BY THE SAME AUTHOR
THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 1895
DOCTRINE AND DEVELOPMENT 1898
NEW COLLEGE, in 'College Histories' Series
(with R. S.R.a.IT) 1901
THE ULTIMATE BASIS OF THEISM, in
' Contentio Veritatis, by six Oxford Tutors" 190
PERSONALITY HUMAN AND DIVINE, in
Personal Idealism ' editcd by H. C. STtTtT 1909
CHRISTUS IN ECCLESIA 19o¢
THE
THEORY
OF G00D AND EVIL
A TREATISE ON MORAl. PHILOSOPHY
HASTINGS RASHI)ALI,
n.x'r'r. çox'ouo), ttos. n.c.L. (nçnHA)
FELLOV AND TUTOlt oF NEW COI.LEGE OXFOI|D
VOLUME I
OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1907
IIENRY FROWI)E, 51.A.
I'UBLISIIER TO TIE UNIVERSITY OF OXI"ORD
LONDON, EDINBURGH
NEW YORK AND TORONTO
TO THE M EMORY
OF
MY TEACHERS
THOMAS HILL GREEN
AND
HENRY SIDGWICK
PREFACE
THE scope of the present work is perhaps ruade suticiently
obvious by the title-page. If is an attempt to detl with the
chief topics usually discussed in books bearing the title' Moral
Philosophy' or ' Ethics.' If is on 8 rather larger scale than the
books gener8lly described 8s ' Textbooks,' or' Introductions,' and
is occupied to some extent vith difficulties and controversies
which can hardly be called 'elementary.' Still, I hve in writ-
ing it had chiefly before my mind the want8 of undergraduate
students in Philosophy. I have endeavoured, tt.s far ts possible,
to assume no previous icquaintance either with cthicl or with
general Philosophy: but it has hot, in 811 p,rts of the work,
been possible fo 8void alluding fo the arguments and objections
of writers whose systems cannot be fully exp18ined or examined
in 8 book like the present. That is especially the case in
13ook II, which is 18rgely occupied with replies to objections
and with the criticism of views more or less opposed to my
own. Even there I have endeavoured to make the drift of
my argument intelligible fo readers who have hot read the
works criticized. But those who want 8 short «tnd fairly
elementary treatment of the subject might perhaps read Book I
by itself, or pass st once from Book I to Book III. That book
deals in part with met8physical questions which do hot 8dmit of
an altogether ' popular ' treatment ; this section of the vork would
no doubt be better understood by 8 student who has read enough
to know in 8 general way the meaning of the metaphysic8l
problem, but I hope if will not be round wholly unintelligible fo
those who may nake their first 8cquaintance with it in these
pages. Advanced students 8re more likely to conplain that
I bave touched upon many great questions, hot specially belong-
ing fo the ethioE1 branch of Philosophy, in a way which must
appear unstisfying fo those who 8re well versed in them, and
dogmatic fo those who do not 8gree with me. I ould venture
ri PREFACE
in reply fo such a criticism fo plead that the necessity of touch-
ing upon difficult questions without getting fo $he bo$tom of
them is fo some exteut inseparable from any treatment of Ethics
which does hot form part of a complete course or syste,n
Philosophy: and the difficulty is increased when one wishes
o avoid allusiveness and technicality of a kind which would
necessarily render the book perplexing and uninstructive to
a student beginning the subject, or fo the general reader who
may take some interest in the ethical and religious aspects
of Philosophy without wishing fo embark upon an elaborate
course of Logic, Psychology, and Metaphysic.
The idea prevails among some Philosophers that Moral Philo-
sophy is a particularly ' easy' branch of Philosophy. I believe
that if is easier than other branches of Philosophy in the sense
that ifs more elementary problems can be discussed with less
technicality, and can be understood more readily af a first read-
ing by persons of ordinary ability and education. For this
reason if seems to me a peculiarly good subjec for the student
of Philosophy fo begin upon, although logically if might well be
considered fo corne rather af the end than at the beginning
of a philosophical course. But, though the controversies which
l-ange round the words ' Utilitarianism ' and ' Intuitionism ' can
be understood and discussed ahnost without reference fo meta-
physical problems, the ultimate question of Moral Philosophy
the meaning and nature of the ideas 'good,' 'right,'' duty'--is
after all the ultimate question of all Philosophy, and involves
the others. I ara very far from thinking that I have got fo the
bottom of all the difflculties involved in that fundamental
problem: upon some of them I am aware that I have hardly
touched in these pages. Nor is there anything very original
in such a solution of them as I have been able fo offer: and yet
I am not aware that, in English af any rate, there is any syste-
matic treatment of them, written from anything like my own
point of view, fo which I could point as altogether meeting the
wants of the class of readers for whom this book is chiefly
intended. Neither of the great writers fo whom I feel I owe
most in the special department of Ethicsthe late Professor
Sidgwick, and the late Professor T. H. Green whose lectures and
PREFACE vii
private classes I used fo attend us an undergraduate--can weli
be regarded as having said the last word upon the subject by
students of a generation later who bave profited not merely
by the criticism which each of them supplies upon the other.
but by the general progress of Philosophy since the first appear-
ance of Sidgwick's Metlwds of Etlics (1874) and of Green's
P'olegomena fo Ethics (i88.). Since the last-mentioned date
the supposed easiness of this branch of Philosophy, or the
superîor attractiveness of Logic and Metaphysic, has led perhaps
fo a certain unwillingness fo write separate treatises on Ethics,
af least among those who take what one may call a constructive
view of the subject . But the periodalmost a quarter of
a century--which has clapsed since the dcath of Green has
been a period of great philosophical activity, and (I venture to
think) of great philosophical pl'ogrcss, and there bas bcen much
incidental treatment of ethical questions in the works both of
English and of foreign Philosophers. There seems therefore
room for a fresh systematic treatlnent of the main problems
of Moral Philosophy in wht I will venture to call (in spire
of great differences both of opinion and of temperalncnt) the
spirit which animated both of them.
Among more recent writers I have learned most perhps from
those from whom I differ most. I bave so frequently criticized
the writings of Mr. F. H. Bradley tlmt I should like to say that.
fundamenta]ly as I dissent froln his ultimate position, I believe
that no one has a deeper sense than myself of personnel obligation
fo his brilliant writings, or a decper appreciation of the stimulus
which he has given fo philo.ophica! progress, hot only in his own
I should wish fo speak with respect of three short English textbooks--
Professor Muirhead's Elements of Ethics Professor Mackenzie's lntvducti«
to Moral Philosophy, and Bishop d'Arcy's Short Study of E hics ; but none of
them cun be said to represent exactly my own point of view. I feel more
sympathy on the purely ethical, though not on the metaphysical, side with
a quite recent work--lIr. Moore's very powerful essay, Princætæa EtMca.
wlùch appeared when my own work was prctically finished. Professor
Paulsen's System of Ethics is an admirable and very attractive book, which
represents on the whole a point of view not unlike my own, but it hardly
touches upon many diiïiculties which bave attracted mach attention in
Eagland.
viii PREFACE
Universiy of Oxford, but throughout the English-speaking
world and beyond it. Unfortunately, Ehics seems to me pre-
cisely the side of Philosophy on which his influence has been
least saluary. I trust that, while criticizing him wih freedom,
I have not failed in the respect that is due perhaps he most
original of conenporm T hinkers.
Wih regard o my criicism of the able work of Professor
A. E. Taylor (The Problem of Condtct), I should wish to explain
that the recent nmnber of thc PMlosophical Review in vhich he
withdraws his viev al)out the merely ' apparent' character of
evil did not corne into my hands till the whole of my criticism
was printed and some of if had been final]y passed for the press,
though I had hot failed fo notice the change of tone already
traceable iu his Elements of Metaphysics. I can only therefore
express my regret for having devoted so much space fo the
criticism of a position vhich its author has abandoned.
If is useless for an author to oflr apologies for the defects of
a book which he is not compelled to write. In explanation
of such deficiencies of the present work as may arise from the
absence of a more exhaustive knowledge of the literature bearing
upon his and cognate subjects, I may, however, be allowed
to plead, for the information of persons unacquainted with our
English system of University teaching, that Oxford College
Turs are very far from possessing the leisure of a German
or an American Professor, aud that they have fo choose between
publishing imperfect work and hot publishing ai all. They may
perhaps console themselves with the reflection that the method
of individual teaching by means of essays and conversation
gives them opportunities of appreciating the real wans of
students vhich are hardly accessible to teachers who sec their
pupils only in the lecture-room. I have a strong feeling that
the progress of knowledge, especially in the region of Philosophy,
is often rerded by an excessive shrinking from criticism, and by
an indefinite postponement of publication in the hope of more
completely satisfying an author's ideal.
The following articles which have already appeared in various
periodicals bave been freely ruade use of with the kind per-
mission of their editors :--' Professor Sidgwick's Utilitarianism"
PREFACE ix
i M$nd, 1885) ; ' 1)r. liartineau and the Theory of Vocation' (Mind,
1888) ; ' The Theory of Punishmenç' (T]e Internatéonal Journ«l
of Ethics, I89I); 'The Limits of Casuistry' (Inter'national
Jou'al of Etlics, I894); 'Justice' (The Economic Review,
I89I, I89oE); 'Can there be a Sure of Pleasures?' (Mind, 1899);
' The Ethics of Forgiveness' (Inte'mtion«l Journal of Ethi«s,
9oo); 'The Commensurability of all Values' (Mgnd, I9¢)oE ).
Some of the earlier aicles have been largely re-written : others
are reprinted with little change.
Dr. McTaggart of Trinity College, Cambridge, has kindly read
through the whole of my proofs, and I ara much indebted fo his
criticisms und suggestions. For assistance and ,dvice in dealing
with parts of the work I ara similarly indebted fo ]ir. C. C. J. Webb
of lIagdalen College, Oxford, and several other friends, nor must
[ omit to mention the help of my wife in the final revision.
H. RASHDALL.
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME I
BOOK I. THE MORAL CRITERION
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY
PAGE
The exact scope and object of a Science is only arrived af gradually,
as the Science itself progresses. This applies rG Phi]osophy and
branches
And the individual student of Philosophy bas rG discover
meaning gradually
Hence no attempt wll be ruade af an exact definition of the scope
of Mol Philosophy beyond saying that we are investigatng the
meaning and application of the tes ' right ' and ' wrong' : plan of
the work explained 3
CHAPTER II. PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM
I. Bentham's vicw that nothing but pleasure can possibly be desired 7
Ifs plausibility depends upon a confusion between three possible
interpretatons: (x) that I always dG that which it gives me most
pleasure af the moment rG dG; (2) that the motive of an action is
always some future pleasure ; (3) that the motive is always rG get
the greatest plcasure on the whole. It is clear that people often dG
things which they once knew would not secure most pleasure on the
whole 8
If it be said that af the moment they persuade themselves that
such things will dG sG, this by itself implics a bias in favour of
immediate pleasure : this involves rejection of the third view
Nor can if be saîd that I always dG what is pleasantest af the
moment, for people offert choose painful things for the sake of some-
thing future .
This again implies that the nearer pleasure is more attractive
But the superior attractiveness of some pleasures over others can-
hot be explained merely by {) expe¢tcd intensity and (2) proximity :
e. g. in case of anger
If hot pleasure but a particular kind of pleasure is desired, this
really implies that something is desired besides pleasure
The hedonistic Psychology involves a hysteron-proteron: in many
cases the pleasure can only be accounted for by pre-existent desire
Few pleasures, chiefly sensual and aesthetic, can be explained
without admitting ' disinterested desires'
PAGE
CHAPTER III. RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM
I. If if is possible to desire other objects than one's own pleasure,
the question remains whether if is rational to do so .
Even the Egcistic Hedonist contends that his end of action is in-
trinsically more reasonable than another's ; and if so, no reason can
be given why one person's pleusure should be desired more than
nother's 4
The recogniticn of this leads us from Egoistic fo Universalistic
ldedonism
II. If if were admitted that Altruism grew out of Egoism, this
would hot prove the hedonistic Psychology, but such a theory is
inconsistent with all that is known about instinct 20
Some instincts are race-preserving, even in animals 22
In men such instincts gradually pass into desires 23
III. J. S. Mill's admission of differences of quality in pleasure
«tbandons psychologioel Hedonism: fo desire a superior quality in
pleasure is hot to desire pleasure 25
Pleasures differ in kind, if by a pleasure is meant hot abstract
pleasantness but a pleasant state of consciousness 26
IV. The difficulties of psychological IIedonism illustrated by the
possibility of desiring objects that will hot be realized till after death
Case of the atheistic Martyr
The pains and pleasures of Conscience cannot be included in the
calculus, for they imply the existence of desire for something besides
pleasure
V. Elements of truth in psychological Hedonism
() The gratification of every desire gives pleasure SI
(2) Pictured or experienced pleasantness strengthens desire
(3) Especially in the case of bad or indifferent desires, which
may be disinterested as well as good ones, but hot in quite the saine
.ense or degree
(4) 1Not all desires are ' disinterested': there is such a thing as
iesire of pleasure .
(5) 1Nor need the possibility of desiring 'sure of pleasures' be
denied (see below, Book II, Ch. i) .
(6) The 'paradox of Hedonism' ('if you aire af pleasure you will
hot get if ') has some truth in if, but is often exaggerated "
VI. The theory t.hat in every desire self-satisfaction is sougl " --
involves the saine hysteron-proteron as the hedonistic Psychology; "-
if I regard the satisfaction of a desire for my nelghbour's gooà as ' ,
my good, this implies that I first desired if apart from ifs tendency fo
promote ny good
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii
PAGE
And this involves the recognition of an ' ough'
II. The late Prof. Henry Sidgwick's Rationalistic Utilitarianism :
his position compared with Mill's 49
Sidgwick admits the existence of disinterested desires, and holds
that if is 'right' or our duty fo pursue the greatest pleasure of
Society on the whole, though such virtuous conduct is hOt in itself
a good 5
0bjeetions fo Sidgwick's posîtion : (I) If practically admits that if
is reasonable for A fo promote B's pleasure ; yet if treats B as a being
who may reasonably pursue nothing but his own pleasure : if such
conduct is reasonable for A, why not for B? If A is fo promote B's
happiness only so far as is consistent with B's promoting the general
pleasure, this seems fo make virtue part of the end
(2) The Dualism of the Practical Reason admitted by Sidgwick is
untenable
(3) If the Egoist is pronounced reasonable in desiring his own
good, and the Altruist in desiring general good, 'reasonable' must
be used in different senses. 56
(4) If fo act rationally is hot itself a good, why should I be
rational ? 57
(5) Sidgwick admits that he cannot fully establish the reason-
ableness of right conduct without the postulates of God and Immor-
tality, but his Hedonism undennines the principal ground for these
beliefs
This criticism sugsts that a rationalist Ehic cannot be hedonistic,
but must treat Virtue or character (i. e. af least the disposition fo pro-
more the general good) as itself part of the good to be promoted 63
III. Reply fo Sidgwick's objections fo making character an end-
in-itself: they seem fo imply forgetfulness that there are other ele-
ments in consciousness besides feeling, i. e. will and knowledge, and
that these may have value .
The final objection is tha'the Moral Consciousness does pronounce
moral goodness fo have value
IV. We bave thus arrived af Kant's position that there are two
rational ends--Virtue and Happiness .
And this will remove most of the practical objections fo Htedonism 72
But the Moral Consciousness does hOt favour the theory that
nothing but pleasure and Virtue (in the sense of disposition fo pro-
more pleasure) is intrinsically good : if includcs other elements in the
good, e.g. Culture. The true good consists in certain states, hot
merely of Feeling, but of Thought and of Volition . 73
V. The relation of Thought, Feeling, and Will fo each other: use
of these and other terres explained 76
xiv ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER IV. [NTUITIONISM
PAO
I. By Intuitionism is meant the theory that the morul faculty pro-
nounces either particular acts (unphilosophical Intuitionism) or rules
of action fo be morally binding without reference fo consequences 8o
Unphilosophical Intuitionism seems to reduce Morality fo mere
caprice, unless it is held that the isolated judgements imply some
principle
To philosophical Intuitionism the following objections may be
made :--
(i) Granted the existence of an intuit.ive impulse to condemn acts
without reference fo consequences, can such judgements be reg.rded
as rational or valid ? 83
(ii) Variations of moral judgements in different faces, ages, and
individuals : but this objection is hot final, for self-evident truths may
hOt be evident fo everybody. 84
(iii) The rule which seems intuitively recognized is often incapable
of exact definition, and admits of exceptions about which there are
no clear intuitions 85
(iv} The rule generally involves a tacit reference to consequences :
some consequences are included in out conception of the act 87
(v) 8ome alleged intuitions contradict others: the requirements
of Benevolence may collide with those of Veracity 89
(ri) The only intuitions which really commend themselves upon
reflection are precisely those upon which Utilitarianism is basedl
the axioms of Prudence, Rational Benevolence, and Equity 90
II. We are thus drlven to accept the principle that actions are fo
be judged by their tendency to promote a universal Well-being. We
bave in the last resort fo appeal to intuitions or judgements of value,
but these relate hOt fo acts but to ends 9 t
This position allows us to recognize that acts may have a value as
well as consequences, for fo the Non-hedonist the means are offert
part of the end 96
Some pleasures are bad 98
III. The moral iudgement is thus a judgement of value--' this is
good," hOt {imrnediately) ' this is right'
CHAPTER ¥. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
I. Our moral judgements involve un ultimate unanalysable idea--
ought' or duty. Utilitarianism requires such an ' ought" as much
as any other sytem, ashas been recognized by Sidgwick
Kant is thus (by Sidgwick's admission)right in tuaking Morality
a 'categorical imperative' in so far as this means that 'rightness
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER VI. REASON AND FEELING
I. It is implied in what precedes that the moral faculty is Reason,
hot any kind of feeling or emotion 138
This does hot imply that the reasonableness of a mor.l act causes
it fo bc done without desire 4o
Moral judgements are normally accompanied by emotion 41
II. The Moral Sense theory of Ethics a reaction aginst an exaggera-
tire Rationalism 42
is ierceived immediately by Reason, :tnd tht the rightness of any
act supplies a motive for doing it
He is also right in recognizing that the prformance of duty is the
agent's highest good o 7
II. But Kant was wrong in suppo«ing that the bare notion of
a Categorical lmperutive will enable us, without any appeal to
experience, to decide v:hat in detail if is right to do .
Experience cannot tell us what is good, but neither can we say
is good without experience . oo
No content for the Moral Law can be got from Kant's first rule.
'Act as if the law of thy action were fo become by thy will
universa] ' o
Kgnt confused two senses of the word ' categoricl ' : a categorical
raie (in one sense) does hot exclude exceptions . 6
III. The principle oï'duty for duty's sake' did hot
supposed) imply that no other motive can give mord value to
conduct 9
Knt ruade the saine mistake s the hedonistic Psychologists 122
IV. The 'sense of duty" must not be treated as unnecessaT or
belonging fo an imperfect Morality
The true moral motive is the rational love of persons (including in
due measure one's self) and of the things which constitute their true
good
Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant 9
V. When if is recognized that other ends or objects of desire are
good besides (} Virtue and (} Happiness, the sharp Dualism of the
Kantian Ethics disappears . 13o
VL No content for ?dorality can be got out of Kant's second rule.
' Use Humanity always az an end, never as a means only' 3
VII. Kmt's third rule, ' Act as member of a kingdom of ends,' is
more rational, but insufficient : ambiguity of all his formulae 33
VIII. The idea of ' good' is logically prior to the idea of' right,'
though each implies the other 35
' Value' the fundamental idea in Morality 37
xvi ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENT.
PAiR
But if the Moral Sense be only a feeling of approbation, whence it
superiority fo other feelings ? t43
Such feelings can have no universal or objective validity [45
III. 8uch ethical maxims as those of Prudence, Rational Benevo-
lence, and Equity are indeed self-evident, but their resemblance fo
mathematical axioms may be exaggerated, or rather they are nothing
but mathematical axioms applied fo conduct, and cannot give a con-
tent fo Morality apart from the judgcment ' this or that is good' 47
And such judgements bave not the precision or exactness of
mathematical judgements 49
They are more like aesthetic judgements, if these are recognized
as possessing objective validity t49
IV. Further elements of truth in the Moral Sense view . 5
The moral judgement is ultimately a judgement upou the value of
some state ofconsciousness, and this always includes feeling 52
We could hardly pronounce knowledge or even goodness fo bave
value ibr a consciousness which was incapable ofderiving any kind oï
satisfaction from them 153
Sometimes the feeling fo which value is assigned may be merely a
feeling of pleasure or pain, but in other cases if may be some emotion
connected with Farticular kinds of conduct, in the absence of which
Reason could hot pronounce the act good or bad r54
But the judgement that the emotion is good is not the saine thing
as the emotion itself T55
If must be remembered (I) that these emotions, in which the value
of an act often lies, are hot arbitrarily selected, but are closely con-
nected with out whole ideal of human good 57
(2) That we cannot (as some Rationalists attempt fo do) pronounce
what is good for man without experience of his actual sensitive,
aesthetic, and emotional nature . 59
(3) Such judgements often require an experience which is beyond
the reach of a single individual: hence the importance of Authority
in Ethics I6O
The above considerations are often forgotten by pure Utilitarians,
as well as by ultra-Rationalists, e.g. Plato 6r
V. Martineau's view that Conscience is neither feeling nor Reason
is scarcely intelligible. I64
Gizycki's objections fo ethical Rationalism turn upon misunder-
standing . I66
I. Examination of the view that, though moral judgements are
rational, they are inseparable from a certain specific emotion in the
absence of which they could not be marie i68
In popular language Conscience implies hot merely the judgement
that this is right or wrong, but the feelings and desires which are
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
presupposed by such judgements and which prompt fo the doing
of the actions judged right .
NOTE ON THE AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT o o
CHAPTER VII. IDEAL UTILITARIANISM
I. Out view that acts are right or wrong uccording as they tend or
do hot tend fo promote a Well-being or ml.m,ia or good consist-
ing of various element.% the relative value of which is intuitively
discerned, may be called Ideal Utiliturianism .
Importance of the three axioms of Prudence, Benevolence, and
Equity
Benevolence must be regulated by Justice .
Popular uses of the terre Justice all imply impartiality in the treat-
ment of individuals upon the basis of some established system of
distribution: ultimate Justice would mean the distribution of the
true good in accordance with the principle that one man's good is of
as much intrinsic value as the like good of another's .
All risques may be included in Benevolence regulated by Justice, but
if is convenient to give distinctive names fo special kinds of contribu-
tion fo social good
II. Even the virtues which are most obviously altruistic bave a value
of their own greater than that of the pleasure which they produce,.
e. g. Humaniy or the social affections .
The ground on which we condemn Infanticide
III. Value of knowledge,, culture, aesthetic and intellectual activiy,
and the accompanying emotions
Veracity and love of truth
IV. Purity
Temperance
V. Humility
VI. The prohibition of Suicide
VIL Duty towards the lower animais
VIII. Ditïiculty of finding a suitable name for an Ethic which is
teleological but hot hedonistic. Such a view widely held . .
IX. When lIorality, pleusure, and other things are pronounced
good, they must hot be thouht of as lying side by side without affect-
ing or modifying one another : they are all parts, elements, or aspects
of an ideally good life which it is the duty of each to promote for ail
CHAPTER VIII. JUSTICE
I. No ethical question can be answered without deciding the ques-
tion ' Whose good is fo be promoted ?' .
There are two competing ideals of Justice : () Equality, and (2) Just
recompense or reward .......
RASHDALL [ b
xvii
PAGE
75
77
"84
187
x89
x9x
x92
x97
204
2x6
219 ,
222
xviii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAOE
II. Examintion ofthe Benthmite maxim, ' Every one to count for
one, nobody for more than one' 223
Abstractly considered, the maxim seems rational 224
But what if an equal distribution diminishes the amount of good to
be distributed ? 225
Equality of considemtion is the on]y equality which is always right,
and this may often demand an unequal distribution 226
No unconditional rights except the right fo consideration 227
Moreover men's capacity for enjoying good varies 228
' Equality of oppounity ' would bear too hardly on the weak 23 °
Some LibeoEy is a condition of Well-being, and this always involves
some inequality 233
III. Does superior capacity constitute a claire fo superior con-
sideration ? . . 234
In most cases such superior consideration is in the interests of all;
but, even whe this is hot the case, we must adroit that higher Well-
being is of more value than lower, and those who are capable of it are
therefore entitled fo superior considerution 235
We can therefore accept the Benthamite maxim only in the sense
' Caeteris paribus every one fo count for one,' or' Every man's good to
count as equal fo the li]-e good of every other' 240
Final collisions between the higher good of few and the lower good
of many rarely occur, especially if the good of the future be duly
remembered . 240
Summary of conclusions 24][
IV. The theory of Reward assumes two forms--'to every man
according fo his merit,' and ' fo every man according fo his work' 243
The two views would work out very differently 243
To say that Justice means paying each man in propolion fo his
work involves forgetfulness of the fact that economic value is relative :
if competition be excluded, there is no means of fixing values 244
To equate the amou;t of different kinds of work is equally im-
possible 247
Nor is the superior dignity--moral, aesthetic, or intellectual--of
different kinds of labour a ground for differential remunerution . 249
Nor yet the difference of natural capacity 250
If is true that the man of higher faculty may require exceptionally
favourable external conditions for the realization of his higher
capacities, and Justice requires that he should hure them . 253
Should superior merit, in the sense ofsuperior lV[omlity or devotion
to the geneml good, be differentially rewarded ? 955
As a marrer of abstract right, the answer is ' No,' and af all events
there is no way of rewarding superior vilue without rewarding
superior capacity; yet if is true that the good ought fo be ruade
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENT xix
PAG :
happy, but the proper reward is the pleasure which results from the
exercise of the superior capacity under fuvourable external con-
ditions . 257
A limit fo the material reward of virt.ue will be set by the eon-
sideration that beyond a certain point such reward might be un-
favourable fo the virtue if.self 259
Hence, prctically, abstract merit must be put aside as a canon of
distributive Justice, and reward for work must be determined by
considerations of social expediency 259
Rewurd will alwuys be necessary, but may become increasingly non-
material 260
V. We bave found that eaeh of out competing ideals, (t Equality
(2) Reward, is true only in the sense in which if is the equivalent of
the other, i. e. every one's good is equally valuable with the like good
of another, but superior good is worth more than inïerior, and the
man of superior capacity should therefore receive proportionately
greater consideration 262
ri. But what if there be a final collision between Benevolence,
i.e. the promotion of good on the whole, and Justice, i. e. the fairest
possible distribution of tho good in proportion fo capacity ? In prac-
tice we should deem if rational fo sacrifice a little good on the whoIe
to a great increase of Justice in ifs distribution, and vice versa, but hot
to sacrifice much good for a little nearer appmach fo just distribution
of if 264
The two prineiples might be brought together by treating Equality
or Justice in distribution as itself a good, but if is diflieult fo regard
such an abstr&ction as a good 266
But, if we regard Morality as a good-in-itself, we may treat Justice
in distribution as part of the good enjoyed by the just individual or
society, and so there will be no real loss of good by the society which
sacrifices some lower good for the sake of juster distribution 267
VII. Justice represents an idem which cannot be immediately
realized 259
Justice as t.he immediate duty of the individual consists in (I) seek-
ing fo promote a nearer approach in social arrangements to the ideal
of equality of consideration, (2) obsérving the principle in private
relations so far as is immediately piacticable, (3) respecting the
existing social and political order so far us if cannot be immediately
changed tbr the better 273
VIII. The rights of property depend upon considerations of social
expediency, including their effeets on chameter 74
IX. Reply fo the objection that sueh a view of Justice is ineon-
sistent with ' organic character of human society' 277
OTE ON RENOUVIER'S IDEA OF JUSTICE 282
xx ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER IX. PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS
PAOE
I. The theory of retributive Justice as expounded by Kant and
others 284
Such a theory does not commend itself fo the moral consciousness. 286
Difficulties of the theory illustrated by Mr. Brudley's attempted
modification of if. 86
Yet the retributive theory possesses elements of truth :
() Psychological or historical truth. Punishment originated in
Vengeance 29t
(9.) Punishment is reformatory as well as deterrent 293
(3) The theory represents the idea that the State has spiritual or
moral ends 295
The educative effect of the criminal law . 296
ri. The theory that ' the promotion of Morality by force is a self-
contradiction' is an exaggeration of the tlath that some liberty is
a condition of the highest Morality 298
III. It cannot be right to inflict pain or other evil except as
a nleans to good 3oo
This does not imply disrespect for personality. 3o3
The expression by punishment of indignation af wrong is good for
individuals and for societies, but should be controlled by Reason:
Love is better than Revenge 3o4
The retributive theory mistakes a natural, and valuable, emotion
for a judgement of the Practical Reason 3o5
IV. The retributive theory can give no reasonable account of
forgiveness 3o5
But we rightly hold that resentnlent and forgiveness are alike
applications of the general duty of promoting social welf«re, and
that social considerations determine the nleasure of both . 3o7
The moral effects of forgiveness 3io
This view of punishlnent must be applied to Theology . 3II
THE THEORY OF GOOD AND EVIL
THE
BOOK I
MORAL CRITERION
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
A CLE,I and adequate conception of the scope and object-matter
of a Science and of ifs relations fo other Sciences is usually
arrived at only at a tolerably advanced stage in the development
of the Science itself. If is impossible fo start with clear con-
ceptions of such matters as tteat, Light, Electricity, and Mag-
netism ; for the attainment of such conceptions is precisely the
goal of the Sciences which deal with these matters, and is even
yet not fully reached. Science starts with some roughly defined
department of common experience, and works towards clearer
and more adequate conceptions of if. In the course of scientific
progress, if sometimes turns oui that a supposed Science deals
with really non-existent objects, or is directed towards aims
impossible of attainment, or that if is really identical with some
Science hitherto supposed fo be distinct, or is a branch of
some Science the very possibility of which was previously
unsuspected. Sciences fuse, subdivide, transform themselves,
or disappear altogether; new Sciences make their appearance
and new groupings of old Sciences. Thus the greatest service
which Astrology ever rendered fo the world was ifs own ex-
tinction : while if was only at a tolerably advanced stage of
development that the Science of Electricity was discovered fo be
identical with that of Magnetism, and hOt identical with the
closely related but still distinguishable Sciences of tteat and
Light. And, if that is the case even with the various depart-
ments of physical Science, each of which studies some group
IASHDALI I
INTRODUCTORY [Book I
or some aspect of tangible and visible things, iV is pre-eminently
the case with Philosophy in general and ifs various branches.
It is only gradually that Philosophy bas clearly differentiated
itself from the special Sciences, and particularly from the most
general of those Sciences. The older Metaphysicians were also
Physicists. IV is only af a comparatively recent date that ]Ieta-
physicians bave abandoned the attempt Vo decide by the methods
of Metaphysics what were really questions of empirical 17atural
Science, and that Phyicists have ceased Vo dogmatize about
metaphysical questions, if indeed a well-defined conception of
the relation between the two spheres can be said Vo have been
arrived af even now: while the exact relations between the
various Sciences included in or closely connected with Philosophy,
such as Logic, Metaphysic, and Psychology, are still avowedly
matters of dispute among Philosophers.
To a certain extent every student of a Science has Vo go through
in the course of his own studies the same process which the
human mind has followed in reaching the present level of
scientific attainment. In the Physical Sciences this necessity
is Vo some extent avoided by the fact that certain results of
Physical Science rapidly become matters of common knowledge
or social inheritance, and so are accepted unconsciously on
authority even before the age af which formal scientific teaching
begins. Though the results of philosophical enquiry are far
from contributing nothing Vo the common stock of socially
transmitted ideas, they pass far more slowly and incompletely
into general circulation. A teacher of Astronomy does not find
iV necessary Vo begin by refuting the hypothesis that the motions
of the heavenly bodies exercise a profound influence upon the
life-history of individual men. In the region of Philosophy
ideas of the same order cannot always be assumed Vo be non-
existent. The very nature and meaning of Philosophy, and still
more the lines of demaroetion between ifs various branches, must
be left slowly Vo dawn upon the student in the course of his
study of Philosophy itself. Philosophy is like learning Vo swim.
A man does not relly discover what iV is until he finds himself
already somewhat out of his depth. He must plunge in boldly,
and discover what he has been af later on.
Chap. i] PLAN OF WORK 3
For these reasons I shall make no formal attempt fo mark out
beforehand the relation of our subjecç to Philosophy in general
or to ifs other branches. I shall begin by assuming only that we
are concerned with the study of human conduct, that we are
investigating the meaning of the ideas ' right ' and ' wrong' with
the object both of arriving af a clearer conception of those ideas
in general, and of determining in a more precise manner than is
done by ordinary persons in common life what thin in particular
are right and what are wrong. How fïr and in what sense such
an aire is attainable is one of the things which must be left to
appear in the course of out enquiry. And in my treatment
of the subject I shall endeavour fo follow what is, not indeed
always but very frequently, the line of development taken by
the mind of students. When first the attempt is ruade fo think
out clearly the unanalysed, more or less confused and incon-
sistent ideas about human conduct with which we all start,
the student is very likely tobe caught by a theory of extreme
simplicty and apparently great scientific completeness and
attractiveness--a theory which, as a marrer of fact, has always
ruade ifs appearance af the beginning of every serious historical
effort to grapple with the ethical problem. He is very likely fo
be bitten by the theory which traces all human conduct to the
operation of a single motive, the desire of pleasure. If this
theory be true, if follows as a marrer of course tbat the only
meaning which can be given fo the terre right is ' conducive
fo pleasure,' and fo the term wrong ' unconducive fo pleasure or
productive of ifs opposite, pain.' The commonly received ideas
about right and wrong, in so far as they are upon such a view
capable of scientific justification af all, have then tobe explained
by showing that the acts commonly regarded as right are produc-
rive of pleasure on the whole to the individual, while the actions
commonly accounted wrong are conducive on the whole fo pain
or loss of pleasure. To examine this theory, known as psycho-
logical Hedonism, will be the starting-point of our investigation
and will be dealt with in the next chapter. If satisfied that
pleasure is not always the motive of the individual's own action,
the student may still very probably be attracted by other forms of
the theory that pleasure in the last resort, either fo the individual
4 INTRODUCTORY [Book I
or to others, is the sole true and ultimate criterion of human
action. Utilitarianism disconnected from psychologicsl Hedonism
will be the subject of our third chapter. From the Utilitarian
group of ethical theories I shall turn fo their extreme opposite,
the theory which asserts in the most uncompromising and un-
analysed way the authority, perhaps even the infallibility, of
the individual Conscience and of the judgements about particular
questions of right and wrong which the ordinary Conscience pro-
nounces--the theory commonly known as Intuitionism. I shall
then try fo bring together the various elements of truth con-
tained in the conflicting theories, and fo arrive ai a view which
will embrace and harmonize them, while avoiding the mistakes
and exaggerations which each, taken by itself, can be shown
fo involve. I shall then go on fo examine more in detail some of
the chief questions of right conduct, the chief commonly recog-
nized virtues and duties or groups of duties, and fo show how
they can be explained and co-ordinated, with whatever correction
of popular notions may turn out fo be necessary, upon the basis
of the theory which will be adopted.
To arrive ai a clearer and more definite conception of the
Moral Criterion--a clearer and more definite answer than is
contained in that common moral consciousness from which we
must all star fo the question ' What ought I fo do, and why
ought I fo do if ?' will be the object of out first book. In the
second book I shall enter ai greater length into some of the
current controversies connected with out subject, by the exam-
ination of which I shall hope further fo elucidate and define
the results arrived ai in the firs book. Most of these con-
troversies may be said fo centre round the question of the
relation of the individual and the individual's good fo society
and a wider social good. I bave therefore styled the book ' The
Individual and the Society.' In the third book I shall deal with
some of those wider philosophical issues which are ultimately in-
volved in any attempt fo think out fully and adequately the
meaning of the words 'right and wrong,' 'good and evil '--in
other words with the relation of Morals and Moral 1)hilosophy
fo out theory of the Universe in general, fo Metaphysic and
Religion, fo the theory of Free-will, fo the facts of Evolution
Chap. il METAPHYSIC AND ETHICS 5
and theories of Evolution, and finally fo practical life. The
subject of this section may be described generally as 'Ian
and the Universe.' In postponing these more general con-
siderations fo the end of our enquiry instead of making them
our starting-point, I ara once more abandoning what may perhaps
be thought the logical order ; and adopting the order which will,
I hope, be most advantageous for purposes of exposition and
dialectical defence, and which will be most convenient for those
who may read this book with no previous acquaintance with
technical Philosophy or with any of ifs branches. With regard
fo the relations between Metaphysic and Moral Philosophy if
will be enough fo premise this muchwthat Metaphysic is an
enquiry into the ultimate nature of Reality and our knowledge
of if; while Moral Philosophy is an enquiry into a particular,
though very general and important, department of our knowledge,
our ideas of right and wrong J, that is fo say into one part]cular
though very fundamental aspect of Reality, the aspect which is
expressed by our moral judgements. To attain some clearer con-
cepçion as fo the relation of these ideas fo other ideas, of this aspect
of Reality fo other aspects, will be one object of our investigation.
But, whatever answer may be given fo this last problem, if must
be possible af least fo begin the enquiry as fo what we mean
by saying that an act is right or wrong, and why we call some
actions right and others wrong, without presupposing any more
than is presupposed in our common unscientific thinking about
the world in general and man's place in it. Af a very early sçage
of our enquiry if may, indeed, be found that we cannot give
a satisfactory answer to that question without assuming particular
answers fo other and more general questions about human know-
ledge and about the ultimate nature of thingsmanswers which
from various philosophical points of view have sometimes been
implicitly or explicitly denied. But I shall endeavour, for the
1 The relation of this question to the wider question 'What is good ?'
will be dealt with in the sequel ; but in modern times lIoral Philosophy bas
grown out of an attempt to answer the question ' What is right ?' rather
than the question ' What is good ?' And this is the essential]y ethical ques-
tion, since, by general admission, Ethics starts with the problem of human
conduct, even though it may soon be discovered that that problem involves
a wider problem about values in general.
6 INTRODUCTORY [Book I
reasons already indicated, fo make the first par of our enquiry
as purely ethical as possible. If and in so far as if shall be found
that fo take a particular view about the ideal of human conduct,
a view fo which we are led purely by the investigation of the
actual contents of our ethical consciousness, logically involves us
in wider conclusions as fo the nature of the Universe and man's
place in if, that will be the best way of defending those wider
conclusions, and so of exhibiting the true relation between that
ethical Science which is the subject of this book and that wider
Science of Reality which will be dealt with in these pages only
in so far as may be necessary for the purpose of attaining clear
îdeas about the meaning and end of human life.
CHAPTER II
ISYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM
I
If; the writings of Bentham 1 and his followors the ethical
doctrine that actions are right or wrong according as they
do or do hot tend fo produce maximum pleasure is founded
upon the psychological theory that as a marrer of fact nothing
is or can be desired except pleasure. The most fundamental
of all distinctions between ethical systems turns upon the
attitude which they adopt towards this theory. If is of course
possible for a Moral Philosopher fo reject the hedonistic Psycho-
logy and still to remain a Hedonist. He may hold that if is,
as a marrer of psycholocal fact, possible fo desire other things
besides pleasure, but that pleasure is the only proper or rational
object of desire. If is possible fo contend that I may, as a marrer
of psychological fact, desire other things, buç that, if I do so,
I am a fool for my pains. On the other hand if is clear that
if nothing but pleazure can be desired, iç is useless, and indeed
meaningless, fo maintin that something other than pleasure
ought to be desired. If will be well, therefore, to clear the
ground by facing the psychological problem before we attack
the ethical questions which depend, fo a large extent, upon our
answer to that problem.
1 And earlier of Hobbes, with this difference--that Hobbes defines plea-
sure in terres of desire (' Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or
desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good,' Leviathan, ch. ri), and
then proceeds to define pleasure as 'the apparance or sense of good.'
Bentham assumes that we already know what pleasure is, and then proceeds
to argue that we desire thut and nothing else. The difference might be
more important than if is if Hobbes had always remembered if himself.
When he identifies the ' iucundum ' with' good in effect, s the end desired,'
he practicully dopts the position of Bentham.
8 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
The plausibility of the doctrine that nothing but pleasure
can be the object of desire depends mainly upon a confusion
between three different senses in which if may be understood.
The proposition that the motive of every action is pleasure
may mean :--
(I) That I always do that which if gives me most pleasure
ai the moment fo do;
() That the motive of every action is somefutue pleasure,
although that future pleasure is hOt necessarily the most intense
(if being for instance possible fo choose the nearer but smaller
pleasure in preference fo one greater but more remote) :
(3) That the motive of every act is always fo get the geatest
quantum of pleasure upo ttte vttole.
qow the doctrine explicitly maintained by psychological
Hedonists is usually the last of these three positions: while
ifs ilausibility arises chiefly from ifs confusion with one or
both of the former. The last proposition is, indeed, one of
those which would hardly obtain a moment's aceptance but
for the supposed consequences of denying if. Let us assume
for the moment that nothing ever is desired except pleasure,
and ask whether if is always the prospect of ttte g'eatest
pleasuqe that moves us. That men do not always do that
which will as a marrer of fact bring them most pleasure will
readily be almitted: need we hesitate fo assert that the world
would be a much better ploee if they did 1 ? qor will if be
denied that people often do actions which, before the rime
of acting, they know very well fo be contrary fo their real
interest, understood in the most purely hedonistic sense. The
drunkard--the ioor drunkard ai all events, who suEers from
his vices in other than purely physiological ways--knows very
well in the morning that he gets more pain than pleasure
from his drink: he craves fo get rid of the habit, and yet,
as a marrer of foet, he drinks on. That will be acknowledged,
' The thing fo be lamented is, not that men have so great regard fo their
own good or interest in the present world, for they have hOt enough ; but
that they bave so little to the good of others.' Bp. Butler, Preface fo
Fifteen Serinons.
Chap. ii, § il iLEASURE AND DESIRE
9
but if may be urged perhaps that at the çeoment of action
such a man has always persuaded himself that the drink will
produce a blance of pleasure on the whole. Adroit, if you
like, that he has. The question remains : how, on the assump-
tions of psychological Hedonism, is if possible fo accourir
for such a persuasion ? Granted that ai the rime he acts he
does hot know that the thing is bad for him, how can a man
who once knew that a thing was bad for himself corne, however
momentarily, fo believe the contrary ? Such conduct as that
of the drunkard will hardly be accounted for by mere intellectual
error, mere involuntary lapse of memory. If a man who in the
morning knew that fo drink a whole bottle of gin was hot for
his good, cornes in the evening fo believe the contrary, his
ignorance must be fo some extent voluntary: he must, as we
say, have ' persuaded himself' that if will do him no harm. And
this voluntary ignorance, this bias in his judgement, has fo
be accounted for: and on the hedonistic theory (in the form
in which it is now before us), it can be accounted for only
in one way. On that theory there is only one desire or emotion
that can ever affect the will, and so exercise a distorting influence
upon the judgement, viz. desire for one's greatest pleasure on
the whole. In the case supposed then desire for his greatest
pleasure on the whole, steadily operating throughout the day,
must somehow have changed the conviction that the man's
greatest pleasure lies in abstinence or moderation into a conviction
that his greatest plesure lies in drunkenness. Is this an in-
telligible piece of isychology ?
Perhaps the marrer may be ruade plainer by a slightly different
illustration. If there is a certain piece of hedonistic calculus in
the world, if is that the pleasure of eating something very bad
for one is hot worth the indigestion which if causes. The
pleasure, unlike that of quantitative or qualitative errors in
drinking, is slighç and almost momentary: the pain may be
continuous and severe. Ask a man with a delicate digestion
whether the wise dyspeptic Hedonist will eat lobster salad.
Ask him in the morning, ask him the moment before dinner,
ask him while he is actually tasting his soup, and he will say
emphatically ' qo. It has almost always disagreed with me;
IO PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
it certainly is not worth the risk of temporary indigestion
and the danger of bringing back that chronic indigestion which
it took me so long fo get over a year ago.' Yet it may be that,
as the dinner iroceeds and conversation flows and spirits rise,
the lobster salad cornes round, and he eats. blow I adroit that in
cases like that itis scarcely possible fo account for the man's
action without supposing at least a momentary intellectual
vacillation. Very likely he does say to himself,' After all the
consequences are not certain : I have upon occasion taken lobster
salad without suffering much. I ara better now than when I are
it last,' and so on. But the question remains, 'Why shou]d he
seek in this way fo deceive himself ?' Do not these efforts
at self-deception imply that he man is hot, as the theory supposes
him fo be, an absolntely impartial judge between the pleasure
of the next moment and the pleasure of the next morning or
the next week ? Were he unbiassed by desire of lobster salad,
or of the pleasure attending ifs consumption, he would un-
questionably have retained his well-grounded conviction as to
the inadvisability of eating it. Supposing, at the very moment
before he took the fatal resolution, he were fo be consulted
by a no less dyspeptic neighbour, he would have no hesitation
whatever about the marrer. 'By no means eat lobster salad,'
he would have said. And when in his own case he acts differ-
ently, itis evident that af that moment he cares more for present
pleasure (in so far as his desire is really a desire for pleasure
at all) than for his pleasure on the whole. There is a bias
in his judgement--a bias derived from desire--which prevents
him from correctly balancing present against future pains. He
has, in short, other desires besides a desire for the greatest
quantum of pleasure, though it may be (for anything we have
seen so far) that he still cares about nothing but pleasure. At
all events, the nearer pleasure exercises more attractive power
than the more remote.
We bave seen reason to reject the third interpretation of the
hedonistic formula; now let us look at the first. It undoubtedly
sounds plausible to say that, if I do a thing, I do if because
if pleases me fo do it; and from this if does not seem a large
step to the admission that, if I prefer one alternative to another,
Chp. il, § il PLEASURE AIçD DESIRE
itis because it pleases me more, and from that to the admission that
I always do that which pleases me most. It might be enough
fo point out that we are reslly misled by an ambiguity of
language. ' If pleases me to doit,' 'it is my pleasure (placet)
that it shall be done,' means merely' I will that it should be
done': as to qvhy I will it, the phrase tells us nothing. But
let us adroit that we sre justified in interpreting this 'placet'
by' It gives me at this moment more pleasure fo do this than
fo do anything else 1., The question still remains ' Why does this
course of action give me so much momentary pleasure as fo
determine my will fo adoptit ?' It cerainly cannot always
be the pleasure resulting at the moment of action that moves
me fo do if. For the most selfish people clearly do many things
which are painful at the rime for the sake of some future end.
Granted that it always gives me most pleasure fo do what I have
made up my mind to do, the question renmins ' What leads
me fo make up my mind?' And this certainly cannot be
the mere momentary pleasure involved in the act itself. If
I thought only of my own momentary sensations while preparing
for a bath on a very cold morning, I cerainly should not take it.
Still less, should I go fo the dentist when my tooth is hot
actually aching. If I do these unplesant things, it must be
for the sake of something--a feeling of my own or otherwise--
which lies beyond that moment. That brings us to the second
possible sense of the psychological-hedonist doctrine--that I
' This seems fo be very much the position ofSigwart : Each end must, if
I ana on the whole to will if and tobe able fo devote nay powers toits attain-
naent, be such aone that the attainment of if promises sonae kind or other
of satisfaction (Befriedigung) for nae, the thought of which so affects nay
feeling, that the expectation of its attainment affords nae joy, the feax of the
opposite causes nae pain' (Sigwart, orfragen der Ethik, p. 5)- This state-
naent (with others in this remarkably clear and able little work) seenas to
nae to be hot actually erroneous, but fo suggest the fallacies of psycho-
logical Hedonism, inasmuch as if is hotnaade clear whether the thought of
the action is now pleasant because if will produce in the agent the greatest
possible naaximuna of pleasant feeling, or because he desires the end and
çonseguently will find satisfaction in its future acconaplishment and in work-
ing for its acconaplishnaent in the present. The word ' Geftihl ' seems to be
used by Sigwart sometinaes in the sense of' desire,' sometinaes of anticipated
pleasure.
i PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDOIqlSM [Book I
always act for the sake of some future pleasure 1, though not
necessarily for the sake of the greatest quantum of pleasure
on the whole.
Why then should one pleasure or sure of pleasures attract
me more than another, apart from ifs being greater in amount ?
If may be said that I ara more attracted by the nearer than by
the remoter pleasure. That is intelligible, and if was admitted
by Bentham, who did not see that the admission was fatal fo the
doctrine, implied if not expressed in the writings of himself and
his followers, that what is desired is always the greatest pro-
spective sum of pleasures. Of course in so far as remoteness
involves uncertainty, that may logically be taken into account
by the hedonistic calculus. But in so far as a remote pleasure
is practically just as certain as a nearer one, if ought on
Benthamite principles fo prove equally attractive. And yet
if is marrer of experience that if very often does not. And
this involves the admission that what I desire in such cases
is not pleasure, but immediate pleasure. The pleasure in the
hand is treated as if if were worth two in the bush, even when
the pleasure in the bush is as certain as that in the hand.
This admission by itself makes a very large inroad into
the apparently logical and coherent system of the hedonistic
Psychology. Ethically itis of little importance, so long as
the only characteristic which can give fo one foreseen pleasure
an increased attractiveness as compared with some other foreseen
pleasure is supposed fo be ifs greater proximity. But he
admission may perhaps prepare the way for the recognition
of the fact that there are other sources of (so fo speak)differ-
ential attractiveness in pleasures besides () expected ntnsity
and (OE) proximity. Let us emphasize the admission that has
so far been ruade. It is admitted, we may assume, that foreseen
greater intensity of pleasure does not always carry with if greater
constraining power over the will. The human mind is not
the mere impartial calculating machine which if is represented
fo be by the hedonistic Psychology in ifs most logical form.
We have in fact recognized the existence of passion in the
1 Not of course excluding the pleasure of the immediate act which in
some cases is obviously the prominent element.
Chap. il, § i] PASSION
human seul, though af present we may be disposed te interpret
passion as a mere liability te be more affected by a nearer
than by a remoter pleasure. But is that a possible explanation
of the extraordinary motive power possessed af certain moments
by one pleure compared with another which, upon calm
review, would, be recognized as being of far greffer intensity
Take the case of an angry man. On a calm review of the
pleasure of avenging seine trifling or imagined slight (ai the
cost perhaps of some serious and clearly foreseen penalty),
the man himself would usually be disposed te adroit
the game was net worth the candle. The pleure, he would
axlmit, would net be worth the sacrifice of even a week's freedom
and ordinary enjoyment of lire. 'Yes,' if will be said, 'but
then the prospect of this pleasure is near, ifs more clearly
perceived intensity triumphs over a chaos of remote, indefinite,
and indistinctly envisaged enjoyments such as might be pur-
chased by self-restraint.' Well, ai that rate, the offer of some
other pleasure more intense and equally near should af once
hold bck the uplifted hand, and transform the angry counte-
nance. Once asume that the attraction lies wholly in pleasure--
that the man is indifferent te the kind of pleasure, except se
far as' kind of pleasure ' implies te him a difference of intensity--
and this consequence must follow. But does if ? The average
wife-beating ruffian would probably adroit on reflection that the
pleasure of beating his wife on one particular occasion
net worth a pot of beer. But tender him the pot of beer when
he is angry, and will the uplifted hand inevitably be lowered te
grp if ? 'No,' if will be said, ' this is what he would de if
he calmly reflected ; but ai such a moment he does net reflect;
his mind is o concentrated upon that one imagined pleasure
that t3ae other fails te obtain an entrance.' But why does
he net reflect The determination te reflect or net te reflect
is just as much a voluntary action as the determination te
strike or net te strike. And, if the hedonistic Psychology
is right, this action must be itself determined by a calculation
as te the greater pleasantness of reflection or non-reflection.
If then n man gets angry and se fnils te reflect upon the
consequences of what he is doing, that must be, if would seem,
4 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDOIçISM [Book I
because he bas corne fo the conclusion that (in this particular
case) non-reflection will be the pleasanter course. But what
should lead him fo such a conclusion ? Experience ? Are we
then really prepared fo say that a hot-tempered man is one
who bas been taught by experience fo believe that af certain
moments non-reflection upon the relative value of pleasures,
necessarily involving the choice of pleasures which calm reflection
would show to be of less intensity, is itself conducive fo ob-
taining the greatest amount of pleasure or af least of immediate
pleasure ? If any one is really prepared fo adroit this analysis
of passion, there is no more to be said. If he is not, he must
concede that, even if we allow the object of choice fo be always
a pleasure, there is something which causes a man af rimes
to prefer one pleasure rather than another, irrespective of ifs
greater nearness or greater intensity. What is this something ?
I know of no better way of expressing if than fo say that the
man desires one pleasure (assuming for the moment that if really
is pleasure which is desired) rather than another 1. It is an
ultimate fact that one desire is stronger than another . The
strength of the desire does not depend wholly upon the intensity
of the imagined pleasure. And in so far as it does not depend
upon such imagined intensity, if is not really a desire for pleasure
qua pleasure. If all that is desired is pleasure--as much of if
as possible, and for as long as possible--it must be a marrer of
indifference fo the man in what form (so to speak) his pleasure
is served up fo him, so long as he gets enough of if. But the
existence of such passions as we bave alluded to is by itself
a sufflcient proof that if is not pleasure in general but some
particular kind of pleasure that is desired in such cases. ow
1 In so far, that is, as his impulses are sufficiently reflected upon fo become
desires. A large par of our habitual bodily movements are of course due
fo impulses which cannot be so described. The actions are voluntary only
because they can be af once inhibited when any conflicting desire presents
itself. Movements which are hot voluntary even to this extent are not
acts.
Of course the cause may lie in the man's physical constitution or in
externa] influences; but, as ex hypothesi we are dealing with voluntary
actions, these causes lying outslde consciousness can only influence hlm by
producing an impulse fo act within consciousness, i.e. a desire.
Chap. ii, § il THE GREAT HYSTERON-PROTERON 5
if seems clear that desire for a paricular kind of pleasure is not
really desire for pleasure and nothing else. Even if we supposed
that pleasure was always part of his object, we should bave
fo adroit that the man desires hOt only pleasure but also a
particular sort of pleasure, hOt necessarily thought of as more
intense than other pleasures. Desire of pleasure then is hOt
the only motive which is capable of inspiring action.
And having got so far, we may be prepared fo go a step
further and adroit that the desire of pleasure need hOt really be
present af ail. Af least there need be no desire for anything
which would be a pleasure apart from the fact that if is desired.
The fact that a thing is desired no doubt implies that the
satisfaction of the desire will necessarily bring pleasure. There
is undoubtedly pleasure in the satisfaction of ail desire. But
that is a very different thing from asserting that the object is
desired because if is thought o[ as pleasant, and in proportion
as if is thought of as pleasant. The hedonistic isychology
involves, according fo the stock phrase, a 'hysteron-proteron';
if purs the cart before the home. In reality, the imagined
pleasantness is created by the desire, hOt the desire by the
imagined pleasantness.
The truth is that fo deny the existence of' disinterested'
desires, i.e. desires for objects other than greatest anticiiated
pleasure , destroys the possibility of accounting for nearly ail our
interests except those of a purely sensual character 2. If is
admitted on all hands that different people get different amounts
of pleasure from the same external sources. Why so ? In the
case of mere physical sensation we can account for the difference
between man and man by differences of physical constitution.
Whether a man likes port or champagne depends upon the
1 The phrase may also be used to mean desires for objects other than one's
own good, however understood, but I ara here arguing with those who would
identify good and pleasure. It will be seen below that I regard the Psy-
chology that is egoistic without being hedonistic as open fo the saine
objections as the latter.
)Sany even of these, as pointed out below, are hot originally desires fir
pleusure, but they muy be treated as such for ethical purposes in so far
as the impulses or appetites are deliberately acted upon from a conviction
of the pleasantne8 of indulgence.
i6 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
constitution, as modified by education, of his palate and nervous
system. If bas nothing fo do with the strength of any pre-existing
impulse towards the one or the other. His preference is hOt, in
any direct and immediate way, determined by his character.
Apart from the anticipated pleasure, he is perfectly impartial or
unbiassed in his decision between the two wines, llothing but
experience of their comparative pleasantness determines his
judgement as fo which of them he will take, so far as no
considerations of health, or economy, or the like may dictate the
choice of one rather than the other 1. Suppose a glass of
champagne fo be administered fo a lire-long teetotaller and
called a glass of lemonle. He may have been wholly innocent
of a desire for champagne; he may have habitually denounced
if as liquid poison; all his anticipations may have been
confined to the unexhilarating lemonade. And yet, given the
requisite nervous organization, he will probably exclaim, ' Why,
this is the very best lemonade that I have ever tasted in the
whole course of my lire I' On the other hand, when we turn fo
moral, intellectual, or other ideal pleasures , we find that their
attractiveness depends entirely upon their appealing fo some pre-
existing desire, though no doubt some accidental and undesired
experience may sometimes awaken a desire hOt previously felt.
To the mind that does hOt desire knowledge, knowledge is hOt
pleasant ; knowledge compulsorily admitted is often round fo be
productive of anything but pleasure. Benevolence does hOt
give pleasure fo people who are hOt benevolent. The psycho-
logical Hedonist analyses Benevolence into a liking for benevolent
1 Of course he might be moved by curiosity to desire . wine which he
had never t.sted; but the plesure which he got from grutifying
curiosity would be distinguish.ble from the physic.l ple.sure of drinking.
The former would be undiminished should the wine f.il fo commend itself
fo his palate.
* I .m of course far from .ttempting fo draw an absolute line of de-
marcation between the two classes of pleasure. Pursuits involving a high
degree of intellectual activity may often owe some of their pleasantnesB fo
some suggestion of sensuous gratification : the desire for power may become
fused with the desire for the sensual grtifications secured by power, &c., &c.
And on the other hand the sensuous pleasure may be a condition of many
others which are hot sensuous. Coleridge, for instance, pronounced tes-
drinking fo be the most intellectual of sensual pleasures.
Chap. ii, § il DISINTERESTED DESIRES 7
p]easure. :No doubt fo the benevolent man Benevolence does
give pleasure, but if gives him ileasure only because he has
previously desired the good of this or that person, or of mankind
af large. Where there is no such desire, benevolent conduct is
not found fo give pleasure. And so with many bad pleasures :
for if is extremely important fo insist that disintrested desires
are hot necessarily good desires 1. If I have set my hear upon
the death of an enemy, if will give me pleasure fo kill him.
Apart from such a desire, there is nothing in the mere physical
process which could possibly account for the pleasure. If would
be no pleasure af all fo kill some other person by precisely the
saine means, unless indeed my desire is nota desire for vengeance
but a disinterested malevolence towards humanity in general 2.
In all such cases if is a certain idea which is pleasant, the idea of
an object which is or may be something quite different from my
own sensations, whether of a purely physical charcter or of any
more exalted kind which a hedonistic Psychology may be able
fo recognize. If is not the representation of my being pleased
in the future which makes the idem of the sick man relieved or
of the wrong avenged pleasant fo me, and so moves my will;
my desire is that the actual objective resul shall be achieved.
Of course if I ara fo be influenced by such a desire, I must, as
we say,' take an interest' in the desired object. So far every
desire might no ¢toubt be called an ' interested' desire. But the
1 The observation of this fact was Bishop Butler's most original contribu-
tion fo moral Psychology. Aristotle admits that there are desires for objects
other than pleasure, but he assumes that these objects are always good
objects--Knowledge, Beauty, Virtue, and the like, and thus ultimately
admits only two motives, desire of 7 «abu and of rb .
The pleasure of sheer cruelty is no doubt less purely ' ideal' than that
of vengeance, and may be more correctly represented as a mere desire for a
particular kind of physical excitement, which gives pleasure just like any
other sensation. If may best be treated as a primitive instinct, just
like the impulses commonly described as appetites--a survival in human
nature of the brute, in which such an in.¢tinct was conducive fo survival.
But, like these appetites, cruelty of course becomes something different in
a man who deliberately makes the satislaction of the impulse his end.
A beast is hot capable (strictly speaking) of cruelty any more than if is
capable of licentiousness. When deliberately indulged, the impulse or
appetite becomes a desire.
IASIDALL I Ç
8 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
question af issue is just thiswwhether I ara capable of taking an
interest in other things besides my own sensations, actual in the
present or imagined as being enjoyed by me in the future. To
deny that I ara capable of taking such an interest would make if
scarcely possible fo explain how anything could plese me except
purely physical sensations, an interest in which is, so fo speak,
compulsory. The plesantness may no doubt be stimulated by
an effort of voluntary attention, or diminished by a voluntary
effort of abstraction, which will usually take the form of
voluntry attention fo something else. But it does hot rest with
us--if does not depend upon our will, or our charcter, or our
desiresmwhether we shall or shall not feel the sensations and
feel them fo be pleasant.
If is extremely important fo insist upon the full extent of
ground covered by this class of ' disinterested desires.' A pre-
judice is sometimes creted aginst the doctrine of disinterested
desires just on account of ifs ethical import. The greater part
of out desires are assumed tobe 'interested,' and in asserting
some few of them fo be 'disinterested,' we are suspected of
trying to introduce questionable exceptions in the interests of
edification. If is, therefore, desirable fo insist that the possi-
bility of being 'interested' in something besides our own
sensations is as distinctly implied by the momentary absorption
in the plot of a novel, or the most evanescent and morlly in-
different sympathy with ifs characters, as by the most sublime
heroism or the most systematic philanthropy. The spectator of
tragedy who hd no ' disinterested desires ' would simply exclaim,
' What is Hecuba fo me, or I fo Hecuba, tht I should weep for
ber? Prove fo me that my own future pleasures are somehow
involved in the fate of Hecub, and then I shall begin tobe
interested in ber story, but not till then.' 1o pleasures in short
are explicable on the hypothesis of psychological Hedonism
except those of a purely sensual charcter, and I may add,
aesthetic pleasures, which after all bave a purely sensuous basis,
however many higher intellectual activities and sympthies my
be involved in them. When a beautiful landscape bursts upon
us unexpectedly, the enjoyment of if is hot dimmed by the fact
that we were hot craving for if beforehand, lor does if appear
Chap. il, § il AESTHETIC PLEASURES 9
that a eraving for beauty in genera] precedes or. is imp]ied in
the first development of the esthetic faeulties; if is rather
experienee of their p]easantness whieh begets the ]ove of beauty.
For, although beauty is not merely a partieular kind of pleasure,
the pleasure is eertain]y an inseparable element o.f the beauty,
and this pleasure does not seem fo imply any previous desire 1.
But direetly Art begins fo involve anything more than the eon-
templation of immediately beautiful form and eolour and sound 2, if
interests us only by appealing fo desires or interests whieh are not
merely desires for pleasure. /k man who eared about nothing but
his own sensations might derlve pleasure from a beautiful sunset,
but he could hardly appreciate a beautiful character or a beautiful
plot, and even the appreciation of physical beauty probably bas its
roots to some extent in a kind of sympathy, however strongly
we may repudiate Hume's attempt to analyse away ont appre-
1 There is much truth in Schopenhauer's doctrine that the satisfaction
afforded by Art is due (I should say, partly due) fo the absorption in mere
contemplation which it involves, and so in the temporary suspension of
desires.
2 And even these could not be desired unless they had previously been
experienced. There would indeed be a shorter way with psycholocal
l:Iedonism if we could assume with Prof. A. E. Taylor that' an appeal fo intro-
spection will show.., that if is impossible fo bave a representative image or
idea of pleasure or pain' (Problem of Cond«ct, p. xx3). So far as I bave been
able fo ascertain, Prof. Taylor appears fo be alone in this peculiar incapacily
for imaging past pleasures and pains. The theory implies so extreme an
abstraction of the content of the pleasant consciousness from its pleasantness
that it hardly requires explicit experience to refute if. If Prof. Taylor cannot
remember what the displeasure was like which it gave him fo look upon his
neighbour's ugly wall-paper, how can he remember even what the paper itself
was like ? l:Iow can he bave an idea of the colour and pattern without an
idea of its ugliness, and what is an idea of ugliness which does not include
unpleasantness ? The reason why the more acute physical pains are (fortu-
nately) less capable of being represented with distinctness in imagination
seems to be that, though assuredly hot without content, they bave (so fo
speak) very little content. There are comparatively few distinct kinds of
qualifies of pain, and still fewer bave names; so that the distinction of
intensity plays the chier part in our idea of them, and intensity is just the
element in which imagination most fails, accurately or fully, to reproduce
past sensations, though it reproduces them quite sufficiently fo enable a boy
to pronounce (when the difference was considerable) which of two floggings
hurt most. This is of course quite a different thing from supposing (with
Hume) that an ' idea' differs from an ' impression' only in liveliness.
20 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
ciation of the elegance of a swan's long neck into sympathy
with its utility fo the swan. Any further analysis of aesthetic
pleasure would here be out of place. I merely note thaç the
aesthetic pleasures, or an element in them, seem fo be the most
prominent case of pleasure, not in the ordinary sense purely
sensual, which does not necessarily imply desire for anything
besides the pleasure itself 1.
II
I have so far confined myself fo the motives operating upon
the consciousness of adult hulnan beings a an advanced stage of
development. I shall hereafter have fo consider how far the
facts of Evolution can throw any light upon our ethical ideas;
and it is of the last importance to keep questions of psychological
fact distinct fronl questions of psychological origin. The starting-
point of any enquiry into the origin or history or explanation of
our ideas, desires, motives or any other facts of consciousness
must be a clear comprehension of what these facts are now in
that developed human consciousness which alone is accessible fo
direct observation. Into questions of origin and history, there-
fore, I do hot propose fo enter now in any detail. But if is
hardly possible fo deal effectively with the theory of psychological
Hedonism without noticing that ifs plausibility lies for many
luinds in a certain confusion between the question of origin and
the question of actual present fact.
I is constantly assumed as a sort of axiom tha ' Altruism'
must have in some way been evolved out of Egoism; and this
assumption offert carries with if the further implication that in
sonm sense Altruism is thereby shown fo be Egoism after ail, only
more or less disguised. If is no surprising that pre-evolutionary
individualists like John Stuart Mill should have supposed
primitive men and the lower animais were pure Egoists. But
is amazing fo discover the saine delusion more or less underlying
the treatment of this subject by the very writer who, vhatever
may be thought of his system as a whole, has af leas the meri
1 I do hOt mean fo imply that the value of aesthetic pleasures is to be
estimated merely by their intensity, or that the desire for aesthetic pleasures
(when once aroused) is merely a desire for pleasure as such.
Chap. ii, § ii] PRIMITIVE MAN NOT AN EGOIST
of having been the first among Darwin's disciples fo suspect
that Darwinian ideas might throw important light upon nany
psychologicM and sociological phenomena 1. If there is one thing
which the Darwinian doctrine of Evolution has emphasized in
the psychological region, if is the existence in animls and in
primitive men of tendencies, impulses, instincts, of whose self-
preserving or race-preserving efficacy they themselves are quite
unconscious. We have hitherto sought our illustrations of impulses
that are not mere desires of pleasure in desires which might be
considered as, in a sense, above the moral or af least above the
intellectuel level of pleasure-seeking. It is quite equally certain
that there are in nnimMs, in primitive men, and in infants af an
advanced stage of social development (fo sy nothing of adults).,
impulses that are below that level 2. The human or other infant
does not suck because experience has convinced if that sucking
is a source of pleasure. If does not first suck by accident, and
then repeat the action because it has found sucking pleasnt,
though this last discovery may no doubt aid in inducing if fo
suck in the right place. It sucks simply because if has an impulse
fo suck. The Physiologist may know why if sucks ; but the child
does not. The young bird does not tnp the inside of its shell
because if has calculated that the breaking of that shell is a con-
dition precedent fo the enjoyment of wider pleasures than are
possible fo if in the limited sphere of ifs early experiences; if
taps for no other reason than that it has an impu|se fo tap. The
beaver that has been in the habit of collecting sticks fo build ifs
habitation will go on collecting sticks when ifs house is ready
built for if. The young elephant does not attoek the aggressor
because experience has convinced if that that is the best way of
avoiding aggression, and the painful consequences of aggression,
in the future; if attacks because if is angry. No doubt in 11
these cases the gratification of the impulse does in fact give
1 The assumption is nowhere distinctly formulated, but if seems fo under-
lie the argument of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Psychology Pt. II ch. ix, and Data
of Ethics, ch. v sq.
For a fuller refutation of the theory that the lower animais or primitive
men or human infants act or behave on egoistic Hedonist principles the
reader may be referred fo the whole later part of Wundt's Ethics and fo
Prof. James's chapter on ' Instinct' in his Principles of Psychology (ch. xxiv.).
22 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
pleasure, or af leasç çhe resistance fo the impulse would be found
painful. And the experienced pleasure or relief from pain
undoubçedly stimulaçes çhe animal to the conçinued performance
of the acts. M.oreover, in some cases the impulses which are
now blind and unreflecting may have originally in some remoçe
ancestor been purposeful; but the facç remains çhaç çhe acçual
stimulus to çhe presenç acç is noç a mere anticipation of pleasure:
çhe pleasure only cornes because there is a pre-existing impulse.
Stvivig of some kind or other is as primitive a factor in all
consciousness as feeling 1. Iç is .quite çrue çhaç normally
only is the satisfaction of the impulse itself a pleasure, but the
instincçs of an animal tend for çhe mosç part fo prompt actions
which are pleasurable on the whole. An instinct which brought
immediate pain would tend fo disappear, and an animal whose
instincts on the whole did not bring if pleasure would tend
disappear also. But these tendencies are by no means always
realized, and require fo be stated with ma.ny qualifications. The
moth would no doubt find it painful fo resis£ the imtulse which
draws if fo the candle: but still if is probable that on the whole
if does not find if pleasant fo bë burned alive. The instinct does
not tend fo promote survival, and yet the moth survive
Many of the instincts or impulses of animals are not self-
preserving but race-preserving, and these are often sources of
immediate pain and danger fo the animal itself. The most
obvious instance is the maternal instinct which often leads an
animal fo brave obvious pain or danger for the sake of ifs young.
And among the higher and more gregarious animals there are
often round not merely the blind impulses of anger and aggression
Some Psychologists would say more primitive. But I see no advantage
in attempting fo identify conscious impulses with unconscious tendencies
towards an end such as may exist in plants, however decidedly these may
differ from merely mechanical processes. Even lr. Spencer does recog-
nize that race-preserving actions hot conducive fo the pleasure of the indi-
vidual are as primitive as individual-preserving actions. That admission cuts
away the ground of his assumption that individual-preserving actions are
always prompted by a desire of pleasure. To identify ' cravings' with ' dis-
comforts' which inspire a desire for their removal (Principles of P-
chology, § 23) tends fo disguise the ]ystevn:»roteron of the Pleasure-
psychology.
Chap. ii, § ii] INSTINCT 2 3
which do actually preserve individual and race alike, but instincts
which lead them fo face easily avoidable perils and pains in
defence of the herd. How far these instincts are due fo 'lapsed
intelligence,' how far fo natural selection, how far fo direct
adaptation, how far they may require the hypothesis of a final
causality which resists further physiological explanation, are
questions with which we are hOt now concerned. The only
point that has here fo be emphasized is that the conscious actions
of infants or animals are as litle explicable by the theory of
psychological Hedonism as those of the hero or the saint. The
impulses are hOt desires for a particular imagined pleasure, still
less for a greatest possible quantum of pleasure upon the whole.
This last aim would imply a power of refiection and abstraction
wholly beyond what we have any reason fo believe fo be possible
in an animal or even a hOt very primitive man. The theory of
psychological Hedonism is therefore hOt entitled fo any advantage
which if might derive from presenting us with a true account of
the hisorical origin of our present human experience. Altruism
was not developed out of Egoism ; though, if if were, that would
hot disprove the existence of Altruism now. Men and animals
have always had both race-preserving and self-preserving in-
stincts. Altruism in the developed human beings is evolved out
of social and race-preserving instincts: Egoism out of self-pre-
serving instincts. Both in their human form involve an intellectual
developraen of which the lower animals are incapable.
The (luestion may be raised whether these instincts or impulses
which we have distinguished from ' disinterested desires' in the
stricter sense do hot exist even in developed humanity ? They
cerainly exist in the human infant : do they in the adult man ?
The answer seems to be that these impulses do certainly exist.
It is perhaps better hOt fo follow Bishop Butler in classing
hunger with such disinterested desires as Benevolence or even
Vengeance 1. Hunger is neither a desire for the pleasure of
eating, nor (in ifs less acute forms) a desire to avoid the pains of
1 Sidgwick follows him in this view (Methods of Ethics, 6th Ed., p. 45)-
Prof. lackenzie seems fo me right in distinguishing a_p_petites from desires
(Manual ofEthics, 4th Ed., p. 46). See also the chapter in James's Psychology
already referred fo (above» p. 2, wte).
4 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
inanition: but if is hOt quite the saine thing as a disinterested
desire of food for food's sake. If is simply an impulse to eat.
But then the human being has a power which the animal has hot,
or a greater power than the animal possesses, of reflecting on these
impulses of his, and presenting their satisfaction to himself as an
object of thought and of encouraging them or resisting them
accordingly. So long as the impulse is a physically irresistible
impulse, as when a man closes his eyes or ducks his head to avoid
an unexpected missile, that is mere' reflex action' ; that is to say,
the act is hot in the moral sense of the word an act af all. The
impulse is hot, properly speaking, a' motive.' But in so far as
the impulse can be inhibited, in so far as the impulse is reflected
on and its object deliberately conceived by the understanding
and adopted by the will, the mere instinct or impulse passes into
what we ordinarily call a desire, and (in so far as the desire is
hot merely a desire for the imagined pleasure of satisfaction)
a' disinterested desire.' And therefore from an ethicl point of
view the distinction between appetites and instinctive desires or
' desires of objects' becomes of comparatively little importance--
of coparatively little importance, though if may for some purpose
be important to remember that an action prompted by impulse
or appetite or instinct, even where hOt actually involuntary, may
be far less voluntary than one which flows from the conscious
and delîberate desire for an object clearly presented to the mind.
There are no hard and fast lines fo be drawn in this marrer. In
the developing race and in the growing child reflex action passes
by imperceptible gradations into instinctive action, and instinct
into voluntary action motived by desire. So in the adult human
individual there is every stage between the purely reflex action
and the fully premeditated and deliberate act; but if would
seem that, though there are instincts, there are here no purely
instinctive acts in the strict sense of the word except those which
are wholly involuntary. The instinct which has been reflected
on and has not been inhibited, may be treated as a desire--for
pleasure or some other object, as the case may be, and the
resulting act is no longer in the strict sense of the word merely
instinctive.
Chap. il, § iii] DOCTRINE OF MILL 25
III
The course of our argument has Mready touched upon the
question of differences in quality among pleasures. We have
already seen thst, even upon the assumption that what is desired
is Mways plessure, i is in many cases clear enough that if is not
pleasure in general that is desired but some particul,r liind of
pleasure, and we have already attempted fo show that such an
admission reMly surrenders the whole hedonistic doctrine. If
people do as a marrer of fact desire pleasures for other reasons
than their greater intensity, if is clearly possible that the superior
ethical quMity or rank or dignity of the pleasure may be one of
the determining factors in their choice. That this is so has often
been admitted by high-minded Hedonists who have not seen how
fatal is the admission fo the whole doctrine that what they desire
is always pleasure as such. We may take for instance the well-
known passage of John Stuart Mill :--
' It is quite compatible with the principle of utility fo recognise
the fsct, thst some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more
valuable than others. If would be absurd that while, in estimating
all other things, quMity is fo be considered as well as quantity,
the estimation of pleasures should be supposed fo depend on
quantity Mone.
' If I ara asked, what I mean by difference of quality in
pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than
another, merely as a pleasure, except ifs being greater in amount,
there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be
one fo which all or Mnmst all who have experience of both give
a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obliga-
tion fo prefer if, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of
the two is, by those who are competently acquMnted with both,
placed so far above the other that they prefer if, even though
knowing it to be attended with a greater mnount of discontent,
and would not resign if for any amount of the other pleasure
which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing fo
the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweigh-
ing quantity, as fo render it, in comparison, of smM1 account 1.,
x Utilitarianim, pp. II, 12.
26 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
Mill's psychological analysis here leaves little fo be desired, but
he failed fo see that a desire for superior quality of pleasure is
not really a desire for pleasure. If I drink a particular wine for
the sake of ileasure, I of course care for the quality of the wine--
ifs faste, bouquet, body, exhilarating properties and the like, in
so far as these conduce fo pleasure. But so far only. I should
give if up the moment that I found a pleasanter wine af the same
price and with equally hygienic properties, except in so far as oc-
casional variety may be itself a source of pleasure. If, therefore,
I care about philanthropic pleasure merely as pleasure, I should
necessarily give if up and take fo the pleasures of an animal
if I were only satisfied of their superior pleasantness. This is
just what, according fo Mill, the wise man will not do: ' few
human creatures would consent fo be changed ino any of the
lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's
pleasures .' He admits therefore that such a man desires some-
thing other than pleasure. What makes him think the pleasures of
the intellect superior fo those of a beast is not their intensity as
pleasures but their superior nobleness or moral elevation. And
that is a consideration which can only appeal fo a man who
cares about nobleness or moral elevation.
Strictly speaking, pleasures do not differ in quality, but only
in quantity. Or, fo be entirely accurate, pleasure varies only in
quantity. In ordinary language we mean by a pleasure a total
state of consciousness which is pleasant. But no man's conscious-
ness af any one moment can be full of pleasure and nothing else.
There must be something there--a faste or a smell, a perception
or a thought, an emotion or a volition--to be pleasant. A man
who should for a single instant have nothing in his mind but
pleasure would be an impossible variety of idiot: for this
would imply that he was pleased af nothing af all. The pleasure
then of this or that moment of consciousness is an abstraction;
if can never exist by itself so long as pleasure is understood to
mean the lnere quality of pleasing. Very different contents of
consciousness--the most purely animal sensation or the loftiest
moral purpose--may have this common quality of pleasing; but,
so long as they are compared merely in respect of this one
I 1. c., p. 2.
Chap. ii, § iv] AMBIGUITIES 7
characteristic, they can only differ in one way--in respect of the
intensity or quantity of this pleasingness ; the pleasure varies in
degree, hot in kind. All this tends fo show how completely the
dmission of qualitative differences in pleasure abondons the
hedonistic point of view. As popular mode of expression,
the doctrine tht pleasures differ in kind is a truc and useful
formula; but if should be recognized thatthis is notHedonism.
For if means precisely ghis--that we scribe value or worth fo
states of consciousness for other reasons than their pleasantness,
lthough certain measure of pleasantness might be a character-
istic of all states of consciousness which are capable of being
desired.
IV
If should be distinctly understood that the question with
which we are af present concerned is a purely psychological one.
If is a mere question of fact, and e.an only be answered by each
man for himself af ter careful observation and analysis of what
goes on in his own mind, aided by observation of what goes on
in other people's minds, in so far as that is revealed by word and
act. All that any writer can do towards helping another person
to perform this process is (a) fo state the question clearly and to
warn him against the ambiguities of language which are the
main source of error upon such subjects; (b) fo remind him of
some of the facts which the hedonistic theory has got fo explain,
and fo ask him whether that explanation is adequate; and (c) fo
state clearly and fully the elements of truth which that theory
holds in solution, and to show that a recognition of such elements
of truth does not carry with it the inferences which the Hedonist
draws from them. I have already attempted fo perform the first
of these tasks, and have ruade some suggestions towards the
second. But before proceeding to the third, I should like fo call
attention fo some of the more extreme cases of disinterested
desire which the theory before us has got fo explain away,
though [ have already tried to show that its failure is quite as
apparent in the case of very ordinary impulses fo action which
are of no special significance from an ethical point of view.
The palmary instance of this failure may perhaps be found in
28 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
cases where a man labours fo accomplish a result which he knows
cannot be achieved till he is dead and no longer able fo enjoy if.
Such instances occur hot only in the case of heroic self-sacrifice
for a political or religious faith, or the less heroic but no less
altruistic efforts of parents fo provide for their children, but in
the case of many desires which in the ordinary, ethical sense of
the word would commonly be described as selfish enough. How
is the hedonistic Psychologist fo explain the vulgarest desire on
the part of some recently ennobled brewer fo ' round a family,'
or the desire of posthumous fame--say for instance, the kind of
literary vanity or ambition which bas had so large a share in
inspiring the life-work even of men like Hume and Gibbon?
