THE ORIGIN
OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF
RIGHT AND WRONG
THE ORIGIN
OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF
RIGHT AND WRONG
BY FRANZ BRENTANO
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
BY CECIL HAGUE
FORMERLY LECTOR AT
PRAGUE UNIVERSITY
WITH A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
WESTMINSTER
ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE &f CO LTD
2 WHITEHALL GARDENS
1902
BT
37
BUTLER & TANNER,
THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS,
FROME, AND LONDON.
THE present translation owes its origin to a desire on the part of the trans
lator of bringing to the wider notice of his fellow-countrymen a work which
has proved beneficial and stimulating to himself. Written during short
intervals of leisure while studying with Professor Anton Marty of Prague
University, it has had the advantage of his careful and constant super
vision. Without his aid it would scarcely have seen the light. The trans
lator has especially to thank Professor S. A. Alexander, of Owens College,
Manchester, for his valuable help in the general revision and the translation
of several difficult passages. It is now, alas, too late to do more than record
the translator's debt to the late Professor Adamson, of Glasgow University,
whose revision and correction of this essay was one of the last services ren
dered to the cause of truth by a life -long disciple.
West Dulwich, 1902.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
THIS lecture, which I now bring before the notice of a
larger public, was delivered by me before the Vienna
Law Society on January 23, 1889. It then bore the
title : "Of the Natural Sanction for Law and Morality."
This title I have changed in order to bring its general
purport more clearly into prominence ; otherwise I have
made scarcely any further alteration. Numerous notes
have been added, and an already published essay :
" Miklosich on Subjectless Propositions " appended. In
what way it bears upon inquiries apparently so remote
will be evident in the sequel.
The occasion of the lecture was an invitation extended
to me by Baron von Hye, President of the Society. It
was his wish that what had been said here a few years
ago by Ihering, as jurist, in his address, Uber die
Entstehung des Rechtsgefuhls, might in the same
Society be illustrated by me from the philosophic point
of view. It would be a mistake to assume from .the
incidental nature of the circumstances to which it owed
its first appearance that the Essay was only a fugitive,
occasional study. It embraces the fruits of many years'
reflection. The discussions it contains form the ripest
product of all that I have hitherto published.
vii
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
These thoughts form a fragment of a Descriptive
Psychology, which, as I now venture to hope, I may
be enabled in the near future to publish in its complete
form. In its wide divergence from all that has hitherto
been put forward, and especially by reason of its being
an essential stage in the further development of some
of the views advocated in my Psychology from the
Empirical Standpoint it will be sufficiently evident
that during the period of my long literary retirement
I have not been idle.
Specialists in philosophy will find also in this lecture
what will be at once recognized as new. As regards
the general reader, the rapidity with which I pass from
one question to another might at first completely conceal
many a sunken reef which required to be circumnavigated,
many a precipice which had to be avoided. Surely I,
if any one, have reason, owing to the conciseness of
statement employed, to remember the saying of Leibnitz
and pay little attention to refutation and much to de
monstration. A glance at the notes — which, were they
to do full justice to the subject, would need to be mul
tiplied an hundredfold — will give him a further idea of
those bye-paths which have misled so many, and pre
vented their finding an issue to the labyrinth. Meantime
I would be well content — nay, I would regard it as the
crown to all my efforts — should all that has been said
appear so self-evident to him that he does not deem
himself bound to thank me once in return.
No one has determined the principles of ethics as, on
the basis of new analyses, I have found it necessary to
Vlll
AUTHOR'S PEEFACE
determine them, no one, especially among those who
hold that in the foundation of those principles the
feelings must find a place, have so radically and com
pletely broken with the subjective view of ethics. I
except only Herbart. But he lost himself in the sphere
of aesthetic feeling, until at last we find him so far from
the track that he, who in the theoretical philosophy
is the irreconcilable enemy of contradiction, nevertheless
in practical philosophy (i.e. ethics) tolerates it when
his principles — the highest universally valid ideas — rush
into conflict with one another. Still his teaching
remains in a certain aspect truly related with mine,
while, on other sides, other celebrated attempts to
discover a basis for ethics find in it points of contact.
In the notes, individual points are more sharply
defined, a very detailed examination of which would
have been too prolix in the lecture. Many an objection
already urged has been met, many an expected rejoinder
anticipated. I also hope that some will be interested
in the several historical contributions, especially in the
inquiries concerning Descartes, where I trace back the
doctrine of evidence to its causes and point out two
further thoughts, one of which has been misunderstood,
the other scarcely noticed, neither treated with the
consideration they deserve. I refer to his fundamental
classification of mental states and to his doctrine of the
relation of love to joy, and of hate to sadness.
With several highly honoured investigators of the
present — assuredly not least honoured by myself—
I have entered into a polemical debate, and indeed most
IX
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
vigorously with those whose previous attack has
compelled me to a defence. I hope that they do not
regard it as a violation of their claims, when I seek, to
the utmost of my power, to help the truth, which we in
common serve, to her rights, and I assure them in turn,
that as I myself speak frankly, so also none the less do
I welcome with all my heart every sincere word of my
opponent.
FRANZ BRENTANO.
CONTENTS
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF RIGHT AND WRONG
A LECTURE
PAQB
1. Value of History and Philosophy for Jurisprudence ; the new pro
posals for the reform of legal studies in Austria . . 1
2. Our theme ; Relation to Ihering's lecture before the Vienna Law
Society .......... 2
3. Twofold meining of the expression " natural right " . . . 2
4. Points of agreement with Ihering ; rejection of the " jus naturae "
and "jus gentium " ; pre-ethical political statutes ... 3
5. Opposition to Ihering. There exists a universally valid naturally
recognizable moral law. Relative independence of the question 4
6. The notion " natural sanction " 4
7. Manifold misconception of the same by philosophers. ... 6
8. Habitually developed feeling of compulsion as such is no sanction . 6
9. Motives of hope and fear as such not yet sanction . . 6
10. The thought of the arbitrary command of a higher power is not the
natural sanction 7
11. The ethical sanction is a command similar to the logical rule . . 8
12. The aesthetic point of view ; as little in ethics as in logic the right
one ........... 9
13. Kant's Categorical Imperative an impracticable fiction . . 10
14. Necessity for preliminary psychological inquiries . . .10
15. No willing without a final end ....... 10
16. The problem : which end is right ? the chief problem of ethics . 11
17. The right end is the best among attainable ends ; obscureness
of this definition . . . . . . . .11
18* Of the origin of the conception of the good ; it has not its origin in
the sphere of the so-called external impression . . .12
19. The common characteristic of everything psychical . . .12
20. The three fundamental classes of psychical phenomena ; idea
(Vorstellung), judgment, feeling (Gemiitsbewegung) . 13
xi
CONTENTS
PA&B
2L The contrasts, belief and denial, love and hate
22. Of these opposed modes of relation one is always right, one wrong .
23. The conception of the good .
24. Distinction of the good in the narrow sense from what is goo^ ^
the sake of some other good .
25. Love is not always a proof that an object is worthy to be loved . Ib
xgff) " Blind "- and " self-evident " judgment .
2?: Analogous distinction in the sphere of pleasure and iisple; ^
sure ; criterion of the good .
28 Plurality of the good ; problems associated therewith .
29. Whether by " the better "- is to be understood that which deserves
to be loved with more intensity .
30. Right determination of the conception
31. When and how do we recognize that anything is in itself prefer
able ? The case of the opposite, of absence, of the addition of
like to like ... • 23
32. Cases where the problem is insoluble . . *0
33. Whether the Hedonists in this respect would have the advantage . 26
34. Why these failures prove less disadvantageous than might
be feared • 27
35. The sphere of the highest practical good . • 28
36. The harmonious development .... .28
37. The natural sanction respecting the limits of right . . 29
38. The natural sanction for positive ethical laws . • 29
39. The power of the natural sanction
40. True and false relativity respecting ethical rules . • 30
41. Derivation of well known special enactments . . .32
42. Why other philosophers, by other ways, arrive at the same goal . 32
43. Whence arise the universally extended ethical truths ? Unclear-
ness concerning processes in one's own consciousness . . 33
44. Trace of the influence of the moments severally mentioned . . 35
45. Lower currents exercising an influence . . . . .37
46. Necessity of guarding against overlooking the distinction between
ethical and pseudo-ethical development . . . .39
47. Value of such developments in the pre-ethical time ; establishment
of the social order ; formation of dispositions ; outlines of laws
at the disposal of legislative ethical authority ; security against
doctrinaire tendencies ....... 39
48. Beneficent influences which still operate continually from this side 41
49. A further word on the reform of politico-legal studies . . .42
Xll
CONTENTS
NOTES.
PA.GB
13. In defence of my characterization of Herbart's ethical criterion . 44
14. Of Kant's Categorical Imperative 44
16. The Nicomachean Ethics and Ihering's " fundamental idea " in
his work ; Der Zweck im Recht . . . . . .46
17. Of the cases of smaller chances in the effort after higher ends . 46
18. Of the dependence of the conceptions upon concrete perceptions . 46
19. The term "intentional" 47
21. The fundamental classification of mental states in Descartes . 47
22. Windelband's error in respect of the fundamental classification of
mental states ; short defence of various attacks upon my Psy
chology from the Empirical Standpoint ; Land, on a supposed
improvement on formal logic ; Stein thai' s criticism of my
doctrine of judgment ........ 50
23. In criticism of Sigwart's theories of the existential and
negative judgments ........ 55
24. Descartes on the relation of " love " to " joy '' and of " hate " to
"sadness" -. .69
25. Of the notions of truth and existence ... .69
26. Of the unity of the notion of the good . .71
27. Of " evidence." Descartes " Clara et distincta perceptio." Sig
wart's doctrine of " evidence " and his " postulates " .71
Of ethical subjectivism. Aristotle's oversight in respect of the
source of our knowledge of the good. Parallels between his
error in respect of the feelings (Gemiitsthatigkeit), and Des
cartes' doctrine of the " Clara et distincta perceptio " as a pre
condition of the logically justified judgment ; modern views
which approach to this doctrine . . .78
29. Of the expressions " gut gef alien " and " schlecht gef alien " .84
31. Typical case of a constant geometrical relation of mental values . 85
32. Cases in which something at the same time both pleases and
displeases ...... .85
33. Establishment of universal laws of valuation on the basis of a
single experience ... .86
34. Certain moments in the theory of ethical knowledge are of more
importance for the theodicy than for ethics itself . . 87
35. Explanation of the manner in which anything in certain cases is
recognized as preferable . • 87
36. The two cases, unique in their kind, in which preferability becomes
clear for us from a certain character in the act of preference . 87
39. Gauss on the measurement of intensities .
xiii
CONTENTS
PAGB
40. Against exaggerated expectations from the so-called psycho-
physical law ......... 89
40. Defence against the objection of a too great ethical rigour . . 90
41. Love of neighbour in harmony with greater care of one's own good 91
43. Why the narrowness of human foresight should not do injury to
moral courage ......... 92
44. In criticism of Ihering's view of the notion of right and of his
criticism of older views ....... 93
45. Of the provisional ethical sanction of objectionable laws . . 96
60. Self-contradiction of Epicurus ...... 97
64-65. Proof for the law of addition of like to like ; testimony for it in
the teaching of the Stoa, of the theistic Hedonists, and in the
demand for immortality ; Helmholtz . . . . .98
67. The great theologians are opponents of the arbitrary character of
the divine law of morals ....... 99
68. John Stuart Mill on the doctrine of the distinction between
" blind " and " self-evident judgments " . . .99
(The numbers missing in the index contain only literary references.)
MIKLOSIOH ON SUBJECTLESS PROPOSITIONS
(Appendix to pages 14 and 55).
I. Short sketch of the essential features treated in Miklosich's article . 105
II. Critical remarks ..... JJA
Biographical Note .... U9
XIV
A LECTURE
1. THE invitation to lecture extended to me by the
Law Society was the more binding as it gave expression
in strong terms to a conviction which, unfortunately,
seems on the point of falling into abeyance. Proposals
for a reform of legal studies have been heard (and they
are even said to have proceeded from university circles)
which can only mean that the roots of jurisprudence
deeply implanted as they are in the spheres of ethics
and national history may be severed, without the organ
ism itself suffering any vital injury.
As regards history, this counsel is to me, I confess,
utterly inexplicable ; in respect of philosophy, I can
excuse it only on the ground that the men who at present
occupy the chairs in the legal faculty have taken a deep
and gloomy impression of the mistakes of a period which
has lately passed away. A personal reproach may
therefore well be spared them. Yet indeed such sug
gestions were every bit as wise as would be the case if a
medical faculty were to propose to erase from their plan
of obligatory studies zoology, physics and chemistry.
If Leibnitz in his Vita a se ipso lineata, speaking of
himself, says : "I found that my earlier studies in
history and philosophy lightened materially my study
of law," and if, as in his Specimen difficultatis in jure,
deploring the prejudices of contemporary jurists, he
exclaims : " Oh ! that those who busy themselves with
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
the study of law would throw aside their contempt of
philosophy and see that without philosophy most of the
questions of their jus form a labyrinth without issue ! "
what indeed would he say were he to rise again to-day,
to these retrograde reform movements ?
2. The worthy President of the Society, who has
retained such a lively and wide sense of the real scientific
needs of his profession, expressed to me his own special
wishes respecting the theme to be chosen. The question
as to the existence of a natural right was, he said, a
subject which enjoyed an exceptional interest with the
members of the Law Society ; and he himself was
anxious to learn what attitude I would adopt with regard
to the views there expressed by Ihering some years ago.1
I consented gladly, and have therefore designated as
the subject of my lecture the natural sanction for law
and morality, wishing thereby, at the same time, to
indicate in what sense alone I believe in a natural right.
3. For a two-fold meaning may be associated with
the term " natural " :—
(1) It may mean as much as " given by nature,"
" innate," in contradistinction to what has been acquired
during historical development either by deduction or
by experience.
(2) It may mean, in contradistinction to what is
determined by the arbitrary will of a dictator, the rules
which, in and for themselves and in virtue of their nature
are recognized as right and binding.
Ihering rejects natural right in either of these mean
ings.2 I, for my part, agree as thoroughly with him
regarding the one meaning as I differ from him regarding
the other.
OF EIGHT AND WRONG
4. I agree completely with Ihering when, following
the example of John Locke, he denies all innate moral
principles.
Further, like him, I believe neither in the grotesque
jus naturae, i.e. quod natura ipsa omnia animalia docuit,
nor in a jus gentium, in a right which, as the Koman
jurists defined it, is recognized as a natural law of reason
by the universal agreement of all nations.
It is not necessary to have gone deeply into zoology
and physiology in order to see that we can no longer use
the animal world as a criterion for the setting up of
ethical standards, even if one is not disposed to go so
far as Kokitansky in pronouncing protoplasma, with
its aggressive character, an unrighteous and evil principle.
As to a common code of right for all nations, such a
belief was a delusion which might hold good in the
antique world; in modern times when the ethno
graphical horizon has been extended, and the customs
of barbarous races drawn upon for comparison, these
laws can no longer be recognized as a product of nature,
but only as a product of culture common to the more
advanced nations.
As regards all this, therefore, I am in agreement with
Ihering ; I am also substantially in agreement with him
when he asserts that there have been times without any
trace of ethical knowledge and ethical feeling ; at any
rate without anything of the kind that was commonly
accepted.
Indeed I acknowledge unhesitatingly that this state
of things continued even when larger communities under
state government had been constituted. When Ihering,
in support of this view, points to Greek mythology with
its gods and goddesses destitute of moral thought and
feeling, and maintains that, by the lives of the gods, the
3
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
life of mankind in the period in which these myths took
shape may be interpreted,3 he does but use a method of
proof which Aristotle has already employed in a similar
manner in his Politics* This also must therefore be
conceded him, and we shall, on this ground, no longer
deny that the earliest political laws supported by penal
sanction were established without the help of any feeling
of right founded upon moral insight. There are, therefore,
no natural moral laws and legal precepts in the sense that
they are given by nature herself, that they are innate ; in
this respect, Ihering's views have our entire approval.
5. We have now to meet the second and far more
important question : Do there exist truths concerning
morality, taught by nature herself, and is there moral
truth, independent of all ecclesiastical, political, in fact
every kind of social authority ? Is there a natural
moral law which, in its nature, is universally and incon-
testably valid for men of every place and time, valid
indeed for every kind of thinking and sentient being ;
and does the knowledge of it lie within the realm of our
mental faculties ? Here we are at the point where I join
issue with Ihering. To this question, which Ihering
answers in the negative, I return a decided affirmative.
Which of us is here in the right our present inquiry into
the natural sanction for law and morality will, I hope,
make clear.
At any rate, the decision as to the former question,
whatever Ihering5 himself may think to the contrary,
does not in any way prejudge the latter. Innate preju
dices do exist ; these are natural in the former sense,
but they lack natural sanction ; whether true or false,
they possess no immediate validity. On the other hand,
there are many propositions recognized after a natural
4
OF RIGHT AND WRONG
manner, which are incontestably certain and have
universal validity for all thinking beings, which, however,
as, for example, the Pythagorean theorem are anything
but innate, else the blissful first discoverer had never
offered his hecatomb to the god.
6. In what has been said I have made it sufficiently
evident how, when I speak of natural sanction, I under
stand the notion of sanction. Yet it will be well to
linger a moment in order to exclude another inadequate
view.
" Sanction " signifies " making fast." Now a law
may be fixed in a double sense :
(1) It may be fixed in the sense of becoming law,
as when a proposed law receives validity by ratifica
tion on the part of the highest legislative authority.
(2) In the sense of being rendered more effectual
by attaching to it positive punishments, perhaps also
rewards.
It is in this latter sense that sanction was spoken
of by writers of antiquity, as when Cicero 6 says of
the leges Porciae : " Neque quicquam praeter sanctionem
attulerunt novi " ; and Ulpian : 7 " Interdum in sanc-
tionibus adijicitur, ut qui ibi aliquid commisit, capite
puniatur." It is in the former sense that the expression
is more usual in modern times ; a law is said to be
" sanctioned " when it secures validity by receiving
confirmation at the hands of the highest authority.
Manifestly sanction in the second sense presupposes
sanction in the first, which sanction is the more essential,
since, without it, the law would not truly be law at all.
Such a natural sanction therefore is of the last necessity
if anything whatever is to bear by nature the stamp
of law or morality.
5
THE OEiaiN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
7. If we now compare with such a view what has
been said by philosophers concerning the natural
sanction for morality, it will be easily seen how
often they have overlooked its essential character.
8. Many think that they have discovered a natural
sanction in respect of a certain line of conduct when
they have shown that a certain feeling of compulsion so
to act is developed within the individual. Since every
one, for example, renders services to others in order to
receive similar services in return, there at last arises a
habit of performing such services even in cases where
there has been no thought of recompense.8 This it is
which is thought to constitute the sanction for love of
our neighbour.
But this view is entirely erroneous. Such a feeling
of compulsion is certainly a force driving to action, but
it is assuredly not a sanction conferring validity. Be
sides, the inclination to vice develops according to the
same law of habit, and exercises, as an impulse, the most
unbounded sway. The miser's passion which leads
him, in his desire of amassing riches, to submit to the
heaviest sacrifices and to commit the most extreme
cruelties, certainly constitutes no sanction for his
conduct.
9. Again, motives of hope or fear that a certain
manner of behaviour, as, for example, regard for the
general good, will render us agreeable or disagreeable
to other and more powerful beings, these it has often
been sought to regard as a sanction for such conduct.9
But it is manifest that the most cringing cowardice, the
most servile flattery might then boast a natural sanction.
As a matter of fact virtue shines out most brightly where
6
OF RIGHT AND WRONG
neither threats nor entreaties are able to divert her from
the right path.
10. Some speak of an education in which man, as
belonging to an order of living beings accustomed to
live in society, receives from those by whom he is sur
rounded. An injunction is repeatedly laid upon him,
the command : " You ought." It lies in the nature
of things that certain actions are very frequently and
generally required of him. There is thus formed an
association between his mode of action and the thought :
" You ought." And so it may happen that he may
come to regard, as the source of this command, the
society in which he lives, or even something vaguely
conceived to be higher than an individual, that is to say,
something regarded in a way as superhuman. The
" ought " associated by him with such a being would
then constitute the sanction of conscience.10
In this case the natural sanction would then consist
in the naturally developed belief in the command of a
more powerful will.
But it is manifest that such a belief in the command
of a more powerful being contains, as yet, nothing which
deserves the name of a sanction. Such a conviction
is shared by one who knows himself to be at the mercy
of a tyrant or of a robber horde. Whether he obey, or
bid defiance, the command itself contains nothing able
to give to the required act a sanction similar to that of
the conscience. Even if he obey he does so through
fear, not because he regards the command as one based
on right.
The thought, therefore, that an act is commanded
by some one does not constitute a natural sanction.
In the case of every command issued by an external will
7
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
the question arises: Is such a command authorized
or is it not ? Neither is there any reference here to a
command enforced by a still higher power enjoining
obedience to the former. For then the question would
again reappear, and we should proceed from one ,
mand to another enjoining obedience to the former,
and from that to a third enjoining in like manner c
dience to the second, and so on ad infin.
Just as in the case of the feeling of compulsion, and in
that of the fear or hope of recompense, so also the
thought of the command of an external will cannot
possibly be the sanction for law and morality.
11. But there are also commands in an essentially
different sense ; commands in the sense in which we
speak of the commands of logic respecting our judg
ments and conclusions. We are not here concerned
with the will of logic, since a will logic manifestly has
not, nor with the will of the logician, to which we have in
no way sworn allegiance. The laws of logic are naturally
valid rules of judging, that is to say, we are obliged to
conform to them, since conformity to these rules ensures
certainty in our judgments, whereas judgments diverging
from these rules are liable to error. What we therefore
mean is a natural superiority which thought-processes
in conformity with law have over such as are contrary
to law. So also in ethics, we are not concerned with
the command of an external will but rather with a
natural preference similar to that in logic, and the law
founded on that preference. This has been emphasized
not only by Kant but also by the majority of great
thinkers before him. Nevertheless there are still many
—unfortunately even among the adherents of the em
pirical school to which I myself belong — by whom this
8
OF RIGHT AND WRONG
fact has neither been rightly understood nor appre
ciated.
12. In what then lies this special superiority; which
gives to morality its natural sanction ? ' Some regarded
it as, in a sense, external, they believed its superiority
to consist in beauty of appearance. The Greeks called
noble and virtuous conduct TO tca\pva the beautiful,
and the perfect man of honour KakoKa^aOo^ ; though
none of the philosophers of antiquity set up this
aesthetic view as ^criterion. On the other hand, David
Hume11, among modern thinkers, has spoken of a moral
sense of the beautiful which acts as arbiter between the
moral and the immoral, while still more recently the
German philosopher, Herbart,12 has subordinated ethics
to aesthetics.
Now I dcTnot deny that the aspect of virtue is more
agreeable than that of moral perversity. But I cannot
concede that in this consists the only and gggejitial
superiority of ethical conduct. It is rather an inner
superiority which distinguishes the moral from the
immoral will, in the same way that it is an inner supe
riority which distinguishes true and self evident judg
ments and conclusions from prejudices and fallacies.
Here also it cannot be denied that a prejudice, a fallacy
has in it something unbeautiful, often indeed something
ridiculously narrow-minded, which makes the person
so scantily favoured by Minerva appear in a most
disadvantageous attitude ; yet who, on this account,
would class the rules of logic among those of aesthetics,
or make logic a branch of aesthetics ? I3 No, the real
logical superiority is no mere aesthetic appearance but
a certain inward rightnesjs which then carries with it
a certain superiority of appearance. It will, therefore,
9
THE OBIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
be also a certain inward lightness which constitutes
the essential superiority of one particular act of will
fc over another of an opposite character ; in which consists
'the superiority of the moral over the immoral.
The belief in this superiority is an ethical motive ;
the knowledge of it is the right ethical motive, the
sanction which gives to ethical law permanence and
validity.
13. But are we capable of attaining to such know
ledge ? Here lies the difficulty which philosophers have
for a long time sought in vain to solve. Even to Kant
it seemed as though none had found the right end of
the thread by means of which to unravel the skein.
This the Categorical Imperative was to do. It resembled
however, rather the sword drawn by Alexander to cut
the Gordian knot. With such a palpable fiction the
matter is not to be set right.14
14. In order to gain an insight into the true qrjgjn
°f ethical knowledge it will be necessary to take some
account of the results of later researches in the sphere
of descriptive psychology. The limited time at my
disposal makes it necessary for me to set forth my views
very briefly, and I have reason to fear that by its con
ciseness the completeness of the statement may suffer.
Yet it is just here that I ask your special attention, in
order that what is most essential to a right understanding
of the problem be not overlooked.
15. The subject of the moral and immoral is termed
the will. What we will is, in many cases, a means to
an end. In that case we will this end also, and even
m a higher degree than the means. The end itself may
often be the means to a further end ; in a far reaching
10
OF RIGHT AND WRONG
plan there may often appear a whole series of ends, the
one being always connected in subordination to the
other as a means. There must be present, however,
one end, which is desired above all others and for its own
sake ; without this essential and final end all incentive
would be lacking, and this would involve the absurdity
of aiming without a goal at which to aim.
16. The means we employ in order to gain an end
may be manifold, may be right or wrong. They are
right when they are really adapted to the attainment
of the end.
The ends, also, even the most essential and final ends,
may be manifold. It is a mistake which appeared
especially in the eighteenth century, nowadays the
tendency is more and more to abandon it, that every
one seeks the same end, namely, his own highest pos
sible pleasure.15 Whoever can believe that the martyr
facing with full consciousness the most terrible
tortures for the sake of his conviction — and there were
some who had no hope of recompense hereafter — was
thus inspired by a desire after the greatest possible
pleasure, such a man must have either a very defective
sense of the facts of the case, or, indeed, have lost all
measure of the intensities of pleasure and pain.
This, therefore, is certain : even final ends are mani
fold, between them hovers the choice, which, since the
final end is for everything the determining principle,
is of the most importance. What ought I to strive after?
Which end is the right one, which wrong ? This, as
Aristotle long ago declared, is the essential, the cardinal
question in ethics.16
17. Which end is right, for which should our choice
declare itself ?
11
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
Where the end is fixed and it is merely a question as
to the choice of means, we reply : Choose means which
will certainly attain the end. Where it is a question
as to the choice of ends we would say : Choose an end
which reason regards as really attainable. This answer
is, however, insufficient, many a thing attainable is
rather to be shunned than sought after ; choose the
best among attainable ends, this alone is the adequate
answer.17
But the answer is obscure ; what do we mean by
" the best " ? what can be called " good " at all ? and
how can we attain to the knowledge that one thing is
good and better than another ?
18. In order to answer this question satisfactorily,
we must, above all, inquire into the origin of the concep
tion of the good, which lies, like tie origin of all our
conceptions, in certain concrete impressions.18
We possess impressions with physical content. These
exhibit to us sensuous qualities localized in space. Out
of this sphere arise the conceptions of colour, sound,
space and many others. The conception of the good,
however, has not here its origin. It is easily recog
nizable that the conception of the good like that of the
true, which, as having affinity, is rightly placed side by
side with it, derives its origin from concrete impressions
with psychical content.
