(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Children's Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Pentagon Papers"

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



IV.A Evolution of the War (26 Vols.) 
U.S. MAP for Diem: The Eisenhower Commitments, 

1954-1960(5 Vols.) 
4. U.S. Training of Vietnamese National Army, 1954-59 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - SENSITIVEl 




UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS 



1945 



1967 




VIETNAM TASK FORCE 



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF 



ITOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 



■^■H 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



/ 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



IV. A. k. 



EVOLUTION OF THE WAE 



US TRAINING 0F_THE YIETHAJ/iESE 
NATIONAL ABtal 195^ - 3-95 9 





TOP SECRET - Sensiti\ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



IV. A. h 



U.S. TRA INING OF TH E VIETNAMESE NATIONAL A RMY, 195^-1959 



Forevrord 






This monograph treats U.S. provisions for the 
security of Vietnam in the period immediately following 
the Geneva Conference. 

The following are tabbed: 

Summary 

Chronology 

Table of Contents 'and Outline 

Footnotes 

Bibliography 












TOP SECRET - Sensitiv 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




H- 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



IV. A. k. 



U.S. TRAINING OF THE VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY, 195--1959 



SUMMARY 

"Hanoi was evacuated on 9 October /l95ji7- The /p. S. liaison/ 
team left with the last French troops, disturbed by what they 
had seen of the grim efficiency of the Viet Minh in their 
takeover, the contrast between the silent march of the 
victorious Viet Minh troops in their tennis shoes and the 
clanking armor of the well- equipped French whose western 
tactics and equipment had failed against the communist 
military-political-economic campaign." l/ 

Up to i960, Vietnam was one of the largest recipients of U.S. 
economic and military assistance in the world: the third ranking 
non-NATO recipient of aid, the seventh ranking worldwide. The U.S. 
Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAG), was the only 
military mission commanded by a lieutenant general; the U.S. economic 
aid mission in Vietnam was the largest anywhere. In the years 1955 
through i960, more than $2 billion in aid flowed into Vietnam, and 
more than 80$ of that assistance went toward providing security for 
the Government of. Vietnam. Nonetheless, in i960 the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff determined that the armed forces of the Republic of 
Vietnam (RVNAF) were inadequately trained and organized, and directed 
urgent action by MAAG to improve their anti-guerrilla capabilities. ?/ 

. Thus, despite the massive U.S. investment in "aid to Vietnam in 
the period 195^-1960, very little had been accomplished in the way of 
fashioning South Vietnamese forces into a suitable instrument for 
countering the "communist military-political- economic campaign" 
aimed at overturning the Government of Vietnam. 

The principal issue examined here is that of the role and 
effectiveness of U.S. advice and assistance provided the armed forces 
of the GVN prior to i960. 

The principal focus is on American assistance to the Vietnamese 
National Army — subsequently the ARVN — although plans and support 
for the Civil Guard -and Self -Defense Corps are also considered. 
Subsidiary questions include: 

- 

— Why did the U.S. undertake the training of ARVN? 
-- How was this decision taken? 






1.1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



6 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



— What was the threat to South Vietnam? 

■ 

— What was the mission of the South Vietnamese army? 
— - What "was the state of the South Vietnamese army? 

* 

— How did the U.S. go about altering this condition? 

« 

— Did U.S. assistance through i960 result in creation of 
South Vietnamese army in the image of the U.S. army? 



» 
» 






The principal conclusion is that U.S. efforts in the period 195^- 
1959 failed to produce an effective Vietnamese counterinsurgent force 

• • due to contemporary perceptions of and reactions to the threat, to 

exaggerated estimates of the value and relevance of American military- 
standards in responding to that threat, to lack of effective bargaining 

j techniques vis-a-vis the Government of Vietnam, and to fragmentation 

and other inadequacies in the American system of determining and 
administering the overall program of assistance to Vietnam.* 



U.S. efforts in the period 195*1- 1960 to create an effective South 
Vietnamese military establishment — and particularly an effective 
National Army — were critically affected by the following considerations 

— The reasons the U.S. undertook the training of the 
Vietnamese armed forces had their "roots not only in the 
desire to contain communism and preserve the freedom of 
South Vietnam, but also in U.S. discontent and frustration 
with French military policy during the Indochina War. 
A strong desire to correct French mistakes generated con- 
siderable bureaucratic 'momentum; preoccupation with the 
perceived inadequacies of French practices led to under- 
estimation of the problems the French had to overcome — 
including that of internal division and governmental 
reluctance — in developing an effective Vietnamese army, 
and to overcorrection of French mistakes by the creation of 
a conventional military force. That Vietnamese army came 
to be organized in divisions -- as the U.S. had so often 
and so unsuccessfully urged the French to do — that would 
have the capability to perform well against the Viet Minh 
divisions in the Red River Delta in 195*^ 9 or presumably 
against their post-195^ equivalent, communist divisions 
crossing the 17th parallel. But the French Indochina War 
was over; circumstances had radically changed. 

— The decision to train the South Vietnamese military 
was based on a compromise between the Departments of State and 
Defense in which "political considerations" which had nothing 
to do with the military objections to an affirmative decision, 



2.1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



I 





















Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



and did not in any way affect the probability of success of the 
undertaking, were allowed to govern rather than considerations 
of limitations in U.S. resources and capabilities, and the basic • 
difficulty of the task at hand. Increasingly a characteristic 
of U.S. decision making, such compromise maximized the probability 
. of consistently selecting the least desirable course of action. 

* • 

— The threat to Vietnam was perceived as constituted of the 
sects and the Viet Minh residue in the South, and the regular forces 
of the DRV in the North; although it was consistently estimated 
that the DRV had the capability to overrun South Vietnam, it was 
just as consistently estimated that the DRV neither needed nor 
intended to do so. Nonetheless, U.S. doctrine regarding estimates 
of capability as opposed to estimates of intention with its 
characteristic emphasis on Order of Battle data (so small a part 
of the real intelligence problem in counter insurgency) led to 
fixation upon the more massive, but less likely, threat of 
overt invasion. 

— The dual mission expected of the Vietnamese army of 
internal and external defense was, given resource and trained 
manpower limitations, internally inconsistent. Given the state 
of U.S. strategic thinking in the 1950's, the nature of SEATO, the 

- . withdrawal of the FEC, the pressures exerted by Diem, and .the 

background of the U.S. MAAG, rooted in the recent Korean experience, 
it was virtually certain to' lead to a conventional military 
establishment designed to counter a conventional threat. It did. 
In fact, given the strength of these influences and the lack of 
U.S. familiarity with effective counterinsurgertt techniques, it 
• is questionable whether assignment of a single mission related 
exclusively to internal security would have made any difference 
I in the type of military establishment that resulted. 



— The South Vietnamese army was in extremely poor condition 
in 195^; its prospects were worse, in view of the limited 
resources, particularly in terms of personnel, the U.S. was 
able to devote tQ its reorganization and training. In addition, 
as the JCS stated, "Unless the Vietnamese themselves show an 
inclination to make individual and collective sacrifices required 
to resist Communism, which they have not done to date, no amount 
of external pressure and assistance can long delay complete 
Communist victory in South Vietnam." * There was no over- 
whelming change in the willingness to sacrifice during the late 
1950 ! s, which added to the already formidable task of creating 

an effective military establishment. 

— The way in which the U.S. MAAG went about creating an 
effective military establishment had four principal characteristics: 

* Memorandum for SecDef from JCS, "Indochina," 17 November 19^ (TS). 



3.1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



•i 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 









r 






concentration on the mission of resistance to overt aggression; 
training from the top down; employment of U.S. standards and 
techniques; and optimistic assessment of the future capabilities 
of paramilitary organizations outside the purview of MAAG. 

— The result of U.S. efforts was more a reflection of the 
U.S. military establishment than of the type of threat or 
terrain. With regard to the overall effectiveness of U.S. 
aid, it seems to have had, unfortunately, all the depth the 
term "mirror image" implies. Furthermore, U.S. performance in 



'to 



creating an effective Vietnamese military establishment was 
adversely affected by the lack of well-founded bargaining 
techniques vis-a-vi s the Government of Vietnam, and by fragmenta- 
tion and other inadequacies in the American system of determining 
and administering the overall program of assistance. 

-- The U.S. quickly became so deeply and so overtly com- 
mitted to the Diem government that any leverage inherent in 
the assistance program rapidly approached zero. Perhaps the 
best illustration of the lack of leverage concerning the 
defense establishment is the case of the Civil Guard, in which 
the principal effects of the U.S. bargaining were negative and 
most directly affected the very organization the U.S. was 
trying to improve. 

— The case of the Civil Guard, a primary internal' security 
force, also affords excellent examples of two sorts of frag- 
mentation affecting the U.S. effort: U.S. interagency com- 
petition (the CG was ultimately transferred to the MOD on the 
advice of MAAG, but against not only the prior advice of the 
MSU advisory team but also against the wishes of the Bnbassy)*; 
and lack of coordination at Embassy level by which the entire 
military assistance effort could be evaluated and resources 
more rationally allocated (the Civil Guard was evaluated 
completely differently by MAAG and by the Bribassy) . 

— A third variety of fragmentation is revealed in the 
relations between Washington and its various representatives 
in the field. Both the GVN and the several U.S. agencies 
relied heavily on Washington for arbitration of disputes 



* Fragmentation in the U.S. community had an obvious and adverse 
effect on the U_. S. cajjability to bargain with the GVN. By devoting 
minimal care to the selection of .the U.S. official he would talk to 
first, Diem could often become the arbiter of, rather than a participant 
in, the bargaining process. Thus General Williams: "I can T t remember one 



time that President Diem- ever did anything of importance concerning the 
military that I recommended against." "Why U.S. Is Losing in Vietnam/ 1 
U.S. News and World Report, November '9, 196^. 



U 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



S 



TOP SECRET! - Sensitive 






















generated in Saigon, Diem carrying his position to the highest 
levels of the agency of. his choice, while U.S. representatives 
had to seek protagonists at various levels within their own 
agencies. The implications for U.S. policy in the field are 
obvious . 

Because of the divisions and diversions inherent in the above, 
U.S.- aid in the period up to i960 failed to produce an effective 
counterinsurgent force either within the National Army, or in the 
paramilitary organizations. This is not to imply that had resources 
been diverted from the creation of a conventional army to that of an 
effective counterinsurgent force the problem of Vietnam would have been 
solved, for the enemy has demonstrated both versatility and flexibility 
that would render such a statement vacuous. It is to suggest, however, 
that given the world situation in the period of relevance and the 
situation in Southeast Asia, it seems likely that the DRV, whatever 
strategic alternative it might have elected to follow, would not have 
been deterred from overt aggression by any army of Vietnam it was 
within U.S.-GVN capability to create. An effective counterinsurgent 
f orce, ' on the other hand, might teve limited its. choices; might well 
have prevented effective prosecution of the guerrilla alternative 
the Viet Cong and the DRV did elect to follow. 



5.1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



I 






UNITED STATES 

OFFICE 
President 
Secretary of State 

Ambassador to GVN 

n 



Secretary of Defense 



it 



Chairman", JCS 



it 



Chief of Staff, Army 



it 



n 



Chief of Naval Operations 



m 



Chief of Staff, Air Force 
ti 

Commandant, Marine Corps 



it 



Chief, MAAG 



IT 



GOVERNMENT OF VIETI&M 
Head of State/President 



ti 



.' 



Prime Minister 



i» 



Minister of Foreign Affairs/ 
Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs 



it 



Minister of Defense/Minister 
of National Defense 



PRINCIPAL PERSONALITIES, 195^-1960 



TERM OF OFFICE 



20 Jan 1953 - 20 Jan I96I 



21 Jan 1953 
16 Apr 1959 
25 Jun 1952 - 20 Apr 1955 



15 Apr 1959 
20 Jan I96I 



20 Apr 1955 - Ik Mar 1957 
Ik Mar 1957 
28 Jan 1953 



Ik Mar 1961 
8 Oct 1957 



9 Oct 1957 - 
3 Dec 1959 - 



2 Dec 1959 
8 Jan 1961 



Ik Aug 1953 - 15 Aug 1957 

15 Aug I957 - 30 Sep I960 

1 Oct I960 - 30 Sep 1962 

15 Aug 1953 - 30 Jun 1965 
30 Jun 1955 - 30 Jun 1959 

1 Jul 1959 - 30 Sep I960 

1 Oct i960 - 30 Sep 1962 

16 Aug 1953 - 17 Aug 1955 

31 Jul 1961 



30 Jun 1957 
30 Jun 1961 



17 Aug 1955 
30 Jun 19^3 

1 Jul 1957 
28 Jun 1952 - 31 Dec 1955 

1 Jan I956 - 31 Dec 1959 

1 Jan i960 - 31 Dgc I963 
2k Oct 1955 - 31 Aug I960 

1 Sep I960 



Mar 19^9 

26 Oct 1955 

12 Jan 195^ 

7 Jul' 195k 



5 Mar I962 

26 Oct I955 
1 Nov I963 

16 Jun 195^ 
1 Uov I963 



17 Dec 1953 - 16 Jun 195- 

5 Jul "l95i4 - May 1955 

Jul 1955 - 1 Hov 1963 



25 Jun 1952 : 



195M?) 



5 Jul 195*1 - 1'Nov 1963 

. 6.1 



NAME 



Dwight D. Eisenhower 
John Foster Dalles 



Christian A. Kerter 



Donald R. Heath 



G. Frederick Reinhart 



Elb ridge Durbrow 
Charles E. Wilson 
Neil H. McElroy 
Thomas S. Gates, Jr. 
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN 
General Nathan F. Staining, USAF 
General Lyman L. Leir.nitzer, USA 
.General Matthew B. Ridgway 
General Maxwell D. Taylor 
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer 
General George H. Decker 
Admiral Robert B. Carney 
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke 
General Nathan F. Twining 
General Thomas D. White 
Genei-al Lemuel C Shepherd, Jr. 
General Randolph McC. Pate 
General David M. Shoup 
Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams, USA 
Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, USA 



Emperor Bao Dai 
Ngo Dinh Dien 



Prince Buu Loc 



Nf,o Dinh Diem 



Nguyen Quoc Dinh 



Tran Van Do 



Vu Van y 



Ngiem Van Tri 
Ngo Dinh Diem 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




o 




73 
O 

z 
o 

o 

< 






c 



c 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



i 



// 



I9L18- -VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY WAS CREATED BY FRANCE. (FALL-RASKIN P. 82.) 

0108^9 THE TERMS OF THE ELYSEE AGREEMENT CONCEDED IN PRINCIPLE THE CREATION 

OF A VIETNAMESE ARMY. 

0110^9 BAO DAI HOPE FOR U.S. ARMS AID INDICATED. 

O602U9 DAI WAS PROCLAIMED VIETNAMESE EMPEROR. 

0621^9 U.S. BACKED THE BAO DAI REGIME. 

1017^9 JCS SUBMITTED A PLAN FOR USING MDA SECTION 303 FUNDS IN AREAS OTHER 

THAN CHINA, NAMELY SOUTHEAST ASIA. 

011650 PEKING RECOGNIZED THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HEADED BY HO CHI 

MINHo MOSCOW FOLLOWED SUIT ON JAN 31, 1950. /J.B. 

020250 FIRST REPORTS ISSUED OF THE ARRIVAL OF CHINESE EQUIPMENT FOR THE 

VIETMINH. THEY STARTED A GENERAL OFFENSIVE. /J.B. 

020750 U.S. AND GREAT BRITAIN RECOGNIZED VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA AS 

ASSOCIATED STATES WITHIN THE FRENCH UNION AFTER THE FRENCH RATIFICA- 
TION OF THE 19^9 ELYSEE AGREEMENT. 

021650 FRENCH REQUESTED U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR THE INDOCHINA 

WAR. 

■ 

021950 U.S. CONSULATE GENERAL IN SAIGON WAS RAISED TO LEGATION, AND A MINISTER 

WAS ACCREDITED TO VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, AND LAOS. /J.B. 

030650 RUSK REQUESTED THAT MILITARY ATTACHES BE ASSIGNED TO SAIGON LEGATION. 

/1ST 288. * 

032550 DEFENSE MINISTER PHAN HUY QUAT OUTLINED A PLAN TO EQUIP THE VIETNAMESE 

ARMY WITHOUT FRENCH PARTICIPATION. (MESSAGE 20*4 GULLION TO ACHESON) 

- 

OU0550 JCS RECOMMENDED TO SEC. DEE. DIRECT MILITARY AID BE PROVIDED TO THE 

FRENCH IN INDOCHINA, THE RATIONALE WAS BASED ON THE DOMINO THEORY 
RE THE FALL OF SOUTHEAST ASIA COUNTRIES. 

6k2k30 THE U C S. ASKED FRANCE WHAT IT HOPED TO ACHIEVE WITH U.S. MILITARY AID. 

TWELVE NATIVE BATTALIONS WERE TO BE READY FOR MILITARY SERVICE BY 1951. 

• 

050850 AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFER E IN PARIS, MINISTER SCHUMAN ANNOUNCED 

THAT A VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY WOULD BE ESTABLISHED, AND SEC. OF 
STATE ACHESON ANNOUNCED THAT THE U.S. WOULD SEND ECONOMIC AND MILITARY 
AID TO THE ASSOCIATED STATES OF INDOCHINA AND FRANCE. 

052550 THE U.S. FORMALLY ANNOUNCED THE INTENT TO ESTABLISH AN ECONOMIC AID 

MISSION TO THE ASSOCIATED STATES OF INDOCHINA. R. BLUM WAS TO BE 
MISSION CHIEF. 



A 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■ • 



053050 A U.S. ECONOMIC MISSION ARRIVED IN SAIGON. /J.B. 

060650 THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TRIED TO OFFSET ITS FAILURE TO WIN OVER THE 

NATIONALISTS BY CRACKING DOWN ON THE GUERRILLAS AND STRESSING THE 
FORMATION OF A VIETNAMESE ARMY. BAO DAI WAS CRITICIZED FOR NOT 
' . ASSUMING ACTIVE MILITARY COMMAND OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY. 

062950 MAJ.GEN. ERSKINE WAS DESIGNATED CHIEF OF THE MILITARY GROUP OF MDAP 

SURVIVAL MISSION TO VIETNAM. 

JUL-AUG 1950 THE KOREAN WAR AND U.S. FEAR OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A VIETMINH 

VICTORY FOR SOUTHEAST ASIS LED TO A READINESS IN WASHINGTON TO 
INCREASE AMERICAN AID TO THE FRENCH IN INDOCHINA. U.S. AID HOWEVER, 
DID NOT CHANGE FRENCH POLICY IN VIETNAM. U.S. OFFICIALS IN SAIGON 
WHO DISAGREED WITH FRENCH POLICY IN INDOCHINA WERE TRANSFERRED AT 
THE INSISTENCE OF THE FRENCH. /J.B. 

071550 THE U.S. MISSION HEADED BY MAJ. GEN. ERSKINE', ARRIVED IN VIETNAM TO 

PAVE THE WAY FOR MAAG. THIS MISSION WAS TO COMPLETE MAP PLANNING 
AND CONFER WITH THE FRENCH. NO U.S. COMBAT MEN WERE TO GO TO 
INDOCHINA, ONLY MILITARY SUPPLIES WOULD BE SENT TO AID THE FRENCH. 

073150 FIRST ELEMENTS OF MAAG ARRIVED IN INDOCHINA. 

080250 TEN OFFICERS, PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, 

ARRIVED IN SAIGON. SHORTLY THEREAFTER AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED WITH 
THE FRENCH ON OPERATIONS OF THE U.S. MISSION. 

080550 THE REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. ERSKINE WAS FILED (NSC 6k). IN IT HE SPOKE 

OF THE FEC STALEMATE, POLITICAL PROBLEM RE FRENCH- VIETNAMESE, LACK 
OF INTERNAL SECURITY, INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENT FOR 
THE U.So, THE COIMIHIST CHINA THREAT. FRANCE 1 S INABILITY TO COPE 
WITH VIETMINH THREAT. 

080650 THE $100-MILLION WORTH OF U.S. MILITARY SUPPLIES, WHICH ARRIVED BY 

AUGUST 9, WERE TO BE USED TO EQUIP THE NEW VIETNAM NATIONAL ARMY. 
THE FRENCH HOPED THAT THIS NATIONAL ARMY WOULD ASSUME A MAJOR PART 
OF FIGHTING THE VIETMINH. VIETNAM TROOPS AT THAT TIME WERE 
DISORGANIZED. 

081050 THE FIRST SHIPMENT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES ARRIVED IN INDOCHINA FROM THE 

U.S. 

081^50 THE FRENCH CABINET DECIDED TO REDUCE THE STRENGTH OF THE EXPEDITIONARY 

CORPS BY 9,000 MEN. THE REDUCTION, WHICH WAS MADE AGAINST MILITARY 
ADVICE, WAS DUE TO THE REFUSAL OF THE ASSEMBLY TO CONSIDER THE 
EMPL0Y1-IENT OF NATIONAL SERVICE RECRUITS IN INDOCHINA. 

081550 BILATERAL AG: MERE BETWEEN U.S. -PRANCE COVERING MDA FOR INDOCHINA WAS 

SIGNED IN DJAKARTA. /217155. 



B 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



13 



082^50 VIETNAMESE TROOPS WERE REPORTED TO BE SLOWLY RELIEVING FRENCH TROOPS. 

0828U0 THE VIETNAM ARMY'S 2ND ANNIVERSARY WAS OBSERVED IN ANNAM. THE LACK 

OF OFFICERS AND NON-COMS , THE PRESENCE OF FACTIONS AND HIGH COSTS 
HINDER THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY. 

0911450 THE kTE SESSION TRIPARTITE MEETINGS DISCLOSED 77,000 IN ARMIES OF THE 

ASSOCIATED STATES, Ml, 000 NATIONALS IN FEC. 

O92U5O THE FRENCH PROMISED THAN VAN HUU AID TO INCREASE THE VIETNAM ARMY. 

10 50 MDAP MONTHLY REPORT FROM SAIGON DISCLOSED POOR RELATIONS BETWEEN 

FRENCH AND MAAG. (GULLION TO SEC .STATE) 

100i+50 BRIG. GEN. BRINK BECAME HEAD OF THE U.S. MILITARY AID GROUP IN VIETNAM. 

101050 U.S. ESTABLISHED A MILITARY MISSION IN SAIGON. 

101350 THE FRENCH PLANNED TO ENLARGE THE VIETNAM ARMY. GENERAL DE LA TOUR DU 

MOULIN WAS APPOINTED ITS MILITARY ADVISOR. 

102^50 DIFFICULTIES WITH RESPECT TO ESTABLISHMENT OF VIET FORCE WERE IN RECRUIT 

MENT, ORGANIZATION OF CADRES, FINANCING, CONSCRIPTION. /SAIGON 
MSG STATE 1ST NOTES 



110550 AN INTER-SERVICE TRAINING COLLEGE WAS OPENED AT DAIAT. /LANCASTER. 

110750 FRENCH AND VIETNAM LEADERS AGREED ON A RAPID BUILDUP OF THE VIETNAM 

ARMY. 

110850 VIETNAM WAS EXPECTED TO SPEND 35-^0 PERCENT OF ITS .1951 BUDGET' ON ITS 

THREE-DIVISION ARMY. 

112250 MINISTER LETOURNEAU TOLD THE FRENCH ASSEMBLY THAT BOTH FRENCH AND 

NATIONAL FORCES IN INDOCHINA WERE TO BE STRENGTHENED. 

12 50 WITH THE CREATION OF THE MINISTRY FOR THE ASSOCIATED STATES, NINE 

SEPARATE MINISTRIES WERE DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH AND RESPONSIBLE 
FOR SOME ASPECT OF FRENCH ACTIVITIES IN INDOCHINA. /NAVARRE. 

120U50 IT V7AS ANNOUNCED TEAT GENERAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY WOULD REPLACE 

GENERAL CARPENTIER AND HIGH COMMISSIONER PIGNON AS THE SUPERIOR 
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMMANDER. HE TOOK OFFICE TWO DAYS LATER. 

120850 AND 122350 COMPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS TO THE I9I49 ELYSEE AGREEMENT 

PROVIDED FOR THE FORMATION OF FOUR DIVISIONS BY THE ELID OF 1951. 
/LANCASTER. 

120850 A NATIONAL VIETNAM ARMY WAS FORMALLY SET UP WITH NATIONAL STATUS FOR 

TROOPS BY ORDER OF BAO DAI. 



C 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



i 






121550 GENERAL ERSKINE FINISHED HIS MISSION. 

122350 THE U.S. SIGHED A MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PENTALATERAL AGREEMENT 

WITH FRANCE, VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, AND LAOS FOR INDIRECT U.S. MILITARY 
AID TO FRENCH UNION FORCES IN INDOCHINA. THE AGREEMENT ON DEFENSE 
AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE LAID DOWN THE CONDITIONS UNDER MICH U.S. AID 
WOULD BE APPORTIONED AND ESTABLISHED THE PRINCIPLE THAT ALL MATERIALS 
PROVIDED WOULD BE HANDED OVER TO THE FRENCH COMMAND, WHILE DIRECT 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ASSOCIATED 'STATES AND MAAG WERE TO BE EXPRESSLY 
PRECLUDED. /LANCASTER. 

122350 MAAG INDOCHINA WAS AUTHORIZED. /217155. 

1951 HO CHI MINH'S ARMY WAS THOUGHT TO CONTAIN 70,000 LIGHTLY ARMED MEN. 2 

PERCENT COMMUNISTS AND THE REST WERE STRONG NATIONALISTS. /NYT 

1951 THE ARMED FORCES ON THE FRENCH SIDE - 150,000. ABOUT HALF WERE NATIVES 

OF UNCERTAIN LOYALTY AND EFFECTIVENESS. FLEM-CWO. 

JAN-MAR 51 DE LATTRE SUCCEEDED IN HALTING COMMUNIST ADVANCES. THE VIETMINH 

WAS FORCED TO RETURN TO GUERILLA TACTICS. THE TROOPS AT THE 
DISPOSAL OF THE FRENCH NOT NUMBERED 391,000. 

01 51 THE FRENCH AND VIETMINH BOTH REORGANIZED THEIR FORCES INTO DIVISIONS , 

SINCE THE TYPE OF COMBAT HAD ESCALATED FROM GUERRILLA WARFARE. 

010851 MAAG INDOCHINA WAS OFFICIALLY ESTABLISHED WITH A STRENGTH OF 128. 

/21?15 ) 4-5. 

011051 GENERAL DE LATTRE' S LEADERSHIP INCREASED THE MORALE OF BOTH THE FRENCH 

AND THE VIETNAMESE FORCES. 

03 51 DE LATTRE LEFT FOR PARIS TO ASK FOR REINFORCEMENTS IN OFFICERS, N.C.O'S 

AND TECHNICIANS WHOSE SERVICES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO TRAIN THE 
NATIONAL ARMIES. 

0^2551 THE FRENCH TESTED THE ABILITY OF THE VIETNAMESE POLICE TO MAINTAIN 

ORDER AND TO CHECK THE VIETMINH INFILTRATION IN THE VINHBAO AREA 
SOUTH OF HAIPHONG. 

05 51 THE ADVENT OF THE MONSOON GAVE DE LATTRE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEVOTE MORE 

OF HIS TIME AND ATTENTION TO THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL ARMIES 
AND HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AS HIGH COMMISSIONER. 

050151 VIETNAMESE ARMY HAD 38,500 MEN. 

052651 GENERAL COLLINS STATED THAT ^-MILLION WORTH OF SUPPLIES HAD BEEN 

SHIPPED SINCE JUNE 19^9. 

061^51 THE CAO DAI SECT MILITARY CHIEF COLONEL TRINH MINK TAY DEFECTED FROM 

FRENCH-VIETNAMESE FORCES AND LED 2,500 MEN 11710 CAMBODIA. 






D 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



/ 



■ - 



( 



071551 BAO DAl ORDERED TOTAL VIETNAM MOBILIZATION TO MEET A POSSIBLE THREAT 

BY CHINA IF A KOREA TRUCE WERE REACHED. 

08 51 THE FRENCH COMMISSIONER FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, GENERAL CHANSON, WAS ASSASSINATED. 

/LANCASTER. . 

080751 PROGRESS IN THE FORMATION OF A" NATIONAL VIETNAMESE ARMY WAS REPORTED. 

VIETNAMESE UNITS HAD PERFORMED ADEQUATELY IN ENGAGEMENTS. LACK OF 
LEADERSHIP, FRENCH- VIETNAMESE QUARRELS, LACK OF EQUIPMENT AND AN 
APATHETIC POPULACE PLAGUED THE EFFORT. /NIE 35 REPORT. 

• 

09 51 DE LATTRE WENT' TO WASHINGTON TO ALLAY AMERICAN SUSPICIONS CONCERNING 

FRENCH INTENTIONS IN INDOCHINA AND TO ASK FOR INCREASED MILITARY 
SUPPLIES FOR THE NATIONAL ARMIES. HE RETURNED TO SAIGON OCT. 19. 
/LANCASTER. 

090251 BRIG. GEN. BRINK REPORTED THAT THE FRENCH-VIETNAMESE FORCES WERE GAINING. 

090751 U.S. SIGNED AND AGREEMENT WITH VIETNAM FOR DIRECT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. 

/J.B. 

092051 DE LATTRE WENT TO WASHINGTON TO PLEAD FOR MORE AMERICAN AID, IN PARTICULAR 

FOR NEW PLANES AND OTHER MODERN EQUIPMENT', OF WHICH MORE AND MORE 
BEGAN TO ARRIVE IN VIETNAM. 

092351 THE U.S. PROMISED TO ACCELERATE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO INDOCHINA. 

10 51 CAO DAI COLONEL TRINH MINI! TAY BUILT A REBEL REGIME. HE DENOUNCED 

BOTH FRENCH AND VIETMINH. 

100151 A SHIPMENT OF RIFLES ENOUGH FOR k DIVISIONS ARRIVED IN VIETNAM FROM 

THE U.S. 

101651 60,000 VIETNAM DRAFTEES REPORTED FOR MILITARY TRAINING AS PART OF 

MOBILIZATION ORDER OF BAO DAI. 

110651 PROGRESS REPORT ON NSC 56l2/l (OCB) CLAIMED THAT PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF 

CIVIL POLICE BOARD WAS REDUCED BY 20 PERCENT BECAUSE OF MODERNIZATION 
EQUIPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION. /l59~l- 

12 51 A SPEECH BY THE RADICAL SOCIALIST DEPUTY DALADIER REVEALED A GROWING 

FRENCH OPPOSITION TO THE INDOCHINA WAR. DALADIER DEMANDED THAT 
FRANCE SEEK PEACE THROUGH THE TOUTED NATIONS. 

121851 THE U.S. PROPOSED AN AGREEMENT BE MADE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE U.S. TO 

INSURE THE CONTINUATION OF THE ELIGIBILITY OF THE STATE OF VIETNAM 
AND THE PROGRAMS OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE NOW BEING EXTENDED. 
AN AGREEMENT WAS RATIFIED IN JANUARY 3, 1952. 



E 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






K, 






1951 PROFITING FROM THE CHANGED CHARACTER OF THE WAR, DE LATTRE WAS ABLE 

DURING HIS BRIEF PROCONSULATE TO GIVE DECISIVE IMPETUS TO THE TARDY 
FORMATION OF A VIETNAMESE ARMY, FIRST BY PERSUADING THE VIETNAMESE 
ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL CONSCRIPTION, AND SECONDLY BY 
SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATING IN WASHINGTON FOR MILITARY AID TO EQUIP THE 
NATIONAL DIVISIONS THAT IT WAS NOW PROPOSING TO RAISE AND TRAIN. 
/LANCASTER. 

EARLY 1952 A TRAINING SCHOOL FOR AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WAS OPENED AT NHA TRAN 

010752 GENERAL DE LATTRE WAS ILL, GENERAL SALAN COMMANDED THE FRENCH FORCES IN 

HIS ABSENCE. 

011152 DE LATTRE DIED. THE COMMUNISTS STARTED A NEW OFFENSIVE. WITH CHINESE 

EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING ARTILLERY, THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO REDUCE 
DE LATTRE 1 S GAINS AND TO ELIMINATE MANY SMALLER POSITIONS BETWEEN 
THE CITIES HELD BY THE FRENCH. 

• 

OIII52 VIETNAMESE ARMY STRENGTH WAS AT 65,000. 

011152 TRIPARTITE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON. 
012852 BAO DAI PLEDGED TO ESTABLISH A 120,000-MAN VIETNAM ARMY. 

0201+52 MINISTER LETOURNEAU CONFERRED WITH BAO DAI ON THE BUILDUP OF, AT© U.S. 

FOR THE NATIONAL ARMY. 

LACK OF TOP OFFICERS SLOWED TRAINING. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON 
APPOINTING A VIETNAMESE CHIEF OF STAFF AND FULLTIME DEFENSE MINISTER. 

021152 VIETNAMESE PARATROOPERS WERE USED IN AN ATTACK ON THE TONGKIN AREA. 

022252 DISSIDENT CAODAIST FORCES CLASHED WITH THE FRENCH. THEIR LEADER, COLONEL 

TRINH MINH TAY, WAS DENOUNCED AS A TRAITOR. 

022352 FRENCH ASKED FOR MORE U.S. AID IN ARMING THE NEW DIVISIONS. 

022U52 GENERAL SAIAN EVACUATED FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM HOA BINH AND 

THE WESTERN END OF THE HOA BIHH-HANOI ROAD IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MORE 
TROOPS FOR THE TONGKIN DELTA OPERATIONS. 

030852 BAO DAI APPOINTED GENERAL NGUYEN VAN HINH AS CHIEF OF STAFF. 

031852 ACHESON TOLD A SENATE COMMITTEE THAT THE INDOCHINA SITUATION WAS VERY 

SERIOUS. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR A LARGE AND EFFECTIVE NATIVE 
FORCE. LETOURNEAU FELT ACHESON' S ALARM WAS UNJUSTIFIED. 

Ok THRU END OF I952 NATIVE FORCES WERE INCREASINGLY USED IN THE FIGHTING. 

Ok0152 MINISTER LETOURNEAU WAS NAKED HIGH COMMISSIONER, AIID REMAINED IN THE 

FRENCH CABINET AS THE ASSOCIATED STATES' MINISTER. GENERAL SAIAN 
REMAINED AS THE MILITARY COMMANDER. 



F 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



17 



0^0852 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WAS ADVISED BY THE SERVICE SECRETARIES THAT 

A POSITIVE COURSE OF ACTION IN INDOCHINA WOULD BE TO EXPAND THE MAAG 
TO TRAIN AMD EQUIP THE NATIONAL ARMY TO PROVIDE INTERNAL SECURITY. 

■ 0*41052 LETOURNEAU SAID THAT FRANCE WAS TO MAINTAIN ITS TROOPS UNTIL NATIVE 

TROOPS WERE READY. 

* 

OU1652 NATIVE OFFICERS UNDER GENERAL NGUYEIf VAN HINH TOOK OVER THE VIETNAM 

ARMY GENERAL STAFF. 

0141952 GENERAL SALAN PRAISED NATIVE TROOPS IN THE CLEAN UP DRIVE OF THE TONGKIN 

DELTA. 

0^2752 THE VIETNAMESE ARMY WAS TO FORM A NATIVE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM AS 

OUTLINED BY ITS CHIEF OF STAFF. 

05 52 VIETNAMESE GENERAL STAFF CAME INTO EXISTENCE. 

051852 EXPANSION OF NATIVE FORCES BROUGHT TOTAL FRENCH AND INDOCHINESE FORCES 

TO ^00,000 o 50,000 REGULAR GROUND TROOPS HAD BEEN ADDED SINCE 
JUNE 19 

O52U52 VIETNAM PLANNED TO CALL 20-28 YEAR OLDS WITH GRADE SCHOOL EDUCATION 

FOR SERVICE AS OFFICERS. THE GENERAL MOBILIZATION WAS DROPPED. 

052852 AT THE TRIPARTITE MEETINGS IN PARIS IT WAS STATED THAT MORE FINANCIAL 

ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. WAS NEEDED TO PUT' 200,000 TROOPS IN ARMIES OF 
THE ASSOCIATED STATES. 

06 52 FOUR REGIONAL STAFFS OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY WERE CREATED. 

