JOHN M. KELLY LIBRARY
Donated by
The Redemptorists of
the Toronto Province
from the Library Collection of
Holy Redeemer College, Windsor
University of
St. Michael s College, Toronto
fJNDSOR
THEODICY.
VOL. I.
THEODICY:
ESSAYS ON DIVINE PROVIDENCE
BY
ANTONIO ROSMINI SERB ATI
Translated with some omissions from the Milan Edition of 1845,
Aya^or yjv, xyzfyoj Si outsit Trspl ouoev is
Plato, in the " Tima>us.
VOL. I
LONGMANS, GREEN & Co.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
NKW YORK, BOMBAY AND CALCUTTA
1912
HOLY REDEEMER LIBRARY,
Imprimatur :
ALOYSIUS EMERY,
Prcep. Provinc. Inst. Char.
TRtbil bstat :
HENRICUS PARKINSON, S.T.I).
Censor Deputatus.
Imprimatur :
KDMUNDUS CANONICUS SURMONT,
Vicarius Genera Its
\\estmoiinsterii, die 22 Julii, 1909.
*,* The following translation of Rosmini s Teodicea is principally due to the
patient labours of the late Father Fortunatus Signini.
THE AUTHOR S PREFACE
TO THE EDITION OF 1845.
i . THE second of the three books which form this
work was published apart, with the title of Essay, in
1826. In 1826-27, it was reproduced together with
the first, also called an Essay, in the collection of
small treatises to which I gave the name of Philo
sophical Minor Works ("Opuscoli Filosofici"). The
third is new.
All three books treat of the same subject, but
under different aspects. Although each book may
stand by itself, and in a certain way may be said to
exhaust its own special theme, nevertheless they are
mutually related in such a way that each helps to
complete the others. For this reason, I have now
thought it advisable to publish them together as a
single work, entitled Theodicy.
I know of no word more suitable for designating the
subject discussed throughout these pages; since Theo
dicy (from the Greek QSQV Six.^ signifies Justice of God t
and this work has- no other purpose than to vindicate
the Equity and Goodness of God in the distribution of
good and evil in the world. Hence the modern cus
tom of taking Theodicy as synonymous with Natural
vi Preface.
Theology, seems to me hardly in accordance with
propriety of language.
2. The connexion of the three books is as follows :
The first is Logical, that is to say, it expounds and
lays down the rules which the human mind must follow
in its judgments regarding the dispositions of Divine
Goodness, in order not to fall into error. It was ne
cessary to put this book first, to remove the first
cause of the errors which men commit in judging of
the supreme dispositions according to which God
permits evil, bestows good, and distributes both among
His creatures. This cause is the want of logical cogni
tions. It shows itself in all those who hastily rush at
conclusions injurious to Divine Providence and con
demnatory of Its decrees, without having previously
taken pains to ascertain what is the true extent of the
capabilities of their reason, or inquired whether those
capabilities be equal to the solution of questions so
deep and intricate. In showing by what principles
human reasoning ought to be guided so as not to go
wrong in a matter of such great difficulty and import
ance, this first book points out the method of reasoning
to be followed in the other two.
The second book is Physical, that is to say, it is a
continual meditation on the laws of nature, on the
essential limitations of created things, on the con
catenation of causes. It is directed to combat another
cause of errors respecting the dealings of Divine
Preface. vii
Providence; I mean the want of physical cognitions.
For, many, not considering that all created natures
are essentially limited, and that the nexus of cause
with effect follows as a consequence of the constitution
of natures, and is that which produces the wonderful
order and beauty of the universe, imagine that to be
possible which is not so, and expect from God absurdi
ties things which, being in themselves impossible,
indeed nothing, cannot be an object either of His power
or of His wisdom. Hence their foolish complaints of
the existence of evil, and of the mode in which evil is
distributed or good dispensed. I sayfooh s/i complaints,
because, in order to comply with their wishes, God
would have to throw the whole world into confusion,
or rather, as was just observed, to do what is altogether
impossible. The aim, therefore, of this second book
is to demonstrate that whatever has been or can be
created, is limited in such a manner, that he who, to
escape from certain evils, should alter the order of
things as now disposed, would only be running the risk
of falling into other and far greater evils ; and that the
sovereign goodness of the infinitely wise Author of
the universe cannot propose to Itself the prevention
of all evil, but only the carrying out of such an arrange
ment, as, when the balance between good and evil is
finally struck, will secure the maximum result of
net good possible. To the attainment of this end,
the laws governing the distribution of good and evil
viii Preface.
among men conspire laws which the Creator has made
known to us by Revelation, as a comfort to our weak
ness of understanding and pusillanimity of heart.
Lastly, the third book is Hyper-physical, being in
tended to combat the third cause of the errors common
to censurers of Divine Providence, which cause lies in
the want of Theological cognitions. These persons,
having no idea of the way in which God intervenes in
nature, and of the laws of action He follows in virtue
of His divine attributes, pretend that He should inter
fere at every turn to deliver them from their miseries,
even such as they have brought upon themselves by
their own free act. They pretend that the calamities
which cannot be avoided under the working of natural
laws should at every turn be prevented by miracles,
that is, by a suspension and interruption of the series
of secondary causes ; and this on the allegation that
it would cost God nothing to do it, and would,
moreover, be conformable to His infinite goodness.
As a means of undeceiving these critics, it will be our
duty in this third book to prove that God cannot
accommodate Himself to such absurd pretensions, in
asmuch as this would necessitate His acting foolishly,
and therefore, in manifest opposition to that perfect
and absolute goodness which essentially belongs to
Him, and with which wisdom alone, but never foolish
ness, can be consistent. Indeed, were God by His im
mediate action to interfere with the course of secondary
Preface. ix
causes, whenever they tend to evil, He would set Him
self in opposition to His own attributes, would con
tradict Himself.
3. In thus endeavouring to uproot these three
causes of error regarding Divine Providence, and in
expounding the doctrines relative to It, I have not
adopted a rigorously scientific style, in the hope that
a freer mode of treatment might prove easier and more
agreeable to the majority of readers. So likewise, I
have refrained from introducing certain more difficult
speculations, although I own that my mind felt almost
involuntarily drawn to them by their very sublimity.
As the argument seemed to be sufficiently developed
without them, the desire of benefiting the greatest
number seemed a sufficient reason for their omission.
Should it, however, please Almighty God to grant me
time and strength for publishing that part of Philoso
phy which is the crown and summit of a Theodicy,
namely, Natural Theology, I may then supply what I
have designedly omitted in this less rigorously scien
tific treatise; which nevertheless should itself be
regarded as a branch of Natural Theology.
It is now eighteen years since the second book of
this work first saw the light; and I soon after became
aware that not all readers seize the drift of my thoughts,
a fact of which experience has ever since continued to
furnish new proofs. Those who fail most in this re
gard are chiefly those who blame me for being too
A*
x Preface.
clear and uselessly prolix, owing to my over-anxiety
not to be misunderstood. They assume towards me the
tone of inexorable judges and censurers, and ascribe
to me opinions which are not contained in my works,
and have never entered my head. With great levity
they distort my sentiments, substituting for them their
own imaginings, and for the words I have used, other
words of an entirely different meaning, which, with
extreme ignorance, they take as synonymous, or equi
valent. On this occasion, therefore, in which a new
book of mine is published, I think it necessary solemnly
to declare, as a caution to all men of good faith in
Italy, that IN NONE OF THE BOOKS ISSUED BY MY
ADVERSARIES UP TO THE PRESENT TIME IS THERE A
TRUE STATEMENT OF MY THEORIES. Hence, I beg all
who wish to know the truth, to take my opinions from
my own works, not from those of my adversaries, in
which they are not to be found.
Then follow thirteen pages, in -which the Author con
fronts in opposite columns the text of ten passages of his
own -writings with the misquotations and falsifications of
them contained in an article of the periodical called "La
Biblioteca Italiana." These, as little suited to the present
purpose, the translators have thought best to omit.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.
BOOK THE FIRST.
On the Limits of Human Reason in its Judgments regarding Divine
Providence.
CHAP. PAGE
I. The Study of the Ways of Providence comforts man under
Temptation I
II. God invites Man to the Study of the Ways of Providence
by setting before him the Book of Nature and of History 6
III. He who believes in the Existence of God can have no valid
reason for being disturbed in mind on account of the
Difficulties presented by the Government of Providence.
He loves, however, to ponder on those Difficulties that
he may better know the Greatness of God ... 9
IV. The Difficulties presented by the Government of Divine
Providence spring from two Sources, viz., I. the
Infinite Wisdom directing that Government, and 2.
the Comparative Ignorance of Man . . . .13
V. Every Difficulty against the Government of Divine Provi
dence, when solved, dispels Man s Ignorance ; when
adored, it enhances his Virtue 20
VI. The Difficulties of explaining Divine Providence may be
overcome in two ways, viz., by Faith and by Reason 22
xii Contents.
VII. Faith is approved by Reason, and adds strength to Man s
Understanding 24
VIII. By abusing Reason, some turn it to their own ruin 29
IX. By trusting solely to Reason, some endanger their own
salvation 33
X. Reason may be safely trusted when associated with Faith . 44
XI. By Revelation only could the Divine Plan of the Universe
be made known, and human doubts as to the perfection
of its Government be dispelled 50
XII. In the Plan of the Universe there is something Infinite and
Mysterious. Here Reason comes to a stop and in
trusts man to Faith 56
XIII. Continuation. It is impossible for man to arrive at the Per
ception of God in the Present Life .... 60
XIV. The Four Limitations of Human Reason are recapitulated.
First Limitation : Reason can form no positive idea
of God 67
XV. Second Limitation of Human Reason: It cannot em
brace the Infinite 79
XVT. Third Limitation of Human Reason: The Intellectual
Capabilities of each human individual have a purely
accidental measure 82
XVII. Fourth Limitation of Human Reason : It can know only
those beings which, independently of its own act, are
presented to it for contemplation .... 88
XVTII. Continuation. Our cognitive acts are accidental to the
mind. The material of our cognitions is limited, and
furnished to each individual by the Creator . . .91
XIX. Continuation. Three objects of cognition granted to man
in a certain measure determined by God s own free will 95
XX. Continuation. Divine Origin of a part of Language . . 98
XXI. Continuation. Man owes to God, together with Language,
the knowledge of some principal Truths which have
been preserved in the Traditions of the Human Race . 102
Contents.
CHAP. ]
XXII. The Science of Happiness cannot be obtained from our
natural reason ; it is learnt from God ....
XXIII. The Science of Happiness is the result of the knowable
taken in its entirety : Human Reason cannot attain to
this result : God alone communicates it to man ; hence
a new proof of the necessity of Faith ....
XXIV. Continuation. The knowledge of times and places tran
scends the powers of Human Reason ....
XXV. The Limitations of Human Reason, as expounded above,
far from proving that Reason and Faith are in mutual
antagonism, prove the very reverse ....
XXVI. The apparent contradictions between Reason and Faith
arise from the fallibility of Reason, and are removed by
Reason acknowledging itself fallible ....
Sensism, by unduly limiting Human Reason, leads to Seep-
XXVII.
XXVIII.
XXIX.
XXX.
XXXI.
Transcendental Idealism, by rendering Human Reason in
capable of attaining to the Truth, leads to Scepticism .
The Limitations above assigned to Human Reason do not
lead to Scepticism
Theodicy destroyed by Modern Philosophy
Moral Dispositions requisite for fitting our mind to over
come the Difficulties it encounters in the dealings of
Providence .
119
123
130
133
136
142
152
159
171
BOOK THE SECOND
On the Laws according to which Temporal Good and Evil are distributed.
CHAP. PAGE.
I. Purpose of this Book : To set forth the special Reasons
which vindicate Divine Providence in the Permission
and Distribution of Temporal Evil .... 181
xiv Contents.
CHAP. PAGE
II. Question of the Origin of Evil. Question of the Nature of
Evil. Utility of these Questions . . 4 .185
III. The Existence of Evil is no derogation to the Divine Per
fection, because Evil does not affect God, but finite
natures only, and its nature is not positive . . . 188
IV. Given a finite nature, the possibility of Evil is inevitable :
God Himself could not prevent it, because He cannot
do the absurd 195
V. Existence of Evil is not opposed to the Perfection and
Sanctity of God any more than its possibility . . 200
VI. Vindication of Divine Justice against the objection that the
descendants ought not to be made to suffer for the sin
of their first parent 204
VII. A first vindication of the Divine Goodness, on the ground
that Man, from want of competent knowledge, cannot,
without rashness, so much as frame an objection against
that Goodness 216
VIII. In the Permission of Adam s Sin, the Goodness of God
shines forth in this, that, through the Grace of the
Redeemer, there is now opened to man a source of
spiritual contentment far outweighing the temporal
evils caused by that Sin 220
IX. Recapitulation. The question of the Distribution of Tem
poral Evil 226
X. As no Man is perfectly free from sin, so no Man can affirm
that in the Distribution of Temporal Good and Evil he
is wrongfully dealt with 229
XI. Under a perfect Government of the Universe, whose funda
mental condition is that it should obtain the Maximum
of Good, Natural Virtue has no claim to exemption
from all suffering : it can only demand that from among
all the series of causes and effects that are possible,
that which is the most favourable to it shall be chosen. 233
XII. Human Nature remains corrupt even after the Person has
been justified ; Temporal Evils fall upon corrupt Nature,
Contents.
xv
CHAP. PAGE
not upon the justified Person; the true cause of these
evils lies in the corruption of Nature itself; God merely
permits them 240
XIII. The Permission of Temporal Evils, which are common to
good and bad alike, is not merely an act of Justice, but
also an effect of Goodness, for they serve as a whole
some remedy to the moral infirmities common to all
men 248
XIV. The Power of Prayer is a means offered to us by Christ for
removing all irregularities in the Distribution of Tem
poral Evil 254
XV. If we consider only the Natural Law, apart from the positive
promises of God, we cannot prove that Temporal Evil
must be distributed in accordance with Virtue and with
Vice 258
XVI. Observation shows that Temporal Good has a continual
tendency to be united with Virtue, and Temporal Evil,
generally speaking, to follow Vice .... 268
XVII. Divine Justice sometimes delays the Punishment of the
Wicked in the interests of Virtue, and thereby justifies
the delay 276
XVIII. Many of those who complain of Providence, have a wrong
notion of Virtue ; and yet Virtue, even as they consider
it, is not without Temporal Advantages . . .281
XIX. Why Temporal Good shows a tendency to accompany
natural Virtue, and Temporal Evil to accompany Vice 288
XX. Temporal Miseries serve to dispose Man to Supernatural
Virtue, and, consequently, to Supernatural Happiness 292
XXI. The very Complaints of those who, although abounding in
Temporal Goods, accuse Divine Providence of not doing
them Justice, are a justification of the same Providence 296
XXII The Contentment which the true Christian finds in Temporal
Afflictions, instead of detracting from his right to an
Eternal Reward, increases it 298
XXIII. Penalties, positive and natural, of Evil Doers. Goodness
of God towards them 300
XVI
Confeiits.
CHAP. PAGE
XXIV. The Question of the Distribution of Temporal Good and
Evil solved when viewed in reference to the Supernatural 303
XXV. First Law of the Distribution of Temporal Good and Evil :
It must all serve unto the perfecting of the Church of
Jesus Christ 306
XXVI. Three Divine Decrees concerning the Execution of the First
Law of the Distribution of Good and Evil in reference
to Supernatural Virtue 309
XXVII. Second Law of the Distribution of Temporal Good and
Evil : This Distribution is directed to educate Men to
the Gospel 315
XXVIII. Three Divine Decrees concerning the Execution of the
Second Law of the Apportionment of Temporal Good
and Evil viewed in reference to Supernatural Virtue . 317
BOOK THE THIRD.
On the Law of the Least Means applied to the Government cf Divine
Providence.
CHAP. PAGE
I. Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books . . . 339
II. Other and more subtle Objections against the vindication
of Providence as given above 372
III. The Solution of the above-mentioned Objections will be
general, that is, one for all 377
IV. The above Objections are drawn from uncertain and falla
cious Principles 379
V. Three Laws of the Activity of Being 383
VI. The Law of Virtue, and the Law of Wisdom . . .387
VII. How the Law of Sufficient Reason may be identified with
the Law of the Least Means 405
Contents. xvii
VIII. In what sense it may be said that the Law of the Least
Means obtains in the world of real beings . . . 414
IX. The Solution of the Objections put forward is contained in
what has been said above 444
X. Answer to the Allegation that " for God to do more or to
do less is all the same; for neither costs Him anything" 456
XI. Positive Arguments, tending to prove that the Moral and
Eudemonological Evils which occur in the Universe, far
from militating against the Wisdom and Goodness of
God, are a proof of them. Preliminary Notions on the
way of measuring the Quantity of Action in order to
ascertain if it be the least possible .... 467
* * * To enable the reader at a glance to know which works of Ros-
mini are translated into English and which are not, the Italian titles have
been appended to such as have not appeared in our own tongue.
THEODICY. VOL. I.
ERRATA.
PAGE LINE
80 17 pretend . .
151 13 apparition .
303 After last line, insert
400 13 descrimination
CORRIGE.
pretend to
semblance
what relations he is linked
with beings other than
discrimination
420 21-2 nor in the second way, but nor in the third way, but in
in the third . the second
433
exists
consists
ON
DIVINE PROVIDENCE.
BOOK I.
Xoyixor
ON THE LIMITS OF HUMAN REASON IN ITS JUDG
MENTS REGARDING DIVINE PROVIDENCE.
Forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes ?
Job. ad., 7-
ON
DIVINE PROVIDENCE.
BOOK THE FIRST.
CHAPTER I.
THE STUDY OF THE WAYS OF PROVIDENCE COMFORTS
MAN UNDER TEMPTATION.
4. Undeserving the name of Wisdom I account
that kind of knowledge which has no influence on the
human heart, but accumulates idly in the mind like so
much dead weight, without adding to the sum of man s
good, or lessening his ills, and without satisfying, or
even soothing with well-grounded hopes, the cease
less longings of his nature, (i)
Granting, then, that only the knowledge which
makes us better, and strengthens us, and raises our
minds to salutary thoughts, has a right to be called
Wisdom ; what better means could we have of ac
quiring so precious a treasure, than pondering on
the Eternal Counsels apparent in the vicissitudes of
(l) On the nature of Wisdom see Rosmini s Essay On the Notion of
Wisdom ("Dell Idea della Sapienza") in the volume entitled Introduction
to Philosophy ("Introduzione alia Filosofia"). Translators Note.
B
2 Ofi Divine Providence.
created things, and endeavouring to bring our own
lives into harmony with them ?
5. All the dangers and temptations which imperil
man s fidelity to virtue, are, it seems to me, due to one
sole cause, viz., the trouble and difficulty which man
experiences in steadfastly adhering to the path of duty,
in a state which deprives him of many enjoyments
and subjects him to manifold suffering. Sensible
good lures his appetite to such a degree that, through
greed of possessing it, he forgets the law of righteous
ness ; suffering has so saddening and depressing
an influence on him, that in the hope of ridding him
self of the galling burden, or at least of escaping from
the extreme vexation of having his inclinations thwart
ed, he abandons himself to evil. But no sooner has
he done so, than the stern voice of conscience rebukes
him for having allowed his affections to deceive him,
and for having violated that unbending law which
fixes certain limits to the indulgence as well of human
desires as of human aversions. Then there arises
within him a fierce battle between two contrary
forces : the incorruptible conscience, which, as a
heavenly herald, unceasingly proclaims in his heart
the divine legislation ; and the bent of sensible
nature, which, blind to the light of truth, will hear of
nothing but what is agreeable and delightful to itself.
This struggle continues until at last it comes to
pass, that either he is brought back to virtue, or, being
too faint-hearted to regain the mastery, becomes
hardened in evil.
6. Now it is when a man has settled down in this
lamentable state of moral perversion, that his mind
enfeebled and unhappy, is apt to be led astray by
Study of Providence a Sotirce of Comfort. 3
harbouring sinister thoughts against the high dis
positions of Divine Providence, (i)
The ills that befall him, and the restrictions imposed
on sensuous gratifications, are to him a source of end
less annoyance and discontent. Unable to find a
means of assuaging this misery, he casts the blame of
it upon that God Who is the Supreme Disposer of all
human things, and has, to the sinner s chiefest dis
comfort, graven on the inner tablets of the heart that
solemn unalterable command: "Turn away from evil,
and do good." Wretched is the man fallen into so
deplorable an error, who has not the mental strength
to understand that the bounds set to present enjoy
ments are rather apparent than real, wisely ordain
ed by the best of legislators to the end that we may,
at a most trifling sacrifice, hereafter secure an un
stinted fulness of all that we can desire.
7. This doctrine is so consoling, that we ought to
look upon it as good, and as such, embrace it with our
hearts, even though our minds do not fully compre
hend its truth. Happy, however, are they, who can
(l) The influence of the passions on men s judgments has been well express
ed in the axiom : Unusquisque judicat prout affectus est ; which agrees in
substance with the English Proverb: "The wish is father to the thought."
St. Augustine has said: "Be it known and understood that there
would have been no error in Religion if man had not worshipped as his
God, his own soul, or his body, or the desires of his fancy." (De Vera
Relig. Ch. x., no. 18.) And in the 38th Chapter of the same book, no.
69, speaking of Infidel reasoners, he uses language equally strong, if not
stronger. Hence one of the principal obstacles which stand in the way of
rectifying the judgments of those in error, is the difficulty of rectifying
their affections; for "Wisdom will not enter a malicious soul, nor dwell
in a body subject to sins." (Wisdom, I. 4.) But, as Christianity teaches,
in order to rectify disordered affections, something more is necessary than
mere human reasoning. On the nature of human error, its causes, and its
remedies, see The Origin of Ideas, from no. 1245 to 13/7. Tr.
4 On Divine Providence.
not only desire or believe it, but also understand it.
Does the infinitely wise Legislator, perchance, forbid
us to investigate the reasons of the laws whereby He
dispenses good and evil, if we are competent to do so ?
On the contrary, he invites us all thereto.
8. But if our minds are unable to soar so high,
what then ? Shall we have the audacity to dispute in all
things with the Divine Intelligence ? Or rather, should
we not seek to render ourselves partakers of God s
own Wisdom through Faith ? Let us strengthen our
weakness by a firm reliance on the words of our
Creator, which so strongly urge upon us abstinence
and patience ? abstinence from momentary delights, by
reminding us of the eternal punishment prepared for in
temperance, and patience under momentary sufferings,
by promising us, in return for it, ineffable and eternal
joys, (i) Nevertheless, it is, as I have said, perfectly
lawful for every one to try, as best he may, to find out
the sublime reasons of the government of Divine
Providence: a government wholly directed to the
advantage of the good, who for love of righteousness
often sacrifice sensible enjoyments, and willingly sub-
(i) It will be observed that the purpose of this work is not to prove
directly the existence of God and of Christian Revelation. The author
takes both these things for granted. But if an intelligent reader, who is
animated by the pure love of truth, happens to be an unbeliever, there can
be but little doubt that by following closely the Author s reasonings he will
find in them such a cumulative mass of evidence, though indirect, in favour
of the truth of both, as to make him feel that it would be very irrational of
him to continue in his unbelief. If it were necessary, not a few cases could
be mentioned of strong, clear-headed Italian thinkers, who, after falling
into religious scepticism by drawing strictly logical deductions from the
principles of the prevalent false philosophies taught them in their youth, have
been reclaimed to Christian Faith and life by an attentive and serious perusal
of the works of this Author. TV.
Study of Providence a Source of Comfort. 5
mitto sufferings; and to the confusion of sinners, whom
Providence blesses with many good things, and
protects from many evils, in such wise, however, as to
leave to their own free will the power of preferring
virtue to pleasure, or suffering to sin.
CHAPTER II.
GOD INVITES MAN TO THE STUDY OF THE WAYS OF
PROVIDENCE BY SETTING BEFORE HIM THE BOOK
OF NATURE AND OF HISTORY.
9. The consideration of the plan which God follows
in instructing mankind has often excited in me a
thrill of sublime emotion. That plan consists in per
mitting that doubts, or rather difficulties, should arise
in men s minds, in order that men may be roused to
action, and moved to reflection and the investigation
of truth.
We may imagine all this universe, both physical
and moral, as a grand and sacred book opened
by God before men s eyes, and full of queries and
problems for the mind of man to solve, and so to
increase the store of his knowledge and contentment.
The pages of the great volume are unfolded gradually
in the course of centuries: the multiplication of the
human race, its division into divers peoples, the disper
sion of these peoples over the face of the earth, then
in succession their mutual relations, their wars, their
rivalries, their alliances ; and in particular the history
of the Jewish People, which God directed with a peculiar
Providence, intending to make it a figure, on a small scale,
of what the entire human race was destined to be at a later
period. The problems found in the earlier pages of this
book are more easy to solve than those which come
Nature and History the Book of Providence. 7
after; nor is a new page ever opened until man has
succeeded in deciphering those that precede.
It seems as if Infinite Wisdom delighted in adopting
with human beings the process known as the Socratic
Method, by which the most difficult truths are
easily elicited from the lips of illiterate persons
and of children; the secret simply consisting of a few
interrogatives skilfully arranged in a certain order.
In this way, I believe, does God act towards His
creatures. He ordains that things which are mar
vellous, and wholly at variance with their modes of
thinking, should happen before the eyes of men,
that being struck with wonder at the novelty, they
may feel prompted to direct their attention to
investigating the hidden causes of things. He does
not wish to say everything Himself, because, being
good, He does not wish His beloved creature, man, to
remain idle and inert, or to be deprived of the noble
gratification and merit which he can gain by instruct
ing himself in many things. To this end, He has
endowed man with the faculty of knowing, that he
may enjoy the honest pleasure of developing know
ledge for himself, of being in part his own teacher.
God would not assist him save in that for which
his natural knowledge could not suffice. And what
was this?
ist Man s faculty of knowing required to be stimu
lated and roused so as to be drawn forth into its own
peculiar act;
2nd To progress in the wisdom necessary to man,
this faculty required to have suitable queries or inter
rogations put to it by its Supreme Instructor;
3rd And it likewise required to be furnished with
8 On Divine Providence.
some general principles, to enable it, by their appli
cation, to arrive at the right answers to those questions.
Furnished with these aids, man would be in a
position to form for himself a science of a truly
ennobling character. God provided him with them,
and, having done so, left him, as I have said, freely to
enjoy the honest and noble delight of being the author
of his own wisdom.
CHAPTER III.
HE WHO BELIEVES IN THE EXISTENCE OF GOD CAN
HAVE NO VALID REASON FOR BEING DISTURBED
IN MIND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFICULTIES
PRESENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PROVIDENCE.
HE LOVES, HOWEVER, TO PONDER ON THOSE
DIFFICULTIES, THAT HE MAY BETTER KNOW THE
GREATNESS OF GOD.
10. The very objections, then, the very difficulties,
which the government of Divine Providence presents,
are of advantage to man, and might be regarded
as a sign and gift of Providence itself; provided only
that on meeting with such enigmas, which after all
are merely the result of his own ignorance, he do not,
like a coward, shrink from their encounter, giving him
self up at once for vanquished, and so prove unfaithful
to that Supreme Goodness which would have made
use of this very means to enlighten him.
For so, in truth, is it wont to happen, that by being
brought face to face with the like problems, men of up
right heart are led to investigate and to discover the
mighty secrets of Divine Providence. Firm in the
belief of the existence of a Supreme and Infinite
Being, they never doubt the goodness and wisdom of
His rule. No difficulty, however impossible to solve
by the aid of mere reason, can in the least de
gree shake the constancy of their faith, or cool the
ardour of their love for that infallible Lord. Still,
io On Divine Providence.
they love to meditate on those difficulties with a view
to their solution; for it is precisely by penetrating
into the depths of those wonderful ways by which
God works out His designs, that man comes to under
stand how immeasurably the Divine Greatness trans
cends human littleness.
1 1 . The delight which a wise man experiences in
endeavouring to penetrate into reasons like these, is
similar to, though of course far exceeding, that which
is felt in scanning the conduct of some great man,
who by vastness of genius, prowess, and sagacity in
counsel, was immensely in advance of all his contem
poraries. How pleasing it is to note the grand aims
of such a man s enterprises, and the extraordinary
and novel means whereby he achieved success ! The
less apparently fit nay, the more obviously unfit these
means appear for the attainment of the end in view,
and the more unexpectedly and happily that end and
the whole enterprise was accomplished, the greater is
the delight afforded by the study of the singular and
altogether exceptional ways by which it was brought
about. How pleasing to identify one s own with those
wonderfully sagacious and far-reaching views, which,
before they were justified by the event, would perhaps
have been condemned by everybody as eccentric, if
not utterly preposterous !
Now, if even man when gifted with superior genius
or character, very frequently acts in a way quite
different from that which would be pursued by other
men, and which they sometimes think wrong or foolish,
need we wonder if the Infinitely Wise Ruler of the
universe very often disposes events in a manner which
we find it hard to conceive, and which seems to .us
Belief in God removes Difficulties. 1 1
absurd, merely because it is wholly at variance with
our own notions of things ?
1 2 . All that is demanded of us in this m atter, therefore,
is that we should treat God with the same respectful
consideration which we very readily show towards
great men. We say that a great man, an extraordinary
genius, seems to be free from the restraint of common
laws. We call an artist, a painter, a poet, original, for
the very reason that he has been able to strike out for
himself a path never before trodden by anyone in
other words, because, leaving behind him all vulgar
precepts as suited only to insufficiently secure intellects,
he has raised himself on the powerful wings of an
inspired nature, to flights which till then it would have
been thought rash or impossible to attempt. Does this
mean that he withdrew himself from subjection to the
eternal rules f No ; he only withdrew himself from
subjection to such rules as were known to the men of
his time, who, accustomed to measure everything by
these alone, set down as foolish or abnormal, not merely
what fell below that standard, but also what rose to an
order one degree above it. (i)
(i) Peter Bayle, having set forth the objections which the existence of
evil suggests against Divine Providence, concluded by saying that he thought
them unanswerable. Leibnitz, in his defence of Divine Providence, showed
that the reason why Bayle could not extricate himself from those difficulties
was because he had recourse to cavil instead of Logic. Among the many
excellent things which Leibnitz said on this subject, we have the distinction
of the arguments which can be brought against a given truth into demonstra
tive arguments, and apparent and conjectural ones ; and he proved that to
overthrow a truth which is certain either from reason or from faith, as for
example the wisdom and goodness of God, no conjectural and apparent argu
ments are of any force, but only demonstrative arguments. Now no demon
strative argument against the Divine Attributes has ever been produced.
" We have no need of a supernatural revelation " (says this great man) " in
12 On Divine Providence.
order to know that there is one only principle of all things, perfectly good
and perfectly wise. Reason gives us infallible demonstrations of this;
consequently, all objections drawn from the imperfections which we observe
in the way in which things proceed in the universe rest merely on fallacious
appearances. For, if we could only understand the universal harmony, we
should see that what we are tempted to blame is part of the design most
worthy to be chosen ; in one word, we should see, and not merely believe,
that what God has done is the best." Whence he also infers that Bayle s
attempt to represent reason as being in contradiction with Faith is a blunder ;
since, if his argument had any value, it would rather set reason in contradic
tion, with itself. He wisely adds : "When there is question of opposing
reason to an article of our Faith, objections amounting to mere likelihood
need not give us any trouble ; for, all the world agrees that mysteries are
against appearances, and do not at all look like truth when viewed on the
side of reason ; but it is enough that they contain no absurdity. Therefore,
to refute them, demonstrations are necessary. This is, doubtless, the
meaning of Holy Scripture when it declares that the wisdom of God is
foolishness before men, and when St. Paul remarks that the Gospel of
JESUS CHRIST is folly to the Greeks and a stumbling block to the Jews.
Clearly, truth cannot contradict truth, and the light of reason is a gift of God
no less than the light of Revelation. Hence it is an approved principle in
sound Theology, that the grounds of credibility (Motiva credibilitatis)
establish once for all the authority of Holy Scripture before the tribunal of
reason, which thenceforth implicitly accepts the teaching of that authority
notwithstanding all apparent arguments to the contrary. One of the causes
by which Bayle may have been induced to believe that the objections brought
by reason against Faith could not be answered, is, that he seemed to be
under the impression that God must be justified in a way similar to that
which we see usually adopted when an accused party is defended before a
human judge. But he forgot to reflect that at the tribunals of men, who
cannot always get at positive truth, it is often necessary to decide the case
upon probabilities and likelihoods, and in very great part upon presumptions
or preconceptions ; whereas it is, as we have always said, agreed by all that
mysteries, although true, have not the appearance of truth " (Discours de la
conformite de lafoi avec la raison). And the merit of Faith consists pre
cisely in this, that we, on God s word, believe that to be true which does not
look like truth. Now, to know what God s word is, we have the " grounds
of credibility," which, taken in their entirety, form a most complete demon
stration.
CHAPTER IV.
THE DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY THE GOVERN
MENT OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE SPRING FROM TWO
SOURCES, VIZ., I. THE INFINITE WISDOM DIRECTING
THAT GOVERNMENT, AND 2. THE COMPARATIVE
IGNORANCE OF MAN.
13. It is chiefly for the reason expressed in this
heading" that God-fearing men remain firm and con
stant in faith and in their love of the Supreme Being,
even in the midst of tribulations. No accident, no
reverse, however sudden, painful, contrary to our ways
of thinking, and, apparently, even to the Divine
Perfections, can have the least power to make us
waver in our faith in those Divine attributes, when
once we have well fixed in our minds the following
very simple truth:
God, being essentially possessed of an intelligence
infinitely superior to ours, must naturally proceed in
a way differing from, and far wiser than, ours;
His rules of action must be such as, at the outset,
appear to our short-sighted minds opposed, or at least
ill-suited, to His purposes. If in His works He were
merely to follow a mode of thinking like that of man,
we should have no sign whereby to know and admire
His Wisdom. Our minds would no longer be able to
ascend from the traces of Divine Wisdom impressed on
creatures to the Creator Himself. Finding in things
and events nothing but a ray of wisdom, uniform and
14 On Divine Providence.
commensurate with man s own, we could indeed infer
from it that an intelligence governs the universe,
but only an intelligence limited as that of man is; and
thus there would be an end to our conception of the
existence of God, the Infinite Intelligence.
No wonder, then, that on looking at the course of the
universe, and especially at the distribution of good and
evil, our little minds should be struck with astonish
ment at many occurrences which at first sight seem
wholly incomprehensible. These difficulties must arise
from the very nature of the case; and so far are they
from militating against the belief in the existence of
an all-providing God, that, but for them, it would be
impossible for us to believe that any Divinity at all
presided over the government of human vicissitudes.
Hence such difficulties are themselves a proof of a
Universal and Divine Providence.
14. It may also be shown in other ways that prob
lems must occur to man s mind, when he undertakes
to judge of the government of the universe according
to those little rules by which he is accustomed to judge
of his own private concerns.
A kingdom cannot be governed by the same rules
as would be found amply sufficient for the good
management of a small family. For a similar reason,
therefore, it is impossible to judge aright of the govern
ment of the universe by the narrow conceptions
belonging to us mortals. Human thought has, besides
its natural limitations, another limitation due to
education and habit. Man can never be free from the
former, and it is very difficult for him to rid himself of
the latter; for as almost every act of his life is restricted
by it, it has become as it were second nature to him.
Sources of Difficulties. 1 5
Why is it, for example, we observe such diversities in
men s ideas and judgments, that it would hardly be
possible to meet with any two individuals who think
exactly alike on all subjects? Is it because of a
difference in the first principles of reason impressed on
each man by nature ? Assuredly not ; for as regards
first principles, all men, when once they have agreed
in the meaning of the words they use, are found to be
perfectly at one. Must we, then, attribute this fact to
the inequalities existing in men s mental powers, in
consequence of which one man is able, on a given
subject, to see further than another? This alone does
not seem sufficient to account for all the divergencies
in question. Because one man sees further than
another, it does not follow that the two must be in
mutual contradiction. They see different, not contrary,
things. One perceives what the other does not
perceive, but the two perceptions are not necessarily
opposed to each other. These contrarieties in the
judgments passed on the same things, or on the means
to be chosen for the attainment of the same end, can
only be fully explained by taking into account the
varieties of those secondary rules which men form for
themselves, and by which they are guided in their
estimates of things. And these rules vary, not merely
according to the various degrees of their intelligence,
and the various affections by which their attention is
influenced, but principally according to their various
experiences, and the wider or narrower sphere of affairs
with which they have had severally to deal. Thus, a
thrifty housewife, who has always made it a point to
be very particular about even the smallest domestic
savings, will probably regard as a wanton extravagance
1 6 On Divine Providence.
those larger outlays which her husband decides upon
as necessary, and, in fact, considers quite moderate and
reasonable, for maintaining the proper position of the
family, or for the dispatch of some important business.
Both, of course, agree on the general principle of con
sulting economy and avoiding prodigality. But the
wife judges of the case by a rule which she has drawn
from her habit of handling only small sums ; whereas
the husband s rule is based on the better knowledge
he has of the entire income of the household which
he governs. Hence their disagreement. Let it be
well understood: the secondary rules vary, because
they are the result of comparison. The greatness or
littleness of an object, its importance or insignificance,
its nobleness or meanness, its utility or hurtfulness, are,
in men s judgments, most frequently relative things.
Hence almost every one has special secondary rules of
his own ; hence also different opinions and conflicting
views.
Moreover, even men engaged in more or less the
same affairs are very often found to be of contrary
opinions as to the best way of conducting those
affairs ; and this not merely on account of the different
degrees of their intelligence, or of their different moral
dispositions, but also because a mere change of circum
stances within the same sphere of action is enough
to accustom one to look at things from a different
point of view, to see them, as it were, in a different
light. Indeed, can we find anywhere a man who, be
he ever so prudent, can escape all criticism, all censure ?
who finds all other men of his condition agreeing with
him in every thing? What wonder, therefore, if dis
agreements are rife among men who have been
Source of Diffictilties. 1 7
differently brought up ? if he who is accustomed to a
wider sphere of action does not think like another
who is accustomed to a narrower sphere, and whose
notions of things are therefore narrowed in propor
tion ? What wonder if they disapprove of each other s
conduct and tax each other with imprudence ? Ought
not these plain matter-of-fact observations to be quite
enough to silence those who pretend to find fault
with the divinely-ordained distribution of good and
evil in the world ?
To a person of this class I should say "May I ask you
to reflect for a moment on what takes place with regard
to your own self? Tell me, can you ever succeed, do
what you will, in escaping every kind of blame from
all and each of your fellow men, or in securing from
all and each the approval of your conduct, even in
those matters in which it seems to you that you have
acted most wisely? and yet the range of your activity
is so insignificant as compared with that of the entire
universe! It ought, therefore, to be infinitely easier,
within so small a sphere, to know what is best. Pray,
then, why do you not agree with the rest of men?
Have they not the same nature and the same origin ?
and are they not possessed of as good a right to the
free exercise of their own judgment as you could ever
claim r Now if you believe yourself entitled to demand
that God should dispose things according to your way
of thinking, why can they not equally demand that
He should dispose the same according to their way of
thinking, which, nevertheless, is entirely at variance
with yours, even in the trifling concerns of every day
life?" Simple as this reasoning is, I do not see how
its cogency could be evaded.
1 8 On Divine Providence.
15. But we will for argument s sake suppose that
the Ruler of the universe were a man, or thought in
human fashion that he were, for example, one of the
boldest detractors of Divine Providence. I ask:
would this put an end to all dissatisfaction ? Would
it do away with all other detractors ? One must indeed
have lost his senses, not to see that the government of
the universe is a task immeasurably transcending all
the powers of the human mind, and that, were God to
hand over the reins of that government to any man for
a single instant, everything would fall into absolute
confusion. The temerity of him who would not
hesitate to receive such a charge seems to have been
expressed by the ancients in the fable of the son of
Clymene, who having obtained his father s leave to
guide the chariot of the Sun for one day, at once
left the track, with the result that the heavens and the
earth would have been consumed in a tremendous
conflagration, had not Jupiter come quickly to the
rescue, by striking him with a thunderbolt, and pre
cipitating him into the river Po. If then no sane man
could presume to imagine himself capable of under
taking so vast a government as that of the universe,
and since, even if he were capable, he could have no
hope of seeing his rule approved by all his fellow men,
how can any one dare to constitute himself a judge of
the Divine Ruler, when the mere fact of this discrep
ancy of opinions proves to him that he ought to be
modest even in judging his equals?
Let the arguments, then, against Divine Providence
be as numerous as they may, we can never reason
ably take them for anything more than mere
plausibilites. Nothing can be deduced from them
Source of Difficulties. 1 9
which is really derogatory to Its supreme dispositions.
Much less can they afford a ground for doubting either
the existence of God or His attributes. I have often
admired the Teutonic good nature which the great
Leibnitz exhibited by dwelling so long on the refutation
of Bayle s sophisms, and on the defence of the conform
ity of Faith with Reason.
I will only add that the inefficacy of the apparent
arguments against Divine Providence is seen still more
clearly, if we consider that the Mind which governs the
world must be most wise and infallible, not like the
human mind, which is subject to error.
CHAPTER V.
EVERY DIFFICULTY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF
DIVINE PROVIDENCE, WHEN SOLVED, DISPELS MAN S
IGNORANCE; WHEN ADORED, IT ENHANCES HIS
VIRTUE.
1 6. But let us for a while set aside this consideration,
and turn back to the fact already mentioned, that the
secondary rules of judgment, drawn from a narrower
circle of experience, differ from those founded on one
that is wider.
I ask: can all these rules, so discordant from one
another, be at one and the same time equally true and
complete ? To say this would be a contradiction ; but
each of them will be at once true and false : true so
long as it is applied to matters falling within that
sphere of things from which it was drawn; false if
applied to things lying outside that sphere. It follows
that such secondary rules as were drawn from a larger
experience and a wider sphere of action will be avail
able for judging aright of a greater number and of a
more extended order of things, than are the more
limited and restricted rules. Those only will be
finally complete which are founded on the observation
of all the component parts of the universe, considered
in their mutual relations; for, as from this grand
sphere nothing would be excluded, so, in the formation
of such rules, no possible experience would be want-
Difficulties not Unprofitable. 21
ing; every species as well as every accident would be
taken into account and, as it were, set face to face in a
universal comparison. Now, in this we can see a fresh
reason why virtuous men, when meeting with those
difficulties which are apt to suggest themselves to the
mind in the consideration of the manner in which
human sorrows and human happiness are apportioned
by Providence, instead of giving way to sadness or dis
couragement, feel internally moved to rejoice. Indeed,
if one of these upright and faithful men happens to ob
serve anything difficult to understand, and so contrary
to all his expectations that it suggests strangeness of
action on the part of God, he is filled with sentiments of
heartfelt gratitude ; for in the very darkness of that
deep secret of Divine Wisdom he sees a reminder of his
own nothingness before God, and of the immense abyss
which lies between the judgments of the Creator and
of His creature. That ray of Divine Greatness gladdens
him beyond measure. Nevertheless he meditates
diligently and hopefully on that secret, trying to search
out those reasons which are at present hidden from
his view; for he is persuaded, that should it please God
to discover them to him in any degree, the narrow
borders of his human understanding will be thereby
immensely enlarged, and the cramped maxims of
human prudence corrected, by the infinite breadth of
the Wisdom of God.
CHAPTER VI.
THE DIFFICULTIES OF EXPLAINING DIVINE PROVIDENCE
MAY BE OVERCOME IN TWO WAYS, VIZ., BY FAITH
AND BY REASON.
17. God does not disappoint the desire of those
men who, in an upright and humble spirit, search care
fully, in order that they may partake of and delight in
His eternal wisdom. He imparts to them abundance
ot light to see into those sublime reasons according
to which He disposes events. If He still keeps
the profoundest depths of His counsels veiled in part
from them, this is only that they may have oppor
tunities of showing their Faith in Him, and enriching
themselves more and more with the high merit of a
perfect submission to His adorable decrees.
From all that we have said thus far it is clear
that we may appropriately distinguish two ways in
which it is possible for man to rid himself of all per
plexities or doubts in regard to Divine Providence,,
that of Faith, and that of Reason.
1 8. The first is broad, very simple, and open to all.
A religious man, assured by his own reason, but at
the same time strengthened in that assurance by the
power which a firm Faith infuses into him, holds
that He Who governs the universe is an Infinite Being,
all-wise, all-powerful, all-just, all-good. Hence, in all
accidents, in all trying encounters, he tranquilly reposes
Two Ways of Explaining Difficulties, 23
in that Being. Nothing disturbs him, nothing comes to
him as a surprise. No matter how painful, no matter how
far beyond his comprehension, all that happens is ever,
in his intimate conviction, a Divine Work ; and this
simple truth is more than enough for him. All possible
objections vanish before this one word: THERE IS A
GOD.
CHAPTER VII.
APPROVED BY REASON, AND ADDS STRENGTH
TO MAN S UNDERSTANDING.
19. Although Faith has the advantage of tran
quillizing the human mind, might not one say that it
is itself a weakness unworthy of serious, thinking
men?
Such indeed is Faith supposed to be by the free
thinker, who therefore looks down upon it with
contempt; but such it does not appear when judged
in the light of calm, dispassionate reason.
Reason declares Faith to be deserving of the highest
praise, and feels bound to acknowledge that it raises
man to a greatness of soul which it would be vain to
expect from mere human learning.
To be convinced of this, confining ourselves to our
case, we have only to place clearly before our minds
the true state of the question. Here is an undeniable
truth which is taught by reason itself, viz., the existence
of God. The question is : How this truth can be so
impressed on the heart of man as to make him cling to
it with perfect consistency of thought and of will, so
that he shall never contradict himself in his reason
ings, never waver, never give place to error through
weakness of mind or heart. Now, let us suppose a
man who has firmly and once for all fixed in his
heart the conviction that there is a God of infinite
Faith Reasonable and Invigorating. 25
wisdom and goodness, Who governs the world ; could
this man ever think of entertaining any doubt as to
the propriety of that government ? On the other hand,
if he were to give way to the doubt, would not this be
a manifest proof that he has been wanting to his own
reason, by allowing himself, through cowardice, to
swerve from that truth which his reason pre
sented to him? Now, it is exactly here that Faith
comes to man s aid by its invigorating influence. For
Faith, I mean Christian Faith, demands, while at the
same time it infuses, a marvellous spiritual energy, an
energy far greater than could ever emanate from truth
as known by reason alone. So true is this, that reason,
finding man too feeble to embrace and practise her
own direct teachings, tries to stay him up, and, as it
were, to entice and allure him by secondary considera
tions which are in themselves merely relative and
accessory.
20. Now let me ask: is it not great strength of char
acter which enables a man by a single general princi
ple to govern his entire life, and without need of any
further support, to be always consistent, to vanquish
all doubts, to master all obstacles, to show himself proof
against all the subtleties and all the allurements of
the passions? (i) It is a fact of every day experience,
that the weaker a person happens to be in mind and
character, the more does he require to be sustained by
a variety of encouragements and accessory reasons that
shall keep him steadfast to moral principle. You
cannot usually govern children and persons of the
weaker sex by those few and solid reasons which
(i) This subject is admirably treated by St. John Chrysostom in his 8th
Homily on the Epistle to the Romans.
26 On Divine Providence.
suffice for a man. Any little pleasure, any little
pain, any sensible affection, is enough to make them
forget the reasons which they have indeed heard, but
which have not sunk deep into their breasts. The slight
impression which abstract truth makes on them, and
their consequent incapacity to make practical applica
tions of it, and, on the other hand, the force which
sensible things exert on their soft and elastic fibres,
reduce to almost nothing the effective energy of those
feeble understandings. This is in substance what
constitutes moral weakness in individuals. An un
mistakable symptom thereof is to find that general
principles, although understood for the moment, have
but little power to direct their lives. You must give
them a great number of accessory and partial reasons,
to prop them up, as it were, on all sides. To attempt
to. solve all their difficulties at once by one compre
hensive answer would be a mere waste of time. Each
difficulty must be met singly with a particular solution
of its own, and that solution exactly suited to their
peculiar disposition. Nothing else will satisfy them.
If what we have said be true, how pitiable an
exhibition is that which those sophists make of them
selves, who, under the pretence of standing up for
the rights of human reason, and from a proud ambition,
it would seem, to measure their strength with the
Most High, are ever eager to argue with excessive
minuteness about the events of the universe, and to go
on without end discussing with Him reason for reason,
as if He were a sophist like themselves! What is this
in reality but showing their own intellectual and moral
weakness? Indeed, if, as we have said, weak and
nerveless characters are unmistakably known by this,
Faith Reasonable and Invigorating. 27
that, being unable in cases of difficulty to feel the force
of a general reason, they require a great number of
partial and minute reasons, in order to be satisfied, I
very willingly leave it to the reader to judge what is
to be thought of these vain men who, with a loquacity
that seems irrepressible, are perpetually finding fault
with almost everything which God disposes in the
world. How strange that they should have arrogated
to themselves the pompous title of esprits forts ! Their
vanity would only excite ridicule, were it not for the
violence, the cruelty, the ferocity, which they wreak
on their too patient fellow-creatures, (i)
Thank God, then, that there are men upright, true,
and faithful, who by simple Faith in His existence and
in His attributes vanquish the world. Although the
world thinks them simple-minded and deficient in
good sense, yet it is to them that true manliness of
character and vigour of intellect really belong. One
principle alone, viz., the existence of God, one belief
alone, the belief in His word, avails them far more
than all the noisy science of men. One truth alone,
shining vividly upon them, and supreme, is enough to
direct them under all possible circumstances. Through
the force of this truth their intellect never wavers, their
spirit is always at peace, their reason always holds
sway, and to their will, ever in conformity with that of
God, the world itself is obedient.
How often has it seemed to me that the whole
(i) The Author here refers to the motley crowd of so-called Philosophers
of the Voltairian School, the out-pourings of whose blasphemous and
flippant literature, as well as the miseries and the blood with which they at
last flooded Europe, were still fresh in the mind of the public at the time in
which he, then very young, was writing this first book. Tr.
28 On Divine Providence.
difference between great and extraordinary men, and
those of the common stamp, consists after all in nothing
else than a greater degree of that interior strength of
which I am speaking ! Great and lasting enterprises
cannot be conceived except by a man who is dominated
by few but lofty principles. It is the force of these which
elevatesand ennobles his whole spirit. Undertheirinflu-
ence, just as if, to use an ancient Greek phrase, a Divinity
were speaking to him, he abandons himself to schemes full
of counsel, almost without taking counsel. A stranger
to hesitation, he goes his way undauntedly in the midst
of dangers, caring for nothing but the high aim on
which his thoughts are fixed ; and so he conquers men
and even nature. Whence all this ? Simply from that
constant uniformity of action, and that sentiment, which
add so mysterious and irresistible a power to the few
but universal conceptions which are his guide.
Thus is the Christian man constantly dominated by
one grand idea, which by its universality embraces and
absorbs into itself all other ideas. To say that the
Divinity Itself works in him, through the light of
this idea, is not by any means a mere dream of
the ancient Greeks. By the energizing virtue of this
idea, and that imperturbable firmness which it produces,
he rises far above all other men, who, wearied under
the immense burden of untrustworthy human cogni
tions, and tossed to and fro in continual uncertainties,
often lose heart, and sometimes even fall into despair.
CHAPTER VIII.
BY ABUSING REASON, SOME TURN IT TO THEIR OWN
RUIN.
2 1 . But as the way of Faith is justly entitled to praise,
inasmuch as it so strengthens man s spirit that he can
with imperturbable calm of mind adore what he does
not understand in the dealings of Divine Providence,
so the way of reason also may turn out to be of very
great advantage to a man who follows it with an
upright spirit.
22. By way of reason I mean that mental process
whereby we seek to find out the particular reasons
according to which Supreme Providence disposes of
created things.
23. This, however, is an abstruse and difficult way,
and few can venture upon it with safety.
For it can be followed in three different modes, or
rather it branches out as it were into three several paths ;
hence the fruit which we reap, for good or evil, from
applying ourselves to the investigation of the sublime
rules followed by Providence in Its government, varies
very widely according to the different modes which we
adopt in the inquiry.
24. The first mode of using our reason in reference
to the dealings of Providence, or the first of the three
subordinate paths just mentioned, is followed by those
who search into the Divine dispositions with an evil
30 On Divine Providence.
heart, in a hostile, haughty spirit, as if their sole de
sire were to discover in those dealings something to
condemn, and hence catch at a pretext for denying, or
at least misrepresenting, that God Whom they love
not, but of Whom, to their extreme anguish, they
are continually in dread.
25. To these unhappy men, who seem ever bent on
discovering, if possible, some excuse for thinking
that there is no God, knowledge yields a sad and
poisonous fruit. It only serves to envelop them in
a profound darkness of perpetual doubt, in which,
deprived of every cheering ray of truth, they have
nothing to console them but the fitful and lurid flashes
of a troubled imagination. Of that wisdom which
gives motion and life to the universe, they every day
understand less and less; and the Deity from Whom
that vital wisdom flows they bitterly and tremblingly
blaspheme.
How much happier is the condition of the humble
and despised believer than that of haughty scio
lists! It is they who are answerable, if the noble gift
of reason, if knowledge, which is so abundant a source
of consolation, has now-a-days fallen so low in general
estimation.
26. Indeed, it is not reason, it is not knowledge, that
is hurtful to humanity, but the vices of men who
foolishly turn to their own injury the highest and
best gifts of heaven. "The study of the universe"
(says Rousseau) "ought, I well know, to raise man up
to his Creator; but it only sets off human vanity.
The philosopher, imagining that he can penetrate into
the Divine secrets, dares to associate his pretended
wisdom with that of the Eternal. He approves, he
Reason abused a Cause of Ruin. 3 1
blames, he corrects, he prescribes laws to nature and
limits to the Deity. But while, occupied with his
vain systems, he racks his brains in the attempt to re
adjust the machine of the universe, the simple rustic
who sees the rain and the sun fertilize his field at
regular seasons, admires, praises, and blesses the Hand
that bestows these favours on him, without troubling
himself as to the manner in which they come about.
He does not seek to justify his ignorance or his vices
by his unbelief. He does not censure the works of
God, nor make war upon his Lord in order to parade
his own sufficiency. Never will the impious word of
Alphonsus X. fall from the lips of an illiterate man :
only a learned tongue could utter such a blasphemy.
While cultured Greece was teeming with atheists, no
barbarian, as ^Elian observes, had ever called the
existence of God into doubt. We may observe the
same thing at this day, for there is in all Asia but
one people versed in letters, and half of this people
is atheist. This is the only nation in Asia in which
atheism is known." (i)
27. By what deplorable misfortune came it to pass
that this man, who knew and could describe so well
the illusions of vain science, did not know how to
guard himself from them r How was it that one who
so thoroughly understood the noble end of the study
of the universe, and how it ought to raise man to the
knowledge of his Creator, afterwards abused this study,
if not to deny the Deity, to misrepresent It at least,
by denying Its Providence as regards the particular
objects of the universe? Who could have thought
that he who had praised the pious rustic, because,
(i) Reponse au Rot de Pologne, etc.
32 On Divine Providence.
with a heart fully convinced of what true wisdom
is, he raises his hands to heaven in thanksgiving
to the Almighty Who sends the sun and the rain
to fertilize his fields, would with the same hand
write words like these? "We must believe that the
particular events of this sublunary world are nothing
in the eyes of the Lord of the universe; that His
Providence is only universal, and that He is content
with preserving the genera and the species, without
troubling Himself about the way in which each in
dividual passes through this fleeting life."(i) Alas!
what is man, if he is subject to such glaring, such
fatal contradictions ? What is man s wisdom, if, when
blinded by the passions, he disowns and denies what,
but a little while before, he saw and confessed ?
(\]Lettre a M. de Voltaire, etc.
CHAPTER IX.
BY TRUSTING SOLELY TO REASON, SOME ENDANGER
THEIR OWN SALVATION.
28. This way of using the human intelligence, there
fore, is much to be dreaded, leading, as it does, evil-
disposed men to terrible falls. It is of such that the
Scripture says: "I will destroy the wisdom of the
wise, and the prudence of the prudent I will reject.
Where is the wise? Where is the Scribe? Where is
the disputer of this world? Hath not God made
foolish the wisdom of this world?" (i)
On the other hand, the study of the invisible attri
butes of the Creator as revealed in that Wisdom which
shines forth in creatures might lead a man to the
knowledge of truth, even though he were not yet im
bued with true piety, provided only he be not enslaved
to evil passions.
29. I say mighf, because the thing is by no means
certain. Human reason, although the offspring of the
Divine, is, when left to itself, short-sighted and liable
to error. Not that the light of reason is itself fallible;
but man is fallible who makes use of and applies it.
Accordingly he who, either freely or of necessity, has
made it a rule for himself to follow no other guide
than his own reason, may or may not read correctly the
(i) Isa. xxix. 14; i Cor. I. 19, 20.
D
34
On Divine Providence.
traces which all things bear of the Wisdom that rules
them. He may encounter difficulties of so serious a
nature as to disturb his evenness of mind and place
in jeopardy the success of his investigations. It is a
mere venture, a game of hazard, in which he commits
his all to the caprice of fortune, and risks the loss
of it. Is it not a mere accident that the difficulties
which occur to him against Divine Providence should
be proportionate to the strength of his understanding?
30. Of a truth, it is purely a matter of accident that an
individual should have received from nature a larger or
smaller amount of mental vigour. This amount,
always an unknown quantity to him, is in no way
dependent on him, and is just so much as nature has
bestowed, not a fraction more. How, then, can any one
prudently abandon himself to the guidance of his reason
alone? Is not this the same as committing one s
destinies to blind chance ? Some may perhaps wonder
at my saying that the amount of our own mental vigour
"is always an unknown quantity to us, and in no way
dependent on us;" yet, singular as it may appear,
it is none the less a simple, undeniable fact.
31. The power of the instrument by which we know
all other things always remains, and by the nature
of the case must always remain, hidden from our
knowledge. We cannot measure the power of our
intelligence. How could we do so except by means of
another intelligence ? And if there are two intelligences
in us (an absurd thing to say) by what will the power
of the second be measured ?(i) Or shall we involve
(i) Let it be well noted that the question here is about the powers of the
individual reason, not about those of human reason considered in itself.
Danger of trusting solely to Reason. 35
ourselves in an infinite series of intelligences (another
absurdity), that is to say, in a series which, precisely
because infinite, could never give us that last intelli
gence which would be necessary for judging all the
rest? What a delusion, then, for a man to suppose
that, if he intrusts himself to the guidance of
his reason, he is safe in his own keeping! Does he
know, to ask once more, what is the strength of this
reason of which he has so high an opinion? Did
he measure it before receiving it, before it was
assigned to him by nature ? Or was he, before coming
into existence, called in for consultation, and invited,
together with his Creator, to weigh this reason in
the balance, thus to make certain that it was of
that strength which would be proportionate and
suitable to his wants, to the force of the difficulties
which he was destined to meet during the life he
was afterwards to receive? Moreover, did he then
examine all those difficulties one by one, as well as all
the temptations to which they would give rise, so that
he might be ready to oppose to them that degree of
intellectual force which would be sufficient to solve and
overcome them all?
Plainly, then, it is by no means necessary, but a
Now the fact that a man s individual reason is unable to measure its own
calibre cannot cause any doubt as to the genuineness of those truths which
he knows by means of it. For, to say that we can make certain of the truth
of what we know is very different from saying that we can tell for certain
what is the extent of our individual capabilities of knowing. The first of
these things we certainly can do in fact, it is necessary that we should be
able to do it ; but the second is beyond the power of the individual reason.
As to human reason considered in itself, we certainly can fix its limits, and
this exactly because, as has just been said, the individual reason can make
itself certain of such truths as have come within its knowledge.
36 On Divine Providence.
matter of pure accident, that a man should be able, by
reason alone, to solve at once all the partial difficulties
which present themselves to him against Divine Provi
dence in the course of his life.
32. I have said "the difficulties which present them
selves to him," and not "all the difficulties which could
be found in the government of the universe." So
unlimited is the extent of this government, that the
human mind, far from ever being able to fathom
the whole depth of the wisdom which is necessary for
administering it, and which is lavishly bestowed upon
every part of it, will never even conceive all the questions
that could be raised concerning it, all the difficulties that
could be proposed. Indeed, it will be, so far as regards
man himself, a pure accident, not only that he should
know how to untie those knots upon which his thought
actually falls ; but also that his thought should fall upon
such or such knots rather than upon others. And he
who already finds it hard to explain some particular
event, and is at a loss how to reconcile it with the Divine
Wisdom, is so far from having penetrated the depth of
those counsels by which all events are directed, that
although there are in nature and in the succession of
things an infinity of other knots, very much harder
to loose than those which he has perceived, he does
not even know that they exist.
But if even those difficulties which man does per
ceive are beyond the power of his reason to solve, what
will befall him if he trust to so ignorant a guide in
judging the whole plan of God s Providence r
33. He will be tempted to stray from the path of
truth. To this temptation a man is not, properly
speaking, compelled to yield, but he very often does
Danger of trusting solely to Reason. 37
yield to it on account of the weakness of his virtue.
When a man who is earnestly engaged in searching for
the causes of things, finds himself thwarted in the
attainment of his object, there naturally arises within
him a feeling of discomfort, of mental pain. To rid
himself of this disagreeable feeling, wholly peculiar
to rational beings, man, unable to discover, as he would
wish, the true causes, very easily takes to inventing a
great number of imaginary ones. To this eager desire
of finding a ready way of accounting for natural phe
nomena was, in part, due that invention of innumerable
divinities presiding over all the operations of nature, an
invention that dishonours human reason, which is at once
so presumptuous, yet so extremely feeble. Man does
not like to remain in a state which constantly reminds
him of, and obliges him to confess, his ignorance. He
therefore imagines a thousand hypotheses, to persuade
himself that he knows a vast deal. Hypotheses resting
mostly on mere assertion have abounded in the world
in proportion to the scarcity of well-ascertained truths.
That which was at first assumed in explanation of
the phenomena, and which could at most be credited
with some few degrees of probability, was soon taken
for a certainty. It is difficult for the generality of men
to keep clearly in mind the distinction between pro
bability and certainty; nay, human nature itself, being
created for truth, slides as it were by its own weight
from the declivity of doubt to the solid plain of settled
persuasion. Hence the hypotheses changed into theses
and dogmas came to vary, not according to the greater
degree of likelihood inherent in them, but according
as they seemed more true to those men who were
reputed wise. Yet these men themselves differed from
38 On Divine Providence.
other people, perhaps only in this, that they had found
greater difficulties in explaining the natural course of
events, and, being unable through ignorance to solve
them, had fancied certain fictitious solutions, and taught
them with great presumption. Herein lies a prolific
source, not only of mythological dreams, but also of
fabulous philosophies.
34. To sum up, then: a man who tries to investigate
the counsels of Providence by means of his reason
alone, abandons himself to mere chance, and does not
even know what that is to which he is trusting. Per
haps he will discover some part of those counsels;
perhaps this part will be enough to tranquillize him,
perhaps it will not; perhaps, again, he will remain
totally in the dark. Uncertain is the success of his
attempt, because uncertain is the power of the instru
ment he uses, unknown the force of the difficulty of the
enterprise to which he girds himself. Nevertheless, if
he happens to gain the knowledge he is in search of,
and to see the light he needs for clearing away his
darkness, he will be confirmed in his belief in the
Deity. In this case, he will probably bless and give
thanks to that Deity for having solved his doubts, and
manifested Itself to him in creatures. Thus it may
come to pass that reason will help him on towards
Faith, and arouse in him a desire to hear the more
immediate voice of so beneficent a Deity. Perhaps
he will second that impulse, and in a heart so well
disposed the light revealed by reason will shine more
and more brilliantly every day, until at last he is
brought to the possession of the entire Divine word,
and received into the true Church of God. Holy
Scripture seems to refer to such a man when it says :
Danger of trusting solely to Reason. 39
"A wise man hateth not the commandments and
justices, and he shall not be dashed in pieces as a
ship in a storm;" and again: "A man of understand
ing is faithful to the law of God."(i) For this is the
same as affirming that the natural judgment itself can
bring man near to Faith and to subjection to the
Divine Law, provided that sense be true and suffi
ciently full.
35. Now, what if our inquirer, either because his
intelligence is too weak or because the difficulties he
stumbles against are too strong, should find himself
baffled in the attempt to reconcile human events with
his notions of Divine wisdom and goodness ? Will
he not be in danger of having his Faith in the Deity
rudely shaken? Will he not be tempted to throw
himself upon some kind of system which, to his short
sighted view, may render it easier to explain events,
perhaps even an atheistic system, such as that of
Fatalism, or of Atomism, which, by banishing all mind
from the world and representing all things as im
pelled by blind necessity, frees him who is gross-
minded enough to embrace it from all further trouble
of searching for explanations, and from all that shame
which is attached to a confession of ignorance r
36. Here, however, there is one thing to be con
sidered. In the common course of physical as well
as of moral events, the wisdom of a provident ruler
is so patent that no observer can fail to be forcibly
struck by it. It unmistakably shows itself on every
side. In the language of Holy Writ, it "cries out on
the highways, in the market-places, and on the house
tops," inviting all men to itself. Therefore, as regards
(i) Ecclus. xxxiii. 2, 3.
40 On Divine Providence.
man s power to see that a mind disposes all things
in the world, there can be no doubt; for that mind
strikes vivid rays of light even into the eyes of those
who would fain close them. Consequently, the diffi
culties which arise against that all-disposing mind
can be only partial, can lie only in some particular
events which have the appearance of being at variance
with that goodness and wisdom according to which the
ordinary course of things is seen to proceed. Such
being the case, a man will always be inexcusable if,
on account of these comparatively very trifling cases
of difficulty, he shrinks back from belief in that God
Whose existence is so overwhelmingly proclaimed by
the testimony of universal nature.
But granted that grounds of objection against that
Providence which shines forth in the whole, can be
found only by one s thought stopping at some very
small part, at some particular event, does it follow
that the virtue of an inquirer who has started by
placing his whole dependence on his own individual
reason will be any the less in danger, or that the
success of his investigations will be any the less uncer
tain ? It is true, that when one cannot explain a certain
thing, all that this proves in fair logic is one s own
ignorance; and it is likewise true, that ignorance is no
valid proof of the non-existence of the Supreme Being.
But how easily, indeed how often, does a man change
the proposition "I do not understand this," into the
other, "This does not exist"? especially as, by tak
ing reason for his sole guide, he has already pro
nounced in its favour, and implicitly declared his
undoubting trust in it. And what if to self-love, to
which the consciousness of ignorance is so mortifying
Danger of trusting solely to Reason. 4 1
and in the end unendurable, we add the allurements
of sense? Will not a man be grievously tempted to
deny or at least doubt the Divine Goodness when
he feels crushed under the load of misfortune, even
setting aside the perplexity and the unpleasant
ness he naturally experiences at seeing the unsatis
factory result of his reasonings r Holy Scripture calls
calamities by the name of temptations, even when
speaking of most holy men ; and praises in most glow
ing terms those who stood faithful to God in the
depth of affliction as, for instance, Job and Tobias
proposing them for imitation as patterns of Faith,
and possessors of perfect virtue. What a terrible
temptation, then, must this be for those who put all
their trust in themselves!
37. Wonderful is the connexion and affinity in man
between sense and mind. Given anything unpleasant
to the senses, the mind is at once naturally inclined to
judge unfavourably of the cause of that pain. And
yet it is quite possible that an effect which is unpleasant
to the sense may be due to a cause in itself excellent :
excellent above all is the First Cause whereby all
things are moved and disposed. If the mind could see
that Cause with an eye undimmed by the complaints
raised by injured sensitivity, it would not be able to
help pronouncing it most lovely. But when its at
tention is drawn to the pain alone, it then forgets to
consider the First Cause in Itself, in Its beauty, in
Its intrinsic goodness; it considers It only, in Its
relation with those unpleasant sensations, I mean only
as the cause of them. Regarded in this way, the First
Cause has a hideous, repulsive look; and the mind
judges of It accordingly. Then the mind, deceived by
42 On Divine Providence.
this sinister judgment, passes on, first to hate that
Cause, next to shun all thought of It, and, finally, to
deny It. Here, therefore, we see how it is that the
way of reasoning sometimes leads man to difficult
encounters, and sometimes even to utter ruin. This
happens when natural reason stumbles against diffi
culties which it is not able to grapple with, while at the
same time, man has not enough virtue to acknowledge
his ignorance and keep the eye of his mind constantly
fixed on it; especially if this occur when he has,
furthermore, to battle with sensible sufferings of a
peculiarly grievous and harassing nature.
38. Hence, St. Paul tells us of the punishment which
God reserved for those philosophers, who, having
betaken themselves to the way of reasoning, came
to a bad end. They saw, indeed, in all creation,
the traces of God s invisible attributes, because God
had placed those traces there for the very purpose that
men might see them; nevertheless, they held the
truth in injustice, they did not confess that truth, nor
proclaim it abroad, nor glorify God, nor give Him
thanks, but became vain in their thoughts, and their
heart was darkened to such a degree that "they changed
the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of
the image of a corruptible man, and of four-footed
beasts, and of creeping things." (i) Thus did they
refuse to recognize that which they beheld everywhere.
They disowned that unity of Wisdom which is mani
fest in all creatures, that unity of Providence which
betokens one only Ruler; they dwarfed it, and split
it up into a multiplicity of paltry and imperfect forms,
(i) Rom. I.
Danger of trusting solely to Reason. 43
inventions of the human mind, and representations of
human power or of mere brute strength.
To conclude : the second way in which we have said
that human reason can be used in investigating the
dispensations of Divine Providence, is fallacious and
unsafe, in one word, its success is purely a matter of
accident. It ought, indeed, to lead man to Faith ; but,
through man s own insufficiency, it not unfrequently
leads him astray and hurries him into the gloomy and
ruinous paths of unbelief.
CHAPTER X.
REASON MAY BE SAFELY TRUSTED WHEN ASSOCIATED
WITH FAITH.
39. Natural reason, then, is short-sighted and liable
to error ; and yet if man by taking reason for his only
guide comes to a bad end, this is never owing to reason
itself, but solely to man s own will.
It is man s will that abuses the short-sightedness of
reason, its ignorance, its darkness, wielding with
most culpable foolishness such miserable weapons
against the Supreme Being.
40. Hence, Christianity is the friend of reason
but not, of course, of the abuse which human infirmity
or malice makes of it. Hence the pastors of the Church
have at all times encouraged men of ability to do their
utmost for the purpose of succouring human weakness
and ignorance, which are a hindrance to man s receiving
fully the teachings of Revelation. Thus, for example,
Leo X. in the 8th Session of the 5th Lateran Council,
wisely enjoined on the Philosophers of his time(i) to
refute by means of arguments furnished simply by the
natural light of reason the errors of the Arabian School,
(i) On the friendly and close alliance between Christian Faith and human
reason, and of the duty of bearing it practically in mind, see also Pius IX s
Dogmatical Constitution De Fide Catholica, expressing the mind of the
Vatican Council, Chapter IV., De Fide etRatione. It will be found inserted
in the volume containing the Acta et Decreta of the IV. Provincial Council
of Westminster, held in 1874 (pp. 123 5). 7r.
Reason associated with Faith a safe Guide. 45
which were then infesting the Church. " For," said he,
" since truth can never be opposed to truth, it follows
that all their (the Arabians ) errors can be refuted
even by reason alone." (i)
( i ) I beg leave to give an instance of the powerful influence which pre
judices imbibed from an early age can exert even on men of high intellectual
culture. Dugald Stewart, in a dissertation prefixed to the first volume of
the Supplement to the Encyclopedia Britannica (4th, 5th, and 6th editions,
1824), says that Melancthon (and consequently Protestantism) discovered that
the moral distinction between good and evil is not due to a positive divine
revelation, but exists in itself! (p. 30.) He adds that Catholics also have
profited by this Protestant discovery. To prove this he quotes a passage
from Lampredi s work on Natural Right and the Law of Nations. More
remarkable still, he does not hesitate to charge the Roman Church with
having attempted to divorce Revelation from reason, and to place the two
in mutual antagonism ; and this he boldly stigmatizes as the most pernicious
heresy of that Church !
Now, in the first place, I will take it upon myself to affirm, without fear of
contradiction, that these few lines (three in all), fallen from Melancthon s pen,
very little known, and not taken from the works of this writer himself, but
borrowed from Christian Meiners, made no appreciable change in the moral
ideas of the time. Secondly: is it not singular that Dugald Stewart did
not observe that in the very passage quoted by him from Lampredi reference
is made to a place in the writings of Melchior Canus, where this Catholic
Divine, not by a few lines, nor by a gratuitous assertion, but at great length
and with a full array of solid arguments, refutes Luther, one of whose most
mischievous errors consisted precisely in divorcing reason from revelation, and
pretending that the moral distinction of good and evil comes to us exclusively
from divine revelation ? Now, Melchior Canus was Melancthon s contem
porary, and died in the same year. How could a man be blind with the
truth so clearly before him ?
But that this obnoxious doctrine, after being held by Luther, was long
maintained among Protestants, we learn from Dugald Stewart himself, who
relates that in the year 1598, Daniel Offmann, Professor of Divinity at the
University of Helmstadt, taught with Luther that philosophy is a mortal
enemy to religion, and that philosophical is so divided from theological truth,
that what is true in philosophy may be false in theology. How could he,
therefore, after this, so confidently, and without giving the shadow of a proof,
ascribe this error to Catholics, and claim for Melancthon the merit of having
enlightened the world by those few sentences which were soon forgotten ?
46 On Divine Providence.
41. Now, as reason leads man to the threshold of
Faith (34), so it hands him over to Faith as to a more
trustworthy guide and a more sublime teacher than
itself.
But on the other hand, Faith, in its turn, leads man
back again to reason ; and then reason, comforted and
sustained by Faith, becomes a secure teacher and an
infallible guide.
This is, therefore, the third mode of using our intelli
gence, far better than either of the two we have
mentioned. He who follows it is like a man walking
along a broad and royal road. He is not lost in that
fearful maze of errors which we described when speak
ing of the first mode (21 27); and he does not wander
to and fro with uncertain and perilous steps, along
tortuous, insecure and most hazardous paths, as we
No ! such an absurdity was never dreamed of by Catholics, and did I not know
the incredible force of prejudices I should not hesitate to brand the assertion
of the illustrious writer as a gratuitous and unworthy calumny. Catholics
have always held in abhorrence this absurdity of the innovators, and the
Roman Pontiffs have always condemned it, from Ockam, who was one of its
first defenders, down to Pomponazzi, whom Leo X. condemned in this
very 5th Lateran Council, that is, before the errors of the Reformation were
spread abroad, or Melancthon had enlightened the world, as D. Stewart
would have us believe. The same condemnation was aftenvards issued
against Daniel Offmann.
If Melancthon did not follow Luther in this particular, it only means
that, by adhering herein to the Catholic teaching, he fell into one error less.
Christianity is a wise religion, and the Roman Pontiffs, who preside over
it, have always been, in virtue of their office, the defenders and promulgators
of wisdom. They have known that the Chair of Truth could only reign in
light. Therefore they have encouraged this wisdom, this light, this truth ;
they have invoked its aid against error ; they have spread it far and wide
together with religion, and, along with wisdom and religion, they have
diffused true civilization and its attendant blessings. How long, then, will
men of an enlightened age show themselves so credulous in believing the
most glaring falsehoods ?
Reason associated with Faith a safe Guide. 47
saw to be the case in the second mode (28 38). He is
taken direct to the happy goal for which he is making.
Yes truly, intelligence thus used is converted into an
open, luminous and straight way. It connects earth
with heaven, and even on earth it causes man to enjoy
a vivid knowledge of the truth, and complete repose.
42. Thus Faith by encouraging human reason, by
succouring it where it is weak, by rectifying its errors,
and by applying a remedy to its most deep-rooted evils
is the one only thing which renders to all men alike
the service of giving peace, and which, no matter what
the strength of an individual s reason may be, supplies
whatever is wanting to make it for him the guide that
he requires. The calibre of men s reason varies, the
Faith received by believers is the same in all. The
power assigned by nature to each individual intelli
gence is of such fixed quantity as not to admit of
substantial increase; hence it does not so adapt itself
to the various emergencies and vicissitudes of life as
to make itself commensurate with each. The deposit of
Faith, on the contrary, is intrusted to man s own free
will, so that he can by study, by good works and by
prayer, draw therefrom as much as ever he needs.
This treasure is increased by use, and is diminished by
negligence, just as man pleases. By trusting to it,
man may very well say that he is safe in his own
keeping, for he knows in whose hands he places his
fortunes, inasmuch as, that treasure being his own, he
can dispose of it at discretion, and always have from
it what will supply his every necessity, both of mind
and heart. Whether or not, therefore, an individual
be possessed of great abilities, he equally finds in
Revelation and Faith the means of rendering those
48 On Divine Providence.
abilities sufficient for his requirements. Faith imparts
those lights in which weak understandings are
deficient; and it unravels that tangled skein of
cavilling sophisms in which powerful intellects some
times find themselves involved as a consequence of the
very attempts they make at reasoning. In both cases it
offers a suitable food, more solid and substantial in
the second case, but not less wholesome nor less agree
able in the first. If a man has abundant leisure for
meditation, Faith will lay open before him vast and
delightful fields for sublime speculations, whereas, if
his occupations leave him but little time to meditate,
it will satisfy him by a few but substantial and divine
ideas. Such is the comfort which Faith gives to
human reason; such the manner in which man can
make use of his intelligence with the happiest results.
43. I beg the reader to note well in what I have
made to consist the difference between this way of
using the intelligence, and the way of Faith alone. If
a man, simply by the force of his belief in God and His
attributes, sets all doubts against Divine Providence
at rest, or again, if simply by a firm reliance on the
assurances of Revelation, he reposes tranquilly in God,
like a child in its mother s arms, I have said that he
follows the way of Faith. But if, besides holding
immovably fast to the truth of God s existence and of
the revealed dogmas, he further sets himself to
investigate many other truths, and to penetrate as far
as he can into the marvels of the Divine Counsels, so,
however, as at the same time to be fully determined
never to lose sight of Faith, but invariably to cleave to
it as the guardian of his reason; then, I say, he
proceeds by the way of reasoning, still a secure way,
Reason associated "with Faith a safe Guide. 49
because he is assisted in it by Faith. In this case his
reasoning may also be called the offspring of Faith ;
and this luminous way was that along which the Saints
went eagerly forward, searching out the grandest truths.
It is the way peculiar to Christians, who do not indeed
renounce reason, yet, on the other hand, are not so
simple or so vain as to imagine that they are not to
listen to any other voice but that of their individual
reason, which neither does nor can give proof of its
sufficiency for their wants.
44. Now who would not consider that man to be the
blind victim of a ridiculous pride, who should refuse
to learn anything from others in order to draw all
knowledge from himself alone? Deprived of all in
struction, nay, deprived of all communication with his
fellow men (since even mere inter-communication is a
source of instruction), how could any one emerge never
so little from that state of complete ignorance in which
he was born ? If, then, to acquire any degree of mental
culture, we are all bound to depend on the assistance
of others, is it not strange that persons should be found
who reject the aid of revealed truths, the teaching of
God Himself?
