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Full text of "Pentagon Papers"

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IV.A Evolution of the War (26 Vols.) 
U.S. MAP for Diem: The Eisenhower Commitments, 

1954-1960(5 Vols.) 
1. NATO and SEATO: A Comparison 



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UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS 



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IV. A. 1 



NATO AND SEATO: A COMPARISON 



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IV. A. 1. NATO AMD SMTP: A COMPARISON 

SUMMARY 

Because the SEATO Treaty has "been used by the Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
and Johnson Administrations to justify U.S. policy, aid, and presence 
in Vietnam, and because many have questioned this justification, the 
treaty has become a center of controversy. The issue is whether by 
intent of the parties and by treaty terminology the U.S. was obligated 
to use force to help defend the territorial independence and integrity 
of South Vietnam. No one seriously challenges U.S. military and eco- 
nomic aid provisions under the SEATO Treaty; the thrust of the criticism 
is the use of U.S. ground combat forces. 

There are plentiful statements over time by the U.S. Government 
on the importance of SEATO. 

President Eisenhower stated: "We gave military and economic 
assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. We entered into a treaty -- the 
Southeast Asia Security Treaty -- which plainly warned that an armed . 
attack against this area would endanger our own peace and safety and 
that we would act accordingly." 

President Kennedy stated: "...The SEATO Pact. . .approved by 
the Senate with only, I think, two against it, under Article 4, stated 
that the United States recognized that aggression by means of armed 
attack against Vietnam would threaten our own peace a.nd security. So 
since that time the United States ha,s been assisting the government 
of Vietnam to maintain its independence. . .The attack on the government 
by communist forces, with assistance from the north, became of greater 
and greater concern to the Government of Vietnam and the Government of 
the United States." 

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Secretary Rusk, speaking for the Johnson Administration, made 
the strongest statement of all: "We have sent American forces to fight 
in the jungles. . .because South Viet~Nam has, under the language of the 
SEATO Treaty, been the victim of 'aggression by means of armed attack. 1 
Those who challenge this rationale contend that unlike the NATO Treaty 
which specifically included the 'use of armed force 1 and unambiguously 
intended such action, the SEATO Treaty was not meant by its U.S. framers 
as an umbrella for American military intervention." 

This is the kind of issue that can readily be argued either way. 
It is obvious the language of the SEATO Treaty allows the signatories 
the choice of military means. And, a respectable argument can be made 
for the further step of obligation. For example, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Report on the treaty in 195^- stated: 

"The committee is not impervious to the risks which this 
treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these 
additional obligations commits the United States to a cause of 
action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks 



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are consistent with our own highest interests. There are 
greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he 
can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions 
which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions." 

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To the contrary, a statement "before the Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee by Secretary Dulles himself can be cited to demonstrate more 
modest, less obligatory designs: 

- "I might say in this connection, departing somewhat 
from order of my presentation, that it is not the policy of 
the United States to attempt to deter attack in this area by 
building up a local force capable itself of defense against 
an all-out attack by the Chinese Communists if it should occur. 
We do not expect to duplicate in this area the pattern of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its significant standing 
forces. That would require a diversion and commitment of 
strength which we do not think is either practical or desir- 
able or necessary from the standpoint of the United States. 

"We believe that our posture in that area should be one 
of having mobile striking power, and the ability to use that 
against the sources of aggression if it occurs. We believe 
that is more effective than if we tried to pin down American 
forces at the many points around the circumference of the 
Communist world in that area. 

"It may very well be that other countries of the area will 
want to dedicate particular forces for the protection of the 
area under this treaty. But we made clear at Manila that it 
was not the intention of the United States to build up a large 
local force including, for example, United States ground troops 
for that area, but that we rely upon the deterrent power of 
our mobile striking force." 

By looking into the words of the treaty in the light of its origins 
and the interests of the U.S. as perceived in 195^> an( i by comparing 
these with NATO language, origins, and development, it is possible to 
make a tentative judgment on the issue of obligation. Whereas it is 
clear that NATO was intended for deterrence against aggression and 
defense with U.S. forces should deterrence fail, SEATO seems to have 
been designed with a view only toward deterrence. Defense, especially 
with U.S. ground forces, was not seriously contemplated. 

There are three pieces of evidence in support of this contentious 
conclusion: (l) the stringent preconditions which the U.S. delegation 
to the Manila Conference to establish SEATO were instructed to insist 
upon; (2) the lack of institutional and force structure development in 
SEATO as compared to NATO; and (3) the fact that SEATO and NATO treaty 
terminology differ in respect to the use of force and other matters . 



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Unlike the guidance under which U.S. negotiators helped to frame 
NATO, U.S. representatives to the conference establishing SEATO were 
given four uncompromisable pre-conditions: 

(a) The U.S. would refuse to commit any U.S. forces 
unilaterally; 

(b) Were military action to be required, one or more of the 
European signatories would have to participate; 

" (c) The U.S. intended to contribute only sea and air power, 
expecting that other signatories would provide ground forces; 

(d) The U.S. would act only against communist aggression. 

These instructions not only clearly exempt the use of U.S. ground forces, 
but presuppose multilateral action before the U.S. would act in any 
capacity. 

With respect to the comparative development of SEATO and NATO, U.S. 
behavior also indicates great restraint and avoidance of commitment. 
NATO was formed in 19^9.? an( i within two years it was well institution- 
alized —» combined command forces in-being and a Standing Group for 
policy guidance. The UoS. consistently resisted the efforts of its 
SEATO partners for comparable institutions. Secretary Dulles, in fact, 
sought to discourage public identification of SEATO with NATO. Only 
in 1959 j did the U.S. accede to the formation of a modest SEATO secre- 
tariat. Moreover, SEATO had to wait until i960 before the U.S. would 
participate in the development of a series of SEATO contingency plans. 
Most important, no U.S. troops have ever been designated specifically 
for SEATO. 

Comparing the specific terminology of the operative sections of the 
SEATO and NATO treaties gives additional credence to the non- obligation 
argument. The key articles of both treaties are those calling for action 
against an enemy threat. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty declares 
that the member nations "agree that an armed attack against one or more 
of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against 
them all, " and that in that event each will take "forthwith. . .such action 
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force...." The cor- 
relative phraseology in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 
Article IV declares that "each Party recognizes that aggression by means 
of armed attack against any of the Parties, or against any state or 
territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter desig- 
nate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will 
in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional process." The SEATO wording is thus intentionally ambig- 
uous on the point of just what response would be made by the members in 
the event of an armed attack. Such an attack against one of the SEATO 
members would be viewed as a "common danger" rather than as an "attack 



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on all." Where NATO prescribes action "forthwith/' SEATO requires only 
that the "common danger" be "met" in accordance with "constitutional 
processes." SEATO also forecloses action on the treaty of any threat- 
ened state without the consent of that state -~ a qualification designed 
to reassure members that their independence was not threatened by neo- 
colonialism or other domination in a SEATO guise. 

In some respects, however, the SEATO Pact is broader than its NATO 
counterparts. The nature of the threat is loosely defined in Article TV 
as "any fact or situation that might endanger the peace of the area" 
and provision is made to protect threatened member countries of the 
region. The area of applicability is left flexible. Moreover, Article 
II of the SEATO Treaty applies the pact against not only "armed attack" 
but also "subversive activities directed from without against /members/ 
territorial integrity and political stability." Also, unlike the North 
Atlantic Treaty, there is no clause in the SEATO Treaty implying a depen- 
dence on United Nations intervention to restore peace once the treaty 
were invoked. 






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TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Paragraph Page 

1. Genesis A-5 

a. Truman Doctrine, I9V7 A- 5 

b. Marshall Plan, I9V7 A-6 

c. ERP and NATO, 19^8-19^9 A-7 

d. The China Aid Program A-8 

e. MDAP, 19U9 A-8 

f . Precursor Pacts in Asia A-9 

g. Indochina and United Action, 195^ A-10 

h. Manila Conference, 195^ A-13 

(1) Force Commitment 

(2) Ant i -Communism 

2. The Treaties Compared A- 15 

a. Introductory Articles Alike A-l6 

b. The Key Articles A-16 

c . Extent of Treaty Areas A-19 

d. UN and Other Pacts A-19 

e . Treaty Institutions A-19 

f . Treaty Longevity A-20 

g. The Appended U.S. "Understanding" A-20 

h. The Vietnam-Laos -Cambodia Protocol A-21 



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Paragraph 

3 • Evolution of the Treaty Organization 

a. NATO Develops Rapidly 

b. SEATO Unstructured by U.S. Preference.. 

c. SEATO Contingency Planning 

(1) Laos Planning 

(2) Vietnam Planning 

(3) Thailand Planning 
(k) The Future 

Footnotes 

Appendix A - A Comparison of the Wording of the 

NATO and SEATO Treaties 

Appendix B - Organizational Charts 



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IV, A. 1. NATO and. SEATO: A Comparison 
1. Genesis 
*' a# Truman Doctrine , 19 ^-7 

In 19^6, Winston Churchill perceived, a postwar threat in a 
wartime ally: 

[ "Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and. its communist interna- 

tional organization intends to d.o...what are the limits, if any, 
to their expansive and. proselytizing tactics. . .From Stettin in 
the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended, 
across the continent... T 1/ 

And. he also depicted, a counter: 

"Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous 
rise of world, organization will be gained, without... a, special 
( relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and. 

the United. States..." 

These insights were reinforced, in early 19^-7 by influential analyses of 
! George Kennan and. others of Soviet motives and. capabilities, which pointed 

out that occasional and sporadic efforts to foil Soviet policy were severely 
disadvantaged,. These analysts held, that the West should seek to oppose 
Soviet expansionism by what the Foreign Affairs "X" article of January, 
19^7 5 called "the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force." 2/ 
Such a strategy, it was held., would force the Soviet to reassess and. ad- 
just its policies, and. the U.S. could expect eventually the "break-up 
or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." Out of these, and similar 
appreciations of Soviet intent emerged, the concept of a U.S. strategy 
of involvement. 

Theory was swiftly abetted, by event. The British notified 
the U.S. that it would, be unable to extend, its economic and military aid. 
; to Greece and. Turkey beyond March, 19^7. The U.S., rather than accept 

the distinct possibility of a Soviet intrusion following British withdrawal, 
chose to take up the burden the British were laying down in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Congress authorized in May, 19^7 * some $1+00 million for 
direct aid. to those countries, acting upon the recommendation of President 
Truman in the March, 19^+7, message known since as the "Truman Doctrine": 

"i believe that it must be the policy of the United States 
to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation 
by armed, minorities or by outside pressures. I believe we must 
a.ssist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their 
own way. . ." 3/ 

The President went on to underscore the U.S. determination to commit its 
resources to contain communism, clearly subordinating military aid to 



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economic and. political means. Finally: 

"To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from 
coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establish- 
ing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make 
possible freedom and independence for all its members. We shall 
not realize our objectives , however , unless we are willing to 
help free peoples to maintain their free institution and their 
national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to im- 
pose upon them totalitarian regimes." 

b. Marshall Plan, 19^7 

The U.S. Secretary of State on June 5, 19^7> proposed the 
cooperative international economic aid subsequently entitled the European 
Recovery Program (ERP), but known widely as the Marshall Plan. ERP was at 
first explicitly designed to permit and even attract Soviet cooperation: 

"Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine 
but a.gainst hunger, poverty, desparation and chaos. Its purpose 
should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to 
permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which 
free institutions can exist." k/ 

But the Soviet rebuffed the Marshall Plan, turned Bloc propaganda against 
it as an adjunct of the Truman Doctrine, and by so doing, bifurcated. Europe 
Moreover, among three top-level U.S. committees examining ways of bringing 
U.S. resources to bear on European recovery, the Committee on Foreign Aid 
(Harriman Committee) found, that: 

"The interest of the United States in Europe ... cannot be 
measured, simply in economic terms. It is also strategic and 
political. We all know that we are faced, in the world, today 
with two conflicting ideologies. . .Our position in the world, has 
been based, for at least a century on the existence in Europe of 
a number of strong states committed, by tradition and. inclina- 
tion to the democratic concept..." 5/ 

The bipolar world, had begun to emerge. In January, 19^8, the British 
Foreign Secretary, following talks with the U.S. Secretary of State, pro- 
posed, an alliance among the U.K., France, and. the Benelux nations, refer- 
ring to "the conception of the unity of Europe and the preservation of 
Europe as the heart of western civilization." 6/ At the end. of February, 
19^-8, western Europe was shocked by the fall of the Czechoslovakian govern- 
ment to a communist coup d. ! etat. In March, the British-proposed allianci 
was contracted, as the Brussels Pact, a fifty-year treaty of collective 
defense and. economic collaboration. U.S. approval was immediate; the 
President told. Congress that: 

"its significance goes far beyond, the actual terms of the 
agreement itself. It is a notable step in the direction of 






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unity in Europe. . .This development deserves our full support. 
I am confident the United States will, by appropriate means , 
extend to the free nations the support which the situation 
requires. . . " jj 

c - ERP and NATO, 1948- 19^9 

On 1 April, 1948, the Soviets initiated the blockade of Berlin. 
In late April, the President called a conference of his senior advisers 
to consider the Soviet threat, as well as the possibility of communist 
fomented uprisings in France and Italy. John Foster Dalles, then State 
Department consultant, later reported that the conferees agreed that: 

"...Only a decisive pronouncement by the United States 
would check the fear that was inspired by Moscow. . ./and that 
• the U.S. should/ proceed along the lines of a North Atlantic 
regional pact. . ." 