06 52 LETOURNEAU WENT TO WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS INCREASES IN U.S. AID. THESE 

DISCUSSIONS RESULTED IN AN AGREEMENT THAT U.S. MILITARY AND FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE INCREASED TO COVER UO PERCENT OF FRENCH 
EXPENSES IN INDOCHINA. A FINAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON JUNE 18 STATED 
THAT THE STRUGGLE IN WHICH THE FORCES OF THE FRENCH UNION AND THE 
ASSOCIATED STATES WERE ENGAGED, AGAINST THE FORCES OF COMMUNIST 
AGGRESSION IN INDOCHINA, WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF WORLD WIDE RESISTANCE 
BY THE FR.EE NATIONS TO COMMUNIST ATTEMPTS AT CONQUEST AND SUBVERSION. 
/DEPT. STATE. 

060352 UNDER THE HIGH COMMISSIONER LETOURNEAU, THE FRENCH PROVOKED MODERATE 

NATIONALISTS BY NAMING NGUYEN VAN TAM AS PREMIER OF THE CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT. NGUYEN VAN TAM, FATHER OF NGUYEN VAN HIMH WHO WAS LATER 
MADE CHIEF OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY, WAS HATED FOR THE PART HE HAD 
PLAYED EARLIER IN THE CRUET, SUPPRESSION OF VIETNAMESE RESISTANCE 
MOVEMENTS . 

060752 FRENCH- VIETNAM COMMANDOS RAIDED THE ANNAM COAST. 

060952 FRANCE HOPED TO SHIFT THE WAR BURDEN TO THE VIETNAM FORCES. 



G 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




O 



061552 U.S. MINISTER HEATH AMD FRENCH MINISTER LETOURNEAU CONFERRED IN 

WASHINGTON. LETOURNEAU PRESSED FOR AID TO EXPAND THE NATIVE FORCES 
AND URGED FOR COMMON U.S. -BRITISH-FRENCH POLICY TO ASSURE VIETNAM 
OF WESTERN SUPPORT. 

062^52 IN THE DEBATE OVER NSC 12k 9 THE TRAINING OF LOCAL ARMIES WAS AN 

ALTERNATIVE, PUT FORTH BY SECRETARY KIMBALL FOR SUCCESSFULLY 
COUNTERING RUSSIA AT THE LOCAL WAR LEVEL. 

062552 NGUYEN VAN TAM TOOK OFFICE AS PREMIER, APPOINTED BY BAO DAI, WHO WAS 

OF STATE. 

07 52 U.S. LEGATION IN SAIGON WAS RAISED TO EMBASSY STATUS. U.S. AMBASSADOR 
• PRESENTED CREDENTIALS TO BAO DAI. A VIETNAMESE EMBASSY WAS 
ESTABLISHED IN WASHINGTON D.C. /j.B. 

071252 LETOURNEAU REVEALED THAT THE VIETNAM NATIONAL ARMY TOTALED 68,000 MEN. 

073052 FRANCE WARNED TPIAT SHE MIGHT HAVE TO ABANDON THE WAR IF THE U.S. DID NOT 

INCREASE FUNDS FOR FRENCH DEFENSE CONTRACTS. AID TO INDOCHINA FOR 
1953 WAS SET AT $350-MILLION. FRENCH HINTED FOR U.S. RELIEF FORCES. 

080152 VIETNAM'S PREMIER PLEDGED WO MORE NATIVE DIVISIONS BY THE YEAR'S END. 

PLANNED A NEW TAX TO RAISE FUNDS FOR THE ARMY. 

092152 THE VIETMIWH STAGED AN ATTACK NEAR SAIGON. 



101252 THE 200TH U„S. SHIP CARRYING MILITARY AID ARRIVED IN SAIGON. /j.B. 

53 A NAVAL TRAINING SCHOOL WAS ESTABLISHED AT NHA TRANG. 

012053 GENERAL 0' DANIEL WENT TO VIETNAM TO REVIEW LETOURNEAU' S OPERATION 

PLANS . 

02 53 AD HOC COMMITTEE TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ISA RECOMMENDED AGAINST 

DIRECT AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAMESE TRAINING PROGRAM 
FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. /JCS HIST. 

020^53 MINISTER LETOURNEAU REPORTED ON A NEW PLAN TO SPPED UP VIETNAMESE TROOP 

TRAINING. 

021653 EX-PREMIER REYNAUD FELT INCREASING THE VIETNAM ARMY WAS THE ONLY SOLUTION 

TO THE MILITARY STALEMATE. MARSHALL JUIN CONCURRED. 

022253 THE FRENCH-VIETNAMESE HIGH MILITARY COMMISSION CONSIDERED DOUBLING THE 

VIETNAM ARMY. IT APPEARED THAT THE FRENCH HAD ACCEPTED BAO DAI'S 
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. NGUYEN VAN HINH'S PLAN TO INCREASE THE 
REGULAR. ARMY. FINANCING DIFFICULTIES WERE ANTICIPATED. 



H 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



79 



022353 TALKS TOOK PLACE AT DALAT, VIETNAM, BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE 

THE HIGH MILITARY COMMAND, THEY DECIDED TO DOUBLE THE PROJECTED 
SIZE OF THE VNA BY ADDING 60 MORE LIGHT BATTALIONS . MEMBERS PRESENT 
TORE BAO DAI (CHIEF-OF-STATE), NGUYEN VAN TAM (PREMIER), NGUYEN VAN 
HINH (CHIEF OF STAFF), LETOURNEAU, AND SALM. THE DECISION WAS A 
MOVE TO END. THE MILITARY STALEMATE. THE REGULAR ARMY = 160,000. 
30,000 WOULD-BE ADDED BY THE END OF 1953 IN 20 BATTALIONS.- 

022^53 C. L.SULZBERGER REPORTED PREMIER MAYER AS SAYING THAT FRANCE COULD NOT 

FULFILL ANY MORE EUROPEAN COMMITMENTS UNLESS THE NATO ALLIES INCREASED 
THEIR AID. A COMMITTEE AGREED TO INCREASE VNA BATTALIONS FROM 30 TO 
THE U.S. OFFERED $1*2 MILLION IN AID CONDITIONAL 0^ THE PLACEMENT OF 
OBSERVERS WITH THE TROOPS. /NYT 022^3. 

022^53 A JOINT FRENCH-VIETNAMESE HIGH MILITARY COMMITTEE DECIDED TO RAISE 71 

BATTALIONS. 

022553 VIETNAM WAS GIVEN MORE FREEDOM IN DEVELOPING ITS NATIONAL ARMY APART 

FROM FRENCH CONTROL. 5^ BATTALIONS WERE TO BE FORMED IN 1953, TO 
CONTROL AREAS LESS UNDER REBEL CONTROL. 

SPRING 1953 EXPEDITIONARY CORPS = LAND FORCES OF 175,000 REGULAR TROOPS, 

INCLUDING 5^,000 FRENCH, 30,000 NORTH AFRICAN, 18,000 AFRICAN, 
20,000 LEGIONARIES, 53,000 LOCALLY RAISED TROOPS, AND 55,000 
AUXILIARY TROOPS, A NAVAL CONTINGENT OF 5,000, AIR FORCE CONTINGENT 
OF 10,000. IN THE ARMIES OF THE ASSOCIATED STATES WERE 150,000 
REGULAR AND 50,000 AUXILIARY TROOPS IN VIETNAM, 15,000 IN LAOS, 
10,000 IN CAMBODIA. /NAVARRE. 

03 53 THE FRANCO-VIETNAMESE HIGH MILITARY COUNCIL APPROVED A NEW PROGRAM 

CALLING FOR AN INCREASE IN VIETNAMESE STRENGTH DURING 1953 OF 
U0,000 MEN IN 5h "COMMANDO" BATTALIONS. 

031^53 THE FRENCH CABINET CONSIDERED A PLAN THAT WOULD LESSEN ITS INDOCHINA 

COMMITMENTS BY TRAINING MORE VIETNAMESE. 

032053 ON A VISIT TO INDOCHINA, U.S C GEN. MARK CLARK PRAISED FRENCH TACTICS 

AND TRAINING METHODS, SAW NO NEED FOR U.S. MILITARY INSTRUCTORS, 
AND SAID THE U.S. WOULD NOT FOIST ITS METHODS ON THE FRENCH. 

032353 GEN. MARK CLARK STRESSED THE NEED TO EXPAND THE VIETNAM ARMY, AND WAS 

INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING THE LOCAL MILITIA, OFFICER CADRES, AND 
TROOP MOBILITY. 

032553 H.W.BALDWIN WAS OPTIMISTIC RE FRENCH INVESTMENT AND VIETNAM ARM? STRENGTH. 

0^42253 AT THE BIPARTITE (US -FRANCE) MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON, DULLES WAS VERY 

ANXIOUS FOR FRENCH TO ADOPT THE SUCCESSFUL U.S. -KOREAN INSTRUCTIONAL 
METHODS FOR USE IN INDOCHINA. /JCS HIST. 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



/ 



0^2253 THE PARIS GOVERNMENT DECREED THAT FRANCE WOULD BE REPRESENTED IN INDOCHINA 

BY A HIGH COMMISSION CONSISTING OF A COMMISSIONER GENERAL IN SAIGON 
AND HIGH COMMISSIONERS IN EACH OF THE ASSOCIATED STATES. 

OU2653 G.GAUTIER WAS APPOINTED HIGH COMMISSIONER IN VIETNAM. 

05 53 ALTOGETHER VIETMINH INSURGENTS STRENGTH = 280,000 INCLUDING REGULARS, 

REGIONAL TROOPS, MILITIAMEN. THE MAIN STRIKING FORCE = 70,000 MEN 
IN FIVE ELITE DIVISIONS. 

050853 GEN. HENRI NAVARRE WAS APPOINTED BY PREMIER MAYER AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF 

OF THE FRENCH UNION FORCES IN INDOCHINA, SUCCEEDING GEN. SALAN. HE 
TOOK OFFICE MAY 20 . 

060^53 VNA DEVELOPMENT PROMISED BY FRENCH IN I9U9 HAD BEEN RETARDED BY A 

SHORTAGE OF OFFICERS, BY FRENCH LACK OF FAITH IN THE VIETNAMESE AND 
FRENCH FISCAL PROBLEMS. /NIE 91 

07 53 THROUGHOUT THE MONTH NAVARRE WAS IN PARIS ATTENDING MEETINGS CONCERNING 

FRENCH ACTIVITIES IN INDOCHINA. THE SCALE OF HIS DEMANDS WERE OBJECTED 
TO BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF BECAUSE FULFILLING THEM WOULD HAVE AN 
ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE AND NORTH 
AFRICA. IT WAS SUGGESTED TO TRY TO GET AN INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE 
OF LAOTIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY TO LESSEN THE FRENCH RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR SECURITY. /LANCASTER. 

070353 FRENCH GOVERNMENT HANDED A NOTE TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF VIETNAM, 

CAMBODIA IN WHICH IT MADE A SOLEMN DECLARATION OF ITS READINESS TO 
COMPLETE THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ASSOCIATED STATES BY 
TRANSFERRING ALL FUNCTIONS WHICH REMAINED UNDER FRENCH CONTROL, AND 
INVITED THE GOVERNMENTS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE FRENCH THE SETTLEMENT 
OF OUTSTANDING CLAIMS IN THE ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, JUDICIAL, MILITARY, 
AND POLITICAL SPHERES. /LANCASTER. 

070353 M.DEJEAN WAS APPOINTED COMMISSIONER GENERAL TO THE ASSOCIATED STATES. 

070953 U.S. GEN. ! DANIEL ENDED A 3 -WEEK SURVEY. HE FAVORED AN INCREASE IN 

MILITARY AID AND WAS CONFIDENT OF FRENCH VICTORY ONCE THE VIETNAMESE 
ARMY WAS FULLY ORGANIZED. 

071253 1^ FRANCO-U.S. BILATERAL TALKS, THE NAVARRE PLAN WAS DEFINED, AS CALLING 

FOR A STRUCTURAL REORGANIZATION TO CREATE UNITS BETTER ADAPTED FOR 
WAR CONDITIONS AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. /lST NOTES 67. 

071653 JAMES REST OF, NYT, LINKED THE LAG IN NATIVE TROOP DEVELOPMENT TO NON- 
ENTHUSIASM FOR BAO DAI ! S REGIME. 

072753 AFTER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE, U.S. AID FOR THE FRENCH IN VIETNAM GREW IN 

VOLUME* 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



d — 

£1 



090653 NON-COMMUNIST NATIONALISTS HELD A CONFERENCE IN SAIGON. THEY DENOUNCED 

FRENCH COLONIALISM, ATTACKED PREMIER TAM AND DEMANDED AN ELECTED 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. 

092353 THE FRENCH FORMALLY AGREED TO ALLOWING U.S. PERSONNEL TO EXAMINE THE 

TO WHICH U.S. AID WAS BEING PUT. 

10 53 IT WAS HOPED THAT 30,000 MEN WOULD BE MOBILIZED FOR THE VIETNAM ARMY 

BEFORE DECEMBER. 

101^53 A VIETNAM NATIONAL CONGRESS OF 200 CONVENED IN SAIGON. RATHER THAN CHOOSE 

POTENTIAL DELEGATES FOR A MEETING WITH FRANCE THEY PASSED A RESOLUTION 
DECLARING AN INDEPENDENT VIETNAM WAS NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FRENCH 
UNION. 

101553 general navarre launched the heaviest offensive operation in wo years. 

11 53 generals t daniel and bonsal conducted a second survey in vietnam. 

/report filed 12-19-53. 

11 53 general o 1 daniel reported on recommendations he made to the french which 

all fell short of introduction of large american influence in planning 
of operations and training of vietnamese forces. /jcs hist. 

11 53 brig. gen. paul w. caraway reported that there was little semblance of a 

national army. 

111953 the 2nd report of general o f daniel stated that the french possessed the 

military initiative. indigenous army development had occurred as 
planned. vietnamese battalions should be used only with regular forces 
and not in separate battalions. reorganization of french forces into 
mobile groups and divisons had been significant. national army 
training had been unsatisfactory. chief maag indochina had keec abreast 
of french plans. 

112953 ho chi menh issued a call for peace negotiations in a stockholm newspaper. 

121753 nguyen van tam left hi's office as premier. 

121853 bao dai asked prince buu loc to take the premiership of vietnam. he 

entered office jan. l6, i95u and served until june l6, 195^. 

1953 a considerable portion of u.s. aid in 1953 was to equip the growing 
vietnamese army, which totaled 155,000 at the end of 1952, and was 
expanded by ^1-0, 000 by the end of 1953, to reach a total strength of 
300,000 by the end of 195^. france planned* to increase fec strength 
in indochina to 250,000 by the end of 1953- /am 

5 1 !- there were 25 americans attached to stem as economic at© technical 
assistants in indochina. stem had 100 native employees 



K 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



$0 



01 $k FEC IN INDOCHINA = 2k), 000. VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY = 211,000. 

LAOTIAN ARMY = 21,000. CAMBODIAN ARMY = 16,000. VIETMINH = 
115,000. REGULARS PLUS 185,000 MILITIAMEN + GUERRILLAS. 

01165^ THE CABINET OF PRINCE BUU LCC WAS INVESTED. 

01265^ AT THE BIG FOUR CONFERENCE IN BERLIN, BIDAULT SPECIFIED THAT A 

CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA BE HELD. / THE MAIN RESULT OF THE BERLIN 
CONFERENCE WAS THE SETTING OF APRIL 26 FOR A MEETING AT GENEVA ON 
INDOCHINA. /FLEM-CWO. 

01295 1 * SEC.DEF. MEMO TO SEC. AF. DIRECTED 200 AIR FORCE PERSONNEL TO INDOCHINA 

TDY TO JUNE 15 , 195^. 

01295^ MAJOR GENERAL ERSKINE, CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENTS SPECIAL COMMITTEE 

ON INDOCHINA, THOUGHT 1 MAAG INDOCHINA SHOULD BE RAISED TO MISSION 
LEVEL TO HELP WITH TRAINING. 

02 5*4 THE NEW FIRST VIETNAMESE DIVISION WHICH HAD BEEN CREATED ACCORDING TO 

THE NAVARRE PLAN AND LEFT IN A STATIC POSITION, TURNED AGAINST 
BAO DAI AND THE FRENCH. /FLEM-CWO. 

02 5k PRESIDENT RHEE OF KOREA OFFERED TO SEND A ROK DIVISION TO INDOCHINA. 

WERE OPPOSED. /31^-1 

02015^ PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE JOINT CHIEFS 
• OF STAFF, OTHER AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND A SPECIAL COMMITTEE 
UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF W. BEDELL SMITH HAD STUDIED THE INDOCHINA 
SITUATION IN TERMS OF WHAT COURSE THE U.S. SHOULD FOLLOW. THEY 
HAD CONSIDERED THE USE OF U.S. GROUND AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN 
INDOCHINA AND ALSO REVIEWED THE OLD THEORY THAT INDOCHINA WAS THE 
KEY TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, WEIGHED ALTERNATIVE PLANS LIKE THE 
STRENGTHENING OF THAILAND. /FLEM-CWO. 

02055 1 *- GEN. 0' DANIEL T S REPORT ON HIS 3RD VISIT TO VIETNAM RECOMMENDED l) 

ORGANIZATION OF A SMALL STAFF TO GO QUICKLY TO VIETNAM WITH DETAILED 
OPERATIONS AND TRAINING PLANS 2) TOO OFFICERS TO BE ATTACHED TO 
VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT 3) MORE FUNDS FOR STEM k) TRAINING COMMAND 
FOR VIETNAMESE NAVAL AND AIR FORCES. 

020951+ WAR MINISTER RENE PLEVEN TOURED VIETNAM. /LANCASTER. 

MID FEB. I95U GENERALS FAY AND BLANCK, CHIEFS OF STAFF OF AIR FORCE AND ARMY 

RESPECTIVELY, AND SECRETARY OF WAR PIERRE DE CHEVIGNE TOURED VIETNAM 
FOR FRANCE. /LANCASTER. 

MAR -APR 5>k THE BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU RAGED. 

03035^ PRINCE BUU LOC ARRIVED IN PARIS WITH A DELEGATE TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT 

OF VIETNAM CLAIMS 0¥\ THE BASIS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S SOLEMN 
AT I ON OF JULY 3, 1953. THE FRENCH INSISTED ON A COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE 
THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE Aim A COMMITTEE TO DEFINE THE NATURE OF VIETNAM 1 S 
ASSOCIATION TO FRANCE. THIS EFFECTIVELY TIED UP AW PUT OFF ACTIONS 
UNTIL THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OPENED. (SEE 0^285*0 -/LANCASTER. 



L 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



ri3 



03205 [ l- ALSOP REPORTED THAT GENERAL ELY SAID IN WASHINGTON THAT FRANCE COULD NOT 

WIN WITH THE MEANS AT HAND AND MUST THEREFORE SEEK A NEGOTIATED PEACE 
BUT THE U.S. COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS BECAUSE THERE WAS 110 FIGHTING 
IN INDOCHINA, AS IN KOREA. THE ENEMY WAS EVERYWHERE, SO IF THE FRENCH 
WITHDREW. ANY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT MUST LEAD RAPIDLY TO TOTAL CQMMOTIST 
CONTROL. " /FLEM-CWO. 

03225 1 ! ADMIRAL ARTHUR RADFORD, CHAIRMAN OF JCS, DECLARED THAT THE FRENCH WERE 

GOING TO WIN THIS WAR. /FLEM-C^O. 

0321*5^ THE PRESIDENT OF U.S. PRAISED THE HEROISM OF THE FRENCH FORCES AND 

DECLARED THAT COMMUNIST AGGRESSION WAS BEING FOUGHT IN INDOCHINA. 
COMMUNIST AGGRESSION WAS THE STOCK PHRASE USED IN WASHINGTON TO 
THE INDOCHINA WAR. /FLEM-CWO. 

03295^ DULLES MADE A SPEECH APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT IN ADVANCE, DECLARING THAT 

COMMUNIST DOMINATION OF INDOCHINA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA BY WHATEVER 
WOULD BE A GRAVE THREAT TO THE FREE COMMUNITY AND SHOULD NOT BE PASSIVE- 
LY ACCEPTED. IN THESE WORDS HE RULED OUT EVEN A FREE ELECTION AS A 
MEANS OF LEGITIMIZING THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT OF HO CHI MINH IN INDO- 
CHINA, STRESSING INSTEAD THE RICHES OF THE AREA AND ITS GREAT STRATEGIC 
IMPORTANCE. REACTION IN SAIGON WAS U.S. UNPOPULAR. /FLEM-CWO 
CHECK FLEM-CWO PG 689 NOTE 99 

Ok 5k GENERAL O'DNAIEL WAS ASSIGNED PERMANENTLY TO INDOCHINA. /JCS HIST. 

0^035^ IN WASHINGTON A SECRET CONFERENCE WAS HELD IN WHICH DULLES AND RADFORD 

TRIED TO PERSUADE EIGHT LEADERS OF CONGRESS TO AGREE TO SUPPORT A 
CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING OUR ENTRY INTO THE INDOCHINA WAR. 
THE MEETING WAS CALLED BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT. THE LEGISLATORS 
PRESENT WERE SEN. WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND, SEN. EUGENE MILLIMAN, SEN. LYNDON 
JOHNSON, SEN. RICHARD B. RUSSELL, SEN. EARL C. CLEMENTS, HOUSE SPEAKER 
JOSEPH MARTIN, REP, JOHN H. MC CORMACK, AND REP. J. PERCY PRIEST. 
RADFORD WANTED TO SEND 200 PLANES FROM THE CARRIERS ESSEX AND 
WHICH HE HAD READY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, PLUS OTHER PLANES FROM THE 
PHILIPPINES, TO SAVE DIEN BIEN PHU. QUESTIONING BROUGHT OUT THAT NOLLE 
OF THE OTHER THREE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF APPROVED OF THE IDEA. RADFORD 
SAID THIS WAS BECAUSE HE HAD SPENT MORE TIME IN THE FAR EAST THAN MY 
OF THEM AND SO HE UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION BETTER. /FLEM-CWO. 

Ok075k PRES. EISENHOWER USED THE; ROW OF DOMINIES THEORY AT A PRESS CONFERENCE. 

/GETTLEMAN P. 100 

0^135^ IN A MEMO FROM JCS TO SEC. DEF. IT WAS STATED THAT THE ARMY WAS 

CURRENTLY CAPABLE OF ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY 
AGAINST DISSIDENTS AND BANDITS BUT NOT AGAINST VIETMINH ALL OUT 
AGGRESSION UNDER DRV DIRECTION. 

■ 

0^155^ ADMIRAL RADFORD, CHAIRMAN OF JCS SAID IN A SPEECH THAT INDOCHINA'S LOSS 

WOULD BE THE PRELUDE TO THE LOSS OF ALL SOUTHEAST ASIA AND A THREAT TO 
A FAR WIDER AREA. /GETTLEMAN P. 100 



M 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



*-7 



OUl65 ] + VICE PRESIDENT NIXON IN AN ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER 

EDITORS RULED OUT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS TO DIVIDE THE 
TERRITORY. HE SAID, "IT IS HOPED THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT HAVE TO SEND 
TROOPS THERE, BUT IF THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT AVOID IT, THE ADMINISTRATION 
MUST FACE UP TO THE SITUATION AND DISPATCH FORCES." /GETTLEMEN 

i 

0^265*4 PUBLIC REACTION WAS SO ADVERSE TO NIXON 1 S STATEMENT THAT DULLES 

SAID THAT THE SENDING OF TROOPS WAS UNLIKELY. /FLEM-CWO. 

0^285^ A JOINT FRANCO-VIETNAMESE DECLARATION STATED THAT VIETNAM, (THE INDEPEND- 
ENCE OF WHICH THE FRENCH HAD PROCLAIMED HALF A DOZEN TIMES), WAS 
FULLY INDEPENDENT. 

05 5^ THE QUAI D'ORSAY AT THE INSISTENCE OF THE U.S. DEPT. OF STATE 

SENT ITS EMISSARIES TO BAO DAI AT CANNES TO RIG THE APPOINTMENT OF 
DIEM ARRIVED IN SAIGON 195*+. (WID Ul-57) EARLY IN MAY DIEM HAD TROUBLE 
' WITH BAO DAI. NEITHER FRENCH NOR BAO DAI HAD ANY LIKING FOR DIEM. 
DULLES AND CARDINAL SEELLMAN WERE IN FAVOR OF A GOVERNMENT HEADED BY 
DIEM ALTHOUGH THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT DULLES WAS NOT OVERENTHUSIASTIC 
ABOUT DIEM. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DID NOT OPPOSE IT. SOME FRENCH 
LEADERS ENCOURAGED IT --FORMER HIGH COMMISSIONER LETOURNEAU AND 
FREDERIC -DUPONT, WHO FOR A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE FALL OF THE LANIEL 
HAD SERVED AS MINISTER FOR THE ASSOCIATED STATES OF INDOCHINA. /J.B. 

05035 1 !- MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS J.H. TRAPNELL DISAGREED IN NEARLY ALL RESPECTS WITH 

GENERAL O 1 DANIEL ON ASSESSMENT OF THE INDOCHINA WAR. HE STRESSED THE 
POLITICAL NATURE OF THE WAR AND SAID THAT A STRICTLY MILITARY SOLUTION 
WAS NOT POSSIBLE. 

05O65h DIEN BIEN PHU FELL. 

05075^ AFTER DIEN BIEN PHU FELL, SECRETARY DULLES SAID THAT THE PRESENT 

CONDITIONS IN INDOCHINA DID NOT PROVIDE A SUITABLE BASIS FOR THE U.S C 
TO PARTICIPATE WITH ITS ARMED FORCES. HE DECLARED HOWEVER, THAT IF AN 
ARMISTICE OR CEASEFIRE CONCLUDED AT GENEVA PROVIDED A ROAD TO A 
COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND FURTHER AGGRESSION, OR IF HOSTILITIES CONTINUED, 
THEN THE NEED WOULD BE EVEN MORE URGENT TO CREATE THE. CONDITIONS 
FOR UNITED ACTION IN DEFENSE OF THE AREA. THE SECRETARY THEN 
POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER HAD REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT U.S. 
WOULD NOT TAKE MILITARY ACTION IN INDOCHINA WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF 
CONGRESS AND THAT HE WOULD NOT SEEK SUCH SUPPORT UNLESS THERE WAS 
ADEQUATE COLLECTIVE EFFORT BASED ON GENUINE MUTUALITY OF PURPOSE IN 
DEFENDING VITAL INTERESTS. 

05085^ GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA, (MAY 8 - JULY 2l) 

05125^- REPORTS OF A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON AT WHICH DULLES WAS REPORTED 

TO HAVE DECLARED TPIAT THE RETENTION OF INDOCHINA WAS NOT ESSENTIAL TO 
THE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AFFECTED FRENCH MORALE ADVERSELY AT GENEVA. 



N 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



J& 



05155^ GEN. ELY AGREED TO ALLOWING U.S. TO TRAIN VIETNAMESE AND TO U.S. ADVISORS 

IN VIETNAMESE UNITS. HE DID NOT GIVE ASSENT TO FORMATION OF VIETNAM 
INTO LIGHT DIVISIONS PER GENERAL f DANIEL'S REQUEST. /JCS HIST. 

05185^ GENERALS ELY, SALAN, AND PELISSIER ARRIVED IN SAIGON. /LANCASTER. 

0518+20 I95I+ BAO DAI SOUGHT SUPPORT FROM U.S. FOR VNA. THIS WAS VIEWED AS AN 

ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN WILLINGNESS OF U.S. TO REPLACE FRENCH. 

( 

05205^ JCS WERE CONVINCED THAT U.S. INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA SHOULD BE 

PREDICATED ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE NATIONAL ARMIES AT THE BEST 
GUARANTEE OF A MILITARY VICTORY. /JCS HIST. 

052^5^ GENERAL 0' DANIEL PRESENTED A PLAN TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILSON TO CREATE 

2 VIETNAMESE DIVISIONS IN THE NORTH AND 9 IN THE SOUTH WITH FRENCH 
COMMAND BUT U.S. COUNTERPART STAFF REPRESENTATION. THE JCS FELT THIS 
WAS AN UNWORKABLE ARRANGEMENT WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT AT GOVT, LEVEL. 
/JCS HIST. 

05265^ MEMO FROM JCS TO SEC. DEF. STATED 2250 U.S. PERSONNEL OVER THE 350 

WERE MAAG REQUIRED TO TRAIN THE ASSOCIATED STATES FORCES. 

06 5^ THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO SET UP A COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE 

OF THE NORTH WHICH WAS INVESTED WITH THE POWERS HITHERTO EXERCISED BY 
THE GOVERNOR, AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE THE DEFENSE OF HANOI IN THE 
EVENT OF A FRENCH WITHDRAWAL. THESE ORDERS WERE LATER AMENDED WITH THE 
RESULT THAT THE COMMITTEE DIRECTED ITS ACTIVITIES TOWARD THE ORGANIZA- 
TION OF RECEPTION CENTERS FOR THE REFUGEES WHO WERE LATER TRANSFERRED 
SOUTH. 

JUNE-JULY 195*4 THE 11TH AND 1^-TH FRENCH INFANTRY DIVISIONS WERE MOVED TO TUNISIA 

WITH MDAP EQUIPMENT WITHOUT U.S. BUT WITH SACEUR APPROVAL. 

06 5h PRESIDENT RHEE OF KOREA'S OFFER TO SEND A ROK ARMY CORPS TO INDOCHINA WAS 

KEPT WIDER CONSIDERATION. /3lA-l. 

06 5^ VIETNAM ARMY WAS AT ITS PEAK STRENGTH OF 219,000. /WID 20-56. 

06015*+ LANDSDALE ARRIVED IN SAIGON TO HEAD SAIGON MILITARY MISSION. /SMM REPT. 

06035^ ADMIRAL RADFORD SUGGESTED TO GENERAL VALLUY, HEAD OF THE FRENCH MILITARY 

MISSION, THE USE OF SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS IN INDOCHINA WAR. ACCORDING 
TO VALLUY THE FRENCH WERE READY TO TURN OVER TO THE U.S. 2 LARGE 
TRAINING CAMPS. 

06035*+ GENERAL PAUL ELY WAS APPOINTED FRENCH HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR INDOCHINA. 

060^5*+ FRANCE INITIALED TREATIES WHICH GAVE THE FRENCH-RECOGNIZED VIETNAMESE 

GOVERNMENT COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE. VIETNAM AGREED TO A FREE ASSOCIATION 
; WITH FRANCE WITHIN THE FRENCH UNION. /NYT 
















Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






060k5k IN PARIS, FRENCH PREMIER LANIEL AND VIETNAMESE PREMIER BUU LOC INITIALED 

WO TREATIES, A TREATY OF INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM ANT) A TREATY OF 
ASSOCIATION PROVIDING FOR COOPERATION THROUGH A HIGH COUNCIL. (DETAILS 
ON FUTURE COLLABORATION, ESPECIALLY MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, WERE TO BE 
WORKED OUT IN SEPARATE CONVENTIONS WHICH WERE NEVER CONCLUDED . ) 

0605 5H GEN. PAUL HENRI ELY WAS APPOINTED TO REPLACE DEJEAN AS COMMISSIONER 

GENERAL FOR THE ASSOCIATED STATES AND REPLACING NAVARRE AS COMANDER AND 
CHIEF OF THE FRENCH UNION FORCES IN INDOCHINA. 

06065^ THE FRENCH AGREED TO THE APPOINTMENT OF NGO DINH DIEM AS PREMIER OF SOUTH 

VIETNAM. 

06085^ GENERAL NAVARRE TURNED OVER HIS COMMAND TO GENERAL PAUL ELY. 

06095^ GENERAL ELY, THRU T DANIEL, REQUESTED THAT THE U.S. ASSUME ORGANIZATIONAL 

AOT SUPERVISORIAL DUTIES IN TRAINING VIETNAMESE DIVISIONS. /JCS HIST. 

0609-26 195^ ELY ! S REQUEST GENERATED A CRISIS IN WASHINGTON. SUCH A TRAINING 

MISSION WAS FELT BY DULLES TO BE CONTRARY TO U.S. INTERESTS SINCE THE 
WAR WAS DEGENERATING SO QUICKLY. GENERAL O 1 DANIEL WAS REFUSED 
PERMISSION TO GO AHEAD WITH THE TRAINING. /JCS HIST. 

062 55^ DOD REQUESTED CHIEF MAAG INDOCHINA TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON TONNAGE AND 

TYPES OF EQUIPMENT IN INDOCHINA. REPLY RECEIVED FROM CHIEF MAAG ON 
JULY 3, AND 7. /309-1 

O6295I4 THE FRENCH BEGAN TO EVACUATE THE SOUTHERN PARTS OF THE RED RIVER DELTA. 
JUL-DEC 1954 VIETMINH ADDED 5 HEW DIVISIONS TO THEIR FORCES. /JCS HIST. 

THE GENEVA CONFERENCE HAD BEEN A DISASTER FOR SECRETARY 

DULLES. AFTER THE TWO WEEK RECESS IN THE MIDDLE OF IT HE ANNOUNCED 
NEITHER HE NOR GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH WOULD RETURN. HOWEVER, AFTER 

• AN URGENT CALL FROM MENDES -FRANCE, DULLES FLEW TO PARIS ON JULY 12, AND 
SMITH RETURNED TO GENEVA. THE INITIATIVE WAS EITHER IN THE HANDS OF 
THE COMMUNIST POWERS ON THE ONE SIDE AND EDEN AND MENDES-FRANCE ON 
. THE OTHER. AT THE END DULLES ANNOUNCED TPIAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT SIGN 
PACTS AND PRESIDENT EISENHOWER SAID ON JULY 21 THAT THE U.S. WOULD 
NEITHER ACCEPT PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AGREEMENTS NOR ATTEMPT 
OVERTURN THEM BY FORCE. THIS WAS DUBBED A POLICY OF INNOCENCE BY 
DISASSOCIATION. /FLEM-CWO 

07 5^ U.S. AND GREAT BRITAIN MET TO DISCUSS THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST 

ASIA. • . 

07 5^ GENERAL O f DANIEL RECOMMENDED TO JCS AH EXPANDED MAAG IN INDOCHINA TO 

PROVIDE AN ORGANIZATION WITH SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO PROVIDE A REALISTIC 
TRAINING PROGRAM. EXPANSION HAD TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE AUGUST 11, 
DEADLINE AS ESTABLISHED IN THE GENEVA AGREEMENT,, THE STATE DEFT. 
CONCURRED. /JCS HIST. 

07015'+ MAJOR LUCIEN CONIEN ARRIVED IN SAIGON AS SECOND MEMBER OF SMM. /SMM REFT. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






rt 



070354 DOD INFORMED DEFT. OF STATE CONCERNING ACTIONS IT HAD TAKEN TO RECOVER 

MDAP EQUIPMENT IN INDOCHINA. STATE COUNTERED WITH AN INQUIRY TO BE 
DIRECTED TO CHIEF MAAG AS TO WHAT FRENCH WERE DOING TO RECOVER MDAP 
EQUIPMENT. CHIEF MAAG REPLIED ON JULY 3 (AND 7). 

070354 AND 070754 CINCPAC ASSIGNED CHIEF MAAG INDOCHINA THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 

RECOVERY AND/ OR DESTRUCTION OF U.S. MDAP MATERIAL IN INDOCHINA. 

07075 1 * NGO DINH DIEM ARRIVED IN VIETNAM. '/SMM REPT. 

070754 HEAD OF STATE AND FORMER EMPEROR BAO DAI APPOINTED NGO DINH DIEM PREMIER 

OF VIETNAM. 

07095^ DOD REQUESTED STATE TO USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ENSURE FRENCH COMPLY 

WITH CHIEF MAAG REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON FRENCH INTENTIONS RE MDAP 
EQUIPMENT. /309-1 

071254 CHIEF MAAG INDOCHINA SUBMITTED PROGRESS REPORT OH SAFEGUARDING MDAP 

EQUIPMENT. IT'S SUCCESS WAS DIRECTLY PROPORTIONAL TO AMOUNT OF FRENCH 
ADVANCE INFORMATION. /309-1 

07165*4 SECRETARY OF STATE SENT MESSAGE TO SMITH AT GENEVA ADVISING HIM TO ATTEMPT 

TO PROTECT MDAP MATERIAL IN THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. /309-1 

071754 CHIEF MAAG SUBMITTED 2ND REPORT ON INDOCHINA EQUIPMENT. /309-1 

07185^ UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE WALTER BEDELL SMITH TALKED WITH PREMIER MENDES- 

FRANCE ABOUT MDAP EQUIPMENT WHO PROMISED TO DISCUSS PROBLEM WITH THE 
APPROPRIATE FRENCH MEN. / 309-1. 