If will be urged that the man who is influenced by such motives
acts as he does because the thought of being talked about after
his death gives him pleasure now. Exactly so; the tltought of
iL gives him pleasure! But that is just what the hedonistic
Psychology declares fo be an impossibility. According fo this
system nothing that is present merely in thought can give
pleasure except the thought of a future pleasant state of the
man's own consciousness. Being talked about after my death is
hot a future state of my own consciousness ; and therefore the
thought of if can, according fo the theory, give me no pleasure
now. Once again we bave the old hysteron-proteron--the cart
before the horse. The hedonistic Psychology explains the desire
by the pleasure, whereas in fact the pleasure owes ifs existence
entirely fo the desire.
The difficulty reaches ifs climax in the case of an atheistic
martyr, who, with no belief in a future lire, dies in furtherance
of an object which cannot be realized till he will (according fo
his own view) no longer be able fo enjoy if. Or, if we choose
(however illogically e) fo explain his conduct by the desire of
enjoying the moments of triumph which may elapse between his
i In such cases we may ignore the belief in Immortality. Even where
such belief is strong and influential, i probably does hot occur fo a man
fo think of himself us hereufter enjoying the contemplution of his greut-
grundchildren seuted on the red benches of the House of Lords, or smiling
down upon his own stutue in the murketpluce of his ntive town.
Since this sense of triumph reully implies tht he is cupuble of looking
forwrd with sutisfuction fo u result other thon his own pleusure.
Chap. ii, § iv] ILEASURES OF IIARTYRDOII 9
resolution fo die and the execution of his sentence, we may put
a case where this interval is non-existent. Supposing a con-
demned man, disbelieving in a future lire, to be told that by
holding up his finger just before the guillotine fell he would
save the life of a dearly loved child or confer some inestimable
benefit on the whole human race. On the hedonistic theory even
such a minimum degree of benevolence would be a psychological
impossibility. For one who knew that the act would be syn-
chronous with the termination of his own consciousness, there
would be no future consciousness the imagined pleasantness of
which could possibly supply a motive for the present act. If it
be contended that the moment of consciousness in which the act
is performed is itself pleasant, the whole point is conceded. For
if is admitted that volitions are rendered pleasant to us in con-
templation, and so are called into actual being, on account of
future effects other than a pleasant state of one's own conscious-
ness. The only way of escape would be to contend that the act
of lifting up a finger would have seemed pleasant fo the man
apart from the effects which if was fo have after his death. But
in normal circumstances the holding up of a finger would give no
pleasure af all.
One last skulking-place of psychological Hedonism may be
briefly noticed, though this represents a form of the error which
rarely imposes upon any but very young students of Ethics. At
a certain stage of reflection egoistic Hedonism is often made fo
present itself in an extremely amiable and even edifying light
by including among the pains and pleasures which determine the
morality of an action the pains and pleasures of Conscience.
othing can be more beautiful, it is suggested, than fo do my
duty simply because I like if. There can be no more efficient
sanction and guarantee of lIorality than the happiness which
experience shows invariably fo follow in ifs train. I will not
here examine whether the pains and pleasures of Conscience are
as a marrer of psychological fact so intense as Moralists have
sometimes round if convenient fo assume. If is probable that,
as regards minor kinds of wrong-doing, in persons of average
conscientiousness, the pains of Conscience have been greatly
exaggerated. If moral obligation were fo be based solely upon
3o PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
this ground, the cynical advice to make one's moral standard as
low as possible in order that one may occasionally enjoy the
luxury of living up to it would have something to be said for if.
But, be this as it may, be the pleasure of right-doing and the
pains of wrong-doing great or small, these pleasures and pains
are only explicable on the assumption of the existence now or in
the past, in the man himself or in others, of desires for something
besides pleasure. When the pleasure arises from the person's
own purely introspective satisfaction in his own morality or
victory over temptation or the like, we have simply another case
of the pleasure attending the satisfaction of all desire. The
attempt fo explain this away is another instance of the old
hysteron-proteron. In other cases there may, indeed, be no
desire--at least in any conscious and explicit form--for the
performance of duty or the happiness of others for ifs own sake
in the individual himself, and yet the doing of the right act may
be a source of pleasure or more probably the doing of the wrong
one a source of pain. The pleasure in the act, or the pain in its
omission, may be due to a habit formed under the influence of
other motives. Or pleasure may bave corne to be associated
with the act, and pain with its omission, through the influence
of a public opinion which is itself based upon an approval or
disapproval not arising from any hedonistic calcu]us, and which
influences the individual quite apart from any anticipated con-
sequences of the public feeling. To attempt fo justify (on
hedonistic principles) the performance of certain acts commonly
called moral by their pleasantness, and then to explain their
pleasantness by assuming that they are moral and so sources of
conscientious pleasure or means of avoiding conscientious pain, is
fo argue in a circle. The pleasantness of the act is explained by
its morality, and its morality is explained by its pleasantness.
If is admitted that the act is often such as could not produce the
attainable maximum of pleasure apart from its being regarded
as moral; but, according fo the hedonistic Psychology, if could
never have corne fo be regarded as moral except through an
experience which showed that apart from the opinion of its
morality if was already the way fo obtain the greatest maximum
of pleasure. The consciousness which can take pleasure in an
Chap. ii, § v] ELEMENTS OF TRUTH 3
action because if is right is hot a consciousness that cares about
nothing but pleasure. If if bas hot risen fo the level of a dis-
interested love of duty, or of tribe or family or individual person,
if must at least be capable of being affected by a desire of social
approbation, or other social impulses and interests, which are just
as diflïcult to account for on the hypothesis of egoistic Hedonism
as the love of duty for ifs own sake, and which generally imply
more definitely ' disinterested' desires on the part of the com-
munity by which the opinion that the act is right has been
created. Even if the community is supposed fo approve or
disapprove merely from self-interest, the community's disappro-
bation would bring no loss of pl¢asure to a consciousness that
cared hot for disapprobation 1. lIoralists like bIandeville, and in
a more refined way Hume, have a tendency fo reduce the motive
of moral conduct fo a kind of vanity. But vanity is as good an
instance as could be round of a disinterested desire, when it
rises above the level of that gregarious instinct which is shared
by the lower animals, and which after all is equally proof against
the hedonistic anMysis.
V
I shall now attempt, even af the risk of some repetition, fo
state what appear fo me the elements of truth contained in the
theory of psychological Hedonism, and fo guard against some of
the exaggerations on the other side which have sometimes helped
fo secure acceptance for that position.
() The gratification of every desire necessarily gives pleasure
in actual fact, and is consequently conceived of as pleasant in
idea before the desire is accomplished. That is the truth which
lies af the bottom of all the exaggerations and misrepresentations
of the hedonistic Psychology. The psychological Hedonist ex-
plains the martyr's death by a tste for the pleasures of martyr-
dom. Undoubtedly a martyr must derive pleasure from the
thought of dying for a holy cause, and even in the midst of the
flames the thought that he is doing something for that cause
Of course, when any ulterior consequence of sociul approbation is fo be
feared, we should hot speak of the person as acting from purely conscien-
tious motives af all.
3 PSYCHOLOGICAL ttEDONISM [Book I
must, presumably, so long as if actually remains in his conscious-
ness, give him some pleasure. But you cannot account for his
action by that pleasure (waiving for the moment out objection
fo the hysteron-proteron), unless you contend that the pleasure
involved in the gratification of the desire is greater in amount
than the pains involved, and foreseen fo be involved, in the
process of achieving that gratification. The thought of the
purpose accomplished or the cause assisted may no doubt, even
in the moment of martyrdom, when abstracted from everything
else in the man's consciousness, be pleasant ; but that is a very
different thing from saying that the process of being burned
alive, taken as whole, is a pleasant one, and that the man
suffers lnartyrdom because, upon a calm and impartial review,
he thinks that the pleasure will predominate over the pain. His
conduct implies that the thought of serving his cause must have
had solne peculiar attraction for him over and above the pleasant-
ness which if shared with the rejected attractions of a happy
and tranquil existence. Had if ever occurred fo him fo make
the calculation, a lnan totally indifferent fo the source or moral
character of his pleasures would surely have found that the
pleasures of living were greater than those of martyrdom 1.
Aristotle saw this with peculiar clearness. The brave man, he
tells us, finds pleasure in the exercise of courage; yet the
pleasure is so small in amount, when compared with the attendant
pains, that the popular mind hardly notices that there is any
pleasure af all in the dying warrior's last moments. On the
whole, such a death seems painful, like the experience of the
athlete fighting in the arena, though there too the contemplation
of the prize and the glory fo be achieved are no doubt sources
of pleasure .
We my here ignore the question of the nerness of the plesure : for
experience seems fo show tht, even if we grant the delightfulness of looklng
forwrd to being burned live, the prospect does hot st 11 gain in ttrctive-
ness when one cornes closer fo if.
Ethic. Nicomach. III. ix. 3 (P. IIIT) O6
oh a" tva, xp ô o %a ov çaiwa ïX«. This side
Chap. ii, § v] PLEASURE STRENGTHENS DESIRE 33
(oE) Iç may be furçher admitçed thaç çhis picçured pleasantness of
the graçification of a desire, though iç will noç explain çhe desire,
does greaçly add fo içs sçrenh. The pleasure of geçting know-
ledge cannoç be explained withouç assuming a 'disinçerested'
love of knowledge. Buç when, impelled by çhis desire or assisted
by çhe co-operation of other motives, we do actual]y cquire
some knowledge and find çhe process more and more delightful,
the desire unquestionbly becomes stronger; just as, vhen
anticipçed pleasure
nmy be progressively diminished. Iç would be difficult ço say
in çhe former case ço what extenç the mere love of the experienced
pleasure of learning may take the place, as a motive, of all
genuine desire for knowledge itself; but cerçainly it may do so
to some exçenç. The scholar may degeneraçe inço the mere
bookworm. And so, on the other hand, çhe young boy usually
begins lire with some curiosity fo know, but may find his love
of knowledge vanish with growing experience of the painfulness
of the road ço iç, or of the greffer pleasantness of the thletics
and çhe athleçic fme which his schoolfellovs, and very probably
his schoohnasçers, have taught him, by precept and example,
regard as çhe chier busins of lire. Here again we have
a çruth, iored if noç denied by modern Anti-hedonists, which
was quiçe clearly recognized by Aristotle. It is hOt çme, he
tells us, as çhe Plaçonisçs maintined,
activities.' An lien pleasure--the pleasure connecçed with
some other and inconsistent acçivitywill no doubç do thaç:
çhe pleasure of eating, for insMnce, interferes with inçellectual
acçiviçy, and çherefore if is when the cting is b,t
eating of sweeçmeaçs goes on mosç briskly in the auditorium;
when çhe specçaçors geç interested in çhe play, they stop eating.
' Buç çheir own proper plesure stimulates our activities and
makes çhem beççer and more sustained .' Therefore, as he
points out elsewhere, we do best whaç we do with pleure.
(3) Sçill more must çhis principle
of Aristotle's doctrine is constntly overlooked in sttlng his view tht the
rtuous mn necesmrily acts with plesure.
a ' àkkpm kvaioua. Ethic. icomach. X. v. 5 {P- I75b)
RASHDALL I
34 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
doctrine of disinterested desires cornes fo be applied, as if was
applied for the first rime by Butler, to bad and indifferent as
well as to good desires. Between the desire of an object and the
desire of the pleasure arising from that objectit is not possible
to draw an absolutely sharp line of demarcation ; the one is
ever passing into and colouring the other. From the pure desire
of an object for which we should be prepared to sacrifice every-
thing, while feeling all the rime that with the personal pleasure
derived from it we could dispense well enough, the mind may
pass 1,y imperceptible transitions to such a desire for the pleasure
as will keep alive an interest in the object entirely for its own
satisfction--a state of mind well illustrated by the familiar
process of 'riding a hobby.' Although, as we have seen, the
worst passions of hmnan nature (equally with the best) are
properly speaking ' disinterested,' if may be admitted that their
disinterestedness is seldom as pure as that of the highest desires.
For the greatest height of disinterestedness implies that the
desire persists in spire of clear and cahn conviction that if is hot,
in the hedonistic sense of the word, fo one's interest, and this will
seldom be the case with the worst desires. The mere victim of
passion will usually (hOt perhaps always) 'persuade himself'
that ifs gratification is hedonistically worth the cost. ]Ioreover,
although the man who indulges to his own loss in what we
commonly call a bad passion does not act merely with a view to
his own pleasure, he does act simply for the gratification of his
own impulses. The outside objectthe death of an enemy or
the likeis no doubt desired as an end, but itis merely his own
private and personal desire for if that nakes if an end fo him;
and no doubt that desire--though not the result of a comparison
between possible pleasuresis offert explicable by association
with other desires and impulses of a more obviously self-regarding,
or a nore obviously animal, characterthe remembrance of an
injury, instinctive jealousy, or the like. On the other hand, the
self-sacrifice of the good man for the welfare of a stranger or the
triumph of a cause may be produced by purely objective or
rational considerations. The object appeals to or 'interests'
him as a rational and reflecting intelligence, not simply as an
individual being with private passions and impulses which
Chap. il, § v] DEGREES OF I)ISINTERESTEDNESS 5
demand their own gratification. The bad man may be betrayed
by passion into a forgetfulness of his true' interest on the xvhole ' ;
but he never wholly forgets himself and his impulses, still less
does he ' lose himself' in universal or ideal interests. There is,
therefore, an important psychological as well as an ethical
difference between the'disinterested' impulses of the bad man
and the purely 'self-forgetful' Benevolence of the best; and
betveen these two extremes there are of course very many
degrees of 'disinterestedness 1., If by a disinterested desire we
mean the desire of an object not merely as an end which
we desire, but as an end in itself which on purely objective
1 Simmel bas devoted much space (Eileitug in die Moralwissesch«ft,
892, I, Kap. ii) fo showing how impossible if is fo form any clear concep-
tion of pure Egoism or of pure Altruism : he shows how the instincts, desires
and emotions with the satisfaction of which a man identifies his own good
or interest or pleasur% alwa.ys include some which are of social origin and
involve a moral element ; whilst the most altruistic man is after all grati-
iing impulses in which he finds his own satisfaction. If seems fo me true
and important to say that altruistic and egoistic impulses fuse inextricably.
Few desires and impulses are wholly altruistic or wholly egoistic: we can
only speak of a more or less altruistic or egoistic character in them. The
motives which prompt the average man fo devote himself heartily fo
his profession can as little be represented as pure desire for the public good
as they can be represented as merely a desire for his own enjoyment or
advancement. His profession bas become to him an end-in-itself, but if bas
become so because he bas both interests which are mainly egoistic and
impulses which are mainly altruistic. At the saine rime, I do hot think we
can deny the psychological possibility of the pure Egoist who deliberately
gratifies his impulses just so far as he thinks they will yield him pleasure
on the whole ; this possibility is hot affected by the social origit or the
social tede»c!/of some of those impulses. The pure Altruist who subordinates
his own interest entirely fo that of others is more difficult fo conceiv% because
the man's very Altruism must produce such an identification of his own
interest with that of others that they can hardly be kept absolutely apart
in consciousness, except in those cases where there is some absolute and
palpable contradiction between the interest of others and what would but
for his Altruism, be conceived of as his own interest. Butwhere the sacrifice
of life, or of all that makes life worth living is deliberately ruade, the fact
that on refiection the man may recognize the sacrifice as a good for him does
hot make it impossible fo describe the desire as such as altruistic, so long as
the object is hot desired merely as a means fo his own good, whether con-
ceived of as pleasure or something else. What is true in Simmel's conten-
tion is that the normal motives of most men are neither purèly altruistic
nor purely egoistic.
36 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISH [Book I
grounds we conceive of as good, then we must pronounce that
such a disinterested desire is possible only in the case of good
desires. ]ad desires and inclinations may be 'disinterested'
in the merely negative sense that they are not desires for
pleasure as such. Desires for the good of another person or
persons are more ' disinterested' in a stricter sense and a higher
dcgree: vhile the highest degree of disinterestedness is only
reached when a moral or universal element enters into the desired
object, when the individual desires the object not merely as
a paoEicular individual vho chances fo have such and such an
impulse, but as a reasonable being who aires at what his Reason
tells him fo be hot merely his good, but part of the good.
(4) If has been implied in what has been said already that
pleasure, though not the only object of desire, is nevertheless
one possible object of desire, and that desire of pleasure, though
incompetent by itself fo explain the most ordinary springs of
action, is widely operative in hmnan lire. If this is hOt offert
explicitly denied, there are many Moralists who in their zeal
against pleasure seem disposed fo ignore or gloss if over. ]3utler,
for instance, appears fo ignore entirely the existence of any
general desire for pleasure as distinct from (a) palbicular 'pro-
pensions,' or affections, or disinterested desires for objects,
and (b) the desire for one's ' interest' on the whole. Whether
or hOt he is right in holding that hunger is a disinterested
desire for food, hunger is clearly distinguishable from the
desire for gastronomic pleasure. When a City Alderman after
satisfying his hunger goes on grossly fo over-feed himself, he is
surely impelled by a love of pleasure which is as distinct from the
passion of hunger as if is from a rational affection owards his
own interest on the whole. Indeed, the calculating desire for
one's interest on the whole, if ' interest' be understood in the
hedonistic sense, is only explicable as the result, in the developed
and reflective consciousness, of the desire for present and
immediate pleasure. The idea of pleasure on the whole is
got by abstraction from a number of particular pleasures each
of which the man desires, but which experience shows him cannot
be enjoyed all af once.
(5) If modern Anti-hedonists have hot explicitly explained
Chap. il, § v] THE SUM OF PLEASURES 37
way all desire for pleasure, some of them have eategorieally
and in terres denied the possibility of desiring a' greatest quantum
of pleasure' or a 'sure of pleasures '. The possibility of desiring
a sure of pleasures was denied by the late Prof. T. H. Green,
but if is diflîeult fo see on what grounds exeept the obvious but
irrelevant faet tht pleasures ennot be enjoyed as a sure
Sueh arguments are surely based upon a mere verbal quibble.
You might as well deny that I enn desire music beeause I eannot
take in a whole symphony simultaneously, while eaeh separate
note, taken by itself, would hot be music af all. When I say
that I desire sure of pleasures, I menn of course that I desire fo
get as mueh pleasure as possible, i. e. fo enjoy pleasure as intense
and as lsting as possible. Such an aire seems to me perfectly
intelligible and rational as far as it goes. How far such a
formulation of the ethical criterion falls short of the real demands
of the moral consciousness, we shall have to consider hereafter.
If is enough here to say that if is not in my view possible to
oppose a hedonistic Ethic on the ground that its end is an
impossible or unattainable one, or the hedonistic Psychology
on the ground that the motive which it represents as the sole
motive of human conduct is an impossible or non-existent
motive. The question is, hovever, of so much importance that
I reserve a more full discussion of if for a separate chapter .
(5) And here perhaps if may be well fo meet an objection
which turns upon what is offert called the' paradox of Hedonism.'
' If you aim af pleasure you vill not get it,' it is said. ' To get
pleasure forger if.' Within certain limits, I quite adroit the
truth of the experience alleged. If is no doubt a serious argu-
ment against the adoption of the hedonistic calculus as our sole
guide in personal conduct. But to a certain extent if is possible
fo allow for this fact of experience even in the hedonistic calculus
itself. I do not find that I rail fo enjoy a holiday because I have
carefully considered which of various tours, equally expensive
or inexpensive and equally recupertive a, I should enjoy most.
Cf. Sidgwick, lethods qf Ethics, 6th ed., p. 34- Book II, ch. i.
s Even this could hot be decided without tuking into considemtion the
pleasure I should get. The hedonistic culculus is us necessuT for duty us
tbr 1)leasure. If the doctrine thut pleasure cunnot be obtained by contrivunce
38 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
I should no doubt begin fo lose pleasure, if I were always calcu-
lating whether the enjoyment had realized my expectations.
But, subject fo this consideration, I do hot believe that in small
matterswsupposing the pursuit of pleasure to be strictly limited
by considerations of duty, so that no latent uneasiness of con-
science cleaves fo out enjoyment--the alleged paradox holds
good ai all. If is hOt a marrer of experienee that pleasure is
diminished by being provided and contrived for beforehand I
I do hOt find that the dinner which I bave ordered myself
always gives me less pleasure than the dinner which bas been
ordered by somebody else. In certain circumstances the previous
contrivance may even becomo a positive enhancement of the
delig'ht; as when Charles Lamb COlnplained that in his days
o[" comparative affluence he could not get the pleasure out of his
theatre-goings and occasional holiday-makings which he did
when they had fo be anxiously planned and eontrived for weeks
beforehand .
VI
Before leaving tbe subject of pleasure I thlnk if desirable
to add a urther explanation. If is possible fo reject the hedon-
istic Psychology without admitting the existence of disinterested
desires in the strictest sense of the vord. Until recently the
existence of disinterested desires was usual]y denied (among
modern Philosophers) only by Hedonists. The late Professor
Green agreed with Professor Sidgwick in accepting unreservedly
were truc, a Physician would bave carefully fo conceal from his overworked
or overworried patient the fact that the tonic he was recommending was
simply a dose of pleasure. This may possibly at rimes be desirable, but hot
in the case of persons who have no rooted antipathy to pleasure.
Not only does hot the calculation always diminish the pleasre, but a
further pleasure may arise om the satisfaction of the desire for pleasurable
lire in general, as bas been well pointed out by von Hartmann, who is
assuredly no ttedonist (' eine zweite reflektierte Lust nus der Bcfriedigung
des eudimonistischen Wollens,' Ethische Sttdie, p. 37}- Af the saine rime
he seems to me mistaken, if hot inconsistent, in maintaining that all
pleasure arises from the satisfaction of some desire (' dass es keine Lust
giebt, die nicht an die Befriedigung eines Begehrens geknfipft wire, 1. c.
P- 43) though he admits that the desire may sometimes be set up by the
mere presence of the means to ifs satisfaction.
" ' 01d China' in The Lest Essays of Elia.
Chap. ii, § ri] EGOISII WITHOUT HEDONIS[ 39
Butler's quite explicit docçrine on this head. Aç the saine rime
we find in Professor Green's writings, side by side with this
view, another which seems fo be scrcely consistent with if.
He commits himself af rimes fo the doctrine that in every action
'self-satisfaction is sought .' His theory of the ' timeless self'
no doubt makes if difficult fo say in what relation this doctrine
of self-satisfaction is supposed fo stand fo the belief in ' dis-
interested desires.' Desires re certainly in rime, and the object
of desire must be conceived of as future. If is, therefore, not
easy fo see how the satisfaction of a self which is hOt in rime
can be ruade into a motive for conduct, or how we can af a definite
moment of rime introduce a change into that vhich is timeless.
Here (as so often with theories of this kind) if is diflïcult not fo
suspect some confusion between the permanent and the timeless.
But, waiving that diflïculty, I can only understand the idea
of 'aiming aç self-stisfaction' fo mean that my motive is a cer-
tain future state of my own consciousness. If I am always
aiming aç a future state of my own consciousness, I cannot
be ' disinterestedly ' pursuing the advancement of learning or the
good of my neighbour. In that case I should care about my
neighbour's good merely as a means fo my own ' satisfaction.'
The two doctrines are antagonistic and inconsistent. Recent
writers of Professor Green's School appear fo have recognized
the fact, and have explicitly adopted the doctrine of 'self-
satisfaction.' They are Egoists without being Hedonists. They
adroit that every action is properly speaking ' interested,' though
my interest is hOt equivalent fo my maximum pleasure. Such a
doctrine seems fo be no less false psychologically, and ethically
scarcely less objectionable, than the hedonistic Psychology itself .
Of course there is a sense in which every ction is ' interested.'
I cannot care for anythingmy neighbour's good, the cause
zProlegomena to EtMcs, Book II, ch. il, und Book III, ch. i.
' The sme nlysis which shows me thut I do hot lwys uim ut my own
plesure, shows me eqully tht I do hOt lwys uim t my own stisfction.
I reject, in the one cse us in the other, the conscious egoism of the form in
which humun choice is conceived--except in the insignificant sense tht I m
conscious that what I desire and aim at is desired and aimed at by me--
u tutologicl proposition' (Sidvick, Ethics of T. H. Greeu, 3'r. Herbert
Spencer and J. Martineau, p. Io3).
4o PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
of 'learning' or of 'sport' or whatever if may be--unless
interests me. But this has, I suppose, never been denied.
simply amounts to saying that a desire which is to more me
must be qny desire. The question, as I conceive if, is whether
the motive of every action is some future state of my ovn
consciousness, or whether if lnay be some state of some other's
consciousness, or some event in the objective world 1. To assert
the former view would amount, as it appears to me, to saying
that a man cannot be benevolent simply because he cares about
his neighbour for that neighbour's sake, but only because he
wants fo be a person conoeious of his own benevolence. His
neighbour's good is regarded not as an end but only as a means
--a means fo some state of his own soul, however 'spiritual'
or exalted that state lnay be supposed fo be. Now such a
doctrine seems tobe simply a recrudescence of the old ' soul-
saving' view of lire, which may so easily degenerate into some-
thing considerably more nauseous and offensive çhan an honesç
egoistic Hedonism which is naked and not ashamed. But the
question with which ve are now concerned is whether the doc-
trine is psychologically true. To my own mind it seems open to
precisely the saine line of objection which its supporters raise in
arguing against Hedonism. If involves the saine hysteron-
proteron. If makes the anticipated ' satisfaction' the condition
of the desire, whereas the desire is really the condition of the
satisfaction. If I cannot by any possibility be moved by my
neighbour's calalnity until I bave satisfied myself that I shall
get myself into a state of desirable moral exaltation by doing so,
you cut away all possibility of explaining why such a state
should be looked ai as desirable or morally exalted. Unless
I looked upon my nelohbour s good as a thing for which I cared,
or vhich possessed intrinsic value apart from any effect upon me,
I should hot think if a good state of mind for me fo contribute
or to have contributed to that good. Itis precisely the unselfish-
Of course, if such un event is fo bave real vulue, it must ultimutely huve
situe effect on some consciousness or other, but this need not be distinctly
contempluted by the ugent. A Sumson might well desire the destruction of
his enemies und their temple, even ut the cost of his own life, without dis-
tictly thikig of the stisfactio to be given to his surviving countrymem
Chap. ii, § vil REAL DISINTERESTEDNESS 4r
ness of the action which I find good. If I cared for my neigh-
bour's welfare merely as a means to my own edification, I should
hot be unselfish. In many cases I cannot doubt that such
acts are done entirely without the thought of self, or even of
abstract duty: the desire of the other man's good acts as directly
and immediately upon the will as the desire of one's own : while,
so far as a reflective idea of goodness or duty enters into the
motive, the very essence of that ideal of moral goodness or duty
for its own sake is precisely this--that the thing should be done
simply because Reason approves it, and without calculation as to
how it will affect our own future consciousness.
The immedicy with which the conception that a thing is
rational acts on the will is best seen perhaps in cases where
no very imiortant moral interest is at stake. A man with
a faste for ' Bradshaw' sees that certain trains are arranged
badly and stupidly. He feels a disinterested aversion to such
an irrational arrangement, tte proceeds anonymously fo write
to the papers or to the Company's Traffic Manager. :No reputa-
tion is fo be got by the step, and he never expects fo travel that
way again. As little is he thinking of any future glow of self-
satisfaction or of the improvement of his own charater. The
mere fact of the thing being irrational and as it should not
be is a sufficient reason to a rational being for wanting to
put it right. If you say he is 'uneasy' at the thing being
wrong and itis the uneasiness that moves him, you are of course
falling once again into the hysteron-proteron in the form in
which it got hold of Locke 1. You are explaining the desire
(and consequent oetion) by the uneasiness, whereas it is really
the desire that explains and occasions the uneasiness.
:No doubt it may be freely admitted that when once an object
is looked upon as good, as a thing that interests us, the desire to
Essay, Book II, ch. xxi, § 4o. In so çar us Locke uctually identifies (as he
shows a tendency fo do) the ' desire' and the ' uneasiness' he is hot open
to this criticism, and in fct no one shows more convincingly that if is hot
' the greater good, though apprehended fo be so' (ib., § 35), which always de-
termines the will ; but in so far as he make8 the motive to be ' the removing
of pin.., as the first and necessary step towards happiness '--' that happi-
ness which we all aire af in all our actions' (lb., § 36)--he is virtually under
the influence of the hedonistic Psychology.
4 PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM [Book I
attain for ourselves the moral good implied in the promotion of that
object supplements, and fuses itself with, the desire that the object
should be attained. Just as experience of the pleasure of satis-
fying a desire reacts upon and reinforces the desire itself, sowith
those high,est desires which consist in devotion to some ideal aim or
some form of otlmr people's good the aspiration after goodness
for ourselves mingles with and reinforces the desire that others
should be benefited or tlm ideal aire promoted : the desire tobe
good and the desire to do good blend into one. The proportion
in which the desire for personal holiness on thaone hand, and the
desire for the promotion of objective interests on the other, enter
into the motives of the best lives probably varies enormously even
in the noblest characters. And from a practical point of view if
is probably desirable that both elements should be present. The
man who is only interested in people and causes is apt to be
indiflbrcnt to apects and departments of Iorality which are
relly of great social importance; while the man who thinks
only of his own spiritual condition is apt to become unhealthily
introspective, if hot anti-soc.lai. Both types of character are
one-sided ; but, if we had fo choose betveen the two, it is hardly
to the man who most consciously and deliberately regards his
family and his neighbours, the poor and the unfortunate, as the
means to his own spiritual advancement, or as supplying occasions
for the . quisition of 'merit,' that we should accord the prefer-
ence. Some of the ethioEl questions on which we have here
touched will demand our attention again. Meanwhile, I content
myself with repeting that, as a pure marrer of Psychology, the
theory that every desire is a desire ' for some form of personl
good ' is open to every objection which its exponents have so
A few expressions of the doctrine here criticized may be given. ]Ir.
Fairbrother is quite justified in making Green hold (The Philosolly of T. H.
Gre, n., p. 67 that the end' is always a "personal good" in some form .... Man
always is actuated by this conception of himself as satisfied ' ; but he ignores
all the passages that hav an opposite tendency. The Bishop of Clogher (Dr.
d'Arcy) introduces another feature into the doctrine--that ' the end of a desir
is not an external thing, but the corresponding activity ' (Shot't St,«dy o.t'Ethics,
2nd ed., p. 58. Somewhat similar, though more vague, is Mr. Bradley's
earlier doctrine that ' nothing is desired except that which is identified with
ourselves, and we can aim at nothing, except in so far as we aim at ourselves
in it' (.Ethical tdies, p. 62). Professor Mui'head likewise contends tha
Chap. ii, § vi] HYSTERON-PROTERON OF EGOISSI 43
convincingly urged against the hedonistic Psychology. The
satisfaction of altruistic and other higher desires only cornes
fo be regarded as 'our good' because ve care for a good which
originally presents itself as a good which is not ours.
' If is only as involved in one's own that one can desire one's neighbour's
good : if is only as his good enters into my conception of my good that I can
make if an object of dtsire and of volition' (The Elem«nts of Ethics,
p. I54 ). And again, ' The essentiel point fo note is that all desire, and there-
fore all will (inasmuch as will depends upon desire), curry with them a
reference to self. Their object is a form of self-satisfaction' (lb., p. 5o).
'Reference to self' is vague, but appears fo be explained by the previous
sentence : ' They [the objects of desire] are related fo the self, in that if is
the realization of them for a self that is desired.' Still there is a vagueness
which I should like fo see cleared up. Does ' for a self' mean (I) that the
desire is mine, or (2) that if is my interest in some future state of myself that
makes me cure fo pull my neighbomas child out of the tire ? The first doc-
trine seems fo be as unquestionable as if is unquestioned ; the latter false.
On p. 47 we seem fo get an explicit statement t]aat if is always a future state
of the self that is desired in the words : ' Desire is a state of tension created
by the contrust between the present state of the self and the idea of a future
state hot yet realised.' Is hot this ' tension' very much like Locke's ' greatest
present uneasiness,' with the disadvantage of introducing a hot vëry intelli-
gible physical metaphor ? I should say that in the case of the anonymous
railway reformer contemplated in the text the tension is caused solely by
the contrast between the present state of the time4able and the ideal which
his reason unfolds fo him. If so, the object of his desire, the object for
which he cures, is hot ' self-satisfaction.' Whatever be the meaning of his
earlier and vaguer utterunces, ! rejoice fo find tht Mr. Brax]ley does now
repudiate the doctrine which I am attacking. ' If is hot true that in volition
the idea is always the idea that I ara about fo do something. I cannot
adroit that the qualification of the change as my act must always in volition
ibrm a part of the idea's original content' (Miud, N. S., No. 44, I9 °2, P- 456)
It is true that Mr. Bradley is speaking of Will, and in his view ' desire is
most certainly hot necessary for will' (ib., p. 457), but he elsewhere declares
still more clearly that we can desire an event outside and quite apart
from our psychical existence '(Mind, N. S., No. 4 , x9o2, p. 8). Tht is
exactly the point on which I wish fo insist, but if seems fo me quite incon.
sistent with Mr. Bradley's doctrine that the bad man acting (as ordinary
people would put if)against knowledge 'is pursuing still and he always
must pursue his own good' (Miad, N. S., No. 43, 9 o2, P- 3°7), and with the
whole tendency of that article. Surely ' my good' is hot ' an event outside
and quite apart from our psychical existence.' Mr. Bradley might reply
that fo 'desire' and to ' will' are hot the saine thing, but if a desire (hOt
opposed by some other desire of sufficient strength) does hot pass into
action, hure we hot the ' freak of unmotived willing' aginst which Mr.
Bradley very properly protests ?
CHAPTER III
RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM
IN the last chapter n attempt ws nmde to show that as
a mtter of psycho]ogical fact hunmn nture is capable of
desiring other tbings besides plessure. To show tht something
besides pleasure is cspble of being desired does not, however,
prove that anything besides pleasure is ultimstely desirble.
If is still quite possible fo maintin tht plesure is the only
true or r,ntionl object of desire. The question remains whether
this is actually the cse. There are undoubtedly people who
on reflectlon re prepared fo declre tht they cn ttch no
ultimate value fo anything besides pleasure. They my recognize
the existence of ' disinterested desires' for knovledge or for
power, for wealth or for vengeance, but on reflection if ppears
fo them rtionl fo grtify these desires on]y in so fr s they
tend fo swell the sure of pleasure--which mens, s we htve
seen, fo geç s much plesure s they cn for as long s they
cn. The wise mn (iç is suggested)will tret the çtainmenç
of ]l other objects s mens, not as ends. Other desires will
be, so far s possible, grtified or repressed, stimulted or dis-
courged or transformed in whtever wy experience shows
fo be on the whole conducive tre getting as much p]essure out
of lire as possible.
:Now so long as the egoistic ttedonist confines himself fo
sserting" I cre nothing bout nything but my own plesure,
nd I propose fo grçify my other impulses only in so fsr s
(in the long run) I think if tends fo procure for me rnximum
yield of plesure on the whole,' he is inaccessible fo logicl ttack.
But very often he does hot stop t thst. tte declres not merely
tht pleasure is his object, but tlmt plesure is the only reasonble
object of desire, thst every resonble mn mus gree wiçh him
Chap. iii, § il EGOISTIC HEDONISM 45
in thinking that his own pleasure is fo each man the only proper
object of pursuit, that any one who pursues any other aire is
unreasonable, and makes a mistke. And when that attitude
is adopted, if becomes possible fo urge that he is implicitly
appealing fo a universal standard which must be the saine
for all men. He admits that Reason can pronounce upon the
value of ends, and that if does so, not from any merely private
point of view, but from an objective or universal standpoint.
The pursuit of pleasure is approved not merely because if chances
fo be the end that he prefers, but because in some sense if is the true
end, the end that ought fo be pursued. The champion of pleasure
may, indeed, contend that the universal rule which Reason
approves, is not that pleasure in general ought fo be pursued,
but that each man should pursue his own pleasure. But an
egoistic Hedonist of this type is liable fo be asked on what
grounds an impartial or impersonal Reason should take up
this position. He may be asked whether, when he condemns
the pursuit of ends other than pleasure, he does hot imply
that the claires of this end are dependent, not upon the in-
dividual's chance likings, but upon something in pleasure itself,
something vhich Reason discerns in if, and which every Reason
that really is Reason must likewise discern in it. And if that
is so, he may further be asked why Reason should attach more
importance fo one man's pleasure than fo another's. If if is
pleasure that is the end, if cannot marrer, if may be urged, whose
pleasure if is that is promoted. The greater pleasure must always
be preferable fo the less pleasure, even though the promotion
of the greatest pleasure on the whole should demand that this
or that individual should sacrifice some of his private pleasure.
From this point of view if will seem impossible tht Reason
should approve the universal rule that each should pursue
his private pleasure with the result of losing pleasure on the
whole. The rational rule of conduct will appear fo be that
each individual should aim at the greatest pleasure on the whole,
and that vhen a greater pleasure for the whole can be procured
by the sacrifice of an individual's private pleasure, the sacrifice
should be ruade. The Egoist's appeal fo Reason, the setting
up of Egoism as an objectively rational rule of conduct, the
45 RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
condemnation as irrational of those who pursue any other
end, seems therefore fo react against his own position. The
logic of the egoistic Hedonist's position carries him away
from egoistic Hedonism and forces him into the adoption of
a universalistic Hedonism.
Whatever may be thought of the llne of argument which thus
attempts fo cross the gulf between egoistic and universalistic
Hedonism, itis at M1 events one vhich has been actually
fol|owed more or less consciously and explicitly by many minds.
There are many persons who remain Hedonists, who are prepared
fo declare that all other objects except pleasure should be
pursued only in so far as they yield pleasure on the whole,
but who are hot prepared to say that if is only their private
pleasure which should be pursued. Among these desires for
objects other than pleasure of which they are conscious, there
is one which does present itself fo them in a different light
from those other impulses which they are prepared fo subordinate
entirely to the pursuit of private pleasure, and that is the desire
for other people's pleasure. For the very principle upon which
their own preference of pleasure fo all other objects of desire
rests, seems fo put them under the necessity of approving a
similar end for other people. How then can they condemn
in themselves an impulse which tends towards the realization
of that end for others? To do so would seem fo involve
inconsistency or self-contradiction. There is of course no
contradiction in the mere existence of inconsistent desires in
different persons. There is no contradiction in admitting, as a
fact, that I may want what my neighbour wants too, and we cannot
both enjoy. But if is otherwise when itis a question of approving
inconsistent desires. Reason cannot give different answers fo
the saine question. If may of course appear to do so : we may
all make mistakes, but when we do so, we acknovledge that
itis hot really Reason which pronounces. If the Reason of
two men tells them opposite things, we necessarily conclude
that one of them at least must be wrong. Hence when occasions
arise, on which what increases pleasure for me diminishes iL
for some one else, if is impossible that each can be right in
judging his own pleasure tobe the more important. By such
Chap. iii, § i] FROM EGOISM TO ALTRUISM 47
a line of thought, the Hedonist who bases his position upon
Reason is driven to recognize that the greatest pleasure on
the whole is from the point of view of Reason the most important
end, no nmtter whether it is I or some other ' I' that is to enjoy
that pleasure. No doubt this bare intellectuel recognition of
its reasonableness does not by itself lead to Mtruistic conduct
except where there is either () a disinterested desire of other
people's well-being (whether of certain definite individuals or
of humanity at large) or () what Professor Sidgwick hs called
a' desire to do what is right and reasonable as such.' In the
tlrst case, Reason will prevent a man, so fo speak, inhibiting
his spontaneous benevolent impulses, as he (more or less fre-
quently) inhibits other impulses when they are shown hot
to be conducive to his own interest on the whole; in the second
case, the reasonableness of the conduct will actully become
the motive for ifs being done, even though (apart fmm the
verdict of Reason) there should be no spontaneous inclination
towards the conduct vhich it prescribes. In this way if is
possible for a mind which strts vith a conviction of the
intrinsic reasonableness of the pursuit of pleasure to feel itself
compelled to adroit, not only the abstract reasonableness of
unselfish conduct, but also the existence of something within
us vhich sanctions, prescribes, dictates, a certain course of
conduct quite irrespectively of the individuM's interest--in
other words to adroit the existence, and the authority of what
is popularly called Conscience, or the 'duty' which Conscience
prescribes--of what in more technicM langu,ge is styled the
Practical Reason or of the categoricM imperative vhich that
Reason enacts.
Or if fo some minds this lnguage about Reason and im-
peratives carries with if associations which seem to lead them
beyond the point which they have really conceded, we may
put the nmtter in a slightly different way. Every one vho
ever thinks about conduct ai all, who regards the choice of
end as a marrer upon which thinking has got anything to say,
every one who attempts to represent his conduct as cap,nble
of rationl justification, gives judgements of value. The egoistic
Hedonist who says not merely ' I like pleasure and therefore
48
RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
I intend to pursue if,' but ' the wise man is he who pursues
pleasure,' shows that he has this ultimate and unanalysable idea
of good or value in his mind as much as the idealizing moralist
who says ' Virtue is the true end of human pursuit.' Even
though 'that which has value' may be fo him coextensive
with pleasure, the term ' value' or 'good ' does hot mea merely
the same as pleasure. The proposition 'my pleasure is good'
is not fo him a mere tautology. If does not mean merely
'pleasure is pleasant.' Still more obviously is this the case
when such a Hedonist recognizes, as I have contended that he is
logically bound fo recognize, that if is not only his pleasure
vhich has value but all pleasure; and that therefore if is
rational for him to pursue his neighbour's pleasure as well
as his own, and fo prefer the larger amount of pleasure to
the smaller, even though the larger pleasure be the pleasure
of others, and the smaller his own.
After such an admission has been made, the enquirer may
still take a utilitarian view of the moral criterion: he may
still hold that we find out what if is reasonable to do by
asking experience fo decide what promotes the greatest happiness
on the whole or (less logically) the 'greatest happiness of the
greatest number' : but he is no longer a Utilitarian in his view
of the ultinate reason for doing what is thus ascertained to
be right. In admitting that one course of conduct is rational,
another irrational, irrespectively of the individual's ' interest,'
he has admitted in effect that one thing is right, another wrong;
he has admitted that the difference between right and wrong
is perceived (in a sense) a p'iori , and not by experience; he
has admitted the existence of an 'ought' and an 'ought hOt,'
however much he must still protest against what he may be
disposed to regard as the mystical character with which the
idea of 'ought' or 'duty' or ' moral obligation' has been
ihvested by the traditional schools of anti-utilitarian or ' in-
tuitional' or ' transcendental ' Ethics.
This assertion will subsequently be explained and qualified (see below,
p. 112, 148 , et_passim).
Chap. iii, § iii DOCTRINE OF SIDGWICK
49
II
Of the writers who have been led by some such line of
thought to attempt the combination of a rationalistic view
of the ultimate basis of Ethics with a purely hedonistic criterion
of conduct, by far the most important and the most distinguished
is the late Professor Henry Sidgwick. To examine the system
of' rationalistic Utilitarianism ' with which his writings present
us, will be perhaps the best way at once of exhibiting in further
detail the argument which has been outlined, and of criticizing
the attempt fo stop exactly at this point in the dialectic
which leads away from Utilitarianism towards what I may be
excused for calling by anticipation a higher and deeper Moral
Philosophy.
Professor Sidgwick's position in the development of English
Utilitarianism may be indicated by saying thaç he takes up
the controversy at the point at which it had been left by lIill.
Of John Stuart lIill's attempt to reconcile a theoretical accept-
ance of the hedonistic isychology with the practical recognition
of an enthusiastic' Altruism,' and even of a ' disinterested love
of Virtue,' almost enough has been said in the last chapter. His
expedient is to introduce into the hedonistic calculus differences
of kind irresolvable into differences of degree. We have already
seen that the desire of a higher pleasure is not really a desire
of pleasure: hat makes one pleasure 'higher' than another
nmst be something other than its pleasingness. Moreover, when
lIill recognizes the possibility of desire for pleasure passing
by association into a ' disinterested love of Virtue for its own
sake,' even were we to accept the paradoxical allegation thaç
Virtue and pleasure have been invariably associated in our
experience, we should still be confronted with the admission
that as an actual fact itis possible for me now to desire
something besides my own pleasure, however I may bave corne
to desire it. Mill's own non-recognition of this consequence was
due no doubt fo the well-known fallacy of 'mental chemistry '-
of supposiug that mental states contain within them unaltered
the states out of which they may bave grown, as a chemical
50 RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
compound still continues fo have in if its component elements 1.
But, even were his accourir of disinterested love of Virtue
psychologically tenable, if might still be pointed out that the
tendency of Mill's theory is fo place the Saint's love of Virtue
precisely on a level with the miser's love of money 3. Granted
that both may be accounted for by association, the discovery
of the association tends fo ifs own dissolution. When the miser
discovers that money is a means and not an end, he will, if
he is sensible, cease fo love money for ifs own sake. When
the Saint, instructed by the Philosopher, discovers that pleasure
is the end and Virtue only the means, he must, one would
suppose, cease to desire Viue for ifs own sake and cultivate
pleasure instead. The more rational he is, the more irrational
will he deem it fo confuse means with ends. Association of
ideas is after all, in such a connexion, only another name for
confusion of thought. An ethical system which is based upon
confusion of thought surely rests upon a precarious foundation.
Professor Sidgwick 3 completely reverses the mode of expanding
in an altruistic direction the Benthamite Hedonism adopted
by Mill. If is because he does so that his Utilitarianism is,
from an intellectual point of view, so great an advance upon
Mill's: though the change of front involves some sacrifice
of the peculiar unction which makes Mill's Utilitarianism so
persuasive a book fo young students of Philosophy. Professor
Sidgwick sees that the admission of difference in kind among
1 In what sense this assumption of Chemistry is actually truc, it is un-
necessary here to enquire.
' To illustrate this farther, we may remember that virtue is hot the only
thing, originally a means, and which if if were hot a means to anything else,
would be and remain indifferent, but which by association with what it is a
means to, cornes to be desired for itself, and that too with the utmost inten-
sity. What, for example, shall we say of the love of money ? There is
nothing originally more desirable about money than about any heap of
glittering pebbles. Its worth is solely that of the things which it will buy ;
the desire for other things than itself, which it is a means of gratifying.
Yet the love of money is hot only one of the strongest moving forces of
human life, but money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself... ".
¥irtue, according to the utilitarian conception, is a good of this description'
(Utilitarianism, pp. 55, 56)
The Methoàs of Ethics, xst ed., x874; 6th ed., x9ox.
Chap. iii,§ iii AGREEMENT WITH BUTLER AND KANT 5
pleasures is utterly irreconcilable, hot only with the hedonistic
Psychology which he abandons, but with the hedonistic con-
ception of ultimate good which he retains; while, on the other
hand, the 'greatest-happiness principle' defined as ' the creed
which holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend
to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse
of happiness,' is hOt p.ï'ia facie bound up with the doctrine that
all desires are desires of pleasure.
Professor Sidgwick fully almits as a psychological fact the
existence of 'disinterested tffections,' Benevolence among the
number. He rightly, however, distinguishes (with Butler, but in
opposition to Shaftesbury and others) between the possibility
of action motived by desire for the happiness of others and the
reasonableness or obligation of gratifying such a desire in
opposition fo private interest. In point of disinterestedness
Benevolence is on a level with Malevolence. But besides these
' particular affections' (fo use Butler's expression) or desires for
particular objects, Professor Sid¢vick recognizes also the
possibility of a' desire fo do what is right and reasonable as such.'
And he does hot in any way shrink from the admission that
such a desire amounts fo what Butler would call a desire fo do
what Conscience prescribes, or what Kant would call a 'respect"
for the Moral Law 1. When a man contemplates himself in his
relations fo his fellow men and asks what if is reasonable for him
fo do, he cannot but recognize that he seems 'ruade,' as Butler
would put if, fo promote public good. A reasonable man
contemplating the world as an impartial spectator, uninfluenced
by private desires or passions, would necessarily recognize
Benevolence as that affection in the 'ceconomy and constitution
of human nature' which ought fo be gratified in preference fo
merely self-regarding desires. To the disinterested spectator
more good must appear preferable to less good, irrespective
of the question whether if is A or B who is benefited, while the
saine disinterested Reason will prescribe an equal distribution
of good among beings capable of enjoying it. The right course
of action is that which would appear reasonable fo such a dis-
1 Von Hartmann uses the expressive terre 'Vernunfttrieb' (Das sittliche
]Bewusstsein, pp. 264, 27o ).
E
52 RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
interested spectator, and fo the agent himself in so far as his
judgement as a rational being is unbiassed by private desires;
if is the course of action which, if he had fo legislate for others
unbiassed by such desires, he would prescribe fo all, the course
which as a rational being he recognizes as' fit fo be ruade law
universal.' In his view of Duty as the resonable course of
action, and in holding that disinterested love of the reasonable
may be a motive of action, Sidgwick follows Butler and Kant,
who are so far in entire agreement. But Sidgwick (here
identifying himself with Butler more closely than with Kant)
also recognizes that fo the rational being placed in the position
of an impartial spectator, if must appear in itself equally
reasonable that each man should pursue his own greatest
happiness. When a man's own greatest happiness would have
fo be purchased by the sacrifice of greater happiness on the part
of others, the reasonable course may still seem fo be the pro-
motion of the happiness of others af the expense of one's own,
so long as he looks upon the marrer from the point of view of
universal Reason; and an impulse more or less strongly
impelling to such a sacrifice is actually felt, af least af rimes,
by all rational beings. But, all the saine, if remains something
apparently unreasonable--something contrary fo that order of
things which a perfectly rational being endowed with unlimited
power might be expected fo appointwthat the happiness of one
should involve a voluntary deduction by another from his own
in itself no less important happiness, lIan is made fo promote
public good, but no less evidently is he made fo promote private
good. Hence Sidgwick abandons the attempt fo find in cases
of collision between the requirements of universalistic and of
egoistic Hedonism any .course of action which is completely
reasonable--reasonable from every point of view--without the
admission of theological postulates. Entirely apart from such
postulates, altruistic conduct can be shown fo be reasonable: if
is the course which will be chosen, as the more reasonable of the
two alternatives, even in opposition fo interest, by the man in
whom the desire fo do ' what is right and reasonable as such' is
predominant ; but such a course can be shown fo be the oe and
only reasonable course, and the contrary fo be completely and
Chap. iii, § iii DUTY AND GOOD 53
wholly unreasonable, only by the aid of a' hypothesis unverifiable
by experîence reconciling the individual with the universal
Reason 1,' that the Universe is constructed upon a reasonable
basis. _And this assumptiin is one which on the whole the writer
seems disposed himself fo concede, though, af least in his later
editions, he makes no positive assertion fo that effect.
The great modern champion of rationalistic or universalistic
Hedonism certainly cannÇt be charged with any desire to conceal
the extent of his approximation fo the position of Butler and
Kant. He is af one with them in the point of view from which
he regards the whole subject. He does not look upon the
Science of Morals as a branch of Natural History. He gives up
altogether the attempt fo find the ultimate end of action by
' induction': he sees that no accumulation of observed sequences,
no experience of what i8, no predictions of what vill be, can
possibly prove what ought fo be. He neither dismisses the
'ought' as a figment (with Bentham), nor involves the whole
discussion in inextricable confusion (with J. S. Mill)by failing
fo distinguish between the desirable and the desired, and calling
a desire for the happiness of others a ' desire for happiness,'
a mode of speaking which would allow us fo define the passion
of revenge as a ' desire for pain, injury, or death.' In one word,
Professor Sidgwick shares with the father of Idealism the
supreme conviction that vog Kpa'î 7rv'a. He recognizes that
Morality is based upon rational and a priori judgements of
value. In so far as the motive of moral action in the individual
is concerned, Professor Sidgwick is in fact an ' Intuitionist' or
' Rationalist.' He is a Hedonist only in his view of the nature
of ultimate or universal Good, and consequently in his view if
the moral criterion. The fundamental question raised by
Professor Sidgwick's position is the logical compatibility of
a rationalistic theory of duty with a hedonistic conception of
1 This phrase is taken from the Ist edition (p. 473), but Prof. Sidgwick's
sttement of the bsolute neceasity of such hrmony to the construction of
u logicully coherent Science of Ethics is mther strengthened thun weukened
in the subsequent editions ; though he seems, mther from u desire hOt to go
beyond the province of pure Ethics thun from uny change of personal
opinion, to assert less strongly, or hot to assert ut all, that the intuitions of
Moral Philosophy actually do supp]y a basis for Theology.
54 RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
tho true good or 7oç of man. Before discussing this question,
it will be well fo re-state Professor Sidgwick's position in a some-
what more concise form.
Looking upon human nature in Butlerian phrase as ' a system '
or ' constitution,' Professor Sidgwick may be said to find in it
three distinct groups of' affections' or 'propensions,' viz. ()
the desire for happiness or private good, or 'self-love'; (oE)
various disinterested desires for objects, i.e. passions such as
Benevolence, hunger, anger, &c. ; (3) the desire to do what
is right and reasonable as such. In the ' calm moment' when
a man, under the influence of this last desire, sits down fo ask
what it is reasonable for him fo do, reflection convinces him,
according to Professor Sidgwick :--(a) that for himself (assuming
certain postulates which upon the whole he is justified in
assuming) it is reasonable fo gratify, in cases of collision,
Benevolence in preference fo self-love, but fo make the gratifica-
tion of all other passions subordinate and instrumental to the
promotion of his own interest on the whole ; (b)that in acting for
the good of others, if is reasonable to gratify their other desires
or passions only in so far as these can be ruade subservient fo
the satisfaction of their desire for happiness. In short, in
himself he is fo recognize Benevolence as having a prerogative
over self-love, though both desires are rational ; while in others
he is to treat self-love as alone among these desires or propensions
entitled fo gratification. If is a duty to promote universal good,
but universal good is merely pleasure. If is rlght fo promote
pleasure, but it is not the individual's own good fo do so.
Such a position seems open to the following objections : () If
we look not so much to the speculative as fo the practical side
of Sidgwick's Utilitarianism, and put aside certain admissions as
fo the logical incompleteness of his position, we may say that his
attitude towards dzty was the attitude of Butler or Kant, while
his attitude towards the idea of good was that of the Hedonist
pure and simple. He tells the individual fo promote other
people's good, but he tells them also that other people's good is
pleasure. Reason bids him make duty rather than private
pleasure his own end, but in thinking what is the end that he is
to pmmote for other people, if pronounces that end to be pleasure.
Chap. iii, § il] EGOISM ILLOGICAL 55
He thus assigns a different end fo the individual and fo the race.
Professor Sidgwick in fact proves unfaithful fo the principle
which he professes fo accept from Kant--not, indeed, as an
adequate definition, but as a fundamental characteristic of the
Moral Law--that if shall be' capable of serving for law universal.'
If is pronounced right and reasonable for A fo make sacrifices
of his own happiness fo the good of B; yet, in considering what
is B's good, he is fo treat him as a being for whom if is right
and reasonable fo live solely for his own happiness, to have no
desire gratified but his desire for pleasure. If is a condition
of the Moral Law, Professor Sidgwick tells us, that if shall be, in
Kantian phrase, ' capable of serving for law universal' ; yet that
law requires each individual fo act upon the hypothesis that he
is the only member of the hunmn race subject fo if. Reason, we
are told, requires us fo act at rimes in a way contrary fo our
interest from love of the' right and reasonable as such' ; yet we
are fo treat all other human beings but ourselves as incapable of
rational desires, as belngs for whom if is reasonable fo desire
nothing but pleasure. Moral action is rational action; and
rational action consists in the gratifying of desires which, if
is admitted, become irrational and immoral as soon as they
collide with the general interest. Such a consequence can only
be avoided by the admission that other people's happiness
is only a rational object of pursuit, for them as for me, in
so far as if is not inconsistent with their promotion of the
general pleasure. The nature of our universal end will then be
profoundly modified. The end becomes not mere happiness but
a social or moral happiness--a happiness which is consistent
with disposition on the part of each member of the society to
promote the happiness of every other in so far as he can do
so without scrificing a greater amount of his own. ])Jorality or
Goodness would thus seem fo have entered into our practical
conception of the end which we are to regard as desirable for
human society.
(2) Sidgwick would no doubt have replied fo the bove objec-
tion by frankly admitting the ' dualism of the Practical Reason.'
A man may recognize, he wrote in his third edition, that ' There
is something that if is reasonable for him fo desire, when he
55 RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
considers himself as an independent unit, and something again
which he must recognize as reasonably fo be desired, when he
takes the point of view of a larger whole ; the former of these
objects I call his own Ultimate "Good," and the latter Ultimate
Good taken universally ; while to the sacrifice of the part fo the
whole, which is from the point of view of the whole reasonable
I apply the different terre "right" fo avoid confusion 1., It is no
doubt quite intelligible that one thing should appear reasonably
to be desired from a man's own point of view, and another thing
when he takes the point of view of a larger whole. But can
both of these points of view be equally reasonable? How
can it be reasonable to take the point of view of the part
when once the man knows the existence of the whole and admits
that the whole is more important than the part ? Must not the
point of the view of the whole be the one and only reasonable
point of view ? From the point of view of the whole, the worker
for the good of the whole can alone seem reasonable. The only
reasonable point of view surely must be the one which recoonaizes
all the facts. From that point of view the promotion of the good
can alone be the reasonable course of action. The reasonable
course is fo promote the general good, for the general good
is greater than the good of the individual. There is surely no
logical contradiction involved in holding that it is intrin-
sically right and reasonable fo promote the good, though such
a course will not always be consistent with the individual's own
good; for Reason bids us promote not merely what is good, but
the greatest good, and fo promote one's own lesser good, just
because if is one's own, will be completely and entirely un-
reasonable.
(3) If the Egoist is pronounced reasonable when he says
'my pleasure is good,' and the universalistic Hedonist equally
reasonable when he says ' the general pleasure is good,' does
not that show that the terms 'reasonable' and 'good' are
really used in different senses? What is there in common
between the' good for me' anti' objective good taken universally'?
The objective universal point of view really implied (by Professor
Sidgwick's own admission) in the terres ' reasonable ' and ' good,'
Methods of.Eth-ics, 3rd ed., lo. 402.
Chap. iii, § il] WHY BE REASONABLE ? 57
seems fo be forgotten when if is contended that the promotion of
the individual's good, even when inconsistent with the general
good, is nevertheless a reasonable object of pursuit. The writer
seems to be relapsing into that meaning of the term ' reasonable'
which has generally round favour with Hedonists who do not
profess fo be 'rationalistic'--that is fo say, 'internally self-
consistent' or ' conducive as a means fo the end which any one
happens actually fo desire.'
(4) The difficulties which have been pointed out might possibly
be evaded by a new mode of statement 1. But if this were donc--if
if were frankly admitçed that the Egoist's conduct is not really
reasonable af allneven so the attitude of mind which universal-
istic Hedonism ascribes fo the good man is one which, when
fully realized is, I believe, practically, af least fo the great mass
of men, an impossible one. There is no logical contradiction
in telling me fo promote other people's good ai the expense
of my own, because if is intrinsically and objecçively reasonable
so fo do. But for me fo act on this rational principle there
must be a subjective reason, or motive. Granted that if is
reasonable for me so fo act, the question still remains 'Why
should I be reasonable ?' The Sidgwickian Moralist might tell
me that I have a desire fo act reasonably. I reply: 'Yes, I have
such a tendency, but if is, taken by itself, not a very strong one,
and if is in my power fo encourage if or fo suppress if. I want
you fo give me some reason why, since you say my own truc
good is nothing but pleasure, I should pursue an end which
is not my good. An abstract or objective Reason may indeed
condemn me if I do not, but I cannot from my own point of view
condemn myself when I pursue what, as you say, Reason itself tells
me is my ov¢n truc good, and decline (so far as I can help if) fo
trouble myself about an end which is not my good. The whole
force of the subjective hold which the precept "be reasonable"
bas exercised over me, so long as I was unacquainted with the
1 The passage just quoted has disal0peared from the fourth and subsequent
editions of Sidgwick's great work, and with if some other concessions fo the
rationality of Egoism, but hot all : sec for instance the note on p. 2oo of the
4th edition (which has since disal010eared), and the concluding 10aragraph of
the final edition.
58 RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book
teachings of rational Utilitarianism, has lain in its inseparable
connexion with another conviction--that it was intrinsically noble
for me fo act in this way, and that fo ct in ccordance with the
reasonable was a good to me, a greater good than I could obtain
by pursuing the pleasure which you tell me is the only true
good. Destroy that conviction, and I have no motive for trying
to cultivate the love of rational action or that love of my neigh-
bour which Reason pronounces fo be reasonable. You have con-
vinced me that there is nothing intrinsically good and noble
about the promotion of other people's happiness. If is a very
nice thing for other people no doubt, but if is hot nice for me.
It is in vain that you tell me such conduct is selfish and irrational,
for you tell me also that selfishness and irrationality are not
in themselves, however inconvenient they may be for other
people.'
Another way of stating this last difficulty of Sidgwick's position
is to say tht the infernal contradiction which it involves is
bottom not so much formal as material. If may possibly be
stated in a form which escapes formal contrliction, though
Sidgwick himself does hot always succeed in so stting if,
but the internal or psychological contradiction remains. The
acceptance of rationalistic Hedonism kills and eradictes
those impulses upon which it has to depend for the practical
fulfihnent of ifs own precepts, by pronouncing that they have no
true worth or value--no less so than Mill's Associationist ex-
planation of the love of ¥irtue as due fo a psychological confusion
and muddle-headedness comparable to that of the miser. It
tends fo reduce the dea of reasonable conduct fo the idea of con-
duct which escapes intellectual contradiction and incompleteness ;
but the desire fo escape such contrliction or one-sidedness is
not by itself a very powerful motive of conduct when it is pro-
nounced fo have no intrinsic valne. For the contrliction, be it
observed, involved in bad conduct arises, on the hedonistic view
of good, merely when I attempt to justify my conduct. If I sy
' it is resonable of me to be an Egoist,' I can be convicted of
self-contradiction. But if I candidly admit' I know that if is
unreasonable fo be an Egoist, but I intend to be unreasonable,'
the contradiction disappears. When the prohibition of Reason is
Chap. iii, § il] BENEVOLENCE HAS VALUE 59
held fo include a specifically moral condemnation, the idea of
' unreasonable' carries with i the idea that conduc condemned
is lacking in absolute or intrinsic worth. That idea is lost or
pronounced illusive when fo act reasonably is denied fo be
good. The whole force which makes Reason appeal fo men
as deserving of respect if derives from that conviction of the
intrinsic value or goodness of rational conduct which Reason,
as interpreted by Sidgwick, pronounces fo be an illusion. We
are hardly perhaps entitled fo say a p'io'i 1 that Reason could
hot deliver itself of two dogmas, which, though involving no
formal contradiction, tend in their practical effect upon human
life fo neutralize one another--the dogma ' if is reasonable fo
be altruistic' and the dogma 'fo be reasonable is no a good
to him who is reasonable or even intrinsically a good af
all': but i would be strange that that moral consciousness,
which by the rationalistic Hedonist's admission proclaims ifs
right fo govern and control human life, should be so consti-
tuted that, in so far as men listen fo ifs voice, ifs own purposes
are defeated. There is in the last resort no way of refuting the
Sidgwickian or any other Moralist but by showing that he
actually misrepresents the conent of the moral consciousness.
And this, I have tried to show, the Sidgwickian Moralist
conspicuously does. He abstracts one hall of the moral con-
sciousness as if actually exists, and attempts by the aid of if
to silence and confound the other hall. He accepts from the
moral consciousness the absract idea of value, of intrinsic and
objective worth, and af the saine rime divorces it from tha idea
of the intrinsic worth of promoting what has worth, which is
de hcto found in inseparable conjunction with if. The only way
in which this infernal inconsistency or discord in the Sidgwickian
system can be cured is by admitting that fo act rightly or reason-
ably possesses value, that fo promote the good is a good not
merely fo others, but fo the individual himself.
(5) But after all, Professor Sidgwick fully admits that he can-
not make Reason consisten with itself wihout the almission of
Without assuming the rationality of the Universe. Upon that assump-
tion, which Sidgwick was practically prepared to make, the position fo me
becomes unthinkable, as contended in the next paragraph.
6o RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
theological postulates. ' The negation of the connexion between
Virtuè and Self-interest,' he tells us,' must force us fo admit
an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent
intuitions of what ii Reasonable in conduct; and from this
admission if would seem fo follow that the apparently intuitive
operation of the Practical Reason, manifested in these contr«-
dictory judgements, is after all illusory 1.' We must, therefore,
go on fo ask whether, upon Professor Sidgwick's premisses, these
theological postulates are admissible, and whether (even if
admitted) they will suffice fo restore the infernal self-consistency
of the Practical Reason.
The difficulties which the great sum of human and animal
suffering presents fo the belief in a 'benevolent Author of
:Nature' ought hot fo be dissembled by those who believe
that Reason warrants the ' venture of faith' and who hold
with Plato) that' the risk is a noble one*.' But, on the hedon-
istic view of the true end of human life, does hOt the demand
ruade upon faith become absolutely overwhelming ? Can a Uni-
verse have a rational purpose or constitution in which the end is
only pleasure and yet in which Reason daily prompts fo the
sacrifice of pleasure ? Surely the assumption of a 'harmony
between the Universal and the Parçicular Reason' must be
pushed a step further. The faith that' Reason is for us King of
Heaven and Earth',' never found n more eloquent or a more
sober exponent than Professor Sidgwick. But in what sense
can if be said that Reason rules in a Universe in which the
accomplishment of ifs true purpose depends upon a systematic
concealment of that purpose ? If is the sole end or rhoç of man
to get as much pleasure as possible : yet in order that he nmy do
so, he is throughout his earthly existence, by way of preparation
or discipline for the realization of his true end in another state,
fo forger that end and live for a totally different one.
So completely does Professor Sidgwick reverse in dealing with
the ultimate g'ound of morality the Aristotelian maxim ' that
we must look fo the end,' upon which he lays so much stress in
connexion with the moral c'iterion. We must believe in a future
1 Methods of Ethics, 6th ed., p. 506. 2 Kakbv r gtet,pa.
s Nos arl [Jaatk« çp'r o:paroî: v« a' Tç (Philebus, p. 28 c).
Chap. iii, § iii HEDONISTIC THEOLOGY
lire, Professor Sidgwick tells us, becanse we mnst believe that the
constitution of things is rational. And yet, according to Professor
Sidgwick, the Universe is so constituted that the man who most
completely succeeds in concealing from himself the true end
of his being--or haply in never fiuding it out--will ultimately
realize that end most thoroughly. That the Universe might be
so constituted is a proposition which does hot involve a logical
contradiction, and which is incapable of empirical disproof ; but
where is the rationality of such a Universe ? If we are to make
assumptions, let them be such as will satisfy the logical demand
on which they are founded. If we are to assume a rational
order in the Universe, surely the end prescribed.to a man by his
Reason must be his highest end. Man is so far a rational being
that he is capable of preferring the rational to the pleasant.
Surely, then, the reasonableness of such a preference cannot
be dependet on ifs ultimately tmning out that he has after
preferred the very thing which his love of the reasonable led
him to reject. It may be the case that wh.t was rejected had
a certain value and would under other circumstances have been
good ; it may be that if is reasonable to expect the preference of
the highe good to be rewarded by the bestowal of the lower also.
But surely in a rational Universe that which man, when he
is most completely rational, desires most cannot be good merely
as a means to what he desires less--in other words, if mnst have
an intrinsic value. Bain's remark that ' " I ara tobe miserable"
cannot be an inference from " I ara to be happy,"' is a perfectly
fair comment or criticism 1 upon a Theology which is founded
upon a purely hedonistic conception of the good. If, however, the
end of man be goodness or a happiness of which Virtue is an
essential element, then if is hot unreasonable that he should
be required to undergo sufferings which may be necessary
conditions of attaining that end for himself and others. If
happiness be the true end, a constitution of things by which the
neglect of happiness should be rewarded with happiness and
devotion to happiness punished by the loss of if, vould
be a purely arbitrary, supremely irrational constitution. But if
goodness be the end without which the highest happiness is
1 .Mid, vol. i, p. 195.
6 RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
incomplete, if goodness be of the essence of the highest happiness,
then it is hot inconceivable that the voluntary neglect of a lower
good in the pursuit of a higher may be intrinsically necessary
to the attainment of that completed state of being, of a lire which
shall embmce both these concepts of goodness and happiness
which Modern Philosophy has been accustomed to separate--the
'Well-being' or ¢Sa,.ovla of ancient Ethics, If Love be indeed
the one element of earthly happiness which is fo be permanent,
then it is intelligible enough that Self-sacrifice should be
a discipline necessary to fit men for ifs enjoyment.
I will add only one further remark at present on this supreme
problem upon which the course of Professor Sidgwick's argument
has compelled me to touch. Sidgwick claires Bishop Butler as
his predecessor in the doctrine of an ' ultimate dualism' of the
Practical Reason. If is true that when Bishop Butler, the thinker
who has so profoundly modified Professor Sidgwick's hedonistic
tendencies, was engaged in writing Moral Philosophy as the
champion of the' disinterestedness ' of virtue against the Hobbist,
when he touched upon theological problems only as accessory to
moral, he was satisfied with a position very much resembling
that of his disciple. Conscience or a 'principle of reflection'
prescribed certain conduct as rational irrespectively of the
interest of the individual; his highest end was duty. The
existence of Conscience was to Butler the basis of Theology, not
Theology the basis of Morality. Yet when he wrote the Serinons,
he still regarded the happiness of the whole as the only con-
ceivable end of the Creator as well as of altruistic conduct in the
individual 1. When he came seriously to face the question of
the ' moral government of the world,' the diitlculties of such
a position were forced upon his notice. The result of the ten
years' thought which intervened between the Sero'ns and the
Aalogy were embodied in those chapters of the latter work on
human life as ' a state of discipline,' which may still be regarded
as (in spire of their rather old-world form and tone) the classical
exposition of that one glimpse of a clue to the problem of the
orin of evil which is open to those who refuse to be led by
a desire for' reconciliation' or' unity' and a philosophical horror
i See the second pragrph of Ser»wh XII and Senon XII1.
Chap. iii, § iii] IS CHARACTER A GOOD ? 6 3
of ' dualism' into some form or other of the denial that evil
is evil.
The substance then of my contention is thaL Professor Sidg-
wick's attempt to reconcile a hedonistic conception of Lhe 'good,'
and consequent.ly a hedonistic criterion of Morality, with an
' intuitional' or rational basis or ultinate ground of MoraliLy
breaks down. The ' dualism' of PracLical Reason is not bridged
over, and cannot be bridged over withouL the admission of Virtue
or character--at leasL the Virtue or character which consists
in the promotion of general pleasure--as an elemenL and the
highesL element of the 'good' which iL is righL Lo promote for
the whole human race.
III
At thts point it may be well briefly to noLice Professor Sidg-
wick's criticism on the doctrine that character is an end-in-itself.
In reference to this view Professor Sidgwick remarks :--
' From a practical, point of view, indeed, I fully recognise Lhe
importance of urgng tlmt men should aim aL an idem of
charter, and conslder ction in its effects on character. But
I cannot infer from this thaL character and its elements--
faculties, habits, or dispositions of any kind--are the constituents
of UltimaLe Good. It seems to me that the opposite is implied
in the very conception of a faculty or disposition ; it can only
be defined a tendency to act or feel in a certain way under
certain conditions; and such a tendency is clearly not valuable
in itself but for the acts and feelings in which it takes effect,
or for the ulterior consequences of these,--which consequences,
again, cannot be regaMed as Ultimate Good, so long as they
are merely conceived as modifications of faulties, dispositions,'
&c.
Professor Sidgwick here admiLs the possibility that the ' acLs'
in which chmacter or disposition takes effect mighL conceivably
have value, tte has got nothing to say aginst such a sup-
position except that iL does not appear to have any to him.
But surely, when it is held thaL character has value, such 'acts'
are included in the idea. And yet the value of the acts cannoL
be estimated in entire isolation or abstraction from the nmn's
Methods of Ethics, 6th ed., p. 393.
64 RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
whole inner life. Character does not consist either of mere
isolated ' acts'--still less of mere abstract 'tendencies' or' dis-
positions.' Not only are the actual volitions involved in the
performance of particular good acts parts of consciousness, and
hOt mere possibilities of consequences in the ,external world,
but there is a volitional element running through our con-
sciousness af other rimes than the particular moment af which
we are definitely resisting temptation or making definite acts
of moral choice. Attention is an act of the will; even desire
involves conation. Emotion, again, is af once a source of action,
an accompaniment of moral action, and a consequence and index
of the habitual direction of the will. And all these--desire,
attention, emotion--are actual elements of consciousness, not
mere potentialities which may manifest themselves in future
conscious acts. Al] these are included in what we mean by
character. Sometimes no doubt we should further include in
the idem character the intellectual side of the moral life--the
ideal that a man sers before himse]f, the judgements of value
which he pronounces, his intellectual interest in the moral life.
Professor Sidgwick would hardly have contended that the content
of the good man's consciousness does not differ from that of the
bad man except af the paricular moments in which the former
is engaged in performing good actions and the latter bad ones.
Character includes, as I have suggested, not merely the actual
state of the will, but other elements of consciousness connected
therewith. And even if we limit the idea of character fo
actual volition, volition is an element in the continuous stream
of consciousness af all rimes. Sidgwick himself has told us
for instance that ' the adoption of an end as paramount' is
' fo be classed among volitions.' A volitional element forms
an element of consciousness during the whole--or, fo avoid
cavil, let me say--nearly the whole of his waking life. And
if is upon the nature of this volitional element, upon the
nature of the objects to which if is directed, upon the habitual
direction of his will, that character primarily depends. If is
this that is pronounced to have value vhen we say that
Virtue is a good or end in itself. No doubt we cannot form
any conception of character without thinking also of the in-
Chap. iii, § iii] GOODNESS OF VIRTUE 6 5
tellectual and emotional accompaniments of the volition; and it
makes little difference whether we do or do hot think of these
accompaniments as included in the conception of character. For
these too bave a value which is not tobe measured bythe amount
or intensity of the pleasure which undoubtedly forms an element
in them. The important point to insist on is that, when we
pronounce character to have value, we are just as emphatically
as the Hedonist pronouncing that it is in actual consciousness
that value resides, and in nothing else . If is the actual con-
sciousness of a man who loves and wills the truly or essentially
good and not mere capacities or potentialities of pleasure-pro-
duction such as might be supposed to reside in a bottle of old
port, which constitutes the 'goodness' or 'virtue' which is
regarded as a 'good' or ' end in itself' by the school which
Professor Sidgwick is criticizing. A ' virtue' or 'faculty' is, of
course (as Professor Sidgwick urges), a mere abstraction, but
only in the sense in which pleasure is an abstraction also. A
man's consciousness eannot at any one moment be full of nothing
but Virtue any more than if can be full of nothing but pleasure.
The will must will something if if is to be pronounced virtuous,
just as there must be feelings, thoughts, and volitions in a man's
consciousness before he can be pleased with them. But for the
difflculty which Sidgwick seems to make of the marrer, it would
have seemed unnecessary to point out that those who nmke
' virtue' an end mean by virtue ' virtuous consciousness,' just
as those who make 'pleasure' an end mean thereby 'pleasant
eonsciousness.' And the virtuous consciousness means a con-
sciousness whose volitions and whose desires are controlled by
a rational ideal of lire together with the feelings and emotions
inseparably accompanying such volitions and desires *
a We might also criticize Prof. Sidgwick's tendeney fo ignore the unity
and the continuity of the self. No doubt the self cannot be regarded as
having value when abstracted from the successive conscious states in which
if manifests itself, but it is equally impossible fo estimate the value of the
conseious states in entire abstraction from the permanent self whieh is
prescrit in ail of them.
2 Modern Psyehology is emphatic in rejecting the old sensationalistie
view of the content of eonsciousness as mere feeling, no less than the oppo-
site assumption of the possibility of thought without volition. ' Whenever
RASHDALL I F
56
RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
If may perhaps be suggested that, when a good state of will
is pronounced desirable, or more desirable than a pleasant state
of conscousness, the real object of preference is a specific pleasure
invariably accompanying volition of a virtuous kind. If is
diflicult fo see wha s gained by such a mode of statement for
any one who bas once pared company with the hedonistic
Psychology: but, since some pleasure must undoubtedly accom-
pany consciousness fo which the person hbnself attaches value,
no great harm will be done either fo ethical theory or fo
pracical Moraliy by such a way of putting the marrer so long
as if, s clearly understood () t,hat the desirabiliy of this
specific pleasure does not depend upon any variable susceptibility
to if on the part of those for whom if is judged desirable;
() that the pleasure is hot necessarily fo those who actuMly
desire if greater in amount or intensity than other pleasures
which hey forego for the sake of obtaining iL. Yet when these
admissions are ruade, if is clear that we no longer really prefer
the virtuous direction of the will simply as a source of pleasure.
From he point of view of pleasure there seems no reason why
this s]ngle kind of pleasure should be given so extraordinary
a preference. If is one which does not seem fo be warranted
either by ifs duration or ifs intensity. As a marrer of experience
we are awake, we are judging; whenever we are awake we are willing'
(Bosnquet, E,'setials qf Logic, p. 4o). r. Bradley hs, indeed, maintained
the possibility of thought without ' active attention' nd so without will
(article on ' Active Attention' in M/ad, N. S., No. 4 , I902), thosgh he
admits that it may be tht even in the theoreticl development of an ide
' the foregoing idea of that development bas itself been the cause of its own
existence,' and so ' it may indeed be contended that all thinking does in the
end imply will in this sense '(p. 7)- The question is an impo¢ant one from
other points of view, but all that I ara protesting against here is the
assumption that in estimating the value of consciousness we must neces-
srily attend merely fo the feeling side, and hot also fo the thinking and
willing side of consciousness. That will be equally unreasonable in what-
ever sense if may be true that we are hot always willing. I should myself
be disposed fo contend tht the active attention which is implied in definite
efforts to think out a problem differs only in degree from the attention which
is implied when ' I passively, as we say, accept the current and course of my
thoughts ' (ib., p. 6. This very ' 10assivity ' involves a distinct attitude of the
ill--sometimes a very difficult one, as a man discovers when with a view fo
going to sleep he tries fo think about nothing in prticulr.
Chap. iii, § iii] GOODNESS OF TRUTH AND BEAUTY 67
if is round that the p|easures of a good Conscience are hot
always high]y exhilarating: while the pains of a bad one,
regarded merely as pains, would in many cases be round tolerable
enough. The pain of a small wrong-doing is probably fo most
men less exquisite than the pain of having ruade a fool of one-
self or eommitted a gross social blunder. If we regarded the
pains of a bad Conscience as mereIy on a ]evel with the pains
of a gaucle'ie, we should try fo live down the former as we do
the latter. The importance that we attribute fo a 'good Con-
science' (quite apart from ifs social effeets) eanno possibly be
explained on merely hedonistie oTounds ; the value we attribute
fo if is not merely the value whi-eh if possesses as a source of
pleasure, and the pleasures of Conscience themselves spring from
and presuppose the eonseiousness of a value in eonseientious
eonduet whieh is not measured by ifs pleasantness.
Sidgwiek's arguments against the possibility of regarding
truth, beauty, and the like as ends-in-themselves may, as if
seems fo me, be met in mueh the same way. He always seems
fo assmne that fo assign value fo sueh ends irrespeetive of their
pleasantness 1 is fo assign value fo them as things existing out-
side eonseiousness altogether. If does not seem fo make mueh
praetieal differenee whether we say that there are elements in
eonseiousness 'higher' than pleasure, or whether we say that
some pleasures are 'higher' than others, so long as no attempt
is ruade fo smuggle baek the hedonistie Psyeholoo T under eover
of the latter form of expression. And yet if ought distinetly fo
be reeognized that sueh preferenee of higher pleasures as higher
is really only a popular way of saying that the true ethieal end
eontains elements other than pleasure. All that is gained by
the former way of putting the marrer is that if suggests that
pleasure is an element of any state of mind whieh ean be re-
garded as possessing any ultimate value. And this need not be
denied, so long as if is reeognized that ifs value is not due solely
fo the amount or intensity of he pleasure, and that, though
sueh a state may eontain some pleasure, if may eontain a great
deal more pain and so be on the whole painful rather than
pleasurable.