19. The common feature of everything psychical
consists in what has been called by a very unfortunate^
and ambiguous term, consciousness ; i.e. in a subject-
attitude ; in what has been termed an intentional relation
o something which, though perhaps not real, is none '
the less an inner object of perception ; " No hearing
without the heard, no believing without the believed,
12
OF EIGHT AND WRONG
no hoping without the hoped for, no striving without the
striven for, no joy without the enjoyed, and so with
other mental phenomena.
20. The sensuous qualities which are given in our
impressions with physical content exhibit manifold
differences. So also do the intentional relations given
in our impressions with psychical content. And, as in
the former case, the number of the senses is determined
by reference to those distinctions between sensuous
qualities which are most fundamental (called by
Helmholtz distinctions of modality), so in the latter
case the number of fundamental classes of mental
^phenomena is fixed by reference to the most fundamental
distinctions of intentional relation.20
In this way we distinguish three fundamental classes.
Descartes in his Meditations21 was the first to exhibit
these rightly and completely ; but sufficient attention
has not been paid to his observations, and they were
soon quite forgotten, until in recent times, and inde
pendently of him, these were again discovered. Now
adays they may lay claim to sufficient verification.22
The first fundamental class is that of ideas (Vorstel-
lungen) in the widest sense of the term (Descartes'
ideae). This class embraces concrete impressions, those
for example which are given to us through the senses,
as well as every abstract conception.
The second fundamental class is judgment (Descartes'
judicia). Previous to Descartes these were thought of
as forming, along with ideas, one fundamental class,
and since Descartes' time philosophy has fallen once
more into this error. This view regarded judgment
as consisting essentially in a combination or relation
of ideas to one another. This was a gross misconception
^
THE OEIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
of its true nature. We may combine or relate ideas as
we please, as in speaking of a golden mountain, the
father of a hundred children, a friend of science ; but
as long as nothing further takes place there can be no
judgment. Equally true is it that an idea always forms
the basis of a judgment, as also of a desire ; but it is not
true that, in a judgment, there are always several ideas
related to one another as subject and predicate. This
is certainly the case when I say : " God is just," though
not when I say : " There is a God."
What, therefore, distinguishes those cases where I have
not only an idea but also a judgment ? There is here
added to the act of presentation a second intentional
relation to the object given in presentation, a relation
either of recognition or rejection. Whoever says :
" God," gives expression to the idea of God ; whoever
says : " There is a God," gives expression to a belief in
him.
I must not linger here, and can only assure you that
this, if anything, admits to-day of no denial. From
the philological standpoint Miklosich confirms the results
of psychological analysis.23
The third fundamental class consists of the emotions
in the widest sense of the term, from the simple forms
of inclination or disinclination in respect of the mere
idea, to joy and sadness arising from conviction and to
the most complicated phenomena as to the choice of
ends and means. Aristotle long since included these
under the term fyefo Descartes says this class
embraces the voluntates sive affectus. As in the second
fundamental class the intentional relation was one of
recognition or rejection, so in the third class it is one of
love or hate, (or, as it might be equally well expressed,)
a form of pleasing or displeasing. Loving, pleasing,
14
OF RIG-HT AND WRONG
hating, displeasing, these are given in the simplest forms
of inclination or disinclination, in victorious joy as well
as in despairing sorrow, in hope and fear, and in every
form of voluntary activity. " Plait-il ? " asks the
Frenchman ; " es hat Gott gef alien," one reads in
(German) announcements of a death ; while the " Placet,"
written when confirming an act, is the expression of the
determining fiat of will.24
21. In comparing these three classes of phenomena
it is found that the two last mentioned show an analogy
which, in the first, is absent. There exists, that is, an
opposition of intentional relation ; in the case of judg
ment, recognition or rejection, in the case of the emotions,
love or hate, pleasure or displeasure. The idea shows
nothing of a similar nature. I can, it is true, conceive
of opposites, as for example white and black, but whether
I believe in this black or deny it, I can only represent
it to myself in one way ; the representation does not
alter with the opposite act of judgment ; nor again,
in the case of the feelings, when I change my attitude
towards it according as it pleases or displeases me.
22. From this fact follows an important conclusion.
Concerning acts of the first class none can be called
either right or wrong. In the case of the second class
on the other hand, one of the two opposed modes of
relation, affirmation and rejection, is right the other
wrong, as logic has long affirmed. The same naturally
holds good of the third class. Of the two opposed modes
of relation, love and hate, pleasure and displeasure, in
each case one is right the other wrong.
23. We have now reached the place where the notions
15
THE OEIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDQE
of good and bad, along with the notions of the true and
the false which we have been seeking, have their source.
We call anything true when the recognition related to it
is right.25 We call something good when the love relating
to it is right. That which can be loved with a right
love, that which is worthy of love, is good in the widest
sense of the term.
24. Since everything which pleases does so, either for
its own sake, or for the sake of something else which is
thereby produced, conserved or rendered probable, we
must distinguish between a primary and a secondary
good, i.e. what is good in itself, and what is good on
account of something else, as is specially the case in the
sphere of the useful.
What is good in itself is the good in the narrower
sense. It alone can stand side by side with the true.
For everything which is true is true in itself, even when
only mediately known. When we speak of good later
we shall therefore mean, whenever the contrary is not
expressly asserted, that which is good in itself.
In this way we have, I hope, made clear the notion
of good.26
25. There follows now the still more important
question : How are we to know that anything is good ?
Ought we to say that whatever is loved and is capable
of being loved is worthy of love and is good ? This is
manifestly untrue, and it is almost inconceivable that
some have fallen into this error. One loves what another
hates, and, in accordance with a well known pgjojip-
logicallaw already previouslvjef erred to it often happens
thaTwhat at first was desired merely as a means to
something else, comes at last from habit to be desired
'for its own sake. In such a way the miser is irrationally
16
OF EIGHT AND WRONG
led to heap up riches and even to sacrifice himself for
their sake. The actual presence of love, therefore, by
no means testifies unconditionally to the worthiness of
the object to be loved, just as affirmation is no uncon
ditional proof of what is true.
It might even be said that the first statement is even
more evident than the second, since it can hardly happen
that he who affirms anything at the same time holds
it to be false, whereas it fr_eguently happens that a
person, even while loving something, confesses himself
that it is unworthy of his love :
" Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor."
How then are we to know that anything is good ?
26. The matter appears enigmatical, but the enigma
finds a very easy solution.
As a preliminary step to answering the question, let
us turn our glance from the good to the true.
Not everything which we affirm is on this account
true. Our judgments are frequently quite blind. Many
a prejudice which we drank in, as it were, with our
mother's milk presents to us the appearance of an irre
futable principle. To other equally blind judgments
all men have, by nature, a kind of instinctive impulsion,
as, for example, in trusting blindly to the so-called
external impression, or to a recent remembrance. What
is so recognized may often be true, but it may equally
well be false since the affirming judgment contains
nothing which gives to it the character of rightness.
Such, however, is the case in certain other judgments,
which in contradistinction to these blind judgments
may be termed " obvious," " self-evident " judgments;
17 c
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
as, for example, the Principle of Contradiction, and
every so-called inner perception which informs me that
I am now experiencing sensations of sound or colour,
or think and will this or that.
In what, then, does the distinction between these
lower and higher forms of judgment essentially consist ?
Is it a distinction in the degree of belief, or is it something
else ? It is not a distinction in the degree of belief ; the
instinctive blind assumptions arising from habit are
often not in the slightest degree weakened by doubts,
and we are unable to get rid of jjorne even when we have
already seen their logical falsity. But such assumptions
are the results of blind impulse, they have nothing of the
clearness peculiar to the higher forms of judgment.
Were the question to be raised : " What is then your
reason for believing that ? " no rational answer would
be forthcoming. It is quite true that if the same inquiry
were to be made respecting the immediately evident
judgment here also no reason could be given, but in
face of the clearness of the judgment the inquiry would
appear utterly beside the point, in fact ridiculous.
Every one experiences for himself the difference between
these two classes of judgment, and in the reference to
this experience, consists, as in the case of every concep
tion, the final explanation.
27. All this is, in its essentials, universally known,27
and is contested only by a few, and then not without
great inconsistency. Far fewer have noticed an analo
gous distinction between the higher and lower formsf
of the feelings of pleasure and displeasure.
Our pleasure or displeasure is often quite like blinc
judgment, only an instinctive or habitual impulse. Th«
is so in the case of the miser's pleasure in piling up, i]
18
OF EIGHT AND WRONG
those powerful feelings of pleasure and pain connected
in men and animals alike with the appearance of certain
sensuous qualities, moreover, as is especially noticeable
in tastes, different species and even different individuals,
are affected in a quite contrary manner.
Many philosophers, and among them very considerable
thinkers, have regarded only that mode of pleasure
which is peculiar to the lower phenomena of the class,
and have entirely overlooked the fact that there exists
a pleasure and a displeasure of a higher kind. David
Hume, for example, betrays almost in every word that
he has absolutely no idea of the existence of this higher
class.28 How general this oversight has been may be
judged from the fact that language has no common
name for it.29 Yet the fact is undeniable and we propose
now to elucidate it by a few examples.
We have already said that we are endowed by nature
with a pleasure for some tastes and an antipathy for
others, both of which are purely instinctive. We also
naturally take pleasure in clear insight, displeasure in
error or ignorance. " All men," says Aristotle in the
beautiful introductory words of his Metaphysics,30
" natually desire knowledge." This desire is an example
which will serve our purpose. It is a pleasure of that
higher form which is analogous to self-evidence in the
sphere of judgment. In our species it is universal.
Were there another species which, while having different
preferences from us in respect of sensible qualities, were
opposed to us in loving error for its own sake and hating
insight, then assuredly we should not in the latter as in
the former case say : that it was a matter of taste, " de
gustibus non est disputandum " ; rather we should here
answer decisively that such love and hatred were funda
mentally absurd, that such a species hated what was
19
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
undeniably good, and loved what was undeniably bad
in itself. Now why, where the feeling of compulsion
is equally strong, do we answer differently in the one
case than in the other ? The answer is simple. In the
former case the feeling of compulsion was an instinctive
impulse ; in the latter the natural feeling of pleasure is
a higher love, having the character of Tightness.31 We
therefore notice when we ourselves have such a feeling,
that its object is not merely loved and lovable, its oppo
site hated and unlovable, but also that the one is worthy
of love, the other worthy of hatred, and therefore that
one is good, the other bad.
Another example. As we prefer insight to error, so
also, generally speaking, we prefer joy (unless indeed
it be joy in what is bad) to sadness. Were there beings
among whom the reverse held good, we should regard
such conduct as perverse, and rightly so. Here too it
is because our love and our hatred are qualified as
right.
A third example is found in feeling itself so far as it is
right and has the character of Tightness. As was the
case with the Tightness and evidence of the judgment,
so also the Tightness and higher character of the feelings
are also reckoned as good, while love of the bad is itself
bad.32
In order that, in the sphere of ideas, we may not leave
the corresponding experiences unmentioned : here in
the same way every idea is found to be something
good in itself, and that with every enlargement in the
realm of our ideas, quite apart from what of good or
bad may result therefrom, the good within us is in
creased.33
Here then, and from such experiences of love qualified
as right, arises within us the knowledge that anything
20
OF RIGHT AND WRONG
is truly and unmistakably good in the full extent to
which we are capable of such knowledge.34
This last clause is added advisedly ; for we must not,
of course, conceal from ourselves the fact that we have
no guarantee that everything which is good will arouse
within us a love with the character of Tightness. Wher
ever this is not the case our criterion fails, and the good
then, so far as our knowledge and practical account of
it are concerned, is as much as non-existent.35
28. It is, however, not one but many things which we
thus recognize as good. And so the questions remain :
In that which is good, and especially in what, as good,
is attainable, which is the better ? and further, which
is the highest practical good ? so that it may become
the standard for our actions.
29. We must first inquire : When is anything better
than anything else and recognized by us as better ? and
what is meant by " the better " at all ?
The answer now lies ready to hand though not in such
a way as to render it unnecessary to exclude a very
possible error. If by " good " is meant that which is
worthy of being loved for its own sake, then by " better "
appears to be meant that which is worthy of being loved
with a greater love. But is this really so ? What is
meant by " with greater love " ? Is it spatial magni
tude ? Hardly ; no one would propose to measure
pleasure or displeasure in feet and inches. ' The inten
sity of the pleasure," some will perhaps say, " is what
is meant in speaking of love as great." According to
this " better " would mean that which pleases with a
more intense pleasure. But such a definition closely
examined would involve the greatest absurdities. Ac
cording to this view, each single case in which joy is
21
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
felt in anything would seem only to admit of a certain
measure of joy, whereas one would naturally think that
it could not possibly be reprehensible to rejoice in what
is really good to the fullest extent possible. Or, as we
say, " with all one's heart." Descartes has already
observed that the act of loving (when directed towards
what is good at all) can never be too intense.36 And he
is manifestly right. Were it otherwise what cautiousness
should we not be called upon to exercise considering
the limits of our mental strength ! Every time one
wished to rejoice over something good, an anxious
survey would be necessary respecting other existing
goods in order that the measure of proportion to our
total strength might in no way be exceeded. And if
one believes in a God, understanding thereby the Infinite
Good, the Ideal of all ideals, then, since a man, even
with his whole soul and strength can only love God with
an act of love of finite intensity he will therefore be
compelled to love every other good with an infinitely
small degree of intensity, and, since this is impossible,
must cease as a matter of fact to love it at all.
All this is manifestly absurd.
30. And yet it must be said that the better is that
which is rightly loved with a greater love, which is
rightly more pleasing, though in quite another sense.
The " more " refers not to the relation of intensity
between the two acts, but rather to a peculiar species
of phenomena belonging to the general class of pleasure
and displeasure, i.e., to the phenomena of choice.
Thereby are meant relating acts which in their peculiar
nature are known to every one in experience. In the
province of ideas there is nothing analogous. In the
province of judgment there are, it is true, alongside the
22
OF EIG-HT AND WRONG
simple, subjectless propositions, predicative judgments
which are acts of a relative character, but this resem
blance is very imperfect. The case here which has most
similarity is that of a decision respecting a dialectically
propounded question : "Is this true or false ? " in
which a sort of preference is given to one above the other.
But even here it is always something true which is, so to
speak, preferred to something false, never something
more true over something less true. Whatever is true
is true in a like degree, but whatever is good is not good
in equal degree, and by " better " nothing else is meant
than what, when compared with another good, is pre
ferable, i.e. something which for its own sake, is preferred
with a right preference. For the rest a somewhat wider
usage of language allows us also to speak of a good as
" better " over against a bad or purely indifferent, or
even to call something bad over against something still
worse " the better." We then say not of course that
it is good, but still better than the other.
This shortly in explanation of the notion of the better.
31. Next the question : How do we know that any
thing is really the better ? Assuming the existence of
simple knowledge of things as good and bad, we appear,
so analogy suggests, to derive this insight from certain
acts of preferring which have the character of Tightness.
For, like the simple exercise of pleasure, so also the act
of preferring is sometimes of a lower or impulsive, and
sometimes of a higher kind, and like the evident
judgment, is qualified as right. The cases in point
are, however, of such a nature that many might say,
and perhaps with a better right, that it is analytical
judgments which furnish us here with the means of
progress, and that instead of our learning the preferability
23
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
from the actual preferences, the preferences have the
qualification of Tightness because they already presume
the recognition of the standard of preferability.37
Chiefly belonging to this class are obviously (1) the
case where we prefer something good, and recognized
as good, to something bad, and recognized as bad. Also
(2) the case where we prefer the existence of something
recognized as good to its non-existence, or the non-
existence of something recognized as bad to its existence.
This case embraces in itself a series of important
cases, as the case where we prefer a good to the
same good with an admixture of the bad ; and, on
the other hand, where we prefer something bad, with an
admixture of good, to the same bad purely for its own
sake. Further, the cases in which we prefer the whole
of a good to its part, and again, the part of something
bad to its whole. Aristotle has already called attention
to the fact that in the case of the good the sum is always
better than the separate parts which together make
up its sum. Such a case of summation presents itself
wherever a state has a certain permanence. The same
amount of joy which endures an hour is better than if
it only lasted for a moment. Whoever denies this, like
Epicurus when he would console us on account of the
mortality of the soul, may easily be led into still more
striking absurdities. For then an hour's torture would
be no worse than that of a moment. And, by combining
both these propositions, we should have to assume that
an entire life full of joy with a single moment of pain
is in no way preferable to an entire life full of pain with
a single moment of joy. This is a result at which not
only every sound mind in general would demur, but also
one respecting which Epicurus in particular, expressly
asserts the contrary.
24
OF RIGHT AND WRONG
Closely related to this is the case (3) where one good
is preferred to another, which, while forming no part
of the first, is yet similar in every respect to one of its
parts. It is not merely by adding a good to the same
good but also by adding it to a good which is in every
respect similar that we get a better for total. The case
is analogous when to a similar bad another bad is thought
of as added. When therefore, for example, a fine picture
is seen, the first time as a whole, the second time only
partially though exactly in the same way, we must then
say that the first view, considered in itself, is better :
Or, when one imagines something that is good and a
second time not only imagines it even as perfectly as
before, but also loves it, this latter sum of psychical acts
is then something better.
Cases of difference in degree belong also to this third
class, and are especially worthy of mention. If one
good, e.g. one joy is in every respect quite equal to
another, only more intense, then the preference which
is given to the more intense is qualified as right, the
more intense is the better. Conversely, the bad which
is more intense, e.g. a more intense pain, is worse. That
is to say : the degree of intensity corresponds with the
distance from the zero point, and the distance of the
greater degree of intensity from zero is compounded
of its distance from the weaker degree of intensity plus
the distance of this from zero. We have, therefore,
really to do with a kind of addition, a view which has
been disputed.
32. Many a one will, perhaps, think to himself that
the three cases which I have set forth are so self-evident
and insignificant that it is a matter for surprise that I
have lingered over them at all. Self-evident they are
25
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
of course, and this must be so, since we have here to
do with what has to serve as a fundamentum. The
case would be worse if they were insignificant ; for, I
confess it frankly, I have scarcely another further case
to add : in all, or, at any rate, most of the cases not
here included a criterion fails us completely.38
An example. All insight is, we have said, something
good in itself, and all noble love is likewise something
good in itself. We recognize both these things clearly.
But who shall say whether this act of insight or that
act of love is in itself, the better ? There have, of
course, not been wanting those who have given a verdict
on this point ; some have even asserted that it is certain
every act of noble love for its own sake is a good so high
that, taken by itself, it is better than all scientific insight
taken together. In my judgment this view is not only
doubtful but altogether absurd. For a single act of
noble love worthy as it is, is yet a certain finite good.
But every act of insight is also a finite good and if I keep
adding this finite quantity to itself ad libitum, its sum
is bound some time to exceed every given finite measure
of good. On the other hand, Plato and Aristotle were
inclined to regard the act of knowing considered in
itself as higher than ethically virtuous acts, this also
quite unjustly, and I only mention it since the opposition
of opinions here is a confirmatory proof of the absence
of any criterion. As often happens in the sphere of
the psychical,39 so also here, real measurements are
impossible. Now where the inner preference is not to
be detected there holds good here what was said in a
similar case of simple goodness — as far as our knowledge
and practical concern go it is as good as non-existent.
33. There are some who, in opposition to the clear
26
OF RIGHT AND WRONG
teaching of experience, assert that only pleasure is good
for its own sake, and pleasure is the good. Assuming
this view to be right, would it have the advantage, as
many have believed, and as Bentham in particular
maintained in its favour,40 that we should at once attain
to a determination of the relative value of goods, seeing
that now we should have only homogeneous goods and
these admit of being measured side by side ? Every
more intense pleasure would then be a greater good
than one less intense, and a good having double the
intensity would be equal to two of half the intensity.
In this way everything would become clear.
A moment's reflection only is needed to shatter an
illusion born of such hope. Are we really able to find
out that one pleasure is twice as great as another ?
Gauss41 himself, who knew something about measure
ments, has denied this. A more intense pleasure is
never really made up of twelve less intense pleasures
distinguishable as equal parts within it, as a foot is
made up of twelve inches. So the matter presents itself
even in simpler cases. But how foolish would any one
appear were he to assert that the pleasure he had in
smoking a good cigar increased 127, or, let us say, 1077
times in intensity yielded a measure of the pleasure ex
perienced by him in listening to a symphony of Beeth
oven or contemplating one of Raphael's madonnas !42
I think I have said enough, and do not need to allude
to the further difficulty involved in comparing the in
tensity of pleasure with that of pain.
34. Only therefore to this very limited extent are
we able to derive from experience a knowledge of what
is better in itself.
I can well understand how any one, reflecting upon
27
THE OEIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
this for the first time, will be led to fear that the great
gaps which remain must, in practice, pro vein the highest
degree embarrassing. Yet as we proceed and make a
vigorous use of what we do possess, we shall find that
the most sensible deficiencies may fortunately turn
out harmless in practice.
p" 35. For, from the cases we adduced of preference
qualified as right, the important proposition follows
that the province of the highest practical good embraces
everything which is subject to our rational operation
in so far as a good can be realized in such matter. Not
merely the self but also the family, the town, the state,
the whole present world of life, even distant future times,
may here be taken into account. All this follows from
the principle of the summation of the good. To promote
as far as possible the good th^ugh^ut_this great whole,
that is manifestly the right end in life, Towards which
every act is to be ordered ; that is th&Iffie, the highest
command upon which all the rest depend.43 v*Self-
devotion" and, on_occasion, sel|-sacrifice are, therefore",
duties; an equal good wherever it be, and therefore
i5-fe ! Prison of another also, is, in proportion to its value,
and, therefore, everywhere equally to be loved, and
I jealousy and malignant envy are excluded.
36. And now, since all lesser goods are to be made
subservient to the good/of this widest sphere, light may
also be shed from utilitarian considerations upon those
dark regions where before we found a standard of choice
wanting. If, for example, it was true that acts of
insight and acts of japjje love are not to be measured
as to their inner worth in terms of one another, it is now
clear that at any rate neither of these two sides may be
entirely neglected at the expense of the other. If one
28
OF RIGHT AND WRONG "V^t
person had perfect knowledge without noble Jove, and
another perfect noble love without knowledge, neither
would be able to ^use his gifts in the service of the still /
greater collective good. A certain harmonious devel-i
opment and exercise of all our noblest powers seems,
therefore, from this point of view~~to be, at any rate,
what we must strive after.44
37. And now after seeing how many duties of love
towards the highest practical good come to light, we
proceed to the origin of duties of law. That association
which renders possible a division of labour is the indis
pensable condition of the advancement of the highest
good as we have learnt to understand it. Man therefore
is morally destined to live in society, and it is easily
demonstrable that limits must exist in order that one
member of society may not be more of a hindrance than
a help to another,45 and that these limits (though much
in this respect is settled by considerations of natural
common-sense) require to be more exactly marked by
positive laws, and need the further security and support
of public authority.
And while in this way our natural insight demands
and sanctions positive law in general, it may, in parti
cular, raise demands on the fulfilment of which depends
the measure of the blessing which the state of law is to
bring with it.
In this way does truth, bearing the supreme crown,
give, or refuse, to the products of positive legislation
its sanction, and it is from this crown that they derive
their true binding force.46 For as the old sage of Ephesus
says in one of his pregnant Sibyl-like utterances :
" All human laws are fed from the one divine law."47
38. Besides the laws referring to the limits of right,
29
THE OKIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
in every society there are other positive enactments
as to the way in which an individual is to act inside his
own sphere of right, how he is to make use of his liberty
and his property. Public opinion approves industry,
generosity, and economy each in its place, while disap
proving idleness, greed, prodigality and much else. In
the statutes no such laws are to be found, but they
stand written within the hearts of the people. Nor
are reward and punishment lacking as regards this kind
of positive law. These consist in the advantages and
disadvantages of good and bad reputation. There
exists here, as it were, a positive code of morality, the
complement of the positive code of law. This positive
code of morality also may contain both right and wrong
enactments. To be truly binding they need to be in
accord with the rules which, as we have already seen,
are capable of recognition by the reason, as a duty of
love towards the highest practical good.
And so we have really found the natural sanction
of morality which we sought.
39. I do not linger here to show how this sanction
operates. Every one would rather say to himself :
am acting rightly," than " I am acting foolishly." And
to no one capable of recognizing what is better is this
fact entirely indifferent in choosing. In the case of
some it is nearly so, whereas for others it is of the very
first importance. Innate dispositions are themselves
diverse and much advance may be made by education
and one's own ethical conduct. Enough, truth speaks,
and whoever is of the truth hears her voice.
40. Throughout the multiplicity of derived laws
graven by nature herself upon the tables of the law,
utilitarian considerations, as we have seen, form the
30
OF EIGHT AND WRONG
standard. As now, in different situations, we resort
to different means, so also with regard to these different
situations different special precepts must hold good.
They may be quite conflicting in their tenour without
of course being really contradictory, since they are
intended for different circumstances. In this sense,
then, a relativity in ethics is rightly asserted.
Ihering has drawn attention to this,48 but he is not
as he seems to think, one of the first. On the contrary
the doctrine was known of old and is insisted upon by f +
Plato in his Republic^ Aristotle in his Ethics, and ^ '
with special emphasis in his Politics has affirmed
it.50 The scholastic philosophers also held fast to the
doctrine, and in modern times men even of such energetic
ethical and political convictions as Bentham51 have not
denied it. If the fanatics of the French Revolution
failed to recognize it, still the clear-headed among their
fellow -citizens, even in that time, did not fall into such
a delusion. Laplace, for example, in his Essai philo-
sophique sur les probabilites occasionally bears witness
to the true teaching and raises his voice in warning.32
Thus it happens that the distinguished investigator
who has disclosed to us the spirit of Roman law and to
whom, as the author of Der Zweck im Recht, we also are
bound in many respects to tender our thanks, has yet
here, as we see, done nothing else than render the doc
trine unclear by confounding it with an essentially
different and false doctrine of relativity. According
to this doctrine, no proposition in ethics, not even the
proposition that the best in the widest sphere ought
to be the determining standard of action, would have
unexceptional validity. In primitive times and even
later, throughout long centuries, such a procedure
would, he expressly says, have been as immoral as, in
31
5
THE OEIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
later times, the opposite conduct. We must, he thinks,
on looking back into the times of cannibalism sympathize
rather with the cannibals, and not with those who
perhaps, in advance of their time, preached even then
the universal love of neighbour.53 These are errors
which have been crushingly refuted not merely by
philosophical reflection upon the fundamental prin
ciples of ethics, but also by the successes of Christian
I missionaries.
41. Thus the road leading to the goal which we set
before us has been traversed. For a time it led us
through strange and rarely trodden districts, finally,
however, the results at which we have arrived smile
[upon us like old acquaintances. In declaring love
(of neighbour and self-sacrifice, both for our country
and for mankind to be duties, we are only echoing what
is proclaimed all around us. We should also find by
going further into particulars that lying, treachery,
murder, debauchery and much besides that is held to
be morally base are, measured by the standard of the
principles we have set up, condemned, one as unjust,
another as immoral.