CHAPTER XI.
BY REVELATION ONLY COULD THE DIVINE PLAN OF
THE UNIVERSE BE MADE KNOWN, AND HUMAN
DOUBTS AS TO THE PERFECTION OF ITS GOVERN
MENT BE DISPELLED.
45. In many places of Holy Writ Faith is described
as a life-spring of intelligence, as a power which
strengthens human reason and leads it to truth, as a
teacher that unfolds before us, and puts us in posses
sion of the secrets of wisdom. St. Paul, writing to the
Hebrews, assures them that it is only by Revelation
we come to know the stupendous plan which God con
ceived and is continually carrying into execution in
the universe.
All this immense chain of events which we call the
universe, beginning with the word that creates, and
ending with the word that judges, is, according to the
Apostle, dependent upon and held firmly together by
God s Eternal Word. "By Faith," he says, "we
understand that the world was framed by the Word
of God, that from invisible things visible things might
be made."(i) Now, what are these invisible things
from which the visible things were drawn ? They are
the concepts of the Omnipotent, which subsisted in
His Mind before the creation ; they are the decrees
conceived by Him from all eternity, but remaining
(I) Hebr. xi. 13.
The Divine Plan made known only by Revelation. 5 1
invisible to creatures, because the latter were not yet
formed and the former were not yet executed. These
decrees and concepts are the design according to
which the All-wise Architect was to raise the
mighty edifice, a design, however, which had never
been delineated in any outward form, but existed only
in His Mind. Accordingly, intellective creatures,
before they are admitted to the vision of that Mind,
have no means of seeing what the great design of the
universe is, until it be externally realized. But it will
not be fully accomplished until the end of the ages.
Then, and then only, will this design, this immense
conception, be rendered perfectly visible ; for, accord
ing to the teaching of St. Paul, all the ages are com
prised in it, all having been from eternity designed
and disposed in the secret of the Eternal Mind.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the ages, along which the
edifice corresponding in its every part to the eternal
model is being gradually raised, have not all run their
course, and, as a consequence, the structure is not com
pletely visible to man living on this earth, it follows
that God alone could by a positive manifestation
have made it known to him in its principal parts and
in its sublime end. Thus is it that to give us an
insight into the Divine conception, a Revelation was
necessary. In other words, by Faith alone, which,
as the Apostle declares, "cometh by hearing," (i) was
it possible for man to understand, that, in accordance
with the decree of the Eternal, the events of all time
are directed to the glory of the Word Incarnate as to
their one and unspeakably sublime end.
46. For this reason, God, in Isaias, bids His afflicted
(I) Rom. x. 17.
52 On Divine Providence.
people be of good courage. And to show on what a
frail support the heathen nations lean by trusting to
their false divinities, He challenges those divinities
and all their worshippers to describe the great plan
of the universe, a description which can be given
by Him alone Who has conceived it, and Who alone
carries it into execution.
In fact, in order to render this great plan manifest,
to impart such knowledge as alone can tranquillize
the human spirit, always restless, always anxious
about its future destiny, one must know the present,
the past and the future ; for, all the immensity of time
and all the vastness of space are gathered together
and conjoined in the most complete, the most perfect
unity ; every atom as well as every movement is
dependent on a single end, eternally fixed and worthy
of God, an end which is God Himself, the Word. "I,"
says God in the place referred to, "am the first,
and I am the last, and besides Me there is no God.
Who is like to Me ? Let him call and declare, and
let him set before Me the order since I appointed the
ancient people; and the things to come, and that
shall be hereafter, let them show unto them. Fear ye
not, neither be ye troubled. From that time I have
made thee to hear, and have declared, you are My
witnesses." (i) This is as if He had said : As there is
no one besides Me who is able to set forth and lay
open to men s view the great plan of the universe,
embracing as it does all things, the length, the
breadth, the depth, the past, the present and the
future ; so there is no one who is able to find out and
to communicate to men what will give them true con-
(i) Isa. xliv. 6-8.
The Divine Plan made known only by Revelation. 53
solation in their misfortunes, namely, that knowledge,
so needful to them, which accounts for the universal
government and justifies it, which solves the difficulties
that arise in the minds of those harassed with tribula
tions, and at the same time allays the agitations of
their hearts. Let those, therefore, tremble in the
darkness of their ignorance who are far away from
Me; but fear not you, My faithful ones; for in the
revelations which I will make to you, and which I
have always made, there is for you an unfailing source
of comfort and of strength. Whatever be the appa
rent prosperity of the impious, envy it not; for it is
uncertain and only momentary.
47. Truly, none but God could have disclosed that
moral end of the universe which reduces to rule all
apparent irregularities : He alone could at the very be
ginning tell man, whom He had just created, how all
things were drawn out of nothing, how the intelligent
creature was the end of all the others, and, lastly,
why this creature existed, why it was made, namely,
to be happy in serving Him. God alone, by revealing
to man the plan which He alone had conceived, could
take him into partnership with Himself in the execu
tion of the same.
The revelation of the secrets of Providence, therefore,
is what imparts that knowledge which encourages and
lifts up the human spirit oppressed by tribulations;
and this revelation could come only from God, could
emanate only from His Word. It could not have been
invented by human reason itself. God presented it to
man by drawing it from the secret thought of His
Eternal Mind, because, externally, that thought would
not be completely realized and manifested save at the
54
On Divine Providence.
end of time, when all things will be seen to result in a
most simple unity. Consequently, without this re
velation, by experimental knowledge alone, man
harassed with evils and confused by the ever changing
round of events, would have found it impossible not to
waver in Faith, or even not to lose altogether the idea
of a beneficent Mind governing the world. For this
reason, God did not leave man without revelation, but
began to give it to him from the moment that his
woes began nay, from the moment that he began to
exist; and we may safely affirm that it was by such
revelation that human reason, originally quite inert,
was first set in motion.
48. Indeed, the knowledge of the existence of God,
and of His wisdom and goodness in the government
of the universe, was that prolific seed, sown at the
beginning, out of which afterwards germinated what
ever of true, of consoling, of precious, the philosophies
of nations have contained.
Hence righteous men, when tossed about and
disturbed by reverses, ask of God no other consolation
than that He would grant them increased light to see
into the secrets of His Providence : " To Thee, O Lord,
have I lifted up my soul. Show, O Lord, Thy ways to
me, and teach me Thy paths. Instruct me in Thy
truth and teach me; for Thou art my Saviour, and on
Thee have I waited all day long."(i) Thus did the holy
Psalmist seek to find in these ways and paths of the
Lord that comfort of which his troubled spirit stood in
need, namely, as Eusebius and Theodore of Heraclea
expound, in the knowledge of the aims of Providence,
of the far-reaching views according to which God dis-
(i) Ps. xxiv. I, 4, 5.
The Divine Plan made known only by Revelation. 55
penses good and evil. It is by communicating these
lights, and a corresponding strength, more abundantly
in proportion as they are more wanted, that God makes
good the promise He has given by His Apostle : " God
is faithful, Who will not suffer you to be tempted above
that which you are able; but will make also with temp
tation issue, that you may be able to bear it."(i) Hence
it comes to pass that, for righteous men, sufferings and
calamities are one of those temptations which St. Paul
calls by the name of human, that is, confined merely
to their sensitive part, and nowise affecting, in a sense
injurious to true Faith, either their mind or their will.
49. Now this consoling science which God commu
nicates to His Saints is nothing but that body of
truths which constitute Revealed Religion. How
precious, then, is this Religion to mankind ! Is it not
true that those who study it well and judge it with
equity, find in the end that it is naught else than a
science of consolation offered to men in order to com
fort and sustain them in their sorrows, to re-animate
them in their discouragement, to stay them in the
truth and in all virtues? A loving, divine message,
therefore, a consolatory treatise is the august volume
of the Holy Scriptures, wherein the deposit of our Faith
is contained. That such is the general scope and
office of the Inspired ^Writings we are assured by St.
Paul, who, addressing himself to the Romans, to
encourage them under their tribulations, says: "What
things soever were written, were written for our learn
ing, that through patience and the comfort of the
Scriptures we might have hope."(2)
(i) i Cor. x. 13. (2) Rom. xv. 4.
CHAPTER XII.
IN THE PLAN OF THE UNIVERSE THERE IS SOMETHING
INFINITE AND MYSTERIOUS. HERE REASON COMES
TO A STOP AND INTRUSTS MAN TO FAITH.
50. But if holy men drew the precious science of
consolation from the lights received from heaven, they
were not by any means so craven-hearted as to expect
that those lights would be sent to them without any
labour on their part. On the contrary, they were assi
duous in pondering on and searching into the Holy
Scriptures; and it was only by doing this that the true
Israelites found comfort in their calamities. The Royal
Prophet, when encompassed by powerful enemies who
were plotting his ruin, sang : "The princes sat and spoke
against me; but Thy servant was employed in Thy
justifications. For Thy testimonies are my medita
tion, and Thy justifications my counsel ;"(i) f r that
wise and holy king was persuaded that "he should not
be confounded, provided he looked into all the Divine
commandments." (2)
51. Yet, ponder as we may on the Divine disposi
tions, search as we may into the inspired Writings,
will it ever be possible for us to embrace all the wisdom,
to comprehend all the laws, by which God directs and
ordains things, inanimate as well as animate ? Shall
we ever be able to grasp the reasons of all events ? In
(i) Ps. cxviii. 23, 24. (2) Ibid. 6.
The Infinite and the Mysterious Objects of Faith. 57
short, can we ever hope to gain such an amount of
knowledge as will altogether dispense with the need of
Faith?
This were a vain thought. Hence the Scriptures
themselves, while on the one hand professing to en
lighten us on the counsels of Providence, take care, on
the other, to put a check on the impetuosity and bold
ness of our greed of knowing. They admonish us, that,
however far our mind may advance in the discovery of
the Divine secrets, it will always come at last to an
extreme limit; every attempt to go beyond must
necessarily prove a failure.
52. This insuperable boundary is, in the first place,
formed by the line which separates the finite from the
Absolute the Infinite ; and it marks the limitation of
every creature, essentially finite.
Nevertheless, the Divine thoughts which determine
the order of the universe, have for object, not merely all
that lies within this extreme limit assigned to created
intellects, but also all that extends beyond it. Thus
the design of Uncreated Wisdom manifests itself to us
like a beam of light which is diffused over the whole
of creation. Parted into myriad rays, it stretches on
far away into the depth of the centuries preordained by
God, and in their immeasurable distance grows gradu
ally dimmer and less perceptible to mortal eyes, until
at last it is lost to them altogether, and absorbed in,
though not confounded with, the infinite ocean of
Eternal Light.
53. Here it is very worthy of remark, that for the
human mind every thing finite is too little, while the
Infinite Absolute is too much; so that man s mind
occupies a middle place between two extremes, both
58 On Divine Providence.
immensely distant from it that is to say, between an
extreme of defect and an extreme of excess ; between
that which does not satisfy it and that which overpowers
it; between that which is infinitely less and that which
is infinitely greater than it; between that which, when
judging wisely, it spurns as being far beneath its
dignity, and that which, as being far too sublime, it is
never able fully to reach. In the great thought, there
fore, by which God creates and orders the universe,
there always remains something invisible and hidden.
Hence the mysteries of Religion, hence the obscurity
of Faith; but from this obscurity, where the human
mind finds itself lost, man derives the grandest idea
and the truest sentiment which it is possible for him to
have of the Divinity.
54. Thus Faith, by giving man understanding, does
not destroy itself, but becomes itself ever more en
nobled, deepened, and refined. It is all the nobler,
more profound, and more refined, in proportion as man s
reason finds itself more bewildered and lost in the
boundless regions of infinity. So long as man, in
investigating "the wonderful things of God," has
exerted himself only to a partial extent, there may still
remain in him that hope which always accompanies a
superficial knowledge, the hope of understanding after
wards what he does not understand now. But if he is
conscious of having done the very utmost which it is
possible for the human mind to do; if he knows that he
has gone to the extremest boundaries attainable by him
and by his nature ; if he touches, as it were, those sacred
boundaries, and, in their presence, feels compelled to
fall down in adoration as before an altar; then human
presumption is entirely brought low, then learned
The Infinite and the Mysterious Objects of Faith. 59
ignorance begins in him, then, sunk into the depth of
his own nothingness, he offers a holier sacrifice to the
Infinite Object of his Faith, as to that object which
vanquishes not merely his own accidental ignorance,
but the very limitations of his nature.
CHAPTER XIII.
CONTINUATION. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR MAN TO
ARRIVE AT THE PERCEPTION OF GOD IN THE
PRESENT LIFE.
55. The reason assigned in the last chapter is not
the only one which proves that intelligence and Faith
are in mutual harmony, and, far from destroying
each other, amicably combine to succour man in
his necessity. What I am now about to say will
likewise shew how human intelligence, however great
its powers, cannot succeed, unless it be aided by
Faith, in maintaining man in a state of perfect tran
quillity amidst the continual shifting and changing
of events.
The intelligence of man is not brought into act
except by means of the perceptions of the senses.
It is from sensible things, namely, from the bodies
that surround us and act upon us, that our understand
ing receives the first materials for its conceptions. I
here prescind from an extraordinary and immediate
communication of God with our souls ; and I believe
that all the principal philosophical schools agree in
the admission that sensations are the causes, or at
least the occasions, of the first operations of our mind ;
and that the differences between these schools are
merely as to the manner in which they try to explain
No Perception of God in the Present Life. 61
how this fact comes about. I hold, moreover, in
accordance with the manifest depositions of experience,
that bodies are, in the present life, the only realities
different from ourselves, which act upon us naturally,
and by so doing excite in us sensations and images
which attract the attention of our mind. For
any reality different from our own to draw the atten
tion of our mind to itself, it must produce such a
modification and passion in our own feeling, as may
indicate to the mind the presence of a being distinct
from ourselves, a term of perception distinct from the
percipient.
56. I may be told that our soul is aided in its opera
tions by another external being, namely, by God : and
I do not deny that the First Cause intervenes in all
the operations of second causes. This, however, does
not mean that the First Being, Who assists the
intelligent soul in its acts, gives Himself to it as the
material of its thoughts. He helps indeed each sub
ject to act, but He does not constitute the real term of
that subject s actions.
57. External bodies, or rather, the sensations
and [sensitive] perceptions which they cause in us,
are, therefore, what furnishes to our mind the first
materials of its operations. Without these, the mind
could not even reflect upon itself. The human in
telligence is, by its constitution, simply a power
acting through a body, which serves it as the instru
ment for obtaining the matter on which it acts. Thus
our body, which partakes of the life of the soul,
occupies, as it were, a middle place between the soul,
which is the life itself, and external bodies, which
have no life. It forms the means of communication
62 On Divine Providence.
between these two extremes. Accordingly, it par
takes of the nature of both, by conjoining in itself
the corporeal and the spiritual substances in an in
effable and recondite union.
58. The whole circle, therefore, within which man s
intellective nature, considered by itself, is confined,
consists of three things: ist, An intelligent soul, the
subject; 2nd, A material world, which is perceived
together with man s own [substantial] feeling, and which
the intelligence renders an object to itself; 3rd, A
body which partakes of the nature of the subject and
of the real object, and is the medium of communication
between the two. In this body the soul receives the
forms which compose the world, and hence can advert
to itself, as well as exercise upon those forms and
upon itself all those operations of which its activity
is capable. This, then, is the whole extent of the de
velopment to which the human intelligence can attain.
In fact, we may reduce it to two heads : ist, An original
feeling, in which the soul receives from bodies that
action which produces in it corporeal forms ; 2nd, The
exercise, on this feeling and these forms, of the opera
tions peculiar to the intellectual activity, operations
which, in ultimate analysis, are reducible to so many acts
of abstraction and of synthesis, (i) Now, bearing this
in mind, it is easy to see that the forming of a positive
conception of God is a task altogether transcending
the capability of man : and here is the proof.
(i) What the Author says in this number on the manner in which human
cognitions are formed is but a rudimentary hint of his theory on this
subject. A full development of that theory will be found in The Origin
of Ideas (Kegan Paul, Trench and Co., London), passim, but especially
in the 2nd volume. Tr,
No Perception of God in the Present Life. 63
59. The perfections found in material things, as also
in man himself, are really distinct, or even separate
from one another. Consequently, from the considera
tion of these things, or of himself, man will indeed be
able to draw the abstract ideas of goodness, of wis
dom, of justice, of power or other perfections; but he
will not be able to conceive all these perfections as
subsisting together in perfect unity ; he will never
know what that most simple perfection is which com
prehends, absolutely free from distinction, all perfec
tions and all grades of entity. Beyond all doubt, that
which is abstracted from known objects must in some
way exist in them. We cannot abstract from a thing
what is not in it. Since, then, there is not, in material
substances and in limited beings generally, any one
thing which contains in itself all partial perfections,
much less which is itself all these perfections together,
it plainly follows that man cannot form the concep
tion of such a being, for he finds no example of it,
nor even any adequate similitude, in all the objects
that are known to him.
60. To make the matter still more clear, I beg the
reader to take note of the following simple considera
tion. The perfections found in created things are
mostly accidental to them; so that creatures may or
may not have those perfections. For example, intelli
gent and moral beings may be wise or foolish, good
or bad. The conception of the Supreme Being, on
the contrary, is of such a nature as absolutely to ex
clude the possibility of any perfection being wanting in
Him ; because in Him all perfections belong to His very
substance and essence or, to speak more accurately,
they are His very Being itself. Of this Being, therefore,
64 On Divine Providence.
neither an image nor a likeness can be drawn from
the observation of the whole of limited nature, because
nowhere in this nature is such a characteristic to be
met with. Although we can see that He exists, we
cannot see what He is. (i)
(i) The new philosophical school of Paris, which owes its life and
increment to the rare genius of Professor Victor Cousin, by recalling to men s
minds the ideas of Plato, has certainly contributed to raise Philosophy
from that depth of degradation into which it had fallen in consequence of
the materialistic and pedantic spirit introduced by Sensism. While, how
ever, it gives me unfeigned pleasure to make this public acknowledgment to
the well-deserving Translator of Plato and of Proclus, I cannot help observing
that he has made a mistake in confounding the Platonic System with the
Christian System of truth. These two systems are as different from each
other as can be. They are as different as the symbol is from the thing fore
shadowed, as the light which shows the objects is from the objects shown
by it, as the rays of the sun are from the sun from which they emanate.
Plato, deprived of the light of Christianity, was only able to see the reflected
rays of the Divinity, and, from an eager desire to fix the gaze of his intellect
on the Absolute, mistook those for Him. Guided by the created light, he
could sec that God must exist ; but God Himself he did not see. In short,
he was able to rise to the contemplation of abstract and common truth ; but
this truth is quite another thing from the First and Subsistent Truth. It is
very easy to confound the First and Subsistent Truth with abstract truth
which naturally shines in the human mind, and which St. Thomas has
distinguished with admirable precision. It is exactly in this distinction that
we must seek for the line of separation between the Christian and the
Platonic system. Without it, the confusion of the two is inevitable. The
natural light of our own mind, fervently contemplated with that loftiness of
view of which great minds are capable, presents characteristics which are
altogether divine, and which it derives from its origin, whereof it exhibits
the trace and preserves the analogy. In fact, that light is seen to be endowed
with an eternal unchangeableness, with a power that cannot be vanquished
by any force, even though infinite, with a self-evidence whence all certitude
originates. It must be confessed that the imposing grandeur of these
characteristics dazzled at first even the earlier Fathers of the Church,
and in our own times we have seen men following in the footsteps of
the Fathers, and founding a new School of Platonism in the Tyrol; I
mean those two most acute thinkers, PP. Ercolano and Filibert. Every
body knows, however, of the heresies to which Platonism gave occasion,
No Perception of God in the Present Life. 65
The mode of being, therefore, of the Divine Nature is
totally hidden from our intellectual vision, however
much we may try to catch sight of it. It always
remains an object of our Faith, separated from us by
a thick and impenetrable curtain. Until that curtain
be removed by the immediate communication which
God will make of Himself to us, we must adore His
inaccessible light in profound humiliation and in hope.
From creatures there are indeed reflected upon us mani
fold rays of His glory, because He has, as far as might
be, diffused over them His perfections and the vestiges
of His wisdom ; but in no part of creation is His Being
openly presented to us. Hence, according to the
teaching of St. Paul, the world is merely a kind of
mirror and an enigma of the Divinity; and as the world
and which the Catholic Church combated so long, for the very reason that
She is quite a different thing from a sect of rational philosophy.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to perceive that the truth naturally shining
in our own minds cannot be the object of Christianity, but only of a
Philosophy based on nature. That truth, however great its excellencies,
shows itself to us purely as a rule of the ?nind, as an abstraction, never as a
subsistent being; and where subsistence is wanting, the principal charac
teristic, nay, the very essence of the Divinity, is wanting. It would be of
no avail to reply that the truth which we see can be proved to be subsistent ;
for such a subsistence as this would not be self-evident and inseparable from
the truth contemplated by us, but concealed and arrived at by means of
reasoning. The subsistence is not, therefore, that light of truth which
we see by natural intuition ; but is something which, although we cannot
see it, we inferentially discover, arguing that it must be conjoined with
the said light, in the same way as we prove that in bodies there is, besides
the accidents which we see, a substance which we do not see. It remains,
then, that God, a simple and subsistent Being, is not known to us by nature,
or by any adequate similitude found in created beings, or even in the light
of the natural truth. Consequently, we never can, in the present life, know
the mode of His Being, although we may, by starting, either from external
things, or from abstract truth as interiorly seen by us, arrive with certainty
at the knowledge of His existence.
F
66 On Divine Providence.
is the only thing visible to us, we can see naught of
the Divinity or of Its Being in Itself most real save
those sparse rays which are reflected to us by this
mirror, so obscurely, as to render them an enigma to
us.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE FOUR LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN REASON ARE RE
CAPITULATED. FIRST LIMITATION: REASON CAN
FORM NO POSITIVE IDEA OF GOD.
6 1. It will now be well for us to pause a while and
to recapitulate what we have said in the preceding
chapters on the four limitations of human reason. From
them we argued that human intelligence, in order to
secure tranquillity amid the trying vicissitudes of this
life, requires to be aided by Revelation and Faith ; and
that Revelation and Reason, far from excluding or
contradicting each other, mutually call for each other,
and, after leading man on some steps, each amicably
refers him to the other.
We have seen that at the beginning, Revelation first
set human reason in motion, and then intrusted man
to its guidance.
Reason, unmindful of the instructions of its heavenly
Teacher, wanders farther and farther astray into a
long course of errors, until brought by sad experience
to a deep-felt sense of its own insufficiency, and weary
of troubles, it again invokes the kindly succour of
that Teacher, Who, ever generous and compassionate,
receives it back with open arms.
Faith having, happily, come once more to the rescue,
infuses anew life and energy into man s reason, sorely
harassed as it is, and brought by its own fearful
68 On Divine Providence.
aberrations to the very verge of ruin, and, without
abandoning it, bids it courageously push forward its
investigations into the vast fields of truth.
Thus sustained, reason is able to advance with great
strides, till it reaches at last those extreme boundaries
which have been fixed by nature itself. Seized
with a feeling of sacred awe at the sight it stops
and reverently pays a willing homage to Faith, which
alone can pass beyond them. Moreover, having now
grown wise, it again intrusts the human spirit to the
powerful guidance of Faith, with the result that this
spirit is lifted up high above all creation, and continues
so until left finally to repose in the bosom of unspeak
able bliss and everlasting Love.
Thus Faith does not limit human intelligence, but
helps and strengthens it to the end that man may
obtain by his own efforts all the knowledge of which he
is capable: and whilst, under its gentle sway, he has
entire freedom to enjoy the pleasure of thus instructing
himself as far as he can, he may always, on the other
hand, rely with certainty on its ready willingness
to teach him all that is needful to him, whenever,
owing to his unavoidable limitations, he is unable
to find it out by himself.
62. The first of the limitations, therefore, to which
we have referred, and which affect, not merely this or
that particular individual, but the human species itself,
nay, all created intelligences, may be thus enunciated:
CREATED INTELLIGENCES CANNOT FORM A POSITIVE
CONCEPT OF GOD, BY MEANS OF WHATEVER KNOW
LEDGE THEY MAY HAVE EITHER OF THEMSELVES OR OF
OTHER LIMITED BEINGS ; BECAUSE IN NO LIMITED
BEING CAN THERE BE FOUND WHAT WOULD BE
First Limitation of Human Reason. 69
NECESSARY TO MAKE IT AN ADEQUATE SIMILITUDE
OF GOD, AN EXISTENCE IDENTICAL WITH PERFEC
TION.
63. Hence we see how true and profound is the
description which Holy Scripture gives of the searcher
after Wisdom. It tells us that he who considereth
her ways in his heart is like unto a lover who looketh
in through the crevices of the windows of his beloved,
and hearkeneth at her doors. He sets up his tent
close to her house, even under the shelter of her roof.
Although he is not permitted to enter that house,
nevertheless it is supreme bliss to him to be protected
under its eaves from the burning rays of the sun and
from the fury of the rains, (i)
64. This limitation of the human understanding
seems also to be alluded to in the Book of Job, by that
question : " Doth not the ear discern words, and the
palate of him that eateth, the taste? "(2) As if to
remind us that man s judgments are shaped in accor
dance with the sensations he receives ; for it is only
from sensations that the operations of the human
mind take their start.
65. None of the inspired writers, however, seem
to have expressed this doctrine so clearly as we find
it expressed by St. Paul in the first epistle to the
Corinthians, where he says : " Charity never falleth
away, whether prophecies shall be made void, or
tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed.
For, we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But
when that which is perfect is come, that which is in
part shall be done away. When I was a child, I spoke
as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a
(i) Ecclus. xiv. Prov. viii. (2) Job xii. n.
70 On Divine Providence.
child. But when I became a man, I put away the
things of a child. We see now through a glass (per
speculum, by means of a mirror) in a dark manner
(in (Bnigmate, enigmatically^ ; but then face to face.
Now I know in part ; but then I shall know even as
I am known." (i)
Created things the only things which we can per
ceive by the light naturally shining in us are here
called by the Apostle "a mirror of the Divinity." But
it is an imperfect mirror, its power being in no w r ay
proportionate to the great Object which it has to re
flect to our eyes. These things are a mirror of the
Divinity merely in so far as they partake of the Divine
perfections. Now, although it is true that they partake
of those perfections to a greater or less extent accord
ing as they are more or less perfect; nevertheless, as
theirs is but a finite nature, that participation can
never be such as to render them anything like an
adequate copy or exemplar of the Infinite Being,
Whose very essence and substance consists in perfec
tion itself subsistent. Whilst, therefore, they can
indicate to us His existence, they must necessarily fall
short of showing us what He is, that is, of giving us a
positive idea of Him. It should be carefully noted
that what is wanting of perfection in creatures, is,
in God, essential, substantial. Consequently, the
difference between participated perfection and Divine
perfection is \vhat would constitute the positive idea
of God. Since, then, that difference and together
with it the essence and substance of God are hidden
from us, we must needs be left without a positive idea
of Him.
(I) I. Cor. xiii. 8-12.
First Limitation of Human Reason. 71
Still, in created things we behold the perfections of
the Supreme Being dispersed, as it were, and confined
within certain limits. These things, therefore, are
for us a mirror of the Divinity, but the image they
reflect has always the nature of an enigma, of a some
thing wrapped up in obscurity and mystery. We
may compare this image to a kind of cipher, having
this singular property, that it cannot signify
any of the things which we know or can know,
but signifies one thing alone, supreme, most perfect,
which we do not see, but of which we know that it must
exist, because it is the only thing that can explain
that cipher which is writ large upon universal nature,
shining vividly before our eyes, continually exciting
our attention, and calling forth our faith and our
adoration.
66. We are thus enabled readily to understand how it
was that some philosophers could go so far as to doubt all
the truths known by us, being unable to see how we
could possibly make ourselves certain that those truths
were not mere products of our mind limited by its own
laws, and, consequently, mere subjective appearances,
of the certainty of whose objects we could have no
solid proof. They saw that our ideas about the Divinity
must be imperfect ; and they attributed this imperfec
tion to our mind itself. It was simply the imperfection
of our mind, communicated to the ideas conceived by
it. The defect being thus attributed to the organ itself,
namely, to the faculty of knowing, the objective truth
of every conception of our mind becomes involved in
doubt.
67. But these philosophers, and Kant in particular,
who carried this kind of speculation farther than any-
72 On Divine Providence.
one else and drew from it alone, we may say, the whole
of his Critical Philosophy, did not sufficiently consider
the fact which I have just expounded in conformity
with the teaching of the Apostle, namely : that the
imperfection which is found in our ideas of the Divinity
as well as of all other super-sensible beings, is due not
to a defect of our mind, or to the mind being, as they
assert, limited to a particular form ; but to the process
which it is compelled to follow, that is to say, to its
not having a direct perception of Divine things, but
being obliged to form the concept of them by arguing,
either from sensible and material objects, or from
its own spiritual but limited substance. In conse
quence of this process, imposed on it by the nature
of things, the mind, naturally, cannot attain to a
perfect idea of the Supreme Being, or, better, to a
real perception of Him; because His essence, being
according to the sublime expression of Holy Scripture,
incommunicable, is not shared by creatures, and
therefore has in them no adequate likeness; but
must be, I might almost say, guessed from the
limited effects by which it indicates its presence in
them. The truth is, as I shall explain elsewhere,
that our mind is so constituted as to receive a
full and complete idea of things whenever it can
perceive the things themselves; but not so when
it is under the necessity of forming its knowledge
of them by means of imperfect and altogether in
adequate similitudes and relations, (i) "When that
which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be
(i) These two kinds of knowledge are, in the Author s language, called
positive and negative knowledge. For his theory regarding them, see
The Origin of Ideas, Vol. Ill, nn. 1234-1241. Tr.
First L imitation of Human Reason. 7 3
done away. When I was a child, I spoke as a child,
I understood as a child, I thought as a child. But
when I became a man, I put away the things of a
child." (i) In this case our ideas unavoidably reflect
the imperfections of the similitudes of which the mind
has had to make use in obtaining its knowledge.
68. For this reason, St. Paul says that when the
mind comes to perceive the things themselves, it
corrects, by means of adequate conceptions thus ac
quired, the imperfections of the ideas it had before.
Accordingly, when man is brought to the vision of
God Himself, he has no need of Faith, that is, of
believing what he cannot know. Then " prophecies
shall be made void, tongues shall cease, and know
ledge shall be destroyed" that knowledge which now
"puffeth us up," but will then appear childishness.
In this life, he means to say, our knowledge cannot
be free from obscurity and mystery ; it suffices indeed
to make us aware of God s existence ; but as regards
His essence, it enjoins on us Faith ; for, given that a
thing is proved to exist, reason obliges us also to be
lieve that it is possessed of the mode of existence which
is suited to it, although we may not be able to form
any concept of that mode. Thus it comes to pass that
"we know in part, and we prophesy in part:" in other
words, from the cipher with which all things in the
universe are marked, we know that there must be the
Being signified by it ; but we are left to guess, as it
were, what that Being is. This is what St. Paul ex
presses by the word prophesying; for this is the way in
which Prophets are wont to speak. When a Prophet
foretells a future event, he shadows it forth with such
(i) i. Cor. xiii. 10, II.
74 On Divine Providence.
characteristic traits as can belong to nothing but that
event itself; but inasmuch as he omits to mention
a number of other circumstances connected with
it, the event continues to remain involved in
obscurity until the prophecy comes to be fulfilled.
Then it is that everything appears perfectly plain, and
we all see that the prophecy could not have applied to
any other case than that for which it was intended ; as
indeed happens with a perfect enigma, which cannot
be explained except by the one thing which it is meant
at once to signify and to conceal.
69. And here I may observe how the method followed
by prophecy agrees in the main with that which the
Creator chose in the beginning for the instruction of
mankind, and which consisted, as we have seen (9),
in so disposing the universe that it should be like
a book set before man s eyes, full of enigmas for
man himself to decipher. Do we not, even in this
constancy in the method of teaching, see a proof of the
immutable truth of God s word ? and do we not behold,
in the character of this method, a proof of the wisdom of
Him Who had so formed human reason that it should
be exactly fitted for it, surrounding the intelligent soul
with a body, and furnishing it with certain organs, so
that, by means of the impressions received from sen
sible things, it might rise to things super-sensible?
70. It is, then, an unquestionable fact that sensible
things can only give very imperfect conceptions of the
super-sensible. This very imperfection, however, re
veals a Divine purpose full of loving-kindness; for by
it two objects are obtained, both of them very excellent.
On the part of man, an opportunity is offered for
the exercise of Faith, that is, of a rational homage
First Limitation of Human Reason. 75
rendered by the created intelligence to the Deity. Now,
intelligence being the noblest portion of creation, this
homage is the greatest honour which God could receive
from His creatures. On the other hand, the greatest
honour which creatures can render to the Creator
forms their greatest merit ; and this entitles them to
the greatest reward. By leaving us, therefore, in the
obscurity of Faith, God has conferred on us the greatest
benefit He could bestow. Indeed, His loving-kind
ness manifests itself far more plainly in what He has
thus withheld from us, than it would have done in
the bestowal of the fullest intelligence. This is the
first object.
On the part of God, this limitation of our human
knowledge obtains another object equally noble,
namely, the reserving to Himself of a wide field for
the display of new liberality. Hence He bestows upon
us by Grace what we cannot have by nature ; and in
this way, according to the sublime expression in the
Book of Job, "He exceeds our knowledge." (ij
71. We can now see why God commanded the
Prophet Ezechiel to propound enigmas to His people (2),
as also why the Scriptures, always consistent, foretold
of the Saviour that "He would open His mouth in
parables" (3), and out of the fulness of His wisdom, "utter
things hidden from the foundation of the world. "(4)
Thus did the Eternal Goodness find the way to impart
knowledge to men without depriving them of the merit
of Faith ; while at the same time they may still gain
the further merit of discovering, through their own
industry and perseverance, many of the things that lie
(I) Job xxxvi. 26. (2) Ezech. xvii. 2. (3) Ps. Ixxvii. 2.
(4) Matt. xiii. 35.
76 On Divine Providence.
hidden under its veils. Difficult points are no longer
a stumbling-block to those who have not the capacity
to understand them, or virtue enough to be satisfied
with remaining in ignorance regarding them : and the
human mind, by being instructed in the same way in
which it goes on gradually developing itself, finds the
task at once less laborious and more agreeable.
72. After all this, we cannot wonder that in the early
stages of humanity wisdom was thought to consist in
an interchange between sages of enigmas to be ex
plained, as being the method of learning best suited
to human nature and most conformable to the great
example given by the First and Supreme Teacher of men.
And so, for instance, we read that Solomon was wont to
do with the King of Tyre. ( i ) Again the wise man is des
cribed in the Book of Proverbs as "he who understandeth
a parable and its interpretation, the words of the wise
and their mysterious sayings. "(2) And it was of these
enigmas not a few of which are still to be met with
in the dealings of Divine Providence regarding the
distribution of good and evil that Job spoke to his
friends when he said : " Hear ye my speech, and receive
with your ears hidden truths. "(3)
73. But what enigmas did he propose to them? The
enigma was himself, who, although righteous, lay
plunged in sorrow, covered from head to foot with
ulcers. Those friends of his could not understand
such an enigma, and were therefore scandalized at
seeing him in that state. Not knowing how to reconcile
such dire sufferings with divine justice, in case he were
innocent, instead of suspending their judgment and
(i) Menander and Dius in fragments preserved by Eusebius.
(2) Prov. i. 6. (3) Job xiii. 17.
First Limitation of Pluman Reason. 77
owning their want of knowledge, they resorted to the
expedient of accusing him as a sinner.
74. The obscurity which they found in this enigma,
and the difficulty of explaining it otherwise than they
did, was greatly increased in consequence of the
mysterious language used by Job. He boldly pro
tested his innocence, so much so that "he had a desire
to speak to the Almighty Himself, and to reason with
Him, for he knew that if he should be judged, he would
be found just." " Call me," he said, confidently turning
to God, "and I will answer Thee; or else I will speak,
and do Thou answer me. How many are my iniquities
and sins? Make me know my crimes and offences.
Why hidest Thou Thy face, and thinkest me Thy
enemy r " (i) Neither these words nor the whole of this
prophetic and enigmatical story, could have been
explained but by one who was acquainted with
the key to all the Old Covenant, namely, by
JESUS CHRIST, of Whom Job was a figure the
God-Man, Who, although just, was to suffer, and
in Whose person alone Job could confidently and
with perfect truth speak in the way he did. But
JESUS CHRIST, Who accounts indeed for all the rest,
remains, Himself, another enigma still more sublime,
a divine secret in a word, an object of Faith. For
it is impossible fully to understand Christ without
understanding the mystery of the Trinity, on which
that of the Incarnation depends, that is, without reach
ing up to that summit which absolutely transcends
all the powers of human intelligence. Hence God s
counsel in disposing events can never be fathomed to
its last depth by any human insight.
(i) Job xiii.
78 On Divine Providence.
Thus the plan of the universe has the Divinity Itself
for its base, and on this base the edifice is being reared
up with a firmness which no power can shake. Well,
then, might that friend of Job say: "Behold, God is
high in His strength, and none is like Him among the
law-givers. Who can search out His ways? or who
can say to Him : Thou hast wrought iniquity? Re
member that thou knowest not His work concerning
which men have sung. All men see Him, every one
beholdeth afar off. Behold, God is great, exceeding
our knowledge; the number of His years is inestim
able."^)
(I) Job xxxvi. 22-26.
CHAPTER XV.
SECOND LIMITATION OF HUMAN REASON: IT CANNOT
EMBRACE THE INFINITE.
75. Since, then, no created intelligence is able, by
the use of its natural powers, to attain to the perception
of God the beginning and the end of the universe
how can any man presume to think himself competent
to judge and censure Him in His mode of government?
But there is more. Not only is it impossible for us to
have the perception of God, or to form a positive concept
of His being, because none of the things that can be
perceived by us has in it what is essential to God,
namely, the identification of essence ivith perfection ; but
it is likewise impossible for our mind to comprehend
Him, because He is actually and in all respects infinite.
76. The second limitation, therefore, which I assign
to human reason, is, that it can never arrive at a clear
knowledge of that last link which keeps the universe
suspended, I might almost say, in eternity, and on
which hangs, wrapped up in deepest mystery, the
counsel of the Providence that governs it. We may
express this limitation thus :
NO FINITE INTELLIGENCE CAN ATTAIN TO A PERFECT
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABSOLUTE INFINITE.
77. Here it should be noted that something of
God s infinity is, in a certain way, communicated to all
His works, so that the infinite is met with in all crea-
80 On Divine Providence.
tion. It mixes itself up with the finite, in space, in
time, in ideas, in the modifications of things, which are
inconceivable without an identical something which
forms their subject. In short, look in whatever direc
tion we may, if our thought seeks at all to advance
beyond the surface of things, it soon finds itself lost in
regions without bounds, expatiating within a horizon
whose extreme border withdraws itself from view
and expands into immensity. I ask then: what mind
will be able securely to pass judgment on the govern
ment of a kingdom like this, of which it does not even
embrace the extent, or fully know the nature ?
78. It is in connexion with the manner in which
Divine Providence dispenses good and evil that the
Book of Job makes it a point to remind us of the great
ness of God on the one hand, and of our own little
ness on the other. There we are told of the secrets
of God s wisdom, and of how His law is manifold, that
is to say, embraces innumerable relations which He
alone can be cognizant of and reveal. "Wilt thou
peradventure comprehend the steps of God, and
find out the Almighty perfectly? He is higher than
heaven, and what wilt thou do ? He is deeper than hell,
and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is
longer than the earth, and broader than the sea. If
He shall overturn all things, or shall press them to
gether, who shall contradict Him ?" (i) That is to say:
The power and the wisdom of God are equal to the im
mensity of His nature; both they and it exceed the con
fines of all created natures. However great these may
be, however calculated to rouse in our limited mind a
sentiment of wonder, a sublime idea, they never can
(i) Jobxi. 7-10.
Second Limitation of Human Reason. 81
lead us to adequately understand that Being Whose
grandeur immeasurably transcends, in a spiritual way,
all material bounds. We need not, therefore, be sur
prised if His wisdom is incomprehensible to us.
Now, this wisdom pervades the whole of the universe;
and it is especially profound in the disposal of the
destinies of men. Hence the Apostle could not help
exclaiming: "How incomprehensible are His judg
ments, and how unsearchable His ways!" (i)
(i) Rom. xi. 33.
CHAPTER XVI.
THIRD LIMITATION OF HUMAN REASON: THE IN
TELLECTUAL CAPABILITIES OF EACH HUMAN
INDIVIDUAL HAVE A PURELY ACCIDENTAL
MEASURE.
79. Another limitation set by the Creator to human
investigations regarding the secrets of His Providence
has been already alluded to in Chapter IX. : I mean
that accidental limitation which determines each indi
vidual s power of knowing. The above-mentioned
limitations belong to the very essence of human reason
itself nay, to that of every created intelligence. The
one here spoken of, although accidental, is none the
less insuperable as regards the individual who has
received it. We may formulate it as follows :
THE POWER OF UNDERSTANDING IS GIVEN BY GOD
TO EACH INDIVIDUAL IN A QUANTITY SO DETERMINED,
THAT HE WHO POSSESSES IT CANNOT MEASURE IT,
THAT IS TO SAY, HE CANNOT ASCERTAIN IN WHAT
RELATION HIS OWN FACULTY OF UNDERSTANDING
STANDS TO THE DIFFICULTY OF THE QUESTIONS THAT
PRESENT THEMSELVES TO HIM FOR SOLUTION.
80. It is therefore absurd, I said, for any one to
presume on his power to find for every difficulty
its own direct and particular reason : on the contrary,
it is both reasonable and necessary that we should
Third Limitation of Hitman Reason. 83
sometimes be doubtful even about those solutions
which seem to us to be right.
One thing only it behoves us all constantly to
do, namely, to hold for certain that every difficulty
regarding the dealings of Divine Providence has a
solution, although we may not always discover it
or discover the true one. It is one thing to be able to
prove that a solution must exist, and another thing to
be able to define what that solution is. All that we
can reasonably demand is that the following thesis
should be demonstrated to us: "Every event which
seems apparently to clash with Divine Goodness or
Divine Wisdom, may, and indeed always must, have an
occult reason, which, if it were manifested to us, would
dispel all our doubts, and appear to be in perfect
harmony with the Divine perfections." More than
this we have no right to pretend ; we have no right to
insist that that reason shall always be indicated to
us ; it should be enough for us to know that it does
exist because it must exist.
81. Even supposing that some reason were to
occur to us which we find satisfactory, what guarantee
should we have of its being on that account the true
reason? How often does a man feel satisfied with
reasons which are valid only in relation to his peculiar
way of viewing things ? How often is one mind set at
rest by a reason which has no such effect upon another ?
As some persons see a difficulty where others see none at
all; so some regard that as a good reason which to others
seems a mere futility. I speak of what we witness in
our every-day experience, not of the nature of human
intelligence itself. I refer to those reasons by which
most men seek to satisfy themselves, not to those
84 On Divine Providence.
which contain a rigorous demonstration, and which
only a very few ever think of asking for.
82. True, this imperfection is in itself accidental;
nevertheless it is of the essence of human nature that
every man should be liable to it. Any man may
feel satisfied with reasons which are not those known
to God, but which he finds satisfactory simply because
they are in keeping with his own short-sighted views.
83. Let us by a mental abstraction take away from
human nature all those truths which God has directly
revealed. In this case, even supposing its intellectual
powers to be perfect and entire, we should still find
that, without any fault of its own, it would reason
imperfectly on Divine Providence, and justify its ways
by reasons weak in themselves, but strong in relation
to its own mental state ; or else, having caught sight of
the difficulties, it would, without offering any special
solution to them, set itself at ease by resting in the belief
of the Divine Wisdom and Goodness.
84. Hence it seems to me that God intended to
humble this nature of ours, so prone to exalt itself
with vain conceit, when He directed its attention to the
essential defect of which I am speaking by saying to
man: "Who is this that wrappeth up sentences in
unskilful words ? Gird up thy loins like a man : I will
ask thee, and answer thou Me. Where wert thou
when I laid the foundations of the earth ? Tell Me if
thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures
thereof, if thou knowest r Or who hath stretched the
line upon it " (that is, who has fixed the relation of
the earth s measure with the other measures of the
universe) ? " Upon what are its bases grounded r Or
who laid the corner stone thereof, when the morning
Third L imitation of Htiman Reason. 85
stars praised Me together, and all the sons of God made
a joyful melody ? . . . Didst thou since thy birth com
mand the morning, and shew the dawning- of the day
its place ? And didst thou hold the extremities of the
earth, shaking them, and hast thou shaken the ungodly
out of it ? .... Hast thou entered into the depths of
the sea, and walked in the lowest parts of the deep r
Have the gates of death been opened to thee, and hast
thou seen the darksome doors ? . . . Didst thou know
that thou shouldst be born ? and didst thou know
the number of thy days ? . . . Who hath put wisdom
in the heart of man ? or who gave the cock understand
ing?"^) In all this sublime chapter God keeps
reminding us of this limitation which makes so evident
our utter insignificance as compared with the greatness
of His Divine Nature. No, it is not from ourselves
that our understanding came. We received it from
God, and received it in such measure as He thought
proper to bestow. It does not depend on us to make
that measure either more or less than it is. We are
confined within the limits that have been fixed for us,
and we must needs be content with them. (2) It is,
(1) Job xxxviii.
(2) Perhaps it will be asked : If man does not know the relation between his
mental capabilities and knowable objects, how is it possible to assign the
limitations of human thought ? To this I reply, that it is one thing to be
able to determine all the limits of the mind, and another thing to be able to
know some of them, those for instance which are assigned to it in this
treatise. Again, it might be said : I know that it is impossible for
the mind to go further in this particular direction ; or : Up to this
particular point it is possible for the mind to reach. But it does not follow
that the same could be said of all cases generally, that one might define how
far the mind could reach in all points. For example, it is possible to demon
strate in general that our mind can perceive the truth, and that it is made pre
cisely for this end; and so likewise it is possible to demonstrate in particular that
86 On Divine Providence.
therefore, mere presumption for anyone to suppose
himself capable of understanding the why and the
wherefore of each and every thing that takes place in
the universe ; and well might God address man in the
words which I have quoted, and the purport of which
may be thus paraphrased: "If thou, O man, hadst been
the author of the world, this work would accord with the
notions of thy limited mind from which it originated.
But it is not so: the world was, ere thou earnest into
existence, made by Me, and by Me alone, the Creator.
And I Who made this world am the very same Who
assigned to thee a certain degree of intelligence, which
thou canst indeed use, but not increase by one tittle.
I have assigned it to thee just such as I pleased, even
as I assigned, within the limits of mere sense, a certain
discernment to the animals devoid of reason. The
relation, therefore, between the things to be known and
the power of thy intelligence, has been fixed by Me, and
thou canst make no change in it. Nay, thou canst not
form any idea thereof. To know it, thou shouldst know
what all the knowable things are ; for to understand a
given relation between two terms, the terms themselves
must be understood. The world does not depend upon
thy mind; neither are the ages adapted to thy littleness.
There are, in space, regions which thou hast never seen,
a certain object, for instance the Absolute Infinite, can never be comprehended
by us. But the same could not be said of numberless other things. Thus,
as regards innumerable secrets of nature, it will never be possible to say
whether they will be discovered by man, or when they will be discovered.
Much less could a similar question be instituted in reference to things, the
very existence of which we are ignorant of ; hence it is, to say the least, a
gratuitous and rash undertaking to maintain, as some writers do, that "man
is able to find out all the truths belonging to the natural order." Lastly,
in this third limitation I speak of the particular reasoning faculty of each
individual, not of the reason of the human species itself.
Third L imitation of Human Reason. 8 7
such as the depths of the abysses, and the heavens ;
while, in time, there are things, such as all those beyond
the threshold of death, which, although they also enter
into the great design, are hidden from thee. As, there
fore, thou knowest not all the parts of the world, every
one of which, nevertheless, is disposed in conformity,
not with thy will, but with Mine, so thou knowest not
how far the sublimity and beauty of this My design
exceeds and transcends thy power of understanding."
Hence it is written: "He hath made all things good
in their time, and hath delivered the world to man s
consideration, so that man cannot find out the work
which God hath made from the beginning to the
end." (i)
(i) Ecclesiastes iii. n.
CHAPTER XVII.
FOURTH LIMITATION OF HUMAN REASON : IT CAN
KNOW ONLY THOSE BEINGS WHICH, INDEPEN
DENTLY OF ITS OWN ACT, ARE PRESENTED
TO IT FOR CONTEMPLATION.
85. To sum up: the first limitation which the human
intelligence finds in its action arises from the process
it is obliged to follow in forming its knowledge of the
Author of the universe. It must, for this purpose,
ascend from nature to that Being Who is above all
nature, and of the simplicity of Whose essence no
example is or can be found in natural and finite things.
The second and third limitations result from the relation
between the calibre of the intelligence and its objects, that
is to say, the second limitation originates from the rela
tion which this faculty has with the Infinite Object, by
which it is necessarily overpowered ; and the third from
the relation it has with those knowable objects which,
al though finite, are difficult for it to grasp, so that it is
quite uncertain whether it will succeed, or not, in gain
ing so thorough a knowledge of them as to be able, by
means of it, to settle all the doubts, to refute all the
sophisms, to solve all the difficulties, which occur to it
in connexion with those objects. All these limitations
are intrinsic to the intelligence itself, a necessary
consequence of the inadequacy of its strength to the
task to be performed.
Fourth Limitation of Human Reason. 89
86. There remains the fourth limitation, which
belongs to the essence of the knowing subject. I have
alluded to it in Chapter XI., and it may be expressed
as follows :
THE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE CANNOT ACQUIRE ANY
KNOWLEDGE UNLESS THE MATERIALS FOR IT BE
FURNISHED BY A CAUSE EXTRANEOUS TO ITSELF. (l)
87. The simplest observation of human cognitions
is enough to convince us of this fact ; and we may
safely affirm that philosophical schools generally are
(l) To the four limitations which I have assigned to man s faculty of
knowing, I would add a fifth, namely, that arising from the conditions by which
this faculty is bound in passing from the state of power to that of action, in
other words, from the laws which it must follow in all its steps; laws that
flow from the nature of the subject to which it belongs. But as it would
take me too long here sufficiently to explain this limitation, I am compelled to
omit it. It must not, however, be forgotten that none of the limita
tions affecting the human intelligence cause any alteration in the formal
and ultimate objects of the cognitive acts; hence it always remains an
instrument fit for knowing the truth. The efforts which this sublime
faculty must make in order to arrive at truth and fully to enjoy its
divine aspect ; the tortuous paths along which it has sometimes to
travel; the overpowering light in which it is at last immerged ; all this, I
say, is no reason why what it comes to see as a logical necessity should
not all be pure and simple truth ; and why we should not have, and
even necessarily have the power of making ourselves certain that it is so.
Whence is it that we know the difference between truth and error ? If our
intellectual faculties were not made for truth, who could ever have taught
us that truth exists ? Who could have caused us to doubt whether what we
perceive be true or false ? Unless our intellectual faculties were made for
truth, and perceived truth, we could never feel any uneasiness respecting the
truth or falsehood of our conceptions. Scepticism, therefore, the most ab
solute Pyrrhonism, is a system that could never have been invented but by
beings created for truth. It witnesses against itself. It shews both that
truth exists and is the natural object of man s intellective faculties, and that
these can, of their own nature, arrive at the discovery of ever new truths ;
for every power is proportionate to its own object, and if it is not acciden
tally disordered, and is rightly used, naturally and infallibly attains to that
object.
go On Divine Providence.
agreed upon it, although they differ in their mode
of explaining it, each school trying to give such
an explanation as may be made to tally with its
own system. In truth, if by the word " know " we
mean, according to the usual way of speaking, "actual
ly to apprehend something with the mind," or "to-
retain the memory of what has been apprehended,"
then every act of knowledge implies an object, and
it implies that this object is, no matter from what
source, presented (i) to our mind. Hence it follows,
that as the acts of the mind are distinct from the
mind itself, these acts presuppose the existence of
the mind; since no power acts before existing. Con
sequently, for the human mind, the knowledge of
things is accidental, so the mind could exist without
that knowledge. Hence the twofold defect, of ignorance
and liability to error. It is not, however, my purpose
here to analyze the limitations and defects to which
our intellective acts are subject, but only to enumerate
the limitations of human intelligence itself.
(i) Referring to this subject in the Origin of Ideas, n. 515, the
Author says: "In order that we may perceive a thing, it is necessary
that that thing should be presented to our perceptive faculty. Unless,
therefore, some term were presented for the act of this faculty, we could
neither have a sensation nor a thought; our spirit would remain in that
inert state which I have just described, and which constitutes one of the
essential limitations of the human understanding. Hence it follows that
the action of our spirit is limited by its term. If, therefore, the term is
what draws forth our intelligent spirit into its proper act, wherein its action
rests, we must needs concede that the presence of the term accounts only
for that special activity which has reference to and terminates in it.
Consequently, the term cannot explain any activity different in nature, or
higher in degree, than that which ends in the term itself." Tr.
CHAPTER XVIII.
CONTINUATION OUR COGNITIVE ACTS ARE ACCIDEN
TAL TO THE MIND. THE MATERIAL OF OUR
COGNITIONS IS LIMITED, AND FURNISHED TO
EACH INDIVIDUAL BY THE CREATOR.
88. The fourth limitation of which we are now
speaking will perhaps be better understood, if we
divide it into two parts according to the two aspects
in which it can be considered. The first part may be
expressed as follows:
THE ACTS WHEREBY THE HUMAN MIND KNOWS
SUBSISTENT BEINGS ARE NOT ESSENTIAL TO IT, BUT
AROUSED IN IT BY THE ACTION OF THOSE BEINGS.
HENCE THE MIND CANNOT FIX ITS ATTENTION ON
ANY ABSTRACT IDEA SPONTANEOUSLY, BUT MUST BE
MOVED THERETO BY SOME SENSIBLE SIGN, WHICH,
BEING ATTACHED TO THAT IDEA, CAUSES THE IDEA
ITSELF TO APPEAR AS IF IT WERE A SUBSISTENT
THING.
89. This at once reminds us of the tabula rasa,
to which Aristotle compares the state in which the
human mind at first exists. Indeed, it may without
any impropriety be said, that our mind, as we receive
it from God, is like a clean tablet, or an unwritten
page. Some being DIFFERENT FROM OURSELVES must
come and with a learned hand, so to speak, gradually
write on this tablet or page the teachings of wisdom.
92 On Divine Providence.
90. Were we left to ourselves alone, I mean to the
internal forces which constitute our nature, were we
not brought into contact with, or affected by, any of
the forces outside, our mind could never stir or
make the least act of any kind ; it could never form a
single thought, although the Omnipotent should pre
serve us in this state of isolation from other subsistent
beings for thousands of years. All would remain
perfectly quiescent in us, and necessarily so ; for there
would be nothing to set our mind in motion, no term
for it to divert its attention to. Ours would be an
inert life resembling non-existence, (i) a state which
indeed affords matter for deep philosophical meditation,
and furnishes a key to the most marvellous secrets of
the study of man. Without something, therefore,
which is different from ourselves, without an action
exerted by other beings upon our sense, we could
never attain to any particular cognition. This our
original immobility is a fact which the thinker dis
covers by observation. Without a stimulus, man s
activity, however great we may suppose it to be, can
not pass into action, although when action has begun,
that activity can preserve, direct, and increase it.
(i) In like manner, even the body, alive but absolutely motionless, and
not impressed in any way by surrounding objects, would, for practical
purposes, be as if it had no life. Again, our eye, gazing immovably at the
pure light diffused through space but never descrying any particular object
whatever in that light, would, for life s purposes, be no better than no eye
at all. The same may be said of our mind, which is the eye of the soul.
So long as this eye contemplates nothing but the original light by the
intuition of which it is constituted a mind, an intellect ; so long as no par
ticular or determinate objects (entities of any kind, real or ideal) present
themselves to its vision in that light, it has none of what is usually called
knowledge ; and so this kind of existence would, practically speaking, re
semble non-existence. Tr.
Man s Cognitions accidental, limited^ &c. 93
g i . But what are external and material beings ?
Who brings them into contact with our sensitive
organs ? Why are we impressed by some rather than
by others r Does the circumstance of these brute
beings presenting themselves to us and striking our
senses depend on themselves ? If we at our coming
into the world, and afterwards in succession, are
surrounded and acted upon by these rather than by
those, is this perhaps due to a free act of theirs by
which they choose either to approach us or to shun
us ? No one can think so. Therefore, the sufficient
reason why our senses are affected by such beings,
and by some rather than by others, at one time and in
one mode rather than at another time and in another
mode, must be sought outside those beings themselves,
in an intelligent and free principle which is superior
to them, and disposes of them, and guides and uses
them at pleasure as instruments for our intellectual
development.
At first, then, our minds are the clean tablet or the
"virgin page" whereon the cognitions will have to be
written written, I repeat, not by ourselves, but by
something external to us, by some force, some being,
which, be it what it may, is indubitably superior to
material beings.
92. But if so, what ought we to think of that in
fatuation which is called pride of learning ? Is it not
as ridiculous as it would be for a written volume to
take pride in itself because it happened to have been
penned by a skilful hand ? Whatever knowledge we
acquire, we must be indebted for it to a being other
than ourselves, a being who can both apply the
stimuli to our mind, and furnish the objects that we
94 On Divine Providence.
are to know. These objects, although co-existent
with us, are independent of us, and subject to the good
pleasure of Him Who made us, and, together with us,
made the universe, that it might form the subject-
matter of our cognitions and be the motor of our intel
lectual activity. Even in this sense, therefore, it is
perfectly true to say that all men are merely disciples,
and that they have but one Master, Him Who is the Al
mighty Lord of all things. Seeing, therefore, that man
has, of his own nature, this general limitation that he
can know nothing unless the elements of his cognitions
be presented to him, it clearly follows that all his learn
ing is reduced to what it has pleased this Sovereign
Lord to teach him. Consequently, how absurd it is
for any one to abuse knowledge by turning it against
his Divine Tutor and Instructor, whereas he knows
not a tittle beyond what that Divine Teacher allows
him to know, what He Himself, within determinate
and impassable limits, imparts to him.
93. To conclude : Man receives his knowledge from
without; and this fact alone imports a humilia
tion, a dependence, which, whether he will or not,
subjects him to the Omnipotent, and obliges him to
give glory to God not only by that knowledge by the
abuse of which he dishonours his Maker, but even by
his very existence.
CHAPTER XIX.
CONTINUATION THREE OBJECTS OF COGNITION GRANT
ED TO MAN IN A CERTAIN MEASURE DETERMINED
BY GOD S OWN FREE WILL.
94. If instead of considering this dependence, this
limitation of man in itself, we consider it in its conse
quences, namely, in the knowledge which it is possible
for man thus circumstanced to acquire, we shall have
the second of the two parts into which we said the
fourth limitation of human reason may be divided. It
will be this :
THE KNOWLEDGE ATTAINABLE BY MAN IS LIMITED
TO WHAT GOD PLEASES TO MANIFEST TO HIM NATU
RALLY OR SUPERNATURALLY.
95. Now, what God has thought fit, speaking
generally, to manifest to man in other words, the ob
jects which He has placed before man for cognition,
may be classified under three heads.
96. First: He placed before him this universe, that
is, man himself and all the natural objects that surround
him and act upon his sensitive organs. This might be
called a natural revelation. To lay hold of it, the use
of the human faculties is required ; and so it seems as
if man himself were the author of his cognitions. But
upon closer examination we find that, inasmuch as the
objects of those cognitions are presented to man s
faculties by God, it is to God that the title of teacher
9 6 On Divine Providence.
properly belongs ; in the same way that this title is
rightly given to a pedagogue who instructs a class of
young pupils by placing before their eyes a series of
well drawn and skilfully arranged representations of
different objects.
97. Secondly : God gave also a supernatural Revela
tion, a Revelation, namely, made not to the senses by
means of created things, but to the understanding
by means of hearing a Revelation of sublime truths
relating to our end and to the means of obtaining it,
or, more in general, of truths which make known to
us the designs of the Creator regarding ourselves, and
invite us to correspond thereto.
98. Now, in both these kinds of Revelation, these
two classes of objects proposed to the human under
standing, the Divine Wisdom ordained that there
should be some things that are obscure and impene
trable, others that are difficult and that can be known
only by long application, and others, finally, that are
clear and luminous. That is to say, it pleased God to
reveal to man such and so many clear things, and so
much of light also in the obscure ones, as would
suffice to enable him to obtain the sublime end
for which he was destined ; leaving at the same
time so much of obscurity and impenetrability as
would suffice, through the experience of that mysterious
darkness, to persuade man of his own littleness as
confronted with the Divine Greatness, and such kind
and degree of difficulty, and therefore of study and
time required for overcoming it, as was fitting in order
that different individuals might have the opportunity
of procuring different intellectual food different, yet
always sufficient, for their need and that no one
Three Objects of Cognition given by God. 97
might be denied the chance of gaining the merit
which can be obtained by application and diligence
in the study of Divine things.
99. Thirdly : In the last place, it was necessary that
man should be supplied with a means for passing from
the most material perceptions to the highest intellectual
abstractions ; and this means could be no other than
language. Man would thus at the same time be
enabled to ascend from the first object of Revelation
to the second, from the natural Revelation to the
supernatural. For, as the external Revelation of
supernatural truths is communicated through hearing,
it requires language as its instrument. Moreover,
this Revelation presupposes many abstract ideas as
already conceived by the mind. Now, man could not
give language to himself; consequently, it is to the
Creator that he owes also this means of knowing. In
consequence of the limitation above mentioned (85-87),
the human mind could not be brought into action
except by the perception either of subsistent beings or
of sensible signs.
CHAPTER XX.
CONTINUATION DIVINE ORIGIN OF A PART OF LAN
GUAGE.
100. Without sensible signs, man could not even
conceive abstract ideas, (i) In fact, what are abstract
ideas ? They are simply qualities of beings contem
plated by the mind in their ideality, and apart by
themselves ; they are mental conceptions. Now,
where are the objects of such ideas to be found ? No
where but in the mind itself.
101. Let us, for example, take the abstract idea of
whiteness. I see a great number of white bodies, but
in none of them do I see whiteness standing by itself
alone. The abstract idea of whiteness gives me
whiteness pure and simple, whiteness without either
admixture or gradation. If I add anything to it, it is
no longer abstract that is, separated from every other
concept, as well as from every connexion and every
substance. Now, in this isolated state, I cannot have
it anywhere but in my own mind. Outside, I per
ceive it only as united with bodies and as existing
together with the weight, flavour, shape and other
qualities belonging to them. Whiteness, therefore, in
so far as it is abstract, exists only in the thought it
is a purely mental being. It has, indeed, so long as it
is found united with other things, its foundation in the
(i) See note to no. 102.
Divine Origin of a Part of Language. 99
external world ; but in its abstract state, as standing
by itself separate from everything else, it has no
existence there. Nevertheless, can this abstract
whiteness which, as such, exists in the mind alone, be
confounded with the mind itself? Not by any means.
The mind perceives abstract whiteness as a thing
distinct from itself; as distinct as all those other
objects which it perceives as really subsisting in the
outer world, (i) Now, how is this mode of conceiving
possible ? I answer :
102. By means of an external sign, a sign which by
holding the place of whiteness apprehended by the
mind, gives it an existence also outside the mind;
a sensible sign of the idea which is not sensible ;
in short, a word directed to single out the white
ness from among the other objects that surround
it so long as it is perceived along with the bodies in
which it really exists. Thus singled out apart from all
(i) Objectivity \~> the first of the characteristics essential to ideas. In
order to see that ideas cannot be confounded with the mind which apprehends
them, it is enough to consider that between them and the mind there is actual
opposition. The mind is the eye that sees, ideas are the things seen by this
eye. The mind is a singular, an idea is a universal. The mind has commenced
in time, the contents of ideas, i.e., the essences of things, are eternal. The
mind is subject to change, the contents of ideas are unchangeable. The mind
is a contingent thing, the contents of ideas are necessary things. This simple
observation ought to be quite sufficient to shew the absurdity of that theory
which affirms that the light of reason, or, in Aristotelian phrase, the light
of the acting intellect, is the thinking faculty itself, or a part of it. For, all
that this faculty sees in ideas is the very thing seen in that light ("being in
general, " ens commune}, seen, that is to say, with various determinations, or
under various aspects. If therefore these ideas, which are all acquired,
cannot be confounded with the mind, or be considered as parts of it for the
reasons stated, a fortiori must this be the case as regards that which is the
foundation of every one of them, and from which all their sublime character
istics are derived. Tr.
ioo On Divine Providence.
other entities, accidental or substantial, the whiteness
stands up distinct and alone before the mind, which,
having its attention called to it by the word which
expresses it, sees it as it were suspended in that word,
and hence sees it just as if it were a subsistent thing.
From this it is plain that external signs were
necessary to man in order that his mind might associate
and bind up abstractions with them. But he could not
invent those signs by himself, for the reason that to
invent, he must already have been possessed of abstrac
tions, which, nevertheless, he could not acquire save by
means of words, (i) God, therefore, imparted to him a
(l) By means of words. In a note to no. 522 of the Essay on the Origin
of Ideas, the Author writes, "In the first place, it would be impossible for
language to be invented by any man who is completely cut off from society,
because in that state no occasion or possibility would exist of an inter
communication of wants and thoughts. But supposing a human individual
placed in the midst of other men who are devoid of language, two questions
may then arise. The first is : Whether these men could invent a language
before having formed some abstract ideas, or form these abstract ideas
before having invented some sort of language or some signs ; and to this
question I answer, No. The second : Could they do these two things
simultaneously, i.e., could they invent words or signs with the same act by
which they form abstract ideas ? And this I think would not be impossible."
And he refers the reader to the Psychology (1456-1473), where this point is
reasoned out at length, and where (1471) the following words occur: "I
have elsewhere " [he refers to this very passage] " expressed the opinion that
human beings could not by themselves conceive and name purely abstract
ideas, for the reason that there is not in nature any stimulus capable of
moving them thereto ; whence I deduced the divine origin of this part of
language. But after more mature reflection the said demonstration does not
seem to me incontrovertible. I therefore distinguish between the question
of fact and that of simple possibility. As a matter of fact, it is certain that
the first man did learn speech by God Himself speaking to him first ; and
the arguments which prove this will be given elsewhere. But if we speak
of a mere metaphysical possibility, that is, if we ask whether the human
family (not isolated man) could in process of time have succeeded in forming
by one and the same complex act, at least some abstract ideas and words or
Divine Origin of a Part of Language. 101
language; that Supreme Instructor taught him the use
of some words, in which the abstractions, contemplated
together with them, might, so to speak, appear out
wardly subsistent. These words could attract to them
selves the attention of the mind, and determine it to fix
itself on special qualities apart from the objects in
which they exist. All this in accordance with the
general law, that the human mind must primarily be
moved to act by the impressions made on the sense
by external objects.
other signs expressing them, I think I can now affirm that I have discovered
(i.e., in nature) that stimulus which suffices to move the human under
standing to such an act, and which I had formerly sought for in vain." Tr.
CHAPTER XXI.
CONTINUATION : MAN OWES TO GOD, TOGETHER WITH
LANGUAGE, THE KNOWLEDGE OF SOME PRINCIPAL
TRUTHS WHICH HAVE BEEN PRESERVED IN THE
TRADITIONS OF THE HUMAN RACE.
103. With respect to the first of the three above-
mentioned objects, I mean the universe, it is St. Paul
who reminds us that whatever we come to learn through
the consideration thereof, ought to be regarded as the
teaching of God Himself.
104. In the passage to which I have before adverted
(38), we have seen that the Apostle condemns the
heathen philosophers because "having known God,
they did not glorify Him as God, or give thanks, but
became vain in their thoughts," as if the truths con
tained in that knowledge had been invented wholly
and solely by themselves ; whereas " that which is
known of God (i) was manifested unto them" by God,
Who diffused the rays of His Power and Divinity over
all creation purposely for the end that, by seeing these,
they might see also His invisible attributes. (2)
105. But how did the human mind first ascend from
creatures to the Creator r How was it drawn into its
(1) That -which is known of God (quod notum est Dei), that is to say,
known and knowable by man.
(2) Rom. i.
Origin of great Traditional Truths. 103
initial movement toward that lofty flight ? Can the
mind of itself begin to act spontaneously ? Has it an
activity, an agility, so independent of all external im
pulses, and of all associations of ideas ? Or rather,
is it not drawn in the first instance, as we have already
said, from external objects to thoughts, and then,
through the mutual association of these, gradually
enabled to acquire dominion over itself, and mobility,
and the power of passing spontaneously from one of
them to the other ? What do the Holy Scriptures tell
us about this matter ? In short, how did man after
being brought into existence begin his intellectual
course ? How did he rise from sensations to abstract
ideas, and thus gain the ability to form judgments on
things judgments, without which, he, as an intelligent
being, would have found the said things of little or no
use, almost unintelligible, and containing in vain the
vestiges of the Divinity, because he could not see these
vestiges apart by themselves, and therefore could not
make use of them as stepping-stones, so to speak, for
ascending with his mind to the Creator ?
1 06. We learn from the Inspired Volume that God
was the first to name the principal parts of creation,
applying a special name to each, so that it might be
fully knowable by man. By creating it, He had
rendered it perceptible ; by naming it, He rendered it
knowable as the type of a species intended to serve as
a light to the mind.
107 In this way language, as originally instituted
by God, was ordained for two purposes, and appointed
as a means of communication between the two great
orders of things the visible and the invisible. Indeed,
the first purpose of language was, as we have just
104 On Divine Providence.
said, to render the sensible universe fully knowable ;
the second was to enable man to pass beyond the
confines of the sensible universe. Once beyond those
confines, man would be capable of taking higher
flights and of attaining to the knowledge of greater
things, things not falling under his senses, yet of
supreme importance to him, inasmuch as in them all
his future destinies centred, and his complete felicity
must ultimately consist.
1 08. This naturally leads us to suppose that language
would not be taught by the Supreme Instructor merely
for its own sake, as the direct scope of the teaching ;
but only indirectly, as a vesture of, and an accessory
to, those great truths which revealed to man the end
of his existence, and the loving care which Divine
Wisdom took of him. Therefore, as I believe, the
eternal truths were incorporated in language and
conveyed together with it. Certainly, God did not
teach language to man in the same way as a master
teaches grammar to his class, but rather as parents
are wont to do with their children, to whom,
simultaneously with language, they teach the things
contained in it.
109. Hence each Divine word must have been a
great instruction for our first parents ere they had
the use of speech. Nor need we wonder that they
readily understood what was said to them, and as
readily could themselves begin to speak, in imitation
of their Teacher; for their power of understanding may
well be supposed to have been very great. In any
case, they did not receive the intellective faculty in
that feeble and unreliable condition in which we now
see it in newly born infants, but they received it in a
Origin of great Traditional Truths. 105
state befitting the adult age in which they were first
created.
no. This is why the Sacred Scriptures attribute
to the Holy Spirit the gift of speech. " The Spirit of
the Lord " (we read in the Book of Wisdom) " hath
filled the whole world ; and that which containeth all
things hath knowledge of the voice." ( i ) This passage
is very suggestive. That we might notice the con
nexion language has with the most sublime truths,
to signify which it was originally ordained, the in
spired writer is not content with saying that the Spirit
of the Lord has the knowledge of speech, but he
adds that this same Spirit fills with Himself the
whole world and contains in Himself all things.
See how he conjoins the knowledge of speech
with the knowledge of all things, or rather, the
knowledge of all things with the knowledge of speech.
He puts down this second knowledge as antecedent to
the first. Only that Divine Spirit Who fills the earth
and all things knows how to speak. The passage
seems, therefore, intended to give us to understand
that the invention of speech, requiring as it did a
universal wisdom in the inventor, was a task altogether
beyond human power.
In truth, to make use of speech after it has been
learnt from others is a very different thing from in
venting it outright. The inventor of human speech
would not perhaps have encountered an insuperable
difficulty in the naming of sensible and subsistent
things ; but how could he have bethought himself of
finding names for abstract ideas, which did not fall
under his perception either in themselves or in any
(i) Wisd. i. 7.
06 On Divine Providence.
sign that would direct his attention to them ? Failing
this perception, one does not see how he could possibly
have observed the qualities of things as distinct and
separate from the subjects in which they exist, or by
what means his attention could have been drawn to
these abstract qualities. Now, without abstract ideas,
how was he to attain to the highest conceptions, which
either are contained in the great abstracts, or else
can be known only by means of abstractions ?
in. And since, as a matter of fact, the lesser ab
stractions are included in the greater, who could have
indicated to man the way of passing from the one
class to the other r of descending, that is to say, from
the more general to the less, which is the first and
obscure process of the human mind, (i) and then
re-ascending from the latter to the former, which is the
second and luminous process ? It was necessary that
man should at first receive, by means of words, the
highest truths and the most general abstractions ; be
cause it is from these that the human mind invariably
starts on its course of development a course which is,
in great part, hidden from, and therefore unperceived
by, the mind itself. Such indeed must have been
(i) This is also the teaching of St. Thomas of Aquin : Prius occurrit
intellectui nostro cognoscere animal quam cognoscere hominem. Et eadem
ratio est si comparemus QUODCUMQUE MAGIS UNIVERSALE ad MINUS
UNIVERSALE (S. p. i., q. Ixxxv., art. iii). In conformity with this doctrine he
writes : Illud quod PRIMO cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cujus intellectus
includitur in omnibus quezcumque quis apprehendit (S. p. i., ii., q.
xliv., art 2.) ; which is the same as to say that without apprehending (i.e.,
having the idea of) being, man can have no other idea, cannot think, and
therefore, that this idea cannot be acquired through any act of the mind,
but must be in the mind from the first, as light to illumine every
thing else. The idea of being, in a word, must be innate, and mind is mind
only by virtue of it. Tr.
Origin of great Traditional Truths. 107
the purport of the names by which God originally
designated the various parts of the universe, these
parts being themselves taken as signs of so many
fundamental abstractions, as I may perhaps have
occasion to show in another place. Now in order to
place language upon so deep a foundation of wisdom,
the inventor must certainly be cognizant of the plan of
the universe, must contain in himself all things, know
all their relations, and the one great end to which they
are all ordained ; in short, he must be possessed of
wisdom, which, as Leibnitz has well said, " according
to the commonly received idea of it, means nothing
else than the Science of Happiness." (i)
112. In many places of Holy Writ it is insinuated
that no merely partial knowledge is enough to consti
tute wisdom ; that wisdom must be the result of univer
sal knowledge ; and that, therefore, man is unable to
discover it by himself, but must receive it as a gift
from the Omniscient. (2) What is said of wisdom,
seems to me equally applicable to the foundations of
human language ; so great is the affinity and con
nexion between these two things ! They were given
conjointly in the same manner, I should almost say,
as the accidents of matter were created conjointly
with matter itself.
113. It would appear that from this doctrine the
Writer of the Book of Wisdom draws an argument
against those who, either openly or even only in
thought, murmur against the dispositions of Provi
dence. The meaning of the passage to which I refer
(1) Pref. Cod. Jur. Gent. Diplom.
(2) See the Author s Essay on the Unity of Education (< Sull Unita
dell Educazione "), where the passages from Holy Scripture are given.
io8 On Divine Providence.
(Ch. i. 5-14), put into a plain English form, might
be thus expressed: "You that have the temerity to
condemn or criticize the decrees of Providence, be
ware ! The language which you employ in so doing,
remember well, was given by none else than the
Spirit of that very God Whom you dare to repine
against ; and He will certainly bring you to account
for the use you make of His gift. Nor can you hide
yourselves from Him ; for He is the same Spirit Who,
filling all things with Himself, knows them all, and
therefore knows the meaning of every word you say,
whether outwardly or secretly in your heart. When
He taught speech to our first parents, He bound it up
inseparably with the eternal truths ; to speak, therefore,
in accordance with the intention of language, you
must love those truths and keep them always in
view. By speaking in a way derogatory to them
you contradict yourselves ; for words have a sense
independent of you and confirmatory of the very things
which you gainsay. You stand, therefore, self-con
demned in the presence of Him Who is perfectly aware
of your contradictions. In his very thoughts, the
blasphemer shall feel God rebuking him for his im
piety. Refrain, therefore, from murmuring ; for it
will only have the effect of killing your own souls.
Believe in God. He has not made death, neither does
He delight in the perdition of men. He has made a
design whose grandeur infinitely transcends all your
powers of comprehension, and He will fully accomplish
it in due time, although in a way which you cannot
even imagine." Hence it comes to pass, that in the
same way that language is communicated from father
to son, also (this writer says) wisdom " conveyeth
Origin of great Traditional Triiths. 109
herself through generations, and maketh friends of
God and Prophets." (i)
114. In the earliest ages it was strongly recom
mended to the heads of families that they should care
fully instruct their offspring in the Divine Law, and
transmit to them the Divine Revelations as well as
the histories which connected our race with the
Creator. It is by these traditions that the traces
of the same primary truths, though much altered and
counterfeited, were preserved throughout all ages and
among all nations, as upon a diligent examination we
can see even at this day. But against the negligence
and unfaithfulness of those ancient men in fulfilling
their obligation, a remedy was, in great part, supplied
by the nature of language. For although language,
in coming down through a long series of generations,
became altered and corrupted in the same measure as
the truths of which I speak, nevertheless it would
neither be entirely destroyed, nor, so long as it con
tinued to exist, be divided from those elements which
form both the roots of all human cognitions, and the
subject and, as it were, the substratum of the first and
radical words. Hence the parents, by the mere fact
of communicating language to their children were,
even unawares, handing down the greatest truths,
which were securely encased, so to speak, and con
signed in the material form of words. This is why
languages, notwithstanding the many corruptions,
changes, divisions, and additions they have under
gone, still seem, in the eyes of competent and im
partial critics, to bear in their first elements the im-
(i) Wisd. vii. 27.
1 10 On Divine Providence.
press of a common origin, as well as of the vestiges
of the same principal truths.
115. In conclusion, then; whatever things man
knows he knows because God communicates them to
him. And these objects thus communicated consist
either of the subsistent things that compose this visible
universe, or of words signifying ideas abstracted from
these things, or, again, of words conveying truths of
a supernatural order truths which He has revealed
by, and closely united with, the words themselves.
CHAPTER XXII.
THE SCIENCE OF HAPPINESS CANNOT BE OBTAINED
FROM OUR NATURAL REASON : IT IS LEARNT FROM
GOD.
1 1 6. It was by the consideration of this truth that
Job found comfort in the depth of his sorrows. For,
passing in review the more marvellous parts of the
universe, he everywhere met with difficulties which no
human thought could solve ; and yet he at the same
time understood that even if he should succeed in
fathoming all the mysteries of nature, he could not on
that account believe himself possessed of wisdom,
inasmuch as wisdom did not lie within the confines of
creation, but had its seat in the bosom of the Eternal.
"Where" (asked the holy man) "is wisdom to be found?