07195^ SEC.DEF. THRU THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF REQUESTED CHIEF MAAG TO INFORM ON 

SPECIFIC FRENCH PLANS FOR SAFEGUARDING MDAP EQUIPMENT IN INDOCHINA. 

/309-1 

072054 CHIEF MAAG INDOCHINA MESSAGE SAID FRENCH PLANS FOR RECOVERY OF MDAP 

EQUIPMENT WERE ADEQUATE SO NO PROBLEMS. 

072054 GENEVA AGREEMENT SIGNED. 

07205^ PARTITION AT THE 17TH PARALLEL BECAME A FACT. DIEM DISCLAIMED ANY 

OBLIGATION TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE GENEVA ACCORDS WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT DID 
NOT SIGN. /WID 41-57. 

072154 GENERAL DELTIEL ON BEHALF OF ELY, AND TA QUANG BUU, THE VIETMINH VICE- 
MINISTER FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE SIGNED THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS. /LANCASTER 

072754 CEASE FIRE (INDOCHINA WAR) WENT INTO EFFECT IN NORTH VIETNAM. 

08 " 54 MUTUAL SECURITY ACT WAS AMENDED TO PROVIDE FOR DIRECT AID TO THE' 

VIETNAMESE . 



Q 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



I 



& 



08 <?k THE GOVERNMENT OF PREMIER NGO DINH DIEM DID NOT CONTROL THE ARMY, LACKED 

A COMPETENT ADMINISTRATION, HAD 110 AUTHORITY OVER THE TERRITORIES RULED 
FOR MANY YEARS BY THE SECTS, AND STRUGGLED DESPERATELY TO HOUSE AND FEED 
THE GROWING MASSES OF REFUGEES. 

08 5^ ACCORDING TO A DA ACSI REPORT OF JAN- 56, AFTER GENEVA 25 PER CENT OF THE 

VNA DESERTED. 

08015^ CEASE FIRE WENT INTO EFFECT IN CENTRAL VIETNAM. 

080U54 THE JCS REPLIED TO CHIEF MAAG'S RECOMMENDATION FOR U.S. TRAINING OF VNA. 

THIS SHOULD ONLY BE UNDERTAKEN IF THE FOLLOWING PRECONDITIONS MET, l) 
STRONG STABLE GOVERNMENT 2) FORMAL REQUEST FROM COUNTRY INVOLVED TO 
U.S. FOR AID AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE 3) FRENCH SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM, 
AND GRANT FULL INDEPENDENCE TO ASSOCIATED STATES. DULLES HELD THAT AL- 
THOUGH CONDITIONS IVERE NOT MET BY VIETNAM, IT WAS 'ESSENTIAL THAT THE 
U.S. TRAIN TO ENABLE THE COUNTRY TO BECOME STRONG AND STABLE. IN NSC • 
5^27/2 THE ISSUE WAS DECIDED IN FAVOR OF U.S. TRAINING THE VIETNAMESE 
ARMY. /JCS HIST. 

08075^ CHIEF MAAG INDOCHINA WAS APPOINTED OVERALL COORDINATOR FOR U.S. PARTICIPA- 
TION IN EVACUATION OF NORTH VIETNAM. /217155. 

08115^ DULLES IN A NOTE TO PREMIER MENDES-FRANCE STATED U.S. WAS PREPARED TO 

DIRECTLY ASSIST, INCLUDING MILITARY AND BUDGETARY, AND TO CONSIDER ■ 
TRAINING THE ASSOCIATED STATES. 

08115^ CEASE FIRE WENT INTO EFFECT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 

08115'+ DEADLINE IN RESPECT TO TOTAL STRENGTH OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN FORCES IN 

VIETNAM. /SMM REFT. 

08ll5 ] 4 THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM (SEE 

ENTRY FOR JULY 20-21, 195*0 WAS ESTABLISHED WITH INDIA AS CHAIRMAN AND 
WITH -CANADA AND POLAND AS THE OTHER MEMBERS. 

08205^ EISENHOWER APPROVED A U.S. POLICY STRESSING WORKING WITH THE FRENCH ONLY 

INSOFAR AS IS NECESSARY. OCMH NSC 5^29/2 

08265 1 ! REPRESENTATIVES OF FRANCE AND ASSOCIATED STATES BEGAN MEETINGS IN PARIS 

REPLACING PAU AGREEMENTS OF 1950. 

09 5^ MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY SURVEY TEAM WEST TO VIETNAM, 

09 5k DIEM ASKED FRANCE TO WITHDRAW FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE BY MAY 1956. 

/JCS HIST. 

09 5^ OPEN CONFLICT BEGAN WITH THE FRENCH-APPOINTED CHIEF OF THE ARMT, GENERAL 

NGUYEN VAN HUSH, WHOM NGO DINH DIEM SOON DISMISSED. WHEN BAO DAI BECAME 
AWARE THAT IT MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR HIM TO PLEASE THE U.S., HE 
ORDERED GENERAL NGUYEN VAN HINH TO GO TO FRANCE. 



R 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



29 



09105^ A DIEM AGENT INFILTRATED THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF MEETING AND DISCOVERED 

COUP WAS BEING PLANNED BY GENERAL HINH TO DEPOSE DIEM. DIEM REMOVED 
HINH AS ARMY CHIEF AND ORDERED HIM OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HINH'S 
ACTIVITIES DISRUPTED PLANNING ACTIVITIES AT THE VIETNAMESE ARMY GENERAL 
STAFF, AND CREATED AN IRRESPONSIBLE INSUBORDINATE ATTITUDE WITHIN VNA 
RANKS. /JCS HIST. 

09085^ EIGHT POWERS SIGNED THE S.E.ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY, INCLUDING A 

PROTOCOL WHICH EXTENDED TO SOUTHERN VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, AND LAOS 
PROTECTION AGAINST AGGRESSION AND ELIGIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC AID. 

09175^ OFFICE FOR REFUGEES WAS SET UP UNDER A COMMISSIONER GENERAL WHO WAS GIVEN 

THE RANK OF SEC. OF STATE. /LANCASTER. 

09225^ IN A MEMO TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, JCS STATED THAT THE GENEVA AGREEMENT 

WOULD HINDER THE U.S. IN TRAINING AND EQUIPPING THE VIETNAMESE. THEY 
ESTIMATED THAT EQUIPMENT IN VIETNAM WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPLY VIETNAM. 
TRAINING OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY WOULD TAKE 3-5 YEARS AND SHOULD HAVE 
LOW PRIORITY TO OTHER U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS. NOT A GOOD TIME TO 
FURTHER INDICATE U.S. TRAINING INTENTIONS RE VIETNAMESE FORCES. THEY 
WANTED TO RETAIN THE FEC. /JCS HIST. 

092^ WASHINGTON CONFERENCE BROUGHT TO LIGHT DIFFICULTIES IN TRAINING THE VNA. 

DULLES VIEWED THE VNA AS A SMALL FORCE DEVELOPED TO INSURE INTERNAL 
SECURITY. THE JCS VIEW WAS THAT A FORCE TWICE AS LARGE WAS NEEDED TO 
PROVIDE TROOPS TO DETER OVERT AGGRESSION ACROSS THE DMZ. /JCS HIST. 

THE FRENCH DELEGATES (GUY LACHAMBRE, EDGAR FAURE, GENERAL ELY, AND 

AMBASSADOR HENRI BONNET) AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THE STEPS TO ACHIEVE 
TOTAL INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE l) THE CANCELLATION OF THE PAU AGREEMENTS 
WHICH GAVE FRANCE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THE ECONOMY, COMMERCE AND 
FINANCES OF VIETNAM, 2) THE TRANSFER OF THE OVERALL COMMAND OF THE 
NATIONAL ARMY TO THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, 3) TO PUT THE U.S. MILITARY 
MISSION IN CHARGE OF TRAINING THE VIETNAMESE ARMY, k) TO GIVE THE 
GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM FULL CONTROL OVER ALL AID FUNDS FROM THE U.S., 
FINALLY 5) TO WITHDRAW THE EXPEDITIONARY CORPS UPON REQUEST OF THE 
VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. /J.B. DRAGON. 

09255^ NGO DIM DIEM REORGANIZED HIS CABINET WITH THE AIM OF WINNING THE 

COOPERATION OF SOME LEADERS OF THE SECTS. 

09275^ FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY CORPS OF 176,000 WAS SCHEDULED FOR PROGRESSIVE 

REDUCTION TO 100,000 BY THE EI© OF 1955. /JCS HIST. 

09285 1 ! AT A CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND U.S. THE DISPOSITION 

OF EQUIPMENT WAS DISCUSSED AND THE BUILD-UP OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY 
WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH FORCES. 

09295^ FRANCO-AMERICAN MINUTE OF UNDERSTANDING ON ASSISTING, DEVELOPING AND 

STRENGTHENING FREE VIETNAM SIGNED. /STATE MESSAGE 12292. 

09305^ U.S. WAS CAUTIOUS IN ITS ESTABLISHMENT OF VNA UNTIL DIEM'S POSITION WAS 

SECURE. /TELG. /JCS HIST. 



S 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



30 



10 5k GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS WAS DESIGNATED SPECIAL U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN VIETNAM 

WITH THE PERSONAL RANK OF AMBASSADOR TO COORDINATE U.S. AID PROGRAMS. 

10 5^ AS VIETMINH WITHDREW FROM THE DELTA AREA, THEY WERE REPLACED BY TROOPS OF 

THE CAO DAI AND THE HOA DAO ARMIES. /JCS HIST. 

10 $k SVN GOVERNMENT WAS UNABLE TO ESTABLISH CONTROL IN RURAL AREAS. VIETMINH 

TOOK OVER LARGE AREAS OF ANNAM AND HOA HAO AND CAO DAIWERE FIGHTING 
FOR PROVINCES IN THE DELTA. /JSC HIST. 

10 jk CONTENTION DEVELOPED BETWEEN SOUTH VIETNAMESE GENERAL HINH AND PRES. DIEM. 

10 5^ HINH WAS WARNED BY ELY AND HEATH NOT TO PLOT AGAINST DIEM. /JCS HIST. 

10025^ GENERAL ELY CONFERRED WITH BAO DAI CONCERNING THE WASHINGTON TALKS AND 

WARNED BAO DAI AGAINST ANTAGONIZING THE AMERICANS. BECAUSE OF THIS, 
DAI DISCONTINUED GIVING SUPPORT TO GENERAL HINH AGAINST DIEM. /j.B. 

10085 1 ! JEAN SAINTENY WAS INSTALLED IN HANOI AS THE POLITICAL CONTACT OF THE 

FRENCH GOVERNMENT WITH THE HANOI REGIME, TO SAFEGUARD PRIVATE FRENCH 
BUSINESS INTERESTS AND TO MAINTAIN A MAXIMUM OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE DRV. FRENCH ENTERPRISES WERE NATIONALIZED BEGINETN( 
THE END OF 1955 WHEN COMMUNISTS DECIDED TO ESTABLISH SOCIALISM. 
/J.B. DRAGON. 

THE. U.S. WAS TRYING TO SEAL OFF NORTH VIETNAM FROM THE SOUTH TO BOYCOTT """ 
THE ECONOMY OF THE NORTH AND WAS THREATENING TO BLACKLIST FRENCH 
BUSINESSES PURSUING A CONTRARY POLICY. FRENCH POLICY, WAS DIRECTLY 
OPPOSITE. PARIS HAD SECRETLY CONCLUDED AND AGREEMENT WITH HO T S GOVT. 
GRANTING THE EQUIVALENT OF RECOGNITION. JEAN SAINTENY, IN HANOI, WAS 
WORKING FOR GOOD POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST 
REGIME, WHICH WOULD SEND A PERMANENT DELEGATION TO PARIS. THE FRENCH 
WISHED TO KEEP A BIG FOOT IN THE DOOR WHICH WE SOUGHT TO SLAM. THEY 
BELIEVED THAT THE SOUTH WOULD BE TAKEN OVER BY THE COMMUNISTS IN 1956 
BUT THAT THE RUSSIANS AND THE CHINESE COULD NOT SUPPLY MUCH ECONOMIC AID 
AND A GOOD MARKET FOR FRANCE COULD BE PRESERVED. /OFLEM-CWO NOTE 1. 

10095^ THE VIETMINH OCCUPIED HANOI. THE FRENCH AND SMM TEAM EVACUATED HANOI. 

/SMM REFT. 

10115^ IN MEMO TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILSON, DULLES EXPRESSED IDEA THAT SECRETARY 

SHOULD CUT DOWN ON THE SIZE OF FORCES REQUIRED IN THE COUNTRIES OF 
S.E.ASIA SINCE NONE NEED ACT ALONE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. THE FRENCH 
REQUEST FOR FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE FEC PLUS A 150,000 MAN ARMY WAS 
UNFEASIBLE FOR U.S. AT THAT TIME. /JCS HIST. 

10115*+ THE COMMUNIST VIETMINH REGIME FORMALLY TOOK OVER CONTROL OF HANOI AND 

NORTH VIETNAM. 



T 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



31 



10155^ SENATOR MANSFIELD ISSUED A REPORT ON INDOCHINA. IT SPOKE OUT SHARPLY 

AGAINST PLANS TO REPLACE DIEM. IF DIEM WAS OVERTHROWN THEN THE U.S. 
SHOULD CONSIDER AN IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION OF ALL AID TO VIETNAM AND THE 
FRENCH UNION FORCES THERE, EXCEPT THAT OF A HUMANITARIAN NATURE. 
MANSFIELD DEFENDED DIEM ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE HAD A REPUTATION THROUGH- 
OUT VIETNAM FOR INTENSE NATIONALISM AND EQUALLY INTENSE INCORRUPTIBILITY. 
HE DENOUNCED THE INCREDIBLE CAMPAIGN OF SUBVERSION BY INTRIGUE AND THE 
CONSPIRACY OF NON- COOPERATION AND SABOTAGE THAT HAD STOOD IN THE WAY OF 
DIEM f S FORGING AHEAD WITH HIS PROPOSED CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM. /U.S. 

10155^ THE VIETNAMESE ARMY WAS INCAPABLE OF PERFORMING MINOR POLICE ACTIONS 

WITHOUT FRENCH STAFF AND LOGISTICS. /JCS HIST. 

10185 1 !- JCS VIEWED THE POLITICAL NECESSITY OF TRAINING THE VIETNAMESE ARMY WAS 

WORTH THE RISK. /JCS HIST. 

10195^ IN MEMO TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, JCS ELABORATED ON THE JUSTIFICATION FOR 

INCREASED VIETNAMESE ARMY. SEATO DID NOT PROVIDE FOR MILITARY 
COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER COUNTRIES. THE REQUESTED WITHDRAWAL OF FEC WOULD 
CREATE A SERIOUS VACUUM TO COPE WITH RESIDUAL VIETMINH AGGRESSION. 
VIETNAM OBJECTIVE WAS THE LIMITED DEFENSE OF THE 17TH PARALLEL TO DETER 
AGGRESSION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY. JCS DID NOT WANT 
TO TRAIN SOUTH VIETNAMESE WITH ONLY A 3^2 -MAN MAAG. BUT IF TRAINING WAS 
NECESSARY, THEY FELT THAT FRANCE "HANDS OFF" WAS ESSENTIAL. /JCS HIST. 

10225^ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVED THE OPERATIONS CO-ORDINATING BOARD 

CALLING FOR A LIMITED AND INTERIM TRAINING PROGRAM. A MESSAGE TO 
AMBASSADOR HEATH IN SAIGON AND GENERAL O f DANIEL INSTRUCTED THEM TO 
COLLABORATE IN ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM THAT WOULD IMPROVE THE LOYALTY 
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VNA. THIS SURPRISED THE FRENCH. /JCS HIST. 

10225 1 *- PRES. EISENHOWER ORDERED A CRASH PROGRAM TO STRENGTHEN THE DIEM GOVERNMENT 

AND A LONG RANGE PROGRAM TO BUILD UP VIETNAMESE FORCES. 

102^5^ PRES. EISENHOWER SENT A LETTER TO PREMIER DIEM OF SOUTH VIETNAM STATING 

THAT BEGINNING JAN. 1, 1955, AMERICAN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE GIVEN NO 
LONGER THROUGH FRENCH AUTHORITIES, BUT DIRECTLY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF 
SOUTH VIETNAM. THE LETTER ALSO STATED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HOPED THEY 
WOULD BE MET BY UNDERTAKING INDISPENSIBLE REFORMS. 

10265^ GENERAL HINH ATTACKED THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. 

10265^ IK A MEMO FROM SEC.DEF. TO JCS THE VIEWS OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER WERE 

EXPRESSED RE VIETNAMESE ARMY TRAINING. IT SHOULD BE A LONG RANGE 
PROGRAM INVOLVING A MINIMUM NUMBER OF FREE VIETNAMESE FORCES, 
EMPHASIZING THE INTERNAL SECURITY MISSION. /JCS HIST. 

102754 AMERICAN MILITARY INFLUENCE IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMY BEGAN WITH THE 

PLACEMENT OF 3 MAAG OFFICERS AT VIETNAMESE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 1 IN THE 
DEFENSE MINISTRY AND 1 AT EACH REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS. THE DECISION WAS 
MADE BY AMBASSADOR HEATH, AND GEN. L' DANIEL WITH GEN. ELY'S APPROVAL. 
/JCS HIST. 



U 







Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



11 5^ VIETNAM ARMY STRENGTH WAS 170,000. IT WAS POORLY TRAINED AND ORGANIZED 

AND HEAVILY DEPENDENT OH FRENCH FOR STAFF, LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND ADVICE. 
/JCS HIST. 

11 -5k THE FRENCH ASKED THE U.S. TO SUPPORT A 100,000 MAN FEC AT A COST OF 

$530 MILLION. /JCS HIST. 

11 5h SMM SURVEY OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY REPORTED GOOD TROOP- CIVILIAN RAPPORT. 
11085^ COLLINS ARRIVED IN SAIGON AS PRES. EISENHOWER'S REPRESENTATIVE. 

11085 ] l HEATH AKD COLLINS FELT SOME SUPPORT TO FEC ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT A VACUUM 

THAT VNA COULD NOT FILL TOUCH WOULD RESULT IN VIETMINH TAKEOVER. FEC 
PRESENCE ESSENTIAL TO U.S. PROGRAM. /JCS HIST. 



11165*+ COLLINS ISSUED HIS COMPROMISE BETWEEN DEFT. OF STATE AKD JCS 1 PLAN ON 

STRENGTH OF VNA. IT CALLED FOR A 77 , 685 MAN ARM? WITH ^,000 CIVILIANS 

/ 
/ 



AND A SMALL AIR FORCE AND NAVY. /JCS HIST. 



IXYl^k THE JCS APPROVED COLLINS 1 PLAN BUT REITERATED THAT HIS FORCE COULD NOT 

PROTECT SOUTH VIETNAM AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK. /JCS HIST. 



11175*4 IN A MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT, DULLES REITERATED GENERAL COLLINS T VIEW THAT 
; IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR FEC TO WITHDRAW. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO 

SUBSIDIZE UP TO $100 MILLION. THE VNA SHOULD BE REDUCED TO 77,000 AND 
TRAINING RESPONSIBILITY ASSUMED BY THE U.S. ?JCS HIST. 

11195^ HINH LEFT SAIGON FOR FRANCE AT THE REQUEST OF BAO DAI. /JCS HIST. 

11205** MENDES -FRANCE VISITED WASHINGTON AFTER WHICH THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT 

OF THE SEPTEMBER WASHINGTON CONFERENCE WERE MADE PUBLIC. /j.B. DRAGON. 

11235 1 !- NIE 63~7-5 } 4 REPORTED A DEMORALIZED, DISORGANIZED VNA. LEADERSHIP AND 

CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH INTERNAL DISORDERS WERE BOTH LACKING. THE 
VIETNAMESE GENERAL STAFF, BUSY WITH POLITICS, NEGLECTED THE ARMY WITH THE 
RESULT THAT THE ARMY WAS INCAPABLE OF OCCUPYING AND PACIFYING AREAS 
FROM WHICH THE VIETMINH HAD WITHDRAW!. TRAINING OF THE VNA WAS BEING 
PERFORMED BY ^,800 FRENCH OFFICERS OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION TO 
VIETNAM. THIS MISSION WAS TO BE INCREASED TO 6,000 BY THE END OF 19 

VIETJ, SSE ARMY STRENGTH WAS ESTIMATED TO BE 170,000 REGULARS AND 10,000 
AUXILIARIES. REGULARS WERE ORGANIZED IN 5 INFANTRY REGIMENTS, 
152 COMBAT 1 BATTALIONS. 20 PERCENT OF THE INFANTRY UNITS HAD FRENCH 
OFFICERS AND 50 PERCENT OF LOGISTICS AND TECHNICAL UNITS WERE CADRES OF 
FRENCH PERSONNEL. THE VNA WAS DEPICTED AS TOTALLY IN ACTIVE AS A 
RESULT OF ITS DEPENDENCY ON THE FRENCH FOR ALL ADVICE AND SUPPORT. 

THE DIEM GOVERNMENT PROPOSED A 200,000 MAN ARMY BY THE END OF 1.95 J 4 TO BE 
INCREASED TO 225,000 BY THE END OF 1955. COST— $450 MILLION. 



V 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






the sect armies were composed of 10,000 cao dai st troops, 8,000 hoa hao, 
2,600 binh xuyen, 4,500 urban police wider binh xuyen. 

ti3ere was little information available on semi -military or police forces. 

112454 u.s. agreed to support the fec at the $100 million level. /jcs hist. 

12 5*1 french decided' to accelerate fec withdrawal from vietnam. they 

persisted in the view that it was u.s. responsibility for 
indochina's remaining in free world sphere. (dulles and mendes-eranch 
argument) /jcs hist. 

12 54 general collins urged diem to appoint quat to ministry of defense. 

/JCS HIST. 

12 54 BECAUSE OF DESERTIONS AND DEMOBILIZATION, THE VIETNAM ARMY WAS DOWN TO 

180 , 000 . 

12 5'+ VIETNAMESE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HO THING MONH OBJECTED TO THE FORCE LEVEL 

IN THE COLLINS-ELY AGREEMENT ON TRAINING AS TOO LOW, THE 8,800 LEVEL 
NOT MUCH LARGER THAN THE SECT ARMIES. IT WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS ECONOMIC 
AND MILITARY REPERCUSSIONS. /JCS HIST. 

121254 DIEM NAMED GENERAL LE VAN TY TO BE THE NEW CHIEF OF STAFF REPLACING 

GENERAL HINH. THE APPOINTMENT APPEARED BASED MORE OR HE'S LOYALTY TO 
DIEM THAN ON ABILITY. FRENCH WERE OPPOSED AND AGREED ONLY AFTER DIEM 
AGREED TO APPOINT GENERAL NGUYEN VAN VY AS INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 
ARMED FORCES. 

12135U COLLINS AND ELY AGREED ON A FORCE STRUCTURE. FULL RESPONSIBILITY 

FOR TRAINING AN INDEPENDENT VNA WAS TO BE ENTRUSTED TO U.S. CHIEF MAAG 
UNDER BROAD AUTHORITY FROM GENERAL ELY. /JCS HIST. 

12.155^ GEN. COLLINS EXPRESSED GRAVE RESERVATIONS IN RESPECT TO CAPABILITIES OF 

DIEM TO ESTABLISH A VIABLE GOVERNMENT. HE URGED THE U.S. STATE DEFT. TO 
SEEK OUT ALTERNATIVES TO DIEM AND RE-EVALUATE PLANS TO ASSIST SOUTHEAST 
ASIA. /JCS HIST. 

123.954 DULLES+MENDES -FRANCE MEETING. DULLES' POSITION VIS-A-VIS DIEM WAS TO 

GIVE HIM EVERY OPPORTUNITY BUT PROBABLY A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO HIM IF HE FAILED. FRENCH INTERPRETED THIS AS A COMMITMENT 
TO CHANGE WHICH THE U.S. DENIED AND AN ARGUMENT ENSUED. /JCS HIST. 

122554 AT THE TRIPARTITE MEETINGS THE PROBLEM OP' TRAINING RE ADEQUATE STAFF WAS 

DISCUSSED AND THE ISSUE OF EXCHANGING TRAINING PERSONNEL RAISED. 
/JCS HIST. 

122554 GENERAL COLL WAS AGAINST TRAINING IF SUBTERFUGE HAD TO BE USED TO 

CIRCUMVENT ARTICLE 16 OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT. COLLINS DID NOT THINK 
ARTICLE 16 WOULD INTERFERE WITH TRAINING. /JCS HIST. 

• 

I.29254 FEW ACCORDS WERE SIGNED PROVIDING FOR FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE, 
123154 COT .3 RAISED THE VIETNAMESE ARMY FORCE LEVEL GOALS TO 100,000. 



W 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



■ 



12315^ NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION DIRECTIVE (PACIFICATION) WAS ISSUED BY FEES. DIEM. 

THIS HAD BEEN DEVELOPED BY A JOINT FHENCH-U.S. WORKING GROUP. /SMM REFT. 

12315^ THE U.S. ANNOUNCED THAT, EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1955, IT WOULD BEGIN TO 

SUPPLY FINANCIAL AID DIRECTLY TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF VIETNAM, CAMBODIA 
AND LAOS FOR THE PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST THE 
THREAT OF COJVMUNIST SUBVERSION AND AGGRESSION. 

01 55 THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ITS PLANS TO REDUCE THE STRENGTH OF THE ARMY FROM 

217,000 TO 100,000. THE CAO DAI HAD 25,000 MEN, THE HOA HAO HAD 20,000. 

01 55 RE-EVALUATION OF U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM WAS UNDERTAKEN. /JCS HIST. 

01 55 LANDSDALE WAS TRANSFERRED TO TRIM TO HEAD NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION. 

EFFORT WAS DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS. FIRST WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
PARAMILITARY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS, SECOND FOR POLITICAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. /SMM KEPT, 

01 55 6,000 HOA HAO AND CAO DAI TROOPS INTEGRATED INTO THE VNA. /JCS HIST. 

010155 U.S. PROMISED JO RENTIER DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM, ON THE BASIS OF 

THE EXISTING PENTALATEML AGREEMENT OF DECEMBER 1950, FOR SUPPORT OF 
VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES. 

010555 DIEM'S CONTROL OVER ASSISTANCE FUNDS BEGAN. IT ALLOWED HIM TO BUILD UP 

HIS OWN STRENGTH AND SECURE LOYALTY OF ARMY. 

0.10555 CARDINAL SPELLMAN VISITED SAIGON. 

010555 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILSON ASKED JCS TO REVIEW U.S. POSITION IN VIETNAM 

AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS RELATIVE TO EIGHT QUESTIONS. /JCS HIST. 

010855 EVER SINCE THE MILITARY COLLAPSE OF TONGKIK THE FRENCH WERE READY TO 

WRITE OFF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT AND PARTICULARLY SINCE IT RAD BEEN LED 
BY A STRONG ANTI-FRENCH PRIME MINISTER. /LONDON ECONOMIST. 

010855 THE FRENCH REVISED THE COLLINS-ELY TRAINING AGREEMENT AND SUBMITTED IT TO 

THE U.S. /JCS HIST. 

011055 GENERAL ELY REPORTED THAT FRANCE WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES AS SOON AS 

THERE WAS A SECURE GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 

011255 THE VIENAMESE GOVERNMENT FORMALLY TOOK OVER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 

PORT OF SAIGON FROM THE FRENCH. /j.B. DRAGON. 

011355 SOUTH VIETNAM A . , NCKD PLANS TO COT ITS 217,000 MAN ARMY BACK TO 

100,000.. 

011455 DIEM LURED A HOA HAO OFFICER COLONEL NGUYEN VAN HUE, THE CHIEF OF ST 

GENERALISSIMO SCAT, INTO HIS CAMP. HE BROUGHT 3,' 500 MEN WITH HIM. THE 
MOVE BOLSTERED DIEM IN THE DISPUTE OVER THE C U REGION. A 
FEW WEEKS LATER, MAJOR NCR I DAY JOINED DI M tfTTH 1,500 MORE Ml . WHICH 
HAD BEEN HOLDING THE CAN THO AREA. AT TEE ! I OF JANUARY, THE CAO DAT. 
LEADER TRINH EH TAY RALLIED AGAIN AS A SHOW OF SUPPORT AFTER HIS 
INITIAL RALLYING IN NOVEMBER 195' '• /J.B. DRAGON. ' 

X 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



v.: 



OII955 PRESIDENT DIEM, GEN. COLLINS AND THE VIETNAMESE MINISTER OF NATIONAL 

DEFENSE REACHED AN AGREEMENT ON FORCE STRUCTURE AND TRAINING PROGRAM 
FOR THE VNA TO WHICH GENERAL ELY CONCURRED. /1-137. 

012055 THE U.S., FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS AGREED IN SAIGON THAT THAT 

WOULD ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ASSISTING THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT 
IN THE ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF ITS ARMED FORCES, WIDER THE OVERALL 
AUTHORITY OF GENERAL PAUL ELY, FRENCH COMMANDS IN CHIEF, AND IN 
CO-OPERATION WITH THE FRENCH MISSION. THIS ACCORD, REACHED AFTER THREE 
MONTHS OF DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS, SAVED FRENCH SENSIBILITIES SOMEWHAT 
BUT TRANSFERRED EFFECTIVE POWER TO THE U.S., REPRESENTED BY GENERAL 
LAWTON COLLINS, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM, GENERAL ! DANIEL WAS 
. APPOINTED TO HEAD THE U.S. TRAINING MISSION, WHICH AIMED AT A 1^40,000 
MAN ARMY, WELL TRAINED AND POLITICALLY INDOCTRINATED TO COMBAT COMMUNIST 
AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH. /FLEM-CWO/ NYT. 

012055 GEN. COLLINS ACCEPTED THE TASK OF TROOP ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF THE 

NATIONAL ARM? -UNDER THE OVERALL AUTHORITY OF GEN. ELY. THE REGULAR ARMY 
WAS TO HAVE 100,000 MEN BACKED BY 150,000 RESERVES WHICH WERE TO BE 
UNDER THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF THE VIETNAMESE NOT THE FRENCH. 

0120555 GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS SUBMITTED HIS REPORT ON VIETNAM TO THE SEC. OF STATE 

AND NSC. IN THIS REPORT HE CALLED FOR A STRONG SEATO PACT COMMITMENT 
TO REACT IN CASE OF HOSTILITIES. HE QUESTIONED FRENCH INTENTIONS IN 
VIETNAM, BACKED DIEM AS BEING THE BEST LEADER FOR VIETNAM. /l~125 

012155 DIEM REQUESTED THAT COMMAND FOR THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES BE TRANSFERRED 

FROM FRENCH TO HIM, AND THE TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION OF THE VIETNAMESE 
ARMY BE HANDED OVER TO AMERICAN OFFICERS. (SEE 02115^ ENTRY) /j.B. DRAGON. 

012^-0210 1955 GENERAL COLLINS WAS CALLED TO WASHINGTON BY THE PRESIDENT FOR A 

CONFERENCE ON THE AID PROGRAM, THE FRENCH HAD AGREED TO THE U.S. 
ASSUMING THE VIETNAMESE ARMY TRAINING. 

012755 GENERAL COLLINS URGED NSC TO RECOMMEND A STRONG U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM. 

THIS WAS DONE. /JCS HIST. 

013155 FRENCH STOPPED SUPPORTING THE SECT ARMIES. /JCS HIST. 

020155 PREMIER DIEM REPORTED THAT THE CAO DAIST GENERAL TRIM MINH TAY OFFERED 

THE GOVERNMENT THE USE OF HIS 5,000 MAN ARMY. 

020155 IN THE GOQUAO AREA, HOA RAO TROOPS ATTACKED A SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY 

BATTALION. AFTER THE VIETMINH HAD WITHDRAWN FROM THE CAMAU PENINSULA 
THE REGULAR ARMY AND THE RAO HAO FOUGHT OVER CONTROL OF THE ARFA. 

020355 SEC.DEF. MEMO EXPRESSED THE VIEW OF NSC THAT FRENCH SUPPORT WAS HEEDED TO 

INSURE VIETNAM SURVIVAL. 

021155 JCS ADVISED SEC.DEF. U.S. SHOULD NOT ENTER INTO COMBINED MILITARY HAH . ! 

FOR DEFENSE OF SEATO AREA NOR DISCLOSE ITS PLANS TO SEATO MEMBERS. 
/JCS HIST. 



y 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



vt 



3 



021155 FRANCE TURNED OVER THE COMMAND 05' SOUTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY FORCES TO THE 

DIEM GOVERNMENT, LEAVING GENERAL ELY AS THE COMMANDER OF THE REMAINING 
FRENCH FORCES. FRENCH SUBSIDIES TO VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES CAME TO A 
END IN THE AGREEMENT SIGNED BETWEEN FRENCH GENERAL AGOSTINI AND VIETNAMESE 
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL LE VAN TY. 

■J 

021255 U.S. -FRENCH AGREEMENT AT GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL WAS REACHED RE COLLINS-ELY 

TRAINING FLAN. /JCS HIST.' 

021255 THE VIETNAMESE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE STATED THAT THE 

GOVERNMENT INTENDED THE SECTS TO BECOME PART OF THE NATIONAL ARMY. 

021255 COLLINS-ELY AGREEMENT WENT INTO EFFECT. THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE 

ADVISORY GROUP (MAAG) TOOK OVER THE TRAINING OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE 
ARMY, FOLLOWING THE RELINQUISHING OF COMMAND AUTHORITY BY THE FRENCH. 

021255 PRES. DIEM ANNOUNCED THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ORGANIZING AND TRAINING THE 

VIETNAMESE ARMY WOULD BE VESTED IN GEN. 0' DANIEL, CHIEF OF THE U.S. 
UNDER THE OVERALL AUTHORITY OF GENERAL ELY. AMERICAN PERSONNE, 
SAID, WOULD BE USED CONCURRENTLY WITH FRENCH PERSONNEL AS ADVISORS AND 
INSTRUCTORS OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES. DEFENSE MINISTER MTNH 
STATED THAT THE AVERAGE STRENGTH OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES DURING 
1955 WOULD BE 1^0,000 IN ACTIVE AND READY RESERVE CATEGORIES. 

021255 LT. GEN. 0' DANIEL'S STAFF NUMBERED 300 AMERICAN OFFICERS, WITH 1,000 FRENCH 

OFFICERS AVAILABLE. $200 -MILLION OF U.S. AID WAS TO BE SPENT ON NATIONAL 
FORCES. 

021355 GENERAL TRINH MINE TAY AND 2,500 MEN SWORE FEALTY TO THE SOUTH VIETNAM 

GOVERNMENT . 

021955 EKES. EISENHOWER DECLARED, IN A LETTER TO BAO DAI, CHIEF OF STATE OF 

VIETNAM, THAT PREMIER DIEM'S ANNOUNCED PROGRAMS OF LAND REFORM AND 
REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD, WHEN FULLY CARRIED OUT', 
FURTHER INCREASE THE STABILITY AND UNITY OF GOVERNMENT AND THAT HE HAD 
CONCURRED IN GENERAL COLLINS ' RECOMMENDATION TO CONTINUE AND EXPAND 
SUPPORT FOR FREE VIETNAM. 

021955 S.E.ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY (SEATO)- -WITH ITS PROTOCOL COVERING 

VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, AND LAOS—WENT INTO FORCE. 

022255 THE U.S., FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE MILITARY EXPERTS WEIGHED FLANS TO BUILD 

THE VIETNAMESE ARMY WIDER U.S. SUPERVISION. 

022755 TRAINING RELATIONS AND INSTRUCTION MISSION (TRIM) ESTABLISHED. TRIM WAS 

A COMBINED U.S. -FRENCH STAFF AND FIELD ADVISORY EFFORT. IT WAS THE 
OUTGROWTH OF THE COLLINS-ELY AGREEMENTS. TRIM CALLED FOR 220 OF THE 
SPACES ALLOTTED IN MAAG. IT WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE VIETNAMESE NAVY AID 
AIR FORCES. /217155, JCS HIST. 

