assemb'y of 363 had put at its head was marching
toward the enemy, — was inopportune for making parliamentary
flirtage, and separating ourselves from him on points of details.

From the Eight — Whom do you call "the enemy"? you have
no right to call us " enemies " ! No one has the right here to call
Frenchmen enemies !

A Member of the Left — They are no Frenchmen !

M. Paul Bert — It has been said to you. . . .

M. Huon de Penanster — We would have been called to order
long ago, if such a word had been used by us.

M. Paul Bert — It has been said to you from this tribune, with
on unexcelled eloquence ; and you know that it is through that
very word that you have been turned away from this House.

M. Huon de Penanster — But we are still within this House !

M. Paul Bert — Gambetta proclaimed it here: "Clericalism,
there is the enemy " !

M. de Baudry d' Assort — Then I will say, that the Republican
majority is the devouring leprosy of society! . . . (Oh! oh!
from the Left.)

The /Speaker — M. Baudry d'Asson, I call you to order. (Ex
clamations from the Right.)

M. de laJlochefoucauld, Duke of Bisaccia — Should it be allowed,
to say that we are enemies?

The Speaker — 'When there is a question of Jesuits, we do not

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 499

moan the members of this Chamber. (Protestations from the
Right.)

M. de la Bassetiere — There is a nice law of liberty and pacifi
cation !

M. Paul Bert — It is for that reason, Gentlemen, that we joined
unanimously together ; hoping that an immense majority of the
Chamber will unite to back the Government, the moment when it
endeavors to snatch from the party of anti-Revolution the most
recent and, one may say, the most audacious, and one of its most
precious conquests ; the moment when it intends to take away
from those who made themselves the adversaries of society, ....

The Count of Perrochel — There is no party here attacking
society.

The Speaker — Do not interrupt ! You are not allowed to
speak.

M. de Baudry d'Asson — Call us to order, if you like ; what is
that to us, after you have said that, by calling us enemies, we are
not attacked !

The Speaker — No, you are not attacked. (Emphatic exclam
ations from the Right.)

M. de Baudry d'Asson — We protect our rights as fathers of
families, and no one can prevent us.

The Speaker — You have the right to answer from this tribune,
but not by interruption ; I shall not allow it.

Continue, M. Paul Bert.

The Count of Kerjegu — No one has the right to insult us, Mr.
President.

The Speaker — But, once more, you are not insulted : I can not
allow you to sa}- this. (New interruptions from the Kight.)

M. de la Rochefoucauld, Duke of Bisaccia — We are called
'• enemies " !

M. de Baudry d'Asson — We ask that the orator should with
draw that word !

The Speaker — You are not allowed to speak.

M. Paul Bert — What word have I to withdraw?

M. de Baudry d'Assnn — The word "enemies." You may de
cline ; but we request it, emphatically.

500 The Doctrine nf the Jesuits.

The Speaker — You have no right to ask for it.

M. de Baudry d'Asson — Beg your pardon !

The Speaker — Not at all ! I call you to order, with special
record in the Official Report ! (Good ! from Center and Left.
Exclamations from the Right.)

M. de Baudry d'Asson — Oh ! you can make use of it as long
as you like ! (Noise.)

M. Paul Bert — Your protestations do not astonish me. They
prove one thing : it is, that a regular confession exists over this
discussion : that there is an equivoque which has not been ex
plained, neither in 1850 nor in 1875 ; yes, it is now time to speak
openly; and it is time it should be dissipated. (Ah! ah! from
the Right.) We use the same words, but they have not the same
meaning. (New interruptions from the Right.)

M. de Baudry d'Asson — You ought to have spoken in that way
before the elections ; if you had done so, you would not be here.

The Speaker — I make an appeal to the members sitting on this
side (he turns to the Right.) When an orator of the talent and
competency of M. Paul Bert undertakes such a mighty debate,
during which it is necessary, more than ever, to maintain in full
the liberty of the tribune, it is not possible that his speech should
be hacked in pieces by interruptions of which the Chamber can
appreciate the consequences. (Applause from the Left.)

M. Paul Bert — We do not speak the same language: we, the
sons of the Revolution (I have said it, and it is sufficient) ; and,
on the other hand, the representatives, champions and protectors
of the Catholic Church, — it being alone the subject of this debate.

M. de la Bassetiere — Ah ! Good !

M. Paul Bert — No, we do not speak the same language.

M. Blachere — We speak but French.

M. Paul Bert — I know some other models of yours. Sir!
(Laughter from the Left.) We use the same words, but with a
different meaning ; we appeal to principles having the same label ;
but not the same source, nor the same end. (Good ! good ! from
the Left.) And when we speak of liberty, we can neither agree
nor understand each other. (Good ! good ! from the Left.) But
I must be precise. Liberty for us — oh ! 1 shall not speak meta-

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 501

physically ; I intend to speak of nothing else but of the liberty of
teaching, — liberty of teaching, for us, is the setting forth of
personal liberty.

M. Charles Floquet — That' s it !

M. Paul Bert — It is a particular case of that precious liberty,
censecrated by the first Declaration of Rights of 1791 ; of that
liberty for every citizen to express his thoughts in all forms and
circumstances possible, under the guardianship and supervision of

the laws.

It is that liberty which means liberty of teaching, for us who
believe in progress, in perfectability, in translating and teaching to
others what we have learned ourselves. It is our right. I should
ssy more : it is our duty. And I feel honored to have written,
long ago, these words: "They speak of k the right of teaching;'
they should say, « the duty ' of teaching. No one can, without
being a guilty egotist, keep to himself a part of the truth."
(Good! good! and applause from the Left.) That liberty, like
all others, Gentlemen, has in its display and execution but one
limit, which has been determined by the Declaration of Rights,—
that is, liberty for others : personal liberty ends only at the point
where the liberty of other citizens is interfered with.

Can we say the same of that liberty as understood, and which
must be so understood, by the Catholic Church? It is impossible I
We proceed from human right : the Catholic Church proceeds from
divine right. She has received her institution from above ; $
has been erected on a sacred foundation ; she has been given the
mission and order to teach. It has been said to her
docete."

The Count of Perrocliel — That is theology.

From the Left — T>v not interrupt.

The Speaker — Truly, M. de Perrocliel, you will compel me
call you to order, and I would regret it very much for your sake :
for generally, you are not in the habit of interrupting. I request
you to have patience and listen to M. Paul Bert, as you intend

answer him. . .,

M. Paul Bert - 1 am told " this is theology ! " Gentlemen, is it

meant by this that these words are not historical? it is, 1

502 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

accept the interruption. (Laughter from the Left.) I was saying
that the Catholic Church declares that she has received the mission
— the divine mission — to teach the truth, the whole truth, as all
facts concerning this world, as well as heaven, has been revealed
to her; that no one has any right to contradict her ; that she possesses
the sacred sign ; that light is not careful, and needs not wrestle with
darkness; that error must disappear before t:uth : she possesses
absolute, immutable, eternal, supreme truth ; consequently, she is
intolerant, and this is lier right.

Gentlemen, for the reason that she hns obtained her institution
from regions to which we cannot attain, for that reason her liberty
is not only like ours, — the right to tell the truth, and to teach all
which concerns her doctrine, — but her liberty falls, offended, by
the mere fact that, in her face, some one tells and teaches some
thing which contradicts her doctrine. (Good ! from the Left.)

Such liberty cannot admit competition : it cannot allow it, and it
refuses to accede to it.

The Count of Maille — Competition ! It is just what she is
sticking for !

M. Paul Bert — Beware of heresy, if you speak so, (laughter
from the Left) ; for it is written that no one can limit the right of
the Catholic Church ; that it must have the direction and super
vision of all instruction ; that, when the infected schools — those
which are not exclusively Catholic — dare stand before the Church,
it is an attempt against its liberty !

I well understand by your silence, that you accept this doctrine.
(Denials from the Right).

A Member of the Right— Not at all ! The Church never said such
a thing !

A Voice from the Left — Can you not let him speak?

M. de Baudry d'Asson — Let our Chairman, then, allow us to
answer.

The Count of Maille, to the Orator — If this is your theology, I
do not congratulate you upon it.

M. Paul Bert — As you do not agreo with my reasoning, because
you think that my interpretation of the thinking and doctrines of
the Catholic Church is erroneous — of which I am not surprised —

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 503

allow rne to strengthen my argument with the help of more compe
tent authorities.

I was saying that the Catholic Church must have not only liberty
but also the monopoly ; she needs it, she will have it, and she in
sists upon having it. I say that she is right ; for intolerance is one
of the signs of positivism ; and, in religious matters, tolerance is
one of the forms of scepticism. She insists upon it; and she exacts
also that governments come to her help and suppress all that of
fends, contradict or injures her. (Exclamations fiorn the Right.)
Listen to this if you do not believe me :

"The duty of the State is to come to the help of the Church . . .
in the work of public education and teaching. . . . The State has
certainly the right to propose, build and open public schools, chairs
for all kinds of universities and branches of teaching; she may
transfer the teaching to all sorts of persons, lay, religious or eccle
siastical ; but always on condition that the Church, which is the
only depository of the faith and of the interests of Christ and souls,
should supervise the same and direct the teaching, so as to pre
vent error from spreading in those places, under pretence of sci
ence, literature or history (Smiles from the Left); and may
find in the teachers true auxiliaries for the great work intrusted to
her by God.

"Such is, in its entire meaning, the thesis of liberty of teaching
and education.

"We are happy when we really enjoy that wretched equality
between falsehood and truth, between heresy and faith, — which in
modern style is called liberty of teaching. For us, it is indeed
liberty, though not full and complete ; lor others, for the ration
alist, protestant, free-thinking teachers, it is simple license. When
they clamor for liberly of teaching, they ask but for license for
leaching. They claim and obtain, not the noble right of using, but
the disastrous faculty of abusing teaching.

"In our unfortunate France, such is the case with University
teaching."

There is the doctrine of the Church !
From the Right — Who is the author of that?
M. Paul Bert— I am quite ready to tell you. The author is a
distinguished and well-known ecclesiastical dignitary, Mgr. de

504 The Doctrine of (lie Jesuits.

Segur ; and the book from which I quote is approved by a Papal
brief. (Laughter and applause from the Left.) ,

The Count of Maille — You always confound dogmatic with prac
tical questions ! (Exclamations and laughter from the Left.)

M. Paul Bert — The honorable M. de Maille is right, and I thank
him for his interruption, not that I had confounded between the
theoretical and the practical question, but I had to mention the
former before speaking of the latter. In Rome, this year, schools
have been opened under the direction of Protestants ; or, as is
said, of Free-thinkers.

Well, it is not a question here of Mgr. de Segur, but of the
Pope himself. It is not now a question of theory, but of facts.
What is the saying of the Pope ?

"We cannot keep silence on the strange impudence with which
they dared to open anti-Catholic schools under our own eyes, at
the very doors of the Vatican. . . .

" . . . Our situation is consequently such that we are obliged
to let error be free to raise up its chairs in our city, as we are not
at liberty to use efficacious means to destroy it, and compel it to
silence." (Laughter from the Left.)

Is this not the practical question? And now, if 3*ou do not well
understand this text, you have only to recall the Middle Ages, and
read this phraseology by the light of Vanini and Giordano Bruno's
burning piles ! (Applause from the Center and Left. — Exclama
tions and ironical interruptions from the Right.)

Such is the thesis, Gentlemen ! And now, if one of you laughs
or protests, I shall say to him : <•• Anathema!"

"Anathema" to whosoever says: The entire direction of
the public schools, in which is educated the youth of a Christian
State, — with the exception, in a certain proportion, of the episco
pal seminaries — should, and must be placed under the supervision
of civil authority ; and this in such a manner that no other
authority should have the right to influence the discipline of the
schools, the direction of studies, the arrangement of grades, and
the choice or approbation of teachers.

Anathema to whosoever says : Catholics may approve of a
method of education outside the Catholic faith and the Church's
authority, and which has for its purpose, at least for its chief j ur-
pose, the knowledge of merely natural matters and the interests
of social life on this earth."

Speech of M. Paul Btrt. 505

This is the truth ; this is the situation.

Was I right in saying that when you pronounce "Liberty," when
yon say "Liberty," we cannot understand each other? Was I
right in saying, that when you say "Liberty" you mean, and we
understand, "monopoly"? (Good! good! from the Center and
Left.)

Ah ! I well know that the times are hard and difficult ; that one
is obliged now and then to bow before the spirit of the century,
and content one's self with half-liberties.

Yes ; Mgr. de Segur says also :

"The Church may find herself face to face, either with unfriendly,
indifferent or friendly powers.

"Mie says to the first: Why do you strike me? I have the right
to live, to speak, to fulfill my divine mission, which is entirely one
of benevolence ; you are wrong to do me harm, to work against
liberty !

"She says to the second : He who is not with me is against me.
Why do you remain indifferent to God's cause? Why do you treat
falsehood as on the same footing with truth, evil like good, Satan
like Christ? You have no right to remain in such indifference !

*4She says to the third : You live in the truth and you act ac
cording to the will of God ; help with all your might to bring about
the glorious reign of Christ, and at the same time to make shine,
through him, truth, justice, peace, happiness ; help me to destroy
and suppress as completely as possible, everything which is con
trary to the most holy will of God, and the true welfare of men.

"Such is the language of the Church amidst the world ; in fact,
it claims only one thing : the liberty to do good, the only true
liberty/'

Gentlemen, I maintain that when you say "liberty," you mean
"monopoly." And I say, that, when we pass a law of the nature
of that brought before this tribune, you may, perhaps, in the n:ime
of the logic of our principles, attack us and tell us : "You are in
contradiction with your principles ; you go against them ; you arc
not logical; and we are going to prove it to you." It is your
right, this discussion. But there is something you have no right
to do : namely, to get angry, because that anger contradicts your
own principles. Well, Gentlemen, the proof of all this is easily
found iii the history of liberty of teaching in our country.

506 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Before the Revolution, was it ever & question of liberty of teach
ing? There was then a great and flourishing University, that of
Paris, besides a certain number of smaller ones, most of them in
a state of decay, and some almost closed. No school could be
open outside of them, without the assent of the King. And no de
grees were conferred in those universities, but by direct delegation
of the secular power ; it was not a question whatever of liberty of
teaching. Here and there, some congregations opened a few col
leges ; but the arrangement of grades was severely interdicted to
them ; sometimes even they were forbidden any preparation of de
grees, and they could open their establishments only after having
received a license from the King.

It was a monopoly. And why did the Church stand it so
patiently? Because it had the whole control of it; because those
universities were receiving canonical instruction; and nothing —
absolutely nothing — could be taught having in it a shadow of
heresj*. It was because the composition of the teaching-body, the
supervision of the bishops, and the King himself strictly guaran
teed the orthodoxy of the doctrines ; because the burning-piles of
the Sorbonne (however harmless they had become, burning noth
ing else but books in the last century,) were yet an efficacious
protection.

And moreover, the King was conservator, protector, defender,
executor of the rights of the Catholic Church, — these are, I believe,
Domat's very expressions, — the King, who swore under oath at
his coronation to exterminate heretics, — always sufficiently edu
cated against any dangerous teaching. Who would have dared,
then, to claim and insist upon liberty of teaching?

Philosophers had to make use of clandestine presses, or the
presses of Holland. As regards Protestants, so recently as 1787,
they had to petition for civil rights to be granted to their chil
dren. . . .

M. de la Bassetiere — Louis XVI. granted it to them.

M. Paul Bert — Yes, Louis XVI. accorded it ; but, almost unan
imously, the members of the clergy, in 1789, protested against this
decision. (Applause and laughter on the Left and Center.)

It is at the time of the Revolution that the thesis and doctrine

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 507

of liberty of teaching first appear. It was contained impliedly in
the Declaration of Rights of 1791 ; it is formally stated in the log-
islation, by the decree of the 29 Frimary, year II., whose first arti
cle reads : "Teaching is free."

But at the same time, conditions were imposed on those intend
ing to teach ; and there is the true ground.

Liberty of teaching, by natural right, as understood by the Rev
olutions, — such as we understand it ourselves, — consists in the
free expression of one's thoughts. Therefore, free liberty must be
granted ; all facilities must be accorded by the law to him who pub
licly addresses himself to citizens like himself, with sound and fully
developed minds ; who proclaims to them certain doctrines, certain
theories, and tries to enlist them in a particular scientific, histori
cal, literary or doctrinal party.

But when it is a question of addressing one's self not to adults,
but to children ; when it is a question of speaking, not in public
but in a class-room, in a school with closed doors ; when it a
question of holding young minds under secret guardianship ; to
keep them away from any foreign contact, to have over them an
unique influence, often isolated from the control of their family ;
when it is a question, at such a tender age, to impress on their
soft brain a mark which will last forever; then the legislation must
interfere. As early as Frimary year II. of the Revolution, there
were required certain conditions of capability and of respectabil
ity, without which it was not allowed to open schools ; and schools
once opened, it was necessary that precautions should be taken for
supervision as to their proper management.

The legislator therefore appointed inspectors to constantly watch
if anything in the doctrines or proceedings of the teachers consti
tuted a danger to the public peace or morality. This is the true
thesis, such as was proclaimed by the Revolution ! (Good ! Good !
from the Left. Exclamations from the Right.)

I hear protestations against what L say. I know very well that
nowadays such protestations are not made with very considerable
energy; but whoever has followed the campaign for the laws on
primary and secondary teaching,— which commenced in 18.30 and
ended only in 1850,— is aware how emphatic were the arguments

508

The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

against this doctrine. It was said to interfere with the rights of
lathers of family, — as is said also to-day, — by preventing them
from choosing the teachers they wished for their children ; by
obliging those children, and the professors appointed by their
fathers, to pass certain examinations. It was said that the State,
by substituting itself for the fathers of families, was assuming a
privilege of which it was unworthy ; because it had no doctrine,
and consequently could have no authority in regard to teaching.

I noticed in the speech of the honorable M. Boycr a trace of
that way of thinking, when he said that " the State has no doc
trine, and no morals ;" and I felt much astonished at hearing such
a thing come from such a deep-thinking mind, from a man so
highly esteemed by the Chamber and the Nation. (Warm approval
from the Center and Left).

And could you not, at the heading of our Codes, — as is printed
on the title-page of othrr books : "Commandments of God and of
the Church," — could you not write these words : "Commandments
of the State"?

The State, therefore, has morals and doctrines. What you
might have said, and what should have been said, — instead of
using the famous phrase of Roger Collard on the teaching of the
State, — is, that the State has neither religion nor metaphysics.
(Renewed approval from the Left.)

It was alleged that the primary conditions and supervision were
interfering with the rights of fathers of families. Oh! those rights
of fathers : we have the right to invoke them ; but we may feel sur
prised that they of the other side (the Right,) dare invoke them.

The passion and grief of the father of the family have been ex
pressed in eloquent terms : poor father ! compelled to send his
children to a school where will be taught them doctrines offensive
to his conscience, compromising, m his eyes, their eternal salva
tion and their worldly morality.

All this has been said, and with reason ; but those who were so
indignant might congratulate themselves that they spoke in the
nineteenth century, and were Catholics; for if they had happened
to live in 1686, and they had been Protestants, they would have
suffered the effect of that edict of Louis XIV. by which the chil-

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 509

dren of Protestants were taken away from their families at the
age of five years, and sent to Catholic schools !

M. Bourgeois — That is a proof that we wish to live according
to our time.

M. Paul Bert — Do you mean to say that you want to acknow
ledge modern progress and civilization? (M. Bourgeois and
several other Members of the Right: Oh! — Fiona the Left: Ah!
Ah!)

M. Bourgeois — There is room enough for both God and Science
in the world ! (A Member of the Left : "The Pope says, No ! ")

M. Clemenceau, ironically — Science is heretical!

The Count of Ma file — Liberty of conscience was granted for
the first time in 1814 by the " Chart ; " and I defy any one to say
or prove the contrary ! (Exclamations.)

M. Paul Bert — We are told that things are going to change ;
that new doctrines are suggested ; that it is desired to live accord
ing to modern times, being willing to make a compromise with
liberty and progress ; that now there is a Catholic liberalism. I
do not wish to refer you to the Univers or to the Civitta Catholica;
but listen to the last anathema of the SYLLABUS of 1864 :

"Anathema to whomsoever shall say : The Roman Pontiff should,
and must, reconcile himself to, and harmonize with progress,
liberalism and modern civilization." (Repeated applause from the
Left and Center.)

M. Bourgeois — You must not quote that anathema without
giving the explanation.

M. Paul Bert — Yon have no right to explain it.

M. Bourgeois — I shall explain it !

M. Paul Bert — The Pope, in a Brief of 1869, has declared, that
no one is allowed to explain or interpret those words ; that they
must be taken literally. I will read that Brief to you, if you
wish it.

M. deSoland — Ue has congratulated the Bishop of Orleans,

who made a commentary upon it.

, M. Paul Bert — Read to the end of that letter of congratulation.

It belongs to the category of correspondence, of which it has been
Wid: "Sileuoe is the best policy." (Ah! Ah! from the Left.)

f>10 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

The right of the State, which has been contested, — can it he
d'Hibted? No ; as I said, the State has no scientific doctrines ; it
leaves to the church the right to have an astronomy, a geology, a
physic, a history of her own. (Smiles from the Left.) The State
has no scientific doctrines: it has MORAL doctrines — doctrines
of social preservation !

On this ground, the State is sovereign master; on this ground,
it must scrupulously examine, if the men to whom it entrusts, or
grants the right to entrust, the education of the young citizens,
are worthy of that confidence; it has the right to examine if their
doctrines are not dangerous to the public peace, to the social order ;
it has the right to examine if, by entrusting those young men to
them, it does not prepare for a civil war in a longer or shorter
period. (Good ! good ! from the Center and Left.)

M. M. de la Billais and Ernest de la Kochette — It is an insult !
We have been brought up in that establishment. We protest.

The Speaker — Gentlemen, do not interrupt.

M. Paul Bert — I do not understand these interruptions.

M. Ernest de la Rocliette — We cannot allow anybody to attack
us.

The Speaker — The orator has the right to judge and examine
those doctrines which at various periods and under the judicial
and royal authority — appealed to by yourselves awhile ago —
have been considered as liable to le-ad to the disastrous excesses
condemned by the orator. When your turn comes, you may refer
to history and explain your doctrines; but, in the meantime, I
request vou to let the discussion proceed. (Good ! good ! from
the Left.)

M. Paul Bert — I beg your pardon, Gentlemen, I have not come
to the point yet. Once there, I will understand your interruptions
and protestations. We stand on the ground of general doctrines,
where monarchy placed itself before the Republic followed, namely,
that the State, in an absolute manner, or, rather, in an abstract
manner, has the right to concern itself as to the consequences of
doctrines impressed on the minds of youth. There is no doubt
about that.

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 511

I would understand your protestations if it were a question of
a monarch ! I do not know if you would make them then ; but I
should understand them. It would be a question of a single and
supreme will — of the will of a man set on the throne by heredity
or usurpation. (Applause from the Center and Left. — Protesta
tions from the Right).

But I stand on simple doctrines, and I confess that I do not
understand your protestations : this lets me foresee terrible storms
for the moment when I shall reach the region of facts.

I oay, that if the power of the State were remitted to the hands
of a monarch, fatal consequences, and its degeneration into tyr
anny, might be the result. We have had many examples of it ;
but this suspicion, justified by the authority of one man, how can
you have it in a democratic Republic? Who is master here, if not
the Nation? Who makes laws and imposes conditions, if not the
universality of citizens ; consulted, and, so to speak, concentrated
into one or two Chambers? And who shall be sovereign in the
nation, if not the Nation itself? Who can judge the nation, if not
the Nation ?

Will you say that it is the Church? Acknowledge, then, t'tat
you proclaim again your thesis of absolutism, and you will tell the
truth ; but do not talk to me of liberty of teaching.

To the liberty of teaching proclaimed by the Revolution, fie
University succeeds.

That conception had, indeed, its magnitude : it has shown it, and
shows it yet. But the University contained in itself a vice —
MONOPOLY ; and the monopoly consisted in the fact, that, instead
of saying, as stated by the Republican thesis, "You shall have
hbeity of teaching, under the condition of having previously
fulfilled certain foimalities, and furnished certain certificates of
capability and morality;" the University said: "Notwithstanding
your certificates are in good order, you shall not 'be allowed to
open schools without my authorization."