And where is the place of understanding?" And he
replied to himself: "Man knoweth not the price
thereof, nor is it found in the land of them that live in
delights " (it does not consist in sensible goods and
pleasures). " The finest gold shall not purchase it,
neither shall silver be weighed in exchange for it.
It shall not be compared with the dyed colours of
India, or with the most precious stone sardonyx, or
the sapphire. Gold or crystal cannot equal it, neither
shall any vessels of gold be changed for it" (from
none of those goods which man naturally experiences,
and from which he forms his estimates of things can
ii2 On Divine Providence.
wisdom be derived). Then he adds: "Wisdom is
drawn out of secret places " (places impenetrable to
human vision). But what places are these ? He goes
on : " It is hid from the eyes of all living, and the
fowls of the air know it not" (it is not contained
within the regions of space). "Destruction and death
have said : With our ears we have heard the fame
thereof." Who, then, knows it ? Here at last comes
the true answer : " God understandeth the way of it,
and He knoweth the place thereof. For He beholdeth
the ends of the world, and looketh on all things that
are under the heaven. Who made a weight for the
winds, and weighed the waters by measure ? When
He gave a law for the rain, and a way for the sounding
storms ; then He saw it, and declared, and prepared,
and searched it. And He said to man : Behold the
fear of the Lord, that is wisdom ; and to depart from
evil, is understanding." (i)
117. In this sublime passage we are informed that
Wisdom cannot dwell in any part of creation, that is,
either in the heavens, or on the earth, or in the sea, or
in the abyss beneath ; but that it dwells only in that
Mind which by a single act contemplates all the diverse
parts of creation, compares them together, and gathers
them into unity a thing impossible to the human
mind, to which the whole of creation is never present
either simultaneously or in succession. Wisdom, as
we have said, is the science of happiness. Now man s
natural knowledge, as Job reminds us, is purely
experimental, viz., obtained by means of the senses.
According to this experience, man knows only external
goods, riches, and the pleasures of life ; but in none
(l) Job xxviii. 12-28.
Science of Happiness learnt from God. 1 1 3
of these things can happiness, and therefore wisdom,
be found : " High and eminent things shall not be
mentioned in comparison with it; and wisdom is
drawn from secret places." (i) But will man, aban
doned to himself, find it after death ? No ; deprived of
communion with God, he will have merely a negative
knowledge of it; in other words, he will then know that
during his life-time he wandered astray from it ; and
thus his idea of wisdom will be no better than one of
those vague notions which we form of things that are
far out of our reach, and which we know only by hear
say : " Destruction and death have said : With our
ears we have heard the fame thereof." (2)
1 1 8. Supposing, however, for argument s sake, that
happiness could be found in some earthly good, and
supposing, moreover, that man had actually obtained
possession of that good, I ask : could he, even in that
case, be independent of God, and securely rely on his
own knowledge and his own power alone ? Not in the
least; for, where is the guarantee that the precious
treasure will not be wrested from him ? Does he know
all the power of the natural forces by which he is
surrounded ? In the continuous, irresistible course of the
mutual interaction of these forces so utterly beyond
his control is it not a fact that he may at any moment
fall a victim and be crushed out of existence ? crushed
like one of those insects on the road which perish
in myriads under the foot of the casual wayfarer?
Ignorant and weak mortal ! who so flippantly discuss
the order established in human things, and censure
and murmur against its Almighty Disposer, and
perhaps imagine that you could alter its course for
(i) Job xxviii. 18. (2) Ibid. 22.
I
H4 On Divine Providence.
the better, tell me what are you ? What are you
even when furnished with all the science attainable
by man, or when boasting of a power that can keep
millions of your fellow creatures enslaved to your
will r Reflect, and you will see your image in the
little infant crying in his cradle, knowing nothing of
himself, nothing of his destiny, nothing of his sur
roundings, and powerless, I will not say to defend
himself from external attacks, but to satisfy his most
urgent needs ; in a word, absolutely dependent on the
provident care of a mother s love. The brute beast
can live tranquil even in the midst of dangers, because
it is without understanding ; but how different is the
case with man ! Man seeks for tranquillity in the
knowledge of things. Essentially rational, he is not,
he may not be set at rest except through reason.
Now what rest, what tranquillity can his reason give
him in the midst of this boundless universe, where he
is a mere atom, in the midst of a thousand forces, a
thousand beings, potent and unyielding, which he sees
moving all around him and acting according to laws
which are unalterable, but regarding the true nature
of which he is left completely in the dark r the
countless orbs that people space; the deep abysses
lurking within the bowels of the earth ; the immense
heaving billows of the ocean that seem constantly
to threaten the continents with submersion; the
terrible hurricanes whose fury can uproot whole
forests ; the conflagrations that reduce cities to heaps
of smouldering ruins ; that invisible and mysterious
electric substance in which a momentary disturbance
of equilibrium seems to make the whole earth totter
to its foundations ; to say . nothing of other forces,
Science of Happiness learnt from God. 115
invisible, unconquerable, and inevitable ? Of what
avail can man s natural knowledge or natural power
be towards rendering him secure and fearless amid
the operation of these inexorable forces ? What can
he, a frail mortal, do to withstand the encounters of
beings so tremendous, and so vastly mightier than
himself, nay, than all he could conceive by the utmost
effort of his imagination, since the mere prick of a pin,
the sting of an insect, a few grains of poison, a
draught of water, or a breath of air, are quite suffi
cient to rob him of all his strength and to deprive
him of life r Of a truth, only that Being Who knows
all nature s laws and is above them all, could so
direct man in the midst of so many powers incompar
ably superior to his own, as to enable him to avoid
their encounters and to remain unhurt by their
collisions : or, better, only this great Knower
and universal Governor, could reveal to him the
science of making himself in the long run superior
to all these formidable powers, and securing the
possession of happiness. Without this revelation,
how could any one know for certain what would
ultimately be to his advantage r If man, in seeking
for what is best for him, were to rely merely on his
own sagacity and forecastings, the most he could
arrive at would be a conjectural and limited know
ledge ; and a knowledge like this would certainly not
suffice to safeguard him against all those accidents
which are liable to happen at any moment, are wholly
beyond his control, and could in an instant scatter all
his plans and fortunes to the winds. God alone, then,
because knowing and directing all accidents in the
universe, is able to tell unerringly beforehand what it
1 1 6 On Divine Providence.
is that will eventually prove most beneficial to man
himself. Hence the words : " God understandeth the
way of wisdom, and He knoweth the place thereof;
for He beholdeth the ends of the world, and looketh
on all things that are under heaven ; Who made
a weight for the winds, and weighed the waters by
measure, when He gave a law for the rain, and a
way for the sounding storms" (that is to say, when
He created and ordered the universe, and so dis
posed it that all things and events in it should
work together for the good of His faithful ones) ;
then it was that He could disclose to man the
great secret of wisdom : " Behold the fear of the
Lord, that is wisdom ; and to depart from evil, is
understanding. " ( i ) This is the same as saying : " Here
in lies the road to happiness, be wise and walk in it,
nothing fearing ; for the things and events of this
world, great and small, although they are often
foolishly supposed by many to work blindly and by
chance, have, in point of fact, their course so calculated
and fixed by Me from eternity, that they must, one
and all, infallibly serve unto the saving and the
perfecting of the righteous."
119. Here, therefore, we have again a manifest
proof of the necessity of Faith and Revelation. For,
even granting that man had the power of avoiding
everything which he knew to be hurtful to him, he
could not, with nothing but his own experience to guide
him, find out all that would be hurtful; because his
own experience never extends to all things and to all
possible events, and cannot therefore serve as a ground
whereon to form a correct idea of the course of the
(I) Jobxxviii. 23-28.
Science of Happiness learnt from God. 117
universe taken in its entirety. Besides, experimental
knowledge is only acquired with time; whereas man
feels an urgent need of at once placing himself for
certain on the way which he knows will lead him to
happiness without first losing himself in the way of
error and misery. A merely conjectural knowledge
regarding the way to happiness, therefore, is not
enough for him.
1 20. Nevertheless, he may find it of use after he has
been encouraged by the Divine Revelations which hold
out the assurance that, if he follows the road indi
cated to him, the Great Mover of all things will be his
protector. Indeed, experimental knowledge, extending
its range as mankind advances in age, brings to light
ever new proofs in favour of the truth of Revelation,
and of the reasonableness of faith; because the more
perfect it grows, the more does it find reason in
agreement with Divine Revelation, which teaches
wisdom to all men with simplicity, with security, and at
all times.
121. In conclusion, then, we must perforce admit
that as human reason is incapable of finding
out, by itself alone, the link which joins together all
things in the universe, it cannot by its particular argu
ments solve all the difficulties that present themselves
in connexion with Divine Providence, and therefore
cannot set the human mind at rest. Thus, if a man
were to say to his reason: "I will follow virtue as thou
commandest, provided thou wilt undertake to assure
me that I shall have happiness in return," how could
reason give this pledge? All it could say in reply
would be: "Experience shows me that, generally
speaking, the most virtuous men are also the happiest."
ii 8 : - On Divint Providence.
But if, not satisfied with this answer, he were further
to ask: "Canst thou assure me that I shall not die to
morrow ? That my house shall not be burnt down ?
That my children shall have good health and a long
life?" To such interrogations as these, reason and
experience which in these matters do not go beyond
the world of sensible things, and do not even compass
all of them are absolutely dumb. They can only refer
the interrogator to the paternal voice of Him Who
governs the future as well as the present, and Who on
this very account is called in Holy Writ "The guide of
wisdom;" for that "In His hand are both we and our
words, and all wisdom, and the knowledge and skill of
works."(i) He, and He alone can from his high throne
say to man with fullest authority: "Be virtuous, and
thou shalt most certainly one day be glad. The things
of the universe do not go hap-hazard ; I have disposed
them all with a view to the blessedness of the righteous.
Whatever may befall thee, stand thou fast in the good
purpose; for everything, even that which has a contrary
appearance, happens for thy good; a good which thou
shalt reap in the end, and which will endure for ever."
(I) Wisd. vii. 15, 16.
CHAPTER XXIII.
THE SCIENCE OF HAPPINESS IS THE RESULT OF THE
KNOWABLE TAKEN IN ITS ENTIRETY: HUMAN
REASON CANNOT ATTAIN TO THIS RESULT: GOD
ALONE COMMUNICATES IT TO MAN : HENCE A NEW
PROOF OF THE NECESSITY OF FAITH.
122. They who believe the Divine intimation, "Be
hold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom ; and to de
part from evil, is understanding," have ever found in
this belief all that is requisite for acquiring know
ledge of the way of happiness.
This great truth was simply a corollary of all that
God knew concerning the plan of the universe which
He had conceived and destined to realization, but
which He did not, indeed could not, reveal to man in
all its parts (50-54) ; neither was this necessary, it
being enough for man to know where all things
ended. Certainly, man does not require much theo
retical knowledge : all that he really needs is the practi
cal corollary of which we are speaking, and which may
truly be called the result of all the knowable. For
this reason, the way of salvation is open to all men,
quite irrespectively of their greater or smaller cap
abilities, provided only that they believe the words of
God. Although God does not give all an equal amount
of knowledge regarding things not necessary, He com
municates to all alike the fruitful consequence of His
120 On Divine Providence.
universal knowledge, a consequence which unmistak
ably points out the way to happiness. Not all men,
therefore, can be learned ; but all can be wise by
yielding assent to the teaching of their infinitely wise
Master. True wisdom is even by men placed in the
ultimate conclusions of knowledge ; (i) and the labouri-
ous science of the learned is, in ultimate analysis,
directed to nothing else than the discovery of simple
truths ; it is not really valuable for its own sake ; all
its labours are spent for the sake of its results. Hence,
from the moment that man s supreme Instructor and
Lord delivered to him His Law, and set before him
life if he kept, but death if he transgressed it, He by
this mere fact consigned wisdom to him. God s
essential veracity made belief in His words a duty for
man, and this duty became more urgent inasmuch as
man could not, as we have said, learn the way to
happiness from his own experience, but solely from
the authoritative declaration of his Creator. The
limitation of his nature demanded that he should be
led to happiness by the guide which alone knew the
way.
123. Thus was man placed in the happy necessity
of paying a most noble tribute to his Creator, the
tribute of a blind faith in His utterances. I say blind
faith, because man had no experimental proof of the
truth of those utterances, and not, of course, as im
plying that his belief in them, the submission of his
intellect to such and so great an authority, the con
fession of his own insufficiency for the great purpose
in question, was not most reasonable. Nothing is
(i) It would seem that most of the proverbs in common use among
different nations belong to this class of conclusions. Tr.
New Proof of the Necessity of Faith. 121
more reasonable than for a person, who has to travel
over a difficult and unknown tract of country, to
follow the directions of one who knows the way.
Would not even the proud philosopher, the man of
independent thought, who perhaps feels indignant
at the bare mention of blind faith, if he should want
to explore a wild Alpine district, consider it a matter
of course to engage the services of some poor villager
who had the reputation of being an experienced guide ?
He all at once forgets his great learning, and the
simple rustic becomes his mentor. See how at the
mere beckoning of this new instructor the philosopher
blindly submits both mind and will ; how he turns
his steps hither and thither, just as he is told, even
along most difficult paths and over most dangerous
precipices, without asking for either geometrical or
other demonstrations, of which the mountaineer would
know nothing. Why all this r Simply because, ac
cording to current report, that man is supposed to
know the way, whilst his own reason tells him that
he does not. There is nothing, then, not only more
reasonable, but also more needful and more common,
than to submit one s reason to other people s authority;
for no man s reason is alone sufficient for all his re
quirements. A fortiori, therefore, nothing is more
conformable to reason than for us to trust ourselves
to the veracity of the Creator, acknowledging, on the
one hand, His power, and on the other our impotence ;
and hence fearing Him ; because if we fail to comply
with His most wise and most perfect will, He has all
nature ready at His bidding to avenge Him, and a
thousand other ways of punishing us. Well, therefore,
may the fear of God and the shunning of His dis-
122 On Divine Providc}ice.
pleasure be described as the pith and substance of
wisdom.
- 124. But if it was right that God should require us
to believe in His words, essentially true, it was also
fitting that He should keep hidden from us many of
those truths which are not necessary for our salvation.
For by acting in this way He was offering us a wider
field for the exercise of our fidelity to Him; and at the
same time leaving us more abundant materials for
meditation which would make us advance further and
further in a rational persuasion of His greatness and
of our own littleness ; and thus such small amount of
knowledge as we could acquire by our efforts would
serve to show more and more how human reason
accords with Faith, and how its depositions tend to
confirm and redound to the glory of truth.
CHAPTER XXIV.
CONTINUATION THE KNOWLEDGE OF TIMES AND
PLACES TRANSCENDS THE POWERS OF HUMAN
REASON.
125. In the order as well of nature as of grace, God,
generally speaking, keeps hidden from us those
particular things which depend upon the complex
action of events, and which we, being ignorant of that
complex action, cannot deduce by reasoning. Holy
Writ tells us that among these divine secrets we must
reckon the determining of times and places, a determin
ation, nevertheless, which is of the greatest importance
to the well ordered movement of the universe. "All
things " (says Ecclesiastes) " have their season, and in
their times all things pass under heaven, all being
contained within their appointed places." (i)
126. The right distribution of times and places
manifestly depends upon the law of fitness between
each of the countless parts of the universe and
the complex whole which results from them. Only
one mind could conceive and apply such law, the mind
which embraces all things in a single thought, since
it is through its appointed times and places that the
great whole is gradually accomplished.
127. It is exactly by referring to the wise distribu
tion of these times and these places in which God s
(i) Eccles. Hi. i.
124 On Divine Providence .
design is actually being carried into realization that
Ecclesiastes convicts human reason of its hopeless
ignorance of that design. For, considering that even
sorrows, because ordained by God, must have a wise
purpose, he says: "He hath made all things good in
their time, and hath delivered the world to the con
sideration of men, so that they cannot find out the work
which God hath made from the beginning to the end."(i)
128. Hence, when the Apostles, after the Resurrec
tion, asked our Lord if He would at that time restore
again the Kingdom of Israel, He answered: "It is not
for you to know the times or moments which the Father
hath put in His power; but you shall receive the power
of the Holy Ghost coming upon you; and you shall be
witnesses unto Me in Jerusalem, and in all Judea and
Samaria, and even to the uttermost part of the earth." (2)
This was an intimation to them that they must not
trouble themselves about the particular dispositions
which the Heavenly Father thinks fit to make of human
things, but must be satisfied with knowing that it is
He Who makes them. Let them only do His will with
simplicity, and all would be well with them in the
end, however contrary appearances might be to this
expectation.
129. Indeed, appearances were then and afterwards
altogether against the restoration of that great King
dom of Israel, for which the Disciples of Christ looked
with so much hope and eagerness of desire. But these
gloomy appearances did not in the least dishearten
them. Certain, even as Abraham was, that God, rather
than suffer His word to be made void, would, from
their very ashes raise them up to a glorious immortality,
(i) Eccles. iii. 10, n. (2) Acts i. 7, 8.
Knowledge of Times, &c. y not Man s. 125
they cheerfully offered themselves to death; and the
innocent blood which for three long 1 centuries flowed
in torrents by order of the cruel masters of the world,
only served to strengthen that lively Faith which kept
on saying with holy Job: "Even if He should kill me,
I will trust in Him."(i)
Such greatness of soul, such long-suffering endurance
could not have been produced by the forecastings of
human reason or human experience, but solely by the
infallible promises of the Creator, embraced with that
faith which fixes its loving gaze on a light immense,
indeed, but removed far beyond the sphere of this
creation. Hence our Lord tells us in St. Matthew,
that "of that day or hour" (of the end of the world) "no
man knoweth. . . . but the Father alone,"(2) on Whose
creative will, common to the Divine Trinity whereof the
Father is the fontal principle, the universe depends.
130. As we have seen that in the Book of Job the
name of wisdom is taken to signify, not the wisdom
belonging to God Himself, but that which He com
municates to men; even so, in many other places of
Holy Writ, God is said to know, or some such phrase
is used when it is intended to indicate God s knowledge,
not as existing in Himself, but in so far as He is
pleased to communicate it to men. Indeed, in the
Inspired Volume God is almost invariably represented
under that particular form in which He has connected
Himself with the universe, and made Himself knowable
to us; and all our reasonings concerning Him are
intelligible and true inasmuch as that form is presup
posed in them. Thus we can understand how it could
be affirmed with truth that the day or hour of the last
(i) Job xiii. 15. (2) Matt, xxiv, 36.
126 On Divine Providence.
judgment is not known "either to the angels of
heaven, or even to the Son, but to the Father only."(i)
The Father knows it of Himself; the Son knows it
inasmuch as He is in the Father, begotten by Him;
but, as man, although He may if He will, know it
by reading it in the Divine Essence, nevertheless He
does not know it in a human way, nor in a way which
is communicable to men or to angels. Hence the title
of human would not, rightly speaking, be applicable
to that knowledge which is not communicated to any
mere man ; for every cognition which we are wont to
qualify by this title must, of its own nature, be possessed
by at least some one of our kind, and be attributable
to him as a human person. But the knowledge of the
last day, as also, in general, of the times and moments
through which the Most High moves and distributes
events, and infallibly leads all things to their destined
end, is the Divine secret wherein it may be said that
the Eternal is pleased to conceal His dread power, that
power whereby, without causing any disturbance in
nature, and as it were by a glance of the eye, He throws
down the ungodly and thrusts them out even from the
very ends of the earth, leaving the righteous triumph
ant; an act which holy Job sets down as one of the
works of the greatness of the Divinity. (2)
131. Hence also our Divine Master inculcates on
us continual watching: "Take ye heed, watch and
pray; for ye know not when the time is." (3) A most
just and most weighty reason, this, for watchfulness !
He describes the Heavenly Father as a lord, who
before starting on a journey, divides the duties of the
administration of his property among his servants,
(i) Mark xiii. 32. (2) Job xxxviii. 13. (3) Mark xiii.33-
Knowledge of Times y &c. y not Man s. 127
but leaves them wholly in the dark as to when they
may expect him to return. As this may be at any
moment, and all of a sudden, and on the other hand
the warning is meant to apply to all men alike, he
ends by saying: "What I say to you I say to all:
watch."(i)
132. From the fact of the Eternal reserving the
knowledge of times to Himself there arises also this
advantage, that whenever the turn of events happens
to be such as suddenly to belie all human prognos
tications, we feel powerfully struck with a deep
reverential sense of the marvellous greatness of the
works of God. In truth, men are at every moment,
I should almost say, caught unawares by the Omnipo
tent; for they never know, they never can know, the
future for certain, nor foresee the results of their own
actions, nor divine the combination of the new
circumstances which supervene, and from which it
would be vain for them to try to escape or to screen
themselves. For the sphere of mundane things is
continually changing, and thus man is constantly in
volved in fresh difficulties and complications in which
he has no practical knowledge to guide him; and as
a consequence, by the very means which he improvises
for meeting an emergency, and for having thought of
which he perhaps considers himself very wise, he is
unwittingly led whither he would least have expected.
Only at last, when the course of things is fast
approaching its inevitable termination, the veil drops
from his eyes, and he sees his mistake. Then he
may set himself to review at leisure the whole of what
has just passed, and perhaps find it all most natural ;
(l) Mark xiii. 37.
128 On Divine Providence.
he may even reproach himself for not having foreseen
things that are so obvious, and attribute his oversight
to mere accident, and promise to himself, and hope,
that he will know better another time ; and so go on
deluding and deceiving himself again and again in
punishment for not attending to the Divine admonition,
and for refusing to acknowledge that the great key
of events, viz., the knowledge of the times, is not in
his hand. Unlike the Eternal, to Whom all the past
as well as all the future is always present, we are never
at the same moment spectators of a whole series of
events. Changing as time changes, we only witness
these events singly, according as they appear one after
another in their appointed turn on the ever-shifting
scene. Hence their marvellous connexion is not
observed by us, until, well-nigh gone and no longer
revocable, they become useless records consigned to
our memory. While each event was present, it drew
the whole of our attention to itself, as if there were
no other to follow. The impression it made upon our
sensitive nature, sometimes the noise which accom
panied it, the complication of elements which it
involved, always the rapidity with which it passed,
the gleam of a thousand hopes which it flashed upon
us, the passions which it set in motion; all this
conspired to deprive us of even that small degree of
reflection which we might have brought to bear on
the uncertain future, and to render us presumptuous,
over-confident, over-buoyant; so that in the end we
are like those persons who, having at early dawn
dreamt of kingdoms and of treasures, wake up to find
their illusion dissipated by the rays of the rising sun.
May we open our eyes at last! May we profit by
Knowledge of Times > &c., not Man s. 129
experience! And seeing, by innumerable facts which
are written in the history of all ages, how, in the
hands of the Supreme Ruler, the tide of events has ever
ended in a way contrary to the vain hopes of the
impious, even when every appearance seemed to
be in their favour, let us magnify His sovereign
Wisdom, and in all humility exclaim with the Apostle :
" O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the
knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His
judgments, and how unsearchable His ways! For
who hath known the mind of the Lord ? Or who hath
been His counsellor? Or who hath first given to
Him, and recompense shall be made him? For of
Him, and by Him, and in Him, are all things : to Him
be glory for ever, Amen." (i)
(I Rom. xi. 33-36.
K
CHAPTER XXV.
THE LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN REASON, AS EXPOUNDED
ABOVE, FAR FROM PROVING THAT REASON AND
FAITH ARE IN MUTUAL ANTAGONISM, PROVE THE
VERY REVERSE.
133. To any one who has followed with attention
what we have said thus far in regard to the limitations
inherent in the nature and constitution of the human
mind, it must, I think, be quite plain that man
cannot secure the tranquillity he so much needs, nor
attain to happiness, unless he is assisted by Faith.
Nevertheless, the question of these limitations has
always been a dangerous one to deal with ; for if the
human mind is credited with larger powers than be
long to it, one runs the risk of rendering it presumptuous
through an illusory belief of knowing more than it does
or can ever know ; and if, from fear of this evil, its
powers are unduly restricted, there is great danger of
falling into scepticism. Among the philosophers who
have treated this subject with any degree of penetra
tion, there are perhaps very few that did not stumble
against one or other of these two rocks. But if I am
not mistaken, the limitations which I have assigned
will keep us equally clear of both, that is to say, of
scepticism on the one hand, and, on the other, of what has
been called the excessive dogmatism of reason. If these
limitations shew that human reason, abandoned to itself
Reason not opposed to Faith. 1 3 1
and taught only by the experience of sensible things, does
not suffice to render us tranquil in respect of the way
in which Providence disposes events, but that it needs
for this purpose to be aided by Faith in God s words ;
they at the same time afford us clear evidence of the
conformity and harmony existing between reason and
Faith ; inasmuch as reason, following its own dictates,
invokes the aid of Faith, and Faith in its turn
instructs and enlightens reason.
But that no doubt may remain as to the friendly
accord of these two noble guides of man, it will be
advisable to examine better in what the antagonism
between them, if such there were, might consist, and
then prove that there is nothing in human reason
which can in any true sense be considered as opposed
or hostile to Faith.
The relation conceivable as diversifying reason from
Faith may be of three kinds.
First, it might be a relation of simple diversity, a
negative relation on the side of reason ; that is to say,
reason in this case would not positively know any
thing that contradicts the teachings of Faith, but
would merely be wanting in the knowledge of those
teachings. Clearly, this kind of difference would in no
way impair either the authority of reason in those
things which it knows, or the truth of what Faith pro
poses to be believed. For our ignorance can never be
taken as an argument against the truth of what, al
though not known to ourselves, is affirmed by a most
grave and infallible authority. No man knows every
thing ; and as that portion of knowledge in which one
is wanting does not invalidate the truth of what he
knows, so vice versa such portion of knowledge as one
132 On Divine Providence.
happens to possess does not prove that what he is
ignorant of must be regarded as false.
And this is exactly the kind of diversity between
reason and Faith which flows from the natural limita
tions we have enunciated above. The effect of those
limitations is simply to determine a certain class of
truths lying beyond such as are knowable by
human reason itself. But in this difference of objects
there is no contradiction, no conflict ; on the contrary,
it is the true motive for their close alliance, since it
is exactly because reason is ignorant of some portion
of the truth, that Faith offers to lend its kindly aid in
supplying the deficiency.
CHAPTER XXVI.
THE APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN REASON
AND FAITH ARISE FROM THE FALLIBILITY OF
REASON, AND ARE REMOVED BY REASON AC
KNOWLEDGING ITSELF FALLIBLE.
134. Secondly -, reason and Faith maybe conceived
as standing in the relation of mutual opposition. This
opposition, if merely the result of the manner in
which reason arrives at certain conclusions, would
be apparent only ; it would be real, if the principles
of reason were themselves directly contrary to the
truths of Faith.
135. The first of these two kinds of opposition is
certainly possible, because human reason, in its deduc
tions, is liable to error, and also because it has not
always a sufficient number of facts whereon to base
an argument both sound and complete.(i) But these
contradictions, being only apparent, do not constitute
any real contrariety or hostility. From the moment
reason comes to understand, that, owing to limits by
which it is hemmed in on all sides, it is ignorant of
many things, from that moment, I say, it of necessity
(i) Sound and complete. Here the reader will do well to remember the
Author s note to no. 12, and all that he has said to prove that the ex
perience of this life can never supply man with all the data which would
be indispensable for enabling him to judge correctly of the true and ultimate
bearing of events as arranged by Divine Providence. 7>.
134 On Divine Providence.
feels morally bound to acknowledge this ignorance
before Faith, and to bow down to her teaching.
Consequently, when it finds in its conclusions anything
contrary to Faith, it must, remembering its own im
perfection, correct them by the light of revealed truth.
The cause of these erroneous deductions is very
obvious : given the recognition of the ignorance in
separable from reason and of its undeniable liability
to error, they must be expected, they must be foreseen
as a matter of course. The acknowledgment of one s
ignorance is virtually an acknowledgment of one s
errors. But reason cannot but be aware of its ignor
ance : are not the limitations of which we have spoken
so many facts discovered by reason reflecting upon
itself? If, then, reason ought to submit to Faith be
cause of the limitation of its knowledge, still more
should it do so because of its liability to error. Having
already implicitly made this submission by recognizing
its natural limitation and fallibility, it can no longer
consistently rebel against Faith under the pretext
that a certain conclusion at which it has arrived is at
variance with the utterances of the latter.
The case, however, would be different, if Faith were
found to be in direct opposition to the very principles
of reason, which are necessarily free from error. The
hostility or contradiction would then be, not apparent,
but real; and reason, therefore, could not submit to
Faith, since it is impossible for reason to renounce
the first principles whence it receives its movement,
as well as guidance to direct it in all its steps. If
reason were to give up these principles, it would des
troy itself; for it is these, and nothing else, that consti
tute it ; and no being can destroy itself. Now this is
Source of Apparent Contradictions. 135
precisely the kind of contradiction which is not found
between reason and Faith, which has never been found,
and which does not follow from the limitations I have
propounded.
CHAPTER XXVII.
SENSISM, BY UNDULY LIMITING HUMAN REASON, LEADS
TO SCEPTICISM.
136. Thirdly : But could not reason raise a doubt
about its own principles ?
I answer : It may at least imagine that it can do so.
But as the fact of its holding these principles as
true, and at the same time finding them contrary to
Faith, would imply the condemnation and destruction
of Faith ; so the fact of its entertaining a doubt about
them would imply its own destruction together with
that of Faith.
137. This would be nothing short of Scepticism,
a most pernicious error, from \vhich, however, as I
must now endeavour to show, the theory I propound on
the limitations of human reason is very far removed.
Whilst I am doing so, the reader will also have an
opportunity of seeing what some modern writers have
said on a question of such great importance, and will
be able to judge for himself as to whether I have
contributed anything toward its solution. I could say
much on the ecclesiastical writers, who have always
been, substantially, in possession of the truth ; but
leaving these aside, I will confine my remarks to those
authors of recent times whom the world has admired
most, and proclaimed the discoverers of great truths.
Sensism leads to Scepticism. 137
Locke was the first who revived the scholastic prin
ciple which had been overthrown in the opinion of men
by Descartes, viz., " that we can understand nothing
of which we have not first had sensible experience."
But he explained and applied this principle in a much
poorer and grosser way than the Schoolmen had done.
He derived the whole of human knowledge from sen
sation and reflection, (i) Condillac, allured by the
desire of simplicity, thought he could improve on
Locke, and explain all knowledge by means of a
single principle, that of sensation. Even the supreme
rules of judgment, (2) which the Schoolmen knew we
receive from nature and see by a kind of instinct,
could, according to this philosopher, be formed
of sensations. Unfortunately, neither of these authors
seems ever to have had the least notion of those great
difficulties which have always presented themselves to
profound thinkers when they sought to explain the
genesis of human cognitions. Whatever occurs to
their presumptuous and very limited understanding,
they give forth in a singular tone of assurance
accompanied with a certain air of contempt for all
those who preceded them. If in disputing with their
school you venture to give utterance to some profound
idea, you are ridiculed for your pains. No arduous
thought, no intense reflection must disturb the tran
quillity of that complacent philosophy. " What is
the use of troubling about these things ? It is impossible
(1) In his famous Essay on Human Understanding, Book II., Ch. I.,
Locke, referring to sensation and reflection, says: "These two are the
fountains of knowledge, whence all ideas we have, or can naturally have,
do spring." Nearly the whole of this first book is an attempt to prove
that there are no principles or ideas innate in our mind. Tr.
(2) i.e., The first principles of reason. Tr.
138 On Divine Providence.
for us to know them. You must not drive us back to
the abstruse subtleties, the unintelligible metaphysics
of the dark ages ; for, thank God, the world is now
more enlightened and refined than it was." This is
the sort of refutation which one hears the sensists offer
to all systems that are above their superficiality.
Hence the annihilation, under their reign, of all serious
knowledge, of all intellectual elevation.
138. Yet what do these philosophers tell us about
the limitations of the human mind ?
As they do not find the least difficulty in deriving
from sensations whatever they like, so as a matter
of course they do not find any limits to human reason
in this respect. Therefore, in their system, reason
becomes inflated with pride and full of arrogance in
the vain belief of being able to learn everything which
man needs by means of sensible experience alone,
on which they rest the most extravagant hopes.
But as it is quite manifest, on the other hand, that
there are many things, for example the substance of
bodies, which can in no wise be apprehended by
corporeal sensitivity, they found themselves compelled
to place a certain limit to the human knowable. They
were not, however, the men to be disconcerted, or to
doubt the truth of their views on account of such a
difficulty. If the knot could not be untied, it must be
cut. Gratuitously, yet with the authoritative tone of
regenerators of science, they denied the possibility of
man knowing anything of the essences and substances
of things. This purely gratuitous limit set to know
ledge reduced philosophy and the knowable itself to
little enough, indeed to nothing ; while at the same
time it failed to humble human reason, which recognized
Sensism leads to Scepticism. 139
the experience of the senses as the only source of know
ledge, and, by a glaring self-contradiction, pronounced
that source to be inexhaustible. Thus the whole of
philosophy was made to consist in the science of
accidents, (i) and it led man to rest satisfied with them.
It indirectly helped the progress of the material arts,
but it enervated and annihilated mental and moral
science, and produced an age at once extremely
superficial and fiercely proud in its superficiality.
Hume came next, and retained as a thing beyond
question the principle of Locke s philosophy, that
man has no other source whence to draw his know
ledge than the sensations produced in him by the
action of external bodies. (2) But he was a man of a
far keener and more logical mind than Locke ; and
it is presumable that such a principle was received
by him as current prejudices are received, as pro
positions which are accepted on trust, and supposed
by everybody to be true. No one thinks of submit
ting these propositions to examination, because it is
(1) i.e., The sensible qualities of things. Tr.
(2) The only right method to be followed in philosophy is, undoubtedly,
that which starts from facts ; and to have proclaimed this method and
rendered it universal is the merit of the modern school. On the other
hand, passing over certain facts and building upon incomplete observations,
are its continual defects. To know how to observe all the facts, to seize
even upon those which most easily escape notice, as for instance those of
our own spiritual feeling and consciousness, and then to accept impartially
the legitimate consequences of the same, these are the qualifications of a
true philosopher. To this end, a most vigilant and continual reflection
upon oneself is necessary. That observation which is only able to take
note of what happens externally to ourselves, of the impressions received
by our corporeal senses from the action of matter, is observation of the
grossest and most vulgar kind. It produces, not a mature philosophy,
but a philosophy in the state of infancy. Such is the philosophy of
Locke, of Condillac, of Destutt-Tracy, etc.
1 40 On Divine Providence.
taken for granted that they have been examined before
and found correct ; and people do not care to do over
again what they believe has been done before them.
It would seem a mere xvaste of time, a finding oneself
always at the beginning. But if Hume admitted the
Lockian principle without examination, he did not
derive from it the human cognitions with the Lockian
simplicity. He saw very clearly that the principles
of reason, as commonly understood, could not be
deduced from mere experience, because they present
themselves as universal, whereas experience, however
repeated and multiplied, never gives anything more
than particular facts. Nevertheless, the principle
that " the whole of what man knows comes from the
experience of the senses " remained fixed in his mind
as a truth beyond discussion. What was the result ?
Consistency led him to call in question the validity of
the principles of reason, inasmuch as neither their
universality nor their necessity was contained, or
could by any possibility be contained, in that experi
ence which he held to be the only source of knowledge.
He therefore set down these principles as a fiction of
man s imagination, an effect of blind habit. Seeing
them realized in experience a very great number of
times, man, through the association of ideas, and the
partiality he naturally has for analogies, supposes
that they must always be realized in the same manner,
and so he takes them for general principles, whereas
in reality they are nothing of the kind. In this way
Locke, by exaggerating the capabilities of sensible
experience and rendering human reason proud and
too bold in its pronouncements, opened the way, quite
unawares, to the abyss of Hume s scepticism, and to
Sensism leads to Scepticism. 141
the debasement of that very reason whose dignity, he
sought to assert.
139. Such indeed is the invariable result of human
aberrations. Every error soon produces another
which is the very reverse of itself; and so our poor
humanity, owing to error, is necessarily abandoned
to agitation, and distracted by opinions the most
opposed to each other. It was the principle of causality
that chiefly arrested the attention of Hume. Being
unable to see how it could be deduced, in its general
form, from experience, he, as we have said, called it in
question, or rather denied it altogether. Now if this
principle is abolished, our mind has no longer any
means of passing from sensible to non-sensible things.
Consequently, for the consistent sensist, whatever did
not fall under the senses had, to say the least, a dubi
ous and uncertain existence. Thus, reason being cast
down from its throne, the right of witnessing to the
truth remained with the senses alone, and these of
course could not witness to any except physical things.
I say witness, but I am wrong ; for, alas ! even this
testimony of the senses, such as it was, could no longer
be considered as valid in the eyes of reason. Hence
we find it, almost at the same time, vigorously assailed
by Berkeley, and the senses dethroned condemned as
so many ministers of illusion to the mind, which is
deceived by their representations into believing that
external bodies have a real existence, whereas in
point of fact they have none.(i)
(i) For a fuller criticism on Locke, Condillac, Hume and Berkeley, see
the Origin of Ideas, 35-98, 311-321, 683-691. Tr.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM, BY RENDERING HUMAN
REASON INCAPABLE OF ATTAINING TO THE TRUTH,
LEADS TO SCEPTICISM.
140. In this state was philosophy when Kant
appeared a much more powerful thinker than those
I have just named, yet not able to escape the in
fluence of that spirit of sophistry which was a dis
tinguishing feature of the age.
It may be said that he opposed himself to all his
predecessors in this, that he found the way of accu
mulating into a single whole the various doctrines and
errors of them all, while at the same time he clothed
them in a new language and developed them.
141. He felt the force of the reasoning of Hume,
which proved that however often facts of a uniform
character might be repeated, no truly necessary and
universal principles could be derived from experience.
Ontheotherhand,herecognizedandmaintained against
Hume, that the principles of reason, admitted by all
mankind and in all times, could not be called in question.
He said, therefore, that as Locke, by his want of
judgment in crediting experience with being the source
of these principles, had puffed up human reason with
an overweening confidence in its own ability to find
out all truths by mere experience, it was perfectly
right for Hume to come forward and put some check on
Transcendental Idealism leads to Scepticism. 143
this arrogance. What Hume did, however, amounted
to nothing more than a censure on reason ; for he simply
demonstrated that the products of experience, and
therefore the horizon to which the vision of reason
extended, were not by any means so large as reason
vainly supposed. But Hume ought to have gone
further than this ; he ought to have given us a critique
or critical judgment of reason itself. It was not enough
to tell us in general that there was a certain horizon
beyond which the eye of reason had no power to see ;
we should also have been told distinctly what was the
exact line that bounded this horizon in short, what
were precisely the confines within which the human
mind is inclosed.
This was the difficult task to which Kant addressed
himself.
142. Having premised that both Locke and Hume
were wrong the first in asserting that the principles
of reason are the result of experience, (i) the second in
denying their truth, universality and necessity he
imagined a hypothesis which should reconcile every
thing. I say hypothesis because we must never forget
that the Kantian system is, after all, nothing but a
hypothesis. He imagined, then, that the principles
in question were a creation of man s reason itself, or
rather, properties and, as it were, spontaneous
acts of man s nature ; so that reason could not help
admitting these principles in judging of whatever
presented itself to it. And since by virtue of this
natural disposition reason vested the sensations received
from experience with a certain universality and neces-
r (i) Hence Kant introduced into his system pure reason that is to say,
reason wholly independent of experience.
144 On Divine Providence
sity, he affirmed that it was these concepts and prin
ciples of reason that rendered sensible experience
possible in other words, caused us to intellectively
perceive and to judge of sensible objects.
Now these concepts and principles, innate in us,
were the confines which Kant assigned to human
reason ; because this faculty in all its operations was
necessitated to use them and no others. Con
sequently, it had no power to judge of them, hence
it could not judge them except by having recourse to
themselves. It was therefore compelled to believe in
them with a blind faith.
143. This is what Kant would have us accept as a
refutation of Hume s scepticism, who had cast a doubt
on the validity of the principles of reason. But, in
truth, it is a sorry refutation ; for it only consists in
offering us another and worse kind of scepticism. If
Hume inflicted a slight wound on truth, Kant pierced
it to the very heart. Hume questioned the existence
of general principles, Kant admitted their existence
nay, their necessity, inasmuch as he supposed them
to be identified with the nature (connaturali) of human
reason ; but by representing them as an offspring, an
effect, of its subjective forms, he rendered them incap
able of witnessing to truth, which is essentially objec
tive, and therefore of witnessing to the real existence
of beings external to us. For in his system the
necessity and universality of the said principles are
nothing but formal laws of the mind, which, through
them, sees things in a determinate and constant mode.
According to Kant, then, whatever the human mind
perceives is merely an apparition in the mind itself, as,
so to speak, in a camera obscura. Thus the mind cannot
Transcendental Idealism leads to Scepticism. 145
see anything really outside itself, or otherwise than as
prescribed by its own restricted laws. Kant, therefore,
by placing the mind in this position, does the same as
would be done by a man who should light a lamp
merely in order that he might see the lamp itself.
This is what he dignifies by the name of transcendental
idealism, in opposition to the empirical idealism of
Berkeley, whom he finds in error for having said that
only bodies are mere appearances, whereas he ought
to have said the same of all the principles of reason
as well. He refutes the scepticism of Hume by
feigning to deny the limitation which the latter, by
ignoring the validity of the principle of causation, had
imposed on human reason ; but in reality he extends
that limitation by subjectivizing and invalidating
all the principles of reason without exception. He
refuted the idealism of Berkeley by transporting it from
a part of the human knowable to the whole. He refutes
relative scepticism and idealism by establishing absolute
scepticism and idealism. And not only does he find
manifest contradictions in experience and reason, but
with great authority he pronounces that "It is nowise
possible to tranquillize pure reason in contradiction
with itself;" heading by these words a chapter of his
philosophy, (i)
In this way a theory which professed to be purely
a criticism of reason was taught by this philoso
pher in the most dogmatic tone the world had ever
heard ; and that was declared to be a supremely true
(l) Kant s Critique of Pure Reason. See in particular Part ii., i.e.
Transcendental Logic, Bk. I., ch. 2, sec. ii., Transcendental Dialectics, Bk.
II., ch. 2., sec vi., and Appendix to Transcendental Dialectics.
L
146 On Divine Providence,
system which tended to do away with the very pos
sibility of truth.(i)
Before comparing what seem to me the limits justly
assignable to human reason with those assigned to it
by Kant, it may not be useless to inquire whence
transcendental idealism originated.
144. Who would believe that this system sprang
from sensism, nay, even from materialism ?
And yet, let me repeat it, every error leads to
an opposite error, and is connected with it by a bond
as intimate as it is incongruous.
Locke had laid it down as a principle that sensible
matter is the source of all human knowledge. On
this principle, Hume, more consistent than Locke, had
destroyed reason by depriving it of all power to know
the truth, and leaving this power, as far as might be,
exclusively in the possession of the senses. Berkeley
completed the work by despoiling the senses of that
pretended possession. But Kant, taking an entirely
material view of the human spirit, devised a way by
which sensitivity, intellect, and reason might be reduced
to one and the same level. Let us see how this
(i) It seems impossible that Kant should not have perceived that, by denying
to theoretical reason the power of pronouncing on the absolute truth of
things, he was involving in ruin all former philosophical systems, and
his own along with them. The critical philosophy has passed capital
sentence against itself: it cannot pretend to any but an apparent
and subjective truth ; nor avails it to say that it is only a negative system,
a system which destroys and does not build up. Whether the propositions
of which it is formed be negative or positive, it is always a fact that they
have only a subjective or apparent truth. By no stretch of ingenuity will it
ever be possible for its defenders to evade the force of this argument. If
the system consists essentially in doubt, why propose it ? And if doubt is
proposed as a certain system, what right has one to propose as certain a
system which annihilates all certainty ?
Transcendental Idealism leads to Scepticism. 147
materialistic idea of our spirit led him to such a con
clusion.
145. He observed that it is a property of matter to
have, at one and the same time, one form only and
that limited, to the exclusion of all other forms.
Seeing this, he supposed {gratuitously be it noted)
that the same must be the case with human reason.
As, therefore, this reason was restricted within certain
determinate forms, and not according to truth, he
did not perceive that the form of otir reason was truth
itself ; and that it was owing exactly to this one only
form that reason did not impart to its objects any of
its own limitations, and therefore did not counterfeit
them, but affirmed them simply according to truth.
146. Kant explained his sophism also by the simile
of a mirror. A mirror reflects the image of things in
conformity with the configuration of its surface, so that
they are counterfeited, elongated, contracted, distorted,
broken into pieces, or jumbled together, as the case
may be. Such, said he (and always gratuitously], is
the human intelligence. It does not perceive things
save in so far as it imparts to them its own form and
thus informs them with itself. Consequently, it never
can make certain of what they really are in themselves.
Indeed, it cannot even make certain of their existence,
because the objects it perceives are never the things
themselves but only their representations. Nor,
again, has it any means of passing from the repre
sentations to the things, for the simple reason that
those always remain wholly external to it in the same
way that one body is always outside other bodies.
By thus materializing our spirit, and consequently
judging of it in accordance with what is seen to take
148 On Divine Providence.
place in bodies, was Kant led to transcendental idealism,
namely, to a system which incapacitates man from
having any knowledge but what is merely apparent
and subjective, (i)
(i) Modern materialism, like all the great errors of the human mind,
had a slow and secret progress of formation. The universal disposition to
it must be sought (who would believe it ?) principally in the XVII. century.
From causes which it would take me too long here to explain, the mind even
of men otherwise well-intentioned was then beginning to receive a certain
tinge of it. In proof of this, as also of what I have ventured to say on the
progress of the thoughts of Kant, I will beg the reader s attention to the
following passage from Pascal, in which clear traces of materialism can
easily be seen. Speaking of the impossibility of our proving the truth of
the principles of reason, Pascal says : Cette impuissance ne conclut autre
chose que la faiblesse de notre raison : mais non pas 1 incertitude de toutes
nos connaissances, comme ils (les pyrrhoniens) le pretendent. Car la con-
naissance des premiers principes, comme, par exemple, qu il y a espace, temps,
mouvement, nombre, matiere, est aussi ferme qu aucune de celles que nos
raisonnements nous donnent. Et c est sur ces connaissances d intelligence
et de sentiment qu il faut que la raison s appuie, et qu elle fonde tout son
discours. Je sens qu il y a trois dimensions dans 1 espace, et que les
nombres sont infinis; et la raison demontre ensuite qu il n y a point
deux nombres carres dont 1 un soit double de 1 autre." (Pensees de Pascal,
2e Partie, art. i.) Let the reader observe in this passage :
1st. The propensity to quote space, time, motion, number, matter, etc., as
examples of the first principles of reason. Clearly, of these things it will
never be possible to prove the necessity, as that of the first principles is
proved. They are not first principles, but first data, not to be confounded
with the principles themselves.
andly. By saying that the knowledge we have of these supposed first
principles is as certain as the consequences which are drawn from them by
reasoning, one leaves oneself open to the reply "that, therefore, principles and
consequences are alike uncertain in other words, that those principles are
merely subjective."
3rdly. To affirm that the impossibility of demonstrating the first principles
of reason arises from the weakness of our intelligence, and not from the
fact that those principles are intuitively true, and therefore incapable of
demonstration, is already a great step toward Kantism. The concession that
we cannot demonstrate those principles because of the weakness of our
intelligence, supposes that they, of their nature, are susceptible of demon-
Transcendental Idealism leads to Scepticism. 149
Marvellous chastisement of human pride ! When
ever man s reason attempts to raise itself above its
own natural level, it finds itself, by that very means,
and quite unexpectedly, cast down with ignominy to
the ground. Kant, by his transcendental idealism, was
filling reason with self-conceit. He would have it to
be a light to itself. He constituted it the creator of
the universe, which it bore within itself, and which
was continually emanating from the laws of its
activity. Strange honour! The entire universe is
changed into a dream ; the Deity is nothing but a
desire ; the human spirit is indeed a great Lord, but
only of chimeras; truth no longer exists, and thus
the light of the sun is extinguished that a will-o -the-
wisp may be put in place of it.
Let us consider for a moment the tortuous wind
ings of this system. It sprang from materialism; it
went on to divinize the human spirit, by making it
the only beginning and end of things, and it
unhappily ended again in materialism. For where,
according to this system, could the seat of what we call
matter be, save in the very nature of the soul ? More
over, are not all things, in this system, reduced to one
only substance, which may be called matter or spirit,
just as we please, according to the divers properties
with which we consider it endowed ? And have we
not thus at last reached Pantheism ? The Materialist
posits one only substance by considering matter ; the
stration. Now, what is of its nature susceptible of demonstration, and
at the same time is not demonstrated, cannot be admitted as true. In such
case, the first principles of reason would be conceded gratuitously. They
would, therefore, have only a gratuitous, or subjective, not an objective
truth. This is Kantism.
150 On Divine Providence.
Spinozist posits one only substance by considering
God ; and the Transcendental Idealist is bound to do
the same by considering exclusively the human spirit.
Is not this one identical system, which starts from
three different points in order to arrive at the same
goal ? Whether these three entities be real or apparent,
all equally admit them and admit their properties, all
make the three to consist of one only being, and to
this one being they attribute all the properties of
each. Is not this being always the same, just as a
body made up of three elements is always the same
whichever of those elements may happen to be taken
first in composing it, provided that when the other two
be added, the three remain so completely mingled
and confused together that one sole and indistinguish
able mass is left ? If, therefore, the Materialists arrive
at their system by the first step, the Transcendental
Idealists and the Pantheists arrive at the same by the
second. For Transcendental Idealism identifies itself
with Materialism by stopping at the human spirit, and
Pantheism identifies itself with it by stopping at God.
No wonder, then, that Kant, immediately after making
the first step, should warily turn round and say to his
followers : " You see that I am no materialist far from
it ; I am, on the contrary, the defender and champion
of the human spirit." Many were simple enough to
believe him ; yet it would have been easy to reply :
" Pray, sir, go on till you have come to your journey s
end, for then we shall be better able to judge of the
true character of your doctrine." Indeed, this is the
most dangerous snare of this writer, that although he
ends by teaching, I should almost say, every kind of
error, yet he proceeds by very long marches, during
Transcendental Idealism leads to Scepticism. 151
which he frequently halts in order to shelter himself
from the imputation of those errors, under the pretext
that he has not yet arrived at them.
147. But not only in the beginning" or the middle
of this system is materialism to be found, it lies deeply
rooted in its very heart. For, why does Kant tell you
that it is impossible for you to know for certain the
existence of things, unless because they are external to
your mind ? He, therefore, unconsciously unites the
idea of space with spiritual beings, and cannot con
ceive a spirit devoid of matter that acts on the mind
itself. When the universe is supposed to be a mere
apparition, and God is conceived only as a being
that occupies some place in this universe, the exist
ence of both the one and the other is, of course,
rendered dubious. How truly, then, do the Holy
Scriptures say that a material spirit blunts the mental
powers, and that only a pure and spiritual soul is cap
able of attaining to the right perception of non-sensible;
objects. Hence they attribute to wisdom the property
of mobility and subtilty. "For wisdom is more
mobile than all mobile things, and reacheth every
where by reason of her purity. For she is a vapour of
the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the
glory of the Almighty God ; and therefore no defiled
thing cometh into her. For she is the brightness of
eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God s majesty,
and the image of His goodness, "(i)
(I) Wisd. vii. 24-26. For a fuller criticism of the Philosophy of Kant,
see Essay on the Origin of Ideas, 301-384. Tr.
CHAPTER XXIX.
THE LIMITATIONS ABOVE ASSIGNED TO HUMAN REASON
DO NOT LEAD TO SCEPTICISM.
148. Thus from Locke to Kant did philosophy, in
spite of so many efforts, go on wandering farther and
farther astray, and entangling itself in its very pro
gress, until men grew weary of it, and lost all faith in
instructors who were only distracting their minds with
doctrines that were continually changing. Hence we
find that the schools of to-day (A.D. 1826), instead of
teaching any definite philosophical system, content
themselves with describing, in an easy popular style,
the vicissitudes through which philosophy has passed
a series of long struggles in search of truth, and of
manifold errors.
If philosophy is to be reinstated in the love and
respect of men, I think it will be necessary, in part,
to return to the teachings of the ancients, and, in part,
to give those teachings the benefit of modern methods
facility of style, a breadth of application embracing
the daily wants of human life, and, finally, to cement
all the parts into one complete whole. The School
men, now made so little of, are the link connecting
ancient with modern philosophers, a link which
ought to be carefully studied. For, although the
scholastic philosophy in its later period became de
generate, childish, and ridiculous, it was not so in
Scepticism and Limitations of Reason. 153
its great writers, among whom it suffices to mention
the prince of Italian philosophers, St. Thomas of
Aquin, whose cherished footsteps it is, and it always
will be, my fond wish to trace in the arduous and
perilous paths of thought. But to return to our
subject:
149. The limitations assigned above humble us, it is
true, but they do not plunge us into the frightful abyss
of scepticism, by declaring our mind incapable of know
ing the truth or of being certain of it.
The first limitation was that we cannot in this life
form a positive idea of the Supreme and Necessary
Being, for the reason that, to do this, it would be
necessary for us to see how, in God, existence, essence,
and operation are identically the same thing (Chap.
xiv).
Now our inability to see this does not arise from any
incapacity of our mind to know the truth, or from its
being restricted and constrained by any particular
form. It arises solely from the course which we are
obliged to take in rising to the conception of this great
and most simple Being. We must, for this purpose,
make use of an imperfect instrument, our bodily organs,
and of most imperfect materials and symbols, viz., the
subtances of the visible universe, or our inner conscious
ness spiritual, but finite. We do not positively
understand the nature of this Being, because He does
not, in the present life, show Himself to us, nor fall
under our perception; neither is there among all the
other beings which are seen or perceived by us, a
single one that has a nature common with His; because
God has nothing in common with creatures. Faith
comes to our aid and promises that we shall see Him
154 On Divine Providence.
when this curtain that now hides Him from us shall
be removed. Then, in the words of St. Paul, "we
shall know Him even as we are known " ( i ) by Him, and,
in those of St. John, " we shall see Him as He is. "(2)
150. The unfaithful mirror, then, the mirror that
does not render a true likeness of the Divine Being, is,
according to the Apostle, not our mind, as Kant main
tains, but the created universe which we contemplate.
The mind is merely the eye that looks into this
mirror and sees what is in it, but does not see God,
because God is not there. Hence, in conformity
with this doctrine, St. John observes that, at present,
not only are we ignorant of a vast deal that relates to
God, but we cannot even form anything like a true
idea of our state as it will be in the next life; because
that state is not as yet disclosed to our view. We can
only conjecture it, and that very imperfectly, from
what we now see of the things around us. He says:
"We are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet
appeared what we shall be. We know that when He
shall appear, we shall be like to Him ; because we shall
see Him as He is. "(3)
The first of the limitations assigned above, therefore,
regards only those invisible things which have no
adequate similitude in visible ones, whereas Kant by
placing the limitation, not in the method which we are
obliged to follow in acquiring knowledge, but in
the cognitive faculty itself, corrupts the source, and
involves in darkness and uncertainty all our cognitions
alike.
151. The human mind, as I conceive it, is not
restricted, is not limited. It has only one form, which
(i) I. Cor. xiii. 12. (2) i. John iii. 2. (3) Ibid.
Scepticism and Limitations of Reason. 155
I call the FORM OF TRUTH, (i) and which does not in
any way restrict it ; because it is not a particular, but
a universal, categoric form, such, that is to say, as to
embrace in its own simplicity all possible forms, whether
specific or generic, and to measure all that is limited.
With this one form I think I am in a position to
explain whatever in the operations of the human soul
transcends the senses and experience. This, however,
is not the place for expounding a philosophic system,
but only for proving that the limitations which I have
ascribed to the human mind, humiliating though they
be, keep us wholly free from the desolating scepticism
of our times a fact which I must now go on to
establish in regard to the three remaining limitations.
152. The second limitation was the inability of the
human mind to comprehend the Absolute Infinite
(Chap. xv).
This also is not due to any limitation or restriction
in the form of the mind, but only to the impossibility
of the Absolute Infinite being fully presented to our
mental vision in other words, being perceived in His
entirety by a finite reality like ourselves.
153. Our mind, in virtue of the form of truth with
which it is endowed, is able to perceive and know all
real beings whatever that are presented to it. But how
(i) It seems that Kant took the -word form in a material sense, such as
we attach to the shape of bodies. I take it in the sense in which it was
taken by the ancient philosophers, who by form understood a perfecting
principle. Moreover, this perfecting principle, in the present case, is ideal
being, which informs our soul. Those critics, therefore, who charged me
with having taken as the basis of my system one of the Kantian forms,
have not understood that the form of which I speak differs essentially from
all the Kantian forms, as object differs both from subject and from extra-
subject.
156 On Divine Providence.
are these beings presented to it ? What is the place
in which they are, if I may so say, located so as to be
visible ? Or, if I may use another metaphor, on what
retina are they depicted ? This is the point which
has never, so far as I am aware, been properly observed
by any one; and yet it is a point both extremely
important and not so very difficult to ascertain. I shall
be brief:
That beings cannot be presented to the mind save
in the soul, of which the mind is a faculty, is what has
been more or less clearly known and said by all. But
what I believe has never been properly grasped is the
distinction between that part of the soul which receives
real beings into itself and presents them to the mind,
and the part which understands them. The limitation
is not, in this second part, in the mind considered
purely as mind, as intelligence, but it is in the first
part, that into which real beings enter, so to speak,
with their reality, and in which the substance of the soul
chiefly consists. This part, then, this substance com
municates with real beings by receiving their action into
itself, in a word, the soul itself, sensitive by essence, (i) is
necessarily limited. Hence the reality of other beings
cannot be communicated to it beyond the extent
allowed by the measure of its own reality. Thus it
comes to pass that the human soul can never fully
comprehend the Absolute Infinite, God. It may
indeed be filled with the Divine Nature, poured into
it as into a vessel, but it can never receive the whole
of this Nature into itself. That is to say, it is
(i) According to the Author, the essence of the soul consists in a
substantial feeling. Set Anthropology I" L Antropologia ") Book II. ;
also the Psychology, 96-106. Tr.
Scepticism and L imitations of Reason . 157
impossible for the Divine Nature to be presented to,
or to be perceived by, the human mind in Its totality.
The reason, then, why we cannot know God per
fectly, is not because our mind has a form that is
limited ; but it is because its form, though unlimited
in itself, is found in a limited nature, and therefore a
nature in which the Absolute Infinite cannot be
contained, nor, consequently, be wholly presented to
it for contemplation.
154. Neither can any doubt arise as to the truth
of those things which our mind comes to see in the
manner we have stated, from either the third or the
fourth limitation (chap, xvi and xvii).
These limitations simply indicate the difficulty which
the mind has to contend with when seeking to catch
sight of things. The fact of these being placed where
they can be seen does not depend on our will. We do
not always know in what direction to look for a certain
object on which we both wish and are able to fix our
mental gaze. To have things brought within sight is
sometimes very difficult, sometimes impossible ; and we
cannot help it. It is impossible when the thing we
should like to find out does not fall under our percep
tion, or is not connected in some way with truths of
which we are already cognizant. Sometimes it has
this connexion, and then we succeed, with more or less
difficulty, in gaining a more or less perfect knowledge
of it. When we seek to discover in nature some law
which is yet hidden from us, in what does our whole
skill consist but in so conducting our inquiry that the
truth we are in search of may be brought within
the range of our mental perspective r This is done,
either through a reasoning whereby we join that truth
158 On Divine Providence.
with others that are already known to us, or through
some external aid which, without labour on our part,
presents the said truth directly to our mind.
The difficulty to be encountered when, in order to
find out a truth which we want to know, (i) we are
obliged to have recourse to reasoning, is what forms
the subject of the third limitation ; and the necessity
under which we are of depending on the free-will of
a being external to us for the direct presentation to
our mind of a certain class of truths, is what forms
the subject of the fourth.
155. To conclude, therefore: None of the four
limitations assigned above has anything whatever to
do with the disheartening state of doubt to which the
sceptic is necessarily doomed ; none deprives our mind
of its supreme and most precious privilege of knowing
the truth. They simply point out under what con
ditions and in what measure it is possible for us to
know it. Those conditions, however, are such as to
make us plainly see what a small thing our mind is in
its marvellous greatness ; for they irresistibly prove
that for all the knowledge which we may acquire, we
are absolutely dependent on that Great Being on
Whom the subsistence of all things depends.
(i) This knowledge is gained by establishing an equation between the
truth to be found out and some other truth already known to us.
CHAPTER XXX.
THEODICY DESTROYED BY MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
156. Having now seen the difference between the
theory on the limitations of human reason as expounded
above, and that of the most celebrated modern schools,
we may proceed to consider the different consequences
of these theories as bearing on the way in which we
ought to meet the difficulties which our mind en
counters in the dealings of Divine Providence.
First of all, we must set aside the school of Locke ;
because this school, in deriving metaphysical truths
from sensible experience, follows no constant law, but
with the imagination and in an arbitrary manner
deduces whatever it pleases.
157. As to Hume, it is easy to see what opinion he
would be likely to form on this subject by following up
the principles he had embraced. We have that opinion
expressed very clearly in the Essay which he entitled,
On Particular Providence and a Future State. Having
started with the resolve to adhere strictly to Locke s
principle that all our knowledge comes from the senses,
and that there is no principle, no rule of judgment
innate in our mind, he, naturally enough, felt bound
to affirm that those which mankind at large considers
as general principles are not such in reality ; for most
certainly they do not come from sensible experience.
At least, their truth was open to grave doubts ; so that
in fact it would be more reasonable to say that they
160 On Divine Providence.
were mere prejudices, delusive notions, which had
insinuated themselves into the minds of the multitude
through the force of habit and the association of ideas.
This would, of course, involve in doubt the existence
of causes, since no cause, as such, ever falls under the
perception of our senses. Above all, it would involve
in doubt the existence of the Final Cause of the
universe, which could not be reached by the corporeal
senses, not only in Its relation of cause, but also on
account of Its being dependent on the existence of
an unseen wisdom, and likewise on account of the
pre-eminent spirituality of Its nature. With philo
sophic violence, therefore, he confined his mind within
the mechanical course of nature alone, this being the
only thing to which the senses could witness, and
declared that human reason had no right to admit
any but natural causes, or, to speak more accurately,
facts which we witness in nature, and of which reason
is not authorized to affirm anything further than that
they follow one after the other. Moreover, having
observed these facts of nature singly, and having
found that they are all finite, he maintained that,
even if the principle of causation were conceded, one
could not legitimately infer from them the necessity
of an Infinite Cause.
In drawing this conclusion he forgot to consider,
that even if there were no need of an Infinite Cause
for explaining the changes which take place in things
that already exist, this need was manifest when there
is question of explaining how these things began to
exist ; how they are preserved in existence ; why they
exist rather than others ; how it is that they are con
nected with one another, and all tend incessantly,
Theodicy destroyed by Modern Philosophy. 161
whether man wills or not, to a grand unity. Of all
this, neither the reason nor the cause is to be found
in them.
158. To this sophism of Hume, Kant also fell a
victim ; and not to this alone. The destruction of the
consoling doctrines regarding Divine Providence was
to issue forth from the very vitals of the philosophy
he had imagined (143). This most unhappy applica
tion of his Transcendental Philosophy was made by
himself in his Essay On the Vanity of all Philosophical
Attempts in Theodicy, as also in that which he entitled,
A Philosophical Sketch of the Way to Eternal Life, and
incidentally in many places of his other writings.
159. In truth, having fully committed himself to
the principle that it is wholly beyond our power to
know whether any being external to us exists, because
(to use his material mode of speaking) our mind cannot
go outside itself, and hence can only see phenomena
or apparitions of things delineated within itself;
and having, moreover, declared that this impossibility
applied with all the greater force to the case of a Being
of Whom experience told us nothing whatever; he
saw no alternative but to conclude, that the belief in
an all-governing Providence had no foundation in
objective truth, and that to say that there is an Author
of the universe was nothing but an arbitrary affirmation
of presumptuous reason.
He had not, however, like Hume, discarded the
principle of causation, that is to say, he had retained
the appearance of it. He had rendered it subjective
and deprived it of all the fecundity of its consequences
in such a manner, that it remained incapable of prov
ing the existence of any cause that was not itself sub-
M
1 62 On Divine Providence.
jective and purely apparent. Hence it is that, accord
ing to his transcendental principles, the contemplation
of visible things leads to nothing beyond a vague
admission of a cause of the world : I say vague, because
it says nothing as to whether this cause acts by a
necessity of nature, or freely ; whether it be connected
and confounded with visible things, or distinct from
them ; whether, finally, it have a true or only apparent
existence. That which is material or mechanical is
apparent to the senses; but that which is moral and free
is not. Accordingly, this philosopher of appearances
denies point-blank the possibility of our mind ever pas
sing from the mechanical course of nature to infer its
moral ends which imply a governing mind. To make up
as it were by an array of fine words for what he in
reality takes away from the truth, he distinguishes two
Theologies, the one Natural and the other Transcen
dental. The first, he says, is that which borrows from
our soul the concept of a Supreme Intelligence which
it supposes to exist, and which it calls God ; but this
is merely a postulate, or a supposition of reason, not
an absolute demonstration. The second, on the con
trary, admits a First Cause, but does so only in name,
this cause being in point of fact a mere ens rationis, a
mere concept of the Original Being, of the Being of
beings, a concept in no way implying the actual
existence of that being outside ourselves. Our reason,
being inclosed within the infrangible barriers of its
own concepts or ideas, cannot possibly go beyond
them, and it would go beyond them if it could argue
from them the existence of an external being. Hence,
in his Critique of Pure Reason he devotes a whole
section to making out what he considers a complete
Theodicy destroyed by Modern Philosophy. 163
demonstration of the utter impossibility of any system
of Natural Theology, as of a thing altogether tran
scending the limits of the human understanding.
Those who agree with him he would call by the
name of Deists, reserving the name of Theists for
those who believe in a Natural Theology. Thus we
have here a clean denial of the validity of every proof
which human reason could produce of God s existence;
and it would therefore be much more correct to call
this, not a deistic, but an atheistic system. But let us
hear Kant himself:
"Whereas by the concept of God " (see how he tries
to evade the charge of atheism) "we are not accustomed
to understand any eternal and blindly active nature
as the first root of things, but a Supreme Being Whose
intelligence and freedom is necessary to constitute the
Author of all ; and whereas also this is the only con
cept that interests us ; so someone, feeling inclined to be
severe, might allege against the Deist " (the transcen
dental philosopher) " that he does not believe in God
at all, but contents himself with the mere assertion of
an original being and of a first cause. Nevertheless,
it not being just to accuse anyone of intending to im
pugn a certain thing, simply because he does not
attempt to maintain it, so it will be more conformable
to equity and moderation to say, that the Deist believes
in a God, while the Theist believes in a living God,
Supreme Intelligence."
1 60. Thanks be to this living God, that the founder
of the Critical Philosophy, although pledged by the
principles of his system to deny the possibility of any
truly valid demonstration of the Divine Existence,
nevertheless shows unmistakable signs of being keenly
164 On Divine Providence.
sensible of the opprobrious stain cast on man s
character by the open profession of atheism, and seeks
therefore with a kind of nervous anxiety to clear him
self of the foul blot as well as he may. Indeed, this is
what happens with many of those who by vain reason
ings would do away with Religion. It is conscience
that rebels within them. It is nature that protests
against the impious attempt, this nature which, even
when depraved, is still the work of God, and by a
recondite sentiment incessantly admonishes man of
the wanderings of his erring reason, and seeks to bring
him back to his First Cause, the fount of Truth and
Goodness. In fact, this anxiety which the transcen
dental theologian exhibits for being called a deist
rather than a theist would seem a miserable puerility.
What is the use of such a distinction, when he denies
the possibility of proving that there exists a living
God, a Supreme and Free Intelligence ; and when,
in order to find something to which he may give the
name of God, he is compelled to have recourse to an
abstraction, by imagining a certain first root of
things, active, but not distinct from the things them
selves, such, therefore, that it always remains uncertain
whether it acts intelligently, or mechanically as
matter does? What is this but playing with words
to deceive the unwary, who, hearing that a God is
admitted, are easily satisfied without any further
enquiries ; whereas if they only reflected on the mean
ing of the word God, they would at once see that it is
cunningly employed by the transcendental philosopher
to signify quite a different thing from what all the
world understands by it ? The unwary do not see the
snare thus laid for them; they take words at their
Theodicy destroyed by Modern Philosophy. 165
current value, and unsuspectingly imbibe the hidden
poison.
It must, however, be confessed that Kant himself
felt the frivolousness of so lame an expedient, of so
insufficient a shelter behind a name. Hence to escape
being thought an atheist, he sought to add a second
excuse, no less puerile than the first. It was, that
the transcendental philosopher does not impugn
the existence of God, but merely declares human
reason incapable of demonstrating it. Did he not
know, then, that, by the most elementary rules of
logic, we are forbidden to concede the existence of
that which is not proven, because this would be a
gratuitous, and therefore a foolish concession ? In his
Essay on Theodicy also he defends himself in the same
frivolous way, that is, by alleging that he does not
impugn Providence by positive arguments, but
only by maintaining that human reason has no
means of proving that there is a Providence. What
does the word atheism mean but the non-admission
of God s existence ? Whether, therefore, that exis
tence is not admitted on the allegation that it
is impossible to prove it, or on the allegation that
such admission is an absurdity, I do not see
how the transcendental philosophy can honestly
consider itself undeserving of the opprobrious title
of atheistic.
161. It is true that Kant, after depriving the
theoretical reason of the power of demonstrating God s
existence, has recourse to the practical reason in order
to admit it. But is not this a new subterfuge ? The
very denomination of practical reason is altogether
incorrect. Are there perchance two reasons in man ?
1 66 On Divine Providence.
Reason is but one; the only difference is in the objects
submitted to it.(i)
Kant showed that he was well aware of this when he
denied to the practical reason all power si demonstration,
and attributed to it only the power of making sup
positions, or, to use his own expression, of admitting
postulates. He fixes very clearly the difference between
these two functions when he defines the theoretic know
ledge as that by which we know what is, and the prac
tical knowledge as that by which we represent to our
selves what ought to be. According to this, then, the
practical knowledge does not tell us that there really
is a God, but it only tells us that there ought to be one.
It is a truth of convenience, a desire of nature, not
an absolute truth. If this philosopher, therefore, gives
the name of reason to that sentiment which teaches
and commands us to be virtuous, this is merely that he
may, by means of so specious a title, enhance its dignity.
By this false, or at least inaccurate denomination,
after having perhaps deceived himself, he deceives his
readers also by giving them the impression that in his
system God is admitted pursuant to a verdict of reason,
whereas He is admitted purely by a longing of nature,
that longing which causes us all to wish that virtue be
conjoined with happiness ; which indeed is all that his
practical reason ultimately comes to. It i s true that Kant
distinguishes among \i\^, postulates those which are sup
posed arbitrarily, and which he terms hypotheses, from
(i) I also have been accused of admitting two reasoning faculties in
man. This is a great misconception of my meaning. As I have abun
dantly explained elsewhere, by practical reason I simply understand the
faculty of reflection in so far as it is influenced by the activity of the will,
and thus becomes a principle of action.
Theodicy destroyed by Modern Philosophy. 167
those which are necessary as a condition of some condi
tional already known to us through the theoretical reason,
and which he says are admitted as theses ; and it is like
wise true that he declares the existence of God to be
a postulate admitted as a thesis. But this again
amounts to nothing ; for the thesis to which he refers
always remains undemonstrated. Indeed, this seems
to me only another attempt at parrying the accusa
tion of Atheism. To remove the bad impression
likely to be produced in his readers by seeing that he
considered God merely as a kind of postulate, he
added to the word postulate the greatest authority he
could.
162. On the other hand, how worthless does this
proof of God s existence appear, when we consider in
their mutual connexion the doctrines enunciated by
Kant on each of his two reasons, the theoretical and the
practical ! So far as the theoretical reason is concerned,
he admits that our spirit might for all we know be the
centre of the universe, and the universe itself be all
made up of appearances issuing forth from our very
nature.(i) Consistently with this admission, he finds in
the practical reason the origin of the aim which we
should propose to ourselves in all our actions. In the
theoretical reason there is nothing to show that our
spirit is not the Creator of nature ; in the practical reason
our spirit is the absolute maker and promulgator of
the moral law. Both in producing the appearances of
the things we know, and in intimating the ethical
precepts, the spirit simply follows the laws of its own
(i) Fichte came next, and abolishing the might be of Kant, pronounced,
not critically but dogmatically, that the Ego (our spirit) was the producer of
everything.
1 68 On Divine Providence.
nature. It is necessitated by these laws to act in this
way, even as a mirror is necessitated to reflect the
images according to its form. Consequently, it is
impossible for us to prove that the legislation which
irresistibly commands us to be virtuous is wise, except
in appearance ; we can only prove that it is necessary,
but of a subjective necessity. Its authority is just what
the authority of our nature may be ; nothing more.
We are subject to it for the sole reason that we have
no power to throw off its dominion.
Now let us see how he proceeds from this to shew
that we are necessitated to admit the existence of a
God, without having any proof of it whatever in
other words, how we are necessitated by the laws of
our spirit to be foolish, since it is foolishness to
admit what we cannot prove :
The laws of our spirit, he says, besides commanding
us to be virtuous, impel us also to long for happiness.
These two tendencies, to virtue and to happiness, do
not always accord in this life, that is to say, it is not
always the case that the virtuous are happy. We
must, therefore, suppose another life, and in it a just
retributor to bring them into harmony. Such is the
Kantian argument in favour of God s existence, an
argument which ultimately resolves itself into the
affirmation that such an existence is a thing advanta
geous to mankind, inasmuch as this God will, in the
future life, reward the virtuous who have obeyed the
noblest command of their nature even by resisting
the less noble inclination that was leading them to an
apparent happiness, and will punish the wicked who
have done the contrary.
1 63 . Certainly, this would be a most valid argument,
Theodicy destroyed by Modern Philosophy. 169
if Kant had not previously divested it of all its force :
I mean if there were in his system any means of prov
ing that those two tendencies of human nature must
really be brought into accord. This, however, is the
major of a syllogism which remains wholly without
proof. For how can he prove it r Not having
admitted beforehand that man s nature has been
constituted with wisdom, he may indeed say that it
seems to us repugnant that the tendencies in question
should not ultimately be made to harmonize ; but then
his fatal theory compels him to grant that the fitting-
ness of this harmony is only apparent, and that the
necessity of its ever being actually realized can in no
way be proved. In fact, to be justified in affirming
that what appears to us fitting must at some time
take place, we should, according to Kant, have to
transcend all the confines of the human mind. It
follows, then, that between the practical reason and
the theoretical there is just this connexion, that the
inductions as well as the postulates of the former
are declared by the latter to be gratuitous.
From so drear a philosophy we may at least
gather one good thing, I mean its author s own
precious confession, that the existence of God is what
fills up the void of human nature, namely, what this
nature feels to be a necessity for it, and what therefore
it incessantly and irresistibly longs after. This con
fession is the greatest encomium of those philosophies
which teach that this existence can be demonstrated
as an absolute certainty, whilst at the same time it is
a most withering critique of the Critical Philosophy.
How can any one embrace a system which maintains
the impossibility of proving what it is absolutely
1 70 On Divine Providence.
necessary for him to admit r If human nature has,
according to Kant, an invincible repugnance to deny
ing God, if this repugnance forces us to admit Him,
will not this same repugnance force us to reject the
Kantian system which would have us believe that no
really valid proof can be given of the Divine existence?
What is philosophy worth, if it deprives me of all good?
And if such a philosophy could be true, would not
error itself be preferable to it ? The moral proof,
therefore, by which Kant pretends to demonstrate
God s existence, either proves nothing, or if it proves
anything, it proves, together with God s existence, the
falsehood and absurdity of the Kantian system.
CHAPTER XXXI.
MORAL DISPOSITIONS REQUISITE FOR FITTING OUR
MIND TO OVERCOME THE DIFFICULTIES IT ENCOUN
TERS IN THE DEALINGS OF PROVIDENCE.
1 64. On the other hand, if I am not greatly mistaken,
the theory which I have endeavoured to set forth in
these pages, while consonant with the teaching of
Holy Scripture, offers us a broad and pleasant way to
the attainment of tranquillity of mind and content
ment of heart in regard to the supreme dispositions
of Providence.
165. I have distinguished two classes of arguments,
both equally fit to meet the objections that are raised
by our infirm reason. The first class is that of general
arguments, the second that of particular arguments.
The general arguments, being very plain and readily
understood, are suited to all men ; the particular
arguments are not suited to all, because their use often
demands abilities above the common.
The general arguments dispose of many difficulties
together by a single answer ; the particular arguments
reply to single difficulties.
Among the first, some are more general, and some
less. The most general of all is that by which all
difficulties whatever, that present themselves to our
weak reason, are summarily cut short by the knowledge
we have that there exists a God infinitely Good, Wise,
172 On Divine Providence.
and Mighty. Revelation is simply a means whereby
we obtain this knowledge in greater abundance ; and
Faith is simply the firm belief we yield to the assur
ances of this God, Who speaks to us from behind the
mysterious veil which now hides Him from us, but
which will be removed when we shall be freed from the
material robes that wrap us while we remain here
below. Revelation, therefore, is not anything contrary
to reason, because that cannot be contrary to reason
which serves to enlighten and instruct it in the highest
truths, even as there is nothing contrary to reason
in the presence of bodies, which is the means through
which the mind comes to know them, or than there is in
the words of a teacher who imparts learning to his
pupils. What could be more absurd than to represent
as contrary to human reason those means by which
it is aided, instructed, and perfected ? Take away
these means, and human reason will remain buried
in darkness, profoundly debased, and as it were
annihilated.
1 66. Nevertheless, even with our reason stimulated
and enlightened by Revelation, we cannot in this life
know or see the Essence of the Divine Nature. Hence
we always remain under the happy necessity of humbly,
though rationally, yielding to God the homage of this
reason, by believing that He Whom we know to exist,
exists in the most befitting mode, though unknown to
us. Patiently to resign ourselves to this our ignorance
until the time when it shall be done away with, to
acknowledge it, to confess it, to suffer it without
disquietude, such is the reasonable homage we have
to yield to the Creator, a homage most pleasing to
Him. It is a just homage, and yet it is galling to those
Dispositions the Study of Providence requires. 173
who will not take pains to reflect, or who are vain of
their knowledge of sensible things. But it is precisely in
this justice, in this humiliation of human pride that the
merit of Faith consists, that Faith, in virtue of which we
stand unalterably fixed in the belief of God s existence,
although we are ignorant of the mode of it. Hence the
slave of pride a vice always essentially opposed to
justice is the only man who deliberately takes to the
road of unbelief. He cannot bear to be told either of the
ignorance of his present condition or of the knowledge
which Revelation offers him. Revelation is to him an
object of horror, and he turns away from it as from
some terrible spectre. He will not see himself as he is.