Dulles also stated that Senator Vandenberg: 

tT ...Felt that the Senate liked the idea of regional associa- 
tions and would be disposed to approve in principle a further 
developing of such associations for collective defense." 8/ 

In May, 1948, Senator Vandenberg introduced a, resolution adopted by the 
Senate on June 11, 1948, by a vote of 64 to 4, advising the Executive to 
undertake the : 

"...Progressive development of regional and other collec- 
tive arrangements for individual and collective self-defense 
in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of 
the Charter /of the UT\[7, association of the United States, by 
constitutional process, with such regional and other collective 
arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help 
and mutual aid, and as affect its national security." 9/ 

The Department of State later explained to Congress that "the contents of 
this resolution. . .became our guide in the discussion and subsequent nego- 
tiations which led to the North Atlantic Pact." 10/ 

In June, 1948, Congress also passed the Economic Cooperation 
Act, establishing the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to adminis- 
ter a program of foreign aid. The following month, armed with the Economic 
Cooperation Act and the Vandenberg Resolution, the U.S. opened exploratory 
talks on an alliance with the Brussels Pact members and Canada. Subse- 
quently, the talks were broadened to include twelve nations. On April 4, 
19^-9? the Worth Atlantic Treaty was signed, and in late July ratified by 
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d. The China Aid . Program 

In the meantime > U.S. policy suffered a setback in Asia. 
A China Aid Program had been enacted by Congress in June, 19^8, in the 
same omnibus foreign assistance legislation which authorized ERP and ECA. 
The China Aid Program met almost immediate failure, for Mao's armies spread 
unchecked over -the China mainland., and. by late 19^-9> the position of the 
Nationalists there was untenable. This "failure" of U.S. aid -- it was 
termed, such by Congressional critics — no less than the urgent situation 
in Europe figured, in Congressional action on military assistance legisla- 
tion placed before it in 19^9* ll/ 

e. MDAP, 19^-9 

In September 19^-9? the Soviets exploded, their first nuclear 
device* On October 6, 19^9^ Congress passed, the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Act, designed, as a comprehensive law, providing a Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program (MDAP) through which U.S. arms, military equipment and. training 
assistance might be provided for collective defense. In the first appro- 
priations under MDAP, NATO Countries received. ^6% of the total, and. Greece 
and. Turkey (not yet NATO members), 16$. 12/ But Korea and the Philippines 
received mod.est aid., and. the legislators clearly intended, the law to under- 
write subsequent appropriations for collective security in Asia. The open- 
ing paragraph of the law not only supported. NATO, but foreshadowed SEATO: 

"An Act to Promote the Foreign Policy and Provide for 
the Defense and General Welfare of the United. States 
by Furnishing Military Assistance to Foreign Nations, 
Approved. October 6, 19^9* 

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United. States of America in Congress assembled., That this 
Act may be cited as the 'Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 19^9- f 

"FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY 

"The Congress of the United States reaffirms the policy of 
the United. States to achieve international peace and security 
through the United Nations so that armed, force shall not be used, 
except in the common interest. The Congress hereby finds that 
the efforts of the United. States and. other countries to promote 
peace and. security in furtherance of the purposes of the Charter 
of the United. Nations require additional measures of support 
based upon the principle of continuous and effective self-help 
and. mutual aid. These measures include the furnishing of military 
assistance essential to enable the United. States and other nations 
dedicated to the purposes and principles of the United. Nations 
Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual 
and. collective self-defense in support of those purposes and. 
principles. In furnishing such military assistance, it remains 



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the policy of the United. States to continue to exert maximum 
efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United. Nations with 
armed, forces as contemplated, in the Charter and. agreements to 
achieve universal control of weapons of mass destruction and. 
universal regulation and. reduction of armaments, including armed. 
e .. forces , under adequate safeguards to protect complying nations 
against violation and. evasion. 

"The Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the cre- 
ation by the free countries and the free peoples of the Far East 
of a joint organization, consistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations, to establish a program of self-help and. mutual 
cooperation designed, to develop their economic and. social well- 
being, to safeguard basic rights and. liberties and to protect 
their security and. independence. 

The Congress recognizes that economic recovery is essen- 
tial to international peace and security and must be given clear . 
priority. The Congress also recognizes that the increased, con- 
fidence of free peoples in their ability to resist direct or 
indirect a.ggression and to maintain internal security will ad- 
vance such recovery and support political stability." 13/ 

f . Precursor Pacts in Asia 

With the Nationalist evacuation to Formosa in November, 19^9* 
an urgent situation developed, in Asia that in ways paralleled, the condi- 
tions that prompted, formation of NATO. The rise of Mao's Peoples Republic 
of China (PRC) seemed to project the monolithic power of Soviet communism 
to the eastern shores of Asia, menacing the relatively small nations along 
China's periphery like the Russians threatened. Western Europe. The Chi- 
nese parroted, the Kremlin's aggressive announcements, participated, in the 
assault on South Korea, and provided aid to Ho Chi Minh in Southeast Asia. 

U.S. counteraction was forthcoming. By 1951* i n an effort 
to bolster the defensive capabilities of the area, the U.S. had become 
a partner in five separate defense treaties in the region. Four bilateral 
arrangements linked, the U.S. with Japa.n, South Korea, Nationalist. China, 
and. the Philippines, forming an arc around, the periphery of Communist China. 
In addition, the ANZUS Treaty was signed, in 1951? a ^d. the Five-Power Staff 
Agency (composed, of Australia, New Zealand, France, UK, and. US) was formed 
in 1953 "to facilitate coordination on problems in Southeast Asia." In 
195^* John Foster Dulles recalled that: 

"When I went out to the Pacific area in 1950 to begin the 
negotiations which resulted, in the Japanese Peace Treaty and. 
a series of security treaties, the original hope had. been that 
we could, have a fairly broad, collective security arrangement. 
As it happened, it was not possible to d.o at that time, and. we 
were content perforce with a series of treaties .. .But those 
treaties themselves indicated that we did. not regard, them as 
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From 19^9 through 1953 the National Security Council maintained, the view 
that a broader regional defense pact or association should be initiated 
by the countries of the area. 15/ In the following 1950 exchange with 
Congressman Fulton, Secretary of State Acheson expressed Administration 
policy: 

"MR. -FULTON: May I read, to the Secretary from the second, 
paragraph of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act: 

'The Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the crea- 
tion by the free countries and free peoples of the Far East, of 
a joint organization consistent with the Charter of the United. 
Nations to establish a program of self-help and. mutual coopera- 
tion designed, to develop their economic and. social well-being, 
to safeguard, the basic rights and. liberties, and to protect their 
security and. independence . f 

"Now may I point out that is a bipartisan policy, because 
it was two Republicans and. two Democrats on this committee who 
put that amendment in. My question then is to the Secretary 
and to the State Department, why, when this was passed clear 
back in 19^-9 9 October 6, has not the State Department taken 
steps to put into effect the declared bipartisan foreign policy 
of the Congress? " 

"SECRETARY ACHESON: Mr. Fulton, I think it is important 
for you to really look at your own words. You said, that the 
Congress expresses itself as favoring the creation by the free 
countries and. free peoples of the Far East of certain things. 
Now the President stated he favors that. On all occasions he 
has stated, it and. I have stated, that that is the attitude of 
the Government of the United States. I should, think that the 
President and. I and the Congress are all agreed, that the very 
important word.s are that this organization should, be created by 
the free peoples of the Far East and. not created, by the United. 
Sta.tes. We are not calling these nations together and. you never 
asked us to call these nations together and. tell them they should, 
create something. 1 know that your knowledge of the Far East 
is sufficient to lead you to conclude that if we did. that it would, 
have exactly the opposite effect of the one which you wish to 
achieve. The President of the Philippines has been going forward 
to accomplish this. We have stated to him, and publicly, that 
we are most sympathetic to this activity on his part, but it 
is most important that it should.be a spontaneous Asian action." l£/ 

g. Indochina and United. Action, I95U 

In the spring of 195^j however, the deterioration of the 
French situation in Indochina caused a re-evaluation of U.S. policy on 
collective security in Asia and. precipitated, proposals by the U.S. to 
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kind, of Southeast Asian coalition. On 6 April 195*+, the NSC, asked to 
consider "appropriate action regarding Ind.ochina and the need, for U.S. 
military intervention/ 1 replied, that the best alternative was a regional 
grouping with maximum Asian participation, YjJ On 13 May, the NSC looked, 
to "avoid, the loss of Indochina and to resolve the colonial problem by 
the creation of a regional grouping." 18/ Crisis transformed, the U.S. 
position on a wide regional alliance from that of a potential joiner to 
that of an anxious organizer. 

| • When the U.S. position changed., the pendulum swung far, pro- 

[ ducing not only the general concept of "united, action," but also several 

specific plans for U.S. -allied, intervention in Indochina in a variety of 
circumstances. Secretary Dulles approached, the British and. French directly 
with a plan in which a ten-nation coalition would, confront communist ex- 
pansion in Southeast Asia. On 12-lU April, Dulles visited. London to get 
Eden's support for this plan, but was turned down. Eden thought it best 
to wait and. see what could, be accomplished, at the Geneva Conference, then 
in preparation. Dulles did get what he thought was Ed.en f s agreement to 
a plan for an ad hoc group of the same nations to meet and. discuss plans 
for collective action in case it became necessary, and. a public statement 
in favor of a broad. Asian alliance. 

Congressional reaction to the latter was immediate. The 
House Foreign Affairs Committee was at the time holding hearings, and. promptly 
issued, a statement endorsing the Dulles and. Eden action, and. citing the 

MDAP legislation. The following is from the Hearings: 

' ■ 

i 

I . "MR. VORYS. Now, could. I read, a paragraph from the text 

of the recent statement issued, by Messrs. Dulles and. Eden... 
i " this paragraph was what caught my attention this morning. 

/Reading^/ 

'Accordingly we are ready to take part with the other coun- 
; tries principally concerned, in the examination of the possibility 

of establishing a collective d.efense within the framework of 
the charter of the United. Nations Organization, to assure the 
. peace, security, and. freedom of Southeast Asia, in the western 
Pacific.' 



■ "I have changed our proposed, statement slightly. 

. 'The Committee on Foreign Affairs notes with approval the 
statement issued, in London on April 13, 195& ? "by "the Secretary 
of State and. the British Foreign Secretary which is in line with 
recommendations previously expressed, by the Committee and Con- 
gress in 19*1-9 • T 



"The second, paragraph reads as follows: 



'This paragraph was drafted, by the Committee on Foreign 



Affairs and. incorporated, in the original Mutual Defense Assistance 



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Act. A similar paragraph was incorporated, in the Mutual Security 
Act of 1953 by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and. passed, by 
the House of Representatives. This language was left out of the 

j • m act as finally passed, because the committee of conference regarded. 

