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A THEODICY;
OB,
VINDICATION OF THE DIVINE GLOEY,
AS MANIFESTED IN THE
CONSTITUTION AND GOYERNMENT OF THE MORAL WORLD.
BY ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE, LL. D.,
BROPE8SOB OF MATHEMATICS IK THE UNIVEBSITY OF VIRGINIA,
TENTH EDITION.
PUBLISHED BY CARLTON & PORTER,
200 MULBERRY-STREET.
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1853, by
CARLTON & PHILLIPS,
in the Clerk s Office of the District Court of the Southern District of New- York.
\(oO
"BC,-
IS53
TO
froffssor $HHUS Cabdl, ftj.,
OF THE UNIVEUSPi T OF VIRGINIA,
THIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED BY ONE WHO ENTERTAINS A HIGH ADMIRATION
OF HIS INTELLECTUAL POWERS AND LEARNING, AS WELL AS OF HIS
CHARACTER AS A CHRISTIAN GENTLEMAN.
INTRODUCTION.
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY PAGE 9
I. The failure of Plato, and other ancient philosophers, to construct a
theodicy, not a ground of despair 11
11. Tie failure of Leibnitz not a ground of despair 15
III. The system of the moral universe not purposely involved in obscurity
to teach us a lesson of humility 19
IV. The littleness of the human mind a ground of hope 21
V. The construction of a theodicy not an attempt to solve mysteries, but to
dissipate absurdities 24
VI. The spirit in which the following work has been prosecuted, and the
relation of the author to other systems 25
PART I.
THE EXISTENCE OF MORAL EVIL, OR SIN, CONSISTENT WITH THE HOLI
NESS OF GOD 31
CHAPTER I. THE SCHEME OF NECESSITY DENIES THAT MAN is RESPONSIBLE FOE THE
EXISTENCE OF SIN 33
I. The attempts of Calvin and Luther to reconcile the scheme of necessity
with the responsibility of man 34
n. The manner in which Hobbes, Collins, and others, endeavour to reconcile
necessity with free and accountable agency 4:1
m. The sentiments of Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche, concerning the
relation between liberty and necessity 45
IV. The views of Locke, Tucker, Hartley, Priestley, Helvetius, and Diderot,
with respect to the relation between liberty and necessity 50
V. The manner in which Leibnitz endeavours to reconcile liberty and neces
sity 54
VI. The attempt of Edwards to establish free and accountable agency on the
basis of necessity The views of the younger Edwards, Day, Chalmers, Dick,
D Aubigne, Hill, Shaw, and M Cosh, concerning the agreement of liberty
and necessity 61
VH. The sentiments of Hume, Brown, Comte, and Mill, in relation to the
antagonism between liberty and necessity 72
Vin. The views of Kant and Sir William Hamilton in relation to the
antagonism between liberty and necessity 78
6 CONTENTS.
IX. The notion of Lord Kames and Sir James Mackintosh on the same
ubject PAQB 81
X. The conclusion of Mcehler, Tholuck, and others, that all speculation on
guch a subject must be vain and fruitless 83
XI. The true conclusion from the foregoing review of opinions and argu
ments w
CHAPTER II. THE SCHEME OF NECESSITY MAKES GOD THE AUTHOR OF BUT 86
I. The attempts of Calvin and other reformers to show that their system of
necessity does not make God the author of sin 87
n. The attempt of Leibnitz to show that the scheme of necessity does not
make God the author of sin 93
TTT. The maxims adopted and employed by Edwards to show that the
scheme of necessity does not make God the author of sin 98
IV. The attempts of Dr. Emmons and Dr. Chalmers to reconcile the scheme
of necessity with the purity of God 110
CHAPTER TTT. THE SCHEME OF NECESSITY DENIES THE REALITY OF MORAL DISTINC
TIONS 113
I. The views of Spinoza, in relation to the reality of moral distinctions 113
TJ. The attempt of Edwards to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the
reality of moral distinctions 11*
HI. Of the proposition that " The essence of the virtue and vice of dispo
sitions of the heart and acts of the will lies not in their cause, but in their
nature" 126
IV. The scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with the reality of
moral distinctions, not because we confound natural and moral necessity,
but because it is really inconsistent therewith 129
CHAPTER IV. THE MORAL WORLD NOT CONSTITUTED ACCORDING TO THE SCHEME OF
NECESSITY 132
I. The scheme of necessity is based on a false psychology 132
II. The scheme of necessity is directed against a false issue 142
UJ. The scheme of necessity is supported by false logic 149
IV. The scheme of necessity is fortified by false conceptions 154
V. The scheme of necessity is recommended by false analogies 160
VI. The scheme of necessity is rendered plausible by a false phraseology 162
VII. The scheme of necessity originates in a false method, and terminates
in a false religion 164
CHAPTER V. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE HUMAN WILL AND THE DIVINE AGENCY 166
I. General view of the relation between the divine and the human power.... 166
U. The Pelagian platform, or view of the relation between the divine and
the human power 171
IJJ. The Augustinian platform, or view of the relation between the divine
agency and the human 176
IV. The views of those who, in later times, have symbolized with Augustine... 178
V. The danger of mistaking distorted for exalted views of the divine
sovereignty 180
CONTENTS. I
r*4P7 KR VI. THE EXISTENCE or MOBAL EVIL, OB snr, EECONCILED WITH THE HOLINESS
OF GOD PAGE 182
1. The hypothesis of the soul s preexistence 182
n. The hypothesis of the Manicheans 183
IEL The hypothesis of optimism 185
IV. The argument of the atheist The reply of Leibnitz and other theists
The insufficiency of this reply 189
V. The sophism of the atheist exploded, and a perfect agreement shown to
subsist between the existence of sin and the holiness of God 192
VI. The true and only foundation of optimism 199
VH. The glory of God seen in the creation of a world which he foresaw
would fall under the dominion of sin 203
Vm. The little, captious spirit of Voltaire, and other atheizing minute
philosophers 209
JHAPTEB VII. OBJECTIONS CONSIDEBED 211
1 It4nay be objected that the foregoing scheme is " new theology" 211
II. It may be imagined that the views herein set forth limit the omnipotence
of God 213
HI. The foregoing scheme, it may be said, presents a gloomy view of the
universe 216
IV. It may be alleged, that in refusing to subject the volitions of men to the
power and control of God, we undermine the sentiments of humility and
submission 218
V. The foregoing treatise may be deemed inconsistent with gratitude to God 222
VI. It may be contended, that it is unfair to urge the preceding difficulties
against the scheme of necessity ; inasmuch as the same, or as great, diffi
culties attach to the system of those by whom they are urged 223
PART II.
THE EXISTENCE OF NATURAL EVIL, OR SUFFERING, CONSISTENT WITH
THE GOODNESS OF GOD 231
CHAPTEB I. GOD DESIRES AND SEEKS THE SALVATION OF ALL MEN 233
I. The reason why theologians have concluded that God designs the salva
tion of only a part of mankind 235
n. The attempt of Howe to reconcile the eternal ruin of a portion of man
kind with the sincerity of God in his endeavours to save them 237
ffl. The views of Luther and Calvin respecting the sincerity of God in his
endeavours to save those who will finally perish 242
CHAPTEB n. NATUBAL EVIL, OB SUFFEBING, AND ESPECIALLY THE SUFFERING OF IN
FANTS, RECONCILED WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD 245
I. All suffering not a punishment for sin 245
n. The imputation of sin not consistent with the goodness of God 250
TTT, The imputation of sin not consistent with human, much less with the
divine goodness 259
IV. The true ends, or final causes, of natural evil 264
V. The importance of harmonizing reason and revelation 272
S CONTENTS.
CHAPTER m. THE SUFFERINGS OF CHRIST RECONCILED WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD 276
I. The sufferings of Christ not unnecessary PAGE 276
n. The sufferings of Christ a bright manifestation of the goodness of God.... 279
III. The objections of Dr. Channing, and other Unitarians, against the doc
trine of the atonement 286
CHAPTER IV. THE ETERNAL PUNISHMENT OF THE WICKED RECONCILED WITH THE
GOODNESS OF GOD 294
L The false grounds upon which the doctrine of the eternity of future punish
ment has been placed 295
II. The unsound principles from which, if true, the fallacy of the eternity
of future punishment may be clearly inferred 297
TTT. The eternity of future punishment an expression of the divine goodness 301
CHAPTER V. THE DISPENSATION OF THE DIVINE FAVOURS RECONCILED WITH THE
GOODNESS OF GOD 312
I. The unequal distribution of favours, which obtains in the economy of
natural providence, consistent with the goodness of God 312
IL The Scripture doctrine of election consistent with the impartiality of
the divine goodness 317
TTT. The Calvinistic scheme of election inconsistent with the impartiality
and glory of the divine goodness 323
IV. The true ground and reason of election to eternal life shows it to be
consistent with the infinite goodness of God 330
CONCLUSION.
A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES AND ADVANTAGES OF THE FORE
GOING SYSTEM 335
I. SUMMARY OF THE FIRST PART OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM 337
I. The scheme of necessity denies that man is the responsible author of sin. 338
II. The scheme of necessity makes God the author of sin 340
TTT. The scheme of necessity denies the reality of moral distinctions 341
IV. The moral world not constituted according to the scheme of necessity... 343
V. The relation between the human agency and the divine 344
VI. The existence of moral evil consistent with the infinite purity of God.... 345
II. SUMMARY OF THE SECOND PART OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM 355
I. God desires the salvation of all men 355
II. The sufferings of the innocent, and especially of infants, consistent with
the goodness of God 357
TH. The sufferings of Christ consistent with the divine goodness 359
IV. The eternity of future punishment consistent with the goodness of God. 360
V. The true doctrine of election and predestination consistent with the
goodness of God 861
VI. The question submitted 364
INTRODUCTION.
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY,
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY.
How, under the government of an infinitely perfect Being, evil
could have proceeded from a creature of his own, has ever been
regarded as the great difficulty pertaining to the intellectual
system of the universe. It has never ceased to puzzle and per
plex the human mind. Indeed, so great and so obstinate has it
seemed, that it is usually supposed to lie beyond the reach of the
human faculties. We shall, however, examine the grounds of
this opinion, before we exchange the bright illusions of hope,
if such indeed they be, for the gloomy forebodings of despair.
SECTION I.
The failure of Plato and other ancient philosophers to construct a Theodicy,
not a ground of despair.
The supposed want of success attending the labours of the
past, is, no doubt, the principal reason which has induced so
many to abandon the problem of evil in despair, and even to
accuse of presumption every speculation designed to shed light
upon so great a mystery. But this reason, however specious
and imposing at first view, will lose much of its apparent force
upon a closer examination.
In every age the same reasoning has been employed to repress
the efforts of the human mind to overcome the difficulties by
which it has been surrounded ; yet, in spite of such discourage
ments, the most stupendous difficulties have gradually yielded
to the progressive developments and revelations of time. It
was the opinion of Socrates, for example, that the problem of
12 INTRODUCTION".
the natural world was unavoidably concealed from mortals, and
that it was a sort of presumptuous impiety, displeasing to the
gods, for men to pry into it. If Newton himself had lived in
that age, it is probable that he would have entertained the same
opinion. It is certain that the problem in question would then
have been as far beyond the reach of his powers, as beyond
those of the most ordinary individual. The ignorance of the
earth s dimensions, the manifold errors respecting the laws of
motion, and the defective state of the mathematical sciences,
which then prevailed, would have rendered utterly impotent
the efforts of a thousand Newtons to grapple with such a prob
lem. The time was neither ripe for the solution of that problem,
nor for the appearance of a Newton. It was only after science
had, during a period of two thousand years, multiplied her re
sources and gathered up her energies, that she was prepared for
a flight to the summit of the world, whence she might behold
and reveal the wonderful art wherewith it hath been constructed
by the Almighty Architect. Because Socrates could not con
ceive of any possible means of solving the great problem of the
material world, it did not follow, as the event has shown, that
it was forever beyond the reach and dominion of man. We
should not then listen too implicitly to the teachers of despair,
nor too rashly set limits to the triumphs of $ie human power.
If we may believe " the master of wisdom," they are not the
true friends of science, nor of the world s progress. " By far
the greatest obstacle," says Bacon, " to the advancement of the
sciences, is to be found in men s despair mid idea of impossi
bility."
Even in the minds of those who cultivate a particular branch
of knowledge, there is often an internal secret despair of finding
the truth, which so far paralyzes their efforts as to prevent them
from seeking it with that deep earnestness, without which it is
seldom found. The history of optics furnishes a most impressive
illustration of the justness of this remark. Previous to the time
of Newton, no one seemed to entertain a real hope that this
branch of knowledge would ever assume the form and clearness
of scientific truth. The laws and properties of so ethereal a sub
stance as light, appeared to elude the grasp of the human intel
lect ; and hence, no one evinced the boldness to grapple directly
with them. The whole region of optics was involved in mists,
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 13
and those who gave their attention to this department of knowl
edge, abandoned themselves, for the most part, to vague gen
eralities and loose conjectures. In the conflict of manifold opin
ions, and the great variety of hypotheses which seemed to pro
mise nothing but endless disputes, the highest idea of the science
of optics that prevailed, w r as that of something in relation to
light which might be plausibly advanced and confidently main
tained. It was reserved for Newton to produce a revolution in
the mode of treating this branch of knowledge, as well as that
of physical astronomy. Not despairing of the truth, he sternly
put away " innumerable fancies flitting on all sides around him,"
and by searching observation and experiment, brought his mind
directly into contact with things themselves, and held it steadily
to them, until the clear light of truth dawned. The consequence
was, that the dreams of philosophy, falsely so called, gave place
to the clear realities of nature. It was to the unconquerable
hope, no less than to the profound humility of Newton, that the
world is indebted for his most splendid discoveries, as well as
for that perfect model of the true spirit of philosophy, which
combined the infinite caution of a Butler with the unbounded
boldness of a Leibnitz. The lowliest humility, free from the
least shadow of despair, united with the loftiest hope, without
the least mixture of presumption, both proceeding from an in
vincible love of truth, are the elements which constituted the
secret of that patient and all-enduring thought which conducted
the mind of Newton from the obscurities and dreams envelop
ing the world below into the bright and shining region of eter
nal truths above. In our humble opinion, Newton has done
more for the great cause of knowledge, by the mighty impulse
of hope he has given to the powers of the human mind, than
by all the sublime discoveries he has made. For, as Maclaurin
says : " The variety of opinions and perpetual disputes among
philosophers has induced not a few of late, as well as in former
times, to think that it was vain labour to endeavour to acquire
certainty in natural knowledge, and to ascribe this to some un
avoidable defect in the principles of the science. But it has
appeared sufficiently, from the discoveries of those who have
consulted nature, and not their own imaginations, and particu
larly from what we learn from Sir Isaac Newton, that the fault
has lain in philosophers themselves, and not in philosophy "
14 INTRODUCTION.
We are persuaded the day will come, when it will be seen
that the despair of scepticism has been misplaced, not only with
regard to natural knowledge, but also in relation to the great
problems of the intellectual and moral world. It is true, that
Plato failed to solve these problems ; but his failure may be
easily accounted for, without in the least degree shaking the
foundations of our hope. The learned Kitter has said, that
Plato felt the necessity imposed upon him, by his system, to
reconcile the existence of evil with the perfections of God ; but
yet, as often as he approached this dark subject, his views be
came vague, fluctuating, and unsatisfactory. How little insight
he had into it on any scientific or clearly defined principle, is
obvious from the fact, that he took shelter from its difficulties
in the wild hypothesis of the preexistence of souls. But the
impotency of Plato s attempts to solve these difficulties, may be
explained without the least disparagement to his genius, or
without leading us to hope for light only from the world s pos
session of better minds.
In the first place, such was the state of mental science when
Plato lived, that it would have been impossible for any one to
reconcile the existence of evil with the perfections of God. It
has been truly said, that " An attention to the internal opera
tions of the human mind, with a view to analyze its principles,
is one of the distinctions of modern times. Among the ancients
scarcely anything of the sort was known." Robert Hall. Yet
without a correct analysis of the powers of the human mind,
and of the relations they sustain to each other, as well as to ex
ternal objects and influences, it is impossible to shed one ray of
light on the relation subsisting between the existence of moral
evil and the divine glory. The theory of motion is " the key
to nature." It was with this key that Newton, the great high-
priest of nature, entered into her profoundest recesses, and laid
open her most sublime secrets to the admiration of mankind.
In like manner, the true theory of action is the key to the intel
lectual world, by which its difficulties are to be laid open and
its enigmas solved. Not possessing this key, it was as impossi
ble for Plato, or for any other philosopher, to penetrate the
mystery of sin s existence, as it would have been, without a
knowledge of the laws of motion, to comprehend the stupendous
problem of the material universe.
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 15
Secondly, the ancient philosophers laboured under the in
superable disadvantage, that the sublime disclosures of revela
tion had not been made known to the world. Hence the ma
terials were wanting out of which to construct a Theodicy, or
vindication of the perfections of God. For if we could see only
so much of this world s drama as is made known by the light
of nature, it would not be possible to reconcile it with the char
acter of its great Author. No one was more sensible of this
defect of knowledge than Plato himself; and its continuance
was, in his view, inconsistent with the goodness of the divine
Being. Hence his well-known prediction, that a teacher would
be sent from God to clear up the darkness of man s present
destiny, and to withdraw the veil from its future glory. The
facts of revelation cannot, of course, be logically assumed as
verities, in an argument with the atheist ; but still, as we shall
hereafter see, they may, in connexion with other truths, be made
to serve a most important and legitimate function in exploding
his sophisms and objections.
SECTION II.
The failure of Leibnitz not a ground of despair.
It is alleged, that since Leibnitz exhausted the resources of
his vast erudition, and exerted the powers of his mighty intel
lect without success, to solve the problem in question, it is in
vain for any one else to attempt its solution. Leibnitz, himself,
was too much of a philosopher to approve of such a judgment
in relation to any human being. He could never have wished,
or expected to see " the empire of man, which is founded in the
sciences," permanently confined to the boundaries of a single
mind, however exalted its powers, or comprehensive its attain
ments. He finely rebuked the false humility and the disguised
arrogance of Descartes, in affirming that the sovereignty of God
and the freedom of man could never be reconciled. " If Des
cartes," says he, " had confessed such an inability for himself
alone, this might have savoured of humility ; but it is other
wise, when, because he could not find the means of solving this
difficulty, he declares it an impossibility for all ages and for all
minds." We have, at least, the authority and example of
Leibnitz, in favour of the propriety of cultivating this depart-
16 INTRODUCTION.
ment of knowledge, with a view to shed light on the great
problem of the intellectual world.
His failure, if rightly considered, is not a ground for despond
ency. He approached the problem in question in a wrong
spirit. The pride of conquering difficulties is the unfortunate
disposition with which he undertook to solve it. His well-kno wn
boast, that with him all difficult things are easy, and all easy
things difficult, is a proof that his spirit was not perfectly
adapted to carry him forward in a contest with the dark enigmas
of the universe. Indeed, if we consider what Leibnitz has actu
ally done, we shall perceive, that notwithstanding his wonder
ful powers, he has rendered many easy things difficult, as well
as many difficult things easy. The best way to conquer diffi
culties is, if we may judge from his example, not to attack them
directly, and with the pride of a conqueror, but simply to seek
after the truth. If we make a conquest of all the truth, this
will make a conquest of all the difficulties within our reach.
It is wonderful with what ease a difficulty, which may have re
sisted the direct siege of centuries, will sometimes fall before a
single inquirer after truth, who had not dreamed of aiming at
its solution, until this seemed, as if by accident, to offer itself to
his mind. If we pursue difficulties, they will be apt to fly from
us and elude our grasp ; whereas, if we give up our minds to an
honest and earnest search after truth, they will come in with
their own solutions.
The truth is, that the difficulty in question has been increased
rather than diminished by the speculations of Leibnitz. This
has resulted from a premature and extreme devotion to system
a source of miscarriage and failure common to Leibnitz, and to
most others who have devoted their attention to the origin of
evil. On the one hand, exaggerated views concerning the
divine agency, or equally extravagant notions on the other, re
specting the agency of man, have frequently converted a seem
ing into a real contradiction. In general, the work of God has
been conceived in such a relation to the powers of man, as to
make the latter entirely disappear ; or else the power of man
lias been represented as occupying so exalted and independent
a position, as to exclude the Almighty from his rightful dominion
over the moral world. Thus, the Supreme Being has generally
been shut out from the affairs and government of the world by
OF THE POSSIBILITY OP A THEODICY. 17
one side, and his energy rendered so all-pervading by the other,
as really to make him the author of evil. In this way, the dif
ficulties concerning the origin and existence of evil have been
greatly augmented by the very speculations designed to solve
them. For if God takes little or no concern in the affairs and
destiny of the moral world, this clearly seems to render him re
sponsible for the evil which he might easily have prevented ;
and, on the other hand, if he pervades the moral world with his
power in such a manner as to bring all things to pass, this as
clearly seems to implicate him in the turpitude of sin.
After having converted the seeming discrepancy between the
divine power and human agency into a real contradiction, it is
too late to endeavour to reconcile them. Yet such has been
the case with most of the giant intellects that have laboured to
reconcile the sovereignty of God and the moral agency of man.
It will hereafter be clearly seen, we trust, that it is not possible
for any one, holding the scheme of a Calvin, or a Leibnitz, or a
Descartes, or an Edwards, to show an agreement between the
power of God and the freedom of man ; since according to these
systems there is an eternal opposition and conflict between
them. It is no ground of despair, then, that the mighty minds
of the past have failed to solve the problem in question, if the
cause of their failure may be traced to the errors of their own
systems, and not to the inherent difficulties of the subject.
Those who have endeavoured to solve the problem in ques
tion have, for the most part, been necessitated to fail in conse
quence of having adopted a wrong method. Instead of begin
ning with observation, and carefully dissecting the world which
God has made, so as to rise, by a clear analysis of things, to
the general principles on which they have been actually framed
and put together, they have set out from the lofty region of
universal abstractions, and proceeded to reconstruct the world
for themselves. Instead of beginning with the actual, as best
befits the feebleness of the human intellect, and working their
way up into the great system of things, they have taken their
position at once in the high and boundless realm of the ideal,
and thence endeavoured to deduce the nature of the laws and
phenomena of the real world. This is the course pursued by
Plato, Leibnitz, Hobbes, Descartes, Edwards, and, indeed, most
of those great thinkers who have endeavoured to shed light oa
2
18 INTRODUCTION.
the problem in question. Hence each has necessarily become
" a sublime architect of words," whose grand and imposing sys
tem of shadows and abstractions has but a slight foundation in
the real constitution and laws of the spiritual world. Their
writings furnish the most striking illustration of the profound
aphorism of Bacon, that " the usual method of discovery and
proof, by first establishing the most general propositions, then
applying and proving the intermediate axioms according to
these, is the parent of error and the calamity of every science"
He who would frame a real model of the world in the under
standing, such as it is found to be, not such as man s reason has
distorted, must pursue the opposite course. Surely it cannot be
deemed unreasonable, that this course should be most diligently
applied to the study of the intellectual world ; especially as it
has wrought such wonders in the province of natural knowl
edge, and that too, after so many ages had, according to the
former method, laboured upon it comparatively in vain. Be
cause the human mind has not been able to bridge over the
impassable gulf between the ideal and the concrete, so as to
effect a passage from the former to the latter, it certainly does
not follow, that it should forever despair of so far penetrating
the apparent obscurity and confusion of real things, as to see
that nothing which God has created is inconsistent with the
eternal, immutable glory of the ideal : or, in other words, be
cause the real world and the ideal cannot be shown to be
connected by a logical dependency, it does not follow, that the
actual creation and providence of God, that all his works and
ways cannot be made to appear consistent with the idea of an
absolutely perfect being and of the eternal laws according to
which his power acts: that is to say, because the high a priori
method, which so magisterially proceeds to pronounce what
must be, has failed to solve the problem of the moral world, it
does not follow, that the inductive method, or that which cau
tiously begins with an examination of what is, may not finally
rise to the sublime contemplation of what ought to be j and, in
the light of God s own creation, behold the magnificent model
of the actual universe perfectly conformed to the transcendent
and unutterable glory of the ideal.
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 19
SECTION JIL
The system of the moral universe not purposely involved in obscurity to
teach us a lesson of humility.
But the assertion is frequently made, that the moral govern
ment of the world is purposely left in obscurity and apparent
confusion, in order to teach man a lesson of humility and sub
mission, by showing him how weak and narrow is the human
mind. We have not, however, been able to find any sufficient
reason or foundation for such an opinion. As every atom in
the universe presents mysteries which baffle the most subtle
research and the most profound investigation of the human
intellect, we cannot see how any reflecting mind can possibly
find an additional lesson of humility in the fact, that the system
of the universe itself is involved in clouds and darkness. Would
it not be strange, indeed, if the mind, whose grasp is not suf
ficient for the mysteries of a single atom, should be really hum
bled by the conviction that it is too weak and limited to fathom
the wonders of the universe ? Does the insignificance of an
egg-shell appear from the fact that it cannot contain the ocean ?
The truth is, that the more clearly the majesty and glory of
the divine perfections are displayed in the constitution and
government of the world, the more clearly shall we see the
greatness of God and the littleness of man. No true knowledge
can ever impress the human mind with a conceit of its own
greatness. The farther its light expands, the greater must be
come the visible sphere of the surrounding darkness ; and its
highest attainment in real knowledge must inevitably terminate
in a profound sense of the vast, unlimited extent of its own ig
norance. Hence, we need entertain no fear, that man s humil
ity will ever be endangered by too great attainments in science.
Presumption is, indeed, the natural offspring of ignorance, and
not of knowledge. Socrates, as we have already seen, endeav
oured to inculcate a lesson of humility, by reminding his con
temporaries how far the theory of the material heavens was be
yond the reach of their faculties. And to enforce this lesson,
he assured them that it was displeasing to the gods for men to
attempt to pry into the wonderful art wherewith they had con
structed the universe. In like manner, the poet, at a much
20 INTRODUCTION.
later period, puts the following sentiment into the mouth of an
angel :
" To ask or search, I blame thee not ; for heaven
Is as the book of God before thee set,
Wherein to read his wondrous works, and learn
His seasons, hours, or days, or months, or years :
This to attain, whether heaven move or earth,
Imports not if thou reckon right ; the rest
From man or angel the great .Architect
Did wisely to conceal, and not divulge
His secrets, to be scann d by them who ought
Rather admire ; or, if they list to try
Conjecture, he his fabric of the heavens
Hath left to their disputes, perhaps to move
His laughter at their quaint opinions wide
Hereafter."
All this may be very well, no doubt, for him by whom it was
uttered, and for those who may have received it as an everlast
ing oracle of truth. But the true lesson of humility was taught
by Newton, when he solved the problem of the world, and re
vealed the wonderful art displayed therein by the Supreme
Architect. Never before, in the history of the human race,
was so impressive a conviction made of the almost absolute
nothingness of man, when measured on the inconceivably mag
nificent scale of the universe. No one, it is well known, felt
this conviction more deeply than Newton himself. " I have
been but as a child," said he, " playing on the sea-shore ; now
finding some pebble rather more polished, and now some shell
rather more agreeably variegated than another, while the im
mense ocean of truth extended itself unexplored before me."
It is, indeed, strangely to forget our littleness, as well as the
limits which this necessarily sets to the progress of the under
standing, to imagine that the Almighty has to conceal anything
with a view to remind us of the weakness of our powers. In
deed, everything around us, and everything within us, brings
home the conviction of the littleness of man. There is not a
page of the history of human thought on which this lesson is
not deeply engraved. Still we do not despair. We find a
ground of hope in the very littleness as well as in the great
ness of the human powers.
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 21
SECTION IV.
The littleness of the human mind a ground of hope.
We would yield to no one in a profound veneration for the
great intellects of the past. But let us not be dazzled and
blinded by the splendour of their achievements. Let us
look at it closely, and see how wonderful it is this thing called
the human mind. The more I think of it, the more it fills me
with amazement. I scarcely know which amazes me the more,
its littleness or its grandeur. Now I see it, with all its high
powers and glorious faculties, labouring under the ambiguity
of a word, apparently in hopeless eclipse for centuries. Shall I
therefore despise it ? Before I have time to do so, the power
and the light which is thus shut out from the world by so piti
ful a cause, is revealed in all its glory. I see this same intelli
gence forcing its way through a thousand hostile appearances,
resisting innumerable obstacles pressing on all sides around it,
overcoming deep illusions, and inveterate opinions, almost as
firmly seated as the very laws of nature themselves. I see it
rising above all these, and planting itself in the radiant seat of
truth. It embraces the plan, it surveys the work of the Su
preme Architect of all things. It follows the infinite reason,
and recognises the almighty power, in their sublimest manifes
tations. I rejoice in the glory of its triumphs, and am ready
to pronounce its empire boundless. But, alas ! I see it again
baffled and confounded by the wonders and mysteries of a
single atom !
I see this same thing, or rather its mightiest representatives,
with a Newton or a Leibnitz at their head, in full pursuit of a
shadow, and wasting their wonderful energies in beating the air.
They have measured the world, and stretched their line upon
the chambers of the great deep. They have weighed the sun,
moon, and stars, and marked out their orbits. They have de
termined the laws according to which all worlds and all atoms
move according to which the very spheres sing together. And
yet, when they came to measure " the force of a moving body,"
they toil for a century at the task, and finally rest in the amazing
conclusion, that " the very same thing may have two measures
widely different from each other !" Alas ! that the same mind,
22 INTRODUCTION.
that the same god-like intelligence, which has measured worlds
and systems, should thus have wasted its stupendous energies
in striving to measure a metaphor !
When I think of its grandeur and its triumphs, I bow with
reverence before its power, and am ready to despair of ever
seeing it go farther than it has already gone ; but when I think
of its littleness and its failures, I take courage again, and de
termine to toil on as a living atom among living atoms. The
glory of its triumphs does not discourage me, because I also see
its littleness ; nor can its littleness extinguish in me the light
of hope, because I also see the glory of its triumphs. And
surely this is right ; for the intellect of man, so conspicuously
combining the attributes of the angel and of the worm, is not
to be despised without infinite danger, nor followed without in
finite caution.
Such, indeed, is the weakness and fallibility of the human
mind, even in its brightest forms, that we cannot for a moment
imagine, that the inherent difficulties of the dark enigma of the
world are insuperable, because they have not been clearly and
fully solved by a Leibnitz or an Edwards. On the contrary,
we are perfectly persuaded that in the end the wonder will be,
not that such a question should have been attempted after so
many illustrious failures, but that any such failure should have
been made. This will appear the more probable, if we con
sider the precise nature of the problem to be solved, and not
lose ourselves in dark and unintelligible notions. It is not to
do some great thing it is simply to refute the sophism of the
atheist. If God were both willing and able to prevent sin,
which is the only supposition consistent with the idea of God,
says the atheist, he would certainly have prevented it, and sin
would never have made its appearance in the world. But sin
has made its appearance in the world ; and hence, God must
have been either unable or unwilling to prevent it. Now, if
we take either term of this alternative, we must adopt a con
clusion which is at war with the idea of a God.
Such is the argument of the atheist ; and sad indeed must
be the condition of the Christian world if it be forever unable
to meet and refute such a sophism. Yet, it is the error involved
in this sophism which obscures our intellectual vision, and causes
so perplexing a darkness to spread itself over the moral order
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 23
and beauty of the world. Hence, in grappling with the sup
posed great difficulty in question, we do not undertake to re
move a veil from the universe we simply undertake to remove
a sophism from our own minds. Though we have so spoken in
accommodation with the views of others, the problem of the
moral world is not, in reality, high and difficult in itself, like
the great problem of the material universe. We repeat, it is
simply to refute and explode the sophism of the atheist. Let
this be blown away, and the darkness which seems to overhang
the moral government of the world will disappear like the
mists of the morning.
If such be the nature of the problem in question, and such
it will be found to be, it is certainly a mistake to suppose
that "it must be entangled with perplexities while we see
but in part."* It is only while we see amiss, and not while
we see in part, that this problem must wear the appearance
of a dark enigma. It is clear, that our knowledge is, and
ever must be, exceedingly limited on all sides; and if we
must understand the whole of the case, if we must comprehend
the entire extent of the divine government for the universe and
for eternity, before we can remove the difficulty in question, we
must necessarily despair of success. But we cannot see any
sufficient ground to support this oft-repeated assertion. Because
the field of our vision is so exceedingly limited, we do not see
why it should be forever traversed by apparent inconsistencies
and contradictions. In relation to the material universe, our
space is but a point, and our time but a moment ; and yet, as
that inconceivably grand system is now understood by us, there
is nothing in it which seems to conflict with the dictates of rea
son, or with the infinite perfections of God. On the contrary,
the revelations of modern science have given an emphasis and a
sublimity to the language of inspiration, that " the heavens de
clare the glory of the Lord," which had, for ages, been con
cealed from the loftiest conception of the astronomer.
]STor did it require a knowledge of the whole material universe
to remove the difficulties, or to blast the objections which
atheists had, in all preceding ages, raised against the perfections
of its divine Author. Such objections, as is well known, were
raised before astronomy, as a science, had an existence. Lucre-
Johnson s Works, vol. iv, p. 286.
24 INTRODUCTION.
tius, for example, though he deemed the sun, moon, and stars,
no larger than they appear to the eye, and supposed them to
revolve around the earth, undertook to point out and declaim
against the miserable defects which he saw, or fancied he saw,
in the system of the material world. That is to say, he under
took to criticise and find fault with the great volume of nature,
before he had even learned its alphabet. The objections of
Lucretius, which appeared so formidable in his day, as well as
many others that have since been raised on equally plausible
grounds, have passed away before the progress of science, and
now seem like the silly prattle of children, or the insane babble
of madmen. But although such difficulties have been swept
away, and our field of vision cleared of all that is painful and
perplexing, nay, brightened with all that is grand and beautiful,
we seem to be farther than ever from comprehending the whole
of the case from grasping the amazing extent and glory of the
material globe. And why may not this ultimately be the case
also in relation to the moral universe ? Why should every at
tempt to clear up its difficulties, and blow away the objections
of atheism to its order and beauty, be supposed to originate in
presumption and to terminate in impiety? Are we so much
the less interested in knowing the ways of God in regard to the
constitution and government of the moral world than of the
material, that he should purposely conceal the former from us,
while he has permitted the latter to be laid open so as to
ravish our minds ? We can believe no such thing ; and we are
not willing to admit that there is any part of the creation of
God in which omniscience alone can cope with the atheist.
SECTION V.
The construction of a Theodicy, not an attempt to solve mysteries, lut to
dissipate absurdities.
As we have merely undertaken to refute the atheist, and vin
dicate the glory of the divine perfections, so it would be a
grievous mistake to suppose, that we are about to pry into the
holy mysteries of religion. No sound mind is ever perplexed
by the contemplation of mysteries. Indeed, they are a source
of positive satisfaction and delight. If nothing were dark,
if all around us, and above us, were clearly seen, the truth
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 25
itself would soon appear stale and mean. Everything truly
great must transcend the powers of the human mind ; and hence,
if nothing were mysterious, there would be nothing worthy of
our veneration and worship. It is mystery, indeed, which lends
such unspeakable grandeur and variety to the scenery of the
moral world. Without it, all would be clear, it is true, but
nothing grand. There would be lights, but no shadows. And
around the very lights themselves, there would be nothing
soothing and sublime, in which the soul might rest and the im
agination revel.
Hence it is no part of our object to pry into mystery, but to
get rid of absurdity. And in our humble opinion, this would
long since have been done, and the difficulty in question solved,
had not the friends of truth incautiously given the most power
ful protection to the sophism and absurdity of the atheist, by
throwing around it the sacred garb of mystery.
SECTION VI.
The spirit in which the following work has teen prosecuted, and the relation
of the author to other systems. L
In conclusion, we offer a few remarks in relation to the man
ner and spirit in which the following work has been undertaken
and prosecuted. In the first place, the writer may truly say,
that he did not enter on the apparently dark problem of the
moral world with the least hope that he should be able to
throw any light upon it, nor with any other set purpose and de
sign. He simply revolved the subject in mind, because he was
by nature prone to such meditations. So far from having aimed
at things usually esteemed so high and difficult with a feeling
of presumptuous confidence, he has, indeed, suffered most from
that spirit of despondency, that despair of scepticism, against
which, in the foregoing pages, he has appeared so anxious to
caution others. It has been patient reflection, and the reading
of excellent authors, together with an earnest desire to know the
truth, which has delivered him from the power of that spirit,
and conducted him to what now so clearly seems " the bright
and shining light of truth."
It was, in fact, while engaged in meditation on the powers
and susceptibilities of the human mind, as well as on the rela-
26 INTRODUCTION.
tions they sustain to each and to other things, and not in any
direct attempt to elucidate the origin of evil, that the first clear
light appeared to dawn on this great difficulty : and in no other
way, he humbly conceives, can the true philosophy of the
spiritual world ever be comprehended. For, as the laws of
matter had first to be studied and traced out in relation to
bodies on the earth, before they could be extended to the
heavens, and made to explain its wonderful mechanism; so
must the laws and phenomena of the human mind be correctly
analyzed and clearly defined, in order to obtain an insight into
the intellectual system of the universe. And just in pro
portion as the clouds and darkness hanging over the phe
nomena of our own minds are made to disappear, will the intel
lectual system of the world which God " has set in our hearts,"
become more distinct and beautiful in its proportions. For it
is the mass of real contradictions and obscurities, existing in the
little world within, which distorts to our view the great world
without, and causes the work and ways of God to appear so full
of disorders. Hence, in proportion as these real contradictions
and obscurities are removed, will the mind become a truer
microcosm, or more faithful mirror, in which the image of the
universe will unfold itself, free from the apparent disorders and
confusion which seem to render it unworthy of its great Author
and Ruler.
Secondly, the relation which the writer sustains to other sys
tems, has been, it appears to himself, most favourable to a suc
cessful prosecution of the following speculations. Whether at
the outset of his inquiries, he was the more of an Arminian or
of a Calvinist, he is unable to say ; but if his crude and imper
fectly developed sentiments had then been made known, it is
probable he would have been ranked with the Arminians. Be
this as it may, it is certain that he was never so much of an
Arminian, or of anything else, as to imagine that Calvinism
admitted of nothing great and good. On the contrary, he has
ever believed that the Calvinists were at least equal to any
other body of men in piety, which is certainly the highest and
noblest of all qualities. And besides, it was a constant delight
to him to read the great master-pieces of reasoning which Cal
vinism had furnished for the instruction and admiration of
mankind. By this means he came to believe that the scheme
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 27
of the Arminians could not be maintained, and his faith in it
was gradually undermined.
But although he thus submitted his mind to the dominion of
Calvinism, as advocated by Edwards, and earnestly espoused it
with some exceptions ; he never felt that profound, internal
satisfaction of the truth of the system, after which his rational
nature continually longed, and which it struggled to realize.
He certainly expected to find this satisfaction in Calvinism, if
anywhere. Long, therefore, did he pass over every portion of
Calvinism, in order to discover, if possible, how its foundations
might be rendered more clear and convincing, and all its parts har
monized among themselves as well as with the great undeniable
facts of man s nature and destiny. While engaged in these
inquiries, he has been more than once led to see what appeared
to be a flaw in Calvinism itself ; but without at first perceiving
all its consequences. By reflection on these apparent defects ;
nay, by protracted and earnest meditation on them, his sus
picions have been confirmed and his opinions changed. If
what now so clearly appears to be the truth is so or not, it is
certain that it has not been embraced out of a spirit of oppo
sition to Calvinism, or to any other system of religious faith
whatever. Its light, whether real or imaginary, has dawned
upon his mind while seeking after truth amid the foundations
of Calvinism itself ; and this light has been augmented more
by reading the works of Calvinists themselves, than those of
their opponents.
These things are here set down, not because the writer thinks
they should have any weight or influence to bias the judgment
of the reader, but because he wishes it to be understood that
he entertains the most profound veneration for the great and
good men whose works seem to stand in the way of the follow
ing design to vindicate the glory of God, and which, therefore,
he will not scruple to assail in so far as this may be necessary
to his purpose. It is, indeed, a matter of deep and inexpressible
regret, that in our conflicts with the powers of darkness, we
should, however undesignedly, be weakened and opposed by
Christian divines and philosophers. But so it seems to be, and
we dare not cease to resist them. And if, in the following
attempt to vindicate the glory of God, it shall become neces
sary to call in question the infallibility of the great founders of
28 INTRODUCTION.
human systems, this, it is to be hoped, will not be deemed an
unpardonable offence.
Thus has the writer endeavoured to work his way through
the mingled lights and obscurity of human systems into a bright
and beautiful vision of the great harmonious system of the world
itself. It is certainly either a sublime truth, or else a glorious
illusion, which thus enables him to rise above the apparent
disorders and perturbations of the world, as constituted and
governed by the Almighty, and behold the real order and
harmony therein established. The ideal creations of the poet
and the philosopher sink into perfect insignificance beside
the actual creation of God. "Where clouds and darkness
once appeared the most impenetrable, there scenes of inde
scribable magnificence and beauty are now beheld with inex
pressible delight ; the stupendous cloud of evil no longer hangs
overhead, but rolls beneath us, while the eternal Reason from
above permeates its gloom, and irradiates its depths. We now
behold the reason, and absolutely rejoice in the contemplation,
of that which once seemed like a dark blot on the world s
design.
In using this language, we do not wish to be understood
as laying claim to the discovery of any great truth, or any new
principle. Yet we do trust, that we have attained to a clear
and precise statement of old truths. And these truths, thus
clearly defined, we trust that we have seized with a firm grasp,
and carried as lights through the dark places of theology,
so as to expel thence the errors and delusions by which its
glory has baen obscured. Moreover, if we have not succeeded,
nor even attempted to succeed, in solving any mysteries, prop
erly so called, yet may we have removed certain apparent
contradictions, which have been usually deemed insuperable to
the human mind.
But even if the reader should be satisfied beforehand, that no
additional light will herein be thrown on the problem of the
moral world, yet would we remind him, that it does not neces
sarily follow that the ensuing discourse is wholly unworthy of
his attention : for the materials, though old, may be presented
in new combinations, and much may be omitted which has
disfigured and obscured the beauty of most other systems.
Although no new fountains of light may be opened, yet may
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 29
the vision of the soul be so purged of certain films of error as
to enable it to reflect the glory of the spiritual universe, just as
a single dew-drop is seen to mirror forth the magnificent cope of
heaven with all its multitude of stars.
We have sought the truth, and how far we have found it, no
one should proceed to determine without having first read and
examined. We have sought it, not in Calvinism alone, nor in
Arminianism alone, nor in any other creed or system of man s
devising. In every direction have we diligently sought it,
as our feeble abilities would permit ; and yet, we hope, it will
be found that the body of truth which we now have to offer is
not a mere hasty patchwork of superficial eclecticism, but a
living and organic whole. By this test we could wish to be
tried ; for, as Bacon hath well said, " It is the harmony of any
philosophy in itself that giveth it light and credence." And in
the application of this test, we could also wish, that the reader
would so far forget his sectarian predilections, if he have any,
as to permit his mind to be inspired by the immortal words of
Milton, which we shall here adopt as a fitting conclusion of these
our present remarks :
"Truth, indeed, came once into the world with her divine
Master, and was a perfect shape most glorious to look on ; but
when he ascended, and his apostles after him were laid asleep,
then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers, who, as that
story goes of the Egyptian Typhon, with his conspirators, how
they dealt with the good Osiris, took the virgin, Truth, hewed
her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to
the four winds. From that time ever since the sad friends of
Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the careful search that
Isis made for the mangled body of Osiris, went up and down
gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them. "We
have not yet found them all, nor ever shall do, till her Master s
second coming; he shall bring together every joint and mem
ber, and shall mould them into an immortal feature of loveli
ness and perfection. Suffer not these licensing prohibitions to
stand at every place of opportunity, forbidding and disturbing
them that continue seeking, that continue to do our obsequies
to the torn body of our martyred saint. We boast our light ;
but if we look not wisely on the sun itself, it smites us into dark
ness. Who can discern those planets that are oft combust, and
SO INTRODUCTION.
those stars of brightest magnitude, that rise and set with the
sun, until the opposite motion of their orbs bring them to such
a place in the firmament, where they may be seen morning or
evening ? The light which we have gained was given us, not
to be ever staring on, but by it to discover onward things more
remote from our knowledge. It is not the unfrocking of a priest,
the unmitring of a bishop, and the removing him from off the
Presbyterian shoulders, that will make us a happy nation ; no,
if other things as great in the Church, and in the rule of life,
both economical and political, be not looked into and reformed,
we have looked so long upon the blaze that Zuinglius and Calvin
have beaconed up to us, that we are stark blind. There be who
perpetually complain of schisms and sects, and make it such a
calamity that any man dissents from their maxims. It is their
own pride and ignorance which causes the disturbing, who
neither will hear with meekness, nor can convince, yet all must
be suppressed which is not found in their Syntagma. They are
the troublers, they are the dividers of unity, who neglect and
permit not others to unite those dissevered pieces which are
yet wanting to the body of truth. To be still searching what
we know not, by what we know, still closing up truth to truth
as we find it, (for all her body is homogeneal and proportional,)
this is the golden rule in theology as well as in arithmetic,
and makes up the best harmony in a Church ; not the forced
and outward union of cold, and neutral, and inwardly-divided
minds."
PART I.
THE EXISTENCE OF MORAL EVIL, OR SIN, CONSISTENT
WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD.
What Time this World s great Workmaister did cast,
To make all things such as we now behold,
It seems that he before his eyes had plast
A goodly patterne, to whose perfect mould
He fashion d them as comely as he could,
That now so fair and seemly they appear,
As naught may be amended anywhere.
That wondrous patterne, wheresoe er it be,
Whether in earth laid up in secret store,
Or else in heav n, that no man may it see
With sinful eyes, for feare it to deflore,
Is perfect Beautie.
SPENSBB.
A THEODICY.
PART I.
CHAPTEK I.
THE SCHEME OF NECESSITY DENIES THAT MAN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF SIN.
Ye, who live,
Do so each cause refer to Heaven above,
E en as its motion, of necessity,
Drew with it all that moves. If this were so,
Free choice in you were none ; nor justice would
There should be joy for virtue, woe for ill. DANTE.
THE doctrine of necessity has been, in all ages of the world, the
great stronghold of atheism. It is the mighty instrument with
which the unbeliever seeks to strip man of all accountability,
and to destroy our faith and confidence in God, by tracing up
the existence of all moral evil to his agency. "The opinion of
necessity," says Bishop Butler, " seems to be the very basis in
which infidelity grounds itself." It will not be denied that this
opinion seems, at first view, to be inconsistent with the free
agency and accountability of man, and that it appears to im
pair our idea of God by staining it with impurity. Hence it
has been used, by the profligate and profane, to excuse men for
their crimes. It is against this use of the doctrine that we in
tend to direct the force of our argument.
But here the question arises : Can we refute the argument
against the accountability of man, without attacking the doc
trine on which it is founded ? If we can meet this argument
at all, it must be either by showing that no such consequence
flows from the scheme of necessity, or by showing that the
scheme itself is false. We cannot meet the sceptic, who seeks
3
84 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
to excuse his sins, and to cast dishonour on God, and expose
his sophistry, unless we can show that his premises are unsound,
or that his conclusions are false. "We must do the one or the
other of these two things ; or, whatever we may think of his
moral sensibility, we must acknowledge the superiority of his
reason and logic. After long and patient meditation on the
subject, we have been forced to the conclusion, that the only
way to repel the argument of the sceptic, and cause the intrin
sic lustre of man s free-agency to appear, is to unravel and
refute the doctrine of necessity.
If we could preserve the scheme of necessity, and at the same
time avoid the consequences in question, we may fairly con
clude that the means of doing so have been found by some of
the illustrious advocates of that scheme. How, then, do they
vindicate their own system ? How do they repel the frightful
consequences which infidelity deduces from it? This is the
first question to be considered; and the discussion of it will
occupy the remainder of the present chapter.
SECTION L
The attempts of Caloin and Luther to reconcile the scheme of necessity with
the responsibility of man.
Nothing can be more unjust than to bring, as has often been
done, the unqualified charge of fatalism against the great Pro
testant reformers. The manner in which this odious epithet is
frequently used, applying it without discrimination to the bright
est ornaments and to the darkest specimens of humanity, is cal
culated to engender far more heat than light. Indeed, under this
very ambiguous term, three distinct schemes of doctrine, widely
different from each other, are set forth ; schemes which every can
did inquirer after truth should be careful to distinguish. The first
is that scheme of fatalism which rests on the fundamental idea
that there is nothing in the universe besides matter and local mo
tion. This doctrine, of course, denies the spirituality of the
Divine Being, as well as of all created souls, and strikes a fatal
blow at the immutability of moral distinctions. It is unneces
sary to say, that in such a sense of the word, neither Calvin nor
Luther can be justly accused of fatalism ; as it is well known
that both of them maintained the spirituality of God, as well as
the reality of moral distinctions prior to all human laws.
Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 35
The second scheme of fatalism rises above the first in point
of dignity and purity of character. It proceeds on the idea
that all things in heaven and earth are bound together by " an
implexed series and concatenation of causes:" it admits the
existence of God, it is true, but yet it regards him as merely the
greatest and brightest link in the adamantine universal chain
of necessity. According to this scheme, as well as to the former,
the very idea of moral liberty is inconceivable and impossible.
This portentous scheme was perfectly understood and expressly
repudiated by Calvin. In reference to this doctrine, which was
maintained by the ancient Stoics, he says : " That dogma is
falsely and maliciously charged upon us. For we do not, with
the Stoics, imagine a necessity arising from a perpetual con
catenation and intricate series of causes contained in nature ;
but we make God the Arbiter and Governor of all things, who, in
his own wisdom, has, from all eternity, decreed what he would
do, and now by his own power executes what he decreed."
Here we behold the nature of the third scheme, which has
been included under the term fatalism. It recognises God as
the great central and all-controlling power of the universe. It
does not deny the possibility of liberty ; for it recognises its
actual existence in the Divine Being. " If the divine will," says
Calvin, " has any cause, then there must be something ante
cedent, on which it depends ; which it is impious to suppose."
According to Calvin, it is the uncaused divine will which makes
the "necessity of all things." He frequently sets forth the
doctrine, that, from all eternity, God decreed whatever should
come to pass, not excepting, but expressly including, the de
liberations and " volitions of men," and by his own power now
executes his decree. As we do not wish to use opprobrious
names, we shall characterize these three several schemes of doc
trine by the appellations given to them by their advocates. The
first we shall call, " materialistic fatalism ;" the second, " Stoical
fatalism ;" and the third we shall designate by the term, " ne-
Widely as these schemes may differ in other respects, they
have one feature in common : they all seem to bear with equal
stringency on the human will, and deprive it of that freedom
which is now conceded to be indispensable to render men ac
countable for their actions. If our volitions be produced by a
36 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
series of causes, according to the Stoical notion, of fate, or by
the omnipotence of God, they would seem to be equally neces
sitated and devoid of freedom. Hence, in attacking one of
these schemes at this point, we really attack them all. "We
shall first consider the question, then, How does Calvin attempt
to reconcile his doctrine with the accountability of man ? How
does he show, for example, that the first man was guilty and
justly punishable for a transgression in which he succumbed
to the divine omnipotence ?
If a man is really laid under a necessity of sinning, it would
certainly seem impossible to conceive that he is responsible for
his sins. Nay, it would not only seem impossible to conceive
this, but it would also appear very easy to understand, that
he could not be responsible for them. In order to remove this
difficulty, and repel the attack of his opponents, Calvin makes
a distinction between " co-action and necessity." " Now, when
I assert," says he, " that the will, being deprived of its liberty,
is necessarily drawn or led into evil, I should wonder if any
one considered it as a harsh expression, since it has nothing in
it absurd, nor is it unsanctioned by the custom of good men.
It offends those who know not how to distinguish between
necessity and compulsion."* Let us see, then, what is this
distinction between necessity and compulsion, or co-action,
(as Calvin sometimes calls it,) which is to take off all appear
ance of harshness from his views. We are not to imagine
that this is a distinction without a difference; for, in truth,
there is no distinction in philosophy which may be more easily
made, or more clearly apprehended. It is this: Suppose a
man wills a particular thing, or external action, and it is pre
vented from happening by any outward restraint ; or suppose
he is unwilling to do a thing, and he is constrained to do it
against his will ; he is said to labour under compulsion or co-
action. Of course he is not accountable for the failure of the
consequence of his will in the one case, nor for the consequence
of the force imposed on his body in the other. This kind of
necessity is called co-action by Calvin and Luther ; it is usually
denominated " natural necessity " by Edwards and his followers ;
though it is also frequently termed compulsion, or co-action, by
them.
Institutes, b. ii, o. iii.
Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 81
This natural necessity, or co-action, it is admitted on all hands,
destroys accountability for external conduct, wherever it ob
tains. Indeed, if a man is compelled to do a thing against his
will, this is not, properly speaking, his act at all ; nor is it an
omission of his, if he wills to do a thing, and is necessarily pre
vented from doing it by external restraint. But it should be
observed that natural necessity, or co-action, reaches no deeper
than the external conduct; and can excuse for nothing else.
As it does not influence the will itself, so it cannot excuse for
acts of the will. Indeed, it presupposes the existence of a
volition, or act of the will, whose natural consequences it coun
teracts and overcomes. Hence, if the question were IB a man
accountable for his external actions, that is, for the motions of
his body, we might speak of natural necessity, or co-action,
with propriety ; bat not so when the question relates to internal
acts of the will. All reference to natural necessity, or co-action,
in relation to such a question, is wholly irrelevant. No one
doubts, and no one denies, that the motions of the body are
controlled by the volitions of the mind, or by some external
force. The advocates for the inherent activity and freedom of
the mind, do not place them in the external sphere of matter,
in the passive and necessitated movements of body : they seek
not the living among the dead.
But to do justice to these illustrious men, they did not attempt,
as many of their followers have done, to pass off this freedom
from external co-action for the freedom of the will. Indeed,
neither of them contended for the freedom of the will at all,
nor deemed such freedom requisite to render men accountable
for their actions. This is an element which has been wrought
into their system by the subsequent progress of human knowl
edge. Luther, it is well known, so far from maintaining the
freedom of the mind, wrote a work on the " Bondage of the
Human Will," in reply to Erasmus. " I admit," says he, " that
man s will is free in a certain sense ; not because it is now in
the same state it was in paradise, but because it was made free
originally, and may, through God s grace, become so again"*
And Calvin, in his Institutes, has written a chapter to show
that "man, in his present state, is despoiled of freedom of
will, and subjected to a miserable slavery." He " was endowed
Scott s Luther and Ref., vol. i, pp. 70, 71.
38 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
with free will," says Calvin, " by which, if he had chosen, he
might have obtained eternal life."* Thus, according to both
Luther and Calvin, man was by the fall despoiled of the free
dom of the will.
Though they allow a freedom from co-action, they repudiate
the idea of calling this a freedom of the will. " Lombard at
length pronounces," says Calvin, "that we are not therefore
possessed of free-will, because we have an equal power to do
or to think either good or evil, but only because we are free
from constraint. And this liberty is not diminished, although
we are corrupt, and slaves of sin, and capable of doing nothing
but sin. Then man will be said to possess free-will in this
sense, not that he has an equally free election of good and
evil, but because he does evil voluntarily, and not by con
straint. That indeed, is true ; but what end could it answer
to deck out a thing so diminutive with a title so superb ?"f
Truly, if Lombard merely meant by the freedom of the will,
for which he contended, a freedom from external restraint,
or co-action, Calvin might well contemptuously exclaim,
" Egregious liberty !":(: It was reserved for a later period in
the history of the Church to deck out this diminutive thing
with the superb title of the freedom of the will, and to pass it
off for the highest and most glorious liberty of which the
human mind can form any conception. Hobbes, it will be
hereafter seen, was the first who, either designedly or unde-
signedly, palmed off this imposture upon the world.
It is a remarkable fact, in the history of the human mind,
that the most powerful and imposing arguments used by the
early reformers to disprove the freedom of the will have been
as confidently employed by their most celebrated followers to
establish that very freedom on a solid basis. It is well known,
for example, that Edwards, and many other great men, have
employed the doctrine of the foreknowledge of God to prove
philosophical necessity, without which they conclude there can
be no rational foundation for the freedom of the will. Yet, in
former times, this very doctrine was regarded as the most for
midable instrument with which to overthrow and demolish that
very freedom. Thus Luther calls the foreknowledge of God a
thunderbolt to dash the doctrine of free-will into atoms. And
Institutes, b. i, c. xv. f Ibid., b. ii, c. ii.
Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 39
who can forbear to agree with Luther so far as to say, that if
the foreknowledge of God proves anything in opposition to the
freedom of the will, it proves that it is under the most absolute
and uncontrollable necessity ? It clearly seems, that if it proves
anything in favour of necessity, it proves everything for which
the most absolute necessitarian can contend. Accordingly, a
distinguished Calvinistic divine has said, that if our volitions be
foreseen, we can no more avoid them " than we can pluck the
sun out of the heavens."*
But though the reformers were thus, in some respects, more
true to their fundamental principle than their followers have
been, we are not to suppose that they are free from all incon
sistencies and self-contradiction. Thus, if " foreknowledge is
a thunderbolt" to dash the doctrine of free-will into atoms, it
destroyed free-will in man before the fall as well as after.
Hence the thunderbolt of Luther falls upon his own doctrine,
that man possessed free-will in his primitive state, with as much
force as it can upon the doctrine of his opponents. He is evi
dently caught in the toils he so confidently prepared for his
adversary. And how many of the followers of the great re
former adopt his doctrine, and wield his thunderbolts, without
perceiving how destructively they recoil on themselves ! Though
they ascribe free-will to man as one of the elements of his pris
tine glory, yet they employ against it in his present condition
arguments which, if good for anything, would despoil, not only
man, but the whole universe of created intelligences nay, the
great Uncreated Intelligence himself of every vestige and
shadow of such a power.
It is a wonderful inconsistency in Luther, that he should so
often and so dogmatically assert that the doctrine of free-will
falls prostrate before the prescience of God, and at the same
time maintain the freedom of the divine will. If foreknowledge
is incompatible with the existence of free-will, it is clear that
the will of God is not free ; since it is on all sides conceded that
all his volitions are perfectly foreseen by him. Yet in the
face of this conclusion, which so clearly and so irresistibly follows
from Luther s position, he asserts the freedom of the divine will,
as if he were perfectly unconscious of the self-contradiction in
which he is involved. " It now then follows," says he, " that
Dick s Theology.
40 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part 1
free-will is plainly a divine term, and can be applicable to none
but the Divine Majesty only."* . . . , He even says, If free
will " be ascribed unto men, it is not more properly ascribed,
than the divinity of God himself would be ascribed unto them ;
which would be the greatest of all sacrilege. "Wherefore,
it becomes theologians to refrain from the use of this term
altogether, whenever they wish to speak of human ability, and
to leave it to be applied to God only."f And we may add,
if they would apply it to God, it becomes them to refrain from
all such arguments as would show even such an application
of it to be absurd.
In like manner, Calvin admits that the human soul possessed
a free-will in its primitive state, but has been despoiled of it
by the fall, and is now in bondage to a " miserable slavery."
But if the necessity which arises from the power of sin over the
will be inconsistent with its freedom, how are we to reconcile
the freedom of the first man with the power exercised by the
Almighty over the wills of all created beings ? So true it is,
that the most systematic thinker, who begins by denying the
truth, will be sure to end by contradicting himself.
In one respect, as we have seen, Calvin differs from his fol
lowers at the present day ; the denial of free-will he regards as
perfectly reconcilable with the idea of accountability. Al
though our volitions are absolutely necessary to us, although
they may be produced in us by the most uncontrollable power
in the universe, yet are we accountable for them, because they
are our volitions. The bare fact that we will such and such a
thing, without regard to how we come by the volition, is suf
ficient to render us accountable for it. We must be free from
an external co-action, he admits, to render us accountable for
our external actions ; but not from an internal necessity, to ren
der us accountable for our internal volitions. But this does not
seem to be a satisfactory reply to the difficulty in question. We
ask, How a man can be accountable for his acts, for his voli
tions, if they are caused in him by an infinite power ? and we
are told, Because they are his acts. This eternal repetition of
the fact in which all sides are agreed, can throw no light on
the point about which we dispute. We still ask, How can a
man be responsible for an act, or volition, which is necessitated
Bondage of the Will, sec. xxvi. | Ibid.
Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 41
to arise in his mind by Omnipotence ? If any one should reply,
with Dr. Dick, that we do not know how he can be account
able for such an act, yet we should never deny a thing because
we cannot see how it is ; this would not be a satisfactory
answer. For, though it is certainly the last weakness of the
human mind to deny a thing, because we cannot see how it is ;
yet there is a great difference between not being able to see
how a thing is, and being clearly able to see that it cannot be
anyhow at all, between being unable to see how two things
agree together, and x being able to see that two ideas are utterly
repugnant to each other. Hence we mean to ask, that if a
man s act be necessitated in him by an infinite, omnipotent
power, over which he had, and could have, no possible control,
can we not see that he cannot be accountable for it ? We have
no difficulty whatever in believing a mystery ; but when we
are required to embrace what so plainly seems to be an ab
surdity, we confess that our reason is either weak enough, or
strong enough, to pause and reluctate.
SECTION II.
The manner in which Hobbes, Collins, and others, endeavour to reconcile
necessity with free and accountable agency.
The celebrated philosopher of Malmsbury viewed all things as
bound together in the relation of cause and effect ; and he was,
beyond doubt, one of the most acute thinkers that ever advo
cated the doctrine of necessity. From some of the sentiments
expressed towards the conclusion of " The Leviathan," which
have, not without reason, subjected him to the charge of atheism,
we may doubt his entire sincerity when he pretends to advo
cate the doctrine of necessity out of a zeal for the Divine Sove
reignty and the dogma of Predestination. If he hoped by this
avowal of his design to propitiate any class of theologians, he
must have been greatly disappointed ; for his speculations were
universally condemned by the Christian world as atheistical in
their tendency. This charge has been fixed upon him, in spite
of his solemn protestations against its injustice, and his earnest
endeavours to reconcile his scheme of necessity with the free-
agency and accountability of man.
" I conceive," says Hobbes, " that nothing taketh beginning
42 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent
without itself. And that therefore, when first a man hath an
appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he
had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not the will
itself, but something else not in his own disposing ; so that it is
out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the will is the neces
sary cause, and by this which is said, the will is also caused
by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that volun
tary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore
are necessitated." This is clear and explicit. There is no con
troversy, he truly says, that voluntary actions, that is, external
actions proceeding from the will, are necessitated by the will.
And as according to his postulate, the will or volition is also
caused by other things of which it has no disposal, so they are
also necessitated. In other words, external voluntary actions
are necessarily caused by volitions, and volitions are necessarily
caused by something else other than the will ; and consequently
the chain is complete between the cause of volition and its
effects. How, then, is man a free-agent? and how is he
accountable for his actions? Hobbes has not left these
questions unanswered; and it is a mistake to suppose, as
is too often done, that his argument in favour of necessity
evinces a design to sap the foundations of human respon
sibility.
He answers these questions precisely as they were answered
by Luther and Calvin more than a hundred years before his
time. In order to solve this great difficulty, and establish an
agreement between necessity and liberty, he insists on the dis
tinction between co-action and necessity. Sir James Mackin
tosh says, that " in his treatise de Servo Arbitrio against Eras
mus, Luther states the distinction between co-action and neces
sity as familiar a hundred and fifty years before it was proposed
by Hobbes, or condemned in the Jansenists."* According to his
definition of liberty, it is merely a freedom from co-action, or ex
ternal compulsion. " I conceive liberty," says he, " to be rightly
Progress of Ethical Philosophy, note 0. Indeed, this distinction appears
quite as clearly in the writings of Augustine, as it does in those of Luther, or
Calvin, or Hobbes. He repeatedly places our liberty and ability in this, that we
can " keep the commandments if we will," which is obviously a mere freedom
from external co-action. See Part ii, ch. iv, sec. 2.
Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 48
defined in this manner : Liberty is the absence of all the impedi
ments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical
qualities of the agent : as for example, the water is said to de
scend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the channel of
the river, because there is no impediment that way ; but not
across, because the banks are impediments ; and though the
water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants liberty to
ascend, but the faculty or power, because the impediment is
in the nature of the water and intrinsical." According to this
definition, though a man s volitions were thrown out, not by
himself, but by some irresistible power working within his
mind, say the power of the Almighty, yet he would be free,
provided there were no impediments to prevent the external
effects of his volitions. This is the liberty which water, im
pelled by the power of gravity, possesses in descending the
channel of a river. It is the liberty of the winds and waves of
the sea, which, by a sort of metaphor, is supposed to reign over
the dominions of a mechanical and materialistic fate. It is the
most idle of all idle things to speak of such a liberty, or rather,
to use the word in such a sense, when the controversy relates to
the freedom of thejnind itself. "What has such a thing to do
with the origin of human volitions, or the nature of moral
agency? Is there no difference between the motion of the
bo_dy and the action of mind ? Or is there nothing in the uni
verse of God but mere body and local motion ? If there is not,
then, indeed, we neither have nor can conceive any higher
liberty than that which the philosopher is pleased to allow us
to possess ; but if there be mind, then there may be things in
heaven and earth which are not dreamed of in his philosophy.
The definition which Collins, the disciple of Hobbes, has
given of liberty, is the same as that of his master. " I contend,"
says he, " for liberty, as it signifies a power in man to do as he
wills or pleases." The doing here refers to the external action,
which, properly speaking, is not an act at all, but merely a
change of state in the body. The body merely suffers a change
of place and position, in obedience to the act of the will ; it
does not act, nor can it act, because it is passive in its nature.
To do as one wills, in this sense, is a freedom of the body from
co-action ; it is not a freedom of the will from internal neces
sity. Collins says this is "a valuable liberty," and he says
44 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT tPart I,
truly; for if one were thrown into prison, he could not go
wherever he might please, or do as he might will. But the
imprisonment of the body does not prevent a man from being
a free-agent. He also tells us truly, that " many philosophers
and theologians, both ancient and modern, have given defini
tions of liberty that are consistent with fate and necessity/
But then, their definitions, like his own, had no reference to
the acts of the mind, but to the motions of the body ; and it is
a grand irrelevancy, we repeat, to speak of such a thing, when
the question relates, not to the freedom of the body, but the
freedom of the mind. Calvin truly says, that to call this exter
nal freedom from co-action or natural necessity a freedom of
the will, is to decorate a most diminutive thing with a superb
title ; but the philosopher of Malmsbury, and his ingenious dis
ciple, seem disposed to confer the high-sounding title and
empty name on us, in order to reconcile us to the servitude and
chains in which they have been pleased to bind us. ~"
This idea of liberty, common to Hobbes and Collins, which
Mackintosh says was familiar to Luther and Calvin at least a
hundred and thirty years before, is in reality of much earlier
origin. It was maintained by the ancient Stoics, by whom it is
as clearly set forth as by Hobbes himself. The well-known
illustration of the Stoic Chrysippus, so often mentioned by Leib
nitz and others, is a proof of the correctness of this remark :
" Suppose I push against a heavy body," says he : " if it be
square, it will not move ; if it be cylindrical, it will. What the
difference of form is to the stone, the difference of disposition
is to the mind." Thus his notion of freedom was derived from
matter, and supposed to consist in the absence of friction ! The
idea of liberty thus deduced from that which is purely and per
fectly passive, from an absolutely necessitated state of body,
was easily reconciled by him with his doctrine of fate.
Is it not strange that Mr. Hazlitt, after adopting this defini
tion of liberty, should have supposed that he allowed a real
freedom to the will ? "I prefer exceedingly," says he, " to the
modern instances of a couple of billiard-balls, or a pair of scales,
the illustration of Chrysippus." We cannot very well see, how
the instance of a cylinder is so great an improvement on that
of a billiard-ball ; especially as a sphere, and not a cylinder, is
free to move in all directions.
Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 45
The truth is, we must quit the region of dead, inert, passive
matter, if we would form an idea of the true meaning of the
term liberty, as applied to the activity of living agents. Mr.
Hazlitt evidently loses himself amid the ambiguities of language,
when he says, that " I so far agree with Hobbes and differ from
Locke, in thinking that liberty, in the most extended and ab
stracted sense, is applicable to material as well as voluntary
agents" Still this very acute writer makes a few feeble and
ineffectual efforts to raise our notion of the liberty of moral
agents above that given by the illustration of Chrysippus in
Cicero. " My notion of a free agent, I confess," says he, " is
not that represented by Mr. Hobbes, namely, one that when all
things necessary to produce the effect are present, can never
theless not produce it ; but I believe a free-agent of whatever
kind is one which, where all things necessary to produce the
effect are present, can produce it ; its own operation not being
hindered by anything else. The body is said to be free when
it has the power to obey the direction of the will ; so the will
may be said to be free when it has jthe power to obey the dic
tates of the understanding."* Thus the liberty of the will is
made to consist not in the denial that its volitions are produced,
but in the absence of impediments which might hinder its
operations from taking effect. This idea of liberty, it is evi
dent, is perfectly consistent with the materialistic fatalism of
Hobbes, which is so much admired by Mr. Hazlitt.
SECTION IIL
The sentiments of Descartes, Spinoza, and Malelranche, concerning the rela
tion between liberty and necessity.
No one was ever more deeply implicated in the scheme of
necessity than Descartes. "Mere philosophy," says he, "is
enough to make us know that there cannot enter the least
thought into the mind of man, but God must will and have
willed from all eternity that it should enter there." His argu
ment in proof of this position is short and intelligible. " God,"
says he, " could not be absolutely perfect if there could happen
anything in this world which did not spring entirely from him."
Hence it follows, that it is inconsistent with the absolute per-
Literary Remains, p. 66.
46 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
fections of God to suppose that a being created by him could
put forth a volition which does not spring entirely from him,
and not even in part from the creature.
Yet Descartes is a warm believer in the doctrine of free
will. On the ground of reason, he believes in an absolute pre
destination of all things ; and yet he concludes from experience
that man is free. If we ask how these things can hang to
gether, he replies, that we cannot tell ; that a solution of this
difficulty lies beyond the reach of the human faculties. Now,
it is evident, that reason cannot " make us know " one thing,
and experience teach another, quite contrary to it ; for JDO two
truths can ever contradict each other. Those who adopt this
mode of viewing the subject, generally remind us of the feeble
ness of human reason, and of the necessary limits to all human
speculation. Though, as disciples of Butler, we are deeply im
pressed with these truths, yet, as disciples of Bacon, we do not
intend to despair until we can discover some good and sufficient
reason for so doing. It seems to us, that the reply of Leibnitz
to Descartes, already alluded to, is not without reason. "It
might have been an evidence of humility in Descartes," says
he, " if he had confessed his own inability to solve the difficulty
in question; but not satisfied with confessing for himself, he
does so for all intelligences and for all times."
But, after all, Descartes has really endeavoured to solve the
problem which he declared insoluble ; that is, to reconcile the
infinite perfections of God with the free-agency of man. He
struggles to break loose from this dark mystery ; but, like the
charmed bird, he struggles and flutters in vain, and finally
yields to its magical influence. In his solution, this great
luminary of science, like others before him, seems to suffer a
sad eclipse. " Before God sent us into the world," says he, " he
knew exactly what all the inclinations of our wills would be ;
it is he that has implanted them in us ; it is he also that has
disposed all things, so that such or such objects should present
themselves to us at such or such times, by means of which he
has known that our free-will would determine us to such or
such actions, and he has willed that it should he so / hut he has
not willed to constrain us thereto" This is found in a letter to
the Princess Elizabeth, for whose benefit he endeavoured to
reconcile the liberty of man with the perfections of God. It
Chapter I.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 47
brings us back to the old distinction between necessity and
co-action. God Brings our volitions to pass ; he wills them ; they
"spring entirely from him;" but we are nevertheless free,
because he constrains not our external actions, or compels us to
do anything contrary to our wills ! We cannot suppose, how
ever, that this solution of the problem made a very clear or
deep impression on the mind of Descartes himself, or he would
not, on other occasions, have pronounced every attempt at the
solution of it vain and hopeless.
In his attempt to reconcile the free-agency of man with the
divine perfections, Descartes deceives himself by a false analogy.
Thus he supposes that a monarch "who has forbidden duelling,
and who, certainly knowing that two gentlemen will fight, if
they should meet, employs infallible means to bring them to
gether. They meet, they fight each other : their disobedience
of the laws is an effect of their free-will ; they are punishable."
" What a king can do in such a case," he adds, " God who has
an infinite power and prescience, infallibly does in relation to
all the actions of men." But the king, in the supposed case,
does not act on the minds of the duellists ; their disposition to
disobey the laws does not proceed from him ; whereas, accord
ing to the theory of Descartes, nothing enters into the mind
of man which does not spring entirely from God. If we sup
pose a king, who has direct access to the mind of his subject,
like God, and who employs his power to excite therein a mur
derous intent or any other particular disposition to disobey the
law, we shall have a more apposite representation of the divine
agency according to the theory of Descartes. Has anything
ever been ascribed to the agency of Satan himself which could
more clearly render him an accomplice in the sins of men ?
From the bosom of Cartesianism two systems arose, one in
principle, but widely different in their developments and ulti
mate results. We allude to the celebrated schemes of Spinoza
and Malebranche. Both set out with the same exaggerated
view of the sublime truth that God is all in all ; and each gave
a diverse development to this fundamental position, to this cen
tral idea, according as the logical faculty predominated over
the moral, or the moral faculty over the logical. Father Male
branche, by a happy inconsistency, preserved the great moral
interests of the world against the invasion of a remorseless logic.
4*} MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
Spinoza, on the contrary, could follow out his first principle
almost to its last consequence, even to the entire extinction of
the moral light of the universe, and the enthronement of blind^
power, with as little concern, with as profound composure, as
if he were merely discussing a theorem in the mathematics.
" All things," says he, " determined to such and such actions,
are determined by God ; and, if God determines not a thing to
act, it cannot determine itself."* From this proposition he
drew the inference, that things which are produced by God,
could not have existed in any other manner, nor in any other
order. f Thus, by the divine power, all things in heaven and
earth are bound together in the iron circle of necessity. It
required no great logical foresight to perceive that this doctrine
shut all real liberty out of the created universe ; but it did
require no little moral firmness, or very great moral insensi
bility, to declare such a consequence with the unflinching auda
city which marks its enunciation by Spinoza. He repeatedly
declares, in various modes of expression, that " the soul is a
spiritual automaton," and possesses nonsuch liberty as is usually
ascribed to it. All is necessary, and the very notion of a free
will is a vulgar prejudice. "All I have to say," he coolly
remarks, "to those who believe that they can speak or keep
silence in one word, can act by virtue of a free decision of
the soul, is, that they dream with their eyes open."J Though
he thus boldly denies all free-will, according to the common
notion of mankind ; yet, no less than Hobbes and Collins, he
allows that the soul possesses "a sort of liberty." " It is free,"
says he, in the act of affirming that " two and two are equal to
four ;" thus finding the freedom of the soul which he is pleased
to allow the world to possess in the most perfect type of neces
sity it is possible to conceive.
But Spinoza does not employ this idea of liberty, nor any
other, to show that man is a responsible being. This is not at
all strange ; the wonder is, that after having demonstrated that
" the prejudice of men concerning good and evil, merit and
demerit, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and
deformity," are nothing but dreams, he should have felt bound
to defend the position, that we may be justly punished for our
Ethique, premiere partie, prop. xxvi. f Ibid., prop, xxxiv.
J Ethique, Des Passions, prop, ii and Scholium.
Chapter I.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 49
offences by the Supreme Ruler of the world. His defence of
this doctrine we shall lay before the reader without a word of
comment. " Will you say," he replies to Oldenburg, " that God
cannot be angry with the wicked, or that all men are worthy
of beatitude ? In regard to the first point, I perfectly agree
that God cannot be angry at anything which happens according
to his decree, but I deny that it results that all men ought to
be happy ; for men can be excusable, and at the same time be
deprived of beatification, and made to suffer a thousand ways.
A horse is excusable for being a horse, and not a man ; but that
prevents not that he ought to be a horse, and not a man. He
who is rendered mad by the bite of a dog, is surely excusable,
and yet we ought to constrain him. In like manner, the man
who cannot govern his passions, nor restrain them by the fear
of the laws, though excusable on account of the infirmity of his
nature, can nevertheless not enjoy peace, nor the knowledge
and the love of God ; and it is necessary that he should
perish."*
It was as difficult for Father Malebranche to restrain his
indignation at the system of Spinoza, as it was for him to ex
pose its fallacy, after having admitted its great fundamental
principle. This is well illustrated by the facts stated by M. Sais-
set : " When Mairan," says he," still young, and having a strong
passion for the study of the Ethique, requested Malebranche
to guide him in that perilous route ; we know with what urgency,
bordering on importunity, he pressed the illustrious father
to show him the weak point of Spinozism, the precise place
where the rigour of the reasoning failed, the paralogism con
tained in the demonstration. Malebranche eluded the question,
and could not assign the pa/ralogism, after which Mairan so ear
nestly sought : * It is not that the paralogism is in such or
such places of the Eihique, it is everywhere. "f In this impa
tient judgment, Father Malebranche uttered more truth than
he could very well perceive ; the paralogism is truly everywhere,
because this whole edifice of words, " this frightful chimera,"
is really assumed in the arbitrary definition of the term sub
stance. We might say with equal truth, that the fallacy of
Malebranche s scheme is also everywhere ; for although it stops
CEuvres de Spinoza, tome ii, 350.
| Introduction to the " (Euvres de Spinoza," by M. Saisset.
4
50 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
short of the consequences so sternly deduced by Spinoza, it sets
out from the same distorted view of the sovereignty and domin
ion of God, from which those consequences necessarily flow.
Spinoza, who had but few followers during his lifetime, has
been almost idolized by the most celebrated savans of modern
Germany. Whether this will ultimately add to the glory of
Spinoza, or detract from that of his admirers, we shall leave the
reader and posterity to determine. In the mean time, we shall
content ourselves with a statement of the fact, in the language
of M. Saisset : " Everything," says he, " appears extraordinary
in Spinoza ; his person, his style, his philosophy ; but that which
is more strange still, is the destiny of that philosophy among
men. Badly known, despised by the most illustrious of his con
temporaries, Spinoza died in obscurity, and remained buried
during a century. All at once his name reappeared with an
extraordinary eclat ; his works were read with passion ; a new
world was discovered in them, with a horizon unknown to our
fathers ; and the god of Spinoza, which the seventeenth century
had broken as an idol, became the god of Lessing, of Goethe,
of Novalis."
"The solitary thinker whom Malebranche called a wretch,
Schleiermacher reveres and invokes as equal to a saint. That
systematic atheist, on whom Bayle lavished outrage, has been
for modern Germany the most religious of men. God-intoxi
cated, as Novalis said, he has seen the world through a thick
cloud, and man has been to his troubled eyes only a fugitive
mode of Being in itself. In that system, in fine, so shocking
and so monstrous, that c hideous chimera, Jacobi sees the last
word of philosophy, Schelling the presentiment of the true
philosophy."
SECTION IV.
The views of LocTce, Tucker, Hartley, Priestley, Helvetius, and Diderot, with
respect to the relation between liberty and necessity.
Locke, it is well known, adopted the notions of free-agency
given by Hobbes. " In this," says he, " consists freedom, viz.,
in our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall
choose or will."* And this notion of liberty, consisting in a
Book ii, chapters 21, 27.
Chapter!.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 61
freedom from external co-action, has received an impetus and
currency from the influence of Locke which it would not other
wise have obtained. Neither Calvin nor Luther, as we have
seen, pretended to hold it up as the freedom of the will. This
was reserved for Hobbes and his immortal follower, John
Locke., who has, in his turn, been copied by a host of illustrious
disciples who would have recoiled from the more articulate and
consistent development of this doctrine by the philosopher of
Malmsbury. It is only because Locke has enveloped it in a
cloud of inconsistencies that it has been able to secure the ven
eration of the great and good.
It is remarkable, that although Locke adopted the definition
of free-will given by Hobbes, and which the latter so easily
reconciled with the omnipotence and omniscience of God ; yet
he expressly declares that he had found it impossible to recon
cile those attributes in the Divine Being with the free-agency
of man. Surely no such difficulty could have existed, if his
definition of free-agency, or free-will, be correct ; for although
omnipotence itself might produce our volitions, we might still
be free to act, to move in accordance with our volitions. But
the truth is, there was something more in Locke s thoughts and
feelings, in the inmost working of his nature, with respect to
moral liberty, than there was in his definition. The inconsist
ency and fluctuation of his views on this all-important subject
are fully reflected in his chapter on power.
Both in Great Britain and France, the most illustrious suc
cessors of Locke soon delivered themselves from his incon
sistencies and self-contradictions. Hartley was not in all re
spects a follower of Locke, it is true, though he admitted his
definition of free-agency. " It appears to me," says Hartley,
" that all the most complex ideas arise from sensation, and that
reflection is not a distinct source, as Mr. Locke makes it." By
this mutilation of the philosophy of Locke, it was reduced back
to that dead level of materialism in which Hobbes had left it,
and from which the former had scarcely endeavoured to raise
it. Hence arose the rigid scheme of necessity, for which
Hartley is so zealous an advocate. In reading his treatise on
the " Mechanism of the Human Mind," we are irresistibly com
pelled to feel the conviction that the only circumstance which
prevents the movements of the soul from being subjected to
52 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPt I,
mathematical calculation, and made a branch of dynamics, is
the want of a measure of the force of motives. If this want
were supplied, then the philosophy of the mind might be, ac
cording to his view of its nature and operations, converted into
a portion of mechanics. Yet this excellent man did not im
agine for a moment that he upheld a scheme which is at war
with the great moral interests of the world. He supposes it is
no matter how we come by our volitions, provided our bodies
be left free to obey the impulses of the will ; this is amply suf
ficient to render us accountable for our actions, and to vindicate
the moral government of God. Thus did he fall asleep with a
specious, but most superficial dream of liberty, which has no
more to do with the real question concerning the moral agency
of man than if it related to the winds of heaven or to the waves
of the sea. Accordingly this is the view of liberty which he
repeatedly holds up as all-sufficient to secure the great moral
interest of the human race.
