NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY
HISTORICAL SECTION
Publication Number 4
"THE NORTHERN BARRAGE"
(TAKING UP THE MINES)
Published under the direction of
The Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS, Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1920
m
Frontispiece.
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY
HISTORICAL SECTION
Publication Number 4
"THE NORTHERN BARRAGE"
(TAKING UP THE MINES)
Published under the direction of
The Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS, Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1920
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
List of illustrations 4
Foreword 5
Chapter I.
Early experiments in the barrage and the development of a method of sweeping
the mines 7
Chapter II.
Preparations for the arrival of the mine sweepers and the commencement of
sweeping operations 14
Chapter III.
The first minesweeping 21
Chapter IV.
The second minesweeping operation 26
Chapter V.
The third minesweeping operation 31
Sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow 36
Chapter VI.
The fourth minesweeping operation 39
Chapter VII.
The fifth minesweeping operation 45
Chapter VIII.
The sixth minesweeping operation 51
Chapter IX.
The seventh and last minesweeping operation 58
Vessels operating with mine force 62,63
Summary of United States minesweeping operations in the North Sea barrage. 64
Chapter X.
Return to the United States and disbandment of the North Sea Mine Force. . . 68
Chart In pocket.
3
764'2'
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
Taking Up the Mines.
Chapter I.
EARLY EXPERIMENTS IN THE BARRAGE AND THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF A METHOD OF SWEEPING THE MINES.
Even before the end of the war was clearly in sight it was recog-
nized that one of the most seriously urgent duties of reconstruction
would be to clear the seas of mines. Few dangers more treacherous
than mines jeopardize the safety of ships and the lives of mariners
in time of peace, for, aside from the actual areas in which mines had
been laid, thousands of them break adrift and, carried by the wind
and currents, infest the neighboring waters for miles around.
Although the subject of who would be required to sweep the vari-
ous areas of mines had been broached on several occasions, it was not
until the latter part of October, 1918, that the questions were defi-
nitely considered. Since it was then evident that an allied victory
and the cessation of hostilities was only a question of weeks, an
allied naval council was convened in London on October 31, 1918, to
conni^TSr what portions of the mined areas should be cleared by each
nati^E, together with an international method of disseminating all
possible data relative to dangerous waters and the routing of mer-
chant ships with the maximum safety.
Capt. R. C. Bulmer, United States Navy, and Capt. J. W. Timmons,
United States Navy, were appointed members of the council to rep-
resent the United States Government. With the exception of the
North Sea mine barrage, the Dover barrage, and the miscellaneous
mine fields in the Helgoland Bight, the contemplated mine-sweeping
operations in general consisted primarily of exploratory sweeping to
make certain that the specified areas were clear of mines. The North
Sea barrage was the primary consideration, for here alone were con-
centrated over 70,000 American and British mines. Of these over 80
per cent had been laid by the United States Navy, and, aside from
the huge number, the American mine presented almost insurmountable
difficulties from a standpoint of sweeping on account of its novel
type and sensitive firing device. Although the policy of the council
throughout its proceedings consisted in allocating to the Allied,
7
8 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
Associated, and Central Powers the clearance of the waters bordering
their individual seacoasts, the problem of clearing the American
mines from the North Sea could not easily be assigned to either
Great Britain or Germany. The United States therefore accepted
the responsibility of removing aU the mines that she had laid, as
well as any she might lay in the future. Great Britain similarly
agreed to remove the British mines from the barrage.
The tasks which faced the two nations who had pledged them-
selves to clear the North Sea barrage, were, however, vitally different.
To begin with, four American mines had been laid for every one that
Great Britain had put down. Then, too, Great Britain had had
extensive experience during the war in sweeping the same types of
mines which she had laid; she possessed a class of mine-sweeping
vessels with very shallow draft, specially constructed for work of
exactly this nature; and, moreover, the work to be done was all
within close proximity to her coasts and operating bases.
On the other hand, there was no known method of sweeping the
mines which the United States had laid. Built on an entirely new
principle, these mines had made the construction of the North Sea
barrage possible, for a long antenna stretching up above the mine
enabled it to do the work for which three or four had previously
been required. Now this same feature became our greatest problem.
With the uppermost end of the antenna at an average of 8 to 10 feet
below the surface of the water, it was impossible for a steel vessel to
pass over and strike the mines without exploding them. A piece
of iron or steel no larger than a nail was sufficient to operate the deli-
cate firing mechanism. None but wooden vessels would be safe in
such a mine field, and then only provided that no metal projeoi^''.x>3,
however small, were exposed on the hull of the ship. Another
handicap to be considered was the distance (3, 000 miles) of the
operating base from our coast.
Almost simultaneously with the commencement of mmelaying
the British Admiralty had shown signs of anxiety as to what means
could be employed to render vessels safe which might be required
to clear a passage through the barrage in case of a fleet action or
when it should become necessary to clear away the mines after the
war. On June 29, 1918, the Admiralty had inquired of the Commander
of the United States naval forces in European waters if any method
had been devised for protecting our ships. He knew of none, and
after cabling the Bureau of Ordnance, referred the problem to the
mme force. United States Atlantic Fleet, who were then in Inver-
ness, Scotland, engaged in laying the barrage.
The problem was not, however, so easily solved as it had at first
appeared. The oomLmanding officers of the various minelayers
were asked to submit recommendations which, when received, were
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 9
all more or less impracticable. In general, the recommendations
favored the development of a sweep sufficiently wide to span an en-
tire group of mines and, with this arrangement, to steam down the
field and explode the mines by touching their antenna with the
sweep wire. Such a scheme was practically beyond consideration
from the start. The mine fields had an average width of approxi-
matel}" 3,500 yards, and the widest sweep which had up to that time
proved practicable varied between 300 and 600 yards, accordmg to
the type of craft employed, and even then the depth of the sweep
was irregular. To expand this to 3,500 yards, keepuig the s^^'eep
throughout its length at a uniform depth, would requu'e months of
experiments and even then might be found impossible.
Nothing further was done until after the allied naval council had
concluded its proceedings and the armistice was signed. Then it
came to a crisis. The Commander, Mme Force, Rear Admiral Joseph
Strauss, was informed that his organization, which had just com-
pleted the construction of the barrage, would be required to remove
it. Even though no method was then known for clearmg the bar-
rage, it was apparent that the muielayers themselves could not be
of service in the mine field with their deep draft. Furthermore, as
most of these vessels could be utilized to advantage for transportmg
troops back to the United States, preparations were commenced for
their return. Prior to sailing, however, as it was desired to take
advantage of all possible talent which might be useful m obtammg
a solution for sweeping the barrage, Admiral Strauss selected a
board from amongst the commanding officers of the mmelayers to
study the question of sweeping the North Sea barrage, and to submit
rttk^i^mendations for its accomplishment. Every possible solution
was considered by this board, but the final recommendations sub-
mitted were essentially an elaboration of the previous suggestions
which had been made. Wooden motor vessels with their propellers
guarded from contact with the mmes were to be used for explodmg
the surface mmes by contact of the sweep wire with the antenna.
After all the surface mines had thus been destroyed, heavy-powered
vessels would be free to enter the mme field and sweep the mines
which had been planted at the lower levels. It was probable that
wooden-hulled vessels of the type suggested could be chartered from
the British Admiralty which we could man with our own crews. As
this plan was the most feasible one yet proposed, 400 trained petty
officers and seamen were taken from the minelayers before their
departure and transferred to the bases m order to have experienced
personnel on hand as the nucleuses for these crews m case it became
necessary to borrow these vessels.
A few days later, December 1, 1918, the minelayers sailed for the
United States, leaving the Black Havjk, with the Patapsco and
10 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
Patuxent, behind as the nucleus for the minesweeping force. The
Black Hawk remamed as the flagship and repair ship of this embryo
organization, while the Patajjsco and Patuxent, two powerful tugs,
were retained to carry out experiments to ascertain, if possible,
some means of sweeping the barrage and to develop the gear which
would be required.
Since it had not been possible during the mining operations, to
grant leave to any of the ofiicers or men on account of the uncertainty
of movements, the squadron was sent to Plymouth for a brief stay
in order that all hands might have an opportunity to visit England
before returning to the United States,
In the meantime a possible solution for protecting vessels in the
mine fields had been suggested by Ensign D. A. Nichols, United States
Naval Reserve Force, who had been on duty on Admiral Strauss's
staff as the assistant communication ofl&cer during the minelaying
operations. The suggestion consisted of an electrical scheme for
blowing up the mines as they came within a given radius of a vessel.
If the radius could be made sufficiently large, it would be possible
to explode all mmes before the sweeping vessels approached close
enough to be damaged by the explosion. Experiments were under-
taken at once, but although the scheme was sound in prmciple, the
distance at which the mines could be exploded was far too small to
enable it to be used without constructing a large elaborate electric
installation for the ships, which rendered this scheme prohibitive.
This experiment, however, had no sooner been carried out than the
solution, which later became the salvation of the ships which did the
work, automatically suggested itself. It consisted merely in re-
versmg the principle of exploding the mines at a distance sq^^:iiii-t
when they were struck by a ship, they would be prevented from
explodmg. During the early part of December every conceivable
test was carried out in order to prove conclusively that no false
assumption had been made, but every test proved more substan-
tially that the application was fundamentally sound and thoroughly
effective. Not only did the scheme prevent the mines from firing
which were actually struck by a ship, but also a partial effect was
produced on the mines within a radius of many feet around the
vessel's hull, which rendered them less susceptible to firing.
Here, at last, was the solution of the greatest difficulty with which
we were faced in connection with sweeping of the North Sea barrage.
Not only did it make it possible to use powerful steel vessels, but it
enabled us to use our own craft instead of being faced with the em-
barrassment of having to call upon the British Government to furnish
vessels to do the work which we had promised to perform, for the
new American minesweepers which had been placed under construc-
tion duruig the war were now being completed in rapidly increasing
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 11
numbers and were of a type admirably suited for the work whicii
we had to undertake.
It was January before all the necessary tests in connection with the
development of the electric protective device had been completed and
the specifications drawn up for its manufacture and installation on
the minesweepers. The necessary information, with the details for
its manufacture, was cabled to the Navy Department with the re-
quest that the manufacture be completed at the earliest possible date
in order that the minesweepers which would be allotted for the work
might arrive in Scotland by the time that the spring weather would
permit operations to be started.
The North Sea weather is notoriously bad throughout the year,
but particularly so in the winter months. This, coupled with the few
short hours of daylight, makes operations such as sweeping practi-
cally mipossible for seven months of the year. If the barrage was to
be completely cleared during the coming siunmer — and it was most
important that it should be — every possible moment must be utilized.
Five months had been required to lay the mines, but the task for re-
moving them was, by its very nature, infinitely more difficult and
exacting.
While the electric protective device was being developed, prepara-
tions were under way for an experiment of a totally different nature.
Since the first mines had been laid in the barrage, there had been no
means of telling its effectiveness nor how well the mines with their
slender antenna had survived the frequent storms. During the latter
part of the summer Admiral Sims had requested the Comimander of
the Mine Force to make a skimming sweep across the mme field to
de1feK'iiiJJi(e if the mines were still there and effective. Many had ex-
ploded shortly after having been laid; others had broken adrift and
been discovered on the coast of Norway; there was also a possibility
that the batteries which fired the mines had not survived as was in-
tended. It was now more essential than ever to determine the actual
condition of the mmes in the barrage before sweeping operations were
undertaken, and to this end arrangements were made to borrow from
the Admu-alty two wooden sailing vessels, man them with volun-
teers, and cross the mine field with a sweep wire between them to
! find out what percentage of the mines were still in place and effective.
I Two Lowestoft fishing smacks arrived at Inverness the latter part
I of November. Preparations were begun at once to fit them out for
i the experiment. The Bed Fern and the Red Rose — such were their
) names — were hauled out upon the ways at Inverness, their seams
I calked, nail heads driven in, the metal parts sheathed with wood, and
1 then a heavy coating of tar applied — all to prevent mines from ex-
' ploding when in contact with the hull. Additional billets were fitted
to accommodate a crew of 10 men on each vessel, the rigging was
12 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
overhauled, and on December 22, 1918, these tiny craft, in tow of the
Patapsco and the Patuxent, set out for the barrage. Lieut. Noel
Davis, United vStates Navy, was in command of the expedition and
the Red Rose; Lieut, (junior grade) Olaf Maatson, United States
Naval Reserve Force, commanded the Red Fern,
The Patapsco and Patuxent, after reaching the southern edge of the
mine field, were to stand by while experiments were being undertaken,
then render assistance if necessary when the vessels again were off
the field.
The next morning found them a few miles to the southward of the
first line of mines in the central portion of the barrage. Shortly after
sunrise the smacks spread sail, stood up to each other, passed sweep
and set coui-se to cross the field of mines. A few minutes before noon,
as the vessels crossed the first line of invisible mines, a giant column
of discolored water sprang high into the air close astern of the Red
Rose. The first mine in the Nortii Sea barrage had been swept.
Separated as it was from that vessel by only a short length of manila
rope, which insulated the sweep wire from her stern, the tremendous
shock of the explosion all but crushed the wooden hull of the vessel;
water spm-ted in between the timbers in countless places; the pump
was started at once, but was barely sufficient to keep her dry.
It was a pretty sight to see these little craft sailing back and forth
across the mine field, wearing and tacking in unison, and keeping
station on each other by furling topsails or streaming sea anchors.
In all, the lines of mines were crossed four times; six of the upper
level mines were exploded, a negligible number, of coui-se, when com-
pared with the 56,000 mines which had been laid, but it had^Droved
conclusively that the mines were still there, ready to explode^ apbn
the slightest contact, and that every possible precaution must be
used in the forthcoming operations to guard the lives of the men who
would be required to sweep the mines.
By 3 o'clock the sun had set; the Patapsco and Patuxent were no
longer in sight. To add to the difficulties, a storm, wliich had been,
foretold by the morning's sky and a rapidly falling barometer, burst
with the force of a hurricane. The sweep was cut adrift from the
Red Rose and Red Fern; the vessels headed about and set course to
the southward to get clear of the mine fields before the twilight had
faded.
The days that followed were days of anxiety at Base 18, and hard-
ship for the crews of the Red Rose and Red Fern. For three days the
storm continued unabated. The Patapsco and the Patuxent were
suffering as badly as or possibly worse than the fishing smacks, and
had not been able to locate them after they had left the mine field.
Realizing the severity of the weather. Admiral Strauss requested the
British authorities to send out such vessels as were available to
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 13
soarch for the sailboats, but the majority of those sent could not
weather the seas and were forced to return to port. Then on Christ-
mas Eve, when hope had almost ebbed away, Lieut. Davis telephoned
to Admiral Strauss that the Red Rose, though badly wrecked by the
storm, had managed to reach Peterhead that morning. The next
da}'' the Red Fern anchored at St. Andrews Bay, having been blown
more than 200 miles from her destination.
The next two months were doomed to be months of comparative
idleness, so far as actual minesweeping was concerned. The Peituxent
had lost her rudder during the storm and had to be sent to Newcastle-
on-Tyne for repairs. The Patapsco alone could not carry out suitable
experiments. Even with the Patuxent, experiments as complete as
was desired could not be made, due to the small electric plants on
those two vessels. The Sonoma and Ontario, as well as four sweepers
of the Axmcet class which were then in the United States, were re-
quested to be sent to Inverness at once in order that further experi-
ments might be conducted and suitable gear developed for the coming
sweeping operations. It was replied that none of these vessels could
be spared from their present duties. As the most important work
was, therefore, to do everything possible to complete the fitting out
and installation of the electric protective devices on the vessels which
were to be sent to Scotland in the spring, Admiral Strauss decided to
return to the United States to push the work and prevent del^ays
arising from questions which would have to be referred to him for
settlement. He proceeded to London on December 26, 1918, and
arranged to have Capt. R. C. Bulmer, L^nited States Navy, then corn-
man din'? officer of the Blaclc Hawlc, appointed Commander, United
Stat'et. />Iinesweeping Detachment, which was to be a suborganiza-
tion of the Mine Force.
Numerous minor details had to be completed in Scotland prior to
the arrival of the minesweepers in order that everything might be
in readiness to commence the operations the moment they arrived.
The mine bases at Inverness and Invergordon were to be closed up.
There were at that time nearly 13,000 mines and 19,000 mine anchors
at the two bases which must be returned to the United States. A
total of 2,500 men had been retained in order to have them available
for manning the British ships which it had been originally contem-
plated to take over. New bases had to be selected and prepared,
and complete operating instructions plamicd and ready for issue.
Chapter II.
PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE MINESWEEP-
ERS AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF SWEEPING OPERA-
TIONS.
Labor conditions in Great Britain at the beginning of 1919 were
critical, and it soon became apparent there would be no possibility of
completing the repairs on the Patuxent before the end of February.
The handicap of having no vessels except the Patapsco to experiment
with was serious. Sweeping experiments were highly essential pre-
liminary to the actual commencement of sweeping. In the first
place, we were required to sweep at a much greator depth than had
heretofore been the practice. The lower tiers of mines had been
planted 240 feet beneath the surface and the ordinary types of kites
were not adapted for sweeping at this great depth on account of the
long length of kite wire required, which reduced the effective width
of the sweep too much. In the second place, it was desired to de-
velop as broad a sweep as possible. Although the British had not
considered it feasible to use sweeps of greater breadth than 500 to
600 yards, it was considered probable that with our powerful mine-
sweepers a considerably wider sweep could be profitably employed.
Since we had no vessels available for carrying out these experiments,
it was necessary to request the Navy Department to carry t^^m, out
in home waters. During the latter part of February and tWd first
part of March experiments were conducted for this purpose off the
Nantucket coast by the Heron, Oriole, and Rohin. These experi-
ments, although of some value, were not in sufficient detail and
accuracy to permit definite and complete deductions to be drawn.
A maximum width of sweep of more than 2,000 yards was obtained,
but the sweeping speed, as well as the depth to which the cod of the
sweep sank, unless a prohibitive number of buoys were used, were
not permissible for use in the North Sea.
In order to take advantage of any information which the British
Admiralty had gained in their sweeping operations during the war,|
as well as subsequent developments in the tests then in progress,
Commander W. L. Beck, United States Navy, who had remained at
Base 18 after completion of the mining operations for work in con-
nection with the minesweeping, was sent to the British mining school
at Portsmouth to obtain all information possible. The visit was
highly profitable and resulted in obtaining the specifications of the
14
I
THE NOETHERN BARRAGE. 15
plunger kites wliich had just been developed and had prov(Ml far
superior to the old prism type. The plunger kite resembles in shape
a section of the wing of an aeroplane, except that it rides upside
down in order to fly downward instead of upward. Another point
obtained by Commander Beck which was important was the use of
right and left hand sweep wire. The effect of the water pressure on
the strands of the wire tends to elevate or depress it, according to the
angle at which it is being towed through the water. A combination
of the two kinds in making up a sweep is therefore necessary in order
to keep the sweep at a more nearly uniform depth. By assembling
the sweep with the right-hand laid wire for the left half of the sweep
and vice versa, the droop of the sweep is almost entirely eliminated
when sweeping at a speed of 6 to 8 knots.