But see below, pp. 75-78.
68
RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIA:NISM [Book I
One more difficulty of Professor Sidgwick may be briefly
considered. To the contention that we sometimes prefer what
are comnonly called higher pleasures to lower ones without
necessarily thinking the former more intense than the latter,
Sidgwick replies that ' what in such cases we really prefer is not
the prescrit consciousness itself, but either effects on future
consciotrsness more or less distinctly foreseen, or else something
in the objective relations of the conscious being, not strictly
included in his prescrit consciousness L' :No doubt the pleasure
is preferred on account of the person's objective relations: the
pleasure abstracted from all knowledge of such objective rela-
tions would be pleasure abstracted from most of those character-
istics which could nmke it higher pleasure, from most of the
features which could commend it fo the Practical Reason as
more worthy of a rational being's enjoyment than the lower
pleasure. It is just because some knowledge of the 'objective
relations' of his pleasures and of himself as enjoying them always
does enter into the consciousness of a rational being enjoying
pleasure, that itis impossible for him, desiring as he does other
things besides pleasure and recognizing it as 'right' or 'reason-
able' for him fo desire such other objects, to leave them out of
accourir in considering the intrinsic desirability of diflrent kinds
of consciousness for himself and other rational beings. For such
a being the pleasure itself becomes different in consequence of
this knowledge of his own objective relations--different in value
even when if is hOt altered in quantity. The pleasure which
a man might take in a cruel entertainment might be harmless
enough, if abstracted from his knowledge that the pleasure was
won by the sufferings of a fellow creature. The pleasures of
sense could hot be condemned or disparaged in comparison with
more social or more intellectual pleasures, but for the knowledge
that the person enjoying them is a member of a society and
capable of intellectual activities. The value which a man
attaches fo his love for wife and children or to the resulting
pleasures could hOt be explained apart from knowledge of the
'objective relations' i.mp]ied in marriage or paternity. To ask
what is the ultimate good of man apart from his knowledge of
Methods.ofEthics, 6th ed., .:p. 399.
Chap. iii, § iii] INCONSISTENCIES OF HEDONISM 6 9
the 'objective relations' in which he stands to the world and
fo his fellow men is really to ask what vouhl be the good for
man if he were a mere animal.
Sidgwick's unwillingness to recognize Virtue as an end in
itself, in spire of his admission that itis reasonable fo prefer
it to private pleasure, appears fo arise largely from an unavowed
essumption that there are no other elements in consciousness
besides feeling, or at least that no such elements can possibly
possess ultimate value. If is impossible fo prove that this last
is not the case; we ean only ask,'Is this really what the
analysis of the moral consciousness reveals fo us; or, if we
are disposed to say that if is always the feeling that is
ultimately valuable, are not the feelings fo which we ascribe
such value feelings of kind which are inseparable from certain
volitions and certain thoughts ? And do we not assign a higher
value fo a rightly directed will, or fo the emotions accompanying
such a will, than to mere pleasant feeling considered merely as
so much pleasant feeling ?'
When all bas been done that can be done in the way of
developing the difilculties of a Utilitarianism which is af once
rationalistic and hedonistic, if must be admitted that if is
impossible fo convict such a position of foral inconsistency,
when once it is modified by the admission that Egoism is
unreasonable, though there is nothing (on hedonistic grounds)
fo be said against a man who likes fo be unreasonable. If
is not the theory that is inconsistent; if îs the procedure of
Re&son which according fo the theory is essentially arbitrary and
unintelligible. The attitude of Sidgwick's good man, af least
when enlightened by Philosophy, may be said fo be just this:
' I see that if is reasonable for me fo prefer my neighbour's
good, but this preference bas in if nothing intrinsically
desirable or beautiful or noble or worth having for ifs own
sake. Duty is duty, but if is not good. Duty is reason-
able, but pleasure is better; what the irrational man secures
fo himself by selfishness is intrinsically better than what
the good man gets by obeylng the voice of Reason within
him.' And the position of the Sidgwickian Reason does hOt
become more intelligible when we attempt fo bridge over the
70 RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
collision between duty nd interest by theological assumptions.
If Reason, expressi.ng itself in the constitution of the Universe,
really does say to the bad man, ' I am sorry that I cannot
reward this consistent selfishness of yours as I should like fo
do; but I em compelled fo think of other people besides you,
and in their iurests I um compelled fo punish a course of lire
and a direction of will which in better constituted world if
would give me the greatest satisfaction fo reward,' there is no
more te be said. But does a Universe construced on such
a principle really strike us as a particularly resonable one ?
In the last resort the only way of showing that pleasure is
hot the true end of lire is by an appeal fo one's own moral
consciousness and that of others so far s if is revealed by word
and deed. Professor Sidgwick, after admitting that consistent
system might be worked out upon the basis of a composite end,
i.e. on including both Virtue and happiness, adds: ' I can give
decisive reason for not accepting if myself: viz., that when
Virtue and Happiness are hypothetically presented s altern-
rives, from a universal point of view, I have no doubt that
I morally prefer the latter ; I should hot think it right to aire
af nmking my fellow-creatures more moral, if I distinctly foresaw
that as a consequence of this they would become less happy.
I should even make similar choice as regards my own future
vioEue, supposing if presented as an alternative fo results more
conducive fo the General Happiness .' All that the critic of such
a statement can do is fo invite the realer fo say whether he oen
accept if as a correct representation of his own moral conscious-
ness--or of Henry Sidgwick's.
With the question whether the Virtue either of individuals or
of society can ever be antagonistic te the general happiness we
are hot yet concerned. My contention so far has been merely
this--that as matter of fact the judgement ' If is right for me
fo make others happy' is practically inseparable from thejudge-
1 Minà No. xiv, x889, p. 487 . If is observable that Sidgwick shrinks from
saying that he would sacrifice his Virtue to his own pleasure if he could do
so without loss of pleasure fo others. Whether the sacritïce of hal0piness to
Vilue could ever ctually be required by Benevolence I have considered in
Book II, chap. i.i, § .
Chap. iii, § iv] VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS 7
ment' If is better for me fo do that than fo be. happy myself
af their expense.' Admitting the bare logicM possibility of
accepting the former judgement while denying the latter,
I believe that such a bare speculative admission of the reason-
ableness of Altruism would have little or no practical effect
upon the majority of minds but for that recognition of ifs
intrinsic goodness by which if is practically aCCOlnpanied.
Reason is reluctant fo adroit that rationMity can ever be
a bad thing or even a lnatter of indifference. :No considera-
tion of posthumous compensation will ever reconcile Reason fo
a constitution of things in which if is compelled fo pronounce
bad, on account of their effects, kinds of conduct which in them-
selves if cannot but find very good. The emotions with which
we actually contemplate good or bad conduct would droop and
wither were we ever once fully persuaded that there is no differ-
ence between a good and a bad man except what is constituted
by some accidentM want of'adjustment' between the interests
of an individual and that of his fellows. Once persuade men
that Thrasymachus was right in making Virtue essentiMly and
fundamentally only another man's good, and you will have
persuaded them Mso that if exists by convention and no by
nature (o',, o çl««)--that if is in short a delusion, hOt
a reality ; and with that belief in the intrinsic value of goodness
will go the theological beliefs that were based upon if.
IV
Let us see then exactly fo what point the course of our
argument has carried us. We have felt compelled by the
very considerations that led us fo regard the preference of
other people's well-being fo our own as rationM, fo treat such
a preference on our part as intrinsicMly better even for our-
selves. We have in fact (with Kant) recognized the existence
of two prima facie rationM ends--Virtue and Happiness, the
latter being treated as part of the true well-being of man only
in so far as is consistent with the predominance of Virtue.
If has been objected, indeed, to such a position, both by
Professor Sidgwick himself and by others, that such a position
involves the admission of two heterogeneous and ' incommensur-
7OE RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
able' ends--Virtue and happiness. To this we may reply that
the very ground on which we have felL bound fo recognize
Virtue as an end in itself compels us fo regard if as an end
superior in value fo pleasure. Reason pronounces that there is
an end which all human acts should aim af promoting, i.e. the
general good, and that no state of a rational will can be regarded
by Reason as good which is hot directed towards that end; and
a will which did hot regard the choice of the right as of superior
value fo pleasure would not be a will directed fo that supreme
end. The man who acted upon the hypothesis that his own
virue and his own p]easure possessed equal intrinsic value
would not really te virtuous aL all. The hypothesis is there-
fore one which contradicts itself. And the principle that the
vill directed towards the good must be regarded as of more
value than the agent's pleasure will equally compel us fo regard
the pleasure of others as an intrinsically valuable end only in
so far as iL is consistent with the like preference of the good
fo the pleasant in those others. In other words, pleasure can
only be regarded as intrinsically valuable in so far as if is
consistent vith Morality. No doubt the 'dualism,' the absolute
antagonism between the two ends, the impossibility of fusing
them into a harmonious whole in which the sharp contrast
between them is lost (so long as all pleasure is put on the
saine level and is regarded as something which Virtue nmst
simply limit from the outside without modifying and transform-
ing), may be a reason for suspecLing that we have not yeL
reached an adequate and complete view of the elements con-
tained in 'the good.' But there is no absolute logical contra-
diction involved in such a position ; if is not open fo the charge
that the two ends or elements of the end are ' incommensurable.'
Now, practically, the introduction of this principle--the
principle that Vilue nmst be regarded as an element, and as
the dominant element, in the good--will by iLself do much to
bring out view of the ethical criterion into harmony with
ordinarily accepted moral ideas, and fo remove some of the
more glaring of the difficulties of Utilitarianism as commonly
understood. For () the most glaring of all the inconsistencies
between Utilitarianism and the deliverances of the ordinary,
Chap. iii, § iv] QUALIT¥ OF PLEASURE 73
unsophisticated moral consciousness, lies precisely in ifs refusal
to recognize the intrinsic goodness of Virtue. OE) The inclusion
of ¥irtue (which for the present we take to mean rational
Benevolence 1) in our conception of the end allows us fo exclude
from if excessive indulgence in the pleasures which we recognize
as good in themselves, and also all pleasures which are incon-
sistent with the predominance of Benevolence, e.g. the pleasures
of cruelty. We shall not merely disallow them on account of
their' infelicific' effects, but we shall regard them as intrinsically
worthless or bad, because they imply an indifference fo the good:
we shall condemn the man who voluntarily indulges his faste
for then, even though accidentally as in an arena, or instance,
in which the combatnts were condemned criminals) he might
be able fo indulge them in a way not immediately inconsistent
with the public interest. (3) We shall ttach a high intrinsic
vlue fo such pleasures as actually include a benevolent element,
and a lower degree of intrinsic superiority fo such pleasures
as are actually conducive fo the public good, though the public
good may be no part of the motive of the person indulging
in them. Under the first hea we should include the actual
pleasures of Benevolence or personal affection, and even fo some
small extent the pleasures of sociability and friendship in so far
as these imply some degree of unselfish good-will fo others.
Under the second we should include the pleasures of ambition
or enmlation and the whole range of aesthetic and intellectual
pleasures.
In this way if would probably be possible fo justify, on the
whole, that preference for what are commonly called higher
pleasures which is so clear an element o the ordinary moral
consciousness; since if will be generally admitted that in the
long run indulgence in social and intellectual pleasures is more
beneficial in ifs indirect social effects than indulgence in mere
sensual gratification or unintellectual amusement. But so far
we have interpreted Virtue as including nothing but Benevolence,
or rather Benevolence and (in due subordination thereto) Pru-
dence ; we bave admitted no ground for scribing superior moral
In the sense of ' desire fo promote plesure on the whole, hot excluding
one's own plesure in due proportion.'
74 RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
value fo one pleasure over another except ifs direct or indirect
influence on the pleasure of others. If is now rime fo ask
whether this limitation really corresponds fo the deliverances
of the moral consciousness. Is there no element in conscious-
ness fo which we should upon reflection ascribe intrinsic value
except (I) Virtue in the sense of simple Benevolence and ()
Pleasure with a preference for social useful pleasures ? Is our
conception of the sutnun bonu for a rational being limited
fo these two elements ? If his will invariably prefers (in case
of collision) other people's pleasure fo his own and if he enjoys
as much pleasure as possible, should we say that a human being
lins all that if is reasonable for him fo want ? Would a coin-
lnunity of simple people enjoying material plenty and inno-
cent amusements in the utmost degree tlmt is consistent with
the predominance of the lnOSt intense and most universal lovew
the lire for instance of some rude Moravian Mission Settlement--
beautiful and noble as such a lire might be, realize fo the full
our highest ideal of human lire ? Would a community devoid
of Letters, of Art, of Learning, of any intellectual cultivation
beyond that low elementary school standard which might be
regarded as absolutely necessary fo Virtue and the enjoyable
filling up of leisure--would such a state of society realize our
ideal ? If if were certain a by no means extreme supposition)
hat the comnmnities which have approximated most nearly
to this pattern have actually realized a higher average of enjoy-
ment than has ever been attained in more ambitious societies,
should we thereupon think it right fo adopt an obscurantist
policy, to burn down libraries and museums and picture galleries,
and to repress all desires for knowledge and beauty which should
soar above the standard indicated ? Do we not rther judge
that such desires ouglt fo be gratified, that in their gratification
nay, in the effort fo satisfy desires which grow stronger with
every partial satisfactionwlies one large element of true human
good, one large source of ifs nobleness and its value ? And can
such a conviction be based upon the extremely dubious calcula-
tion that the pleasures resulting from such pursuits or produced
by them in others are invariably intenser, when due allowance
is ruade for the increasing susceptibility to pain which they
Chap. iii, § iv] G00DS OF THOUGHT AND WILL 75
bring with them, than those attainable by the healthy and
moderate pursuit of more animal satisfactions in due subordina-
tion to the activities of social Morality ? Should ve really te
prepared to condemn any study, say that of pure Mathematics,
which could te shown fo te less 'felicific' than Sciences
and Arts of more immediate and obvious 'utility'? To all
these questions I can only answer for myself,' No.' Argument
on questions of ultimate ends is impossible. All that I can
dois to trace the further modifications which this admission
of other ends besides Virtue and happiness will compel us fo
make in the system of rationalistic Utilitarianism, from which
we have already diverged by making Virtue as well as happi-
ness into an element, and the more important element, in our con-
ception of the ultimate end. The view to which we have been
led may te briefly expressed as follows. The human soul is
a trinity. Consciousness includes three elements or aspects or
distinguishable activities--Thought, Feeling, and Volition or (fo
use a more general terre) Conation, each of which is unintel-
ligible in entire abstraction or separation from the rest. There
is a good state and a bad state of intellect, of feeling, and of
will. The good consists in a certain stte of all three of them.
If may te true in a certain rough and popular sense that in
thought and perhaps even in the good will, taken in absolute
abstraction from the two others, we could discover no value
at all, while in pleasm'e we could find such a value 1. That
is the assumption upon which all Hedonism is based; and the
assumption might perhaps te admitted, though we might refuse
fo adroit the inferences based upon if, if we could attach any
meaning fo pleasure taken absolutely by itself. But if is often
forgotten that there is no such thing as pleasure without
a content, and this content, which makes the state of conscious-
ness pleasant or unpleasant, is, af least in rational beings,
dependent upon the other two aspects of consciousness. It is
no doubt possible by an effort of abstraction to think only of
the intensity of our pleasurable feelings without thinking of
their content, and fo make their value depend upon that
intensity, but there is no ground whatever for assuming that
1 Cf. below, pp. 78, 53.
7 6 RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
we actually do so or ought fo do so. In judging of the ultimate
value of any state of consciousness we think of its content--of
the state of desire and of will on the one hand and of intellect on
the other, as well as of feeling, and of the content of feeling as
well as of ifs intensity. Sometimes we pronounce a less pleasant
state of consciousness fo be more valuable than a more pleasant
one because if involves an activity of the higher intellectual
faculties, or because it represents the direction of the will fo
a higher good. Sometimes, no doubt, the different parts of our
nature represented by the trinity of thought, feeling, and will
cannot all obtain equal satisfaction by the saine course of action,
and then we bave fo choose between a course which will satisfy
one part of our nature and that which will satisfy the other;
but the ideal good of men wou|d include all three. If would
include truth and activity of thought, pleasantness of feeling,
and goodness of will. In what relation the goods predominantly
connected with each of these elements of our nature stand fo
each other, we shall in some general way consider hereafter
It will be enough to say here that we have already recognized
the supreme value of the good will, i. e. of the devotion of the
will towards that which the moral consciousness recognizes as
the good for humanity af large, that in the abstract we recognize
the superior value of intellectual activities fo mere pleasant
feeling, while the superiority of certain states of pleasant feeling
fo others is largely due fo their arising fo a greater extent than
others from the activity of the two higher elements in our
nature, the activity of the good will or of the intellect, or both.
V
If we were to enter af greater length into the relation between
the different parts or elements or activities of our nature, with
which we have just been dealing, we should find ourselves
involved in many difficult and important matters of psychological
1 If will be fully recognized that no one of them can actually exist in enfire
abstraction from the other. The good will, for instance, must include some
pleasant feeling and some knowledge.
Chap. iii, § v] PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS 77
controversy. Such psychological problems I wish in the present
work fo avoid in so far as their solution is not directly and
immediately necessary for the purpose of Ethics. But by way
of explaining my use of them, a few remarks may be added.
I do not adopt the usage of those Psychologists who make
feeling equivalent merely fo pleasure and pain. Such a usage
seems fo imply an abstraction of the pleasure from ifs content,
which is not what we really mean when we talk about feeling,
and which tends fo encourage the idea that we are interested in
nothing but the hedonistic intensity of our consciousness apart
from ifs content. By Thought or Reason I do not mean merely
discursive thought fo the exclusion of immediate perception, but
the whole intellectual side of our consciousness ; I include in if
every kind of awareness. Desire I regard as belonging fo the
conative or striving side of our nature, though if implies also,
and cannot exist apart from, both the intellectual and the feeling
side of if: we must know in sonne measure what we desire, and
the desire is itself a state of feeling, though if is more. An
emotion is simply a name for a kind of feeling, but the term is
usually and properly reserved for those states of feeling which
are not, and do hOt immediately arise from, physical sensations,
but imply the existence of idea and of those higher desires which
are directed towards ideal objects. If is obvious that in these
distinctions we are concerned with aspects of consciousness
rather than with distinct and separable things or facts or
' states.' In some cases the distinction between them is clear
and capable by an ea.sy abstraction of a pretty sharp differentia-
tion in our thought: in other cases they are simply the sme
thing looked at from a slightly different point of view. We
have no difficulty for instance in distinguishing processes of
mathematical calculation from the pleaunt feeling by which they
are accompanied in the mathematical mind, or the unpleaant
feeling which those processes create in the unmathematicl. On
the other hand a simple perception of colour must be treated a
an intellectual activity when we think of the recognized relation
between the person or subject and his object, as a state of
feeling when we think of if merely as a state of the subject
and from the point of view of his interest in if. Similarly one
78 RATIONALISTIC UTILITARIANISM [Book I
and Lhe sine desire Inay be looked upon silnply as a partieular
sLaLe of Lhe subjeet and so as feeling, or as involving Lhe inLel-
leeLual idea of an end, or again as a eonaLive aeLiviLy Lending
fo realize Lhat end. Further fo illusLrate boLh the distineLions
between, and Lhe inLer-dependenee of, Lhese fundalnental aspeeLs
of eonseiousness does not seeln neeesssry Lo enable us Lo proeeed
wiLh our eLhieal enquiry. All LhaL need here be elnphasized is
Lh,L Lhe value whieh we reeognize in eonseiousness is noL depen-
dent upon ny one of Lhese aspects Laken in absoluLe absLraeLion
froln ,nnother. The extrelnesL Hedonist will find iL ilnpossible Lo
aLLaeh a elear Inening fo Lhe idea of pleasure Laken apart froln
11 awareness Lhat one is pleased, or of whnt one is pleased aL;
Lhe extremest RigorisL would find iL diffleult Lo say whaL would
be the value of a good will whieh did not know what iL willed
and did not eare wheLher iL willed iL or not. And Lhe moral
eonoeiousness does hot encourage us fo approxilnaLe fo any sueh
feaLs of sbstraetion, even in so far as Lhis Inay be possible. IL
pronounees ils judgelnenL upon the value of eonseiousness as
a whole. For the purpose of weighing one good gainst another
and ehoosing beLween Lheln in cases of collision, iL Inay often
have Lo aLLelnpL a relatively eolnplete abstraction of one aspect
froln another; but iL does not pronounee LhaL any aspect has
exclusive value, or LhsL the value of one aspect is Lo be esLilnted
enLirely without referenee Lo Lhe others, or Lhst the good ean be
eoneeived of under any one of theln. The Inan is lZeason,
Feeling,, Will; and Lhe ideal staLe for Inan is an ideE1 stte of
all three elelnents in his nature in Lheir ideal relation Lo one
anoLher.
AL Lhis point iL is probable Lht Lhe reader who is inclined Lo
uLilitarin ways of thinking will be disposed fo ask ' How do you
know that knowledge is good, or (if you like so fo express iL) that
the pleasures attending ils pursuit and attainlnent are intrinsiclly
superior Lo those of eLing and drinking ?' The answer Inust be,
' I do as a malter of faet so judge : I judge iL ilnlnediately, and,
so far, a prio'i : Iny Reason so pronounces : judgelnents of value
are ultimate, and no ethicl position, utiliLurian or other, can
rest on anything but judgelnents of value.' What is this, the
reader is likely t excliln, but sheer Intuitionisln ? How far
Chp. iii, § ri IS EGOISM RATIONAL ? 79
I m prepred fo ccepç flis idençifiction will pper from çle
next chpçer .
The logicl contrdiction involved in Egoism hs been powerfully
urgued by von Hrtmann in his criticism of Nietzsche and Max Stirner
(Ethische Stt«dien, pp. 33-9o). More recently Mr. oore has incisively
expressed the difficulty as follows : ' What Egoism holds, therefore, is that
each man's happiness is the sole good--that a number of different things are
each of them the only good thing there is--an absolute contradiction ! No
more complete and thorough refutution of any theory could be desired. Yet
Professor Sidgwick holds that Egoism is rational,' a conclusion which he
proceeds fo characterize as ' absurd' (Pricipia Etl ica, 9o3, p. 99). I should
agree with him that the position is self-contradictory in a sense in which
universalistic Hedonism is hot, and that with all his subtlety Sidgwick failed
altogether fo escape what was really an inconsistency in thought, even if he
escaped an actual or formal contradiction. But fo point out this logical
contradiction does not seem fo me quite so easy and final a way of refuting
Sidgwick's position as it does fo lr. Moore for these reasons : () The Egoist
with whom Professor Sidgwick is arguing would probably not accept
Mr. Moore's (and my own) conception of an absolute objective good, though
I should adroit and have contended in this chapter that if he fully thought
out what is implied in his own contention that his conduct is ' reasonable '
he would be led to that conception. (2) Sidgwick only admitted that the
Egoist was reasonable from one point of view--reasonable as far as he goes,
i.e. when he refuses to ask whether his judgements are consistent with
what he cannot help recognizing as the rational judgements of other men,
and limits himself fo asking whefher he can make his own judgements
consistent with themselves from his own point of view. No doubt Sidgwick
ought to have gone on to adroit that this imperfectly reasonable point of
view was hOt really reasonable af all, and fo some extent he has done this
in his last Edition. And (3) after all, even if we adroit that the Egoist is
unreasonable, there remains the question 'Why should he cure fo be
reasonable ?' If was largely the diflïculfy of answering this question
on universalistic Hedonist principle which drove Professor Sidgwick fo
admit a ' dualism of the Practical Reason,' and I ara not sure that the
question bas been very satisfactorily answered by ]Ir. Moore who, though
he is no Hedonist, appears fo be unwilling fo give the good will the highest
place in his scale of goods.
CHAPTER IV
INTUITIONISM
I
BY Intuitionism is usually understood the theory that actions
are pronounced right or wrong a prioïi without reference fo
their consequences. According fo one view if is supposed that
Conscience, or whatever else the moral faculty may be called,
pronounces on the morality of particular courses of conduct
af the moment of action. This form of the doctrine has been
styled by Professor Sidgwick unphilosophical Intuitlonism,
while he gives the name philosophical Intuitionism fo the
doctrine that what is intuitively judged fo be right or wrong
is always some general rule of conduct, from which the morality
or immorality of this or that particular course of action
must be deduced. According fo the first view, Conscience is
an ever-present dictator issuing detailed injunctions fo mee
particular cases as they arise: according o the second, Con-
science is a legislator, whose enactments have fo be applied
fo particular cases by the saine intellectual process as is employed
by a judge in administering an act of Parliament 1. Intuitionists
1 If is probable that many ' Intuitionists' would hold . position mid-
way between these extreme views. They would hold that some rules are
intuitively discerned fo be of absolute obligation, while in other cases tho
decision must be lef fo the intuitive judgement of the moment. If may be
asked where we are fo find examples of the Intuitionist presupposed by the
Utilitarian polemics. To a large extent no doubt he is a man of straw set
up fo be knocked down again. If will generally be found that most of the
writers usually associated with the name make larger admissions than the
popular exponents or assailants of this view recognize as fo the necessity of
consider/ng consequences and the paramount duty of promoting the general
good properly understood. But if cannot be denied that Bishop Butler
(especially in the Dissertation of Virtue) and Reid hure approximated fo this
position. The writer who seems specially fo have introduced the terre ' intui-
Chap. iv, § il UNPHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONISM 8i
may further be divided into two classes according fo the view
which they take as fo the nature of the faculty by which these
a priori judgements are pronounced. By some Intuitionists
this faculty is supposed fo be Reason, by others a ' Moral Sense.'
But the nature of the faculty involved in our moral judgements
is one which can best be discussed when we have answered the
easier preliminary question'Do
reasonably, pronounce ctions fo
regard fo their consequences, in
can be foreseen ?'
we in practice, or can we
be right or wrong without
so far as such consequences
The belief described as unphilosophical Intuitionism in ifs
wildest form is one which can hardly claim serious refutation.
If if is supposed that the injunctions of the moral faculty are
so wholly arbitrary that they proceed upon no general or
rational principle whatever, if if is supposed that I may to-day
in one set of circulnstances feel bound by an inexplicable impulse
within me fo act in one way, while to-morrow I may be directed
or direct myself fo act differently under circumstnces in no way
distinguishable from the former, then moral judgements are
reduced fo an arbitrary caprice which is scarcely compatible
with the belief in any objective standard of duty; for if will
hardly be denied that, if right and wrong are hOt the same
for the same individual on different but precisely similar
occasions, they OEn still less be the same for differen
persons, and all idea of an objective moral law disappears.
If may of course be Mleged that the circumstances of no two
acts are precisely alike, but they may certMnly be alike in
all relevant respects. If if be said that Conscience will vary
ifs judgement in accordance with the circumstnces of the case,
and that other men's Consciences in proportion to their en-
lightenment will Mways pronounce the same judgements under
tion' us the note of u School is Richard Price, but that writer's admissions
ure so umple that he ends by virtuully resolving ull duties into Benevolence,
understood in a non-hedonistic sense, und Justice. His Re.ieu, qf the lorinci-
.pal Questions and Dijficulties in Morals (1759) I regurd us the best work
published on Ethics till quite recent rimes. It contuins the gist of the
Kantiun doctrine without Kunt's confusions. In this chupter it must be
understood thut I um criticizing a type of opinion and hot any particular
writer.
RASHDALL I G
8OE INTUITIONISM [Book I
similar circumstances, there must be some rule or principle by
which if must be possible ho distinguish between circumstances
which do and circumstances which do hot alter our duty, however
little this rule or principle may be present in an abstracç form
fo the moral consciousness of the individual. Granted, therefore,
that the moral judgements may as a maçter of psychological
fact reveal themselves first and most clearly in particular cases
{just as we pronounce judgements about particular spaces and
distances long before we have consciously put geometrical prin-
ciples into the form of general axioms), if must still, if would
seem, be possible by analysis of out particular moral judgements
fo discover the general principles upon which they proceed.
Analytical thought and philosophical language may be inade-
quate for the accurate expression of the delicate shades and
grad,tions of circumstance upon which, in complicated cases,
our moral judgements actually depend; but some approximation
fo this, some rough rules or principles of ethical judgement,
ought, one would think, fo be capable of being elicited from
a wide comparative survey of one's own and other people's
actual judgements. If this be denied, moral instruction must
be treated as absolutely impossible. Now if may be quite
true that in many ways 'example is better than precept,' not
only on account of ifs emotional effect but even on account
of the intellectual illumination supplied by a good man's conduct
in presence of varyîng practical difficulties. It is true that
the contemplation in actual fact or in recorded history of a
good life may suggest ideals which no mere system of precepts,
abstracted from particular applications, can adequately embody.
A general rule is often best embodied in a concrete, typical case.
The parable of the Good Samaritan has taught the true meaning
of Charity more clearly as well as more persuasively than any
direct precept that could be culled from the writings of Seneca
or even from the Sermon on the Mount. But still there is
a consensus among reasonable men çhat moral instruction of
some kind--however vague, general, and inadequate fo the
complexities of actual life--is possible, desirable, and necessary.
We do not say fo a child who asks whether he may pick a
flower in somebody else's garden, 'My good child, that depends
Chap. iv, § i] CONSIDERATION OF CONSEQUENCES 8 3
entirely upon the circumstances of the particular case: fo lay
down any general rule on the subject would be a piece of
unwarrantable dogmatism on my part: consult your own Con-
science, as each case arises, and all will be well.' On the
contrary, we say af once: ' You must hOt pick the flower:
because that would be stealing, and stealing is wrong.' Make
any reserves you please as fo the inadequacy of the rule, its
want of definiteness, its inability fo meet many problems of
life, the necessity for exceptions and the like; yet if must be
admitted that if there be any one poi.nt about Morality as fo
which there is a consensus alike among all plain men and
nearly all Philosophers' if is surely this--that general rules
of conduct do exist. Morality cannot be reduced fo copy-book
headings, but copy-book headings we do and must have. Now, in
proportion as all this is admitted, unphilosophical Intuitionism
tends fo pass into the phflosophical variety of the Intuitionist
creed and may be subjected fo the saine criticism.
The strongest part of Sidgwick's great work consists in ifs
analysis of common-sense Morality. The loose statements of
Intuitionists as fo the clearness, certainty, adequacy, and self-
evidence of the ordinarily received rules of conduct have never
been subjected fo so searching, so exhaustive, and so illuminating
an examination. That task has been done once for all, and need
hOt in detail be done over again. If will be enough in this
place fo exhibit in the barest outline the difficulties which
this mode of ethical thought has fo confront :--
(i) Granted the existence of intuitive tendencies fo approve
action of particular kinds, we may stil! ask why we should
trust fo blind unreasoning impulses which refuse fo give any
rational account of themselves. Granted the existence of such
judgements as a marrer of psychological fact, Jwhence cornes
their validity? If if be said 'they are deliverances of moral
Reason,' we may ask whether if can be really rational fo act
without some consideration of consequences ? What does rational
conduct mean but acting with a clear conception of our ultimat
' Some of Mr. Bradley's utterunces in Ethcal Studies und elsewhere seem
fo constitute the only exception known to me. This position will be further
discussed in the last chapter of this work.
(2
84 INTUITIONISM [Book I
purpose or aire, and taking the means which seem bestadapted
to attain that end ? ' Look before you leap' seems fo be one
of the clearest of ail practical axioms: fo act in obedience fo
every subjective impulse, even if it be p'ina racle an impulse
arising from the higher partof our natre, would seem very
like adopting as our maxim ' Leap before you look.' Of course
there may be circumstances in which we have fo leap after
a very hurried and imperfect survey of the sitation under
penalty of being too laie fo leap af all, but some looking
before leaping is as necessary in the most unexpected and
agonizing crisis of the battle-field or the hunting field as in
the leisured pomp and circumstance of formal athletic sport.
(ii) The moral notions which bave seemed equally innate,
self-evident, and authoritative fo those who held them have
varied enormously with different races, different ages, different
individuals--even with the saine individuals ai different periods
of lire. If will be unnecessary fo illustrate ai length the varia-
tions of moral sentimentwhich have formed the main stock-in-
trade of utilitarian writers from the days of John Locke fo those
of Herbert Spencer. We have been taught to honour our
fathers and mothers: there have been races which deemed if
sacred duty fo eat them. Average Greek public opinion looked
with favour, or af least indulgence, upon acts which are crimes in
most civilized modern communities. Pious and educated Puritans
could see no harm in kidnapping negroes or shooting Irishmen.
The eminent evangelical clergyman John Newton pronounced
the hours which he passed in the captain's cabin of a slaver,
separated by a plank or two from a squalid mass of human
misery of which he was the cause, fo have been sweeter
hours of divine communion than he had ever elsewhere known.
Some virtues seem fo be of very laie development even among
civilized races--religious toleration, for instance, and humanity
towards animals. And so on, and so on.
To beginners in Moral Philosophy these objectons fo In-
tuitionism will usually present themselves as the strongest and
most unanswerable. In truth perhaps they are the weakest.
Neither the slow development of the moral faculty nor ifs
unequal development in different individuals af the saine level
Chap. iv, § i] OBJECTIONS TO INTUITIOIqISM 8 5
of social culture forms any objection to the a priori character
of moral judgements. We do not doubt either the axioms of
]VIathematics or the rules of reasoning, because some savage
cannot count more than rive , or because some highly educated
classical scholars are incapable of understanding the fifth propo-
sition of Euclid's first book. Some of us will even refuse fo
allow our belief in the objectivity of aesthetic judgements to
be shaken because a Zulu will hold a picture upside down,
because an uneducated bargee will often prefer some gaudy
sign-board fo an old Master, because the taste which pronounced
Queen's College the only really satisfactory piece of Oxford
architecture does not commend itself to that of the twentieth
century, or because even among the most cultivated art critics
of the present day there exist considerable differences of opinion.
Intuitionists have no doubt shown a tendency to claire infalli-
bility as well as authority for the moral judgements of the
individual: but such a claire is by no means necessary to the
extremest view of the arbitrary, unconsequential, isolated
character of moral judgements. We may adroit the validity
of the principles of reasoning and of the axioms of Mathe-
matics, alçhough many men reason badly, and some cannot
even count. Men's moral judgements may be intuitive, but
they need not be infallible. Self-evident truths are not truths
which are evident to everybody. There are degrees of moral
illumination just as there are degrees of musical sensibility or
of mathematical acuteness. Taken by themselves, the variations
of moral judgement form a less serious objection to the intuitional
mode of thought than those which follow, although if may be
certainly contended that Intuitionism of the cruder kind cannot
adequately account for these variations.
(iii) Even when a certain intuition is actually found in
all or most men of a certain race and age, the moral rule which
it enjoins usually turns out upon examination to be incapable
of exact definition. All, or nearly all, detailed moral rules hve
some exceptions, except indeed when the rule laid down taitly
excludes such exceptionl cases. The rule ' Thou shalt do no
Assuming uch to be the fct, s is sometimes lleged, though the truth
my be that they hve no words or other signs for higher numbers.
86 INTUITIONISM [Book I
mureler' presents itself no doubt a firs sigh s a moral rule
admitting er no exception; bu that is only because murder
neans 'killing except under those exceptional circumstances
under which if is right fo kill.' Now, even where there seems
fo be the fullest agreement, at leas among men of developed
moral nature, as to the main rules, it is frequently found fo
disappear as soon as we come to discuss the exceptions; while
even the saine individual will often find that af this point
his intuitions become indistinc or fail him altogeher. And
in practice it will nearly always turn out that the exception
has been introduced from some consideration of consequences.
Those who are most positive in maintining a particular moral
rule fo be of self-evident and universal obligation independently
of consequences, will generally shrink from applying it in certain
extreme cases. Set forth to the Intuitionist in sufficient detail
the appalling consequences of applying his rule, pile up the
agony sufficiengly, and there will almosg always corne a point
at which he begins to be doubtful as go whether the rule applies,
and a further point at which he is certain that it does not.
' Thou shalt do no murder'; but mosg men will admit thag
there are exceptional cases in which killing is no murder,
and perhaps a very large majority would be got go declare
that their intui-tions were clear in excepting self-defence, war
or ag least lawful war, and judicial execution. Bug ask at
what point killing in self-defence becomes lawful, what consti-
tutes war or whag constitutes lawful war, for what offences
we may lawfully inflict denth, at what point it becomes the
duty of the individual to refuse fo take part in an unrighteous
campaign or to carry out an iniquitous sentence--and we find
ourselves once again in a chaos of uncertainties. And observe
exactly the point of the uncertainty: ghe uncertainty lies
exactly in this--that no clear intuitions are forthcoming as
to the exact moment at which it begins fo be legitimate to
take account of consequences. 'Thou shalt not kill except
in self-defence, or by judicial sentence.' So much may perhaps
be pronounced to be self-evident without reference to conse-
quences. But if the established government absolutely refuses
fo protect person, property, or Morality, shall we never reach
Chap. iv, § i] CONSEQUENCES 87
a sae of anarchy such as will warranç he intervention of
an exçra-legal commiççee of public safey or vigilance association,
and çhe summary execuçion of içs sençences ? If only çhe
foreseen consequences are bad enough, no one but an advocaçe
of absoluçe non-resisçance wi]l fai] ço relax his severiçy, and çhe
advocate of unlimiçed non-resisçance is cerçainly noç in a position
to claim any general consensus in his favour. INow, if çhere
be any point a which an apparent intuition has ço give way
before clearly foreseen iii consequences, how tan we logically
say thaç if can ever be right fo exclude consideration of conse-
quences ? We must af least examine the probable consequences
of an act sufliciently fo feel reasonably sure that if will have
none of those extreme results which, if is admitted, would
have the ef/çct of suspending the moral rule upon which it
is proposed fo act. The only people who have really carried
ou the doctrine that apparently self-evident moral rules cannot
be modified by the consequences, however socially disastrous,
of disobeying hem fo anything like ifs logical results, are those
who (like Count Leo Tolstoi)preach the doctrine of unlimited
submission fo force, unlimited giving fo mendicants and the
like. And here common-sense Intuitionism decidedly declines fo
follow.
(iv) The above considerations may probably lead on fo
the reflection that after ail so,ne reference fo consequences is
really included in every moral rule. Indeed, you cannot really
distinguish an act from ifs prescrit or foreseeable consequences.
The consequences, in so far as they can be foreseen, are actually
part of the act. You cannot carry out any rule whatever
without some consideration of consequences. You cannot obey
the rule of Benevolence without aking whether giving money
in the street really is Benevolence; and that depends upon
whether if will actually have the effect of doing ultimate good
fo those fo whom you give and others who may be affected
by the expectaion of similar assistance which your act creates.
You cannot obey the command ' Thou shalt not kill' withou
considering whether the trigger that you pull will actually
discharge a bullet, how far the bullet is likely fo travel, what
if will meet with on the way, and (if if is likely fo hit any one)
88 INTUITIONISM [BookI '
whether that person is on the point of shooting somebody else,
or is a peaceable and inoffensive fellow-citizen. What would
be the meaning of asking whether drunkenness would be wrong
if if did not make a man incoherent in his talk, irrational in
his judgements, unsteady in his gait, and irresponsible in his
behaviour ? Drunkenness taken apart from all ifs consequences
would not be drunkenness. Once adroit that consequences must
be considered af all, and if is arbitrary fo stop af any particular
point in the calculus of social effects. You are not really in
a position fo pronounce upon the morality of the act until
you have the completest view that circumstances enable you
fo take of the whole train of events which will be started by
your contemplated volition. Until you have formed that
estimate of consequences, you do not really know what you
are doing: af any point in the vast orbit of changes which
spreads from every human action, like the widening ripple
that radiates from a stone dropped into smooth water, if is
always theoretically possible that some circumstance may be
discovered which may remove the case from the category to
which your moral rule refers.
No doubt in practice if is often imperative that we should act
without this elaborate investigation : but the very enquiry ' how
long ought I fo deliberate before I act ?' is precisely one of those
questions upon which if is impossible fo discover any intuitive
rule containing no reference fo the probable consequences--the
consequences, that is fo say, on the one hand of deliberating
too much, and on the other of not deliberating enough. If there
are cases in which our moral consciousness clearly bids us do
something or other af once without thinking of consequences,
if will be round that these cases are precisely those in which
excessive deliberation would be likely fo lead fo harmful results.
To stay and reflecç upon all the consequences which might be
expected fo flow from obeying or resisting the impulse fo plunge
into the water after a drowning man would very rapidly place
the former alternative out of the question; o encourage the
habit of prolonged deliberation in such cases would be fo make
gallant attempts af rescues few, and successful rescues fewer.
If is therefore considered enough fo justify the attempt that
Chap. iv, § i] INCONSISTENT INTUITIONS 8 9
a man knows he is a good swimmer, that the sea is not ex-
eeptionally rough, and that if is hOt certain that the attempt
will fail. There are, of course, seores of cases in whieh if is
right fo aet on short deliberation - but if will probably be found,
on analysis, that if is some eonsequenee of allowing people fo
deliberate upon whieh the judgement is ultimately based. If is
a eommonplaee of utilitarian Ethies that many things must be
avoided altogether whieh might in exeeptional cases have good
effeets just beeause exceptions, if admitted af all, would have
a tendeney fo beeome too numerous 1.
(v) Sfill more obviously does the existence of eontradietory
moral intuitions eompel an appeal fo eonsequenees. When the
duty of Benevolenee eollides with the duty of Veraeity, or the
claire of one individual fo immediate relief with the duty of
doing what is best for soeiety on the whole, how shall we
determine whieh rule is fo take preeedenee ? If is no use fo say
with Dr. Martineau ' Aet in obedienee fo the highest motive ';
for if is impossible fo pronounee one motive higher than another
in the abstraet, without referenee fo eireumstanees. If I were
If is therefore quite reasonable fo hold that some aets may properly be
forbidden by Morlity, just as others are forbidden by law, beeause (though
offert harmless) there is . probable balance of harm in allowing the practiee
af all. Law forbids my erossing the line exeept by the bridge (although the
pruetiee is quite safe for an .ble-bodied man in full possession of all his
faculties) because my indu]ging in if has a tendency fo encourage imitation
in the feeble, the elderly, and the deaf, who are likely fo be run over. If is
quite reasonable fo urge that even modemte gmbling ought fo be forbidden
by publie opinion on mueh the saine grounds. Until publie opinion h.s
forbidden if, I ara hot, indeed, af liberty fo treat the man who plays whist
for sixpenees as a moral offender. But, if I think that soeiety would do well
fo adopt as ifs rule the total condemnation of gambling, if is my duty under
ordinary circumstances fo abstain from if myself, and fo do what in me lies
(short of censoriously condemning individuals who differ from me) fo bring
about the adoption ofthis rule. Those who will hot under any possible circum-
stances adroit that ' abusus tollit usure' would find if difficult fo justify a
whole host of accepted moral rules which rest on this principle. The whole
social code which restricts the rime, place, and circumstances of social inter-
course between the sexes is based on this principle. Acts in themselves
harmless are forbidden altogether because experience shows that they are
liable to lead fo bad consequences in some cases.
* This doctrine is developed in the first part of the second volume of Types
of Ehical Theorg.
90 INTUITIONISM [Book I
fo pronounee Veraeity invariably a higher motive than Bene-
volenee, I eould never tell a lit or employ a deteetive fo tell ont
for me, fo avoid the extremest social disaster. If, on the other
hand, I pronounee Benevolenee higher than VeraeiVy and every
other possible motive, I have praetieally adopted the utilitarian
prineiple, and Veraeity would have always fo give way fo
Benevolenee, wherever there was the slightest collision between
them. But neither solution of the problem seems fo satisfy the
demands of out moral eonseiousness. The first view strikes us
as too rigorous, the last as too lax. What out aetual moral
judgement seems fo say is, that in sueh collisions iV is the
amount of the unveraeity or the amount of the inhumanity that
will have fo determine whieh rule is fo give way. And this
eannot be aseertained without a ealeulation of eonsequenees. If
once if be admitted that under any possible eombination of
eireumstanees I may tell a lit (however strongly ont may feel
the praetieal inexpedieney of entering upon sueh a calculation in
all ordinary cases), I must still feel bound Vo examine the cir-
cumstanees suflïeiently fo be pretty sure that there is no proba-
bility of this turning out fo be ont of those extreme or exeeptional
cases in whieh the lit would be warranted. In general, of course,
this hasty survey of the consequenees is so instantaneously
performed as fo escape notice altogether. A truVhful man
aets af once on the general rule unless he detects something
in the cireumstanees which seems fo call for further eon-
sideration.
(vi) While the foregoing objeetions may be urged against
many of the alleged intuitions fo whieh intuitional Moralists
appeal, there are some whieh do submit fo the tests whieh
bave been round fatal fo the claire for absolute and final
validity on the part of the test. The axioms of Prudente,
Rational Benevolenee, and Equity do possess the elearness and
definiteness and freedom from self-contradiction whieh other
alleged intuitions so conspieuously laek. If does on reflection
strike us as self-evident that I ought fo promote my own good
on the whole (where no ont else's good is affeeted), that I ought
fo regard a larger good for soeiety in general as of more intrinsic
value than a smaller good, and thaV ont man's good is (other
Chap. iv, § ii] INTUITIONS RELATE TO ENDS 9 x
things being equal) of as much intrinsic value as any other
man's. But these axioms, so far from throwing any doubt upon
the truth of Utilitarianism, are precisely the maxims upon
which Utilitarianism itself is founded for those who attempt fo
base the duty of promoting pleasure upon ifs intrinsic rightness
or reasonableness. In the acceptance of those maxims as genuine
moral axioms, Sidgwick bas, as we have seen, laid the foun-
dations for a reconciliation between Intuitionism and Utili-
tarianism. But the acceptance of these axioms does not make in
favour of the kind of Intuitionism which if is the object of this
chapter fo examine; for these are precisely the axioms upon
which Utilitarianism itself is based. Such intuitions do not
forbid us--on the contrary they expressly require and cotnpel
us--fo attend fo the consequences of actions, and fo make our
judgement about them depend upon their tendency fo promote
a universal good.
II
If is perhaps unnecessary to multiply objections fo that sort
of Intuitionism which declares that certain rules of action are
fo be followed irrespectively of consequences. If is irrational fo
judge of the morality of an action without tracing ifs bearing
upon human Well-being as a whole. We are compelled fo accept
the utilitarian formula in so far as if asserts that conduct is
good or bad only in proportion as if tends fo promote the Well-
being of human society on the whole. But we have already
seen reasons for rejecting the utilitarian identification of
greatest good with greatest pleasure; and we have seen that
in the judgements as fo the value of different kinds of good we
encounter a p'io'i or immediate deliverances of the moral con-
sciousness of precisely that kind fo which the term Intuition is
commonly applied. What then is the difference between the
intuitions which we have rejected and the intuitions which we
have felt ourselves compelled fo accept ? The intuitions of the
Intuitionist are supposed fo lay down invariable rules of conduct;
the a p'iori or immediate j udgements which we have admitted
relate fo ends, fo the relative value of different elements in
human Well-being or «Satlzot,la. In other words the intuitions
9 2 INTUITIONISM [Book I
of the Intuitionist disregard consequences; ours relate precisely
to the value of different kinds of consequence. The Intuitionist
pronounces intuitive judgement upon acts; our intuitions relate
to ends; his take the form ' this is right,' ours always the form
' this is good.'
A few illustrations will make the contrast plain. The old
intuitive rule of Veracity is supposed to say,' Do not lie under
any circumstances whatever': our judgement of value gives us
only'Truth-speaking is good; lying is bad.' And the moment
the intuitive or a priori truth is put in this new form, the
irrationality and unworkableness of the old intuitional system
disappears. We are not forbidden to calculate consequences.
Certinly we must trace the bearing of an act upon universel
Well-being; but in our ««Ltov« truth-speaking, or rather the
truth-speaking and truth-loving character, finds a place. Suppos-
ing the speaking of the truth will in this particular case involve
such and such evils, the question is ' Which is the worse--these
evils or the evil involved in the lie ; so much suffering, and surfer-
ing caused by my voluntary act, or so much untruthfulness?'
It is impossible, of course, to set forth in detail all the circum-
stances upon which a right decision of such cases may depend.
But if would be generally agreed that fo tell a lie to sve some-
body from hearing an unpleasant remark, or to save him from
some trifling injury to his pride or self-esteem, wou]d be to choose
the greffer of two evils instead of the less. On the other hand,
to save a friend's life af the cost of concealing bad news by a lie
would be a less evil than the voluntary causing of his death by
speaking the truth. Of course, if any one disputes such a view
of the oese, we have nothing to say. As in all questions of
ultimate ends, argument is impossible: but so in this particular
case the vast majority of conscientious people judge and act.
And be it observed that on this principle our moral judgements
cn never contradict one another. It remains true that truth is
good, and speaking an untruth an evil; but like other goods,
truth may have to give way fo greater goods; lying is always
an evil, but it may be the less of two evils. It is evil even
when the justifioEtion for the lie is palpable and incontestable.
Where the circumstances are such that the isolated act does not
Chai). iv, § iii EXCEPTIONS 93
evidence or encourage an unruthful habit or character, the evil
may be very small; but we cannot always secure that the evil
shall be a small one. Lying in detectives is necessary and right,
but, like some other I)rofessional duties, if may hot always be
good for the character of the person who practises if. I is
often necessary to do things which are right for us, bub which
are liable fo be imitated by those for whom if is wrong. If the
evil of the anticii)ated imitation be great enough, this may no
doubt be a sufficient reason for abstinence, but no sensible man
would forbid a father to smoke because the example may tire
his youthful son with te ambiton f do likewise.
The general result then of out discussion, taken in connexion
with I)receding chai)ters, is that the true criterion of Morality
is the tendency of an act fo I)romote a Well-being or
whch includes many oter good tings besides pleasure, among
which Virte is te greatst The value of tese element in
human lire is detrmined by te Practical Reason intitvely,
immediatly, or (if we like fo say so) a priori 1. Ail moral
judgements are ultimatly judgement as f te intinsic worth
or value of some element in consciousness or lfe.
And we may go one step further than this in recognition Of
the partal tut of Intuitonism. The greatobjecton in many
minds f te utlitarian view of Etics is te element of calculaton
which ifinvolves. When tis objecton is ruade int a plea for
acting withoutrerd fo consequences, ifis (as I have en-
deavoured f show) completly irratonal. But ail the sume the
directness and immediacy which appear to characterize our
clearestmoral I)erceptons do seem af firstsightan objecton fo the
doctrine that I cannot decide whether a thing is right or wrong
until I have worked out all ifs I)robable consequences upon so
remote and intangible a thing as universal Well-being. And the
I wish for the present to avoid as far as possible metaphysical discussion,
and therefore content myself with saying that by a priori I mean merely tha
the judgement is immeàiate--not obtained by inference or deduction from
something else in the way in which the Utilitarian supposes his judgements
to be deductions from rules got by generalization from experience (though,
as I have explained, he always assumes the ultimate major premiss ' Pleasure
is good '). That in another sense judgements of value are hot independent
of experience, I shall hereafter strongly insist, especially in the next chapte».
94 INTUITIONISM [Book I
difficulty is hot fully met by insisting on the fact that on most
of the ethical difflculties of common lire the moral consciousness
of the community has already laid clown rules which the in-
dividual bas only o apply fo the marrer in hand. For there
are no moral judgements which probably strike those who make
them as more authoritative and self-evident than those by which
a certain act is judged tobe wrong in spire of an overwhelming
weightof custom and tradition. Suchajudgement was pronounced,
for instance, when a solitary monk declared that the gladiatorial
combat was a barbarous brutality, though the tradition of ages
and a whole circus-full of professedly Christian spectators pro-
nounced if right, and by a public protest, which cost him his lire,
sealed the doom of the whole institution. And there is no reason
why we should not fully recognize the validity of such judgements
without any surrender of the principles which we have adopted.
For this indefinable Well-being or ¢«tlora, which our moral
Reason pronounces tobe the ultimate end of all human conduct,
is itself ruade up of elements of consciousness--feelings, volitions,
emotions, thoughts, activities--each of which is itself an object
of moral valuation. If these elements were not each of them by
itself t the object of a judgement of value, there could be no
judgement of value upon the whole. Every one would recognize
this as regards acts which cause immediate pleasure or pain.
Nobody supposes that, when I sec a man sticking a knife into
another, it is necessary for me to calculate the effct of the act
upon the lives of ail human beings, present and future, before
I condemn the proceeding. I say at once,' This pain is bad:
therefore the infliction of it is wrong'; and, if I ara not a
Hedonist, I may add,' the character or disposition which this
act shows is worse than the pain which it causes.' And it is
equally so in many cases where the act has no such immediate
and obvious bearing upon the welfare of human society. That
a rational being should use his intellect t make things appear
to his brother man otherwise than as they are strikes me at once
I speak of course in rough and relative sense. We could form no
judgement upon the worth of an act or a state ofmind without some general
knowledge of ifs relation fo life as a whole. The illustrations will, I trust,
sufficiently explain my meaning.
Chap. iv, § iii THE RIGHT AID THE GOOD 95
as irrational and evil. I do hOt want fo trace out all the effects of
lying upon human society before I say, ' this is a lie and there-
fore bad.' If is not the existence or even the relative and partial
valldity of such judgements that is disputed, so much as their
finality. In many cases if is prctically apparent af the first
glance that no possible circumstances could make this act--the
cutting or the lying--result in an overplus of good fo human
society. In many more cases there is a great improbability that
any circumstance af present unknown fo me will disclose
a prospect of beneficial consequences which would reverse my
prina facie judgement. But, unless I know all the clrcum-
stances, if is always possible that further knowledge might reveal
such a tendency. The man sticking a knife into his fellow with
apparently heart]ess brutality may turn out fo be a surgeon per-
forming a salutary operation. The lie which I put down fo
mere indifference fo truth may turn out fo be part of a detective's
scheme for the capture of a murderer or the protection of an
innocent man. If is not always practically necessary fo look fo
the ultimate end before we judge, and act upon our judge-
ment: but, until we have done so, we are never sure that
we have reached one of those ultimate moral judgements
which represent an immediate deliverance of Reason, and which
no further knowledge of facts and no demontration of con-
sequences can possibly shake. There would be little objection
fo the claims which the Intuitionst makes for his intuitions,
if only he would admit that they are subject fo appeal, though
ît is only an appeal fo the saine tribunal which pronounced the
original judgements--an appeal (fo borrow an old legal phrase)
a conscietia nale iforata ad coscientia nelis
fornanda. So long as the ntutive judgement runs in the
form, ' This is right,' if s always liable fo be reversed on a wider
survey of consequences. If if be turned into the form, ' This is
good,' if cannot possibly be reversed (supposing tht the man's
ethical ideal be a true one), though the resulting duty may
appear different when this iso]ated judgement is brought into
comparison with other moral judgements affirming the superior
goodness of some other end 1. In Morality, as in other matters,
t 2his point has been well put by Dr. lIcTaggart. 'But is a moral
9 6 IITUITIOIISM [Book I
out judgements require fo be eorrelated and eorreeted by reference
fo one another. Only the judgemens that are based upon
eomplete knowledge are final. The idem moral judgement implies
a conception of the idem good for soeiety as a whole, but we eould
have no idem of what is good for soeiety as a whole unless we
had a power of pronouneing that this or that partieular moment
of eonseious lire is good or bad. Out conception of the moral
idem as a whole is built up out of particular judgements of
value, though particular judgements of value bave fo be pro-
gressively corrected by our growing conception of the moral
ideal as a whole, just as our conception of the laws of nature
is built up out of particular perceptions, though when that
knowledge is once attained if reacts upon and Mters the per-
ceptions themselves.
And by expressing the moral judgement as a judgement of
value we get this further advantage. We emphasize the fact
which eudaemonistic systems of Ethics are apt fo overlook--that
acts are the objects of moral judgements as well as consequences.
Because no act can be good or bad without reference fo con-
sequences, if does not follow that ifs morMity depends wholly
upon those consequences. To the Hedonist, of course, such a dis-
tinction would be meaningless. For him nothing about an act is
of any value or importance besides the consequences. Whether
a poor family economize by infanticide or by curtailing their
expenditure is simply a question of profit and loss. If the sum
criterion,' he asks, ' wanted at all? It might be maintained that it was hot.
It would only be wanted, it might be said, if we decided out actions by
general rules, which we do hot. Out moral action depends on particular
judgements that A is better than B, which we recognize with comparative
immediacy, in the saine way that we recognize that one plate is botter
than another, or one picture more beautiful than another. Itis on these
particular intuitive judgements of value, and not on general rules, that
out moral action is based.
' This seems to me a dangerous exaggeration of an important truth. If is
quite true that, if we did hot begin with such judgements, we should bave
neither morality nor ethics. But if is equally true that we should bave neither
morality nor ethics if we stopped, here e must begin, with these judge-
ments, and treated them as decisive and closing discussion. For out moral
.judgements are hopelessly coutradictory of one another.' (Studies in Hegelian
Cosmology, p. 97-)
Chap. iv, § il] ACT AND CONSEQUENCES 97
of pleasure would be equal in the two cases, if would be a marrer
of perfect indifference by which machinery the requisite cor-
respondence between food and eaters shall be effected. The
inhumanity of the act, the want of self-control which if implies,
the retaper or character which if expresses and fosters are matters
of no importance except in so far as they may result upon the
whole in an actual diminution of pleasure or increase of suffering.
But, when once if is admitted that the end includes a certain
ideal of human character, then the deliberate extinction of
children deliberately brought into the world with the intention
of so disposing of them will seem a vastly greater evil, fo the
individuals concerned and fo the society which tolerates their
conduct, than much poverty with all ifs physical hardships and
privations.
From this non-hedonistic point of view we can no longer
recognize an absolute distinction between means and ends.
Some means may no doubt have no value beyond that of
conducing fo a further end; but many, nay most, of the acts
which do conduce to further ends have a value (positive or
negative) of their own; and this value must be taken into accourir
in estimating the rightness or wrongness of the acts.
If is on this principle that we must deal with most of the prima
racle collisions between our ordinary moral judgements and the
results of eudaemonistic calculation. othing but consciousness
has value, but volitions and desires, emotions and aspirations
and imaginations, are elements in all our consciousness as well
as mere pleasures and pains. There are acts so intrinsically re-
pulsive that if strikes us as, on the face of if, impossible that any
pleasure which they might yield could be worh the evil which
they involve. In this way most people would condemn without
further examination proposais for the abolition of marriage
or the permission of promiscuous infanticide. But still even
in such cases if is not speculatively admissible fo say, 'we will
not look af the consequences.' Practically, of course, i may
often be right fo refuse fo argue some proposed moral innovation:
that must depend upon circumstances. But, if we do argue,
if we do want speculatively fo get fo the bottom of an ethical
question, we are bound to look af all the consequences, and
A.SH DAXJ. I
98 IITUITIONISM [Book I
pronounce whether, given such and such probable results, they
are worth the evil involved in the means taken fo gain them.
In many cases--where the consequence on the strength of which
if is proposed fo do some questionable act is hot some remote
effect but some immediate pleasure--it is convenient fo discuss
the question as one of higher versus lower pleasure, though in
strictness this means, according fo out view, that the getting
pleasure from one source is better than getting if from another,
that one kind of pleasant consciousness is intrinsically better
than another, though hot more pleasant. And, if we treat one
pleasure as intrinsically better than another, there îs no logîcal
objection fo our regarding some pleasures (i.e. the getting
pleasure from some things) as intrinsically bad.
If is clear fo my mind that there do exist pleasures which are
intrinsically bad. On strictly hedonistic principles I fail fo
understand why we should object fo the Spanish or Southern-
French bull-fight, fo the German students' face-slashing duels,
to the coursing and pigeon-shooting which the higher public
opinion is beginning fo condemn among ourselves, fo the wild-
beast fights of the Roman amphitheatre, or perhaps even fo the
gladiatorial combats themselves, af least if the gladiators were
justly condemned criminals. Hedonism is hOt bound fo object fo
all infliction of pain, but only fo insist that the pain inflicted shall
yield a suflîcient overplus of pleasure on the whole. There is no
more difficult ethical question than the question of the negative
value fo be attributed fo pain as compared with the positive
value fo be attributed fo pleasure. There is no question
assuredly upon which people's actual j udgements would differ
more. Which would you rather have--some particularly longed
for treat, the holiday or the travel that you have set your heart
upon + a painful operation without chloroform, or no treat and no
operation 2. Different men would answer such questions very
differently 1. But, fo return fo our bull-fight, upon any rational
I If is an extremely difllcult question fo say how far in such matters
Hedonism would be bound fo accept the verdict of the persons themselves.
For we often deceive ourselves as fo the pleasurableness of pleasures hot
immediately present, even when we have some experience fo go upon, and
yet such flse estimates are causes of further pleasures and pains--pleasures
Chap. iv, § ii] BAD PLEASURES 99
or intelligible view of the comparative values of pleasure and
pain, the intense pleasure which such spectacles give fo thousands
of beholders must surely outweigh the pain inflicted on a few
dozen animals or even a few dozen criminals. If ten thousand
spectators would not be sufficient fo readjust the balance, suppose
them multiplied tenfold or one-hundredfold. A humant man
would condemn the spectacle all the saine. He will pronounce
such pleasures of inhumanity bad, quite apart from the some-
what dubious calculation that the encouragement of inhumanity
in one direction tends fo callousness in another. Experience
does not seem fo show that persons habituated fo the infliction
of pain in one direction sanctioned by custom are less humane
than other men in other directions. If is possible fo question
the morality of many forms of sport without accusing the
average country gentleman of exceptional inhumanity, or doubt-
ing the sincerity of the indignation with which he sends a
labourer's boy fo prison for setting his dog af the domestic car.
Another good instance of intrinsically bad pleasures is supplied
by drunkenness. The pleasures of drunkenness strike the
healthily constituted mind as intrinsically degrading and dis-
gusting, though if is probable that occasional acts of drunkenness
are physically less injul4ous than a course of ordinary dinner-
parties; and we should think the man's conduct in getting
drunk worse instead of better if he had carefully taken pre-
cautions which would prevent the possibility of his doing
mischief or causing annoyance fo othe'rs while under the influence
of Ms premeditated debauch. Of course in all such cases, where we
pronounce a particu]ar kind of pleasure bad, we must remember
what was said in dealing with the distinction between higher
and lower pleasures. The pleasure taken by itself--in abstraction
from the total content of the consciousness enjoying itwcannot
possibly have anything bad about if. In the nigh all cows are
black; when we have ruade abstraction of all that differentiates
one pleasure from another, the abstract remainder must obviously
be identical from a moral as from every other point of view.
If is really the getting pleasure from such and such things that
or pains of expectation, imagïnatio, or retrospect--wlaich must themselves
corne into the calculus.
H
x INTUITIONISM [Book I
is pronounced bad in such cases. If is good tobe pleased,
but hot ai everything, or under all circumstances, or ai all
costs.
III
Our examination of the traditional Intuitionism has thus
brought us round t the saine position which we arrived af
by a criticism of the traditional hedonistic Utilitarianism. We
round that the Utilitarians were right in saying that actions
are right or wrong according as they tend fo promote or fo
diminish universal Well-being, but we found tlmt they were
wrong in thinking that the Well-being of a rational creature
consists simply in pleasure, and pleasure measured quantitatively.
We saw reason to believe that the very choice of the right and
rational course for ifs own sake was itself a good and the greatest
of all goods, and that itis impossible logically fo establish the
duty of preferring the general pleasure fo our own without
recognizing the intrinsic value of such a preference of universal
good both for ourselves and for others. We saw further that
besides this preference of the truly good in conduct or character
there were many other elemens in the ideal state of a human
soul besides the Altruism of ifs volitions and the pleasantness of its
sensations ; and when we faced the question, how we know these
things tobe good in various degrees, we were obliged fo answer
' We know if intuitively or immediately ; we can give no reason
why it should be so exceptthatwe see if so fo be.' So far we were
obliged fo adroit that the Intuitionists were right. We found,
however, that the Intuitionists were mistaken in supposing that
the moral Reason on which they rightly base out ethical judge-
ments either lays down fixed and exceptionless laws of conduct, or
issues isolated, arbitrary, disconnected decrees pro 'e nata without
reference fo probable results. We saw that fundamentally these
moral judgements were judgements of value: they decide what
is good, not immediately and directly what is right. Since
priera facie if is always right fo follow the good, these judge-
ments may often in practice condemn this or that kind of conduct so emphatically that we feel sure that no calculation of con-
sequences is likely to prevent out turning the judgement 'tis is
Chap. iv, § iii] THE MORAL CRITERION
good' into a judgement ' this is right': but we saw that theo-
retically no single judgement of value can form the basis of
a rule of conduct which admits of no exceptions. For moral
Reason bids us not only seek fo realize the good but fo realize
rauch good as possible, and (if I may anticipate a point which
we have not yet established) to distribute that good justly or
impartially between the various persons who may be affected by
our actions. We have seen reason, while accepting the intuitional
view of the imperativeness of duty and the supreme value of
raoral goodness, to hold that the law of duty itself requires us to
consider the consequences of our actions and to seek fo promote
for all mankind a )atttoa or Well-being which shall include
in itself all the various elements to which moral Reason ascribes
value; and include them in such wise that each is accorded
ifs due value and no more than that value. So far we have
decided nothing as to what these elements are except that Virtue
is the most. important of them, that culture or knowledge is
another, and that pleasure has a place among them, although
some pleaures are bad and the relative value of others has fo be
determined by a non-hedonistic standard.
We have begun our study of Ethics with the question of the
moral criterion. Logically it might seem that we should have
discussed the theory of duty in general before attacking the
question how we find out what particular acts or classes of acts
are duties. I have adopted the former course because if seemed
the best way of showing how impossible it is for the most
thorough-going Utilitarian to avoid admitting that this simple,
unanalysable notion of duty or the reasonable in conduct does
exist, and of illustrating the impossibility of constructing
logically coherent system of Ethics without the assumption
the reasonableness of an ct is a sufficient ground for its being
done. Before we go further, however, if may be well to dwell
t some greater length upon the nature of this fundamental
idea ; and the best way of doing so will be by brief examina-
tion of the classical exposition of if contained in the system of
Immnuel Knt.
CHAPTER V
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
I
WE have seen that there is implied in every ethical judgement
the idea that there is something which is intrinsically good,
which t is reasonable fo do, which is right, which ought to
be done. These different modes of expression I regard as alter-
native ways of expressing the same unanalysable idea which
is involved in all ethicaljudgements--as much in the Utilitrian's
judgement that he ought fo promote the greatest happiness
of the greatest number as in .the Idealist's judgement ' I ought to
aire af the greatest Virtue or Perfection for myself or for others.'
If any one questions the existence of this idea of rightness, no
argument can do more than remove some of the misconceptions
which may prevent his explicitly recognizing what is really
implied in the workings of his own mind. To attempt this task
will be the object of the present chapter. If any one denies the
authority or validity (as distinct from the existence) of this idea
of duty, such a vindication of ifs validity as if is possible fo give
belongs to Metaphysic. The relation of Morals to Metaphysic is
a subject on which something must be said hereafter : and yet ail
that even Metaphysic can do in this connexion is to develope the
extravagant consequences in which a man becomes involved if
he denies the validity of his own thought. To deny the deliver-
ances of our own Reason is fo deprive ourselves of any ground
for believîng in anything whatever. To adroit that our Reason
assures us that there are some things which if is right fo do, and
yet to ask why we should believe that those things ought fo be
done, is fo ask why we should believe what we see fo be true.
Sidgwick's account of this dea of duty is so clear and so
entirely dissociated from any metaphysical assumptions which
Chap. v, § i] THE IDE/k OF DUTY io 3
to some minds might seem diflïcult or questionable, that I cannot
do better than quote him ai length :--
' If seems then that the notion of" ought" or "moral obligation"
as used in our common moral judgements, does not merely
import (x) that there exists in the mind of the person judging
a specific emotion (whether complicated or not by sympathetic
representation of similar emotions in other minds) ; nor () that
certain rules of conduct are supported by penalties which will
follow on their violation (whether such penalties result from the
general liking or aversion felt for the conduct prescribed or
forbidden, or from some other source). What then, i may be
asked, does if import ? What definition can we give of "ought,"
"right," and other terms expressing the saine fundamental notion ?
To this I should answer that the notion which these terms have
in common is too elementary fo admit of any formal definition ....
The notion we have been examining, as if now exists in our
thought, cannot be resolved into any more simple notions : if can
only be made clearer by determining as precisely as possible it
relation to other notions with which if is connected in ordinary
thought, especially fo those wih which if is liable o be confounded.
' In performing this process if is important fo note and dis-
tinguish two different implications with which the word "ough"
is used; in the narrowest ethical sense what we judge "ought fo
be" done, is always thought capable of being brought about
by the volition of any individual fo whom the judgement
applies. I cannot conceive that I "ought" fo do anything which
a the same rime I judge that I cannot do. In a wider sense,
however,--which cannot conveniently be discardedI sometimes
judge that I "ought "o know what a wiser man would know, or
feel as a beter man would feel, in my place, though I may know
that I could not direcfly produce in myself such knowledge
or feeling by any eflbrt of will. In this case the word merely
implies an ideal or pattern which I "ought "--in the stricter
sense--to seek fo imitate as far as possible. And this wider
sense seems fo be that in which the word is normally used in the
precept of Ar generally, and in political judgements: when
In the sentences omitted the writer explains that he doe8 hot exclude
the possibility that the notion bas been graduully develoled.
lO4
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
I judge that the laws and constitution of my country "ought
fo be "other than they are, I do not of course imply that my own
or any other individual's single volition can directly bring about
the change. In either case, however, I imply that what ought
tobe is a possible object of knowledge : i.e. that what I judge
oughV tobe must, unless I ara in error, be similarly judged by
all raVional beings whojudge truly of the marrer 1.
' In referring such judgements fo the" Reason," I do not mean
Vo prejudge the question whether valid moral judgements are
normally attained by a process of reasoning from universal prin-
ciples or axioms, or by direct intuition of the particular duVies
of individuals. If is not uncommonly held that the moral faculty
deals primarily with individual cases as they arise, applying
direct]y to each case the general notion of duty, and deciding in-
tuitively whaV ought fo be donc by this person in these particular
circumstances. And I admiV that on this view the apprehension
of moral truth is more analogous fo Sense-perception than fo
Rational Intuition (as commonly understood): and hence the
term Moral Sense might seem more appropriate. But the terre
Sense suggests a capacity for feelings which may vary from
A and B without eiVher being in error, rather than a faculty of
cognition: and iV appears fo me fundamentally important Vo
avoid this suggestion. I have therefore thought if betVer to use
the terre Reason with the explanaVion above given, fo denote
Vhe faculty of moral cognition .'
In claiming for the idea of duty not merely existence but
auVhority, we have implied that the recognition that some-
thing is our duty supplies us wiVh whaV we recognize upon
reflection as a sufiîcienV motive for doing if, a motive on which
iV is psychologically possible fo act. The recognition of the
Vhing as right is capable of producing an impulse Vo the doing
of if. This impulse need nob be strong enough Vo override other
motives, nor need we enter here upon the question in whaV sense
(if any) the choice beVween this motive of duty and other desires
1 As a representatlon of the prescrit writer's views this statement of the
unanalysable character of the right must be taken fo be qualified by what
follows (below, pp. I37, I38) as fo the relation between this notion and thc
wider concept of' good.'
Methods OEEthics, 6th ed., pp. 3-34-
Chap. v, § i] DICTATES OF REASON o 5
or impulses must be held fo depend upon the undetermined choice
of the individual af the moment of action. If is enough for our
present purpose that on reflection we recognize that the seeing
a thing fo be right is a reason for doing if, and that in some
men af some moments the desire fo do what is reasonable or
right as such causes the actions fo be done.
Once again I may quote Sidgwlck :--
'Further, when I speak of the cognition or judgement that
"X ought fo be done "--in the stricter ethical sense of the terre
ought--as a "dictate" or "precept" of reason fo the persons fo
whom if relates; I imply that in rational beings as such this
cognition gives an impulse or motive fo action : though in hulnan
beings, of course, this is only one motive among others which are
liable fo conflict with if, and is not always--perhaps not usually--
a predominant motive. In fact, this possible conflict of motives
seems fo be connoted by the terre "dictate" or "imperative ";
which describes the relation of Reason fo mere inclinations or
non-rational impulses by comparing if fo the relation between
the will of a superior and the wills of his subordinates. This
conflict seems also fo be implied in the terms "ought," "duty,"
"moral obligation," as used in ordinary moral discourse: and
hence these terms cannot be applied fo the actions of rational
beings fo whom we cannot attribute impulses conflicting with
reason. We may, however, say of such beings that their actions
are "reasonable," or (in an absolute sense) "right."
' I ara aware that some persons will be disposed fo answer all
the preceding argument by a simple denial that they can find in
their consciousness any such unconditional or categorical impera-
rive as I have been trying fo exhibit. If this is really the
final result of self-examination in any case, there is no more fo
be said. I, af least, do not know how fo impart the notion of moral
obligation fo any one who is entirely devoid of if. I think, how-
ever, that many of those who give this denial only mean fo deny
that they have any consciousness of moral obligation fo actions
without reference fo their consequences; and would not really
deny that they recognise some universal end or ends--whether if
be the general happiness, or well-being otherwise understod--as
that af which if is ultimately reasonable fo aire .... But in this
io5 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
view, as I have before said, the unconditional imperative plainly
cornes in as regards the end, which is--explicitly or implicitly--
recognised as an end at which all men "ought" fo aim; and it
can hardly be denied that the recognition of an end as ultimately
reasonable involves the recognition of an obligation fo do such
acts as most conduce fo the end 1.,
These two positions (1)that the rightness of actions is per-
ceived immediately by the Reason, (oE) thaç this rightness ought
fo be and is capable of becoming a motive fo the Will, are
embodied by Kant in the two famous phrases, the categorical
imperative and the autonomy of the will. Duty is a categorical
imperative because when a thing is seen fo be right, we feel
commanded fo do if categorically, absolutely, as a means fo no
end beyond itself. If duty meant merely ' Do this if :you want
fo be happy, or fo be perfect, or fo go fo heaven,' if would be
merely a hypothetical imperative.- ifs obligation would depend
on our happening fo desire the end fo which we saw the action
in question fo be a means. As if is, we feel that the rightness
of doing what we see to be our duty is in no way dependent on
the presence or absence of any desire or inclination towards what
is commande& If is true that the action cannot be done unless
there is an impulse fo do what is right or reasonable on our part,
but such a desire may be created by the Reason which recognizes
the rightness: we desire to do the act commanded (in so far as
we do desire it) because if is commanded ; we do hot judge that
we are commanded fo do the act simply because we chance fo
desire if e. When then we do a thing because if is right, the will
Met]ods of Ethlcs, 6th ed., pp. 34-5-
If was partly to avoid this implication that Kant refused to speak of a desire
to do one's duty, and partly because, as pointed out below, he erroneously
assumed that every desire was a desire for pleasure. He therefore spoke
of the ' interest' of Reason in the Moral Law or 'respect' for the Moral Law
as the subjective motive of right conduct. But in his eagerness fo assert
that Reason immediately moves the will, he bas at rimes the appearance of
ïorgetting {what Aristotle urges against Plato} that bare thought does hot
initiate action (oa a/ oiv «vd) : that moral choice (rpoalp«) involves
a desire (gp) for the end as well as the intellectual perception that an act
will promote the end. As von Hartmann purs it, ' Das Pflichtgefiihl ist selbst
eine Neigung' (Das sittl. Beunesstsein, p. 254 ). Moreover, this habit of speak-
ing as if Reason stepped in (so fo speak) and worked the human body without
Chap. v, § il IIORALITY A GOOD o 7
is autonomous: if is a ' ]aw to itself.' Though the man feels
commanded fo do the act whether he likes if or not, if is never-
theless the man himself--his own Reason, the highest part of his
nature--which issues the command or makes the law. Hence in
the highest sense he is most free when most completely the slave
of duty 1.
The two positions in which we have taken Sidgwick as
a peculiarly lucid exponent of Kant are in the Philosopher's
own writings associated with a third in which his utilitarian
disciple does not follow him. To Kan the performance of duty
is not merely 'righç'; itis the highest 'good' of the agent.
Here we have already round reason to believe that Kant is right,
and can only refer the sceptic to the testimony of his own con-
sciousness. If he denies that he finds in his own consciousness
the judgement 'goodness of conduct possesses a higher worth
than anything else in the world,' the only way to argue vith
him would be to try fo show that his own actions, or at least
his judgements of himself and other men, really imply that he
thinks so; hat his approval of himself when he does right and
disapproval when he does wrong are quine inexplicable upon the
assumption that bad conduct is merely conduct which is irrational
from the point of view of Society though wholly rational from
his own private point of view. For the man who believes it, the
judgement ' Morality is good and the greatest of goods' or ' the
good will is the most important element in the good' is as much
a simple and ultimate deliverance of the moral consciousness as
the judgement ' Itis right to promote the general good.'
the intervention of any subjective motive, involved him in mach unneces-
sarily mysterious language about the Autonomy of the Will. When Kant
said that the will is a 'law fo itself' he meant that in right action Reason
is a law to the will ; in fact, according fo Kant, the will is Reason, at least
when the will is rightly directed. Wrong acts, if would appear, can only be
said fo be willed, and so fo be free, according fo Kant, in so far as Reason
might bave intervened fo stop them and did hot. But the Psychology of
wrong action is one on which Kant is as vague as he is unsatisçctory.
1 No doubt in Kant's own view this use of the terre ' free' (in which it can
only be applied to right acts) implies also the opposite of ' determined' or
'necessitated' (see below, Book III, ch. iii, § i). The double sense in
which Kant used the term' free' is very clearly pointed out by Prof. Sidvick,
Methods of Ethics, Book I, ch. v and Appendix.
IO8 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
II
So far we may regard Kant as having laid down in the most
impressive way the principles which must form the basis of every
constructive ethical system 1. But in Kant's own view these
positions are associated with two other doctrines which require
further exanination. In the first place he assumed that out of
this bare idea of a categorical imperative, without any appeal to
experience, he could extract a moral criterion, i.e. that he could
ascertain what is the actual conent of the Moral Law, what in
detail if is right to do. Secondly, he assumed that, so far as an
act is hot determined by pure respect for the Moral Law, it
possesses no moral value whatever. Let us examine each of
these positions in turn.
The value of Kant's work consisted very largely in supplying
a metaphysical basis for Ethics. So long as itis assumed that
all our ordinary knowledge of matters of fact cornes from experi-
ence of an ' external world,' there is always a sort of suspicion
that any kind of knowledge which cannot point to such an origin
xnust be in some sense unsubstantial or delusive. The Critique
of Pure Reason demonstrates that in all our knowledge there is
an element which is not derived from experience : all knowledge
implies ' forms of perception' and' forms of understanding' which
are a priori, part of the constitution of the mind itself, not
supplied toit from without. The marrer of sensation is from
without, but sense by itself is not thought. I cannot judge of
the size and distance of particular objects without a marrer
supplied by sensible perception: but I could not build up these
data into the conception of a square table of a certain size unless
I had already notions of space, of spacial and causal relations, of
i Kant was no doubt wrong in supposing that all other systems but his own
were based upon 'heteronomy of the Will.' This is hOt true of Plato and
Aristotle (fo say nothing of other ancient writers) whom Kant's education
had hOt qualified him fo understand, nor of the Cambridge Platonists and
other English Rationalists of whom he appears to bave known little or
nothing. If was hOt true of them unless the doctrine of the categorical
imperative is distorted into the precept ' Do your duty without considering
whether what you are doing is good for any one or hot,' and in that sense the
idea of Autonomy is, as contended below, indefensible and absurd
Chap. v, § iii KANT'S MORAL CRITERION
substance and accident and the like which do not come from
experience 1. In all actual knowledge there must be a marrer
supplied by experience and a formal element which is a priori.