1 ' the existing paragraph of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act as 

giving ad.equ.ate expression of congressional policy. 1 " 19/ 



The U.S. moved, immediately to assemble the ad hoc group Dulles had. dis- 
cussed with Ed.en, inviting representatives of some 10 nations to meet 
in Washington on 20 April. Two days before the meeting was to take place , 
the British announced, they would, be unable to attend. They had not realized, 
they said., that the meeting would, take place so soon, and they had. not 
been given the opportunity to pass on the conferees. 20/ The meeting 
was held anyway, but became a general briefing of the twenty nations com- 
prising the allied side at the Geneva Conference. 

In the meantime, other coalition plans were in the making. 
An early concept, the first of many to be advanced., provided, a choice 
of two courses of action: 

"The U.S. is prepared, to join actively in two regional group- 
ings. The first such grouping will include nations ree,dy immedi- 
ately to intervene in Indochina provided, certain conditions are 
o met. The second such grouping should, be d.efined., with wid.er 

participation, to guarantee against communist aggression or sub- 
version of all Southeast Asia with the exception of Indochina 
so long as active fighting continues." 2l/ 

The first of these groupings was to contain the U.S., France, the Associated. 
States of Laos, Ca.mbod.ia, and. Vietnam, Thailand., and. the Philippines. The 
second, was to be composed, of "all countries who wish to join" including the 
Colombo Plan countries (Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan), Korea, 
and "perhaps" the Chinese Nationalists. The U.S. wished, to avoid a "white 
man's party" 22/ in the formation of any regional group, but the powers 
able to contribute substantial military support to the plans were not Asian. 
Neither coalition materialized before Geneva. 

The dramatic fall of Dien Bien Phu served, notice to the world, 
of French military impotence in Ind.ochina. When the participants of the 
Indochina fighting moved, to the conference table in April, 195^-* "the U.S., 
fresh from the bitter experience of Panmunjom, looked, on the upcoming dis- 
cussions apprehensively, fearing that the French tactical d.efeat presaged, 
strategic disaster. At one time or another during the Geneva Conference, 
the U.S. considered.: (l) merely urging the French to a greater effort, 
(2) assisting the French with material support in varying degrees, (3) 
intervening in conjunction with the British, (k) taking military action 
with all those prepared, to do so, and. (5) working out a long range South- 
east Asia allia,nce. None of these courses of action proved, practicable. 
Nonetheless, the outcome of the Geneva Conference did catalyze SEATO. 
Within the councils of the U.S. Government, the concession of half of Viet- 
nam to the communists was considered another retreat before communist expansion. 

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Secretary of State Dulles publicly drew two lessons from Geneva: (l) that 
popular support was essential to combat communist subversion, and (2) collec- 
tive defense against aggression could, not be devised, after the aggression 
was in progress. 23/ He went on to assert that a collective security 
system in Southeast Asia could in the future check both outright aggression 
and subversion. The U.S. moved, promptly to convene an international con- 
ference at Manila in late summer , 195^-> to devise such a security system. 

h. Manila Conference, IS^k 

The outlook at Manila, however, tended, to be more retrospec- 
tive than futuristic. Vice Admiral A. C. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (ISA) and chief DOD representative in the U.S. delegation observed, 
in his report that: 

"...the Manila Conference convened following communist mili- 
tary achievements in Indochina and political and psychological 
successes at Geneva. Against this background, the effort of the .. . 
Manila Conference to construct a collective defense arrangement 
for Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific was directed in 
large measure to recovering from the psychological blow thus ad- 
ministered to the Free World. Much of what was said, at the Con- 
ference bore witness to the preeminence of psychological objec- 
tives in the thinking of the participating States. In a real 
sense, the Treaty that emerged, at Manila is a response to the 
Geneva Agreements." 2hJ 

The task facing the conferees was formidable compared, with that Atlantic 
planners had faced six years earlier. The Geneva reverse provided, a small 
basis for common action. NATO had been created, in a. relatively uncompli- 
cated, political situation, in an atmosphere of understanding and. common 
need, to meet an unambiguous threat. Moreover, the Worth Atlantic nations 
could, build, collective defense on an infrastructure of shared, culture, 
political ideals, and interdependent economies. Commitments of the member 
nations could be clarified to stipulate standing forces, command, structures, 
and. roles in planning. The nations at Manila, on the other hand, confronted, 
a complex of dilemmas. Anti-communism was no unifying force. Throughout 
the region, potential communist aggressors were likely to adopt causes of 
ant i- colonialism, anti-traditionalism, racism, religion, or irredentism. 
Moreover, the conferees represented disparate cultures in countries scat- 
tered, across the world.. Of the eight nations present, only two were Asian; 
several nations whose location made them logical candidates for an Asian 
coalition chose not to attend. 

The U.S. representatives at the Manila Conference in Septem- 
ber, 195^-5 arrived, with instructions to insist on a number of preconditions 
for U.S. military action in Southeast Asia. First, with its commitments 
in Europe, the U.S. would, refuse to act unilaterally in Asia; further, 
any such action would, have to involve not only Asian nations, but also 
major European partners. Moreover, the U.S. would, not be prepared, to com- 
mit ground, troops into combat in Asia; other nations would, do the ground 



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fighting under a cover of U.S. sea and air power. In addition, the U.S. 
defined the communist threat as the only real danger in the area; the U.S. 
did. not want to be drawn into an alliance directed against any other sort 
of enemy, particularly desiring to avoid colonial conflicts. Hence, the 
U.S. sought to restrict the applicability of any U.S. commitment to a few 
specified nations especially vulnerable to communist aggression. Each of 
these two major U.S. qualifications — the proscriptions against land forces, 
and emphasis on anti- communism -- created its own dilemmas, solutions to which 
proved to be elusive. 

(l) Force Commitment 



The resource -- political as well as military -- the U.S. 
was prepared to commit to SEATO was bound to constitute its principal 
strength. But the U.S., with its NATO commitments already a sizeable bur- 
den, was not prepared to pay the price of a strong coalition. In no sense 
was the U.S. prepared to commit itself to SEATO as it had to MTO. (it 
is interesting that Dulles was so concerned with avoiding a public identi- 
i fication of SEATO with NATO that he tried to have the new treaty called 

"MANPAC," for "Manila Pact." 25/) Rather, the U.S. searched for ways in 
which other nations would, provide troops. But few nations in 195^ possessed 
the capability to field an army of significance within the SEATO region. 

■ 

Vice Admiral Davis noted that: 

"The United States was faced in this issue, I believe, with 
the dilemma of attempting to attain two objectives that were 
not completely compatible; on the one hand there was a desire to 
place the communists on notice as clearly as possible that further 
aggression on the area would, meet with effective collective counter- 
action. Such unequivocal notification would tend to enhance the 
psychological effect of the Treaty on the Free World and. the de- 
terrent effect on the communists. Yet on the other hand, in spite 
of the greater psychological effect that a strongly worded Treaty 
might have, the attainment of this objective was necessarily limited 
by the extent to which the United. States, in its own interest, 
could undertake advance military commitments under the Treaty in 
restriction of its freedom of action." 26/ 

"While the U.S. continued, to call the prospective pact 
. "regional," a region existed, only in the sense that a certain geographical 
• area was considered to be threatened, by the expansion of communism. The 
membership solicited for the SEATO conference was worldwide; potential 
force contributors were overbalanced, on the European side; and. even within 
the region itself, several countries did not desire to become participants, 
and others were not invited. Determined not to become enmeshed in South- 
east Asia without help from Europe, the U.S. settled for a SEATO based on 
unspecified, forces from eight nations, five of which were ethnically 
European -- a position which apparently dismissed from consideration the 
disadvantages which would accrue to armies drawn from former metropole 
nations. 



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Several of the states at Manila were acutely disappointed. 
at the reluctance of the U.S. to place its military forces at the disposal 
of the pact; they were expecting a NATO-like commitment and they were sur- 
prised when it was not forthcoming. Admiral Davis reported that: 



"With respect to the military aspects of the Treaty, most 
of the participating States , notably the Philippines and Thailand, 
urged provisions that would explicitly commit the Treaty Parties 
to take military action in event of aggression in the Treaty area. 
The commitment of the United States to such action, of course, 
was the purpose of these urgings. Much was said about the de- 
sirability of the NATO as opposed to the allegedly weaker ANZUS 
formula. Most of the participating States argued that explicit 
commitments to take action were necessary if the Treaty was to - 
have the desired, deterrent effect on the communists." 27/ 

But the U.S. delegates maintained their opposition, arguing that the U.S. 
had to retain its freedom of action, and could, not accept a treaty commit- 
ment that was inconsistent with Constitutional requirements, and. therefore 
prejudicial to ratification of the treaty by the Senate. 

I 

(2) Ant i- Communism 

At the beginning of the Manila Conference, the U.S. served 
notice that it looked on the future SEATO agreement as an ant i- communist 
pact, and. that it would, react only against a communist threat. The U.S. . 
agreed, to "consult" with the other members to decide future action, if 
faced, with a non-communist threat. This, of course, had the effect of 
emphasizing once again the qualified, nature of the U.S. commitment: the 
strongest power in the pact reserved the right to opt out of contingencies. 
Other nations present at Manila saw many other threats to regional peace, 
some of which seemed. to them a good, deal more dangerous than communism 
( e.g . Indonesian relations with Malaya, and. Indian relations with Pakistan). 
There was, as a result, some hesitance to look on the pact as a mutual band- 
ing together against all dangers. Few missed the irony of the U.S. being 
the chief advocate of the SEATO pact, and also its prime qualifier. 28/ 

2. The Treaties Compared. 

Although Secretary of State Dulles wished to avoid comparisons 
of SEATO with NATO, such were inevitable. Similarities were in fact intended. 
by many of the Manila Conferees, and. emerged, in the wording of the treaties. 
All the delegations at Manila, the U.S. included, took pains with treaty 
terminology, calculating carefully the effect it would have on their own 
domestic politics, as well as on the communist countries. As Admiral Davis 
reported: 

"The Treaty is a document that speaks to many audiences; 
it supports self-determination of peoples, self-government and. 
independence in deference to Asian nationalism; it provides for 
economic and. technical cooperation as an inducement to present 

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Asian 'neutralist 1 countries to associate themselves with the 

Treaty; it permits the accession of other states, thus avoiding 

the charge that the Treaty members form an exclusive club with 

aggressive designs 'against 1 other States; . . .These elements of 

the Treaty attest to the importance the member States place on 

the effect o^ the document upon their respective publics. . .The 

success that the Treaty may have in enhancing the defense of the 

area will therefore have to be judged in light of the fact that 

it has psychological and economic as well as military objectives." 29/ 

a. Introductory Articles Alike 

The initial article of both treaties is the same, word for 
word.* The member nations promise not to use force in any manner incon- 
sistent with the principles of the United Nations. Article 2 of NATO 
conforms to Article III of SEATO: an undertaking to strengthen free insti- 
tutions and promote economic progress, and is identical except for speci- 
fic mention in SEATO of technical assistance and promotion of social 
well-being, wording which is not in the NATO version. The reversal of- 
the order of presentation of the second and third articles is interest- 
ing. In NATO, the article committing the members to strengthen free in- 
stitutions precedes the article on developing collective capacity to 
resist attack. The order is changed in SEATO, perhaps emphasizing defense 
over other considerations. Article 3 of NATO corresponds to Article II 
of SEATO: an expression of resolve to develop a collective capacity to 
resist armed attack. There is, however, a significant difference in the 
SEATO article with the addition of a clause applying the Treaty specifically 
to subversion. This clause, in combination with the provision of SEATO 
Article IV that the parties shall consult immediately on measures of com- 
mon defense if threatened by other than armed attack, places subversive 
aggression, in the form of externally fomented or supported insurgency, 
or coup d * etat , within the purview of the treaty. 

b. The Key Articles 

Central to analysis of the two treaties is comparison of the 
articles calling for action to meet an enemy threat. These are Articles 
k and 5 of the NATO Treaty, and Article IV of the SEATO Treaty. In general, 
the SEATO article has come under heavy criticism for lack of forcefulness. 
As presented below, the SEATO article has been transposed to parallel 
the two articles of NATO, but no words have been added or deleted. 



NATO Art, k & 5 

The Parties will consult together 
whenever, in the opinion of any of 
them, the territorial integrity, 



SEATO Art. IV 

If, in the opinion of any of the 
parties, the inviolability or 
the integrity of the territory or 



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nato Art, k & 3 

political independence or security 
of any of the Parties is threatened. 