This is monopoly !

However, the teaching given by the schools of the State was so
wise, so moderate, so much in accordance with the moral need of
the majority of the nation, Chat liberal "minds did not protest. The

512 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Church alone protested, and with an ardor and intolerance that is
unparalleled.

Actually, the thesis has been rendered much easier, and they
have been obliged to give up a good deal ! It is generally acknowl
edged that the University is respected. One feels honored to
have been its pupil — to reckon some friends among its teachers.
All that is very pleasant. But it was not so when, formerly, it
was directly attacked.

M. Bourgeois — I don't know about that. I was not born !

M. Paul Bert — At that time, the University was the infected
school ; it was — for this expression has been a kind of watchword
— "a great repository of public instruction." Listen how it was
spoken of: It was "the negation, the annihilation of all notions
of good and evil, of all divine and human laws, of all true sanc
tions ; it was fatalism, suicide, crimes of all kinds, destruction of
all morality." ("The Monopoly of the University ; " Paris, 1843.)
This is one extract among a thousand.

Some Bishops, by their insults, were appealed by writs of ex
cess.

Then, the Church alone protested against the monopoly of the
University. And why did they protest so much, while accepting
so cheerfully the monopoly of the old monarchial government?
Merely and always for the same reason ; because they were the
high supervisors of the ancient teaching; and the University, with
out excluding them fn m the direction — far from it — had left them
absolute sovereigns neither of the programs, the teaching, nor of
the teaching staff.

However, the legislation of 1808 had written at the head of the
Constitution of the University: 4kThe teaching shall be given ac
cording to the doctrine of the Catholic religion."

Yet, in 1814, the Catholic Church having become the State
Church, her principles were imposed on the nation with still more
i igor.

But, no matter! The time had passed : the Revolution had done
its work. The idea of liberty of conscience had become incorpor
ated with the customs ; and, while respecting the general dogmas
of the Church, the teaching of religion wa>s set apart in the tuition

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 513

of the University. It did not predominate over everything. From
that arose the quarrel ; the raising of shields in the name of liberty;
the campaign of 1831 ; and finally, the triumphant campaign of
1850.

If the Church had dared, at that time, to state her claims in
the way that I pointed out at the beginning of this speech, they
would doubtless have been rejected by the good sense and wisdom
of the country. But they had taken shelter under the liberty of
the father of the family, — behind this sacred liberty, the least clash
ing with which infringes on what is nearest and most sensitive
within us. This liberty was used as a shield by those who asked
for the monopoly of the Church, by those who would have returned,
if they could be the masters, to the Declaration of 1686 ; that is to
say, to the suppression of the liberty of the father of the family !
You know through what complicity of generous illusions, to say
the least, the law of 1850 was voted, and also the law of 1876.
Had we then secured liberty? Was it liberty of teaching which was
proclaimed in 1875 ? It is easy to ascertain that it was not, and
this simply by one characteristic point.

I have said to you, that, for us, liberty of teaching proceeds
from personal right. Now, it is a rule in every legislation, and
hence in French legislation, that when individual rights are united
they are not considered in their totality ; for always by associa
tion they lose something of their whole importance. Then the
State interferes.

Now, strange to say, a phenomenon, unique in our legislation,
happened regarding this law of 1875 ; the individual right is re
duced by the law of 1875 to regularly mean conditions, so far so
that it was impossible to practice it,— of which we see the proof
in the denunciation of certain newspapers against the conferences
of the school of anthropology. Well, these limits placed upon each
individual's rights disappeared when these individual rights were
united: from this juxtaposition, from this union of incomplete
rights, rights more complete were born : such rights which go so
fa°r as even to extend over the dominion of public power. (Good !
Good! from the Left).

514 Tlit Doctrine of the Jesuits.

I do not believe Ihnt our legislation shows us another example
of such a peculiar heresy.

The scheme of law placed for discussion before you, re-estab
lishes things nearly in their normal state ; it reconstitutes this true
liberty of teaching ; it gives this liberty of teaching to all those
who show a proof of capacit}" and morality in some particular con
dition. This scheme of'law is not a coming back to monopoly, as
it does not recall the preliminary authorization ; it leaves standing
what actually exists for the liberty of men grouped, associated ;
but it re-establishes this liberty upon its true basis, the indi
vidual liberty.

What is the novelty in it, then? What is, then, Article 7? for
it is necessary that we come to it, inasmuch as it excites so much
passion. It is the addition to the conditions already required of
a new condition. (That's it! That's it ! from the Left and Cen
ter.)

It is the institution, — I do not insist upon this word, I know
how offensive it may appear, — it is the institution of a new order
of particular indignity, which will weigh upon a certain class of
citizens.

M. Plichon — The most honest citizens, too!

M. Paul Bert — That is what it is ; and the question is to know
if this indignity is justified, if this incapacity is justified, if the
State was right in bringing out to light this indignity, this inca
pacity. That is the question. (Signs of approval from Left and
Center.)

The Count of Maille — That is worth the dogmatic anathema.

The Speaker — Do not interrupt !

M. Paul Bert — Our honorable colleague, M. de Maille, does a
very great honor to our Minister of Public Instruction, by placing
Art. 7 on the same footing as the Encyclical Letter, "Quanta
Citra " / (Laughter from the Left.)

The principle of liberty itself is not touched upon ; but a new
condition of indignity, — justified or not justified, we will see
about that later on, — a new condition of indignity is established.

Is it justified? That is a discussion which would take a great
deal of time, and require the production at this time of many doc-

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 515

uments, which prevents me going further into it for the present,
by its very importance ; we shall see, when we reach the special
discussion of the Article, if the non-authorized congregations really
deserve to be placed under the heading of indignity of which there
is here a question.

Art. 7 has principally the Jesuits in view, besides all non-
authorized congregations.

First: Is this indignity so extraordinary and so new a subject?
Is it an invention of our honorable Minister? Is it a novelty?

To the indignation raised by this article, a feeling of surprise
seems to be added. I do not know about the value of this indig
nation ; but such surprise cannot be very serious.

As early as 1828, the well-known Ordinances had decided, that
in certain establishments teaching could not be authorized, unless
by the signing of a declaration that one did not belong to any un
authorized congregation.

M. Blachere — That was monopoly, then!

M. Paul Bert — I know very well that it is said these Ordinances
do not signify anything ; as it is said that the decree of Mes-
sidor, year XII., is a work of passion, and that it was to pay the
ransom of M. de Villede, that Charles X. was compelled to expel
the Jesuits from the secondary teaching.

Ah, Gentlemen ! that would show only one thing : namely, that
the Jesuits were really very much hated by the whole population,
BO as to afford the hope that, by the sacrilice of the former, the
Villede ministry, compromised as it was, could be saved. Yes,
they must have been very unpopular, for a man, who certainly
was not a radical, M. de Carne, to be able to proclaim before the
Chambers of Deputies that the measure had been received with en
thusiasm all over France! (Laughter and applause from the
Left.)

In 1844, when the law on secondary teaching was in discussion,
a man, who was not a Radical either — nor will I presume what
place he would occupy actually in this Chamber, nor make any
comparison which might be offensive to somebody here,— but
finally, a man who was certainly not a radical, the honorable Duke
of Brogile, said :

516 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

"To Iho diploma, the private teacher . . . should add a writ
ten certificate that he belongs neith- r to any association, nor to
any congregation which is not authorized by law. This obligation
has nothing new in it."

I am one of those who think, that the Ordinances of 1828, hav
ing been voted under the empire of monoply, and the law of 1850
having given liberty of teaching to every citizen, the members of
the non-authorized religious associations have the actual right to
teach the three different degrees. (Good ! from the Right) It is
precisely for that reason that the honorable Minister of Public
Instruction requests you to deprive them of this right. (Good!
from the Left and Center. — Exclamations and laughter from the
Right.)

That is very clear, indeed ; and I am astonished at your laugh
ter.

It is to sny, besides, that this Art. 7 is dangerous from this fact,
that it seems to annul existing legislation in the matter of the ex
istence of the non-authorized religious congregations. By taking
away from them the right of teaching, which the existing legisla
tion grants to them, many people think you thus recognize their
true existence, and all previous legislation is made void.

I do not believe this. I am one of those who think, — and some
jurists, more learned than a simple licentiate at law shall be heard
from this tribune pleading this important thesis, — lam one of
those who think that the law of 1790, that the law of 1792, that
the decree of Messidor, year XII., are in force yet. I am one of
those who say, as did M. Thiers in 1845, that if these laws prohibit
ing the religious congregation are now void, then the congrega
tions fall under the execution of Art. 291 of the Penal Code of
the law of 1834 on Associations. I will add, that if these last laws
do not apply to congregations, the reason is, the latter are regu
lated by the laws of 1790 and 1792.

M. 'Bourgeois — You might speak tons of M. Thiers in 1850.

M. Paul Bert — Thus, either they fall, as congregations, under
the execution of the law of 1790 ; or the}' fall as associations un
der the execution of Art. 291 of the Penal Code.

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 517

Because, finally, you cannot imagine that these associations are
regulated by no law whatsoever!

A man of great authority, Chancellor Pasquier, who cannot be
suspected of radicalism, said, in 1827: "It is an eternal principle,
independent of positive laws, which does not allow a society, what
ever it may be, to be formed in a State, without the approval of
the^ great Powers of the Nation."

Congregations, therefore, are in view of and under the control,
either of the law of 1790, or of Art. 291 of the Penal Code ; or if
it became impossible that either of these laws apply to them, it is
necessary to immediately make a law for the congregations, which
would have, I am sure, nothing to gain by it.

But, suppose that the Minister of Public Instruction and the
State Secretary, following that thesis which declares that Art. 291
of the Penal Code applies to religious congregations, proceed
against their members and secure judgment against them to the
full penalties of this severe law of 1834, whose abrogation I hope
we shall soon note ; then, immediately, on the strength of Art. 26
of the Law on Primary and Secondary Teaching, and of Art. 8 of
the Law on Higher Education, congregations would be placed
under prohibition, through incapacity of teaching. I believe, Gen
tlemen, that it would have been more prudent for the congrega-
tionists to have accepted this lenient and moderate compromise,
prepared by the Minister of Public Instruction, and have used it
as a tacit acknowledgment of their existence.

M. Baudry d'Asson — You are vtTy kind towards us, indeed !

M. Paul Bert — The Members of the Commission had before
them an Amendment, on which, doubtless, a considerable debate
will be raised in this Chamber. It was sail to us : '-What do you
fear from the teaching of the religious congregations ? What do
you wish to fight against, by Art. 7 of the scheme of law? You
propose to fight against the doctrines they are teaching, because
you consider them dangerous. You believe, rightly or wrongly,
that there exists in the bosom of this society, based on national
sovereignty, some associations teaching scorn for the sovereignty
of this nation. You believe that, in this country, in which politics
rest on universal suffrage, and which is characterized by a He pub-

518 The Doctrine of (he Jesuits.

licnn government, there exists some associations which teach scorn
i'or universal suffrage and our Republican form of government.
You fear a social clanger from the doctrines of the Jesuits, — such
doctrines as were proscribed so many times, and which have raised
against them universal reprobation, at least in the last ceivury.
And you say that, because of these doctrines, Jesuits' teaching
must be prohibited.

But look out ! these doctrines were simply Jesuitical doctrines
in the last century ; they are no more Jesuitical now-a-day ; they
have become the doctrines of the Catholic Church itself. All con
gregations, and, moreover, all members of the secular clergy, —
all those who receive Catholic investiture, — are compelled, by
duty to conscience, to teach the doctrines of the Jesuits. The
Catholic Church has, so to speak, crystalized itself around Jesuit
ism ! (Good ! from several seats on the Left.)

If, therefore, it is in consequence of these doctrines you will
interdict non-authorized congregations, be logical, and extend this
interdiction to the secular clergy ; because teaching will be just as
dangerous in their hands as in those of the Jesuits. This is,
Gentlemen, the thesis which has been proclaimed by the Commis
sion, and which will doubtless be brought to this tribune by our
eloquent colleague, M. Madier de Montjau. The Commission
declined to follow him in that way ; it so declined for two reasons.
First, we said to ourselves, that if the Government thought of
making such a distinction between these two classes of persons,
who may be assimilated in the doctrinal point of view, it is be
cause it has doubtless some reasons to think, that if certain dan
gers exist on one side, they are attenuated on the other ; perhaps
it has, through private inquiries made at home, and particularly
outside the frontiers, some reasons to believe that some changes
are in progress ; perhaps it perceives some symptoms of modi
fications acknowledged as necessary by many serious-minded men,
by many sincere Catholics, bringing back some harmony between
the Church on one side, and progress, liberalism, and modern
civilization on the other.

In fact, we inwardly think perfect logic does not exist in this
world ; and if the Government requests us to draw a line between

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 519

authorized congregations and those not authorized, it is likely
it is because it has some reasons for so doing. Theii we recall a
mnxim of St. Augustine. (Laughter from the Left.)

Saint Augustine said somewhat as follows: "God, who is Al
mighty, tolerates in this world a little evil, though he could pre
vent it, fearing, doubtless, that by preventing it, more good might
be destroyed, and greater evil might be occasioned."

" Likewise governments," — it is still St. Augustine who speaks,
"are often compelled to tolerate certain evil, for fear of pre
venting more good, or of letting an evil become greater."

This is our first reason : I did my best to sustain it with such
authority as would render it acceptable to everybody. (Good !
and laughter from the Left.)

Here is our second reason : It is that the secular clergy are prac
tically far different from religious congregations ; the recognized
congregations are far from being like the unauthorized societies.

M. de la Bassetiere — Not as regards doctrine ; they have given
proof to the contrary.

M. Paul Bert— Without a doubt ; I do not place myself now at
the doctrinal point of view. I say there is a wide difference — all
of you know it ; therefore it is useless to insist upon the point -
between the religion* orders and the secular clergy, the latter being
appointed by the bishops, functionaries of the State, composed
of officers appointed by the State, and paid by the State.

This clergy has our confidence ; it deserves to have it. We
cannot forbid their teaching in a private way. Religious orders,
authorized or not, are similar as to their doctrines ; but in the
judgment of the lay State, there is a wide margin between associa
tions which submit to the conditions required by law, presenting
their regulations for approval, modifying them when so requested,
— as did the Brethren of Saint- Yron at the beginning of this
century, who claimed the assistance and acknowledged the
rio-hts of the State ; and some groups of men who associate
themselves outside of the law, outside of the State, refusing to
exhibit their statutes, to submit to the rules of civil society, or even
to recognize its rights and supremacy. (Applause from the Lc-f
and Center.}

520 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

A Member of the Right — That is an error.

M. Paul Bert — Why, then, do they not ask for the recognition
of their laws?

M. Plichon — Because they know civil society and all its laws.

M. Blachere — If they act contrary to the law, prosecute them.

M. Paul Bert — In general, those who get round the laws, are
those who know them best. (Good ! and laughter from the Left).
Oh, I do not deny that they are well acquainted with them.

What is sure is, - that they will not submit to the State :
that they do not recognize the Nation as sovereign. What
is certain is, that they are continually opposing the princi
ple proclaimed by Chancellor Pasquier : "That eternal principle,
independent of positive laws, which does not allow that a society,
whatever it ma}T be, should be constituted in a State, without the
approval of the great Powers of the Nation ! "

I say, that those congregations are putting themselves in a state
of rebellion against the State ; that they do injury to the State
(Noise from the Right) ; and I say, that the State has the right to
say to them : "You will not recognize ray authority; therefore,
I will not permit you, who are despising my rights, to teach the
national youtji ! " (Renewed interruptions from the Right).

M. Bourgeois — The proof!

M. Paid Bert — Proof is requested ! What proof? The proof
that those societies are not acknowledged by law?

M. Bourgeois — That they do not acknowledge the law.

M- Paul Bert — That they will not present their statutes. It is
a fact.

M. Bourgeois — Expel them, if they act contrary to the law.

M. Paul Bert — I was saying, that there is between these non-
authorized associations and the acknowledged congregations the
immense distance which separates people who do not submit to
law and those who do. This is the reason why we accepted Art.
7, with the distinction it made between these two different kinds
of congregations.

Another formal objection is made. We have been told, "That
Art. 7 is not in its proper place ; it refers to religious congrega
tions. It should not have been found in a law on Education." It

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 521

is added also : "This Article has for its object primary and sec
ondary teaching ; it is too general a subject to be inserted in a
law dealing specially with higher instruction."

The honorable Minister of Public Instruction will reply to this
argument ; he certainly will answer triumphantly. We, the Mem
bers of the Commission, did not feel inclined, through a sort of
parliamentary modesty — through legislative scruples — to put
ourselves in contradiction with the Government at the very mo
ment of its execution of an energetic action, and decline to vote
for an article approved by us, under the pretence that, perhaps, it
was out of place. And why did we not do so ? Because the real
value of our decision would not have been understood. This is
the right of political parties. It would not have been said that
we rejected the article for reason of formalism, but because we
were not satisfied as to its principle. We are not willing to afford
that satisfaction to our adversaries.

Here are, Gentlemen, the reasons which have compelled us to
vote Art. 7, fie most important, considerable and novel part of
the proposed law.

Besides, there is a disposition which seems actually to have
passed, in the second place ; and the expressions of excitement
which it has aroused are nothing but the echo of ancient and far-
c.-ff passion. It is the Article which restores to the State the
bestowing of degrees.

About two years a<jo, when the honorable M. Wadington pro
posed a very similar law, its opponents provoked a great agitation
throughout the country, and a scheme of petitions, which came in
covered with two or three hundred thousand signatures, — which
signatures are mostly the same as those which have been more
recently presented to us, affixed by but a very small number of
active citizens.

A Member of the Rujht — There are fifteen hundred thousand of

them.

A Member of the Left — Including children !

M. Paul Bert— 1,500,000 ! I am willing to believe it. I don't
know anything about it: only a small quantity has been received

522 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

by us — 126,153, — reserving the honor of the big lump for the
Senate.

It would be fair to strike off the signatures of women and
children, which form a considerable quota.

The Count of Kerjegu — Not so many, though.

M. Paul Bert — Also, to deduct such signatures as are written
by the same hand. (Laughter from the Left.)

I have seen a certain number of those fulse signatures, — as
man}' as eight of them following one another in a single petition.
These should be deducted, as well those gathered a few days ago
in one of the prisons. (Laughter).

M. cle la Biliais — As for those who are dwelling there, they are
deprived of their liberty.

M. Paul Bert — Let us leave these trifles. L^t us take your
figures, and accept your statement of 1.500,000 signatures. I say,
those 1,500,000 signatures ought not to be mentioned here, before
this Assembly. We represent a far larger number. Two years
ago, after an order of the day . . .

A Voice frcm the Left — There are not 1,500,000.

The Speaker — We cannot verify the statement just now. It is
therefore better for both parties to refrain from such exclamations.

M. Paul Bert — . . . After an order of the day relative to
ultramontane intrigues, and voted by 363 members, a campaign
commenced, during which this Chamber had to give way. The
consequence was dissolution, and we returned to our electors: we
requested them to judge between the acts of those who had caused
the dissolution and our own conduct. We denounced to them the
clerical intrigues, — or rather the Jesuitical intrigues, to call them
by their right name. You know their answer : they elected us
again; not only 363, but 385! We do not represent 1,500,000
signatures, including those of women, children, and prisoners ; we
represent here 6,000,000 electors. (Hurrah! and applause from
the Left and Center) .

M. Anisson-Duperron — And we, 5,000,000!

M. Ernest de la Itochette — This is the art of grouping figures !

M. de MaiUe — Masonic lodges, that is what you represent!
(Noise). . . .

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 523

3f. de Baudry d'Asson — You represent the dying "Republic, the
agonizing Republic! (Exclamations from the Left. — Laughter
from the R;ght).

The Speaker — M. de Baudry d'Asson, this is an intolerable
system of interruption ! (Exclamations from t ic Rigiit.) Gentle
men, I understand very well certain interruptions, and as you see,
I do not repress them ; but it is impossible, even when done incon-
siderateh' (Laughter from the Left) and without authority, to
allow anyone to say, that " the Republic is dying." There are
enough people here who know very well that it is living, and that
it shall live ! (Applause from the Center and Lefl.)

M. de Baudry d'Asson — We ought to take you as a model,
Mr. Chairman, to learn the art of interrupting, as taught by you
\vhensittingonthesebenches! (Noise.) . . .

The Speaker — M. de Baudry d'Asson, if }'our mind is made up
to interrupt, I shall take the advice of the Chamber, and request
it to put a stop to that system ! (Approbation from the Center
and Left.) Let this notice be sufficient! . . .

Continue, M. Paul Bert, and do not let yourself be disturbed
from your discussion.

M. Paul Bert — The honorable M. de Baudry d'Asson was say
ing that we represent here the dying Republic ! . . .

M. de Baudry d'Asson — Exactly !

M. Paul Bert — Decency prevents me telling which is the dying
party to-day.* (Good ! good ! from the Center and Left.)

M. Bourgeois — I guess you are not addressing us !

M. Paul Bert — Gentlemen, the restoration to the State of a
prerogative which no one can contest, has been in 187G the object
of very forcible claims, which have since become more moderate,
for those concerning Ait. 7 were to be expressed previously,
and more emphatically, if possible. These -claims were expressed
more particularly,— and will surely be so again m the speeches of
orators who will succeed each other at this tribune,— on acquired
rights, and on the great principle of the stability of the laws.

We may likely be told: u You interfere with acquired rights.

* The death of the " Imperial Prince " (Napoleon III.'s heir,) had been
made kiiuvvn that very day.

524 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

iTpon the faith of the law of 1875 capital has been accumulated,
colleges have been erected, mutual agreements have been made
between professors and those establishments, great expenses have
been incurred. You have no right, by the stroke of a pen, to
annul those contracts, to make those expenses of no account."

We may also be told: " What becomes of the principle of the
stability of the laws, when a law voted in 1875 is suppressed in
1879 ; when everything is to be repeatedly and unceasingly dis
cussed, — shall the Republic be the government of perpetual insta
bility?"

Gentlemen, when such language is used on the stability of the
laws — when it is desired to have a law of long-lasting force, — it
must be voted at a time when the Assembly which makes it has
full power of action and really represent the national opinion !
It should not be delayed, as was done in 1875, until a Chamber,
having prolonged its sitting beyond every limit and expectation,
— and even, according to nearly half of its members, beyond its
rights, — should have come, dying and in the spasms of agony, to
vote a law with only 50 majority ! . . .

M. de la Bassetiere — It was that very Assembly which instituted
the Republic !

M. Paul Bert — Even during the discussion of the law, warn
ings were not lacking : several orators declared that such a law
would scarcely survive to the National Assembly. . . .

During the parliamentary vacations following the vote of the
12th of July, 1875, some authorized voices, — voices whose author
ity and power were soon to be extended, — have declared that the
law would soon be abrogated.

Many among us have made such a promise in the course of the
electoral period ; so that on its entry to office, the Government, in
its message, and soon after in a proposition of law, requested us
to revise what was excessive in the law on liberty of higher teach
ing, the collation of degrees, and the mixed jury.

This bill, voted by us, was rejected in the Senate, by a majority
of two votes ! You know that.

I ask you, in good faith, whether it was possible to think that
law was going to be of long duration ? if those capitalists who

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 525

united, at the request of the French bishops — in contradiction of
the concordat, but let us not insist upon it, — to establish the
Universities of Lille, of Lyons, etc., could in good faith say, that
they will be surprised the day when this excess of power will be
taken away from them.

Oh, if it were a question of destroying those establishments, —
of closing them, of di-charging the totality of the teaching body
as well as the pupils, — I concede that, in spite of all these warn
ings, you might have some good reasons to give, some sound
motives for complaining of persecution,

A Voice from the Left — Apparent reasons !

M. Paul Bert — Those reasons, the Chamber would judge ; but
in the actual situation, I maintain that yon have no appearance of
reason to give : I maintain that it has been impossible for any
University founder, or any appointed teacher, to think that the
mixed jury would continue to exist beyond a few months after the
meeting cf the Assembly of 1876.

M. de la Bassetiere — Why not?

M. Paul Bert — It is said, also, that the collation of degrees
does not touch questions of principle; that there is in it nothing
fundamental or vital ; that the Government is seeking only aggra
vating and ruinous measures, so as to prevent Catholic universities
from existing.