Rather than confess that he does not understand the
way in which the Supreme Being exists, he denies
His existence, and seeks to excuse his denial by
alleging that the arguments which are brought forward
to prove that existence are insufficient. Or else he
rushes to the contrary extreme, by pretending that he
sees God by a natural intuition. Humility, on the other
hand, this generous virtue, this rational submission
of the whole man, but especially of his reason, to Him
Whom Holy Scripture calls "The only Wise," humility,
which recognizes and confesses the limits that have
been fixed to the human mind, prepares the way for
Faith, and, through Faith, leads man direct to truth ;
while pride darkens his mind and is a prolific source of
errors. But no matter how absurd may be the errors
in which the proud man becomes inextricably involved,
he feels quite satisfied so long as he can flatter himself
with a high opinion of his own worth, and thus
hide from himself his weaknesses and imperfections.
To arrive at this, he denies, or, in the words of
174 On Divine Providence.
St. Jude the Apostle, " blasphemeth the things
he knoweth not;"(i) and, that he may the more
effectually succeed in putting out of his thoughts
that Great Object, to the knowledge of Whose
nature he cannot attain, whilst his ignorance
of it he is ashamed to confess, he goes to
the length of simulating and counterfeiting humility
itself, by extenuating excessively the capabilities of
reason. But it is easy to see that this is nothing but
a vain show of virtue, devoid of all substance, because
devoid of truth. Thus no one who possesses any degree
of discernment can be imposed upon by that false
philosophic modesty which affects to make it so great
a point to insist on the Divine incomprehensibility, or
else, by subtle fallacies, seeks to do away with the
possibility of our knowing by means of reason the real
existence of beings outside us.
167. To recapitulate, then: All men may, if they
will, tranquillize themselves in regard to the disposi
tions of Divine Providence ; because all have ready
at hand intelligible reasons, more or less general,
the consideration of which may, and indeed must,
completely allay any trouble they may be tempted
to feel in consequence of the turn taken by events.
The more general these reasons are, the larger is the
number of persons who can avail themselves of them ;
( I ) " But these men blaspheme whatever things they know not " (spiritual
things), "and what things soever they naturally know" (sensible things)
"like dumb beasts, in these they are corrupted (in his corrumpuntur)."
Jude, i. 10. The Holy Scriptures, which, speaking in God s name,
intimate to us the duty of submitting to Faith, are also excellent helps to
our reason, by communicating to us the most splendid and most direct
arguments calculated to make us understand more and more the sublime
ways of the Almighty in His government of the universe.
Dispositions the Study of Providence requires. 175
and the more particular they are, the more do they
require of intellective force and of study, owing to
their difficulty and multiplicity ; since questions, by
being particularized, are necessarily multiplied. But
whether these reasons be general or particular, they
are in themselves equally valid and cogent.
Nevertheless, the general reasons, although more
clear, require a greater virtue and strength of character
in order to keep man steady in all difficult encounters,
by a continual application of them (29, 30). The
particular reasons, on the other hand, have this ad
vantage, that, when thoroughly understood, they
succour human weakness, because, being nearer to
the events, they are easier of application, and either by
sensible proofs or by motives which accord with the
way in which the human mind is accustomed to proceed,
help to calm all disquiet.
A general reason is that of the Divine authority; and
it suffices, by itself alone, to dispel all difficulties
without exception. To be content with this reason is
what I have called the method of FAITH, by following
which the believer is never disturbed in mind, no
matter how unexpected, painful, or incomprehensible
to him an event may be. On the contrary, the in
vestigation of the reasons less general than this, down
to the most particular, I have called the method of
INTELLIGENCE, which, unlike the method of Faith,
cannot be followed with equal profit by all. Faith,
therefore, rests on a first reason, and the way of Faith
cannot be trodden without intelligence; so also the
way of intelligence must not, indeed cannot, freely be
trodden without Faith. Intelligence thus assisted
by Faith, should be the guide of all those who love
176 On Divine Providence.
tranquilly to fix their gaze on the traces of the wisdom
that everywhere shines forth. Fully assured by the
first and most general reason that investigation can
only lead to a prosperous issue, these persons eagerly
pursue their way, not so much that they may justify
Divine Providence, as that they may understand and
admire more and more its marvellous workings.
1 68. Along this royal road, those advance most
who are most virtuously disposed. It is a great error
to suppose that the Holy Scriptures, as the enemies of
truth would have us believe, encourage cowardice and
intellectual sloth. On the contrary, they continually
incite us to vigilance and to zeal in a keen search after
knowledge. But they do not, on this account, advise
us to reject the most excellent of the means we have
for becoming enlightened, namely Revelation, and to
restrict ourselves to the less valid means, namely the
contemplation of visible nature. The Revelation
contained in them, and the Faith they inculcate, are
indicated to us as the most solid basis of learning, and
the beginning of all wisdom. "You know," says
Moses to the people of Israel, " that I have taught you
statutes and justices, as the Lord my God hath com
manded me : so shall you do them in the land which
you shall possess. And you shall observe and fulfil
them in practice. For this is your wisdom and under
standing in the sight of nations, that hearing all these
precepts, they may say: Behold a wise and under
standing people, a great nation. Neither is there any
other nation so great that has gods so nigh them, as
our God is present to all our petitions/ (i)
But if man should have the audacity to dispute with
(i) Deuter. iv. 4-7.
Dispositions the Study of Providence requires. 177
God, as if God were one of his equals, and malignantly
carp at the Divine dispositions, what wonder that God
should abandon him to the illusions of his own rashness
and let him be entangled and held fast in his own evil
thoughts ? Hence the Book of Wisdom, which is in
reality a treatise on the high and provident dispositions
of the Almighty, begins with the precepts we must
observe, if we wish to find ourselves in a proper con
dition for gaining a true insight into those sublime
designs. First of all, it says, we must " love justice ; "
then we must be good and gentle of heart, so that we
may incline "to think of the Lord in goodness,"
namely, as of that Being the mere idea of Whom
implies all love; then we must seek this Lord "in
simplicity of heart," namely, without being misled by
any interested views, or any of those passions which
excite and blind us. All voices of self-love must be
repressed, so as to allow of truth being sought with
directness and candour. To investigate Divine things
with a heart preoccupied by distorted affections, is to
tempt God ; and " God is found only by those who
tempt Him not, and He showeth Himself to those who
have Faith in Him. For perverse thoughts separate
from God," whilst, on the other hand, " steady virtue
reproveth the universe," that is to say, keeps in the
way of truth even those who would not otherwise have
much ability to tread it. Again, " Wisdom will not
enter into a malicious soul," that is, into a soul
cavillously bent on finding evil in others ; neither will
it " dwell in a body subject to sins," where, conse
quently, the mind is continually agitated and carried
away by the winds of the passions. Finally, the Holy
Spirit requires us to beware of all duplicity, both in
N
178 On Divine Providence.
the purposes we aim at, and in the kind of knowledge we
seek after ; for He " will flee from the deceitful, and
will withdraw Himself from thoughts that are without
understanding." If a soul into which He has once
entered should unfortunately fall away from virtue, He
will surely desert it and leave it a prey to remorse :
" He shall not abide when iniquity cometh in." (i)
Such, then, are the qualities which dispose us for
successfully investigating the Divine secrets ; because
the mind, in its steps, is moved by the will and guided
by the affections. Well, therefore, might the holy
King David sing to God : " Much peace have they
that love Thy law, and to them there is no stumbling-
block." (2)
(i) Wis. ch, i. (2) Ps. cxviii. 165.
ON
DIVINE PROVIDENCE.
BOOK II.
ON THE LAWS ACCORDING TO WHICH TEMPORAL
GOOD AND EVIL ARE DISTRIBUTED.
Forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes : ?
yob, xi., 7.
ON
DIVINE PROVIDENCE.
BOOK THE SECOND.
CHAPTER I.
PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK : TO SET FORTH THE SPECIAL
REASONS WHICH VINDICATE DIVINE PROVIDENCE
IN THE PERMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION OF TEM
PORAL EVIL.
169. In the preceding book I treated, as far as was
necessary for my purpose, of the confines which have
been set to the human mind and to the knowledge
attainable by it. To attempt to pass beyond these con
fines would be an absurd temerity, an attempt to do
what is impossible. Nor, in truth, has man any need of
passing beyond them in order to satisfy the legitimate
demands of his mind and of his heart ; because Reason
and Faith, in mutual accord, are ever ready to give him
all the aid he requires for clearing away any difficulties
which may occur to him concerning the origin of evil,
and the wisdom and goodness of that Providence which
permits evil and allows it, according to certain laws, to
1 82 On Divine Providence.
be mixed up with the good so plentifully bestowed upon
mankind.
Nay, all those difficulties absolutely fall to the ground
the moment they are confronted with certain most
powerful reasons of general application, such, for ex
ample, as that of the certainty of the existence of a
Supreme Being. These reasons were likewise touched
upon in- the preceding book.
In this book I must come down more to par
ticulars, by opposing to the said difficulties reasons
of a more special kind, directed to combat them in de
tail, as a comfort to the weakness of the human mind,
and a salutary and agreeable nourishment to hearts
well and piously disposed.
1 70. It is not, however, my intention to treat of all
the questions which the consideration of the ills that
continually afflict humanity very readily suggests, and
which may be reduced to those two celebrated questions
which have in all times been discussed by the most
acute thinkers, viz. :
i st. " How can free-will in man, the fount of moral
good, be reconciled with the fixed course of events,
namely, with the prevision and predestination of God,
and His action on creatures?" Leibnitz calls this
question one of the two labyrinths of the human
mind, (i)
2nd. " How can temporal evil, and its distribution
among men, as we actually see it taking place, be
reconciled with the Divine attributes, namely, with the
Divine Sanctity, Justice, Goodness, Wisdom and
Power ?"
(i) The other labyrinth of the human mind, according to Leibnitz, is the
question of the Mathematical Infinite. See the preface to his Theodicy.
Purpose of this Book. 183
171. Now, I shall confine myself to the second of
these two most important questions. Accordingly,
supposing the first to be already settled, I shall assume
as postulates the three following propositions: ist,
Man is a free agent ; 2nd, All things are pre-ordained
by God from eternity ; 3rd, These two propositions
involve no contradiction, there being a right way of
reconciling them, whatever that way may be.
This separation of the two questions seems to me
all the more allowable inasmuch as the second is not
so necessarily connected with the first, but that it may
be understood without it, and be treated, as many
writers have treated it, by itself alone.
172. Nevertheless my subject, even thus restricted,
affords inexhaustible matter. Among the multitude of
writers who have discussed it, St. Augustine, Leibnitz,
Archbishop King, and Count De Maistre, stand in the
foremost rank ; so that the difficulty for those who, like
myself, propose now-a-days to write a vindication of
Divine Providence and for this end to give a short ex
position of the wise and excellent laws according to which
temporal good and temporal evil are allotted by God to
men lies in the abundance of materials to choose
from, rather than in their scarcity.
173. Although I were unable to add anything to
what has been said by others, I should not consider it
a loss of time to write upon so noble a theme, (i) For
it seems to me an act of humanity toward our suffering
(I) The Abbe Vrindts, on occasion of the late Jubilee, published in
France a work on the same subject (Du Mai, Paris, Chez Mequignon-Havard.
1826). This proves that the need of treating these questions is felt in our
time. Certain questions, although of ancient date, have always a new in
terest, because the human race itself is ever new, has ever the same nature,
and the same questions to put to itself.
1 84 On Divine Providence.
fellow-beings even only to recall to their memories
those reasons, so noble, so profound, and so true, by
which religious wisdom can shed immortal joys over
the most poignant griefs of frail mortality.
174. The question, "How temporal evil can be
reconciled with the Divine attributes," is not quite so
simple as it appears to be. It is composed of two parts,
which for clearness sake I must distinguish. The first
regards the origin of temporal evil, the second regards
its distribution. These parts have a close mutual
relation, and I shall therefore treat of both ; yet they
are distinct, and I shall therefore treat first of the one
and then of the other.
CHAPTER II.
QUESTION OF THE ORIGIN OF EVIL. QUESTION OF THE
NATURE OF EVIL. UTILITY OF THESE QUESTIONS.
175. When we see virtuous men suffer, we ought to
consider whether they suffer because they are virtuous,
or because they are human beings. We see that they
suffer: but can we affirm that virtue is the cause of
their sufferings ? If we cannot prove this, we are not
authorized to say that virtue is afflicted and ill-used.
We ought rather to say that what suffers is human
nature, and that those individuals suffer, not because
of their virtue, but because they are men.
But why does human nature suffer? Being the
work of an infinitely perfect God, should it not be free
from all sufferings whatever ?
Here begins the question of the origin and of the
nature of evil.
176. To inquire whence evil comes to human nature,
and to inquire in what the nature of evil consists, are,
again, two different questions. Nevertheless, they are
closely connected, and sometimes merged into one.
Hence they should be treated together ; for in order
to form a correct idea of the nature of a thing, it is
almost always necessary to mount to the source from
which it springs.
177. For the theist, the mere belief in the existence
of the infinitely perfect Being is, as we have said, an
1 86 On Divine Providence.
all-sufficient guarantee that the origin of evil can be
no disparagement to the Divine perfections. In the
knots which his reason is unable to unravel, he adores
a Wisdom transcending his own; for all objections,
even though apparently insoluble, entirely lose their
force before such direct demonstration as is involved
in the very idea of God.
Only the atheist, therefore, can be scandalized at the
existence of evil on this earth, taking his ignorance as
an argument for denying God. Now, although I do
not intend to address myself to atheists, who are beings
of uncertain existence, but to persons who believe in
an Infinite Being endowed with all perfections, and
particularly to Christians, nevertheless I shall not,
as I have said, avail myself in this book of so
general a principle for solving the objections against
Divine Providence. Weak minds require some other
kind of support. It is very difficult for most men, on
the strength of the direct argument alone, to regard as
null and void all objections, even the most plausible.
Too much logical consistency would be required of
them to be able to open their minds to the full
light of such a demonstration, and to feel its force so
strongly that none of the contrary allegations should
in the least shake the firmness of their conviction.
178. Nevertheless, if even an atheist will carefully
ponder on those special answers which will be brought
forward in vindication of the Providence that has per
mitted evil to enter into the world (and many others
could be added of a similar kind), he will not labour in
vain. He will, I venture to affirm, come to see that
the distribution of good and evil, far from proceeding
by blind chance, exhibits unmistakable evidences of a
Origin and Nature of Evil, 187
design so vast, so sublime, and so beneficent as to be
of itself an irrefragable proof of a Supreme Providence,
and of the presence of a Supreme Being directing it.
I would merely ask him to take, provisionally, as a
hypothesis, what the Christian Religion teaches on this
subject ; and I feel convinced that he would find in
that hypothesis a beauty, a grandeur, a perfection which
would render it difficult for him not to perceive that it
stands far above all mere hypotheses, and hence that
it is something more than an empty theory ; that it is
truth.
CHAPTER III.
THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL IS NO DEROGATION TO THE
DIVINE PERFECTION, BECAUSE EVIL DOES NOT .
AFFECT GOD, BUT FINITE NATURES ONLY, AND ITS
NATURE IS NOT POSITIVE.
179. The objections which suggest themselves to
the mind against the Divine attributes as one inquires
into the origin of evil, may be classified under three
heads, viz.:
i st. Those which concern the Perfection and
Sanctity of God ;
2nd. Those which assail His Justice;
3rd. Those which assail His Goodness.
1 80. Now, if we suppose that the Divine Goodness
has been vindicated, the attributes of Wisdom and of
Power will have been equally defended. Given a
demonstration that the evils existing in the world
prove nothing against the unlimitedness of the Good
ness of God, it follows that they prove nothing against
the unlimitedness of His Wisdom and His Power. The
reason is that an Infinite Goodness cannot be conceived
except as accompanied by a Wisdom and a Power like
wise Infinite. These are, so to speak, the two great
arms of Goodness. It is by means of them that it
diffuses its immeasurable benefits. Wisdom points
out to Goodness what is the best to will ; and Power
renders this volition, this love of what is best, operative.
Evil, not positive; does not affect God. 189
Let us, then, begin by discussing the objections
which are raised against the Perfection and Sanctity of
God.
181. The first is this: "How is the existence of
any evil possible under a God infinitely holy and per
fect r " Those who make this objection are at a loss to
understand how the Goodness of God can be reconciled
with the evil which is found in the creatures of God.
It seems to them as if the concept of a Being endowed
with infinite perfection excluded the very possibility of
evil. If that perfection is infinite, must it not fill with
itself all things, all times, all spaces in the universe r
Evil, therefore, not having any place to rest in, should
be eliminated from nature. Thus argues human short
sightedness.
182. Reduced to its simplest form, this objection
may be thus worded: "Since an infinitely perfect
Being necessarily exists, evil is impossible."
183. There was a time when such an objection was
most difficult to answer, before St. Augustine, in
refuting the Manichean heresy of the "Two Prin
ciples," discovered and brought out into full light
the nature of evil. To any one who then wished
to meet it directly, the objection seemed impossible to
solve.
184. It is true that even before St. Augustine,
the heathen philosopher Epictetus had known that
evil is not a nature, and had written this most beauti
ful sentence : "As we require no target for aiming
amiss, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the
world." (i) By these words he distinctly insinuated
(i) Sicut dberrandi causa, meta non ponitur, sic nee natura malt in
nnuido existit. (See the Manuale.)
i go On Divine Providence.
that evil consists simply in the failure of an action to
attain its own proper term. The missing of this term
is the evil of the action, in the same way that the
discharge of a bow is faulty when the arrow misses its
mark. For the arrow to be shot straight, art and skill
are necessary; none, to make it go astray.
Later on, St. Athanasius, in an oration against Idols,
wrote : " Neither from God, nor in God, nor at the
beginning, was there any evil ; nor does there exist
a substance of evil, but men, imagining and thinking
the privation of good, began to form to themselves a
notion of evil, and, by a fiction, affirmed those things
to be which were not."(i) Thus did this Greek Father
notice the existence of that faculty by which the
human mind conceives the negation of things under
a positive form, and from this faculty he most
correctly derived the origin of the corruption of evil.
That evil is nothing but a privation, was seen also
by St. Basil, as we may gather from his comparing it
to death and to darkness, and then concluding : " We
must not look upon evil as though it were a thing exist
ing of itself, external to us, nor imagine that there is
some natural principle of malice ; but each one should
acknowledge himself to be the author of his own
perversity. "(2)
Among the Latin Fathers, a similar thought was
expressed by St. Jerome in his Commentaries on the
Lamentations of Jeremias, where he says: " Evil is not,
of its own nature, any of the things that subsist, and
is not created by God. "(3)
(1) O ratio in Idola.
(2) ffexam., Homil. II., from which St. Ambrose drew a similar sentence,
as may be seen in his ffexam., L. I. c. 8. (3) Cap. III.
Evil, not positive ; does not affect God. 191
185. Nevertheless, this doctrine was not sufficiently
discussed and cleared up until St. Augustine with his
wonderfully keen intellect unfolded it under all its
aspects, thus annihilating for ever the heresy of the
" Two Principles."
He proved irrefragably that evil is not a subsistent
and positive entity; that God, therefore, fills all things
with His infinite perfection and holiness, without in
any way entering, so to speak, into evil ; and, as a con
sequence, that to explain how evil arises there is no
need of having recourse to a first positive principle
which produces it. (i)
St. Prosper expressed this doctrine of his master
in the following verses :
Per Verbum omnipotens Deus omnia condidit unus,
A quo natura est nulla creata mali :
Et quod non fecit dives sapientia Verbi,
Non habet in rerum conditione locum.
Nulla igitur vitiis substantia, nullaque vita est,
Quae vegetet corpus, materiamque suam.
Sed cum libertas discedit ab ordine recto,
Nee servant proprium quae bona sunt modulum,
In culpa et vitio est vagus in contraria motus,
Fitque malum veram deseruisse viam."(2)
(i). The principal places where St. Augustine treats of the nature of
evil are : Confess. II. 2o.Enchirid. IX XIII, De lib. Arbitr. III. 5,
VIII XV. In Joan. Tract. I., and in all the writings against the
Manicheans.
(2). Epigr. 95 :-
" By His almighty Word one God made all,
But made no evil nature, great or small.
Now, what from that wise Word doth not proceed,
May be a thing in name, yet not in deed.
192 On Divine Providence.
This doctrine, after so much light thrown upon it by
the Doctor of Grace, has been embraced by all the
wise, and most useful consequences have been drawn
from it.
1 86. Seeing, therefore, that evil is now generally
known to be in reality nothing but a privation of good, (i)
To think that vice and error may partake
Of substance, growth, and life, were a mistake.
But when free-will from its right order strays,
Or when good things transgress by devious ways,
Their lawless course brings guilt and sin in sooth ;
For evil is to leave the path of truth."
(i). The Biblioteca Italiana, however, in an article upon this little
work (no. cxxxi) has thought fit to question the accuracy of the above defini
tion of evil. It says: "The definition advocated by our Author might
have pleased the ancient Peripatetics, inasmuch as it seems to imply a
belief in the negative principle, which is very much the same as the principle
of privation and of non-existence in which those philosophers believed ; but
it would hardly meet with the approval of the compilers of the Encyclopedie
(See art. Du Mai), or of the illustrious Dr. King, whose work On Evil
has been so much admired."
In reply I might observe, that the Encyclopedie does not seem to be a
very fitting authority to appeal to in a matter of this kind ; and that as
regards the Peripatetics and the schoolmen, it were high time to cease
despising what one is ignorant of. I might also observe, that the writer of
the article here contradicts what he said in the preceding page, where he
wanted to prove that I give too much importance to things which are
already known, because I give the name of Cosmic Law to the principle
that "The limitation of created things is the cause of all their imperfections."
He does not perceive that this principle, known, as he says, to everybody,
is in reality that very same principle which, according to him, is so much
controverted. And yet the passage from Leibnitz, which I had put at the
end of my essay, might have reminded him of the fact ; for it distinctly
states that limitation and the negative or privative principle are one and
the same thing. Here is the passage : Et hue redit Sancti Augustini
sententia, quod causa mali non sit a Deo, sed a nihilo, hoc est, non a positivo,
sed A PRIVATIVO, hoc est, AB ILLA QUAM DIXIMUS LIMITATIONS
CREATURARUM."
But what shall I say of the authority both of Dr. King and the Encyclo-
Evil, not positive; does not affect God. 193
the objection of which we are speaking cannot
be considered as of much weight. Privation is the
effect, not of a positive, but of a negative cause. It
arises either from defective formation, in consequence
of which a being does not fully attain its nature, or
else from weakness or slackness in the action of a being.
Now it is plain that neither of these two defects can
occur in God. For while, on the one hand, His nature
is infinitely perfect, His action is, on the other, as
perfective as His nature, nature and action being in
Him necessarily one and the same thing. It follows
that the cause of all evil lies only in creatures whose
substance is always finite. As the act of existence is
not essential to them, they may receive it in an imper
fect degree ; and likewise, their power and their second
acts, being different from their existence, may be
defective and fall short of the right mark.
187. It is not, then, in the essence of beings
that evil must be sought, but in their natural con
stitution [naturazione], or in their action and
passion three things which for simplicity s sake
pedie, which the Biblioteca opposes to me? If these authorities had given
utterance to the error which is now attributed to them, they would not
deserve to be quoted. But in their defence it must be confessed that they
have done no such thing, but the very contrary. The Encyclopedie begins
its review of the work of the Archbishop of Dublin thus: "Voici 1 idee
generate du systeme de Pillustre Archeveque de Dublin. i Toutes les
creatures sont necessairement imparfaites, et toujours infiniment eloignees
de la perfection de Dieu ; si 1 on admettait un principe negatif, tel que la
privation des peripateticiens, on pourrait dire que chaque etre est compose
d existence et de non-existence; c est un rien tant par rapport aux perfections
qui lui manquent, qu a 1 egard de celles que les autres etres possedent : CE
DEFAUT OU COMME ON PEUT L APPELER, CE MELANGE DE NON-ENTITE
DANS LA CONSTITUTION DES ETRES CREES, EST LE PRINCIPE NECESSAIRE
DE TOUS LES MAUX NATURELS, ET REND LE MAL MORAL POSSIBLE, COMME
IL PARAITRA PAR LA SUITE," &C., &C.
O
1 94 On Divine Providence.
I shall include under the general denomination of
action. When, therefore, the action of contingent beings,
not following its proper course, turns to a term which
is at variance with the requirements of their essence,
then there is evil in it. And here we must be careful
to note well what that is which in the devious action
in question properly deserves the name of evil. For
it would be an error to suppose that the whole action
itself is evil. The action, as action, is always a positive
thing, whereas, evil, viz., the privation of good, is not
a positive but a negative thing. Thus in every action
which misses its right natural term, two elements
must be distinguished, the one positive and the other
negative. The first is the entity itself of the action ;
the second is the failure of the action to attain the end
demanded by its nature. The first is good ; the second
is a privation of good, consequently an evil, a loss for
the being in which it has occurred, and an irreparable
loss. I say irreparable, in this sense, that the identical
action, when once gone wrong, can no longer be
rectified, as in the case of a seed which is destitute of
productive power, or of a fruit which decays before
reaching maturity.
CHAPTER IV.
GIVEN A FINITE NATURE, THE POSSIBILITY OF EVIL IS
INEVITABLE; GOD HIMSELF COULD NOT PREVENT
IT, BECAUSE HE CANNOT DO THE ABSURD.
Omnis creatura certis sua naturcz circumscripta est limitibus.
St. Ambrose, De Spir. S. f I., VII
1 88. But here it will at once be objected : Granting 1
the truth of what you have just said, how is it that God,
Whose Power, Goodness and Wisdom are infinite, has
not made creatures so perfect that they should never
be at fault in their action ?
189. To answer this difficulty, we must consider the
nature of created things, and grasp well the fact that,
since it would be impossible for God to create another
God, the universe and all things therein contained
must necessarily be limited.
LIMITATION ENTERS INTO THE NATURE OF ALL
THINGS, GOD ONLY EXCEPTED.
This is a fundamental law of creation, and it is also
the key that opens to us the way to understand Divine
Providence.
190. Now from the fact that all creatures, for the
very reason that they are creatures, have a limited
entity, it follows that they must also have a limited
action, and therefore an action which is accidental and
liable to fail. Let us see how this comes about in
regard to each of the three great classes of things that
196 On Divine Providence.
exist, viz., the material, the sensitive, and the intel
lective.
191. i st. Material things. A body cannot extend
its action beyond the place which it occupies; it cannot
enter into the place occupied by another body ; and if
the two come violently into collision, they break into
pieces. I shall not dwell longer on the consideration
of this defectiveness in the action of corporeal natures ;
because this would lead me into a very difficult and
very long discussion, in which I should first of all have
to inquire whether these natures have any subjective
perfection, or whether the whole of their perfection
does not consist in being an object to the intellective
nature that perceives them, (i)
192. 2nd. Sensitive things: The sensitive nature
has this natural limitation that it is very susceptible to
pleasure as well as to pain, and necessarily so. If we
take away from sense this susceptibility, the very idea
of feeling will vanish from before our mind. Such,
then, being the nature of feeling, not even God, with
all His attributes, could have prevented it from being,
per se, liable to both agreeable and disagreeable
perceptions ; for without this liability, it would not
have been the nature which it is. He could not,
therefore, annul the possibility which this nature has
of suffering, or, which comes to the same thing, could
not prevent it being liable to defective action.
1 93. 3rd. But God, intending to form a much more
excellent nature than the sensitive, made man, a
(i) On this important and interesting subject, see the Author s
Principles of Moral Science ("Principii della Scienza Morale"), ch. ii.,
Philosophy of Rights (" Filosofia del Diritto "), Vol. I., p. 185, and
Theosophy ("Teosofia"), Vol. II., p. 16. Tr.
Possibility of Evil inevitable in the finite. 197
being naturally endowed with intelligence and with
freedom to choose between good and evil. The merely
sensitive nature was furnished with an instinct leading
it invariably to seek what is pleasant and to shun what
is painful ; but an intelligent and free nature could
not act by blind necessity. This, be it noted, belongs
to its excellence; for it is an excellence to have
dominion over one s own actions, to be able to choose
this action or that according as one likes best. This
privilege adds to the nature that possesses it the most
noble quality of being the producer of its own per
fection, and of entering, as it were, into partnership
with the Creator in giving completion to itself. But
in order that this nature might have such excellence,
it was requisite that it should also have the power to
do the contrary by failing in the work of its perfection.
Consequently, even if God had so willed, He could not
have created this excellent nature otherwise than as
liable to defect.
Thus, the possibility of physical and moral evil is
inseparable from the nature of all things except God; for
the nature of all things that have been, or can be,
created, necessitates in them some limitation ; and
this limitation subjects them to the possibility of evil
physical evil, if the nature is not moral, and moral
evil, if the nature is moral, (i)
(i) Here we can see by what link privation, or evil properly so called, is
connected with the natural limitation of creatures, to which some improperly
give the name of metaphysical evil. The ideas conveyed by the three words
negation, limitation, privation, although akin to, are different from, one
another, ist. Negation has a wider meaning than either limitation or
privation ; for it simply expresses the absence or non-existence of anything.
2nd. Limitation has a wider meaning Ihanprtvation. It signifies the negation
of an entity considered as part of another entity ; and when this second
198 On Divine Providence.
194. What is said of natures taken singly, applies
also to natures taken complexly, i.e., in combination.
Since, as a matter of fact, all natures are endowed
with certain forces (I here use the word force to signify
every aptitude of acting and being acted upon), it
follows that when they come together, mutual
action and reaction, opposition, union and divi
sion, must be the result. Hence each nature will
be liable to be affected, beneficially or injuriously, by
the others. Sensitive natures will be apt to benefit or
hurt one another; and still more will intellective
natures be apt to benefit or hurt, seeing that their
activity is greater than that of the sensitive. The
liability or aptitude of which I speak is a necessary
consequence of these natures being all arranged, as
it were, in the same place, and in such a manner as to
be capable of approaching, or receding from, each
other ; in one word, of being ordered in the same
universe. Since this mutual attraction and repulsion,
this helping or hindering one another, is a consequence
of their very essence, given the suitable relations and
conditions, it is clear that God could not combine
these natures into that whole of marvellous beauty
which the universe presents to our eyes, without at the
entity is not necessary to the thing of which one speaks nay, is excluded
from its nature, the limitation is called natural. 3rd. Privation signifies a
limitation against nature, as when a thing is wanting in what its nature
demands ; for example, when an act fails in reaching the term to which it is
naturally ordained. If I think of a man who might exist, but does not exist,
I think of a negation. If I think of an actual man who, although perfect
in every respect as a human being, has in him nothing beyond what falls
within the sphere of human nature as such, I think of a limitation. Lastly,
if I think of a man who has had the misfortune to lose an arm, or is
deficient in something which he could and should have in accordance
with his nature, I think of a privation, and therefore an evil of that man.
Possibility of Evil inevitable in the finite. 199
same time leaving them subject to those mutual actions
and reactions as well for good as for evil.
195. To sum up, then : Evil is only a deficiency ; it is
not a substance nor any positive quality of a substance.
No positive cause is therefore required to produce it,
no essentially evil principle to account for its existence.
God, by filling all things with His goodness, does not
render evil impossible. This deficiency called evil
is merely the action of some limited nature in so far
as it fails to attain its own proper term, and is therefore
found in creatures only. Limitation, or liability to
fail, is so connatural to creatures, that to think them
existent without it would be an absurdity. If creatures
were not limited, they would be infinite like the Creator,
eternal like Him, independent like Him, self-existent
like Him ; in fact, they would be creatures without
being created a contradiction in terms. Therefore
the possibility of the evils to which created things are
subject is metaphysically necessary, so that not even
God s omnipotence, supposing Him to will that they
should exist, could do away with it.
Thus neither the nature of evil, nor ^possibility, or,
in other words, the limitation of natures, is anywise
in contradiction with the Divine Sanctity and Per
fection ; the first, because it is a mere privation;
the second, because it is necessarily connatural to all
things that have been or could be created.
CHAPTER V.
THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL IS NOT OPPOSED TO THE
PERFECTION AND SANCTITY OF GOD ANY MORE
THAN ITS POSSIBILITY.
196. The limitation of creatures, which necessarily
renders evil possible, is not itself evil. It remains,
therefore, to explain how the passage from limitation
to privation, or the existence of evil, is brought about.
Certainly a thing cannot be called corrupted for the sole
reason that it is limited. Although limited, it may be
perfect of its kind, that is, entirely free from the evil
which might befall it. If, then, the limitation of
creatures does not necessarily involve the actual
existence of evil in them, I ask : to what must we
attribute their passing from being simply limited to
being bad r
197. To answer this question, it is necessary to
note that the natural limitation of creatures varies in
character and quality according to the different
natures of the creatures themselves.
Some of them are almost entirely passive, that is,
devoid of any internal principle moving them to act
of their own accord. Others, on the contrary, are in
great part active, that is, endowed with an internal
principle of their own, from which their actions spring.
198. Obviously the first cannot pass from the state
of limitation to that of corruption, or evil, save by the
Existence of Evil not opposed to God s Sanctity. 201
action or impulse of an external force. We see this in
the motion of bodies. A body never begins to move
by itself; its movements are always caused from
without, being due to propulsion or else (if we are
to say that attraction is a force) to attraction from other
bodies.
199. With the others the case is different. For,
while they possess, under certain conditions, an activity
of their own, their limitation consists not merely in
receiving the impulse to evil, but also to a certain extent
in directly producing it. They have an active liability
to evil, a liability depending on themselves. As it is
they that act, so it is they that act amiss. If, therefore,
the miscarrying of their action places them in a state
of privation, the fault is their own, since, having a
limited power of action, they choose to pass to that
defective mode of action in which their corruption or
evil lies.
200. In physical natures, then, which are passive,
the principle in virtue of which they change from
limitation to privation must be sought outside them ;
but in moral natures it must be sought within them.(i)
Nay, it is in this very principle that their limitation
chiefly consists ; that is to say : The limitation of
moral natures lies in the power they have of choosing evil
as well as good, of performing actions which attain their
own natural term, and so perfect the moral being, or
actions which miss that term, and thus deprive such a
(i) I said at no. 197, that moral natures are active in part, and not in all
respects. The reason is, that there is a certain degree of passivity belong
ing to them also, in consequence of which they can, besides producing evil in
themselves, receive it also from without, as we see in the case of the trans
fusion of original sin.
202 On Divine Providence.
being of the perfection it ought to have, and infect it
with evil.
Let us apply this to human nature. This nature is
essentially free to take either a right or a wrong course.
This liberty is an excellent endowment inasmuch as it
is the source of merit; but it has at the same time this
limitation that it can turn to evil, for the notion of merit
necessarily implies that of the possibility of demerit
If, then, we consider human nature as it is in itself,
we find that it must be capable of passing, of its own
accord, from being limited to being morally disordered.
Now we know from the traditions of the human race
that moral evil preceded physical evil, and that it
was man himself who, abusing his free-will, rendered
himself immoral, whereas he had been ordained by his
Creator to the perfection of virtue.
Here we have plainly the origin of all evils.
201. In fact, moral evil having been thus introduced
into the world, the appearance of physical evil is not
difficult to explain. It was simply a natural conse
quence of that close and necessary relation which
exists between the moral and the physical order
between physical and moral evil.
Nay, this relation is of so inviolable a nature, that it
would have been against the Divine Perfection and
Sanctity itself to let moral evil escape without a just
retribution in the form of physical evil.
Physical evil, or sensible suffering, is the only
possible way of avenging the Divine Sanctity which
the offender has outraged, and attempted, though
in vain, to destroy and annihilate. Punishment alone
restores the order of justice violated by sin, in
asmuch as it compels the unjust to render to the
Existence of Evil not opposed to God s Sanctity. 203
Divine Greatness, by means of the penalty, that glory
which he refused to give by a voluntary homage that
would have deserved recompense.
202. The truth, therefore, is, that whether the evil
which is found on this earth be considered in its nature
or in its possibility, or, finally, in the way in which it
passed from possibility to actual existence, nothing can
be proved from it which is in the least degree derogatory
to the Divine Sanctity and Perfection.
CHAPTER VI.
VINDICATION OF DIVINE JUSTICE AGAINST THE OB
JECTION, THAT THE DESCENDANTS OUGHT NOT TO
BE MADE TO SUFFER FOR THE SIN OF THEIR FIRST
PARENTS.
203. Here, however, some one will be ready to say :
"Why should the descendants be involved in the evils
which fell upon their first parent in punishment of his
sin ? Does not this seem contrary to justice ? " This
objection we must now answer.
204. First of all, I think it necessary to observe that
it is a very common thing for men to confound justice
with goodness, and to assail the former with accusations
which from their very nature could have no force what
ever except as urged against the latter. How prone
are people to claim rights which have no existence,
or to complain of wrong where there has been no wrong
at all ! How extravagant are the pretensions of self-
love ! In its prejudiced eyes, it is a crime for you, not
merely to do a hurtful thing, but also not to be lavish
with what is your own. Let only your accustomed
liberalities be diminished never so little nay, let
them only not be increased up to the measure of your
client s greedy expectations, and lo ! you will, in too
many cases, have the cry of injustice raised against
you; and this fancied injustice will be made the
occasion of a thousand complaints, so that a very
trifling accident will suffice to change into an object
Original Sin and Divine Justice . 205
of execration and hatred a benefactor towards whom
no true gratitude had ever been felt.
205. If this behaviour is often shown to man, it is
shown much oftener to God.
And yet what a difference, in the matter of justice,
between man and the Almighty ! A man may indeed
wrongfully withhold from us that which is really ours,
that to which we have acquired a positive right ; and
when this happens, we are entitled to complain of in
justice. But is such a thing ever possible in the
relation in which man stands to God? Can it ever
be said with truth that God is a debtor to man ?
This point must be well pondered ; for if man cannot
show a true title of right, that is to say, a title that
renders him truly a creditor with God, and God a
debtor to him, the very possibility of any objection
against Divine justice becomes inconceivable, and the
affirmation of it an absurdity. Now, the mere notion
of what God is, and of what man is, when clearly
understood, is quite enough to decide the point. What,
then, is God ? A being who gives all and receives
nothing. What is man ? A being who gives nothing
and receives all. I ask, therefore : between two such
beings can the question of reciprocal justice ever be
raised ? Can the second of these beings say to the first,
from whom he has received all that he possesses, and to
whom he has given nothing, and can give nothing:
"Thou hast done me an injustice"? Merely to ask
this question is to answer it.
206. It will be said, that although man cannot have
a right before God, by virtue of his nature, he may
nevertheless have it on the supposition that a promise
has been given by God Himself. This is true; for
2o6 On Divine Providence,
if the giving of a promise on the part of God is an
act of goodness, when the promise has been given, it
implies in man a right to expect its fulfilment. But
this is exactly what is wanting in regard to the tem
poral good of which we are speaking. Has God,
perchance, promised to His faithful servants that their
merits shall be rewarded in the present life ? Has He
pledged His word to the effect that they shall be free
from temporal calamities? Or rather, has He not
prepared them beforehand to suffer these calamities
with magnanimity? Has he not instructed them to
look upon such things as a great means for purifying
and increasing their virtue ? Has He not shewn them
by His own example that humiliation is the road to
glory, and sacrifice the road to happiness ?
207. It will be rejoined, that it is nevertheless
repugnant to our natural feeling to concede that the
Creator can inflict pain on innocent creatures : under
a God Who loves truth, only the guilty must be
miserable.
Granted : but we must make a distinction. Do
you complain because God afflicts you positively by
depriving you of what is yours, or because He afflicts
you negatively by not bestowing on you what is His ?
If you consider well what men call injustice, you will
find that no one is ever reproached with it who, although
he refuses to part with his own, does not lay his hands
on what belongs to others ; who, although he is not
given to deeds of beneficence, neither insults, nor
injures, nor kills his fellowmen. Such a one may, if
you will, be described as niggardly, but not as unjust.
Now, as we are speaking here of justice and nothing
else, let us apply to God that same notion of justice
Original Sin and Divine Justice. 207
which our conduct shews quite well that we have in
our dealings with men, and then it will be easy to
justify Him.
208. Are the evils which have passed from the first
parent of the human race to his descendants, inflicted
positively by God Himself? Did God perhaps, by His
own act, take away from men anything belonging to
their nature ? True, He withdrew from the first man,
in consequence of his sin, the supernatural gifts with
which He had endowed him. But these do not in any
way belong to human nature. Besides, it would be
much more true to say that man himself iniquitously
cast away the gift of grace, than to say that God with
drew it from him ; for it was man, who, by his wilful
transgression, placed himself in a state in which God s
gracious union with him was rendered intrinsically
impossible, since Essential Holiness cannot co-exist
with sin.
209. So likewise the corruption which has remained
in human nature is not due to a positive action of God,
but to natural laws which were brought into play by
man s sinful action. Sin deteriorates and enfeebles the
human will. Hence the will of our first parent, after
his transgression, found itself weaker than it was before,
weaker, I mean, in two ways : first, by the total loss
of supernatural energy, because that transgression
divested man of all supernatural gifts ; secondly, by a
diminution, in great part, of the natural energy, because
sin is also an offence against nature, and has therefore
an injurious effect upon it. Thus the will of Adam
remained deteriorated, not merely in comparison with
its former high state, but also in comparison with its
natural perfection; for there can be no doubt that human
208 On Divine Providence.
nature, free from all sin, is morally stronger than when
tainted with sin. Now, it must be remembered that
man, when once fallen into a sinful state, is no longer
able, by himself, to rise out of it so as to be restored to
justification. Nor is God bound by any law of justice
so to restore him, that is to say, to perform in his
favour what would be an act of infinite power, indeed,
an act (if we consider well its nature) equal to, nay
greater than, creation itself. So far as mere justice
was concerned, the Creator, besides abandoning His
rebellious creature to itself, was bound to inflict on it
a chastisement proportionate to the offence.
210. But even supposing that God, by a free act of
infinite mercy, were moved to justify the sinner, it
would not follow that the sinner s will must regain
all the moral forces which it previously had. It
would be enough for it to be set straight in its
superior part, although the inferior part remained
weak and with an evil bent. This, Faith tells us, was
precisely the method of justification ordained by Jesus
Christ.
211. But it will be rejoined : "What you say explains
the condition of the first parents of mankind ; but what
about their descendants r Is it not unjust that they,
who have had no share in the guilt, should share in the
evils flowing from it r"
I repeat that there would be force in the objection if
God Himself had, by a positive act, despoiled these
descendants of what was theirs, or inflicted positive evil
upon them. But in the first place, what had they before
they were born ? Nothing. Therefore nothing could be
taken from them. Then, the evils which they brought
with them into the world came to them not from a
Original Sin and Divine Justice. 209
positive act of God, but from the action of natural
causes, from the laws of human generation.
212. It is a well-established fact that the state, not
only physical, but also moral, of the parents, influences
that of the offspring. The reason is, that generation is
not the work of the body alone, but much more of the
power and energy of the soul, (i) If, therefore, man
after sin was left with a very feeble will, incapable of
dominating his animal propensities, the children would
naturally inherit this defect, even assuming that their
father and mother had already, by the Divine Mercy,
been fully justified. For, justification being a gratui
tous gift, and therefore accomplished in that mode and
within those limits which God thought fit to assign to it;
and God having, for this wise purpose, ordained that it
should be purely personal (2) could not be transmitted
by generation. Accordingly, those children must come
into the world, both defective in their will and devoid
of justification. It is not, then, I repeat, by a positive
act of God that the evils endured by the descendants of
Adam were inflicted, as though they were penalties
deserved for them by their parents : no, these evils were,
(1) See the Author s Philosophy of Rights ("Filosofia del Diritto"),
nn. 1358 1368. That the mental and moral state of the parents influences
the physical, mental, and moral state of their offspring, was always held
by all ancient Physicists. The observations of modern physicians and
naturalists have confirmed this view, as may be seen in the recent work
entitled : Thoughts on the mental functions, being an attempt to treat Meta
physics as a branch of the physiology of the nervous system. Edinburgh,
1843, p. 178.
(2) According to the Author, the person "is an intellective subject in
so far as it contains a supreme active principle " (Anthropology, "Antropolo-
gia," no. 769).
The nature "is all that goes to constitute a being, or to put it in act"
(Psychology, no. 56). TV.
P
2io On Divine Providence.
as we have said, the result of the action of natural
causes, that is, of the laws according to which human
nature is propagated.
Let us hear St. Thomas : " Sin (the corruption of the
will) does not pass into the descendants of the first
parent by way of demerit, but by way of transfusion,
consequent upon the transfusion of nature. For, the
act of one (human) person cannot merit or demerit for
the whole nature." (i) The transmission, therefore, of
original sin is nothing but a necessary consequence of
the limitation of human nature, a limitation which
could not be avoided if this nature was to be created
at all.
213. If after this it were still urged that there is
something repugnant in the notion of a being, who,
having done no wrong, is miserable, while a God lives
and reigns in the universe, I would again beg the
objector to remember that here we are discussing the
question of justice, and there is no injustice in ordain
ing thaf wherever there is that moral evil, that
corruption of the personal will which constitutes sin
(though not freely committed), there also shall be
the penalty due to it. A little further on, we shall
come to the question of goodness, and answer the ob
jection suggested by the difficulty, which there seems
to be at first sight, of reconciling the notion of an
(i) " Peccatum non transit in posteros a primo parente PER MODUM
DEMERITI, quasi ipse omnibus mortem meruerit etinfectionempeccati, sed PER
MODUM TRADUCTIONIS CONSEQUENTIS TRADUCTIONEM NATURAE. Non
enim unius persona actus toti natures mererivel demereri potest, nisi limites
humance natures transcendat, ut patetin Christo, qui Deus et homo est ; unde
a Christo nascitrmrjilii graticz, non per carnis traductionem, sed per met itum
actionis. Ab Adam vero nascimur filii ir& PER PROPAGATIONEM, NON PER
DEMERITUM." In II. Sentent., Dist. xx., q. II., a. 3, ad yn.
Original Sin and Divine Justice. 2 1 1
Infinite Goodness with the permission that sin should
enter into man by no fault of his own, though only
through secondary causes, and without the direct or
positive action of God Himself.
214. For the present we will consider that the
noble longing which human nature feels for happiness
was implanted in it by Him Who, from pure goodness,
willed to draw it out of its original nothingness. Now
it is certainly only fitting that this goodness, which
is infinite, should be in all respects complete, and that
therefore no human being should, without his own
fault, be made to suffer pain, or be afflicted by
it. But let me ask: Is this a matter of right
in the proper sense of the term? And on what is
it founded? Solely on the need of human nature,
in other words, on man s indigence. Now does
indigence constitute a right? Because I am in
want of a certain thing, is that thing mine? Or am I
at liberty to take it to myself as I please ? Moreover,
does this indigence come direct from God, or rather
is it not, as we have said, a limitation of man s nature,
a mere effect of the series of natural causes which was
disordered by man himself? Clearly, this is a very
different title from those on which rights are founded as
men understand the word in their usual intercourse. A
right never consists in a mere need; it always supposes
something positive, some fact, as would be for example
the occupation of a plot of ground that had not been
previously occupied by any one. On the contrary, the
only title which man can show to God here is that of
the poor mendicant, who, to enlist the sympathy of the
passers-by, exposes his sores while imploringly asking
for the wherewithal to appease the cravings of his
212 On Divine Providence.
hunger and to cover his nakedness. Whatever, human
nature has, is God s; it was His before He bestowed it,
and it remains unalienably His after He has bestowed
it. It is therefore impossible for any man ever to find
a title, on the strength of which he may hold God bound
to grant him happiness, or to preserve him from evil,
or to restore to him all that was bestowed on his nature
at first, but which man himself voluntarily cast aside.
The only thing which may be fairly alleged on man s
behalf in this matter is, that inasmuch as the Divine
Goodness is in every way complete and entire, it
cannot render or leave its work in man imperfect, it
cannot permit that he should without his own fault,
suffer irremediably, and that a creature made for
happiness should be subjected to misery without just
reason.
But as this relation of congruity between the happi
ness of an innocent creature and the Goodness of the
Creator does not belong to what is properly called
justice, but only to the plenitude of goodness, the
Divine Justice remains self-vindicated.
215. Nay, the mere notion of Creator and of creature
is enough to shew that any complaint of a created
being against the Justice of his Maker is an absurdity.
If complaints are at all admissible, they can only refer
to His Infinite Goodness. Whatever part God may
withdraw of the good He has bestowed on man, He
disposes of His own. A debtor might without impro
priety complain of the cruelty of a creditor who despoils
him of what is necessary for relieving his misery ; not
of injustice : or if there is something unjust in the fact
of the creditor, by that rigid enforcement of his claims,
reducing his debtor to extremities, because man s right
Original Sin and Divine Justice. 2 1 3
to the goods of this earth cannot be unlimited, the
same can never apply to the dispositions of God
regarding His creature, because His right over it is
necessarily full, absolute, and inalienable. Conse
quently, all repinings against Divine Justice have
no meaning except as referred to the Divine Good
ness ; and this we shall defend presently.
216. But even supposing that the objection based
upon the transmission of the evils deserved by the first
parent to his descendants could have reference to justice,
would it have force as applied to ourselves ?
We have already answered this inquiry, but we will
put our answer in another form. Agreeably to the
terms which God, as supreme Lord, had intimated to
the first man, if the latter persevered in innocence,
happiness would follow as a result ; if he broke the
command laid on him, he would be condemned to
death. Plainly, this is all mere justice. After the
commission of sin, though the seeds of death
have, together with the forbidden fruit, entered into
Adam s body and into all nature, by which he was
surrounded, yet, the execution of the sentence of
death is deferred. And this is pure mercy ; for it
is mercy for the judge to delay the execution of the
capital sentence passed on the culprit. Some think
it probable that the fruit eaten by Adam contained,
as the penalty for sin, a latent poison, by whose malig
nant action human nature was deteriorated and weak
ened. Such is the opinion we find in the Hebrew
tradition. Be this as it may, Adam s soul and body,
after the fall, were very different from what they had
been before, and he found in himself concupiscence
and mortality. Now, as we have already said, the
2 1 4 On Divine Providence.
law of generation is : Like parent, like offspring. This
law is not arbitrary, but consequent upon the whole
fabric of the animal, and hence none but infirm and
mortal children could be born of an infirm and mortal
father. As, therefore, the first evil was owing solely to
the limitation of created things, and God had nothing
to do with it ; so the imperfection of the offspring must
be attributed solely to imperfection of the generator,
and God has nothing to do with it. If, as we have
seen, there is no reason for attributing to God the fall
of Adam, neither is there any reason for attributing
to God the natural effects of that fall. The limited
creature transgressed ; that transgression produced
other evils by virtue of a natural law, and these evils
produced others in their turn. However long this
chain of evils may be, we must remember that each
link of the chain comes from the one before it as a
consequence of the limitation of things ; that this
limitation which leaves the way open to evil is a
necessity, and therefore incapable of change. In
truth, it would be a contradiction in terms to say
that God can create natures that are not limited;
since the very fact of a nature not being self-existent,
but receiving its existence from another, is itself a
limitation. The propagation, therefore, of physical
evil from parent to offspring is not difficult to explain ;
and as to that of moral evil, it follows naturally, inas
much as this evil consists in the prevalence of morbid
animality over the enfeebled personal will.
217. No one who is at all capable of reflection will
now insist further and object, that if human nature, as
created, was to prove so imperfect, God ought to
have created a better nature. In the first place,
Original Sin and Divine Justice. 215
this supposed better nature would, by the same law
of limitation, have likewise been subject to evils, and
even to greater evils ; for it must be observed that
the greater the good of which a created nature is capable,
the greater is the evil to which it is liable. In the
second place, this objection, if it were properly
understood, would be impossible, and whoever makes
it does not in reality know what he says. Man
cannot desire any nattire but his own ; he cannot desire
to be an Angel, or an Archangel, or any other thing
howsoever excellent it may be. The reason is, that
this desire would imply the desire of the destruction
and annihilation of his own nature, the desire, namely,
of that which every being essentially and invincibly
abhors ; and this absurdity shows the absurdity and
impossibility of that imaginary desire, (i)
( I ) That neither man, nor any other being can desire a nature superior to
his own, is distinctly held by St. Thomas. Here are his words : " Nulla res
quce est in inferiori gradu natures potest appetere superioris natures gradum,
quid esse si transferretur in gradum superioris natures .... jam. ipsum
non esset. Sed in hoc imaginatio decipitur : quia enim homo appetit esse
in altiori gradu quantum ad aliqua accidentalia, qua possunt crescere sine
corruptione subjecti, existimat quod possit appetere altiorem gradum
natures, in quern pervenire non posset nisi esse desineret." S. p. I., q.
LXIII., art. 3.
CHAPTER VII.
A FIRST VINDICATION OF THE DIVINE GOODNESS, ON
THE GROUND THAT MAN, FROM WANT OF COM
PETENT KNOWLEDGE, CANNOT, WITHOUT RASH
NESS, SO MUCH AS FRAME AN OBJECTION AGAINST
THAT GOODNESS .
2 1 8. It remains, therefore, for us to consider whether
there be anything derogatory to the Divine Goodness in
the fact of God having permitted the sin of our first
parent. For, that sin once committed, punishment
became a necessity, and the effect of that punishment,
consisting in moral and physical evil, must, by the
action of a natural law, be regularly transmitted from
parent to offspring throughout the entire human race.
Hence, if any just cause of complaint against God s
Goodness exists, it can be found only in that permis
sion.
219. Here I may as well observe at once that I
cannot, in regard to such permission, say what I said
when speaking of the possibility of evil, namely, that
omnipotence itself could not prevent it ; since in the
notion of God withholding that permission there is no
such absurdity as we discover in the notion of God
preventing the possibility of evil (ch. iv). Undoubtedly,
if God had willed to prevent Adam s fall, He could
have done so without interfering with Adam s liberty.
Could not the Almighty have assisted His intelligent
Rashness of objections against God.
217
and free creature in such a way that it should not fail
in its action ? Has He not in His hands a sublime
power by which He can move liberty unerringly to a
fixed end without at the same time destroying it ?
Revelation tells us that He has ; natural reason itself
proves it to us irrefragably ; and he would indeed have
an imperfect notion of the nature of God s Pwer who
should deny this. Let the manner in which man s
liberty and God s Omnipotence are conjoined be as
recondite as we will, truth compels us to admit the one
as well as the other, and I have, at the beginning of
this book, assumed them both as postulates, (i)
220. If, then, God could have prevented Adam s fall,
and thus saved him and his whole race from a foul
stain and from the lamentable train of evils consequent
upon it, why did He not do so ? Would not this have
been in harmony with His Sovereign Goodness ?
Such is the question I must now answer, and my
answer is in the negative.
There are certain things which at first sight appear
to be acts of goodness, but in point of fact are cruelty ;
contrariwise, there are certain actions which, when first
seen, cause a shock to one s feelings by their apparent
cruelty and barbarity ; but on being examined more
closely, are found to contain the very flower of kind
ness and of most exquisite love. It is wisdom alone
that can lead goodness to its ultimate effect, to its true
completion. An unwise goodness which sees but few
things and those only close at hand, cannot provide
( i ) On the conciliation of human liberty with the necessary principle of
causality, see the Author s Anthropology in aid of Moral Science (" Antro-
pologia in servigio della Scienza Morale ") nn. 636-643. Also, on the
limits of human liberty, see the same work, nn. 650-763. Tr.
: ; On Drrini Providence.
for what does not fall within its mental vision or lies
far away in the distance : but a wise goodness whose
views are far-reaching and embrace a vast range of
tilings, seems sometimes harsh and neglectful of partial
goods, whereas it purposely leaves them aside for the
moment in the certainty of gathering" them up after
wards increased a thousand-fold in die great whole
which it ever contemplates.
221. We can see from this, that it is by no means
an easy matter to decide what best beseems a wise
goodness which governs a large circle of affairs ; and
the less easy in proportion as that goodness is wiser
and greater, and the sphere of its government larger
and more complicated. To estimate aright the good
ness of the dispositions of an eminently wise being,
one must be possessed of a wisdom equal to his.
222. The true way to form a just appreciation of
the goodness of a government is by setting the sum
total of virtue and happiness which that government
secures to the commonwealth against the sum total of
the attendant misery and vices, and striking the
balance, (i)
According to this principle, for man to be in a
position to judge aright whether the permission of
Adam s sin was the more eligible alternative for God
to take or not, in view of the greatest good, he ought
to have a thorough comprehension of all the conse-
<|Dence& of that sin: I mean of the new order of things
which the Divine Omnipotence drew from it. He
n Onthefkirfamentalprindpfcof good goTCTMnat, see the Author s
rf*O^i^
_-.. . .-.-
Ch. -aa."\Tr.
Rashness of objections against God. 219
would have to compare this latter order with that
which would have ensued in the event of Adam re
maining innocent. Consequently, he would require,
on the one hand, to know perfectly the same primitive
order, destroyed as it was at its very commencement^
and, on the other, to have enough mental penetration
fully to understand calculating all its parts and grasp
ing all its excellencies^ the system under which man
kind is now governed, and which is intimately linked
with that of the entire universe, i If there be any
one who thinks himself possessed of all these cogni
tions, who thinks he can grapple with a problem of
such prodigious magnitude, and thus pronounce
whether the Eternal, in permitting the old order to
fall that the present one might be substituted for it,
did right or wrong, such a one will be able to make
the objection we are speaking of with some show of
reason. But if it would be absurd for any mortal to
presume so much of himself, why do we not all rather
adore in silence the overwhelming greatness of the
Wisdom of God ?
(I) That the universe, with aH its numberless parts, is ordered into a
wonderful unity, is shown by the Author in his Introduction to the Gospel
according to St. John ("Introduzione del Vangelo secondo Giovanni"^
pp. 32-34. Turin edition of iSS:>. Tr.
CHAPTER VIII.
IN THE PERMISSION OF ADAM S SIN, THE GOODNESS
OF GOD SHINES FORTH IN THIS, THAT, THROUGH
THE GRACE OF THE REDEEMER, THERE IS NOW
OPENED TO MAN A SOURCE OF SPIRITUAL CON
TENTMENT FAR OUTWEIGHING THE TEMPORAL
EVILS CAUSED BY THAT SIN.
223. Nevertheless, concerning the lofty purposes of
His Sovereign Wisdom in the great matter we are dis
cussing, God has not left us altogether in the dark. He
has vouchsafed as much light as we, in our present
state, are capable of receiving. His word, ever full of
reasonableness and goodness, even when it enjoins
Faith, informs us of the design of His mercy, that by
meditating on it we may be filled with the tenderest
emotions of love. It tells us distinctly, that, turning to
account the occasion given Him by the sin of Adam, He
established on the ruins of the old order of things another
order, more sublime and more magnificent, and that
where sin did abound grace abounded more. ( i ) It has,
on this point, revealed wonderful secrets, yet of such a
nature as to be more difficult to understand, the more
presumptuously man seeks to be unjust towards his
Maker.
224. For, in the midst of the temporal evils which
justly afflict fallen humanity, through the Redemption
(l) Rom. v. IO.
Christ s Grace outweighs Sin and Temporal Ills. 221
which took sin away by bestowing grace, there was
introduced into the human spirit a new and inex
haustible source of contentment, springing from a
generous love of the very justice that inflicts those
evils, and from the hope of a better, supremely blissful,
interminable life.
225. Many imagine that the highest human good
consists in bodily enjoyment, and the extreme of
human misery in bodily pain ; and so they find it very
difficult to understand how a man s happiness can be
increased by restricting him as to the former, and
still more by subjecting hinj to the latter. But how mis
taken they are ! Verily, the true seat of happiness,
and therefore the aptitude for supreme enjoyment, is in
the intelligent spirit alone.
Spiritual pleasures and spiritual pains are of a kind
not to be compared with those of the body. To enjoy
these pleasures, man will often encounter the severest
bodily hardships. Sometimes, to an illusion of his
imagination (itself a proof of his interior energy), to a
desire of revenge, to a great ambition, to a passion for
what the world calls glory, to a miserable vanity, but
much more to the immense attractions of virtue, he will
sacrifice the things he holds most dear, and his very
life : the most appalling torments will have no terrors
for him. It is by the energy of his spirit that he is
enabled to brave all these things, not only with firmness,
but also with alacrity and joy ; by this it is that he can
boast of knowing how to die. Man has simply to reflect
a little on himself, in order to see that there is within
him a spirit capable of such greatness and such sublime
happiness as to find, in an increase of virtue, ample
compensation for whatever bodily afflictions he may
222 On Divine Providence.
have to endure. I would that this noble property were
seriously considered which the human spirit has of van
quishing, by a joy peculiar to itself, all miseries of the
body. Those who do not feel this grand moral energy in
themselves may very easily observe it in many of their
fellow men, and if they do so in good faith, they will
not be able to resist the conviction that man can in very
deed attain to this pinnacle of excellence, to a fortitude
so great as to enable him to behold with a joyous and
smiling countenance the frail tenement of his body
crushed and buried under the ruins of a tottering
universe.
Now this sublimity of virtue, and this most exquisite
joy, wholly spiritual, triumphant over the sufferings
and therefore over the pleasures, too, of the corporeal
substance, would have been impossible, if man had not
experienced these sufferings. Inasmuch, then, as
temporal evils serve man as a step for ascending to a
virtue and a contentment of supreme excellence, which
he could not have known in his former state, they
ought to be accounted as a veritable blessing for him.
226. But could not God have given this virtue and
this contentment without its being necessary for man
to pass through the ordeal of suffering ? Whoever
asks this question shews that he has not caught
the drift of my argument. If that virtue, and the
jubilant triumph which springs from it, are the result
of vanquishing pain, surely pain is a necessary
condition of it, a condition which not even God could
do away with ; for it would be ridiculous to say that
God can bring about the vanquishing of pain where
there is no pain to be vanquished.
Well may we admire the ways of the Good-
Christ s Grace outweighs Sin and Temporal Ills. 223
ness of God ! If He has, together with sin, permitted
evils to beset the body of man, He has at the same
time rendered him all the richer in spiritual goods,
which far outweigh all he can suffer, since they are the
result of a triumph obtained over those evils. Nor
could this triumph have been secured without that
permission, any more than there can be a victory with
out a battle, owing to the natural limitation of things,
which God could not change. Thus man s present
condition, through Faith in the Redeemer and His
promises, is to be ranked higher than the state of
innocence. For, in the state of innocence he would have
been incapable of tasting the delights of sacrifice and
winning the honours of mastery over pain. The one is
as much higher than the other as joy of spirit outweighs
bodily pain, that is to say, infinitely, because the order
of spiritual things excels the order of corporeal things,
not in degree but in kind, and because the predomin
ance of the intelligent spirit over the instincts of the
animal nature can be increased without any assignable
limit.
227. It will, of course, be observed that I speak of
man s condition merely in regard to the good and evil
to which he is subject in this life, since my argument
here extends no further. This is the least favourable
view that can be taken of the new order of things,
occasioned by the sin of our first parents. How much
easier would it be to vindicate the Wisdom of God
in the permission of that sin by showing the superiority
of the new system over the old by a reference to the
other parts of this system ? For example, I might point
out the eternal goods prepared for man, more exquisite
and excellent in proportion to the higher virtue which
224 On Divine Providence.
he can now attain. I might indicate the treasures of
sanctity and bliss accumulated in a single Man, Him in
whom all things have been restored, namely Jesus
Christ treasures so transcendantly great that He is, in
Himself alone, worth much more than the rest of the
human race taken together, even as the body is worth
more than the garments. I might furthermore call
attention to the excellence of the new grace over the
old ; to the light of glory shining infinitely brighter
through that wisdom and goodness which knew how
to draw so much good from the evil of the creature;
to the victory of God s power over the rebellious
sensitive nature, and also over the diabolical host,
vanquished by its own weapons ; to the rejoicings of
the countless angelic intelligences, who sing praise in
contemplating the immensity of the divine conception.
I might even bid men admire and adore justice itself
glorified in the chastisement of the rebel angels,
who, having it in their power to gain salvation,
deliberately preferred their own ruin an evil which,
like the sin of our first parent, God did not permit
save for the end that the virtue and happiness
of innumerable just might be produced and increased,
and that the universal order, given the fundamental
conditions, might prove to be, not only most magnifi
cent and most beautiful, but also the best among all
possible orders, that is, such as would contain in itself the
maximum of happiness attained at the cost of the
relative minimtim of misery. I say "minimum of
misery," because, owing to the limitation of created
things, neither a virtue of a certain kind nor a happiness
of a certain kind could have existed without the accom
paniment of some moral evil and some misery.
God s Grace outweighs Sin and Temporal Ills. 225
In dealing with creatures, the Eternal had prede
termined certain conditions, in accordance with which
to solve, as it were, a stupendous " Problem of Maxima
and Minima." The problem was this : " To find how
the universe which He decreed to create could be
made to yield the greatest possible amount of hap
piness with the least amount of misery possible." Such
is the Optimism I speak of, in fact, the only true
Optimism. Now, who will pretend to be able to con
vict the Eternal of error in His calculation, and to prove
that He has given a wrong solution of the problem ?
But we shall return to this great problem in the third
book, where we shall set forth its data, and give some
faint idea of the way to discover its solution.
CHAPTER IX.
RECAPITULATION. THE QUESTION OF THE DISTRIBU
TION OF TEMPORAL EVIL.
228. To sum up : It has thus far been shewn that
temporal evil entered into the world by an act of
justice, that is to say, as a punishment of the sin com
mitted by the first parent of the human race.
That the efficient cause, if we may so call it, of the
first evil that ever was on this earth I mean moral
evil was man himself, by nature a free agent; and
this necessarily entailed physical evil, the punishment
of moral evil.
That God was the permissive cause of the sin of Adam
and the ordainer of its penalty as an act of justice ;
but the propagation of moral and physical evil from
parent to offspring is due to natural laws, and to
the constitution of created beings and especially
of human nature, which is transmitted through
generation.
That even in permitting the fall of our first parent,
God acted, not only with Infinite Wisdom, but also
with Infinite Goodness, inasmuch as that fall, through
which the infernal enemy intended to ruin the
Creator s work, was in His hands to be the occasion
for introducing a new order of things far grander
than the first, more excellent, more glorious to
Recapitulation . 227
Himself, more advantageous to man the order
centring in the Redemption.
229. It now remains that we should treat of the
distribution of temporal good and evil, the second of
the questions which we undertook to discuss (172),
and upon which indeed the things already said about
the origin of evil will be found to have thrown no little
light. Let us state the difficulty clearly :
The existence of temporal evil on this earth has
in it nothing repugnant to reason; nothing that can
justly be regarded as any disparagement to those
sublime attributes which belong to the Creator and
Preserver of all things. Granting, then, that in
man s present state temporal good must necessarily
be mixed up with evil, the question arises: Will
evil happen by blind chance, and without God
having anything to do in the matter, or con
trariwise r And if the mode is wholly subject to
God s control, will He not so provide as that
temporal evil may invariably fall on the sinner, and
temporal good be reserved for the just, who are
faithful to Him and do their best to imitate Him
in His beneficence r Why, then, do wicked men so
often revel in prosperity, while the innocent are
groaning in affliction, and trampled upon by the
guilty ?
230. Innumerable are the considerations I might
bring forward in answer to this complaint, which is
prompted rather by the weakness of human sensitivity
than by the dictates of calm reason. But I will
content myself with touching upon the chief; and
these will lead me at last to set forth those most
excellent and wise laws by which the Eternal regulates
228 On Divine Providence.
and apportions, for an end worthy of Himself, all
temporal good and evil.
I shall show, therefore, that temporal evil is always,
in the long run, reserved for vice, and temporal good
for virtue ; and, as we proceed, it will appear that the
accomplishment of this great purpose is admirably
promoted by those very irregularities (as they seem to be
for the moment), which are apt to alarm weak-minded
persons, and to scandalize those who, in consequence
of not having a firm faith in Revelation, are likewise
deficient in that moral strength which is necessary for
a consistent belief in the depositions of reason.
CHAPTER X.
AS NO MAN IS PERFECTLY FREE FROM SIN, SO NO
MAN CAN AFFIRM THAT IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF
TEMPORAL GOOD AND EVIL HE IS WRONGFULLY
DEALT WITH.
231. Such, first of all, is my contention as regards
the question in hand. It is impossible for any man
ever to prove either to himself or to others, that, in the
distribution of temporal good and evil, he is unjustly
treated. This would be true even though we were to
admit that virtue ought always to be rewarded with
temporal good, and vice punished with temporal evil ;
and though we were to suppose that God had not in
store those other far better and greater goods, and
those terrible chastisements, by which He will most
amply compensate the just for the sufferings they
have endured, and make the wicked bitterly regret
their unlawful enjoyments.
232. Even conceding all this, for a man to be able
to prove beyond all doubt that it is an injustice to
afflict him with temporal calamities, it would be neces
sary that he should be perfectly free from all moral
taint. Only such a man as this would have any title
to complain if he were compelled to suffer. He
who is not such, be his iniquity never so slight, is
bound to confess that humiliation and chastisement are
fully his due ; and if he will not confess it, he is, for this
230 On Divine Providence.
very reason, most unjust. His complaint justifies the
Providence that inflicts suffering on him, because that
complaint is itself a crime of arrogance and temerity.
233. This is true, I repeat, however slight a man s
iniquity may be, because between moral evil and physi
cal evil there can be no proportion. Moral evil is in
a sense infinite; because infinite is the authority of
the law which sin violates; necessary (i) the moral
order which sin attempts to overthrow ; infinite the
dignity of God Whom sin offends. Consequently, no
temporal evil, however great, is an adequate punish
ment for even the least among formal sins.
234. Now, what man on earth will dare to affirm
that he is absolutely sinless ? Does not Holy
Scripture tell us that "the very justices of men are,
in the sight of God, no better than filthy rags," (2) and
that "every man is a liar," (3) and that "if we shall
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and
the truth is not in us " r (4) Wherefore, let every one
interrogate his inmost conscience, and, in the light
of the response it will give, judge what to think
of himself if he should complain of his treatment
by Divine Providence. It is impossible that a man s
conscience, provided it be sincere, should not witness
against him in some point or other. Even the
heathens recognized this ; and hence they said that
"to err is human," as if to signify that failing
and human nature are two inseparable things, and
(i) Necessary. All things that are necessary by nature (and such is the
moral order} are infinite, at least in this sense, that no power can alter or
destroy them. 7>.
2) Quasi pannus menstruates universes justitice nostr<z. Isai. Ixiv. 6.
3) Ps. cxv. ir. Rom. Hi. 9-23. (4) i. Jo. i. 8.
Man, because a Sinner ; not wrongfully dealt with. 2 3 1
that where human nature is, there must also be
some moral fault, some sin. Either, therefore, con
science reproves us, and then why should we repine
against suffering ? or it blinds us into believing our
selves to be morally irreproachable, and then this very
blindness, or rather this profound lie of our proud
heart, would render us deserving of the most severe
chastisements.
235. It is true that if man is considered, not in what
he has by nature, but in so far as he is united with Jesus
Christ through sanctifying grace, he may be called
righteous, or, to use the language of Holy Scripture,
"just." But this makes no difference as to our
point. For even the justified Christian falls into the
lesser kind of sins, for which the sufferings of this
life are never too severe a punishment. Besides,
a man incorporated with Christ is just only by the
justice which Christ communicates to him. Now, in
the first place, the Christian has a thousand reasons for
never complaining of the evils that afflict him ; hence
there is no need of spending any words to justify in his
eyes that Providence which he continually blesses and
adores in all things. Moreover, even supposing that a
man has been justified, can he, without express revela
tion, be quite certain of his own righteousness ? All he
says, all he can say, is what was said by the Apostle :
"I am not conscious to myself of anything, but I am
not hereby justified." (i) For, Holy Scripture, in
which he believes, gives him plainly to understand that
" Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or
hatred, but all things are kept uncertain for the time
(i) I. Cor. iv. 4.
232 On Divine Providence.
to come." (i) Thus, while the true Christian is the
only person who can be entitled to the appellation of
"just," he emphatically disclaims all certain know
ledge of his state, considering it a profound secret
known to God alone. (2)
236. And even if he were assured of his own
righteousness by an express revelation, he would not
on that account dream of claiming exemption from
temporal sufferings; for he knows too well that it is
not his own, but comes to him from Jesus Christ.
Hence under the royal robe of sanctity which clothes
and adorns him, he still sees in himself a vile sinner,
deserving of all chastisement. For, of himself, as of
himself, only evil could come, and if he now possesses
any good, he owes it all to the fact of his having been
graciously incorporated with his suffering Redeemer,
the root of sin continuing to remain in him as long as
he lives on this earth.
(1) Eccles. ix. I, 2. The doctrine that without express revelation from
God no one can be certain as to whether he be in the state of grace or not,
is an article of Christian Faith, defined by the Council of Trent. De Justificat.
c. ix. Tr.
(2) Eccles. ix. i.
CHAPTER XL
UNDER A PERFECT GOVERNMENT OF THE UNIVERSE,
WHOSE FUNDAMENTAL CONDITION IS THAT IT
SHOULD OBTAIN THE MAXIMUM OF GOOD, NATURAL
VIRTUE HAS NO CLAIM TO EXEMPTION FROM
ALL SUFFERING: IT CAN ONLY DEMAND THAT
FROM AMONG ALL THE SERIES OF CAUSES AND
EFFECTS THAT ARE POSSIBLE, THAT WHICH IS
THE MOST FAVOURABLE TO IT SHALL BE CHOSEN.
237. But let us return on our steps a little. Since the
just Christian neither has, nor can have, a right to
complain of temporal sufferings, it follows that the
discussion in which we are now engaged can only
regard those men who are just by what is called
natural virtue, (i) Now if we consider natural virtue
alone, even supposing it to be perfect of its kind and
to be known with certaninty to exist and neither
supposition is ever verified in reality can the admis
sion be allowed, that temporal good and evil must be dis
tributed in the ratio of the degree of natural virtue and
vice, neither more nor less ? Certainly not. For, speaking
of the natural order alone, what is requisite that it may
(i) By natural virtue, or virtue of the natural order, is meant the
conformity of the will with the dictates of the moral law as known by the
light of reason unassisted by supernatural or divinely revealed truths.
Human nature, being grievously wounded by original sin, cannot practise
perfect natural virtue as it might if it existed in a state of perfect soundness
or integrity. Tr.
234 On Divine Providence.
be directed with supreme wisdom and goodness ? Noth
ing else than that there may result from it in the end
the greatest possible good and the least possible evil
(222 230). Hence pure good, good unmixed with evil,
either is altogether impossible, or if it is possible, this
very circumstance would prevent the attainment of the
maximum good, which is the aim of a supremely, and
therefore infinitely wise Ruler ; since, as we have seen,
certain goods of superior excellence cannot absolutely
be attained without the accompaniment of certain evils.
It follows, that to know what and how much good the
man possessed of natural virtue might lay claim to, it
would be necessary to consider all that grand order
which is formed by the things of the universe taken in
their totality, that is to say, in the totality of the human
race and of its duration.
238. Viewing the universe in this way, we find that
it is governed by general laws, as well natural, that is
flowing from the very nature of the beings forming it,
as supernatural, that is of grace. I say of grace, because
grace also follows certain general laws established by
the wisdom of God. Among these laws we notice some
rare exceptions, or miracles, both in nature and in grace,
these exceptions being likewise pre-ordained by God
and subordinated to laws or reasons of their own.
From this we can see the truth of that saying (provided
it be properly understood) "That every antecedent
state of the world has in itself the reason of the state
which next follows it." For the few exceptions do not
abrogate the law which regulates the general order of
the universe, indeed, it would not be difficult to shew,
that they are themselves links in the unity of the great
design. Thus the whole course of this great order
Natural Virttie and Exemption from Suffering. 235
of things is, from beginning to end, connected to
gether as effects are connected with their causes, or
consequences with their principles.
Hence the great work of God s wisdom consisted
in deciding upon the position to be assigned to the
beings just created, the motion to be given to free
natures, and the first events to be permitted or
prevented in accordance with that prevision which,
standing at the beginning of all things, grasped with
perfect clearness the whole of the immense series of
future events, down to the very last.
239. Now, temporal evil as well as temporal good,
in all its forms, is but a part of those events, bound up
and interwoven with the rest, and therefore brought
about by the same natural causes and according to the
same natural laws by which the universe is governed.
Consequently, its right or wrong distribution depends
on the position of those first data. To this height
is it necessary to rise in order that one may be able
to say whether the existing distribution of temporal
good and evil is wise or unwise, just or unjust. It is
necessary to go back in thought to that moment in
which God, when creating things, assigned to each its
place, and either by His permission or His action, con
trolled the first movements of free natures. It is above
all necessary to determine what God had to do then,
in order that the entire universe might be found, at the
end of time, to have yielded the maximum sum of virtue
and happiness that could have been attained under any
among all the combinations of events possible. It is,
in one word, necessary to embrace in a single calcula
tion all the facts of the world, great and small, past,
present, and still to come, through the knowledge of all
236 On Divine Providence.
their laws and relations. This is what must be done
by him who would pass judgment on the apportion
ment of temporal good and evil : this is the problem
which every sciolist thinks himself competent to argue
about, which gives occasion to Christians of weak faith
to murmur, and to the impious to blaspheme.
240. I think this reflection is quite enough to
show how absurd and rash are all the objections raised
against Divine Providence on the score of the distribu
tion of temporal good and evil. That virtuous man,
for example, fell wounded in battle, or was suddenly
struck by lightning, or was buried under the ruins of
his house. To be in a position fairly to complain of
God, what would he have to do r He would have to
submit to an exact calculation the entire series of the
events which have preceded and prepared his mishap ;
and he could not do this without going back
through each of the links of this prodigiously
long chain of causes and eifects, until he reaches that
first instant in which things began to exist and act.
The proper question, therefore, for him to ask, would
not be : " Why was I, an innocent man, hit by the
enemy s bullet, whilst the comrade at my side, a thief
and a blasphemer, escaped unhurt?" or, "Why did God
strike me with lightning?" or, "Why did He make my
house fall upon me?" But it would be : "Why did God
permit all this immense series of events which has
resulted in my death ?" "Why did He so dispose things
in the beginning?" or, "Why did He not save me by
a miracle?" This is a very different question from the
other ; and to answer it in a rational way, he would
require to know whether in case God had, among the
other series of events that were possible, chosen one in
Natural Virtue and Exemption from Suffering. 237
which his life would have been spared, there would
not have ensued the deaths of many persons as virtuous
as himself, or more so. And in case God had saved
him by a miracle, he would require to know how
it would have affected all the rest of the universe ; how
much more, perhaps, virtue would have had to suffer
by the change in the whole chain of events, whereof
his death was a link. He would, moreover, require
to know whether miracles do not themselves form part
of the laws which govern grace and give order to an
invisible universe. It is plain, therefore, that all com
plaints against Divine Providence, all murmurings,
proceed from littleness of mind, from incapacity to
understand what it really is that one complains of, or
murmurs against.
241. To demand a change, either natural or mirac
ulous, in the pre-established order of things, is there
fore the same as to demand of God a new universe, a
new arrangement or combination of events from among
all those that could be made, by changinginallpossible
ways the relative positions of the countless beings
and actions of beings which exist in the universe.
