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IV.A Evolution of the War (26 Vols.)
U.S. MAP for Diem: The Eisenhower Commitments,
1954-1960(5 Vols.)
3. U.S. and France's Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1954-56
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UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945
1967
VIETNAM TASK FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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&£T*-Q
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IVo A.J.
EVOLUTION OF THE WAR
U.S. AMD FRANCE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM
~195l + , 1956
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THE U.S. AMD FRANCE f S WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM,
1954-1956
Foreword
This section of the study traces chronologically relations among
France , the U.S. and the State of Vietnam in the aftermath of the
Geneva Conference. The following are tabbed:
Summary
Chronology
Table of Contents and Outline
Footnotes
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IV. A. 3
THE U.S. AND FRANCE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM
195^-1956
SUMMARY
Vietnam was the crucible of contemporary France. Military defeat
by the Viet Minh -- unprecedented victory of Asian over European --
was but one political reagent: there was also intense frustration and
disappointment among French of Rightist- colon convictions that sneaker-
shod Asian peasants could undo a century of costly labor at France's
"civilizing mission," and jeopardize the largest investment of French
capital in the Far East. The Tonkin Delta region represented in a
special way all that Vietnam meant to France. Tonkin, of all Vietnam,
was where French economic stakes were highest, where the culture of
France most completely overglossed indigenous ways, where stood educa-
tional focus of Vietnam — the University of Hanoi, with its French
faculty — and where Catholicism flourished among the rural folk.
Thus, evacuation of Tonkin per the dictates of the Geneva Settlement
stung less from a sense of humiliation over Dien Bien Phu than from a
sense of abandonment: an epoch had closed, France was demeaned,
. Had the Geneva Settlement been fulfilled, France might have retained
a presence and influence in Vietnam that would have mollified both the
Right and Left. After all, no significant body of opinion in France
held the French should continue to mold Vietnamese politics or that the
French Expeditionary Corps should remain there undiminished — the
reality of the DRV and the exigencies of North Africa rendered
such' a position untenable. The Left and the Center were quite- willing for
France to withdraw under the Geneva formula; even the "Indochina"
clique within the army recognized the priority of Algeria. But France
in the end, at American instance, had to accept withdrawal without the
cover of general elections, and to accede to a second, further, more
final abandonment.
The supplanting of France by the U.S. in South Vietnam, and the
failure of the Geneva Settlement, both well advanced by mid-1956, denied
the French Left its prospects for cooperation with Ho Chi Minh in a
precedent -setting experiment in coexistence. It disappointed moderates
who had hoped to preserve French cultural influence and salvage French
capital. It enraged Rightists who interpreted American policies in
Vietnam invidiously. None of these factions was prepared to take a
stand for France's staying, but all attempted to draw political
sustenance from acerbic treatment of the U.S.
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The whole episode of French withdrawal from Vietnam, in fact,
soured the Western alliance. It is possible that Prance's
rejection of the European Defense Community on August 30, 195^, ma y
have been in part payment for Soviet good offices on behalf of France
at Geneva. But it is certain that many French were persuaded that
the U.S. and the UK furnished inadequate support to France during
the latter phases of the war, and at the Conference. And it is
equally certain that American policy in the aftermath of Geneva
widely alienated affection for the U.S. in France, and created that
lack of confidence which the Suez crisis of summer, 195 6, translated
into outright distrust.
After the Geneva Conference, all the governments involved in
the Accords, with one significant exception, anticipated that France
would remain in Vietnam. The exception was the State of Vietnam,
whose Premier, Ngo Dinh Diem, was determined to uproot French
influence as a concomitant to the establishment of a genuinely
independent nationalist government. The policy of the United States
was initially directed toward a partnership with France, a joint
sponsorship of Diem and the newly independent nation he headed.
Almost at once, however, U.S. policy began to respond to
military urgency, and this in turn caused the U.S. to move beyond
partnership to primacy. In September of 195^, SEATO was brought into
being, its protection extended to Vietnam by a protocol to the Manila
Pact. The U.S. resolved through SEATO to balk further expansion of
communist dominion, and looked to transforming Vietnam into a key
redoubt in the line of containment. The U.S. was determined that
Vietnam would become politically sound, economically self-sufficient,
and militarily capable of providing for its own internal security,
coping with invasion from North Vietnam, and contributing to the
deterrent strength of the SEATO coalition. France, then beset with
internal political divisions, and plagued. with Algeria, evidenced
doubt, indecision, and occasional reluctance in aiding Vietnam toward
the foregoing objectives. The U.S. was not prepared to wait. In
late. September 1954, the U.S. cut out the French as middle-men in
all its assistance for Vietnam, and began to deal directly with Diem,
his government, and his armed forces.
France did not readily accept this enlarged American role, nor
was there complete agreement with the U.S. Government that the
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United States should pursue a further shouldering aside of France.
Through the fall of 1954, France-U.S. relations worsened., and a
policy debate developed in Washington. Once again, military con-
siderations emerged as paramount. The JCS were originally opposed
to the United States assuming responsibility for training the Army of
Vietnam. They took the position, however, that if political con-
siderations dictated such a U.S. involvement "the Joint Chiefs of Staff
would agree to the assignment of a training mission to MAAG Saigon,
with safeguards against French interference with the U.S. training
mission." On October 26, 195^, the Secretary of Defense, acting on
behalf of the President, instructed the JCS to prepare a "long-range
program for the organization and training of a minimum number of free
Vietnam forces necessary for internal security." The development of
this plan and an appropriate working relationship with the French con-
tinued into 1955.? and necessitated the dispatch to Vietnam of General
J.Lawton Collins, with Ambassadorial status, to obtain a tri-partite
agreement acceptable in Saigon, in Paris, and in Washington. During
November 195^, the JCS expressed serious reservations about the success
of such a combined undertaking. Nevertheless, the NSC considered the
policy sound, and this judgment was confirmed from the field by
General Collins. Collins reported that:
It would be disastrous if the French Expeditionary
Corps would be withdrawn prematurely since otherwise
Vietnam would be overrun by an enemy attack before the
Manila Pact Powers could be enacted..
Collins recommended that the United States continue military aid to
France to "encourage the French to retain sufficient forces." In the
meantime, events in Vietnam seemed to support those who, like the JCS,
continued to entertain strong reservations about the future of Ngo
Dinh Diem and his government. Diem managed to survive attempted coups
by army leaders, and succeeded in maintaining an unhappy peace with the
several armed factions of Cochinchina. But his political future
remained questionable at best. At the same time, the French mission
in Hanoi pressed hard to preserve French economic and cultural pre-
rogatives in North Vietnam, and certain French political leaders in
Paris spoke grandiloquently of a cooperative modus vivendi with the
DRV becoming a model for east-west relations -- a disquieting message
for the U.S. Secretary of State and those who shared his convictions
within the Administration. Finally, parallel to these developments,
the Bnperor Bao Dai, retaliating for Diem's vituperative political
campaign against him, actively sought to supplant Diem.
All the foregoing tension resolved to two central issues between
the United States and France. The first was the question of how and
by whom Vietnam's armed forces were to be trained. The second, and
more far-reaching, was whether Ngo Dinh Diem was to remain at the head
of Vietnam's government, or whether he was to be replaced by another
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nationalist leader more sympathetic to Bao Dai and Prance. The first
issue was resolved relatively quickly. General Collins struck an
agreement with General Ely in Vietnam by which, despite serious mis-
givings in Paris, France agreed to turn over the training of the Viet-
namese army to the U.S. and to withdraw French cadres. On February 12,
1955 > the U.S. assumed responsibility for training Vietnamese forces,
and the French disassociation began.
But the political controversy over Diem was less easily resolved.
Diem exacerbated matters with increasingly vehement stricture against
the French and Bao Dai. The United States on its part was insensitive
to the impact within Prance of Diem's militant anti-communism —
frequently directed at the French Left — and of the rancor aroused
by U.S. statements portraying America as the only friend of Vietnamese
nationalism. The U.S. did alert, however, to French statements that
Diem was categorically incapable of unifying Vietnamese nationalists.
French advice to the U.S. that Diem should, therefore, be replaced
was seconded by Ambassador Collins from Vietnam. Throughout the winter
and spring, Secretary Dulles and the Department of State in general
seemed disposed to consider favorably suggestions that an alternative
leader for the Vietnamese be placed in power. However, despite an
ostensibly thorough search, no nationalist leader with qualities
competitive with Diem's was identified.
Both the U.S. and France were then caught up in the sweep of
events. The aimed sects directly challenged Diem's authority, and he
responded with force. An uneasy truce ended the first clash in March,
and amid the mounting tension in April 1955, the U.S., France, and
Bao Dai all sought actively to bring about a change in the GVN. On
28 April, Diem, against U.S. advice, against French advice, and against
the advice of his, cabinet, moved again against the sects. When Binh
Xuyen resisted in Saigon, he committed the Vietnamese army to battle.
Diem's forces won an immediate military victory, and simultaneously
Diem's brother, Whu, co-opted a committee of nationalist figures
who called for Bao Dai's removal, and transfer of civil and military
power to Diem.
Encouraged by Diem's success, the U.S. declared its unequivocal
support for him as opposed to Bao Dai. The U.S. choice presented acute
difficulties for France. The French Government was convinced that
Nhu's "Revolutionary Committee" was under Viet Minh influence, and
was strongly resentful of a renewed GVN campaign against French presence.
In May 1955, France, the U.S., and Britain met in Paris to discuss
European defenLe, but France promptly made Vietnam the principal agenda
item. France maintained that the U.S., in backing Diem, forced upon
France the necessity for withdrawing altogether from Vietnam. The
French Foreign Minister Faure held that Diem was "not only incapable but
mad . . . France can no longer take risks with him." Secretary Dulles in
reply indicated that the U.S. was aware of Diem's weaknesses, but stressed
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Diem's recent successes as indicating redeeming qualities. But,
Dulles pointed out "Vietnam is not worth a quarrel with France, " and
offered U.S. withdrawal in preference to allied disunity. No decision
was taken immediately, and during a recess Secretary Dulles received
advice from the JCS that Diem seemed the most promising avenue to
achievement of U.S. objectives, and that while withdrawal of the
French Expeditionary Corps is "ultimately to be desired, " a precipitate
withdrawal was to be prevented since it would "result in an increasingly
unstable and precarious situation" and the eventual loss of South Vietnam
to communism. Secretary Dulles then proposed to the French that they
•continue to support Diem until a national assembly were elected.
British support for Diem seems to have swayed Faure, and he accepted
Dulles 1 proposal. The tri-partite meeting ended on a note of harmony,
but the undertones were distinct: the days of joint U.S. -French policy
were over; thereafter, the U.S. would act independently of France in
Vietnam.
Backed by the United States, Diem refused to open consultation
with the North Vietnamese concerning general elections when the date
for these fell due in July 1955. Pressing his military advantage
against the sects, he moved to consolidate his position politically
within South Vietnam. In October, he won a resounding victory in a
popular referendum in which voters were given a choice between Diem and
Bao Dai, As Diem f s political strength grew, his relations with Paris
deteriorated. In December 1955, Diem suddenly terminated the existing
economic and financial agreements with France, and called upon France
to denounce the Geneva agreements and break relations with Hanoi. Soon
thereafter, he withdrew South Vietnamese representatives from the French
Union Assembly.
On January 2, 1956, general elections in France produced a govern-
ment under Socialist Guy Mollet, a third of the members of which were
communists or avowed neutralists. In early March, Mollet 1 s Foreign
Minister, Pineau, declared in a speech to the Anglo-American Press
Association in Paris that France would actively seek policy position
bridging East and West, and that there was no unanimity of policy among
the U.S., UK, and France. He cited UK Middle East policy and U.S. sup-
port for Diem as contrary to French interests, and condemned both powers
for stirring up the Moslem world to France's distinct disadvantage in
North Africa. A few days later, at a SEATO Council meeting in Karachi,
Pineau proclaimed the end of the "era of aggression, " and called for a
"policy of coexistence."
Action followed Pineau 1 s line. On March 22, 195 6, France agreed
with Diem to withdraw the FEC altogether. On April 26, 1956, the
French High Command in Saigon was disestablished. On the due date for
the general elections agreed to at Geneva, France possessed no military
forces in Vietnam. And the date for the fulfillment of the political
portions of the Settlement, July 1956; coincided with the inception of
the Suez crisis
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IV. A, 3-
THE U.S. AND FRANCE T S WITHDRAWAL
FROM VIETNAM, 195^-1956
CHRONOLOGY
DATE
EVENT OR DOCUMENT
DESCRIPTION
7 Jul 5k
Diem appointed
Premier of South
Vietnam
21 Jul 54
Geneva Accords
signed
8, 12 Aug 54;
20 Aug 54
National Security-
Council meetings ;
NSC 5^29/2
Urged by America and France,
Emperor Bao Dai named Ngo Dirih
Diem premier of South (Free)
Vietnam. Bao Dai remained legal,
constitutionally recognized
Chief of State.
France became guarantor of Viet-
namese sovereignty, unity, terri-
torial integrity (Conference
Final Declaration, Article 7);
with the PAVN, guarantor of armis-
tice agreements (Geneva Agreements,
Articles 22, 23), and all-Vietnam
elections (Conference Final Declara-
tion, Article 7) France agreed
to withdraw the French Expeditionary
Corps at the request of local
governments (Conference Final
Declaration, Article 10, Unilateral
Declaration, France)
US policies toward post-Geneva
Vietnam.
Economic: disassociate France from
levers of command, integrate land
reform with refugee resettlement,
work with the French but "encourage"
them to turn over financial, adminis-
trative, economic controls to the
Vietnamese. Give aid directly
to the Vietnamese — not through
France.
Military: work with France only
insofar as necessary to build up
indigenous military forces able to
provide interns.! security.
Political: France must grant total
independence (including right to
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Aug 5I+
Sainteny Mission
8 Sep 5^
Manila Pact Signed
27-29 Sep 5h
Washington Con-
ference
withdraw from French Union) to
South Vietnam and support a
strong indigenous government.
Diem must broaden the governmental
base, elect an assembly, draft a
constitution and legally' dethrone
Bao Dai. French support and co-
operation for these policies was
necessary; retention of the FEC
was essential to South Vietnamese
security.
Jean Sainteny was sent to Hanoi
to find ways to protect French
economic and cultural intersts in
the DRV. Political overtones of
the mission annoyed the US and
General Paul Ely, High Commissioner
in the South. Ely received firm
assurance from Mendes -France that
France was not playing a "double
game", has not sent Sainteny for
political bridge-building purposes.
Mendes-France reaffirmed French
support for an independent, strong
South Vietnam.
Dulles' anti- communist military
alliance was realized in SEATO.
The Associated States of Indochina
were covered by separate protocol
ensuring collective defense by
SEATO nations in case of subversion
or aggression.
France agreed to support Diem
(against the French belief that
Diem would prove unable to unify
or stabilize the country); agreed
to keep the FEC in South Vietnam
but received no indication of
possible US financial aid for the
French forces . France knew
economic and military aid would
be given directly to Vietnam but
was led to believe she would have
a hand in its distribution by
ambiguous US-drafted statements.
The US military role in Vietnam was
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22 Oct 5^
NSC Action Program
2k Oct $k
Eisenhower letter
to Diem
8 Nov 5h
Collins Mission
13 Dec $h
Collins -Ely
Minute of Under'
standing
not discussed because of a State-
JCS split (Dulles wanted to
assume training responsibilities;
JCS. did not because of political
instability, presence of French
troops and Geneva restrictions).
The US decided to take firmer
steps to strengthen Diem, to tell
Paris that French support had
been inadequate . An earlier JCS
concession to consider a training
program for the NVA opened the way
for the decision to inaugurate a
"limited" US role in military
affairs .
Announced direct economic aid and
military assistance from the US;
demanded no Vietnamese moves as
reciprocation for aid. France
called it a carte americaine^
said it violated the principle of
joint action adopted in September.
General J. Lawton Collins, given
broad authority to coordinate all
US programs and — with French
support — get things moving,
arrived in Vietnam.
France will grant full autonomy
to the VNA by July 1955, the US
will assume training responsibili-
ties, the US MAAG, Indochina, will
direct the training program --
under General Ely ! s overall auth-
ority. French and US instructors
will be phased out as VNA efficiency
increases. Washington approved the
Minute; Paris objected, particularly
to the phase-out of French trainers.
France did not relent and consent
until 11 February 1955.
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16 Dec $k
Collins recommends
Diem be replaced
19 Dec $k
Trilateral Meetings,
Paris (U.K., U.S.,
France)
20 Jan 55
Collins ? report to
NSC
12 Feb 55
Training Relations
and Instruction
Mission (TRIM)
opens
Diem f s failure to include Dr.
Quat in the cabinet as Defense
Minister confirmed Collins 1
doubts about Diem's capacity
to stabilize the government, or
rally support for his regime.
He recommended Bao Dai's return
be considered, but if this were
unacceptable, recommended the
US withdraw from Vietnam.
Mendes-France insisted the time
had come to consider an alternative
to Diem. Recommended Collins and
Ely study the problem and come
up with suggestions for a change
by mid- January. France felt-
Bao Dai should be involved in
an alternative plan. Dulles:
Diem is the only suitable leader
but we will consider alternatives
and will allow Collins and Ely to
consider the matter. But Dulles
made it clear that Congress
would probably not appropriate
funds to a Vietnam without Diem.
U.S. study of alternatives was
cursory, however; Dulles was sure
Diem could succeed, with proper
direction; he was more sure that
no other possible leader existed.
December's despair over Diem
had dissipated; Diem had acted
well on a few matters. Collins
recommended continued support for
Diem because without it South
Vietnam will surely fall to com-
munism and the rest of other
Southeast Asia will soon follow.
The NSC approved Collins' report.
General 0' Daniel, under Ely's
general supervision, took charge
of programs to train and reorganize
the VNA along American lines. Des-
pite friction between French and
Americans in Saigon and despite
Paris -Washington disputes, officers
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22 Feb 55
United Front
announced
21 Mar 55
United Front
"ultimatum"
29-30 Mar 55
Diem attacks
central police
headquarters
in TRIM seemed able to rise
above differences and initiate
sound programs for the VNA.