03 55 ONLY 81 PERSONS WERE AVAILABLE FOR ASSIG I ENT TO TRIM. /217155- 
03 55 NATIONAL ARMY VS. SECT CIVIL WAR - . (MARCH-APRIL) 



Z 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



*7 



03 55 FRENCH PREMIER FAURE STATED THAT FRANCE WOULD WITHDRAW THE -EXPEDITIONAL 

CORPS AT THE DEMAND OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. CORPS STRENGTH HAD 
BEEN REDUCED SINCE OCTOBER 195^- FROM 175,000 TO 30,000. MOST WERE 
STATIONED AT CAP ST. JACQUES. 

03 55 DIEM SENT NGUYEN HUU CHAU TO PARIS TO ASK THAT AUTHORITY OVER ALL TROOPS 

IN VIETNAM INCLUDING FRENCH BE VESTED IN THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. 
FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD AGREE TO NOTHING BUT SEPARATE COMMANDS. 

030155 DULLES VISITED SAIGON AS PART OF HIS TOUR OF THE FAR EAST AND CONFERRED 

WITH GENERAL ELY AND AMBASSADOR BONNET ON TROOP TRAINING BY THE U.S. 
THE FRENCH FEAR U.S. ENCROACHMENT. 

030*1-55 THE CAO DAI POPE ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED FRONT OF 

NATIONALIST FORCES. /JCS HIST. 

030*455 THE CAO DAI BEGAN A CIVIL WAR AND WERE JOINED BY THE IIQA HAO AND BINH 

XUYEN . 

030855 THE RELIGIOUS SECT REBELS STAGED UPRISINGS IN BAIANG AND CAMAU PENINSULA. 

DIEM PLACED HIS PALACE UNDER HEAVY GUARD AND ORDERED THE VIETNAMESE 
TO DESTROY THE REBEL BANDS. 

■ 

031155 THE U.S. FAVORED A MEETING OF DEPUTIES AT THE WORKING LEVEL TO CONSIDER 

A CUT IN FRENCH MILITARY FORCES AND THE FORMATION OF A MODERN VIETNAMESE 
DEFENSE FORCE RATHER THAN A THREE-MINISTER CONFERENCE AS THE FRENCH 
PROPOSED. 

• 

031255 DIEM SENT' *40 INFANTRY BATTALIONS AGAINST BACUT'S FORCES IN THE THOTNO 

AREA AND REPORTED THAT THE BALANG AREA WAS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL. 

032155 UNITED FRONT RELEASED DECLARATION AND MOTION AGAINST DIEM. /JCS HIST. 

032855 DIEM'S TROOPS OCCUPY CENTRAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS. /JCS HIST. 

END OF MARCH 1955 GENERAL ELY, HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR FRANCE AND COMMANDER OF THE 

EXPEDITIONARY CORPS, FEARING A CIVIL WAR WHICH WOULD ENDANGER FRENCH 
PROPERTY AND LIVES STEPPED IN TO STOP DIEM FROM CRUSHING THE BINH XUYEN. 
HE WAS NO FRIEND OF THE SECTS. /j.B. DRAGON, 

032955 IN THE NAME OF THE NATIONAL FRONT OF THE SECTS AND OTHER DISSIDENT GROUPS 

THE BINH XUYEN, AFTER FIRST ISSUING AN ULT , ATTACKED THE NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT BY FIRING AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE." THE NATIONAL ARMY 
REACTED VIGOROUSLY. THE FRENCH INTERFERRED, AND WITH AMBASSADOR COLLINS 
SUPPORT IMPOSED AN ARMISTICE ON THE GOVERNMENT. THE BINH XUYEN WERE II. 
CONTROL OF THE POLICE IN SAIGON. AN ARMED REVOLT WAS PRECIPITATED 
THAT ULTIMATELY SPREA.D INTO LARGE-SCALE DISSIDENCE IN THE SOUTHERN 
PROVINCES WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ELEMENTS OF THE CAO 
DAI AND HOA HAO RELIGIOUS SECTS. 

• 032955 BINH XUYEN ATTACKED POLICE HEADQUARTERS. /JCS HIST. 



! 



AA 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






032955 ELY IMPOSED A CEASE-FIRS DURING WHICH THE BINH XUYEN AND FRENCH TOOK UP 

FORTIFIED POSITIONS IN SAIGON. SOME SECTORS WERE PUT OFF-LIMITS TO 
NATIONAL ARMY TROOPS. THE FRENCH COMMAND STILL CONTROLLED ALL SUPPLIES 
FOR THE VIETNAMESE ARMY AND WERE WITHHOLDING AMMUNITION AND FUEL. 

033155 COLLINS ADVISED THE U.S. STATE DEPT. TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES TO DIEM. 

/JCS HIST. 

APR-NOV 1955 FRENCH COMPONENT OP TRIM REDUCED TO 122 FROM 268. /JCS HIST. 

OU0755 COLLINS-ELY MEETING AT WHICH ELY CONCLUDED DIEM HAD TO BE REPLACED. 

/JCS HIST. 

OU0755 GEN. COLLINS' RECOMMENDATION TO DULLES WAS TO REMOVE DIEM. /MSG ^399 

OU0755 GEN. ELY FELT TRIM COULD ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE VNA IN A FEW MONTHS. 

/MSG 4382. 

OU1055 SVN GOVERNMENT SET UP A CIVIL GUARD FORCE OF i|0,000 TO HELP CONTROL AREAS 

EVACUATED BY THE VIETMINH. 

OU1555 WHEN IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT DIEM WOULD RENEW HIS ATTACK ON THE BINH XUYEN 

COLLINS BECAME ALMOST EMPHATIC IN HIS OPPOSITION TO DIEM. /j.B. DRAGON. 

OU2055 COLLINS RETURNED TO WASHINGTON FOR AN AID CONFERENCE. (APRIL 20-30) 

ADVOCATED THAT DIEM HAD TO BE REPLACED. 

0>l2255 SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND VIETMINH TROOPS BEGAN LARGE SCALE MOVEMENTS INTO 

ARFAS ASSIGNED UNDER THE TRUCE. 

0)-l2355 DIEM ANNOUNCED GENERAL ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD IN 3 OR k MONTHS. THIS WAS 

A POLITICAL MOVE TO MAINTAIN HIMSELF IN POWER. /j.B. DRAGON. 

0-'l2655 DIEM OUSTED THE REBEL NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF LAI VAN SANG, STRIPPED THE 

BINH XUYEN OF ITS POLICE POWER, APPOINTED NGUYEN NGOC LE IN SANG'S PLACE 
AND SET A DEADLINE FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLICE FORCE TO REPORT. 

OU2755 DULLES AND COLLINS AFTER CONFEF: [ IG WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP STATED 

THE U.S. POSITION WAS TO CONSIDER A SHIFT OF SUPPORT FROM DIEM BUT 
IF FRENCH WOULD GUARANTEE FULL BACKING TO THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT 
EVOLVED AND WOULD RESOLVE ITS AMBIGUOUS POSITION RELATIVE TO NORTH 
VIETNAM. /JCS HIST. 

OU2755 DIEM-SECT TRUCE WAS BROKEN. /JCS HIST. 

OU2855 BAO DAI ORDERED THAT TP.E MILITARY POWER BE TURNED OVER TO THE OPPOSITION 

GENERAL NGUYEN VAN VY, BUT DIEM IGNORED THE ORDER. 

0^2855 CIVIL WAR BROKE OUT IN SAIGON. DIEM ORDER]® THE VIETNAMESE ARMY TO ATTACK. 

0^3055 FRANCE UNDER THE TRUCE ACCORD, CUT ITS MILITARY FORCES IN SOUTH" VIETNAM 

TO 90,000 WHILE REMOVING MOST TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA AND LAOS. 



BB 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



OP 



I 



01+3055 THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY CONGRESS, A REPORTED ' BROAD BASED GROUP, CALLED 

ON DIEM TO FORM A HEW GOVERNMENT AND ELIMINATE BAO DAI. /JCS HIST. 

050155 GENERAL NGUYEN VAN VY TOOK CONTROL OF SOUTH VIETNAM FOR A DAY. HE HELD 

DIEM PALACE PRISONER AMD ORDERED TROOPS INTO STRATEGIC SAIGON POSITIONS. 
MILITARY LEADERS WERE CONFUSED BY THE COMMAND SHIFT AND CLAIMED THAT 
IT BLOCKED AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE REBELS. BY THE NEXT DAY DIEM 
RESUMED CONTROL WITH GENERAL LE VAN TY T S HELP. 

050255 THE NATIONAL ARMY OPENED AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE REBELS OUTSIDE SAIGON. 

050555 THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE COMPRISING SOME 4,000 DIEM 

SUPPORTERS MET AND DEMANDED REMOVAL OF BAO DAI. 

05085-5 AT TRIPARTITE MEETINGS (US -FRANCE -GREAT BRITAIN, MAY 8-lU) FAURE 

THREATENED TO WITHDRAW THE EEC BECAUSE OF U.S. -FRENCH DISAGREEMENT OVER 
WITHDRAWAL OF DIEM. DULLES BELIEVED HIS THREAT. /JCS HIST. 
DULLES AGREED THAT BAO DAI COULD BE RETAINED IF HE STOPPED INTERFERING 
WITH DIEM'S EXERCISE OF POWER. DULLES REFUSED TO SEE BAO DAI IN PARIS. 
/J.B. DRAGON. 

050955 JCS MEMO TO SEC.DEF. STATED THAT THE VNA WAS LITTLE GOOD, THAT PRESENCE 

OF AN OUTSIDE FORCE IN VIETNAM WAS ESSENTIAL AND THAT EVENTUAL FRENCH 
WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE DESIRED. 

/353-1 

O5.IO55 THE REBELLION WAS BROKEN, DIEM RECONSTITUTED HIS GOVERNMENT BY FORMING A 

NEW CABINET COMPOSED LARGELY OF HIS OWN FOLLOWERS. 

051155 GENERAL NGUYEN VAN HINH WAS RELIEVED OF HIS GENERALSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP IN 

THE VIETNAMESE ARMY. 

051155 IN TALKS BETWEEN FAURE AND DULLES, THE U.S. HELD THAT THE FRENCH 

WITHDRAWAL FO FORCES SHOULD BE CO-ORDINATED WITH THE TRAINING AND 
ORGANIZATION OF VIETNAM'S NATIONAL ARMY TO ASSURE THAT NATION'S DEFENSE. 
THE VIETNAM SITUATION DID NOT LEND ITSELF TO A 

CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE U.S., (I.E. -THE U.S. IN 
THE FUTURE WOULD ACT INDEPENDENTLY OF FRANCE.) /JCS HIST. 

051255 DIEM HOPED THAT FRANCE WOULD MOVE ITS EXPEDITIONARY CORPS TO THE 1?TH 

PARALLEL AND NOT KEEP THEM IN SAIGON, TOURANE AND CAP ST. JACQUES. 
FELT THE FRENCH TROOPS MAJOR ROLE WAS TO GUARD AGAINST AGGRESSION FROM 
THE NORTH. 

051355 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS, THE FRENCH EVACUATED HAI 

051355 FRANC AND U.S. PRODUCED A TOTAL AGREEMENT ON A POLICY FOR VIETNAM. 

AGREED TO BACK DIEM WITH DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS. FAURE WAS REPORTED TO 
HAVE OBTAINED FRC ' DULLES ASSURANCE THAT THE U.S. WOULD LOYALLY BACK 
FRANCE IN SEEKING TO PREPARE FOR THE I956 ALL-VIETNAM ELECTIONS. 

FAURE REPORTED THAT GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND U.S. HAD REACHED A 

NON-WRITTEN AGR ; AT FRANCE WOULD CONTINUE FORCE WITHDRAWAL BUT 
POSSIBLY ONE C( . .GENT CGHT BE LEFT. 



CC 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



7 






051^55 GENERAL COLLINS LEFT SAIGON FOR A NATO POSITION. /JCS HIST. 

■ 

051.555 THE IMPERIAL GUARD OF BAO DAI WAS ABOLISHED AND MERGED WITH THE ARMY. 

051655 DEADLINE OF WITHDRAWAL FOR FRENCH UNION FORCES TO SOUTH OF 17'TH PARALLEL 

AND VIETMINH TO NORTH. 

051855 THE VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY COMPLETED OCCUPATION OF QUI NEON, HELD BY 

THE VIETMINH FOR 10 YEARS. ' 

052055 GENERAL ELY DEMANDED TO BE RELIEVED. HE WAS WORN OUT BY HIS EFFORTS TO 

CARRY OUT AN IMPOSSIBLE MISSION. /J.B. DRAGON. 

052055 THE FRENCH COMMAND AGREED TO RETIRE ITS TROOPS FROM THE SAIGON-CHOLON. 

/J.B. DRAGON. 

052055 THE FIRST MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY (MSU) POLICE TECHNICIANS ARRIVED IN 

VIETNAM, UNDER ICA AUSPICES. 

052155 BOA DAI WAS DEPOSED AS EMPEROR. 

052155 DIEM SENT THE NATIONAL ARM REINFORCEMENTS TO THE HAO HAO AREA. 

052355 SVN TROOPS WERE FLOWN TO THE HAO HAO AREA IN COCHIN CHINA. ARMY FORCES 

WERE THERE AS A SAFETY MEASURE --NO ATTACK WAS PLANNED. 

052655 AMBASSADOR G. FREDERICK REINHARDT ARRIVED IN SOUTH VIETNAM REPLACING 

GENERAL COLLINS. 

052955 DIEM ATTACKED SECTS. 

06 55 LT.COL.JORGENSEN, ASSIGNED BY GENERAL O'DANIEL TO ASSIST AMBASSADOR 

COLLINS IN STAFF PLANNING FOR A CIVIL GUARD, WAS REQUESTED BY AMBASSADOR 
REINHARDT TO CONTINUE THIS WORK. COLONEL VALERIANO AND MICHIGAN STATE 
UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION PERSONNEL WERE ALSO INVOLVED IN THE EARLY 
NATIONAL POLICE PLANNING PROGRAM. 

05 55 DIRECT FRENCH INTERFERENCE IN THE SECT -DIEM FIGHT HAD EFFECTIVELY ENDED. 

/J.B. DRAGON. 

060155 THE VIETNAMESE ARMY TOOK OVER THE SUPPLY SYSTEM WHEN THE FRENCH EVACUATED 

THE PHU THO DEPOT. 

060155 THE NATIONAL ARMY AND POLICE TOOK OVER THE SECURITY OF SAIGON. 

060555 THE NATIONAL ARMY BEGAN A LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE FORCES OF 

GENERALS BA CUT AND TRAN VAN SOAI SOUTH WEST OF SAIGON. 

060655 THE VIETMINH GOVERNlvENT DEMANDED TALKS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENEVA 

AGREEMENT TO PREPARE THE ELECTIONS IN JULY, 1956, TO UNIFY VIETNAM. 



LD 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



. 



060655 DIEM INSISTED THAT FRANCE HONOR THE PROMISE MADE BY MENDES-FRANCE AT 

GENEVA TO WITHDRAW FRENCH TROOPS FROM VIETNAM SINCE THIS WAS THE ONLY 
WAY THAT FRENCH COLONIAL AEGIS COULD BE REMOVED. FRANCE WAS WILLING TO 
WITHDRAW BUT WAS NOT ABOUT TO LEAVE ITS LOGISTICAL SUPPORT UNDER 
VIETNAM CONTROL AS DIEM HOPED. /JCS HIST. 

062055 GENERAL ELY LEFT SAIGON AFTER TURNING OVER HIS COMMAND TO GENERAL PIERRE 

JACQUCT, WHO WAS DESIGNATED ACTING COMMISSIONER GENERAL AND COMANDER AND 
CHIEF OF FRENCH UNION FORCES IN INDOCHINA, PENDING NOMINATION OF ELY'S 
REPLACEMENT. /JCS HIST. ( 

070155 FRANCE FORMALLY RELINQUISHED COMMAND AUTHORITY OVER THE VIETNAMESE NAVY 

AND AGREED THAT FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE FORCES SHOULD BE UNDER 
INDEPENDENT COMMANDS. 

070155 THE ARVN BEGAN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HAO HAO IN THE THAT SON AREA. 

070255 THE DEPENDENCE OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY COMMAND ON THE FRENCH HIGH COMMAND 

AT LAST CAME TO AN END. THE EXPEDITIONARY CORPS WAS THEN CONCENTRATED 
IN THE CAP ST. JACQUES VICINITY AND HAD BEEN REDUCED FROM 175,000 TO 
30,000 MEN. /J.B. DRAGON. 

070355 THE U.S. APPROVED DROPPING THE PLAN TO CUT THE ARMY TO 100,000 MEN SO 

THE ARM COULD ABSORB THE ARMIES OF THE RELIGIOUS SECTS. 

070755 ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF HIS INSTALLATION AS PRIME MINISTER, DIEM ANNOUNCED 

THE NATIONAL REFERENDUM SET FOR OCTOBER 23, 1955- /J.B. DRAGON. 

070755 FRENCH FORMALLY TRANSFER NHA PRANG AIR BASE TO VIETNAMESE CONTROL. 

071655 NGO DIM DIEM DECLARED THAT SOUTH VIETNAM, NOT HAVING SIGNED THE GENEVA 

AGREEMENT, WOULD NOT TAKE PART IN GENERAL ELECTIONS UNLESS THEY WERE 
GUARANTEED TO BE FREE IN THE NORTH AS WELL AS IN THE SOUTH. /J.B. DRAGON. 

071855 AFTER AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF AID BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE 

DRV ON JULY 7, MOSCOW ALSO CONCLUDED AN AID AGREEMENT WITH HANOI. 

071855 THE NATIONAL ARMY BATTLED THE HOA MO IN HA TIEN. 

071855 U.S. OFFICERS STARTED TO TRAIN VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS IN QUANG TRI. 

071955 NGO DINH DIEM REFQSED TO ATTEND TALKS WITH DELEGATES FROM THE NORTH ON 

ELECTIONS TO BE HELD IN 1958. TALKS WERE SCHEDULED BY TEE GENEVA 
TO BEGIN JULY 20, 1955. 

SVA REJECTED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S INVITATION TO DISCUSS 
ELECTIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT IN THE NORTH THE PEOPLE WOULD NOT BE ABLE 
TO EXPRESS THEIR WILL FREELY AND THAT FALSIFIED VOTES IN NORTH VIETNAM 
COULD OVERRULE THE VOTES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. /READER 



072955 THE ASST.SEC.DEF. (ISA) REQUESTED A JCS EVALUATION OF THE MAAG-RECOMi D- 

ed 150,000 MAN VILA FOR FY 1955-56. ISA REITERATED FORCE REQUIREMENTS 
TO ME T INTERNAL NOT EXTE L AGGRESSION. /323-1 



EE 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



n 



08 55 THE U.S. COUNTRY TEAM SUBMITTED THE TEAM PLAN FOR TRAINING THE 

SECURITY FORCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM. /COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE 933, DISPATCH 

08' 55 THE FRENCH AGR.EED TO ABOILISH THE MINISTRY FOR THE ASSOCIATED STATES OF 

INDOCHINA. ITS FUNCTIONS, MUCH ALTERED BY THE REALIZATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE, WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 

08 55 NO AGREEMENT ON FRENCH FORCES STATUS AND WITHDRAWAL WAS REACHED IN 

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN FRENCH AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVES IN 
PARIS . 

080955 DIEM'S REFUSAL TO DISCUSS ELECTIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAM INCREASED 

THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN ATTACK BY THE, NORTH. U.S. POLICY IN THIS EVENT WITH 
RESPECT TO SEATO AND APPLICATION OF FORCES WAS DEVELOPED. /JCS HIST. 

080955 GENERAL O f DANIEL PROPOSED U.S. SUPPORT 150,000 FORCE LEVEL IN VIETNAMESE 

ARMY, PLUS 10,000 TROOPS OF THE SECT ARMIES BY JULY 1, 1956. 

O8IO55 AMBASSADOR REINHARDT AND CINCPAC ENDORSED GENERAL T DNAIEL'S FORCE LEVEL, 

JCS RECOMMENDED IT BE APPROVED. /JCS HIST. 

081655 HENRI HOPPENOT, AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE ON EXTRAORDINARY MISSION AND HIGH 

COMMISSIONER OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC NEAR THE STATE OF VIETNAM PRESENTED 
HIS LETTERS OF CREDENCE TO PRIME MINISTER DIEM. THIS ACTION TERMINATED 
THE OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF FRANCE IN INDOCHINA. 

083055 DULLES DECLARED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH DIEM AND 

SUPPORTED THE CONTENTION THAT CONDITIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM RULED OUT 
POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING FREE ELECTIONS. /LANCASTER. 

09 55 FATHERLAND FRONT WAS ORGANIZED IN HANOI, FORMERLY WAS LIEN VIET. 

090255 JCS AGREED WITH THE TAYLOR ANALYSIS. 

090255 VOD CONCURRED IN SECRETARY OF THE ARMY'S DESIGNATION OF SAMUEL T. WILLIAMS 

TO SUCCEED 0' DANIEL AS CHIEF MAAG. /326-1 

■ 
SEPT 6-29 1955 LT. GEN. BRUCE C. CLARK CO ENDING GENERAL USARPAC VISITED WEST 

PACIFIC AND S.E. ASIA, REVIEWED THE TRIM ORGANIZATION. /JCS HIST. 

090955 JCS ENVISAGED DEFENSE OF S.E. ASIA AS RELYING INITIALLY 01: INDIGINOUS FORCES. 

U.S. AIR AND NAVAL POWER, ARMY MOBILE STRIKE FORCE. JCS HOWEVER FELT 
SUBVERSION WAS REAL THREAT. NO ADDITIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE SENT TO ASIA 
UNTIL THAT CHANGED. /JCS TO SEC.DEF. MEMO. 

093255 JCS HE 938351 REQUESTED CINCPAC TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS ON PHILIPPINE 

TRAINING IN COUNTER SUBVERSION FOR VNA. 

092055 DIEM OPENED A CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BINH XUYEN WITH 22 BATTALIONS. 

092155 DIEM ISSUED A STATEMENT THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF A CONFERENCE BETN I 

SOUTH AND NORTH VIETNAM. /LANCASTER. 



FF 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



i'J 






10 55 CINCPAC RECOMMENDED VNA TRAINING IN PHILIPPINES. BOTH JCS AND DOD 

CONCURRED BY NOVEMBER 1955- /323-1. 

10 55 BINH XUYEN WAS DEFEATED AS AN ORGANIZED ARMED INSURGENT FORCE. 

10 55 SOUTH VIETNAM RECALLED ITS DELEGATION FROM PARIS. WHICH HAD BEEN TRYING 

TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF THE FRENCH FORCES. 

101055 WASHINGTON APPROVED THE COUNTRY TEAM PLAN FOR TRAINING- THE SECURITY FORCE 

IN SOUTH VIETNAM. /STATE DEPI. •: MESSAGE 1221. 

101155 NIE 63, 1-3-35 REPORTED THE STRENGTH OF THE VNA AT lVf,000 PLUS 8-10,000 

SECT FORCES IN THE PROCESS OF BEING INTEGRATED. THE GVN WANTED A FORCE 
OF 200,000 WHEREAS THE U . S . -APPROVED FORCE LEVEL WAS 150,000 BY JULY 
1956. THE VNA WAS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF COUNTERING MAJOR GUERRILLA 
OPERATIONS. 

VIETNAMESE NATIONAL POLICE HAD U,500 MEN. CIVIL GUARD WAS TO BE ORGANIZED 
FROM PROVINCIAL GUARDS, LOCAL MILITIA AND OTHER ELEMENTS UNDER MINISTER 
OF INTERIOR. ORGANIZATION TO CONTAIN 65,000 MEN THE U.S. TO SUPPORT 
ONLY 25,000. 0212-1ST. 

THE FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY CORPS WAS REDUCED TO 1+5,000 TROOPS. 

IOI855 THE REFERENDUM TO BE HELD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN DIEM AND BAO DAI AS ANNOUNCED 

BY DIEM WAS DECLARED ILLEGAL BY BAO DAI. 

102355 IN A NATIONAL REFERENDUM HELD TO ELECT THE CHIEF OF STATE, NGO DINH DIEM 

RECEIVED 5,721,735 VOTES, AGAINST 63,017 FOR BAO DAI, FORMER EMPEROR 
SINCE MARCH 7, 19^9, HEAD OF STATE OF VIETNAM. /j.B. 

102655 A REPUBLIC WAS PROCLAIMED BY NGO DINH DIEM. HE BECAME THE FIRST PRESIDENT 

OF SOUTH VIETNAM. 

102855 CINCPAC DISPATCH 280503A REDESIGNATED MAAG INDOCHINA AS MAAG VIETNAM. 

217155. 

103155 PRESIDENT DIEM ISSUED HIS FIRST ORDER TO THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AS 

THEIR SUPREME COMMANDER. 

11 55 MDAP EQUIPMENT WAS VALUED AT $508,000,000 ACCORDING TO FRENCH INVENTORY. 

11 55 REPORT FROM VIETNAM COUNTRY TEAM INDICATED REDUCTION IN FRENCH FORCES 

RESULTED IN LOSS OF CONTROL OF MDAP MATERIALS. COULD NOT SUPPLY FORCES 
IN THE EVENT OF CONTINGENCY BY MID-I956. FRENCH WERE ALSO REMOVING 
GOOD EQUIPMENT. /JCS HIST. 

11 55 CIVIL GUARD TRANSFERRED BY DIEM FROM MINISTRY OF INTERIOR TO PRESIDENCY. 

11 55 GENERAL S.T. WILLIAMS ARRIVES IN SAIGON. 

110155 JCS APPROVED ADMIRAL STUMP'S VIEWS AND AUTHORIZED CINCPAC TO BUDGET AND 

PLAN THE PROGRAM. 

1.13055 PROGRAM FOR REDISTRIBUTION OF MDAP EQUIP' REACHED THE CRITICAL STAGE. 



GG 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






12 55 TRIM ACCOMPLISHED LITTLE TRAINING DURING 1955', BECAUSE OF CONTINUED 

EMPLOYMENT OF THE VIA IN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SECTS AND THE LACK OF 
INTEREST BY THE FRENCH. /JCS HIST. 

12 55 HOA RAO, BINH XUYEN AMD CAO DAI WERE NO LONGER AN ORGANIZED THREAT TO THE 

GOVERNMENT . . 

120655 THE CNO (AS JCS EXECUTIVE AGENT) REPORTED TRAINING HAD PROGRESSED BUT 

CRITICAL STAGE HAD BEEN REACHED. ( STEPS HAD TO BE TAKEN TO RETAIN THE 
TEMPO OF MAAG. 

120855 VNA ARMY, DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM, HAD BEEN ABLE TO THWART 

VIETMINH AND SECTS. LATE 1955 THE VNA GENERAL STAFF BEGAN TO REGROUP 
THE ARM INTO DIVISIONS TO TRAIN. ADDITIONAL SECURITY FORCES WERE 
EEDED TO FILL THE VOID CREATED BY THE WITHDRAWING ARMY UNITS. /JCS HIST 



121255 THE U.S. CONSULATE IN HANOI WAS CLOSED. 

121255 JCS REQUESTED OSD TO ASK NSC TO RECONSIDER ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL FOR 

VIETNAM, 

121355 SEC.DEF. , WILSON TO SECRETARY OF STATE, DULLES MEMO DISCUSSING GENEVA 

AGREEMENT, ARTICLE 16 RELATIVE TO EXPANDED MAAG TO HANDLE MDAP EQUIPMENT. 
JCS, CINCPAC, DOD FELT THAT ARTICLE 3.6 AND ITS RESTRICTIVE CLAUSE DID 
NOT APPLY TO U.S. AND SVN SINCE NEITHER HAD SIGNED. 

121355 A COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY LT. COL. EVANS MET IN PLANS SECTION, MAAG, TO PLAN 

THE PREPARATION OF TOO NEW TD'S (TERM) FOR MAAG. THE FIRST PLAN WAS TO 
ACCOMPLISH PRESENT MISSION AND THE SECOND TO ACCOMPLISH A MISSION TO 
BEGIN JULY 1, 1956. 

121.655 ALLEN DULLES WROTE JOHN FOSTER DULLES THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO CIA 

OPERATIONS THAT RESTRICTIONS ON THE NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL BE 
RELAXED SO THAT AGENCY WOULD BE ASSURED OF SUFFICIENT SLOTS UNDER 
MILITARY COVER TO DO ITS JOB. /335-1. 

122055 THE NEW PLANS (TD) BEING DEVELOPED AT MAAG -VIETNAM WERE COMPLETED. 

122755 LT. COL. HANELIN REPORTED TO CHIEF, MAAG ON WASHINGTON ACTION ON MAAG- 

VIETNAM PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS. 

122755 GENERAL 0' DANIEL REPORTED THAT MR. ROBERTSON, DEFT. OF STATE, STATED THAT 

STATE MIGHT REACT FAVORABLY TO AN INCREASE OVER THE AUTHORIZED 3^2 

EARLY 1956 CONTROVERSY EXISTED BETWEEN FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE OVER ADMINISTRATION 

OF THE TRIM PROGRAM. IT FUNCTIONED WITH SOME U.S. ADVISORS BUT WAS 
PREDOMINATELY STAFFED WITH FRENCH INSTRUCTORS. /WID 17-56. 

01 56 SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY UNITS OCCUPIED TAY NINE, PRINCIPAL CAO DAI POLITICAL 

CENTER, LEADj ! TO THE BREAK UP OF THE OR fIZED CAO DAI ARMED 
INSURGENCY. AGRE I . WITH CAO DAI LEADERS ON FEBRUARY 28 LEGALIZED 
CAO DAI RELIGIOUS PRACTICES AND FORBADE ITS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AS 
RELIGIOUS SECT. 



HH 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



¥< 



c 



011156 CNO ASKED CINCPAC FOR MINIMUM U.S. PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO REPLACE FRENCH. 

011356 CHIEF-MAAG REPORTED TO CINCPAC THAT SECRETARY QUARLES SUGGESTED THAT 

FRENCH OR VIETi: :SE CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS BE HIRED TO REPLACE THE 
WITHDRAWING FRENCH FORCES. THIS WAS NOT POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE TO 
VIETNAMESE.. 

0111+56 THE FRENCH ANNOUNCED PLANS TO RETAIN 230 PERSONNEL AS ADVISORS TO VNAF 

PLUS 130 OF THEIR PERSC . EL TO SERVE AS A TRAINING CENTER FOR F-8-F 
TRAINING AND TO RETAIN EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF VNAF AND NAVY THRU 
3956. 

01ll:56 CHIEF -MAAG INFORMED CINCPAC THAT MAAG VIETNAM WAS DEVELOPING A HEW TD 

ANTICIPATION OF A RAISE IN PERSONNEL CEILING. 

011*156 MAAG CABLE TO CINCPAC STATED THEIR SECOND PLAN WOULD PROVIDE FOR ADVICE 

DOWN TO BATTALION LEVEL AND WOULD THUS REQUIRE 10^9 U.S. PERSONNEL AS 
AGAINST PRESENT 3^2 AUTHORIZED. 

011956 CHIEF -MAAG INFORMED CINCPAC THAT THE FIRST PLAN CALLED FOR 636 U.S. 

MILITARY. 

012156 A MESSAGE FROM CHIEF, MAAG, VIETNAM TO CINCPAC, DEPTAR, CNO, AND DEPIA 

STATED THAT THE CONTINUED WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH PRESENTED A PROBLEM IN 
THE DISPOSAL OF EXCESS EQUIPMENT. HELP ASKED IN THE SPEED-UP OF ADMIN- 
ISTRATIVE PROCESSING OF DECLARATIONS AND SHIPPING INS RUCTIONS. 

012556 MEMO TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM ASD STATED THAT REPORT OF INTERAGENCY 

COSTING TEAM THAT HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A 5 WEEK MISSION TO VIETNAM 
INDICATED 150-200 MORE WERE NEEDED AT MAAG FOR LOGISTIC PURPOSES. 

012656 PRES. DIEM FORMALLY ASKED FOR AN INCREASE IN U.S. ADVISORS. IT WAS THE 

VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS POSITION THAT REPLACING DEPARTING FRENCH FORCES 
WITH U.S. FORCES WOULD NOT VIOLATE EITHER THE SPIRIT NOR THE LETTER OF 
THE GENEVA ACCORDS. 

012756 CINCPAC INFORMED CNO THAT WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH AND INABILITY OF FRENCH 

AND VIETNAMESE TO COMPROMISE REQUIRED EXPEDITING AUGMENTATION PLANS 
DECISION TO RAISE 3^-2 CEILING WAS MADE. 

013156 A JOINT INVENTORY OF MDAP EQUIPMENT WAS PROPOSED TO FRENCH. 

013156 SEC.DEF. C.E. WILSON WROTE SEC. STATE DULLES OUTLINING PROBLEMS OF MAAG 

VIETNAM RE SHORTAGE OF PERSC L TO HANDLE LOGISTICS PROBLEMS. 

02 56 THE GOVE? ENT GAINED OCCUPATION OF CAO DAI POSTS IN TAY NINH AND 

INTEGRATION OF MOST OF GENERAL PHUONG'S FORCES. /WID 9-56. 

02 56 FEC STRENGTH DOWN TO 15,000. 



II 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



Hi 



020256 DULLES DECIDED PROTECTION OF MDAP EQUIBffiNT WARRANTED AN INCREASE IN 

PERSONNEL AND THEREFORE AUTHORIZED A GROUP OF 350 FOR THE TEMPORARY 
EQUIPMENT RECOVERY MISSION TO BE SENT TO VIETNAM. THE MISSION FAS TO 
PREVENT A GREATER DOLLAR LOSS THROUGH MISUSE OR WASTE OF U.S. PROVIDED 
MATERIEL. 

020356 SEC. OF STATE DULLES DECIDED THAT THE TERM OPERATION SHOULD BE USED TO 

IMPLEMENT HIS DECISION TO EXPLORE WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS A MEANS OF 
RECOVERING U.S. EQUIPMENT. /l-33- 

021256 FOLLOWING SECRET NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE VIETNAMESE GOVERMENT, TRAN VAN 

SOAI, THE LEADER OF AN IMPORTANT MO MO FACTION REJOINED THE VIETNAM 
ARMY. BA CUT, ANOTHER PRINCIPAL HOA MO LEADER, WAS CAPTURED ON APRIL 
13, LEADING TO THE BREAKUP OF ORGANIZED HOA HAO ARMED INSURGENCY. 

/WID 9-59. 

021356 A MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR TO SECRETARY OF STATE STATED TMT TERM SHOULD BE 

PRESENTED SOLELY AS AN EQUIPMENT RECOVERY MISSION AND NOT AS A TRAINING 
MISSION. 

022156 FRANCE AGREED TO WITHDRAW ITS REMAINING FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. 

03 56 THE FREE VIETNAMESE INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCY WAS OFFICIALLY DESIGMTED 

SELF DEFENSE CORPS. /WID 13-56. 

03 56 DIEM DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FEC FROM VIETNAM. 



G 



030956 DIEM. HELD ANOTHER CONFERENCE WITH NAVAL COMMANDER LE QUANG MY REGARDING 

THE COMMUNIST OCCUPATION OF BOISEE ISLAND OF THE PARACEL GROUP. PURPOSE 
OF CONFERENCE APPARENTLY TO FORMULATE POLICY PRIOR TO TALKS WITH FRENCH 
TO COMMENCE MARCH 3.0. NO MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE PARACELS WAS 
TAKEN. /WID IO-56. 

031^56 U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES VISITED SOUTH VIETNAM. 

031556 FIRST PHASE OF FRANCO-VIETNAMESE TALKS ENDED WITH THE VIETNAMESE INSISTING 

UPON COMPLETE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL BASES IN VIETNAM. DIFFICULTY 
IN TALKS CENTERED AROUND THE FRENCH NAVAL ARSENAL IN SAIGON. ITS REPAIR 
FACILITIES WERE IMPORTANT TO THE VIETNAM NAVY. THE FRENCH ALSO NEEDED 
THE REPAIR FACILITIES FOR ITS NAVY ALT) WANTED EITHER PRIORITY 
REPAIR SERVICE FOR FRENCH SHIPS AT THE ARSENAL OR THE NON-MDAP EQUIPMENT 
TO SET UP SUCH A FACILITY WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN AND MOVED 
ELSEWHERE. MUCH OF THE NON-MDAP EQUIPMENT THERE WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE 
BEEN GIVEN TO THE FRENCH BY THE U.S. /WID 10-56. 