All this would seem, in a measure, familiar to us as
the shores of his native land to the sea-farer when,
after a voyage happily consummated, he sees them rise
suddenly into view, and the smoke curling from the
old familiar chimney.
42. And certainly we are at liberty to rejoice over
this. The absolute clearness with which all this follows
is a good omen for the success of our undertaking, since
it is the method by which we arrived at our result, which
is obviously the most essential feature in it. Without
it what advantage can our inquiry be said to have over
32
OF RIGHT AND WRONG
that of others ? Even Kant, for example, whose doc
trines concerning the principles of ethics were quite
different, arrived, in the further course of his statement,
pretty much to the popular view. But what we miss
in him is strict logical coherence. Beneke has shown
that the Categorical Imperative as Kant used it, may
be so employed as to prove, in the same case, contra
dictory statements and so everything and nothing.54
If, none the less, Kant is able to arrive so often at right
conclusions, this must be attributed to the fact that
from the outset he had harboured such opinions. Even
Hegel, had he not known in other ways that the sky
was blue, would certainly never have succeeded by
means of his dialectic in deducing this d priori. Did
he not equally succeed in demonstrating that there
were seven planets, a number accepted in his day,
but which in our time science has long left behind ?
The causes of this phenomenon, therefore, are easily
understood.
43. But there is another point which appears enig
matical. How does it happen that the prevailing public
opinion respecting law and morality is itself, in so many
respects, obviously right ? If a thinker like Kant was
unable to discover the sources from which ethical know
ledge flows, how can we believe that the common folk
succeeded in drawing therefrom ? And if this were
not the case, how were they able, while ignorant of the
premises, still to reach the conclusions ? Here the
phenomenon cannot possibly be explained from the
fact that the right view was long before established.
This difficulty also resolves itself in a very simple
manner when we reflect that much in our store of know
ledge exists, and contributes towards the attainment
33 D
THE OKIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
of new knowledge, without the knowledge of the process
itself being clearly present to consciousness.
It must not be supposed that in saying this I am an
adherent of the wonderful philosophy of the unconscious.
I am speaking here only of undeniable and well known
truths. Thus it has often been observed that for thou
sands of years men have drawn right conclusions without
bringing the procedure and the principles which form
the condition of the formal validity of the inference
into clear consciousness by means of reflection. Indeed
when Plato first took the step of reflecting upon it, he
was led to set up an entirely false theory which assumed
that every inference was a process of reminiscence.55
What was perceived and experienced on earth recalled
to the memory knowledge acquired in a pre-mundane
existence. Nowadays this error has disappeared. Still,
false theories concerning the fundamental principles of
syllogism are continually emerging, as, for example,
when Albert Lange,56 finds them in space-perceptions
and in synthetic propositions d priori, or Alexander
Bain57 in the experience that the moods Barbara, Celarent,
etc., have up to the present time been found to be valid
in every case : mere crude errors which overlook the
immediate intuitions forming the conditions of right
conclusions, but which do not prevent Plato, Lange,
and Bain from arguing in general exactly like other
people. In spite of their false conception of the true
fundamental principles, these still continue to operate
in their reasoning.
But why do I go so far for examples ? Let the expe
riment be made with the first " plain man " who has
just drawn a right conclusion, and demand of him that
he give you the premises of his conclusion. This he
will usually be unable to do and may perhaps make
34
OF RIGHT AND WRONG
entirely false statements about it. On requiring the
same man to define a notion with which he is familiar,
he will make the most glaring mistakes and so show
once again that he is not able rightly to describe his own
thinking.
44. Meantime, however dark the road to ethical know
ledge might appear, both to the " plain man " and to
the philosopher, we must still expect, since the process
is a complicated one and many combined principles
operate therein, that the traces of the operation of each
separate principle will be evident in history, and this
fact, even more than agreement in respect of the final
results, is a confirmation of the right theory.
This also, if only the time permitted, in what fulness
would I not be able to lay before you ! Who is there,
for example, who would not, as we have done, regard
joy as something evidently good in itself, if only it were
not joy in what is bad. Nor has there been any lack
of writers on ethics who have asserted that pleasure
and the good were strictly identical conceptions.58
Opposed to these were others who bore witness to the
inner worth of insight and such will be supported by all
unprejudiced minds. Many philosophers have wished
to exalt knowledge above all else as the highest good.59
They recognized, however, at the same time, a certain
inner worth in each act of virtue, while others have
carried this view so far as to recognize only in virtuous
action the highest good.60
On the one hand, therefore, we have had sufficient
confirmatory tests in support of our view.
Next with regard to the principles of choice, how often
do we not see the principle of summation applied as, for
example, when it is said that the measure of the happi-
35
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
ness of life as a whole and not that of the passing moment
is to be considered.61 And, again, passing beyond the
limits of the self, when, for example, Aristotle says, that
the happiness of a nation seems to be a higher end than
that of an individual happiness,62 and that in the same
way in a work of art, or in an organism and similarly
in the case of the family, the part always exists for the
sake of the whole ; everything is here subordinate to
the "common" ("«? TO xoivov").63 Even in the
case of the whole creation he makes the same principle
hold good. " In what," he asks,64 " regarding all created
things consists the good, and the best, which is its final
aim " ? Is it immanent or transcendent ? And he
answers : " Both," setting forth as the transcendent
aim the divine first cause, likeness to which everything
strives after, while the immanent aim is the world- order
as a whole. The like testimony to the principle of sum
mation might be taken from the lips of the Stoics.65 It
reappears in every attempt to construct a theodicy from
Plato down to Leibnitz and even later.66
In the precepts of our popular religion, again, the
operation of this principle is also distinctly visible. When
it ordains us to love our neighbour as ourselves, what
else is taught but that, in the right choice, equality
(be it our own or that of others) shall fall with equal
weight into the balance, from which follows the subor
dination of the single individual to the good of the
collective whole ; just as the ethical ideal of Christianity
-the Saviour— offers himself as a sacrifice for the sal
vation of the world.
And when it is said : " Love God above all else "
(and Aristotle also says that God is much rather to be
called the best than the world as a whole),67 here also
there is a special application of the law of summation
36
OF RIGHT AND WBONG
For how else do we think of God than as the sum of all
that is good raised to an infinite degree ?
And so the two propositions : that we should love
our neighbour as ourselves, and love God above all else,
are manifestly so closely related that we are no longer
surprised to find added the words that the one law is
like unto the other. The law that we are to love our
neighbour, it should be carefully noted, is not subor
dinated to that of love of God, and derived from it, it is,
according to the Christian view, not right because God
has required it, rather he requires it because it is by
nature right ; 68 and this Tightness is made manifest
in the same way, and with the same clearness by means,
so to speak, of the same ray of natural knowledge.
Sufficient testimony has perhaps been offered to the
shaping operation of those factors which have been
separately set forth by us, and so we have, on the one
hand, a strengthening of our theory while, on the other
hand, we have in essentials the explanation of that
paradoxical anticipation of philosophical results.
45. We are not to suppose, however, that all has now
been said. Not every opinion regarding law and mora
lity holding good in society to-day, and which has also
the sanction of ethics, flows from these pure and noble
sources which, even when hid, have none the less dis
charged their waters in rich abundance. Many such
views have arisen in a way quite unjustifiable from a
logical point of view, and an inquiry into the history
of their origin shows that they take their rise in lower
impulses, in egoistic desires through a transformation
due, not to higher influences, but simply to the instinctive
force of habit. It is really true, as so many utilitarians
have pointed out, that egoism prompts men to make
37
THE OEIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
themselves agreeable to others and that such conduct
continually practised, develops finally into a habit
which is blind to the original ends. The chief reason
for this is the limits of our mind, the so-called " nar
rowness of consciousness," which does not allow of our
always keeping clearly before us the more remote and
final ends side by side with what is immediately in
question. In such a way many a one may be frequently
led, by the blind force of habit, to have regard also for
the well-being of others with a certain self-forgetfulness.
Further, it is true, as some have particularly insisted,
that in history it must often have happened that a
powerful person has selfishly reduced to subjection a
weaker individual, and transformed him by force of
habit more and more into a willing slave. And then
in this slave-soul an avrb^ e$a comes in the end to
operate with a blind, but none the less powerful force,
an impelling " you ought," as though it were a revelation
of nature regarding good and bad. On every violation
of a command he feels himself, like a well-trained dog,
uneasy and inwardly tormented. When such a tyrant
had, in this way, reduced many to subjection his prudent
egoism would cause him to give commands helpful to
the maintenance of his horde. These orders would in
the same slavish manner become habitual, and as it
were, natural to his subjects. And so regard for the
whole of this community would gradually become for
each subject something into which he felt himself driven
in the manner above described. At the same time,
we may easily recognize how, owing to the constant
care exercised towards his subjects, habits must be
formed in the tyrant himself favourable to a regard
for the welfare of the community. It may even happen
at last that, just as in the case of the miser, who sacrifices
38
OF RIGHT AND WRONG
himself for the sake of his gold, the tyrant may be ready
to die for the maintenance of his people. Throughout
the whole process thus described ethical principles do
not exercise the slightest influence. The compulsion
which in this way arises, and the opinions which as a
result approve or disapprove of a certain procedure
have nothing whatever to do with the natural sanction
and are devoid of all ethical worth. It may, however,
be easily understood — especially if one considers how
one tribe enters into relations with another and consi
derations of friendliness begin here too to prove advan
tageous, — how this kind of training may lead, indeed
one may venture to say must, sooner or later, lead to
opinions in agreement with the principles springing
from a true appreciation of the good.
46. Thus also the blind, purely habitual expectation
of similar events under similar circumstances which
animals, and also we ourselves, practise in countless
instances, often coincide with the results which a com
plete induction according to the principles of the calcula
tion of probability would, in the same case, have brought
about. The very similarity of result has led people
even with a psychological education,69 to regard the
two processes as exactly identical, although they stand
wide as the poles asunder, the one completing itself by
means of a purely blind instinct, while the other is illu
mined by mathematical evidence. We ourselves should,
therefore, be well on our guard against supposing in
such pseudo-ethical developments the concealed influ
ence of the true ethical sanction.
47. Great, however, as is the contrast, still even these
lower processes have their worth. Nature — and this
39
THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE
has been often insisted on70— frequently does well in
leaving much which concerns our welfare to instinctive
impulses like hunger and thirst rather than leave every
thing to our reason. This, also, is confirmed in our case.
In those very early times in which, as I conceded to
Ihering, (why you will, perhaps, now be better able to
see,) nearly every trace of ethical thought and feeling
was absent, much nevertheless was done which was a
preparation for true virtue. Public laws, however much
in the first instance established under the influence of
lower motives, were yet preliminary conditions for the
free unfolding of our noblest capacities.
Nor is it a matter of no consequence that, under the
influence of this training, certain passions became mode
rated and certain dispositions implanted which made it
easier to follow the true moral law in the same direction.
Catiline's courage was assuredly not the true virtue of
courage if Aristotle is right when he says that they only
have such who go to danger and to death " rou KO,\OV
eveica" " for the sake of the morally beautiful."71
Augustine might have made use of this instance when
he said : " virtutes ethnicorum splendida vitia." But
who will deny that if such a man as Catiline had been
converted, the dispositions he had acquired earlier
would have made it easier for him to venture to ex
tremes in the service of the good too ? In this way,
the ground was made receptive for the admission of
truly ethical impulses and therein lay a powerful encou
ragement to the propagation of truth on the part of
those who were foremost in the discovery of ethical
knowledge, and first to hear the voice of a natural sanc
tion. It is in this sense that Aristotle observed that it is
not every one who can study ethics. He who is to hear
about law and morality, must be already well conducted
40
OF RIGHT AND WRONG
by dint of habit. In the case of others, he thinks, it is
but a waste of pains.72
Indeed, still more may be said in praise of the services
rendered to the recognition of natural law and morality
by these pre-ethical, though not pre-historical, times.
The legal ordinances and customs formed in this time,
owing to the reasons previously assigned, approached
so closely to what ethics demands, that this peculiar
kind of mimicry blinded many to the absence of a more
thorough going affinity. What, in the one case, a blind
impulse and in the other, knowledge of the good exalts
into a law, is often completely the same in substance.
The legislative moral authority found therefore in these
already codified laws and customs the rough drafts, as
it were, of laws, which with a few changes, it could
sanction without more ado. These were the more
valuable because, as seems required from a utilitarian
point of view, they were adapted to the special circum
stances of the people. A comparison of the one consti
tution with the other made this noticeable, and early
helped to lead to the important knowledge of the real
relativity of natural right and of natural morality. Who
knows whether otherwise, it would have been possible,
even for an Aristotle, to succeed to the degree in which
he did in steering clear of all cut and dried doctrinaire
theories ?
So much, therefore, concerning the pre-ethical times,
in order that these may not be denied the acknowledg
ment which they deserve.
48. Nevertheless it was then night ; though a night
which heralded the coming day, and the dawn of that
day witnessed assuredly the most glorious sunrise which,
in the history of the world is yet to rise into full splen-
THE ORIGIN OF ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE
dour. I say, is to rise, not has risen, for we still see the
light struggling with the powers of darkness. True
ethical motives, in private as in public life, are still far
from being everywhere the determining standard.
These forces — to use the language of the poet* — prove
themselves still too little developed to hold together
the structure of the world ; and so nature, — and we
have need to be thankful that it is so — keeps the machine
going by hunger and love, and, we must also add, by all
those other dark strivings which, as we have seen, may
be developed from self-seeking desires.
49. Of these, and their psychological laws the jurist
must, therefore, if he would truly understand his time,
and influence it beneficially, take cognizance, as well
as of the doctrines of natural right and natural morality
which our inquiry has shown to be not the first but —
in so far as hope in the realization of a complete ideal
may be cherished at all — will be the last in the history
of the development of law and morality.
Thus the near relationships of jurisprudence and
politics of which Leibnitz spoke, become evident in
their full range.
Plato has said : " It will never be well with the state
until the true philosopher is king, or kings philosophize
rightly." In our constitutional times we should express
ourselves better by saying that there will never be a
change for the better regarding the many evils in our
national life until the authorities, instead of abolishing
the limited philosophical culture required for law stu
dents by the existing regulations, shall rather strive
hard to secure that for their noble profession they shall
really receive an adequate philosophical culture.
* Schiller,
42
NOTES
1 (p. 2). Cf. "her Udie Entstehung des Rechtsgefiihls."
Lecture by Dr. Rudolf von Thering, delivered before the Vienna
Law Society, March 12, 1884 (Allgem. Juristenzeitung, 7 Jahrg.,
No. 11 seq., Vienna, March 16-April 13, 1884). Cf. further, v.
Ihering, Der Ziveck im Recht, vol. ii. Leipzig, 1877-83.
2 (p. 2). For the first point, cf. Allgem. Juristenzeitung,
7 Jahrg. p. 122 seq., Zweck im Recht, vol. ii. p. 109 seq. For the
second point Allgem. Juristenzeitung, 7 Jahrg. p. 171, Zweck im
Recht, pp. 118-123. It is here denied that there is any absolutely
valid ethical rule (pp. 118, 122 seq.) ; further every " psycho
logical " treatment of ethics, according to which ethics is repre
sented " as twin sister of logic " is contested.
3 (p. 4). Allgem. Juristenzeitung, 7 Jahrg., p. 147 ; cf. Zweck
im Recht, vol. ii. p. 124 seq.
4 (p. 4). Aristotle, Politics, i. 2, p. 1252 b. 24.
5 (p. 4). Cf. e.g. Allgem. Juristenzeitung, 7 Jahrg. p. 146.
6 (p. 5). Rep. 2. 31.
7 (p. 5). Dig, 1. 8, 9.
8 (p. 6). Amongst the numerous adherents of this view
and one of its best advocates is J. S. Mill in his Utilitarianism,
chap. iii.
9 (p. 6). Here also, along with many others, J. S. Mill may
be cited. The motives of hope and fear are, according to him,
the external ; the motives first described, the feelings developed
by habit, the internal sanction. Utilitarianism, chap. iii.
43
NOTES
10 (p. 7). Cf. espec. here a discussion in James Mill's
Fragment on Mackintosh, printed by J. S. Mill in the second
edition of his Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind,
vol. ii. p. 309 seq. ; and Grote's powerful essay published by
A. Bain under the title, " Fragments on Ethical Subjects, by the
late George Grote, F.R.S.," being a selection from his posthumous
papers, London, 1876 ; Espec. Essay 1, On the Origin and
Nature of Ethical Sentiment.
11 (p. 9). D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles
of Morals, London, 1751.
12 (p. 9). Herbart, Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philo
sophic, 81 seq. Collected Works, vol. i. p. 124 seq.
13 (p. 9). This comparison with logic should be my best
defence against the charge of placing Herbart's doctrine in a false
light. Were the logical criterion to consist in judgments of taste
experienced on the appearance of thought-processes in accordance
with or opposition to rule, it would then, in comparison with
what it actually is (the internal self-evidence of a process in
accordance with rule) have to be called external. Similarly
Herbart's criterion of ethics is rightly characterized as external,
however loudly Herbartians may insist that in the judgment
of taste which arises spontaneously on the contemplation of
certain relations of will, an inner superiority regarding these
relations is recognizable.
14 (p. 10). In his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,
Kant enunciates his Categorical Imperative in the following
forms : " Act only in accordance with that maxim which you
can at the same time will should become a universal law," and
" Act as if the maxim of your action were by your will to be raised
to a universal law."
In the Critique of Practical Reason it runs " Act so that the
maxim of your will could on each occasion be valid as a universal
legislative principle," i.e. as Kant himself explains, in such a way
that the maxim, when raised to a universal law, does not lead
to contradictions and consequent self-abrogation. The conscious
ness of this fundamental law was, for Kant, a fact of pure reason,
44
NOTES
thereby proclaiming itself to be legislative (sic volo sic jubeo).
Beneke has already observed (Grundlinien der Sittenlehre, vol.ii.
p. xviii., 1841 ; cf. his Grundlegung zur Physik der Bitten, a
counterpart to Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,
1822) that it is nothing more than a " psychologische Dichtung,"
and to-day no one able to judge is any longer in doubt concerning
it. It deserves to be noted that even philosophers like Mansel,
who have the highest reverence for Kant, admit that the Cate
gorical Imperative is a fiction and absolutely untenable.
The Categorical Imperative has at the same time another and
not less serious defect, i.e. that even when admitted, it leads to
no ethical conclusions. Kant fails, as Mill (Utilitarianism, chap,
i.) rightly says " in an almost grotesque fashion " to deduce what
he seeks. His favourite example of a deduction, by which he
illustrates his manner of procedure not only in his Grundlegung
zur Metaphysik der Sitten but also in the Critique of Practical
Reason is as follows : May a person, he asks, retain for himself
a possession which has been entrusted to him without a receipt
or other acknowledgment ? He answers, No. For he thinks,
were the opposite maxim to be raised to a law, nobody, under
such circumstances, would entrust anything to anybody. The
law would then be without possibility of application, therefore
impracticable and so self-abrogated.
It may easily be seen that Kant's argumentation is false,
indeed absurd. If, in consequence of the law, certain actions
ceased to be practised, the law exercises an influence ; it there
fore still exists and has in no way annulled itself. How ridiculous
would it appear if the following question were treated after an
analogous fashion : " May I yield to a person who desires to
bribe me ? " Yes, since, were I to think of the opposite maxim
as raised to a universal law, then nobody would seek any longer
to bribe another ; therefore the law would be without application,
therefore, impracticable, and so self-abrogated.
15 (p. 11). Cf. J. S. Mill, System of Deductive and Inductive
Logic, vol. iv. chap. iv. section vi. (towards the end) ; vol. vl.
chap. ii. section iv. and elsewhere, e.g. in his Utilitarianism,
Essays on Religion, and in his article on Comte and Positivism,
part ii.
45
NOTES
16 (p. 11). Cf. with what has been said in the lecture the
first chapter of the Nicomachian Ethics, and it will be seen that
Ihering's "fundamental thought" in his work Der Zweck im
Recht, vol. i. p. vi., viz. : " that no legal formula exists which
does not owe its origin to an end," is as old as ethics itself.
17 (p. 12). Cases may arise where the consequence of certain
efforts remains in doubt, and two courses are open : one present
ing the prospect of a greater good but with less probability,
the other a lesser good but with a greater probability. In
choosing here, account must be taken of the degree of proba
bility. If A is three times better than B, but B has ten times
as many chances of being attained as A, then practical wisdom
will prefer course B. Supposing that, under like circumstances,
such a procedure always takes place, then (in accordance
with the law of great numbers) the better would, generally
speaking, be realized, a sufficient number of cases being assumed,
and so such a manner of choosing would still obviously corre
spond to the principle laid down in the text, i.e. " Choose the
best that is attainable." The full significance of this remark
will be made still more evident in the course of the inquiry.
18 (p. 12). This truth was familiar to Aristotle (cf. e.g.
De Anima, iii. 8). The Middle Ages maintained it,
but expressed it unfortunately in the proposition : nihil est
in intelluctu, quod non prim fuerit in sensu. The notions " will
ing, " concluding " are not gained from sensuous perception ;
the term " sensuous " would in that case have to be taken so
generally that all distinction between " sensuous " and " super-
sensuous " disappears. These notions have their origin in
certain concrete impressions with psychical content (Anschau-
ungen psychischen Inhalts). From the same source arise the
notions "end," "cause" (we observe, for example, a causal
relation existing between our belief in the premises and in the
conclusion), " impossibility " arid " necessity" (we gain these
from judgments which accept or reject not merely assertori-
cally, but, as it is usually expressed, apodictically,) and many
other notions which some modern philosophers, failing in detecting
the true origin of them, have sought to regard as categories given
46
NOTES
a priori. I may mention, by the way, that I am well aware
Sigwart and others influenced by him have recently questioned
the peculiar nature of apodictic as opposed to assertorical judg
ments. But this is a psychological error which it is not the place
to discuss here. Of. note 27, p. 83 sub.
19 (p. 12). This doctrine in germ is also found in Aristotle ;
cf. espec. Metaph. : A 15, p. 1021 a. 29. This term " intentional,"
like many other terms for important notions, comes from the
scholastics.
20 (p. 13). The question of the grounds of this division is
discussed in more detail in my Psychologic vom empirischen
StandpunJcte (1874, Bk. ii. chap. vi. ; cf. also chap. i. section 5).
The statements there made regarding this division I still consider
to be substantially correct in spite of many modifications respect
ing points of detail.
21 (p. 13). Meditat. iii. " Nunc autem ordo videtur exigere,
ut prius omnes meas cogitationes (all psychical acts) in certa
genera distribuam . . . Quaedam ex his tanquam rerum ima
gines sunt, quibus solis proprie convenit ideae nomen, ut cum
hominem, vel chimaeram, vel coelum, vel angelum, vel Deum
cogito ; aliae vero alias quasdam praeterea formas habent, ut cum
volo cum timeo, cum affirmo, cum nego, semper quidem aliquam
rem ut subjectum meae cogitationis apprehendo, sed aliquid
etiam amplius quam istius rei similitudinem cogitatione com-
plector ; et ex his aliae voluntates sive affectus aliae autem judicia
appellantur."
Strangely enough this clear passage has not prevented Windel-
band (Strassb. philos. Abhandl. p. 171) from ascribing to Des
cartes the view that the judgment is an act of volition. What
led him astray is a discussion in the fourth Meditation on the
influence of the will in the formation of judgment. Even scho
lastics like Suarez had ascribed too much to this influence, and
Descartes goes so far in exaggeration of this dependence that he
considers every judgment (even the self-evident judgments) as
the work of the will. But to " produce the judgment " and
" to be the judgment " are yet manifestly not one and the same.
47
NOTES
And, therefore, although Descartes, in the passage cited, allows
his view as to the influence of the will to appear, and probably
it is only on this account that he assigns to the judgment the
third place in the fundamental classification of psychical pheno
mena, yet none the less he says without contradiction : aliae
voluntates — aliae judicia appellantur.
More illusive are a couple of passages in his later writings,
i.e. in his Principia Philosophiae (i. 32), published three years
after the Meditations, and in a work also written three years later :
Notae in Programma quoddam, sub finem Anni 1647 in Belgio
editum, cum hoc Titulo : Explicatio mentis humanae sive animae
rationalis, ubi explicatur quid sit, et quid esse possit." Particu
larly might the passage in the Principles lead to the opinion
that Descartes must have changed his view, and it is astonishing
that Windelband has not appealed to this passage rather than
to that in the Meditations. We read here : — Ordines modi cogi-
tandi quos in nobis experimur, ad duos generales referri possunt ;
quorum unus est, perceptio sive operatio intellectus ; alius vero
volitio sive operatio voluntatis. Nam sentire, imaginari, et pure
intellegere, sunt tantum diversi modi percipiendi ; ut et cupere,
aversari, affirmare, negare, dubitare, sunt diversi modi volendi.
At first sight this passage appears to be so clearly in contradic
tion to the one in the third Meditation that, as we have said, it
is scarcely possible to avoid the supposition that Descartes had
meantime rejected his thesis as to the three fundamental classes
of psychical phenomena, so shunning Scylla only to plunge into
Charybdis ; avoiding the old mistake of confusing the judgment
with the idea (Vorstellung), he would now seem to confound it
with the will. But a more attentive examination of all the
circumstances will suffice to exonerate Descartes from such a
charge, and this on the following grounds : (1) There is not the
slightest sign that Descartes was ever conscious of having become
untrue to the view expressed in the Meditations. (2) Further,
in the year 1647 (three years after the publication of the Medita
tions and shortly before writing the Notae to his Programma)
the Meditations appeared in a translation revised by Descartes
himself, where, remarkably enough, not the slightest alteration
is to be found in the decisive passage in the third Meditation.
48
NOTES
kt Entre mes pensees," it reads, " quelques unes sont commes
les images des choses, et c'est a celles-la seules que convient
proprement le nom d'idee . . . D'autres, outre cela ont quelques
autres formes ; . . . et de ce genre de pensees les unes sont appe-
Ues volontes ou affections, et les autres jugements" (3) In the
Principles itself he says directly after (i. No. 42) that all
our errors depend upon our will (a voluntate pendere) ; but so
far is he from regarding the " error " as an act of volition, that he
says there is no one who errs voluntarily (nemo est qui velit falli).
Still clearer is it that he does not regard the judgment like the
desires and dislikes as inner activities of the will itself, but only
as a product of the will, since he at once adds ; sed longe aliud
est velle falli quam velle assentiri iis, in quibus contingit errorem
reperiri," etc. He does not say of the will that it desires, affirms,
assents, but that it wills the assent ; so also, not that it is true
but that it desires the truth (veritatis assequendae cupiditas . . .
efficit, ut . . . judicium ferant).
As to Descartes' real view, therefore, there can be no doubt ;
his doctrine has not in this respect suffered the slightest change.