French subsidies to the Cao Dai
and Hoa Hao sect armies -- about
40,000 men — ended in February.
When Diem refused to meet sect
requests for financial aid, inte-
gration of forces into the VMA
and recognition of spheres of
influence, previous sect coopera-
tion with Diem ceased. Repre-
sentatives of the Cao Dai, Hoa
Hao, Dan Xa (Ba Cut), Lien Minh
(Thinh Minh The) and Birih Xuyen
(Bay Vien) forces met at Tay Ninh,
agreed to work together against
Diem. Cao Dai Pope Tac headed
the group.
Claiming to speak for the popular
will, the United Front asked that
Diem form a government of national
union and make other political,
economic, military reforms. Diem
called this an ultimatum and
refused to consider the request.
The Front then sent an emissary
to Bao Dai asking him to intervene
on its behalf. Bao Dai refused.
Brewing for months, the fight
finally broke between Diem and
the Binh Xuyen (a coalition of
gangsters and river pirates which
ran gambling and prostitution in
Cholon, and the Saigon-Cholon
police, paid Bao Dai for his pro-
tection and enjoyed some French
support). A company of paratroopers
took over the central police station,
driving the Binh Xuyen back into
Cholon. Diem then wanted to go
after Police Commissioner Sang and
end Binh Xuyen control. Defense
Minister Minh resigned when Diem
refused to consult the cabinet over
this. However, French representations
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7 Apr 55
Collins and Ely
agree Diem must go
23 Apr 55
Diem proposes to
broaden the govern-
ment
26 Apr 55
Diem fires Sang
27 Apr 55
Dalles agrees to
a change in Saigon
28 Apr 55
Diem hits the
Binh Xuyen
dissuaded Diem from taking on
Bay Vien's 6000-man force at
this time , and the French then
negotiated a truce between Diem
and the Binh Xuyen.
Collins says Diem has proved
himself incapable of inspiring
unity, and must be replaced.
Dulles demurs, then agrees to
consider a change if Collins
will fly to Washington for
consultations .
Diem calls for a national
referendum and elections for a
national assembly within six
months. The Front scores the
proposal.
(Collins had left Saigon for
Washington. ) Diem replaces Sang
with a man loyal to his regime
but Sang refuses to resign saying
only Bao Dai had the legal auth-
ority to remove him.
Collins met with Dulles in
Washington. Dulles agreed to
consider an alternate to Diem
but was determined to keep this
from the French until their pur-
poses were clear and their promise
to unequivocally support a new
regime firm. Saigon was informed
of this new policy.
Diem struck at the Surete — and
Sang- -after fighting erupted
between the VKA and Binh Xuyen
forces in Cholon. The French
said Diem instigated the fight;
Americans supported Diem's version
that the Binh Xuyen began firing
first. Whatever its origin, the
fight ended with a VNA victory.
The Binh Xuyen were driven out of
Cholon into the Rung Sat swamps.
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30 Apr 55
Revolutionary
Congress
Announced
1 May 55
Bao Dai's
ultimatum
1 May 55
The US: back on the
track behind
Diem
8 May 55
A National
Campaign
launched
8-11 May 55
Tripartite Talks ,
Paris
Xll
Diem's brother Nhu had a hand
in organizing this broad amalgam
of political interests behind a
program calling for support of
Diem against the Binh Xuyen, sects
and Bao Dai, in favor of broad
representation in the government.
Generals The and Phuong, tired of
the "weak" Revolutionary Congress,
formed a Revolutionary Committee
whose outlook was more anti-Bao
Dai and anti-French than the
Congress. Present and former
Vietminh supporters were members
of the Congress and Committee .
Bao Dai summoned Diem to replace
the Army Chief of Staff with his
own man. Diem ignored the sum-
mons and orders.
Because of Diem f s victory --
superficial though it may have
been -- over the Binh Xuyen,
because of VNA support for Diem,
Dulles canceled the cable of 28
April: again, the US will support
Diem .
Diem announced a national cam-
paign to regain, "wayward"
provinces and unify the country.
Or: he declared war on the sects.
The VNA fought over a year against
Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen forces, but
finally established control over
them, over areas of sect influence
and control.
Faure: We cannot support Diem --
but Vietnam is not worth a split
in Franco -American relations.
Therefore, France offers to with-
draw from Vietnam. Dulles: We
must support Diem. But if a US
withdrawal would prevent discord,
the US will consider it. Then,
after hearing JCS and Collins '
arguments against either precipi-
tate French withdrawal or a US
withdrawal, Dulles urged Faure to
accept a new proposal: support
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July I955
Diem refuses to
meet with the DRV
about elections
2k Oct 55
National
Referendum
Aug-Dec 1955
Franco -Viet name s e
Conferences
Diem a while longer on the
grounds that he will broaden the
government and call for elections.
Faure agreed -- against his own
wishes and against strong popular
pressure and on several conditions
(most of which required action
from Diem and which Dulles could
not guarantee). Dulles then
suggested France and the US
apprise each other of policy and
actions but pursue them more
independently than in the past.
The days of joint policy -- of
togetherness in Vietnam — were
over.
France and Britain urged Diem to
hold consultations with Hanoi for
all-Vietnam elections, as stipulated
in the Geneva Accords. The US sug-
gested consultations but also
suggested Diem request firm guaran-
tees (for secret ballot, UN or
international supervision) which
the DRV was expected to reject.
But Diem refused to meet with the
North Vietnamese. He had not
signed the Geneva accords and
denied being bound by them in any
way.
With 98 percent of the vote, Diem
became President of the Republic
of Vietnam- -and Bao Dai was dethroned.
Diem wanted renegotiation of
economic and financial accords
reached in 195 *+S transfer of Viet-
namese affairs from the ministry
of the associated states to the
Foreign Office; abolition of
Ely's former post of High Com-
missioner; termination of the
military High Command and Viet-
namese authority over remaining
French troops in Vietnam. (The
FEC now numbered about 35 > 000 —
vice the 150,000-man force which
France spoke of retaining in Viet-
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26 Apr 56
French High
Command abolished
July, 1956
All-Vietnam
elections
nam during the September 195^
Washington Conference). France
could not accept Diem T s last
demand; had difficulty satisfying
the others, but finally made
major concessions. Diem f s response
was to withdraw Vietnamese repre-
sentatives from the French Union
Assembly.
Only about 5*000 French troops
remained in Vietnam; most French
instructors had left TRIM. A
French liaison mission with the
ICC still functioned, however, and
France still served on the Joint
Armistice Commission with DRV
military representatives.
Diem had refused to consult with
the DRV about elections in 1955;
he refused to hold them in 1956.
Diem did agree to take over the
French responsibility to support
the ICC; France would continue to
finance ICC operations. The
Joint Armistice Commission gradu-
ally died of inactivity.
xiv
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20 Jan 61
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KEY AMERICAN PERSONALITIES: I95I+-I956
President: Dwight D. Eisenhower
Secretary. of State: John Foster Dalles
Secretary of Defense: Charles E. Wilson
Ambassador to Vietnam: Donald R. Heath (25 Jun 52-20 Apr 55);
Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Special Mission (8 Nov 5U-6 May 55);
G. Frederick Reinhart (20 Apr 55-1^ Mar 57)
Chairman, JCS: Arthur W. Radford, Adm., USN (ik Aug 53-15 Aug 57)
Chief MAAG, Indochina:
John W. 1 Daniel, Lt. Gen., USA (31 Mar 5^-23 Oct 55);
Samuel T. Williams, Lt. Gen., was 1st Chief of MAAG to
Vietnam (2k Oct 55-31 Aug 60) __
Jun 54 -
Feb 55
KEY FRENCH PERSONALITIES: 195 J +~1956
23 Feb 55
31 Jan 56
-
-
31 Jan 56 -
16 Apr 57
Prime. Minister: Pierre Mendes-France
Foreign Minister: Georges Bidault
Minister for Associated States: Guy La Chambre
Minister for National Defense: Rene Pleven
High Commissioner, Vietnam: General Paul Ely
Prime Minister: Edgar Faure
Foreign Minister: Antoine Pinay
Minister for Associated States: M. La Forest
Minister for National Defense: General Pierre Koenig
High Commissioner, Vietnam: General Ely's post abolished
after his departure, June 1955* (Gen. Jacquot assumed
military responsibilities until April, 1956)
Ambassador, Vietnam: Henri Hoppenot (July, 1955)
Prime Minister: Guy Mollet
Foreign Minister: Christian Pineau
Minister for National Defense: Maurice Bourges-Maunouvy
High Commissioner, Vietnam: (General Jacquot - military
responsibilities until April 1956)
Ambassador, Vietnam: M. Payart (November, 1956)
Mar k-9 -
26 Oct 55
12 Jan 5I+
16 Jun $k
7 Jul 5k -
1 Nov 63
KEY SOUTH VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES; 195^-1956
Head of State: Bao Dai, Emperor
Head of State: Bao Dai
Premier: Prince Buu Loc
Minister for Foreign Affairs :
Nguyen Quoc Dinh
Head of State: Ngo Dinh Diem (President: 23 Oct 55)
Premier: Ngo Dinh Diem
Minister for Foreign Affairs: Tran Van Do (Jul 5k - May 55)
Vu Van Mau (Jul 55 - Nov 63)
Minister for National Defense: Ngo Dinh Diem (General Minh
served temporarily, early 1955) .
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THE U.S. AND FRANCE 'S WIT HDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM,
195^-1956
TABLE OF CONTENTS and OUTLINE
Page
A. Introduction: Post-Geneva Expectations 1
1. France Will Stay in Vietnam 1
2 . Diem: France Will Leave Vietnam. 2
3. The U. S. Will "Join" France in South Vietnam 2
B. Initial U. S. Policy Toward Indochina 3
1. SEATO: The New Initiative? 3
2. Alternative French Policies k
3. U.S. Objectives in Vietnam: Political, Economic, Military... 5
h. The U.S. "Chooses" Policy for France 6
C. Tentative U.S. Involvement Becomes Deeper, Firmer ' 7
1. Adoption of Military Responsibilities 7
a. Arguments Against U.S. Training the VNA 7
b . Dulles ■ Views 7
c. The NSC Backs Dulles 8
d. JCS-State Split on Force Level, Mission for VNA. 9
e. Again, the NSC Backs Dulles, Recommends a U.S. Military
Program in South Vietnam 11
f . Collins ilgrees with the NSC 12
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Page
2. Conditions in Vietnam Invite Firmer Action 12
a. The Military Threatens Diem 13
b . The Sects Threaten Diem 13
c . And the Binh Xuyen Oppose Diem 13
3- French Laxity Demands Strong U. S. Programs Ik
a. The Washington Conference , September, 195^- 1^-
b . The U. S. Faults French Support for Diem 15
c. Accommodation Between I&ris and Hanoi? 15
d . Sainteny or Ely? 16
e . The Mansfield Report . 16
h. NSC Action Program of October and Eisenhower Letter to Diem.. 17
5« More Action: The Collins Mission 18
'6. France Objects to Collins-Ely Agreements 18
D. Franco-American Impasse Over Diem 20
1. Paris: Diem is 111- Suited for Rule 20
2. Collins : Diem Cannot Lead South Vietnam 20
3* State Department: Diem Is the Only Available Leader 21
k. December Tripartite Talks 22
a. France Proposes Alternative to Diem, Dulles Seems to
Acquiesce 22
b. But Dulles Reports, No Other Suitable Leader Can Be Seen. 2k
c. The U. So Looks at Alternatives 2k
5* January 1955- U.S. Backing for Diem is Reaffirmed 25
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" Page
E. Crisis of the Spring, 1955 26
1. The Problem of the Sect Armies 26
2. The United Front Challenges Diem 27
3 • Diem Challenges the Bihh Xuyen 27
h. Truce -- Bat No Calm 28
. a. Lansdale ! s Version 28
b. Ely and Collins Decision: Diem Must Go 29
c. Dulles 1 Indecision 29
d. Paris: Diem's Time Is Up . 30
e. Bao Dai' s Plan 30
f. Dulles 1 Decision: U.S. Will Consider a Change in Regime.. 31
5 . Diem Acts Against the Binh-Xuyen 31
6. Washington Acts : U. S. Will (Again) Support Diem 32
7. . Diem and Others Defy Bao Dai 32
8 . May Trilateral Meetings 33
a . Dulles Backs Diem 33
b . The French Position 3^
c. Faure: We Will Withdraw to Save the U.S. -France
Alliance 35
d. Dulles: Continue With Diem — But Independent of France.. 36
F. The Twilight of French Presence in Vietnam 37
1. All- Vietnam Elections 38
2. Franco -Vietnamese Differences, Autumn, 1955 39
3. What of French Obligations Under the Geneva Accords? kO
FOOTNOTES kl
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IV. A. 3-
. THE U.S. AND FRANCE T S WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM, 1954-1956
A- Introduction: Post-Geneva Expectations
1. France Will Stay in Vietnam
After 100 years of investment, interest and influence,
France got out of Vietnam in less than a year after the Geneva Conference
of July 195*+ • And France did not want to leave. On July 25, three days
after signing the Geneva Accords, Prime Minister Mendes-France said
France would maintain cultural and economic ties with North Vietnam and
would assist the development of Free (South) Vietnam, l/ The predecessor
Laniel Government had recognized "Vietnam as a fully independent and
sovereign state in possession of all qualifications and powers known
in international law" on June k, 195^ J Mendes-France pledged to uphold
and further that treaty. 2/ In August he announced a three-phase
formula to implement it. Economic, administrative and financial ties
with the Associated States would be terminated as fast as possible. 3/
By December 195^.? the last vestiges of the French colonial apparatus
had been eliminated, hj However, Mendes- France's formula viewed
membership in the French Union as compulsory -- indicative of French
desire to stay in Vietnam but inimical to demands lodged by Diem and
the United States for independence which included the right to with-
draw from the French Union. 5/
Also in August, General Paul Ely, French High Commissioner
in Vietnam, reaffirmed French support of Vietnamese independence and
French readiness to further Vietnamese development. That the French
had a role to play was clear: French economic investment, cultural
institutions, military, political and administrative operations were
already part of South Vietnamese life. That France must play a role
was also clear. Under the Geneva Accords, France had pledged to
guarantee all-Vietnam elections in 1956, guarantee execution of the
armistice agreement, guarantee Vietnamese sovereignty, unity and
territorial integrity, pledged to maintain the French Expeditionary
Corps until Vietnam requested its removal. General Ely had been
delegated extensive political and military authority to enable him
to meet these obligations. He worked sincerely to persuade both
Vietnamese and French that mutual cooperation would be mutually
1 beneficial, to erase the colonialist tinge of French presence, to
both speed and smooth the French transition from master to equal
partner of Vietnam. 6/
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2. Diem: France Will Leave South Vietnam
In this endeavor, Ely received qualified support from
French officials, "colons ,r and military officers in Vietnam. He
received sporadic support from Paris. He received almost no support
from the Vietnamese. France was not "welcome in Vietnam for many
reasons, a major one being Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. A Francophobe
of the first order, Diem wanted full independence for South Vietnam
and wanted France out of the country as soon as possible. Many shared
Diem's sentiments. France had just lost a long, devastating and
demoralizing war against Vietnamese communists as well as Vietnamese
nationalists. French colonial rule had been tight, previous French
promises of independence had been broken. Why believe professions of
French good intentions in 195^ were any different from those of the
past? Added to this was the problematical relationship of France
vis-a-vis South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam.
Some South Vietnamese expected France to actively work toward
accommodation with the Viet Minh and reunification of North and
South under Viet Minh direction. Many more felt the fact of continued
French presence alone compromised South Vietnamese independence.
"To convince the people of Vietnam that the administration was independent,
it became a political necessity to be anti-colonial and specifically anti-
French." 6a/
3- The U.S. Will "Join" France in South Vietnam
Finally, France was not alone in Vietnam. More than
Diem, more than the psychological damage done by colonial years, the
United States made life in Vietnam difficult for France. The U.S.
was eager to strengthen Vietnam, needed and demanded French cooperation,
but offered little in return. U.S. policy insisted upon an immediate
and dramatic transformation of French policy. But the U.S. little
understood what this meant to France, what problems it created for
French domestic and foreign policy or what U.S.* concessions might
help effect the transformation.
Although remnants of the French Expeditionary Corps
remained until 1956, France was out of Vietnam to all intents and
purposes by May 1955; "t^ n months after Geneva. These months are
characterized by professions of Franco-American cooperation but
demonstrations of Franco-American division, characterized by conflict
of word and action on several levels. Paris said one thing but did
another, Paris said one thing and French officials in Saigon did the
opposite; Washington activities were not always in line with Washington
pronouncements and the gulf between the thought and deed of Ngo Dinh
Diem only compounded an already sensitive situation. It is during
this period that Diem established his rule^ against French advice and
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best interests but with almost unwavering support from Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles. And it is the period during which the anti-
coramunist moralism of Dulles and Diem rejected any rapprochement with
the North, ultimately ensuring that the temporary military demarkation
line would become a permanent division of Vietnam.
B. Initial U.S. Policy Toward Indochina
The U.S. began revising policy toward Indochina as the
Geneva Conference closed. The exercise was marked by urgency dictated
by the belief that Geneva had been a disaster for the free world.
Geneva gave Communist China and North Vietnam a new base for exploita-
tion of Southeast Asia; it enhanced Peking's prestige to Washington's
dismay and detriment ; it restricted free world room to maneuver in
Southeast Asia. And its grant of Vietnamese territory above the
seventeenth parallel to the communist Ho Chi Minh was a painful
reminder of the scarifying French defeat by the Viet Minh, the first
defeat of a European power by Asians (Asian communists at that), a ■
defeat shared by the United States to the tune of more than $1.5 billion
in economic and military assistance granted France and the Associated
States of Indochina. 7/
J*. SEATO: The New Initiative?