How overwhelmingly great must be the number of
these several combinations will be readily seen by any
one who is at all familiar with this kind of calculation.
Let him try to ascertain in how many ways any
considerable quantity of numbers, say from one to one
hundred, can be arranged, and he will soon perceive
that his task is not likely to come so speedily to an
end. The virtuous man, then, who asks to be saved
from the death brought upon him in the present
series of events, asks for nothing less than a new
universe. But if one virtuous man may do this, all the
238 On Divine Providence
other virtuous men who are subject to different temporal
calamities may, of course, do the same ; and so there
will be a multitude of different universes asked of God
at one and the same time. Moreover, whichever among
these new universes God may think fit to choose, many
other virtuous men will have to suffer in consequence,
and thus become equally entitled, each to ask for a new
universe on his own behalf . . . . O men ! ye know not
what ye ask. How could God satisfy your indiscreet
and contradictory wishes ? O hapless world, if its
fortunes, if its government were to depend on human
minds ! It would be divided, and torn asunder into a
thousand factions by a perpetual strife of desires and
opinions : all order would disappear from it, and
in a short time everything would fall into confusion
and chaos.
242. If, then, the virtuous suffer, and the guilty
enjoy a transitory triumph, let no one be scandalized
at this, since it is necessary for the order of the
universe. (i) The virtuous must not complain, the
(l) The system proposed by Pope, Shaftesbury, and Bolingbroke for
vindicating Divine Providence against the objection based on the existence
and distribution of temporal evils, is widely different from that set forth in
these pages. Those writers said indeed that " Evils are necessary for the
order of the universe ; " but they considered this order only in its materiality
and external appearance, as, so to speak, a spectacle presented to the human
mind for contemplatiqn. In short, they spoke of a physical order, and
found it excellent because governed by general and constant laws, to which
the most minute atom is subject no less than the greatest of the celestial
luminaries, thus producing an admirable regularity. But is this sufficient to
vindicate Providence ? Of what use to a man is the maintenance of the
laws of the universe and the fixed order which it presents to the mind, if
these laws and this order are not directed to his happiness ? Would he not;
reasonably enough, think it better for him that the law of gravitation,
for example, were less constant, when in consequence of its exact
fulfilment he must be buried under a falling mass of earth ? In our
Natural Virtue and Exemption from Suffering. 239
wicked cannot glory; for all is permitted by that
wisdom which only delays retribution to the end that
justice may at last be perfectly satisfied.
Natural virtue, therefore, cannot reasonably claim
to be always exempt from temporal evil and attended
by temporal good ; all it can fairly rely upon is, that
the Supreme Controller of the universe has, among all
the combinations of events that were possible, chosen
the one which is least unfavourable to it.
system, temporal evils are shown to be necessary to the universe, but
in another sense. By order I mean a moral order ; and I say that these
evils are necessary inasmuch as, without them, it would not be possible for
humanity to attain the maximum sum of virtue and of happiness. From
the system of the writers I have named, who consider the physical order
only, forgetting its relation with virtue and happiness (the only things we
care about) there comes their favourite saying, that All is good. In our
system the existence of evil is not denied ; on the contrary, it is admitted as
a manifest, undeniable fact ; but it is also affirmed that " The saying All is
good, taken in an absolute sense and apart from the hope of a future," as
even Voltaire observes, "is nothing but an insult to the sorrows of human
life" (Pref. au Poeme sur le Desastre de Lisbonne). We cannot, in an
absolute sense, say that All is good, unless we take away the veiy idea of
evil, as those do who consider physical things in themselves alone, without
any reference to intellective and moral beings, for whom alone evil exists.
Therefore, in our system, the expression All is good, changes into this other
and more correct one : All serves unto good, that is, all helps to produce the
maximum amount of virtue and happiness in the human race. We agree,
therefore, with the following comment which M. de Voltaire makes on the
system of the three writers above mentioned : // est clair que leur systeme
sctpe la Religion Chretienne par ses fondements, et ti 1 explique rien du tout
(Dictionnaire Philosophique, Art. Du Bien). On the other hand, however,
we must leave him to reconcile this statement of his with what he says
in another place : Pope a-vait dit tout est bien en un sens qui etait tres-
recevable, et Us (Pope s followers) le disent aujourd hui en un sens qui
pent etre combattu (Pref. au Poeme sur le Desastre, etc.) .
CHAPTER XII.
HUMAN NATURE REMAINS CORRUPT EVEN AFTER THE
PERSON HAS BEEN JUSTIFIED ; TEMPORAL EVILS
FALL UPON CORRUPT NATURE, NOT UPON THE
JUSTIFIED PERSON; THE TRUE CAUSE OF THESE
EVILS LIES IN THE CORRUPTION OF NATURE
ITSELF; GOD MERELY PERMITS THEM.
243. But the man of the purely natural order has
never existed. And is human nature perfect now?
Revelation and experience answer in the negative.
Both the one and the other tell us in unmistakable
language that moral disorder is inborn in man. How
often do our evil tendencies forestall the decrees of our
will ! Where, then, can perfect natural virtue be found,
if nature itself is corrupt ?
But Revelation deposes to more than this. While
assuring us that man is, through the merits of Jesus
Christ, from being unjust rendered just, it teaches also
that, together with Christian justice which sanctifies
his person, he retains in his nature (i) a part of the
original infirmity, which causes him to fall into a
variety of minor offences (2) as well as into moral
(1) See note to n. 212.
(2) It is an Article of Christian Faith, defined by the holy Council of
Trent, that a Christian even in the state of grace cannot (unless he be
favoured with an extraordinary privilege from God) go through this life
without committing some venial sins (See De Justificat, Can. xxiii). He
can, however, always diminish the number of these sins, and the degree of
their wilfulness. Tr.
Corrupt Nature, the Cause of Temporal Evils. 241
imperfections, and which is not destroyed save by
death. And this truth is, of itself, quite enough to
show how unreasonable it would be even for the
justified Christian to claim immunity from temporal
ills, which indeed, besides being just penalties, are also
salutary medicines.
244. How much more unreasonable, if we consider
that these ills, on the one hand, are the effect of the
corruption of the nature common to all men, and that,
on the other, they do not directly come from God, Who
merely permits them, but from the very laws of
nature ?
This latter fact, of which I have availed myself for
the purpose of explaining and justifying the exist
ence of temporal evil, serves equally for justifying its
distribution ; since this evil is likewise distributed
through the action of natural causes, nor does it in
any way affect the personality, which by its spiritual
and moral excellence rises far above all sensible
sufferings, but only the corrupt nature.
245. But we will present the same truths under
another aspect. So excellent is man s nature, that
whenever truth and righteousness present themselves
to his mental vision, he understands them and can
love them.
That natural light, however, in which he beholds
the fair aspect of truth and good, renders him no
further service than that of enabling him to dispose
all his actions in a fitting manner, and to direct them
to a perfection confined to the natural order. His
knowledge is an abstract knowledge, a rule of life,
an object of supreme delight to the intelligence, of
which it forms, as . it were, the chief element, but
R
242 On Divine Providence,
not a real or subsistent (i) being in the possession of
which he can find that complete happiness of which
he is capable. Now God, in His goodness, not wishing
to limit man s enjoyment to the perpetual contem
plation of an abstract idea of truth, or of a purely
negative idea of the Divinity, (2) having, on the
contrary, destined him for the possession of Himself
Subsistent Truth, Infinite Being, capable of being
possessed and enjoyed; God, I say, communed directly
with man as soon as created. He presented Himself
to him as his Maker and his God, and imposed on him
a precept which was not found in man s reason
itself; thereby making known to him the fact that
human reason applied to the beings which form the
universe (3) was not the source of a complete legislation,
but that there was, beyond reason, a superior Will
from which new precepts emanated. Thus did man
come to be constituted in a positive relation with his
Maker that is to say, a relation not necessarily
flowing from the conditions of his nature.
To man, therefore, destined to a supernatural end,
(1) In Rosmini s Philosophy, real being and subsistent being are synony
mous terms. Tr.
(2) The negative idea of a thing, according to Rosmini, is that which we
have when we know that the thing exists, without at the same time having
experience of its nature. Such is the idea of God which it is possible for
man to gain by the light of his natural reason alone. For four fundamental
and irrefragable proofs of God s existence, see Rosmini s Philosophical System,
translated by Mr. Thos. Davidson (Kegan Paul, Trench and Co., London).
Tr.
(3) How reason applied to sensible objects becomes a principle of moral
obligation, is explained by the Author in several of his works. See, for
example, the Treatise on Moral Conscience ("Trattato della Coscienza
Morale"), B. ii., ch. iii., art. 3; and Principles of Moral Science ("Principii
della Scienza Morale "), Ch. v., art. 6, ",,Tr.
Corrupt Nature, the Cause of Temporal Evils. 243
the possession of a good, different from himself and
infinite, became thenceforth a necessity. No sooner
was the knowledge of this good imparted to him
through grace, than he began to taste its sweetness,
saw the possibility of its full enjoyment, and the duty
incumbent on him of securing it. But this Infinite
Good, to which a man who has had any experience
thereof longs to be united, cannot be reached by his
own natural powers. Being, as a creature, infinitely
beneath God, he can only receive Him in that measure
in which God thinks fit to communicate Himself.
Here we must try clearly to realize to ourselves the
fact that the impossibility of the intellective creature
gaining the possession of the Infinite Good by its own
powers, arises from its unavoidable limitation. Not
even God could create an intelligence capable of
attaining, by its own natural powers, to the vision of
Himself! It is always necessary that God should, of
His own free act, present Himself to the intellect,
illumining it by His presence ;(i) else, how will the
intellect be able to fix its gaze on God s Essence,
which it neither has in itself, nor meets with in any
created being? Hence, Holy Scripture, with great
sublimity of expression, calls God a Hidden God, (2)
thus distinguishing Him from the false divinities of
men s inventing. As a consequence of this limita
tion, the intellective creature, in order to attain a
supernatural end, stands in need of God s grace and
(1) This is manifest also from the fourth limitation of human reason,
which we set forth in the preceding book, Chapters XVII XXV., and
owing to which our mind cannot think of any object, unless the same be
presented to it by some external agent.
(2) Isai. xlv. 15.
244 On Divine Providence.
goodness. And Revelation teaches that God, after
bringing man into existence, favoured him, out of pure
loving kindness, with His friendship. In the Book of
Genesis, God is described as a loving father conversing
familiarly with Adam, to enable him by grace to
secure that glorious end which would raise him to so
high an estate, and for gaining which his nature
neither had nor could have the requisite power.
Let it be well noted, that this friendship and this
supernatural aid was pure grace, and that man, after
receiving it, rejected it of his own perverse will. Then
God withdrew from nature which He had been protect
ing and perfecting by His presence. He seemed, in the
words of Holy Scripture, to say: "I will hide My face
from them, and will consider what their last end
(abandoned as they are to themselves) shall be."(i)
Thus was the first man bereft of so necessary an aid,
and left with his own nature only, and this nature
grievously injured by his own free act. Hence [for the
reason we have stated above, nos. 212, 216] the same
aid would, as a matter of course, be wanting in his
descendants also. God has not deprived them of what
once belonged to them ; He has merely withdrawn what
was His own. They have received all that belongs to
human nature, but such as their father had rendered
it, such as he could give. Now, human nature, re
duced in this way to a state which unfitted it for the
possession of God, could no longer exist without feeling
(i) Deuteron. xxx., 20. Such is the threat, as terrible as it is.mild, which
God intimated to His rebellious people through the lips of Moses. No
words could express more forcibly the impotence of man "and the extreme
need he has of God. To humble man s pride, God does not at all require-
to smite him in a direct manner ; He has only to abandon him, to leave him
to himself, free to do what he will and what he can.
Corrupt Nature, the Cause of Temporal Evils. 245
a perpetual thirst for a good capable of satisfying
it : I mean, for those supernatural waters whose
sweetness it had once tasted. In any case, it was a
thirst not to be allayed by anything this earth could
offer; because corrupt man found neither order nor
moral repose in himself. And yet he could not re
nounce the desire of quenching that thirst. What
must be the result? A continual and restless endeav
our to find some way of appeasing that desire, either
in the objects around him, or in himself.
246. Here pride and sensuality discover themselves.
Man, fallen back upon himself, no longer cared for
that supernatural aid which he had not. He felt, on
the contrary, a keener, a more presumptuous senti
ment of his own powers, and relied upon still being
able, by means of them alone, to obtain full content
ment : here he showed his pride. Finding, however,
on occasions, that this confidence betrayed him,
he poured himself out upon created things; greedily
threw himself upon every alluring object; sought
happiness everywhere ; pursued every phantom wherein
he seemed to himself to see some prospect of satis
faction ; separated from God, he attached himself to
material things: this is how sensuality showed itself.
Thus human nature not indeed because injured or
smitten by the Divine Judge, but simply by being left
to itself in the state to which man s own free action had
reduced it, and deprived of the gratuitous gift which
he had by that action cast away, and which was no
part of itself, not because constituted imperfectly by
its Author, but by reason of its own limitation was
no longer sufficient for itself; there lay concealed in it
a germ of saddest corruption and disorder, a germ
246 On Divine Providence.
which the first sin had already rendered in the highest
degree prolific. The overweening confidence, there
fore, of finding peace in self or in other creatures,
even if it were not imputable as a fault (culpa) to the
descendant of Adam himself, because he inherits it
necessarily, would be none the less a true disorder, and
a source of continual torment, inasmuch as he would
unceasingly strive after happiness, and as unceasingly
find himself disappointed.
247. Let us now consider how wisely and how justly
God acted in permitting that temporal evils should
propagate themselves from the first parent to his des
cendants. For my own part, I have no doubt that the
mere fact of man s soul being deprived most justly
deprived of the supernatural aid we have spoken of,
sufficed to prostrate his energies, already disordered
by sin, and to dispossess him, to a large extent, of the
dominion over his body, which was kept alive by the
vigour of a soul joined in friendship and close union
with life s very fountain. The first chapter of Genesis
represents God as making Himself, so to speak, part
of the universe, and, under some natural and visible
form, delighting in His creatures and presiding over
their government. Now, I believe that in consequence
of God s withdrawing from nature when the ties which
united Him with it and which entered into the general
plan were snapped asunder, nature remained as it were
without its soul, barren, saddened, a prey to all the
evils expressed in the divine maledictions. Be that
however, as it may, it is enough for us to understand
that human nature, deprived of the friendship of its
Author, even though still possessed of its essential
constitutives, carries with it necessarily a germ of dis-
Corrupt Nature, the Cause of Temporal Evils. 247
order and of woes which affect and corrupt even its moral
element. The ultimate effect of the development of
so sad a germ can only be misery and despair, since
man never finds what he seeks, but finds at last in all
things vexation of mind.
Now, since the disorder and the evil bent of the will
which constitutes original sin cannot be laid to the
charge of the descendants of Adam, because it does
not depend on their own free or personal will, there is
no need, for the validity of our argument, of regarding
temporal ills and sufferings as personal penalties.
But as the former may be taken as a fact belonging to
the moral order, proceeding, however, from the limita
tion of human nature and its liability to fail, so the
latter may be taken as a consequence of the former, a
consequence founded on the connexion of the spiritual
and moral with the physical order.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE PERMISSION OF TEMPORAL EVILS WHICH ARE
COMMON TO GOOD AND BAD ALIKE, IS NOT
MERELY AN ACT OF JUSTICE, BUT ALSO AN EFFECT
OF GOODNESS ; FOR THEY SERVE AS A WHOLE
SOME REMEDY TO THE MORAL INFIRMITIES
COMMON TO ALL MEN.
248. That he who seeks happiness where it can
not be found should be doomed to disappointment,
is not only just, not only necessary, but also an ordin
ance prompted by goodness and love.
Suppose that it were possible for man to find hap
piness in himself or in the objects around him, or at
least that God had intervened to diminish in large
measure the sufferings man has to endure in seeking
to compass his end by these tortuous and trouble
some ways and God could not have done so without
working a miracle would this be for man s advan
tage r By no- means. The more trouble and pain
man finds in himself or in other creatures, the
less inclined is he to place his confidence and his
affections in these things. On the other hand, the
greater and more varied are the delectations he suc
ceeds in deriving from creatures, so much the more
does the disorder, I mean, the absurd hope of finding
full contentment without God, grow in him ; and so he
goes on farther and farther away from God. The germ
Permission of Temporal Evils , an Effect of Goodness. 249
of the disorder, therefore, which human nature left by
God to itself contains, would grow more and more
mischievous, until at last it brought down upon it greater
miseries from that necessity of justice which makes
straight all that is crooked, and compels every dis
ordered thing to re-enter into order, that is to say, by
rendering this human nature a torment to itself in
proportion as it has taken greater delight in fornicat
ing with created things, to use a Scripture phrase, in
defiance of its God. Obviously, then, the ordeal of the
sufferings and calamities which man experiences in
this life, is not only a just penalty of the first sin and
a consequence of his natural limitation, which begets
disorder, and, through disorder, pain ; but also a
protection and a barrier against the impetus of
this furious nature, which does not suffice for itself,
and yet is perpetually dreaming of its own self-
sufficiency.
249. When, however, we turn our attention to the
grace brought into the world by JESUS CHRIST, we
then see that a new supernatural aid, more excellent
than the first, is offered to the spirit of man, who can
through it be reunited with God. God has, of His own
free Goodness, come to the rescue of human nature.
Taught by a sad experience the futility of all attempts
to find the much-coveted peace in anything within
this creation, he turns back from his wanderings, and
eagerly casts himself into the bosom of his generous
Divine Lover, drawing thence a new and inexhaustible
spiritual vigour. Then do the disappointments and
sufferings of this life become for him a means, not
only of putting a check to his irregularities, but also
of bringing him back to his true rest, and he sees in
250 On Divine Providence.
them the goodness of God shining forth with increased
brilliancy.
250. Hence, again, the utter unreasonableness of any
complaint with respect to temporal afflictions. We all
come into the world in an attitude of aversion from God,
with a limitation in our nature which causes disorder
in the will; and this disorder entails various sufferings.
The law which imposes suffering on us is, therefore,
natural and just, because common to all who are morally
tainted. It is also good, because it goes counter to our
natural disorder, and, so far as it can, corrects it, and
because the obstruction of the ills against which our
disordered nature has to contend helps us, through
JESUS CHRIST, to turn back, and admonishes us to
return without delay to that God Who once more comes
forward inviting us to His embraces.
251. It is true that JESUS CHRIST, in redeeming and
saving man, has thought fit to confine man s restoration,
in the first instance, to his person, leaving his nature
still infirm and subject to death, which destroys it,
until the time of the Resurrection, when our Lord will
regenerate it entirely. This economy in human
justification and restoration was chosen by God for
exalted reasons. Several of the reasons it is possible
for us to know, and one has just been touched upon.
252. Were it, however, impossible for us to know
any of them, should we have the audacity to dictate to
God even in the matter of His liberality, or pretend
that His Goodness, which comes to the relief of our
miseries spontaneously and without the least right
on our part, must proceed in the way which we choose
to lay down for it and in no other? In remedying the
disorder of our nature, is not God free to do so in the
Permission of Temporal Evils , an Effect of Goodness. 2 5 1
degree He judges best, whether wholly or in part? If,
then, He were to think proper whilst leaving us subject
to temporal evils to save us from those of eternity,
ought not our gratitude to our merciful Deliverer to
be unspeakably great? What monstrous ingratitude!
God loads lost man with His benefits, and in return is
summoned by him to judgment!
253. Again, temporal calamities and sufferings
were, in the first place, left to fallen man as a remedy
against his deeply-rooted moral malady that pre
sumptuous sentiment of the capabilities of his nature
separated from God by sin, which identifies itself
with pride, and which is a prolific source of concupi
scence. Only by a long course of severe afflictions and
bitter disappointments could such a malady be
cured. Only by this means, accompanied with the light
of grace, could man be brought to see the abso
lute nullity of himself as well as of other creatures in
regard to his true contentment, and so be made at last to
turn to God, and in the words of the penitent St. Augus
tine exclaim: "Truly Thou hast made us for Thyself,
and our hearts can have no rest until they repose in
Thee!" If man had not had the galling experience of
misfortune, he might perhaps have found peace in God,
but he could never have felt, or felt so deeply, not only
that his peace is in God, but that it is nowhere else, and
that his intellective nature, which all other natures
serve, can find its happiness in no created thing.
254. The materials of human reasoning are
furnished to the understanding by the senses (55-58).
Hence, sensible experience was necessary in order to
prove to man that his nature stood in continual need
of his Creator, to give him a fuller knowledge of God s
252 On Divine Providence.
perfection and of his own imperfection. In a word,
this experience was necessary, in order that man s
intelligence and his very senses humbled under the
mighty hand of God might discern the glory of the
Most High in triumphing over all created things. But
it is precisely in the vivid perception of this glory that
man s great chance of salvation lies ; since the more
deeply the splendour of God s glory or power penetrates
into his soul, the more abundant is the grace he
receives.
If, therefore, human cognitions start from sense, and
sense has need of experience, how could God have led
man to so perfect a knowledge, without at the same
time leaving him to experience both the ills inherent
to his fallen nature, and his own infirmity? How
could man, without this, have arrived at so intense a
conviction of his own nothingness and of the Divine
Greatness, and, by consequence, have been raised to
his present lofty eminence of grace and bliss ? Was it
fitting that God should instruct His creatures by setting
aside the laws ordained for that very purpose by
Himself? Or rather, could He have done so ? Can a
stone be set in motion save by a force overcoming its
inertia? Or can a sensation be produced in the animal
except by a sensible thing acting upon it? Or can a
being operate otherwise than through the use of its
powers or faculties? Must God, then, prevent by
miracles those ills, the experience of which alone could
disabuse of his fatal errors this compound of mind and
body called man ?
See, therefore, the wisdom and the goodness of God!
He has left to man temporal evils, all of them of man s
making, that man might thereby attain the highest
Permission of Temporal Evils, an Effect of Goodness. 2 5 3
moral perfection and the greatest bliss. And is it not
strange that a Christian should not understand what
even Plato, by gathering up the remnants of the original
traditions, understood very well, as we may see from
the following passage in the Critias : " The God of
Gods, seeing that men had lost the most excellent
among things most precious, decreed to subject
them to such treatment as might have the effect
of at once punishing and regenerating them " ? Indeed
this truth, so expressed by the Athenian Philosopher,
would be quite enough to dissipate the difficulties that
are urged against the apportionment of temporal evils.
For, considering, on the one hand, that the defective
state of man s nature renders him liable to all those
evils, and, on the other, that these evils, through the
strength infused into him by the grace of the Redeemer,
serve as a cure for his deadly moral disease, we arrive
at the conclusion, that whilst those persons who
happen to have comparatively less to endure may,
from a natural point of view, congratulate themselves
on this fact as on an accidental stroke of good fortune,
the others, who are more severely tried, may justly
see in their hardships a supernatural Divine mercy.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE POWER OF PRAYER IS A MEANS OFFERED TO
US BY CHRIST FOR REMOVING ALL IRREGULARITIES
IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TEMPORAL EVIL.
255. But there are many who do not consider, or
at least do not always consider, this original imperfec
tion of their nature this sin which we all carry with
us, this continual propensity to presume extravagantly
on our capabilities and those of corporeal things, a
presumption, the keen habitual feeling of which, isolated
from reliance on the Creator, may be defined as
instinctive pride. Hence their complaints about tem
poral good and evil not being equitably apportioned
according to personal merit and demerit, or ac
cording to those virtues and vices which are called
actual, that is to say, which are not simply inherited,
but which are attributable to the free action of the
individual himself. This, it seems to them, ought
to be the ruling principle of the distribution. Now,
I do not wish to oppose them on the score of
their inattention. Neither am I so sanguine as to
expect that the fact of our original disorder will be
accepted by all as being by itself alone a sufficient
explanation of the common ills. As I have before
observed, that strength of mind which is necessary for
dispelling, through the constant use and application
of a single general principle, all the objections that
Power of Prayer, 255
can be raised against a given truth, belongs only to a
few. I will therefore, instead, try to succour, if
possible, the intellectual weakness of these complain
ants by calling their attention to other considerations
of a more proximate and less general kind.
256. We have already noticed the connexion
existing between the events of the universe (238 240);
and we have seen that the universal course of things,
and hence the distribution of temporal good and evil,
depend altogether on the original positions of the several
beings and on their first movements, all determined
alike by Divine Wisdom. We have also observed how
it would be a task far transcending all the powers of
human intelligence to form a direct judgment as to
the wisdom, or otherwise, of those positions and move
ments. After this, we went on to consider that the
best of all the positions in question could not have
been that which would result in saving all the just
from all temporal suffering", but must be that from which
the just would have as little to suffer as possible, while
at the same time as few as possible of the unjust were
allowed to escape the penalties due to them. And
when I say the just, I of course abstract from the original
disorder of our nature, and from the unavoidable actual
effects of that disorder, as well as from those minor
failings to which even those who share in Christ s
sanctifying grace are, generally speaking, subject by
reason of their frailty: and all these abstractions
render my argument all the stronger.
Even though we were not authorized to affirm
without proof that the universe as disposed by God in
the beginning tended to favour virtue, and in the long
run to punish vice to the fullest extent, and though the
256 On Divine Providence.
very notion of God forbids us to doubt it, yet the teach
ing of Christianity, which is wont to answer the most
arduous questions, furnishes us with a higher light
that corroborates the conclusions at which reason itself
arrives. For our Divine Master assures us that the
Heavenly Father watches with peculiar love over the
just, takes them under His special protection, and
showers down on them profusely His benedictions.
Moreover, He has placed among the dogmas of our
faith this most consoling truth, That prayer offered in
the name of the Mediator obtains whatever it asks, (i)
Now, it is very seldom that those who pray ask for
miracles. It follows that according to Christian
philosophy many temporal blessings may be obtained
by prayer without a miracle being at all necessary.
But this truth implies another, namely, that God, when
determining in the beginning the order of the events
which were to follow in succession, foresaw all the
prayers and desires of the just, (I say desires, because
whatever things the just desire, they ask the same of
God, on whom their hearts are ever fixed ; indeed,
sometimes their desire is equivalent to a prayer ;)
and, with this provision, He so predisposed things that
those prayers should be answered in the natural
course of events answered, that is to say, by His
granting either the very blessing which was asked, or
else a greater one ; and always in such a manner that,
whichever of the two was granted, it should be made
to accord with the universal good. The knowledge
we have of the first of these truths is our guarantee for
the certainty of the second.
It is also a tenet of Christian Faith, that under
(i) Jo. xiv. 13, 14.
Power of Prayer. 257
the system of Redemption there can be no truly virtuous
life save through the grace of JESUS CHRIST, which
begets prayer.
But prayer, while itself the effect of grace, is, in its
turn, the means of grace.
Consequently, prayer, as at once the effect and the
means, becomes the measure of grace; and if of
grace, therefore of virtue. Thus we may say that in
the Christian system, virtue and prayer form an
equation.
But we have said that prayer, offered in the name of
the Mediator, obtains whatever it asks.
The plain outcome, therefore, of all this is, that " All
blessings are apportioned according to the measure of
virtue for the very reason that they are apportioned
according to the measure of prayer."
CHAPTER XV.
IF WE CONSIDER ONLY THE NATURAL LAW, APART
FROM THE POSITIVE PROMISES OF GOD, WE CAN
NOT PROVE THAT TEMPORAL EVIL MUST BE DIS
TRIBUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH VIRTUE AND
WITH VICE.
257. But now we shall do well to examine more
closely the claims of that virtue which complains of
not being fairly treated. And in the first place, let us
try to ascertain its true character, and see if it be
really entitled to the name of virtue; for indeed it is
by no means an unfrequent thing in this matter to
hear that vaunted as a reality which is only an empty
appearance. Discriminating, therefore, true from
false virtue, let us see to which of the two kinds this
presumptuous and querulous virtue ought to be referred
whether to the true and sterling, or to the artificial
counterfeit ; and again, what virtue has more merit,
that which modestly holds its peace, or that which
arrogantly fills the air with lamentations.
258. First of all, let us recall to mind the very
wide difference between virtue of the natural order
and virtue of the supernatural order.
259. Supernatural virtue, considered only in its
external characteristics, differs from the natural by the
quality of the law which it follows, and by the promises
which sanction that law. The law it follows is positive,
that is, imposed by an act of authority, the authority of
God Himself. The promises made to those who
Distribution of Evil imder the Natural Law. 259
observe it are likewise positive, explicit, solemn.
The law which directs natural virtue, on the other
hand, is known only through the light of reason, and
can shew no sanction whatever in the form of positive
promises.
I shall not delay to inquire whether this human
reason, which presumes so much on itself, can point
to a single truth discovered by its own powers alone,
and whether therefore it can justly lay claim to being
called the promulgator of any legislation ; or rather,
whether all that enlightenment of which it is nowadays
so vain-glorious, is not, when we trace it to its origin, to
be attributed in reality to those positive instructions
which, together with language, were imparted to man
by the Creator in the beginning, and from which our
first progenitors received the impulse to the free use
of their reason, as well as the germs of all human
wisdom germs which were afterwards transmitted
by the heads of families to their sadly forgetful des
cendants (99 114). Indeed, this is my belief, and I
very much incline to the opinion of those who deplore
the blindness of human pride in taking to itself, by an
act of sacrilegious robbery, the glory which belongs to
Him Who, in the words of Holy Writ, is the " Only
Master" and the "Only Wise, "(i) Leaving aside,
(I) The meaning which I attach to the phrase, Light of natural Reason,
may be gathered from what was said in the first Book, Chap. xix. I there
distinguish three classes of things proposed to man s knowledge by God :
First, natural objects; Second, God Himself and all that relates to
man s supernatural end; Third, language and with it the principles of
reasoning. Now, this third thing, which is the means of human reasoning,
when applied to the first class of things, gives what may be called natural
reasoning ; and when applied to the second class of things, it gives what
may be called supernatural reasoning.
260 On Divine Providence.
however, the inquiry as to whence those lights origin
ally came, and taking them merely as I find them, I
very willingly recognize in the same the firm founda
tions of the moral legislation. And since they mani
fest themselves to us, not as the mere intimations of a
sovereign will, but as consequences of rational prin
ciples shining with an eternal truth, I shall give this
legislation the name of natural, and shall from the
observance of it draw the concept of natural virtue.
260. I admit, then, a natural virtue: but how un
certain is it in its commands ! How timid and hesitating
its voice in difficult encounters ! Its law is a law inspired
by sentiment rather than intimated by reflection.
It is not indeed that this noble moral sentiment,
which never dies within us, is devoid of light, or does
not reveal itself as intimately conjoined with a function
of reason, the intellectual preceptions of beings, (i)
Nor again is it that this same feeling, which suggests
to us so high a respect for all endowed with intelligence
and free- will, which sweetly inclines us to love our fellow
creatures, to share with them the good things in which
we abound, and sometimes to forget ourselves for their
sake and all this, without hope of any other recom
pense than the delight of thinking that we have been
instrumental in assuaging sorrow or relieving distress
is not good, right, and helpful to the cause of virtue.
Nevertheless, this feeling and that lofty abstract idea of
virtue which reflection is able to draw therefrom do not
exert upon human reason enfeebled as it is and easily
(i) For an explanation of how the intellectual perception of beings
assumes the force of moral law of greater or less extension, see the Author s
Treatise on Conscience ("Trattato della Coscienza Morale"), Bk. ii. nn.
123-125; 131-134; 157-200. 7>.
Distribution of Evil under the Natural Law. 261
seduced a force so powerful and so constant that man
may not, when sorely exercised, either disown them or
doubt the legitimacy of their authority. But if in those
trying moments the Divine Legislator presents Himself
to him, and says : " Be of good heart, listen with perfect
confidence to the voice which speaks within thee; that
voice comes from Me;" after receiving such an as
surance as this, man can no longer deny assent to the
law which he feels to be written in his heart, without
being in the highest degree to blame. The authority of
that recondite law becomes clear and fully authenticated.
The voice is a voice whose origin can no longer be
unknown or doubted. The Legislator has drawn aside
the veil behind which he was hidden ; it is Himself
that is seen, and in the observance or violation of the
law it is Himself that is openly honoured or out
raged.
261. The law of natural moral good, therefore, when
considered as the manifestation of God s will to man,
acquires an unmistakable evidence and an authority
which is infinite. For this reason God, as we have
seen (nn. 104, 108, 114), never left the world wholly
unprovided with such traditions as would assist men
to lift their minds even to Himself; and those among
the Gentiles who specially applied themselves to the
study of wisdom were condemned, because, according
to the expression of the Apostle, " they held the truth
of God in injustice." For they knew the divine exis
tence and attributes, inasmuch as God had manifested
the same to them by endowing them with an intelligence
which, illumined and fertilized by the traditions
originated by Himself, might from visible things rise up
to the conception of invisible ones, namely of His Divi-
262 On Divine Providence.
nity and Sovereign Power.(i ) On the other hand, weak
indeed were the foundations laid for morality by those
who, abandoning the traditional truths, shut themselves
up within the narrow circle of the knowledge attained
by reason alone ; but not even these could they have
laid, had it been possible for them to abandon also
whatever knowledge they had received from intercourse
with human society. It is to this uncertainty, this
feebleness of the natural law as taught by human reason
alone, as also to the impressions of sensible things,
whose voice unceasingly insinuates lying doctrines, and
discredits virtue as a mere illusion of the fancy, that
we owe the fact, as deplorable as it is universal, of there
being such an abundance of ethical philosophy in the
books and on the ostentatious tongues of pretenders to
human wisdom, but such a lack of it in their lives and
actions. Some conspicuous deed, and that more famed
than virtuous, they think sufficient to entitle them to be
called virtuous men, and perhaps to cover the crimes
of heaven knows how many years, or certainly the
daily infractions of this same moral law, a law so
severe, that one single act committed against it is
enough to deprive a man of the right to the title of
" guiltless," which, after all, is only the lowest degree
of virtue. If, therefore, there is any one who believes
himself to be in every respect a virtuous man, let such
a one come forward and protest against the unfairness
of the present distribution of the ills of this life : but
before doing so, let him prove, if he can, his entire
freedom from guilt ; let him prove it at least to himself
in one of those fugitive moments, when his heart, in
the stillness of solitude, dares calmly and dispassion-
(i) Rom. Ch. I.
Distribution of Evil under the Natural Law. 263
ately to look truth in the face and listen to its
voice.
262. But now the question arises: To whom will
this wonderful being, this portent among men, address
his protest, his complaints ? Who was his legislator ?
What was the sanction of the law which, as is here
supposed, he has magnanimously observed against all
the most terrible odds ? These questions, alas ! he can
not answer. He cannot find any legislator, or know of
any, because none has manifested himself. The law
which he has so fully obeyed was intimated to him by
his own reason, which, as soon as it has enunciated
the law, owns itself powerless to either reward or
punish, nay, declares its whole and sole office to consist
merely in indicating what is right, and presenting it
as so absolute, so necessary, that its binding force
stands altogether apart from any hope of recompense
or any fear of chastisement. The light of natural
reason in promulgating the law peremptorily summons
man to obey, and there the matter ends. It is true
that in point of fact the consequence of man s
obedience to the law of reason is tranquillity, and that
of disobedience remorse ; but this very tranquillity and
this remorse, when carefully looked into, are found to
be nothing else than the same voice which intimates
the law. For that voice takes a different tone according
to the quality of the response which man makes to it
by his actions ; the tone of approbation if he obeys the
summons, and of reproach if he disobeys. Obedience
to its precepts is all that this law cares for. Con
sequences are nothing to it. In its eyes, man s physical
good and physical evil are just as if they did not exist.
The reason why no connexion can be discovered
264 On Divine Providence.
between the moral law as proclaimed by reason alone,
and anything in the shape of sensible reward or sensible
punishment, is very plain. The moral law,beingreceived
purely by the intelligence and proposed unconditionally
to man s free- will, does not concern itself nor mix itself up
with what belongs to the sphere of the senses, a sphere
far beneath its own. The two essences, the sensible,
and the intelligible and moral, are incommunicable,
mysteriously conjoined, it is true, in the unity of the
human subject, but neither confounded nor assimilated.
The moral essence promises nothing, desires nothing,
gives nothing of that which is sensible; even as the
sensible essence cannot aspire to any of the delights of
the intelligible, which in regard to it have no existence.
Hence, for this wonderful twofold being called man
to complain because his sensitive nature derives no
pleasure from the merits of his intelligent nature, or
to be scandalized at finding that the former suffers while
the latter seems deserving of reward, is a preposterous
thing. The only reward to which he is entitled, consists
in the testimony of a good conscience, and this never
fails him, being, as we have said, the natural and
necessary consequence of the practice of virtue. To
pretend that he who complies with the law of his own
nature should be rewarded with sensible enjoyment, and
he who violates it, punished with sensible suffering, is
well nigh as unreasonable as it would be to demand that
the retribution due to the merits or demerits acquired
by one man should be given to another man, or rather,
to speak more correctly, to a being of another nature,
to demand, for example, that the horse should be
rewarded or punished for the valour or cowardice of
its rider.
Distribution of Evil under the Natural Law. 265
Apart, then, from God, there is no sufficient
reason why virtue should rely on receiving any other
recompense than the testimony of a good conscience.
263. The case is different when the moral law
emanating from the natural light of reason is positively
promulgated by an external legislator. It may then
happen that he accompany his promulgation with large
promises, and it would become him well: this would
be the effect of his liberality, and of his supreme bounty.
But were he, in addition to the natural law, to impose
other positive precepts, differing not only in the
manner but in the substance of the promulgation, then
alone would promises like these be by a certain
equity demanded, (i)
264. Wherefore, when man, wishing as it were to
sunder himself from God, restricts himself to his
natural reason only, he forfeits all claim to positive
promises. By so doing, he in reality removes
mind from nature, even as he removes light from
reason. What do I mean by this ? I mean that
then reason and nature are, for him, nothing but a fact.
He can require nothing from either of them. He
constitutes himself a hearer of what reason says, a
(i) Hence the feeling, so universal and so deeply rooted in mankind, that
the practice of virtue must be followed by positive rewards, proves that the
moral law was received from an external legislator, Who once spoke to man,
or at least, that it was derived from the notion of a supreme Legislator. If
men had derived the moral law from the light of their reason alone, quite
apart from the thought of a being who was Sovereign Lord of all, they never
could have harboured within themselves such an expectation or have been
so strongly impressed with the certainty that a distinct and condign reward
would follow a virtuous life, that it is now difficult to persuade them that
this feeling is not a natural suggestion of their reason itself. A similar thing
has happened in regard to many other truths, which, to use the expression of
a learned writer, are not -natural to, but naturalized in man.
266 On Divine Providence.
spectator of what takes place in nature: that is all.
He hears reason and feels the force of its commands
without knowing their result. He does not ask what
is the true foundation of those commands, and yet they
present themselves as none the less absolute, none the
less inexorable. He sees the spectacle of nature, and
feels that he is himself a factor in it, indeed a spectacle,
perhaps a cruel spectacle, but of a cruelty which, like
all facts, cannot be helped, from which he cannot appeal
even as he cannot cry for mercy or pity. Such is
reason, such is nature considered in itself, sundered
from God. The first merely commands, the second
merely acts. The command of the first knows of no
indulgence, t of no hope; the action of the second is
blind, and order cannot be demanded of it as a thing
which it ought to have, but can only be sought as a
fact which it presents to the observer.
265. It is true that, on observing this fact in nature,
a man may, even by means of reason alone, rise to the
knowledge of the existence of a Supreme Mind.
But how will that existence be recognized by him who
in the same fact sees everything but order, who seems
to himself to see irregularities rife on every side no
discrimination made between the good and the bad,
or, worse still, the good oppressed and the bad exalted r
Noble indeed and magnanimous must be the
conscience of that man, who in the face of this can
frankly say to himself: "Ah no, it cannot be! A
conflict, a contradiction between the two orders,
of nature and of reason, is what I cannot admit. I
will rather believe that these orders will certainly
be reconciled in a future life. To this consoling
belief wall I ever cling. It is good, and for me
Distribution of Evil under the Natural Law. 267
the good will be the proof of the true." And yet, what
does even this courageous effort of the human spirit
lead to after all? Not to looking for order between
virtue and happiness in this life, but only to expecting
it beyond the grave.
Once more, then, it is unreasonable, it is foolish
in a man to complain because, although a follower of
natural virtue, he has a troubled existence.
266. Nevertheless, the man who rejects the
positive revelation of Christianity, and undertakes to
investigate his own nature and that of the universe
which surrounds him by the mere light of reason, can
only consider both as facts; as he cannot demand that
they be subject to some law which he conceives good
and wise, but only observe and from his observation
argue the laws of the universe. Let us investigate
together with him by observing the facts, according to
what law good and evil are distributed on earth. Let
us see, that is, if the virtuous and the wicked share them
indifferently ; or if the distribution varies in such wise as
to justify us in affirming that the good are constantly
more favoured than the wicked, or the wicked, on the
contrary, more prosperous than the good.
CHAPTER XVI.
OBSERVATION SHOWS THAT TEMPORAL GOOD HAS A
CONTINUAL TENDENCY TO BE UNITED WITH
VIRTUE, AND TEMPORAL EVIL, GENERALLY SPEAK
ING, TO FOLLOW VICE.
267. If even on this earth we find that in the
succession of events a certain order of goodness and
of justice is maintained, we shall be authorized to
infer from it the existence of that Creator Whom we
have, for argument s sake, seemed for a while to
ignore.
268. But first of all, we see, or believe that we see,
that this order is not perfect, namely, not without
irregularities. Is it not evident that not every vicious
act is instantly punished, nor every virtuous act in
stantly rewarded ? To be convinced of this, we have
but to glance at this sun of ours shining daily upon
hideous villanies stalking the earth with head erect,
whilst merit of the highest order meets with nothing
but adversity. This, however, does not necessarily
mean that there is no order of justice, or that there is
not that order which there ought to be, and which is
the only one that can be expected.
269. We have already seen that it would be alto
gether unreasonable to affirm the possibility of such
a combination of the beings forming the universe, such
a concourse of events, as would result in saving all the
Un ion of Temporal with Moral Good and Evil. 269
virtuous from temporal suffering and letting none of
the vicious escape therefrom. We must not therefore
imagine that our observation of facts will reveal the
existence of a perfect order, of a perfect accord between
merit and enjoyment, demerit and misery. Yet it will
at once be a source of relief to us, and reason enough
for dispelling all doubts and disposing us to believe
in a Sovereign Mind governing the world wisely and
well, if we find that, in general, the vicious are tempor
ally punished and the virtuous rewarded.
270. In fact, death and all those ills to which every
human being without exception is inevitably subject,
are due to the limitation of our nature separated from
its Maker. Consequently, it would be absurd to expect
protection against these ills from nature or from natural
virtue. It remains, then, that the accord between
virtue and vice, and temporal good and evil, cannot
justly be looked for in regard to common and
necessary ills, but only in regard to such as depend on
accidental circumstances.
Among accidental goods, the first is tranquil
lity of heart; and we have seen that this natural re
ward never fails a man who practises that virtue which
consists in conforming himself to the dictates of the
moral law as manifested to him by the light of reason,
and thus paying homage to the Divinity, which, with
out his knowing it, lies hidden, so to speak, within that
law.
271. To this many other wholesome results must be
added ; for the beings whom man has to deal with in
this life, and to whom his applications of the dictates
of the natural law may refer are his fellow creatures
and himself.
270 On Divine Providence.
Now, it will not be difficult to perceive, that he who
faithfully observes the rules of morality in regard both
to his fellow creatures and to himself, is more likely
(other things being equal) to secure temporal good
and escape temporal evil, than he who does the reverse.
272. For, good moral behaviour towards one s
fellow creatures consists in being so disposed as
sincerely to wish well to all, and in showing this by
deeds; whereas vice consists in forgetting the con
sideration which is due to others, and thinking only
of oneself. Now, he who is known as a true well-
wisher to all, is, by general consent, preferred to him
who is known as a grovelling self-seeking creature.
He has, therefore, the majority of votes in his favour,
and hence the greater probability of obtaining this
life s advantages. There will be against him the
interests of each; but each, in regard to his own
interests, finds himself alone; and so he is overmatched
by the power of all. True, he may have to compete
with some who simulate the same virtue ; but the
simulation of virtue can be neither so frequent, nor so
constant, nor so sure of itself, as genuine virtue is.
Although, therefore, it may happen that the honest
lover of the common weal is overcome by interested
passions combined against him from accidental causes,
yet this must be a less frequent, because a less probable
occurrence.
273. Here we must consider that cases of irregu
larity, although comparatively very rare, make a
greater impression than those which proceed in
accordance with the nature and requirements of
things. Hence the notion that irregularities are very
frequent, is an entirely mistaken notion, founded, not
Union of Temporal with Moral Good and Evil. 2 7 1
upon calm calculation, but rather upon the disgust
one feels at seeing a wicked man exalted. And this
very disgust proves that that is a thing against nature,
and, consequently, less frequent than its opposite ; since
that which goes against nature happens very seldom,
and that which proceeds according to nature is the
standing rule. It likewise proves that men are just
in judging of the cause of their neighbours, unjust
only when they judge of their own cause. This is why
in the world the judgments passed on the external
merit of individuals, are, for the greater part, correct,
and why the votes given in judgments regarding
others exceed in number those given in judgments
regarding oneself, in fact, exceed nearly by as much
as is the number of judgers multiplied by itself.
274. Some might perhaps doubt the soundness of
my contention, that virtue enjoys a greater probability
of obtaining this life s advantages, because I have
made that probability depend on the condition " other
things being equal." And I do not deny that, if it were
to happen that the enemies of a virtuous man had
greater power than he, they would certainly prevail
against him. But it must be remembered that my
question is : " How is temporal good more likely to be
distributed among men," and, among the items of this
good, that very power the abuse of which is here de
plored. I am therefore supposing the good as not yet
distributed, and am enquiring according to what law
it continually and naturally tends to distribute itself.
Now, I maintain that this law is the following :
TEMPORAL GOOD HAS A CONTINUAL TENDENCY TO
FOLLOW NATURAL VIRTUE, AND TEMPORAL EVIL TO
FOLLOW VICE.
2 72 On Divine Providence.
275. In whatever state the world may find itself,
however irregularly temporal good may seem to be
distributed, the tendency I speak of never ceases
to be in operation ; it always remains true that this
kind of good continually tends to unite itself to virtue.
Thus, even when a body is at rest, it is none the
less on that account attracted to the centre of the earth.
This means that temporal good in its various forms, if
not at once distributed in the regular order, must con
tinually move in that direction. The perfection of the
equilibrium between virtue and well-being, or certainly
the drifting of events towards that perfection, no matter
how interfered with by accidental disturbances, must
ever go on approaching nearer and nearer its full
consummation.
276. The better to understand this, let the reader
give a moment s attention to the Law of Probability, a
sovereign law presiding over the application of all the
other laws of the universe and shaping their modes of
action, as will be shown in a Treatise on Cosmology
which, God willing, I intend to publish, if I may cherish
the hope that studies of this kind will find favour and
encouragement in Italy, (i)
277. If you put into a bag 90 little balls of ivory, all
of the same size, one sixth of them yellow, two sixths
red, and three sixths black, and then draw them out
one at a time at haphazard, there is no certainty
that one colour will come out first rather than another,
but there is probability in the proportions of one half
for the black, one third for the red, and one sixth for
(i) This was written in 1825. The Author afterwards treated of the
subject of Cosmology in several of his works, but especially in the
"Teosofia." Tr.
Union of Temporal with Moral Good and Evil. 273
the yellow. Whichever colour you happen to extract
is always an irregularity, because that colour had not,
so to speak, an entire right to come out, but only half
a right, or a third, or a sixth part. But if, replacing
the ball after each extraction, you go on repeating the
same operation a very great number of times, you will
find that the number of balls for each colour comes
nearer and nearer to the relative proportions in respect
of the colours. And the longer you continue, the more
will the irregularity diminish, and the normal design
become more apparent ; thus clearly showing you, that
the law which inclines the colours to regularize them
selves, although accidentally disturbed in its action,
would entirely prevail if you were to prolong the ex
tractions to an indefinite length of time.
Agreeably to this, he who can only consider particu
lar cases, is not in a position to be able to realize to
himself the marvellous beauty of this universe ; nay, in
noticing the irregularities which are inevitable in it,
he must take them as so many evidences of deform
ity ; whereas he who considers a long series of events
will see therein an admirably regular and symmetrical
order. Thus, if a man, seeing a fine piece of embroidery
were to examine each stitch or thread apart from the
rest, he would see one colour after the other, but not
the beauty of the whole. Duly to appreciate this, he
must look at the piece from a certain distance, and
take in at a glance the harmonious effect of all the
colours, to each of which the cunning hand of the
embroiderer has assigned its own proper place. Hence
we may conclude :
In the application of the laws of the universe, the great
Artificer has disposed that there should be irregularities
274 On Divine Providence .
in particular instances , and regularity in the ivhole, making
the very irregularities serve for the accomplishment of His
grand eternal design,
278. This, too, is what comes to pass in the
apportionment of temporal good and evil. If
you see a virtuous man in distress think that
that is only one case. Look at his entire life, and
you will probably find that his prosperity has been
far in excess of his adversities. And if you should not
be able to see the law of order fulfilled by considering
the life of a single person, extend your consideration
to whole families. You will then discover that
those have been more prosperous who have been
more virtuous. Again, the irregularities observable
in families taken singly, will much diminish in your
eyes, if, instead of only one family, you consider many ;
and still more, if you consider whole nations. The
history of these is there to tell us as a constant fact,
that while virtue stood high among them, they flourish
ed, but in proportion as they sank deeper and deeper
in moral degradation, they went on decaying until they
perished. Yet fewer will the irregularities appear to
you, if you survey the entire history of virtue and vice
in all mankind, and the diminution will be the more
marked the longer are the periods in which you under
take to examine it.
279. To illustrate what I say by a single example
(for the brevity I have proposed to myself will not
allow of more), I invite you to reflect how sometimes
that seems to be an irregularity which contributes in a
very high degree to the general regularity. It is a
simple fact, observed in all times, that certain disposi
tions, vicious as well as virtuous, are propagated from
Union of Temporal with Moral Good and Evil. 275
parent to offspring. This is, in great part, the reason
why different races exhibit different temperaments,
peculiarities in their modes of thinking, and in their
habits and manners. By bearing this in mind, you
will readily perceive how hereditary maladies, which
appear to be irregularities, may be the means of
fulfilling a Avise providential purpose. The sins of
the parents, punished with disease, are punished
in the same way in their children, because the latter
inherit the inclination to the same sins. Add to this
the domestic education and example, which materially
contribute to strengthen in the children the vicious
impress left in them by the parents through generation,
and therefore to increase the probability of their
committing those same sins, and as a, general result,
to multiply them. It was every way fitting that races
morally so vitiated, should be afflicted with greater
corporal evils, to the end that they might be extin
guished sooner than those that are incorrupt, and so
virtue might always be seen at last to have won the
day.(i)
(i) This subject has been treated also by La Place in his " Philosophical
Essay on Probability." where he writes: "On y verra sans doute avec
interet, qu en ne considerant meme dans les principes eternels de la raison,
de la justice et de Phumanite, que les chances heureuses qui leur sont
constamment attachees, il y a un grand avantage a suivre les principes,
et de graves inconveniens a s en ecarter. Leurs chances, comme celles qui
sont favorables aux lotteries, finissent toujours par prevaloir au milieu des
oscillations du hazard. Je desire que les reflexions repandues dans cet essai,
puissent meriter 1 attention des philosophes, et la diriger vers un object si
digne de les occuper."
CHAPTER XVII.
DIVINE JUSTICE SOMETIMES DELAYS THE PUNISHMENT
OF THE WICKED IX THE INTEREST OF VIRTUE,
AND THEREBY JUSTIFIES THE DELAY.
280. I cannot here refrain from inserting an obser
vation, as sagacious as it is true, which we find in
a book of Plutarch entitled : " Why Divine Justice
sometimes delays the punishment of wicked men."
He says that God does not instantly punish crime,
because He views things, not separately, but in their
aggregate ; He looks not so much at what each human
action taken singly would demand, as at what will
best promote the realization of a perfect order of
justice combined with goodness in the course of men s
lives taken as a whole. Now, how often do we see
wicked men abandoning their evil courses, and then
advancing in virtue, far more perhaps than they had
done in vice. Were God to smite these men with
death the very moment they commit the first sin, there
would not, it is true, be the particular irregularity by
which that sin does, for a season, escape punishment ;
but there would also be the loss of that grand order
to which such irregularity gives rise. For in the cases
in question, the claims of justice are satisfied in the
lives of these men taken as a whole, with great
advantage to them, and with an increase of glory to
the Divine Clemency, as well as an increase in the sum
total of the virtue attained by mankind at large.
Punishment delayed in the Interest of Virtue. 277
281. The Greek philosopher confirms this sage
observation of his in the following words: "Great
characters produce nothing that is not great. And
since their energy is too vigorous to remain idle, like
ships tossed about by the billows and the storms, they
are ever in a state of agitation until they have come to
form well-settled habits. Now, as a man who knows
nothing of agriculture looks contemptuously upon a
plot of land which he sees covered with brambles, w r ild
herbs, stagnant water, reptiles, and the like, whereas
an expert husbandman will perhaps see in these very
things a clear proof of the fertility of the soil ; so is
it with great characters. They are, in the beginning of
their career, liable to go astray into very vicious and
perverse ways ; and we, feeling indignant at this,
imagine that men of such ill promise ought at once to be
exterminated from the face of the earth. But He Who
understands the art of human cultivation better than we
do, seeing how much that is good and generous there is
in these same men, waits patiently for the season of
wisdom and virtue, when their robust temperaments
will bear fruit worthy of themselves."
282. In accordance with this wise view, Plutarch
compares the principle followed in the case now under
consideration to the law of the Egyptians which or
dained, that " If a woman with child happened to
be sentenced to death, the execution of the sentence
should be put off till after child-birth." Many a
wicked man, observes our Philosopher, is in a posi
tion similar to that of this woman, deserving of death,
and perhaps already condemned by God; but there
lurks within him some noble action, some magnanimous
deed. It belongs to the Wisdom, therefore, no less
278 On Divine Providence.
than to the Goodness of God to delay his punishment
for awhile, that he may have time to yield that ex
cellent fruit of virtue which is secretly being matured
within him.
283. Even if this were not a fruit of true virtue
in which case the man would be supposed not to be
reformed, and consequently incapable of spontaneously
making full compensation for what he has by his
evil conduct detracted from Divine Justice would not
the same reasoning hold in the event of such fruit
being of advantage to others r Ought not our all-wise
and all-perfect God still to suspend that man s punish
ment, supposing that He had destined him, even
against his will and without his knowing it, to render
some great service to the world at large ?
"If Dionysius the tyrant," (the same author con
tinues,) " had been punished at the very instant of his
usurpation, there would not perhaps have been a single
Greek left in Sicily ; for the Carthaginians, possessing
themselves of that country would have banished them
all. The same thing would have happened to the city
of Apollonia, and to that of Anatorium, and, probably, to
the whole island of Leucadia, if Periander s punishment
had not been delayed till long after his usurpation of
sovereignty over those places. And for my own part,
I have no doubt that Cassander s punishment was put
off for no other motive than that he might serve as the
means of rebuilding and repeopling Thebes."
284. Then he passes to speak of the use which God
makes of tyrants for punishing the crimes of peoples ;
the tyrants themselves being, for reasons worthy of
His Greatness and His Clemency, reserved for punish
ment at the end of their mission a luminous truth,
Punishment delayed in the Interest of Virtue. 279
of which the history of all ages affords manifest
proofs. As instances in point, he cites Phalaris in the
case of the Agrigentines, and Marius in that of the
Romans ; but it would not be difficult to substitute for
those ancient examples many others of recent date,
and certainly not less solemn. Or rather, it would be
useless to do so, since the world seems to have hardly
recovered as yet from the shock it felt at those which
have occurred within our own generation, (i)
285. Here it is a satisfaction to me to note how
the principles laid down above agree with the wise
observations of this Greek Philosopher. Let me sum
up those principles in the form of questions and
answers :
Q. Why delay the punishment due to a guilty
man ? According to the laws of justice is not this
an irregularity r
A. Yes, it is an irregularity, but it is only partial,
and serves the purpose of securing more perfect order
in the great whole a momentary irregularity which
later on will be corrected, and turn out to be itself the
source of a more perfect regularity.
Q. But would it not be better to bring about this
order of the whole, this more perfect regularity,
without permitting that disorder, that irregularity ?
A. This would be impossible ; for if that man, at
first wicked, and then by his extraordinary virtue a
shining light to humanity, were punished immediately
after his first sin, how could the germs of virtue and
moral greatness which lie hidden in him be developed?
Or how could he, in the order of Divine Providence,
(i) The Author seems to refer to the case of such men as Robespierre,
Marat, etc., in the French Revolution of 1789. 7>.
280 On Divine Providence,
serve, though perhaps involuntarily, as an instrument
for saving thousands of innocent men from misery, or
punishing thousands of the wicked ? Obviously, his
wickedness, though remaining unpunished for a season,
and giving occasion to an apparent irregularity, is the
very thing which ministers to justice) and contributes
to re-instate in the world the moral order on a larger
scale than it could otherwise reach.
Q. But why should this be necessary ?
A. Because all creatures are limited ; and therefore
it follows that they cannot, at one and the same time,
unite in themselves every kind of good, or escape
every kind of evil. Hence, in order to avoid certain
evils, they must necessarily incur other evils, and in
order to obtain certain goods they must necessarily
submit to the loss of other goods. Accordingly, the
great art, so to speak, by which Divine Wisdom con
trols and governs the world, lies not indeed in pre
venting all evil, but in disposing events in such a
way that the evils it permits may be the means of
realizing an amount of good that far outweighs them
in the balance.
CHAPTER XVIII.
MANY OF THOSE WHO COMPLAIN OF PROVIDENCE,
HAVE A WRONG NOTION OF VIRTUE; AND YET
VIRTUE, EVEN AS THEY CONSIDER IT, IS NOT
WITHOUT TEMPORAL ADVANTAGES.
286. Very many of those who complain of
Providence, take the name of virtue in an improper
sense. They call those actions virtuous which are of
immediate temporal advantage : such is their natural
virtue. It may, however, be affirmed without fear of
contradiction, that, strictly speaking, this is no true
virtue ; for, the moral law, in paying homage to which
true virtue alone consists, although it begins to
manifest itself to human intelligence during this
mortal life, is in itself something eternal. Besides,
man, considered as separated from God, cannot
turn his affections and his thoughts save to things
that will be, or may be, temporally beneficial ;
whether he seek those things for himself, or, being
endowed with a kindly disposition, delight in ex
tending them to others, he always acts in view of
some temporal benefit, or at all events for a limited
object which may at any moment be superseded by a
greater. Perhaps a cold, calculating cast of mind
will have the effect of rendering him a mere egotist,
and of inducing him to be good to others only for his
own sake, while an instinct of his heart that instinct
282 On Divine Providence.
which is never altogether extinguished in a human
being inclines him to benevolence. But instinct is not
virtue : and yet he wishes that this mysterious and
delightful instinct should be taken for a virtue, and
flatters himself with the notion that it really is one, and
takes the credit to himself accordingly He sees, more
over, that he could not resist this instinct without
opposing truth, and that to oppose truth would be a
thing objectively evil. But then, how is he to persuade
himself that this objective evil is of all things the
most hurtful to him, and that nothing in this world
could compensate him for it ? At most, he might strive
to interpret such pure and noble promptings of nature as
indicating the will of a legislator and generous
remunerator, who keeps himself shrouded in mystery ;
and thus it would be only by an act of faith
that virtue could be made efficacious and begin to
reign in him. Virtue ! sublime and sweet name !
The mortal who has lost his God, hears its sound, but
he understands not its meaning. For, truly, it is
only when man s actions are informed by the love of
a law in which he sees an infinitely lovable and mighty
Legislator, that that law acquires for him a new love
liness, and exerts a new power over him, and makes
those actions truly deserving to be called virtuous.
Then, rooted in an infinite good, virtue becomes as
immovable in him as is the law on which it depends ;
rises superior to all human passions and feelings ;
transcends in value all temporal interests and advan
tages.
But it is not yet time for us to speak of true virtue :
our business now is to argue with those who, while
giving the name of virtue to those actions which are
A Wrong Notion of Virtue. 283
temporally advantageous, complain of Divine Provi
dence.
287. I say, then, that the complaints of these
utilitarians are in contradiction with their own defini
tion of virtue. For, if virtue consists in aiming at and
working for temporal advantages, it is clear that those
are most virtuous who know how to do this best. And
are not these, on the whole, also the most prosperous?
288. Let us observe this, first, in the relation which
each man has with his fellow men, and then in the
relation which he has with himself.
Every man defends himself against his aggressors ;
and so does society. In all communities there is an
established system of justice for repressing offences
against the public order and the rights of property.
Whence did civil society itself originate but from the
necessity of each being strengthened by the co-operation
of all, to enable them to defend their properties and
their freedom from the molestation of the ill-disposed ?
The same also was necessary for maintaining a fixed
order of things, in w r hich the well-behaved might
with greater security enjoy the distinctions and
rewards of a life free from reproach. Human society,
then, regarded in its general aspect, is that which
makes an effectual provision for punishing crime and
for giving virtue its due. In all nations, there is, and
always has been, a public administration of justice,
which is considered sacred, and, as it were, the sword
of God. If any escape from it, they can only be the
exception.
289. But the name of virtue, in the sense we are
speaking of, is used to signify, not merely what is
done for the well-being of society, as that of vice is used
284 On Divine Providence.
to mean what is done against the same, but also to
signify that system of proper self-control, which the
individual observes in regard to his own person, or,
more briefly, the utility which the individual seeks
for himself. For example, a man who is strictly tem
perate, and who so regulates his house as always to
keep his expenditure within his income, without at
the same time being niggardly, is justly held to be
worthy of praise. But do not virtues of this kind secure
all the temporal reward they are entitled to? Indeed,
they are called virtues for this very reason. And
are not the contrary vices punished by disease and
other misfortunes which follow in their train r The
spendthrift is soon reduced to poverty ; the miser, to
say nothing of the cruel privations he inflicts on him
self, becomes an object of hatred and execration
to all the world; the drunkard begets a thousand
diseases in his body. Take away gluttony and in
temperance from mankind, and you will have extirpat
ed the greater number of diseases. The proverbial
longevity of priests and of those who lead the re
ligious life, is a patent proof of the advantage which
temperance procures in the present life.
290. Let us make another consideration. Nothing
is more common in our time than to give prominence
to the fact that even great criminals, with all their vices,
are not without certain traits which are called virtues.
A discernment that can forecast the future; a capability
for conceiving great projects, together with an un
daunted courage in carrying them into execution ;
intrepidity in dangers ; fertility of resource ; a presence
of mind that is never taken aback in any emergency
however sudden ; these, and qualities like these, are
A Wrong Notion of Virtue. 285
things which the world admires and praises. In fact,
they have in them a peculiar worth, a kind of natural
goodness. Is it not right that the diligent, the labo
rious, the provident, should acquire a larger share of
this life s goods than the negligent, the slothful, the im
provident, who do not look beyond the present moment r
These goods are like a citadel that must be carried
by assault, or a province that must be subjugated by
hard fighting. Men contend for them, and the victory
is for the most valiant. It is true that at times, through
some unforeseen accident, the reverse happens ; but it
is not less certain that under equal circumstances, the
best man, as the saying is, has always the best chance.
This greater probability of success is what invariably
gives the advantage to those who are possessed of the
worth of which I speak.
291. It is, however, necessary for us to ponder well
on the reason why these endowments and these merits
of the person, which are so much admired and extolled,
fail sometimes to obtain their temporal reward. What
has been said above, will furnish us with a reason easy
to understand. All these good qualities belong to
human nature ; consequently, they are liable to fail,
because the same liability is essentially inherent in
human nature.
The prudence with which superior men who make the
acquisition of temporal goods the aim of their lives, are
wont to proceed ; the fairness, equity, and beneficence
by which they win the goodwill of those around them ;
the temperance and austerity with which they discipline
themselves for hard work; the fortitude which they
exhibit in the midst of dangers ; that kind of mag
nanimity which causes them to prefer an honoured
286 On Divine Providence.
name even to life itself; these and the like virtues are
nothing but an effort which human nature makes to
aggrandize and ennoble itself, and thus find content
ment. But as, owing to that limitation which we
touched upon above, it cannot acquire these perfections
without external aid, the aid of a being who, having
them in himself, is able to communicate them to others ;
so it is not only fitting, but necessary, that all such
efforts should be unavailing. In this way human
nature gives glory to that God from Whom it has
separated itself. Hence, albeit those who are en
dowed with the virtues referred to, find it easier to
obtain temporal goods than those who are not ;
nevertheless, they do not always obtain them ; and
when they do obtain them, they soon come to lose
them by death. This, then, is how the powers of mere
human nature really stand even when viewed in re
ference to the attainment of temporal goods ; THESE
GOODS CANNOT BE ATTAINED WITH CERTAINTY, OR
EXCEPT UPON THE INEXORABLE CONDITION OF THEIR
HAVING QUICKLY TO BE LOST TO THEIR POSSESSOR.
What a humiliating thought for this proud nature of
ours !
2Q2. And even what good there is in all this, must
be ascribed to the Goodness of God; for all those
endowments which we have enumerated above were
received by man with his nature, and man s nature is
the work of God. That very truth which naturally
shines upon the human intellect is not man, but a
divine appurtenance. The only good thing which man
may properly call his own is that kind of love of self
which prompts him to use his endowments and powers
more or less energetically, more or less sagaciously,
A Wrong Notion of Virtue. 287
and without interfering with the interests of others,
and which on this account wins for him the repute of
being a lover of justice. But the love of justice, as
taught by the light of natural reason alone, proves
ineffectual when all interests seem to go dead against
it. We find pleasurable and noble instincts implanted
in the human soul ; yet, as a matter of fact, we also
find that, rather than these instincts being set in
motion, as they ought to be, by man s moral faculty
the will it is they that set this in motion ; and they
are not always calculated to succour human reason.
Nevertheless, the Power and Wisdom of God have so
disposed things, that by means of mere natural justice
and even mere natural prudence, man should be able
to avoid many temporal evils, and secure many tem
poral advantages. Now, from this law which conjoins
temporal good with virtue and wisdom, and temporal
evil with vice and folly and which is sometimes
fallacious, as it was fitting that it should be men,
instead of taking occasion to give honour to the
Supreme Providence, took occasion to be puffed up
with arrogance and pride. They invented a doctrine
full of presumption, now by promising to such imper
fect virtue as the natural virtue is, a constant natural
happiness ; now by defining virtue as a mere seeking
after temporal advantages, and calling those men virtu
ous who best understand the art of enriching themselves
with human goods. In the meantime, however, the
votary of utilitarianism recognizes and justifies un
awares to himself the Providence of the Creator.
CHAPTER XIX.
WHY TEMPORAL GOOD SHOWS A TENDENCY TO AC
COMPANY NATURAL VIRTUE, AND TEMPORAL EVIL
TO ACCOMPANY VICE.
293. But why is it that in the apportionment of
natural good and evil, the law which we have just
referred to is seen to prevail, namely, that temporal
prosperity has a continual tendency to accompany
natural virtue, and temporal adversity, generally
speaking, to follow in the wake of vice ?
This fact is due not less to God s original collocation
of the beings forming the universe, and His selection
of their first free movements, than to the goodness He
imparted to them by the creative act a goodness at
which he expressed His delight by saying, as we read
in Genesis (ch. i), that all things which He had made
were good. This goodness, however, which creatures
owe to likeness with the Creator, does not exclude that
imperfection which we have noted above, and by reason
of which it comes to pass that even the intellective
creature the most excellent of all stands continually
in need of the aid of its Maker, the infinitely perfect
Being. Hence :
In creatures, two elements must be distinguished :
the one negative, namely LIMITATION; the second
positive, namely, THE PARTICIPATION OF EXISTENCE.
The first element renders them capable of every evil,
Why the Tendency to Union, &c. 289
unless God by an act of free loving- kindness comes to
their assistance ; the second renders them capable of
order and of every good. The first comes from them
selves I mean from their original nothingness ; the
second comes to them from creation.
294. These things were seen also and expressed,
although somewhat confusedly, by the earliest philoso
phers. Whether it was that they received from the
primitive traditions some lights of which we cannot
now well appreciate the importance; or that some
extraordinary intellects, breaking through the darkness
in which men had of their own accord enveloped them
selves, succeeded in catching some glimpses of the
highest truths ; or, as is more probable, from both
these causes together ; certain it is that in the writings
of those studious men, which have come down to us, we
find traces of a wisdom far greater than we might be
led to expect from those miserable times. In proof of
this, it may suffice to quote a passage from Plato, where,
expounding the doctrine of Timaeus of Locris, he comes
very near the theory of the two elements which are to
be found in the nature of all created things ; and from
which all the constituent laws of the universe are
derived ; although the Locrian Philosopher, perhaps
from not having expressed his concept with sufficient
clearness, could not afterwards successfully rebut some
erroneous consequences which others insisted on draw
ing- from it. Plato, then, writes : " According to
Timaeus of Locris, all things proceed from two causes."
(This is the same as to say, that whatever is observed
in the universe may be explained by means of two
principles.) "First, mind, whence proceed all those
things which come into existence in virtue of some
2 go On Divine Providence.
reason." (Here we have the Divine ideas, the causes
and exemplars of all that there is of positive in created
natures.) "Then necessity, whence proceed those things
which exist in virtue of a certain kind of force in
accordance with the powers and faculties of bodies."
(Here we have limitation, the cause, as we have seen,
of necessity, which is, more than in all other things,
observed in the corporeal and material.)
295. Now, is it not a delightful thing for the mind
to consider how all the laws of the constitution of the
universe originate from two elements alone r
In fact, the limitation of creatures (first element)
produces that Cosmic Law by which ALL NATURES,
ABANDONED TO THEMSELVES, ARE LIABLE TO EVIL a
most universal law, which the sin of the intellective
creature has brought out into full light. Hence the
sublime and mysterious saying of the Gospel : HE THAT
HUMBLETH HIMSELF SHALL BE EXALTED, AND HE THAT
EXALTETH HIMSELF SHALL BE HUMBLED.
296. The goodness placed in beings by the creative
act, and indeed identical with the beings themselves
(second element), produces the other constituent cosmic
laws, THESE LAWS BEING NOTHING BUT THE CONSTANT
RELATIONS BETWEEN FINITE BEINGS CONSIDERED IN
THE DIVINE MIND.
297. The primitive position which Divine Wisdom
assigned to these beings could not change these laws
whereby the universe is governed : it merely regulated
their action ; in other words, it determined the cases to
which they would actually apply for example, that
given number of times, that place, that moment, in
which beings would be found to combine in such a
manner that this or that law would come into opera-
Why the Tendency to Union, &c. 291
tion. If you imagine in the atmosphere two clouds
charged with opposite kinds of electricity, and suppose
that there is a conducting medium between them, you
have the combination of the three things that are
requisite for the action of the law of electrical
equilibrium. Without this equilibrium, the law would
have been just as true as it is now, but it would have
had no occasion for manifesting itself.
298. The application, then, of the cosmic laws,
depends upon the combination of things.
From this we can see how futile is the objection
which we hear sometimes urged against the efficacy of
prayer, on the ground that God does not change the
laws of the universe. To hear our petitions, God has
no need whatever of changing these laws. All He has
to do is to dispose them that they may operate in one
way rather than in another ; and for this purpose it is
quite enough to assume that He has, in His all-wise fore
knowledge, pre-ordained the combinations of things,
and therefore the cases in which these same laws would
be applied and outwardly manifested. There is no
question of excluding electricity from the law of
equilibrium ; it is simply a question of preventing the
communication between the two clouds through the
conducting medium ; and such communication would,
according to our assumption, be prevented in con
sequence of the primordial disposition of things.
CHAPTER XX.
TEMPORAL MISERIES SERVE TO DISPOSE MAN TO
SUPERNATURAL VIRTUE, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, TO
SUPERNATURAL HAPPINESS.
299. But it is time for us to consider that human
excellence to which the venerable name of virtue
applies in all the fulness of its meaning. All external
actions, no matter how excellent and admirable they
may seem to human eyes, are merely the body of
virtue, not its soul. Its soul, its, form, (i) lies in the
sublimity and purity of the aim of those actions, which
is hidden away in the inmost recesses of the human
will, where virtue has its throne. Supernatural virtue,
as we have said, leaving all creation aside, lifts men up
from earth to heaven ; it immediately unites the limited
with the infinite. Indeed, in our present state, it is
nothing else than the acknowledgment of the limitation
of human nature, and the reunion of this nature with
God. Christian Faith teaches that man s reunion with
God is purely the effect of grace, freely given by God s
bountifulness, and freely accepted by man. It is not
man that of his own movement goes to God ; it is God
( i ) Form, in the philosophic sense in which the Author uses the word
here, is that which makes a given thing to be what it is, to have the nature
it has. Thus the rational soul is thefortn of the human body, because it is in
virtue of the soul that this body is a human, and not merely an animal body.
Or we may also say that form is what determines the specific essence of a
thing. TV.
Temporal Ills in relation to the Slip er natural. 293
that comes to man. By loving us first, God creates in
us together with the obligation the power of loving
Him in return. This God did even in the beginning:
but man, inebriated, as it were, by the sense of the
perfection he had received, forgot his need of the
Divine Benefactor ; for a want which has been fully
satisfied is not felt. But the evils which ensued upon
the privation of God, had the effect of rousing him
again to a sense of his insufficiency. Then out of pure
goodness, God loved man again, although man him
self was incapable even of conceiving in what the
loving aid of his Creator consisted. Indeed, so deadly
an evil is sin, that, whilst it inflicts a frightful wound
in the innermost recesses of our nature, it prevents our
being aware of it, precisely because it wounds and
corrupts what we may call the very organ by which
we come to know our moral evils and necessities.
The plan decreed by Divine Mercy for accomplishing
the work of human restoration was therefore as follows:
that man, through a continued experience of physical
ills, should be made a\vare of his own insufficiency ;
that one Man entirely free from sin, whose Manhood
was taken by the Godhead unto a Divine Person,
should spontaneously submit to these ills, and thus
acquire an immense credit with Divine Justice ; and
that, by transferring this credit to his fellow-men
He might be able to pay off their debts, and com
municate anew to them that union with God which He,
as Man-God, possessed by nature. The claims of
Divine Justice being thus satisfied, man could be
re-united with God, not merely in the way he was
united at first, but in a way much more intimate and
excellent. So long as human nature was perfect,
294 On Divine Providence.
there was no obstacle to its being supernaturally united
with God ; but this obstacle is put by the infection of
sin. Hence in the former state, God could effect man s
union with his Maker by a less powerful grace than
He can in the latter. Consequently, the greater man s
imperfection is in his fallen condition, the more abun
dant is the grace which comes to his rescue.
300. It is, then, (wonderful to say !) in nature s very
infirmity that Divine grace shines forth in its greatest
brilliancy, and, by consequence, human virtue finds its
highest perfection ; since through grace, man, weak
though he be in himself, has the power of being
supernaturally virtuous.
Being now at a greater distance from God than he
was when his nature had no moral taint, a greater effort
of virtue is necessary to re-unite him with his Maker.
Now, the experience of physical miseries serves him as
a stimulus to make this effort; for, not being a pure
intelligence, but an intelligence acting through bodily
organs, he can only realize his extreme need of God
by sensible proof.
301. Hence it comes to pass that such a virtuous
man never allows himself to complain of Divine
Providence, be his temporal afflictions what they may.
Filled with an eager desire of growing every day in
the knowledge of himself, and in union with God,
he conforms his will to the Eternal Wisdom, which
reveals to him its secrets, and he welcomes his sufferings
as so many aids which feelingly and effectually help
him to know his natural imperfection, and, conse
quently, the need he has of that God from Whom he was
estranged even from his origin. Humbly acknowledg
ing that imperfection, he rejoices at seeing in it the very
Temporal Ills in relation to the Supernatural. 295
place in which Divine grace finds an agreeable abode,
and is pleased to show forth its grandeur. He exults
in the thought that there is much for God to do in him,
and very little for arrogant nature. Hence he delights
in sufferings, and draws from them an ineffable and
unique sweetness of such exquisite nature as has
nothing like it on this earth, and he perceives that
voluntary humiliation has been the seed of a new andun-
expected greatness. With a thrill of joy his heart then
assures him that he has conquered, and that, through
being made one with Christ, (i) he has himself become
the lord of nature, inasmuch as even were the entire
universe to fall upon him, it would only serve to crown
the triumph of his sacrifice. This is indeed a great
and marvellous thing ! The truly virtuous man groans
in sufferings, and at the same time, instead of
complaining, feels overjoyed by finding in those
sufferings a hidden source of life ; and the greater his
virtue, the greater his joy. It is only the pretender to
virtue who complains of Providence, he whose virtue is
little else than a name; and the less virtuous he is, the
louder his denunciations of what he would fain have
people believe to be a wrong done to him. And yet
his virtue, such as it is, ordinarily speaking, obtains its
reward, as we have said, and for what it fails to obtain,
the blame is due, as we shall presently see, to its own
defect. Still he is not satisfied; he perverts the very
kindnesses bestowed on him into an occasion for mur
muring, and thereby commits a moral offence for which
temporal reverses are no adequate punishment. (233.)
(l) Of course, not one in person, but by community of life; for those who
are in the state of sanctifying grace partake of Christ s own life: "I live
now not I, but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. ii. 20). The Gospel similitude
of "the vine and the branches" (Jo. xv.) conveys the same truth. Tr.
CHAPTER XXI.
THE VERY COMPLAINTS OF THOSE WHO, ALTHOUGH
ABOUNDING IN TEMPORAL GOODS, ACCUSE DIVINE
PROVIDENCE OF NOT DOING THEM JUSTICE, ARE
A JUSTIFICATION OF THE SAME PROVIDENCE.
303. In the very complaints, however, to which we
have just referred, it is easy to see a new justification
of Divine Providence.
For if, as a matter of fact, the further removed a man
is from true virtue, the more prone he shows himself
to carp at the Divine dispositions, is it not plain that
that man feels unhappy, that temporal goods have
no power to appease the cravings of his heart r
Of a truth, it is one thing to possess temporal goods,
and quite another thing to enjoy them. Those are
greatly in error who take the distribution of this kind of
goods as the test whereby to judge of human happiness.
What does it profit to have an abundant supply of them,
if one does not know how to use them? if, instead of
proving a source of contentment, they only serve to
harass the soul with desires, followed in their turn by a
thousands fears, anxieties, and heart-burnings r In the
eyes of sober reason, a spare meal of the humblest fare,
but seasoned with joy, peace, innocence, a good name,
and human benevolence, is far better than princely
banquets embittered with the poison of enmities,
A Retort against Complainers. 297
discords, dark suspicions, the maledictions of God and
men, and comfortless remorse.
304. Let us, then, consider temporal goods, not in
themselves, but in their use, I mean in the degree of
contentment which they afford to their possessors, and
all apparent irregularities will vanish ; for we shall find
that these degrees are invariably in the ratio of the
amount of true virtue.