Since only one vessel, the Patapsco, was available, it was necessary
to modify the program of contemplated experiments in order that
the one vessel might take the place of two.. An actual test of the
electric protective device in the mine field was considered essential,
but as a further precaution, a preliminary experiment was made by
planting four mines, completely assemble^, with the exception that
the T. N. T. had been replaced by cement, then steaming past them
and striking the antennas to see if the mines would explode while in
contact with a ship fitted with the electric protective device. The
results of this test, while favorable, were not conclusive, due to the
difficulties of observation. It was therefore decided to make a
further test of the protective device in the mine field, using a single
Act aeon sweep to explode the upper level mines by toucliing their
antennae. The Actaeon sweep resembles in principle the paravanes.
iX^x')^ spars fitted with rudders carry the ends of the sweep wires
out on each quarter of the sweepers in the form of an inverted ''V."
The experiment was carried out the latter part of January in the
western part of the barrage. A total of 20 lines of upper level mines
were crossed which, with an effective breadth of sweep of 1 60 yards,
should have yielded a maximum number of 33 mines and a minimum
of 23. Actually none were exploded. Assuming that the sweep
maintained the proper depth (which apparently was so from the
measurements taken), it appeared that either the mines were not
there or else their antennae had been carried away during the winter
storms. Neither of these conclusions, however, seemed entirely
probable, since less than a month prior the Red Rose and Red Fern
had found in their experiment that approximately 28 per cent of the
upper level mines were still in place with antennae intact.
Since no mines were obtained in this experiment the test of the
electric protective device was not particularly positive, for the
Patapsco probably passed over no mines which were sufficiently
shallow to come in contact with the hull of the vessel; otherwise
they would have been exploded by the sweep.
16 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
A careful anal^^sis of the contemplated sweeping of the barrage,
the difficulties which might be encountered, and the material which
would be required had by this time been completed. It was apparent
that if the upper level mines had lost their antennae it would be
necessary to cut most of these mines from their moorings in order to
remove them. This in turn would necessitate special vessels to
sink the mines, and to this end Commander Minesweeping Detach-
ment requested that 20 sub chasers, which were the only type of vessel
then available, be sent to Inverness by the 1st of April.
It was estimated that 18 sweepers would be able to complete the
clearance of the barrage in the coming summer, provided they
arrived by the 1st of April. But since the estimate was not based
on a known performance, as many other sweepers as could be spared
were asked for in order to insure the completion of the work. The
original estimates of the sweep wire and kites which were then con-
sidered necessary to clear the barrage were, as it developed later,
ludicrously small ; three kites per vessel and six complete sweeps for
each pair were at that time considered a liberal allowance. When
actual operations began more than this entire quantity of kites and
half the amount of sweep wire w^s expended in a single operation.
A further development in connection with the electric protective
device was tried out during February and appeared at the time to
have possibilities for simplifying the sweeping operations. It con-
sisted of a scheme of charging the sweep wire electrically, so that
mines would be exploded by striking their mooring cables as well as
by striking their antennae. The tests, such as were possible to make
with the limited facilities at hand, were encouraging and the depart-
ment in Washington was requested to include in the installatf sA^n
the minesweepers the additional connections necessary to enable
it to be used.
The submarine chasers began to arrive at Inverness the latter part
of February, and by the 1st of March 19 had reported, including 3
which had previously been sent to Norway for exhibition and possible
sale. The highly favorable impression made by these vessels while
in Norwegian waters is worthy of note and was the subject of corre-
spondence to the Secretary of the Navy complimenting the command-
ing officers and the crews on their splendid appearance and capable
seamanship.
As soon as the sub chasers had arrived at Inverness they were
organized into divisions and placed in training for their prospective
duties on the mine field. Dummy mines were constructed and target
practice was held under adverse weather conditions to enable the
chasers to sink mines with the necessary rapidity when they went
out with the sweepers. Further drills and instructions were carried
out in comiection with planting dan buoys and picking them up
Explosion of mine on contact with sweeping cable electrically charged. (Pages 10-16.)
A mine explosion close astern the U. S. S. Patapsco. The black gases of combustion can be
seen in the center of the explosion. (Page 40.)
16-1
One of the 54 new American mine sweepers built during the World War. (Page 10.)
16-2
The mine sweepers proved to be wonderful sea boats. (Page 10.)
16-3
Chart showing experimental nnine sweeping by U. S. S. Patapsco and U. S. S. Patuxent, IVlarch
22-24, 1919. (Page 17.)
lG-4 . >
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 17
again, since at this time it was considered probable these vessels
would also have to do this work.
While the above work was in progress, arrangements were being
completed as rapidly as possible for the demobilization of Base 17
and the reduction of personnel at Base 18 to the minimum necessary
to carry out the work in connection with the* minesweeping; at that
time we contemplated using Base 18 as the primary base for the
sweeping operations. The mines at Bases 17 and 18 had all been
returned to the United States. On the 1st of March Base 17 at Inver-
gordon had been completely demobilized and was turned over to the
British. The Admiralty had already made plans for establishing
a permanent mining base at Invergordon and had filled the stowage
sheds with their own mines as rapidly as ours had been moved out.
On account of the shortage of space, it was also necessary for them
to stow large quantities of mining material at Base 18, but on account
of its proximity to the city of Inverness, the explosive charges were
all sent to Invergordon.
In the early part of February the Force Commander had directed
that two nucleus crews be assembled, trained, and held in readiness
to man German merchant ships which were being taken over by the
United States. The first crew left Base 18 on the 24th of February
to man one of these vessels which was then at Liverpool. The
second crew remained at the Base imtil May 3 when it was dispatched
to Southend, England, to man the Brandenburg.
By the middle of March, repairs on the Patuxent having been com-
pleted, she returned to Inverness. A homemade electric protective
device was installed, and on the 20th of March the Patapsco and
Pii'oaxent, with Capt. Bulmer in command, set out for the barrage to
make the first real experiments with the actual gear which was in-
tended to be used in the sweeping operations which were to foUow.
Two days later the two vessels passed sweep at the western end of
group 9 and commenced a zigzag to the eastward along this group.
The sweep was regulated to cut the upper and middle level mines
adrift and to explode the lower level mines by touching their antennae.
No sooner had the vessels entered the mine field than the first mine
was exploded. The sweeping continued without interruption or
serious casualty for several hours. The weather was rough and ob-
servations were difficult, but nevertheless mines could be seen rising
to the surface astern of the sweep after they had been sawed from
their moorings.
Just before reaching the eastern end of the group one mine was
exploded in the center of the sweep and almost simultaneously several
others exploded in the near vicinity. One was an upper level mine
fairly close aboard on the port quarter of the Patapsco; two others
181064°— 20 2
18 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
were lower level mines whose position at the instant could not be
determined. Almost immediately following this series of explosions
clouds of black smoke began to pour from the funnels of the Patuxent
as a widening slick of brown water, marking the explosion of a lower
level mine, spread out around her. The mine exploded by the sweep
wire had countermined these others, one of which had been directly
underneath the Patuxent. Lights throughout the vessel had been
broken by the shock of the explosion, the floor plates in the firerooms
had been thrown from the deck, and other minor casualties through-
out the ship had occurred. With the firerooms dark, the floor plates
topsy-turvy, it seemed for a moment to the men on board as if the
ship was sinking, but regardless of all not a man left his station.
The men confined below decks in the firerooms, who were particularly
plucky, were later commended for their action by the Secretary of
the Navy.
We had experienced a danger which later was to become one of the
most serious which had to be faced. No conceivable effort could
eliminate the possibility of one mine countermining others. Against
this condition the electric protective device was useless. A mine
planted at the lowest level had caused considerable damage aboard
the Patuxent. It seemed most probable that had it been an upper
level mine the ship would have been sunk.
A few moments after the Patuxenfs shock another mine was ex-
ploded by the sweep, which fractured the sweep wire and necessitated
leaving the field, so that it might be repaired in safety. Before this
could be done, however, a blinding snowstorm had overtaken the
two vessels, and since it was nearly dark, course was set for Lerwick,
the principal town in the Shetland Islands. The next day the ^6rt
was inspected by Capt. Bulmer with a view of using it as a base for
the minesweeping operations.
The following morning the Patapsco and the Patuxent returned to
the mine field and made further experiments, then proceeded to
Kirkwall in the Orkney Islands to make a similar inspection. Upon
completion of the inspection Capt. Bulmer paid his respects to the
rear admiral at Scapa, who was also in command of the British naval
base at Kirkwall, then returned with the two tugs to Inverness.
In the two days' sweeping 21 American mines had been exploded
and 17 more were definitely known to have been cut adrift. It was
probable that on the first day, when the weather was rough, con-
siderably more were cut adrift but could not be observed on account
of the waves and the whitecaps. Several British floating mines
were sighted during the operations and sunk by rifle fire.
The experiment had been satisfactory in every particular; several
upper level mines which were cut up were seen to possess their com-
plete antennae. It was therefore probable that one of the two
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 19
vessels, at least, had actually passed over mines of this nature without
exploding them, due to the effectiveness of the protective device.
On account of the inadequate gear available, it was not possible to
try out the scheme of using the charged sweep for exploding the
mines by contact of the sweep wire with their mooring cables. The
type 7 plunger kites, as well as the arrangement of the sweep, which
was an innovation in mine sweeping, had proved entirely satisfactory,
and it was considerable relief to know that the large quantities of gear
and material which had had to be ordered without opportunity for
experiment in advance would be entirely satisfactory.
In the meantime preparations in the ITnited States were rapidly
reaching completion. Commander B. L. Canaga, who had been on
duty with the mining squadron during the construction of the barrajje,
had been ordered to duty at Boston in connection with the fittiill^
out of the minesweepers at that yard, and, upon completion, to duty
in command of a division of the sweepers. Commander W. F.
Jacobs, who had been with the mining squadron, was later ordered
to similar dutj^ at the Norfolk Navy Yard. By April 6 the first 12
sweepers had left Boston and headed for Inverness. Eight days later
they were followed by four more. The sweep wire, kites, insulated
kite wire and miscellaneous accessories had been completed and
placed on board the sweepers prior to their departure. Additional
supplies and material, including 2,000 34-inch sphero-cylindrical
buoys for possible use buoying sweep wires, had been sent on the
Lake View.
At Inverness the preparations were equally well along; it had been
d/teided to use Kirkwall as the primary base for operations on accomit
of its proximity to the barrage. Arrangements had been completed
to obtain from the British Admiralty an oil ship, water boat and
gasoline boat, also to obtain coal from the British coal barges which
were maintained at KirkwaU. But since the transportation facilities
from Great Britain to KirkwaU were so inadequate Base 18 was to be
used as a receiving base for the constant train of supplies which
were required at KirkwaU. Vessels of our own force would trans})ort
the supplies between the two bases. Also since the hospital facilities
available on the Black Hawk were far too small for the entire force,
it was necessary to retain those at Base IS to handle the more serious
cases as they occurred. AU subchasers had midergone thorough
repairs on engines and hull in preparation for the strenuous duty they
were to perform. Special large scale charts of the mine field had
been requested from the British hydrogra]>her and were completed
just prior to the arrival of the sweepers. Aihninistrative instructions
and organizations had been prepared and ])rinted, ready for issue as
soon as the vessels should arrive. Additional light buoys had been
laid to mark the boundaries of the North Sea barrage, and special
20 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
dan buoys had been ])urchased from tbe Admiralty for use in con-
nection with the sweeping operations.
The Y. M. C. A. had sent a hut to Kirkwall, where it had been
erected by our men sent from Inverness, so that that organization
would be prepared to entertain our men as soon as we arrived.
Later tlie Knights of Columbus also established themselves at Kirk-
wall, and throughout the summer the hospitality offered by those
two huts, together with their entertainments and dances, played a
very important part indeed in brightening the months spent in this
far and not altogether attractive corner of the world.
In the early morning, the 20th of April, the first 12 sweepers
dropped their anchors in Inverness Firth. A few hours later, Admiral
rauss, who had crossed by passenger boat, arrived in Inverness
d hoisted his flag immediately on the Black Hawk. His instruc-
tions were brief: operations were to begin at the earliest possible
moment, and every effort must be made to complete the clearance
of the North Sea barrage that year, taking due 23recaution for the
safety of the vessels and their crews.
Chapter III.
THE FIRST MINE-SWEEPING OPERATION.
Although it was of the utmost importance to com})lete the removal
of the barrage during the summer of 1919 in order that no mines
which might be dangerous to shipping would remain unaccounted
for during the winter months, when work would be impossible, there
was still a higher principle which must take precedence in planning
the sweeping operations — the war was over and human life, whiA
for nearly five years had been practically valueless, had at last
returned to par. The clearance of the barrage was a peace-time
operation and the lives of the men who were required to do the work
must be guarded above all else.
A board was accordingly appointed by Rear Admiral Strauss to
consider which of the various possible means of sweeping the mines
would aflFord the greatest safety to the men on the ships. As a result
of the recommendations of the board, it was decided that the first
operation should be experimental, using a very short sweep and sweep-
ing transversely across the lines of mines with the hope that the
sweepers might alwa3^s be between the lines (which were 500 yards
apart) when there was a possibility of the sweep wire being in contact
with the mines in any individual row. In this way it was hoped that
tj^e danger due to countermining might be largely avoided.
Considerable work had to be done before the first operation could
be undertaken. The sweeping material had been brought over by
the sweepers in bulk and required to be distributed and assembled
before leaving port. Many repairs had also been necessitated by the
trans-Atlantic voyage.
While these preparations were in progress a disturbance occurred
in Inverness between the United States bluejackets and the local
population. It was the only occurrence of its kind which marred a
sojourn of approximately two years of the United States forces in
Scotland. The riot had been brewing for a long time and revolved
essentially around the old, old question of the feminine contingent.
Our men with their higher pay and possibly greater attractions had
captivated the Scotch lassies to such an extent that the native sons,
upon demobilization, found their contemplated brides enamored with
the foreigners. The feeling grew steadily worse, even though every
means to prevent an open brawl was used. Athletics were encouraged
to the fullest possible extent with the hope of attracting the majority
21
22 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
of the men to diversions in which the girl question would not arise.
But, regardless of the precautions which were taken, the crisis was
reached on the evening of April 25, when the demobilized soldiers and
sailors, coupled with a portion of the male population, rose en masse
and drove the American bluejackets off the streets. Liberty was
stopped at once and remained suspended during the remainder of the
period that Base 18 was kept in operation. The whole affair was
probably regretted far more by the citizens of Inverness than by our
own men. The shopkeepers especially deplored the sad occurrence,
since a very high percentage of their profits (and a very good profit
it was) resulted from the trade with the American sailors. Later it
was humorously interesting on Sunday afternoons to see the line of
"bonny lassies" holding hands through the barbed-wire fence which
separated them from their American ''laddies" within the confines
at Base 18.
Two days later the Secretary of the Navy and his party, who were
then making an inspection tour of Great Britain, passed through
Inverness on their way south. On account of the limited time avail-
able, Base 18 was not inspected.
By the 28th of April everything was in readiness to commence the
first operati(»n, but sailing was delayed for 24 hours on account of
the heaviest snowstorm of the year. The following morning the 12
sweepers which had arrived, accompanied by 6 sub chasers, got
underway for the barrage, while the Black Hawk and the remaining
chasers sailed for their new base at Kirkwall. A few hours after
the Black Hawk had anchored she was joined by the Heron, Auk,
Sanderling, and Oriole, Just arriving from the United States.
Since the first operation was to be purely experimental, no definite'
area of mines was to be cleared. Several important appliances were
still to be tested, and on account of the scant experiments which had
been possible to perform prior to the arrival of the sweepers, it was
desired to gain more definite information of the behavior of the mines.
We must know more definitely the danger of countermining; what
percentage of the mines were stiU in place; and if the mines were
still in the positions in which they had originally been laid. There
was a possibility that the storms and currents had scattered them
from the straight lines in which they had been dropped, in which
case the safety reasons for adopting the method of sweeping wliich
had been chosen for this first operation were groundless.
In passing it will be noticed that these and subsequent experiments
were a loss of time and a serious and wasteful delay of a large force
that could have been avoided could the four sweepers requested in
December, or even the Sonoma and Ontario, have been obtained for
this very purpose of developing the safest and most efficient sweep
and determining the characteristics of the field.
I
I
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 23
The pairs of sweepers were directed to stand over to a point on the
southern side of the barrage opposite buoy No. 6, form line abreast,
well separated, so that the mines which were countermined by one
pair would not be likely to damage adjacent pairs, then sweep across
the barrage toward buoy No. 6. After completing the first crossing
they were to turn and recross back and forth for two days to gain
the information required.
On May 2 the sweepers and sub chasers completed the first opera-
tion and proceeded to Kirkwall. In all 221 American mines had
been destroyed, wliich represented approximately 25 per cent of the
total mines which were laid in the areas over which they had swept.
The percentage at the time seemed much too small, and in the light
of subsequent operations was easily accounted for on account of the
difficulty which the sweepers had in telling when their sweep was
broken. It frequently occurred that a pair of vessels would con-
tinue operating for sometimes hours before they became aware that
their sweep had been severed by the explosion of a mine. In this
manner they assumed that there were no mines in the areas which
they had passed over, while in reality the mines were still there but
could not be caught with a broken sweep.
The principal appliance to be tested was the use of an electrically
charged sweep wire by which it was hoped to blow up the mines
when the sweep wire came in contact with their mooring cables as
well as ^\^th their antennaB. In order to charge the sweep a more or
less elaborate arrangement was necessary on board the sweepers
which insulated the kite wire from electrical contact with any part
of, the vessel and connected it through the sweep drum to the proper
SKR} of the generator. Special insulated kite wire had been manu-
factured in the United States for this purpose.
The device was not, however, successful, due to several unforeseen
factors. The first and most serious was the effect upon the magnetic
compasses of the ships; the powerful solenoid caused by the current
in the kite wire which was wound around the sweeping drum caused
a deviation of the magnetic compasses amounting, in some cases
to nearly eight points. Various ships were differently affected, and
in consequence steered widely diverging courses in attempting to
make parallel crossings over the barrage. While the larger portion
of this deviation could possibly have been eliminated, the scheme
was still unsuccessful, for it was found in later experiments that the
electrical charge was dissipated so rapidly from its point of connec-
tion with the uninsulated wire that no effect was produced a few
fathoms from the connection.