The Parties agree that 
an armed, attack 



against one or more of them 



in Europe or North America 

shall be considered, an attack 
against them all 

and. consequently they agree that 

if such an armed, attack occurs , 
each of them 

in exercise of the right of in- 
dividual or collective self- 
defense recognized., by Article 
51 of the Charter of the United. 
Nations 



SEATO Art. IV 

the sovereignty or political in- 
dependence of any Party in the 
Treaty Area or of any other State 
or territory to shich the provi- 
sions of paragraph 1 of this Arti- 
cle from time to time apply is 
threatened, in any way other than 
by armed, attack or is affected, or 
threatened, by any fact or situation 
which might endanger the pea.ce of 
the area, the Parties shall con- 
sult immediately in order to agree 
on the measures which should, be 
taken for the common defense. 

• 

Each Party recognizes that aggres- 
sion by means of armed, attack 

against any of the Parties or 
against any state or territory 
which the Parties by unanimous 
agreement may hereafter designate 

In the Treaty area 

would, endanger its own peace and. 
safety 



and. agrees that 



it will in that event 



will assist the party or 
parties so attacked, by taking 
forthwith, individually and. in 
concert with the other parties 

such action as it d.eems neces- 
sary, including the use of 
armed force. 

to restore and. maintain the 

security of the North Atlantic 
Area. 



act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional 
processes 



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NATO Art, k 8c 3 

any such armed attack and all mea- 
sures taken as a result thereof 
shall immediately be reported to 
the Security Council. 

Such measures shall be terminated 
when the Security Council has 
taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international 
peace and security. 



SEATO Art . IV 

measures under this paragraph shall 
be immediately reported to the 
Security Council of the United 
Nations 



It is understood that no action 
on the territory of any state 
designated by unanimous agreement 
under paragraph 1 of this article 
or on any territory so desig- 
nated shall be taken except at the 
invitation or with the consent 
of the government concerned. 



As the American delegation at Manila noted, the SEATO Article IV was in 
line with the wording used in the U.S., Philippine, Korean, and ANZUS pacts. 
The issue of pre commitment to react to armed, attack was side-stepped: 

"Secretary Dulles pointed out during the conference that the 
wording of the North Atlantic Treaty, which speaks of an attack 
on one as an attack on all, nevertheless provides that the Parties 
will act in accordance with their constitutional processes. He 
persuaded, the Conference that the final agreed wording of Arti- 
cle IV would be better received by the Senate, should tend, to 
minimize d.ebate, and. would, facilitate ratification by the United 
States." 30/ 

The SEATO Treaty wording is thus intentionally ambiguous on the point of 
just what response would be made by the members in the event of an armed 
attack. Such an attack against one of the SEATO members would be viewed, 
as a "common danger" rather than as an "attack on all." Where the NATO 
Treaty notes that action taken "forthwith" might includ.e the "use of armed 
force," the SEATO Treaty states merely that "common danger" would, be "met" 
in accordance with "constitutional processes." SEATO also, makes the provision 
that no action shall be taken on the territory of any threatened state with- 
out the consent of that state, a qualification necessary to reassure small- 
country members that their independence was not threatened by neocolonialism 
or other domination, and. recognition of one of the most significant differ- 
ences in the environment of the two treaty organizations. 

In some respects, nevertheless, Article IV of the SEATO Treaty 
is broader than its NATO counterparts. The nature of the threat is loosely 



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defined, as "any fact or situation that might endanger the peace of the area/' 
and provision is made to respond to threatened, countries that are non-members 
of the pact. In addition, there is no clause implying dependence on the 
Security Council of the UN to step in to "restore and. maintain international 
peace and security," as there is in the NATO Treaty. Yet, the main point 
evident is that both the wording of NATO and that of SEATO provid.e the 
basis for a strong defensive strategy or, indeed., would, admit of a weak 
one. There is enough room for interpretation under the SEATO Treaty for 
membersto devise all the defensive protection that NATO offers, and more. 

c. Extent of the Treaty Areas 

NATO Article 6 is the equivalent of SEATO Article VIII, dealing 
with definition of the treaty area. Both are broad, but the SEATO article 
is the more flexible of the two. In SEATO the area is limited, on the 
north at latitude 21 degrees, 30 minutes, thus eliminating Formosa, Hong 
Kong, Korea, and Japan. The rest of the area is defined only as "the 
general area of South-East Asia" and. "the general area of the South-West 
Pacific." The area, the treaty notes, can be modified at any time by 
unanimous agreement. The phrase that permitted inclusion of "the entire 
territories of the Asian parties" was noted by the U.S. delegation as 
having the advantage of bringing in West Pakistan "under the protection 
of the Treaty even though it is not in Southeast Asia." 31/ 



&. UN and Other Pacts 

Except for a change in two or three unimportant words, NATO 
7 and 8 are summed, up and. repeated in SEATO VTj these articles declare 
that agreements between SEATO members and. the UN, or by members with other 
countries are not, nor will be, in conflict with SEATO responsibilities. 



o- 



e. Treaty Institutions 

NATO 9 and SEATO V establish a council for military and other 
planning. In the NATO Treaty this council is authorized to set up "sub- 
sidiary bodies," while in the SEATO Treaty such authorization is not given 
This was a disappointment to several of the delegations at the Manila 
Conference. The Australians came forward, with a request for a strong 
organization, but the U.S. delegation was able to persuad.e them to accept 
a modification of their proposal, substituting a concept of "consultation" 

"During the sessions of the Working Group it became evid.ent 
that some countries would, propose wording calling for the establish- 
ment of military machinery, possibly along NATO lines. Recalling 
the position of ^/the U.S. State/ Department that military partici- 
pation should be consultative along lines of the ANZUS arrangement 
rather than permanent and formal as in NATO, the Defense Representa- 
tive. . .proposed that consideration be given to the inclusion of 
the following wording after the first sentence of Article IV: , 
'To this end the Parties to the Treaty will consult with regard 



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to military planning as required by the situation in the area. T 
Shortly thereafter the Australian delegation proposed the follow- 
ing addition to Article V: T The Council shall set up such sub- 
sidiary machinery as may be necessary to achieve the military 
and other objectives of the Treaty. ' Since the Australian proposal 
involved an open ended commitment, this Department and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff opposed it and accepted the wording suggested by 
the Defense Representative. The Department of State agreed, and 
instructed the U.S. Delegation to support incorporation of this 
wording in Article IV." 32/ 

Secretary Dulles was able to bring about deletion of the references to 
periodic or regular consultation that had been introduced into the draft 
treaty. 

f . Treaty Longevity 

The final NATO articles (ll-lU) are administrative, covering 
ratification of the treaty, the length of time it is to remain in force, 
provisions for review of the articles, and archival responsibilities . 
These are paralleled in SEATO articles IX -XI. The NATO Treaty provides 
for withdrawal of its members after 19&9; members are to give a year's 
notice prior to such action „ The SEATO Treaty is to remain in force in- 
definitely, but members also may withdraw on one year's notice. 

g. The Appended U S. "Understanding" 

Throughout the discussions at Manila the U.S. insisted that 
the focus of the pact be on the prevention of further communist expansion 
in the treaty area. When the other nations would not acquiesce to a word- 
ing of the treaty to make anti-communism its specific objective, the U.S. 
requested that an "understanding" be appended to the treaty. This was a 
U.S. unilateral statement of intent — a qualifier upon the first paragraph 
of Article IV., in which the members agreedthat in the event of aggression 
they will "act to meet the common danger in accordance with constitutional 
processes." The U.S. in the understanding restricts the applicability of 
its agreement to act, stating that only communist aggression will be recog- 
nized as warranting immediate response. In the event of other kinds of 
aggression, the U.S. would consult with the other member nations Admiral 
Davis reported disagreement over this point at the conference: 

"All participating States except the United States supported 
exclusion of the word 'Communist T from the Treaty. The U.S. draft 
originally referred to 'Communist aggression' in the preamble and 
in Article IV. The chief reason advanced by the other signatories 
for the deletion was the desire of most of the Parties that the 
Treaty cover any kind of aggression in the area. Pakistan, for 
example, wished that the Treaty would apply to possible aggression 
by India. The United States position was that the United States 
could not properly say that any aggression in Southeast Asia would 
endanger its own peace and safety, and that it could accept the 



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obligations of Article IV only in respect to Communist aggression. 
For this reason, the United States attached an 'understanding' 
to the Treaty in this sense. All other participants accepted the 
Treaty with the U.S. 'understanding. ! " 33/ 

In the "understanding" the U.S. further complicated the matter by changing 
"aggression by means of armed attack" of Article IV to "aggression and armed 
attack" y in the same sentence, the understanding uses "aggression or armed 
attack" to refer to paragraph 2 of Article IV, which in fact is worded 
"threatened in any way other than by armed attack." The admixture of terms 
accentuates one of the major difficulties of the alliance: the governments 
of the SEATO treaty area were threatened by a complicated variety of destruc 
tive movements that might be called aggression against a member state. 
The appellation could be fitted in anywhere between "armed attack" and 
"fact or situation which might endanger the peace." The U.S. insistence on 
this point of "understanding" was probably superfluous. The latitude that 
the U.S. wanted already was built into the treaty, in Article IV. The 
emphatic nature of such an appendix to the treaty may have been calculated 
as a way to call the attention of the world to a powerful U.S. stand against 
further encroachments of communism. Such a call would have been consistent 
with the U.S. feeling of a necessity to re-establish a psychological posi- 
tion in the face of the "defeats" of Geneva. Nevertheless, the confirma- 
tion of U.S. single-mindedness that made a communist threat the only valid 
call for immediate response narrowed SEATO at its inception. 

■ 

h. The Vietna.m-Laos -Cambodia Protocol 

. 
j * The final item of the SEATO Treaty is a "protocol," which 

states unanimous agreement among the members to include Cambodia, Laos, 
and "the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam" 
under the protection of Articles III and IV of the Treaty. In other words, 
these countries, without actually becoming members of the pact, would be 
entitled to "economic measures including technical assistance" and also 
to defense against any attack, overt or not, from without or within. The 
U.S. had wanted to include these countries in SEATO, but membership might 
have seemed legally a contravention of the Geneva Agreements. At Geneva, 
Laos had not signed any agreement prejudicial to such a pact, but the 
Laotian Government, on the final day of that conference, had made the 
following declaration: 



"The Royal Government of Laos will never join in any agree- 
ment with other states if this agreement includes the obligation 
for the Royal Government of Laos to participate in a military 
alliance not in conformity with the principles of the United 
Nations or with the principles of the ^Geneva/* Agreement on 
the Cessation of Hostilities..." 3V 



South Vietnam, on the other hand, was coextensive with one of the zones 
described in Article 19 of the armistice, which specifies: 

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"The two Parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to 
them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for 
the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy." 35> 



France — one of the "Parties" to the armistice — was thus not in a posi- 
tion to admit the GVN to SEATO. However, nothing in the Geneva Accords 
appeared to exclude 9,11 three countries from being extended protection 
under such a pact without member status. 36/ This was pointed out by the 
French delegation: 

"At French suggestion specific reference to Cambodia, Laos, 
and Vietnam was removed from the text of the Treaty, but these 
States are covered by the provisions of the Treaty in a separate 
protocol. . .The French felt that this method of extending the 
application of the Treaty to the Associated States was less 
likely to be construed as a violation of the spirit of the Geneva 
Agreements." 37/ 



wrote : 



At the conclusion of' the Manila Conference, Admiral Davis 






"I believe the Manila Conference accomplished the objec- 
tive expected of it from the United States point of view. In 
my judgment our Defense representation in the U.S. Delegation 
succeeded in its efforts to insure that the Treaty is consistent 
in its military implications with the positions taken by the 
-Joint Chiefs of Staff and by this Department." 38/ 

The U.S. had, in effect, made a public statement of its intent to counter 
further communist moves in SEA, but left vague the specifics of its response 
The pact, as intended, was fundamentally "consultative." There was to be 
no unified command, no bases, and no contribution of forces to a standing 
group; the U.S. accepted these lacks, and stressed the psychological gains 
of merely bringing a treaty into existence, pointing out that SEATO opened 
the way to a stronger and more all- encompassing defense of Southeast Asia 
than had theretofore been possible. 