CHAPTER XXII.
THE CONTENTMENT WHICH THE TRUE CHRISTIAN
FINDS IN TEMPORAL AFFLICTIONS, INSTEAD OF
DETRACTING FROM HIS RIGHT TO AN ETERNAL
REWARD, INCREASES IT.
305. In all that I have said thus far, there is
nothing to invalidate that proof of the existence of a
future state which philosophers have drawn from the
violations of justice so frequent in this life, where we
have often to bewail the oppression of the good, and
the undue exaltation of the wicked.
For, although a truly good man finds in his conscience
a peace and joy far outweighing all he has to suffer in
the case in question, it is to God alone and to his own
virtue that he owes this blessing. Hence his claim
to redress, as against his oppressor, always remains
unsatisfied. A time must therefore come when the
oppressor shall be humbled under him, and make
reparation for the wrong done. This, Eternal Justice
demands.
306. Moreover, the interior joy which a virtuous
man knows how to draw from sensible sufferings is
itself a merit calling for reward. O the Goodness and
Wisdom of the Most High ! First, He teaches us the
secret, and infuses into us the power of converting
temporal sorrows into a well-spring of sweetest delight;
Contentment in Affliction an Increase of Merit. 299
and then He puts this very delight to our credit,
entitling us to other delights immeasurably greater and
eternal. For, such indeed are those joys which await
the wayfarer on this earth who has walked in faith and
in the firm hope of the recompense promised him by
the God of truth.
CHAPTER XXIII.
PENALTIES, POSITIVE AND NATURAL, OF EVIL DOERS.
GOODNESS OF GOD TOWARDS THEM.
307. Setting aside, however, the question of interior
contentment, in which alone true happiness consists,
and considering solely the external apportionment
of temporal evils ; we have already seen how those
immoral actions which prove detrimental to society
are generally punished at its hands, and those whereby
the law of proper self-control is violated, become a
prolific source of painful bodily ailments (288, 289).
It is only in the case of crimes committed directly
against God that retribution seems to be comparatively
rare, for the reason that men do not care to punish evil-
doing save in so far as it causes injury to themselves.
To this class of crimes committed against the Creator
belong certain offences which are not hurtful to society
except when repeated a great number of times, although
each commission of them is an offence against the
reverence which is due to God and to His holy law. Yet
it is also true that these do not altogether escape
temporal punishments.
308. In the first place, when they redound to the
injury of society, society itself, as I have said, makes
a point of punishing them. And here it will be well
to observe that those who break the laws of God have
already an evil and disordered will ; hence it often
Evil Doers Penalties : God s Goodness. 301
happens that they receive from human justice those
chastisements which God in His patience delays
inflicting on them.
309. In the second place, sin, and the consequences
of it, degrade and debase the human soul to a degree
of which it would be impossible to form a full and
adequate conception.
Whatever efforts a man conscious of guilt may make
to think highly of himself, however many may be the
shifts of his pride, it is always true that he lies prostrate
under the fatal blow he has received. Go whithersoever
he will, he always carries with him an impress of
foulest turpitude, which has the effect of depressing his
spiritual energies, and, in consequence, of stamping with
an inexplicable feebleness all the actions which he
performs, all the undertakings in which he engages,
all the attempts which he makes at self-aggrandizement,
and which should be called rather the spasmodic efforts
of despair than the resolute darings of true courage.
The foulness of that impress, and its attendant diminu
tion of spiritual energy, go on increasing in proportion
to the frequency with which these unhappy men repeat
their offences ; so much so, that the very efforts which
they make in sinning serve to hasten their deterioration.
So the dismal downward progress continues until
at last their prostration becomes complete. Such is
the way in which moral evil naturally works out its own
penalty. And I am inclined to believe that it is to the
physical and moral deterioration insensibly produced
in certain families by the sins of the parents, that we
must attribute the abject beggary into which those
families are seen gradually to fall, and from which it is
afterwards so extremely difficult to raise them, on
302 On Divine Providence,
account of their utter want of elasticity, of prevision,
of light, of aptitude to be stirred up to act, or to feel
the force of an argument. Indeed, I am not sure
whether the origin of savage tribes may not be traced
to a similar cause. Sin naturally begets fear and
that terrible dread which trembles at a light gust
of wind and at the rustling of a leaf; and the last
results of this are convulsive agitations of the soul,
most opprobrious carnal sins, incendiary theories,
despair, suicide, (i)
310. Moreover, according as in a civil common
wealth the significance of this degradation of the soul
is more or less understood, and the importance of
religion for the social good is more or less keenly
felt, offences directed against God are punished by the
laws with greater or less severity. Hence the difference
which we observe in the attitude assumed by society at
different periods with reference to the punishment of
crimes against religion, and to the rewards bestowed
on virtuous conduct.
311. Hence also we can see that of the two parties
that may be offended by sin, I mean God and man,
God is by far more indulgent and forbearing ; for
whilst man punishes the culprit at once, God very often
allows him ample time to repent and amend. On the
other hand, we must not lose sight of the fact that no
punishment of this life could ever be an adequate
satisfaction for sin , and this fact is itself a new proof
of the existence of a future state.
(i) On this subject, see the Author s Essay on Hope (" Saggio sulla
Speranza ").
CHAPTER XXIV.
THE QUESTION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF TEMPORAL
GOOD AND EVIL SOLVED WHEN VIEWED IN REFER
ENCE TO THE SUPERNATURAL.
312. The apportionment of good and evil resulting
from God s primary arrangement of the universe, was
made, not so much out of regard to the claims of that
lofty virtue which aspires to an eternal reward, as in
accordance with two other laws of the Divine Wisdom
and Goodness.
These are precisely the laws to the clearing up of
which this second book is chiefly directed. For, it is
by the consideration of them that the Christian s mind
is set completely at rest, and that he feels powerfully
incited to the tenderest gratitude towards God, and to
the most devout admiration of His greatness.
313. Indeed, it is only the Christian to whom the
whole of the great design of Providence can be imparted,
and by whom it can be contemplated in its entirety, with
out any exclusion of parts, because only the Christian
knows the place which he occupies in the universe, and
understands all the relations which bind man to the
created things around him, as well as to the eternal
Creator Who pervades the whole. The unbeliever, on
the contrary, blind to the highest truths touching his
own nature, knows neither what his place is, nor by
304 On Divine Providence.
himself; and so he vegetates like an insensate brute in
the midst of a universe, which, although radiant on all
sides with light, is, to him, dark and inexplicable, even
as he is inexplicable to himself.
314. The same must be said of those philosophers
who, ambitious of drawing all knowledge from them
selves, begin by excluding the very possibility of
thought ; I mean by basing all their reasonings on the
absurd assumption that God and revealed doctrines
must be treated as non-existent. In this way they
render themselves incapable of applying their minds
to the consideration of God s counsels, and make a
bargain, so to speak, with their pride to close up
against themselves the avenues of wisdom. If you
enter into an argument with them, you are compelled
to use an arid and crippled kind of discourse ; because,
owing to their peculiar disposition, to set before them
the grand order of Divine Providence in anything like
its glorious fulness, would be of no use whatever. In
reality, they idolize their own reason as much as
they hate truth ; and on this very account they put
senseless restrictions on reason itself, and enchain
it with arbitrary bonds, lest it should set foot in a
region spacious and fruitful, thrown open to them by
a generous Master. But because this region is not
their own, they prefer to perish in their indigence.
Or else they simply disbelieve and blaspheme what
ever does not come from their own reason. And as
from their own reason left to itself there comes nothing
but darkness, the result is that they are continually
walking along a road on which none of the things
which the Word of God has created is to be met with
the dismal road ofnulh sm.
Distribution of Good and Evil viewed Supernatur ally. 305
The reader will now see how it was that in dealing
in previous chapters with the question of the provi
dential apportionment of good and evil in this life, I
stopped, so to speak, at its surface. I could not do
otherwise. Having to view this question in reference
to what is called natural virtue, I was obliged to
judge of it according to the elementary and meagre
concepts of human philosophy, rather than according
to the plenitude of Christian wisdom. Now, however,
that the time is come for viewing the same question
in reference to supernatural virtue, I shall be able
thoroughly to sift it; for I shall address myself to
Christians, namely, to persons who are not children in
respect to truth, but have been rendered adult and
robust by the secrets concerning Divine and human
nature, which Revelation discloses to them.
And of a truth, in the present state of fallen humanity,
what relates to supernatural virtue is all that a
Christian need care about. For, since man is born in
sin, would his salvation be possible without Faith in
the Redeemer r And what is this Faith, this beginning
of salvation, but a supernatural relation of man ?
Therefore, all that in the present state restores man
to moral perfection and to happiness is supernatural.
In this supernatural relation, then, begins and ends
all that is truly of importance for him, all that contains,
not a mere hypothetical speculation, but substantial
saving truth.
CHAPTER XXV.
FIRST LAW OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF TEMPORAL GOOD
AND EVIL : IT MUST ALL SERVE UNTO THE PER
FECTING OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST.
315. Coming, then, to the two laws of Providence
which must now engage our attention, it will be well
first of all to recall to mind that God s design in
permitting the fall was that He might thence draw a
form of human virtue and happiness higher than would
have been attained without that permission the virtue
of Christ, which consists in love reuniting the sinful
creature with its offended Creator.
316. This virtue, with the happiness consequent
upon it, must therefore be brought upon the earth, and
there triumph over all things. For this object, it was
necessary that the society of men banded together for
the cultivation of this same virtue, should have assured
to it by the Supreme Providence a perpetual existence.
But no society composed of men can continue to exist
unless it be provided with external goods. Again, this
society was destined to triumph and to go on increasing
until it embraced at last the whole of mankind. It
followed from this, that all temporal goods must be made
subservient to its end, so that the same society might
truly be said to draw all things to itself. Such is
the history of the Church of Jesus Christ ; such the first
law according to which God had even from the
First Law of the Distribution of Good and EviL 307
beginning disposed that all temporal goods should be
distributed. In His all-seeing wisdom, He assigned
these goods, not to virtuous individuals, but to the
society of the virtuous ; not to be given all at once,
but in the succession of times ; not as the reward of
virtue, but as the means of subsistence to its posses
sors, of their multiplication, and of their triumph over
human cupidity.
The first law, then, by which God apportions good
and evil may be formulated thus :
ALL THINGS MUST SERVE TO THE CONSERVATION,
INCREASE, AND SANCTIFICATION OF THE CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST.
317. For this end, it would not have sufficed that
virtue should merely be regarded with greater favour
than vice by mankind at large. This favour is extended
even to that sort of human virtue in which the interests
and cupidities of men are concerned. The individual,
generally speaking, finds it to his advantage to moder
ate his own cupidity so as to be free to show a certain
equity towards the cupidity of those around him (286
288). But this can in no way be said of Christian
virtue, it being of the very essence of this virtue to
place no trust whatever in nature as such, and to rely
solely on God. Consequently, it falls as a crushing
weight upon carnal hearts, scattering to the winds all
their expectations, or rather their vain illusions, and
showing forth in most vivid light the humiliating
insufficiency of all the affections, the passions, the
reckonings and forecastings of this nature, which,
having separated itself from God, presumes on its
ability to secure greatness and happiness by its own
resources. Hence the wrath and fury of proud
308 On Divine Providence.
nature against this sudden rush of light, which com
pels it to see itself as it really is. And here we have
the true source of all the wrongs done to Christian
virtue ; of all the hatred shown to, and the cruel ill-
treatments inflicted upon, holy men ; of all the perse
cutions of the Church.
Nature, inflated with the belief of its own sufficiency,
knows nothing beautiful, nothing great, outside itself.
Following this as the only rule of its judgments, it
must of necessity despise all those whom it sees
making little of its endowments, viewed in themselves.
It must therefore despise Christians, who are the great
offenders in this respect. On the other hand, Christians
cannot come to terms with nature ; for they have
knowledge of other goods infinitely more excellent
than mere natural endowments. They feel that they
are powerfully supported by the Divine aid, nay, that
they are possessed of God Himself. Furnished with
this great gift, they see clearly how very small is the
value and how very short the duration of mere natural
good, and hence how foolish it would be for them to
seek to deceive themselves in their estimate of the
CHAPTER XXVI.
THREE DIVINE DECREES CONCERNING THE EXECUTION
OF THE FIRST LAW OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF
GOOD AND EVIL IN REFERENCE TO SUPERNATURAL
VIRTUE.
318. The antagonism between all that is admired
by the world, and what is called Christian piety, is a
well-known fact apparent at all times and in all places.
In the eyes of the world, this piety is the very
quintessence of all that is ignoble, weak, and foolish.
But God s decree is, that what is supposed to be ignoble,
weak, and foolish, shall in reality be the very power
that triumphs in the combat in other words, that the
invisible grace which is in man, shall at last triumph
over all visible nature, and triumph with all the pomp,
and, I would almost say, with all the eclat which it is
possible to imagine.
319. To effect this purpose, God from the beginning
would seem to have embodied the fundamental law of
which we have just spoken in three distinct decrees.
Of these the first appears to have been :
THAT THEY WHO OPPOSE THE JUST, MAY PROSPER
FOR AWHILE,, BUT THAT THEY MUST FAIL IN THE
END.
Open the book of history. You there see all the
kingdoms of the earth beginning, growing, and decay
ing. In their midst you see the Church of God, ever
3io On Divine Providence.
the same in her humility, surviving all mortal greatness.
From her very first appearance, in the most despised
and abhorred of nations, in the hands of a few poor
fishermen, followers of One Who had been executed
as a criminal, she proclaims herself destined to fill the
whole earth ! And yet no one derides so extraordinary
an announcement ; all take it as a most serious thing.
The great ones of the earth are alarmed ; the rulers of
imperial Rome put forth their vast power to annihilate
her. For three long centuries does the battle, or rather
the butchery, continue; and in all regions innocent
blood flows in torrents. The conflict over, whose is
the victory ? Wearied out with the slaughter of the
just, who do not resist, but allow themselves to be torn
to pieces as lambs by wolves, the Caesars are, one after
the other, punished by the wrath of God, and most of
them in a terrible way. The Church, in accordance
with her mission, has gathered as many immortal
laurels as were the blows struck at her. Laden with
these unfading trophies, she has always advanced, she
has made her way up to the throne, and received the
master of the world himself as one of her children ; full
of clemency, she has taken to her loving embraces the
descendant of the tyrants. They had been able to begin,
but they could not finish.
After this period, the Church s trials have not ceased,
for they never are to cease ; but the issue of all her
various battles is always similar to the first. Whether
she be again assailed by the cruel violence of brute
power, or by the sophisms and craftiness of the domin
ant philosophy, or by the obstinate malice of heretics,
or by the barbarity of the times, or by the licentious
ness of her own children, or by the hypocrisy of her
Three Decrees concerning the First Law. 3 1 1
indocile ministers, or by all these things together ; she
indeed mourns, she shows herself in a state of conster
nation, and anxious, more about her children than
about herself; all her enemies are shouting with
joy over her groanings, and trumpeting forth their
victory to the four winds : but wait. The suffering
one still lives, and firmly maintains the struggle by
her faith, her meekness, her unconquerable patience,
her prayers, and the offer of her blood. Ah ! lovely
spouse of Jesus Christ, cease weeping, be comforted,
and look around thee. Thine enemies are gone ; they
have passed away like a shadow of the night, they are
all buried in the earth, the food of worms, and their
names are either forgotten or held in execration. Thou
dost still endure, as full of life as ever, and the universe
proclaims thy triumph.
320. These historical observations imply that God,
from the beginning, disposed human goods in such a
way that His Church should always be furnished with
as much of them as she needed. Those who look at
events in connexion with their proximate causes, find
them, ordinarily speaking, quite natural ; for the
reason that was mentioned above, namely, that God
has ordained all things in the universe to be linked to
gether as cause and effect. Nevertheless, the fact of
this close connexion of all events being due to the
original arrangement of things, does not render it any
the less attributable to the will and ordinance of God ;
indeed, it sets forth in a more vivid light the sublimity
of His Wisdom in that arrangement, wholly directed to
favour the good.
The moral of these reflections is, that in the vicissi
tudes of human affairs we ought to admire and adore
3i2 On Divine Providence.
the unfathomable Wisdom, the ineffable Goodness,
and the ever present Will of God ; and furthermore, to
understand that there is nothing more foolish than
to take the concatenation of events as an excuse for not
adoring in all things the Divine Will, since this con
catenation is itself entirely the work of that Will.
321. The second decree would seem to have been
this :
THAT THE VIRTUE OF THE JUST MUST TRIUMPH MORE
FULLY BY MEANS OF THEIR TEMPORAL OPPRESSION.
322. We have already said that men, left to their
own devices, dispute and strive with one another for
the possession of temporal goods; and the stronger
and abler get the larger share (288, 290, 291). Such is
the law according to which these goods are distributed,
in the order of natural virtue.
But the introduction into the world of the new virtue,
the virtue of Jesus Christ, which aims at the acquisition
not of temporal, but of eternal goods, and relies, not
on the power of nature, but solely on that of grace,
brought with it a new law. Thenceforth to despise, or
rather, not to trust in goods of this kind, was to be
the means of obtaining them.
323. For this reason, wonderful as it may seem,
Christian nations will ever excel the other nations
of the world, even in what goes to constitute human
splendour, and this for no other reason than that
there is in them, on the whole, a greater degree of
detachment from human goods.
The Church, always humble and poor in spirit, and
her priests together with her, will be continually en
riched, in proportion as her ministers sincerely love
poverty, and exhibit a conspicuously disinterested
Three Decrees concerning the First Law. 3 1 3
magnanimity in the holy use of wealth. Such is the
astounding but inevitable course of things. Poverty
was chosen by Jesus Christ as the educator and instruc
tor of His followers. It is, if I may use the expression,
their primary virtue. They are distinctly commanded
not to be solicitous about anything, but to leave the
care of themselves to God, Who does not forget them,
Who in fact has thought of them even from the begin
ning of creation. This their superior wisdom which
fixes its gaze directly upon the designs of God, and
abandons itself to those designs with perfect tran
quillity, looking up to God for everything, because it
seeks His and not man s triumph ; this entire and
most humble poverty of spirit, is what must prepare
for them, and put them in possession of, those earthly
goods from which their hearts are all the while wholly
detached.
But the Church, besides teaching the world detach
ment from these goods by the example of her most
trustworthy children leading poor and mortified lives,
must also teach the right use of them. In this way
she must successively exercise and exhibit in herself
all those virtues which may be practised in the use of
the things of this world ; and although externally
possessed of all things, she must be as detached in
heart from them as when she had them not. Made
rich and mighty, not by men, but by God in Whom
alone she puts her trust, she must through the course
of ages fulfil the word of her Divine Founder : " I SHALL
DRAW ALL THINGS TO MYSELF," (l) that is, to the
nakedness of the cross.
(I) Jo. xii. 32.
3 1 4 On Divine Providence.
324. The third and last decree, which completes the
other two, may be expressed thus :
THAT THE VICTORY OF THE JUST, AND THEIR
DOMINION OVER ALL THINGS, MUST BE ENJOYED BY
THEM IN COMMON WITH CHRIST.
Since detachment from natural things is the dis
tinguishing feature of Christian virtue, and what wins
the victory over them, and leads to their external
possession ; it follows that the true Christian, feeling
his immense superiority over all the forces of nature,
must ever rejoice in external sufferings, and therefore
regard it as a great happiness to suffer, not only for
his own salvation, but also for the salvation of others.
Should he happen to suffer more than his own
sins require, he would certainly be compensated by
God for the excess. He would, in a way, gain a credit
with God, entitling him, after he has been himself
redeemed, to be a redeemer of his fellow men. He
would thus participate in all that belongs to the Author
of grace Himself, even in the work of Redemption.
What a transport of joy must the consciousness of this
sublime participation produce in the soul ! And this
joy returns, so to speak, upon itself at every instant,
and by this continual returning, incessantly renews
and multiplies itself! True, it is hidden from the
world ; but it is all the more precious for being hidden.
The profane understand it not: it is the ineffable secret
of the Saints.
CHAPTER XXVII.
SECOND LAW OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF TEMPORAL
GOOD AND EVIL : THIS DISTRIBUTION IS DIRECTED
TO EDUCATE MEN TO THE GOSPEL.
325. In order that the Society which is deputed as the
custodian of perfect virtue on this earth might uninter
ruptedly exist to the end of time, it was also necessary
that in the distribution of temporal good, ordained at
the beginning of things, God should have regard to
the weakness and infirmity of that nature in which He
intended to ingraft His grace. He had not to destroy
its constituent elements, but only to perfect it ; and
even this He had to do with gentleness through those
laws of His grace which I have hinted at above, and
which reveal, in the redemption of souls, a wisdom
similar to that exhibited in the creation of the
material world, where every thing is harmoniously
presented and developed by means of uniform and
regular operations.
Hence, the second fundamental law observed by
Divine Providence in the apportionment of temporal
good and evil was this :
TEMPORAL GOOD AND EVIL MUST BE DISPENSED
ON EARTH ACCORDING AS IS REQUISITE IN ORDER
THAT GOD S PEOPLE MAY BE EDUCATED TO THE VIRTUE
OF JESUS CHRIST.
Certainly, even grace follows in its dispensation
316 On Divine Providence.
certain laws assigned by God, and in large measure
hidden from man ; and in accordance with ftiese
man must be led to that virtue, wholly super
natural, which consists in a complete victory of the
spirit over rebellious nature. Now, this could only
be obtained by degrees, in proportion to the successive
development of nature upon which grace is ingrafted,
a development which is in great part accomplished by
the action which temporal goods and evils exercise on
men.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
THREE DIVINE DECREES CONCERNING THE EXECUTION
OF THE SECOND LAW OF THE APPORTIONMENT OF
TEMPORAL GOOD AND EVIL VIEWED IN REFERENCE
TO SUPERNATURAL VIRTUE.
326. God, therefore, seems to have made three mar
vellous decrees to direct the execution of this second
law also. The first might perhaps be worded thus :
THAT SO LONG AS THE TRUE BELIEVER, FROM WANT
OF SUFFICIENT INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT, IS UN
ABLE TO FORM A CLEAR CONCEPTION OF A HAPPINESS
ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT OF SENSIBLE THINGS, HE
SHALL BE BLESSED WITH DOMESTIC AND NATIONAL
PROSPERITY, AND THIS, IF NEED BE, EVEN BY MIRA
CLES ; THAT HE MAY THUS BE MADE CERTAIN OF THE
EXISTENCE OF A GOD WHO REWARDS VIRTUE.
327. This decree fulfils two purposes : the conser
vation and the uninterrupted existence of the society
of the just for all time, and the succour afforded to the
weakness and imperfection of individual just souls.
328. With regard to the society of the just, it
remained in force until the coming of Christ, Who, by
His blood rendered this society most pure and wholly
spiritual. After His coming, it is applied only to
individuals according as God in His mercy thinks fit,
in consideration of their particular needs.
329. Now, we must first of all briefly explain how it
318 On Divine Providence.
was that before the coming of Christ men of good will
required this sensible aid more than they do at present.
The secret for mastering the difficulties which are
presented to us by the history of the development of
human nature, of its needs, and of its errors, must be
sought in the law which the faculty of abstraction
follows in its progress. Man, who at the beginning
formed but one concrete whole, if I may so express
myself, became in course of time divided into many
parts. He had at first no notion of separating one thing
from another in his judgments. The farther back we
go into antiquity, the more simple and less marked by
distinctions do we find these judgments to be ; and it
does not require much power of observation to make
one see that the source of ancient errors lay in the want
of distinctions, ivhile that of modern errors lies in the
opposite excess. Accordingly, man at the beginning
could not abstract from sensible things, and fix his
thought on spiritual things only. The individual was
merged in the family, and when nations began to be
formed, there existed in them a singular unity very
closely resembling that of the family.
330. This oneness, and, so to say, concreteness which
characterizes man s thoughts and feelings at that early
period this indivisibility of the perception of himself
and the world around him, this inability to consider
things under one particular aspect only, nay, this
necessity of considering them in their entirety as they
stood before him and represented themselves to his
thought, without detaching from them any special
qualities or relations in order to consider them apart
is a matter which calls for our careful attention. The
more so, as we should not otherwise be able to
Three Decrees concerning the Second Law. 3 1 9
form a true and adequate idea of that primitive state,
from which mankind has been ever since receding,
and will ever continue to recede, in proportion as it
developes and progresses. Moreover, without this,
it would never be possible for us to know what kind
of being man is. His nature cannot be known by
considering it as it presents itself in some individuals,
or in a small society, or even in civil society, or in all
humanity together, if the examination is restricted to
one particular period only. For the innumerable
aspects, the aptitudes and the forms of which it is
susceptive and which it goes on successively exhibiting
and developing in the lapse of ages, are subject to end
less variations. At the same time, it always contains,
in its hidden recesses, new germs which cannot be
observed and recognized, until each one, in its own
proper season, shoots forth and grows up sufficiently
to be submitted to observation and analysis.
And as we do not perceive a germ so long as it does
not show itself by some little shoot or blade; so, on the
other hand, when we examine some small branch
put forth by this wonderful plant called humanity, we
forget the root of the plant itself; we neglect to go
back step by step till we reach its first germ, and
are thus enabled to conceive that state from which
its development began, and the knowledge of which
is, as I have said, necessary to give us a true insight
into all those conditions and modifications which are
assumed by a being so changeable and so complex as
man is.
Whence, in fact, so many vain and wholly inapplicable
theories, for example, on education and on social
government, but from a partial and inadequate
320 On Divine Providence.
knowledge of human nature? Man is studied in the
individual, and the individual furnishes but a scanty
number of observable facts. He is observed as he is
found in our time ; and it is supposed that he has always
been and always will be the same. But in reality he
has existed in so many states, all differing from the
present, that we do not even dream of them, do not
so much as think of their possibility. And in like
manner, being in continual motion, he will in course of
time assume other states, equally new, and such as
almost to make him seem of a different nature from
that of to-day. I grant that for conceiving useful
institutions it would be enough to understand the
present state of mankind ; but how could this state be
understood save by a continual comparison with those
of the past ? It is by comparison alone that we come
to notice the properties of things ; and our attention is
not attracted except by differences.
331. Again, whence so many false judgments
passed on the earlier ages of the world ? Whence that
incredible rashness in censuring and condemning as
base and bad whatever was done by our ancestors?
Whence that eagerness to discover in them the extreme
of ignorance and folly, and the very personification of
wickedness, in order that our own wisdom and virtue
(of which perhaps our posterity will make but very light
account) may be exalted to the stars by the contrast ?
Whence, in fine, that revolting delight which some men
seem to take in trying to make it appear that only a
few ages ago the human race had not attained to the
possession of even the most elementary principles
of common sense, but was little better than the
brutes, an offshoot of the race of apes? Whence,
Three Decrees concerning the Second Law. 321
I ask, all this ? Simply from that proud presumption
which does not care to take into account the divers
states and modifications successively assumed by man
kind, and forgets to consider that the manners and
institutions of men are good or bad relatively to the
state of mankind at the time in which they live. I
repeat : man cannot be known by studying him only in
that particular form in \vhich he is presented to us
by modern society. He must be studied on a far wider
basis. Our estimate of him must be founded upon a
diligent and impartial investigation into the most varied
conditions in which he has existed in this world, and
especially into that original condition from which his
development started, as well as into the laws governing
that first onward movement. Only by putting together
the whole of the facts disclosed by such an investigation
is it possible to judge accurately as to what would or
would not be suited to humanity at any given period.
In this sense it is true to say, as an able writer (i) said
of late, that not the individual, but collective mankind
is the competent witness of truth.
332. In fact, it is by the various states of mankind
that the materials of our most important judgments are
furnished; and no one can be better acquainted with
those states than mankind itself, which is the subject
of them. To what can man bear witness save to that
which he sees? As the writer just referred to has
wisely remarked, we must beware of confounding the
power of production with the faculty of perception. (2)
1 i ) The Abbe de Lamennais had not severed himself from the Church
when the Author wrote this. Tr.
(2) Ce n est done parce qu il se glorifie de sa raison que l homme
s egare, mais parce qu il se meprend sur sa nature en s attribuant ce qui n est
Y
322 On Divine Providence.
Does man perhaps create truth ? Does he generate
it from his own mind, form it with his own subs
tance ? Far from it. He can only receive it. He
is limited to the objects which are set before him
by an invisible force, which is not certainly himself
(85-87). Such as they are presented, he sees them,
enunciates them, divides and unites them. This is all
that his reason can do. His capabilities extend no
further ; and any attempt to go beyond this boundary
and produce a truth to himself, would be folly, I
might almost say a sacrilege. It would be imi
tating that experimentalist who should pretend, by
means of chemical operations, to increase the number
of the elementary atoms of matter which God has
created. The whole circle of man s knowledge, then,
is, in ultimate analysis, reducible to what falls within
the experience of his senses, or is conveyed to him by
other men through language.
This being so, how could man at the beginning
discriminate between the conflicting claims of body
and spirit, of the individual and the family, of the
family and the nation, of the nation and the entire
pas a lui. Dans son orgueil il confond la capacitt de connoitre avec la
puissance de produire. II oublie que son intelligence, purement passive a
Porigine, nalt et se developpe a 1 aide des verites qu on lui donne,
et qu elle ne possede que ce qu elle a refu. Doue du pouvoir de
combiner les verites primitives et d en tirer des consequences, pouvoir
borne comme toute action d un etre fini, il cherche en soi la certitude
ou la deniere ralson des choses, et ne 1 y trouvant pas, il commence a douter.
Les verites se retirent, la nuit se fait ; au milieu de cette nuit, il cesse de se
reconnoitre lui-meme, seul et fier de sa solitude, il essaie de creer ; il remue
d obscurs souvenirs, et croit peupler d etres reels son entendement desert,
parce qu il evoquedesfantCmes. Mais bientOt detrompe, las de ce vain labeur,
il ferme les yeux et s assoupit dans des tenebres eternelles." de Lamennais,
Essai sur PIndifference, etc. Chap. xix.
Three Decrees concerning the Second Law. 323
human race ? Certainly, not by his own spontaneous
and arbitrary movement, but solely according as
the occasions for making all these distinctions and
separations happened to offer themselves to him. It
is true that God, by teaching him a certain number
of words, had led him to mark with his mind the
fundamental abstractions (99-115). But these were
too few for his requirements; for the faculty of abstrac
tion had to be applied to all his life, and to the judgments
which he might day by day be called upon to pass on
things. He knew from the beginning that within his
mortal frame there dwelt an immortal spirit ; but how
could this first abstraction direct him in all his judg
ments on the value of things, or how could he draw from
it all the consequences which it implicitly contained ?
He needed for this purpose repeated experiences of
corporeal enjoyments and corporeal sufferings, and
thus to be gradually brought to perceive that
there was a good residing in the spirit alone, and a
happiness which had in it nothing corporeally sensible.
This was a separation from all that was most
closely united to him by ties of nature, of love, of habit;
it was a concentration upon himself ; a state, therefore,
entirely new to him ; since, till then, he had only been
able to conceive a happiness affecting his whole
nature, composed of body and of spirit, and not a purely
spiritual happiness.
The same must be said of virtue. Virtue presented
itself to man embodied in actions, either his own or
other men s; but what a long series of reflections and
experiences had to be made ere he could arrive at
a perfectly distinct idea of virtue in its inmost
essence of virtue, that is to say, wholly spiritual, and
324 On Divine Providence.
consisting purely in the free act of an intelligent will
conforming itself to the universal order of being!
No doubt he knew from the first what was virtue and
what was vice ; but he contemplated both the one and
the other, as I have just said, as they appeared in the
actions of men, without discriminating between that
which was material, and, as it were external in them,
and that which constituted solely their form. To enable
him to arrive at so high a degree of analytical know
ledge, it was necessary that occasions should be afforded
him of seeing actions which seemed virtuous, unac
companied by interior virtue that is, of seeing men who
counterfeited virtue ; or else that actions should come
under his notice, which, although resembling those of
virtue, or of vice, were simply (as in the case of brutes)
the product of instinct, and hence deserving neither
of praise nor of blame. It was also necessary that he
should meet with instances in which a man, in spite of the
purest and best intentions, could not extern ally perform
a virtuous deed. The occurrence of many such cases
would, by degrees, lead him to distinguish true from
apparent virtue, intentions from their external realiza
tion, until there remained in his mind the moral
element pure and simple, distinct from all external
adjuncts.
333. But if man had a spirit, the seat of virtue and
happiness, and a body which partook of both, he also
found himself in the midst of a family, with wife and
children, whom love joined with him in a union closer,
I would almost say, than that which nature had formed
between his own spirit and body. It was, therefore,
again necessary that he should learn to separate in his
mind the happiness and virtue of his spirit isolated
Three Decrees concerning the Second Law. 325
and alone, from that which diffused itself over
those cherished portions, so to speak, or extensions
of himself. Occasions must be given him of seeing
men who, although abounding in every thing which
goes to make up the temporal prosperity of a house
hold, were restless and unhappy ; and occasions of
seeing others who, while plunged in the deepest domestic
sorrow, as Job, for instance, found within themselves
an invincible spiritual energy which made them proof
against all misfortunes. Then, and then only, would
he be in a position to advert to the difference between
the temporal well-being of the family and interior
happiness, and to separate the one from the other in
short, then only would he be in a position to under
stand that this well-being was merely an over-plus,
and that the family was not essential to happiness,
but only a something to which that happiness ex
tended.
But let the family be multiplied, let its relations
increase, the ties which bind the individual to his fellow
men would increase in the same proportion ; he would
acquire a more extended existence I mean national
existence ; and this would create the need of further
abstraction. As he had to discriminate, first, between
the spirit, the seat of virtue and happiness, and the body,
which partook of both, then between the individual and
the family which the virtue and happiness of the individ
ual so intimately affects ; so he must now discriminate
between individual virtue and happiness, wholly
spiritual, as we have said, and national virtue and
happiness, which are merely an application and
extension of those of the individual. Having now
grown into a nation, he felt as if the nation were part
326 On Divine Providence.
of himself, and, of course, saw that a vastly enlarged
sphere for the exercise of his activity had arisen all
around him. He must, therefore, be led to perceive
that this new extension was not necessary for his
complete happiness ; that he communicated to it what
ever morality and happiness he himself had, but in the
same manner, I would almost say, as the sun which fills
with its rays the whole of the sphere in which it moves,
without that sphere being identified with itself. For
this end new r abstractions, and hence new experience
of a suitable kind were required. He must witness
cases of national prosperity largely shared in by men
who were all the while unhappy, and of men who,
without any such advantage, were quite happy and
contented. By this means he \vould come clearly to
understand that what belongs to the nation is a very
different thing from what belongs to pure truth, pure
virtue, pure happiness; as different as the modifications
of human nature are from what constitutes the common
and general basis of this nature.
334. Now, man cannot go through all these abstrac
tions in a moment, he can only do so successively and
by aid of repeated experience ; and the more so, as each
abstraction implies the one before it, since, by an
unalterable law of human intelligence, the whole series
of abstractions, from the lowest to the highest, must be
gone through in consecutive order. On the other hand,
if man were to pass over a single one of the abstractions
in question, his ideas of virtue and happiness would
not be entirely cleared of heterogeneous elements.
They w r ould remain more or less encumbered with
sensible things, with things extraneous to their
essence. Consequently, he would in the end have failed
Three Decrees concerning the Second Law. 327
to attain to a perfect knowledge and a purely spiritual
love of virtue, and to a perfect rule to guide him
to the possession of that happiness which endures
for ever.
335. But in order that mankind might have the time
necessary for completing all this series of abstractions
for meeting with suitable opportunities of observing
all these things separated from one another in reality,
so as to be able to make the requisite comparisons
between them, and note the differences ; and, finally,
for rendering these operations familiar to themselves,
and applying them to all the cases that might occur
a long course of ages was needed. Nor did they need
less time for bringing themselves into a disposition to
bear those trials which might be imposed on them
as the practical result of each consecutive abstraction.
Unquestionably, it takes man a long time, ordinarily
speaking, not only to develop his mind, but also to
acquire an habitual readiness to submit to hardship.
It is only by degrees that he grows strong in virtue,
and, following up the light made ever purer and
purer by his mental abstractions, so ennobles and
intensifies his love as to give it prevalence over sensible
impressions.
336. Love, being a rational act, presupposes know
ledge. So long, therefore, as men were not in posses
sion of a pure knowledge of virtue, they could not love
virtue for its own sake alone in other words, with a
love wholly spiritual. And yet, even supposing- them
to have obtained such knowledge, it does not follow
that their love could instantly be excited and raised to
a high degree of intensity.
Love requires a decree of the will; but when the
328 On Divine Providence.
will has decreed, love does not reach perfection all at
once. It requires time. It kindles little by little, until,
by continued fanning, it bursts at last into a flame.
So with the love of virtue and happiness wholly
divested of their accidental surroundings. First, a
thoroughly purified knowledge of their nature must be
fixed in the mind, and this takes a very long time. Then
there must come the volition, strong and determined,
and this also is a thing that cannot be withdrawn from
the laws of time. Only after this, that is to say, after
very protracted and oft-repeated acts and efforts, can
the love of pure virtue and happiness rise to that height
of fortitude which gives it strength to overcome all
the allurements of sensible things. Such at least is
the ordinary course which love pursues, if not in each
individual, certainly in humanity at large. A long
time, therefore, must have elapsed before it could run
through all this course, and so reach perfection in the
end.
337. But here it may well be asked : Was it possible
for man, furnished as he is with a nature so weak and
frail, to attain to such lofty virtue, to such predominat
ing love as you describe r
I answer : Not, certainly, by his own feeble powers.
The abstraction of virtue, even if it could be obtained
by man s natural mental force, is too shadowy and, as
it were, too aerial a thing, and man s heart would never
be satisfied with uniting itself in perpetuity to so
languid a phantom, in preference to the things
which he sees with his eyes, and touches with his
hands. Only the grace of the Redeemer could add
body and reality to that abstraction by showing in it
God Himself; only the grace of the God-Man could
Three Decrees concerning the Second Law. 329
re-invigorate the will and re-kindle the fire of an
immeasurable love in the frozen heart of man.
This operation of grace, however, went hand in hand
with that of nature, and assisted it. Like that of
nature, therefore, it followed the law of time. Its
successive steps are these :
338. In the first place, it aided man to purify
the idea of virtue from all things merely sensible,
to get quite rid of which it was necessary that man
should go through the whole series of the observations
and experiences which we have described above
a process of very long duration.
Secondly : A perfectly pure idea of virtue being
thus attained, grace could render it efficacious by
divinizing it ; for so soon as man perceived with
his mind the beauty of the Divine Reality which
was now conjoined with that idea, his mind would
begin powerfully to feel the force of virtue, and
to have a keen relish of its ineffable sweetness.
Thirdly: Man s will having now become capable of
a sublime love, grace could move it to determine
itself thereto, and could render it constant in its
action, and hence capable of actually producing
that most pure, unlimited, invincible love, of which
we have been speaking.
339. From all these considerations we can under
stand how it was that the God of infinite good
ness, fully knowing that human nature which He
had created, did not from the very beginning impose
on man so difficult a duty as that of abstracting
altogether from human goods, especially from paternity
and from nationality. He did in this as the wise
agriculturist of whom the poet sings :
33O On Divine Providence.
" Ac dum prima novis adolescit frondibus setas,
Parcendum teneris : et dum se laetus ad auras
Palmes agit, laxis per purum immissus habenis,
Ipsa acies nondum falcis tentanda." (i)
340. Did God, however, on this account, leave man
without the chance of practising virtue? Did He
deprive him of religion, of happiness, of union with
Himself? By no means. On the contrary, with
wisdom truly divine, He found the way of associating
with temporal advantages the sublime cult of sacrifice,
and making them all admirably subservient to the
same.
341. It is true that this could not be accomplished
except by a profusion of miraculous interventions.
For, if man had at that time seen his virtue receive a
merely natural reward, his thought could not have
soared so high as continually to view through them
that Supreme Mind which had disposed all things at the
beginning; since no occasion would then have been
afforded him for discriminating between the forces of
nature and Him Who was directing and sustaining
them. His faculty of abstraction required, therefore,
to be aided in this also by means of external objects,
in which he might see things separated one from the
other, and might thus learn to discriminate between
them when they presented themselves to him blended
together. He required to observe on the one hand
the action of nature, and on the other the action of God
(i) Virgil, Georg. II. 362 365. " In the time of their young growth
and their first leaves you should spare their infancy, and even when the vine-
branch is pushing its way exultingly into the sky, launched into the void in
full career, the tree should not as yet be operated on by the pruning-hook"
(Conington).
Three Decrees concerning the Second Law. 33 1
in the prodigies which suspended the laws of nature,
that so he might fully distinguish, first, nature from
God, and then, in the spectacle presented by nature,
w r hat nature did by its own forces, and what was done in
it by the Supreme Mind ; in short, that he might fully
distinguish the physical forces from the direction they
followed, in virtue of a wise distribution of all beings
made from the beginning of the world. Virtue and
vice were, therefore, at the time we speak of,
accompanied by sensible and often miraculous rewards
and punishments, in order that man might by these
means, as by signs and language adapted to his con
dition, be taught the excellence of virtue and the
contemptibleness of vice, and at the same time might
not attribute anything to himself, or to an unknown
cause acting in nature, but might ascribe all to that
God Who was surrounding him with prodigies.
342. Hence we find that God at a very early period
identified His worship with the vicissitudes of a
family, thus rendering it domestic. In the house of
the Patriarchs, this form of religion continued until the
people sprung from that house were mature enough to
form a nation.
Then God made His Religion national(\] that is to
say, He identified it in a wonderful manner with all
the interests and the vicissitudes of one chosen nation.
But when the minds of men had so far developed
that they could separate not only the interests of the
family from those of the nation, but also the interests
d) According to this, it would seem quite plain that the theory, "An
independent National Church, " is, after the coming of Christ, a retrograde
step of the human mind, wholly at variance with the law followed by God
in the training and governing of humanity. Tr.
332 On Divine Providence .
of the nation from those of humanity at large, then
man had reached the state of perfect maturity; "the ful
ness of times" had come, and JESUS CHRIST appearing
on this earth, announced a Religion wholly separated
from earthly interests, wholly spiritual. This Religion,
therefore, stands on a footing all its own; it is as
independent of flesh and blood as God is.
343. For this Religion, then, had men to be edu
cated by Providence; and Providence, to obtain this
end, made use of caresses and of stripes ; that is to
say, of corporal goods and corporal evils wisely appor
tioned. And herein it is easy to notice a second
divine decree which may be expressed as follows :
THAT SO LONG AS MAN S FACULTIES WERE NOT
SUFFICIENTLY DEVELOPED, THE SENSIBLE GOODS
BESTOWED ON HIM AS A REWARD OF HIS FAITH
AND OBEDIENCE SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO CONFIRM
HIM IN THE WILLINGNESS TO DO WHATEVER IT MIGHT
ULTIMATELY PLEASE GOD TO MAKE KNOWN TO
HIM, THOUGH HE COULD NOT KNOW IT AT PRESENT ;
THAT THUS HE MIGHT BE DISPOSED TO EMBRACE
IMPLICITLY THE PERFECT VIRTUE OF THE REDEEMER ;
AND SO OBTAIN ETERNAL LIFE.
344. In truth, God regulates temporal goods and
evils, as we can see in the Jewish people, in accordance
with the weakness of men, and with their greater or
less mental development ; yet always in view of the
great end of imparting to them spiritual instruction
and leading them to that sublime virtue which is
destined to vanquish all things. For, as we have
already observed, this height of virtue is not gained by
man all at once ; and hence grace is given him with
the same gradation which his nature follows in its
Three Decrees concerning the Second Law. 333
development. What God requires of him is, not to
regard nature as alone sufficient for his needs, and to
acknowledge his own absolute inability to be re
united with God without aid from Him. Now, this
reunion of man with God is effected by Faith in God s
word ; for, unless God had spoken first, man would have
had no means of raising himself up to Him. Grace,
therefore, is given according to the measure of Faith ;
and as the measure of Faith is proportionate to that of
revealed truth, it follows that Grace is given in the
same proportion as Revelation, (i) Accordingly, the
Grace of pre-Christian times was limited to enabling
man to expect the coming of the Messiah, and to accept
implicitly whatever He should teach ; whereas the new
Grace extends to enabling him to believe explicitly
what the Messiah has taught, and to rely firmly on the
fulfilment of His infallible promises. Pre-Christian
believers, therefore, were disposed to embrace, through
a kind of implicit Faith, that sublime spirituality which
the Messiah was afterwards to preach, but which they,
with the exception of a very few Saints, did not
understand, and which we Christians do understand.
345. How ingenious, then, if I may use the expres
sion, is the Divine Goodness ; how condescending, and,
as it were, self-accommodating to all the gradations of
human nature, to all the various states through which
this nature passes ! Two conditions were indispensable
for bringing about man s salvation after the fall of our
first parents. First, it was requisite that man should be
( i) For some explanation of what the Author merely hints at in this place,
see his Supernatural Anthropology, ("Antropologia Soprannaturale,") Vol.
I., Bk. I., ch. vii., Art. iii., 3, 4. Also his Introduction to St. John s
Gospel (" Introduzione del Vangelo secondo Giovanni "), Lesson xx. Tr.
334 On Divine Providence.
possessed of a virtue so pure as to involve the complete
sacrifice of his corrupt self, and an offering of all earthly
goods in satisfaction to offended Divine Justice.
Secondly, it was necessary that this most pure virtue,
wholly free from earthly accretions, wholly spiritual,
should form the one sole aim of all his actions, the
ultimate term of all his desires. But how could he aspire
to that which he could not even know, of which it was
so difficult for him to form an idea ? Must, then, all
those perish who have to live on this earth during all
that period in which their intellectual faculties are
not sufficiently developed to rise to abstractions of so
elevated an order ? By no means ; God found the way
to save man in all states and in all times, and always
through the humiliation of all human nature. In other
words, He found the way to satisfy those two great
conditions of human salvation. For, when humanity
is capable of rising to the abstractions of pure virtue,
He saves it by teaching it to make a sacrifice of nature
to God, as is done by the disciples of the Crucified ; and
during that period in which it is still unable to soar
so high, He saves it by infusing into it a readi
ness of will to do whatsoever God shall teach or com
mand ; consequently, to submit also, by implication,
to this sacrifice, so extremely repugnant to nature,
which the Divine Exemplar of men had first to offer on
the tree of the cross. This was the state of those
ancient just who were living in longing expectation
and desire of the Redeemer.
346. The third decree of the Divine Wisdom for
the fulfilment of the second law, of which we are speak
ing, would seem to have been this :
THAT SO LONG AS MAN S FACULTIES ARE NOT SUFFI-
Three Decrees concerning the Second Law. 335
CIENTLY DEVELOPED, HE MUST BE AIDED TO DISCRI
MINATE BETWEEN NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL
GOOD BY MEANS OF TRIBULATIONS APPORTIONED TO
HIM ACCORDING TO THE MEASURE OF HIS CAPACITY
AND OF THE GRACE BESTOWED ON HIM.
Indeed, it is by afflictions that God, to use the
language of Holy Scripture, is wont to tempt, prove,
and purify His Saints. These men of Faith being, on
the one hand, fully convinced that nothing happens in
this world save by the most righteous and adorable
Will of God ; and, on the other, seeing that their virtue
is accompanied by temporal reverses, conclude that
there must be reserved for virtue, in another world, a
happiness infinitely higher than any that could be
enjoyed in the present life. God confirms them in this
belief by His own infallible promises. In this way they
go on gradually rendering their idea of true happiness
more and more pure ; and at the same time, the expe
riences they make of the frailty of human and natural
things the joy that springs from the consciousness ot
their fidelity and fortitude, and that ineffable heavenly
sweetness which the " Spirit of all consolation" spreads
abroad in their inmost souls have the effect of detach
ing their hearts by little and little from all things
mortal, until at last they feel an utter contempt for
such, and cling as to their treasure, a treasure of
priceless value, to the naked cross of their Saviour.
347. The plain outcome, then, of all that has been
said above, is this, that the principle on which temporal
good and temporal evil are apportioned on this earth
is not the same for all classes of men. With the
perfect, God follows simply the first of the laws which
we have expounded (ch. xxv xxvi). With the imper-
336 On Divine Providence.
feet (and there are now many nations in this state,
nations which are being prepared for the call to Faith),
He makes use also of the second law (ch. xxvii xxviii).
As regards those men who rely exclusively on their
own natural resources, He leaves them entirely to the
action of the laws of human nature (ch. xviii xix) ;
but as regards those who dare to rise in opposition
to His kingdom, like a champion armed for battle,
He combats and brings them to naught (319).
ON
DIVINE PROVIDENCE
BOOK III.
THE LAW OF THE LEAST MEANS APPLIED TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE.
Ego SAPIENTIA quando prazparabat ceelos, cider am; quan-
do certa lege et gyro vallabat abyssos ; quando czthera
firmabat sursum, et librabat fontes aquarum ; quando
circumdabat mart terminum suum, et legem poncbat
aquis, ne transirent fines sues; quando appendcbat fun-
damenta terra CUM EO ERAM CUNCTA COMPONENS
et delectabar per singulos dies, ludens coram eo omni
tempore, ludens in orbe terrarum : ET DELICI^E ME^E,
ESSE CUM FILIIS HOMINUM.
Prov. viii, 12, 27-31.
ON
DIVINE PROVIDENCE.
BOOK THE THIRD.
CHAPTER I.
RECAPITULATION OF THE TWO PRECEDING BOOKS,
348. In taking up anew this work after an interval of
many years,* I must first of all resume the thread of my
reasoning by a brief recapitulation.
In the two preceding books, Divine Providence was
vindicated in two different ways, viz., by negative
arguments in the first book, and \*y positive arguments in
the second. The negative arguments were directed to
show that every allegation which man presumes to
bring against the supreme Providence of the Creator
and Ruler of the world is simply of no force in fact,
is nothing else than an exhibition of presumptuous
ignorance. The reason is, that the human mind, how
ever great one might suppose its powers to be, must
always, by the very nature of the case, remain incom-
* See the Author s Preface. Tr.
340 On Divine Providence.
petent to undertake such an enormous task as that of
judging of the government of the world, or of the dis
pensation of good and evil which the All-wise therein
ordains. The positive arguments went to prove that
evil, whether considered in its existence, or in that
distribution which we actually see, is in no way op
posed to the Divine attributes of Sanctity, Justice and
Goodness ; nay, when our natural reason, in dealing
with the question of evil, avails itself of the powerful
aid afforded it by the teachings of supernatural Reve
lation, those attributes are found to shine forth with a
new and most dazzling splendour.
349. As to the Sanctity and the Justice of God, it
seems to me that after the things already said, no
doubt or suspicion can remain in the minds of those
who have understood them. For the Divine Sanctity
is seen to be perfectly free from reproach, the moment
we realize to ourselves the fact that evil has nothing
whatever to do with the Divine Nature ; inasmuch as
it consists simply in a defective action of created
beings a kind of action so inherent in finite natures,
that these cannot be conceived otherwise than as liable
to it, whereas no such liability is conceivable in God.
Hence as God, because infinite, necessarily excludes
from Himself all evil, and is therefore holy and perfect
by essence, so He cannot create a being not subject to
fall into evil ; because He cannot do absurdities, and
it would be an absurdity to say, either that a created
being is infinite, or that it is free from that possibility of
evil which follows necessarily from its limitation.
In like manner, all allegations brought against the
Justice of God, on the score of the permission and
distribution of evil, fall to the ground as soon as one
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Book 341
grasps this truth, that the cause of evil lies in the
created natures themselves, and chiefly in those which
are possessed of freedom to do either right or wrong.
For, as justice consists in leaving to others what
belongs to them, so injustice consists in taking it from
them without their consent. Now, to suffer finite
beings to act according to their own nature, and
still more to act freely, is certainly not to deprive
them of what belongs to them ; therefore it is not
an injustice. And as finite natures, in consequence
of their limitation, are the cause of evil, so they
are the cause of its distribution ; since evil naturally
distributes itself by the same means by which it is
produced.
350. But as regards the Divine Goodness, I strove to
vindicate it by a longer line of argument. Nevertheless,
this theme is so beautiful, so grand, and so marvellously
rich in matter for thought, (i) that I cannot resist the
impulse to invite the special attention of the reader to
it again, in this third book. I think indeed that the
arguments already brought forward ought to suffice to
(i) It may perhaps not be uninteresting to the reader if we record here a
little incident that happened whilst this book was being dictated by the
Author at Stresa. The anecdote is thus related by the late Fr. Signini :
"In an afternoon walk with the writer of these lines, Rosmini suddenly
stopped (as he was accustomed sometimes to do), and after expressing the
intense delight he found in the beauty of the subject he had then in hand,
added these precise words : To do full justice to this subject it would
be necessary to write thirty books. I have in my mind the materials,
but how can it be done ? Time is so short, and there are so many other
things to be done! We must content ourselves with the minimum
possible. The writer would be sorry were any one to take these words
as a mere piece of random talk ; for he can certify, from his own personal
knowledge, that Rosmini, however warm his feelings might be, always
strictly measured the language he used in conversation." Tr.
34 2 On Divine Providence.
convince any reasonable person that everything which
occurs in the universe is a sign and a proof of the
Supreme Goodness of the Creator. But man is weak.
The truths expounded being of a very elevated and
wholly spiritual order, the bright light in which they
at first presented themselves to his mind may gradually
become dimmed by the distracting impressions which
sensible things continually make upon him, and, as a
consequence, the firmness of his adhesion to those truths
may diminish in the same proportion. My fervent hope
is, therefore, that it will be no waste of time to bring
forward a fresh array of arguments, and to lay bare
the futility of the last and most plausible of the
objections which can be urged in this matter; that so
the salutary truths under consideration may be more
firmly and deeply engraven on the mind.
351. This appears to me all the more important for
the very reason that the exalted idea which men form
to themselves of God and of His Goodness, is peculiarly
apt to lead them to expect from God certain things,
which, although they seem to befit a Being who is both
infinitely good and omnipotent, are, in reality, neither
good nor indeed deserving to be called " things" at all,
because they involve self-contradiction. This arises
from their idea of the Deity being too vague and con
fused. For example, it is no uncommon thing to hear
some such language as the following : " The Goodness
of God is infinite, and so is His Power : why then does
He not free us from all evils and fill us with every kind
of good ? He could do it if He would ; and how much
better for us all, and more in accordance with His
Goodness would that be!" This objection, which has
in it such an appearance of truth that even pious men
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 343
are wont to rebut it rather by an act of adoring-
faith than by the force of reasoning, I have not
altogether passed over. Certainly, it is most reason
able that those who believe in God should also believe
that He never can fail to act with infinite goodness,
even where short-sighted human reason seems to see
the contrary. But this was not enough. Convinced
that human reason itself, if it investigates with rectitude
and with perseverance, can, at least when strength
ened by Revelation, find the way to entirely dispel
that objection, and can discover that its source lies
purely in the ignorance and superficiality of those who
propose it, I made it my duty in the preceding book to
advance some arguments directed against such false
reasoning. Briefly summed up in another form, the
arguments were these.
352. The objection urged assumes that whenever
God sees that His creatures, left to act with their own
powers and in accordance with the laws of their nature,
are about to fail, He ought Himself to interfere in such a
way as to suspend their action, or rather, to keep it
steadily up to the mark, and so prevent that failure.
It brings us, therefore, face to face with the great
question of the intervention of God in creation, I
mean, of the application of that wholly supernatural
action in which God Himself is the immediate agent,
and the effect of which consists in modifying the
action of natural things. As the present book is to be
mainly devoted to the discussion of this question, with
a view to its solution, the reader will see why I have
called it hyper -physical (Cirep-tpuaixos}. In the preceding
book this discussion was only commenced.
353. It was there observed that all things which have
344 On Divine Providence.
been or can be created, are, because of their finite nature,
necessarily liable to evil. This at once disposed of the
allegation that the beings forming the universe ought
to have been made by God better than they are. For,
setting aside the fact that man cannot truly desire that
other beings had been created instead of himself or
that his nature were more perfect than it is (217 and
note), whatever the other substances in question might
have been, they could not have been free from that
liability to fail, which is inseparable from all that is
limited, and in which lies the origin of all evil. Then we
pointed out, as a necessary consequence of the same
principle, that, no matter how beings had been distribu
ted at the beginning of the world, or what kind of
connexion had been established between them, evil
could not have been avoided. From this we concluded
that the only way in which God, in distributing and
linking together the various natures which form the
universe, could have acted with infinite goodness and
wisdom, was by disposing them in such a manner that
they should result in the production of the greatest
amount of net good, that is, of good obtainable after
deducting from it the evil which it was altogether
impossible to prevent.
354. This, however, is not precisely the difficulty
of which we are speaking. What the objectors mean
is, not the intervention of God in the disposal of things
at the moment of creation, but the intervention of His
action in the universe already created. They pretend
that He ought continually to assist His creatures so as
always to protect and sustain them against falling into
evil. Such is the common objection, and it is against
this that our remarks must now be specially directed.
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 345
355- With this end in view, I made two remarks in
the preceding book. In the first place, the question
was confined to the good and evil of men ; because the
good and evil of those beings which have no intelli
gence, such as the material and the purely sensitive,
are not, properly speaking, good and evil, save in re
lation to man ; and also because the complaints which
men make against Divine Providence regard their own
evils, being in fact nothing else than the expression of
their grief. In the second place, I observed, that in
order to know whether the deliverance from evil
afforded to man by the intervention of a direct Divine
action would be of true advantage to him, it was
necessary first of all to know what human nature is,
what its limitations. These limitations were therefore
studied, with the result that man, constituted as he is,
could not obtain certain kinds of good, unless on the
condition of being subjected to certain evils. Whence
it was inferred that the screening of man from evil is not
always the act of supreme goodness which it appears
to be at first sight ; but that it is so only when it does
not entail the loss of goods which are more desirable,
or at least not less desirable than the cessation of that
evil. So true is this, that if man himself were
offered his own choice in the matter, and knew well
the relative bearings of those goods and evils,
he would unhesitatingly prefer having the two
together to being deprived of both. For, goods and
evils, pleasures and pains find in the soul a common
measure in which they are confronted together,
thus enabling man to strike the balance, with the
result that one sole feeling is left in him, of satis
faction or of dissatisfaction, according as he finds the
346 . On Divine Providence.
balance to be on the side of good, or on that of
evil.(i)
If this were not so, how could man rejoice, as he
often does, at a paltry gain which costs him untold
labour and toil? How could the merchant commit
his life and his fortunes to the ocean wave, and when
he has safely brought back his ship laden with a
precious freight, count as nothing the troubles, the
anxieties, the dangers, the sicknesses, and the thousand
other inconveniences which befell him during his long
voyage, fully satisfied with the addition he has made
to his wealth? Or how could that which the world
calls glory, a good which after all is more imaginary
than real, be held in such high esteem that many
hesitate not to purchase it even by death ?
It should be attentively considered that when the
brave veteran, for example, returns to his native
village, shows to his neighbours gathered around
him the scars of the wounds he received in many a
battle, and relates the hair-breadth escapes he had in
those bloody encounters, he experiences a pleasure,
the like of which, whether as to kind or degree, it would
be impossible for him to feel, unless he had really
suffered the smart of the wounds, and had by his
courage overcome the cruel fear of death. So, likewise,
(i) See the Author s work entitled Society and its Aim ("La Societa
ed il suo Fine"). Bk. IV., Ch. viii. There he shews how pleasures and
pains, although they appear so different in their natures that one would
hardly think it possible to find a common measure for them, are never
theless confronted, weighed, and measured together in the most simple
unity of the human soul, leaving man either satisfied or dissatisfied, as the
case may be. It is by this effect, of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and not
by pleasures and pains taken singly, that we must be guided, if we wish to
form a true judgment as to whether a man be in a good or a bad, a happy or
an unhappy state.
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 347
the fortune which one has succeeded in realizing by
industrious labour, patient endurance, long privations,
and careful savings, brings with it a peculiar delight
which could in no wise be felt in the case of even greater
wealth received merely as a gift, or as an inheritance.
The truth, then, is that there are for man certain
pleasures which are the fruit and consequence of
certain sufferings, and naturally so conjoined with
these, that it would be impossible, even for God, Who
does not do absurdities, to separate them. Indeed,
how could God cause a man to experience that joy
which he derives from the consciousness of being
the author of his own good, if he were not the author
of it ? How could He cause the millionaire to delight
in the thought of having accumulated his wealth
by his own hard exertions, and by his proving himself
superior to the greatest of difficulties, if that wealth had
cost him nothing ? How make the veteran to feel proud
of himself as, in his old age, he thinks of his former
prowess, of his courage and valour in the fight, and of
his steady endurance of the hardships of the soldier s
life, if he had never been in the ranks, and all his days
had been passed in the quiet retirement of a comfortable
home : Is, then, God to lead man into a belief of his
having overcome pains and dangers which have never
existed ? To suppose this would be to change Him
Who is by essence Truth itself, into a foul deceiver :
another absurdity. His Goodness would not in that
case be true goodness, because He would not be a
truthful God.
It must therefore be admitted that certain human
goods are only the effect of certain evils, and that
human nature itself is content to have them in this
348 On Divine Providence.
way, rather than not have them at all. And if human
nature is satisfied, why should there be any complaints ?
No, these complaints are not made by human nature,
but only by some individuals, who are not in this her
faithful interpreters, who do not consult her real
desires, but merely follow certain abstract and deceitful
speculations of their own.
356. Let it also be borne in mind that the necessity
of certain evils for gaining certain most desirable goods
is precisely one of the limitations inherent in a finite
nature. For, it would indeed be a vulgar error to
suppose that the concept of limitation applies only to
bodies. Every finite nature has special limits of its own,
and their quality and form cannot be known save by
observing each nature separately, how it is formed,
what are its endowments, to what laws it is subject.
Hence, as bodies have a limit of extension, so living
beings have their limits in the laws of feeling, which is
their constitutive form ; while man, a being composed
of matter, feeling, and intelligence, partakes of the limits
belonging to these three elements, and has, besides,
those limits which result from their relations, and
from the links, physical and dynamical, which unite
them together.
Whilst, therefore, the Infinite Being essentially
enjoys all good without limitations of any kind, the
good of finite beings can be had only with certain
fixed conditions. Thus it comes about that there is
for each of these beings a good peculiar to itself, so
that no other kind or form of good would be suitable
for it. This gives us the clue to the right way of
putting the question : "How God ought to proceed in
His treatment of man, or any other of His creatures in
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 349
Order that He may truly be said to act with infinite
goodness." It would be a mistake simply to inquire
whether God deprives a given being of any kind of
good, or allows it to be subjected to any kind of evil,
thinking at once that this is at variance with the
notion of an infinite goodness. The real points to be
ascertained are: ist. Whether He bestows on that
being the good which is peculiar to it, suitable to its
nature ; 2nd. Whether He bestows such good in the
highest degree ; and 3rd. Whether it would or would
not be possible for the same good to attain its highest
degree without having some evil mixed up with it.
Unquestionably, from Him Whose Goodness is infinite
we have a right, indeed we ought to expect a supreme
good ; but this good should be considered, not in the
abstract, but in reference to the being on which it is
bestowed ; since the good which does not suit a given
being is, for it, no good at all, is not desired nor willed
by it. Hence the question must be confined to
investigating what is the good peculiar to the finite
being of which one speaks, and how and when that
species and form of good may be said to be supreme
in its kind. It is precisely by applying this principle
to man that we find that the good peculiar to him
cannot be conceived as having reached its highest
perfection, save on condition of being preceded or
accompanied by certain evils which aid in forming and
completing it; and that therefore the existence of evils
on this earth, instead of derogating from the Goodness
of God, is a proof of it.
357. What is said here of the individual man,
is equally applicable to humanity taken as a whole.
For, as by examining the nature of the individual we
350 On Divine Providence.
discover that he could not obtain certain goods which
he prizes most highly, unless he were subjected to-
certain evils, whose negative value, as measured in his
soul, is vastly inferior to the positive value of those
goods ; so does it happen with humanity in general.
Man s nature could not fully develop all its faculties,
nor acquire a profound knowledge of itself, nor attain
to the summit of civilization, of the various virtues, of
prosperity in its several forms, if it were not exercised
with the experience of misfortunes, with the goad of
needs and of sufferings, with an incessant struggle
against difficulties, but above all, with that sublime
warfare a spectacle so pleasing in the sight of the
All- wise and All-good in which virtue, armed with
nothing but its own intrinsic worth, combats and
vanquishes material force, the might of the impious,
the crushing load of adversity. In another work,
I have undertaken to show that a government, to be
perfect, must tend to produce in the community ruled
by it a state of things in which human nature, 6n the
balance being struck between the sum of the goods
which it enjoys, and the evils which it suffers, shall be
found in possession of the maximum of net good, no
matter how that good may be distributed, even though
it should have to be accumulated in a small number
of individuals, and some individuals should, on that
account, have to remain in a state of misery, (i) Now,
(i) This most important rule, available for measuring the degree of the
goodness of a government, deserves all attention. See Society and its Aim
(" La Societa ed il suo Fine "), Bk. IV., CK. x.
[The Translators would much wish, if it were possible, to insert here the
whole of the long Chapter referred to in this note. They think it right,
however, to observe in particular, that by saying that " the maximum of net
good might even, in certain cases, have to be accumulated in a few in-
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 351
the one sole aim of Divine Providence is to direct its
government to the greatest good of mankind taken in
its entirety; and if such good cannot be obtained
without the loss of some individuals, the cause lies,
not in any want of Goodness in God, but solely in the
limitation of that nature which He intends to benefit
in the highest degree.
358. Such is the substance of the principles on
which in the second book I grounded my vindication
of the Goodness of the Supreme Providence; and they
all point to the conclusion that, although the Good
ness of God is unlimited, and therefore disposed to-
bestow every good and to remove every evil, human
nature is not unlimited, nor capable of receiving in it
self every kind of good free from every kind of evil, so
that it limits, if I may so speak, the Divine Goodness,
and prevents It from obtaining that fulness of effect
which It would otherwise produce. The truth of these
principles as well as their efficacy for dissipating the
objections raised against the Divine Goodness, was
rendered still more manifest by some special applica
tions which we made of them to man, and of which
the following is a brief summary.
359. These applications start from the following
general principle : " It belongs to the perfection of a
being to be itself the author of its own good."
This principle applies not to man alone, but to all
things without exception ; it follows from the intrinsic
order of being, and is therefore one of those which we
call ontological principles. It deserves to be attentively
dividuals," the Author does not by any means imply that it is not the duty
of a good government to do all that is possible, by legitimate means, for
securing the well-being of the largest number.]
352 On Divine Providence.
considered for this reason, that it gives rise to a new
condition for the action of Divine Goodness. In fact,
we can see from it that that goodness, to be supreme,
must not limit itself to bestowing good on man, but
must furthermore act in such a way as to enable man
to become the author and cause of his own good; since
if this were not so, he would be deficient in one of the
highest excellences of human nature.
360. Now all human good may be reduced to two
classes : moral good and eudemonological good. Man,
aided by God, may make himself in a way the author
of the one as well as of the other a prerogative dear
and precious to him beyond all others. For the Good
ness of God, therefore, towards man to be supreme,
and for it to correspond with the aspiration of man s
nature, it ought to bestow on him only what he could
not procure by himself, and to assist him in procuring
all that he can.
361. But the order of these two classes of good is,
that the eudemonological must follow the moral as its
necessary appendage. This order is an eternal law of
justice, and is itself an ontological principle, because
contained in the universal order of being. Indeed, it
never can be true that a being is well ordered and
happy, who possesses the eudemonological good alone,
without the moral, or who would make the latter merely
subservient to the former a disorder which would
cause the moral good instantly to disappear. Hence
it follows that the Goodness of God in promo
ting man s welfare could not be supreme, unless it
maintained this moral order unless it directed its
cares to render him, first, virtuous by moral good, and
then happy by the addition of eudemonological good.
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 353
362. Moreover, the same goodness, to be truly
supreme, must lead man to procure for himself a
supreme moral good. To know, therefore, how it
behoved the goodness of the Supreme Being to
proceed in its dealings with man, two things must
be inquired into: ist. What it was to do to render
man in the highest degree the author of his own moral
good; 2nd. What it was to do to make the moral good
so produced by man supreme, namely, the greatest
possible.
363. Now, as regards the first of these two things,
man is the author of his own moral good in virtue of
his free-will. Consequently, the goodness of God to
man could not be supreme, unless it left him free
to choose his own course nay, unless it left him
this freedom, or, as it is technically called, liberty of
indifference, in the largest possible measure; since
merit, supposing its other conditions not to be wanting,
is greater in proportion as man s liberty is greater.
Generally speaking, therefore, it was not fitting that
God in moving man to moral good should diminish his
liberty, by taking away or diminishing its indifference ;
at least in those cases in which such diminution would
not be compensated in the whole of humanity, or by
an increase in the sum total of moral good produced
in the universe.
364. As regards the second thing, namely, the
greatness of the moral good which man was to pro
duce, this increases in proportion to the greatness of
the two elements of which it is the result I mean : ist.
The effort made in obtaining it; 2nd. The Divine
Object, which is the only good communicated from
above to the mind and heart of man.
2 A
354 On Divine Providence.
365. As regards the first of these two elements, it
plainly involves the necessity of an eudemono logical
evil. For, the effort which man makes to be virtuous
is all the greater, and consequently the moral good
he gains by it is all the more precious, the greater the
opposition, whether moral or physical, which he has
to vanquish. By moral, I mean the opposition he
encounters from the inclination to evil which he has
in himself, and with which are associated the allure
ments of sensible pleasure, which also must be over
come; and by physical, the opposition arising from
corporal and temporal evils, which the practice of
virtue renders it sometimes necessary to withstand.
From this double opposition there accrues to man an
increase of moral good in two ways :
i st. By the effort he makes in overcoming pleas
ure and pain. This effort is an act of great love
towards morality, a practical homage rendered to the
superiority of this over other goods, which for its sake
are despised, a homage which terminates in God as
that Being Who is subsistent Goodness itself. Thus
the degree of effort which man makes in gaining virtue,
marks the degree of intimate union between himself
and the eternal principle of virtue. For, the moral
good acquired by man may be greater or less in
intensity as well as in extent; and the effort requisite
to acquire it heightens the first without increasing
the other, for the effort which virtue costs makes it
take the deeper root in man without necessarily ex
tending its growth ; without changing the species of
good, it renders man s union with it all the more
close.
2nd. The more man gives of his own, so to speak,
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 355
the more he sacrifices of his eudemonological good
that he may gain moral good, the larger credit does he
acquire with Eternal Justice, whose inviolable law is,
that he who suffers for the sake of righteousness and
in order that he may become possessed of it, gives,
and even throws away as dirt, everything he loves on
earth, shall not go without compensation. This law
of compensating and remunerating justice, rests on the
ontological principle that " Being under the moral form,
placed in opposition to being under the real form, (i) must
ultimately triumph over the latter and receive from it
infinite glory." Whence it logically follows, that he
who renounces a real good for love of moral good,
and, appreciating this immensely, is determined to have
it at no matter what cost to himself, must in the end by
his very loss be a gainer. If this were not so, if the
lover of moral good were, on its account, to be de
prived of the sensible good without advantage to
himself, moral being would not fully triumph over
the reality of merely sensible good. Hence it is
that Eternal Justice has a most abundant retribution
in store for the virtuous sufferer ; so that he finds at
last, that the good which he renounced in order to
acquire virtue was not lost, but exchanged for a
( i ) The Author distinguishes three forms, or modes, of being, the ideal,
the real, and the moral. By ideal being he understands being in as far as it
is knowable, or intelligible. By real being he understands being that feels,
or is felt, or that in any way modifies feeling. By moral being he understands
the relation of harmony or disagreement between real and ideal being. See
Philosophical System nn. 166, and foil. ; also Theosophy ("Teosofia") Vol. L,
nn. 147 and foil. It must be carefully borne in mind that all these three
forms of being are realities in the sense that they are true entities, and that
each really exists in its own form, though one could not exist without the
others. See nn. 384, 385. Tr.
356 O7^ Divine Providence.
greater ; and what is more important, that which he
generously gave (and it was God s gift), is recovered
by him, no longer as a gift, but as a wage, no longer
as a fortuitous acquisition, but as a credit of justice.
Thus that cudemonological good which for the sake
of moral good he had freely renounced, follows later
on in the very train of that same moral good,
wonderfully enhanced in dignity and splendour. Now,
what could be more delightful to a man than to
see himself encompassed with most precious eude-
monological goods which he knows for certain are by
Eternal Justice apportioned to him as his due, because
they are the fruit of his labours, and therefore in a
true sense his very own ? On this principle is founded
that proof of the existence of a future life alluded to
above, a life the mere hope of which causes the Chris
tian to experience a foretaste of bliss, even in this
world.
366. From all these things, the truth of which
cannot be called in question, it is plain that if the
Goodness of God was to lead man to the attainment of
the greatest possible good, it must place him, or per
mit him to be placed in a condition in which the ac
quisition of virtue would demand of him the GREATEST
EFFORT and the GREATEST SACRIFICE, always, however,
proportionate to his strength, and saving such other
conditions of the greatest good, as would either pre
suppose or entail some further diminution of that effort
and that sacrifice. The greatness of the effort would
fulfil that moral condition which consists in the intensity
of the act whereby moral good is sought and grasped ;
and the sacrifice, that is, the loss of eudemono logical
good, even although it did not cost any effort, would
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 357
also be of great advantage to man by rendering him a
creditor with Divine Justice in respect of the good of
which he had voluntarily deprived himself for the love
of virtue, and for which he must, as we have seen, be
abundantly compensated.
367. Now, that most noble kind of moral perfection
which man attains by effort and sacrifice, brings with
it many other advantages which he could not obtain
except by submitting to the eudemono logical evil
which is involved in the labour of striving, and in
privation and suffering.
First of all, in the great struggle which man sustains
for the sake of virtue, and in the deprivation of other
goods that he may gain virtue alone, he acquires an
experimental and most efficacious knowledge of its
sweetness and beauty. And since the highest virtue has
God for its object, he acquires also an intimate know
ledge of God Himself, finding by experience how con
temptible all other things are in comparison with God,
and how unworthy of being pursued by him, not
withstanding their apparent attractiveness; whereas
they who have no such experience cannot know this
sovereign good save by a kind of cold negative know
ledge, like that which one obtains by hearsay or by
vague rumour only.
Hence we find that God, in carrying out His great
purpose of training man to virtue, made use of temporal
evils as a preservative against the allurements of tem
poral goods, so dangerous to human weakness ; while,
on the other hand, He made use of temporal goods as
a preservative against the opposite danger to which
the same human weakness might be exposed from the
pressure of temporal evils in the earlier ages of
358 On Divine Providence.
the world, when man s mind had not risen to high
abstractions, and was still incapable of understanding
and relishing spiritual goods.
368. Another advantage which results to man from
a virtue gained by hard struggles and by sacrifices,
consists in the pleasing consciousness he has of his
victory. Aware of having vanquished all things, he
feels himself greater than all, and made like unto God
through that divine virtue which God has communi
cated to him, and by which he has conquered. Hence
a most exquisite and ineffable joy pervading his whole
soul, and together with this, that powerful feeling of
security which, as it were, places him, while still living
on this earth, in heaven, whence he looks down
contemptuously on the sensible world as by far too
mean a thing for him.
369. Passing now to the second of the elements from
which the greatness of the moral good man has to pro
cure for himself must be derived, we saw that it con
sists of God Himself in so far as man partakes of Him.
Granting the condition above mentioned, that
" man s moral perfection is not supreme unless he
himself be the author of it," it follows of necessity,
that the communication which God made of Himself to
man, in order to be such as to befit an infinite goodness,
ought to have been made in accordance with these two
laws :
i st. That God should place no limit to that com
munication ;
2nd. That it should be left to the free-will of man,
aided and strengthened by God, to draw to himself the
Divine good in however large a measure he might
choose.
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 359
Thus, in virtue of the first law, the communication
of good was, on the part of God, altogether unlimited,
infinite ; and, in virtue of the second law, man became
possessed of the Divine good by his own acquisition,
and could go on at will enlarging his possession up
to the fullest capabilities of his faculties, nature, and
efforts. God exhorted and stimulated him to do this
by the great precept : " Thou shalt love the Lord
thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul,
and with thy whole mind." (i)
Now, that the Goodness of God followed these two
laws in the dispensation of the Divine good to men, is
seen clearly in the work of the Incarnation, wherein
the Divine Word was personally conjoined with
human nature. In this way the Word Himself was
given to man and to all men as the great fountain, the
inexhaustible spring from which the Divine good can
be drawn without measure : and in the Eucharistic
Sacrifice, in the Sacraments, in prayer, and in super
natural works, man has so many means of marvellous
efficacy for producing all moral good and perfection,
without any other limit than that which proceeds from
the will and the action of man himself. For, the more
use man makes of those means, and the better is his
disposition of will, the more of this good and perfection
does he draw from the fountain.
370. These were in substance the arguments with
which in the preceding book I sought to vindicate the
Goodness of God in permitting physical and eudemono-
logical evil ; and they seem to me to prove conclusively
that this evil was necessary for enabling man to
acquire a supreme moral perfection, from which there
(i) Matth. xxii. 37.
360 On Divine Providence.
would most certainly follow every eudemonological
good ; and so the universe would obtain its most noble
and most excellent end.
It would be to no purpose to object that the necessity
of physical evil for the realization of supreme moral
good has no place in God, in Whom this good exists
without having been preceded or being accompanied
by any evil whatever. For it must be observed, as has
been said before, that in God moral good does not
exist under the same conditions as it does in man. Moral
good must not be considered alone, in the abstract,
but as it is in God, and as it can be in man. The
different natures in which it exists alter its conditions.
In God, moral good is the Divine Nature, God Him
self, eternal, absolute Act. In man, moral good is only
an accident ; it is not self-existent, but brought into act
(with the aid of God) by man himself. Now, man
cannot act otherwise than by means of his faculties and
energies, and according to the laws of his nature. If
then, in man, moral good is a production, one must
consider how it is produced and made to exist, and
we have seen that this is done through the acts of the
will, more efficacious and more perfect in proportion
as there is greater effort and sacrifice implied in them.
This is, therefore, a condition of human virtue, not of
the Divine.
371. But why did God permit moral evil also? He
permitted it, as was pointed out, because moral evil
also is a condition of a moral good which far outweighs
it in the balance. To the fall of man we owe the work
of Redemption, an infinite abyss of Divine Goodness.
It may be allowed that God could, even without the fall,
have become incarnate, a thing altogether in har-
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 361
mony with the essence of the Supreme Goodness and
thus have communicated Himself in a supreme degree
to His creatures, (i) But I do not speak of the work
of the Incarnation, but of the Redemption. Redemp
tion is the complete triumph of moral being over real
and intellectual being, in so far as this is separated
from it in the world of contingencies. Through
Redemption, moral being vanquishes and subjugates
real and intellectual being, which sought to dissever
itself from it, leading it captive as a trophy to grace
its triumph, and thus saving, elevating, perfecting it.