I believe, on the contrary, and the Chamber thought in 1879,
with an immense majority, that it is a question here of a right of
which it is impossible to despoil the State, the reason of which is
very simple : In every country of the world, in all times, the
State has required from its officers certain pledges of capability ;
and those pledges could be furnished only before delegates of the
State.

From this it clearly follows, that the State must be entirely free
in the choice of its delegates. Now, what is the object of the law
of 1875 ? It takes away that liberty. It compels it to take from
certain bodies, constituted outside of itself, on whose recruitment
it has no kind of action, over which it has but a right of inspection
extremely vague and not really known — it compels the State to
take into- the bosom of those bodies a part of the members of its

526 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Jury of Examination, when it ought to be absolutely and perfectly
free in its choice.

There may be some attractive point in the thesis of the special
State Jury, which certainly will be presented to you from this
tribune. The Commission has not faikd to attend to it. It has
not failed either to take into consideration the solution just ac
cepted in Belgium, which consists in granting, through a direct
and special delegation of the State, to all free Universities, the
right to confer their own degrees. In fact, one of our honorable
colleagues, the Duke of Feltre, has proposed the same plan in his
suggestion.

But if, taking it at the worst, one may see in this a contradic
tion of the principles I have just named, — when it is a question,
as in Belgium, of Universities which had already been of long
duration, had given certain pledges, had made themselves appre
ciated by the public and the State for twenty or thirty years, — it
is impossible to discuss the question to ascertain whether the State
is going to withdraw and deliver the collation of di grees. for the
only reason that a University would be established, with the help
of teachers! Consequently, we have rejected the proposition of
the Duke of Feltre as insufficient, dangerous, and premature.
(Good! good! from the Center and Left.)

There remains the thesis of the State Jury : that Jury where it is
to be gathered.

No one ever had the thought of depriving the State professors
of the right to grant degrees to their own pupils !

M. de la Bassetiere — To be both judge and defendant !

M. Paul Bert — Consequently, it would have been necessary to
institute a jury for free universities. This would be giving two
origins to the same degree, which is the most foolish and reckless
action imaginable. We have rejected that system.

The true State Jury we found already constituted : it is the body
teaching and examining the faculties of the State.

Here are the reasons for which we have voted the Article restor
ing to the State the collation of degrees.

But we are told : 4t This article is harmful and ruinous ; it will
close the doors of Universities ! And to that ruin dishonor is

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 527

added ; because you take away from them titles they hnd borne
since the 13th Century ; for, through a peculiar and genealogical
miracle, universities established three years ago invoke the remem
brance of ancient faculties, and consider themselves as their heirs."
(Laughter from the Left.)

M. de la Bassetiere — That is true ; they are their legitimate
dang liters.

M. Paid Bert — We are told: "You deprive them of a title
they possessed since the 13th century," excepting a certain inter
val. (New laughter from the Left.) They add that, " We do
injury to those universities." I have been, indeed, astonished to
see that thesis developed in one of our most important reviews, by
the pen of a writer bearing a name much respected in the Uni
versity. This writer protests and affirms that things did not get
along in the same way in 1850 ; that such an insult had not then
been made to places for secondary teaching ; that they had not been
refused the right to bear the titles of High School and College.
It is certain that this interdiction had not been enacted. But what
is sure, also, is, that under the Empire, a decree of 1860 restricted
to State establishments the exclusive right to bear the title of
Colleges and High Schools ; and for this reason they were inter
dicted to others, under the pretence that such titles are State titles,
— that is, the property of the State ; that such an usurpation con
stituted a regular offence against the right of property ; and, at the
same time, there is involved a question of loyalty.

Now, while speaking on the subject, I recommend the too-long-
nrgleeted execution of this decree to the attention of the Minister
of Public Instruction, who may find more than one opportunity to
enforce the said decree.

Gentlemen, I do not think that the fact of depriving schools for
higher teaching of their titles of Colleges and Universities, — as well
as taking away from them the collation of degrees, for restoring
them to the State Jury, — may be of such importance as to
threaten the very existence of those institutions.

I dare say, that those very men who protest with such bitter
ness, have neither the intention of closing their establishments,
nor the fear that they will be deserted by their pupils.

523 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

We have, in this instance, several examples to present : A
school which is growing- in authority and becoming renowned, even
abroad, the School for Political Science, instituted in Paris a few-
years ago, is actually prospering, and has numerous pupils. It
does not call itself a u University ;" it does not confer any degrees ;
or, at least, the certificates of capacity granted by its directors
are of no official value !

The same may be said relative to a more recent school, but
which nevertheless will purely, also, attain celebrity — 1 mean the
School of Anthropology !

And I cannot help mentioning that, this very day is celebrated
the centennial of the foundation of that illustrious Central School,
although not bearing the title of University, and whose coveted
diplomas are of no State authority ! (Good ! good ! from the
Left.)

No, you have nothing to fear, if you do what you propose, —
if 3Tou desire to provide for certain things that are lacking, to give
certain instruction neglected by the State, or even do better in
teaching than the State schools ; if you earnestly mean to work
actively for the progress of science, the improvement of higher
teaching, your educational institutions will prosper.

But if such is not your intention, — if you fed no interest in
the true progress of science, — if you appealed to Catholics, dis
quieted and impassioned, only for the sake of increasing the funds

of free establishments, (Laughter from the Center and

Left) ; if, as per the report of certain calumniators, you wish
— and that "you" does not apply to anyone present, — if you
want only to have, in the cheapest way, the greatest number
possible, within medical universities, physicians who dispose or
prepare their patients (renewed laughter from the Center and
Left) ; if you wish to have in all law universities notaries giving
advice on the disposition of wills, (Applause, on the same seats. —
Protestations from the Right.) ....

M. de la Rochefoucauld, Duke of Bisaccia — These are terrible
insinuations.

M. de la Bassetiere — Mr. Chairman, it is impossible to allow
such insinuations ; and I refer them to your highest sense of jus-

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 52(J

ticc It can not be allowed to bring forth at a French tribune
such allegations without accompanying proof.

M. Paul Bert — I said, Gentlemen, that the "you" did not
anply to any one here present. (Exclamations from the Ri<rht.)
Do you want me to say now, that it does not apply to any°one
of the existing universities, and that I am merely drawino- a
hypothesis of what is not likely to exist?

M. de la Bassetiere — Why do you talk about it?

M. Paul Bert -Well, I ask you, Gentlemen, if, by any possi-
)ihty, there were such universities, having no other purpose but
the preparation, in those conditions and for that end, of notaries,
lawyers,

^ The Count de Maille — Being a talented man, why do you not
discuss like a man of talent?

M. de Kerjegu — Whydo you discuss an impossible hypoth
esis?

M. Paul Bert — Gentlemen, it is almost as difficult to speak in
this case of hypothesis as of reality. (Applause from the Center
and Left.)

Finally, if the so-called universities do not accomplish the mis
sion for which they have been instituted,

A Member of the Itiykt — Let them live; you shall see! ...

M. Paul Bert— . . . it is entirely possible that the actual law
gives them a mortal blow ; and then, of what would they have to
complain?

I did not see with satisfaction the institution of that liberty of
higher teaching. Not because I am hostile to its principles, ....

M. de la Rochette (ironically) — On the contrary !

M. Paul Bert— . . . . but I confess that I feared the conse
quences. I explained myself on this point at the tribune of the
National Assembly, and you will please allow me to recall the
hypothesis I then suggested.

I said, while speaking first of the monopoly system : Here are
two children, who were born in the same village, the sons of two
friends ; they go together to the village school ; then to the com
mercial college, or to the high school ; and from thence to the
State University. They meet again on the same seats, follow the

530 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

same teaching: they are not cast in the same mould; as it his
been said, they will not be the effigy of the same stamp, — and
our own discussions, we who have been brought up in these condi
tions, are a sufficient proof of it, — but, at least, they will have
learned to know each other, and to love each other.

Among their teachers — among their older schoolmates — they
will have met with the expression of diverse feelings, opinions and
doctrines ; they will have compared them with those directly
taught in the bosom of their families : and then they will have
formed for themselves a conviction and a doctrine of their own,
which might be erroneous, but which, at least, will be impregnated
with that spirit of tolerance which is the fruit of an earnest convic
tion. (Exclamations from the Right.)

That is the consequence of monopol}". It has its inconveniences,
I said so ; but }*ou see that it has also its usefulness and greatness.

And now, in the actual state of things, what may, or what is
going to happen ? One of these children is going to follow the
evolution I just spoke of : he goes to the public secular school, to
the State college, and to the State untversit}' ; and on his way he
receives that instruction alluded to — that education impregnated
with tolerance. (Laughter from the Right.)

Yes, Gentlemen, it is precisely because it is impregnated with
tolerance, because it is the enemy of fanaticism, that fanatics
themselves have alleged that it causes degradation of character.

The other child will go to the Brothers' school, to the Jesuits'
college, and, finally, to the Catholic university, not seeing his
friend for many years, — and what kind of instruction has he
received? I do not speak of the scientific teaching; that is not
of much interest for the Chamber, although I cannot help recalling
that maxim which will have directed all his education, — that
maxim of a celebrated and eloquent doctor, Joseph cle Maistre,
who, if he were living to-day, would defend Catholic universities,
namely: " Ignorance is better than science; for science comes
from men, and ignorance comes from God." (Laughter from the
Center and Left.)

M. de la Biliais — He did not put that maxim into practice.
(Exclamations from the Left.)

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 531

M. Paul Bert — O\\ ! Sir, these are maxims which are practised

on others — on those over whom one wishes to dominate, and

are simply used as instruments of power. (Renewed applause
from Center and Left.)

M. de la Bassetiere — Please quote to us the words of Voltaire,
who wanted for the people only a plow, a yoke, and some hay !

The Speaker — Do not interrupt !

M. Paul Bert — Gentlemen, if you do not like me to quote De
Maistre, I will relate to you some facts I witnessed personally ; I
will speak to you of pupils who present themselves for the higher
diplomas, after having poured into their inkstands a few drops of
the water of Our Lady of Loirdes, so as to ensure their success.
(Double salvo of applause from the Left. — Protestations from
the Right.)

M. Bourgeois — Perhaps his lay teacher will not be learned
enough to chemically analyze it.

M. Paul Bert — As regards moral teaching, we shall talk about
it when we reach Article 7, — when we shall commence its special
discussion, and we shall see whether the modern casuistry has
sufficiently rejected the disgusting maxims of Sanchez and Liguori.
(Noisy exclamations from the Right.)

You will then judge if this word is ovcrstrong. As I do not
give the proof to-day, I will withdraw it if you like; but when I
come to its explanation, you will ask me yourselves to recall it.
(Good ! from the Left.)

So much for science; that is for morals: but we are here a
political assembly : let us see what the child will have learned in
respect of practical politics.

He will have learned that the Catholic Church must be the only
Master and Sovereign in the world, and completely dominate and
rule all secular governments, which have only duties to fulfill to
wards it, while it has all the rights, "for it is King and Emperor,
or nothing at all," according to the saying of M. de Montalembert.

And if he has been in the school of law at Lyons, he will have
learned that, "even in questions of simple social utility, the Gov
ernment can do nothing without the assent of the Church."

He will have learned — thf&u ate sacred words — that " there is

532 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

an anathema against whomsoever pretends that it pertains to the
secular power to determine what are the rights of the Church, and
the limits within which she may exercise them."

He will have learned from the mouth of Gregory XVI. that
" liberty of conscience is a delirium — l deliramentum.' '

He will have learned from the mouth of the late Pope, that
" universal suffrage is an universal lie ; that it is a delirium to
pretend that citizens have any right to the liberty of expressing
their opinion."

He will have learned, in short, to despise — and from that to hate,
there is but one step — all the principles which are the founda
tion of our social state and our political state ; and he will be very
fortunate if he has not been brought up, for instance, in the
diocese of Toulouse, and if he has not been compelled to enlist in
the sacred militia, in the Papal militia ; if it has not been sai.l to
him, in inflammatory language, that the hour has come, that the
sacred bugle has sounded, that the flag is unfurled, and now is the
time for the new Maccabees to draw the sword and march to vic
tory or martyrdom !

Well, I ask you, when the young man who has received such
instruction meets the friend of his childhood, how will he look upon
him? What terrible preparation you will so have made aguin&tthe
public peace? I said it, and I repeat it to you: You will have
prepared civil war in the public mind. (Warm applause from t!.e
Center and Left.) Yes, you will have prepared civil war in the
public mind ! Would to God that good national sentiment and
public common sense prevent it from going farther ! (Good !
good ! from the Left. )

But we have been told, " It is the consequence of liberty ! "

M. de Bcmdry iVAsson — But there are two ministers here, who
have been brought up by the Jesuits !

M. Bourgeois — Those who were just applauding }TOU, have their
sons educated by Jesuits ! It is a great inconsistency !

The Speaker — Please do not interrupt.

M. Paul Bert — I ask you, Gentlemen, if the quotations I made
awhile sgo, emanating from authorized mouths, and often from
sacred mouths, are not actually taught in the instruction of the

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 533

congregations? I ask you, if it is not true, the word of a man
whom I regret not to see here any more, because he was not one
of those men who dissimulate their thoughts, — I mean the hon
orable Comte Albert de Mun

From the Right — You rejected him; you invalidated him. . . .

M. Paul Bert — I invalidated him? Yes, for the sake of justice,
but with deep regret ; for his character and talent did honor to this
Chamber. (Good ! good ! from many seats of the Left.)

Well, you know what he said from this tribune ; you remember
the words which were gathered and published in the educational
books and in Catholic Universities, especially in the University of
Lyons : k' It is not possible for you, Gentlemen, to say where the
Catholic Church begins and where it ends ; its authority extends
over all."

But we are told, " That is the consequence of liberty ! " I do
not believe it ; I think liberty might have been secured on other
conditions ; I believe that liberty could be organized even in State
institutions.

I expected it to be quite different. I had imagined liberty in
full light, in the full sunshine, in full contradiction : I had thought
that we might reopen the great universities in which all doctiines
could be taught, and all theories and opinions freely expressed
and brought to light. I was not afraid of contradiction. One of
my honorable colleagues was saying to me yesterday: "You
would not be worthy of the name of a man of science if you feared
contradiction." I am not afraid of it, but on one condition. I
repeat it, it is that it should be with equal arms, and in full light.
(Applause from the Left.)

M. Annison-Duperron — You should not have excluded your

adversaries. . . .

M. Paul Bert — That was not the case : they wanted to hold
minds in close restriction ; they were constantly watching ; they
endeavored that no contradiction should reach them, because
was the best way to prepare men for future events. (Good !

the Left.)

This was not very secretly done. I do not speak of political
meetings, where one is more prudent; but of certain books, m

534 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

which it is said: "Our duty is to make use of the poor limited
liberties left to us, to prepare a large nucleus of Christian gene
rations, strongly bteeped in faith, devoted to the cause of the
Church, knowing true liberty thoroughly, in order that the future,
at least, should be better than the present, and that a bright
spring should succeed to our interminable winter ! " (Good ! from
the Right.)

M. de la Biliais — We want to think of the future, as a consola
tion for the present.

M. Paul Bert — That is their intention, which can be summed
up in one word : They are invoking the name of liberty, so as to
prepare slavery ! " (Good ! good ! from the Centre and Left.)

I ask you, a political assembly, if, when such doctrines are
taught, if, when they are taught secretly, you can disinterest your
selves to the point of disarming the State of that poor and in
sufficient right it will have to make inquiries, by questioning pupils
whether those doctrines did not prevent them from acquiring, at
least, some positive knowledge?

I ask you, if, when some men have refused to submit to the
laws of the State by refusing to show their statutes, so as to ob
tain its authorization

Voice from the Eight — They have not been asked to present
them.

M. Paid Bert — Do you mean to say, that it belongs to the
Government to ask for the statutes of a secret society? That is a
strange doctrine.

Can you deny to the Government the right of refusing to those
who wish to teach the youth, the possibility of doing what I have
just pointed out? (Noise from the Right.)

What you want is a deaf Government, an impotent Government,
an incapable Government : governmental nihilism, governmental
abdication. (Exclamations from the Right.)

Well, we shall not consent to that abdicatio'n ; and as long as a
breath of life remains m us, we shall fight to maintain for the
Nation that it should be sovereign at home, and receive orders
from nobody ! (Interruptions from the Right.)

M. de Baudry d'Asson — You will not be alone to fight, M. Paul

Speech of M. Paul Bert. 535

Bert, I tell you ; there is Catholic France behind you, do not
forget it !

M. Paul Bert — These Gentlemen are eager, I believe, for a
homage which I am quite disposed to pay to them. I well know
that when the call to arms was mnde'nt the frontier, when the
foot of the enemy trampled the soil of fatherland, you were found
there. . . .

Voice, from the Right — Yes ! yes ! we were !

M. Paul Bert — ... If I had forgotten it, you have repeated
it often enough for it to be remembered. (Good ! good ! from the
Left) .

M. Viette — They were not alone to defend fatherland ! Every
one took part in her defence !

M. Paul Bert — You were not the only ones who did it ; and
this does not signify anything for the past, except, perhaps, that
your liberty of teaching has not yet borne all its fruits. (Good !
from the Left).

I believe that I have demonstrated that you must restore to the
State a prerogative belonging to it, and the return of which will
not excite even a legitimate surprise ; I believe I have demon
strated that there are dangerous doctrines, and that you have the
right to prevent those who teach them, and did not set themselves
aright towards the State, from teaching them to the national
youth. That is the whole thesis of the law.

Now, before descending from this tribune, will you allow me, I
do not say an advice, — you would not permit it — but a kind of
warning? That warning I took the liberty of giving when the
discussion of the law presented by the honorable M. Wadington
took place ; it has not been listened to. I said then to many of
its adversaries, that they would have done wisely to have accepted
that law.

]f accepted, said I, it may be considered as a transaction.

M. de Baudry d'Asson — We do not want any transaction.
(Exclamations from the Center and Left).

M. Paid Bert — It is not to you I wish to give advice, M. de
Baudry d'Asson !

M. de Baudry d'Asson — You are right ; because I would not

accept it !

536 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

The Speaker — Then do not interrupt. (Good ! from the Left.)

M. Paul Bert— It it is voted, said I then, that law will constitute
a kind of transactional ground from which it will be difficult to come
out, and what you call the liberty of teaching will be singularly
protected by that law voted by Republican Chambers. If you
reject it, your triumph will not be of long duration. We are soon
to have new elections ; senatorial elections are shortly to re-estab
lish harmony between the two Chambers ; and this time it will not
be a question merely of this modest collation of degrees : you may
lose much for not having been willing to give up a little !

A Member of the Eight — We may also gain much !

M. Paul Bert — I have not been listened to ; I shall not be
listened to, if I repeat the same warning in about the same terms.

Gentlemen, the law submitted to you may be summed up by
this formula, given by the illustrious Leibnitz: "They have no
right to liberty, who want to use it for teaching hate and the over
throw of all liberties." (Good ! from the Center and Left).

That is the meaning of the actual scheme of law.

And I say to you now : Take care ! for if the proposed law be
rejected, — if intolerance of sects, if Jesuitical and ultramontane
intrigues continue to excite public feelings, it might happen some
day, in another Chamber may be, that more audacious men, —
surely, less prudent, doubtless, less wise, I am inclined to believe,

M. Bourgeois — More logical !

M. Paul Bert — But more logical, as it is suggested to me, will
ask for the translation into legislative and administrative language
of the formula of the above-named great philosopher : " Tolerance
itself is not due to intolerant people ! " (Renewed applause from
Left and Center. The orator on resuming his seat was warmly
congratulated by a great number of his colleagues.)

'

SPEECH

at tjje Sitting of tfjc 5tfj of
3ul2, 1879.

DISCUSSION OF ARTICLE 7.*

M. Paul Bert — Gentlemen : lam called to the tribune by the
word of the honorable orator, f who just left it. He said a minute
ago, "that one would not dare to mention again that series of
lies — that is his expression — which for several centuries have
been heaped up around the history of the Jesuits ! " . . .

M. Keller — That word was not addressed to you personally.

From the Left — We hope not !

M. Paul Bert — The idea never entered my mind that such a
word could have been meant for me personally !

From the Left and Center — Good ! good !

M. Paul Bert — If I had been called to this tribune by an
expression which goes somewhat beyond the limits of parlia
mentary language, I would deceive the Chamber, — and I should
try in vain to do that, because it would not let itself be taken in,
— if I said that my intervention is absolutely improvised and
unforeseen. (The orator shows them a pile of books and docu
ments. Laughs of approbation from the Left and Center.) No:
I come here to fulfill a promise I made in the course of a first
speech, at the beginning of the discussion on the project of the
law in question.

*Article 7 reads as follows: "No one is permitted to take an active part
in public or free teaching, nor in the direction of a teaching institution,
of whatever order it may be, who belongs to an unrecognized religious
congregation."

t M. Keller.

538 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

I said, that in Article 7, liberty of teaching -is not interfered
with. . . .

From the Right — Oh ! oh !

M. Paul Bert — I said that the actual law consecrates the prin
ciple of liberty of teaching ; but, that it however adds to it condi
tions of incapacity, to preliminary conditions of exclusion, —
wisely instituted by the laws of 1850 and 1875, for all those who
wish to keep even a private school, — that it adds to those regu
lations a new condition.

I said, that it adds to the class of those people to whom it is
not allowed to open schools, to whom it is not allowed to teach,
the members of non-acknowledged congregations ; and that it
places them ut singuli, according to the expression of our honor
able reporter, M. Spuller.

This principle being stated. I said, — and I have not been
interrupted, and this thesis has been accepted, — I said that it is
only a question of proving that such exclusion is right ; and I
added that this proof could be brought out effectively only when
the discussion on Article 7 should take place ; and that it would
be inopportune to try and give it in the course of the general
discussion.

From the Left and Center — It is true ! good !

M. Paul Bert — Now the discussion of Art. 7 is opened.

It is, therefore, a question actually to know if the Minister of
Public Instruction, if the Government, has had good reasons to
request that the members of non-authorized congregations should
no longer take an active part in teaching ; and especially if that
exclusion is justified towards the celebrated Order of Jesuits, which
is particularly in view by public opinion, and around which —
everybody acknowledges it — all other religious Orders are con
centrating themselves ; for they consider it now-a-day as their chief
and master.

The Minister of Public Instruction, at the time of his first
speech, brought to this tribune documents which have particu
larly struck and moved the Chamber. He has shown that the pro
visions stated by several orators tending to expose as dangerous
the consequences of the teaching of history, the teaching of law,

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 539

and of everything touching the very foundation of our modern
society, — he lias clearly shown that those provisions were perfectly
right ; he did so by quoting to you several pages of books of his
tory, which are used for teaching in all schools belonging to reli
gious congregations.

The discussion took place on some points of detail. M. Keller
endeavored to explain, "That the books of history in ques
tion were not the only ones used in the institutions directed by
the Jesuits ; that they represent a very small number of copies :
and that it has been necessary to use a ladder to find a single
one."

I shall not insist on this trifling matter ; the Minister is, better
than myself, in a situation to reply to that sort of argument. I
shall not insist upon this order of particular facts, although it
would be easy to put under your eyes several texts having a great
analogy with those quoted by the Minister; but that would be
falling into useless repetitions.

In my opinion, we must consider the question from a higher
point of view.

Gentlemen, the teaching of history and all other teachings, are
but a consequence of the general moral principles of those who
teach them. What it is necessary to do to find out or to ascertain
if the teaching of a certain body of men is dangerous and preju
dicial to public morals, is not to find fault with some texts drawn
from secondary works ; no, we must go straight to the very books
in which those men have recorded their feelings and thoughts.
We can see, then, how they understand the principles of our
society. We must study — skipping mere details — the very edu
cation they give, as it is said that therein lies their triumph ; and
that it is that education which is so strongly recommended to all
mothers and fathers of families ; we must seek out what relates
not to the student, but to the man ; what tends to make the man
himself ; that is to say, the principle and basis of morals.

Well, let us see how the Jesuits, in all times, from the organic
tionof their Order until now — this very day included, —let us
see how they understand those principles of morality ; how they
understand the great truths on which rests, not only modern

540 Tlte Doctrine of the Jesuits.

society, but the whole social world. (Applaust from the Center
and Left.)