In additic)n to this, the insulation of the kite wire was unsatisfac-
tory. The conductivity of the steel wire was so low that the insu-
lation heated excessively, becoming in some cases so soft as to almost
24 tHE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
allow it to be wiped off from the wire. Besides this, the heavy pres-
sure on the insulation as it was hauled in over the roller chock on
the stern of the sweeper caused it to crack so badly that its insu-
lating properties were much impaired almost as soon as it had been
placed in use. The principle of using the charged sweep was there-
fore abandoned.
During the two days there had been observed seven separate
instances of countermining, none of which had resulted in any dam-
age to the vessels engaged. The thing learned which was of greatest
importance in the subsequent operations was that the countermines
were apt to occur at any time without relation to the initial explosions
which caused them. The cause of these "hang fires " was not entirely
apparent. It might be due to leaks started in the antenna floats
which, after reaching a certain point, were suflB.cient to explode the
mines. Observations at night on the hydrophones showed that the
mines continued exploding throughout the night at irregular inter-
vals. Admiral Strauss therefore decided that since mines were apt
to explode at any moment without relation to other mines, the safest
method of sweeping the barrage would be to cross the field the
minimum number of times that was actually necessary; or, in other
words, to use the largest sweep which it was practicable to employ
instead of endeavoring to use a sweep, as had been done on the first
operation, sufficiently small to allow the sweepers to be between the
lines of mines when there was a possibility of exploding a mine by
contact with the sweep wire. The longer sweep would allow a field
to be cleared in about one-third as many crossings over the mines
as would be necessary with the shorter one.
Since no information was available relative to the size of the swe^'p
which could be employed and kept at a uniform depth without the
use of buoys, it was again necessary to undertake experiments. On
account of the large number of exploding mines, which meant frequent
sweep partings, it was out of the question to attempt to use buoys
on the sweep wire to keep it at uniform depth, since such practice
would make a cumbersome sweep requiring much loss of time for
passing and repassing. On the other hand, the sweep must be
sufficiently short to prevent it from dragging along the bottom, which
would frequently result in breaking it. It was necessary that the
kites should reach a depth of at least 250 feet and it was equally neces-
sary that the cod of the sweep should not, in general, go below a depth
of 300 feet.
As a result of the two days' sweeping, it was apparent that the 18
minesweepers which had been assigned to the mine force could not
hope to complete the clearance of the barrage that year, so Admiral
Strauss requested that 16 more be dispatched to Kirkwall at the
earliest possible moment, 4 to be sent immediately they could be
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 25
made ready without waiting for docking or protective devices, as this
installation could be installed on that number by the Black Hawk
using spares then on hand; the other 12 to be fitted in United States
yards before sailing.
It was further apparent that additional vessels would be required
to act as mark boats for the sweepers to enable them to navigate
more accurately. It was understood that some of the New England
deep-sea trawlers had been taken over by the Navy during the war
for patrol vessels and Admiral Strauss asked that 30 of these be sent
him for work in the North Sea. A few days later, however, it was
learned that the Admiralty would be glad to turn over on charter
any number of their new steam trawlers which we might require,
provided we could furnish crews to man them. Since this arrange-
ment was quickest, permission was obtained from the Navy Depart-
ment to take over 20 of these vessels and place American crews on
board.
During the two days ' sweeping, the loss of sweep wire and kites
had been heavy, although not nearly so heavy as we were later to
experience. It was apparent that our estimates had been far too
light. The original quantity we had ordered was therefore doubled,
and arrangements were made to obtain as many kites as possible from
the British Adnm-alty, while more could be built and sent us from
the United States.
The day after the sweepers returned to port our first casualty
occurred. William McHaskell, boatswain's mate first class, while
operating the towing engine of the Auk, was caught between the shaft
of the sweeping drums and the crosshead of the engine and badly
\Sushed. He died shortly afterwards. As a result of the recom-
mendations of a court of inquiry, all sweepers were required to install
safety guards to prevent similar accidents occurring.
Chapter IV.
THE SECOND MINESWEEPING OPERATION.
While the vessels were in port being overhauled experiments were
conducted to ascertain the largest sweep which it would be practicable
to use in the barrage. Since no special recorders for measuring the
depth at which the kites and sweep wire rode, it was necessary to
use an improvised arrangement in order to obtain an approximation
of the data required. As a result of the test, it appeared feasible to
sweep at approximately 800 yards distance, using 600 fathoms of
sweep wire and 90 fathoms of kite wire on each vessel.
In the meantime the preparations for taking over and manning
the British trawlers were arranged and Lieut. Commander E. N.
Parker, United States Navy Reserve Force, and Lieut. T. D. Warner,
United States Navy, were sent to Falmouth, where 1 1 of these vessels
were placed in commission with the assistance of the U. S. S. Chat-
tanooga and the British authorities. Lieut. Commander Parker and
the Chattanooga later proceeded to Grimsby, England, where the nine
remaining trawlers were turned over to the United States Govern-
ment and commissioned before sailing for Kirkwall. Considerable
difficulty was encountered in obtaining personnel to man these vessels.
Orders had just been received to begin the release of the men who had
enlisted for the duration of the war. The mine force was alreadv
undermanned, as well as most of the other European stations, and
officers and men were consequently at a premium.
Considerable difficulty was encountered during the first part of the
operations in making the necessary repairs on the minesweepers.
Many of them were sent over with practically no spare parts, which
necessitated making patterns and castings on board the repair ship
before many of the repairs could be completed.
By the time the repairs and overhaul of the minesweepers and sub
chasers had been completed a southeastly storm came on, which
lasted several days and prevented the vessels from sailing until the
10th of May.
This coming operation was to be the first real attempt to clear a
definite area of the mines. It had been decided to clear each of the
13 groups of mines separately, since the first operation had shown
that the mines were closely within the charted positions and that to
sweep the large intervening spaces would therefore be a loss of time.
Countermining was still considered our greatest danger. Therefore,
26
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 27
in order to reduce its possible effects while we were learning more
about the mines, it was decided to sweep group 12 on the coming
operation, since only one of its three rows of mines were laid at the
very dangerous upper level. As a further safety precaution all pairs
of sweepers were to sweep transversely ; that is, to cross the lines of
mines at right angles to their length, then turn and recross, overlap-
ping their last track. The method is tedious and slow, but it was
deemed to be safer since the possibility of being above a mine when
others might explode was considered less. The 9 pairs of sweepers
which were available were to work independently, separated by equal
intervals along the length of the field, in order that the countermines
caused by one pair would be less likely to affect neighboring ships.
As our trawlers had not yet arrived at Kirkwall, the British Mine
Clearance Officer there, Commander C. H. G. Benson, Royal Navy,
kindly lent us 8 trawlers under his command, which were then unem-
ployed, to act as marker boats for the sweepers.
The second day on the field started the casualties, which continued
intermittently throughout the operations. Curiously, too, the cause
of most of the serious mishaps came from a totally unexpected source.
Up to this time the danger of mines fouled in the kites, exploding
when the sweep was being hauled in, had not been experienced.
The Patuxent was the first victim. On May 12 the sweep had been
severed by an explosion and had to be hauled on board to be repaired.
Wlien the kite was within sight a mine could be seen hanging by its
mooring cable. The commanding officer immediately sent all hands
forward to a place of safety, going aft himself to clear it with the
assistance of his chief boatswain's mate. The mine was on the sur-
fiS^ about 10 feet from the side of the ship when suddenly, without
apparent cause, it exploded. Several men were blown overboard
by the mass of flying water, but all were rescued. The commanding
ofiicer, who at the time of the explosion was only a few feet from the
mine, escaped with the loss of his thumb, which was amputated by
a flying fragment. Since the force of the explosion had been largely
spent in the air, the damage to the ship was not serious, and a few
days in dry dock were sufficient to repair her.
Up to this time several mines which had fouled the sweep had
hc^en hauled on board as souvenirs; for, according to design, they
sliould be safe when within approximately 30 feet of the surface.
This practice now was discontinued voluntarily. No one trusted
the mines under any circumstances, and one ship even went so far
as to double the risk by throwing one, which was then on board,
back over the side.
Precaution, however, could not entirely eliminate the danger of
mines fouled in the sweep. In the first place, they could not be seen
until they were dangerously close to the ship; then the action which
28 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
was taken might or might not prove the proper one. It was impos-
sible to tell.
Two days after the Patuxent's accident the same casualty befell the
Boholink, but with far more serious results. Again the conmaanding
officer went aft to clear the mine in person. Almost before anything
could be done it exploded, killed the commanding officer, Lieut.
Frank Bruce, United States Navy, and blew the boatswain and three
other men into the water. All fom- were rescued, although the
boatswain had been knocked unconscious by the shock.
The ship was seriously damaged. The after hull plating had been
driven in in places as much as 2 and 3 feet; the rudder and rudder
post were gone; the propeller distorted and shaft bent; the engine
had been thrown out of line; the towing engine, capstan, search-
lights, and many other fixtures had been broken or disabled. The
boilers, fortunately, were not damaged, which enabled the wrecking
pumps to handle the water which poured into the after part of the
ship.
The Teal took the Boholink in tow and, accompanied by the
Swallow and 8C-/^5, headed for port. Before they had progressed
far a heavy fog set in, which added to their difficulties. In passing
Fair Isle, which was invisible in the fog, they found themselves to
northward of- their position. The Swallow, which was leading,
grazed a submerged rock but signaled the danger warning to the
Teal and Boholink in time for them to alter course and avoid it.
Later the same day the ships attempted to enter Scapa Flow,
their destination, via Kirk Soimd, which had been blocked except
for one narrow and difficult opening during the war to bar the passage
to the enemy's submarines. In the strong tide which runs in 1^;'. 3
passage the towline to the Boholink snapped and the current was
rapidly setting her on shore. The Swallow managed to get alongside
her and make fast before the tide had carried her into dangerous
water. As they continued up the gradually narrowing channel the
Teal, which was leading, realizing that the Swallow with a ship in
tow would be taking too great a risk in attempting this passage,
signaled to the Swallow to turn around. In attempting to tm*n
they were set into shallow water by the 8-knot current and forced to
anchor. The anchor dragged and the Swallow grounded, but was
able to get off at once without assistance. Leaks were started in
nine of the fuel-oil tanks, which necessitated docking the Swallow.
After temporary repairs were made to the Boholink at Scapa she
was towed to Devonport, England, where extensive repairs were
undertaken. Special parts, such as rudder, rudder post, and stern
tube were shipped from the United States to Devonport to save time,
but even then it required over six months to complete the repairs.
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 29
On the 16th of May a middle level mine was countermined directly
beneath the Turlcey, causing her to leak so badly as to necessitate
docking.
It was a fortunate thing for us to have drydocks so near at hand
as those at Invergordon and at Lyness in Scapa Flow. Almost
daily ships were being damaged so badly that they required docking.
The British, to whom the dry docks belonged, gave us permission to
use them as the occasion arose. Toward the latter part of the
operations, however, the conditions at Lyness were somewhat altered
on account of the large amount of dry dock work necessitated by the
salvaging of the sunken German ships, and the freedom which had
hitherto been granted us to use tliis dock became somewhat restricted.
The long hours of daylight which existed during the summer months
in that liigh latitude were of great assistance in our operations, since
they enabled the vessels to operate up to the limit of physical endur-
ance and were further beneficial, especially during the early opera-
tions, because they enabled the vessels more easily to keep clear of
the many floating mines which had broken adrift in the vicinity of
the barrage. It is interesting to note that although far fewer British
mines were laid in the barrage than American mines, a great many
more of the former type were sighted afloat than our own. While
ours were a menace to the sweepers at night, the British mines were
very much more so, since the electric protective device was ineffective
against them. As regards the supposed safety of mines broken from
their moorings and floating on the surface, Admiralty records showed
that previous to the summer of 1918 four vessels had been sunk by
mines broken adrift and floating on the surface. On account of the
Stinger of floating mines, aU ships were directed not to cruise dm'uig
the hoiu^ of darkness unless it became absolutely necessary.
The usual nighttime procedure when the weather permitted was to
steam several miles from the mine field and anchor by means of a
heavy weight or a kedge anchor made fast to the end of the sweep
wire. When there was no wind such an arrangement was usually
sufficient to hold the ships, but even a moderate breeze ordinarily
caused them to drag considerably.
The seagoing qualities of the sweepers and also subchasers was not
fully appreciated during the early operations, and as a result the ships
sometimes sought shelter during storms in which they could have
operated as they later did.
While proceeding to Lerwick in the Shetland Islands for shelter
on the night of May 22, the Osprey, the flagship of the senior officer
present, ran aground on Loofa Baa in Lerwick Harbor. The little
harbor was rather congested with shipping, which obscured several
of the aids to navigation and particularly one marking the obstruc-
30 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
tion on which the vessel grounded. By lightening the ship as much
as possible she was cleared the following day and proceeded under
her own power to Kirkwall and later to Scapa, where she was docked.
The damage done in grounding was slight.
By the 29th of May the operation was completed and all vessels
returned to port. The clearance of group 12 had required consider-
ably longer than had been expected. After each of the pairs had
completed sweeping its own section, numerous longitudinal sweeps
were required with all the vessels in formation before no mines were
found. The fleet, too, had been materially reduced by the casualties
which had occurred and which had accordingly lengthened the time
required to complete the operation. A total number of 1,672 mines
were accounted for, which indicated that 43 per cent were still in
place. This figure was almost double what we had been led to expect
as a result of the first sweeping operation.
Next to the casualties to the ships and their personnel the most
serious factor was the heavy loss of sweeping material. Sweeps had
parted over 200 times, resulting in the loss of approximately 50 kites
and huge quantities of sweep wire. A few days after the operation
had begun Admiral Strauss cabled to the Navy Department request- 1
ing that his order for 30 kites per month be increased to 150 kites per
month, and that the first deliveries should be made in June. From
then on the problem of providing sufficient gear for the vessels to con-
tinue sweeping necessitated combing the dockyards and supply
bases of Great Britain, and even searching the coast of France, in
hopes that material of the nature we required might be found.
I
Chapter V.
THE THIRD MINESWEEPING OPERATION.
From the beginning the insulated kite wire had been a source of
considerable annoyance. Under the heavy pressure the insulation
split and peeled off as the kite wire passed over the stern chocks of the
ships. Manila rope would have served equally as well as the insu-
lated wire, since it was not found possible to use the charged sweep
originally contemplated, but manila was particularly difficult to
obtain in Great Britain.
With the hope of finding some solution to enable bare kite wire to
be used, Dr. H. L. Curtis, of the Bureau of Standards, who was then
in London, was sent to Kirkwall in order that his technical experience
might be utilized. Experiments were carried out under various condi-
tions to ascertain the possibility of extending the zone of electrical
protection down the kite wire a sufficient distance so that mines touch-
ing it would not explode until they had passed beyond the distance at
which damage to the ship might result. The results of the experiment
were interesting but not productive. No matter what arrangements
were used, the electrical charge was dissipated witliin a few feet of its
point of application to the kite wire, and the only solution that re-
mained was to cover the steel kite wire with some nonconductive insul-
t'on which would prevent it from firing the mines. The old insulated
wire was patched up, parceled and served; ships which had sufficient
manila used it; and those with neither took plain wire and insulated
it %\dth a heavy parceling of canvas served over with marline.
Trouble was encountered with the boilers on several vessels on
account of the bitumastic coating in the feed-water bottoms becoming
loose and being carried into the boilers, thence through the steam
lines to the engines. On account of this condition several vessels —
the Auk and the Curlew in particular — were disabled at various times
for periods of several days while the bitumastic was being cleaned out.
The problem of providing sufficient water for the sweepers became
acute immediately after the completion of the second operation.
The rainfall, upon which the water supply was largely dependent,
had been light. Without warning the town authorities announced
that the water supply for our ships was no longer available. Although
the sweepers were designed to have evaporators of sufficient capacity
to make them independent in so far as water was concerned, it proved
to be far from the case. The evaporators could not produce half
31
32 THE NOKTHERN BARRAGE.
their rated capacity, and at the end of 16 days all vessels had re-
turned to port practically empty of water. Admiral Strauss inves-
tigated the possibility of obtaining water from a small fresh-water
lake about 5 miles from Kirkwall, but aside from the high charges
which the owner demanded for the water, which in the meantime
was running to waste, the development work would have required
considerable time and expense. Arrangements were therefore made
to send out water boats to Lyness, a distance of approximately 50
miles, to refiU. By keeping the water boat working constantly and
by exercising the strictest economy it was possible to keep the vessels
supplied in this manner.
By June 2 all of the trawlers which we had taken over had arrived
at Kirkwall and were being fitted out for their intended duties on
the mine field. The U. S. S. Seneca, which had also been ordered to
join the mine force on account of her excellent facilities as a wrecking
ship, arrived at this time. That vessel, however, belonged to the
Coast Guard, and as they requested that she be returned to the United
States at the earliest possible date, she was detached from the mine
force about a week after she had arrived.
The incidental work in connection with the sweeping had by this
time increased to such an extent that it became necessary to establish
a small base on shore where the large quantities of sweeping material
buoys, etc., might be stowed, repaired and assembled. Arrangements
were completed through the British Admiralty to take over a small
tract of land at Carness Point, on the eastern side of Kirkwall Harbor
for this purpose. The space had previously been occupied by three
fishing industries and contained small sheds which were available
for barracks. Additional barracks, however, were brought h^m
Base 18 and set up here, and this, together with a loading pier for
trawlers and sweepers constructed by the Black Hawk, satisfactorily
met our requirements throughout the summer.
Considerable anxiety had been felt from the beginning whether
or not the electric protective device would cause an undue amount
of electrolysis on the hulls of the sweepers. The heavy electric cur-
rents flowing from the hulls of the ships might possibly cause the
steel plating and fixtures to deteriorate so rapidly as to seriously
affect the structural strength of the vessels. As fast as the ships
were docked for repairs necessitated by injuries on the mine field
they were carefully inspected to ascertain the rate of the corrosion.
At first it appeared perhaps more serious than it actually was. Wher-
ever there was a bare spot on the hulls the pitting could easily be
seen, but although it was quick to take effect, the subsequent rate
was not sufficiently fast to seriously weaken the shells of the vessels.
By this time so much of the incoming gear required for the mine
sweeping had accumulated at Inverness that it was necessary to send
I
Sinking a mine by rifle fire. (Page 18.)
Sinking a mine by rifle fire.
(Page 18.)
Three explosions between the Lapwing and Penguin. (Page 40.)
First (ExpERfrr^NTAL) Mjnesweeping OFiKf^mu
flpfJiU 50-tAnyZ, «9l9
■it
^i=^'^
' ' Cnaft
32-2
thu'wi<-iy.ft:r^t(^xs5erimental) mine sweeping operation, April 30, 1919-May 2 1919
(Page 22.)
m
.1
i
1
k
A mine foul of the U. S. S. Patuxent's kite. Tlie mine exploded in less tnaii a minute after
this picture was tal<en. (Page 27.)
'A conr'i|S/rete,Virj9j^ics\rp»eq|'cluring sweeping operations. T. N. T. lying on the deck. (Page 27.)