The first step toward countering this disaster had been
discussed with Britain and France since the spring of 195^-j anc i Walter
Bedell Smith 1 s comment as Geneva closed, "We must get that pact!,"
heralded its inauguration. 8/ The Southeast Asian Collective Defense
Treaty was to be a "new initiative in Southeast Asia" to protect the
U.S. position in the Far East and stabilize "the present chaotic
situation ... to prevent further losses to communism" through sub-
version or overt aggression. 9/ But the Manila Pact, signed on
September 8, 195^^ proved to be neither the new initiative nor the
strong anti-communist shield called for by Secretary Dulles. Vice
Admiral A. C. Davis, deputy assistant secretary and Defense Department
representative at Manila, reported the Pact left Southeast Asia "no
better prepared than before to cope with Communist aggression." 10 /
The failure was largely of American making. While Dulles wanted to
put the communists on notice that aggression would be opposed, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted the United States must not be committed
financially, militarily or economically to unilateral action in the
Far East and that U.S. freedom of action must not be restricted, ll/
The two objectives conflicted and one cancelled out the other. Thus,
Article IV of the treaty, the mechanism for collective action in case
of enemy threat, did not pledge automatic response with force to force.
Instead, each signatory promised to "act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes." The United States,
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particularly Mr. Dulles, tried to put teeth into SEATO through unilateral
declarations of U.S. readiness to act. Dulles defined the obligations
under Article IV as "a clear and definite agreement on the part of the
signatories, including the United States, to come to the aid of any
member of the Pact who under the terms of this treaty is subjected to
aggression." 12 / However, Dulles failed to instill the same dedication
to instant intervention in the other SEATO members.
The obligation assumed at Manila emphasized the importance
attached to Southeast Asia by the U.S. Government. U.S. refusal to
pledge unqualified support to Indochina emphasized the need for
indigenous strength and stability in the area to counter communist
power, to make infiltration and aggression less appetizing to the
enemy. Of the three Indochina states, most important yet least stable
and least strong was South Vietnam. Thus, the second step in policy
development was to decide what the U.S. could do to change the situa-
tion, a decision which turned on what France could or would do in
South Vietnam.
2. Alternative French Policies
That France and the United States would eventually part
company over Vietnam might have been predicted in August 19 5^ > when
U.S. policy toward Vietnam was drawn. Formulae for economic, military
and especially political courses of action were different from — ■ often
antithetical to -- French objectives and interests.
The U.S. intelligence community felt if France "acted
swiftly to insure Vietnam full independence and to encourage strong
nationalist leadership . . . anti-French nationalist activity might
be lessened (and) with French military and economic assistance — -
backed by U.S. aid -~ the Vietnamese could proceed to develop gradually
an effective security force, local government organization and a long
range program for economic and social reform." 13 / But there were
three other routes or combinations of routes open to France in post-
Geneva Vietnam. France could work to maintain French Union ties,
indirect French political control and economic domination rather
than grant full independence to Vietnam. Or, France could try to
reach an agreement with the Viet Minh, expedite elections and achieve
a unified country in which French cultural, economic and political
interests could be maintained. A fourth possibility, thought likely
only if the situation deteriorated to the point of hopelessness, was
a French decision to withdraw all military, economic and administra-
tive support from Indochina. lk/
Of the four courses of action open to France, three were
rejected, by the Eisenhower Administration. Continuation of French
Union ties plus indirect French controls would be impossible under Diem,
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whose anti-French feeling ran deep, who had not in the past and would
not now accept anything less than complete freedom from France. And
Diem had American backing. Dulles believed "the kind of thing he
stands for" is the "necessary ingredient of success" and called the
Diem government the "nucleus for future efforts." 15/ Accommodation
with the Viet Minh was anathema to both Diem and the U.S. Although
American policy spoke of taking steps to prevent the complete absorption
of the DRV into the Soviet bloc, those steps amounted to nothing more
than maintenance of a U.S. consulate in Hanoi. 16/ Dulles in particular
could not see Ho Chi Minh as Asia's Tito and refused to deal with him,
thereby crushing Mendes- France's hope that Vietnam could become an
experiment in peaceful coexistence, lj/ The U.S. was equally determined
to prevent the quick withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps from
Vietnam. It was believed:
*
in the last analysis, Vietnamese security will be determined
by the degree of French protection and assistance" in the
development of a national army,
plus Vietnamese energies and the will of other powers to guarantee
Vietnamese security. 18/
Thus, United States policy required France to grant full
Vietnamese independence quickly and to support a strong indigenous
political regime, to maintain French military presence but reduce
military, economic and political controls. Basic guidance determined
at "National Security Council meetings on August 8 and 12 became
NSC 5^29/2, issued on August 20.
3^ U.S. Objectives in Vietnam: Political, Economic, Military
The American formula for government in free Vietnam rested
on three legs. Independence was first and more important. France must
treat South Vietnam as an independent sovereign nation and the U.S.
would deal with it on that basis . Full independence was the only way
to win nationalist support away from the Viet Minh, and nationalist
support was thought to be essential to successful government in South
Vietnam. Secondly^ the U.S. would urge Ngo Dinh Diem to establish
a government of national union representative of dominant elements
on the political scene. After bringing some stability to the nation,
a Constituent Assembly would be called and a constitution drafted to
herald the legal dethroning of Bnperor Bao Dai and inauguration of
democracy. 19/ Finally, the formula demanded firm French and U.S.
support for Diem. Despite his rigidity, his penchant for a one-man
show and his inability to communicate or deal with people, Diem was a
nationalist untainted by past association with either Viet Minh or
French. This quality, plus full independence, plus Franco-American
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backing and encouragement for broad reform ultimately would result in
a strong anti-communist South Vietnam. Or so the U.S. thought.
U.S. determination to back Diem was made with the knowledge
that French support for him was hardly enthusiastic. Guy La Chambre,
Minister for the Associated States, faulted Diem on three essential
points: Diem would oppose a representative government, oppose agrarian
reform and refuse to depose Bao Dai and create a republic. La Chambre
expected a new government would be necessary to give South Vietnam a
chance of winning the 1956 elections. 20 /
America's economic policy for South Vietnam was designed
to yield immediate political advantage, cope with the staggering dis-
tortion of Vietnamese economic life and ease France out of economic
affairs. U.S. planners believed integration of land reform measures
with refugee resettlement would fill a triple bill: -surplus land
distributed among the thousands of refugees would invite their political
support, facilitate assimilation of Tonkinese with Cochin-Chinese and
bring the land to full productivity. Aid would be given directly to
Vietnam as befitting its independence and as a means to accelerate
! the "disassociation of France from (economic) levers of command." 2l/
j French domination in this area, it was thought, stifled Vietnamese
efforts and contradicted Vietnamese independence. It also inhibited
American economic interests. Militarily, the U.S. would build up
"indigenous military forces necessary for internal security . . .
working through the French only insofar as necessary." 22/ Exactly
how indigenous forces would be developed was not decided until December
195^- > because France had some ideas about what to do and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff differed with State Department opinions as to the kind
of U.S. involvement required.
k. The U.S. "Chooses" Policy for France
In effect, these policy decisions of August 195**- asked
Mendes-France to overcome "French traditional interests and emotions
which have in the past governed the implementation of policy in Indo-
china." They asked for -- or demanded -- a "dramatic transformation
in French policy" because policy makers believed this was necessary
to "win the active loyalty and support of the population for a South
Vietnamese Government." 23/ The U.S. asked France to stay in Vietnam
militarily, to get out of Vietnamese economic and political life, but
at the same time Washington asked for French support and cooperation
in implementing U.S. programs. This was probably asking too much.
By December, the U.S. no longer asked for French support
but demanded it. By December, the qualified U.S. commitment to Diem
had hardened, U.S. involvement in Vietnam had deepened and U.S.
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activities there either dominated or simply excluded the French. Several
i
forces converged to produce this change in U.S. policy. Resolution of
differences within the Eisenhower Administration on military issues
opened the way for U.S. assumption of responsibilities in what had been
an exclusively French preserve. The belief that Diem for all his
failings and weaknesses was the only available leader for South Vietnam,
and that he needed stronger U.S. and French support to quell opponents
and speed development led to the creation of programs designed to
provide that strong support.
Finally, the U.S. believed France had not done enough for
Diem, believed the schizophrenic French policy of professing support
while acting to undermine Diem's regime was largely to blame for
Vietnamese difficulties. This resulted in demands that France live
up to her promises. It made unilateral American efforts more attractive
— French assistance might not be available in any case — - and it
inspired a feeling that Americans had to do more because the French
were doing so little.
C. Tentative U.S. Involvement Becomes Deeper, Firmer
1. Adoption of Military Responsibilities
Authorization for General John (iron Mike) 0' Daniel, Chief
of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (mAAG), Indochina, to take
up the task of training the Vietnamese National Army (VNA) was long in
coming. General T Daniel and French General Ely had discussed U.S.
participation in training in June 195^-j 0*Daniel drew up a comprehensive
plan for advisory assistance at all levels of the military establish-
ment and in July begged the U.S. to beef up the MAAG staff before
August 11, when the Geneva prohibition against introduction of new
military personnel went into effect. 24/ But the Joint Chiefs of
Staff objected.
a. The JCS Arguments Against U.S. Training the VNA
Early in August, the JCS listed four preconditions
essential to the success of a U.S. training effort in Indochina,
preconditions which should be met before training obligations were
assumed. First:
It is absolutely essential that there be a reasonably
strong, stable civil government in control. It is hope-
less to expect a US military training mission to achieve
success unless the nation concerned is able effectively
to perform those governmental functions essential to the
successful raising and maintenance of armed forces.
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Secondly, that government "should formally request
that the United States assume responsibility for training . . .
forces and providing the military equipment, financial assistance and
political advice necessary to insure internal stability." The Chiefs
saw no role in training for the French; the third precondition called
for complete French withdrawal from the country:
Arrangements should be made with the French granting
full independence to the Associated States and providing
for the phased, orderly withdrawal of French forces,
French officials and French advisors from Indochina in
order to provide motivation and a sound basis for the
establishment of national armed forces. The United
States from the beginning should insist on dealing
directly with the governments of the respective
Associated States, completely independent of French
participation or control.
Finally, both "local military requirements and the over-all US
interests should dictate the size and composition of indigenous forces."
§5/
b. Dulles f Views
Of the four preconditions, only the second presented
no problem. The State Department, notably Secretary Dulles, Walter F.
Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, and Kenneth
T. Young, head of an interdepartmental Vietnam Task Force, objected to
the other three stipulations. Dulles outlined his thinking in a
letter of August 18 to Defense Secretary Charles Wilson. Agreeing that
the Diem government "is far from strong or stable" Dulles pointed out
that reorganization and retraining of the army was "one of the most
efficient means of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become strong."
Calling this "the familiar hen-and-egg argument as to which comes
first," Dulles made his preference clear. He saw two courses of
action open to the United States:
•
one, to strengthen the government by means of a political
and economic nature and the other, to bolster that
government by strengthening the army which supports it.
Dulles wished to adopt both courses.
As for the question of French presence or absence,
Dulles said:
It would be militarily disastrous to demand the with-
drawal of French forces from Vietnam before the creation
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of a new National Army. However . . .• there would seem
to be no insuperable objection to the U.S. undertaking
a training program . • . while at the same time the
French Forces commence a gradual phasing out from that
theater. 26/
c. The NSC Backs Dulles
Adoption of NSC 5^-29/2 indicates the U.S. Government
found Dulles f views more persuasive than those of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. But while it was agreed to "work through the French only
insofar as necessary" to build up indigenous forces, the program for
bolstering the Vietnamese army was not developed for several months.
d. JCS-State Split on Force Level, Mission for VNA
On September 22, in a memorandum recommending
establishment of a MAAG, Cambodia (if "all French advisors ultimately"
are withdrawn, if the U.S. deals directly with Phnom Penh and if these
caveats are written into a bilateral agreement with Cambodia), the JCS
recommended against assignment of training responsibilities to the
Saigon MAAG because of the "unstable political situation" in South
Vietnam. 27/ Instability was noted "with concern" by the JCS in a
second September 22 memorandum dealing with development of forces in
Indochina, as was the cease-fire agreement (called "a major obstacle
to the introduction of adequate US MAAG personnel and of additional
arms and equipment"). 28 / Because of these factors, the Chiefs con-
sidered "this is not a propitious time to further indicate United
States intentions with respect to the support and training of Viet-
namese forces."
But the JCS had been directed by the NSC to address
the question of Vietnamese force levels; against their best wishes, one
supposes, this memorandum forwarded their views. A 23^,000-man army
was proposed for Vietnam; the annual cost of training and maintaining
this force — assuming France turned over to the VNA arms and equipment
furnished under the U.S. Military Development Assistance Program since
1950 — was put at $^20 million. Another $23.5 million would be
needed to train and equip the Navy and Air Forces. Further, the JCS
wanted speedy relinquishment of French over-all command of the VNA and
speedy withdrawal of French forces as the Vietnamese "are capable of
exercising command of an effective force." Finally, the JCS requested
"a definite agreement ... be obtained from the French Government
with respect to the timing of their programmed phased withdrawal"
before U.S. assumption of training responsibilities. 29 /
Dulles objected to these proposals:
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It seems to me that the mission of the Vietnamese
National Armed Forces should be to provide internal
security. The manpower and cost estimates (of the JCS)
would seem to be excessive in the above context.
The Secretary called a French request of $330 million to support the
French Expeditionary Corps, then expected to number 150,000 men
through 1955, and the Vietnamese plan to keep 230,000 men under arms
,f • . • beyond what the United States should consider feasible to
support for maintaining the security of free Indochina at this time."
Instead, he called it "imperative" that the U.S. Government -- e.g.,
the JCS — "prepare a firm position on the size of the forces we
consider a minimum level to assure the internal security of Indochina."
30/
A week later the Chiefs in turn objected. The idea
of training the VNA for internal security contradicted NSC 162/2
which "envisages reliance on indigenous ground forces to the maximum'
extent possible" in territorial defense. Citing the threat from
"considerable numbers of Viet Minh guerrillas and sympathizers . . .
known to be or suspected of being within the territory, of free Vietnam"
and the GVN "intention of requesting the phased withdrawal of the
French forces by 1956" the Chiefs said:
This would result in a complete military vacuum unless
the Vietnamese are adequately prepared to take over pro-
gressively as the French withdraw.
The force levels recommended on September 22 were reaffirmed as "the
minimum required ultimately to carry out the . . . objectives" of the
VNA, which should be "to attain and maintain internal security and to
deter Viet Minh aggression by a limited defense of the Geneva Armistice
demarkation line." The JCS pointed again to the unstable political
situation in Vietnam, the 3^-2-man MAAG ceiling and concluded:
Under these conditions, US participation in training not
only would probably have but limited beneficial effect but
also would assume responsibility for any failure of the program.
In light of the foregoing and from a military point of view, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States should
not participate in the training of Vietnamese forces in
Indochina. However, if it is considered that political con-
siderations are overriding, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
agree to ohe assignment of a training mission to MAAG,
Saigon, with safeguards against French interference with
the U.S. training effort. 3l/
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e. Again , the NSC Backs Dulles , Recommends a U.S.
Military Program in South Vietnam
Political considerations were overriding. The JCS
concession to consider training the Vietnamese for internal security
alone coincided with deliberations in the Operations Coordinating Board
over possible ways in which to strengthen the Diem regime. A crash
program had been outlined by State , part of which was a limited interim
training program recommended by the OCB. Admiral Radford, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed this would set in motion the long-
range training program proposed by General T Daniel in June; he still
believed that program should not be adopted. But before the JCS could
consider or suggest revisions to the OCB proposal, the National Security
Council met on October 22 and approved a joint State-Defense message to
Saigon authorizing Ambassador Donald Heath and 'Daniel to "collaborate
in setting in motion a. crash program designed to bring about an improve-
ment in the loyalty and effectiveness of the Free Vietnamese Forces." 32/
The JCS were directed to recommend force levels necessary to "accomplish
the military objective merely of the maintenance of internal security." 33/
Responding on November 17 > the JCS proposed a force of
89,085 at an estimated cost of $193-1 million for Fiscal Year 1956 and
approximately $100 million for the remainder of FY 1955. To provide
internal security and "in an attempt to stabilize the Diem government" the
JCS suggested prompt reduction in force and prompt reassignment of selected
personnel and units to maintain "the security of the legal government in
Saigon and other major population centers," execute "regional security
operations in each province" and perform "territorial pacification missions."
Later, military centers would be established for reorganization and training
of the military.
The Chiefs expressed serious reservations about the
probability of Vietnamese — and American -- success. First,
the chaotic internal political situation within Vietnam
is such that there is no assurance that the security forces
visualized herein can be developed into loyal and effective
support for the Diem Government, or, if developed, that
these forces will result in political and military stability
within South Vietnam. Unless the Vietnamese themselves show
an inclination to make individual and collective sacrifices
required to resist communism, which they have not done to
date, no amount of external pressure and assistance can long
delay complete Communist victory in South Vietnam.
Secondly, "the cooperation and collaboration of the
French MAAG" is vital to effective execution of the program -- and the
JCS doubted that support would be readily offered. Finally, the Chiefs
cautioned,
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the above program does not provide adequate security for
I the Associated States against external aggression after
the withdrawal of the French forces. With the Viet Minh
increasing the size and effectiveness of their forces and
with no forces in "being committed to mutual defense under
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the above
J long-range program would be insufficient to provide more
than limited initial resistance to an organized military
assault by the Viet Minh. 34/
f. Collins Agrees with the NSC
Another memorandum of November 17 indicated how quickly
the United States had moved to inaugurate the crash program approved at
the October 22 NSC meeting. Secretary Dulles outlined for President
Eisenhower the recommendations of General J. Lawton Collins, special
envoy sent to Vietnam to over-see all U.S. operations, coordinate them
with French programs and get things moving. Collins recommended the
the "Vietnamese National Army. . .be reduced by July 1955 to 77,000. It
should be placed under Vietnamese command and control by that date....