But in Moralty--n the idea of duty--we are presented with
a form which needs no filling up from experience, a form which is
(so fo speak) ifs own content, since if is a marrer of immedate con-
sciousness that this a p'iori concept of duty can supply a motive
fo the will. Now in this position a very important truth
is almost universally admitted by the most Kantian of modern
Moralsts) confused with a very serious error. That no experience
can prove an act fo be rght, that no accumulation of knowledge
as fo what is can possibly give us an o%qlt, is a truth which
only be denied by assertng that there is no meaning in dut:y or
in Moralty. Experence of the past may tell us what has been
or what will be: if cannot possibly tell us what ought fo be.
That which ought fo be is ex ri terre ini something which as yet
is hot and which may conceivably never be. In that sense our
moral judgements are undoubtedly a priori or independent of
experience. But that without any ppeal fo experience we
get af the content as well as the form of the moral law,
easily be shown fo be a pure delusion. Let us see how
moee the attempt.
The rules of action which the categorical imperative is sup-
posed to give us are the following :--
() ' So act as if the law of thine action were fo become by thy
will law universal.'
(OE) ' Regard humanity whether in thine own person or in that
of any one else always as an end and never as a means only.'
(3) ' Act as a member of a kingdom of ends .'
This is very indequte nd populr sttement, nor do I men fo assent
fo Knt's ide of form derived from the mind nd mtter derived from
some source outside the mind. I hve merely endevoured fo explin for
the benefit of ny one fo whom if is unfmiliar K.nt's use of the terres
' form' nd mtter' so far as is necessry for the comprehension of his
ethicl position.
Kant nowhere explains the relation in which the three rules re sup.
posed fo stand towards one nother, nor does he ever bring them into close
contact with one nother ; but in different parts of his ethicl writings ech
one of them is treted as the fundmentl principle of Morlity. In pructice
Io THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
Let us examine the first of these rules--' Act as if the law of
thy action were fo become by thy will law universal.' low it
is quite trie that if does follow from the very idea of there being
something which if is right fo do irrespectively of inclination
that this course toast, in the saine circumstances, be binding
upon every one else. And therefore in a sense if is true that no
action can be really a moral rule the principle of which could not
be universalized. If is good practical advice fo urge that when
we have fo pronounce upon the morality of a proposed acb we
should ask ourselves whether if represents a principle which
we should think if rational fo will as a universal rule of conduct.
But this is by itself a merely negative test. If gives us no
definite information until we have made up our minds as fo what
if is which makes conduct rational or irrational. We can, indeed,
with a little ingenuity extract from if the ail-important axioms
of Benevolence and Equity: for, if there is something which it is
intrinsically right fo do, what is right for me would be right for
any one else in the saine circumstances 1: hence if must be right
for me fo treat every other man as if would be right for him fo
treat me under similar circumstances. If my good is recognized
as something which if is intrinsically right for others fo promote,
the good of each other individual must also be treated as an end
the promotion of which I must look upon as incumbent upon me:
hence I ara bound fo" promote the greatest good of humanity
collectively (the maxim of rational Benevolence), and fo treat
each individual's good as of equal value with the good of évery
other (the maxim of Equity). But these rules by themselves
will give us no practical guidance till we know what that good
is which ought fo be promoted by every rational being for every
other.
The Kantian maxim, properly interpreted, thus occupies in
he uses one or the other of them just as may be most convenient for the pur-
pose of proving the particular duty with which he is dealing.
1 This principle seems fo me fo require some qualification (see below,
p. x5 note) ; and if is obvious that we have hOt really got this rule out of the
form, for without knowing what sort of being the ' other ' is, and what ' good'
he is capable of, we cannot say what that good is worth--unless, indeed, we
make if mean simply an individual's good must be of as mach value as the
like good of any other individual.
Chap. v, § iii IçADEQUACY OF KAçT'S RULE i
Ethics the saine position which the law of contradiction holds in
Logic 1. The law of contradiction is a negative test of truth : it
tells us that two judgements which contradict one another cannot
both be truc, but as fo which judgements in particular are truc, if
will give us no information : only, when I know that judgement A
is truc, if will tell me that judgement B, being inconsistent there-
with, cannot also be truc. In the saine way the Kantian rule
tells us that a genuine ultimate rule of conduct must not only be
logically consistent with itself, but also be such as that all ifs
prescriptions shall be consistent with all other ethical rules. The
supreme ethical precept must consist of an harmonious and self-
consistent system of precepts. If need hardly be said that this
by itself is a most important negative test of ethical truth. If
gives us the principle upon which alone inference or reasoning
(as distinct from immediate judgements of Reason) is possible in
Ethics. The fact that something is a part of the truc ethical
rule supplies, if we assume this principle to be self-evident,
a demonstrative proof that some precept inconsistent with if
cannot be a part of it2. But as to what rule of action in
particular is reasonable, if gives us no information whatever.
If we interpret the rule of acting on a principle fit for law
universal as equivalent fo Sidgwick's three ethical axioms--of
This interpretation of Kant is well insisted on by Sigwart (Loglc, E.T.,
il. p. 543 seq.). Sigwart would call the principlé"in question a postulate :
I should venture fo regard if as both a postulaçe and an axiom. If ought
hOt tobe denied by any one who is hOt prepared to question the validity of
all thinking. Mr. Brudley is so far consistent that he accuses thought as
well as Morality of infernal inconsistency. Some of his followers (in Ethics)
bave been less logical. Mr. Bradley is only following out his own principle
fo ifs logical conclusion when, in his frequent polemics against Casuistry,
he denies apparently the possibility of any inference whatever in the ethical
sphere (see below, Bk. III, ch. ri). If is enough for out present purpose fo
insist that the seff-evident axioms of Ethics and the inferences baed upon
them have as much validity as any other parts of our thinking.
If will be observed that I ara speaking of elements in the supreme
ethical rule, hot elements of the end. The end itself must hOt contain
intrinsically incompatible elements, but in paicular circumstances ele-
ments of the end are often incompatible: but the ethical rule says ' in
that case promote the good which is of most intrinsic value.' Even the good
may and obviously does contain elements which cannot all be enjoyed by
the saine person
112
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
Benevolence, Equity and Prudence--we shall get rules for the
promotion and distribution of the good or ultiInate end, but no
information as fo what particular things are good : and, until we
know that, we cannot get any principles from which we can
deduce the right course of conduct in any one single case. If
with Sidgwick (who could quote much in Kant himself to
support this interpretation) we ruade 'good' in this connexion
equiva]ent fo ' pleasure,' and interpretd our rule fo mean 'pro-
more universal pleasure and distribute if equally,' we should
obviously have gone beyond the mere a priori formal rule.
We should have appealed fo experience--an appeal which our
categorical imperative was intended by Kant fo exclude. The
judgement 'Happiness ought fo be promoted' is no doubt in
a sense a priori, but not in the sense that no information derived
from experience is necessary fo ifs being ruade. Kant himself
admits that the concept of happiness is of empirical origin 1
Experience must tell us what happiness is before we can judge
happiness fo be good. Still more obviously experience is waned
to tell us what particular goods constitute happiness, or what are
the means fo procure those goods. If might be thought that
Kant could get a content for the Moral Law by holding
that the true good of man is simply Morality, a concept which
might be said fo be of purely a priori origin, and that we should
find out what particular actions are right by considering wha
actions would promote universal Morality. But here again, if the
concept of the end is in a sense purely a priori, experience is
needed to tell us the means; and Kant has incapacitated himself
from adopting this solution of the problem by the exaggerated
Libertarianism which ruade him pronounce an action due fo
another's influence fo be not truly ' free,' and therefore without
moral value 2. Consequently, he pronounced that if was ira-
'All the elements which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether
empirical, i.e. they must be borrowed from experience' (Gundlegung zut
Met. d. Sitten, § 2, t»anslated by Abbot in Kant's Theo»y of Ethics, 4th ed.,
,seo, p. 3s).
Metaph. Anfangsg,'ïmde d. Tugendlehre, Einleitung, § iv seq. (Abbot, p. 296).
But this is qualified (hardly consistently) by the admission of a negative duty
towards the moral well-being of others, i.e. hot to create temptatàons (Abbot,
p. 3o4).
Chap. v, § ii] FITNESS FOR LAW UNIVERSAL x x 3
possible for one man fo mke another's moral good his end.
Hence if Virtue is by itself fo constitute the end, if must be
the man's own virtue tht he must treat as his end. To tell
a man fo make his own virtue an end will hOt tell him what
to do until he knows what acts if is virtuous fo perform, and as
fo this the formula that what is right for him is right for others
will give him no information whatever. How then did Kant
attempt fo extract out of the bare form of the Moral Lw
a knowledge of the pa%icular actions which are right or wrong?
If is impossible fo maintain that Kant gives a clear and con-
sistent meaning fo his own dictum. Sometimes the irrationality
of willing the universal adoption of the immoral course appears
to turn simply upon the fact that the social consequences fo
which the adoption of such a will would lead are consequences
which no rational man could regard as good. We cannot will
universal promise-breaking because in that case no promises
would be ruade, and t rimes the irrationality of willing such
a consequence seems fo turn upon ifs injurious social effects.
Still more clearly when Kant pronounces that we cannot
rationally will the non-development of our faculties, the irra-
tionality of such a course is ruade to depend simply upon the
fact that the rational man actually regards this non-development
as bad and their development as good . Here the appeal fo
! , A third' [the first two cases are suicide and breach of promise] 'finds
in himself a talent which with the help of somo culture might make him a
useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circum-
stances, and prefers fo indulge in pleasure rather than fo take pains in
enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however,
whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with
his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees
then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law
although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rust,
and resolve fo devote their lires merely fo idleness, amusement, and
propagation of their species--in a word, fo enjoyment; but he cannot
possibly will that thls should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted
in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily
wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have been
given him, for all sorts of possible purposes ' (Grundlegung, § 4 : Abbot, p. 4o).
I pass over the objections (i) that elsewhere the development of faculties is
hOt regarded by Kant as an ultimate good, the only ultimate goods being
Virtue and Happiness; (2) that Kant relies upon teleological assumptions
I4 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
consequences which can only be known by experience is scarcely
disguised : the a priori judgement relates simply to the goodness
or badness of the end. But Kant was able fo conceal from him-
self the necessity of this appeal fo experience, beoEuse in certain
carefully selected instances he was able fo point fo the appear-
ance of iternal contradiction in the reverse of the accepted
rule 1. We cannot rationally will that men shall break their
promises, beoEuse in that case no promises would be made; and
we cannot rationally will something fo be done which will make
if impossible fo observe the very rule which we will. In a society
in which there were no promises, if would no longer be possible
to observe our proposed rule of universal promise-breaking; if
no promises are ruade, none can be broken. /ow even here if is
evident that Kant falls back upon his experience of human
nature fo tell him wha will be the consequences of his act:
but still he might maintain that, given this much experience, the
contradiction is self-evident. Yet if is easy fo show that absence
of contradiction, in this sense, would be a very irrational test of
conduct. Kant himself appears fo concede that there would be
no infernal contradiction in willing that all men should leave
their faculties undeveloped. Nor would there be any internal
contradiction in adopting as out rule of action the promotion of
universal misery, or af least of the maximum of misery which
should be consistent with the continued survival of the human
race. That is, indeed, according fo some Pessimists, precisely the
end which is actually realized in the world as we know if.
And, just as we hold many acts fo be wrong which involve no
infernal contradiction, so there are many things which we pro-
nounce right in spire of such contradiction. Kant tells us that
we cannot rationally will universal promise-breaking, because the
universal adoption of such a rule would lead fo a state of things
in which the rule ' Break your promises' could no longer be
observed. We must hOt commit suicide, because if every
fo which he was not entitled : he had no right (from his point of view) to
assume tha out çculties were 'given' us for any reason whatever.
It is true that even in the selected cases the contr.diction is hot really
internal. Itis the actual structure of human society which makes the
suggested rule unworkable.
Chap. v, § iii TEST OF :NON-CONTRADICTION 5
one did so, there would soon be nobody left fo practise the
virtue of suicide. Then are we, if lnay be asked, fo deny that
Philanthropy is a duty because the universal practice of
a reasonable Philanthropy would lead fo a state of things in
which there would be no poor upon whom fo practise that virtue?
Shall we refuse fo bless the peacemaker, because if every one
shared his disposition, there would be no quarrels fo adjust ?
And then, again, how unreasonable is the alternative with which
we are presented--either fo will universal suicide and universal
lying, or fo forbid each of these practices in any circumstances
whatever! As reasonably might ve pronounce Kant's own
celibacy a crime because universal celibacy would rapidly
extinguish the human race and (consequently) the practice of
celibacy.
If is true that the emergence of an infernal contradiction (in
Kant's sense) in any suggested moral rule does show that we
have not reached an ultiate principle of conduct. We can,
indeed, put such rules as ' Give fo the poor' into a universal
form by lnaking them hypothetical : ' So long as there are any
poor, relieve them;' but so might we say,' So long as there are
any human beings alive, let them commit suicide.' Still, the
fact that the rule is only applicable fo a particular set of cir-
CUlnstances does show that we have not reached an ultimate
principle. The rule, ' Be charitably disposed,' may, indeed, be
universally willed: but then Kant's object in applying his test
of fitness for law universal is fo supply a guide for the details
of outward conduct, not for mere dispositions and intentions,
and this purpose is not served by such generalities as these.
And even in this case there is really a reference fo the physical
constitution of human beings which is known fo us only from
experience. We might interpret charity to mean 'a disposition
fo promote good,' but the absence of infernal contradiction will
not tell us what good is. lIoreover, as has already been pointed
out, although an ultimate moral principle must be free from
infernal contradiction, itis impossible fo deny that many ira-
moral principles lnight very well be universalized without leading
fo any such contradiction. The structure of the Univel-se and of
human nature is quite as consistent with the non-development
I2
ii6 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
as with the development of human faculties. And if the
criterion is not of universal application, how are we fo know
when fo apply if, and when not?
The fact is that Kant appears fo have confused two distinct
senses of the tenn 'categorical.' When he sers forth that if is
of the essence of every moral law fo be categorical, he means
that it must adroit of no exception due to the subjective dis-
inclination of the individual for the course of action which it
prescribes. We must hOt say, ' I admit Tempernce or Veracity
tobe right in a general way : only I personally happen to have
such a rooted antipathy to Temperance or Veracity, or whatever
it be, that I must regard myself as an exception fo the general
rule.' To talk in that way no doubt destroys the very nature of
a Moral Law. If is an essential characteristic of the loral
that whatever is right for me must be right for every man in
precisely the sme circumstnces 1. But when Kant tries to
make out this mere unconditionality of a rule an absolute test
of ifs reasonableness, he bas fo assume that the categorical
character of an imperative excludes the possibility of an ex-
ception based not on the mere subjective disinclination of the
individual, but on the nature of the case. He does not see
the rule ' Do this except in such and such circumstances' is just
as 'categorical' and just as little 'hypothetical' as the rule
' Do this under all circumstances whatever,' so long as the
exceptions are recognized as no less universa! in their applica-
tion, no less based upon the reason and nature of things,
the original rule. Kant in fact confuses the inclusion of
exception i a moral rule with the admission of an exception to
moral rule. He does not recognize that the difference between
rule with an exception and a grammatically categorical rule is
often a purely verbal one. The precept ' Do no murder' admits
of no exceptions,.because ' murder' means ' killing except in such
and such eircumstances.' The rule ' Thou shalt not kill'
exceptions. So. the rule ' Lie not' could be represented as equally
i Thatwe can onl hold this principle by including in the ' circumstances '
the man's own character and disposition. (other than an indisposition fo
perform what has once been proved fo be his duty), I bave contended below
in the chapter on ' Vocation' (vol. il, ch. iv).
Chap. v, § ii] QUESTION OF EXCEPTIONS 7
'categorical' if there were as clear a usage in favour of the
proposition that a legitimate untruth is no lie, as there is in
favour of the proposition that in certain circumstances killing
is no murder. We are obliged sometimes fo express a moral rule
in the form of a general command with an exception simply
because the enumeration of the circumstances fo which the rule
is inapplicable is shorter and more convenient than an exhaustive
enumeration of all the cases fo which if is applicable. And if
is clear that every rule, however general, implies some set of
circumstances in which alone it is capable of being applied.
The duty of not committing adultery is only applicable fo the
relations between two persons of whom one af least has a lawful
spouse, and if is obvious that this term ' lawful' postulates
a larger number of highly complicated social arrangements,
about which there is by no means a universal consensus, and
which the most enthusiastic Kantian could hardly attempt fo
determine on any a priori principle. Either, then, we must say
that every possible rule really involves a hypothesis under which
alone if is applicable; or we may say that every moral law
excludes all exception if only you put if into a sufficiently general,
and a sufficiently infernal, form. ' Kill not' bas exceptions:
' Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' (properly understood)
has none 1. But, in whichever way if is put, if is plain that we
can get no criterion of Morality out of the presence or absence
of exceptions. ' Kill not' has exceptions, and yet (subject fo the
exceptions) is accounted a good moral principle. On the other
hand,' Thou shalt love thy friend and hate thine enemy ' does not
appeal fo us as the highest morality, in spire of ifs being quite
as categorical as the Christian precept.
Kant's attempt fo extract an ethical criterion out of the bare
form of the Moral Law is the more remarkable, because he did not
hold (as he is sometimes supposed to do) that there is no other
rational end of action except the bare performance of duty.
' The Moral Law, we may ay has fo be expressed in the form, "Be this,"
hot in the form, "Do this." The possibility of expressing any rule in this
form may be reg.rded as deciding whether if can or cannot have a dis-
tinctively mor.l char.cter. Christianity gave prominence to the doctrine
that the true moral law says "hate hot," instead of "kill hot"' (Leslie
Stephen, Science of Ethics, I882, p. I55 ).
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
Had he held tht view, it would have become fairly impossible
for him even fo have persuaded himself that he had discovered
in the bare form of the law any content for the idea of duty 1
If a man is fo perform his duty, he must know what that duty
is; and the mere knowledge that, when he has discovered what
his duty is, if is a thing categorically commanded does not help
fo find out what if is. If is impossible, in short, fo show the
rationality of one course of action rather than another until we
have admitted that something else besides the performance of
duty--some objective good other than the state of the will--
is a rational end of action or possesses value . And Kant did
adroit that there is such another rational end of action--which
i Dr. Lipps (Die ethischen Grundfragen, 899, P. 58 seq.) has attempted fo
clear Kant of the imputation that his categorical imperutive bas no content
by suggesting that the content is supplied by all our naturM desires and in-
clintions : the moral law simply prescribes the way and extent fo which they
should be indulged. I believe that this is very largely the explanation of
Kunt's own view of the marrer, but if is open fo the objection that if allows
all actual tendencies of human nature ('aller mSglichen menschlichen
Zwecke ') fo be indulged in proportion fo their actual strength, except in so
far as their indulgence interferes with the indulgence of other such ten-
dencies in ourselves and in other individuals. If is obvious that we should
have fo appeal fo experience fo know what is the relative strength of these
tendencies; and, after all, if supplies us with a very unsatisfactory test of
their relative value. If only the tendency fo opium-smoking were sufficiently
strong in a whole community, the Kantian principle (as interpreted by
Dr. Lipps) would make universal opium-smoking a categoricul impemtive.
2 Lotze, the last man in the world fo sanction vulgur Hedonism has said :
' There is nothing af all in the world, which would have any vlue until if
has produced some pleasure in some being or other capable of enjoyment.
Everything antecedent fo this is naught but an indifferent kind of fact, fo
which a value of ifs own can be ascribed only in an anticipatory way, and
v¢ith reference fo some pleasure that is fo originate from if' (Practical
Philosophy, Eng. Truns. by Ladd, p. xg)- I believe this statement might
be defended, since (a) pleasure is an element in all ultimate good. (b) Lotze
has hot said that the vMue lies exclusively in the pleasure abstructed from
the other elements of consciousness, or that if is to be measured by the
amout of that pleasure. But his statement seems fo me liable fo mis-
understanding. On the other hand, if is surprising fo find Lotze admitting
that ' the effort fo hold fast pleasure, or fo regain if, and fo avoid pain, are
the only springs of all practical activity' (Microcosmus, E. T., i. p. 688), but
here again the taint of Hedonism is removed by a recognition of differences
in the quality of the pleasure.
Chap. v, § iii] DUTY FOR DUTY'S SAKE xx9
possesses worth, not indeed 'absolutely and unconditionally,' but
on one condition--that if does not interfere with Virtue. And
that other end is Happiness. From this position if would seem
logically fo follow that the truc criterion would be the tendency
of an action fo promote for all mankind Happiness in so far as
is compatible with Virtue. This would supply us with a quite
intelligible and workable view of the moral criterion, and it
would correspond roughly with the actual deliverances of the
moral consciousness. That if is an inadequate view of the
ultimate end of human life, i have already attempted fo show;
and ifs deficiencies will be further illustrated when we pass on
fo the other mistaken assumption, from which I am anxious fo
dissociate Kant's fundamental doctrine of a categorical im-
perative.
III
That duty should be donc for duty's sake we have seen fo be
really implied in the very notion of there being such a thing as
duty. But if does not follow that the desire fo do one's duty
must always be the sole and exclusive motive of right conduct,
or that conduct not consciously inspired by respect for the Moral
Lw as such must possess no moral value at all. Yet such was
the assumption of Kant himself. To Kant the most unselfish 1
devotion fo wife or child, the most ardent patriotism, the most
comprehensive philanthropy, possessed no more moral value than
the purest avarice or the most unmitigated selfishness. Unless
the man loves, or rather behaves as though he loved (since love,
he holds, cannot be commanded) wife, or country, or humanity
silnply from an actual, conscious respect for the Moral Law, his
conduct is worthless--not necessrily wrong (for if is noç a crime
to promote one's own happiness when duty does not forbid), but
entirely without moral value. The will that wills from pure
love of the brethren is morally on a level with the will that
wills from pure love of self. If is of no more value than the
1 I speak popularly: to Kant there could be no such thing as an
'unselfish' love of anything except duty, and even that could only be
' respected,' hot ' loved.' To Kant (in his stricter moments), as to Bentham,
Benevolence hot inspired by pure sense of duty was merely a love of
benevolent pleasure.
o THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
behaviour of an animal. Such is the revolting and inhuman
Stoicism fo which Kant's ideal logically leads. If is, as Schopen-
h.uer purs if, the ' apotheosis of lovelessness, the exact opposite,
as if is, of the Christian doctrine of lIorals 1., In well-known
lines the poet Schiller makes the disciple of Kant complain :
Gldly, I serve my friends, but ls I do if with plesure.
ttence I m plagued with the doubt tht I m hot a virtuous person-"
in reply fo which the answer given is :
Sure, your only resource is fo try to despise them entirely,
And then with aversion to do wht your duty enjoins you 2
lor can if be alleged that Kant has any desire fo conceal this
result. He holds ex professo that all desire is bad. ' The
clinations themselves being sources of want, are so far from
having an absolute worth for which they should be desired, that
on the contrary if must be the universal wish of every rational
being fo be wholly free from them .' We might ask in what,
according fo Kant, happiness is fo consist ? Happiness, as we
know if, arises entirely from the satisfaction of desires 4, and
happiness is admitted fo be a rational end of action ; how then
can the desires be consistently treated .s a mere encumbrance
which the rational man would fain be without ? But if is
enough fo point out the utter discrepancy between the Kantian
dogma and the strongest moral convictions of manknd. The
' common-sense' philosophyof Bishop Butler is here a far better
exponent of the moral consciousness. Insisting as strongly as
Kant upon the claires of Conscience, he yet recognizes that
Conscience does not prescribe ths total suppression of all other
'passions, propensions, or affections.' If rather pronounces that
some of the desires ought fo be encouraged, some suppressed,
others moderated or controlled, and all subordinated to Benevo-
lence and self-love--the two great rational impulses which
make for the good of ourselves and our fellow men . And in
I Ueber àie Grundlage der Moral, § 0 (The Basis of Morality, trans, by
A. B. Bullock, x9o3, p. 49)- tte goes on fo call if a piece of' stupid moral
pedantry' ( tactlosen moralischen _Pedantismus).
2 From Die _Philosophen. » Grundlegung, § 2 (Abbot, p. 45).
Including the desire of pleasure.
» I do hot mean fo accept this as a fully adequate account of the matter
Chap. v, § iii] THE MORAL MOTIVE ii
this teaching ]utler was only developing the principles of
Aristotle who (amid many retrogressions) advanced beyond
Plato just by his recognition of the fact that desire is as
essential an element of human nature as Reason; that the raw
material (so to speak) of the sublimest virtues and of the
coarsest vices is the same, that natural impulses are good or evil
just according as they are or are not controlled by the ideals
which Reason sets up 1. Granted fully that an act may be donc
from the bare sense of duty, from a desire which is created
solely by out conviction that a certain course is intrinsically
right or reasonable, this is not in most cases an adequate
analysis of a good man's motives. In most of his acts the good
man is doing something towards which he £as some inclination
apart from the consideration that it is his duty. He works for
wife and children because he loves them: he speaks the truth
because he feels an instinctive repulsion for a lie: he relieves
suffering because ' he cannot bear' to sec another man in pain.
It is rather in the selectionof the right one from among the
many impulses by which his will is from rime to rime solicited,
and in the reinforcement of it when it is absolutely or relatively
too weak, that the 'sense of duty' need corne into play . It is
only perhaps af rare crises in the moral life, when duty calls
for some great sacrifice or commands resistance fo some great
temptation, that the 'sense of duty' becomes the one all-
sufficient motive present to the consciousness. It is no doubt
eminently desirable that the sense of duty should be always
present in the background or, as the Psychologists have called
it, the ' fringe' of consciousness 3 ; that Reason should be (so to
speak) a consenting party fo all our actions, however strongly
prompted by natural impulses, and be ready to inhibit even the
noblest and most generous of them when it threatens fo oppose
unless the idêa of Benevolence and that of self-love have been understood
in a non-hedonistic sense.
1 Cf. below, p. i53 sg.
2 Dr. Martineau's Ethics have the merit of developing this idea: but he
exaggerates when he denies that the love of duty or desire ' to do what is
right and reasonable as such,' can ever be a ' spring of action' af all (Types
of Ethical TheotT, 3rd ed., ii. p. 279 sq.).
s 3f. James, lsychology, i. 258 sq., 47I s., &c.
i THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
itself fo duty's call. But, even when this is hot the case, even
when in a particular act or in the general tenour of a man's
lire conscious and deliberate respect for the Moral Law as such
cannot be said fo occupy this paramount and predominant
position, we do not in fact regard the act or the character of
such a man as entirely destitute of moral value. We may regard
his defective sense of duty as a moral defect or shortcoming,
but we do not regard him as on a level with the selfish
pleasure-seeker. If would be a violent perversion of psycho-
logical faet fo represent that every man who works hard and
resists temptations fo self-indulgence from love for his wife and
children, or from a zeal for his profession, is inspired by pure
respect for the abstract Moral Law; if would be a perversion of
moral faet (attested in the only way in which moral faet ean be
attested, by the evidence of eonseiousness) fo say that such
conduct is morally worthless 1. To do so would involve the
denial of moral value hot only fo much of the normally good
conduct of average civilized men, and fo all the more elementary
morality of children or savages (fo whom the idea of a Moral
Law or an abstraet 'duty' tan hardly be said fo have oeeurred),
but also fo some of the very noblest aets of generous but one-
sided and imperfect characters.
The source of Kant's ethical mistake must be sought in his
defective Psychology. He assumed, as completely as Hobbes or
Locke, that the motive of every action is pleasure except in one
case. Reason had, he thought, the power of arbitrarily inter-
posing, and acting directly upon the man's will, by laying upon
him a categorieal eommand fo do this or abstain from that:
but, exeept when and in so far as the man was influeneed by
pure respect for such injunctions, his will was always under the
influence of pleasure and pain. Apart from the power of inter-
position accorded fo this deus ex machina, the eategorical
If wou]d perhaps be consistent with Kantian principles fo say that the
aet possesses some moral value because there is some respect for the moral
law ; but this explanation does hot really express the facts. The man is
possibly hot thinking ofthe bIoral Law as such af ai1 (I bave exp]ained below
that he may nevertheless recognize that there is something intrinsically
good in his love for wife and children)» and yet we do recognize that the
disinterested affection by itself gives the act moral value.
Chap. v, § iii] KANT'S PSYCHOLOGY oE3
imperative, Kant was a psychological Hedonist. Moreover, he
assumed that an action determined by self-interest was com-
pletely 'natural,' that the motives of the calculating pleasure-
seeker were the same in kind as the mere animal impulses of the
savage or even the beast. He would probably have explained
the behaviour of animals as due fo the pursuit of pleasure. He
did not recognize the high degree of abstraction, the high intel-
lectual and moral development, which is implied in the deliberate
pursuit of so ideal an object as ' maximum pleasure' or' happi-
ness' in general. Regarding all desire as desire for pleasure,
and the desire of pleasure as merely 'natural,' he was obviously
unable fo recognize any difference in moral value between one
kind of desire and another. Benevolence and malevolence
were simply different forms of pleasure-seeking. From the point
of view which we have adopted we are able to recognize that the
value of the desire depends upon the nature of the objects desired.
We can pronounce, and as a marrer of fact the moral conscious-
ness does pronounce, that devotion fo the family or the tribe
is a higher and nobler motive of action than devotion to one's
own good, love of knowledge better than love of sensual indul-
gence, indignation against cruelty or injustice better than resent-
ment provoked by jealousy. We may, therefore, ascribe moral
value fo a man's acts in proportion as they are inspired by a
desire of objects which Reason pronounces intrinsicMly good,
although the man may not pursue them consciously because
Reason pronounces those objects fo be good--still less because
Reason pronounces the acts to be right apart from their tendency
to gratify a desire for the objects. In proportion as the moral
consciousness is developed, or at all events in proportion as the
man's intellectual development allows his morality to become
self-conscious and reflective, the intrinsic value of the objects which
he pursues is recognized with increasing distinctness and abstract-
ness; and this recognition brings with it reinforcement of the
higher impulse as against the competing desires which might
otherwise take its place. Some degree of this consciousness
of value is no doubt necessary to make it a motive which can
fairly be described as a higher desire at ail. The most ldimen-
tary family affection implies a certain consciousness (wholly
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATtVE [Book I
unanalysed no doubt) of the claires or rights or intrinsic worth
of other persons, and of the consequent superiority of such an
impulse fo mere sensual desire--a consciousness which is not
present in the maternal impulses of the lower animals, in which
naturalistic writers have seen realized their highest ideal of con-
duct. But even in highly developed moral natures, and in some
of the highest actions of such natures, if is often impossible
fo discover the conscious presence in any high degree of respect
for the abstract idea of duty or the Moral Law as such. The
philanthropist is carried away by an enthusiasm of humanity
which does not stop fo ask whether fo relieve suffering or fo fight
against oppression is or is not contained in the categorical
imperative of Reason. And such zeal for the things contained
in the law we certainly pronounce morally good, however little
conscious reference there may be fo the law which contains
them.
IV
And from this point of view the thought may occur fo us:
' if good conduct implies only desire for objects which Reason
can recognize as good, why do we need the "sense of duty "
or the categorical imperative af M1 ?' May we not say with
Aristotle that a man is not really good unless he hkes the things
that another may recognize as constituting his duty, or even go
beyond Aristotle (who did insist that in developed Morality there
should be a conscious recognition that the things desired were
good), and say ' It is nobler fo be so fired by the thought of
tyranny and injustice and suffering, so fo feel others' wrongs
as though they were one's own, that the question never arises af
all whether if is a duty fo fight against them, or even whether if
be Kabv fo do so ? Would if not show a positive defect in the
man's character if he should decline fo make a sacrifice which
the good of his family demanded till he had calmly reflected that
if was a dutiful or a beautiful thing for him fo do ? Is if not
better fo be socially useful because one loves one's neighbours as
oneself than fo regard them with indifference, and yet fo feed
or serve them only because if is one's duty ?'
We are here in the presence of something like an antinomy.
Chap. v, § iv] THE MORAL MOTIVE 2 5
On the one hand, if does seem nobler fo love the things contained
in the law than fo do good things unwillingly because we feel
bound fo obey the law as such. On the other hand, it seems
difficult fo admit that there can be any nobler motive than
devotion fo duty as such, or that there can be a perfect character,
or even perfect act, in the inspiration of which such devotion
has no place.
The solution of our difficulty seems fo lie in a consideration
which we have hitherto neglected. If is quite true that an
action may be good which is done from the love of some good
object. The poor man who shares his scanty dinner with a still
poorer friend has certainly done an ct possessing moral worth.
The scholar who' scouts delights, and lives laborious days' from
sheer love of Learning is not fo be trea.ted as on a level with the
mere sensualist because he is not habitually inspired by reflection
on the duty of research, or even because he may be seriously
wanting in devotion fo many kinds of social good. But love
of any particular good object is always liable fo interfere with
the promotion of some other, and, if may be, more important
good. Love of Learning is good, but the scholar in whom that
passion extinguishes all others may become selfish and inhuman,
if all social impulses are stifled in ifs pursuit. Nero's love of Art
was a redeeming feature in his character, but the fact (if if
be a fact) that he' fiddled while Rome was burning ' was rather an
aggravation than an extenuation of his callous indifference fo
human suffering. Enthusiasm for some particular cause is good,
if the cause be a righteous one; but the roof of all fanaticism
lies in a devotion fo some single good which extinguishes all
scruple or respect for rules no less essential fo human Well-being
than Temperance or the influence of the Church or even the con-
version of sinners. Unselfish affection or loyalty fo particular
persons or societies is good ; but the morality of the man who
surrenders himself fo if without restraint may degenerate into
mere honour among thieves. Family affection may steel the
heart against the claims of a wider humanity. Even a genuine
Patriotism may produce absolute blindness fo the plainest dic-
tares of Humanity or international Justice. And so on. Now
duty means, as we have seen, precisely devotion fo the various
5 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
kinds of good in proportion to their relative value and impor-
tance. 1o one then can be trusted af all rimes and in all
circumstances to attribute fo each good precisely ifs proper
degree of worth in whom there is not strong devotion fo that
supreme good in which all others are summed up. If is hOt
necessary that a man should make the sense of duty the sole
notive of all his conduct, provided if is always ready fo inhibit
an action the moment he sees any reason for believing that if is
contrary fo his duty. The conscientious man will not seek
actually fo substitute the sense of duty for other motives of con-
duct, because he will recognize that many of the commonplace
actions of lire are better performed from some other impulse,
and that the cultiv,tion of altruistic or ideal impulses is actually
a part of that ideal of human character which duty bids him
promote in himself as in others. He will eat his breakfast from
force of habit or because he is hungry; the sense of duty will
only be ready, in the background of consciousness, so to speak ,
fo stimulate him when appetite fails or fo inhibit him whcn some
call of duty demands the suspension or omission of that meal on
a particular morning. He will select things to eat and drink
because he likes them, provided that he is always ready fo
modify his choice when there is reason fo believe that what
he likes is unwholesome or too expensive. He will labour for
the good of his family because he cares about it as much or more
than he does for his own good, but the sense of duty will always
be ready fo remind hlm of the claims of the workmen or the
There is considerable ethical importance in the modern Psychologist's
recognition that we do hot think of one thing or ' idea ' af a rime, but that
while the centre of consciousness may be occupied by some ideu, there is
a ' fringe' of other ideas present with various degrees of clearness and dis-
tinctness (like the object lying on the outside of the fringe of vision e. g.
persons of whose presence we are conscious without actuully looking at
them sufficiently fo know who they are). An idea present in the ' fringe'
of consciousness can alwuys become the central object of the mental vision
when occasion arises for if. The good man will always bave the sense of duty
somewhere in the fringe of his consciousness. This view is hot inconsistent
with the doctrine strongly insisted on by manyPsychologists that we can only
«tted to one 'object' af a rime ; but af all events such an ' object' may in-
clude many ' ideas' (in James's sense) which may be the object of different
degrees and kinds of attention.
Chap. v, § iv] THE MORAL MOTIVE 7
customers whom his methods of business may prejudice. YIe
will throw himself into the work of a profession, because he
likes it, because he is ambitious of success, recognition, oppor-
tunities of more interesting or more important work and the
like; but he will be ready fo listen fo the faintest whisper
of a suspicion arising in his mind that the path of ambition and
the path of real social duty bave ben fo diverge. The Priest
will devote himself heart and soul fo the good of his parish
simply because he wants fo see his flock happier and better. He
will do his work all the more effectively the more completely
he identifies their well-being with his own, the more he takes
delight in his occupation; but the sense of duty will always
be ready fo press upon his attention the more disagreeable or the
more unpopular duty, fo suggest the claims of study fo the un-
studious, the claires of his poor fo the man whose heart is in
books, the claims of rest or reflection or devotion when absorp-
tion in work threatens fo dry up the foundations of thought
and of feeling. In proportion as a man's habitual desires or
' interests' are identified with some wider form or element of
human good, the danger of collisions between various forms
of good---the difference, so fo speak, between devotion fo a par-
ticular end and devotion fo the good in generalQmay tend fo
disappear. The sense of duty may be less needed as check or as
spur fo the man of ardent temperament, absorbed in self-denying
philanthropy, than if is fo the average man whose habitual
energies are divided by a remunerative profession and an
affectionate family. But if is unnecessary fo illustrate the
possibilities of moral aberration which attend upon devotion
fo every form of good less than the whole.
And where there is devotion fo the whole of human good,
fo the ' marrer' of the Moral Law, fo every kind of good object
in due proportion fo ifs intrinsic worth, need there then be any
thought of the ' form' af ail ? Is the idea of'duty for duty's
sake' part of the highest ideal of character or is if always a note
of imperfection . The question is not an easy one, for every
term that we use in speaking of such matters is a more or less
ambiguous one: but I would suggest the following outline
of an answer :--
i8 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
(x) Goodness in the narrower moral sensemthe right direction
of the willmis itself the greatest of goods, and must always
be paramount in the ideal man; but the ideal man will care
about many other things besides the right direction of his own
and other people's wills--knowledge, beauty, particular persons,
social intercourse, various pleasures in proportion fo their intrinsic
value. If is scarcely possible that he should aequire this habitual
right direction of the will without more or less consciously
thinking of if; but, in so far as he does corne fo love the things
prescribed by Reason, respect for duty s such will tend fo pass
into a sense of the relative value of the goods which he loves, and
fo lose that abstractness, and also that sense of constraint and
obligation, which are elements in the sense of duty as understood
by Kant and his followers. Af bottom the sense of duty is the
due appreciation of the proportionate objective value of ends.
In this sense alone is the ' feeling of obligation' an ultimate and
indispensable element of the moral consciousness 1
(2) Since the various ends the promotion of which constitutes
the content of the Moral Law are all resolvable into some state of
conscious beings, if may be said that an ideal love of mankind
would supersede all sense of duty as such, provided that this love
of persons be taken fo include a desire of vrious goods for them
in proportion fo their relative value, and in particular a pre-
dominant desire for their moral Well-being. In this sense if may
be said that 'perfect love casteth out fear'--even of the Moral
Law--and constitutes by itself, in the strictest possible sense,
' the fulfilment of the law.' Ai ifs highest the sense of duty
is identical with the rational love of persons (including in due
measure self-love), and the things which constitute their truc
good.
(3) For a mind which believes in the existence of a Person
whose will is absolutely directed towards the truc good, the love
of such a Person, the conscious direction of the will towards the
end which He wills, absorbs into itself the sense of duty. The
love of God is the love of duty with the added intensity both of
intellectual clearness and of emotional strength which rises from
1 , Une conscîence morale n'aboutit pas la tbrmule-" je dois faire ceci,
mais la formule : ceci est à faire' (R.uh, L'Expérience mole, 19. 32).
Chap. v, § v] SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM oE9
the conviction that an ideal is also already real. How far and
in what sense the belief in such a Person must be considered as
involved or implied in the idea of an objective Morality, is
a question which must be considered hereafter. Meanwhile
I notice merely as a psychological fact that in the religious
consciousness the idea of Duty may lose those aspects and
associations which often cause a revolt against the idea of
a categorical imperative.
Kant's categorical imperative has been justly (in some of
ifs aspects) ridiculed by Schopenhauer as a mere survival from
the Iowest form of the 'servile' theological Morality which
he professed fo have abandoned. ' Whether he calls his fetich
categorical imperative or Fitziputzli,' makes no difference .
It was the survival of the drill-sergeant Theology of eighteenth-
century Prussia with the drill-sergeant turned into an abstraction.
In depersonalizing his imperative and cutting if adrift from ifs
connexion with the real world as a whole, life as a whole, good
as a whole, he reduced if fo something arbitrary, abstract, almost
inhuman. Repersonalize if, regard if as the reflex in the human
soul of the Will which wills the supreme good of humanity, and
the categorical imperative loses all those features which tend fo
present if as an emotion incompatible with and inferior fo the
other impulses or emotions which may inspire men fo right con-
duct. To the Christian or the Theist with a worthy idea of
God the love of goodness is no longer distinguishable from the
love of the concrete good which forms the content of the divine
Will as of all good human wills.
V
How far the love of goodness, whether or not embodied in
a Person, can supersede in the actual conditions of human life
the sense of effort, of struggle, of sacrifice commonly associated
with the aspect of ]Iorality embodied in the term Duty, is
another question fo which we must return hereafter. If the
sense of duty be really the sense of the relative value of ends,
if is obvious that some sense of constraint or 'obligation' must
always be connected with the idea of duty, so long as any of
1 Grundlage der Moral, § 0 (E. T., 1 a. 5o).
RASHDALL I ]
3o THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
the ends which we rationally desire are incompatible with the
attinment of any other such ends which we either desire or
feel that we ought fo desire. Meanwhile, I may notice the close
connexion between the two great defects in the Kantian ethical
system which have been pointed out--the harsh ' dulism' of his
view of human good and his erroneous doctrine as fo the motives
of moral conduct. The ethical criterion fo which the Kantian
system logically points, and which Kant af moments seems on
the verge of deliberately adopting, is the tendency of actions to
promote a Well-being or «atto,a in which there are two
elements, () Virtue or the performance of duty, () Happiness
conceived of as mere pleasure. This view hs been criticized as
inadequate, and if might be possible fo enlarge upon the harsh
psychological dualism which if involves. If cuts human nature
into two halves which have no connexion with, or relation fo, or
influence on one another. Between these two elements in the
idel human lire there seems fo be nothing in common: nay,
there is af lenst the appearance of actual irreconcilability between
them. In so far as a man succeeds in finding happiness in his
work, his Virtue, if might seem, must surfer (' but Mas! with
plesure I do if ') ; in so far as he lives for duty, considered as
something opposed fo his inclinations, he will tend fo be unhappy
Happiness, according fo Kant, has value, but no moral vlue:
the work of Virtue on the other hand seems fo consist precisely
in ifs tendency fo thwrt those naturM impulses in the satisfaction
of which ordinary happiness consists. Now the moment if is
recognized that other desires exist besides the respect for the
Moral Law on the one hand and pleasure on the other, that
these desires may have very various degrees of moral vlue, that
Reason does not condemn or supersede but only regulates desire,
that pleasure is good or bad according fo the nature of the desire
from the gratification of which if springs,--both the inadequacy
and the dualism disppear. Virtue no longer seems fo consist in
thwarting all the other impulses of our nature: happiness is
no longer destitute of moral value when if arises from the
stisfaction in due degree of M1 the desires which possess an
intrinsic worth of their own, a value which may often be superior
1 NO doubt Kant often repudiates this deduction from his princîples.
Chap. v, § vil USE tIUMANITY AS AN END I3
fo the value which they possess as mere sources of pleasure. The
conditions of human life may prevent the actal atainment of this ideal reconciliaton, but tere is no necessary or invariable
antgonism beteen te to ends ; they tend fo pass into a single,
intrnally harmonious and self-consistent ideal of lire.
VI
If may be desirable fo add a word about the second of the
three moral criteria put forward by Kantwthe rule 'Use
humanity whether in thine own person or in that of any other
always as an end, never as a means only.' If is the principle
less frequently insisted on in Kant's own writings, and ifs
relation fo the other is hot very precisely determined. He uses
if chiefly fo prove the immorality of suicide and of sexual
transgression. There can be no question of the deep moral
significance of the principle, but if is too vague fo be really
of any use as a moral criterion without knowledge of a kind
which cannot be extracted out of the formula itself. We mus
know what is the true end of human life before we can tell
whether a certain course of conduct does or does hot involve
treating humanity only as a means. Now Kant (as we bave
seen) only recognizes two ends in human life--one primary, i.e.
Morality, the other secondary, i. e. happiness. On Kant's view
of Free-wi]l if is impossible fo make another man immoral or less
moral. Hence if wou]d seem that he has no right fo condemn
conduct towards another for any other reason than ifs interference
with his other end---happiness. And this is clearly hOt always
done by the kind of conduct which he has in mind. Nor, even
if this consideration be waived, can he show that the conduct
which he condemns involves using the body of another, or one's
own, as a means, any more than much conduct which no one
could describe as immoral. I ara using a porter's body as a
means when I employ him fo carry trunks for me, and there
is nothing immoral in my doing so. I ara not using him onIy as
a means, if I pay him for his work and treat him as a moral
being no less entitled fo a share in all the true goods of lire than
myself. Kant never said anything so absurd (though he is
constantly cited as doing so) as that we should never use
K 2
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
humanity as a means, but only that we should never use iV as
means withouV using iV also as an end, and iV is impossible
from some conception of a concreVe end or good of human lire) Vo
show VhaV sexual immoraliVy mighV noV be equally compVible
wiVh like recogniVion of oVhers' claires. We should only have
Vo insisV on jusV and considerate VreaVmenV of Vhose who hve
been called Vhe 'priesVesses of humaniVy 1., The one kind of
exchange of services is, on Kanffs premisses, exacVly on level
wiVh the oVher. KanV's real feeling was no doubV that the
conducV in question was inconsisVenV wiVh a Vrue ideal of the
relations beVween man and wolnn, but iV was impossible for
hhn Vo prove VhaV inconsistency so long as he lmrrowed his
conception of Vhe ideal human lire down Vo Vhe performance of
social duVy on Vhe one hand and Vhe indiscriminaVe enjoymenV
of pleasure on Vhe oVher. IV is noV Vhe treaVing of hunmniVy
as a means VhaV sVrikes us as wrong (for VhaV mighV quiVe well
be compatible wiVh recognizing iV also as an end), but
VreaVing of humniVy as a means in this pa'ticula" vay, as
a means tre such and such a kind of sensual pleasure, Vo such and
such an end in which Reason can find no value. IV is only
because we have judged already VhV such VreaVmenV is a degrad&-
tion of humaniVy VhaV we pronounce iV Vo be using humaniVy
' only as a means.'
Once again, we see Vhe impossibiliVy of reducing moral
judgemenVs Vo a merely inVellecVual, non-moral principle; of
geVVing a criVe6on out of mere formal conceptions, which tke
no accounV of Vhe conVenV or inVended consequences on which
depends all Vhe moraliVy or Vhe immoraliVy of our actions. Mere
universaliVy or freedom of contradiction is no VesV of goodness or
badness. The judgemenV of value cannoV be reduced Vo
oVher sort of judgement---a judgemenV of formal consistency or
a judgemenV as Vo Vhe relation beVween ends and means,
which Vakes no accounb of Vhe ch&racVer of those ends. IV
' Kant has specially in mind the case of certain other kinds of sexual vice,
nd there his contention would be still more hopeless, if we assume that
happiness (: pleasure) is the only end except duty considered simply as
the promotion of pleasure for others (Tugendlehre, Th. I. § 7, Semple's
Translation, 3rd ed., 1871 , p. 240 ).
Chp. v, § vii] THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 133
is only in estimating the value of an end that the moral Reason
really cornes into play. Abstract the form of the law from the
matter of it, and there is nothing left on which a judgement of
value can be passe& A rule of action is not nmral because if is
consistent, unless if consistently conduces fo an end in which
Reason can recognize value; neither is the making of humanity
a means immoral unless the end fo which if is a means be one
which Reason refuses fo recognize as part of the true end for
man. The non-recognition of this principle involved Kant in
the absurdity of gravely questioning whether if was lawful fo
cut one's hair, and of solemnly pronouncing the conduct of
a woman who cuts off ber hair fo sell it--irrespectively of the
motives for which she wants money--not 'altogether devoid of
blame 17 Such a verdict will probably fail fo commend itself fo
readers of Mr. Marion Crawford's touching 'Cigarette-maker's
Romance.'
vII
If has generally been recognized that the best expression
of Kant's fundamental ethical principle is fo be found in his
third rule--' Act as a member of a kingdom of ends': that is fo
say ' Act in such a way as fo treat thyself and every other
human being as of equal intrinsic value ; behave as a member of
a society in which each regards the good of each other as of
equal value with its own, and is so treated by the rest,' in which
each is both end and means, in which each realizes his own good
in promoting that of others. That such an ideal of human
Society must, as far as if goes, be approved by the moral con-
sciousness, follows from what bas been already said: but,
considered as a guide fo the details of conduct, if suffers from
the saine fatal ambiguity as the preceding formulae. There
is no sufiicient definition or explanation of this good of others
which we are fo promote. We have still got nothing but a' form'
without any content. If we fill up the deficiency from other parts
of Kant's system, and interpret ech man's end as 'goodness +
happiness,' that (as has been explained) gives us an intelligible,
but a rough and inadequate, criterion of MorMity: and on that
1 Tugenàlehre, Th. I. § 6 (Semple, p. 239 sq.).
i34 THE CATEGORICAL IM1)ERATI VE [Book I
interpretation, which in many passages would appear fo be
Kant's own 1, we must cast fo the winds the whole of his
elaborate attempt fo get af the details of conduct without
appeal fo experience or calculation of consequences, and fo ex-
hibit that good will as actuated by the mere form of a universal
law without any regard fo the content or marrer of if.
In truth there run through the whole of Kant's ethical teach-
ing two inconsistent and irreconcilable lines of thought--one
of which is the basis (though only the basis) of all sound
ethical theory; while the other has proved the fruitful parent
of every extravagance, superstition, and absurdity by which
the scientific study of Ethics has been, and still is, impeded.
Every formula of Kant's may be interpreted, and af rimes
appears fo be interpreted by himself, in ech of these opposite
ways. 'Duty is a categorical imperative.' That may mean
' there is a right course of action which is intrinsically right
and reasonable for every man whether he likes if or hot,' and
that is simply an analysis of what duty means fo any one fo
whom if means anything af all. Or if may mean ' there are
certain cts which we recognize as being right fo do without
thinking of the ends (social or otherwise) which they will tend
to realize,' than which no better definition could be given of
the irrational in conduct. 'Duty for duty's sake' may mean
that'we should pursue the good or intrinsically valuable end
just because if is good,' or if may mean that we should act
without reference fo an end af all. 'Act on a principle fit
for law universal' may mean' Pursue the ends which Reason
1 , The realization of the summum bonum in the world is the necessary
object of a will determinable by the lIoral Law' (Ix'iti]c d. loraktischen
Vernunft, Dialektik, Pt. II, § 4, P. 252, and Abbot, p. 218). ' Now inasmuch
as virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the summum
bonum in a person, and the distribution of happiness in exact proportion fo
morality . . . constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world ; hence
this summum bonum expresses the whole the perfect good' (Dialektik,
Pt. II, Abbot, p. 2o5). Of course in so far as Kant did not recognize that
the goodwill means the will that wills the promotion and just distribution
of happiness, he was still liable fo the criticism that he has provided
no means of determining what will is moral: but on the whole if would
seem that in such passages as the above he meant fo define virtue as the
villing of acts tending fo promote happiness and the just distribution of if.
Chap. v, § viii] GOOD AND RIGHT 35
pronounces to be intrinsically valuable for others no less than
for thyself,' or it may mean ' Make the avoidance of internal
inconsistency the criterion of thy conduct.' ' Treat humanity as
an end and never merely as means' lnay mean ' Regard the true
Well-being of every man as possessing an intrinsic worth,' or
it lnay mean 'Regard it as beneath thy dignity tobe of use
to the society in vhich thou livest, and indulge in phantmstic
scruples about things which do no real harm to thyself or
anybody else.' The ' kingdom of ends' represents simply a coin-
bination of the two last maxilns, and is liable to the saine charge
of ambiguity ; though of all the formulae elnployed by Kant it
is the one vhich lends itself most readily to the more rational
interpretation.
VIII
One more way of expressing our criticism upon the Kantian
system shall be attempted, because it will supply a convenient
opportunity of giving a definite answer fo an ethical question
of fundamentM ilnportance--the question which is the logically
prior conception, the idea of ' good' or the idea of ' right.' Kant
never thoroughly ruade up his mind about this question. He
always started with the idea of 'right'; and all his difilculties
arose from the attempt to give a meaning to, and fo find
a content for, this idea of 'right' without appealing to the
idea of 'good.' In our view the idea of 'good' or ' value' is
logically the primary conception, though psycholocally the
idea of ' right' may often in modern men be the more early
developed. That action is right which tends to bring about the
good. There is no attempt here to get rid of the ultinmte
unanalysable 'ought.' The good is that which 'ought' tobe
Such a statement is in no wuy inconsistent with the doctrine which
I fully accept, that the word ' good' is indefinable : we can only bring out
the real meaning of the idea by the use of words which equully imply
notion. ' Good,' ' Ought ' (when applied to ends), ' Value," the End' I regard
as synonymous terms. Mr. Moore, in his recent Principia Ethica, hus done
we]l to emphasize in u very striking manner that 'good is indefinable i ; but
when he goes on to suy (p. 7) ' and yet, so far us I know, there is only one
ethical writer, Prof. Hem:y Sidgwick, who bas clearly recognized and stated
this fact,' I cannot admit the historicul uccuracy of his statement. To say
36 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
The difference between the two terms is this: that the terre
' right' is applicable only to voluntary actions ; the terre ' good'
is applicable to many things besides acts. Entirely apal from
the question,' who caused such things ?' I judge that pain or
discordant music or ugly pictures (i. e. of course the endurin,"
of pain by conscious beings, the listening fo discords or the
contemplation of bad pictures by conscious beings) are bad
things. They seem fo lne bd whether they arise from chance
or necessity or voluntary ,ction. Only because I have so judged
is there any ground for the judgement ' it is right, in so far as
if is possible fo get rid of thesc things'; but, whether they can
le got rid of or hot, they are e«lually bad 1. The will that
nothing of writers who (like Mr. Moore and myself learned the doctrine
lurgely from Sidgwick, I should contend that if was taught with sufficient
distinctness by Plato (whatever may be thought of his further attempt fo
show thut only the good has retl existence), Aristotle, and , host of modern
writers who h,ve studied lu their school--by no one more emphatically than
by Cudworth. The only criticism which I should lnake upon Mr. Moore's
exposition of if is that he ignores the other ways in which the saine notion
luay be expressed, md in paicular the correlative notion of 'right' or
' ought.' He is so possessed with this iden that the ' good' is indefinable thnt
he will hot even trouble fo expound ,nd illustmte if in such ways as are
possible in the case of ultimate ideas.
The non-recognition of this principle (so fnlly admitted, as we have
seen, by Lotze) is fo my mind the len.ding defect in the Bishop of Clogher's in
many respects admirable Short Study o.fEt]Hcs (2nd ed., IgOI ). Bishop d'Arcy
fully appreciates the defects of Kant's ' formalism,' and of the attempt to
pronounce acts right or wrong without regard fo consequencês known to us
from experience : yet we find him asseoEing ' the end, or good, of man is »an
doig, the concretion of man and the world. This concrete n.ctivity is the
only thing which can be called good in itself' (pp. t68-9) , and 'the only
true good is tobe good in the sense of performing the good act' (p. 277 ).
Such statements seem fo me to imply a reveion fo Kant's attempt to say
th,t to cause toothache is wrong without having fit decided whether tooth-
ache (however caused) is or is hot u bad thing. And if goes beyond Kant in
pronouncing that nothing but n. moral ,ct is good af all. Wundt seems to
me equally open to criticism, when he talks about happiness as being ' hOt
an end in itself, but a by-product of mor,l effort' (Ethics, Eng. Tmns., iii.
p. 9o), or about an ' objectively Wolhless sure of individual hppinesses '
(ib., p. 83). If is curious that so modern and 'scientific' a lIomlist as
Wundt should be n.lmost the only living thinker of high eminence who out-
kants Kant in his view of the exclusive value of a moral end, which, how-
ever, is to him hot so much the perfection of individual wills as a vague and
impersonal ' progress of humanity.'
Chap. v, § viii] THE IDEA OF VALUE 37
deliberately causes or refuses to fighç againsç such things may
be, and I believe is, a worse evil than the pain or the bad music
or the ugly pictures. But unless these things were evils, the
will that refused fo remove them would not be evil either; its
acts would not be acts of a wrongly directed will. Kant generally
ends by coning round fo this viev--that the right or rational act
is the act which wills tlm good. Unfortunately he did hot see
that with that admission his attempt to avoid the appeal fo
experience completely breaks down. Itis possible, though it
is iTational, to vill particular acts without attending fo the
consequences which experiênce shows likely fo rêsult from
them; itis impossible to pmnounce that something is good
until one knovs wlmt itis. No experience will tell us what
is good unless we include in our idea of 'expêrience' an un-
avowed judgement of value; but without experience of vhat
a thing is if is impossible fo sy whether it is good or not. If
is obvious that this necessity of experience for sound ethical
judgements goes a long way fo explain the actual divergences
of moral codes. When the Caliph Omar (if the story be not
a myth) ordered the Alexandrian library fo be burned, if is
probable that he knev very imperfectly vhat the Alexandrian
library or any other library really was. I do hot deny that
there might be fanatics who knowing a good deal about the
contents of these books would still bave ordered them to be
burnt; but if is probable that a more extensive acquaintance
with their contents would have moElified the Caliph's judgement.
The consistent Kantian, i.e. a disciple of Kant in his most
logical but leeust rational movelnents, ought fo be able fo say
whether they should be burned vithout knowing what sort of
books they were or even that they were books af all.
Our moral judgements are ultimately judgements of Value.
The fundamentl idea in Morality is çhe idea of Value, in which
the idea of ' ought' is implicitly contained. The advantage in-
volved in the use of the terre ' value' lies in ifs freedom from
* Strictly no doubt there must be some feature in the act known fo us fo
account for out choosing if, but the motive might be the simple desire to act
without further reflect,_'on-the 'pure cussedness' from which, indeed, if is
so hard fo distinguish the motive of the ideal Kantian. when Kant.ism is
understood on ifs irrational side.
138
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [Book I
many of the exaggerations and mystifications which have some-
rimes created a prejudice against the terre 'ought,' even in
minds which have no prejudice against the reality which if
signifies. The idea of 'good' and the idea of 'right' are, as
it seems to me, correlative terres. Itis implied in the idea of
'good' that it ought tobe promoted; the idea of 'right' is
meaningless apart from a 'good' which right actions tend fo
promote. If, finally, we ask what is the relation of the idea
of value to the ide of' moral ' value, I should answer that all
that has value has moral value, in the sense that if must be moral,
in due proportion fo the amount of that value, to eromote if ; but
hy moral value we generally mean the particular kind of vlue
which we assign to a good character. That value is, as I believe,
the greatest, of all values. Pleasure is a good, and if is right fo»"
a man to promote if in himself as in others. We assign value
to the pleasure, but we do not assign any particular value to
the acts or to the characters from which it springs, since this
promotion of private pleasure does hot necessarily indicate
a good character, and even the promotion of the highest ends
may have no moral value when the promotion of such ends
forms no part of the man's motive; only when we recognize
a man's conduct as exhibiting the preference of the good because
if is the good or the preference of some higher fo some ]ower
goeel for its own ske do ve assign to if the peculiar kind and
degree of value which we usually terre moral value
I have in this chapter for the most part avoided all criticism of sides of
the Kantian Ethics which could hot be discussed without reference to the
defects of the metaphysical system with which they are so closely con-
nected. Even Kant's purely ethical position I have only examined so fitr as
seenled desirable as a means of helping forward my own argument.
CHAPTER VI
REASOb[ AND FEELING
I
IN the preceding chapters I have ssumed tht Kant is right
in making Morality fo be essentially rational, in holding tht
moral approval is a judgement of the Intellect, hOt a feeling
or an emotion. This position seems now fo require some further
justification thon if has yet received, and this justifioEtion may
perhaps best tke the form of a reply fo the objections which
re commonly ruade fo if. The reily will be one which my
be thought fo involve considerable qualifications of the creed
known as ethical Rtionalism as represented by such men as
Clarke in the seventeenth century nd by Knt nd other
modern Idelists.
The most obvious form which objections re likely fo take
will be something of this kind: Does hOt common opinion
recognize that Morality is an affir, hOt of the head, but of the
heart ? Are not our moral perceptions attended with a glow
and warmth of feeling which is entirely bsent from our
perception (say) of a mathematical truth 1 ? Are hOt good
men very often stupid and boe men often intellectuel ? If we
admit that there is n intellectual element in what is commonly
clled Conscience, must we not af least say with Bishop Butler
that Conscience is neither merely ' sentiment of the under-
standing' nor 'a perception of the heurt,' but 'partakes of the
nature of both 3, ?
a Cf. the passage quoted ïrom lartineau, Tyles of Ethical Theoy, below,
lo. I65.
2 Dissertation of Virfue. This chunge from the more rutionlistic position
of the Serinons was perhps due fo the influence of Hutcheson. He now
uoe. he terre ' moral senoe' as a Nnonym for Conscience.
I4o REASON AND FEELING [Book I
The common objections seem fo imply several misconceptions--
misconceptions, however, for which the exaggerations of Kant
and other ethical Rationalists are, it must be admitted, largely
responsible. In the first place, when if is held that moral
judgements are given by Reason, we do not imply that their
rationality is the sole reason for the acts being done. Un-
doubtedly itis possible to see that an act is right with absolute
clearness and not fo do it---nay, fo feel practically little or
no disposition to do if. Even when an act is done out of
pure 'respect' for a recognized duty, there must at least be
present a ' desire for what is right and reasonable as such'
(fo use Professor Sidgwick's phrase) or the duty will not be
done. And we have seen reasoa to hold that Kant was wrong
in insisting that this rational desire is or ought to be the sole
motive which impels us to the performance of good actions.
It has been admitted that normally the ends prescribed by
the Practical Reason are objects of desire for their own sake,
that actions direced towards such ends may possess moral
value even when the thought of an abstract law does not
enter into the agent's consciousness ai all; and that even
the best actions of the best men are commonly influenced
by other desires besides bare respect for duty. lgow when
Conscience presents itself as partly an ' emotion of the heart,'
the term is probably used to include not merely the perception
of what is right but also the impulses which cause what is
right to be done--to include at least the'resiect' or love for
the good and ierhaps also the whole of those benevolent or
oher higher affections and emotions which are aiproved by
the moral Reason as motives to action 1; while the question
ai issue between ethical Rationalists and their opponents is
simply the question 'by what faculty or part of our nature
do we discover that an act ought fo be done ?'
It may further be admitted that the judgements of Practical
1 , The single act of conscience may be a feeling, an emotion, an impulse
or a judgment' (Wundt, Ethics, Eng. Trans., vol. iii, p. 6o). Wundt is
surely wrong in making Conscience or avSraç mean originally a ' knowing
with God,' instead of an ' inner' or ' self-knowledge.' The word, iL is signifi-
cant fo observe, is first found in the generation immediutely after Aristotle--
a period of great progress both in ethical feeling and ethical theory.
Chap. ri, § il THE MORAL FACULTY 4
Reason normally create a more or less powerful impulse towards
the performance of what they enjoin; and, in those who are
powerfully influenced by such judgements, they are undoubtedly
accompanied by an emotion of a kind which is wholly absent
from mere mathematical judgements. Still, iç is possible fo
disçinguish between the judgement thaç the acç is righç and
the emotions by which çhaç judgemenç is accompanied. Iç
will perhaps be conçended çhaç in some persons who would
commonly be described as very good men emotion of one
kind or another is so obviously the main inspirer of çheir
conduct that if is difficulç fo detect any intellectual judgemenç
aç all. And if may be admitted çhat as a marrer of psychological
fact çhe process by which many people corne fo aççach the idea
of rightness fo particular kinds of conduct is almost entirely
an emotional one.- but sçill I should contend that, in so far
as çhe idea of goodness or rghçness forms the objecç of thaç
emotion, the intellectual judgemenç musç necessarily be there.
This liability fo be influenced or even wholly deçermined by
emoçional causes is no peculiariçy of ethical judgemens. All
sorts of psychological causes may be aç work in inducing a man
fo accepç a parçicular çheory as fo the causes of the French
Revoluçion; buç the mosç prejudiced and passionate view of
the marrer and the most calm and scientific would be alike
impossible fo a man whose consciousness did not contain
the intellectual concept or category of Causaliçy. lobody
would ever dream of describing such a hisçorical judgemenç as
içself a mere emotion. Jusç in the saine way, emoçion may inspire
paricular judgements of righç and wrong, but iç could noç
create the idea of 'righç' or of 'good.' Even in those cases
where the actual motive is mosç clearly emotional, some per-
ception of the goodness of çhe acç may be said fo ençer into
çhe exciçing cause of the emotion, or çhe emotion may be said
fo be accompanied by a judgemenç of ifs own value. A man
may devote himself enthusiastically fo some philanthropic object,
from a passion excied by the abstrac idea of Justice, or he may
be moved by a pure love of humanity which is neverheless
accompanied by the judgemenç thaç iL is good ço feel such a love.
In some cases one, in oçhers çhe other may seem ço be çhe more
4 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
appropriate mode of statement, but the two kinds of judgement---
the judgement which ascribes value fo the emotion and the
judgement which ascribes value fo an object and by so doing
excites the emotion which leads fo aetion--run into one another.
All that is necessary fo contend for at present is that judge-
ment and emotion are logically distinguishable, and that the
judgement of value does more than merely record the fact of
the emotion being felt.
II
When the popular unwillingness fo recognize the rational
charater of our moral perceptions assumes the form of a philo-
sophical theory, if tends fo pass either into the theory of a
' moral sense' or into the theory of a moral 'faulty called
Conscience' which is represented as wholly sui generis--distinct
alike from intellectual judgement and from any kind of feeling
or emotion. Let us briefly examine each of these views.
In the writings of John Locke the Rationalism of Cumberland
and the Cambridge Platonists had degenerated into mere theo-
logical Utilitarianism. Locke continued fo use the old language
about Morality being rational; but in him that language had
corne fo men almost the opposite of what if was originally
intended fo mean. The appeal fo Reason was intended as an
answer fo Hobbes, and now Reason was used in a sense in
which Hobbes himself would have had no objection fo base
Morality upon if. By Reason was no longer meant a faculty
which originates the idea of something intrinsically good in
itself, and which pronounces what things are intrinsically
good, but merely the faulty which connects ends and means .
1 Exception may be taken in some quarters fo the use of the word
'faculty' af all in this connexion. The word bas fallen into disfavour
partly because by a certain school if bas been used fo suggest the idea of
a definite number of mental activities sharply distinguishable from and
independent of each other--planted, as Plato would bave said, as it were
' in a wooden horse,' fo the ignoring of the unity of self-consciousness, and
partly because the invention of a specific faculty bas often taken the place
of logical or psychological aalysis of complicated mental processes. I hope
I have sufficiently guarded myself against these mistakes. But fo prescribe
altogether the use of the word ' faculty' is to 11 into the very superstition
which the denouncers of if have in view. Whatever we do, there must be
Chap. ri, § iii THE IIORAL SEbSE THEORY I43
To Locke Virtue was rational because if could be demonstrated
tha without i a man will inf«fllibly go o l=Iell, l=Ience in
men like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson we find a recoil from
a way of thinking which seemed fo make lIorality a mere
marrer of selfish calculation. If was though that Morality
would be all the safer if if were removed altogether from the
jurisdiction of he intellect, and placed under the control of
' he hearb.' Moreover, these men shared, or a least had in-
completely shaken off, he metaphysical presuppositions of the
Master against whose Ethcs they had revolted. Experience,
by whch was practically meant sensation, was regarded as the
sole source of knowledge. If, therefore, Morality was fo be shown
fo be something real, if must, if seemed, be revealed fo us by
some klnd of feeling or sensation. Yet o base Morality upon
he deliverances of the ordinary sensibility, upon the pleasures
and pains of the bodily senses, mean of course Hedonism
pure and simple. To avoid this consequence they invented
a special sense which was fo be the source of our moral know-
ledge, just as sigh is he source of out colour-perceptions and
hearing of our sound-perceptions. Moraliy was ruade o rest
(like all out knowledge) upon a kind of feeling; only if was
a specific feeling. Moral approbation was a feeling wholly
sui ge.ne'is, arsing from the contemplation of good acts; dis-
approbation a feeling similarly arising from the contemplation
of bad acts. Hot o insis on the complete wan of analogy
beween the bodily senses and this organless sense of MorMity,
all such schemes are open fo one insuperable objection. If
moral approbation is a mere feeling, how can if claire any
superiority over other feelings ? Granted that if gives me a
pleasan feeling fo do a kind action, and that if causes me
a particular kind of discomfor fo tell a lie, tha may be
very good reason under normal circumstances for my doing
the one and avoiding the other. But supposing I do not happen
fo be sensitive fo this particular kind of feeling, or sup.posing
I m so constituted that a violation of some social conventionality
a faclllty or capacity (,) of doing if. In asking what is the moral
faculty, I mean only to ask by which of the distinguishable activities of the
single self-conscious self our ideas of right and wr0ng are fo be referred.
144 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
shocks me more than a moral offence , why should I aççach
any paramount importance fo this particular feeling of moral
disapprobaçion ? I may have certain capacity for the pleasures
of whist, but I do no feel bound fo play iç if I like reading
a novel better. If we grant that immorality does normally
cause me mental or emotional distress and discomfort of a
particular kind; still under particular circumsances Moraliy
may cause me more pain and discomfort of another kind. I
may dislike the pains of Conscience much, but I may dislike
the thumbscrew more. Why ara I bound, if threatened with
torture for refusing to revel a secre which I ara bound to keep,
or falsely fo accuse n innocen mn, to prefer the pie,usures
of an easy conscience fo those of a whole skin and easy nerves ?
To insisç on the specific characçer of the feeling in question
is noçhing fo the point; çhe pleasures of whist-playing are
different from those of touch or faste, bu they are noç necessurily
superior to them. The tste of port is specifically different from
that of sherry, but if is not necessarily superior fo iç. If i
be said ' Oh ! buç you are inwardly conscious tha these pleasures
are superior in kind, and not merely in qualiçy, to those of sense,
tha they ougt, t to be attended ço more than others,' is noç
that really admitting that we have fo do wih something
more than a mere feeling, with a dictate of Reason or a judge-
ment of value ? If is not the feeling which claires obedience,
buç the judgement which assigns a value fo that feeling.
h[oreover, not only does a Moral Sense theory rail fo supply
any reason why the individual should accord fo hîs own moral
perceptions 8 primacy among the feelings and emotions of which
his naçure is OEpable, bug iç is totlly unable fo assign any
1 , The hOt taking into consideration this uthority, which is implied
in the idea of reflex of approbation or disapprobation, seems a material
deficiency or omission in Lord Shaffesbury's InoEuir!! concerning Virtue.
tte has shewn beyond all contradiction that vioEue is nturally the interest
or hppiness, and vice the misery of such a creature as man, placed in
the ciroumstances which we re in this world. But suppose there are
particulr exceptions ; a case which the author was unwilling fo put .... Or
suppose a cuse which he has put nd determined, that of a sceptick hOt
convinced of this happy tendency of virtue or being of a contrary opinion.
His determination is, that if would be without remedy' (Butler, Pref. fo
Fifteen Serwns).
Chap. vi, § iii OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL JUDGEMElqT 145
universal validity fo such moral perceptions. Inconsistent or
contradictory feelings, qua feelings, are equally true and valid
for those who feel them. When the colour-blind man calls the
red light green or grey, if really is green or grey to him;
judgement is as true as that of the man who pronounces if red.
Feelings as feelings are hot ' true' or ' false' af ail; while as
fo the judgements based upon them, the judgement of A that
he sees red and of B that he sees green, these no doubt possess
objective validity, but such statements as fo what two men
actually feel are perfectly compatible with one another. Now,
if a good act means simply an actwhich causes me fo ex[erience
a particular kind of feeling which I call moral approbation, if
is undeniable that such feelings are occasioned in different men
by different, and even oçposite, kinds of conduct. The pious
fraud may occasion no less pleasure fo the man brought up fo
regard such acts as right than a sacrifice ruade in the cause
of truth will cause in the heart of another differently educated.
A Spanish bull-fight excites feelings of enthusiastic approval
in the minds of most Spaniards and feelings of lively dis-
approval in most Englishmen. Observe exactly where the
difficulty lies. It is hot the practical difficulty of ascertaining
moral truth. Every ethical system has fo adroit that the
Conscience of the individual is hot infallible, that men's ethical
judgements do as a marrer of fact contradict one another, ttow-
ever strongly I feel that a certain course of conduct is right,
I may make a mistake, just as I may make a mistake about
a scientific or historical theory fo which I may be no less
passionately attached. The objectivity of the moral judge-
ment does hot mean the infallibility of the individual, or even
of a geneçal consensus of individuals af a particular rime and
place. What is meant is that if I ara vight in my approbation
of this conduct, then, if you disalirove of if, you must be wrong.
If Morality be a marrer of objective truth or falsity, then the
Moral Law remains unaffected, though you and I--nay, the
whole human race in ifs present stage of moral development--
may have erroneously conceived some of its provisions. But,
if the goodness of an act means simply that the act
occasions a specific emotion in particular men, then the same
46 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
act may be atone and the saine rime good and bad. Moral
feelings will have no more objective truth or validity than any
other feelings which vary in their nature or intensity with the
varying sensibility of different men's skins or sensory nerves.
The bull-fight will be neither right nor wrong, but simply right
to some people, wrong to others, just as mustard is neither
objectively nice nor objectively nasty, but simply nice to some
people, nasty fo others 1.
If may perhaps be replied, ' These feelings are hOt what make
things right or wrong; they are merely the subjective index by
which we recognize the presence of an actual qualîty in the
world of objective fact.' This is no doubt what was really
meant by the doctrine of Moral Sense in the hands of con-
structive Moralists like Hutcheson. A full reply to the objection
would involve a discussion of the metaphysical system which it
presupposes. No doubt if knowledge of any kind could be
explained by mere feeling, Morality so explained would af least
possess as much objectivity as the rest of our knowledge.
Moral Sense theories are no more fatal fo Morality thau
Sensationalism is fo Science. I can only point out here that,
just as all knowledge implies something more than feeling, so,
if Morality is to possess any universal truth or validity, moral
perceptions must be regarded as judgements. The specific moral
feeling can be at most merely the occasion or index by which we
are enabled to make the judgement, it cannot be ifs sole source ;
just as I cannot actually make the judgement that this triangle
is larger than that withou sensible experience, though there
is more in the judgement than mere sense. The essential idea
of 'good' cannot corne from feeling, though feeling may some-
rimes be psychologically the cause or occasion of my pro-
nouncing this or that particular act fo be right or good.
III
If has been the practice of ethical Rationalists to compare the
moral faculty with the faculty by which we immediately appre-
1 If may indeed be contended that there is an aesthetic, and therefore an
objective, element even in gastronomic matters. If so, we must substitute
some pleasu»e of a still more purely sensuous type.
Chap. ri, § iii] THE MATHEMATICAL AIALOGY
hend mathematical axioms or the laws of thought. I have myself
contended that if is possible fo discover moral axioms, the truth
of which appeals fo us very much in the sme way as the truth
of the axioms 'If equals be added fo equals, the wholes are equal'
or' Two straight lines cannot enclose a space.' Such ethical axioms
are the three great laws of Prudence, ltional Benevolence, and
Equity, which Professor Sidgwick regards as the ultimate basis
of Ethics. And I have fully admitted the validity and importance
of these axioms. But this comparison of moral fo mathematical
axioms may be overdone. If may be insisted on in a way which
ignores some of the characteristic features of our ethical judge-
ments, and ifs palpable failure fo represent the facts may lead
to a reaction against the whole idea of rational Morality.
Rationalistic Moralists have not always observed that in them-
selves there is nothing ethical about these axioms of Prudence,
Benevolence, and Equity except the bare formal notion or
category of ' the good' which they involve. The axiom of
Equity, 'one man's good is of as much intrinsic worth as
the like good of another ,' may, indeed, be reduced fo the form
of a merely analytical judgement. That which I recognize as
having value in one man I must recognize as having the same
value in another, provided if is really the same thing that is
implied in the assertion that if has value. And the two other
axioms--those of Benevolence and Prudence--simply assert that
more good is always more valuable than less good. They are
not merely comparable fo the axioms of Mathematics ; they are
simply particular applications of those axioms. The judgement
that the value of the good of all is greffer than of any one
man's may be treated as a mere case of the mathematical axiom
that the whole is greater than ifs part, But so far there is
nothing really ethical about the judgement except in so far as
if involves the ethical proposition that value or good is one
of the things which have quantity. Yet, after all, such a way
of representing the marrer is really superficial ;
conception of value that the whole meaning of
lies. And that conception of value cannot be
1 This qualification of the axiom (hot recognized by
Bentham or Sidgwick) I shall expl,in and defend in Chal0.
for if is in the
the judgement
analysed away
Utilit, arians like
viii of this Book.
48 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
into the mere statement of an emotional fact. Considered as
a mere statement of psychological fact, no assertion could well
be more false than that my feeling towards one man, the
emotion which I experience in knowing that he is benefited
or that he is injured, is the same as that which I should
experience in the case of any other. The ethical Rationalists
are, if appears to me, quite right in treating these judgements
as genuine axioms which are to some extent analogous to the
axioms of mathematics; but such axioms are by themselves
quite incapable of solving any concrete ethical problem. The
really ethical element in them is contained simply in the con-
ception of ' value' or 'good,' and we cannot use them till we
bave pronounced some concrete thing or experience tobe good.
They resemble the axioms of Mathematics just because they are
purely formal. All that they can dois to direct us as to the
way we are to distribute ' the good' when we know what it
is. The really ethical judgement lies in the pronouncement that
this or that is good. And, when we corne to the judgement
which pronounces that this or that is good or has value, the
judgement assumes a form which seems psychologically nluch
less like the mathematical, and much more like the aesthetic,
judgement--a form consequently in which it can with much
more plausibility be compared fo a mere emotion or even a mere
sensation. I can give no reason why I judge this pleasure tobe
higher than that--the pleasure of Shakespeare to the pleasure
of champagne--except that I see if fo be so, just as I can give
no reason why I know this tobe beautiful or that fo be square,
except that I see that they are so. We naturally express our
judgement by saying' I feel if tobe so,' rather than' I know
it tobe so.' And that is one reason why they have so often
been supposed tobe mere feelings. Very often probably this
immediacy is all that is meant by those who insist on treat-
ing them as feelings of a supposed ' Moral Sense.' But only
a Sensationalist can suppose that the expression ' I feel that
A is B' represents a mere feeling. ' I feel' is here merely a
loose popular synonym for' I judge.' Propositions cannot be
felt.
Another fact which has favoured the theory is the impossibility
Chap. vi, § iii] THE AESTHETIC ANALOG¥ 49
of expressing our real and concrete ethical judgements, as
distinct from the merely formal and abstract axioms just con-
sidered, with the scientific accuracy and definiteness characteristic
of other self-evident truths. Although the judgement 'pleasure
is good but not so good as Virtue' is an immediate judgement,
and so far resembles a mathematical axiom, it is one which does
not admit of being expressed with the saine precision as mathe-
matical judgements. And still more when we corne fo particular
applications of our idea of value, when we ask what is the
relative value of this as compared with that pleasure, or what
is the comparative importance for an individual or a nation of
a definite kind of artistic sensibility and of social feeling, we do
not find that consensus among all who barely understand the
meaning of the terres employed which can be claimed for the
xioms of mathematics. And the essence of the really ethical
judgement lies not in general axioms of the type suggested above
but in the concrete judgement' this particular pleasure or this
kind of knowledge is good or valuable,' ' that kind of pleasure is
bad'; here the immediacy seems to be much more like the
immediacy of the aesthetic appreciation, or even that of a mere
judgement of perception, ' this is green.' All these characteristics
of the ethical judgement tend fo win acceptance for the Moral
Sense theory of moral apprehension.