One day, Mgr. Dupanloup, bishop of Orleans, eloquently said,
from the tribune of the national Assembhr : "People are dying
through disobedience to the Decalogue — through not knowing the
Decalogue. " *

Let us see how the Jesuits know and understand the Decalogue ;
let us see what they are doing with those eternal principles of

morality in respect of family, of property, of sworn faith

(Renewed applause from the Left and Center,) of human

life ; and, when we have seen all that, it will be little interesting
to know how they name those principles in the records of history.

What the Jesuits were about two hundred years ago, I do not
think it is necessaiy to recall. In an immortal pamphlet which
has attained a place in history, and is classed among the master-
works of French literature, Pascal has described them sufficiently.
We may all recall to mind those quotations of facts, as really re
pulsive as they are ridiculous.

We all know the composition of their morality : mental restric
tions, unlawful compensations, philosophical doubts and sins, prob-
abilism and amphibology ! Everybody is aware how moral prin
ciples were shaken and set aside ; how free will was enervated
and weakened : this was, in fact, all that was necessary to deliver
man into the hands of a director!

A Member of the Right — This is a pretty old story I

M. Paul Bert — I hear a justified interruption. I am told,
" This is very old." Yes, that is old ; as far back as 165G, when
the " Provinciales " were published; before 1662, the year of
Pascal's death. It is indeed very ancient ; therefore I shall not
inquire of any of the old casuists ; I shall ask nothing of Tambou-
rin, Decastille, Filliucius, Emmanuel Sa, Suarez, Sanchez, or
Escobar, the most celebrated of all.

A Member of the Left — You were going to forget him.

M. Paul Bert — I shall not ask what they thought about morals :

* This quotation has heen taken as nn epigraph by an anonymous Jesuit,
who published in Arras a vulgar pamphlet, entitled, The ticrtiples of Paul
Bert. But the scoundrel deems it witty and smart to put iu my mouth the
words of M. Dupanloup. Ob uno disct onutes.

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 54 1

you would reply: " Times are different nowaday; morals of our
age are not the same as those of the sixteenth and the beginning
of the seventeenth centuries."

However, Gentlemen, we read in the " History of the Jesuits"
a celebrated word, whose origin seems not to be well known ; for
my honorable friend, M. Spuller, having repeated after others that
it came from the celebrated and unfortunate General Ricci, was
very much blamed for it ; yes, it appears that it was not a Jesuit
who said, " Sint ut sunt, aut not sint" but Pope Clement XIII.
But, at least, it is a Jesuit who said, long after Pascal's time,
4' Sumus tales guales." Was he not talking the truth?

Let us see, then, what the Jesuits were a hundred years after
Pascal.

At that moment, in 1762, a great event happened in the history
of French Jesuits.

The adventures of several Orders, which had called public atten
tion to them — I use a mild word, in order to avoid interrup
tion at this time — had determined Parliament to look into their
case, and in 17G2, a celebrated decree requested the King for their
proscription.

A Member of the Right — Louis XV.

M.Paul Bert — It you refuse to Louis XV. royal homage,
surely I shall not substitute myself to you. (Laughter and ap
plause from the Left.)

That decree asked the King to take immediate steps against
men whose " Doctrines would tend to destroy natural law, that
rule of morality which God himself has implanted in the heart of
man ; and consequently to break all ties of civil society, by author
izing theft, lying, perjury, the most criminal impurity, and, gene
rally, all passions and crimes, by teaching secret compensation,
equivocation, mental restrictions, probabilism and philosophic!
sin; to destroy all human feelings among men, by authorizing
murder and parricide ; to annihilate royal authority," etc

Then come accusations having no interest for us, as we
a theological assembly.

Such solemn and terrible formulas, issued by the first constituted
body France possessed, then th. Parliament, debating uitli u

542 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Chambers, cannot be alleged, as it has been said so often in
regard of Pascal's pamphlet, to be the expression of a mean and
narrow religious passion.

Besides, the Parliament took necessary care ; for to its decree
we find annexed, in considerable number, documents which are
precisely the basis and proof of the accusation brought forth by
Parliament against the Order of Jesuits.

Those documents, no one can deny their true origin, nobody
ever denied it. It has been said that they were gathered for the
purpose. Such an objection is made by all culprits about the
charges made against them. Generally, one seeks in the acts of
the defendant what is particularly criminal. This was done by
the Parliament.

Here is, Gentlemen, the volume containing them. It is bulky,
and printed in very small type ; consequently it does not relate the
particular doctrine of one Jesuit only ; it is not a single individual
taken from the rank cum superiorum permissu; it is not a man
taken at random who expresses himself in these pages ; it is the
whole Order of Jesuits !

And here must be made a general observation, and I will take
the liberty to present it, relative to the last quotations brought out
by M. Keller.

Every party has its fanatics ; but, when following a method
formerly in use by the National Assembly — and which seems not
to have formed many pupils here, I can not say why — according
to an ancient method, our opponents draw from Republican books
or newspapers quotations exaggerating the doctrine of our party,
they have not the right to compare these extracts with those we
make in the inverse sense from your books and newspapers.

And here is the reason : because those quotations are secured
from persons placed in the front rank, who adhere to extreme
principles and sometimes shoot at the body of the troops; those
quotations do not represent the opinion of the majority of our
Republican party ; they are not accepted by it ; but are the result
of the exaggeration and ardor of certain reckless sharp-shooters,
or the doings of certain personalities a little out of rank, of
outcasts !

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 543

On your side, it is otherwise : the more excessive the quotations,
the more violent the expressions, the more absolute or aggressive
the doctrines, so much as to raise sometimes public indignation,
the nearer we approach the bulk of your army ; the nearer we are
the center of those doctrines ; the more certain we are of meeting,
behind the work of those soldiers who publish nothing without the
authorization of their General, the approbation of their supreme
chief, often more violent than themselves, I mean the Pope.
(Good ! good ! from the Center and Left).

That is the difference, and you must always bear it in mind.

Let us come back to the Jesuits.

The main charges for which they have been sentenced by the
Parliament of Paris, are eighteen in number. Several are of no
interest to us ; it does not matter much to us to know in what
they were guilty at the point of view of religion, or of idolatry.

But the moral question is treated under various titles; the first
of them all is entitled " Probabilism." You all know what that
means. In fact, the quotations, which I am going to have the
honor of presenting to your appreciation, will recall it to you in a
very precise manner.

This is how a Jesuit, who was at the same time a cardinal, has
explained probabilism. He says :

'•In general, either in matter of faith or in matter of morals,
(Please notice, Gentlemen, that this is the formula of Papal infal
libility," velfide, velmoribus),—"!* general, either in matter of
faith or in matter of morals, it is allowed to everyone to follow
whatever opinion is directly less probable and less certain,
although the contrary opinion be more probable and more sure,
and is" considered as such. But it is necessary to restrict the
proposition, and understand it of an opinion whose practical
probability is certain for the party who acts." (Laughter

the Left).

Consequently, when a man finds himself in doubt, and
obliged to choose between two solutions for any act of his
he is perfectly free to follow the worst, even though it be criminal,
on condition that there is a practical probability which «*m*
his mind certain - and useful. (Noise f.om the Right).

544 The Doctrine of (he Jesuits.

/Several Members of the Right — That is theology !

M. Paul Bert — Gentlemen, I am told: ''This is theology!"

A Member of the Right — Badly interpreted theology !

M. Paul Bert — I should know very little indeed of those to
whom I speak if I had not expected this interruption !

But, as long as this seems to you to be theology, we are going
to see what are the applications of that principle, on a ground
which fs not theological.

"It is asked," says Gregoire of Valence, "if a judge may,
without respect of persons, give sentence according to the interests
of a friend, in favor of a probability indistinctly applicable to one
opinion or another, when a point of law divides the attorneys. I
say : first, if the judge thinks that both opinions are equally prob
able, he may righteously, in order to favor his friend, give
sentence according to the opinion which authorizes the claim of
his friend. Moreover, he might, even in view of being of service
to his friend, judge sometimes according to the one opinion, and
sometimes to the contrary, (Laughter and applause from the
Left).

A Member of the Left — It is the height of the art !

M. Haentjens — It is the doctrine of validations and invalida^
tions, (Approving laughter from the Right).

M. Paul Bert — You complained enough about it, that you
should not approve the formula. But I must proceed, for the end
is precio'us : "providing, however, no scnndal results from his
decision." (Ah ! ah ! from the Left). That is to say, for instance,
in the particular case named a while ago by M. Keller, " providing
no telegraphic messages are found later on." (Laughter and
applause from the Left) .

M. Louis le Provost de Launay — The telegrams of the Govern
ment of the National Defence are very interesting !

The Speaker — You can read them at your leisure, but do not
interrupt !

M. Louis le Provost de Launay — A short time ago the Left
were interrupting as they pleased.

The Speaker — I request of you, for the second time, not to
interrupt-

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 545

M. Paul Bert — So much for judgments, which are not a theo
logical matter ; but they certainly are a particular matter.

This is now for single personalities :

"Is it allowed to follow sometimes a probable opinion and
sometimes another, on the same matter? It is probable, for
instance, that a certain tax has been unjustly levied ; it is also
probable that it may have been justly imposed. Now may I, who
have been appointed by the king to collect that tax, insist upon it?
And in another instance, because I am a merchant, may I defraud
the State secretly of that duty?

" Likewise, it is probable that one may be compensated with
money for the loss of one's reputation ; it is also probable that
one cannot be so compensated.

"Then, may I, whose reputation has been injured, compel the
offender to indemnify me with money ; and in another instance
may I, supposing I have injured the reputation of another, decline
to indemnify him pecuniarily for the loss of his reputation?"

Now, what says the learned Jesuit ?

" I assert that one can righteously, in such a case, act one way
or the other, as he deems best to his interests." (Laughter from
the Left).

Gentlemen, I must proceed very quickly ; for if you are not con
vinced, I have some other quotations at your disposal.

A Member of the Right— We have read the "Provinciates."

M. Paul Bert— I will add only,— as I was just told that I was
talking about theology and not instruction,— a quotation relative
to teaching :

'•Doctors and professors occupying chairs of universities, are
not obliged to teach the feelings which seem to them most proba
ble ; for those sentiments are often least accepted and least author
ized, and would cause scandal ; and it would be imposing a heavy
burden on teachers if they were under the obligation of teaching
what seems to them most probable."

I consequently fear, Mr. Minister, that you will have much
trouble, even with the help of your inspectors, in ascertaining what
is taught by the Jesuits, especially touching the opinions which
seem most probable to the teachers of those institutions.

546 The D-jctrine of the Jesuits.

After the great chapter on Probabilism, which is full of extracts
very similar to those I just read, comes another on philosophical
sin. It is not less interesting, nor less detailed. I shall pick up
only one :

" Although we all know," (it is Father Lacroix who wrote this
in 1757), — "although we all know this natural law, that a lie is
forbidden in principle, as also that it is not generally allowed to
kill anybody of one's own authority ; however, such circumstances
may occur where we think forcibly that these things are permitted
at the present moment. It is thus that Cassien, a holy and learned
man, . . . and others have thought, that the official lie is some
times permitted, ... It is thus, according to the narrative of
Vasquez, that a vulgar man thought that he could honestly and
piously act in such a manner, by turning over a sick person, thereby
to cause his earlier death, and so deliver him from excruciating
pains. ... It is thus, that another man, as relates Sarasa in his
book, 'The Art of Ever Rejoicing,' "... that recalls to mem
ory the confraternity of " Smilings," which has been instituted in
Vaucluse, I believe; but seriously, I call to this passage the atten
tion of those who are so jealous, and with reason, of the rights of
fathers of families. "It is thus that another man, through his zeal
for the glory of God and for the salvation of souls, baptized the
children of Moors brought to him by their parents, and killed them
immediately afterwards, in order that their salvation might be cer
tain, and for fear that being returned to their parents they would
not be taught the faith of the Catholic Church." (Oh ! oh !)

Let us pass over quickly, Gentlemen. You see, I skip hundreds
of pages at a time ; and I will quote a little at random, as the hon
orable M. Keller said just now. (Laughter from the Left.)

I come to the title of Falsehood and Perjury. Is it theology
again ?

"It is asked, what precautions are to be taken in the use of am
phibology? I answer: 1, that, without rejecting what has been
said in the preceding question, in order to well understand amphi
bology, we must distinguish two different manners, according to
which persons of judgment can make use of it. The first consists
in having the intention of expressing, outwardly, but material

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 547

words ; so, for greater safety, when one begins to say: "I swear ! "
one must add mentally "that to-day," and proceed then aloud: '-I
did not do this, or that." Because all is true, in this manner."
(Renewed laughter from the Left.)

In 1719, Father Casseudi declared that he had found a new way
of never tolling a lie, and at the same time of hiding the truth !
(Laughter from the Center and Left.) And this not in keeping
silence, as the old Casuists used to do, but by speaking out :

"This manner consists in speaking but ma'erially, and pronoun
cing words without the intention of giving them any meaning, as
if they really had no meaning whatever. Just as when I pronounce,
for instance, the word : ' Clictri.'

"If supposing once that this word, ' I do not know, I have not
done it,' or other similar statements, do not signify anything in a
case where there is obligation to speak and at the same time to
hide the heart's secret, it is easil}T explained how, not only there
is not, but even there cannot exist, any lie in the mind of him who
speaks ; because no one lies but by words meaning the opposite of
what is really in the mind.

1 'It is allowed to make use of merely material oaths, every time
that, besides a grave motive which compels one to use some words
without signification, there is yet a better reason for taking an
oath in a merely material form.

"He who swears materially, does not swear; because, in order
to really swear, it is requisite to use this word, ' I swear,' as men
tally significative of the oath. Therefore, he who uses this word
'I swear/ as not being significant, does not really swear." (Ironi
cal applause from the Left.)

You see, Gentlemen, that the doctrine of the Jesuits is improved;
this was in full in the eighteenth century, fifty years after Pascal's
time !

Oh, there is a great deal more like it; but to bring it out, I
should have to quote the whole volume ; for the Rev. Fathers
were not contented with presenting these general principles. The
priests may have to deal sometimes with dull-minded people, un
able to apply such rule to particular cases. Well, Fathers Buzem-
baum and Lacroix teach them by giving examples :

548 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

''Thus, as the word Gall as in Latin, may signify in French a
rooster, or a Frenchman, if one asked, while talking in the latter
language, if I have killed a Frenchman, — though I have really
killed one, — I may outwardly answer 'No,' while meaning a 'roos
ter.' (Exclamations and laughter from the Left.)

4 'Like wise the verb esse in Latin means to be, or to eat. There
fore, when I am asked if Titus is at home, I may outwardly answer
4 No,' though he is in, while mentally meaning that he is not eat
ing." (Oh! oh! from the Left. — Laughter from the Right.)

I don't very well understand whnt makes you laugh ; 1 would
feel obliged by having the explanation. I do not think you mean
by so doing to show disrespect to the Order of the JSociety of
Jesus ! . . .

The above quotation is from Buzembaum, in 1757 ; that is ten
years nfter the publication of Montesquieu's "L'Esprit des Lois,"
(The Spirit of Law.)

I pass on. The following is about secret compensation :

" One does not sin against justice," says Longuet, " and one is
not obliged to make restitution when one receives money for com
mitting a murder, for striking somebody, or for any other act
against justice.

44 When a man is so miserably situated, and another man is in
such a wealthy situation that the latter is obliged to help the for
mer, he who is poor may take secretly, in a good way, the prop
erty of the rich man, without incurring sin, or being compelled to
make restitution."

4'A wife can, even against her husband's wish, contract or give
alms, or make valid donations, and spend at her pleasure, either
for gambling or other honest recreations, or for her fancies and
dress."

4 'Servants or others do not sin by taking something, presuming
of their master's intention, because they feel convinced through the
light of reason, that their master would not like to be unjust."

4'A son does not sin when he steals something from his father,
against the latter's desire, in order to help others who are in need."

4'If children believe, in good faith, that their father would have
given them what they stole from him, if they had dared to ask him

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. . 549

for it, they are not held to make restitution, as such may be the
custom among people of the same situation."

Secret compensation, the crime of theft, has very much occupied
the good Fathers, at the point of view of the amount required to
constitute a mortal sin. The value of that sin, — the only one com
pelling to restitution,— has singularly varied from century to cen
tury ; that is easy to understand, as the value of money changes
(Laughter from the Left); besides, appreciations may vary, and
they do vary in fact, according to the state of fortune of the per
son who suffers the theft. So many casuists, so many different
amounts ; every one considering the case from his own point of
view. We shall see presently, how casuists of the nineteenth cen
tury have resolved the question.

Father Buzembaum, the last one quoted,— and for that reason
he has concentrated, while perfecting it, the whole doctrine,— went
further yet : " For he who is very poor may take all that is neces
sary for him, etc. ; and what a man can do for himself, he can do
also for another who is in extreme poverty." That is the doctrine
of the Jesuits.

But this is better yet: " A poor man in this case, could even
kill him who would prevent him from taking the thing needful to
him, as one can kill a thief for taking away something of great im
portance, at least needful, or who retains it by violence " ace
in«- to what it was said above.

Thus, here is organized theft— and murder, when the one suffr
ing the theft has the notion to be opposed to it,-under the in.u
cie^nt pretext that he does not want to give it up.

You seem to become indignant at hearing that one could find in
such a thesis an excuse for homicide. Well, I have quotations far
more direct to read to you, and you will see presently that t
are of a particular interest, for we find again their very principle

in the 19th century:

- Can a son," it is said there, <« wish for the death of his fat her,
in order to enjoy his inheritance? Can a mother wish or the
death of her daughter, so as not to be obliged any longer

or learn with joy such events, the answer is

550 The Dwtrine of the Jesuits.

easy ; as it is allowed to desire these things and to receive them,
because you do not rejoice at the evil of others, but at the good
which comes to you." (Exclamations and laughter from the
Left).

The question is put further, even to inquiring if a son is per
mitted to kill his father, when under proscription. (Noise from
the Left). But if I moreover told you that Father John De
Castille affirms that this may be possible, you would answer me,
'that such things were said in 1641, and that everything has
changed since then ; let us then proceed to more recent times.

Now the following happened in the 18th century : Father George
Gobat asks himself, "'If it is permitted to a son to rejoice at the
murder of his own father, which he has committed himself while
in a state of intoxication, on account of the riches coming to him
by the consequent inheritance." And he answers "yes," with the
following ingenious explanations :

"As it is supposed that the parricide has been innocently com
mitted, through lack of reason, caused by drunkenness, and that
there had been no premeditation ; that besides, the parricide has
for aim the acquirement of great riches, an effect which is good,
or at least certainly not bad ; it follows, consequently, that the
above doctrine, which may seem paradoxical, is true in speculation,
although dangerous in practice." (Hearty laughter from the
Left.)

It would be necessary to quote the whole book, Gentlemen ;
and there are but two things to do in presence of those quota
tions : either deny their existence, which is impossible ; or else
feel a deep impression of indignation and disgust ! (That's true !
good ! from the L ft).

One gets thoroughly sick at such reading. I however, perused
the book all through : it is truly a swamp, in which it is impossi
ble to step anywhere on a solid bottom. Everything in it is mud
and filth ! (Numerous signs of approval).

We see, with astonishment, that a great number of those
doctrines and quotations have not been written by mere theolo
gians, casuists, or philosophers addressing grown-up men, but
they have been written by teachers, and have been seized on the

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 551

copy-books of pupils in the Jesuits' colleges — of Amiens and
buns, for instance.

These are, Gentlemen, the morals of the Jesuits at the end of
the 18 ih century. I shall not conclude yet, because you would
tell me: '-Well that occurred one hundred years ago! The
sumus tales quotes is perhaps out of fashion, that doctrine may
have changed ; it reaches nearer the Gospel ; the Decalogue does
not receive any more such violations from those who present them
selves to us as its most authorized defenders.

Let us, then, skip another century : let us come to present times,
and see the writing of those who give themselves the mission of
teaching youth, and from whom the Minister for Public Instruc
tion, the Government, and, I think, the Chamber, will t.ike away
that mission ; of which we believe them to be unworthy !

Well, here is a Compendium, dated 1834.

Perhaps you are going to find it too old ; but I confess that I
have not got any more recent at hand. It however has since had
a great many further editions.

Rev. Father Moullet, in his Compendium theologian moralis,
etc. . . . cum superiorum permissu, (Laughter Irom the Left)
Fribourg, 1834 :

" It is doubted," says he, " whether it is allowed to kill a man
who wants to appropriate to himself a material property of great
value, but not necessary however to his existence.

- The affirmative opinion seems the most probable. (Interrup
tions and laughter from the Right).

"The reason is, that charity does not compel us, in order
save our life, or the life of our neighbor, to lose a notable part <

our wealth."

M. de laBassJiere-Tbrt ™ the theory of all property-ownc

against thieves !

M. Rene Goblet, State Secretary for Justice Dcpartmen
not the theory of the Penal Code !

M. Louis Le Provost de Launay - You don't want us, then, tc
protect ourselves against house-breakers? . . .

M. Paul Bert -I request simply tl;at the Stenographer reg.a
those approbutive interruptions! (Good! g KK! ! from the Lef:

552 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

But, as this is causing discussion on this side Cthe Right), we are
going to talk on something else :

On page 221, it is asked, to what is a man held who gives his
oath in a sham manner, with intention to deceive?

Answer: "He is held to do nothing, relative to religion,
because of not havinj taken a true oath " (exclamations and
laughter from the Left) ; " but he is held by justice to fulfill what
he has sworn in a sham and deceitful manner."

I firmly believe it, for it is not likely that tribunals would be
satisfied with the answer, that one is held to do nothing for the
only reason that one has not taken a true oath. (Noise from the
Right).

M. Louis Le Provost de Launay — What of those who took an
oath of fidelity to the Empire? (Noise).

M. Paul Bert — Gentlemen, those theories are very often
troublesome for the pupils of the Rev. Fathers ; here is an
example: One day, at an examination for electorship, in a phil
osophical composition on the universality of moral laws, a pupil
of the Jesuits found himself in great doubt how to answer this
general thesis: "Theft is forbidden." And he made this objec
tion : " Why, then, did God allow the Hebrews on leaving Egypt,
to take along with them everything they could carry? Was not
this a theft? Did not the property taken belong to Pharaoh's
subjects?"

Such was the objection of an honest young man. But hold on ;
be sure, his good education has sheltered him from his own con
science : "Doubtless, but all those things first belonged to God,
who is sovereign Master of the whole world. And he can, at his
will, take back from some what he has given them, so that others
may enjoy it." (Exclamations and laughter).

Do you wish to hear of another nature of acts, which constitutes
a whole long chapter of the big book I have before my eyes, and
on which subject I however could not make any quotation, because
there is none which could be decently made in public.

A Member of the Left — Not even in Latin?

M. Paul Bert — Not even in Latin ! (Oh ! oh ! — Laughter).

The Count of Douville-Maillcfen — Ask, then, for the secret com
mittee ! (Noise).

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 553

M. Paul Bert — It is true that Rev. Father Moullet, in his
Manual of Morality, finds out the way to turn the difficulty, by
using words which can be read aloud :

"If someone," says he, page 126, "takes delight in keeping
up guilty relations with a married woman, not because she is
beautiful" (hearty laughter from the Center and Left) ; "abstract
ing the circumstance of marriage, such a delectation does not
imply the crime of adultery." (Laughter and applause from the
Left).

" This is," says he, " a very ancient opinion of St. Liguori."

Mind, Rev. Father Liguori was beatified by the Holy Catholic
Church! (Laughter.)

M. de la Bassetiere — St. Alphonsus of Liguori was not a
Jesuit ! (Exclamations from the Left.)

M. Paul Bert — Well, then, I will quote to you some facts from
Jesuits. In fact, Gentlemen, this point does not much matter,
and we shall have to talk in a few moments about this argument
which consists in saying : " That man is not a Jesuit ! '

M. de la Bassetiere — I interrupted you merely to ascertain a
simple fact ; but not at all with the intention to say that his
doctrine is not the Catholic Doctrine. The Catholic Church has
approved St. Alphonsus of Liguori's doctrines, therefore we have
no right to declare that it is not the true doctrine. We are
Catholics, and shall so remain to the very end. (Noisy exclama
tions and applause, and ironical laughter from the Left and
Center) .

Several Members of the Left — Then it is your doctrine?

M. de la Bassetiere — I demand to speak !

A Member — This is an argument in favor of divorce !