031656 AGREE WAS REACHED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AT© THE CAO DAI. SECT 

WHICH RELEGATED THE LATTER TO A PURELY RELIGIOUS ROLE. A COROLLARY 
TMT AGREE IT WAS THAT ALL THE CAO DAI ARMED DISSIDENTS, ESTIMATED 
MAX] : 'i.OOO, HAVE CAPITULATED WITH THEIR ARMS AND AM UTIOBT. 
PROCESSING OF THE SURRENDEREES STARTED AROUND MARCH 13, 1956. BA CUT 
REMAINED AIT OPPO] IT OF THE GOV! 1 IT. /WID 10-56. 

032256 AGREE IT WAS SIGNED BY FRENCH AND VTETN 1SE STIPULATING THE WITHDRAWAL 

OF FEC BY JUNE 30, 1956. 



JJ 



r r v 

■7 I 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



Oh 56 TERM WAS PRESENTED TO THE ICC FOR APPROVAL. NEITHER APPROVAL NOR 

DISAPPROVAL WAS RECEIVED SO THE PROJECT PROCEEDED IN JUKE. /WID 

0^-0656 VIETNAM GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH 

ICC AND REITERATED ITS POSITION OF SUPPORTING VIETNAM-WIDE ELECTIONS 
AT SUCH TIME AS CONDITIONS IN COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM PERMITTED GENUINE- 
• LY FREE VOTING. 

- 

040856 TRIM MISSION ENDED. REDESIGNATED COMBAT AND TRAINING ORGANIZATION. 

0^1056 THE LAST ELEMENTS OF FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY CORPS LEFT SAIGON. 

0^1256 DIRECTIVE FROM CNO TO COFSA+COFSAF ISSUED IMPLEMENTING THE TERM PROGRAM. 

IN IT THE CNO STATED THAT TERM SHOULD APPEAR TO BE SEPARATE ORGANIZATION 
FROM MAAG. 

CHIEF OF TERM SHOULD BE A SENIOR COLONEL OR BRIG. GEN. NOT PRESENTLY 
APPEARING ON MAAG'S ROSTER. 

042356 THE FRENCH HIGH COMMAND WAS INACTIVATED. /NIE 2k$ 1ST N. 

0^2556 AT THE REQUEST OF THE GVN MOST OF THE FEC WERE WITHDRAWN FROM INDOCHINA. 

OU2856 THE DEPARTURE FROM SAIGON OF GENERAL JACUOT, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE 

FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY CORPS, MARKED THE DISSOLUTION OF THE; FRENCH HIGH 
COMMAND IN VIETNAM. /PROGRESS REPT. NSC 5^05/5^28/5 

OU2856 ARVN TRAINING BECAME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MAAG. 



05 56 THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF .DEFENSE VISITED VIETNAM AND URGED MORE SUPPORT 

FOR THE CIVIL GUARD. 

EARLY MAY 1956 AGREEMENT HAD NOT YET BEEN REACHED CONCERNING THE STATUS OF 

SAIGON NAVAL ARSENAL RELATIVE TO THE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL. /WID 19-56 

050156 ROBERT D. MURPHY, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WROTE WILSON THAT TERM 

PERSONNEL SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A TRAINING FORCE, BUI THEY SHOULD BE 
ADMINISTRATIVELY SUPERVISED BY MAAG NOT EMBASSY. 

051556 VNA STRENGTH WAS 156,000. 

051556 DEADLINE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FRENCH NAVAL PERSONNEL (EXCEPT FOR SMALL 

LIQUIDATING DETACHMENTS). TRANSFER OF CONTROL OF THE ARSENAL TO THE 
VIETNAMESE WAS TO BE MADE. /WID IO-56. 

052356 DOD OFFICIALLY ESTABLISHED THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR TERM. /JCS HIST. 

06 56 GVN ESTIMATED VIETMINH ACTIVE STRENGTH AT 1,360 OUT OF 6-8,000 HOSTILE 

FORCE. U.S. PUT STRENGTH AT 8-10,000 IN SKELETON UNITS. 

06 56 THE GVN FORMALLY REQUESTED AUGMENTATION OF MAAG. A SPECIAL 

DETACH' : IT OF 350 MEN WAS ORGANIZED AND CHARGED WITH RECOVERING AND 
EXPORTING LARGE QUA .. 'TIES OF U.S. WAR MATERIEL. A COLLATERAL PURPOSE 
WAS TO INCREASE THE LOGISTICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE VTETNAME EE ARMY. 
THE PROJECT WAS T- . /WID 13-57- 



KK 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



'.• 






060156 AFTER JUNE 1, 1956, THE DEADLINE FOR WITHDRAWAL OR TURNOVER TO THE 

VIETNAMESE OF AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT, THE FRENCH WERE COMPLETELY 
PHASED OUT OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE. ONLY A FEW FRENCH INSTRUCTORS 
REMAINED IN SOUTH VIETNAM. /WID 17-56. 

060156 U.S. TEMPORARY. EQUIPMENT- RECOVERY MISSION (TERM) ACTIVATED. 

060756 ADMIRAL RADFORD BRIEFED THE NSC ON THE STRATEGY FOR THE DEFENSE OF SOUTH 

VIETNAM WHICH REPEATED THE PLANS 'SET FORTH IN FEBRUARY AND SEPTEMBER. 

063056 THE VNA HAD 11*2,000 MEN IN h FIELD DIVISIONS AND 6 LIGHT DIVISIONS AND 

13 TERRITORIAL REGIMENTS, PLUS SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS. THIS WAS 
APPROVED STRENGTH. /WID 20-56. 

07 56 THE CRUCIAL MONTH DURING WHICH THE ELECTIONS TO UNIFY VIETNAM SHOULD HAVE 

BEEN HELD AS PROVIDED IN THE GENEVA AGREEMENT PASSED WITHOUT INCIDENT. 
/J.B. 

07 56 CIVIL GUARD 51,000 STRONG, OPERATED IN THREE MILITARY REGIONS. 
O70656 VICE PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON VISITED SOUTH VIETNAM. 

070756 ADMIRAL RADFORD BRIEFED THE NSC ' ON CONCEPT DELINEATED IN 56l2/l. 

O7II56 JCS DIRECTED CINCPAC TO PREPARE A CONTINGENCY PLAN BASED ON THE QUICK 

RESPONSE STRATEGY AS SET FORTH BY ADMIRAL RADFORD IN THE JUNE 7, 1956 
BRIEFING TO NSC, FOR DEFENSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. 

071356 BA CUT EXECUTED. /WID 32-56. 

071756 COMMUNIST ARMED STRENGTH IN THE SOUTH ESTIMATED AT 5-10,000 1955-56, 

PROBABLY ABOUT 8,000 WITH 5,000 ORGANIZED IN SKELETON. COMPANIES. 
/2U7 NIE 1ST. 

071756 THE VNA HAD THE APPROXIMATELY 1^5,000 TROOPS. /NIE. 

071756 NIE 63-56 STATED WASHINGTON'S CONCEPT OF THE CIVIL GUARD AND THE SELF- 
DEFENSE CORPS. THE GVN ORGANIZED THE CIVIL GUARD TO RELIEVE THE VNA'S 
MANY STATIC INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES. THE 1*8,000 MEN IN LIGHTLY ARMED 
MOBILE COMPANIES WERE TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER, COLLECT INTELLIGENCE, 
CONDUCT COUNTER-SUBVERSION OPERATIONS IN PROVINCES PACIFIED BY THE V 
THE 60,000 MAN SELF-DEFENSE CORPS WAS TO MAINTAIN VILLAGE SECURITY. 

072056 THE ALL-VIETNAMESE ELECTION AS PROVIDED IN 195 1 * GENEVA DECLARATION FAILED 

TO TAKE PLACE. /READER. 

072156 FRENCH ACCEDED TO SOUTH VIETNAM'S REQUEST TEAT FRENCH BE REPRESENTED BY AN 

AMBASSADOR RATHER THAN A HIGH COMMISSIONER. 

073056 A VIE! USE LIAISON MISSION TO THE ICC WAS ESTABLISHED PREPARATORY TO 

THE TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM THE FRENCH LIAISON MISSION. /READER. 

08 56 ESTIMATES OF VIETMINH IN SVH WERE 5,000-7,000. /WID 32-56. 



LL 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






083156 TERM AT FULL STRENGTH OF 350. 

090556 THERE WAS A CHANGE IN POLICY FROM TRAINING THE VIET ESE ARMY FROM 

INTERNAL SECURITY ALONE TO BOTH A MISSION OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND 
LIMITED INITIAL RESISTANCE. CCMH. 

O91656 U.S. TRAINING PROGRAM OF ARVN WENT INTO EFFECT. 

O91956 FRENCH AIR FORCE OFFICIALLY TRANSFERRED THE TOURANE AIR EASE TO VIETNAMESE 

CONTROL. 

100156 OPLAN ^6-56 DEFENSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM PRE'PARED BY CINCPAC. 

102^56 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT EMPHASIZED THAT THE SUBVERSION-POLITICAL THREAT TO 

SOUTH VIETNAM WAS MORE LIKELY TO BE A REAL DANGER THAN OVERT AGGRESSION. 

110156 THE CHIEF OF MAAG PROPOSED SUPPORTING THE CIVIL GUARD AT A STRENGTH OF 

59.160 AND A SELF DEFENSE CORPS OF 60,000. OCMH. 

12 56 COUNTRY TEAM JUDGED THE VNA CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 

SECURITY. /JCS HIST. 

01 57 DIEM ASKED THE U.S. TO INCREASE HIS FORCE TO 200,000. THIS WAS REFUSED. 

010357 THE ICC REPORTED THAT BETWEEN DECEMBER 1955 AND AUGUST 1956 NEITHER 

. NORTH OR SOOTH VIETNAM HAD BEEN FULFILLING ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 
195^ ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. 

021557 THE TWO PACIFICATION OPERATIONS TRUONG TAN BUU AND THOAI NGOC HAU 

TERMINATED. THE VN MILITARY FELT THAT THE ARMY SHOULD PERFORM ONLY 
MILITARY FUNCTIONS WHICH DID NOT INTERFERE WITH NORMAL TRAINING. 
HOWEVER DIEM WAFTED THE TWO OPERATIONS TO BE CONTINUED AS PART OF THE 
PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS ROUTINE FUNCTIONS. BUU AND HAU HAD BEEN 
VAST MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS EMPLOYING MEN FROM THE ARMED 
CIVIL GUARD, AND CIVIL ACTION COMMITTEES WITH THE PURPOSE TO BRING ALL 
UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND TO PUBLICIZE AND POPULARIZE THE DIEM 
GOVERNMENT. /WID 15-57- 

03 57 THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT DIEM ANNOUNCED A SERIES OF REGULATIONS 

INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS. /J.B. 

031957 OPLAN ^6-56 DEFENSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WAS APPROVED BY JCS. 

0^1657 ELBRIDGE DURBROW PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS AS AMBASSADOR OF THE U.S. TO 

SOUTH VIETNAM. 

050257 PEES. DIEM REINSTITUTED A DRAFT LAW. /JCS HIST. 

050^57 ARVN'S FIRST MAJOR TACTICAL CONTROL HEADQUARTERS WAS ESTABLISHED, I CO 

/JCS HIST. 

050557 PRESIDENT DIEM VISITED THE U.S. 

050957 PRESIDENT DIEM ADDRESSED A JOINT ASSEMBLY OF CONGRESS. 



MM 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



750 



051057 IN A MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT DIEM AND DEPUTY SECRETARY QUARLES, 

DIEM PUT FORTH HIS PLAN TO MOVE THE CIVIL GUARD INTO HIGH PLATEAU 
AREAS TO FILL THE VACUUM THERE. HE ALSO PUT FORTH THE NEW ARMY 
REORGANIZATION. HE WANTED THE SAME NUMBER OF DIVISIONS BUT WITH A 
STRENGTH INCREASE UP TO 10,000 WHICH REQUIRED A TOTAL FORCE INCREASE OF 
20,000. 

051157 PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND PRESIDENT DIEM DECLARED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES 

WOULD WORK TOWARD A PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF VIETNAM (JOINT COMMUNIQUE). 

051157 ACCORDING TO EISENHOWER AND DIEM THE CHIEF DANGER TO SOUTH VIETNAM WAS 

THE IARGE BUILDUP OF MILITARY FORCES IN WRTH VIETNAM. 

051757 NORTH VIETNAMESE LIAISON MISSION TO THE ICC WAS WITHDRAWN FROM SAIGON 

AT THE REQUEST OF SOUTH VIETNAM. . 

052^57 ASST. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, GVN, SUBMITTED A WRITTEN REQUEST TO CHIEF-M 

FOR U.S. ADVISOR ASSISTANCE FOR THE VIETNAM AIR FORCE AND NAVY. 

052857 NEW YORK STATE POLICE INSPECTOR UPDIKE WAS ASKED TO. SET UP THE SOUTH VIET- 
NAMESE POLICE FORCE. 

053157 FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE TRAINING OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE, NAVY, 

AND AT THE VIETNAMESE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE TERMINATED. 
FRENCH LEGAL INSTRUCTORS TO GENDARMERIE AND CIVIL GUARD STILL REMAINED. 

06 57 THE FRENCH NAVAL AND AIR FORCE TRAINING MISSION WAS WITHDRAWN FROM SOUTH 

VIETNAM. 

061357 THREE NEW YORK STATE POLICEMEN WERE ASSIGNED TO HELP ORGANIZE THE POLICE 

IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 

07 57 GVN REQUESTED $60 MILLION FOR HEAVY EQUIPMENT FOR THE CIVIL GUARD. MA 

AND MSU PROPOSED $1^-18 MILLION. /JCS HIST. 

07 57 AN ICA SURVEY REPORT ON VIETNAM INDICATED THAT COMMODITY ASSISTANCE 

FUNDING TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM WAS TO END IN 1958. /159-1 

07 57 SINCE THE ARVN f S ANTI -DISSIDENT CAMPAIGNS HAD ACHIEVED SUCH SUCCESS, THE 

SOUTH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT DIVERTED MOST OF THE MILITARY TO TRAINING FOR 
CLASSICAL WARFARE AS A NECESSITY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST POSSIBLE 
DRV AGGRESSION. /WID 30-58. 

09 57 ALL 10 ARVN DIVISIONS HAD COMPLETED BASIC TRAINING. 7 DIVISIONS HAD 

FINISHED THIRD LEVEL TRAINING. 

102257 U.S. PERSONNEL WERE INJURED IN SAIGON IN THE BOMBING OF INSTALLATIONS 

THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP AND OF THE U.S. INFORMATION 
SERVICE. 

11 57 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS DEPICTED VIETCONG EFFORTS AS ONE OF SURVIVAL DURING 

JULY 1956 - JULY 1957. /JCS HIST. 



m 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



•-■ i 



120957 SOUTH VIETNAM EX-DIRECTOR OF POLICE NGUYEN VAN TON WAS SENTENCED FOR 

AIDING THE REBEL ELEMENTS. 

58 THE VIETNAMESE ARMY WAS REORGANIZED. FIELD AMD LIGHT DIVISIONS WERE 

CONVERTED TO 7 IMPROVED DIVISIONS. (LATE 1958-SEFI. 1959) 

OIOU58 LARGE COMMUNIST GUERRILLA BAND ATTACKED A PLANTATION NORTH OF SAIGON, 

REFLECTING STEADY INCREASE IN COMMUNIST ARMED ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM 
SINCE MID-1957- 

032758 PERMANENT SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE UNDER THE PRESIDENCY 

ESTABLISHED. 

Ok 58 THROUGH INTENSIVE RECRUITING IN THE SOUTH, THE NORTH VIETNAM GUERRILLA 

STRENGTH IN THE SOUTH ROSE TO ABOUT 2,100. /WID 51-58. 

05 58 ORGANIZED COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WERE ESTIMATED AT 1,1^0-1,^+00. 

/WID 22-58. 

07 58 THE SVN GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO ANNIHIIATE VIETCONG SUFFERED FROM RELYING 

TOO HEAVILY ON THE INEFFICIENT PARAMILITARY FORCES INSTEAD OF THE ARMY 
TO PUR DOWN ARMED INSURGENCY. /WID 30-58. 

07 58 GENERAL PHAM XUAN CHIEU WAS THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR ARVN. /WID 
09 58 MAAG REPORTED U.S. PERSONNEL WERE VC TARGETS. 

091058 FRANCE AND SOUTH VIETNAM SIGNED AN AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH FRANCE PROVIDED 

AID FOR THE VIETNAM GOVERNMENT'S AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM -- l,*+90 

12 58 VIETNAMESE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION STRENGTH OF 6,500, INCLUDING 2,500 

PERMANENT AGENTS. /WID 52-58. 

120858 PRESIDENT EISENHOWER APPROVED A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION WHICH 

AMONG OTHER ITEMS EMPHASIZED POLICE AND CONSTABULARY TYPE FORCES FOR 
INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES IN LIEU OF LARGER INDIGENOUS MILITARY 
ESTABLISHMENTS. 

59 IT WAS ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE BETWEEN 5 ,000 --12, 000 COMMUNIST 

GUERRILLAS ACTIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM IN 1959- • ' 

01 59 JCS REPORTED ARVN WAS READY TO FULFILL THE MISSION THE U.S. HAD SET 

/JCS HIST. 

01 59 GVN AGREED TO TRANSFER THE CIVIL GUARD TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. 

AID PROGRAM TO THE CIVIL GUARD WAS THEN RESUMED. /JCS HIST. 

010759 30,000 POLICE AND CIVIL GUARDSMEN HAD BEEN LOCALLY TRAINED IN LAW 

ENFORCEMENT AND TECHNICAL TRAINING COURSES. MORE TRAINING IN 
ADMINISTRATION AND COMMAND FUNCTIONS WAS BEING REQUESTED. 



00 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



w'- 



010759 NSC 5309 REPORTED THAT THE U.S. EMBASSY AND THE GVN HAD REACHED AN AGREE- 
MENT ON TRAINING AND EQUIPPING A CIVIL GUARD FORCE OF 32,000. THE 
WAS IN WASHINGTON FOR APPROVAL. THE QUESTION BEING ASKED WAS WHETHER 
THIS SITUATION REQUIRED IMPROVEMENT IN THE CIVIL GUARD OR WHETHER OTHER 
EXISTING VIETNAMESE SECURITY FORCES COULD ADEQUATELY DEAL WITH THE 
SITUATION. - 

011259 A NORTH-SOUTH VIETNAM MEETING WAS HELD TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS CONCERNING 

DEMILITARIZED ZONE. THE OPPOSING PARTIES PREPARED TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC 
LOW-LEVEL MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN. ARRANGED BY ICC. /WID 39-58. 

032959 VNAF FLEW ITS FIRST MISSION AGAINST A VC TARGET. /SAIGON-STATE MSG 

M*57. /JCS HIST. 

Ok 59 DIEM ENCOURAGED TERRORIST ACTIVITY REPORTING. 

0^0959 DIJRBROW-DIEM-WILLIAMS CONFERENCE ON WORSENING INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION. 

050659 EMBASSY DID NOT BELIEVE DIEM'S STORY THAT SECURITY WAS AT ITS WORST SINCE 

1955. U.S. SKEPTICISM RE THREAT TO SVN CONTINUED THROUGH 1959- 
S-STATE 2345 6MAY59. 

052659 THE ICC STATED TERM SHOULD END ACTIVITIES BY MID-1959- 
052659 2,000 GUERRILLAS WERE REPORTED IN SVN. THOUSANDS MORE WERE INACTIVE. 

CIVIL GUARD STRENGTH = k -7,000. WA = 136,000 REGULARS. INTERNAL SECURITY 
FORCES WERE NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF ERADICATING A DRV SUPPORTED 
GUERRILLA FORCE. VNA WILL HAVE TO BE DIVERTED TO THIS TASK. /2U9- 

052959 U.S. ADVISORS WERE AT REGIMENTAL, SEPARATE ARTILLERY, ARMOR AND 

MARINE BATTALION LEVEL. 

052959 USOM PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION BEGAN RETRAINING AND RE-EQUIPPING CIVIL GUARD. 

/JCS HIST. 

063059 THE MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY POLICE ADVISORY GROUP LEFT VIETNAM. USOM 

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION TOOK OVER TRAINING RESPONSIBILITY. THEY OBTAINED 
NO RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE CIVIL GUARD DURING THE NEXT TWO 
YEARS. /JCS HIST. 

070859 COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS ATTACKED THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY BASS AT BIEN HOA 

TWO U.S. MAAG PERSONNEL WERE KILLED AND ONE WAS WOUNDED. 

033059 SECOND NATION ELECTIONS GAVE THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AND 

OTHER PRO-GOVERNMENT POLITICAL PARTIES ALL SEATS IN THE. NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. NO OPPOSITION CANDIDATES WERE ALLOWED TO 
TAKE THEIR SEATS. 

09 59 DIEM ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE 1000 VC REGULARS. 

09 59 THE ARVN FRENCH STYLE k FIELD AID 6 LIGHT DIVISIONS CONVERTED TO 7 U.S. 

TYPE 10,000 M DIVISIONS. /JCS HIST. 



PP 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



09 59 JCS PAPER TO NSC URGED U.S. TO BACK PROGRAMS HOT PERSONALITIES. 

103059 SPOKESMAN OF TEE VIETNAMESE ARMY DISCLOSES THAT A CAMPAIGN AGAINST 

COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN THE COUNTRY'S SOUTHERNMOST REGION, THE CAMA 
PENINSULA, RESULTED IN HEAVY GUERRILLA LOSSES. 

12 59 OSD DIRECTED CINCFAC TO PREPARE A NEW JOINT DISTRIBUTION TABLE REFLECTING 

TERM PHASE OUT. /ITEM 56.. 

12 59 FIRST USE OF HELIOCOFTERS TO MOVE TROOPS. /SAIGON TO STATE 206l 1/3 

020160 GVN DIRECTIVE ISSUED ORDERING CONCENTRATION ON ANTI -GUERRILLA TRAINING 

TACTICS. 

021860 AMBASSADOR DURBROW TOLD CINCPAC CIVIL GUARD ANTI -GUERRILLA TRAINING WAS 

URGENT. CINCPAC HELD OUT FOR MAAG/TERM RESOLUTION RE ICC. /JCS HIST. 

03 60 FIRST AGROVILLE ESTABLISJffiD IN PHONG DIM PROVINCE. 

032U60 CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY TOLD THE JCS THAT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN VIETNAM 

HAD BADLY DETERIORATED AND THAT DIEM CONSIDERED THAT VIETNAM WAS IN 
ALL OUT WAR WITH THE VIETCONG. 

Ok 60 VIETCONG STRENGTH U,000. 

031760 NORTH VIETNAM PROTESTED TO THE CHAIRMEN OF THE 195^ GENEVA CONFERENCE 

(BRITAIN AND THE USSR) THE FORMIDABLE INCREASE OF PERSONNEL IN 
THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP IN SOUTH VIETNAM 
AND ACCUSED THE U.S. OF TURNING SOUTH VIETNAM INTO A U.S. MILITARY 
BASE FOR THE PREPARATION OF A NEW WAR. 

OJ+3060 AN OPPOSITION GROUP OF 18, CALLING THEMSELVES THE COMMITTEE FOR PROGRESS 

AND LIBERTY, SENT A LETTER TO PRES. DIEM DEMANDING DRASTIC ECONOMIC, 
ADMINISTRATIVE, AND MILITARY REFORMS. 

050560 U.S. ANNOUNCED THAT AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM, 

THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ADVISORY GROUP WAS TO BE INCREASED BY 
THE END OF THE YEAR FROM 327 TO 685 MEMBERS. 

052060 THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED TO THE UNITED KINGDOM THAT THE WO GOVERNMENTS 

AS CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, SHOULD APPEAL TO THE U.S. TO 
REFRAIN FROM INCREASING THE NUMBERS OF ITS MILITARY ADVISORS (MAAC-) 
SOUTH VIETNAM AND ALSO TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWING MAAG 
SOUTH VIET!. . THEIR PRESENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM CONTRADICTED THE SP 
OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS. THE AIM WAS TO LIQUIDATE ONE OF THE 
SOURCES OF UNREST /■ OF STR] . ttNG PEACE IN INDOCHINA. 

06 60 COMMUNIST GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM INCREASED. (JUNE-OCTOBER) 

060160 MAJ.GEN. LIONEL T. MC GARR WAS APPOINTED THE HEAD OF THE U.S. MAAG. 

O6O06O COUNTER-INSURGENCY TR/ !G PROGRAM UNDER MAAG FOR THE V] !SE ARMED 

FORCES WAS STARTED. 



QQ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 






7 















063060 THERE WERE ONLY 25 MSU ADVISORS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 

• 

101260 SEC.DEF. TOLD THE JCS THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINING AND LOGISTICAL 

SUPPORT OF THE CIVIL GUARD SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE MAAG BROMPTLY 
AND THAT THE CIVIL GUARD SHOULD BE PUT IN THE VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF 
DEFENSE, RATHER THAN IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. 

122960 CIVIL GUARD WAS TRANSFERRED TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FROM MINISTRY OF 

INTERIOR AT MAAG'S REQUEST.' /JCS HIST. 

01 6l THE FIRST INCREMENT OF CIVIL GUARD BEGAN TRAINING UNDER THE MAAG. 

013061 PRES. KENNEDY AUTHORIZED $29^100,000 TO EXPAND THE VIETNAM ARMED FORCES TO 

170,000 PLUS $12,700,000 FOR THE CIVIL GUARD. 

03286.1 MESSAGE FROM TRAPNELL TO JCS INDICATED FAILURE OF CG AND VNA TO COPE WITH 

VIETCONG. RECOMMENDED U.S. SUPPORT FULL 68,000 CIVIL GUARD FORCE. 

OJ4O36I U.S. -VIETNAMESE TREATY OF AMITY AN"D ECONOMIC RELATIONS WAS SIGNED IN 

SAIGON. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RATIFIED THE TREATY ON JUNE 1*+. 

OhOkGl PRESIDENT DIEM APPEALED TO THE ICC TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE AND ENERGETIC 

INVESTIGATION OF GROWING TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION THROUGHOUT SOUTH 
VIETNAM. 

0^0961 PRESIDENT DIEM AND VICE PRESIDENT THO WERE ELECTED BY AN OVERWHELMING 

MAJORITY IN THE VIETNAM PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. 

0^2961 PRESIDENT KENNEDY AUTHORIZED MAP SUPPORT FOR ALL 69,000 CIVIL GUARD. 

MAAG VIETNAM WAS DIRECTED TO SUPPORT ANT) ADVISE SDC. MAAG STRENGTH 
TO BE INCREASED AS NEEDED. 

05 6l MAAG PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM NUMBERED 685- ABOUT HALF WERE AIRBORNE 

COMMANDOS. 

050561 PRES. KENNEDY DECLARED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT CONSIDERATION WAS BEING 

GIVEN TO THE USE OF U.S. FORCES, IF NECESSARY, TO HELP SOUTH VIETNAM " 
RESIST COMMUNIST PRESSURES. HE DECLARED THAT THIS WOULD BE ONE OF THE 
SUBJECTS DISCUSSED DURING THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT 
JOHNSON IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 

051161 U.S. VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 

051361 WHILE JOHNSON WAS IN VIETNAM A JOINT COMMUNIQUE DECLARED THAT ADDITIONAL 

U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID WOULD BE GIVEN TO HELP SOUTH VIETNAM IN 
ITS FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNIST GUERRILLA FORCES. 

06 6l IT WAS ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE BETWEEN 7,000-15,000 COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS 

IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 

06 6l LOCAL MILITIAMEN IN SOUTH VIETNAM NUMBERED 50,000, SAME A3 IN 1959 . 

O60961 DIEM ASKED SUPPORT FOR AN INCREASE IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMY TO A FORCE OF 

270,000. 



RR 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



60 



<j 



080261 PRESIDENT KEKKEDY DECLARED THAT THE U.S. WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO SAVE 

SOUTH VIETNAM FROM COMMDMISM. 

080U61 PRES. KENNEDY AUTHORIZED AN INCREASE IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMY TO 200,000. 

a* 

081561 VNA - 150,000, CIVIL GUARD - 60,000, SELF DEFENSE CORPS - ^5,000, 

VIETCONG - 12,000. /25^ NIE. 

i 

090161 THERE WAS A SERIES OF ATTACKS BY 1, 000 COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN KONTUM 

PROVINCE. AN ARMY COMMAND COMMUNIQUE STATED THAT DURING THE MONTH OF 
AUGUST THERE WERE hi ENGAGEMENTS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT FORCES AND COMMUNIST 
REBELS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 

091761 A BRITISH ADVISORY MISSION ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLICY MATTERS, HEADED 

BY R. THOMPSON (FORMER PERMANENT DEFENSE SECRETARY IN MALAYA) LEFT 
SOOTH VIETNAM. 

091861 COMMUNIST FORCES ESTIMATED AT 1,500 MEN ATTACKED AND SEIZED THE CAPITAL 

OF PHUOC THTINH PROVINCE ONLY 60 MILES FROM SAIGON. 

092561 PRESIDENT KENNEDY, ADDRESSING TEE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN N.Y. , DECLARED 

THAT A THREAT TO PEACE WAS THE SMOLDERING COALS OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST 

100.161 SEATO MILITARY EXPERTS MET IN BANGKOK, THAILAND, TO CONSIDER THE 

INCREASING COMMUNIST MENACE TO SOUTH VIETNAM. ADM. HARRY D. FELT, U.S. 
NAVY COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN THE PACIFIC, DECLARED THAT THERE WAS NO 
IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF USING U.S. TROOPS TO STOP THE COMMUNIST ADVANCES IN 
SOUTHEAST AS3A, BUT HE INDICATED THAT AMONG THE PLANS EVOLVED FOR 
EVENTUALITY, SOME DID CALL FOR THE USE OF AMERICAN TROOPS. 

10026.1 PRES. DIEM = "IT IS NO LONGER A GUERRILLA WAR WAGED BY AN ENEMY WHO ATTACKS 

US WITH REGULAR UNITS FULLY AND HEAVILY EQUIPPED AND WHO SEEKS A 
STRATEGIC DECISION IN S.E.ASIA IN CONFORMITY WITH THE ORDERS OF THE 
COMMUNIST INTERNATIONA." 

THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID THAT THE U.S. COMMITTEE HEADED BY DR. EUGENE 
STALEY RECOMMENDED AN INCREASE IN AID BOTH FOR MILITARY MEASURES AND 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. 

101161 PRES. KENNEDY ANNOUNCED (AT HIS NEWS CONFERENCE) THAT HE WAS SENDING GEN. 

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, HIS MILITARY ADVISER, TO SOUTH VIETNAM TO INVESTIGATE 
THERE THE MILITARY SITUATION AND TO REPORT ON IT TO HIM PERSONALLY. 

101861 A STATE OF EMERGENCY WAS PROCLAIMED IN SOUTH VIET BY PRESIDENT DIEM. 

111661 FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE RSCOM iDATICNS IN GENERAL TAYLOR'S REPORT, PRESIDED 

KENNEDY (WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL) DECIDED TO. 
BOLSTER SOUTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY STRENGTH, BUT NOT TO COMMIT U.S. COMBAT 
FORCES AT THIS TIME. 

12 6l THERE WERE 170,000 VIE . MESE ARMY TROOPS. 

12 6l THE NUMBER OF CIVIL GUARD TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAD RISEN TO 60,000. 






SS 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



6t 



120861 U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT PUBLISHED A WHITE PAPER THAI STATED THAT SOUTH 

VIETNAM WAS THREATENED BY CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER OF COMMUNIST CONQUEST. 

12lU6l U.S. PRES. KENNEDY PLEDGED INCREASED AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM. 

122961 U.S. AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM WITHDREW" EARLIER OPPOSITION TO INCREASE IN 

VIETNAMESE FORCE LEVELS. 

063062 MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY ADVISORY GROUP LEFT VIETNAM. 

I 






TT 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









> 

DO 
> 

z 



Ln 



J 


















Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET "■- Sensitive 



IV. A. k. 



U.S. TRAINING OF THE VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY 



I95IP1959 



i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS AND OUTLINE 



J^g£ 



A. Why did the U.S. undertake the training of ARVN? 1 

B. How was the decision to organize and train Vietnamese forces 
taken? 3 

C. .."What was the threat to South Vietnam? .'. • 6 

1. The Sect Forces •• 6 

2. The Viet Minh Residue \ • 7 

3- The Vietnamese People ' s Army ......... 8 

D. What was the mission of the Vietnamese forces? 10 

1. U.S. strategic military policy . 10 

2. The nature of SEATO • • • H 

3* The French Expeditionary Corps 13 

k. The pressures exerted by the Diem Government lh 

5- Recent U.S. experiences in Korea . . . . 15 

E. What was the state of the South Vietnamese Army? 15 

F. How did the U.S. go about altering the state of the VNA? 17 

G. Did U.S. assistance through i960 result in creation of a 

South Vietnamese Army in the image of the U.S. Army? 2k 

3_. Evolution of the mission ■ 2k 

2. The strategy of the regular establishment 2k 

3. On the tactical level 2k 



i TO? SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Page 

- h. The organization of the defense establishment 25 

5- Manpower policies 26 

6. The equipment provided the Vietnamese regular forces 30 

7. The training of the Vietnamese armed forces . . . 30 

Table: Comparison of U.S. 7T ROCID Infantry Division (1956) 

and ARVN Standard Division (1959) 27 

Diagrams: U.S. Infantry Division TOE 7T ROCID (20 December 1956).. 28 

ARVN Reorganized Infantry Division, 1959 (standard 

ARVN division) 29 



FOOTNOTES 



2 



3 

» - . . 

BIBLIOGRAPHY .' , k2 



ii TOP SECRET - Sensitive 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



IV. A. h. 



U.S. TRAINING OF THE VIET NAMES E NATI ONAL ARMY, 

' 195^-1959 



A . V? hy did the U.S. undertake the training of ARVi-I?. 

Underlying the U.S. decision to train the ARVK were broad 
political objectives and beliefs relating to Asia, together with 
narrower considerations relating to methods of achieving U.S. objec- 
tives in Southeast Asia. Both broad and narrow considerations had 
their origins in the post-World War II chaos in Asia; both stemmed 
from the overall U.S. aim to deter or defeat communist aggression 
wherever and whenever it might occur; and both became pillars of U.S. 
Indochina policy with the fall of Mainland China to the communists 
in 19^9. 

On the broader level, the U.S. decision to train the Vietnamese 
armed forces was "viewed as necessary to preserve the independence and 
'freedom of Vietnam south of the 17th parallel, an essential prerequisite 
to the containment of communism. Containment- -lately a function of 
SEATO as well as of the U.S. --was viewed as essential to the preserva- 
tion of the rest of Southeast Asia from communist domination and control 
Communist domination of the area was viewed as the outcome associated 
with the fall of Free Vietnam by the proponents of the domino theory, 
which continued as a major influence on U.S. foreign policy throughout 
the period examined here, "in view of the importance of Vietnam to all 
of Southeast Asia, I am convinced that the United States should expend 
the funds, materiel, and effort required to strengthen the country and 
help it retain its independence," reported General J. Lawton Collins, 
"if the chances of success are difficult to calculate, the results of 
a withdrawal of American aid are all too certain, not only in Vietnam, 
but throughout Southeast Asia. Such a withdrawal would hasten the rate 
of communist advances in the Far East as a whole and could result in 
the loss of Southeast Asia to communism. In my opinion, the chance of 
success is not only worth the gamble; we' cannot afford to let free Viet- 
nam go by default." 3/ 

On the narrower level, several considerations tended to urge 
an affirmative decision concerning a training role for the U.S.: 

1. Throughout the French-Indochina war, U.S. authorities 
continually \irged the French to create and train a Vietnamese national 
Army. This measure was pressed not only because the U.S. believed it 
to be a necessary political gesture (evidence of the true independence 
of the Associated States), but also because U.S. experts viewed it as 
a military measure vital to the successful prosecution of the war. kj 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



hi 



2. The U.S. was never satisfied with French efforts concerning 
the Vietnamese National Army and was continually frustrated by apparent 
French reluctance to act on this score. Particularly disturbing to 
U.S. officials were French in'action concerning formation of the VrlA. 
into divisional units, French training procedures, and French reluctance 
to develop a Vietnamese officer corps: in short, acute frustration 
was caused by French refusal to initiate changes U.S. officials believed, 
rightly or wrongly, that the U.S.. could and would initiate if the U.S. 
were in charge. 