How far the analogy between aesthetic judgements and ethical
can be admitted, must depend upon the view which we take of
the aesthetic judgement itself. The Moral Sense writers have
usually assu,ned that aesthetic approval is merely a particular
kind of subjective feeling. The judgement ' this picture is
beautiful' means to them merely ' I get from the contemplation
of this picture a particular kind of pleasant feeling.' And, if
that were the case, the relegation of the moral judgement fo the
same category as aesthetic appreciation would be fatal fo that
authority or universality which we divine fo be of ifs essence. On
the other hand we may be prepared fo deny that the judgement
of one man on matters of Art or Poetry is as good as another, as
would undeniably be the case if the aesthetic judgement were
notlfing but a marrer of feeling. We may maintain that there
is a right and wrong in matters of aesthetic appreciation as well
5 o REASOIç AND FEELIIçG [Book I
as in matters of conduct. We may claire for the aesthetic
judgement a certain objectivity, and consequently a partly
rational character. But Aesthetics is a much more difficult
Science than Ethics. The objectivity of aesthetic appreciation is
much more difficult fo defend, the relation between the rational
or intellectual and the merely sensuous or emotional elements in
if much more difficult fo determine, than is the case with the
moral judgement. At all events, the theory of an absolute
standard of aesthetic value could not be defended without a more
elaborate treatment of the whole subject than would be here in
place. Consequently, I dispense myself from any further attempt
fo define the relations between aesthetic and moral value, and
will only point out that the analogy between aesthetic perception
and moral may be admitted without giving up the position that
there is an element in the moral judgement which cannot be
reduced fo mere subjective feeling or emotion and which must
be regarded as belonging fo the rational or intellectual part of
our nature.
And when once the rational and objective character of the
aesthetic judgement is admitted, we may with great advantage
insist upon this rather than .upon the mathematical analogy,
because the comparison avoids a suggestion which is apt fo
cleave fo the mathematical analogy--the suggestion that these
judgements of value can be ruade prior fo and independent of
experience . The judgement' this viev is beautiful' no doubt
(in so far as if claires that the man who does not think so makes
a mistake) asserts something which is hOt given in experience,
but no one contends that if can be ruade without looking at the
view, or even without the experience of other views and pictures
by which the man's aesthetic sensibility has been cultivated.
Even the ordinary judgement of perception (' this is a square
object ') involves, for those who have learnt the lesson of Kant's
Critique, much besides mere sensation--the forms of space and
1 If is of course admitted by Kant that even the mathematical axioms in
point of rime are hOt prior fo experience ; his contention is that, when once
there bas been experience of space or number in geneml, their truth is
seen independently of any particular fact or facts of experience--that the
«niversal truth of the principle is implied or presupposed in each particular
judgement about space or number.
Chap. vi, § iv] lqEED OF EXPERIENCE
rime, the categories of substance and accident, quantity, &c.
And so the judgement ' this act of charity is good' involves
no doubt experience, for we cannot pronounce that it is good
without knowing what it is, an admission which was, as we
have seen, never explicitly ruade by Kant himself. But it
remains true () that the judgement of value is an immediate
judgement of the Practlcal Reason, not a mere feeling; () that
the essence of the judgement--the idea of value--is a distinct
intellectual concept or category; and (3) that the moral judge-
ment possesses a universality or objectivity which cannot be
ascribed to mere sensations or to the judgements of perception
founded upon them 1, So much is involved in the very idea
of Morality or duty or moral obligation. The very heart of our
moral conviction is that there is something which every rational
being, in so far as he is rational, must recognize as intrinsically
right, that that something must be the saine for all persons
under the saine conditions, and cannot be dependent upon the
subjective caprice of particular persons. The Moral Sense
theory, duly realized and thought out, necessarily involves the
admission that that conviction on our part is a delusion. There
is, therefore, no real analogy between an ethical 'perception' (if
the word is to be allowed) and the sensations, perceptions,
or emotions with which they are compared by the Moral Sense
school. So far then ethical Rationalism is right, when once we
have got rid of Kant's attempt to make out that the ethical
judgement is not merely not derived from experience but does
not require as its condition knowledge derived from experience
IV
But there are further elements of truth in the Moral Sense
position to which we have not yet done justice.
Of course there is an objectivity even in the judgement of perception.
My toothache as a feeling is pu.rely subjective in the sense that I alone
feel if. But my judgement ' I bave a toothache' claims objectivity. I mean
that the man who denies is in error.
- 2 By experience is here meant of course experience in the sense of the
Empiricists--mere sensible experience. There is no objection fo saylng
that moral judgements are derived from experience if we include in the
term 'experience' the whole of out intellectual as well as out other
psychical activities.
J5 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
In the first I)lace we must emphasize what is already imi)lied
in the admission that exi)erience is necessary fo the ethical
judgement. This admission imi)lies that the ethical judgement
is invariably based ui)on some fact of feeling; since experience,
though it includes more than feeling, does always involve feeling.
The ethical judgement pronounces that something has value, and
we do not on reitection I)ronounce that anything can have value
excei)t some state of consciousness. I do not, indeed, believe
that feeling rei)resents the only element in, or asi)ect of, con-
sciousness which has value; but feeling is always an element in
every state of consciousness, and an inseparable element. And
no judgement can be I)ronounced as fo whether a state of con-
sciousness is good without taking the feeling-aspect of if into
account. Feeling is therefore always part of the ground on
which an ethical judgement is based. This represents the true
element in Hedonism. The mistake of Hedonism lies in trying
fo abstract the feeling side of consciousness from its other sides,
and making the whole value of the consciousness fo lie in that
feeling-aspect, the cognitive and conative elements being deliber-
ately I)ut out of sight; while the value of feeling is supposed to
reside in the mere abstract pleasantness in resi)ect of which all
pleasures are qualitatively alike, and not in the total content
which is pleasant. We have already accepted the I)osition that
knowledge and goodness are intrinsically valuable elements of
consciousness. Yet these things taken apart from feeling are as
much abstractions as feeling when taken ai)art from knowledge
and volition. And it is impossible to say what value we should
assign to the latter, if they were capable of actually existing
apart from the feeling by which they are necessarily and inevit-
ably accompanied. I can, indeed, intelligibly say that knowledge
and goodness, even when accompanied by bodily I)ain, are good ;
but, even when the I)ursuit of knowledge or the doing of a good
action brings with if a measure of pain, some measure of pleasant
feeling norlnally accompanies those intellectual or volitional
states. When I say that the state is on the whole painful,
I mean that its pleasantness simply as pleasantness is outweighed
by I)ains of another kind, and yet I may think that it possesses
more value than many states which on the whole are pleasant.
Chap. vi,§ iv] PLEASURE IN ALL GOOD
We may, indeed, ttach value fo knowledge even for a con-
sciousness which does not find pleasure in its possession; but,
if so, we must do so either for ifs uses or effects or propret spem,
as a step to an enjoyment of which the man is capable but to
which he has not yet attained. In a consciousness which was
for ever incapable of feeling the smallest pleasure or interest in
what it knew, if would be difficult fo say that knowledge could
be an end-in-itself. Indeed, the very idea of an ' end' implies
the existence of beings with tendencies, desires, or impulses for
which some kind of satisfaction can be found in that end. This
satisfaction is not the saine thlng as pleasure, but there can be
no satisfaction without some (however low a degree) of pleasure.
' The good' is an intellectual category, but it is a category which
would be.meaningless in a purely knowing consciousness. Hence
it may be doubted whether we could rationally attch any value
even to the good will in a consciousness which not only did not
derive, but was intrinsically and for ever incapable of deriving,
any pleasure or satisfaction from its goodness. We may, indeed,
recognize that the good will has a value, and ought consequently
to be cultivated, in those who, as a mtter of present fact, do not
care about goodness and derive no pleasure from it. But then
we should sy that they ought fo care about if. In so far as it
is possible for a man to do his duty without liking the dutiful
action taken by itself (apart from the pains incidentally involved
in it), we should say that that was because he is not good
enough. The value of goodness does not mean merely
pleasurableness fo the agent af this or that moment; but still
I can as little conceive if psychologiclly possible for a man to
say 'My whole will is completely devoted to and concentrated
upon the good, but it gives me not the smallest pleasure or
stisfction fo be good' as I could attch any meaning o the
statement ' I recognize indeed the exquisite beauty of that land-
scape, but, as far as my own pleasure goes, I would just as soon
gaze at a blank wall'; though I can quite intelligibly say ' This
picture gives me more pleasure than that other which I acknow-
ledge to be more beautiful.' Beauty is more than pleasure, but
it is unintelligible without it. Value is not a feeling, but it
cannot be recognized as attributable to anything in consciousness
54 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
which can excite no feeling of pleasure in ifs possessor. The
fallacy of Hedonism lies in the attempt fo estimate the value of
the feeling element in abstraction from the other elements of
consciousness. Knowing, feeling, willing are, for us af least, the
three inseparable aspects of consciousness. It is upon conscious-
ness taken as a whole that we pronounce our ultimate judge-
ments of value; the nature of ifs knowledge and ifs will must
necessarily colour and determine the value of the feeling by
which in any consciousness they are accompanied.
Invariably, then, moral judgements imply facts of feeling as
part of their ground--that is fo say either feelings actually
experienced or desires which imply feeling in the present as well
as feeling in their subsequent satisfaction . Those feelings need
not be the feelings of the person making the judgement, and in
many cases there is nothing specifically moral about them.
I judge that if is wrong for me or any one else fo stick
pins in.o a human being, simply because if hurts. If I did
not know that it hurts, if I did not know what pain is, I could
not judge if fo be a bad thing, or the aet of causing if wrong.
Given that knowledge, I can pronounce the act wrong, quite
apart from any sympathetic or other feeling which the act may
excite in myself. But sometimes we can recognize a far less
superficial truth in the Moral Sense position than this. The
actual ground of my judgement may be simply an emotion ; and,
although an emotion fo which I assign value must be fo some
extent pleasant, I may assign it a value which is not measured
by its pleasantness. I may approve of an act not merely on
account of the pleasure or pain which if causes, but also on
account of the emotion which it excites, the emotion from which
if proceeds, or the emotion by which if is accompanied. I may
approve of maternal affection not merely on account of the
benefit arising fo the babe and fo society, but for ifs own sake;
and that emotion, though if is a source of pleasure, is assuredly
one which also causes much pain. Yet the value which we
ascribe fo it is certainly not smallest in those cases in which the
pain is greatest. Still more closely do we approach fo a recogni-
1 What we usually call a desire I take fo be a state of feeling and a certain
state of will or conation combined.
Chap. vi, § iv] MORAL EMOTION 155
tion of the specific emotion which the Moral Sense theory
wishes fo make the beginning and end of the ethical judgement
when we take into consideration the feelings which the mere
contemplation of some acts excites iii a well-regulated mind,
whether the mind be the agent's or that of some' disinterested
spectator '--say for instance the disgust which is experienced af
an isolated act of otherwise practically harmless drunkenness,
out feeling about acts of impurity. If is in cases of this sort
that we can least of all ignore the fact that not merely ordinary
feelings of pleasure but certain specific kinds of higher emotion
do form part of the ground on which our moral judgements are
based. They are part of what the moral judgement pronounces
fo have value. And they are judgements which could hot really
be pronounced by a consciousness which could hot experience
those emotions, which knew only on the one hand the data
supplied by the senses and on the other hand the abstract axioms
of the Practical Reason.
But this recognition of the absolute indispensability of certain
specific emotions (in many cases) fo out moral judgement does
not in the least invalidate what has already been said as fo the
intellectual, rational, objective character of the judgement of
value. The judgement that a certain emotion has value is
a different thing from the mere emotion itself . Without the
1 , For, if we once suppose the general physical basis of animal lire to be
seriously altered, if is impossible to say to what extent the types of senti-
ment and action which, under present conditions, approve themselves as
life-preserving and beneficial to the individuel and the species would be
still in place' (Taylor, The Pt'oblem of Conduct, p. 41). Prof.Tylor's insistence
that the details of duty would be different in different surroundings is quite
justified, but he seems to me to think that this proves more than if does-
that if altogether upsets any claire for objective validity or a ' rational'
charucter in our moral judgements. But (I) it is true that I may recognize
tht the ferocity of the tiger is as life-preselwing and beneficiul fo ifs species
as the charity ofthe Saint ; yet I need hot pronounce that if bas the saine in-
trinsic value : and (2) though the judgements as to -ight and wrong for human
nature would be different if our physical constitution were altered, that does
hot show that every rational intelligence, in proportion as if is rational,
would hot pronounce the saine course of conduct fo be right for man as he
is. And this is what we mean by treating the moraljudgement as objective.
' Notre vrai guide n'est ni l'instinct, ni une pensée transcendante, c'est
la réflexion sur l'instinct' (Rauh, L'Exlérience motvde, p. 96).
356 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
a p'ivïi and purely intellectual idea of value we could never
pass from the judgement ' I feel such and such an emotion' fo
' if is right for me and others fo do the act which excites in me
this emotion'; though the judgement could equally little be pro-
nounced by a person incapable of experiencing the emotion, or at
least of understanding and respecting ifs existence in others
through the analogy of something more or less similar in his
own experience. It is not the existence of the feeling but our
judgement that that feeling is good that enables us fo say that
the act whîch excites if is right or wrong. If is not merely
because if is a feeling excited by conduct that if can claire any
pre-eminence over other feelings. If that were so, if would have
no validity except for the pe-sons naturally disposed fo feel it.
But our judgement that certain conduct is wrong does hOt dis-
appear because as a marrer of fact we may know that if excites
no such feeling of disgust or repulsion in the person guilty of it.
There are doubtless individuals who really do feel no disgust
whatever at isolated or even habitual acts of drunkenness (though
they are probably fewer than those who merely pretend fo feel
none): but we do hot say that on that account drunkenness is
right for such men. On the contrary we say that, if a man bas
hot got such feelings, so much the worse for him: they are feel-
ings which he ought to have. He falls short of the ideal of
luanhood if he has them hot 1. There are other cases where
natural feelings of disgust at particular kinds of conduct are
pronounced on reflection to have no value whatever--e.g, the
young medical student's sensations on first entering a dissecting
room. We pronounce that such feelings should simply be got
over as quickly as possible. The ultimate truth then which the
Moral Sense school distorts is that in SOlne cases a state of feel-
ing is judged to have an absolute value, which, though more or
less pleasant, is hot measured merely by its pleasantness, and
that such states of feeling form in and for themselves, entirely
Chap. ri, § iv] REASON AND EMOTION 57
apart from any further consequences, an element in that ideal
good which we recognize if as our duty fo promote. I shall
hereafter give other illustrations of this class of moral judge-
ments 1, but meanwhile I should observe three things about the
feelings or emotional states of the kind which I mean:
(I) Although we can give no reason why the feeling, say of
human affection, should be better than a feeling of satisfaction in
eating except that we j udge if to be so, the feelings fo which we
give this kind of preference are not arbitrarily and capriciously
selected. They are intimately connected with our whole con-
ception of the proper relation of man fo man--our whole
conception of what human life and human society should be.
The judgement cannot therefore be reduced t any sort of
isolated perception involving no exercise of the percipient's
intellect, and no reference or relation fo other judgements or
ideas. It is impossible to dissociate our condemnation of illicit
sexual intercourse from our conception of monogamy as the true
type of sexual relation, our approval of which is based upon
a great deal besides spontaneous emotions of approval or repug-
nance. The conception depends upon nothing less than our whole
ideal of what constitutes a desirable state of human society and
of the individual human soul. We judge that the state of feeling
most conducive fo the maintenance of the approved type possesses
an intrinsic value. We cannot in the ordinary orthodox-utili-
tarian fashion p'ove irregular sexual relations t be wrong because
they tend fo prevent marriage and the growth of population ; for
it depends upon many circumstances whether they have that
eflct, and whether or not that effect is in itself to be regretted.
Our condemnation of fornication, in spire of the diminution of
pleasure which ifs prohibition undoubtedly involves, is not a de-
duction from a judgement about marriage resting on Utilitarian
grounds, but simply one side or aspect of that ideal of life which
prescribes both the monogamous marriage and the rule of
purity before marriage. That ideal condemns sexual indulgence
except where it can be made instrumental and subordinate fo
higher and more spirtual affections. When certain states of
feeling appear to be selected for approval or condemnation by
1 See Chap. vil
5 8 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
a kind of instinct which can give no further account of itself,
these are, in so far as they persist after the fullest reflection, not
merely isolated feelings of approval or disapprobation such as
the deliverances of the Moral Sense are sometimes supposed to
be, but feelings which are elements in a single, interconnected,
articulated ideal of human lire. And ideals are recognized as
such by the intellect, however much (in some cases) the existence
of certain feelings or emotions may be the condition of such
a recognition. So again when I condemn drunkenness, my
judgement implies a whole conception of human life--that man
is a rational being, adapted for certain ends, responsible for his
actions, possessed of a certain worh or dignity, having such and
such relations to his fellows, capable of certain intellectual and
moral activities, activities which are interfered with and impeded
by drunkenness. This whole ideal of what man is and ought fo
be is implied in my judgement that if is intrinsically degrading
and unworthy of a rational being voluntarily fo place himself in
a state in which he is not master of his own actions, however
elaborate the precautions which he may take against doing harm
to himself and others when in that condition. The feeling of
repugnance to the act is inseparable from a whole complex
of judgements about human lire and ifs purposes which are
very different from isolated emotions, So again with such an
obviously unutilitarian precept as that which condemns canni-
balism. Clear]y if the victim is not killed on purpose fo be
eaten, cannibalism under certain circumstances night present
itself as an eminenly sanitary and economical arrangement.
If we judge that man ought to endure considerable priva-
tion--some would perhaps say even extreme privation--
rather than eat human flesh, if is because we feel that this
external reverence a human corpse is an expression of a
reverence for humanity which possesses a higher value than
the momentary relief from hunger. It is impossible o isolate
our condemnation of cannibalism from our whole ideal of the
proper relation of man fo his fellow men. The psychologically
very similar feeling against dissection which long stood in the
way of surgical progress we decline encourage because if is
inconsistent with an enlightened ideal of human lire as a whole.
Chap. vi, § iv] IEED OF EXPERIENCE 59
(OE) And these considerations do involve the recognition of
a principle which is constantly forgotten by Rationalists of the
Kantian type. If is quite true that the question of what is
moral for man depends upon his actual psychical constitution,
including his sensitive, aesthetic, and emotional nature. If if is
said that moral judgements are in a sense a priori, that must hot
be taken fo mean that we could define the rules of human con-
duct without an empirically derived knowledge of the actual
constitution of human nature, and of human society. That if is
right fo promote the true good of all that lives and is conscious
is, indeed, an a priw'i truth which Reason can recognize without
any appeal fo empirical knowledge except what is implied in the
idea of conscious lire: but what actually is for the good of man
or any other creature cannot be ascertained without a knowledge
of the nature and capacities of that creature. The prohibition
of shooting would be irrational among beings who were ' like the
air, invulnerable' : the law of marriage and all that flows from if
presupposes the sexual difference itself--not merely the physical
difference, but all the emotional and moral differences--between
man and woman. If would be absurd fo attempt an answer fo
the question what would be the best type of sexual union if
human beings were not so constituted that man's feelings towards
woman are different from those with which he regards his
own sex, if men and women were hot naturally inclined towards
permanent and exclusive unions 1, if enmtions of the highest and
1 The researches of Prof.Westermarck (History of H«man Marriage) tend fo
confirm Aristotle's dictum that man is , dpa«t (rvrva(rvtt¢bv izïhor q rohtvt«O.
This is proved partly by inference from the fact that the higher apes are
monogamous, partly by a wide induction from anthropological and historical
facts. Polyandry is a rare, Polygamy a much more common institution,
but both are exceptional arrangements due fo special circumstances. The
later work of essrs. Spencer and Gillen (The Natire Tribes of Central
.Australia) may be heid fo modify Prof. Westermarck's conclusions, but the
mos that they point fo is a system of group-marriages, hOt the sheer promis-
cuity of McLellan's speculations ; and after all, even in those marriages, one
husband occupies an exceptional position. Even here a tende»cy to Mono-
gamy is discernible. The great diflîculty experienced by otherwise suc-
cessful ' free-love ' communities in America is the ineradicable tendency to
form exclusive unions. But of course these facts are intended rather as an
illustration than as a proof of the position taken up in the text.
6o REASON AND FEELING [Book I
puresç çype were not found t be subtly and inseparably con-
nected with such unions, and so on.
(3) I may add çhat çhe passing of judgemençs of çhis kind
often demands for ifs full justification an amount of experience
which is quite beyond the reach of a single individual. The
monogamous ideal of lire is based upon çhe accumulated ex-
perience of the human race, noç merely çhe experience of the
numerical majority ; if is doubtful, indeed, whether the indepen-
denç verdict of the numerical majority, even in those counçries
which have not frankly abandoned the Christian ideal in this
marrer, would really endorse this judgement, but for the deference
paid fo the verdict of the besç men which is based upon the results
of all the experience within their reach, experience of themselves
and others, experience of çhe good results of the observance and
the bad results of the non-observance of the monogamous rule.
Buç by experience of good and bad results I do hot mean, of
course, mere pleasure and pain. If is upon the whole spiritual
condition which results from the control as compared wîth
the whole spiritual condition which results from the non-
control of these particular passions that the judgement of value
is pronounced. And çhe dependence of çhese judgements upon
an experience which cannot well be possessed by the young makes
this department of morality peculiarly dependent in practice
upon respect for moral authority . I shall return to this matter
in a chapter which will be specially devoted fo the place of
Authority in Ethics. If is sufficient here to note that there
are many departments of Morality in which if must be recognized
that the judgements of the individual--at leasç of ordinary
individuals, and of ail individuals as regard a large part of
their lives--are and must be largely influenced by Authority.
Io prejudice is donc by this admission to the final and para-
mount authority of the moral consciousness : for this authority
fo which the appeal is ruade (when it is rightly ruade) is simply
i This authority is hot necessarily or exclusively that of a religious creed,
a religious teacher, or a religious community : but this is the most definite
and conspicuous form which moral authorit.y actually assumes in modern
rimes. This dependence is, I believe, one explanation of the undoubted face
that this is a department of morality which is peculiarly liable to surfer from
the decay of religious belief.
12hap. vi, § iv] SPONTANEOUS FEELINGS I6I
that of the moral consciousness in a higher stage of development,
or of the moral consciousness working upon an experience which
is wider and fuller than that of the isolated average individual.
Two very opposite schools of thought are apt fo deny or
ignore the truth that the content of our moral judgements is
dependent upon the sensitive and emotional as well as the
rational nature of man. If is often forgotten by the ordinary
Utilitarian. He does not of course refuse to take into account the
experience tha such and such things bring pleasure, but he does
sometimes rail to take into account tendencies fo particular
emotions, spontaneous tendencies to approve of certain kinds
of conduc and fo disapprove of others, which rest upon no
logîcal ground, but must simply be taken as data upon which
the Practical Reason has to work. The hedonistic assumption
that all a man's desires are really desires for pleasure favours
the delusion that desires can be created or extinguished or
modified af will, if only you can show that good hedonistic
results would be attained by doing so. On the other hand
the rationalistic Moralist often forgets that the raw material,
so fo speak, upon which Practical Reason pronounces ifs judge-
ments of value and which if works up into ideals must always
be supplied by the actual experiences, emotions, desires, tendencies
and aspirations of human nature. The judgement that the
tendency of human nature fo find satisfaction in certain kinds
of conduct has value is, indeed, an immediate judgement which
canno be derived from experience in the ordinary sense of
the word; but we very often cannot say why we should have
such a tendency, or deny that in beings differently constituted
other kinds of conduct might tend fo their highes attainable
good 1.
1 Von Hartmann is one of the few idealistic ]VIoralists who bave adequately
remembered this. lIan, according fo him, gets his notions of the End ' from
the application of Reason fo the actual course of events, including the sub-
jective moral motives of men' ('aus der Anwendung der Vernunft auf den
gesamten Weltlauf einschliesslich der subjektiven sittlichen Veranlagung der
lIenschen.' Ethische Studien, p. I8). At the saine rime, when he goes on
fo call the process of arriving at the ideal end ' inductive,' he seems fo ignore
the fundamental difference between recognizing a value in the various ele-
ments ofwhich the end is ruade up, and that of merely asserting their actual
RASHDALL I I
6 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
The question is raised, for instance, whether the received view
of the mutual duties of parents and children, brothers and
sisters, can be justified by a purely Utilitarian calculation. Can
it be shown fo be conducive fo the greatest happiness of the
greatest number ? Waiving the difference between a hedonistic
and a non-hedonistic conception of happiness, nothing is easier
than to show the practical advantages of the arrangement, if
you assume the actual tendency of the human mother to feel
for her own offspring the most passionate of human affections,
the actual tendency of all human beings fo feel a stronger
attachment fo their own near kin than fo strangers, and conse-
quent]y fo recognize a stronger claim upon their Benevolence.
Given this tendency, the encouragement of if leads both fo
unselfishness in parents and fo the proper brnging up of
existence, tIe seems sometimes (ib., p. x92) to fall into the mistake of trying
to form a conception of the ethical end by induction from the actual em-
pirically ascertained tendency of the Universe, the fallacy of which bas been
sufficiently pointed out by Mr. HerbeloE Spencer's critics. That moral Reason
can deal with data which it cannot itself supply or create, no one (among
ethical Ration,lists) appreciates better than von Hartmann. ' Diese Norm
ist ein Produkt der Vernunft, ein lde,l, welches zeigt, wie der Mensch
eigentlich sein sollte. Aber dieses Ideal ist nicht ein systematisch aus
irgend welchem anderen Prinzip abgeleitetes sondern ein Komplex von un-
mittelbaren Geïtihls- oder Geschmacksurteilen ' (ib., p. 94)- He points out too
that in rime this reasonable criticism of, and selection, among out desires
modifies the feelings themselves (ib., p. i99 ). The only point in this state-
ment to which I should demur is that he seems disposed to identify the
'judgement of faste' with mere feeling, which would leave to the Reason
nothing but the function of collecting and combining the actual feelings of
the judger--a mode of thought quite inconsistent with the whole of his
powerful plea for un absolute or rational standard of lV[orality. Re,son
must hot merely collect and systematize, but select and value the different
elements of human experience.
If is surprising to find how blind naturlistic Moralists continue to be to
the fact that the real problem of Ethics is as to how we determine or
ought fo determine the ultimate end. This problem is wholly ignored in
such works as ]I. Lévy-Bruhl's La Morale et la Sciewe des murs (9o4), the
main idea of which is that the Science of the means to the end should be
based upon Sociology (or a complex of sociological Sciences): how the
end is to be discovered and what are the metaphysical implications of the
idea of an ' end' are questions which he does hot ask. There is no indica-
tion in an otherwise clever work that ifs author is capable of even under-
utanding their meaning.
Chap. ri, § iv] FAMILY AFFECTION
children. On the other hand, put out of sight the de recto
emotional constitution of human nature, and nothing could
be easier than fo demonstrate the disadvantages arising frora
these narrow family attachments, and the infinite hedonistic
and moral superiority of a society in which all older men
should be regarded as fathers, all equals as brothers. So
llato argued, and he was only wrong beoeuse he supposed
that Reason could pronounce moral judgements without
appeal fo the actual emotional tendencies of human nature,
or because he supposed that human nature was more modifiable
than if is. The Moral Sense school are right in holding that
our moral judgements are partly dependent upon the feelings
and emotions with which we do naturally regard conduct of
various kinds, and that these must be taken account of before
we pronounce whether that conduct is fo be regarded as right
or wrong. If would be impossible fo show that if is a more
imperative duty fo relieve suffering af our own door than
suffering af a distance, if if were not an actual tendency of
human nature fo feel a reatier and deeper sympathy with
the suffering that one actually beholds: and so on 1. This
last illustration may help to suggest the importance of the
opposite side of ethioel truth. While Reason nmst take
account of those actual feelings and emotions which form part
of our moral nature before pronouncing by what means most
good will be realized, we oennot allow the actual strength of
the feeling fo be the sole test of moral approval or disapproval.
Ioral progress consists very largely in substituting deliberate
thought-out judgements for oesual and variable emotions: and
the exercise of Reason in rime reacts upon the emotions them-
selves. When we bave corne intellectully fo recognize the
claires of suffering which we do not see, we may corne fo feel
for if a sympathy which is something very different from, and
very much more powerful as a motive for action than, the bre
intellectual recognition that the worth of a human being must
Hume was right in insisting that in avemge human nature (apart
from the influence of logical reflection or rtional considemtion) 'the
qualifies of the mind are selfishness and limited generosity' (Treatise,
Book III, Pt. ii, § ).
64 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
be quite independent of geographical considerations or ethno-
logical affinities. Even moral feeling must be guided and
controlled by Reason; fo a very large extent, indeed, the
difference between ' higher ' and' lower' feeling consists precisely
in the différence between mere feeling as it exists in merely
non-moral natures and feeling in the form which if assumes
when guided and controlled by human Reason. The judgemen
of value which Reason pronounces is not dictated by the feelings,
but the actual feelings supply the materials which if uses in
building up a consistent and harmonious idem of human life.
Reason cannot invent new feelings, but it can so regulate
human conduct as fo produce a maximum of those in which
if recognizes most value, and that regulation of conduct tends
in time to produce actual feeling in accordance with the idem
which Reason sers up.
V
The objections fo the Moral Sense view of Ethics are sub-
stantially the same as those which must be urged against the
systems which represen the moral faculty as something sui
generismneither Reason nor feeling. Bishop Butler discerned,
as we have seen , the fundamental defec of all mere Moral
Sense theories--tha they could assign no reason why this
feeling of the Moral Sense should be accorded any superiority
over other feelings. A Moral Sense can bave no authority:
authority is of the essence of Conscience. To Bishop Butler
himself, af least when he wrote his Semons, the authority of
Conscience was, it is probable, simply the authority of Reason.
His habitual synonym for Conscience is a 'principle of Re-
flection ': at rimes he explicitly calls if Reason. But some
of his disciples--of whom Dr. Marineau is the most distin-
guished representative--decline to admit this identification. If
is so exceedingly difficult to grasp the idea of a ' faculty' which
is neither part of our intellectual nature nor yet any kind of
feeling or emotion that the view is hot easy to criticize. It may
be enough perhaps fo quote Martineau's statement of his position
and fo point out the source of the confusion into which he
seems to fall :
See above, p. I44, note.
Chap. ri, § ri ]IARTLNEAU'S VIEW I5 5
' And when, in order fo scrutinise their relation, we lay them
side by side and look af their contents, we see a once that
the features, present in approvl and absent from assent are
precisely the whole of the oral charoeteristics, whence the
judgement derives ifs ethical quality. In my assent fo the
proposition that any two radii vectores of an ellipse, meeting
af their peripheral extremities, are together equal fo the trans-
verse axis, and my dissent from the assertion that they are
always equal fo one another, I have none of the self-contentment
and of the compunction respectively involved in my right and
wrong volitions; I assign no zerit to the truth, no demerit
to the error, or fo the mind that is subject to them; were
my belief rewarded, I should be ashamed of the absurdity:
were my misbelief punished, I should resent the injustice.
But these experiences, which fail fo attend the Yes and
of Reason, are the sure of the moral sentiments which attend
the Yes and Vo of Conscience. There is nothing, therefore, in
common except the naked fact of acceptance or rejection ; the
thing accepted or rejected, if is plain, is wholly different 17
There is much virtue in that 'nothing except.' All that
Dr. ]Iartineau's objections really show is that the moral judge-
ment is an essentially different kind of judgement from any
other: they do not show that if is not a judgement. When
a piece of conduct is pronounced 'rational' or .'reasonable,'
something else no doubt is ment than when a conclusion is
pronounced logically fo follow from ifs premisses. If we treat
' reasonable' and 'right' as synonyms, that does not imply
that we do not recognize the enormous difference between
' -easonable' or ' reasonable fo think' and ' reasonable fo be
done.' In this sense if is quite true there is an element present
in the moral judgement and absent in the mathematical.
does not follow that this element is simply ' the glow of emotion,'
though such a glow may be a more or less inseparable accompani-
Types of Eth$cal Theory 3rd ed., vol. II, p. 473. Cf. also the admission
'In one sense, every experience of out nature might be pronounced intellectual.
. . Passion and emotion themselves are, in us, hot without thought, and
may be always treated as thought in a glow' (p. 458). Ifthere is thought in out
moral perception, there must be thought about something, and that some-
thing cnnot be just the fact of the perception itself.
I66 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
ment of the judgement. Nothing can be more important than
to emphasize the sui geeris character of the moral judgement,
that is fo say of that idea of goodness or value which forlns
ifs essence. But that does not show the necessity for inventing
a separate faculty to give such judgements. We are not
confusing rime with space because we assign fo our ideas of
both an intellectual origin. We may if we like call Practical
Reason a separate faculty from speculative Reason--that is
only a question of words. We realIy mean simpIy thut they
are distinguishabIe aspects of one and the saine rational self.
The important thing is that we shouId recognize that moral
judgements possess an absolute truth or falsity, which is equally
valid for all rational beings 1 ; and, if that is recognized, it seems
most natural to ascribe them to Reason.
Much the saine line of objection fo the rationalistic position
has been followed in a more recent attempt to rehabilitate the
old Moral Sense view of Ethics, or something like it, ruade by the
Ite Professor Gizycki. His line of argument seems to me fo
imply the same misunderstandings, and fo demand the same
concessions, as the old English ' Moral Sense' view and Dr.
]Iartineau's PhiIosophy of Conscience. But there is one objection
ruade by Gizycki which demands an additional word of explana-
tion. If is really strange to find an eminent Professor of Philo-
sophy solemnly arguing that, if the rationalistic view were true,
' the most intellectual man would be the best morally, and the Ieast
ntelligent would be the worst .' Here in the first place I notice
the confusion alredy pointed out--between what tells a man
his duty and what makes him do it. Men of genius may see
their duty clearly enough, but they do hot always do if.
:Nobody could discourse more beautifully about ]Iorality than
Goethe or Coleridge. But this is not all. It is not even true
True for all rational beings, not equally binding on all rational beings.
All rational beings must recognize them as binding on beings constituted as
man is constituted. These essential principles of morality must no doubt
be the saine for ail such beings, but not ifs detail.
' A» Introd«ction to the Stt«dj of 'tldcs, adapted from the German of
G. M. Gizycki by Stanton Coit, Ph.D., 89 , p. 87; a work which had
already appeared in 889 under the title ' A Student's Manual of Ethical
t»hilosophy. '
Chap. vi, § v] GIZ¥CKrS ARGUMENTS 6 7
that, on the rationalistic principle, the most intelligent man must
know his duty best. For 'intelligence' has many branches or
departments, or aspects. The man who has mathematical
capacity may be singularly wanting in the gift of lancuage or
expression; he may be wholly blind fo the beauty of A or of
loetry; while the Artist and the Scholar may be exceptionally
unmathematical, loets have often been entirely unmusical.
Roughly speaking perhaps the possession of superior mental
capacity in one direction may be held generally fo carry with if
something more than average capacity in others; but fo this
rule there are many exceptions. In the same way i may be
roughly--very roughly--te that men of superior ability are
on the vhole more capable of moral appreciation (and even
perhaps more moral n practice) than men of nferior mental
capacity. We may distrust the speculations about a distinctly
criminal type of brain, but if is certain that professional criminals
are usually people of very low mental capacity, though a few
are men of great intellectual ability. Af the saine rime if is
perfectly possible, and often happens, that the prticular capacity
for apprehending the distinction between right and wrong may
be possessed by persons not otherwse remarkable for intellect ;
while ntellectual persons are occasionally very deficient in this
respect. Ths might be admitted even by the straiest sect of
ethical Rationalism. But in these pages if has been furher
contended that, though the apprehension of moral dstinctions is
in itself an intellectual act, the exercise of thls intellectual
capacity is often conditioned by and postulates a certain emo-
tional endowment. Some of our ethical judgements could hOt
be given af all were a certain emotion absent; and, given the
emotion, the ethcal judgement s often a very simple affair: bub
intellectual judgements are not the less intellectual because they
lie within the capacity of very' unintellectual' persons. If is
much the saine, I suppose, with the aesthetic faculty. The
intellectual character of the musical faculy--its close connexion
vith the capacity for the mosb abstract kind of thinking--is
attested by the tendency of musical and mathematical talent fo
go together. Yeb intellect alone will not make a Musician;
musical originality or even high musical apprecition presupposes
i68 REASON AND FEELIIG [Book I
a capacity for certain kinds of emotion, which the Mathematician
may lack. So with the moral faculty ; if belongs fo the intellect,
yet if may be paralysed or perverted by want of emotional
capacity. This has often been the case probably with enthusiasts
and fanatics--men of exceptional sense of duty or exceptional
devotion fo ideals of one kind or another, bus little human
affection. Some persons may have little delicacy of moral
judgement for want of the original capacity for emotion. Still
more often may people who possess perhaps in a high degree ail
the intellectual capacities required for giving judgements of
value exhibit small moral insight in actual lire, because through
their own personal failure in right willing, or through their
unfavourable moral environment, they have nos acted up fo such
light as they had. The leason that judges and the will that
acts are not one and the same thing, bus they are only two sides
of one and the saine self, an..d they do most powerfully act and
react upon one another. The maxim ' obedience is the organ of
spiritual knowledge' has been abused in the interests of obscur-
antism and fanaticism, bus if represents nevertheless a mosç
important fact in lIoral Psychology .
¥I
To some minds if will probably appear that I have inadequately
stated the intimacy of the connexion between the rationaljudge-
ment of value and the emotions by which if is normally accom-
panied. There are Moralists who, agreeing that the idea of value
is logically distinguishable from the emotion with which right
conduct is contemplated, will insist that de facto they are so
inseparable that the moral judgement could not be ruade by, and
could have no meaning for, a mind destitute of the specific moral
emotion. ' I think,' writes a friend who takes th]s view
the "reason" and "feeling" which are fo be found in moral
judgments, though no doubt distinguishable, are not only always
found together, but each is unintelligible and empty apart from
1 Cf. Aristotle's
' I cannot call fo mind any printed expression of this doctrine, though
is taught by high authorities in Oxford--a fact which must be my apology
for quoting a private letter.
Chap. ri, § ri] FEELING AND JUDGEMENT 6 9
the other. The judgement "this is right" is hOt a moral judge-
ment unless one has, more or less, the moral emotion {for in the
judgement "this is right," when the ground is any authority, the
moral emotion and the judgment proper fall upon the authority,
hot strictly upon the particular point), nor is if a moral emotion
unless if claires univerlity. This, I think, is the saine view as
yours, but perhaps you might more carefully avoid the use of
language which suggests juxtaposition (reason + feeling) ; which
is surely unsatisfactory, and leads to what one finds inadequate
in the language of Hume on one side and Kant on another.' To
such a line of criticism I should reply as follows:
() With regard to the suggestion about mere 'juxtposition,'
I have very definitely admitted that in all cases some feeling is,
in part, the ground of the judgement. That being so, the judge-
ment could hot be made without the feeling, but the feeling
which is the ground of a moral judgement is, in my view, hot
alvays any specifically moral or 'higher' kind of feeling. In
some cases the judgement implies a particular kind of 'higher'
emotion, but not in all. In some cases the only feeling which
is implied as the ground of the judgement is simple pleasure and
pain, not in ourselves but in others, though without some
experience of them in ourselves we should not know what they
are in others. To know that this act causes pain in others is all
that I want fo enable me fo condemn if. That pain is the negation
of good, and that the good ought fo be promoted, are self-evident
truths perceivable by the intellect. How far in actual fact there
exist persons so constituted as fo be capable of seeing that truth
without experiencing the smallest emotional repulsion against
causing pain, or the smallest inclination fo avoid if themselves,
is a question of empirical Psychology on which I should hot like
to pronounce a decided opinion. But I see nothing self-con-
tralictory in the supposition that there may be such persons.
There certainly seem fo be persons who do make this judge-
ment, but in whom ethical emotion and ethioel inclination
are so small as in no way fo accourir for the judgement being
ruade.
(OE) And even in persons who are not altogether incapable of
moral emotion, some moral judgements are hot as a marrer of
7o REASON AND FEELING [Book I
fact ccompanied by any emotion af all, though the saine judge-
ment may on other occasions call forth emotion of great strength.
The proposition that pleasure is good and pain bad--or that
some particular trifling pleasure of my own is good and conduct
which interferes with if wrong in myself or in another--is one
that can be assented fo without any emotion whatever ; and yet
that proposition is the ultimate ground for my condemnation
of some act of cruelty which might excite in me feelings of warm
indignation. And I regard if as a marrer of great theoretical
importance fo insist that the intellectual categories of good and
right are as distinctly present in the cool and calculating judge-
ment that if is unreasonable fo throw away a large pleasure for
a snmller one (no marrer whose ttmt pleasure be), as in our
enthusiastic approval of some heroic act of self-sacrifice.
(3) Of course we can, if we choose, include in our idea of good and
evil, right and wrong, the emotion which they excite in normally
constituted persons, or even all the varieties of emotion that
they may excite in abnormlly constituted persons. On the
principle that we do not know a thing fully till we know all its
relations, if may no doubt be said tht we do not fully under-
stand the meaning of right and wrong unless ve do tke into
account these facts of our emotional nature. To a person
incapable of any such emotion the terms would no doubt hot mean
all that they mean fo one who is capable of if. But I ara hOt
prepared fo admit that if would mean nothing fo him. Not
only would if mean something fo him, but that something is,
I should hold, the very essence of the moral judgement, con-
sidered simply as a judgement. The ideas of good and evil,
right and wrong, seem fo be as distinguishable in thought from
any emotion accompanying them as the idea of a circle is froln the
aesthetic feeling which may perhaps be in fact ifs inseparable
accompaniment. To insist upon the greater practical importance
of the feeling attending the moral judgement would be wholly
beside the point.
(4) The contention that the term ' right' means nothing apart
from the emotions by which moral judgelnents af the higher
levels of moral experience are usually accompanied seems fo me
open fo further objection. I am unable fo recogize the
Chap. ri, § ri] 1O SPECIFIC IIORAL FEELIlgG
existence of any one particular specifically' moral' emotion 1. An
intellectual category must be one and the saine for all intelligences,
though there may be a greater or less degree of clearness, explicit-
ness, and adequacy in the apprehension of if af different stages
of intellectual development. But emotion is essentially a variable
and subjective thing. And the emotion excited by good or bad
conduct, and by the judgements of moral approbation or dis-
approbation which they call forth, are no exception fo the rule.
These emotions are different in the case of different races, different
individuals, different periods of lire. Even in the saine individual
they vary from day fo dy with our changing mooEls and
circumstnces. The emotions which different kinds of good or
bad conduct excite are very different, even when the intellectual
approval or disapprowl is the saine. Few people approve an
act of commonplace Justice with the warmth which they bestow
on an act of Generosity, and yet Justice is quite as important
as Generosity. When I judge a massacre fo be wrong, my
judgement is exactly the saine whether if has been committed
by Englishmen on Englishmen in the streets of London, or by
Chinamen on Chinamen in the streets of Pekin, but my emotion
would probably be very different both in kind and intensity.
Even with characters of exceptional moral earnestness, there
is every reason to suppose that the emotion accompanying their
ethical thinking nmst be of very different kinds. Itis im-
probable that a mind of John Wesley's severity could ever have
felt the tender hunmnity of St. Francis of Assisi, or that in
a man of sympathetic nature like John Stuart Mill the sense of
duty assumed the emotional tone with which if was invested in
the Philosopher whose personal character has stamped itself for
ever upon the doctrine of the ' categorical imperative.' To say
that the category of value or of duty was present in the mind
of Mill as much as in that of Kant, however little the Metaphysic
of the former may have recognized ifs presence, is an assertion
which I understand and accept. Whether the emotional accom-
i , Es giebt demnach nicht ein bestimmtes Gefiihl, welches als m o r a lis ch e s
Gefiihl von allen anderen Gefiihlen verschieden w're, sondern j e de s Gefiihl
entspricht in seiner Tendenz mehr oder minder sittlichen Aufgaben, oder
es widerspricht denselben in h6herem oder geringerem Grade' (Hartmann,
.Das sittl. Bewusstsein, p. I48).
17z REASON AI'D FEELIlqG [Book I
paniments of thelr judgements were the same is a psychological
question which if would be a piece of the most unwarrantable
dogmatism to determine a 2io'i. If, therefore, the assertion
that a moral emotion claires universality means that the same
emotion must be present in all moral persons, I see no ground
for the assumption. ]qor, indeed, in strictness can I understand
the meaning of asserting that any emotion whatever ' claires
universality.' That, when I recognize a value in certain
emotion, my judgement claires universality I admit; but I
recognize the probability that many different kinds of moral
emotion my possess a high degree of intrinsic worh, and I see
no reason for selecting one particular type of if as the one and
only 'moral emotion,' in the absence of which the judgement
could hot be moral af all. If may no doubt be urged that the
ideal man would feel exactly the saine kind of emotion on the
saine occasions. That would be a somewhat difficult contention,
inasmuch as a certain limitation, and therefore certain indi-
viduality, seems essentiel to a nature thnt is fo be truly human.
But, whatever may be thought of this point, the assertion
supplies no ground for saying that the judgement is not in
thought quite distinguishable from the emotion. The ideal man
might be unable fo think of universal gravitation without
profound 'cosmic emotion,' but that supplies no reason for
declaring that a Physicist who has never felt a moment's' cosmic
emotion' in his life must be ignorant of universal gravitation.
(5) It is only, as I have already pointed out, in the case of
certain particular ethical judgements (not in all) that they simply
cnnnot be ruade by a consciousness incapable of certain emotions:
here where that is so, the judgements turn upon the actual value
of the emotions as elements in human life. A consciousness which
was entirely lacking in all the higher feelings--aesthetic, intellec-
tual, social, moral--fo which the developed moral consciousness
assigns value, would assuredly have a limited and distorted
moral ideal, but if does not follow that if would ttach no
meaning af all fo the ideas of right and wrong, or be unable fo
pronounce correctly upon simple problems of elementary
]Iorality. If might still for instance be able fo recognize
the wrongness of the individual deliberately preferring his own
Chap. vi, § vil INFLUENCE OF INTEREST 73
interest fo that of the community, and fo apply that judgement
to many particular cases.
(5) If may even be admitted that those judgements which
do not psychologically depend upon the presence of emotion
are not very likely ever fo be made--to say nothing of the
respect paid fo them--by a nind totally destitute of the
emotions which naturally accompany them. If the human mind
could ever be a passionless thinking machine, if nlight indeed
be contended that the emotionless man would be a particularly
good judge of right and wrong in respect of those questions9
questions for instance of Justice in the distribution of pleasure--
which lay within ifs range. But no mind can ever be a passion-
less mirror of Reality. In the nind which is (relatively or
absolutely) devoid of moral or social feeling, the place of such
feelings is sure fo be taken by other feelings, emotions, and
desires, which must necessarily distort the moral judgement
or totally prevent ifs exercise. Even our most abstract thinking
is dominated by purpose or interest of some kind. Minds which
take no interest in Morality do hot think about if af all. I sec
no reason why for instance a person incapable of moral emotion
should hOt be able fo recognlze the injustice of slavery, though
he might have felt no inclination fo agitate for ifs abolition.
But we know that as a marrer of fact the minds which first
pronounced slavery fo be wrong were minds dominated by
a passion for Justice and an ardent love of Humanity. In
minds which have no such passion, indifference may prevent any
judgement whatever upon the problem; interest may suggest
wrong judgements.
This doctrine of the inseparability of the moral judgement
from one particular kind of emotion seems fo me not only
umvarrantable in itself, but dangerous in ifs theoretical ten-
dency: for if obscures the fact that the judgement of value by
vhich we recognize that my own pleasure is a reasonable end
of pursuit is exactly the saine in its intellectual character as our
recognition of an intrinsic value in heroism or saintliness,
although the emotional accompaniments of the two judgements
may be very different. If is true no doubt that the amount
of value which we recognize in the former case is much smaller
i74 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
than thaç which we recognize in the latter. To the pleasure
which iç is righç to pursue we assign value: but we do not
attribute much inçrinsic value to çhe will which wills that
pleasure unless çhe preference of çhe pleasure implies devoçion
to some higher kind of good, or ço the good as such, on the parç
of the agent; and çhis is commonly the case only when the
pleasure aimed aç is not çhe agenç's own, since only in this case
is there usually presenç any sçrong çemptaçion ço pursue some
other end, though we may ascribe some small value to
preference even of privaçe interesç ço mere brute passion.
Conduct directed çowards çhe good is righç whether iç implies
¥irtue on the parç of çhe agenç or noç: buç such conducç need
noç possess value in any appreciable degree. The value may
often lie in the end or consequences, noç in çhe act içself. And
the çerm moral value is commonly reserved for çhe value thaç
we attribute ço characçer--ço the good will or aç leasç fo
inclinations and dispositions, desires and emoçions, which we
recognize as conducive ço or resulçing from a seççled bent
of çhe will çowards the good . Iç is important no doubt
insisç on çhe superior value which we ascribe ço such preference
for the good. Buç çhe çwo kinds of value are not absolutely
incommensurable. However much superior çhe value of a good
acç may be thaç of a çransitory pleasure, we sçill use çhe terre
' value' of boçh, and we use if in çhe saine sense : çhe çwo kinds
of value differ as being aç çhe top and çhe bottom of the saine
scale, hOt as representing çwo çoçally incommensurable scales.
There can be only one ultimate scale of values, however
heterogeneous çhe objecte which we appraise by thaç scale.
Thus ço the actual relief of pain and healing of wounds which
resulted ço the man fallen among thieves from çhe acç of
good Samaritan we assign value. If it were noç good for
wounds ço be healed, if would not have been 'ight for çhe good
Samaritan fo heal çhem; but we should noç call the injured
Prof. Taylor seems to me to forger this use of the terre ' moral value'
hen he declares, without qualification, that ' if is quite impossible, after
the fashion of popular philosophy, fo draw a line between qualities that are
moral and qualities that are hot so. Whatever is felt by men fo be worth
having af ail bas, eo ilso , moral value, or rather, moral value is a tautologous
expression' (t)vblem of Conduct, p. 297 ).
Chap. ri, § vil CONSCIENCE 75
man's feeling w'ally good. On the other hand, fo the good
Samaritan's act we assign ' moral value,' and we may even assign
moral value fo the emotion which prompted, or fo the pleasure
vhich resulted from the act, even though the emotion and the
pleasure may noV have been under the immediate control of the
will, because iV would be an indication of character or of
a settled bent of the will. Such is the ordinary usage of
language. The distinction between ' moral value' and ' value' is
no doubt one of great proetical importance, inasmuch as if
implies a conviction of the supreme and unique value of
rightly directed will. But there is noç the absolute disparity
between them thaç is suggested by the idea of a distinctively
moral emotion in the absence of which out judgements as fo the
value of this or thaV element of human life could noV be moral
judgements at all.
If has been contended in this chapter that ' the moral faculty '
is essentiMly Reason. ]3y that is meant that the ideas of
Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, are intellectuM concepts
or categories which cannot be reduced fo any kind or sorV of
mere feeling. ]3ut if has been fully ax]mitted that practlclly
the power of deciding beçween right and wrong involves many
emotional elements, and these are certainly included in what is
popularly spoken of as Conscience. Conscience or (fo speak
more scientifioelly)the moral consciousness may be held fo
include not merely the oepacity of pronouncing morM judgements,
but the whole body of instincts, feelings, emotions, desires which
are presupposed by and which influence these judgements,
as well as those which prompt fo the dolng of the actions which
they prescribe . o more accurate definition oen be given,
because the ' moral faculty' cannot actually exist apart from
the other elements of self-consciousness. The Practical Reason
implies all the other activities of Reason and would be impossible
without them; and iV implies also, noç a mere single specific
feeling or emotion, but a whole complex of feelings and
1 Another element in what is commonly called Conscience is simply the
individual's consciousness of the fact that he is or is hOt doing whut
he himself believes fo be right. 'If perceives whether those [actions] if
judges right, or those if judges wrong, are actually adopted' (Shalworth
14odgson, Philosolohy of Exlerience, vol. IV, 13. 86).
7 6 REASON AND FEELING [Book I
emotions upon the value of which the Praticl 1Reason has
fo pronounce. ' Conscience' or the moral consciousness is a naine
for a particular aspect of the single self which is thought and
feeling and will. Morality would be impossible and meaningless,
or af least defective and one-sided, for a being in whom any one
of these elements were wanting 1.
1 If may be broadly stated that all recent moralists who approach the sub-
ject from a purely psychological point of view tend fo agree with the Moral
Sense position in making Morality ultimately fo rest upon feeling, though
they may be less clear about the specific and distinctive character of the tel-
ing. To H6ffding for instance the value-judgement is simply a feeling, arising
largely f'»om Sympathy (Ethil, pp. 4 I, 72, &C.) ; the categorical imperative
is ' an instinct' (ib., p. 55)- Though quite aware that this position involves
the sacrifice of all objective character for moral judgements, he seems fo me
constantly fo use language and fo express ideas which imply such an objec-
tivity. Simmel insists strongly on the fact that the ' ought' is an ultimate
and unanalysable category of out thought, but makes the whole content of the
' ought' corne from feeling (Einleitug in die Moralwissenscha]t, Berlin, 89%
I, pp. 23 sq., 54, 39, &c.). But if is difficult fo see how if is possible fo
assert the validity of a category (and if if is a category of tho,ght ifs validity
can hal<lly be denied) without any power fo apply if fo a marrer or fo give
if a content. Such an assertion would seem fo be like maintaining that we
have indeed a category of quantity or number, but are quite incapable of
counting. Granted that out judgements in detail are liable fo be influenced
by all sorts of psychological considerations, just as subjective motives con-
stantly lead fo numerical miscalculations (e. g. of the numbers present af
a meeting in which we are interested), if is difficult fo see how there can be
a category which we cannot validly use af all. After all the category of
o,cght in general is simply an abstraction got by compaling together actual
judgements of value. If what is contended is that we do think values but
that such judgements possess no objective validity, the reply fo if must
simply be the general metaphysical reply fo all Scepticism. Much of
Simmel's polemic against Rationalism in Ethics seems fo turn upon the old
confusion between Reason and reasoning (e. g. in Einleitng, I, pp. 98-99) ; af
the saine rime he has done a service by pointing out with much acuteness
and vivacity some of the psychological causes which as a marrer of fact do
largely determine out actual moral judgements, e.g. out tendency fo assume
that the usual or normal conduct of out society is the right course. But if
is perhaps a mistake fo take Simmel's use of the terre 'category' too
seriously. If appears that ultimately the category of ' end' (practically
identical with that of ' ought ') is a merely ' subjective' category (II, p. 347,
&c.) which would seem fo mean that we have a confused idea of an ' ought'
which we take fo mean something, but which is of no more objective sinifi-
cance than the idea of ' Kismet' or that of a Centaur, though (like those
ideas) if may influence human conduct. But the admission that as a matter
Chap. vi, note] THE AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT
77
of psychological fact these ideas of' ought,' ' end,' ' the good,' &c., do exist,
and cannot be resolved into something else, represents a great advance on
the crude Psychology which simply explained them as ' fear of tribal ven-
geance,' or the like. When writers like Simmel deny their objective validity,
they do so as sceptical or sensationalistic metaphysicians, hOt as observers of
psychological fact. These admissions become particularly valuable when we
turn fo the philosophical fireworks of such a writer as Guyau (Esquisse d'une
Morale sans obligation ni sanction), whose original discovery seems fo be that
any factor of out consciousness which he cannot explain on the assumptions
of his own Philosophy may be got rid of by the simple device of calling if
' mysticah'
NOTE ON THE AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT
A chapter on the relation between the moral and the aesthetic judge-
ment might bave formed a natural and desirable sequel fo the treatment of
' Reason and Feeling' in Ethics, but I do hOt feel that my acquaintance
with Aesthetic Philosophy enables me fo undertake if. A few remarks on
the subject may, however, be useful with a view fo clearing up what bas
been said in the preceding chapter, and to prevent misunderstanding.
(I) I distinctly recognize an objective element in out aesthetic judge-
ments. That is implied in out strong conviction that there is a right and
a wrong about such judgements. They too, like moral judgements, are in
a sense judgements of value. But I do hOt say that they are 'objective'
in exactly the saine sense and fo the saine extent as the ethical judgement.
For they seem fo be more closely connected with the variable physiological
organization of individuals than ethical judgemente. If has been suggested,
for instance, that the restful feeling of green for human beings is due fo
effects on the human eye and nerves of its frequency in Nature--especially
for our arboreal ancestors; while the effect of red ('like the sound of
a trumpet,' fo quote the famous remark of a man blind from his birth) is
due fo ifs infrequency in Nature. By beings with a different evolutionary
history, therefore, a red landscape with a few touches of green would, if
may be contended, be pronounced as beautiful, and beautiful in the saine
way, as we think a landscape of predominant green with a few touches
of red. So again the beauty of a Gothic window as compared with a square
one may plausibly be connected with the frequency of the Gothic arch in
woods and the rarity of square arches in Nature. Even if such theories are
well founded, they do hOt destroy the existence of an objective element
in out aesthetic judgements. The perfect intelligence might still pronounce
the aesthetic feeling which we experience good, though in beings otherwise
constituted other aesthetic experiences might be good also. If may be
contended that we have something parallel fo this in the moral laws which
are obviously applicable only to beings constituted like man, though the
good for such beings may be something in which every rational intelli-
gence would recognize value. But then I for one should contend that the
RASDALL X N
i78 REASON AND FEELING [BookI
nore ultimate of out moral judgements, such as that which recognizes
the value of love, are independent of such differences in the structure of
individuals or of society (see Bk. III, chap. iii), and represent hot merely
hat all rational beings would pronounce valuable in us, but an element
of experience which must exist and bave value in all higher minds and
in God. If may be that we might say the saine of aesthetic judgements--
that the value which may be recognized in aesthetic judgements which
differ and even contradict one another in detail, might all be referable
fo some higher principles of aesthetic judgement which would explain
them all; but we can form a less distinct conception of such principles
than we can of the fundamental moral laws. I cannot undertake fo discuss
the marrer here, but will only notice that aesthetic judgements (as we know
them in human beings) do seem fo be more intimately connected with, and
inseparable from, sensations which presuppose a particular physiological
organization than the most fundamental moral judgements, although I do
hot regard that fact as any reason for denying that they are in a true sense
objective.
2) If the moral judgement is essentially a judgement of value, ifs sphere
must be absolutely all-embracing. There can be no department of human
]fie, no kind of human consciousness or experience, upon which the moral
Reason may hot pronounce ifs judgements of value. People in whom
aesthetic interests are stronger than ethical interests frequently attempt
iv set up a sphere of Art to which Morality is supposed fo have no relation
whatever. Such persons simply show that they have too narrow a view
of what Morality is. What they really mean, or ought fo mean, is that
aesthetic activities or enjoyments bave a high value quite apart from any
further effects upon conduct in the narrower sense--that if may be morally
right fo paint and look af pictures which have no tendency fo make the
artist or the beholder go away and perform his social duties better. That
artistic enjoyment has this high value and forms an important element
in true human good, I bave strongly contended. Out aesthetic objector
may, however, mean more than this. He may mean that any amount
of aesthetic enjoyment, and all kinds of if, are right, and right in all
circumstances. Such a proposition is so extravagant that if could hardly
be ruade by anybody who really contemplated the full consequences of
his assertion; but, whether the proposition be true or false, if represents
an ethical judgement--as much so as the proposition that the interests
of Art must sometimes give way fo the claims of social duty, and that there
are in the world plays hot devoid of aesthetic value which if was morally
wrong fo write, and whlch the State is right in hOt allowing fo be acted.
The question what kinds of Art if is good fo produce, how much rime if
is right for such and such persons fo spend in producing them or in con-
templating them, within what limits the aesthetic indulgence should be
restrained in the interests of wholesome moral feeling--these and such-like
questions are moral questions. Morality deals with ultimate ends or
elements in the end. No indulgence which does not form part of the true
ultimate end can possibly be justified.
Chp. ri, note] ART AND BEAUTY 79
(3) The question may then be raised 'what is the relation between the
moral and the aesthetic judgement ?'
The moral judgement is a judgement of value; but is hot, it may be
asked, the aesthetic judgement also judgement of vaiue--at least for
those who recognize its objective character and refuse to reduce it to the
judgement ' this gives me a particular kind of pleasure'? When I pro-
nounce that a thing is aesthetically 'good,' does not that imply that it
is an end which ought fo be puued ? Up fo a certain point there can
be little difficulty in answering the question. We may say that the moral
judgement is in all cases the final one, but that the moral judgement must
use the data supplied by the aesthetic judgement. The aesthetic judgement
tells us ' this is beautiful.' The moral judgement goes on fo say ' Beauty,
or this particular kind of beanty, bas an intrinsic worth, and consequently
ought fo be pursued.' We may even say that for a consciousness which
recognizes the intrinsic value of Beauty, the judgement ' this picture is
aesthetically good' practically implies and includes the judgement 'the
contemplatiou of this picture has a certain intrinsic worth,' though other
and purely moral judgements will be required to determine its relative
worth as compared with other goods.
(4) But what if the moral judgement and the aesthetic judgement
actually contradict one another? In ordinary cases of what may be
superficially called collisions between the moral and the aesthetic judge-
ments no real difficulty arises. When I say 'this play is aesthetically
a good one, but on this particular evening it would be wrong for me to
go and see it,' this is merely an ordinary case of the collision between
goods. The judgement ' the contemplation of this play bas a certain
worth' is hot rendered untrue by the judgement ' What I should do with
my rime and money if I did hot go fo see this play, bas a greater worth,
and if is my duty hot only fo seek the good but the greatest good. Hence
if would be morally wrong fo see the play.'
The real difficulty arises, hot when we pronounce merely that what is
aesthetically good is yet a good which for certain persons in certain circum-
stances ought fo be surrendered in favour of a greater good, but when we
pronounce if fo be from a moral point of view actually bad. In some cases
if may be possible fo isolate and separate the good element from the bad.
We may approve a novel as a work of Art, and yet condemn the moral
tendency of incidental reflections or remarks by the author, or of certain
disgusting episodes which (even if ot actually irrelevant fo the plot as
it stands, as is often the case) may still be regarded as contributing
nothing fo the aesthetic effect of the piece which could hot equally be
secured by a somewhat different plot. Here we may say 'the work of Art
as such is good; but a novel ought hot merely fo be artistic but fo be
decent. What I pronounce morally bad forms no part of what I pronounce
aesthetically good.' But in other cases the immoral tendency may be too
intimately allied with the artistic effect of the piece tobe treated in this
way. The particular kind of Art in question may be aesthetically good, and
yet by ifs very nature appeal fo passions which had better (from a moral
8o REASON AND FEELING
point of view) not be excited, at least in this way and in this intensity.
This is particularly the case, I should judge, with certain kinds of Music in
their effect upon highly musical natures. But even here is hot the case after
all only a case of the comparison of values ? If we condemn the piece--
that is to say, if we judge that it ought hot to bave been written, or that if
ought hot to be pelormed, or that particular persons should hOt hear
if, or that it should hot be listened to frequently--we judge that, though
the worth which it possesses qua work of Art is a real worth, that worth
is hot so great as the worth of properly regulated passions, and that, if and
in so far as the former kind of good cannot be enjoyed without the loBs of
the latter, that good is one which we should do without.
Of course I need hardly say that we may condemn the moral tendency of
a book or a piece of music without necessarily saying that nobody should
under any circumstances read the book or hear the music. The good may
still--for particular persons and in particular circumstances--outweigh the
evil. But that in some circumstances if is a moral duty to abstain from
enjoyments which are aesthetically admirable cannot be doubted. In the
great majority of cases--at least as regards Literaturemthe important
thing is the relative proportion which the morally stimulating and the
morally depressing in out reading bear to each other. Ruskin has remarked
that the important thing is hot so much what we don't read as what we do
read. The properly nourished mind may for a sufficient purpose read,
without in jury and even with advantage, much which in itself has an
immorM tendency, just as the properly nourished physical frame can
swallow many germs of disease without deleterious effects. The principle
must apply fo a greater or less extent fo other branches of Art.
(5) Another way of putting the marrer is to say that, when we pronounce
a particular experience aesthetically good but morally bad, we mean that if
appeals to and satisfies a part of our nature, and a part which, when we
look af it in abstraction from our nature as a whole, we pronounce good :
but that, when compared with our ideal of human nature as a whole, this
particular indulgence fails to be approved. To indulge in it for certain
persons, in certain circumstances, or beyond a certain point, or in some
cases to indulge in it at all--would be to attach disproportionate value
to this side of out nature as compared with others. The case of an aesthetic
indulgence given up in deference to moral considerations differs from the
case of a banquet condemned and abstained from as too costly or luxurious
only in the fact that the value of the good surrendered is, when taken in
abstraction from out ideal of human lire as a whole, a higher or more
valuable good than the pleasures of good eating and drinking.
(6) Frora the point of view which has now been reached it may be
possible to make a further step towards the solution of the difficulties
presented by the problem of objectivity in the aesthetic judgement. The
difficulty with which we are confronted is that (a) we are unwilling to
adroit that the judgement (say) of a certain Australian Minister of Educa-
tion who solemnly pronounced that ho had hinself examined the works
of William Shakespeare and could discover nothing in them but profanity
Chap. ri, note] OBJECTIVITY OF BEAUTY
and obscenity, and that he should therefore discourage their use in schools,
is objectively as good as that of the cultivated critics of all nations who
regard Shakespeare as the greatest drainatic genius that the world has
produced; and yet that (b) so Inany of out aesthetic judgements are so
obviously connected with features of out particular huinan (soinetiines even
out local or facial) experience which we can perfectly well imagine to be
different in another planer. Take for instance the undeniable tendency
to regard the usual or normal or typical forin of man or any other aniinal
as the Inore beautiful, and to regard any considerable deviation froin it as
ugly--even when the individual thereby approxiinates to a type which in
another aniinal we should think beautiful. We do hot like a human face
which approxiinates to the shape which in a horse or a mouse we should
think beautiful enough. May it be possible to adinit that the question
what particular ïorins or colours give us aesthetic pleasure is largely
dependent upon physiological constitution, use and wont, enironinent,
accidental association ; but that the objectivity of the aesthetic judgement
lies hot in the judgement which states the tact that we experience such
and such a feeling but in the judgeinent which ascribes a value to this
feeling--that in truth if is hOt the strictly aesthetic judgeinent that is
objective, but the judgeinent of value which is pronounced on such and
such an aesthetic experience ? Froin this point of view we can adroit that
aesthetic pleasure is often given to different persons by different experiences ;
and yet that in certain cases there may be no Inore value in the one state
of consciousness than in the other. The pleasure vhich red trees and
a green sunset Inight give to the inhabitants of another planer might be
just as ' true' or ' high' a pleasure as we derive froin green trees and red
sunset. In a differently constituted planer square arches Inight suggest
feelings of awe and solemnity closely analvgous to those which we derive
ïroin a Gothic cathedral, and both kinds of emotion might bave their value.
The negro's ideal of huinan beuuty Inay include a broader nose and
a different shape of head froin a European's, but the resulting pleasure
might to a perfectly disinterested intelligence appear to possess precisely
the saine value. But, though this Inight be so with those particular
elements in the aesthetic consciousness which are in this way due to
accidental circuinstances, it need hot be so with all. The Australian
statesinan mentioned above might bave derived soine pleasure froin the
poetry (say) of Longfellow or Mr. Kipling, and the disinterested intelli-
gence would pronounce that that pleasure would have soine value, but it
would ascribe a higher value to the different pleasure which a more
cultivated person would derive from Longfellow or )If. Kipling, and
a still higher value to the pleasure which Longfellow or Mr. Kipling
bave presumably derived froin Shakespeare, but which the illiterate Minister
of Education would be incapable of feeling af all. For the different
estiinate pronounced upon the poets in question would depend hot upon
Inere accidents of physical organization or environinent but upon general
mental cultivation, upon qualities of intellect and character which to
an iinpartial intelligence would appeax to possess very different values»
i8 REASON AND FEELING
Here if is hot the same pleusure tht is caused by different kinds of poetry
fo different men, but u quite different pleasure. If is truc that the
capacity for aesthetic appreciation may be dependent upon a delicacy
of eye and car which is purely physical. An unmusical poet may through
the structure of his nervous system be incapacitated from deriiing pleasure
from music without being a man of lower intellect or chamcter thun the
musicien who derives exquisite pleasure from the same sounds, or rather
from sounds caused by the saine instruments, though they are sounds
which the unmusical poet simply does hot hear. When the unmusical poet
pronounces the music hOt fo be beautiful, his judgement may in a sense
possess strictly objective truth: for hot only is he right in saying that
he gets no aesthetic pletsure from the music, but he is right in suying
that no high objective value attaches fo what he ctually hears--to the
sensations, ideas, and emotions which the music actually produces in him.
Could the musician sharo that experience, he would agree with the poet
as fo ifs low intrinsic value. The poet is only in error if he denies the
objective vMue of the emotion which the music sers up in souls that
possess the musical capacity which has been denied him; or when he
supposes that the elementary musical pleasure which he does himself derive
from simple hymn or song is of equl intrinsic worth with the pleasure
which Beethoven or Bach give fo the musical. Even where a pletsure
is given fo some people by what appeurs fo the more cultivated critic
absolutely ugly, there may be a worth in the pleasure, though we may
say that the uncultivated man is wrong, in a sense, in feeling if because his
enjoyment of if implies incapacity for something much better worth
enjoying. If we say more than this, if we say that he ought hot fo go
on indulging in his low aesthetic pleasures (even if he cmanot school
himself into enjoying what the cultivated man enjoys), out judgement
is clearly a moral judgement, and hot an aesthetic one af Ml. To distin-
guish more in detail between the elements of aesthetic appreciation which
ure due fo merely accidental circumstances and which might conceivubly
vary in differently constituted beings without either of them being in error,
and those which are accounted for by incapcities in some beings for kinds
of consciousness the value of whiih could hot be denied by any intelligence
without error, would involve a treatise on Aesthetic Philosophy which
I have no intention of attempting. I merely throw out the suggestion that
the really objective element in the aesthetic judgement is thejudgement
of value which if implies. The judgement of value implied in aesthetic
judgement differs from ordinary judgements of value merely in being
a judgement as fo the vMue of a particular class or tspect of human
experience which requires fo be looked t in relation fo a whole complex
of other judgements of value before if can form ground for making the
avowedly and professedly moral judgement ' this kind of experience ought
fo be indulged in by A or B or promoted by A or B in C or D af such und
such a rime and in such and such circumstances.'
{7) The result of this analysis--or mere suggestion of a possible unalysis--
is hot fo deny the objectivity of mny of out aesthetic judgements, but
Chp. vi, note] COMPARISO OF VALUES
to bring the objective element in them into closer connexion with our
ordinary judgements of value--the judgements which we usually call dis-
tinctively moral judgements. The judgement 'this is beautfful' claims
objective validity in the sense that it asserts (a) that in the ideally consti-
tuted consciousness, it will produce such and such an aesthetic experience,
and (B) that this aesthetic experience possesses such and such a value.
There may be cases in which a man might derive an equally valuable
aesthetic experience from other external objects, just as one man likes
one kind of food and another another without there being any difference
of intrinsic value between the two kinds of pleasure: but that is no
so always. In other cases the consciousness that thought such and
such things beautiful would be pronounced by an omniscient mind to be
inferior to the consciousness to which i appeared ugly. At the saine
rime, though aesthetic judgements are (or include) judgements of value,
they are value-judgements of a very distinctive and special kind. There
will always be this much difference between them and what we usually
call moral judgements, (a) that to judge well of the value of various kinds
of aesthetic experience requires a different kind of mental capacity from
that which is required to judge well of other values, and (b) that the
judgement ' this bas aesthetic value' cannot pass into a moral judgement,
on which any one can be called upon to act, until the value of the aesthetic
experience has been compared with the value of other kinds of experience--
the value for instance of Love in ourselve8 and of the pleasure produced
by a socially useful action in others, and it is this estimate of conoarative
values which we usually call in a distinctive sense the moral judgement.
Many may bave a good aesthetic judgement, i. e. are capable of the higher
aesthetic experiences and judge rightly of their value, who may bave a bad
moral judgement, i. e. be incapable of appreciating other kinds of experience
af their true value when compared with the higher aesthetic experiences ;
others may bave a good moral judgement in general, i. e. rightly estimate
(say) the superior value of Love and rightly balance the value of other
people's pleasure against their own, but may make mistakes in particular
cases from want of a developed aesthetic conscientiousness, i.e. because
they do hot see that Sh«kespeare is beautiful or underestinaate the true
value of the sense of beauty.
CHAPTER
IDEAL UTILITARIAlqISM
I
In previous chapters I have sought fo show that the way
fo find out whether an action is right or wrong, when we are
forced fo consider such a question for ourselves without reference
fo some established rule l, is fo consider whether iL will tend
fo produce for society in general a Well-being or ¢«tlOt'« or
good which includes many elements possessing different values,
which values are intuitively discerned and compared with one
another by the moral or practical Reason. The right action is
always that which (so far as the agent has the means of knowing)
will produce the greatest amount of good upon the whole. This
position implies that all goods or elements of the good are in
some sense and for some purposes commensurable. Some of the
objections which may be taken fo this position I shall consider
hereafter. In the present chapter I shall aim at illustrating
how the moral judgements implied by the special virtues, and in
particular by those which are p'ina racle most unutilitarian,
are explainable upon the supposition that all moral judgements
are ultimately judgements as to the value of ends. This view of
Ethics, which combines the utilitarian principle that Ethics must
be teleological with a non-hedonistic view of the ethical end,
I propose fo call Ideal Utilitarianism. According fo this view
actions are right or wrong according as they tend fo produce for
all mankind an ideal end or good, which includes, but is not
limited fo, pleasure.
A paramount position among our moral judgements is (as we
have seen) occupied by the three axioms of Prudence, Benevo-
i When we ought to enter upon such a consideration is a question which
I bave discussed in Book II, chap. v.
Chap. vil, § il ]EbEVOLENCE AND JUSTICE 18 5
lence, and Ecluity. If is self-evident fo me that I ought (where
if does hOt collide with the greater good of another) fo promote
my own greatest good, that I ought fo prefer a greater good
on the whole fo a lesser, and that I ought fo regard the good
of one man as of eclual intrinsic value with the like good of any
one else.
This last assumption will be further defended and explained
in the Chapter on Justice. hleanwhile, if may be assumed that
the ultimate meaning of absolute Justice is fo be sought in this
equal distribution of good.
Such is the meaning, I take if, of ultimate social Justice.
Justice in this absolute sense prescribes the principle, whatever
if be, upon which the good is fo be distributed, while Benevo-
lence is taken fo mean the promotion of maximum social good
without reference fo the question of ifs distribution. In this
sense even the hedonistic Utilitarian must admit the necessity
of recognizing that Virtue OEnnot be altogether resolved into
Benevolence, unless the meaning of Benevolence is narrowed
down to a Benevolence which is consistent with Justice. But
if must be admitted that there are many senses of the word
Justice, as popularly used, which do hot seem priera facie
fo have any reference fo the question of the distribution of
Well-being or ultimate good. When we say that if is unjust
fo punish a man without hearing his defence, or fo compel
a man fo give evidence against himself, or fo punish a man
twice for the saine offence, or fo make an ex ot facto law,
or fo decide a civil oetion in favour of the poorer or the more
deserving litigant who has nevertheless the worse case--in
all such cases there seems no obvious or immediate reference
fo any principle for the ultimate distribution either of ultimate
Well-being or of ifs material conditions. In Aristotelian lan-
guage 'regulative' Justicel--the Justice of the law-courts
seems fo be a different virtue from' distributive' Justice. Iut in
all these heterogeneous uses of the term Justice there seems
The sme my be raid of his Commercial Justice, or Justice of Exchnge.
If ssumes the justice of the principle of privte property nd free brter
in exchnge, vhich Socialist might regurd s intrinsiclly unjust on ccount
of the dvntage which if gives fo the possessor of unerned cpitl.
-86 IDEAL UTILITARIAlqISM [Book I
te be this much in common; they ail prescribe impartiality in
the treatment of individuals; they forbid inequality, or rather
arbitrary inequality--inequality net justified by the require-
ments of social Well-being, or some other general and rational
principle--in the treatment of individuais. They ail involve
the application of some general rule or principle without respect
of persons te particular cases. The question of the justice of
this rule is net, in common discourse, brought into question.
We cal1 a judge unjust who refuses te apply the law impartially,
though we ourselves disapprove of the law and regard if as
essentially unjust. Thus we may say that the word, as used
in ordinary parlante, aiways denotes impariality in distribution
upon some condition--assuming some established principle or
rule of the actual social order, which must itself no doubt rest
upon seine principle of absolute Justice if if is te be capable of
ultimate justification, but the justice of which is for the moment
assumed. Thus we say that it is unjust te punish one man more
severely than another for the saine offence and under precisely
similar circumstances, because here no consideration of social
expediency (that is te say, ai bottera no conflicting claires of
other men) can interfere with the general principle that one man
should be treated in exactly the same way as another under exactly
the saine circumstances. The principles of absolute Justice canner
require such unequai treatment : if they did, that would constitute
such a difference of circumstance as might justify the unequal
treatment. But we de net regard if as unjust for the judge te
decide a case in a way which will enrich an already rich man
and beggar a poor man, because we assume the justice of the
laws of property, and regard it as the duty of the judge simply
te administer that law impartiaily ; as unjust that a naval officer
should receive more prize-money than a common sailor, because
on other grounds we assume that social Well-being demands the
adoption of an unequal scale of remuneration for officers and
men, while we should regard if as unjust te give more te one
man than te another of the saine rank. If is unnecessary te
multiply illustrations: in ai1 cases the popular usages of the
term Justice, in se far as they are capable of defence, may be
held te imply the due regard of the claim of individuals--no
Chap. vil, § il PARTICULAR VIRTUES i8 7
their intrinsic merit or ultimate claires fo Well-being, but their
claim according fo some estblished or recognized law or prin-
ciple of distribution. Varied as are the uses of the terre Justice
in eommon language, the underlying idea of all of them seems fo
be that our ccepted principles of social conduct, whatever they
may be, should be applied impartially as between different
individuMs or classes. Sometimes of course when an act or
a custom or an institution is pronounced unjust, it is ment
that the estnblished principle itself is one which cannot be
defended upon any ground of social expediency, that it violates
the fundamental principle that the ultimate value of one nmn's
good is equal fo that of the like good of another. But this
question of absolute Justice raises so many difficult and intricate
questions that further explanations must be reserved for a
separate chapter.
Subject to due regulation by the rule of Justice or Equity 1, if
might seem fo follow from the principles which we have hitherto
atopted that all virtues could be explained as ultimately resolv-
able into rational Benevolence or Love. But even the Hedonist
must recognize that special names are in practice given fo various
special kinds of conduct, which are supposed fo be conducive in
definite and distinguishable ways fo human good ; such kinds of
eonduct, or rather the dispositions fo perform them, are eMled
particular virtues. On the view which judges of the ultimate
value of goods by other than a hedonistic standard we are able
fo establish a sharper and clearer distinction between the different
duties or the dispositions which lead fo their performance, sinee
we can recognize not merely a distinction between different
kinds of conduct M1 ultimately conducive to a single good, but
also a real and important distinction between the kinds of good
which they tend fo promote. Thus even from the hedonistic
point of view if is clerly convenient fo have a distinctive naine
for the disposition fo observe the rule of truth-speaking, though
1 Which includes Prudence, or the recognition of the due claires of self.
That due recognition of the claires of self is a duty is well put by H5ffding
(Ethik, p. 9) : ' If follows from the principle of Welfare [or Utility] that
the individual is only one among many, but iL follows also therefrom tha
the individual really is one among many.'