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3. Evolution of the Treaty Organization 

a. NATO Develops Rapidly 

NATO rapidly acquired institutions.* The treaty entered 
into force in August , 19^9- By September, a Military Committee, a . 
Standing Group, and the Regional Planning Groups had been created. By 
November a Financial and Economic Board and a Military Production and 
Supply Board had been set up. By December agreement had been reached 
on a strategic concept for the integrated defense of the NATO area. 
A year later a centralized command and control structure was formulated, 
becoming operational as SHAPE on 2 April 1951; with headquarters in the 
old Hotel Astoria, in Paris. Spurred on by the events occurring in 
Korea, NATO was further simplified and streamlined in the Ottawa meeting 
of September 1951; where a Temporary Council Committee chaired by 
W. Averell Harriman was set up. This became a permanent council, in 
March, 1952, a month after the accession of Greece and Turkey to the 
pact. 39/ I n the wake of a major setback when the French Assembly 
refused to ratify the European Defense Community (EDC) proposal in 
August, 195^; the Paris Agreements were pushed through in October, 
providing for the accession of West Germany to NATO, and the establish- 
ment of a combined field command.** Early in 1956 the NATO Council 
appointed a Committee of Three Ministers (Mart in o of Italy, Lange of 
Norway, and Pearson of Canada) to study ways that further cooperation 
could be achieved within NATO. The report of this Committee was approved 
by the Council on 1^ December, 1956. Consultation within NATO was to 
become "an integral part of the making of national policy." ko/ The 
meeting of 16-19 December 1957 of the NATO Council included the heads of 
government, with Eisenhower and Macmillan participating. This meeting 
symbolized the significance which all the NATO countries attached to the 
pact -- and it was this sense of meaningfulness, commonality, and neces- 
sity, more than the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, that accounted 
for the rapid organizational growth. 



b. SEATO Unstructured by U.S. Preference 

The Manila Conference eventuated in a pact termed the 
"Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol Thereto, Septem- 
ber 8, 195^"; the treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 
82 to 1, and entered into force on February 19, 1955- *+l / The history 
of the development of SEATO thereafter is quite different from NAT0 T s, 
since the initial policy of the U.S. was to discourage, rather than to 
assist, the evolution of a permanent structure. SEATO military staff 



* Appendix B, Organizational Charts 
** In the same month — October, 195^ ™ the Warsaw Pact came into being 



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i 









i 



I 



i 



. 









consultations were held frequently, but were attended by relatively 
low-ranking U.S. officers, carefully instructed on limits of their 
planning flexibility. At the SEATO conference in Bangkok in February 
1955; "the U.S. position on military arrangements under the pact was 
to avoid discussion of permanent formal organization. A Defense Depart' 
ment memorandum on the U.S. stance again recommended that the ANZUS 
pact be used as a model: 

"The U.S. desires to make no commitments of U.S. forces 
for use under the Manila pact. (This view has not been con- 
veyed to the other powers . ) 

"With regard to military machinery for the coordination 
of measures to combat overt aggression, the U.S. is opposed 
to the establishment of formal military machinery or of a 
permanent SEATO staff. Instead, the U.S. supports the estab- 
lishment of military advisors, who would meet periodically, 
formulate their own rules of procedure and any necessary 
organizational arrangements, designate planning assistants to 
work on specified projects, and insure that military planning 
activities are coordinated with those designed to counter sub- 
versive activities. 

"While not explicitly so stated, the U.S. position is one 
of confining its activities and commitments to the scope of 
those made under the ANZUS Pact. Such apparent concessions 
to the other powers as have been made in the Working Group 
papers do not alter the fact that the U.S. is unwilling to 
commit any forces to the defense of Southeast Asia , opposes * . 
any military organizational arrangement which would require 
the integration of U.S. and allied war plans, and prefers to 
deal with its allies bilaterally rather than mult ilat era lly. " 
k2/ /inphasis added/ 

The U.S., although it refused to become deeply committed 
in advance to a military organization styled along NATO lines, was 
well aware of the necessity to be prepared to fight in the SEATO area. 
U.S. unilateral plans and preparations had been set in motion when, in 
January, 1955; the Secretary of Defense requested the JCS to provide 
"a concept of the possible application of U.S. military power in the 
implementation of Article IV of the Manila Pact" under two different 
assumptions: (l) prohibition of nuclear weapons; (2) permission to 
employ nuclear weapons. Requirements were established for: 

"l. Broad outline plans for U.S. action... to deter 
or counter overt aggression by Communist China or, where 
applicable, by Viet Minh, against each of the Southeast 
Asian nations which are parties to the Manila Pact or 
against the free areas of Indochina which might be covered 
by the Pact. ^Emphasis added/ 






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"2. ...a statement as to the readiness capability of U.S. 
armed forces, in the next few years, to conduct operations in 
implementation of Article IV, 1, of the Manila Pact." k'j/ 

The U.S. forces vould constitute a "mobile reserve" ready for commit- 
ment to the treaty area, but the U.S. would enter no fixed agreement 
as to what those forces might be, or under what circumstances they 
would be used. Despite this unilateral planning, however, instructions 
for the delegates to the Bangkok conference indicated that planning for 
or creation of combined commands were not to be considered within the 
•scope of the SEATO Pact. Suppression of guerrillas was to be handled 
by "indigenous forces only" unless these proved incapable of coping 
with the problem. 

- 

At the 1955 Bangkok Conference the Australians and New 
Zealanders repeated their willingness to make troop commitments to a 
SEATO force, but the U.S. representatives, following instructions, 
evaded discussion of the subject, kk/ The pressures on the U.S. team 
were strong, and the members came away with the conviction that the 
major factor "to contend with" in future meetings was bound to be 

"...the obvious desire of the Asian nations to establish 
a NATO-type S'EATO organization with everything that it implies 
in the nature of force commitments." h^ / 

Later in 1955* U.S. planners once more were approached by 
counterparts of several other countries with the proposal that, as a 
step toward some kind of SEATO standing group, a small secretariat be 
set up to study methods of creating a "possible future organizational 
structure." The report of the U.S. representatives stated, "The 
establishment of such an ad hoc arrangement should not prejudice the 
eventual creation or evolution of a standing group. . .should the need 
become necessary because of inadequacies revealed by experience." kS/ 
The JCS commented: 

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objection to the 
establishment of a small permanent secretariat, which would 
be an instrument of the Military Advisers and subordinate 
planning committees. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
would not agree to the possible evolution of such a secre- 
tariat into an organization of a standing nature...." h'j/ 

This was the same point of view expressed by CINCPAC, who noted with 
apparent relief that: 

"The recognition of the requirement for a small permanent 
secretariat has definitely forestalled for the foreseeable 
future any determined insistence for either a permanent staff 
planners organization, a standing group, or a combined staff." hQ/ 



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The U.S. members attending the SEATO Military Staff 
Planners Conference in Pearl Harbor in November , 1955 ? received 
basically the same instructions as had been given to earlier planners: 

• • 

(1) No acceptance of a permanent "standing group" staff 
organization. 

(2) No U.S. participation in the development of combined 
plans . 

(3) No commitment of U.S. forces. k$/ 

A demonstration by the U.S. 25th Infantry Division was considered quite 
impressive by the conference delegates , but did not assuage the appetite 
among other SEATO nations for strong, concrete U.S. force commitments. 
The chief U.S. delegate, Rear Admiral A. P. Storrs, recommended to his 
superiors that the U.S. add "substance" to SEATO by: 

(1) Accepting the concept of a permanent staff organization. 

(2) Accepting the concept of combined planning. 

(3) Maintaining a U.S. division in the Central Pacific. 50/ 

Storrs felt that these actions might satisfy the rest of the SEATO 
nations and quiet their demands for a permanent U.S. force commitment, 
but he focused on a fading issue. While some SEATO members, especially 
Australia and New Zealand, kept up an insistence on a stronger organiza- 
tion for the pact, others began to show less and less interest in SEATO 
per se. By the end of 1955, the U.S. realized that SEATO would fall 
apart unless something were done to provide a permanent structure. Admit- 
ting that the Asian countries were "losing faith" in SEATO, the State 
Department decided to reexamine the U.S. position pertaining to a perma- 
nent staff organization for the SEATO Council. 51/ A decision for a 
permanent body of staff planners was taken at a meeting of SEATO Mili- 
tary Advisers in Karachi in March, 1956. 52/ The advisers agreed on a 
staff organization headed by a chief of staff with flag rank. Bangkok 
was selected as the site for SEATO headquarters. 

At the ninth conference of SEATO Military Advisers, in 
February 1959> it was agreed that a series of outline plans for the 
"introduction of a SEATO force into threatened areas" would be prepared. 53, 
The plans would be based on the assumption that the initial requirement 
would be for one Irigade group or regimental conbat team with appropriate 
naval support. Discussion of a command structure to implement these plans 
was postponed to a later meeting, over the objections of the Pakistani 
delegate, who insisted that the time for action was "now": 



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tu 



Until a command structure, even if only in skeleton form, 
for SEATO forces has been evolved, SEATO is not in a position, 
collectively, to operate instantaneously. . . .A study on command • 
structure should be started now." 5k/ 

At the following meeting, in September 1959; a SEATO command was estab- 
lished in embryo when the U.S. agreed to the reorganization of the' 
Military Planning Office into a configuration that could be assimilated 
by the planning staff of a permanent SEATO headquarters along the lines 
of SHAPE. 55/* By the twelfth SEATO Military Advisers Conference in 
Washington in May i960, Secretary of Defense Gates was able to make 
the public announcement that SEATO had advanced significantly in organ- 
ization and planning: 

"National forces of the Southeast Asia countries, backed 
by powerful mobile forces, contribute to the deterrent.... 
Coordinated SEATO military plans have been prepared and are 
capable of rapid execution to parry any likely Communist threat... 
SEATO exercises have progressed from simple observer type to. . . 
sophisticated maneuvers. ..." 56/ 



c. SEATO Contingency Planning 

During the winter of 1959~1960 a series of plans was pre- 
pared for contingencies throughout the SEATO area. By the spring of 
I96I these SEATO plans, numbered 1 through 6, came under consideration 
in the first "invoking" of the SEATO Treaty, when the Pathet Lao forces 
threatened to overrun Laos and invade Thailand. 57/ From the U.S. 
point of view, the SEATO plans were derivatives of U.S. unilateral plans 
for Southeast Asia covering "action up to and including action with 
Communist China." The then current U.S. master plan, PACOM Operations 
Plan 3^-59; served as the basis for U.S. contributions to the SEATO 
Plans. 58/ 

The U.S. led the way in preparation of a series of six 
contingency plans for the treaty area . By the fall of 1961 some of 
these plans had been approved and others were under discussion at 
Bangkok. 59/ Of these plans, at least three were concerned with the 
SEATO Protocol states of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Plan $1 provided 
for the defense of Southeast Asia, including Pakistan, against attack 
by forces of Communist China and the DRV. The general concept was: 

(l) "To launch air and naval attacks; local forces to 
delay the enemy's advance as feasible while rapidly reinforcing. 



with external SEATO forces. 



TT 



(2) "To establish ground defenses in order to hold the 
enemy forward of vital areas in South Vietnam, Thailand and 
East Pakistan, and to build up forces behind them while con- 
ducting air and naval offensive against enemy forces, base 
areas, L0C T s and war-making capacity." 



*See Appendix B for present organization. 

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(3) "After appropriate build-up, to launch a counter offen- 
sive, including a major amphibious assault on North Vietnam, to 
inflict a decisive defeat on enemy military forces and at the 
same time liberate occupied territory." 60/ 

Plan 5 provided U.S. troops to release the Royal Laotion forces for 
offensive operations and to assist them "to regain areas lost." The 
U.S. would also provide "additional military and logistic support." 
This was a fully developed and approved plan, for which "the Field Force 
Commander T s plan is complete." 6l/ Plan 6 provided for the defense of 
the protocol states against attack by forces of the DRV. The general 
concept was: 

(1) "To hold the enemy as far forward as possible and to 
provide defense in depth, securing main ports of entry and 

bases for build-up and deployment of forces for counter-offensive." 