His great disciple, Dr. Priestley, pursues precisely the same
course. " If a man," says he, " be wholly a material being, and
the power of thinking the result of a certain organization of the
brain, does it not follow that all his functions must be regulated
by the laws of mechanism, and that of consequence his actions
proceed from an irresistible necessity?" And again, he ob
serves, " the doctrine of necessity is the immediate result of the
materiality of man, for mechanism is the undoubted consequence
of materialism."* Priestley, however, allows us to possess free
will as defined by Hobbes, Locke, and Hartley.
Helvetius himself could easily admit such a liberty into his
unmitigated scheme of necessity, but he did not commit the
blunder of Locke and Hartley, in supposing that it bore on the
great question concerning the freedom of the mind. "It is
true," he says, " we can form a tolerably distinct idea of the
word liberty, understood in its common sense. A mem is free
who is neither loaded with irons nor confined in prison, nor in
timidated like the slave with the dread of chastisement : in tliis
sense the liberty of man consists in the free exercise of his
power ; I say, of his power, because it would be ridiculous to
mistake for a want of liberty the incapacity we are under to
pierce the clouds like the eagle, to live under the water like the
Disquisitions and Introduction, p. 5.
Chapter!.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 53
whale, or to become king, emperor, or pope. We have so far
a sufficiently clear idea of the word. But this is no longer the
case when we come to apply liberty to the will. What must
this liberty then mean ? We can only understand by it a free
power of willing or not willing a thing : but this power would
imply that there may be a will without motives, and conse
quently an effect without a cause. A philosophical treatise on
the liberty of the will would be a treatise of effects without a
cause."*
In like manner, Diderot had the sagacity to perceive that
the idea of liberty, as defined by Locke, did not at all come
into conflict with his portentous scheme of irreligion, which had
grounded itself on the doctrine of necessity. Having pro
nounced the term liberty, as applied to the will, to be a word
without meaning, he proceeds to justify the infliction of punish
ment on the same grounds on which it is vindicated by Hobbes
and Spinoza. " But if there is no liberty," says he, " there is
no action that merits either praise or blame, neither vice nor
virtue, nothing that ought to be either rewarded or punished.
What then is the distinction among men ? The doing of good
and the doing of evil ! The doer of ill is one who must be
destroyed, not punished. The doer of good is lucky, not virtu
ous. But though neither the doer of good nor of ill be free, man
is, nevertheless, a being to be modified ; it is for this reason the
doer of ill should be destroyed upon the scaffold. From thence
the good effects of education, of pleasure, of grief, of grandeur,
of poverty, &c. ; from thence a philosophy full of pity, strongly
attached to the good, nor more angry with the wicked than
with the whirlwind which fills one s eyes with dust."
" Adopt these principles if you think them good, or show me
that they are bad. If you adopt them, they will reconcile yon
too with others and with yourself: you will neither be pleased
nor angry with yourself for being what you are. Reproach
others for nothing, and repent of nothing, this is the first step
to wisdom. Besides this all is prejudice and false philosophy."
Though these consequences irresistibly flow from the doctrine
of necessity, yet the injury resulting from them would be far
less if they were maintained only by such men as Helvetius
and Diderot. It is when such errors receive the sanction of
Helvetius on the Mind, p. 44.
54 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
Christian philosophers, like Hartley and Leibnitz, and are rec
ommended to the human mind by a pious zeal for the glory of
God, that they are apt to obtain a frightful currency and be
come far more desolating in their effects. "The doctrine of
necessity," says Hartley, " has a tendency to abate all resent
ment against men : since all they do against us is by the ap
pointment of God, it is rebellion against him to be offended
with them."
SECTION V.
The manner in which Leibnitz endeavours to reconcile liberty and necessity.
Leibnitz censures the language of Descartes, in which he
ascribes all the thoughts and volitions of men to God, and com
plains that he thereby shuts out free-agency from the world.
It becomes a very curious question, then, how Leibnitz himself,
who was so deeply implicated in the scheme of necessity, has
been able to save the great interests of morality. He does not,
for a moment, call in question " the great demonstration from
cause and effect " in favour of necessity. It is well known that
he has more than once compared the human mind to a balance,
in which reasons and inclinations take the place of weights ; he
supposes it to be just as impossible for the mind to depart from
the direction given to it by " the determining cause," as it is for
a balance to turn in opposition to the influence of the greatest
weight.
Nor is he pleased with Descartes s appeal to consciousness to
prove the doctrine of liberty. In reply to this appeal, he says :
" The chain of causes connected one with another reaches very
far. Wherefore the reason alleged by Descartes, in order to
prove the independence of our free actions, by a pretended
vigorous internal feeling, has no force.* "We cannot, strictly
speaking, feel our independence ; and we do not always per
ceive the causes, frequently imperceptible, on which our reso
lution depends. It is as if a needle touched with the loadstone
were sensible of and pleased with its turning toward the north.
Mr. Stewart says : " Dr. Hartley was, I believe, one of the first (if not the
first) who denied that our consciousness is in favour of our free-agency."
Stewart s Works, vol. v, Appendix. This is evidently a mistake. In the above
passage, Leibnitz, with even more point than Hartley, denies that our conscious
ness is in favour of free-agency.
Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 55
For it would believe that it turned itself, independently of any
other cause, not perceiving the insensible motions of the mag
netic matter."* Thus, he seems to represent the doctrine of
liberty as a mere dream and delusion of the mind, and the iron
scheme of necessity as a stern reality. Is it in the power of
Leibnitz, then, any more than it was in that of Descartes, to
reconcile such a scheme with the free-agency and accountability
of man ? Let us hear him and determine.
Leibnitz repudiates the notion of liberty given by Hobbes
and Locke. In his "Nouveaux Essais sur L Entendement
Humain," a work in which he combats many of the doctrines of
Locke, the insignificance of his idea of the freedom of the will
is most clearly and triumphantly exposed. Philalethe, or the
representative of Locke, says: "Liberty is the power that a
man has to do or not to do an action according to his will"
Theophile, or the representative of Leibnitz, replies : "If men
understood only that by liberty, when they ask whether the
will is free, their question would be truly absurd." And again :
" The question ought not to be asked," says Philalethe, " if the
will is free : that is to speak in a very improper manner : but
if man is free. This granted, I say that, when any one can, by
the direction or choice of his mind, prefer the existence of one
action to the non-existence of that action and to the contrary,
that is to say, when he can make it exist or not exist, according
to his will, then he is free. And we can scarcely see how it
could be possible to concewe a being more free than one who is
capable of doing what he wills" Theophile rejoins: "When
we reason concerning the liberty of the will, we do not demand
if the man can do what he wills, but if he has a sufficient inde
pendence in the will itself; we do not ask if he has free limbs
or elbow-room, but if the mind is free, and in what that free
dom consists."f
Essais de Theodicee, p. 99.
f " Hobbes defines a free-agent," says Stewart, " to be he that can do if he
will, and forbear if he -will. The same definition has been adopted by Leibnitz,
by Collins, by Gravezende, by Edwards, by Bonnet, and by all later necessitari
ans." The truth is, as we have seen, that instead of adopting, Leibnitz has very
clearly refuted, the definition of Hobbes. Mr. Harris, in his work entitled " The
Primeval Man," has also fallen into the error of ascribing this definition of liberty
to Leibnitz. Surely, these very learned authors must have forgotten, that Leib
nitz wrote a reply to Hobbes, in which he expressly combats his views of liberty.
56 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part t,
Having thus exploded the delusive notion of liberty which
Locke had borrowed from Hobbes, Leibnitz proceeds to take
what seems to be higher ground. He expressly declares, that
in order to constitute man an accountable agent, he must be
free, not only from constraint, but also from necessity. In the
adoption of this language, Leibnitz seems to speak with the ad
vocates of free-agency ; but does he think with them ? The
sound is pleasant to the ear ; but what sense is it intended to
convey to the mind? Leibnitz shall be his own interpreter.
" All events have their necessary causes," says Hobbes. " Bad,"
replies Leibnitz : " they have their determining causes, by which
, we can assign a reason for them ; but they have not necessary
, causes." Now does this signify that an event, that a volition,
vjs not absolutely and indissolubly connected with its " determin
ing cause?" Is this the grand idea from which the light of
liberty is to beam on a darkened and enslaved world ? By no
means. "We must indulge no fond hopes or idle dreams of the
kind. Volition is free from necessity, adds Leibnitz ; because
" the contrary could happen without implying a contradiction."
This is the signification which he attaches to his own language ;
and it is the only meaning of which it is susceptible in accord
ance with his system. Thus, Leibnitz saw and clearly exposed
the futility of speaking about a freedom from co-action or re
straint, when the question is, not whether the body is untram
melled, but whether the mind itself is free in the act of willing.
But he did not see, it seems, that it is equally irrelevant to
speak of a freedom from a mathematical necessity in such a
connexion ; although this, as plainly as the other sense of the
word, has no conceivable bearing on the point in dispute. If a
volition were produced by the omnipotence of God, irresistibly
acting on the human mind, still it would not be necessary, in
the sense of Leibnitz, since it might and would have been dif
ferent if God had so willed it ; the contrary volition implying
no contradiction. Is it not evident, that to suppose the mind
may thus be bound to act, and yet be free because the contrary
act implies no contradiction, is merely to dream of liberty, anc
to mistake a shadow for a substance ?
As the opposite of a volition implies no contradiction, says
Leibnitz, so it is free from an absolute necessity; that is to
say, it might have been different, nay, it must have been dif-
Chapter!.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 57
ferent, from what it is, provided its determining canse had
been different. The same thing may be said of the motions of
matter. We may say that they are also free, because the oppo
site motions imply no contradiction ; and we only have to vary
the force in order to vary the motion. Hence, freedom in this
sense of the word is perfectly consistent with the absolute and
uncontrolled dominion of causes over the will ; for what can
be more completely necessitated than the motions of the body ?
The demand of his own nature, which so strongly impelled
Leibnitz to seek and cling to the freedom of the mind, as the
basis of moral and accountable agency, could not rest satisfied
with so unsubstantial a shadow. After all, he has felt con
strained to have recourse to the hypothesis of a preestablished
harmony in order to restore, if possible, the liberty which his
scheme of necessity had banished from the universe. It is no
part of our intention to examine this obsolete fiction ; we merely
wish to show how essential Leibnitz regarded it to a solution
of the difficulty under consideration. " I come now," says he,
" to show how the action of the will depends on causes ; that
there is nothing so agreeable to human nature as this depend
ence of our actions, and that otherwise we should fall into an
absurd and insupportable fatality ; that is to say, into the Mo
hammedan fate, which is the worst of all, because it does away
with foresight and good counsel. However, it is well to explain
how this dependency of our voluntary actions does not prevent
that there may be at the bottom of things a marvellous spon
taneity in us, which in a certain sense renders the mind, in its
resolutions, independent of the physical influence of all other
creatures. This spontaneity, lut little known hitherto, which
raises our empire over our actions as much as it is possible, is
a consequence of the system of preestablished harmony" Thus,
in order to satisfy himself that our actions are really free and
independent of the physical influence of other creatures, he has
recourse to a fiction in which few persons ever concurred with
him, and which is now universally regarded as one of the vaga
ries and dreams of philosophy. If we are to be saved from an
insupportable fate only by such means, our condition must
indeed be one of forlorn hopelessness.
Before we take leave of Leibnitz, there is one view of the
difficulty in question which we wish to notice, not because it is
58 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
peculiar to him, but because it is very clearly stated and con
fidently relied on by him. It is common to most of the advo
cates of necessity, and it is exceedingly imposing in its appear
ance and effect. " Men of all times," says he, " have been
troubled by a sophism, which the ancients called the raison
pwresseuse] because it induces them to do nothing, or at least
to concern themselves about nothing, and to follow only the
present inclination to pleasure. For, say they, if the future is
necessary, that which is to happen will happen whatever I may
do. But the future, say they, is necessary, either because the
Divinity foresees all things, and even preestablishes them in
governing the universe ; or because all things necessarily come
to pass by a concatenation of causes."* Leibnitz illustrated the
fallacy of this reasoning in the following manner: "By the
same reason (if it is valid) I could say If it is written in the
archives of fate, that poison will kill me at present, or do me
harm, this will happen, though I should not take it ; and if that
is not written, it will not happen, though I should take it ; and,
consequently, I can follow my inclination to take whatever is
agreeable with impunity, however pernicious it may be ; which
involves a manifest absurdity. . . . This objection staggers them
a little, but they always come back to their reasoning, turned
in different points of view, until we cause them to comprehend
in what the defect of their sophism consists. It is this, that it
is false that the event will happen whatever we may do ; it will
, happen, because we do that which leads to it ; and if the event
is written, the cause which will make it happen is also written.
Thus the connexion (liaison) of effects and their causes, so far
from establishing the doctrine of a necessity prejudicial to prac
tice, serves to destroy it."f The same reply is found more than
once in the course of the same great work ; and it is employed
by all necessitarians in defence of their system. But it is not
a satisfactory answer. It overlooks the real difficulty in the
case, and seeks to remove an imaginary one. The question is,
not whether a necessary connexion between our volitions and
their effects is a discouragement to practice, but whether a neces
sary connexion between our volitions and their ca/uses is so.
It is very true, that no man would be accountable for his exter
nal actions or their consequences, if there were no fixed relation
Essais de Theodicee, pp. 5, 6. f Id - P 8
Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 59
between these and his volitions. If, when a man willed one
thing, another should happen to follow which he did not will,
of course he would not be responsible for it. And if there were
no certain or fixed connexion between his external actions and
their consequences, either as they affected himself or others, he
certainly would not be responsible for those consequences. This
connexion between causes and effects, this connexion between
volitions and their consequences, is indispensable to our account
ability for such consequences. But for such a connexion, noth
ing could be more idle and ridiculous than to endeavour to do any
thing; for we might will one thing, and another would take place.
But must the same necessary connexion exist between the
causes of our volitions and the volitions themselves, before we
can be accountable for these volitions, for these effects ? This
is the question. Leibnitz has lost sight of it, and deceived him
self by a false application of his doctrine. The doctrine of
necessity, when applied to volitions and their effects, is indis
pensable to build up man s accountability for his external
conduct and its consequences. But the same doctrine, when
applied to establish a fixed and unalterable relation between
the causes of volition and volition itself, really demolishes all
responsibility for volition, and consequently for its external
results. Leibnitz undertook to show that a necessary connexion
between volition and its causes does not destroy man s account
ability for his volitions ; and he has shown, what no one ever
doubted, that a necessary connexion between volition and its
effects does not destroy accountability for those effects ! Strange
as this confusion of things is, it is made by the most celebrated
advocates of the doctrine of necessity ; which shows, we think,
that the doctrine hardly admits of a solid defence. Thus Ed
wards, for example, insists that the doctrine of necessity is so
far from rendering our endeavours vain and useless, that it is
an indispensable condition or prerequisite to their success. In
illustration of this point, he says : "Let us suppose a real and
sure connexion between a man having his eyes open in the clear
daylight, with good organs of sight, and seeing ; so that seeing
is connected with opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not
opening his eyes ; and also the like connexion between such a
man attempting to open his eyes and his actually doing it : the
supposed established connexion between these antecedents and
60 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
consequents, let the connexion be never so sure and necessary,
certainly does not prove that it is in vain for a man in such
circumstances to attempt to open his eyes, in order to seeing ;
his aiming at that event, and the use of the means, being the
effect of his will, does not break the connexion, or hinder the
success."
" So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the
doctrine of the necessity of events by a certainty of connexion
and consequence : on the contrary, it is truly forcible against
the Arminicm doctrine of contingence and self-determination,
which is inconsistent with such a connexion. If there be no
connexion between those events wherein virtue and vice con
sist, and anything antecedent; then there is no connexion
between these events and any means or endeavours used in
order to them : and if so, then those means must be in vain.
The less there is of connexion between foregoing things and fol
lowing ones, so much the less there is between means and end,
endeavours and success ; and in the same proportion are means
and endeavours ineffectual and in vain."
In like manner, Dr. Chalmers, in his defence of the doctrine
of necessity, has in all his illustrations confounded the con
nexion between a volition and its antecedent, with the relation
between a volition and its consequent. To select one such
illustration from many, it would be idle, says he, for a man to
labour and toil after wealth, if there were no fixed connexion
between such exertion and the accumulation of riches.
We reply to all such illustrations, It is true, there must be
a fixed connexion between our endeavours or voluntary exer
tions and their consequences, in order to render such endeavours
or exertions of any avail, or to render us accountable for such
consequences. But it should be forever borne in mind, that
the question is not whether a fixed connexion obtains between
our volitions and their sequents, but whether a necessary con
nexion exists between our volitions and their antecedents. The
question is, not whether the will be a power which is often fol
lowed by necessitated effects ; but whether there be a power
behind the will by which its volitions are necessitated. And
this being the question, what does it signify to tell us, that the
will is a producing power ? We deny that volitions and their
antecedents are necessarily connected ; and our opponents re-
Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 61
fute us by showing that volitions and their sequents are thus
connected ! We deny that A and B are necessarily connected ;
and this position is overthrown and demolished by showing that
B and C are thus connected ! Is it not truly wonderful that
such men as a Leibnitz, an Edwards, and a Chalmers, should,
in their zeal to maintain a favourite dogma, commit so great an
oversight, and so grievously deceive themselves ?
l~
SECTION VL
The attempt of Edwards to establish free and accountable agency on the basis
of necessity The views of the younger Edwards, Day, Chalmers, Dick,
D Aubigne, Hill, Shaw, and M Cosh, concerning the agreement of liberty
and necessity.
The great metaphysician of New-England insists, that his
scheme, and his scheme alone, is consistent with the free-
agency and accountability of man. But how does he show this ?
Does he endeavour to shake the stern argument by which all
things seem bound together in the relation of cause and effect ?
Does he even intimate a doubt with respect to the perfect co
herency and validity of this argument ? Does he once enter a
protest against the doctrine of the Stoics, or of the materialistic
fatalists, according to which all things in heaven and earth are
involved in an "implex series of causes?" He does not. On
the contrary, he has stated and enforced the great argument
from cause and effect, in the strongest possible terms. He
contends that volition is caused, not by the will nor the mind^
but by the strongest motive. This is the cause of volition, and
it is impossible for the effect to be loose from its cause. It is
an inherent contradiction, a glaring absurdity, to say that mo
tive is the cause of volition, and yet admit that volition may,
or may not, follow motive. This is to say, indeed, that motive
is the cause, and yet that it is not the cause, of volition ; which
is a contradiction in terms.* So far from saying anything,
then, to extricate the volitions of men from the adamantine
circle of necessity, he has exerted his prodigious energies to
fasten them therein.
Hence the question arises, Has he left any room for the in
troduction of that freedom of the mind, which it is the great
object of his inquiry to establish upon its true foundations?
Inquiry, part ii, sec. viii.
62 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
The liberty for which he contends, is, after all his labours, pre
cisely that advocated by Hobbes and Collins, and no other.
It is a freedom from co-action, and not from necessity. But he
is entitled to speak for himself, and we shall permit him so to
do : " The plain and obvious meaning of the word freedom and
liberty," says he, " in common speech, is the power, opportunity,
or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or, in other
words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the
way of doing or conducting in any respect as he wills. And
the contrary to liberty, whatever name we call it by, is a per
son being hindered, or unable to conduct as he will, or being
necessitated to do otherwise." Here, it will be seen, that liberty,
according to this notion of it, has no relation to the manner in
which the will arises, or comes into existence ; if one s external
conduct can only follow his will, he is free.
" There are two things," says he, " contrary to what is called
liberty in common speech. One is constraint, otherwise called
force, compulsion, and co-action which is a person being ne
cessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is re
straint ; which is, his being hindered, and not having power to
do according to his will. But that which has no will cannot
be the subject of these things." This definition, it is plain, pre
supposes the existence of a volition ; and liberty consists in the
absence of co-action. It has no relation to the question as to
how we come by our volitions, whether they are put forth by
the mind itself without being necessitated, or whether they are
necessarily produced in us. It leaves this great fundamental
question untouched.
On this subject his language is perfectly explicit. There is
nothing in Kames, nor Collins, nor Crombie, nor Hobbes, nor
any other writer, more perfectly unequivocal. " But one thing
more," says he, " I would observe concerning what is vulgarly
called liberty, namely, that power and opportunity for one to
do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that
is meant by it, without taking into the meaning of the word
anything of the cause of that choice, or at all considering
how the person came to have such a volition, or internal habit
and bias; whether it was determined by some internal ante
cedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause;
whether it were necessarily connected with something foregoing,
Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 63
or not connected. Let the person come lyy his choice any how,
yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his
pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free ac
cording to the primary and common notion of freedom" Now
this is all the definition of liberty with which his "Inquiry"
furnishes us ; and this, he says, is " sufficient to show what is
meant by liberty, according to the common notion of mankind,
and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word." ^
It is easy to see, that there is no difficulty in reconciling
liberty, in such a sense, with the most absolute scheme of ne
cessity or fatalism the world has ever seen. Let a man come
by his volition ANY HOW ; let it be produced in him by the di
rect and almighty power of God himself; yet, "he is perfectly
free," provided there is no external co-action to prevent his
volition from producing its natural effects !
President Day is not pleased with the definition contained in
the "Inquiry;" and in this particular we think he has dis
covered a superior sagacity to Edwards. But his extreme
anxiety to save the credit of his author has betrayed him, it
seems to us, into an apology which will not bear a close ex
amination. "On the subject of liberty or freedom," says he,
" which occupies a portion of the fifth section of Edwards s
first book, he has been less particular than was to be expected,
considering that this is the great object of inquiry in his work.
His explanation of what he regards as the proper meaning of
the term is applicable to the liberty of outward action^ to what
is called by philosophers external liberty." " This is very well
as far as it goes. But the professed object of his book, accord
ing to the title-page, is an inquiry concerning the freedom of
the will, not the freedom of the external conduct. "We natu
rally look for his meaning of this internal liberty. "What he
has said, in this section, respecting freedom of the will, has
rather the appearance of evading such a definition of it as
might be considered his own."* Now, is it possible that Presi
dent Edwards has instituted an inquiry into the freedom of the
will, and written a great book in defence of it, and yet has
evaded giving his own definition of it? If so, then he may
have demolished the views of others on this subject, but he has
certainly not established his own in their stead; and hence, for
Day s Examination of Edwards on the Will, sec. v, pp. 80, 81.
f4 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
aught we know, he really did not believe in the freedom of the
will at all ; and, for all his work shows, there may be no such
freedom. For how is it possible for any man to establish his
views of the freedom of the will, if he is not at sufficient pains
to explain his meaning of the terms, and forbears even to give
his own definition of them ?
But the truth is, the author of the " Inquiry " has placed it
beyond all controversy, that he has been guilty of no such
omission or evasion. He has left no room to doubt that the def
inition of liberty, which he says is in conformity "with the
common notion of mankind," is his own. He always uses this
definition when he undertakes to repel objections against his
scheme of necessity. " It is evident," he says, " that such a
providential disposing and determining of men s moral actions,
though it infers a moral necessity of those actions, yet it does
not in the least infringe the real liberty of mankind, the only
liberty that common sense teaches to "be necessary to moral agency,
which, AS HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED, is not inconsistent with such
necessity."* He defines liberty in the very words of Collins
and Hobbes, to mean the power or opportunity any one has
" to do as he pleases ;" or, in other words, to do " as he wills "\
This definition, he says, is according to the primary and com
mon notion of mankind ; and now he declares, that " this is the
only liberty common sense teaches is necessary to moral agency."
It is very strange that any one should have read the great work
of President Edwards without perceiving that this is the sense
in which he always uses the term when he undertakes to repel
the attacks of his adversaries. To select only one instance out
of many, he says, " If the Stoics held such a fate as is repug
nant to any liberty, consisting in our doing as we please, I ut
terly deny such a fate. If they held any such fate as is not
consistent with the common and universal notions that mankind
have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue, and vice, I dis
claim any such thing, and think I have demonstrated the scheme
I maintain is no such scheme.":): Thus he always has recourse
to this definition of liberty, consisting in the power or oppor
tunity any one has " to do as he pleases," or, in other words,
" as he wills," whenever he attempts to reconcile his doctrine
with the moral agency and accountability of man, or to vindi-
Inquiry, part iv, sec. 9. f Had. I Ibid., sec. 7.
Chapter I.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 65
cate it against the attacks of his opponents. We must suppose
then, that Edwards has given his own definition of liberty in
the Inquiry, or we must conclude that he defended his system
by the use of an idea of liberty which he did not believe to be
correct ; that when he alleged that he " had demonstrated " his
doctrine to be consistent with free-agency, he only meant with
a false and atheistical notion of free-agency.
We are not surprised that President Day does not like this
definition of liberty ; but we are somewhat surprised, we con
fess, that such an idea of liberty should be so unhesitatingly
adopted from Edwards, and so confidently set forth as the
highest conceivable notion thereof, by Dr. Chalmers. He does
not seem to entertain the shadow of a doubt, either that the
definition of liberty contained in the Inquiry is that of Ed
wards himself, or that which is fully founded in truth. He
freely concedes, that " we can do as we please," and supposes
that the reader may be startled to hear that this is " cordially
admitted by the necessitarians themselves !"
But this concession he easily reconciles with the tenet of neces
sity. " To say that you can do as you please," says he, " is just to
affirm one of those sequences which take place in the phenom
ena of mind a sequence whereof a volition is the antecedent,
and the performance of that volition is the consequent. It is
a sequence which no advocate of the philosophical necessity is
ever heard to deny. Let the volition ever be formed, and if it
point to some execution which lies within the limits we have
just adverted to, the execution of it will follow."* Thus, his
notion of liberty makes it consist in the absence of external im
pediments, which might break the connexion of a volition and
its consequent, and not in the freedom of the will itself from
the absolute dominion of causes. Such an idea of free-will, it
must be confessed, is very well adopted by one who intends to
maintain " a rigid and absolute predestination" of all events. *
The manner in which Edwards attempts to reconcile the free-
agency and accountability of man with the great argument
from the law of causation, or with his doctrine of necessity, is,
as we have seen, precisely the same as that adopted by Hobbes.
There is not a shade of difference between them. It is, indeed,
easy to demonstrate that liberty, according to this definition of
Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, part iii, chap. i.
06 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
it, is not inconsistent with necessity; and it is just as easy to
demonstrate, that it is not inconsistent with any scheme of fate
that has ever been heard of among men. The will may be ab
solutely necessitated in all its acts, and yet the body may be
free from external co-action or natural necessity !
But though there is this close agreement between Hobbes
and Edwards, there are some points of divergency between
Edwards and Calvin. The former comes forward as the advo
cate of free-will, the latter expressly denies that we have a free
will. Calvin admits that we may be free from co-action or
compulsion ; but to call this freedom of the will, is, he con
siders, to decorate a most "diminutive thing with a superb
title." And though this is all the freedom Edwards allows us
to possess, yet he does not hesitate to declare that his doctrine
is perfectly consistent with " the highest degree of liberty that
ever could be thought of, or that ever could possibly enter into
the heart of man to conceive."
The only liberty we possess, according to all the authors re
ferred to, is a freedom of the body and not of the mind.
Though the younger Edwards is a strenuous advocate of his
father s doctrine, he has sometimes, without intending to do so,
let fall a heavy blow upon it. He finds, for instance, the fol
lowing language in the writings of Dr. West, " he might have
omitted doing the thing if he would," and he is perplexed to
ascertain its meaning. " To say that if a man had chosen not
to go to a debauch, (for that is the case put by Dr. West,) he
would, indeed, have chosen not to go to it, is too great trifling
to be ascribed to Dr. West." " Yet to say," he continues, " that
the man could have avoided the external action of going, &c.,
if he would, would be equally trifling ; for the question before
us is concerning the liberty of the will or mind, and not the
body." The italics are his own. It seems, then, that in the
opinion of the younger Edwards it is very great trifling to speak
of the power to do an external action in the present controversy,
became it relates to the will or mind, and not to the ~body. We
believe this remark to be perfectly just, and although it was
aimed at the antagonist of President Edwards, it falls with
crushing weight on the doctrine of President Edwards him
self. Is it not wonderful that so just a reflection did not
occur to the younger Edwards, in relation to the definition
Chapter 1.1 WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 67
of liberty contained in the great work he had undertaken to
defend?
We have now seen how some of the early reformers, and
some of the great thinkers in after-times, have endeavoured to
reconcile the scheme of necessity with the free-agency and
accountability of man. Before quitting this subject, however,
we wish to adduce a remarkable passage from one of the most
correct reasoners, as well as one of the most impressive writers
that in modern times have advocated the doctrines of Calvinism.
" Here we come to a question," says he, " which has engaged
the attention, and exercised the ingenuity, and perplexed the
wits of men in every age. If God has foreordained whatever
comes to pass, the whole series of events is necessary, and
human liberty is taken away. Men are passive instruments in
the hands of their Maker ; they can do nothing but what they
are secretly and irresistibly impelled to do ; they are not, there
fore, responsible for their actions ; and God is the author of
sin." After sweeping away some attempts to solve this diffi
culty, he adds : " It is a more intelligible method to explain
the subject by the doctrine which makes liberty consist in the
power of acting according to the prevailing inclination, or the
motive which appears strongest to the mind. Those actions
are free which are the effects of volition. In whatever manner
the state of mind which gave rise to volition has been produced,
the liberty of the agent is neither greater nor less. It is his will
alone which is to be considered, and not the means by which it
has been determined. If God foreordained certain actions, and
placed men in such circumstances that the actions would cer
tainly take place agreeably to the laws of the mind, men are
nevertheless moral agents, because they act voluntarily and are
responsible for the actions which consent has made their own.
Liberty does not consist in the power of acting or not acting,
but in acting from choice. The choice is determined by some
thing in the mind itself, or by something external influencing
the mind; but whatever is the cause, the choice makes the
action free, and the agent accountable. If this definition of
liberty be admitted, you will perceive that it is possible to
reconcile the freedom of the will with absolute decrees ; but we
have not got rid of every difficulty." Now this definition of
liberty, it is obvious, is precisely the same as that given by
68 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
President Edwards, and nothing could be more perfectly
adapted to effect a reconciliation between the freedom of the
will and the doctrine of absolute decrees. How perfectly it
shapes the freedom of man to fit the doctrine of predestination !
It is a fine piece of workmanship, it is true ; but as the learned
and candid author remarks, we must not imagine that we have
" got rid of every difficulty." For, " ly this theory" he con
tinues, " human actions appear to be as necessary as the motions
of matter according to the laws of gravitation and attraction
and man seems to be a machine, conscious of his movements,
and consenting to them, ~but impelled by something different
from himself"* Such is the candid confession of this devoted
Calvinist.
We have now seen the nature of that freedom of the will
which the immortal Edwards has exerted all his powers to
recommend to the Christian world ! " Egregious liberty !
exclaimed Calvin. " It merely allows us elbow-room," says
Leibnitz. " It seems, after all, to leave us mere machines,"
says Dick. " It is trifling to speak of such a thing," says the
younger Edwards, in relation to the will. " Why, surely, this
cannot be what the great President Edwards meant by the
freedom of the will," says Dr. Day. He certainly must have
evaded his own idea on that point. Is it not evident, that the
house of the necessitarian is divided against itself ?
Necessitarians not only refute each other, but in most cases
each one contradicts himself. Thus the younger Edwards says,
it is absurd to speak of a power to act according to our choice,
when the question relates, not to the freedom of the body, but
to the freedom of the mind itself. He happens to see the
absurdity of this mode of speaking when he finds it in his adver
sary, Dr. West ; and yet it is precisely his own definition of
freedom. " But if by liberty," says he, " be meant a power
of willing and choosing, an exemption from co-action and
natural necessity, and power, opportunity, and advantage, to
execute our own choice / in this sense we hold liberty."f Thus
he returns to the absurd idea of free-will as consisting in " elbow-
room," which merely allows our choice or volition to pass into
effect. Dr. Dick is guilty of the same inconsistency. Though
Lectures on Theology, by the late Rev. John Dick, D. D.
f Dissertation, p. 41.
Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 69
he admits, as we have seen, that this definition of liberty does
not get rid of every difficulty, but seems to leave us mere
"machines;" yet he has recourse to it, in order to reconcile
the Calvinistic view of divine grace with the free-agency of
man. "The great objection," says he, "against the invinci
bility of divine grace, is, that it is subversive of the liberty of
the will."* But, he replies, " True liberty consists in doing
what we do with knowledge and from choice"
Yet as if unconscious that their greatest champions were
thus routed and overthrown by each other, we see hundreds of
minor necessitarians still fighting on with the same weapons,
perfectly unmindful of the disorder and confusion which reigns
around them in their own ranks. Thus, for example, D Au-
bigne" says, " It were easy to demonstrate that the doctrine of
the reformers did not take away from man the liberty of a
moral agent, and reduce him to a passive machine." Now,
how does the historian so easily demonstrate that the doctrine
of necessity, as held by the reformers, does not deny the liberty
of a moral agent ? Why, by simply producing the old effete
notion of the liberty of the will, as consisting in freedom from
co-action ; as if it had never been, and never could be, called
in question. "Every action performed without external re
straint," says he, " and in pursuance of the determination of
the soul itself, is a free action."f This demonstration, it is
needless to repeat, would save any scheme of fatalism from
reproach, as well as the doctrine of the reformers.
The scheme of the Calvinists is defended in the same man
ner in Hill s Divinity : " The liberty of a moral agent," says
he, " consists in the power of acting according to his choice ;
and those actions are free, which are performed without any
external compulsion or restraint, in consequence of the deter
mination of his own mind." " According to the Calvinists,"
says Mr. Shaw, in his Exposition of the Confession of Faith,
" the liberty of a moral agent consists in the power of acting
according to his choice ; and those actions are free which are
performed without any external compulsion or restraint, in con
sequence of the determination of his own mind." J Such, if we
may believe these learned Calvinists, is the idea of the freedom
Dick s Lectures, vol. ii, p. 167. t History of the Reformation, b. v.
1 Hill s Divinity, ch. ix, sec. iii.
70 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
of the will which belongs to their system. If this be so, then
it must be conceded that the Calvinistic definition of the free
dom of the will is perfectly consistent w T ith the most absolute
scheme of fatality which ever entered into the heart of man to
conceive.
The views of M Cosh respecting the freedom of the will, seem,
at first sight, widely different from those of other Calvinists and
necessitarians. The freedom and independence of the will is
certainly pushed as far by him as it is carried by Cousin, Cole
ridge, Clarke, or any of its advocates in modem times. " True
necessitarians," says he, " should learn in what way to hold and
defend their doctrine. Let them disencumber themselves of all
that doubtful argument, derived from man being supposed to
be swayed by the most powerful motive."* Again: "The
truth is," says he, "it is not motive, properly speaking, that
determines the working of the will ; but it is the will that
imparts the strength to the motive. As Coleridge says, i It is
the man that makes the motive, and not the motive the man. "f
According to this Calvinistic divine, the will is not determined
by the strongest motive ; on the contrary, it is self-active and
self-determined. " Mind is a self-acting substance," says he ;
" and hence its activity and independence." In open defiance
of all Calvinistic and necessitarian philosophy, he even adopts
the self-determining power of the will. " ]S"or have neces
sitarians," says he, " even of the highest order, been sufficiently
careful to guard the language employed by them. Afraid of
making admissions to their opponents, we believe that none of
them have fully developed the phenomena of human sponta
neity. Even Edwards ridicules the idea of the faculty or power
of will, or the soul in the use of that power determining its own
volitions. Now, we hold it to be an incontrovertible fact, and
one of great importance, that the true determining cause of
every given volition is not any mere anterior incitement, but
the very soul itself, by its inherent power of will.";): Surely,
the author of such a passage cannot be accused of being afraid
to make concessions to his opponents. But this is not ail. If
possible, he rises still higher in his views of the lofty, not to
say god-like, independence of the human will. "We rejoice,"
The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, b. iii, ch. i, sec. iii.
fid., b. iii, ch. i, sec. ii. J Ibid.
Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. VI
says he, " to recognise such a being in man. We trust that we
are cherishing no presumptuous feeling, when we believe him
to be free, as his Maker is free. We believe him, morally
speaking, to be as independent of external control as his Cre
ator must ever be as that Creator was when, in a past eternity,
there was no external existence to control him."*
Yet, strange as it may seem, Mr. M Cosh trembles at the idea
of " removing the creature from under the control of God ;"
and hence, he insists as strenuously as any other necessitarian,
that the mind, and all its volitions, are subjected to the domin
ion of causes. " We are led by an intuition of our nature,"
says he, " to a belief in the invariable connexion between cause
and effect ; and we see numerous proofs of this law of cause
and effect reigning in the human mind as it does in the exter
nal world, and reigning in the will as it does in every other
department of the mind."f Again : " It is by an intuition of
our nature that we believe this thought or feeling could not
have been produced without a cause ; and that this same cause
will again and forever produce the same effects. And this
intuitive principle leads us to expect the reign of causation, not
only among the thoughts and feelings generally, but among the
wishes and volitions of the soul."J
Now here is the question, How can the soul be self-active,
self-determined, and yet all its thoughts, and feelings, and voli
tions, have producing causes ? How can it be free and inde
pendent in its acts, and yet under the dominion of efficient
causes ? How can the law of causation reign in all the states
of the mind, as it reigns over all the movements of matter, and
yet leave it as free as was the Creator when nothing beside him
self existed ? In other words, How is such a scheme of necessity
to be reconciled with such a scheme of liberty? The author
replies, We are not bound to answer such a question nor are we.
As we understand it, the very idea of liberty, as above set forth
by the author, is a direct negative of his doctrine of necessity.
But although he has taken so much pains to dissent from his
necessitarian brethren, and to advocate the Arminian notion
of free-will, Mr. M Cosh, nevertheless, falls back upon the old
Calvinistic definition of liberty, as consisting in a freedom from
The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, b. iii, ch. i, sec. ii.
f Ibid. 1 Ibid. Ibid.
72 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
external co-action, in order to find a basis for human respon
sibility. It may seem strange, that after all his labour in laying
the foundation, he should not build upon it ; but it is strictly
true. " If any man asserts," says he, " that in order to respon
sibility, the will must be free that is, free from physical
restraint ; free to act as he pleases we at once and heartily
agree with him ; and we maintain that in this sense the will is
free, as free as it is possible for any man to conceive it to be."
And again : "If actions do not proceed from the will, but from
something else, from mere physical or external restraint, then
the agent is not responsible for them. But if the deeds proceed
from the will, then it at once attaches a responsibility to them.
Place before the mind a murder committed by a party through
pure physical compulsion brought to bear on the arm that
inflicts the blow, and the conscience says, here no guilt is
attachable. But let the same murder be done with the thorough
consent of the will, the conscience stops not to inquire whether
this consent has been caused or no"* Thus, after all his dissent
from Edwards, he returns precisely to Edwards s definition of
the freedom of the will as the ground of human responsibility ;
after all his strictures upon " necessitarians of the first order,"
he falls back upon precisely that notion of free-will which was
so long ago condemned by Calvin, and exploded by Leibnitz,
and which relates, as we have so often seen, not to acts of the
will at all, but only to the external movements of the body.
SECTION VII.
The sentiments of Hume, Brown, Comte, and Mill, in relation to the antag
onism between liberty and necessity.
Mr. Hume has disposed of the question concerning liberty
and necessity, by the application of his celebrated theory of
cause and effect. According to this theory, the idea of power,
of efficacy, is a mere chimera, which has no corresponding
reality in nature, and should be ranked among the exploded
prejudices of the human mind. " One event follows another,"
says he ; " but we never can observe any tie between them.
They seem conjoined, but never connected"^
The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, b. iii, ch. i, sec. ii.
t Hume s Works, Liberty and Necessity.
Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 73
We shall not stop to examine this hypothesis, which has
been so often refuted. We shall merely remark in passing,
that it owes its existence to a false method of philosophizing.
Its author set out with the doctrine of Locke, that all our ideas
are derived from sensation and reflection ; and because he could
not trace the idea of power to either of these sources, he denied
its existence. Hence we may apply to him, with peculiar force,
the judicious and valuable criticism which M. Cousin has
bestowed upon the method of Locke. Though Mr. Hume
undertakes, as his title-page declares, to introduce the inductive
method into the science of human nature, he departed from
that method at the very first step. Instead of beginning, as he
should have done, by ascertaining the ideas actually in our
minds, and noting their characteristics, and proceeding to trace
them up to their sources, he pursued the diametrically opposite
course. He first determined and fixed the origin of all our
ideas ; and every idea which was not seen to arise from this
preestablished origin, he declared to be a mere chimera. He
thus caused nature to bend to hypotheses ; instead of anat
omizing and studying the world of mind according to the
inductive method, he pursued the high a priori road, and recon
structed it to suit his preestablished origin of human knowledge.
This was not to study and interpret the work of God "in the
profound humiliation of the human soul ;"* but to re-write the
volume of nature, and omit those parts which did not accord
with the views and wishes of the philosopher. In the pithy
language of Sir William Hamilton, he " did not anatomize, but
truncate."
If this doctrine be true, it is idle to talk about free-agency,
for there is no such thing as agency in the world. It is true,
there is a thing which we call volition, or an act of the mind ;
but this does not produce the external change by which it is
followed. The two events co-exist, but there is no connecting
tie between them. " They are conjoined, but not connected/
In short, according to this scheme, all things are equally free,
and all equally necessary. In other words, there is neither
freedom nor necessity in the usual acceptation of the terms;
and the whole controversy concerning them, which has agitated
the learned for so many ages, dwindles down into a mere empty
Bacon.
74 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
and noisy logomachy. Indeed, this is the conclusion to which
Mr. Hume himself comes ; expressly maintaining that the con
troversy in question has been a dispute about words. "We are
not to suppose from this, however, that he forbears to give a
definition of liberty. His idea of free-agency is precisely that
of Hobbes, and so many others before him. " By liberty," says
he, " we can only mean a power of acting or not acting accord
ing to the determination of the will : that is, if we choose to
remain at rest, we may ; if we choose to move, we also may."*
Such he declares is all that can possibly be meant by the term
liberty and hence it follows that any other idea of it is a mere
dream. The coolness of this assumption is admirable ; but it is
fully equalled by the conclusion which follows. If we will ob
serve these two circumstances, says he, and thereby render our
definition intelligible, Mr. Hume is perfectly persuaded " that
all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it."
If Mr. Hume had closely looked into the great productions of
his own school, he would have seen the utter improbability, that
necessitarians themselves would ever concur in such a notion of
liberty.-)-
If Mr. Hume s scheme were correct, it would seem that
nothing could be stable or fixed ; mind would be destitute of
energy to move within its own sphere, or to bind matter in its
orbit. All things would seem to be in a loose, disconnected,
and fluctuating state. But this is not the view which he had of
the matter. Though he denied that there is any connecting link
Of Liberty and Necessity.
f Although Mr. Hume gives precisely the same definition of liberty as that ad
vanced by Hobbes, Locke, and Edwards, he had the sagacity to perceive that this
related not to the freedom of the will, but only of the body. Hence he says, " In
short, if motives are not under our power or direction, which is confessedly the
fact, we can at bottom have NO LIBERTY." We are not at all surprised, therefore,
at the reception which Hume gave to the great work of President Edwards, as
set forth in the following statement of Dr. Chalmers, concerning the appendix to
the " Inquiry." "The history of this appendix," says he, "is curious. It has
only been subjoined to the later editions of his work, and did not accompany the
first impression of it. Several copies of this impression found their way into this
country, and created a prodigious sensation among the members of a school then
in all its glory. I mean the metaphysical school of our northern metropolis,
whereof Hume, and Smith, and Lord Kames, and several others among the more
conspicuous infidels and semi-infidels of that day, were the most distinguished
members. They triumphed in the book of Edwards, as that which set a conclu
sive seal on their principles," &c. Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, ch. ii.
Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OP GOD. 75
among events, yet he insisted that the connexion subsisting
among them is fixed and unalterable. " Let any one define a
cause," says he, " without comprehending, as part of the defini
tion, a necessary connexion with its effect; and let him show
distinctly the origin of the idea expressed by the definition, and
I shall readily give up the whole controversy."* This is the
philosopher who has so often told us, that events are " conjoined,
not connected."
The motives of volition given, for example, and the volition
invariably and inevitably follows. How then, may we ask, can
a man be accountable for his volitions, over which he has no
power, and in which he exerts no power? This question has
not escaped the attention of Mr. Hume. Let us see his answer.
He admits that liberty " is essential to morality."! For " as
actions are objects of our moral sentiment so far only as they
are indications of the internal character, passions, and affections,
it is impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame,
when they proceed, not from these principles, but are derived
altogether from external violence." It is true, as we have seen,
that if our external actions, the motions of the body, proceed
not from our volitions, but from external violence, we are not
responsible for them. This is conceded on all sides, and has
nothing to do with the question. But suppose our external ac
tions are inevitably connected with our volitions, and our voli
tions as inevitably connected with their causes, how can we be
responsible for either the one or the other? This is the ques
tion which Mr. Hume has evaded and not fairly met.
Mr. Hume s notion about cause and effect has been greatly
extended by its distinguished advocate, Dr. Thomas Brown;
whose acuteness, eloquence, and elevation of character, have
given it a circulation which it could never have received from
the influence of its author. Almost as often as divines have
occasion to use this notion, they call it the doctrine of Dr. Brown,
and omit to notice its true atheistical paternity and origin.
The defenders of this doctrine are directly opposed, in regard
to a fundamental point, to all other necessitarians. Though
they deny the existence of all power and efficacy, they still hold
that human volitions are necessary ; while other necessitarians
ground their doctrine on the fact, that volitions are produced by
Of Liberty and Necessity.
76 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart I,
the most powerful, the most efficacious motives. They are not
only at war with other necessitarians, they are also at war with
themselves. Let us see if this may not be clearly shown.
According to the scheme in question, the mind does not act
upon the body, nor the body upon the mind ; for there is no
power, and consequently no action of power, in the universe.
Now, it is known that it was the doctrine of Leibnitz, that two
substances so wholly unlike as mind and matter could not act
upon each other ; and hence he concluded that the phenomena
of the internal and external worlds were merely " conjoined, not
connected" The soul and body run together to use his own
illustration like two independent watches, without either ex.-
erting any influence upon the movements of the other. Tims
arose his celebrated, but now obsolete fiction, of a preestablished
harmony. Now, if the doctrine of Hume and Brown be true,
this sort of harmony subsists, not only in relation to mind and
body, but in relation to all things in existence. Mind never
acts upon body, nor mind upon mind. Hence, this doctrine
is but a generalization of the preestablished harmony of Leib
nitz, with the exception that Mr. Hume did not contend that
this wonderful harmony was established by the Divine Being.
Is it not wonderful that so acute a metaphysician as Dr. Brown
should not have perceived the inseparable affinity between his
doctrine and that of Leibnitz ? Is it not wonderful that, instead
of perceiving this affinity, he should have poured ridicule and
contempt upon the doctrine of which his own was but a gener
alization? Mr. Mill, another able and strenuous advocate of
Mr. Hume s theory of causation, has likewise ranked the pre-
established harmony of Leibnitz, as well as the system of occa
sional causes peculiar to Malebranche, among the fallacies of
the human mind. Thus they are at war with themselves, as
well as with their great coadjutors in the cause of necessity.
M. Comte, preeminently distinguished in every branch of
science, has taken the same one-sided view of nature as that
which is exhibited in the theory under consideration ; but ho
does not permit himself to be encumbered by the inconsistencies
observable in his great predecessors. On the contrary, he
boldly carries out his doctrine to its legitimate consequences,
denying the existence of a God, the free-agency of man, and
the reality of moral distinctions.
Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 77
Mr. Mill also refuses to avail himself of the notion of liberty
entertained by Hobbes and Hume, in order to lay a foundation
for human responsibility. He sees that it really cannot be
made to answer such a purpose. He also sees, that the doc
trine of necessity, as usually maintained, is liable to the objec
tions urged against it, that "it tends to degrade the moral
nature of man, and to paralyze our desire of excellence."* In
making this concession to the advocates of liberty, he speaks
from his own " personal experience." The only way to escape
these pernicious consequences, he says, is to keep constantly
before the mind a clear and unclouded view of the true theory
of causation, which will prevent us from supposing, as most
necessitarians do, that there is a real connecting link or influ
ence between motives and volitions, or any other events. So
strong is the prejudice (as he calls it) in favour of such connec
tion, that even those who adopt Mr. Hume s theory, are not
habitually influenced by it, but frequently relapse into the old
error which conflicts with the free-agency and accountability
of man, and hence an advantage which their opponents have
had over them.
These remarks are undoubtedly just. There is not a single
writer, from Mr. Hume himself, down to the present day, who
has been able either to speak or to reason in conformity with
his theory, however warmly he may have embraced it. Mr.
Mill himself has not been more fortunate in this respect than
many of his distinguished predecessors. It is an exceedingly
difficult thing, by the force of speculation, to silence the voice
of nature within us. If it were necessary we might easily
show, that if we abstract "the common prejudice," in regard
to causation, it will be as impossible to read Mr. Mill s work on
logic, as to read Mr. Hume s writings themselves, without per
ceiving that many of its passages have been stripped of all
logical coherency of thought. The defect which he so clearly
sees in the writings of other advocates of necessity, not except
ing those who embrace his own paradox in relation to cause
and effect, we can easily perceive in his own.
The doctrine of causation, under consideration, annihilates one
of the clearest and most fundamental distinctions ever made in
philosophy ; the distinction between action audpasswn, between
Mill s Logic, pp. 622, 523.
78 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
mind and matter. Matter is passive, mind is active. The very-
first law of motion laid down in the Principia, a work so much
admired by M. Comte and Mr. Mill, is based on the idea that
matter is wholly inert, and destitute of power either to move
itself, or to check itself when moved by anything db extra.
This will not be denied. But is mind equally passive? Is
there nothing in existence which rises above this passivity of
the material world? If there is not, and such is the evident
conclusion of the doctrine in question, then all things flow on
in one boundless ocean of passivity, while there is no First
Mover, no Self-active Agent in the universe. Indeed, Mr.
Mill has expressly declared, that the distinction between agent
and patient is illusory.* If this be true, we are persuaded that
M. Comte has been more successful in delivering the world
from the being of a God, than Mr. Mill has been in relieving
it from the difficulties attending the scheme of necessity.
SECTION VIII.
The views of Kant and Sir William Hamilton in relation to the antagonism
letween liberty and necessity.
" To clear up this seeming antagonism between the mecha
nism of nature and freedom in one and the self-same given
action, we must refer," says Kant, " to what was advanced in
the critique of pure reason, or what, at least, is a corollary from
it, viz., that the necessity of nature which may not consort with
the freedom of the subject, attaches simply to a thing standing
under the relations of time, i. e., to the modifications of the
acting subject as phenomena, and that, therefore, so far (i. e., as
phenomena) the determinators of each act lie in the foregoing
elapsed time, and are quite beyond his power, (part of which
are the actions man has already performed, and the phenomenal
character he has given himself in his own eyes,) yet, e contra,
the self-same subject, being self-conscious of itself as a thing in
itself, considers its existence as somewhat detached from the
conditions of time, and itself, so far forth, as only determinable
by laws given it by its own reason."f
Kant has said, that this " intricate problem, at whose solution
centuries have laboured," is not to be solved by "a jargon of
Mill s Logic, book ii, chap, v, sec. 4. t Metaphysics of Ethics.
Chapter!.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 79
words." If so, may we not doubt whether he has taken the
best method to solve it ? His solution shows one thing at least,
viz., that he was not satisfied with any of the solutions of his
predecessors, for his is wholly unlike them. Kant saw that the
question of liberty and necessity related to the will itself, and
not to the consequences of the will s volitions. Hence he was
compelled to reject those weak evasions of the difficulty of
reconciling them, and to grapple directly with the difficulty
itself. Let us see if this was not too much for him. Let us
see if he has been able to maintain the doctrine of necessity,
holding it as a "demonstrated truth," and at the same time
give the idea of liberty a tenable position in his system.
If we would clear up the seeming antagonism between the
mechanism of nature and freedom in regard to the same voli
tion, says he, we must remember, that the volition itself, as
standing under the conditions of time, is to be considered as
subject to the law of mechanism: yet the mind which puts
forth the volition, being conscious that it is a thing somewhat
detached from the conditions of time, is free from the law of
mechanism, and determinable by the laws of its own reason.
That is to say, the volitions of mind falling under the law of
cause and effect, like all other events which appear in time,
are necessary; while the mind itself, which exists not exactly in
time, is free. We shall state only two objections to this view.
In the first place, it seems to distinguish the mind from its act,
not modally, i. e., as a thing from its mode, but numerically,
i. e., as one thing from another thing. But who can do this ?
Who regards an act of the mind, a volition, as anything but
the mind itself as existing in a state of willing ? In the second
place, it requires us to conceive, that the act of the mind is
necessitated, while the mind itself is free in the act thus necessi
tated. But who can do this ? On the contrary, who can fail
to see in this precisely the same seeming antagonism which
Kant undertook to remove ? To tell us, that volition is necessi
tated because it exists in time, but the mind is free because it
does not exist in time, is, one would think, a very odd way to
dispel the darkness which hangs over the grand problem of life.
It is to solve one difficulty merely by adding other difficulties
to it. Hence, the world will never be much wiser, we are
inclined to suspect, with respect to the seeming antagonism
80 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
between liberty and necessity, in consequence of the specula
tions of the philosopher of Konigsberg, especially since his
great admirer, Mr. Coleridge, forgot to fulfil his promise to
write the history of a man who existed in " neither time nor
space, but a-one side."
Though Kant made the attempt in his Metaphysics of Ethics
to overcome the speculative difficulty in question, it is evident
that he is not satisfied with his own solution of it, since he has
repeatedly declared, that the practical reason furnishes the only
ground on which it can be surmounted. " This view of Kant,"
says Knapp, " implying that freedom, while it is a postulate of
our practical reason, (i. e., necessary to be assumed in order to
moral action,) is yet inconsistent with our theoretical reason,
(i. e., incapable of demonstration, and contrary to the conclu
sions to which the reflecting mmd arrives,) is now very gener
ally rejected."*
In regard to this point, there seems to be a perfect coin
cidence between the philosophy of Kant and that of Sir William
Hamilton. " In thought," says the latter, " we never escape
determination and necessity."f If the scheme of necessity
never fails to force itself upon our thought, how are we then
to get rid of it, so as to lay a foundation for morality and
accountability ? This question, the author declares, is too much
for the speculative reason of man ; and being utterly baffled in
that direction, we can only appeal to the fact of consciousness,
in order to establish the doctrine of liberty. " The philosophy
which I profess," says he, " annihilates the theoretical problem
How is the scheme of liberty, or the scheme of necessity, to be
rendered comprehensible ? by showing that both schemes are
equally inconceivable ; but it establishes liberty practically as
a fact, by showing that it is either itself an immediate datum,
or is involved in an immediate datum of consciousness."^: We
shall hereafter see, why the scheme of necessity always riveted
the chain of conviction on the thought of Sir William Hamilton,
and compelled him to have recourse to an appeal to conscious
ness in order to escape its delusive power.
c Knapp s Theology, p. 620. f Reid s Works, note, p. 611. I Id., p. 699, note.
Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 81
SECTION IX.
The notion of Lord Kamea and Sir James Mackintosh on the same subject.
Lord Kames boldly cut the knot which philosophy had failed
to unravel for him. Supposing the doctrine of necessity to be
settled on a clear and firm basis, he resolved our feelings of
liberty into "a deceitful sense" which he imagined the Al
mighty had conferred on man for wise and good purposes. He
concluded that if men could see the truth, in regard to the
scheme of necessity, without any illusion or mistake, they would
relax their exertions in all directions, and passively submit to
the all-controlling influences by which they are surrounded.
But God, he supposed, out of compassion for us, concealed the
truth from our eyes, in order that we might be induced to take
care of ourselves, by the pleasant dream that we really have
the power to do so.
We shall not stop to pull this scheme to pieces. We shall
only remark, that it is a pity the philosopher undertook to
counteract the benevolent design of the Deity, and to expose
the cheat and delusion by which he intended to govern the
world for its benefit. But the author himself, it is but just to
add, had the good sense and candour to renounce his own scheme ;
and hence we need dwell no longer upon it. It remains at the
present day only as a striking example of the frightful contor
tions of the human mind, in its herculean efforts to escape from
the dark labyrinth of fate into the clear and open light of
nature.
Sir James Mackintosh, though familiar with the speculations
of preceding philosophers, was- satisfied With none of their solu
tions of the great problem under consideration, and "conse
quently he has invented one of his own. This solution is
founded on his theory of the moral sentiments, which is peculiar
to himself. This theory is employed to show how it is, that
although we may come by our volitions according to the scheme
of necessity, yet we do not perceive the causes by which they
are necessarily produced, and consequently imagine that we
are free. Tims, the "feeling of liberty," as he calls it, is
resolved into an illusory judgment, and the scheme of necessity
is exhibited in all its adamantine strength, " It seems impossi
6
82 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
ble," says he, " for reason to consider occurrences otherwise than
as bound together by the connexion of cause and effect ; and
in this circumstance consists the strength of the necessitarian
system."*
We shall offer only one remark on this extraordinary hypoth
esis. If the theory of Sir James were true, it could only show,
that although our volitions are necessarily caused, we do not
perceive the causes by which they are produced. But this fact
has never been denied : it has always been conceded, that we
ascertain the existence of efficient causes, excepting the acts of
our minds, only by means of the effects they produce. Both
Leibnitz and Edwards long ago availed themselves of this
undisputed fact, in order to account for the belief which men
entertain in regard to their internal freedom. "Thus," says
Edwards, " I find myself possessed of my volitions before I can
see the effectual power and efficacy of any cause to produce
t\iem,/or the power and efficacy of the cause are not seen ~but ly
the effect, and this, for aught I know, may make some imagine
that volition has no cause" We shall see hereafter that this is
a very false account of the genesis of the common belief, that
we possess an internal freedom from necessity ; but it is founded
on the truth which no one pretends to deny, that external effi
cient causes can only be seen by their effects, and not by any
direct perception of the mind. It was altogether a work of
supererogation, then, for Sir James Mackintosh to bring forth
his theory of moral sentiments to establish the possibility of a
thing which preceding philosophers had admitted to be a fact.
It requires no elaborate theory to convince us that a thing
might exist without our perceiving it, when it is conceded on
all sides, that even if it did exist, we have no power by which
to perceive it. With this single remark, we shall dismiss a
scheme which resolves our conviction of internal liberty into a
mere illusion, and which, however pure may have been the
intentions of the author, really saps the foundation of moral
obligation, and destroys the nature of virtue.
Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 276.
Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 83
SECTION X.
The conclusion of M&hler, Tholuclc, and others, that all speculation on such
a subject must be vain and fruitless.
Considering the vast wilderness of speculation which exists on
the subject under consideration, it is not at all surprising that
many should turn away from every speculative view of it with
disgust, and endeavour to dissuade others from such pursuits.
Accordingly Moehler* has declared, that " so often as, without
regard to revelation, the relation of the human spirit to God hath
been more deeply investigated, men have found themselves forced
to the adoption of pantheism, and, with it, the most
arrogant deification of man} * And Tholuck spreads out the
reasoning from effect to cause, by which all things are referred
to God, and God himself only made the greatest and brightest
link in the chain ; and assuming this to be an unanswerable ar
gument, he holds it up as a dissuasive from all such speculations.
He believes that reason necessarily conducts the mind to fatalism.
We cannot concur with these celebrated writers, and we
would deduce a far different conclusion from the speculations
of necessitarians. This sort of scepticism or despair is more
common in Germany than it is in this country ; for there, spec
ulation pursuing no certain or determinate method, has shown
itself in all its wild and desolating excesses. But it is sophistry,
and not reason, that leads the human mind astray; and we
believe that reason, in all cases, is competent to detect and
expose the impositions of sophistry. We do not believe that
one guide which the Almighty has given us, can, by the legiti
mate exercise of it, lead us to a different result from that of
another guide. We are persuaded that if reason seems to force
us into any system which is contradicted by the testimony of
our moral nature, or by the truths of revelation, this is unsound
speculation: it is founded either on false premises, or else
springs from false conclusions, which reason itself may correct,
either by pointing out the fallacy of the premises, or the logical
incoherency of the argument. We do not then intend to
abandon speculation, but to plant it, if we can, on a better
foundation, and build it up according to a better method.
Moehler s Symbolism, p. 117.
84 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Port I,
SECTION XL
The true conclusion from the foregoing review of opinions and arguments.
All the mighty logicians we have yet named have yielded to
"the demonstration" in favour of necessity, but we do not
know that one of them has ever directed the energies of his
mind to pry into its validity. They have all pursued the
method so emphatically condemned by Bacon, and the result
has verified his prediction. " The usual method," says he, " of
discovery and proof by first establishing the most general pro
positions, then applying and proving the intermediate axioms
according to these, is the parent of error and the calamity of
every science."* They have set out with the universal law of
causality or the principle of the sufficient reason, and thence
have proceeded to ascertain and determine the actual nature
and processes of things. "We may despair of ever being able to
determine a single fact, or a single process of nature, by rea
soning from truisms; we must begin in the opposite direction
and learn " to dissect nature," if we would behold her secrets
and comprehend her mysteries.
By pursuing this method it will be seen, and clearly seen,
that "the great demonstration" which has led so many philo
sophers in chains, is, after all, a sophism. We have witnessed
their attempts to reconcile the great fact of man s free-agency
with this boasted demonstration of necessity. But how inter
minable is the confusion among them ? If a few of them concur
in one solution, this is condemned by others, and not unfre-
quently by the very authors of the solution itself. "We entertain
too great a respect for their abilities not to believe, that if there
had been any means of reconciling these things together, they
would long since have discovered them, and come to an agree
ment among themselves, as well as made the truth known to
the satisfaction of mankind. But as it is, their speculations are
destitute of harmony are filled with discordant elements. In
stead of the clear and steady light of truth, illuminating the
great problem of existence, we are bewildered by the glare of
a thousand paradoxes ; instead of the sweet voice of harmony,
reaching and calling forth a response from the depths of the
Novum Organum, book i, aph. 69.
Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 85
human soul, the ear is stunned and confounded with a frightful
roar of confused sounds.
We shall not attempt to hold the scheme of necessity, and
reconcile it with the fact of man s free-agency. We shall not
undertake a task, in the prosecution of which a Descartes, a
Leibnitz, a Locke, and an Edwards, not to mention a hundred
others, have laboured in vain. But we do not intend to aban
don speculation. On the contrary, we intend to show, so
clearly and so unequivocally that every eye may see it, that
the great boasted demonstration in favour of necessity is a pro
digious sophism. We intend to do this; because until the
mentanasTon be purged of the film of this dark error, it can
never clearly behold the intrinsic majesty and glory of God s
creation, nor the divine beauty of the plan according to which
it is governed.
86 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
CHAPTER H.
THE SCHEME OF NECESSITY MAKES GOD THE AUTHOR OF SIN.
I told ye then he should prevail, and speed
On his bad errand ; man should be seduced,
And flatter d out of all, believing lies
Against his Maker ; no decree of mine
Concurring to necessitate his fall,
Or touch d with slightest moment of impulse
His free-will, to her own inclining left
In even scale. MILTON.
THE scheme of necessity, as we have already said, presents two
phases in relation to the existence of moral evil ; one relating
to the agency of man, and the other to the agency of God. In
the preceding chapter, we examined the attempts of the most
learned and skilful advocates of this scheme to reconcile it with
the free-agency and accountability of man. We have seen
how ineffectual have been all their endeavours to show that
their doctrine does not destroy the responsibility of man for
his sins.
It is the design of the present chapter to consider the doctrine
of necessity under its other aspect, and to demonstrate that it
makes God the author of sin. If this can be shown, it may
justly lead us to suspect that the scheme contains within its
bosom some dark fallacy, which should be dragged from its
hiding-place into the open light of day, and exposed to the
abhorrence and detestation of mankind.
In discussing this branch of our subject, we shall pursue the
CDurse adopted in relation to the first; for if the doctrine of
necessity does not make God the author of sin, we may con
clude that this has been shown by some one of its most profound
and enlightened advocates. If the attempts of a Calvin, and an
Edwards, and a Leibnitz, to maintain such a doctrine, and yet
vindicate the purity of God may be shown to be signal failures,
we may well doubt whether there is a real agreement between
these tenets as maintained by them. Nay, if in order to vin
dicate their system from so great a reproach, they have been
Chapter III WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 87
compelled to adopt positions which are clearly inconsistent with
the divine holiness, and thus to increase rather than to diminish
the reproach ; surely their system itself should be more than
suspected of error. We shall proceed, then, with this view, to
examine their speculations in regard to the agency of God in
its connexion with the origin and existence of moral evil.
SECTION I.
The attempts of Calmn and other reformers to show that the system of neces
sity does not make God the author of sin.
Most of the advocates of divine providence have endeavoured
to soften their views, so as to bring them into a conformity
with the common sentiments of mankind, by supposing that
God merely permits, without producing the sinful volitions of
men. But Calvin rejects this distinction with the most positive
disdain. " A question of still greater difficulty arises," says he,
"from other passages, where God is said to incline or draw
Satan himself and all the reprobate. For the carnal under
standing scarcely comprehends how he, acting by their means,
and even in operations common to himself and them, is free
from any fault, and yet righteously condemns those whose
ministry he uses. Hence was invented the distinction between
doing and permitting because to many persons this has ap
peared an inexplicable difficulty, that Satan and all the impious
are subject to the power and government of God, so that he
directs their malice to whatever end he pleases, and uses their
crimes for the execution of his judgments. The modesty of
those who are alarmed by absurdity, might perhaps be excusa
ble, if they did not attempt to vindicate the divine justice from
all accusation by a pretence utterly destitute of any foundation
in truth"* Here the distinction between God s permitting and
doing in relation to the sins of men, is declared by Calvin to
be utterly without foundation in truth, and purely chimerical.
So, in various other places, he treats this distinction as "too
weak to be supported." " The will of God," says he, " is the
supreme and first cause of things ;" and he quotes Augustine
R ith approbation to the eifect, that " He does not remain an
idle spectator, determining to permit anything; there is an
Institutes, book i, chap, xviii.
88 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
intervention of an actual volition, if I may be allowed the
expression, which otherwise could never be considered a cause."*
According to Calvin, then, nothing ever happens in the uni
verse, not even the sinful volitions of men, which is not caused
by God, even by " the intervention of an actual volition" of the
supreme will.
It is evident that Calvin scorns to have any recourse to a
permissive will in God, in order to soften down the stupendous
difficulties under which his system seems to labour. On the
contrary, he sometimes betrays a little impatience with those
who had endeavoured to mitigate the more rugged features of
what he conceived to be the truth. " The fathers," says he,
"are sometimes too scrupulous on this subject, and afraid of
a simple confession of the truth. "f He entertains no such
fears. He is even bold and rigid enough in his consistency to
say, "that God often actuates the reprobate by the interposi
tion of Satan, but in such a manner that Satan himself acts his
part by the divine impulse.":]: And again, he declares that by
means of Satan, "God excites the will and strengthens the
efforts" of the reprobate. Indeed, his great work, whenever
it touches upon this awful subject, renders it perfectly clear
that Calvin despises all weak evasions in the advocacy of his
stern doctrine.
It has been truly said, that Calvin never thinks of " deducing
the fall of man from the abuse of human freedom." So far is
he from this, indeed, that he seems to lose his patience with
those who trace the origin of moral evil to such a source."
" They say it is nowhere declared in express terms," says Calvin,
" that God decreed Adam should perish by his defection ; as
though the same God, whom the Scriptures represent as doing
whatever he pleases, created the noblest of his creatures with
out any determinate end. They maintain, that he was possess
ed of free choice, that he might be the author of his own fate,
but that God decreed nothing more than to treat him according
to his desert. If so weak a scheme as this be received, what
will become of GodV.-omnipfltence, by which he governs all
things according to his secret counsel, independently of every
person or thing besides."] The fall of man, says Calvin, was
^Institutes, book i, chap. xvi. | Id., book ii, chap. iv. J Id., book i, chap,
xviii. Id., book iii, chap, xxiii. || Id., book iii, chap, xxiii, sec. 4, 7.
Chapter II.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 89
decreed from all eternity, and it was brought to pass by the
omnipotence of God. To suppose that Adam was the author
of his own fate and fall, is to deny the omnipotence of God, and
to rob him of his sovereignty.
Now, if to say that God created man, and then left his sin
to proceed wholly from himself, be to rob God of his omnipo
tence, and to affirm that he made man for no determinate end,
the same consequences would follow from the position that God
created Satan, and then left his sin and rebellion to proceed
wholly from himself. But, strange as it may seem, the very
thing which Calvin so vehemently denies in regard to man,
he asserts in relation to Satan ; and he even feels called upon
to make this assertion in order to vindicate the divine purity
against the calumny of being implicated in the sin of Satan !
" But since the devil was created by God," says he, " we must
remark, that this wickedness which we attribute to his nature
is not from creation, but from corruption. For whatever evil
quality he has, he has acquired by his defection and fall. And
of this Scripture apprizes us ; but, believing him to have come
from God, just as he now is, we shall ascribe to God himself
that which is in direct opposition to him. For this reason,
Christ declares, that Satan, < when he speaketh a lie, speaketh
of his own ; and adds the reason, because he abode not in
the truth. When he says that he abode not in the truth, he
certainly implied that he had once been in it ; and when he
calls him the father of a lie, he precludes Ms imputing to God
the depravity of his nature, which originated wholly from him
self. Though these things are delivered in a brief and rather
obscure manner, yet they are abundantly sufficient to vindicate
the majesty of God from every calumny."* Thus, in order to
show that God is not the author of sin, Calvin assumes the very
positions in regard to the rebellion of Satan which his opponents
have always felt constrained to adopt in regard to the transgres
sion of man. What then, on Calvin s own principles, becomes
of the omnipotence of God? Does this extend merely to man
and not to Satan? Is it not evident that Calvin s scheme in
regard to the sin of the first man, is here most emphatically
condemned out of his own mouth? Does he not here endorse
the very consequence which his adversaries have been accus-
Institutes, book i, chap, xiv, sec. 16.
90 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
tomed to deduce from his scheme of predestination, namely,
that it makes God the author of sin ?
This scheme of doctrine, it must be confessed, is not without
its difficulties. It clothes man, as he came from the hand of
his Maker, with the glorious attributes of freedom ; but to what
end? Is this attribute employed to account for the introduc
tion of sin into the world ? Is it employed to show that man,
and not God, is the author of moral evil ? It is sad to reflect
that it is not. The fall of man is referred to the direct " omnip
otence of God." The feeble creature yields to the decree and
power of the Almighty, who, because he does so, kindles into
the most fearful wrath and dooms him and all his posterity to
temporal, spiritual, and eternal death. Such is the doctrine
which is advanced, in order to secure the omnipotence of God,
and to exalt his sovereignty. But is it not a great leading
feature of deism itself, that it exalts the power of God at the
expense of his infinite moral perfections ? So we have under
stood the matter; and hence, it seems to us, that Christian
divines should be more guarded in handling the attribute of
omnipotence. " The rigid theologians," says Leibnitz, " have
held the greatness of God in higher estimation than his good
ness, the latitudinarians have done the contrary ; true ortho
doxy has these two perfections equally at heart. The error
which abases the greatness of God should be called anthropo
morphism, and despotism that which divests him of his good
ness."*
If Calvin s doctrine be true, God is not the author of sin,
inasmuch as he made man pure and upright ; but yet, by the
same power which created him, has he plunged him into sin
and misery. Now, if the creation of man with a sinful nature
be inconsistent with the infinite purity of God, will it not be
difficult to reconcile with that purity the production of sin in
man, after his creation, by an act of the divine omnipotence ?
If we ask, How can God be just in causing man to sin, and
then punishing him for it ? Calvin replies, That all his dealings
with us " are guided by equity."f We know, indeed, that all
his ways are guided by the most absolute and perfect justice;
and this is the very circumstance which creates the difficulty.
The more clearly we perceive, and the more vividly we realize,
Theodice, p. 365. f Institutes, book i, chap. xiv.
Chapter IL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 91
the perfection of the divine equity, the more heavily does the
difficulty press upon our minds. This assurance brings us no
relief; we still demand, if God be just, as in truth he is, how
can he deal with us after such a manner ? The answer we ob
tain is, that God is just. And if this does not satisfy us, we are
reminded that "it is impossible ever wholly to prevent the
petulance and murmurs of impiety."* We seek for light, and,
instead of light, we are turned off with reproaches for the want
of piety. We have not that faith, we humbly confess, which
" from its exaltation looks down on these mists with contempt ;"f
but we have a reason, it may be " a carnal understanding,"
which longs to be enlarged and enlightened by faith. Hence,
it cannot but murmur when, instead of being enlarged and en
lightened by faith, it is utterly overwhelmed and confounded
by it. And these murmurings of reason, which we can no more
prevent than we could stop the heavings of the mighty ocean
from its depths, are met and sought to be quelled with the re
buke, " Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God ?" We
reply not against God, but against man s interpretation of God s
word ; and who art thou, O man, that puttest thyself in the
place of God ? " Men," saith Bacon, " are ever ready to usurp
the style, -Non ego, sed Dominus f and not only so, but to
bind it with the thunder and denunciation of curses and anathe
mas, to the terror of those who have not sufficiently learned out
of Solomon, that the causeless curse shall not come. "
In relation to the subject under consideration, the amiable
and philosophic mind of Melancthon seems to have been more
consistent, at one time, than that of most of the reformers.
" He laid down," says D Aubigne, " a sort of fatalism, which
might lead his readers to think of God as the author of evil, and
which consequently has no foundation in Scripture: since
whatever happens, said he, * happens by necessity, agreeably
to divine foreknowledge, it is plain our will hath no liberty
whatever. " It is certainly a very mild expression to say, that
the doctrine of Melancthon might lead his readers to think of
God as the author of evil. This is a consequence which the
logical mind of Melancthon did not fail to draw from his own
scheme of necessity. In his commentary on the Epistle to the
Eomans, in the edition of 1525, he asserted " that God wrought
Institutes, book iii, ch. xxiii. f W., book i, ch. xviii.
92 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
all things, evil as well as good ; that he was the author of Da
vid s adultery, and the treason of Judas, as well as of Paul s
conversion."
This doctrine was maintained by Melancthon on practical as
well as on speculative grounds. It is useful, says he, in its
tendency to subdue human arrogance ; it represses the wisdom,
and cunning of human reason. We have generally observed,
that whenever a learned divine denounces the arrogancy of
reason, and insists on an humble submission to his own doc
trines, that he has some absurdity which he wishes us to em
brace; he feels a sort of internal consciousness that human
reason is arrayed against him, and hence he abuses and vilifies
it. But reason is not to be kept in due subordination by any
such means. If sovereigns would maintain a legitimate author
ity over their subjects, they should bind them with wise and
wholesome laws, and not with arbitrary and despotic enact
ments, which are so well calculated to engender hatred and re
bellion. In like manner, the best possible way to tame the
refractory reason of man, and hold it in subjection, is to bind it
with the silken cords of divine truth, and not fetter it with the
harsh and galling absurdities of man s invention. Melancthon
himself furnished a striking illustration of the justness of this
remark ; for although, like other reformers, he taught the
doctrine of a divine fatality of all events, in order to hum
ble the pride of the human intellect, his own reason afterward
rebelled against it. He not only recanted the monstrous
doctrine which made God the author of sin, but he openly
combatted it.
In the writings of Beza and Zwingle there are passages, in
relation to the origin of evil, more offensive, if possible, than
any we have adduced from Calvin and Melancthon. The mode
in which the reformers defended their common doctrine was,
with some few exceptions, the same in substance. They have
said nothing which can serve to dispel, or even materially les
sen, the stupendous cloud of difficulties which their scheme
spreads over the moral government of God.
Considering the condition of the Church, the state of human
knowledge, and, in short, all the circumstances of the times in
which the reformers lived and acted, it is not very surprising
that they should have fallen into such errors. The corruptions
Chapter II.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 93
of human nature, manifesting themselves in the Romish Church,
had so extravagantly exalted the powers of man, and especially
of the priesthood, and so greatly depressed or obscured the sov
ereignty of God, that the reformers, in fighting against these
abuses, were naturally forced into the opposite extreme. It is
not at all wonderful, we say, that a reaction, which shook the
very foundations of the earth, should have carried the authors
of it beyond the bounds of moderation and truth. They would
have been more than human if they had not fallen into some
such errors as these which we have ascribed to them. But the
great misfortune is, that these errors should have been stereo
typed and fixed in the symbolical books of the Protestant
Churches, and made to descend from the reformers to their
children s children, as though they were of the very essence of
the faith once delivered to the saints. This is the misfortune,
the lamentable evil, which has furnished the Eomish Church
with its most powerful weapons of attack ;* which has fortified
the strongholds of atheism and infidelity ; and which has, be
yond all question, fearfully retarded the great and glorious
cause of true religion.
If we would examine the most elaborate efforts to defend
these doctrines, or rather the great central dogma of necessity
from which they all radiate, we must descend to later times ;
we must turn our attention to the immortal writings of a Leib
nitz and an Edwards.
SECTION II.
The attempt of Leibnitz to show that the scheme of necessity does not make
God the author of sin.
This philosopher employed all the resources of a sublime
genius, and all the stores of a vast erudition, in order to main
tain the scheme of necessity, and at the same time vindicate
the purity of the Divine Being. That subtle and adroit sceptic,
M. Bayle, had drawn out all the consequences of the doctrine
of necessity in opposition to the free-agency of man, and to the
holiness of God. Leibnitz wrote his great " Essais de Theodicee,"
for the purpose of refuting these conclusions of Bayle, as well
as those of all other sceptics, and of reconciling his system with
See Moehler s Symbolism.
94 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
the divine attributes. In the preface to his work he says, "We
show that evil has another source than the will of God ; and
that we have reason to say of moral evil, that God only permits
it, and that he does not will it. But what is more important,
we show that God can not only permit sin, but even concur
therein, and contribute to it, without prejudice to his holiness;
although, absolutely speaking, he might have prevented it."
Such is the task which Leibnitz has undertaken to perform ; let
us see how he has accomplished it.
" The ancients," says he, " attributed the cause of evil to mat
ter ; but where shall we, who derive all things from God, find
the source of evil ?"* He has more than once answered this
question, by saying that the source of evil is to be found in the
ideas of the divine mind. " Chrysippus," says he, " has reason
to allege that vice comes from the original constitution of some
spirits. It is objected to him that God has formed them ; and
he can only reply, that the imperfection of matter does not per
mit him to do better. This reply is good for nothing ; for matter
itself is indifferent to all forms, and besides God has made it.
Evil comes rather from forms themselves, but abstract ; that is to
say, from ideas that God has not produced by an act of his will,
no more than he has produced number and figures ; and no
more, in one word, than all those possible essences which we
regard as eternal and necessary ; for they find themselves in
the ideal region of possibles ; that is to say, in the divine under
standing. God is then not the author of those essences, in so
far as they are only possibilities ; but there is nothing actual,
but what he discerned and called into existence ; and he has
permitted evil, because it is enveloped in the best plan which
is found in the region of possibles ; that plan the supreme wis
dom could not fail to choose. It is this notion which at once
satisfies the wisdom, the power, and the goodness of God, and
yet leaves room for the entrance of evil."f
In reading the lofty speculations of Leibnitz, we have been
often led to wonder how one, whose genius was so great, could
have permitted himself to rest in conceptions which appear so
vague and indistinct. In the above passage we have both light
and obscurity ; and we find it difficult to determine which pre
dominates over the other. "We are clearly told that God is not
Theodicee, p. 86. fM.. P- 26 *
Chapter II.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 95
the author of evil, because this proceeds from abstract forms
which were from all eternity enveloped in his understanding,
and not from any operation of his will. But how does evil
proceed from abstract forms ; from the ideal region of the pos
sible ? Leibnitz does not mean that evil proceeds from abstract
ideas, before they are embodied in the creation of real moral
agents. Why then did God create beings which he knew from
all eternity would commit sin ? and why, having created them,
did he contribute to their sins by a divine concourse ? This is
coming down from the ideal region of the possible, into the
world of real difficulties.
According to the philosophy of Leibnitz, God created every
intelligent being in the universe with a perfect knowledge of
its whole destiny ; and there is, moreover, a concourse of the
divine will with all their volitions. Now, here we are in the
very midst of the concrete world, and here is a difficulty which
cannot be avoided by a flight into the ideal region of the pos
sible. How can there be a concourse of the divine will with
the human will in one and the same sinful volition, without
a stain upon the immaculate purity of God? How can the
Father of Lights, by an operation of his will, contribute to our
sinful volitions, without prejudice to his holiness? This is the
problem which Leibnitz has promised to solve ; and we shall,
with all patience, listen to his solution.
The solution of this problem, says he, is effected by means
of the " privative nature of evil." "We shall state this part of
his system in his own words : " As to the physical concourse,"
says he, " it is here that it is necessary to consider that truth
which has made so much noise in the schools, since St. Augus
tine has shown its importance, that evil is a privation, whereas
the action of God produces only the positive. This reply passes
for a defective one, and even for something chimerical in the
minds of many men ; but here is an example sufficiently anal
ogous, which may undeceive them."