I88 IDEAL UTILITARIAIISM [Book I
fo the Utilitarian truth-speaking is simply one of the particular
rules which the supreme and all-incluslve duty of promoting
human pleasure imposes upon mankind. From the point of view
of ideal Utilitarianism we may no doubt recognize that devotion
fo true human good will include all other virtues, Veracity
among the number: but we shall be disposed fo insist more
strongly upon this and other special or particular virtues, because
fo us truthfulness of character, in ourselves and others, is a part
of the end or ideal life which the virtuous man will seek fo pro-
more, and hOt merely a means fo a good other than itself. We
shall be less disposed fo acquiesce in the disposition fo reduce all
the virtues fo Benevolence, since in practice ethical teaching
of this kind is pretty sure fo obscure or slur over the fact that
the end which the benevolent man is fo promote must include
many other kinds of good besides pleasure, many dispositions,
emotions, activities, states of consciousness which are valued for
their own sakes and hot merely as a means fo some further good.
I do hot intend in the present work fo attempt any exhaustive
enumeration or description of the particular kinds of conduct,
the particular duties or virtues, which are included in the dis-
position fo promote true human good, or of the various ends or
elements in that good with which these various duties or virtues
are specially concerned. I shall hOt attempt fo show elaborately
in what ways virtues such as Honesty, Industry, Family Affection,
Kindliness, Compassion, Loyalty (to the State or other social
institutions), Orderliness, Courage (physical and moral) are con-
ducive fo the general good. That they are so is common ground
between the hedonistic and the ideal Utilitarian, though no
doubt if will be possible fo find in connexion with all of them
casuisticl questions which might have fo be differently answered
by those who take and by those who refuse fo take a hedonistic
view of human good. Descriptions or classifications of duties or
viloEues are apt fo be tedious and useless, unless the details of
duty are discussed with much greater fullness than is compatible
with the scope of the present work. I propose, therefore, fo
confine myself in this chapter fo some remarks upon those duties
or virtues which seem ai tiret sight most difficult fo reconcile
with the view that all virtue consists ultimately in the promotion
Chap. vii, § ii] HUMANITY x 89
of truc social good, and which really are (as if appears fo me) in-
capable of being reconciled with that doctrine, so long as social
good is understood in a purely hedonistic sense.
II
In the first place, I must observe that even those virtues
which are most obviously altruistic in their tendency are,
according fo our view, also ends in themselves--having a value
independent of, and in some cases much greater than, the mere
pleasure which they cause in others. Hence it becomes rational
to encourage the cultivation and exercise of these virtues even
in ways which cannot always be shown to produce a net gain in
pleasure on the whole. I have already illustrated this in the
case of Humanity fo men and animals. The high value which
we assign fo all natural kindliness of feeling and fo parental
affection in particular is, I believe, one of the main grounds
for our eondemnation of infanticide. The same consideration
forbids the extinction of ]ife in the case of the old or the sick or
the insane, and generally speaking, persons whose existence
is a burden to the community, even should they be willing
fo consent fo the sacrifice. If if be assumed that their lives
are a burden even fo themselves, then of course the question
is complicated with another, the lawfulness of suicide, to which
we shall return later on.
It is no doubt quite compatible with this high estimate of the
social affections fo urge that in certain directions Christian
sentiment bas been carried fo extremes. But here it is important
fo bear in mind a principle on which we shall have frequently fo
insist--that we must take into consideration the actual psycho-
logical constitution of human nature, and the impossibility
of modifying if exactly in the way and to the extent to which
we please. If might be diflïcult without this principle fo justify
out absolute condemnation of the extinction of extremely mis-
shapen infants. If would be difflcult, that is, fo maintain
a p'iori that if would not be a gain to society fo eliminate the
infants most grossly and obviously unfitted for life, were it nog
for the fact of the horror which the idea actual]y excites in
humane persons. The moral reformer who should feel inclined
I9o IDEAL UTILITARIANISM [Book I
to uggest some modification of the existing custom will, however,
reflect on the extreme value of the feelings which such a sugges-
tion would shock, the extreme diflâculty of drawing the line
between the iermitted and the unpermitted elimination, and the
impossibility of securing that interference with spontaneous
emotions shall stop just where he wants if fo stop. He will
remember the ease with which the kindly inhibition of an
unhal0py lire might degenerate (in individual parents and in
society af large) into a mere selfish repudiation of trouble,
priv,tion or anxiety, and the encouragement which any extension
of the practice would give to materialistic and hedonistic views
of life. We condemn infanticide, because we consider the feelings
which the prohibition cultivates fo be of more intrinsic worth
than the good which if secures. Given the actual psychological
constitution of human nature, we may even judge if best that
such questions should not be raised af all: but, if they are
raised, there is no principle upon which they can be decided but
this of the comparative worth of the sentiments and type of
character encouraged by that prohibition and of the social advan-
rages which might accrue from ifs relaxation. While I have
no doubt that on the whole the establlshed rule is right, if is
possible that in certain extreme cases the Christian sentiment
bas been pushed too far, and that in the case of actual monsters
or beings entirely destitute of human intelligence, in vhich if
is possible fo draw a fairly definite line, and in which the lire
that is preserved is as valueless from a moral as if is from
a hedonistic point of view, an exception mighb be ruade 1.
If appears that this was the recognized doctrine both for Church and
State in Christian countries in the seventeenth century: see constant allu-
sions fo it in connexion with the difficulty of defining the term ' man' in
the works of Leibniz. In ' Some Remarks on Punishment' in the Inter-
national Jourual of Ethics (vol. iv, x893-4, p. 269 sq.), Mr. Bradley assumes
the whole of the modern aversion fo infanticide fo be due fo wht he would
regard as a pure superstition about the taking of human lire. That the
feeling of the sanctity of lire, assumed fo be prescribed by direct divine
revelation, bas historically exercised some influence in this direction can
hardly be denied ; but that so deeply-seated and widely-spread an ethical
change should be due entirely fo ' superstition' or fo merely theological ideas
(reasonble or unreasonable) is a view which will probably commend itself
only fo anti-Christian fanaticism. The Buddhistic feeling against the taking
Chap. vil, iii] DUTY OF SELF-CULTURE 9
Another possible case in which a vMuable sentiment has been
indulged fo an exaggerated extent may perhaps be found in the
practice of preserving, ai immense risk fo warders and doctors,
the lires of homicidal maniacs.
III
I pass on to consider some other of the less obviously utilitarian
virtues and duties. Through all of them there seems fo run the
general principle that a higher value should be attributed fo
the exercise and cultivation of the higher--that is fo say,
of the intellectual, oesthetic, and emotionalwfaculties than fo
the indulgence of the merely animal and sensual part of our
nature. We regard knowledge, culture, enjoyment of beauty,
intellectual activity of all kinds, and the enotions connected
with these things, as having a higher value than the pleasures
arising from the gratification of the mere animal propensities to
eating and drinking or physical exercise or the like' What
of life, however little in ifs exaggeration capable of rational defence, is af
all events sufficient fo show that the sentiment with which we have to deal
is hot the mere influence of a supposed divine command inherited by Chris-
tianity from Judaism. Noreover, if is worthy of note that the practice
advocated by Nr. Bmdley was condemned by the best pagans. Even Plato,
fo whom llr. Bradley appeals, did hot approve of the deliberate bringing
into existence of children expressly designed for the slaughter-house ; he
sanctioned infanticide only in case of children born of parents who had
passed the prescribed age ; while Aristotle condemned infanticide for the
mere purpose of reducing population, and allowed if only in the case of
misshapen infants. For a sanction fo 'social surgery' of the wholesale
type advocated by Nr. Bradley we must descend below the level of the
' higher Paganism.'
' We may legitimately attribute a higher va.lue fo athletic enjoyment
than to mere gratification of the senses because (a)athletic exercises
(especially in the form of gaines) in moderation are as conducive fo the due
activity of the intellect as in excess (an excess very soon reached) they are
detrimental fo if, (b) because (especially in men of small moral or intellectual
capacities) they supply a useful antidote fo till more animal propensities,
(c) because they do cultivate some moral and inte]lectual qualifies. I might
say more on this side of the matter if it were hot for the enormous exaggera-
tion of the moral value of athletics which is popular af the present moment,
and which is threatening the higher life of the nation no less than the
prestige of out commerce and the efficiency of out army. The fallacy of
the arguments commonly used by those schoolmasters who encourage the
9 z IDEAL UTILITARIANISM [Book I
is the relative value of these things as compared with activities
of a directly social character, is a question on which we may have
fo say something hereafter. If is not necessary fo deny that the
encouragement even of such intellectual pursuits as are of the
least direct and obvious social utility does lead fo an increase of
pleasure on the whole, bus our feeling about them is nos based
upon any such doubtful calculations : and assuredly there are
many cases where an individual would find if difficult fo justify
the devotion of his whole rime fo pursuits which bring pleasure
only fo himself, and perhaps a very small circle of other people,
when if might be bestowed upon work which would undoubtedly
bring pleasure or a saving of pain fo large numbers, if he thought
that all pleasure was of equal worth, that nothing was of any
value bus pleasure, and that conduct was right only in so far as
if tends fo increase of pleasure.
This general principle of the superiority of certain parts of
our nature fo others--the more purely human fo the more
animal--is the roof of two sers of virtues :--
x. Of those virtues (though moderns are not much in the habit
of thinking of them as virtues aS all) which consist in the
exercise of the higher intellectual and oesthetic faculties :
OE. Of the virtues which consist in the due control or sub-
ordination of the lower or more animal impulses.
Of the first we need nos speak more aS length, except in
one connexion. This seelns fo be the place to say a word
about the source of our respect for Truth. Granted the great
social utility of being able fo take a man's word (suy in com-
mercial transactions), if is obvious, fo my mind, that upon
hedonistic assmnptions the exceptions would be much more
numerous than would commend themselves aS least fo a well-
brought-up Englishman. There would be no reason why we
should resist that tendency fo say (in matters of no importance),
exaggerations of Athleticism seems fo lie chiefly in assuming () that the
qualifies undoubtedly cultivated by gaines cannot be cultivated in any other
way, (.) that the resource, initiative, self-control, habit of co-operution,
prompt action, &c., cultiwted in one particular wy will trunsfer themselves
to other spheres. Experience does hot seem fo favour either assumption. A
football player who excels in ' combination ' is quite as likely us other men
fo play for his own hand in real life.
Chap. vii,§ iii] VERACITY i93
af any expense fo Truth, what would be agreeable fo the hearer
which is, indeed, almost sanctioned by the current morality of
some civilized nations. If is of course possible fo enumerate
many inconveniences--particularly what we may call moral
inconveniences, loss of any opportunities of learning our defects
and the like--which result from such a toleration of minor lying.
But, entirely apart from all such considerations, I believe that
we do on reflection recognize something intrinsically fitting in
the rule which prescribes that a mtional being, endowed with
faculties which enable him to pursue, to communicate, and to
love the truth, should use those faculties in that way rather
than for the purpose of making things appear otherwise than
as they are. So much appears fo me fo be the clear result
of introspection, and to be implied in the strongest moral
convictions of oçher men. But, it is equally easy go show
that to erect the principle of Veracity into a hard and fasb
rule admitting of no exceptions is out of harmony with the
belief and the practice of the most conscientious persons. Where
some conventional use of language is sufficiently recognized,
formal untruths may no doubt be removed from the category
of lies proper by çhe principle thaç words must be çaken go
mean what they are commonly understood fo mean. In this
way we may defend the formal ' hOt t home,' the usual forms
of social and epistolary salutation, the hyperboles of courtly
compliment, though in proportion as these latter pass beyond
the minimum of fixed convention their justification becomes
more precarious. But çhis principle is inpplicable fo the actuM
deception practised by detectives, or by private persons towards
a brigand inquiring the whereabouts of his victim, or to the
denial of bad news fo sick persons, or to lies told for the
preservation of important secrets, or to the employment of
ancient formulae {a political oath, a declaration imposed by some
ancient Stature, or a confession of faiçh 1), which nobody takes
quite literlly, but wiçh respect go which the limiçs of per-
missible latitude are hOt definitely fixed by universally under-
a I have discussed this particular applîcation of the principle in an article
in the International Journal of Ethics, ' Prof. Sidgwick on Religious Con-
formity,' vol. III (Jan. I897).
RASHDALL X 0
94 IDEAL UTILITARIANISM [Book I
stood and accepted custom. Of course, in proportion as these
exceptions fo the rule of truth-speaking are generally recognized,
part of the moral objection fo them disappears. Though they
in some cases deceive for the moment the particular person fo
whom they are aldressed, they do hOt fo any important extent
tend fo weaken respect for truth, the habit of telling the truth,
and the general confidence in other people's statements.
If is no doubt much fo be desired that a general under-
standing should be arrived ai about such matters. But as
a marrer of fact no such general understanding does exist,
and the absence of such an understanding forms an insuperable
objection fo finding even in the case of Veroeity--the stronghold
of popular Intuitionism--the case of an intuitively discerned
rule of conduct, universally binding without any consideration
of consequences. From our point of view we have no difficulty
in reconciling the ' intuitive' basis of the virtue with the occur-
rence of exceptions based upon consideration of consequences,
Truth-speaking is a good, and so (still more) is that inward
love of truth of which truth-speaking is the expression and
the guarantee. If is almost invariably right fo speak the
truth, because if is morally good both for ourselves fo speak
if and for others fo hear if, even when if is unplesant fo
both parties. But there are other goods besides truth-speaking
and truth-loving: and sometimes Truth must be scrificed fo
the more imperative claires of Humanity or of Justice. In
each case we must decide which is of the greatest worth--the
peaking of truth and the habit of speaking if which my
lie would tend fo discourage, or the life which my lie will
save, the injustice that if will prevent, the practical good which
if will enable me to do, the greater truth which if will enable
me to diffuse. There are even cases in which a lie has fo be
told in the interests of Truth itself. An untrue statement
must be moee fo one man in order fo keep a secret which
one has promised fo respect; a statement literally untrue must
be malle that a higher truth may be taught or real liberty of
thought and speech advanced .
This is udmirably put by H6ffding (EtMk, p. I78 ) : ' The duty of spe.king
the truth .mounts fo this, the duty of 10romoting the suprem.cy of the truth
Chap. vii, § iii] TRUTH-SEEKING x95
Iç will be observed thaç I have drawn no hard and fasç
distinction beçween çhe duçy of Veracity and çhe duty towards
Truth in a wider and more speculative sense. And if seems
fo me of greaç practical importance to insisç çhaç the social
duty of Veraciçy and çhe duçy of sciençific enquiry ultimately
spring from tshe same roots, tshough in tshe case of Veracity
the duty is more direcçly and immediately dependenç upon
our social relations. We ought noç tolie one to another
recognized by St. Paul), because we are' members one of another,'
because we do noç like to hear lies old to ourselves, and oughç
noç to like them even when they are pleasant. Deception implies
wanç of respect for çhe personaliçy of others. But, after all,
the distinction is only one of degree, for there is some social
reference even in the duty of seeking sl0ecultive truth.
is under ordinary circumstances best for ourselves and for
others that we should seek and make known the truth in
matters of Religion and of Science as well as about the
of common life. Iç is important to insist upon the close
connexion between a very practical duty and one which is
intimately associated with the highest intellectual aspirations
for two reasons. Iç emphasizes the fact that the social duty
is noç confined t the mere abstinence from false statements
(though of course the negtive rule is capable of more exact
definition and admiçs of fewer legitimate exceptions than
(" die Wahrheit zur Herrschafg zu bringen ") : the end may, however, often
be interfered with by speaking the truth.' So Sir Leslie Stephen: 'The
rule, "Lie hot," is the extelnal rule, and corresponds approximately to the
infernal rule, " Be trustworthy."... Truthfulness is the rule because in
the vast majority of cases we trust a mon in so for as he speaks the truth : in the
exceptional cases the mutual confidence would be violated when the truth
hot when the lie, is spoken' (A Study of Ethics p. 2o8). So the insistence
upon a strict and literal interpretation of political or religious formulae
often opposed to the interests of Truth. The mon too scrupulous to join
party, some part of whose programme does hot express his real mind, or to
subscribe a creed details of which are obsolete, often does less thon he might
do fo propagate the truth. Such protests often bave their value, but if is
perhups the tendency of conscientious persons fo over-estimate this negative
devotion to Truth. In the case of the actual ' pious fraud ' or «rra;or «o
it is most commonly the minor, hot the major premiss of the moral syllogism
which is questionable. Such frauds would be justifiable if (when all their
consequences are considered) they were socially beneficLul.
196 IDEAL UTILITARIAb[ISM [Book I
positive), and if furher illustrates how the admission of ex-
ceptions is compatible with the fullest recognition of an'intuitive'
basis for the duty. If may be recognized as a general principle
that if is a duty fo seek for and fo reveal the truth in spire
of the fct that ifs discovery often seems fo weaken or fo
shatter beliefs, institutions, habits, traditions of high social
utility. Even in the most modern rimes I believe that this
duty is inalequately recognized, af least by those who are
in the habit of attaching most value fo what are commonly
called moral considerations in the narrower sense of the word.
There is probably, in this country af least, to much, hOt too
little, unwillingness to communicate fo the ignorant and the
young the results of Science or of scientific Theology, for fear
they should weaken the reverence and the Morality which
have in the past been associated with beliefs no longer tenable.
And yet those who put the duty highest acknowledge
if has af rimes fo give way fo others more imperative still.
:No one but a fanatic thinks if a duty fo proclaim the truth
on every subject, af ail rimes and under all circumstances--
in omnibuses and railway trains, before old and young, simple
and learned, on suitable occasions and unsuitable--with equal
openness and equal insistence. Some respect we ail recognize
if as right fo show fo he known convictions, the sympathies,
the limitations, the prejudices of our hearers; fo the social
convenience of the principle that there is a rime and place
for ail things; fo a host of conventions, traditions, and under-
standin,o'. The principle that all moral judgements are judge-
ments of value, while all value is comparative, supplies us
with an unfailing means of reconciling the highes reverence
for Truth with the limittions which ail sensible and right-
feeling persons recognize fo the duty of actively proclaiming if;
although if does hot (any more than any other ethical principle)
supply us with an infallible mode of discerning what is right
in difficult cases of' conflicting duties 1.,
Of course in the strictest sense there can be no
no doubt true that the duty only begins when the conflict oftruditionul rules
or of real moral principles bas been decided. If one supposed 'duty' is
overruled by another, the former is hot reully . duty. But the expression
is u natural and convenient one.
Chap. vii, § iv] PURITY 97
IV
The due subordination of the appetites, their eontrol in sueh
a way as is most favourable fo the activity of the higher part
of our nature, constitutes the virtue of Temperance in that wider
sense indicated by the Greek «tçpoav, translated by the
Schoolmen tenpe'atia, but for which modern languages have
no single comprehensive naine. In some ways the circumstance
is regrettable, as if tends fo oblivion of the fact that the saine
consideration which dictates the control of the sexual impulse
dictates also moderation not only in drinking but in eating
and (it may be added) in respect of all the lower and more
animal pleasures. On the other hand it has the advantage
of emphasizing the fact that in the degree and kind of control
which the highest Morality imposes upon the sexual appetite
we have advanced beyond the mere nloderation which coin-
rnended itself to the average Greek mind in the rime of
Aristotle.
If is in dealing with the virtue of Purity as if has been
understood by the Christian consciousness, and the higher
religious consciousness even outside the limits of Christendom,
that hedonistic-utilitarian explanations of Morality break down
most hopelessly. If is in reference to this virtue that the
developed moral consciousness does seem most nearly fo assume
the form which Intuitionism gives to all ethical precepts--
that of a prohibition fo do certain acts, a prohibition which
gives no further account of itself, and which positively forbids
any calculation of consequences or admission of exceptions.
While strongly insisting that the moral consciousness in its
highest development does condemn all sexual indulgence outside
monogamous marriage, I should contend that this prohibition
admits of being stated in the form of a judgement as to the
ultimate value of an end. If is a certain state of feeling whieh
is pronounced fo be of intrinsie value--a state of feeling which
the elearest moral insight and the highest spiritual experienee
of the race bave deeided to be incompatible with sexual in-
dulgence outside a relatively permanent monogamous union.
If the moral eonseiousness here see'rns fo forbid M1 ealeulation
x9 8 IDEAL UTILITARIANISM [Book I
of consequences, or comparison of values, if is because from
the nature of the case if is practically impossible that con-
siderations of social well-being should ever prescribe a departure
from the rule. I will hot attempt fo discuss the wholly abnormal
circumstances in which if might be possible fo conceive that
some great advantage, whether for country or for humanity,
might be obtained by submission fo a single act of impurity
af the behest of a tyrant or the like. Without positively
denying that such exceptions might conceivably be found, I will
only point out that even the absolute refusal fo relax the
rule in however extraordinary a case would be quite compatible
with the doctrine that the morality of acts depends upon their
consequences, for i may be held that such a refusal (when we
take into account ifs tendency fo secure respect for the principle
in the eyes of others) is so great a good fo be worth any
sacrifice which has fo be paid for if in any paricular combination
of circumstnces. The man or the woman who brought suffering
on family or country by heroism of this kind would hot be
setting up an arbitrary categorical imperative against the true
interests of the human race, but simply interpreting the true
interests of the race by a non-hedonistic standard of value.
I have said that the law of Purity is the moral precept which
almits of the most exact definition and which gives rise fo the
smallest possibility of exceptions of a kind which will appeal fo
men of highly developed moral nature in modern Christendom.
But if is worth pointing out that there is a side on which the
law is less capable of exact and universally aecepted definition,
and on which if involves questions obviously incapable of sertie-
ment withou reference fo social consequences. There is a con-
sensus, within the limits indicated above, that sexual indulgence
must be limited fo monogamous man'iage. But as fo the exac
conditions which constitute a lawful lnonogamous marriage the
consensus is cerLuinly much less complete--in particular upon
two points, upon the question of prohibited degrees and the
question of divorce. With regard fo prohibited degrees, nothing
much need be said, since if is generally admitted by those
who do not feel that society is bound for all rime by the
decision of the ear]y Church, or of Roman Emperors and their
Chap. vii, § iv] MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 99
ecclesiastical advisers, that the limits must be determined by
considerations of social convenience in the ordinary sense of
the terre. The only way in which the adoption of a non-
hedonistic standard will be likely to modify our attitude tovards
the question will be in reinforcing the demand that the higher
moral aspect of marriage shall be allowed due weight as well as
the question of mere materialistic convenience. We shall ask
noç merely whether the prohibition of marriage with a deceased
wife's sister is most conducive fo the convenience and enjoyment
of widowers and their families, but whether the principle that
marriage-relationship shall be regarded as equivalent to blood-
relationship tends to heighten the general ideal of the marriage
bond. I do not contend that this consideration will practically
be likely to modify the decision to which we should have corne
on other grounds. On the question of divorce, however, this
aspect of the marrer becomes of paramount importance.
Those who take the highest view of the marriage-tie--for
practical pmposes, we may as well say, those who adopt the
Christian view of marriage--are agreed in insisting that if
is part of ifs ideal that such unions shall be permanent. The
idecd of marriage is a spiritual union of a kind which absolutely
forbids any voluntary termination of if, even independently
of the interests of children, which are also no doubt best secured
by the greatest attainable permanence. The question vhether
under particular circumstances, when this ideal bas not been
reached, the dissolution of the marriage with libey fo marry
again is or is not the less of two evils involves precisely the saine
kind of comparison of goods--in this case of very heterogeneous
goods--which we bave seen fo be necessary in every ethical
judgement. Here, as usual, the comparson is not wholly
balancing of higher good against lower: there are moral advan-
rages and moral disadvantages on both sides. On the one hand
there is the moral advantage of insisting ulon the idea of per-
manence, in forcing people fo enter upon marriage with the
deliberate intention of doing all that in them lies fo make if
a permanent and a spiritual union and not a mere partnership
based upon interest and terminable at pleasure: on the other
hand there are the obvious moral objections to the prohibition of
co IDEAL UTILITARIAIISM [Book I
re-marriage where cohabitation bas become impossible. The
question does not seem fo be one which admits of any universal
solution without regard fo circumstances of rime and place:
and itis fo be observed that the moral problem is here not
precisely the saine as the political problem. If is one question
whether people aiming af the highest ideal of lire ought fo
marry again in certain circumstances: if is another question
whether, if people wish fo do so, the State should prevent them.
The question is, therefore, one fo which the State may quite
intelligibly give one answer, and the Church, which is a voluntary
society for the promotion of the highest life, a somewhat different
one. On the other hand any appearance of discord between the
morality of the Church and the morality of the State is itself
a grave source of moral perplexity and relaxation: on such
matters the State, af least in Protestant countries and with the
ma«jority of their inhabitants, is a more powerful moral educator
than the Church. I will leave the subject with the remark that on
this question there is likely fo be a grave difference between the
solutions offered by hedonistic and by non-hedonistic Utili-
tarianism. The logioE1 Hedonist will attach much greater im-
portance than the ethical Idealist fo the hardship involved in
the prohibition of re-marriage fo an offending party , and much
less fo the social importance of inculoEting, even af the cost
of real hardship fo individuals, a high and spiritual ideal of
marriage.
Another question connected with the definition of Purity
is ralsed by the change which is actually passing over the
morality of Europe with regard fo the relation of the sexual
instinct fo the procreation of children. The subject deserves
a passing mention because we have here a great unsettled
problem of Ethics in which differences of ethical theory may
bave a vital bearing upon practical questions of immense moment :
and if is good even from the most purely theoretical point of
view fo bring our ethical theories into contact with real practical
1 I regard the prohibition of marriage even by the Church to the inno-
cent party in the case of adultery as clearly incapable of rational justification
(whatever may be thought about the question of the guilty paoEy): the
Eastern Church has always observed this distinction.
Chap. vil, § iv] AN ETHICAL PROBLEM sot
problems. In Christian countries there has been a tendency
until recently fo condemn all restriction, even of the most purely
negative kind, fo the number of births, and fo represent if as
a moral duty for married persons fo bring into the world the
largest number of children that is physically possible. The rime
is past when such a precept would have been defended on the
ground that a maximum increase of population is in itself, in all
circumstances, a desirable end; though out solution of the
problem may be seriously affected by out view of the degree
of urgency which the population question bas reached. Every one
but a Pessimist will almit that the population of a country
oughç fo be kept up or even (so far as this can be done without
lowering the quality of ifs lire)fo increase; and that therefore
it is a moral duty on the part of married persons to be willing
to undertake the responsibilities of parentage : that is pari of the
ideal of marriage. It does not follow that if is desirable that
population should increase with a maximum rapidity : if that
were so celibay would be immoral. But even apart from the
population question, there are many considerations which may
reasonably be urged against the assumption that large families
are always a good thing: and these considerations are not
all of a hedonistic or materialistic charater. There is the
wife's health, the interference with other than purely domestic
employments, the loss of educational advantages which the
increase of family may entail upon every member of if. Of
course if if is considered desirable that the increase of familles
should sometimes be restrained by rational considerations, the
morality of such restraint may depend much upon the method
adopted. Methods which involve' interference with nature'
are open fo objections which cannot be urged against the method
which involves nothing but self-restraint during certain periods.
The question is one which cannot be discussed in detail here,
though if is one which urgently demands free and candid
examination. Iy object here, as throughout this chapter, is not
so much fo discuss and fo settle detailed questions of Casuistry as
fo point oui the method by which they ought fo be solved. In
this, as in other cases, if we are not fo prove unfaithful fo the
method we have adopted, we must not fall back upon the short
o IDEAL UTILITARIANISM [Book I
and easy method of saying that we have an intuition that all
such methods are wrong. We must fairly estimate on the one
hand the evils of all sorts, moral, intellectual, hedonistic, which
are produced by the over-multiplication of families fo the indi-
viduals primarily concerned and fo the community in general,
on the other the goods which may be secured by the contrary
practice, and compare them with the good and evil involved in
the proposed remedy--the value or unvalue which we attribute
fo the act in itself and fo ifs subsequent effects upon health,
upon character, and upon the whole ideal of lire which if ex-
presses and tends fo foster. We must pronounce on the side
on which we judge the balance of 'good' fo lie.
The other branch of the Greek self-control («oeçpoa/v) is the
one fo which the term Temperance has generally been confined
by modern usage. There is a disposition fo narrow if still
further fo the duty of moderation in drinking, which has nearly
succeeded in eliminating from modern Morality the idea that
there is anything disgraceful in what medieval Ethics styled
'gulosity '--over-eating or excessive addiction fo the ' pleasures
of the table' af whatever expense of money or (what is the saine
thing) of human labour. When taken in the narrower sense
of moderation in drinking, there is undoubtedly no duty that
can be more easily or convincingly inculcated on the most purely
hedonistic grounds, so long as if is understood fo forbid merely
habitual excess in the use of alcohol or similar stimulants. And
of course occasional excess may be condemned on account of the
great probability that if will lead fo more frequent acts of
the saine kind. Nevertheless, the question of the immorality
of occasional drunkenness is one upon which there will be,
as if seems fo me, a real difference between the verdict of hedon-
istic and of ideal Utilitarianism. The hyenic ill-effects of
getting drunk once a month are probably not so bad (for many
men) as the taking of two glasses of port every day after dinner.
For some men the former are in all probability a negligible
quantity, while the two glasses of port would mean certain gout
or chronic dyspepsia. On hedonistic principles an occasional act
of drunkenness would only be condemned because if might lead,
in the man himself and others, fo habits of excess which would
Chap. vii, § iv] TEMPERANCE o 3
hot be innocent, and under many circumstances there is little
risk 1 that such an act will lead o habitual excess. And yet the
healthy moral consciousness does condemn as intrinsically de-
grading even the most occasional act of deliberate drunkenness.
On the method of ideal Utilitarianism such a condemnation will
be justified without any elaborate attempt fo prove the existence
of remoter social ill consequences. We see the act fo be intrin-
sically disgusting, and there is an end of the marrer .
If will be observed that in some of the obligations usually
included under the naine of Purity and in the duty of Temper-
ance we bave clear instances of self-regarding duties. If is true
no doubt that no kind of wrong-doing is without social ill effects,
but in some cases the social ill effect may be simply the encourage-
ment of the like violations of self-regarding duty in others.
There would be no objection fo such encouragement unless the
act were wrong in the individual case. The duty of Self-culture
--of developing one's intellectual and aesthetic capacities in
so far as is compatible with the fulfilment of social obligations--
is another self-regarding duty. On the method of hedonistic
Utilitarianism a man on a deset4 island would have no duties
except fo get as much pleasure as possible, and perhaps to
preserve his capacity for future service in the event of his
rejoining society. The latter contingency being, in the case
supposed, highly problematical, if might be urged that an
Alexander Selkirk would best observe the precepts of the
Utilitarian creed by seeking fo increase his pleasure fo a maxi-
mure point, even though the effect of such indulgence would
be fo incapacitate himself for future service, and fo hasten his
end. ' A shor life and a merry one' would be the aim of any
i I do hot say none. The loss of self-respect which arises from first act
of drunkenness may involve grave consequences, but this is so just because
the man does hot really believe that drunkenness is only wrong so far as if
diminishes pleaure.
2 Of course by drunkenness I meun the voluntary extinction of conscious-
ness and self-congrol for no purpose but momentary pleasure or satisfaction
of impulse. If alcoholic poisoning were suituble anaesthetic for medical
purposes, ifs use might undoubtedly be as justifible as that of chloroform.
In normal circumsances if is obvious that there cn be no remoter good
effects fo outweigh the immediute evil.
o4 IDEAL UTILITARIAqISM [Book I
such consistent Utilitarian who thought that a longer lire of
higher pursuits would not so effecually exinguish the misery
of solitude as ' he shor vehemence' of some carnal pleasure.
On our theory i would be the duy, even of he man accidentally
separated flm society and little likely fo rejoin if, fo cultivate
the higher par of his nature and wih that view fo moderate
his indulgence in such lower pleasures as migh be open o him.
V
Among the virtues which are based upon the principle of
the due subordination of lower fo higher impulses may perhaps
be included the virtue of Humiliy. This virtue is unlike the
various forms of Temperance inasmuch as the impulse which
is suboMinated is not of a purely animal character : pride or he
high estimation of self is a feeling which, though i may have no
doub an instinctive and almos animal impulse as is basis,
arises in ifs human form from desires peculiar fo a rational
nature. There is no passion, I may remark in passing, which
more obsinaely refuses fo be resolved into a desire of pleasure
on he one hand or into any other impulse, such as love of power,
on the oher. The love of power is no doub closely connected
vith the tendency fo self-estimation and self-assertion, but if is
no the saine hing. Love of power is itself a very clear instance
of a' disinterested desire,' though the fact is often forgoten by
Hedoniss owing o the plausibility of the attemp fo resolve
if ino love of he pleasures which power will bring. But love
of power is not the saine thing as pride : if has a closer affiniy
vith vaniy. The pleasure of self-approbation can only be
explained on the supposition that there is already a love of self-
approbation which canno be resolved into a desire for the
pleasure.
The virue of ttumility seems fo call for some further exami-
nation because if is ofen brought forward as a palmary instance
of the non-utilitarian, and even the non-teleological characer,
of our highest ethical judgements. From the poin of view of
hedonistic Utilitarianism the approval of Humility could hardly
be justified except on the ground tha mos people are prone
fo an over-estimation of self (which involves obvious social
Chap. vii, § v] HUMILIT¥ o 5
inconveniences), and that if is therefore desirable fo aim af the
opposite stte of feeling in the hope of reoeMng the desirable
mean. But if is not only from a hedonistic point of view thaS
we may feel a difflculty in admitting that there can be anything
virtuous in an untruthful estimate of one's own powers, attain-
ments, or achievements, whether in the moral, the intellectual,
or any other sphere. The Idealist will feel bound, more even
than the Hedonist, fo aire af Truth; and if may be doubted
whether the undiscriminating exaltation of Humility, con-
sidered as an under-appreciation of self, is the best means of
attaining this end. Il might be urged tht itis more likely
fo lead fo profession, on occasions when such profession
will be belauded, of an estimate which is not really enter-
tained. And yeS if can hardly be seriously maintained that
there is nothing of permanent worth in the Christian ideal
of Humility beyond a common-sense precepS that if is well
fo think rather less of oneself than one is naturally inclined
tv do for fear of thinking too much. The frequent exaggerations
and occasional gross aberrations of Christian sentiment on this
marrer may be admitted: and yet we have only fo think of
Aristotle's revolting picture of the high-souled man (geahg¢/vxoç) 1
fo realize that5 even the least Christian modern Moralist5 will recoil
from thaV proud insistence upon one's own merits which is more
or less the tendency of all pagan thought, af least till the second
century of the Christian era, upon this marrer. The solution of
the difficulty seems to be that we should approve a truthful
estimate of one's own powers and merits as being most favour-
able fo moral progress, intellectual self-development, and
fo social usefulness; but thaç we should disapprove of any
habitual dwelling with satisfaction upon one's own capacities
or one's own merits for two reasons. Any true or worthy con-
ception of the moral ideal places too great5 a gulf between that
ideal and the actual performance (in his own view) even of
a good man fo permit5 him any great self-complacency af the
thought that he is better than the majority of his neighbours.
i EtMc. Nicomach., IV, § 3 (P- 23b). Of course I ara aware of the
explntions by which all superior people are accustomed to defend the
Aristotelian idel.
¢)6 IDEAL UTILITARIANISM [Book I
In most men af least this feeling will be strengthened by the
recognition that the difference between themselves and their
fellows is largely due fo the influence of others in the present or
the past, and hOt fo any efforts which begin exclusively with
themselves. To use theological language, the good man will ascribe
his goodness to'grace,' recognizing that his good qualifies are
due in the first instance fo parentage, influence, example, social
tradition, education, community, Church, and ultimately, if he is
a religious man, fo God : he will care for goodness too much for
ifs own sake fo treat if as a ground for self-satisfaction af his own
achievement as compared with that of others. And that brings
us fo the second ground upon which the high ethical value of the
]:[umility raay be considered to rest. The good man cares too
rauch for others fo derive pleasure from the thought that they
are worse than himself. His highest goodness is too much
pervaded by the impulse of self-communication fo be regarded
as a private possession which is enjoyed because if is he that has
if rather than some one else. The Saint OEnnot help being
aware that he has certain qualifies of character which many
men lack, but so far from wishing fo keep his virtues fo himself
he will wish that they were common as the air of heaven, that
' all the Lord's people were prophets.' ]:[e will, moreover, recog-
nize in others goodness, or af least capacities of goodness, which
will prevent his treating the worst of raen with anything
1 If may be objected that if a nn is fo ascribe his virtue8 (in . 8ense)
to God or the Universe, so may he his vices. Humility will be saved af the
expense of Remorse. In so far as this difficulty is theological or meta-
physical, I shall deal with if in the chupter on Free-will (Book III,
chap. iii) : from the merely ethical point of view I should contend that,
just as the considemtion I .m insisting on is hOt inconsistent with a due
approvl of and stisfaction in one's own good qualifies, so the reflection
that a nn did hOt make his own originl bad tendencies will hOt be
inconsistent with disapproval of those tendencies and dissatisfaction with
himself so long as he yields fo them. The saine consideration will
condemn an exaggerted contemplation of one's own originl bad ten-
dencies no less thun exggerated self-complacency af one's good ones.
If tho good man will be more disposed to dwell upon the share of other
persons or of the Universe in the production of his good qualifies than
upon their share in the production of his bad ones, that is becuuse if is
morally healthier, more conducive fo moral progress, fo do so,
Chap. vii, § ri] SUICIDE o 7
approaching contempt. When those capcities are unrealized,
he will feel sorrow and pity rather than smug self-complacency.
Itis hot so much by his opinion of himself that the Aristotelian
' magnanimous man' disgusts us as by his contempt for other
people. Humility then turns out fo be no separate, distinct,
isolated, non-social virtue '--a sort of arbitrary appendix fo the
code of duty to one's neighbour introduced (as seems fo be
suggested in some quarters) by special divine decree for the
express purpose of showing the inalequcy of all rational prin-
ciples of hlorality. The duty flows directly from the general
principle of the individual's subordination fo the whole society.
Any attempt fo cultivate the virtue in and for itself is likely
fo be suicidal: if is simply one particular aspect of the ideal
attitude towards the moral ideal on the one hand and towards
one's neighbour on the other. Pride means self-absorption;
Humility is simply the consequence of absorption in something
higher and something wider. Just as truc Benevolence does hot
involve absolute forgetfulness or neglect of self, so truc Humility
does hot demand a voluntary ignorance of one's real capcities
or character, or forbid the assertion of one's claires in ways con-
sistent with due respect for the claims of others. Humility only
involves a due subordination of self-love fo those social impulses
in the satisfaction of which alone the truc or higher self-love can
attain ifs end. Truc Humility is but an aspect of truc love
of one's neighbour.
VI
The question of Suicide is one of so exceptional a character
that a writer on Ethics may fairly be asked how he proposes
fo deal with if. If will be unnecessary fo enlarge upon the
various utilitarian reasons against suicide in the vast majority
of cases. Even if life be hedonistically hot worth living, it
1 Thut ttumility is reully u kind of Churity is well recognized by St.
Thomus Aquinus, who is entirely free from the medieval tendency to encouruge
excessive self-debusement, tic condemns ' Pusillunimitus' us severely as
Aristotle. In principle he ex.ctly hits the weak points of the Aristotelian
ideul when he condemns the vuinglorious mun, becuuse ' uppetitum glorlae
suae non refert in debitum finem, putu ad honorera Dei, vel proximi salutem '
(Summa Theol., II, Pt. ii, Q. x32 ).
o8 IDEAL UTILITARIAblISM [Book I
is possible to do something to diminish its miseries. Only if
there were reason to hope that the practice could be largely
imitated, would a pessimistic Hedonism inc]ude suicide among
its duties. Itis only when a man's lire becomes burdensome
to others as well as to himself that the hedonistic Utilitarian
would seem logically bound to sanction it. When, however,
lire is looked upon as possessing value on other than hedonistic
grounds, it can no longer be pronounced to have lost that value
the moment it ceases to yield a balance of pleaure on the whole
either to the individual or to society. This consideration is
amply sufficient fo condemn the act in a vast number of caes in
which it might seem rational enough on hedonistic grounds.
If would not tend to a right estimate of the relative importance
of the higher and lower goods for a man to give up the struggle
to live nobly the moment he begins to doubt whether if is
hedonistically worth the pain that it costs, or for society to
allow him to do so as soon as his services cease to bring ita net
gain of pleasure. It may be thought, however, that even allow-
ing its due weight to this consideration, there are extreme cases
in which it becomes difficult to defend the peremptory rule
of modern Christianity when once itis admitted that pain is an
evil. There are rimes when life seems to have lost its value
from an intellectual and a moral point of view as well as from a
hedonistic one. When lire has reduced itself to a slow and pain-
ful process of dying, why, it may be thought, should we prolong
a useless agony which seems tobe as incompatible with moral
effort as with enjoyment of lire ? On this question I will only
make the following remarks, premising that they are not intended
as a full and alequate discussion of the subject :
(I) It is impossible, as I have several rimes remarked, to con-
struct de "novo an idem of human lire without taking into
consideration the actual constitution of human nature, including
feelings about conduct which from a purely rational point of
view seem difficult to account for. I do not regard the exis-
tence of such feelings as final arguments for or against particular
kinds of conduct. They cannot dispense us from the necessity of
passing upon them ourjudgements of value. It is always possible
that such feelings, however strong and widely diffused, may
Chap. vii, § vil SUICIDE AND IMMORTALIT¥ 209
in some cases be feelings which Reason must disregard. But when
in a general way the feeling commends itself to us as possessing
high moral value, or as intimately associated with what possesses
high value, the wise man will hesitate to defy if in particular
cases, even though a p'iori he mlght have been inclined fo
doubt whether ifs value is great enough fo overbalance what
is sacrificed fo if.
(2) Although the value of the higher life is not dependent
upon ifs duration, the comparative value of higher and lower
goods may be considerably affected by the answer which is given
fo the question how long the consequences of moral effort may
be expected fo last. There are many cases in which I should
myself be unable fo regard as rational the prohibition of suicide
without admitting the postulate of Immortality. The good will
is possible even in extremest agony, but the good will is not all
that is necessary for Well-being; and if does not seem possible
fo decide whether the continuance of moral discipline is worth
the prolongation of an existence from which all else that gives
value fo life has departed without asking what are to be the
fruits of this moral discipline, whether if is rational fo hope for
another state in which the character thus formed may have
further opportunities of expressing itself in moral activity and
of producing that happiness without which all other good must
be incomplete. I may add that this is almost the only case
(unless we include also the somewhat parallel question of infan-
ticide) in which the answer fo any detailed question of Ethics
can rationally be affected by the answer that is given fo a purely
theological problem. Our attitude towards Morality in general--
the whole tone and temper of our ethical life--is likely to be
profoundly modified by our acceptance or rejection of fundamental
theological ideas ; but I hardly know of any other detailed ques-
tion of Casuistry (except of course those connected with what
may be called in the narrower sense religious or ecclesiastical
duties), about which what is the rational solution for a Christian
or a Theist could be pronounced irrational for one who does not
think if reasonable fo entertain even the hope of Immortality. 1
I may by anticipation explain that I do hot regard any external authority
as infallible.
Io IDEAL UTILITARIANISM [Book I
(3) We shall hereafter have fo consider the weight which
an individual ought fo attach fo those ethical judgements of
other men which have taken shape in established rules and
institutions, and in paricular fo the ethical judgement of the
best men--in a word the place of Authority in Ethics. This
is precisely a case in which the wise man will feel bound fo
remember the great weight of authority fo which the absolute
rule against suicide may appeal 1. A strong feeling against
suicide seems fo he the spontaneous deliverance of the moral
consciousness, wherever the Christian view of life, with ifs ideas
of discipline, educati0n, or moral probation, and ifs sense of
responsibility fo a divine Father, is ccepted. If was the accept-
ance of this faith' by a society in which suicide was one of the
commonest ways of quitting lire which created the modern
tradition on the subject. The strength of the feeling is the more
remarkable in the entire absence of any express prohibition
either in the Jewish or the Christian scriptures. Any one who
sympthizes with this general view of lire will give ifs due
weight fo this accumulation of authority before he proceeds
No doubt if may be urged that there may be just as many possible
opportunities of moral discipline in another life as there are in this,
and that we might as reasonably refuse fo inoculate against small-pox,
on account of the moral discipline which small-pox may involve, as refuse
to cure a diseased life by a voluntary death. (Cf. Hume's Essay on Suicide.)
I should submit that the two cases are hOt parallel. We do know tolerably
vell the consequences of curing disease or refusing to cure if, and we judge
that, though there is some good fo be got by voluntal:y endurance of pain,
there is more good fo be got on the whole by fighting against if, and using
one's life for work and for enjoyment. In the case of Suicide we do hot
know enough about the consequences of the two alternatives fo make such a
comparison of moral advantages and disadvantages. We do not know whether,
if opportunities of moral discipline and self-improvement are voluntarily
thrown away here, other such opportunities will be afforded in another
life. I freely adroit, however, that such merely negative considerations
ould hot be sufficient fo condemn Suicide, but for the strong moral instinct
against if which seems fo accompany a certain stage of moral development--
an instinct so strong that if supplies (for those who believe that the course
of things is directed by Reason towards an End) a presumption that if has
a purpose in the economy of the Universe. I adroit that such instincts and
the presumptions founded upon them are not final: but a man ought fo
be very sure of his ground before he overrules them.
Chap. vii, § vi] SOlfIE PROBLEMS
fo inVroduce eiVher in Vheory or pracVice an exeepVion Vo this
rule, even in Vhose exVreme cases where his own unassisted moral
eonsciousness mighV have felV disposed Vo do so.
I have been speaking of Vhe general rule. There are no doubV
exeepVional cases in which suicide, or someVhing which iV is
diffieulV Vo distinguish from suicide, would be generally approved.
Where a sufficienV .objeeV is Vo be aVVained by iV, Vhe voluntary
eourting of deaVh becomes the sublimesV heroism: and, if iV
be held thaV only Vhe aeVual wielding of Vhe weapon or voluntary
swallowing of Vhe poison eonsViVutes suicide, a liVVle ingenuiVy
naighV possibly reveal exeepVional cases where an unselfish
objecV of greaV imporVance eould only be aehieved by such an
acV of self-slaughter. The strong feeling againsV multiplying
sueh cases or aecustoming men even to eontemplate their possi-
bility is, as I have eontended, a healVhy one. I will only venVure
Vo suggest a doubV wheVher Vhe idea VhaV iV is an absolute duty,
under ail eireumstanees, Vo prolong lire to Vhe lasV momenV
aV which medical skill and eare ean prolong iV is noV someVimes
earried to exVremes. IV is a remarkable faeV VhaV when iV was
rumoured thaV Vhe imprisoned Europeans in Pekin had deVer-
nained in the lasV resorV Vo shoot Vhemselves and their wives,
raVher Vhan face certain Vorture and dishonour aV Vhe hands
of Vhe barbarians, noV a word was heard in condemnaVion of thaV
resolve. When the alternaVive between a more or a less painful
form of deaVh is brought abouV by disease and noV by human
agency, are we bound Vo choose Vhe more painful ? May it noV
at leasV be said VhaV, when disease has reached a certain poinV,
Vhe Physician may frankly reeognize VhaV to save pain rather
than to prolong life should be his primary aire ? And perhaps
this is noV going mueh beyond Vhe acVual pracViee of the medical
profession in recenV rimes.
I eannoV buV feel that in my treaVmenV of Vhis quesVion I may
seem Vo some to be hesitating beVween a frank aeceptanee and
a Vhorough-going rejecVion of whaV are commonly called ' Intui-
rions.' BuV the reason for this is, I believe, Vo be soughV in Vhe
naVure of Vhings, in the real difficulty of disVinguishing mere
feelings or aversions whieh may be only prejudiees due to
inheritanee or environmenV or supersViVion from real judgemenVs
I IDEAL UTILITARIAIISM [Book I
of value 1. And yet I am clear that the two things must be
distinguished. Incest is not wrong simply because if shocks
me, but because I judge that the feeling which revolts from
incest is one which deserves respect. The idea of eating rat's
flesh inspires me with horror, but under some circumstances
I ara clear that if would be a duty fo eut if. There are cases
where if is less easy fo discriminate between pathological
aversion and moral condemnation. The only approach fo a test
by which fo effect such a discrimination that I can suggest
is fo put the question--does the spontaneous aversion or apparent
intuition disappear after full reflection upon the act itself as well
as upon all circumstances and consequences ? If an intuition--an
apparently unaccountable repugnance to some kind of conduct--
persists after a due consideration of all the consequences of
yielding to if, if may probably be taken fo represent not merely
a feeling, but a feeling fo which the moral Reason attributes
intrinsic value. If it disappears, if may be dismissed as a
pathological affection, due o mere education or environment,
which iL is rational fo ignore. The aversion fo cruelty remains
even when we bave satisfied ourselves that coursing causes
an amount of pleasure fo some Englishmen and bull-fighting
fo most Spaniards which greatly outweighs the pain caused
I , As knowledge arises unperceived from the excitations of experience if
develops a host of prepossessions, purtly true, partly erroneous .... Just in
the saine way there axise from the orinal nature of the mind and the
silently working influences of circumstunces many prepossessions, some truc
and some erroneous, concerning what we ought to do ; if we examine our-
selves, we find that af first if is on]y belief in Duty in general and in
binding luws of action thut stands out with clearness and self-evidence ; but
whut these laws are, and how far we can comprehend them in their purity
depends partly upon the influence of externul conditions of life, which
moderute or excite our blind impulses, partly upon the accuracy with which,
in reflection, we sepurate the general commands of Conscience from the
individual forms in which, as applicable to the particular circu/nstances of
our own life, they first press themselves upon us' (Lotze Mictvcosmus, E. T., I,
pp. 7Io-I). I-Iow far . study of the psychological and evolutionary origin of
our moral intuitions or instincts may assist the process of discrimination
between permanently valid moral judgements and inherited prejudices
or survivals of an eurlier morulity, I hure considered in . luter chapter
(Book III, chap. iv).
Chap. vii, § vii] DIFFICULTIES OE13
to hare and bull and horses. Ou the other hand a Jew or an
eastern Christian probbly experiences no less horror af the
thought of eatiug blood-pudding, aud a strictly educated Scotch-
lllall af the thought of Sunday lin]sic. But in these cases, when
the man learns the history of the traditions about Sabbath-
observauce and the eating of blood, he ceases fo attach auy
moral value or authority fo the scruple, though for a rime
the mere subjective feelings may retin something of their oh!
intensity.
In lnost cases if is possible in this way fo break up an intuitive
moral feeling iuto the fecling and the judgement that accompanies
if. But in other cases this analysis is hy no mems easy. I do
hot believe that there is any infallible logical or psychological
process fol" distinguishing betwcen retl judgements or" value aud
mere prejudices or vflueless instincts, any more timn there is
any infallible receipt for correct reasoning. If there were,
the diiilculties l)oth of ethical speculation and of practicl
lire would for the most part distppear. But the difflculty
of the process, of which such case ts that of suicide may
be considered the extrelnesg illustration, contains in if nothing
to make us doubt :--(D that Morality ultimately rests upon
immediate judgements of value ; (z) that a feeling--whether the
feeling arises from the contemplation of the act or from the act
itself--can legitimately be a ground of action only when ap-
proved by a judgement of value ; (3) that no moral judgement
can be considered final in which the moral Retson has hot
contemplated all the foreseeable consequences of au action beforc
l.)tssing ifs judgement of value.
Vil
So far it has been assumed that the moral criterion is con-
stituted by the etict of the action upon the good of mankind.
If seems unnecessary af every turn to add ' and of aninals in
so far as their good can be promoted by human action': but
in strictness (as was contended by John Stuart Mill), this ought,
I believe, alvays to be included. The idea of taking into con-
sideration the good of animais w]ll no doul)t seem fo manv
OE4 IDEAL UTILITARIANISM [Book I
extravagant. A disposition o minimize the intelligence of animals,
and the importance of their sufferings, is a raditional prejudice
of the metaphysical mind. The prejudice was no doubt in-
herited from Theology, but prejudices of theological origin
often continue rampnt in the philosophical field long after
Theology, more in touch with changes of popular sentiment,
bas got rid of them. Philosophers will hot nov, like the
Cartesian who denied feeling to the brutes or Spinoza who
admitted it , boldly pronounce t]mt we may do wlmt we
like vith the tnimals. tut still there is an unwillingness
fo adroit tht the suflrings of animals really matter. If is,
we are told ly vriters of the school of Green, hot in the
interest of animal well-being, but in that of out own hunmnity
that we ought fo avoid causing t.hem unnecessary suffering.
I bave alreacly dwelt upon the illogicality of this position in
speaking of the question whether pleasure is part of the end
for nmnkind. The same considerations which apply fo the
case of hunmn pleasure apply also fo tlmt of animais. If the
suflring of animals is no evil, it cannot be inhumane in me
fo cause if. If it is an evil, if mus be my duty to prevent
if. The well-being of animals thenw]mtever well-being they
nre capable of--seems fo me quite distinctly fo possess some
value, and therefore fo form part of that good which constitutes
the ethical end. From a practical point of viev no doubt
the duty becomes very much more of a negative than a positive
one. For if rarely happens in practice that we can do much
' Nec tmen nego brut sentire: sed nego, quod proptere non licet
nostre utilituti consulere et iisden d libitum uti, edemque trctre, prout
nobis rngis convenir; qundoquidem nobiscum n,tur non conveniunt et
eorum uffectus ub ffectibus humanis sunt ntur divesi' {EtMca, P. IV,
Prop. XXXVI], Schol. ). Such is Spinoz's quite logicl deduction from
the theory which bses my neighbour's clims simply upon the fact thut my
good nd his re ' , common good,' nd not on the fct tht ech hs vlue.
Perhaps the first Philosopher fo ssert strongly the duty of humnity to
nimls wus Schopenhuer, who condemns Kant for resting it merely upon
the tendency of cruelty fo spreal from beast fo mn, instead of treting
nimls s (in their way) ends in themselves (Die Grudlegug d. Moral., § 8,
E. T., p. 94)- The claires of unima]s are fully recognized by H6ffding (Et]dk,
pp. I72, I73) : 'That the beast is hot to be treated as a mere meuns, follows
ut once from his capacity for puin.'
Chap. vii, § viii DUT¥ TO ANIMALS 5
fo promote the positive well-being of anîmals, af least of animais
not in a state of captivity; and, although we do assign some
value fo the well-being of domestic animals, it is, we think,
of very small value in comparison with that which we seg
upon human well-being. While, therefore, we should condemn
the infliction of needless torture upon the brutes, we should
generally condemn any large expenditure of hunmn energy
in ministering to their comforts and luxuries. What is the
comparative value of animal pleasure or of the avoidance of
animal suffering as compared either with hunmn pleasure and
pain or with the higher good of man is a question on which
wide differences of opinion exist, as is shown by the much-
debated question of Vivisection. I do not propose now fo
discuss that problem in detail. I will merely say that from
the point of view which I have taken up it is not possible
either to deny that it may sometimes be right to inflict unmerited
suffering upon an animal or to declare that no amount of animal
suffering can be of any importance when compared with the
smallest amount of human convenience or the smallest azcession
fo human knowledge. The whole question is one of comparative
value: and that is one which no formula can settle 1.
If will be observed that I have assumed that the sole good
of which animals are capable is pleasure, and that for them there
exists no evil but pain. Such is the only hypoçhesis on which,
in our profound ignorance of animal minds, it seems reasonable
to act. No doubt it would be diflàcult to deny that the domesti-
cation or education of animals, in some cases amounting almost
fo their participation in human friendship, nmy constitute a sort
of higher good, and may be looked upon as possessing something
more than a merely hedonistic value: but I cannot follow an
enthusiastic writer in the 1.terational Journal of Ethics who
has lately conçended that animais have a right not merely fo
pleasure bug to ' self-realization .'
1 The only adequate and philosophical discussion of the question which
I have seen is fo be found in Edmund Gurney's essay in Tertitm (uid. He
decides for a moderate and st.rictly regulated permission of Vivisection.
The _l?i#tts ofA»inals, by ]=Ienry S. Sait (Jan., 9oo).
i 6 IDEAL UTILITARIA_N ISM [Book I
VIII
The view of Ethics which has now been sketched hcks a
recognized naine, and if is a misfortune that if does so: for
modes of thought which have no names often rail fo obtain
the currency of those which have. The terre Utilitarianism
is irretrievably associated with Hedonism; and the word In-
tuitionism, the only creed which is popularly recognized as
the opposite of Utilitarianism, is inevitably suggestive of the
crude and absurd theory that the morality of an act can be
determined apart from ifs consequences. And yet the view
expounded in this chapter has been widely held. If is the view
of Plto and of Aristotle, though in them there is always a
tendency to make Morality consist in the pursuit of the individual's
own well-being, unhedonisticalIy understood, strongIy as if was
asserted, especially by Plato, that that individual's own good
was essentially bound up with that of his society. If was the
view of all the older English Moralists, in whom Platonic and
Aristotelian traditions were universalized by Christianity--the
view of Cumberland, of the Cambridge ilatonists, and (sub-
stantially} of Clarke. If was equally the view of the Moral
Sense school, which arose when in Locke the rationalistic
tendency had sunk back into Theological Hedonism: for Hut-
cheson, the author of the famous 'greatest happiness of the
greatest number 1' formula, recognized the superior 'dignity'
of some pleasures and of some persons as compared with that of
others. If was very seldom, indeed, that the propositîon that
Morality consists in promoting the true well-being of human
society was ever formally denied before the rime of Butler in
England and of Kant in Germany . The ethical system of Kant
Hutcheson uctually used the phrase ' greutest numbers.'
And by him explicitly only in the Dissertation. In the Serinons he still
often adopts the Utilitarian test, though he treats conscience as a sort of
magical key fo Utility.
a I do hOt sy tht the proposition was lways positively sserted. This
was prevented partly by the influence of ideas of Natural Rights derived
ïrom the conception of Natural Law and partly by the idea of particular
Chap. vil, § viii] INFLUENCE OF KAbT 27
(assisted in England by the influence of Butler and his followers)
bas produced a hopeless confusion between the question whether
Morality consists in promoting an end and the question what
that end is. From that confusion Moral Philosophy has hardly
yet emerged: and we still occasionally find eminent writers
arguing that Morality consists in doing certain things that one
feels a mysterious prompting fo do without knowing why one
does them or seeking fo harmonize and co-ordinate the isolated,
instinctive, unanalysed deliverances of one's moral consciousness.
But on the whole there is observable a very general tendency fo
corne back fo the view of the older seventeenth-century writers,
and fo assert that orality consists in the promotion of true
human good, but a good of which pleasure is only an element.
Janet in France, in Germany Lotze (though he has hardly
elaborated a Moral Philosophy), and more recently Paulsen,
may be mentioned among the writers who have contributed
fo this tendency 1. If it is not the view of Hegel, in whom Moral
Philosophy is practically merged in political Philosophy, it
is af least the view of many who call themselves his disciples
And yet the system remains without a naine. Non-hedonistic
Utilitarianism might serve the turn, though a definition by
negation is unsatisfactory. Idealistic Utilitarianism would do
better, though the term is too apt fo suggest a metaphysical,
instead of a purely ethical, position. Professor Paulsen has
suggested that 'teleological' Ethics should be contrasted with
unteleological or' formalistic' Ethics a. This is an excellent
classification, but unfortunately we still lack a neat and recog-
nized terre fo denote the view of Ethics which is af once teleo-
logical and anti-hedonistic. On the whole, perhaps, the terre
' ideal Utilitarianism 4, seems the best that is available. Eudae-
precepts hot discoverable by Reason but enjoined by express divine Revela-
tion.
Lotze often approaches very near fo the position of pure ttedonism, but
he is saved from if by his admission of a qualitative difference in pleasure.
2 Notably Dr. McTaggart, if we are fo include that very original thinker
among 'Hegelians.' I may also mention Mr. Moore's Princioeia Ethica
as a striking expression of the saine view of Ethics.
-" A System ofEthics, Eng. Trans., by Prof. F. Tilly, x899.
* In so far as he is teleologica.1 and hot hedonistic, I might include among
i8 IDEAL UTILITARIANISM [Book I
monistic Ethics might better serve fo distinguish such view
from the rigorist or ascetic theory which refuses even fo include
pleasure in ifs conception of the end ; but (through the persistent
misrepresentation of certain writers) the terre Eudaemonism has
become too much confused with Hedonism fo be wholly free
from ambioity. The terre Utilitarianism will perhaps suf-
ficiently suggest that we do estimate actions by their tendency
fo promote human good, and ' Utility' will always curry with if
some suggestion of pleasure ; while the qualification' ideal' will
remind us that the good for which we seek is not a conception
got by abstraction from a number of empirically given experiences
of pleasure or pain, but an ideal set up by rational judgements
of value passed upon all the elements of our actual experience.
the supporters of ' Ideal Utilitarianism' the distinguished German thinker,
Edward von Hartmann, whose writings appear fo me fo be the most im-
portant of recent contributions to the subject. But von Hartmann insists
that the true end, and consequently the true Ethic, is hot positively but
negatively Eudaemonistic (' privativ-eudtmonistische '). This seems fo imply
three differences from ordinary Hedonism: () Inasmuch as positive happi-
ness or good of any kind is unattainable, the object of the moral man must
be fo diminish the evil of the Universe, partly for the sake of the pelons
imlnediately affected, and partly with a view fo assist the efforts of the
Absolute fo reach the one ultimately desirable good (all consciousness being
necessarily attended with more pain tban plesure)--a relapse into ifs
original state of Unconsciousness; (2) the true ethical end must include
otber elements of Value besides pleaure (' Unter dem Gesichtspunkte eines
ethischen Zweckes ergeben sich andere Wertbestimmungen ftir alle Dinge und
Seelenvorginge als unter dem Gesichtspunkte des isthetischen, religi(isen,
eudimonistischen, intellektualischen.'--EthischeStudien,p. 28) ; (3) Morality,
though an end-in-itself fo us, is from the point of view of the Universe merely
a means fo a further end (as fo this see below, Bk. III, chap. ii). If is clear
that the first and the third modifications are dictated by a pessimistic
system of Metaphysics which I do not share, and seem fo bave no necessary
connexion with the second, which is hOt af all suggested by the terre
'negative Eudaemonism.' With this reservation his view of the relation
fo each of the various elements in the end--hedonistic, intellectual, moral--
seems fo me peculiarly well balanced, except that his desire fo show the un-
attainability of positive Well-being makes him exa.ggerate the difficulties
and underestimate the utility (restricted as I myself believe if fo be) of
the 'hedonistic calculus.' All these difficulties would equally have fo be
met in determining how to attain a minimum of pain.
Clmp. vil, § ix] MR. BRADLEY'S OBJECTIONS
IX
Some of the objections most fre«luently urged against such
et view of Ethics will be considered in our lttCl" books. But
thcre is one fo which I may briefly reply af once. The view
that we lmve arrived af is that the morality of our actions is fo
be determined ultimately by ifs tendency fo promote a universal
end, which end itsclf consists of many ends, and in particular
two--Morality and pleasure. A'ainst this position if may be
object,,d that if two (or more) goods are brought together, neither
of them will remain unaltered. The dirent ends cmmot simply
exist side l)y side: the diflbrence letween them must be ' tran-
scended.' ' That two elements should necessarily corne together,
and af the saine rime that neither of them should be qualified
by this relation, or again that l'elttion in the end should hOt
imply a whole which subordinates and qualifies the two terms--
all this in the end seems unintelligible L' I bave «tlluded fo this
objection here bec«tuse if seems fo be directed a.gainst an ethical
position more or less resembling my own. If is easy enough fo
expose any system fo ridicule when the critic deliberately intro-
duces into the statement of if features which have no place in the
minds or the writings of those whom he criticizes, and ignores
much which they both think and sa)'. I do not know any writer
who has nmintained that the g'ood consists of two elements--good-
ness and virtue--which are unaltered by their relation fo each other.
Af all events, in these pages nothing has been said, and nothing
is implied, about the diflircnt elements in the end not being
qualified by the relation in which they stand to one another:
and much has been said of a directly opposite tendency. I have
insisted that the recognition of differences among pleasures means
the qualification of pleasure by other elelncnts in consciousness
know]cdge or virtue or whatever if is, and that, on the other
Bradley, Apl»earattce «»d Re«dity, 2nd ed., p. 425. The criticism is indeed
directed against the idea of a good consisting of only two ends--happiness
and goodness--for which the present writer does hot contend, but in prin-
ciple the objection might equally be brought against any view which recog-
nized a good consisting in a number of goods.
2o IDEAL UTILITARIAIISM [Book I
hand, the idea of pleasure is so inimately bound up wih all that
we call good tlmt if is impossible o form any concei)tion of an
ideal Virtue or contemplation of Beauty which includes no kind
or degree of pleasure. We can give no account of ' the good'
without breaking if up into vgrious 'goods'; and yet no one
element in the good can be unaflced by the rel,tion into which
if is brought in the consciousness of the person enjoying if with
the other elements in that good. In particular, the value which
is set ui)on the good will determines he kind of pleasure
which can be regarded as good by he good man. Wha the
benevolent man regards as good for self is a differen thing from
what , selfish man regards as lais good. The pleasure which
is derived from culture is a different thing from the I)leasure
which cornes from other sources just because the goodness of
culture does hot lie solely in ifs pleasantness. For the ideal ma
placed in favourable circumstances if will be impossible fo draw
a sharp line between he good for himself and he good for
others: for he finds his good largely in activities useful fo
others, and the indulgences which ai)art from their bad effects on
others he might enjoy he can enjoy no longer when he knows
those eticts. The ideal end or good for man is no a number of
goods lying side by side and having no relation fo one another,
but a I)articular kind of lire in which various elements are
harmoniously combined. Undoubtedly the elements are altered
l,y their rel,tions, just as the notes of a chord or the instruments
of mi orchestra I)roduce togethèr an effect which is different from
what each of them produces hy itself. But there could be no
musical notation unless we could distinguish these elements and
speak of the wholethe choral or the harmony--as produced by
their coml,ination. That the whole is the sure of the parts is
true, though if is hot the whole truth : for if is equally true that
the whole is more than that sure. Every attempt fo distinguish
the elements of which the ideal good is ruade up involves some
bstraetion. But, as no one has tught us more convincingly
than Mr. Bradley himself, all thought involves abstraction. We
could give no intelligible account of the good except by regarding
iL as a combination of goods. Further reply fo lr. Bradley's
somewhat lofty and conteml)h, ous remarks upon t.he tendency
Chap. vii, § ix] GOODS AND THE GOOD 2oEx
of what he calls 'popular Ethics 1, mus be lef fo he further
course of our argumen. The objections apply to every system
of Ethics which has atemped fo give any intelligible account of
'the good 'mthat is fo say, o almost every system of Ethics
excep perhaps 1V[r. Brsdley's own. They all represen the
good lire as an ideal in which nmny distinguishable elements are
harmonized and combined ". From such a view Mr. Bradley is
estopped by his doctrine of an essential and unavoidble con-
tradiction in the deliverances of the moral consciousness--
doctrine which will be deMt with in another chapter. Mean-
while, i may be observed in passing tha 1V[r. Bralley's own
objection can be retorted with some effect upon his system, in
which ' self-assertion' and' self-scrifice' are pronounced equMly
good in complete isolation from ech other without any attempt
being malle to build up a coherent and harmonious ideal of lire
in which each shall find its proper place. If the moral conscious-
ness were incapable of making such an attempt, Mr. Bralley
could not be blamed for leaving he marrer there: if will here-
after be contended that the moral consciousness lies under no
such inoepacity, however difficult in detil may be the problems
to which this collision gives rise 3.
1 No writer is really so much open to the objection just mentioned as
Knt himself, whom even lV[r. Brdley will hrdly tret as representtive
of' populr Ethics.'
2 Dorner is right in protesting tht 'ds Sittliche eine Totlittt, eine
Einheit ist, die nicht mosaikrtig sich zusmmensetzen lsst' (Das mensch-
liche Handeln, I895, p. 53)-
s Book II, chap. iii.
CHAPTER VIII
JUSTICE
W have so far been engaged in considering the nature of the
various goods, or elements in the good, which if is the individual's
duty fo realize for human society. But fo say that if is our
duty fo produce the greatest possible good is a principle which
cannot by itself determine the righ course of action in any
single instance. There remains the question, ' Whose good is fo
be promoted ?' We want a principle fo guide us as fo the
distribution of good among the various persons capable of enjoy-
ing it: and we have so far been content fo take as our guide
Bentham's principle ' Every one fo courir for one and nobody for
more than one,' though we have already given fo this maxim
the somewhat different form ' Everybody's good fo be treated as
of equal value with the like good of every one else.' This
modification must now be further explained and justified. I have
already said as much as seemed necessary about Justice in the
popular sense of the terre, the relative or conventional Justice
which prescribes equal treatment of different individuals upon
the basis of some established and accepted social order or con-
stitut¤on or system of understandings. We have here fo deal
with the absolute Justice by whose precepts the morality of the
very social order or constitution or system of understandings
must itself be determined. If in this chapter I shall seem to
be straying into subjects which belong more properly fo Political
Philosophy or even fo Political Economy than to Ethics, I may
plead that any treatment of Ethics which does hOt touch upon
such questions must necessarily be theoretically barren and
practically unprofitable. an is a social being, and it is impos-
sible to determine his duties, or even fo examine into the abstract
Chap. viii, § il] COIFLICTIIG IDEALS
nature of duty, without dealing fo some extent with his relations
-fo the social environment in whieh he finds himself.
low, when we ask' What is Justice ? ', we are af once met by
two eonflieting ideals, eaeh of whieh on the face of if seems
entitled fo respect. In the first place the prineiple that every
human being is of equal intrinsie value, and is therefore entitled
fo equal respect, is one whieh eommends itself fo eommon sense,
a prineiple whieh may naturally elaim fo be the exaeter expres-
sion of the Christian ideal of Brotherhood. On the other hand
the prineiple that the good ought fo be preferred fo the bad,
that men ought fo be rewarded aeeording fo their goodness or
aeeording t their work, is one whieh no less eommends itself
the unsophistieated moral eonseiousness. We shall perhaps best
arrive af some true idea of the nature of Justice by examining
the elaims of these two rival and primafa¢ie ineonsistent ideals--
the ideal of equality, eonsidered in the sense of equality of eon-
sideration, and the ideal of just reeompense or reward--and we
shall perhaps do well fo start with the suspicion that there will
be a eonsiderable presumption against any solution of the problem
whieh does not reeognize some meaning or element of
in eaeh of them.
In examining
and nobody for
essential fo bear
put forward by
II
the doctrine of 'every one to count for one
more than one' in ifs Benthamite form, if is
in mind the context in which if stnds. If was
Bentham (not, of course, for the first rime)
as a canon for the distribution of happiness. He saw clearly
enough that his ' greatst happiness' principle, or the principle
of greatest good (however good be intrpretd), stands in need of
this or some other supplementry canon before if can be available
for practicl applioEtion. It is obvious that in a community of
a hundred persons we might produce the greatest possible happi-
ness or good in a variety of ways. If would be quite legitimate,
so far as the greatest happiness principle is concerned, fo give
the whole of our disposble good fo twenty-five out of the hun-
dred, and fo ignore the other seventy-five, provided that by so
doing we could make each of these twenty-five four rimes as
OEoE4 JUSTICE [Book I
happy as we should make each of the hundred by an equal
distribution; and, if by an unequal distribution we could make
twenty-five people rive rimes as happy, or give them rive rimes
as much good (whatever the true good be) as we could procure
for each of the hundred by an equal distribution, we should
be absolutely bound by our ' greatest good' principle (taken by
itself) fo ignore the seventy-five, and distribute our good ex-
clusively among the five-and-twenty. The principle which
Bentham adopted as a solution of such problems is the maxim
' Every one fo count for one and nobody for more than one.' He
failed fo see how impossible if is fo establish such a principle by
experience or fo rest if upon anything but an a priori judge-
ment. Only a grammatical ellipse dispensed him from the
necessity of expanding if into the ' Every man ought fo coun;
for one, &c.,' and so introducing an 'ought'--that mystical,
meaningless word of which he is said fo have pronounced that,
if if is fo be used at all, if ought fo be banished from the
Dictionary.
The maxim then does not assert that every one ought fo
receive an equal share of wealth, or of political power, or of
social consideration, but simply equal consideration in the dis-
tribution of ultimate good. Bentham was no Socialist; af heart
he was no; much of a democrat. Equality of political power,
when in later years he advocated if, was for him merely a means
fo secure that legislation should aire af giving every one, as far
as possible, an equal share of whatever 'good' legislation is
capable of securing. The value of the maxim is hOt much
affected by the fact that Bentham himself recognized no good
but pleasure.
ow so long as the amount of good would be neither increased
nor diminished by an equal distribution, the justice of such
a rule will hardly be disputed. Understood in this abstract
sense, the rule merely asserts that, if you have a certain quantity
of good fo divide between A and B, you ought fo give half fo A
and hall fo B, so long as all you know about them is that one is
A and the other B, or' other things being equal,' or 'so long
as there is no reason for preferring A fo B.' IIow far the axiom
ought fo be modified in ifs practical application by the fact tha;
Chap. viii, § iii THE BENTHAMITE MAXIM 5
A never does differ from B solely in being a different individual,
and what kind of inequality between A and B supplies reason-
able ground for an inequality in the shares assigned fo them, are
questions which have yet fo be considered. But if can hardly
be denied that equality is the right rule for distributive Justice
in the absence of any special reason for inequality.
Our first difficulty crises in the case where an equal distribution
of good necessarily diminishes the amount of good fo be dis-
tributed. Ig is clear that this is offert ghe case. It is easy
fo imagine cases where the difficulgy occurs in connexion wigh
an actual disgribution of a definite magerial good thing fo a
definite and assignable number of persons. In a beleaguered
garrison nobody would question the justice of an equal dis-
tribution of rations; bug supposing if were known ghat relief
could hot arrive for a mongh, and ghat the provisions available
could keep hall of ghem clive, while an equal distribugion would
ensure the slow starvation of the whole, ghere would,be some-
thing fo be said for casting lots as fo which hall should be fed
and which should starve. I do nog maintain that the conditions
indicated could ever be exactly forghcoming, or even that ghe
course suggested would be acgually the right one fo take if they
were. But, if ghat course would hot be righg in the case sup-
posed, if must be for some ogher reason than igs injustice. No one
would be bold enough fo propose ghat the whole garrison should
starve simply go ensure an ideal equality between all the in-
dividuals concerned. The kind of Socialism that insists that all
should be miserable ragher than ghat any one should be ruade
a litfle happier than anybody else has been justly described
as ' Individualism run mari.' In a less extreme form the diftîculty
I have indicated is of constant occurrence. The Schoolmaster,
for insgance, has go face ghe problem how far a whole class is fo
be kept back that ghe ultra-stupid minority may learn some-
thing. And when we turn from detailed questions of individual
conduct fo large problems of social and political action, the case
supposed is hot the exception but the rule. Nobody will deny
that the prescrit distribution of good things is excessively and
arbitrarily unequal. The most sagisfied champion of the existing
social order will hOt deny that many people are badly clothed,
JUSTICE [Book I
badly fed, overworked, and otherwise mlserable through no
fault of their own. And yet the most extreme advocate of social
reconstruction, who is af once sane and well informed, will hardly
deny that any attempt fo produce an immediate equality of
possessions, or of happiness, or of opportunity (whichever if be),
vould only cure these inequalitles by produclng, in no long
period, a general dead-level of misery and want, or (fo put if
af the lowest) by seriously diminishing the ultimate Well-being
of the country or the race. Here, then, an unequal distribution
has fo be adopted in order that there may be something fo dis-
tribute. Either we may say (from a rough, practical point of
view) that equality is a good but is not the good, and that
we must in practice balance the principle of greatest good against
the principle of equality, or (with more scientific precision) we
may assert that in such cases there is no real sacrifice of equality.
The law is fulfilled even in the case where ifs practical operation
seems fo involve the height of inequality, just as the laws of
motion are fulfilled when two opposite forces neutralize each
other and produce rest. For what the individual is entitled
fo is simply equality of consideration. The individual has had
his rights even when the equal rights of others demand that
in practice he should receive no good af all, but even a consider-
able allowance of evil. If would be the height of injustice,
indeed, that the good of ninety among a hundred people should
be considered, and the Well-being of the remaining ten wholly
ignored. The ninety and the ten are entitled fo consideration
precisely in the ratio of ninety fo ten. The rights of the ten
would be grossly violated, if the ninety vere fo do what would
be best for themselves were the remaining ten out of the way;
as, for instance, by dividing among themselves all the available
provisions, and giving none fo the excluded ten. On the other
hand there are cases where if would not only be expedient, but
just, that ten men should die that the remaining ninety might
live, e.g. in war, where an indefensible position has fo be de-
fended merely fo delay an enemy's advance. In such cases the
minority gets ifs rights as fully as the majority, provided ifs
proportionate claim fo consideration has been duly satisfied
belote if was determined that the measure proposed was on the
Chap. viii, § ii] EQUALITY OF CONSIDERATIO 7
whole for the general good. David would have been guilty of no
injustice had his choice of Uriah the Hittite for the post of danger
been determined by purely military and impersonal considerations.
lot only does the principle of equal consideration not neces-
sarily prescribe any actual equality of Well-being or of the
material conditions of Well-being: when properly understood,
if does no favour the attemp fo draw up a priori any detailed
list of the 'rights of man.' If is impossible fo discover any
tangible concrete thing, or even any specific 'liberty of action
or acquisition,' fo which it can be contended that every individual
human being has a right under all circumstances. There are
circumstances under which the satisfaction of any and every
such right is a physical impossibility. And if every assertion of
right is fo be conditioned by the clause ' if if be possible,' we
might as well boldly say that every man, woman, and child
on the earth's surface has a right to iooo a year. There
is every bit as much reason for such an assertion as for maintain-
ing that every one has right fo the means of subsistence, or fo
three acres and a cow, or fo lire, or to liberty, or fo the Parlia-
mentary franchise, or to propagate his species, or the like. There
are conditions under which none of these rights can be given fo
one man withou prejudice fo the equal rights of others. There
seems, then, fo be no 'right of man' which is unconditional,
except the right fo consideration--that is to say, the right to
have his true Well-being (whatever that true Well-being be)
regarded as of equal importance in all social arrangements with
the Well-being of everybody else. Elaborate expositions of the
rights of man are, at best, attempts fo folznulate the most impor-
tant actual or legal rights which an application of the principle
of equality would require fo be conceded fo" the generality of
men af a particular stage of social development. They are all
ultimately resolvable into the one supreme and unconditional
right--the 'ig]tt fo conside¢ation; and all particular applications
of that principle must be dependent upon circumstances of rime
and place. What particular legal rights will, in certain con-
ditions of rime and place, best conduce to each man being equally
considered in the distribution of Well-being, must be ascertained
by experience.
228 JUSTICE [Book I
In practice most of the crude or dangerous misapplications
of the doctrine of equality spring from the attempt to translate
an abstract equality of consideration into an immediate equality
of concrete possessions, or personal liberties, or political power,
or what not. Most of the objections fo the doctrine may (I think)
be met by bearing in mind the distinction on which I have been
dwelling. Thus if migh be objected fo the principle of equality
that an atempt fo realize he immediate equality of property, or
of some particular kind of property, might be good for the present
generation, though if would lead fo ultimate anarchy. The
objection is me if if be remembered that future generations
have rights as well as he present. Generations yet unborn may
bave the right o consideration; though that is obviously the
only right that they are af present capable of enjoying 1
Then, again, most of the cruder and more direct applications
of the equality principle involve the tacit assumption that
the Iegislator has af his command a definite quantity of happiness
or other good which he can distribute af his pleasure. A
moment's reflection shows that if is never 'good' itself, but
simply the conditions of good, that are capable of being ' dis-
tributed,' either by the State or by a private individual. This
is noç (as has sometimes been thought) an objection fo Bentham's
principle properly understood. If is always possible fo aim
ai an equal distribution of good, fo attach equal value fo each
man's good, fo consider each equalIy, in so far as his Well-being
is capable of being affected by out action; but if is hot always
possible actually fo secure this equal distribution of Well-being.
Nothing that can possibly be distributed is a good under ail
circumstances or fo ail persons. There is no paradise that some
people would not contrive fo turn into a hell even for themselves.