(2) "To destroy the enemy's forces, L0C T s and capacity to 
wage war through an intensive interdiction program conducted by 
SEATO air and naval forces supported by such air and naval forces 
under national command as are made available." 

(3) "While maintaining the defense, forces for the counter- 
offensive phase will be assembled and built up. When appropriate, 
a general offensive to include a major amphibious assault against 
North Vietnam will be mounted to inflict a decisive defeat on the 
enemy military forces and to liberate the territory overrun by 

. the DRV." 62/ 

U.S. ground force commitment to the plans was a corps consisting of 
three infantry divisions plus a Marine Expeditionary Force of one division 
Air support was a tactical bomber squadron, two tactical fighter squad- 
rons, and a Marine air wing. Anticipated support of the plans by other 
SEATO countries is evident in available ground force troop lists for 
plans k and 6: 63/ 






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TOTAL GROUND FORCES 



- 






\ 








Plan h (SEA.) 


Div 


RCT 


Bn 


3 


k 




1 


1 




1 






1 






1 










1 
1 


h 


1 




ll 


6 


2 


15 


8 




k 


1-1/3 





Plan 6 (VN-L-C) 
Div RCT/BDE Bn 



3 

1 



1 

1 
1 







1 






1 


k 


1 


3 


9 


5 


5. 


12* 


7* 


5* 



NATION 

Thailand 
Pakistan 
United Kingdom 
Australia 
New Zealand 
France 
Philippines 
South Vietnam 

Total Non-U. S. 

CINCPAC Est. Rqmt 

Shortage 



(l) Laos Planning 

A modification of Plan #5 existed under the temporary 
title of "Plan 5-plus, " drafted by the JCS in September 196I as a pro- . 
posed contingency plan for intervention in Laos. In this concept, 
25,400 troops would be sent into Laos. The force would consist of the 
following: 64/ 

Support and Reserves 

11, 000 

3, 300 

3,500 

4,700 
200 . 



Country 


In Laos 


U.S. 


5,500 


Thailand ■ 


11, 400 


Commonwealth 


4,400 


(UK, Australia, KZ) 




Pakistan 


1,400 


Philippines 




GVN 


2.700 



These troops would augment the Royal Laos forces of 38,500 in the Regu- 
lar Army, 11,000 Meos, and 29,800 other defense forces. In this modifica 
tion of Plan 5, it was assumed that the Royal Laotian Government would 
appeal to SEAT0 for assistance. This would initiate an airlift of SEAT0 
forces into key points along the Mekong River at Vientiane, Paksane, 
Thakkek, Savannakhet, and Pakse. These forces would support the Royal 
Laotian troops against communist forces in the areas of northern Laos 
bordering on Thailand and from all of the Laotian panhandle. At the 
same time, Thai forces would operate around Luang Prabang and GY^ troops 
would operate along the GVN- Laos border. 




* Includes a two division reserve held outside the theater of operations 
and two RCT-size airborne units held in SVN. 



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(2) Vietnam Planning 

The JCS, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense 
on 5 October, 196lj noted that although recommendations had been for- 
warded on the subject of intervention in Southeast Asia, nothing had 
been done. "The time is past/' they stated, "when action short of inter- 
vention could reverse the rapidly worsening situation." The JCS con- 
sidered that "the execution of SEATO Plan 5j or a suitable variation 
• ' thereof" was the "military minimum commensurate with the situation." 66/ 

Defense replied on the same day, requesting JCS analysis of two concepts 
for SEATO intervention in Vietnam: 

"There appear to be two principal military possibilities. 
One would involve the use of SEATO forces at the greatest 
possible number of entry points along the whole of the South 

; . Vietnamese border, probably excluding that part of the 17th 

parallel now held in force by the Vietnamese Army itself. An 
alternative possibility would be the use of SEATO forces to 

i cover solely the 17th parallel itself, which includes some 

major infiltration routes, and thus to free the Vietnamese forces 
now stationed there for engagement against the Viet Cong. Under 
either possibility, planning should envisage maximum possible use 
of the SEATO forces to establish effective communications in as 
wide an area of Viet-Nam as possible, and to serve as a means 
for introducing new techniques into the Vietnamese forces them- 
selves. The forces would, of course, be entitled to take all 
necessary action for their own security, but would not (unless 
the concept were later expanded) engage in offensive operations 
against the Viet Cong that were not strictly necessary to their 
own security. Your military recommendations for the refinement 
of these guidelines into more precise rules of engagement should 
be a part of your response." 67/ 

The JCS reply, on 9 October 1961, noted that the use of SEATO troops 
all along the border was "not. feasible" because the VC could bypass such 
forces or attack them piecemeal. Further, the concept of use of SEATO 
troops at the 17th parallel was "feasible. .. .but militarily unsound" 
because the area was not the VC main avenue of approach, and also because 
the move could easily be interpreted as aggression against the DRV. The 
JCS recommended, instead, that : 

"...the over-all objective could best be served by the 
implementation of SEATO Plan 5/6l or a variation thereof, 
now." 68/ 



If this action could not be taken, the JCS continued, then the U.S. could 
[ "provide a degree of assistance" to the GW and could "free certain South 

Vietnamese forces for offensive actions against the Viet Cong." No 
action was taken to implement the SEATO plan. 

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(3) Thailand Planning 

In May 1962 when the Pathet Lao threat against 
Thailand became acute, a U S. battle group was dispatched on joint 
training exercises within the country. President Kennedy announced 
that more UcS. troops would be sent, and by 15 May a second contin- 
gent landed. On the same day, newspapers reported that the U S. was 
seeking SEATO help, and that W. Averell Harriman, then Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, had "outlined the U.S. 
position in separate conferences with envoys of Australia, New Zeland, 
Pakistan, and the Philippines." 69/ Within two days, all the SEATO 
members except France had agreed to send help if necessary. The U.S. 
sent l+,000 troops into Thailand. Three other SEATO nations actually 
put forces (albeit token forces) into Thailand. The UK sent 10 Hunter 
jet-fighters, Australia sent a jet squadron, and New Zealand sent 100 
parachute troops and three transport aircraft. The Philippines and 
Pakistan publicly noted that they were standing by to help. 

(k) The Future 

Discussions on the best method under SEATO to "meet 
the common danger" in Vietnam have not produced an overall agreement, 
and three of the eight SEATO nations — the UK, France, and Pakistan — 
have not responded to Vietnam's invitation to commit troops there. Of 
the five SEATO nations now fighting in Vietnam, the strength figures as 
of 17 October 1967 were: 






U.S. 


^69,000 


Australia 


6,500 


Thailand 


2,500 


Philippines 


2,000 


New Zealand 


Soo 


Total 


4fcS0,400 



70/ 

One non-member of SEATO, the Republic of Korea, was contributing ^-8,000 
troops to the fighting as of that date, raising the Free World Forces 
total to 528,^00. France, in view of past policies, could not be expected 
to make a contribution; the amount of SEATO "unity" displayed by French 
participation would be offset by other obvious considerations. Pakistani 
assistance might be welcomed as a gesture of support for SEATO. But the 
major shortfall to date in SEATO has been the British decision that it is 
unable to participate militarily in Vietnam. 

With all its weaknesses, the majority of the SEATO pact 
nations have actually collaborated in regional defense in the Vietnam war. 
In fact, given the range of disparity among the members, it is a source 
of wonder that support of SEATO nations for Vietnam has been as strong 
as it has been. The conflict in Vietnam is a crucible for SEATO; the 
future of the alliance will be profoundly affected by the outcome of the 
war. 






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IV. Ac 1. FOOTNOTES 

1. Winston Churchill 9 "Alliance of English-Speaking People/ 1 Vital 

[ Speeches of the Day , Vol. 12 (March 15, 1946). Speech was delivered 

! in Fulton, Missouri. . : 

2. By "X," "The Sources of Soviet Conduct/ 1 Foreign Affairs , Vol. 25 
(July, I9V7), 566-82. 

3o U.S. Department of State Bulletin , Vol. l6 (March 23, 19^7) 3 536. 

4. Ibid ., (June 15/19I+7), 1159-1160. 

5° Committee of European Economic Cooperation, General Report , Vol. 1 
(U.S. Department of State Publication 2930, 1947), 13. 

• • 

6. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 446. H. C. DEB 5 S Col. 396-397 
(January 22, 1948) . 

7. U.S. Department of State Bulletin , Vol. 18 (March 28, 19^+8) , 4l9. 

8. John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (1950), 95-96. 
(_ 9. Congressional Record , Vol. 9*4, Part VI, 80th Congress, 2d Session, 7791. 

10. North Atlantic Treaty, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 8lst Congress, 1st Session, Part I, 237. 

11. Charles Wolf, Jr., Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, i960) , 40-52. 

12. Ibid ., 53~5 1 + 
13- Documents on American Foreign Relations , 1949 3 626. 

14. U.S. Congress, Hearings on Executive K , 83d Congress, 2d Session, 
Part I (November 11, 1954). 

15. NSC 48/2, 30 Dec 19^9 (TOP SECRET) favors a regional association of 
non-Communist states in Southeast Asia, in which the U.S. "should 
not take an active part in early stages." 

NSC 48/3 ? 26 Apr 1951 (TOP SECRET) recommends that the U.S. "consider 
the desira.bil.ity of security arrangements with other countries of 
Asia, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis." A NSC progress 
report (5 Aug 1953) on NSC 124/2 states that the U.S. will continue 
to maintain the position that regional defense pacts should be initi- 
ated by countries in the region. Cf., also note 23, below. 



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16. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings to Amend the ECA Act of 19^8 as 
Amended, 1950, Part I, 33-35- 

17. Report of NSC 192d meeting, 6 Apr I95U (TOP SECRET), 3. 

18. NSC 5^05-2, Bonesteel Memorandum, NSC Policy Board (TOP SECRET), 
May 13, 195^. 

19. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings on East-West Trade Before the Sub - 
Committee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, 83d Congress, 2d Session (GPO, 195*0 , 292-293<> 

20. Memorandum by Merchant (EUR) of conversation between Ambassadors 
Makin and Smith (u) , and between Makin and Dulles, 18 Apr 195^ 
(SECRET); Tel DULTE 3, 22 Apr 195^ from Paris (TOP SECRET). Re- 
ported in State Department Research Project 370, 21-22. 

21. NSC 5^05-2, Bonesteel Memorandum, NSC Policy Board (TOP SECRET), . 
May 13, 195^. 

22. Robert Cutler, in a White House Memorandum of May 7, 195U (TOP SECRET), 
calls the 5 -power Staff Agency a "white man's party," Cf., NSC File 
No. 5^05- 

23. NSC 5^05-2, Policy Planning Board files, April, May, June (TOP SECRET), 
Paragraph 17 of NSC 5^05 (TOP SECRET) states: "Take measures to pro- 
mote the coordinated defense of Southeast Asia, recognizing that the 
initiative in regional defense measures must come from the governments 
of the area." ISA Memorandum, Wade to Bonesteel, 13 Apr 195U (TOP 
SECRET) comments on this paragraph: "in view of what we are now try- 
ing to do toward organizing a regional group^ the initiative is ob- 
viously with us." 

2k. Memorandum to SecDef, "Report on the Manila Conference" (SECRET), 
ik Sep 195^> p. 1 (hereafter referred to as "Manila Report"). 

25- John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles (New York: Harper, 1957) , 222; re- 
ported in Roscoe Robinson, SEATO: An Appraisal (University of 
Pittsburgh Marter T s Thesis, 196U) . Cf., also Hearings, 83d Congress, 
2d Session, Part I, 195 1 4- . 

26. Memorandum to SecDef, "Report on the Manila Conference" (SECRET), 

Ik Sep 195U, 3; A.S.B. Olver, SEATO: The Manila Treaty and Western 
Policy in Southeast Asia . (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1956) , p. 12. 



_y 



27. Manila Report (SECRET), 2. 

28. . New York Times , September 8, 195^ 



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29. Manila Report (SECRET), 1. 

30. Ibid ,, 3. 

31. Ibid . 3 k. 

32. Ibid ., 3.-; TOSEC 25 (Sep 3, 5*0 

33. Ibid ., k. 

3U. Memorandum to SecDef from Herman Phleger, Subject: "Geneva Armistice 
Agreement Restrictions on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam," dated 
July 27, 195I+ (SECRET). 