" The celebrated Kepler, and after him M. Descartes, have
spoken of the natural inertia of bodies, and that we can con
sider it as a perfect image, and even as a pattern of the original
limitation of creatures, in order to make us see that privation is
the formal cause of the imperfections and inconveniences which
are found in substance as well as in actions. Suppose that the
06 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
current of a river carries along with it many vessels which
have different cargoes, some of wood, and others of stone ; some
more, and some less. It will happen that the vessels which
are more heavily laden will move more slowly than the others,
provided there is nothing to aid their progress . . . Let us com
pare the force which the current exercises x>ver the vessels and
what it communicates to them, with the action of God, who
produces and preserves whatever is positive in the creature,
and imparts to them perfection, being, and force ; let us com
pare, I say, the inertia of matter with the natural imperfection
of creatures, and the slowness of the more heavily laden vessel
with the defect which is found in the qualities and in the actions
of the creature, and we shall perceive that there is nothing so
just as this comparison. The current is the cause of the move
ment of the vessel, but not of its retardation ; God is the cause
of the perfection in the nature and the actions of the creature,
but the limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the cause
of the defect in its actions. Thus the Platonists, St. Augustine,
and the schoolmen, have reason to say that God is the material
cause of evil, which consists in what is positive, and not the
formal cause of it, which consists in privation, as we can say
that the current is the material cause of the retardation, without
being its formal cause ; that is to say, is the cause of the swift
ness of the vessel, without being the cause of the bounds of that
swiftness. God is as little the cause of sin, as the current of the
river is the cause of the retardation of the vessel."* Or as Leib
nitz elsewhere says, God is the author of all that is positive in
our volitions, and the pravity of them arises from the necessary
imperfection of the creature.
We have many objections to this mode of explaining the
origin of moral evil, some few of which we shall proceed to
state. 1. It is a hopeless attempt to illustrate the processes of
the mind by the analogies of matter. All such illustrations are
better adapted to darken and confound the subject, than to
throw light upon it. If we would know anything about the
nature of moral evil, or- its origin, we must study the subject
in the light of consciousness, and in the light of consciousness
alone. Dugald Stewart has conferred on Descartes the proud
distinction of having been the first philosopher to teach the
Thfeodicee, pp. 89, 90.
Chapter II.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 97
true method according to which the science of mind should be
studied. " He laid it down as a first principle," says Stewart,
" that nothing comprehensible by the imagination can be at
all subservient to the knowledge of mind ; and that the sensible
images involved in all our common forms of speaking concern
ing its operations, are to be guarded against with the most
anxious care, as tending to confound in our apprehensions, two
classes of phenomena, which it is of the last importance to dis
tinguish accurately from each other."* 2. The privative nature i ;
of evil, as it is called, is purely a figment of the brain ; it is an I
invention of the schoolmen, which has no corresponding reality
in nature. When Adam put forth his hand to pluck the for
bidden fruit, and ate it, he committed a sinful act. But why
was it sinful ? Because he knew it was wrong ; because his act
was a voluntary and known transgression of the command of
God. Now, if God had caused all that was positive in this
sinful act, that is, if he had caused Adam to will to put forth
his hand and eat the fruit, it is plain that he would have been
the cause of his transgression. Nothing can be more chimerical,
it seems to us, than this distinction between being the author
of the substance of an act, and the author of its pravity. If
Adam had obeyed, that is, if he had refused to eat the forbid
den fruit, such an act would not have been more positive than
the actual series of volitions by which he transgressed. 3. If
what we call sin, arises from the necessary imperfection of the
creature, as the slowness of a vessel in descending a stream
arises from its cargo, how can he be to blame for it ; or, in
other words, how can it be moral evil at all ? And, 4. Leibnitz
has certainly committed a very great oversight in this attempt
to account for the origin of evil. He explains it, by saying
that it arises from the necessary imperfection of the creature
which limits its receptivity ; but does he mean that God cannot
communicate holiness to the creature ? Does he mean that God
endeavours to communicate holiness, and fails in consequence
of the necessary imperfection of the creature ? If so, what
becomes of the doctrine which he everywhere advances, that
God can very easily cause virtue or holiness to exist if he should
choose to do so ? If God can very easily cause this to exist, as
Leibnitz contends he can, notwithstanding the necessary imper-
Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 114.
7
98 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
fection of the creature, why has he not done so? Is it not
evident, that the philosophy of Leibnitz merely plays over the
surface of this great difficulty, and decks it out with the orna
ments of fancy, instead of reaching down to the bottom of it,
and casting the illuminations of his genius into its depths ?
SECTION HI
The maxims adopted and employed ly Edwards to show that the scheme of
necessity does not make God the author of sin.
"This remarkable man," says Sir James Mackintosh, "the
metaphysician of America, was formed among the Calvinists
of New-England, when their stern doctrine retained its vigor
ous authority. His power of subtle argument, perhaps un
matched, certainly unsurpassed among men, was joined, as in
some of the ancient mystics, with a character which raised his
piety to fervour." It is in his great work on the will, as well
as in some of his miscellaneous observations, that Edwards has
put forth the powers of his mind, in order to show that the
scheme of necessity does not obscure the lustre of the divine per
fections. With the exception of the Essais de Theodicee of
Leibnitz, it is perhaps the greatest effort the human mind has
ever made to get rid of the seeming antagonism between the
scheme of necessity and the holiness of God.
According to the system of Edwards, as well as that of his
opponents, sin would not have been committed unless it were
permitted by God. But in the scheme of Edwards, the agency
of God bears a more intimate relation to the origin and exist
ence of sin than is implied by a bare permission of it. " God,"
says he, disposes "the state of events in such a manner, for
wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it
be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly
follow."* And this occurrence of sin, in consequence of his
disposing and ordering events, enters into his design. For
Edwards truly says, that " If God disposes all events, so that
the infallible existence of the events is decided by his providence,
then, doubtless, he thus orders and decides things knowingly
and on design. God does not do what he does, nor order what
he orders, accidentally and unawares, either without or beside
Inquiry, p. 246.
Chapter II.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 99
his intention." Thus, we are told, that God so arranges and
disposes the events of his providence as to bring sin to pass, and
that he does so designedly. This broad proposition is laid
down, not merely with reference to sin in general, but to cer
tain great sins in particular. " So that," says Edwards, " what
these murderers of Christ did, is spoken of as what God brought
to pass or ordered, and that by which he fulfilled his own word."
According to Edwards, then, the events of God s providence
are arranged with a view to bring all the sinful deeds of
men " certainly and infallibly" to pass, as well as their holy
acts.
Now, here the question arises, Is this doctrine consistent
with the character of God? Is it not repugnant to his in
finite holiness ? We affirm that it is ; Edwards declares that
it is not. Let us see, then, if his position does not involve
him in insuperable difficulties, and in irreconcilable contra
dictions.
Edwards supposes that some one may object : " All that these
things amount to is, that God may do evil that good may
come ; which is justly esteemed immoral and sinful in men,
and therefore may be justly esteemed inconsistent with the per
fections of God." This is a fair and honest statement of the
objection; now let us hear the reply. "I answer," says
Edwards, " that for God to dispose and permit evil in the man
ner that has been spoken of, is not to do evil that good may
come ; for it is not to do evil at all." It is not to do evil at all,
says he, for the Supreme Ruler of the world to arrange events
around one of his creatures in such a manner that they will
certainly and infallibly induce him to commit sin. Why is not
this to do evil ? At first view, it certainly looks very much like
doing evil ; and it is not at once distinguishable from the temp
tations ascribed to Satanic agency. Why is it not to do
evil, then, when it is done by the Almighty ? It is not to do
evil, says Edwards, because when God brings sin certainly and
infallibly to pass, he does so "for wise and holy purposes."
This is his answer : " In order to a thing s being morally evil,
there must be one of these two things belonging to it : either it
must be a thing unfit and unsuitable in its own nature, or it
must have a lad tendency, or it must be done for an evil end.
But neither of these things can be attributed to God s ordering
100 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
and permitting such events as the immoral acts of creatures for
good ends."* Let us examine this logic.
We are gravely told, that God designedly brings the sinful
acts of men to pass by the use of most certain and infallible
meetns ; but this is not to do evil, because he has a good end in
view. His intention is right ; he brings sin to pass for " wise
and holy purposes." Let us come a little closer to this doctrine,
and see what it is. It will not be denied, that if any being
should bring sin to pass without any end at all, except to secure
its existence, this would be a sinful agency. If any being
should, knowingly and designedly, bring sin to pass in another,
without any " wise and holy purposes," all mankind will agree
in pronouncing the deed to be morally wrong. But precisely
the same deed is not wrong in God, says Edwards, because in
his case it proceeds from " a wise and holy purpose," and he has
" a good end in view." That is to say, the means, in themselves
considered, are morally wrong ; but being employed for a wise
and holy purpose, for the attainment of a good end, they are
sanctified ! This is precisely the doctrine, that the end sancti
fies the means. Is it not wonderful, that any system should be
so dark and despotic in its power as to induce the mind of an
Edwards, ordinarily so amazing for its acuteness and so exalted
in its piety, to vindicate the character of God upon such
grounds ?
The defence of Edwards is neither more nor less than a play
on the term evil. When it is said, that " we may do evil that
good may come ;" the meaning of the maxim is, that the means
in such a case and under such circumstances ceases to be evil.
The maxim teaches that " we may do evil," that it is lawful to
do evil, with a view to the grand and glorious end to be attained
by it. Or, in other words, that it is right to do what would
otherwise be morally evil, in order to accomplish a good end.
If Edwards had considered the other form of the same odious
maxim, namely, that " the end sanctifies the means," he would
have found it impossible to evade the force of its application to
his doctrine. He could not have escaped from the difficulty
of his position by a play upon the word evil. He would have
seen that he had undertaken to justify the conduct of the Father
of Lights, by supposing it to be governed by the most corrupt
Inquiry, part iv, sec. iz.
Chapter IL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 101
maxim of the most corrupt system of casuistry the world has
ever seen.
What God does, says Edwards, is not evil at all ; because his
purpose is holy, because his object is good, his intention is
right. In like manner, the maxim says, that when the end is
good and holy, " it sanctifies the means." The means may be
impure in themselves considered, but they are rendered pure
by the cause in which they are employed. This doctrine has
been immortalized by Pascal, in his " Provincial Letters ;" and
we cannot better dismiss the subject than with an extract from
the " Provincial Letters." " I showed you," says the Jesuitical
father, "how servants might, with a safe conscience, manage
certain troublesome messages ; did you not observe that it is
simply taking off their intention from the sin itself \ and fixing
it on the advantage to be gained."* On this principle, stealing,
and lying, and murder, may all be vindicated. " Caramuel,
our illustrious defender," says the Jesuit, " in his Fundamental
Theology," enters into the examination of many new
questions resulting from this principle, (of directing the inten
tion,) as, for example, whether the Jesuits may kill the Jansen-
ists ? " Alas, father !" exclaimed Pascal, " this is a most sur
prising point in theology! I hold the Jansenists already no
better than dead men by the doctrine of Father Launy." " Aha,
sir, you are caught ; for Caramuel deduces the very opposite
conclusion from the same principles." " How so ?" said Pascal.
" Observe his words, n. 1146 and 1147, p. 547 and 548. The
Jansenists call the Jesuits Pelagians ; may they be killed for
so doing? No for this plain reason, that the Jansenists are
no more able to obscure the glory of our society, than an owl
can hide the sun; in fact, they promote it, though certainly
against their intention ocddi non possunt, quid nocere non
potueruiii. "Alas, father," says Pascal, "and does the exist
ence of the Jansenists depend solely upon their capacity of
injuring your reputation ? If that be the case, I am afraid they
are not in a very good predicament ; for if the slightest proba
bility should arise of their doing you any hurt, they may be
despatched at once. You can perform the deed logically and
in form ; for it is only to direct your intention right, and you
insure a quiet conscience. "What a blessedness for those who
Letter vii.
102 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
/
can endure injuries to know this charming doctrine! But, on
the other hand, how miserable is the condition of the offending
party ! Really, father, it would be better to have to do with
people totally devoid of all religion, than with those "who have
received instructions so far only as to this point, relative to
directing the intention. I am afraid the mtention of the mur
derer is no consolation to the wounded person. He can have
no perception of this secret direction poor man ! he is conscious
only of the How he receives ; and I am not certain whether
he would not be less indignant to be cruelly massacred by peo
ple in a violent transport of rage, than to be devoutly killed
for conscience sake." Now, we submit it to the candid reader,
whether the reasoning here ascribed to the Jesuit by Pascal, is
not exactly parallel with that on which Edwards justifies the
procedure of the Almighty ? If God may choose sin and bring
it to pass, without contracting the least impurity, because his
intention is directed aright, to a wise and good end, may we
not be permitted to imitate his example ? And again, if God
thus employs the creature as an instrument to accomplish his
wise and holy purposes, why should he pour out the vials of his
wrath upon him for having yielded to the dispensations of his
almighty power ? In order to save his doctrine from reproach,
Edwards has invented a distinction, which next demands our
attention. " There is no inconsistence," says he, " in supposing
that God may hate a thing as it is in itself, and considered
simply as evil, and yet that it may be his will it should come
to pass, considering all consequences. I believe there is no
person of good understanding who will venture to say, he is
certain that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the
whole compass and extent of existence, and all consequences in
the endless series of events, that there should be such a thing
as moral evil in the world. And if so, it will certainly follow,
that an infinitely wise Being, who always chooses what is best,
must choose that there should be such a thing. And if so,.
then such a choice is not evil, but a wise and holy choice.
And if so, then that Providence which is agreeable to such a
choice, is a wise and holy Providence. Men do will sin as sin,
and so are the authors and actors of it ; they love it as sin, and
for evil ends and purposes. God does not will sin as sin, or for
the sake of anything evil ; though it be his pleasure so to order
Chapter H] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 103
things that, he permitting, sin will come to pass, for the sake
of the great good that by his disposal shall be the consequence.
His willing to order things so that evil should come to pass for
the sake of the contrary good, is no argument that he does not
hate evil as evil ; and if so, then it is no reason why he may
not reasonably forbid evil as evil, and punish it as such."*
Here we are plainly told, that although God hates sin as sin,
yet, all things considered, he prefers that it should come to pass,
and even helps it into existence. But man loves and commits
evil as such, and is therefore justly punishable for it.
There are several serious objections to this extraordinary dis
tinction. It is not true that men love and commit sin as sm.
Sin is committed, not for its own sake, but for the pleasure
which attends it. If sin did not gratify the appetites, or the
passions, or the desires of men, it would not be committed at all ;
there would be no temptation to it, and it would be seen as it is
in its own loathsome nature. Indeed, to speak with philosoph
ical accuracy, sin is never a direct object of our affections or
choice ; we simply desire certain things, as Adam did the for
bidden fruit, and we seek our gratification in them contrary to
the will of God. This constitutes our sin. The direct object of
our choice is, not disobedience, not sin, but the forbidden thing,
the prohibited gratification. We do not love and choose the
disobedience, but the thing which leads us to disobey. This is
so very plain and simple a matter, that we cannot but wonder
that honest men should have lost sight of it in a mist of
words, and built up their theories in the dark.
Secondly, the above position, into which Edwards has been
forced by the exigencies of his doctrine concerning evil, is
directly at war with the great fundamental principle on which
his whole system rests, namely, that the will is always deter
mined by the greatest apparent good. For how is it possible
that men should commit sin as sin, and for its own sake, if they
never do anything except what is the most agreeable to them ?
How is it possible that they pursue moral evil merely as moral
evil, and yet pursue it as the greatest apparent good? If it
should be said that men love sin merely as sin, and therefore it
pleases them to choose it for its own sake, this reply would be
without foundation. For, as we have already seen, there is no
Inquiry, part iv, sec. ix.
104 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
such principle in human nature as the love of sin as such, or for
its own sake ; and consequently sin can never delight or please
the human mind as it is in itself. And, besides, it is self-con
tradictory ; for the question is, How can a man commit sin for
its own sake on account of the pleasure it affords him ? It
wculd be an attempt to explain an hypothesis which denies the
veiy fact to be explained by it.
In the third place, if the philosophy of Edwards be true, no
good reason can be assigned why men should restrain themselves
from the commission of sin : for, all things considered, God pre
fers the sin which actually exists, and infallibly brings it to
pass. He prefers it on account of the great good he intends to
educe from it. Why then should we not also prefer its exist
ence ? God is sovereign ; he will permit no more sin than he
can and will render subservient to the highest good of the uni
verse ; and so much as is for the highest good he will bring into
existence. Why, then, should we give ourselves any concern
about the matter ? "Why should we fear that there may be too
much sin in the world, or why should we blame other men for
their crimes and offences ?
The inference which we have just mentioned as necessarily
flowing from the doctrine of Edwards, has actually been drawn
by some of the most illustrious advocates of that doctrine. Thus
says Hartley, as we have already seen, " since all men do against
us is by the appointment of God, it is rebellion against him to
be offended with them." This is so clearly the logical inference
from the doctrine in question, that it is truly wonderful how any
one can possibly fail to perceive it.
"We are told by Leibnitz and Edwards, that we should not
presume to act on the principle of permitting sin in others, or
of bringing it to pass, on account of the good that we may educe
from it ; because such an affair is too high for us. But, surely,
we need have no weak fears on this ground; for although it
may be too high for us, they do not pretend that it is too high
for God. He will allow no more sin to make its appearance in
the world, say they, than he will cause to redound to the good
of the universe. He prefers it for that reason, and why should
we not respond, amen ! to his preference ? Why should we
give ourselves any concern about sin ? May we not follow our
own inclinations, leaving sin to take its course, and rest quietly
Chapter II.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 105
in Providence ? To this question it will be replied, as Calvin
and Edwards repeatedly reply, that the revealed, and not the
secret, will of God is the rule of our duty. We do not object
to this doctrine ; we acknowledge its perfect propriety and cor
rectness : but it is no reply to the consequence we have deduced
from the philosophy of Edwards. It only shows that his philos
ophy leads to a conclusion which is in direct opposition to reve
lation. So far from objecting that any should turn from the
philosophy of Edwards to revelation, in order to find reasons
why evil should not be committed by us, we sincerely regret
that such a departure from a false philosophy, and return to a
true religion, is not more permanent and universal.
The doctrine of Edwards on this subject destroys the harmony
of the divine attributes. It represents God as having two wills ;
or, to speak more correctly, it represents him as having pub
lished a holy law for the government of his creatures, which he
does not, in all cases, wish them to obey. On the contrary, he
prefers that some of them should violate his holy law ; and not
only so, but he adopts certain and infallible means to lead them
to violate and trample it under foot. It is admitted by Ed
wards, that in this sense God really possesses two wills ; but he
still denies that this shows any inconsistency in the nature of God.
Edwards says, that the will of God does not oppose sin in the
same sense in which it prefers sin, and that, therefore, there is no
inconsistency in the case. But let us not deceive ourselves by
words. Is it true, that sin is opposed by what is called the
revealed will of God, by his command ; and yet that it is, all
things considered, chosen by his secret and working will ? He
commands one thing, and yet works to bring another to pass !
He prohibits all sin, under the awful penalty of eternal death,
and yet secretly arranges and plans things in such a manner
as to secure the commission of it !
We have already seen one of these defences. God "hates
sin as it is in itself;" and hence he prohibits it by his command.
" Yet it may be his will it should come to pass, considering all
its consequences ;" and hence his secret will is bent on bringing
it into existence. There is no inconsistency here, says Ed
wards, because the divine will relates to two different objects;
namely, to " sin considered simply as sin," and to " sin con
sidered in all its consequences." We do not care whether
106 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
the two propositions contradict each other or not ; it is abun
dantly evident, as we have seen, that it makes God choose that
which he hates, even sin itself, as the means of good. It makes
the end sanctify the means, even in the eye of the holy God.
This doctrine we utterly reject and infinitely abhor. We had
rather have " our sight, hearing, and motive power, and what
not besides, disputed, and even torn away from us, than suffer
ourselves to be disputed into a belief," that the holy God can
choose moral evil as a means of good. We had rather believe
all the fables in the Talmud and the Koran, than that the ever-
blessed God should, by his providence and his power, plunge
his feeble creatures into sin, and then punish them with ever
lasting torments for their transgression. We know of nothing
in the Pantheism of Spinoza, or in the atheism of Hobbes, more
revolting than this hideous dogma.
The great metaphysician of New-England has made a still
further attempt to vindicate the dogma in question. "The
Arminians," says he, "ridicule the distinction between the
secret and revealed will of God, or, more properly expressed,
the distinction between the decree and law of God ; because
we say he may decree one thing and command another. And
so, they argue, we hold a contrariety in God, as if one will of
his contradicted another. However, if they will call this a
contradiction of wills, we know that there is such a thing ; so
that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it. We and
they know it was God s secret will, that Abraham should not
sacrifice his son Isaac ; but yet his command was, that he should
do it."* Such is the instance produced by this acute divine,
to show that the secret will of God may prefer the very thing
which is condemned by his revealed will or law ; and on the
strength of it, he is bold to say, " We know it, so that it is the
greatest absurdity to dispute about it"
We have often seen this passage of Scripture produced by
infidels, to show that the Old Testament contains unworthy
representations of God. If Edwards had undertaken to refute
the infidel ground in relation to this passage, he might have
done so with very great ease : but then he would at the same
time have refuted himself. The Scriptural account of God s
commanding Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, was long ago
Edwards s Works, vol. vii, p. 406.
Chapter IL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 107
employed by the famous infidel Hobbes to show that there are
two wills in God. This argument of Hobbes has been refuted
by Leibnitz. " Hobbes contends," says Leibnitz, "that God wills
not always what he commands, as when he commands Abra
ham to sacrifice his son:" and he replies, that "God, in com
manding Abraham to sacrifice his son, willed the obedience, <wd
not the action, which he prevented after having the obedience ;
for that was not an action which merited in itself to be willed :
but such is not the case with those actions which he positively
wills, and which are indeed worthy of being the objects of his
will ; such as piety, charity, and every virtuous action which
God commands, and such as the avoidance of sin, more repug
nant to the divine perfections than any other thing. It is incom
parably better, therefore, to explain the will of God, as we
have done it in this work."* It is evident that Leibnitz did
not relish the idea of two wills in God ; and perhaps few pious
minds would do so, if it were presented to them by an atheist.
But there was too close an affinity between the philosophy of
Leibnitz and that of Hobbes, to permit the former to furnish
the most satisfactory refutation of the argument of the latter.
This command to Abraham does not show that there ever
was any such contrariety between the revealed and the decretal
wills of God, as is contended for by Hobbes and Edwards.
God intended, as we are told, to prove the faith of Abraham,
in order that it might shine forth and become a bright example
to all succeeding ages. For this purpose he commanded him
to take his only son, whom he loved, and go into the land of
Moriah, and there offer him up as a burnt-offering upon one
of the mountains. Abraham obeyed without a murmur. After
several days travelling and preparation, Abraham has reached
the appointed place, and is ready for the sacrifice. His son
Isaac is bound, and laid upon the altar ; the father stretches
forth his hand to take the knife and slay him. But a voice is
heard, saying, " Lay not thine hand on the lad ; neither do thou
anything unto him." Now, the conduct of Abraham on this
memorable occasion, is one of the most remarkable exhibitions
of confidence in the wisdom and goodness of God, which the
history of the world has furnished. It deserves to be held up
to the admiration of mankind, and to be celebrated in all ages
Theodicee, p. 327.
108 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
of the world. We sincerely pity the man, who is so taken up
with superficial appearances, or who is so destitute of sympathy
with the moral greatness and beauty of soul manifested in this
simple narrative, that he can approach it in a little, captious,
sneering spirit, rather than in an attitude of profound admira
tion. But our business, at present, is not so much with the
laughing sceptic as with the grave divine.
What evidence, then, does this story furnish that the secret
will of God had anything to do with the simple but sublime
transaction which it records? God commanded Abraham to
repair to the land of Moriah with his son Isaac ; but are we
informed that his secret will was opposed to the patriarch s
going thither, or that it opposed any obstacle to his obedience ?
Are we told that God so arranged the events of his providence
as to render the disobedience of Abraham, in any one partic
ular, certain and infallible ? We cannot find the shadow of any
such information in the sacred story. And is there the least
intimation, that when Abraham was commanded to stay the
uplifted knife, the secret will of God was in favour of its being
plunged into the bosom of his son? Clearly there is not.
Where, then, is the discrepancy between the revealed and the
secret wills of God in this case, which we are required to see ?
Where is this discrepancy so plainly manifested, that we abso
lutely know its existence, so that it is the height of absurdity
to dispute against it ?
If there is any contrariety at all in this case, it is between
the revealed will of God in commanding Abraham to offer up
his son, and his subsequently revealed will to desist from the
sacrifice. It does not present even a seeming inconsistency
between his secret will and his command, but between two
portions of his revealed will. This seeming inconsistency
between the command of God and his countermand, in relation
to the same external action, has been fully removed by Leibnitz ;
and if it had not been, it is just as incumbent on the abettors
of Edwards s scheme to explain it, as it is upon his opponents.
If God had commanded Abraham to do a thing, and yet exerted
his secret will to make him violate the injunction, this would
have been a case in point : but there is no such case to be found
in the word of God.
It may not be improper, in this connexion, to quote the fol-
Chapter IL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 109
lowing jndicious admonition of Howe: "Take heed," says he,
" that we do not oppose the secret and revealed will of God to
one another, or allow ourselves so much as to imagine an oppo
sition or contrariety between them. And that ground being
once firmly laid and stuck to, as it is impossible that there can
be a will against a will in God, or that he can be divided from
himself, or against himself, or that he should reveal anything
to us as his will that is not his will, (it being a thing inconsist
ent with his nature, and impossible to him to lie,) that being, I
say, firmly laid, (as nothing can be firmer or surer than that,)
then measure all your conceptions of the secret will of God by
his revealed will, about which you may be sure. But never
measure your conceptions of his revealed by his secret will ;
that is, by what you may imagine concerning that. For you can
but imagine while it is secret, and so far as it is unrevealed."*
" It properly belongs," says Edwards, " to the supreme abso
lute Governor of the universe, to order all important events
within his dominions by wisdom ; but the events in the moral
world are of the most important kind, such as the moral actions
of intelligent creatures, and the consequences. These events will
be ordered by something. They will either be disposed by
wisdom, or they will be disposed by chance ; that is, they will
be disposed by blind and undesigning causes, if that were pos
sible, and could be called a disposal. Is it not better that
the good and evil which happen in God s world should be
ordered, regulated, bounded, and determined by the good
pleasure of an infinitely wise being, than to leave these things to
fall out by chance, and to be determined by those causes which
have no understanding and aim ? .... It is in its own nature fit,
that wisdom, and not chance, should order these things."f
In our opinion, if there be no other alternative, it is better
that sin should be left to chance, than ascribed to the high and
holy One. But why must sin be ordered and determined by
the supreme Ruler of the world, or else be left to chance ?
Has the great metaphysician forgotten, that there may be such
things as men and angels in the universe ; or does he mean,
with Spinoza, to blot out all created agents, and all subordinate
agency, from existence ? If not, then certainly God may refuse
to be the author of sin, without leaving it to blind chance,
Howe s Works, p. 1142. f On the Will, part iv, sec. ix.
110 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
which is incapable of such a thing. He may leave it, as we
conceive he has done, to the determination of finite created
intelligences. If sin is to come into the world, as come it evi
dently does, it is infinitely better, we say, that it should be left
to proceed from the creature, and not be made to emanate from
God himself, the fountain of light, and the great object of all
adoration. It is infinitely better that the high and holy One
should do nothing either by his wisdom or by his decree, by
his providence or his power, to help this hideous thing to raise
its head amid the inconceivable splendours of his dominion.
Such speculations as those of Edwards and Leibnitz, in our
opinion, only reflect dishonour and disgrace upon the cause
they are intended to subserve. It is better, ten thousand times
better, simply to plant ourselves upon the moral nature of man,
and the irreversible dictates of common sense, and annihilate
the speculations of the atheist, than to endeavour to parry them
off by such invented quibbles and sophisms. They give point,
and pungency, and power to the shafts of the sceptic. If we
meet him on the common ground of necessity, he will snap all
such quibbles like threads of tow, and overwhelm us with the
floods of irony and scorn. For, in the memorable words of
Sir William Hamilton, " It can easily be proved by those who
are able and not afraid to reason, that the doctrine of necessity
is subversive of religion, natural and revealed." To perceive
this, it requires neither a Bayle, nor a Hobbes, nor a Hume ; it
only requires a man who is neither unable nor afraid to reason.
SECTION IV.
The attempts of Dr. Emmons and Dr. Chalmers to reconcile the scheme of
necessity with the purity of God.
As we have dwelt so long on the speculations of President
Edwards concerning the objections in question, we need add
but a few remarks in relation to the views of the above-men
tioned authors on the same subject. The sentiments of Dr.
Emmons on the relation between the divine agency and the sin
ful actions of men, are even more clearly defined and boldly
expressed than those of President Edwards. The disciple is
more open and decided than the master. "Since mind can
not act," says he, " any more than matter can move, without a
Chapter n.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. Ill
divine agency, it is absurd to suppose that men can be left to
the freedom of their own will, to act, or not to act, independ
ently of a divine influence. There must be, therefore, the
exercise of a divine agency in every human action, without
which it is impossible to conceive that God should govern moral
agents, and make mankind act in perfect conformity to his
designs."* " He is now exercising his powerful and irresistible
agency upon the heart of every one of the human race, and
producing either holy or unholy exercises in it."f " It is often
thought and said, that nothing more was necessary on God s
part, in order to fit Pharaoh for destruction, than barely to
leave him to himself. But God knew that no external means
and motives would be sufficient of themselves to form his moral
character. He determined therefore to operate on his heart
itself, and cause him to put forth certain evil exercises in view
of certain external motives. When Moses called upon him to
let the people go, God stood by him, and moved him to refuse.
When the people departed from his kingdom, God stood by
him and moved him to pursue after them with increased malice
and revenge. And what God did on such particular occasions,
he did at all times.":): It is useless to multiply extracts to the
same effect. Could language be more explicit, or more revolt
ing to the moral sentiments of mankind ?
If God is alike the author of all our volitions, sinful as well
as holy, one wonders by what sort of legerdemain the authors
of the doctrine have contrived to ascribe all the glory and all
the praise of our holy actions to God, and at the same time all
the shame and condemnation of our evil actions to ourselves.
In relation to the holy actions of men, all the praise is due to
God, say they, because they were produced by his power.
Why is not the moral turpitude of their evil actions, then, also
ascribed to God, inasmuch as he is said to produce them by his
irresistible and almighty agency ? We are accountable for our
evil acts, say Dr. Emmons and Calvin, because they are volun
tary. Are not our moral acts, our virtuous acts, also voluntary ?
Certainly they are ; this is not denied ; and yet we are not
allowed to impute the moral quality of the acts to the agent in
such cases. This whole school of metaphysicians, indeed, from
Calvin down to Emmons, can make God the author of our evil
Emmons s Works, vol. iv, p. 372. f ft>id., p. 388. J Ibid., p. 327
112 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
acts, by an exertion of his omnipotence, and yet assert that
because they are voluntary we are justly blameworthy and
punishable for them; but though our virtuous acts are also
voluntary, they still insist the praiseworthiness of them is to be
ascribed exclusively to Him by whom they were produced.
The plain truth is, that as the scheme originated in a particular
set purpose and design, so it is one-sided in its views, arbitrary
in its distinctions, and full of self-contradictions.
The simple fact seems to be, that if any effect be produced
in our minds by the power of God, it is a passive impression,
and is very absurdly called a voluntary state of the will. And
even if such an impression could be a voluntary state, or a voli
tion, properly so called, we should not be responsible for it,
because it is produced by the omnipotence of God This, we
doubt not, is in perfect accordance with the universal con
sciousness and voice of mankind, and cannot be resisted by the
sophistical evasions of particular men, how great soever may be
their genius, or exalted their piety.
We shall, in conclusion, add one more great name to the list
of those who, from their zeal for the glory of the divine omnipo
tence, have really and clearly made God the author of sin.
The denial of his scheme of "a rigid and absolute predes
tination," as he calls it, Dr. Chalmers deems equivalent to the
assertion, that " things grow up from the dark womb of non
entity, which omnipotence did not summon into being, and
which omniscience could not foretell." And again, "At this
rate, events would come forth uncaused from the womb of non
entity, to which omnipotence did not give birth, and which
omniscience could not foresee."* Now all this is spoken, be it
remembered, in relation to the volitions or acts of men. But
if there are no such events, except such as omnipotence gives
birth to, or summons into being, how clear and how irresistible
is the conclusion that God is the author of the sinful acts of the
creature ? It were better, we say, ten thousand times better,
that sin, that monstrous birth of night and darkness, should
grow up out of the womb of nonentity, if such were the only
alternative, than that it should proceed from the bosom of God.
Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, chap, ill
Chapter HI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 113
CHAPTER m.
THE SCHEME OF NECESSITY DENIES THE REALITY OF MORAL DISTLNCTIONa
Our voluntary service He requires,
Not our necessitated ; such with him
Finds no acceptance, nor can find ; for how
Can hearts, not free, be tried whether they serve
Willing or no, who will but what they must
By destiny, and can no other choose ? MILTON.
IN the preceding chapters we have taken it for granted that
there is such a thing as moral good and evil, and endeavoured
to show, that if the scheme of necessity be true, man is absolved
from guilt, and God is the author of sin. But, in point of fact,
if the scheme of necessity be true, there is no such thing as
moral good or evil in this lower world ; all distinction between
virtue and vice, moral good and evil, is a mere dream, and we
really live in a non-moral world. This has been shown by
many of the advocates of necessity.
SECTION I.
The mews of Spinoza in relation to the reality of moral distinctions.
It is shown by Spinoza, that all moral distinctions vanish
before the iron scheme of necessity. They are swept away as the
dreams of vulgar prejudice by the force of Spinoza s logic ; yet
little praise is due, we think, on that account, to the superiority
of his acumen. The wonder is, not that Spinoza should have
drawn such an inference, but that any one should fail to draw
it. For if our volitions are necessitated by causes over which
we have no control, it seems to follow, as clear as noonday,
that they cannot be the objects of praise or blame cannot be
our virtue or vice. So far is it indeed from requiring any
logical acuteness to perceive such an inference, that it demands,
as we shall see, the very greatest ingenuity to keep from per
ceiving it. Hence, in our humble opinion, the praise which has
been lavished on the logic of Spinoza is not deserved.
His superior consistency only shows one of two thing*
8
114 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part 1,
either that he possessed a stronger reasoning faculty than his
great master, Descartes, or a weaker moral sense. In our
opinion, it shows the latter. If his moral sentiments had "been
vigorous and active, they would have induced him, no doubt,
either to invent sophistical evasions of such an inference, or to
reject the doctrine from which it flows. If a Descartes, a
Leibnitz, or an Edwards, for example, had seen the conse
quences of the scheme of necessity as clearly as they were seen
by Spinoza, his moral nature would have recoiled from it with
such force as to dash the premises to atoms. If any praise,
then, be due to Spinoza for such triumphs of the reasoning
power, it should be given, not to the superiority of his logic,
but to the apathy of his moral sentiments. For our part,
greatly as we admire sound reasoning and consistency in specu
lation, we had rather be guilty of ten thousand acts of logical
inconsistency, such as those of Edwards, or Leibnitz, or Des
cartes, than to be capable of resting in the conclusion to which
the logic of Spinoza conducted him that every moral distinc
tion is a vulgar prejudice, and that the existence of moral good
ness is a dream.*
SECTION II.
The attempt of Edwards to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the reality
of moral distinctions.
It would not be difficult to see, perhaps, that a necessary
holiness, or a necessary sin, is a contradiction in terms, if we
would only allow reason to speak for itself, instead of extorting
testimony from it by subjecting it to the torture of a false logic.
For what proposition can more clearly carry its own evidence
along with it, than that whatever is necessary to us, that what
ever we cannot possibly avoid, is neither our virtue nor our
fault ? What can be more unquestionable, than that we can
be neither to praise nor to blame, neither justly rewardable nor
punishable for anything over whose existence we have no power
* Emphatically as this conclusion is stated by Spinoza, and harshly as it is
thrust by him against the moral sense of the reader, he could not himself find
a perfect rest therein. Nothing can impart this to the reflective and inquiring
mind but truth. Hence, even Spinoza finds himself constrained to speak of the
duty of love to God, and so forth ; all of which, according to his own conclusion,
is irrelative nonsense.
Chapter IH] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 115
or control ? Yet this question, apparently so plain and simple
in itself, has been enveloped in clouds of metaphysical subtilty,
and obscured by huge masses of scholastic jargon. If, on this
subject, we have wandered in the dim twilight of uncertain
speculation, instead of walking in the clear open day, this has
been, it seems to us, because we have neglected the wise admoni
tion of Barrow, that logic, however admirable in its place, was
not designed as an instrument "to put out the sight of our
eyes."
It shall be our first object, then, to pull down and destroy
"the invented quibbles and sophisms" which have so long
darkened and confounded the light of reason and conscience in
relation to the nature of moral good and evil, to dispel the
clouds which have been so industriously thrown around this
subject, in order that the bright and shining light of nature
may, free and unobstructed, find its way into our minds and
hearts.
We say, then, that there never can be virtue or vice in the
breast of a moral agent, prior to his own actings and doings.
On the contrary, it is insisted by Edwards, that true virtue or
holiness was planted in the bosom of the first man by the act
of creation. "In a moral agent," says he, "subject to moral
obligations, it is the same thing to be perfectly innocent, as to
be perfectly righteous. It must be the same, because there
can no more be any medium between sin and righteousness, or
between being right and being wrong, in a moral sense, than
there can be a medium between straight and crooked in a
natural."* This is applied to the first man as he came from
the hand of the Creator, and is designed to show that he was
created with true holiness or virtue in his heart. According to
this doctrine, man was made upright, not merely in the sense
that he was free from the least bias to evil, or that he possessed
all the powers requisite to moral agency, but in the sense that
true virtue or moral goodness was planted in his nature by the
act of creation. If this be so, the doctrine of a necessary holi
ness must be admitted ; for surely nothing can be more neces
sary to us, nothing can take place in which we have less to do,
than the act by which we are created.
This then is the question which we intend to examine:
Original Sin, part ii, chap, i, sec. i.
110 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
whether that which is concreated with a moral agent, can be
his virtue or his vice ? "Whether, in other words, the dispo
sitions or qualities which Adam derived from the hand of God,
partook of the nature of true virtue or otherwise? Edwards
assumes the affirmative. To establish his position, he relics
upon two arguments, which we shall proceed to examine.
The first argument is designed to show, that unless true vir
tue, or moral goodness, had been planted in the nature of man
by the finger of God, it could never have found its way into
the world. To give this argument in his own words, he says :
" It is agreeable to the sense of men in all nations and ages, not
only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but that
the good choice itself, from whence that effect proceeds, is so ;
yea, also, the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection
of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous.
This is the general notion not that principles derive their
goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness
from the principles whence they proceed ; so that the act of
choosing what is good is no further virtuous, than it proceeds
from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind ; which
supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a
virtuous act of choice ; and that, therefore, it is not necessary
there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there
can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before
the existence of a good disposition of heart, what is the charac
ter of that choice ? There can, according to our natural notions,
be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous prin
ciple, but from mere self-love, ambition, or some animal appe
tites ; therefore, a virtuous temper of mind may be before a
good act of choice, as a tree may be before its fruit, and the
fountain before the stream which proceeds from it."* Thus, he
argues, if there must be choice before a good disposition, or
virtue, according to our doctrine, then virtue could not arise
at all, or find its way into the world. For all men concede, says
he, that every virtuous choice, or act, must proceed from a vir
tuous disposition ; and if this must also proceed from a virtuous
act, it is plain there could be no such thing as virtue or moral
goodness at all. The scheme which teaches that the act must
precede the principle, and the principle the act, reduces the
Original Sin, part ii, ch. i, sec. i.
Chapter III.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 117
very existence of virtue to a plain impossibility. He shows
virtue to be possible, and escapes the difficulty, by referring it
to the creative energy of the Divine Being, by which the prin
ciple of virtue, he contends, was planted in the mind of the
first man.
This argument is plausible ; but it will not bear a close exam
ination. It might be made to give way, in various directions,
before an analysis of the principle on which it is constructed ;
but we intend to demolish it by easier and more striking argu
ments. If we had nothing better to oppose to it, we might
indeed neutralize its effect by a counter-argument of Edwards
himself, which we find in his celebrated work on the will.
He there says, that the virtuousness of every virtuous act or
choice depends upon its own nature, and not upon its origin
or cause. If we must refer every virtuous act, says he, to
something in us that is virtuous as its antecedent, we must like
wise refer that antecedent to some other virtuous origin or cause ;
and so on ad injmitum. Thus we should be compelled to trace
virtue back from step to step, until we had quite driven it out
of the world, and excluded it from the universality of things.*
Now this argument seems just as plausible as that which we
have produced from the same author, in his work on Original
Sin. Let us lay them together, and contemplate the joint
result. According to one, the character of every virtuous act
depends upon the virtuousness of the principle or disposition
whence it proceeds ; according to the other, it depends upon its
own nature, and not at all upon anything in its origin, or cause,
or antecedent. According to one, we must trace every virtuous
act to a virtuous principle, and the virtuous principle itself to
the necessitating act of God ; according to the other, we must
look no higher to determine the character of an act than its
own nature ; and if we proceed to its origin or cause to deter
mine its character, we shall find no stopping-place. We shall
not trace it up to God, as before, but we shall banish all virtue
quite out of the world, and exclude it from the universality of
things. According to one argument, there can be no virtue
in the world, unless it be caused to exist, in the first place, by
the necessitating, creative act of the Almighty ; and according
to the other, the virtuousness of every virtuous act depends upon
Inquiry, part iv, sec. L
118 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
its own nature, and is wholly independent of the question
respecting its origin or cause. The solution of these incon
sistencies and contradictions, we shall leave to the followers
and admirers of President Edwards.*
But we have something better, we trust, to oppose to Presi
dent Edwards than his own arguments. If his logic be good
for anything, it will prove that God is the author of sin as well
as of virtue. For it is as much the common notion of mankind
that every sinful act must proceed from a sinful disposition or
principle, as it is that every virtuous act must proceed from a
virtuous disposition or principle ; and hence, according to the
logic of Edwards, a sinful disposition or principle must have pre
ceded the first sinful act ; that an antecedent sinful disposition
or principle could not have been introduced by the act of the
creature, and consequently it must have been planted in the
bosom of the first man by the act of the Creator. This argu
ment, we say, just as clearly shows that sin is impossible, or
that it must have been concreated with man, as it shows the
same thing in relation to virtue. If we maintain his argument,
then, we must either deny the possibility of moral evil or make
God the author of it.
After having laid down principles from which the impossi
bility of moral evil may be demonstrated, it was too late for
Edwards to undertake to account for the origin of sin. Accord
ing to his philosophy, it can have no existence ; and hence we
are not to look into that philosophy for any very clear account
of how it took its rise in the world. Indeed, this point is hur
ried over by Edwards in a most hasty and superficial manner,
They are accustomed to boast, that no man ever excelled Edwards in the
reductio ad alsurdum. But we believe no one has produced a more striking illus
tration of his ability in the use of this weapon, than that which we have just
adduced. For if we contend, that every act is to be judged according to its own
nature, whether it be good or evil, he will demonstrate, that we render virtue
impossible, and exclude it entirely from the world. On the other hand, if we
shift our position, and contend that no act is to be judged according to its own
nature, but according to the goodness or badness of its origin or cause, he will
also reduce this position, diametrically opposite though it be to the former, to
precisely the same absurdity ; namely, that it excludes all virtue out of the world,
and banishes it from the universality of things ! Surely, this reductio ad ab-
turdum is a most formidable weapon in his hands ; since he wields it with such
destructive fury against the most opposite principles, and seems himself scarcely
less exposed than others to its force.
Chapter ELI WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 119
in which he seems conscious of no little embarrassment. In his
great work on the will he devotes one page and a half to this
subject; and the greater part of this small space is filled up
with the retort upon the Arminians, that their scheme is en
cumbered with as great difficulties as his own ! He lets the
truth drop in one place, however, that " the abiding principle
and habit of sin" was " first introduced by an evil act of the
creature."* Is it possible? How could there be an evil act
which did not proceed from an antecedent evil principle or dis
position ? What becomes of the great common notion of man
kind, on which his demonstration is erected ? But we must allow
the author to contradict himself, since he has now come around
to the truth, that an evil act of the creature may and must have
preceded the existence of moral evil in the world. If an intel
ligent creature, however, as it came from the hand of God, can
introduce a " principle of sin by a sinful act," why should it be
thought impossible for such a creature to introduce a principle
of virtue by a virtuous act ?
The truth is, that a virtuous act does not require an antecedent
virtuous disposition or principle to account for its existence ; nor
does a vicious act require an antecedent vicious principle to ac
count for its existence. In relation to the rise of good and evil
in the world, the philosophy of Edwards is radically defective ;
and no one can discuss that subject on the principles of his phi
losophy without finding himself involved in contradictions and
absurdities. If his psychology had not been false, he might
have seen a clear and steady light where he has only beheld
difficulties and confusion. As we have already seen, and as we
shall still more fully see, Edwards confounds the power by which
we act with the susceptibility through which we feel : the will
with the emotive part of our nature. Every one knows that we
may feel without acting ; and yet feeling and acting, suffering
and doing, are expressly and repeatedly identified in his writ
ings. Having merged the will in sensibility, he regarded vir
tue and vice as phenomena of the latter, and as evolved from
its bosom by the operation of necessitating causes. Hence his
views in relation to the nature of moral good and evil, as well
as in relation to their origin, became unavoidably dark and
confused.
Inquiry, part iv, sec. x.
120 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
If we only bear in mind the distinction between the will and
the sensibility, we may easily see how either holiness or sin
might have taken its rise in the bosom of the first man, without
supposing that either a holy or a sinful principle was planted
there by the hand of the Creator. If we will only carry the
light of this distinction along with us, it will be no more diffi
cult to account for the rise of the first sin in the bosom of a
spotless creature of God, than to account for any other volition
of the human mind. The first man, by means of his intelli
gence, could contemplate the perfection of his Creator, and,
doing so, he could not but feel an emotion of admiration and
delight. But this feeling was not his virtue. It was the natural
and the necessary result of the organization which God had
given him. He was also so constituted, that certain earthly
objects were agreeable to him, and excited his natural appetites
and desires. These appetites and desires were not sinful, nor
was the sensibility from whose bosom they were evolved : they
were the spontaneous workings of the nature which God had
bestowed upon him. But his will was free. He could turn
his mind to God, or he could turn it to earth. He did the latter,
and there was no harm in this. But he listened to the voice
of the tempter ; he fixed his mind on the forbidden fruit ; he
saw it was pleasant to the eye ; he imagined it was good for
food, and greatly to be desired to make one wise. Neither
the possession of the intellect by which he perceived the beauty
of the fruit, nor of the sensibility in which it excited so many
pleasurable emotions, was the sin of Adam. They were given
to him by the Author of every good and perfect gift. His will
was free. It was not necessitated to act by his desires. But
yet, in direct opposition to the known will of God, he put forth
an act of his own free mind, his own unnecessitated will, and
plucked the forbidden fruit to gratify his desires. This was his
sin this voluntary transgression of the known will of God. On
the other hand, if he had resisted the temptation, and instead
of voluntarily gratifying his appetite and desire, had preserved
his allegiance to God by acting in conformity with his will,
this would have been his virtue. He would have acted in con
formity with the rule of duty, and thereby gratified a feeling
of love to God, instead of the lower feelings of his nature.
Thus, by observing the distinction between the will and the
Chapter III.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 121
sensitive part of our nature, we may easily see how either holi
ness or sin might have arisen in the bosom of the first man,
though he had neither a holy nor a sinful principle planted in
his nature by the hand of the Creator. We may easily see
that he had all the powers requisite to moral agency, and that
he was really capable of either a holy or a sinful act, without
any antecedent principle of holiness or sin in his nature.
We have now said enough, we think, to show the fallacy of
Edwards a first great argument in favour of a necessary holiness.
We have seen, that we need not suppose the existence of a
virtuous principle in the first man, in order to account for his
first virtuous act, or to render virtue possible. We might point
out many other errors and inconsistencies in which that argu
ment is involved ; but to avoid, as far as possible, becoming
prolix and tiresome, we shall proceed to consider his second
argument in favour of a necessary or concreated holiness.
His second argument is this : " Human nature must have
been created with some dispositions a disposition to relish
some things as good and amiable, and to be averse to others as
odious and disagreeable; otherwise it must be without any
such thing as inclination or will ; perfectly indifferent, without
preference, without choice, or aversion, towards anything as
agreeable or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated dis
positions at all, they must be either right or wrong, either
agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things. If man had
at first the highest relish of things excellent and beautiful, a
disposition to have the quickest and highest delight in those
tilings which were most worthy of it, then his dispositions were
morally right and amiable, and never can be excellent in a
higher sense. But if he had a disposition to love most those
things that were inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions
were vicious. And it is evident there can be no medium
between these."
It is thus that Edwards seeks and finds virtue in the emotion,
and not in the voluntary element of man s nature. The natural
concreated disposition of Adam, he supposes, was morally right
in the highest sense of the word, because he was so made as to
relish and delight in the glorious perfections of the divine
nature. Our first answer to this is, that it is contradicted by
the reason and moral judgment of mankind in general, and, in
122 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
particular, by the reason and moral judgment of Edwards
himself.
It is agreeable to the voice of human reason, that nothing
can be our virtue, in the true sense of the word, which was
planted in us by the act of creation, and in regard to the pro
duction of which we possessed no knowledge, exercised no
agency, and gave no consent. And if we listen to the language
of Edwards, when the peculiarities of his system are out of the
question, we shall find that this moral judgment was as agree
able to him as it is to the rest of mankind. For example:
human nature is created with a disposition to be grateful for
favours ; and this disposition, according to Edwards, must either
be agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things, that is, it
must be either morally right or wrong in the highest sense of
the word. There can be no medium between these two it
must partake of the nature of virtue or of vice. Now, which
of the terms of this alternative does Edwards adopt ? Does he
pronounce this natural disposition our virtue or our vice ? We
do not know what Edwards would have said, if this question had
been propounded to him in connexion with the argument now
under consideration ; but we do know what he has said of it in
other portions of his works. This natural concreated disposi
tion is, says he, neither our virtue nor our vice ! " That in
gratitude, or the want of natural affection," says he, " shows a
high degree of depravity, does not prove that all gratitude and
natural affection possesses the nature of true virtue or saving
grace."* " We see, in innumerable instances, that mere nature
is sufficient to excite gratitude in men, or to affect their hearts
with thankfulness to others for favours received."f " Gratitude
being thus a natural principle, ingratitude is so much the more
vile and heinous ; because it shows a dreadful prevalence of
wickedness, which even overbears and suppresses the better
principles of human nature. It is mentioned as a high degree
of wickedness in many of the heathen, that they were without
natural affection. Eom. ii, 31. But that the want of gratitude,
or natural affection, is evidence of a great degree of vice, is
no argument that all gratitude and natural affection has the
nature of virtue or saving grace."
Here, as well as in various other places, Edwards speaks of
Rsligious Affections, part iii, sec. ii. t H>i(L
Chapter ELI WITH THE HOLINESS OP GOD. 123
gratitude and other natural affections as the better principles
of our nature ; to be destitute of which he considers a horrible
deformity. But, however amiable and lovely, he denies to these
natural affections, or dispositions, the character of virtue ; be
cause they are merely natural or concreated dispositions. They
are innocent ; that is, they are neither our virtue nor our vice,
but a medium between moral good and evil. Nothing can be
more reasonable than this, and nothing more inconsistent with
the logic of the author. Such is the testimony of Edwards him
self, when he escapes from the shadows of a dark system, and
the trammels of a false logic, and permits his own individual
mind, in the clear open light of nature, to work in full unison
with the universal mind of man.
According to the author s own definition of " true virtue," it
" is the beauty of those qualities and acts of the mind that are
of a moral nature, i. e., such as are attended with desert of
praise or Harriet Surely, Adam could have deserved no praise
for the qualities bestowed on him by the act of creation ; and
hence, according to the author s own definition, they could not
have been his virtue. In regard to the " new creation " of the
soul, Edwards contends that all the praise is due to God, and no
part of it to man ; because the whole work is performed by
divine grace, without human cooperation. Now, we admit that
if the whole work of regeneration is performed by God, then
man is not to be praised for it ; that is to say, it is not his virtue.
Here again the author sets forth the true principle ; but how
does it agree with his logic in relation to the first man ? "Was
not his creation wholly and exclusively the work of God ? If so,
then all the praise is due to God, and no part of it to man. But,
according to the author s own definition, when there is no praise-
worthiness there is no virtue ; and hence, as Adam deserved no
praise on account of what he received at his creation, so such
endowments partook not of the nature of true virtue.
But we have a still more fundamental objection to the argu
ment in question. It proceeds on the supposition that true vir
tue consists in mere feeling. This view of the nature of virtue
is admirably adapted to make it agree and harmonize with the
scheme of necessity; but it is not a sound view. If an object
is calculated to excite a certain feeling or emotion in the mind,
that feeling or emotion will necessarily arise in view of such
124 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT |Part I,
object. If the glorious perfections of the divine nature, for ex
ample, had been presented to the mind of Adam, no doubt he
would have been necessarily compelled to " love, relish, and
delight in them." But this feeling of love and delight, thus
necessarily evolved out of the bosom of his natural disposition,
however exquisite and enrapturing, would not have been his
virtue or holiness. It would have been the spontaneous and
irresistible development of the nature which God had given him
We may admire it as the most beautiful unfolding of that na
ture, but we cannot applaud it as the virtue or moral goodness
of Adam. We look upon it merely as the excellency and glory
of the divine work of creation. We could regard the glory of
the heavens, or the beauty of the earth, with a sentiment of
moral approbation, as easily as we could ascribe the character
of moral goodness to the noble qualities with which the Al
mighty had been pleased to adorn the nature of the first man.
The beautiful feeling or emotion of love is merely the blossom
which precedes the formation of true virtue in the heart. This
consists, not in holy feelings, as they are called, but in holy
exercises of the will. It is only when the will, in its workings,
coalesces with a sense of right and a feeling of love to God,
that the blossom gives place to the fruit of virtue. A virtuous
act is not a spontaneous and irresistible emotion of the sensi
bility ; it is a voluntary exercise and going forth of the will in
obedience to God.
It is a strange error which makes virtue consist in "the
spontaneous affections, emotions, and desires that arise in the
mind in view of its appropriate objects." If these necessarily
arise in us, " and do not wait for the bidding of the will,"* how
can they possibly be our virtue? how can they form the objects
of moral approbation in us? Yet is it confidently asserted,
that the denial of such a doctrine " stands in direct and palpa
ble opposition to the authority of God s word."f The word of
God, we admit, says that holiness consists in love ; but does it
assert that it consists in the feeling of love merely ? or in any
feeling which spontaneously and irresistibly arises in the mind ?
If the Scripture had been written expressly to refute such a
moral heresy, it could not have been more pointed or explicit.
Holiness consists in love. But what is the meaning of the
9 Dr. Woods.
Chapter III.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 125
term love, as set forth in Scripture ? We answer, " This is the
love of God," that we " keep his commandments." " Let us
not love in word, neither in tongue, but in deed and in truth."
" Whosoever heareth these sayings of mine and doeth them, I
will liken him unto a wise man who built his house upon a rock."
" Ho that hath my commandments, and Tceepeth them, he it is
that loveth me." Here, as well as in innumerable other places,
are we told that true love is not a mere evanescent feeling of
the heart, but an inwrought and abiding habit of the will. It
is not & suffering* it is a doing. The most lively emotions, the
most ecstatic feelings, if they lead not the will to action, can
avail us nothing; for the tree will be judged, not by its
blossoms, but by its fruits.
If we see our brother in distress, we cannot but sympathize
with him, unless our hearts have been hardened by crime.
The feeling of compassion will spontaneously arise in our
minds, in view of his distress ; but let us not too hastily imag
ine therefore that we are virtuous, or even humane. We may
possess a tender feeling of compassion, and yet the feeling may
have no corresponding act. The opening fountain of compas
sion may be shut up, or turned aside from its natural course, by
a wrong habit of the will; and hence, with all our weeping
tenderness of feeling, we may be destitute of any true humanity.
We may be merely as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal.
" Whoso hath this world s goods, and seeth his brother have
need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how
dwelleth the love of God in him ?" It is this loving in work,
and not in feeling merely, which the word of God requires of
us ; and when, at the last day, all nations, and kindreds, and
tongues, shall stand before the throne of heaven, we- shall be
judged, not according to the feelings we have experienced, but
according to the deeds done in the body. Hence, the doctrine
which makes true virtue or moral goodness consist in the
spontaneous and irresistible feelings of the heart, " stands in
direct and palpable opposition to the authority of God s word."
Feeling is one thing ; obedience is another. This counter
feit virtue or moral goodness, which begins and terminates in
feeling, is far more common than true virtue or holiness. Who
can reflect, for instance, on the infinite goodness of God, with
out an emotion or feeling of love ? That man must indeed be
126 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
uncommonly hard-hearted and sullen, who can walk out on a
fine day and behold the wonderful exhibitions of divine good
ness on all sides around him, without being warmed into a feel
ing of admiration and love. When all nature is music to the
ear and beauty to the eye, it requires nothing more than a
freedom from the darker stains and clouds of guilt within, to
lead a sympathizing heart to the sunshine of external nature, as
it seems to rejoice in the smile of Infinite Beneficence. The
heart may swell with rapture as it looks abroad on a happy
universe, replenished with so many evidences of the divine
goodness ; nay, the story of a Saviour s love, set forth in elo
quent and touching language, may draw tears from our eyes,
and the soul may rise in gratitude to the Author of such bound
less compassion ; and yet, after all, we may be mere sentiment
alists in religion, whose wills and whose lives are in direct oppo
sition to all laws, both human and divine. Infidelity itself, in
such moments of deep but transitory feeling, may exclaim with
an emotion known but to few Christian minds, "Socrates died
like a philosopher, but Jesus Christ like a God," and its iron
nature still retain " the unconquerable will."
We may now safely conclude, we think, that the mists raised
by the philosophy and logic of Edwards have not been able to
obscure the lustre of the simple truth, that true virtue or holi
ness cannot be produced in us by external necessitating causes.
Whatsoever is thus produced in us, we say, cannot be our
virtue, nor can we deserve any praise for its existence. This
seems to be a clear dictate of the reason of man ; and it would
so seem, we have no doubt, to all men, but for certain devices
which to some have obscured the light of nature. The princi
pal of these devices we shall now proceed to examine.
SECTION III.
Of the proposition that " The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions
of the heart and acts of the will, lies not in their cause, lut in their
nature."*
For the sake of greater distinctness, we shall confine our
attention to a single branch of this complex proposition ; namely,
that the essence of virtuous acts of the will lies not in their
Inquiry of President Edwards, part iv, sec. 1.
Chapter III.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 127
cause, but their nature. Our reasoning in relation to this point,
may be easily applied to the other branches of the propo
sition.
We admit, then, that the essence of a virtuous act lies in its
nature. If this means that the nature of a virtuous act lies in
its nature, or its essence lies in its essence, it is certainly true ;
a ad even if the author attached different ideas to the terms
essence and nature, we do not care to search out his meaning ;
as we may very safely admit his proposition, whatever may be
its signification. We are told by the editor, that the whole
proposition is very important on account of " the negative part,"
namely, that " the essence of virtue and vice lies not in their
cause" We are also willing to admit, that the essence of every
thing lies in its own nature, and not in its cause. But why is
this proposition brought forward ? What purpose is it designed
to serve in the philosophy of the author ?
This question is easily answered. He contends that true vir
tue may be, and is, necessitated to exist by powers and causes
over which we have no control. If we raise our eyes to such
a source of virtue, its intrinsic lustre and beauty seem to fade
from our view. The author, indeed, endeavours to explain why
\t is, that the scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with
the nature of true virtue. The main reason is, says he, because
we imagine that the essence of virtue and vice consists, not in
their nature, but in their origin and cause. Hence this per
suasion not to busy ourselves about the origin or cause of vir
tue and vice, but to estimate them according to their nature.
We are fully persuaded. If any can be found who will
assert " that the virtuousness of the dispositions or acts of the
will, consists not in the nature of these dispositions or acts of
the will, but wholly in the origin or cause of them," we must
deliver them up to the tender mercies of President Edwards.
Or if any shall talk so absurdly as to say, " that if the dispo
sitions of the mind, or acts of the will, be never so good, yet if
the cause of the disposition or act be not our virtue, there is
nothing virtuous or praiseworthy in it," we have not one word
to say in his defence ; nor shall we ever raise our voice in favour
of any one, who shall maintain, that " if the will, in its inclina
tions or acts, be never so bad, yet, unless it arises from something
that is our vice or fault, there is nothing vicious or blame-
128 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
worthy in it." For we are firmly persuaded, that if the acts
of the will be good, then they are good ; and if they be bad,
then they are bad ; whatever may have been their origin or
cause. We shall have no dispute about such truisms as these.
We insist, indeed, that the first virtuous act of the first man
was so, because it partook of the nature of virtue, and not
because it had a virtuous origin or cause in a preceding vir
tuous disposition of the mind. But, in his work on Original
Sin, Edwards contends otherwise. He there contends, that no
act of Adam could have been virtuous, unless it had proceeded
from a virtuous origin or cause in the disposition of his heart ;
and that this could have had no existence in the world, unless
it had proceeded from the power of the Creator. Thus he
looked beyond the nature of the act itself, even to its origin
and cause, in order to show upon what its moral nature de
pended ; but now he insists that we should simply look at its
own nature, and not to its origin or cause, in order to determine
this point. He ascends from acts of the will to their origin or
cause, in order to show that virtue can only consist with the
scheme of necessity ; and yet he denies to us the privilege of
ascending with him, in order to show that the nature of virtue
cannot at all consist with the scheme of necessity !
We admit that the virtuousness of every virtuous act lies, not
in its origin or cause, but in itself. But still we insist that a
virtuous act, as well as everything else, may be traced to a false
origin or cause that is utterly inconsistent with its very nature.
A horse is undoubtedly a horse, come from whence it may ; but
yet if any one should tell us that horses grow up out of the earth,
or drop down out of the clouds, we should certainly understand
him to speak of mere phantoms, and no real horses, or we should
think him very greatly mistaken. In like manner, when we are
told that virtue may be, and is, necessitated to exist in LS by
causes over which we have no control ; that we may be to praise
for any gift bestowed upon us by the divine power ; we are con
strained to believe that he has given a false genealogy of moral
goodness, and one that is utterly inconsistent with its nature.
Nor can we be made to blink this truth, which so perfectly ac
cords, as we have seen, with the universal sentiment of mankind,
by being reminded that moral goodness consists, not in its origin
or cause, but in its own nature. Virtue is always virtue, we
Chapter HI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 129
freely admit, proceed from what quarter of the universe it may ;
yet do we insist that it can no more be produced in us by an
extraneous agency than it can grow up out of the earth, or drop
down out of the clouds of heaven. That which is produced in
us by such an agency, be it what it may, is not our virtue, nor
is any praise therefor due to us. To mistake such effects or
passive impressions for virtue, is to mistake phantoms for things,
shadows for substances, and dreams for realities.
SECTION IV.
The scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with the reality of moral dis
tinctions, not because we confound natural and moral necessity, but because
it is really inconsistent therewith.
Let us then look at this matter, and see if we are really so
deplorably blinded by the ambiguity of a word, that we cannot
contemplate the glory of the scheme of moral necessity as it is
in itself. The distinction between these two things, natural and
moral necessity, is certainly a clear and a broad one. Let us see,
then, if we may not find our way along the line of this distinc
tion, without that darkness and confusion by which our judg
ment is supposed to be so sadly misled and perverted.
It is on all sides conceded, that natural necessity is inconsist
ent with the good or ill desert of human actions. If a man were
commanded, for example, to leap over a mountain, or to lift the
earth from its centre, he would be justly excusable for the non-
performance of such things, because they lie beyond the range
of his natural power. " There is here a limit to our power," as
Dr. Chalmers says, " beyond which we cannot do that which we
please to do ; and there are many thousand such limits."* This
is natural necessity, in one of its branches. It circumscribes and
binds our natural power. It limits the external sphere beyond
which the effects or consequences of our volitions cannot be
projected. It reaches not to the interior sphere of the will
itself, and has no more to do with its freedom than has the in
fluence of the stars. We may please to do a thing, nay, we
may freely will it, and yet a natural necessity may cut off and
prevent the external consequence of the act.
Again, if by a superior force, a man s limbs or external.
* Institutes of Theology, part iii, chap. i..
9
130 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT IJPart i,
bodily organs should be used as instruments of good or evil,
without his concurrence or consent, he would be excusable for
the consequences of such use. This is the other branch of natu
ral necessity. It is evident that it has no relation to the freedom
or to the acts of the will, but only to the external movements
of the body. It interferes merely with that external freedom
of bodily motion, about which we heard so much in the first
chapter of this work, and which the advocates of necessity have,
for the most part, so industriously laboured to pass off upon the
world for the liberty of the will itself. As this natural neces
sity, then, trenches not upon the. interior sphere of the will, so
it merely excuses for the performance or non-performance of
external actions. It leaves the great question with respect to
man s accountability for the acts of the will itself, from which
his external actions proceed, wholly untouched and undeter
mined.
Far different is the case with respect to moral necessity.
This acts directly upon the will itself, and absolutely controls
all its movements. Within its own sphere it is conceded to be
" as absolute as natural necessity,"* and " as sure as fatalism."-)-
It absolutely and unconditionally determines the will at all
times, and in all cases. Yet we are told that we are accounta
ble for all the acts thus produced in us, because they are the
acts of our own wills ! Nothing is done against our wills, as in
the case of natural necessity ; (they should rather say, against
the external effects of our wills ;) but our wills always follow,
and we are accountable therefor, though they cannot but fol
low. Moral necessity is not irresistible, because this implies re
sistance, and our wills never resist that which makes us willing.
It is only invincible ; and invincible it is indeed, since with the
mighty, sovereign power of the Almighty it controls all the
thoughts, and feelings, and volitions of the human mind. Now
we see this scheme as it is in itself, in all its nakedness, just as
it is presented to us by its own most able and enlightened de
fenders. And seeing it thus removed from all contact with the
scheme of natural necessity, we ask, whether agents can be
justly held^accountable for acts thus determined and controlled
by the power of God," or by thosQ, invincible causes which his
omnipotence marshalleth ?
President Edwards. f ** Chalmers.
Chapter III.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 131
We speak not of external acts ; and hence we lay aside the
whole scheme of natural necessity. We speak of the acts of
the will ; and we ask, if these be not free from the dominion
of moral necessity, from necessitating causes over which we
have no control, can we be accountable for them? Can we be
to praise or to blame for them ? Can they be our virtue or our
vice ? These questions, we think, we may safely submit to the
impartial decision of every unbiassed mind. And to such minds
we shall leave it to determine, whether the scheme of moral
necessity has owed its hold upon the reason of man to a dark
confusion of words and things, or whether its glory has been
obscured by the misconception of its opponents?.
In conclusion, we shall simply lay down, in a few brief propo
sitions, what we trust has now been seen in relation to the
nature of virtue and vice : 1. No necessitated act of the mind
can be its virtue or its vice. 2. In order that any act of the
will should partake of a moral nature, it must be free from the
dominion of causes over which it has no control, or from whose
influence it cannot depart. 3. Yirtue and vice lie not in the
passive state of the sensibility, nor in any other necessitated
states of the mind, but in acts of the will, and in habits formed
by a repetition of such free voluntary acts. Whatever else may
be said in relation to the nature of virtue and of vice, and to
the distinction between them, these things appear to be clearly
true ; and if so, then the scheme of moral necessity is utterly
inconsistent with their existence, and saps the very foundation
>f all moral distinctions.
132 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT fPart I.
CHAPTEK IY.
THE MORAL WORLD NOT CONSTITUTED ACCORDING TO THE SCHEME OP
NECESSITY.
I made him just and right ;
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.
Such I created all the ethereal powers
And spirits, both them who stood and them who fail d ;
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell. MILTON.
WE have already witnessed the strange inconsistencies into
which the most learned and ingenious men have fallen, in their
attempts to reconcile the doctrine of necessity with the account
ability of man, and the glory of God. Having involved them
selves in that scheme, on what has appeared to them conclusive
evidence, they have seemed to struggle in vain to force their
way out into the clear and open light of nature. They have
seemed to torment themselves, and to confound others, in their
gigantic efforts to extricate themselves from a dark labyrinth,
out of which there is absolutely no escape. Let us see, then,
if we may not refute the pretended demonstration in favour of
necessity, and thereby restore the mind to that internal satis
faction which it so earnestly desires, and which it so constantly
seeks in a perfect unity and harmony of principle.
SECTION I.
The scheme of necessity is based on a false psychology.
There are three great leading faculties or attributes of the
human mind ; namely, the intelligence, the sensibility, and the
will. By means of these we think, we feel, and we act. Now,
the phenomena of thinking, feeling, and acting, will be found,
on examination, to possess different characteristics ; of which wo
must form clear and fixed conceptions, if we would extricate
the philosophy of the will from the obscurity and confusion in
which it has been so long involved. Let us proceed then to
examine them, to interrogate our consciousness in relation to
them.
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 133
Suppose, for example, that an apple is placed before me. I
fix my attention upon it, and consider its form : it is round.
This judgment, or decision of the mind, in relation to the form
of the apple, is a state of the intelligence. It does not depend
on any effort of mine, whether it shall appear round to me or
not: I could not possibly come to any other conclusion if I
would : I could as soon think it as large as the globe as believe
it to be square, or of any other form than round. Hence this
judgment, this decision, this state of the intelligence, is neces
sitated. The same thing is true of all the other perceptions or
states of the intelligence. M. Cousin has truly said : " Undoubt
edly different intellects, or the same intellect at different periods
of its existence, may sometimes pass different judgments in
regard to the same thing. Sometimes it may be deceived ; it
will judge that which is false to be true, the good to be bad,
the beautiful to be ugly, and the reverse : but at the moment
when it judges that a proposition is true or false, an action
good or bad, a form beautiful or ugly, at that moment it is not
in the power of the intellect to pass any other judgment than
that it passes. It obeys laws it did not make. It yields to
motives which determine it independent of the will. In a word,
the phenomenon of intelligence, comprehending, judging, know
ing, thinking, whatever name be given to it, is marked with the
characteristic of necessity."*
Once more I fix my attention on the apple : an agreeable
sensation arises in the mind; a desire to eat it is awakened.
This desire or appetite is a state of the sensibility. Whether I
shall feel this appetite or desire, does not depend upon any
effort or exertion of my will. The mind is clearly passive in
relation to it ; the desire, then, is as strongly marked with the
characteristic of necessity, as are the states of the intelligence.
The same is true of all our feelings ; they are necessarily deter
mined by the objects in view of the mind. There is no con
troversy on these points ; it is universally agreed that every
state of the intelligence and of the sensibility is necessarily
determined by the evidence and the object in view of the mind.
It is not, then, either in the intelligence or in the sensibility
that we are to look for liberty.
But once more I fix iny attention on the apple : the desire is
Psychology, p. 247.
134 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
awakened, and I conclude to eat it. Hitherto I have done
nothing except in fixing iny attention on the apple. I have
experienced the judgment that it is round, and felt the desire
to eat it. But now 1 conclude to eat it, and I make an effort
of the mind to put forth my hand to take the apple and eat it.
It is done. Now here is an entirely new phenomenon ; it is an
effort, an exertion, an act, a volition of the mind. The name is of
no importance ; the circumstances under which the phenomenon
arises have called attention to it, and the precise thing intended
is seen in the light of consciousness. Let us look at it closely,
and mark its characteristic well, being careful to see neither
more nor less than is presented by the phenomenon itself.
We are conscious, then, of the existence of an act, of a voli
tion: everybody can see what this is. We must not say, as
the advocates of free-agency usually do, that when we put forth
this act or volition we are conscious of a power to do the con
trary ; for this position may be refuted, and the foundation on
which we intend to raise our superstructure undermined. We
are merely conscious of the existence of the act itself, and not
even of the power by means of which we act ; the existence of
the power is necessarily inferred from its exercise. This is the
only way in which we know it, and not from the direct testi
mony of consciousness. Much less if we had refused to act,
should we have been conscious of the power to withhold it;
much less again are we conscious of the power to withhold the
act, as we do not in the case supposed exercise this power. But
certainly we are conscious of the act itself ; all men will con
cede this, and this is all our argument really demands.
Here then we are conscious of an act, of an effort, of the
mind. Look at it closely. Is the mind passive in this act?
No ; we venture to answer for the universal intelligence of man.
If this act had been produced in us by a necessitating cause,
would not the mind have been passive in it ? In other words,
would it not have been a passive impression, and not an act,
not an effort of the mind at all ? Yes ; we again venture to
answer for the unbiassed reason of man. But it is not, we have
seen, a passive impression ; it is an act of the mind, and hence
it is not necessitated. It is not necessitated, because it is not
stamped with the characteristic of necessity. The universal
reason of man declares that the will has not necessarily yielded
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 135
like the intelligence and the sensibility, to motives over which
it had no control. It does not bear upon its face the mark of
any such subjection " to the power and action" of a cause. It
is marked with the characteristic, not of necessity, but of liberty.
We would not say, with Dr. Samuel Clarke, that " action and
liberty are identical ideas ;" but we will say, that the idea of
action necessarily implies that of liberty ; for if we duly reflect
on the nature of an act we cannot conceive it as being necessi
tated. This consideration furnishes an easy and satisfactory
solution of a problem, by which necessitarians are sadly per
plexed. They endeavour in various ways to account for the
fact that we believe our volitions to be free, or not necessarily
caused. Some resolve this belief and feeling of liberty into a
deceitful sense ; some imagine that we are deceived by the
ambiguities of language ; and some resort to other methods of
explaining the phenomenon. "It is true," says President
Edwards, " I find myself possessed of my volitions before I can
see the effectual power of any cause to produce them, for the
power and efficacy of the cause is not seen but by the effect ;
and this, for aught I know, may make some imagine that
volition has no cause, or that it produces itself." But this is
not a satisfactory account of the imagination, as he would term
it. We also find ourselves possessed of our judgments and
feelings before we perceive the effectual power of the cause
which produces them. Why then do we refer these to the
operation of a necessary cause, and not our volitions ? If the
power and efficacy of the cause is seen only by the effect in the
one case, it is only seen in the- same manner in the other. Why
then do we differ in our conclusions with respect to them?
Why do we refer the judgment and the feeling to necessary
causes, and fail to do the same in relation to the volition ? The
reason is obvious. The mind is passive in judging and feeling,
and hence these phenomena necessarily demand the operation
of causes to account for them ; but the mind is active in its voli
tions, and this necessarily excludes the idea of causes to pro
duce them. The mind clearly perceives, by due reflection, and
at all times sees dimly, at least, that an act or volition is different
in its nature from a passive impression or a produced effect ;
and hence it knows and feels that it is exempt from the power
and efficacy of a producing cause in its volitions. This fact of
136 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part 1,
our consciousness it is not in the power of sophistry wholly to
conceal, nor in the power of human nature to evade. Hence
we carry about with us the irresistible conviction that we aie
free; that our wills are not absolutely subject to the dominion
of causes over which we have no control. Hence we see and
know that we are self-active.
Having completed our analysis, in as far as our present pur
pose demands, we may proceed to show that the system of
necessity is founded on a false psychology, on a dark confusion
of the facts of human nature. It is very remarkable that all the
advocates of this system, from Hobbes down to Edwards, will
allow the human mind to possess only two faculties, the under
standing and the will. The will and the sensibility are expressly
identified by them. Locke distinguished between will and de
sire, between the faculty of willing and the susceptibility to feel
ing ; but Edwards has endeavoured to show that there is no such
distinction as that for which Locke contends. We shall not
arrest the progress of our remarks in order to point out the
manner in which Edwards has deceived himself by an appeal
to logic rather than to consciousness, because the threefold dis
tinction for which we contend is now admitted by necessitarians
themselves. Indeed, after the clear and beautiful analysis by
M. Cousin, they could not well do otherwise than recognise this
threefold distinction ; but they have done so, we think it will be
found, without perceiving all the consequences of such an ad
mission to their system. It is an admission which, in our
opinion, will show the scheme of necessity to be insecure in its
foundation, and disjointed in all its parts.
With the light of this distinction in our minds, it will be easy
to follow and expose the sophistries of the necessitarian. He
often declaims against the idea of liberty for which we contend,
on the ground that it would be, not a perfection, but a very
great imperfection of our nature to possess such a freedom.
But in every such instance he confounds the will with one of
the passive susceptibilities of the mind. Thus, for example,
Collins argues that liberty would be a great imperfection, be
cause "nothing can be more irrational and absurd than to be
able to refuse our assent to what is evidently true to us, and to
assent to what we see to be false." Now, all this is true, but it
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 137
is not to the purpose ; for no one contends that the intelligence
is free in assenting to, or in dissenting from, the evidence in
view of the mind. No rational being, we admit, could desire
such a freedom ; could desire to be free, for example, from the
conviction that two and two make four. M. Lamartine, we are
aware, expresses a very lively abhorrence of the mathematics,
because they allow not a sufficient freedom of thought because
they exercise so great a despotism over the intellect. But the
circumstance which this flowery poet deems an imperfection in
the mathematics, every enlightened friend of free-agency will
regard as their chief excellency and glory.
The same error is committed by Spinoza : " We can consider
the soul under two points of view," says he, " as thought and as
desire." Here the will is made to disappear, and we behold
only the two susceptibilities of the soul, which are stamped with
the characteristic of necessity. Where, then, will Spinoza find
the freedom of the soul ? Certainly not in the will, for this has
been blotted out from the map of his psychology. Accordingly
he says : " The free will is a chimera of the species, flattered by
our pride, and founded upon our ignorance." He must find the
freedom of the soul then, if he find it at all, in one of its passive
susceptibilities. This, as we have already seen, is exactly what
he does ; he says the soul is free in the affirmation that two and
two are four ! Thus he finds the liberty of the soul, not in the
exercises of its will, of its active power, but in the bosom of the
intelligence, which is absolutely necessitated in all its deter
minations.
In this particular, as well as in most others, Spinoza merely
reproduces the error of the ancient Stoics. It was a principle
with them, says Hitter, " that the will and the desire are one
with thought, and may be resolved into it."* Thus, by the an
cient Stoics, as well as by Hobbes, and Spinoza, and Collins,
and Edwards, the will is merged in one of the passive elements
of the mind, and its real characteristic lost sight of. " By the
freedom of the soul," says Hitter, " the Stoics understood simply
that assent which it gives to certain ideas."f Thus the ancient
Stoics endeavoured to find the freedom of the soul, where Spi
noza and so many modern necessitarians have sought to find it,
in the passive, necessitated states of the intelligence. This was
History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. iii, p. 555. f JkicL
138 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
indeed to impose upon themselves a mere shadow for a sub
stance, a dream for a reality.
" By whatever name we call the act of the will," says Fd-
wards, " choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking,
disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, com
manding, forbidding, inclining or being averse, being pleased or
displeased with all may be reduced to this of choosing,"*
Thus, in the vocabulary and according to the psychology of
this great author, the phenomena of the sensibility and those of
the will are identified, as well as the faculties themselves.
Pleasing and willing, liking and acting, are all one with him.
His psychology admits of no distinction, for example, between
the pleasant impression made by an apple on the sensibility,
and the act of the will by which the hand is put forth to take
it. " The will and the affections of the soul," says he, " are not
two faculties ; the affections are not essentially distinct from the
will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and
inclination, but only in the liveliness and sensibility of exer-
cise."f And again, " I humbly conceive that the affections of
the soul are not properly distinguished from the will, as though
there were two faculties."^ And still more explicitly, " all acts
of the will are truly acts of the affections. " Is it not strange,
that one who could exhibit such wonderful discrimination when
the exigences of his system demanded the exercise of such a
power, should have confounded things so clearly distinct in
their natures as an act of the will and an agreeable impression
made on the sensibility?
It is not possible for any mind, no matter how great its
powers, to see the nature of things clearly when it comes to the
contemplation of them with such a confusion of ideas. Even
President Edwards is not exempt from the common lot of hu
manity. His doctrine is necessarily enveloped in obscurity.
We can turn it in no light without being struck with its incon
sistencies or its futility. He repeatedly says, the will is always
determined by the strongest affection, or appetite, or passion ;
that is, by the most agreeable state of the sensibility. But
if the will and the sensibility are identical, as his language
expressly makes them ; or if the states of the one are not dis-
President Edwards s Works, vol. ii, p. 16. f Id -. l. v, pp. 10, 11.
t Id., vol. iv, p. 82. Ibid.
Chapter IV. ] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 139
tinguishable from the states of the other, then to say that the
will is always determined by the sensibility, or an act of the
will by the strongest affection of the sensibility, is to say that
a thing is determined by itself. It is to say, in fact, that the
.will is always determined by itself; a doctrine against which
he uniformly protests. Nay, more, that an act of the will causes
itself ; a position which he has repeatedly ascribed to his oppo
nents, and held up to the derision of mankind.
It is very remarkable, that Edwards seems to have been con
scious, at times, that he laid himself open to the charge of such
an absurdity, when he said that the will is determined by the
greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable to the
mind. For he says, " I have chosen rather to express myself
thus, that the will always is as the greatest apparent good, or
as what appears most agreeable, than to say the will is deter
mined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most
agreeable ; because an appearing most agreeable to the mind,
and the mind s preferring^ seem scarcely distinct" We have
taken the liberty to emphasize his words. Now here he tells
us that the " mind s preferring," by which word he has
explained himself to mean willing,* is scarcely distinct from
" an appearing most agreeable to the mind." Here he returns
to his psychology, and identifies the most agreeable impression
made on the sensibility with an act of the will. He does not
like to say, that the act of the will is caused by the most agree
able sensation, because this seems to make a thing the cause
of itself.