M. Paul Bert — Here is, Gentlemen, The Christian Instructions
for Young Men and Young Girls, with approbation of Mgrs. the
Archbishops and Bishops of Lyons, Besancon, Bordeaux and
Nancy, published at Lyons in 1840, by the Rev. Father Humbert.

Well, Gentlemen, it is absolutely impossible for me to mat
quotations from it. I leave them at the disposal of those
wish. (Numerous interruptions.)

From various sides — Read ! read I

554 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

The Viscount of Belizal — No insinuations! read!

M. Paul Bert — Well, as you are insisting, I will quote only the
most presentable part. (Laughter.)

A Member — In Latin?

M. Haentjens — Say it in Greek !

M. Paul Bert — Here is first a part which is addressed to young
girls. The Rev. Father says to young maidens: " How can you
have the leniency to allow frequent kisses, liberties, and familiar
and too free carresses ? What does your conscience tell you on all
this?"

Further, speaking to young boys, and in order to lead them
away from drunkenness, he relates to them the adventure of a
certain Cyrillus, " who, coming out of a saloon, went so far in the
open street as to strike his own mother, who was pregnant ! " *

"The woman made such violent efforts to protect herself, that
she had a miscarriage. That unfortunate drunkard attempted
another day the violation of one of his sisters, who preferred being
stabbed by her unworthy brother, rather than consent to such a
crime. Their father, hearing a noise, hurried in ; but his madly
furious son then dipped his hands in the blood of the author of his
life by cutting his throat ; he stabbed also another of his sisters,
who came in and took upon her her father's defence."

It is certain that the Rev. Father does not present this Cyrillus
as a model ; but, finally, I ask you, if it is not really abominable
to put into the hands of young boys and girls — for it is a book
given to both young boys and young girls — narratives and exam
ples of facts of such a monstrous nature, — I would say filthy, if
this word could be said from this tribune, — it is a book of instruc
tion, a book of morality, a school-reader. . . .

* In order not to raise the indignation of the Chamber too much, and
fearing to be interrupted, I attenuated this Oil ions text. I reestablish it
here in all its entirety. " The young man used to frequent saloons. One
dav, coming out of such a place of debauchery, in a thorough state of
drunkenness, he had the imprudence (impudence, in several editions) to at
tack his own mother, ivho was pregnant, solicited her to a shameful crime, and
resolved ti use violence upon her. The ivoman had therefrom a miscarriage."
But there are many other abominations in this little book, which seems
written by a man taken with erotomania!

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 555

M. cle la Bassetiere — It is not, and it cannot be a book of
instruction.* (Exclamations from the Left.)

From the Left — Wkzt is it, then?

The Viscount of Belizal — Where was it printed?

M. Paul Bert — Gentlemen, as I am told that these quotations
are not taken from educational books, I am going to read to you
some which I picked out of a book of instruction.

And, as one could think and say,— and it was in fact so said
but a short time ago — that all those quotations were of a philo
sophical nature, and could not be applied to children themselves,
I am going to take up a book which is intended for young children,
even the youngest. . . .

M. Naentjens — WsiS the book just cited presented to children?

M. Paul Bert — ... And you will easily recognize therein the
monstrous doctrines of the Jesuits qf the last century, doctrines
which a moment ago raised the indignation of the members
of the Left of the Chamber, and which caused the laughter of the
deputies on the other side :

"Can one act according to a probable opinion?" asks M.
Marotte, Vicar-general of the Bishop of Verdun, in his abridged
(in form of Catechism) " Complete Course of Christian Instruc
tion, for the Use of Christian schools." (4th edition.)

I think that is a book of instruction ! It dates from 1870 ; and
so I hope you will m>t say that these doctrines are of another age !

The Viscount of Belizal — It is not written by a Jesuit: a Je:
can not be a Vicar-general !

The Speaker — Nobody is telling you that it is written by a
Jesuit. It is told to you that it is a book of Instruction,
ter from the Left.)

From the Left — Yes, he is a Jesuit!

* In order to answer M. de la Bassetiere's interruption. I will say ^ that
Rev Father Humbert's book was, anil is yet WK ely spn ead^ n c o^a
tional and even in lay schools. (See my Keport oil the Lav>

1U^S, ^ch'fflSlended for little children, and of which the Btahop
of Nimea undertook the defence in ^™JJ^«SS?b5 has under!
was published in the course of the Vlllt]! s which 32

556 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

M. de la Bassetiere — Then it must be now well understood,
that it is not the Jesuits alone, but the whole Catholic Church that
}ou are attacking ! (Exclamations from the Left.) Please allow
me : we have authority to believe . . . (Noise.)

From the Left — Let the orator speak !

The Speaker — M. de la Bassetiere, your name is set down;
you may speak immediately after M. Bert; I therefore request
you not to interrupt, so that I may likewise request silence when
it will be your turn to speak at the tribune.

The Count of Maille — But the calumny remains !

The Speaker — M. de Maille, I call you to order! You cannot
talk about calumny when the first page of this book has just been
read to you textually !

The Count of Maille — I demand to speak !

The Speaker — You may speak at the end of the sitting.

M. Paul Bert — Gentlemen, the question is to know if the odious
doctrines of morality exposed by Pascal, and condemned by the
Parliament of Paris, remain the Jesuits' doctrine ; if they are act
ually taught by the Jesuits ! (That's it ! Good ! from the Left.)

The Viscount of Kermenguy — I was educated by the Jesuits ;
my sons also ; and I affirm, sir, that neither my teachers, nor my
sons' teachers, have ever presented to any of us the books which
you are talking aJbout. (Noise from the Left.)

M. Paul Bert— Well, now, almost all the orators on this side
of the Chamber [the Right] who came to this tribune, said to us
that there was no distinction to be made any longer between Jes
uits, the other religious congregations, or even the secular clergy ;
they said to us, — and this is the truth, — that the whole Catholic
world adheres to Jesuitical ideas and doctrines ; consequently we
have the right to declare, when we find those doctrines expressed
by a member of a congregation, whatever it may be, or a member
of the secular clergy, we have the right to declare : "Those doc
trines are Jesuitical doctrines," without needing to look for any
thing else ! (Approbation from the Left.)

The Viscount of Belizal — I\> is the Catholic Church itself you
are attacking !

M. Paul Bert — I quoted some Jesuits to you. Ah ! I know very

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 557

well that they actually have the great shrewdness to conceal them
selves behind members of other religions congregations, behind
members of the secular clergy, and even behind laymen ; but when
it is a question of a book having official authorization approved by
Bishops or the Pope, one can openly declare that this book pro
fesses the Jesuitical doctrines, arid I have the right to take hold of

it.
M. de la Bassetiere — Theu, it is the whole Church you wish to

proscribe.

The Viscount of Belizal — At least, give us the name of the

writer.

The Speaker— But the orator has already named him.

From the Left and Center— Read ! Read on !

M. Paul .Bert— "Question : Can one act according to a probable

conscience?" etc. . . •

"Answer: In what concerns faith, the validity of sacraments, '-
I pass rapidly over this first part, because you might tell me again
I am talking theology,-- outside these circumstances, that is to
say, outside the question of faith, one can, without committing
follow the more probable opinion, though the less certain ; by s
acting, it is acting with prudence." (Laughter.)

Gentlemen, do you not recognize here the judge's theory c
"probabilism," quoted to you a short time ago, referring
merchant who was willing to pay the tax, because, as a mer
he did not consider it justly levied, but who, however, exacted he
payment of it as Collector for the Treasury, because, after all, the
tax might be just, and that in the latter case he was clrawm
out of it. (Good ! from the Left.)

Please notice, it is no longer a question of a work of 1760 ; tl
refers to a book printed in 1870.

"tluestion . 18 ,„ al,.,,^ to wish for a bad action, or to
about it, on account of the advantage resulting from ,t

"Answer : It is never allowed to wish for a bad action, o
joice about it, on account of the advantage which is the resuit of

"'There Jin all this, Gentlemen, a remarkable similarity to one

558 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

of the ancient quotations. I read to you a short time ago a coin
cidence very peculiar indeed, if M. Marotte is not a Jesuit. Listen :

"•But it is allowed to rejoice of an advantage, although it may
result from an evil. For instance, a, son rmiy receive with pleas
ure the inheritance he has secured through the murder of his
father." (Exclamations from the Left and Center.)

A Member from the Center — Who approved this book?

M. Albert Jolly — Some bishops !

M. Paul Bert — This book you can buy ; its seventh or eighth
edition has been published ; which is a proof that the approbation
of our Monseigneurs has brought good luck to it, and Unit it might
not deserve the marks of indignation it excites on certain benches.
(Laughter from the Loft.)

A Member of the Right — Not at all !

M. Paul Bert — Ah ! you are not indignant. The stenographer
will take it down. (Laughter and applause from the Left.)

I proceed further, page 259 :

4 'Question: Is it sometimes allowed to kill an innocent person?

"Answer: It is never allowed to kill directly an innocent per
son, even in view of the public interest (exclamations from the
Left) ; but, one may, in a grave and urgent necessity, do an action
good in itself, although it may cause the death of one or several
innocent persons, providing he who does this action has only in
view the good which can result from it, and turns aside with all
his power from the bad effect he fears."

That is the doctrine of secret intention, of which we have hun
dreds of samples in the large volume published by the Parliament.

I was telling you a moment ago, that the Jesuit Fathers have
tried to ascertain at what precise point theft begins, regarding the
value of things.

M. Marotte feels the same embarassment ; but, as he writes in
1870, he knows the value of money, and he explains :

"That depends," says he, "not only upon the value of the thing
stolen, but also upon the wealth and situation of the person to
whom the thing belongs, the damage that person suffers, etc. . . .
So, a theft of ten francs, made to the prejudice even of the richest
person, is always a mortal sin ; but towards poor people, working-

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 559

men, those who have a bare competency, a theft of one franc,
two or three francs, four or five francs, is a mortal sin also."

Thus, till ten francs it is not . . .

A Member of the Right — Mortal sin !

M. Paul Bert — ... Mortal sin, is to steal from rich persons !
Page 266 :

"Question. Must one always be considered as guilty of theft,
when he takes the property of his neighbor? "

That is a question plain and explicit, put by M. Marotte, Vicar-
general, to a child of the Christian schools, regarding the precept
of the Decalogue : " Thou shalt not steal ! "

Well, now ! the boy will likely first answer : " No ! " The first
direction given to that young mind towards this question : " Must
one always be considered as guilty of theft, when he takes away
the property of his neighbor?" — the dominative and guiding
thought, is: "No!"

"It may happen that the one from whom the property is stolen
has no right to be opposed to the theft ; which takes place, for
instance, when the one who takes what belongs to his neighbor is
in extreme need ; and when he takes only what he badly needs ; or
when he takes it secretly, as a compensation, not being able to
secure in a different way what is owed him by right of justice."
(Exclamations from the Left and Center). I fear I shall annoy
the Chamber with all these quotations.

From the Left and Center — No ! no ! Speak ! speak !

M. \Paul Bert — I of course pass over many chapters, but I
believe that I am pointing out the most interesting . . .

From the Left — We will get up a book of them !

M. Paul Bert — Page 276 : " Question. Can one be sometimes
dispensed from the obligation of making restitution when the
is committed?

"Ans. Yes!

"Question. What are the cases which may allow the po;

ponement of restitution?

"Ans. They are :

" 1 Physical powerlessness ; that is to say, the bad financii
state of the debtor, who has nothing of his own, c
extreme need.

5 GO The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

"2. Moral powerlessness, in other words, the state in which
the debtor is unable to make restitution without falling from his
justly acquired rank, (exclamations from the Left) ; without fall
ing or dragging his family into misery, or exposing himself to the
danger of losing his reputation." (Renewed exclamations from
the Left).

Other facts are of but little interest compared with these great
and solemn principles, so remarkably engraven in a work devoted
to youth! (Noise from the Right).

M. Louis Le Provost de Launay — This book is the work of a
madman.*

M. Paul Bert — You are very harsh, Gentlemen, for our Mgrs.
the Bishops and Archbishops who approved it, are Louis, Bishop
of Verdun, Andre, Bishop of Strasbourg, etc., etc.

I do not think they would have approved the work of a madman,
nor a book which would not teach pure doctrines ! That book
Gentlemen, is pure doctrine !

M. Laroche Joubert — The Bishops did not read it before they
approved it.

M. Paul Bert — This book is spread everywhere; it is the
abridgment of a complete course of Christian instruction, where
you will find these maxims developed with a luxury of preambles
which recalls exactly the big book from which I quoted some
extracts a few minutes ago.

M. Albert Joly — There is a new edition of it printed in 1874, it
is more than that one, and is intended for schools also !

M. Haentjens — Is it expurgated ? (Hearty laughter — ironical
applause on several benches of the Left).

M. Paul Bert — The word "expurgated" might seem a little
severe for some members on this side (the Right) ; but, finally,
I can give satisfaction to the request which has just been made.
The last edition is expurgated ; some passages which I quoted are

* I did not know at that moment that Marotte's Catechism and Christian
Instruction were the official books for religious education in our Normal
Primary Schools. Recently, the Director of one of our Colleges (La Re
union), having opposed the introduction of this odious little book, the
Chaplain made a complaint oil the subject, and the Director was dis
charged.

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 5G1

blotted out, particularly that where it is a question of the son who
rejoices at the murder of his father.

Here is the edition of 1870, which was taught for a long time in
the public schools of Paris; it is the fourth edition. And, if I
could make some abstracts for you from the various catechisms
which are taught in our country schools, I would easily show you
that exactly the same doctrines are taught.

With regard to those questions, I wish to justify myself from a
reproach which was made against me the other day. I was told
that I made hypotheses ; I was told that nobody could ever think
that the teaching of Catholic universities have gone so far astray :
that it would become, in reality, an art of getting around the civil
and penal code, without running the risk of meeting its disagreeable
effects.

I have here, — he is not a Jesuit, that's true; it is the Count
Anatole de Segur, — I have here some extracts from a pamphlet
recently published, in 1872, by the Religious Weekly of the diocese
of Montpellier, a pamphlet which is honored with the approval of
Mgr. the Bishop of Montpellier ; those extracts, therefore, can be
considered as representing also the pure doctrines, or at least —
for there must be made a distinction, you saw it, between spec
ulation and practice — as representing some directions which,
although disagreeable on the side of speculation, are well worth
at least being put into practice.

The Count of Segur troubles his mind very much about the
prudent steps taken by the Civil Code in order to prevent legacies
and gifts being received by persons who have no lawful right to
be heirs ; that is to say, persons who are not considered regular
citizens. He explains very openly, with a truly juridicial art,— that
is the proof, Mr. Minister, that the pupils of Catholic Colleges will
not be perplexed before the professors of the University, — The
Count of Segur explains in a very particular manner, with a
thoroughly juridicial science, the delicate points of what he calls
"the points of contact of charitable and religious liberty —
another and new kind of liberty !— with civil legislation."

" Those points once kndvvn," says he, " it will be easy to avoid
them." That is very simple ; in f:«'-t, it should t>c done so at first ;
he gives Kxl advk-o for nil po.isil)k- case*.

562 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

"Many piolis persons," said he, " who wish to give a part of
their fortune to a good purpose, are prevented from d ting so by
the strictness of this principle. They would like to choose the
mediums of their liberalities; to unite the spiritual aim to their
material gifts ; and they do not care to intrust to other hands but
those of pious persons the execution of their charitable desires."

In other words, those persons would like to overturn the law ;
but how? And then follows, I repeat, a series of practical direc
tions, very useful to those who are disturbed by the law.

Next, M. de Segur adds, with a charming simplicity :

". . . By means of these perfectly legitimate and moderate ways
of very easy use, the benefactors of the poor can harmonize respect
of the severe rules of the law with their preferences and the
accomplishment of their pious intentions."

I stop here, Gentlemen, I have made you acquainted with some
samples of what teaching is in the hands of those men who were
presented to you at this tribune, and everywhere, as the safe
guardians of the purest doctrine and of the highest morality. It
is constantly said, that Society is running away with the revolu
tionary torrent ; that they are the salvation anchor ; that it is
necessary to be fastened to them in order to be on solid ground,
or to keep afloat.

Now, Gentlemen, you know what ideas, what principles of
morality, used to guide them in olden times, and which lead them
novv-a-days, — ideas which are very easy for them to transfer from
the domain of speculation into the field of practice ! (Signs of
approbation from the Left).

If I were speaking of the pedagogical art with which those prin
ciples are impressed, there would be much to say, and interesting
facts also ; but you would reply, "that I was criticising private
schools, not only at the point of view of morality, but mainly re
garding their pedagogical value ; and that I was praising the Uni
versity schools, by contrast with the Jesuitical and congregational
colleges."

I would be told that such a proceeding could not be in place at the
French tribune. That is exactly what I think ; and consequently, I
shall not follow an example of the same kind, but in the inverse

Second Speech of M. Paul fieri. 5G3

way to what was given to me by our adversaries. (Renewed ap
probation from the Center and Left.)

This is, Gentlemen, for the boys' instruction.

But for the last century or so, a quite particular and new event
has taken place. The girls' education, until the Revolution, was
almost exclusively in the hands of religious congregations. Tho«e
congregations were giving a peculiar teaching, which, at the point
of view of instruction, so to speak, was generally very weak, ex
cept only in a few famous and renowned private institutions. ' I5ut
from the documents of that time, the young girls received then a
very good education, at the point of view of morality.

Great care was taken in the convents not to bring up the young
girls like future nuns; those young girls who should return into so°
ciety and become mothers of families. The mystic sentiment was
not excited in them. Truly religious feelings were impressed upon
them, but of an elevated nature, in harmony with the purest mo
rality. The result of this was, that social tranquility, that calm in
the bosom of the family of which the disappearance is sometimes
regretted in the present time.

But, since the beginning of last century,— since the famous tale
of Abbot Girard and Miss la Cadiere,— since the more celebrated
adventure of Mary Alascoque, the Jesuits have endeavored to take
hold of the education of young girls. They could not do it directly.
Their regulations forbad it to them. So they raised up a great num
ber of congregations which have no similarity to the old congre
gations known by our fathers and mothers.

In fact, most of them bear the titles of the " Sacred Heart of
Jesus," the "Sacred Heart of Mary, "etc., which shows they are of
recent institution.

The Jesuitical congregations are trying, in opposition to the old
and wise congregations, to impress the young girls' minds with an
excessive and peculiar mysticism ; for these intellectual congrega
tions are united with what might be called the most material or
ganization !

From the Left — That's it ! Good !

M. Paid Bert — Formerly, great care was taken as to dogmatical
questions, legendary narratives and religious stories, anil to puss

564 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

rapidly over certain delicate circumstances on which it is not very
good to awaken the minds of children, especially of young girls ;
to-day it seems, on the contrary, that a certain pleasure is taken to
call their attention to them, by means of intellectual processes which
are the most strange and dangerous imaginable. I do not know
of a book more interesting to read, in relation to this, than the
4 'Meditation on the Life and Masteries of Our Lord Jesus Christ,
according to St. Ignace's method." You see, it is truly a question
of Jesuits, and after the renowned exercises of the founder of the
Order of Jesuits. These books are intended for young girls ; con-
sequentl}', I do not get out of our subject. This book, for instance,
is specially dedicated to young ladies, and is taught in the colleges
of the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

While perusing it, Gentlemen, it is astonishing to see, at the
point of view of the subjects studied and the manner of studying
them, what really terrible means are used in the bosom of those
institutions, which all belong to non-authorized congregations. At
the point of view of the method itself, it is an exaggeration of
mysticism which is tending to placing the young person absolutely
outside of the world, her exterior friends and the temporal impres
sions which surround her. She should keep in an obscure and quiet
place ; she should live apart, mentally speaking, from all worldly
things, concentrate her mind on a particular point of a religious
story, fix her senses and soul upon that point with an absolute at
tention. In the course of her meditations there are preludes, prelim
inary prayers, a combination of ways and proceedings, through
which she forcibly becomes perfectly isolated from the rest of the
world.

And then, — what is very strange indeed, — that young girl, in
this state of semi-somnambulism, almost asleep, her whole mind far
off from this world, is all of a sudden called upon to exercise all her
senses, one after another, and apply them to the only object on
which her mind was fixed, and which is there present and living
before her e}~es.

There are, in this, Gentlemen. I do not hesitate to sny, all the
required conditions of a criminally prepared and organized hallu
cination. (Good! Good! from the Left).

Second Sjwech of M. Paul Bert. 565

After each one of those meditations comes what is called the
application of the senses ; that is, the sight, heaving, smell, taste,
finally touch. So much for the method !

Think, gentlemen, how dangerous this is. Those who have
invented it, or rather those who have put it into practice, not only
for nuns, as wished by St. Ignace, but for young girls who are
expected soon to become wives and mothers of families, living in
society, such are truly guilty and responsible for so many insane
cases. And, if those who write such books do not feel the conse
quence of what they have done, I send them back to the treatise,
"Young Ladies' Education," by Fenelon. They will find in it
severe and profitable lessons ! (Interruptions from the Right).

M. de la Bassetiere — This book is simply intended for future
nuns !

M. Paul Bert — I beg your pardon, M. de la Bassetiere. It
is not a question of nuns, but of young girls. There are two
editions.

The Speaker (addressing the Right) — I will remark to you,
Gentlemen, that we have given to this debate such an extension
and ampleness, that all of your orators have been able to review
all historical, political, and religious subjects ; the same liberty
must be given to your opponents, so that it may be maintained
presently for you. (Good). Please continue, M. Paul Bert.

M. Paul Bert M. de la Bassetiere says to me, that this book

is merely intended for nuns. I wish to reply to that point — for
the argument, without being largely extended, might seem to have
a little value. I say, that M. de la Bassetiere is mistaken : there
are two editions of this book, one dedicated to nuns — which I
have not, as it is of no value to me ; I remain in the domain of
-instruction — and the other devoted to young girls; and you cer
tainly are better able than I to know that this book is of daily
use in the colleges of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and many o
congregational schools.

That is for the method ! I was not embarrassed until now, b
cause I did not go beyond the limits of what might be called the
application of Medicine to Pedagogy ; but I should be very embar
rassed to speak on the subjects which are treated in those medita-

5G6 The D >ctrine of the Jesuits.

tions, and to quote some of them textually. Nevertheless they
must be pointed out. Now, do you know to what the attention of
young girls is called? There is the Annunciation, for instance.
There are a dozen meditations on the Annunciation of the Holy
Pregnancy, and its consequences ! (Laughter from the Left) . There
are three or four meditations on the hidden life of Jesus in his
mother's bosom ; meditations on which the young girl is requested
not only to reflect, but t) place herself in a state to interrogate,
by each one of her senses, the actual position of Jesus. (Indig
nant exclamations from Left and Center).

I could read them.

And after the Annunciation, there is the Visitation. The same
order of questions is followed. One even goes farther. . . .

M. Margaine — And what of the explanation of the Holy
Ghost's operation ?

M. Paul Bert — Here are two full pages of tho«e meditations:
first, it is the contemplation ; next, the application of the senses on
the Circumcision ! (Exclamations and laughter. Read !)

The 33d contemplation on the Circumcision shows three pre
ludes, three points, one colloquy, and one resolution. (Laughter).

M. de la Bassetiere — It is very easy to dress up all that ; but
the ground work cannot be true !

M. Paul Bert — M. de la Bassetiere reproaches me that I dress
all this : I am going, therefore, to read it out quite naked.
(Good! good! from the Left. Read! read!)

M. du Bodan — That is not possible; there are ladies and
young girls in the galleries !

M. Paul Bert — Our honorable and respected colleague, M. du
Bodau, says to me, we are not here alone ; but that there are
ladies and young persons in the galleries. . . .

M. Faure — Please wait until the galleries are empty.

M. Paul Bert — I recognize it ; and from that comes all my
hesitation. But you will acknowledge that it is a very strange
situation, to be standing at a French tribune, before an assembly
of men, before an audience of adults, without daring to read what
is done and written, to be read, meditated, and thought over in

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 5<57

private by a young lady, M. du Bodan ! (Warm approbation and
prolonged applause from the Center and Left).

M. de la Bassetiere — I ask very respectfully from Mr. President
(Noise).

The Speaker — You will speak soon ! you cannot be allowed to
constantly interrupt !

M. Paul Bert — You reproach us for dressing up the citations,
and you do not consent that we read them aloud !

From the Left — Read ! read !