35 • U.S. Congress, "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, 
July 20, 195^-5" in Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia 
and Vietnam (Committee Print, 89th Congress, 2d Session), 43. 

36. Phleger, op. cit ., (SECRET), 5- 

37. Manila Report (SECRET), k. 

38. Ibid., (SECRET), 5. 

39. Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years . (Utrecht: Bosch, 1952) passim . 

kO. NATO Information Service, The NATO Handbook . (Utrecht: Bosch, 1963) , 62 

hi* U.S. Congress, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and 
Vietnam , op. cit ., 70-7^ • 

k2. DoD (ISA) Memorandum, Subject: "Analysis of Possible Implications of 

the Bangkok Conference," January 31, 1955 (TOP SECRET), File #71325 in 
NSC 5^05-2, 3. 

1*3 • SecDef Memorandum for JCS, Subject: "Concept and Plans for the Imple- 
mentation, if Necessary, of Article IV, 1, of the Manila Pact," dated 
January 6, 1955 (TOP SECRET) . 

Memorandum, Subject: "Department of Defense Contribution to and 
Participation in the Bangkok Conference," dated March 29, 1955 
(TOP SECRET) . 

45. Ibid., (TOP SECRET) 

k6. JCS Memorandum CM-171-55, Subject: "Summary of Report of Military Staff 
Planners Conference. . .Baguio, Philippines, April-May 1955;" dated 
July 1, 195 5 9 (TOP SECRET). 

I47. Ibid. 



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k8o JCS Memorandum > Subject: "Report of Military Staff Planners Confer- 
ence, Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty , Baguio, Philippines , 
April-May 1955/ T dated June 2, 1955 (Appendix "A") (TOP SECRET)'. 

- 

k$. Defense Memorandum, "U.S. Support of SEATO Military Activities," 
(TOP SECRET), 1., in NSC 5^05-3- 

50. Ibid ., (TOP SECRET), 3- 

51. Defense Memorandum to SecNav, Subject: "Southeast Asia Collective 
Defense Treaty (SEATO) Staff Organization," dated December 16, 1955 
(SECRET). 

52. CIECPAC Message to OSD, 222208Z March 1956, (TOP SECRET). 

53 •• JCS Memorandum for SecDef, Subject: "Force Availabilities and Command 
Relations for the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)," dated 
March 23, 1959, (SECRET), 1. ' 

$k. Ibid ., (SECRET), 2. 

55. JCS Memorandum for SecDef , Subject: "Proposal for Reorganization of 

the SEATO Military Planning Office," dated September 8, 1959, (SECRET), 1. 

56. Appendix to the Congressional Record , AVi75 (i960). 

57. State Departmant Memorandum of Conversation #8857, Subject: "Laos/' 
dated 29 April 1961 (TOP SECRET), covering meeting of SecState, SecDef, 
Atty Gen., JCS, and 8 others. 

58. Memorandum for SecDef, dated October 5 5 19^1, "Alternative Plans for 
Southeast Asia," (TOP SECRET) 

59. Memorandum for SecDef from Deputy Assistant SecDef, Subject: "Alterna- 
tive Plans for Southeast Asia," (TOP SECRET), dated 5 October 1961. 
The plans, numbered 1-6, are not available; data on the plans had 
been obtained from cross-checking commentaries on them, and is incom- 
plete. One plan ("5 plus"), an adoption of #5, is singled out as 
existing "only as a U.S. concept." Plan 5 has been "fully approved." 
Plans h and 6 are "being discussed this week at the SEATO MilAd Con- 
ference in Bangkok. 

- 

60. Study for SecDef from Asst SecDef (ISA) recommending U.S. troop list 
for SEATO plans k and 6, dated 22 September 196l, (TOP SECRET) . 

6l • Memorandum for SecDef, Subject: "Alternative Plans for Southeast Asia" 
(TOP SECRET), dated 5 October 1961. 



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62. ISA Study of 2 September 196l, cited in Note 60, (TOP SECRET). 

63. Ibid ., (TOP SECRET). 

6U. JCS Memorandum 66l-6l to SecDef, Subject: "Plan for Military Inter- 
vention in Laos," dated 20 September I96I, (TOP SECRET). 

65. Ibid., (TOP SECRET) 

66. JCS Memorandum 70k~6l to SecDef, Subject: "Planning for Southeast 
Asia," dated 5 October 1961, (TOP SECRET). 

67. Memorandum from SecDef to JCS, Subject: "Planning for Southeast Asia," 
dated 5 October 1961, (SECRET). 

68. JCS Memorandum 716-61 to SecDef, Subject: "Concept of Use of SEATO 
Forces in South Vietnam," dated 9 October 1961, (TOP SECRET). 

» 

69. The New York Times , 15 May 1962. . 

70. Figures from OASD/PA Vietnam Desk. 



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APPENDIX A 



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A COMPARISON OF THE WORDING OF THE NATO AND SEATO TREATIES 



NOTES : 

1. In this layout, sections of the SEATO Treaty are transposed for comparison 
with like sections of the NATO Treaty. No words have been omitted. 

2. Significant passages pointing cut differences are underlined. 

3. Comments are in brackets. 



NORTH ATLANTIC T REATY 
Washington, D .C . , T~April 19U9* 



SEATO TREATY 



The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm 
their faith in the purposes and prin- 
ciples of the Charter of the United 
Nations and their desire to live in 
peace with all peoples and all Gov- 
ernments. 



The Parties to this Treaty, 



Recognizing the sovereign equality of 
all. the Parties, 






They are determined to safeguard the 
freedom, common heritage and civiliza- 
tion of their peoples, founded on the" 
principles of democracy, individual 
liberty and the rule of law. 



They seek to promote stability and 
well-being in the North Atlantic area. 



They are resolved to unite their 
efforts for collective defense and for 
the preservation of peace and security. 



They therefore agree to this North 
Atlantic Treaty: 



* Effective 2k August 19U9 



Reiterating their faith in the pur- 
poses and principles set forth in the 
Charter of the United Nations and 
their desire to live in peace with 
all peoples and all governments, 



Reaffirming that, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, 
they uphold the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and declaring that they will 
earnestly strive by every peaceful 
means to promote self-government and 
to secure the independence of all 
countries whose peoples desire it and 
are able to undertake its responsi- 
bilities, 



Desiring to strengthen the fabric of 
peace and freedom and to uphold the 
principles of democracy, individual 
liberty and the rule of law, and to 
promote the economic well-being and 
development of all peoples in the 
Treaty Area, 



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Intending to declare publicly and 
formally their sense of unity , so 
that any potential aggressor will 
appreciate that the Parties stand 
together in the area, and, 



Desiring further to co-ordinate their 
efforts for collective defense for 
the preservation of peace and 
security, 



Therefore agree as follows: 



ARTICLE 1 

The Parties undertake, as set forth 
in the Charter of the United Nations, 
to settle any international dispute 
in which they may be involved by 
peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security and 
justice are not endangered, and to 
refrain in their international rela- 
tions from the threat or use of force 
in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations. 



ARTICLE I 

The Parties undertake, as set forth 
in the Charter of the United Nations, 
to settle any international dispute 
in which they may be involved by 
peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security and 
justice are not endangered, and to 
refrain in their international rela- 
tions from the threat or use of force 
in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations. 



ARTICLE 2 

The Parties will contribute toward the 
further development of peaceful and 
friendly international relations by 
strengthening their free institutions, 
by bringing about a better under- 
standing of the principles upon which 
these institutions are founded, and 
by promoting conditions of stability 
and well-being. They will seek to 
eliminate conflict in their inter- 
national economic policies and will 
encourage economic collaboration, 
between any or all of them. 



ARTICLE III 

The Parties undertake to strengthen 
their free institutions and to co- 
operate with one another in the 
further development of economic 
measures, including technical assist- 
ance, designed both to promote 
economic progress and social well- 
being and to further the individual 
and collective efforts of governments 
toward these ends. 



/The SEATO Treaty places more stress 
on technical assistance and social 
well-being; reversal of the order of 
the second and third articles places 
emphasis on collective defense^ 



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ARTICLE 3 



ARTICLE II 






In order more effectively to achieve 
the objectives of this Treaty 9 the 
Parties, separately and jointly, by 
means of continuous and effective 
self-help and mutual aid, "will main- 
tain and develop their individual 
and collective capacity to resist 
armed attack. 



ARTICLE k 

The Parties will consult together 
whenever, in the opinion of any of 
them, the territorial integrity, 
political independence or security 
of any of the Parties is threatened 



In order more effectively to achieve 
the objectives of this Treaty, the 
Parties, separately 'and jointly, by 
means of continuous and effective 
self-help and mutual aid will main- 
tain and develop their individual 
and collective capacity and to resist 
armed attack and to prevent and 
counter subversive activities directed 
from without against their territorial 
integrity and political stability. 



/The SEATO Treaty adds subversion as 
a contingency^/ 



ARTICLE IV 

2. If, in the opinion of any of the 
Parties, the inviolability or the 
integrity of the territory or the 
sovereignty or political independ- 
ence of any Party in the Treaty Area 
or of any other State or territory to 
which the provisions of paragraph 1 
of this Article from time to time 
apply is threatened in any way other 
than by armed attack or is affected 
or threatened by any fact or situa- 
tion which might endanger the peace 
of the area, the Parties shall con- 
sult immediately in order to agree on 
the measures which should be taken 
for the common defense. 



/The SEATO Treaty expands upon the 
word "threatened.^/ 



ARTICLE 5 

The Parties agree that an armed 
attack against one or more of them 
in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them 
all, and consequently they agree that, 
if such an armed attack occurs, each 



1. Each Party recognizes that aggres- 
sion by means of armed attack in the 
Treaty Area against any of the Parties 
or against any Stat e or territory 
which the Parties by unanimous agree- 
ment may hereafter designate, would 



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of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by Article 51 of the Char- 
ter of the United Nations, -will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by 
taking forthwith, individually emd in 
concert with the other Parties, such 
action as it deems necessary, includ - 
ing the use of armed force , to restore 
and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area. 



^"Armed force" is not specifically men- 
tioned in the SEATO Treaty^ 



Any such armed attack and all measures 
taken as a result thereof shall imme- 
diately be reported to the Security 
Council. Such measures shall be 
terminated when the Security Council 
has ta,ken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international ' 
peace and security. 



^/This requirement is not in the SEATO 
Treaty// 7 



endanger its own peace and safety, 
and agrees that it will in that event 
act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional 
processes . Measures taken under this 
paragraph shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council of 
the United Nations. 



/The SEATO Treaty specifically covers 
non-members -- "any state" -- this is 
not specific in the NATO Treaty^ 



3* It is understood that no action 
on the territory of any State desig- 
nated by unanimous agreement under 
paragraph 1 of this Article or on 
any territory so designated shall be 
taken except at the invitation or 
with the consent of the government 
concerned. 



/This understanding is not specific 
in the NATO Treaty// 



ARTICLE 6* 

For the purpose of Article 5> &n aimed 
attack on one or more of the Parties 
is deemed to include an armed attack: 



ARTICLE VIII 

As used in this Treaty, the "Treaty 
Area" is the general area of South- 
East Asia, including also the entire 



* As amended by Article 2 of the 

Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty 
on the accession of Greece and Turke 



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on the territory of any of the Parties 
in Europe or North America, on the 
Algerian Departments of France** on 
the territory of Turkey or on the 
islands under the jurisdiction of any 
of the Parties in the North Atlantic 
area north of the Tropic of Cancer; 



on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of 
any of the Parties, when in or over 
these territories or any other area in 
Europe in which occupation forces of 
any of the Parties were stationed on 
the date when the Treaty entered into 
force or the Mediterranean Sea or the 
North Atlantic area north of the 
Tropic of Cancer. 



territories of the Asian Parties, 
and the general area of the South- 
West Pacific not including the 
Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 
minutes north latitude. The Parties 
may, by unanimous agreement, amend 
this Article to include within the 
Treaty Area the territory of any 
State acceding to this Treaty in 
accordance with Article VII or other ■ 
wise to change the Treaty Area. 



/This emphasis on flexibility of 
application is not in the NATO 

Treaty^ 



* ARTICLE 7 

This Treaty does not affect, and shall 
not be interpreted as affecting, in 
any way the rights and obligations 
under the Charter of the Parties 
which are members of the United 
Nations, or the primary responsi- 
bility of the Security Council for 
the maintenance of international 
-oeace and security. 