In this he does wisely; but having shaped his doctrine to
suit himself more exactly, in what form is it presented to us ?
Let us look at it in its new shape, and see what it is. The will
is not determined by the greatest apparent good, because a
thing is not determined by itself; but the will is always as the
greatest apparent good ! Thus the absurdity of saying a thing
is determined by itself is avoided ; but surely, if an appearing
most agreeable to the mind is not distinct from the mind s act
ing, then to say that the mind s acting is always as that which
appears most agreeable to it is merely to say, that the mind s
acting is always as the mind s acting ! or, in other words, that
a thing is always as itself ! Thus, his great fundamental propo-
Inquiry, p. 17.
140 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
sition is, in one form, a glaring absurdity ; and in the other, it
is an insignificant truism; and there is no escape from this
dilemma except through a return to a better psychology, to a
sounder analysis of the great facts of human nature.
When Edwards once reaches the truism that a thing is always-
as itself, he feels perfectly secure, and defies with unbounded
confidence the utmost efforts of his opponents to dislodge him.
" As we observed before," says he, " nothing is more evident
than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please,
then they do what appears most agreeable to them ; and to say
otherwise, would be as much as to affirm, that men do not
choose what appears to suit them best, or what seems most
pleasing to them ; or that they do not choose what they prefer
which brings the matter to a contradiction" True ; this brings
the matter to a contradiction, as he has repeatedly told us ; for
choosing, and preferring, or willing, are all one. But if any
one denies that a man does what he pleases when he does what
he pleases ; or if he affirms that he pleases without pleasing, or
chooses without choosing, or prefers without preferring, we
shall leave him to the logic of the necessitarian and the phy
sician. We have no idea that he will ever be able to refute
the volumes that have been written to confound him. Presi
dent Edwards clearly has the better of him ; for he puts " the
soul in a state of choice," and yet affirms that it " has no choice."
lie might as well say, indeed, that " a body may move while
it is in a state of rest," as to say that " the mind may choose
without choosing," or without having a choice. He is very
clearly involved in an absurdity ; and if he can read the three
hundred pages of the Inquiry, without being convinced of his
error, his case must indeed be truly hopeless.
Edwards is far from being the only necessitarian who has
fallen into the error of identifying the sensibility with the will ;
thus reducing his doctrine to an unassailable truism. In his
famous controversy with Clarke, Leibnitz has done the same
thing. " Thus," says he, " in truth, the motives comprehend
all the dispositions which the mind can have to act voluntarily ;
for they include not only reasons, but also the inclinations and
passions, or other preceding impressions. Wherefore if the
mind should prefer a weak inclination to a strong one, it would
act against itself, and otherwise than it is disposed to act"
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 141
Now is it not wonderful, that so profound a thinker, and so
acute a metaphysician, as Leibnitz, should have supposed that
he was engaged in a controversy to show that the mind never
acts otherwise than it acts; that it never acts against itself?
Having reduced his doctrine to this truism, he says, this " shows
that the author s notions, contrary to mine, are superficial, and
appear to have no solidity in them, when they are well con
sidered." True, the notions of Clarke were superficial, and
worse than superficial, if he supposed that the mind ever acts
contrary to its act, or otherwise than it really acts. But Clarke
distinguished between the disposition and the will.
In like manner Thummig, the disciple of Leibnitz, has the
following language, as quoted by Sir William Hamilton : " It
is to philosophize very crudely concerning mind, and to image
everything in a corporeal manner, to conceive that actuating
reasons are something external, which make an impression on
the mind, and to distinguish motives from the active principle
itself" Now this language, it seems, is found in Thummig s
defence of the last paper of Leibnitz (who died before the con
troversy was terminated) against the answer of Clarke. But,
surely, if it is a great mistake, as the author insists it is, to dis
tinguish motives from the active principle itself; then to say
that the active principle is determined by motives, is to say
that the active principle is determined by itself. And having
reached this point, the disciple of Leibnitz finds himself planted
precisely on the position he had undertaken to overthrow,
namely, that the will is determined by itself. And again, if it
be wrong to distinguish the motive from the active principle
itself, then to say that the active principle never departs from
the motive, is to affirm that a thing is always as itself.
The great service which a false psychology has rendered to
the cause of necessity is easily seen. For having identified an
act of the will with a state of the sensibility, which is univer
sally conceived to be necessitated, the necessitarian is delivered
from more than half his labours. By merging a phenomenon
or manifestation of the will in a state of the sensibility, it seems
to lose its own characteristic, which is incompatible with the
scheme of necessity, and to assume the characteristic of feeling,
which is perfectly reconcilable with it; nay, which demands
the scheme of necessity to account for its existence. Thus, the
142 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
system of necessity is based on a false psychology, on which it
has too securely stood from the earliest times down to the
present day. But the stream of knowledge, ever deepening
and widening in its course, has been gradually undermining the
foundations of this dark system.
SECTION IL
The scheme of necessity is directed against a false issue.
As we have seen in the last section, the argument of the
necessitarian is frequently directed against a false issue ; but the
point is worthy of a still more careful consideration.
We shall never cease to admire the logical dexterity with
which the champions of necessity assail and worry their adver
saries. They have said, in all ages, that "nothing taketh
beginning from itself;" but who ever imagined or dreamed of
so wild an absurdity? It is conceded by all rational beings.
Motion taketh not beginning from itself, but from action ; action
taketh not beginning from itself, but from mind ; and mind
taketh not beginning from itself, but from God. It is false,
however, to conclude that because nothing taketh beginning
from itself, it is brought to pass " by the action of some immediate
agent without itself." The motion of body, as we have seen, is
produced by the action of some immediate agent without itself;
but the action of mind is produced, or brought to pass, by no
action at all. It taketh beginning from an agent, and not from
the action of an agent. This distinction, though so clearly
founded in the nature of things, is always overlooked by the
logic of the necessitarian. They might well adopt the language
of Bacon, that the subtilty of nature far surpasseth that of our
logic.
Hobbes was content to rest on a simple statement of the fact,
that nothing can produce itself; but it is not every logician
who is willing to rely on the inherent strength of such a posi
tion. Ask a child, Did you make yourself? and the child will
answer, No. Propound the same question to the roving savage,
or to the man of mere common sense, and he will also answer,
No. Appeal to the universal reason of man, and the same
emphatic No, will come up from its profoundest depths. But
your redoubtable logicians are not satisfied to rely on such testi-
Chapter IV. I WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 143
mony alone : they dare not build on such a foundation unless it
be first secured and rendered firm by the aid of the syllogistic
process. I know "I did not make myself," says Descartes,
" for if I had made myself, I should have given myself every
perfection." Now this argument in true syllogistic form stands
thus : If I had made myself, I should have endowed myself
with every perfection ; I am not endowed with every perfec
tion ; therefore I did not make myself. Surely, after so clear
a process of reasoning, no one can possibly doubt the proposi
tion that Descartes did not make himself! In the same way
we might prove that he did not make his own logic : for if he
had made his logic, he would have endowed it with every pos
sible perfection ; but it is not endowed with every possible per
fection, and therefore he did not make it.
But President Edwards has excelled Descartes, and every
other adept in the syllogistic art, except Aristotle in his physics,
in his ability to render the light of perfect day clearer by a few
masterly strokes of logic. He has furnished the reason why
some persons imagine that volition has no cause of its existence,
or " that it produces itself." Now, by the way, would it not
have been as well if he had first made sure of the fact, before
he undertook to explain it ? But to proceed : let us see how he
has proved that volition does not produce itself, that it does not
arise out of nothing and bring itself into existence.
He does this in true logical form, and according to the most
approved methods of demonstration. He first establishes the
general position, that no existence or event whatever can give
rise to its own being,* and he then shows that this is true of
volition in particular, f And having reached the position, that
volition does not arise out of nothing, but must " have some
antecedent" to introduce it into being; he next proceeds to
prove that there is a necessary connexion between volition and
the antecedents on which it depends for existence. This com
pletes the chain of logic, and the process is held up by his fol
lowers to the admiration of the world as a perfect demonstra
tion, Let us look at it a little more closely, and examine the
nature and mechanism of its p r *rts.
If the huge frame of the earth, with all its teeming popula
tion and productions, could rise up out of nothing, he argues,
Inquiry, part i, sec. iii. f Id., part i, sec. iv.
144 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
and bring itself into being without any cause of its existence,
then we could not prove the being of a God. All this is very
true. For, as he truly alleges, if one world could thus make
itself, so also might another and another, even unto millions
of millions. The universe might make itself, or come into
existence without any cause thereof, and hence we could never
know that there is a God. But surely, if any man imagined
that even one world could create itself, it is scarcely worth
while to reason with him. It is not at all likely that he
would be frightened from his position by such a reductio ad
dbsurdum. "We should almost as soon suspect a sane man of
denying the existence of God himself, as of doubting the pro
position that " nothing taketh beginning from itself."
Having settled it to his entire satisfaction, by this and other
arguments, that no effect whatever can produce itself, he then
proceeds to show that this proposition is true of volitions as well
as of all other events or occurrences. " If any should imagine,"
says he, " there is something in the sort of event that renders
it possible to come into existence without a cause, and should
say that the free acts of the will are existences of an exceeding
different nature from other things, by reason of which they
may come into existence without previous ground or reason of
it, though other things cannot; if they make this objection in
good earnest, it would be an evidence of their strangely forget
ting themselves ; for it would be giving some account of the
existence of a thing, when, at the same time, they would main
tain there is no ground of its existence."* True, if any man
should suppose that a volition rises up in the world " without
any ground or reason of its existence," and afterward endeavour
to assign a ground or reason of it, he would certainly be
strangely inconsistent with himself; but we should deem his
last position, that there must be a ground or reason of its exist
ence, to be some evidence of his coming to himself, rather than
of his having forgotten himself. But to proceed with the argu
ment. " Therefore I would observe," says he, " that the par
ticular nature of existence, be it never so diverse from others,
can lay no foundation for that tLing coming into existence with
out a cause ; because, to suppose this, would be to suppose the
particular nature of existence to be a thing prior to existence,
Inquiry, pp. 54, 55.
Chapter IV. 1 WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 145
without a cause or reason of existence. But that which in any
respect makes way for a thing coming into being, or for any
manner or circumstance of its first existence, must be prior to
existence. The distinguished nature of the effect, which is
something belonging to the effect, cannot have influence back
ward to act before it is. The peculiar nature of that thing
c.illed volition, can do nothing, can have no influence, while it
is not. And afterward it is too late for its influence : for then
the thing has made sure of its existence already without its
help."* After all this reasoning, and more to the same effect,
we are perfectly satisfied that volition, no matter what its
nature may be, cannot produce itself; and that it must have
some ground or reason of its existence, some antecedent with
out which it could not come into being.
We shall not do justice to this branch of our subject, if we
leave it without laying before the reader one or two more speci
mens of logic from the celebrated Inquiry of President Edwards.
He is opposing " the hypothesis," he tells us, "of acts of the will
coming to pass without a cause." Now, according to his defini
tion of the term cause, as laid down at the beginning of the
section under consideration, it signifies any antecedent on which
a thing depends, in whole or in part, for its existence, or which
constitutes the reason why it is, rather than not.f His doctrine
is, then, that nothing ever comes to pass without some "ground
or reason of its existence," without some antecedent which is
necessary to account for its -coming into being. And those who
deny it are bound to maintain the strange thesis, that something
may come into existence without any antecedent to account for
it ; that it may rise from nothing and bring itself into existence.
It is against this thesis that his logic is directed.
"If it were so," says he, "that things only of one kind, viz.,
acts of the will, seemed to come to pass of themselves ; and it
were an event that was continual, and that happened in a course
whenever were found subjects capable of such events; this
very thing would demonstrate there was some cause of them,
which made such a difference between this event and others.
For contingency is blind, and does not pick and choose a par
ticular sort of events. Nothing has no choice. This no-cause,
which causes no existence, cannot cause the existence which.
Inquiry, p. 55. f id., p . 50.
10
146 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart I,
comes to pass to be of one particular sort only, distinguished
from all others. Thus, that only one sort of matter drops out
of heaven, even water; and that this comes so often, so con
stantly and plentifully, all over the world, in all ages, shows
that there is some cause or reason of the falling of water out of
the heavens, and that something besides mere contingence
had a hand in the matter."* We do not intend to comment on
this passage ; we merely wish to advert to the fact, that it is a
laboured and logical effort to demolish the hypothesis that acts
of the will do not bring themselves into existence, and to show
that there must be some antecedent to account for their coming
into being. We shall only add, "it is true that nothing has no
choice ;" but who ever pretended to believe that nothing puts
forth volitions ? that there is no mind, no motive, no ground or
reason of volition ? Is it not wonderful that the great metaphy
sician of New-England should thus worry himself and exhaust
his powers in grappling with shadows and combatting dreams,
which no sane man ever seriously entertained for a moment ?
" If we should suppose non-entity to be about to bring forth,"
he continues, " and things were coming into existence without
any cause or antecedent on which the existence, or kind or
manner of existence depends, or which could at all determine
whether the things should be stones or stems, or beasts or
angels, or human bodies or souls, or only some new motion or
figure in natural bodies, or some new sensation in animals, or
new idea in the human understanding, or new volition in the
will, or anything else of all the infinite number of possibles,
then it certainly would not be expected, although many millions
of millions of things were coming into existence in this manner
all over the face of the earth, that they should all be only of one
particular kind, and that it should be thus in all ages, and that
this sort of existences should never fail to come to pass when
there is room for them, or a subject capable of them, and that
constantly whenever there is occasion."! Now all these words
are put together to prove that non-entity cannot bring forth
effects, at least such effects as we see in the world ; for if non
entity brought them forth, that is, to come to the point in dis
pute, if non-entity brought forth our volitions, they would not
be always of one particular sort of effects. But they are of one
Inquiry, p. 54. t Id -. P- 55
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 147
particular sort, and hence there must be some antecedent to
account for this uniformity in their nature, and they could not
have been brought forth by nonentity ! Surely if anything
can equal the fatuity of the hypothesis that nonentity can bring
forth, or that a thing can produce itself, it is a serious attempt
to refute it. How often, while poring over the works of neces
sitarians, are we lost in amazement at the logical mania which
seems to have seized them, and which, in its impetuous efforts
to settle and determine everything by reasoning, leaves reason
itself neither time nor opportunity to contemplate the nature of
things themselves, or listen to its own most authoritative and
irreversible mandates.
But lest we should be suspected of doing this great metaphy
sician injustice, we must point out the means by which he has
so grossly deceived himself. According to his definition of
motive, as the younger Edwards truly says, it includes every
cause and condition of volition. If anything is merely a condi
tion, without which a volition could not come to pass, though
it exerts no influence, it is called a cause of that volition, and
placed in the definition of motive. And if anything exerts a
positive influence to produce volition, this is also a cause of it,
and is included in the same definition. In short, this definition
embraces every conceivable antecedent on which volition in
any manner, either in whole or in part, either negatively or
positively, depends. Thus the most heterogeneous materials are
crowded together under one and the same term, the most dif
ferent ideas under one and the same definition. Is it possible
to conceive of a better method of obscuring a subject than such
a course ? When Edwards merely means a condition, why does
he not say so ? and when he means a producing cause, why does
he not use the right word to express his meaning ? If he had
carried on the various processes of his reasoning with some one
clear and distinct idea before his mind, we might have expected
great things from him ; but he has not chosen to do so. It is
with the term cause that he operates, against the ambiguities
of which he has not guarded himself or his reader.
"Having thus explained what I mean by cause," says he,
"I assert that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause."
"We have seen his reasoning on this point. He labours through
page after page to establish his very ambiguous proposition, in
148 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
a sense in which nobody ever denied it ; unless some one has
affirmed that a thing may come into being without any ground
or reason of its existence, may arise out of nothing and help
itself into existence. Having sufficiently established his funda
mental proposition in this sense, he proceeds to show that every
effect and volition in particular, is necessarily connected with
its cause. "It must be remembered," says he, "that it has
been already shown, that nothing can ever come to pass with
out a cause or a reason ;"* and he then proceeds to show, that
" the acts of the will must be connected with their cause." In
this part of his argument, he employs his ambiguous proposi
tion in a different sense from that in which he established it.
In the establishment of it he only insists that there must be
some antecedent sufficient to account for every event ; and in
the application of it he contends, that the antecedent or cause
must produce the event. These ideas are perfectly distinct.
There could be no act of the mind unless there were a mind to
act, and unless there were a motive in view of which it acts ;
but it does not follow that the mind is compelled to act by
motive. But let us see how he comes to this conclusion.
" For an event," says he, " to have a cause and ground of its
existence, and yet not be connected with its cause, is an incon
sistency. For if the event be not connected with its cause, it
is not dependent on the cause : its existence is, as it were, loose
from its influence, and may attend it or may not"\ " Depend
ence on the influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect.":}:
Again, " to suppose there are some events which have a cause
and ground of their existence, that yet are not necessarily con
nected with their cause, is to suppose that they have a cause
which is not their cause. Tims, if the effect be not necessarily
connected with the cause, with its influence and influential cir
cumstances, then, as I observed before, it is a thing possible and
supposable that the cause may sometimes exert the same influ
ence under the same circumstances, and yet the effect not fol-
low." He has much other similar reasoning to show that it is
absurd and contradictory to say that motive is the cause of
volition, and yet admit that volition may be loose from the
influence of motive, or that " the cause is not sufficient to pro
duce the effect."] In all this he uses the term in its most nar-
Inquiry, p. 77. f Ibid, t Ibid. Id., p. 78. ||Id.,p. 79.
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 140
row and restricted sense. It is no longer a mere antecedent or
antecedents, which are sufficient to account for the existence of
the phenomena of volition ; it is an efficient cause which pro
duces volitions. Thus he establishes his ambiguous proposition
in one sense, and builds on it in another. He explains the
term cause to signify any antecedent, in order, he tells us, to
prevent objection to his doctrine, when he alleges that nothing
ever comes to pass without some cause of its existence ; and
yet, when he applies this fundamental proposition to the con
struction of his scheme, he returns to the restricted sense of the
word, in which it signifies, " that which has a positive efficacy or
influence to produce a thing." It is thus that the great scheme
of President Edwards is made up of mere words, having no intrin
sic coherency of parts, and appearing consistent throughout,
only because its disjointed fragments seem to be united, and its
huge chasms concealed by means of the ambiguities of language.
SECTION III
The scheme of necessity is supported by false logic.
One reason why the advocates of necessity deceive themselves,
as well as others, is, that there is great want of precision and
distinctness in their views and definitions. We are told by
them that the will is always determined by the strongest
motive ; that this is invariably the cause of volition. But what
is meant by the term cause f We have final causes, instru
mental causes, occasional causes, predisposing causes, efficient
causes, and many others. Now, in which of these senses is the
word used, when we are informed that motive is the cause of
volition? On this point we are not enlightened. Neither
Leibnitz nor Edwards is sufficiently explicit. The proposition,
as left by them, is vague and obscure.
Leibnitz inclined to the use of the word reason, because he car
ried on a controversy with Bayle and Hobbes, who were atheists ;
though he frequently speaks of a chain of causes which embrace
human volitions.* While Edwards, who opposed the Armini-
ans, generally employs the more rigid term cause; though he,
too, frequently represents motive as " the ground and reason "
of volition. The one softens his language, in places, as he con-
* Theodicee.
150 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
tends with those who had rendered themselves obnoxious to the
Christian world by an advocacy of the doctrine of necessity in
connexion with atheistical sentiments. The other appears to
prefer the stronger expression, as he puts forth his power against
antagonists whose views of liberty were deemed subversive of
the tenets of Calvinism. But the law of causality, as stated by
Edwards, and the principle of the sufficient reason, as defined
and employed by Leibnitz, are perfectly identical.
When we are told that motive is the cause of volition, it is
evident we cannot determine whether to deny or to assent to
the proposition, unless we know in what sense the term cause
is used. We might discuss this perplexed question forever, by
the use of such vague and indefinite propositions, without pro
gressing a single step toward the end of the controversy. We
must bring a more searching analysis to the subject, if we hope
to accomplish anything. We must take the word cause or
reason, in each of its significations, in order to discover in what
particulars the contending parties agree, and in what particu
lars they disagree, in order to see how far each party is right,
and how far it is wrong. This is the only course that prom
ises the least prospect of a satisfactory result.
If we mean by the cause of volition, that which wills or exerts
the volition, there is no controversy ; for in this sense the advo
cates of necessity admit that the mind is the cause of volition.
Thus says Edwards : " The acts of my will are my own ; i. e., they
are acts of my will."* It is universally conceded that it is the
mind which wills, and nothing else in the place of it ; and hence,
in this sense of the word, there is no question but that the mind
is the cause of volition. But the advocates of necessity cannot
be understood in this sense ; for they deny that the mind is the
cause of volition, and insist that it is caused by motive.
The term cause is very often used to designate the condition
of a thing, or that without which it could not happen or come
to pass. Thus we are told by Edwards, that he sometimes uses
" the word cause to signify any antecedent" of an event,
" whether it has any influence or not," in the production of such
event, f If this be the meaning, when it is said that motive is
the cause of volition, the truth of the proposition is conceded by
the advocates of free-agency. In speaking of arguments and
Inquiry, p. 277. f M. f pp. 60, 61.
Chapter IV.l WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 151
motives, Dr. Samuel Clarke says : " Occasions indeed there may
be, and are, upon which that substance in man, wherever the
self-moving principle resides, freely exerts its active power."*
Herein, then, there is a perfect agreement between the con
tending parties. The fact that the mind requires certain con
ditions or occasions, on which to exercise its active power, does
not at all interfere with its freedom ; and hence the advocates
Df free-agency have readily admitted that motives are the occa
sional causes of volition. We must look out for some other
meaning of the term, then, if we would clearly and distinctly
fix our minds on the point in controversy.
We say that an antecedent is the cause of its consequent,
when the latter is produced by the action of the former. For
example, a motion of the body is said to be caused by the mind ;
because it is produced by an act of the mind. This seems to be
what is meant by an "efficient cause" It is, no doubt, the most
proper sense of the word ; and around this it is that the con
troversy still rages, and has for centuries raged.
The advocates of necessity contend, not only that volition is
the effect of motive, but also that " to be an effect implies pas-
siveness, or the being subject to the power and action of its
cause."f Such precisely is the doctrine of Edwards, and Col
lins, and Hobbes. In this sense of the word it is denied that
motive is the cause of volition, and it is affirmed that mind is
the cause thereof. Thus, says Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his reply
to Collins, " T is the self-moving principle, and not at all the
reason or motive, which is the physical or efficient cause of
action ;" by which we understand him to mean volition, as that
is the thing in dispute. Now, when the advocates of free-
agency insist that motive is not the efficient cause of volition,
and that mind is the efficient cause thereof, we suppose them
to employ the expression, efficient cause, in one and the same
sense in both branches of the proposition. This is the only fair
way of viewing their language ; and if they wished to be under
stood in any other manner, they should have taken the pains
to explain themselves, and not permit us to be misled by an
ambiguity. Here the precise point in dispute is clearly pre
sented ; and let us hear the contending parties, before we pro/-
ceed to decide between them.
Remarks upon Collins s Philosophical Inquiry. f Inquiry, p. 198.
152 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Tart 1,
You are in error, says the necessitarian to bis opponents, in
denying that motive, and in affirming that mind, is the efficient
cause of volition. For if an act of the mind, or a volition, is
caused by the mind, it must be produced by a preceding act of
the mind, and this act must be produced by another preceding
act of the mind, and so on ad infinitum which reduces the
matter to a plain impossibility. Now, if the necessitarian has
not been deceived by an unwarrantable ambiguity on the part
of his adversary, he has clearly reduced his doctrine to the
absurdity of an infinite series of acts : that is to say, if the advo
cate of free-agency does not depart from the ordinary meaning
of words, when he affirms that mind is the efficient cause of
volition ; and if he does not use these terms " efficient cause" in
different senses in the same sentence, then we feel bound to
say that he is fairly caught in the toils of his adversary. But
we are not yet in condition to pass a final judgment between
the parties.
The necessitarian contends that " volition, or an act of the
mind, is the effect of motive, and that it is subject to the power
and action of its cause."* The advocate of free-will replies, If
we must suppose an action of motive on the mind to account
for its act, we must likewise suppose another action to account
for the action of motive ; and so on ad infinitum. Thus the
necessitarian seems to be fairly caught in his own toils, and
entrapped by his own definition and arguments. .
Our decision (for the correctness of which we appeal to the
calm and impartial judgment of the reader) is as follows : If
the term cause be understood in the first or the second sense
above mentioned, there is no disagreement between the con
tending parties ; and if it be understood in the third sense, then
both parties are in error. If, in order to account for an act of
the mind, we suppose it is caused by an action of motive, we
are involved in the absurdity of an infinite series of actions ;
and on the other hand, if we suppose it is caused by a preced
ing act of the mind itself, we are forced into the same absurdity.
Hence, we conclude, that an act of the mind, or a volition, is not
produced by the action of either mind or motive, but takes its
rise in the world without any such efficient cause of its exist
ence.
Edwards s Inquiry, p. 178.
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 153
Each party has refuted his adversary, and in the enjoyment
of his triumph he seems not to have duly reflected on the de
struction of his own position. Both are in the right, and both
are in the wrong ; but, as we shall hereafter see, not equally so.
If we adopt the argument of both sides, in so far as it is true,
we shall come to the conclusion that action must take its
rise somewhere in the universe without being caused by pre
ceding action. And if so, where shall we look for its origin ?
in that which by nature is endowed with active power, or in
that which is purely and altogether passive ?
"We lay it down, then, as an established and fundamental
position, that the mind acts or puts forth its volitions without
being efficiently caused to do so, without being impelled by its
own prior action, or by the prior action of anything else. The
conditions or occasions of volition being supplied, the mind
itself acts in view thereof, without being subject to the power
or action of any cause whatever. All rational beings must, as
we have seen, either admit this exemption of the mind in
willing from the power and action of any cause, or else lose
themselves in the labyrinth of an infinite series of causes. It
is this exemption which constitutes the freedom of the human
soul.
We are now prepared to see, in a clear light, the sophistical
nature of the pretended demonstration of the scheme of neces
sity. " It is impossible to consider occurrences," says Sir James
Mackintosh, otherwise than as bound together in " the relation
of cause and effect" Now this relation, if we interpret it
according to the nature of things, and not according to the
sound of words, is not one, but two.
The motions of the body are caused by the mind, that is,
they are produced by the action of the mind ; this constitutes
one relation : but acts of the mind are caused, that is, they are
produced by the action of nothing ; and this is a quite different
relation In other words, the motions of body are produced by
preceding action, and the acts of the mind are not produced by
preceding action. Hence, the first are necessitated, and the
last are free : the first come under " the relation of cause and
effect," and the last come under a very different relation. The
relation of cause and effect connects the most remote conse
quences of volition with volition itself; but when we reach voli-
154 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
tion, there a new relation arises : it is the relation which sub
sists between an agent and its act. We may trace changes in
the external world up to the volitions or acts of mind, and per
ceive no diversity in the chain of dependencies ; but precisely
at this point the chain of cause and effect ceases, and agency
begins. The surrounding circumstances may be conditions,
may be occasional causes, may be predisposing causes, but they
are not, and cannot be, producing or efficient causes. Here,
then, the iron chain terminates, and freedom commences, In
the ambiguity which fails to distinguish between " the relation
of cause and effect," and the relation which volition bears to its
antecedents, " consists the strength of the necessitarian system."
Let this distinction be clearly made and firmly borne in mind,
and the great boasted adamantine scheme of necessity will
resolve itself into an empty, ineffectual sound.
Hence, if we would place the doctrine of liberty upon solid
grounds, it becomes necessary to modify the categories of M.
Cousin. All things, says he, fall under the one or the other of
the two following relations: the relation between subject and
attribute, or the relation between cause and effect. This last
category, we think, should be subdivided, so as to give two
relations ; one between cause and effect, properly so called, and
the other between agent and action. Until this be done, it will
be impossible to extricate the phenomena of the will from the
mechanism of cause and effect.
We think we might here leave the stupendous sophism of the
necessitarian ; but as it has exerted so wonderful an influence
over the human mind, and obscured, for ages, the glory of the
moral government of God, we may well be permitted to pursue
it further, and to continue the pursuit so long as a fragment or
a shadow of it remains to be demolished.
SECTION IV.
The scheme of necessity is fortified ~by false conceptions.
One of the notions to which the cause of necessity owes
much of its strength, is a false conception of liberty, as consist
ing in " a power over the determinations of the will." Hence it
is said that this power over the will can do nothing, can cause
no determination except by acting to produce it. But accord
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 155
ing to tliis notion of liberty, this causative act cannot be free
unless it be also caused by a preceding act; and so on ad
injmitum. Such is one of the favourite arguments of the
necessitarian. But in truth the freedom of the mind does not
consist in its possessing a power over the determinations of its
own will, for the true notion of freedom is a negative idea, and
consists in the absence of every power over the determinations
of the will. The mind is free because it possesses a power of
acting, over which there is no controlling power, either within
or witliDut itself.
It must be admitted, it seems to us, that the advocates of
free-agency have too often sanctioned this false conception of
liberty, and thereby strengthened the cause of their opponents.
Cudworth, Clark, Stuart, Coleridge, and Reid, all speak of this
supposed power of the mind over the determinations of the will,
as that which constitutes its freedom. Thus says Reid, for
example : " By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand a
power over the determinations of his own will." Now, it is
not at all strange that this language should be conceived by
necessitarians in such a manner as to involve the doctrine of
liberty in the absurd consequence of an infinite series of acts,
since it is so understood by some of the most enlightened advo
cates of free-agency themselves. " A power over the determi
nations of our will," says Sir William Hamilton, " supposes an
act of the will that our will should determine so and so ; for we
can only exert power through a rational determination or volition.
This definition of liberty is right. But the question upon ques
tion remains, (and this ad infinitum) have we a power (a will)
over such anterior will ? and until this question be definitively
answered, which it never can, we must be unable to conceive
the possibility of the fact of liberty. But, though inconcei vable,
this fact is not therefore false." True, we are unable to con
ceive the possibility of the fact of liberty, if this must be con
ceived as consisting in a power over the determinations of the
will ; but, in our humble opinion, this definition of liberty is
not right. It seems more correct to say, that the freedom of
the will consists in the absence of a power over its determina
tions, than in the presence of such a power.
There is another false conception which has given great
apparent force to the cause of necessity. It is supposed that
156 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
the states of the will, the volitions, are often necessitated by the
necessitated states of the sensibility. In other words, it is sup
posed that the appetites, passions, and desires, often act upon
the will, and produce its volitions. But this seems to be a
very great mistake, which has arisen from viewing the subtle
operations of the mind through the medium of those mechanical
forms of thought that have been derived from the contempla
tion of the phenomena of the material world. In truth, the
feelings do not act at all, and consequently they cannot act
upon the will. It is absurd, as Locke and Edwards well say, to
ascribe power, which belongs to the agent himself, to the
properties of an agent. Hence, it is absurd to suppose that our
feelings, appetites, desires, and passions, are endowed with
power, and can act. They are not agents they are merely the
properties of an agent. It is the mind itself which acts, and
not its passions. These are but passive impressions made upon
the sensibility ; and hence, " it is to philosophize very crudely
concerning mind, and to image everything in a corporeal man
ner," to conceive that they act upon the will and control its
determinations, just as the motions of body are caused and
controlled by the action of mind.*
This conception, however, is not peculiar to the necessitarian.
It has been most unfortunately sanctioned by the greatest advo
cates of free-agency. Thus says Dr. Reid, in relation to the
appetites and passions : " Such motives are not addressed to the
rational powers. Their influence is immediately upon the will."
" When a man is acted upon by contrary motives of this kind,
he finds it easy to yield to the strongest. They are like two
forces pushing him in contrary directions. To yield to the
strongest he needs only oe passive" If this be so, how can Dr.
Reid maintain, as he does, that " the determination was made
by the man, and not by the motive?" To this assertion Sir
William Hamilton replies : " But was the man determined by
no motive to that determination ? Was his specific volition to
this or to that without a cause ? On the supposition that the
sum of the influences (motives, dispositions, tendencies) to voli
tion A is equal to 12, and the sum of counter volition B,
equal to 8 can we conceive that the determination of volition
A should not be necessary? We can only conceive the voli
See Examination of Edwards on the Will.
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 157
tion B to be determined by supposing that the man creates
(calls from nonexistence into existence) a certain supplement
of influences. But this creation as actual, or in itself, is incon
ceivable ; and even to conceive the possibility of this inconceiv
able act, we must suppose some cause by which the man is
determined to exert it. We thus in thought, never escape
determination and necessity. It will be observed that I do not
consider this inability to notion any disproof of the fact of free
will."
It is true, that if we suppose, according to the doctrine of Sir
William and Dr. Reid, that two counter influences act upon th e
will, the one being as 12 and the other as 8, then the first must
necessarily prevail. But if this supposition be correct, we are
not only unable to conceive the fact of liberty, we are also able
to conceive that it cannot be a fact at all. There is a great dif
ference, we have been accustomed to believe, between being
unable to conceive how a thing is, and being able to conceive
that it cannot be anyhow at all : the first would leave it a mere
mystery, the last would show it to be an absurdity. In the one
case, the thing would be above reason, and in the other, con
trary to reason. Now, to which of these categories does the
fact of liberty, as left by Sir William Hamilton, belong? Is it
a mystery, or is it an absurdity ? Is it an inconceivable fact, or
is it a conceived impossibility ? It seems to us that it is the
latter ; and that if we will only take the pains to view the
phenomena of mind as they exist in consciousness, and not
through the medium of material analogies, we shall be able to
untie the knot which Sir William Hamilton has found it neces
sary to cut.
The doctrine of liberty, if properly viewed, is perfectly con
ceivable. We can certainly conceive that the omnipotence of
God can put forth an act without being impelled thereto by a
power back of his own ; and to suppose otherwise, is to sup
pose a power greater than God s, and upon which the exercise
of his omnipotence depends. By parity of reason, we should
be Compelled to suppose another power still back of that, and
so on ad injmitum. This is not only absurd, but, as Calvin
truly says, it is impious. Here, then, we have upon the throne
of the universe a clear and unequivocal instance of a self-active
power, a power whose goings forth are not impelled by any
158 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT IPart I,
power without itself. It goes forth, it is true, in the light of
the Eternal Reason, and in pursuit of the ends of the Eternal
Goodness ; but yet in itself it possesses an infinite fulness, being
self-sustained, self-active, and wholly independent of all other
powers and influences whatsoever.
Now, if such a Being should create at all, it is not difficult to
conceive that he would create subordinate agents, bearing his
own image in this, namely, the possession of a self-active
power. It is not difficult to conceive that he should produce
spiritual beings like himself, who can act without being neces
sitated to act, like the inanimate portions of creation, as w T ell
as those of an inferior nature. Nor is it more difficult to con
ceive that man, in point of fact, possesses such a limited self-
active power, than it is to conceive that God possesses an infinite
self-active power. Indeed we must and do conceive this, or
else we should have no type or representative in this lower part
of the world, by and through which to rise to a contemplation
of its universal Lord and Sovereign. We should have a temple
without a symbol, and a universe without a God. But God
has not thus left himself without witness ; for he has raised man
above the dust of the earth in this, that he is endowed with a
self-active power, from whence, as from an humble platform,
he may rise to the sublime contemplation of the Universal
Mover of the heavens and the earth. But for this ray of light,
shed abroad in our hearts by the creative energy of God, the
nature of the divine power itself would be unknown to us, and
its eternal, immutable glories shrouded in impenetrable dark
ness. The idea of an omnipotent power, moving in and of
itself in obedience to the dictates of infinite wisdom and good
ness, would be forever merged and lost in the dark scheme of
an implexed series and concatenation of causes, binding all
things fast, God himself not excepted, in the iron bonds of
fate.
If liberty be a fact, as Sir William Hamilton contends it is,
then no such objections can be urged against it as those in
which he supposes it to be involved. We are aware of what
may be said in favour of such a mode of viewing subjects
of this kind, as well as of the nature of the principles from
which it takes its rise. But we cannot consider those principles
altogether sound. They appear to be too sceptical, with respect
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. I5d
to the powers of the human mind, and the destiny of human
knowledge. The sentiment of Leibnitz seems to rest upon a
more solid foundation. " It is necessary to come," says he, " to
the grand question which M. Bayle has recently brought upon
the carpet, to wit, whether a truth, and especially a truth of
faith, can be subject to unanswerable objections. That excel
lent author seems boldly to maintain the affirmative of this
question : he cites grave theologians on his side, and even those
of Rome, who appear to say what he pretends ; and he adduces
philosophers who have believed that there a/re even philosophi
cal truths, the defenders of which cannot reply to objections
made against them." " For my part," says Leibnitz, " I avow
that I cannot be of the sentiment of those who maintain that a
truth can be liable to invincible objections ; for what is an
objection but an argument of which the conclusion contradicts
our thesis? and is not an invincible argument a demonstra
tion?" "It is always necessary to yield to demonstrations,
whether they are proposed for our adoption, or advanced in the
form of objections. And it is unjust and useless to wish to
weaken the proofs of adversaries, under the pretext that they
are only objections; since the adversary has the same right,
and can reverse the denominations, by honouring his arguments
with the name of proof #, and lowering yours by the disparaging
name of objections. "*
There is another false conception, by which the necessitarian
fortifies himself in his opposition to the freedom of the will. As
he identifies the sensibility and the will, so when the indiffer
ence of the latter is spoken of, the language is understood to
mean that the mind is indifferent, and destitute of all feeling or
emotion. But this is to view the doctrine of liberty, not as it
is held by its advocates, but as it is seen through the medium
of a false psychology. We might adduce a hundred examples
of the truth of this remark, but one or two must suffice. Thus,
Collins supposes that the doctrine of liberty implies, that the
mind is " indifferent to good and evil ;" " indifferent to what
causes pleasure or pain y" " indifferent to all objects, and swayed
by no motives." Gross as this misrepresentation of the doctrine
of free-agency is, it is frequently made by its opponents. It oc
curs repeatedly in the writings of President Edwards and Presi-
Discours de la Conformite de la Foi avec la Raison.
160 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I
dent Day.* The freedom of the witt, indeed, no more implies
an indifference of the sensibility than the power of a bird to fly
implies the existence of a vacuum.
SECTION V.
The scheme of necessity is recommended by false analogies.
It is insisted that there is no difficulty in conceiving of a
caused action or volition ; but this position is illustrated by false
and deceptive analogies. Thus says an advocate of necessity :
" The term passive is sometimes employed to express the rela
tion of an effect to its cause. In this sense, it is so far from
being inconsistent with activity, that activity may be the very
effect which is produced. A cannonshot is said to be passive,
with respect to the charge of powder which impels it. But is
there no activity given to the ball ? Is not the whirlwind active
when it tears up the forest ?"f Not at all, in any sense pertain
ing to the present controversy. The tremendous power, what
ever it may be, which sets the whirlwind in motion, is active ;
the wind itself is perfectly passive. The air is acted on, and it
merely suffers a change of place. If it tears up the forest, this
is not because it exercises an active power, but because it is
body coming into contact with body, and both cannot occupy
the same space at one and the same time. It tears up the
forest, not as an agent, but as an instrument.
The same is true of the cannonball. This does not act it
merely moves. It does not put forth a volition, or an exercise
of power ; it merely suffers a change of place. In one word,
there is no sort of resemblance between an act of mind and the
motion of body. This has no active power, and cannot be made
to act : it is passive, however, and may be made to move. If
the question were, Can a body be made to move ? these illustra
tions would be in point ; but as it relates to the possibility of
causing the mind to put forth a volition, they are clearly irrel
evant. And if they were really apposite, they would only show
that the mind may be caused to act like a cannonball, a whirl
wind, a clock, or any other piece of machinery. This is the
only kind of action they serve to prove may be caused ; and
See Examination of Edwards on the Will, sec. ix.
t President Day on the Will, p. 160.
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 161
such action, as it is called, has far more to do with machinery
than with human agency.
President Edwards also has recourse to false analogies. To
select only one instance : " It is no more a contradiction," says
lie, " to suppose that action may be the effect of some other
cause besides the agent, or being that acts, than to suppose that
life may be the effect of some other cause besides the being that
lives."* Now, as we are wholly passive in the reception of
life, so it may be wholly conferred upon us by the power and
agency of God. The very reason why we suppose an act cannot
be caused is, that it is a voluntary exercise of our own minds ;
whereas, if it were caused, it would be a necessitated passive
impression. How can it show the fallacy of this position, to re
fer to the case of a caused life, in regard to which, by universal
consent, we do not and cannot act at all ?
The younger Edwards asserts, that " to say that an agent that
is acted upon cannot act, is as groundless as to say that a body
acted upon cannot move." Again : " My actions are mine ;
but in what sense can they be properly called mine, if I be not
the efficient cause of them ? Answer : my thoughts and all my
perceptions and feelings are mine yet it will not be pretended
that I am the efficient cause of them."f But in regard to all
our thoughts and feelings, we are, as we have seen, altogether
passive ; and these are ours, because they are necessarily pro
duced in us. Is it only in this sense that our acts are ours ?
Are they ours only because they are necessarily caused to exist
in our minds ? If so, then indeed we understand these writers ;
but if they are not merely passive impressions, why resort to
states of the intelligence and the sensibility, which are con
ceded to be passive, in order to illustrate the reasonableness of
their scheme, and to expose the unreasonableness of the oppo
site doctrine? We admit that every passive impression is
caused ; but the question is, Can the mind be caused to act ?
As we lay all the stress on the nature of an act, as seen in the
light of consciousness, what does it signify to tell us that another
thing, which possesses no such nature, may be efficiently caused ?
All such illustrations overlook the essential difference between
action and passion, between doing and suffering.
Inquiry, p. 203. t Dissertation, p. 181.
11
162 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I.
SECTION VL
The scheme of necessity is rendered plausible by a false phraseology.
The false psychology, of which we have spoken, has been
greatly strengthened and confirmed in its influences by the
phraseology connected with it. As Mr. Locke distinguished
between will and desire, partially at least, so he likewise distin
guished a preference of the mind from a volition. But Presi
dent Edwards is not satisfied with this distinction. " The
instance he mentions" says Edwards, " does not prove there is
anything else in willing but merely preferring."* This may
be very true ; but is there nothing in willing, in acting, but
merely preferring ? This last term, however it may be applied,
seems better adapted to express a state of the intelligence, than
an act of the will. Two objects are placed before the mind :
one affects the sensibility in a more agreeable manner than the
other, and therefore the intelligence pronounces that one is
more to be desired than the other. This seems to be precisely
what is meant by the use of the term preference. One prefers
an orange to an apple, for instance, because the orange affects
his sensibility more agreeably than the apple ; and the intelli
gence perceiving this state of the sensibility, declares in favour
of the orange. This decision of the judgment is what is usually
meant by the use of the term preference, or choice. To prefer,
is merely to judge, in view of desire, which of two objects is
more agreeable. But judging and desiring are, as we have
seen, both necessitated states of the mind. Why, then, apply
the term preference, or choice, to acts of the will ? Why apply
a term, which seems to express merely a state of the intelli
gence, which all concede is necessitated, to an act of the will ?
Is it not evident, that by such a use of language the cause of
necessity gains great apparent strength ?
There is another way in which the language of the necessi
tarian deceives. The language he employs often represents the
facts of nature, but not facts as they would be, if his system
were true. Hence, when this system is attacked, its advo
cates repel the attack by the use of words which truly represent
nature, but not their errors. This gives great plausibility
Inquiry of Edwards, p. 222.
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 163
to their apologies. Thus, when it is objected that the scheme
of necesssity "makes men no more than mere machines,"
they are always ready to reply, " that notwithstanding this doc
trine, man is entirely, perfectly, and unspeakably different from
a machine." But how ? Is it because his volitions, as they are
called, are not necessarily determined by causes? No. Is it be
cause his will may be loose from the influence of motives? No.
Is it because he may follow the strongest motive, or may not fol
low it? No. Nothing of the kind is hinted. How does the man,
then, differ so entirely from a machine? Why, " in that he has
reason and understanding, with a faculty of will, and so is capa
ble of volition and choice." True, a machine has no reason or
understanding ; but suppose it had, would it be a person ? By
no means. We have seen that the understanding, or the intel
ligence, is necessarily determined ; all its states are necessitated
as completely as the movements of a machine. This constitutes
an essential likeness, and it is what is always meant, when it
is said that necessity makes men mere machines. But it seems
that man also has " a faculty of will, and so is capable of volition
or choice."* Yes, he can act. Now this language means
something according to the system of nature ; but what does it
mean according to the system of necessity ? It merely means
that the human mind is susceptible of being necessitated to
undergo a change by the "power and action of a cause,"
ivhich the advocates of that system are pleased to call an act.
They never hint that we are not machines, because we have
any power by which we are exempt from the most absolute
dominion of causes. They never hint that we are not machines,
because our volitions, or acts, are not as necessarily produced
m us, as the motions of a clock are produced in it. Now, if
this scheme were true, there would be no such things as acts
or volitions in us : all the phenomena of our minds would be
passive impressions, like our judgments and feelings. When
they speak of the will, then, which is capable of volitions, or
acts, they deceive by using the language of nature, and not of
their false scheme.
Edwards s Inquiry, p. 222.
164 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
SECTION VII
The scheme of necessity originates in a false method, and terminates in a
false religion.
This system, as we have seen, has been built up, not by an
analysis of the phenomena of the human mind, but by means
of universal abstractions and truisms. It takes its rise, not from
the facts of nature, but from the conceptions of the intellect. In
other words, instead of anatomizing the world which God has
made so as to exhibit the actual plan according to which it has
been constituted, it sets out from certain identical propositions,
such as that every effect must have a cause, and proceeds to
inform us how the world must have been constituted. This
" usual method of discovery and proof," as Bacon says, " by
first establishing the most general propositions, then applying
and proving the intermediate axioms according to these, is the
parent of error and the calamity of every science." Nowhere,
it is believed, can a more striking illustration of the truth of
these pregnant words be found, than in the method adopted by
necessitarians. They begin with the universal proposition, that
every effect must have a cause, as a self-evident truth, and then
proceed, not to examine and discover how the world is made,
but to demonstrate how it must have been constructed. This
is not to "interpret," it is to " anticipate" nature.
By this high a priori method the freedom of the human
mind is demonstrated, as we have seen, to be an impossibility
and the accountability of man a dream. Man is not respon
sible for sin, or rather, there is no such thing as moral good
and evil in the lower world ; since God, the only efficient foun
tain of all things and events, is the sole responsible author of
all evil as well as of all good. Such, as we have seen, are the
inevitable logical consequences of this boasted scheme of ne
cessity.
But we have clearly shown, we trust, that the grand demon-
tration of the necessitarian is a sophism, whose apparent force
is owing to a variety of causes : First, it seeks out, and lays
its foundation in, a false psychology ; identifying the feelings,
or affections, and the will. Secondly, by viewing the opposite
scheme through the medium of this false psychology, it reduces
Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 165
its main position to the pitiful absurdity that a thing may pro
duce itself, or arise out of nothing, and bring itself into exist
ence ; and then demolishes this absurdity by logic ! Thirdly,
it reduces itself to the truism, that a thing is always as it is ;
and being entrenched in this stronghold, it gathers around
itself all the common sense and all the reason of mankind, as
well it may, and looks down with sovereign contempt on the
feeble attacks of its adversaries. Fourthly, it fortifies itself by
a multitude of false conceptions, arising from a hasty applica
tion of its universal truism, and not from a severe inspection
and analysis of things. Fifthly, it decorates itself in false anal
ogies, and thereby assumes the imposing appearance of truth.
Sixthly, it clothes itself in deceptive and ambiguous phrase
ology, by which it speaks the language of truth to the ear, but
not to the sense. And, seventhly, it takes its rise in a false
method, and terminates in a false religion.
These are some of the hidden mysteries of the scheme of
necessity ; which having been detected and exposed, we do not
hesitate to pronounce it a grand imposition on the reason of
mankind. As such, we set aside this stupendous sophism,
whose dark shadow has so long rested on the beauty of the
world, obscuring the intrinsic majesty and glory of the infinite
goodness therein displayed. We put away and repudiate this
vast assemblage of errors, which has so sadly perplexed our
mental vision, and so frightfully distorted the real proportions
of the world, as to lead philosophers, such as Kant and others,
to pronounce a Theodicy impossible. We put them aside utterly,
in order that we may proceed to vindicate the glory of God, as
manifested in the constitution and government of the moral
world.
166 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
CHAPTEK Y.
THE RELATION BETWEEN THE HUMAN WILL AND THE DIVINE AGENCY.
Thou art the source and centre of all minds,
Their only point of rest, eternal Word !
From Thee departing, they are lost and rove
At random, without honour, hope, or peace.
From Thee is all that soothes the life of man,
His high endeavour and his glad success,
His strength to suffer and his will to serve. COWPEK.
And God proclaimed from heaven, and by an oath
Confirm d, that each should answer for himself;
And as his own peculiar work should be
Done by his proper self, should live or die. POLLOK.
THE evils of haste and precipitancy in the formation of opinions
are, perhaps, nowhere more deplorably exhibited, than in regard
to the relation between human and divine agency. Indeed, so
many rash judgments have been put forth on this important
subject, that the very act of approaching it has come to be
invested, in the minds of many persons, with the character of
rashness and presumption. Hence the frequent warnings to
turn our attention from it, as a subject lying beyond the range
of all sober speculation, and as unsuited to the investigation of
our finite minds. If this be a wise conclusion, it would be well
to leave it to support itself, instead of attempting to bolster it
up with the reasons frequently given for it.
SECTION I.
General mew of the relation between the divine and the human power.
It is frequently said, for example, that it is impossible to
reconcile the agency of God with that of man ; because we do
not know how the divine power operates upon the human mind.
But, if we examine the subject closely, we shall find that the
manner in which the Spirit of God operates, is not what we
want to know, in order to remove the great difficulty in ques
tion. If such knowledge were possessed in the greatest possible
perfection, we have no reason to believe that our insight into
Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 167
the relation between the human and the divine power would
be at all improved. For aught we can see, our notions on this
point would remain as dim and feeble as if we possessed no
such knowledge. If we could ascertain, however, precisely
what is done by the power of man, then we should see whether
there be any real inconsistency or conflict between them or not.
This is the point on which we need to be enlightened, in order
to clear up the difficulty in question ; and on this point the
most satisfactory light may be attained. If we must wait to
understand the modus operandi of the divine Spirit, before we
can dispel the clouds and darkness which his influence casts
over the free-agency of man, then must we indeed defer this
great mystery to another state of being, and perhaps forever.
Those who have looked in this direction for light, may well
deplore our inability to see it. But let us look in the right
direction : let us consider, not the modus operandi of the divine
power, but the effects produced by it, and then, perhaps, we
may behold the beautiful harmony subsisting between the
agency of God and the freedom of man.
The reason why the views of most persons concerning this
relation are so vague and indistinct is, that they do not possess
a sufficiently clear and perfect analysis of the human mind.
The powers and susceptibilities of the mind, as well as the laws
which govern its phenomena, seem blended together in their
minds in one confused mass ; and hence the relations they bear
to each other, and to the divine agency, are as dim and fluctu
ating as an ill-remembered dream. In this confusion of laws
and phenomena, of powers and susceptibilities, of facts and fan
cies, it is no wonder that so many crude conceptions and vague
hypotheses have sprung up and prevailed concerning the great
difficulty under consideration. In the dim twilight of mental
science, which has shown all things distorted and nothing in its
true proportions, it is no wonder that the beautiful order and
perspective of the moral world should have been concealed
from our eyes. It was to have been expected, that every
attempt to delineate this order, would, under such circum
stances, prove premature, and aggravate rather than lessen
the apparent disorders prevailing in the spiritual world. Ac
cordingly, such attempts generally terminate, either in the
denial of the free-agency of man, or of the sovereignty of God ;
168 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
and those who have maintained both of these tenets in reality,
as well as in name, have usually refused to allow themselves to
be troubled by the apparent contradictions in which they are
involved. While they recognise the two spheres of the human
and of the divine agency, they have left them so shadowy and
indistinct, and so distorted from their real proportions, that they
have inevitably seemed to clash with each other. Hence, to
describe these two spheres with clearness and precision, and
to determine the precise point at which they come into contact
without intersecting each other, is still a desideratum in the
science of theology. We shall endeavour to define the human
power and the divine sovereignty, and to exhibit the harmony
subsisting between them, in such a manner as to supply, in
some small degree at least, this great desideratum which has so
long been the reproach of the most sublime of all the sciences.
But this is not to be done by planting ourselves upon any one
particular platform, and dogmatizing from thence, as if that par
ticular point of view necessarily presented us with every possible
phase of the truth. There has been, indeed, so much of this
one-sided, exclusive, and dogmatizing spirit manifested in rela
tion to the subject in question, as to give a great appearance of
truth to the assertion of an ingenious writer, that inasmuch as
different minds contemplate the divine and human agency from
different points of view, the predominant or leading idea pre
sented to them can never be the same ; and hence they can
never agree in the same representation of the complex whole.
The one, says he, " necessarily gives a greater prominence to the
divine agency, and the other to the scope and influence of the
human will, and consequently they pronounce different judg
ments ; just as a man who views a spherical surface from the
inside will forever affirm it to be concave, while he who con
templates it from the outside will as obstinately assert that it is
convex." But although this has been the usual method of treat
ing the subject in question, such weakness and dogmatizing is
self-imposed, and not an inevitable condition of the human
mind. We may learn wisdom from the errors of the past, no
less than from its most triumphant and glorious discoveries.
In the discussion of this subject, it is true that opposite par
ties have confined themselves to first appearances too much, and
rested on one-sided views. But are we necessarily tied down to
Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 169
such inadequate conceptions ? The causes which separate men
in opinion, and the obstacles which keep them asunder, are in
deed powerful; but we hope they do not form an eternal bar
rier between the wise and good. In regard to doctrines so
fundamental and so vital as the divine sovereignty and human
freedom, it is to be hoped that all good men will some day unite,
and perfectly harmonize with each other.
As we are rational beings, so we are not tied down to that
appearance of things which is presented to one particular point
of view. If this were the case, the science of astronomy would
never have had an existence. Even the phenomena of that
noble science are almost inconceivably different from those pre
sented to the mind of man at his particular point of view. From
the small shining objects which are brought to our knowledge
by the sense of sight, the reason rises to the true dimensions of
those tremendous worlds. And after the human mind has thus
furnished itself with the facts of the solar system, it has pro
ceeded but a small way toward a knowledge of the system itself.
It has also to deduce the laws of the material world from its first
appearances, and, armed with these, it must transport itself from
the earth to the true centre of the system, from which its won
derful order and beauty may be contemplated, and revealed to
the world. Then these innumerable twinkling points of light,
which sparkle in the heavens like so many atoms, become to
the eye of reason the stupendous suns and centres of other
worlds and systems.
If we should judge from first appearances, indeed, if we
could not emancipate ourselves from phenomena as they are ex
hibited to us from one particular point of view, then should we
never escape the conclusion, that the earth is the fixed centre
of the universe, around which its countless myriads of worlds
perform their eternal revolutions. But, fortunately, we are
subject to no such miserable bondage. The mind of man has
already raised itself from the planet to which his body is con
fined, and, planting itself on the true centre of the system, has
beheld the sublime scheme planned by the infinite reason, and
executed by the almighty power of the Divine Architect. Surely
the mind which can do, and has done, all this, has the capacity
to understand, place it where you will, that although the inside
of a sphere is concave, the outside may be convex ; as well as
1*70 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
some other things which may perhaps have been placed beyond
its power, without due consideration. But in every attempt to
emancipate ourselves from first appearances, and to reach a
knowledge of the truth, " not as reflected under a single angle,"
but as seen in all its fulness and beauty, it is indispensable to
contemplate it on all sides, and to mark the precise boundaries
of all its phases.
Hence we shall not plant ourselves on the fact of man s
power alone, and, viewing the subject exclusively from thence,
enlarge the sphere of human agency to such an extent as to
shut the divine agency quite out of the intellectual and moral
world. Nor, on the other hand, shall we permit ourselves to
become so completely absorbed in the contemplation of the
majesty of God, to dwell so warmly on his infinite sovereignty
and the littleness of man, as to cause the sphere of human
power to dwindle down to a mere point, and entirely disappear.
We shall endeavour to find the true medium between these
two extreme opinions. That such a medium exists somewhere,
will not be denied by many persons. The only question will
be, as to where and how the line should be drawn to strike out
this medium. In most systems of theology, this line is not
drawn at all, but left completely in the dark. We are shown
some things on both sides of this line, but we are not shown the
line itself. We are made to see, for example, the fact of human
existence as something distinct from God, that we may not err
with Spinoza, in reducing man to a mere fugitive mode of the
Divine Being, to a mere shadow and a dream. And on the
other side, we are made to contemplate the omnipotence of
God, that we may not call in question his sovereignty and
dominion over the moral world. But between these two posi
tions, on which the light of truth has thus been made to fall,
there is a tract of dark and unexplored territory, a terra incog
nita, which remains to be completely surveyed and delineated,
before we can see the beauty of the whole scene. In the
attempt to map out this region, to define the precise boun
dary of that imperium in imperio, of which Spinoza and others
entertained so great a horror, we should endeavour to follow
the wise maxim of Bacon, "to despise nothing, and to admire
nothing."
In other words, we should endeavour to "prove all things,
Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 171
and to hold fast that which is good," without yielding a blind
veneration to received dogmas, or a blind admiration to the
seductive charms of novelty. Hence, we shall first stand on
the same platform with Pelagius, and endeavour to view the
subject with his eyes; to see all that he saw, as well as to cor
rect the errors of his observation. And having done this, we
shall then transport ourselves to the platform of Augustine,
and contemplate the subject from his point of view, so as to
possess ourselves of his great truths, and also to correct the
errors of his observation. Having finished these processes, it
will not be found difficult to combine the truths of these two
conflicting schemes in a complete and harmonious system,
which shall exhibit both the human and the divine elements of
religion in their true proportions and just relations to each
other.
SECTION II.
The Pelagian platform, or mew of the relation between the divine and the
human power.
The doctrine of Pelagius was developed from his own per
sonal experience, and moulded, in a great measure, by his oppo
sition to the scheme of Augustine. According to the historian,
Neander, as well as to the testimony of Augustine himself, the
life of Pelagius was, from beginning to end, one " earnest moral
effort." As his character was gradually formed by his own
continued and unremitted exertions, without any sudden or
violent revolution in his views or feelings, so the great fact of
human agency presented itself to his individual consciousness
with unclouded lustre. This fact was the great central position
from which his whole scheme developed itself. And, as the
history of his opinion shows, he was led to give a still greater
predominance to this fact, in consequence of his opposition to
the system of Augustine, by which it seemed to him to be sub
verted, and the interests of morality threatened.
The great fact of free-will, of whose existence he was so well
assured by his own consciousness, was so imperfectly interpreted
by him, that he was led to exclude other great facts from his sys
tem, which might have been perfectly harmonized with his central
position. Thus, as Neander well says, he denied the operation of
172 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
the divine power in the renovation of the soul,* because he
could not reconcile its influence with the free-agency of man.
This was the weak point in the philosophy of Pelagius, as it has
been in the system of thousands who have lived since his time.
To reject the one of two facts, both of which rest upon clear
and unequivocal evidence, is an error which has been con
demned by Butler and Burlamaqui, as well as by many other
celebrated philosophers. But this error, so far as we know, has
been by no one more finely reproved than by Professor Hodge,
of Princeton. " If the evidence of the constant revolution of
the earth round its axis," says he, " were presented to a man, it
would certainly be unreasonable in him to deny the fact, merely
because he could not reconcile it with the stability of everything
on the earth s surface. Or if he saw two rays of light made to
produce darkness, must he resist the evidence of his senses,
because he knows that two candles give more light than one?
Men do not act thus irrationally in physical investigations.
They let each fact stand upon its own evidence. They strive
to reconcile them, and are happy when they succeed. But
they do not get rid of difficulties by denying facts.
" If in the department of physical knowledge we are obliged
to act upon the principle of receiving every fact upon its own
evidence, even when unable to reconcile one with another, it is
not wonderful that this necessity should be imposed upon us in
those departments of knowledge which are less within the
limits of our powers. It is certainly irrational for a man to
reject all the evidence of the spirituality of the soul, because
he cannot reconcile this doctrine with the fact that a disease of
the body disorders the mind. Must I do violence to my nature
in denying the proof of design afforded by the human body,
because I cannot account for the occasional occurrence of de
formities of structure ? Must I harden my heart against all the
evidence of the benevolence of God, which streams upon me in
a flood of light from all his works, because I may not know
how to reconcile that benevolence with the existence of evil ?
Must I deny my free-agency, the most intimate of all convic-
A different view of the Pelagian doctrine on this point is given by Wiggers,
and yet we suppose that both authors are in the right. The truth seems to me,
that Pelagius, as usually happens to those who take one-sided views of the truth,
ha* asserted contradictory positions.
Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 173
tions, because I cannot see the consistency between the free-
ness of an act and the frequency of its occurrence ? May I
deny that I am a moral being, the very glory of my nature,
because I cannot change my character at will?"* j,
If this judicious sentiment had been observed by speculatists,
it had been well for philosophy, and still better for religion.
The heresy of Pelagius, and the countless forms of kindred
errors, would not have infested human thought. But this senti
ment, however just in itself, or however elegantly expressed,
should not be permitted to inspire our minds with a feeling
of despair. It should teach us caution, but not despondency ;
it should extinguish presumption, but not hope. For if " we
strive to reconcile the facts" of the natural world, " and are
happy when we succeed," how much more solicitous should we
be to succeed in such an attempt to shut up and seal the very
fountains of religious error ?
Nothing is more wonderful to my mind, than that Pelagius
should have such followers as Keimarus and Lessing, not to
mention hundreds of others, who deny the possibility of a divine
influence, because it seems to them to conflict with the intel
lectual and moral nature of man.f To assert, as these philoso
phers do, that the power of God cannot act upon the human
mind without infringing upon its freedom, betrays, as we
venture to affirm, a profound and astonishing ignorance of the
whole doctrine of free-agency. It proceeds on the amazing
supposition that the will is the only power of the human mind,
and that volitions are the only phenomena ever manifested
therein ; so that God cannot act upon it at all, unless it be to
produce volitions. But is it true, that God must do all things
within us, or he can do nothing ? that if he produce a change
in our mental state, then he must produce all conceivable
changes therein ? In order to refute so rash a conclusion, and
explode the wild supposition on which it is based, it will be
necessary to recur to the threefold distinction of the intelligence,
the sensibility, and the will, already referred to.
In the perception of truth, as we have seen, the intelligence
is perfectly passive. Every state of the intelligence is as com
pletely necessitated as is the affirmation that two and two are
The Way of Life, chap, iii, sec. ii.
f Knapp s Theology, vol. ii, p. 471. Note by the translator.
174 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
equal to four. The decisions of the intelligence, then, are not
free acts ; indeed, they are not acts at all, in the proper sense
of the word. They are passive states of the intellect. They
are usually called acts, it is true ; and this use of language is,
no doubt, one of the causes which has given rise to so many
errors and delusions in regard to moral and accountable agency.
With every decision or state of the intelligence, with every per
ception of truth by it, there is intimately associated, it is true,
an act of the mind, a state of the will, a volition, by which the
attention is directed to the subject under consideration; and it
is this intimate association in which the two states or mental
phenomena seem blended into one, which has led so many to
regard the passive susceptibility, called the intelligence, as an
active power, and its states as free acts of the mind. A more
correct analysis, a finer discrimination of the real facts of con
sciousness, must prevail on this subject, before light can be let
in upon the philosophy of free and accountable agency. The
dividing knife must be struck between the two phenomena in
question, between an active state of the will and the passive
states of the intelligence, and the obstinate association be severed
in our imagination, before the truth can be seen otherwise than
through distorting films of error.
As every state of the intelligence is necessitated, so God may
act upon this department of our mental frame without infring
ing upon the nature of man in the slightest possible degree.
As the law of necessity is the law of the intelligence, so God
may absolutely necessitate its states, by the presentation of
truth, or by his direct and irresistible agency in connexion with
the truth, without doing violence to the laws of our intellectual
and moral nature. Nay, in so acting, he proceeds in perfect
conformity with those laws. Hence, no matter how deep a
human soul may be sunk in ignorance and stupidity, God may
flash the light of truth into it, in perfect accordance with the
laws of its nature. And, as has been well said, "The first
effect of the divine power in the new, as in the old creation, is
light."
This is not all. Every state of the sensibility is a passive im
pression, a necessitated phenomenon of the human mind. No
matter what fact, or what truth, may be present to the mind,
either by its own voluntary attention or by the agency of God,
Chapter V.I WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 175
or by the cooperation of both, the impression it makes upon the
sensibility is beyond the control of the will, except by refusing
to give the attention of the mind to it. Hence, although truth
may be vividly impressed upon the intelligence, although the
glories of heaven and the terrors of hell may be made to shine
into it, yet the sensibility may remain unaffected by them. It
may be dead. Hence, God may act upon this, may cause it to
melt with sorrow or to glow with love, without doing violence
to any law of our moral nature. There is no difficulty, then, in
conceiving that the second effect of the divine power in the new
creation is " a new heart."
Having done all this, he may well call on us to " work out
our salvation with fear and trembling, for God worketh in us to
will and to do of his own good pleasure." We have seen that
the state of the will, that a volition is not necessitated by the in
telligence or by the sensibility ; and, hence, it may " obey the
heavenly vision," or it may " resist and do despite to the Spirit
of grace." If it obey, then the vivifying light and genial shower
have not fallen upon the soul in vain. The free-will coalesces
with the renovated intelligence and sensibility, and the man
"has root in himself." The blossom gradually yields to the
fruit, and the germ of true holiness is formed in the soul. This
consists in the voluntary exercise of the mind, in obedience to
the knowledge and the love of God, and in the permanent habit
formed by the repetition of such exercises. Hence, in the great
theandric work of regeneration, we see the part which is per
formed by God, and the part which proceeds from man.
This shows an absolute dependence of the soul upon the
agency of God. For without knowledge the mind can no more
perform its duty than the eye can see without light ; and with
out a feeling of love to God, it is as impossible for it to render
a spiritual obedience, as it would be for a bird to fly in a vacu
um. Yet this dependence, absolute as it is, does not impair the
free-agency of man. For divine grace supplies, and must sup
ply, the indispensable conditions of holiness ; but it does not
produce holiness itself. It does not produce holiness itself, be
cause, as we have seen, a necessary holiness is a contradiction
in terms.
Is it not evident, then, that those who assert the impossibility
of a divine influence, on the ground that it would destroy the
176 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT (Parti,
free-agency of man, have proceeded on a wonderful confusion
of the phenomena of the human mind ? Is it not evident that
they have confounded those states of the intelligence and the
sensibility, which are marked over with the characteristics of
necessity, with those states of the will which inevitably suggest
the ideas of freedom and accountability? But, strange as it
may seem, the philosophers who thus shut the influence of the
Divine Being out of the spiritual world, because they cannot
reconcile it with the moral agency of man, do not always deny
the influence of created beings over the mind. On the contrary,
it is no uncommon thing to see philosophers and theologians,
who begin by denying the influence of the Divine Spirit upon
the human mind, in order to save the freedom of the latter, end
by subjecting it to the most absolute dominion of facts, and cir
cumstances, and motives.
SECTION III
The Augmtinian Platform, or mew of the relation between the divine agency
and the human.
The doctrine of Augustine, like that of Pelagius, was de
veloped from the individual experience and consciousness of its
author. The difference between them was, that the sensible
experience of the one furnished him with only the human ele
ment of religion, which was unduly magnified by him ; while
the divine element was the great prominent fact in the con
sciousness of the other, who accordingly rendered it too exclu
sive in the formation of his views. The one elevated the human
element of religion at the expense of the divine ; the other per
mitted the majesty of the divine to overshadow the human, and
cause it to disappear.
The causes which induced Augustine to take this sublime but
one-sided view of religion may be easily understood. In the
early part of his life, he abandoned himself to vicious excesses ;
being hurried away, to use a metaphor, by the violence of his
appetites and passions. His conscience, no doubt, often re
proved him for such a course of life, and gave rise to many
resolutions of amendment. But experience taught him that he
could not transform and mould his own character at pleasure.
He lacked those views of truth, and those feelings of reverence
Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 177
and love to God, without which true obedience is impossible.
Hence he struggled in vain. He felt his own impotency. He
still yielded to the importunities of appetite and passion. Of a
sudden, however, he finds his views of divine things changed,
and his religious sensibilities awakened. He knows this mar-
vollous transformation is not effected by himself. He ascribe?
it, and he truly ascribes it, to the power of God; by which he
has been brought from a region of darkness to light. Old
things had passed away, and all things become new.
But now observe the precise manner in which the error of
Augustine takes its rise in his mind. He, too, as well as Pela-
gius, confounds the passive susceptibility of the heart with a
voluntary state of the will. The intelligence and the sensibility
are the only elements in his psychology ; the states of them,
which are necessitated, constitute all the phenomena of the
human mind. Holiness, according to him, consists in a feeling
of love to God. He knows this is derived from the divine
agency ; and hence he concludes, that the whole work of con
version is due to God, and no part of it is performed by himself.
I know, says he, that I did not make myself love God, by
which he means a feeling of love ; and this he takes to be true
holiness, which has been wrought in his heart by the power of
God. " Love is the fulfilling of the law ; but love to God is
not shed abroad in our hearts by the law, but by the Holy
Ghost." He is sure the whole work is from God, because he is
sure that the intelligence and the sensibility are the whole of
man. How many excellent persons are there, who, taking their
stand upon the same platform of a false psychology, proceed to
dogmatize with Augustine as confidently as if the only possible
ground of difference from them was a want of the religious
experience of the Christian consciousness, by which they have
been so eminently blessed. We deny not the reality of their
Christian experience ; but we do doubt the accuracy of their
interpretation of it.
Thus, the complex fact of consciousness, consisting in a state
of the sensibility and a state of the will, was viewed from oppo
site points by Pelagius and Augustine. The voluntary phase
of it was seen by Pelagius, and hence he became an exclusive
and one-sided advocate of free-agency ; the passive side was
beheld by Augustine, and hence he became a one-sided and
12
178 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
exclusive advocate of divine grace. If we would possess the
truth, and the whole truth, we must view it on all sides, and
give a better interpretation of the natural consciousness of the
one, as well as the supernatural consciousness of the other, than
they themselves were enabled to give. Then shall we not
instinctively turn to one-sided views of revelation. Then shall
we not always repeat with Pelagius, " Work out your own sal
vation with fear and trembling," nor always exclaim with
Augustine, that " God worketh in us to will and to do of his
good pleasure ;" but we shall with equal freedom and readiness
approach and appropriate both branches of the truth.
SECTION IV.
The mews of those who, in later times, have symbolized with Augustine.
Those divines who have adopted, in the main, the same lead
ing views with Augustine, have generally admitted the fact of
free-agency ; but, because they could not reconcile it with their
leading tenet, they have, as we have seen, explained it away.
The only freedom which they allow to man, pertains, as we have
shown, not to the will at all, but only to the external sphere
of the body. They have maintained the great fact in words,
but rejected it in substance. Though they have seen the absur
dity of rejecting one fact because they could not reconcile it
with another, yet their internal struggle after a unity and har
mony of principle has induced them to deny, in reality, what
they have seemed to themselves to preserve, and maintain.
We have seen, in the first chapter of this work, in what
manner this has been done by them ; it now remains to take
a view of the subject, in connexion with the point under con
sideration.
The man who confounds the sensibility with the will should,
indeed, have no difficulty in reconciling the divine agency with
the human. If the state of the mind in willing is purely passive,
like a state of the mind in feeling ; then to say that it is
produced by the power of God, would create no difficulty what
ever. Hence, the great difficulty of reconciling the human with
the divine agency, which has puzzled and perplexed so many,
should not exist for one who identifies the will with the sensi
bility ; and it would exist for no one holding this psychology,
Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 179
if there were not more in the operations of his nature than in
the developments of his system. Perhaps no one ever more
completely lost sight of the true characteristic of the manifesta
tions of the will, by thrusting them behind the phenomena of
the sensibility, than President Edwards ; and hence the diffi
culty in question seemed to have no existence for him. So far
from troubling himself about the line which separates the human
agency from the divine, he calmly and quietly speaks as if such
a line had no existence. According to his view, the divine
agency encircles all, and man is merely the subject of its influ
ence. It is true, he uses the terms active and actions, as appli
cable to man and his exertions ; but yet he regards his very acts,
his volitions, as being produced by God. " In efficacious grace,"
says he, " God does all, and we do all. God produces all, and
we act all. For that is what he produces ; namely, our own
acts." Now I think Edwards could not have used such lan
guage, if he had attached any other idea to the term act, than
what really belongs to it when it is applied, as it -often is, to
the passive states of the intelligence and the sensibility. An
act of the intellect, or an act of the affections, may be produced
by the power of God ; but not an act of the will. For, as the
Princeton Review well says, " a necessary volition is an ab
surdity, a thing inconceivable."
It is scarcely necessary to add, that in causing all real human
agency to disappear before the divine sovereignty, Edwards
merely reproduced the opinion of Calvin ; which he endeav
oured to establish, not by a fierce, unreasoning dogmatism, but
upon the principles of reason and philosophy. " The apostle,"
says Calvin, "ascribes everything to the Lord s mercy, and
leaves nothing to our wills or exertions"* He even contends,
that to " suppose man to be a cooperator with God, so that the
validity of election depends on his consent," is to make the
" will of man superior to the counsel of God ;"f as if there were
no possible medium between nothing and omnipotence.
Institutes, b. iii, ch. xziv. t IMd.
180 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part L
SECTION V.
The danger of mistaking distorted for exalted views of the divine
sovereignty.
There is no danger, it is true, that we shall ever form too
exalted conceptions of the divine majesty. All notions must
fall infinitely below the sublime reality. But we may proceed
in the wrong direction, by making it our immediate aim and
object to exalt the sovereignty of God. An object so vast and
overwhelming as the divine omnipotence, cannot fail to trans
port the imagination, and to fill the soul with wonder. Hence,
in our passionate, but always feeble, endeavours to grasp so
wonderful an object, our vision may be disturbed by our emo
tions, and the glory of God badly reflected in our minds. Our
utmost exertions may thus end, not in exalted, but in distorted
views of the divine sovereignty. Is it not better, then, for
feeble creatures like ourselves, to aim simply to acquire a
knowledge of the truth, which, we may depend upon it, will
not fail to exhibit the divine sovereignty in its most beautiful
lights?
If such be our object, we shall find, we think, that God is the
author of our spiritual views in religion, as well as those genuine
feelings of reverence and love, without which obedience is
impossible ; and that man himself is the author of the volitions
by which his obedience is consummated. This shows the pre
cise point at which the divine agency ceases, and human agency
begins ; the precise point at which the sphere of human power
comes into contact with the sphere of omnipotence, without
intersecting it and without being annihilated by it. It shows
at once the absolute dependence of man upon God, without a
denial of his free and accountable agency ; and it asserts the
latter, without excluding the Divine Being from the affairs of
the moral world. It renders unto Caesar the things which are
Caesar s, and unto God the things which are God s. At the
same time that it combines and harmonizes these truths, it
shows the errors of the opposite extremes, and places the doc
trines of human and divine agency upon a solid and enduring
basis, by preventing each from excluding the other.
In all our inquiries, truth, and truth alone, should be our
grand object. All by-ends and contracted purposes, all party
Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 181
schemes and sectarian zeal, will be almost sure to defeat their
own objects, by seeking them with too direct and exclusive an
aim. These, even when noble and praiseworthy, must be
sought and reached, if reached at all, by seeking and finding
the truth. Thus, for instance, would we exalt the sovereignty
oi God, then must we not directly seek to exalt that sovereignty,
but put away from us all the forced contrivances and factitious
lights which have been invented for that purpose. It is the
light of truth alqne, sought for its own sake, and therefore
clearly seen, that can reveal the sublime proportions, and the
intrinsic moral loveliness, of this awful attribute of the Divine
Being. On the other hand, would we vindicate the freedom
of man, and break into atoms the iron law of necessity, which
is supposed to bind him to the dust, then again must we seek
the truth without reference to this particular aim or object.
We must study the great advocates of that law with as great
earnestness and fairness as its adversaries. For it is by the
light of truth alone, that the real position man occupies in the
moral world, or the orbit his power moves in, can be clearly
seen, free from the manifold illusions of error ; and until it be
thus seen, the liberty of the human mind can never be suc
cessfully and triumphantly vindicated. If we would understand
these things, then, we must struggle to rise above the foggy
atmosphere and the refracted lights of prejudice, into the
bright region of eternal truth.
182 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
CHAPTER YI.
THE EXISTENCE OF MORAL EVIL, OR SIN, RECONCILED WITH THE
HOLINESS OF GOD.
One doubt remains,
That wrings me sorely, if I solve it not.
The world, indeed, is even so forlorn
Of all good, as thou speakest it, and so swarms
With every evil. Yet, beseech thee, point
The cause out to me, that myself may see
And unto others show it : for in heaven
One places it, and one on earth below. DANTE.
THEOLOGY teaches that God is a being of infinite perfections
Hence, it is concluded, that if he had so chosen, he might have
secured the world against the possibility of evil ; and this
naturally gives rise to the inquiry, why he did not thus secure
it? Why he did not preserve the moral universe, as he had
created it, free from the least impress or overshadowing of evil ?
Why he permitted the beauty of the world to become dis
figured, as it has been, by the dark invasion and ravages of sin ?
This great question has, in all ages, agitated and disturbed the
human mind, and been a prolific source of atheistic doubts
and scepticism. It has been, indeed, a dark and perplexing
enigma to the eye of faith itself.
To solve this great difficulty, or at least to mitigate the stu
pendous darkness in which it seems enveloped, various theories
have been employed. The most celebrated of these are the
following : 1. The hypothesis of the soul s preexistence ; 2. The
hypothesis of the Manicheans ; and, 3. The hypothesis of opti
mism. It may not be improper to bestow a few brief remaiks
on these different schemes.
SECTION I.
The hypothesis of the soul? 8 pre&cistence.
This was a favourite opinion with many of the ancient phi
losophers. In the Phsedon of Plato, Socrates is introduced as
maintaining it; and he ascribes it to Orpheus as its original
Chapter VL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 183
author. Leibnitz supposes that it was invented for the purpose
of explaining the origin of evil;* but the truth seems to be,
that it arose from the difficulty of conceiving how the soul
could be created out of nothing, or out of a substance so differ
ent from itself as matter. The hypothesis in question was also
iraintained by many great philosophers, because they imagined
tl at if the past eternity of the soul were denied, this would
shake the philosophical proof of its future eternity, f There
can be no doubt, however, that after the idea of the soul s pre-
existence had been conceived and entertained, it was very gen
erally employed to account for the origin of evil.
But it must be conceded that this hypothesis merely draws
a veil over the great difficulty it was designed to solve.
The difficulty arises, not from the circumstance that evil exists
in the present state of our being, but from the fact that it is
found to exist anywhere, or in any state, under the moral
administration of a perfect God. It is as difficult to conceive
why such a being should have permitted the soul to sin in a
former state of existence, even if such a state were an estab
lished reality, as it is to account for its rise in the present world.
To remove the difficulty out of sight, by transferring the origin
of evil beyond the sphere of visible things, is a poor substi
tute for a solid and satisfactory solution of it. The great
problem of the moral world is not to be illuminated by any
such fictions of the imagination ; and we had better let it alone
altogether, if we have nothing more rational and solid to advance.
SECTION II.
The hypothesis of the Manicheans.
Though this doctrine is ascribed to Manes, after whom it is
called, it is of a far more early origin. It was taught, says
Plutarch, by the Persian Magi, whose views are exhibited by
him in his celebrated treatise of Isis and Osiris. "Zoroaster,"
says he, " thought that there are two gods, contrary to each
other in their operations a good and an evil principle. To the
former he gave the name of Oromazes, and to the latter that
of Arimanius. The one resembles light and truth, the other
darkness and ignorance." We do not allude to this theory for
Essais de Theodicee. f Cudworth s Intellectual System.
1 84 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
the pui-pose of combatting it ; we suppose it would scarcely find
a respectable advocate at the present day. This, like many
other inventions of the great intellects of antiquity, has entirely
disappeared before the simple but sublime doctrines of the
religion of Jesus.
M. Bayle, it is true, has exhausted the resources of his genius,
as well as the rich stores of his learning, in order to adorn the
doctrine of Manes, and to render it more plausible, if possible,
than any other which has been employed to explain the origin
and existence of evil. But this was not because he sincerely
believed it to be founded in truth. He merely wished to show
its superiority to other schemes, in order that by demolishing
it he might the more effectually inspire the minds of men with
a dark feeling of universal scepticism. It was decorated by him,
not as a system of truth, but as a sacrifice to be offered up on
the altar of atheism. True to the instincts of his philosophy, he
sought on this subject, as well as on all others, to extinguish
the light of science, and manifest the wonders of his power,
by hanging round the wretched habitation of man the gloom
of eternal despair.
Though this doctrine is now obsolete in the civilized world,
it was employed by a large portion of the ancient philosophers
to account for the origin of evil. This theory does not, it is
true, relieve the difficulty it w^as designed to solve ; but it shows
that there was a difficulty to be solved, which would not have
been the case if evil could have been ascribed to the Supreme
God as its author. If those philosophers could have regarded
him as a Being of partial goodness, they would have found no
difficulty in explaining the origin and existence of evil ; they
would simply have attributed the good and the evil in the
world to the good and the evil supposed to pertain to his nature.
But they could not do this, inasmuch as the human mind no
sooner forms an idea of God, than it regards him as a being of
111. limited and unmixed goodness. It has shown a disposition,
in all ages, to adopt the most wild and untenable hypotheses,
rather than entertain the imagination that evil could proceed
from the Father of Lights. The doctrine of Manes, then, as
well as the other hypotheses employed to explain the origin of
evil, demonstrates how deep is the conviction of the human
mind that God is light, and in him there is no darkness at all.
Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 185
In searching after the fountain of evil, it turns from the great
source of life and light, and embraces the wildest extravagancies,
rather than indulge a dark suspicion respecting the goodness
of its Maker.
SECTION m.
The hypothesis of optimism.
" The fundamental principle of the optimist is," says Dugald
Stewart, "that all events are ordered for the best; and that
evils which we suffer are parts of a great system conducted by
almighty power under the direction of infinite wisdom and
goodness." Leibnitz, who is unquestionably one of the greatest
philosophers the world has produced, has exerted all his powers
to adorn and recommend the scheme of optimism. We have,
in a former chapter, considered the system of Leibnitz ; but we
have not denied its fundamental principle, which is so well
expressed in the above language of Mr. Stewart. If he had
confined himself to that principle, without undertaking to
explain how it is that God orders all things for the best, his
doctrine would, have been free from objections, except for a
want of clearness and precision.
Dr. Chalmers has said that the scheme of optimism, as left
by Leibnitz, is merely an hypothesis. He insists, however, that
even as an hypothesis, it may be made to serve a highly im
portant purpose in theology. " If it be not an offensive weapon,"
says he, "with which we may beat down and demolish the
strongholds of the sceptic, it is, at least, an armour of defence,
with which we may cause all his shafts to fall harmless at our
feet." This remark of Dr. Chalmers seems to be well founded.
The objection of the sceptic, as we have seen, proceeds on the
supposition that if a Being of infinite perfections had so chosen,
he might have made a better universe than that which actually
exists. But we have as good reasons to make suppositions as
the sceptic. . Let us suppose, then, that notwithstanding the
evil which reigns in the world, the universe is the best possible
universe that even infinite wisdom, and power, and goodness,
could have called into existence. Let us suppose that this
would be clearly seen by us, if we only knew the whole of the
case ; if we could only view the present condition of man in all
186 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
its connexions and relations to God s infinite plans for the uni
verse and for eternity. In other words, let us suppose, that if
we were only omniscient, our difficulty would vanish, and where
we now see a cloud over the divine perfections, we should
behold bright manifestations of them. This is a mere supposi
tion, it is true, but it should be remembered that the objection
in question is based on a mere supposition. When it is asked,
why God permitted evil if he had both the power and the will
to prevent it ? it is assumed that the prevention of evil is better,
on the whole, than the permission of it, and consequently more
worthy of the infinite wisdom and goodness ascribed to God.
But as this is a mere supposition, which has never been proved
by the sceptic, we do not see why it may not be sufficiently
answered by a mere supposition.
This is an important idea. In many a good old writer, it
exists in the dark germ; in Dr. Chalmers it appears in the
expanded blossom. Its value may be shown, and its beauty
illustrated, by a reference to the affairs of human life ; for many
of the most important concerns of society are settled and deter
mined by the application of this principle. If a man were on
trial for his life, for example, and certain facts tending to
establish his guilt were in evidence against him, no enlightened
tribunal would pronounce him guilty, provided any hypothesis
could be framed, or any supposition made, by which the facts
in evidence could be reconciled with his innocence. "Evi
dence," says a distinguished legal writer, " is always insufficient,
where, assuming all to be proved which the evidence tends to
prove, some other hypothesis may still be true ; for it is the
actual exclusion of any other hypothesis which invests mere
circumstances with the force of proof."* This is a settled prin
ciple of law. If any supposition can be made, then, which
would reconcile the facts in evidence with a man s innocence,
the law directs that he shall be acquitted. Any other rule of
decision would be manifestly unjust, and inconsistent with the
dictates of a sound policy.
This principle is applicable, whether the accused bear a good
or a bad moral character. As, according to the hypothesis, he
might be innocent ; so no tribunal on earth could fairly deter
mine that he was guilty. The hardship of such a conclusion
Starkie on Evidence.
Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 187
would be still more apparent in regard to the conduct of a man
whose general character is well known to be good. In such a
case, especially, should the facts be of such a nature as to ex
clude every favourable hypothesis, before either truth or justice
would listen to an unfavourable decision and judgment.
Such is the rule which human wisdom has established, in
order to arrive at truth, or at least to avoid error, in relation to
the acts and intentions of men. Hence, is it not reasonable, we
ask, that we should keep within the same sacred bounds, when
we come to form an estimate of the ways of God ? "No one can
fairly doubt that the world is replete with the evidences of his
goodness. If he had so chosen, he might have made every
breath a sigh, every sensation a pang, and every utterance of
man s spirit a groan ; but how differently has he constituted the
world within us, and the glorious world around us ! Instead of
swelling every sound with discord, and clothing every object
with deformity, he has made all nature music to the ear and
beauty to the eye. The full tide of his universal goodness flows
within us, and around us on all sides. In its eternal rounds, it
touches and blesses all things living with its power. We live,
and move, and have our very being in the goodness of God.
Surely, then, we should most joyfully cling to an hypothesis
which is favourable to the character of such a Being. Hence,
we infinitely prefer the warm and generous theory of the opti
mist, which regards the actual universe as the best possible, to
the dark and cold hypothesis of the sceptic, which calls in ques
tion the boundless perfections of God.
In the foregoing remarks, we have concurred with Dr. Chal
mers in viewing the doctrine of Bayle as a mere unsupported
hypothesis ; but have we any right to do so ? It has not been
proved, it is true ; but there are some things which require no
proof. Is not the doctrine of Bayle a thing of this kind ? It
certainly seems evident that if God hates sin above all things,
and could easily prevent it, he would not permit it to appear in
his dominions. This view of the subject recommends itself
powerfully to the human mind, which has, in all ages, been
worried and. perplexed by it. It seems to carry its own evi
dence along with it ; to shake the mind with doubt, and over
spread it with darkness. Hence, we should either expose its
fallacy or else fairly acknowledge its power.
188 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
On the other hand, the theory of Leibnitz, or rather the great
fundamental idea of his theory, is more than a mere hypothesis.
It rests on the conviction of the human mind that God is in
finitely perfect, and seems to now from it as a necessary conse
quence. For how natural, how irresistible the conclusion, that
if God be absolutely perfect, then the world made by him must
be perfect also ! But while these two hypotheses seem to be
sound, it is clear that both cannot be so : there is a real conflict
between them, and the one or the other must be made to give
way before our knowledge can assume a clearly harmonious
and satisfactory form.
The effects of the hypothesis of the sceptic may be neutralized
by opposing to it the hypothesis of the theist. But we are not
satisfied to stop at this point. "We intend, not merely to neu
tralize, but to explode, the theory of the sceptic. We intend to
wrest from it the element of its strength, and grind it to atoms.
We intend to lay our finger precisely upon the fallacy which
lies so deeply concealed in its bosom, and from which it derives
all its apparent force and conclusiveness. We shall drag this
false principle from its place of concealment into the open light
of day, and thereby expose the utter futility, the inherent ab
surdity, of the whole atheistical hypothesis, to which it has so
long imparted its deceptive power. If Leibnitz did not detect
this false principle, and thereby overthrow the theory of Bayle,
it was because he held this principle in common with him. We
must eliminate this error, common to the scheme of the atheist
and to that of the theist, if we would organize the truths which
both contain, and present them together in one harmonious and
symmetrical system ; into a system which will enable us, not
merely to stand upon the defensive, and parry off the attacks of
the sceptic, but to enter upon his own territory, and demolish
his strongholds ; not merely to oppose his argument by a counter
argument, but to explode his sophism, and exhibit the cause of
God in cloudless splendour.
This false principle, this concealed fallacy, of which the athe
ist has been so long allowed to avail himself, has been the source
of many unsuspected errors, and many lamentable evils. It has
not only given power and efficacy to the weapons of the sceptic,
but to the eye of faith itself has it cast clouds and darkness over
the transcendent glory of the moral government of God. It has
Chapter VL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 189
prevented a Leibnitz from refuting the sophism of a Bayle, and
induced a Kant to declare a theodicy impossible. It has, indeed,
as we shall see, crept into and corrupted the whole mass of re
ligious knowledge ; converting the radiant and clearly-defined
body of truth into a dark, heterogeneous compound of conflicting
elements. Hence we shall utterly demolish it, that neither a
fragment nor a shadow of it may remain to darken and delude
the minds of men.
SECTION IV.
The argument of the atheist The reply of Leibnitz and other theists TJie
insufficiency of this reply.
Sin exists. This is the astounding fact. of which the atheist
avails himself. He has never ceased to contend, that as God
has permitted sin to exist, he was either unable or unwilling to
prevent it. God might easily have prevented sin, says he, if
he had chosen to do so ; but he has not chosen to do so, and
therefore his love of virtue is not infinite, his holiness is not
unlimited. Now, we deny this conclusion, and assert the infinite
holiness of God.
This assertion may be true, says Yoltaire, and hence God
would have prevented all sin, if his power had not been limited.
The only conceivable way, says he, to reconcile the existence
of sin with the purity of God, is " to deny his omnipotence."
We insist, on the contrary, that the power of God is absolutely
without bounds or limits. Though sin exists, we still maintain,
in opposition to every form of atheism, that this fact implies no
limitation of any of the perfections of God.
Before proceeding to establish this position, we shall consider
the usual reply of the theist to the great argument of the
atheist. " The greatest love which a ruler can show for virtue,"
says Bayle, "is to cause it, if he can, to be always practised
without any mixture of vice. If it is easy for him to procure
this advantage to his subjects, and he nevertheless permits vice
to raise its head in his dominions, intending to punish it after
having tolerated it for a long time, his affection for virtue is not
the greatest of which we can conceive ; it is then not infinite"
This has been the great standing argument of atheism in all
ages of the world. This argument, as held by the atheists of
190 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
^antiquity, is presented by Cudworth in the following words:
(^ " The supposed Deity and Maker of the world was either will-
> ing to abolish all evils, but not able ; or he was able but not
\^ willing ; or else, lastly, he was both able and willing. This
latter is the only thing that answers fully to the notion of a God.
Now that the supposed Creator of all things was not thus both
able and willing to abolish all evils, is plain, because then there
would have been no evils at all left. "Wherefore, since there
is such a deluge of evils overflowing all, it must needs be that
either he was willing, and not able to remove them, and then
he was impotent ; or else he was able and not willing, and then
he was envious ; or, lastly, he was neither able nor willing, and
then he was both impotent and envious." This argument is,
in substance, the same as that presented by Bayle, and relied
upon by atheists in all subsequent times.
To the argument of Bayle, the following reply is given by
Leibnitz : " When we detach things that are connected together,
the parts from the whole, the human race from the universe,
the attributes of God from each other, his power from his
wisdom, we are permitted to say that God can cause virtue to
~be in the world without any mixture of vice, and even that he
may easily cause it to le so"* But he does not cause virtue to
exist without any mixture of vice, says Leibnitz, because the
good of the whole universe requires the permission of moral
evil. How the good of the universe requires the permission of
evil, he has not shown us ; but he repeatedly asserts this to be
the fact, and insists that if God were to prevent all evil, this
would work a greater harm to the whole than the permission
of some evil. Now, is this a sufficient and satisfactory reply to
the argument of the atheist ?
It certainly seems to possess weight, and is entitled to serious
consideration. Bayle contends, that as evil exists, the Creator
and Governor of the world cannot be absolutely perfect. He
should have concluded with me, Leibnitz truly says, that as
God is absolutely perfect, the existence of evil is necessary to
the perfection of the universe, or is an unavoidable part of the
best world that could have been created. It is thus that he
neutralizes, without demolishing, the argument of the atheist,
and each person is left to be more deeply affected by the argu-
Th6odic<Se.
Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 191
ment of Leibnitz, or by that of Bayle, as his faith in the
unlimited goodness of God is strong or weak. If the theist, by
such means, should gain a complete victory, this would be due
to the faith of the vanquished, rather than to the superiority
of the logic by which he is subdued.
To this argument of Leibnitz we may then well apply his
own remarks upon another celebrated philosopher. Descartes
met the argument of the necessitarian, not by exposing its
fallacy, but by repelling the conclusion of it on extraneous
grounds. " This was to cut the Gordian knot," says Leibnitz,
who was himself a necessitarian, " and to reply to the conclu
sion of one argument, not by resolving it, but by opposing to it
a contrary argument ; which is not conformed to the laws of
philosophical controversy." The reply of Leibnitz to Bayle is
clearly open to the same objection. It does not analyze the
sophism of the sceptic, or resolve it into its elements, and point
out its error ; it merely opposes its conclusion by the presenta
tion of a contrary argument. Hence it is not likely to produce
very great effect ; for, as Leibnitz himself says, in relation to
this mode of attacking sceptics, " It may arrest them a little,
but they will always return to their reasoning, presented in dif
ferent forms, until we cause them to comprehend wherein the
defect of their sophism consists." Leibnitz has, then, accord
ing to his own canons of criticism, merely cut the Gordian knot
of atheism, which he should have unravelled. He has merely
arrested the champions of scepticism " a little," whom he should
have overthrown and demolished.
His reply is not only incomplete, in that it does not expose
the sophistry of the atheist ; it is also unsound. It carries in its
bosom the elements of its own destruction. It is self-contra
dictory, and consequently untenable. It admits that it is easy for
God to cause virtue to exist, and yet contends that, in certain
cases, he fails to do so, because the highest good of the universe
requires the existence of moral evil. But how is this possible ? j
It will be conceded that the good of the individual would be M Q
promoted, if God should cause him to be perfectly holy and ///
happy. This would be for the good of each and every indi-
vidual moral agent in the universe. How, then, is it possible
for such an exercise of the divine power to be for the good
of all the parts, and yet not for the good of the whole ?
192 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
So far from being able to see how these things can hang
together, it seems evident that they are utterly repugnant to
each other.
The highest good of the universe, we are told, requires the
permission of evil. What good ? Is it the holiness of moral
agents ? This, it is said, can be produced by the agency of
God, without the introduction of evil, and produced, too, in the
greatest conceivable degree of perfection. Why should evil be
permitted, then, in order to attain an end, which it is conceded
can be perfectly attained without it ? Is there any higher end
than the perfect moral purity of the universe, which God seeks
to accomplish by the permission of sin ? It certainly is not the
happiness of the moral universe ; for this can also be secured,
in the highest possible degree, by the agency of the Divine
Being, without the permission of moral evil. What good is
there, then, beside the perfect holiness and happiness of the
universe, to the production of which the existence of moral evil
is necessary ? There seems to be no such good in reality. It
appears to be a dream of the imagination, a splendid fiction,
which has been recommended to the human mind by its horror
of the cheerless gloom of scepticism.
SECTION Y.
V
The sophism of the atheist exploded, and a perfect agreement shown to subsist
between the existence of sin and the holiness of God.
Supposing God to possess perfect holiness, he would certainly
prevent all moral evil, says the atheist, unless his power were
limited. This inference is drawn from a false premiss ; namely,
that if God is omnipotent, he could easily prevent moral evil,
and cause virtue to exist without any mixture of vice. This
assumption has been incautiously conceded to the atheist by his
opponent, and hence his argument has not been clearly and
fully refuted. To refute this argument with perfect clearness,
it is necessary to show two things : first, that it is no limitation
of the divine omnipotence to say that it cannot work contra
dictions ; and secondly, that if God should cause virtue to exist
in the heart of a moral agent, he would work a contradiction.
We shall endeavour to evince these two things, in order to
refute the grand sophism of the sceptic, and lay a solid founda-
Chapter VL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 193
tion for a genuine scheme of optimism, against which no valid
objection can be urged.
In the first place, then, it is not a limitation of the divine
omnipotence to say, that it cannot work contradictions. There
will be little difficulty in establishing this point. Indeed, it
will be readily conceded ; and if we offer a few remarks upon
it, it is only that we may leave nothing dark and obscure behind
us, even to those whose minds are not accustomed to such
Rpeculations.
As contradictions are impossible in themselves, so to say that
God could perform them, would not be to magnify his power,
but to expose our own absurdity. When we affirm, that om
nipotence cannot cause a thing to be and not to be at one and
the same time, or cannot make two and two equal to five, we
do not set limits to it ; we simply declare that such things are
not the objects of power. A circle cannot be made to possess
the properties of a square, nor a square the properties of a
circle. Infinite power cannot confer the properties of the one
of these figures upon the other, not because it is less than
infinite power, but because it is not within the nature, or
province, or dominion of power, to perform such things, to
embody such inherent and immutable absurdities in an actual
existence. In regard to the doing of such things, or rather of
such absurd and inconceivable nothings, omnipotence itself pos
sesses no advantage over weakness. Power, from its very
nature and essence, is confined to the accomplishment of such
things as are possible, or imply no contradiction. Hence it is
beyond the reach of almighty power itself to break up and
confound the immutable foundations of reason and truth. God
possesses no such miserable power, no such horribly distorted
attribute, no such inconceivably monstrous imperfection and
deformity of nature, as would enable him to embody absurdities
and contradictions in actual existence. It is one of the chief
excellencies and glories of the divine nature, that its infinite
power works within a sphere of light and love, without the least
tendency to break over the sacred bounds of eternal trutn, into
the outer darkness of chaotic night !
The truth of this remark, as a general proposition, will be
readily admitted. In general terms, it is universally acknowl
edged ; and its application is easy where the impossibility is
13
194 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part 1,
plain, or the contradiction glaring. But there are things which
really imply a contradiction, without being suspected to do so.
We may well ask, in relation to such things, why God does not
produce them, without being sensible of the absurdity of the
inquiry. The production of virtue, or true holiness, in the
breast of a moral agent, is a thing of this kind.*
This conducts us to our second position ; namely, that if God
should cause -virtue to exist in the breast of a moral agent, he
would work a contradiction. In other words, the production
of virtue by any extraneous agency, is one of those impossible
conceits, those inherent absurdities, which lie quite beyond the
sphere of light in which the divine omnipotence moves, and
has no existence except in the outer darkness of a lawless
imagination, or in the dim regions of error, in which the true
nature of moral goodness has never been seen. It is absurd,
we say, to suppose that moral agents can be governed and
controlled in any other way than by moral means. All physical
power is here out of the question. By physical power, in con
nexion with wisdom and goodness, a moral agent may be
created, and endowed with the noblest attributes. By physical
power, a moral agent may be caused to glow with a feeling of
love, and armed with an uncommon energy of will ; but such
effects, though produced by the power of God, are not the
virtue of the moral agent in whom they are produced. This
consists, not in the possession of moral powers, but in the proper
and obedient exercise of those powers, f If infinite wisdom,
and goodness, and power, should muster all the means and
appliances in the universe, and cause them to bear with united
energy on a single mind, the effect produced, however grand
and beautiful, would not be the virtue of the agent in whom it
is produced. Nothing can be his virtue which is produced
by an extraneous agency. This is a dictate of the universal
reason and consciousness of mankind. It needs no meta
physical refinement for its support, and no scholastic jargon
for its illustration. On this broad principle, then, which is so
clearly deduced, not from the confined darkness of the schools,
but the open light of nature, we intend to take our stand in
opposition to the embattled ranks of atheism.
The argument of the atheist assumes, as we have seen, that a
See chapter iii. T Compare chap. iii.
Chapter VL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 195
Being of infinite power could easily prevent sin, and cause holi
ness to exist. It assumes that it is possible, that it implies no
contradiction, to create an intelligent moral agent, and place it
beyond all liability to sin. But this is a mistake. Almighty
power itself, we may say with the most profound reverence,
cannot create such a being, and place it beyond the possibility
of sinning If it could not sin, there would be no merit, no vir- _ /
tiie, in its obedience. That is to say, it would not be a moral //
agent at all, but a machine merely. The power to do wrong, as
well as to do right, is included in the very idea of a moral and
accountable agent, and no such agent can possibly exist without
being invested with such a power. To suppose such an agent
to be created, and placed beyond all liability to sin, is to suppose
it to be what it is, and not what it is, at one and the same time ;
it is to suppose a creature to be endowed with a power to do
wrong, and yet destitute of such a power, which is a plain con
tradiction. Hence, Omnipotence cannot create such a being,
and deny to it a power to do evil, or secure it against the possi
bility of sinning.
We may, with the atheist, conceive of a universe of such
beings, if we please, and we may suppose them to be at all
times prevented from sinning by the omnipotent and irresistible
energy of the Divine Being ; and having imagined all this, we
may be infinitely better pleased with this ideal creation of our
own than with that which God has called into actual existence
around us. But then we should only prefer the absurd and
contradictory model of a universe engendered in our own weak
brains, to that which infinite wisdom, and power, and goodness
have actually projected into being. Such a universe, if freed
from contradictions, might be also free from evil, nay, from the
very possibility of evil ; but only on condition that it should
at the same time be free from the very possibility of good. It
admits into its dominions moral and accountable creatures,
capable of knowing and serving God, and of drinking at the
purest fountain of uncreated bliss, only by being involved in ir
reconcilable contradiction. It may appear more delightful to
the imagination, before it comes to be narrowly inspected, than
the universe of God ; and the latter, being compared with it,
may seem less worthy of the infinite perfections of its Author ;
but, after all, it is but a weak and crazy thing, a contradictious
196 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
and impossible conceit. We may admire it, and make it the
standard by which to try the work of God ; but, after all, it is
but an " idol of the human mind," and not " an idea of the Di-
dne Mir.d." It is a little, distorted image of human weakness,
and not a harmonious manifestation of divine power. Among
all the possible models of a universe, which lay open to the in
finite mind and choice of God, a thing so deformed had no
place ; and when the sceptic concludes that the perfections of
the Supreme Architect are limited, because he did work after
such a model, he only displays the impotency of his own wis
dom, and the blindness of his own presumption.
Hence, the error of the atheist is obvious. He does not con
sider that the only way to place all creatures beyond a liability
to sin, is to place them below the rank of intelligent and ac
countable beings. He does not consider that the only way to
prevent "sin from raising its head" is to prevent holiness from
the possibility of appearing in the universe. He does not con
sider that among all the ideal worlds present to the Divine Mind,
there was not one which, if called into existence, would have
been capable of serving and glorifying its Maker, and yet in
capable of throwing off his authority. Hence, he really finds
fault with the work of the Almighty, because he has not framed
the world according to a model which is involved in the most
irreconcilable contradictions. In other words, he fancies that
God is not perfect, because he has not embodied an absurdity
in the creature. If God, he asks, is perfect, why did he not
render virtue possible, and vice impossible? Why did he not
create moral agents, and yet deny to them the attributes of
moral agents? Why did he not give his creatures the power to
do evil, and yet withhold this power from them? He might
just as well have demanded, why he did not create matter
without dimensions, and circles without the properties of a circle.
Poor man ! he cannot see the wisdom and power of God mani
fested in the world, because it is not filled with moral agents
which are not moral agents, and with glorious realities that are
mere empty shadows !
If the above remarks be just, then the great question, why
has God permitted sin, which has exercised the ingenuity of man
in all ages, is a most idle and insignificant inquiry. The only
real question is, why he created such beings as men at all ; and
Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 197
not why he created them, and then permitted them to sin. The
first question is easily answered. The second, though often pro
pounded, seems to be a most unmeaning question. It is unmean-^ x
ing, because it seeks to ascertain the reason why God has per
mitted a thing, which, in reality, he has not permitted at all.
Having created a world of moral agents, that is, a world en
dowed with a power to sin, it was impossible for him to prevent [_
sin, so long as they retained this power, or, in other words, so
long as they continued to exist as moral agents. A universe of
such agents given, its liability to sin is not a matter for the will
of God to permit ; this is a necessary consequence from the
nature of moral agents. He could no more deny peccability to
such creatures than he could deny the properties of the circle to
a circle ; and if he could not prevent such a thing, it is surely
very absurd to ask why he permitted it.
On the supposition of such a world, God did not permit sin
at all ; it could not have been prevented. It would be consid
ered a very absurd inquiry, if we should ask, why God permit
ted two and two to be equal to four, or why he permitted the
three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. But
all such questions, however idle and absurd, are not more so
than the great inquiry respecting the permission of moral evil.
If this does not so appear to our minds, it is because we have
not sufficiently reflected on the great truth, that a necessary
virtueis. a-cojitradictipn in terms, an inherent and utter impos
sibility. The full possession of this truth will show us, that
the cause of theism has been encumbered with great difficulties,
because its advocates have endeavoured to explain the reason
why God has permitted a thing, which, in point of fact, he has
not permitted. Having attempted to explain a fact which has
no existence, it is no wonder that they should have involved
themselves in clouds and darkness. Let us cease then, to seek
the reason of that which is not, in order that we may behold
the glory of that which is.
We have seen that it is impossible for Omnipotence to create
moral agents, and yet prevent them from possessing an ability
to sin or transgress the law of God. In other words, that the
Almighty cannot give agents a power to sin, and at the same
time deny this power to them. To expect such things of him,
is to expect him to work contradictions ; to expect him to cause
198 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
a thing to be what it is, and not what it is, at one and the
same time. Thus, although sin exists, we vindicate the charac
ter of God, on the ground that it is an inherent impossibility
to exclude all evil from a moral universe. This is the high,
impregnable ground of the true Christian theist.
We have already said, that the only real question is, not why
God permitted evil, but why he created beings capable of sin
ning. Such creatures are, beyond all question, the most noble
specimens of his workmanship. St. Augustine has beautifully
said, that the horse which has gone astray is a more noble
creature than a stone which has no power to go astray. In like
manner, we may say, a moral agent that is capable of knowing,
and loving, and serving God, though its very nature implies an
ability to do otherwise, is a more glorious creature than any
being destitute of such a capacity. If God had created no such
beings, his work might have represented him " as a house doth
the builder," but not " as a son doth his father." If he had
created no such beings, there would have been no eye in the
universe, except his own, to admire and to love his works.
Traces of his wisdom and goodness might have been seen here
and there, scattered over his works, provided any eye had been
lighted up with intelligence to see them ; but nowhere would
his living and immortal image have been seen in the magnifi
cent temple of the world. It will be conceded, then, that there
is no difficulty in conceiving why God should have preferred a
universe of creatures, beaming with the glories of his own
__Jmage, to one wholly destitute of the beauty of holiness and the
light of intelligence. But having preferred the noblest order
of beings, its inseparable incident, a liability to moral evil, could
not have been excluded.
Hence God is the author of all good, and of good alone ; and
evil proceeds, not from him nor from his permission, but from
an abuse of those exalted and unshackled powers, whose nature
and whose freedom constitute the glory of the moral universe.
This, then, is the sublime purpose of God, to give and con
tinue existence to free moral agents, and to govern them for
their good as well as for his own glory. This is the decree of
the Almighty, to call forth from nothing into actual existence,
the universe which now shines around us, and spread over it
the dominion of his perfect moral law. He does not cause sin.
Chapter VL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 199
He does not permit sin. He sees that it will raise its hideous
head, but he does not say so let it le. No ! sin is the thing
which God hates, and which he is determined, by all the means
within the reach of his omnipotence, utterly to root out and
destroy. The word has gone forth, " Offences must needs come,
but woe unto the man by whom they come !" His omnipotence
is pledged to wipe out the stain and efface the shadow of evil,
in as far as possible, from the glory of his creation. But yet,
so long as the light and glory of the moral universe is permitted
to shine, may the dark shadow of evil, which moral agents cast
upon its brightness and its beauty, continue to exist and par
tially obscure its divine perfections. And would it not be un
worthy of the divine wisdom and goodness to remove this par
tial shadow, by an utter extinction of the universal light ?
SECTION VI.
The true and only foundation of optimism.
Though few have been satisfied with the details of the system
of optimism, yet has the great fundamental conception of that
system been received by the wise and good in all ages. " The
atheist takes it for granted," says Cudworth, " that whosoever
asserts a God, or a perfect mind, to be the original of all things,
does therefore ipso facto suppose all things to be well made,
and as they should be. And this, doubtless, was the sense of
all the ancient theologers," &c.* This distingushed philosopher
himself maintains, as well as Leibnitz, that the intellectual
world could not have been made better than it is, even by a
being of infinite power and goodness. " To believe a God,"
says he, " is to believe the existence of all possible good and
perfection in the universe ; it is to believe that things are as
they should be, and that the world is so well framed and
governed, as that the whole system thereof could not possibly
have been better."f
But while this fundamental principle has been held by philos
ophers, both ancient and modern, it has been, as we have
seen, connected with other doctrines, by which it is contra
dicted, and its influence impaired. The concession which is
universally made to the sceptic, that if God is omnipotent, he
Intellectual System, vol. ii, p. 328. t I d -> vol. ii, p. 149.
j
200 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
can easily cause virtue to exist without any mixture of vice, is
fatal to the great principle that lies at the foundation of optim
ism. It resolves the whole scheme, which regards the wtfrld
as the best that could possibly be made, into a loose, vague,
and untenable hypothesis. It is true, the good man would
infinitely prefer this hypothesis to the intolerable gloom of
atheism ; but yet our rational nature demands something more
solid and clear on which to repose. Indeed, the warmest sup
porters of optimism have supplied us with the lofty sentiments
of a pure faith, rather than with substantial and satisfactory
views. The writings of Plato, Leibnitz, Cudworth, and Ed
wards, all furnish illustrations of the justness of this remark.
But nowhere is its truth more clearly seen than in the following
passage from Plotinus : " God made the whole most beautiful,
entire, complete, and sufficient," says he ; " all agreeing friendly
with itself and its parts ; both the nobler and the meaner of them
being alike congruous thereunto. Whosoever, therefore, from
the parts thereof, will blame the whole, is an absurd and unjust
censurer. For we ought to consider the parts not alone by
themselves, but in reference to the whole, whether they be
harmonious and agreeable to the same ; otherwise we shall
not blame the universe, but some of its parts taken by them
selves."*
The theist, however, w T ho maintains this beautiful sentiment,
is accustomed to make concessions by which its beauty is
marred, and its foundation subverted. For if God could easily
cause virtue to exist without any mixture of vice, it is demon
strable that the universe might be rendered more holy and
happy than it is, in each and every one of its parts, and con
sequently in the whole. But if we assume the position, as in
truth we friay, that a necessary virtue is a contradiction in
terms, then we can vindicate the infinite perfections of God, by
showing that sin may enter into the best possible world. This
great truth, then, that " a necessary holiness is a contradiction
in terms," which has been so often uttered and so seldom fol
lowed out to its consequences, is the precise point from which
we should contemplate the world, if we would behold the power
and goodness of God therein manifested. This is the secret of
the world by which the dark enigma of evil is to be solved.
Cudworth s Intellectual System, vol. ii, p. 338.
Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 201
This is the clew, by which we are to be conducted from the
dark labyrinth of atheistical doubt and scepticism, into the clear
and open light of divine providence. This is the great central
light which has been wanting to the scheme of optimism, to
convert it from a mere but magnificent hypothesis, into a clearly
manifested and glorious reality.
God governs everything according to the nature which he
lias given it. Indeed, it would be as impossible to necessitate
true and genuine obedience by the application of power, as it
would be to convert a stone into a moral agent by the appli
cation of motives and persuasion. As sin is possible, then,
though omnipotence be pledged to prevent its existence, it is
clear that it cannot be regarded as a limitation of the divine
power. This cuts off the objection of Yoltaire, and explodes
the grand sophism on which it is based. God hates sin above
all things, and is more than willing to prevent it ; and he actu
ally does so, in so far as this is possible to infinite wisdom and
power. This refutes the objection of Bayle, and leaves his
argument without the shadow of a foundation. God does not
choose sin, or permit it as a means of the highest good, as if
there could be any higher good than absolute and universal
holiness ; but it comes to pass, because God has created a world
of moral agents, and they have transgressed his law. This
removes the high and holy God infinitely above the contami
nation of all evil, above all contact with the sin of the world,
and shows an impassable gulf between the purity of the Cre
ator and the pravity of the creature. By revealing the true
connexion of sin with the moral universe, and its relation to
God, it clearly shows that its existence should not raise the
slightest cloud of suspicion respecting his infinite goodness and
power, and thus reconciles the fact of sin s existence with the
adorable perfections of the Governor of the world.
It may be said, that although God could not cause holiness
to prevail universally, by the exercise of his power, yet he
might employ means and influences sufficient to prevent the
occurrence of sin. To this there are two satisfactory answers.
First, it is a contradiction to admit that God cannot necessitate
virtue, because such a thing is impossible ; and yet suppose that
he could, in all cases, secure the existence of it, without any
chance of failure. It both asserts and denies at the same time,
202 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
the idea of a necessary holiness. Secondly, the objection in
question proceeds on the supposition, that there are resources
in the stores of infinite wisdom and goodness, which might
have been successfully employed for the good of the universe,
and which God has failed to employ. But this is a mere gra
tuitous assumption. It never has been, and it never can bo
proved. It has not even the appearance of reason in its favour.
Let the objector show wherein the Almighty could have done
more than he has actually done to prevent sin, and secure holi
ness, without attempting violence to the nature of man, and
then his objection may have some force, and be entitled to
some consideration. But if he cannot do this, his objection
rests upon a mere unsupported hypothesis. It is very easy to
conceive that more light might have been imparted to men,
and greater influences brought to bear on their feelings ; but it
will not follow that such additional inducements to virtue would
have been good for them. For aught we know, it might only
have added to their awful responsibilities, without at all con
ducing to their good. For aught we know, the means employed
by God for the salvation of man from sin and misery have, both
in kind and degree, been precisely such as to secure the maxi
mum of good and the minimum of evil.
Let the sceptic frame a more perfect moral law for the gov
ernment of the world than that which God has established ; let
him show where more tremendous sanctions might be found to
enforce that law ; let him show how the Almighty might have
made a more efficacious display of his majesty, and power, and
goodness, than he has actually exhibited to us ; let him refer
to more powerful influences, consistent with the free-agency
and accountability of man, than those exerted by the Spirit of
God ; let him do all this, we say, and then he may have some
right to object and find fault. In one word, let him meet the
demand of the Most High, " what more could have been done
to my vineyard, that I have not done in it," and show it to be
without foundation, and then there will be some appearance of
reason in his objection.
Chapter VI/l WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 203
SECTION VIL
The glory of God seen in the creation of a world, which he foresaw would
fall under the dominion of sin.
It may be said that we have not yet gone to the bottom of
the difficulty ; that although omnipotence could not deny the
capacity to commit sin to a moral agent, yet God could pre
vent moral evil, by refusing to create any being who he fore
knew would transgress his law. As God might have prevented
the rise of evil in our world, by refusing to create man, why,
it may be asked, did he not do so ? Why did he not, in this
way, spare the universe that spectacle of crime and suffering
which has been presented in the history of our fallen race ? To
this we answer, that God did not choose to prevent sin in this
way, but to create the world exactly as he did, though he fore
saw the fall and all its consequences ; because the highest good
of the universe required the creation of such a world. We are
now prepared to see this great truth in its true light.
The highest good of the universe may, no doubt, be promoted
in various ways by the redemption of our fallen race, of which
we have no conception in our present state of darkness and
ignorance. But we are furnished with some faint glimpses of
the true source of that admiration and wonder with which the
angels of God are inspired, as they contemplate the manifesta
tion of his glory in reconciling the world to himself. The
felicity of the angels, and no doubt of all created intelligences,
must be found in the enjoyment of God. No other object is
sufficiently vast to fill and satisfy the unlimited desires of the
mind. And as the character of God must necessarily constitute
the chief happiness of his creatures, so every new manifesta
tion of the glory of that character must add to their supreme
felicity.
Now, if there had been no such thing as sin, the compassion
of God would have been forever concealed from the eyes of his
intelligent creatures. They might have adored his purity ; but
of that tender compassion which calls up the deepest and most
pleasurable emotions in the soul, they could have known abso
lutely nothing. They might have witnessed his love to sinless
beings ; but they could never have seen that love in its oinnipo-
204 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
tent yearnings over the ruined and the lost. The attribute of
mercy or compassion would have been forever locked up and
concealed in the deep recesses of the Divine Mind ; and the
blessing, and honour, and glory, and dominion, which shall be
ascribed by the redeemed unto Him that sitteth upon the throne,
and unto the Lamb, forever and ever, would not have been
heard in the universe of God. The chord which now sends
forth the sweetest music in the harmony of heaven, filling its
inhabitants with deep and rapturous emotions of sympathy and
delight, would never have been touched by the finger of God.
How far such a display of the divine character is necessary
to the ends of the moral government of God can be known only
to himself. We are informed in his word, that it is by the
redemption of the world, through Christ, that the ends of his
moral government are secured. It pleased the Father, saith
St. Paul, that in Christ all fulness should dwell ; and having
made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile
all things unto himself, whether they be things in earth, or
things in heaven. Thus we are told that all things in heaven
are reconciled unto God, by the blood of the cross. But it may
be asked, How was it possible to reconcile those beings unto
God who had never sinned against him, nor been estranged
from him ? According to the original, God is not exactly said
to reconcile, but to keep together, all things, by the mediation
and work of Christ. The angels fell from heaven, and man
sinned in paradise ; but the creatures of God are secured from
any further defection from him, by the all-controlling display
of his character, and by the stupendous system of moral agen
cies and means which have been called forth in the great work
of redemption.
In this view of the passage in question we are happy to find
that we are confirmed by so enlightened a critic as Dr. Mac-
knight. In relation to these words, " And by him to reconcile
all things," he says, " Though I have translated the dnoKaraXXd^a.
to reconcile, which is its ordinary meaning, I am clearly of
opinion that it signifies here to unite simply ; because the good
angels are said, in the latter part of the verse, to be reconciled
with Christ, who never were at enmity with him. I therefore
take the apostle s meaning to be this : < It pleased the Father,
by Christ, to unite all things to Christ, namely, as their Head and
Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 205
Governor. ; (Col. i, 20.) The same sublime truth is revealed in
other portions of Scripture, as in the fifteenth chapter of First Cor
inthians, where it is said, that it is the design of God to subject
all things to Christ, and exception is made only of Him by
vhom this universal subjection and dominion is established.
Qlie accomplishment of such an object, it will be admitted, is
>ne of unspeakable importance. For no government, however
perfect and beautiful in other respects, can be of much value
unless it be so constructed as to secure its own permanency.
This grand object, revelation informs us, has been attained by
the redemption of the world through Christ. But for his work,
those blessed spirits now bound together in everlasting society
wilh God, by the sacred ties of confidence and love, might have
fallen from him into the outer darkness, as angels and arch
angels had fallen before them. The ministers of light, though
having drunk deeply of the goodness of God, and rejoiced in
his smile, were not satisfied with their condition, and, striving
to better it, plucked down ruin on their heads. So, man in
paradise, not content with his happy lot, but vainly striving to
raise himself to a god, forsook his allegiance to his Maker, and
yielded himself a willing servant to the powers of darkness.
But an apostle, though born in sin, having tasted the bitter
fruits of evil, and the sweet mercies of redeeming love, felt
such confidence in God, that in whatsoever state he was, he
could therewith be content. Not only in heaven not only in
paradise but in a dungeon, loaded with irons, and beaten with
stripes, he could rejoice and give glory to God. This firm and
unshaken allegiance in a weak and erring mortal to the throne
of the Most High God, presents a spectacle of moral grandeur
and sublimity to which the annals of eternity, but for the ex
istence of sin, had presented no parallel.
It is by the scheme of Christianity alone that the confidence
of the creature in his God has been rendered too strong for the
gates of hell to prevail against him. But for this scheme, the
moral government of God might have presented scenes of mu
tability and change, infinitely more appalling than the partial
evil which we behold in our present state. Or if God had
chosen to prevent this, to render it absolutely impossible, by
the creation of no beings who he foreknew would rebel against
him, this might have contracted his moral empire into the most
206 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
insignificant limits. Thus, by the creation of the world, God
has prepared the way to extend the boundaries of his empire,
and to secure its foundations. Christ is the corner-stone of the
spiritual universe, by which all things in heaven and earth are
kept from falling away from God, its great centre of light and
life. ISTo wonder, then, that when this crowning event in the
moral government of the universe was about to be accomplished,
the heavenly host should have shouted, " Glory to God in the
highest!"
This view of the subject of moral evil, derived from revela
tion, harmonizes all the phenomena of the moral world with the
perfections of God, as well as warms and expands the noblest
feelings of the human heart. St. Paul ascribes the stability of
all things in heaven to the manifestation of the divine character
in the redemption of our fallen race. If this be the case, then
those who so confidently assert that God might have preserved
the world in holiness, without impairing the free-agency of man,
as easily as he keeps the angels from falling, are very much
mistaken. This assertion is frequently made ; but, as we con
ceive, without authority either from reason or revelation. It is
said by a learned divine, "That God has actually preserved
some of the angels from falling ; and that he has promised to
preserve, and will, therefore, certainly preserve the spirits of
just men made perfect ; and that this has been, and will be,
done without infringing at all on their moral agency. Of
course, he could just as easily have preserved Adam from fall
ing, without infringing on his moral agency."* This argument
is pronounced by its author to be conclusive and " unanswer
able." But if God preserves one portion of his creatures from
falling, by the manner in which he has dealt with those who
have fallen, it does not follow that he could just as easily have
kept each and every portion of them from a defection. If a
ruler should prevent a part of his subjects from rebellion, by
the way in which he has dealt with those who have rebelled,
does it follow that he might just as easily have secured obedi
ence in the rebels ? It clearly does not ; and hence there is a
radical defect in the argument of these learned divines and the
school to which they belong. Let them show that all things in
heaven are not secured in their eternal allegiance to God by the
Dwight s Sermons, vol. i, pp. 254-412. Dick s Lee., p. 248
Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 207
work of Christ, and then they may safely conclude, that man
might have been as certainly and infallibly secured against a
defection as angels and just men made perfect. If God binds
the spiritual universe to himself, by the display of his un
bounded mercy to a fallen race, it does not follow that he could,
by the same means, have preserved that race itself, and every
other order of beings, from a defection. For, on this supposi
tion, there would have been no fallen race to call forth his
infinite compassion, and send its binding influences over angels
and the spirits of just men made perfect.
According to the sublime idea of revelation, it is the trans
cendent glory of the cross that it exerts moral influences, which
have bound the whole intelligent creation together in one har
monious society with God, its sovereign and all-glorious head.
For aught we know, the stability of the spiritual universe could
not possibly have been secured in any other way ; and hence,
if there had been no fall, and no redemption, the grand intel
lectual system which is now so full of confidence and joy,
might have been without a secure foundation. We have seen
that its foundation could not, from the very nature of things,
have been established and fixed by mere power ; for this could
not have kept a single moral agent from the possibility of sin
ning, much less a boundless universe of such beings.
The Christian believer, then, labours under no difficulty in
regard to the existence of evil, which should in the least oppress
his mind. If he should confine his attention too narrowly to
the nature of evil as it is in itself, he may, indeed, perplex his
brain almost to distraction; but he should take a freer and
wider range, viewing it in all its relations, dependencies, and
ultimate results. If he should consider the origin of evil
exclusively, he may only meet with impenetrable obscurity and
confusion, as he endeavours to pry into the dark enigma of the
world ; but all that is painful in it will soon vanish, if he will
only view it in connexion with God s infinite plans for the good
of the universe. He will then see, that this world, with all its
wickedness and woe, is but a dim speck of vitality in a bound
less dominion of light, that is necessary to the glory and per
fection of the whole.
The believer should not, for one moment, entertain the low
view, that the atonement confers its benefits on man alone.
208 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
The plan of redemption was not an after-thought, designed to
remedy an evil which the eye of omniscience had not foreseen ;
it was formed in the counsels of infinite wisdom long before the
foundations of the world were laid. The atonement was made
for man, it is true ; but, in a still higher sense, man was made
for the atonement. All things were made for Christ. God,
whose prerogative it is to bring good out of evil, will turn the
short-lived triumph of the powers of darkness into a glorious
victory, and cause it to be a universal song of rejoicing to his
great name throughout the endless ages of eternity.
"Who would complain, then, that he is subject to the evils of
this life, since he has been subjected in hope? Everything
around us is a type and symbol of our high destiny. All things
shadow forth the glory to be revealed in us. The insignificant
seed that rots in the earth does not die. It lives, it germinates,
it grows, it springs up into the stately plant, and is crowned
with beauty. The worm beneath our feet, though seemingly so
dead, is, by the secret all-working power of God, undergoing
changes to fit it for a higher life. In due time it puts off its
form of death, and rises, " like a winged flower," from the cold
earth into a warm region of life and light. In like manner,
the bodies we inhabit, wonderfully and fearfully as they are
made, are destined to moulder in the grave, and become the
food of worms, before they are raised like unto Christ s glorified
body, clothed with power and immortality. Nature itself, with
all its teeming forms of beauty, must decay, till "pale con
cluding winter comes at last, and shuts the scene." But the
scene is closed, and all its magnificence shut in, only that it
may open out again, as it were, into all the wonders of a new
creation. Even so the human soul, although it be subjected to
the powers of darkness for a season, may emerge into the light
and blessedness of eternity. Such is the destiny of man; and
upon himself, under God, it depends whether this high des
tiny be fulfilled, or his bright hopes blasted. " I call heaven
and earth this day to witness," saith the Lord, " that I have set
before you life and death, blessing and cursing ; therefore choose
life."
Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 209
SECTION VIII.
The little, captious spirit of Voltaire, and other atheizing minute philosophers.
It will be objected, no doubt, that in the foregoing vindication
of the divine holiness, we have taken for granted the Christian
scheme of redemption ; but it should be remembered, that we
do not propose " to justify the ways of God to man" on deistical
principles. We are fully persuaded, that if God had merely
created the world, and remained satisfied to look down as an
idle spectator upon the evils it had brought upon itself, his
character and glory would not admit of vindication ; and we
should not have entered upon so chimerical an enterprise. We
have attempted to reconcile the government of the world, as set
forth in the system we maintain, and in no other, with the per
fections of God ; and whoever objects that this cannot be done,
is bound, we insist, to take the system as it is in itself, and not
as it is mangled and distorted by its adversaries. We freely
admit, that if the Christian religion does not furnish the means
of such a reconciliation, then we do not possess them, and are
necessarily devoted to despair.
Here we must notice a very great inconsistency of atheists
They insist that if the world had been created by an infinitely
perfect Being, he would not have permitted the least sin or dis
order to arise in his dominions ; yet, when they hear of any
interposition on his part for the good of the world, they pour
ridicule upon the idea of such intervention as wholly unworthy
of the majesty of so august a Being. So weak and wavering
are their notions, that it agrees equally well with their creed,
that it becomes an infinitely perfect Being to do all things, and
that it becomes him to do nothing ! Can you believe that an
omnipotent God reigns, says M. Yoltaire, since he beholds the
frightful evils of the world without putting forth his arm to
redress them? Can you believe, asks the same philosopher,
that so great a being, even if he existed, would trouble himself
about the affairs of so insignificant a creature as man ?
Such inconsistencies are hardly worthy of a philosopher, who
possesses a wisdom so sublime, and a penetration so profound,
as to authorize him to sit in judgment on the order and har
mony of the universe. They are perfectly worthy, however
14
210 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I ;
of the author of Candidus. The poison of this work consists,
not in its argument, but in its ridicule. Indeed, it is not even
an attempt at argument or rational criticism. The sole aim
of the author seems to be to show the brilliancy of his wit, at
the expense of " the best of all possible worlds ;" and it must
be confessed that he has shown it, though it be in the worst
of all possible causes.
Instead of attempting to view the existence of evil in the light
of any principle whatever, he merely accumulates evil upon
evil ; and when the mass has become sufficiently terrific, with
the jeering mockery of a small fiend, he delights in the con
templation of the awful spectacle as a conclusive demonstration
that the Kuler of the world is unequal to the government of his
creatures. His book is merely an appeal to the ignorance and
feelings of the reader, and can do no mischief, except when it
may happen to find a weak head in union with a corrupt heart.
For what does it signify that the castle of the Baron Thunder-
ten-trock was not the most perfect of all possible castles ; does
this disprove the skill of the great Architect of the universe ?
Or what does it signify that Dr. Pangloss lost an eye ; does this
extinguish a single ray of the divine omniscience, or depose
either of the great lights which God ordained to rule the world ?
Lastly, what does it signify that M. Voltaire, by a horrible
abuse of his powers, should have extinguished the light of
reason in his soul ; does this disprove the goodness of that
Being by whom those powers were given for a higher and a
nobler purpose ? A fracture in the dome of St. Paul s would,
no doubt, present as great difficulties to an insect lost in its
depths, as the disorders of this little world presented to the
captious and fault-finding spirit of M. Voltaire ; and would as
completely shut out the order and design of the whole structure
from its field of vision, as the order and design of the magnifi
cent temple of the world was excluded from the mind of this
very minute philosopher.
Oiapter vTLl WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 211
CHAPTER YH.
OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED.
Heaven seeth all, and therefore knows the sense
Of the whole beauteous frame of Providence.
His judgment of God s kingdom needs must fail,
Who knows no more of it than this dark jail. BAXTER.
One part, one little part, we dimly scan,
Through the dark medium of life s feverish dream ;
Yet dare arraign the whole stupendous plan,
If but that little part incongruous seem. BEATTIE.
THOUGH we have taken great pains to obviate objections by the
manner in which we have unfolded and presented our views,
yet we cannot but foresee that they will have to run the gaunt
let of adverse criticism. Indeed, we could desire nothing more
sincerely than such a thing, provided they be subjected to the
test of principle, and not of prejudice. But how can such a
thing be hoped for? Is all theological prejudice and bigotry
extinct, that an author may hope to have a perfectly fair hear
ing, and impartial decision ? Experience has taught us that we
must expect to be assailed by a great variety of cavils, and that
the weakest will often produce as great an effect as the strongest
upon the minds of sectarians. Hence, we shall endeavour to
meet all such objections as may occur to us, provided they can
be supposed to exert any influence over the mind.
SECTION I
It may ~be objected that the foregoing scheme is "new theology,"
If nothing more were intended by such an objection, than to
put the reader on his guard against the prejudice in favour of
novelty, we could not complain of it. For surely every new
opinion which comes into collision with received doctrines,
should be held suspected, until it is made to undergo the
scrutiny to which its importance and appearance of truth
may entitle it. No reasonable man should complain of
212 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
such a precaution. Certainly, the present writer should not
complain of such treatment, for it is precisely the treatment
which he has received from himself. He well remembers,
that when the great truths, as he now conceives them to be,
first dawned upon his own mind, how sadly they disturbed and
perplexed his blind veneration for the past. As he was him
self, then, so ready to shrink from his own views as "now
theology," he surely cannot censure any one else for so doing,
provided he will but give them a fair and impartial hearing
before he proceeds to scout them from his presence.
It is true, after the writer had once fairly made the discovery
that "old theology" is not necessarily true theology, he could
proceed with the greater freedom in his inquiries. He did not
very particularly inquire whether this or that was old or new,
but whether it was true. He felt assured, that if he could only
be so fortunate as to find the truth, the defect of novelty would
be cured by lapse of time, and he need give himself no very
great concern about it.
Not many centuries ago, as everybody knows, Galileo was
condemned and imprisoned for teaching " new theology." He
had the unbounded audacity to put forth the insufferable heresy,
" directly against the very word of God itself," that the sun
does not revolve around the earth. The Vatican thundered,
and crushed Galileo; but it did not shake the solar system.
This stood as firm in its centre, and rolled on as calmly and as
majestically in its course, as if the Vatican had not uttered its
anathema. Its thunders are all hushed now. Nay, it has even
reversed its former decree, and concluded to permit the orbs
of light to roll on in the paths appointed for them by the
mighty hand that reared this beautiful fabric of the heavens and
the earth. Even so will it be, in relation to all sound views
pertaining to the constitution and government of the moral
world ; and those who may deem them unsound, will have to
give some more solid reason than an odious epithet, before
they can resist their progress.
We do not pretend that they have not, or that they cannot
give, more solid reasons for this opposition to what is called
"new theology." We only mean, that an objection, which,
entirely overlooking the truth or the falsehood of an opinion,
appeals to prejudice by the use of an odious name, is unworthy
Chapter VII.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 213
of a serious and candid inquirer after truth, and therefore
should be laid aside by all who aspire to such a character.
SECTION II.
It may "be imagined that the views herein set forth limit the omnipotence of
God.
This objection has already been sufficiently answered ; but it
may be well to notice it more distinctly and by itself, as it is
one upon which great reliance will be placed. It is not deny
ing the omnipotence of God, as all agree, to say that he cannot
work contradictions ; but, as we have seen, a necessitated voli
tion is a contradiction in terms. Hence, it does not deny or
limit the divine omnipotence, to say, it cannot produce or neces
sitate our volitions. It is absurd to say, that that is a voluntary
exercise of power, which is produced in us by the power of God.
Both of these principles are conceded by those who will be
among the foremost, in all probability, to deny the conclusion
which necessarily flows from them. Thus, the Princeton
Keview, for example, admits that God cannot work contradic
tions; and also that "a necessary volition is an absurdity, a
thing inconceivable." But will it say, that God cannot work a
volition in the human mind ? that omnipotence cannot work this
particular absurdity? If that journal should speak on this
subject at all, we venture to predict it will be seen that it has
enounced a great truth, without perceiving its bearing upon the
Princeton school of theology.
If this objection has any solidity, it lies with equal force
against the scheme of Leibnitz, Edwards, and other philosophers
and divines, as well as against the doctrine of the foregoing
treatise. For they affirm, that God chooses sin as the necessary
means of the greatest good ; and that he could not exclude sin
from the universe, without causing a greater evil than its per
mission. This sentiment is repeatedly set forth in the Essais de
Theodice"e of Leibnitz ; and it is also repeatedly avowed by Ed
wards. Now, here is an inherent impossibility ; namely, the
prevention of sin without producing a greater evil than its per
mission, which it is assumed God cannot work. In other words,
when it is asserted, that he chooses sin as the necessary means
of the greatest good, it is clearly intended that he cannot secure
214 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
the greatest good without choosing that sin should exist. Hence
if the doctrine of this discourse limits the omnipotence of God,
no less can be said of that to which it is opposed.
But both schemes may be objected to on this ground, and
both be set aside as limiting the perfections of God. Indeed,
it has been objected against the scheme of Leibnitz, "that it
seems to make something which I do not know how to express
otherwise than by the ancient stoical fate, antecedent and supe
rior even to God himself. I would therefore think it best to
eay, with the current of orthodox divines, that God was per
fectly free in his purpose and providence, and that there is no
reason to be sought for the one or the other beyond himself."*
We do not know what reply Leibnitz would have made to such
an objection; but we should be at no loss for an answer, were
it urged against the fundamental principle of the preceding
discourse. We should say, in the first place, that it was a very
great pity the author could not find a better way of expressing
his objection, " than by the ancient stoical fate, antecedent and
superior even to God himself." To say that God cannot work
contradictions, is not to place a stoical fate, nor any other kind
of fate, above him. And if it is, this impiety is certainly prac
tised by " the current of orthodox divines," even in the author s
own sense of the term ; for they all affirm that God cannot
work contradictions.
If such an objection has any force against the present treatise,
it might be much better expressed than by an allusion to " the
ancient stoical fate." Indeed, it is much better expressed by
Luther, in his vindication of the doctrine of consubstantiation.
When it was urged against that doctrine, that it is a mathe
matical impossibility for the same corporeal substance to be in
a thousand different places at one and the same time, the great
reformer resisted the objection as an infringement of the divine
sovereignty : " God is above mathematics," he exclaimed : " I
reject reason, common-sense, carnal arguments, and mathe
matical proofs."f There is no doubt but the orthodox divines
of the present day will be disposed to smile at this specimen
of Luther s pious zeal for the sovereignty of God ; and although
Witherspoon, as quoted in "New and Old Theology," issued by the Presby
terian Board of Publication.
f D Aubigne s History of the Reformation, book xiii.
Chapter VII.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 215
they may not be willing to admit that God is above all reason and
common-sense, yet will they be inclined to think that, in some
respects, Luther was a little below them. But while they smile
at Luther, might it not be well to take care, lest they should
display a zeal of the same kind, and equally pleasant in the
estimation of posterity ?
In affirming that omnipotence cannot work contradictions,
we are certainly very far from being sensible that we place a
" stoical fate " above God, or any other kind of fate. We would
not place mathematics above God ; much less would we place
him below mathematics. Nor would we say anything which
would seem to render him otherwise than "perfectly free in
his purpose, or in his providence." To say that he cannot make
two and two equal to five, is not, we trust, inconsistent with
the perfection of his freedom. If it would be a great imper
fection in mortals, as all orthodox divines will admit, to be able
to affirm and believe that two and two are equal to five ; then
it would be a still greater imperfection in God, not only to be
able to affirm such a thing, but to embody it in an actual
creation. In like manner, if it would be an imperfection in
us to be able to affirm so great " an absurdity," a thing so
" inconceivable " as a " necessary volition ;" then it could not
add much to the glory of the Divine Being, to suppose him
capable of producing such a monstrosity in the constitution and
government of the world.
There is a class of theologians who reject every explication
of the origin of evil, on the ground that they limit the divine
sovereignty ; and to the question why evil is permitted to exist,
they reply, " We cannot tell." If God can, as they insist he
can, easily cause holiness to shine forth with unclouded, uni
versal splendour, no wonder they cannot tell why he does not
do so. If, by a single glance of his eye, he can make hell itself
clear up and shine out into a heaven, and fix the eternal glories
Df the moral universe upon an immovable foundation, no wonder
they can see no reason why he refuses to do so. The only
wonder is that they cannot see that, on this principle, there is
no reason at all for such refusal, and the permission of moral
evil. For if God can do all this, and yet permits sin "to raise
its hideous head in his dominions," then there is, and must be,
something which he loves more than holiness, or abhors more
216 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part 1,
than sin. And hence, the reason why they cannot tell is, in
our humble opinion, because they have already told too much,
more than they know. To doubt in the right place, is often the
best cure for doubt ; and to dogmatize in the wrong place, is
often the most certain road to scepticism.
SECTION III.
The foregoing scheme, it may le said, presents a gloomy view of the universe.
If we say that God cannot necessitate our volitions, or neces
sarily exclude all evil from a moral system, it will be objected,
that, on these principles, " we have no certainty of the con
tinued obedience of holy, angelic, and redeemed spirits."*
This is true, if the scheme of necessity affords the only ground
of certainty in the universe. But we cannot see the justness
of this assumption. It is agreed on all sides, that a fixed habit
of acting, formed by repeated and long-continued acts, is a
pretty sure foundation for the certainty of action. Hence, there
may be some little certainty, some little stability in the moral
world, without supposing all things therein to be necessitated.
Perhaps there may be, on this hypothesis, as great certainty
therein, as is actually found to exist. In the assertion so often
made, that if all our volitions are not controlled by the divine
power, but left to ourselves, then the moral world will not be
so well governed as the natural, and disorders will be found
therein ; the fact seems to be overlooked, that there is actually
disorder and confusion in the moral world. If it were our object
to find an hypothesis to overturn and refute the facts of the
moral world, we know of none better adapted to this purpose
than the doctrine of necessity ; but if it be our aim, not to deny,
but to explain the phenomena of the moral world, then must
we adopt some other scheme.
But it has been eloquently said, that " if God could not have
prevented sin in the universe, he cannot prevent believers from
falling ; he cannot prevent Gabriel and Paul from sinking at
once into devils, and heaven from turning into a hell. And
were he to create new races to fill the vacant seats, they might
turn to devils as fast as he created them, in spite of anything
that he could do short of destroying their moral agency. He
Old and New Theology, p. 38.
Chapter VIL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 217
is liable to be defeated in all his designs, and to be as miserable
as he is benevolent. This is infinitely the gloomiest idea that
was ever thrown upon the world. It is gloomier than hell
itself." True, there might be a gloomier spectacle in the uni
verse than hell itself ; and for this very reason it is, as we have
seen, that God has ordained hell itself, that such gloomier
spectacle may never appear in the universe to darken its trans
cendent and eternal glories. It is on this principle that we
reconcile the infinite goodness of God with the awful spectacle
of a world lying in ruins, and the still more awful spectacle of
an eternal hell beyond the grave.
It is true, there might be a gloomier idea than hell itself;
there might be two such ideas. Nay, there might be two such
things ; but yet, so far as we know, there is only one. We beg
such objectors to consider, there are some things which, even
according to our scheme, will not take place quite so fast as
they may be pleased to imagine them. It is true, for example,
that a man, that a rational being, might take a copper instead
of a guinea, if both were presented for his selection; but
although we may conceive this, it does not follow that he will
actually take the copper and leave the guinea. It is also true,
that a man might throw himself down from the brink of a
precipice into a yawning gulf; yet he may, perhaps, refuse to
do so. This may be merely a gloomy idea, and may never
become a gloomy fact. In like manner, as one world fell away
from God, so might another, and another. But yet this imagin
ation may never be realized. Indeed, the Supreme Ruler of
all things has assured us that it will not be the case 5 and in
forming our views of the universe, we feel more disposed to
look at facts than at fancies.
We need not frighten ourselves at " gloomy ideas." There
are gloomy facts enough in the universe to call forth all our
feais. Indeed, if we should permit our minds to be directed,
not by the reality of things, but by the relative gloominess of
ideas, we should altogether deny the eternity of future torments,
and rejoice in the contemplation of the bright prospects of the
universal holiness and happiness of created beings. We believe,
however, that when the truth is once found, it will present the
universe of God in a more glorious point of view, than it can
be made to display by any system of error whatever. Whether
218 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
the foregoing scheme possesses this characteristic of truth or
not, the reader can now determine for himself. He can deter
mine whether it does not present a brighter and more lovely
spectacle to contemplate God, the great fountain of all being
and all light, as doing all that is possible, in the very nature of
things, for the holiness and happiness of the universe, and
actually succeeding, through and by the cooperation of his
creation, in regard to all worlds but this ; than to view him as
possessing the power to shut out all evil from the universe, for
time and for eternity, and yet absolutely refusing to do so.
But let me insist upon it, that the first and the all-important
inquiry is, " What is truth ?" This is the only wise course ; and
it is the only safe course for the necessitarian. For no system,
when presented in its true colours, is more gloomy and appalling
than his own. It represents the great God, who is seated upon
the throne of the universe, as controlling all the volitions of his
rational creatures by the omnipotence of his will. The first
man succumbs to his power. At this unavoidable transgression,
God kindles into the most fearful wrath, and dooms both him
self and his posterity to temporal and eternal misery. If this
be so, then let me ask the reader, if the fact be not infinitely
"gloomier than hell itself?"
SECTION" IV.
It may 1)6 alleged, that in refusing to subject the volitions of men to the
power and control of God, we undermine the sentiments of humility and
submission.
This objection is often made : it is, indeed, the great prac
tical ground on which the scheme of necessity plants itself.
The object is, no doubt, a most laudable one ; but every laud
able object is not always promoted by wise means. Let us
see, then, if it be wise thus to assert the doctrine of a necessi
tated agency, in order to abase the pride of man, and teach him
a lesson of humility.
If we set out from this point of view, it will be found exceed
ingly difficult, if not impossible, to tell when and where to stop.
In fact, those who rely upon this kind of argument, often carry
it much too far ; and if we look around us, we shall find that
the only means of escaping the charge of pride, is to swallow
Chapter VIL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 219
all the doctrines which the teachers of humility may be pleased
to present to us. Thus, for example, Spinoza would have us
to believe that man is not a person at all, but a mere fugitive
mode of the Divine Being. Nothing is more ridiculous, in his
eyes, than that so insignificant a thing as a man should aspire
to the rank of a distinct, personal existence, and assume to him
self the attribute of free-will. " The free-will," says he, " is a
chimera of the same kind, flattered by our pride, and in reality
founded upon our ignorance." Now it may not be very hum
ble in us, but still we beg leave to protest against this entire
annihilation of our being.
Even M. Comte, who in his extreme modesty, denies the
existence of a God, insists that it is nothing but the fumes of
pride and self-conceit, the intoxication of vanity, which induces
us to imagine that we are free and accountable beings. No
doubt he would consider us sufficiently humble and submissive,
provided we would only forswear all the light which shines
within us and around us, and swallow his atheistical dogmas.
But there is something more valuable in the universe, if we
mistake not, than even a reputation for humility.
But no one will expect us to go so far in self-abasement
and humility, as to submit our intellects to all sorts of dogmas.
It will be amply sufficient, if we only go just far enough to
receive the dogmas of his particular creed. Thus, for example,
if you assail the doctrine of necessity, on which, as we have
seen, Calvinism erects itself, the Puseyite will clasp his hands,
and cry out, " Well done !" But if you turn around and oppose
any of his dogmas, then what pride and presumption to set up
your individual opinion against " the decisions of the mother
Church !"* And he will be sure to wind up his lesson of humil
ity with that of St. Yincentius : " Quod ubique, quod semper,
quod ab omnibus" Seeing, then, that a reputation for humility
is not the greatest good in the universe, and that the only pos
sibility of obtaining it, even from one party, is by a submission
of the intellect to its creed ; would it not be as well to leave
such a reputation to take care of itself, and use all exertions to
search out and find the truth ?
Tell a carnal, unregenerate man, it is said, that though
God had physical power to create him, he has not moral power
The writer here speaks from personal experience.
220 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
to govern hirn, and you could not furnish his mind with better
aliment for pride and rebellion. Should you, after giving this
lesson, press upon him the claims of Jehovah, you might expect
to be answered, as Moses was by the proud oppressor of Israel :
" "Who is the Lord, that I should obey his voice ? "* He must,
indeed, be an exceedingly carnal man, who should draw such
an inference from the doctrine in question. But we should not
tell him that " God had no moral power to govern him." We
should tell him, that God could not control all his volitions ;
that he could not govern him as a machine is governed,
without destroying his free-agency ; but we should still insist
that he possessed the most absolute and uncontrollable power
to govern him ; that God can give him a perfect moral law,
and power to obey it, with the most stupendous motives for
obedience ; and then, if he persist in his disobedience, God
can, and will, shut him up in torments forever, that others,
seeing the awful consequences of rebellion, may keep their
allegiance to him. Is this to deny the power of God to govern
his creatures ?
But is it not wonderful that a Calvinist should undertake to
test a doctrine by the consequences which a " proud oppressor,"
or " a carnal man," might draw from it ? If we should tell
such a man, that God possesses the absolute power to control
his volitions, and that nothing ever happens on earth but in
perfect accordance with his good will and pleasure, might we
not expect him to conclude, that he would then leave the matter
with God, and give himself no trouble about it ?
If we may judge from the practical effect of doctrines, then
the authors of the objection in question do not take the best
method to inculcate the lesson of humility. They take the pre
cise course pursued by Melancthon, and often with the same
success. This great reformer, it is well known, undertook to
frame his doctrine so as to teach humility and submission : with
this view he went so far as to insist, that man was so insignifi
cant a thing, that he could not act at all, except in so far as he
was acted upon by the Divine Being. Having reached this
position, he not only saw, but expressly adopted the conclusion,
that God is the author of all the volitions of men ; that he was
the author of David s adultery as well as of Saul s conversion.
Old and New Theology, p. 40.
Chapter VII.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 221
Now, it is true, if the human mind could abase itself so low as
to embrace such a doctrine, it would give a most complete, if
not a most pleasing example of its submissiveness. But it can
not very well do so. For even amid the ruins of our fallen
nature, there are some fragments left, which raise the intellect
and moral nature of man above so blind and so abject a
submission to the dominion of error. Hence it was, that
Melancthon himself could not long submit to his own doctrine ;
and he who had undertaken to teach others humility, became
one of the most illustrious of rebels. This suggests the profound
aphorism of Pascal : " It is dangerous to make us see too much
how near man is to the brutes, without showing him his great
ness. It is also dangerous to make him see his greatness with
out his baseness. It is still more dangerous to leave him igno
rant of both. But it is very advantageous to represent to him
both the one and the other."*
The fact is, that nothing can teach the human intellect a
genuine submission but the light of evidence: this, and this
alone, can rivet upon our speculative faculty the chains of
inevitable conviction, and bind it to the truth. Those who
teach error, then, may preach humility with success to the
blind and the unthinking ; but wherever men may be disposed
to think for themselves, they must expect to find rebels. How
many at the present day have begun, like Melancthon, by the
preaching of submission, and ended by the practice of rebellion
against their own doctrines. It is wonderful to observe the
style of criticism usually adopted by the faithful, as one illus
trious rebel after another is seen to depart from their ranks.
The moment he is known to doubt a single dogma of the estab
lished faith, the awful suspicion is set afloat, " there is no tell
ing where he will end." Alas ! this is but too true ; for when
a man has once discovered that what he has been taught all his
life to regard and reverence as a great mystery, is in reality an
absurdity and an imposition on his reason, there is no telling
where he will end. The reaction may be so great, indeed, as
to produce an entire shipwreck of his faith. But in this case,
let us not chide our poor lost brother with pride and presump
tion, as if we ourselves were unstained with the same sin. Let
us remember, that the fault may be partly our own, as well as
Pensees, I. Partie, art. iv, sec. vii.
MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
his. Let us remember, that the sin of not even every unwar
rantable innovation, is exclusively imputable to the innovator
himself. For, as Lord Bacon says, " A fro ward retention of
customs is a great innovator."
If those who, some centuries ago, formed the various creeds
of the Christian world, were fallible men, and if they permitted
serious errors to creep into the great mass of religious truth con
tained in those creeds, then the best way to prevent innovation
is, not to preach humility and submission, but to bring those
formularies into a conformity with the truth. For, if the " Old
Theology" be unsound, the "New Theology" will have the
audacity to show itself. And who, among the children of men,
will set bounds to the progress of the human mind, either in the
direction of God s word or his work, and say, Hitherto shalt
thou come, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed ? Who
will lash the winds into submission, or bind the raging ocean at
his feet?
SECTION V.
The foregoing treatise may T>e deemed inconsistent with gratitude to God.
" Such reflections," it has been urged, " afford as little ground
for gratitude as for submission. Why do we feel grateful to
God for those favours which are conferred on us by the agency
of our fellow-men, except on the principle that they are instru
ments in his hand, who, without l offering the least violence to
their wills, or taking away the liberty or contingency of second
causes, hath most sovereign dominion over them, to do by
them, and upon them, whatsoever himself pleaseth? On any
other ground, they would be worthy of the principal, and He of
the secondary praise."* True, if men are " only instruments in
his hand" we should give him all the praise ; but we should
never feel grateful to our earthly friends and benefactors. As
we should not, on this hypothesis, be grateful for the greatest
benefits conferred on us by our fellow-men ; so, in the language
of Hartley, and Belsham, and Diderot, we should never resent,
nor censure, the greatest injuries committed by the greatest
criminals. But on our principles, while we have infinite ground
for gratitude to God, we also have some little room for grati
tude to our fellow-men.
Old and New Theology.
Chapter VIL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 223
SECTION VI.
It may be contended, that it is unfair to urge the preceding difficulties against
the scheme of necessity ; inasmuch as the same, or as great, difficulties at"
tach to the system of those by whom they are urged.
This is the great standing objection with all the advocates of
necessity. Indeed, we sometimes find it conceded by the ad
vocates of free-agency ; of which concessions the opposite party
are ever ready and eager to avail themselves. In the statement
of this fact, I do not mean to complain of a zeal which all can
did minds must acknowledge to be commendable on the part of
the advocates of necessity. It is a fact, however, that the fol
lowing language of Archbishop Whately, in relation to the
difficulty of accounting for the origin of evil, is often quoted by
them : " Let it be remembered, that it is not peculiar to any
one theological system : let not therefore the Calvinist or the
Arminian urge it as an objection against their respective ad
versaries; much less an objection clothed in offensive language,
which will be found to recoil on their own religious tenets, as
soon as it shall be perceived that both parties are alike unable
to explain the difficulty ; let them not, to destroy an opponent s
system, rashly kindle a fire which will soon extend to the no
less combustible structure of their own."
No one can doubt the j ustice or wisdom of such a maxim ;
and it would be well if it were observed by all who may be dis
posed to assail an adversary s scheme with objections. Every
such person should first ask himself whether his objection
might not be retorted, or the shaft be hurled back with destruc
tive force at the assailant. But although the remark of Arch
bishop Whately is both wise and just, it is not altogether so in
its application to Archbishop King, or to other Arminians. For
example, it is conceded by Dr. Keid, that he had not found
the means of reconciling the existence of moral evil with the
perfections of God ; but is this any reason why he should not
shrink with abhorrence from the doctrine of necessity which so
clearly appeared to him to make God the direct and proper
cause of moral evil? "We acknowledge," says he, "that
nothing can happen under the administration of the Deity
which he does not permit. The permission of natural and moral
evil is a phenomenon which cannot be disputed. To account
224 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
for this phenomenon under the government of a Being of in
finite goodness, has, in all ages, been considered as difficult to
human reason, whether we embrace the system of liberty or
that of necessity." But because he could not solve this diffi
culty, must he therefore embrace, or at least cease to object
against every absurdity which may be propounded to him ?
Because he cannot comprehend why an infinitely good Being
should permit sin, does it follow that he should cease to protest
against making God the proper cause and agent of all moral
evil as well as good ? In his opinion, the scheme of necessity
does this ; and hence he very properly remarks : " This view of
the divine nature, the only one consistent with the scheme of
necessity, appears to me much more shocking than the permis
sion of evil upon the scheme of liberty. It is said, that it re
quires only strength of mind to embrace it : to me it seems to
require much strength of countenance to profess it." In this
sentiment of Dr. Reid the moral sense and reason of mankind
will, I have no doubt, perfectly concur. For although we may
not be able to clear up the stupendous difficulties pertaining to
the spiritual universe, this is no reason why we may be permit
ted to deepen them into absurdities, and cause them to bear, in
the harshest and most revolting form, upon the moral senti
ments of mankind.
The reason why Dr. Reid and others could not remove the
great difficulty concerning the origin of evil is, as we have seen,
because they proceeded on the supposition that God could
create a moral system, and yet necessarily exclude all sin from
it. This mistake, it seems to me, has already been sufficiently
refuted, and the existence of moral evil brought into perfect
accordance and harmony with the infinite holiness of God.
But it is strenuously insisted, in particular, that the divine
foreknowledge of all future events establishes their necessity ;
and thus involves the advocates of that sublime attribute in all
the difficulties against which they so loudly declaim. As I
have examined this argument in another place,* I shall not
dwell upon it here, but content myself with a few additional
remarks. The whole strength of this argument in favour of
necessity arises from the assumption, that if God foresees the
future volitions of men, they must be bound together with other
Examination of Edwards on the Will.
Chapter VII.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 225
things according to the mechanism of cause and effect; that is to
say that God could not foresee the voluntary acts of men, unless
they should be necessitated by causes ultimately connected with
his own will. Accordingly, this bold position is usually as
sumed by the advocates of necessity. But to say that God
could not foreknow future events, unless they are indissolubly
connected together, seems to be a tremendous flight for any
finite mind ; and especially for those who are always reminding
us of the melancholy fact of human blindness and presumption.
Who shall set limits to the modes of knowledge possessed by an
infinite, all-comprehending mind? Who shall tell how God
foresees future events ? Who shall say it must be in this or that
particular way, or it cannot be at all ?
Let the necessitarian prove his assumption, let him make it
clear that God could not foreknow future events unless they are
necessitated, and he will place in the hands of the sceptic the
means of demonstrating, with absolute and uncontrollable cer
tainty, that God does not foreknow all future events at all,
that he does not foresee the free voluntary acts of the human
mind. For we do know, as clearly as we can possibly know
anything, not even excepting our own existence, or the exist
ence of a God, that we are free in our volitions, that they are
not necessitated ; and hence, according to the assumption in
question, God could not foresee them. If the sceptic could see
what the necessitarian affirms, he might proceed from what he
knows, by a direct and irresistible process, to a denial of the
foreknowledge of God, in relation to human volitions.
But fortunately the assumption of the necessitarian is not
true. By the fundamental laws of human belief, we know that
our acts are not necessitated ; and hence, we infer that as God
foresees them all, he may do so without proceeding from cause
to effect, according to the method of finite minds. We thus
reason from the known to the unknown; from the clear light of
facts around us up to the dark question concerning the possi
bility of the modes in relation to the divine prescience. We
would not first settle this question of possibility, we would not
say that God cannot foreknow except in one particular way,
and then proceed to reason from such a postulate against the
clearest facts in the universe. No logic, and especially no logic
based upon so obscure a foundation, shall ever be permitted to
15
226 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,
extinguish for us the light of facts, or convert the universal intel
ligence of man into a falsehood.
Those who argue from foreknowledge in favour of necessity,
usually admit that there is neither before nor after with God.
This is emphatically the case with the Edwardses. Hence, fore
knowledge infers necessity in no other sense than it is inferred
by present or concomitant knowledge. This is also froely con
ceded by President Edwards. In what sense, then, does present
knowledge infer necessity ? Let us see. I know a man is now
walking before me; does this prove that he could not help
walking? that he is necessitated to walk? It is plain that it
infers no such thing. It infers the necessary connexion, not
between the act of the man in walking and the causes impelling
him thereto, but between my knowledge of the fact and the
existence of the fact itself. This is a necessary connexion
between two ideas, or propositions, and not between two events.
This confusion is perpetually made in the " great demonstra
tion" from foreknowledge in favour of necessity. It proves
nothing, except that the greatest minds may be deceived and
misled by the ambiguities of language.
This argument, we say, only shows a necessary connexion
between two ideas or propositions. This is perfectly evident
from the very words in which it is often stated by the advocates
of necessity. " I freely allow," says President Edwards, " that
foreknowledge does not prove a thing necessary any more than
after-knowledge ; but the after-knowledge, which is certain and
infallible, proves that it is now become impossible but that the
proposition known should be true." Now, here we have a
necessary connexion between the certain and infallible knowl
edge of a thing, and the infallible certainty of its existence !
What has this to do with the question about the will ? If any
man has ever undertaken to assert its freedom, by denying the
necessary connexion between two or more ideas, propositions,
or truths, this argument may be applied to him ; we have
nothing to do with it.
Again : " To suppose the future volitions of moral agents,"
says President Edwards, " not to be necessary events ; or, which
is the same thing, events which are not impossible but that they
may n6t come to pass ; and yet to suppose that God certainly
foreknows them, and knows all things, is to suppose God s
Chapter VIL] WITH THE HOLINESS OP GOD. 227
knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God
certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will
infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so contin
gent that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge
inconsistent with itself ; or that one thing he knows is utterly
inconsistent with another thing he knows. It is the same thing
as to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible
truth which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth."
Now all this is true. If we affirm God s foreknowledge to be
certain and at the same time to be uncertain, we contradict
ourselves. But what has this necessary connexion between the
elements of the divine foreknowledge, or between our proposi
tions concerning them, to do with the necessary connexion
among events f
The question is not whether all future events will cer
tainly come to pass; or, in other words, whether all future
events are future events ; for this is a truism, which no man in
his right mind can possibly deny. But the question is, whether
all future events will be determined by necessitating causes, or
whether they may not be, in part, the free unnecessitated acts
of the human mind. This is the question, and let it not be lost
sight of in a cloud of logomachy. If all future events are
necessitated, then all past events are necessitated. But if we
know anything, we know that all present events are not neces
sitated, and hence, all future events will not be necessitated.
We deem it always safer to reason thus from the known to the
unknown, than to invert the process.
But suppose that foreknowledge proves that all human voli
tions are under the influence of causes, in what sense does it
leave them free ? Does it leave them free to depart from the
influence .of motives ? By no means. It would be a contra
diction in terms, according to this argument, to say that they
are certainly and infallibly foreknown, and yet that they may
possibly not come to pass. Hence, if the argument proves
anything, it proves the absolute fatality of all human volitions.
It leaves not a fragment nor a shadow of moral liberty on
earth.
If this argument prove anything to the purpose, then Luther
was right in declaring that "the foreknowledge of God is a
thunderbolt to dash the doctrine of free-will into atoms ;" and
228 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I,
Dr. Dick is right in affirming, " that it is as impossible to avoid
them " (our volitions) " as it is to pluck the sun out of the
firmament."* It either proves all the most absolute necessi
tarian could desire, or it proves nothing. In our humble opinion
it proves the latter.
On this point the testimony of Dr. Dick himself is explicit :
" Whatever is the foundation of his foreknowledge," says he,
" what he does foreknow will undoubtedly take place. Hence,
then, the actions- of men are as unalterably fixed from eternity r ,
as if they had been the subject of an immutable decree "\ But
to dispel this grand illusion, it should be remembered, that the
actions of men will not come to pass because they are fore
known; but they are foreknown because they will come to
pass. The free actions of men are clearly reflected back in the
mirror of the divine omniscience they are not projected forward
from the engine of the divine omnipotence.
Since the argument in question proves so much, if it proves
anything, we need not wonder that it was employed by Cicero
and other ancient Stoics to establish the doctrine of an abso
lute and unconditional fate. "If the will is free," says he,
" then fate does not rule everything, then the order of all causes
is not certain, and the order of things is no longer certain in
the prescience of God ; if the order of things is not certain in
the prescience of God, then things will not take place as he
foresees them ; and if things do not take place as he foresees,
there is no foreknowledge in God." Thus, by a reductio ad
absurdum, he establishes the position that the will is not free,
but fate rules all things. Edwards and Dick, however, would
only apply this argument to human volitions. But are not
the volitions of the divine mind also foreknown ? Certainly
they are ; this will not be denied. Hence, the very men who
set out to exalt the power of God and abase the glory of man,
have, by this argument, raised a dominion, not only over the
power of man, but also over the power of God himself. In
other words, if this argument proves that we cannot act unless
we be first acted upon, and impelled to act, it proves no less
in relation to God ; and hence, if it show the weakness and
dependence of men, it also shows the weakness and depend
ence of God. So apt are men to adopt arguments which defeat
Theology, vol. i, p. 358. f Ibid.
Chapter VIL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 229
their own object, whenever they have any other object than
the discovery of truth.