M. Paul Bert — We will read, and we shall make justice from
all this !

M. de la Bassetiere — I ask for the title of the work, the
writer's name, and the date of the edition.

The Speaker — M. de la Bassetiere . . . (Interruption from
the Left) .

A Member of the Left — There are no explanations to be given !

(Noise) .

The Speaker — A\\w me, Gentlemen, I am the only judge on
the question to know if explanations should be given or not.

M. de la Bassetiere asks a question, which was answered about
fifteen minutes ago.

M. de la Bassetiere — I did not hear it !

The Speaker — "Rut I think it useful to repeat it: M. de
Bassetiere asks for the writer's name, the title of the work, and
the date of its publication.

M. Paul Bert, will you please answer. (Interruptions

noise).

Please, Gentlemen, listen to the answer!

M. Paul Bert -We will ask for a special sitting for inte
tions ! (Laughter from the Left) .

I am reading :

« Meditation according to St. Tgnace's Method on the Life a
Mysteries of our Lord Jesus Christ-4 volumes in I2mo, pub
b/ Lecoffre, 1867, with a dedication to St. Joseph, and auot
the Youno- Ladies of the Sacred Heart of Jesus."

M. de Bosredon-Ky whom has this book been approved

568 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

M. Paul Bert — It is used everywhere; it lias had I do not
know how many editions !

M. de la Bassetiere — Who is the author?

M. Pat rl Bert — There is no name on it. (Exclamations from
the Right).

M. de la Bassetiere — We protest . . . (Noise) ... If there
is not the name of the writer . . . (Noise) ... If there is not
the name of the writer . . . (To order!)

The Speaker — I shall be compelled to call you to order, M. de
la Bassetiere ! Please do not interrupt !

M. de la Bassetiere — I say, if there is no name of the author,
and if there is no episcopal approval, this book is perfectly worth
less. (Good ! from the Right — Exclamations from the Left).

M. Paul Bert — Worthless? that's very hard for a book which
is used in houses of religious education !

M. de la Bassetiere — That is just what ought to be proved !

M. Paul Bert — It is its seventh or eighth edition !

From the Right — That is not a reason.

A Member of the EigJit — The "Assommoir " has had more than
fifty editions !

M. Paul Bert — It was published by Lecoffre. You can make
against this publisher the accusation of heresy, and settle the
matter with him.

But, in fact, those various meditations, according to the method
of St. Ignace, seldom bears an author's name ; many of them are
approved, others do not mention any approval.

Here is a catalogue full of that kind of works, they are all
conceived in the same spirit; all of them devote a meditation to
each one of those so dangerous particular cases which I pointed
out a little while ago. I do not mean to say that I have not
chosen the more favorable quotations for the thesis I am sustaining.
The last one I wished to read to you is more complete, perhaps,
than the others, but I remember that all are very dangerous.

It is not so much the diabolical, shameful and abominable
details which the author has entered upon, which are of such a
nature as to upset the imagination of young girls ; but it is the
situation itself in which they are placed when inviting them to

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 5(>9

contemplate such scenes, and after the preliminary prayer to
apply to it all their senses ; first, the sight ; second, the bearing ;
third, the taste ; fourth, the smell ; fifth, the touch. . . .

Here are, in particular, the dispositions which should be brought
to the study of the Circumcision. (Noise from the Right).

The Count Jean de Colbert-Laplace — I ask for the doors to be
closed.

M. Laroche-Joubert — The secret committee should be re
quested.

M. Paul Bert — I ask of you permission not to read it. In
fact, I gave some directions ; every one can look through the
book, at the National Library, for instance, unless some are
pretesting, and they again would say, that it is in order to put a
dress on those quotations that I do not care to read them !

The Count of Perrochel — There is on it neither the writer's
name nor the episcopal approval.

M. Paul Bert — Do you wish for some books which have the
episcopal approval? Here they are.

But now I declare, it is not a question of school books ! (Ah !
ah! from the Right).

It is a question of books given to the pupils as prizes (Laughter
from the Left), of reading books ; it is a question of those small
books which are presented to the Christian youth, and approvec
by Mgr. the Bishop of Limoges !

Here is an extract from this Christian and moral library. Very
truly if only a popular almanac had published the first story of
this book -I do not mean to say the commission on peddling
would not let it go, many others are passed over without a wor
but the general public attorneys would have stopped it.

From the Eight — Read it!

M. Paul Bert-It is « Charity's Triumph," by M. Baudran, a
Limoges ; Bardon Brothers, publishers.
There is no date on it.

Tins "Triumph" consists in a dialogue between Enstaelnus,
Mayor of Alexandria, one of the most violent persecutors
gion, and a virgin named Theodora.

570 The 'Doctrine of the Jesuits.

The Mayor summoned the Virgin to sacrifice to false gods ; the
Virgin declined, and the Mayor then said to her :

"There is a decree from Emperors which ordains that virgins
who refuse to sacrifice to the gods shall be exposed in a shameful
place. ..."

M. Maryame — He was a prefect of the moral order! (Laugh
ter from the Left).

M. Paul Bert — Then follows a dialogue between the Virgin, who
shows a legitimate anxiety and m-ikes proof of a pretty complete
sort of special instruction, and the Mayor, who, after a most dis
agreeable insistance, sentences the young girl to be sent to a place
of debauchery. The rakes immediately crowd round her ; but
Jesus Christ comes and protects her, and she is thereby drawn out
from the situation, to her great honor, by a young man, who puts
himself in her place and dresses her with his clothes.

The Count Jean de Colbert- Laplace — Read entirely !

From Various Seats — No ; that will do !

The Speaker — There are limits to curiosity !

M. Paul Bert — As you are insisting, I can read a few lines more.
You will see what is written for young children, with approval of
the Bishop of Limoges ! (Laughter.)

Theodora says, "The only grace I ask from you, is that nobody
will attempt my pudicity."

The Mayor answered her: " Sacrifice to the gods, or else in a
short time you will have lost that virgmit}7 of which you are so
proud."

From the Left and Center — That's enough ! That's enough !

M. Edouard Lockroy — And you say that this is approved by a
Bishop ?

M. Paul Bert — We have yet more recent document', and which
belong to the class of school books. Such are dictations made by
a vicar in a girl's normal school. Of those dictations, for instance,
I can name only the titles :

"Are there different ways of sinning against purity?"

"Sin against purit}' can be committed in five different ways : by
acts words, looks, desires and thoughts."

Until there, that's all right, although it seems very singular that

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 571

a young vicar be appointed to dictate to young girls, sixteen to
twenty years old, the number and nature of the various ways of
sinning against purity. (Approbative laughter from the Left.)
But he is not satisfied with this entirely ritual enumeration, for

he then says :

" One can sin by actions in three principal ways. (Noisy ex
clamations from the Left.)

Several Members — That is too bad !

The Baron Etieune cle Ladoucette — This must be the story of a
priest afflicted with a sick mind, of whom it was spoken in Nancy,
and who was excluded from the teaching board.

M. Paul .Bert — Gentlemen, I wish you to excuse me for having
entered into so many sickening details, and brought out to light
things which have never been mentioned at a French tribune. But
it is&not my fault ; it is the fault of those who say and declare with
boldness that, urbi et orbi, they are the guardians of all morality !
(Applause from the Center and Left.)

Now, then, what are they doing with morality? You have seen
a few examples of it. You may imagine what their oral education
can be, from what you know of their written teaching.

You see, Gentlemen, what they did for boys and what they ti
to do for girls. It is now your duty to see if you will not stop
this strange teaching,-not to say something worse,-
it by voting Article 7.

Let us put aside all this shame and ignominy. Let us look at t
question from another point of view ; let us look upon it from the
political standpoint. It was already pointed out in this debate, 01
rather it was only slightly touched.

In order to understand properly the political side of this qne
tion, for what concerns Jesuits particularly, and consequently r
ligious congregations who have gathered around them, it w .
sary to see under which circumstances tins famous Or er wi
formed, and how those conditions are singularly similar 1
in which we ourselves are actually placed.

The Jesuu's Society dates from 1684 The Reformation was
just born; a wind of free thought was blow.ng ov« the West
Europe. The treaty of Nuremberg had taken Germany awn, Ho,

572 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

the Papacy, by securing liberty of worship. France itself was
threatened. Calvin had just published his first book. Then ap
peared Ignace de Loyola.

He was neither an ordinary nor a middling man; he soon under
stood that, besides the old monastic orders, wearing various cos
tumes, devoted to particular works, there was room for a special
militia, which would have for its only purpose to fight against free
thought, and to bring back to obedience to the Pope the nations
who were straying away from him. As a military troop, abso
lute and passive obedience was indispensable to this militia.

He then founded the Society of Jesus. And this society
answered such an urgent emergency, that, as soon as it was
founded, it had an outbreak which was similar to an explosion !
Less than a hundred years later, the Jesuits had spread all over
the world, ruling, acting and also irritating public opinion, so much
so that the old hyrnn was sung :

"Gubernant spirituale,
Gubemant et temporale,
Gubernant omiiia male."

With the chorus :

'Oros, qui cum Jesu itis,
Non ite cum Jesuitis! "

Already, in that time, they had excited first the jealousy, next
the passion, and even sometimes the indignation of the people.

However, their work was done ; they had torn from heresy
France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Savoy already threat
ened.

What more could they do ?

Germany, England and Scandinavian countries were lost to
Catholic faith !

In France, Spain and Italy, on the contrary, the Catholic faith
had nothing more to fear. After the "Renaissance" time in Latin
countries, liberty of conscience and political liberty had both been
wrecked.

Some almighty kings, anointed in the name of the Lord, elected
by divine right, and professing the Catholic faith as a State reli
gion, swore to fulfill the laws of the Catholic Church, of which

Second Speech cf M. Paul Bert. 573

they declared themselves the devoted sons, and swore to extermi
nate all heretics: those kings had offered a safe guarantee to Koine
and the Catholic Church. Thence, almost nothing was left for the
Jesuits to do, either in political or in temporal matters. Popes
used to deal directly with Kings, and those two powers mutually
granted to one another certain privileges ; on the temporal ground
on one side, and on the spiritual on the other.

In the midst of all that, the Jesuits occupied themselves with
instruction, business and traffic. You know it did them no good.
They were very busy with confession, causists; they present*
rulers of the people with that " velvet way " leading to Heaven c
which Escobar spoke. But with all that, they lost a gre
their importance.

Assuredly, some eminent individuals of their Order were not
without having, thanks to their situation as kings' eon lessor* , a
influence on the fate of the people; but the mo* of the bociety
abandoned the merely political platform.

However, among their struggles about casuist.es or dogn>
did not forget the'principal purpose for winch they -- — ^
On one hand, the attack wa, marie again by them .garnet
.how of free thought, and Port Royal fell under the.r blows
1 other hand, they endeavored to make triumphant everywhere,

^s;:^

th Catholic Church.

T,.en came the Revolution. ^

The Uevo.ut.on did f*^*£?££M of ,—«-

as the -Renaissance had lone. )t

tion, it rendered free all regions, ^"^j^ U,c,r author-

just enabled the Jesuits to appear nga.n

ily over the C:<lln>lie world.

The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

In fact, the danger was the same for the Papacy as in the sixteenth
cent ury. It was then no longer Protestantism which threatened,
but Rationalism. Civil power had finally become secularized!
The Church may be sometimes consulted, but she will never com
mand again. Was this Revolution without appeal, without hope,
for them? The Jesuits, who contributed to save the Papacy in the
great crisis of the Reformation, are going to place themselves at
the head of the new movement to save the Papacy from the Revo
lution. But they will ask reward for their assistance, and the whole
of Catholicism will have to pay dearly for it, too !

It is thus, that after having passed over a long period, during
which they performed no more important part than other religious
Orders, they have succeeded, since the Revolution, in making°pre-
dominant their particular opinions in the Church, to such an ex
tent that these opinions have become regular articles of faith.

At the same time while they were fighting for the Pope and the
Church ; at the same time that the old Society of Jesus — and the
following word must be interpreted in a military sense, for in tak
ing it Loyola remembered the heroic acts of his youth,— was taking
arms again for the Pope's service, they stated their conditions!
they compelled the whole Catholic world to consider as true their
private opinions, and forced it to accept the dogmas of the Im
maculate Conception and of Papal Infallibility (speaking ex-
calhednt). (Good ! good ! from the Left and Center).

Yes, Gentlemen, the Society of Jesus had for mission to draw
back the modern world from its tendency towards free thought !
First, they hope to bring back, repentant, to the Pope amfthe
Church, their beloved, rich, and powerful daughter, Fiance, who
has separated herself from them. This Society has for mission,
to put their hands upon our society in the name of the Church ;
not m a brutal manner, far from that, for the Pope is not intend
ing to command directly Princes and Republics ; but the Societv of
Jesus acts in such a manner that those Kings and Republics shall
give back of themselves to Catholicism, to the Church, her lost
power and authority.

And it is for that reason, in this country and neighboring lands,

Second Speed L of M. Paul Bert. 575

a supreme struggle is now taking place ; it is why Art. 7 is only a
momentary event, or rather the first act of this great fight !
From the Right — That is full of promise !

M. Paul Bert—Truly speaking, there is not, — allow me this com
parison, which shall he very short, — there is not only the Catholic
religion thus placed face to face with the secular governments;
another religion, just as important at the point of view of the
number of its members, shows the same spectacle. The Mussul
mans also, are seeing their chiefs, who formerly used to unite to
gether the civil and religious powers, progressively compelled un
der the pressure of circumstances to give preeminence to the civil
element, and to become secularized more and more. The Chris
tians, the Jews themselves, are allowed to take part in their coun
cils.

What happens then? As you see in our country, the Catholic
Church fights against the civil power, with the Society of Jesus at
her head ; so you see sultans, beys, emperors, khedives, forced to
act aoainst the secret religious opposition of their people, which is
excited and led by that congregation of Khouans from which I;
de Loyola has borrowed his motto.

And it is a strange fact, to which it is interesting to call the j
tention of historians, namely, in his supreme constitution, Ignace
has copied, neither the ancient monastical orders, nor the work o
Dominique or Francois d'Assise, but the Khouans' organization,
with its passive obedience, its provincials, its powerful gmer

It can be be read in Ignace de Loyola's history, the narrative
a long and curious conversation of Iguace with a Moor in the Ara
gem mountains, from which it is allowable to think that the mind,
of the Jesuits was acquainted with the laws of the Order o

"I'lg your pardon, Gentlemen, for this detailed statement
Nevertheless, there is a very strange commence.

lou Know the formula of the Company of Jeans' Order : "Thou
Shalt be in the hand of thy director liUe a corps,

•Or of some other similar Arabic religions Or.Urs, tor Mobmmeta,
creeds of that kind arc- vc-ry iminc-r<.

576 The Doctrine of tJte Jesuits.

A Member — Yes ! "Perin.de ac cadaver!"

M. Paul Bert — Well ! Khouans have a chief, a regular general,
similar to that of the Jesuits, and the Khouans' formula is : "Thou
shalt be in the hand of thy chief, like a corpse in the hand of the
washer of the dead, who turns and turns it again at his will."

Now there is, in all the South Mediterranean countries, a con
stant fight between the various Mohammedan governments and the
Khouans ; the same kind of struggle which is now commen
cing in France between the Government, the Catholics and the
Jesuits. And by a strange and very queer coincidence, we French
men who have to govern on the northern side of the Mediterranean
Sea a Catholic population, and on the southern side Mahomme-
dan people — we fight here against the Jesuits about Art. 7, and
over there with the Khouans, in the Aures. (Approbation from
the Left.)

Gentlemen, you should think deeply over the nature of the fight
which is started against la}' governments by the Society of Jesus,
inarching in front of and commanding the Catholic Church. It is
not a political disturbance ; it is a social war ! And we must ac
knowledge the fact, that it is not the Catholic Church who has
made the declaration of war. She may consider herself provoked
by the lowliness to which governments want to reduce her ; for
she affirms that, from divine investitute and authority, she has the
right to command them. She simply requests them to let her take
the place she was occupying, and which she believes to be legiti
mately due to her.

M. Keller was saying a little while ago, and he was undoubtedly
right: '"The Church does not deal with politics ; the Jesuits do not
interfere with politics." That is true ; but under conditions that
that you understand the word " politics " in its narrowest sense.
No ; the Jesui's are neither monarchists nor republicans. And, I
believe, even if they had to choose, they would prefer to turn re
publicans ; for in a republic there is no king claiming a share of
the power; and they could, if circumstances were favorable to
them, monopolize the whole of it.

So, in the countries where they have been able to become abso
lute masters, in South America, what have they done? Thoy took

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 577

great care not to help the chance of a king. They founded several
Republics.

Likewise, they will accept very gladly the French Republic, pro
viding they can get hold of her, and make use of her as the hum
ble servant of the Catholic Church.

How can they reach that point? It is no longer a question here
of a king, and a confessor alone would not be sufficient. It is the
nation which is sovereign ; then they have to win the whole nation.
The middle classes are directing the nation ; it is necessary, there
fore, to get hold of them. And then, they have displayed their
marvellous and habitual resources.

They said to themselves, The world always follows the stronger,
or at least he who seems to be strongest, and says so. And then,
with the help of a thousand diverse causes, with the secret com
plicity of governments, (which greatly mistake in these matters in
believing they can make use of the Jesuits ; while, on the contrary,
the Jesuits are making use of and laughing at them, and are at the
same time taking advantage of the complicity of governments,) the
fear of the middle classes after our civil war, the fright of souls
after the disasters to our fatherland, and the support of the clergy
all gathered around them, which brought to them the help of its
power, its authority, and even of the income from worship and of
the inexhaustible resources which they know so well to secure
among the faithful ; taking advantage of all these means and all
these circumstances, they have constituted the- clerical party.

Please notice that I take great care not to say the

?*For there is an important distinction to be made. Catholics are
citizens who simply ask from civil society to be protected
free exercise of their faith. (That's it!) The Clerical party request
that civil society be subjected to the dogmas of Catholicism
(Applause from the Left and Center.) It is quite

e, they have constituted the clerical parly! This party is
everywhere and nowhere; it is the fairy to which the honorable 1
Keller was alluding, and whom one meets everywhere wit
being able to seize her anywhere ! This party is m the admin.

578 Tlie Doctrine of the Jesuits.

tration, the magistracy, the army, civil society, and in all
branches of human activity, and at every degree of the social hier
archy. This party constitutes a body which is at the same time
spread all over the world regarding its members, but as regards its
interests powerfully concentrated. Why? Because its numerous
members hold together, help each other, depend upon one another,
protect and push forward one another; because the French mid
dle class were convinced and made to believe, that if they wished
to succeed in the various branches of the administration, (Good!
That's it !) to obtain high grades in the army, to shine in the first
ranks of the magistracy or diplomacy, and secure, as physician or
lawyer, a good patronage at the first start ; and even in commerce
to have a blessed store, with plentiful capital and good customers,
it was sufficient to join the clerical party, and so show it respect,
help and affection. And the Society of Jesus alone is responsible
for these new merits.

That is what was suggested to the French middle classes ; and
when they were convinced of the fact, it had to be acknowledged
that it was unfortunately the truth. (Applause).

And so the Jesuits hoped that the French nation was finally
in their hands, and that with her they had secured the power.

However, such triumphs could not satisfy the Company of
Jesus. It would have been very imprudent to trust much in such
troops. Men who join an army for mere interest, do not deserve
to be depended upon. Who knows, if the pole towards which
they gravitate happened to change, doubtless, as a faithful com
pass, they would follow it, and change also?

After having secured possession of those who fight through,
and for interest, they wanted to possess those also who fight
through and for faith : in order to form them, they must not try
to take hold of grown-up men, but of young children. To obtain
that result, they had to secure the right of teaching youth. I now
come back to my subject,. Gentlemen, so as to get through with it
sooner.

The Count of Maille — Yes, you are entering upon the subject!
(Noise from the Left).

M. Paul Bert — Yes, the Jesuits then decided to capture the

Second Speech of M. Paul Bert. 579

education of youth, because it is only by taking the child when
very young, by keeping him from childhood in close watch and
under severe rule, that he can be impressed with feelings of long
duration. This is the only way they could be certain that the
child would not escape them, and that they could retain him
incorporated, fanaticized, unassailable by temptations.

Then what did they? With an admirable shrewdness, the very
first day the clerical party became master in the Assembly of 1850,
they asked for the liberty of primary and secondary teaching.

The second time, twenty years later, when the clerical party
became master once more, in the Assembly of 1871, it completed
its work by obtaining the liberty of superior instruction. And so
at all degrees soldiers were prepared, the true soldiers of Loyola's
army. (Good ! good.)

For me, here is where lies the danger ; it is on this ground that
we must fight, without truce or rest. What France does fear,
what she struggles against, is the impression upon the mind of the
young generations of the doctrine of the Society of Jesus, which
is the domination of the whole civil world by the clergy. For, if
they ever could take hold of the public power, national liberty
would soon be suppressed, and it would be all over with what
is dearest to us ! . . .

The danger lies there !

It is in order to remove it that the Minister of Public Instruc
tion laid before us his scheme of law, and that the Chamber will
vote it by an immense majority.

Politics were spoken of. No, have no fear. It is not on the
political ground, in its narrowest sense, that the quest

be put.

The Jesuits, through the clerical party, which is their banner
and their means of action, have committed a great polit
-let them allow me to say so. willi all the respect due to their

skillfulness. (Smiles) That they have unfortunately .

themselves to a party whose name is not very popular you «, I
be obliged to acknowledge, and even I could say, without offend
ing you, this party arouses somewhat-it is a prejudice perhaps -
the popular wrath, the passion of universal suffrage!

580 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

The}* committed this supreme mistake. That party has gone to
nothing. The danger is no longer on that side ; it is on the side
of the future ; the greatest danger is to see them becoming
republicans ! (Applause from the Left and Center) .

The danger for the future is to see them give up a dangerous
alliance, break off from the old monarch}', and throw away that
old government which was used by them as a mark, as a sign,
before the populace.

Now, Gentlemen, it is sufficient for us to have unmasked
beforehand those intrigues, to have pointed them out to the
generous-hearted and wise French people. We may be tranquil ;
never in a country like ours, never in this France, whose name is
synonymous of frankness, no, never, will the Jesuits reign. (Re
peated applause. The orator, when returning to his seat, was
warmly congratulated by his colleagues, who received him with
repeated salvos of applause.)

SPEECH

JBelifercti at tjje Sitting of fljc 7tfj of
3ulg, 1879.

SEQUEL TO THE DISCUSSION OF ARTICLE 7.

M. Paul Bert — I wish to speak on a personal matter.

The Speaker — M. Paul Bert is allowed to speak on a personal
matter.

M. Paul Bert — Gentlemen, I asked to speak concerning a
private fact. My name has been mentioned very often since the
beginning of this sitting, and it appears that I look like a man
overwhelmed with reproaches ! . . .

Gentlemen, some one said that my quotations were inexact.

A Member of the Right — Mutilated !

M. Paul Bert — Yes, mutilated. I have been represented as a
calumniator ; and I must say, by the side of a certain Pascal, a
well-known mathematician and philosopher (smiles on the Left
and Center) , I have been nailed to the pillory of history by the
revengeful taunts of M. de la Bassetiere. (Laughter on the same
seats).

I could get over it, Gentlemen, providing these so-called refuta
tions were true denials, and that something else besides vague
allegations had been brought forth.

What has been done? I quoted two kinds of texts : the ancient
books gathered by order of the Parliament of Paris in 1762,
collated by the Commissaries with the texts themselves, as men
tioned in the said decree. (Noise from the Right.)

Gentlemen, you are very particular about the respect due 1
magistrates, and you are right ; but please first respect your own
magistracy, your antique parliament !

582 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

M. Louis Le Provost de Launay — Which you afterwards guil
lotined !

M. Paul Bert — I never guillotined nor killed anybody, you
know it quite well. (Laughter from the Left).

M. Louis Le Provost de Launay — Republicans like you did it,
if you prefer.

M. Paul Bert — Gentlemen, no one could doubt the exactness
of the text ; now that is just what ought to have been done !

A Member of the Right — It was not said " inexact texts," but
"mutilated texts."

M. Paul Bert — It is impossible for anybody to read at the
tribune a whole big book, such as the decree of the Parliament !

M. Granier de Cassagnac — You have faithfully quoted the
book; it is incontestible. Now, what is the value of the work?
that is the question.