It only remains, therefore, to come to an understanding of his
obviously variable modes of expression, and this is, I believe,
solved incontrovertibly in the following manner. Descartes,
while regarding will and judgment as two classes differing funda
mentally, none the less finds that in contradistinction to the
first fundamental class — that of ideas — these have something
in common. In the third Meditation he designates (cf. the above
passage) as the common element the fact that although essen
tially based upon an idea, in both alike there is contained a
further special form. In the fourth Meditation a further common
character appears, i.e. that the will decides concerning them ;
not only can it determine and suspend its own acts, but also those
of the judgment. It is this common character which he was
bound to regard as especially, indeed all important, in the first
part of the Principles, xxix.-xlii. Accordingly, he classes
them, in opposition to the ideas (which he calls operationes intel-
lectus) under the term operationes voluntatis. In the Notae
to the Programma he calls them distinctly in the same sense,
ffdeterminationes voluntatis." " Ego enim, cum viderem, praeter
49 E
NOTES
perceptionem, quae praerequiritur ut judicemus, opus esse affir-
aatione vel negatione ad formam judicn constituendam, nohsque
saeve esse libenm ut cohibeamus assensioncm, etiamsi rem peici-
piamus, ipsum actum judicandi, qui non nisi in assensu, hoc est
L affirmatione vel negatione consist, non retnh ad perceptionem
intellectus sed ad determinationem vohmtatis. He does not
even hesitate in the Principles to term both these two classes
of „,,*; coailmdi. " modi volendi " the context seeming sufficiently
oi modi cuyuuw, - ,
to indicate that he means only to express thereby the fact that
they fall within the domain of the will.
In further support of this explanation we may compare 1
scholastic terminology into which Descartes as a young man
was initiated. It was customary to denote under the term actus
voluntatis not merely the movement of the will itself but also the
act performed in obedience to the will. In accordance with
this custom, the actus voluntatis fell into two classes ; the actus
elicitus voluntatis and the actus imperatus voluntatis. In a similar
manner Descartes groups the class which, according to him, was
only possible as an actus imperatus of the will along with his
actus elicitus. There is here, therefore, no question of a common
fundamental character of the intentional relation.
Clear as all this is to those who carefully attach due weight
to the various moments, it would yet appear that Spinoza (pro
bably misled rather by the passage in the Principles than
by that cited by Windelband), anticipates Windelband in this
misunderstanding of the Cartesian doctrine. In his Ethics, ii.
prop. 49, he actually, and in the most real sense, regards the
affirmatio and negatio as " volitiones mentis" and by a further
confusion, comes finally to obliterate the distinction between
the two classes ideae and voluntates. " Voluntas et intellectus
unum et idem sunt " his thesis now reads, so overthrowing not
only the three-fold classification of Descartes, but also the old
Aristotelian dual classification. Spinoza has here, as usual, done
nothing else than corrupt the teaching of his great master.
22 (p. 13). I do not mean to say that the classification is
universally recognized to-day. It would not even be possible
to regard as certain the Principle of Contradiction if in order
60
NOTES
to do so we were to await universal assent. In the present
instance it is not difficult to understand that old, deeply-rooted
prejudices cannot all at once be banished. But that even under
such circumstances it has not been possible to urge a single
important objection affords the best confirmation of our doctrine.
Some, as for instance, Windelband — while giving up the attempt
at including judgment and idea (Vorstellung) in one fundamental
class, on the other hand believe it possible to subsume judgment
under feeling, thus falling back into the error which Hume
committed earlier in his inquiry into the nature of belief. Accord
ing to these writers, to affirm implies an act of approval, an
appreciation on the part of the feelings, while denial is an act
of disapproval, a feeling of repugnance.
Despite a certain analogy the confusion is hard to understand.
There are people who recognize both the goodness of God and
the wickedness of the devil, the being of Ormuzd and the being of
Ahriman, with an equal degree of conviction, and yet, while
prizing the nature of the one above all else, they feel themselves
absolutely repelled by that of the other. Since we love know
ledge and hate error it is, of course, proper that those judgments
we hold to be right (and this is true of all those judgments which
we ourselves make) are for this very reason dear to us, i.e. we
estimate them in some way or other through feeling. But who
on this account would be misled into regarding the judgments
themselves which are loved as acts of loving ? The confusion
would be almost as gross as if we should fail to distinguish wife
and child, money and possessions, from the activity which is
directed towards these, inasmuch they are the objects of affection.
Cf. also what has been said (note 21) with regard to Windelband,
where, misunderstanding Descartes, he ascribes to him the same
teaching ; further, note 26 (on the unity of the idea of the good)
as well as what is urged by Sigwart in the note (in part much to
the point) on Windelband (Logic, vol. i. chap. ii. p. 156 seq.). To
those who, despite all that has been said, still wish further argu
ments for the distinction between the second and third funda
mental classes, I may, perhaps, be allowed to refer them, by
anticipation, to my Descriptive Psychology, which I have
alluded to in the preface as an almost completed work, and which
51
NOTES
will appear if not as a continuation, yet still as a further develop
ment of my Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint.
As against Windelband, I here add the following observations :
1. It&is false and a serious oversight, as he himself will be
convinced on reading again in my Psychology, vol. i. p. 262,
when he (p. 172) makes me assert, and that too as a quotation
from my own work, that " love and hate " is not an appropriate
term for the third fundamental class.
2. It is false, and a quite unjustifiable supposition when (p. 178)
he ascribes to me the opinion that the classification of judgments
according to quality is the only essential classification belonging
to the act of judgment itself. I believe exactly the contrary.
I regard, for example (of course in opposition to Windelband),
the distinction between assertorical and apodictic judgments
(cf. here note 27, p. 83), as also the distinction between self-
evident and blind judgments as belonging and highly essential,
to the act of judgment itself. Other differences, again, especially
the distinction between simple and compound acts of judgment,
I might mention. For it is not every compound judgment that
can be resolved into quite simple elements, and something
similar takes place also in the case of certain notions, a fact
known to Aristotle. What is red ?— Red colour. What is
colour ? — The quality of colour. The difference, it is seen,
contains in both cases the notion of the genus. The separating
of the one logical element from the other is only possible from
the one side. A similar one-sided capacity to separate appears
also in certain compound judgments. J. S. Mill is, therefore,
quite wrong when he (Deductive and Inductive Logic, vol. i. chap. iv.
section 3), regards as ridiculous the old classification of judgments
into simple and compound, and thinks that the procedure in
such a case is exactly as if one should wish to divide horses
into single horses and teams of horses ; otherwise the same
argument would hold good against the classification of concep
tions into simple and compound.
3. It is false, though an error which finds almost universal
acceptance, and one from which I myself at the time of writing
the first volume of my Psychology was not yet free, that the
so-called degree of conviction consists in a degree of intensity
52
NOTES
of the judgment which can be brought into analogy with the
intensity of pleasure and pain. Had Windelband charged
me with this error I would have acknowledged the complete
justice of the charge. Instead of this he finds fault with me
because I recognize intensity with regard to the judgment, only
in a sense analogous, and not identical to that in the case of feeling,
and because I assert the impossibility of comparing in respect
of magnitude, the supposed intensity of the belief and the real
intensity of feeling. Here we have one of the results of his
improved theory of judgment !
If the degree of conviction of my belief that 2+1=3 were
one of intensity how powerful would this be ! And if the said
belief were to be identified, as by Windelband (p. 186), with
feeling, not merely regarded as analogous to feeling, how de
structive to our nervous system would the violence of such a
shock to the feelings prove ! Every physician would be com
pelled to warn the public against the study of mathematics
as calculated to destroy health. (Of. with regard to this so-
called degree of conviction the view of Henry Newman in his
interesting work : An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent —
a work scarcely noticed in Germany.)
4. When Windelband (p. 183) wonders how I can regard the
word " is " in such propositions as " God is," " A man is "
(ein Mensch ist), " A lack is " (ein Mangel ist), " A possibility
is," "A truth is," (i.e. There is a truth), etc., as having the same
meaning and finds it extraordinary (184, note 1) in the author
of Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles
that he should fail to recognize the manifold significance of "to
be," I can only reply that he who in this view does not perceive
the simple consequence of my theory of the judgment can hardly
have understood this doctrine. With regard to Aristotle it
never occurs to him, while dividing the " ov " in the sense of
reality into various categories, and into an " bv evepyela
and ov Svvdpet, ", to do the same with the " ea-nv "
transforming what is the expression of an idea into that
of a judgment and the " bv to? aX^/^e? " as he calls it.
This could only be done by those who, like Herbart and many
others after him, did not know how to hold apart the notion
53
NOTES
of being in the sense of absolute position and being in the sense
of reality (cf. the following note).
5. I have just said that there exist simple and compound
judgments, and that many a compound judgment is not, without
a residue, resolvable into simple judgments. Special attention
must be paid to this in seeking to convert judgments otherwise
expressed into the existential form. It is self-evident that only
simple judgments, i.e. such as are, strictly speaking, without
parts, are so convertible. I may therefore be excused for not
thinking it necessary to emphasize this expressly in my Psycho
logy. If this restriction hold good universally it is, of course,
valid also of the categorical form. In the propositions categorical
in form, which the formal logicians have denoted by the signs
A.E.I, and 0. they wish to express strictly simple judgments.
These are therefore one and all convertible into the existential
form (cf. my Psychology, vol. i. p. 283). The same, however,
will not hold good when propositions categorical in form contain
in consequence of an ambiguity of expression (cf. p. 120, note
to Appendix) a plurality of judgments. In such a case the exis
tential form may certainly be the expression of a simple judgment
equivalent to the compound one, but cannot be the expression
of the judgment itself.
This is a point which Windelband ought to have considered
in examining (p. 184) the proposition : " The rose is a flower "
with respect to its convertibility into an existential proposition.
He is quite right in protesting against its conversion into the
proposition : " There is no rose which is not a flower," but he
is not equally right in ascribing this conversion to me. Neither
in the passage cited by him nor elsewhere have I made such a
conversion, and I consider it just as false as that attempted by
Windelband and all such as may be attempted by anybody else.
The judgment here expressed in the proposition is made up of
two judgments of which one is the recognition of the subject
(whether it be that thereby is meant " rose " in the ordinary
sense, or "what is called rose," "what is understood by rose"),
and this, as we have just said, is not always the case where a
proposition is given of the form : All A is B.
Unfortunately Land also has overlooked this, the only one
54
NOTES
among my critics who has succeeded in comprehending, in their
necessary connection with the principle, what Windelband has
termed the " mysterious " hints which I have thrown out towards
the reform of elementary logic, and in deducing them correctly
from it. (Of. Land, " On a supposed improvement in Formal
Logic " in the papers of the Kgl. Niederlcindischen Akademie der
Wissenschajten, 1876.)
I conclude with a curiosity recently furnished by Steinthal
in his Zeitschrift fiir Volkerpsychologie (chap, xviii. p. 175). I
there read with astonishment : " Brentano's confusion in com
pletely severing judgments from idea and thoughts (!) and
grouping the judgments as acts of recognition or rejection, with
love and hate (!!) is instantly removed if such (?) a judgment,
as an aesthetic judgment is termed " Beurteilen " (!). Probably
Steinthal has never once glanced into my Psychology, and has
only read Windelband's statement concerning it ; this, however,
so hastily that I hope he will not be ungrateful at my sending
his lines to Windelband for correction.
23 (p. 14). Miklosich, Subjectlose Scttze, second edition,
Vienna, 1883.
In order to make the reader familiar with the contents of this
valuable little book a notice written at the time for the Vienna
Evening Post may prove useful. Through an oversight it was
printed as a feuilleton in the Vienna newspaper. As no one
certainly would look for it there, I will include it here by way
of an appendix. Meantime, Sigwart's monograph, The Imper-
sonalia has appeared, in which he opposes Miklosich. Marty
has submitted this, as well as (shortly before) the corresponding
section in Sigwart's Logic to a telling criticism in the Vierteljahrs-
schrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophic, with regard to which
criticism Sigwart, though without any reasonable ground, has
shown himself highly indignant. " II se fache," the French
say, "done il a tort." That Sigwart's theory in its essential
points has not succeeded, even Steinthal really allows, though
in his Zeitschrift (chap, xviii. p. 172 seq.) he burns thick clouds
of incense to the writer of the monograph, and even in his preface
to the fourth edition of his Origin of Language applauds a form
55
NOTES
of conduct which every true friend of that deserving man
(Sigwart) must regret. After the high praise awarded to him
at the outset, one feels somewhat disappointed finally by the
criticism. Steinthal rejects (pp. 177-180) Sigwart's theory on
its grammatical side. There would only remain therefore as
realfy successful Sigwart's psychological theory. But the psy
chological portion is not that concerning which SteinthaPs
estimate is authoritative ; for in that case, one would be bound
to take seriously the following remark : "In the proposition :
" Da btickt sich's hinunter mit liebendem Blick " (a line from
Schiller's Diver], it is obvious that everybody must think
of the king's daughter, but it is not she which stands before [me
but a subjectless " sich hinunter-biicken," and now I have all
the more fellow-feeling for her. According to my (SteinthaPs)
psychology, I should say the idea of the king's daughter " fluc
tuates " (schwingt) but does not enter into consciousness."
This calls for something more than the old saying : Sapienti sat.
I
The psychological theory of Sigwart shows itself in all its
weakness when he seeks to give an account of the notion of
" existence" It has been already recognized by Aristotle, that
this notion is gained by reflection upon the affirmative judgment.
But Sigwart, like most modern logicians, neglects to make use
of this hint. Instead of saying that to the existent belongs
everything of which the affirmative judgment is true, he becomes
repeatedly, and once more in the second edition of his logic
(pp. 88-95) involved in diffuse discussions upon the notion of
being and upon existential propositions, which cannot in any
way conduce to clearness, seeing that they mo vein false directions.
" To be," according to Sigwart, expresses a relation (pp. 88, 95) ;
if it be asked : What kind of a relation ? the answer would, at
first sight (92), appear to be, a relation to me as thinking. But
no ; the existential proposition asserts just this : " that
the existing also exists, apart from its relation to me and to
another thinking being." It cannot, therefore, be " a relation
to me as thinking." But what other relation can be meant ?
Not until p. 94 is this brought out more clearly. The relation
56
NOTES
ought to mean (of course lie adds "zunachst " , provisionally)
the agreement (" identity " ib.) of the thing represented with
a possible impression (" einem Wahrnehmbaren " ib. " something
which may be perceived by me," ib. p. 90).
Now it will be immediately recognized that this notion of
existence is too narrow ; for it might very well be asserted that
much exists which it is not possible to perceive, e.g. a past and
a future, an empty space, and any sort of deficiency, a possibility
or impossibility, etc., etc. It is therefore not surprising that
Sigwart himself seeks to widen the notion. But he does this
in a manner which I find it difficult to understand. At first
sight he appears to say in order that something may exist it is
not necessary that it can be perceived by me ; it is enough if
it can be perceived by anybody. Or what else can be meant
when Sigwart, after what has just been said, that existence was
the agreement of the thing represented with a possible impression,
thus continues : " That which exists stands not merely in this
relation to me but to all other existing beings ? " It cannot
surely mean that Sigwart is inclined to ascribe to every existing
being the capacity to receive every impression. It may be he
only wishes to say that everything which exists stands to every
other existing being in the relation of existence, and then it
might be concluded from what immediately follows that this
rather meaningless definition is intended to express that existence
is the capacity to act or to be acted upon. (" What exists . . .
stands in causal relations to the rest of the world " ; similar also
is p. 91, note : the existent is something which " can exercise
effects upon me and others.") Finally, however, there is some
ground for thinking Sigwart would say : what exists is that
which can be perceived or can be inferred as perceivable, for
he adds : " hence (on account of this causal relation) from
what is perceivable also an existence which is merely inferred
may be asserted."
That all this is equally to be rejected it is not difficult to re
cognize.
For (1) To " infer " the existence of something does not mean
so much as "to infer that it is capable of being perceived."
If, for example, the existence of atoms and of empty spaces
57
NOTES
could be assured by inference, we should still be very far from
proving their perceptibility either to ourselves or to some other
being. If any one were to conclude the existence of God while
giving up the attempt " to give vividness" to the thought by anthro
pomorphic means, he would not on this account believe that
God must be perceptible to one of his creatures or even that he
is the object of his own perception.
2. From this point of view it would be absurd for any one to
say : I am convinced that there is much the existence of which
can neither be perceived at any time or even inferred by any
body." For that would mean : " I am convinced that much
can be perceived or can be inferred to be capable of perception
which yet can never be perceived or inferred." Who does not
recognize here how far Sigwart has strayed from the true notion
of existence !
3. Should Sigwart wish in this passage to widen the notion
of existence to such a degree as to think that existence is that
which can either be perceived or inferred from some perceivable
object, or again, stands in some sort of causal relation to what
is perceivable, it might be replied — if indeed such a monstrous
notion of existence still require refutation — that even this notion
is still too narrow. If, for example, I say : It may be that an
empty space exists but this can never with certainty be known
by any one, I thereby confess that existence may perhaps belong
to empty space ; but I deny most definitely that it is perceptible,
or that it is to be inferred from that which is perceptible. In
regard to relations of cause and effect on the other hand, it is of
course impossible that empty space (which is certainly no thing)
can stand in such a relation to anything perceivable. We should
thus once again arrive at an absurd meaning in interpretation
of an assertion in no way absurd.
How wrongly Sigwart has analysed the notion of existence
is also proved very simply by means of the following proposition :
A real centaur does not exist ; a centaur in idea, however, cer
tainly exists, and that as often as I imagine it. Whoever does
not clearly recognize here the distinction of the ov w? aX^fle?
i.e. in the sense of existing, from ov in the sense of real (wesen-
haft) will I fear hardly be brought to recognize it by the fullest
58
NOTES
illustrations which might be furnished by further examples.
We may, however, also consider briefly the following point :
According to Sigwart, the knowledge of the existence of anything
consists in the knowledge of the agreement of something repre
sented in idea with, let us say, x, since I do not clearly understand
with what. What now is necessary in order to recognize the
agreement of something with something else ? Manifestly,
the knowledge of everything which is required in order that this
agreement should really exist. But this requires (1) that the
one element exist, (2) that the other element exist, and (3) that
between them there exist the relation of identity since what does
not exist can be neither like something nor different from it.
But the knowledge of the first element constitutes already in
itself a knowledge of existence. Hence the knowledge of the
two remaining elements is no longer necessary to the recognition
of any existence, and Sigwart's theory leads to a contradiction.
(Of. with what has been said here, Sigwart's polemic against my
Psychology, book ii. chap. vii. in his work ; The Impersonated,
p. 50 seq., and Logic, vol. i. second edition, p. 89 seq. note, as
well as Marty's polemic against Sigwart in the articles : " Tiber
Subjectlose Satze " in the Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche
Philosophic, viii. i. seq.*
II.
As Sigwart has failed to grasp the nature of judgment in general
he is not, of course, able to understand that of the negative judg
ment in particular. He has gone so far in error as to deny to
it an equal right as species along with the positive judgment ;
* I had already written my Critique of Sigwart's notion of existence when
I became aware of a note in his Logic, second ed. p. 390, a passage which,
while it has not made it necessary to alter anything which I had written,
has led me to insert it for the purpose of comparison. " Das Seiende iiber-
haupt," Sigwart writes, " kann nicht als wahrer Gattungstaegriff zu dem
einzelnen Seienden betrachtet werden ; es ist, begrifflich betrachtet, nur
ein gemeinschaftlicher Name. Denn, da ' Sein ' fur uns ein Relations-
pradikat ist, kann es kein gemeinschaftliches Merkmal sein, es miisste denn
gezeigt werden, dass dieses Priidikat in einer dem Begriffe alles Seienden
gemeinsamen Bestimmung wurzle." I fear that the reader will, just as
little as myself, attain by this explanation to clearness concerning Sigwart's
notion of existence. He will perhaps the better understand why all my
efforts regarding it have proved futile.
59
NOTES
no negative judgment is, he thinks, a direct judgment, its object
is rather always another actual judgment or the attempt to form
such a judgment.
In this assertion Sigwart is opposed to some important psy
chological views which I have made good in my lecture. It
would therefore seem fitting to resist his attack. For this
purpose I shall show: (1) that Sigwart's doctrine is badly founded ;
(2) that it leads to an irremediable confusion, as in that case
Sigwart's affirmative judgment is a negative judgment, while
his negative judgment if indeed a judgment at all, and not rather
the absence of one, is a positive judgment, and that moreover
his positive judgment really involves a negative one, along with
other similar confusions. (3) Finally I think it will be possible
— thanks to Sigwart's detailed explanations — to show the genesis
of his error.
1. The first inquiry in the case of an assertion so novel and
so widely diverging from the general view, will be as to its foun
dation. With regard to this, he insists above all (p. 150) that
the negative judgment would have no meaning if the thought
of the positive attribution of a predicate had not preceded.
But what can this mean ? Either there is here a clear petitio
principii, or it cannot mean anything more than that a connection
of ideas must have preceded. Now granting this for a moment
(although I have in my Psychology shown its falsity) this would
by no means prove his proposition, since Sigwart himself recog
nizes (p. 89 note, and elsewhere) that such a " subjective con
nexion of ideas " would still not be a judgment ; that there
needs rather to be added to it a certain feeling of constraint.
An argument follows later (p. 151) the logical connexion of
which I understand just as little. It is rightly observed that
in and for itself we have the right to deny of anything an infinite
number of predicates, and it is with equal right added that in
spite of this, we do not really pass all these negative judgments.
And now what conclusion is drawn from these premisses ?
Perhaps this, that the fact that a certain negative judgment
s warranted is not sufficient in itself to explain the entrance
the judgment. This we may without hesitation admit. But
igwart concludes quite otherwise; he permits himself to assert,
60
NOTES
it follows from this that the further condition which is here
lacking is that the corresponding positive affirmation has not
yet been attempted. This is indeed a bold leap, and one which
my logic at least is not able to follow. And why, if one were
to inquire further, are not all the positive judgments here con
cerned really attempted ? The most probable answer, judging
by the examples given by Sigwart (this stone reads, writes,
sings, composes ; justice is blue, green, heptagonal, rotating),
is, that this has not been done because the negative judgment
has already been made with evident certainty ; for this would
best explain why there is no " danger of any one attributing
these predicates to the stone or to justice." If, however, any one
prefer to answer that " the narrowness of consciousness " makes
it impossible to attempt at the same time an infinite number
of positive judgments, I am content with this expedient also,
only it must then be asked if this appeal ought not to have been
made directly and earlier, since Sigwart himself calls the possible
negative judgments an " immeasurable quantity."
It is also a curious error (Marty has already called attention
to it), when Sigwart asserts that in contradistinction to what
holds good of the negative judgment " every subject admits only
of a limited number of predicates being affirmed." But why ?
Can we not, for example, say a whole hour is greater than half
an hour, greater than a third, greater than a fourth and so on
ad infin. ? . . . If then, notwithstanding, I do not really make
all these judgments, there are evidently good reasons for this ;
above all that the " narrowness of consciousness " forbids it.
But then this might also be applied most successfully in regard
to negative judgments.
Somewhat later we meet a third argument which, as I have
already by anticipation refuted it in my Psychology (book ii. chap.
7, section v.), will be treated quite shortly here. If the negative
judgment were a direct one, co-ordinated with the affirmative
judgment as species then, thinks Sigwart (p. 155 seq.), whoever
in an affirmative categorical proposition regards the affirmation
of the subject as involved must, to be consistent, regard the
denial of the subject as involved in the negative proposition,
which is not the case. The latter observation is correct, the
61
NOTES
former assertion, however, quite untenable, as it involves in
itself a contradiction. For exactly because the existence of
each part in a whole is involved in the existence of the whole,
the whole no longer exists if but one of its parts is missing.
It only remains now to consider a point of language by which
Sigwart believes himself able to support his view. A testimony
for it is, he thinks, to be found in the fact that the symbol for
the negative judgment is formed in every case by means of a
combination with the symbol of affirmation, the word " not "
being added to the copula. In order to judge what is here
actually the fact, we will glance for a moment at the sphere of
feeling. Sigwart agrees, I think, with me and everybody else
that pleasing and displeasing, rejoicing and sorrowing, loving
and hating, etc., are co-ordinate with each other. Yet a complete
series of expressions denoting a disinclination of feeling are
found in dependence upon the expression for the corresponding
inclination. For example, inclination, disinclination ; pleasure,
displeasure ; ease, disease ; Wille, Widerwille ; froh, unfroh ;
happy, unhappy ; beautiful, unbeautiful ; pleasant, un
pleasant ; — even " ungut " is used. The explanation of this
is, I believe, not difficult for the psychologist, notwithstanding
the equally primordial character of these opposite modes of
feeling. Ought then the explanation of the phenomenon lying
before us in the expression of the negative judgment, closely
related as it is to the before mentioned phenomenon, to be really
so very difficult, even assuming the primordial character ?
As a matter of fact the case must be very bad when thinkers
like Sigwart in making statements so important in principle,
and at the same time so unusual, have to resort to arguments
so weak.
2. The grounds on which Sigwart's doctrine concerning the
negative judgment rest have, therefore, each and all proved
untenable. This must be so ; for how could the truth of any
doctrine be shown which would plunge everything into the
greatest confusion ?
Sigwart finds himself compelled to distinguish between the
positive and the affirmative judgment, and the affirmative
judgment— one hears and wonders at the new terminology—
62
NOTES
is according to him, closely examined, a negative judgment.
On page 150 he says literally : " The primordial judgment can
certainly not be termed the affirmative judgment, but is better
described as the positive judgment, for only in opposition to
the negative judgment, and in so far as it rejects the possibility
of a negation, is the simple statement A is B an affirmation,"
and so on. Inasmuch as it " rejects." What else can that
mean than " so far as it denies " ? As a matter of fact only
those negations can, according to this new and extraordinary
use of language, be called affirmations ! Yet this would really
mean, and particularly when it is said that the proposition A is
B is often such a negation (cf. the expressions just quoted), that
the use of language would be reduced to a confusion quite unne
cessary and altogether unendurable.
Not only is the affirmation—- as set forth — according to Sigwart
really a negation but also, paradoxical as it may seem, the nega
tion, on close consideration, proves to be a positive judgment.
It is true, Sigwart protests against those who, like Hobbes, would
regard all negatives as affirmative judgments with negative
predicates. But, following Sigwart, if this is not so, then these
must be affirmative judgments with affirmative predicates,
since he teaches that the subject is in every case a judgment,
the predicate being the notion of invalidity. On p. 160 he says
in the note the negation does away with a supposition, denies
the validity, and this expression, considered in itself, might be
taken to mean that Sigwart assumes here a special function of
denial (absprechen) the contrary of that of affirmation (zu-
sprechen). But no ; a negative copula (cf. p. 153) according
to him there is not.
Now what in the world is one to understand by " denial "
(absprechen) ? Does it mean the simple suppression (Aufho-
renlassen) of the positive judgment upon the given subject matter,
that is, according to Sigwart, the falling away of the feeling of
compulsion previously given in a connexion between ideas ?