3- The U.S. had the capability to train "native armies," as 
demonstrated by Korean forces. Although U.S. pressure on the French 
culminated in a French visit to Korea to observe U.S. training methods 
and procedures, the French were most impressed with the unsuitability 
of Korean forces and the methods used to train them to the situation in 
Indochina. 5/ 

h. The U.S. had been considering the idea of U.S. training of 
Vietnamese forces since early in the Indochina war; in fact, the U.S. 
had been asked as early as 1950 to participate in a Vietnamese plan for 
a Vietnamese National Army trained and equipped by the U.S. without 
French participation. 6/ The U.S. attitude was ambivalent- As early 
as April 1952 the Service Secretaries suggested that the U.S. expand 
the Indochina MAAG to undertake training and equipping of a national 
army should the French declare their intention to withdraw from Indo- 
china; 7/ in January 195^ General Erskine suggested elevating MAG 
to the status of a mission "to help in training." 8/ On the other 
hand, although the theme of U.S. training of Vietnamese forces became 
increasingly prominent from early 1953 on, a high-level committee in 
Defense recommended against seeking direct American participation in 
training in January of that year, and the JCS agreed with this recom- 
mendation, which stemmed from French opposition to any such role for 
the U.S., relatively higher French qualifications to train the local 
armies, and from the language problem. 9/ As the war neared its close, 
however, CHMAAG General 1 Daniel, in face of firm and consistent opposi- 
tion from the French, pressed harder and harder for a direct American 
involvement in the training of Vietnamese forces; in May 195*1- General 
Ely, the French High Commander, apparently succumbed to ! Daniel's pressure 
to agree to U.S. training of, and the positioning of U.S. advisors with, 
Vietnamese units. 10/ On 9 June 195 l U Ely, through ! Daniel, requested 
the U.S. to organize and supervise the training of Vietnamese divisions, 
and to do the same for all other Vietnamese training, 11/ By this 
time, however, U.S. decisionmakers believed 'that the "situation in 
Vietnam has- degenerated to point where any commitments at this time to 
send over U.S. instructors in near future might expose us to being 
faced with situation in which it would be contrary to our interests to 
have to fulfill such commitments," 12/ and they feared that, "it may 
be that in effort to draw U.S. into conflict without having U.S. con- 
ditions on intervention met, French military may now seek U.S. training 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



■• 









:' 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



in advance of U.S. commitment to intervene with own combat forces.... 
We are resolved not to get dr.awn in to training program to reverse 
situation training program has virtually no chance of success...." 13/ 
Although T Daniel repeatedly requested a reversal of this decision, 
going as far as to request his plea by passed on "to the highest authority" 
on 26 June 5 1^/ the denial stood to the end of the Indochina war. 

5- Tli is prolonged involvement with the problem of affording 
U.S. assistance in training of the Vietnamese National Army lost hardly 
any of the momentum given it by General r Daniel during the final days 
of the Indochina war in spite of the U.S. decision to stop all aid ship- 
ments to Indochina on 30 July 195^- and to reconsider the entire problem 
of U.S. actions relating to Indochina. 15/ On 27 July, General T Daniel 
again urged that the U.S., without French interference, undertake a 
priority program for training the Vietnamese Army, and took steps to 
expand the authorized roster of MAAG personnel prior to the Geneva-imposed 
strength ceiling deadline of 11 August without Washington approval of the 
program. 16/ It is believed that this momentum, generated in Saigon and 
supported by the department of State, was of itself 03" considerable 
importance in the actual taking of the decision to organize and train 
Vietnamese forces 



o . 



B ■ How was the decision to organi ze and tr a.in Vietname se forces 
taken? 

Ambassador Heath and his superiors in the Department of State 
"strongly concurred" with General 0" 1 Daniel's recommendation of 27 July 
that the U.S. undertake a priority program to train the Vietnamese Army. 17/ 
The JCS, however, recommended that "before the United States assumes 
responsibility for training the forces of any of the Associated States 
certain preconditions were four in number: "a reasonably strong, stable 
civil government in control"; a request from each of the Associated States 
that the U.S. "assume responsibility for training their forces and pro- 
viding the military equipment, financial assistance, and political advice 
necessary to insure internal stability"; arrangements with the French 
"granting full independence to the Associated States a.nd providing for 
the phased orderly withdrawal of French forces, French officials, and 
French advisors from Indochina"; and "the size and composition of the 
forces. .. should be dictated by the local military requirements and the 
over-all U.S. interests." 18/ These recommendations were transmitted 
by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State by letter. 19/ 



In response to this letter, Secretary Dulles indicated that 
Cambodia, had already met the recommended conditions, and that although 
Vietnam had not yet done so, the U.S. should nonetheless undertake a 
training program since strengthening the army was in fact prerequisite 
to stability ("one of the most efficient means of enabling the Viet- 
namese Government to become strong is to assist it in reorganizing the 
National Army and in training that Army.") 20/ Alt! ugh in approvi 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



57 



O 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



NSC 5^-29/2 , which provided for the maintenance of forces in Indochina 
as necessary to assure the internal security of the area, the NSC had 
apparently decided the issue in favor of the Secretary of State, the 
disagreement between State and Defense continued with an additional 
dispute concerning the level of forces to be maintained. In agreeing 
to train Cambodian forces , the JCS in effect reasserted their earlier 
position vis-a-vis Vietnam: 

However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note with concern 
the unstable political situation presently existing within 
the state of South Vietnam, and accordingly consider that 
this is not a propitious time to further indicate United 
States intentions with respect to the support and training 
of either the Vietnamese regular or police forces. Accord- 
ingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend against the 
assignment of a training mission to MAAG Saigon. 2l/ 

In recommending force levels for Vietnam, the JCS reiterated 
the above recommendation and pointed out that the US MAAG would be 
limited by the Geneva cease-fire agreement, that "the development of 
the proposed forces. . .will require extensive and detailed training which 
will extend over a period of 3 to 5 years," and that "in view of the 
uncertain capabilities of the French and Vietnamese to retrieve, retain, 
and reorganize the dispersed forces of Vietnam, it may be several years 
before an effective military force will exist. Therefore, U.S. military 
support to that area,, including the training and equipping of forces, 
should be accomplished at low priority and not at the expense of other 
U.S. military programs and should not be permitted to impair the develop- 
ment through MBA. programs of effective and reliable forces elsewhere. 11 22/ 

The JCS proposed Vietnamese forces of 18^,000 (5 divisions of 
light infantry including one light artillery battalion per division- - 
111, 000; 12 regiments — 24, 000; gendarmerie- ~9> 000; Headquarters, Service 
and Support forces— 110,000), a militia of 50,000, and a small air force 
and navy, and proposed that "French forces consisting of a minimum of 
k divisions .. .should be retained in this country until phased out by 
U.S. -trained Viet Nam units." 23/ 

The Secretary of State, still believing in the need for a U.S. 
training mission, disagreed with the force levels proposed by the JCS, 
considering them excessive to the requirement of maintaining internal 
security as expressed in NSC 5*129/2. 2k/ On 19 October the JCS argued 
that their force proposals were justified by the ultimate objectives of 
the forces of Vietnam and repeated their opposition, from a military 
point of view, to U.S. participation in the training of Vietnamese forces. 
Their memorandum concluded, however, by providing the concession the 
Department of State must have so eagerly sought: 



_ 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



Cf 



TOP ^ECRU;'! 1 - Sensitive 



However, if it is considered that political considera- 
tions are overriding, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would agree 
to the assignment of a training mission to MMG 5 Saigon, _ 
with safeguards against French interference with the U.S. 
training mission. 25/ 

With this crack in the Defense position, the OCB recommended, 
and the NSC approved a limited and interim training program for Vietnam. 
On 22 October a, Joint State-Defense message was dispatched to Saigon 
authorizing Ambassador Heath and General ! Daniel to "collaborate in 
setting in motion a crash program designed to bring about an improve- 
ment in the loyalty and the effectiveness of the Free Vietnamese forces," 26, 
and on 26 October the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the request 
of the President, instructed the JCS to prepare a "long-range program 
for the reorganization and training of the minimum number of Free Viet- 
namese forces necessary for internal security (paragraph lOd/l of NSC 
5^29/2)." 27/ The decision, subject only to refinement, negotiation 
with the French, and reexamina/cion in the light of redevelo-pments, had 
been taken- -and had been taken largely on the basis of an opening in 
the position of the Department of Defense which, far from dealing with 
the specific and reasonable objections to U.S. training of Vietnamese 
forces, simply avoided those objections by making the concession on 
totally different grounds. 28/ 

The impact of the Presidents decision, not to assist the French 
by bombing at Dien Bien Phu and of his refusal to permit the landing of 
a U.S. force in the Hanoi -Haiphong area after the fall of Dien Bien Fnu 
as recommended by the Chairman of the JCS also seems to have contributed 
to this concession. As reported by James Gavin, "...there was a com- 
promise. We would not attack North Vietnam, but we would support a South 
Vietnamese government that w-' would provide a sta.ble, independent govern- 
ment that "was representative of the people. As I said before, we saw 
ourselves as the good guys. The French had let us down, but we would 
continue the battle. Also, we in the Army were so relieved that we had 
blocked the decision to commit ground troops to Vietnam that we were in 
no mood to quibble over the compromise." 29/ 

The refinement of the decision to organize and train the national 
army, dealing with missions and force levels, was comp3-eted by the JCS 
on 17 November 195*'; in an interesting change of position (see note 28), 
the Joint Chiefs asserted that "KAAG Indochina is capable of furnishing 
training assistance to develop the internal security Army and Navy forces, 
provided: a. A maximum portion of the MAAG military personnel is devoted 
to training; and b. The cooperation and collaboration of the French MAAG 
is secured." 30/ 

Negotiations with the French were completed when the agreed 
minute of understanding between General J. Lawton Collins and General 



X 



t 









TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



& 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Paul Ely of 13 December 195^ was approved by the U.S. and, later, by 
the French governments. The agreement, which provided for full autonomy 
for Vietnamese forces by 1 July 1955 and for assumption by the US MAAG 
of full responsibility for assisting the Government of Vietnam in the 
organizing and training of armed forces (under the general supervision 
of the French High Commander and with the help of French advisors), led 
to the assumption of this responsibility by General 0' Daniel on 12 Febru- 
ary 1955- 

The reexamination of the decision, reported by the JCS on 21 Janu- 
ary I955 , suggested that "although national policy prescribes making every 
possible effort to prevent South Vietnam from falling to the communists, 
the degree to which the United States is willing to support this policy 
in men, money, materials, and acceptance of additional war risks is not 
readily apparent," and urged that: "Prior to consideration of military 
courses of action with respect to this area, a firm decision at national 
level as to implementation of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia is mandatory." 
Although no such decision was forthcoming, and even this reexamination of 
the decision to assist the Vietnamese did not choose one course of action 
over any other, it did imply by repeated honks on the domino klaxon that 
U.S. assistance to Vietnam was required. When, a week later, General 
Collins expressed in more positive terms this need, the way was clear 
for the NSC to endorse a strong U.S. policy in Vietnam, 31/ confirming 
General 1 Daniel's takeover on February 12- -but the extent to which the 
U.S. was prepared to support this policy (then or now) was never made 
clear. 

C. What was the th reat to South Vi etnam? 

In addition to the more general considerations underlying the 
U.S. decision to train Vietnamese forces was the specific consideration 
of the enemy threat to South Vietnam. As perceived during the time this 
decision was being taken, the threat consisted of three elements: the 
dissident sect forces in South Vietnam; the communist forces in South 
Vietnam, dominated by the decisionmakers in Hanoi; and the Vietnamese 
People's Army of North Vietnam. 

-*-• The sect forces, consisting of an estimated 10,000 Cao Dai, 
2,500 Hoa Hao, and 2,600 Bien Xuyen forces, plus the urban police forces 
which were at that time under the control of the Binh Xuyen, were in 
opposition to the fledgling Diem government. 3-/ "The politico-religious 
armed groups called the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen are anti- 
communist in orientation, but feudalistic and regressive in all other 
respects. At present they have an effective veto power ever government 
action. This power they use to block reforms which might threaten 
their preferred military, economic, and political status, They will 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



retain their power to threaten and harass the government until the 
National Army is strong enough to neutralize their forces." 33/ 

The sects thus were regarded as an internal security 
threat— and more specifically as a threat to the Diem government. By 
some in Saigon they were regarded as the major internal threat. 3V 
Long subsidized by the French as their partners in the Indochina war., 
and faced with the end of French financial assistance; major elements 
of the sect forces were integrated into the Vietnamese National Army; 
other elements 3 including the Koa Hao forces of Ea Cut, were fragmented 
and reduced to low-level dissidence by government forces 5 according to 
contemporary intelligence estimates ; by 1956. 35/ There is some evi- 
dence that these fragmented groups were penetrated by the communists, 
however 9 and that they were used by the communists throughout the period. 
In this role the sects represented a continuing, if low-level * insurgent 
threat as an element in the overall internal security problem not 
qualitatively different from that repre ented by the communists them- 
selves. ' 4 

2. The Viet 'Minh Residue in South Vietnam was generally 
regarded as the instrument with which "the Communists" would pursue 
their "objective of securing control of all Indochina." 36/ Contem- 
porary (195^) intelligence reports indicated the belief that 

...the Viet Minh will seek to retain sizeable military 
and political assets in South Vietnam. Although the /Geneva/ 
agreements provide for the removal to the north of all Viet 
Minh forces , many of the regular and irregular Viet Minh 
soldiers now in the south are natives of the area, and large 
numbers of them will probably cache their arms and remain in 
South Vietnam. In addition, Viet Minh administrative cadres 
have been in firm control of several large areas in Central 
and South Vietnam for several years. These cadres will 
probably remain in place.... 3?/ 

Later reports confirmed this statement and continued to describe the 
situation as "precarious." 38/ 

Estimates during the period of relevance were consistent 
on the issue of control of the Viet Minh movement in the South: They 
did not question unity of purpose among the communists of the north 
and south (or 3 for that matter, among the members of the communist 
bloc); they did continue to assert or infer that the Viet Minh in the 
south were under the control of the Viet Minh in the north. 39/ 

Viet Minh* force "levels in the south were variously esti- 
mated by the U.S. during this period but never exceeded 10>000i GVN 
estimates, which tended to include all organized dissidents , were con- 
sistently lower than the U.S. estimates, never exceeding 8,000. Of 



7 : ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 

6 ■ TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

these estimated dissidents, no more than some 2,000 were considered "active" 
by any available- official estimate in the period 195^-1960. These forces 
were consistently estimated to be augmented by political and administra- 
tive cadre; koj - their modus operandi was seen as subversion and small- 
scale guerrilla operation. 

Thus the main internal threat to South Vietnam was viewed 
i throughout the period as Hanoi- controlled subversion and small-scale 

guerrilla operations carried our primarily by military and political 
cadre of the Viet Minh. 

3- The Vietnamese Peo ple 's Army "continued evolution" into a 
regular military force during the last year of the French-Indochina war, kl/ 
and in the period during which the U.S. was deciding to assume responsi- 
bility for organizing and training the South Vietnamese army the VB\ was 
judged to be increasing its already formidable capabilities. k2/ In April 
1955> the regular VPA^ "reorganized and strengthened since Geneva/' was 
estimated to have increased in numbers to 2^0,000 (largely at the expense 
of the regional forces of 37,000 and the popular forces of 75>°°0) and to 
have been organized into 10 infantry divisions, 2 artillery divisions, 
1 AAA groupment, and 25 independent infantry regiments. ^3 / Throughout 
the period 19^1-1960 the VPA grew slowly and was consistently estimated 
to have the capability of defeating both French and Vietnamese forces 
were VPA forces to' undertake an invasion of South Vietnam. It was gener- 
ally assumed that these forces would be backed by Communist Chinese forces, 
if such backing proved necessary. 

Just as consistent as the high estimates of VPA capabilities 
were the estimates of the VPA's intentions: the communists, although 
continuing to pursue their goal of controlling all of Indochina, would 
"without violating the armistice to the extent of launching an armed 
invasion to the south or west, pursue their objective by political, 
psychological , and paramilitary means." hk/ In the fall of 195^- it was 
reported that "the Viet Minh probably now feels that it can achieve 
control over all Vietnam without initiating large-scale warfare. Accord- 
ingly, we believe that the Communists will exert every effort to accomplish 
their objectives through means short of war.... If, on the other hand, 
South Vietnam should appear to be gaining in strength or if elections 
were postponed over Communist objections, the Communists probably would 
step up their subversive and guerrilla activities in the South and if 
necessary would infiltrate additional armed forces in an effort to gain 
control over the area. However, we believe that they would unlikely 
openly to invade South Vietnam at least prior to July I95I;...." k^J 

The theme of political, psychological, and paramilitary 
operations as the communist method of securing its objectives was stressed 



8' TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



I 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



in all available estimates throughout the years 195^-1960. No U.S. 
estimate that it was likely the VPA would overtly invade South Vietnam 
during that period has been found; on the contrary , in spite of insistence 
by Diem that invasion by the DRV was a serious possibility, h§/ U.S. 
estimates continued to stress that such an invasion was unlikely. In 
the words of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, engaged in the business of deter- 
mining U.S. policy in the event of aggression in Vietnam, "the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that at this time the major threat 
to South Vietnam continues to be that of subversion " Wf/ 

In a somewhat later period it was stated that "The North 
Vietnamese Army is almost twice the size of the South Vietnamese Army. 
The threat posed by the large northern forces has put constant psycho- 
logical pressure on the GVN." k8/ In view of the nature of the U.S. 
response to the combined .threat posed by the sects, the Viet Minh in 
South Vietnam, and the VPA as reflected in the missions assigned the 
forces of South Vietnam, it would appear that this "constant psycho- 
logical pressure" had telling effects on U.S. as well as GVN policymakers. 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



6" 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 



1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



^ • What was the mission of V ietnamese force s? 

The mission initially envisioned for the forces of Free Vietnam 
by the principal advocate of a U.S C role in organizing and training 
those forces, the Secretary of State y was simply that of providing and 
maintaining security within the borders of their country, k§/ and it 
was on this basis that the decision to assume responsibility for the 
organization and training of the Vietnamese National Army was taken. 
This single mission concept was in dispute, however, before, during, and 
after its pronouncement; the joint Chiefs of Staff, in an attempt logi- 
cally to trace through the web of U.S C commitments woven largely by the 
Secretary of State, were on the record in opposition to it; 50/ end, in 
fact, by early 1956 a two- or three-fold mission for South Vietnamese 
forces was considered more or less established by the Chiefs and by 
others more directly concerned with the organization and training of the 
Vietnamese forces 51/ . 

The evolution of the mission of the Vietnamese forces from that 
of maintaining internal security to (a) maintaining internal security; 
(b) resisting external aggression; and (c) contributing to regional 
defense with other non-Communist countries was affected critically by 
five factors: the state of U.S. strategic military policy in the mid--1950 T s; 
the nature of SEATO and of U.S. views concerning fulfillment of its com- 
mitments under that treaty; the withdrawal of the French Expeditionary 
Corps; pressures exerted by the Diem government; and recent U.S. experi- . 
ences in Korea. 

- 

1# U.S. strategic military policy in the mid-1950 T s, as has 
been well documented, 52/ was both complex and confused, and confusion 



over the issue of massive retaliation versus local defense was particular- 
ly intense c The JCS ~ among others -- were unable ever to resolve the 
dilemma posed by U.S. policy in this regard with respect to the defense of 
Southeast Asia. 



Co o 



The JCS had contended, first, that "from the point of view of the 
United States, with reference to the Far East as a whole, Indochina is 
devoid of decisive /presumably narrowly defined/ military objectives 1 ' 53/ 
when considering U.S. intervention in the Indochina war, and that the main 
target of U.S. air and naval forces should be the source of the aggression 
(i.e., China). But they also contended both during and after the Indochina 
war that atomic weapons should be used within Vietnam in the local defense 
of that country -- and that if permission to use such weapons were denied 
(a spectre which appeared constantly to haunt the Chiefs), U.S. force 
requirements and the time required to achieve victory would soar. 53/ > jjfft/ 
Finally, afi:er the French defeat, the Chiefs argued that a ground defense 
against aggression from Forth Vietnam by South Vietnamese forces would be 
necessary to provide time for the U.S. to intervene wit h ground forces, 
again using atomic weapons for local defense. 55/ 



- • TOP SEC RET - Sensitive 

10 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



YO • • 

TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

■ 

• 

Thus 3 although U.S. defense policy in the mid-1950 f .s called for 
main but not sole reliance on nuclear weapons, and on use of massive re- 
taliatory power in response to acts deemed hostile to the interests of 
the United States , definition of .and planning for use of such weapons , 
in retaliation or otherwise, were so ambiguous, and the concepts them- 
. selves so unclear that, particularly when applied to specific remote 
local defense situations , their value as guidance was virtually nil. 

2 ' The nature of SEATO, and of U.S. views concerning fulfillment 
of its obligations under the SEATO treaty, necessarily reflected the con- 
fusion in overall U.S. defense policy and planning. Added to this general 
problem was the more specific matter of matching U.S. resources to the 
worldwide commitments, including SEATO, that had been assumed since the 
end of World War II. Thus the Joint Chiefs stated that !? U.S. commitments 
; to Formosa, Japan and Korea, which nations have been excluded from the 

/SEATO/ treaty, make it imperative that the United States not be restricted 
by force commitments in the subject treaty area;- $6/ to these commitments 
must be added the numberous U.S. obligations outside Asia. 

'As is well-known, the.SEATO treaty, pressured into existence by 
• the United States and intended to deter overt aggression by China or other 
Communist nations, relied heavily in concept on the military participation 
i of the U.S. Faced with the magnitude of U.S. commitments, particularly 

•.in relation to the capabilities of the defense establishment, and con- __ 
• tinually confronted by the. considerations and requirements of general war, 

the JCS sought a way in which U e S. SEATO obligations might be carried out: 

5- a Continued development of combat effective indigenous 
forces, with their structure and training mutually coordinated 
to develop local leadership and prestige, and with improved 
capabilities to create a aohesive fighting force through inte- 
; ' gr at ion of their operations with adjacent indigenous forces and 

with support by operations of forces of other Manila Pact 
members c 

be Readiness to retaliate promptly with attacks^ by the 
. most effective combination of U.S. armed forces a.gainst the mili- 
tary power of the aggressor. 

- 

c. Encouragement of other Manila Pact countries to main- 
tain forces in readiness to counter aggression,, 

! d. Discussion, in general terms, of unilateral military 

plans by the Military Representatives to the Council to the extent 
necessary to insure maximum participation and cooperation by other 
member nations but not to the extent that U.S. strategic plans or 
the availability of U.S. forces for implementing such plans might 
be revealed o 



TOP SECR?iT - Sensitive 



11 



7/ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



e* Periodic visits by U.S. forces into the area as 
demonstrations of intent % and for joint and combined training 
exercises, . 



f. Availability of appropriate mechanism for the 
•' employment of U.S. forces in support of friendly indigenous 
forces in support of friendly -indigenous forces in the general 
area, ( 

6. The concept of prompt retaliatory attacks does not 
envisage attacks on targets within the aggressor country other' 
than on military targets involved in the direct support of the 
aggressor action. If authorized, atomic weapons would be used, 
even in a local situation, if such use will bring the aggression 
to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on a balance of 
political and military consideration, such use will best advance 
U.S. security interests. Under the alternative assumption that 
authority to use atomic weapons cannot be assured, the above 
concept would not require change, but this assumption would -not 
permit the most effective employment of U,S. armed forces, and 
consequently might require greater forces than the U.S. would 
be justified in providing from the over-all point of vi:ew. 57/ 

The clear intent of this concept --in accordance with SEATO 
objectives -~ is deterrence of and response to overt aggression against 
South Vietnam, among other countries; in view of limited U.S resources, 
and of the recognition of this problem in NSC 162/2, which "envisages 
reliance on indigenous ground forces to the maximum extent possible," 58/ 
and in view of the psychological pressure generated by the powerful VTA, 
the logical consequence of assignment of the mission T 'to countery ex- 
ternal aggression" to local South Vietnamese forces is virtually unavoid- 
able. Therefore, the JCS stated their view — and held to it throughout 
the period 195^--19oO — - "that the ultimate objectives of the military 
forces of the Associated States should be: 

VIETNAM — to attain and maintain internal security and to 
deter Viet Minh aggression by a limited defense of the Geneva 
Armistice demarcation line. 59/ 

Although it was not until the publication of NSC 5612/1 in mid- 
1956 that approved U.S. policy recognized this mission by stating that 
the U.S. should "assist Free Vietnam to build up indigenous armed forces, 
including independent logistical end administrative services, which will 
be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial 
resistance to attack' by the Viet Minh," 60/ "unofficial U.S. policy, from 
the JCS in Washington through the MAAG in Vietnam, 61/ h:^ set in motion 
programs which implicitly assigned a mission of limited* initial resistance 
to Vietnamese forces which attempted to be both responsive to SEATO re- 
quirements and cognizant of-U c S. resource limitations. 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



12 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






r 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

3- The French Expeditionary Cor ps, with a force of 176,000 
men in October 1954, figured heavily' in U.S 7- French plans for the 
defense of South Vietnam. In effect, the FEC was planned to be the 
shield behind which training of the VKA could be conducted, free of 
major concern over a Viet Minh attack across the 17th parallel. 
Unfortunate from the point of view of these plans were the major policy 
disputes that plagued — and finally did in — joint U.S. -French acti- 
vities in Vietnam. 

Dominant among U.S. -French disagreements were the French reluc- 
tance to support the Diem Government and the apparent French attitude of 
conciliation toward the Communists in both North and South Vietnam depends 
at a minimum on an early and convincing demonstration by the French of 
their wholehearted support." 62/ It was particularly frustrating not 
only that no such "wholehearted support" was forthcoming but also that 
considerable evidence tended to support the belief that the French were 
actively attempting to overthrow Diem during the period they remained in 
Vietnam. 63/ 

- French reluctance to support Diem -- or, as the U.S. estimated, 
"any nationalist government" 6k/ -- was consistent with their attitude 
toward Communist North Vietnam. Although Generals Collins and Ely 
enjoyed a cordial relationship of mutual trust, there is considerable 
evidence that Ely was, in a sense, the victim of both his superiors in 
the French Government and of his subordinates in Vietnam. Thus while 
Collins almost never expressed doubts regarding Ely's statements to him 
(and never of his integrity), French politics both high- and low-level, 
were particularly intense and seemed to be directed toward preservation 
of French commercial and cultural influence in both North and South 
Vietnam. The high-level French mission to Hanoi, the Saintenay Mission, 
was in particular regarded as evidence of French duplicity, although 
General Ely, in his memoirs, denies such duplicity. 65/ Suspected French 
assistance to the sect forces opposing the Diem Government and French 
activities within the joint U.S. -French Training Relations Instruction 
Mission were also consistent with the policy of preservation of French 
interests. 

For some time U.S. policymakers had been thinking seriously 
about going it alone in Vietnam without the French. When at the Washing- 
ton Conference in September 195^5 "the French delegates discussed their 
intentions to cut the FEC to 100,000 by the end of 1955 and asked for 
$330 million in U.S. svvport for the FEC at that level, the reaction 
among U.S.- decision makers was negative. On November 5 it was decided 
that on balance the U.S. would probably fare better in Vietnam without 
the French, and it was tentatively agreed that the U.S. should not con- 
tinue its support that had been requested, but should limit the contri- 
bution to $100 million. In their view a complete withdrawal of the FEC 
in Ip55 would create a vacuum that only the Viet Minh could fill, for the 
VNA would remain incapable of coping even with Viet Minh irregular forces 



TOP SECRET - Se nsiti ve 

13 



•t 



• • 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



for at least that period* Furthermore, French cooperation was essential 
to the success of any U.S. project in Vietnam, and a decision to grant 
any support for the FEC would jeopardize French cooperation. 66/ 

Although Heath and Collins prevailed and $100 million was 
allocated to support the FEC during 1955 5 the French were informed that 
no further assistance could "be expected beyond that time. 6jJ The French 
responded by making it clear that a drastic reduction of the FEC was in 
the offing — to a level of Ho,000 by the end of 1955> and the Foreign 
Office emphasized that although this action was based entirely on monetary 
considerations there was also much sentiment in France for transferring 
the FEC to Forth Africa. In Vietnam, it was stated, French troops were 
serving the interests of the Free World; if the Free World would not pay 
their costs, then they should be sent to Forth Africa, where they would 
be serving the interests of France and the French Union. 68 / 

Pressures applied by Diem also influenced the French exodus. 
Mailing' no secret of his Franco-phobia, Diem asked the French to withdraw 
the FEC as early as September 195 1 !-, and in March 1955 Premier Faure 
announced that France would withdraw the FEC at the demand of the Viet- 
namese Government . By October 1955, the FEC had been reduced to 
i|5 ? 000; 69/ by February I956 only 15,000 remained; 70/ and on April 1, 
1956 the remnants of the FEC left Saigon, leaving only small Air Force 
and Navy training missions behind. 

With the dissolution of the French dissolution of the French 
high. command on April 23, only the VKA was left to carry out the mission 
of guarding South Vietnam against aggression from the north, a mission 
which the French had oeen expected to perform*, 

^' The pressures exerted by the Pi era Government on the U.S. 
regarding the Vietnamese* National Army were consistently in favor of 
larger forces than the U.S. was willing to support 71/ and in the criti- 
cally formative .years of 195^ an ^- 1955 were oriented toward regular 
forces organized to combat an invasion from the north as well as to pro- 
vide internal security. Just as Diem had felt the FEC should be deployed 
along the Ifth parallel, 72/ he believed that the VKA should be manned 
and organized in such a way as to counter any such invasion, although 
"from the earliest days senior Vietnamese officers, including General Minh, 
argued for the creation of an effective grass-roots security organization 
in the countryside. They knew how the war had been fought and lost. Diem 
at first had no idea. While the Viet Minh tactics were changing from 
attrition to annihilation, Diem was abroad. He returned with the opinion 
that aircraft and naval craft were the essentials and that even infantry 
were no necessary. -Later he developed an attachment to artillery. . * • By 
the time he came round to accepting the advice of his <y^m generals, the 
United States had embarked on its major plans for major reorganization, 
and the paramilitary forces, which Diem had created in a, half-hearted way, 
were withering on the vine." 73, 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






m 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



'/• 



■ 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



5° Recent U.S. exp erie nc es in Korea, were of two kinds: a tre- 
mendous effort to counter an invasion by a large Communist conventional 
army across a parallel of latitude with a large conventional army com- 
posed primarily of U.S. and U.S. -trained "native" troops; and an anti- 
guerrilla effort so miniscule as to "be accorded to U.S C forces and less 
than half a short paragraph in General Matthew B. Ridgway's 291-page book 
on the Korean war. 

.••So it seemed a good time /in November 195l/ *° take care 
of a persistent annoyance -- the existence of large bands of 
guerrillas in South Korea, particularly in the mountainous areas 
northwest of Chinju, where they had taken refuge after the Com- 
munist retreat. Van Fleet assigned lieutenant General Paik Sun 
Yup, with two ROK divisions, to Operation RATKILLER, designed to 
rid us of this potentially dangerous threat. By the end of 
January 1952, nearly 20,000 freefooters -- bandits and organized 
guerrillas -- had been killed or captured and the irritation was 






ended for good. 



In view of the Korean' experience, not yet two years old at the time of 
'Daniel's assumption of responsibility and training of the Vietnamese 
Rational Army, it is hardly surprising that the mission of defense, 
however limited, of the 17th parallel was envisioned for these Viet- 
namese forces to complement the more limited mission of achieving and 
maintaining internal security. Kor perhaps is it surprising that this 
mission came to dominate the organization and training of the VEA. 

E. Wha t w as the state of the Sout h Vie tnamese Army? 

While the U.S. was still in the process of taking the decision 
to assume responsibility for organizing and training the Vietnamese army, 
KIE-63-7-5^ reported on the condition of that army. Related documents 
give no reason to suspect the accuracy of this estimate or to believe 
the estimate overstates the magnitude, of the tasks the U.S. was about to 
undertake: 

23. The Vietnamese national Army has an estimated strength 
of 170,000 regulars and 10,000 auxiliaries. Naval and air 
strength is negligible. The regulars include 5 infantry regi- 
ments and 152 combat battalions, of which 69 are infantry, 6l 
light infantry, 8 guard, 5 airborne infantry, 8 artillery, and 
one armored reconnaissance. The regroupment necessitated by 
the Geneva Agreements has forced many units to leave their home 
provinces for the first tirae, resulting in a considerable number 
of desertions since 1 June (up to 25 percent of the total army 
strength) . Some auxiliaries and other semimilitary forces are 
being demobilized, with the exception of the armed forces of 
the. South Vietnamese sects and certain guard and militia elements. 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



15 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



76 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



The Vietnamese General Staff has become so involved in political 
affairs that it has neglected the required planning of an "ade- 
quate internal security program. This neglect has fostered a 
spirit of insubordination" and irresponsibility throughout the 
army. The army in some instances has been incapable of execut- 
ing occupation and pacification operations in areas formerly 
under Viet Mirih control. Almost all units, particularly those 
from North Vietnam, require a- period of intensive training and 
reorganization to bring them up to strength and improve their 
effectiveness. 

24. Advisory and training aid is provided by approximately 

H,800 French officers and ]\ T C0 ! s currently serving in the French 
Military Mission to Vietnam. This mission is to be increased to 
6 5 000 by the end of I95H. These individuals serve in command, 
staff, and advisory roles on the Vietnamese General Staff in the 
territorial command structure, and in training establishments. 

.About 20 percent- of Vietnamese infantry units and 50 percent of 
support and technical units are cadred at least partially by the 

. French. The army is still under French operational control and 
continues to be completely dependent on the French for logistic 
support. • . 

25. A major reason for the ineffectiveness of the Vietnamese 
National Army is its lack of adequately trained officers. Only 
about one percent have received training roughly equivalent to 
that of a US army officer of field grade and virtually none has 

•a comparable background of staff and command experience. Very 
few of the Vietnamese officers would be competent even in 
assignments justified by their training and experience, and 
even fewer are capable of an adequate performance at the higher 
positions of responsibility which they now hold. Their back- 
ground is one of subordination to French command, and they are 
inclined to rely heavily on French advisers even when given 
positions of authority and responsibility. 

26.. The other serious deficiencies in the South Vietnamese 
national forces, ineffective organization and training and 
absence of logistics and technical services, are related to the 
lack of leadership and stem from the same basic cause, i.e., 
French failure to train and develop qualified leaders. This 
situation can be resolved only over a period of time and only 
if an intensive program for the progressive development of an 
effective officer corps is soon initiated. 

28c We have little information on the strength and status 
of other semi-military and police forces. ... 

29c South Vietnam 1 s mobilisable manpower pool is estimated 

at 1,500,000 physically fit, military-age males, 01 which about 
20 percent are now under arms. An additional 10 -percent could 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

16 



K 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



probably be mobilized without initially curtailing essential 
economic activities. The Vietnamese Government would be 
almost entirely dependent- upon foreign aid to support such a 
force. 

30c The Diem Government proposes to expand the army to 
200,000 by the end of 195 1 ! , and to 225,000 by the end of 1955 • 
By the latter date, the army would include 10 divisions plus 
60 territorial battalions. The cost of maintaining these forces 
through 1955 has been estimated at about $^50, 000, 000 of which 
almost all would have to be furnished by external assistance . 
The French have supported this proposal as being required.... 
A proposal for development of a National Guard under the Ministry 
of the Interior has been postponed pending the outcome of French- 
Vietnamese -United States discussions c 

31. On the other hand, the United States is considering 
the reduction of the Vietnamese army to about 80,000, including 
3 combat light divisions. These reduced forces would have pri- 
marily an internal security mission. Against a large-scale Viet 
Minh invasion, they would serve only as a delaying force . Cost 
of maintaining the forces at the reduced levels has been tenta- 
tively estimated at about $200,000,000 per year. This est mated 
cost is in addition to financial, economic, and military support 
funds, which might total $150,000,000 per year. 75/ 

.Thus a listing of problems and deficiencies to be dealt with would 
contain at least the following: force size; force structure; disengage- 
ment of general staff from political affairs; planning of an internal 
security program; planning of a delaying strategy to counter invasion 
from the north; correction of a spirit of insubordination and irresponsi- 
bility; replacing French cadre; developing a self-reliant officer corps; 
developing an independent logistics capability; developing adequate 
technical services; development of training system and program; learning 
about and coping with the problems of semi-military and police forces; 
resolving the problem of the National Guard. 