The cost to the U.S. would be two hundred million dollars annually....
The United States should assume training responsibility. . .by January 1,
1955 > with French cooperation and utilizing French trainers."
Collins insisted that French forces be retained in
Vietnam:
It would be disastrous if the French Expeditionary
Corps were withdrawn prematurely since otherwise Vietnam
would be overrun by an enemy attack before the Manila
Pact Powers could act.
To "encourage the French to retain sufficient forces," Collins urged
U.S. financial support of at least $100 million through December 1955 •
General Ely concurred. 35 /
2. Conditions in Vietnam Invite Firmer Action
The situation in Vietnam during the autumn of 195^- invited
an action program of some kind — any kind. Premier Diem barely
controlled Saigon; he was opposed by his army ! s chief of staff, by power-
ful sect politicians guarding significant special interests with powerful
sect armies; he was at least tacitly opposed by many French in Vietnam.
The countryside had been devastated by the war; communications, adminis-
tration and financial operations were stalled; an already prostrate
economy was threatened by the deluge of some 860,000 refugees from the
north. Over all hung "an atmosphere of frustration and disillusionment"
created by the Geneva Accords and imposed partition, "compounded by
widespread uncertainty as to French and US intentions." 36/ U.S. policy
in August set out to correct the uncertainty: Diem was to be supported
by both America and France. But U.S. policy could not eliminate Diem's
opposition.
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a . The Military Threatens Diem
General Nguyen Van Hinh, Chief of Staff of the Viet-
namese National Army, was the first coup-plotter to rise and first to
fall. September threats of a military revolt were first staved off by
the mediation of U.S. Ambassador Donald Heath and General Ely (who
doubted Diem's capacity to lead but worked to prevent his violent down-
fall). Then Diem uncovered a coup plot, arrested some Hinh supporters,
•removed the general from command and ordered him out of the country. 37/
Hinh refused to leave and continued his machinations against the govern-
ment. Plans for one coup in October were dropped when Hinh was told
revolt would mean automatic termination of U.S. aid. 38/ Another"
scheduled for October 26 was foiled when Colonel E. G. Lansdale, head
of the Saigon Military Mission and chief CIA man on the scene, lured
two key subordinates out of the country. Lansdale invited Hinh and
staff to visit the Philippines. Hinh unhappily declined but his
supporters -- one of whom allegedly was a French agent — could not
resist the chance to see the inner workings of the Magsaysay-led, U.S.-
supported operation against Huk insurgents. 39/ Finally, in November,
Bao Dai was persuaded by America and France to intervene on Diem's
behalf. He did, ordered Hinh to report to Cannes, and on November 19 >
the general left the country, ho/ General Hinh enjoyed some French
support in his anti-Diem activity. Ambassador Heath reported he received
I ' "quiet encouragement if not unofficial support" from many French officers
and officials in Saigon and "at the working level in Paris." kl/ Hinh
was also aided initially by the sects, later by the Binh Xuyen.
b. The Sects Threaten Diem
The Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, basically religious
groups with important political controls and interests as well as private,
French- subsidized armies, worked with Hinh through early September.
Then, spurred by the knowledge that precipitate action would jeopardize
J American aid, the sects agreed to work with Diem. k2/ Last minute
threa/ts and "heavy pressure" from French officials against coalition
; left sect leaders "dizzy" but they recovered sufficiently to accept
cabinet positions on September 2k. k^J Shaky to begin with, the co-
I alition never worked: Diem refused to delegate responsibility to his
eight new ministers and they soon tired of trying to work through the -
government. '
c . And the Binh Xu yen Opp ose Diem
The Binh Xuyen, too, considered joining the coalition
but pulled out when Diem refused to name Binh Xuyen leader, "a colorful
brigand named Le Van (Bay) Vien" Minister of the Interior, kk/ Bay Vien
had forged a motley group of small-time gangsters into a fairly sophis-
ticated organization of 6000 big-time gangsters and river pirates, and
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had been helped in this endeavor by Bao Dai and French colonial admin-
istrators. The Binh Xuyen controlled prostitution and gambling in
Cholon and the Saigon-Cholon police force -- reportedly because Bay Vien
paid Bao Dai some kO million piasters for these privileges . k^J Still-
dissident sect Headers such as Ba Cut, whose 5000 Hoa Hao adherents
denounced Geneva and refused cooperation with Diem, and Frenchmen opposed
to Diem abetted Binh Xuyen intrigues against the government.
3« French Laxity Demands Strong U.S. Programs
More than the Vietnamese power struggles and Diem's inability
to consolidate his rule, French activities during the autumn of 195*+ gal-
vanized the United States. From acquiescence to U.S. demands in September,
American policy makers felt France had moved toward opposition to U.S.
demands by November. That this assessment of French actions was either
objective or fair is questionable.
a. The Washington Conference, September, 195^-
After Franco-American discussions in Washington in late
September -- the first in a progression of monthly meetings on Vietnam --
the United States seemed to have scored highest. France promised to
support Diem, to grant independence to Vietnam quickly. kGj The transfer
of financial, administrative, economic and other functions to the Viet-
namese had begun and would be completed by December 195^-* That France
balked at U.S. demands for an immediate grant of independence outside of
the French Union is not surprising: French cultural, economic and polit-
ical interests in Vietnam were still strong; the Frenchman's belief in the
validity of the French Union was deep. No French government dared defy
public opinion by seeming to hasten the end of the French Union, kj/
France felt the U.S. had an "almost psychological attachment to 'inde-
pendence' without giving sufficient thought and attention to the practical
problems and risks involved." kQ/
Secondly, the U.S. had been able to defer a commitment
to finance the French Expeditionary Corps in Vietnam although an indication
that aid would be resumed, if not resumption itself, had been the first
order of French business at the Washington Conference, ks / France agreed
to maintain the Corps in Vietnam but was told no aid figures would be
available until December. 5^ /
Both France and the U.S. thought their respective economic
aims had been won. France objected strongly to the idea of direct Ameri-
can aid to Vietnam on the grounds that it violated the Geneva Accords,
would needlessly provoke Communist China, promote graft and corruption in
Vietnam, and intensify the political struggle. Plus, "past (French)
sacrifices on behalf of Vietnam and their obligation as a member of the
French Union" made French supervision of aid essential. 57/ To France,
a compromise agreement drafted by Walter Bedell Smith meant the U.S.
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accepted these arguments and was willing to give France a hand in
disbursing aid to the Associated States* 52/ The U.S. chose
not to interpret the agreement this way. The State Department said the
U.S. merely indicated willingness to consult on such matters. 53/
On 29 October 3 Dulles told Mendes-France that the U.S. alone would dis-
perse aid; by late November Mendes-France finally tired of arguing an
obviously lost cause and dropped the matter. $k/
b . The U.S. Faults French Support for Diem
• • Despite apparent agreement at Washington to back Diem,
Secretary Dulles met with Mendes-France three weeks later in Paris about
the same subject. "For. . .ready reference" Acting Secretary of State
Herbert Hoover quoted for Dulles part of the 29 September Minute of
Understanding in which the
...representatives of France and the United States agree
that their respective governments support Ngo Dinh Diem in
the establishment and maintenance of a strong, anti-Communist
and nationalist government. To this end France and the
United States will urge all anti-Communist elements in Vietnam
to cooperate fully with the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem in
order to counter vigorously the Viet Minh and build a strong
free Vietnam. . . .While Ely seems to have attempted honestly to
carry out this agreement, the fact that many French elements
have never accepted Diem solution must have weakened Ely's
efforts and encouraged Hinli camarilla in its recalcitrance....
Unless Diem receives unreserved US and French support, his
chances of success appear slight. With such support, his chances
are probably better than even, repeat even. 55/
e. Accommodation Between Paris and Hanoi?
Apart from the quiet backing given Diem T s opponents
by French officers and officials in Saigon and persistent Paris proposals
for a cha,nge in government (Prince Buu Hoi, whose "political ideologies"
were repugnant to Dulles, was a French favorite at this time), the U.S.
found in French accommodative gestures toward Hanoi ample proof that
French backing for Diem was reserved at best. 56 / Ambassador Dillon
felt Mendes-France found in Vietnam a "situation ideally designed to
test (the) bases of his fundamental political philosophy of 'peaceful
coexistence 1 " and that his government grew more and more "disposed to
explore and consider a policy looking toward an eventual peaceful North-
South rapprochement." 57/ French insistence on strict legal interpre-
tation of the Geneva Accords was one example of accommodation thinking.
France objected to anything which could possibly delay or destroy
elections in 1956; Dillon predicted Paris would accept the results of
elections "however academic that exercise may eventually prove to be." 58,
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But the most worrisome example to those at the State Department who
lined up against any kind of accommodation was the Sainteny Mission
to Hanoi.
d. Sainteny or Ely?
Jean Sainteny, credited with reaching short-lived
independence accords with Ho Chi Minh in March 19^6, was sent back to
Hanoi in August 195^- to find ways to protect French business and
.cultural interests in Tonkin. 59 / Sainteny 1 s past success at rapproche-
ment gave the mission definite political overtones. General Ely wished
Paris had sent a "stupid type of consular official" not a man of Sainteny 1 s
"active stripe"; he was disturbed enough to fly to Paris to tell Mendes-
France he would resign if French policy was to play a "double game" in
North and South Vietnam aimed at backing whichever side ultimately won.
Mendes-France assured Ely that French policy was to give maximum support
to the anti-Communist elements in South Vietnam and do everything possible
to assure their victory in 1956. Ely was placated and returned to Saigon.
But Sainteny remained in Hanoi and maximum support for Diem did not
materialize. 60/
From another source came word that Ely was not "au
courant" with French policy. French Union Counsellor Jacque Raphael-
Leygues, reportedly a member of the Mendes-France "brain trust" on Indo-
china, told Ambassador Dillon that Sainteny had convinced Paris that
South Vietnam was doomed and the "only possible means of salvaging any-
thing was to play the Viet Minh game and woo the Viet Minh away from
Communist ties in the hope of creating a Titoist Vietnam which would co-
operate with France and might even adhere to the French Union." Raphael-
Leygues said France deferred to U.S. wishes over which government to
support in Saigon "to get money for the French Expeditionary Corps and
to fix responsibility for the eventual loss of South Vietnam on the U.S. 6l,
In December 195^-j Sainteny won Ho Chi Minh T s agreement
to permit French enterprises to carry on without discrimination. But if
the contract pleased Paris it did not assure French businessmen in Tonkin.
Viet Minh legislation would regulate their operations; profits could not
be transferred outside the Communist orbit. Most French concerns decided
potential benefit was not worth the risk of doing business with the DRV
and despite Sainteny' s efforts to establish mixed government-private
corporations , most withdrew from the North. 62 / Sainteny remained as a
"general delegate" to the DRV.
e. The Mansfield Report
A final spur to U.S. action was the Mansfield Report.
After a. fact-finding trip to South Vietnam, Senator Mansfield concluded
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his old acquaintance Diem was the only man for the job in Saigon. He
said the issue "is not Diem as an individual but rather the program
for which he stands." That program "represents genuine nationalism, . . .
is prepared to deal effectively with corruption and. . .demonstrates a
concern in advancing the welfare of the Vietnamese people." The Senator
felt it "improbable" that any other leadership "dedicated to these
principles" could be found and recommended the Government "consider an
immediate suspension of all aid to Vietnam and the French Union Forces
there, except that of a humanitarian nature, preliminary to a complete
•reappraisal of our present policies in Free Vietnam" if Diem fell. 63/
The Mansfield Report elated Diem (who proceeded to react
with even more intransigent self-righteousness to suggestions of change),
subdued the French and annoyed Paris. For those Frenchmen who favored
conciliation with the Viet Minh, Mansfield's analysis proved the validity
of their policy. Obviously , they said, if Diem falls the U.S. will heed
Mansfield and withdraw from Vietnam. Equally obviously, they said, Diem
will fall. Ergo, France should start "betting on Viet Minh to win war." 6k/
To French officials willing to back Diem the Report and Washington T s
endorsement of it was a violation of the Franco -American agreement to sup-
port another government if Diem fell. When Mendes -France reminded Dulles
of this and spoke of the need to lay plans for "another structure of govern-
ment" which both France and the US could support, Dulles was noncommittal. 65,
k. NSC Action Program of October, and Eisenhower Letter to Die m
President Eisenhower's letter to Diem of 2k October (written
August and shown to the French at that time; held up until the political
situation in South Vietnam settled somewhat; finally approved for trans-
mission at the October 22 NSC meeting) was called a direct violation of
the principle of cooperative action agreed upon in September by Minister
La Chambre. 66 / French Ambassador Bonnet told Secretary Dulles that "it
was felt (the letter) had given Diem full rein without requiring of him
as a preliminary condition that he should first succeed in forming a strong
and stable government, even though this preliminary condition had been a
part of the basis of the Washington agreements." Bonnet added that the
letter might be a violation of the armistice and the Viet Minh might take
advantage of it. 67/ Then, when Ambassador Dillon suggested to the
Quai d 1 Or say that French support for Diem had not been all that it might
have been, La Chambre was inflamed. Not only was this a false allegation,
it was a direct slur on General Ely, the government in Paris and the glory
of France. M. La Chajnbre said he was personally convinced Diem was
leading South Vietnam to disaster but would still support him:
We prefer to lose in Vietnam with the US rather than
to win without them. . .we would rather support Diem knowing
he is going to lose and thus keep Franco-US solidarity than
to pick someone who could retain Vietnam for the free world
if this meant breaking Franco-US solidarity. 68 /
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In response, Secretary Dalles formally told Mendes- France
that both the Eisenhower letter and the stronger U.S. action were "in
furtherance of the understandings reached at Washington." The U.S.
had not "the slightest idea of questioning the good faith of the French
government" but "ma.ny French officials have not concealed their belief
that Diem has failed. . .and. . .should be replaced." This attitude produced
an "impasse 'in Saigon" necessitating firmer action. 69/ La Chambre
received this with "little comment" other than to suggest appointment of
Nguyen Van Tarn (General Hinh's father, Premier during 1952-1953 and a
strong-even oppressive-administrator) to the Interior Ministry. La Chambre
called this a "way out of the mess... (for) here is -a man who knows how
to fight Communists." 70/ As in the past, the U.S. rejected the proposal.
5 • More Action' The Collins Mission
The initial U.S. action program rested on three assumptions:
that Diem could be persuaded to accept U.S. proposals, that Hirih would
obey the government, that the French at all levels would cooperate. None
proved immediately valid. So the U.S. adopted yet another tactic. General
J. Lawton Collins, U.S. Representative to the NA.T0 Military Committee, was
dispatched to Vietnam on November 8 with the personal rank of Ambassador
(Heath returned to the State Department). As President Eisenhower des-
cribed it, Collins 1 mission was:
to coordinate and direct a program in support of (Diem's)
government to enable it to: (a) promote internal security
and political and economic stability; (b) establish and main-
tain control throughout the territory; and (c) effectively
counteract Viet Minh infiltration and paramilitary activities
south of the demarkation line. 71/
After initial resistance to the Collins mission (seen as a
precursor to complete U.S. take-over of Indochina), General Ely established
a close working relationship with Collins. A seven-point program for
political, military and economic action was quickly designed. On Decem-
ber 13, Ely and Collins signed a Minute of Understanding agreeing that
France would grant full autonomy to the VNA. by July 1, 1955 and that the
U.S. would assume training duties in January. They agreed the French
Expeditionary Corps must remain in Vietnam and the level of financial
assistance suggested by Collins ($100 million through December 1955 after
which assistance was not contemplated) was adopted by the Foreign Opera-
tions Administration and subsequently announced to Paris. Aid was contingent
upon consultation with Congress and "subject to Ely and Collins and the two
governments mutually agreeing on what is to be done in Indochina." 72/
6. . France Objects to Collins-Ely Agreements
• ■
Paris was unhappy about the aid figure — a third of
what France requested. Consequently, withdrawal of French forces was
speeded: of the 150,000 troops scheduled to remain in Vietnam through
1955, all but 35,000 were phased out. Monetary reasons were said to be
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paramount but political and psychological pressures for the pull-out
were probably more important. There was strong sentiment in France
for sending the FEC to North Africa where it could serve the interests
of France and the French Union. In Vietnam, French soldiers served the
free world but were hated by the Vietnamese and ignored by the very powers
they aided, powers which did not care enough to properly defray French
expenses. 73 /
Paris was more upset by the Minute of Understanding.
During November discussion with Dulles, Mendes-France had said he doubted
full autonomy could be assumed by the Vietnamese by July 1955 and believed
a readjustment of MAAG personnel for the new training mission might violate
the Geneva Accords. These arguments were reiterated at December Trilateral
meetings. But Mendes-France T s real trouble was agreeing to phase out
French instructors. Neither the French people nor French soldiers would
understand why France was denied influence while required to support such
a heavy burden in Vietnam. Mendes-France and General Ely insisted that
if French instructors were eliminated the U.S. automatically would have
assumed primary responsibility for free world policy toward Indochina. 7V
(Dulles and General Collins rejected that line of reasoning but convinced
neither the French nor others that it was fallacious . )
Collins compromised in the Minute of Understanding by
agreeing to softer language (both French and American instructors would
be removed as Vietnamese efficiency increased), hoping to assuage Paris.