This is impossible, since the removal of this would bring about
a condition in which the connexion of ideas remains, without
being either affirmed or denied. How often does something
of which we were previously certain become uncertain without
63
NOTES
our on this account denying it. What then is this denying ?
May we perhaps say that according to Sigwart it is a feeling
oneself compelled (sich-gendtigt-fiihlen) to annul, whereas affirm
ing is a feeling oneself compelled to posit? We should then
ha veto say that all the while we are passing a negative judgment,
we are in reality always seeking to pass a positive judgment,
but that we experience a hindrance in so doing. The same
consciousness, however, is felt by one who is clearly aware of
the entire absence of a positive ground. For how can any one
succeed in believing anything which he at the same time holds
to be entirely ungrounded ? Of no one, especially if Sigwart's
definition of the judgment be applied as the standard, is this
conceivable ; that is to say, every one in such a case will expe
rience failure in such an attempt. Accordingly there is, as yet,
no negative judgment. If then the rejection does not signify
a negative copula it must manifestly be regarded as an instance
of the affirmation of the predicate " false," or (to use Sigwart's
term) as its " identification " with the judgment which in this
case should be the subject. This " false " also cannot simply
mean " untrue," for I can assert " untrue " of thousands of
things with regard to which the predicate " false," which appears
in certain judgments, would not be in place. If only judgments
are true, then of everything which is not a judgment the predicate
" untrue " must be affirmed, though certainly not on that ac
count the predicate "false." "False" must therefore be
regarded as a positive predicate ; and so from Sigwart's point
of view absolutely false in principle, certain as it is that the
merely not being convinced (nicht-iiberzeugt-sein) is no denial,
it is equally certain that we have actually no choice ; we should
be compelled to regard every negative judgment as a positive
judgment with a positive predicate. So we arrive at a second
and greater paradox.
But here a third factor enters which completes the confusion,
.f we examine Sigwart's view as to the nature of judgment in
general, it may be shown in the clearest manner possible that
the simple positive judgment itself involves in turn, a negative
judgment. That is to say, following Sigwart, every judgment
involves besides a certain combination of ideas, a consciousness
64
NOTES
of the necessity of our " identification " (unseres Einssetzens)
and the impossibility of its contradictory (cf. espec. p. 102),
the consciousness, moreover, of such a necessity and impossibility
valid for all thinking beings (cf. pp. 102 and 107), which, by the
way, is of course quite as false as Sigwart's whole view of the
nature of j udgment in general. All j udgments without exception
are, on account of this peculiarity, called by Sigwart apodictic ;
nor will he admit the validity of any distinction between the
assertorical and apodictic forms of judgment (cf. p. 229 seq.).
I now ask : Have we not here a negative judgment distinctly
involved ? Otherwise what meaning can be given to the state
ment when we hear Sigwart speak of a " consciousness of the
impossibility of the contradictory." Further I have already
shown in my Psychology how all universal judgments are nega
tive, since to be conscious of universality means nothing else
than to be convinced that there exists no exception ; if this
negative be not added, the most extensive list of positive asser
tions will never constitute a belief in universality. When
therefore, a consciousness that every one must so think is here
spoken of, there is in this fact a further proof of what I have
asserted, namely that according to Sigwart's doctrine of judg
ment the simplest positive acts of judgment must involve a
negative act of judgment. And yet we are called upon at the
same time to believe that the negative judgment, as set forth
(p. 159 seq.), arose relatively late, and that therefore on this, as
well as on other grounds, it is unworthy of being placed side by
side, with the positive judgment as a species equally primordial !
Sigwart would surely not have expected this of us had he been
conscious of all that I have here set forth in detail, and which is
the more clearly seen to be involved in his exposition, often so
difficult to comprehend the more carefully it is submitted to
reflection. Of course expressions may be found where Sigwart,
respecting this or that point of detail, asserts the contrary of
what is here deduced ; for what else can be expected where
everything is left in such ambiguity, and where the attempt
to make things clear exhibits the most manifold contradictions ?
3. Finally, we have still to show the genesis of the error in
which this able logician has involved himself in a relatively
65 F
NOTES
simple question after having once mistaken the nature of the
judgment. The proton pseudos is to be sought in a delusion
which has come down to us from the older logic that to the essence
of the judgment there belongs the relation of two ideas with one
another. Aristotle has described this relation as combination
and separation (<rvv6ea-t? KOI Siaipeats) although he was
well aware of the imperfect propriety of the expressions, adding
at the same time that in a certain sense both relations might
be described as a combination ((rvvQeffis, cf. de Anima, iii.
6). Scholastic and modern logic held fast to the expres
sions " combination " and " separation " ; in grammar, however,
both these relations were termed " combination," and the symbol
for this combination the " copula." Sigwart now takes seriously
the expressions " combination " and " separation," and so a
negative copula seems to him a contradiction (cf. p. 153), the
positive judgment, on the other hand, appears to be a pre
supposition of the negative judgment, since, before a combination
has been set up, it cannot be separated. And so it appears to
him that a negative judgment without a preceding positive
judgment is quite meaningless (cf. p. 150 and above). Conse
quently we find this celebrated inquirer in a position which
compels him to put forth the most strenuous efforts all to no
purpose — the negative judgment remains inexplicable.
In a note (p. 159) he gives us, as a result of such attempts, a
remarkable description of the process by which we arrive at the
negative judgment — a result in which he believes himself finally
able to rest satisfied. In this account the false steps which he
successively makes become, each in turn, evident to the attentive
observer. Long before the point is reached where he believes
himself to have come upon the negative judgment, he has as a
matter of fact already anticipated it.
He sets out with the correct observation that the first judg
ments which we make are all positive in character. These
judgments are evident and made with full confidence. "Now,
however," he continues, " our thought goes out beyond the
given ; by the aid of recollections and associations, judgments
arise which are at first also formed in the belief that they express
reality " (which means, according to other expressions of Sigwart,
66
NOTES
that the ideas are combined with the consciousness of objective
validity ; for this (xiv. p. 98) belongs to the essence of the
judgment) " as, for example, when we expect to find something
with which we are acquainted in its usual place or pre-suppose
respecting a flower that it smells. Now, however, a part of what
is thus supposed contradicts our immediate knowledge." (We
leave Sigwart to show here how we are able to recognize anything
as " contradictory " when we are not as yet in possession of
negative judgments and negative notions. The difficulty
becomes still more sharply apparent as he proceeds : ) " when
we do not find what we expected, we become conscious of the
difference between what exists merely in idea and what is real."
(What does " not find " mean here ? I had not found it pre
viously ; obviously I now find that what was erroneously sup
posed to be associated with another object is without it, and this
I can only do by recognizing the one and denying the other,
i.e. recognize it as not being with it. Further what is meant
here by " difference " ? To recognize difference means to recog
nize that of two things the one is not the other. What is meant
by existing " merely in idea " ? Manifestly, " what exists in
idea which is not at the same time also real." It would seem,
however, that Sigwart is still unaware that in what he is describing
the negative function of the judgment is already more than once
involved. He continues :) " That of which we are immediately
certain is another than that " (i.e. it is not the same, it is indeed
absolutely incompatible with that) " which we have judged in
anticipation, and now " (i.e. after and since we have already
passed all these negative judgments) "appears the negation which
annuls the supposition and denies of it validity. And here a
new attitude is involved in so far as the subjective combination is
separated from the consciousness of certainty. The subjective
combination is compared with one bearing the stamp of certainty,
its distinction therefrom recognized, and out of this arises the
notion of invalidity." This last would almost seem to be a
carelessness of expression, for if invalid were to mean as much
as " false " and not " uncertain " it could not be derived from
the distinction between a combination with and a combination
without certainty, but only from the opposition existing between
67
NOTES
a combination which is denied and one which is affirmed. As
a matter of fact, the opposite affirmative judgment is not
at all necessary to it. The opposition, the incompatibility
of the qualities in a real, is already evident on the ground of
the combination of ideas representing the opposite qualities
which, as I repeat once more, cannot, according to Sigwart
himself (p. 89 note ; and p. 98 seq.), be called an attempt at
positive judgment. Although this may now and again happen
in the case of contradictory ideas, it certainly does not happen
always. If, for example, the question is put to me : Does there
exist a regular chiliagon with 1001 sides ? then— assuming that
I am not perfectly clear in my own mind, as will be the case with
most men, that there does exist a regular chiliagon, I certainly
do not attempt to form a judgment (i.e. according to Sigwart,
confidently assume) that there exists a regular chiliagon having
1001 sides before forming the negative judgment that no such
figure exists on the ground of the opposition between the
qualities.
Sigwart himself, as his language frequently betrays (cf. e.g.
pp. 152 and 150) recognizes at bottom, as he is bound to recog
nize, in spite of his attack upon the negative copula, that nega
tion and denial are just as much a special function of the judg
ment as affirmation and recognition. If this be granted, then
the range of their application is by no means so limited as he
erroneously asserts. It is false that in every case where a
denial takes place the predicate denied is the notion " valid."
Even of a judgment we may deny now its validity, now its
certainty, now its a priori character. And just in the same way
the subject of the judgment can change most frequently. Of
a judgment we may deny certainty, and validity ; of a request,
modesty ; and so in every case, universally expressed, we may
deny B of A. Sigwart himself, of course, does this just like
any one else. Indeed he sometimes speaks unintentionally
far more correctly than his theory would admit, and witnesses,
as it were, instinctively to the truth ; as, e.g. p. 151, where he
declares not— as he elsewhere teaches— that the subject of a
negative proposition is always a judgment, and its predicate
the term " valid," but " that of every subject ... a countless
68
NOTES
number of predicates may be denied." This is certainly true and
just on this account the old doctrine holds that affirmation and
denial are equally primordial species.
24 (p. 15). The discovery that every act of love is a " pleas
ing," every act of hate a " displeasing," was very near to Des
cartes when he wrote his valuable little work on The Affections.
In the second book, Des Passions, ii. art. 139, he says : " Lorsque
les choses qu'elles (1'amour et la haine) nous portent a aimer
sont veritablement bonnes, et celles qu'elles nous portent a hair,
sont veritablement mauvaises, 1'amour est incomparablement
meilleure que la haine ; elle ne saurait etre trop grande et elle
ne manque jamais de produire la joie " ; and this agrees with
what he says a little later : "La haine, au contraire ne saurait
etre si petite qu'elle ne nuise, et elle n'est jamais sans tristesse."
In ordinary life, however, the expressions " joy " and " sad
ness," " pleasure " and " pain " are only used when the pleasure
and displeasure have attained a certain degree of liveliness. A
sharp boundary in this unscientific division there is not ; we
may, however, be allowed to make use of it as it stands. It is
enough that the expressions, " pleasure " and " displeasure "
are not narrowed down by any such limit.
25 (p. 16). The expressions " true " and " false " are em
ployed in a manifold sense ; in one sense we employ them in
speaking of true and false judgments ; again (somewhat modify
ing the meaning), of objects, as when we say, " a true friend,"
"' false money." I need scarcely observe that where I use the
expressions " true " and " false " in this lecture, I associate
therewith not the first and proper meaning, but rather a meta
phorical one having reference to objects. True, is, therefore,
what is ; false, what is not. Just as Aristotle spoke of " ov &>?
a\rj6es " so we might also say, " d\r)0e<; o>? 6V."
Of truth in its proper sense it has often been said that it is
the agreement of the judgment with the object (adequatio rei
et intellectus, as the scholastics said). This expression, true in
a certain sense, is yet in the highest degree open to misunder
standing, and has led to serious errors. The agreement is re
garded as a kind of identity between something contained in
the judgment, or in the idea lying at the root of the judgment
69
NOTES
and something situated without the mind. But this cannot be
the meaning here ; "to agree " means here rather as much
as " to be appropriate," " to be in harmony with," " suit,"
"correspond." It is as though in the sphere of feeling one
should say, the Tightness of love and hate consists in the agree
ment of the feelings with the object. Properly understood this
also would be unquestionably right ; whoever loves and hates
rightly, has his feelings adequately related to the object, i.e.
the relation is appropriate, suitable, corresponds suitably,
whereas it would be manifestly absurd were one to believe that
in a rightly directed love or hate there was found to be an iden
tity between these feelings or the ideas lying at their root on the
one hand, and something lying outside the feelings on the other,
an identity which is absent where the attitude of the feelings
is unrightly directed. Among other circumstances this mis
understanding has also conduced towards bringing the doctrine
of judgment into that sad confusion from which to-day psy
chology and logic seek with such painful efforts to set themselves
free.
The conceptions of existence and non-existence are the cor
relates of the conceptions of the truth of the (simple) affirmative
and negative judgments. Just as to judgment belongs what is
judged, to the affirmative judgment what is judged of affirma
tively, to the negative judgment, what is judged of negatively,
so to the Tightness of the affirmative judgment belongs the exist
ence of what is judged of affirmatively, to the Tightness of the
negative judgment the non-existence of what is judged of nega
tively ; and whether I say an affirmative judgment is true, or,
its object is existent ; whether I say a negative judgment is
true, or its object is non-existent ; in both cases I am saying
one and the same thing. In the same way, it is essentially one
and the same logical principle whether I say, in each case either
the (simple) affirmative or negative judgment is true, or, each
is either existent or non-existent.
^ Thus, for example, the assertion of the truth of the judgment,
"a man is learned," is the correlate of the assertion of the
existence of the object, " a learned man " ; and the assertion
of the truth of the judgment, " no stone is alive," is the correlate
70
NOTES
of the assertion of the non-existence of its object, " a living stone."
The correlative assertions are here, as everywhere, inseparable.
The case is exactly the same as in the assertions A > B and that
B < A ; that A is the cause of B, and that B is produced by A.
26 (p. 16). The notion of the good, in and for itself, is
accordingly a unity in the strict sense, and not, as Aristotle
teaches (in consequence of a confusion which we shall have to
speak of later) a unity in a merely analogous sense. German
philosophers also have failed to grasp the unity of the concep
tion. This is the case with Kant, and, quite recently, with
Windelband. There is a defect in our ordinary way of speaking
which may prove very misleading to Germans inasmuch as for
the opposite of the term " good " there is no common expression
current, but this is designated now as " schlimm," now as " libel,
now as " bose," now as " arg," now as " abscheulich," now as
" schlecht," etc. It might very well, as in similar cases, come
to be thought that not only the common name is wanting, but
also the common notion. And if the notion is wanting on the
one side of the antithesis, it would also be wanting on the other,
and so the expression " good " would seem an equivocal term.
Of all the expressions quoted, it seems to me (and philologists
also, whose advice I have asked, are of the same opinion), that
the expression " schlecht," like the Latin " malum," is most
applicable as the opposite of the good in its full universality,
and in this way I shall allow myself to use this expression in
what follows.
The fact that I adhere to the view of a certain common char
acter regarding the intentional relation of love and hate does
not debar my recognizing along with this view, special forms
for particular cases. If, therefore, " bad " is a truly universal
simple class conception, there may yet be distinguished special
classes within its domain of which one may be suitably termed
" bose," another " libel," etc.
27 (p. 18). The distinction between " self-evident " and
" blind " judgments is something too striking to have altogether
escaped notice. Even the sceptical Hume is very far from
denying the distinction. Self -evidence, according to him (Enq.
71
NOTES
concerning Hum, Underst. iv.) may be ascribed, on the one hand,
to analytic judgments (to which class belong also the axioms of
mathematics and the mathematical demonstrations), and, on
the other hand, to certain impressions, but not to the so-called
truths of experience. Reason does not lead us here, but rather
habit, after a manner entirely irrational ; belief, in this case is
instinctive and mechanical (ib. v.).
But to observe a fact does not mean to set forth its nature
clearly and distinctly. As the nature of the judgment has,
until recent times, been almost universally misunderstood, how
could it be possible rightly to understand its self-evidence ? It
is just here that even Descartes' discernment fails him. How
very closely the phenomenon occupied him a passage in the
Meditations bears witness : " Cum hie dico me ita doctum esse
a natura (he is speaking of the so-called external impressions)
intelligo tantum spontaneo quodam impetu me ferri ad hoc
credendum non lumine aliquo naturali mihi ostendi esse verum,
quae duo multum discrepant. Nam quaecunque lumine natu
rali mihi ostenduntur (ut quod ex eo quo dubitem sequatur me
esse et similia) nullo modo dubia esse possunt quia nulla alia
facultas esse potest, cui aeque fidam ac lurnini isti, quaeque ilia
non vera esse possit docere ; sed quantum ad impetus naturales
jam saepe olim judicavi me ab illis in deteriorem partem fuisse
impulsum cum de bono eligendo ageretur, nee video cur iisdem
in ulla alia re magis fidam."— (Medit. iii.).
That Descartes did not mark the fact of self-evidence, that he
did not observe the distinction between intuition and blind
judgment certainly cannot be affirmed from the above. But,
while separating the judgment as a class from the idea, he still
leaves behind in the class of ideas the character of self-evidence
which distinguishes the judgments of intuition. It consists,
according to him, in a special mark of the perception, that is,
of the idea lying at the root of the judgment. Descartes even
goes so far as actually to call this act of perception a " cogno-
scere," a " knowing." A " knowing," that is, and still not an
act of judgment ! These are rudimentary organs which after
the progress made, owing to Descartes, in' the doctrine of judg
ment, remind us of a stage of life in Psychology which has been
72
NOTES
surmounted ; but with this distinction, in opposition to similar
phenomena in the history of the development of the species,
that these organs, in no way adapted, become in the highest
degree troublesome, and render all Descartes' further efforts
for the theory of knowledge ineffective. He remains, to use
Leibnitz' phrase, " in the antechamber of truth " (cf. here note
28, towards the end). Only in this way does Descartes' clara
et distincta perceptio— concerning which term itself it is so diffi
cult to gain a clear and distinct idea— in its curious dual nature
become perfectly intelligible. The only means of overcoming
this confusion is to seek that which distinguishes insight in oppo
sition to other judgments as an inner quality belonging to the
act of insight itself.
It is true that some who have sought here have yet failed to
find. We saw (cf. note 23) how Sigwart conceives the nature
of the judgment. To this, he teaches, there belongs a relation
of ideas to one another, and along with this a feeling of obliga
tion respecting this connexion. (Cf. sections 14 and 31, espec. 4
and 5.) Such a feeling therefore, always exists even in the case
of the blindest prejudice. It is then abnormal, but is held (as
Sigwart expressly explains) to be normal and of universal
validity. And what now in contrast to this case, is given in the
case of insight ? Sigwart replies that its evidence consists in
the same feeling (cf. e.g. section 3) which now, however, is not
merely held to be normal and universally valid, but is really
normal and universally valid.
It seems to me that the weakness of this theory is at once
apparent ; and it is on many grounds to be rejected.
1. The peculiar nature of insight, the clearness and evidence
of certain judgments from which their truth is inseparable
has little or nothing to do with any feeling of compulsion. It
may well happen that at a given moment I cannot refrain from
so judging, yet none the less the essence of its clearness does
not consist in the feeling of compulsion, and no consciousness
of an obligation so to judge could, as such, afford security as
to its truth. He who disbelieves in every form of indeterminism
in respect of judging, regards all judgments under the circum
stances in which they were passed as necessary, but he does not
73
NOTES
and with indisputable right — regard all of them as on that
account true.
2. Sigwart, in seeking the consciousness of insight in a feeling
of necessity so to think, asserts that the consciousness of one's
being compelled is, at the same time, a consciousness of a neces
sity for all thinking beings whenever the same grounds are
present. If he means, however, that the one conviction is
doubtless connected with the other, this is an error. Why,
when a person feels bound to pass a judgment upon certain
data, should the same compulsion hold good in respect of every
other thinking being to whom the same data are also given ?
It is obvious that only an appeal to the law of causality which,
under like conditions demands like results, could be the ground
of the logical connexion. Its application, however, to the
present case would be entirely erroneous, since this would involve
the ignoring of the special psychical dispositions, which, although
they do not directly enter into consciousness at all, must yet
be regarded, along with the conscious data, as pre- determining
conditions, and these are very different in the case of different
persons. Hegel and his school, misled by paralogisms, have
denied the principle of contradiction ; Trendelenburg, who op
posed Hegel, has at least restricted its validity (cf. his Abhand-
lungen uber Herbarts Metaphysik). The universal impossibility
of inwardly denying the principle which Aristotle asserted
cannot therefore, to-day, be any longer defended ; Aristotle
himself, however, for whom the principle was self-evident,
assuredly found its denial impossible.
Whatever is evident to any one is of course certain not only
for him, but also for every one else who, in the same way, sees
its evidence. The judgment, moreover, which is seen to be
evident by any one has also universal validity, i.e. the contra
dictory of what is seen to be evident by one person, cannot be
seen to be evident by another person, and every one who believes
in its contradictory is in error. Further, since what is here said
belongs to the essence of truth, whoever has evidence of the
truth of anything may perceive that he is justified in regarding
it as true for all. But he would be guilty of a flagrant con
fusion of ideas who should regard such a consciousness that a
74
NOTES
truth is true for all, as equivalent to a consciousness of a universal
necessity of thinking.
3. Sigwart involves himself in a multitude of contradictions.
He asserts and must assert — if he is not to yield to the sceptics
and relinquish his entire logical system — that evident judgments
are not merely different from non-evident judgments, but that
they are also distinguishable in consciousness. The one class
must therefore appear as normal and of universal validity, the
other class as not so. But if evident and non-evident judgments
alike carry with them the consciousness of universal validity,
then the two classes would at first sight exactly agree in the
manner in which they present themselves, and only as it were,
afterwards (or at the same time, though as a mere concomitant),
and by reflection upon some sort of criterion which is applied
to them as a standard could the distinction be discovered. And
passages are actually to be found in Sigwart where he speaks
of a consciousness of agreement with the universal rules which
accompany the fully evident judgment. (Cf. e.g. Logic, 2nd ed.,
39, p. 311.) But apart from the fact that this contradicts ex
perience — for long before the discovery of the syllogism, con
clusions were reached syllogistically and with complete evidence
— it is also to be rejected inasmuch as, seeing that the rule
itself must be assured, it would lead either to an infinite regress,
or to a circulus vitiosus.
4. Another contradiction with which I have to charge Sig
wart (though in my opinion it might have been avoided even
after his erroneous view as to the nature of the judgment and
as to the nature of self-evidence), we meet with in his doctrine
of self -consciousness. The knowledge that I am contains only
self-evidence, and this exists independent of any consciousness
of an obligation so to think and of a necessity which is common
to all alike. (At least I am not able otherwise to understand
the passage, Logic, 2nd ed., p. 310 : " The certainty that I am
and think is the absolutely last and fundamental one — the con
dition of all thinking and certainty at all ; here, only immediate
evidence can be given ; one cannot even say that this thought
is necessary, since it is previous to all necessity, and just as
immediate and evident is the conscious certainty that 1 think
75
NOTES
this or that ; it is inextricably interwoven with my self-con
sciousness ; the one is given with the other.") After Sigwart's
doctrine already examined, this would appear to be a contradictio
in adjecto and, as such, quite indefensible.
5. Further contradictions appear in Sigwart's very peculiar
and doubtful doctrine concerning the postulates, which he op
poses to the axioms. The latter are to be regarded as certain
on the ground of their real intellectual necessity ; the former,
not on the ground of purely intellectual motives, but on psycho
logical motives of another kind, on the ground of practical needs.
(Logic, 2nd ed. p. 412 seq.) The law of causality : e.g. is, accord
ing to him, not an axiom, but a mere postulate ; we regard it as
certain, since we find that without affirming it we should not
be able to investigate nature. Sigwart, by this mode of accepting
the law of causality, that is, affirming, out of mere good-will,
that in nature under like conditions, the same results would
constantly be forthcoming, manifestly takes it for granted
without being conscious of its intellectual necessity. But, if all
"taking-as-true" (Fiirwahrhalten) is an act of judgment, this
is quite incompatible with his views as to the nature of the
judgment. Sigwart has here, as far as I can see, but one way
of escape, i.e. to confess that he does not believe in what, as a
postulate, he accepts as certain (as e.g. the law of causality) ;
then, however, he will be hardly serious in hoping for it.
6. This point becomes still more doubtful on reflection upon
what (2) has been previously discussed. The consciousness of
a universal necessity of thought does not, according to Sigwart,
belong to the postulates, but rather to the axioms. (Of. 5.)
But Sigwart could only with any plausibility exhibit the con
sciousness of this universal necessity of thinking as operating
in the consciousness of one's personal necessity of thinking by
making use of the universal law of causation. But this causal
law is itself merely a postulate ; it is destitute of self-evidence.
It is therefore obvious that the universal thought-necessity in
the case of the axioms is also a postulate, and consequently they
lose what, according to Sigwart, is their most essential distinc
tion from the postulates. It may perhaps be in accordance
with this that Sigwart calls the belief in the trustworthiness of
76
NOTES
" self-evidence " a postulate. But how the statement so inter
preted, can be brought into harmony with the remaining parts
of his doctrine I am at a loss to conceive.
7. Sigwart denies (31) the distinction between assertorical
and apodictic judgments, since in every judgment the sense of
necessity in respect of its function is essential. Consequently
this assertion likewise hangs together with his erroneous funda
mental view of the judgment ; he would appear to identify the
feeling which he sometimes calls the feeling of evidence with the
apodictic character of a judgment. But it would be quite un
justifiable to overlook the modal peculiarity of certain judgments,
as for example, the law of contradiction in distinction from other
forms of judgment like that of the consciousness that I am.
In the first instance, we have to do with what is "necessarily true
or false," in the second instance only with what is " true or false
as a matter of fact," though both are in the same sense evident
and do not differ in respect of their certainty. Only in the case
of judgments like the former, not, however, from such as the
latter do we draw the notions of impossibility and necessity.
That Sigwart, in opposing the view which regards the apo
dictic judgment as a special class, also occasionally bears witness
against himself is clear from what has been already said (4).
The knowledge that I am, he calls, in opposition to the know
ledge of an axiom, the knowledge of a simple actual truth (p. 312).
Here he speaks more soundly than his general statements would
really allow.
Sigwart's theory of self -evidence is, therefore, essentially false.
As in the case of Descartes, so here it cannot be said that Sigwart
was not conscious of the phenomenon ; indeed, we must rather
say in his praise, that with the greatest zeal he has sought to
analyze it, but as is the case with many in psychological analysis,
it would seem that in the eagerness of analyzing he did not stop
at the right point, and has sought to resolve into one another
phenomena very distinct in nature.
It is obvious that an error respecting the nature of evidence
is fraught with the gravest consequence for the logician. It might
well be said that we have here touched upon the deep-seated
organic disease in Sigwart's logic, if this may not rather be said
77
NOTES
to consist in a misunderstanding of the nature of the judgment
in general. Again and again its evil results become manifest,
as for example, in Sigwart's inability to understand the most
essential causes of our errors, Cf. Logic, vol. i. 2nd ed. p. 103,
note, where, with strange partiality he assigns the chief blame
to the defective development of our language.
For the rest, many another celebrated logician in recent times
can claim no superiority over Sigwart here. As a further
example we need only observe how the doctrine of evidence
fares at the hands of the admirable J. S. Mill. Cf. note 69, p. 99.