ARTICLE 8 

Each Party declares that none of the 
international engagements now in force 



ARTICLE VI 

This Treaty does not affect and shall 
not be Interpreted as affecting in 
any way the rights and obligations of 
any of the Parties under the Charter 
of the United Nations or the responsi- 
bility of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of international peace 
and security. Each Party declares 
that none of the international 
engagements now in force between it 
and any other of the Parties or any 
third party is in conflict with the 
provisions of this Treaty, and under- 
takes not to enter into any inter- 
national engagement in conflict with 
this Treaty. 



** On l6th January, 1963, the French 

Representative made a statement to the 
North Atlantic Council on the effects 
of the independence of Algeria on cer- 
tain aspects of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. The Council noted that insofar 
as the former Algerian Departments of 
France were concerned the relevant 
clauses of this Treaty had become 
inapplicable as from 3rd July? 19&2. 



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"between it and any other of the 
Parties or any third State is in con- 
flict with the provisions of this 
Treaty, and undertakes not to enter 
into any international engageraent in 
conflict with this Treaty. 



ARTICLE 9 

The Parties hereby establish a coun- 
cil, on which each of them shall be 
represented to consider matters con- 
cerning the implementation of this 
Treaty. The Council shall be so 
organized as to be able to meet 
promptly at any time. The Council 
shall set up such subsidiary bodies 
as may be necessary; in particular 
it shall establish immediately a 
defense committee which shall recom- 
mend measures for the implementation of 
Articles 3 and 5. 



ARTICLE 10 

The Parties may, by unanimous agree- 
ment, invite any other European State 
in a position to further the prin- 
ciples of this Treaty and to contrib- 
ute to the security of the North 
Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. 
Any State so invited may become a party 
to the Treaty by depositing its instru- 
ment of accession with the Government 
of the United States of America. The 
Government of the United States of 
America will inform each of the 
Parties of the deposit of each such 
instrument of accession. 



ARTICLE V 

The Parties hereby establish a Coun- 
cil, on which each of them shall be 
represented, to consider matters con- 
cerning the implementation of this 
Treaty. The Council shall provide for 
consultation with regard to military 
and any other planning as the situ- 
ation obtaining in the Treaty Area may 
from tme to time require. The Coun- 
cil shall be so organized as to be 
able to meet at any time. 



/See also NATO #12^ 



ARTICLE VII 

Any other State in a position to 
further the objectives of the Treaty 
and to contribute to the security of 
the area may, by unanimous agreement 
of the Parties, be invited to accede 
to this Treaty,, Any State so invited 
may become a Party to the Treaty by 
depositing its instrument of accession 
with the Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines. The Government 
of the Republic of the Philippines 
shall inform each of the Parties of 
the deposit of each such instrument 
of accession. 



ARTICLE 11 



ARTICLE IX 






This Treaty shall be ratified and its 
provisions carried out by the Parties 
in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes. The instru- 
ments of ratification shall be deposited 



2. The Treaty shall be ratified and 
its provisions carried out by the 
Parties in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes. 
The instruments of ratification shall 






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as soon as possible with the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America , 
which will notify all the other 
signatories of each deposit. The 
Treaty shall enter into force "between 
the States which have ratified it as 
soon as the ratifications of the 
majority of the signatories, includ- 
ing the ratifications of Belgium, 
Canada, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
the United States, have been deposited 
and shall come into effect with 
respect to other States on the date of 
the deposit of their ratifications. 



ARTICLE 12 

After the Treaty has been in force for 
ten years, or at any time thereafter, 
the Parties shall, if any of them so 
requests, consult together for the 
purpose of reviewing the Treaty, 
having regard for the factors then 
affecting peace and security in the 
North Atlantic area, including the 
development of universal as well as 
regional arrangements under the Charter 
of the United Nations for the main- 
tenance of international peace and 
security. 



be deposited as soon as possible 
with the Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines, which shall 
notify all of the other signatories 
of such deposit. 



3. The Treaty shall enter into force 
between the States which have rati- 
fied it as soon as the instruments of 
ratification of a majority of the 
signatories shall have been deposited, 
and shall come into effect with 
respect to each other State on the 
date of the deposit of its instrument 
of ratification. 



^Touched on in Article V of SEAT0_J 



ARTICLE 13 

After the Treaty has been in force for 
twenty years, any Party may cease to 
be a party one year after its notice 
of denunciation has been given to the 
Government of the United States of 
America, which will inform the 
Governments of the other Parties of 
the deposit of each notice of denun- 
ciation. 



ARTICLE X 

This Treaty shall remain in force 
indefinitely, but any Party may 
cease to be a Party one year after 
its notice of denunciation has been 
given to the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines, which 
shall inform the Governments of the 
other Parties of the deposit of each 
notice of denunciation. 



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[ ' 



ARTICLE lk 

This Treaty, of which the English and 
French texts are equally authentic, 
shall be deposited in the archives 
of the Government of the United States 
of America. Duly certified copies 
will be transmitted by that Govern- 
ment to the Governments of the other 
signatories. 






ARTICLE XI 

The English text of this Treaty is 
binding on the Parties, but when the 
Parties have agreed to the French 
text thereof and have so notified the 
Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines, the French text shall be 
equally authentic and binding on the 
Parties. 



FROM ARTICLE IX 

1. This Treaty shall be deposited 
in the archives of the Government 
of the Republic of the Philippines. 
Duly certified copies thereof shall 
be transmitted by that Government to 
the other signatories. 



UNDERSTANDING OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

The United States of America in 
executing the present Treaty does 
so with the understanding that its 
recognition of the effect of aggres- 
sion ajid armed attack and its agree- 
ment with reference thereto in 
Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only 
to Communist aggression but affirms 
that in the event of other aggression 
or armed attack it will consult under 
the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 
2. 



In witness whereof the undersigned 
Plenipotentiaries have signed this 
Treaty. 



Done at Manila, this eighth day of 
September, 195*+. 



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JOn 23 October 195^ a NATO Protocol 
permitted accession of the Federal 
Republic of Germany// 



PROTOCOL 

Designation of States and territory 
as to which provisions of Article 
IV and Article III are to be appli- 
cable: 



The Parties to the South-East Asia 
Collective Defense Treaty unani- 
mously designate for the purposes 
of Article IV of the Treaty the 
States of Cambodia and Laos and the 
free territory under the jurisdiction 
of the State of Vietnam. 









The Parties further agree that the 
above mentioned States and territory 
shall be eligible in respect of the 
economic measures contemplated by 
Article III . 



This Protocol shall enter into force 
simultaneously with the coming into 
force of the Treaty. 



In witness whereof, the undersigned 
Plenipotentiaries have signed this 
Protocol to the South-East Asia 
Collective Defense Treaty. 



Done at Manila, this eighth day of 
September , 195^. 



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"O COMMUNICATIONS AGENCIES IN EUROPE (Por/s-Lonc/on) 
"O ADVISORY GROUP FOR AERO NAUTICAL RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT (Par/s) 



ALLIED COMMAND 
ATLANTIC 



Norfolk' 



u.s. 



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CHANNEL COMMITTEE 



London 



U.K. 



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ALLIED COMMAND CHANNEL 



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CANADA-U.S. 
REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP 



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ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE 



SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE 



Paris 



France 




NAVAL DEPUTY 



DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED 
COMMANDER 




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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 

ALLIED FORCES 

NORTHERN EUROPE 

Kolsaas Norway 



! COMMANDER 
ALLIED LAND FORCES 
jj NORWAY 



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Norway 



COMMANDER 

ALLIED LAND FORCES 

DENMARK 

| Copenhagen Denmark 



COMMANDER 

ALLIED AIR FORCES 

NORTHERN EUROPE 

Kohaas Norway 

r;m* . TC 




COMMANDER 
ALLIED NAVAL FORCES 

NORTHERN EUROPE 
I Kolsaas Norway 



COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 

ALLIED FORCES 

CENTRAL EUROPE 

Fontainebleau France 




COMMANDER 
! ALLIED LAND FORCES 

CENTRAL EUROPE 
4 Fonzaineblcau France 



COMMANDER 

ALLIED AIR FORCES 

CENTRAL EUROPE 

Fontainebleau France 



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COMMANDER 
ALLIED NAVAL FORCES 

CENTRAL EUROPE 
( Fontainebleau France 




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AIR DEPUTY 



COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 

ALLIED FORCES 

SOUTHERN EUROPE 

Naples Italy 



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S COMMANDER 

I ALLIED LAND FORCES 
1; SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE 



t«i Izmir 



Turkey 



COMMANDER 
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SOUTHERN EUROPE 
" Verona Italy 



COMMANDER 

ALLIED AIR FORCES 

SOUTHERN EUROPE 

Naples Italy 






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COMMANDER 

NAVAL STRIKING 

AND SUPPORT FORCES 

SOUTHERN EUROPE 
Naples Italy 






COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 
ALLIED FORCES 
MEDITERRANEAN 
Malta 



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COMMANDER 
WESTERN 
MEDITERRANEAN 
Algiers 




COMMANDER 

EASTERN 

MEDITERRANEAN 

Athens Greece 

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COMMANDER 

NORTHEAST 

MEDITERRANEAN 

Ankara Turkey 



COMMANDER 
GIBRALTAR- 
MEDITERRANEAN 
Gibraltar 




COMMANDER 

CENTRAL 

MEDITERRANEAN 

Naples Italy 



COMMANDER 

SOUTHEAST 

MEDITERRANEAN 



Malta 





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SUPREME ALLIED 
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Noifo/i- U.SA 




DEPUTY SUPREME 
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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 
WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA 



Norfolk 



U.S.A. 



COMMANDER 
STRIKING FLEET ATLANTIC 



New York 



COMMANDER 

OCEAN 

SU3-AREA 



Norfolk 



U.S.A. 



COMMANDER 

CANADIAN ATLANTIC 

SU3-AREA 

Halifax Canada 



! COMMANDER 

NORTH AMERICAN 
ANTI-SUBMARINE DEFENCE 
FORCE ATLANTIC 

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U.S.A. 



COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 
EASTERN ATLANTIC AREA 



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COMMANDER MARITIME AIR 
EASTERN ATLANTIC AREA 

Northwood U.K. 



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COMMANDER 

NORTHERN 

SUB-AREA 



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U.K. 



COMMANDER 

MARITIME AIR 

NORTHERN SUB-AREA 



Rosyih 



U.K. 



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Plymouth 



COMMANDER 
CENTRAL 
SUB-AREA 




U.K. 



COMMANDER MARITIME AIR 
CENTRAL SUB-AREA 



U.K. 



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U.K. 



COMMANDER 
I SUBMARINE FORCE 

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| Cosport U.K. 



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COMMANDER 

BAY OF BISCAY 

SUB-AREA 

France 

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COMMANDER 

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Rosyth 



U.K. 



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COMMANDER 

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COMMANDER 

PLYMOUTH 5U3-AREA 

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U.K. 



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COMMANDER 

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France 



COMMANDER 

BREST SU3-AREA 

CHANNEL 



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NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



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#* ♦ * * * * * * ♦ * * * * # * * * * ♦ * * * * 

* . 



SEA TO COUNCIL 



. Secretary General 



1 



— 

I Deputy Secretary-General 



Council Representatives 



Permanent Working Group 



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Budget Sub-Committee 



Central 
Services 

, Office 



Committee of Economic 
Experts 



Cultural 
Relations 
Office 



Committee on Information 
Cultural, Education 
and Labour Activities 



Committee of Security 
Experts 



. 



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Economic 
Services 
Office 



• Public 
Information 
Office 



Research 

Service 

Office 



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Security 
Office 



****** When Council is in session 
-Chairman of P. W.G. 






A- 50 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






- 






I 
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Senior 
Planners 



^•foO 



:cmrrjittee 



Planning 
Teams 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 











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Military Advisers 
. Group 



Chief, SEATO Military 
Planning Office 



Military 
Secretariat 



Administrative 
Staff 



. ^, 



Deputy, PIO 
(Military) 



Security 
Co-ordinator 



Senior Planners also act as the representatives 
in the Military Planning Office of their respective 
•Military Advisers 



A- 51 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



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