He failed. When the Minute was forwarded for final approval Mendes-France
stalled. First he had to study it closely to ensure no conflict with
Geneva was involved. Then on January 7, the French submitted a redraft
of the Minute which omitted reference to General T Daniel T s authority over
French personnel. 75 /
Collins was already annoyed by hedging in December ,
tantamount to a slap in the face of Ely to whom full authority to negoti-
ate the agreement had been delegated. 76 / Pie refused to "agree to (the
redraft) unless specifically instructed by higher authority" because lines
of authority were not spelled out. 77/ Yet Ely thought Paris had approved
the original agreement. He urged Collins to continue negotiations with
the Vietnamese on the basis of the first Minute , advice Collins followed
despite the Paris-Washington snafu. On January 19 and 20 a formal exchange
of letters finalized the agreement for U.S. assumption of training duties
and financial support ($21-!-. 5 million) for the Vietnamese forces. The
forces would be scaled down to 100,000 by December 1955. Both cost and
force levels were raised from Collins' November recommendations in deference
to Vietnamese arguments. 78/ The U.S. and France remained deadlocked
until February 11, 1955 j when the terms — but not the form — of the
original agreement were finally accepted. The next day., General T Daniel
assumed responsibility for training Vietnamese forces and the Training
Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM) went into operation. 79/
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D. Franco -Ameri can Impasse Over Diem
Resolution of military problems within the U.S. Government
and between the U.S. and France was a fairly major accomplishment.
Political differences were not similarly resolved. To support or not
to support Ngo Dinh Diem was the issue over which France and America
split.
1. Paris: Diem Is Ill-Suited for Rule
As noted above , France acquiesced in the retention of Diem
as Prime Minister in deference to U.S. insistence and French concern for
U.S. financial assistance for the FEC during the September Washington
conference. In mid -November, Mendes-France reaffirmed the 29 September
agreement but said an alternative form of government had to be considered
unless Diem implemented an energetic program within the next two months.
By December , when Mendes-France , Dulles and Eden met in Paris, the
French Premier made it clear he thought the time had come for a change.
Two ways to accomplish change were suggested. Bao Dai could name a
Viceroy and give him full authority to use the powers of Chief of State
to unify the warring political factions. Tran Van Huu, Nguyen Van -Tarn
or Dr. Phan Huy Quat were possible candidates for this job. 80 / Or,
Bao Dai himself could return to Saigon and form a government with Huu as
Premier, Tarn as Interior Minister, Quat in Defense. 8l/
France wanted Diem out of power for several reasons. U.S.
policymakers did not seem to fully appreciate how galling Diem's Franco-
phobia must have been, nor did the U.S. seem to understand -- or allow for
the divisive effect Diem's militant ant i- communist stance had within the
French Government. Little consideration was given to charges that the
U.S. was undermining France by portraying itself as the only friend of
Vietnamese nationalism. But the U.S. could appreciate the validity of
French arguments that Diem had not been and perhaps would not be able to
unify and stabilize South Vietnam.
2 . Collins: Diem Cannot Lead South Vietnam
General Collins had been skeptical about Diem from the outset;
by December he was convinced an alternative to his government should be
urgently considered. Diem T s refusal to name Dr. Quat as Defense Minister
triggered Collins 1 recommendation. Both Collins and Colonel Lansdale had
urged Diem to accept Quat, agreeing Quat alone was strong enough to unify
the Vietnamese armed forces behind the Saigon government. On December 13,
Collins suggested five reasons for Diem's adverse decision:
(l) unwillingness to delegate control of Vietnam armed forces
to any strong man; (2) fear of Quat as potential successor;
(3) opposition of sects (who also feared a strong man in the
defense post); (h) influence of brothers Luyen and Mhu (anxious
to neutralize the power of any potential successor); (5) desire
to retain Minh (acting defense minister; loyal to Diem) in
government. 82/
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According to Collins,
Whatever the reasons, the failure to utilize Quat
epitomizes lack of unity among Vietnamese and lack of decis-
ive leadership on part of Diem. . . -Acceptance of status quo
with Minh elevated to Defense Ministry and sects reinforced
in veto power over government is simply postponing evil day
of reckoning as to when, if ever, Diem will assert type of
leadership that can unify this country and give it chance of
competing with hard, effective, unified control of Ho Chi
Minh, 83/
Three days later, General Collins communicated his "final
judgment" on the situation. He made four recommendations:
A. Continue to support Diem along present lines for short
while longer but without committing US to specific aid
programs ;
B. Consider urgently, as possible alternative, the early
return of Bao Dai;
C. If after short period of further test Diem Government
fails to achieve substantial progressive action and if
return of Bao Dai is acceptable to US Government, to support
his prompt return;
D. If return of Bao Dai is not acceptable to US Government,
assuming Diem Government continues to demonstrate inability
' to unite free Vietnam behind an aggressive program, I recom-
mend re-evaluation of our plans for assisting Southeast Asia
with special attention (to an) earlier proposal. Qk/
The earlier proposal, made by General Collins on December 13, was that the
U.S. gradually withdraw from Vietnam. Collins said this was the "least
desirable (but) in all honesty and in view of what I have observed here
to date this may be the only sound solution." 85/
3. State Department: Diem Is the Only Available Leader
The State Department went along with Collins 1 suggestion to
avoid specific assistance commitments at the present time but could not
see salvation in Bao Dai. A memorandum from Ambassador Heath, then working
in the Far East Bureau is indicative of State Department thinking. Heath
first called attention to "massive opposition" faced by Diem and French
unwillingness to firmly support him -- implying that all Diem's problems
were not Diem T s fault. He then spoke of General Collins' "attempt to
achieve a rapid solution," said Collins' "recommendations are now based
on the circumstances of a satisfactory settlement prior to January 1" —
thereby suggesting that one not looking for a rapid solution might not
arrive at similar conclusions.
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The memorandum closed with Heath's interpretation of
Secretary Dulles' policy and his own thoughts as to what ought to be
done :
In our view., General Collins* recommendations ignore the
basic factor that we would assist a Communist takeover by a
withholding of our aid, even if it must necessarily be given
to a government which is less than perfect. The Secretary
has analyzed the situation as one in which we are conducting
a time buying operation. If we withhold our support to Viet-
nam, it will be taken over sooner than if we extend smaller
aid, at a figure of about a third of last year. In the mean-
time, we will proceed to do what we can to strengthen Cambodia,
Laos and Thailand. This is .my understanding of the Secretary's
policy.
I recommend we inform the Secretary and General Collins
that we recognize the dangers posed by the above policy, but that
in the lack of more useful alternatives that we will continue
to support Diem, because there is no one to take his place who
would serve US objectives any better. This includes the Bao
Dai solution which is opposed by the facts of Bao Dai's lack
of support in Vietnam and his past demonstrations of inability
to govern. The fear that a fiscal commitment of over $3°° rnil-
. lion plus our national prestige would be lost in a gamble on
the retention of Free Vietnam is a legitimate one, but the
withholding of our support at this juncture would almost inevit-
ably have a far worse effect." 86/
The substance of the memorandum was cabled to Secretary Dulles, then in
Paris for the Tripartite French, U.S. and British discussions. 87/
k . December Tripartite Talks
a. France Proposes Alternative to Diem, Dulles Seems to
Acquiesc e
On 19 December, Mendes-France opened the Indochina, talks
by calling Diem's approach "wholly negative," said "not a single reform
suggested (by Franco-American working groups advising the government on
all matters) had been accepted by Diem," that the "French Government now
considered. . .a strong approach would have to be made to Diem." Reaffirming
his past agreement with Dulles' "thesis that we must do our maximum to
permit Diem Government to succeed" Mendes-France added:
now-. ..he was not longer sure that even maximum would help.
He said we must now have alternate formula in mind. Without
varying from our stated purpose of supporting Diem Govern-
ment as long as it exists we must now prepare in our minds
for alternative. 88,
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Dulles agreed the
task in South Vietnam was difficult (but) regarded basic
factors as favorable. People were opposed to communism
and had great natural resources. . .they received greater
aid from abroad than North. . .situation was much improved
now that there was full cooperation between French and
American authorities. The problem must not be approached
in spirit of defeatism. Only serious problem we have not
yet solved is that of indigenous leadership. We cannot
expect it to be solved ideally because there is no tradi-
tion among indigenous people for self-government. We must
get along with something less good than best.... (The US was)
not repeat not committed to Diem in any irrevocable sense.
We have accepted him because we knew of no one better.
Developments have confirmed our fears as to his limitations
but no substitute for him has yet been proposed. Those
suggested in past varied from month to month. Now it is
claimed that only Bao Dai can save situation. If that is
case, then we must indeed be desperate We should continue
to back Diem but exert more pressure on him to make changes
we consider necessary. 89 /
Mendes-France suggested the U.S. and France approach
Bao Dai and mentioned the French Viceroy plan to replace Diem. Dulles
countered by saying the U.S. and French might use Bao Dai but "we must
go to him prepared with our own ideas and not... simply accept his."
Dulles did not expect any Viceroy to be able "to decide on alternate to
Diem and to set up machinery to implement our ideas... our job (is) to
create this machinery." He added,
We must exhaust all our pressures on Diem to get things
done before considering alternate solutions. .. .He asked
Mendes not to think we had obstinately closed our minds to
possible alternate solution. We had not repeat not, but '
our investigation of alternate must be done on careful basis
and we must for present support Diem. 9°/
Mendes-France agreed. He summarized his position as
follows: •
First, to support Diem; second, to study alternatives.
Collins and Ely should be instructed to explore further
possibilities including Bao Dai with great discretion...
third point was that Ely and Collins should be requested to
investigate matter of timing. How much further delay can
be tolerated?. . .We must set deadline.... 91/
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Then Dulles agreed — - but added a fourth point:
If the US should decide that there is no repeat no
good alternative to Diem we will have to consider how
much more investment we will be prepared to make in Indo-
china. Our policy would have to be reappraised. Congres-
sional committees. . .would have to be consulted. Mansfield
believes in Diem.... Even slight chance of success in Vietnam
was worth considerable investment. US had also to think of
what happened in adjacent countries — in Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand and Malaya. US situation was different from that
of French. French had. an investment in lives and property
in Vietnam while ours involved effect that fate of Vietnam
would have on rest of Southeast Asia. 92/
b. But Dulles Reports, No Other Suitable Leader Can Be Seen
After the Tripartite meetings, Dulles reported his assess
ment of their outcome to Saigon. He said he had agreed with Mendes-France
on four points concerning Diem but' had not agreed to a deadline for Diem's
replacement. Rather, "Collins and Ely would report late January on over-
all situation."
Dulles called the "investment in Vietnam justified even
if only to buy time to build up strength elsewhere in area" and concluded:
We are going to have to maintain flexible policy and proceed
carefully by stages in Vietnam. . . .Under present circumstances
and unless situation (in Vietnam) clearly appears hopeless and
rapidly disintegrating, we have no choice but continue our aid
Vietnam and support of Diem. There no other suitable leader
known to us. - 93/
France believed Dulles had in fact committed the United
States to consider a change with which Bao Dai would be associated by
mid-January. Washington denied it and Paris protests were unable to
budge the State Department. The U.S. and France did agree that the Tri-
partite talks had given Collins and Ely a mandate to study alternatives,
however. 9V
c. The U.S. Looks at Alternatives
Having told Paris the U.S. was not committed to either
a deadline or an alternative involving Bao Dai, the U.S. proceeded to
study alternatives. Secretary of Defense Wilson asked the Joint Staff to
assess the impact on military commitments to Southeast Asia of the loss
of South Vietnam, of continued but reduced assistance to that nation and
of a range of actions in between. 95/ T^ e JCS responded by calling
Wilson 1 s alternate options incomplete, that consideration of increased
aid, and institution of a unilateral program of direct guidance to the
GVN through an "advisory system" should be among U.S. considerations.
If these programs were insufficient to insure the retention of South
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Vietnam to the free world the U.S. might deploy "self-sustaining forces
to South Vietnam either unilaterally or as part of a Manila Pact force"
or the U.S. could withdraw all U.S. support from South Vietnam and con-
centrate on "saving the rest of Southeast Asia."
No specific course of action was recommended but the
JCS predicted the loss of Cambodia and Laos would follow a communist
take-over of South Vietnam; they felt a greatly expanded aid program
would be necessary to retain a friendly government in Thailand. In any
event, the chance that U.S. armed forces would be required to support
American policy in Southeast Asia would be greatly increased if South
Vietnam fell. The Chiefs concluded by saying "a firm decision at the
national level as to the implementation of US policy in Southeast Asia
is mandatory, recommended. . .against a 'static 1 defense for this area and
...recommended adoption of a concept of offensive actions against the
military power of the aggressor." 96/
5- January 1955: U.S. Backing for Diem is Reaffirmed
General Collins 1 recommendations to the National Security
Council on January 20, 1955 underscored the crucial position South Viet-
nam held within the context of American policy toward Southeast Asia.
Like Dulles and the Joint Chiefs before him, Collins said:
In view of the importance of Vietnam to all of Southeast
Asia, I am convinced that the United States should expend the
funds, material and efforts required to strengthen the country
and help it retain its independence. I cannot guarantee that"
Vietnam will remain free even with our aid. But I know that
without our aid Vietnam will surely be lost to Communism. If
the chances of success are difficult to calculate, the results
of a withdrawal of American aid are only too certain not only
in Vietnam but throughout Southeast Asia. Such a withdrawal
would hasten the pace of Communist advances in the Far East as
a whole and could result in the loss of Southeast Asia to
Communism. In my opinion the chance of success is not only
worth the gamble; we cannot afford to let free Vietnam go by
default. 97/
Collins was more sanguine about Diem than he had been a
month before. Diem ha,d shown some progress: General Minh was named
Minister of Defense and seemed to be doing an adequate job; Diem had
launched an anti-corruption drive (and in closing the Grande Monde
Casino, Diem threw down the gauntlet before the Binh Xuyen) and had made
some advances in land reform. Collins recommended continued U.S. support
for him:
On balance I believe that Diem's integrity, strong
nationalism, tenacity and spiritual qualities render him
the best available Premier to lead Vietnam. . .against com-
munism. .. .Considering all factors, although the situation
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in Vietnam is not brdgirtj I believe that if Diem has firm US
support and guidance and active French cooperation, or at least
acquiescence, his government has a reasonable prospect of success
• 98/
As a result of Collins 1 recommendations the NSC endorsed a strong
policy in Vietnam: the US would continue to support the Diem government and
continue to press France to carry out its commitments under the Smith-
LaChambre agreement „ The NSC approved in principle the programs of mili-
tary and economic aid to implement Collins 1 recommendations (about $500
million) and determined to seek reaffirmation of the Manila powers 1 deter-
mination to react under the SEATO treaty if hostilities were resumed., 99 /
Dulles decided to "take the plunge" and begin direct aid to Vietnam on
January 1, 1955° The aid program was to be flexible and fluid, adjusted
according to circumstances and subject to discontinuance at any time, as
at present o lOO/
Eo Crisis of the Spring, 195 5
With strong United States backing, Diem went into the sect crisis
of the spring, 1955 • Different from the military coup crisis of Autumn
195^- ar *d the Quat cabinet crisis of December, the sect crisis was resolved
by Diem T s taking firm action and was not followed by another It was fol-
lowed by the end of any real French presence in Vietnam.
1. The Problem of the Sect Armies
The sects had been quiescent but not quiet since Cao Dai and Hoa
Hao ministers had joined the cabinet in September 195^ ° The end of French
subsidies for sect armies in February shook them out of complaceny. Diem
agreed to pay a part of what the armies had received from the French to ease
the transition of some 40, 000 soldiers to civilian life. But transition it
was to be: he would not tolerate armed bands separate from VNA command and
separate from Saigon's political guidance. Sect leaders had different
objectives, however. They wanted to preserve their military forces by
integrating, intact, as many units as possible into the National Army.
(With a VNA force level of 100,000, few could be accommodated ; in January
only 6,000 sect troops had been absorbed.) Secondly, the sects wanted sub-
stantial government assistance for soldiers forced to leave' the military.
Most important, they wanted recognition of their areas of influence and
Diem's assurance that he would not encroach on their territories. Diem
would countenance no part of this third request. 10l/
Since December, a Franco -American group headed by Col. Lansdale
and directed to ! come up with a peaceful solution" to the problem had
worked furiously, found a solution and urged its prompt adoption. Generals
Collins and Ely decided to give the matter further study. Lansdale 1 s
reaction:
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We warned them that time was extremely short, that the sects
were about to take action by arms and that a peaceful solution
would have to be introduced immediately or the opportunity
would be lost* The opportunity was losto 102/
2o The United Front Challenges Diem
«
Lost because Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sect leaders joined with
Bay Vien in February, put down hostilities among themselves and joined in
a United Front of Nationalist Forces . In March, the United Front demanded
Diem form a government of large national union The eight sect cabinet
members resigned (although Cao Dai Generals The? and Phuong soon changed
their minds). A United Front de3.egate tried to convince Bao Dai to with-
draw Diem 1 s powers as premier but the timely arrival of a personal letter
from President Eisenhower outlining US objectives and progress in Vietnam
proved more persuasive The letter either reassured Bao Dai that the US
had not written him out of the political picture or made him think twice
about joining with the sects and thereby incurring US wrath • Whatever the
reason, he refused to intervene on behalf of the Front „ 103/ Mem called
the Front Program an ultimatum and would not budge.