P. How did the U.S. go about altering the state of the VKA? 



With the JCS -recommended force levels for Indochina forwarded to 
Secretary of Defense on 22 November 195^ the upper bound of the regular 
Vietnamese army force goals was established at 18^,000; 76/ the teiing 
into account of the objections of Secretary of State, who regarded this 
force leve.1 as "excessive" to the mission of establishing and maintain- 
ing interna,! security, 77/ set^the lower -bound goal of approximately 
88,000. The earliest U.S. actions toward the .VKA were devoted to reduc- 
ing- the VKA to this lower level while reorganizing the forces in order 
to rectify as many as possible of the problems listed above. 



. :■ 



TOP SECRET - Se nsi tive 
17' 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



77 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Although at this stage MAAG was charged solely with the task of 
assisting the Vietnamese to develop a force capable of establishing 
and maintaining internal security, the second mission of limited resis- 
tance to an onslaught from the north was reflected in General Collins 1 
recommendations of 15 November. In recommending a force level of some 
88,000, General Collins indicated his belief that divisional combat 
elements should be included in the force structure to assist the FEC 
to absorb the shock of invasion if' hostilities were renewed as well as, 
if called upon, to reinforce the security troops in pacification activi- 
ties c General Collins also contended that to reduce the VNA by half 
without at the same time providing forces organized for combat rather 
than merely for security duty was certain to have a bad effect on Viet- 
namese morale. 78/ * 

Accordingly, General Collins recommended that the U.S, support a 
small, well-balanced force including 13 security regiments and an air- 
borne RCT for internal security purposes and a three-field-division 
force to delay any Communist invasion until external assistance from 
the Manila powers could arrive. A small navy and air force were recom- 
mended to complete the Vietnamese defense establishment, 7g/ 

On 17 November the JCS approved Collins 1 recommendations, empha- 
sizing, however, that this program "does not provide adequate security 
for the Associated States against external aggression after the with- 
drawal of the French forces. With the Viet Minh increasing the size 
and effectiveness of their forces and with no force in being committed 
to mutual defense under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 
the above long-range program would be insufficient to provide more then 
limited initial resistance to an organized military assault by the Viet 
Minh." 80/ In his report of 20 January, Collins expanded on this recom- 
mended force structure, a structure "based on the concept that a rela-. 
tively small force, properly trained, equipped and led can perform the 
above missions more effectively and at less cost than a larger force 
which would be disproportionate to the economic and manpower capacities 
of the country.'" Q\l 

The task of assuring that Vietnamese forces were properly trained, 
equipped, and led fell initially to the Training Relations Instruction 
Mission (TRIM), a joint U.S. -French enterprise under U3MAAG Chief 
O'Danielc Although the Collins-Ely minute of understanding did not go 
into effect until 12 February 1955 > f Daniel had begun to implement 
that agreement in 195*4 by organizing TRIM, which consisted of all French 
and U.S. advisory and training -oersonnel as well as French cadres with 
Vietnamese units, for this purpose. 32/ During 1955> TRIM occupied 
itself with organizing a military school system, setting up programs 
for training officers and specialists in the U.S. and other countries, 
and reducing the language barrier. Much time and thought went into 
planning for reorganizing and. training the army on a divisional rather 
than a battalion ba^is, but TRIM accomplished little in this area during 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 
18 



% 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



1955 "because of the continued employment of the WA against the sects 
and because of the French phaseout, which was veil underway during that 
year. 83/ 

- 

« 

The continuing conflict with sect forces, the reduction and even- 
tual withdrawal of the FEC, the lack of a capability to demobilize 
efficiently, concern about overloading the economy with unemployed 
veterans (potential grist for the sects 1 < and for the Communists 1 mill), 
and the fact that the 88,000-man VEA was viewed as only slightly larger 
than the sect forces alone led the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense (KOD) 
to object to the 88,000 force level in 19?1+. As a first compromise, 
CHMAAG indicated that the U.S. would agree to supporting a goal of 
100,000 by the end of 1955; the same factors led to O'Daniel's recom- 
mendation of a goal of U.S. -supported forces of 150,000 (plus 10,000 
sect-troops) by 1 July 195I4 . 8k/ Ambassador Reinhardt and CBICPAC 
fully endorsed T Daniel T s recommendation, and the JCS recommended ap- 
proval of this force basis. 85/ Upon D0D approval, MAAG immediately 
began planning for the reorganization of Vietnamese forces "according 
to American concepts" 86/ and at the newly approved level. The organiz- 
ing and training of this force of h field divisions, 6 light divisions, 
13 territorial regiments, 1 airborne EOT, and supporting troops, plus an 
air force and navy of limited size, was to occupy MAAG until the reorgani- 
zation of 1959. 8j/ 

To accomplish this task, MAAG had a total strength of 3^2 officers 
and men, of which 220 were assigned TRIM in February 1955- With the 
French withdrawing personnel engaged in processing- MDAP equipment, MAAG 
found it difficult to supervise redistribution and end use of this 
material. 88/ As early as February, before the French began to withdraw, 
O'Daniel had reported he needed twice the authorized MAAG strength to 
accomplish this mission; 89/ both 0'Daniel and CINCPAC argued against 
the State Department T s interpretation that Article l6 of the Geneva 
Agreement held MAAG to a ceiling of 3^2 personnel and the JCS recommended 
"that the Secretary of Defense inform the National Security Council of 
the gravity of the situation in Vietnam, requesting the authority to 
raise the 3^-2 limitation;" 90/ and the Secretary of Defense, in forward- 
ing these dissenting views to the Secretary of State, agreed with the 
dissenter, gl/ Before the Secretary of State could reply to the D0D 
inquiry, an interagency costing team which had just returned from Vietnam 
reported that because of the reduction in French personnel control of 
MDAP supplies and spaces had been lost and that as a result, "the capa- 
bility of supply of forces in the field in the event hostilities should 
be resumed in mid-1956 would be virtually non-existent." 92/ 



On February 3, '1956, the Department of State acquiesced in the 
creation of the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM). 93/ By 
the end of 1956* this group of 350 military personnel had greatly facili- 
tated the recovery and redistribution of MDAP equipment; although they 



TOP SECRET - Sensiti-, 



19 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



'// 












• 






* 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



were not part of MAAG, they had also improved the organization of Viet- 
namese logistical services and had launched an extensive logistical 
training program, . In addition, TERM relieved MAAG of logistical re- 
sponsibilities, thus freeing MAAG personnel for training. %kf There- 
after, the RAA.G training program "gained momentum." 95/ ~~" 

* 

This momentum was in the direction of training and organizing the 
VNA so that it would have its proper role in the overall defense of 
Vietnam as had already been envisioned by the MAAG in 1955: 

(1) The organization and missions of the National Army, 
Civil Guard and Self -Defense Corps all supplementary in assur- 
ing adequate internal security for Free Vietnam, The National 
Army retains overall responsibility for internal security in 
accordance with its assigned mission. The development of the 
Civil Guard and Self -Defense Corps as supplementary internal 
security agencies will, at nominal cost, provide for increased 
internal security and simultaneously afford necessary relief 
£JL^™yjjj^lJi s . "^r necessary combat tra ining , thus gr eatly 
JJ^£^A^iLJ^Jp otential °~ Free Vietnam to "resist armed 
aggression from without > coordinated with guerrilla and sub- 
versive action from within. 

(2) The Civil Guard will be responsible for (a) nation- 
wide civil law enforcement except in those, cities having 
municipal police, (b) supplementing, the Array Territorial - 
Regiments in maintain internal security, and (c) serving as 

an operating agency for the Vietnamese Bureau" of Investigation 
in the collection of ant i~ subversive intelligence. The Civil 
Guard will possess the necessary mobility to concentrate against 
strong subversive actions, supplementing and lending breadth to 
the Army Territorial Battalions. 



* . • 



. (3) Neither the Army nor the. Civil Guard will have the 
necessary strength, dispersion or familiarity to provide neces- 
sary protection for widely scattered and numerous (approximately 
6,000) villages against subversive actions of Viet Minh cadres 
and dissident sect personnel. The Self-Defense Corps, operating 
with 10-men armed units in each village, would possess these 
requirements to the degree necessary to ferret, out and eliminate 
existent or potential subversive movements ... . The Army and the 
Sel3"-Defense Corps will have the same command channels.... Close 
coordination will exist between Self-Defense Corps units and the 
Civil Guard, on the lower levels. S'6/ 

No concept for defending Free Vietnam could be clearer: the regular 
army in command of (or in close coordination with) the irregulars who 
will have the capability to free the army to fill an army role -- "to 
resist armed aggression from without." Unfortunately, however sound this 



TOP SECRET' - Sensitive 
20 . - 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



. 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



concept may have been ~~ and in view of demonstrated Viet Cong and DRV 
flexibility it is not clear that the concept was completely unsound — 
it was never successfully implemented e The VNA, gradually transformed 
into ARVN, was organized and trained along U.S. lines (at least in the 
view of those doing the training and reporting on their progress 57 / 
and by the end of 1958 MAAG was able to state that "The combat posture 
of the Vietna:nese Armed Forces has 'improved to a marked degree in the 
past few years. At the end of CY 1958, the Vietnamese Army, competed 
with other army forces in Southeast Asia, reached a relatively high 
degree of combat effectiveness.... 1 ' 98/ But the Civil Guard and the 
; Self -Defense Corps were never brought to the stage of development at 

which they might have relieved the army of the internal security mission 
for which its new-found organization, training, and equipment were 
rendering it unfit. 

As far as can be estimated on the basis of available information, 
training within Vietnam was conducted in as centralized a fashion as 
possible. Limited availability of personnel and GW opposition pre- 
cluded posting of U.S. advisors to lower than airborne brigade level 
until 1961, although the need for advisors at lower levels was well 
recognized. 99 / Training methods were, as far as can be judged, 
standard U.S. methods minimally adapted to the Vietnamese context; 
standard training cycles similar to U.S. programs were employed; ex- 
tensive use was made of translated U.S. training films and training 

jf and field manuals. Extensive training of Vietnamese officers in the 

U.S. was conducted. Combat and support units, especially logistics 
units, benefited equally from U.S. methods and procedures. Equipment 
(including personal gear) reflected U.S. taste in kind, if not in 
quality. And U.S. organizational preferences became fully realized 
when, in 1959, the agitation begun by General D'Daniel during the Indo- 
china war had its full flowering in the reorganization of the Vietnamese 
Army into a General Headquarters, Field Command, six Military Region 
Headquarters, two Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops, one provisional 
Corps Headquarters, and seven standard divisions of 10,500 men each. By 
1959 these forces were judged capable of maintaining internal security 

s and of providing limited initial resistance to any renewed aggression . 

from the North. 100/ 

In spite of all this progress, however, MAAG statements in 1959 - 
reveal that many of the problems and deficiencies found in the VKA of 
195*4 and noted above were still to be found in the ARVJS of 195?: 101 / 
although force size had been settled oy fiat, it was still a troublesome 
problem particularly vis-a-vi s the (JVM which persisted in its desire for 
larger forces; force structure was still unclear, particularly with 
reference to command and control; as the abortive coup of i960 was to 
show, high-ranking officers were still politically active; 102 / plans 
for an internal security program relied heavily on the virtually non- 
existent capabilities of the Civil Guard and Self -Defense Corps; 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 
21 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



21 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



correction of a spirit of insubordination and irresponsibility was not 
compete, as revealed at low as well as high (or "coup") levels- 103/ 
French cadre had been replaced, but with Vietnamese cadre generally 
less well-adapted to their role; a self-reliant officer corps was still 
a vision of the future, as were an independent logistics capability and 
adequate technical services; and although something had been learned 
about the problems of semi -military and police forces, not enough had 
been done to cope with them to provide genuine internal security. 

There were, in fact, several views of the roles and missions of 
the paramilitary forces . The Michigan State University Advisory Group, 
under contract to USOM, Vietnam to provide counsel and guidance on the 
development of the Civil Guard (CG), viewed this organization as a national 
police, civilian in character and function, lightly but adequately equipped, 
with sufficient delegated authority and training to enforce all laws, con- 
trol subversion, and collect intelligence data in areas not covered by 
municipal police, as well as establishing close ties with the population 
of the rural areas by- fixed basing in the villages within pacified areas. 
10 v Diem envisaged the CG as a large and powerful military organization 
accountable to him through his appointed province chiefs -- a counter to 
the army in the struggle for power which would also provide provincial 
security through mobility from posts outside the villages; in line with 
this view, he transferred the CG from the Ministry of the Interior to the 
. Presidency in 1956. The USMAAG came to view the CG much as Diem did ~- 
not, of course, -as an anti-coup safeguard, but as a mobile counter sub ver- 
sion force, an adjunct to the army that would relieve it of internal • 
security duty and free it to learn how to counter the threat from the 
North. 105/ As of the end of 1956 the CG were being trained at the 
Quang Trung School to assist the army in case of crisis or of overt 
attack; JL06/ by late 1957, they were conducting operations with ABVii 
in unpacified areas. 167/ 

The MSU Advisory Group, in a 1956 report, 108/ outlined the problems 
that existed with respect to the problems of the several Vietnamese law 
enforcement agencies, including the CG, and made far-reaching recommenda- 
tions, some of which were reiterated in the Counter insurgency Plan of 
I960. 109/ - This reiteration supports the hypothesis that few of the MSU 
recommendations were acted upon effectively in the intervening years . 

In July 1957, the GVK requested $60 million worth of heavy equipment 
for the CG, which had been equipped only with non-U. S. weapons surplus . 
to the army's requirements. MAAG and MSU proposed §lk - 18 million in 
lighter equipment; in 1958, a compromise was reached, providing for only 
$14 million but including some of the heavy equipment to be issued over 
a U-year period with the understanding that the CG be reorganized into a 
civilian operation under the Ministry of Interior and along lines proposed 
by U.S. advisors. Lip/ Little progress was made in changing the Civil 
Guard, however, in spite of this U.S. leverage; txhe §lk million in 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



22 



r\ /•» 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



assistance was withheld for almost two years. In January 1959, Diem 
agreed to transfer the CG to the Minister of the Interior, and the U.S. 
agreed to go ahead -with the aid program The new Public Safety Division 
of USOM assumed responsibility for training the CG in June, but the 
impasse over the concept of the CG continued until December i960, when 
Diem, at MAAG's urging, transferred the CG to the DOD. Ill / 

The Self -Defense Corps (SDC),'like the CG, was armed with non-U. S, 
weapons surplus to the army's requirements . Established by Diem as a 
part of the DOD, the SDC received U.S. 'assistance from its inception in 
the form of a $6 million per year subsidy for salaries. All reports 
indicate that the SDC was in even worse shape than the CG. The contro- 
versy that engulfed both these organizations for five years produced 
two paramilitary units that, far from being adequate to free the army 
for combat, " were confusingly organized, inadequately equipped, poorly 
trained, and badly led -~ even when compared with ABVR. 112/ 

* 

According to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College "Study 
on Army Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam/' published 
in June i960, 113/ n The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam are 
anxious to take the offensive and 'march to Hanoi. 1 The Chief, MAAG, 
and his principal assistants who come in direct contact with the Viet- 
namese high command must be constantly alert to detect this desire and 
any evidence of preparations therefor, as the consequences of such a 
premature act, not only to the numerically inferior South Vietnamese 
Armed Forces, but also to the entire region and possibly the whole world, 
could be most serious." Given the deficiencies remaining in the seven 
standard division regular army that would do the marching, and the state 
of the paramilitary forces, the authors of this study were well advised 
to add, parenthetically and perhaps wistfully: "(Eventual reunification 
through 'peaceful means' is to be hoped for.)" 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



23 



S3 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



G • Did U,So assistance through i960 result in cre ation of a South 
Vietnamese Army in the image of the U.S P Army ? ' 

While it would" probably be incorrect to assert that the UoS created 
a complete "mirror image" of its own forces in the Vietnamese defense estab- 
lishment, consideration of the mission, strategy, tactics, organizations, 
manpower policy, equipment, and training of that establishment indicates that 
conscious and unconscious U.So efforts did result in emphasis on conventional 
forces (at the expense of paramilitary forces) "governed by the concept of a 
war front enabling use of the superior weaponry and technology of the West 
against a guerrilla force that was potentially the spearhead of a more mas- 
sive thrust out of North Vietnam." UJj/ 

1* Evolution of the mission of the VNA has been described The 
fact is that assignment of a dual mission to VNA led rapidly to formation of 
a regular military establishment designed primarily to counter the threat of' 
overt invasion from the North • Countering the internal threat- -as is so 
often the case~-was downgraded to the status of a "lesser-included capa- 
bility in the regular forces." 11$/ 



2o The strategy of the r eg ular establishment was described as 
early as 1956 as 

defensive in nature and involves the conduct of a delaying action 
against external aggression of sufficient duration and effec- 



tiveness to hold as much ground as possible, and retain the key 
strategic entity, the Saigon Complex, in order to permit the 
arrival of the foreign military assistance which will be neces- 
sary to preserve her territorial integrity and national sovereignty 
•00. This defensive strategy must not only include consideration 
of the enemy threat in the form of overt military aggression from 
outside her borders but also from separate or concurrent extensive 
guerrilla and clandestine activities conducted by indigenous dis- 
sident groups or foreign military and political cadres already 
present or infiltrated into the country,, 116/ 

The latter threat was countered by the territorial regiments in 19^6; these 
3^£imgnts _were abolished i n 1959 , wit h the^'advent of the 7 standard division- 
force. Thus on the strategic level the regular forces came to reflect the 
strategy evolved by the U S in Korea arid elsewhere. 

3« On the tactical level the Vietnamese forces also came to re- 
flect standard U S doctrine --with one possible exception, that of "paci- 
fication o" 

Thus the tactical doctrine which will probably emerge from the 
present /l956/ reorganization and training period will most likely 



# •* 



TOP-SECRET - Sensitive 
2k 



■ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



£t 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



reflect past., relatively small-unit, infantry-type operations under 
the French; the inherently mobile infantry nature of the present 
forces influenced by increased firepower; a capability for coor- 
dinated operations up to division and eventually corps level; and 
increased service and logistical support for the essentially . 
infantry-type forces Mobility and increased infantry firepower 
will dictate the utilization of essentially infantry tactics o. o 
The VNA /will/ adopt a highly mobile tactical doctrine character- 
ized by extensive movement and maneuvering of the main body with 
extensive mining and ambuscades, irj / 

The preponderant evidence gleaned from ARVN experience against the Viet Cong 
supports the hypothesis that ARVN tactics, influenced by the factors listed 
above, rapidly evolved toward relatively large-scale operations, heavily 
reliant on increased prepower including artillery and air support, and away 
from "relatively small-unit, infantry-type operations," again reflecting 
UoSo practice, if not U.So doctrine, in countering large-scale aggression. 

The concept and tactics of the pacification mission, unlike those 
of countering aggression, required particular concentration on specialized 
methods of dealing with the local populace as well as countering insurgents. 
Thus the Saigon Military Mission reported that as a result of its teaching 
efforts, . - 

Troops were courteous, they had constructed a school and were 
holding classes for both children and adults with Army volunteers 
as teachers, they had helped rebuild the marketplace and church, 
they carried out active patrolling, and they had placed locked 
boxes to receive information and suggestions from the population,, 
People responded to the treatment. In a few days they started 
being friendly with the troops (something usually reserved for 
Communist troops in Asian countries) and, after a Viet Minh 
hand-grenade attack on the marketplace, information about names 
and locations of the Viet Minh cadres started to flow to the 
Army from the people 118/ 

In spite of this apparent good start, MAAG Country Statements from 1955 to 
1959 a ^e silent on the subject of training for pacification, although 
National Security Action, as pacification was then called, was actually 
underway c This is a reasonably good indication of how important this set of 
concepts and tactics was regarded by MAAG officers. I Iff/ In fact, quite 
the opposite was the case: MAAG reports constantly complained of the diver- 
sion of the Vietnamese Army from unit training to pacification, without 
suggesting that specialized training in the tactics of this mission might 
be useful o I'jtf/ The clear inference is that the orthodoxy of UoS tactical 



doctrine prevailed • m ^s 

k. The organization of the defense establishment in general re- 
flected the UoSc practices insofar as it was feasible to persuade the Diem 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



25 



So 



. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET ~ Sensitive 



government to adopt them. Igt'/ Available evidence indicates that the standard 
ARVN division of 1959 was patterned after the 1956 U.S. Army division- 
reduced in scale , and without organic armor, aviation, and band. 

Each ARVN standard division had 10,^50 tf' ien organized in three 
regiments, each of which was capable of independent action and could be 
broken into company-size task forces c Each division had two artillery 
battalions equipped with towed 105 'mm howitzers and k.2" mortars, one 
engineer battalion, and technical and logistics support companies The 
seven divisions were formed into two Corps. There were also four armor 
battalions, one airborne brigade, one marine group, one air force fighter- 
bomber squadron, two C-Vf transport squadrons, two light aircraft observa- 
tion squadrons, and one squadron of helicopters . 3-27^/ 

In 196h Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams (Chief MAAG 
: Vietnam 1955~6o) during the course of an interview was asked whether MAAG 
had created the Vietnamese Division in the image of the American Division. 
His vehement denial included the statement that "Actually, there was little 
similarity between the South Vietnamese division in existence then flS59j 
or now 'f^9Q\J "." 12z/ However, an examination of the following table and 
figures indicates that there were more similarities than differences in the 
overall structure of the two organizations All of the technical services 
were to be found in the 1959 ARVN Division, although at somewhat reduced 
strength in some cases . Division artillery was 50 percent heavier in the 
UcSo Division and was concentrated in 105 mm howitzer battalions with some 
155 mm, 8-inch and 763 mm weapons. The ARVN Division had a k. 2-inch 
mortar battalion in addition to the 105 mm battalion. Maneuver units, 
the regiments of the U.S. and ARVN Division, were about equal in strength. 
Both regiments contained a mortar company. There were more regiments in 
the U.S. Division (5) as opposed to ARVN T s 3, and the U.S. regiments were 
divided into rifle companies (k per regiment). In the ARVN Division there 
was an intermediate battalion echelon. In this respect the 1959 ARVN 
Division more closely resembled the J-HR Regiment of the U.S. Army 7R 
Division (l955)» This regiment type was heavier than both the ROC ID 7-111 
Infantry Regiment and the ARVN 1959 Regiment and was evidently capable of 
more sustained operations, since it had organic support units attached to 
it including a company of tanks. A similar regiment (7-11R) without the 
technical support units was supposed to provide the division with the flex- 
ibility to conduct operation with task forces of any size, a stated goal 
of the authors of the ARVN Divisional reorganization. !£:?•/ Thus, while the 
mirror image accusation is not entirely correct, neither is the denial that 
there were no similarities between the U.S. and ARVN Division The evi- 
dence available suggests that clearly the blueprint for the 1959 ARVN 
Division reorganization was to be found in the T0E T s of the U.S. Army. 

5. Manpower policies in Vietnam in the late 195^ : s resulted in 
allocation of the best personnel to the Vietnamese Armed Forces. 



TOP S ECRET - Sensitive 
26 



00 



no 



CO 

K 
O 

! 

CO 
CD 



< 



COMPARISON OF U.S. 7.T ROCID INFANTRY DIVISION (1956) AND 

ARVN STANDARD DIVISION (1959) (U) 



Iten or Unit 



Division Total Strength 

Div Hq 6c Hq Co 
Tank Bn 
Arm'd Car Bn. 
Engineer Combat Bn 
Signal 

Division Arty 

• 105 mm How Bn 
4.2" Mortar Bn 

Infantry Regiment 

Hq 6c Hq Spt Co 

Rifle Co 

Heavy Mort 81 mm 

Hq & Hq Det & Band 

Quartermaster Company 

Medical 

Ordnance 

Combat Aviation Co 

Administrative Service Co 

Transportation 



a. 



U.S. 7T ROCID Inf Div 1956 



Have 



Yes 



No 



x 

X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 



X 
X 
X 

X 

X 
X 

X 
X 
.X 
X 
X 



X 



Strength 



13,748 

292 

.1 763 

669 

791 

Bn 525 

1,763 

897 






7,135 

1,550 

4,860 

725 

70 

194 

Bn-302 

Bn-327 

223 

162 

Bn 532 



ARVN 1959 Inf Div 



Have 



Yes 



x 



X 

X 

X 

X 



No 



X 
X 



X 
X 
X 



X 
X 
X 



X 



X 



X 
X 



Strength 



11,076 



186 



466 

Co 164 

• 976 

420 

551 

7,353 
a 
a 
a 



65 

Co 151 
Co 114 



Co THJo c: - v 



Not known. 
[Source: Infantry Reference Data, 1958 (U) ; Weekly Intelligence Digest, PAC0M, 3-28-58, p. 15" (S)] 



J h3 

O 

to 

o 

£J 

1-3 

! 

CO 

CD 
i — i 
i— • 

CO 

H- 
c+ 

< 



z 




2; 




9 


a 


^0 




^^ 




oje 


r/i 


o 




r» 


b 


g 




3 

cr 


2 




tn 




X 


Z 


a> 


Z 




9 


i— f 


o 


< 

IT) 


oj 




U) 


o 


^— i 


i 


0> 


D. 


■ 


(U 




-1 


Z 




1 ^ 


as 





00 







£> 




f-f 


c ; 


• • 


D 


to 


U-> 


o 


OJ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



27 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



• 



X 

. X 





• — «• 
. .-, — 




Q < 




~- o 

• — ^_ 



CD 




r^ 


r. 


• -- 4.. 


o 

6 






•*— 


«- O 


-*.- 


cp u 


D 


r* 


a."} 


LU 





o 

lis 

i u 




/• ~+ 




IS) 

z 

< 

Y- 




o 

> 



Q 




o 




• »- 


C 


.Ju- 





a 


■4- 


• 


V- 




c t 





a 


-• - 


kT% 


u 


f. 


l' 1 


o 




V-. 




Y- 









x 



J 



£ 






GO <j 



.T 



O 



X 



\ 



N 



- co ; 

4 - » 

a ; 

° 

• a i 
u ! 

• c* . 
p . 



< * ^ 



§'j 

-E I 



< .i 



O 
i — I 



CD 

E 

CD 
O 

CD 

o 

CD 

CV! 



o 
o 

DC 



r- 



O 



"> 






cr 



on 

* 

!Z> 



" ' 



■• 



..28 



TOPSECR ET - Sensiti ve 



» • 









»-3 

o 

CO 

o 



I 

CO 
fD 

to 

< 

CD 



Pioneer 
Battalion 



nf entry Division 



492 




HQ & HQ 
Company 



Ordnance 
Company 



?,958 



Transportation 

Company 



Reconnaissance 
Company 



Quartermaster 

• Company 




i \ 



Arti t ,ery 
Division 




!05-mm 
Hov. ifzer Battalion 
( Howitzers 12 ) 



4.2" Mortar 

Battalion 
( 2/ Mortars ) 



•PRINCIPAL WEAPONS AND VEHICLES 



.J n*ies 



Source 



Study on Ai 



m y Aspects pf r h e M I ! I ta ry 



Ass« 



c t r. n 



:e 



F;c 



Ofi ■::■'■ 



rs \/:,~.f 






3 V : 2 carbines 
652 bsr : 

* 13 rv;c' ineauns. ca! .30 



An..y Command end Gener-.;l Staff 

College, 1 June >960 (S) - 



o « 



* rocKet launchers, o.o 
56 «ecoI!!#ss rifles, 57— n n 



72 mortars, 60-mm 

72 moi tors , 3 1 -mm 

27 mortars, 4.2V 

1 2 hov, I tzers , 1 05-mm to v. e d 

3)5 truck, 1, 4 ton 

442 truck, 3/4 ton 

fej truck", J / ton 



[1-3 
O 

CO 

53 



1-3 

1 

o: 

H 
c* 
H 

<s 

CD 



/ 



/ 



/ 



- .'.--•ARVN Reorganized Infantry Division, 1959 

(standard ARVN division) 






a a 

y & 

,o ET 

o — 

c °- 

R m 

U) o 

? §■ 

<3 ON 

rj go 

a S 

B o 

to u> 

o uj 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



1 

.TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Rational direction of manpower was not proposed by American 
advisors and would have lain "beyond the capacity for organiza- 
tion of the RVN Government; all young professional graduates 
were enlisted into the army, which then controlled most of the 
manpower to do the jobs and had to be allowed to make good the 
civilian shortcomings engendered by conscription. 12$/ 









• 



This insatiable requirement for the "best" men to build up the officer corps 
was in part a reflection of the requirements of the South Vietnamese social 
structure; in any event, it was much closer to the conventional U S o view of 
an officer corps than to the view of llo Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, and 
reflected the view that well-schooled men are required to manage complex 
modern armies 

^° The equipment provided the Vietnamese regular forces was more 
suited to countering aggression from the North than to preserving internal 
security in the South While ARVN were not equipped as heavily as those 
of the UeS.--they had no tracked vehicles (tanks or personnel carriers), 
fewer trucks, and generally lighter weapons --727 trucks, 660 trailers— 
to make them mechanized and road -bound .. Armor was provided, but was not 
organic to the standard division . 



e • o 



U.So military aid was programmed in more or less the same 
fashion as for countries like Turkey and Korea, where guer- 
rillas were not a threat . The Vietnamese armed forces not 
only were equipped with tanks, planes, artillery and similar 
hardware that was relatively little value against guerrrillas 
as the French had discovered so painfully and the Pentagon 
apparently had not noticed „ They were also trained to depend 
on that kind of big bang support in battle, reducing both 
their capability and their psychological willingness to get 
out and fight the guerrillas the only way that works: with 
rifles, close in. 12>g/ 

7« That the training of the Vietnamese armed forces was conducted 
along U0S0 lines has been documented above « Between 1950 and 1959* 

(1) 3.>296 Vietnamese military personnel had received training 
in military facilities in the United States, while 7^7 had 
been trained in other Free Vforld military schools . 12 : 4j 

■ 

(2) Training films, manuals and lesson plans were those 
used by the UcS, military adapted to Vietnamese culture and 
environment . lg? 

(3) The U.S. was particularly proud of its accomplishments in 
the training of armed forces in Korea, where a large conven- 
tionally organized force had proven itself in the combat 
recently experienced there. iXfj 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

■ ' - " „ - 1 . . ~- ■ . • 

30 







10 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



.TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






These factors, then- -the dual mission, strategy, tactics, 
organization, manpower policy, equipment, and training- -all directly contri 
buted to the formation of a Vietnamese military establishment, and in parti 
cular to an ARW, that in i960 bore overall resemblance to the UoS. 
military establishment and particularly close resemblance to the U S Army* 
Unfortunately, events since i960 have demonstrated that the ARVN was not 
well-suited to countering the internal security threat; its efficacy 
against overt aggression still remains to be tested. 



r 



f . 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



. 



31 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



c ri 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



IV. C. 



FOOTNOTES 






••■Report of the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), August 195 1 *- 
August 1955 (S). 

2 JCS telegram to CINCPAC 97^802, 30 March i960; JCSM-90-6-60, 
15 September i960. Cf., Duneanson, Dennis J. } Government and Revolution 
in Vietnam , 196S, pp. 290-305. 

J. Law ton Collins, Special Representative of the United States in 
Vietnam, "Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council," January 20, 
1955 (TS). See also NSC documents throughout the period 1950-1960 which 
are consistent with this statement of objectives and consequences. 

A 

The key to th is problem [the Indochina war] is a strong and effective 
Nationalist army with the support of t he Populace behind it ." Debriefing, 
M/General Thomas J. H. Trapnell, Jr., 3 May 1954, in 0SD files 092/092.2 
Indochina. U.S. decisionmakers seemed to agree virtually unanimously with 
this statement. 

In April 1953 CHMAAG General Trapnell reported that French observers 
had returned from Korea with little but a list of reasons why U.S. training 
procedures could not be effectively applied in Indochina. Msg, CHMAAG 
Indochina to AC of S G-3 and CINFE, MG619A, DA-IN-257701 , 15 April 53. 
Although the minutes of the Bipartite U.S. -French Conversations (First 
Session, April 22, 1953, 3:30 p.m., Quai d'Orsay) reported that "The 
French missions which have been received in Korea were very useful. 
Marshall Juin himself ha§ brought back information the French propose to 
use in the formation of the Vietnam army," the qualifiers added, even at 
this high diplomatic level ("But the problem is not the same in Indochina 
as in Korea. The problems facing the two armies are not comparable, but 
some lessons can be applied") lend weight to the Trapnell Interpretation 
that the French visits to Korea had been largely a waste of time (S). 

This plan, outlined to then Charge d'Affaires Gullion, was dismissed 
as "fantastic," although it was seen that this Vietnamese attitude raised 
serious -problems . Msg, Gullion to Acheson, 204, 25 March 1950 (S). History 
of the Indoch ina Inciden t, Historical Section, JCS. Series B, 1 February 
1955 (TS). (Hereinafter referred to as JCS History.) In May 1954, Ngo Dinh 
Luyen, Bao Dai's personal representative, told Philip W, Bonsai that Bao Dai 
seeks U.S. help for the National Army. Memcon, May 18 and 20, 1954 (TS), 
OSD- Files 1954. 

Memorandum for SECDEF from Service Secretaries, "Draft State Department 

Statement on Indochina, dated 27 March 1952," 8 April 1952 (TS). 
g 

Memorandum for Record, "Meeting of President's Special Committee on 
Indochina, 29 January 1954," 30 January 1954 (TS). 



32 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



*2 - ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive 






9 ' 
Report by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Assistant to the Secretary for . 

International Security Affairs.../' ND, End to (TS) Memorandum, Acting 

SECDEF to Service Secretaries, "Forty Additional Vietnam Battalions," 

19 February 1953. 

°JCS History. 

11~ 

Msg, CHMAAG 1C to CSUSA, MG 1651, DA, 091515Z June 54, DA-IN-64188 

(9 June 1954) (S). 

12 

Msg, Murphy to AmEmb (Paris)", TOSEC 392, 10 June 1954 (TS). 



" 13 • 

Msg, SECSTATE to Amb (Paris), 4551, TEDUL 191, 12 June 1954 (TS). 

14 

JCS History. 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Suspension of U.S. Military Aid 
to Indochina in Event of a Cease Fire," April 30, 1954; Memorandum from 
SECDEF to Service Secretaries and JCS, July 30, 1954. 

Msg, CHMAAG Indochina to DEPTAR, Mg 2062A, 271130Z July 1954, 
DA-IN-74737, (TS). JCS History . Although interpretations of the Geneva 
'■.•■• Agreements with regard to ceilings as they applied to U.S. military forces 
• varied, the Department of State interpreted the agreement as fixing the 
number of forces at or below the level existing on 11 August 1954. 

17 JCS His tory. 

1 o 

Memorandum for SECDEF, "U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities 
in Indochina," 4 August 1954 (S) . 

19 

Letter, SECDEF to SECSTATE, 12 August 1954 (S), 

" 20 

Memorandum SECSTATE to SECDEF, 18 August 1954 (S). JCS His tory . 

21 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "U.S Assumption of Training 

Responsibilities in Indochina," 22 September 1954 (TS) . 

"""'" 22 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Retention and Development of Forces 

in Vietnam," 22 September 1954 (TS). 

- 23 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Retention and Development of Forces 

in Indochina," 22 September 1954 (TS)., 

24 

Memorandum, SECSTATE to SECDEF, October 11, 1954 (TS). 

" 25 

Memorandum, SECDEF from JCS, "Development and Training of Indigenous 

Forces in Indochina," 19 October 1954 (TS) . 

Msg, SECSTATE to AmEmb (Saigon) 1679, 22 October 1954 (TS). 

27 

Memorandum, -SECDEF to JCS, 26 October 1954 (TS). 



oo TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



.n 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 






TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



954 (TS) % 






' 28 lrr . • 

With reference to the question of training Vietnamese forces the 

Joint Chiefs 1 of Staff desire to point out that in addition to the curren t- 
unstable political situation in Vietnam the terms of the Geneva Armistice 
Agreement have been interpreted to limit t he strength" of MAA G, Indochina 
to 342 personnel. Even if all these military personnel were replaced by U.S. 
civilians to perform the normal functions of the MAAG and the military personnel 
were thereby released for training duties only, the number of U.S. personnel 
would permit_miT y limited participa tion^ in the over- all training program . 
Under these conditions, U.S. participation in training not only would probably 
nave but jj.mi.ted beneficial effect but also would assu re res po nsibility for any 
failure o f the prog ram." (Italics added). Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, 
"Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina," 19 October 19 

29 

James M. Gavin, Crisis Now, p. 49. 
3 . , 

Memorandum to SECDEF from JCS, "Indochina," 17 November 1954 (TS). 