It is frequently said, as we have seen, that it is a contradic
tion to affirm that a thing is foreknown, or will certainly come
to pass, and that it may possibly not come to pass. This posi
tion is at least as old as Aristotle. But let it be borne in mind,
that if this be a contradiction, then future events are placed,
not only beyond the power of man, but also beyond the power
of God itself ; for it is conceded on all hands, that God cannot
work contradictions. This famous argument entirely overlooks
the question of power. It simply declares the thing to be a
contradiction, and as such, placed above all power. In other
words, if it be absurd or self-contradictory to say, that a future
event is foreknown, and, at the same time, might not come to
pass, this proposition is true of the volitions of the divine no
less than of the human mind ; for they are all alike foreknown.
That is to say, if the argument from foreknowledge proves that
the volitions of man might not have been otherwise than they
are, it proves precisely the same thing in regard to the voli
tions of God. Thus, if this argument proves anything to the
purpose, it reaches the appalling position of Spinoza, that noth
ing in the universe could possibly be otherwise than it is. And
if this be so, then let the Calvinist decide whether he will join
with the Pantheist and fatalist, or give some little quarter to the
Arminian. Let him decide whether he will continue to em
ploy an argument which, if it proves anything, demonstrates
the dependency of the divine will as well as of the human;
and instead of exalting the adorable sovereignty of God, sub
jects him to the dominion of fate.
PART II.
THE EXISTENCE OF NATURAL EVIL, OR SUFFERING,
CONSISTENT WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD.
The path of sorrow, and that path alone,
Leads to the land where sorrow is unknown.
o o c= o o o
But He, who knew what human hearts would proTe,
How slow to learn the dictates of his love,
That, hard by nature and of stubborn will,
A life of ease would make them harder still,
In pity to the souls his grace designed
For rescue from the ruin of mankind,
Call d forth a cloud to darken all their years,
And said, " Go, spend them in the vale of tears."
COWPU.
PART II.
CHAPTER I.
GOD DESIRES AND SEEKS THE SALTATION OP ALL MEN.
Love is the root of creation, God s essence.
Worlds without number
Lie in his bosom, like children : he made them for this purpose only,
Only to love, and be loved again. He breathed forth his Spirit
Into the slumbering dust, and, upright standing, it laid its
Hand on its heart, and felt it was warm with a flame out of heaven.
TEQNEB.
THE attentive reader has perceived before this time, that one of
the fundamental ideas, one of the great leading truths, of the
present discourse is, that a necessary holiness is a contradiction
in terms, an inherent and utter impossibility. This truth has
shown us why a Being of infinite purity does not cause virtue
to prevail everywhere, and at all times. If virtue could be
necessitated to exist, there seems to be no doubt that such a
Being would cause it to shine out in all parts of his dominion,
and the blot of sin would not be seen upon the beauty of the
world. But although moral goodness cannot be necessitated to
exist, yet God has attested his abhorrence of vice and his appro
bation of virtue, by the dispensation of natural good and evil,
of pleasure and pain. Having marked out the path of duty for
us, he has made such a distribution of natural good and evil as
is adapted to keep us therein. The evident design of this ar
rangement is, as theologians and philosophers agree, to prevent
the commission of evil, and secure the practice of virtue. The
Supreme Ruler of the world adopts this method to promote
that moral goodness which cannot be produced by the direct
omnipotency of his power.
Hence, it must be evident, that although God desires the
happiness of his rational and accountable creatures, he does not
234 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart II,
bestow happiness upon them without regard to their moral
character. The great dispensation of his natural providence, as
well as the express declaration of his word, forbids the inference
that he desires the happiness of those who obstinately persist in
their evil courses. If we may rely upon such testimony, he
desires first the holiness of his intelligent creatures, and next
their happiness. Hence, it is well said by Bishop Butler, that
the " divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make
very free in our speculations, may not le a ~ba/re, single disposi
tion to produce happiness, but a disposition to make the good,
the faithful, the honest man happy."*
He desires the holiness of all, that all may have life. This
great truth is so clearly and so emphatically set forth in revela
tion, and it so perfectly harmonizes with the most pleasing con
ceptions of the divine character, that one is filled with amaze
ment to reflect how many crude undigested notions there are in
the minds of professing Christians, which are utterly inconsist
ent with it. " As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure
in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his
way, and live. Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die ?" This
solemn asseveration that God desires not the death of the sinner,
but that he should turn from his wickedness and live, one would
suppose should satisfy every mind which reposes confidence in
the divine origin of revelation. And yet, until the minds of
men are purged from the films of a false philosophy and secta
rian prejudice, they seem afraid to look at the plain, obvious
meaning of this and other similar passages of Scripture. They
will have it, that God desires the ultimate holiness and happi
ness of only a portion of mankind, and the destruction of all the
rest ; that upon some he bestows his grace, causing them to be
come holy and happy, and appear forever as the monuments of
his mercy ; while from some he withholds his saving grace, that
they may become the fearful objects of his indignation and
wrath. Such a display of the divine character seems to be
equally unknown to reason and to revelation.
Butler s Analogy, part i, chap. ii.
Chapter L] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 235
SECTION I.
The reason why theologians have concluded that God designs the salvation of
only a part of mankind.
The reason why so many theologians come to so frightful a
conclusion is, that they imagine God could very easily cause
virtue in the breast of every moral agent, if he would. Hence
arises in their minds the stupendous difficulty, " How can God
really desire the holiness and happiness of all, since he refuses
to make all holy and happy ? Is he really in earnest, in plead
ing with sinners to turn from their wickedness, since he might
so easily turn them, and yet will not do it? Is the great God
really sincere in the offer of salvation to all, and in the grand
preparations he hath made to secure their salvation, since he
will not put forth his mighty, irresistible hand to save them?"
Such is the great difficulty which has arisen from the imagina
tion in question, and confounded theology for ages, as well as
cast a dark shadow upon the Christian world. It is only by
getting rid of this unfounded imagination, this false supposition,
that this stupendous difficulty can be solved, and the glory of
the divine government clearly vindicated.
We have before us Mr. Symington s able and plausible
defence of a limited atonement, in which he says, that " the
event is the best interpreter of the dwine intention" Hence he
infers, that as all are not actually saved, it was not the design
of God that all should be saved, and no provision is really made
for their salvation. This argument is plausible. It is often
employed by the school of theologians to which the author
belongs, and employed with great effect. But is it sound ? No
doubt it has often been shown to be unsound indirectly that
is, by showing that the conclusion at which it arrives comes
into conflict with the express declarations of Scripture, as well
as with our notions of the perfections of God. But this is not
to analyze the argument itself, and show it to be a sophism.
Nor can this be done, so long as the principle from which the
conclusion necessarily follows be admitted. If we admit, then,
that God could very easily cause virtue or moral goodness to
exist everywhere, we must conclude that " the event is the best
interpreter of the divine intention ;" and that the atonement
236 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part H,
and all other provisions for the salvation of men are limited in
extent by the design of God. That is to say, if we admit the
premiss assumed by Mr. Symington and his school, we cannot
consistently deny their conclusion.
Nor could we resist a great many other conclusions which are
frightful in the extreme. For if God could easily make all men
holy, as it is contended he can, then the event is the best evi
dence of his real intention and design. Hence he really did
not design the salvation of all men. When he gave man a holy
law, he really did not intend that he should obey and live, but
that he should transgress and die. When he created the world,
he really did not intend that all should reach the abodes of
eternal bliss, but that some should be ruined and lost forever.
Such are some of the consequences which necessarily flow from
the principle, that holiness may be caused to exist in the breast
of every moral agent. This is not all. We have before us
another book, which insists that since the world was created,
the law of God has never been violated, because his will cannot be
resisted. Hence, it is seriously urged, that if theft, or adultery,
or murder, be perpetrated, it must be in accordance with the
will of God, and consequently no sin in his sight. " The whole
notion of sinning against God," this book says, "is perfectly
puerile." Now all this vile stuff proceeds on the supposition,
that " the event is the best interpreter of the divine intention ;"
and it rests upon that supposition with just as great security, as
does the argument in favour of a limited atonement. Though
we may well give such stuff to the winds, or trample it under
foot with infinite scorn, as an outrage against the moral senti
ments of mankind ; yet we cannot meet it on the arena of logic,
if we "concede that holiness may be everywhere caused to exist,
and universal obedience to the divine will secured.
The only principle, it clearly seems to us, on which we can
reconcile such glaring discrepancies between the express will
of God and the event, is, that the event is of such a nature that
it is not an object of power, or cannot be caused to exist by the
Divine Omnipotence. For his " secret will," or rather his exe
cutive will, is always in perfect harmony with his revealed
will. It is from an inattention to the foregoing principle, that
theologians have not been able to see and vindicate the sincerity
of God, in the offer of salvation to all men. We have examined
Chapter!.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 287
their efforts to remove this difficulty, and been constrained to
agree with Dr. Dick, that " we may pronounce these attempts
to reconcile the universal call of the gospel with the sincerity
of God, to be a faint struggle to extricate ourselves from the
profundities of theology." But on looking into those solutions
again, in which for some years we found a sort of rest, we could
clearly perceive why theology had struggled in vain to deliver
itself from its profound embarrassments on this subject, as well
as on many others. These solutions admit the very principle
which necessarily creates the difficulty, and renders a satis
factory answer impossible. Discard this false principle, substi
tute the truth in its stead, and the sincerity of God will come
out from every obscurity, and shine with unclouded splendour.
SECTION II.
Tke attempt of Howe to reconcile the eternal ruin of a portion of mankind
with the sincerity of God in his endeavours to save them.
To illustrate the justness of the remark just made, we shall
select that solution of the difficulty in question which has been
deemed the most profound and satisfactory. We mean the solu
tion of "the wonderful Howe."* This celebrated divine clearly
saw the impossibility of reconciling the sincerity of God with the
offer of salvation to all, on the supposition that he does anything
to prevent the salvation, or promote the ruin of those who are
finally lost. He rejects the scheme of necessity, or a concur
rence of the divine will, in relation to the sinful volitions of
men, as aggravating the difficulty which he had undertaken to
solve. This was one great step towards a solution. But it still
remained to " reconcile God s prescience of the sins of men with
the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and
whatsoever means he uses to prevent them." Let us see how
he has succeeded in his attempt to accomplish this great object.
He admits in this very attempt, " that the universal, continued
rectitude of all intelligent creatures had, we may be sure, been
willed with a peremptory, efficacious will, if it had been best."
lie expressly says, that God might have prevented sin from
Robert Hall, a profound admirer of Howe, has pronounced his attempt to
reconcile the sincerity of God with the universal offer of salvation, to be one of
his great master-pieces of thought and reasoning.
238 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part n,
raising its head in his dominions, if he had chosen to do so.
" Nor was it less easy," says he, " by a mighty, irresistible hand,
universally to expel sin, than to prevent it." Now, having
made this concession, was it possible for him to vindicate the
sincerity and wisdom of God in the use of means to prevent sin
which he foresaw must fail to a very great extent ?
After having made such an admission, or rather after having
assumed such a position, we think it may be clearly shown that
the author was doomed to fail ; and that he has deceived him
self by false analogies in his gigantic efforts to vindicate the
character of God. He says, for example : " We will, for dis
course s sake, suppose a prince endowed with the gift or spirit
of prophecy. This most will acknowledge a great perfection,
added to whatsoever other of his accomplishments. And sup
pose this his prophetic ability to be so large as to extend to
most events which fall out in his dominions. Is it hereby
become unfit for him to govern his subjects by laws, or any
way admonish them of their duty ? Hath this perfection so
much diminished him as to depose him from his government ?
It is not, indeed, to be dissembled, that it were a difficulty to
determine, whether such foresight were, for himself, better or
worse. Boundless knowledge seems only in a fit conjunction
with an unbounded power. But it is altogether unimaginable
that it should destroy his relation to his subjects ; as what of
it were left, if it should despoil him of his legislative power and
capacity of governing according to laws made by it ? And to
bring back the matter to the Supreme Euler: let it for the
present be supposed only, that the blessed God hath, belonging
to his nature, the universal prescience whereof we are discours
ing ; we will surely, upon that supposition, acknowledge it to
belong to him as a perfection. And were it reasonable to affirm,
that by a perfection he is disabled from government ? or were
it a good consequence, He foreknows all things he is therefore
unfit to govern the world? "
This way of representing the matter, it must be confessed, is
exceedingly plausible and taking at first view ; but yet, if we
examine it closely, we shall find that it does not touch the real
knot of the difficulty. The cases are not parallel. The prince
is endowed with a foreknowledge of offences, which it is not in
his power wholly to prevent. Hence it may be perfectly con-
Chapter L] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 239
sistent with his wisdom and sincerity, to use all the means in
his power to prevent them, though he may see they will fail in
some cases, while they will succeed in others. But God, accord
ing to the author, might prevent all sin, or exclude it all from
his dominions by "his mighty, irresistible hand." Hence it
may not be consistent with his wisdom and sincerity to use
means which he foresees will have only partial success, when
he might so easily obtain universal and perfect success. It
seems evident, then, that this is a deceptive analogy. It over
looks the root, and grapples with the branches of the difficulty.
Let it be seen, that no power can cause the universal, continued
moral rectitude of intelligent creatures, and then the two cases
will be parallel ; and God may well use all possible means to
prevent sin and cause holiness, though some of his subjects
may resist and perish. Let this principle, which we have
laboured to establish, be seen, and then may we entirely dispel
the cloud which has so long seemed to hang over the wisdom
and sincerity of the Supreme Kuler of the world. We might
offer strictures upon other passages of the solution under con
sideration ; but as the same error runs through all of them, the
reader may easily unravel its remaining obscurities and embar
rassments for himself.
If holiness cannot be caused by a direct application of power,
it follows that there is no want of wisdom in the use of indirect
means, or of sincerity in the use of the most efficacious means
the nature of the case will admit : but if universal holiness may
be caused to exist by a mere word, then indeed it seems to be
clearly inconsistent with wisdom to resort to means which must
fail to secure it, and with sincerity to utter the most solemn
and vehement asseverations that it is the will of God to secure
it; for how obvious is the inquiry, If he so earnestly desire it,
and can so easily secure it, why does he not do it ?
In rejecting the principle for which we contend, Howe has paid
the usual penalty of denying the truth ; that is, he has contra
dicted himself. " It were very unreasonable to imagine," says
he, " that God cannot, in any case, extraordinarily oversway
the inclinations and determine the will of such a creature, in a
way agreeable enough to its nature, (though we particularly
know not, and we are not concerned to know, or curiously to
inquire in what way,) and highly reasonable to suppose that in
240 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
many cases lie doth." Here he affirms, that our wills may be
overruled and determined in perfect conformity to our natures,
in some way or other, though we know not how. Why, then,
does not God so overrule our wills in all cases, and secure the
existence of universal holiness ? Because, says he, " it is mani
fest to any sober reason, that it were very incongruous this
should be the ordinary course of his conduct to mankind, or the
same persons at all times ; that is, that the whole order of intel
ligent creatures should be moved only by inward impulses ;
that God? 8 precepts, promises, and comminations, whereof their
nature is capable, should be all made impertinences, through
his constant overpowering those that should neglect them ; that
the faculties, whereby men are capable of moral government,
should be rendered to this purpose, useless and vain ; and that
they should be tempted to expect to be constantly managed
as mere machines that know not their own use."
What strange confusion and self-contradiction! The wills
of men may be, and often are, swayed by the mighty, irresist
ible hand of God, and in a way agreeable to their nature / and
yet this is not done in all cases, lest men should be governed
as mere machines ! The laws, promises, and threatenings of
God, are not to be rendered vain and useless in all cases, but
only in some cases ! Indeed, if we would escape such incon
sistencies and self-contradictions, we must return to the position
that a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms, that no
power can cause it. From this position we may clearly see,
that the laws, promises, and comminations; the counsels, ex
hortations, and influences of God, which are employed to pre
vent sin, are not a system of grand impertinences, are not a
vast and complicated machinery to accomplish what might be
more perfectly, easily, and directly accomplished without them.
We may see, that God really desires the holiness and happiness
of all men, although some may be finally lost ; that he is in
earnest in the great work of salvation ; and when he so solemnly
declares that he has no pleasure in the death of the sinner, but
would rather he should turn and live, he means precisely what
he says, without the least equivocation or mental reservation.
This position it is, then, which shows the goodness of God in
unclouded glory, and reconciles his sincerity with the final
result of his labours.
Chapter!.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 241
But we have not yet got rid of every shade of difficulty. For
it may still be asked, why God uses means to save those who
he foresees will be lost ? why he should labour when he foresees
his labour will be in vain ? To this we answer, that it does not
follow his labour will be in vain, because some may be pleased
to rebel and perish. This would be the case in regard to such
] ersons, provided his only object in what he does be to save
tiiem ; but although this is one great end and aim of his agency,
it does not follow that it is his only object. For if any perish,
it is certainly desirable that it be from their own fault, and not
from the neglect of God to provide them with the means of sal
vation. It is his object, as he tells us, to vindicate his own
character, and to stop every mouth in regard to the lost, as well
as to save the greatest possible number. But this object could
not be accomplished, if some should be permitted to perish
without even a possibility of salvation. Hence he gives to all
the means, power, and opportunity to turn and live ; and this
fact is nearly always alluded to in relation to the finally impeni
tent and lost. Thus says our Saviour, with tears of commiser
ation and pity : " O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I
have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth
her chickens under her wings, and ye would not ! Behold, your
house is left unto you desolate." Now the tears of the Redeemer
thus wept over lost souls, and this eloquent vindication of his
own and his Father s goodness and compassion, would be a
perfect mockery, if salvation had never been placed within
their reach, or if their obedience, their real spiritual obedience
and submission, might have been secured. But as it is, there
is not even the shadow of a ground for suspecting the sincerity
of the Redeemer, or his being in earnest in the great work of
saving souls.
Again the impenitent are addressed in the following awful
language: "Turn ye at my reproof: behold, I will pour out
my spirit upon you, I will make known my words unto you.
] because I have called, and ye refused ; I have stretched out
my hand and no man regarded ; but ye have set at naught all
my counsel and would none of my reproof: I also will laugh at
your calamity : I will mock when your fear cometh." Thus
the proceeding of the Almighty, in the final rejection of the
impenitent, is placed on the ground, that they had obstinately
16
242 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
resisted the means employed for their salvation. This seems to
remove every shade of difficulty. But how dark and enigmati
cal, nay, how self-contradictory, would all such language appear,
if they might have been very easily rendered holy and happy !
Thus, by bearing in mind that a necessary holiness is a contra
diction, an absurd and impossible conceit, the goodness of God
is vindicated in regard to the lost, and his sincerity is evinced
in the offer of salvation to all.
SECTION m.
The mews of Luther and Calvin respecting the sincerity of God in his
endeavours to save those who will finally perish.
On any other principle, we must forever struggle in vain to
accomplish so desirable and so glorious an object. If we pro
ceed on the assumption that holiness may be very easily caused
by an omnipotent, extraneous agency, we shall never be able to
vindicate the sincerity of the Almighty, in the many solemn
declarations put forth by him that he desires the salvation of
all men. The only sound, logical inference for such premises,
is that drawn by Luther, namely, that when God exhorts the
sinner, who he foresees will remain impenitent, to turn from hii
wickedness and live, he does so merely in the way of mocker)
and derision; just "as if a father were to say to his child,
Come, while he knows that he cannot come."*
The representation which Calvin, starting from the same
point of view, gives of the divine character, is not more amiable
or attractive than that of Luther. He maintains that "the
most perfect harmony " exists between these two things : " God s
having appointed from eternity on whom he will bestow his
favour and exercise his wrath, and his proclaiming salvation
indiscriminately to all."f But how does he maintain this posi
tion ? How does he show this agreement ? " There is more
apparent plausibility," says he, "to the objection [against pre
destination] from the declaration of Peter, that the Lord is not
willing that any should perish, but that all should come to
repentance. But the second clause furnishes an immediate
solution of the difficulty ; for the willingness to come to repent-
Hagenbach s History of Doctrines, vol. ii, p. 259.
| Institutes, book iii, chap, xxiv, sec. xvii.
Chapter!.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 243
ance must be understood in consistence with the general tenor of
Scripture."* Now what is the general tenor of Scripture, which
is to overrule this explicit declaration that " God is not willing
that any should perish ?" The reader will be surprised, perhaps,
that it is not Scripture at all, but the notion that God might
easily convert the sinner if he would. " Conversion is certainly
.in^the power of God;" he adds, "let him be asked, whether he
wills the conversion of all, when he promises a few individuals
to give them a heart of flesh, while he leaves them with < a
heart of stone. " Thus the very clearest light of the divine
word is extinguished by the application of a false metaphysics.
God tells us that he " is not willing that any should perish :"
Calvin tells us, that this declaration must, in conformity with
the general tenor of Scripture, be so understood as to allow us
to believe that he is not only willing that many should perish,
but also that their destruction is preordained and forever fixed
by an eternal and immutable decree of God. Nay, that they
are, and were, created for the express purpose of being devoted
to death, spiritual and eternal. Is this to interpret, or to refute
the divine word ?
The view which Calvin, from this position, finds himself
bound to take of the divine character, is truly horrible, and
makes one s blood run cold. The call of the gospel, he admits,
is universal is directed to the reprobate as well as to the elect ;
but to what end, or with what design, is it directed to the
former? "He directs his voice to them," if we may believe
Calvin, "but it is that they may become more deaf; he
kindles a light, but it is that they may be made more blind ; he
publishes his doctrine, but it is that they may be more besotted ;
he applies a remedy, but it is that they may not be healed.
John, citing this prophecy, declares that the Jews could not
believe, because the curse of God was upon them. Nor can it be
disputed, that to such persons as God determines not to enlighten,
lie delivers his doctrine involved in enigmatical obscurity, that
its only effect may be to increase their stupidity."f
In conclusion, we would add that it is this idea of a necessi
tated holiness which gives apparent solidity to the arguments
of the Calvinist, and which neutralizes the attacks of their op
ponents. To select only one instance out of a thousand : the
Institutes, book iii, chap, xxiv, sec. xvi. f Id., sec. xiii.
244 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part n.
Calvinist insists that if God had really intended the salvation of
all men, then all would have been saved ; since nothing lies be
yond the reach of his omnipotence. To this the Arminian
cries out with horror, that if God does not desire the salvation
of all, but is willing that a portion should sin and be eternally
lost, then his goodness is limited, and his glory obscured. In
perfect conformity with these views, the one contends for a
limited atonement, insisting that it is confined either in its origi
nal design, or in its application, to a certain, fixed, definite num
ber of mankind ; while the other maintains, with equal earnest
ness, that such is the goodness of God that he has sent forth
his Son to make an atonement for the sins of the whole world.
To design and prepare it for all, says the Calvinist, and then
apply it only to a few, is not consistent with either the wisdom
or goodness of God ; and that he does savingly apply it only to
a small number of the human race is evident from the fact that
only a small number are actually saved. However the doctrine
of a limited atonement, or, what is the same thing in effect, the
limited application of the atonement, may be exclaimed against
and denounced as dishonourable to God, all must and do admit
the fact, that it is efficaciously applied to only a select portion
of mankind ; which is to deny and to admit one and the same
thing in one and the same breath.
Now, in this contest of arms, it is our humble opinion that
each party gets the better of the other. Each overthrows the
other; but neither perceives that he is himself overthrown.
Hence, though each demolishes the other, neither is convinced,
and the controversy still rages. Nor can there ever be an end
of this wrangling and jangling while the arguments of the op
posite parties have their roots in a common error. Let the
work of Mr. Symington, or any other which advocates a limited
atonement, be taken up, its argument dissected, and let the
false principle, that God could easily make all men holy if he
would, be eliminated from them, and we venture to predict
that they will lose all appearance of solidity, and resolve them
selves into thin air.*
We do not intend to investigate the subject of a limited atonement in the pres
ent work, because it is merely a metaphysical off-shoot from the doctrine of elec
tion and reprobation, and must stand or fall with the parent trunk. The strength
of this we purpose to try in a subsequent chapter.
Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 245
CHAPTEK H.
NATURAL EVIL, OR SUFFERING, AND ESPECIALLY THE SUFFERING OF INFANTS
RECONCILED WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD.
Sweet Eden was the arbour of delight ;
Yet in his lovely flowers our poison blew :
Sad Gethsemane, the bower of baleful night,
Where Christ a health of poison for us drew ;
Yet all our honey in that poison grew :
So we from sweetest flowers could suck our bane,
And Christ, from bitter venom, could again
Extract life out of death, and pleasure out of pain.
GILES FLETCHEB.
IF, as we have endeavoured to show, a necessary holiness is a
contradiction in terms, then the existence of natural evil may
be easily reconciled with the divine goodness, in so far as it
may be necessary to punish and prevent moral evil. Indeed,
the divine goodness itself demands the punishment of moral
evil, in order to restrain its prevalence, and shut out the dis
orders it tends to introduce into the moral universe. Nor is it
any impeachment of the infinite wisdom and goodness of God,
if the evils inflicted upon the commission of sin be sufficiently
great to answer the purpose for which they are intended that
is, to stay the frightful progress and ravages of moral evil.
Hence it was that the sin of one man brought " death into the
world, and all our woe." Thus the good providence of God, no
less than his word, speaks this tremendous lesson to his intelli
gent creatures : " Behold the awful spectacle of a world lying
in ruins, and tremble at the very thought of sin ! A thousand
deaths are not so terrible as one sin !"
SECTION I
All suffering not a punishment for sin.
"We should not conclude from this, however, that all suffering
or natural evil bears the characteristic of a punishment for
moral evil. This seems to be a great mistake of certain theo
logians, who pay more attention to the coherency of their system
than to the light of nature or of revelation. Thus, says Dr.
246 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
Dick : " If our antagonists will change the meaning of words,
they cannot alter the nature of things. Pain and death are
evils, and when inflicted by the hand of a just God, must ~be
punishments : for although the innocent may be harassed and
destroyed by the arbitrary exercise of human power, none but
the guilty suffer under his administration. To pretend that,
although death and other temporal evils have come upon us
through the sin of Adam, yet these are not to be regarded as a
punishment, is neither more nor less than to say, they must
not be called a punishment, because this would not agree with
our system. If we should concede that they are a punishment,
we should be compelled to admit that the sin of the first man is
imputed to his posterity, and that he was their federal head.
We deny, therefore, that the labours and sorrows of the present
life, the loss of such joys as are left to us at its close, and the
dreadful agonies and terrors with which death is often attended,
have the nature of a penalty. In like manner, a man may call
black white, and bitter sweet, because it will serve his purpose ;
but he would be the veriest simpleton who should believe
him."
Now, we do not deny that the agonies and terrors of death
are sometimes a punishment for sin : this is the case in regard
to all those who actually commit sin, and sink into the grave
amid the horrors of a guilty conscience. But the question is,
Do suffering and death never fall upon the innocent under the
administration of God ? We affirm that they do ; and also that
they may fall upon the innocent, in perfect accordance with the
infinite goodness of God. In the first place, we reply to the
confident assertions of Dr. Dick, and of the whole school to
which he belongs, as follows : To pretend that death and other
temporal evils are always punishments, is neither more nor less
than to say, " they must be called punishments, because this
would agree with our system. If we should concede that they
are not a punishment, we should be compelled to admit that
the sin of the first man is ;not imputed to his posterity, and that
lie was not their federal head. If our antagonists," &c. Surely
it is not very wise to use language which may be so easily
retorted.
Secondly, it is true, the change of a word cannot alter the
nature of things ; but it may alter, and very materially too, our
Chapter H] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 24 Y
view of the nature of things. Besides, if to refuse to call suf
fering in certain cases a punishment, be merely to change a
word, why should so great an outcry be made about it ? Why
may we not use that word which sounds the most pleasantly to
the ear, and sits the most easily upon the heart ?
Thirdly, we do not arbitrarily and blindly reject the term
punishment, "because it does not agree with our system."
We not only reject the term, but also the very idea and the
thing for which it stands. We mean to affirm, that the inno
cent do sometimes suffer under the administration of God ; and
that all suffering is not a punishment for sin. The very idea of
punishment, according to Dr. Dick himself, is, that it is suffer
ing inflicted on account of sin in the person upon whom it is
inflicted ; and hence, wherever pain or death falls under the
administration of God, we must there find, says he, either actual
or imputed sin. Now, in regard to certain cases, we deny both
the name and the thing. And we make this denial, as it will
be seen, not because it agrees with our system merely, but
because it agrees with the universal voice and reason of man
kind, except where that voice has been silenced, and that rea
son perverted, by dark and blindly-dogmatizing schemes of
theology.
Fourthly, there is a vast difference, in reality, between regard
ing some sufferings as mere calamities, and all suffering as pun
ishment. If we regard all suffering as punishment, then we
need look no higher and no further in order to vindicate the
character of God in the infliction of them. For, according to
this view, they are the infliction of his retributive justice,
merited by the person upon whom they fall, and adapted to
prevent sin ; and consequently here our inquiries may termin
ate ; just as when we see the criminal receive the penalty due
to his crimes. On the other hand, if we may not view all suf
fering as punishment, then must we seek for other grounds and
principles on which to vindicate the goodness of God; then
must we look for other ends, or final causes, of suffering under
the wise economy of divine providence. And this search, as
we shall see, will lead us to behold the moral government of
the world, not as it is darkly distorted in certain systems of
theology, but as it is in itself, replete with light and ineffable
beauty.
248 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
But before we undertake to show this by direct arguments,
let us pause and consider the predicament to which the greatest
divines have reduced themselves, by their advocacy of such an
imputation of the sin of one man. Dr. Dick affirms, as we have
seen, that every evil brought upon man under the good provi
dence of God, must be a punishment for sin ; and hence, as
infants do not actually sin, they are exposed to divine wrath on
account of the sin of Adam, which is imputed to them. But is
not this imputation, which draws after itself pain and death,
also an evil? How has it happened, then, that in the good
providence of God, this tremendous evil, this frightful source of
so many evils, has been permitted to fall on the infant world ?
Must there not be some other sin imputed to justify the inflic
tion of such an evil, and so on ad infinitum? Will Dr. Dick
carry out his principle to this consequence ? Will he require, as
in consistency he is bound to require, that the tremendous evil of
the imputation of sin shall not fall upon any part of God s cre
ation, except as a punishment for some antecedent guilt ? No,
indeed : at the very second step his great principle, so con
fidently and so dogmatically asserted, completely breaks down
under him. The imposition of this evil is justified, not by any
antecedent guilt, but by the divine constitution, according to
which Adam is the federal head and representative of the
human race. Tims, after all, Dr. Dick has found some princi
ple or ground on which to justify the infliction of evil, beside
the principle of guilt or ill-desert. Might there not possibly be,
then, such a divine constitution of things, as to bring suffering
upon the offspring of Adam in consequence of his sin, without
resorting to the dark and enigmatical fiction of the imputation
of his transgression ? If there be a divine constitution, as Dr.
Dick contends there is, which justifies the imputation of moral
evil, with all its frightful consequences, both temporal and eter
nal death, may it not be possible, in the nature of things, to
suppose a divine constitution to justify suffering without the
imputation of sin ? How can the one of these things be so
utterly repugnant to the divine character, and the other so per
fectly agreeable to it ? Until this question be answered, we
may suspect the author himself of having assumed positions
and made confident assertions, " because they agree with his
system."
Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 249
" We say, then," says Dr. Dick, " that by his sin his posterity
became liable to the punishment denounced against himself.
They became guilty through his guilt, which is imputed to them,
or placed to their account ; so that they are treated as if they
had personally broken the covenant." Thus all the posterity
of Adam, not excepting infants, became justly obnoxious to the
"penalty of the covenant of works, death, temporal, spiritual,
and eternal." Now, we would suppose that this scheme of
imputation is attended with at least as great a difficulty as the
doctrine that the innocent do sometimes suffer under the good
providence of God. Indeed, the author does not deny that it is
attended with difficulties, which have never been answered.
In regard to the imputation of sin, he says : " Candour requires
me to add, that we are not competent fully to assign the reasons
of this dispensation. After the most mature consideration of
the subject, it appears mysterious that God should have placed
our first parent in such circumstances, that while he might
insure, he might forfeit, his own happiness and that of millions
of beings who were to spring from his loins. We cannot tell
why he adopted this plan with us and not with angels, each of
whom was left to stand or fall for himself."* Now, when it
is affirmed that the innocent may suffer for wise and good pur
poses, why is all this candour and modesty forgotten ? Why is
it not admitted, "It may be so;" "We cannot tell?" Why
is the fact, of which these writers so often and so eloquently
remind us, that the human intellect is a poor, blind, weak thing,
quite unfit to pry into mysteries, then sunk in utter oblivion,
and a tone of confident dogmatism assumed ? Why not act
consistently with the character of the sceptic or the dogmatist,
and not put on the one or the other by turns, according to the
exigencies of a system ?
If we ask, why infants are exposed to death, we are told, that
it is a punishment for Adam s sin imputed to them. We are
told that this must be so ; since " none but the guilty ever
suffer under the administration of God," who is not an arbi
trary and cruel tyrant to cause the innocent to suffer. Why
then, we ask, does he impute sin to them? To this it is replied,
" We cannot tell." No wonder ; for if there must always be
antecedent guilt to justify God in imposing evil upon his sub-
Lectures on Theology, vol. i, p. 458.
250 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part H,
jects, then there can be no reason for such a dispensation for
imposing the tremendous evil of the imputation of sin. The
advocates of it themselves have laid down a principle, which
shows it to be without a reason. Hence they may well say,
" We cannot tell." Thus suffering is justified by the imputation
of guilt ; the imputation of guilt by the divine constitution :
and the divine constitution, by nothing ! If this is all that can
be done, would it not have been just as well to have begun, as
well as ended, in the divine constitution of things ? But, no !
even the most humble of men must have some explanation,
some little mitigation of their difficulties, if it be only to place
the world upon the back of an elephant, the elephant upon the
back of a tortoise, and the tortoise upon nothing.
It seems to be inconceivably horrible to Dr. Dick, and others
of his school, that the innocent should ever be made to suffer
under the providence of God ; but yet they earnestly insist that
the same good providence plunges the whole human race in
fants and all into unavoidable guilt, and then punishes them
for it ! To say that the innocent may be made to suffer is mon
strous injustice is horrible ; but to say that they are made sin
ners, and then punished, is all right and proper ! To say that
the innocent can suffer under the administration of God, is to
shock our sense of justice, and put out the light of the divine
goodness ; but it is all well if we only say that the punishment
due to Adam s sin is made, by the same good administration, to
fall upon all his posterity in the form of moral evil, and that
then they are justly punished for this punishment ! Alas, that
the minds of the great and the good, born to reflect the light of
the glorious gospel of God upon a darkened world, should be so
sadly warped, so awfully distorted, by the inexorable necessities
of a despotic system !
SECTION IL
The imputation of sin not consistent with the goodness of God.
This point has been already indirectly considered, but it is
worthy of a more direct and complete examination. It is very
remarkable that although Dr. Dick admits he cannot reconcile
the scheme of imputation with the character of God, or remove
its seeming hardships, not to say cruelty, he yet positively
Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 251
affirms that " it is a proof of the goodness -of God."* Surely, if
the covenant of works, involving the imputation of sin, as ex
plained by Dr. Dick, be a "proof of the divine goodness," it
cannot but appear to be too severe. But as this point, on which
he scarcely dwells at all, is more elaborately and fully discussed
by President Edwards, we shall direct our attention to him.
"It is objected," says Edwards, "that appointing Adam to
stand in this great affair as the moral head of his posterity, and
so treating them as one with him, is injurious to them." "To
which," says he, " I answer, it is demonstrably otherwise ; that
such a constitution was so far from being injurious to Adam s
posterity any more than if every one had been appointed to
stand for himself personally, that it was, in itself considered,
attended with a more eligible probability of a happy issue than
the latter would have been ; and so is a constitution that truly
expresses the goodness of its Author." Now, let us see how this
is demonstrated.
" There is a greater tendency to a happy issue in such an ap
pointment," says he, " than if every one had been appointed to
stand for himself; especially on these accounts : (1.) That Adam
had stronger motives to watchfulness than his posterity would
have had ; in that, not only his own eternal welfare lay at stake,
but also that of all his posterity. (2.) Adam was in a state of
complete manhood when his trial began. "f In the first place,
then, the constitution for which Edwards contends is " an ex
pression of the divine goodness," because it presented stronger
motives to obedience than if it had merely suspended the eternal
destiny of Adam alone upon his conduct. The eternal welfare
of his posterity was staked upon his obedience ; and, having
this stupendous motive before him, he would be more likely to
preserve his allegiance than if the motive had been less power
ful. The magnitude of the motive, says Edwards, is the grand
circumstance which evinces the goodness of God in the appoint
ment of such a constitution. If this be true, it is very easy to
see how the Almighty might have made a vast improvement in
his own constitution for the government of the world. He
might have made the motive still stronger, and thereby made
the appointment or covenant still better : instead of suspending
merely the eternal destiny of the human race upon the conduct
Lectures on Theology, p. 4-58. f Edwaxds s Works, vol. ii, p. 648.
252 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
of Adam, he might have staked the eternal fate of the universe
upon it. According to the argument of Edwards, what a vast,
what a wonderful improvement would this have been in the
divine constitution for the government of the world, and how
much more conspicuously would it have displayed the goodness
of its Divine Author !
Again, the scheme of Edwards is condemned out of his own
mouth. If this scheme be better than another, because its mo
tives are stronger, why did not God render it still more worthy
of his goodness, by rendering its motives still more powerful
and efficacious? Edwards admits, nay, he insists, that God
might easily have rendered the motives of his moral govern
ment perfectly efficacious and successful. He repeatedly de
clares that God could have prevented all sin, " by giving such
influences of his Spirit as would have been absolutely effectual
to hinder it." If the goodness of a constitution, then, is to be
determined by the strength of its motives, as the argument of
Edwards supposes, then we are bound, according to his princi
ples, to pronounce that for which he contends unworthy of the
goodness of God, as being radically unsound and defective.
This is emphatically the case, as the Governor of the world
might have strengthened the motives to obedience indefinitely,
not by augmenting the danger, but by increasing the security
of his subjects; that is to say, not by making the penalty more
terrific, but by giving a greater disposition to obedience.
The same thing may be clearly seen from another point of
view. Let us suppose, for instance, that God had established
the constitution or covenant, that if Adam had persevered in
obedience, then all his posterity should be confirmed in holi
ness and happiness ; and that if he fell, he should fall for him
self alone. Would not such an appointment, we ask, have been
more likely to have been attended with a happy issue than
that for which Edwards contends ? Let us suppose again, that
after such a constitution had been established, its Divine Author
had really secured the obedience of Adam ; would not this
have made a " happy issue " perfectly certain ? "Why then was
not such a constitution established ? It would most assuredly
have been an infinitely clearer and more beautiful expression
of the divine goodness than that of Edwards. Hence, the phi
losophy of Edwards easily furnishes an unspeakably better con-
Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 253
stitution for the government of the world, than that which has
been established by the wisdom of God ! Is it not evident, that
the advocates of such a scheme should never venture before the
tribunal of reason at all ? Is it not evident, that their only safe
policy is to insist, as they sometimes do, that we do not know
what is consistent, or inconsistent, with the attributes of God,
in his arrangements for the government of the world ? Is it
not evident, that their truest wisdom is to be found in habitually
dwelling on the littleness, weakness, misery, and darkness of
the human mind, and in rebuking its arrogance for presuming
to pry into the mysteries of their system ?
The vindication of the divine goodness by Edwards, is, we
think it must be conceded, exceedingly weak. All it amounts
to is this, that this scheme is an expression of the goodness of
God, because, in certain respects, it is better than a scheme
which might have been established. So far from showing it to
be the best possible scheme, his philosophy shows it might be
greatly improved in the very respects in which its excellency is
supposed to consist. In other words, he contends that God has
displayed his goodness in the appointment of such a constitu
tion, on the ground that he might have made a worse ; though,
according to his own principles, it is perfectly evident that he
might have made a better ! Is this to express, or to deny, the
absolute, infinite goodness of God ? Is it to manifest the glory
of that goodness to the eye of man, or to shroud it in clouds and
darkness ?
Edwards also says, that " the goodness of God in such a con
stitution with Adam appears in this : that if there had been no
sovereign, gracious establishment at all, but God had proceeded
on the basis of mere justice, and had gone no farther than this
required, he might have demanded of Adam and all his pos
terity, that they should have performed perfect, perpetual obedi
ence" The italics are all his own. On this passage, we have
to remark, that it is built upon unfounded assumptions. It is
frequently said, we are aware, that if it had not been for the
redemption of the world by a "sovereign, gracious" dispensation,
the whole race of man might have been justly exposed to the
torments of hell forever. But where is the proof? Is it found
in the word of God ? This tells us what is, what has l)een, and
what will be j but it is not given to speculate upon what might
254 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
be. For aught we know, if there had been no salvation through
Christ, as a part of the actual constitution and system of the
world, then there would have been no other part of that system
whatever. We are not told, and we do not know, what it would
have been consistent with the justice of God to do in relation
to the world, if there had been no remedy provided for its
restoration. Perhaps it might never have been created at all.
The work of Christ is the great sun and centre of the system as
it is ; and if this had never been a part of the original grand
design, we do not know that the planets would have been created
to wander in eternal darkness. We do not know that even the
justice of God would have created man, and permitted him to
fall, wandering everlastingly amid the horrors of death, with
out hope and without remedy. We find nothing of the kind in
the word of God ; and in our nature it meets with no response,
except a wail of unutterable horror. We like not, we confess,
those vindications of God s goodness, which consist in drawing
hideous, black pictures of his justice, and then telling us that it
is not so dark as these. We want not to know whether there
might not be darker things in the universe than God s love ; we
only want to know if there could be anything brighter, or
better, or more beautiful.
The most astounding feature of this vindication of the divine
goodness still remains to be noticed. We are told that the con
stitution in question is good, because it was so likely to have
had a " happy issue." And when this constitution was estab
lished by the sovereign will and pleasure of God, the conduct
of Adam, it is conceded, was perfectly foreseen by him. At
the very time this constitution was established, its Divine Author
foresaw with perfect absolute certainty what would be the issue.
He knew that the great federal head, so appointed by him,
would transgress the covenant, and bring down the curse of
" death, temporal, spiritual, and eternal," upon all his posterity.
O, wonderful goodness ! to promise eternal life to the human
race on a condition which he certainly foreknew would not be
performed ! Amazing grace ! to threaten eternal death to all
mankind, on a condition which he certainly foreknew would be
fulfilled !
This cannot be evaded, by asserting that the same difiiculty
attaches to the fact, that God created Adam foreseeing he
Chapter II. J WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 255
would fall. His foreknowledge did not necessitate the fall of
Adam. It left him free as God had created him. Life and
death were set before him, and he had the power to stand, as
well as the power to fall. He had no right to complain of God,
then, if, under such circumstances, he chose to rebel, and incur
the penalty. But if the scheme of Edwards be true, the
descendants of Adam did not have their fate in their own
hands. It did not depend on their own choice. It was necessi
tated, even prior to their existence, by the divine constitution
which had indissolubly connected their awful destiny, their
temporal and eternal ruin, with an event already foreseen.
And the constitution binding such awful consequences to an
event already foreseen, is called an expression of the goodness
of God!
Suppose, for example, that a great prince should promise his
subjects that on the happening of a certain event, over which
they had no control, he would confer unspeakable favours upon
them. Suppose also, that at the same time he should declare
to them, that if the event should not happen, he would load
them with irons, cast them into prison, and inflict the greatest
imaginable punishments upon them during the remainder of
their lives. Suppose again, that at the very time he thus made
known his gracious intentions to them, he knew perfectly well
that the event on which his favour was suspended would not
happen. Then, according to his certain foreknowledge, the
event fails, and the penalty of the covenant or appointment is
inflicted upon his subjects : they are cast into prison ; they are
bound in chains, and perpetually tormented with the greatest
of all imaginable evils : not because they had transgressed the
appointment or sovereign constitution, but because an event
had taken place over which they had no control. Now, who
would call such a ruler a good prince ? Who could conceive,
indeed, of a more cruel or deceitful tyrant ? But we submit it
to the candid reader, if he be not more like the prince of pre
destination, than the great God of heaven and earth ?
Tins scheme of imputation, so far from being an expression
of infinite goodness, were indeed an exhibition of the most
frightful cruelty and injustice. It would be a useful, as well as
a most curious inquiry, to examine the various contrivances of
ingenious men, in order to bring the doctrine of imputation
256 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II.
into harmony with the justice of God. "We shall briefly allude
to only two of these wonderful inventions, those of Augustine
and Edwards. Neither of these celebrated divines supposed
that a foreign sin, properly so called, is ever imputed to any
one ; but that the sin of Adam, which is imputed to his descend
ants, is their own sin, as well as his.* But here the question
arises, How could they make Adam s sin to be the sin of his
descendants, many of whom were born thousands of years after
it was committed ?
Augustine, as is well known, maintained the startling paradox,
that all mankind were present in Adam, and sinned in him.
In this way, he supposed that all men became partakers in the
guilt of Adam s sin, and consequently justly liable to the
penalty due to his transgression. Augustine was quite too
good a logician not to perceive, that if all men are responsible
for Adam s sin, because they were in him when he transgressed,
then, it follows, that we are also responsible for the sins of all
our ancestors, from whom we are more immediately descended.
This follows from that maxim of jurisprudence, from that dic
tate of common-sense, that a rule of law is coextensive with the
reason upon which it is based. Hence, as .Wiggers remarks :
" Augustine thought it not improbable that the sins of ancestors
universally are imputed to their descendants."! This conclu
sion is clearly set forth in the extracts made by the translator
of Wiggers.:): If this scheme be true, we know indeed that we
are all guilty of Adam s sin ; but who, or how many of the
human race, were the perpetrators of Cain s murder beside him
self, we cannot determine. Indeed, if this frightful hypothesis
be well founded, if it form a part of the moral constitution of
the world, no man can possibly tell how many thefts, murders,
or treasons, he may have committed in his ancestors. One
thing is certain, however, and that is, that the man who is born
later in the course of time, will have the more sins to answer
for, and the more fearful will be the accumulation of his guilt ;
as all the transgressions of all his ancestors, from Adam down
to his immediate parents, will be laid upon his head.
Clearly as this consequence is involved in the fundamental prin-
Edwards on Original Sin, part iv, chap, iii, p. 543.
t Encheir., c. 46, 47. See also remarks by the American editor and translator.
1 See p. 284.
Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 257
ciple of Augustine s theory, the good father could not but reel
and stagger under it. " Respecting the sins of the other parents,"
says he, " the progenitors from Adam down to one s own imme
diate father, it may not improperly be delated, whether the
child is implicated in the evil acts and multiplied original faults
of all, so that each one is the worse in proportion as he is later ;
or that, in respect to the sins of their parents, God threatens
posterity to the third and fourth generation, because, by the
moderation of his compassion, he does not further extend his
anger in respect to the faults of progenitors, lest those on whom
the grace of regeneration is not conferred, should be pressed
with too heavy a burden in their own eternal damnation, if
they were compelled to contract by way of origin (originaliter)
the sins of all their preceding parents from the commence
ment of the human race, and to suffer the punishment due to
them* Whether, on so great a subject, anything else can or
cannot be found, by a more diligent reading and scrutiny of the
Scriptures, I dare not hastily affirm."!
Thus does the sturdy logician, notwithstanding his almost in
domitable hardihood, seem to stand appalled before the conse
quences to which his principles would inevitably conduct him.
Having followed those principles but a little way, the scene
becomes so dark with his representations of the divine justice,
that he feels constrained to retrace his steps, and arbitrarily in
troduce the divine mercy, in order to mitigate the indescribable
horrors which continually thicken around him. Such hesitation,
such wavering and inconsistency, is the natural result of every
scheme which places the decisions of the head in violent con
flict with the indestructible feelings of the heart.
In his attempt to reconcile the scheme of imputation with the
justice of God, Edwards has met with as little success as Augus
tine. For this purpose, he supposed that God had constituted
an identity between Adam and all his posterity, whereby the
latter became partakers of his rebellion. " I think it would go
If God, out of tne abundance of his compassion, imputes the sins of parents
only to the third or fourth generation, how has it happened that Adam s trans
gression is imputed to all his posterity, and punished throughout all generations ?
Is there any consistency, or harmony, in such views respecting the government
of the world ?
f Wiggers s Presentation, note by translator, p. 285.
17
258 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part H,
far toward directing us to the more clear conception and right
statement of this affair," says he, in reference to imputation,
" were we steadily to bear this in mind, that God, in every step
of his proceedings with Adam, in relation to the covenant or
constitution established with him, looked on his posterity as
being one with him. And though he dealt more immediately
with Adam, it yet was as the head of the whole body, and the
root of the whole tree ; and in his proceedings with him, he
dealt with all the branches as if they had been then existing in
their root. From which it will follow, that both guilt, or ex-
posedness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came
upon Adam s posterity just as they came upon him, as much as
if he and they had all coexisted, like a tree with many branches ;
allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the
place Adam stood in as head or root of the whole. Otherwise,
it is as if, in every step of proceeding, every alteration in the
root had been attended at the same instant with the same altera
tion throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I
think this will naturally follow on the supposition of their being
a constituted oneness or identity of Adam and his posterity in
this affair."* As the sap of a tree, Edwards has said, spreads
from the root of a tree to all its branches, so the original sin of
Adam descends from him through the generations of men.
In the serious promulgation of such sentiments, it is only for
gotten that sin is not the sap of a tree, and .that the whole
human race is not really one and the same person. Such an
idea of personal identity is as utterly unintelligible as the nature
of the sin and the responsibility with which it is so intimately
associated. Surely these are the dark dreams of men, not the
bright and shining lights of eternal truth.
Before we take leave of President Edwards, we would re
mark, that he proceeds on the same supposition with Calvin, f
Bates4 Dwight, Dick, and a host of others, that suffering is
always a punishment of sin, and of " sin in them who suffer. "||
" The light of nature," says Edwards, " or tradition from ancient
revelation, led the heathen to conceive of death as in a peculiar
manner an evidence of divine vengeance. Thus we have an
Edwards on Original Sin, part iv, ch. iii. f Institutes, book ii, ch. i.
\ Divine Attributes. Sermon on Original Sin.
|| Original Sin, part i, ch. ii.
Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 259
account, that when the barbarians saw the venomous beast
hang on Paul s hand, they said among themselves, No doubt,
this man is a murderer, whom, though he hath escaped the
seas, yet vengeance suffereth not to live. "* We think that
the barbarians concluded rashly : it is certain that St. Paul was
neither a murderer nor a god. Nor, indeed, if the venomous
beast had taken his life, would this have proved him to be a
murderer, any more than its falling off into the fire proved him
to be a god, according to the rash judgment of the barbarians.
There is a better source of philosophy, if we mistake not, than
the rash, hasty, foolish judgments of barbarians.
SECTION III.
The imputation of sin not consistent with human, much less with the divine
goodness.
There are few persons whose feelings will allow them to be
consistent advocates of the doctrine of the imputation of Adam s
sin. " To many other divines," says Bishop Burnet, " this seems
a harsh and inconceivable opinion : it seems repugnant to the
justice and goodness of God to reckon men guilty of sin which
they never committed, and to punish them in their souls eter
nally for that which is no act of theirs."f It certainly " seems
very hard," as the author says, " to apprehend how persons who
have never sinned, but are only unhappily descended, should be,
in consequence of that, under so great a misery." But how to
escape the pressure of this stupendous difficulty is the question.
There are many who cannot endure it ; or rather, there are very
few who can endure it ; but, as Bishop Burnet says, they find
no difficulty in the idea of temporal punishment on account of
Adam s sin. "This, they think, is easily enough reconcilable
with the notions of justice and goodness, since this is only a
temporary punishment relating to men s persons.":). But do
they not sacrifice their logic to their feelings ? Let us see.
Tins view of a limited imputation, and a limited punishment,
is not confined to the Church of England. It prevails to a
greater or less extent in all denominations. But President
Edwards has, we think, unanswerably exposed the inconsistency
Original Sin, part i, ch. ii.
f Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles, article ix. J Ibid.
260 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
of its advocates. " One of them supposes," says he, " that this
sin, though truly imputed to INFANTS, so that thereby they are
exposed to a proper punishment, yet is not imputed to them in
such a degree, as that upon this account they should be liable
to eternal punishment, as Adam himself was, but only to tem
poral death, or annihilation Adam himself, the immediate
actor, being made infinitely more guilty of it than his posterity.
On which I would observe, that to suppose God imputes, not
all the guilt of Adam, but only some little part of it, relieves
nothing but his imagination. To think of poor little infants
bearing such torments for Adam s sin, as they sometimes do in
this world, and these torments ending in death and annihila
tion, may sit easier on the imagination, than to conceive of their
suffering eternal misery for it ; but it does not at all relieve
one s reason. There is no rule of reason that can be supposed
to lie against imputing a sin in the whole of it, which was com
mitted by one, to another who did not personally commit it,
but will also lie against its being so imputed and punished in
part; for all the reasons (if there be any) lie against the impu
tation, not the quality or degree of what is imputed. If there
be any rule of reason that is strong and good, lying against a
proper derivation or communication of guilt from one that
acted to another that did not act, then it lies against all that
is of that nature .... If these reasons are good, all the differ
ence is this : that to bring a great punishment on infants for
Adam s sin, is a great act of injustice, and to bring a compara
tively smaller punishment is a smaller act of injustice ; but not,
that this is not as truly and demonstrably an act of injustice as
the other."*
We hold this to be a solid and unanswerable argument ; and
we hold also, that God can no more commit a small act of
injustice than a great one. Hence, in the eye of reason, there
is no medium between rejecting the whole of the imputation of
Adam s sin, and ceasing to object against the imputation of the
whole of it, as inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God.
We may arbitrarily wipe out a portion of it in order to relievo
our imagination / but this brings no relief to the calm and
passionless reason. It may still the wild tumults of emotion,
but it cannot silence the voice of the intellect. Why not relieve
Edwards on Original Sin, part iv, ch. iii.
Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 261
both the imagination and the reason ? Why not wipe out the
whole dark film of imputation, and permit the glad eye to open
on the bright glory of God s infinite goodness ?
The wonder is, that when Edwards had carried out his logic
to such a conclusion, he did not regard his argument as a per-r
feet reductio ad absurdum. The wonder is, that when he had
carried out his logic to the position, that it might well consist
with the justice of God to impute the whole of Adam s sin to
" poor little infants," as he calls them, and then cause them to
endure " eternal torments for it," his whole nature did not
recoil from such a conclusion with indescribable horror. For
our part, highly as we value logical consistency, we should
prefer a little incoherency in our reasoning, a little flexibility in
our logic, rather than bear even one " poor little infant" on the
hard, unyielding point of it into the torments of hell forever.
St. Augustine was the great founder of the doctrine of the
imputation of sin. But although he did more than any other
person to give this doctrine a hold upon the mind of the Chris
tian world, it never had a perfect hold upon his own mind. So
far from being able to reconcile it with the divine goodness, he
could not reconcile it with his own goodness. For this purpose,
he employed the theory that all the posterity of Adam were, in
the most literal sense, already in Mm, and sinned in him in
his person ; and that Adam s sin is therefore justly imputed to
all his posterity.* He also appeals to revelation. "St. Au
gustine," as Father Almeyda truly says, " and the fathers who
follow him, take the fundamental principle of their doctrine
(which affirms that infants without baptism will endure eternal
pain) from the sentence which the Supreme Judge is to pro
nounce at the last day. We know that the Lord, dividing the
human race into two portions, will put the elect on the right
hand, and the reprobate on the left ; and he will say to those on
the left, Depart into eternal fire. St. Augustine then argues,
that infants will not be on the right, because Jesus Christ has
positively excluded all those who shall not le lorn again of
water and of the Holy Spirit : then they will be on the left ;
and thus they will be comprehended in the damnation of eter
nal fire, which the Lord will pronounce against those who shall
See Knapp s Theology, vol. ii, art. ix, sec. 76 ; also Wiggers s Presentation
of Augustinism and Pelagianism, chap, xix, p. 268.
262 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
be on the left side : for having no more than two hands, and
only two places and two sentences, since, then, there are infants
which God does not favour, it follows that they will be com
prehended in the sentence of the reprobate, which is not only
a privation of the sight of God, but also the pain of fire."*
Such is the ground, and such the logic, on which St. Augustine
and his followers erected that portentous scheme, that awful
speculation, which has so long cast a dark cloud over the glory
of the Christian world, and prevented it from reflecting the
bright, cheering beams of the divine goodness.
But, what ! could St. Augustine find rest in his own views,
in his own logic? Did he really banish all non-elect infants
into the region of penal fire and everlasting woe ? If he adhered
to the literal meaning of the words of revelation, as he under
stood them, he was certainly bound to do so ; but did he really
and consistently do it ? Did he really bind the " poor little "
reprobate, because it had sinned in Adam, in chains of adamant,
and leave it to writhe beneath the fierce inquisitorial fury of the
everlasting flames? Did he really extract the vials of such
exquisite and unprovoked wrath from the essence of infinite
goodness itself ? No : this was reserved for the superior logic
and the sterner consistency of an iron age. But since it has
been extracted, we may devoutly thank Almighty God, that it
is now excluded from the hearts of men calling themselves
Christians, and kept safely bottled up in their creeds and con
fessions.
St Augustine could not endure the insufferable consequences
of his own doctrine. Hence, in writing to his great friend, St.
Jerome, he said, " in all sincerity : when I come to treat of the
punishment of infants, believe that I find myself in great
embarrassment, and I absolutely know not what to reply"
Writing against Julian, he adds: " I do not say that those who
die without baptism will be punished with a torment such that
it would be better for them if they had never been born" And
again : " Those who, besides original sin which they have con
tracted, have not committed any other, will be subjected to a
pain the most mild of all."f Thus by adopting a wrong inter
pretation, the principles of which were but little understood in
his time, St. Augustine banished all unbaptized infants from the
Harmonie cle la Raison et de la Religion. f Ibid., Almeyda.
Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 263
kingdom of light ; but yet he could hardly find it in his heart
to condemn them to the outer darkness. He had too great a
regard for the word of God, as he understood it, to permit non-
elect infants to reign with Christ in heaven ; and, on the other
han i, he was too severely pressed by the generous impulses of
his nature, nay, by the eternal dictates of truth and goodness,
1o permit him to consign them really to the "fire prepared
for the devil and his angels." Hence, although Christ knew
of " but two places," he fitted up a third, to see them in which,
was, as Edwards would say, " more agreeable to his imagin
ation."
It was the sublime but unsteady genius of St. Augustine that
caused this doctrine of the damnation of infants to be received
into the Christian world, and find its way into the council of
Trent. That celebrated council not only adopted the views of
St. Augustine on this subject, but also most perfectly reflected
all his hesitation and inconsistency. Widely as its members
differed on other points, they all agreed that unbaptized infants
should be excluded from the kingdom of heaven. There was
but little unanimity however, as to the best method of disposing
of them. The Dominicans fitted up a dark, subterraneous
cavern for them, in which there is no fire, at least none such as
that of the infernal regions, and in which they might be at least
as happy as monks. This place was called Limbo which, we
suppose, is to Purgatory, about what the varioloid is to the
smallpox. The Franciscans, more humane in their doctrine,
determined that " dear little infants," though they had never
felt the sanctifying influences of holy water, should yet reside,
not in dark caverns and holes of the earth, but in the sweet
light and pure air of the upper world. Well done, noble Fran
ciscan! we honour thee for thy sweet fancy! Surely tliou
wert not, like other monks, made so altogether fierce by dark
keeping, that thou couldest not delight to see in God s blessed,
beautiful world, a smiling infant !
Others insisted, that unbaptized infants would be condemned
to become philosophers, and turn out the authors of great dis
coveries. Tliis may seem a terrible damnation to some persons ;
but, for our part, if we had been of that famous council, it is
likely we should have been in favour of this decree. As the
most agreeable punishment we could imagine, we should have
264 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
been for condemning them, like the fallen angels of Paradise
Lost, to torment themselves with reasonings high,
" Of providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,
Fix d fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute."
And if any of them had been found to possess no very great
aptitude for such speculations, then, rather than they should find
no end in wandering mazes lost," we should have condemned
them to turn poets and " build the lofty rhyme."
So completely did the spirit of a blind exegesis triumph over
the light of reason in the time of Augustine, that even Pelagius
and his followers excluded unbaptized infants from the king
dom of heaven, because our Saviour had declared that a man
could not enter therein, except he be born of water and of the
Spirit. It is true, they did not banish them into " the fire pre
pared for the devil and his angels," nor into Limbo, nor into
dark holes of the earth ; on the contrary, they admitted them
to the joys of eternal life, but not into the kingdom of heaven.*
Thus, the Pelagians brought " poor little infants" as near to the
kingdom of heaven as possible, without doing too great violence
to the universal orthodoxy of their time.
But as we cannot, like the Church of Rome, determine the
fate of infants by a decree, we must take some little pains to
ascertain how it has been determined by the Supreme Ruler of
the world. For this purpose we shall first show, that there is
suffering in the world which is not a punishment for sin, and
then declare the great ends, or final causes, of all natural evil.
SECTION IV.
The true ends, or final causes, of natural evil.
We have often wondered that grave divines should declare
that there could be no natural evil, or suffering, under the
administration of God, except such as is a punishment for sin
in the person upon whom it is inflicted. We have wondered,
that in declaring none but a tyrant could ever permit the inno
cent to suffer, they have entertained no fears lest they might
strengthen the cause of atheism. For if it be impossible to
justify the character of God, except on the principle that all
u Wiggers s Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism, chap. iv.
Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 265
suffering is merited on account of sin in the object of it, then
it is easy to see, that the atheistical argument against the good
ness of God is unanswerable. The atheist might well say : " Do
we not see and know that the whole animal creation suffers?
Now for what sin are they punished ? The inferior animals,
you will admit, are not capable of committing actual sin, any
more than infants are ; and Adam was not their federal head
and representative. Hence, unless you can show for what sin
they are punished, you must admit that, according to your own
principles, God is a tyrant." How Dr. Dick, or Dr. Dwight, or
President Edwards, or Calvin, would have answered such an
argument, we cannot determine. For although they all assume
that there can be no suffering under the good providence of
God, except it be a punishment for sin in the object of it, yet,
so far as we know, they have not made the most distant allu
sion to the suffering of the inferior animals. Indeed, they seem
to be so intently bent on maintaining the doctrine of the impu
tation of sin to infants, that they pay no attention, in the assump
tion of the above position, either to the word of God, or to the
great volume of nature spread out before them.
But we find the difficulty noticed in a prize essay of three
hundred pages, on the subject of native depravity, by Dr. Woods.
The author assumes the same ground with Edwards, that all
suffering must be justified on the ground of justice ; and hence
lie finds a real and proper sin in infants, in order to reconcile
their sufferings with the character of God. This is the only
ground, according to Dr. Woods, on which suffering can be
vindicated under the administration of a perfect God. Where,
then, is the real and proper sin in the inferior animals to justify
their sufferings? This difficulty occurs to the distinguished
author, and he endeavours to meet it. Let us see his reply. It
is a reply which We have long been solicitous to see, and we
now have it from one of the most celebrated theologians of the
present day.
" Some suppose," says he, " that infants suffer as irrational
animals do, without reference to a moral law or the principles
of a moral government. A strange supposition indeed, that
human beings should for a time be ranked with beings which
are not human, that is, mere animals." He is evidently shocked
at such an insult offered to poor little infants. He will not
266 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
allow us, for one moment, to take the whole race of man,
" during the interesting period of infancy, cut them off from
their relation to Adam, degrade them from the dignity of hu
man beings, and put them in the rank of brute animals, and
then say, they suffer as the brutes do This would be the
worst of all theories, the farthest off from Scripture and rea
son, and the most revolting to all the noble sensibilities of
man."
Now, it is really refreshing to find these allusions to " the
dignity of human beings " in a writer of this school ; and
especially in Dr. Woods, who has so often rebuked others for
their pride, when they have imagined that they were only en
gaged in the laudable enterprise of asserting this very dignity,
by raising men from the rank of mere machines. It is so refresh
ing, indeed, to find such allusions in Dr. Woods, that we could
almost forgive a little special pleading and bad logic in his at
tempt to vindicate the " dignity of human beings," which should
have been an attempt to vindicate the goodness of God.
We do not place human beings and brutes in the same rank,
except in so far as both are sensitive creatures, and consequently
susceptible of pleasure and pain. In this particular, the Crea
tor himself has, to a certain extent, placed them in the same
rank, and it is useless to cry out against his appointment. lie
will not listen to our talk about " the dignity of human beings."
He will still leave us, in so far as bodily pain and death are
concerned, in the same rank with mere animals. This single
point of resemblance between animals and human beings is all
that our argument requires ; and the fact that animals do suffer
pain and death cannot be denied, or swept away by declama
tion. Let this fact be fairly and openly met, and not merely
evaded. Let it be shown how the suffering of mere animals
may be reconciled with the infinite goodness of God, and we
will undertake to show how the suffering of guiltless " human
beings " may be reconciled with it. Nay, we will undertake to
show that the suffering of infants may be reconciled with tho
divine goodness, on the same, and also on still higher, grounds.
We will place their sufferings on a more solid and a more defi
nite foundation, than upon such vague and misty assertions as
that they " suffer with reference to a moral law."
We do not cut off infants from their relation to Adam ; nor
Chapter H] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 267
could we, if we desired to do so, cut them off from their relation
to the animal nature which God has given them. It may be a
very humiliating thought, it is true, that human beings should
ever eat like mere animals, or sleep like mere animals, or suffer
like mere animals ; but yet we cannot see how any rebellion
against so humiliating a thought can possibly alter the fact.
We do not deny, indeed, that a theologian may eat, and sleep,
and suffer on higher principles than mere animals do ; but we
seriously doubt if infants ever eat, or sleep, or suffer on any
higher principles. It may shock the "noble sensibilities" of
man that dear little infants should suffer as brutes do, especially
when the term brutes is so strongly emphasized; but how it
can relieve the case to have the poor little creatures arraigned
at the bar of divine justice, and condemned to suffer as male
factors and criminals do, is more than we can possibly compre
hend. To have them thus arraigned, condemned, and punished
as criminals, may dignify their sufferings, and render them
more worthy of the rank of human beings ; but this is a dignity
to which, we trust, they will never aspire.
If we are not mistaken, then, the theory for which we con
tend is " not the worst of all theories," nor " the most revolting
to the noblest sensibilities of man." It is a worse theory to sup
pose, with Edwards, that they may be arraigned and banished
into " eternal misery " for a sin they have not committed, or
the possession of a nature they could not possibly have avoided
possessing. It is better, we say, to rank the human race " for
a time," " during the interesting period of infancy," even with
mere animals, than to rank them with the devil and his angels.
But, in truth, we rank them with neither ; we simply leave them
where God hath placed them, as a connecting link between the
animal and the angelic natures.
But we may produce many instances of suffering among hu
man beings, which are not a punishment for sin. We might
refer to the feeling of compassion, which is always painful, and
sometimes wrings the heart with the most exquisite agony ; and
yet this was not planted in our bosom as a punishment for sin,
but, as Bishop Butler has shown,* it was ordained by a God of
mercy, to teach us a lesson of mercy, and lead us to mitigate
the manifold miseries of man s estate. We might also refer to
Sermon on Compassion.
268 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart H.
an indignation against crime, which, as the same profound
thinker has shown in his sermon on resentment, was planted in
our natures, not to punish the subject of it, but to insure the
punishment of others, that is, of criminals ; and thereby to pre
serve the good order and well-being of the world. This sense
of wrong, of injustice, of outrage, by which the soul is so often
tortured, is not designed to punish the subject of it, but to pro
mote the happiness and virtue of mankind. We might refer tv>
these, and many other things of the same kind, but it is not
necessary to dwell upon particular instances ; for the principle
against which we contend may be more directly refuted by an
appeal to reason, and to the very authors by whom it is advo
cated ; for, although it is adopted by them, and seems plausible
at first view, it is often lost sight of when they lose sight of
their system, and they give utterance to another principle more
in accordance with the voice of nature.
It is evident, that if the government of God requires that no
suffering should be inflicted, except as a punishment for sin,
then his perfect moral government requires that the punish
ment should, in all cases, be exactly proportioned to the demerit
of those upon whom it falls.
For, as Butler truly says, "Moral government consists in
rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked; in rendering
to men according to their actions, considered as good or evil.
And the perfection of moral government consists in doing this,
with regard to all intelligent creatures, in exact proportion to
their personal merits and demerits."* This will not be denied.
Hence, if suffering is distributed by God as a punishment for
sin in all cases, as Calvin and his followers assert, then it must,
on the same principle, be distributed according to the demerit
of men. But is this the case ? Does this necessary consequence
of this principle agree with fact ? If so, then every vile deed,
every wicked outrage, committed by man, should be regarded
as an instrument of divine justice, and deserved by those upon
whom they fall. The inquisition itself, with all its unuttered
and unutterable horrors, should be regarded, not merely as an
exhibition of human wickedness and wrath, but also as an
engine of divine justice, to crush the martyr on its wheels,
because he refuses to lie to his own soul and to his God !
Butler s Analogy, part i, chap. iii.
Chapter II.1 WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 269
tare itself recoils from such a conclusion. Not one of the
writers in question would adopt it. Hence, they should not
advocate a principle from which it necessarily flows.
Indeed, they all argue the necessity of a future state of retri
bution, from the unequal distribution of natural good and evil
in this life. But Lord Bolingbroke has refuted this argument
bj reasoning from their own principles. He insists that such is
the justice of God, that there can be no suffering or natural evil
in this life, except such as is proportioned to the demerits of
men ; and hence he rejects the argument from the apparent
unequal distribution of pleasure and pain in this world in favour
of the reality of a future judgment. He resents the imputation
that God could ever permit any suffering which is not deserved,
as warmly as it is resented by Dr. Dick himself, and proclaims
it to be dishonourable to God. All rewards and punishments,
says he, are equal and just in this life ; and to say otherwise, is
to take an atheistical view of the divine character. Learned
divines proceed on the same principle, as we have seen, when
they contend for the imputation of sin ; but they forget and
overlook it, when they come to prove the future judgment to
the infidel. Thus, in their zeal to establish their own peculiar
dogmas, they place themselves and their cause in the power of
the infidel.
But if suffering be not always inflicted, under the admin
istration of God, as a punishment for sin, for what other end is
it inflicted ? We answer, it is inflicted for these ends : 1. Even
when it is inflicted as a punishment for sin, this is not the only
end, or final cause of its infliction. It is also intended to deter
others from the commission of evil, and preserve the order of
the world. 2. In some instances, nay, in very many instances,
it is intended to discipline and form the mind to virtue. As
Bishop Butler well says, even while vindicating the moral
government of the world : " It is not pretended but that, in
the natural course of things, happiness and misery appear to
be distributed by other rules, than only the personal merit and
demerit of character. They may sometimes be distributed by
way of mere discipline. And in his profound chapter on a
" State of probation, as intended for moral discipline and im
provement," he shows that they are actually distributed for this
purpose. 3. The unavoidable evils of this life, which are not
270 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
brought upon us by our faults, are intended to serve as a full to
set off the blessedness of eternity. Our present light afflictions
are intended, not merely to work out for us an exceeding and
eternal weight of glory, but also to heighten our sense and
enjoyment of it by a recollection of the miseries experienced in
this life. They are intended to form but a short and discordant
prelude to an everlasting harmony. If they should not pro\o
so in fact, the fault will be our own, without the least impeach
ment of the beneficent design of the great Author and Euler
of the universe.
On these grounds, especially on the first two, we must justify
all the natural evil in the world. In regard to the second,
Bishop Butler says : " Allurements to what is wrong ; difficulties
in the discharge of our duties ; our not being able to act a uni
form right part without some thought and care ; and the oppor
tunities we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we
dislike, or obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, when
we either cannot do it at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful
ones ; these things, that is, the sna/res and temptations of vice,
are what render the present world peculiarly fit to ~be a state of
discipline to those who will preserve their integrity / because
they render being upon our guard, resolution, and the denial
of our passions, necessary to that end." Thus, the temptations
by which we are surrounded, the allurements of those passions
by which vice is rendered so bewitching, are the appointed
means of moral discipline and improvement in virtue.
The habit of virtue thus formed, he truly observes, will be
firm and fixed in proportion to the amount of temptation we
have gradually overcome in its formation. "Though actions
materially virtuous," says he, " which have no sort of difficulty,
but are perfectly agreeable to our particular inclinations, may
possibly be done only from those particular inclinations, and so
may not be any exercise of the principle of virtue, i. e., not te
virtuous actions at all ; yet, on the contrary, they may be an
exercise of that principle, and, when they are, they have a ten
dency to form and fix the habit of virtue. But when the exer
cise of the virtuous principle is more continued, oftener repeated,
and more intense, as it must be in circumstances of danger,
temptation, and difficulty of any kind, and in any degree, this
tendency is increased proportionably, and a more confirmed
Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 271
habit is the consequence."* The greater the temptation, then,
the more fixed will be the habit of virtue, by which it is gradu
ally overcome and subdued.
This habit may become so fixed, by a struggle with tempta
tions and difficulties, as to raise the soul above the dangers to
which moral agents are exposed. " Virtuous self-government
is not only right in itself, but also improves the inward consti
tution or character ; and may improve it to such a degree, that
though we should suppose it impossible for particular affections
to be absolutely co-incident with the moral principle, and con
sequently should allow, that such creatures as have been above
supposed would forever remain defectible ; yet their danger of
actually deviating from right may be almost infinitely lessened,
and they fully fortified against what remains of it ; if that
may be called danger, against which there is an adequate effec
tual security, ,"f
"These several observations," says he, "concerning the active
principle of virtue and obedience to God s commands are appli
cable to passive submission or resignation to his will, which is
another essential part of a right character, connected with the
former, and very much in our power to form ourselves to."
This, then, is the view which we think should be entertained
with respect to the natural evils of this life : they are intended
by the infinitely wise and good Kuler of the world to detach
us from the fleeting things of time and sense, by the gradual
formation of a habit of moral goodness, arising from a resist
ance against the influence of such things and firm adherence to
the will of God, and to form our character for a state of fixed
eternal blessedness. Such is the beneficent design of God in
relation to the human race itself. His design in relation to the
more magnificent scheme of the moral universe, in thus plant
ing the human race and striving to train it up to virtue and
happiness, we have already considered.^:
We say, then, that it is a principle of the divine government
of the world to impose natural evil or suffering as a means of
good. It is objected against this principle, that it is to do evil
that good may come. "To say that Christ was subjected to
sufferings" says Dr. Dick, " for the benevolent purpose of con
ferring important benefits upon mankind, is to give the highest
Analogy, chap. v. f Id - c ha P- v, p. 178. J Part i, chap. vi.
272 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
sanction to the principle which is so strongly reprobated in the
Scriptures, that evil may be done that good may come." The
theology of Dr. Dick, and of his school, does not sufficiently
distinguish between natural and moral evil. "We are nowheie
told in Scripture, that it is wrong to do natural evil, or inflict
suffering, that good may come. Every good man acts upon
this principle every day of his life. Every act of self-denial,
and every infliction of parental discipline, are proofs of the just
ness of this remark. The surgeon who amputates a limb, in
order to save the life of his patient, acts upon the same principle.
But who ever thought of condemning such conduct ? Who ever
reminded him that he should not do evil that good may come ?
It is plain, that neither " the sufferings " of Christ, nor any other
sufferings imposed for the real good of the world, are liable to any
such objection, or come under the condemnation of any such
maxim. This objection lies, as we have seen,* against the doc
trine of Edwards and his followers, that moral evil, that sin,
may be chosen as the means of good. The high and holy God
never commits, or causes others to commit, moral evil that good
may come; but he not only may, but actually does, inflict
natural evil in order to promote the good of his creatures.
Thus, by applying the language of Scripture to natural evil
instead of to moral, Dr. Dick has just exactly inverted the order
of things as they actually exist in the constitution and govern
ment of the moral world.
SECTION V.
The importance of harmonizing reason and revelation.
y
For these reasons, we refuse to justify the sufferings of infants,
on the ground that the sin of Adam was imputed to them. A
sentiment so dark and appalling but ill accords with the sublime
and beautiful spirit of the gospel. It partakes more of the
weakness and infirmity of human nature than of the divine
nature of Him who "spake as never man spake." The best
account which Plato could give of the sufferings of infants was
that they had sinned in some former state of existence, for which
they are punished in this. St. Augustine and his followers,
rejecting such a view, and relying on the literal sense of the
Part i, chap. ii.
Chapter H.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 273
words of reveiation, advanced the hypothesis that infants sinned,
not in a preexistent state, but in Adam ; for which they are
justly exposed to pain and death. Others again, not being
able to conceive how infants could be really and personally in
Adam many thousand years before they were born, so as to sin
with him, adopted the hypothesis, that if they had been in his
place they would have sinned, and are therefore justly exposed
to the penalty due to his transgression ; according to which
theory each soul might be made liable to the guilt of infinitely
more sin than any finite being could possibly commit. Another
age, rising above such dark notions respecting the nature of sin
and the justice of God, maintained the hypothesis that Adam s
sin was imputed to all his posterity, by w r hich the fearful
penalty due to his sin might be justly inflicted upon them.
According to a fifth theory, it is clear that " nothing under the
empire of Jehovah " can be sin, except a known transgression
of the law ; and infants are punished, because, as soon as they
come into the world, they knowingly transgress the law of God.
They cannot knowingly sin, says a sixth theory ; but still they
really transgress the law of God by those little bubbling emo
tions of anger, and so forth, as soon as they come into exist
ence; and hence, the penalty of sin is inflicted upon them.
Such are some of the hypotheses which have been adopted by
Christian theologians to reconcile the suffering of infants with
the justice and goodness of God. The more we look into them,
the more we are amazed that the great lights of the world
should have indulged in reveries so wild and so wonderful ;
and the more are we convinced, that the speculations of men on
these subjects, and the whole theological literature of the world
in relation to it, form one of the darkest chapters in the history
of the human mind.
How unlike are such views respecting the origin and exist
ence of natural evil to the divine simplicity and beauty of the
gospel ! " Who did sin, this man or his parents," said the dis
ciples to our Saviour, " that he was born blind ?" They made
no doubt but that the great evil of natural blindness must have
been the punishment of some sin ; and merely wished to know
whether it were his own sin, committed in some former state
of existence, or the sin of his parents. Their minds seem to
have hung in a state of vacillation between the theory of Plato
18
274 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part IT,
and that of imputation. But our Saviour replied : " Neither
did this man sin, nor his parents," that he was born blind ; but
u that the work of God might be made manifest in him." We
thank thee, O blessed Master, for that sweet word ! How
delightful is it, after passing through the dark labyrinths of
human folly to sit at thy feet and drink in the lessons of heav
enly wisdom ! How pleasant to the soul how inexpressibly
cheering is it to turn from the harsh and revolting systems
of men, and listen to the sweet accents of mercy as they fal]
from thy lips !
The great law of suffering, then, is that it is intended for the
benefit of intelligent creatures. This is the case, even when it
assumes the character of punishment ; for then it is designed
to prevent moral evil. Such a view of natural evil, or suffering,
does not give that horrid picture of the world which arises
from the sentiment that all pain and death must be a punish
ment for sin. This causes us to see the black scourge of retri
butive justice everywhere, and the hand of fatherly correction
nowhere. It places us, not in a school or state of probation, to
train us up for a better and brighter world, but in the midst of
inquisitorial fires and penal woe. It teaches that all mankind
became guilty by the act of one man ; and that for one deed,
millions upon millions of human beings are justly obnoxious,
not only to temporal and spiritual, but also to eternal death.
We are perfectly aware of all the arguments which have
been drawn from Scripture in support of such a doctrine ; and
we are also perfectly satisfied that they may be most easily and
triumphantly refuted. But at present we do not mean to touch
this argument ; we shall reserve it for another work. In the
mean time, we must be permitted to express the sentiment, that
a system of theology, so profoundly unphilosophical, so utterly
repugnant to the moral sentiments of mankind, can never fulfil
the sublime mission of true religion on earth. It may possess
the principle of life within, but it is destitute of the form of life
without. It may convert the individual soul, and lead it up to
heaven ; but it has not the radiant form and power of truth, to
command the admiration and conquer the intellect of the world.
It may elevate and purify the affections, even while it depresses
and confounds the understanding ; but it cannot transfigure
the whole mind, and change it into its own divine image. Noth-
Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 275
ing but the most fixed and rooted faith, or the most blind and
unquestioning submission, can withstand the fearful blasts and
dark impulses of such a system.
ISTo wonder, then, that under a system so deplorably deficient
in some of the most sublime features of Christianity, infidelity
and Pelagianism should so often have sprung up. If we write
libels on the divine government, we must expect rebellions and
insurrections. This is the natural consequence of the great
fundamental heresy which places reason and revelation in
opposition to each other. Orthodoxy, as she proudly styles
herself, may denounce such rebellions ; but she herself is partly
responsible for the fatal consequences of them. Keason and
revelation can never be dissevered, can never be placed in
violent conflict, without a frightful injury to both, and to the
best interests of mankind. Keason must find its own internal
power and life in revelation, and revelation must find its own
external form and beauty in reason. The perfection and glory
of each consists in the living union and consentaneous develop
ment of both.
If we teach absurdity, it is worse than idlo to enforce sub
mission by arrogant and lordly denunciations of human pride,
or of " carnal reason." And we shall always find, indeed, that
when a theologian or a philosopher begins by abusing and vili
fying human reason, he either has some absurdity which he
wishes us to swallow, or he wishes to be excused from believing
anything in particular. Thus, the dogmatism of the one and
the scepticism of the other unite in trampling human reason
under foot ; the one, to erect an empire of absurdity, and the
other, to erect an empire of darkness upon its ruins. It should
be the great object of all our labours to effect a reunion and
harmony between revelation and reason, whose "inauspicious
repudiations and divorces" have so long " disturbed everything
in the great family of mankind."*
This language of Bacon is applied by him to the empirical and rational
faculties of the human mind.