32-4
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 33
the Aspevleaf, the British oil ship operating under our orders, to
Inverness to transport the gear to Kirkwall. During the spring,
while the preliminary arrangements were being made for the arrival
of the svreepers. considerable difficulty had been encountered in
obtaining a gasoline boat large enough to care for the sub chasers
throughout the operations. Up until the last m.om.ent none could
be allotted to our use, and it had been necessary to have shipped to
Inverness a large amount of gasoline in drums which were then on
hand at the United States air station at Eastleigh, England. Also
a large number of dan buoys, which had been requested, had arrived
at Inverness. It was this gasoline and other material that the
Aspenleaf brought from Inverness and stowed aboard until such
time as it was required elsewhere.
During the first part of June the ration allowance for the sweepers
and trawlers was increased SI a day. This was done at the request
of the Commander of the Mine Force on account of the unusuaUy long
hours which the men on the mine field were working, which necessi-
tated giving them an extra meal after their regular supper. This
allowance had previously been authorized for the sub chasers.
On account of the difficulty of seeing marker buoys which were
planted by the various vessels to define the limits of their work, an
effort was made to obtain a number of smaU captive baUoons w^hich
might be tethered to the buoys in order to increase their visibility.
; Twenty of these were obtained through the British air ministry, and
arrangements were begun to fit the trawler Richard BuTkeley as a
balloon ship in order that she might fill the balloons with hydrogen
and secure them to the buoys as required. The scheme, however,
qould never be carried out on account of the poor construction of the
balloons. The bags were made of single-ply fabric and when filled
would not retain their buoyancy for more than a few hours. We
required a balloon which would stay up at least four or five days.
By the 3d of June the sweepers and chasers were again ready to
sail, but a storm delayed their departure until the afternoon of the
5th. The same day they sailed four of the new sweepers, the Gheiv-ink,
Flamingo, Thrush, and Penguin, which had been requested by ,the
admiral upon completion of the first operation, arrived at Kirku^all,
and the Black Hawk began at once the installation of the electrical
protective devices which had been sent over on the first sweepers for
spares.
Group 9 was to be cleared on the third operation. This group,
consisting of 5,520 mines, was the largest which had been laid on
a single operation. The British had already cleared their single
line of mines laid at a depth of 95 feet about 1,000 yards to the
northward of our field. Out of the 1,300 British mines originally laid
181064°— 20 3
34 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
in this line 606 had survived until summer and were accounted
for by the British sweepers.
The object in clearing this large group at the present time was
twofold. On future operations it would shorten the distance that
our vessels would have to steam in going back and forth from port
and at the same time would reduce the number of mines which might
break adrift and menace our ships in the western part of the barrage.
Furthermore, this group of mines, although the largest we had laid,
contained only two rows laid at the upper level. It was still desired
to avoid as much as possible the chances of being damaged by counter-
mining while experience was being gained. This danger was not,
however, so great as had been originally anticipated, and Admiral
Strauss had therefore decided to have one division of the mine
sweepers sweep their section of the field longitudinally in order to
compare this method with the transverse sweeping which had been
used up until this time. If the division succeeded in demonstrating
that the danger was no greater, our sweeping speed could probably
be greatly increased and possibly enough to complete the clearance
of the barrage this year. In order to judge personally the relative
merits of the two methods, the admiral hoisted his flag on the
Eider and spent several days on the mine field observing the actual
conditions and the diflSiculties which were being encountered.
An interesting indication of the success of the barrage occurred
the second day after the sweepers had begun work. In the western
part of the barrage the water is more shoal than elsewhere, and while
crossing the lines of mines the Heron and Sanderling were suddenly
brought almost to a standstill by an obstruction which fouled their
sweep. A few minutes later a large patch of oil rose to the surface and
spread out astern of them. Evidently a German submarine which
had been sunk in the barrage had been encountered. The minelaying
squadron while passing close to the same spot a few days after they
had laid the mines had sighted the body of a German sailor floating
in the water. From the records of the Admiralty, it was presumed
that the obstruction was the wreck of the German submarine UB-127.
A few days after the operation had begun the admiral returned to
port. From what he had seen he was convinced that longitudinal
sweeping could be used with equal safety. The rate of sweeping of
the division which had tried it out had been no faster than that of the
other two divisions, but the cause was apparent; in the first sweeping
of a line of mines the division, three pairs in tandem, could keep
position on this line by the explosions and the mines cut adrift. But
after having once gone over such a line and having removed the greater
portion of the mines, much difficulty was encountered in locating the
position of the line so that the remaining mines could be removed.
If it were possible to accurately define the lines of mines with buoys
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 35
preliminary to the sweeping operations, it could reasonably be ex-
pected that a field could be cleared in a very much shorter ])eriod of
time. Some doubt existed whether such buoying could be carried
out successfully on account of the difficulty of telling exa(?tly the
position of the lines of mines due to the irregularity in which they
exploded and rose to the surface. At least it was worth a try, and
orders at once were issued to fit out a buoy-laying squadron in order
to have the fields which were to be cleared on the succeeding opera-
tion marl, ed before the operation began.
With each field carel'ully buoyed on each side throughout its length,
a formation sufficiently large to cover the entire width was desired to
sweep longitudinally in one formation. For such a formation more
vessels were required. The only ships available were the British
trawlers which we had recently taken over. They had been built
expressly for minesweeping and, although it was impossible to fit
them with the electrical protective device, it was considered feasible
to use them in the rear of the regular sweepers to cover the ground
which had once been swept over and thus catch* any mines which
might have been missed in the initial sweep. Preparations were
begun at once to fit out 10 of these vessels and have them ready for
sweeping by the time that group 9 was completed.
As soon as the Osprey had completed her docking, necessitated by
the grounding in Lerwick Harbor, detailed experiments were made to
obtain accurate data with regard to the performance of the sweep
wire and kites. Sweeps were parting continuously, sometimes with-
out apparent cause, and since it was oftentimes attributed to fouling
the bottom instead of being severed by the explosions of the mines,
i^ was necessary to know exactly at what depth the kites and sweep
wire submerged under various conditions. Special depth recorders
had been borrowed from the Admiralty, designed expressly for meas-
urements of this nature. They consisted of small torpedo-shaped
flasks containing hydrostats for measuring the pressures, which were
recorded continuously on sheets revolved by special air clocks
which were not affected by the heavy vibrations in the sweep wire.
With these depth recorders it was possible to make accurate measure-
ments which enabled us to determine exactly the lengths of kite
wire which must be used under various conditions.
The problem of providing sufficient sweep wire became extremely
serious before group 9 could be completed. We had practically drained
the Admiralt}^ of all they could spare ; a small quantity then on hand
at the manufacturers had been ])urchased and still the supply was
insufficient. When the trawlers were being taken over at Grimsby,
Lieut. Commander Parker had noticed a considerable stock of sweep
wire in the naval base at that place, but in response to a telegram to
the senior naval officer of that port we were informed that none could
36 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
be spared. Lieut. Commander Parker was, however, certain tha:
if he were permitted to go in person he would be able to obtain at"
least part of the quantity which he had seen. The Commander of
the Mine Force, as a last resort, even though he had been refused
officially, gave Lieut. Commander Parker permission to take a trawler
to Grimsby in hopes that some of the wire might be procured. A few
days later the trawler returned with 11,000 fathoms of wire. This
quantity was barely sufficient to tide us over until the first shipment
from the United States arrived at Liverpool.
On the 21st day of June the tranquillity of existence in the isolated
little village of Kirkwall was brol- en by the news that the interned
German fleet at Scapa Flow was being scuttled by the men on board.
Admiral Strauss's report to the Secretary of the Navy is particularly
interesting and is quoted in full:
I have to report the sinking of the interned German fleet at Scapa Flow to-day. At
about 12.30 I received word from Commander White, Royal Navy, senior naval officer
at Kirkwall, that at noon a German ship had sunk, and simultaneously the German-
colors had been hoisted on all of their ships. No information reached me from Ad-
miral Prendergast, commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands, who was, at the time,
the senior British naval officer in the Adcinity. Vice Admiral Sir Sydney Fremantle,
commanding the Fifth Battle Squadron (now the guard squadron in Scapa), was
absent exercising at target practice in Pentland Firth. Commander White came on
board shortly after 1 o'clock and announced that several more German ships had been
sunk. I at once went ashore, taking Capt. Bulmer with me, and proceeded by auto-
mobile to Houton Bay, the nearest point on the mainland from which the German
fleet could be seen. On coming within sight of the anchorage of the German fleet it
was evident that most of them had disappeared. It was then 3 p. m., and at about 3. 10
p. m., upon arrival at Houton, I gave orders by telephone for all minesweeping tugs
of our force at Kirkwall to proceed at once to Scapa Flow and report to Admiral Pren-
dergast for duty. I thought it possible that some of the sinking vessels might sur^dve
long enough to be towed into shoal water. It is about 40 miles from Kirkwall Bay ist
the German fleet's anchorage. I notified Admiral Prendergast by telephone that
these vessels would be under his orders. At a few minutes after 3 o'clock four of the
minesweeping tugs were under way for Scapa.
At 3 o'clock the Fifth Battle Squadron had retm'ned from sea, but two of the ships
were still under way at 3.30. The others had anchored apparently in their regular
berths. Shortly afterwards all of the squadron had been anchored. At 3.30 there
were but three German battleships afloat, one north of and close to Cava Island. This
ship was being towed along in a westerly direction by a British destroyer with the
evident intention of beaching her on the Calf of Cava. She was deep in the water
with a slight list to port. Another battleship was anchored north of the land joining
ScadHeadand Green Head. This vessel was also deep in the water and listed slightly.
A little later her moorings had evidently been slipped and she was drifting with the
ebb tide to the southward and eastward. The battleship Baden was anchored
about half a mile north of Scad Head, apparently uninjured. Two light cruisers, one
of the Eviden class, were under tow by a destroyer each north of the Barrel of Butter.
They were being towed toward Smoogroo Bay. A light cruiser of the new Eviden
class was at anchor between Green Head and Cava and was evidently filling rapidly
by the stern. This last ship sank in a few minutes while at anchor. She submerged
slowly by the stern until her forefoot was well out of the water, when she keeled over
on her starboard side and sank. The next ship to sink was the battleship which was
fl
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 37
drifting between Scad Head and Green Head. She waa well down by the stern when
she turned with head southwest, righted herself, and sank on an even keel with the top
of her turrets just awash. At about 4.20 the destroyer towing the battleship northeast
of Cava parted her towline. Her tow was then deep in the water but upright. In
a few minutes she listed heavily to port, then turned completely over on her port side
and sank. At about 4.30 one of the light cruisers had been beached in Smoogroo Bay.
She is in an upright position with the water just below her upper air ports. She can
be salvaged. At this time they were still attempting to tow the light cruiser of the
Emden class into the same water. As this vessel still had nearly all of her freeboard
they have probably succeeded.
The Baden is the only heavy ship afloat at this \vriting. As far as could be seen
from our point of observation at Houton, all of the large number of destroyers in
Gutter Sound were sunk. One light cruiser had been beached on the western side of
Cava Island.
At 5.30 I received a mesage from Admiral Prendergaat to recall the four tugs, as
they were no longer needed.
I was told by an officer of the British air force at Houton that he had seen 16 of the
German vessels sink. The first 'one, Admiral Von Renter's flagship the Emden,
ha\'ing sunk almost exactly at noon. He stated that all of the vessels had the German
colors fljdng when they sank. None that I saw sink had them hoisted. He stated
that the colors on the remaining vessels had been hauled down on the approach of
British destroyers. I was also informed that Admiral Von Renter came ashore in a
British drifter before his flagship sank. He was carefully dressed, and the enlisted
men ^vith him, seen by my informant, were in clean dress blues. He had his baggage
with liim, but at once requested of the British officer in conamand at Houton Bay that
he send off vessels to save the crews, exclaiming that his men were sinking the ships.
Admiral Von Renter was not permitted to land but was sent off in the drifter to the
British station ship Imperieuse. The crews of the various vessels were rescued by
British trawlers and torpedo vessels. I have no information as to casualties.
The sweeping of group 9 dragged on to what seemed at the time
an interminable period. The weather during the month of June
h\td been bad — ^far worse than the ordinary — and this, coupled with
the heavy currents which flow through the Fair Island passage, had
greatly delayed the completion of the operation. On the 1st of
' July, after 26^ days at sea, the group was finally completed and the
i sweepers returned to port. Of this time 11 days had been lost due
ito inability to operate on account of the storms. The damages
'had been light; none of the vessels had been seriously injured except
SC-164 and SC-208. The former had been damaged by a mine
which she was sinking exploding near her on the surface, causing
i! considerable wreckage about the upper decks. SC-208 after sinking
ia mine had steamed past it and it had exploded after having sunk
I some distance below the surface. The seams in her hull were opened
up so that she was taking considerable water and had to be escorted
to port by the Teal and another chaser. Docking was required
before she could resume operations. Several of the ships had had
narrow escapes but in each care, with the exception of the Tanager
which required a week in port, were able to complete the repairs
upon the mine field.
38 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
A report had been received from the AlUed Naval Armistice Com
mission, who had been carrying out the armistice inspections in
Germany containing the details of the German methods of mine-
sweeping. In general they employed very small vessels for sweeping
and used neither serrated wire nor any form of cutter to cut the
mooring cables of the mines when encountered in the sweep. Nothing
could be learned from their methods.
It was some consolation to know that our progress was more
rapid than the Biitish sweeping forces who were engaged in clearing
their portions of the barrage. One of these forces was based at Kirk-
wall and was responsible for clearing the British mines in the western
half of the barrage. The other was based at Lervig, in Norway,
and was engaged in removing British mines adjacent to the Norwe-
gian coast.
Our rate of sweeping although better than the British was far from
satisfactory to us. Unless it was tripled it would be impossible
to complete the clearance of the barrage during the summer of 1919.
The Commander of the United States Naval Forces in European
Waters had already shown signs of uneasiness and had asked for an
estimate of the date on which the sweeping would be completed.
The Commander of the Mine Force in turn replied that no estimate
could be given until after the completion of the succeeding operation.
By that time the new method of sweeping longitudinally with all
ships in formation, after having carefully buoyed the mine field in
advance, would have been tried and he could then estimate how much
longer would be required to clear the 11 remaining groups.
I
Chapter VT.
THE FOURTH MINESWEEPING OPERATION.
One day after the sweepers returned to port the buoy-laying squad-
ron set out to mark the small group 12-A and then group 11, wliich
were to be undertaken (m the fourth operation.
Fortunately, the overhaul period between the third and fourth
operations enabled the mine force to celebrate the Fourth of Jul3^
Although the major items of repairs could not be suspended under
any conditions, it was possible to lay aside many of the routine duties
in order that the majority of the men in the force could engage in the
customary celebrations without delaying the sweeping operations.
Boat races, field sports, baseball games, and various entertainments,
including a large smoker in Kirkwall in the evening, were arranged
and made the day most pleasant. The British entered corchally into
the festivities, as they had done on the preceding Fourth of July
in Inverness.
By the 7th the sweepers were again ready to go out. The buoy-
laying scjuadron had succeeded in marking the small group "12-A" and
were weU along with group 11. The task had not proved so difficult
as had been expected. The steel antenna floats of the lower and
middle level mines enabled them to be distinguished from the upper-
^^evel mines when they were cut adrift. By noting the interval of
time wliich elapsed between the explosion of a mine and the appear-
ance of the slick on the surface it was generally possible to determine
whether it had been planted at 160 feet or 240 feet. The upper-level
mines were more difficult to identify. If they exploded it was
usually after they had been dragged some distance from their posi-
tion; when they were cut up a certain allowance, dependent on the
depth of the water, must be made for the amount that they had
dipped while being sawed from their moorings. Countermines were
frequent and were of much assistance, since they rose exactly in the
positi(>n in which they had been laid. The currents in the North
Sea were baffling. None of the h3"drographic publications gave
definite data as to their strength and directions, and measurements
had to be taken constantly in order that a proper allowance might
be made.
Details of the formatir n and the method of sweeping were worked
out with great care for this operation. Tln-ee pairs of sweepers were
39
40 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
placed in column formation on the lower and middle level lines of
mines. There were insufficient vessels to have three pairs on each
of the upper-level lines of mines, and it was perhaps not so necessary,
since fewer of them were still in place. It was hoped that by this
arrangement at least c ne pair on each line could always be kept oper-
ating while the others repaired their sweeps after having parted them
and were regaining their positif ns in the formation. This compact
formation also assisted navigation and made it much easier to keep
on the lines while proceeding from one buoy to the next (the buoys
were 3 miles apart).
Shortly after noon on the 7th of July the sweepers arrived at the
western end of group 12-A, took their respective positions in the
formati<'n, and started down the field. Seven sweeps of this field
were made with the entire formaticn, before no mines were found..
This was done in a day and a half, or with twice the rapidity of the
previous operation. But here a large percentage of time was neces-
sarily lost due to frequent turnings, for, in fact, only 7 hours and 40
minutes of actual sweeping had been required on this small field, and
besides the gain in time, it was satisfying to know, thanks to the
buoys, that all parts of the field were covered each time.
The Oriole and Rail had been damaged by mines fouling their kites
and exploding as they were hauled in, but besides this, which was apt
to occur irrespective of the method of sweeping, no casualties had mar-
red the inauguration of this new plan. The enthusiasm of the force
was unbounded. At last definite satisfactory resi.ilts for the effort
expended could be seen.
Before the vessels could get straightened out and started on the
next field, group 11, the oncoming darkness made it impracticable to
attempt further operatirns that evening. The next morning, July
9, the 43 vessels were in formation and headed down the mine field.
But a flood of catastropliies was in store for us, more than we should
have to face any other day during the entire operations. The first
victim was the Curlew, which was damaged by the explosion of a mine
fouled in her kite and was forced to return to Ejrkwall for repairs.
Shortly afterwards three mines were coi ntermined beneath the
Patapsco. Forti nately, the damage was n(^t serious. The Penguin
followed with numerous minor damages from an explosic^n in her kite,
and almc'St at the same time the William Darnold was similarly dis-
abled. Both ships succeeded in making temporary repairs upon the
mine field and c( ntinued operations. The Lapwing was next; she was
seriously countermined and had to return to port. Sub chaser 4^,
while sinking a floating mine, expl(»ded it and also had to return.]
Then, to cap the climax, six mines were countermined beneath orj
close aboard the Pelican. One directly beneath her was an upper-j
level mine and the ship was practically deluged in the mass of water]
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 41
tlirown up by the explosion. When the water had subsided the
Pelican was sinking. The ex.plosi< n had badly ruptured the forward
part of the ship and she was rapidly filling ^vit]l water.