Owing to the great unclearness as to the nature of evidence,
almost universal, it becomes conceivable why, as often happens,
we meet with the expression " more or less self-evident." Even
Descartes and Pascal use such expressions, although it is clearly
quite unsuitable. Whatever is self-evident is certain, and cer
tainty in the real sense knows no distinctions of degree. Even
quite recently we find the opinion expressed in the Vierteljahrs-
schrift jiir wissenschaftliche Philosophic (and the writer is mani
festly quite serious), that there exist self-evident suppositions
which, in spite of their self-evidence, may quite well be false.
It is unnecessary to add that I hold this to be opposed to reason.
I may here, however, express regret that lectures delivered by
me at a time when I still regarded degrees of conviction as inten
sities of judgment, seem to have given an occasion for such
confusions.
28 (p. 19). Cf. Hume's Essay, already cited : An Enquiry
concerning the Principles of Morals. Other philosophers, who
have placed the foundation of ethics in the feelings, as e.g.
Beneke and Uberweg (who follows him) have seen further than
Hume here. (Cf. the presentation of Beneke's ethics in his Grund-
riss der Geschichte der Philosophic, iii.) Herbart comes still nearer
to the truth when he speaks of self-evident judgments of taste
(these, however, are really not judgments at all, but feelings,
and as such are not self-evident, but can only be said to have
something analogous to self-evident judgments) and when he
further opposes to the merely pleasurable the beautiful, ascrib
ing to the latter as distinct from the former, universal validity
78
NOTES
and undeniable worth. Unfortunately, there is always some
thing false mixed up with his view, and Herbart loses at once
and for ever the right path, so that his ethics in its course di
verges much further from the truth than the doctrine of Hume.
Those thinkers who have completely overlooked the distinc
tion between pleasure with the character of Tightness and
pleasure which is not so qualified, are in danger of falling into
opposite errors. The one class view the matter as though all
pleasure had the character of Tightness, the other class as though
no pleasure were so qualified. By the one class the notion of
the good as that which rightly pleases, is entirely given up ;
" worthy of desire " (begehrenswert) in distinction from " desir
able " (begehrbar), is an unmeaning expression. For the other
class, " worthy of desire " (begehrenswert) remains as a separate
notion, so that there is no tautology in their saying nothing is
in itself desirable except in so far as it is in itself worthy of
desire, is good in itself. Manifestly they must, to be consistent,
assert this, and this they have really taught. The extreme
hedonists all belong to this class ; but, along with them, many
others ; in the Middle Ages, for example, the teaching is found
in Thomas Aquinas, whose greatness receives fresh appreciation
from Ihering (cf. Summ. theol. l.a. qu. 80, qu. 82, art. 2 ad. 1,
etc.).
But even then such a view cannot be maintained in the light
of the facts without exposing the nature of good and bad to a
falsification which involves a form of subjectivism similar to
that formerly committed by Protagoras respecting the notions
of truth and falsehood. Just as, according to this subjectivist
in the sphere of the judgment, man is the measure of all things,
and often what is true for one, may at the same time be false
for another — so the advocates of the view that only the good
can be loved, only the bad hated, are really compelled to assume
that, in this sphere, each is himself the measure of all things ;
for the good, in that it is good ; for the bad, that it is bad ;
so that often something is, in itself and at the same time, both
good and bad : good in itself, in the case of all who love it for
its own sake ; bad in itself, in the case of all who hate it for
its own sake. This is absurd, and the subjectivistic falsification
79
NOTES
of the notion of the good is to be rejected equally with the sub-
jectivistic falsification of the notions of truth and existence by
Protagoras, but with this difference : that the subjectivistic
error in the sphere of what is rightly pleasing and displeasing
takes root more easily and infects most ethical systems even
to-day. Some, as recently, Sigwart (Vorfragen der Ethik, p. 6),
confess it openly ; others fall into this error without themselves
becoming clearly conscious of the subjectivistic character of
their view.*
* Those especially who teach that generally speaking the knowledge,
pleasure, and perfection of each individual is, for him. good, their opposites
bad, and that all else is in itself indifferent, will perhaps protest against
my classing them among the subjectivists. It might even seem on a super
ficial survey, that they have set up a doctrine of the good equally valid for
all. But on a more careful examination we tind that this teaching does not
even in a single instance, hold one and the same object to be good iini-
versally. For example, my own knowledge is, according to this view, for
me worthy of love : for every one else indifferent in itself, while the know
ledge of another individual is in itself for me indifferent It is curious to
observe theistic thinkers, as often happens, setting up a subjectivistic view
respecting the good, valid of all mortal loving and willing, while, at the
same time assuming that God. without respect of person, estimates every
perfection by a kind of objective standard. Tlu's exception with regard to
the loving and willing of God and the notion of Him as eternal Judge is then
meant to render harmless in respect of its practical consequences, the egoism
which such a principle implies.
Of the celebrated controversy between Bossuet and Fenelon it may be
said that the great bishop of Meaux advocated a kind of subjectivism.
Fene Ion's theses, though he advocated a system of morality neither ignoble
nor unchristian, were finally condemned by the Cliurch of Rome, though it
did not go so far as to reject his teaching as heretical. Otherwise one would
really be compelled to condemn also those tine glowing lines attributed by
many to St. Theresa, that in a very imperfect Latin translation have found
their way into many Catholic prayer-books which is much more than their
escaping the ecclesiastical censor. I give them translated directly from
the Spanish :—
Nicht Hoffnung auf des Hinunels sel'ge Freuden
Hat Dir, mein Gott. zum Dienste niich verbunden.
Nicht Fureht, die ich vor ew'gem Graus empfunden,
Hat rnieh bewegt der Sunder Pfad zu meiden.
Du Herr bewegst mich, mich bewegt Dem Leiden,
Dem Anblick in den letzten. baneen Stunden,
Der Geisseln \Vuth. Dein Haupt von Dora urnwunden,
Dein schweres Kreuz und— ach !— Dein bittres Scheiden.
Herr. Du betccgest mich mit solchem Triebe.
Das ich Dich liebte. «v»' kein Himmel offen.
D*ch fOrctote, urn* auch kein Abgrund schreckte ;
80
NOTES
Whoever, as I have said, has once accepted the view that
nothing can please except in so far as it is really good, nothing dis
please, except in so far as it is really bad, is on a way which, if
consistently followed, must lead him to subjectivism. This is
evident as soon as it is admitted (and at first sight, it is true,
it may be denied) that opposite tastes, here desire, there dislike,
may be associated with the same sense phenomenon. One
might, in defence, argue that here, in spite of the similarity of
the external stimulus the corresponding subjective idea may
have an essentially different content. But such a view refutes
itself in those cases where we ourselves repeatedly experience
the same phenomenon, and, in consequence of a further develop
ment in age or by reason of a changed habit (cf. text 25, p. 16)
thereby experience a different feeling, dislike for desire, or desire
for dislike. There remains, then, no doubt that as a fact the
feelings may take an opposed attitude towards the same phe
nomenon ; and again, in the case where ideas instinctively
repel us, while at the same time arousing within us a pleasure
Xichte kannst Du gebat. u-as mir Liebe wec-ktc ;
Denn tciird* ich auch nicht, in'c ich hoffe^ hoffen,
7cA wurde dennoch lieben, trie ich liebe."
The teaching of Thomas Aquinas has often been so represented as though
it were pure subjectivism. It is true that much of his teaching sounds
quite subjectivistic (cf. e.g. Summ. theol. la, q. SO, art. 1, especially the
objections and replies as well as the passages in which he declares that the ,*»
happiness of each is the highest and final end, asserting even of the saints '.i
in heaven that each rightly desires more his own blessedness than the bles
sedness of all others). Along with these* however, are to be found state
ments in which he soars above this subjectivistic view as. for example,
when he declares (as Plato and Aristotle before him and Descartes and
Leibnitz after) that everything which exists is good as such, not good
merely as a means but also — a point which pure subjectivists (as recently
Sigwart. Vorfr. d. Ethik. p. 6) expressly deny — good in itself, and again, when
he affirms that in case any one — an impossible case — had at any time to
choose between his own eternal ruin and an injxiry to the Divine love, the
right course would be to prefer his own eternal unhappiness.
There the moral feeling of western Christendom touches the feeling of
the heathen Hindu, as is shown in a somewhat^strange story of a maiden
who renounces her own everlasting blessedness for tTie salvation of the rest
of the world ; as also that of a positivist thinker like Mill when he declares
sooner than bow in prayer before a being not truly good, -'to hell he will go."
I knew, a Catholic priest who. on account of this utterance of Mill's, voted
for1 him at the parliamentary election. (ftrM»».> <4< "A **f ?£>-'* '•A)
81 G
NOTES
of a higher kind (cf. note 32, p. 92), what has been said is also
clearly evident.
Finally, we should expect from one who thinks that every
act of simple pleasure is right, and that one act never contra
dicts another, a similar doctrine in respect of the act of choosing.
But the reverse is here so obvious that the advocates of this
view have in striking contrast always asserted in the most
definite manner that different individuals have preferences
opposite in character, and that one is right, the other wrong.
Glancing back from the disciples of Aristotle in the Middle
Ages to the master himself, we find his teaching appears to be a
different one. Aristotle recognizes a right and a wrong kind
of desire (ope^i? op0rj KOI OVK opOrj) and that what is desired
(ope/rrov) is not always the good. (De Anima, iii. 10.) In
the same way he affirms in respect of pleasure (fj&ovtf) in the
Nicomachian Ethics that not every pleasure is good ; there is
a pleasure in the bad, which is itself bad (Nic. Eth. x. 2). In
his Metaphysics he distinguishes between a lower and a higher
kind of desire (einOvpla and fiovXrjo-K;) ; whatever is desired
by the higher kind for its own sake is truly good (Metaph. A
7, p. 1072 a. 28). A certain approach to the right view seems
already to have been reached here. It is of special interest
(a point I have only discovered later) that Aristotle has suggested
an analogy between ethical subjectivism and the logical sub
jectivism of Protagoras, and equally repudiates both (Metaph.
K 6, p. 1062 b. 16, and 1063 a, 5). On the other hand it would
appear from the lines immediately following as though Aris
totle had fallen into the very obvious temptation of believing
that we can know the good as good, independent of the excita
tion of the emotions. (Metaph. 29 ; cf. De Anima, iii. 9 and
10.)
In close connection with this appears to be the passage (Nic.
Eth. i. 4) where he denies that there is any uniform notion of
the good (understanding, of course, the good in itself, cf. respect
ing this, note 26, p. 77), thinking rather that only by way of
analogy does there exist a unity in the case of the good of rational
thinking and seeing, joy, etc., and when, in another passage
(Metaph, E 4, p. 1027 b. 25), he says that the true and the false
NOTES
are not in the things, where the good and the bad are, i.e. the
former predicates (e.g. true God, false friend) are ascribed to
the things only in respect of certain mental acts, the true and
false judgments, while the latter, on the other hand, are not in
a similar way ascribed to them merely in respect of a certain
class of mental activities : — all of which, incorrect as it is, is
still connected as a necessary result with the aforesaid error.
He is more in agreement with the true doctrine of the origin of
our notion and knowledge of the good, when (Nic. Ethics, x. 2)
he adduces as an argument against the assumption that joy
does not belong to the good, the fact that all desire it, and
adds : " For if only irrational beings desired it, the opposition
to this argument would still contain a certain justification ;
but if every rational being also does so, how can anything be
said against it ? " Yet even this utterance is reconcilable with
his erroneous view.
Considered in this aspect, the moralist of sentiment (Gefiihls-
moralist), Hume, has here the advantage of him, for Hume
rightly urges, how is any one to recognize that anything is to
be loved without experiencing the love ?
I have said that the temptation into which Aristotle has
fallen appears quite conceivable. It arises from the fact that,
along with the experience of an emotion qualified as right there
is given at the same time the knowledge that the object itself
is good. Thus it may easily happen that the relation is then
perverted and the love is thought to follow as a consequence
of the knowledge, and recognized as right by reason of its agree
ment with this its rule.
It is not without interest to compare the error here made
by Aristotle in respect of emotion qualified as right with that
which we have seen was committed by Descartes in respect of
the similarly qualified judgment (cf. note 27, p. 78). The cases
are essentially analogous ; in both cases the distinguishing
mark is sought in the special character of the idea which forms
the basis of the act rather than in the act itself qualified as
right. In fact it seems to me evident from various passages in
his treatise Des Passions, that Descartes himself has treated
the matter in a way quite similar to that of Aristotle, and in a
83
NOTES
manner essentially analogous to his doctrine of the self-evident
judgment.
At the present time many approach very near to Descartes'
error in respect of the marks of self-evidence (if we are not rather
to say that the error is really implicitly contained in their state
ments) when they regard the matter as though in the case of
every self-evident judgment a criterion were referred to. In
this case it must have been previously given somewhere, either
as recognized — and this would lead to infinity — or (and this is
the only alternative), it is given in the idea. It may be said
that here also the temptation to such a misconception lies ready
to hand and this may well have exercised a misleading
influence upon Descartes. Aristotle's error is less general,
though only because the phenomenon of the emotion qualified
as right has, generally speaking, come less frequently under
consideration than that of the similarly qualified judgment.
If the nature of the former has been misunderstood, the
latter has often been so overlooked as not even to admit of its
essential nature being misinterpreted.
29 (p. 19). When I affirmed that the language of common
life offers no suitable terms for activities of feeling qualified as
right, I did not mean thereby to deny that certain expressions
are, in themselves, well suited, indeed they would seem to have
been created for this purpose, particularly, for example, the
expressions " to be well pleasing" and " to be ill pleasing " (gut
gefallen and schlecht gef alien), as distinct from the simple " to
be pleasing " and " to be mis-pleasing." Though, however, it
might seem advisable to limit these terms in this way and so
to make them serve as scientific terms, scarcely any trace of
such a limitation is to be found in ordinary language. One
does not, of course, care to say : " the good pleases him ill,"
" the bad pleases him well," though one still says that to one
this tastes good, to another that, and so on, i.e. the expression
" to be well pleasing " is applied unhesitatingly even in the case
where pleasure is given in the lowest instinctive form. Indeed
the term-" impression " (Wahrnehmung) has degenerated in an
almost similar way. Only really appropriate in respect of know-
84
NOTES
ledge, it came to be applied in the case of the so-called external
impression (aussere Wahrnehmung), i.e. in cases of a belief, blind,
and in its essential relations, erroneous, and consequently would
require, in order, as a terminus technicus to have scientific ap
plication, an important reform of the usual terminology and
one which would essentially narrow the range of the term.
30 (p. 19). Metaph., A 1, p. 980 a. 22.
31 (p. 20) i.e., " Als richtig characterisiert." This phrase, ,
which occurs frequently, I have translated sometimes as above, ^ .- v
sometimes by "qualified as right." By this phrase and its
equivalents is meant that the'act (sc. of loving, hating, or pre
ferring,) is at once perceived by us to be a right one, bears
the mark or character of Tightness.
32 (p. 20). In order to exclude a misunderstanding and
the doubts necessarily connected therewith, I add the following
remark to what has been suggested shortly in the text. In
order that an act of feeling may be called purely good in itself
it is requisite : (1) that it be right ; (2) that it be an act of pleasing
and not an act of displeasing. If either condition be absent,
it is already, in a certain respect, bad in itself ; pleasure at the
misfortunes of others (Schadenfreude) is bad on the first ground ;
pain at the sight of injustice, on the second ground. If both
conditions are lacking, the act is still worse, in accordance with
the principle of summation of which we shall speak later in the
lecture. According to this same principle, where a feeling is
good, its increase increases also the goodness of the act, while,
similarly, where an act is purely bad, or at least participates
in any respect in the bad, with the intensity of the feeling
increases the badness of the act. When the act is a mixed one;
good and bad manifestly increase, or diminish, in simple pro
portion to one another. The " plus " belonging to the one or the
other side, must therefore, with the increase in intensity of the act
become ever- greater, with its decrease ever smaller. And so
the surplus of good in the act may, under certain circumstances
in spite of its impurity, be described as a very great good, while
conversely, the surplus of the bad may, despite the admixture
of the good, be described as something very bad (cf. note 36).
33 (p. 20). It may happen that, at the same time, one and
85
NOTES
the same thing is both pleasing and displeasing. First, some
thing in itself displeasing may yet be pleasing as a means to
something else, and vice versa ; then a case may arise where
something instinctively repels us, while at the same time it is
loved by us with a higher love. We may thus have an instinc
tive repugnance to a sensation, which is yet at the same time
(and every idea, qua idea, is good), a welcome enrichment of
our world of ideas. Aristotle has said : "It happens that de
sires enter into conflict with each other.- This happens when
the reason (\6<yo<>) and the lower desires (efn&v^ia) are in
opposition (De Anima iii. 10). And again : " Now the lower
desires (eVt#u/Lua) gain a victory over the higher, now the
higher over the lower, and as " (according to the ancient astro
nomy) " one celestial sphere the other, so one desire draws off
the other with it when the individual has lost the firm rule over
himself " (De Anima ii.).
34 (p. 21). Just as love and hate may be directed towards
single individuals, so also they may be directed to whole classes.
This Aristotle has already observed. We are, he thinks, " not
only angry with the individual thief who has robbed us, and
with the individual sycophant who deceives our confiding nature,
but we hate thieves and sycophants in general " (Rhet, ii. 4).
Acts of loving and hating, where in this way there is an under
lying general conception, also possess frequently the character
of Tightness. And so quite naturally along with the experience
of this given act of love or hate, the goodness or badness of the
entire class becomes manifest at one stroke, and apart from
every induction from special cases. In this way, for example,
we attain to the general knowledge that insight as such is good.
It is easy to understand how near the temptation lies, in the
case of such knowledge of a general truth without any induction
from single cases otherwise demanded in truths of experience,
entirely to overlook the preparatory experience of a feeling
having the character of Tightness, and to regard the universal
judgment as an immediate synthetic a priori form of knowledge.
Herbarfs very remarkable doctrine of a sudden elevation to
general ethical principles seems to me to point to the fact that
86
NOTES
he had observed something of this peculiar process without
at the same time becoming quite clear about it.
35 (p. 21). It is easy to see how important this proposition
may become for a theodicy. As regards ethics it might be
feared that its security becomes thereby seriously endangered,
perhaps, indeed, completely destroyed. To see how unfounded
such a fear is, cf. note 43, p. 99.
36 (p. 22). It seems to me evident even from analysis of the
notion of choice (1) that everything which is good is to be pre
ferred, i.e. that in an act of choice it shall fall as a reasonable
moment into the balance ; (2) that everything bad forms a
reasonable anti-moment, and therefore also that (3) in such cases
— partly by direct means, partly by an addition in which the
good and the bad are to be taken into account as quantities
with opposite signs — the preponderance in which right choice
is to be grounded may become evident, i.e. the preferability or
superiority of the one as opposed to the other. According to
this view, it does not, closely examined, require the special
experience of an act of preference having the character of right-
ness, but only the experience of simple similarly qualified acts
of pleasing and displeasing, in order to attain in the above-
mentioned cases to the knowledge of the better. And therefore
Z have said that we derived our knowledge of preferability, not
from the fact that our experience has the character of Tightness,
but that the said preferences possess the character of Tightness
because the knowledge of preferability has here been made the
determining standard. I do not, however, mean to say that
the same distinguishing character which was previously insisted
upon in the case of certain simple acts of pleasing is not also
here really present.
37 (p. 24). In order that the procedure here might have
been rendered quite exact and really exhaustive, two other very
important cases would still need to have been mentioned in the
lecture. The one case is that of pleasure in the bad, the other
that of displeasure in the bad. If we enquire : Is pleasure in
the bad good ? the answer has already been given in a measure
quite rightly by Aristotle : No. " No one," he says in the
87
NOTES
Nicomachian Ethics (x. 2, p. 1174 a. 1), "would wish to feel joy
in what is shameful even if it were made certain to him that no
harm would result therefrom." The hedonists, to which class
belonged such noble men as Fechner (cf . his work on The Highest
Good) contradicted this view. Their teaching is to be rejected ;
in practice as Hume has observed, they fortunately proved
much better than in theory. There is still, however, a grain of
truth in their view. The pleasure in the bad is, qua pleasure,
good, and only at the same time bad as a wrong activity of
feeling, and though, by reason of this perversion, it may be
described as a preponderance of the bad, it cannot be regarded
as something purely bad. While, therefore, abhorring it as
bad, we are really making an act of choice in which freedom
from what in the object is bad is preferred to the possession of
what is good. And when we recognize the aversion as right,
this is possible only because the preference has the character
of Tightness.
The case is similar when we inquire if a similarly qualified
displeasure in the bad is good, as e.g. where a noble heart feels
pain on seeing the innocent oppressed, or where some one, look
ing back upon his past life, feels remorse at the consciousness
of a bad action. Here the case is in every respect the reverse
of the one preceding. Such a feeling arouses a state in which
pleasure preponderates, but this pleasure is not pure ; it cannot
be called a pure good like the joy which would have arisen were
the opposite of that over which we now mourn a fact, hence
Descartes' advice (cf. 24, p. 75)— to turn the attention and
feeling in an equal degree rather to the good— would really not
lose its significance. We recognize all this clearly, and have
therefore, once more a preference with the character of Tightness
as the source of our knowledge of what is worthy of preference.
In order not to introduce too many complications, I omitted
m my lecture when discussing preferences to mention these cases.
And this seemed to me the more admissible, because it would
practically lead to the same result, if (like Aristotle in the case
of disgraceful pleasure) one were to treat hate qualified as right
on the one hand and love qualified as right on the other, as
phenomena of simple disinclination and inclination.
88
NOTES
It may be easily seen that from these special cases of a possible
determination of a quantitative relation between good and bad
pleasure and displeasure, on the one hand, and of Tightness and
unrightness on the other hand (cf. for these also Note 31, p. 91)
there is no hope of filling in the great gaps referred to in the
lecture in a way valid for all cases.
38 (p. 26). Cf. my Psych, from the Empirical Standpoint,
book ii. chap. iv.
39 (p. 26). E. Dumont. Traites de legislation civile et
penale, extraits des manuscrits de J. Bentham ; espec. in the
section bearing the title : " Principes des legislation," chap. iii.
section 1 towards the end ; chap. vi. section 2 towards the end ;
and chaps, viii. and ix.
40 (p. 27). S. Rudolph Wagner. Der Kampf urn die
Seele, vom Standpunkt der Wissenschaft. (Sendschreiben an Herrn
Leibarzt Dr. Beneke in Oldenburg.) Gottingen, 1857, p. 94
note. "Gauss said, the author (of a certain psychological work)
spoke of a want of exact measurements in the case of psychical
phenomena, but it would be good if we only had clumsy ones,
one could then make a beginning ; but we have none. There
is here wanting the conditio sine qud non of all mathematical
treatment, i.e. whether and how far the changing of an intensive
into an extensive quantity is possible. Yet this is the first and
indispensable condition ; then there were also others. On this
occasion Gauss spoke also about the usual incorrect definition
of quantity as an ' ens ' which is capable of being increased or
diminished ; one ought rather to say, an ' ens ' that admits of
being divided into equal parts. . . ."
41 (p. 27). Fechner's psycho-physical law, even were it as
sured, whereas it awakens continually increasing doubt and
opposition, could only be used as a means of measuring the in
tensity of the content of certain concrete perceptions, not,
however, for measuring the strength of the emotions like joy
and sorrow. Attempts have been made at determining the
measure of feelings by means of the involuntary movements
and other externally visible changes accompanying them. To
89
NOTES
me, this seems very much as if one were to seek to reckon the
exact date of the day of the month by means of the weather.
The direct inner consciousness, however imperfect its testi
mony may be, nevertheless offers here far more. At least one
draws from the spring itself, whereas in the other case one has
to do with water rendered impure by a variety of influences.
42 (p. 27). Sigwart, in his Vorfragen der Etkik (p. 42),
emphasizes the fact that no more must be required from the
human will than what it is able to perform. This utterance,
which coming from the lips of so decided an indeterminist
(cf. Logic, ii. p. 592) may especially excite surprise, hangs to
gether with his subjective view of the good, from which view,
in my opinion, there is offered no logical, normal path to the
peace of all who possess a good will. (Cf. e.g. the way in which
Sigwart, p. 15. passes over from egoism to regard for the general
good.)
But similar expressions are also heard from others. And it
might really appear doubtful whether the sublime command
which bids us to subordinate all our actions to the highest
practical good is really the right ethical principle. For, putting
aside cases of want of reflection, which do not, of course, enter
here into consideration, the demand for such complete self-
devotion still seems too stringent, since there is no one, however
carefully he may conduct himself, who, looking sincerely into
his heart, will not frequently be compelled to say with Horace : —
" Nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor,
Et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor."
And yet the doubt is unfounded, and a comparison may serve
to make this clear. It is certain that no one can entirely avoid
error ; still, avoidable or unavoidable, every error remains a
judgment, which is what it should not be, and is opposed to
the indispensable demands of logic. What applies to logic in
respect of weakness of thought applies to ethics on the ground
of weakness of will. Ethics cannot cease to demand from a man
that he should love the acknowledged good and prefer that which
is recognized to be better, not putting anything else before
the highest practical good. Even were it proved (which is not
90
NOTES
the case), that in a definite class of cases all men without excep
tion in respect of these were never able to remain true to the
highest practical good, this would still not afford the slightest
justification for setting aside the fundamental ethical demand.
Even then it would still remain an evident and unchangeable
truth, the sole and only right rule, here as everywhere, to give
the preference to the better over what is less good.
J. S. Mill fears that this would lead to endless self-reproaches
and that these constant reproaches would embitter the life of
each individual. This, however, is so little implied by the rule
that it is easily demonstrable that such a result is excluded.
Goethe well understood this, —
'w Nichts taugt Ungeduld "
i.e. impatience in respect of one's own imperfections, he says
in one of his by no means lax sayings, —
" Noch weniger Reue,"
—giving way to the stings of conscience, w^ien fresh joyous
resolve is alone available, —
" Jene verinehrt die Schuld,
Diese schatft neue."*
In an album I once found in the hand of the pious Abbot
Haneberg, afterwards Bishop of Spires, the following lines,
written to the same effect : —
" Sonne dich mit Lust an Gottes Huld,
Hab' mit alien — auch mit dir, Geduld." f
43 (p. 28). It is necessary to be on one's guard against
drawing from the principle of love of our neighbour the con-
elusion that each has to care for every other individual in the
same degree as for himself, which, far from conducing towards
the universal good, would rather essentially prejudice it. This
* " Impatience naught avails
Nor more availeth rue,
One addeth to the fault,
The other maketh new." — Tr.
f " Bathe thyself with delight in the sunshine of heavenly grace,
Let patience toward all men abound — e'en with thyself find a place." — Tr.
91
NOTES
is seen by reflecting on the circumstance that to ourselves we
stand in a position different from that in which we stand to
everybody else, while again in respect of these others we are in
a position to help, or to injure, one more, the other less,
there are human beings in Mars the inhabitants of the earth can
and ought to wishJheffiLgood also, not however to strive after
their good in fEelame manner as for himself and his fellow-men.