If is obvious that equal conditions of Well-being will hot
produce equal amounts of actual Well-being fo persons of
differing mental and bodily constitution. The devotee of equality
as a practical watchword will probably say, ' Let the conditions
be equally distributed; for the test, the individual must take
If this mode of statement be Chought paradoxical, if may be put in
another way--that if is a duty now fo respect the rights which future
generations will bave when they are born.
viii, § iii NOT EQUALIT¥ OF WEALTH 9
care of himself.' But such a rule of conduct would actually
violafe the principle of equal consideration. For the end fo
be aimed ai is nos equality of conditions, but equal Well-being,
or rather (as already explained) so much equality as is consistent
with there being as large as possible an amount of good fo
distribute. But actual equality in the distribution of any
concrete thing might nos only diminish the amount fo be
distributed, but might actually widen the inequalities in the
resulting enjoyment. A distribution of food, for instance, which
took no account of the varying appetites and needs of difIrent
individuals might produce a lower average of actual health and
enjoyment than an unequal distribution. To insist on according
the saine measure of personal liberty to children and fo adults,
to uncivilized men and fo civilized, fo the insane or half-witted
and fo the sane, might actually result in lowering the real
Well-being which each and every one might enjoy under an
unequal distribution: the amount of liberty might be too great
for the Well-being of one class, and too small for that of the
other. When we come fo the higher sources of human pleasure
or to those higher kinds of human good which cannot be
expressed in terres of pleasure, if is still more glaringly evident
that men's capacities for such goods vary enormously, and that
an equal distribution of their material conditions would hot
result in an actual equality of enjoyment and would therefore
be opposed fo the principle of equal consideration. We assuredly
should not effect an equal distribution of aesthetic enjoyment by
subjecting every citizen fo a uniform course of artistic education.
The variety of men's capcity for different kinds of good
constitutes by itself a sufficient condemnation of any attempt
to equalize conditions irrespectively of the varying capacity
fo utilize the conditions and to turn them (so to speak) into
actual Well-being. Any social arrangements which should
wholly ignore dif[rences of characer and ability in the dis-
tribution of material goods would not only infallibly diminish
the amount of good on the whole, but might even militate
against the equal consideration of each individual in the dis-
tribution of if. If has offert been objected fo the Benthamite
rule that if would require society fo treat the drunken idler
:3o JUSTICE [Book I
as well as reats the ndusrous and capable workman. Such
an objection implies a oal msundersanding of the prnciple.
To rea the drunkard in a way which would encourage him
in his drunkenness and his idleness--to give him the wages
and he libery which do conduce o Well-being in the sober
and indusrious--would no really be fo consider his good as
mach as theirs. I would really not be considering his rue
good a all, o say nohing of he violation of oher men's
righs involved in placing he man who makes no contribution
fo he general good in he same position as those who do. To
reward he idler as mach as the industrious (even if we supposed
tha the reward would really be for his good) would be o make
hlm coun no for one bu for several ; since his suppor would
impose additional labour on he industrious members of the
community. To examine wha social arrangements are bes
fited o secure a really equal consideraion of each man's good
is no par of my present undertaking ; bu if may safely be sald
ha no social arrangements will bave tha effec which do no
in some way secure ha men's maerial conditions shall bave
some proportion fo heir varying powers of utilizing them for
heir own Well-being and ha of he whole sociey.
Many people will be disposed fo mee hese difflculties by
suggesing the rue idea of social justice is 'equaliy of oppor-
tuniy.' I should be far from denying the grea pracical value,
within certain limits, of this ideal; though i would be easy
to show the impracticabiliy of a literal realization of i: o
give everybody really equal opportunities the State would
have fo supp]y every child wih an equally good mother 1
Bu from a theoretical poin of view, the ideal itself is open
fo exactly the same objections as he ideal of equal distribution
when applied fo so gross and concrete a marrer as food. The
English navvy would no be given an equal opportuniy of making
the mos of his lire by an allowance of food which would seem
wanon superfiuiy fo a Japanese soldier . Equally far removed
from the ideal of just distribution would if be fo furnish equal
1 Cf. Leslie Stephen's essay on 'Social Equality' in Social Rights a»d
Duties, vol. i.
The varying capacity for work is hot here fo the point.
Chap. viii, § ii] EQUALITY OF OPPORTU57ITY 3 I
educational opportunities to the dunce and the genius. Here
it would, indeed, be difficult fo say on which side the inequality
would lie. The dunce might want three rimes the attention
that the genius would require in learning fo read: while the
genius will require for the realization of his capacities a higher
education whieh the dunce is quite incapable of utilizing.
will perhaps be contended that the man who is not capable
of profiting by it may be said to 'enjoy' the opportunity as
much as the man who is. But this is clearly a mere façon de
parler. The opportunity is no more a good fo the man fo whom
Nature has denied the capacity for using if than a pair of
spectacles is a good fo a blind man. But, if by 'equality of
opportunity' is fo be meant a simple equalization of external
conditions irrespective of the individual's power of using it,
if we are fo eliminate from the inequalities which we are fo
aire af equalizing all those which are due fo the inequality
of Nature's bounty, such a principle will lead fo some strange
results. In that case we shall have satisfied our duty fo the
idiot by giving him every advantage that we offer to the
sane man, while we shall refuse to violate our ideal of equal
opportunity by providing him with asylums and keepers, which
the sane man does hot want. The distinction between men
of different race, between the sexes, between the sick and the
whole, will have to be equally ignored . In whichever way
equality of opportunity is understood, it leads fo results which
would strike every one as absurd and unjust. 'Equality of
opportunity,' however valuable as a rough practical application
within certain limits of some deeper principle, cannot be pushed
toits logical consequences without absurdity. It leads to such
absurdity because it is opposed to the principle of equal con-
Another more formidable difficulty urlses if we extend our view fo in-
equulities hot of physicul constitution, but of physicul circumstunce. If
every member of society or of every locul community is fo bave the full
benefit of superior soil, climute, &c., we huve Cupitulism af once, though the
Cupitalist is a group instead of an individuul. On the other hand, we might
ask the Sociulist who aires af equulity whether he is reully prepured fo give
to the Luplander as much extru udvantuge as would compensate him for hot
living in the Rivieru, or fo penulize the inhubitant of Johunnesburg fo un
extent which would put him on u level even with the Londoner.
OE3 OE JUSTICE [Book I
sideraion which commends itself fo us as just, while i cannot
always be assumed hat if will accord with the principle
of maximum good which is no less self-evidently reasonable.
Equality of opporunity is only a raional maxim in so far
as i leads fo greaer good on he whole and fo a more equal
distribution of that good. And if is always possible ha some
measure of inequality of opportunity may lead boh to the
existence of more good on the whole, and fo a more equal
distribution of ha good. The institution of the family neces-
sarily involves great inequality of opportunity, and ye if
is possible hat he system under which each child is looked
after by is own mother leads fo each getting a higher average
of aenion than would be secured under a systen of State
crches and boarding-schools, which after all would not eliminate
the necessary inequality of opportunity arising from the varying
capciy of differen educators. While there can be lile doubt
tha a much greater measure of 'equality of opporunity' is
socially desirable, if is not fo be assumed ha he total extinction
of more or less hereditary classes enjoying a certain superiority
of wealh, of culture, and consequently of opporunity, is neces-
sarily conducive o the public interes ; though the progressive
diminution of such differences is undoubtedly involved in every
a.tempt fo raise he maerial, intellectual, and moral level of the
least favoured classes. So far as superior opporuniy secures
on the whole superior efficiency in certain kinds of work by
which all benefi, the superior opportuniy will receive a social
justification, and so be hot unjust,
How far the principle of equal consideraion requires or would
be promoed by an unequal distribution of acual goods is
a practical question which I do no desire here fo discuss. Any
distribution of good things which he world has actually seen is,
of course, jus as far removed from an equal distribution of
acual good as i is from an equal distribution of he conditions
or opporuniies of Well-being. Wheher, on he principle of
equal consideraion, a particular step owards greater equality
ought fo be promoed or resised, will depend upon he question
whether, under exising conditions--hings being wha they are,
human nature being what if is, and so on--the change will be in
Chap. viii, § iii LIBERTY IS INEQUALITY 233
the interest of all, the interest of each being regarded as of
exactly equal importance. That equality of consideration would
be violated by immediate attempts at forcible and sudden social
reconstruction will be generally admitted. But that is not all.
A certain liberty of action is, and always will be, a condition of
Well-being; and liberty of action implies inequality. It implies
some power of appropriating to one's self the results of one's own
activity, or of disposing of them to others. Granted that
necessary vo'l¢ might be parcelled out by the State, if is difficult
fo see how rational beings could occupy their leisure, either in
a way agreeable fo themselves or in a way favourable fo the
development of intelligence and character, without a power of
voluntarily disposing of their activities in such a way as to
constitute an inequality of enjoyment, either for themselves or
for persons immediately dependent upon them or favoured by
them. And if is impossible that those inequalities should not
be the parent of other inequalities. The man who has been
benefited by association with a man of exceptional talent, or
learning, or skill, will pass on his exceptional advantages to
others. A town which has been blessed with inhabitants of
exceptional energy and character will enjoy advantages which
the State could not possibly transfer to others, though if might
make it its business artificially to destroy them. A remorseless
application of the principle of equality would not only be fatal
to the family but would involve the enforcement of the unnatural
maxim of clerical seminaries, 'pas d'amitis particulières.'
Af what point the attempt to realize equality ceases fo be on
the whole productive of a veater probability of good for each,
is a practical question which experience only will enable us to
decide. I merely want fo point out () that some inequality is
a condition of Well-being; (OE) that there is only one sort of
equality that is always practicable and always right, and that is
equality of consideration, since ve can always (ideally) give
each individual equal consideration in making up our minds
whether this or that will be on the whole for the general good ;
and (:) that, while it is certainly a duty to aim af a social con-
stitution which shall bring about more actual equality of good,
it must hot be assumed a priori that such equality will alvays
234 JUSTICE [Book I
be secured by increased equality of wealth or political power
or by any other kind of external equality whatever. The
principle of equal consideration certainly requires us fo aim af
greater equality of actual Well-being, but only on condition that
the greater equality will not violate the equal right of each fo
enjoy as much good as itis possible for him fo enjoy.
So far I have been able fo contend that obvious objections fo
the principle of equality properly understood do not really form
an objection fo the principle of equal consideration--to the doc-
trine that each man is entitled fo an equal consideration af the
hands of the community; though the result of such equal
consideration, under given conditions, may be an exceedingly
unequal distribution of actual goods. But now I have to meet
a difficulty which is less easy of even theoretical solution.
III
If has already been indicated incidentally that if is not only
the less than normal capacity, but also the more than normal
capacity of exceptional persons, that may impose upon the
community unequal sacrifices fo enable them fo attain an equal
level of Well-being. Let us look af the difficulty in ifs least
serious form. The number of persons capable of the highest
intellectual cultivation and of enjoying the good incidental
fo such high cultivation is unquestionably a small minority. If
such goods are fo be enjoyed af all, they can only be enjoyed by
the few; and yet to give these few the opportunity of such
cultivation imposes upon the community sacrifices of inferior
good (such good as can be enjoyed by all) quite out of proportion
fo the number of those for whom the sacrifice is made. If may
be contended, of course, that the extra value of the services
of such persons fo the community is well worth the social cost
involved in their long years of unproductive education or
preparation, the number of persons and (if may be) the expendi-
ture of Inaterial employed in giving that education, the waste
which (on any conceivable system of selection) will be incurred
by the education of persons who eventually turn out fo be
unfitted for the highest work, and so on. So long as that is the
case, we do no doubt escape the diflàculty by our formula of
Chap. viii, § iii] UI'qEQUAL CAPACITIES
35
equal consideration. These favoured persons may be allowed
advantages which the many do hOt enjoy; but if is good for
each member of the community that they should enjoy them.
Once again, equality of consideration itself demands a departure
from concrete equality. In this way our difflculty is fairly met,
so long as we confine our attention fo such higher kinds of
culture and resulting Well-being as are of obvious social utility.
But when we corne fo what (though the word has somewhat
priggish associations) must, I suppose, be called ' the higher
culture,' the case is different. If is greatly fo be feared that the
eost of higher culture fo the comnmnity must always be con-
siderable. If may be doubted whether there is hOt a kind of
culture which demands for ifs vitality the existence of a class
invested with something more than an equal sh,re of all that
makes lire pleasant and attractive, that relieves froln sordid
cures and gives room for the free expansion of individuality--a
class with a good deal of leisure (af least in youth), a good deal
of freedom, an education of the kind that can only be kept alive
as an hereditary tradition 1. But of course such a class can only
be maintained by enormous waste. The leisure will be wasted
in a large proportion of cases; the liberty will be abused; the
freedom fo do with one's life what one pleases without justifying
if fo the rest of the community, will, in a majority of cases, be
used fo do with one's lire what cannot be justifie& Only a snmll
proportion of these favoured individuals will do enough fully fo
justify their superior advantages. If may be said, indeed, that
a socialistic or communistic community might devise means for
keeping alive such a class if its social value be adequate fo the
1 This view is unaffected by the fact that, where this class exists, indi-
vidual members of if (offert the highest intellects) may corne from the classes
outside if. They enter into and appropriate the tradition which is kept alive
by the favoured families. And if is, of course, superfluous fo remark that by
the favoured class I do hOt merely or primarily mean what is called in the
conventional sense the Aristocracy or the Plutocracy (neither of which, as a
class, cures much for ' higher culture' or contributes much to if), but a class
enjoying as an hereditary possession a more than average measure of wealth
or opportunity, and the existence of which is often no doubt more or less
dependent upon the richest class either by being recruited from if or by
supplying ifs needs.
236 JUSTICE [Book I
cost if involves. But, granting for the present this social value,
what is the probability of a whole community, organized on
principles of pure equality and accustomed fo exact in all
departments implicit obedience fo ifs collective will, recognizing
the value of such culture 1 ? That, of course, is a practical
question which does hOt necessarily touch our theory. If such
a community vould not recognize the value of a class which is
essential fo the highest social Well-being, then fo that extent
all attempts af greater equality of social conditions should stop
at the point at which the existence of this class begins fo be
endangered, on the principle of equal consideration itself. But
all this is assuming the social value of the class. And yet may
there not be a point af which the benefits of ' culture' cease fo
be capable of very wide diffusion ? Is if possible fo prove, either
ce priori or a poste'iori, that there may not be a final irreconcila-
bility between the higher Well-being of the few and the lower
Well-being of the many ?
Many will be disposed to brush aside the objection somewhat
contemptuously. They will be disposed fo sy, 'Yes, there is
a certain exquisite polish of life which probably is not capable
of wide diffusion, which demands the existence of a fev favoured
families with estates, and dividends, and large houses. If is
possible that, if an omnipotent Social Democracy were established
to-morrow, it would seriously diminish the present expenditure
upon professors and libraries in the German Empire. There would
be less "research" on matters but remotely connected with life.
Fewer monographs would be published. Emend£tions would n0t
flourish. Latin verse-making would lose the high market value
which if still commands in this country. There would even be
I need hardly say that many things which are now impossible might
become possible with the gradual education of the community.
2 I mean merely that something must be taken off from the lower Well-
being of the many, hot that the condition of the many must be ruade an
absolutely undesirable one. It might be, of course, contended that it was
actually good that men of lower capacities should enjoy less than the largest
possible amoun of the lower goods (eating, drinking, &c.). On this view
the difficulty will disappear, but this position postulates that all who are
capable of it bave the opportunity of entering the favoured class. And this
is just what no artificial arrangement seems capable of securing.
Chap. viii, § iii] THE COST OF CULTURE 37
a general lowering of the standard of Greek and Latin scholarship.
Those who would still study Greek and Latin would bave fo be
content with knowing those ]anguages, say, rather better than
even learned men are now content fo know French and German.
And there would be fewer people fo take an interest in
Aldine editions or old china. But all this is of very little
weight--of very little weight even for the serious intellectual
interests of humanity af large. To urge such matters as
a grave objection fo any policy which would bring us even
a step nearer the social millennium, is like justifying Egyptian
bondage, because without if, in all probability, the modern
globe-trotter would have had fo eliminate the Pyramids from his
programme.'
Personally, I should have a good deal of sympathy with such
a reply, though I might feel less confident than our sanguine
Socialist that the vulgarizing rust, which might be the price of
a real advance towards social equality, would stop af the mere
polished surface of our intellectual lire. But so far we are
contemplating comparative]y trifling differences of intellectual
level--say the difference between the intellectual level of Berlin
and that of a South American University. Let us now suppose
if were possible by some scheme of social reconstruction to win
for the great mass of European society the social and economic
conditions which may be attained by some communistic brother-
hood in the United States, but af the cost of extinguishing all
Science, all Literature, all Art, all intellectual activity which
arises above the highest level known in such communities.
That might possibly represent, even on the intellectual side taken
by itself, a higher kind of lire than is now lived by the vast
majority even of European humanity. The extinction of the
' higher culture' could not, therefore, be resisted on the ground
of the diffused influence upon the community of the small
cultivated class. If asked whether we should as a fact resist
such a social revolution as I have contemplated in the interests
of the higher culture, many of us would be disposed fo answer, ' If
the programme included the bringing of human society af large up
fo the moral level of a Moravian mission settlement, opposition
fo if would be hard fo justify.' If we confine our attention
28 JUSTICE [Book I
merely fo the general diffusion of a low materil comfort, a dull
contentment, and an education ranging between that of the
Sunday School and that of the Mechanics' Institute, we might
well be in gret doubt and perplexity. I for one should certinly
doubt whether, if I had the power, I could doom the world fo
continuance of our present social horrors, although their re-
movoEE1 might lead fo the evanescence of research and speculation,
'sweetness and light,' full and varied exercises of the faculties,
and all the rest of if. Of course I do not asserç for one momenç
thaç such an alternative is now, or ever will be, in ifs naked
simplicity, presented fo the social reformer. In the long run
(putting aside the influence of excepçional outbursts of religious
excitement) iç is probable that moral and intellectual progress
are intimate]y connected. In the long run the diffusion of some
culture among the nmny is only obtainable by the maintenance
of a much higher culture mnong the few. But after all if is
easy enough to conceive circumstances in which we might have
to choose between the wide diffusion of a lower kind of Well-
being and a much narrower diffusion of a higher kind of lire.
In çhe intellectual sphere, af all events, there is . higher lire
which, if if exists at all, can only exist for the comparatively
few; and, in certain circumstances, if is aç least a speculative
possibility that the existence of such a lire for the few should
only be purchasable by sacrifices on the parç of the many
which are not compensuted by any appreciable advantage fo
that many. If under such conditions we pronounce that the
higher lire oughç hOt fo be extinguished, then we do af least
depart from the principle of equal consideration, understood as
we have hitherto understood if.
In the cases alrealy contemplted, some will perlmps doubç
whether the principle should be sacrificed or not. I will now
mention a case in which probably no one will hesitate. If is
becoming tolembly obvious af the present day that all improve-
ment in the social condition of the higher races of mankind
postulates the exclusion of competition with the lower races.
That means that, sooner or later, the lower Well-being--it may
be ultimately the very existence--of countless Chinamen or
negroes must be sacrificed that a higher lire may be possible
Chap. viii, § iii] ANIMALS AND MEN OE39
for a mueh smaller number of white men 1. If is impossible fo
defend the morality of sueh a poliey upon the prineiple of equal
eonsideration taken by itself and in the most obvious sense of
the words. If we do defend if, we distinetly adopt the prineiple
that higher lire is intrinsieally, in and for ielf, more valuable
than lower lire, though if may only be attainable by fewer
loersons, and may hot eontribute fo the greater good of those
who do not share
I will add a case whieh ealls still more indisputably for the
aplolieation of the saine prineiple. When we say, 'Every one fo
eount for one,' we are no doubt thinking merely of human beings ;
but why are the lower animals fo be exeluded from eonsideration?
I should be prepared fo say that in point of faet they ought not
fo be wholly ignored. Their pain is eertainly an evil, possibly
as great an evil, as eqxal pain in human beings apart from the
question of the aetivities with whieh the pain may interfere:
their eomfort or pleasure bas a value fo whieh every humane
person will make 8orne sacrifices. But few peolole would be dis-
posed fo spend money in bringing the lives of fairly-kept London
eab-horses up fo the standard of eomfort represented by a sleek
brewer's dray-horse in preferenee fo spending if on the improve-
ment of the higher lire in human beings. The lires of animals
eannot be thus lightly treated exeept upon a prineiple whieh
involves the admission.that the lire of one sentient being may be
more valuable than the lire of another, on aeeount of ifs greater
potentialities--apart altogether from the social utilities whieh
may be involved in their realization. However ineonsiderable
the differenees of eapaeity among human faces or individuals
may be when eompared with the differenees between the lowest
man and the highest beast, the distinction that we make between
them implies the prineiple that eapaeity does marrer. The claire
of the individuM does after all depend upon his eapaeity for an
intrinsieally valuable kind of lire ; we eannot talk of the value of
an 'individuM' apart altogether from the question what sort
of individuM if is, and only the Hedonist will seek fo judge of
1 The exclusion is far more difficult fo justify in the case of people like
the Jap,nese who are equMly civilized but bave fewer wants than the
Western.
4o JUSTICE [Book I
that value solely by the individual's capacity for pleasure.
positive proof can, as if appears fo me, be given that the higher
good of few and the lower good of many may not come into
collision. And when they do come into collision, there are some
cases inwhichwe should, I think, prefer the higher good of the few.
How far then does this admission modify our acceptance of
the Benthamite principle of equal consideration ? Only fo
extent--that, if we still adhere fo the formula 'every one fo
count for one and nobody for more than one,' we must reduce
fo a still more abstract form. We may still say that every one
is fo count for one so long as all we know about him is that he
is one 1. We may still say, ' Caeteris paribqs, every one is fo
count for one.' But then, ths will only amount fo the assertion,
' Every one is fo count equally, so long as he is equal ; but the
capacity for a higher lire may be a ground for treating men
unequally.' Or more simply we may say ' Every man's good fo
count as equal fo the lilce good of every other man.'
While if is impossible fo show that the claims of the few
possessing Mgher capacities for good will never corne into
collision with the claims of the many fo such good as they
are capable of, there are some considerations which will, I think,
very largely prevent the necessity of choosing between the rival
claires in practical life. While we cannot theoretically demon-
strate that the best sort of life (in the intellectual region) will
alvays diffuse ifs benefits over the whole social organism, we
may in general find an ample justification for promoting the
higher culture of the few in the qltiqnate results of such higher
culture fo the community generally. The principle of Election
has a place in Ethics and Politics as well as in Theology. If is
often right for governments and for individuals fo bestow much
more than their fair share of attention upon the few on account
of the ultimate value fo society of there being such a higher
class. We are, in fact, applying once more the principle that, in
the equal distribution of good, future generations have their
i Or» as if is well put by von Hartmann, ' If Equity demands a distribution,
without respect of persons, that means only : all peculiarities of the person
which are irrelevant (unwesentlich) for the purpose of the distribution must
be put aside ' (Das sittl. Bewusstsein, p. 438).
Chap. viii, § iii] PRINCIPLE OF ELECTION 4
share as well as the present. Itis sometimes suggested that, in
the then condition of the world, Athenian culture and Athenian
democracy were impossible without slavery 1. It would perhaps
be hard to show that the actual slaves of the rime were much
better off for the intellectual ar, d the political lire in which they
had no share; but it would hOt be too much to say that in the
forces which have ultimate]y banished slavery from Europe and
Amerîca, in the forces to which the modern democratic movement
owes its existence, that Hellenic city-life of which slavery vas
the foundation is no unimportant factor. In so far as that
was so, slavery might claim a temporary and relative justifica-
tion. On the same principle, we might justify our compara-
tive indifference to the welfare of the black races, when if
collides with the higher Well-being of a much smMler European
population, by the consideration that if the higher lire is ever
to become possible on any large scale for black men it can only
be through the maintenance and progress of a higher race. Still
more are such considertions applicable to the maintenance of
a culture or a civilization within a community from the benefit
of which large classes within it are at present excluded, though
of course the effort to extend the class that benefits by it should
go hand in hand with the effort that maintains and improves the
culture of the few. Such considerations will, it may be, practically
prevent the necessity of our actually claiming for a smaller class
any social expenditure (so to speak) but what can ultimately be
repaid to the society (though hot always fo the actual persons)
which makes that Well-being possible. Since, however, the re-
payment is made to future generations, it supplies no ground
for assuming that a communistic or ultra-sociMistic community
would be sure to recognize the importance of such an expenditure.
If may be well, perhaps, to summarize the conclusions which
I have endeavoured to establish.
(I) "If i8 a self-evident truth that in the distribution of ultimate
good every one should count for one, and nobody for more than
I That Aristotle would bave thought so there can be no doubt. But it
should hot be assumed that had men arisen capable of appreciating the
essential injustice and the economic defects of slavery, Greek civilization
and Greek culture would have been the worse for an Abo]itionist campaign.
S»L, x R
4 JUSTICE [Book I
one, so long as all that we know about the persons in question
is that they are individual members of human society. This is
the ideal of Justice.
(OE) The equal distribution of concrete good things would
often produce unequal amounts of actual Well-being, and would
therefore be inconsistent with the principle of equal consideration.
Strict equality of opportunity equally fails fo satisfy the require-
ments of ideal Justice.
(3) The equal distribution even of actual Well-being would
often produce a low total amount of good fo be distributed, and
would consequently violate the equal right of each fo have ,as
large a share of good as if is possible for him fo have consistently
with respect for the like right in others. Practically this con-
sideration must involve much inequality in actual distribution.
The only equality that if is reasonable fo aim af is equality
of consideration.
(4) All men are not capable of the saxe kind or amount of
good. While the enjoyment by some of such good as, from the
nature of the case, cannot be enjoyed by all is usually for the
good of all, and hence justified by the principle of equal con-
sideration, if is impossible fo show that this will be invariably
the case. Individuals, or faces, with higher capacities (i. e.
capacities for a higher sort of Well-being) have a right fo more
than merely equal consideration as compared wih those of lower
capacities. Hence the formula, 'Every one fo counç for one,
nobody for more than one,' must be interpreted fo mean 'every
one's good fo count for as much as the like good of any one else.'
(5) In practice if may, however, usually be assumed that the
realizaçion of such superior capacities by those who possess them
is for the ultimate good of the human race.
We have, so far, left out of account altogether all strictly
moral differences between man and man. We have left out of
account the question whether the share of good fo be allotted
to each man, or rather (as we have seen) his share of considera-
tion in the distribution of good, ought ever fo be more than
another's on account either (from one point of view) of his
greater contribution fo the common good, or (from another) his
greater virtue or merit. An answer fo this question will
Chap. viii, § iv] THEORY OF REWARD 243
practically amount fo a discussion of the second of the formulae
which purport fo be an adequate expression of social justice--
the formula,' To every one according fo his merits,' the theory
of just recompense or reward.
IV
I shall now proceed fo examine this second formula which,
on Lhe face of if, presents iLself fo many people as self-evidently
just and reasonable--the theory of reward or just recompense.
This doctrine is apt fo express itself in two forms. Sometimes
if is said that every one ought fo be rewarded in proportion
fo his meriL; af other rimes we are told thaL every one should
be rewarded according fo the amount of his work or service
fo society. Sometimes the maxim is'to every man according
fo his merit'; aL other rimes 'fo every man according fo his
work 1o'
Although, on a superficial view, these two formulae might be
accepted as practically identical, there is really a fundamental
difference between them. We may no doubt reduce both of
them Lo the form 'everybody is fo be rewarded according fo
his merit.' But in the firsL case merit is understood in a moral,
in the second in an economic, sense. A moment's consideration
will show that the two interpretations would lead fo essentially
different results. A picture painted with the Loes by a handless
man may show much more zeal, industry, perseverance, and
the like, as well as more skill and ability, than one painted
in Lhe usual way. If the two pictures were of equal artistic
worth, the painters ought, according fo the second formula,
03 be rewarded equally; while, according fo the first, the toe-
painter should receive, iL may be, ten or twenLy rimes the reward
of the hand-painter. And this is by no means an extreme
1 I am here treating the formula in the sense in which if is usually put
forward--as a rule for the actual distribution of concrete goods. If if
is put forward as a formula for the distribution of actual Well-being, ifs
application would have fo be further modified by the principle which
has been already dwelt upon in connexion with the formula of equal con-
sideration--the principle that an equal wage will hot secure equal Well-
being.
:44 JUSTICE [Book I
illustration of the divergent consequences of the two methods:
for iL is hot easy fo exaggerate the difference between the
maximum and the minimum of human talent, skill, strength,
or other capacities which determine the quantity and value
of the results produced by a given amount of labour. Let us,
then, examine the economic interpretation of our thesis first.
The theory that ideal Justice means paying each man in propor-
tion fo the value of his work to the community looks plausible only
so long as we forger that economic value is essentially relative,
and not absolute. What we mean by the value of a given thing
is the amount of other things which will actually be given for
if under certain social conditions. But, when we are assuming
that the very constitution of society has been, so to speak, put
into the melting-pot--when we are given carte blanche fo
reconstruct human society in accordance with ideal Justice,
all the usual means of ascertaining value disappear. Our
ordinary ideas of value postulate that wealth is divided among
a number of individuals who, under whatever restrictions, are
free to barter one form of it for another. The valuewlet us
say--of medical attendance depends upon the amount of other
good things which people are prepared to give up in exchange
for medical attendance, under such conditions as the following:
() that the numbers of the medical profession depend upon the
number of persons who are induced to enter if by the advantages
which if holds out, as compared with other professions open fo
the saine class of persons; () that the profession requires
a certain expenditure upon education; and (3) that this ex-
penditure is only within the reach of a limited number of
persons who have--themselves or their parentshaccumulated
a certain amount of wealth, and become, fo a limited extent,
capitalists; and so on. I need hot take further pains fo show
that values, no less than prices, are fixed by competition 1. The
t AIl the conceptions employed by Economists, such us ' murginul utility,'
'murginul demund,' ' consumer's rent,' and the like, seem fo be in the saine
case. If may be observed thut even if some meuns could be discovered,
in the absence of competition, for mesuring the extent fo which different
commodities could sutisfy the actuul desires of men, this would be no cri-
terion of their truc ethical value for those who hold tht good does hot mean
what men actuully desire. The ethicl disquisitions of some Economists
Chat). viii, § iv] VALUES ARE COMPARATIVE :45
very instance which I have chosen is, indeed, one of those in
which prices are not «holly fixed by competition; and, just
af the point at which they cease fo be fixed by competition
(between different classes of workers, if not between individual
workmen), we cease to be able fo express the value of the article
sui)i)lied. It is customary with general I)ractitioners fo regulate
their fees by the wealth of the patient, of which the probable
rental of his house is taken as a rough indication. Now, if
patient A I)ays os., patient B pays 7s. 5d., and patient C Ss., for
a precisely similar visit, which fee represents the true value
of the commodity supplied ? This is a question which it is
obviously impossible to answer. ow, in a community organized
throughout upon a non-competitive basis, it would be as in»
possible fo express in general terres the value of medical attend-
ance as compared with other things that have value, as if is to
express the true value of those particular visits which are
remunerated according fo the wealth of the patient. Value
is ascertained by competition. It implies that there is a limited
supply of the commodities in question, or af least a limited supply
of commodities in general, and that if you have one, you can't
have another. Now, medical attendance is precisely a coin-
nodity for which there is a by no means unlimited demand.
A socialistic State which should determine the vocation of all
its members, and provide their whole education, might very
conceivably secure medical attendance free for all ifs citizens.
If everybody could have as much medical attendance as he
required without giving up his share of any other commodity,
it would be clearly imi)ossible fo ascertain the economic value
of medical attendance fo the community.
It may be said that these considerations would cease fo be
applicable when we think not of the demand for this or that
commodity (which is always limited) but of the demand for
commodities in general which is practically unlimited. The
(even when they repudiate the hedonistic Psychology) eem to me to be
seriously vitiated by the assumption that such is the case. One of the great
objections to schemes for the immediate realizationof the socialistic ideal is
that they would certainly involve an attempt to fix remuneration (including
hours of work) by reference to the wants af present l'elt, and the ideal of
happiness ' at present entertained, by the average worker.
OE46 JUSTICE [Book I
case would not, indeed, be altered supposing the State undertook
fo determine how much of each commodity the worker should
receive, and exchange were ruade as criminal as accumulation.
But what if the worker were paid by tickets on the stores,
and each worker were allowed fo take his day's allowance in
whatever form he pleased ? Two cases are then supposable.
The State would have fo fix the amount of one commodity
which should be exchangeable for another. If if undertook
fo estimate the value of the article by reference fo the amount
of skill, knowledge, training, &c., which if took fo produce if,
we must suppose the problem which we are discussing already
solved ; since what we are in search of is precisely some common
denominator by means of which fo compare the value of watch-
making and the value of turnip-cultivation. If, on the other
hand (to avoid involving ourselves in a logical circle), we assume
that the quality of the labour is fo be neglected, the only
criteria by which if is possible fo ascertain how much of one
commodity ought fo be served out as the equivalent of so much
of another will be () the amount of labour expended on ifs
production, (oE)the amount of land or its products and capital
required for its production, capital being resolvable into
the results of past labour, and of the ' abstinence' or waiting
which has saved it from immediate consumption . On the
principle now contemplated, the worker who was allowed fo
take his pay in beef or in bread would, of course, have fo choose
between several pounds of bread and one of beef, because if
takes more land fo grow a pound of ox-flesh than to grow a
pound of flour. But this element in the relative value of
different com/nodities has, of course, nothing to do with the
value of the workman's work qua work 2. Hence, the only
If seems unnecessary for our present purpose fo discuss the economic
question how far land should be regarded as capital.
It may be urged that the worker whose work has involved expenditure of
capital, i.e. 'abstinence' or 'waiting,' should be remuneruted for that ex-
penditure. But under such an ideal system as is here contemplated the
work which produced the capital would have been adequately rewarded af
the rime ; and, when we presuppose an ideal distribution, there would be no
occasion for capital fo be accumulated by the voluntary saving of indi-
viduals, as the State would have provided all that was required out of the
Chap. viii, § iv] QUALITIES OF WORK 47
way in which we can compare the value of two pieces of work
(on any hypothesis) is by their respective amounts.
Even then our difficulties are hot af an end. What is
amount of work ? Clearly not the rime spent on if ; for somo
kinds of work are harder than others. But hardness is hot by
itself a reason for additional remuneration, except in so far
as harder work is more disagreeable than lighter work. Some
very light kinds of work may become disagreeable by reason of
their extreme monotony ; while severe bodily exercise is fo some
people a positive delight. Hard work may likewise become
disagreeable when pursued for such a length of rime as would
no't be disagreeable in the case of lighter work. But all that the
hrd-worker can claire is that, in so far as his work is moro
disagreeble than other work, he shall be compensated for ifs
disagreeableness, either by liberty fo work for fewer hours, or
by other advantages--such as more food, tickets on stores, &c.
If is possible that some system might be devised for comparing
the relative disagreeableness of work by ascertaining the amounts
of each which the average man would be willing fo do for the
same remuneration, including under that term ll the adwntges
--whether in leisure or food or other conveniences--by which
a community might endeavour fo equalize the conditions of
workers in different occupations. In that way if might be
possible to ascertain the quantity of work which different
commodities or services fo the community cost. And quantity
of labour, in the sense explained, is the only criterion by which
we could measure the relative value of different kinds of work.
Although this reasoning seems fo me fo be unanswerable, if is
probable that fo some minds if will be round too abstract to be
satisfying. ' What!' they will exclaim; ' do you mean fo say
that the Physician does not perform a greater service fo society
than the ploughman ? Is he not therefore fo receive a pro-
portionate reward ? Granted that the destruction of competition
would prevent your measuring this relative value in terms of
£ s. d., the general sense of the community is surely equal
fo the task of appreciating the relative importance of difirent
common funds. In speaking of 'capital' throughout this chpter I of
course men ' productive' and hot ' consumptive ' cpitl.
4 8 JUSTICE [Book I
services, and will act according fo ifs innate sense of what is
just or appropriate.' I answer: Is if so clear that the service
of the Physician is so rouch roore important than that of the
ploughman ? Af present we measure their relative iroportance
by the coroparative difficulty of getting thero. But with carte
blanche fo postulate any forro of society that he chooses, the
legislator would have no difficulty in roaking if quite as easy
fo get roedical attendance as fo get bread. A sufflcient number
of people will be educated as Physicians fo secure that roedical
attendance shall be forthcoroing for every roan who wants if,
and sufficient ploughmen will be provided fo supply everybody
with as rouch bread as he can eat. And, when these two
conditions are secured, no further production either of bread
or of roedical attendance will be of the slightest value fo the
coromunity 1. If you can have enough of both, if is iropossible
fo say which is the roore valuble. If you ask which is the
roore valuable when you cannot have enough of both, it roust
be adroitted that the ploughroan performs the more indispensable
service. Some of us would die or surfer without the Physician :
but we should all die without the ploughmn or soroe equivalent
food-producer. If, then, this is the sense which you put upon
the principle ' To every roan according fo his work,' if would
seero that the ploughroan should be paid more thon the Physician.
But if is iropossible fo adroit the justice of the principle thus
interpreted. The Physician would naturally say fo the State,
' If I had known tht I was fo be served like that, I should
bave wanted fo be ploughroan too. And if you, for your
greater convenience, insisted that I should be a Physician, why
should I surfer on that account? You sy, "Bread is roore
necessary than medical attendance "; but if you did not want
fo bave both, you should not have insisted on roy being a
Physician.'
If is evident that the real consequences of following out this
roaxim, 'Every roan according fo his work,' would be very
different froro those usually intended by af least one class of
ifs dvocates. When they do not roean that equal work should
1 Foreign trade being, for greater simplicity, ignored. If corn is exported,
it is, of course, hOt serviceable fo the community as bread.
Chap. viii, § iv] WORK AND FACULTY 249
be reeompensed by equal advantages, they usually assume Lhat
what is eommonly eonsidered the higher work, that whieh
employs the highest faeulties, intelleetual work, artistie work,
spiritual work, &e., should be remunerated more highly than
the lower, more meehanieal, more animal work. Now, this
contention may be based on one of two grounds: either (I)
on the ground that by sueh work a higher service is performed
to Lhe eommunity, or (OE) that the higher faeulty should reeeive
higher remuneration simply beoEuse if is higher. In the first
case, I am unable fo see the justice of the demand. The man
who prints Bibles no doubt renders a higher service to the
community than the nan who prints 'penny dreadfuls.' But,
assuming that both minister to legitimate social needs, nobody
would propose that the former should receive higher remunera-
tion than the latter. So long as the different values spring from
some difference in the mere objective results of work, nobody
will contend that the more important or 'higher' consequences
should form a ground for unequM reward of exactly the saine
vork. If you say, ' The work itself is different, not merely
its external consequences,' I cannot see how there tan be a
difference in kind between one work and another when abstracted
both (I) from the results fo the community and (2) from the
faculties employed by the worker. If you mean to insist upon
the last, then you adopt the second of our two original alterna-
rives, which we have yet fo examine.
Is the superior dignity--the morM or aesthetic or intellectual
superiority--of the activities employed any ground for dditionM
remuneration? Of course, if intellectual work is considered
more disagreeable than unintellectual, then the work ought fo
receive compensuting advantages. But if is not the common
opinion that to intellectual 29ersos intellectual vok is less
agreeable than manual labour or mechanical drudgery. Most
people would probably say, ' Caeteris 2»aribus, the intellectual
vork is infinitely the more pleasant.' Even if we suppose the
social estimation and other conditions of intellectual and manuM
labour equalized, there would probbly be more persons anxious
fo undeake intellectual instead of nmnual work than the
community could provide with adequate employment. For our
250 JUSTICE [Book I
present purpose, however, if is enough fo negative any claim
for additional remuneration on the ground of additional dis-
agreeableness. If, however, the intellectual work is supposed
fo imply a sort of nerit on the part of the worker, and fo claire
remuneration on that score, one must ask,' To what does the
intellectual worker owe the opportunity of doing this higher
work ?' The answer will be, () partly fo superior education
and opportunities, (OE) part]y, in the case of the higher kinds of
intellectual work, fo the possession of natural capacities which
are confincd fo a more or less small proportion of the human
race. low, in so far as the position of the brain-worker is due
fo education, if is clearly not his merit but the organization of
society which has put him in this position. Under present
conditions, if is generally the command of capital that secures
education; and, the capital expended upon education being
nearly always accumulated by others than the person whom
if benefits, if will hardly be pretended that an accident of this
kind can claim remuneration on grounds of abstract Justice,
however expedient if may be as a means fo the general good
under certain conditions that such remuneration should be given.
And under altered social arrangements the community could, of
course, easily secure that the requisite educational advantages
should be given fo as many persons as ifs social needs might
demand. In either case, there is no question of superior merit
in the intellectual worker.
But how does the marrer stand with regard fo those capaclties
for higher work which are due to lature ? lature has given
fo many Englishmen intellectual powers possessed by very few
negroes. Among Englishmen she has made, perhaps, from two
fo rive per cent. capable 1, with the requisite education, oppor-
tunity and application, of obtaining a first-class in literae
hmaiores af Oxford--to take the distribution of one particular
kind of intellectual capacity as a sample of the comparative
rarity of high intellectual powers. And when we come fo the
highest kind of intellectual capacity, she gives high originality
to one man in a thousand, genius fo half a dozen in a genera-
tion, and so on. But should the possession of capacities for
I need hardly say that this estimate is little better than guesswork.
Chap. viii, § iv] NO RIGHT TO REWARD :5 I
doing the precise kind of work which only a certain number
of his fellow countrymen can do--should even the power fo do
(a power which is implied, of course, by even the most modest kind
of originality) the particular thing which no one else living can
do, constitute ground for superior remuneration ? So long as
the question is considered merely as one of' reward '--of some
additional gratification, not implying or essential fo the exercise
of his superior faculty--I must say that I cannot sec the justice
of this extra remuneration. Everybody would admit that the
mere rarity of a capacity would be no ground for exceptional
treatment ; though, of course, the most mechanical and accidental
kind of superiority (e. g. delicacy of touch enabling a man fo
test grain better than anybody else) may, under a competitive
r6gime, enable a man fo appropriate an enormous share of the
world's wealth. Under a competitive r6gime giants and dwarfs
can make considerable money by exhibiting themselves; but
on principles of ideal Justice is there any reason why they
should be paid more for their day's labour than an ordinary
sandwich-man ? Is the case altered when the qualification is
not merely rare but intellectually or artistically or even (in so
far as moral qualifies are hot under the immediate control
of the will) morally admirable ? Should strength of brain or
steadiness of nerve or a natural love of work entitle a man fo
a superior share of the good things of life, any more than
strength of arm ? If a man bas a body of extraordinary size
or strength, if is right that I should look upon him--not, indeed,
with the feeling of awe or respect which is often in fact inspired
by the feeling that in certain circumstances such a man might
assault us with impunity, but with the feelings of wonder and
iuterest which are inspired by an elephant or a fossil mammoth.
If he has extraordinary skill and agility of body, if is fitting
that I should look upon him with the half-aesthetic, half-
sympathetic feeling that is inspired by the sight of a gazelle
or a greyhound. If he has exceptional brain-power, the imagina-
tion of a poet or the penetration of a philosopher, if is right that
I should treat him with respect, i. e. the intellectual respect that
his qualifies merit. If he has moral or spiritual capacities above
those of conmon men, then if is right that I should treat him
5 JUSTICE [Book I
with moral and spiritual respect. But I see no reason why, on
account of either the intellectual or the spiritual superiority,
I should offer him a bottle of champagne while for my less
gifted guest I only provide small beer. leither intellectual
nor spiritual superiority seems to constitute an intelligible
ground for assigning to a man a larger share of carnal delights
than his neighbour. The opportunity of freely exercising his
superior faculty and the power or authority which his particular
gift fits him to wield, these strike us as the fitting rewards, and
the only fitting rewards, for superiority of this kind. To the
man who is capable of a higher kind of happiness than others
because of his higher gifts, that higher happiness itself surely
is the due reward--not a larger meed than others of those lower
kinds of pleasure of which alone his inferior may be capable.
If any difference were to be made between the two, it mght
be plausibly argued that the superior man should recelve less
of those lower pleasures which he ought better to be able to
do without, than the man who is capable of nothing else. Of
course it may be suggested that the superior man may be
expected to ' make a good use' of his superior wealth, i.e. to
use it in the public interest. But if so, the wealth is not really
'distributed,' the distribution is merely postponed. The real
problem is, 'what is it just that the superior man should
enjoy ?'
To translate the somewhat abstract language into terres of
actual social arrangements, Justice does not seem to me to
require that because Nature has given a man capacities which
fit him for superior usefulness to the community, his work per
hour should--on any principle of abstract Justice and apart
from considerations of social utility--be paid at a higher rate
than the equally exhausting or disagreeable work of common
men 1 When I say'paid at a higher rate,' I mean that there
is no reason why he should be better fed, clothed, or housed;
1 The fatigue of work demands remuneratlon only in so far as (i) it makes
it disagreeable, which if does hot always do or (2) makes the worker capable
of doing less of it. If, on account of the value of his work, if is socially de-
sirable that he should do a longer day's work than others, then no doubt the
absence of recreation should be ruade up fo him in other ways.
Chap. viii, § iv] WORK AND PAY 253
that he should be indulged in more or more expensive amuse-
ments, or allowed longer holidays.
1No doubt if is quite true that the man of higher faculty
requires for the exercise of those faculties certain external
conditions of an exceptional character. And some of these
conditions may consist in a larger supply of those conveniences
and indulgences which ordinary men are quite capable of
appreciating. Nay, the higher faculty may sometimes be a
source, not of greater happiness, but of greater misery, unless
these conditions are forthcoming. The musical genius, for
instance, might be driven distracted by being compelled fo live
amid the noise and bustle, the barrel-organs and the hurdy-
gurdies, which would be Paradise fo many an East-end factory-
girl. And of intellectual workers in general if may be said that
they do require for the favourable exercise of their faculties
a larger share of certain comforts and conveniences than would
be likely fo fall fo the lot of the average workman under
a r6gime of absolute equality. If is doubtful whether the
luxurious table of a successful barrister is any more conducive
fo his activity than the humbler fare of the solicitor's managing
clerk, who may sometimes do quite as large an allowance of
brain-work ; but if is probably true that the brain-worker wants
more and better food than is absolutely necessary for the less
exhausting kinds of mechanical work. Still, if everybody had
his fill of plain and wholesome diet, I don't know that the brain-
worker could on grounds of abstract Justice claim anything
more 1. Nor is there any reason in the nature of things--existing
social conventionalities apart--why the brain-worker should be
clad in broad-cloth, and the hand-worker in corduroy. But if
is otherwise when we corne fo less material convenîences. If is
probably desirable in the interests of his efficiency that the
higher-class brain-worker should be set free from petty worries
and anxieties. Under existing conditions, that would mean that
he ought fo be allowed servants to do for him things which
other people have fo do for themselves; under any arrange-
If is possible no doubt that a certain amount of luxury, even in matters of
eating and drinking, may sometimes be conducive to efficiency, but, if the
luxuries were given on this ground, they would not be given byway of' reward.'
254 JUSTICE [Book I
ments he would want a larger amount of se'vice. If is desirable
that he should have more house-room than the most ideal
Socialism would probably assign fo ordinary hand-workers.
The doctor's carriage is none the less a personal luxury because
if is also necessary fo his business. The author will want
a study, the artist a studio, the student books and room fo
stow them. If his wife is fo be capable of sharing his lire, and
not fo be a mere housekeeper, she must also be secured more
than the normal exemption from household drudgery by nurses
and other servants. And if family life is fo be maintained, if is
practically inevitable that some of these advantages should be
extended fo his children, who may nevertheless be very far from
inheriting his mental superiority. Then, too, if is probable that,
if the lives of highly cultivated people are fo be ruade as agree-
able fo them as thei' lives are fo people of less cultivation, they
will want amusements or interests that will impose upon the
community a heavier fax than the amusements of the less
cultivated. We can hardly conceive of the most absolutely
socialistic State allowing very extensive opportunities of foreign
travel to every one; and yet if is clearly desirable that they
should be within the reach of some. Moreover, for the exercise
of certain mental gifts, considerable leisure and some liberty of
action may be essential--including the liberty at rimes fo be
unproductive. Literary production of a certain kind has, indeed,
often been stimulated by the most abject bodily want ; but if is
certain that the higher kinds of intellectual labour could never
be ruade into a daily task, fo be exacted under penalty of im-
prisonment or short commons by a socialistic taskmaster. In
ways like these if is probably right that the more gifted man--
or even the more educated man when once the community has
allowed him a higher education than the common--should have
exceptional treatment. But if is rather because these things
are necessary or desirable for the full development and enjoy-
ment of a faculty which ought fo be developed, than as' reward'
for being differently constituted from ordinary men, that he
may rightfully claire from the community the use--in certain
directions--of more wealth than would fall fo his lot under
a perfectly equal distrîbutiofi.
Chap. viii, § iv] MORAL IIERIT 55
Our examination of the dictum,' To every man according fo
his work,' has, so far, tended to this result--that we can accept
if only in the sense,' The development of higher capacity is
of more worth than the development of lower capoeity, and
consequently ought fo be provided with all the conditions
necessary fo ifs exercise.' And thîs was, if will be remembered,
the one exception which our examination of the other maxim,
'Everybody fo count for one, and nobody for more than one,'
compelled us fo adopt before we could adroit ifs universal
applicability in any sense other than the purely abstract one,
' Caeteris pc«'ibu,s, everybody fo count for one,' or ' One man's
good fo count for as much as the like good of any other.' We
came fo the conclusion that the higher good was worth more
than the lower, and that consequently the man who has more
capazity for higher good should count for more than the man
who has less.
So far, however, we have confined our attention fo those
differences in capacity for work which are due solely fo differ-
ences of natural endowment. But now, what of the differences
whîch are due fo will ? What of the strictly moral differences 2.
Ought the virtuous fo be rewarded ? What, in ultimate analysis,
are we fo make of the popular notion of'merit'? Here if is
necessary fo put aside two philosophical problems with which
a discussion of this question is usually involved.
(x) I put aside for the present the question of Free-will. The
facts of heredity, the phenomena of mental loathology, and the
constancy of statistics make if plain that Free-will (in the popular
' indeterminist' sense of the word) is on any view hot the oly
cause of some men's goodness and other men's badness. And if
is obviously impossible fo discriminate in our treatment of other
people between the part which undetermined choice (if such
a thing there be) may play in the formation of actual good
volitions, and the factors in their causation which are due fo
other influences. Hence if is clear that, if we are in any sense
fo reward men for their goodness, we must look only fo the
actual quality of their volitions. We must reward them for
being good without raising the question how they came fo be so.
() The question involves an answer fo the theory of punish-
256 JUSTICE [Book I
ment. If punishment is retrospective and retributive, then if
may be inferred that reward must also rest upon an a priori
basis, and not be a means fo anything beyond itself. That is
a question which I reserve for sei)arate treatment in the next
chapter : but, even if we deny that the bad man ought fo surfer
pain as an end-in-itself, independently of the moral effect fo be
I)roduced upon him and others, if does not follow that we must,
on that account, decline fo say that happiness ought fo be
distributed in proportion fo goodness. If is one thing fo cause
a man pain, another fo refuse fo make him hai)pier than some-
body else. When if is a question of inflicting pain, the o'us
p'oba'ndi, so fo speak, would seem fo rest with the inflicter;
vhen if is a question of distributing happiness, if may be
considered fo lie with the claimants. If I hang, or assault, or
imprison a man, he naturally demands my authority for doing
so ; but if might easily be maintained that I do no wrong fo A by
giving a certain lot of hapi)iness fo B. The question is, there-
fore, not settled by the view we take of the theory of punishment,
unless, indeed, we look upon punishment in a merely negative
aspect as the withholding of some good 1. We must therefore
still ask,' Is if reasonable that an individual or a community,
having the conditions of happiness or Well-being 2 af his or ifs
disi)osal , should distribute them fo all equally, or should dis-
tribute them in proportion fo the moral worth of the individuals
concerned ?'
To this question the obvious practical answer will be that we
shall distribute in accordance with merit because we want fo make
as many people good as I)ossible, and that exi)erience shows that
the best way of effecting that object is fo contrive that, so far
as possible, goodness shall lead fo hai)piness, and badness fo
misery 3. The question whether, ai)art from such tendency,
a See below, p. 294 note.
The idea of distribution according to merit is genemlly understood to
refer to the distribution of happiness, since the higher elements of Well-
being constitute the merit which is tobe rewarded, and cannot therefore be
themselves distributed by way of reward.
8 If we hold (with Aristotle} that Virtue necessarily or intrinsically leads to
happiness (given the favouruble external conditions or an ' unimpeded exer-
cise' of virtuous activities), the question ceases to bave any meaning except
Chalo. viii, § iv] CLAIMS OF SUPERIOR CAPACITY 257
Justice would require an unequal distribution of external goods
is an extremely abstract question which if can never be necessary
fo answer for the solution of any practical problem. But, if the
question must be answered, I should be disposed fo say: If the
marrer be treated as an abstract question of merit and reward,
I can sec no reason ai all why superior moral goodness should
be assigned a superior quantity of external goods, that is fo say,
the means of indulging desires which have no connexion with
this superior goodness. So far as the word 'merit' means
anything more than ' intrinsic worh' or 'value,' if must be
treated as one possessing no intl}igible meaning. Goodness does
hOt merit material reward, as though goodness were a loss fo
the possessor which can only be rationalized if he be paid for
But if the question be asked whether the good man ought not fo
be made happy, I should answer, 'Yes, certainly he ought fo be
ruade happy, because the kind of happiness of which the good
man is capable possesses so much higher a value than the
happiness of the less virtuous character. Just because Virtue
is not by itself the only good for man, though if is his highest
good and an essential condition of the good, the man who has
should be given all that is necessary fo complete his truc Well-
being. Pleasure taken by itself in abstraction from all other
elements of consciousness may have a very small value : pleasure
taken in connexion with elements of consciousness that are bad--
such pleasure in a word as a bad man is capable of--may have
still smaller or perhaps a negative value; but such pleasure as
accompanies the exercise of the higher faculties under favourable
circumstances possesses a very high value indeed.' But if this
be the ground on which we pronounce that goodness should be re-
warded, if is clear that if is not any and every kind, nor every
amount of pleasure or material source of pleasure, that should be
the ideal reward of the good man. The fitting reward of the
in relation fo God, who may no doubt be conceived of as creating human
nature in such a way as to nmke goodness constitute or contribute fo the
happiness of the creature. Goodness can hardly be thought tobe a good
all without being supposed fo be tf source of happiness: the question
remains whether, in so far as happiness is dependent on external circum-
stances, the other conditions of happiness ought fo be ruade to follow upon
goodness.
R&SHD&LL I S
258 JUSTICE [Book I
good man (if we still talk of reward ai all) is the opportunity for
the freest and most fruitful exercise of his highest capacities--
their exercise in such a way as shall be most favourable both to
the goodness itself and fo the pleasure which, under favourable
circumstances, goodness brings with it. Il is (as Aristotle puis
if) the 'appropriate' or 'cognate' pleasure tht is the fitting
reward of the activity, together with such other pleasures as are
conducive or hOt unfavourable to the continued exercise of
vi$uous activities. And fo that end the man ought clearly
o be assigned hOt the amount of external goods which he has
'earned,' for moral goodness cannot be expressed in terres of
external goods, or of such happiness as external goods can secure,
but the quantity of external goods which will be most calculated
fo secure that ideal of life which includes goodness and culture
and happiness . And if if be asked what is fo be done when
the claires of the good man corne into collision with those of less
good or bad men, I answer in accordance with the principle
which we have already adopted: ' the higher kind of lire is
worth more than the lower: consequently the man with the
higher capacities must be treated as of more value than the
1 This of course represents the Aristotelian idea of the proper relation of
external goods fo ««oi«, but if is a principle which Aristotle entirely
forgets in his crude accourir of distributive Justice. If is perhaps a some-
what parmioxical result of out principle (one which Aristotle would have
been little disposed to adroit) that the less completely viuous man might
sometimes huve fo be assigned more material reward than the more irtuous.
The average man, even the avemge good man, certainly does want, fo make
him really happy, many external goods whlch would hOt have increased the
huppiness of St. Francis of Assisi, or even of an ideal man of legs one-sided
development than St. Froncis.
The higher capacities, hot the higher performance. Logically we should
have fo adroit that, if the bad man could be rendered capable of the
higher life by expending upon him whut if would be prepred to spend
upon the better man, the expenditure would be equally justified. And there
are cuses where that principle muy really be acted on. We are justified in
spending money fo bring one sinner fo repentance which might otherwise
bave been spent in adding to the comforts of ninety-and-nine just persons
who need no repentnce, ttow fo compare the claires of the sinner and the
just might offert be a difficult problem but for the fortunate fact that the
conversion of the most obviously anti-social sinners involves the saving of
considerable expense fo the just persons.
Chap. viii, § iv] REWARD INJURIOUS TO VIRTUE .9
man of less capacity----of how much more value is a problem
which the practical Reason must solve when occasion arises for it.'
Iç should be observed, indeed, thaL the grounds on which we
do, in a sense, admiç the good fo be ençitled to reward will by
çhemselves set a limit fo the amounç of çhis reward, in so far as
it consist in the means of gratifying çhe lower or more animal
desires. Iç will be generally admitçed that çhe possession, or aL
least çhe consumpçion, of much wealçh in such ways is not
favourable to--may even be inconsistenç with--çhe highest
moral Well-being. And when çhe exisçing inequalities are
jusçified as a means fo the encouragement of 'merit,' it is fçen
forgotçen thaç the influence of excessive wealth upon çhe moral
Well-being of its possessors may be as injurious as its influence
in decreasing the moral and physical Well-being of the poor. If
the question be raised, whether çhe sysem of rewarding Virtue
is noç itelf injurious ço Virçue, I should be quite prepared ço
adroit thaç the reward of Virtue might very easily be carried t
this point, though in the interests of socieçy we often have
fo encourage social service even t çhe injury of the highesç
character. And this is one of the difficulties çhat I should feel
in admiççing, even as an abstracç and theoreçical proposiçion,
thaç çhe good man ought, as a marrer of a p'ior Justice, fo be
rewarded in proportio to his merit. For çhaç would mean, if
we use words in çheir ordinary sense, çhaç every increase of
Virtue should, on principles of ideal Jusçice, bring with iç
a larger house, more servants, beçter dinners, more expensive
pleasures, more splendid equipages, and more costly horseflesh.
And çhese things would possibly not be good for çhe good man.
The House of Lords may be a useful insçitution under exisçing
social condiçions, but iL can hardly be said to °encourage ' the
highest Virçue in Peers or çheir eldest sons.
But how far is this principle, çhaç çhe good ought ço be
revarded, available as a canon of distribuçive Justice in actual
life ? For practical purposes hardly aç all. We must, no doubt,
in criticizing or seeking fo aller exisçing social arrangements
bear in mind the necessiçy of securing conditions favourable to
the highesç type of life. But in içs ordinary economic arrange-
mençs the only kind of goodness which society aç large bas i
260 JUSTICE [Book I
in ifs power fo reward is positive contribution fo social good,
and for the most part such contribution fo social good as adnits
of being hot altogether inadequately expressed in terres of
- s.d. The only kind of reward, in short, of which if is possible
fo take much practical accourir is the economic reward for work
done. For how is if possible fo discriminate between the portion
of the work produced which is due fo superior goodwill, to
industry, perseverance, integrity, and that which is due to
superior capacity ? If is obvious that one workman can do in
an hour twice as much work as another working equally hard.
But how can we test the intensity of a man's application ?
is practically impossible fo reward industry without rewarding
cleverness also. And yet we have seen that the ideal of just
reward is hOt satisfied by paying a man according fo the actual
quantit.y of work done irrespective of the qualifies which he
shows in doing if. If follows then that, if there is fo be any
diversity of reward af ail, if cannot be based upon the principle
of ideal Justice, but must be regulated by social expediency. If
anybody thinks that men in general could be induced fo put
forh their maximum activity in the service of the community
without the prospect of reward,-for themselves and those nearly
connected with them, he is a person with whom if is useless fo
argue. Rewards there must be; and yet rewards cannot be
directly justified by considerations of ideal Justice, but only
indirectly by their tendency fo bring about in the long run
equality of consideration in the distribution of good.
_And lest I should be accused of taking s low view of human
nature or inadequately recognizing ifs future improvsbility, let
me add two practical considerations which must be borne in
mind before our conclusions are used as a justification of the
sociil status quo, or as an argument against any suggested
modification of society in a socialistic direction. In the first
place, it must be remembered that a very small reward is quite
suflcient fo call forth men's utmost energies when no oçher is
obtainuble. A free labourer would laugh in your face if you
proposed to allure him fo greater industry by the offer of an
additional two ounces of bread per diem, but such an offer is found
a very effective stimulus smong the inmates of ttis Majesty's
Chap. viii, § iv] REWARD AS A MEANS 6I
gaols. German judges probably work as hard as English ones,
though they do not receive such large salaries. After a certain
point small incomes stimulate activity as much as lrger ones
when no larger ones are fo be had. The other consideration is
that even in the existing state of society the rewards for which
men work (in so far as they do work for reward) are very large|y
honorary--rewards which take the form of social consideration
or of interesting employment for their higher faculties. The
pecuniary gains even of the most remunerative professions are
small compared with those of commerce, but they are more
attractive fo educated men because even ai the present day
an eminent Physician or Lawyer enjoys more consideration and
has a more interesting lire than a successful clothier or brewer
with a much larger income. And the Civil Service can secure
the highest ability at a still lower rate. Even wealth itself is
largely valued as the concrete embodiment of success and the
source of social consideration. In the society of the future
these principles might be carried much further. Rewards will
always be necessary, but rewards may be increasingly small in
their cost fo the community, and increasingly non-material in
character; and, though reward must always in the nature of
things consist in some sort of differential advantage, the ad-
vantage may be increasingly consistent with and conducive fo
the highest development of the less favoured individuals.
Reward must always, under any possible conditions of human
lire, mean the getting something which somebody else has not
got: it need not always mean the gain of one ai the expense of
the whole. Both the lower kind of non-material rewards (stars,
ribbons, titles, newspaper notoriety, conventional social position)
and the higher (more responsible and more intellectual work,
power, influence, interesting society, the esteem of the best)
must always from the nature of the case belong fo the few,
but they need not involve a burden on the many. And
if the enjoyment of the best things in life does involve, and
always must fo some extent involve, exceptional material ad-
vantages, the material side of the reward may still be treated as
a condition of that better lire which ideal Justice would award
fo the exceptionally gifted, and not as ifs essence.
6 JUSTICE [Book I
While the principles of ideal Justice can hardly be ruade into
a rule Capable of actual application te the actual payment of each
individual citizen even in a socialistic Eutopia, the principle
that the higher lire possesses superior value bas a most important
bearing upon questions of social organization and social policy.
If emphasizes the fact that we must net push the search for
equality of conditions, or even the pursuit of maximum Well-
being for all, te the point which might be fatal te progress and
se extinguish the higher kinds of human existence altogether.
Frein the point of view of reward, if that principle is te be
admitted at all, if would be only moral effort that could be
supposed te carry with ita title te superior remuneration: and
the difficulty of distinguishing superior effort frein superior
ability was, we saw, insuperable. But, if we claim for higher
capacity the conditions of ifs exercise on the ground simply of
the higher worth of the life which such capacity makes possible,
if will become unnecessary te draw a sharp line between moral
and intellectual capacity, between superior exertion and superior
success. Ail kinds of higher lire--moral, intellectual, and
aesthetic--will be treated as more valuable than lower lire. In
the distribution of good things--or, te speak more practically, in
the criticism and modification of social institutions--each element
in life should receive the weight that is due te ifs intrinsic
quality, and net merely te its amount measured by a hedonistic
or any other merely quantitative standard. Such is the ultimaSe
meaning of that idea of distributive Justice or just recompense
which protests against the Benthamite idea of equal consideration,
pure and simple, and seeks te mend if hy the Aristotelian formula,
' equal things te equal persons.'
The general result of our enquiry has been, I apprehend, to
show that each of these competing ideals of Justice is only
reasonable in the sense in which if becomes equivalent fo the
other. We saw that Equality was only reasonable in a sense
which implied, not equality in the possession or enjoyment of
any concrete good, but only equality of consideration--equality
in the degree of importance which is attached fo each man's
Chap. viii, § v] BENTHA
individual Well-being
as such distributon
action. And even so,
and nobody for more
AND ARISTOTLE 6 3
in the distributon of ultimate good so far
is capable of being effected by _human
the formula ' every one fo count for one
than one' requires fo be interpreted as
meaning 'every one's good fo be considered as of equal value
with the li]'e good of every other individual '. If is not really
individuals considered simply as individuals but individuals con-
sidered as capable of a certain kind of good that are intrinsically
valuable, and entitled fo consideration equal in so far as their
eapacities are equal, unequal in proportion as their capacities are
unequal. And when we turned fo the other ideal of recompense
or reward, we round if fo be childishly unreasonable in so far as
if meant that every indîvidual should be assigned sugar-plums in
proportion fo his moral or other 'merit,' but entirely reasonable
in so far as if meant that superior capacity constitutes a superior
title hOt only fo the conditions for the realization of such capaci-
ries, but fo those other good things of human life which are
.necessary fo complete that ideal of a desirable life of which
virtuous actàvity is not the whole. These two ideals como to the
saine thing ; both prescribe equality of treatment when Cal?acities
are equal, treatment in proportion fo the intrinsic worth of the
capacity when they are unequal. And the worth of a capacity
is really, as we have pointed out, the worth of that kind of good
life which the capacity enables the individual fo realize. As the
formula of reward according fo merit seems too hopelessly
charged with misleading suggestions fo be adopted by a rational
system of Ethics, I prefer fo retain the tenthamite maxim with
the explanation that if is each man's good that is as good as the
like good of another, hOt the individual abstracted from all those
.capacities the possession of which can give him worth or entitle
him fo ' consideration ' af the hands of his fellows 1.
1 If we grant that superior capacity should receive the superior considera-
tion, the question may still be raised whether, if and in so far as the persons
enjoying superior culture are hot and cannot always be those intrinsi-
cally most fit fo receive if, tho existence of a favoured class enjoying
such culture can be justified. To a large extent this state of things actually
exists : to a certain extent if must probably always be so if the higher cul-
ture is fo subsist af all. I should reply: I have already urged that the
existence of this class is socially useful, if ' useful' be only understood in
264 JUSTICE [Book I
The superior man's good is worth more than the inferior man's
(whatever the nature of his superiority)--how much more must
be decided by our judgement of value in each particular case of
moral choice. The superior man's good has more value than that
of the inferior man, simply because if is a greater good.
VI
From this point of view if might almost appear as if we
had succeeded in reducing out two maxims of Justice and
Benevolence fo one and the saine all-embracing precept--that
of promoting a maximum of good on the whole.
But out difficulties are not yet af an end. If may still be
asked, ' What are we fo do when we can only satisfy equal claires
fo good by diminishing the total amount of good to be enjoyed ?'
Even the abstract and theoretical solution of this problem is,
if must be confessed, a marrer of extreme difficulty, fo say
nothing of practical applications. If may, indeed, be maintained
that our theory of equal consideration for good of equal worth
will still prove equal fo the strain. We have already seen how
frequently inequality in actual distribution is demanded by the
a non-hedonistic sense. If it could be shown that its existence could hot be
justified on social grounds, I should still maintain that a society with a
cultivated class would be better than a society without one ; the inequality
would be justified by the superior value of higher good. But it would still
remain a duty to aire af making the favoured class consist of the persons
most capable of the higher life. So ikr as that cannot be done, it is still
better that the higher life should be led by some, even though that life be
hot so good a thing as it might be if the opportunity of it were reserved for
the most capable persons. Von Itartmann's tirades against the ' social-
eudaemonistic Moral principle' and the associated ideal of equality (he
entirely fails fo distinguish between the different possible senses of the
word) are to a large extent answered by his own convincing, if exaggerated,
demonstrations of the necessity for social inequality (Das sittliche Bewusst-
sein, pp. 503-5o8, &c.). When he seems positively to contend for the maxim-
izing of inequality, his argument turns partly upon an over-estimate of the
necessity for competition, so that the fittest (in an intellectual and ethical
sense) may be selected, while he forgets that the higher stages of animal
and human evolution bave been attended by a progressive dimb,ution of
waste ; and partly upon his pessimistic exaggeration of the incompatibility
between progressive culture and happiness whether in the individual or the
society.
Chap. viii, § vil JUSTICE AND BENEVOLENCE
65
maxim of equal consideration itself. But are we fo assume that
this must always be so--that, no marrer how great an inequality
is required fo effect if, the promotion of maximum good on the
whole will always be right, because the hardship fo the individual
or the minority sacrificed will always be no more than is war-
ranted, on the principle of equal consideration, either by the
inferior numbers of the minority or by their inferior capacities
for good 1 ? If is clear that if the sacrifice of good on the whole
fo failess of distribution were carried beyond a certain point,
we should be violating the principle that one man's good is
of the saine value as the like good of another. If we were
fo impose great hardships upon a whole community in order
tlmt the life or health of one man might be sparcd, that would
be fo treat that man's lire as more valuble than the life of many.
But what if a very slight increase of good on the whole
could be secured by a very gross inequality in ifs distribution ?
Ought ve never fo sacrifice something in the total amount
of good that there may be a greater fairness--a greater approach
fo equality for equal capacities--in ifs enjoyment? I think
itis clear that, if a very small sacrifice of good on the whole
could secure much greater equality in ifs distribution, we should
say that the sacrifice ought fo be ruade. Whether the structure
of human society is such that we could ever produce more good
on the whole by distributing unequally, is a problem which
we hardly possess the data for determining . But we may
perhaps be tolerably certain that a rigid carrying out of the
principle that no sacrifice of individuals is fo be condemned
which is balanced by an equivalent increase of good on the
a If is clear that in this last case Justice, in the sense which we have given
fo if, might prescribe the sacrifice of the majority fo a minority, but if will
simplify the discussion fo assume that the superior numbers and the superior
capacity are on the sume side.
2 Tht a fairer distribution of muterial wealth would be worth purchasing
af the cost of diminished production on the whole, few would dispute. But
then if cannot be assumed that the additionl production would really be
additionl good. In all probability if would not be so. A lesser amount
nmre fairly distributed would produce greater good on the whole. Here u
luw of diminishing returns cornes into pluy. £Ioo added fo u rich mn's
income would hot perceptibly add fo his enjoyment; divided among ten
poor men if might produce a greut deal.
266 JUSTICE [Book I
whole would lead eo a sacrifice of unforeunaee minorieies--ehe
weak in mind or body, ehe sick, ehe hale, ehe maimed--such
as common humaniey would condemn 1. Ai all evenes we are
noe eneitled fo exclude the speculaeive possibility of such a seaee
of things, and consequenely muse not assume an invariable
harmony between ehe ultimaee resules of our ewo maxims of
Benevolence and of Justice or Equiey.
How then are we fo co-ordinate tho two principles of action ?
Ont way of doing so es eempting on accoune of ets simpliciey.
We mighe say ehae equaliey of distribution es ieself a good, and
so ehae te will always be right eo promoee the greatese good
on ehe whole, after giving due weighe eoehe good involved
in equaliey. The question how much gain in fairness of dis-
tribution es eo be ereaeed as equivalene in woreh eo a given
amoune of other goods will ehen be simply an ordinary case
of comparison of values--a very difficult ont in practice, but
offering no pareicular difficuley in eheory. But objection may
be taken fo regarding as 'a good' so abserace a thing as a
diseribution--someehing which cannot be regarded as ehe good
of any ont of ehe persons affeceed nor of all of ehem colleceively,
since we have admieted ehe possibiliey of a diminution of good
on ehe whole in consequence of such an ideal distribution. Such
an objection es no doube a reasonable ont : and te mighe lead us
to give up the aeeempe eo reduce our axiom of Benevolence and
our axiom of Equiey eo a single principle. From a praceical
point of view te might be enough fo say that ehere are simply
ewo sides of a single ideal of lift, and ehe praceical Reason muse
decide in each case which es more important--Justice or good on
ehe whole. But te seems hardly consistent wieh ehe very mean-
ing of 'good' eo suggese ehaç ie raay someeimes be a duey to
promoçe someehing which es noe ehe good. If we are eo aeeempe
fo defend ehese maxims of Justice and Benevolence as valid and
self-consistent judgemenes of ehe praceical Reason, te es a maeeer
of lift and death eo our position to find either a common de-
nominaeor, in terres of which boh principles could be expressed,
1 As already suggested (above, p. 53), this consequen0e might he avoided
by assigning u sufficiently high value fo sympathetic feolings--u solution
vhich es practically much the sme as we arrive ut bolow.
Chap. viii, § vil JUSTICE ITSELF A GOOD 267
or at least some third principle which should govern us in
deciding between their respective claires--in deciding when
to sacrifice quantity of good in favour of just distribution, and
when fo sacrifice justice of distribution in order that there may
be more good to distribute. The difficulty may, I think, be escped
by remembering that, according fo the view of the end here
adopted, if is not only the pleasure or other non-moral good which
is promoted by right actions which constitutes the supreme ethical
end, but the qualities of character which these acts express.
And not only Benevolence but Justice also is part of the ideal
lire for the society at large and for each individual member
of it. And this inclusion of Justice or Equity in our ideal of lire
sers limits fo the extent to which we can allow individuals or
societies to promote a maximum of other good at the expense
of great inequality in its enjoyment, just as the inclusion of
culture among our ends or elements in tle end sers limits fo the
amount and kind of pleasure which we can regard as elements in
the good. In insisting therefore that an individual or a society
ought sometimes (if such a collision should in practice oecur) to
sacrifice something in amount of good in order to efict its more
just distribution, we are hOt enjoining any one to subordinate the
pursuit of good to something which is not a good at all, but
simply insisting on one particular case of that subordination
of lower goods to higher which every non-hedonistic system
of Ethics must adroit af every turn. An abstract 'distribution'
cannot be a good, but a disposition and a will to distribute justly
may be. A society which for the sake of increasing the plesure
or even the culture of some should be content to condemn a
minority of its members to extreme hardships would be thinking
too much of its pleasure or its culture and too little of its own
Justice. If an individual or a minority, on the other hand, were
to demand of the majority that this sacrifice should be carried
beyond a certain point, if would be thinking too much of its own
claires or (fo put it in another way) too much of the encouragement
of sympathy and mercy to individuals nd t)o little, if may be,
of culture or plesure in society at large. There is a proper
degree of subordination of the individual to society, and a sub-
ordination which goes beyond that degree. Both of these
268 JUSTICE [Book I
principles of conduct may be expressed as ultimately qualities
of human character. When a Quaker or a disciple of Tolstoi
refuses fo kill a man in a just war because that particular man
has committed no crime, he is, according fo common opinion,
wrong because his ideal attaches too much importance fo kind-
ness and goodwill for individuals and too little fo the common
interests of human society af large and that system of rights by
which those interests are promoted. Were a society fo refuse fo
do anything for ifs submerged tenth or twentieth--to do more
for them than their strict numerical proportion might demand--
in the interest of ifs own comfort or even of ifs own culture, that
would be attributing too much importance fo comfort and culture
and too little fo the moral quality (whether you call if Justice or
Benevolence) which revolts against allowing individuals fo surfer
the wors horrors of poverty because they are only a minority.
Wha is the exact degree of importance which should be attached
fo each of these elements of character--solicitude for individual
interests and the care for other forms of social good--is, just like
any other question as fo the relative value of goods, a problem
upon which the practical Reason must pronounce in each par-
ticular case, and which does hot adroit of being solved by any
exact or universal formula.
The principle which I bave been contending for may be briefly
expressed thus. The claires of social good are paramount. If is
always a duty fo promote maximum social good. Both the rule
of Justice and the rule of Benevolence ultimately turn on the
value of certain kinds of consciousness. Benevolence asserts
the value of good. Justice asserts the value of persons. There
is no real and final collision between these aspects of the ideal
end, for good is ultimately the 'good of definite individuals.
Justice and Benevolence are thus the correlatives of one another.
Good has no worth--it has indeed no existence--apar from
persons : persons have no value apart from the good which they
are cpable of enjoying. But if is true that the good of some may
have ultimately fo be secured af the cost of a diminished enjoyment
of good by the whole society. And Justice does prescribe that
we should aire af bestowing equal good on equal capacity.
Some sacrifice of individuals fo the whole is, indeed, prescribed
Chap. viii, § vii] PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
z6 9
by the just claires of the majority. Too great a soerifice of the
individuals does present itself fo us as unjust even when it
might be prescribed by the principle of maximum good. But
when this is the case, if is because consideration for the claires
of individuals no less than consideration for the whole forms part
of that ideal character which is itself the highest element in the
good. When Justice itself is given its due place as part of
the true good for society and each individual in it, we may say
that if is always a duty to promote the greatest good on the
whole.
VII
To apply these highly abstract considerations fo proetice--to
enquire to what conclusions they point in the region of social
and political conduct--forms no part of my present undertaking.
Every political question is, of course, in the last resort an ethical
question. But in so far as the duty of the individual turns upon
questions as to the ultimately best form of human society or the
means of promoting if by social and political action, the dis-
eussion passes into the region of social and political rather than
of purely ethical Philosophy. The considerations on which
I have insisted will, I trust, have shown the impossibility of
any individual immediately effecting by his own unassisted
efforts an ideally just distribution, the impossibility even for
society of realizing if immediately, the unreasonableness even
under any conceivable social order of basing the distribution of
good merely upon a principle of ideal Justice to each particular
individual without reference to that other side or aspect of
lIorality which enjoins the promotion of the greatest good on
the whole. The enjoyment by each individual of as much good
as he is entitled to by his capacities (relatively to the capacities
of others) must be looked upon therefore as an ideal--a far-off
ideal, fo which only more or less distant approoehes are possible
even in the region of self-consistent Utopias. This would,
perhaps, be admitted by many zealous advocates of Equality.
But I hope I have further indicated the necessity of not making
any actual equality of good, even as a distant ideal, our primary
object, but rather general Well-being; and I trust I have shown
JUSTICE [Book I
further that such a course is imperatively required by ideal
Justice itself, since the only equality that is capable of ira-
mediate realization is equality of consideration, and to produce
equality of distribution at the cost of lowering the average
amount distributed would be a violation of that one essential
equality. If in the course of my argument I have incidentally
replied to some of the arguments by which the extremer kinds
of Socialism 1 are sometimes advocated, I trust if has become no
less evident that any attempt fo justify the status quo--the
taking of interest, the system of inheritance, the fixing of wages
and prices by competition and the like--as an even approximate
realization of Justice is a still more indefensible thesis. This
present state of affairs may be for the moment--with the
exception of this or that immediately possible reform--a less
violation of justice than any other po««ible system ; and so long
the maintenance of the existing order of society minus the
possible reforms will be demanded by Justice itself: Justice can
never require us to make matters worse. :None the less, the
discrepancy between the present distribution of wealth and any
that could a priori be justified in the interests of general Well-
being emphasizes the fact that one large element of private
duty which Justice prescribes for the individual must be the
striving after a more socially beneficial system. But we shall
be prepared fo find that even in the remote future no system of
distribution that is at once possible and socially expedient will
realize the dream of any other equality than equality of con-
sideration.
The ideal Justice which I have attempted fo adumbrate is nofi
capable of immediate political realization. It would open up
a large question were I to ask how far it is capable of immediat
application in the domain of private Ethics--I mean, how far i
is possible for each individual to act upon principles of ideal
Justice, in so far as it ress with himself to determine how much
* In strictness Socialism does hot necessarily imply an equal distribution
of material things, but tbe more thoroughgoing advocates of the doctrine
that the State should be the sole owner of the instruments of production
and the sole employer of labour offert adopt that programme only as a
means fo an ultimate equality of wealth or enjoyment.