Just 17 minutes after the accident Capt. R. C. Bulmer, who had
come out to direct the operations, had placed his flagship, the AuJc,
alongside the Pelican, connected the wrecking hose with the for-
ward compartments of the damaged vessel, and the pumps were
working at their maximum capacity to keep the ship afloat. A few
minutes later the Eide?' had secured on the Pelican's other side
and her pumps were doing likewise. The Teal then took the three
ships in tow and the four vessels, lashed together, headed slowly
for port, with the bow of the Pelican barely above water. All
went well for the first few hours. The pumps of the two vessels
were sufficient to maintain the Pelican in her present condition.
Her own boilers had been disabled by the explosion, so that she was
entirely dependent upon the assistance of the AuJc and the Eider.
But they had not gone far before difficulties began to arise. A head
sea sprang up which made it difficult for the vessels to remain along-
side of the Pelican without excessive strain being thrown on the
moorings and hose lines as the ships were tossed about by the seas.
As the ships proceeded conditions gi-ew worse. The pump lines
carried away and the water gained rapidly until the Pelican's
bow was awash. The forward fireroom bulkhead, which alone
kept the Pelican afloat, was buckled and distorted by the pressure
of the water on the forward side and in danger of bursting at any
moment. Since under such conditions it was not safe to leave un-
Tiecessary men aboard the damaged ship, 12 volunteers to remain on
the Pelican to do the necessary work were asked for, but every
member of her crew stepped forward. After choosing the 12 strongest
men, the remainder had to be ordered from their ship against their
wiU.
In the meantime, the crews on the Auk and the Eider worked
desperately to get the pump lines repaired and again operating.
There were stiU 50 miles of open sea to be traversed before shelter
could be reached, and to add to the difficulties darkness had overtaken
them. Men stood by with axes to cut the mooring lines on the Auk
and the Eider in case the Pelican should sink. This struggle con-
tinued throughout the night, and although it seemed at tunes as if
there was little hope of reaching shelter where the pumps would
have a better chance and where some leaks might be plugged, the
ceaseless and determined efforts were finally rewarded when, the fol-
lowing day, the ships reached the shelter of Tresness Bay with the
Pelican still afloat. Sich holes as could be plugged with the vessel
in her present conditions were stopped, and the same afternoon
42 THE JfORTHERN BARRAGE.
she was towed to S^apa Flow, where she was docked and temporary
repairs made to enable her to be towed. to Newcastle-on-Tyne, where
complete repairs could be undertaken.
In order to expedite these repairs, since the dry dock was in great
demand at this time for salvage work on German destroyers, 25
carpenter's mates and shipwrights were taken from the Black HiwJc
and Panther and, with a repair officer, sent in a trawler, where they
were quartered to work as a night shift on the Pelican. The damages,
however, were so extensive that three weeks' continuous work was
required before her hull could be patched by wooden timbers suffi-
ciently well to permit her being again towed in the open sea.
The morning following the day on which so many of the vessels
suffered casualties a curious accident befell the Flamingo. She had
anchored for the night a few miles to the northward of the mine field,
but on account of the current and wind had dragged until at daylight
she found herself considerably to the southward of her original posi-
tion. While weighing the anchor, which had become fouled with
a mine while being dragged through the mine field, steel touched
copper and the mine went off close under her stern. The rudder was
badly damaged, the skeg was bent, capstan and generators disabled,
and the stern dished in in several places. It was necessary to tow
her to EarkwaU, and later to Invergordon, where she was dry docked.
The most serious casualty of aU occurred on the 12th of July,
when the trawler RicJiard Bulkeley was sunk by the explosion of a
mine fouled in her kite. It had been sighted a few feet below the
surface of the water, and in an attempt to reduce the danger the kite
wire was being veered in order to get the mine farther astern. For
some unaccountable reason it exploded, shattering the after part o{
the hull, allowing the ship to fid and sink within seven minutes.
The vessels in the vicinity rushed to her assistance, but before they
could arrive she had gone down. They managed, however, to recover
aU but one officer and six men, who either drowned or were carried
down with their ship.
The commanding officer, Commander Frank R. King, United States
Navy, who was also in command of the division of trawlers, had last
been seen on the bridge as the ship settled lower and lower in the
water. Previously, when one man had struggled to the deck half
stunned by the shock of the explosion which had blown off his life
preserver. Commander King took off his lifebelt, buckled it around
the sailor, and helped him to get clear of the ship before she took her
final plunge. Until the ship disappeared he was still hunting for
others of his crew who might be left on board. He went down with
the RicJiard Bulkeley and was never seen again. In commemoration
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 43
of the memory of this gallant officer the Secretary of the Navy a few
months later named a new destroyer in his honor.
On the 17th of July the sweeping of group 11 had been comple)bed.
Two days had been lost on account of the weather, making a total of
six days which were required to clear this field, which had originally
consisted of nearly 5,500 mines. From the viewpoint of time, the
results had been everything which we had hoped for and the rate
of sweeping had actually been tripled. With good weather conditions
there seemed now a chance of completing the clearance of the barrage
before the winter storms set in, but since only two more favorable
months remained this was still highly improbable.
On the other hand, the casualties had been enormous. One
vessel had been sunk, another permanently disabled, three damaged
so badly that dry docking was necessary, and several others, less
severely damaged, had been able to make temporary repairs on the
mine field which enabled them to continue. A careful analysis of
the accidents, however, showed that in the greater portion of the
cases, they had been due to causes which were independent of the
method of sweeping, and since we were working at a much faster rate,
the accidents had only been proportional to the nuiliber of mines
which were being swept per day. It was therefore decided that the
present method of longitudinal sweeping should be continued, since
the total accidents would be the same in either case and the preference
lay decidedly in favor of the more rapid method.
One lesson had been learned. The structure of the trawlers was
not sufficiently strong to withstand the shock of the exploding mines.
Although they had been used for sweeping astern of the other vessels
^to make sure that the field was clear, they had accounted for a far
larger number of mines than had been expected. The danger, there-
fore, would constantly exist, so the admiral decided to return the
majority of them to the Admiralty, keeping only six which were to
be used for miscellaneous purposes, transporting stores from Inverness
to Kirkwall and carrying minesweeping gear and provisions to the
vessels on the mine field.
When the trawlers had been taken over from the Admiralty they
were accepted on the assumption that they were in first-class operat-
mg condition. The formality of an on-charter survey was waived,
and it was likewise agreed that when the vessels were returned they
should be turned over in the same condition and that no off-charter
survey should be called for. The monthly rates of hire which we
were paying for the trawlers were as follows: Mersey class, £240 per
month; Castle class, £225 per month; Strath class, £160 per month.
In case of loss or serious damage, the United States should be re-
sponsible for the liabilities incurred.
44 " THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
As soon as it was decided to return part of the trawlers all possible
repairs which could be made were undertaken by the repair ships.
A few days later the vessels were dispatched to Brightlmgsea, Eng-
land, where they were turned over to the British Admiralty with the
assistance of the U.S.S. Cliattanooga who represented the Commandei
of the United States Naval Forces in European Waters. It is of in-
terest to note that the British officers who accepted the trawlers for
their Government were delighted with the condition in which they
were received; so much so in fact, that they remarked they had never
seen trawlers in such perfect condition.
The additional sweepers which Admiral Strauss had requested in
May had, in the meantime, arrived. Four reached Kirkwall on the
10th of July and four more on the 15th, making a total of 12 instead
of the 16 which were originally requested. This now brought the
total force of sweepers up to 32, 2 of which were permanently dis-
abled and 3 more either in dry dock or about to go in dry dock for
repairs.
Chapter VII.
THE FIFTH MINESWEEPING OPERATION.
With the exception of one minor change, the method of sweeping
which had been used on the fourth operation was to be continued
until the barrage was cleared. The buoy-laying squadron, after
completing its work, had carried out experiments to ascertain the
practicability of removing the greater portion of the lower and middle
level mines by exploding them by touching their antenna. The
object sought was to reduce the losses of kites and sweep wire. Much
difficulty was still being encountered in obtaining sufficient quanti-
ties of this material to keep the sweepers supplied. When attempt-
ing to cut a mine from its mooring the mooring frequently slid along
the sweep wire until the horns on the mine case came in contact with
the sweep wire and caused the mine to explode. The sweep wire was
almost invariably shattered by such an explosion, and aside from the
delay necessitated in repairing and repassing the sweep, parts of the
gear were frequently lost before it could be hauled aboard.
The experiment was in all respects successful. Over 75 per cent
of the mines at the deeper levels were exploded in this manner with-
out damage to the sweep. It was accordingly decided that on sub-
sequent operations the leading pair of sweepers on each row of deep
mines should have their sweeps regulated so as to touch the antennas
instead of cutting the mooring cables. The two pairs of sweepers
rfi'-hich followed the leading pair were to set their sweeps well below
the depth at which the mines were planted so as to cut up any mines
which were defective or had lost their antennae and were not exploded.
So few of the upper level mines still had antennae left that it was not
worth while to attempt a similar method on them, and it was there-
fore necessary to continue sweeping them by cutting the mooring
cables as had been done up to this time.
A scheme which partially solved the danger of mines fouling the
kites was adopted at this time and consisted of placing explosive
cutters on the kite wires just above the kites. Then, when the moor-
ing lines of mines slid down the kite wire they would be caught in
the jaws of the cutters, operate the mechanism, and be chopped in
two before they had an opportunity of fouling the kite. These
cutters lessened the danger of mines fouling the kites approximately
50 per cent.
We had at last found a satisfactory method for sweeping the bar-
rage and one which would enable us to complete the work in a few
45
46 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
months. In the meantime, however, we had been laboring strenu-
ously, but under great disadvantages. We had begun work with im-
mature knowledge on various points and many experiments had been
necessary. These experiments, which have been mentioned pre-
viously, consisted of several to determine the present condition of
the mines separately and as a whole; two to determine the depth to
which sweep wire could be submerged ; one to determine the maximum
practicable spread of the sweep; and several others in an effort to
use the charged sweep. Besides this, the first three operations had
been undertaken and executed with this imperfect knowledge, with
the result that too much time had necessarily been spent on an appar-
ently small percentage of our task. Also, we had had to discard the
charged sweep, the installation for which had been costly both in
time and money.
These delays were what we had hoped to avoid when, during the
previous winter, we had requested four sweepers; then, when this
request was refused, had asked for the Sonoma and Ontario. The
delays that continually threatened, due to failures in the delivery
of sweep wire and kites, and the additional work entailed in parceling
out our small supply and exchanging articles between sweepers on
the mine field, are mentioned elsewhere. We had requested sweepers
at Inverness by April 1, but it was the 20th before the first ones arrived,
and although we had asked for at least 18, and more if they could be
spared, only 18 were sent, and it was the 7th of May before the last
2 of these reported. Then, on May 2, when we asked for 16 more
sweepers, only 12 were sent.
At this time, in reph^ to our cable stating the improbability of fin-
ishing this year, a message was received from the department sa^angy
Department notes possibility unable complete minesweeping this summer and
urges most strongly that every possible effort be made to complete this work this year.
And two weeks later a second, stating in part:
Department insists that sweeping must be completed this year and will cooperate
in every way to accomplish this.
It was naturally rather disheartening to realize from these two
messages that the department failed to appreciate the difficulties
under which we were working and that every possible effort was
being made with the facilities available to speed this work to the
limit. However, despite the difficulties, the task was completed ^^dth
all the dispatch the department hoped for.
In the early days of preparation for the sweeping operations it
had been feared that the problem of adequate signal communica-
tions with so large a force of small vessels wdth comparatively un-
trained crews, would offer many difficulties. When the sweepers
would be in formation they would stretch out over a distance of
more than 10 miles and the ordinary visual signals would conse-
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 47
quently be out of the question without a considerable loss of time and
possibility of error in relaying the messages. With this in view, it
had been requested that the sweepers be fitted out \\ith radiotele-
phone installations. The subchasers, which had been engaged in
submarine patrols in European waters, had already been supplied
with this equipment.
The various procedures for communications had been carefully
worked out and incorporated in the Minesweeping Orders which had
been printed and issued to the force prior to the first operation. In
general, all messages which could be transmitted without relaying
were to be sent by flag hoist, searchlight, or semaphore. Messages
which afl'ected a division,, squadron, or the entire force were sent by
radiotelephone. Shape signals, consisting of combinations of balls,
drums, diamonds, and flags, were also prescribed for the more com-
mon signals in connection with passing sweeps and maneuvering. On
the whole, the system was highly satisfactory, and after the first few
days no difficulties were encountered. The radiotelephone proved
highly reliable as well as possessing a high degree of ruggedness, and
in only the very severest of accidents was disabled by the explosion
of mines. The range of audibility of the telephones for the mine
sweepers averaged approximately 30 miles. In some cases satis-
factory communication was maintained at distances of 50 to 60
miles. On account of the short antenna of the subchasers their
range of audibility was considerably less, in general, not being more
than 10 miles. Considerable difficulty was constantly encountered
on the subchasers on account of the sal t-Vater spray and leaks in their
hulls, which caused a great amount of short circuiting in the appa-
v\'atus. The spark sets on the sweepers, though only 1 kilowatt, proved
entirely satisfactory, especially after aU sweepers were equipped
with audion panels and the flagships with tw^o step amplifiers. Com-
munication between the Black Hawk and sweepers at anchor in a
Norwegian Fjord, 250 miles distant, was carried on with ease.
The Eider and Florningo were dry docked at Invergordon during the
latter part of July and both carefully examined for the corrosive
effects caused by the currents in the electric protective device. Ap-
proximately 30 per cent of the rivet heads and about 15 per cent of
the plates showed considerable pitting. The zincs were completely
eaten away. The condition, however, was not serious nor progressing
at a rate which was likely to prove serious, provided that the opera-
tions were completed within a reasonable period.
About this time an interesting memorandum was received from
Dr. H. L. Curtis, of the Bureau of Standards, who had visited the mine
force at Kirkwall a few months prior in connection with experiments
in insulating the kite wire. Assuming that a current of 100 amperes
was used on the electrical protective device, the electrolytic action
48 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
resulting therefrom would cause the loss of approximately 100 grams
of iron per hour from the hull of the ship. This would amount to
about 1 ton per year, provided that the current f.owed continuously,
which was, of course, not the case. Since this loss, if concentrated
in a few^unpainted spots, might prove serious by weakening the
strength of the skm of the ship, it was desirable that the hull should
not be kept too thoroughly painted, for then the deterioration woidd
be more evenly distributed over the skin of the ship.
The sweepers sailed again for the mine field on July 22, after hav-
ing had a period in port of only four days. The buoy-la3'ing squadron
had by that time practically completed the marking of group 6 and
then group 3, which were to be undertaken on this operation.
While buoying group 6 a very interesting condition was discovered.
On account of the pressure of time when the barrage was being laid
it had been necessary to assume that the soundings given on the
charts were approximately correct. Since none of the soundings,
except near the Norwegian coast, w ere greater than 80 fathoms, the
mine moorings had all been cut to this length so that they might be
used in any portion of the barrage except the deep along the coast
of Norway.
During the minelaying. no opportunity had been available for
checking the soundings, and even if it had been, little could have
been done to alter the material which W' as then on hand. During the
buoy-laying operations, however, careful soundings w^ere taken at
intervals of approximately 3 miles along each of the groups of mines,
and it was found that in the^ six th group the depth of water for over
half its length was well over 80 fathoms, in one place reaching
depth of 125 fathoms. Tliis meant that the mines when plante
were carried to a depth considerably below that intended on accou
of the limitations in the length of their mooring cables. The res
was that for over half the length of this group there was in realit;
no surface barrage at all. Fortunately, the water shoaled to th
northw'ard, so that groups 9 and 12 w'ere planted in less than 8
fathoms, w^hich prevented the break in the surface barrage fro
extending throughout its width. This same condition was disco
ered later to obtain also on the Norw^egian end of the barrage, causi
group 2 to be planted deeper than intended.
The new method of antenna sweeping for the lower and middle
level mines proved highly successful. Group 3 was completed in
two days. Before group 6 could be completed a storm had over-
taken the fleet, making it impossible to work and carrying away most
of the marker buoys which had been planted. The buoy squadi'on,
which had, in the meantime, returned to port, was rushed out to
repair the damage done by the storm and also to mark groups 5, 5-A
and 7, so that these groups might be undertaken before the ships
I
Explosion of deepest level mine. A circle of brown discolored water spreading slowly around
the vessel. (Page 18.)
U. S. S. Bobolink In the midst of a mine explosion. Completely destroyed May 20, 1919.
The vessel's smoke can be seen emerging from the left of the explosion. (Page 28.)
Kirkwall Harbor, Orkney Islands. U. S. mine sweepers at sea. (Page 19.)
I
ThS'mine sweeping fleet at Stavanger, Norway. (Page 56.)
; «l*.i'
A portion of the German high-seas fleet which sank in shallow water at Scapa Flow.
(Page 36.)
4»-3
The mine sweeping detachment at Ponta Delgada. ^Parfe '/'^'.)' '
U. S. S. Pelican shortly after she was countermined, showing the pump line from U. S. S. Elder
keeoing the Pelican afloat. (Page 41.)
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Sphero-cylindrical steel buoys stowed at Carness Point. These buoys were used for marker
buoys for the mine fields. (Page 68.)
A deckload of marker buoys and dan buoys. The long slender spars with a barrel in the
middle are called dan buoys. (Page 68.)
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 49
returned to port. The rate of sweeping had been so rapid that the
ships had requested permission to undertake these additional groups
before retui-ning to Kirkwall. Five working days sufficed for the
clearance of gi'oup 3. Groups 5 and 5-A, which had a combined
length of less than 20 miles, were cleared in a single day and group 7
was begun at once.
Considerable fog caused intermittent delay in the operations, but
in spite of this gi'oup 7 was 'completed in three days, after which the
fleet returned to port August 7. The western end of group 7 had
not been cleared on account of the danger of the British line of mines,
which started a few miles to the northward. These mines had been
planted only 6 feet below the sm-face, and since their relative posi-
tion was not accurately known it was not considered safe to approach
their general vicinity.
The damages incm'red during this operation were remarkably
light. The Aulc on July 30 was countermined and forced to return
to Kirkwall for three days' repairs. The Osprey, the flagship of
the buoy-laying squadron, while laying a dan buoy found it fouled by
a mine which exploded beneath her bow, causing much minor
damages but not preventing her continuing the operation. Sub chaser
208 was again injm-ed by the explosion of a mine which she had sunk
but was able to make port under her own power. The auxiliary
condensers on the Turkey had exploded due to bitumastic being
carried over from her double bottoms and lodging under the valves
of the condenser, preventing their closing, and allowing the steam
pressure to build up to such a point as to wreck the condenser. She
was able to continue, however, until a condenser was taken from the
pelican, which was permanently disabled, and installed- on the
Turkey. A mine exploded in the kite of the Curlew, blowing two
men overboard, one of whom sank almost immediately and was
not recovered. The vessel continued sweeping throughout the day,
but later was ordered to Kirkwall to have the leaks stopped which
had been caused by the explosion.