France wanted Bao Dai to mediate between Diem and the United
Front o The US wanted to issue a joint declaration telling the sects both
America and France opposed violence and warning them that the French Ex-
peditionary Corps would block any movement of Hoa Hao troops into Saigon
to reinforce the Binh Xuyen Ely and Paris refused the warning clause:
French troops would act only in protection of the lives and property of
French and. foreign nationals . 104/
3o Diem Challenges the Binh Xuyen
During this time, Lansdale was meeting almost nightly with Diem e
He reports Diem
was desparately trying to get French and US help to remove the
• Surete from the control of the Binh Xuyen French and US
reactions to the problem were in the form of advice to proceed
.slowly, to act with caution Events would not permit this 105/
Before dawn on the 28th of March, a paratrooper company loyal
to Diem attacked and overcame the Binh Xuyen-controlled central police
headquarters. The next day, Diem told Defense Minister Minh he planned to
oust Binh Xuyen Police Commissioner Lai Van Sang that afternoon --
March 29 — and replace him with someone loyal to his regime. Minh in-
sisted Diem at least consult the cabinet before taking action Q Diem re-
fused and Minh resigned. Representatives of General Ely were able to
persuade Diem to defer any move against the Surete , however. 106/
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jr- On the night of March 29-30 the Binh Xuyen struck backo
Mortar shells fell on the palace grounds and Binh Xuyen troops tried to
regain the prefecture They were repulsed by National Army troops The
VNA then moved to attack the Surete itself in retaliation but French
officers apparently cut off their gas and ammunition supplies temporarily
to keep the National Army on the defensive c Fighting ended by 3:30 in
the morning of March 30 107 /
' General Ely opposed a VNA offensive against the Surete
headquarters , not because it might fail but because it was irrelevant
Relevant was Diem T s inability to defeat the sects rapidly and decisively
throughout the country,. If force were used to prove a minor point, a
long, bloody and major civil war would surely ensue Ely was outraged at
Diem 1 s attitude He felt the premier verged on megalomania and was ready
to "put the city to sword and flame to establish his authority " 108 /
Collins sympathized with Ely, but also felt if Diem did not prove he could
control Saigon he would be forced to accede to sect demands 109,
^+o Truce - But No Calm
On March 31.? a ^-8-hour cease-fire was won by General Jean
Gambiez, trusted by both the National Army and the Binh Xuyen o The truce
was extended into April but failed to cool tempers or ease tensions. (Cao Dai
forces which had broken with the United Front were integrated into the
National Army on March 31> however ~ one happy note for Diem.)
a ° Lansdale 1 s version
Lansdale, whose account of this and later developments is
not at all flattering to the French, says Ely decided to impose a cease-fire
and won Collins 1 concurrence French officers then moved in and stopped the
fighting.. Lansdale "saw Ambassador Collins. .explaining that only the Binh
Xuyen would gain by the cease-fire." But it continued:
•
Ambassador Collins was sincerely convinced that the Binh Xuyen
could be induced by French negotiations to withdraw from the
Surete and police control of the metropolis • o . 110/
Lansdale reports the French had long been working against Diem through the
Vietnamese National Army (they used its G-6 as an arm of French intelligence)
and that French soldiers under his command in the National Security Divi-
sion of TRIM tried to sabotage the Diem regime and US programs designed to
strengthen it.
The French had daily fed us the latest French propaganda line
(Diem was weak, Diem was bloodthirsty, the VNA had low morale
ooowas unable to fight, Americans didn ! t understand the Viet-
namese, all whites must encourage only selected Vietnamese
loyal to the French because the remainder would turn against
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all whites in another "night of the long knives" similar to
that of 191*6.)
Nov the French had been insistent that the National Army was a
hollow shelly that its officers would refuse to fighto.othat
morale was so "bad the troops would desert rather than follow
"bloody Diemo" 111/
Lansdale implies Collins fell for this "propaganda" but he, Lansdale,
did not.
On the cease-fire, Lansdale reports:
1
The French told Diem that if he tried to take over Surete
headquarters which was now included in the French zone, French
troops would open fire on the Vietnamese Army The US advised
Diem to be patient, that the French were really being helpful
by negotiating with the Binh Xuyen c The cease-fire limit was
extended o o oSizeable sums were being offered (by French) to
Army officers and to sect leaders who were remaining loyal to
Diem and to entice them into being at least neutralo Those'
who refused were subjected to character assassination
attacks . . 112/
bo Ely and Collins 1 Decision: Diem Must Go
On April 7.? Collins and Ely discussed Diem. Ely said Diem
could be maintained only by overcoming enormous difficulties After a full
day of "soul-searching," Ely had been forced to conclude Diem had to go
to preserve Vietnam for the free world e He would accept anyone but Diem
as premier. 113/ Collins had been nearing a similar conclusion o 'On
March 31 be told the State Department it was necessary to consider alter-
natives 'to Dierrio Ilk/ A week later Collins cabled Dulles to insist Diem
be removed. He recommended Tran Van Do (Diem 1 s foreign minister who also
resigned from the cabinet in March) or Dr Quat as replacements . 115/
Co Dulles 1 Indecision
Dulles replied as he had in December: he could not see how
Diem 1 s replacement would solve the sect problem for any successor worthy of
US assistance would still have to contend with them A change in premiers
would damage US prestige throughout the Far East: the US would be charged
with paying lip service to the cause of Asian nationalism, then abandoning
a nationalist leader when pressured by "colonial interests c " Plus pro-
Diem Congressional sentiment was a problem o The Mutual Security bill was
under debate and Mansfield had made it clear that Congress would be reluc-
tant to appropriate funds to a Vietnam without Diem. Despite these diffi-
culties, Dulles eventually agreed to consider a change if Collins would
personally come to Washington for consultation o 116/
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.
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d. Paris: Diem's Time Is Up
At the same time Paris was fast losing patience. The
time has come to form a government responsive to dominant political
forces in Vietnam, to abandon the unrealistic U.S. policy of maintaining
and strengthening Diem, said France. Formation of a Conseil Superieur
was proposed, representative of Diem and his supporters, the sects,
intellectuals, politicians and the army. The Conseil would decide policy
and a cabinet of non-political technicians headed by Diem would implement
it. 117/ But the U.S. rejected this plan saying Diem should be allowed
to strike back at the Binh Xuyen with force and France and America should
support him — morally and logistically. 118/
Then Washington asked the Quai d'Orsay to answer a set of
questions designed to elicit specific French plans for the change in Viet-
namese government. Paris' rejoinder: the questions should be answered
jointly or the united Franco -American effort in Vietnam would be over and
France would have to say publicly that the U.S. had assumed sole responsi-
bility for developments in Vietnam. 119/ But in mid-April, France filled-
m part of the questionnaire -- leaving blank a successor to Diem (only
joint consultation could decide this). Paris proposed Collins and Ely
draw up a slate of acceptable candidates for major positions. The U.S.
and French governments would a,gree on a final list, ask Bao Dai to summon
representatives of various factions to Cannes and on the basis of French-
U.S. recommendations, negotiate a solution to the sect-Binh Xuyen-Diem
impasse. Sect support would be assured by their membership in a high
council and a program of honors, indemnification and integration of sect
troops into the National Army. 120/
e. Bao Dai's Plan
•
On April 21, Bao Dai announced his own plan for resolving
the crisis, remarkably similar to that submitted by Paris. Bao Dai wanted
to summon various representatives to Cannes, name Dr. Quat as premier, ask
him^to form a cabinet of technicians and a high council of notables. On
April 26, Bao Dai said he would implement the scheme unilaterally unless
the U.S. made some response by the following day. 121/
Meanwhile, Collins had left Saigon for consultations with
Dulles. Lansdale reports a meeting held just before his departure:
He (Collins) told Lansdale not to be worried by newspaper
rumors that the US would stop supporting Diem. Lansdale
asked then if his orders were to continue supporting Diem;
Collins said yes. Members of the country team privately
felt that Diem should be supported by us, that the National
Army was ready to support him and had the capability of
defeating the Binh Xuyen. 122/
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fo Dulles' decision: U.S, Will Consider a Change in Regime
General Collins and Secretary Dulles met on April 27 o
Dulles agreed to consider shifting support to either Quat or Do and a
message to this effect was sent to Saigon. 123/ But Dulles determined not
to discuss this with France until a full and frank statement of her inten-
tions had been received o That statement was to include an unequivocal as-
surance to back whole-heartedly any new political arrangements in Saigon
and to resolve "certain ambiguities" in French policy toward North Vietnam.
Until this declaration appeared the US would reveal no change of heart
over Diem 124 /
5° Diem Acts Against the Binh Xuyen
Then the truce exploded On 28 April; Diem told Lansdale:
The Army and people laid the blame (for the crisis between the
government and the Binh Xuyen) on the French because they could
see French armored vehicles and troops in the streets evidently
ready for action against the Vietnamese We (lansdale and an
assistant) told him that it looked as the Vietnamese still
. needed a leader, that Diem was still President , that the US was
still supporting him Q
' That afternoon, Diem's private secretary called Lansdale. He
said the palace was
under heavy mortar fire, that the President was on another line
talking to General Ely, that Ely stated that he couldn't hear
any explosions and the President was holding the mouthpiece out
towards the explosions so Ely could hear them Hai (the secre-
tary) started to ask what should be done, interrupted himself to
say that the President had just ordered the National Army to
start returning the fire and had so informed Ely Q He hung up
125/
Against the advice of French; US and most cabinet advisors, Diem
had issued a decree charging Police Commissioner Lai Van Sang with "very
grave official misconduct" and named Col. Nguyen Ngoc Le to replace him e
Sang refused to resign, saying only Bao Dai had authority to remove hinu
Binh Xuyen troops in Cholon apparently opened fire on National Army units
and Binh Xuyen shells fell again on the palace o But within nine hours after
Diem T s order to take the offensive, the National Army had driven the Binh
Xuyen back into Cholon. Fires raged (set by the Binh Xuyen, according to
Lansdale); hundreds were killed or wounded 126/
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6o Washington Acts: U.S. Will (Again) Support Diem
Washington responded with alacrity to Diem's success, superficial
though it waso Saigon was told to forget Dulles T earlier message about US
willingness to see a change in government „ Policy had not changed after all:
the US supported Diem The Saigon Embassy burned the first message 127/
7<> Diem and Others Defy Bao Dai
Buoyed by his showing against Bay Vien, Diem ignored the summons
from Bao Dai which appeared on April 28 • The Emperor ordered Diem and
General Ty to Cannes, placed Binh Xuyen sympathizer General Vy in charge of
the army and dispatched General Hinh to Saigon with personal instructions
from Bao Dai. 128/ Diem refused to leave Saigon, refused to allow General Vy
to assume command, refused to allow General Hinh into the country, 129 /
On April 30 a new development surfaced The National Revolu-
tionary Congress of the Vietnamese people was announced Backed by Cao Dai
Generals Phuong and The , Hoa Hao General Ngo, other attentiste politicians,
it claimed to represent almost all political parties in South Vietnam o The
Congress declaration repudiated Bao Dai, dissolved the present government
and called on Diem to form a new government and elect a national assembly to
draft a constitution c 130/
Diem was receptive to the program of the Revolutionary Congress,
particularly since his brother Nhu had a hand in drafting it. He was prob-
ably not as receptive to some of the activist members of the Congress, how-
ever, most of whom joined in a Revolutionary Committee. Generals Trinh Minh
The and Phuong confided to Lansdale:
The Revolutionary Committee had grown out of the Revolutionary
. Congress Front organization which Diem 1 s brother Nhu had tried
to organize some days earlier; they had followed (SMM's) advice
and had joined with Nhu in the Front but were dissatisfied with
some of the weak organizations they felt Nhu was depending on^
so had organized something more ^dynamic to meet the threat of Vy
and Bao Dai and called themselves the Revolutionary Committee e
They wanted Bao Dai dethroned and wanted the French to stop
interfering in Vietnamese affairs. 13 l /
Support, backhanded though it may have been, helped Diem politic-
ally in Vietnam and with the United States. Militarily he was never really
threatened by Bao Dai or Generals Vy or Hinh (who was never able to deliver
Bao Dai*s special orders ) D The National Army was stronger than French and
Americans thought and it refused to obey General Vy. The following episode,
related to Lansdale by General Ty and Colonel Tran Van Don after their tem-
porary arrest by Vy, illustrates this e General Vy bragged about being able
to get anything he wanted from the French „ Ty and Don asked him to prove
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it." (They). . .asked him to call up the French and request the armored
vehicles which the French had been holding at Bien Hoa so long without
delivering to the Vietnamese Army. The French rushed these vehicles to
Hinh's house (Vy f s headquarters), evidently having been holding them just
outside town for this emergency, where Army men took them over and drove
them into the fight against the Bihh Xuyen. Ton said the French still
hadn't caught on, still thought that Vy would use this armor to bring the
Army into line to stop fighting the Binh Xuyen and be loyal to Bao Dai.
Don added that the Army felt the same as the Revolutionary Committee: Bao
Dai was finished." 132/ General Vy retreated to Dalat (and Bao Dai ! s
Imperial Guards), then left the country.
During these days, General Ely had grown more convinced that
Diem was not only irresponsible, he was quite mad. Ely feared fighting
would spread to the European sector but was unable to win American or
British support for an attempt to reirnpose the cease-fire. American
Charge d 'Affairs Kidder felt Ely himself was approaching hysteria and
that his emotiona.l involvement compromised his usefulness to either
France or the United States. 133 / Ely's premonitions of violence between
Vietnamese and French forces proved unfounded. But violence did accompany
Diem's final offensive against the Bihh Xuyen which opened on May 2 when
the VHA crossed the Chinese Arroyo and attacked Bay Vien's forces in
Cholon. By the following day, most of the Binh Xuyen had been driven out
into the Rung Sat swamps.
I . When Collins returned to Saigon he urged Diem to hold the
! Revolutionary Committee in check (Collins, most of the French and French
intelligence thought Vietminh had infiltrated the front organization;
they feared Diem would become its prisoner if he backed it too strongly).
Collins wanted Diem to reconstitute the government and get on with reforms,
leaving the problem of Bao Dai to an elected national assembly. 135/ Diem
followed this advice. He invited some 7°° elected counselors from 39
j provinces to consider Bao Dai's legality. An Estates General composed of
50 counselors drew up a program demanding Bao Dai transfer all civilian
and military powers to Diem who would exercise them until the assembly
met — within six months — to draw up a constitution. 136/
8. May Trilateral Meetings
_
i a. Dalles Backs Diem
At this same time, France, the United States and Britain
met once again in Paris. The Tripartite session had been called to discuss
problems of European Defense but Vietnam was the real subject. The posi-
tions of both S2cretary Dulles and French Prime Minister Edgar Faure (who
succeeded Mendes-France in February 1955) toward Diem had hardened. Dulles
insisted he be upheld:
Diem is only means US sees to save South Vietnam and counter-
act (the) revolutionary movement underway in Vietnam. US sees
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no one else who can Q Whatever US view has been in past, today
US must support Diem whole-heartedly o US must not permit Diem
to become another Karensky e
o o
• Bao Dai . . had irretrievably lost capacity to be anything but
titular head of government. o oCao Dai and Hoa Hao could be used
but not Binh Xuyen. „ • oWith support (of France and US) Diem could
sit on top of revolution o Diem is only force of moderation,,
FEC is certain stabilizing influence. US was giving ftmds to
support Vietnamese army and could not see anyone else to give
funds to but Diem for that purpose.
ooln US view present revolution is not yet dominated or influenced
by Communists to any appreciable degree «, o o Support of Diem did
not indicate US non-recognition of his weaknesses US 000 had
been and remained ready to support any other man who might be
presented by orderly process of law e (Dulles) remarked that just
before outbreak of fighting US was prepared to consider alter-
natives but he was not sure now that it would have been practi-
cal, oodf there is a better man US is ready to consider him but
. o olio one has been suggested Although Collins had reached
agreement with Ely in early April to change Diem he now believes
we must support him. 137/
bo The French Position
French Minister La Forest had opened the meeting by pointing
to consultations (scheduled for July) between North and South Vietnam about
elections. He said France felt South Vietnam could win the contest if a
"nationalist, stable and broadly based government" were in control and that
Franc e wanted South Vietnam to win.
There is no ambiguity in French policy between North and South
Vietnamo Presence of France in North could not be erased by
stroke of pen c It is French duty to protect her cultural and
economic presence there. Sainteny mission is designed for only
that purpose o France had given up thought of mixed companies
as result (US) objections and had now surrendered coal mines.
o o
LaForest presented the French analysis of events over the past
four months o While the US could not argue his facts, the US could not accept
LaForest' s interpretation of thenu Differences between the two nations were
more fundamental than at any time in the pasto
o o o
France had loyally supported government of Diem from begin-
ning o Any allegation to contrary is untrue. . France reached
agreement with US last December to persuade "or compel" Diem to
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enlarge government. It was agreed to give him until January at
which time, if he had failed, we would look into matter of alter -
° nate discreetly This was not done. Last March present govern-
ment broke into open conflict with sects „ United Front of sects
was formed against Diem Both December agreement and common
sense told us at that time that something (had) to be done to avoid
civil warooooFor this reason, joint Ely-Collins approach was triedo
It was hoped they would arrive at joint plan for solution.
Washington appeared first to welcome this concept then changed its
mind. Collins left Saigon when civil war was about to break outo
Untenable truces were declared a When they were about to expire
Bao Dai submitted his own piano «,<> in order to try to reconcile US
and French failure to acto US failed to reply to Bao Daio In
absence of Collins from Saigon, Bao Dai acted
LaForest continued o o .that new Revolutionary Committee appeared to
have control o Committee is strongly under Viet Minh influence <> o
There is violent campaign against French and French Expeditionary
Control. Viet Minh agents make good use of it and certain
Americans do not seem sufficiently aware of this« French Govern-
ment does not wish to have its army act as platform for Vietminh
propaganda o Army will not be maintained at any costo.o 138 /
Co Faure: We Will Withdraw to Save the US-France Alliance
Then Mo Faure took the floor, stating France was not in
agreement with the United States and that It was time to speak frankly.
He said Diem Is "not only incapable but mad," he took advantage of Collins 1
absence to effect a "coup de force which won primary victory but which has
not contributed to any lasting solution and "France can no longer take
risks with hlm " Diem will bring on a Viet Minh victory, focus the hostility
of everyone on French and force a break between France and the US
Faure concluded with this significant statement.
Diem is a bad choice, impossible solution, with no chance to
succeed and no chance to Improve the situation. Without him some
solution might be possible, but with him there is none However,
I cannot guarantee any other solution would work nor is it
possible to clarify the situation,. There seems to be fundamental
disagreement between us c I could have claimed that since French
position is predominant in Vietnam, you should accommodate your
views more to ours, but I have rejected this. What should be
done under the circumstances? What would you say if we were to
retire entirely from Indochina and call back the FEC as soon as
possible. I fully realize this would be a grave solution, as it
would leave French civilians and French interests in a difficult
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.positiorio o • olf you think this might he a possible solution, I think
I might be able to orient myself towards it if you say so It would
have advantage of avoiding all further reproach to France of
"colonialism" while at same time giving response to Diem T s request
that France should go G Since it contemplates the liquidation of
the situation and the repatriation of the FEC, would the United
States be disposed to help protect French civilians and the
refugees? 139 /
Secretary Dulles repeated his awareness of Diem's weaknesses
but did not agree with Faure T s opinion Diem "showed so much ability that
US fails to see how he can be got rid of now 00 oDiem is stronger now than
when Bao Dai first withdrew his powers " Dulles said the worst aspect of
the problem was the differences between France and the US: "Vietnam is not
worth quarrel with France c " Then he matched Faure's offer by saying the US
would withdraw from Vietnam if that would solve the problem*.