Moral being, which triumphs over the rebellion of real
and intellectual being, is the sanctity of God, the
(i) St. Thomas (S. p. iii., q. i., art. I.) proves in general the fittingness
of the Incarnation on the ground that God is the essence of goodness, and
that it befits Him therefore to communicate Himself to creatures in a
supreme degree. His argument runs as follows : "That is fitting for each
thing to do which accords with its nature. Thus for example, it is fitting
for man to reason, because this accords with his nature in so far as he
is rational. Now, the nature of God is the very essence of goodness, as is
shown by Dionysius (De Div. Nomin. c. i.). It follows that whatever
accords with the nature of good is fitting for God to do. But it belongs
to the nature of good to communicate itself to others, as is likewise shown
by Dionysius (Ibid. c. iv.). Therefore it accords with the nature of Him who
is the Supreme Good to communicate Himself to the creature in a supreme
degree : and that is done chiefly by His conjoining a created nature with
Himself in such a manner, that of the three things, the Word, the Soul and
the Flesh, one person alone is formed, as Augustine says (De Trinit. L. xiii.,
c. xviii.). Hence it is manifest that it was fitting for God to become Incar
nate." This intrinsic reason of the fittingness of the Incarnation is equally
valid whether we suppose man to have sinned or not. Nevertheless, we
cannot say for certain what God might have done if man had persevered in
the state of innocence ; for, as St. Thomas observes a little further on (Ibid.
art. 3), "Those things which, being above all that is due to the creature,
proceed purely from the free will of God, cannot be known by us save in so
far as they have been delivered in Holy Scripture, through which the
Divine will is made known to us."
362 On Divine Providence.
Sovereign Good, communicating itself to man despite
the obstacle placed in its way by man s sin. The
communication which God makes of Himself to sinful
man by destroying sin, is an act of goodness infinitely
greater than would be that of communicating Himself
to man in the state of justice ; and God, loving to give
full scope to this extreme effusion of His Goodness,
permitted sin. Nor was He content that such effusion,
such display of the infinite magnificence of His bene
ficent Goodness, should be His own work alone.
He would have man to be His co-operator therein, to
become, together with Himself, the author of his own
redemption ; following here also the great principle
referred to above, " That the greatest benefit which can
be conferred on man consists, not simply in bestowing
good on him, but in placing him in such a position
that he may himself be the author of that good." With
this intent "The Word was made flesh and dwelt
among us," and a Man free from all sin and assumed
into a Divine Person became the Redeemer of all other
men enslaved to sin ; and in order to redeem them He
died. This act of beneficence on the part of the God-
Man, and the Divine virtues which He practised in
accomplishing the same, are a good of such inestimable
value, that in comparison with it the evil of all the
sins of the world counts as nothing; and well therefore
might Infinite Goodness permit the fall which gave
occasion thereto. Nay, I will go further : in the just
balance of Divine Wisdom, the least moral good con
tained in the least of the sufferings of Christ must weigh
more than the moral evil of all the sins which jnen
have committed or which they could commit. Hence,
by occasion of the sin permitted by God, there was
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 363
given to man in Christ a moral good so overwhelming
ly great as to be beyond the possibility of calculation ;
so that, even if all other men were to perish eternally,
the Humanity saved and glorified in Christ would not
only compensate for that loss, but also exceed it in
value beyond all measure.
372. This, however, was not the only advantage
which Divine Wisdom had in view in permitting sin.
To the moral good which was realized and accumulated
in Christ through the merit of having given His life
for the salvation of the world, we must add the result
which followed from it, I mean the actual accomplish
ment of that salvation. For, through Faith in the
Divinity of Christ and in His saving power, and
through Baptismal Regeneration, sins are cancelled,
and men, being incorporated in Him, become partakers
of all His infinite treasures of good. Moreover, the
application of His merits which takes place in Baptism
is so steadfast that even the sins committed afterwards
cannot entirely abolish it. For, they who fall into
sin after being baptized, still retain the impression ot
that priestly character with which they were sealed in
Baptism, and which renders them capable of obtaining
the remission of their actual sins through the virtue
and the Sacrament of Penance.
373. They can also obtain from Christ, chiefly by
prayer, the grace of efficacious compunction, through
which they become in a certain way redeemers of
themselves. If the sinner had not been previously re
formed by the virtue of Christ, he could never be
converted to God ; for he could not perform any act
endowed with the virtue of satisfying Divine Justice,
of finding God, the Sovereign Good, and taking hold
364 On Divine Providence.
of Him. To be rendered capable of such supernatural
act, the sinner must be succoured by the power of God
Himself, and that power is administered to fallen man
by Christ in Baptism. Herein we have indeed a manifest
proof of the Infinite Goodness of God, and of the
Supreme Charity of the Man-God to His fellowmen ;
whilst men in turn knowing full well that they could
never have hoped to gain so great and so gratuitous a
gift by themselves, find in it a powerful incentive to
boundless gratitude, a most urgent motive for giving
glory to the Saviour. This is, again, an immense moral
good which it would not have been possible for them to
enjoy unless they had been first redeemed from sin.
Thus does the misery of sin prove once more, in the
hands of God, a source of gain greater than the loss.
Furthermore, Christian adults are bound to have, of
their own free-will, supernatural faith in Christ Who
is made known to them ; and the power of performing
acts of this faith was received by them with the baptis
mal character. Hence, although they do not by their
voluntary faith co-operate in impressing on themselves
that character, which is solely the work of Christ, they
co-operate in producing the fruit of faith, I mean their
full justification. But there is also another way in
which the baptized become, through Christ, the authors,
as it were, of their own justification.
That is, as I have said, by repenting of their actual
sins committed after Baptism. For, he who after
being baptized falls into sin, may still have recourse
to prayer, which will obtain for him the grace of true
compunction, and to the Sacrament of Penance. And
although the cleansing of the soul from sin belongs to
God alone, nevertheless it belongs to the sinner to
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 365
approach the Sacrament and to place himself in the
proper dispositions for receiving Absolution ; so that
it is true to say that, with the Divine aid, he freely
co-operates in the work of his own justification.
374. Nay, properly speaking, all that the Sacrament
of Penance duly received necessarily does, is to supply
what it would be altogether beyond human power to
do, and to give to the sinner the power of doing what
he could not do if left to himself; that is to say : ist,
To remit mortal sin by the infusion of sanctifying
grace; 2ndly, To remit eternal punishment; 3rdly, To
strengthen the sinner against relapses. As soon as
the sinner is freed by grace from mortal sin, he again
has the power of gaining supernatural merit, and is
therefore capable of practising the virtue of penance,
both expiatory and meritorious. Then the exercises of
penance, through the grace of God which accompanies
them, can produce two effects: ist, That of cancelling
the relics (reliquicz) that still remain of the sins re
mitted;^) 2nd, That of satisfying for the temporal
(i) The celebrated President of the Council of Trent, Cardinal Stanis
laus Hosius, in the excellent work in which he summarized the Catholic
Faith in the name of the Synod of Petricow, held in 1551, sets forth very
clearly this doctrine about the relics (reliquics) of sin, which often remain
after the Sacrament of Penance has been received. His words are : " Nor
is there a penalty alone remaining due after the guilt has been remitted, but
the guilt itself is not abolished by the Sacrament of Penance so completely
as not to leave behind it some vestiges (reliquice) to which a penalty is due "
(Confessio Catholiccs fidei Chtistiana, etc., ch. xlviii). He proves this by
the example of David, who, although he had been told by the Prophet
Nathan that " The Lord had taken away his sin " (II. Kings, xii. 13), still
prayed that God would blot out his iniquity and cleanse him more and
more therefrom, because of the traces which sin, although remitted,
had left in him. " David is not satisfied with the healing of his wound,"
says St. John Chrysostom (In Ps. to Horn. II.) ; he asks furthermore that
the scar of that wound may be removed, and that he may be restored to his
366 On Divine Providence.
punishment which remains due on account of those
vestiges, (i) The tears of compunction, the contrition
pristine cleanness " (Ibid}. Then the learned Cardinal thus proceeds :
"We see the same thing in Baptism, in which original sin is taken away in
such a manner as to leave some traces of itself, namely, those disordered incli
nations (fames concupiscentics), which it is necessary to mortify by pious
exercises during the whole course of our lives. So likewise with the
Sacrament of Penance : there remain after it, as a kind of evil incentive
(fames), certain vestiges of sin which must be purged away by salutary
satisfactions ; and this especially if the sin should have passed into a habit :
for, the more deeply sin has been rooted in the soul, the greater and the
longer is the purgation it needs. For, as St. Bernard says, sin may
be speedily washed away, but for the perfect healing of it a long
course of cure is requisite (Serm. de Ccena Z)om.)." In corroboration
of the same doctrine, he quotes several great authorities : St. Athanasius (de
Blasphem. in Spir. S.), St. Basil (Homil. de Pcenit,}, St. Gregory of Nyssa
(Orat : Non esse dolendum ob eorum obitumqui in fide decesserunt), Origen
(In Levit., c. viii.), St. Cyprian (Serm. De eleemosyn.), and others in great
number. Now, these scars which Hosius calls " relics of preceding sins to
which a penalty is due (quibus pcena debetur) " do not any longer fall under
the concept of guilt (culpa), because the free-will repudiates them ; yet
they fall under the concept of sin (peccatum), habitual and venial, because
the will still retains some inordinate attachment, to which sometimes it
does not even advert, and of which, at all events, it cannot divest itself at
once.
(i) The same Hosius, an authoritative interpreter of the Council of
Trent and its President, expounds, in the work above quoted, the doctrine
about the temporal punishment the debt of which remains after the
pronouncing of the sacramental Absolution, in the following terms : " Satis
faction is made by fastings, almsdeeds, prayers, and other pious exercises of
the spiritual life, not indeed for the eternal punishment, which, together
with the guilt, is remitted either by the Sacrament or the desire of the
Sacrament : but for the temporal punishment, which, as Holy Scripture
teaches, is not always remitted entirely (as it is in the case of Baptism) to
those who, ungrateful for the grace of God which they had received, have
grieved the Holy Spirit, and have not been afraid to violate the temple of
God." After referring to a number of weighty testimonies in proof of this
necessity of penal exercises, he continues : "The aim of such satisfaction,
however, is not to expiate the guilt or the eternal punishment ; for, to do this
belongs to Christ alone. He alone was made the propitiation for our sins,
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 367
and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world (I. Jo. ii. 2). He
alone by His death destroyed death; satisfied abundantly for our sins,
reconciled us to His heavenly Father. It is not, then, of this satisfaction
that we now speak, but of that which consists chiefly in those fruits of pen
ance to which Christ vouchsafes the name of justice (Matt. vi.). They
are : fasting, prayer, and almsdeeds, whether undertaken by us of our own
will, or enjoined on us by our Pastors, and the dispensers of the Sacraments.
When this satisfaction is made from the motive of faith and of divine
love, it extirpates the causes of our sins, it cancels the vestiges of sin, and
remits the temporal punishment either wholly or in part. Lastly, it is also
made for an example." This does not, however, detract anything from
the merits of Christ. On the contrary, it shows His supreme goodness in
rendering us, through those very merits, capable of satisfying in part for our
selves a gift which raises us to the highest moral dignity ; for by it we
imitate Christ Himself, nay, become partners with Him in the very work
of our Redemption. " True it is indeed " (continues the Cardinal), " that
Christ made abundant satisfaction for our sins by suffering so many
torments and even death itself. But does this mean that He suffered, that
He made satisfaction in order that we after falling away from that grace
which we being dead together with Him, had received in Baptism (i. Peter,
ii.) might thenceforth suffer nothing, do nothing for our sins ? Certainly
not ; but He gave us an example, that we might follow in His footsteps, that,
as He, clothed with our flesh, but entirely free from all sin, carried His
cross, so we also, contaminated as we are with so many sins, might cany
our cross. It is of this that He admonishes us by saying : If any man will
come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow Me.
(Matth. xvi. 24.) St. Gregory, explaining those words of Samuel to Saul :
Behold what is left, set it before thee. (i . Kings, ix. 24), says It was indeed
left, because Christ did not accomplish all that had to be done for us. For, by
His cross He redeemed all men ; but it remained that they who strive to be
redeemed and to reign with Him should be crucified (Lib. iv. in libros
Reg., c. iv.). He had in truth seen this residue, who said : If we suffer, we
shall also reign together with Him. (i I. Tim. ii. 12.) As if he had said :
That which Christ accomplished does not profit except those who accom
plish that which remained to be done. Hence Blessed Peter the Apostle
says : Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow
His steps. (i. Pet. ii. 21.) And St. Paul says : I fill up those things that
are wanting of the sufferings of Christ in my flesh. (Col. I. 24.) Nevertheless,
the penal satisfaction which man makes to Divine Justice has no value what
ever save through the merits of Christ and through His grace." Let us hear
the Cardinal again : " Here some one may say : Of what advantage, then,
has the cross of Christ been to me, if I must still continually carry my own
368 On Divine Providence.
of heart, the penal works, by which the penitent sinner
strives daily to purify himself more and more, receive
from the grace of God and the merits of Christ a
virtue of such excellence that the Fathers do not
hesitate to call it a laborious Baptism. (i) Now,
these acts by which man makes satisfaction to God,
amends, and, as it were, redeems himself from the
consequences of sin, are moral goods of an infinite
value, which would have been lost to humanity but for
the permission of sin. It seems to me that it would be
impossible for man under any other circumstances to
perform an act so excellent, to feel so vividly in
oneself the Goodness of God, to glorify and extol
God so highly, as is done by the sinner who is
converted from his iniquities. If, as we have seen,
man s moral virtue consists in a movement which
raises him up to the Supreme Good, evidently the
sinner redeemed and aided by God is the fittest subject
for the greatest virtue; for, the movement whereby he
raises himself up from the depth of his iniquities to
the summit of the Divine Sanctity, is the greatest, the
most powerful that can be conceived, and requires the
cross, as if His had not sufficed ? I answer : It has been of great
advantage. For, our cross would be of no use to us, neither should we
derive any benefit therefrom, unless the cross of Christ had preceded it, by
Whose merit our cross has all the value it has. Tn the same way also our satis
faction for sin would be of no avail, if it had not been preceded by the
satisfaction of Christ, by Whose death and blood those things which we do
in expiation for our sins are rendered efficacious and acceptable to God.
Thus it is manifest that all the benefit which we receive from our satisfaction
proceeds solely from the virtue, merit, and efficacy of Christ s Passion, the
source and foundation of all our good works, which therefore are not more
ours than they are Christ s, Who worketh in us and Who says : Without
Me ye can do nothing. (Jo. xv. 5.)"
(i) St. Jo. Damasc. Bk. iv., c. ix.
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 369
greatest effort and most complete sacrifice. In truth,
the sinner who is converted, dies, and is resuscitated
quite another man. This seems to me the reason why
Christ said that there is more joy before the Angels of
heaven upon one sinner doing penance than upon
ninety-nine just who need not penance. (Luke xv.)
This joy is felt also on this earth by all those souls
who are zealous for the glory of God, and to whom
therefore nothing is more gladdening than to see the
conversion of even one sinner. If we ask sinners
themselves who have returned to God with their whole
heart oh ! what language could describe the sweetness
of their tears? How delicious a balm soothes all
their austerities and penances! And if to those
who do not know their interior disposition they
sometimes seem pitiless and cruel to themselves, this
is because for them, sufferings, mortifications, the
satisfactions they offer to God, have lost all asperity,
nay, have become their most cherished treasure, their
daily food, of which they never tire. A heavenly light
gleams in their souls, and by that new light they know
God all the more intimately, the more they have
offended Him; they would almost annihilate them
selves in order thus to restore to Him that honour
and that love of which they have robbed Him;
their only grief is that they cannot do this to the
extent they would wish, and that all their affections,
all their efforts to love Him are no worthy compensation
for that love which they have denied Him, because
those tokens of affection are always less than He
deserves. Thus the keen sense, the profound and
experimental knowledge which true penitents acquire
of God and of themselves, the boundless gratitude which
2 B
370 On Divine Providence.
takes possession of their hearts, the vehement and
insatiable ardour with which they strive to restore
outraged justice, and to make atonement to their
offended God, are acts perfective of man, moral goods
of the highest order, which humanity would not have
attained if Divine Wisdom had not permitted sin.
Well, therefore, may the Church exclaim: O felix
culpa qu<z talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem !
375. But against this it will be urged : The infinite
goods communicated by the Redeemer profit only
those who are saved. Why has not the Gospel been
announced to every individual human being? And
why does God permit that many also of those to whom
the Gospel had been announced, and who have been
baptized and have believed, should fall into sin and
even be lost?
I answer, ist. It must not be supposed that they who
without any fault of theirs have not attained to the
grace of Baptism and of Faith, either because Christ
was not announced to them, or because they died in
infancy without Baptismal Regeneration, receive no
benefit from the Redeemer. For, although Christ does
not communicate to them the grace which raises man to
the supernatural order; it is nevertheless certain, as I
shall endeavour to shew elsewhere, (i) that He will
restore to them their body, and what belongs to the
order of the natural life, using on behalf of all the
power and dominion He has over all flesh.
376. 2ndly. As regards the fact of God not communi
cating the supernatural grace of the Redeemer to every
human individual, as also of His permitting the actual
sins which men commit of their own free-will, and on
(i) See Appendix II.
Recapitulation of the Two Preceding Books. 371
account of which many are lost ; the reason must
be sought in the principle which we have indicated
above (357) as the criterion whereby the goodness of a
government should be estimated. That goodness, we
said, to be supreme, must tend to produce the greatest
good of the creatures governed taken in its sum total.
Whether this good be accumulated or distributed, it
makes no difference, provided only that justice be
maintained equally with all. Hence, if the greatest
good could not be obtained without permitting certain
evils, it would be an act of supreme goodness to
permit them. Sound reason, therefore, requires us to
believe, that when the world shall have run its course,
the net result of good in those who are saved in the
supernatural order, plus the sum of good remaining
in those who are not so saved even after making
full allowance for the evils that have been suffered by
all human individuals throughout all time will give
a total of such magnitude as actually to constitute the
maximum of good which the government of Providence
could, consistently with the Divine attributes, obtain
in mankind. Hence we are also bound to acknow
ledge that the very sins which men freely commit,
together with the loss of the reprobate, were in
dispensable conditions to the attainment of so great
a good. How this could be, was explained in the
last part of the preceding book, where we saw that
Divine Providence directs all events to the perfecting
and the triumph of the Church of the Redeemer, which
is the universal means whereby God obtains the end
of creation, namely, the maximum of moral good,
followed necessarily by the maximum of eudemonolo-
gical good.
CHAPTER II.
OTHER AND MORE SUBTLE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE
VINDICATION OF PROVIDENCE AS GIVEN ABOVE.
377. Nevertheless, there remain certain objections
which seem to throw a doubt on the validity of the
vindication which we have so far given of the Divine
Goodness. These objections appear very ingenious
and subtle ; but on this very account one can see all
the more in them a manifest proof of the shortsighted
ness of human reason, which imagines itself to be
propounding subtle and difficult truths, when in reality
it is only endeavouring to mystify itself. Now, to
present these objections in all their apparent force, and
to expose their hollowness, will be the purpose of the
present book.
378. With a view to make it clear that God governs
mankind with supreme goodness, I began by laying
down the principle that "His goodness would be
supreme if it obtained the greatest amount of good
which human nature, all things considered, can be made
to produce." Then I went on to show that it would be
impossible for a human being to have any valid reason
for saying that this maximum of good is not actually
obtained, and hence for denying or doubting any of the
Divine attributes. In particular, it was pointed out that
from the apparent irregularities observable in the
government of Providence nothing can be concluded
More Subtle Objections. 373
against the existence of God, or in justification of the
complaints which men afflicted by evils utter against
Him. To demonstrate this, I observed that, of all the
species of good, moral good is the most excellent, and that
eudemonological good acquires the nature of complete
good only when it follows the moral as its natural appen
dix. After this I considered the elements from which
the greatness of the various kinds of good, but especi
ally moral good, may be gathered and estimated;
and the result of this investigation was, that, in order
to form a correct estimate of this greatness, one must
consider the good of which there is question, not merely
in the abstract, but also in its practical bearing on
man, in so far as man acquires it by the use of his own
energies, so as to become the author of it to himself.
The Supreme Good, at once moral and eudemonolo
gical, is God, the Infinite Good ; but since it is necessary
that man should unite himself to this good by his own
acts, should possess himself of it by the use of his own
energies (created by God Himself in him), and, on
the other hand, his acts and energies are necessarily
finite, it follows that he cannot possess himself of it in
its totality. Hence it must be held that mankind will
have attained the largest measure of good when, its
energies and its limitations being taken into account,
it has done all that it was possible for it to do.
Now, there is no proof that God does not obtain
this maximum of fruit from mankind. For, that which
would seem to show the contrary, when carefully
examined, is found to have manifestly the character
of one of the conditions which we have indicated as
requisite for the realization of the greatest good. No
doubt, it seems at first sight that man s moral status
374 On Divine Providence,
would have been more fortunate than it is, if, deprived
of liberty, he had been necessitated to act virtuously ;
but upon reflection we discover that liberty is an
indispensable condition for rendering man the author of
his own good. It seems also that it would have been
better if man could have been virtuous without any
effort; but on going deeper into the matter we find
that effort and combat are likewise an indispensable
condition of real merit. Moreover, it seems more
desirable that man should be able to practise virtue
without being obliged to make any sacrifice ; but here
also the truth turns out to be that upon sacrifice
depends the amount of credit which man acquires with
Eternal Justice, and of the recompense which he hopes
to receive. Again, a life free from physical ills would
seem preferable to one afflicted with them ; but the
truth is, that these ills are a powerful stimulus for bring
ing into action the best faculties of human nature; are
the means through which man becomes wise, and ac
quires experimental knowledge of himself as well as of
other things ; and finally, are the necessary occasion of
that sacrifice whereby the human will rises above the
external and material world, and moral being triumphs
over physical being. It seems that things would go
better with mankind if sensible allurements did not
draw men away, as they now do, from the path of right
eousness ; but reflection shows that this very temptation
is a necessary condition of a greater victory on the part
of virtue which overcomes it, and a field wherein the
virtuous man displays his heroism and learns more and
more to know himself and the relations he has with the
things around him. It seems, above all, most desirable
that moral evil should be altogether excluded from the
More Subtle Objections. 375
world ; but again this kind of evil is found to be a
necessary condition of man s greatest good, whether
because it gives occasion to repentance and conversion
of heart, which is the greatest prodigy of moral virtue
and of the Divine Goodness ; or because it becomes a
stimulus to the most exquisite sentiments of love and
gratitude towards God, sentiments full of unspeakable
sweetness ; or because the perversity of some indivi
duals immensely increases the merit of others, and thus
adds largely to the sum of the complex good of man
kind. As regards the eternal loss of the reprobate,
considering the Justice and Sanctity of God, this is the
inevitable consequence of moral evil ; especially if we
bear in mind that the moment of man s death is an
accident bound up with the whole series of events a
series, which, being regulated by the Supreme Good
ness, cannot and must not have regard to this or that
particular individual, but to that greatest amount of the
complex good of the whole human species, in view of
which good the said series is disposed.
Now, against all these arguments tending to justify
Divine Providence, the following very subtle objections
may still be urged :
379. ist. It is certain that God, without destroying
man s free-will or even diminishing it in the least,
can move it to moral good. It seems, therefore, con
formable to the nature of God, Who is the essence of
goodness^ that He should move the free-will of all men
to the greatest moral good ; and they would be none
the less the free authors of their own actions.
2nd. It is true that effort, sacrifice, and consequently
the victory over physical evils, serve to increase the
moral worth of human actions. But the greatness of
37 6 On Divine Providence.
moral good does not depend on these elements alone,
but also on the extent to which God, the supreme
object of morality, communicates Himself to the soul.
It follows that man could be abundantly compensated
for the moral good which he would lose in case he were
freed from the necessity of making efforts and sacrifices,
by a spontaneous and extraordinarily abundant com
munication of Himself on the part of God. In a word,
God can communicate Himself to man in any measure
He pleases ; He could, therefore, simply by using this
His power, enrich man with the highest sanctity, with
out obliging him, as He now does, to submit to the
painful ordeal implied in manifold struggles and
sufferings. And certainly thus to lighten the burdens
of human life would seem in accordance with Infinite
Goodness. What is said of moral good may be said
also of the eudemonological. God could amply make
up for that knowledge and that joy which man derives
from his combats and sacrifices, and his very repen
tance, by an immediate infusion of a knowledge
and joy more vivid and intense, though of another
species.
3rd. In the same way, God could save all men, and
even make them attain the highest degree of sanctity;
either by moving their free-will or by infusing sanctity
into them independently of their free co-operation,
or, finally, by givin g sinners, at the moment of their
death, a grace of such efficacy as to change them
instantaneously, no matter how great their wickedness,
into saints of the highest rank.
Such are the objections which are now to be answered,
and which I hope to solve in the most complete
CHAPTER III.
THE SOLUTION OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED OBJECTIONS
WILL BE GENERAL, THAT IS, ONE FOR ALL.
380. These objections might be answered in
several ways. For example, as regards the second, we
might rightly affirm that it leaves matters just as they
were. For, he who makes it, allows that, in his theory,
human nature would be deprived of that increase of
moral good which accrues to it from personal effort
and sacrifice; and this is the same as to concede that
mankind could no longer attain the maximum of per
fection of w r hich it is capable. In fact, assuming that
God wished to communicate Himself to man in as
large a measure as is conceivable, He could always
do this, and at the same time leave to man the
glorious opportunity of entitling himself thereto by
his own exertions. Consequently, the Divine com
munication in question does not exclude effort and
sacrifice on the part of man. These simply increase
man s moral good; or rather, they enrich him with
a species of good so different from all others, and
so peculiar, that it can in no case be compensated or
commensurated by any other; especially when we
consider that man, in virtue of his natural constitution,
is far more pleased with a good acquired by his own
efforts and sacrifices, than he would be if this same
good were bestowed on him merely as a gratuitous
gift (355).
378 On Divine Providence.
381. But to meet the said objections one by one, each
on a distinct ground of its own, is not the object of this
book. I prefer meeting all the three by the same
answer, but an answer which I flatter myself will be
found thoroughly conclusive by those who understand
it. It will be drawn from the laws according to which
wisdom operates ; and these laws are to be sought and
discovered in the very essence of wisdom itself.
To this end let us begin by clearly denning what
it is that these objections pretend that God should
do in order truly to be said to act with supreme
goodness.
CHAPTER IV.
THE ABOVE OBJECTIONS ARE DRAWN FROM UN
CERTAIN AND FALLACIOUS PRINCIPLES.
382. The men who raise the objections now
under consideration, would have us believe that God
cannot be said to govern the world with supreme good
ness, because He does not by His omnipotence move
the free-will of all men to choose the most virtuous
course; because He does not infuse into them such an
amount of virtue and grace as would amply compensate
for the moral excellence which arises from effort,
combat, and sacrifice; and lastly, because He does not
by His omnipotence save all men, at least, at the point
of death.
But I would ask these critics : Are you, pray, quite
sure of the truth of your assertion ? Is it really certain
that the rules of which you make use for distinguishing
the relative degrees of goodness are not fallacious r Is
the maximum of goodness so easy to determine as it
seems to you ? Or might not perhaps the measuring
of the height of the Goodness of God be more difficult
than the measuring of the distances of the fixed stars
from our globe, or the length of the rays of their light ?
For if this were so, and if you who so readily charge
the Divine government of the universe with being less
perfect than it might be, were not positively certain of
the soundness of the rules by which you gauge the
380 On Divine Providence.
highest summit of goodness, should you not rather
adore in silence, and leave matters to the judgment of
Him Who holds the reins of that government? For,
if those rules were even only uncertain, the objections
based on them would likewise be uncertain, and hence
would lead to no conclusion. As we observed before,
Providence remains intact and fully vindicated if it
only can be proved that the goodness which God
deals out to men may be supreme, although one may
not be able to measure it, nor be in possession of such
standards as are required for defining the conditions
which it must have in order to be supreme. (12) Surely
ignorance cannot form the ground of an objection, and
a wise being will not cease to be wise, because there is
an ignorant person who is unable to comprehend his
wisdom !
383. In truth, it is impossible to arrive at a correct
estimate of the Goodness of the Creator without at the
same time having an adequate idea of His Wisdom.
The reason is, that no one can act with supreme good
ness, unless he be supremely wise. A foolish goodness
is no goodness, since foolishness is already of itself an
evil. If a foolish man happens freely to do some good,
he does it, not in so far as he is foolish, but because
he is not wholly foolish; for if he were, he could not
be the author of any good. Vice versa, in order that a
being may be all goodness in his operations, he must
be all wisdom; in order that he may produce the highest
good, he must make use of the highest knowledge.
Consequently, the essence of goodness must lie in the
essence of wisdom : so close is the link between the
Divine attributes!
It follows, that the critics of Divine Providence with
Futility of above Objections. 381
whom we are dealing- cannot prove that the rules which
they pretend to impose on Supreme Goodness are
unquestionably true, unless they likewise prove that
the rules followed by Supreme Wisdom are the same.
Now, this is precisely what they cannot do. And
although, in accordance with the axiom of Logic,
asserenti incumbit probatiO) it is on them that devolves
the duty of making good their assertions, and until
they do this, such assertions are sufficiently met by a
mere negation ; nevertheless, I will not shrink from the
task of demonstrating that the proof in question is an
impossibility. I will, moreover, strive to show that the
laws which they would prescribe to the Goodness of
God, are not the laws followed by wisdom, but rather the
reverse. For this purpose, it will be necessary to start
with our investigations from the very notion of wisdom,
and to seek in that concept the principles according
to which wisdom operates by its very nature, and
therefore necessarily. This is the task to which I
now gird myself.
CHAPTER V.
THREE LAWS OF THE ACTIVITY OF BEING.
384. Ontology (i) shows us that being has a three
fold act, that is to say, exists in three modes.
Being in the first mode is called real; in the second,
ideal; in the third, moral,
385. Ideal being exists only in the real, and real
being which contains the ideal is called intellectual
being.
Moral being exists only in the intellectual.
Hence the human mind conceives three kinds of real
being: the simply real, the intellectual real, and the
intellectual moral.
386. Each of these three real beings has an intrinsic
order, and consequently an order in its operation.
Hence three laws governing in their operation the
three kinds of real beings.
387. The law governing the operation of real being,
considered simply as such, is that of causality, which is
expressed thus: "If anything begins to exist, there
must have been an entity which has made it begin" (a
cause).
388. The law governing the operation of real being,
in so far as it is intellectual, is that of sufficient reason,
which is expressed thus: "The intellectual being
(i) The Science of Ontology, to which the author here alludes, must
not be confounded with what has now come to be called Ontologism. 2>.
Three Laws of the Activity of Being. 383
does not act without an end proportionate to its
action" (a reason).
389. The law governing the operation o real being,
in so far as it is moral, is that of moral liberty, which
may be expressed thus: "Moral being tends to unite
itself to all the entity known, without being impeded
therein by any partial entity." (i)
(i) The moral liberty of which we speak here must be carefully
distinguished from meritorious liberty, that namely, which is the source of
merit. The latter, called also bilateral liberty (or simply, free-will) is only
a branch of moral liberty. Some among the moderns confine the name of
liberty to the meritorious kind alone ; but one does not see why the meaning
of the word liberty should, in opposition to the common custom of the
ancients, be thus restricted; and to pretend that it should, seems merely
quarrelling about words. Qucestio est de voce, remarks very justly that eminent
Divine, Dominic Viva (Proposit. III., Jansen., xviii.,) num voluntas solum
libera a coactione dicenda sit absolute libera. Multi affirmant, et in hac
acceptione D. Thomas dicit (Qucest. X. De Potent. Dei, art. II., ad 5m.) :
" Deus sua voluntate libere amat se ipsum, licet de necessario vult bonitatem
suatn, et tamen in volendo est libera . et in eodem sensu decent passim
Spiritum Sanctum libere procedere a Patre et Filio, ac beatos Deum amare.
Now, it is certain that the act with which God loves Himself, and with
which the Blessed in heaven love God, is holy, and therefore most moral,
although not free. Hence we here call moral that liberty which is necessary
to constitute an act as morally good ; and this liberty is not always meritorious.
The meritorious liberty must be free, not only from all coercion (coactione),
but also from all necessity. For merit is not the whole of moral good,
but only one form of it. There is a moral good which implies no merit ; and
such is the love with which God loves Himself, or that with which the
Blessed love God, although there is in it a goodness of transcending
excellence.
What I here call moral liberty must not, however, be confounded with
spontaneity. The latter has a far wider meaning than the former ; because
it expresses, not a power, but a mode of action belonging to various powers.
A real being also, by its instinct, acts spontaneously, and yet has nothing
moral in it. Again, an intellectual being acts spontaneously, without its
action being therefore moral.
Moral liberty, ist, is an internal principle of the agent, not an external cause
moving him to act. In this sense St. John Damascene has defined that
384 On Divine Providence.
390. These three laws governing the operations of
the threefold form of being are necessary and immut
able. But an explanation must be given of the sense
in which I call them necessary.
391. When I say that real being necessarily acts in
conformity with the law of causality, I take the word
act as meaning, not the primal act (actus primus) in
virtue of which that being itself exists, but its secondary
acts (actus secundi) by which it causes new entities to
exist. Here the necessity is absolute ; for a real being
could not produce any new entity were it not itself in
existence. A product supposes a producer.
392. When I say that intellectual being necessarily
acts only when there is sufficient reason, I mean that
unless it did so, its action would not be intellectual;
because an action, to be intellectual, must have a
reason which precedes it as its guiding light. Never
theless, because an intellectual being, besides being
intellectual, is also real, as was stated, it sometimes
acts blindly, without a reason, or without a sufficient
reason ; but in that case it is not, properly speaking,
the intelligence that acts, but the reality alone. Hence
which is done with liberty thus : Sponte id fieri dicitur, cujus principium
et causam continet is qui agit (de Fide Orthodoxa, Lib. II., c. xxiv.). This
does not suffice to constitute meritorious liberty ; because there can be no
doubt that the cause of the love which God has for Himself, is not outside
Him, but is His veiy essence ; nevertheless that love, although essentially
characterized by moral liberty and essentially holy, is not meritorious.
2ndly. Moral liberty is not found in all the internal principles of the agent,
but only in that which constitutes him moral, and which consists in the
tendency to good generally, to every good, to every entity (since ens et
bonum convertuntur), and hence to the whole of being. This tendency is
that primal act which constitutes the power of acting morally, and which
I have elsewhere called also by the name of moral instinct. But all this
will be seen more clearly from what will be said in the sequel.
Three Laws of the Activity of Being. 385
it seems that intellectual being is not necessitated to
act according to a sufficient reason; and this is true if
we speak of an intellectual being composed of reality
and intelligence; but it is not true if by a mental
abstraction we separate from that being its reality, and
consider it purely in so far as it is intellectual; for, as
such, it cannot act except on condition of following a
sufficient reason; without this, there is no act of in
telligence at all.
393. When I say that moral being is necessitated to
act with moral liberty, my meaning is that it is not
determined to its action by any external cause, inas
much as it is itself an internal principle tending to
unite itself to all the entity known, in which union it
finds its good, pure delight, joy.
Here, however, we must make a similar observation
to that made regarding the necessity peculiar to
intellectual being. What we call moral beings are
not purely moral, but are at the same time both real
and intellectual. Hence they do not always act as
moral beings, but they act sometimes as intellectual,
and sometimes simply as real. It seems, therefore, that
they do not always act according to the law of moral
liberty. Indeed, this is so whenever they do not act as
moral, but only as real or as intellectual beings. In
these cases they follow the laws governing respectively
the action of real or of intellectual being. But if by a
mental abstraction their moral entity is separated from
the other two, the necessity of the laws which we have
assigned to them is at once seen. For, to say that the
moral entity does not in its action tend with a
spontaneous movement to unite itself to the whole of
being, would be a contradiction in terms ; since that
2 C
386 On Divine Providence.
entity would then be wanting precisely in that which
gives it the name and quality of moral.
394. In conclusion, individuals which are simply
real, invariably maintain their own laws of operation,
because they stand alone and do not contain any other
form of being. But intellectual individuals, and moral
individuals, sometimes deviate from their own laws ;
not indeed because these laws have not, in respect to
them, an equally absolute necessity, but because in
them, being exists under different forms, each of which
may follow its own particular laws. For real being is
what individuates ideal being which it contains, and is
also what individuates moral being, which arises from
the active relation between real and ideal being ; so
that there is no individual, either intellectual or moral,
which is not first of all real, (i) Thus, the intellectual
individual has two modes of action ; one according to
the law of real being, and another according to that of
ideal being, because it is the result of the two ; and
the moral individual has three modes of action ; one
according to the law of real being, a second according
to that of ideal being, and a third according to that
of moral being, because it is formed of the three, which
are, so to speak, its component elements.
(i) How real being is the principle of individuation, is explained in the
Anthropology (" Antropologia "), Bk. IV., ch. i., art. v.
CHAPTER VI.
THE LAW OF VIRTUE, AND THE LAW OF WISDOM.
Recta ratio ipsa est virtus.
St. August. De Utilit. Credendi, XII. 27.
395. What, then, is the law of virtue ?
It is that of moral being, of which we have just given
the formula.
396. But why does not the moral individual always
follow the law of virtue, without ever turning to vice ?
Because, as I said, that individual is not moral only,
but also intellectual and real. It has therefore a three
fold activity, that is to say, the activity peculiar to
real being, the activity peculiar to intellectual being,
and the activity peculiar to moral being. Hence,
when it acts as a real being, or as an intellectual being,
its action may be opposed to the law of moral being.
397. But how is it possible that being under one
form should find itself in opposition with the same
being under another form ? Are we, then, to suppose
that being is at war with itself, and that there is of
necessity strife raging perpetually within it?(i)
(i) As it is difficult to explain the possibility of error in an intellectual
being, so it is difficult to explain the possibility of sin in a moral being. I
have elsewhere shown that in the human understanding two faculties must
be distinguished : the faculty of simple knowledge, and the faculty of affirma
tion and persuasion ; and I have also shown that error belongs, not to the
first, but to the second, which is in great part subject to the human will. See
The Origin of Ideas, Sect, v., p. iv. Treatise on Conscience ("Trattato
388 On Divine Providence.
No, certainly, this is not possible ; on the contrary,
being under its three forms is in marvellous accord
with itself, and the threefold law of its action produces
that primordial harmony whence all other harmonies
originate.
Why, then, I ask again, does the moral individual,
by acting according to the law of reality, or according
to the law of intelligence, happen sometimes to be in
contradiction with the law of morality ?
The reason of this is because the moral individual
della Coscienza Morale "), nn. 26-29. Philosophical System, n. 71. The
faculty of simple knowledge is produced in man by ideal being; but the
faculty of affirmation and persuasion is produced by the real being that has
come into relation with the faculty of knowledge which it possesses. The
book of Giuseppe Ferrari, entitled De Verreur (Paris, 1840), deserves to be
read, because it clearly sets forth the difficulty which philosophers have
encountered in trying to explain how errors can take place in an intelligent
being. In justice to myself, however, I feel bound to observe, that he is
mistaken in thinking that I contradict myself when I affirm, first, that men,
in consequence of being obliged to act, must, even when not speculatively
certain of the thing, make practical judgments which, without their own
fault, are sometimes erroneous ; and then condemn Idolatry, Materialism,
etc. It seems to him that, to be consistent, I ought, for the same reason
(of the necessity of acting) to have excused these errors also. But if he will
only be good enough to reconsider the matter a little,! feel certain that his own
perspicuity will soon make him acknowledge : 1st, That Idolatry, Materialism,
etc., are not practical judgments, but speculative errors, not at all necessary
for action ; 2ndly, that the necessity of action of which I speak does not refer
to the mode of action, but simply to action itself. For example, if I wish to
preserve life, I must eat ; but this necessity does not oblige me to make use
of one kind of food rather than another. In the same way, granted that
Religion is necessary to man, it does not follow that he is necessitated to
take a false and absurd Religion, such as Idolatry is. Idolatry would never
have appeared in the world, if voluntary vice had not darkened men s under
standing, or, as I am wont to express it, had not caused their faculty of
persuasion to assent to error.
A similar difficulty is found in explaining the possibility of sin ; and it is
this difficulty that I have here been endeavouring to meet.
The Laws of Virtue and Wisdom. 389
does not possess real being, nor, consequently, intellec
tual being, in all their fullness ; in a word, because it
is limited; and limitation, as we have seen, lies at the
bottom of all evil (293-295). When real being is
considered in all its completeness, its operations are
found to be entirely in accordance with the law which
governs the operation of intelligent as well as of moral
being. So also, if we imagine an intelligent being
complete in all respects, it will never in its operation
go counter to the law of moral being ; on the contrary,
all its acts will naturally be in entire agreement there
with. But if there is question of a limited real being,
and, consequently, also of a limited intelligent being,
then it may very well happen to place itself in contra
diction with the law of moral being ; not because its
operations proceed from a real or from an intelligent
being, but because they proceed from a real or an
intelligent being which is limited. This limitation it is
that causes it to act not fully in unison with the law of
reality, or of intelligence, hence in opposition to the
moral law which always aims at the totality of being.
398. Now let us apply all this to man, who is an
individual at once real, intellectual, and moral. If
his three activities the real, the intellectual, and the
moral were to act separately, and wholly indepen
dently of one another, it could not be said that they
were mutually at war. For example, the animal acts
which take place independently of the will such as
the circulation of the blood, digestion, etc. belong to
real being, which acts independently of, but not in opposi
tion to, the law of intelligence and that of morality, (i)
(i) In the supposition that man were naturally perfect, would actions
of this kind depend on his free-will ? My own belief is that his free-will would
390 On Divine Providence.
These three activities, however, do not always act in
an isolated way, but very often with a mutual relation,
both active and passive. In such cases, there is either
agreement or disagreement between them ; and what
produces the one or the other is the will y which collects
and unifies all three in itself. These principles of
action I have also called elsewhere respectively animal
instinct, rational instinct, moral instinct, (i) To say the
will, is the same as to say the./iitman individual; because
the will is precisely that activity which constitutes the
human individual. It is, then, the activity of the
individual the will which by its unity places the three
operative principles or instincts in close relation to one
another, and hence in agreement or disagreement.
The individual, as we have said, is always formed by
reality, the root of the other two modes of being.
Consequently, the will also belongs to real being,
which contains the ideal and the moral, which are
individuated in it. Again, the will is a power which
springs up in real being, through the intelligence
which is in it ; for the will is an activity whose action
follows knowledge. Now, knowledge can extend to
everything. Accordingly, the animal instinct, the
rational instinct, and the moral instinct, may equally
be objects of knowledge. Hence the will may deter-
have it in its power to suspend and to excite all the animal activities ; but if
the will were to abstain from interfering by its action, whether prohibitory
or excitatory, then the animal functions would continue, because their
proximate cause would lie in the animality itself. Even in our present state
the will can have more or less influence on these functions ; but they do not
necessarily depend upon the will ; hence they can be accomplished in us
without its intervention (See the Treatise on Conscience, " Trattato della
Coscienza Morale," n. 69).
(i) See the Treatise on Conscience, n. 66.
The Laws of Virtue and Wisdom. 391
mine itself to act according to the good that is presented
to it by the animal instinct, or by the rational, or by
the moral. In this way the human individual, through
the will, makes his choice as to which of the three
instincts he will follow in his action, and this choice is
what places these instincts in the relation of agreement
or of disagreement with one another, (i) It is not one
instinct that acts independently by itself; it is the
individual that chooses between the several instincts.
399. Having thus explained how, through the
unity of the individual or of his distinctive power,
the will, the three instincts are brought into relation,
and, so to speak, into competition, we must now go on
to investigate how it is possible for them to be mutually
opposed, and how the preference given to one may be
an injury and an outrage to the others.
To repeat what has been said. Being, entire and
complete in each of the three modes, could admit of no
war within itself, and so the three instincts would be
in perfect accord. But since, the real being which
constitutes the human individual, so far from com
prising the whole of reality, is only a very small part of
it, the result is that the instinct which springs up in it
is not that of real being in its totality. It follows that
the instinct of human reality does not tend to give
actuality and perfection to the whole of real being, but
(i) Hence St. John Damascene says that the act of choosing springs
from the mind: Harum (rerum) -vero electio penes mentem nostram est ;
nam ipsa (mens) actionis fans est et origo (De Orthodoxa Fide, Lib. II., c.
xxvi.). These words are an authoritative justification of the distinction I have
drawn between practical or operative knowledge, and merely speculative
knowledge. For if, according to this Father and St. Thomas who follows
him, the mind is the principle and source of action, we must needs say that
the first stamina, so to speak, of human activity lie in knowledge itself.
39 2 On Divine Providence*
tends only to give actuality and perfection to that
very small particle of reality which is in man. As a
consequence, the said instinct is found at variance
with the exigency of moral being, which always tends
to the whole, always calls for the completion of being,
always demands that every part of being shall form,
in due proportion, the object of man s recognition and
love.
400. But the origin of the opposition spoken of will
be more clearly seen by a description of the way in
which the law of moral being is constituted. Man, who,
when considered merely in what he has of reality,
appears so limited, when considered as an intelligent
being, stretches forth as it were, on the one hand, into
infinity, whilst, on the other he again presents himself
as confined within very narrow bounds. The form ( i ) of
his intellect is ideal being, which is infinite in extent.
This form, however, does not itself place him in commu
nication with real being, does not cause him to perceive
any reality (153). Reality, as we have seen, is given to
him in feeling, and in a most limited measure. If, then,
we consider man in so far as he is endowed with the
intuition of ideal being, his intellect has in it something
of the infinite ; for ideal being shows him the essence of
(i) Objective form, not subjective. Rosmini s ideal being (or the light of
reason] stands to the intellect that sees it, as the material light stands to
the eye on which it shines. In this Rosmini is fundamentally opposed to
Kant, who made all his forms come from the mind itself ; so that in reality
those forms were nothing but the mind which saw itself in the different
attitudes presented by them. Kant s fatal system, which radically destroys
the objectivity, and by consequence the intrinsic necessity and the unchange-
ableness and eternity of truth, is in substance the same as the system of
those who would have it that the intellect and the light in virtue of which it
is an intellect, are one and the same thing. 2>.
The Laws of Virtue and Wisdom. 393
being, (i) and gives him the formal knowledge of the
whole of being. But inasmuch as the reality and sub
stance of being is communicated to him in an extremely
limited quantity, the quantity only which he feels he
can perceive that and no more. It is true that from
those realities which he perceives he can by reasoning
infer the existence of other realities ; and it is also true
that the existence of other realities may through
language be made known to men by other beings who
are in communication with him. But in the first place,
the realities which he comes to know of in these two
ways, are not all the realities which subsist; and in the
second place, unless they happen to resemble the reali
ties which he has himself perceived, his knowledge of
them is a blank knowledge. It does not show him the
mode in which they exist; it only informs him of their
existence, and of the relations they happen to have with
the beings perceived by him. This blank knowledge
we have elsewhere designated by the name of ideal-
negative. (2) Thus the knowledge acquired by man is
of three kinds: ist, Ideal knowledge, or knowledge of
intuition, whereby man knows the essences of beings ;
this is always universal, though more or less deter
minate ; 2nd, Perceptive knowledge, or knowledge of
perception, whereby man knows the actual existence of
beings ; this is always particular, and very restricted ;
3rd, Ideal-negative knowledge, or knowledge gained
either by reasoning or from the testimony of others,
whereby man knows the existence of certain real beings,
(1) To say that ideal being shows man the essence of being, is the same
as to say that it shows him what being, or to be, is, irrespectively of modes or
of kind (See- Philosophical System, n. 1 8). Tr.
(2) For the very important distinction between positive knowledge and
negative knowledge, see The Origin of Ideas, nn. 1234-1241 ; n. 1416. Tr.
394 On Divine Providence.
but does not know the mode of their being ; and he
knows furthermore certain relations which they have
with the beings perceived or intued by him, and which
determine them to his mind. All this, however, does
not place him in communication with reality itself.
These three kinds of knowledge might be reduced to
two, namely, ist, The knowledge of the essence of
beings, and 2nd, The knowledge of their actual ex
istence, the latter being subdivided into positive know
ledge, and into ideal-negative knowledge.
Such being the case, I ask : How is the law of the
action of moral being constituted ?
401. It follows, as we saw, from the action of intel
lectual being, namely, the law of sufficient reason. Let
us see how.
First of all, we must be careful not to confound the
law of sufficient reason considered as a principle of action
and belonging to the practical reason, (i) with the
principle of causality. If a man acts, his action has
always an efficient cause ; for there is no effect without
a cause. Such is the law of every action in so far as it
(i) Here it is necessary to bear in mind the sense in which I use the word
practical reason, entirely different from that attached to this word by Kant,
and which I have defined in the Treatise entitled Principles of Moral Science,
("Principii della Scienza Morale,") ch. v., art. v. Now, as the ways of
knowing are two, the one speculative and the other practical, so the prin
ciples of reason have two values, the one speculative and the other practical.
I will explain. The principle of sufficient reason in the speculative order is the
cause conceived by the mind as the reason which accounts for the existence of
a given effect. But the same principle of sufficient reason in the practical
order is quite another thing ; it is that which renders the agent reasonable.
When a man has a good reason for a certain action, and determines to do it
in view of that reason, reason has then become the original cause of his action ;.
the principle of sufficient reason has been rendered efficacious, operative,
practical. Such is the law governing the actions of intelligent beings.
The Laws of Virtue and Wisdom. 395
is real. This efficient cause, however, is not always, in
itself, a sufficient reason for man. Indeed, sometimes
man acts in defiance of reason. In that case, he does
not render the principle of sufficient reason practical ;
it is not by this principle that his action is determined ;
consequently he does not act according to the law of
intellectual being.
402. Now, what does this law imply ? It implies the
necessity of acting for a reason. A reason is something
seen by the mind; to say reason, therefore, comes to the
same as to say cognition no matter in what way that
cognition may be acquired. Whether it be of the class
above alluded to as the ideal, or of the perceptive, or of
the ideal-negative, it is always a cognition, and hence
a reason for action. All things that are known to us,
therefore, constitute, relatively to our intellectual
activity, so many reasons capable of leading to action ;
nor does the mode under which they are known, cause
them to become either stronger or weaker reasons than
they are in themselves. For example, man is known
to us in the perceptive mode, and God in the ideal-
negative mode. The perceptive mode has a much
greater power ro set the human activity in motion than
the ideal-negative. Nevertheless, man s worth is not
increased, nor the dignity of God lessened on that
account; and these objects constitute a reason for
action, not in proportion to the degree of power which
the mode of knowing has to move and determine us to
action, but in proportion to their own intrinsic value.
402. But how is it that perceptive knowledge has
more power to move us than ideal or ideal-negative
knowledge only ?
The reason is, that in perception, real being is
.3 9 6 On Divine Providence.
communicated to us. Consequently the efficacy of
perception to set our activity in motion proceeds from
the activity of real being, which has the nature of
efficient cause ; whereas the ideal cognition, or the ideal
negative, presents to us nothing but a sufficient reason,
without that efficacy.
403. Since, therefore, reality is only the matter of
cognition, and not its form, it is plain that the action
befitting intelligent being is that which springs from
the form of cognition ; and this is equally found in all
the modes of knowing. It follows that the law of
sufficient reason in the practical order consists in
acting in accordance with the objects as formally known,
and not in accordance with the objects as materially
Perceived.
404. Hence, if a being were purely intelligent, that
is to say, if beings were known to him by no other
than formal knowledge, he would invariably act
according to the law of intelligence, namely, according
to the entity or worth of those beings, and therefore
according to a sufficient reason.
So also, if a being were to know all beings in the
same mode, no matter which of the three we have
enumerated, the mode of knowing would not then have
any influence in determining him to act in opposition to
the entity or worth of those beings. Consequently, his
action would always be directed by a sufficient reason,
because it would always be proportionate to the
entities known, and not to the different modes in which
they are known.
405. With these doctrines we are in a position to
explain how it is that the law of moral being proceeds
from the action of intellectual being, and that man
The Laws of Virtue and Wisdom. 397
sometimes deviates from the one as well as from the
other.
Moral being has necessarily a tendency to unite
itself to the whole of being, feeling pleasure and
rejoicing in it ; which tendency might also be called a
natural and universal love. Now, that which, properly
speaking, constitutes the moral essence, does not con
sist in the effectiveness of such tendency, but in its uni
versality ; it consists in accounting every being good
in so far as it is being, and hence a good all the
greater, the more there is in it of entity. I must
beg the reader to remember that in saying this I
simply speak of an ontological fact which should be
attentively and impartially considered. That " every
being is good," is a proposition having its foundation
in this fact, that " complete being loves itself," in other
words, that " there exists a Being Whom we call
complete and moral because He loves entity itself."
The existence of this love is the ontological fact which
we affirm : its characteristic is that this love has entity
itself for its own peculiar object, and therefore is pro
portionate to the degrees of entity, neither more nor
less. When, however, we say love, we mean something
rational, we mean, that is to say, that the object loved
is given to the principle of love through knowledge.
Now, speaking of man, we have already seen that his
only formal knowledge is that which extends alike to
all entity indeterminately, and, with their several
determinations, to all the bekigs known by him. In
other words, we have seen that of the beings which
man knows he always knows the formal part, but
not always the material part. Accordingly, in order
that his activity may be moral, i.e., extend virtually to
398 On Divine Providence.
all entity, and actually to all beings known, he must
follow formal knowledge^ that is to say, he must love
entity in so far as he knows it, quite irrespectively
of the mode in which he knows it. Man, then, acts
according to the law of moral being only when he
distributes his affection or love in proportion to the
degrees of entity contained in the beings known by
him, whatever be the mode in which he knows them.
406. But we have said the very same of the action
of intelligent being as such ; for we have said that
intelligence obeys the law of sufficient reason, and that
the sufficient reason consists in the beings known,
apart altogether from the mode in which they are
known. The question now arises : " Is the law of
intellectual action identical with the law of moral
action ? "
Such is precisely the case ; for an intelligence would
never act unless moved thereto by some affection ; and
this affection, to be really intelligent, must spring from
knowledge, must be an appreciation of the being known.
Now, being, in order to be appreciated, must be a good
to the knower; since the words good and affection express
two correlative concepts, so that good and affection
co-exist, and the one calls for the other in virtue of that
law ofsynthesism to which we have elsewhere referred/ 1)
Good and affection are the two distinct terms of the
ontological fact mentioned above. If follows, that an
intelligent being, either would have no activity what
ever, or else must have in him a principle of universal
love, which is exactly what is entitled to the name of
moral. Hence it is that we always distinguish two
(i) See Principles of Moral Science (" Principii della Scienza Morale "),
ch. ii., art. i.
The Laws of Virtue and Wisdom. 399
kinds of knowledge, the one speculative and the other
operative. The speculative knowledge has no action
outside itself; it rests in the ideas contemplated by it.
The operative knowledge is an appreciation and affection
whereby the knower tends to enjoy the being known ;
and this practical act of the intellectual being is the
very thing which constitutes moral being.
407. Why, then, have we spoken of two distinct
laws : that of sufficient reason, and that of moral
liberty ?
The law of sufficient reason governs both speculative
and operative knowledge ; but with this difference : In
the order of speculation, the inquirer seeks for a suffi
cient reason of the things he knows, and he finds that
reason in principles and in causes. When he has
found these, his mind is satisfied and at rest. Here
there is as yet no morality. In the order of action, on
the contrary, what moves the agent to act is, not the
desire to explain things to himself, but the affection
which inclines him to unite to himself the whole of
being by enjoying it as his good. This affection or
love it is, which, by adhering to the different beings in
proportion to the respective degrees of entity (which
entity constitutes their aptitude to be loved), renders
the sufficient reason operative, practical. For, a known
entity becomes a sufficient reason for the action only
because it is naturally loved, or, which is the same thing,
because it is naturally a good. The sufficient reason,
therefore, in so far as it accounts to an intelligent
being for what he knows, is one thing ; and the suffi
cient reason of his action is another. In the first of
these capacities, the sufficient reason is merely a light
to the mind ; in the second, it is a principle of action ;
400 On Divine Providence.
and it is only when considered in reference to this
latter capacity, that the law of sufficient reason identi
fies itself with the law of morality. No sooner is the
intelligence accompanied by affection, no sooner does
an object present itself as lovable, than the intelligent
being becomes active by an action determined by the
degrees of the entity known, and these degrees become
the sufficient reason for his acting morally : morality
then exists in intelligence. Thus, sufficient reason is
changed into moral liberty the instant that it becomes
operative.
408. Hence the law of moral being receives a two
fold descrimination. When considered in so far as it
is an active principle independent of the modes of
knowing and of the instincts of reality, it is called
moral liberty; and when considered in the universality
of the moral affection which distributes itself according
to the worth of the beings known, it is called practical
sufficient reason.
409. Here again we can see how it is that man,
although by nature a moral being, may deviate from
the law of morality and contradict it by his actions.
This is owing to the same reason for which we said that
an intellectual being may deviate from the law of in
telligence ; since it is one sole deviation with two
different relations, the one a relation to mere know
ledge, and the other a relation to complacency in the
entity known ; so that sin is, in fact, practical error. As
therefore an intelligent being, if he were intelligent
only, would never deviate from the law of intelligence
(404 ; so a moral being, if he were moral only, would
never act otherwise than morally. Man, however,
besides being intelligent and moral, is also real, and
The Laws of Virtue and Wisdom. 401
reality furnishes him with the matter of his cognitions ;
hence it comes to pass that his cognitions are, in part,
materiated or perceptive, and, in part, free from mat
ter and purely formal. Now, pure formal cognition is
what constitutes the sufficient reason of intellectual
and moral action, because it is by it alone that beings
are known as they are in themselves. But materiated
or perceptive cognitions disturb in man the order of
beings as known formally in themselves, by impelling
him to act, not according to that order, but accord
ing to the stimulus of the reality. Hence a struggle
in man, invited on the one hand by the noble instinct
of his moral nature to act conformably to the worth of
beings as known by formal knowledge, and on the
other violently drawn to act contrariwise, by the in
stinct of that limited portion of reality which is per
ceived by him, and which cares for nothing but its own
satisfaction.
410. Between these two contending instincts there
sits as arbiter the will, which, as we have said, is the
radical activity of the individual human subject as
such, (i) This activity differs from the three instincts
above enumerated as the individual subject differs from
the three entities ; that is to say, it differs mentally from
the real entity, from the intellectual entity, and from the
moral entity. It does not, however, properly speaking,
(i) This may serve to explain the following passage of St. Hilary : Trio,
tantum in homine reperimus, id est corpus et animam et -voluntatem. Nam
ut corpori anima data est ; ita et potestas utrique utendise ut vellet, indulta
est (In Matth. x. 20). In distinguishing the will from the body and from
the soul, he points out the will as a power capable of making use, at
pleasure, either of the animal instinct, which comes from the corporeal
reality, or of the intellectual and moral instinct with which the soul is
endowed.
2 D
402 On Divine Providence.
constitute a fourth entity. It is simply the union of
the three, which springing from the unity of real being,
as from their root, are first threefold, and then unified
in moral being as in their perfection. Thus the will is
the activity of being existing in moral intelligence. It
belongs, therefore, to the individual, to his will, to
decide in the struggle of which we speak, either in
favour of the intellectual and moral law which sum
mons him to act in accordance with beings as known
formally, or in favour of the law of real being,
which impels him to act in accordance with beings
materially known, that is, in accordance with mere feel
ing and instinct. When the will decides in favour of
the moral instinct, it becomes one with it, simply add
ing to its force ; when it decides in favour of the real
instinct, it likewise identifies itself with it ; and it is
thus that sin arises. The will is a force of the indi
vidual, which each of the two contrary instincts seeks
to attract and keep to itself. Nevertheless, it often
happens that neither of them succeeds, and then the
will remains in the state of bilateral liberty, or liberty
of indifference. But if either of these instincts attracts
the will to such a degree as entirely to control its
activity, then the individual wills and does good or evil
necessarily (although spontaneously) and hence with
out either merit or demerit. Such is the state of the
blessed in heaven and of the reprobate in hell.
We are now enabled to define precisely what the law
of virtue is and what the law of wisdom.
411. The law of virtue is : " Always act in conform
ity with the law of moral being."
412. The law of wisdom is: "Always act in con
formity with the law of intellectual being."
The Laws of Virtue and Wisdom.. 403
413. The law of virtue, therefore, is that of moral
liberty, in virtue of which man does not allow himself
to be controlled either by the instinct of limited real
being, or by the instinct of intellectual being limited
by materiated knowledge, in opposition to formal
knowledge.
The law of wisdom is that of sufficient reason, in
virtue of which man does not allow himself to be moved
by any efficient cause, without an adequate reason.
414. Accordingly, the law of moral being becomes
the law of virtue, when it is viewed in reference to the
possibility of man s deviating from virtue by allowing
his actions to be determined by the impression he
receives from the force peculiar to reality, either alone,
or joined with materiated knowledge, and it can be so
viewed because man is an agent at once real, intel
lectual, and moral.
The law of intellectual being becomes the law of wisdom,
when it is viewed in reference to the possibility of
man s deviating from wisdom, by likewise allowing
his actions to be determined by materiated knowledge,
in so far as this is influenced by the force peculiar to
reality, in opposition to the true worth of beings as
shown him in the pure light of formal knowledge.
415. Here, then, we see how the law of virtue and
the law of wisdom are closely conjoined, and result, in
fact, in one and the same law ; and we also see why
wisdom was taken by all antiquity to signify a virtuous
knowing, the foundation of virtue, virtue itself in its
full completion.
416. Let us now return to the object to which all
that we have said in this long chapter was directed.
We wished to vindicate the Providence and the Good-
404 On Divine Providence.
ness of God against the three objections last set forth
(379). With this intent, we have shown :
i st. That the law of virtue is the same as the law
of wisdom ;
2ndly. That the law of wisdom is the same as the
law of sufficient reason ;
3rdly. That therefore the law of sufficient reason
and the law of virtue are but one and the
same law.
From this it plainly followed, that if a being were
to act without sufficient reason, he would be neither
wise nor virtuous. Hence we concluded, that the said
objections would at once appear to be futile if it could
only be shown that he who makes them does not judge
of the Divine Goodness according to a true and certain
rule, which can be no other than the law of wisdom.
For, in that case there would be no valid ground for
affirming that there is a sufficient reason why God
should either move the free-will of all men so as to
make them all attain to supreme good ; or communicate
Himself to them in so exuberant a measure as to dis
pense them from all effort and all sacrifice without at
the same time subjecting them to any loss of virtue ;
or, at least, by His omnipotent action convert all
obstinate sinners at the moment of death, and thus
save them from hell. For, unless it be shown that God,
by omitting to do these things, goes against the law
of sufficient reason, it will never be proved that He
fails either in wisdom or in virtue, or in goodness;
and so the objections remain without any weight. Now,
that this sufficient reason cannot be found and con
sequently that the objections in question are entirely
devoid of force, will be seen by what is to follow.
CHAPTER VII.
HOW THE LAW OF SUFFICIENT REASON MAY BE
IDENTIFIED WITH THE LAW OF THE LEAS7 J
MEANS.
Sapiens operator perficit opus suum breviori via qua potest.
St. Thomas, Sumtna, p. iii., q. iv., art. v.
417. The law of sufficient reason, then, considered
as the law of practical reason (407), is the law according
to which wisdom operates. We must now reduce this
sovereign law to another formula of equal value, by
showing that it is the same as the law of the least
means in other words, that the law of the least means
is identical with that law of sufficient reason, which
wisdom necessarily follows in determining the quantity
of action and of the means to be employed in its
operations. That the identity of the two formulae may
be clearly seen, I invite attention to the following
reflections.
418. When a wise person thinks about doing a
certain thing, he puts three questions to himself:
i st. Shall I do this thing, or shall I not ?
2nd. What do I aim at in doing it r
3rd. Hoiv shall I proceed in order that I may
realize my aim ?
The answer to these questions can be affirmative
only when he sees a sufficient reason for each affir
mation.
419. The sufficient reason which governs the
406 On Divine Providence.
actions of a wise being is, therefore, threefold that is
to say, he must in every action he does follow three
sufficient reasons.
A sufficient reason must determine him to decide
on acting rather than on not acting.
A second sufficient reason must determine him in
acting to aim at one result rather than at
another.
A third sufficient reason must determine him to
proceed to the attainment of this result in one
way rather than in another, by certain means
rather than by others.
420. These reasons, taken abstractly, are three, but
in the order of facts, they constitute only one complex
reason ; for if any one of them were wanting, a wise
being would not have that truly sufficient reason which
causes him to act.
421. In the preceding chapter we have said that
beings, as known formally, are, speaking in general,
the sufficient reason according to which wisdom acts.
And in truth, any one who carefully considers the
matter, will find that it is only by the entities known
that a wise being can be furnished with all and each
of the reasons which are necessary for his action. Let
us see this :
I. What can be the sufficient reason which leads a
wise being to decide on acting rather than on not
acting ?
Obviously, it must consist in an end which he pro
poses to himself. Now, a wise agent cannot find any
end worthy of him except in a being at once intellectual
and moral, whether this be himself or someone else.
In other words, every wise action must have for its end
Identity of Two Lavas. 407
the esteem, the love, the respect, the perfection, or the
production of an intellectual-moral being. Let us see
this part by part by classifying all the actions which
it is possible for an intelligent being to perform.
422. These actions fall under three heads :
i st. To know beings, to appreciate them, to love
them, and according to this appreciation and
this love to determine the rest of one s
actions ;
2nd. To increase the perfection of known exis
tent beings ;
3rd. To cause new beings to come into existence.
423. Now I ask: If the beings here spoken of were
not of an intellectual-moral nature, could they afford
a wise agent a sufficient reason for acting ?
Assuredly not ; for as I have explained elsewhere,
merely real beings cannot, by the very nature of
things, be anything else than means, (i) A being that
has not both the intellectual and moral faculty,
has no PERSONAL SELF (suita) ; (2) and it is only
we who by language (3) and imagination endow
it with such. It exists, but of an existence which
is relative, and in the nature of a means to an end
lying outside it, and belonging to beings of the
intellectual-moral order. Having therefore no SELF, it
is incapable of any good, it cannot refer to itself either
good or evil, or in fact anything. As a consequence,
no sufficient reason will ever be found for loving, or
benefiting, or producing a being which has not intelli
gence and free-will, or at all events is not ordained to one
(1) See Principles of Moral Science (" Principii della Scienza Morale"),
Ch. IV., art. viii.
(2) See Psychology, nn. 875-877. (3) Ibid. no. 876.
408 On Divine Providence.
which has ; because, to say it once more, in this kind of
being the object necessary to benevolence, the PER
SONAL SELF, is wanting. We may indeed appreciate it in
relation to another thing which exists to itself and enjoys
good for itself, we may imagine it to have an enjoyment
of its own; but in these cases, the object, the end of
the action, is still a being possessed of SELF, and there
fore intellectual-moral.
424. If, then, the three kinds of actions we have
mentioned had some merely real good for their object
and rested in that, they would not be at all wise.
Indeed, it involves a contradiction to suppose that an
intelligent being would ever think of acting on such a
condition. Even if he were apparently to love, or to
benefit, or to propose to himself as the end of his action
the production of a being devoid of intelligence, on
diligent examination we should find that in so doing,
he either had himself for his end, or in imagination
gave, as we have said, an intelligence, a self, to beings
which are not possessed of it. Hence his action would
always, in point of fact, have for its term a being en
dowed with intelligence, or erroneously supposed to be
so endowed. In this latter case the action would be
foolish, because untruthful, although at the same time
it would belong to the order of intelligence.
None of the three kinds of action which we have
indicated could, therefore, be seriously thought of by
an intellectual being, unless he had for his object an
intellectual-moral being. Consequently, the latter
alone can constitute a sufficient reason to determine a
wise agent to act rather than to abstain from action.
425. Before proceeding further, it may be here
observed that the same condition, namely, that the
Identity of Two Laws. 409
object be intellectual-moral, is required also in order
that the actions in question may be moral ; thus again
showing that wisdom and morality are in perfect accord,
and, as it were, identified.
In fact, we have already seen that no action could
appertain to the moral order, unless its end regarded
an intellectual being.
What esteem, what love can an intelligent being
have for a being which is devoid of intelligence ? He
will have no esteem or love for it; or he will esteem and
love it for its own sake ; or he will esteem and love it
for the sake of a being that is intelligent, that is,
he will love it as a means to his own advantage and
pleasure, or to the advantage and pleasure of others.
In this last case his esteem and his love are raised to
the moral order, because they terminate in intellectual
being.
In the second case, his esteem and his love belong to
the moral order in an inverted sense : I mean, they are
immoral, because they do an injustice to intellectual
being by falsely attributing its excellence to a thing
that has it not. Here it is again in reference to
intellectual being that the act is in opposition to the
order of morality.
In the first case, there is no act, and therefore no
morality of any kind.
426. A similar reasoning may be made as regards
the perfecting of a being. If the being whose perfection
is increased is intellectual or moral, then the act also
is moral. But if it is neither intellectual nor moral,
then nothing moral is done, unless that perfection be
intended for the advantage of another being who is
intellectual-moral.
4io On Divine Providence.
427. So likewise as regards that action by which a
new being is produced. If that being is neither intel
lectual nor moral, nor produced for the advantage of a
being who is intellectual and moral, such production
has no morality in it. It will simply be the product of
a real being which acts blindly, not the action of a
moral being, (i)
In conclusion, no action can be moral, save by having
for its object, or its ultimate end, an intellectual-moral
being ; for, as we have said, moral being, by its very
essence, tends to the totality or completion of being, and
not to one form of it only ; it does not stop at reality,
but with reality conjoins intelligence and love. By this
union, being is complete, and the action becomes moral.
428. II. What can be the sufficient reason determin
ing a wise being to produce one effect rather than
another ?
Again it must be intellectual being, the object of the
action. This may furnish a sufficient reason either
morally necessary and absolute, or not necessary and
only relative.
429. For, if we speak of the first kind of actions,
namely, of the esteem, and the love and the actions
consequent upon them, the intellectual being who is
the object of these actions affords a sufficient reason
(i) Simple production considered in the abstract is, in a moral sense,
neither good nor evil. Hence, so long as one speaks of production, without
specifying its mode or its object, there is no moral law to command or to for
bid it. But the good or the evil belongs to the mode of the production, and lies
in the goodness or badness of the object intended. It follows, that if the pro
ducer, instead of aiming by his action at nothing beyond reality, aims at what
will render it intellectual-moral, and endows it with the suitable qualities and
perfections, then what he produces is truly a moral good, and his action is a
wise action, because it is clone for a proper end, a sufficient reason.
. Identity of Two Laws. 41 1
which is in part necessary and absolute, in other
words, morally binding. This sufficient reason con
sists in the degree of entity which formal know
ledge shows to exist in that being, and which is
precisely what determines the measure or quantity
of esteem and love due to it, and the actions conse
quent upon that esteem and love. Accordingly, if
an intellectual-moral being is appreciated more than
his degree of entity deserves, the act is no longer truly
wise nor moral, because that excess, being arbitrary
and blind, contradicts the law of sufficient reason. If
he is appreciated less than his degree of entity demands,
the act is again defective, because the law of sufficient
reason is not adequately recognized by it.
430. I say, and the actions consequent iipon that esteem
and love, for it should be distinctly observed that this
first kind of morality the obligatory extends to
these also. Some of them come under the name of
cultus, and some under that of beneficence : of cultus, if
they express interior affections ; of beneficence, if they
are done for the good of others.
Thus those outward actions by which man s affections
naturally exhibit themselves, ought not, without some
just cause, to be repressed ; and this proves the obliga
tion of an external worship of the Divinity. So likewise,
the father is bound to maintain and educate his son,
as a consequence of the appreciation which he ought
to have of himself as well as of his son, and of the
paternal love which is a natural part of himself, (i)
(l) It should be observed, that although the appreciation due to a moral
being ought to render all who are able, willing to succour him in case of
need, nevertheless not every kind of suffering or of misery, is a sufficient
reason for determining such esteem and affection as will show themselves by
412 On Divine Providence.
431. The second and third kinds of moral actions
of which we are speaking, have no sufficient reason
inducing moral obligation ; hence they include only
deeds of purely gratuitous goodness. What, then,
will be the sufficient reason for these actions ?
Not, certainly, the right of the being whose perfec
tion it is intended to increase, or which it is intended
to bring into existence. For, no one has a right to
gratuitous goodness ; and much less can rights be
claimed by a being that does not yet exist.
Neither can it be moral obligation, which we have
excluded. What then is the sufficient reason ?
The mere goodness of the benefactor, who acts accord
ing to his nature, expressed in the aphorism, Bonum
est diffusivum sui (" Goodness is diffusive of itself").
432. Nevertheless, the effects of this goodness have
certain limits; and it is these limits that determine
the benefactor to produce one effect rather than another.
Now, these limits arise from the limited measure :
i st. Of the power and knowledge of the benefactor
himself;
2ndly. Of his goodness;
3rdly. Of the capacity of the being whom it is
intended to perfect or to produce.
It is, then, in the instinct of the goodness of the bene-
action. For, if the need in question were caused by guilty conduct, and
the sinner still persisted in his evil course, then that degree of esteem and
affection which prompts kindly action, would cease to be binding, and would
be rightly superseded by the love of justice which demands that the sinner
surfer condign punishment. Only an infinite, omnipotent, and wholly
gratuitous goodness, such as that of the Supreme Being, can cancel sin
itself, giving also due satisfaction to justice, as it did in the Redemption
of mankind. This however would be a work appertaining, not to the
first, but to the second class of the moral actions above enumerated.
Identity of Two L anas. 4 1 3
factor bounded by his own limitation, by that of the
means at his disposal, and finally by that of the nature
of the being who is the object of his beneficence
that the sufficient reason must be found which deter
mines the quantity of beneficent effect of which we speak.
433. III. But by thus determining the quantity of
beneficent effect to be aimed at, we do not as yet
determine the kind of action, the expedients, the
means to be employed for its actual production. For,
the same effect may be obtained in different ways, and
by different means and actions. What is, then, the
sufficient reason that determines the right mode of
action to be chosen in order to obtain a given effect r
This reason lies in the quantity of the effect which
it is proposed to obtain.
If, therefore, different modes of action equally fitted
to obtain that effect in full perfection, were to present
themselves to the mind, it is clear that a wise person
would give preference to that which is the simplest, the
easiest, the least expensive. Indeed, if the effect at
which he aims is what determines him to act, and if
that effect is all he wants, why should he employ a
greater means than is needed for effecting his purpose r
He will therefore choose, for producing the effect in
question, the least adequate cause, the least quantity
of action, the least means.
Such is what we call the Law of the Least Means. It
is the same law as that of sufficient reason, applied to
determine wisely the mode of action to be followed for
obtaining a given effect.
CHAPTER VIII.
IN WHAT SENSE IT MAY BE SAID THAT THE LAW OF
THE LEAST MEANS OBTAINS IN THE WORLD OF
REAL BEINGS.
434. The importance of this law, upon which our
future reasonings will have to be based, does not
permit me to proceed further without first briefly
showing that its dominion extends also to the whole
order of real things.
We have just seen the expression that law may
take: "A wise being, when intending to produce a
given effect, will choose for that production the least
cause possible." In this formula we already hear
the words effect and cause, which remind us of the law
governing the operations of real being, the law of
causality.
435. In fact, since an intelligent being is real being
wedded to the ideal, we must needs admit, that
although he directs his action in accordance with the
law of sufficient reason, nevertheless the action itself
to which he is led by a sufficient reason, cannot be
accomplished save in accordance with the law of
causality, because such action is real. The intel
ligent being knows this law and understands its
necessity ; consequently, the same reason which
determines him to a given action, determines him also
Law of the Least Means in the Universe. 415
to follow the law in virtue of which the effect is
obtained, namely, as we have just said, the law of
causality. Now, this law is also formulated thus :
"Like effect, like cause;" which is the same as to
say, that the quantity of the effect determines that of
the cause, neither more nor less. And in truth, if, on
comparing a given effect with a given cause, the latter
is found to exceed in quantity the former, it is plain
that all such excess is a dead loss in reference to the
effect ; indeed, in so far as the cause exceeds, it is no
cause at all. Thus it comes to pass that in the order
of real being, every effect is always the greatest possible
in respect to its cause ; or vice versa, that every effect is
always produced by the least among all the causes
which could possibly produce it, for if that cause were
not the least, it would be greater than is wanted, and
in so far as it is so it would not be a cause.
436. To speak accurately, however, the concepts of
greatest and of least, as applied respectively to effects
and to causes, are not derived from the mere considera
tion of real nature itself. In this nature there are only
causes and effects ; the relations of greatest and of least
are added to them by our mind, which considers the
effect as an end to be gained either by ourselves or by
others. I will explain.
437. Real nature produces nothing but real effects ;
and these are always simply commensurate with their
causes, so that in them there is neither a more nor a
less. But our mind conceives a possibility of their
being greater or less, although there is no such pos
sibility in point of fact. Hence in relation to this
supposed possibility the mind finds that each effect is
always the greatest, and each cause always the least
4i 6 On Divine Providence.
possible, (i) For example, the light, in passing from
a rarer to a denser medium, is refracted by approach
ing the perpendicular. Now, if we imagine that the
light, as though it were endowed with understanding,
proposed to reach the point at which it now arrives, by
the shortest path and with the smallest velocity in
other words, wished to save as much of velocity and
distance as possible, it certainly could not take any
other course than it does take. (2) As a matter of fact,
(1) In fact, any one who carefully considers how mathematicians proceed
in solving problems of maxima and minima, will perceive that they always
suppose a series of possible terms, among which they try to discover the
greatest or the least of all. Now, that series of terms is not a thing existing
in nature ; those terms are merely abstract possibilities conceived by the
mind. By applying this theory to what is seen to happen in nature, it is
found that each natural effect responds to that term, greatest or least, which
is sought, and to no other; and it is precisely on this account that
that is the only term in actual existence, to the exclusion of the others,
which are assumed, as I have said, hypothetically, in order thus to succeed
in getting at what is wanted.
(2) Pietro Martino was the first to demonstrate that the minimum in the
course followed by the light when passing through mediums of various
densities, is the result of the velocity combined with the space traversed ; so
that if the velocities maintained by the light in two mediums are marked by
the letters a, b, and the spaces traversed by the letters x, y, the minimum
value of the formula will be ax-\-by. If to the space and the velocity we add
the mass of the bodies, and generalizing the principle, we say that "In all
the motions occurring in the universe, MSV i.e., the mass multiplied by the
space traversed and by the velocity is always the minimum" we shall have
what Maupertuis has called " The law of the least action." To show how
far this law, as conceived by Maupertuis, is exact, and how far inexact, a
great deal would have to be said which I could not well express within the
limits of a short note ; nor indeed is it necessary for my purpose. It will be
enough for me to observe that the law of the least action as conceived by
the French savant should be combined with and corrected by that of the
"Conservation of active forces," for which we are indebted to Huygens;
because in the formula of Maupertuis, the living forces are not taken into
account. And this would not yet be enough. I shall, however, further on
Law of the Least Means in the Universe. 417
however, there are not several ways for it to choose
from : it has only one way, that determined by the
forces which propel it. But we, with our intellective
imagination, conceive several others as so many
postulates. That which is impossible in reality, we
assume as a possibility, and, by comparing 1 the real
with the supposed ways, we find that the light follows
exactly the course which requires the least quantity of
action.