276 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT | Part II,
CHAPTER in.
THE SUFFERINGS OF CHRIST RECONCILED WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD.
blessed Well of Love ! Flower of Grace !
glorious Morning Starre ! Lampe of Light !
Most lively Image of thy Father s face,
Eternal King of Glorie, Lord of Might,
Meeke Lambe of God, before all worlds behight,
How can we thee requite for all this good?
Or who can prize that thy most precious blood ? SPENSKE.
IN the preceding chapter we have endeavoured to show that
natural evil or suffering is not inconsistent with the goodness
of God. We were there led to see that God, although he never
chooses moral evil, often imposes natural evil, or suffering, in
order to secure the well-being of the world. Of this general
principle, the sufferings and death of Christ are a particular
instance ; they are not anomalous, but a striking manifestation
of a great principle which pervades the whole economy of
divine providence. These sufferings, so far from being incon
sistent with the goodness of God, are a stupendous display of
that sublime mercy which is over all his works. To illustrate
this position, and clear it of sceptical cavils and objections, is
the main object of the present chapter.
SECTION I.
The sufferings of Christ not unnecessary.
Because the necessity of Christ s death and sufferings js not
manifest at first view, or because the utility of them is not seen,
it is concluded by some that they were wholly useless, and con
sequently inconsistent with the infinite goodness ascribed to the
Ruler of the world. "We shall content ourselves with disposing
of this objection in the words of Bishop Butler. "To object
against the expediency or usefulness of particular things revealed
to have been done or suffered by him," says he, " because we
do not see how they were conducive to those ends, is highly
absurd. Yet nothing is more common to be met with than this
Chapter EL] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 277
absurdity. But if it be acknowledged beforehand, that we are
not judges in this case, it is evident that no objection can, with
any shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of
Christ s mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be
shown positively, not to be requisite, or conducive, to the ends
proposed to be accomplished ; or that it is in itself unreason
able."*
Again : " It is indeed," says he, " a matter of great patience to
reasonable men to find people arguing in this manner ; objecting
against the credibility of such particular things revealed in
Scripture, that they do not see the necessity or expediency of
them. For, though it is highly right, and the most pious exer
cise of our understanding, to inquire with due reverence into the
ends and reasons of God s dispensations ; yet, when those reasons
are concealed, to argue from our ignorance, that such dispensa
tions cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption
of this kind of objection seems almost lost in the folly of them.
And the folly of them is yet greater, when they are urged, as
usually they are, against things in Christianity analogous, or
like to those natural dispensations of Providence which are
matters of experience. Let reason be kept to, and if any part
of the Scripture account of the redemption of the world by
Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the Scrip
ture, in the name of God, be given up : but let not such poor
creatures as we go on objecting against an infinite scheme,
that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts,
and call this reasoning ; and what heightens the absurdity in
the present case, parts which we are not actively concerned in."t
This reply is amply sufficient for such an objection. But
although the concession is made, for the sake of argument, it is
not true, that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of the
sufferings of Christ. For, as the author well says : " What has
been often alleged in justification of this doctrine, even from
the apparent natural tendency of this method of our redemp
tion its tendency to vindicate the authority of God s laws, and
deter his creatures from sin : this has never been answered, and
is, / think, plainly unanswerable though I am far from think
ing it an account of the whole of the case."J
It is true, we believe, that the position that the great work
Butler s Analogy, part ii, chap. v. f Analogy. J Ibid.
278 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT jPart II,
of Christ was necessary to maintain the authority of God s law,
and to deter his creatures from sin, never has been, and never
can be refuted. Yet nearly all of the commonly received sys
tems of theology furnish a principle, a false principle, on which
this position may be overthrown, and the sufferings of Christ
shown to be unnecessary. For if a necessary holiness be not a
contradiction in terms, if God can, as is usually asserted, cause
holiness universally to prevail by the mere word of his power,
then the work and sufferings of Christ are not necessary to
maintain the authority of his law, and deter his creatures from
sin. In other words, the sufferings of Christ were " not requi
site to the ends proposed to be accomplished," because, on such
a supposition, they might have been far more easily and com
pletely accomplished without them.
Those who maintain, then, as most theologians do, that God
could easily cause virtue to exist everywhere if he would, really
set forth a principle which, if true, would demonstrate the suf
ferings of Christ to be unnecessary, and consequently inconsist
ent with the goodness of God. We must strike at this false
principle, and restore the truth that a necessary holiness is a
contradiction in terms, an inherent and impossible conceit, if
we would behold the sublime significancy and beauty of the
stupendous sacrifice of the cross. We shall then behold the
necessity of that sacrifice, and see the omnipotent yearnings of
the divine love in its efforts to overcome an obstacle, which
could not be otherwise surmounted.
It is often said, we are well aware, that God might have
saved us by a mere word ; but he chose not to do so, preferring
to give up his Son to death in order to show his love. But
how can such a position be maintained ? If God could save us
by a word, how can it display his love to require such immense
sufferings in order to save us? If he could accomplish the
salvation of all men by a mere word, how does it show his love
to make such wonderful preparations for their salvation ; and,
after all, permit so large a portion of them to be eternally lost ?
If we could save the life of a fellow-being by merely putting
forth a hand, would it display our love for him if we should
choose to travel all around the earth, and incur incredible hard
ships and sufferings in order to save him ? Would this display
our love, we ask, or our folly ? Is it not evident, then, that the
Chapter III.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 2*79
principle that virtue or holiness might be easily caused to exist
everywhere, is utterly repugnant to the glory of revelation ? Is
it not evident that it causes the transcendent glory of the cross
to disappear, and reduces the whole complicated system of
means and appliances for the salvation of the world to a mere
idle mockery of the miseries of man s estate ? Does it not
show the whole plan of salvation, as conceived and executed by
the infinite wisdom of God, to be an awkward and bungling
attempt to accomplish an end, which might have been far more
easily and perfectly accomplished ? And if so, does it not be
come all Christian theologians to expunge this false principle
from their systems, and eradicate it from their thoughts ?
SECTION II.
The sufferings of Christ a bright manifestation of the goodness of God.
The reason why the love of God does not appear to all men in
the sacrifice of his Son is, that it is often viewed, not as it is in
itself, but through the distorting medium of false analogies, or
of a vague and ill-defined phraseology. Hence it is that the
melancholy spectacle is everywhere presented of men, of rational
and immortal beings, living and dying in a determined opposi
tion to a doctrine which they have not taken the pains to under
stand, and of whose intrinsic grandeur and glory they have not
enjoyed the most remote glimpse. So far from beholding the
love of God, which shines forth so conspicuously in the cross of
Christ, they see in it only an act of injustice and cruelty on the
part of God.
One source of this error, we have no doubt, is to be found in
the use, or rather in the abuse, of the term punishment. In the
strict sense of the word, it is not only unjust, but impossible, for
God to punish the innocent. The very idea of punishment, ac
cording to the strict sense of the word, implies the notion of
guilt or ill-desert in the person upon whom it is inflicted. It is
-suffering inflicted on an offender, on account of his real or sup
posed personal guilt. Hence, as God regards all things just as
they are in themselves, he cannot possibly look upon the inno
cent as guilty ; and consequently he cannot, in the strict sense
of the word, inflict punishment upon them. And when we
speak of the punishment of Christ, we merely mean, or should
280 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
merely mean, to convey the idea that he suffered, in order to
release us from the punishment due to our sins. It would be
well, perhaps, if this could always be borne in mind ; for most
men are more under the influence and power of words than
they are apt to see, or willing to acknowledge. The mere ex
pression, the punishment of the innocent, is apt to awaken
associations in the mind which are inconsistent with the dictates
of justice ; but which the idea of the atonement would never
have suggested, if clearly and distinctly viewed in its own clear
light, and not through the dark medium of an ill-defined
phraseology.
Another source of the error in question is to be found in the
ambiguity of the term justice. It is frequently said that the
atonement is a satisfaction to divine justice ; to which it is
replied, that justice requires the punishment of the very indi
vidual who offends, and not of another person in his place. Let
us consider this subject.
The term justice has two distinct significations, which I
shall designate by the epithets retributive and administrative.
By retributive justice, I mean that attribute which inclines
Him to punish an offender merely on account of the intrinsic
demerit and hatefulness of his offence ; and which animadverts
upon the evil conduct of a moral agent, considered as an indi
vidual, and not as a member of the great family of intelligent
beings. This attribute seeks to punish sin merely because it
deserves punishment, and not because its punishment is neces
sary to secure the ends of government ; and, supposing sin to
exist, it would have its object, even if there were only one ac
countable creature in the universe.
The object of public or administrative justice is quite differ
ent. It inflicts punishment, not because it is deserved, but in
order to prevent transgression, and to secure the general good,
by securing the ends of wise and good government. In the
moral government of God, one of the highest objects of this
kind of justice, or, if you please, of this phase or manifestation"
of the divine justice, is to secure in the hearts of its subjects a
cordial approbation of the principles according to which they
are governed. This is indispensable to the very existence of
moral government. The dominion of force, or of power, may
be maintained, in many cases, notwithstanding the aversion of
Chapter III.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 281
those who are subject to it; but it is impossible to govern the
heart by love while it disapproves and hates the principles to
which it is required to submit, or the character of the ruler by
whom those principles are enforced.
^ Now, it is very true, that Christ has made a satisfaction to
divine justice. This is frequently asserted; but it is seldom
considered, we apprehend, with any very great degree of dis
tinctness, in what sense the term justice should always be
understood in this proposition. It cannot properly refer to the
retributive justice of God. This requires the punishment of
the offender, and of no one else. It accepts of no substitute.
And hence, it is impossible to conceive that it can be satisfied,
except by the punishment of the offender himself. The object
of this sort of justice, as I have said, is personal guilt; and
hence, as our Saviour did not become personally guilty, when
he assumed our place and consented to die for us, so it is impos
sible to conceive that he became liable to the infliction of the
retributive justice of God. And we suppose it is this idea, at
which the Socinian vaguely and obscurely aims, when he says,
that the justice of God requires the punishment of the trans
gressor alone ; and that it is absurd to suppose it can be satisfied
by the substitution of the innocent in his stead. He denies the
whole doctrine of satisfaction, because he sees and feels that it
is not true according to one meaning of the terms in which it is
expressed.
In truth and in deed, the sinner is just as guilty after the
atonement as he was before ; and he is just as obnoxious to the
inflictions of the retributive justice of God. He may be most
justly punished ; for as the claims of retributive justice have
not been satisfied, so they may be demanded of him without
being a second time exacted. He really deserves the wrath of
God on account of his sins, although administrative justice has
been satisfied ; and hence, when he truly repents and believes,
all his sins are freely and graciously remitted. No satisfaction
is made to retributive justice.
It is the administrative justice of God that has been satisfied
by the atonement. This merely enforces the punishment of the
sinner, as I have said, in order to secure the ends of good
government ; and hence, it is capable of yielding and giving
place to any expedient by which those ends may be secured.
282 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part n,
In other words, it is capable of being satisfied by whatever
method God may be pleased to adopt in order to secure the
ends of good government, and to accomplish his own glorious
designs, without the punishment of the sinner. All this, as we
shall see hereafter, has been most gloriously accomplished by
the death and sufferings of Christ, God can now be just, and
yet the j ustifier of him that believes. The great obstacles which
the administrative justice of God interposes to the forgiveness
of sin, having been taken out of the way and nailed to the
cross, that unbounded mercy from which the provision of such
a Saviour proceeded, can now flow down upon a lost and
ruined world in all the fulness and plenitude of its pardoning
and sanctifying power.
As a general thing, those who undertake to vindicate the
sufferings of Christ against objections, rest their defence on the
ground that they are a satisfaction to the administrative justice
of God. This is seen, not from their express declarations, but
from the nature of their arguments and defence ; as if they
unconsciously turned to this position as to their stronghold.
On the other hand, those who assail the sacrifice of Christ,
almost invariably treat it as if it were a satisfaction to the
retributive justice of God. Both sides seem to be right, and
both wrong. The whole idea of satisfaction to divine justice
by a substitute is not absurd, because the idea of satisfaction
to retributive justice is so ; nor is the whole justice of God, or
the justice of God in every sense of the word, to be conceived
of as satisfied by the atonement, because his administrative
justice is thus satisfied. When it is thus asserted, then, that
the justice of God is satisfied by the atonement ; we should be
careful, we think, to observe in what precise sense this propo
sition is true, and in what sense it is false ; in order that we
may pursue the clear and shining light of truth, neither dis
tracted by the clamour of words nor enveloped in clouds of
logomachy.
There is a class of theologians, we are aware, and a very
large class, who regard the sufferings of Christ as a satisfaction
to the retributive justice of God. But this forms no part of the
doctrine which we have undertaken to defend ; and, indeed,
we think the defence of such a view of the atonement clearly
impossible. It is placed on the ground, that the sins of the
Chapter III.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 283
world, or of those for whom Christ died, have been imputed to
him ; and hence he really suffers the inflictions of the retri
butive justice of God. The objections to this scheme, which
seek to remove the apparent hardships and injustice of the
sufferings of the innocent, by the fiction of the imputation of
the sins of the guilty, we shall not dwell upon here ; as we so
fully considered them in the preceding chapter. To our mind
they are plainly unanswerable. We would vindicate the suf
ferings of Christ no more than those of infants, on the ground
that sin was imputed to him, so as to render them just. On
the contrary, we hold them to have ben wholly undeserved ;
and instead of vindicating them on the ground of stern justice,
we vindicate them on the ground of the infinite, unbounded,
and overflowing goodness of God.
It is easy to see that such a view of the atonement does not
in the least degree conflict with the justice of God. It merely
teaches, that God has provided for the salvation of the world by
the sufferings of Jesus Christ, who was without spot or blemish.
Surely we cannot find it in our hearts to object, that the suffer
ings of Christ for such a purpose are not consistent with the
justice of God, if we will only read a single page in the great
volume of nature and of providence. It has been said by
Bishop Butler, that such an objection " concludes altogether as
much against God s whole original constitution of nature, and
the whole daily course of divine providence, in the government
of the world, i. e., against the whole scheme of theism and the
whole notion of religion, as against Christianity. For the world
is a constitution, or system, whose parts have a mutual refer
ence to each other ; and there is a scheme of things gradually
carrying on, called the course of nature, to the carrying on of
which God has appointed us, in various ways, to contribute.
And when, in the daily course of natural providence, it is
appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults of
the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection as the
instance we are considering. The infinitely greater importance
of that appointment of Christianity which is objected against,
does not hinder but that it may be, as it plainly is, an appoint
ment of the very same kind with what the world affords us
daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in the
objection, it would be stronger, in one respect, against natural
J84 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
providence, than against Christianity ; because, under the
former, we are in many cases commanded, and even necessi
tated, whether we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others,
whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary."
Now, how very unreasonable is it in the theist, to object
against Christianity, that it represents God as having acted upoii
a particular principle, i. e., as having appointed the innocent to
suffer for the good of the guilty, when we see that he has
everywhere recognised and adopted the very same principle in
the government of the world ? However remote this principle
may appear from the conceptions of man, it is not only found
in the volume of inspiration ; it is deeply engraven by the
finger of God himself upon every page of the volume of natu
ral providence. And to question the divine original of revela
tion, because it contains such a principle or appointment, while
we admit that God created and governs the world, is about as
unreasonable as it would be to deny that a letter came from a
particular person, because it was clearly written in his hand
writing, and bore evident traces of his peculiarities of style and
thought.
Let us view this general principle in a particular instance.
This will set it in a clear and striking light, and seem to vindi
cate the constitution of the world, as well as the doctrine of the
atonement. The principle of compassion has been planted in
our bosom by the finger of God. And thus the necessity is laid
upon us, by a law of our nature, to suffer on account of the
distresses which our fellow-men bring upon themselves by their
own crimes and vices ; and we are impelled in various ways to
undergo inconvenience and loss, and self-denial and suffering,
in order to avert from them the consequences of their own mis
conduct. But have we any reason to complain of this appoint
ment of God ? Certainly not : for if we obey the indications
of his will, as seen in this part of the constitution of our nature,
by doing all in our power to relieve the distresses of our fellow-
men, we shall be infinitely more than repaid for all that we
may undergo and suffer. However painful may be the feeling
of compassion, we only have to obey its dictates by relieving
the distressed to the utmost of our ability, and we shall be more
than repaid by the satisfaction and delight which never fail to
reault from such a course of life ; to say nothing of those infinite
Chapter HI.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 285
rewards which God has prepared for those who sincerely love
and serve him.
Just so it is in relation to the sufferings of Christ. He was
led by his boundless compassion to avert from us the awful
consequences of sin, by the agony, and the sufferings, and the
death, which he endured upon the cross. And, according to
the doctrine of atonement, he is infinitely more than repaid for
all this. Though he suffered in the flesh, and was made a spec
tacle to men and angels, yet he despised the shame, seeing the
joy that was set before him. We do confess that we can see
no insufferable hardship in all this, nor the least shadow of
injustice. One thing is certain, if injustice is exhibited here,
it is exhibited everywhere in the providence of God ; and if the
doctrine of the atonement were stricken from the scheme of
Christianity, the injustice which is supposed to attend it would
still continue to overhang and cloud the moral government of
God. And hence, if the deist or the Socinian would escape
from this frightful spectre of his own imagination, he must bury
himself in the most profound depths and most cheerless gloom
of atheism.
The doctrine in question is frequently misrepresented, and
made to appear inconsistent with the justice of God, by means
of false analogies. The Socinian frequently speaks of it, as if it
were parallel with the proceeding of a human government that
should doom the innocent to suffer in place of the guilty. Thus
the feeling of indignation that is aroused in the human bosom
at the idea of a virtuous man s being sentenced to suffer the
punishment due to the criminal is sought to be directed against
the doctrine of the atonement. But in vain will such rhetoric
be employed to excite indignation and horror against the doc
trine of the cross, in the mind of any person by whom it is at
all understood.
The cases are not at all parallel. In the first place, no human
government has a right to doom a virtuous man to bear the
punishment due to the criminal ; and if he were willing to suf
fer in the place of the culprit, no government on earth has a
right to accept of such a substitute. The life of the virtuous
citizen is the gift of God, and no earthly power has the author
ity to take it for any such purpose. It would be a violation of
the will of God for any human government to admit of such a
286 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part H,
substitution. On the contrary, Christ had the power to lay
down his life ; and he did so, in perfect accordance with
the appointment of God. In submitting to the death of the
cross, he did not subvert, he fulfilled the end of his earthly
existence.
Secondly, it would overthrow the ends of public justice for
any human government to permit a good man, the ornament
and blessing of society, to die in the room of the criminal, its
scourge and plague. The sufferings of the good citizen in such
a case would be pure and unmitigated evil. While they would
deprive society of his services, they would throw back upon it
the burden of one who deserved to die. They would tend to
render the punishment of crime uncertain ; they would shock
the moral sentiments of mankind, and cover with odium and
disgrace the government that could tolerate such a proceeding.
But not so in relation to the sufferings of Christ. He assumed
his human nature for the express purpose of dying upon the
cross. He died, not to deliver an individual and turn him loose
to commit further depredations upon society, but to effect the
salvation of the world itself, and to deliver it from all the evils
under which it groans and travails in pain. He died for sin
ners, not that they might continue in their sins, but in order to
redeem unto himself a peculiar people zealous of good works.
In the third and last place, the death of a good man is the
end of his existence, the entire extinction of his being, in so
far as all human government is concerned ; whereas the death
of Christ, in relation to the government of God, was but the
beginning of his exaltation and glory. He endured the cross,
despising the shame, in view of the unbounded joy that was
set before him. The temporal evils which he endured, unut
terably great as they were, if viewed merely in relation to
himself, were infinitely more than counterbalanced by the eter
nal satisfaction and delight that resulted from them.
SECTION m.
The objections of Dr. Channing, and other Unitarians, against the doctrine
of the atonement.
It is likewise objected against the doctrine of the atonement,
that it obscures the freeness and glory of the divine mercy. It
Chapter IE.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 28Y
is supposed to interfere with the freeness of the favour of God,
inasmuch as it requires a sacrifice to procure the remission of
sin. This point, no less than the former, the Socinian endeavours
to establish by means of analogies drawn from the ordinary
transactions of life. " I know it is said," says Dr. Channing,
" that Trinitarianism magnifies God s mercy, because it teaches
that he himself provided the substitute for the guilty. But I
reply, that the work here ascribed to mercy is not the most
appropriate, nor the most fitted to manifest it and impress it on
the heart. This may be made apparent by familiar illustration.
Suppose that a creditor, through compassion to certain debtors,
should persuade a benevolent and opulent man to pay him in
their stead; would not the debtors see a greater mercy, and
feel a weightier obligation, if they were to receive a free,
gratuitous release ? And will not their chief gratitude stray
beyond the creditor to their benevolent substitute ? Or sup
pose that a parent, unwilling to inflict a penalty on a disobedient
but feeble child, should persuade a stronger child to bear it ;
would not the offender see a more touching mercy in a free
forgiveness, springing immediately from a parent s heart, than
in this circuitous remission ?"
If there were any force in such analogies, they would con
clude quite as much against the scheme of Dr. Channing as
against ours. For he maintains that the sinner can obtain for
giveness only by a sincere repentance of his sins. He teaches
that God requires the sinner to humble himself, and take up his
cross and follow Christ. Now to return to the case of the
debtor. Would he not see a greater kindness, "and feel a
weightier obligation," if he were to receive a free release, with
out any conditions being imposed upon him, than if it was
accompanied by any terms or conditions ?
But the analogy is false. However well it might serve some
purposes, it is misapplied by Dr. Channing. If a creditor is
known to love money, as most men are, and he should never
theless release his debtors ; this would undoubtedly be an
exhibition of his kindness. And we might measure the extent
of his kindness by the amount of the indebtedness which he had
forgiven. But although the creditor, who is the most easily
moved by the necessities of his debtor, may be the most com
passionate man, it does not follow that the governor, who under
288 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part JL
all circumstances, makes the most free and unrestrained use of
the pardoning power, is the best ruler. The creditor has a
perfect right to release his debtor ; and in so doing, he affects
the interest of no one but himself: whereas, by the pardon of
offences against public law, the most sacred rights of the com
munity may be disregarded, the protection of law may be
removed, and the general good invaded. The penalty of the
law does not belong to the supreme executive, as a debt belongs
to the creditor to whom it is due ; and hence it cannot always
be abandoned at his pleasure. It is ordained, not merely for
the ruler, but for the benefit and protection of all who are sub
ject to its control. And hence, although a creditor may show
his mercy by releasing his necessitous debtors ; yet the ruler
who undertakes to display his mercy by a free use of the par
doning power, may only betray a weak and yielding compassion
for the individual, instead of manifesting that calm and enlight
ened benevolence which labours to secure the foundations of
wise and good government, and thereby to promote the order
and happiness of the governed.
This leads me to remark, that the hope and the theology of
the Socinian is built upon the most inadequate conceptions of
the divine mercy. This is not a weak and yielding thing, as
men are so fondly prone to imagine ; it is a universal and
inflexible law. The most perfect harmony exists among all the
attributes of God ; and as his justice demands the punishment
of the sinner, so also doth his mercy. The bosom of God is not,
like that of frail mortals, torn and distracted by conflicting
principles. Even to the maintenance of his law, that bright
transcript of his eternal justice, his mercy is inviolably pledged.
Heaven and earth shall sooner pass away, than his mercy shall
withdraw from the support of one jot or one tittle of it. It is
not only just and holy, and therefore will be maintained with
almighty power ; but it is also good, and therefore its immutable
foundations are laid in the everlasting and unchanging mercy
of God.
For the universal good, it will be inexorably enforced against
the individual transgressor. God is not slack concerning his
promises. He is free from all human weakness. His mind is
not limited, like that of man, to be more affected by partial
Buffering than by that universal disorder and ruin which must
Chapter HI/I WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 289
inevitably result from the unrequited violation of his law. The
mind of man is unduly affected by the present and the proxi
mate : but to God there is neither remote nor future. And
when, in wisdom and in goodness, he first established and or
dained the law unto life, he saw the end from the beginning ;
and he can never sacrifice the universal good by setting aside
that law in order to avoid partial evil. His mercy to the whole
creation makes the same demand as his justice. The execution
of divine justice is, indeed, but a manifestation of that mercy
which is over all his works ; and which labours, with omnipo
tent energy, to secure the good of all, by vindicating the majesty
and glory of that law, upon the preservation of which inviolate
the good of all depends. The fire that is not quenched is
kindled by the boundless love of God no less than by his justice ;
and the very fierceness of its burning is, that it is the " wrath
of the Lamb." Let us not be deceived by the vain fancies and
the idle dreams which our fond wishes and narrow-minded in
firmities are so apt to beget in us. Let us remember that the
mercy of God is united with omniscience ; and that it is to be
found only in the bosom of Him whose empire extends to the
utmost bounds of the universe, as well as throughout the end
less ages of eternity.
In the genuine spirit of Socinian theology, Dr. Channing, in
his illustration, has set before us the mercy of God alone ; and
that, too, merely in relation to the sinner, and not in relation to
his law and government. He entirely overlooks the fact, that
it is impossible to exhibit either the justice or the mercy of
God in the most affecting manner, except in union with each
other. It is frequently said, we are aware, that if God had
pardoned the sinner without enforcing the demands of the law,
he would have displayed his mercy alone, and not his justice;
but in fact this would have been a very equivocal display of
mercy. It would have shown only one of two things : either
that God regarded the sinner with an eye of compassion, or that
he did not regard his sin : either that he was merciful, or that
he had no great abhorrence of sin: either that he loved the
transgressor, or that he did not hate the transgression.
To illustrate this point, let us take the case of Zaleucus, the
king of the Locrians. He passed a certain law, with the penalty
that every transgressor of it should lose both his eyes. It so
19
290 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT |Part II,
happened that his own son was the first by whom it was vio
lated. Now, any one can see, that although Zaleucus had
been a hard-hearted and unfeeling tyrant, he might have par
doned his son, just because he had no regard to the demands
of public justice ; or, on the other hand, that he might have
inflicted the penalty of the law upon his son to the uttermost,
not out of a supreme regard to the law, but because he was
destitute of mercy and natural affection. Neither by remitting
the whole punishment, nor by inflicting it with rigour, could he
have made such a display of his justice and mercy as to make
a deep moral impression upon his subjects. In other words, if
either of these attributes had been left out in the manifestation,
the display of the other must have been exceedingly feeble and
equivocal. Both must be seen in union, or neither can be seen
in the fulness of its glory.
How, then, could Zaleucus have displayed both of these at
tributes in the most perfect and affecting manner? By doing
precisely that which he is said to have done. He directed that
one of his own eyes should be put out, and one of his son s.
Whose heart is not touched by this most affecting display of the
tender pity of the father, in union with the stern justice of the
law-giver? His pity would not allow him to inflict the whole
penalty upon his beloved son ; and his high regard for the de
mands of public justice would not permit him to set at naught
the authority of the law : and but for the possession and mani
festation of this last trait of character, the mighty strugglings
and yearnings of the first could not have burst forth and ap
peared with such overwhelming power and transcendent lustre.
Hence, every system of redemption which, like that of the
Socinian, leaves out of view the administrative justice of God,
does not admit of any very impressive display of his goodness
and his mercy.
All such illustrations must be imperfect, in some respects ;
but the one above given conveys a far more adequate view of
the atonement than that presented by Dr. Chamiing. The
application of it is easy. Such was the mercy of God, that he
could not leave his poor fallen creatures to endure the awful
penalty of the law ; and such was his regard for the purity and
happiness of the universe, that he could not permit his law to
be violated with impunity. If his administrative justice had
Chapter HI.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 291
not stood in the way, the offer of pardon to the sinner would
have cost him merely a word. And hence the length, the
breadth, and the depth of his love could not have been mani
fested. But he was the Euler of the universe, and as such his
law stood in the way. He owed it to himself not to permit this
to be trampled under foot with impunity, nor its violation to be
forgiven, until he had provided some way in order to secure
the high and holy ends for which it had been established.
Hence, as it was not possible for God to deny himself, he sent
forth his beloved Son, who had been the companion of his
bosom and his blessedness from all eternity, to take upon him
self the form of a servant, and by his teaching, and obedience,
and sufferings, and death, to vindicate the majesty of the law,
and to render it honourable in the sight of the universe. And
it is this wonderful union of the goodness and the severity, of
the mercy and the justice of God, which constitutes the grand
moral tendency and glory of the cross.
The course pursued by the king of the Locrians, in relation
to the crime of his son, secured the ends of the law in a much
greater degree than they could have been secured by a rigor
ous execution of its penalty upon the person of his son. It
evinced a deep and settled abhorrence of crime, and an inflexi
ble determination to punish it. It cut off all hope from his
subjects that crime would be permitted to escape with impunity.
And hence, after such a manifestation of his character as a
king, he could permit his son to enjoy the unspeakable blessings
of sight, without holding out the least encouragement to the
commission of crime.
So, likewise, in relation to the sufferings of Christ. These
were not, in strictness, the penalty of the law. This was eternal
death ; whereas the sufferings of Christ, inconceivably great as
they were, were but temporal ; and there can be no proportion
between sufferings which know a period, and those which are
without end. Hence, as we have already said, he did not
satisfy the punitive justice of God. But the sacrifice of Christ
answered all the purposes that could have been answered by
the rigorous execution of the law ; and it answered them in an
infinitely greater degree, than if the human race had been per
mitted to endure it without remedy.
God s love to his Son was inconceivably greater than that
292 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
which any creature ever bore to himself or to any other ; and,
consequently, by offering him up as a substitute for guilty
mortals, in order that he might save them without doing
violence to his administrative justice, he manifested the infinite
energy of his determination to destroy sin. No account of the
indescribable odiousness and deformity of evil, nor of the incon
ceivable holiness of God, could have made so deep an impres
sion of his implacable abhorrence of sin, as is made by the cross
upon which his Son was permitted to expire amid the scorn and
contempt of his enemies. The human imagination has no power
to conceive of a more impressive and appalling enforcement of
the great lesson, " Stand in awe, and sin not," than that which is
presented to an astonished universe in the cross and passion of
the Son of God.
And besides, it possesses this other unspeakable advantage,
that while it manifests an infinite abhorrence of sin, it displays
the most heart-subduing love of the sinner. If Zaleucus had
exhausted the penalty of the law upon his son, this would have
had little or no tendency to reform his heart, or to induce him
to acquiesce in the justness of the law. It would have been
more apt to lead him to regard the king as an unfeeling father.
But when he was made to see, by the manner in which the
king had dispensed the law, that he cherished the warmest
feelings of affection for him, there was no cause left for a mur
mur on the part of any, but for the highest admiration on the
part of all.
Just so in relation to the sufferings and death of Christ. If
God had exhausted the fearful penalty of the law upon poor,
suffering, and degraded humanity, this would have been well
calculated to inspire his creatures with a servile and trembling
awe of him. From their limited and imperfect views of the
evil of sin, and of the reasons why it should be punished, they
would not have been prepared to acquiesce in such tremendous
severity. Thus, one of the great ends of God s moral govern
ment would have been subverted : the affections of his creatures
would have been estranged from him, through a distrust of his
goodness and a dread of his power, instead of having been
drawn to him by the sweet and sacred ties of confidence and
love. But how different is the case now ! Having given for
us his beloved Son, who is greater than all things, while we
Chapter m.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 293
were yet enemies, now that we are reconciled to him, we are
most firmly persuaded that he will freely give us all things that
can possibly conduce to our good. Surely, after such a display
of his love, it were highly criminal in us, to permit the least
shadow of suspicion or distrust to intercept the sweet, and
cheering, and purifying beams of his reconciled countenance.
"Whatever may be his severity against sin, and whatever terror
it may strike into the conscience of evil-doers, we can most
cordially acquiesce in its justness : for we most clearly perceive,
that the penalty of the law was not established to gratify any
private appetite for revenge, but to uphold and secure the highest
happiness of the moral universe.
NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT I Part n,
CHAPTER IY.
THE ETEENAL PUNISHMENT OF THE WICKED RECONCILED WITH THE
GOODNESS OF GOD.
And thus,
Transfigured, with a meek and dreadless awe,
A solemn hush of spirit, he beholds
All things of terrible seeming : yea, unmoved
Views e en the immitigable ministers,
That shower down vengeance on these latter days.
For even these on wings of healing come,
Yea, kindliug with intenser Deity ;
From the celestial mercy-seat they speed,
And at the renovating wells of love,
Have fill d their vials with salutary wrath. OLBMDGE.
HAVING considered the sufferings of the innocent, it now
becomes necessary to contemplate the punishment of the guilty,
in connexion with the infinite goodness of God. This conducts
us to the consideration of the most awful subject that ever
engaged the attention of a rational being, the never-ending
torments of the wicked in another world. Though plausible
arguments and objections have been urged against this doctrine,
we are perfectly satisfied they will not bear the test of a close
examination. They have derived all their apparent force and
conclusiveness, it seems to us, from two distinct sources, namely :
from the circumstance that this appalling doctrine has been too
often placed, by its advocates, upon insecure and untenable
grounds ; and from the fact, that the supporters of this doctrine
have too often maintained principles from which its fallacy may
be clearly inferred. In the defence of this doctrine, then, we
shall endeavour to point out, first, the false grounds upon which
it has been placed ; secondly, the unsound principles from
which its fallacy may be inferred ; and, thirdly, we shall en
deavour to show the means by which it may be clearly and
satisfactorily reconciled with the goodness of the Supreme
Ruler of the world.
Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 205
SECTION I.
The false grounds upon which the doctrine of the eternity of future punish
ment has been placed.
Nothing could be more untenable, it seems to us, than the
usual argument in favour of future punishments, which seeks
to justify their eternity on the ground that every sinful act,
because it is committed against an infinite being, is infinite, and
therefore deserves to be visited with endless torments. This
argument, which seems but little better than a play on the
term infinite, is perhaps calculated to make no impression upon
any mind, which is not already fully persuaded of the truth of
the doctrine in question. On the other hand, it may be so
easily refuted by a multitude of considerations, that it exposes
the doctrine, in one of its defences, to the triumphant attacks of
its adversaries. We shall not exhaust the patience of the reader
by dwelling upon the refutation which may be given of such
an argument. We shall dismiss it with a single reply, and that
we shall give in the language of John Foster.
" A common argument has been that sin is an infinite evil,
that is, of infinite demerit, as an offence against an infinite
being ; and that, since a finite creature cannot suffer infinitely
in measure, he must in duration. But, surely in all reason, the
limited, and in the present instance, diminutive nature of the
criminal, must be an essential part of the case for judgment.
Every act must, for one of its proportions, be measured by the
nature and condition of the agent : and it would seem that
one principle in that rule of proportion should be, that the
offending agent should be capable of being aware of the magni
tude (the amount, if we might use such a word,) of the offence
he commits, by being capable of something like an adequate
conception of the being against whom it is committed. A per
verse child, committing an offence against a great monarch, of
whose dignity it had some, but a vastly inadequate apprehen
sion, would not be punished in the same manner as an offender
of high endowments and responsibility, and fully aware of the
dignity of the personage offended. The one would justly be
sharply chastised; the other might as justly be condemned to
death. In the present case, the offender does or may know that
296 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
the Being offended against is of awful majesty, and therefore
the offence is one of great aggravation, and he will justly be
punished with great severity ; but by his extremely contracted
and feeble faculties, as the lowest in the scale of strictly rational
and accountable creatures in the whole creation, he is infinitely
incapable of any adequate conception of the greatness of the
Being offended against. He is then, according to the argument,
obnoxious to a punishment not in any proportion to his own
nature, but alone to that infinity of the supreme nature, which
is to him infinitely inconceivable and unknown."*
This answer alone, though perhaps not the best which might
be made, we deem amply sufficient. Indeed, does not the posi
tion, that a man, a poor, weak, fallible creature, deserves an
infinite punishment, an eternity of torments, for each evil
thought or word, carry its own refutation along with it ? And
if not, what are we to think of that attribute of justice, which
demands an eternity to inflict the infinite pangs due to a single
sin ? Is it a quality to inspire the soul with a rational worship,
or to fill it with a horror which casteth out love ?
Another argument to show the infinite ill-desert of some men,
is drawn from the scientia media Dei. It is said, that if God
foresaw that if they had been placed in various other circum
stances, and surrounded by other temptations, their dispositions
and character would have induced them to commit other sins ;
for which they are, therefore, as really responsible as if they
had actually committed them. If this be a correct principle, it
is easy, we must admit, to render each individual of the human
race responsible for a greater number of sins than have ever
been committed, or than could ever have been committed by
all the actual dwellers upon the face of the earth. Nay, by
such a process of multiplication, it would be easy to spread the
guilt of a single soul over every point of infinite space, and
every moment of eternal duration. But such a principle is
more than questionable. To say nothing of its intrinsic deform
ity, it is refuted by the consequences to which it leads. "We
want arguments on this subject, that will give the mind, not
horrid caricatures of the divine justice, but such views of that
sublime attribute as will inspire us with sentiments of admira
tion and love, as well as with a godly fear and wholesome awe.
Letter on the Duration of Future Punishment, pp. 19, 20.
Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 297
SECTION IL
The unsound principles from which, if true, the fallacy of the eternity of
future punishments may be clearly inferred.
It is a doctrine maintained by Augustine, Calvin, and Luther,
as well as by many of their followers, that, in his fallen state,
man " is free to evil only." He can do nothing good without
the aid of divine grace ; and this, in point of fact, is given to
but a very small number of the human race ; at least, efficacious
grace is given to but few, so that the greater part of mankind
cannot acquire or possess that holiness without which no man
shall see the Lord. Now, if we take our stand upon this plat
form of doctrine, it will be found utterly impossible, we think,
to defend the eternity of future punishments.
It was upon this platform that John Foster erected his tre
mendous battery against the doctrine in question; and it is
believed, that the more closely the argument is examined, the
more clearly it will be seen, that he has either demolished the
doctrine which was so obnoxious to his feelings, or else the
platform which constituted so essential a part of his own creed.
In our humble opinion, " the moral argument," as he calls it,
" pressed irresistibly upon his mind ;" because it was drawn
from false premises, of whose correctness he seems not to have
entertained the shadow of a doubt. He clung to the conclu
sion, when he should have abandoned the premises. But we
shall give his own words, and permit the reader to judge for
himself.
After having endeavoured to impress our feeble powers with
" the stupendous idea of eternity," he adds : " Now think of an
infliction of misery protracted through such a period, and at the
end of it being only commenced, not one smallest step nearer a
conclusion, the case just the same if that sum of figures were
multiplied by itself ; and then think of man, his nature, his
situation, the circumstances of his brief sojourn and trial on
earth. Far be it from us to make light of the demerit of sin,
and to remonstrate with the Supreme Judge against a severe
chastisement, of whatever moral nature we may regard the
infliction to be. But still, what is man ? He comes into the
world with a nature fatally corrupt, and powerfully tending to
298 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
actual evil. He comes among a crowd of temptations adapted
to his innate evil propensities. He grows up (incomparably
the greater portion of the race) in great ignorance, his judg
ment weak, and under numberless beguilements into error;
while his passions and appetites are strong, his conscience
unequally matched against their power, in the majority of
men, but feebly and rudely constituted. The influence of what
ever good instructions he may receive, is counteracted by a
combination of opposite influences almost constantly acting on
him. He is essentially and inevitably unapt to be powerfully
acted on by what is invisible and future. In addition to all
which, there is the intervention and activity of the great tempter
and destroyer. In short, his condition is such that there is no
hope of him, but from a direct, special operation on him, of
what we denominate grace. Is it not so ? Are we not con
vinced ? Is it not the plain doctrine of Scripture ? Is there
not irresistible evidence, from a view of the actual condition
of the human world, that no man can become good in the
Christian sense, can become fit for a holy and happy place
hereafter, but by this operation db extra? But this is arbi
trary and discriminative on the part of the sovereign Agent,
and independent of the will of man. And how awfully evident
is it, that this indispensable operation takes place only on a
comparatively small proportion of the collective race !
" Now this creature, thus constituted and circumstanced,
passes a few fleeting years on earth, a short, sinful course, in
which he does often what, notwithstanding his ignorance and
ill-disciplined judgment and conscience, he knows to be wrong,
and neglects what he knows to be his duty ; and, consequently,
for a greater or less measure of guilt, widely different in dif
ferent offenders, deserves punishment. But ENDLESS PUNISH
MENT ! HOPELESS MISERY, through a duration to which the
enormous terms above imagined will oe absolutely NOTHING 1
I acknowledge my inability (I would say it reverently) to admit
this belief, together with a belief in the divine goodness, the
belief that < God is love, that his tender mercies are over all
his works. Goodness, benevolence, charity, as ascribed in
supreme perfection to him, cannot mean a quality foreign to all
human conceptions of goodness : it must be something analo
gous in principle to what himself has defined and required as
Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 299
goodness in his moral creatures ; that, in adoring the divine
goodness, we may not be worshipping an unknown God.
But, if so, how would all our ideas be confounded, while con
templating him bringing, of his own sovereign will, a race of
creatures into existence, in such a condition that they certainly
will and must must by their nature and circumstances go
wrong, and be miserable, unless prevented by especial grace,
which is the privilege of only a small proportion of them, and
at the same time affixing on their delinquency a doom of which
it is infinitely beyond the highest archangels faculty to appre
hend a thousandth part of the horror /"*
Now, granting the premises, we hold this argument to be un
answerable and conclusive. But is it not wonderful that it did
not occur to so acute a mind as Foster s, that the same premises
would furnish a valid argument against the justice of all pun
ishment, as well as against the justice of eternal punishments?
Surely, if the utter inability of man to do good without divine
grace is any extenuation, when such grace is not given, it is an
entire and perfect exoneration. It is either this, or it is nothing.
Such are the inevitable inconsistencies of the best thinkers,
when the feelings of the heart are at war with the notions of the
head. Instead of analyzing this awful subject, and tracing it
down to its fundamental principles, upon which his reason
might have reposed with a calm and immovable satisfaction,
Foster seems to have permitted his great mind to take root in
a creed of man s devising, and then to be swayed by the gusts
and counter-blasts of passion. Believing that man " must go
wrong," that nature and circumstances impose this dire neces
sity upon him, his benevolence could not contemplate an eter
nity of torments as due to such inevitable sin. It was repelled
by " the infinite horror of the tenet." On the other hand, his
abhorrence of evil, and sense of justice, shrank with equal vio
lence from the idea that all punishment is unjust; and hence he
could say, "Far be it from us to make light of the demerit of
sin, and to remonstrate with the Supreme Judge against a
severe chastisement." Thus did his great mind, instead of rest
ing upon truth, perpetually hang in a state of suspense and
vacillation between the noblest feelings of his heart and the
darkest errors of his creed.
Letter, &c., pp. 15-18.
300 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part IL
Others, who have adopted the same creed, have endeavoured
to extricate themselves from the dilemma in which Foster found
himself, not by denying the eternity of future punishments, but
by inventing a very nice distinction between the natural and
moral inability of man. " He can obey the law," say they,
"if he will;" all that " he wants is the will." All his natural
faculties are complete ; only let him will aright, and he is safe.
But, after all, the question still remains, How is he to get the
will, the good will, in order to render him acceptable to
God ? Does he get it from nature is it a part of his birth
right? No: from this he derives a depraved will, "free to
evil only." Is it vouchsafed to him from above? Is it a gift
from God ? Alas ! to those who are lost, and perish eternally
in their sins, the grace of God is never given ! What does it
signify thus to tell them, or to tell the world, that they have the
natural ability to obey ; that none of their natural faculties are
lost; that they still have understandings, and affections, and
wills? "What can all these avail them? Is it not the merest
mockery to assure them that they really have hearts, and wills,
and feelings, if they " must go wrong," if they must put forth
the volitions for which they shall be tormented forever ?
Upon this distinction we shall not dwell, as we have fully
considered it in our " Examination of Edwards on the Will."
We shall merely add, that it is not an invention of modern
times.* It is at least as old as the age of Augustine. " The
Pelagians think," says he, " they know some great thing, when
they say, * God would not comma/nd what he knew could not be
done ~by man? Who does not know this? But he commands
what we cannot do, whereby we know what we ought to ask of
him. For it is faith which obtains by prayer what the law
commands. For true it is that we keep the commandments if
we will, (si volumus /) but as the will is prepared of the Lord,
we must seek of him that we may will as much as is sufficient,
in order to our doing by volition, (ut volendofaciamus") Truly,
we can keep the commandments if we will to do so ; for, as
Augustine immediately says, " certain it is, that we will when
we will."f But no man can put forth a volition in conformity
Robert Hall supposes that Edwards must have found it in Owen. He might
have found it in a hundred earlier writers,
t Wiggers s Presentation, p. 210 Note by Translator.
Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. SOI
with the commandments, unless it be given him of God, who
" causes us to will good ;"* and this is never given to the repro
bate. How, then, can they be justly consigned to eternal tor
ments? How can they be eternally punished for that which
they could not possibly avoid ? It is no wonder that a Foster
should have shrunk from " the infinite horrors of such a tenet,"
as seen from this point of view ; the only wonder is, that any
one can be found who can possibly endure them.
The same distinction, as we have already said, is relied upon
by Edwards in order to show that man has an ability to obey
the law of God.f
Thus we are gravely taught that we are able to obey the
law of God ; because if we will to do so, the external act will
follow ; and because it is certain that if we will we do really
will. But how to will is the question. Can we put forth the
requisite volitions ? No one doubts that if we put forth the
volition which the law of God requires, we then obey him,
whether the external act follow or not; nor that if we will,
then we do really will. But all this leaves the great question
untouched, Can we put forth the requisite volitions without
divine aid ? And after this question has been answered in the
negative, and we have been told that such aid is not given to
the reprobate, all this talk about a natural ability, which must
forever prove unavailing, is the merest mockery that ever en
tered into the imagination or the metaphysics of man. How
ever the fact may be disguised by verbal niceties, it as really
places eternal life beyond the reach of the reprobate, as is the
very sun in the firmament of heaven, and makes eternal death
as inevitable to them as is the rising and the setting thereof.
SECTION III.
The eternity of future punishments an expression of the divine goodness.
We have seen in the first chapter of this part of the present
work, that God really and sincerely intended the salvation of
all men ; and that if any are lost, it is because it is impossible
in the nature of things to necessitate holiness; and that the
impenitent, in spite of all the means employed by infinite
wisdom and goodness for their salvation, do obstinately work
Wiggers s Presentation, p. 210 Note by Trans. | Freedom of the Will, p. 30.
302 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
out their own ruin and destruction. Omnipotence cannot con
fer holiness upon them ; they do not choose to acquire it ; and
hence, they are compelled to endure the awful wages of sin.
To those who reject this view of the nature of holiness, the
world in which we live must forever remain an inexplicable
enigma ; and that to which we are hastening must present still
more terrific subjects of contemplation. To their minds the
eternal agonies of the lost can never be made to harmonize with
the infinite perfections of God, by whom the second death is
appointed. "How self-evident the proposition," says Foster,
" that if the Sovereign Arbiter had intended the salvation of
the race, it must have been accomplished." Having so sum
marily settled this position, that God did not intend the salva
tion of the race, the question which admits of no answer, Why
did he not intend it? might well spread a mysterious darkness
over the whole economy of divine providence. It was that
darkness, that perplexing and confounding darkness, by which
the mighty soul of Foster was oppressed with so many gloomy
thoughts, and filled with so many frightful imaginations.
For our part, if we could believe that God could easily work
holiness in the heart of every creature, and that he does not do
go simply because he does not intend their salvation, we should
not have attempted to vindicate his perfections. We should
have believed in them, it is true ; but we should have been con
strained to confess, that they are veiled in impenetrable clouds
and darkness. Hence, if we had not confessed ignorance and
inability for all minds and all ages, as so many others have
done, we should, at least, have confessed these things for our
selves, and supinely waited for the light of eternity to dispel
the awful and perplexing enigmas of time. But we hold no
such doctrine; we entertain no such sentiment. We believe
that God, in his infinite, overflowing goodness desires, and from
all eternity has desired, the salvation of all men. "We believe
: that salvation is impossible to some, because a necessary holi
ness is impossible, and they do not choose to work out for
themselves what cannot be worked out for them, even by
omnipotence. It was the bright and cheering light which this
truth seemed to cast upon the dark places of the universe, that
first inspired us with the thought and determination to produce
a theodicy. And it is in the light of this truth, if we mistake
Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 308
not, that the infinite love of God may be seen beaming from
the eye of hell, as well as from the bright regions of eternal
blessedness. This conclusion we shall endeavour methodically
to unfold, and to set in a clear light.
In the first place, then, to begin with our fundamental posi
tion, the Creator could not necessitate the holiness of the crea
ture. Hence this holiness, after all the means and the ability
were given to him, must be left to the will of the creature him
self. All that could be done in such a case was, for God to set
life and death before us, accompanied by the greatest of all con
ceivable motives to pursue the one, and to fly from the other ;
and then say, " choose ye :" and all this has God actually
done for the salvation of all men. Hence, though some should
be finally lost, his infinite goodness will be clear. Let us see
what objections may be urged against this conclusion.
Supposing it granted, that a necessitated virtue is a contra
diction in terms, and that it is indispensably requisite to ordain
rewards and punishments in order to prevent sin and secure
holiness ; it may still be said that the penalty of eternal death
is too severe for that purpose, and is therefore inconsistent with
the goodness of God. Indeed, after such a concession, this is
the only position which can be taken in opposition to the doc
trine in question. Let us then look at it, and examine the
assumption upon which it rests for support.
If such punishments be too severe, it must be for one of these
two reasons: either because no object can justify the infliction
of them, or because the end proposed by the Supreme Kuler is
not sufficiently great for that purpose.
Let us suppose, then, in the first place, the position to be
assumed, that no object can possibly justify the infliction of
such awful punishments. Such would be the case, we admit,
if such punishments were unjust were not deserved by the per
son upon whom they are inflicted. Hence, it becomes indis
pensable, in order to vindicate the divine benevolence, to show
that eternal sufferings are deserved by those upon whom they
fall. Otherwise they would be unjust, and consequently un
justifiable ; as the end could never justify the means.
We say, then, that eternal sufferings are deserved by the
finally impenitent, not because every sinful act carries along
with it an infinite guilt, nor because every sinner may be
304 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
imagined to have committed an infinite number of sins, but
because they will continue to sin forever. It will be conceded,
that if punishment be admissible at all, it is right and proper
that so long as acts of rebellion are persisted in, the rewards of
iniquity should attend them. It will be conceded, that if the
finally impenitent should continue to sin forever, then they for
ever deserve to reap the rewards of sin. But this is one part
of the Scripture doctrine of future punishments, that those who
endure them will never cease to sin and rebel against the
authority of God s law.
Foster has attempted a reply to this defence of the doctrine
in question, but without success. " It is usually alleged," says
he, " that there will be an endless continuance of sinning ....
and therefore the punishment must be endless." But " the
allegation," he replies, " is of no avail in vindication of the
doctrine, because the first consignment to this dreadful state
necessitates a continuance of the criminality / the doctrine
teaching that it is of the essence, and is an awful aggravation
of the original consignment, that it dooms the condemned to
maintain the criminal spirit unchanged forever. The doom to
sin as well as to suffer, and, according to the argument, to sin
i/n order to suffer, is inflicted as the punishment of the sin
committed in the mortal state. Virtually, therefore, the eter
nal punishment is the punishment of the sins of time."*
Even according to the principles of Foster himself, the argu
ment is wholly untenable. For he admits, that such is the evil
nature of man, such the circumstances around him, and such
the influences of the great tempter, he must inevitably go
wrong; and yet he holds that he may be justly punished for
such transgressions. Now, if every man who comes into the
world be doomed to sin, as this author insists he is, and may
be justly punished for sins committed in this life, why should
he be excused for the sins committed in another state, because
he is doomed to commit them ? But this argumentum ad
hominem is merely by the way, and has more to do with the
consistency of the author, than with the validity of his position.
We shall proceed to subject this to a more searching and a
more satisfactory test.
His argument assumes, that " it is of the essence of the
Letter, pp. 21, 22.
Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 305
original consignment, that it dooms the condemned to maintain
the criminal spirit unchanged forever." This is an unwarrant
able assumption. We nowhere learn, and we are nowhere
required to believe, that the guilty are doomed to sin forever,
because they have voluntarily sinned in this life ; much less
that they are necessitated to sin in order to suffer ! The doc
trine of the eternity of future punishments is not necessarily
encumbered with any such ridiculous appendage ; and if any
one can be found to entertain so absurd a view of the doctrine,
we must leave him to vindicate the creation of his "own
imagination.
We do not suppose that the soul of the guilty will continue
to sin forever, because it will be consigned to the regions of the
lost ; but we suppose it will be consigned to the regions of the
lost, because, by its own repeated acts of transgression, it has
made sure of its eternal continuance in sinning. God dooms
no man to sin neither by his power nor by his providence.
But it is a fact, against which there will be no dispute, that if
a man commit a sin once, he will be still more apt to commit
the same sin again, under the same or similar circumstances.
The same thing will be true of each and every succeeding repe
tition of the offence ; until the habit of sinning may be so
completely wrought into the soul, and so firmly fixed there,
that nothing can check it in its career of guilt. Neither the
glories of heaven, nor the terrors of hell, may be sufficient to
change its course. No amount of influence brought to bear
upon its feelings, may be sufficient to transform its will. " There
is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour," says But
ler, "which being transgressed, there remains no place for
repentance in the natural course of things." And may we not
also add, nor in the supernatural course of things either ; and
there only remains a certain fearful looking-for of judgment?
As this may be the case, for aught we know, nay, as it seems so
probable that this is the case, no one is authorized to pronounce
endless sufferings unjust, unless he can first show that the object
of them has not brought upon himself an eternal continuance
in the practice of sin. In other words, unless he can first show
that the sinner does not doom himself to an eternity of sinning,
he cannot reasonably complain that his Creator and Judge
dooms him to an eternity of suffering.
20
306 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
But it may be said, that although the sinner may deserve to
suffer forever, because he continues to sin forever ; yet it were
more worthy the infinite goodness of God, to release him from
so awful a calamity. If the sinner deserves such punishment,
it is not only just to inflict it upon him, it is a demand of infinite
goodness itself that it should be inflicted upon him, provided
a sufficiently great good may be attained by such a manifesta
tion of justice. This brings us to the consideration of our
second point, namely : Is the object proposed to be accom
plished by the infliction of eternal misery sufficiently great to
justify the infliction of so severe a penalty? In other words,
Is such a penalty disproportioned to the exigencies of the case ?
In his attempt to show, that the infliction of eternal misery
is too severe to consist with the goodness of God, Mr. Foster
does not at all consider the great ends, or final causes, of penal
enactments. He merely dwells upon the terrors of the punish
ment, and brings these into vivid contrast with the weakness
and impotency of man in his mortal state. This, it must be con
fessed, is a most one-sided and partial view of so profound a sub
ject ; much better adapted to work upon the feelings than to
enlighten the judgment. All that he seems to have seen in the
case, is a poor, weak creature, utterly unable to do any good,
subjected to eternal torments for the sins of "a few fleeting
years on earth." Hence it was, that " the moral argument,"
which " pressed so irresistibly on his mind," came in " the stu
pendous idea of eternity."
Indeed, according to his theology, there could be no object
sufficiently vast, no necessity sufficiently imperious, to justify
eternal punishments. The prevention of sin, and the promotion
of universal holiness, could not form such an object or constitute
such a necessity ; for, according to his creed, all this might have
been most perfectly attained by a word. Hence, he was puz
zled and confounded in the contemplation of what appeared to
him so much unnecessary evil. " I acknowledge my inability"
said he, " to admit the belief, (the belief in endless punishment,)
together with the belief in the divine goodness the belief that
4 God is love, that his tender mercies are over all his works. "
As we have already seen from another point of view, we must
come out from his theology if we would see the harmony and
agreement between these beliefs. We must take our stand on
Chapter IV.l WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 307
the position, that Omnipotence cannot necessitate holiness, and
must have recourse to rewards and punishments to secure it.
Otherwise all evil and all suffering will remain an inexplicable
enigma; all rewards and punishments awkward and clumsy
contrivances to attain an end, which might be much better at
tained without them.
On this high and impregnable ground the moral argument
of Foster loses all its irresistible force, and "the stupendous
idea of eternity " presses with all its weight in favour of endless
punishment. If temporal punishments are justified on the
ground that they are necessary to meet the exigencies and up
hold the interests of temporal governments, surely eternal pun
ishments may be justified on the same ground in relation to an
eternal government. The "stupendous idea of eternity" at
taches to the whole, as well as to the part ; and hence nothing
can be gained to the cause of Universalism by the introduction
of this idea, except in the minds of those who take only a one
sided and partial view of the subject.
The spectacle of punishment for a single day, it will be ad
mitted, would be justified on the ground that it was necessary
to support for a single day a government ; especially if that
government were vast in extent and involved stupendous in
terests. But if suffering for a single day may be justified on
such a ground, then the exigencies of such a government for
two days would justify a punishment for two days; and so on
ad infinitum. Hence, the doctrine of eternal punishments in
common with the eternal moral government of God, is not
a greater anomaly than temporal punishments in relation to
temporal governments. If we reject the one, we must also
reject the other. Indeed, when we consider not only the eter
nal duration, but also the universal extent, of the divine govern
ment, the argument in question, if good for anything, presses
with greater force against the little, insignificant governments
of men, than against the moral government of God. One
reason why Foster was "repelled into doubt by the infinite
horrors of the tenet" is, that he merely contemplated the suffer
ings of the guilty, and saw not how those sufferings were con
nected with the majesty and glory of God s universal and eternal
empire. It is as if an insect should undertake to set bounds to
the punishments which human beings have found necessary
808 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part n,
to meet the exigencies and uphold the interests of human
society.
We are told by writers on jurisprudence, that penalties should
be proportioned to offences ; but, as has been truly said, how
this proportion is to be ascertained, or on what principles it is
to be adjusted, we are seldom informed. We are usually left
to vague generalities, which convey no definite information, and
furnish no satisfactory guidance to our minds. If we can ascer
tain the precise conditions according to which this principle
should be adjusted, even by goodness itself, we shall then be
the better able to determine whether the eternal suffering of the
guilty and impenitent is not a manifestation of the love of God,
of that tender mercy which is over all his works.
It is a maxim that punishment should be sufficient to accom
plish the great end for which it is imposed, namely, the preven
tion of offences. Otherwise, if it failed to accomplish this obj ect,
" it would be so much suffering in waste."* Now, who can
say that the penalty of eternal death is not necessary to this end
in the moral government of the universe, or that it is greater
than is necessary for its accomplishment ? "Who can say that a
punishment for a limited period would have answered that end
in a greater or more desirable degree ? Who can say that there
would have been more holiness and happiness, with less sin and
misery, in the universe, if the punishment of those whom nothing
could reclaim had not been eternal ? Who can say that it would
be better for the universe, on the whole, if the punishment of
sin were limited than if it were eternal? Until this question,
which so evidently lies beyond the range of our narrow facul
ties, be answered, it is presumption to object that eternal pun
ishment is inconsistent with the goodness of God. For aught
the objector knows, this very penalty is demanded by infinite
goodness itself, in order to stay the universal ravages of sin, and
preserve the glory of the moral empire of Jehovah. For aught
he knows, the very sufferings of the lost forever may be, not
only a manifestation of the justice of God, but also a profound
expression of that tender mercy which is over all his works.
For aught he knows, this very appointment, at which he takes
so great offence, may be one of the main pillars in the structure
of the intellectual system of the universe ; without which its in-
Jeremy Bentham.
Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 309
ternal constitution would be radically defective, and its moral
government impossible. In short, for aught he knows, his ob
jection may arise, not from any undue or unnecessary severity
of the punishment in question, but from his own utter inca
pacity to decide such a point in relation to the universal and
eternal government of God.
It may be said that this is an appeal to human ignorance,
rather than a reply to the argument of the Universalist. Surely,
it is good to be reminded of our ignorance, when we undertake
to base objections against the doctrines of religion upon assump
tions about the truth of which we know, and, from the nature of
the case, must know, absolutely nothing. If the doctrine in
question involved any inherent contradictions, or were it clearly
at war with the dictates of justice, or mercy, or truth, there
might be some reason in our opposition ; but to oppose it be
cause we cannot see how it subserves the highest interests of the
universe, seems to be an exceedingly rash and hasty decision ;
especially as we see that such a penalty must powerfully tend
to restrain the wickedness of men, as well as to preserve un-
fallen creatures in their obedience.
It is not at all strange that beings with such faculties as we
possess, limited on all sides, and far more influenced by feeling
than by reason, should be oppressed by the stupendous idea of
eternal torments. It absolutely overwhelms the imagination
of poor, short-sighted creatures like ourselves. But God, in his
plans for the universe and for eternity, takes no counsel of hu
man weakness ; and that which seems so terrible to our feeble
intellects may, to his all-seeing eye, appear no more than a dark
speck in a boundless realm of light. Surely, if there ever was,
or ever could be, a question which should be reduced to the
simple inquiry, " What saith the Scripture?" it is that respecting
the future condition of the wicked.
It is truly amazing that a mind like Foster s should have put
this inquiry so easily aside, and relied with so much confidence
upon what he was pleased to call " the moral argument." This
argument, as we have seen, is altogether unsound and sophisti
cal. It bases itself upon the prejudices of a creed, and termi
nates in dark conjectures merely. He hopes, or rather he
" would wish to indulge the hope, founded upon the divine at
tribute of infinite benevolence, that there will be a period some-
310 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part n,
where in the endless futurity, when all God s sinning creatures
will be restored by him to rectitude and happiness." Yain
hope ! delusive wish ! How can they be made holy without
their own consent and cooperation? And if they could be
restored to rectitude and happiness, how can we hope that God
would restore them, since he has not been pleased to preserve
them in their original state of rectitude and happiness ?
But perhaps, says he, there will be, not a restoration of all
God s sinning creatures to rectitude and happiness, but an anni
hilation of their existence. Even this conj ecture, if true, " would
be a prodigious relief;" for "the grand object of interest is a
negation of the perpetuity of misery." Suppose, then, that the
universe had been planned according to this benevolent wish of
Mr. Foster, and that those who could not be reclaimed should,
after a very protracted period of suffering, be forever anni
hilated ; would this promote the order and well-being of the
whole creation ? How did Mr. Foster know but that such a
provision in the government of the universe would oppose so
feeble a barrier to the progress of sin, that scenes of mutability,
and change, and ruin, would be introduced into the empire of
God, from which his benevolence would shrink with infinite
abhorrence ? How did Mr. Foster know but that the Divine
Benevolence itself would prefer a hell in one part of his domin
ions, to the universal disorder, confusion, and moral desolation
which such a provision might introduce into the government of
God? Such a conjecture might, it is true, bring a "prodigious
relief" to our imagination; but the government of God is in
tended for the relief of the universe, and not for the relief of
our imagination.
Others besides the author in question have sought relief for
their minds on this subject, by indulging in vague conjectures
respecting the real design of the Supreme Ruler and Judge.
Archbishop Tillotson, for example, supposes that although God
actually threatened to punish the wicked eternally, he does not
intend, and is not bound, to carry this threat into execution.
This penalty, he supposes, is merely set forth as a terror to evil
doers, in order to promote the good order and well-being of the
world ; and after it has subserved this purpose, the Lawgiver
will graciously remit a portion of the threatened penalty, and
restore all his sinning creatures to purity and bliss. In reply to
Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 311
this extraordinary position, we shall only say that if the Al
mighty really undertook to deceive the world for its own good,
it is a pity he did not take the precaution to prevent the arch
bishop from detecting the cheat. It is a pity, we say, that he
did not deceive the archbishop as well as the rest of men ; and
not suffer his secret to get into the possession of one who has so
indiscreetly published it to the whole world.
Nothing seems more amazing to us than the haste and pre
cipitancy with which most men dispose of subjects so awful as
that of the eternity of future punishments. One would suppose
that if any subject in the whole range of human thought should
engage our most serious attention, and call forth the utmost
exertion of our power of investigation, it would be the dura
tion of punishment in a future life. If that punishment be
eternal, it is certainly the most momentous question which ever
engaged the attention of man, and is to be lightly disposed of
only by madmen.*
* On one point we fully concur with Mr. Foster, (see Letter, p. 27 :) " As to
religious teachers, if this tremendous doctrine be true, surely it ought to be almost
continually proclaimed as with the blast of a trumpet, inculcated and reiterated,
with ardent passion, in every possible form of terrible illustration ; no remission
of the alarm to thoughtless spirits."
But if it be so incumbent on religious teachers, who believe this awful tenet,
thus to proclaim it to a perishing world, is it not equally incumbent on them not
to speak on such a subject at all until they have taken the utmost pains to form
a correct opinion concerning it ? If the man who merely proclaims this doctrine
in the usual quiet way of preachers, while he sees his fellow-men perishing around,
is guilty of criminal neglect, what shall we say of the religious teacher who,
without having devoted much time to the investigation of the subject, exerts his
powers and his influence to persuade his fellow-men that it is all a delusion, and
that the idea of endless misery is utterly inconsistent with the goodness of God?
How many feeble outcries and warnings of those who are so terribly rebuked by
Mr. Foster, may be silenced and forever laid to rest by his eloquent declamation
against the doctrine in question, and how many souls may be thereby betrayed
and led on to their own eternal ruin ! Yet, wonderful as it may seem, Mr. Fos
ter tells us that his opinion on this awful subject has not been the result of " a
protracted inquiry." In the very letter from which we have so frequently quoted,
he says : " I have perhaps been too content to let an opinion (or impression) ad
mitted in early life dispense with protracted inquiry and various reading." Now,
is this the way in which a question of this kind should be decided, a question
which involves the eternal destiny of millions of human beings ? Is it to be de
cided, not by protracted inquiry, but under the influence of an " impression ad
mitted in early life ?"
312 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT |Part II,
CHAPTER Y.
THE DISPENSATION OF THE DIVINE FAVOURS RECONCILED WITH THE GOODNESS
OF GOD.
God, whose thunder shakes the sky,
Whose eye this atom globe surveys,
To thee, my only rock, I fly ;
Thy mercy in thy justice praise.
Then why, my soul, dost thou complain ?
Why drooping seek the dark recess ?
Shake off the melancholy chain,
For God created all to bless. CHATTERTON.
IN the preceding part, we considered the doctrine of predesti
nation, under the name of necessity, in its relation to the origin
of evil. We there endeavoured to show that it denies the re
sponsibility of man, and makes God the author of sin. In the
present part, it remains for us to examine the same doctrine in
relation to the equality of the divine goodness. If we mistake
not, the scheme of predestination, or rather the doctrine of
election, which lies at its foundation, is, when rightly under
stood, perfectly consistent with the impartiality and glory of
the goodness of God. On this subject we shall now proceed to
unfold our views in as orderly and perspicuous a manner as
possible.
SECTION I
The unequal distribution of favours, which obtains in the economy of natural
providence, consistent with the goodness of God.
It has been thought that if the goodness of God were un
limited and impartial, the light and blessings of revelation
would be universal. But before we should attach any weight
to such an objection, we should first consider and determine
two things.
First, we should consider and determine how far the unequal
diffusion of the light of revelation has resulted from the agency
of man, and how far from the agency of God. For, if this in-
Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 313
equality in the spread of a divine blessing has sprung in any
degree from the abuse which free, subordinate agents have made
of their powers, .either by active opposition, or passive neglect,
it is in so far no more imputable to a want of goodness in the
Divine Being than is any other evil or disorder which the crea
ture has introduced into the world. In so far, the glory of God
is clear, and man alone is to blame. It is incumbent upon
those, then, who urge this objection against the goodness of
God to show that the evil in question has not resulted from
the agency of man. This position, we imagine, the objector
will not find it very easy to establish ; and yet, until he does
so, his objection very clearly rests upon a mere unsupported
hypothesis.
Secondly, before we can fairly rely upon the objection in
question, we should be able to show, that the agency of God
might have been so exerted as to spread the light of revelation
further than it now extends, without on the whole causing
greater evil than good. Light or knowledge, it should be
remembered, is not in itself a blessing. It may be so, or it
may not ; and whether it be a blessing or a curse depends, not
upon the beneficence of the giver, but upon the disposition and
character of the recipient. Before we should presume to
indulge the least complaint, then, against the goodness of divine
providence, we should be able to produce the nation, whose
character for moral goodness and virtue would, on the whole,
and in relation to its circumstances, have been improved by the
interposition of God in causing the light of truth to shine in
the midst of its corruptions. But we are manifestly incompe
tent to deal with a question of such a nature. Its infinite com
plication, as well as its stupendous magnitude, places it entirely
beyond the reach of the human mind. So manifold and so
multiform are the hidden causes upon which its solution de
pends, that general principles cannot be brought to bear upon
it ; and its infinite variety and complication of detail must for
ever baffle the intellect of man. Hence, an objection which
proceeds on the supposition that this question has been solved
and determined, is worth nothing.
But, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that the unequal
diffusion of religious knowledge has proceeded directly from
the agency of God. Still the obj ection against his goodness, in
314 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
regard to the dispensation of light, would be no greater than
in relation to all the dispensations of his favour. All the gifts
of Heaven health, riches, honour, intelligence, and whatever
else comes down from above are scattered among the children
of men with the most promiscuous variety. Hence, the unequal
distribution of the blessings of the gospel, or rather of its exter
nal advantages, is so far from being inconsistent with the charac
ter of God, that it is of a piece with all his other dispensations :
it is so far from standing out as an anomaly in the proceedings
of the Divine Being, that it falls in with the whole analogy of
nature and of providence. Hence, there is no resting-place
between the abandonment of this objection, and downright
atheism.
Let us see, then, what force there is in this objection, when
urged, as it is by the atheist, against the whole constitution and
management of the world. It proceeds on the supposition, that
if light and knowledge, or any other natural advantage, were
bestowed upon one person, it would be bestowed upon all
others, and upon all in precisely the same degree. According
to his view, there should be no such thing as degrees in knowl
edge, and consequently no such thing as self-development and
progress. To select only one instance out of many : the atheist
objects, that it is not worthy of infinite wisdom and goodness
to provide us with so complicated an instrument as the eye, as
a means of obtaining light and knowlege. "Why could not this
end be attained by a more simple and direct method ? Why
leave us, for so great a portion of earthly existence, in com
parative ignorance, to grope out our way into regions of light ?
In the eye of reason, there is no end to this kind of object
ing ; and it only stops where the shallow conceit, or wayward
fancy, of the objector is pleased to terminate. It is very easy
to ask, Why a Being of infinite goodness did not confer light
and knowledge upon us directly and at once, without leaving
us to acquire them by the tedious use of the complicated means
provided by his natural providence. But the inquiry does not
stop here. He might just as well ask, Why such a Being was
pleased to confer so small an amount of light upon us, and leave
us to acquire more for ourselves ? Why not confer it upon us
without measure and without exertion on our part ? The same
interrogation, it is evident, may be applied to every other bless-
Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 315
ing, as well as to knowledge; and hence the objection of the
atheist, when carried out, terminates in the great difficulty,
why God did not make all creatures alike, and each equal to
himself. On the principle of this objection, the insect should
complain that it is not a man ; the man that he is not an angel ;
and the angel that he is not a god. Hence, such a principle
would exclude from the system of the world everything like a
diversity and subordination of parts ; and would reduce the
whole universe, as a system, to as inconceivable a nonentity as
would be a watch, all of whose parts should be made of exactly
the same materials, and possessing precisely the same force
and properties.
In every system, whether of nature or of art, there must be
a variety and subordination of parts. Hence, to object that
each part is not perfect in itself, without considering its rela
tions and adaptation to the whole, is little short of madness.
And what heightens the absurdity in the present case is, that
the parts which fall under observation may, for aught we know,
possess the greatest perfection which is consistent with the
highest good and beauty of the whole.
If God has endowed man with the attributes of reason and
speech ; if he has scattered around him, with a liberal hand,
the multiplied blessings of life ; if, above all, he has made him
capable of eternal blessedness, and of an endless progress in
glory ; this should warm his heart with the most glowing grati
tude, and tune his tongue to the most exalted praise. And the
man, the rational and immortal being, whose high endowments
should lead him to murmur and repine at the unequal dispen
sations of the divine bounty, because God has created beings
of a higher order than himself, and placed them in a world
where no cloud is ever seen, and where no sigh is ever heard,
would certainly, to say the very least, be guilty of the most
criminal ingratitude. Keason and conscience might well cry
out, Shall the thing formed say to Him who formed it, Why
hast thou made me thus ? And God himself might well demand,
Is thine eye evil, because I am good ?
The case is not altered, if we suppose that the divine favour
is unequally bestowed upon different individuals of the same
species, instead of the different orders of created beings. The
same principle 01 wisdom and goodness, as Butler remarks,
316 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Park H,
whatever it may be, which led God to make a difference
between men and angels, may be the same which induces him
to make a difference between one portion of the human family
and another to leave one portion for a season to the dim twi
light of nature, while upon another he pours out the light of
revelation. The same principle, it may also be, which gives
rise to the endless diversity of natural gifts among the different
individuals of the same community, as well as to the different
situations of the same individual, in regard to his temporal and
eternal interests, during the various stages of his earthly exist
ence. And if this be so, we should either cease to object against
the goodness of God, because the same powers and advantages
are not bestowed upon all, or we should adopt the atheistical
principle, in its fullest extent, which has now been shown to be
so full of absurdity.
But although we cannot see the particular reasons of such a
diversity of gifts, or how each is subservient to the good of the
whole ; yet every shadow of injustice will disappear, if we con
sider that God deals with every one, to use the language of
Scripture, " according to what he hath, and not according to
what he hath not." His bounty overflows, in various degrees,
upon his creatures ; but his justice equalizes all, by requiring
every one to give an account of just exactly as many talents as
have been committed to his charge, and no more.
In this respect, all the dispensations of divine providence are
clearly and broadly distinguished from the Calvinistic scheme
of election and reprobation. According to this scheme, the
reprobate, or those who are not objects of the divine mercy,
have not, and never had, the ability to obey the law of God ;
and yet they are condemned to eternal death for their failure to
obey it. This is to deal with them, not according to what they
have, but according to what they have not, and what they
could not possibly have. Hence, to reason from one of these
cases to the other, from the inequality of gifts and talents
ordained by God to a scheme of election and reprobation, as
Calvinists uniformly do, is to confound all our notions of just
dealing, and to convert the rightful sovereignty of God into
frightful tyranny. The perfect justice of this remark will, we
trust, be made to appear the more clearly and fully in the
course of the following section of the present work.
Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 317
SECTION II.
The Scripture doctrine of election consistent with the impartiality of the
divine goodness.
We have seen that the election of a nation to the enjoym^
of certain external advantages, or the bestowment of superior
gifts upon some individuals, is not inconsistent with the perfec
tion of the divine goodness. Beyond the distinctions thus indi
cated, and which so clearly obtain in the natural providence of
God, it is believed that the Scriptural scheme of election does
not go; and that the more rigid features of the Calvinistic
scheme of election and reprobation can be deduced from revela
tion only by a violent wresting and straining of the clear word
of God. Let us see if this assertion may not be fully estab
lished.
The ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Komans, it is well
known, is the portion of Scripture upon which the advocates of
that scheme have chiefly relied, from Augustine down to Cal
vin, and from Calvin down to the present day. But, to any
impartial mind, we believe, this chapter will not be found to
lend the least shadow of support to any such scheme of doctrine.
We assume this position advisedly, and shall proceed to give
the reasons on which it is based.
Now, in the interpretation of any instrument of writing, it is
a universally admitted rule, that it should be construed with
reference to the subject of which it treats. What, then, is the
subject of which the apostle treats in the ninth chapter of Ko
mans? In regard to this point there is no dispute; and, to
avoid all appearance of controversy in relation to it, we shall
state the design of the apostle, in this part of his discourse, in
the words of one by whom the Calvinistic scheme of election
is maintained. " With the eighth chapter," says Professor
Hodge, in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Eomans, " the
discussion of the plan of salvation, and its immediate conse
quences, was brought to a close. The consideration of the
calling of the Gentiles, and the rejection of the Jews, com
mences with the ninth, and extends to the end of the eleventh."
Thus, according to the author, "the subject which the apostle
had in view," in the ninth chapter, is "the rejection of the
318 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II
Jews, and the calling of the Gentiles." Now, if this be his
subject, and if the discussion of the plan of salvation was
brought to a close in the eighth chapter, how can the doctrine
of election and reprobation, which lies at the very foundation
of, and gives both shape and colouring to, the whole scheme of
salvation, as maintained by Calvinists, be found in the ninth
chapter? How has it happened that such important lights
have been thrown upon the plan of salvation, and such funda
mental positions established in relation to it, after its discussion
has been brought to a close ? But this only by the way ; we
shall hereafter see how these important lights have been ex
tracted from the chapter in question.
The precise passage upon which the greatest stress is laid
seems to be the following: "The children being not yet born,
neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God,
according to election, might stand, not of works, but of him that
calleth ; it was said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger.
As it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated."
Now, the question is, Does this refer to the election of Jacob to
eternal life, and the eternal reprobation of Esau ; or, Does it
refer to the selection of the descendants of the former to consti
tute the visible people of God on earth ? This is the question ;
and it is one which, we think, is by no means difficult of
solution.
The apostle was in the habit of quoting only a few words of a
passage of the Old Testament, to which he had occasion to refer ;
and in the present instance he merely cites the words of the
prophecy, " The elder shall serve the younger." But, according
to the prophecy to which he refers, it was said to Eebecca,
" Two nations are in thy womb, and two manner of people shall
be separated from thy bowels; and the one people shall be
stronger than the other people, and the elder shall serve the
younger." Nothing can be plainer, we think, than that this
prophecy relates to the descendants of Jacob and Esau, and
not to the individuals themselves.
This view of the above passage, if it needed further confirma
tion, is corroborated by the fact that Esau did not serve Jacob,
and that this part of the prophecy is true only in relation to his
descendants. Thus the prophecy, when interpreted by its own
express words, as well as by the event, shows that it related to
Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 319
" two nations," to " two manner of people," and not to two
individuals.
The argument of St. Paul demands this interpretation. He
is not discussing the plan of salvation. The question before
him is not whether some are elected to eternal life on account
of their works or not ; and hence, if he had quoted & prophecy*
from the Old Testament to establish that position, he would
have been guilty of a gross solecism, a non sequitur, as plain as
could well be conceived.
For these reasons, we think there can be but little doubt with
respect to the true meaning of the passage in question. And
besides, this construction not only brings the language of the
apostle into perfect conformity with the providence which God
is actually seen to exercise over the world, but also reconciles it
with the glory of the divine character.
In regard to the meaning of the terms loved and hated, used
in the prophecy under consideration, there can be no doubt
that the interpretation of Professor Hodge is perfectly just.
" The meaning is," says he, " that God preferred one to the
other, or chose one instead of the other. As this is the idea
meant to be expressed, it is evident that in this case the word
hate means to love less, to regard and treat with less favour.
Thus in Gen. xxix, 33, Leah says, she was hated by her hus
band ; while, in the thirtieth verse, the same idea is expressed
by saying, Jacob loved Rachel more than Leah. Matt, x, 37.
Luke xiv, 26 : If any man come to me, and hate not his
father and mother, &c. John xii, 25."
No one will object to this explanation. But how will the
language, thus understood, apply to the case of individual elec
tion and reprobation, as maintained by Calvinists? We can
see, indeed, how it applies to the descendants of Esau, who were
in many respects placed in less advantageous circumstances
than the posterity of Jacob ; but how can God be said to love
the elect more than the reprobate ? Can he be said to love the
reprobate at all ? If, from all eternity, they have been eter
nally damned for not rendering an impossible obedience, should
we call this a lesser degree of love than that which is bestowed
upon the elect, or should we call it hate ? It seems, that the
commentator feels some repugnance at the idea of setting apart
p Surely a very singular doctrine to be found in a prophecy.
320 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
the individual, before he has " done either good or evil," as an
object of hate ; but not at all at the idea of setting him apart
as an object of eternal and remediless woe !
" It is no doubt true," says Professor Hodge, " that the pre
diction contained in this passage has reference not only to the
relative standing of Jacob and Esau, as individuals, but also to
that of their descendants. It may even be allowed that the
latter was principally intended in the communication to Re
becca. But it is clear : 1. That this distinction between the
two races presupposed and included a distinction between the
individuals. Jacob, made the special heir to his father Isaac,
obtained as an individual the birthright and the blessing ; and
Esau, as an individual, was cut off."
This may all be perfectly true ; it is certainly nothing to the
purpose. It is true, that Jacob was made the special heir to
his father ; but did he thereby inherit eternal life ? The dis
tinction between him and Esau was undoubtedly a personal
favour ; the very fact that his descendants would be so highly
blessed, must have been a source of personal satisfaction and
joy, which his less favoured brother did not possess. But was
this birthright and this blessing the fixed and irreversible boon
of eternal life ? There is not the least shadow of any such thing
in the whole record. The only blessings, of a personal or indi
vidual nature, of which the account gives us the least intima
tion, either by express words or by implication, are like those
with which God, in his providence, still continues to distinguish
some individuals from others. They are not the gift of eternal
life, but of certain external and temporal advantages. Hence
they throw no light upon the Calvinistic scheme of election
and reprobation. To make out this scheme, or anything in
support of it, something more must be done than to show that
God distinguishes one nation, or one individual, from another,
in the distribution of his favours. This is conceded on all sides ;
and has nothing to do with the point in dispute. It must also
be shown, that the particular favour which he brings home to
one by his infinite power, and which he withholds from an
other, is neither more nor less than the salvation of the soul.
It mast be shown, that the mere will and pleasure of God makes
such a distinction among the souls of men, that while some are
invincibly made the heirs of glory, others are stamped with
Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 321
the seal of eternal death. The inheritance of Jacob, and the
casting off of Esau, were, so far as we can see, very different
from the awful proceeding which is ascribed to God according
to the Calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation.