Two more instances of the success of the mine barrage were en-
countered during this operation when wi"ecks of vessels, presumably
submarines, were encountered by the sweep wu-es. The two obstruc-
tions were comparatively close together, one in latitude 59° 20' 30"
north, longitude 0° 55' 00" east, and the other in latitude 59° 29' 30"
north, longitude 0° 44' 00" east. The former was thought to be the
TJ-102\ the latter could not be identified from the records at the
Admiralty.
The lack of sweeping material still threatened to delay us. Every
conceivable som'ce of supply was investigated; deliveries from the
United States had fallen far below our expectations; the 150 kites
181064°— 20 i
50 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
per month which we had requested, beginning with dehvery in June,
had not been received; 50 out of the first month's shipment had
finally arrived with the new sweepers on the 15th of July and 50
more via fast transport. All British sources for kites had been
drained, they even having resorted in some cases to the use of the
prism kites in order to provide us with suitable kites to reach the
great depth necessary.
Sixty thousand fathoms of sweep wire had been ordered from
Bullivant Co. — a British concern — but our needs were inunediate.
Although we desired equal quantities of right and left hand seiTated
■^-inch wire, we were now glad to get any kind. Twenty thousand
fathoms were located at Rosyth and two trawlers dispatched to
bring it to Ku-kwall. Shortly afterwards a supply of wire arrived at
Liverpool from the United States. The U. S. S. Chesapeake, which
had been ordered from Brest to join our forces, stopped at Liver-
pool en route for this, but was required to make another trip to gej
all the material.
The mine force had, in the meantime, been increased by the addi-
tion of three sub chasers, the SC-95,SG-256, and SC-354 which had
been on duty in Russia for several months.
On the 5th of August Capt. Roscoe C. Bulmer, United States
Navy, Commander Mine Sweeping Detachment, died on board the
U. S. S. Black Hawk from injuries received the day before when
thi"own from an automobile which had skidded. The death of Capt.
Bulmer was a severe loss, both officially and personally, to the entire
force. His unbounded enthusiasm and cheerfulness, coupled with
resolute determination, at times in the face of overwhelming odds,
had been invaluable in the early part of the minesweeping when the
obstacles and accidents were so discouraging. His body after being
embalmed was sent to Inverness and thence shipped to the United
States for burial.
Chapter YLll.
THE SIXTH MINESWEEPING OPERATION.
Perhaps the most remarkable part of the entire s\vee]>ing opera-
tions was the magnificent spirit exhibited by the men who manned
the ships. A large portion of the crews consisted of men in the
Reserve Force or who had enlisted for the duration of the war.
They were now due and entitled to be released from service in order
that they might resume their occupations in civilian life. Orders had
been issued by the Secretary of the Navy in May and June directing
their release, but we could not let them go. Every man on board
ship was needed, and more, too; reliefs for them could not be obtained
on account of the rapidly increasing shortage of personnel in the
Navy. The Secretary therefore authorized the suspension of his
orders until the clearing of the barrage had been completed.
The work was dangerous and is perhaps best illustrated by a letter
of Rear Admiral Strauss to the Secretary of the Navy, which read in
part as follows :
We are getting along with the work much better now than at first. The weather is
better and we have more ships to operate with. If the weather is extraordiiiaiily
good we may finish this year. It is quite possible, however, that the increased dark-
I ness and heavy gales that are almost continuous from the latter part of September on
in the North Sea may compel ^is to send a small finishing expedition next spring. I
am hoping that this will not be the case, and we are all bending our utmost energy to
get through with it. As may be imagined, the work of gathering these thousands of
mines scattered throughout an area in the North Sea of some 6,000 square miles is a
big job and a hazardous one. The laying of the mines was accomplished in 50 or 60
working hours and the hazard was slight or nonexistent. We have had our losses, but
are much more fortunate than the British, who lost two large minesweepers of the
Flouer class last month, when 40 men were drowned.
If we do not finish this year it will be necessary for all of the minesweepers to be
distributed among our navy yards on the Atlantic coast for extensiA-e re]>airs. On
! every trip to the mine field nearly every one of them is subjected to explosions which
[ wi-eck machinery and crush plates and frames. We have 75 vessels now attached to
this expedition, and the two repair ships Black Hauk and Panther serve as navy yards
to keep them going. Their work is no small part of the achievement.
The men, as well as the officers, realized the necessity of completing
I the clearance of the barrage during the summer of 1919 ; they also real-
I ized that the quicker it was cleared the sooner they would be released
i from service, and they plugged along from 4 o'clock in the morning
until 9 and 10 and sometimes even later at night. As the summer
51
52 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
progressed and the days became shorter, it became necessary for the
sweepers to get under way and in formation in darkness, ready to
begin the day's work at the first break of dayUght. Frequently it
was necessary to spend a good portion of the night in getting ready
for the next day's work. As there never was sufficient sweep gear
to equip all ships for their contemplated stay at sea, it was often nec-
essary to transfer material from one ship whose losses had been light
to another who had been less fortunate. This work was ordinarily
undertaken after sweeping operations for the day had been com-
pleted. Buoys, too, for marking the nev/ groups of mines were
equally in demand. It was necessary after the sweeping of a group
had been completed to pick up all the buoys which had survived so
that they might be transferred to the vessels of the buoy-laying
squadron and be used again. In order not to waste the hours of day-
light, the buoy squadron frequently spent part or all of the night in
gathering these buoys from the various sweepers who had picked
them up.
It is an interesting fact that the dangers involved in an under-
taking never seem to receive consideration by the average man who
is required to do the work. Minesweeping was continually danger-
ous. Mines exploded when least expected; one ship had been sunk;
on others men had been blown overboard and lost. A catastrophe
was apt to happen at any moment, but by now minesweeping to all
hands was merely the "day's work."
The days in port were even more busy than those at sea. Every
moment had to be utilized to complete the repairs and the overhaul
at the earliest possible moment. After each trip, besides refueling
and taking on water, the boilers had to be cleaned, provisions ob-
tained, new sweep gear provided, and the old overhauled and re-
paired. The repair ships buzzed incessantly. ,By this time the
casualties caused by mine explosions had become so well standardized
that the parts most subject to wreckage had been manufactured in
quantity, so that a vessel on return to port could be fitted out imme-
diately. At times the work in port was so strenuous that vessels
were unable to grant liberty to their crews before they were required
to sail again for the barrage.
A comparison of the conditions under which ours and the British
forces operated is interesting. After they had completed the second
operation we had 20 times as many mines to sweep as the British
detachment based at Kirkwall. The forces were nearly equal in size.
Their task was unquestionably a delicate one to remove the mines
which were planted at a submergence of 6 feet, but then they had
vessels specially constructed for the purpose, and their mines were
close to port, while ours were 200 miles away. In developing a newly
designed sweep for this field and in waiting for the best of weather,
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 53
their work dragged until we had cleared our entire barrage, with the
exception of the southern half of the field adjacent to their single
line of mines.
On account of the dangers in minesweeping the British Govern-
ment employed only volunteers for this purpose, paid them almost
double wages and gave them in addition a bonus for each mine
that was destroyed. No recognition or extra compensation was
given the American minesweepers, nor were volunteers called for to
man the ships.
It was now the middle of August. After the completion of the
fifth operation 55 per cent of the barrage had been removed. From
a careful study of the meteorological records we could expect the
equinoctial storms about the middle of September, and after that
the winter storms would set in with such violence and frequency
that further operations would be practically impossible. In other
words, 45 per cent of the barrage remained to be cleared in approxi-
mately one month. And to make the task more difficult, of the six
remaining groups, all but group 8 were in the extreme eastern part
of the barrage. Group 8 began just off the Orkney Islands, but
could not be undertaken until the British had completed clearing
their line of 6-foot mines which ran parallel to ours and was separated
by an interval of one-half mile.
The sweepers sailed to the mine field on the 12th of August. In
order to reduce the distance which the sub chasers would have to
steam in going back and forth to the mine field, the Panther and all
chasers which did not accompany the sweepers sailed for Lerwick
the same day to base on that port during this operation. The
average distance from this port to the eastern groups was approxi-
mately 60 miles shorter than from Kirkwall. The time that the
sub chasers could remain at sea was entirely dependent upon their
gasoline supply, and the saving of 120 miles was equivalent to ap-
proximately an additional day with the sweepers. When the sweep-
ers went out on an operation, and if necessary when they were re-
turning to port, the sub chasers were taken in tow in order to con-
serve their fuel. In tliis manner the average period of 4 days, which
had been the customary time which they had ordinarily stayed at
sea during war-time operations, was increased in several cases to as
much as 10 days.
Arrangements had previously been made with the Norwegian
Government to allow our vessels to enter the ports of that country
without pilots, and also to use radio within their territorial waters.
The Norwegian mine field, which had been laid in September, 1918,
in the vicinity of Udsire Island, had been removed by them during
the spring. After the armistice it had been learned that this field
consisted of approximately 700 mines laid at a depth of 4 meters.
54 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
If the sweepers could possibly do so, the admiral desired that they
should complete all of the five groups which remained in the eastern
portion of the barrage before returning to Kirkwall in order to avoid
the loss of time of a return trip. As our rate of sweeping had steadily
increased, with fair weather conditions and light casualties, it ap-
peared as though this might be possible.
Group 10 was the first which was undertaken. The Tanager was
damaged by the explosion of a mine in her kite and was forced to
return to Kirkwall. The Turkey was similarly damaged but suc-
ceeded in completing repairs on the mine field and was able to con-
tinue. In the first day's work on this field 1,373 mines were ac-
counted for, which proved to be the record day for the barrage.
The tliird day after leaving port a storm prevented the ships from
operating. This happened to be the date on which candidates for
warrant officers were required to be examined. Predicting that the
minesweepers would be at sea at this time, permission had been re-
quested to postpone the examinations until the vessels returned to
port, but the request had not been granted. In the heavy seas it
was impossible to transfer the candidates to- a single ship in order
that the examinations might be held in the customary manner, so in
order not to deprive the men of an opportunity to quaUfy for a com-
mission it was necessary to appoint the commanding officers of all
vessels as members of the examining board, and hf' means of the
radiotelephone to simultaneously ask all candidates the successive
questions of the examinations while they remained on board their
own ships.
Despite the storm, gi'oup 10 was completed in foui- days. The
Penguin, one of the vessels of the buoy-laying squadron, was injured
by the explosion of a mine fouled in her kite and returned to port
for three days' repairs! Group 4 was swept next and was similarl;]^
completed in four days. Group 1 was then begun, but before it wj
completed the sweepers w^ere dh-ected to shift to group 2, wliich con-
sisted of only two rows of upper-level mines. These lines had provec
extremely difficult to buoy on account of the small percentage
mines which remained, and it was therefore desirable to sweep it al
once so as to reduce the possibility of the marker buoys being carriedl
away in a storm and the consequent necessity of re-marking it,
which, with the still fewer remaining mines, would have been doubly
difficult.
After completing the initial sweep of this group the sweepers
proceeded to Lervig, Norway, in order to redistribute the sweep gear,
obtain fresh water, and deliver the buoys to the buoy squadron,
which had been picked up after the completion of groups 10 and 4.
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 65
Lervig, which is a small summer resort about 40 miles up Bommel
Fiord, was the primary base for the British minesweepers which
were operating off the Norwegian coast. The harbor, though small,
forms an excellent anchorage capable of berthing as many as 100
vessels the size of the minesweepers.
The sweepers arrived there on the night of the 22d, completed
watering and the redistribution of gear, and sailed on the following
morning. That afternoon and the next day sufficed for the clearance
of group 2, but it had required more time than had been anticipated.
For some unaccountable leason the mines which had been moored
in approximately 150 fathoms of water seemed far more difficult to
cut up, regardless of the fact that their mooring cables were only
five-sixteenths inch in diameter instead of seven-sixteenths inch,
which had been used on all other mines. Due to the increasing lack
of kites several of the vessels substituted buoy anchors, but these
were only partially satisfactory.
The shortage was extremely serious. While it was possible to
clear the shallow mines by using weights as substitutes, this method
could not be used on the other mine fields, where it was necessary go
sink the sweeps to a depth of 260 feet. The Black Hawk and Panther
had, since the beginning of the operation, laid aside other work and
were now devoting all their resources to the manuf actiu-e of sufficient
kites to tide over until the CJiesapeake, which had been sent to Brest
for kites arriving there from the United States, could retm-n to
Kjrk\v'all. Fortunately, the fom- additional sweepers which the
admiral had requested one month before arrived on the 21st and 22d
of August with 30 kites on board, and shortly afterwards the Chesa-
peake arrived with 130 kites on board. The combined number were
sufficient to see us through the remainder of this operation. The
I Chesapeake, however, had to return to Brest for an additional 70 kites
I which she had had to leave behind on the first trip.
56 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
While the vessels were operating off the Norwegian coast a disease
broke out on board several of the ships which appeared at the time
to be influenza. Although the ships had been at sea for a period
of 10 days and it was unlikely that influenza should break out under
those conditions, still it w&s not advisable with the frightful epidemic
of the previous year still fresh in mmd to take any chances. The
CJiewink and Lark were sent to Bergen and their patients trans-
ferred to a hospital. The ailment turned out to be Bamble fever,
oi" what is more commonly known in Norway as fishermen's fever.
After completing group 2 work was resumed on group 1, but
before the field could be completed a storm had driven the vessels
into Stavanger for shelter. One day was spent in port and work
was commenced on group 13. The Rail was damaged on the 29th
by an explosion of a mine fouled in her kite, which blew one blade
off her propeller and damaged the rudder so badly in addition to
the customary mmor breakages that it was necessary to send her to
Invergordon for docking. Two days later the Auk was similarly
damaged and also was sent to Invergordon, where she was docked
at the same time as the Rail.
Due to fog interfering considerably with the clearance of group
13, it was the 5th of September before that group was finally com-
pleted. A mine had exploded in the kite of the Oriole, doing con-
siderable damage to the after part of the ship and necessitating
her return to port. The Swan was, damaged in going alongside the
Turkey in rough weather to obtain sweeping material and also had
to return. On the 30th of September the Seagull was counter-
mined by an upper level mine directly beneath her, which opened
up the hull so badly as to necessitate assistance to keep her afloa/
By the 1st of September sweeping the groups of mines in the
eastern portion of the barrage had been practically completed, and
smce no more sub chasers would have to be sent to this distant part
of the field, the Panther, with the sub chasers at Lerwick, returned
to Kirkwall.
The plans for returning to the United States had m the meantime
been completed. Various possibilities for the disposal of the sub-
chasers had been considered, and it had finally been decided that
each chaser should be towed home by a sweeper. Since any method
of returning them was very costly and their future usefulness doubtful,
attempt was made by the Force Commander to dispose of them by
sale, but without success.
Prior to sailing for the United States it would be necessary to
dock all of the chasers in order to calk their hulls and place them in
a seaworthy condition for a trans-Atlantic voyage. Arrangements
had been made for this docking and repair at Devonport, England,
and on the 5th of September the Panther and six of the chasers left
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 57
Kirlnvall for that port. The dock was of sufficient size to accom-
modate six chasers at a time, and additional vessels were to be sent
as rapidly as the repairs were completed on those then at Devon-
port. The Panther continued her duties as repair ship to the chasers,
and completed such portions of the work as was possible while the
vessels were in dry dock.
In the meantime the Sanderling had been disabled by an upper-
level countermine and was laid up for the remainder of the operation.
The damages were considerable, but not so extensive as to necessitate
extended repairs. Sixteen days later she was able to resume opera-
tions.
The same day that the Sanderling was countermined a mine
exploded under SC-38, completely disablmg her. The shock had
been so severe that the engine bedplates were broken, the deck
lifted clear of the beams, and the hull caused to leak badly. She
was towed to port by the Heron, but the repairs required were so
extensive that the necessary expenditure was not considered justified.
Unsuccessful attempts were made to sell her in Kirkwall and In-
verness, after which she was towed to Harwich, and turned over to
the Chattanooga for the same purpose.
As the work on the Norwegian side of the barrage drew to an end,
it began to appear that our operations would be delayed by the
failure of the British to complete the clearance of their 6-foot line
of mmes. Admiral Strauss had repeatedly requested the British
Mme Clearance OflScer to do everythmg possible to get their mines
up at the earliest practicable date and had offered to assist him with
any means at his disposal.
The sweepers after havmg completed the five eastern groups had
requested permission to sweep group 8 before returning to port.
The northern half of this field was buoyed and the primary sweep
was fuiished, but still the British had not finished with their single
Ime of mines. During the past few days one of the American
sweepers had been operating with the British forces in order to keep
them informed of the exact position of our line of mines, so that they
might judge more accurately the location of their own.
The delay was extremely serious to us. Every day that our
vessels were unable to operate was costmg the Government between
S60,000 and $70,000, which represents the daily operating expense
of the force. More serious than this, however, was the constantly
encroaching possibility that we could not .finish the barrage this
year. At any time now the equinoctial storms could be expected.
Since it was not, safe to do further work on group 8 on account
of the British mmes, the sweepers, after making a preliminary test
sweep of groups 5, 7, 9, and 12, returned to port, after having been
away for a period of 32 days — a splendid endurance record for such
small vessels. '
Chapter IX.
THE SEVENTH AND LAST MINESWEEPING OPERATION.
On the previous operation, after the northern half of group 9 had
been swept, the minesweepers still had sufficient fuel to operate for
three days, so it had been decided to take advantage of the time
available and make a test sweep of group 7 to make sure that all
mines had been removed. This field had been less carefully swept
than any of the others, and, besides, a great many more mines had
been found near the western end than had been anticipated when the
short end which had been left on the fourth operation was being
cleared. After the final sweep had been finished on the western end
of this group the minesweepers continued up the field so as to cover
its entire width throughout its length. By the time they had swept
7 miles of the portion of the field which had previously been reported
swept a pocket containing 24 mines was discovered. Six other mines
were subsequently obtained in the near vicinity when this area was
again swept. Farther up the field 4 mines were obtained in another
position and 5 in another.
This condition was decidedly disconcerting. The field had been
reported clear and we had had every reason to believe that it was ;
but now in passing over a swept field a total of 39 mines had been
found. If this condition existed throughout the barrage it would be
necessary to resweep each of the groups with the large number of
vessels which were now available and which could be placed in forma-
tion so as to efficiently cover the full width of the field and thus
eliminate the possibility of leaving holidays which were sometimes
unavoidable when a small number of vessels attempted to clear a
large area. The admiral had therefore directed that the remaining
days which the vessels could remain at sea should be spent in testing
other groups to determine whether the same conditions existed as
had been found in group 7. The groups which appeared to be the
least thoroughly swept were group 12, which had been swept trans-
versely on the second operation; group 9, which had similarly been
swept on the third; and group 11, which was the first field on which
longitudinal sweeping was tried out.