M. Paul Bert — That is logical, and the remark is correct.
But, I repeat, it is not my business to do the work of M. de la
Bassetiere ; as proof of his saying, he should have brought here
the original books themselves, and shown us that the abstracts
compiled by the Commissaries of the Parliament arc mulitated and
inexact. This is what ought to have been done ; now until you
give proof to the contrary, I have the right to say that what
was presented to the Parliament, what was authorized by the
Parliament of Paris, is the real expression of the truth, and
proves my assertions.

M. de Baudry d'Asson — There are 758 falsifications of that
book !

M. Paul Bert — Find out one only, and bring it to us, that will
do!

M. de Baudry d'Asson — I shall bring them to you.

M. Paul Bert — I pass to another kind of works, to the more
recent books from which I quoted. Was there any doubt about
them? Was the exactness of my quotations contested ? Certainly,
they are shortened, as you say, because I did not wish to read the
whole book, but do you deny their exactness? No, nobody did
so ; and nobody can do so ! Consequently, I have the right to say
that I told the truth !

Third Speech of M. Paul Bert. 583

I have quoted M. Moullet, who, it seems, is not a Jesuit; but
I would say, lie at least deserves to be one, for he taught morals
at the Jesuits' college in Fribourg, during several years, and his
doctrine is certain to be the doctrine of the Jesuits. The book
published by him in 1845 or 1846, bore the approval of the Bishop
of Lausanne. Do you not think my quotation is good? Let us
pass to something else. (Applause from the Left.)

As regards Abbot Marotte, the cause is heard, I believe?*
Numerous voices from the Center and Left — Yes ! yes !
M. Paul Bert— A certain Baudran has been spoken of, who, it
was said, deserved the title of Abbot ; 1 did not know it; the
book I quoted from did not give him that title.

What I said, and what could not be denied, is that M. Baudran,
in this perfectly disgusting book, was backed by the approval of
the Bishop of Limoges. This could not be denied, and
csling to the cause.

Another fact was also pointed out. I found in the OFFICIAL
JOURNAL an interruption which 1 had not heard ; but
surprised, though I am usually very attentive. (Smiles) .
said that the Vicar of Nancy, who had dictated those obscenities
(whose texts I have here, but I dare not read.) to high schools
young girls, was insane. That is easy to say; but the proc
should be given. What is certain is, that for several months the
said Vicar has taught those abominations, dictated those <
books; that the school-mistress made complaints to the pai
and that they were without the slightest effect. What is certa
is, that after a few months, the sitting of the depa;t:nen 1
CouiuMl bavin* taken place, the whole affair was brought before it,
an, Tin presence of the consequent scandal the vicar was not
interdicted, but simply sent away from that school. Where?
do not know anything about him ; for it is very hard foi
Minister of Justice himself to know exactly what becomes
vicars and teachers of religious congregations who a e Bent
^ticl on account of mischief ! (Laughter and applause (roin
tlw Lelt and Center).

584. The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

Regarding quotations, I will not accumulate them indefinitely.
However, there are a few points, in the long series of cases of
conscience I successively named before you, which had been
forgotten by the Casuists I quoted ; but which are very carefully
dissected by modern Jesuits.

It is not a question here, as I was reproached regarding Rev.
Father Humbert, of an author dead in 1771, but of a book
reprinted in 1840 ; it is a question of principles taught in full in
the 19th century, especially by the Rev. Father Guiy. Perhaps
some one will say that I am wrong again in calling him Rev.
Father? All I know is, that he is a professor of the College of
Rome, and that his "Compendium Theologies Moralis" was pub
lished in 1868, with the appioval of several bishops !

I think he is sure to teach the true doctrines ; for otherwise,
the Papal thunderbolts near at hand would not fail to fall upon
him !

I will read three quotations from him :

From the Left — "Are clerks held to obey the laws ? Answer:
Certainly not, when they are contrary to ecclessiastical immuni
ties." *

So much for politics. That's very simple, it is a good general
formula.

Now, let us see some particular cases. If the Minister of Fi
nance was present, I do not know how he would look upon the fol
lowing advices :

"Question : Is it a sin, and is one held to make restitution when
prohibited goods are imported? Answer: As regards restitution,
the answer is certainly negative, for it does not strictly cause any
prejudice to the rights of anybody."

But here are more serious cases concerning the Minister of Jus
tice, who is sitting over there, I see.

First, one question concerning every one at the point of view of
general honesty :

"He who has promised to many a rich young girl, of good
health and character, is not held to fulfill his promise if she
falls into poverty, sickness, OK vice ; because then it is a simple

*See above page (48.)

TJtird Speech of M. Paul Bert. 585

promise which does not oblige." (Exclamations and laughter from
the Left.)

Next, about secret compensation, of which I quoted some exam
ples from comparativel}" old casuists, dating one hundred years
ago. I have shown that Abbot Marotte had entirely adopted and
reproduced the whole of their doctrines. But the Honorable M.
de la Rochefoucauld, Duke of Bisaccia, said: "The Abbot Marotte
has nothing to do with us : he was no authority, he is not a Jesuit,
and it is here only a question of Jesuits ! " Then, it will be use
ful to demonstrate that modern Jesuits have exactly the same
teaching as the ancient casuists. Here is a secret compensation,
which is meant not only for a debt, but for a sentence before jus
tice.

I shorten the quotation, as it is a very long one : it may be found
on page 33 of the Cases of Conscience, by Gury ; you can verify
the text for yourselves :

"Tityre, a shepherd, was sentenced by the Court to a fine and
to pay damages for having caused havoc in a field with his flock ;
but this unfortunate shepherd thinks the sentence is unrighteous."

The casuist asks himself, if Tityre may compensate himself for
the damages he had to pay by helping himself to the property of
the farmer who prosecuted him, and to the property of the Treas
ury, to get back the money he was fined. And he answers affirm-,
atively, without hesitation ! *

* There is an error here, which, in one of the preceding sittings, M.
Granier de Cassagnac very courteously reproached me for. But
rather inclined to believe that, when the interruption occurred my co >-
league had no more Gary's text before his eyes than myself else he would
not have said that I was confounding the thesis with the solution ; no, whc
I interrupted him bv reading again my quotation and saying, , " The e arc
two Tity?es," he should have answered : " Just so there are two 1 tyre.
the objects of two different cases, and you attributed to the ™

which the casuist attributes to the second." For such is

reader refer to the text and appreciate the way of J

«Sa^^wg«i

in secret, granted to a man unjustly sentenced? I admit,

586 The Doctrine of the Jesuits.

So it is ! It is sufficient, Gentlemen, simply to think that the
sentence is unjust. (Laughter from the Left.)

A Voice from the Left — That is not serious !

M. Paul Bert — Those Gentlemen do not find this serious.

I will continue to make you laugh ; for here is the story of a man
named Pomponius, who, in order to revenge himself, tried to kill
with a gun the goat of a certain Maurus ; he missed the goat, but
the cow of Marinus, who was browsing near by, was killed instead.

It is asked, to what reparation is Pomponius held? And Gury
answers : ''To nothing ! " *

In fact, he is not held to make reparation on account of the goat
he tried to kill, having missed her ; and he is not held to make re
paration to the owner of the cow which was killed, as he did not
intend killing it. (Applause and hearty laughter from the Left
and Center.)

M. Barodet — They have a great deal of wit.

M. Paul Bert — Let us see, Gentlemen, if you will laugh at the
application, on the human species, of the ingenious method imag
ined for the murder of cows and goats.

This may be seen on page 4 of " Cases of Conscience," by the
said Gury, published at Regensburg in 1865. | It is a question
here of a man named Adalbert, who, intending to kill his enemy
Titius, killed by error his friend Caius. What should we think of
Adalbert?

"Adalbert should be entirely dispensed from the sin of homi
cide ; ' for his external act was not directed positively against
Caius, who was killed involuntarily by him. Consequently he is
not obliged to any restitution to Caius' heirs."

seems doubtful and depends upon circumstances, I should like to ask any
magistrate what he would do if such a man, arrested in the very act of
compensation on the property of his neighbor, or in stealing tiie cash
of the treasury, were brought before him? Finally, I ask any sensible
man, what he will think of the situation of poor Tityre, who, on being
brought again before the Court, should exclaim : "Why do you condemn
me, and why do you call me a thief ? My confessor, a good Jesuit, told
me that I might act as I have done, with full safety of conscience."

* See page 196.

f I had only the German edition, or rather abstracts of that edition, ,
communicated to me at the beginning of the Sitting.

Third Speech of M. Paul Llert. 587

So we have, in 1865, for the practice of murder, a very handy
doctrine. If you wish, without committing a sin, to kill some
one, the scheme is very simple : you have hut to mentally wish
the death of a man, and then shoot at the person by his si le.
(Ironical applause from the Left and Ceuter.- Interruptions from

the Right).

M. (le la Rochefoucauld, Duke of Bisaccia - \\ hen you go
confess, they will be indulgent to your sins ! That is all

°M Paul Bert — I will never have to accuse myself of such
actions i but it seems that the same thing cannot be said
who go to Father Gary's confessional !

Here are, Gentlemen, some new quotations. I have her
book full of such matters. It is not a book written by a Parlia
ment, and you can consequently reject it, so to •P-*^
But I would rather advise you to peruse and verify my quot
I have named the texts, pages, works, etc., and until you have
brought to this tribune the proof . . .

AMember of the Right-We shall bring it

M Paul Bert -We shall see, Sir; in the meantime, pie
fo the consequences I draw my.elf from ^ur own

lated by a great number of bis colleagues

TIIE END

i i

INDEX.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE JESUITS.

PAGE

5

Epigraph to Book

Note to the Thirteenth Edition ^

Publishers' Preface, n

Dedication

First Preface — Aim and Plan of the Book ^

Second Preface — Summary of the Book ^

Analysis of Gury

BOOK I.

CASES OF CONSCIENCE.
TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTIONS.
CHAPTER I. Of the Notions of Human Acts

CHAPTER II. Principles of the Acts ^

ART. I. Of the Voluntary Act 4G

Section 1. Of the Voluntary Act in Genera
Section 2. Of the Voluntary Act in Particular - _-_ ^

ART. II. Of Free Will - ' ' _ . 49

ART. III. Obstacles to Free Will and to Will . . . 49

Section 1. Of Ignorance _ _ 50

Section 2. Of Concupiscence _" . . . 50

Section 3. Of Fear - ... 50
Section 4. Of Violence

CHAPTER IIL Morality of Human Acts : Essence of Morahty, ^

Its Sources _ m 51

ART. I. Of the Essence of Morality I . - 61

ART. II. Of its Sources _ . . 51

Section 1. Of the Object ._ _ . M

Section 2. Of Circumstances ... 52

Section 3. Of the End „ - - M

Appendix. On the Merit of the Acts

590 Index.

PAGE

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON HUMAN ACTS.

Case 1. Of Will 53

Case 2. Of Will - 53

Case 4. Of the Indirect Will 55

Case 5. Of the Indirect Will 5G

Case 6. Effects of Ignorance 56

Case 9. Of Fear and Violence 57

Case 10. Of Concupiscence 58

Case 11. Of the Object of Morality - - - - - - 59

Case 14. Of the Intention of the Agent GO

TREATISE ON CONSCIENCE.

CHAPTER I. Sound and Unsound Conscience .... 61
CHAPTER II.

ART. I. Of the Certain Conscience G2

ART. II. Of the Doubtful Conscience G2

CHAPTER III. The Scrupulous and Lax Conscience - - - G4

ART. I. The Scrupulous Conscience 64

ART. II. The Lax Conscience G5

CHAPTER IV. The Probable and Improbable Conscience - - G5

ART. I. The Nature of Probability. G >

Different Systems on Probability GG

ART. II. Efficacy of Probability to form Conscience G8

ART. III. The Use of Probability 69

CASES OF CONSCIENCE.

Case 1. Erroneous Conscience -----..70

Case 2. "Erroneous Conscience --73

Case 3. Doubtful Conscience ---....74

Case 7. On Probability 74

Case 9. Authority of the Confessor Relative to Opinions 75

Case 11. On the Change of Opinion --,..„ 76

TREATISE ON LAWS.

PART I.

LAWS IN GENERAL.

CHAPTER I. Nature and Qualities of the Law .... 73

CHAPTER II. The Legislator 73

CHAPTER III. Object and Subject of the Law - - 80

CHAPTER IV. Promulgation and Acceptation of the Law - - 82

ART. I. Promulgation 82

Index. 591

PA OK

ART. II. Acceptation

CHAPTER V. Obligation of the Law - - - -

ART. I. The Force of the Obligation

AIIT. II. Manner of Satisfying the Obligation of the Law

ART. Ill Causes Exempting from Obeying the Law

Section 1. Nature of these Causes

Section 2. Voluntary Application of these Causes

CHAPTER VI. Interpretation of the Law and of Epikeia
Section 1. Interpretation
Section 2. Moderation (Epikoia)

CHAPTER VII. Dispensation of the Law

ART. I. Power which Exempts

ART. II. Causes Required in order to be Exempted

ART. III. End of the Exemption

CHAPTER VIII. Cessation of the Law

PART II.

DIFFERENT SORTS OF LAWS.

85
CHAPTER I. Natural and Divine Law

ART. I. Natural Law

ART. II Positive Divine Law

CHAPTER II. Ecclesiastical and Civil Law

ART. I. Ecclesiastical Law g(J

ART. II. Civil Law 8tf

CHAPTER HI. Penal and Annuling Law _ ^

ART. I. The Penal Law 86

ART. II. The Annuling Law g7

CHAPTER IV. Unwritten and Traditional Laws ^

CHAPTER V. Favorable or Privileged Law

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON THE LAWS.

Refusal ... 01

Case 19. The Annuling Law ~_ .fl

Case 20. The Penal Law

TREATISE ON SINS.

*» „

PART i.
N.u,,,, G-UVTV. ^ *******

592 index.

PAGE

CHAPTER I. Nature of Sin 93

1. Attention of the Mind 93

2. Consent of the Will ........ 93

CHAPTER II. Gravity of Sin, and Especially of Mortal and

Venial Sin 94

CHAPTER III. Distinction of Sin 94

ART. I. Specific Distinctions • 94

ART. II. Numerical Distinction 94

PART II.

KINDS OF SINS.

CHAPTER I. Internal Sins 95

CHAPTER II. Capital Sins 96

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON SINS

Case 1. Gravity of Sin 97

Case 2. Specific Distinction of Sins 97

Case 3. Specific Distinction of Sins 97

Case 4. Numerical Distinction of Sins 98

Case 6. Numerical Distinction of Sins 98

Case 8. Internal Sins 99

Case 15. On Drunkenness - - - - - - _ -101

Case 16. On Drunkenness ------._ JQI

Case 17. On Drunkenness 102

TREATISE ON VIRTUES.

CHAPTER I. Faith- - " 103

ART. I. Necessity of Faith 103

ART. II. Object of Faith 103

ART. III. Vices Opposed to Faith ]03

CHAPTER II. Hope 103

CHAPTER III. Charity - - - - - . . - 104

ART. I. Love to God 104

ART. II. Love to Our Neighbor 104

Section 1. Precept for the Love of Our Neighbor - - ]04

Section 2. Works of Mercy, Alms, and Brotherly Correction - 105

Section 3. Vices Opposed to Charity for Our Neighbors - - 105

ART. I. Scandal ------._._ 105

ART. II. Co-operation lOG

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON VIRTUES.

Case 7. Relations with Heretics 108

Index. 593

PAGE

Case 12. Charity Towards Our Neighbor ; Maternal and Conjugal

Love 109

Case 13. On Dancing 110

TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE.

PRECEPT I.

CHAPTER I. Acts Relative to the Virtue of Religion 111

ART. I. On Adoration ....
ART. II. On Prayer

CHAPTER II. Vices Opposed to Religion
ART. I. On Superstition

Section 1. On Idolatry

Section 2. Forbidden Worship

Section 3. On Divination

Section 4. On Magic and Witchcraft -
Appendix 1. Table^Turning
Appendix 2. Animal Magnetism
Appendix 3. Consultation of Spirits, or Spiritualism
ART. II. Irreligion

Section 1. Temptation Relative to God

Section 2. Sacrilege

Section 3. Simony

CASES ON THE FIRST PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE.

Case 9. On Divination

Ca*e 10. Magic and Witchcraft

Case 12. Table Turning - nJj

Case 13. Animal Magnetism iig

Case 16. On Sacrilege

SECO-ND PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE.
CHAPTER I. Vain Usurpation of the Name of God and Bias- ^

phemy
ART. I. Vain Usurpation of God's Holy Name - ^

ART. II. Blasphemy

. . - 121

CHAPTER II. Oaths , _ _ m

ART. I. The Conditions of an Oath - ' '

Section 1. Conditions Required for the Validity of an Oath 121

ART. II. The Obligation of the Oath _ J22

Appendix on Adjuration - _-

CHAPTER III. Vows - - 123

ART. I. Conditions Required for Vows -

594 Index.

PAGE

Section 1. The Intention Required by the Vow ... 123

Section 2. Motive for the Vow 123

ART. II. Obligation of the Vow 123

ART. III. Cessation of the Vow 124

Section 1. Annulment of the Vow 124

Section 2. Dispensation from the Vow --'-.. 124

Section 3. Change of Vow 124

CASES ON THE SECOND PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE.

Case 7. The Value of Vows 125

Case 8. The Value of Vows 125

THIRD PRECEPT OP THE DECALOGUE.

CHAPTER I. What is Commanded on Feast Days - - - 126

ART. I. What is to be Done, Generally, on Feast Days - - 125

ART. II. The Hearing of Mass in Particular 126

CHAPTER II. Things Forbidden on Sundays and Feast Days - 126

ART. I. Forbidden Work on Feast Days 127

ART. II. Causes for Which Salaried Works are Permitted on Feast

Days 128

CASES ON THE THIRD PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE - 128
FOURTH PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE.

CHAPTER I. Obligation of Children towards their Parents - 129

Suction 1. Love 129

Section 2. Respect - 130

Section 3. Obedience 130

CHAPTER II. Obligations of-Parents towards their Children - 131

Section 1. Love 131

Section 2. Education 131

CHAPTER III. Conjugal Obligations - - - 131

CHAPTER IV. Obligations of other Superiors and Inferiors - 132

ART. I. Obligations of Masters and Servants ... - 132

Section 1. Master's Obligations 132

ART. II. Obligations of Masters and Pupils 132

ART. III. Obedience and Respect towards Temporal Authority - 132

CASES ON THE FOURTH PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE.

Case 3. The Duties of Sons - - - 133

Case 6. The Duties of Parents - - 134

Case 7. The Duties of Masters - ; ; ' - ' -" - - ' - - 134

Index.

FIFTH PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE.

CHAPTER I. Suicide 135

CHAPTER II. Mur;ler - . 1H5

ART. I. The Murder of a Guilty Person or of a Criminal Ifl5

ART. II. Murder of an Unjust Aggressor 13(5

ART. III. Murder of an Innocent Person 137

Abortion 138

CHAPTER III. Duelling 138

CHAPTER IV. War I39

CASES ON THE FIFTH PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE.

Case 3. Admirable Expedient of a Virgin
Case 9. Abortion
Case 10 Abortion -

SIXTH AND NINTH PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE.

CHAPTER I. Lustful Sins not Consummated.
ART. I. Immodest Kisses and Bodily Contact
ART. II. Looking on Obscene Things
ART. III. Immodest Reading and Conversation

CHAPTER II. Lustful Sins Consummated
Section 1. Fornication
Section 2. Adultery

Section 3. Incest - - - 14<>

Section 4. Sacrilege

Section 5. Defloration

_ low

Section 6. Ravishment
ART. II. Sins Committed Against Nature ^

Section 1. On Pollution

Section 2. On Sodomy IM

Section 3. On Bestiality
CASES ON T.I> SIXTH AND NIST.I PKECEI-TS ™ ™« D"**"™

TREATUH OX THE SEVENTH AND TENTH PRECEPTS OK T« D«U- ^

LOGUE

CASES os THE SEVENTH AND TENTH PUECKPT OK THE DKCALOOC-*

1 -"'-">

EIGHTH PRECEPT OF THE E ^ _

CHAPTER I. Lying _ _ . ,.-,.-,

ART. I. Lying in General _ _ ,--

AKT. II. Mental Restriction -

596 Index.

PAGE

CHAPTER II. Defamation 159

ART. I. On the Sin of Defamation 159

ART. II. Reparation for Outraged Honor 162

CHAPTER III. Outrage 1C3

CHAPTER IV. Rash Judgment, Suspicious and Rash Doubts - 16;i

Appendix. On Violation of Secrecy 163

CASES ON THE EIGHTH PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE.

Case 2. Mental Restriction 16r>

Case 5. Defamation I67

Case 6. Defamation
Case 10. On Secrecy

Case 11. Open Letters 1Gt)

TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS OF THE CHURCH.

Precepts 1,2. On the Keeping of Feast Days

Precepts. On Annual Confession - 171

Precept 4. On Communion at Easter 171

Precept 5. On Abstinence from Meats, Other Than During the

Time of Fasting 171

Precept 6. Of the Ecclesiastical Fast I*"2

CHAPTER I. The Essence and Obligation of the Fast - - 172

ART. 1. On the One Meal and Lunch I"2

ART. II. On Abstinence from Meat in Fasting - - - - 172

ART. II [. Hours for Meals l™

CHAPTER II. On Cases which Exempt from Fasting - - 172

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON THE PRECEPTS OF THE CHURCH.

Case 8. On Fasting ' 17_3

Case 12. On Excusing from the Fast 173

Case 13. On Abstinence from Meat 174

TREATISE ON JUSTICE AND RIGHTS.

PART I.

NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND RIGHTS

CHAPTER I. General Notions on Justice and Rights - - - 175

ART. I. Nature of Justice 17»

ART. II. Nature of Rights

ART. III. General Principles of Rights and Justice - - - 175

Section 1. General Principles of Rights 175

Sectior 2. General Principles of Justice 175

Index. 597

CHAPTER II. Principal Kinds of Right 1 JO-
ART. I. Ownership 176

Section 1. Object of Ownership 170

Section 2. Subject of Ownership 177

ART. I. Ownership of the Sons of the Family .... 177

ART. II. Ownership of Wives 177

ART. III. Ownership of the Clergy 179

ART. IV. Ownership of Authors - 179

Sections. The Acquisition of Ownership - 179

ART. I. By Occupation . . 179

ART. I. By Objects that are Found 181

ART. III. By Prescription - - 181

ART. IV. By Accession 181

ART. II. Of Usage and Usufruct - 181

ART. III. By Servitudes - - 181

PART II.

VIOLATION OF RIGHT, OR INJUSTICE.

CHAPTER I. Injustice in General 181

CHAPTER II. Injustice in its Kind, or, Sins Against Justice 183

ART. I. Nature of Theft 183

ART. II. On Causes Excusing from Theft 186

Section 1. Necessity Excusing from Theft 186

Section 2. Secret Compensation 187

PART III.

ON RESTITUTION.

Section 1. Restitution in General 190

CHAPTER I. Obligatory Restitution 190

CHAPTER II. The Roots of Restitution - 191

ART. I. The Acceptance of Another's Property -

Section 1. The Owner in Good Faith

Section 2. The Owner in Bad Faith

Section 3. The Owner of Doubtful Faith

ART. II. Unprofitable Wrong Doing

ART. Ill On Unjust Co-operation

Section 1. One who Orders Evil

Section 2. One who Advises Evil - - - - - - .

Section 3. The One who Gives Consent

Section 4. The Flatterer

Section 5. The Receiver of Stolen Goods

Section 6. The Participator

598 Index.

PAGE

Section 7. Those who Keep Silent, Make No Opposition, Do

Not Divulge; or, Negative Co-operators - - 199

CHAPTER III. On the Circumstances of Restitution - - 200

ART. I. How Much it is Necessary to Restore? - ... 200

ART. II. To Whom is it Necessary to Make Restitution ? - - 200

ART. III. In What Order is it Necessary to Make Restitution? - 200

ART. IV. How is the Restitution to be Made? - 201

ART. V. When is the Restitution to be Made? .... 201

CHAPTER IV. Cases which Exempt from Restitution - - 201

Section 2. Different Kinds of Restitution .... 202
CHAPTER I. Restitution for Injury Done to the Welfare of the

Soul 202

CHAPTER II. Restitution for Injury to the Body - - - 203

ART. I. Restitution for Homicide 203

ART. II. Restitution for Rape and Fornication .... 203

ART. III. Restitution for Adultery 204

CHAPTER III. On Restitution for the Injury Caused to Tempo
ral Fortune in Particular Cases ... 205

ART. I. Of Taxes • .205

ART. II. Of Injury Caused on the Occasion of Military Service 206
ART. III. On Confiscation of Property in the Revolution in

France 206

Section 1. Ecclesiastical Property - 206

Section 2. Individual Property - 206

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON JUSTICE AND RIGHTS.
ON PATRIMONY.