The same remark is applicable to other attempts to show,
that God s favour was bestowed upon Jacob, as an individual,
in preference to Esau. "As to the objection," says Professor
Hodge, " that Esau never personally served Jacob, it is founded
on the mere literal sense of the words. Esau did acknowledge
his inferiority to Jacob, and was postponed to him on various
occasions. This is the real spirit of the passage. This prophecy,
as is the case with all similar predictions, has various stages of
fulfilment. The relation between the two brothers during life ;
the loss of the birthright blessing and promises on the part of
Esau ; the temporary subjugation of his descendants to the
Hebrews under David ; their final and complete subjugation
under the Maccabees ; and especially their exclusion from the
peculiar privileges of the people of God, through all the periods
of their history, are included." Suppose all this to be true,
what relation has it to the election of some individuals to eter
nal life, and the reprobation of others ?
We shall not dwell upon other portions of the chapter in
question ; for, if the foregoing remarks be just, it will be easy
to dispose of every text which may, at first view, appear to sup
port the Calvinistic doctrine of election. We shall dismiss the
consideration of the ninth chapter of Romans with an extract
from Dr. Macknight, who, although a firm believer in the Cal
vinistic view of election and reprobation, does not find any sup
port for his doctrine in this portion of Scripture. " Although
some passages in this chapter," says he, " which pious and
learned men have understood of the election and reprobation
of individuals, are in the foregoing illustration interpreted of
the election of nations to be the people of God, and to enjoy the
advantage of an external revelation, and of their losing these
honourable distinctions, the reader must not, on that account,
suppose the author rejects the doctrines of the decree and fore
knowledge of God. These doctrines are taught in other pas
sages of Scripture : see Rom. viii, 29." Thus this enlightened
critic candidly abandons the ninth chapter of Romans, and seeks
support for his Calvinistic view of the divine decrees elsewhere.
21
322 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
Let us, then, proceed to examine the eighth chapter of Ro
mans, upon which he relies. The words are as follow : " For
whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be con
formed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born
among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate,
them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justi
fied : and whom he justified, them he also glorified." "We need
have no dispute with the Calvinists respecting the interpretation
of these words. If we mistake not, we may adopt their own
construction of them, and yet clearly show that they lend not the
least support to their views of election and reprobation. " As
to know" says Professor Hodge, " is often to approve and love,
it may express the idea of peculiar affection in the case ; or it
may mean to select or determine upon" These two interpreta
tions, as he truly says, " do not essentially differ. The one is
but a modification of the other." " The idea, therefore, obvi
ously is, that those whom God peculiarly loved, and by thus
loving, distinguished or selected from the rest of mankind ; or,
to express both ideas in one word, those whom he elected he
predestinated, &c." Thus, according to this commentator, those
whom God elected, he also predestinated, called, justified, and,
finally, glorified.
Now, suppose all this to be admitted, let us consider whether
it gives any support to the Calvinistic creed of election. It
teaches that all those whom God elects shall be ultimately
saved ; but not one word or one syllable does it say with respect
to the principle or ground of his election. It tells us that God, in
his infinite wisdom, selects one portion of mankind as the objects
of his saving mercy, the heirs of eternal glory ; but it does not
say that this selection, this approbation, this peculiar love, is
wholly without foundation in the character or condition of the
elect. It tells us that God has numbered the elect, and written
their names in the book of life ; but it does not tell us that, in
any case, he has taken precisely such as he has left, or left pre-
cisely such as he has taken. The bare fact of the election is
all that is here disclosed. The reason, or the ground, or the
principle, of that election is not even alluded to ; and we are
left to gather it either from other portions of Scripture, or from
the eternal dictates of justice and mercy. Hence, as this pas
sage makes no allusion to the ground or reason of the divine
Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 323
election, it does n i begin to touch the controversy we have
with theologians of the Calvinistic school. Every link in the
chain here presented is perfect, except that which connects its
first link, the election to eternal life, with the unconditional
decree of God ; and that link, the only one in controversy, is
absolutely wanting. We have no occasion to break the chain ;
for it is only to the imagination that it seems to be uncondition
ally bound to the throne of the Omnipotent.
As this passage, then, determines nothing with respect to the
ground or reason of election, so we have as much right to affirm,
even in the presence of such language, that God did really fore
see a difference where he has made so great a distinction, as the
Calvinists have to suppose that so great a distinction has been
made by a mere arbitrary and capricious exercise of power.
That we have a better reason for this position than our opponents
can produce for theirs, we shall endeavour to show in the en
suing section.
SECTION III.
The Calvinistic scheme of election inconsistent with the impartiality and
glory of the divine goodness.
Having seen that the unequal distribution of favours, which
obtains in the wise economy of Providence, distinguishing na
tion from nation, as well as individual from individual, is not
inconsistent with the perfection of the divine goodness ; and
having also seen that the Scripture doctrine of election makes
no other distinctions than those which take place in the provi
dence of God, and is equally reconcilable with the glory of his
character, we come now to consider the Calvinistic scheme of
election and reprobation. "We have shown on what principles
the providence of God, which makes so many distinctions among
men, may be vindicated ; let us now see on what principles the
Calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation seeks to justify
itself. If we mistake not, this scheme of predestination is as
unlike the providence of God in its principles as it is in the ap
palling distinctions which it makes among the subjects of the
moral government of the world.
" Predestination," says Calvin, " we call the eternal decree
of God, by which he has determined in himself, what he would
324 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT IPort H,
Lave to become of every individual of mankind. For they are
not all created with a similar destiny ; but eternal life is fore
ordained for some, and eternal damnation for others. Every
man, therefore, being created for one or the other of these
ends, we say, he is predestinated either to life or to death."*
Again : " In conformity, therefore, to the clear doctrine of
Scripture, we assert, that by an eternal and immutable counsel,
God has once for all determined, both whom he would admit
to salvation and whom he would condemn to destruction."-)*
The doctrine of predestination is set forth in the Westminster
Confession of Faith, in the following terms : " By the decree of
God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels
are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained
to everlasting death."
" These men and angels, thus predestinated and foreordained,
are particularly and unchangeably designed ; and their number
is so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or
diminished."
" Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God,
before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his
eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and
good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting
glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any fore
sight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them,
or any other thing in the creature, as conditions or causes moving
him thereunto ; and all to the praise of his glorious grace."
"As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he,
by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, foreordained
all the means thereunto. Wherefore, they who are elected,
being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ, are effectually
called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season ;
are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power through
faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ,
effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but
the elect only."
"The rest of mankind, God was pleased, according to the
unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth
or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sov
ereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain to
Institutes, book iii, ch. rxi. t n>id.
Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 325
dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious
justice."
The defenders of this system assume the position, that as
" by Adam s sin the whole human race became a corrupt mass,
and justly subject to eternal damnation ; so that no one can
blame God s righteous decision, if none are saved from per
dition."* Augustine expressly says : " But why faith is not
given to all, need not move the faithful, who believe that by
one all came into condemnation, doubtless the most just; so
that there would be no just complaining of God, though no one
shculd be freed" And again : "The dominion of death has so
far prevailed over men, that the deserved punishment would
drive all headlong into a second death likewise, of which there
is no end, if the undeserved grace of God did not deliver them
from it."f Such is the picture of the divine justice, which the
advocates of predestination have presented, from the time of
Augustine, the great founder of the doctrine, down to the
present day. It surely furnishes a sufficiently dark back
ground on which to display the divine mercy to advantage.
We are told, however, that we should not judge of the pro
ceeding of God, according to our notions of justice. This is
certainly true, if the divine justice is fairly represented in the
s iheme of predestination ; for that is clearly unlike all that is
called justice among men. If God can create countless myriads
of beings, who, because they come into the world with a
depraved nature, and " can do nothing but sin," he regards
with such displeasure, as to leave them without hope and with
out remedy ; and not only so, but dooms them to eternal misery
on account of an unavoidable continuance in sin ; it must be
confessed, that we should not presume to apply our notions of
justice to his dealings with the world. They would more
exactly accord with our notions of injustice, cruelty, and
oppression, than with any others of which we are capable of
forming any conception.
But, if we are not to decide according to our notions of jus
tice, how shall we judge, or form any opinion respecting the
equity of the divine proceeding ? Shall we judge according to
some notion which we do not possess, or shall we not judge
at all ? This last would seem to be the wiser course ; but it is
Wiggers, ch. xvi. f Wiggers s Presentation, ch xvL
326 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part H,
one which the Calvinists themselves will not permit us to adopt.
They tell us, that the predestination of the greater part of
mankind to eternal death is "to the praise of God s glorious
justice." But how are we to behold this glorious manifestation
of the divine justice, if we may not view it through any medium
known to us, or contemplate it in any light which may have
dawned upon our minds ?
Indeed, although the defenders of this doctrine often declare
that the predestination of so many men and angels to eternal
misery, displays the justice of God in all its glory ; yet their
own writings furnish the most abundant and conclusive evi
dence, that they themselves can see no appearance of justice
in such a proceeding. On various occasions they do not hesi
tate to tell us, that although they cannot recognise the justice
of such a proceeding, yet they believe it to be just, because it
is the proceeding of God. But how can that be a display of
justice to us, which, according to all our notions, wears the
appearance of the most frightful injustice? Calvin himself
admits, that the justice of God, which is supposed to be so
brightly displayed in the predestination of so many immortal
beings to endless woe, is, in reality, therein involved in clouds
and darkness. Yet he does not fail to deduce an argument
in its favour from " the very obscurity which excites such
dread."*
It seems clear, that if the divine justice is really displayed
in the punishment of the reprobate, it would have been exhibited
on a still more magnificent scale by the condemnation of the
whole human race. For, according to Calvinism, all were
equally deserving of the divine displeasure, and the saved are
distinguished from the lost only by the election of God. Hence,
this scheme shows the justice of God to be limited, or not dis
played on so grand and imposing a scale as it might have been ;
that is to say, it shows the justice of God to be less than infinite.
But if such be the justice of God, we certainly should not com
plain that it has been limited by his mercy ; we should rather
rejoice, indeed, to believe that it had been thereby entirely
extinguished.
Notwithstanding the claims of divine justice, all were not
reprobated and doomed to eternal death. A certain portion of
Institutes, book iii, ch. xxi.
Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 32V
mankind are elected and saved, " to the praise of his glorious
grace." Now, it is conceded by Calvinists, that " all the cir
cumstances which distinguish the elect from others are the
fruit of their election."* This proposition is deduced by a Cal-
vinistic divine from the "Westminster Confession of Faith."
It is also conceded, that if the same grace which is given to
the elect, should be bestowed upon the reprobate, they also
would be saved, f Why, then, is it not bestowed? Why this
fearful limitation of the divine mercy ? Can the justice of God
be manifested only at the expense of his mercy, and his mercy
only at the expense of his justice ? Or, is the everlasting mercy
of God, that sublime attribute which constitutes the excellency
and glory of his moral nature, so limited and straitened on
all sides, that it merely selects here and there an object of its
favour, while it leaves thousands and millions, equally within
its reach, exposed to the eternal ravages of the spoiler ? If so,
then are we bound to conclude, that the mercy of God is not
infinite ; that it is not only limited, but also partial and arbi
trary in its operation. But such is not the mercy of God. This
is not a capricious fondness, nor yet an arbitrary dictate of feel
ing ; it is a uniform and universal rule of goodness.
To select one here and there out of the mass of mankind,
while others, precisely like them in all respects, are left to
perish, is not mercy ; it is favouritism. The tyrant may have
his favourites as well as others. But God is not a respecter of
persons. If he selects one, as the object of his saving mercy,
he will select all who stand in the like condition ; otherwise,
his mercy were no more mercy, but a certain capricious fondness
of feeling, unworthy of an earthly monarch, and much more of
the august Head and Ruler of the moral universe.
These views and feelings are not peculiar to the opponents
of Calvinism. They exist in the bosom of Calvinists themselves ;
only they are so crushed beneath a system, that they cannot
find that freedom of development, nor that fulness of utterance,
which sc rightfully belongs to them, and which is so essential
to their entire healthfulness and beauty.
We shall give only one illustration of the justness of this
remark, although we might produce a hundred. After having
endeavoured to vindicate the mercy of God, as displayed in the
Hill s Divinity, p. 525. f Id - P- 526.
328 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II,
scheme of predestination, Dr. Hill candidly declares : " Still,
however, a cloud Jiangs over the subject and there is a difficulty
in reconciling the mind to a system, which, after laying this
foundation, that special grace is necessary to the production of
human virtue, adopts as its distinguishing tenet this position,
that that grace is denied to many."* Notwithstanding his
most elaborate defence of predestination, he may well say,
that " a cloud still hangs over the subject," and darkens the
mercy of God.
Some of the stereotyped attempts of Calvinists to escape from
the cloud which hangs over their doctrine are too weak to
deserve a serious refutation. "We are often asked, for example,
if God may not do what he pleases with his own? Most
assuredly he may ; but does it please him, according to the
high supralapsarian notion of Calvin, to create myriads of men
and angels, to the end that they may be eternally damned ?
Does it please him, according even to the sublapsarian scheme, to
leave the great mass of mankind in the helpless and forlorn
condition in which they were born, without assistance, and
then subject them to eternal misery, because they would not
render an obedience beyond their power ? Truly, the sovereign
Creator and Kuler of the world may do what he pleases with
his own ; but yet we insist, that it is his supremest pleasure to
deal with his creatures according to the eternal principles of
justice and mercy.
His power is infinite, we admit, nay, we joyfully believe;
but yet it is not a power which works according to the lawless
pleasure of an unmitigated despot. It moves within a sphere
of light and love. God s infinite wisdom and goodness super
intend and surround all its workings ; otherwise its omnipotent
actings would soon carry the goodly frame of the world, to
gether with all the blessed inhabitants thereof, into a state of
utter confusion and chaotic night ; leaving occasion for none,
save the blind idolaters of power, to exclaim, " May he not do
what he pleases with his own ?"
We are also told, that " God is under no obligation to his
creatures." Supposing this to be true, (though true most cer
tainly it is not,) yet does he not owe it to himself does he not
owe it to the eternal principles of truth and goodness does he
Hill s Divinity, p. 562.
Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 329
not owe it to the glory of his own empire over the world to
deal with his rational and immortal creatures, otherwise than
according to the dark scheme of Calvinistic predestination?
Nay, is it not due to the creature himself, that he should have
eome little chance or opportunity to embrace the life which
God has set before him ? Or, in default of such opportunity, is
it not due to him that he should be exempt from the wages of
the second death ?
Confessing the wisdom and justice of predestination, as main
tained by themselves, to be above our comprehension, the
Calvinists are accustomed to remind us of the littleness, the
weakness, and the blindness of the human mind, and how
dangerous it is for beings like ourselves to pry into mysteries.
We are aware, indeed, that our faculties are limited on all sides,
and that we are exceedingly prone to assume more than belongs
to us. We are not sure that the human mind, so little and so
assuming, appears to any very great advantage in its advocacy
of the Calvinistic scheme of predestination. This scheme is not
only found in the ninth chapter of Romans, by a strange mis
apprehension of the whole scope and design of the apostle s
argument, but, after having based it upon this misinterpretation
of the divine word, its advocates persist in regarding all opposi
tion to it as an opposition against God. As often as we dispute
the doctrine, they cry out, "Nay, but, O man, who art thou
that repliest against God ?"
This rebuke was well administered by St. Paul. He applied
it to those who, understanding his doctrine, did not hesitate to
arraign the equity of the divine proceeding in the election of
one nation in preference to another to constitute the visible
Church on earth. This was not only to reply against God s
word, but also against the manifest arrangements and dispensa
tions of his providence. But it is not well applied by Calvin
ists, unless they possess an infallibility which authorizes them
to identify their interpretation of the word of God with the
\\ord itself. It is not well applied by them, unless they are
authorized to put themselves in the place of God. If they have
no right to do this, we must insist upon it that it is one thing to
reply against God, and quite another to reply against Calvin
and his followers.
S30 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part n,
SECTION IV.
The true ground and reason of election to eternal life shows it to le consistent
with the infinite goodness of God.
"We agree with both Calvinistic and Arminian writers in the
position, that no man is elected to eternal life on account of his
merits. Indeed, the idea that a human being can merit any
thing, much less eternal life, of God, is preposterous in the
extreme. All his gifts are of pure grace. The creation of the
soul with glorious and immortal powers was an act of pure, un
mixed favour. The duty of loving and serving him, which we
are permitted to enjoy, is an exalted privilege, and should in
spire us with gratitude, instead of begetting the miserable
conceit that our service, even when most perfect, could deserve
anything further from God, or establish any claims upon his
justice. This view, which we take to be the true one, as com
pletely shuts out all occasion of boasting as does the scheme of
election maintained by the Calvinists.
It is objected, that God did not elect individuals to eternal
life, because he foresaw that they would repent and believe ;
since repentance and faith themselves are the fruits of election.
If this objection have any force, we are persuaded that it arises
from an improper wording, or presentation, of the truth against
which it is directed. We cannot suppose that God elected any
one because he foresaw his good works, so as to make election
to depend upon them, instead of making them to depend upon
election. This does not prevent an individual, however, from
having been elected, because God foresaw from all eternity that
,the influences attending upon his election would, by his own
voluntary cooperation therewith, be rendered effectual to his
salvation. This is the ground on which we believe the election
of individuals to eternal life to proceed. Accordingly, we sup
pose that God never selected, or determined to save, any one
who he foresaw would not yield to the influences of his grace,
provided they should be given. And we also suppose that such
is the overflowing goodness of God, that all were elected by
him, and had their names written in the book of life, who he
foresaw would yield to the influences of his grace, and, by the
cooperation therewith, " make their calling and election sure."
Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 331
This scheme appears to possess the following very great ad
vantages :
1. It does not give such a pervading energy to the operations
of divine grace as to exclude all subordinate moral agency from
the world, and destroy the very foundation of man s account
ability.
2. It does not weaken the motives to the practice of a virtu
ous and decent life, by assuring the worst part of mankind that
they are just as likely to be made the objects of the saving
grace of God as any others. On the contrary, it holds out this
terrible warning, that by an obstinate continuance in evil-doing,
the wicked may place themselves beyond the effectual influ
ences of divine grace, and set the seal of eternal death to their
own souls.
3. It shows the mercy of God to be infinite. No one, except
those who place themselves beyond the possibility of salvation
by their own evil deeds, is ever lost. Hence, the mercy of
God, which takes in all whose salvation is within the range of
possibility, appears in full-orbed and unclouded splendour. It
could not possibly appear greater, or more beautiful, than as it
presents itself to our view in this scheme.
4. It shows the justice of God to be infinite. This, according
to the above view, is neither limited by, nor does it limit, the
mercy of God. It acts merely upon those who were not, and
never could be made, the objects of mercy; and it acts upon
these according to the full measure of their ill-desert, as well as
according to the exigencies of the moral empire of God. It has
no limits, except those which circumscribe and bound the ob
jects of infinite justice.
5. It not only shows the mercy and justice of God to be as
great as can possibly be conceived, but it also shows the per
fect harmony and agreement which subsists between these
sublime attributes of the Divine Being. It marks out and
defines the orbit, in which each revolves in all the perfection
and plenitude of its glory, without the least clashing or inter
ference with the other.
In conclusion, we would simply ask the candid and impartial
reader, Does any dark or perplexing " cloud still hang over the
subject?" Is "there a difficulty in reconciling the mind to a
system," which exhibits the character of God, and his govern
332 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part H,
ment of the world, in so pleasing and so advantageous a light ?
Does not a system, which gives so glad and joyous a response
to the demand of God, " Are not my ways equal ?" recommend
itself to the affections of the pious mind ?
It very clearly seems to us, that, strong as are the convictions
of Dr. Chalmers in favour of " a rigid and absolute predes
tination,"* his affections cannot always be restrained within
the narrow confines of so dark a scheme. His language, in
pleading for the universality of the gospel offer, contains, it seems
to us, as direct, and pointed, and powerful condemnation of
his own scheme as can well be found in the whole range of
theological literature. " There must be," says he, " a sad mis
understanding somewhere. The commission put into our hands
is to go and preach the gospel to every creature under heaven ;
and the announcement sounded forth in the world from heaven s
vault was, Peace on earth, good-will to men. There is no
freezing limitation here, but a largeness and munificence of
mercy boundless as space, free and open as the expanse of the
firmament. We hope, therefore, the gospel, the real gospel,
is as unlike the views of some of its interpreters, as creation, in
all its boundless extent and beauty, is unlike the paltry scheme of
some wretched scholastic in the middle ages. The middle age
of science and civilization is now terminated ; but Christianity
also had its middle age, and this, perhaps, is not yet fully
terminated. There is still a remainder of the old spell, even
the spell of human authority, and by which a certain cramp
or confinement has been laid on the genius of Christianity. We
cannot doubt that the time of its complete emancipation is
coming, when it shall break loose from the imprisonment in
which it is held ; but meanwhile there is, as it were, a stricture
upon it, not yet wholly removed, and in virtue of which the
largeness and liberality of Heaven s own purposes have been
made to descend in partial and scanty droppings through the
strainers of an artificial theology, instead of falling, as they
ought, in a universal shower upon the world. \
Is it possible, that this is the language of a man who believes
that Heaven s purposes of mercy descend, not upon all men, but
only upon the elect ? It is even so. Boundless and beautiful
as the goodness of God is in itself ; yet, through the strainers of
Institutes of Theology. f Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, ch. Yii.
Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 333
his theology, is it made to descend in partial and scanty drop
pings merely, and not in one universal shower. It is good-will,
not to men, but to the elect. Such is the " chilling limitation,"
and such the frightful "stricture," on the genius of Chris
tianity, from which, in the fervour of his imagination, the great
heart of Chalmers burst into a higher and a more genial ele
ment of light and love.
Alas ! how sad and how sudden the descent, when in the
very next paragraph he says : " The names and number of the
saved may have been in the view, nay, even in the design and
destination of God from all eternity and still the distinction
is carried into effect, not by means of a gospel addressed par
tially and exclusively to them, but by means of a gospel ad
dressed generally to all. A partial gospel, in fact, could not
have achieved the conversion of the elect:" that is to say, though
it was the design and destination of God from all eternity to
save only a small portion of those whom he might have saved ;
yet he made the offer of salvation to all, in order to save the
chosen few ! And if he had not proclaimed this universal offer,
by which " the largeness and munificence " of his mercy are
made to appear as " boundless as space," the elect could not
have been saved ! If so, is it the real goodness of God, then, or
merely the appearance of universal goodness, that leadeth men
to repentance ?
" Any charm," says he, " which there is in Christianity to
recall or to regenerate some, lies in those of its overtures which
are so framed as to hold out the offered friendship of God to
all :"* that is, that although God intends and seeks to save only
a few, he offers the same salvation to all, to give an efficacious
charm to the scheme of redemption ! Indeed, if the Calvin-
istic scheme of an absolute predestination be true, then we
admit that there is a charm and a glory in the magnificent
delusion, arising from God s offer of friendship to all, which is
not to be found in the truth. But that scheme, as we have
seen, is not true ; and also, that the goodness of God is as
boundless and beautiful in reality, as it could possibly be in
appearance.
We agree with Dr. Chalmers, that the goodness of God should
be viewed, not through the medium of predestination, but as it
Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, ch. vii.
334 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT, ETC. [Part IL
shines forth in the light of the glorious gospel. We agree with
him, that " we ought to proceed on the obvious representations
which Scripture gives of the Deity ; and these beheld in their
own immediate light, untinged ly the dogma of predestination.
God waiting to oe gracious God not willing that any should
perish, Imt that all should come to repentance God swearing
~by himself that he has no pleasure in the death of a sinner, lut
rather that all should come unto him and live God leseeching
men to enter into reconciliation, and this not as elect, lut simply
and generally as men and sinners ; these are the attitudes in
which the Father of the human family sets himself forth unto
the world these the terms in which he speaks to us from
heaven." It is precisely in this sublime attitude, and in this
transporting light, that we rejoice to contemplate the Father of
mercies ; and this view, it must be confessed, is wholly " un
tinged with the dogma of predestination."
CONCLUSION.
A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES AND ADVANTAGES
OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
There is a lamp within the lofty dome
Of the dim world, whose radiance clear doth show
Its awful beauty; and, through the wide gloom,
Make all its obscure mystic symbols glow
With pleasing light, that we may see and know
The glorious world, and all its wondrous scheme ;
Not as distorted in the mind below,
Nor in philosopher s, nor poet s dream,
But as it was, and is, high in the Mind Supreme.
ANOV.
CONCLUSION.
i.
SUMMARY OF THE FIRST PART OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
THE commonly received systems of theology are, it is confessed
by their advocates, attended with manifold inconveniences and
difficulties. The habit of mind by which, notwithstanding such
difficulties, it clings to the great truths of those systems, is wor
thy of all admiration, and forms one of the best guarantees of
the stability and progress of human knowledge. For in every
department of science the great truths which dawn upon the
mind are usually attended with a cloud of difficulties, and, but
for the habit in question, they would soon be permitted to fade
away, and be lost in their original obscurity. Copernicus has,
therefore, been justly applauded,* not only for conceiving, but
for firmly grasping the heliocentric theory of the world, not
withstanding the many formidable objections which it had to
encounter in his own mind. Even the sublime law of the ma
terial universe, before it finally established itself in the mind of
Newton, more than once fell, in its struggles for acceptance,
beneath the apparently insuperable objections by which it was
attended; and, after all, the overpowering evidence which
caused it to be embraced, still left it surrounded by an immense
penumbra of difficulties. These, together with the sublime
truth, he bequeathed to his successors. They have retained the
truth, and removed the difficulties. In like manner, admirable
though the habit of clinging to every sufficiently accredited
truth may be, yet, whether in the physical or in *the moral
sciences, the effort to disencumber the truth of the difficulties
by which its progress is embarrassed should never be remitted.
Whewell s History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. i.
338 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
The scientific impulse, by which a great truth is grasped, and
established upon its own appropriate evidence, should ever bo
followed by the subordinate movement, which strives to remove
every obstacle out of the way, and cause it to secure a wider
and a brighter dominion in the human mind. And in propor
tion as any scheme, whether in relation to natural or to divine
things, shall, without a sacrifice or mutilation of the truth, divest
itself of the darkness which must ever accompany all one-sided
and partial views, will it possess a decided advantage and
superiority over other systems. Since this general principle
will not be denied, let us proceed, in conclusion, to take a brief
survey of the foregoing scheme of doctrine, and determine, if
we can, whether to any truth it has given any such advantage.
It clearly seems free from the stupendous cloud of difficulties
that overhang that view of the moral universe which supposes
its entire constitution and government to be in accordance with
the scheme of necessity. These difficulties pertain, first, to the
responsibility of man ; secondly, to the purity of God ; and,
thirdly, to the reality of moral distinctions. These three several
branches of the difficulty in question have been respectively
considered in the first three chapters of the first part of the
present work ; and we shall now briefly recapitulate the views
therein presented, in the three following sections.
SECTION I.
The scheme of necessity denies that man is the responsible author of sin.
If, according to this scheme, all things in heaven and earth,
the volitions of the human mind not excepted, be under the
dominion of necessitating causes, then may we well ask, How
can man be a free and responsible agent ? To this inquiry the
most illustrious advocates of the scheme in question have not
been able to return a coherent or satisfactory reply. After the
search of ages, and the joint labour of all their gigantic intel
lects, they have found no position in their system on which the
freedom of the human mind may be securely planted. The
position set up for this purpose by one is pulled down by an
other, who, in his turn, indicates some other position only to be
demolished by some other advocate of his own scheme. The
more we look into their writings on this subject, the more
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 339
irreconcilable seems the conflict of opinion in which they are
among themselves involved. The more closely we contemplate
the labour of their hands, the more clearly we perceive that all
their attempts, in opposition to the voice of heaven and earth,
to rear the great metaphysical tower of necessity, have only
ended in an utter confusion of tongues. So far, indeed, are
they from having found and presented any such view of the
freedom and responsibility of man, as shall, by the intrinsic and
overpowering lustre of its evidence, stand some chance to dis
arm the enemies of God, that they have not even found one in
which they themselves can rest. The school of the necessitarian
is, in reality, a house divided against itself; and that, too, in
regard to the most vital and fundamental point of its philos
ophy.
There seems to be one exception to the truth of this general
remark : for there is one scheme or definition of liberty, in
which many, if not most, of the advocates of necessity have
concurred ; that is, the definition of Hobbes. As the current
of a river, says he, is free to flow down its channel, provided
there be no obstruction in the way ; so the human will, though
compelled to act by causes over which it has no control, is free,
provided there be no external impediment to prevent its voli
tion from passing into effect. This idea of the freedom of the
will, though much older than Hobbes, is primarily indebted to
his influence for its prevalence in modern times ; for it de
scended from Hobbes to Locke, from Locke to Edwards, and
from Edwards to the modern school of Calvinistic divines.
"No matter how we come by our volitions, says Edwards, yet
are we perfectly free when there is no external impediment to
hinder our volitions from passing into effect : that is to say,
though our volitions be absolutely produced by the divine
omnipotence itself, or in any other way ; yet is the will free,
provided no external cause interpose to prevent its volition from
moving the body. According to this definition of the liberty
of the will, it is not a property of the soul at all, but only an
accidental circumstance or condition of the body. In the sig
nificant language of Leibnitz, it is not the freedom of the mind ;
it is merely " elbow-room." It consists not in an attribute, or
property, or power of the soul, but only in the external oppor
tunity which its necessitated volitions may have to necessitate
840 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
an effect. We ask, How can the mind be free ? and they tell
us, When the body may be so ! We inquire about an attribute
of the spiritual principle within, and they turn us off with an
answer respecting an accident of the material principle without !
An ignoratio elenchi more flagrant a mistaking of the question
more palpable it is surely not possible to conceive. Yet this
definition of the freedom of the will, though so superficially
false, is precisely that which has found the most general accept
ance among necessitarians. Though vehemently condemned
by Calvin himself, unanswerably refuted by Leibnitz, sneered
at by Edwards the younger, and pronounced utterly inadequate
by Dr. John Dick ; yet, as we have seen, is it now held up as
" the Calvinistic idea of the freedom of the will."
We do not wonder that such a definition of free-will should
have been adopted by atheizing philosophers, such as Hume
and Hobbes, for example ; because we cannot suppose them to
have been penetrated with any very profound design to uphold
the cause of human responsibility, or to vindicate the immaculate
purity of the divine glory. But that it should have been
accepted with such unquestioning simplicity by a large body
of Christian divines, having the great interests of the moral
world at heart, is, we cannot but think, a sufficient ground for
the most profound astonishment and regret ; for, surely, to plant
the great cause of human responsibility on a foundation so slen
der, on a fallacy so palpable, on a position so utterly untenable,
is to expose it to the victorious assaults of its weakest enemy
and invader.
SECTION IL
The- scheme of necessity makes God the author of sin.
The necessitarian, in his attempts to vindicate the purity of
God, has not been more successful than in his endeavours to
establish the freedom and accountability of man. If, according
to his scheme, the Supreme Kuler of the world be the primal
cause of all things, the volitions of men included ; it certainly
seems exceedingly difficult to conceive, that he is not impli
cated in the sin of the world. And this difficulty, so appalling
at first view, remains just as great after all that the most enlight
ened advocates of that scheme have advanced as it was before.
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 341
We have witnessed the efforts of a Leibnitz, an Edwards, and
a Chalmers, to repel this objection to the scheme of necessity ;
and if we mistake not, we have seen how utterly ineffectual
they have proved to break its force, or resist its influence. The
sum and substance of that defence is, as we have seen, that God
may do evil that good may come ; a defence which, instead of
vindicating the purity of the divine proceeding, represents it as
having been governed by the most corrupt maxim of the most
corrupt system of casuistry the world has ever seen. It darkens,
rather than illuminates, that profound and portentous obscurity
of the system of the world, arising from the origin and ex
istence of moral evil. So far from removing the difficulty
from their scheme, they have only illustrated its force by the
ineffable weakness of the means and methods which that scheme
has necessitated them to employ for its destruction.
SECTION III.
The scheme of necessity denies the reality of moral distinctions.
For, if all things in the world, the acts of the will not
excepted, be produced by an extraneous agency, it seems clear
that it is absurd to attach praise or blame to men on account
of their volitions. Nothing appears more self-evident than the
position, that whatever is thus produced in us can neither be
our virtue nor our vice. The advocates of necessity, at least
those of them who do not admit the inference in question,
invoke the aid of logic to extinguish the light of the principle
on which it is based. But where have they found, or where
can they find, a principle more clear, more simple, or more
unquestionable on which to ground their arguments ? Where,
in the whole armory of logic, can be found a principle more
unquestionable than this, that no man can be to praise or to
blame for that which is produced in him, by causes over which
he had no control ?
We have examined those arguments in detail, and exhibited
the principles on which they proceed. Those principles, instead
of being of such a nature as to subserve the purposes of valid
argument, are either insignificant truisms which prove nothing,
or else they reach the point in dispute only by means of an
ambiguity of words. Of the first description is the celebrated
342 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
maxim of Edwards, that the essence of virtue and vice consist*
in their nature, and not in their cause. By which he means,
that no matter how we come by our virtue and vice, though
they be produced in us according to the scheme of necessity,
yet are they our virtue and vice. If a horse should fall from
the moon, it would be a horse : for no matter where it come s
from, a horse is a horse ; or, more scientifically expressed, the
essence of a horse consists in the nature of a horse, and not in
its origin or cause. All this is very true. But then, we no
more believe that horses fall from the moon, than we do that vir
tue and vice are produced according to the scheme of necessity.
Of the last description is that other maxim of Edwards, that
men are adj udged virtuous or vicious on account of actions pro
ceeding from the will, without considering how they came by
their volition. True, we may judge of external actions accord
ing as their origin is in the will or otherwise, without consider
ing how its volitions come to pass : but then this is because we
o Jr /
proceed on the tacit assumption that the will is free, and not
under the dominion of necessitating causes. But the question
relates, not to external actions or movements of the body, but
to the volitions of the mind itself. And this being the case, it
does make a vast difference in our estimate, whether we con
sider those volitions as coming to pass freely ; or whether,
according to the scheme of necessity, we regard them as being
produced by the operation of causes over which we have no
control. In this case, it is impossible for the human mind to
attach praise or blame to them, or view them as constituting
either virtue or vice. For nothing can be plainer than the
position, that if anything in us be produced by the mighty and
irresistible operation of an extraneous agency, it can neither be
our virtue nor vice. This principle is so clear, that logic can
neither add to nor detract from the intrinsic lustre of its evi
dence. And all the cloudy sophistications of an Edwards, in
genious as they are, can obscure it only to the minds of those
who have not sufficient penetration to see through the nature of
his arguments.
At this point, then, as well as- at others, the scheme of neces
sity, instead of clearing up the old, has introduced new difficul
ties into the system of the world. Instead of diffusing light, it
has actually extended the empire of darkness, by investing in
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 343
the clouds and mists of its own raising, some of the brightest
elements which enter into its organization. By scholastic re
finements and sophistical devices, it has sought to overturn and
destroy, not the elements of error and confusion, but some of
the clearest and most indestructible intuitional convictions of
the human head and heart.
But great as these difficulties are, we may still be asked to
embrace the scheme from which they flow, on the ground that
it is true. Indeed, this is the course pursued by some of the
most enlightened Calvinistic necessitarians of the present day.
Freely admitting that all the attempts of Leibnitz, of Edwards,
and others, to bring the scheme of necessity into an agreement
with the dictates of reason, have left its stupendous difficulties
pretty much where they found them wrapped in impenetrable
gloom ; they nevertheless maintain this scheme, and propose it
to our acceptance, on the sole and sufficient ground of its evi
dence. If we may judge from those of their writings w T hich we
have seen, this course of proceeding is getting to be very much
the fashion among the Calvinists of the present day ; and they
have a great deal to say in praise of simply adhering to the
truth, without being over-solicitous about its difficulties, or pay
ing too much attention to them. That man, say they, is in
imminent danger of heresy w r ho, instead of receiving the truth
with the simplicity of a little child, goes about to worry himself
with its difficulties. He walks in dark and slippery places.
We agree with them in this, and commend their wisdom : for
it presents the only chance which their system has of retaining
its hold on the human mind. But before accepting this scheme
on the ground of its evidence, we have deemed it prudent to
look into the very interior of the scheme itself, and weigh the
evidence on which it is so confidently recommended.
SECTION IV.
The moral world not constituted according to the scheme of necessity.
In the prosecution of this inquiry, we have appeared to our
selves to find, that this boasted scheme of necessity is neither
more nor less than one grand tissue of sophisms. We have
found, we believe, that this huge imposition on the reason of
man is a vile congregation of pestilential errors, through which,.
344 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
if the glory of God and his marvellous ways be contemplated,
they must appear most horribly distorted. We have found that
this scheme is as weak and crazy in the mechanism of its inter
nal structure as it is frightful in its consequences. Instead of
that closely articulated body of thought, which we were led to
expect therein, we have found little more than a jumble of in
coherences, a semi-chaotic mass of plausible blunders. We
have seen and shown, we trust, that this grand and imposing
scheme of necessity is, in reality, based on a false psychology,
directed against a false issue, supported by false logic,
fortified by false conceptions, recommended by false analogies,
and rendered plausible by a false phraseology. And, besides,
we have ascertained that it originates in a false method, and
terminates in a false religion. As such, we deem it far better
adapted to represent the little, narrow, dark, crooked, and per
verted world within, than the great and all-glorious world of
God without. So have we not spared its deformities.
SECTION V.
The relation between the human agency and the divine.
Having got rid of the scheme of necessity, which opposed so
many obstacles to the prosecution of our design, we were then
prepared to investigate the great problem of evil : but, before
entering on this subject, we paused to consider the difficulty
which, in all ages, the human mind has found in attempting to
reconcile the influence of the Divine Spirit with the freedom of
the will. In regard to this difficulty, it has been made to ap
pear, we trust, that we need not understand how the Spirit of
God acts, in order to reconcile his influence with the free-
agency of man. We need to know, not how the one Spirit acts
on the other, but only what is done by each, in order to see a
perfect agreement and harmony in their cooperation. The in
quiry relates, then, to the precise thing done by each and not
to the modus operandi. Having, in opposition to the commonly
received notion, ascertained this to be the difficulty, we lave
found it comparatively easy of solution.
For the improved psychology of the present day, which gives
so clear and steady a view of the simple facts of consciousness,
has enabled us to see what may, and what may not, be pro-
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 345
duced by an extraneous agency. This again has enabled us to
make out and define the sphere of the divine power, as well as that
of the human ; and to determine the point at which they come
into contact, without interfering with or intersecting each other.
The same means have also shown us, that the opposite errors
of Pelagianism and Augustinism have a common root in a false
psychology. The psychology of the past, which identifies the
passive states of the sensibility with the active states of the will,
is common to both of these schemes. From this common root
the two doctrines branch out in opposite directions ; the one on
the side of the mind s activity, and the other on that of its
passivity. Each perceives only one phase of the complex
whole, and denies the reality of the other. With one, the
active phase is the whole ; with the other, the passive impression
is the whole. Hence the one recognises the human power alone ;
while the other causes this power entirely to disappear beneath
the overshadowing influence of the divine.
Now the foregoing system, by availing itself of the psychology
of the present day, not only does not cause the one of these
great facts to exclude the other, but, by showing their logical
coherency and agreement, it removes the temptation that the
speculative reason has ever felt to do such violence to the cause
of truth. It embraces the half views of both schemes, and
moulds them into one great and full-orbed truth. In the great
theandric work of regeneration, in particular, it neither causes
the human element to exclude the divine, nor the divine to
swallow up the human ; but preserves each in its integrity, and
both in their harmonious union and cooperation. The mutual
inter-dependency, and the undisturbed inter-working, of these
all-important elements of the moral world, it aims to place on
a firm basis, and exhibit in a clear light. If this object has
been accomplished, though but in part, or by way of a first
approximation only, it will be conceded to be no small gain, or
advantage, to the cause of truth.
SECTION VL
The existence of moral evil consistent with the infinite purity of God.
The relation of the foregoing treatise to the great problem
of the spiritual world, concerning the origin and existence of
346 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
evil, may be easily indicated, and the solution it proposes dis
tinguished from that of others. This may be best done, per
haps, with the aid of logical forms.
The world, created by an infinitely perfect Being, says the
sceptic, must needs be the best of all possible worlds : but the
actual world is not the best of all possible worlds : therefore it
was not created by an infinitely perfect Being. Now in reply
ing to this argument, no theist denies the major premiss. All
have conceded, that the idea of an infinitely perfect Being
necessarily implies the existence and preservation of the great
est possible perfection in the created universe. In the two
celebrated works of M. Leibnitz and Archbishop King, both
put forth in reply to Bayle, this admission is repeatedly and
distinctly made. This seems to have been rightly done ; for, in
the language of Cudworth, " To believe a God, is to believe the
existence of all possible good and perfection in the universe."*
In this, says Leibnitz, is embosomed all possible good. But
how is this point established? "We judge from the event
itself," says he ; " since God has made it, it was not possible to
have made a letter "\ But this is the language of faith, and
not of reason. As an argument addressed to the sceptic, it is
radically unsound ; for as a medium of proof, it employs the
very thing in dispute, namely, that God is infinitely perfect.
Hence this is a petitio principii, a begging of the question. If
this were all that M. Leibnitz had to offer, he might as well
have believed, and remained silent.
But this was not all. He endeavours to show, that the world
is absolutely perfect, without inferring its perfection from the
assumed infinite perfection of its Author. At first view, this
does not appear to be so ; for the sin and misery which over
flow this lower part of the world seem to detract from the
perfection and beauty of the whole. Not so, says Leibnitz :
"there are some disorders in the parts, which marvellously
heighten the beauty of the whole ; as certain discords, skilfully
employed, render the harmony more exquisite.";}: Considered
as an argument, this is likewise quite unsatisfactory. It is, in
fact, merely the light of the imagination, playing .over the
bosom of the cloud ; not the concentrated blaze of the intelli-
Intellectual System, vol. ii, p. 349. f Theodicee, Abrege de la Controversy
JIbid.
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 34 7
gence, dispelling its gloom. And besides, this analogy proceeds
on a false principle ; inasmuch as it supposes that God has him
self introduced sin into the world, with a view to its happy
effects. We could sooner believe, indeed, that the principle
of evil had introduced harmony into the world in order to
heighten the frightful effects of its discord, than that the prin
ciple of all good had produced the frightful discord of the
world, in order to enhance the effects of its harmony. But we
shall let all such fine sayings pass. Perhaps they were intended
as the ornaments of faith, rather than as the radiant armour and
the invincible weapons of reason.
Though Leibnitz frequently insists, that " the permission of
evil tends to the good of the universe,"* he does not always
seem to mean that evil would be better than holiness in its
stead ; but that the permission of sin is not so great an incon
venience as would be its universal prevention. " We ought to
say," says he, " that God permits sin, because otherwise he
would himself do a worse action (une action pwe) than all the
sin of his creatures. "f But what is this worse, this more unrea
sonable action of which God would be guilty, if he should pre
vent all sin ? One bad feature thereof would be, according to
Leibnitz, that it would interfere with the freedom of the will.
In his " Abrege* de la Controverse," he says : " We have added,
after many good authors, that it is in conformity with the gen
eral order and good, for God to leave to certain creatures an occa
sion for the exercise of their liberty." This argument comes
with a bad grace from one who has already denied the liberty
of the will ; and, indeed, from the very form of his expression,
Leibnitz seems to have adopted it from authority, rather than
from a perception of any support it derives from his own prin
ciples. He asserts the freedom of the will, it is true, but he
does this, as we have seen, only in opposition to the " absolute
necessity " of Hobbes and Spinoza ; according to whom nothing
in the universe could possibly have been otherwise than it is.
In his "Keflexions sur le Livre de Hobbes," he says, that
although the will is determined in all cases by the divine omnipo
tence, yet is it free from an absolute or mathematical necessity,
" because the contrary volition might happen without implying
a contradiction" True, the contrary volition might happen
Abrege de la Controverse. | Reflexions sur le Livre de Hobbes.
348 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
without implying a contradiction ; for God himself might cause it
to exist. And if, by his almighty and irresistible power, he should
cause it to exist, the will would still be free in Leibnitz s sense
of the word ; since its contrary might have happened. Hence,
according to this definition of liberty, if God should, in all cases,
determine the will to good, it would nevertheless be free ; since
the contrary determination might have been produced by his
power. In other words, if such be the liberty of the will, no
operation of the Almighty could possibly interfere therewith ;
as no volition produced by him would have rendered it impos
sible for him to have caused the opposite volition, if he had so
chosen and exerted his omnipotence for that purpose. This
defence of the divine procedure, then, has no foundation in the
scheme of Leibnitz ; and the only thing he can say in its favour
is, that after the authority " of many good authors," we have
added- it to our own views.
Archbishop King, too, as is well known, assumes the ground
that God permits sin, on account of the greater inconvenience
that would result to the world from an interference with the
freedom of the will. But so extravagant are his views respect
ing this freedom, that the position in question is one of the
weakest parts of his system. The mind chooses objects, says
he, not because they please it; but they are agreeable and
pleasant to the mind, because it chooses them. Surely, such
a liberty as this, consisting in a mere arbitrary or capricious
movement of the soul, that owns not the guidance of reason, or
wisdom, or anything apparently good, cannot possess so great a
value that the moral good of the universe should be permitted to
suffer, rather than that it should be interfered with or restrained.
But these are merely argumenta ad hominem. There are
" many good authors " who, although they maintain neither of
the above views of liberty, insist that it is better for God
to permit sin, than to interfere with the freedom of his crea
tures. But is it clear, that greater inconveniences would have
arisen from such an interference, than from the frightful reign
of all the sin and misery that have afflicted the world ? If God
can so easily prevent all sin, and secure all holiness, by restrain
ing the liberty of his creatures, is it clear, that in preferring
their unrestrained freedom to the highest moral good of the
universe, he makes a choice worthy of his infinite wisdom ? In
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 349
other words, is it not more desirable that moral evil should
everywhere disappear, and the beauty of holiness everywhere
shine forth, than that the creature should be left to abuse his
liberty by the introduction of sin and death into the world ?
Besides, it is admitted by all the authors in question, that God
sometimes interposes the arm of his omnipotence, in order to
the production of holiness. Now, in such an exertion of his
power, he either interferes with the freedom of the creature, or
he does not. If he does not interfere with that freedom, why
may he not produce holiness in other cases also, without any
such interference ? And if, in some cases, he does interfere
therewith, in order to secure the holiness of his creatures, why
should he not, in all cases, prefer their highest moral good to
so fatal an abuse of their prerogatives ? Is his proceeding
therein merely arbitrary and capricious, or is it governed by
the best of reasons ? Undoubtedly by the best of reasons, say
all the authors in question : but then, when we come to this
point of the inquiry, they always tell us, that those reasons are
profoundly concealed in the unsearchable depths of the divine
wisdom ; that is to say, they believe them to be the best, not
because they have seen and considered them, but because they
are the reasons of an infinitely perfect mind. Now, all this is
very well ; but it is not to the purpose. It is to retire from the
arena of logic, and fall back on the very point in dispute for
support. It is not to argue ; it is simply to drop the weapons
of our warfare, and oppose the shield of faith to the shafts of
the adversary.
It is also contended by Leibnitz and King, as well as many
other good authors, that there is an established order, or system
of laws, in the government of the world ; into which so great a
confusion would be introduced by the interposition of divine
power to prevent all sin, that some had better be permitted.
This, which Leibnitz so positively asserts, is thrown out as a
conjecture by Bishop Butler.* But in the present controversy,
it is not to the point. For here the question is concerning the
order and government of the moral world itself. And this
being the question, it is not admissible for one of the parties
to say, that the proposed plan for the government of the world
is not the best, because it would interfere with and disturb the
c Analogy, part i, chap. vii.
350 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
arrangements of that which is established. This is clearly to
beg the question. It is to assume that the established method
is the best, and therefore should not have been superseded by
another ; but this is the very point in dispute.
The truth is, that the theist has assailed the sceptic in his
strong and impregnable point, and left the vulnerable part of
his system untouched. This may be easily seen. The obj ection
of the sceptic is thus stated by Leibnitz : Whoever can prevent
the sin of another, and does not, but rather contributes to it by
his concourse and by the occasions he gives rise to, though he
possesses a perfect knowledge, is an accomplice. God can
prevent the sin of his intelligent creatures : but he does it not,
though his knowledge be perfect, and contributes to it by his
concourse and the occasions to which he gives rise : therefore
he is an accomplice. Now Leibnitz admits the minor, and
denies the major, premiss of this argument. He should have
done the contrary. For, admitting that God might easily pre
vent sin, and cause holiness to reign universally, what had he
left to oppose to the attacks of the sceptic but the .shield of
faith ? lie might say, indeed, as he often does, that God volun
tarily permits sin, because it is a part and parcel of the best
possible universe. But how easy for the sceptic to demand,
What good purpose does it answer ? Can it add to the holiness
or happiness of the universe ? Cannot these high ends, these
glorious purposes of the Divine Being, be as well attained by
the universal rectitude and purity of his creatures, as by any
other means ? Cannot the Supreme Ruler of the world, in the
resources of his infinite mind, bring as much good out of holi
ness as can be brought out of sin ? And if so, why permit sin
in order to the good of the creation ? Are not the perfect holi
ness and happiness of each and every part of the moral world
better for each and every part thereof than are their contraries ?
And if so, are they not better for the whole ? By this reply,
the theist is, in our opinion, disarmed, and the sceptic victorious.
Hence we say, that the former should have conceded the major,
and denied the minor, premiss of the above argument ; that is,
he should have admitted, that whoever can prevent the sin of
another, but, instead of so doing, contributes to it by his con
course, is an accomplice : and he should have denied that
God, being able to produce holiness in the place of sin, both
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 3l
permits and contributes to the reign of the latter in his domin
ions. The theist should have denied this, we say, if he would
have raised the ever-blessed God above all contact with sin,
and placed his cause upon high and impregnable ground, far
above the attacks of the sceptic. But as it is, he has placed
that cause upon false grounds, and thereby exposed it to the
successful shafts of the adversary.
Another reason assigned by Leibnitz* and Kingf for the per
mission of moral evil is, that if God should interpose to prevent
it, this would be to work a constant and universal miracle. But
if such a thing were possible, why should he not work such a
miracle ? By these authors themselves it is conceded, that the
Almighty often works a miracle for the production of moral
good ; and, this being the case, why should he not exhibit this
miracle on the most grand and magnificent scale of which it is
possible to conceive ? In other words, why should he not ren
der it worthy of his infinite wisdom, and power, and goodness ?
Is it not by a like miracle, by a like universal interposition of
his power, that the majestic fabric of the material globe is up
held, and the sublime movement of all its countless orbs con
tinually carried on ? And if so, are not the order and harmony
of the moral universe as worthy such an exercise of his omnipo
tence as are the regularity and beauty of the material? We
defend the Divine Author and Preserver of all things on no
such grounds. We say that a universal holiness is not produced
by the omnipresent energy of his power, not because this would
be to work a miracle, but because it would be to work a con
tradiction.
But we are becoming weary of such replies. The very ques
tion is, Why is there not a universal interposition of the divine
power ? and the reply, Because this would be a universal inter
position of the divine power ! What is all this but a grand at
tempt to solve the awful mystery of the world, which ends in
the assurance that God does not universally interpose to prevent
sin, because he does not universally interpose to prevent it?
Or, in fewer words, that he does not, because he does not ?
Since, sin exists, says the sceptic, it follows that God is either
ur.able or unwilling to prevent it. " Able, but unwilling" re-
Remarques sur Le Livre de M. King, sec. xvi.
1 Origin of Evil, vol. ii, ch. v, sec. v.
852 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
plies the theist. Such is the answer which has come down to
us from the earliest times ; from a Lactantius to a Leibnitz, and
from a Leibnitz to a M Cosh. No wonder that in all this time
they have not been able to find the reason why God is unwilling
to prevent sin ; since, in truth and reality, he is infinitely more
than willing to do so.
But, saying that he is willing, shall we concede that he is un
able 3 By no means : for such language implies that the power
of God is limited, and he is omnipotent. We choose to impale
ourselves upon neither horn of the dilemma. We are content
to leave M. Bayle upon the one, and M. Yoltaire upon the other,
while we bestow our company elsewhere. In plain English, we
neither reply unwilling nor unable.
We do say, however, that although God is infinitely willing
to secure the existence of universal holiness, to the exclusion of
all sin, yet such a thing is not an object of power, and there
fore cannot be produced by omnipotence itself. The produc
tion of holiness by the application of power is, as we have seen,
an absurd and impossible conceit, which may exist in the brain
of man, but which can never be embodied in the fair and
orderly creation of God. It can no more be realized by the
Divine Omnipotence than a mathematical absurdity can be
caused to be true.
Hence, we no longer ask why God permits sin. This were
to seek a ground and reason of that which has no existence, ex
cept in the imagination of man. God does not permit sin. He
chooses it not, and he permits it not, as an essential part of the
best possible universe. Sin is that which his soul abhors, and
which all the perfections of his nature, his infinite power and
wisdom, no less than his holiness, are pledged to wipe out from
the face of his creation. He does not cause, he does not toler
ate sin, on account of its happy effects, or on account of the
uses to which it may be turned. The only word he has for
such a thing is woe; and the only attitude he bears toward it
is one of eternal and inexorable vengeance. All the schemes
of men make light of sin ; but God is in earnest, infinitely and
immutably in earnest, in the purpose to root out and destroy
the odious thing, that it may have no place amid the glory of
his dominions.
As sin did not originate by his permission, so it does not con-
SUMMARY OF THE FOEEGOING SYSTEM. 353
tiDiie by his sufferance. He permits it, indeed, in that he per
mits the existence of beings capable of sinning ; and he permits
tho existence of such beings in the very act of permitting the
existence of those who are capable of knowing, and loving, and
serving him. An infinitely good Being, says M. Bayle, would
not have conferred on his creature the fatal power to do evil.
But he did not reflect that a power to do good is, ex necessitate
roi, a power to do evil. Surely, a good Being would bestow on
his creature the power to do good the power to become like
himself, and to partake of the incommunicable blessedness of a
holy will. But if he would bestow this, he would certainly con
fer power to do evil ; for the one is identical with the other.
And sin has arisen, not from any power conferred for that pur
pose, but from that which constitutes the brightest element in
the sublime structure and glory of the moral world. It arises,
not from any imperfection in the work of God, but from that
without which it would have been infinitely less than perfect.
" All divines admit," says Bayle, " that God can infallibly
produce a good act of the will in a human soul without depriv
ing it of the use of liberty."* This is no longer admitted. We
call it in question. We deny that such an act can be produced,
either with or without depriving the soul of liberty. We deny
that it can be produced at all : for whatever God may produce
in the human soul, this is not, this cannot be, the moral good
ness or virtue of the soul in which it is produced. In other
words, it is not, and it cannot be, an object of praise or of moral
approbation in him in whom it is thus caused to exist. His
virtue or moral goodness can exist only by reason, and in case
of an exercise of his own will. It can no more be the effect of
an extraneous force than two and two can be made equal to
five.
In conclusion, the plain truth is, that the actual universe is
not in the best of all possible conditions ; for we might con
ceive it to be better than it is. If there were no sin and no
suffering, but everywhere a purity and bliss as great as it is
possible to conceive, this would be a vast improvement in the
actual state of the universe. Such is the magnificent dream of
the sceptic ; and, as we have seen, it is not without truth and
justice that he thus dreams. But with this dream of his, mag-
Dictionary, Article Paulicians.
23
354 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
nificent as it is, there is connected another which is infinitely
false : for he imagines that the sublime spectacle of a world
without sin, that the beatific vision of a universe robed in stain
less splendour might have been realized by the Divine Omnipo
tence ; whereas, this could have been realized only by the uni
versal and continued cooperation of the whole intelligent crea
tion with the grand design of God. On the other hand, the
theist, by conceding the error and contesting the truth of the
sceptic, has inextricably entangled himself in the toils of the
adversary.
The only remaining question which the sceptic has to ask is,
that since God might have prevented moral evil by the ^crea
tion of no beings who he foresaw would sin, why did he
create such beings? Why did he not leave all such uncreated,
and call into existence only such as he foreknew would obey
his law, and become like himself in purity and bliss? This
question has been fully answered both from reason and revela
tion. We have shown that the highest good of the universe
required the creation of such beings. "We have shown that it
is by his dealings with the sinner that the foundation of his
spiritual empire is secured, and its boundaries enlarged. In
particular, we have shown, from revelation, that it is by the
redemption of a fallen world that all unfallen worlds are pre
served in their allegiance to his throne, and kept warm in the
bosom of his blessedness.
If the sceptic should complain that this is to meet him, not
with weapons drawn from the armory of reason, but from that
of revelation, our reply is at hand : he has no longer anything
left to be met. His argument, which assumes that a Being of
infinite power could easily cause holiness to exist, has been
shown to be false. This very assumption, this major premiss,
which has been so long conceded to him, has been taken out of
his hands, and demolished. Hence, we do not oppose the shield
of faith to his argument ; we hold it in triumph over his ex
ploded sophism. We merely recall our faith, and exult in the
divine glory which it so magnificently brings to view, and
against which his once blind and blundering reason has now no
more to say.
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 355
II.
SU3DIARY OF THE SECOND PART OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
HAVING reconciled the existence of sin with the purity of God,
and refuted the objections against the principles on which that
reconciliation is based, we next proceeded to the second part of
the work, in which the natural evil, or suffering, that afflicts
humanity, is shown to be consistent with his goodness. This
part consists of five chapters, of whose leading principles and
position we shall now proceed to take a rapid survey in the re
maining sections of the present chapter.
SECTION L
God desires the salvation of all men.
The fact that all men are not saved, at first view, seems in
consistent with the goodness of the Divine Beir, and the
sincerity of his endeavours for their conversion. "We naturally
ask, that if God could so easily cause all men to turn and live,
why should he in vain call upon them to do so ? Is he really
sincere in the use of means for the salvation of all, since he
permits so many to hold out in their rebellion and perish ? In
other words, if he really and sincerely seeks the salvation of all,
why are not all saved? This is confessedly one of the most
perplexing and confounding difficulties which attach to the
commonly received systems of theology. It constitutes one of
those profound obscurities from which, it is admitted, theology
has not been able to extricate itself, and come out into the clear
light of the divine glory.
By many theologians this difficulty, instead of being solved,
is most fearfully aggravated. Luther, for example, finds it so
great, that he denies the sincerity of God in calling upon sin
ners to forsake their evil ways and live ; and that, as addressed
to the finally impenitent, his language is that of mockery and
scorn. And Calvin imagines that such exhortations, as well as
the other means of jgrace offered to all, are designed, not for the
356 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
real conversion of those who shall finally perish, but to enhance
their guilt, and overwhelm them in the more fearful condemna
tion. If it were possible to go even one step beyond such doc
trines, that step is taken by President Edwards : for he is so
far from supposing that God really intends to lead all men into
a conformity with his revealed will, that he contends that God
possesses another and a secret will by which, for some good
purpose, he chooses their sin, and infallibly brings it to pass.
If any mind be not appalled by such doctrines, and chilled with
horror, surely nothing can be too monstrous for its credulity,
provided only it relate to the divine sovereignty.
The Arminian with indignation rejects such views of the
divine glory. But does he escape the great difficulty in ques
tion ? If God forms the design, says he, not to save all men, he
is not infinitely good ; but yet he admits that God actually re
fuses to save some. ISTow, what difference can it make whether
God s intention not to save all be evidenced by a preexisting
design, or by a present reality ? Is not everything that is done
by him, or left undone, in pursuance of his eternal purpose and
design? "What, then, in reference to the point in question, is
the difference between the Arminian and the Calvinist ? Both
admit that God could easily save all men if he would ; that is,
render all men holy and happy. But the one says that he did
not design to save all, while the other affirms that he actually
refuses to save some. Surely, if we may assume what is con
ceded by both parties, the infinite goodness of God is no more
disproved by a scheme of salvation limited in its design, than
by a scheme of salvation limited in its execution. Hence, it is
admitted by many Arminians themselves, that their own scheme
merely mitigates and softens down, without removing, the ap
palling difficulty in question.
There are many exceptions to this remark. One of the most
memorable of these is the judgment which Kobert Hall* pro
nounces concerning the solution of this difficulty by the " Won
derful Howe." This solution, as we have seen, labours under
the ame defect with those of its predecessors, in that it rejects
9 It is not exactly just to rank Hall among the Arminians. His scheme of
doctrine, if scheme it may be called, is, like that of so many others, a hetero-
geneotis mixture of Calvinism and Arminianism a mixture, and not an organic
Compound, of the conflicting elements of the two system*
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 357
the truth that a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms.
Instead of following the guidance of this truth, he wander*
amid the obscurities of the subject, becomes involved in nu
merous self-contradictions, and is misled by the deceitful light
of false analogies.
We shall not here reproduce his inconsistencies and self-
contradictions. We shall simply add, that although he, too,
attempts to show why it is for the best that all should not be
saved, he frequently betrays the feeble and unsatisfactory nature
of the impression which his own reasons made upon his mind.
For the light of these reasons soon fades from his recollection ;
and, like all who have gone before him, when he comes to con
template the subject from another point of view, he declares
that the reasons of the thing he has endeavoured to explain,
are hid from the human mind in the profound depths of the
divine wisdom.
If we would realize, then, that God sincerely desires the sal
vation of all men, we must plant ourselves on the truth, that
holiness, which is of the very essence of salvation, cannot be
wrought in us by an extraneous force. It is under the guidance
of this principle, and of this principle alone, that we can find
our way out from the dark labyrinth of error and self-contra
diction, in which others are involved, into the clear and beau
tiful light of the gospel, that God " will have all men to be
saved, and come unto a knowledge of the truth." It is with
the aid of this principle, and of this alone, that we may hear
the sublime teachings of the divine wisdom, unmingled with
the discordant sounds of human folly.
SECTION II.
The sufferings of the innocent, and especially of infants, consistent with the
goodness of God.
By the Calvinistic school of divines it is most positively and
peremptorily pronounced that the innocent can never suffer
under the administration of a Being of infinite goodness. They
cannot possibly allow that such a Being would permit one of
his innocent creatures to suffer ; but they can very well believe
that he can permit them both to sin and to suffer. Is not this
to strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel ?
358 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
Having predetermined that the innocent never suffer, they
have felt the necessity of finding some sin in infants, by which
their suffeiings might be shown to be deserved, and thereby
reconciled with the divine goodness. This has proved a hard
task. From the time of Augustine down to the present day, it
has been diligently prosecuted ; and with what success, we have
endeavoured to show. The series of hypotheses to which this
effort has given rise, are, perhaps, as wild and wonderful as any
to be found in the history of the human mind. "We need not
again recount those dark dreams and inventions in the past
history of Oalvinism. Perhaps the hypothesis of the present
day, by which it endeavours to vindicate the suffering of infants,
will seem scarcely less astonishing to posterity, than those ex
ploded fictions of the past appear to this generation.
According to this hypothesis, the infant world deserves
to suffer, because the sin of Adam, their federal head and
representative, is imputed to them. It is even contended that
this constitution, by which the guilt or innocence of the world
was suspended on the conduct of the first man, is a bright
display of the divine goodness, since it was so likely to be
attended with a happy issue to the human race. Likely to be
attended with a happy issue ! And did not the Almighty fore
see and krow, that if the guilt of the world were made to
depend on the conduct of Adam, it would infallibly be attended
with a fatal result ?
We have examined, at length, the arguments of an Edwards
to show that such a divine scheme and constitution of things
is a display or manifestation of goodness. Those arguments
are, perhaps, as ingenious and plausible as it is possible for the
human intellect to invent in the defence of such a cause.
When closely examined and searched to the bottom, they cer
tainly appear as puerile and weak as it is possible for the human
imagination to conceive.
Indeed, no coherent hypothesis can be invented on this sub
ject, so long as the mind of the inventor fails to recognise the
impossibility of excluding all sin from the moral system of the
universe : for if all sin, then all suffering, likewise, may be
excluded ; and we can never understand why either should be
permitted ; much less can we comprehend why the innocent
should be allowed to suffer. But having recognised this impos-
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 359
sibility, we have been conducted to three grounds, on which,
it is believed, the sufferings of the innocent may be reconciled
with the goodness of God.
First, the sufferings of the innocent, in so far as they are the
consequences of sin, serve to show its terrific nature, and tend
to prevent its introduction into the world. If this end could
have been accomplished by the divine power, such a provision
would have been unnecessary, and all the misery of the world
only so much " suffering in waste." Secondly, the sufferings
of the innocent serve as a foil to set off and enhance the bless
edness of eternity. They are but a short and discordant prelude
to an everlasting harmony. Thirdly, difficulties and trials,
temptations and wants, are indispensable to the rise of moral
good in the soul of the innocent ; for if there were no tempta
tion to wrong, there could be no merit in obedience, and no
virtue in the world. Suffering is, then, essential to the moral
discipline and improvement of mankind. On the one or the
other of these grounds, it is believed that every instance in
which suffering falls upon the innocent, or falls not as a pun
ishment of sin, may be vindicated and reconciled with the
goodness of God.
SECTION III.
The sufferings of Christ consistent with the divine goodness.
The usual defences of the atonement are good, so far as they
go, but not complete. The vicarious sufferings of Christ are
well vindicated on the ground, that they are necessary to cause
the majesty and honour of the divine law to be respected ; but
this defence, though sound, has been left on an insecure founda
tion ; for it has been admitted that God, by the word of his
power, might easily have caused his laws to be universally
respected and obeyed. Hence, according to this admission,
the sufferings of Christ might have been easily dispensed with,
and were not necessary in order to maintain the honour and
glory of the divine government. According to this admission,
they were not necessary, and consequently not consistent with
the goodness of God.
Again : by distinguishing between the administrative and
the retributive justice of God, and showing that the vica-
360 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
rious sufferings of Christ were a satisfaction to the first, and not
to the last, we annihilate the objections of the Socinian. By-
means of this view of the satisfaction rendered to the divine
justice, we think we have placed the great doctrine of the
atonement in a clearer and more satisfactory light than usual.
We have shown that the vicarious sufferings of the INNOCENT
are so far from being inconsistent with the divine justice, that
they are, in fact, free from the least shadow or appearance of
hardship either to him or to the world. Nay, that they are a
bright manifestation of the divine goodness both to himself
and to those for whom he suffered ; the brightest manifestation
thereof, indeed, which the universe has ever beheld.
SECTION IV.
The eternity of future punishment consistent with the goodness of God.
The genuine Calvinist, if he reason consecutively from some
of the principles of his system, can never escape the conclusion
that all men will be saved : for so long as he denies the ability
of men to obey without the efficacious grace of God, and affirms
that this grace is not given to such as shall finally perish, it
must follow that their punishment is unjust, and that their
eternal punishment were an act of cruelty and oppression
greater than it is possible for the imagination of man to con
ceive.
It was precisely from such premises, as we have seen, that
John Foster denied the eternal duration of future punishment.
His logic is good ; but even an illogical escape from such a
conclusion were better than the rejection of one of the great
fundamental doctrines of revealed religion. By having shown
his premises to be false, we demolished the very foundation of
his arguments. But, not satisfied with this, we pursued those
arguments into all their branches and ramifications, and exposed
their futility. By these means we have removed the objec
tions and solved the difficulties pertaining to this doctrine of
revealed religion. In one word, we have shown that it is not
inconsistent with the dictates of reason, or with the principle
of the divine goodness.
We have shown that the eternal punishment of the wicked
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 361
is deserved, and therefore demanded by the divine justice ;
that they serve to promote the highest moral interests of the
universe, and are consequently imposed by the divine goodness
itself. We have shown, that in the administration of his eter
nal government, the infliction of an endless punishment is even
more consistent with goodness than the use of temporal pun
ishment in the management of a temporal government ; for the
first, besides being eternal in duration, is unbounded in extent.
Thus reason itself, when disenchanted of its strong Calvinistic
prejudices and its weak Socinian sentimentalities, utters no
other voice than that which proceeds from revelation ; and
this it echoes rather than utters. In plainer words, though
reason does not prove or establish the eternity of future pun
ishment, it has not one syllable to say against its wisdom, its
justice, or its goodness.
SECTION V.
The true doctrine of election and predestination consistent with the goodness
of God.
The Calvinists endeavour to support their scheme of elec
tion and predestination by means of analogies drawn from the
unequal distribution of the divine favours, which is observable
in the natural economy and government of the world. But
the two cases are not parallel. According to the one, though
the divine favours are unequally distributed, no man is ever
required to render an account of more than he receives.
Whereas, according to the other, countless millions of human
beings are doomed to eternal misery for the non-observance of
a law which they never had it in their power to obey. This
is to judge them, not according to what they receive, but
according to what they receive not, and cannot obtain. It is
to call them to give an account of talents never committed to
their charge. The difference between the two cases is, indeed,
precisely that between the conduct of a munificent prince who
bestows his favours unequally, but without making unreason
able demands, and the proceeding of a capricious tyrant who,
while he confers the most exalted privileges and honours on
one portion of his subjects, consigns all the rest, not more unde
serving than they, to hopeless and remediless destruction ; and
362 SUMMAKY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
that, too, for the non-performance of an impossible condition.
Is it not wonderful that two cases so widely and so glaringly
different, should have been so long and so obstinately con
founded by serious inquirers after truth ?
The Calvinistic scheme of predestination, it is pretended,
derives support from revelation. The ninth chapter of Romans
which, from the time of Augustine down to the present day,
has been so confidently appealed to in its support, has, as we
have seen, no relation to the subject. It relates, not to the
election of individuals to eternal life, but of a nation to the
enjoyment of external privileges and advantages. This is so
plain, that Dr. Macknight, though an advocate of the Calvin
istic dogma of predestination, refuses to employ that portion of
Scripture in support of his doctrine.
Nor does the celebrated passage of the eighth chapter of the
same epistle touch the point in controversy. "We might well
call in question the Calvinistic interpretation of that passage,
if this were necessary ; but we take it in their own sense, and
show that it lends no support to their views. The Calvinists
themselves being the interpreters, that passage teaches that
God, according to his eternal purpose, chose or selected a cer
tain portion out of the great mass of mankind as the heirs of
eternal life. Granted, then, that a certain portion of the human
race were thus made the objects of a peculiar favour, and pros-
pectively endowed with the greatest of all conceivable blessings.
But who were thus chosen, or selected ? and on what principle
was the election made ? In regard to this point, it is not pre
tended by them that the passage in question utters a single
syllable. They themselves being the judges, this Scripture
merely affirms that a certain portion of mankind are chosen or
elected to eternal life ; while in regard to the ground, or the
reason, of their election, it is most perfectly and profoundly
silent.
Hence it leaves us free to assume the position, that those per
sons were elected or chosen who God foresaw would, by a
cooperation with his Spirit, make their calling and election
sure. And being thus left free, this is precisely the position
in which we choose to plant ourselves, in order to vindicate
the divine glory against the awful misrepresentations of Calvin
ism : for, in the first place, this view harmonizes the passage
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 363
in question with other portions of the divine record, and allows
us, without the least feeling of self-contradiction, to embrace
the sublime word, that God " will have all men to be saved ;"
and that if any are not made the heirs of his great salvation,
it is because his grace would have proved unavailing to
them.
Secondly, this view not only harmonizes two classes of seem
ingly opposed texts of Scripture, but it also serves to vindicate
the unbounded glory of the divine goodness. It shows that the
goodness of God is not partial in its operation ; neither taking
such as it leaves, nor leaving such as it takes ; but embracing
all of the same class, and that class consisting of all who, by
wicked works, do not place themselves beyond the possibility
of being saved. Unlike Calvinism, it presents us, not with the
spectacle of a mercy which might easily save all, but which,
nevertheless, contenting itself with a few only, abandons the
rest to the ravages of the never-dying worm.
Thirdly, at the same time that it vindicates the glory of the
divine mercy, it rectifies the frightful distortion of the divine
justice, which is exhibited in the scheme of Calvinism. Accord
ing to this scheme, all those who are not elected to eternal life
are set apart as the objects on which the Almighty intends to
manifest the glory of his justice. But how is this glory, or his
justice, manifested? Displayed, we are told, by dooming its
helpless objects to eternal misery for the non-performance of
an impossible condition! A display of justice this, which, to
the human mind, bears every mark of the most appalling
cruelty and oppression. A display of justice stamped uith the
most terrific features of its opposite ; so that no human mind
can see the glory of the one, for the inevitable manifestation of
the other ! No wonder that Calvinists themselves so often fly
from the defence of such a display of the divine justice, and
hide themselves in the unsearchable clouds and darkness of the
divine wisdom. This being of course a display for eternity,
and not for time, they may there await the light of another
world to clear away these clouds, and reveal to them the great
mystery of such a manifestation of the divine justice. But
whether that light will bring to view the great mystery of the
divine wisdom therein displayed, or the great secret of human
folly therein concealed, we can hardly say remains to be seen.
364 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
The view we take presents a glorious display of the divine
justice for time as well as for eternity.
Fourthly, this view not only shows the justice and the mercy
of God, separately considered, in the most advantageous light,
but it exhibits the sublime harmony which subsists between
them. It presents not, like Calvinism, a mercy limited by jus
tice, and a justice limited by mercy ; but it exhibits each in its
absolute perfection, and in its agreement with the other : for,
according to this view, the claim of mercy extends to all who
may be saved, and that of justice to those who may choose to
remain incorrigibly wicked. Hence, the claim of the one does
not interfere with that of the other ; nor can we conceive how
either could be more gloriously displayed. We behold the
infinite amplitude, as well as the ineffable, unclouded splendour
of each divine perfection, without the least disturbance or col
lision between them. In the very act of punishment, the tender
mercy of God, which is over all his works, concurs, and inflicts
that suffering which is demanded by the good of the uni
verse. The torment of the lost, is " the wrath of the Lamb."
The glory of the redeemed, is the pity of the Judge. Hence,
instead of that frightful conflict which the scheme of Calvinism
presents, we behold a reconciliation and agreement among the
divine attributes, worthy the great principle of order, and har
mony, and beauty in the universe.
SECTION VL
The question submitted.
"We must now take leave of the reader. We have honestly
endeavoured to construct a Theodicy, or to vindicate the divine
glory as manifested in the constitution and government of the
moral world. "We have endeavoured to reconcile the great
fundamental doctrines of God and man with each other, as well
as with the eternal principles of truth. It has likewise been
our earnest aim, to evince the harmony of the divine attributes
among themselves, as well as their agreement with the condition
of the universe. In one word, we have aimed to repel the
objections, and solve the difficulties which have been permitted
to obscure the glory of the Divine Being ; whether those diffi
culties and objections have seemed to proceed from the false
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 365
philosophy of his enemies, or the mistaken views and misguided
zeal of his friends. How far we have succeeded in this attempt,
no less arduous than laudable, it is not for us to determine.
We shall, therefore, respectfully submit the determination of
this point to the calm and impartial judgment of those who
may possess both the desire and the capacity to think for
themselves.
NOTE.
IN this work, beginning at page seventy, Dr. M Cosh is accused of being on
both sides of the great question respecting the freedom of the will, which has
been so long debated between Arminians and Calvinists. In the fourth edition
of his "Divine Government " he replies, in an appendix, that " it is much
easier to assert than to prove this." I have not laboured to show his self-con
tradiction. I have simply exhibited his statements on both sides of the ques
tion, and left the reader to determine whether the contradiction does not show
itself.
Dr. M Cosh says, " Mr. B. has made his use of some unguarded expressions
used in the first edition of this work, but which had disappeared from the later
British editions before the Theodicy was published;* we do not think the
statements now made are inconsistent," &c. Now does not this indirectly
admit that the statements as before made by him were inconsistent ?
But what are these " unguarded expressions V" Only two of the expres
sions noticed by me have disappeared from the work of Dr. M. The one is
the extract, on page seventy, concluding with the words of Coleridge : " It is
the man that makes the motive, and not the motive the man." Now here,
let it be remembered, the whole controversy is concerning the relation between
motive and the will. Dr. M. says that Necessitarians have erred because they
have been " afraid of making admissions to their opponents." He entertains
no such fear. He boldly proceeds to adopt the pointed and well-known
expression of one of the most distinguished of these opponents ; an expression
relating to the very point in controversy, and, if true, decisive of the whole
question. Now who could, for one moment, have imagined that in adopting
such language Dr. M. was merely putting forth " an unguarded expression ?"
If it were not his mature and deliberate opinion, I make bold to affirm that it
ought to have been so ere it was given to the world.
The other position of the author, considered as an unguarded expression,
will appear still more wonderful. It relates to the nature of liberty. In the
first edition of his work Dr. M. adopted that notion of the freedom of the will
which is maintained by President Edwards and other Calvinistic divines. It
has been, indeed, called, by a distinguished Calvinist, the Calvinistic idea of
moral liberty. (See page 69.) It is discussed at length in the first chapter
My strictures were on the only American edition.
NOTE. 367
of this work, and in section fourteen of my " Examination of Edwards on the
Will."
When I saw the same idea put forth by Dr. M Cosh, I supposed that as he
was a Calvinistic divine so he had adopted the Calvinistic idea and definition
of free-will. I certainly did not imagine for an instant that such a position
was merely " an unguarded expression " on his part. I should, indeed, just as
soon have supposed that his whole work, from beginning to end, was made up
of " unguarded expressions." Nay, I should as soon have supposed that the
same position in President Edwards, though so elaborately wrought out and
explicitly laid down by him, was merely an " unguarded expression." Indeed,
if we would write on these great themes at all, we should take care how we
speak of moral liberty, the very thing in dispute. It will not do to speak in
unguarded expressions; and if we adopt the stereotyped definition or idea of
any particular school, we should not complain that it is supposed to be our
real opinion.
It is a little remarkable, I think, that, although it is in this work that Dr. M.
is accused of self-contradiction, he notices only certain passages in the ex
amination aforesaid, and attempts no reply to my strictures upon his work. I
still think he contradicts himself. Let the reader judge.
" Mr. B." says he, " deals much more in the criticism of others than in the
exposition of his own system." This is true, and especially in regard to his
" Examination." For all that is necessary to establish " his own system " of
free-will is to show that the scheme of his opponents is false. In other words,
if it be shown that there is no power over the will by which its volitions arc
determined, then are we free. Hence, to batter down the scheme of necessity
is to establish the doctrine of free-will.
" In such a subject as the freedom of the will," says Dr. M., " it is easy to
start objections, but not so easy to evolve a doctrine free from all difficulties."
Hence, even if Mr. B. has not evolved any system of his own, it is to be hoped
he has committed no very great sin. It will be time, he thinks, to evolve a
system when he can find one which shall be free from contradiction.
But I have, according to Dr. M., been singularly unfortunate in having
landed myself in many difficulties, although I have evolved no doctrine of my
own. Here is one of these many difficulties : " In order to support his theory,
he is obliged to strip causation of its very peculiarities to make effect mean
simply what is effected," &c. Now, if an effect does not mean what is
effected, I should like to know what it does mean. Does it mean something
that is not effected ? If so, what becomes of Dr. M. s great principle, that
every effect must have a cause ? " See this defective view noticed," says Dr.
M., " in Art. Ill, p. 523." On turning to that article we find him saying:
" There is something new implied in the very conception of effect it is some
thing effected, something which did not exist before, or put in a new state."
What! is it possible, after all, that an effect t> something effected 1 ? in its very
conception, something effected?
According to my scheme, says Dr. M., " there can be no guarantee, even in
the power of God, against the very saints in glory falling away, or even we
use tne language reluctantly in the continuance of the Divine Excellence."
868 NOTE.
This objection has been a thousand times urged against the scheme of Armin-
ians. It is repeatedly noticed in this volume. (See Part I, chap, vii, sec. 3 ;
also Part J, chap, vi, sec. 7 ; and also Part II, chap, ii, sec. 4.) The bare
restatement of this objection by Dr. M., who makes no allusion to my answers,
does not entitle it to further notice.
According to Dr. M., Mr. B. says : " We are conscious of action, and a
thing which acts cannot be caused." Now here, Dr. M. has not only made
his use of this unguarded expression ; he has made the unguarded expression
itself. It is not mine. It can nowhere be found in my works ; for I have
taken the utmost pains to guard against any and every such blundering
expression of my views. It is true, and I admit, that " a thing which acts
can be caused." The mind, for example, acts ; and yet the mind is caused,
yea, it is created by the power of the Almighty.
I have never doubted that " a thing which acts can be caused." But thai is
not the question ; for that is, on all sides, conceded. " The question is," as I
have said in my examination, (p. 121,) "can the mind be efficiently caused to
act? Or, in other words, has an act of the will not has the mind not has
the will itself but has an act of the will an efficient cause ? Is each act
produced by a preceding act ? That is the question which I have put, and
put with emphasis, in order that my position might not be misunderstood. I
have not only clearly, distinctly, and most emphatically put this precise ques
tion, but I have also accompanied its terms with an elaborate explanation of
the precise sense in which they are used by me. But all this is overlooked,
and other words are substituted in their place. All my arguments and illus
trations are passed by, and I am made to father a proposition which I have not
put forth, and which I utterly repudiate and reject as false.
Having done this, Dr. M. may well add, " There is an obvious mistake
here, and indeed in his whole view of action and passion. Surely that which
ia acted on may itself have power of action." Surely, I repeat, it may. The
mind, though acted on, not only may have, but it has, a power of action in
itself. I know not what mistakes Dr. M. may have discovered in my " whole
view of action and passion ;" but I do know that the only mistake therein
which he attempts to point out is one of his own creation. He convicts me
of a gross blunder, not by quoting my own expressions, but simply by invent
ing an expression for me. He should be more guarded.
NOTE. Some of my quotations from Dr. M Cosh s work will be found in the fourth
edition, in Article VII. of the Appendix.
THE END.
Bledsoe, Albert Taylor
A theodicy. loth d
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