It is in this connexion that the injunction to take thought
in the_fir£t .instance for oneself, a precept to be found in
everV system of morality, is justifiable : " yv&0i aavrov,"
TrSweep before your own doorstep," etc. The demand to seek
first of all the welfare of wife and child, home and fatherland,
is also universal. The command : " Take no thought for the
morrow," in the sense in which it really offers wise counsel, also
flows as a result from the same source. That my future happi
ness ought not to be so dear to me as my present happiness is
not here implied.
So regarded, the communistic doctrines which illogical im-
W> I petuosity would seek to JeFive from the lofty principle of uni-
' versa! brotherhood are shown to be unjustifiable.
44 (p. 29). The fact that we are often unable to measure
the more remote results of our actions offers a more serious
difficulty.
But even this thought will not discourage us if we love the
universal good. It may be said of all results which are un
recognizable in an exactly equal degree, that one has just as
many chances in its favour as the others. According to the
law of great numbers a compensation will on the whole result,
and so whatever calculable gooJ^we create will stand as a plus
on the one side and, just as though it stood alone, will justify our
choice.
From the same point of view, as I have already suggested in
the lecture (p. 22), the doubt is removed which in a similar
manner might arise through uncertainty as to whether every
thing that is good draws from us a love having the qualification
of Tightness, and whether, therefore, we are able to recognize
it as good and to take due account of it.
92
NOTES
45 (p. 29). That in the case of the limits of right (Rechts-
grenzen) we have essentially to do with spheres which lie at
the disposal of the individual will has been frequently empha
sized both by philosophers (cf. in this respect e.g. Herbart's
Idea of Right) and by able jurists. Ihering in his Geist des
romischen Rechts, iii. 1 (p. 320 note), demonstrates this with
numerous citations. Arndt e.g. in his Handbuch der Pandekten
defines law as " supremacy of the will regarding an object " ;
for Sintenis it is, " the will of one person raised to the universal
will." Wiridscheid defines it as " a certain volition (Willens-
inhalt) of which the legal code in a concrete case affirms that
it may be made valid as against every other will." Puchta,
who has perhaps expressed the thought in the most manifold
ways, says in his digest of Roman law, section 22, " as the
subjects of such a will thought of potentially men are called
persons, . . . personality is therefore the subjective possibility
of the legalized will, of a legal power." In the same work (section
118, note b) he observes in regard to a want of personality :
"" The principle of modern law is inability to dispose of property " ;
many other of his expressions convey the same meaning.
As however these legal authorities have concentrated their
attention exclusively upon legal duties, and do not touch upon
the problem as to the way in which the individual will has to
rule in its legal sphere, Ihering has interpreted them as
meaning that they considered the true and highest good,
and the most intrinsic and final end, towards which the legal
code strives, to be the exercise of the will as will, the joy of the
individual in his volitional activity ; " the final end of all law
is, for them, willing" (pp. 320, 325); "the end of law (according
to them) consists once for all in the power of the will, in its
supremacy " (p. 326). One can well understand how he comes
to condemn a theory so interpreted (p. 327), and even that he
succeeds in making it appear ridiculous. " According to this
view," he says, (p. 320) "all private right is nothing less than an
arena in which the will moves and exercises itself ; the will is
the organ by which the individual enjoys his right, the profit
obtained from legal right consists in feeling the joy and glory
of power, in the satisfaction of having realized an act of will,
93
NOTES
e.g. of having effected a mortgage, transferred a title, and so
proved oneself to be a legal personality. What a poor thing
would the will be if the bare and low regions of law were the
proper " sphere of its activity ! "
Certainly the heaviest charges of absurdity and ridiculous
ness would be well deserved if those scholars who regard the
immediate aim of law as consisting in a limitation of the
spheres at the disposal of the will had intended in so doing to
disavow all regard for the final ethical end, i.e. the advancement
of the highest practical good. There is, however, absolutely
nothing to justify this insinuation, and therefore one could
perhaps with more right smile at the zeal of an attack which is
really levelled merely against windmills. Moreover, what
Ihering proposes to set in its place is certainly a bad substitute.
For, in regarding the sphere ascribed by the legal authority to
the individual simply as a sphere consigned to their egoism (a
view which, as the author of De r Zweck im Recht, he perhaps no
longer holds), he is thus led to his definition : " Law (Recht) is
legal security for enjoyment," whereas he would have been more
correct in saying : " Law is legal security for the undisturbed
disposal of individual power in the advancement of the highest
good." Is then injustice something which exhausts bad con
duct ? By no means ; legal duties have limits ; duty in general
governs all our actions, and this our popular religion expressly
emphasizes, as, for instance, when it asserts that for every idle
word the individual must render an account.
Besides this first objection, which rests upon a simple mis
understanding of the intention, Ihering has also raised several
others which are essentially due to imperfections in the use of
language. If the legal code essentially consists in setting certain
limits to the activity of the individual will in order that one
person may not disturb the other in striving after the good, it
follows that he who has, or had, or will have no will has also no
legal sphere. I say, " has, or had, or will have," for obviously
regard must be paid to the past and to the future. A dead
man often exercises an influence extending into the far distant
future, so that Comte well says : the living are more and more
dominated by the dead. In like manner, the situation will
94
NOTES
entail that, in respect of many problems, we leave the decision
to the future, i.e. renounce the sovereignty in favour of a future
will. This consideration resolves many a paradox urged by
Ihering (pp. 320-325) ; not however, all. In the case of one
who from birth has been an incurable imbecile, it is obvious
that no power of will whatever can be found, to which regard
for the highest practical good might allow a sphere ; there re
mains therefore to him, according to our view, really no legal
sphere, and yet on every hand we hear of a right which he pos
sesses in his own life ; even under some circumstances, we refer
to him as the owner of a great estate, or ascribe to him the right
of a crown or kingly rule. On examining the relations closely,
we find that we are never concerned here with a true legal sphere
respecting a subject incapable of being held responsible, but
rather with the legal spheres of other individuals, as, for example,
that of a father who, in providing for his imbecile child, gives
instructions in his will concerning his property, the dominion of
whose will is safeguarded after his death by the law of the land ;
or (as, for example, the case where the imbecile's life is held to
be sacred), quite apart from the injury done to the simple duty
of affection which this would involve, there is also in question
the State's legal sphere, which permits no one else to commit a
fatal attack, and accordingly often imposes a punishment, even
in the case of an attempt at suicide.
A third objection of Ihering's, i.e. that by a limitation of rights
as affecting spheres of will, even the most senseless dispositions of
will must be allowed legal validity (p. 325), this offers, after
what has been said, hardly any further difficulty . Certainly
many a foolish disposition of will must be allowed. Were the
State not to admit this, then it alone would possess a definitive
right of disposal ; all private right would be at an end. So
long as not merely subjects, but also governments, are liable
to commit acts of foolishness, such an extension of the power
of the State cannot be recommended. For the rest, just as
secondary ethical rules in general suffer exceptions, and in par
ticular expropriations in the case of private owners are fre
quently necessary, so also it is clear and to be admitted with
out contradiction, that senseless dispositions or dispositions
95
NOTES
which have evidently lost all meaning and reference to the
highest practical good can be annulled by the State. Regard
for the highest practical good is here, as is the case of every
other so-called collision of duties, decisive.
46 (p. 29). That a law, which in and for itself is bad and
contrary to nature, however condemnable from an ethical point
of view, and its modification urgently necessary, may yet in
many cases receive a provisional sanction from the reason, this
has long been recognized and made clear, as e.g. by Bentham
in his Traites de Legislation civ. et pen. In antiquity Socrates,
who deemed himself worthy to be feasted in the Prytaneum,
• died for the sake of this conviction. The positive legal code,
I despite all its defects, creates a condition of things which is better
than anarchy, and since each act of insubordination to the law
threatens to injure its force in general, so in those circumstances
brought about by the law it-self, it may be that provisionally
and for the individual a mode of action even from the rational
standpoint is right, which, apart from this, would be in no way
i justifiable. All this results without doubt from the relativity
[ of the secondary ethical rules, which will be treated later.
It may be added that errors respecting the laws of positive
morality (a point shortly to be discussed in the lecture) in a
similar way demand, under certain circumstances, to be taken
into account.
It dare not, on the other hand, be overlooked that there are
Ihere limits, and that the saying : " We ought to obey God rather
than man," may_not, in its free and sublime range, be allowed
to sufferinjury.
47 (p. 29). Heraclitus of Ephesus (B.C. 500), the oldest of
the Greek philosophers, of whose philosophy we possess rather
extensive fragments.
48 (p. 31). Ihering, Der Zweck im Recht, vol. ii. p. 119, and
other passages.
49 (p. 31). Politics, vol. i. chap. 5.
50 (p. 31). Nic. Ethics, v. 14, p. 1137 b. 13. Politics, iii.
and iv.
96
NOTES
51 (p. 31). Of. Discours preliminaire to the Traites de
Legislation, also the section " De 1'influence des temps et des
lieux en matiere de legislation " of that work.
52 (p. 31). Philos. Versuch iiber die W ahrscheinlichkeiten
von Laplace, translated from the sixth edition of the original text
by N. Schwaiger, Leipzig, 1886, p. 93 seq. (Application of
the calculation of probabilities to moral science.)
53 (p. 32). Cf. Allg. Juristenzeitung, vii. p. 171 ; Zweck
im Recht, vol. ii. p. 118 ; 122 seq.
54 (p. 33). Grundlegung zur PJiysik der Sitten. Cf. above
note 14, p. 49.
55 (p. 34). Cf. e.g. the Meno dialogue.
56 (p. 34). Friedr. Alb. Lange, Logische Studien, ein Beitrag
zur Neubcgrundung der formalen Logik und der Erlcenntnislehre.
Tserlohn, 1877.
57 (p. 34). Alex. Bain, Logic, pt. 1. Deduction. London,
1870, p. 159 seq.
58 (p. 35). e.g. Bentham, also, in antiquity, Epicurus.
59 (p. 35). e.g. Plato and Aristotle, and following them
Thomas Aquinas.
60 (p. 35). The Stoics, and in the Middle Ages, the followers
of Scotus.
61 (p. 36). This even Epicurus did not deny (little in har
mony as it is with his utterance quoted p. 54).
62 (p. 36). Nic. Ethics, I. i.
63 (p. 36). Metaph. A 10.
64 (pi 36). Metaph. A 10.
97
NOTES
65 (<D 36) They made the relation to the greater whole
serve as an argument in favour of the view that the practical
life (of the politician) stands higher than that of the theorist.
66 (« 36) This testimony to the principle of summation
likewise reappears as often as in a theory based upon egoistic
ind utilitarian grounds, the notion of God is employed m the
construction of ethics (e.g. Locke ; Fechner in his work on the
highest good; cf. also for Leibnitz, Trendelenburg, Histor.
Ileitrcige vol. ii. p. 245). God, so runs their argument, loves each
of His creatures, and therefore their totality more than the
single individual ; He therefore approves and rewards the sacri
fice of the individual to the whole, while disapproving and punish
ing self-seeking injury.
In the desire after immortality also, the influence of the prin
ciple of summation is manifest. Thus Helmholtz, (uber die
Entstehung des Planetensy stems, lecture delivered at Heidelberg
and Cologne, 1871), in seeking to offer a hopeful prospect to those
who cherish this desire, says : " The individual (if that which
we achieve can ennoble the lives of those who succeed us) may
face fearlessly the thought that the thread of his own conscious
ness will one day be broken. But to the thought of a final
annihilation of the race of living mortals, and with them, the
fruits of the striving of all past generations, even men of minds
so unfettered and great as Lessing and David Strauss could
scarcely reconcile themselves." When it is scientifically shown
that the earth will one day be incapable of supporting living
beings, then, he thinks, the need of immortality will irresistibly
return, and we shall feel bound to cast about for something which
will afford us the possibility of assuming it.
67 (p. 34). Metaph. A 10.
68 (p. 37). This is the standing doctrine of the great theo
logians, as e.g. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica. Only
certain nominalists, like Robert Holcot, teach the complete arbi
trariness of the divine commands. Cf . my essay on the Geschichte
der kircUichen Wissenschaften im Mittelalter, in Mohler's Church
98
NOTES
History (published by Gams, 1867) vol. ii. 526 seq., respecting
which, however, the reader is asked not to overlook the revision
of the printer's errors in the " errata," p. 103 seq., at the end
of that work.
69 (p. 39). At a time when psychology was far less advanced
and inquiries into the province of the calculation of probability
had not brought sufficient clearness into the process of rational
induction, it was possible even for a Hume to fall a victim to this
gross confusion. Cf. his Enq: concern. Hum. Underst., chaps, v.
and vi. More striking is it that James Mill and Herbert Spencer
have still not advanced in the slightest degree beyond Hume ;
(Cf. Anal, of the Phen. of the Hum. Mind, vol. ii. chap. ix. and
note 108), and that even the acute thinker, J. S. Mill, although
Laplace's Essai Philosophique sur les Probabilites lay at his dis
posal, never arrived at a clear distinction of the essential difference
between these two forms of procedure. This hangs together
with his failure to appreciate the purely analytic character of
mathematics and the import of the deductive procedure in
general. Indeed he has absolutely denied that the syllogism
leads to new knowledge. Whoever bases the whole of mathe
matics upon induction cannot possibly justify mathematically
the inductive procedure. It would be for him a circulus vitiosus.
It is here beyond question that Jevon's Logic takes a truer view.
Even in the case of Mill, it sometimes appears as if an inkling
of the immense difference had begun to dawn upon him, as
when, in a note to his Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human
Mind (vol. i., chap. xi. p. 407), in criticizing his father's theory,
he says : "If belief is only an inseparable association, belief is
a matter of habit and accident and not of reason. Assuredly an
association, however close, between two ideas is not a sufficient
ground (the italics are his own) of belief ; it is not evidence that
the corresponding facts are united in external nature. The
theory seems to annihilate all distinction between the belief
of the wise, which is regulated by evidence and conforms to the
real successions and co-existences of the facts of the universe,
and the belief of fools which is mechanically produced by any
accidental association that suggests the idea of a succession or
99
NOTES
co-existence to the mind ; a belief aptly characterized by the
popular expression, believing a thing because they have taken
it into their heads." This is all excellent. But it is robbed of
its most essential worth, when, in a later note (vol. i. p. 438.
note 110) we hear J. S. Mill say : " It must be conceded to him
(the author of the Analysis] that an association sufficiently
strong to exclude all ideas that would exclude itself, produces a
kind of mechanical belief, and that the processes by which the
belief is corrected, or reduced to rational bounds, all consist in
the growth of a counter-association tending to raise the idea of a
disappointment of the first expectation, and as the one or the
other prevails in the particular case, the belief or expectation
exists or does not exist exactly as if the belief were the same thing
with the association," and so on.
There is much here that calls for criticism. When ideas are
mentioned which mutually exclude one another it may well be
asked what kind of ideas these are ? According to another
utterance of Mill's (vol. i. p. 98 seq. note 30 and elsewhere), he
knows " no case of absolute incompatibility of thought except
between the thought of the presence of something and that of
its absence." But are even these incompatible ? Mill himself
teaches elsewhere the very opposite when he thinks that along
with the idea of existence there is always given at the same time
the idea of non-existence (p. 126, note 39 ; " we are only con
scious," he says, " of the presence of an object by comparison
with its absence "). Apart, however, from all this, how strange
is it that Mill here overlooks the fact that he abandons entirely
the distinctive character of self-evidence, and retains only that
blind and mechanical formation of judgment, which he rightly
treats with contempt. The sceptic Hume stands in this respect
far higher, since he at least sees that such an empirical (empi-
ristisch) view of the process of induction does not satisfy the
requirements of our reason. Sigwart's criticism of Mill's theory
of Induction (Logic, vol. ii. p. 371) contains here much that is
true, though in appealing to his postulates he has certainly not
substituted anything truly satisfactory in the place of what is
defective in Mill.
100
NOTES
70 (p. 40). Cf. Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Under
standing, vol. ii. towards the end.
71 (p. 40). Nic. Ethics, in. 10. Cf. the subtle discussions
in the subsequent chapter on the five kinds of false courage.
72 (p. 41). Nic. Ethics, i. 2.
101
APPENDIX I
103
I
" SUBJECTLESS propositions " so the celebrated philologer
has entitled a little work which, on its first appearance, bore the
title, The Verba Impersonated in the Slav Languages.
The change of name may well be connected with considerable
additions in the second edition. The new designation would,
however, even in the earlier form, have been the more suitable
title. For, far from treating the special nature of merely one
family of languages, the author sets up a theory of wide-reaching
significance, which, while contradicting the prevailing view,
only deserves all the more on this account general attention.
Not only philology, but also psychology and metaphysics have
an interest in the problem. Moreover, the new doctrine pro
mised to bring profit not only to the inquirer in these lofty spheres
but also to the schoolboy at present tortured by the school
master with impossible and incomprehensible theories (cf.
p. 23 seq.).
Such an influence, however, the treatise has not exercised.
The earlier views still hold unbroken sway even to-day, and
although the appearance of the monograph in a new edition
bears testimony to a certain interest in wider circles, this is
manifestly not due to the circumstance that the work was believed
to have thrown light upon old doubts and errors. Darwin's
epoch-making work, quite apart from the truth of its hypothesis,
had, even for its opponents, an indisputable worth ; the wealth
of important observations and ingenious combinations every one
had to acknowledge with admiration. So also in the case of
Miklosich, who has compressed into a few pages a rich store of
105
APPENDIX
learning and interspersed the most subtle observations. Many
who have withheld their assent to his principal thesis may still
feel indebted to him for many points of detail.
Here, however, we wish chiefly to consider the main problem
and, very briefly, to make ourselves clear respecting that with
which it really deals.
It is an old assertion of logic that the judgment consists essen
tially in a binding or separating, in a relation of ideas to one
another. This view, almost unanimously maintained for two
thousand years, has exercised an influence upon other disciplines.
And so we find grammarians from very early times teaching that
no more simple form of expression in the case of the judgment
exists, or can exist, than the categorical, which combines a subject
with a predicate.
That the carrying out of this doctrine brings with it difficulties
could not, of course, be permanently concealed. Propositions
like : it rains, it lightens, appear as though they had no wish
to conform to this view. Yet none the less the majority of
inquirers were so firmly convinced, that in such cases they felt
compelled, not so much to doubt the universal validity of their
theory as rather to search for the subjects, which in their view
were only apparently missing. Many really believed themselves
to be in possession of the same. Now, however, in marked
contrast to the unity which had hitherto prevailed, they branched
off in the most varied directions. And if we examine somewhat
closely and in detail the various attempts at an explanation,
we shall easily be able to understand, why none of these were
able to give permanent satisfaction, or even for a time to bring
about unanimity.
Science explains by reason of its comprehending a multiplicity
as a unity. Here also, of course, every effort has been made
to accomplish this, but every attempt has proved futile. When
we say : it rains, many have supposed that the unnamed subject
denoted by the indefinite " it " is " Zeus " : Zeus rains. But
when we say : " es rauscht," is is obvious that Zeus cannot be
the subject. Others again have thought that the subject is
here " das Rauschen " ; consequently the meaning of the propo
sition would be: "das Rauschen rauscht." The previous
106
APPENDIX
example they also completed in the same manner : " Raining,
(or the rain) rains."
When, however, we now say : " es fehlt an Geld," the meaning
must therefore be : " das Fehlen an Geld fehlt an Geld." But
this is absurd. It was therefore explained that the subject here
is " Geld," and the meaning of the proposition is : " Geld fehlt
an Geld." Closely examined, this would seem to strike a blow
at the wished-for unity of explanation. If, however, by closing
one eye, the failure here may be partially ignored, even this is
useless when we stumble upon propositions like : " es giebt
einen Gott." respecting which we arrive at no satisfactory mean
ing either in the proposition : " das einen Gott geben giebt einen
Gott ; das Geben giebt einen Gott," or in the proposition, " Gott
giebt einen Gott."
It was therefore necessary to look for an explanation of an
entirely different character. But where was such an explanation
to be found ? And even if ingenuity were here able to hit upon
some expedient, what availed such leaping from case to case,
which could only be called the caricature of a truly scientific
explanation ? Not a single designation of the subject which
has been so far suggested, can be termed suitable, unless indeed
it be a saying of Schleiermacher's. For if this philosopher
(cf. p. 16) has really asserted that the subject in such cases is
chaos, this utterance must be regarded, not so much as an attempt
at explanation as rather a satire upon the hypotheses hitherto
set up by philologists.
Many inquirers are therefore of opinion that the real subjects
of such propositions as : it rains, it lightens, have, up to the
present time, not been discovered, and that even at the present
time it is the business of science to find them. But, would it not
be strange if the tracing of a subject, which is thought of by
everyone, and which, though unexpressed, forms the basis of
the judgment, should yet offer such extraordinary difficulties ?
Steinthal seeks to explain this by saying that by the gramma
tical subject something is suggested, which is yet unthinkable.
But many will reply with Miklosich (p. 23) : " We would not,
I think, be going too far in asserting that grammar is not con
cerned with the unthinkable."
107
APPENDIX
The totality of the phenomena and the absolutely grotesque
failure of every attempt to determine the nature of the subject,
however often and however ingeniously this has been attempted,
are the chief grounds on which Miklosich bases his assertion
that, generally speaking, the supposed subject in the case of
such propositions is a delusion, that the proposition is no com
bination of subject and predicate, that, as Miklosich expresses
it, the proposition is subjectless.
Further reflections go to confirm this view, and among these
one consideration as to the nature of the judgment requires to
be emphasized on account of its special importance. Miklosich
combats those who, like Steinthal, deny that there is any recipro
cal relation between grammar and logic, at the same time repel
ling the attacks which, on the ground of such a reciprocal relation,
might be made against his doctrine by psychologists and logicians.
Indeed he arrives at the result that, in consequence of the special
peculiarity of certain judgments, subjectless propositions must
from the very first be expected in language. According to his
view it is wrong to suppose that every judgment is a relation
existing between ideas. It often happens that in a proposition
only one fact is affirmed or denied. In such cases a mode of
expression is also necessary, and it is obvious that this cannot
well consist in a combination of subject and predicate. Miklosich
shows how philosophers have been repeatedly led to this know
ledge, though, as a rule, they have not appreciated sufficiently
the significance of their discovery. Not sufficiently clear them
selves as to the new truth to which they gave expression, and,
at the same time, clinging with strange indecision to certain resi
dues of the older view, it came about that what at first they
affirmed they at last essentially deny. Thus Trendelenburg
chose to find expressed in the proposition, " it lightens," in the
last resort, no real judgment, but only the rudiments of a judg
ment which precedes the notion of lightning and settles down into
it, thereby forming the basis for the complete judgment, "lightning
is conducted by iron." Herbart finally declared such judgments
as " es rauscht," to be no judgments in the ordinary sense, not,
he thought, what in logic is, strictly speaking, termed a judg
ment. The passage in which our author censures the incon-
108
APPENDIX
sistency of these philosophers, and shows that the source of
their confusion lies in their misunderstanding of the nature
of judgment and in their erroneous definition of it (p. 21 seq.),
is excellent.
From all this Miklosich draws the conclusion that his subject-
less propositions are completely assured. And not only does
he consider their existence beyond doubt, he further shows that
their appearance is by no means so rare as might be supposed
from the controversy into which it has been necessary to enter
concerning them. Their great variety had led him, in the
second part of his treatise (pp. 33-72) to set forth their chief
classes, and there we find subjectless propositions with the
Active Verb, the Reflexive Verb, the Passive Verb and the verb
to be," each of these four classes being illustrated by means
of numerous examples from the most various languages. This
is especially the case with the first class, where he makes an
eightfold division with the object of grouping the propositions
according to the difference in their content. He mentions as
universally true (p. 6) that the finite verb of the subjectless
propositions always stands in the third person singular, and,
where the form admits a difference of gender, in the neuter.
In other directions also he traces the matter further. He
shows how these propositions did not arise later than those which
predicate something of a subject, but appear from the very
outset among the various forms of propositions (p. 13 seq., p. 19),
and how, in the course of time, they have disappeared from
several languages (p. 26). He proves that the languages in which
they are preserved enjoy an advantage, inasmuch as their appli
cation lends to the language a special liveliness (26), and he
shows how in other respects also it is not always possible to
substitute for the subjectless proposition the categorical form,
with which it is supposed to be identical. " Ich friere " is, for
instance, not fully identical with " mich friert." Instead of,
was frierst du draussen ? Komme doch herein ! we cannot
say : was friert dich's draussen ? etc. " Mich friert " cannot
be applied if I expose myself voluntarily to the cold (p. 37).
109
II
This, shortly, is the substance of his book, regarding which
I venture to make a few critical observations.
I have sufficiently expressed in this summary, my approval
of the treatise in general, especially in respect of the main argu
ment. The proofs appear to me to be of so cogent a nature,
that even the unwilling will scarcely be able to escape from the
truth. Quite independent of these arguments, however, I had
myself, long ago, arrived at the same view, by way of a purely
psychological analysis, and gave, in the most decisive manner,
public expression to it, when in 1874 I published my Psychology.
Great, however, as were the pains I then took to set the
teaching in a clear light and to show every former view untenable,
my success so far has been slight. Apart from isolated indi
viduals, I have been just as little able to convince the philo
sopher, as Miklosich, in his first edition, was able to convince
philologists. Where a prejudice has, during centuries, become
ever more and more firmly rooted, where a doctrine has pene
trated even to the primary school, when a theory has come to
be regarded as fundamental upon which much else rests, and
so, as it were, by its weight rendered the foundation immovable,
in such a case, it is not to be expected that the error will im
mediately disappear as soon as its refutation is established ;
on the contrary, it is to be feared that distrust of the new view
will be so great, as not even to admit of a closer examination
being made regarding the grounds on which it rests. And yet
when two investigators completely independent of each other
agree in their testimony, when by quite different paths they
arrive at the same goal, it may be hoped that this concurrence
will not be regarded as a mere coincidence, but that a more
careful attention will be bestowed upon the arguments on
either side. I hope that this will be so in the case of the new
edition of Miklosich, in which I am glad to see regard paid to
my own work.
110
APPENDIX
The agreement with regard to the main points makes sub
ordinate points, in respect of which we differ, of less moment.
I shall, notwithstanding, briefly touch on these.
Miklosich has termed those simple propositions, in which
there is contained no combination of subject and predicate,
and in the recognition of which I am in agreement with him,
" subjectless propositions." I am not able entirely to approve
his use of the term and the grounds which he has given for its
use.
Subject and predicate are correlative conceptions and stand
or fall together. A proposition which is truly without a subject
must with equal right be regarded as without a predicate. It
does not therefore seem to me quite fitting that Miklosich
should always term such propositions subjectless, and it is quite
incorrect when he calls them mere predicative propositions.