Case 1. Of the Property of Children 208

Case 2. Of the Property of Children 209

Case 6. Of Occupation 210

Case 8. Of Occupation 210

Case 12. Of Things . - - - - - - - - 211

Case 17. Of the Prescription - - 211

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON INJUSTICE AND THEFT.
SECRET COMPENSATION.

Case 1. The Gravity of Theft 213

Case 2. Of Small Thefts 214

Case 3. The Thefts of Children and Servants - - - - 214

Case 4. Theft of Wives 215

Case 5. A Tailor's Cleverness - - - - - - - 216

Case 7. The Innocent Condemned, instead of the Guilty One - 216

Index. 599

Case 9. A Servant's Ruse 218

Case 10. Secret Compensation 218

Case 11. Secret Compensation _ 219

CASES ON RESTITUTION IN GENERAL.

Case 3. Obligatory Restitution 221

Case 5. A Baker Taken in His Own Meshes - - - - 221

CASES ON RESTITUTION OF OTHER'S PROPERTY.

Case 3. The Dishonest Holder 223

Case 7. The Possessor Dishonestly --.... 223

CASES ox WRONG UNJUSTLY DONE.

' Case 1. A Guilty Man, though Being in the Right 225

Case 2. Threat to Denounce a Guilty One 225

Case 3. The One Doing Wrong in Spite of Himself - 226

Case 5. Prevented Benefaction 227

Case 7. Lamentable Error - 227

Case 9. Mistake in the Wrong Done by Some One - - - 228
Case 10. Mistake in the Wrong Done by Some One 229

Case 11. The Fashionable Novice 230

Case 12. * A Hare for Un Sou 231

CASES ON CO-OPERATION IN ORDER TO INJURE OTHERS.
Case 1. The One who Commands— The Employer 233

Case 2. The Employer 233

Case 4 The One who Advises 234

Case 5. The One who Consents - 234

Case 6. The One who Consents - 234

Case 11. Negative Co-operation

Case 13. Negative Co-operation

Case 14. The One Who Says Nothing -

CASES ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF RESTITUTION.

Case 1. Joint Responsibility

Case 5. Time of Restitution -

Case 10. Causes which Dispense with Restitution

Case 14. Release of Property

Case 15. Embarassed Debtors

CASES ON SPECIAL RESTITUTIONS.
Case 2. Restitution for Homicide

O J rt

Case 3. Restitution for Rape

Case 4. Restitution for Fornication

Case 10. Fraud to the Prejudice of the Treasury

Case 11. Fraud to the Prejudice of the Treasury

600 Index.

TREATISE ON CONTRACTS.

PART I.

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 216

CHAPTER I. Conditions Required for the Contract 247

ART. I. The Reasons for the Contract 247

ART. II. Subject of the Contract 248

Section 1. Minors 248

Section 2. Wives 248

Section 3. People Dead in Law 248

Section 4. Interdicted Persons and Spendthrifts - 248

ART. III. Required Consent 248

Section 1. Qualities of Legitimate Consent 248

Section 2. Faults Opposed to Consent 248

CHAPTER II. Obligation of the Contract 250

CHAPTER III. Modifications of the Contracts 251

ART. I. The Oath Joined to the Contract 251

ART. II. Some Specified Modes of Contract .... 251

ART. Ill Condition of the Contract 251

PART II.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONTRACTS 251

CHAPTER I. Promise 252

CHAPTER II. Gifts 252

ART. I. Gifts in General 252

ART. II. Different Kinds of Gifts 252

Section 2. Wills 252

Section 3. The Gift by Reason of Death 253

Section 4. Entailment and Trust 254

CHAPTER III. Loan to Custom 255

CHAPTER IV. Deposit, and Deposit by Sequestration - - 255

CHAPTER V. Commission and Administration of Property - 255

CHAPTER VI. Loan 255

ART. I. Nature of the Contract of the Loan .... 255

ART. II. Interest or Gain Received from the Loan ... 255

ART. II. Titles which Excuse the Interest 256

1. Loss Experienced 25G

2. Deprivation of a Gain 257

3. Risk of Loss 257

4. Conventional Penalty -- - 257

5. Title Coming from the Civil Law 257

Appendix : On Loan-Banks 257

Index. 001

PAGE

SECTION IT.
ONEROUS CONTRACTS 259

CHAPTER I. Sale and Purchase 259

ART. I. Nature of the Sale and Purchase - - 259

ART. II. Fair Price 259

ART. III. Principal Kinds of Sales 202

Section 1. Retrovendition, or Mohatra 262

Section 2. Auction Sale - - 262

Section 3. Monopoly - 263

Section 4. Sale by Middle Men - 263

CHAPTER II. Partnership and Treble Contracts 263

ART. I. Partnership
ART. II. Treble Contract

CHAPTER III. Renting 2C4

CHAPTER IV. Exchange 264

CHAPTER V. Quit-rent 264

CHAPTER VI. Subsidiary Contracts

ART. I. The Bondsman -

ART. II. The Security

ART. III. The Mortgage

CHAPTER VII. Contingent Contracts

ART. I. Insurance -

ART. II. Betting -

ART. III. The Lottery -

^RT. I. Gambling -

CASES ON CONTRACTS IN GENERAL.

9fr
Case 1. Motive of the Contractor

Case 2. Motive of the Contract

Case 3. Contracts for a Shameful Object -

Case 11. Condition in the Contract

Case 14. The Disemboweled Dog -

CASES ON PROMISES AND DONATIONS.

270

Case 1. Promise - - 2_0

Case 3. Donation Between Living Parties -

271
Case 4. Conditional Donation

Ca;-e 6. Donation for Cause of Death -
Case 7. Donation for Cause of Death -
Case 8. Donation for Cause of Death -

602 Index.

PAGE

Case 9. Donation Made by a Dying Man and Denied by His Heir 273

Case 10. Parents' Donation - - 274

CASES ox WILLS AND LEGACIES.

Case 2. Value of the Will 276

Case 3. Value of the Will : Nocturnal Spectre 276
Case 6. Will Destroj-ed by Hazard, and Reconstructed by Artful
ness 277

Caj-e 11. Legacies 278

Case 12. Conditional Legacies 279

Case 13. Profane Legacies, Showing a Lack of Legal Formali
ties ----. 280

Case 14. Pious Legacies, Having a Lack of Legal Formalities - 280

Case 15. Pious Legacies 282

CASES ON COMMODATE, DEPOSIT, MANDATE AND LOAN.

Case 1. Commodate 283

Case 2. Unfortunate Borrower -_.._._ 283

Case 6. Deposit -._.. 284

Case 8. Mandatory 285

Case 14. Reason Which Excuses Usury 285

CASES ON SALE AND ITS SPECIES.

Case 7. Remarkable Picture Bought at a Low Price - 286

Case 14. Cunning Seller 286

Case 18. Auction Sale 287

Case 19. Miraculous Image of the Blessed Virgin - 288

Case 22. Compromise ---__--_. 289

Case 23. Commercial Dealings 290

CASES ON RENTING, AND OTHER ONEROUS CONTRACTS.

Case 4. Long-Term Lease 291

Case 8. Exchange .- 291

Case 11. Money Dealings 292

Case 13. On Security 294

Case 15. Guaranty ___._.___ 295

Case 16. Mortgage 295

Case 17. On Betting 297

Case 22. On Gambling 297

Case 23. For the Want of One Trick, Martin Lost His Donkey 298

Indm. (503

PAGE

BOOK SECOND.

TREATISE ON PECULIAR SITUATIONS.
I. — LAICS. II. — ECCLESIASTICS. III.— REGULAR FRIARS.

PART FIRST.
LAY SITUATIONS.

CHAPTER I. Judge's Duties - - ... 300

Appendix 1. On Jurors - - 301

Appendix 2. On Arbiters - - 301

CHAPTER II. Obligations of the Advocates and Attorneys 301

CHAPTER III. Solicitor's Duties 302

CHAPTER IV. Duties of Registers and Notaries 302

CHAPTER V. Duties of Prosecutors and Defendants 302

CHAPTER VI. Witnesses' Duties 303

CHAPTER VII. On Duties of Physicians, Surgeons and Pharma
cists 304

CHAPTER VIII. On Duties of Rural Constables 305

CHAPTER IX. On Artists and Laborers 305

PART SECOND.

SITUATION OF CLERGYMEN.

CHAPTER I. Common, Positive and Negative Obligations of

Clergymen

ART. I. Positive Obligations

ART. II. Negative Obligations of Clergymen, or What is Forbid
den to Them

CHAPTER II. Special Obligations of Clergymen
ART. I. Obligations of Bishops
ART. II. Obligations of Parsons - - - -
ART. III. Obligations of Prebendaries -

Appendix 1. Privilege of Priests

Appendix 2. Advantages of Priests

PART THIRD.

SITUATIONS OF FRIARS.

CHAPTER I. On the Nature of the Religious State
CHAPTER II. On Religious Vocation

604 Index.

PAGE

CHAPTER III. On the Obligations of Vows .... 30<j

ART. I. Vow of Poverty 309

ART. II. Vow of Chastity 310

ART. III. Vow of Obedience 310

CHAPTER IV. Privilege of Regulars 311

Appendix : On the Actual State of Regulars in France - - 311

CASES ON SPECIAL SITUATIONS.
LAY PERSONS.

Case 1. The Judge 312

Case 2. The Judge 312

Case 4. The Barrister 313

Case 6. The Defendant Before the Court 314

Case 7. Witness Called Before the Court 316

Case 5. The Notary 317

Case 10. The Rural Constable 318

CASES ON THE RELIGIOUS STATE.

Case 5. Religious Vocation 319

Case 6. On the Parents' Consent 320

Case 8. Vow of Poverty 322

Case 9. Vow of Poverty 323

Case 12. Vow of Poverty 325

Case 15. On the Property of Monks 326

Case 17. Vow of Obedience 326

GENERAL TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENTS.
CHAPTER I. Definition, Number and Division of the Sacraments 327
CHAPTER II. Matter and Form of the Sacraments - - - 327
CHAPTER III. Minister of the Sacraments 327
ART. I. Required Conditions for Administering the Sacraments ;
or, of the Attention, Intention, Good Faith, and Hon
esty of the Minister 327

ART. II. Duty of the Minister 327

CHAPTER IV. Person who Receives the Sacraments - - 327
ART. I. Required Conditions in Order to Receive the Sacraments

in a Valid Manner ....... 327

ART. II. Required Conditions in Order to Receive the Sacraments
in a Lawful Manner

TREATISE ON BAPTISM.

CHAPTER I. Nature, Propriety, and Necessity of Baptism - 328

Index.

CHAPTER II. Matter and Form of Baptism ....
ART. I. Matters to be Avoided, and Matters Preferred, Concern
ing Baptism -------- 328

ART. II. Formula of Baptism 309

CHAPTER III. Minister of Baptism 329

CHAPTER IV. On the Subject of the Baptism - ... 399
CHAPTER V. Accessory Solemnities of Baptism, God-Fathers,

and Ceremonies 399

ART. I. God-Fathers 330

ART. II. Ceremonies of Baptism 330

Appendix on Caesarian Operation, to Baptize a Child who is not

yet Born 330

TREATISE ON CONFIRMATION.

CHAPTER I. Matter and Form of Confirmation - - 331

ART. I. Matter of Confirmation ... - 331

ART. II. Form of Confirmation .... 331

CHAPTER II. Minister of Confirmation 331

CHAPTER III. Person who Receives Confirmation 331

TREATISE ON THE EUCHARIST.

PART I.

THE EUCHARIST AS A SACRAMENT.

CHAPTER I. Nature and Efficacy of the Eucharist 332

CHAPTER II. Matter and Form of the Eucharist 332

ART. I. Matter of the Eucharist

ART. II. Form of the Sacrament of the Eucharist 333

CHAPTER III. Minister who Gives the Eucharist
ART. I. Power of this Minister
ART. II. Obligation to Administer the Eucharist
ART. III. Special Conditions Required to Properly Administer

the Eucharist

ART. IV. Manner of Giving the Eucharist to the Sick
ART. V. Manner of Keeping the Holy Eucharist
CHAPTER IV. The Person who Receives the Eucharist
ART. I. Obligation to Receive the Eucharist
ART. II. Required Dispositions for Receiving the Eucharist

PART II.

THE EUCHARIST AS A SACRIFICE.
CHAPTER I. Nature and Virtue of the Sacrifice of the Mass 334

GOG Index.

PAGE

CHAPTER II. Application of the Sacrifice of the Mass - - 334

CHAPTER III. Obligations to Celebrate the Sacrifice - - 334

ART. I. Obligation to Celebrate it, Created by Priesthood - - 334

ART. II. Obligation Created by Duty - - - - • -, -' 334

ART. Ill Obligation Created by Salary 335

Appendix : For the Priests of the Society of Jesus ... 335

CEIAPTER IV. Time and Place of the Celebration - - - 335

ART. I. Time of the Celebration 335

CHAPTER V. Method of the Celebration 335

ART. I. Required Conditions for Celebrating Mass - 335

ART. II. Rubrics - 335

TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT OF PEXANCE.

PART I.

On the Essence of the Sacrament of Penance ; its Nature, Matter,

and Form 336

CHAPTER I. Nature of Penance - 336

CHAPTER II. Matter of the Sacrament of Penance 336

CHAPTER III. Form of the Sacrament of Penance 336

PART II.

THE PERSON WHO RECEIVES THE SACRAMENT OF PEXANCE; OR, ON
THE PENITENT'S DUTIES.

CHAPTER I. Contrition 336

ART. I. Contrition, properly so called 336

ART. II. Purpose 336

CHAPTER II. On Confession ... 337

ART. I. Necessity of Confession 337

ART. II. Quality of Confession 337

ART. III. Repetition of Confession 337

ART. I. Assessment of Penance ------- 337

ART. II. Accomplishment of Penance 337

PART III.

MINISTER OF PENANCE.

CHAPTER I. Power of the Minister 337

ART. I. Approbation - •• - - - . - - - - 337

ART. II. Jurisdictiou -.__.-___ 337

ART. III. Reserved Cases 337

Appendix 1. On the Absolving of an Accomplice to a Shameful

Sin - - - -, ... - - - - ... 337

Index. G07

PAC.E

Appendix 2. Solicitation to Sin in Course of the Confession • 338

CHAPTER II. Duty of the Minister During and After the Con
fession - 339

ART. I. Duty of the Minister During the Confession • 340

ART. II. Duty of the Minister After the Confession - 340

TREATISE ON EXTREME UNCTION.
CHAPTER I. Nature and Eflects of Extreme Unction 341

CHAPTER II. Matter and Form of Extreme Unction 341

ART. I. Matter 341

ART. II. Form 341

CHAPTER III. Minister of Extreme Unction 341

CHAPTER IV. Person who Receives Extreme Unction - 341

TREATISE ON ORDER.

CHAPTER I. Nature and Division of Order 342

CHAPTER II. Matter and Form of Order 342

CHAPTER III. Minister of the Sacrament of Order • 342
CHAPTER IV. Person who Receives the Sacrament of Order • 342
CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL.

Case 3. Change of Matter

Case 4. "Lapsus Linguae"

Case 6. Interruption

Case 18. The Person who Receives the Sacrament

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON BAPTISM.

Case 1. The Matter of Baptism

Case 6. The Matter of Baptism

Case 9. A Child Baptized Three Times

Case 10. Baptism of the Children of Heretics

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON CONFIRMATION

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON THE EUCHARIST -

Case 1. Substance With Which the First Consideration Should

be Made

Case 7. Ministry for the Eucharist
Case f 1. The Holy Viaticum

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON THE MASS.

350
Case 12. 'Change of Application -

608 Index.

PAGE

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON CONFESSION.

Case 11. Circumstances of Sins ----._. 351

Case 13. Denunciation of the Accomplice - 352

Case 14. Inquiries About the Accomplice's Name ... 354

Case 21. Absolution of a Dying Heretic - 354

Case 22. Absolution of a Dying Heretic ----- 355

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON SEVERAL CASES.

Case 2. Cause of Reserve 357

Case 14. Absolution of an Accomplice 357

Case 15. Absolution of an Accomplice 358

Case 16. Absolution of an Accomplice 358

Case 17. Absolution of an Accomplice - 359

Case 18. Absolution of an Accomplice _ _ . 359

Case 19. Absolution of an Accomplice 360

Case 20. Absolution of an Accomplice 360

Case 21. Absolution of an Accomplice 360

Case 22. Absolution of an Accomplice 361

Case 23. Absolution of an Accomplice - .... 3(ji

Case 24. Shameful Solicitations - - - - -- - - 361

Case 25. Shameful Solicitations - 362

Case 26. Shameful Solicitations 362

Case 28. Shameful Solicitations - 362

CASES ON THE DUTY OF CONFESSORS.

Case 6. Occasion of Sinning 364

Case 7. Occasion of Sinning 364

Case 8. Occasion of Sinning _.._-.. 354

Case 9. Occasion of Sinning __..-.. 365

Case 10. Occasion of Sinning ."..»'.-.; 365

Case 11. Habitual Sinners 3G6

Case 13. Relapses - 366

Case 16. The Confessor Before Dying Persons 366

Case 17. The Confessor with Ladies - 367

Case 23. Confessor's Error ... - - 368

CASES ON THE SECRET OF THE CONFESSION.

Case 3. Exterior Use of the Knowledge of Confession - - 369

Case 4. Exterior Use of Confession 369

Case 7. Accomplices Before the Same Confessor - - - * 370

Case 8. The Secret for a Layman 370

CASES OF CONSCIENCE o\ EXTREME UNCTION AND ON ORDER - 371

Index. 609

PAGE

TREATISE ON MARRIAGE.

CHAPTER I. Affiancings - - - - 372

ART. I. Nature of Afllancings 372

ART. II. Obligations and Purposes of Afllaiicings - 373

ART. III. Dissolution of Affiancings - ... 373

CHAPTER II. Publication of Bans 374

ART. I. Necessity of Bans - 374

ART. II. Circumstances of Bans • 374

ART. III. Dispensation of Bans 374

ART. IV. Revelation of the Impediments 374

CHAPTER III. The Nature and Purpose of Marriage 375

ART. I. On the Nature of Marriage
ART. II. Purpose of Marriage

Section 1. Its Unity

Section 2. Duration of Marriage 376

ART. I. As for the Tie
ART. II. As for the Bed

CHAPTER IV. Matter and Form of Marriage

CHAPTER V. Minister who Gives and Person who Receives

Marriage

ART. I. Minister
ART. II. Person

CHAPTER VI. Obstacles to Marriage
ART. Ill Prohibitive Obstacles
ART. III. Detrimental Obstacles

Various Kinds of Obstacles

Obstacle for Cause of Alliance

Obstacle for Difference of Worship

Obstacle for Cause of Clandestinity

Obstacle Through Powerlessness

Obstacle for Cause of Abduction
ART. III. Dispensation for Invalidating Obstacles

The Dispensing Power

CHAPTER VII. Marriage Made Valid Again
ART. I. Marriage Made Valid Again in Case of Lack of Consent
ART. II. Marriage Made Valid Again in Case of Lack oJ

scribed Forms
ART. III. Marriage Made Valid Again in Case of Incapacity o

the Parties

CHAPTER VIII. On Conjugal Duty -

610 Index.

ART. I. De la Legitimite de 1'Acte Conjugal; I11 en Soi ; 2° Par

rapport aux Circonstances 388

Section 2. Legitimite de 1'acte Conjugal par rapport aux Cir
constances 388

I. Des Circonstances de Personne 389

II. Des Circonstances de Position - . 390

III. Des Circonstances de Temps 390

ART. II. De 1'Obligation d'Accomplir 1'acte Conjugal - 392

ART. III. Des Peches des Epoux 393

Section 1. Des Peches des Epoux par Exces - 393

Section 2. De 1'Onanisrae en Particulier - 397

CASES OF CONSCIENCE ON AFFIANCES.

Case 2. Value of Promises - - 400

Case 6. Conditional Consent 401

Case 7. Breaking of Affiances 402

Case 8. Breaking of Affiances 403

Case 9. Breaking of Affiances - 404

Case 10. Breaking of Affiances - - - 404

CASES ON PUBLICATION OF THE BANS.

Case 4. Obligation to Declare Obstacles to Marriage • - 4-07

Case 5. Obligation to Declare Obstacles to Marriage - - - 407

CASES ON CONSCIENCE ON THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE.

Case 2. Consent of the Spouses - - 408

Case 3. Conditional Consent 409

Case 4 Conditional Marriage 410

Case 5. Conditional Marriage 410

Case G. Separation of Bed and Residence .... 411

CASES ON OBSTACLES TO MARRIAGE.

Case 1. Value of Obstacles 412

Case 13. A Woman who is Sister, Daughter and Wife of Her

Husband .... 412

Case 14. Spiritual Relationship - ... 413

Case 16. Affinity 413

Case 18. Honesty 414

Case 20. Murder 414

Case 21. Murder - - - - 415

Case 22. Crime 416

Case 23. Crime 416

Case 24. Crime - - 417

Case 26. Fear 417

Index. 611

PAGE

Case 33. Marriage of Heretics - . 418

Case 34. Attendance of the Priest .... 418

Case 36. Attendance of the Priest - - - 4i<j

CASES ox DISPENSATION FOR MARRIAGE.

Case 2. Exposition of the Case 421

Case 3. Exposition of the Case 421

Case 4. Subreptitious Dispensation 422

Case 5. Subreptitious Dispensation - 422

Case 6. Subreptitious Dispensation - - - 423

Case 7. Dispensation for Guilty Relations, with Relapse 423

Case 10. The Validity of Marriage Restored 424

CASES ON DIRECTION OF MARRIED PERSONS.

Cas 1. Obligation de Remplir les Devoirs 425

Cas 2. Obstacle au Devoir Conjugal - 426

Cas 3. Obstacle au Devoir Conjugal - - - 428

Cas 4. Obstacle au Devoir Conjugal -

Cas 5. Instruction Pour les Fiances et les Epoux

Cas 6. Onanisme

Cas 8. Onanisme

TREATISE ON CENSURES.

CHAPTER I. On Censures in General

ART. I. Nature, Division and Conditions of Censures

1. Of the Nature of the Censure
ART. II. Originator or Proraulgator of the Censure
ART. III. The One who Undergoes the Censure •
ART. IV. Removal of the Censure
CHAPTER II. Different Species of Censures
ART. I. Excommunication
ART. II. Suspension

Appendix Of Deposition and Degradation •
ART. III. Interdict

Appendix 1. Interdiction of Divine Things

Appendix 2. On Ecclesiastical Sepulture -

TREATISE ON IRREGULARITIES.

j j rt

CHAPTER I. Irregularities in General

119

CHAPTER II. Irregularities in PartU

44:5
Appendix. On Indulgences and Jubilee

\^n i\ i ± j~j iv j. A . j. i. * ^ ^ «••*

ART. I. Irregularities Through Defect
ART. II. Irregularities Through Defect

612 Index.

PAGE

CHAPTER I. Indulgences - 443

CHAPTER II. Jubilee - 443

CASES ON CENSURES AND IRREGULAKITIES.

Case 7. Censures : Religious Claustration - - - 444

Case 8. Irregularities : Irregularities in General - - 444

SUR LE SlXIEME PRECEPTE DU DECALOGUE.

Sur les Obligations des Epoux et sur Quelques Questions Relatives

au Marriage 449

APPENDIX.

Propositions Condemned by Innocent XI., on the 6th of March,

1679 486

SPEECH, Delivered at the Sitting of the 21st of June, 1879 - - 495
SPEECH, Delivered at the Sitting of the 5th of July, 1879 - - 537
SPEECH, Delivered at the Sitting of the 7th of July, 1879 - 581