So likewise we observe that nature often shapes its
productions in an hexagonal form ; for instance, as
Mairan tells us, in the seeds of certain plants, in the
scales of certain animals, and sometimes in the flakes
of snow, etc. Now, this form is the natural result of
soft round flexible bodies being placed in close
juxtaposition. Thus packed together, they can give
no other figure. But our mind, by examining the
properties of that figure, discovers that it is, of all
figures, the most sparing of space, and hence that it
must have been the one chosen if such beings were to
be created according to the Law of the Least Means.
Our mind arrives at this conclusion, because it
confronts that figure with the others which it has
imagined as possible ; although when nature itself
produces it, no other figure is possible.
It remains therefore to ask how and why it is that
the human mind feels prompted to set down as a law
of nature what is only a mode of conceiving belonging
to itself. The general reason is, because man, in con-
touch upon the measure of the least action considered in reference, not
merely to bodies, but to all beings generally, so that the law in question
will be converted into an ontological one ; and what is there said about the
fixing of that measure will suffice for my intent.
2 E
4i 8 On Divine Providence.
ceiving any reality, always adds to it something of his
own, which he must afterwards take away by means
of reflection, if his concept is to be genuine. He
regards the action of real nature as similar to his
own action, which is intellectual and voluntary. Now,
a being who, like man, acts by intelligence and will,
is not tied to one mode of action alone : he proposes an
end to himself, he aims at producing a given effect
decided on by himself, and this effect, in so far as con
ceived, lies outside simple reality. Reality does not
choose the ends of its action ; indeed, to speak accurate
ly, it has no ends, but only effects, which are determined
solely by the blind forces or activities which im
mediately produce them. Being incapable of choosing
the effects of its actions, it is, of course, incapable of
choosing the ways and means of obtaining them. It
always has one only way of acting, one only mode of
producing those effects; no other ways or modes are
possible to it. Hence the effects which it produces
cannot properly be called greatest, neither can their
causes be called least ; since there is no possibility of
other effects or of other causes to serve as terms of
comparison. Man, on the contrary, can propose to
himself whatever ends he pleases, and can choose
between divers ways of obtaining those ends. As an
intellectual being, which of these ways will he choose ?
The simplest of all, the easiest, in short, that which
leads him to obtain the effect he desires by the least
means ; for, what is beyond that, is superfluous, is a
waste of action, has no sufficient reason.
438. Now, an intelligent being acts in this way even
when the effect which he aims at cannot be obtained
save by the action of the forces belonging to real
Law of the Least Means in the Universe. 419
beings, let us say to corporeal beings. If the physical
effect he desires to obtain were equal to the whole
sum of the effects produced by such quantity of these
beings as he can dispose of, he would have nothing to
do but wait for the complex effect of the actions
natural to them ; and that would be the effect he seeks.
But man does not, ordinarily speaking, wish for the
whole sum of the effects produced or producible by
the action of corporeal beings, because he has certain
special requirements of his own, different from those
of brute bodies. Among the many effects, therefore,
which their natural action does or could produce, he
singles out one for himself, I mean either an indi
vidual or a complex one which is to serve as a means
to his intellectual or moral ends. Accordingly, he must
seek for this particular effect in nature ; but there he
finds it mixed up with other effects which are of no im
portance to him, which he does not want. He must,
therefore, separate it from all the rest, that he may
have it by itself alone. In this way that effect will
become a minimum in respect of the complex of all
the others with which it lay confused in nature. As a
consequence, the immediate cause which he chooses
for producing it must also be a minimum in this sense,
that he, as intelligent, will not make use of any of
those forces or causes which produce other effects that
he wishes to exclude.
439. For example, let an intellective being set him
self to move a spherical body from a higher to a lower
plane; and let us suppose that what he wants to obtain
from the forces of nature is this descent and nothing
else. What will intelligence or wisdom suggest to him ?
The different ways, rectilinear, curvilinear, and mixed,
420 On Divine Providence.
by which that body can descend, are innumerable.
Nature has all these ways and the material body itself
has no preference for one rather than for another. But
which will be the one chosen by the intellective being
who cares for the descent alone? Certainly that in
which there is nothing superfluous. It is plain, there
fore, that among all the possible ways of descent he will
select that which oifers to the descending body the least
resistance, because every resistance is an impediment
to its descent; he will, that is to say, select the way
by which the body can descend in the least time, and
hence with the greatest celerity. Essential Wisdom
finds this way at once; but man, whose wisdom, con
fronted with Essential Wisdom, is as a drop in the
ocean, must search for it by long and laborious study,
comparing together all the possible ways of descent
until he finds the one best suited to his purpose. He
will therefore compare the straight, the curved, and the
mixed lines, and, upon careful examination of the pros
and cons^ become persuaded that what he seeks must be
found, not in the first, nor in the second way, but in
the third, the curved. But as in curves also there are
endless varieties, he will repeat the same operation in
regard to these, and go on until at last he discovers
that the simplest, easiest, quickest way of descent lies
in that kind of curve which has received the name of
cycloid the curve described by any point in the
circumference of the circle, e.g., a wheel when rolled
along a straight line and keeping always in the same
plane. Wisdom, therefore, will prescribe to him, for
the attainment of his object, the adoption of the
cycloidal way, because that accords with the Law of
the Least Means.
Law of the Least Means in the Universe. 42 1
440. Now, when man has found this out, he is apt
to draw the conclusion that whenever a brute body
moves in a cycloidal curve as for instance in the case
just mentioned of the points of the circumference of a
wheel it is material nature itself that follows the Law
of the Least Action ; and so he attributes wisdom to it.
But this is an error. The curve is traced by the wheel s
circumference merely because the motor-force applied
to a body of circular form like the wheel makes it do so.
It has no choice, for that is the only way possible.
Hence, in respect to the wheel, it cannot with any truth
be called either an easier or a more difficult way. It
is, however, easier in respect to that one end which
man proposes to himself when he wishes to make a
body descend from a higher to a lower plane by a path
different from the vertical.
Man, then, attributes to material bodies the same laws
according to which he is himself accustomed to act ;
and thus it seems to him that those bodies also follow
in their action the Law of the Least Means. This fact
is very deserving of attention, and I will give one or
two more examples of it, the better to prepare the way
for the argument which I wish to base upon it.
441. Suppose that an intelligent being wants to
find in nature an isochronous motion, namely, that
kind of motion which, constantly repeated, is ever
uniform in time. Nature can certainly act so as to
produce this effect, but it does not mark out such effect
in particular from among all the others which it can
produce. It acts with perfect indifference in whatever
way may be required by the positions and circum
stances in which it finds itself at every moment.
The intelligent being, therefore, to obtain at any time
422 On Divine Providence,
he wishes the particular effect of continuous and
isochronous motions, is obliged to place certain bodies
in such positions as may fit them, by obeying their
own law (that of causality), to secure the attainment of
his object. Hence he will apply the cycloid to the
pendulum, and by this means obtain a constant propor
tion between the motion of rotation and that of transla
tion the two motions of which the cycloidal motion is
the result ; and this invariable constancy of proportion
will give him precisely what he wants. It is, therefore,
again the intelligence which chooses, among all curves,
the cycloidal ; thus avoiding, in the production of the
effect sought, all irregularity as well as all superfluity.
442. The very same mode of reasoning is applicable
to the inventions of machinery. All these inventions
are systems of bodies devised by man s intelligence,
in order to obtain certain special effects ; and their
perfection consists in nothing else than simplicity,
which is always reducible to a saving of action. The
less the action whereby they obtain the effect in
tended, the more is their mechanism in accordance
with the principle of intelligence. Hence, if a machine
were formed by an infinite intelligence of perfect
wisdom, the action used in obtaining its effect would
be the very least possible.
443. In material nature, on the contrary, there is
nothing like this ; for it cannot will any one special
effect, and in all those movements which its forces
actually produce, it is subject to physical necessity.
When, however, I say that material nature does not
follow the Law of the Least Means, I mean to speak of
those effects which it produces by its own forces alone ;
not of that which might come to it from an intelligence
Law of the Least Means in the Universe. 423
presiding over it. This point requires some explana
tion.
We must observe, then, that material beings may be
considered either in their own individuality, or in their
relations with space, or with other units of matter. These
material units (extra-subjective) are the atoms, namely,
the primary elements of matter, which I assume to be
indivisible. Now, the forces with which these atoms
are conceived as endowed, do not in any way determine
the place they ought to occupy in space. Indeed, the
atom always preserves its identity, and hence the
identity of its forces, whatever be the part of space in
which it happens at any time to be located. It follows
that these forces of which the atom is the result (and
which give it no motion, since the material atom never
passes by itself from rest to motion, or vice versa], do
not impel it to seek one place rather than another.
Consequently, it is not in them that we must look for
the cause of the atom being found located in this or in
that spot in space. Now, this non-existence, in the
atoms, of a cause determining their position, this nega
tion, has often been converted by human imagination
into something positive, into a reality; and this reality,
a creation or rather a fiction of man himself, has been
called hazard or chance. In this way, hazard or chance
was affirmed to be the cause of the collocation of the
atoms in space.
How did the human mind fall into so enormous an
error as to transform even nothingness into a causer
This was in large measure due to the intellective
instinct.
444. It is a property of this instinct to incline the
mind to judge of the being of things according to the
424 On Divine Providence.
principles peculiar to the mind itself. Each of these
principles begets a corresponding instinct in the
faculty of judgment, and one of them is precisely the
principle of causality. Accordingly, the mind is so
inclined to see effects conjoined with their causes,
that whenever it does not at once find the causes,
it readily creates or invents them with a precipi
tate judgment. As, therefore, the atoms have not
in themselves the cause of their being in one place
rather than in another, fallacious human judgment
takes hold of that absence of cause and calls it
by the words hazard, chance, and so it gives reality
to what is no reality at all. For, as I have explained
elsewhere, words draw to themselves the attention of
the mind, which takes them as signs of things, always
supposing that there is, underlying the word, a thing,
even when there is none. In this way, nothingness
itself is conceived by man as something positive, in virtue
of the word nothing, (i) The word stands in lieu of
the thing which is wanting; it is a representative that
represents nothing ; but man, to whom this want of the
thing represented is irksome, does not examine that
word s message ; he blindly accepts it as a true
representative ; although, in truth, it is like an impostor
who boasts of a message which no one has given him.
445. To resume, then : the cause of the colloca
tion of the atoms in space is not in themselves, in their
nature, in their forces ; whatever, therefore, this cause
may be, it must be sought outside the atoms them
selves. This cause must have determined the places
for them all at the beginning of things. From these
primitive positions, through mutual action and reac-
(i) See Psychology, no. 1045.
Law of the Least Means in the Universe. 425
tions, and the changes that have since then succes
sively occurred according to constant laws, there has
arisen the present collocation of the atoms, the present
state of the material universe. Obviously, this cause
which lies outside matter must have been intelligent.
If it was intelligent, it must, in collocating the
atoms in a certain way, have proposed to itself
certain ends ; since, as we have seen, it is by the ends
that the sufficient reason the guiding principle of
intelligence is constituted.
Moreover, these ends, as we have also seen, could
only have consisted in the good of intellectual moral
beings (423).
If this intelligent cause is supposed to have been
infinite, it must, in the collocation of the atoms, have
maintained in the utmost perfection the Law of the
Least Action, or of the Least Means. It must, there
fore, have collocated these atoms in such a way as to
obtain the greatest effect with an action relatively
least.
Hence the Law of the Least Means, of which the
material atom can show no vestige, must be expected
to shine conspicuously in the complex of the atoms,
namely, in the world, if it is true that the world is the
work of wisdom, and if we consider the relations of
position between the atoms in order to those effects
which are beneficial to intellective moral beings. For,
as these relations cannot have for their cause the
material atoms themselves, they must be attributed to
the action of an intelligence.
If, therefore, by the observation of nature we ac
tually find: ist, that material things spontaneously
produce a quantity of the effects beneficial to intellec-
426 On Divine Providence.
tive beings, and 2ndly, that these effects follow the
Law of the Least Action ; we shall have a manifest
proof that an intelligent cause has been at work, and
that wisdom presides over the material world.
And as this is precisely what is seen in numberless
effects produced by atoms and by material causes
associated in given ways in nature ; so it comes to pass
that men are wont to regard the Law of the Least Action,
or of the Least Means, as belonging to the material
beings themselves ; whereas in very truth it is only a law
of that intelligent being, who, keeping himself hidden
from our sight, presents to our senses his work, nature.
446. From all these things we may conclude, that
the Law of the Least Means may be recognized by man
in material nature in two ways :
i st. In purely material effects considered irrespec
tively of the advantages which intellective-moral
beings may derive from them, as for instance, in the
minimum of action employed by the light in passing
through media of various densities, or in the wonder
ful rapidity with which the electric fluid reaches a
given point through conductors made of the same
substance, though of varying lengths, etc.
In these effects it is the human intelligence
that ascribes the Law of the Least Action to material
nature; because it compares the way in which
they are produced, not with other ways physically
possible (for there are none such, since nature has
only one way, one mode of acting), but with ways
which man s mind supposes to be possible, while it
imagines material nature as an agent free to choose
between them. Thus, the Law of the Least Means does
not belong to the physical things engaged in such
Law of the Least Means in the Universe. 427
productions, but is imposed upon them by man, who
erroneously credits them with the law of his own intel
ligence.
2nd. In material effects viewed in order to the good
of intellective-moral beings. This class of effects de
pends on the harmonious union of many material
beings ; a union which is not determined by any virtue
or force inherent in those beings themselves, but by
an intelligent cause which must have so disposed and
ordered them. Here we see again, that the Law of the
Least Means belongs, not to mere physical beings, but
to an intelligence ; although this applies it to them in
the manner already stated.
447. So far, however, we have considered real
being, as it presents itself to us in the universe, under
one aspect only, namely, that which exhibits it to us
as material or corporeal, in other words, as either sen-
siferous or felt, (i) The other aspect under which it
should be considered is that which exhibits it to us as
sensitive. In fact, the merely sensitive soul, such as
that of beasts, is a real being, but not an intelligence.
Now, does this kind of vital principle maintain in its
action the Law of the Least Means ?
To answer this question, it is necessary first of all to
reflect that in animals there is not sensitivity alone,
but sensitivity organized and individuated. Now, to
know whether sensitivity follows the Law of the Least
Action, it is again necessary to consider it first by itself
alone, apart from that which it owes to organization ;
thus doing with sensitivity the same as we have done
with matter. For, we have considered matter, first, in
what it has in itself, in its apparent forces ; and after -
(i) See Anthropology (" Antropologia "), Bk. II., Sect. II., Ch. ix.
428 On Divine Providence.
wards, in what it receives from its collocation in space,
whence arise those peculiar relations between its
several parts, whereof this sensible universe is the
result.
448. What, then, does sensitivity considered by
itself, in its mere concept, present to us ?
Nothing else than a uniform feeling diffused in space,
which becomes its term. This feeling is not greater
at one point of space than it is at another. It has no
fixed principle from which to depend ; but the self
same principle of feeling is found alike and with the
same activity at every point of the space felt. Such
is the genuine concept of sensitivity divested of what
ever may come to it from without.
Now, sensitivity, or better, feeling, taken in this
way does not act according to the Law of the Least
Action, or of the Least Means, but only according to
that of causality.
And in truth, what kind of activity does the concept
of mere corporeal feeling present to our mind r
449. The activity of feeling must be sought in the
sentient act. It is a property of the sentient act to
produce the maximum of feeling possible. Indeed, this
is what real being does in its every act, what every
cause does when at work. We have already seen that
in the order of material real being the effect is equal
to the quantity of the producing cause; and that
human intelligence considers this effect as a maximum
in comparison with other effects theoretically, though
not physically, possible. In the same way, the feeling
produced by the sentient act is greatest in this sense,
that man may imagine other feelings less in degree,
not adequate to the act, and in comparison with which
Law of the Least Means in the Universe. 429
the actual feeling presents itself as greatest. When,
however, the sentient act, in virtue of the determina
tions and conditions it receives from without, has
come into existence, then the feeling which follows
does not admit of either a "more" or a "less;" it is
simply what it ought to be ; and hence, speaking ac
curately, it cannot be designated as " greatest," but
only as "proportionate to the act which produces it."
The maximum, then, which is found in feeling, does
not belong to real being, but to the manner in which
man s intelligence conceives it.
450. But now, what are the circumstances and con
ditions which determine the sentient act ? They may
vary ad infinitum. What, then, is the sufficient reason
for which a given feeling in actual existence has such
or such conditions rather than such or such others, is
determined in this way rather than in that? Can we
find this sufficient reason in sensitivity itself?
Certainly not. As we have seen that the position of
the atoms in space is not determined by the forces of
the atoms themselves, but comes from a cause exter
nal to them, so likewise the conditions which deter
mine the sentient act to be more or less intense, to be of
a certain quality rather than of another, etc., are not
found in the act of sensitivity itself. Sensitivity is
indifferent alike to any of the acts which may belong
to it. It simply posits that act to which it is deter
mined by the conditions that happen to be imposed
on it. We must, therefore, look for the cause of its
determinations in something outside itself.
45 1 . Now, what is this external something which
determines the corporeal sensitivity to one kind of act
rather than another?
43 On Divine Providence.
It is the collocation of the corporeal molecules,
which are the term of feeling, or to adopt a term more
in use, the organization. In fact, the corporeal sensi
tivity is an energy consisting in an adherence of feeling
to a body. It depends, therefore, on the body in such
a way that, were this to be withdrawn from it, it
would itself cease to exist, (i) Hence the collocation
of the said corporeal molecules, which are destined to
be the term of feeling, and the passions to which the
body resulting from them is subject, are the conditions
determining the sentient act, and, by consequence, the
feeling produced by it. If, then, the body is larger,
the feeling is more extended. If the body felt changes
place, the feeling goes along with it. If in the body
felt there occur internal movements without doing
away with the feeling of it, the feeling is impressed by
those movements, receives excitations, sensions from
them. If the felt body loses its continuity, the feeling
is multiplied with the multiplication of the continua.
If several felt bodies become conjoined in one, their
several feelings also combine so as to become one
only. In all this the corporeal sensitivity operates
(i) See the Anthropology (" Antropologia "), Bk. II., Sect. I., Ch.
XII.-XV. ; Sect. II., Ch. I.-XI. From what I advance here, the reader
will perceive that I consider the sensitivity determined in animals by organi
zation as the principle of all their instinctive operations. This thought
which I have expounded more fully in the Psychology is not new ; but it has
not perhaps received as yet all that large development of which it is
susceptible. Bonnet plainly admits the same principle where, treating of the
marvellous performances of bees, he writes : " N avanfons pas que les
Abeilles, ainsi que tous les Animaux, sont de pures machines, des horloges,
des metiers, etc. Une Ame tient probablement a la machine : elle en sent
les mouvements ; elle se plait a ces mouvements ; elle regoit par la machine
des impressions agreables ou de plaisantes, et c est cette SENSIBILITE qui
estle grand et L UNIQUE MOBILE de 1 Animal." Contemplation de la Natun,
P. xi., ch. xxvii.
Law of the Least Means in the Universe. 431
with its own energy, which, as we have said, consists
in an adherence of feeling to bodies. In short, when
ever to sensitivity there is allotted a body in certain
given positions and conditions, sensitivity displays a
corresponding energy, producing the greatest possible
feeling, greatest, I mean, in the sense above explained.
And since every energy, every act is a force which
posits itself, it follows that the felt body, by being
subject to sensitivity, receives from it an influence
which holds it together, or preserves its internal move
ments, or increases them, or diminishes them, according
to the peculiar nature of the sensitive force or energy.
452. From this we may draw an obvious conse
quence. The corporeal feeling has not its determina
tion in itself, but in the collocation of the atoms and
molecules which constitute its term, and the cause of
this collocation lies wholly outside the body and its
forces. If, therefore, we find by observation that the
atoms and molecules are distributed so as to produce
an organization and a unity of feeling calculated to
give results which tend to the good of intelligent
beings ; and if, moreover, we find that the complex
and permanent feeling arising from such distributions
proceeds, in giving those results, in accordance with the
Law of the Least Action ; we are plainly bound to admit
that the external cause which has determined this
harmony of corporeal parts in view of so excellent an
end, and with so much wisdom, must be intelligent.
Accordingly, the fact of the animal operations obeying
the Law of the Least Action, or of the Least Means,
proves that this law belongs, not to the animals
themsleves, but to an intelligence which dominates
animality and keeps it subject to its control.
432 On Divine Providence.
453. Hence the theory here proposed, far from
denying that in the composition of the animal and in
its operations there is an end and a mode proceeding
from intelligence, firmly establishes it.
For, if we observe the composition of the most per
fect of all animals, namely, of man, we find that it is
ordered for the immediate service of intelligence ; nay,
that it is ordered for the very production of an intel
lective being, man himself. This composition, there
fore, not being due either to corporeal forces or to
sensitivity, must be attributed to an intelligent author.
454. As to other animals, the services which man
derives from them are innumerable ; and in pro
portion as the sciences progress, new uses and new
advantages are discovered, which man, even without
his knowledge, draws from the animal kingdom. These
also, then, are ordered for the good of intellective
beings.
455. Cannot some vestiges of the Law of the Least
Means be found also in the organisms of brute
animals ?
Undoubtedly they can. Even that little attention
which has, up to the present, been bestowed upon the
composition of bodies, is enough to show this in many
of the effects produced by animal bodies. But it is
probable that with the increase of carefully conducted
and persevering observation and studies on the animal
operations, the vestiges they bear of the great law of
intelligence will become ever more apparent. Were I
to enter fully into this subject, I should be endless : it
will be enough to have touched upon it.
456. First of all, let us bear well in mind that the
animal is the result of organization, or, which comes
Law of the Least Means in the Universe. 433
to the same thing, of a certain distribution of atoms, the
union of which constitutes the living machine. There
is nothing to show that with the breaking up of the
organization the sensitivity of the atoms ceases ; whilst
there are many reasons for believing that feeling always
adheres to them, multiplied either into as many sensitive
beings as are the divided portions, if these still retain an
organism, or, if all suitable organism has been lost,
into as many as are the atoms themselves. Hence the
gradation of animals from the most complicated to the
most simple, a gradation which ends with living mole
cules or atoms. In the event, however, of separate
atoms alone remaining, there could certainly be no
motion exhibited by them, because atoms are invisible
and unalterable ; consequently, all fusion of several
feelings into one would cease, and with it all sensitive
excitation as well as that harmony (i) between motion
and feeling which gives unity to multiplicity, and
preserves and reproduces this unity in which the
animal properly exists.
457. From this concept of the animal we can see
that the Law of the Least Action regulates the composi
tion of the animal no less than its operations. For, all
that goes to constitute the animal, and all that is done by
it in order to its life, preservation, and reproduction,
arises from one sole and most simple cause, the sensitive
(i) Readers who take an interest in the important question of harmony
here referred to by the Author, are recommended to read carefully the whole
of the i ith Ch. of Sect. II. of the second book of the Anthropology. There
the Author professedly undertakes to explain, by the laws of mere animality,
all those wonderful operations which are, by a most common error, taken as
indicating the existence in animals of intelligence properly so called. He
refers to the same subject in the Psychology, especially in Bk. iv., Ch.
xxviii., and in Bk. v., Ch. i., ii. and iii., etc. Tr.
2 F
434 On Divine Providence.
energy, to which an infinite wisdom has given diverse
occasions for operating in those marvellous ways
which are observed in the individual animal, simply
by uniting together at the beginning some corporeal
atoms in such a manner as to make them result in
prolific germs. Given these first aggregates of atoms,
or these germs varied perhaps in all possible ways,
and placed in relation with other external atoms, also
suitably disposed the sensitive energy itself does all
the rest, and constitutes the animal, and nourishes it,
and develops it, and reproduces it. This energy it is
that constitutes all the numberless forms of animals,
which, as I have just said, I believe to be as many as
are the aggregates capable of constituting a living
machine. Hence the graduated scale, I do not say of
beings, but of animals. Indeed, that which Leibnitz
called The Law of Continuity in nature, if it be confined
within the sphere of animal beings, and rightly under
stood, is in agreement with observation, which is daily
becoming richer in facts and more complete, (i)
(i) It does great credit to the penetration of Leibnitz, that from the Law of
Continuity he deduced the concept of polyps and predicted their discovery.
He writes : " For myself, such is the force of the principle of continuity, that
not only should I not be surprised to hear that beings had been found which,
with respect to certain properties, for example those of nutrition and gene
ration, could be taken equally for vegetables and for animals but I
am convinced that there really are such beings, and that natural history will
perhaps discover them some day." In my opinion, however, Leibnitz
proposed the Law of Continuity in too general a form. He proposed it as
a gradation of beings generally, whereas it ought to be confined within each
species of beings (because there is a law which I call "Law of the Constipation
of Species ," and of which I shall speak "elsewhere). And in truth, between
one species and another there is not mere gradation, but a leap. Thus
between brute matter and animal feeling, animal feeling and intelligence,
there is a difference which cannot be traversed. But what is still more,
between contingent nature and the Necessary Being there is the infinite.
Law of the Least Means in the Universe 435
Could there be a simpler design than this, by which
the animal is obtained with all its innumerable varieties
marked in a continuous gradation by means of a most
simple energy, such as the sensitive energy is, and of a
Probably Leibnitz was led to give an undue extension to the Law of
Continuity by the imperfect manner in which species had been classified by
Philosophers. Animals, for example, are divided by Naturalists into many
species ; but, properly speaking, they form one species only. So the
vegetables, so the minerals. Those that are called species of animals, of
vegetables, of minerals, are merely gradations within the same species, which
might more appropriately be called by the name of classes or families. A
further question now arises : Can we say that within the same species the
Law of Continuity is perfect ? This point cannot be decided by experience.
Reasoning, on the other hand, shows that, if by Continuity is meant that
between one class or family and another within the same species there is a
difference infinitely small, we are driven to a reductio ad absurdum. In
nature, there is no such thing as an infinitely small difference, for the
simple reason that in nature the infinitely small does not exist. But if
by the Law of Continuity is meant that the differences are as small as it is
possible for them to be, then there is no absurdity involved ; and it is in
this sense that I admit the law. In fact, that there should be all the classes
of animals which can exist, is quite conceivable. But since certain conditions
are requisite to the constitution of every animal namely, the fusion of many
feelings into one, the absence of internal pain, harmonious individuality, a
circular action preserving and reproducing the vital functions it is plain,
that not every aggregate of atoms is fit to constitute an animal, a suitable
organization. Only certain determinate aggregates wisely combined can do
this. Consequently, there may indeed be, between these aggregates, a
gradation, but not in the sense that there may not remain, between one
and another, the possibility of other aggregates unfit to constitute the
animal, or the animal germ suitably organized. In this sense, there is nothing
to forbid the belief that all the species of created beings generally form a
continuous chain, that is, in the sense that between one species and another
no species is possible. I shall, however, speak of this more fully in the
Cosmology, should it please God to grant me life and leisure to publish it .
In all cases, between the contingent and the necessary, the distance will
always remain infinite. Still this will not break the chain, if we consider it
as formed of links that are really possible ; because it is not within the
range of possibilities, that the contingent should even so much as approach
the necessary.
436 On Divine Providence.
varied disposition of atoms which affords to this energy
the occasion of operating in manifold ways ? Never
theless, this very thing must not be supposed to be
arbitrary, but to issue forth from the order intrinsic to
being.
458. When the animal is constituted, it is found en
dowed with organs the action of which is so harmo
nious, that the preservation, the development, and the
propagation whereby it is perpetuated, are not effects
produced by a single organ, but by the actions of all
the several organs conspiring together to the same end.
Observe, for example, how nutrition takes place ; you
will find that the digestive and assimilative apparatus
maintains a constant harmony with that which is des
tined for the taking of food and preparing it for the
stomach. Thus, animals that live on vegetable food
are furnished with longer intestines than carnivorous
animals. Why r Because the vegetable food, being
less nutritious, requires to remain longer in the body,
in order that the nutritive substance may be extracted
from it. Hence these animals have the mouth, the
teeth, the esophagus, etc., of such form and nature as
serve admirably for taking, crushing, and preparing
vegetable food; whilst at the same time they are
unprovided with any apparatus for procuring animal
food. Precisely the contrary may be observed in the
carnivorous. The mere form of the beak of birds,
adapted to the nutriment suitable to each kind, may
\vell excite our admiration. Birds of prey, which
feed on live flesh, have a strong hooked beak, for
catching and tearing up the prey. Granivorous
birds have a short and thick beak, necessary for
breaking and, as it were, grinding the grain. Those
Laws of the Least Means in the Universe. 437
that live on spiders, flies, gnats, and the like, have a
delicate and sharply pointed beak, just the thing for
catching the smallest and frailest insect without its
being reduced to fragments at the first bite. The snipe,
which feeds on worms hiding at the bottom of marshy
ground, could not support life, but for its long, straight,
slender bill which enables it to search down deep and
find what it wants, but which would be a great embar
rassment to other kinds of birds. In short, the organs
of all animals are the most fitting and the most
convenient instruments that could be imagined for the
special needs of each kind. And this fitness and
convenience means a saving of action ; since less action
is required to obtain an effect by a suitable instrument,
than by one which is unsuitable and ill-fashioned.
459. It will be said that the organization develops
of its own accord in virtue of the primitive instinct
which operates as a formative or plastic force. Just so ;
but in the first place, the simplicity of this means em
ployed by nature in framing and fashioning animals
with all their parts corresponding and subservient to one
another, clearly betokens the Law of the Least Action
applied to these complex beings by a wisdom that has
no parallel. In the second place, why is it that this
instinctive virtue, though but one in its concept, varies
its operations so as to develop so many species of
animals, and not one only ? Is there a single animal,
however diminutive in size, however simple in structure,
that has not the internal order and the correspondence
between its parts which I have mentioned ?
460. I have said that the corporeal sensitivity is but
one in its concept ; and the instinct is merely the
energy which sensitivity exerts on the body, both felt
438 On Divine Providence.
and sensiferous. But the action of sensitivity and of
instinct does not vary its direction and its mode save
by reason of the different composition of felt and
sensiferous atoms. To explain the animal, therefore,
it is necessary to suppose, as already given, a primi
tive organization which has not its cause in sensitivity.
In other words, it is necessary to suppose a germ
organized in a certain way, and in which sensitivity,
through its instinct, operates. It is, moreover, neces
sary to suppose the variety of these germs, of which
the numberless varieties of animals produced by the
plastic force of the instinct are the result. Hence the
necessity of having recourse to an intelligence acting
from without. Only in this way can we give a rational
account of how the atoms, instead of being loosely dis
persed through the infinity of space, were found
distributed in various groups, forming so many animal
germs ; how these germs, each differing from the others,
yet each perfect in its kind, came to be composed and
fashioned with such wisdom as to afford to the action
of the sensitive instinct the occasion of developing a
perfect animal body with \vell ordered parts, a body in
which life, excitation, individuality of feeling would be
preserved and reproduced in a perpetual circle ; and
lastly, how all the parts, while developing in the
manner best suited to their relation with one another,
concurred in producing a complex of harmonious
effects I mean that one sole feeling into which the
innumerable feelings which constitute the animal are
absorbed.
461. If we furthermore consider that every animal,
to preserve itself, must be in relation with the external
and sensiferous world, and must act on it, and produce
Law of the Least Means in the Universe, 439
in it diverse effects, which are necessary for its pre
servation and reproduction, we shall everywhere fall
in with vestiges of the Law of the Least Action ; and
these vestiges will be seen in greater variety and more
manifestly in proportion as progress is made in this
kind of studies.
462. Even now we may say with all truth that all
the movements made by animals are regulated by the
Law of the Least Action. Indeed, animals do not by
any means make all the movements they could make ;
they invariably select those which, all things con
sidered", give them greater pleasure with less labour.
Thus, for example, an animal that could walk
on two legs will walk on all fours so long as it finds
this the more comfortable posture. Every animal lies
down, disposes its limbs, carries its body in the most
agreeable way, although it would at the same time
have the power of placing itself in a different posture.
What determines it is always the principle of doing
the least possible for the one sole end of getting the
greatest pleasure it can get under the circumstances.
The very pace and habits of movement in animals are
entirely regulated by this principle ; and the stopping,
running, leaping, and the thousand and one other
performances observable in these creatures, all depend
on it.
463. The same principle determines the sounds
emitted by the various kinds of animals. As a rule,
each kind has the physical power of producing several
sounds ; but it keeps constantly to one, whether it be
a roar, or a grunt, or a hiss, or a song, or any other
form or cry ; it keeps to the one that costs it less labour,
with an equal or a greater pleasure. And here I would
44 On Divine Providence.
observe by the way, that the same principle is available
even for explaining the multiplicity of tongues and of
dialects in mankind. The organs of speech variously
modified produce different sounds ; and men, in virtue
of the Law of the Least Means, adopt those which,
relatively to them, are more spontaneous than others ;
although their organs could produce others equally
well.
464. I should never come to an end if I were to
consider in detail the habitats and the nests which
different animals construct for themselves. Suffice it
to say that in these constructions the Law of the Least
Means is invariably maintained, and sometimes accord
ing to strict geometrical rule; as may be seen, for
instance, in the famous example of the bees.
It is well known that their cells have all a perfectly
hexagonal form. Now, as a matter of fact, the hexagon
is, among all possible polygons, that which occupies
the least space. But this is not all : these hexagonal
cells terminate with a pyramidal bottom by means of
the union of three rhombi similar and equal to one
another. The angles which these rhombi might make
when joined in the form of a pyramid are countless,
and the pyramid would, of course, be acute or obtuse
in exact proportion to the degrees of the angles chosen
for it. But what angles do the bees constantly prefer
in their work? Maraldi examined them with the
greatest care, and found that the larger ones measure
generally 109 degrees 28 minutes, and the smaller 70
degrees 32 minutes. Now Koenig, a distinguished
mathematician, undertook to solve the following
problem: "What ought to be the angles of an
hexagonal cellule with a pyramidal bottom, in order
Law of the Least Means in the Universe. 441
that the least possible quantity of material may be
required for its construction?" As the result of his
calculations he found that the larger angles of the
rhombi ought to be of 109 degrees 26 minutes, and the
smaller angles of 70 degrees 34 minutes. Moreover,
he demonstrated that the bees, by preferring the
pyramidal to a flat bottom, effect a saving in regard
to that quantity of wax which would be necessary for
making the flat bottom, with the further advantage of
acquiring a larger and more convenient space.
The construction of the honey-comb on such nice
geometrical principles is, no doubt, the necessary effect
of instinct. But whence this instinct? It certainly
cannot be found in the concept of sensitivity; because
sensitivity, as such, is indifferent as to any particular
kind of action; to act in this or that special way, it
requires to be determined. What is it that determines
it ? It is, as we have said, the organization, namely,
that suitable union of the atoms to which sensitivity
together with its instinctive force adheres as to its term,
and by which it allows itself to be directed and moved
in sundry ways. Again, whence this collocation of
atoms, which gives rise to the germ of the bee, and
from the germ to its tiny body, constructed and
quickened in such a way as to determine the instinct
that forms the honey-comb? The cause of this does
not lie in the nature of the atoms any more than in
that of sensitivity ; it lies, therefore, in an intelli
gence external to the bees, superior to and ruling all
nature.
The Law of the Least Action, then, is a law belonging
solely to intelligence ; yet it is found invariably main
tained in all the real beings forming the universe.
442 On Divine Providence.
Consequently, the universe is directed and governed
by an intelligence.
465. It is precisely from this great truth that those
logical rules are derived which the most celebrated
students of nature have laid down for the guidance of
all who wish to understand and interpret nature aright
and to discover its secrets.
Such are the two which Sir Isaac Newton expressed
as follows:
i st. " In explaining the facts of nature, more causes
must not be admitted than are truly such, and at the
same time sufficient to account for those facts."
2nd. "Those facts of nature which are of the same
species must, as far as possible, be explained by
the same causes; as for example, a stone s falling to
the ground in Europe and in America, or the reflec
tion of light on the earth and in the planets." (i)
These two rules are true simply because, as Galileo
had already said before Newton, "Nature, as all agree,
does not employ many things where she can do with
few; she does much with little." And this is nothing
but the principle of the Least Action or the Least Means,
universally admitted by naturalists under various
denominations, and sometimes under that of "Law of
Parsimony." (2)
(1) 1 Causas rerum naturalium non plures admitti debere, quam quce
et -vercE sint et earum ph<znomenis explicandis sufficiunt.
2 Effectuiim naturalium ejusdem generis e&dem assignandce sunt
causes, quatenus fieri potest, ut descensus lapidum in Europa et in America,
reflexionis lucis in terra et in planetis.
(2) John Bernoulli enunciates the principle in these words : "It is truly
a wonderful thing to see how all the productions of nature take place in
perfect accord with the universally admitted metaphysical canon, which
Law of the Least Means in the Universe. 443
says : Nature does nothing in vain, always goes by the shortest road ;
never employs many things to do that which can be done by few "
(Mirari satis non possumus, quod natures effectus conspirent semper
cum generalissimo canone metaphysico, qui nobis dictat : Naturam nihil
facere frustra, semper agere per -viam breviorem ; quce possunt fieri per
pauca, nunquam a natura fieri per plura"} (Oper. T. IV., p. 271).
CHAPTER IX.
THE SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS PUT FORWARD IS
CONTAINED IN WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOVE.
466. The Law of the Least Means, then, is the law of
sufficient reason in so far as this law determines wis
dom s mode of action. It is regularly maintained in
all nature, in all real being, insensitive as well as sen
sitive, but has not its cause in nature itself; thus
plainly showing that the real beings forming the uni
verse are governed by an intelligence.
The Law of the Least Means becomes likewise the
law of virtue when it is considered in relation with
moral liberty, namely, with the love which is found in
intellective being, and with will.
It follows that, if the way in which God acts in
regard to men were not regulated by the Law of the
Least Means, He would fail in the attribute of goodness
no less than in that of wisdom. Such is the corollary
to the establishing of which was directed all that has
been said thus far regarding the Law of the Least Means.
This corollary is of very special importance .in con
nexion with our argument ; because it is on it that we
propose to take our stand in discussing the objections
which we have undertaken to solve in this book.
467. The objectors say that God does not treat men
with supreme goodness :
i st. Because He does not with certainty of effect
Solution of Objections Found. 445
move the will of all men alike to moral good, as He
could certainly do without destroying their liberty.
sndly. Because He does not communicate moral
good to men without at the same time obliging them
to self-sacrifice, whereas the good which they would
merit by sacrifice could be easily supplied by a more
liberal communication on His part.
3rdly. Because He does not move the will of all
men to moral good with irresistible efficacy, at least at
the moment of their death, as He also could do if He
chose. True, their meritorious liberty might thus be
destroyed ; but the good which could be gained by the
use of this liberty might be compensated by the great
ness of the good He directly communicates to them.
Obviously, these assertions suppose that the good
ness of God, to be supreme, must do the three things
expressed in them ; and if it does not, it is not sup
reme. But I would ask : is this supposition true ? The
question is a very grave one ; for if the supposition is
false, the objections are nothing but castles built in the
air, in fact mere exhibitions of human ignorance and
human rashness. Now, after all that we have said, it
is evident that, to prove that the supposition is true,
one must prove that God, if He does not act in the way
stated, acts in opposition to the Law of the Least Means;
for this, and no other, is the law that determines the
operations of wisdom and of goodness. Unless, there
fore, our objectors can prove at least with some show
of probability, that God by not doing as they would
wish, violates this law, their objections come to
naught.
Now, can such proof be given r If they think it can,
I have no hesitation in saying that upon making the
446 On Divine Providence.
attempt, they will find themselves hopelessly disap
pointed. Let us see.
468. It is plain, that in order to move all men to
moral good with certainty of effect, God would have to
do in them more than He does at present. For, now
He does move some in this manner, but to others
He only gives the power to reach salvation if they
will, permitting at the same time that through their
own fault they should be lost. To please our objectors,
therefore, He must, as I have said, put forth in men
a greater quantity of action than He does under the
existing system.
It is likewise plain, that if God wished to dispense men
from all sacrifice, and to compensate them for the moral
good that they would thus lose, by directly communi
cating to them a corresponding increase of that same
good, He would, again, have to do much more than He
does now, and consequently employ a proportionately
larger quantity of action.
Moreover, it is evident, that if God wished to move
the will of all men generally with an efficacy so power
ful as to determine it to final moral good without the
forces of liberty being able to withstand that move
ment, He must do vastly more than He does
now, that is to say, He must largely increase the
quantity of the action He now puts forth in men for
their advantage.
Increased quantity of action on the part of God, then,
is in reality what our objectors insist upon as requisite
for entitling Him to be truly called supremely good in
His dealings with mankind.
469. Let us, then, for the moment, and only for the
sake of argument, entertain the supposition that God,
Solution of Objections Fotind. 447
changing as it were His mind, had decided on using,
in favour of mankind, a greater amount of action than
He does in the system now in force. Would it follow
that this increased action must be directed to obtain
precisely the three things demanded by our objectors?
It is beyond all question that whatever be the amount
of action which God wishes to use, He must use it in
accordance with the law of wisdom, which, as we have
shown, is that of the least quantity of action or of the
Least Means. To prove, therefore, that any increase of
action which God might employ in His creatures must
produce exactly the three things referred to, it would
be necessary, first, to demonstrate that those things
are the best effect or the greatest good which God could
under any circumstances obtain from such increase.
For, as we have seen, a quantity of action is called least
when it is applied in such a way as to bring about the
greatest result possible.
Hence the objections of our adversaries cannot begin
to be of any weight until they produce an irrefragable
demonstration of the truth of the following proposi
tion :
" The quantity of action which would be necessary
for effecting the three things that have been indicated,
or two of them, or one as for example for obtaining
that all men, from first to last, should be saved could
not, by any possibility be employed for a greater good
than this."
This is what these objectors, if they understand the
true nature of the question at issue, are bound to prove,
before their objections can claim to be of any force.
470. Now, have they ever tried to bring this proof?
Nay, have they ever even so much as dreamed that it
448 On Divine Providence.
was their duty to do so ? If not, as is certainly the case,
then I have still the right to reply that their objections
are no better than gratuitous assertions, ignorant and
audacious pretensions to teach the Creator the way in
which He ought to conduct Himself in His operations.
To say to the Creator : " If you wish me to esteem you
supremely wise and good, you must act precisely in the
manner that I think right and proper," and at the same
time to hold oneself dispensed from the obligation of
showing why He ought to do so, is certainly a strange
mode of proceeding.
471. But it is a great deal more than this. Not
only have these objectors never understood what it was
that they had to prove in order that their allegations,
instead of being purely arbitrary, might have some
claim to be called arguments; not only have they
never bethought themselves of their obligation to grap
ple with that difficulty ; but it can further be demon
strated that the difficulty is such as to transcend all
the powers of human intelligence. Only the Infinite
Intelligence can solve the great problem involved in it.
I will explain.
472. A government presiding over a multitude of
intelligent beings is as perfect as can be expected, when
it obtains the greatest amount of good possible with the
means at its disposal, even though evils should un
avoidably happen to be mixed up with that good.
This proposition I firmly believe to be true ; and those
who wish to see my proofs of it have only to refer to
the place where I have given them in another work, (i)
(i) See Society and its Aim ("La Societi ed il suo Fine "), Bk. iv., ch.
viii.-x.
Solution of Objections Found. 449
To reduce this proposition to a form suitable to our
present argument, we will transform it (as mathema
ticians do with equations) into this other, which is
perfectly the same in meaning : "A government, to be
perfect, must direct its provisions in such a way that
the governmental action which it employs shall obtain
an amount of good which is the greatest possible, even
after due allowance has been made for the evils which
the same action is apt to entail, because then the end
is obtained with an action which is relatively least." In
order, therefore, that the sum total of good that remains
after deducting the evils may be truly the greatest
possible, it is not necessary that it should be distributed
among a large rather than among a small number of
individuals (saving always what rightfully belongs to
each) ; all that is necessary is that its amount, after the
evils have been deducted, should be the greatest pos
sible, (i) In fact, let us suppose a case in which the
quantity of action at the disposal of the government
could be employed in two ways by being directed to
obtain two different composite effects, each greatest in its
kind. One is a sum of goods secured without the ad
mixture of any evils whatever ; and the other is a sum of
goods which are accompanied with evils, in such wise,
however, that upon striking the balance between the
goods and the evils, there remains a net total of good of
such magnitude as to form the very largest of all the
totals possible. Which of the two ways will a wise
government choose ? Undoubtedly the second ; because
then its action will in truth be employed to by far the
best advantage, and therefore in accordance with the
(i) Ibid.
2 G
450 On Divine Providence.
law of wisdom, the Law of the Least Means applied to
obtain the maximum of effect.
This reasoning implies that goods and evils are
counterbalanced in the simplicity of the human soul,
and, like two weights placed in opposite scales,
neutralize each other ; so that an evil compensated by
a good largely outweighing it, ceases to be an evil,
and man himself in this case willingly embraces that evil
from love of the good that is conjoined with it. (i)
To this we must add, that when there is question of a
ruler who is supremely good, the interior comparison
of which I speak is made by him also. For, to him
also it is a source of satisfaction to produce good, as it
is a source of pain to see the evils that mix themselves
up with the good; hence, if he is truly such as we
suppose him to be, he will unquestionably choose that
mode of action which, all things considered, gives him
the greatest amount of good.
Contrariwise, if a ruler had good reason to know that
by producing the greatest good possible without the
admixture of any evils, the sum total obtained would
exceed the net sum of that which he would produce with
an admixture of evils, it would unquestionably be in
keeping with his perfect goodness to produce good
alone, to the exclusion of all evil.
473. If these principles are applied to God s govern
ment of His intelligent creatures, it will be readily
seen what a difficult thesis our adversaries are bound
to maintain in order that their objections may have
force. For their contention is that God ought to
save all men, and, moreover, ought to free them
(i) This also I have demonstrated in the place quoted above.
Sohition of Objections Found. 451
from all evils. Now, according to what we have said,
this would not show Him to be supremely good, unless
it were true that, by saving all men, or freeing them
from all evils, He obtained an absolute maximum of
good relatively to the quantity of action or of the means
employed by Him in other words, a sum total of good
larger than He could obtain by permitting that some
men should be lost, or that they should suffer some
evils. The objectors must, therefore, prove that the thing
is so, namely, they must prove that the fresh quantity of
action which they want Him to put forth in accomp
lishing their object could not be spent more advan
tageously; or, what is the same thing, they must prove
that the said fresh quantity of action would, by being
directed to prevent the said evils, produce a good
absolutely greater than it would by being employed
in producing other goods, though mixed with evils.
Indeed, is it quite clear that, in case God were to
decide on employing that fresh quantity of action
which is demanded of Him, He could not draw from
it a good greater than the salvation of all men, or the
freeing of all from pain ? Could He not, for example,
by the same quantity of action applied according to the
law of wisdom, multiply the number of intelligent
natures, and thus bring about a good beyond all calcu
lation ? Who can say, who can demonstrate with
certainty, that the same increase of action could not,
through another combination of circumstances, be
made to produce a good incomparably greater than the
evil which it is desired to eliminate ? What man,
what angel will be able to grapple with a problem
like this ? Would not the solution of it require before
hand what it would be an absurdity to expect from any
452 On Divine Providence.
finite intelligence, a thorough knowledge of all the
ways in which God could apply and utilize that quantity
of action ? Is it not, then, a proof of gross ignorance,
an unpardonable temerity, to demand of God : ist. that
He should employ in the government of His creatures
a greater quantity of action than He does, and
2ndly. that He should employ it, not in the way that
His wisdom directs, but in the way that seems good
in our eyes ?
Of a certainty, when we allow ourselves to be so
impressed by the sight of human evils that we would
forthwith have them banished from off the face of the
earth, we act blindly ; we think of only one thing ; we
do not consider that the quantity of action which would
suffice to remove those evils might perhaps be differ
ently used, and in the hands of God yield an amount
of good which, although accompanied with evils,
would, upon striking the balance, be found infinitely
to preponderate.
It is, therefore, a mere illusion to affirm that God, to
be supremely good, ought to permit no evil ; it is a
prejudice, a gratuitous proposition neither proved, nor,
as we have just shown, capable of proof. Our objectors
have not the faintest notion of this. Carried away by
their feelings, they take no time for sober reflection,
and a mistaken pronouncement is the consequence.
Certainly, the Law of theLeast Action does not include
the condition that " the quantity of action employed by
a wise being must produce good alone, unmixed with
evils." The only thing which this law determines is,
that, " the quantity of action employed by a wise being
must produce an effect which, after due allowance is
made for any evils that may accompany it, shall still
Solution of Objections Found. 453
prove the best among all the effects that are possible."
But the mode in which wisdom as well as goodness
operates is guided by nothing else than the Law of the
Least Action. Therefore, the condition which it is pre
tended to impose on God does not belong to the law of
wisdom and of goodness. Therefore, it is not true that
God, in order to show Himself perfectly wise and
good, must follow that condition. Therefore, the fact
of evils mixing themselves up with His works, gives
us no right to conclude that He is any the less wise
and good on that account.
474. Nor is this all. By imposing on Divine
Wisdom a condition not beseeming it, our adversaries,
in reality, aim at the destruction of that very Wisdom.
For, how can that be wisdom, which operates accord
ing to laws at variance with the law of wisdom,
and therefore foolishly r Hence, when they complain
of God, they in reality find fault with Him for not
being, like themselves, deluded by folly. Such is the
true outcome of those objections which, to human
shortsightedness, seem at first to present so grave and
serious an appearance.
475. A problem cannot be solved aright unless it be
cleared of all the conditions that have nothing to do
with its nature. The problem of wisdom is this:
"What is the greatest good that can be obtained by a
given quantity of action?" Our objectors insist on
adding to it the condition that "the greatest good
must have no evil conjoined with it;" and thus by an
arbitrary ipse dixit they render the solution of the pro
blem of wisdom impossible. For the problem of wisdom
they substitute one that is altogether different and very
much more restricted. But God, Who by His very
454 On Divine Providence.
essence is guided in His operations by wisdom, will
assuredly not heed their criticisms, and will continue
to act in a manner worthy of Himself.
476. This Divine mode of action shows us in fact
that the great problem of wisdom, with whose arduous-
ness only the Infinite Mind can cope, is solved by God
thus: "A given quantity of action obtains a larger
sum of net good by permitting the admixture of some
evil, than it would yield if no evils were permitted."
This is a comment on the famous words of St.
Augustine : Deus satius duxit dc malis bonafacere, quant
nulla mala csse pcrmittcre (" God judged it a better thing
to draw good out of evils than not to permit any evils
at all"), (i)
(i) Although I could not endorse the Optimist Theory in the general
way in which Leibnitz has expressed it, nevertheless I think I may venture
to say, that if one were to imagine all the possible worlds in which the
quantity of action employed for the attainment of good was not the least
possible, every one of these worlds would be set aside by Divine Wisdom in
favour of that wherein good would be secured by the least quantity of
action. The reason is that this is essentially wisdom s law of action.
Hence that world in which this law is observed is better than all those in
which it is not observed; because " The works of God are perfect " (Deu-
teron. xxxii. 4). We may therefore apply here Valla s Dialogue on
Divine Providence, continued with such nice discrimination by Leibnitz.
To be brief, I shall give it in the words in which Fontenelle in his eulogy of
Leibnitz summarises it : "There is a dialogue by Lorenzo Valla, in which
this author, by a fiction, represents Sextus, the son of Tarquinius the Proud,
as going to Delphi to consult the oracle on his destiny. Apollo predicts to
him that he will violate Lucretia. Sextus complains of that prediction.
Apollo replies that he has no fault in the matter, inasmuch as he is merely
the augur ; that every thing had been arranged by Jupiter, to whom, there
fore, all complaints should be made. With this the dialogue ends ; and
we may see by it that Valla saves the prescience of God at the expense of
His Goodness. Not so Leibnitz. He continues Valla s fiction in accordance
with his own system. Sextus goes to Dodona, and complains to Jupiter on
account of the crime to which he is destined. Jupiter answers him that all
he has to do is not to go to Rome; Sextus, however, openly declares that
Solution of Objections Found. 455
he will not renounce the hope of obtaining the kingdom, and he departs.
Then Theodore, the High Priest, asks Jupiter why he has not given to
Sextus a different will. Jupiter sends Theodore to Athens to consult
Minerva. She introduces him into the palace of destinies, where there are
to be seen, designed on the walls, all the possible universes from the worst
to the best. In this last, Theodore finds the crime of Sextus, and, springing
from it, the liberty of Rome, a government prolific of virtues, an empire
that will greatly benefit a vast portion of the human race ; whereupon Theo
dore has not one word more to say."
If, instead of saying, as in the dialogue, that the universes designed on the
walls in the palace of destinies were " the worst and the best," we say that
they were " those in which the Law of the Least Means is not maintained,"
and " those in which it is maintained," and that the crime of Sextus, or
other crimes, were found in the latter, then the fiction will answer
admirably as an illustration of my thought. Only it must be remembered
that the going or not going to Rome depended on the free-will of Sextus.
His crime, therefore, was attributable to himself, not willed by Jupiter,
but permitted because of the greater good that would ensue from it.
CHAPTER X.
ANSWER TO THE ALLEGATION THAT " FOR GOD TO DO
MORE OR TO DO LESS IS ALL THE SAME; FOR
NEITHER COSTS HIM ANYTHING."
477. The objections raised by our opponents, then,
are in reality indications of a superficial mind, and,
when carefully examined, vanish into nothing.
As, however, we find ourselves dealing with objec
tions which the vulgar raise against Divine Providence
by consulting, not the reasons intrinsic to good
government, but their own desires and subjective
affections, we will stop to meet another of these
objections, which is quite as shallow as those we have
indicated.
It is often said : It costs God nothing to employ
in favour of His creatures any quantity of action He
pleases. With Him there is no question of more or of
less ; for He has no need to economize force. Even if
He were to expend such quantity of action as could,
by being used in another way, obtain a greater good,
it would not follow from this, that that greater good
need be lost. For, He could, if He chose, obtain it by
adding another quantity of action sufficient to produce
it. But could not this second quantity of action also
be utilized for producing a still greater good? yes, it
is replied ; but this good also could be obtained by a
third increase of action. And what do you say of the
Objection: Action costs God nothing. 457
possibility of this new increase of action producing 1 a
yet greater good by being differently employed? We
grant this possibility, is again the reply; still you must
not forget that that same good could be obtained by a
further increase of action, and so ad infinitum; because
God is infinite, and His action has no assignable limits.
478. This reasoning, if the reader reflects, is like
the suggestion made to the Duke of Urbino when the
excavations for the foundations of his magnificent
palace were being proceeded with. Castiglione relates
that there was some difficulty in disposing of the earth
dug out of those excavations, and that one of the
courtiers advised the Duke to have a large hole dug
for the purpose. Upon the Duke s asking how they
were to dispose of the material that would be displaced
by the making of the hole, that sage gentleman replied
that the hole should be made larger so as to hold all.
The Duke tried to explain to him that this would not
mend matters, because a larger hole would imply a
larger quantity of material thrown up, and therefore
the necessity of finding more room in which to deposit
it; but all in vain. The courtier still went on insisting
that the hole should be made larger and larger until it
should hold all the earth they required to dispose of;
and nothing the Duke and the bystanders could say
had any effect in bringing him to see the hallucination
under which he was labouring.
479. But to answer the objection directly, I will say
that it contains two errors, indeed two absurdities.
The first is, that if the Law of the Least Action is, as I
have demonstrated, essentially the law of wisdom, to
pretend that God should abandon it and follow a dif
ferent law, is the same as to require that He should
45 8 On Divine Providence .
act foolishly. The thought of God abandoning in His
works the Law of the Least Action could only be enter
tained by persons who do not understand this law, who
do not see that it constitutes intelligence itself, and at
the same time do not realize to themselves the fact
that, in the eyes of a supremely good ruler, evils are
no evils when they produce a good far outweighing
them in the balance, even as in the thermometer the
degrees of cold would be neutralized if they were the
means of producing an increased intensity of heat.
480. The second error and absurdity contained in
the objection now before us lies in the supposition that
God can produce an infinite quantity of action outside
Himself. I say outside Himself, because the quantity
of action which we are speaking of here, is that pro
duced by Him in the universe, which may be considered
as an aggregate of means and of ends. The ends are
the good produced, namely, the complex and final sum
of moral-eudemonological good. The means are all
the entities and the actions directed to that production.
The Law of the Least quantity of Action obtains when
the sum of the means is the least that could be used
relatively to the sum of the ends, or vice versa, when
the sum of the ends is the greatest that could be
relatively to that of the means used. Now, neither
the one nor the other of these two sums can ever
be infinite, although God Who produces them is in
finite.
481. But it is urged : If the Goodness of God is, as
it must be, infinite, will it not naturally wish to diffuse
itself infinitely? And if it wishes to diffuse itself
infinitely, why not produce infinite beings, in which it
would find no limits whatever ? Would not a refusal
Objection: Action costs God nothing. 459
to acknowledge this power in God, amount to a limit
ing of His Omnipotence ?
I answer that it would not; for it is not limiting
God s Omnipotence to say that He cannot do absurdi
ties. Absurdities have no place in the great ocean of
being.
Now, if it is maintained that the finite beings to be
created by God ought to have been infinite in number,
the absurdity would be manifest. An infinite number
is a contradiction in terms ; since every number must
necessarily be determinate, and consequently suscep
tible of addition or increase. On the other hand, each
of these beings must always remain finite, that is to
say, limited to a certain quantity of good ; and likewise
the means that would have to be employed for leading
it to the good of which it is capable, must be limited
as to quantity.
482. If it is further maintained that each created
being, in order that God might exhibit an infinite
goodness towards it, must be infinite in its nature, then
we have another absurdity not less glaring than the
first. Plurality of beings, and infinity, present two
mutually contradictory concepts ; hence there can be
only one infinite ; and that is God Himself. His
Goodness is indeed diffused and displayed infinitely,
but only within Himself, by those mysterious opera
tions whereby He subsists in three Persons. But if
the Goodness of God extends infinitely within Himself,
who is to hinder it from diffusing itself also in the
creation of finite beings, by communicating to them
such good as they are capable of? Would not the
denial of this power in God be a limiting of His
Goodness on the plea that it is illimitable ? Grant that
460 On Divine Providence.
the action of this Goodness supposes first of all an
infinite object, and if I may say so, an infinite pro
duction. This, we have just said, is found in the
Generation of the Eternal Word and in the Procession
of the Holy Spirit. But after this, seeing that finite
beings also, capable of a limited measure of good, are
possible, on what ground can God be forbidden to
create them ? Are they, then, evil things ? or rather, is
not each of them good, though limited ?
483. On the other hand, no limited being (and
therefore not even our objectors) will ever put forward
such an objection, if he really knows what it means ;
for there is no created being endowed with understand
ing who does not love his own existence, and all the
good it is capable of, and who does not consider the
one as well as the other as a signal benefit of the
goodness of God.
484. Now, since it is not only not repugnant, but
supremely in harmony with the nature of the Divine
Goodness, that besides displaying itself infinitely within
the Infinite Being, that goodness should also exhibit
itself in finite beings by creating them and enriching
them with the endowments of which they are capable ;
it plainly follows that no further room is left for objec
tions which one might be disposed to raise concerning
the greatness of these beings. For, what human
intelligence will pretend to be able to fix the exact
measure of that greatness, so that God could not choose
another either above or below it? Is not the very
thought of such a pretension ridiculous ? And then,
be the measure fixed by man what it may, it will always
remain finite, and hence infinitely distant from infinity.
The quantity of real entity to be given to creatures
Objection: Action costs God nothing. 461
cannot, therefore, be determined simply by reference to
the concept of Divine Goodness ; its determination must
be allowed to rest entirely with God s free-will, or at
least one must find some other way of explaining
it. (i)
485. In creation, then, however its interminable
expanse may exceed all human imagination, there can
only exist a finite quantity of real entity ; beings limited
in nature, in greatness, in number, have limited ends,
and means likewise limited.
Accordingly, although the Divine Goodness is in
itself unlimited, nevertheless, w T hen it produces con
tingent being, it becomes subject to a kind of limitation,
not in itself, but belonging necessarily to the effect
produced by it. For, the capacity of good, in finite
being, is finite. (2)
486. It only remains, therefore, that the Divine
goodness should diffuse itself as far as is consistent
with the capacity of created being, observing in this
also the law of wisdom. Let us see what is the extent
of the capacity of intellective moral created being,
whose good alone can be the aim of creation (423).
(1) I do not by this intend to deny that it would be possible to introduce
here one of the most elevated questions that could be asked, namely :
"Whether the goodness of God, which, because infinite, certainly tends to
produce the greatest good, when considered in relation to the finite beings
that are possible, contains in itself any principle of congruity of a kind to
determine in some way the greatness and the number of created beings."
It is not, however, necessary for me to enter into so deep a question here,
as my argument remains complete and perfectly conclusive apart from it. I
shall therefore, reserve it for treatment in the Cosmology.
(2) The capacity of finite being is finite in this sense, that, whatever gift
may be bestowed upon this kind of being, it can only be bestowed in a
finite measure.
462 On Divine Providence.
487. The intellective-moral being, man for example,,
is so constituted, that on the one hand, as we have seen,
he partakes of the infinite, namely, in so far as he has
the intuition of ideal being; and on the other, he pos
sesses reality in a finite measure ; and hence, as a real
being, he is finite. The fact of his reaching unto the
infinite in the sphere of ideality makes him capable of
an infinite extrinsic end. Accordingly, God, Whose
goodness has no bounds, has ordained His intelligent
creatures to the fruition of Himself; and under this
aspect it is said with truth that the blessed in heaven,
who have obtained their great end, see all the entire
Essence of God. But as all created real beings are
finite, so they never can have the reality of God com
municated to them entirely. Hence it is also very
justly said that the blessed in heaven see all God, but
not all that He is (totum scd non totaliter) ; and again,
that they see God, but do not comprehend Him : and
of God it is said that He is incomprehensible, and that
He dwells in light inaccessible.
488. Nor would it be of any avail to reply that God,
in communicating His reality to intellective beings,
neither confounds nor identifies Himself with them,
but always remains outside them. For, not only are
the faculties and forces of a finite real being finite, but
it is also necessary that the objects, in so far as they
adapt themselves to the act of those faculties, become
in a certain way finite. Hence, it is an absurdity, a
contradiction in terms, to imagine an act of a finite real
being arriving at the perception of God in His totality.
To explain this by a simile, though very far from ade
quate, we \vill suppose a man s hand touching a body
immensely larger than itself, the earth for example.
Objection : Action costs God nothing. 463
The hand cannot cover in this body any more space
than corresponds to the extent of its own surface. Now,
if the globe of the earth could have such unity and sim
plicity that no division could be conceived in it, we
might then say that the hand touches the whole earth,
but not all of it.
489. From this it follows that, assuming that God
has proposed to enrich an intelligent creature with His
gifts, it is in conformity with His infinite goodness that
He should give that creature, for its extrinsic end, the
infinite good, namely, His own reality, because it is
capable of receiving so great a gift. But if it be asked
in what measure He can communicate to it His own
reality, the reply must be : " in a limited measure."
490. If it were further desired to investigate to what
extent the greatness of this measure may be increased,
we would leave the inquirer to choose the answer which
seems to him best : whether he thinks he can determine
in some way its extreme limit, or prefers to say with St.
Thomas that it may always be indefinitely increased,
provided it always remains finite. Both answers would
serve our present purpose equally well, because both
bring us to the same conclusion, namely, that the real
good which God can communicate to a finite being
must always be limited in quantity.
491. It is true that if we hold that the said measure
may be indefinitely ( i ) increased, there no longer remains
any sufficient reason to determine its quantity ; since
in that case God might choose equally well a given
measure or a larger. This choice would then depend
(i) An indefinite quantity means a quantity which can always be increased
without ever becoming actually infinite.
464 On Divine Providence.
entirely on His liberty, whose act would thus constitute
its sole sufficient reason. And although this follows
from the things said above, yet it may be better seen
by arguing thus. Suppose that God had determined
upon a certain measure of good to be distributed
among His creatures; could it be affirmed that He
ought to have chosen a larger measure, say twice as
large ? Certainly not; because if it were twice as large
it might be still doubled, and then doubled again, and
so on indefinitely, without ever reaching infinity. There
are therefore only two alternatives between which to
choose: either the good which God destines for His
creatures must be infinite, or else it must be limited
to a finite quantity. The first alternative is absurd;
therefore only the second remains. But every finite
quantity, increase it as you may, never approaches
infinity; because the finite is always infinitely distant
from the infinite. Therefore the action of prescribing
to the goodness of God one measure rather than another
is preposterous. If there were a reason for demanding
one increase, there would be exactly the same reason
for demanding a second, and then a third, and a fourth,
and we should never come to the end ; hence we should
never be able to determine a measure, which never
theless must necessarily be determinate.
It remains manifest, therefore, in every system, that,
whether there be a sufficient reason to determine by
way of congruity the measure of the good which God
has to distribute among His creatures, or whether this
determination depend purely on an act of His free-will,
it is always equally certain that the good destined for
His creatures must be of a limited quantity.
492. The direct consequence of this is, that the
Objection: Action costs God nothing. 465
quantity of action which God employs in producing
the said good cannot be infinite; it must be limited.(i)
493. But the law of wisdom requires that this
quantity of action, whatever it may happen to be,
should be the least possible relatively to its effect, or
that its effect should be the greatest possible relatively
to the quantity of action. Therefore, supposing that
God, in surveying, so to speak, all the effects obtainable
by that quantity of action variously employed, were
to find that the one containing the greatest complex
good would be that which consists, not of goods alone,
but of goods mixed with evils and often occasioned by
them ; we should be bound to say that it would be in
accordance with His infinite wisdom to prefer the latter,
because this would in reality give what His goodness
invariably aims at the maximum of good.
494. If, then, in the idea of the universe which
served as exemplar to the creative power, God saw
that the sins committed by men, and the ruin of those
( i ) St. Thomas touches in many places upon the question Whether God
does that which is best ; " and he distinguishes between a material and a
formal best. He excludes the first, which in truth is no best at all, but he
admits the second. In one place he proposes the following objection:
" Nature always does that which is best, and God much more so. But it
would be better if there were many worlds than if there were one only ;
because many good things are worth more than a few good things." And
he answers thus : " No wise operator aims at material plurality as his end ;
because material plurality has no fixed limit, but tends by its nature to the
indefinite. Now, the indefinite is repugnant with the notion of end. But
when we say that many worlds are better than one, we speak according to
material multitude. This kind of best does not belong to the intention
of God operating ; because, if He had made two worlds, we might with the
same reason say that He ought to have made three ; and so on indefinitely "
(S. p. I., q. XLVIL, art. III., ad 2m). From this we can infer that the
Angelic Doctor admits the formal best as belonging to the end which God
proposes to Himself.
2 H
466 On Divine Providence.
who are lost, were evils necessary for obtaining the
greatest good possible by means of the least action
possible, He could not have prevented such without
deviating from the law of wisdom and goodness, from
which laws He cannot deviate in His works, because
He is essentially Wisdom and Goodness itself.
495. Now, what we have said above shows that the
thing might have been so ; and no human intelligence
can prove the contrary. Therefore our objectors have
not shown why the sins committed by men and the loss
of the reprobate, although they might have been pre
vented by God s power, should be deemed repugnant
with the concept of His wisdom and goodness. There
fore their objections have no weight whatever, but are
simply prejudices of ignorant temerity.
CHAPTER XI.
POSITIVE ARGUMENTS, TENDING TO SHOW THAT THE
MORAL AND EUDEMONOLOGICAL EVILS WHICH
OCCUR IN THE UNIVERSE, FAR FROM MILITATING
AGAINST THE WISDOM AND GOODNESS OF GOD, ARE
A PROOF OF THEM. PRELIMINARY NOTIONS ON THE
WAY OF MEASURING THE QUANTITY OF ACTION IN
ORDER TO ASCERTAIN IF IT BE THE LEAST POS
SIBLE.
496. No one is justified in saying that the sins to
which men are subject, and the consequent loss of the
reprobate, evince a want of goodness on the part of
God, Who does not prevent them although He could
do so ; because it lies altogether beyond the power of
human intelligence to prove that those evils could be
removed from the world without a violation of the law
of wisdom, which is that of the Least quantity of Action.
And this suffices for vindicating Divine Providence.
But if it is impossible for our opponents to prove that
the evils in question are not necessary, to the end that
the universe may be formed and governed by the least
quantity of action, will it be impossible for us to
prove the direct contrary, namely, that the said evils
are so necessary, that, without them, the Law of
the Least Action an essential condition of Infinite
Goodness and Wisdom could not be maintained ?
I think not. And even if the proofs that are within
our reach had no other force than that of probable
468 On Divine Providence.
conjecture, it would still be a consoling and useful
labour to collect them together : for, although they are
not necessary for vindicating Infinite Goodness, they
nevertheless help the mind of man to raise itself up to
it, and they strengthen his faith and trust in the
Creator and Preserver of all things.
I will, therefore, begin here to set forth this surplusage
of proofs, if it may be so called, and I venture to hope
that intelligent readers will in the end find them to be
much more than conjectural indeed, to be rigorously
demonstrative. But since the field upon which I make
bold to enter yields an inexhaustible harvest, I only
propose to gather some few sheaves, as it were, feeling
certain as I do that, even if we were to garner a far
larger store, there would still remain very much more
for others to reap.
497. To demonstrate, therefore, that the very evils
of the present as well as of the future life, far from
being any reason for our thinking disparagingly of the
infinite wisdom and goodness of God, are a powerful
motive for our magnifying it all the more, we must first
of all investigate how the quantity of action may be
measured, and then prove that this quantity, to be the
least, must admit of evils.
498. In this investigation it is necessary to proceed
with the utmost clearness of ideas, owing to the subtlety
of the point at issue, and the consequent danger of the
reasoning going astray, unless the terms which are
used in it be very clear and precise. As p. means to
this, I will premise a few considerations on the proper
way of measuring the quantity of action in general.
Afterwards I will define exactly what that quantity is
which forms the object of the problem in hand.
Measure of the Quantity of Action. 469
499. I. In the first place, it must be borne in mind
that the quantity of action here spoken of is relative
to the effect to be produced by it ; in other words, that
action is called least, in reference to the end which it is
sought to obtain, and not as considered in itself.
500. II. In the second place, since the ends which
it is intended to obtain may be very many, it is plain
that the rule which is employed in measuring the
quantity of action relatively to one end, cannot be
equally available for measuring the quantity of action
relatively to another end. For instance :
a. If the end which it is sought to obtain were merely
the moving of a body to a certain distance, then, given
the velocity, the least action would be represented by
the straight line ; or, in general, given that a body is
wanted to pass from one place to another by the
shortest road, the straight line is the one that will
require the least action. It is the principle of Ptolemy,
the theory of the shortest way, which obtains in Optics
and Catoptrics. The reason is, that in this case, the
space traversed is the means employed for obtaining
the end in view ; and it is the means that must be
economized when one wishes to produce an effect by
the least quantity of action. Hence the action is here
said to be least, solely in relation to the space saved.
The shortest way, then, taken as indicating the least
action, has reference to the saving of space.
b. If, on the other hand, not space, but time were
considered as the means of obtaining a given end, then
it is obvious that that quantity of action would be
least which was produced in the shortest time possible.
In that case, therefore, the saving of time would have
to be aimed at. From this principle, applied to the
2 H*
470 On Divine Providence.
motion of bodies, it follows that, for the least action,
one ought to calculate, besides the shortness of the
distance, the velocity of the motion ; because the
quicker a body moves, the sooner it arrives at its des
tination.
c. But if, instead of space or time, force is considered
as the means, and consequently the saving of force
is the object sought ; then we shall have to say that
a less quantity of action is employed in moving
a body, when an increased velocity is obtained by the
same amount of force. Hence in this case also it
comes to pass that the quantity of action is in inverse
ratio to the velocity. And since, if the living force,
and the mass of the body to which it is applied, are
given, the velocity resulting therefrom is greater in
proportion as the obstacles which the body finds in its
way are less, as happens with bodies descending by a
cycloidal curve ; we have here Leibnitz s principle
of the easiest way.
d. From this we may infer that, under these two
aspects, the increased velocity does not constitute an
increased quantity of action (as was maintained in
general by Maupertuis), unless on condition that the
velocity be itself proposed as an end to be gained, or in
other words, that it be considered as the means of pro
ducing another effect. In that case, if the same effect
can be produced in the same time by the same move
ments made with less velocity, there will be a diminished
quantity of action, for the very reason that there is a
saving of velocity. Euler(i) applied this principle,
combined with that of the saving of space, to the tra-
(i) See Memoires de VAcademie de Berlin, vol. vii., nn. 1750, 1751;
also Euler s work on the problem De Maximis et Minimis.
Measure of the Quantity of Action. 471
jectories that are described by means of central forces ;
and he demonstrated that the velocity multiplied
by the element of the curve is always a minimum.
Lagrange extended the same principle to all systems
of bodies subject to the laws of attraction, and acting
in any way one upon another.
e. Let us now suppose that uniformity of motion is the
effect sought to be produced. In this case, the nearer
the motion obtained approaches to uniformity, the
greater is the effect, which therefore will have reached its
maximtim when the uniformity is perfect. Consequent
ly, the quantity of action will be the least, if the means
which are used for transforming an irregular continuous
motion into a uniform motion, are the simplest possible.
This is the problem of the time-piece, namely : " How
to convert the accelerated motion of a weight, or of an
expanding spring, into the uniform motion of the hands
of the time-piece." The maximum of velocity, or of
the space traversed, etc., forms no part of the question
here. The simplicity of the means invented for obtaining
uniform motion^ constitutes therefore the perfection of
the time-piece.
/. But if the effect to be produced is simply the
formation, with a given quantity of material, of a utensil,
an instrument, or such like, so that the material is
considered as the means ; then the saving will regard
the material itself; and it will be true to say that the
quantity of action is least, when the said formation is
accomplished with the minimum of material. This
reminds me of the principle of Koenig, who, as we have
seen (464), found that the bees in the construction of
their hives adopt a form which requires the least
amount of wax possible.
472 On Divine Providence.
501. III. On the other hand, it is needless to say,
that if the effect which has to be produced is not simple
but complex, that is to say, made up of several effects
together, it is not always possible to obtain that
saving of means which can be obtained when one effect
alone is sought. In this case, the maximum of effect
will consist in the compound result of the various effects
desired, and there will be the minimum of action when
the means employed are, taken together, the fewest and
the simplest possible. We will take an example from
muscular mechanics :
The mechanism of the human body was formed by
nature in such a manner that its movements might be
very great and at the same time very rapid, produced
by the smallest expenditure of force. Here, then, there
was no question of saving either space or velocity.
Space and velocity stood, not as means, but as effect,
which had to be relatively the greatest. Force was,
therefore, the thing to be economized. Now, the muscles
and the bones constitute, for the most part, levers of
the third kind, (i) In this kind of lever the power acts
without any loss, and therefore with the greatest effect
when it is applied in a normal direction ; but when it
is applied obliquely, it is resolved, and that part of
it which is not normal is lost. Now, the power of the
muscles, applied to the bones, acts on them in an al
most normal direction, because the muscles which
contract in the action are attached to the bones
just underneath their enlargement at the extremi
ties. Thus a saving of force is obtained. But after
(i) By " lever of the third kind," mechanicians mean that lever which has
the fulcrum at one extremity, the resistance at the other extremity, and,
between the two, the power which is applied to set it in motion.
Measure of the Quantity of Action. 473
this, if we consider that the arm of the resistance
is much longer than that of the power, we at once see
that for the motion which it is sought to obtain, more
force is required than if the arm of the resistance were
shorter. Wherefore this ? Because the wisdom of the
Creator intended to obtain a motion which should, as
we have said, be at once very great and very rapid ;
and this it could not obtain without the employment
of increased power. Thus it comes to pass, that if
when I stretch forth my right arm the part in which
the muscle is inserted is displaced, let us say three
inches per second, the other extremity of the arm re
cedes from its position with a velocity of some three feet
per second. Why so ? Because the arm of the resis
tance is twelve times as long as that of the power. It
was, therefore, impossible to save here as much force
as might have been saved if the effect sought had been
merely to set the lever in motion, and there had been
no intention of rendering its movements at once great
and rapid. The quantity of the total effect aimed at
being larger, the expenditure of a correspondingly
larger force became indispensable for obtaining it.
502. IV. Lastly, it may happen that the effect to
be obtained is one and simple, but that the means em
ployed cannot be otherwise than many ; and they must
all work together, for the reason that one could not be
left to act by itself alone, without interfering with the
action of another.
In this case, in order that the effect may be the
greatest possible, it will again be necessary to sacrifice
a portion of the action of the means taken singly. For
instance, to take a problem from Political Economy,
"How to make the duty laid upon a given kind of
474 O ?l ftwine Providence.
imported goods, yield the largest profit to the State."
Here two means offer themselves : the one is to raise
the duty, and the other to increase the importation and
consumption of the goods in question. But it is clear
that if the duty is excessively high, the importation
and consumption will diminish in the same proportion.
And if the duty is excessively low, the public revenue
will have very little benefit from it. Neither of these
means, therefore, can be had recourse to, without lessen
ing to a greater or less extent the efficacy of the other.
The maximum of the effect intended will have been
attained, when the duty is reduced to that limit which
will result in the importation and consumption being
large enough to compensate with advantage for the
loss caused by the reduction.
Another example. There is question of fixing the
beacon in a lighthouse. Whether you place it high,
or place it low, part of its illuminating power is certain
to be lost, in the first case in the ratio of the elevation,
and in the second case in the ratio of the obliquity of
the rays. Perfection will have been reached when the
altitude is so nicely adjusted that the diminished ob
liquity of the rays compensates advantageously for
the light which is lost in consequence of the increased
elevation. In most of the problems of maxima and
minima there is seen this opposition in the relative
efficacy of the means employed, and this because of
that limitation which we have said is inherent in all
finite things.
503. Now, from all these examples we may see how
the principle of the Least quantity of Action may be
reduced to another and more general formula, and so
precise as to preclude the possibility of all further
Measure of the Quantity of Action. 475
questions as to the rule which ought to be followed in
determining the least quantity of action in every case
of the general problem. It is this: "In seeking to
obtain the effect which you desire, use the least means
possible:" which, of course, implies that, relatively to
the means, the effect is as great as it can be. Thus
the principle of the Least quantity of Action is con
verted into the principle of the Least Means ; and it is
under this formula that we shall continue to speak of
it hereafter.
S. Militant s Tflit&s:
MAKKKT WEIGHTON YORKSH1KK.
B 3643 .T46 E5 1912 v.l
SMC
Rosmini, Antonio,
1797-1855.
Theodicy : essays on
divine providence /
ALU-6081 (awsk)