(Of. pp. 3, 25, 26, and elsewhere.) This might suggest the view
that he likewise believes a second conception (the subject) is
understood though not expressed, had he not in the most
decided manner denied this (p. 3 seq. and elsewhere) ; or that
he regarded such propositions as stunted forms of categorical
propositions, and the latter form as the original, had he not
expressly refuted this also (p. 13 seq.). His view rather seems
to be, that the natural development from the simple to the
categorical form in thinking and speaking is generally accom
plished in such a way that the notion which stands alone in
the former proposition is combined with a second as subject.
" The subjectless propositions," he says, p. 25, " are propositions
which consist only of a predicate, of what, in the natural process
of thought- formation must, in a great number of propositions,
be regarded as the prius, for which a subject may, but not
necessarily must be sought."
But this also can hardly be right, and the expression " sub
ject " scarcely seems to favour this view. That which forms the
basis is, of course, certainly that which in the construction of
the judgment stands first. The temporal succession of the
words also agrees ill with such a view, since, in the categorical
proposition, we usually begin with the subject. In opposition
to such a view it may also be contended that the emphasis
111
APPENDIX
usually falls upon the predicate (and Trendelenburg has made
use of this to indicate that the predicate is the main conception,
and even with exaggeration goes on to say : " We think in
predicates," cf. p. 19). If the predicative conception is what is
newly added, it will, accordingly, be the object of greater in
terest. On the other hand, we would be compelled to expect
exactly the opposite if the notion of the subject contained the
newly added moment.
It may just as truly be said, " a bird is black," as, " some
thing black is a bird " ; " Socrates is a man," as, " a man is
Socrates " ; but Aristotle has already observed that only the
former predication is natural, the latter form is opposed to the
natural order. And this is really so far true, that we naturally
make that term the subject to which we first pay regard in form
ing a judgment, or to which the hearer must first attend in order
to understand the proposition, or to gain knowledge as to its
truth or falsity. We can be assured of the existence of a black
bird by seeking it among birds or among black objects, more
easily, however, among the former. In the same way we may
be more easily assured that an individual belongs to a particular
species or genus by analysing its nature than by running over
the entire range of the corresponding general notion. The
cases of exceptions clearly confirm the rule and the grounds on
which it rests, as, for instance, when I say : " There is some
thing black ; this something black is a bird," in which case it
is just because I have first recognized the colour that I accord
ingly make it the subject in the categorical proposition so formed.
Of the two categorical Sorites, the Aristotelian and the Go-
clenian, the former in every succeeding link makes that term
the subject which is common to it and to the one preceding,
the latter form makes it the predicate. It is just on this account
that the former appears the more natural, and as such is gene
rally regarded as the regular, the latter as the reversed form.
In like manner where, to a proposition not consisting of a com
bination of ideas, we add a categorical proposition having one
term in common with the former, we usually apply this not as
a predicate but as a subject, and we should therefore prefer to
say that a predicate has been sought for a subject rather than
112
APPENDIX
that a subject has been sought for a predicate. For example :
es rauscht ; das Rauschen kommt von einem Bache (there is
a sound of running water ; the sound comes from the brook).
Es donnert ; der Donner verkiindet ein nahendes Gewitter (it
thunders ; the thunder heralds an approaching storm). Es
riecht nach Rosen ; dieser Rosengeruch kommt aus dem Nach-
bargarten (there is a smell of roses ; the rose-scent comes from
a neighbour's garden). Es wird gelacht ; das Gelachter gilt
dem Hanswurste (there is laughter ; the laughter is due to the
clown). Es fehlt an Geld ; dieser Geldmangel ist die Ursache
der Stockung der Geschafte (there is a lack of money ; this
dearth of money is the cause of the depression in trade). Es
giebt einen Gott ; dieser Gott ist der Schopfer des Himmels
und der Erde (there is a God ; this God is the maker of heaven
and earth), etc., etc.
Only in one sense, therefore, does the term " subjectless pro
position " appear to me justifiable, and even perhaps deserving
of recommendation, in so far as regard is paid to the fact, that
the notion which is contained thereby is the only, and there
fore, of course, the main conception ; a preference which in the
categorical proposition belongs, as we have seen, to the predi
cate. Similarly also in respect of categorical in relation to
hypothetical propositions we would much rather say that they
are propositions without an antecedent, than propositions with
out a consequent proposition ; not as though we meant that
where there is no antecedent there may still be a consequent
proposition, but that in the hypothetical construction the con
sequent is the main proposition. In this way then I might
perhaps agree with the author respecting the term " subjectless
proposition."
Another point, however, in which I am unable fully to agree
with him is the question as to what extent subjectless propo
sitions are applicable. Miklosich rightly emphasizes the fact
that the limits are on no account to be drawn too tightly. But
he thinks such limits at any rate exist, and this is just what is
shown most clearly in his attempt to classify and divide the varied
nature of the matter capable of being expressed by subjectless
sentences. But this appears to me incorrect. The applica-
113 i
APPENDIX
bility of the subjectless form may, strictly speaking, be rather
regarded as unlimited, since — as I believe I have already shown
in my Psychology — every judgment, whether expressed in cate
gorical, hypothetical or disjunctive form admits, without the
slightest alteration in the sense, of being expressed in the form
of a subjectless proposition or, as I expressed it, of an existential
proposition. Thus the proposition, " A man is ill," is synony
mous with " There is a sick man " ; and the proposition, " All
men are mortal," with the proposition, " There is no immortal
man," and the like.1
In yet another direction Miklosich appears to me to have
limited too narrowly the applicability of his subjectless pro
positions. We have heard that such propositions constitute
" an excellence in a language," " respecting which all languages
are very far from being able to boast " (p. 26). This, however,
appears scarcely credible if it be true, as in another passage he
has so convincingly shown, that there are and always have been
judgments which do not consist in any combination of two
ideas with each other, and which therefore it is impossible to
express by means of a connexion of a subject with a predicate
(p. 16). From this must follow, not merely, as Miklosich
affirms, the necessary existence of subjectless propositions
generally, but further (which he denies] the existence of such
propositions in all languages.
1 Supplementary note. What is here said of the general applicability
of the existential form holds good only with the one manifest limitation, in
respect of judgments which are really completely simple. In expressing
such judgment logic has always made use of the categorical form ; in
common life they are often applied as the expression of a plurality of
judgments based upon each other. This is clearly the case in the proposi
tion, " this is a man." In the demonstrative " this " the belief in existence
is already included ; a second judgment then ascribes to him the predicate
" man." Similar cases are frequent elsewhere. In my opinion it was the
original purpose of the categorical form to serve as a means of expressing
such double judgments (Doppelurteile), which recognize something while
affirming or denying something else of it. I also believe that the existential
and impersonal forms have, by a change in function, proceeded from this
form. This does not alter its essential nature : a lung is not a swim-
bladder (Fisch -blase) even though it has developed therefrom, and the
word " kraft " is none the less a merely syncategorematic word (Gf. Mill,
Logic, i . 2, § 2), even though its origin may be traced to a substantive.
114
APPENDIX
That the author has here fallen into error seems to me partly
explicable from the fact that in order to proceed with the utmost
caution and lay claim to no unwarrantable example, he has not
ventured to regard certain propositions as subjectless, which,
in truth, really are so. We saw that Miklosich expressed the
view that the finite verb of subjectless propositions always
stands in the third person of the singular, and, when the form
admits a difference of gender, in the neuter. This was cer
tainly too narrow a limit, a limit which he himself transgresses,
though this appears in a much later passage. In the second
part of his treatise he says : " In ' es ist ein Gott,' the notion
4 Gott ' is affirmed absolutely without a subject, and this is
also the case in the proposition ' es sind Goiter ' " ; and he adds :
The " ist " of the existential proposition takes the place of the
so-called copula " ist" which in many, though by no means in
all, languages, is indispensable to the expression of the judg
ment, and has the same significance as the termination of person
in the finite verb as is clearly shown in the proposition " es ist
Sommer, es ist Nacht " alongside the propositions, " es sommert,
es nachtet." " Ist " is accordingly not a predicate (p. 34 ;
cf. also p. 21 above). As a matter of fact, if the proposition,
" es giebt einen Gott," is to be considered subjectless, " so also
must the proposition, " es ist ein Gott," and therefore also,
u es sind Gotter " ; and thus the rule previously laid down has
proved to be too narrow. That the existential propositions and
other analogous forms, which may be found, are all to be reckoned
as subjectless propositions may serve to confirm what we have
sought to show above, i.e. that no language exists, or can exist,
which entirely dispenses with these simplest forms of propo
sitions. Only certain special kinds of subjectless propositions
therefore, am I able, with Miklosich, to recognize as the peculiar
advantage of certain languages.
These are the criticisms which I have thought it necessary
to make. It will be seen that, if found to be justified, they do
not in the slightest degree prejudice either the correctness or
the value of the author's main argument, but rather lend to it
a still wider significance. And so I conclude by expressing once
again the wish that this suggestive little work, which, on its
115
APPENDIX
first appearance did not meet with sufficient general recog
nition, may in its second edition — where individual points have
been corrected, much extended, and particularly the critical
objections of scholars like Benfey, Steinthal and others, refuted
with a laconic brevity, yet rare dialectical power — find that
interest which the importance of the inquiry and its excellent
treatment deserve.
116
APPENDIX II
117
FRANZ BRENTANO, son of Christian Brentano, and nephew of
Clemens Brentano and Bettina von Arnim, was born on January
16, 1838, at Marienberg, near Boppard on the Rhine. He early
embraced the study of philosophy and theology, both at Berlin,
under Trendelenburg, and also at Munich. In 1864 he was
ordained priest, and two years later became privat docent in
the University of Wiirzburg. In 1873 he was appointed pro
fessor there, but in the same year resigned his office in conse
quence of his changed attitude towards the Church, and as an
opponent of the Vatican Council. Somewhat later, in response
to this change in his convictions, he separated himself definitely
from the Church.
In 1874 Brentano received a call to the University of Vienna,
and continued there teaching Philosophy until 1895, first as
ordinary professor, and afterwards, having meantime renounced
his professorship, as privat docent. The reasons which led him
to retire from this post also, are set forth in his work, My Last
Wishes for Austria (Stuttgart, 1895). After withdrawing from
his post as teacher he took up his residence at Florence.
Brentano regards Aristotle as his real teacher in philosophy,
and his two earliest publications, Von der mannigfachen Bedeu-
tung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (Freiburg, i. Br. 1862), and
Die Psychologic des Aristoteles insbesondere seine Lehre vom vou?
TToirjTtKos (Mainz, 1867), are a testimony to his comprehensive
study and thorough knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy.
Especially is he in agreement with the Stagirite regarding the
high position he would assign to the application of the empirical
method as the only one which, in regard alike to scientific
and philosophical problems, is able by cautious and gradual
119
APPENDIX
advance, to attain to knowledge. These first principles of
method, especially in their relation to psychological research,
he has set forth and practised in his first systematic work,
Psychologic vom Empirischen Standpunlcte (vol. i., Leipzig, 1874).
It was also his regard for this method of inquiry which early
imbued him with a special interest for the works of the most
eminent English philosophers of modern times, not only John
Locke and David Hume, but also Bentham, the two Mills,
Jevons and others. A study of these writers led Brentano to
enter at length in his Wiirzburg lectures into a critical and
explanatory treatment of English psychology and logic, charac
terizing it as a source of instruction and inspiration at a time
when other distinguished advocates of German philosophy
•looked askance at this attitude towards English thought, be
lieving that by its contact with English writers the peculiar
character of German thought might suffer. It will be observed
that only the first volume of the Psychology from the Empirical
Standpoint has hitherto appeared, and it seems hardly likely
that the work in its present form will be continued, for further
reflection convinced Brentano that descriptive1 psychology, or
Psychognosy, as of most importance in the examination and
presentation of psychological problems, must be separated from
genetic psychology,2 a study necessarily half physiological in
character ; and that the former problem as the naturally earlier
and least difficult study should first be as far as possible com
pleted.
Such psychognostical inquiries, although not yet in principle
separated from genetic inquiry, occupy by far the greater part
of the first volume of the Psychology from the Empirical Stand
point. Among the subjects there treated are : 1, the funda
mental revision of the classification of psychical phenomena,
and their division into the three main classes : ideas, judgments,
and phenomena of love and hate ; 2, and in particular, a new
and more appropriate characterization of the judgment.
The insufficiency of the old doctrine according to which judg-
1 i.e. the closest possible description and analysis of psychical events and
their contents, on the basis of inner observation.
2 i.e. the more difficult inquiry into the laws underlying the origin of
phenomena.
120
APPENDIX
raent consists essentially in a connexion of ideas, had already
been shown by Hume, and more recently was strongly emphasized
by Mill, though neither was able to arrive at perfect clearness
respecting its real nature. Notwithstanding this, the affinity
of Brentano's doctrine of the judgment with that of Mill, led
to a scientific correspondence, and later to arrangements for a
personal interview, when, at the last moment, the plan was
frustrated by the death of the great English investigator.
The new description of the judgment and its essential quali
ties form the basis for a reform of logic even in its most ele
mentary stages, a reform which, in its essential features, is
suggested in the above-mentioned work, and also touched upon
in the Essay here translated ; but this truer description of the
phenomenon of judgment also throws light upon the description
and classification of the modes of speech from the point of view
of their function or meaning, — a classification based upon true
and most essential distinctions. In comparison with phonetics
this branch is still little developed. What is here said, was seen
by eminent philologists like Fr. von Miklosich, the pioneer in
the sphere of Slav comparative philology. In the appendix will
be found an article bearing upon this view.
While engaged in a profound study of the descriptive pecu
liarities connected with the third fundamental class of psychical
states above referred to — a study analogous to that previously
undertaken by him with regard to the judgment — Brentano was
led to the discovery of the principles of ethical knowledge which
form the subject of this lecture. The author, in his lectures
delivered before students of all faculties, but especially to stu
dents in the faculty of law, during each winter session throughout
many years, presented a complete and fully developed system of
ethical teaching based upon these principles.1 Unfortunately,
1 Since this essay was written the statements as to the principles here
developed have been modified only in respect of two points which, if not
practically important, are still theoretically so, and these, with the
author's permission, may be here shortly referred to : —
1. In the lecture (p. 15) it is said that anything may be either affirmed
or denied, and that if the affirmation is right its denial must be considered
wrong, and vice versa. Tt is also stated that this is true analogously in
respect of love and hate.
121
APPENDIX
this lecture still remains unpublished. The same holds good of
many of his inquiries into " descriptive psychology," or psycho-
gnosie, e.g. inquiries into the nature of sense perceptions accord
ing to their qualitative and spatial nature, the nature of the
continuum, the time phenomenon, etc., the results of which are
hitherto familiar only to those who have either attended his
lectures, or have been present during private conversations.
As to the other branches of philosophy, the work of
Brentano already published forms but a portion — often but
the smaller portion — of investigations, which, in the manner
above described, have become known to a larger or smaller
circle of disciples. This explains the striking fact that, in pro
portion to the extent of what has been published, an unusually
large number of investigators and scholars appear in a greater
or lesser degree to have been influenced by Brentano. (Uberweg-
Heinze, in the eighth edition of the Grundriss der Geschichte
der Philosophie, reckons, as belonging to his school, six names
of men at present occupying important positions as teachers
of philosophy.)
One section of Brentano's doctrine of sense-perception forms
This Brentano no longer asserts, but rather observes that whereas the
whole must be denied, if but a part is untrue, a sum of good and bad, on the
other hand, may be of such a nature as nevertheless as a whole to be worthy
of love. It may be also so constituted that good and bad remain in
equilibrium.
2. In the lecture (p. 24), and in the corresponding note 37 (p. 87), it is
said that our preference qualified as right in the case where, for instance,
to one good another is added, is drawn, not from our knowledge of the
preferability of the sum as opposed to the parts, but that analytic judg
ments here yield the means of our advance in knowledge, and that the
corresponding preferences are therefore qualified as right, since the
knowledge (given analytically) is here the criterion. Here it is overlooked
that without the experience of acts of preferring we neither have nor could
have the conception, and therefore also our notion of preferability. And
so it is also true that it is by no means evident from analysis that one good
plus another is preferable to each of these goods taken singly. Here also
a complete analogy to the sphere of the true is wanting.
One truth added to another does not yield something more true. On the
other hand, one good plus another good yields a better. But that this is so
can only be understood by means of a special experience belonging pecu
liarly to this sphere, i.e. by means of the experience of acts of preferring
which are qualified as right.
122
APPENDIX
the substance of a lecture, Zur Lehre von der Empfindung, de
livered at the Third International Psychological Congress held
in Munich (1896), and published in the report of its proceedings
(1897). A fragment of the above system of ethical inquiry,
Uber das Schlechte als Gegenstand dichterischer Darstellung
(Leipzig, 1892), treats of the worth and preferability of the
ideas employed by the artist.
With regard to psycho-genetic problems, apart from the ques
tion as to the meaning and validity of Fechner's psycho-physical
law, a question discussed in the first volume of his Psychology
and elsewhere, and that of the spirituality and immortality of
the soul, which formed repeatedly the substance of lectures at
Vienna University, Brentano has especially occupied himself
with the laws of the association of ideas. One result of this
study is his lecture, Das Genie, published in 1892, which seeks
to explain the artistic productions of men of genius — often
regarded as something quite unique and inexplicable — as a
development of psychical events which universally control our
imaginative life.
Of Brentano's researches in metaphysics and in the theory of
knowledge it must also be said that hitherto they remain still
unpublished, though they are familiar to a greater or smaller
circle of disciples. In this latter sphere are to be mentioned
particularly his inquiries respecting the nature of our insight
into the law of causality, the logical justification of induction,
the a priori nature of mathematics, and the nature of analytic
judgments. In ontological questions also psychognosie has
proved fruitful to the investigator in leading him to an under
standing and to an analysis based upon experience, of the most
important metaphysical notions, as, for instance, causality, sub
stance, necessity, impossibility, etc., notions which some,
despairing of the task rightly insisted upon by Hume, of showing
their origin to be based upon perception and experience, have
sought to explain straight away as a priori categories.
For the rest, Brentano, in regard to metaphysics, is a decided
theist. He is an adherent of the theory of evolution, while
denying that accidental variations and natural selection in the
struggle for existence render explicable the phenomena of
123
APPENDIX
evolution and the teleological character of the organism, basing
his objections, among other things, upon the fact that this attempt
at a solution not only leaves unexplained the first beginnings of
an organism, but also takes too little account of the fact that
with the increasing perfection and complication of the organism
it becomes more and more improbable that an accidental varia
tion will lead to an improvement upon that which already exists.
And yet if there is to be progress, the organisms which, in the
struggle for existence, survive must not only be more perfect
than those which perish, but also more perfect than the organ
isms through which they themselves are descended.
Brentano's views on the historical development of philo
sophical inquiry and the causes determining that development,
the present state of philosophy and its views regarding the
future, he has set forth in various publications : Die Geschichte der
Philosophic im MittelaLter (Mohler's Kirchengeschichte, vol. ii.
1868) ; Uber die Grilnde der Entmutigung auf philosophischem
Gebiete (Vienna, 1874), delivered as an inaugural address on
entering upon his work at Vienna University ; Was fur ein
Philosoph manchmal Epoche macht (Vienna, 1876) ; Uber die
Zukunft der Philosophie (Vienna, 1893) ; and Die vier Phasen
der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand (Stuttgart, 1895).
In the last work a concise survey is made of the entire course
of the History of Philosophy, and it is there shown how in the
three periods, rightly regarded as distinct (Greek Philosophy,
the Philosophy of the Middle Ages, and Modern Philosophy),
there is each time an analogous change, a rising or blossoming
period, and three periods of decadence, of which those which
succeed are always the psychologically necessary result of the
preceding. That in so doing Brentano has characterized the
latest phase of German philosophy, the so-called idealistic direc
tion from Kant to Hegel as the third or mystic period of de
cadence (howbeit with all due recognition of the talents of these
writers) has naturally aroused violent opposition, though it has
not found any real refutation.
It has been already said that Brentano's earliest efforts were
directed to historical inquiries and especially to a presentation
of the Aristolelian psychology and to important sections of his
124
APPENDIX
Metaphysics. The results of these researches, diverging as the}7
did in many respects from the traditional view, did not fail to
awaken the attention of other investigators. Their attitude,
however (with a few exceptions like Trendelenburg, and in part
also Grote), was, on the whole, hostile and polemic. This was
especially so in the case of E. Zeller, in the later edition of his
Greek Philosophy, and in view of the reputation which this work
enjoys, Brentano thought it necessary to offer, as against Zeller' s
attacks, at least with regard to one point, an apology for his own
view, a point where the threads of metaphysics and psychology
become most intimately related, and where at the same time,
the contrast between the opposing views of these two writers in
the psychological and metaphysical spheres alike culminate.
And so there appeared in the Report of the Proceedings of the
Imperial Academy of Sciences in Vienna (1882) Brentano's
article : " Uber den Creatianismus des Aristoteles, in regard
to which E. Zeller in the same year, in the Report of the Pro
ceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin
(vol. 49), published a detailed reply under the title : " Uber
die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Ewigkeit des Geistes." The
charge which is there made by Zeller against Brentano of inter
preting Aristotle without sufficient confirmation and with over-
confidence, Brentano has sufficiently repelled in his Offener
Brief an Herrn Prof. Dr. E. Zeller (Leipzig, 1883), and the
proofs which are here offered of the way in which Zeller, on his
part, bases his own attempts at explanation and his charges
against Brentano show distinctly that, if here one of the two
opponents is really open to the charge of over-confidence, it is
at anv rate not Brentano.
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INDEX TO AUTHORS
ADDISON, JOSEPH, 22.
* Alien,' 33.
Allen, Rev. G. C, 42.
Andom, R., 33.
Anitchkow, Michael, 3.
Anon., 3, 33.
Arber, Professor Edward, 22-25.
Argyll, Duke of, 33.
Armstrong, Arthur Coles, 42.
Arnold, T. W., 3.
Arnold, Sir Edwin, 45.
Ascham, Roger. 22, 23.
BACON, LORD, 23.
Bain, R. Nisbet, 3.
Ballin, Mrs. A., 26.
Bankes, Roden, 26.
Barmby, Beatrice Helen, 42.
Barnfield, Richard, 25.
Bartholomew, J.G..F.R.G.S., 14.
Bates, Arlo, 33.
Battersby, Caryl, 42.
Battye, A. Trevor-, F.L.S., 14.
Baughan, B. E., 42.
Bayley, Sir Steuart Colvin, 7.
Beatty, William, M.D., 3.
Beaumont, Worby, 26.
Berthet, E., 33.
Bertram, James, 4.
Bidder, George, 42.
Bidder, M., 33.
Birdwood, Sir George, M.D.,
K.C.I.E., C.S.I., LL.D., 15.
Birrell, Augustine, Q.C., M.P., 4.
Black, C. E. D., 10.
Blount, Bertram, 26.
Bonavia, Emmanuel, M.D., 26.
Boswell, James, 4.
Bower, Marian, 33.
Brabant, Arthur Baring, 10.
Bradley, A. GM 4.
Brame, J. S. S., 28.
Bright, Charles, F.R.S.E., 4.
Bright, Edward Brailston, C.E.,4-
Brownell, W. C., 20.
Browning, Robert, 42.
Bryden, H. A., 33.
Burroughs, John, 5.
CAIRNES, CAPT. W. E., 33.
Campbell, James Dykes, 42.
Campbell, Lord Archibald, 5.
Capes, Bernard, 33.
Carmichael, M., 34.
Caxton, William, 24.
' Centurion,' 5.
Chailley-Bert, J., 5.
Chamberlain, Rt. lion. Joseph,
M.P.,D.C.L., LL.D., 5.
Chambers, R. W., 34.
Charles, Joseph F., 34.
Charrington, Charles, 34.
Coldstream, J. P., 26.
Cole, Alan S., 20.
Collins, J. Churton, 5.
Conway, Sir William Martin, 14.
Cooper, Bishop Thomas, 25.
Cooper, E. H., 34.
Cornish, F. Warre, 34.
Courtney, W. L., 5.
Coxon, Ethel, 34.
Cunynghame, Henry, 20.
Currie, Maj.-Gen. Kendall, 5.
Curzon, The Right Hon. George
N. (Lord Curzon of Kedles-
ton), 5.
DALE,T.F. (Stoneclink), 17, 34.
Daniell, A. E., 20, 31.
Danvers, Fred. Charles, 7.
Darnley, Countess of, 34.
Davidson, Thomas, 6.
Decker, Thomas, 24.
Deighton, Kenneth, 6.
De Bury, Mile. Blaze, 6.
Denny, Charles E., 34.
Dinsmore, Charles A. , 6.
Doughty, Charles, 43.
Doyle, C. W., 34.
Dryden, John, 43.
49
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Duff, C. M., 6.
Durand, Lady, 15.
Dutt, R. C., C.I.E., 6.
EARLE, ALICE MORSE, 12.
Earle, John, 22.
Elliott, Robert H., 15.
Englehardt, A. P., 15.
FILIPPI, FiLiPPO DE, 15.
Fish, Simon, 24.
Flowerdew, Herbert, 35.
Forbes- Robertson, Frances, 35.
Ford, Paul Leicester, 35.
Fox, Arthur W., 6.
GAIRDNER, JAMES, 6.
Gale, Norman, 43.
Gall, John, M.A., LL.B., 27.
Gardner, Edmund, 43.
Gascoigne, George, 22.
Gemmer, C. M., 43.
Glasgow, Ellen, 35.
Godkin, E. L., 6, 7.
Goffic, Charles le, 36.
Gomme, G. Laurence, 7, 36, 37,
47-
Googe, Barriabe, 23.
Gosson, Stephen, 22.
Graham, David, 43.
Granby, Marchioness of, 20.
Greene, Robert, M.A., 24.
Gribble, Francis, 7.
Guillemard, Dr. F. H. H., 16.
Gwynn, Paul, 35.
HABINGTON, WILLIAM, 23.
Hackel, Eduard, 27.
Hake, A. Egmont, 7.
Hanna, Col. H. B., 7, 18.
Hannan, Charles, F.R.G.S., 35.
Harald,J. H., 31.
Harewood, Fred., 33.
Harris, Joel Chandler (Uncle
Remus), 35.
Hayden, E. G., 7.
Hewitt, J. F., 7.
Hewlett, Maurice, 35.
Hodgson, R. LI., 15, 34.
Holden, Ed. S., LL.D., 8.
Holland, Clive, 27.
Hone, W. H. St. John, 8, 20.
Houfe, C. A., 8.
Howell, James, 23.
Hunter, Sir W. W., 8.
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Shakespeare, William, 45.
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52.
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Slaughter, Frances, 34.
Smith, Edward, 12.
Smith, F. Hopkinson, 40.
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Sneath, E. Hershey, 12, 32.
Soane, John, 40.
Somervell, Arthur, 48.
Somerville, William, 43.
Spalding, Thomas Alfred, 12, 18.
Spenser, Edmund, 45.
Stadling, J., 16.
Stanihurst, Richard, 24.
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Thorburn, S. S., 41.
Thornton, Surg. -General, C.B.,
13-
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Tottel, K., 23.
Townsend, Meredith, 12.
Traill, H. D., 13.
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30-
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