The sweepers had started from buoy No. 6 and had steamed from
there to the eastern end of group 12 then turned and covered approxi-
mately three-quarters of the length of group 11. A total of 5 mines
58
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE, 59
had been found. The next day the remainder of groups 11 and 12
had been swept and a total of 50 mines discovered concentrated in
two small groups. The following day while returning to Kirkwall
group 9 had been reswept and 2 mines found. The outlook was dis-
couraging. Each of these groups had originally been swept until
no mines had been obtained and the}^ had therefore been considered
clear. It was true that these were the groups in which the proba-
bility of finding mines was greatest on account of the inexperience
in sweeping, and also due to the comparatively small number of ves-
sels which were available when the groups were undertaken. But
since mines had been found the admiral considered it necessary to
make a general test sweep of other portions of the barrage to deter-
mine definitely the completeness of the subsequent sweeping. Time
was now becoming the all-important factor. The rapidly shorten-
ing days no longer enabled the vessels to work 15 and 16 hours a day
as they had done.
Thirty-two days awa}^ from port had been a long period and a
hard one for the sweepers. Many repairs which ordinarily would
have required the assistance of repair ships or navy yards had been
completed while at sea. One sweeper had made new piston rings from
a stove lid; another had dismantled her condenser overnight and
replaced leaking tubes with new ones and was ready to resume opera-
tions by daylight the next morning. A third ship found it neces-
sary to replace tubes in one of the boilers, but instead of returning
to port, wlfere she might be dismantled, she managed, by running
at slightly reduced speed, to cut out that boiler, cool it down, and
replace the tubes while the vessel was actually engaged in sweeping.
While this was being done the ship was rolling so heavily in the seaway
that her topmast had been carried away.
But there was no rest for the weary. Since it was now a question
of days before bad weather would be upon us, the admiral asked by
signal how many of the ships could complete their overhaul and be
read)^ to sail at the end of three days. In less than half an hour
after the signal was sent 23 of them replied that they could go.
Actually 29 of them succeeded in getting away at the time prescribed,
the remaining 4 sailing the following day.
The British line of mines to the southward of group 8 had in the
meantime been cleared. • Out of the 1,300 mines which had been
laid at a submergence of 6 feet less than 50 had survived. Although
it was expected that a great many had been carried away by the
storms during the past year, still it was hardly believed that only
such a very small number would be left.
To com])letGf the clearance of group 8 was the j-^rincipal task which
remained to be done and work was begun on it immediately. But
60 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
before it coiiM be completed the long dreaded equinoctial storms
which mark the arrival of winter had arrived. For three days it
raged with unprecedented violence; the sweepers at sea sought shelter
in the lee of Sanday Island, while the vessels in port kept steam at
the throttle ready to maneuver at an instant's notice in case their
moorings were carried away. One of the lighters which was used for
distributing gear to the sweepers was sunk by filling with spray, and
two of the sub chasers were blown ashore, but rescued, one with some
difficulty. A British tarnsport, the S. S. Vedic, returning from
Russia with approximately 1,000 people on board, was driven on a
reef off North Ronaldsay and four of our sweepers were dispatched
to her assistance. She managed, however, to float clear at high water
the following day without having sustained serious damage.
By the 22d of September the storm had moderated sufficiently to
enable the sweepers to resume operations. Group 8 was finished, but
before the general clearance sweep could begin another storm had
broken. This one lasted only one day, so that on the 24th the general
test sweep was begun. The results of the next few days were waited
for with almost breathless anxiety. If no mines were found our work
would be complete and we could start for home at once. If, on the
other hand, occasional mines were encountered throughout the field, it
would be necessary to resweep each of the 13 groups in order to make
absolutely sure that they were clear. The first da}^ all went well.
Group 12 was reswept and no mines were encountered; the next day
another storm came on which made it impossible to work fKcept when
the ships were running before the seas, so group 5 and the eastern
part of 4 were swept and again no mines were found. By nightfall
the storm had increased to such an extent that sweeping was imposj.
sible throughout the following day. Realizing that the seas would
still continue for nearly a day after the storm had subsided the ships
headed into the storm in order to be at the western end of group 11,
so that it might be swept in case the storm had moderated by the
morning of the 27th. In this field there was one spot which was
suspected to possibly contain several mines, although it had been
covered three times, and buoys had therefore been dropped to mark
the position to enable it more easily to be found on the general clear-
ance sweep. The first time it was passed the ships were slightly out
of position and no mines were obtained, but the next da}^ it was again
swept with the ships in exactly their proper position and 4 of the long-
suspected mines were cut adrift. The next day groups 6 and 3 were
swept and found to be free of mines. The following day, September
30, group 9 was again gone over without finding any mines and the
ships slipped sweeps for the last time in the North Sea barrage.
By working the force under his command up to the limit of physical
endurance, the tremendous task of removing the North Sea mine bar-
THE NORTHEKN BARRAGE. 61
rage had barely been completed before the winter with its constant
gales had overtaken us. The last week upon the mine-field, sweeping
had been accomplished under great difficulties. The weather had been
at its worst, but the experience of five months had enabled the vessels
to operate under conditions which at first would have been hopeless.
Even then they had been compelled to do nearly all the sweeping
before the wind.
In the six days' sweeping S64 square miles had been carefully cov-
ered, embracing the areas which had been niost densely mined and
where the possibility of finding mines was greatest. In this entire
area only 4 mines had been found, and they were in a position which
had been suspected and buoyed in order that they might be cleared
upon this final operation. It was evident that the clearance of the
barrage had been complete, and the day the operations ended Ad-
miral Strauss, in a brief message to the Secretary of the Navy, an-
nounced that the clearance of American mines in the North Sea had
been finished.
The days of ceaseless effort and the lack of comforts and diversions
were easily forgotten in the hour of triumph. And it was indeed a
triumphant force that passed the final buoy marking the last mile
of what had once been the barrage. As the sweepers, two by two,
steamed by the buoy, slipped sweep, and set their course the last time
for Kirkwall, cheers burst forth spontaneously from every officer and
man in the detachment, while the sirens and the whistles shrieked
loudly. A mammoth task had been performed; a barrier that had
menaced the German submarines and later barred the commerce of
the seas had finally been conquered; and the Navy's obligation to
vmankind to remove the mines which she had laid had been fulfilled.
A few hour^ after the task had been completed Admiral Strauss re-
ceived the following message from the Commander of United States
Naval Forces in European waters :
My hearty congratulations to you and all under your command on completion of an
arduous task finely done.
^ Knapp.
The next day the following cable was received from the Secretary
of the Navy:
It is with the greatest of pleasure that the Secretary of the Navy congratulates the
officers and men of the North Sea minesweeping detachment on having so creditably
completed the stupendous task of clearing the North Sea of the mines planted by our
Navy during the war. This most arduous and dangerous work, one of the greatest and
most hazardous tasks undertaken by the Navy, and Avhich has been carried on with
cheerfulness and integrity, will go down in the annals of history as one of the Navy's
greatest achievements. Every loyal citizen of the United States and every officer
and man in t^ie Navy must look with pride upon these men who have once again ful-
I filled the glorious traditions of the service which they represent.
JosEPHUs Daniels.
62
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
Vessels operating with mine force, North Sea minesweeping detachment.
REPAIR SHIPS AND FORCE AUXILIARIES.
Ships.
Date
attached.
Date
detached.
Descriptive data.
Remarks.
U.S.S. Black Hawk.
Jan. 4,1919
Nov. 25,1919
Displacement, 9,000;
length, 420 feet: speed,
Flagship; repair ai
supply ship for swee]
12 knots: cruising
ers.
radius, 1,200 miles.
U.S.S. Panther
May 26,1919
do
Displacement, 3,380;
length, 320 feet; speed,
12 knots: cruising
radius, 5,500 miles.
Repair and supply shl
for sub chasers an
trawlers.
U. S.S.Seneca
Jime 2, 1919
June 6, 1919
Displacement, 1,445;
length, 204 feet; draft,
17.3; speed (maxi-
mum), 13.2; beam,
Coast Guard cutter, ii
tended for salvage an
general utility duty.
34 feet.
U.S. S.Chesapeake...
Aug. 8, 1919
Oct. 1,1919
Displacement, 1,200
tons; length. 210 feet:
beam, 40 feet: draft,
13 feet; speed, 9.5
knots.
Wrecking vessel, used i
cargo carrierer b
tween Liverpool, Bres
and Kirkwall.
S. S. Aspenleaf
Apr. 21,1919
Aug. 18,1919
Capacity, 6,700 tons
Oiler, used also as stoi
ship for reserve suppl
gasoline.
S.S.Crenella
Aug. 16,1919
May 6, 1919
Sept. 26,1919
Sept. 23,1919
Capacity ? 7 ,700 tons
Capacity, 154,000 gallons.
Oiler.
R.F.A.Hickorol
Petrol supply ship ft
sub chasers and Britis
motor launches.
R.F.A.Petronel
Apr. 29,1919
July 29,1919
Capacity, 370 tons
Seagoing water vessel.
R.F.A.Hopkiln
July 20,1919
Oct. 1,1919
Capacity, 580 tons
SUBMARINE CHASERS.
Ships.
Date
attached.
Date
detached.
Descriptive data.
U.S.S.C.37
Mar. 1,1919
Nov. 2t
,1919
U.S.S.C.381
Apr. 23,1919
Mar. 1, 1919
Oct. 1
Nov. 2J
,1919
,1919
U.S.S.C.40
U.S.S.C.44
Feb. 24,1919
do.
U.S.S.C.4.'J
do
do.
U.S.S.C.46
Feb. 26,1919
do.
U.S.S.C.47
Feb. 24,1919
do.
U.S.S.C.48
do
do.
U.S.S. C. 95
July 28,1919
Apr. 12,1919
Feb. 24,1919
do.
do.
do.
U.S.S.C.llO
U.S.S.C.164
Displacement , 70 tons; length , 110 feet; bear
U.S.S.C.178
do
do.
15 feet; draft, 6.5 feet; ma-\imum spee<
U.S.S.C.181
do
do.
16 knots; fuel capacity, 2,350 gallon
U.S.S.C.182
do
do.
cruising radius at 10 knots, 675 miles.
U.S.S. C.206
Feb. 26,1919
do
do
do.
U.S.S.C.207
U.8.S.C.208
do
do.
U.S.S.C.254
Apr. 12,1919
July 28,1919
Mar. 1, 1919
Nov. 1
Nov. 2£
do.
,1919
,1919
U.S.S. C.2562 ,
U.S.S.C.259
U.S.S.C.272
Feb. 24,1919
do
do.
do.
U.S.S.C.329
U.8.S.C.354
July 28,1919
Feb. 24.1919
do.
do.
U.8.S.C.356
i
I Permanently disabled by mine explosion Sept. 25, 1919.
* Destroyed by gasoline explosion and fire at sea Nov. 1, 1919.
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
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THE NORTHERN" BARRAGE.
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Chapter X.
RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES AND DISBANDMENT OF
THE NORTH SEA MINE FORCE.
Had it not been necessary to return the sub chasers to the United
States the problem of getting home would have been a very easy
matter. Efforts to sell these vessels in Europe had been unsuccess-
ful, and to lay them up in a British port until the following summer,
when the weather conditions would have been more suitable for the
long return voyage, would have been unduly expensive. As pre-
viously stated, it had been decided that they should be taken home
escorted by the minesweepers. A southern passage across the
Atlantic was chosen in order to break up the trip by stops at Lisbon,
the Azores, and Bermudas, and with the expectations that the
weather would be more favorable than on a northern route.
By the time that the sweeping operations had been completed all
the chasers except two had been sent to Devonport for docking prior
to their trans-Atlantic voyage. The six remaining British trawlers
were being sent to Harwich, England, as fast as they could be spared
and there were turned over to the British Admiralty. The British aux-
iliaries which were operating under our orders were similarly turned
back to their owners as rapidly as their services with the mine force
could be dispensed with. A small cargo vessel, the U. S. S. Lake
Freed, had arrived at Earkwall in the early part of September in
response to a request of the commander of the Mine Force, and was
loaded with the various minesweeping gear which could not be
carried by the repair ships or the sweepers. This gear consisted
principally of about 2,000 sphero-cylindrical steel buoys which had
been sent from the United States with the expectation that they
would be required for buoying the sweep wire to keep it from dragging
on the bottom. Due to the adoption of a shorter sweep wire than
originally contemplated, these buoys were found not necessary for
this purpose, but had proved most valuable for making the marker
buoys which were used in marking out the mine fields. As soon as
the Lake Freed had been loaded the store base on Carness Point at
Kirkwall was demobilized and turned over to the British. .
Besides the gear at Kirkwall, there was still a quantity of material
at Inverness which had also to be returned to the United States.
This material also was loaded on the Lake Freed, and by the 17th of
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THE NORTHERN" BARRAGE. 69
September Base 18 at Inverness had been completely demobilized
and was turned over to the British senior naval officer at 10 o'clock
that date.
This base had been in operation for almost two years, and during
that time had served many purposes. During the summer of 1918
it had assembled and loaded on the minelayers approximately 25,000
mines. After the minelaying had been completed the base had been
tlie home of the early sweeping operations and had also acted as a
training and assembling station for two of the crews which manned
the German merchant ships taken over by the United States. After
the minesweeping detachment had moved to Kirkwall the base still
proved invaluable. Large quantities of provisions had been left in
store at the base when the minelayers had returned to the United
States and, augmented by additions from Liverpool, were sufficient
to supply the force at Kirkwall throughout the summer. In addition
to this, the base acted as a receiving and shipping depot for the tre-
mendous quantity of supplies which were constantly required to
enable the minesweepers to continue operations. Almost a constant
procession of trawlere or sweepers plied between Kirkwall and Inver-
ness, frequently towing barges loaded with supplies in addition to
the quantities that had been placed on board.
On October 1, the day after the sweepers had retiu-ned, the BlacTc
Hawk and 14 of the sweepers sailed for Devonport. The Eider and
6 other sweepers had proceeded direct to Invergordon from the mine
field in the order to .obtain about 700 drums of gasoline shipped there
from Inverness which was to be used for the sub chasers. The
Quail and Auk were detailed to escort sub chasers 16 Jf. and 206 — the
only chasers which had not ah'eady sailed for Devonport — and refuel
them with gasoline, since no supply was available at any English port.
The general plan for taking the chasers home consisted in towing
them as long as the weather permitted, and in case the sea became
I too rough they were to be cast off and travel under their own power.
Each sweeper which had been designated to tow a chaser and four
' additional stand-by vessels were given approximately 75 drums of
; gasoline in order that it might be possible to refuel the chaser at sea
should such a procediu^e become necessary. Since there were a
I gi-eat many more sweepei-s than chasers it was not necessary that
; they should all proceed in company, and arrangements were made
for 5 of the vessels, including the Patapsco and Patuxent, which had
, been in European waters longer than any of the other ships in the
; detachment, to proceed direct to the United States as soon as routine
1 overhaul could be completed in Kirkwall, This division got under-
jway October 6 and proceeded direct to the Azores, and thence to
Hampton Roads, reaching the United States approximately two
;i weeks ahead of the rest of the force.
70 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
Of the remaining sweepers the Oriole, Penguin, Curlew, and Tanager,
which required dock yard repairs before they could attempt a trans-
Atlantic passage, sailed for Chatham, where the Forc€ Commander
had arranged with the Admiralty to have this work completed.
The Avocet, Thrush, and Chesapealce sailed direct for Brest, the first
two vessels to tow to the United States the water vessels Nenette and
Bin Tin Tin. The Chesa'peake, which had been operating with us
for the past two months, had reached the limit of her utility as a
naval vessel and was to be put up for sale.
The Black Hawk, accompanied by the Oriole, while en route to
Devonport stopped at Gravesend to land the Commander of the Mine
force in order that he might proceed to London. A general railroad
strike was in progress at the time, which had made travel practically
impossible in Great Britain except by means of motor transportation.
The admiral's automobile, which had been placed on board at Kirk-
wall, was landed to enable him to proceed to London, and later to
Southampton, England, where he embarked upon the Adriatic to
return to the United States in order that the arrangements might be
completed for the disbandment of the force upon its arrival home.
Commander W. L. Beck accompanied the admiral as far as London
in order to attend a conference of the International Mine Clearance
Committee, which desired to discuss problems which had arisen in
connection with the mines weeping operations, prior to the departure
of our North Sea forces for the United States. Admiral Strauss, in
addition to Commander Beck, attended the conference in case any
questions should arise in connection with the methods or complete-
ness of the removal of the American mines from the North Sea bar-
rage.
While repairs were in progress at Devonport effort was made to
give the men as much liberty as possible, as well as an opportunity
to visit London and other parts of Great Britain before returning
to the United States. Owing to the riot which occurred in Plymouth
between the American sailors and the civilian population several
months before, there was apparently a tendency on the part of the
populace to reopen the old brawl. Small fights broke out the first
day that liberty was granted, and regardless of the heavy patrol
that was established, the conditions grew worse and worse, finally
culminating in the death of an American bluejacket who was assaulted
by a civilian. Liberty was stopped for the remainder of the stay
in England.
As the repairs at Devonport and Chatham drew to an end, the
minesweeping force was divided into two detachments for the trip
home, as had been previously decided, with a view of reducing the
congestion while the vessels were in harbors and thus enabling them
to obtain fuel and water more easily. On the 12th of October the
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 71
Panther and 12 of the sub chasers sailed from Devonport to Brest,
France. They were followed two days later by 14 of the mine-
sweepers. On the 15th the BlacTc Hawk and the remaining sweepers
and chasers, except the Swan, Auk, SC-164, 178 and 206, got imder
way for Brgst. The repairs were completed on these latter vessels the
day following the departure of the Black Hawk, when they got under
wa}^ In the meantime three of the vessels which had been sent to
Chatham were completed and were on their way to Brest to join the
remainder of the detachment. The repairs on the Ptnguin required
more time than had been expected, and it was necessary to hold her
at the dockyards for several additional days.
Although there was plenty of fuel, v,ater, and gasoline available
at Brest, considerable difficulty was encountered in getting it on
board the vessels. Four days were required before the Panther and
her detachment of 12 sub chasers and 14 sweepers could get under
way for Lisbon. The Black Hawk and the remainder of the sweepers
and chasers, however, managed to sail after two daj-s in port.
The Panther and her convoy arrived in Lisbon on October 20,
followed by the Black Hawk detachment two days later. Tlie object
in stopping at Lisbon was to break the trip for the sub chasers on
account of the discomforts in living aboard those vessels while at
sea. The weather, however, was so good during this part of the
voyage that the force could have proceeded direct to the Azores
from Brest with almost equal comfort. Lisbon, however, was a
pleasant town and offered many attractions and diversions for the
men in the detachment, and even though it postponed the final date
of arrival in the United States, the days spent there were apparently
much enjoyed by the personnel. After two days spent in port the
two detachments, separated by an interval of one day, got under
way for Ponta Delgada in the Azores.