000
Choice open to us is to have Diem supported or to withdraw
US interest in Vietnam is simply to withhold area from com-
munists. US will give consideration to any suggestion French
make but must warn that US financial support may not be ex-
pected to any solution which (Dulles) can think of as alterna-
tive to Diemo iho/
Foreign Secretary MacMillan , calling British interests
"more indirect but nonetheless vital because (l) interest in area itself
and (2) interest in Communist threat from any area in world," made the ob-
vious statement that a decision on Vietnam was too grave to be taken that
evening o Faure and Dulles agreed l4l/
do Dulles; Continue with Diem - but Independently of France
By May 11, when the three ministers reconvened, Dulles had
received counsel from the JCS and General Collins As was their wont, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff offered no opinion about whether Diem should or should
not be continued (a matter for "resolution at the governmental level") but
then stated his government showed the "greatest promise of achieving the
internal stability essential for the future security of Vietnam*" Address-
ing the military aspects of the problem, the Chiefs found neither withdrawal
of the French Expeditionary Corps nor withdrawal of US military support
acceptable. The Vietnamese National Army was considered incapable of main-
taining internal security, even less able to resist outside aggression with-
out outside military assistance The US was barred by Geneva from increas-
ing its forces either to defend Vietnam or to defend French civilians, other
foreign nationals or refugees Thus, although withdrawal of the French
Expeditionary Corps is "ultimately to be desired," precipitate withdrawal at
this time was not: it would "result in an increasingly unstable and pre-
carious situation" and the eventual fall of South Vietnam to communism.
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The Chiefs felt France alone would be unable to stabilize the situation,
that the WA would fall apart without "US moral and materiel support,"'
and that the "best interest of France as well as the United States" .war-
ranted energetic action to restore internal order and prevent South Viet-
nam' s loss to the free worldo 1^2 /
General Collins also opposed French withdrawal for three
reasons: first, the FEC was responsible under the Manila Pact for the
defense of Indochina and neither the US nor Britain were prepared to take
over that responsibility,. Secondly, French military assistance (logistical
support and training) was essential to the development of the Vietnamese
forces o Third ; although the presence of French troops was a source of
bitterness to the Vietnamese, General Collins believed the FEC was a
stabilizing influence on Vietnamese politics . 1^3 /
Dulles 1 proposal to Faure on May 11 reflected these judg-
ments o Emphasizing that Indochina, for all its importance, must not be
allowed to damage Franco -American relations, that US support for Diem must .
not be allowed to split the alliance, Dulles proposed that France continue
to support Diem until a National Assembly could be elected to determine
the ultimate political structure of South Vietnam, a structure which might
or might not include Diem, ikk/
Against his own views, against French public opinion and
on certain conditions; Faure accepted the proposal. The Prime Minister
insisted the Diem government be enlarged, elections be held as soon as
possible, the sect problem be resolved, anti-French propaganda cease,
Bao Dai be retained as chief of state, French and American officials deemed
disturbing to Franco-US harmony be removed from Vietnam (Lansdale, for one)
and that the US assure him French economic, cultural and financial relations
with South Vietnam would be nurtured Agreeing to these stipulations,
Dulles added Diem was not a US puppet and he could not guarantee conditions
involving Vietnamese action would be met. Then, saying the problem in
Vietnam did not lend Itself to a contractual agreement between France and
the United States, Dulles suggested each should state its policy and pro-
ceed accordingly,. In effect, said Dulles, the days of joint policy are
over; the US will act (more) independently of France in the future „ lk6/
Fo The Twilight of French Presence in Vietnam
Back in Vietnam, Diem was doing well D He had dealt the Binh Xuyen
a coup de grace; the Army was pleased with its success against Bay Vien,
supported Diem and rather relished the chance to continue the fight against
remaining sect armies Diem launched a campaign against the sect armies
on May 8, to regain control of wayward provinces and solidify Saigon's
control throughout the country • The US, again, gave Diem unqualified sup-
port and the French, again, reluctantly backed him* Bao Dai was a minor
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threat; trying to overthrow Diem had been a "blunder and his popularity was
very low c On May 10, a relatively unknown group of "technicians" was
named as Diem 1 s cabinet, to function until elections for a national assembly
(lie Id on March k, 1956). General Collins left Vietnam on May lk} Ambassador
Go Frederick Reinhardt replaced him later in the month. And on June 2,
General Ely 1 s mission terminatedo General Jacquot assumed military duties
as Commissioner-General, duties which consisted primarily of supervising
the increasingly rapid pace of the French military pull-out.
lo All-Vietnam Elections
Although political concessions made to the United States in May
and economic and military actions taken before and after that time had re-
duced -- almost eliminated -- French presence and influence in Vietnam
France still was obligated to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Accords
Under increasing pressure from French public opinion to give Hanoi no
pretext for renewing hostilities as long as the French Expeditionary Corps
remained in South Vietnam, the French Government urgently sought to persuade
Diem to accept consultations about the elections scheduled to begin in July
1955 • lw/ Britain wanted to prevent any public repudiation of the Accords
and joined France in urging Diem to talk to the Vietminho But Diem had not
changed his view of the Accords: he had refused to sign them and continued
to insist he was not bound by them c ikj/
The United States stood between these extremes A draft policy
toward all-Vietnam elections -- finally produced in May 1955 ~ held that to
give no impression of blocking elections while avoiding the possibility of
losing them, Diem should insist on free elections by secret ballot with
. strict supervision Communists in Korea and Germany had rejected these
conditions; hopefully the Vietminh would follow suit. 1^8/
Diem could not bring himself to sit down with the Vietminho Consul-
tations would give the appearance of having accepted the Geneva settlement;
consultation with the Vietminh without the kind of Western backing given Rhee
and Adenouer would be futile, lk-9/ On July l6, Diem said South Vietnam
could "not consider any proposal from the Communists" without proof that
they had mended their ways and were prepared to hold genuinely free elec-
tions. 150/ But another reason was Diem ! s belief that he could not re-
present a sovereign nation -- or be free of Vietminh propaganda charges of being a
colonialist puppet -- until the French High Command and the French Expedi-
tionary Corps were gone c 15l/ Minister Nguyen Huu Chau was dispatched to
Paris to negotiate the withdrawal of the FEC from Vietnam (except naval
and air forces which Diem wanted under VNA command) and revision of economic,
; . cultural and financial accords 152/ Diem also wanted Vietnamese affairs
transferred from the Ministry of Associated States to the French Foreign
office; he insisted the post of High Commissioner be abolished and that
Ely's successor (Henri Hoppenot) be credited as Ambassador.
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2o Franco -Vietnamese Differences, Autumn 1955
France was anxious to get the FEC out of Vietnam (and into North
Africa); the matter of turning the High Command over to the TOA was not a
problem*. Placing French units under Vietnamese command was a definite prob-
lem, however and domestic politics would not allow any immediate change of
Vietnam's status within the French Union 153/ Talks stalled until July*.
Diem accepted Ambassador Hoppenot (whose duties, if not title, were' that of
High Commissioner) and things moved a bit, then stopped when Diem arrested
two French officers suspected of bombing electric power stations in Saigon
and said they would be tried by Vietnamese courts In October, France re-
fused to talk unless the officers were released. 15V The deadlock was
finally broken by the French in December o Paris agreed the Quai d ! 0rsay
would handle Vietnamese affairs, refused to accept the assignment of a dip-
lomatic representative from the DRV to France and made it clear the Sainteny
mission was in Hanoi solely for economic and cultural reasons o France had
already recognized Vietnam as a Republic after Diem's resounding -- too
resounding -- victory of 98 percent of the vote in an October popular refer-
endum. Diem finally released the officers into French custody*, 155/
But these concessions produced no improvement in French-
Vietnam relations o In December, Diem suddenly terminated the economic
and financial accords worked out at the Paris conference of 195^-J mounting
US activity fast drove the former colony from franc to dollar area and
stringent commercial regulations applied to French businesses in South
Vietnam forced already outraged entrepreneurs out of the country in increas-
ing numbers o Diem laid down these conditions on which he would consider
renewed relations with France France had to
denounce the Geneva Agreements, to renounce to speak
about the general elections In 195^^ to approve openly
and without reservation the policy of Mr Diem, to
break all relations with the Vietminh and of course
to call home the Sainteny Mission.
Soon after this, Diem withdrew South Vietnamese representatives from the
French Union Assembly*. 156 /
There was little France could do. Diem spoke for a government
no longer dependent on French support, no longer near collapse o By Feb-
ruary 1956; only 15^000 French troops remained in Vietnam and 10,000 of
these were to be evacuated by the end of March o The High Command was abol-
ished on April 26, 1956° The next month, the US Temporary Equipment Recovery
Mission (TERM) entered Vietnam and another 350 military personnel were
added to the US advisory effort o Few French instructors remained at the
TRIMc
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•3° What of French Obligations Under the Geneva Accords ?
But an important question remained „ Under the Geneva agreements
France was responsible for protection and support of the International Con-
trol Commission; representatives of the People's Army of North Vietnam and
France sat on the Joint Armistice Commission charged with ensuring provisions
of the armistice agreement were meto France could not lightly cast off these
obligations nor could France transfer them to South Vietnam: Diem denounced
the Geneva accords and refused to be bound by them in any way.
In February, French Foreign Minister Pineau described the dif-
ficult French position as a result of certain conditions:
These are the independence granted to South Vietnam and the .
Geneva accords some provisions of which have up to date demanded
and justified our presence in this country o 157/
Particularly difficult was the question of ICC support o Diem
refused to associate South Vietnam openly with the ICC but did agree to"
assume responsibility for its servicing if France would leave a small mis-
sion in Vietnam to fulfill French obligations • 158/ Dulles liked this idea.
His view was: "while we should certainly take no positive step to speed up
present process of decay of Geneva Accords, neither should we make the
slightest effort to infuse life into them," 159/
Eight months later, Diem finally relaxed his uncompromising stand
against Geneva, agreed to respect the armistice and provide security for the
ICC. In July 1956, Vietnam promised to replace the French liaison mission to
the ICCo France maintained membership on the Joint Armistice Commission and
continued to bear ICC expenses 160/ But France was never able to meet Geneva
obligations concerning the elections of 1956, for Diem matched his refusal
to consult with the Vietminh about elections with an adamant refusal to ever
hold theirio Neither Britain nor the Soviet Union pressed the matter; the
United States backed Diem 1 s position
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IV.A.3-
FOOTNOTES
1. Bator > Victor, Vi etnam - A Diplom atic Tragedy , Oceana Publications,
Dobbs Ferry, New lork 19^5; p. 177-
2. Le Monde, 5 June 195k, Bator, p. 213 .
3. Paris Msg 366, 27 July 5k (S); Pans Msg ^38, 30 Jul $k (S)j N ew York
T imes , 27 Aug 5k, 3 Sep 5k; Deptel 7U0 to Paris, 30 Aug 5k (sj
k. lMew ¥ork Times, 30 Dec 5k. Bacor, p. 150: WJfcien the Institute of
Emission and the Excnange Office vere transferred to the Government
of South Vietnam (5 Jan 55) Diem proclaimed: "With the last and
fundamental attribute of our sovereignty regained, henceforth complete
independence of Vietnam has become a living reality."
5 V Paris Msgs 366, 27 Jul 5^ (S)j ^ 30 Jul $K (S)
6. Bator, pp. 175-182. (Bator quotes from the memo ires of General Paul
E1 ^ : L'Indochine dans la To urmente , Plon, Paris 196k)
6a. Bator, p. 1I16.
7. Military Grent aid given France for Indochina under the Military Develop-
ment Assist ance Program from 1950 through 195k, (cut off after Dien Bien
Phu) totalled $710 million. Economic aid to the Associated States of
Indochina totalled $827 million • John D. Montgomery, The Politics of
Foreign Ai d (New York: Praeger, 196*0, 28k.
8. LaCouture, Jean et DeVillers, Phillipe, La Fin d'Une Guerr e, Editions
du Seuil, Paris, I960; p. 29*4-.
9. State Department Draft Report, "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East",
3 Aug 5k (TS)
10. Memorandum from Vice Admiral A.C. Davis for the Secretary of Defense,
"Report on the Manila Conference" 12 Sep 5^ (S).
11. NSC Record of Actions, 210th Meeting, 12 Aug $h; 211th Meeting, 18 Aug
5 1 *- (TO). Letter, Secretary of Defense Wilson to Secretary of State
Dulles, 17 Aug 5k (TS). -
12. Statement made at Bangkok meeting of Manila Pact Council members, 23
Feb 55, quote in lk Sep 55 Memorandum for the Director, Office of NSC
Affairs, Subject: "U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression
in Vietnam." (S) from A.C. Davis, Vice Admiral., USN, Director, Office
of Foreign Military Affairs, 0ASD/ISA.
-
13. NIE 63-5-5)^ 3 Aug 5k, "Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina".
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Ik, Ibid.
15. Deptel 610 to Paris, 18 Aug $k (S).
16. NSC 5^29/2, 20 Aug $k (TS). JCS arguments against dealing with the DRV
are contained in the NSC Records of Meetings 210 and 211 (8 and 12
Aug 5if). Saigon Msgs 336, 27 Jul $k (S), 518, 10 Aug 5*4- . (Ambassador
Heath also argued against dealing with Hanoi "because it would lead
the South Vietnamese to think the US planned accommodation with the
communists) .
17* Paris Msg 2080, 15 Nov $k (s)
18. NIE 63-5-54
19. State Department Beporfc, "A U.S. Policy for Post-Armistice Indochina",
12 Aug 54 (S).
20. Pails Msg lv8l, k Aug 51* (s)
21. Deptel 1023 to Saigon, Ik Sep $k (s). State Department Report, "A
U.S. Policy for Post-Armistice Indochina"; 12 Aug 5^. State Department
Report, "Other Major Political Questions", 27 Aug $k\ President
Eisenhower states: "On August 17, I directed that aid to Indochina
henceforth be given directly to the Associated States rather than
France" , in Mandate for Change (Doubleday, 19&3), p. 3^1 .
22. NSC -5^29/2
23. NIE 63-5-51*
2k. Memorandum for Record, Meeting of General Valluy and Admiral Radford
3 Jun $k (T5). ' Chief MAAG IC Msg 2062A to Department of the Army,
271130ZJul5^ (S).
25. JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: "U.S. Assumption
of Training Responsibilities in Indochina", k Aug 5*4- (To)
26. Letter, Secretary of State Dul3.es to Secretary of Defense Wilson,
18 Aug 5J+ (TS)
27* JCS Memorandum for the SecDef, Subject: "U.S. Assumption of Training
Responsibilities in Indochina", 22 Sep $k (T8). State feared France
and Britain vould object to the JCS conditions and were loath to
disclose then; Cambodia seemed unwilling to antagonize France by
accepting them. JCS insistence was firm, however, and the establish-
ment of a MAAG in Cambodia was stalled for several months until JCS
views finally prevailed • The matter of a unilateral agreement itself
was at least an indirect affront to France because the US apparently
agreed to French demands for a joint training venture in Cambodia
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during the Washington Conference of late September 195^1. The agree-
ment was loosely worded; U.S. and French interpretations differed —
"but the U.S. version prevailed. Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum
for Record, "U.S. -French Talks Regarding Indochina," 27 Sep jk, 10
Oct $k (TS); State Msg 99 to Phnom Penh, 13 Oct $k (TS); State Msg
2213 to Saigon, 1 Dec $k (s).
28. In a study of June 195*1-, the JCS had estimated some 2250 advisors would
he required to train the Vietnamese military forces. MAAG Indochina
was limited to 3^.2 men.
29. JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: "Development
and Retention of Forces in Indochina", 22 Sep $k (To).
30o Letter, Secretary of State to Secretary of Defense, 11 Oct $k (TS).
31. JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: "Development
and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina", 19 Oct $k (To)o
32. NSC Record of Action, 2l8th Meeting, 22 Oct $h (To); Deptel 1679
to Saigon, 22 Oct $k (S).
33* NSC Action 1250; cited in Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
from R. Streuve Hensel (AID/ISA), Subject": "Development of
Indigenous Forces in Indochina", 30 Oct r j,k (To).
3k. JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: "Development
of Indigenous Forces in Indochina", 17 Nov r jh (TS).
35. Memorandum for the President from Dulles; Subject: "General Collins 1
Recommendations Regarding Military Force Levels in Vietnam", 17 Nov
5^ (TS).
36. HIE 63-5-5!].
37. Saigon Msgs 97-1, 11 Sep 5^ (TS); IO36, 16 Sep $k (TS); 3.076, 17 Sep $k
(TS); 120^, 2k Sep $k (TS); 933, 9 Sep 5^ (S)j 953, 95^10 Sep 5 ] i (s).
38. Saigon Msgs 1330, 5 Oct <?k (S); 1382, 8 Oct 5^ (S); 1397, 10 Oct $k
(s); 1U3U, 13 Oct $k (s); 1^87, 18 Oct $k (s); 1*93, 19 Oct ^k (S).
39. Report of the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), 195^-1955 (s).
to. Paris Msgs I927, 5 Nov $k (S); 2036, 12 Nov $k (s); 2211, 25 Nov $k (S);
22to, 28 Nov 3k (S); 2272, 30 Nov 5^ (C)j 2290, 1 Dec 5*+ (C)j Saigon
Msg 1807, 12 Nov 5!*- (S).
kl. Saigon Msgs IO36, 16 Sep 5^ (To); 120^, 2k Sep 5^ (TS).
k2. Saigon Msg 79»±, 29 Aug 5^ (S).