Chap. viii, § vii] PERSONAL EXPENDITURE 271
of that portion of the world's wealth over which he has legal
control he shall al]ocate to himself, and how much to the service
of other indîviduals or of the community. I cannot attempt
now fo discuss that question adequately; I am ai present con-
cerned with a purely theoretical and not with a practical ques-
tion. And yet if is desirable sometimes, even in the interests of
pure theory, to point out some of the practicM bearings of
speculative ethical controversies. And therefore I do hot hesi-
tare to suggest the urgent need of bringing our highest idel of
Justice fo bear upon the detils of private lire and especially of
personal expenditure. If is obvious that if is hot possible for
most people in an un-ideal state to aet in accordance with what
would be the right in an ideal state of things. For eaeh man fo
allot to himself no nore of the good things of this lire than might
be his under a r6gime of ideal Justice would demanda heroism
which such equality would hot involve under such a régime, and
ai rimes would be injurious fo others, and even fo society at
large. In some directions if would be inexpedient for any one ;
in many directions if would be inexpedient for every one. Such
an attempt would hOt really conduce to Justice itself; for under
existing conditions the professional man, compelled to live like
an artisan, would surfer much more than the artisan suffers.
For the present we must to some extent acquiesce in the idea of
a standard of comfort for each class. The maintenance of such
a standard is up fo a certain point required by the different
demands for efficiency in different callings, in part by the
necessity for keeping up that stimulus fo superior industry,
skill, inventiveness and the like, which we have seen fo be
essential fo social Well-being even where if would otherwise be
difilcult fo reconcile with the requirements of ideal Justice. But
where different standards of comfort exist, some measure of con-
formity fo the customs of one's class or position, in such matters
as eating and drinking, housing, service, dress, entertainment,
amusement and the like, is denanded under penalty of hardship
and isolation such as would hot be endured by any one, were
such matters arranged for us on principles of ideal Justice in
a socialistic State. If the system is good on the whole, if cannot
always be wrong for the individual fo fall in with it: the individual
a 7 JUSTICE [Book I
cannot be required fo act in a way which, if generally imitated,
would be socially injurious, and the attempt fo do away with all
expenditure which exceeds what would be possible if wealth
were equally distributed would, we have some reason fo believe,
be socially injurious. Still, if is a clear duty on the part of
every one who is convinced that the share of good things
enjoyed by the few is disproportionate and intrinsically unjust,
fo seek fo limit his own personal expenditure wherever he can
do so without a less efficient discharge of his own social function
or other social inconvenience. If would be a step fo the creation
of a new morality upon such subjects, if we were fo cultivate
the habit of compelling ourselves fo give some kind of reason
for our indulgence in any kind of expenditure over and above
what would be allotted under a régime of pure equality, whether
the justification be found in our particular social function, in
the conditions necessary for the exercise of out own parçicular
capaciçies, natural or acquired, in the superior intellectual or
aesçhetic value of out pleasures and çheir indirect social eficts,
in the necessiçy of inequality and competition as a stimulus
fo indusçry, or only in the necessities and conventionaliçies of
the existing social code, which someçimes tender intrinsically
unnecessary expendiçure the smaller of çwo evils. If iç is
probable that the principle of a class standard of comfort will
always be inevitable and even in a measure socially useful, we
must af least recognize çhe duty of trying fo reduce the present
enormous differences between the highest and the lowest standard;
and, in çhe case of those whose class sçandard is high, of aiming
for themselves at the lower rather çhan çhe higher limiç allowed
by çhat standard, except when some higher good ço the consumer
himself or some social advantage fo others would seem ço result
from the higher expenditure. If may safely be said that the
scale of expenditure prevalent among the richest classes is as
little conducive fo their highest Well-being as fo that of the
poorest. If under existing conditions the existence of such
expenditure is necessary as a stimulus to the etrepreneu" or
the captain of industry, the fact that if should be necessary is
a moral evil for the gradual removal of which itis a duty to
strive.
Chap. viii, § vii] IMMEDIATE APPLICATIONS 273
A word must be added fo bring these general considerations
to bear upon the duty of the individual. The duty of Justice in
the individual seems fo consist in (1) seeking fo bring about by
political or other means such an improvement in political and
social organization as will realize a more complete equality of
consideration than is possible in his existing environment;
(2) observing this principle of equal consideration in his rela-
tions fo his fellow men in so far as is possible under existing
conditions; (3) respecting all those political and social arrange-
ments, however much af variance with the ultimate ideal, as are
enforced by the existing social order, in so far as that order
cannot immediately be improved upon by the individual's volun-
tary action under existing conditions. It is to the duties of
Justice and Benevolence taken together that we should ulti-
mately refer the duty of Loyalty to existing social institutions
and particularly fo the State ; the duty of Honesty, which means
respect for the existing laws of property so long as they are hot
capable of immediate improvement by the individual's own action ;
and the observance of such other rules, whether enforced by law
or otherwise, as are round conducive fo social Well-being. In
a sense, as I bave endeavoured fo show, ail duties are social,
since if is never either right or possible fo aire af one's own
individual good without regard fo the good of others. In
sense no duty is purely social in the sense of the Hedonist, since
every duty is more or less liable fo modification by the con-
sideration that the true good alike for individuals and for
societies is something more than pleasure. In the highest sense
Benevolence and Justice (if we include in it Prudence or due
regard for self) may be so understood as fo include ail other
virtues: true Justice and true Benevolence represent two sides,
each of them unintelligible or, af least, certain fo be misunder-
stood if taken apart from the other--of the single ail-inclusive
duty of promoting the different kinds of good in proportion to
their true intrinsic worth or place as elements in the good.
is because this good does include various elements that Virtue in
general is divided into the many virtues with which we have
already attempted fo deal in the preceding chapter. To insist
on the fact that all virtues can be reduced fo the single virtue of
]ASHDALL I T
274 JUSTICE [Book I
just Benevolence is desirable because if emphasizes the truth
that there is a single ail-inclusive ideal of lire in reference
fo which alone separate 'virtues' become intelligible; over-
emphasis in ethical teaching upon the 'unity of Virtue' and
neglect of particular ' virtues' practically tends either to a
vagueness which may degenerate into Antinomianism, or (if
the consequential test of virtuous conduct in detail is much
insisted upon) o a too hedonistic interpretation of the ultimate
good. Insistence upon Benevolence as the sole ultimate duty
can only be sale when if is duly intelreted as a Benevolence
which is inclusive of Justice, and which bas due regard fo all
those non-hedonistic elements in the good which are promoted
by and consist of the special virtues fo which particular names
have been assigned. In all that bas been said about social duty,
if is assumed that the individual's own good is to be given due
consideration, and, when this good is non-hedonistically inter-
preted, if will include many forms of 'self-regarding' duty
besides Prudence in the sense of due regard for one's own
' interest' in the hedonistic sense.
VIII
Before leaving the subject of Justice some addition seems fo
be called for to what has been said about the institution of
property. If the principles which have been laid down in this
chapter are right, the duty of respecting that institution is
simply a particular part of the duty of obeying the State--
a duty which is itself a part of the more general obligation to
respect the conditions of social Well-being. A more detailed
discussion of property seems fo belong rather fo political than
to ethical Philosophy in its narrower sense. If may be well,
however, briefly fo point out in what sense we can, and in what
sense we cannot, regard the duty of respecting property as one
of essential and permanent obligation. Itis a duty to respect
the existing laws of property because some system of distribut-
ing material wealth or ifs enjoyment is essential fo social
Well-being, and the existing system is the best that has
hitherto been devised ; at all even individual acts of rebellion
against if retard rather than accelerate the working out of
Chap. viii, § viii] PRIVATE PROIERTY 75
a better system. The sme regard for social Well-being and
the best possible distribution of if which prescribes obedience
fo the existing law sanctions any improvement of if that may
be possible, the moment that if does become possible. Property
is the creation of Law, and wht Lw has created, Law may
modify in the future as if has modified if in the past. A priori
if might seem that some form of collective ownership in the
instruments of production would be more likely fo harmonize
the conflicting claims of different individuals than any possible
system of private Capitalism. This is not the place fo enquire,
how far the enormous practical difiïculties of bringing about
such a system without introducing other and worse evils are
difiïculties inherent in the nature of things, and how far they
are difiïculties which if may ultimately be found possible fo
overcome. Whether ownership should be individual or collec-
tive is simply a detailed question of the means fo social Well-
being, tut if may be pointed out that there is one limit which
is set fo the attempt fo substitute collective for individual
ownership by the nature of the end itself. The end, as we
have seen, is, or rather includes, a certain type of charcter or
(more properly) a certain kind of life led by men of a certain
character. The end is the perfection of individual lives. The
perfect life for the individual is not an isolated or solitry life :
if is eminently social, a lire whose good consists in activities
which minister fo the good of others as well as fo his own. But
still if must be a lire in which there is room for the individual
fo act, fo pursue his own ideals, fo choose the means fo them,
fo direct his own activities, fo reap the fruit of those activities,
fo experience the consequences both of success and of failure.
There can be no true human good lire which does not include
all this, and if is difiïcult fo see how any system of distribution
can minister fo this end which does not allow some appropria-
tion of material wealth more individual and permanent than
any which is consistent with a thorough-going Collectivism--
Collectivism of the kind which aims at securing an absolute
equality of distribution or, af least, some close approximation
fo if. Wealth cannot be made subservient fo a truly moral life
without some measure of liberty in ifs use, and consequently
T2
7 6 JUSTICE [Book I
even in its abuse. The right use of wealth cannot be secured
by the most magnificent system of public maintenance. Just
as children brought up in large public institutions are offert
more deficient in character, initiative, and intelligence than
children educated in very unsatisfactory homes, so an institu-
tion-bred population could hot realize a high ideal of human
lire. Men and women might be lodged in the most luxurious
of workhouses, fed sumptuously every day af the public expense,
driven daily from the most moderate of State-regulated tasks to
the most refined of State-regulated amusements. They might
be dosed periodica]ly with the most carefully considered doses
of State-regulated education, culture, and even religion. But all
these things could hot avail fo produce an ideal human lire.
Character cannot be developed when the will is passive, nor
intelligence when there is little demand or opportunity for its
exercise. There must be room for initiation, for selection, for
choosing what to do or hot o do, for laying out plans hot from
day to day but for a long future. And this there cannot be
without hot merely some appropriation of material wealth for
immediate needs butsome power of disposing of if with a view
fo the deliberately chosen purposes of a man's whole lire, and
fo the good of others in whom he is interested. This line of
thought has been well developed by Prof. Bosanquet. ' Is if not
enough, we may be asked, fo know tha one can have what is
necessary and reasonable ? lqo; that makes one a child. A
man must know what he can count on, and judge what to
do with if. If is a question of initiation, plan, design, hot of
a more or less in enjoyment 1.,
If is possible that all that Prof. Bosanquet contends for, and all
that can reasonably be contended for as a matter of principle,
might be combined with a much greater extension of collective
ownership than he himself would be disposed to contemplate.
Socialism does hOt object to private property, but only fo
private capital. If is only upon the questionable assumption
that private property necessarily carries with if the institutions
of unlimited private bequest and private Capitalism that Prof.
1 Essy on ' The Principle of Privte P»operty,' in Aspects of the Social
Pvblem (895), p. 33-
Chap. viii, § ix] OBJECTIONS OE77
Bosancluet's demand for a sphere in which individual choice and
individual responsibility shall have free ælay can be considered
fatal fo the more moderate socialistic schemes. Socialism allows
the possession of t)rivate property in the only sense in which
nine-tenths of the community now possess prîvate prot)erty.
Private property may perhaps corne hereafter fo mean some-
thing seriously different from what if means now; but Prof.
Bosancluet's general principle ought fo be fully accepted. If
is the supreme condition of truly moral system of t)roperty -
distribution that if shall be the one most favourable fo the
cultivtion and development of the highest individual charac-
ters. If in some form the institution of private property must
be regrded as permanently necessary for the development
of individual personality, we need not dwell upon the extent
fo which that institution as if now existsmthe system of
unlimited competition, unlimited accumulation, unlimited in-
heritance--will have fo be modified before if cn be regarded
s the system best calculated fo develope in the individual a moral
idel which includes in itself tenevolence and Justice.
IX
The whole of my treatment of Justice in this chapter will
(like the Benthamite formulée which I bave accepted in a modi-
fied shpe) be met in some quarters by the objection that if
is inconsistent with an adequate recognition of the 'organic
character of human society.' Here again if would lead me too
far into the political region to discuss the truth and meaning of
the undoubtably important but much-abused formula that
' society is an organism.' What is meant by the objection is,
I take if, prctically 1 something of this kind. If has hithert)
been assumed that man's duty consists in contributing fo
a certain general welfare of society, as though he could allot
a certain amount of good fo himself and other lots of good
fo other individuals: whereas, as a marrer of fact, we cannot
distinguish between the good tht man does fo himself nd
I do hot here discuss the metaphyslcal or logical question how far the
abstract category of Organism is applicable fo Society, and confine myself
fo the ethical side or application of the doctrine.
78 J USTICE [Book I
the good that he bestows on another. Truc human good
consists largely in activities which are af once my good and the
good of others 1. And further a man's duty does not consist
in a general contribution fo a lump of good: if consists in
performing some special function marked out for him by his
position in the social organism. Neither a man's contribution
to the general good, nor the quantity or quality of if which he
enjoys, can be exaetly the saine as every other man's. 1o
improved social arrangements can secure that the tailor shall
enjoy exctly the saine good as the scholar. The tailor's function,
lais aetivity, and therefore a large part of his truc good, consists
in doing his tailor's work and finding his own good in if, and
tbe scholar's good eonsists in leading the scholar's lire. You
cannot 'distribute' to the tailor the seholar's good, which
consists mainly in leading the scholar's life. Ail social progress,
all culture, all civilization involves a eonstantly increasing
'differentiation." Il is only in an extremely simple state of
society that the lives of different people can extly resemble
one another, a sociey in which only very simple needs are felt,
and in which each family or household supplies practically
ifs own needs. And the increasing differentiation necessarily
carries with if hot only unlikeness but inequality. The different
kinds of life are hot, and cannot eonceivably be, all equally
pleasant, or equally valuable from any other point of view than
tha of the goodwill which may be exhibited in all of them.
The differentiation involves exceptional sacrifices for some,
exceptional advantages and enjoyment for others. To
the equalization of individual Well-being is therefore inconsistent
with the welfare of society af large. And that is hot all. The
truc good of every individual, even apart from his occupation
or sphere of social service, is necessarily unlike that of every
other: every individual is more or less unlike every other and
therefore fo some extent wants a different kind of life fo satisfy
him. And these differences become greater, the higher the
state of social development, the higher the capacities, and
the higher the development of the individuul concerned. A dead
level of individual Well-being could only be secured by cutting
a Qualifications of this lorincilole are discussed below, Bk. II. chap. iii.
Chap. ix, § ix] ORGANIC VIEW OF SOCIET¥ 79
down all individual eminences, and that would mean the
extinction of all the higher kinds of Well-being altogether : for
these are essentially depeadent upon the multiplication and differ-
entiation of wants on the one hand, and of individual capacities
on the other. The formula of equal consideration, even in the
modified form which we have given fo if, is therefore, if may be
urged, no less objectionable from the point of view of a true
individualism than it is from that of the' social organism 1.,
There can be no doubt as fo the extreme importance of these
considerations from a practical point of view. They do constitute
an enormous objection and difficulty in the way of all collectivist
schemes. Thcy are absolutely fatal fo any crude attempt ai an
immediate realization of the collectivist ideal. An immediate
Collectivism would certainly mean the lowering not merely
of material conditions but of modes and ideals of life fo the
level which the many are immediately capable of appreciating.
And they will always be fatal fo schemes of Socialism which
aim at an absolutely dead level of material conditions, at an
extinction of all differences in education, in culture, in modes
of life, in ¢luantity and ¢luality of work. The Socialism which
proposes to împose six hours' manual work a day on every onem
on Physicians and Scholars and inventors for instance--would
mean a return fo Barbarism. But these conse¢luences arc,
I should contend, sufficiently guarded against by the interpreta-
1 This principle has been urged with much force, but with some exaggera-
tion, by Simmel (Einleitug I, p. 35o, et 1ass-m), though he ]s hot one of those
who insist much on tle idea of a social organism. On this basis a runn]ng
re is kept up against Socialism all through his powerful writings. By way
of criticism I will only add fo what I bave said in the text the following
remarks : () The only sort of Socialism which he seems to contemplate is
one which aires af absolute equality of conditions ; (2} his ultimate good is
hot either pleasure or Well-being, but a' maximum of energy,' which is best
secured by maximum ups and downs of pleasure and pain : the struggle for
existence becomes with him hot a means but an end (see further below
Bk. II. chap. ii, adfin.) ; and for this a larger measure of' differentiatîon ' is
naturally required tlan is wanted on a more commonplace interpretatlon
of ideal Well-being. That a high development of individual capacity re-
quires some liberty, and that all liberty involves so»e inequality and some
pain, is no doubt true: but Simmel's view seems fo involve a positive
apotheosis of Unrest.
280 JUSTICE [Book I
tion which I have placed upon the Benthamite formula. What
I have contended for is simply equaliy of consideration; and
an absolute equality of conditions would involve a diminution
of general welfare which would be inconsistent wih the good
of all members of the society or the great majority of them, and
would therefore be condemned by the formula itself. Moreover,
I have admitted the superior righs of the superior kind of
Well-being, and therefore of the superior man who is capable
of enjoying if. I have only insisted that even the claims of the
superior man must be estimated with due regard fo the claims,
be they small or great, of other people. If any one likes fo
regard the highest development of a few superior beings as an
object compared wih which immense masses, so fo speak, of
commonplace virtue and happiness may be treated as a negligble
quantity, such a view would fo my mind misrepresent the actual
verdict of the healthy moral consciousness, but if would be quite
consistent with the formula of equal consideration if we assume
that he was righ in his judgements of comparative value 1. But
if (fo return fo the social side of the objection) by the allegation
that my view is inconsistent with the organic character of human
society if is implied that human society has a good which is
distinct from the good of the individual persons composing if,
if this ' good' or' development' of sociey is made a sort of fetish
fo which whole hecatombs of individual lives are fo be ruthlessly
sacrificed, I can only reply that such a view seems fo me a pure
superstition--a widely prevalent superstition which is responsible
for much of the stupidiy and mismanagement with which the
world's affairs are often conducted. With the Philosopher the
mistake may sometimes be an hones blunder: translated into
practical politics this vague talk about the 'interests of the
social organism' generally carries with if the assumption that
society is fo be organized in such a way as fo secure a maximum
advantage fo the limited class which is actually in possession
of the lion's share of good things, and that those who threaten
' Simmel bas suggested that in some cases a man might justifiably treaç
himself as a person of this importance, like Nietzsche's Ubermensch. So anti-
social an attitude would, in my view, involve the sacrifice of the higher fo
the lower, even in the individual's own life.
Chap. viii, § ix] INDIVIDUAL WELFARE 8
to disturb this arrangement are fo be shot down forhwith. In
practice if mens Beati posidentes: the existîng Prussian
constitution in Church and State is the final and highest
development of ' the Idea.'
There is no good that is hot the good of some individual
or individuals, though unquestionably that good is the good
of social beings interested in the welfare of their fellows,
and occupying definite positions in the social system. It is
a cler deliverance of the reflective moral consciousness that we
should endeavour fo secure as much as possible of this good lire
for as many individuals as possible. It is true no doubt that,
when we corne fo ask in detail ho'w the good lire is fo be enjoyed
by as many individuals as possible, we must remember all those
characteristics of human society which are emphasized by the
formula 'society is an organism '--that one man's good is hot
necessa'ily another's loss, that it is in discharging his social
function that the individual attains hîs truest good, that social
functions vary, that a man's good must be relative fo his
function, that increasing differentiation in many respects is a note
and condition of social progress, that the lire of society is
a continuous growth and can only be gradually modified, that
some liberty is a condition of all higher Well-being and that
all liberty carries inequality with if, and finally that the maxim
represents an idel which if is a duty fo aire af but which can
never be fully realized. These considerations will be further
developed in the chapter on ' Vocation.' But all this does hot
seem fo require any modification-of our doctrine that Justice
does consist in the apportionment fo each individual of his due
share of good, in so far as that good can be secured or modified
by human agency. Questions of Justice cannot be thought out
without assuming that good is a thing which we can distribute.
This assumition involves, like all speculative theories, a good
deal of abstraction. But it in no way implies that we really
suppose that human ' Well-being' or 'good' is a tangible lump
of plum-cake which we can serve out in slices according fo
a tariff prescribed by the intuitive moral eonsciousness.
merely asserts that the social Organism is hot an end in itself
but a means to the good of individual human beings, each of
8 JUSTICE [Book I
whoin should be treated (as far as possible) according fo his
own individual worth 1.
To complete out treatinent of Justice one Inore question Inust
be faced--the question of Punishinent. We bave seen in what
sense if is a duty for the individual, both in his private relations
and as a ineinber of a coininunity, acting in concert with others,
to aiin af rewarding Virtue. If reinains for us fo inquire ' In
what sense, and on what grounds, is if a duty fo punish Vice ?'
NOTE ON RENOUVIER'S IDEA OF JUSTICE.
An attempt bas been ruade by M. Renouvier in his Sciewe de la morale --
one of the most serious and earnest efforts to grapple with the real problems
of Ethics which bas been ruade in recent times--to resolve all Virtue or at
least all moral obligation (in the strict sense) into Justice. Taking his
stand on the Kantian principle that Justice represents the conditions upon
which the liberty of one (i.e. his opportunities of obtaining his truc end) is
compatible with the like liberty of ai1, he attempts to deduce therefrom ai1
the ' strict' duties which man owes to man. But if is admitted that such
duties can only be fully discharged in an ideal state of society (the état de
2aix). They postulate a state of things in which every one else is equally
willing to perform his duty towards the agent and towards ai1 others.
Where others ignore their obligations, the right of defence justifies en-
croachments upon the liberty of others (including all State coercion) which
go beyond strict Justice, while scope is afforded for a Benevolence equally
going beyond those limits ; but such Benevolence can only be considered a
duty in so far as it sprin out of one's duty to oneself--the duty of develol>
ing oneself morally and cultivating one's generous emotions. Hence a code
of Ethics suitable to the existing état de guerre is hot (like the duties of Jus-
tice) capable of strict scientific formulation. I adroit that if is possible to
give a tolerably accurate analysis of out actual moral ideas on this basis.
M. Renouvier's work seems to me quite the ablest attempt to develope the
Kantian formalism into something like a reasonable and self-consistent
system. But it seems to be open to the following objections ; () The dnty
of respecting others' liberty is hot an ultimate and independent duty, but is
derivable from the value of others' good; a certain kind of liberty is an
' The whole developed appamtus of constitution and go'ernment would
bave absolutely no endor meaning if their activities did hot ultimately result
in the good of individuals' (Sigwaxt, Vo,fragen àer Ethik, p. I7). If might
seem unnecessary fo quote so obvious a remark, except as a proof that
sanity in talking about the social organism is hot quite unknown among
philosophers of acknowledged distinction.
Published in 869.
Chap. viii, note] RENOUVIER'S VIEW
83
essential condition of Well-being, but if is hOt Well-being itself. To aire af
liberty rather than Well-being seems fo me irrational. (2) This being so, if
is arbitrary fo set the limits which Renouvier sers fo the assistance which
one man owes fo another--to say that he must abstain from interference,
but is under no obligation fo help others fo realize their truc good. (3) We
can form so inadequate a picture of a perfect humanity and a morally perfect
society that if is hardly worth while fo attempt fo draw out in detail the
duties which in such a state man would owe fo man : any value which such
an attempt might possibly have would seem fo be rather for Law than
for Morality. (4) When the author cornes to the critical question of
property, he is obliged fo adroit that the a priori rights of property
(substantially Locke's divine right of the first grabber) which he claires as
necessary fo the liberty of each are in the nature of things (and hot only in
consequence of other men's injustice) unfairly restrictive of the liberty of
others, so that his a _priori Morality is hot even fit for an ideal society
or consistent with itself. (5) Hence if is practically much more convenient
fo reduce both the Justice appropriate fo the état de paix and the restric-
tions imposed by the état de guerre to a general duty of promoting as far as
_pos.,ible under actual circunstances the good of each in proportion to its
intrinsic value. This is, I believe af bottom, what all this elaborate appara-
tus cornes fo, when ifs arbitrary and dogmatic accidents bave been removed.
For a discussion of the idea of' works of supererogation,' necessitated in a
peculiarly harsh and rigorous form by M. Renouvier's system, the reader may
be referred fo the chapter on ' Vocation' in our second Book.
CHAPTER IX
PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS
I
TIEIE was a rime when the notion that blood demands blood
was held so firmly and so crudely that little distinction was
ruade between intentional and unintentional acts of homicide.
Ancient law abounds in traces of this inveterate instinct of
10rimitive humanity. We see the leslator of the Pentateuch
endeavouring fo lilnit ifs operation by the institution of cities of
refuge, whose walls protected the unintentional homicide against
further pursuit by the avenger of blood. We find the saine
inability fo distinguish between voluntary and involuntary
homicide in the curious notions of the Canon Law (still, perhaps,
theoretically in force among us) about the 'irregularity' con-
tracted by consecrated persons and consecrated places through
the most unwitting bloodshed, and hOt contracted by the most
atrocious violence involving no physical effusion of blood. We
see the saine curious but once useful superstition in the old law
of Deodand, which required the forfeiture of the inanimate
object or the irrational animal which had, in the most accidental
way, been the instrument of man's death. Thus even the horse
from whieh a fatal fall had been sustained, or the boat from
whieh a man had drowned himself, were ruade the subjeets
of this peeuliar application of retributive justice. Ai the present
day the eruder forms of this old-world ery of blood for blood are
no longer heard; but what is, perhaps, after all only a more
refined form of the same fundamental notion lingers in the
theory whieh makes the primary objeet of punishment fo be
retribution. A man bas done wrong, therefore for that reason
and for no other, if is said, let him be punished. Punishment,
we are told, is an end in itself,--not a means fo any end beyond
Chap. ix, § il KANT'S RETRIBUTIVE TttEORY 285
itself. Punishment looks fo the past, not fo the future. The
guilt of the offence must be, in some mysterious way, wiped out
by the suffering of the offender ; and that obliteration or cancelling
of the guilt-stained record, be it noticed, is conceived of as quite
independent of any effect to be produced upon the sufferer by
his bodily or mental pain. For, the moment we insist upon the
effec produced upon the sufferer's soul by his punishment,
the retributive theory is deserted for the reformatory or the
deterrent. Here is the famous passage of Kant :--
' Juridical punishment can never be administered merely
a means for promoting another good, either with regard fo
the criminal himself or fo civil society, but must in all cases be
imposed only because the individual on whom if is inflicted
tas cowmitted a c'me.... The penal law is a Categorical
Imperative ; and woe to hiln who creeps through the serpent-
windings of Utilitarianism fo discover some advantuge that
may discharge him from the justice of punishment, or even
from the due measure of it 1 !, He goes on to defend the lex
talionis as the only just principle for the allotment of penalty
fo crime, and fo make the famous declaration that, ' if a civil
society resolved fo dissolve itself with the consent of
members' [so that punishment would be no longer required for
deterrent purposes], '... the last murderer lying in the prison
ought fo be executed before the resolution was carried out 2.,
There we have the retributive theory propounded by the
greatest of modern philosophers; and it is still defended by
philosophers and philosophic jurists in Germany, England, and
America a. For most modern men, whether or hot they have
consciously abandoned the theory, this view exercises but little
influence over our ideas of human justice, though if is to be
feared that it still casts a black shadow over popular conceptions
of the punishment in store for sin in another world.
Kunt's Philosolohy of Law, E. T. by Hustie, 887, p. 95-
Ib. p. 98.
Hegel hus usuully been understood fo muintuin the retributive theory.
Dr. cTuggurt (Hegel's ' Theory of Punishment' in International Journal of
Ethics, vol. VI, July, 896 ) bus endeuvoured to show thut this is u mis-
understunding. Dr. McTaggart's own view, whether reully 'Hegeliun' va"
]aot, is in the muin thut for which I contend.
286 PUIISttMEIT AND FORGIVEIESS [Book I
If is difficult fo argue against a theory whose truth or false-
hood must be decided for each of us by an appeal fo his own
moral consciousness,--by the answer which he gives fo the
simple question whether he does or does not in his best moments
feel this mysterious demand that moral guilt should be atoned
by physical pain. That the sight of wrong-doing--particularly
when it takes the form of cruelty--does inspire a sentiment
of indignant resentment in healthy minds, and that it is right
and reasonable that in all legal ways that sentiment should
be gratified, no sensible person will deny. But that is only
because experience shows that the infliction of pain upon offenders
is one of the most effectual ways--and in some cases the only
effectual way---of producing amendment. The question is
whether, apart from ifs effects, there would be any moral pro-
priety in the mere infliction of pain for pain's sake. A wrong
has been done--say, a crime of brutal violence; by that act
a double evil has been introduced into the world. There has
been so much physical pain for the victim, and so much moral
evil has polluted the offender's soul. Is the case ruade any
better by the addition of a third evil,--the pain of the punished
offender, which ex lzypotlzesi is fo do him no moral good what-
ever ? If, as enlightened philanthropists sometimes seem fo
imagine, the direct effect of all punishment that really is punish-
ment were fo inspire the offender and others with a passionate de-
sire to repeat the offence,--if in our prisons a liberal diet, genial
society, free communication with the outside world, artistic cells,
abundant leisure and varied amusement were round in practice
to be more deterrent and more reformatory than solitude and
plank bed, skilly and the narrow exercising yard, how many
disciples of Kant would be Kantian enough fo forbid the institu-
tion of a code of graduated rewards for our present system of
pain-giving punishments ?
Perhaps the simplest way of satisfying ourselves that if is
impossible fo reconcile the retributive theory of punishment, either
with the actual practice of our courts or with any practicable
system of judicial administration, will be fo notice the modi-
fication which is presented by Mr. Bradley. Mr. Bradley
seems fo be so much struck with the obvious disproportion
Chap. ix, § il MR. BRADLEY'S VIEW 8 7
between the moral and the legal aspect of various offences, that
he actually gives up the doctrine that the amount of punish-
ment should correspond with the amount of the offence, while
still maintaining that punishment in general is justified only
by the past sin, not by the future advantage.
' We pay the penalty, because we owe if, and for no other
reason; and if punishment is inflicted for any other reason
whatever, than because if is merited by wrong, if is a gross
immorality, a crying injustice, an abominable crime, and hot
what if pretends to be. We may have regard for whatever
considerations we please--our own convemence, the good of
society, the benefit of the offender; we are fools, and worse,
if we rail fo do so. Having once the right fo punish, we may
nmdify the punishment according fo the useful and the pleasant,
but these are external to the marrer ; they can hot give us a right
fo punish, and nothing can do that but criminal desert .... Yes,
in siite of sophistry, and in the face of sentimentalism, with
well-nigh the whole body of our self-styled enlightenment against
them, our people believe fo this day that punishment is inflicted
.tbr t]e sake of punishment,' &c.
Ethical Studies, 876 , pp. 25, 26. In a note which appeared in the Iter
tationalJoutal qfEthics (' Some Remarks on Punishment,' vo]. IV, Ap., 894,
p. 284) , r. Brudley protests against being supposed to hold that punish-
ment is inflicted for the sake of pain. Alluding to an article in the saine
Journal, which is substantially reproduced in the present chapter, Mr. Bradley
remarks : ' Mr. Rashdall appears to me to misunderstand the view which he
attacks. He takes me fo hold an "intuitive theory of punishment," by which
(so far as I can judge) he means a view based on some isolated abstraction.
I find this strange, and what is perhaps stranger is that he treats me as
teaching that punishment consists in the infliction of pain for pain's sake.
At least I ara unable otherwise to interpret his language. Now, I certainly
said that punishment is the suppression of guilt, and so of the guilty person.
But I pointed out that negation is hot a good, except in so far as if belongs
to and is the other side of positive moral assertion (Ethical Stuàies, p. 25).
Pain, of course, usually does go with the negative side of punishment, just
as some pleasure, I presume, attends usually the positive side. Pain is, in
brief, an accident of retribution, but certainly I never ruade it more, and
I ara hot aware that I ruade it even an inseparable accident. If a criminal
defying the law is shot through the bruin, are we, if there is no pain, to hold
that there is no retribution ? My critic seems, if I may say so, fo hold an
" intuitive theory" of my views.'
Upon this explanation I should like to make the following remarks :--
(t) I admit that for 'pain' I ought fo have said 'or other evil, loss of
88
PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS [Book I
ow, in the firsç place, is çhis eonsisçenç? If punishment
is ' modified' for uçilitarian reasons, does hOt that mean that
if is inflicted partly for retribution and partly for some other
reason ? If so, we do not pay the penalty because we owe if,
and fo o othe eason. And, secondly, is if logical ? If sin
by itself confers the right and imposes the duty of punishment,
there must be a right to inflict either a definite amount of
punishment or an infinite amount. If the latter, if is obvious
that the State will always have the right fo inflict any quantity
of punishment if pleases upon any of ifs citizens af any rime,
since all bave sinned and incurred thereby unlimited liability to
something good being treated as an evil.' If it were hot thought an evil fo
be shot through the brain, the shooting would certMnly hot be a punish-
ment. What retribution would be in which there was no such evil, I ara
wholly af a loss to understand.
(2) I ara quite willing to adroit that Mr. Bradley recognizes a positive
side as well as a negative side o punishment, but I bave entirely failed fo
discover what this positive side is. Mr. Brudley goes on to say that punish-
ment is ' the reaction of a moral organism, and this organism bas a par-
ticular concrete character.' I don't deny that in punishment the organism
reacts against the criminal ; and very offert the criminal reacts against the
organism. But what I want fo know is ' why ought it so to react .9' If if
haz a purpose in doing so, let that purpose be expressed. If the purpose be
to produce any effect upon society, it seems fo be totally misleading to
say that ' punishment is inflicted for the sake of punishment' or for ' retri-
bution' and so on. If that purpose be anything else besides the production
of good effects on conscious beings, if seems to me wholly immoral and
i-cational. I cannot look upon an abstraction like ' moral assertion' as an
end-in-itself.
(3) In spire of Mr. Bradley's explanations, I cannot adroit that the views
ho maintains in the above-mentioned Article are reconcilable with the
chapter in Etltical Studios. Mr. Bradley formerly maintained that it was
immoral to punish except for retribution : now ho defends ' social Surgery '
(i. e. wholesale Infanticide) for the reduction of population. Any infliction
of pain, loss, or death is justified, if appears, for an adequate social end
provided we do not call it punishment. 8urely it is a more sophism to
suppose that the' gross immorality,' the ' crying injustiee,' the ' abominable
crime' of unmerited punishment can be escaped by the more trick of calling
it ' social Surgery' instead of' punishment.' It is fair to add that Mr. Brudley
adds : ' I should bave little to correct in the old statement of my view except
a certain number of one-sided and exaggerated expressions.' To me, if I may
say so with profound respect for his later writings, the chapter in Ethical
Studios fo which ho alludes seems to consist in little else but one-sided and
exaggerated expressions.
Chap. ix, § i] PUNISHMENT NOT RETRIBUTION 8 9
punishment. ' Use every man after his desert, and who shou|d
'scape whipping ?' Such a contention would render the whole
theory nugatory. If, on the other hand, wrong-doing confers
a right fo inflict a merely limited amount of punishment,
Mr. Bradley is open fo the following objections :--
0) How can this amount be fixed? How can moral guilt
be expressed in terres of physical pain ? To any one who
believes that punishment is justified by ifs effects, the right
or just amount of punishment is that which will best serve
the ends for which punishment exists--i.e, deterrence and
reformation. But how, apart from its end, can the amount
of punishment due fo each offence be fixed ? I find in my own
mind no intuitions on the subject, and believe that if we were ail
fo sit down and attempt fo write out lists of crimes, with the
number of lashes of the car or months of imprisonment which
they intrinsically merit, we should find the task an extremely
difficult one, and should arrive ai very discordant results. Af
ail events, such a task would be hopelessly out of harmony with
the actual practice of the most enlightened tribunals. It is
obvious that drunkenness in a ' gentleman ' will offert be, morally
speaking, as culpable as burglary in an hereditary criminal. But
if is hOt so much the practical as the theoretical impossibîlity
of the task that I wish to emphasize. The idea of expressing
moral guilt in the terres of car or birch-rod, gallows or pillory,
hard labour or penal servitude, seems to be essentially and
intrinsically unmeaning. There is absolutely no commensura-
bility between the two things.
(OE) Assuming this difliculty removed, it is clear that when the
proper amount of punishment has been inflicted, the right fo
punish has been exhausted. If any further punishment is
inflicted for utilitarian reasons, it will be simply, on Mr. Bradley's
premisses, so much unjustifiable cruelty. If forty stripes save
one is the proper punishment for any offence, the fortieth will be
simply a common assault, no marrer whether if is inflicted by
the private individual or by the public executioner.
(3) The only way of escape open fo Mr. Bradley would be
fo contend that though the State may hot for utilitarian reasons
increase, if may for utilitarian reasons reduce the ideally just
290 PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVEbIESS [Book I
punishment. The position is on the face of if a somewhat
arbitrary one, and if is open fo this objection: if involves the
admission that in all cases wrong-doing confers a right, but does
not impose a duty of punishment. Can if be moral that society,
if if might, without failure in duty, remit punishment, should
punish just beoeuse if pleases so fo do ? This would be fo adroit
that whether we shall punish or not is fo be determined by mere
caprice. So, if you auy that if is a duty fo punish, except where
utilitarian considerations demand that less than the idel amount
should be inflicted, you practically adroit that whether any
punishment should be infliced af all, and how much, must be
determined by teleological considerations. The theory of an
intuitive command fo punish will have reduced itself fo the
somewhat barren assertion that you have no right fo punish
excep where there has been wrong-doing. This is a proposition
which if is hard fo dispute, since, as a general rule, no public
purpose is served by hanging the wrong man. There are, how-
ever, cases where if must be admitted tlmt suffering may lawftflly
be inflicted on innocent persons--e, g. where a barony or a hun-
dred is maAe fo pay compensation fo persons injured in riot,
or where « savage village that has sheltered a murderer is burnt
by a European man-of-war. There are, too, exceptional crises
in which if is necessary, in the interests of society, fo be less
exacting in the marrer of evidence than a civilized state ough fo
be in quiet rimes.
We are here, however, straying into diîcult and disputable
questions of details, and if is best fo be content with simply
pointing out that, when we have applied fo the theory the
qulifications which are demanded by the obvious facts, if is
reduced fo venez modest limits. If amounts sîmply fo the asser-
tion that punishment should be inflicted only on the guilty;
i almits that in ifs infliction the legislator should be governed
by utilitarian considerations, that is, by the end which punish-
ment actually serves.
From the point of view which we have hitherto been taking,
the retributive theory will appear fo many a mere survivM
of bygone modes of thought. Yet, as îs usually the case with
theories which exhibit so much persistence as the one before us,
Chap. ix, § i] CONCESSIONS
the retributive theory of punishment contMns a good deal of
truth af the bottom of it,Bdeeper truth perhaps than the Ben-
thamite view, which has taken ifs place in popular thought.
There are, I think, three elements of truth which the retributive
view of punishment recognizes, and which the ordinary utilitarian
view often ignores.
() Firstly, if possesses psychological or historical truth.
is correct as an explanation of the origln of punishment. That
punishment originates in the instinct of vengeance is a common-
place of Anthropology. Criminal law was in ifs origin a sub-
stitute for private vengeance. The fct is illustrated by the
Jewish law of homicide, by the Saxon system of Wergilt, and by
the Roman law which punished the thief caught red-handed
twice as severely as the thief convicted afterwards by evidence
taken in cold blood. The theory was that the owner would
naturally be twice as angry in the first case as in the second,
though, of course, the injury donc either fo himself or the coin-
munity would be precisely the saine. And this connexion between
punishment and vengeance is hot simply a marrer of history. It
is still (as Sir Henry Malne has insisted 1) one of the purposes of
punishment fo serve as an ourlet, a kind of safety-vMve, for the
indignation of the community. All laws ultimately depend for
their enforcement upon the public sentiment in their favour;
hence the legisltor cannot afford fo take no account of popular
sentiment in their administration. There are many features
of the modern criminal law which can only be defended on
account of the desirability of keeping up a certMn proportion
between the measure of public indignation and the measure
of legM penalty--for instance, the distinction marie between
accomplished crimes and attempts af crimes which have failed
through causes independent of the offender's volition. Public
opinion will sanction capital punishment vhen the blood of
a brother man seems to cry for vengeance from the ground;
if would hOt tolerate an execution for an attempted murder
which has failed through a pistol missing tire. If may be doubted
whether this irrationl mode of estimating punishment by the
actual, and hot by the intended, effects of an act is hot sometimes
1 Ancient Law, 4th ed., x87o , p. 389 .
9 PUNISHMEIT AND FORGIVENESS [Book ]
carried unnecessarily far, as when, for instance, a Magistrate
remands a prisoner to see how his victim's wounds progress.
Whence if would seem fo follow that, since a total abstainer's
wounds heal sooner than a drunkard's, a man is tobe punished
more severely for stabbing a drunkard than for stabbing a total
abstainer. In ways like this, deference fo popular sentimenç
may be carried too far, but there can be no doubt of the sound-
ness of the principle that the criminal law, while if seeks fo
guide, must not go too far ahead of popular sentiment, nor yet
(as American lynch law occasionally reminds us) lag too far
behind it.
(z) The second half-truth held in solution by the retributive
theory is the fct that punishment is reformatory as well as
merely deterrent. Very often, indeed, if will be round on ex,mi-
nation that those who most loudly clmour for reformatory
punishments do not renlly believe in the reformatory effect
of punishment t all. Punishment is necessarily painful (posi-
tively or negatively), or if censes to be punishment. Those
people who denounce any particulr punishment on the ground
tht if is painful, really mean that you ought fo reform criminals
instead of punishing them. Now, of course, if is the duty of
the State to endevour fo reform criminals as ell as fo punish
them. But when a man is induced fo bstin from crime
by the possibility of a better lire being brought home to
him through the ministrations of prison Chaplain 1, through
eduction, through a book from the prison library, or the efforts
of a Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society, he is not reformed by
punishzeut af 11. No doubt there are reformatory agencies
much more powerful than punishment; and without the co-
operation of such agencies if is rarely that punishment makes
the criminal into a better man. 13ut if is none the less truc that
punishment does help fo make men better, and not simply fo
induee them fo abstain from punishable acts for fear of the
eonsequences. Af first sight this may seem fo be a paradox;
but if seems so only when we forger that every man has in him
better self, as well as a lower self. And if the lower sel
Or (ecording fo n system which is, I beliee, dopted in ome Americ
prisons) by the lectures of the loral Philosopher ttched to the prison.
Chap. ix, § il REFORMATORY PUNISHMENT 93
is kept down by the terror of punishment, higher motives are
able fo assert themselves. Fear of punishment protects a man
against himself. If in the punishment of criminals we have
practically fo think much more of ifs effects upon others than
of ifs effects upon the men themselves, if is otherwise in educa-
tion. Fear of punishment by itself will seldom turn an idle boy
into a diligent one ; but there are few boys who could be trusted
Lo work their best aL all rimes, if in Lheir weaker moments they
were hot kept fo their duLy by a modicum of fear; and there
are few of us, perhaps, whose conducL would not fall still fur-
ther behind our own ideal than if actually does, if our better
selves were not sometimes reinforced by fear of punishment,--
aL leasL in the form of social disapprobation or loss of reputation.
And in the case of actual crime, that conviction of the external
strength of the Moral Law which punishment brings with if is
usually af least the condition of moral improvement; though
Lhat conviction will noL make a man morally beLter, unless
the external judgement is ratified and confirmed by the appellaLe
tribunal of his own Conscience. levertheless, this external re-
spect for the Moral Law is the first step fo the recognition of ifs
infernal, ifs intrinsic authority.
Plausible as if looks Lo deny a priori Lhat mere pain can
produce moral effects, Lhe extravagance of the contention becomes
evident when if is seen that if involves Lhe assertion that no
external conditions have any effect whatever upon character. If
is malter of common experience that men's characters are power-
fully affected by misfortune, bereavement, poverty, disgrace.
Adversity is hot, of course, uniformly and necessarily productive
of moral improvement. But no one will deny thaL under certain
circumstances, and with men of certain temperaments, greaL
moral changes are often produced by calamity of one kind
or another. In some cases the effect is direct and immediate;
in other cases the effect is produced indirectly through the
awakening of religions emotion. In eiçher case, of course, all
that the misfortune does is fo create conditions of mind favourable
fo the action of higher motives and considerations, or fo remove
conditions unfavourable fo their action. Punishment, on ifs
reformato T side, may be said fo be an artificial creation of
e94
PUIISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS [Book I
conditions favourable to moral improvement. The artificial
creation of such conditions bas, of course, this advantage over
ordinary misfortune, that if is seen tobe the direct consequence
of the wrong-doing, which is not necessarily the case with
other alterations of circumstanees.
In view of these considerations, we may, perhaps, go one step
further and maintain that even in cases where punishment will
hot bave a reformatory effect, where the tendencies to evil are
too strong fo be kept in check by fear, even then punishment
may be, in a sense, for the moral good of the offender. Wicked-
ness humbled and subdued, though if be only by external force,
is a healthier moral condition than wickedness suceessful and
triumphant. That is the extremest point fo which we can go
with the advocates of the vindictive theory. This is, I suppose,
the truth which underlies the hackneyed expressions about
avenging the insult offered to the Moral Law, vindicating the
Moral Law, asserting its inajesty, and so on. We recognize that
punishment may sometimes be right, in the interests of the
offender himself, even when if fails to deter. The pleasures
of successful wickedness may be treated as bad pleasures which
are of less than no value, and even pleasures not in themselves
connected with the successful wickedness may, when enjoyed
by a bad man, be regarded as of very small intrinsic value. But
still, itis always a certain effect on consciousness and character
that constitutes its justification, not merely the satisfaction of an
impersonal and irrational law 1
1 1 should be prepared to recognize a larger amount of tlth in the
a priori view of punishment, if the idea of punishment were fo be confined
simply fo the withholding of good things, fo what theologians bave called
a looena danni. XVhether if would be right fo make the bad happy if the
absence of happiness would bave no effect on their badness--not even that
of making them feel that goodness is stronger than evil--is almost too
abshct a question fo admit of an answer ; but that in a sense if is true that
goodness and happiness ought fo go together bas already been adInitted in
the last chapter. I could accept llr. Moore's view that 'the infliction of
pain on a person whose state of mind is bad muy, if the pain be hot too
intense, create a state of things that is better on the whole than if the evil
state of Inind had existed unpunished,' with the reservation 'whether such
a state of things can ever constitute a positive good, is another question '
(Priwilffa Ethica, p. 24). 0nly I should submit that the ground of out
Chap. ix. § il MORAL END OF THE STATE
(3) A word will suflce fo indicate the third and the highest
truth which the vindictive theory of punishment caricatures. It
is the truth--the great Aristotelian truth--that the State bas
a spiritual end.
We all know that experence sers tolerably strict limits fo the
extent fo which if is desirable that the State should interfere
with personal liberty and private lire in the pursuit of moral
and spiritual ends. There are many grave moral offences which
the State may reasonably refuse fo punish for quite other
reasons than indifference fo moral Well-being. The offence may
be incapable of exact definition. If might recluire for ifs
detection a police-force which would be a public burden, or
involve an inquisitorial procedure, or give rise to blackmailing
and false accusation to an extent wh]ch would constitute a greater
evil than the offence itself. The experience of the ecclesiastical
courts, which continued in full operation in this country àown
fo 542 1, or of the clerical government prevalent in Rome under
the Papacy, would afford plenty of illustrations of the evils
incident to such attempts to extend police supervision fo the
details of private lire. Very often, no doubt, the difficulty
arises largely from the fact tbat the attempt purs too great
a straln upon the Conscience of the community. Many offences
may be, on the whole, condemned by public opinion which are
hot condemned with sufficient earnestness fo secure the enforce-
ment of the criminal law against them. With all these admissions,
if must still be contended that the State is perfectly entitled fo
repress immorality. If an act is not inconsistent with the t'ue
Well-being either of the individual or of society, if is hot
immoral; and, even if it were admitted that the State should
not interfere with conduct affecting only the Well-being of the
individual, it is impossible that any act which affects the Well-
approval is hot the mere fact ' that the combined existence of two evils may
yet constitute a less evil than would be constituted by the existence ofeither
singly' (lb., p. 5}, but the tendency of the pain fo make he state of mind
less opposed fo out ideal of what if ought fo be.
Their jurisdiction over laymen was of course occasionally exercised
rauch later date. Since the penances imposed by the ecclesiastical courts
were (and theoretically are) enforceable by imprisonment, no distinction
in principle could be dwn between their action and that of the State.
296 PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS [Book I
being of an individual should be without consequences for
others also. The distinction between crimes and sins can be
found only in considerations of social utility. A crime is simply
a sin which if is expedient fo repress by penal enactment 1.
Every civilized state punishes some offences which cannot be
said tobe injurious fo the 'public good,' unless moral Well-being
is considered fo be part of the public good.
If must be remembered that if is hOt merely by actual and
direct intimidation that the State can promote Morality. The
criminal law has an important work fo do in giving expression
fo the moral sense of the community. Popular ideas as fo
the moral gravity of many offences depend largely upon the
punishment which is awarded to them by the criminal courts.
There are probably thousands who have hardly any distinct
ideas about sin except those which are inculcated af Assizes and
Petty Sessions. If is no uncommon experience for a clergyman
fo be told by a dying man--notorious, if may be, for fornication
or drunkenness or hard selfishness--that he has nothing fo
reproach himself with, his Conscience is quite clear, he has
never done anything wrong that he knows of, he has no reason
fo be afraid fo meet his God, and so on. Then upon enquiry if
turns out that what the man really means is that he has done
nothing for which he could have been sent fo prison.
There are many offences which the State can do little fo
check by the directly deterrent efforts of punishment, but which
if can do much fo prevent by simply making them punishable.
Since a few persons with good coats have actually been sent
fo prison for bribery af elections, the respectable public has
really begun fo suspect that there may be something wrong
in the practice. A very little reflection upon the different
estimates which are formed of these forms of immorality or of
dishonesty for which people go fo prison, and of those for which
they do not go fo prison, will show af once the enormous
importance of the criminal law in promoting the moral education
of the public mind. While, therefore, there are some kinds of
1 In practice, of course, this term is usually reserved for the graver kinds
of offences against the law. We do hOt talk about the crime of having
one's chimney on tire.
Chap. ix, § ii] COMPULSORY MORALITY
wrong-doing whîch, either from their essential natures or from
collateral considertions, cannot be wisely dealt with by the
criminal law, we may expect that with the necessary moralization
of a community, the sphere of criminal law ought gradually to
extend. In the growing disposition o en&ct and enforce laws
against gambling, fo assist, if not fo enforce, temperance by Act
of Parliament, and fo protect by the criminal law the chastity of
young girls, we may recognize an instahnent of moral progress.
The doctrine that you cannot make men moral by Act of Parli&-
ment is about as true as the doctrine that you cannot make men
&bstain from crime by Act of Parlia]nent. In spire of all the
efforts of the Legislature, the practice of stealing has hot been
entirely stamped out. The fact that no legislation has suc-
ceeded in producing & perfectly moral community does hot show
that the State cannot do nmch fo make a community more
moral than it would otherwise be.
II
It will be urged by some tha the enforcement of Morality
eads fo deprive that Morality of the freedom which is one of
its essential conditions. The ideal lire tht we want to pronmte
is hot a society in which certain things are done, but a state of
society in which certain things are done from the right mitives
--by persons ' in a certain state of mind' and 'doing them for their
own sake' (rç e×OT«ç and aVTY Y[Ka TY 7paTTotytoy),aS Anstotle
would put it. The aim of society, and of the State, is to promote the
growth of characters of a certain type. Too great social pressure,
still more decidedly too much State coercion, is destructive of the
spontaneity, the individuality, the variety without which the
highest types of character will hot groxv. We do hot wish fo
turn people out exactly in the same mould. Th&t is so partly
because the mould which any existing society would be apt to
impose is not an ideally perfecr one, and we want fo bave room
for further growth in our idel: partly because (within certain
limits) there is room for considerable variety not merely in the
type of external conduct, but in actual character. Different
types of characters are mutually complementary and combine
fo form an ideal society. But even the ch&racter which we do
298 PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS [Book I
want fo be universM--that devotion fo the generM good, tht
compliance with the prilnry conditions of social Well-being,
which must be an element in M1 intrinsicMly vMuble characters
--would lose much of ifs value if enforced beyond a certain
point. The failure of Monasticism has been largely due fo ifs
attempt fo enforce too much. Not only does the prescribed
routine of life destroy individuality and originMity, but even
the Morality which is ctually secured ceases fo be the result of
morM effort. A lire in which there are no temptations--or
rather in which the place of naturM temptations is taken by
artificiM ones manufctured by unnaturM conditions of lire 1__
and no room for spontaneous effort is hOt conducive fo moral
growth. There is much in the history of monastic institutions
which goes fo show that such a minute regulation of life by
unbending rule encourages a certain childishness of character, fo
say nothing of graver anti-social tendencies. That is so even
though the hold which the rule has on the man depends entirely
(in modern rimes) upon his voluntary consent 2. Still graver
would be the deterioratlon of charcter under a system wherein
all lire should be regulated by police discipline. Character is
formed by acts of choice; consëquently character cannot be
developed when there is no occasion for the individuM fo choose
af all.
These considerations have been mueh inslsted upon by the
late Professor T. Il. Green, and (as if seems fo me with con-
siderable exaggeration) by Prof. Bosanquet. To say tht'the
promoton of morality by force.., is an absolute self-contradic-
ton' is fo take a very superfleial view of the maçter. Such
dietum assumes that, when an aet is enforced, iç must be done
merely because if is enforced. If cannot be doubted that dis-
1 With all ifs beauties, itis impossible fo read many pages of the Imitatio
Christi without feeling thn.t the writer is incessantly occupied with tempta-
tions of this kind.
2 This, of course, was hot the case in the Middle Ages, when the secular
arm returned the ' apostate ' monk fo his convent ; and even now the penni-
less condition of the renegde monk often has the saine effect.
Bosanquet, PhilosoThical Theoj of the State, 1899, p. 192. The statement
is, indeed, modified by the preceding sentence : ' Whatever acts are enforced
re, so far as the force operates, withdrawn from the higher liîe.'
Chap. ix, § iii IMMORALITY AND CRIME
honesty would become rampant in a country wherein stealing
should be unpunished. And yet if would be the veriest cynicism
fo assert that the majority of our fellow countrymen keep their
hands out of other people's pockets only because they are afraid
of going fo prison if they don't. The existence of punishment
for an offence may create a state of feeling in which the act is
looked upon as wrong in itself. The individual who begins
with abstaining from fear of punishment may end by regarding
the act with hearty and spontaneous dislike : and the individual
born into a society already permeated with this feeling may
simply not be aware that the existence of punishment for the
offence has anything fo do wiçh his own dislike of iç. There
may be no great objection fo the formula that the Sçate ought
rather fo create the conditions of lIoraliçy than fo enforce if,
but if is impossible fo draw a sharp line of distinction between
the two things. One of the conditions for the growth of a ' free
Morality' may be the existence of laws which have compara-
tively rarely fo be enforced. There is hardly any kind of
legislation in favour of Moraliy advocated by any sensible
person which might hot be brought within the formula under-
stood in a liberal sense: understood strictly, if would exclude
knds of legislation to which few sensible persons object. To
seek fo enforce all Morality would indeed be fatal fo the higher
growth of character." but if is ridiculous fo contend that no
room would be left for the spontaneous exercise of Virçue
because certain elementary requirements of Morality are en-
forced by law. Liberty fo get drunk is surely no more essential
fo character than liberty fo steal.
When all these admissions have been ruade, it may still be
maintained that there is no fundamental distinction in princple
between the offences which the State wfll do well fo punish and
those which if will do well fo let alone. There is no civilized
State which does not in practice punish many offences for no
other reason than that there is a strong moral feeling against
them. If there is fo be moral progress in the future, we may
expect the area of conduct dealt with by the criminal law fo
widen. And if involves no cynicism fo predict that there will
be little progress unless if does. Bad conduct which leople feel
PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS [Book I
really strongly about they will always want fo repress. And
the punishment of the grosser kinds of misconduct, so far from
diminishing people's sensitiveness about the unpunished mis-
conduct, tends greatly fo increuse if. Conscience is aroused by
the reflection that much misconduct which goes unpunished differs
only in degree from that which conducts men to prison. When
we wish fo make people feel strongly the wrongness of idleness
or certain kinds of ' company-promoting,' we point out that if is
really the saine thing as sealing. When we attain fo a social
condition in which if shall be possible fo punish the worst kinds
of company-promoting, perhaps even the worst kinds of idleness,
we shall perhaps feel more sensitive about that excessive pursuit
of self-interest or amusement which ai present counts lmost as
a virue.
III
There is another aspect of the retributive theory of Punishment
on which I should like briefly to insist. If the theory of the
moral criterion which has been defended in previous chapters be
a truc one, if must be truc in every case and without any
exception. The idea that punishment can be an end in itself
apart from the effects which if is fo produce is wholly incon-
sistent with that principle of teleological Morality which (in
every other connexion) would be accepted by most of those who,
in servile adherence fo an unintelligent philosophical tradition,
still maintain the retributive theory of punishment . The
1 The influence of mere tradition in this marrer is curiously illustrated in
the case of Prof. Bosanquet, who still considers if necessary fo speak of
punishment as retributive, while the explanation of punishment which he
gives, though fo my mind evasive and unsatisfactory, has really nothing
'retributive' about if except the naine. Ne sums up: 'In short, then,
compulsion through punishment and the fear of if, though primarily acting
on the lower self, does tend, where the conditions of truc punishment exist
(i. e. the reaction of a system of rights violated by one who shares in if), fo
a recognition of the end by the person punished, and may 8o far be regarded
as his own will, implied in the maintenance oï a system fo which he is a
party, returning upon himself in the form of pain. And this is the theory
of punishment as retributive ' (The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 227).
Verily one would hot have thought so if Prof. Bosanquet had hot told us so !
The fact is that Prof. Bosanquet so completely rejects the retributive theory
Chap. ix, § iii] PLATONIC VIEW 3o
essence of the moral judgement is, as is seareely denied by the
modern adherents of the Kantian tradition, a judgement of
value. othing ean be right exeept as a mens fo something
whiêh has value in itself; nothing surely ean be an end in itself
exeept some state of a eonseious being, and fo say that a state of
eonsêious being is an end in itself is fo say that iL is good. The
essence of punishment is the enduranêe of pain or some other
evil. In spire of the high authorities that may be quoted for
the eontrary view, I venture, under the aegis of Plato and the
rnany Christian thinkers who have round his ides on this
subjeêt in essential harmony with the Christian retaper, fo
maintin that an evil e,nnot under any eireumstanees beeome
a good exêept relatively--either positively, as a means fo
some morally good state of eonsêiousness, or medieilmlly (v
el, apdKov clôt), by way of remedy against some worse evil. If
iL be urged that punishment is a good as a rneans fo the vindie,-
Lion or the assertion or the aveno-ing of the Moral Law, I should
venture fo ask how an abstraet ' vindieation' or' assertion ' ean
be a good--how a mere event or occurrence in nature ean be
a good exêept in so far as iL is the expression of some spiritual
state or a means of produeing suêh a state. Even the ]loral
Law itself is hot an end in itself, but only souls or wills
reêognizing and regulating their action by the lIoral Law. If
iL be urged that the avenging of the Moral Law is right beeause
iL is the expression of the avenger's indignation, that is an
intelligible answer; and I have already admitted that the
expression and eultivation of indignation is one of the purposes
of punishment, though this êan be hardly regarded as an ulti-
mate end, but rather a means fo a further end---the spiritual
good of the man himself and of soêiety aL large. But, if punish-
ment is fo be justified on aêêount of the good iL does fo OEe
punisher, we have already gone some way towards the abandon-
of punishment that he really cannot believe that if bas actuully been held
by any one else. And yet I ara free fo adroit that there îs much in all this
talk about involuntary .nd impenitent submission fo an unreformatory
punishment being really the act of the person's own will, which is quite as
unintelligible and ethically objectionable as fixe crudest form of the retribu-
tire theory, as implied for instance in fixe mny populr views ofthe Christian
doctrine of Atonement.
3o2
PUbIISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS [Book I
ment of the retributory theory in ifs ordinary form ; and further
a question arlses as to the punisher's right fo inflict evil on
another in order fo secure a good for himself. He---the punisher
--is no doubt an end in himself, and is justified in seeking his
own good; but what rîght has he fo ignore another's good
except as a means fo some greater good of his own or of the
society in which he lives ? If will hardly be seriously contended
that such and such a sentence of rive years' penal servitude is fo
be justified because the pain involved is outweighed by the
spiritual good which Mr. Justice So-and-so may have secured fo
himself by passing if. If may be suggested that if is justified
because if is the expression of the indignation of society; that
the sentence tends fo promote in society a reverence for the law
which the criminal has broken, or, again, that the punishment
produces moral good in the offender. In that case we have
frankly abandoned the idea that punishment is an end in itself,
and have adopted the view that if is a means fo some good in
society af large or in the criminal himself. If is true that the
word 'deterrence' hardly expresses adequately the fact that
the good which punishment confers upon society is in part a
spiritual good; that if tends hOt merely fo deter men from
committing crime, but fo impress upon their minds the idea that
crime is wrong--something fo be avoided and hated for ifs own
sake. The word 'reformation,' again, hardly does justice fo the
idea that if is good for the criminal fo feel the indignation of
soeiety, fo feel the external effeets of his wrong-doing : that if is
a good, one whieh if would be perhaps worth while (if we are fo
raise so abstraet and unpraetieal a question) fo promote, even if
we knew that in this partieular case if would not lead fo tht
whieh is the ultimate objeet of all punishment (so fr as the
eriminal himself is eoneerned), the alteration of his will, the
change of his eharaeter. That mere eonseiousness on the part of
the eriminal may even be regarded as in ifs way a good. The
endurance of evil eannot be itself a good: the utmost length
that we ean go is fo say that if may be a neeessary condition or
element in a stte of mind whieh we ean reeognize as relatively
good--as better than that of sueeessful and unresisted evil-
doing. Both the ' deterrent theory' and the ' reformatory
Chap. ix, § iii] USING HUMANITY AS END 303
theory' are no doubt inadequate to express the whole tlth
about punishment. There is a side of punishment which might
perhaps be best expressed by the terre ' educative theory'; or,
perhaps, we may simply say that the end of punishment is
partly deterrent or utilitarian, and partly ethical. Both sides of
punishment would be summed up in the assertion that our view
of punishment must be a teleological one.
Itis sometimes supposed that the utilitarian view of punish-
ment is inconsistent with a proper respect for human personMity :
if involves, we are told, the treatment of humanity as a means
and not as an end. If by ' utilitarian' theory is meant a view
resting upon a hedonistic theory of Ethics, I have nothing fo say
in ifs favour; if by ' utilitarian' is meant silnply a view which
treats punishment as a means to some good, spiritual or other-
wise, of some conscious being, I should entirely deny the justice
of the criticism. In the first place I should contend tlmt in
a sense if is quite right and inevitable that we should treat
humanity as a means. When a servant is called upon to black
the boots of his toaster, or a soldier to face death or disease in
the service of his country, society is certainly treating hulnanity
as a means: the men do these things not for their own sakes,
but for the sake of other people. Kant himself never uttered
anything so foolish as the maxim which indiscreet admirers are
constantly putting into his mouth, that we should never treat
humanity as a means: what he did say was that we should
never treat humanity only as a means, but always also as an
end. When a man is punished in the interest of society, he is
indeed treated as a means, but his right fo be treated as an end
is not thereby violated, if his good is treated as of equal impor-
tance with the end of other human beings. Social life would not
be possible without the constant subordination of the claires of
individuals fo the like claims of a greater number of individuals ;
and there may be occasions when in punishing a criminal we
bave to think more of the good of society generally than of the
individual who is punished. No doubt if is a duty to think also
of the good of the individual so far as that tan be donc con-
sistently with justice to other individuals: if is obviously the
duty of the State fo endeavour fo make ifs punishments as far as
3o4
PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS [BookI
possible reformatory as well as deterrent and educational fo
others. And how the reformatory view of punishment can be
accused of disrespect for human personality, because forsooth if
uses a man's animal organism or his lower psychical nature as
a means to the good of his higher self, I cannot profess to
understand. The retributive view of punishment justifies the
infliction of evil upon a living soul, even though it will do
neither him nor any one else any good whatever. If itis to do
anybody any good, punishment is not inflicted for the sake of
retribution. Itis the retributive theory which shovs a dis-
respect for human personality by proposing to sacrifice human
life and human Well-being fo a lifeless fetich styled the Moral
Law, which apparently, though unconscious, has a sense of
dignity and demands the immolation of victims fo avenge its
injured aour propre.
The real basis and stronghold of the theory whlch I am
investigating is-to be round in the undoubted psychological fact
that the sense of indignation or resentment st wrong arises
naturally and spontaneously in the human mind 1 without any
calculation of the personal or social benefits tobe derived from
gratifying if, and in the profound ethical conviction that for
societies--though not always for individuals--it is morally good
and healthy that this indignation should be encouraged and
expressed. 'Revenge,-my friends,' says Carlyle, 'revenge and
the natural hatred of scoun(lrels, and the ineradicable tendency
to 'evanclze" oneself upon them, and pay them what they hav
merited; this is for evermore intrinsically a correct, and even
a divine feeling in the mind of every man.' Such language
I could cordially adopt 3, though with the proviso (of which more
hereafter) that this feeling is hot so divine as the love which the
best men do succeed in feeling towards the worst, and that it
must not be allowed to extinguish that higher feeling. The
feeling of indignation is a natural and healthy one,--natural
i Psychologically, no doubt., this tendency can in a sense be explained
by evolutionary causes.
2 Except in so far as the word ' revenge' may imply the theory which
I ara disclaiming. I make this quotation (aad the following from Stephen)
from a second-hand source, and it seems hardly necessary to spend further
rime in searching for the passages.
Chap. ix, § iii] CRIMINAL LAW EDUCATIV E 3o5
nd healthy, we may dd, in partial correction of Carlyle, in
proportion to ifs disinterestedness. If is one great purpose of
Criminnl Law fo give expression to this naturel indignation
gainst wrong. But Law, in the discharge of ifs ideal function
as Reason without Passion (,oç âv«v rdOovç), seeks not merely fo
express but fo regulate, nd fo regulate with view to an end.
In the words of Sir James Stephen, ' the criminal lw regulates,
sanctions, and provides a legitimate satisfaction for the passion
of revenge ; the criminal law stands fo the passion of revenge in
much the saine relation s marriage to the sexual ppetite.'
And in both cses the ultimate end of the regflation is to
be round in a certain idel of social Well-being.
The error of the upholders of the retributive theory lies,
as if seems fo me, in mistaking a mere emotion or feeling
n emotion or feeling which in itself is good and importnt
element in every well-balnced characterfor a judgement of
the Practical Reason. The Practical Reason may often judge
that the emotion should be freely indu|ged, though af other
rimes if will no less emphatically pronounce that the most
elementary requirements of social order demand ifs partial or
entire restraint. The rel question is whether if is right to
punish simply because we feel inclined fo do so, to gratify
a natural pssion simply because if is there, or whether in this,
as in the cse of other spontneous emotions or desires (including
the spontneous impulses of Affection and Benevolence), we ought
fo regulate passion by Reason, fo act for n end, i.e. for the pro-
motion in ourselves and others of whatever we tke fo be the
ideal kind of human lire. How the existence of an instinctive
resentment ginst personal wrong, or in good men against
wrong fo others or moral depravity, can suspend the one all
comprehensive duty of love fo all men (including, of course, our-
selves) is a question which will, perhaps, offer no difficulties
fo those philosophical MorMists whose ethical system seems to
consist in the mixture of a little truculent Theology borrowed
from primitive Judaism with a good deal of pure paganism ; but
which must, I think, be an embarrassing one to those Retribu-
tionists who profess any sympathy with Christian standards
of Ethics. The most Christian of nediaeval thinkers (e. g. Dante
3o6 PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS [Book I
or Wycliflb ) always maintaîned that God's punishments were,
and man's should be, the expression of love. And this remark
suggests another of the difficulties involved in the retributive
theory--the difflculty of reconciling it with that side of the
moral ideal which is expressed by the word Mercy or Forgive-
ness.
IV
If is one of the great enbarrassments of the retributive
theory that if is unable to give any consistent account of the
duty of forgiveuess and ifs relations fo the duty of punishment.
If is seldom that one finds anybody so logical as fo maintain
that if is always a duty fo punish, and never right fo forgive, af
]east till the wrong-doing has been expiated by punishment,--
a theory which runs counter to a strongly felt and widely diffused
ethica! sentiment and which makes the Berenger law or our
own First Offenders' Act a piece of immoral legislation. Others
seem fo have no nswer fo the difficulty but the admission:
' Here are two inconsistent moral precepts: if is a duty fo
punish and a duty fo forgive : it is impossible fo lay down any
general p'inciple in the marrer : you must do whatever strikes
you as best in each case as it arises.' Such an answer may satisfy
those who think that Morality consists simply in a collection
of isolated impulses, intuitions, or particular judgements, which
Reason is in'capable of reducing to any consistent or intelligible
whole. It will hardly satisfy those who believe that our ethical
judgements can be reduced fo a system, and that the emergence
of apparent ethical antinomies simply shows that we have not yet
succeeded in getting fo a really fundamentl ethical principle.
The absence of internal contradictîon, though by itself it will
supply no adequate content for the Moral Law, we may surely
venture (with Kant) fo regard as a necessary condition of any
law which can really claire fo be moral. If the duty of punish-
ment is fo rest upon an a prio'i deliverance of the moral
consciousness which pronounces that, be the consequences what
they may, sin must be punished, if is difllcult fo see hov forgive-
ness can ever be lawful. If punishment is sometimes right and
sometimes wrong, on what pnciple are we fo distinguish between
Dante in the P««rgatorio : Wycliffe even as regards Hell.
Chap. ix, § iv] FORGIVEgESS 307
the tvo classes of cases ? That is the probleln to which, as it
appears fo me, no intelligible answer can be given on the retribu-
rive theory, but which is hOt insusceptible of a solution on the
basis of the teleological or educative view.
Among the very few moral philosophers who have bestowed
«my serious attention upon this question of forgiveness is Bishop
Butler. By him the duty of forgiveness is resolved into the
duty of being ' affeeted towards the injurious person in the saine
way in whieh any good men, uninterested in the case, would be ; if
they had the saine just sense, which we bave supposed the injured
person fo have, of the fault: after which there will yet remain
real good-will towards the offender 1., The duty amounts to
this: ' that we should suppress that partial, that false self-love,
which is the weakness of our nature ; that uneasiness and misery
shouhl hot be produced, without any good purpose to be served
by if: and that ve should hot be affected tovards persons
diflrently from what their nature and character require.'
' Resentment,' he says again,' is hOt inconsistent with good-will ;
for we often sec both together in very high degrees ; hot only in
parents towards their children, but in cases of friendship and
dependance, vhere there is no natural relation. These contrary
passions, though they may lessen, do hot necessarily destroy
each other.'
The duty of resentmcnt md the duty of forgiveness are thus
reduced fo particular applications of the general lav of prolnoting
.social Well-being. If is out duty to make our own personal
resentment subordinate fo the general good of society, just as
it is a duty fo subordinate goodwill towards individuals fo the
interests of other individuals. In determining vhether we should
resent or punish an injury (fo ourselves or to others) or whether
we should forgive, we should simply consider what is best for
the interests alike of the individual himself and of society af
large, the offender's good and the injured person's interest alike
being assigned ifs due, and no lnore than ifs due, importance.
The distribution (so to speak) of punishment and of forgiveness
vil] alike be guided by the general principle of Benevolence
or goodwill to society in general, the duty of promoting the
' Sermon IX.
.oS PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS [Book I
greatest good on the whole,--guided and controlled by the prin-
cil)le of ' Equity,' in the sense which has already been defined.
It may also be observed incidentally that on this view of the
duty of forgiveness as simply a particular manifestation of
the general duty of love, we are able to clear up an ambiguity
about the meaning of forgiveness which often occasions some
difflculty in discussions of this kind. We are often toh| that
forgiveness is not inconsistent with punishment; that we may
1)unish first and forgive afterwards, af least where punishment
is a duty arising out of some public function or parental relation
and hot a lnere gratification by legal or extra-legal means of
resentment against private wrong. And this is quite true as far
as if goes ; forgiveness may lnean simply the cessation of personal
resentment after the exaction of whatever penalty may be
dcmanded by considerations of social Well-being and public duty.
But, although in practice the adoption of this attitude may no
doubt be easier in the public ofiicial than in the pl'ivate person,
it is impossible to draw a hard and fast line between punishment
inflicted by the official in the discharge of public duty aud the
resentment exhibited by the private person, or betweeu the
vengeance which takes the forln of legal prosecution and that
which shows itself in private remonstrance or the refusal of
social intercourse. Even legal punishment generally requires
private initiation, and the saine considerations of social Well-
beingwhich require legal punishment in some cases require private
resentmeut in others. If would be fo the last degree disastrous
fo the Well-being of any society whatever if individuals altogether
ceased fo show anger or fo express resentment af personal rude-
ness or personal liberties or general want of respect for one
another's personalities; and from the nature of the case if is
usually the injured party who must take the initiative in such
resentment, though if may be that the ideal society would save
him such a necessity by anticipating the resentment,--an ideal
which is already approximately realized in gTOUpS of people
among whom good breeding is combined with that real good
feeling of which good breeding is at ifs best the expression and
af its worst the caricature.
AI1 tllis shows that we cannot attain fo the idem combination
Cha. ix, § iv] FORGIVENESS AND PUNISHMENT o 9
of punishment with forgiveness by merely laying it down that
the magistrate must punish while the man must forgive. Nor,
again, can we merely say that the duty of forgiveness begins
when the due punishment has been exacted. For what will
forgiveness mean in this case ? Are we to sa.y that when the
formal sentence bas been served, it is the duty of the judge or of
society generally to treat the criminal with the saine cordiality
with which we should have received him had he never offended ?
Undoubtedly society does hot give its repentant criminals the
fair chance that they may reasonably cluim, but to say that we
nmst treat them as though they had never done wrong, or that
former convictions should not aggravate the sentence, is surely
to demand what is impracticable and pernicious. Nor in private
relations can we always be called upon to treat the man who has
betrayed our trust--even aftcr repcntance or apology--as though
he had uot betrayed it; nor can a friend, after a quarrel which
has revealed in him a character which we had hot suspected,
ever again 1)e a friend in the saine sense or degree as before, even
after the most ample repentance or apology. Without, there-
fore, denying that there is a sense in which fol'giveness may be
combined with punishment, it is impossible to find for that
forgiveness which is compatible with punishment a meaning
more definite tha this--that punishment should not exclude
whatever kind of goodwill can iii the circumstances be
properly combined with punishment. And tiret surely is some-
thing far too indefinite to satisfy the idea of forgiveness in its
full and ordinary sense. It is impossible, in short, to get rid of
the popular association of the idea of forgiveness with remission
of penalty.
There is, then, a sense in which forgiveness is opposed to
punishment. On the view that I bave taken it will sometimes
be a duty to punish and sometimes to forgive. In determining
which we shall do in each particular case, t.he good man--
whether the private individual or the public ofiïcial, who is after
all only the representative of a society of individuals as much
bound by the law of love in their corporate as in their individual
capacitywill consider which, having regard to a]l the circum-
st.ances of t.he case, will best serve those social ends to which
3o PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS [Book I
punishment and forgiveness alike are means. The ideal punish-
ment would no doubt be one which was the best alike in the
iuterests of society and of the individual. Under our present
system of legal punishment it is to be feared that this is an ideal
hOt very often attained. A man has often fo be punished in
Che interest of society whose own Well-being would be best pro-
moted by forgiveness. In such a case we bave fo balance the
intcrest of society against the interest of the individual, or rather
perhaps what the society gains by the moral improvement
of the particular individual against what if gains from the
dctcrrent and educative effcct of the punishment upon other
individuals.
And upon this view of the relation of punishment fo forgivc-
ncss, there is no bsolute antagonlsm betwcen thaç sense of
forgiveness in which if is opposed fo punishmcnt and that sense
in which if is compatible with punishment. Just the saine con-
siderations which impose the duty of punishment will limit the
meaure of if; just those saine considerations which allow of the
total remission of penalty in some cases will allow of some miti-
gation of if in other cases, and will impose in all cases the duty
of showing whatever Benevolence and goodwill towards the
offender is compatible vith that measure of punishment which
social duty demands. Punishment and forveness, when they are
what they ought fo be, being alike the expression of love, the
mode and degree of their combination will likewise be only
the application of the general precept of love fo the circumstances
of the particular case.
In the main, then, we may accept Bishop Butler's interpre-
ration of the proper relation between punishment and forgive-
ness, and yet we cannot but feel that something is missed
in this cool nd calculating utilitarian analysis. We feel that
thcre nmst be something more in forgiveness than the mere
limitation of vengeance by the demands of public welfare.
Seeley, in one of the best chapters of Ecce Homo, helps us
fo supply the deficicncy . If is true that in ifs essence the
duty of forgiveness is the duty of lying aside priv«de or
Ecce Homo, chap. xxii. Von Hrtmann hs lso recognized this justifica-
tion of forgiveness (Des sittl. Bew,«sstsei». p. 78.
Chap. ix, § iv] DIVINE PUNISHMENT 3
personal resentment,--of resenting the wrong because it is
wrong and not because I ara the victim of if. But wht
Bishop Butler has misscd is the fact tlmt vengeance often
loses ifs moral effect just bec.use the venger of the wrong
is its victim, while forgiveness often touches the heart just
bec.use the forgiver is the mn who suflbred by the wrong,
and therefore the nmn in whom if is lmrdest to forgive. The
wronged lun's forgiveness will often hve a moral effect, awaken
a gratitude and a penitence, which the forgiveness of the dis-
interested spectator or the remotely interested 'society' would
hot secure. It is perfectly true, as Butler taught, that forgive-
ness is only a particular case of love; but he forgot that to
a human being who bas wronged his fcllow, forgiveness is an
infinitely more convincing proof of love tlmn punishmeut can
ever be, and may, therefore, touch the heart as punishment will
seldom touch if. In the light of this erinciple nothing tlmt has
been said as to the dut 3" of balancing the good effects of forgive-
ness against the good effects of punishment need be recalled"
onIy, in choosing between them, this peculiar magie of the
wronged person's forgivcness must needs be duly remembered.
In conclusion, I may remark that all these considerations are
as much applicable fo any punishments which Theists may
expect as the consequence of sin in another world as to the
clumsy attempts af ideal Justice with which we are obliged
to be satisfied in the school or the criminal court. Now as
in the days of Plato it is a paramount duty of Moral Philosophy
to lay dovn Canons for Theology (rg:ov :«p' O«oAoyiaç). It need
hardly be pointed out tiret the acceptance of out principles about
Punishment will involve a considerable amendment of popular
ideas about what we slmll still do well fo think of as divine
punishment, while we recognize the inadequacy of such a meta-
phor or symbol of God's deaIing vith human souIs. Few
Theologians of the present day will be bold enough fo follow
Abelard in defence of everlasting punishment us being justified
by the example and warning which the rate of the wicked
supplies fo the rest of hmnanity. And the acceptance of the
principles here laid down about forgiveness may invoIve a no
less complete reconstitution of many popular schemes concerning
32 PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS [Book I
divine forgiveness and atonement. The idea of vicarious surfer-
ing has nothing immoral about if ; under the conditions .of human
lire love can hardly be manifested in ifs highest degree without
if. If is otherwise vith the idea of vicarious punishment. Even
on the retributive viev of punishment, the idea of substituted
vicarious punishment would never for a moment be defended by
a modern Christitn except with a view fo bolster up an obsolete
theological tradition--still less so on the view of punishment
adopted in these pages. On the other hand the idea that the
nature of God has received its fullest revelation in a self-
sacrificing lire and death is one gainst which the Moralist
can have nothing fo say.
Oxford : Printed at the Clarendon Press by HORS, CE IART,
R shdsll, Hstins
..Tbe theo7 of good and
evil
v. I
BJ
i011
.R2 -