The weather continued fine for the next leg of the cruise and the
two detachments reached the Azores on the 27th and 28th of October,
respectively. The small harbor at Ponta Delgada was taxed almost
ito its maximum capacity by the arrival of the 55 vessels in the two
detachments. There was much difficulty in obtaining water and
provisions at the Azores. The facilities for supplying water were
inadequate and, in addition, the local authorities gave merchant
ships precedence. Over 500 tons of water were required by our
vessels, but only 100 tons could be obtained, and it was necessary
for the Black Haivk to remain there a day and a lialf longer than de-
sired in order to get this. The problem of obtaining fresh provisions
was equally difficult. There apparently was plenty of beef and
vegetables available on the island, but on account of the very bitter
rivalry between the contractors at Ponta Delgada the firm which
72 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
underbid the others was prevented from delivering its produce to
our ships.
In the meantime the Penguin, which had completed her repairs
at Chatham, had arrived at the Azores with the U. S. S. Concord,
which she was escorting.
On the evening of the 29th of October the Panther and her detach-
ment sailed from the Azores for the Bermudas. Two days later the
Black Hawk detachment sailed, and they in turn were followed by
the Penguin and Concord on October 31.
The excellent weather which had prevailed up until the arrival
at the Azores was now replaced by a succession of gales for the next
two weeks. During 10 of the 13 days which were required for the
passage from the Azores to Bermuda, the wind averaged from force
4 to force 8, and three-quarters of this time it was practically dead
ahead. At times the ships were barely able to make headway through
the heavy seas.
The third day out from the Azores sub chaser 256, which was then
in tow of the U. S. S. Falcon, was destroyed by a fire following a
gasoline explosion. The fire spread so rapidly that the vessel was
completely in flames before measures could be taken to save her.
Ail the men on board, several of whom had been badly burned,
succeeded in getting clear of the vessel and into the water, where
they were rescued by the vessels in the near vicinity. As soon as
the sweepers could get within range of the burning chaser they
turned their fire hose on her, but the fire was so intense that she con-
tinued to burn to the water line and shortly afterwards disappeared.
The court of inquiry wliich was convened upon arrival at the Ber-
mudas concluded that the accident was caused by the gasoline tanks /
breaking adrift due to the heavy rolling of the vessel at the time, and,
having broken adrift, the tanks became ruptured allowing the engine
room to be filled with gasoline vapor which was ignited probably
by the auxiliary engine or the fan motor.
The storms, coupled with the short amounts of fuel which it had
been possible to obtain at Brest, caused several of the vessels to run
short before they reached Bermuda. The Turkey was towed a
portion of the distance by the Panther; the Swallow and Auk were
oiled at sea by the Black Hawk; and several of the sub chasers were
given gasoline at sea. The Seagull ran entirely out of oil, so that
she could not maintain fires under the boilers long enough to operate
her radio and report the seriousness of her condition. The engineer
officer, however, managed to connect the generator of the radio appa-
ratus to the engine in the motor sailing boat and operated it for a
sufficient length of time to enable the Seagull to call for assistance.
The Black Hawk, which was practically the only vessel that still had
THE NORTHERN BARRAGE. 73
a reserve supply of oil on board, proceeded to the assistance of the
Seagull.
The vessels of the two detachments blown apart by the severe
storm of the last three days straggled into Bermuda, arriving singly
or in groups between the 9th and 13 th of November. The gale
made the entrance through the narrow channels to the inner harbor
extremely difficult, and even after the vessels had succeeded in get-
ting inside several lost their anchors shortly after they had dropped
them on account of the strength of the wind that was blowing.
By the evening of the 15th the Panther detachment was ready to
sail. Another storm had sprung up in the meantime and the dock-
yard officials were much surprised that we should send such tiny
vessels as the sub chasers to sea under such adverse weather condi-
tions. The chasers had, however, shown their abiHty to weather
in safety gales far worse than the present one, and no hesitation was
felt in getting underway. The following day the remaining vessels,
except the Blaclc Hawk, weighed anchor and stood out of the harbor.
The weather having been too severe for the dockyard to take the
Black Hawk alongside the oil dock, it was necessary for her to remain
until the 17th in order to get oil.
While in Bermuda a radio message had been received from the
Secretarj^ of the Navy inquiring what day we would arrive at Hamp-
ton Roads (which was originally intended as the destination of the
minesweepers), and also whether it would be possible to proceed from
there to New York in time to arrive at that port by the 18th of
November, This was not, however, possible and as an alternative
it was suggested that the force proceed direct to New York instead
of by way of Hampton Roads. The reconunendation was approved
and the orders to the vessels which were then ready to sail were
accordingly modified.
The two detachments arrived off Tompkinsville, N. Y., on the
19th and 20th of November. Shortly after the Black Hawk had
anchored Admiral Strauss returned on board and rehoisted his flag.
The force was to be reviewed on Monday the 24th, and the following
day the North Sea mines weeping detachment would be disbanded
and various sweepers would proceed to dift'erent navy yards to
undergo repairs before joining the new organizations to which they
were to be assigne^. The sub chasers would report to the Com-
mandant Third Naval District to be dismantled and placed on sale.
On the 21st of November the vessels shifted berth to the North
River, the sweepers anchoiing in two columns with the sub chasers
tied up alongside.
The representatives of the Y. M. C. A., the K, of C, and the
TV. C. C. S. boarded the ships, distributing candy and tobacco and
»
74 THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.
telling the men of the various entertainments which had been arranged
for them. Dances, boxing, theaters, and sight-seeing trips were
all included in the program of amusements which were to occupy
their every moment.
At 10 o'clock on the morning of November 24 the Secretary of the
Navy reviewed the North Sea Mine Force from on board the U. S. S.
Mereditli. After steaming up one side of the formation they returned
on the other side, then the reviewing party went on board the U. S. S.
Heron, one of the sweepers, to inspect her.
The review was followed by a reception given by the Secretary
on board the U. S. S. Columbia to the officers of the mine force and
their wives. Simultaneously a luncheon was given by the K. of C.
to 2,000 of the enlisted men at the Astor Hotel.
At midnight November 24, 1919, the flag of Rear Admiral Joseph
Strauss, United States Navy, who had been in command of the Mine
Force United States Atlantic Fleet (although this organization later
became known as the North Sea Mine Force when the fleets of the
Navy were reorganized in the spring of 1919) during the construction
and destruction of the North Sea barrage, was hauled down, and at
the following noon the force was disbanded.
And so ends the story of the northern barrage. In five months
the building of a barrier of mines from Scotland to Norway had been
accomplished. Peace came and in less than 11 months after the
signing of the armistice the task of removing those same mines had
been completed; and in so far as mines laid by the United States
Navy were concerned as a menace to navigation the North Sea was
again made safe for world commerc-3.
INDEX.
Page.
Actpeon sweep 15
Adriatic, Br. S. S 70
Allied Naval Armistice Commission 38
Allied Naval Council .- 9
Arrival at New York 73
Aspenleaf , British oil ship 33, 62
Auk, U. S. S., minesweeper 22, 25, 31, 41, 49, 56, 63, 69, 71, 72
Avocet, U. S. S., minesweeper 13, 63, 70
Baden, German battleship 36, 37
Bamble fever 56
Base at Carness Point 32
Base at Kirkwall 19, 38
Base 17, Invergordon 13, 17
Base 18, Inverness 12, 13, 17, 19, 69
Beck, W. L., Commander, U. S. Navy 14, 15, 70
Benson, C. H. G., Commander, R! N 27
Black Hawk, U. S. S., flagship and repair ship, minesweeping force, North
Sea 9, 10, 13, 19, 20, 22, 25, 32, 33, 42, 47, 50, 51, 55, 62, 69, 70, 71, 72, 7S
Bobolink, U. S. S., minesweeper 28, 63
British Admu-alty 14, 17, 19, 25, 32
British mining school at Portsmouth 14
British steam trawlers taken over 25, 35, 43, 63
Bruce, Frank, Lieutenant, U. S. Nav>' 28
Bullivent Co., British corporation 50
Bulmer, Roscoe C, Captain, U. S. Navj-- 7, 13, 17, 18, 36, 41, 42, 50
Buoy-laying squadron 35, 45
Bureau of Ordnance, U. S. Navy Department 8
Canaga, B. L., Commander U. S. N 19
Casualties, personnel 25, 27, 28, 42, 49, 50, 70, 72
Casualties, ships 13, 18, 27, 28, 29, 35, 37, 40, 41, 43, 49, 54, 56, 57, 60, 72
Chattanooga, U. S. S., cruiser 26, 44, 57
Chesapeake, U. S. S 50,55,62,70
Chewink, U. S. S., minesweeper 33,56,63
Columbia, U. S. S., cruiser 74
Commander U. S. Naval Forces in European Waters 8, 38, 61
Commencement of sweeping operations 14
Comparison of conditions under which U. S. and British forces operated 52
Completion of first operation 23
Completion of minesweeping northern barrage 60, 61
Concord, U. S. S. minesweeper 72
Congratulatory cable of Secretary of the Navy 61
Cormorant, U. S. S., minesweeper 63
Crenella, British steamship, oiler 62
Curlew, U. S. S., minesweeper 31,40,49,63,70
Curtis, H. L., Dr., Bureau of Standards 31, 47
Davis, Noel, Lieutenant, U. S. Navy 5, 12, IS
75
b
76 INDEX.
Page.
Development of a method of sweeping the mines 7
Disbandment of North Sea Mine Force 68, 73, 74
Dover barrage 7
Dummy mines 16
Early experiments in the barrage 7
Eider, U. S. S., minesweeper 34, 41, 47, 63, 69
Electric protective device 10, 11, 15, 16, 32
Electrically charged sweep wire 23
Emden, German cruiser 36, 37
Examination of warrant officers 54
Expense of daily operation 57
Experiments off Nantucket 14
Falcon, U. S. S., minesweeper 63, 72
Fifth minesweeping operation 45, 64
Finch, U. S. S., minesweeper 63
First mine swept 12
First minesweeping operation 21, 64
Fitting out minesweepers at Boston 19
Flamingo, U. S. S., minesweeper 42, 47, 63
Fourth of July celebration 39
Fourth minesweeping operation 39, 64
Fremantle, Sir Sidney, Vice Admiral, R. N 36
Fleet at Point Delgada, Azores 71
George Burton, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
George Clark, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
George Cochrane, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
German fleet sunk at Scapa Flow , 36
German methods of minesweeping 38
Grebe, U. S. S., minesweeper 63
Group 1, northern barrage 54, 56
Group 2, northern barrage 54, 55, 56
Group 3, northern barrage 48, 49, 60, 67
Group 4, northern barrage 54, 60
Group 5, northern barrage 48, 49, 57, 60, 67
Group 5-A, northern barrage 48, 49
Group 6, northern barrage 48, 60, 67
Group 7, northern barrage ^ 48, 49, 57, 58, 67
Group 8, northern barrage 53, 57, 59, 60, 67
Oroup 9, northern barrage 33, 35, 37, 48, 57, 58, 59, 60, 67
Group 10, northern barrage 54
Group 11, northern barrage 39, 40, 43, 58, 59, 60, 67
Oroup 12, northern barrage 27, 30, 48, 57, 58, 59, 60, 67
Group 12-A, northern barrage 39, 40
Oroup 13, northern barrage 56
Harrill, William K., Lieutenant, U. S. Navy 5
Heron, U. S. S., minesweeper 14, 22, 34, 57, 63, 74
Hickorol, British fuel ship 62
Hopkiln, British water vessel 62
Imperieuse, British station ship 37
International Mine Clearance Committee 70
Jacobs, W. F., Commander U. S. N 19
John Clay, U.S. trawler, British owned 63
John Collins, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
I
INDEX. 77
Page.
John Dunkin, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
John Fitzgerald, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
John Graham, trawler, British owned 63
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy 61, 74
King, Frank R., Commander, U. S. Navy 42
Kingfisher, U. S. S., minesweeper 63
Kites at Brest 55
Kites from the United States 55
Kites, shortage of 50, 55
Knapp, Harry S., Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy 61
Knights of Columbus 20, 73
Labor conditions in Great Britain, 1919 14
Lake Freed, U. S. S., cargo vessel 68
Lake View, U. S. S., N. 0. T. S. vessel 19
Lapwing, U. S. S., minesweeper 40, 63
Lark, U. S. S. , minesweeper 56, 63
Lervig, British base for minesweepers 38, 55
Lowestoft fishing smacks 11
Maatson, Olaf, Lieutenant (junior grade), U. S. Naval Reserve Force 12
Mallard, U. S. S., minesweeper 63
Marsh, C. C, Captain, U. S. Navy (retired) 5
Material, loss of 30
McHaskell, William, B. M. IcL, Auk, death of 25
Meredith, U. S. S., destroyer 74
Mine force ships reviewed by the Secretary of the Navy 74
Nenette, U. S. S., water vessel 70
Nichols, D. A., ensign, U. S. Naval Reserve Force 10
Norwegian mine field 53
Ontario, U. S. S., tug 13,22,46
Oriole, U. S. S., minesweeper 14, 22, 40, 56, 63, 70
Osprey, U. S. S., minesweeper 29, 35, 49, 63
Panther, U. S. S., tender 42, 51, 53, 55, 56, 57, 62, 71, 72, 73
Parker, E. N., Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve Force 26, 35, 36
Patapsco, U. S. S., tug 9,10,12,13,14,15,17,18,40,63,69
Pat Caharty, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
Patuxent, U. S. S., tug 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 27, 63, 69
Pelican, U. S. S., minesweeper 40, 41, 42, 49, 63
Penguin, U. S. S., minesweeper 33, 40, 54, 63, 70, 71, 72
Percentage of U. S. mines accounted for in sweeping 67
Petronel , British water vessel 62
Plunger kites 15
Pockets of mines 58
Prendergast, Vice Admiral, R. N 36, 37
Preparations for the arrival of the minesweepers 14
Quail, U. S. S., minesweeper. 63, 69
Radiotelephone installations 47
Rail, U. S. S., minesweeper 40, 56, 63
Railroad strike in Great Britain 70
Rates of hire for British trawlers 43
Ration allowance increased 33
Red Fern, British fishing smack 11, 12, 13, 15
Red Rose, British fishing smack 11, 12, 13, 15
Return to the United States 68
78 INDEX.
Page.
Richard Bulkeley, U. S. S., trawler, British owned 33, 42, 63
RinTinTin, U. S. S., water vessel 70
Riot at Inverness, Scotland 21
Robin, U. S. S., minesweeper 14,63
Sanderling, U. S. S., minesweeper 22, 34, 57, 63
Satisfactory method for sweeping found 45
Seagull, U. S. S., minesweeper 56,63,72,73
Second minesweeping operation 26, 64
Secretary of the Navy 16, 18, 22, 43, 51, 61, 73
Seneca, U. S. S., Coast Guard vessel 32, 62
Seventh and last minesweeping operation 58, 64
Siam Duffey, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
Sims, W. S., Admiral, U. S. Navy 11
Sixth minesweeping operation 51, 64
Sonoma, U. S. S. tug 13, 22, 46
Strauss, Joseph, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy 5, 9, 12, 13, 20, 21, 24, 25, 30,
32, 34, 44, 51, 57, 70, 73, 74
Submarine chasers 16, 62, 68, 71, 73
S. C. No. 37 62
S. C. No. 38 57, 62
S. C. No. 40 62
S. C. No. 44 62
S , C. No. 45 28, 62
S. C. No. 46 '. 40, 62
S. C. No. 47 62
S. C. No. 48 62
S. C. No. 95 50, 62
S. C. No. 110 62
S. C. No. 164 37, 62, 69, 71
S. C. No. 178 62, 71
S. C. No. 181 62
S. C. No. 182 62
S. C. No. 206 62, 69, 71
S. C. No. 207 62
S. C. No. 208 37, 49, 62
S. 0. No. 254 62
S. C. No. 256 50,62,72
S. C. No. 259 62
S. C. No. 272 62
S. C. No. 329 62
S. C. No. 354 50, 62
S. G. No. 356 62
Summary of U. S. minesweeping operations, North Sea barrage 64,65, 66, 67
Summary of final clearance sweep, Sept. 8 to 30 67
Swallow, U. S. S., minesweeper 28, 63, 72
Swan, U. S. S., minesweeper .< 56, 63,71
Sweep wire at Grimsby 35
Tanager, U. S. S., minesweeper 37, 54, 63, 69
Teal, U. S. S., minesweeper 28, 37, 41, 63
Third minesweeping operations 31, 64
Thomas Blackhome, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
Thomas Buckley, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
Thomas Graham, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
INDEX. 79
Page.
Thomas Henrix, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
Thomas Laundry, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
Thrush, U. S. S., minesweeper 33, 63, 70
Timmons, J. W., Captain, U. S. Navy 7
Total mines laid by United States 67
Total U. S. mines which survived after premature explosions 67
Total U. S. mines accounted for in sweeping operations 67
Total British mines destroyed by U. S. Forces 67
Turkey, U. S. S., minesweeper 29, 49, 54, 56, 63, 72
U-102, German submarine 49
U. B.-127, German submarine 34
Vedic, British steamship 60
Visit of the Secretary of the Navy to Inverness, Base 18 22
Von Renter, Admiral, German Navy 37
Vessels operating with mine force, North Sea, minesweeping detachment . . 44, 62, 63
War Camp Community Service 73
Warner, T. D., Lieutenant, U. S. Navy 26
Water supply 31
Weather in North Sea 11
Whippoorwill, U. S. S., minesweeper 63
White, Commander, R. N 36
Widgeon, U. S. S., minesweeper 63
William Ashton, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
William Caldwell, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
William Darnold, U. S. trawler, British owned 40, 63
William Johnson, U. S. trawler, British owned 63
Woodcock, U. S. S., minesweeper 63
y.M.C.A 20,73
O
JF fi ^ar^ '"^- |j-
CHART
OF
Central Section of the North Sea Barrage
Showing IVIarl<er Buoys Laid to Define the
Lines of Mines Preliminary to
the Sweeping Operations
181064-20
TO ACCOMPANY
Monograph No. 4
'The Northern Barrage (Taking up the Mines)"
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of Naval Reco ds and Library
Historical Section
1920
F
f
NORTH SEA BARRAGE
AMRKirAS AHM BRITISH MINES
SHEET 3
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St'
CENTRAL SECTION
OF THE
North Sea Barrage
SHOWING
Marker Boors Laid to
DeriNE THE Lines of
Mines Preliminary
TO THE Sweep I NG
Operations
™J
ji^^.
LOAN PbRIOD 1 [2
HOME USE
£yEASSTAMP|DBElOVV
BERKELEY, CA 94720
764248
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA UBRARY
III
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