1*3 . Saigon Msgs 1150, 1154, 21 Sep $k (To); 1162, 22 Sep $k (TS); II85,
k3 TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
23 Sep ^h (TS); 1231, 25 Sep 5^ (S).
kh. Shaplen, Robert, The Lost Re v olution , Harper and Row, (Colophon Edition)
New York, 1966; p. 116
^5o Shaplen, p. Il6
U6. State Department Records: E/LaC D-D/l, "Establishment and Maintenance
of a Stable Ant i -Communist Government in Vietnam 11 , 23 Sep $h (s). E/LaC
E-l/3, "Other Major Political Questions, Draft Minute of Understanding",
27 Sep 51*. (S). E/LaC Memorandum 16, "Minute of Understanding" k Oct 5 if
(S). Deptal 1327 to Saigon, 1 Oct $K (S).
^7* Paris Msgs 366, 27 Jul 5U (s); ^38, 30 Jul 5^ (S).
1*8. Paris Msgs 377, 27 Jul $h (s); 715, 20 Aug $h (S).
h$. State Department Records: E/LaC VM-3 "Minutes of Economic Sessions
of Franco-American Bilateral Talks", 20 Oct 5*4- (TS). Deptel Pails
737, 28 Aug 5I1. (TS).
50. State Department Records: E/LaC D-31, "US Financial Assistance to
French Union Forces in Indochina", 2k Sep *jh (TS). E/LaC VM-3, "Minutes
of Economic Sessions of Franco-American Bilateral Talks", 2 Oct $k (TS).
51. Paris Msg 715, 20 Aug $k (s); Deptel to Paris 737, 28 Aug $K (S); E/LaC
Memorandum 1^-, "French Position Papers re Military Aid and Economic
Assistance to the Associated States", 2B~Sep 5k (S).
52. E/LaC MC-2: "Memorandum of Conversation, Smith- LaChamb re Meetings",
29 Sep 5^!-, 6 Oct 5^ (TS). The statement referred to reads as follows:
"Such (aid) programs will be planned and closely coordinated to assure
" • maximum effectiveness through appropriate machinery established in
agreement with interested governments." The obvious ambiguity
invites conflicting interpretations.
53* E/LaC Memorandum 20: "Report to the Secretary of State (from Robertson)
on Franco-American Bilateral Talks", 8 Oct $k, 22 Oct $k (TS). E/LaC
D-l/2, "US Relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam", 23 Sep $k (TS).
5*1-. Deptel I565 to Paris, 29 Oct $h (TS); Paris Msg 1898, k Nov $h (S);
Saigon Msg I919, 21 Nov $k (s); 1935. 23 Nov $h (s); Deptel 2070 to
Saigon, 22 Nov 5^ (S).
55- Paris TEDUL 11, NIACT, 21 Oct $k (TS).
56. Paris Msgs 2018, 1 Nov 5^ (S)j 1883, 3 Nov $h (s); Deptel 1737 to Pa.ris,
10 Nov. 5^ (S); NIE 63-7-5!*: "Probable Developments in South Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia through July 195&", 23 Nov $k. (This discusses
strong sentiment in France to get rid of Diem in favor of someone less
hostile to the Vietminh).
kk TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
57. Paris Msg 208o, 15 Nov 3k (s).
58. Ibid.
59. Paris Msg 6k6 } 15 Aug 3k (S); Saigon Msg kyk, 8 Aug 5U (S).
60. Saigon Msgs 795, 29 Aug 5^ (S); 507, 10 Aug 5^ (S) ; 721, 2k Aug 5!+ (S).
Paris Msg 6k6, 15 Aug 5% (s).
61. Paris Msg I665, 29 Oct $k (S).
62. Hew York Times. 11 Dec 3k; Deptel to Saigon, 2U13, 13 Dec 5U (C); Paris
Msg 25*12, llTDec 5U (C).
63. 83a Congress, 2d Session, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: "Re-
port of Senator Mike Mansfield on a Study Mission to Vietnam, Cambodia
and Laos", 15 Oct 5U.
6U
Paris Msg 1608, 16 Oct 5I* (S); Saigon Msgs 1U78, 17 Oct 5U (s); 1501,
20 Oct 3k (S).
65. DULTE 5 from Paris, 21 Oct 5k (TS). Robert Shaplen, op.cit., p. 118,
reports these comments by Kenneth Young: "Wo realized we had to
proceed carefully with the French, so when they made clear their
position on Diem, we sent a cable to Senator Mansfield, of the Foreign
Relations Committee, who was abroad, asking him what he thought of Diem
as Premier. Mansfield was an old friend of Diem's and we knew what
the answer would be in advance, of course, but it stunned the French.
While they then dropped their open campaign to dump Diem, it became
apparent that they were still maneuvering behind the scenes toward
the same objective, and we realized that while we still had to work
with the French in Vietnam, we would have to adopt a more independent
position."
66. NSC Record of Action, 2l8th Meeting, 22 Oct 3k (TS); TEDUL lk, NIACT,
to Paris, 22 Oct 3k (TS); Paris Msgs 1718, 2*1 Oct 3k (TS); 1737,
25 Oct 3k (TS).
67. Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary of State Dulles, French Ambassador
Bonnet, Sub ject : * Indochina/ 26 Oct 5MS).
680 Paris Msgs 1718, 2k Oct 3k (TS); 1737, 25 Oct 5^ (TS).
69. Deptel 1565 to Paris, 29 Oct 3k (TS).
70. Paris Msgs 1835, I836, 30 Oct 3k (TS).
71. Letter President D.D. Eisenhower to General J. Lawton Collins, 3 Nov
3k (TS).
72. Saigon Msgs I761, 8 Nov 3k (s); 1830, 15 Nov 3k (TS); FAO Washington
kt- TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
TOP SECRET ~ Sensitive
USFOTO 263 to Paris and Saigon, 2h Nov 5*4- (s); (Ely and Collins 1 strong
recommendation that the FEC be maintained in Vietnam overcame reser-
vations of military and diplomatic leaders in Washington that it "be
withdrawn. Washington's reasoning: civil war^ not overt aggression,
threatened Vietnam — and the FEC would not be used in a civil conflict;
the immediate US objectives of restoring order in Vietnam and bolstering
Diem were not furthered by the presence of French troops* Therefore,
the FEC is not worth the cost of its upkeep.)
73o Paris Msg 2^33, 8 Dec $k (TS).
7*+. Saigon Msgs 2250 (NIACT), 13 Dec 5U (TS); 202^ 30 Nov 5^ (S); 22ol,
l I f2009ZDec5l+ (C)j Paris 2601, 19 Dec 5*4- (TS).
75. Paris Msg 2270, 31 Dec 3k (TS); Paris Msg 2870 (NIACT), 7 Jan 55 (TS);
Deptel 2766 to Saigon, 7 Jan 55 (TS).
76. Saigon Msg 2^55, 25 Dec 5MTS).
77. Saigon Msgs 2660 ( NIACT), 9 Jan 55 (TS)j 2663, lO1230ZJan55 (S)j Paris
Msg 2797, 3 Jan 55 (S).
78. Saigon Msgs 2^53, 2k Dec $k (s); 2676, 10 Jan 55 (TS); 2876, 2219^Z
Jan 55 (S)o
79° Paris Msgs 306U, 20 Jan 55 (TS); 3195, 28 Jan 55 (TS); Deptel 2629 to
Paris, 2k Jan 55 (TS); 2726 to Paris, 1 Feb 55 (TS); Saigon Msg 33-3,
111757ZFeb55 (c). Franco-American cooperation often missing in other
endeavors was fairly good in TRIM. Intrigues between French and U.S.
personnel and French intrigues against Diem existed — but their
interference with the task of directing and developing the VNA was
not as great as it might have been. Even Lansdale— hardly an avid
French supporter— says: "there was a job to be done", and credits some
French officers for their competence and cooperating in doing the job.
(SMM Report).
80. Paris Msg 2601, 19 Dec $k (TS).
81. Paris Msg 2987, Ik Jan 55 (S).
82. Saigon Msg 2250 (NIACT), 13 Dec $k (TS).
83o Ibid . '
8k, Saigon Msg 2303 (NIACT), l6 Dec 5*+ (TS) .
85. Saigon Msg 2250, 13 Dec jh (TS).
860 Memorandum for Walter S. Robertson (Assistant Secretary of State for
the Far East) from Ambassador Donald R. Heatn; Subject: "Comments
on Saigon Telegram 2303", 3.7 Dec 5 1 *- (TS).
k6 TOP SECRET - Sensitive
»
>
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
Q
O
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
a i i i ii u i i . i n » i ■ ■ ..,».. i n
87. Deptel 2274 (NIACT) to Paris, 17 Dec 54 (TS)j 2487 to Saigon, 17 Dec 54
(TS).
88. Paris 2<S01, 19 Dec 54 (TS).
89. Ibid.
90.
Ibid.
91.
Ibid.
92.
Ibid.
93o Deptel 2585 to Saigon, 24 Dec 54 (TS).
94. Deptel 2872 to Saigon, 13 Jan 55 (TS); Paris Msg 3034, 18 Jan 55 (TS).
95. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the JCS; Subject: "Reconsideration
of Military Programs in Southeast Asia", 5 Jan 55 (TS).
96. JCS Memorandum for tae Secretary of Defense; Subject: "Reconsideration
of Military Programs in Southeast Asia", 21 Jan 55 (TS).
97. Memorandum for tne Secretary of State from General Collins; Subject:
"Report on Vietnam for the NSC", 20 Jan 55 (TS).
980 Ibid .
99. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the JCS, et .aL.j Subject: "Report
on Vietnam for the NSC", 3 Feb 55 (TS).
100. Memorandum for Record: Meeting between Dulles, Robertson and Young,
Subject: "Indochina", 29 Dec 55 (TS).
101. Saigon Msgs 3747, 10 Mar 55 (s); 4373, 6 Apr 55 (S).
102. SMM Report.
103. Deptel 2956 to Paris, 21 Feb 55 (S); Paris Msgs 3&54, 1 Mar 55 (S);
3896, 15 Mar 55 (S).
104o Saigon Msgs 3384, 25 Mar 55 (s); 4096, 24 Mar 55 (s); Paris Msgs 4070,
24 Mar 55 (s); 4151, 26 Mar 55 (S).
105- SM-1 Report o
106. Saigon Msg 4192, 29 Mar 55 (S).
107. New York Times , 30 Mar 55. General Ely first denied any French inter-
ference with Vietnamese troop movements and said the VNA had been
47
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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
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issued all the gas and ammunition required., A few days later, however,
Ely said the French had not restricted gas or ammunition "except for
a few hours" during the fighting on March 29-30. Saigon Msgs ^292,
2 Apr 55 (T3); ^9, 6 Apr 55 (TS).
108. Saigon Msg 1*230 (NIACT), 3020*O.ZMar55 (s).
109. Saigon Msgs *+292, 2 Apr 55 (TS); k26h, 31 Mar 55<>
110. SMM Report •
111. Ibid .
112. Ibid .
113. Saigon Msg U382, 7 Apr 55 (TS).
111*. Saigon Msg 1*263, 31 Mar 55 (TS) .
115. Saigon Msg 1*399, 7 Apr 55 (TS).
II60 Deptel 14438 (HIACT) to Saigon, 9 Apr 55 (TS); 1*1*66, 11 Apr 55 (TS);
4575, 16 Apr 55 (TS).
117. Paris Msgs 1*200, 28 Max 55 (S); l*28l, 1*285, 2 Apr 55 (S)j 1*328, 5 Apr
55 (TS); I+395, 9 Apr 55 (TS)
118. Deptel 3510 (NIACT ) to Paris, 1* Apr 55 (TS).
119. Deptel 3622 to Paris, 12 Apr 55 (s); Paris Msg 1*1*98, 16 Apr 55 (s).
120. Paris Msg U503, 17 Apr 55 (TS).
121c Paris Msgs 4576, 21 Apr 55 (TS); ^659, 26 Apr 55 (s).
•
122 • SMM Report.
123. Deptel ^757 ( NIACT) to Saigon, 27 Apr 55 (TS).
12ko Deptels 3828 (NIACT) to Paris 27 Apr 55 (TS); 38^9 to Paris, 28 Apr 55
(TS).
125. SIM Report.
126. Saigon Msgs k86o ( NIACT), 28 Apr 55 (S)j W8l, 28l515ZApr55 (s); k$k^,
30 Apr 55 (s)c Some French alleged that Diem had initiated the fighting,
but U.S. officials claimed this was false, that the Binh Xuyen had started
a coup.
kQ TOP SECRET - Sensite/e
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
127. Deptel kQjl (NIACT) to Saigon, 1 May 55 (TS).
128. Paris Msg h^kS, 30 Apr 55 (T3).
129. Saigon Msgs 1*926, 29 Apr 55 (s); hSJl, 30 Apr 55 (S)j U928, 29 Apr 55 (C).
130. Saigon Msgs kskh, 30 Apr 55 (S); lj-957, 30 Apr 55 (0U0).
131 o SMM Report o Colonel Lansdale recruited Trinh Minh The to Diern's side
in the fall of 195^-j a significant achievement because of The's
prestige in Cao Dai and other circles and because of The's several
thousand troops. Lansdale was accused of having bribed The to win
his support but vigorously denies this. However, the SMM did secretly
reimburse The's Lden Minh forces who moved into Saigon and acted as
Diem's palace guard in 0ctober o In January, most of the Lien Minh
were integrated into the Vietnamese National Axray. General Phuong,
another Cao Dai leader, joined Diem's cabinet in September His
support for the premier was on-again-off -again through the fall and
winter but he was fairly solidly behind Diem by the spring of 1955 c
Phuong f s troops were integrated into the VKA on March 31, 1955 •
132 . SMM Report.
133o Saigon Msgs U882, 28 Apr 55 (s)j k$26, 29 Apr 55 (s); ^953^ 30 Apr 55 (s);
2908, 29 Apr 55 (C)o
13^. Saigon Msg 1*039 > h May 55 (s).
135. Saigon Msgs 5005, 2 May 55 (S)j 50^-7, 50^9, 505 1 . 1 , k May 55 (S); U867,
(KIACT), 3 May 55 (S)j Paris Msg ^8U, h May 55 (S).
I360 Saigon Msg 5103, 6 May 55 (s)
*
137. SECT0 8 from Paris, 8 Kay 55 (TS).
138. Ibid .
139. Ibid.
1*10. Ibid.
lUl. Ibid .
lU2. JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense; Subject: "Indochina (Vietnam)"
9 May 55 (TS).
1V3 « Saigon Msg 51*1-5, 9 Kay 55 (TS).
Ikk. SECT0 36 from Paris, 11 Kay 55 (TS).
1A5. SECT0 k2 from Paris, 12 May 55 (TS).
kg TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
1K6. Paris Msg 69, 6 Jul 55 (s).
iVf. Deptels to Saigon: 35, 5 Jul 55 (S)j 53. 6 Jul 55 (S); 80, 9 Jul 55 (s);
155, 1^ Jul. 55 (S); 165, 15 Jul 55 (S)j 179, 16 Jul 55 (s).
1U8. NSC 5519: Draft Statement, n US Policy on All-Vietnam Elections 1 ' , 17
May 55 (TS). The JCS concurred in this draFt policy with one crucial
exception: the statement that a communist attack would be opposed
"with US armed forces if necessary and feasible" was unacceptable.
The Chiefs wanted it changed to say opposition to attack would be
"by invoking the Manila Pact and taking vigorous action thereunder
to repel the Communist military aggression •" Obviously, unilateral
U.S. action was to be avoidedo (JCS Memorandum to the Secretary of
Defense, Subject: NSC 5519, "U.S. Policy on All-Vietnam Elect ions 11 )
19 May 55 (TS) . '
The NSC considered the problem of elections on 9 June end decided
to shelve the draft NSC statement Its main features hsj± already been
conveyed to Diem; it was felt no new policy toward an outbreak of
hositlities was required. (Memorandum, Executive Secretary of NSC
to NSC, "U.S. Policy on All-Vietnam Elections", 13 Jun 55 (TS)).
IU9. Deptels to Saigon 53^7, 3 Jun 55 (S); 5731, 8 Jun 55 (S); 35, 5 Jul
55 (S).
1 5°° Nev York Times , 17 Jul 55-
151o Saigon Msg 5677, 6 Jun 55 (s); Deptel 5U38 to Saigon 11 Jun 55 (S).
152. Saigon Msgs 5706, 7 Jun 55 (S)j 5731, 8 Jun 55 (s).
153, Paris Msgs 5513, 551U, 16 Jun 55 (s); 5601, 21 Jun 55 (s); 5776, 29
Jun 55 (S); 27, 2 Jul 55 (s); I83, 12 Jul 55 (S) . Saigon Msg
5969, 2k Jun 55 (S)o
l$k. Saigon Msg 381, 23 Jul 55 (S); Paris Msg iktiO, 29 Sep 55 (S); 1757,
Ik Oct 55 (s).
155. Paris Msg 2889, 17 Dec 55 (c); SECTO 17 from Paris, 17 Dec 55 (c).
156. Le Monde , 1^ Dec 1955; Paris Msg 2886, 17 Dec 55 (s); Mew York Times
1 Nov 55"; Saigon Msg 2671, 5 Jan 56 (S).
157. Press Conference, 23 Feb 56, in Le M onde , 2k Feb 560
158. Saigon Msgs 2086, ll+ Nov 55 (S); 2206, 23 Nov 55 (S); Paris Msg 3783,
21 Feb 56 (S).
50 TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
159. Deptel 1901 to Saigon, 2 Dec 55 (s).
160 • NIE 63-56, "Probable Developments in Nortn and Soutn Vietnam Tarougja
MLd-1957", 17 Jul 56; Saigon Msg 287, 2k Jul 56 (C).
51
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