31 - 
NSC Record of Action 131b, 27 January 1955 (TS). JCS History. 

Memorandum, SECDEF . to Service Secretaries and JCS, "Report on Vietnam 

. for the NSC," 3 February 1955 (TS). 

32 - - 

NIE 63-7-54, 23 November 1954 (S). Excluded from this estimate 

are those Ho a Hao forces under the control of the VNA or the French. 

33 

Report to SECSTATE by J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative in 

Vietnam, January 20., 1955 (TS) . 

34 

Discussions with a member of US MAAG in 1954-1955 period (U) . 

35 „ 

. . . thq government by force and bribery has drastically reduced the 

importance of these groups to challenge its authority." NIE 63.1-3-55, 
11 October 1955. ."All significant sect resistance in South Vietnam has 
been eliminated " NIE 63-56, 17 July 1956. (S). 

36 

NIE 63-5-54, 3 August 1954. (S). 

37 tt -A 
Ibid . 

NIE 63-7-54, 23 November 1954 (S) . * 

39 

In fact, many estimates failed to make any distinction between 

northern and southern forces. See MAAG Narrative Statement dated August 23, 

1958 (S), which estimated "Viet Cong strength in North Vietnam" at 268,000. 

40 

For particularly detailed estimates of Viet Minh organization in 

South Vietnam, see Department of State documents, "The Communist Subversive 

Threat in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos," DR/SP 57.1, December 29, 1955 (S); 

and "The Communist Subversive Threat to the SEATO Treaty Areas, II. The 

Subversive Threat in South Vietnam," DRF SP-62, October 24, 1956 (S) • 

NIE 91, 4 June 1953 (S). 

42 

NIE 63-7-54, 23 November 1954 (S) . 

43 

NIE 63.1-2-55, 26 April 1955 (TS). 

44 

NIE 63-5-54, 3 August 1954 (Italics added) (S). 



3k 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



% 






.» - ' * ■ 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



° ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



<v 



45 

NIE 63-7-54, 23 November 1954 (S). 

46 

Minutes of Meeting between President Diem and Deputy Secretary Quarles, 

10 May 1957, 15 May 1957 (S) . 

47 

Memorandum for SECDEF, "U.S. Policy in the Event of a Reversal of 

Aggression in Vietnam," 9 September 1955 (TS). 

48 

NIE 14.3/53-61, 15 August 1961 (S). 

49 

I Memorandum, SECSTATE to SECDEF, October 11, 1954 (TS) . 

See Note 27 above. 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Development of Defense Information 

Relating to Certain U.S. Aid Programs (Vietnam)," 13 April 1956 (TS). 

52 - - t--.- 

See, for example, W. W. Kaufmann, Th e Mc Na ma r a . __S t r ategX , esp. Chapter I 

53 

Memo for SECDEF from JCS, "Studies with Respect to Possible U.S. 

Action Regarding Indochina," 26 May 1954 (TS) . 

. Memorandum for SECDEF from the JCS, "Concept and Plans for the 
" . Implementation, If Necessary, of Article IV, 1, of the Manila Pact," 

_ 11 February 1955 (TS) ,. paragraphs 6 and 7. _. 

Ibid . , paragraphs 6-9. 

5 Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, Military Consultation under 
the Southwest Asia Collective Defense Treaty," 8 October 1954 (TS) . 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Concept and Plans for the 
Implementation, If Necessary, of Article IV, 1, of the Manila Pact," 

11 February 1955 (TS) . 

« 58 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Development and Training of 

Indigenous Forces in Indochina," 19 October 1954 (TS) . 

59 TK .. 
Ibid . 

NSC 5612/1, September 5, 1956 (TS). "The NSC at its meeting on 7 June 
1956 b. Noted that the President f s .view' that it would be desirable for 
appropriate U.S. military authorities: (1) to encourage Vietnamese military 
planning for defense against external aggression along lines consistent with 
U.S. planning concepts based upon U.S. policy." Memorandum for Service 
Secretaries and JCS, from ASD(ISA) "Capability to Deal with Local Aggression 
in Vietnam," no date (TS) . "Limited initial resistance" was subsequently 
defined as "resistance to Communist aggression by defending or deploying 
in such in such manner as to preserve and maintain the integrity of the 
government and its armed forces for the period of time required to invoke 
the UN Charter. and/or Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or - the 
period of time required for the U.S. Government to determine that considera- 
tions of national security require unilateral U.S. assistance and to commit 
U.S. or collective security forces...." Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, 
"U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia," 21 December 1956 (TS). 



! 35 TOP S ECRET - Sensitive 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



% 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 









'- 



. _».- . 



61 

From December 1955 on,- MAAG reports either implicitly or explicitly 

assigned the counter-aggression mission to the Vietnamese Army. In December 
•1955 the MAAG reported that the VNA would have the capability to delay a 
•Viet Minh attack across the 17th parallel for 60 days following a year's 
^concentrated training of a 10-division force. MAAG Country Statement for 

1955, December 1955 (S) . 

62 * 
SNIE 63-6-54, 15 September 1954 (S) . 

63 - 

CX. particularly "Report of the SMM August 1954-August 1955 (S) . 
By April 1956, NIE 63.1-2-55 (TS) reported that "French policy is openly ' 

committed to the replacement of Diem at the earliest possible opportunity " 

Although U.S. policy toward Diem was variable, French policy, however 
negative, seemed to enjoy the virtue of consistency. 
64, 

NIE 63.1-2-55, 26 April 1955 (TS). 
65 

Ely, General D'Arme'e Paul, Memoires , L'lndochine Dans La Tourmente , 

Chapters XI and XII. 

66 * 

Msg, Heath to SECSTATE, 1761, 8 November 1954 (S) ; Msg, Collins sgd 

Kidder to SECSTATE, 1830, 15 November 1954, DA-IN-99015 (16 November) (TS) . 
JCS History. ' 

Msg, ROA Washington sgd Stassen to USAMB Paris, USAMB Saigon, USFOIO 
263, 24 November 1954 (C). JCS H istory . ' 



Msg, Dillon to SECSTATE, 2433, 8 December 1954 (TS) . JCSJjistory. 



68 

^ 9 NIE 63.1-3-55, 11 October 1955 (S). 
7 °JCS History . 

71 NIE 63.1-3-55, 11 October 1955 (S) . 

72 

New York T imes , May 12, 1955. 

73 

Denis Warner, The Last Confucian, pp. 107-108. 

74 

Matthew B. Ridgway, The. Korean War, p 

75 NIE 63-7-54, 23 November 1954 (S) . 



191. 



Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, ''Retention and Development of 
Forces in Indochina," 22 September 1954 (TS). 

77 Msg, Collins sgd Kidder to SECSTATE, 1830, 15 November 1954, 
DA-IN-99015, (16 November) (TS), JCS History. 

Ibid. 



79 



Ibid. 



80 Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Indochina," 17 November 1954 (TS) 

81 Report to SECSTATE from J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative 
in Vietnam, "Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council," 
January 20, 1955 (TS) . The above is from "Supplement to the Report on 
Vietnam by Gen. J. Lawton Collins," (S) . 



c 



36 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



97 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



on 

TRIM Briefing, in "Report of Visit of Lt . General Bruce C. Clarke, 
Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific to Western Pacific and Southeast 
Asia, 6-29 September 1955," (S) . JCS History, 

o o 

The theme of diversion of the VNA from training by combat runs 
throughout the period. The reduction of French participation in TRIM 
is revealed by the following table: TRIM Officer Strengths, March 1955- 
March 1956 [Source: "Study on Army Aspects of the Military Assistance 
Program in Vietnam," U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1 June 
I960, (S)] . 

U.S. Officers French Officers 



3/55 


68 


209 


5/55 


121 


225 


7/55 


124 


108 


9/55 


125 


66 


11/55 


142 


58 


1/56 


149 


53 


3/56 


189 






----- 

f Msg, CHMAAG Indochina to CINCPAC, 091330Z, August 1955 (TS) . 
JCS His tory . .. . .„__-.-■.-—- 

O C 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Revised Force Base for Vietnam," 
19 August 1955 (TS). In his memorandum of 29 July 1955 to the JCS requesting 
JCS evaluation of the 150,000 force basis, Actg ASD(ISA) questioned the 
inclusion of the mission "to check external aggression," insisting that 
circumstances if it is to be acceptable to U.S. Government authorities." (TS) 
Subsequent D0D approval of this force level constituted, in effect, approval 
of the counter-aggression mission. 

JCS History. * • • 

87 

Actual Strengths of Vietnamese forces was as follows: [Source: 

"Study on Army Aspects...," U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 
1 June 1960, p. C-5 (S)] . 

Army Navy Air Force 

3,500 
3,400 
3,500 
3,500 
4,600 
4,800 



1/55 


170,000 


1,500 


1/56 


152,000 


4,200 


1/57 


138,600 


4,900 


1/58 


131,500 


4,900 


1/59 


135,500 


5,000 


12/59 


132,000 


5,200 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



37 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



72 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



88 

Large excesses of equipment in Vietnam resulted from the decrease 

in numbers of both the FEC and the VNA; the VNA were totally incapable of 

assuming logistical responsibility, and the withdrawal of the FEC resulted 

in the dumping of mountains of equipment on the Vietnamese; further, the 

French were confronted with a deteriorating situation in North Africa and 

were concerned with salvaging the best equipment for their own use and 

refused to allow U.S. personnel into their installations and supply dumps 

to inventory both the qualitative and quantitative status of inventory. 

["Study on Army Aspects...," U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 

1 June 1960, pp. D-6 - D-8. (S)] . 

89 

Msg, CHMAAG Indochina to CNA, MG125A 100810A February 1955, 

DA-IN-117629 (S). JCS History. 

. 90 

Memorandum for 'SECDEF, "Raising U.S. Military Personnel Ceiling 

of MAAG Vietnam," 9 December 1955 (S). 

91 

Letter, SECDEF to SECSTATE, 13 December 1956 (S). 

92 

Memorandum for SECDEF from ASD(ISA), 25 January 1956; letter, 

SECDEF to SECSTATE, January 31, 1956 (S) . 



93 

See letter from Deputy Under Secretary of State to SECDEF dated 

1 May 1956 (S) which details restrictions on TERM as well as summarizing 

State Department views regarding TERM. 

• 94 

TERM per se was disbanded and its personnel assigned to MAAG in 

1960. By some TERM was labelled a "subterfuge" from the military point 

of view (see "Study on Army Aspects..." pp. D-1FF); that it was probably 

also a useful subterfuge 'from an intelligence point of view is revealed 

by Allen W. Dulles' strong endorsement of SECDEF ' s desire to augment MAG 

Vietnam, which concludes his statement regarding the need for additional 

CIA slots under military cover in Vietnam. Memorandum for SECSTATE from 

Director, CIA, 16 December 1955 (S). 

JCS .Histor y . 

.96 * . - 

MAAG Country Statement for Vietnam and Laos as of 31 December 1955 

f (S). Italics added. 

97 

viz.. MAAG statements: "Permanent reorganization. . .along U.S. lines 

and associated regroupment is not yet complete" (31 December 1955); 

"Continuing reorganization and regroupment ... along U.S. lines The 

reorganization and realignment of the logistical base upon U.S. lines has 
been slow...." (30 June 1956); "While continuing reorganization and training 
along U.S. lines...." (12 December 1956); "Reorganization of the Vietnamese 
Army along U.S. lines is progressing but is not yet complete...." (30 June 
1957); "Reorganization of the Vietnamese Army along U.S. lines is progressing 
but is not yet complete T0E f s and TD's for ARVN units have been pre- 
pared by MAAG and forwarded to ARVN for review." (31 December 1957); "Most 
of the desirable elements of the United States system, as they apply to the 
Vietnamese Armed Forces, will eventually be reflected in the procedures used by 
Army." (24 August 1958); "The training being conducted is generally along -U.S. 
lines " (25 November 195S ~~< r31"March 1959). (All S). 

■ 

- 

TOP SECRET - Sensitive 
38 . ' 



?f 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 



1 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



98 

MAAG Vietnam Narrative Statement, November 1958, revised to include 

all changes through 31 March 1959 (S) . Apparently the NVA was excluded 

from this comparison. 

99 ' 

"Preferably, two U.S. advisory personnel should be assigned to each 

battalion size unit." MAAG Country Statement, 30 June 1956 (S). Authorized 
Advisor positions were as follows: ( 

AUTHORIZED NUMBER OF ADVISORS, AUTHORIZED STRENGTH PER UNIT 
[ Sour c e : Research Analysis Corporation, Cost Analys is of Counteri nsurgency 
Land_ Combat O perations: Vietnam , 1957-1964 (U) Volume II, Appendix G, 
pp. 210-211, August 1967 (S)] 

• 

1956 1957 1958 1959 . 1960 1961 

Corps - 5(5) 10(5) 15(5) 15(5) 100(33) 

Division 30(3) 30(3) 30(3) 35(5) 35(5). 35(4) 

Regiment 35(1) 35(1) 31(1) 26(1) 26(1) 29( 1) 

Battalion - - - - - 672 ( 7) 

Abn Brigade 1(1) 1(1) ' 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 4(4) 

Ranger Co. - 7(7) 7(7) 18(.5) 

Schools and Tng Centers 26(6) 26(6) 26(6) 22(6) 22(6) 42(3) 

Sectors - ' - - 39( 1) 



Total 92(11) 97(16) 98(16) 106(25) 106(25) 939 (53.5) 

Available information does not permit accounting for the balance of MAAG strengtl 
for any of the years considered. According to RAC, "There are no data available 
on the actual number of U.S. Army advisors in the RVN before 30 November 1961." 

100 MAAG Vietnam Narrative Statement, November 1958, revised to include 

all changes through November 1959 (S). 

10L., • 

Ibid. . - • ■ . 

102 "The fact that the army marched, as it were, on its Counterpart 
Fund did not' secure its exclusion from politics after all, therefore, 
and in the end the army killed Ngo Dinh Diem when the U.S. suspended the 
CIP in order to bring him to his senses." Duncanson, op.cit. , p. 293. 

' 103 "... discipline was affected by distaste to inflict punishment on 
the slack or insubordinate and, with that, loss of face, so that such 
misdemeanors as absence without leave (outright desertion was race) and 
neglect to carry out operational orders became very common." Ibid., p. 290. 

104 Memorandura, Dr. Edward W. Wcidner to Mr. Leland Barrows, USCM, 
"Recommendation for American and Vietnamese Action Re Civil Security, 
October 11, 1955. ' • 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 

39 • : : 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



(00 ' TOP SECRET. - Sensitive 



* 



105 

THE 63-56 (S). 

MAAG Country Statement for Vietnam as of 31 December 1956, pp. 12 -and 18 
(S). 

MAAG Vietnam Country Statement for Vietnam as of 31 December 1957 (S), 
p. 16. ( 

■jAO * 

"Report on the Proposed Organization of the Law Enforcement Agencies 
of the RVN," MSU Police Advisory Staff, Saigon, Vietnam, April 1956. 

Despatch, Saigon to State 276, 4 January 1960 (S) . . 

«- • - « • 

110 ' 

Despatch, Saigon to State, 400, 29 May 1959 (S). JCS History. 

The best available account of the Civil Guard dispute is contained 
in John D. Montgomery, The Polit ics of F oreig n Aid , pp. 64-70. 

112 

PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 30-58 (S); 

113 

""Page C-22. " 

114 "■"•-.■ 

Duncanson, £p_. cit . , p. 305. 

Speaking in 1954, President Eisenhower gave eloquent testimony 
. to this type of reasoning: "If you could win a big one, you would certainly 
win a little one." (Quoted in Kaufmann, o£. cit. , p. 25). 

PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest, 18 May 1956 (S), p. 16. 
Ibid., p. 17. 

118 Report of the SMM, August 1954-August 1955 (S) . This Mission, 
headed by then Colonel Edward Lansdale, USAF, was particularly concerned . 
with unorthodox methods of combatting the Communists. Colonel Lansdale 
subsequently served as a member of TRIM under f Daniel, but his activities 
were specialized. 

* » . - . . • 

119 " 

e.g., "Tactical unit personnel and equipment have been employed on 

numerous occasions in the government's agricultural larid development program, 

civilian relocation and resettlement program and in pacification and security 

missions. Such operations reduce the effectiveness of formal training 

programs.... The Civil Guard should eventually assume complete responsibility 

for internal security of the nation." MAAG Narrative Statement, November 1958 (S) 3 

revised to include changes through 31 March 1959 (S). 

120 

Consider, for example, not only U.S. efforts to establish clear lines 

of authority from the. GVN to its armed forces, but also that no discussion has 

been found in the available data pertaining to the desirability of a complete 

tri-service establishment, complete with a Marine Corps. 

121 

Army In forma t ion D ig e s 1 3 November 1960, pp. 36-37. 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



I'Ql ' TOP SECRET - Sensitive 



122,r Why U.S. is Losing in Vietnam/ 1 U.S. N evzs and World Report, 
November 9, 1964, p. 64. 
123 



"The Practical Demands of MAAG," Lt . General Samuel T. Williams, 
! L Military Review , Vol. 41, No. 7, July 1961, p. 7. 

124 

Duncanson, o£. cit . , p. 293. 

1 2S " ( 

John Mecklin, Mission in Torment, p. 12. 

1 2 Cost Analy sis of _ Counterinsurgency Land Com bat O perations: Vietnam 
1957-19 64 (U), Research Analysis Corporation, RAC 7D-232, August 196/. 
Vol. II, pp. 54-56. * 

127,, 

"The Armored School South Vietnam, " Armor, January-February 1958, 

pp. 42-43; also MAAG Country Statement for Vietnam and Laos as of 
31 December 1955, p. 23 (S) . 

128 fI 

; I ( "For some reason," wrote General Samuel T. Williams," many advisors 

I seem more ready to assist in drawing up division and corps problems than 

r they are in building and supervising problems for the smaller unit." 
F ' Military_Rev j : ew. Vol. 41, July 1961, p. 13. 



TOP SECRET - Sensitive 
111 



j 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 




m 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



I. Unclassified Materials 



A. Books and Repo rt 



s 



Bain, Chester, Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict , Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967. 

Bator, Victor, Vietnam, a Diplomatic Trage d y: The Origins of the 
United States Inv olvement, Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs 
Ferry, New York, 1965. 

Bodord, Lucian, (trans, by Patrick ! Brien), The Quicksand "War : 
Prelude to Vietnam , Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Massa- 
chusetts, 1967. 

Buttinger, Joseph, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled: Volume I, From 
Colonialism to the Vietminh , Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 
1967. 

Buttinger, Joseph, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled: Volume II, V ietnam 
at War , Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1967. 

Chatham House Study Group, Collective Defence in Southeast A sia: 
The Manila Treaty and its Implications , Oxford University Press , 
London, 1956. 

Dune an son, Dennis J. , Government and Revolution in Vietnam , Oxford 
University Press, London, 1968. 

Ely, General D ! Armee Paul, M emoires L'lndochine Dans La Tourmente , 
Libraire Plon, Paris, 1964. 

Fall, Bernard B. , Street Without Joy: Insur genc y in Indochina, 1946- 
1963 , Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1961. 

Fall, Bernard B. , T he Two Viet-N ams : A Pol itical and Military Analysi s, 
Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1964. 

Fall, Bernard B. , Vi etnam Witness 1953 -66, Frederick A. Praeger, 
New York, 1966. 

Gavin, James C. , Crisis Now , Random House, New York, 1968. 

Ge 1 1 1 eman , Ma r v in E . , e d . , V ietnam: His tory , Documents, and O pinions 
on a Major World Crisis , Fawcett World Library, New York, 1965. • 

Gur tov , Me 1 v in , The First Vi etnam Cr isis: Ch inese ConrnunisL Strat egy 
and the United Stat e s Invo lvement 1 9 53-1954 , Col uinb i a University 
Press, New York, 1967. 



U 



/of 









' •» 









Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Halberstam, David, The Making of a Quagmi re, Random House, New York, 
1965. 

Hammer, Ellen J., The Struggle for Indochina 1940-1955 , Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, California, 1966. 

Jordan, Amos, Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia , Frederick 
A. Praeger, New York, 1962. , 

Kahin, George McTurnan, John tf. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam , 
Dial Press, New York, 1967. 

Kaufmann, W. W. , The Mc N amara Strategy , Harper and Row, New York, 
1964. " 

■ 

King, John Kerry, Southeast Asia in Perspective , MacMillan Company, 
New York, 1956. 

Lacouture, Jean, (trans, by Konrad Keller and Joel Carmichael), 
Vietnam: Between Two Truces , Vantage, New York, 1966. 

Lancaster, Donald, The Emancipation of French Indochina , Oxford 
University Press, London, 1961. 

Lindholm, Richard W. , ed., Vietnam, The Firs t Five Ye ars: An Inter- 
national Sym posium, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing 
Michigan, 1959. 

Mc Car thy , Joseph E . , Illusion of Power; American Policy Toward Vietnam 
19 54-1966 , Carlton Press, New York, 1967. 

Mecklin, John, Miss ion in Torment: An Intimate Accoun t of the U. S. 
Role in Vietnam , Doubleday and Company, Garden City, New York, 1965. 

Montgomery, John D. , The Politi cs of Foreign Ai d, Frederick A. Praeger, 
New York, 1962. 



Nguyen Cong Vien, Seekin g the Tru th ; the Inside Story of Vietnam 

After the French Defeat by a Man Who Served in Dai's Cabinet , Vantage 
Press, New York, 1966. 

Nutt, Anita Lauve, Troika on Tria l: Contr ol or Comp romise?, Vol. I, 
Defense Documentation Center, Virginia, September 1967. 

Nutt, Anita Lauve,* T roika on Trial: Control or Compr o mise.?, Vol. II , 
Defense Documentation Center, Virginia, September 1967 . 

Nutt, Anita Lauve, Troika on Trial: Control or Compromise?, Vol . J.II, 
Defense Documentation Center, Virginia, September 1967. 



s 



1. -> 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



105 






Pan, Stephen, Daniel Lyons, Vietnam Crisis , Robert Speller & Sons, 
New York, 1966. 

Raskin, Marcus G. and Bernard B. Fall, eds., The Vietnam Reorder: 
Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Vietnam 
Crisis , Random House, New York, 1965. 

Ridgway, Matthew B. , Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway; as 
told to Harold H. Martin , Harper, New York, 1956. 

Ridgway, Matthew B., The Korean War , Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 
1967. 

Salmon, Malcolm, Focus on Indo-China , Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, Hanoi, 1961. 

Scigliano, Robert, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress , Houghton 
' Mifflin, Boston, 1964. 

Scigliano, Robert, Guy H. Fox, Technical Assistance in Vietnam: The 
Michigan State University Experience , Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 
1965. 

Shaplen, Robert, The Lost Revolution: The Story of Twenty Years of 

Neglected Opportunities in Vietnam and of America's Failure to Foster 
Democracy There , Harper and Row, New York, 1955. 

Warner, Denis, The Last Confucian; Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and the 
West , Penguin, Baltimore, Maryland, 1964. 

Zagoria, Donald S., Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi , Pegasus, 
New York, 1967. 



B. Articles 

Conner, Judson, J., "Teeth for the Free World Dragon," Army Information 
J Di gest , November 1960. 

Tlarriman, W. Averill, "What Are We Doing in Southeast Asia," New York 
Times Magazine , May 27, 1962. • . . 

Myers, Samuel L. , "Building a Strong National Vietnamese Army, Free 
World Forum , May 1959. 

■ 

Noll, John V., Jr., "The Armored School South Vietnam," Armor , January- 
February, 1958. 

Stevenson, Charles S., "The Far East MAAGs : Good Investment in Security," 
Army , November 1960. 

Williams, Samuel T. , "The Practical Demands of MAAG," Mil itary Review , 
July 1961. 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



(6(o 


. | 




* 









• 






Williams, Samuel T. , "Why the U. S. is Losing in Vietnam: An Inside 
Story," U. S. News and World Report, November 9, 1964. 



C. Other 

Fo urth Semiannual Report to Congress on the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program; Message from the President of the United States , House 
Document No. 352, 82nd' Congress , 2nd Session, Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D. C. , February 1952. 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Study Mission to South - 
east Asia and the Pa cific, House Report No. 2024, 83rd Congress, 
2nd Session, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C, July 
1954. 

Mansfield, Mike, Indochina: R e port on a Study Mission to the Associated 
States of Indochina, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos , 83rd Congress, 1st Ses- 
• sion, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C, October 27, 1953. 

New York Times issues throughout the period. 

Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Public Affairs, 
United States Aid Program in Vietnam: Report to Senate Committe e 
on Foreign Relation s, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D. C. , February 26, 1960. 

Memo: Dr. Edward W. Weidner to Mr. Leland Barrows, USOM, "Recommen- 
dation for American and Vietnamese Action re.. Civil Security," 
October 11, 1955. 

"Report on the Proposed Organization of the Law Enforcement Agencies 
of the PvVN," Michigan State University Police Advisory Staff, 
Saigon, Vietnam, April 1956.. 

• (Vol. II. ) Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's 
Committee to Study the United States Military Assi stance Program , 
William H. Draper, Chairman, Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D. C, August 17, 1959. 

U. S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International Organi- 
zations: Obli ga tions and Other Commitment s, ICA, Office of Statistics 
and Reports, July 1, 1945 through June 30, 1960. 

U. S . F oreig n Assistance and Assistance from International Org a nizations: 
Obligations and Other Commitments, ICA, Office of Statistics and Re- 
ports, July 1, 1945 through June 30, 1961 (Preliminary). 

U. S. Army Infantry Reference Data, 1956. 
U. S. Army Inf antry R eference Data , 1957. 
U. S. Army Infantry Reference Data , 1958. 



V 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Tog 









II. Classified Materials 

A. National Security Council Documents 

NSC 48, June 10, 1949. (TS) 

NSC 41/1, December 23, 1949. (TS) 

NSC 64, February 27, 1950. (TS) 

* 
NSC 64/1, December 21, 1950. (TS) 

NSC 64, Progress Report, April 27, 1951. (TS) 

NSC 124, February 13, 1952. (TS) 

NSC 124/1, June 10, 1952. (TS) 

NSC 124/2, Progress Report, August 5, 1963. (TS) 

Memorandum for Defense Members, NSC Planning Board, "Draft 
Revision NSC 124/2, n December 8, 1953. (TS) 

NSC 177, December 30, 1953. (TS) 
• "Army Position on NSC Action, 11 No. 1074-a, April 1954. (TS) 
NSC Action 1074-a, April 5, 1954. (TS) 
NSC Action 1086~a,b,c, April 15, 1954. (TS) 

■ 

NSC Action 1147-b, June 4, 1954. (TS) 

NSC 5421, June 1, 1954. (TS - Special Security Precautions) 

NSC Record of Action 1316, January 27, 1955. (TS) 

NSC 5519, May 17, 1955. (TS) 

NSC 5405/5429/5, "Progress Report, " July 11, 1956. (S) 

# 

NSC 5612, Draft, August 15, 1956. (TS) 

NSC 5612/1, September 5, 1956. (TS) 

NSC 5612/1, Progress Report, November 6, 1967. (S) 

OCB Report in NSC 5809, August 12, 1959. (S) 

NSC 6012, July 25, 1960. (S) 






46 



:» 



TOE 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



B. National Intelligence Estimates 
NIE 5, December 29," 1950. (S) 
NIE 20, March 20, 1951. (S) 

NIE 35, August 7, 1951. (S) 

t 

NIE 35/1, March 3, 1952. (S) 

NIE 35/2, August 27, 1952. (S) 

NIE 47, October 31, 1952. (TS) 

« 

NIE 91, June 4, 1953. (S) 
NIE 10-2-54, March 15, 1954. (S). 

NIE 63, April 30, 1954. (S) ....'.• ' 

NIE 63-3-54, May 21, 1954. (S) 

NIE 10-3-54, June 1, 1954. (TS - Limited Distribution) 
NIE 63-4-54, June 15, 1954. (S) 
NIE 63-5-54, August 3, 1954. (S) 
• NIE 63-7-54, November 23, 1954. (S) 
NIE 10-7-54, November 23, 1954. (S) 
NIE 63.1-2-55, April 26, 1955. (TS) 
NIE 63.1-3-55, October 11, 1955. (S) 
NIE 63-56, July 17, 1956. (S) 
NIE 63.2-57, May 14, 1957. (S) 
NIE 63-59, May 26, 1959. (S) 
NIE 14.3/53-61, August 15, 1961. (S) 



C . Special Estimates and Sp e cial National Intelligence Estimates 
SE 22, March 4, 1952. (TS) • 

SE 32, October 3, 1952. (S) 



V? 



(Of 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 









SE 52, November 10, 1953. (TS) 

SE 53, December 18; 1953. (TS) 

SNIE 63-2-54, June 9, 1954. (S) 

SNIE 10-4-54, June 15, 1954. (TS- Limited Distribution) 

( 
SNIE 63-6-54, September 15, 1954. (S) 

SNIE 63.1-2/1-55, May 2, 1955. (S)' 

SNIE 63.1-4-55, September 13, 1955. (TS) 

SNIE 58-2-61, July 5, 1951. (TS - NO FORN) 



r~ 






D. State Department: Doc uments 

Documentary History of United States Policy Toward Indochina, 
1940-53, Research Project 354, April 1954, Historical Division, 
Department of State. (TS) - 

Message, Murphy to AmEmb (Paris), TOSEC 392, June 10, 1954. (TS) 

Message, SECSTATE to Amb (Paris), 4551, TEDUL 191, June 12, 1954. (TS) 

Memorandum, SECSTATE to SECDEF, August 18, 1954. (S) 

Memorandum, SECSTATE to SECDEF, October 11, 1954. (TS) 

§ 
Message, AmEmb (Saigon), from State/Defense, ' October 21, 1954, 
Draft. (TS) 

Message, SECSTATE to AmEmb (Saigon), 1679, October 22, 1954. (TS) 

Message, Heath to SECSTATE, 1761, November 8, 1954. (S) 

. Message, Collins signed Kidder to SECSTATE, 1830, November 15, 1954, 

DA-IN-99015 (November 16). (TS) ""^ 

Message, Dillon to SECSTATE, 2433, December 8, 1954. (TS) 

J. Lav7ton Collins, Special Representative of The United States in 
Vietnam, "Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council," 
• January 20, 1955 (TS) with Supplement (S). 

Department of State, INR, "The Communist Subversive Threat in Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Laos," DR/SP 57.1, December 29, 1955. (S) 

Letter, Deputy Under-Secretary of State to SECDEF, dated May 1, 1956. (S) 



HS 



(10 



I 












Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



Department of State, INR, "The Communist Subversive Threat to the 
SEATO Treaty Area, II. The Subversive Threat in South Vietnam," 
DRF SP-62, October 24, 1956. (S) 

Dispatch, Saigon to State, 400, May 29, 1959. (S) 

Dispatch, Saigon to State, 276, January 4, 1960. (S) 

Chronology on Vietnam, 1950-1965 , Research Project No. 747, Histori- 
cal Studies Division, Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State, November 1965. 



E. Defense Department Documents 

Memorandum for SECDEF from Service Secretaries, "Draft State Depart- 
ment Statement on Indochina, of March 27, 1952," April 8, 1952. (TS) 

Enclosure to Memorandum, Acting SECDEF' to Service Secretaries, "Forty 
Additional Vietnam Battalions," February 19, 1953. Report by the 
Ad Hoc Committee to the Assistant to the Secretary for International 
Security Affairs. 



Message, CINFE, MG619A, DA-IN-257701 , April 15, 1953. 



"Report of U. S. -Joint Military Mission to Indochina," July 15, 1953. 
(TS) 

"Progress Report on Military Situation in Indochina," November 19, 
1953. (TS) 

"Comments on 'Progress R.eport on Military Situation in Indochina, 1 
November 19, 1953," (Comments by Army Attache, Saigon), December 24, 
I ' 1953. (S) 

"Report of U. S. Special Mission to Indochina," February 5, 1954. (TS) 



Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Suspension of U. S. Military Aid to 
Indochina in Event of a Cease Fire," April 30, 1954. 






"Debriefing, Major General Thomas J. H. Trapnell, Jr., May 3, 1954, 
OSD File No. 092/092.2, Indochina. (TS) 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Studies with Respect to Possible 
U. S. Action Regarding Indochina," May 26, 1954. (TS) 

Message, CHMAAGIC to CSUSA, MG 165 1 DA, 0915 15Z, June 1957, 
DA-IN-64188 (June 9, 1954). (S) 

Message, CHMAAG Indochina, to DEPTAR, MG 2062A, 271130Z, July 1954, 
DA-IN-74737. (TS) 

Memorandum from SECDEF to Service Secretaries and JCS, July 30, 1954. 



/// 






. 






Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



Memorandum for SECDEF from JSC, "U. S. Assumption of Training 



I Responsibilities in Indochina, August 4, 1954. (S) 

Letter, SECDEF to SECSTATE, August 12, 1954. (S) 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, l! U. S. Assumption of Training 
Responsibilities in Indochina, 11 September 22, 1954. (TS) 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Retention and Development of 

Forces in Vietnam," September 22, 1954. (TS) 

» 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Military Consultation under the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 11 October 8, 1954. (TS) 

Memorandum, SECDEF from JCS, "Development and Training of Indigenous 
Forces in Indochina," October 19, 1954. (TS) 

Memorandum, SECDEF to JCS, October 26, 1954. (TS) 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Indochina," November 17, 1954. (TS) 

Memorandum for JCS from SECDEF, "Reconsideration U. S. Military Pro- 
grams in Southeast Asia," January 5, 1955. (TS) 

Memorandum for SECDEF, "Reconsiderations of U. S. Military Programs 
i in Southeast Asia," January 21, 1955. (TS) 

History of the Indochina Incident , Historical Section, JCS, Series B, 
February 1, 1955. (TS) 

Draft, History of the Indochina Incident ; Supplements 1-3, Series B, 
Historical Section, n.d.(TS) • . 

Message CHMAAG Indochina to CNO MG 125A 100810A, February 1955, 
DA-IW 117629. (S) 

Memorandum, SECDEF to. SERVICE SECRETARIES and JCS, "Report on Vietnam 
• . • for the NSC," February 3, 1955. (TS) 

Memorandum for SECDEF from the JCS, "Concept and Plans for the Imple- 
mentation If Necessary of Article IV, 1, of the Manila Pact," 
February 11, 1955. (TS) 

Report of the Saigon Military Mission, August 1954 - August 1955. (S) 

Memorandum for SECDEF from the JCS, "U. S. Policy in the Event of a 
Reversal of Aggression in Vietnam," September 9, 1955. (TS) 

Report of Visit of Lt. General Bruce C. Clarke, Corroanding General, 
U. S. Army Pacific to Western Pacific and Southeast Asia, 
September 6-29, 1955. (S) 

Memorandum for SECDEF, "Raising U. S. Military Personnel Ceiling of 
MAAG Vietnam," December 9, 1955. (S) 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 



HZ 












- 



Memorandum for SECDEF from ASD (ISA), January 25, 1956. (S) 

Letter, SECDEF to SECSTATE* January 31, 1956. (S) 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Development of Defense Information 
Relating to Certain U. S. AID Programs (Vietnam), 11 April 13, 1956. 
(TS) 

Letter, SECDEF to SECSTATE, December ( 13, 1956. (S) 

Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "U. S. Policy in Mainland Southeast 
Asia," December 21, 1956. (TS) 

Minutes of Meeting between President Diem and Deputy Secretary 
Quarles, May 10, 1957, May 15, 1957. (S) 

Memorandum for the Record by Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, "Pacifi- 
cation in Vietnam," July 15, 1958. (S) 

"Study on Army \spects of the Military Assistance Programs in Vietnam," 
U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, ' June 1, 1960. (S) 

Notes on U. S. Policy Toward Vietnam since 1945, OCMH, TS-62-5-3, 
May 24, 1962. (TS) 

MAAG Country Statement for Vietnam and Laos as of December 31, 1955. 
(S) 

MAAG Country Statement for Vietnam as of June 30, 1956. (S) 

MAAG Country Statement for Vietnam as of December 31, 1956. (S) 

MAAG Country Statement for Vietnam as of June 30, 1957. (S) 

MAAG Vietnam Country Statement for Vietnam as of December 31, 1957. (S) 

MAAG Vietnam Narrative Study, August 23, 1958. (S) 

MAAG Vietnam Narrative Statement, November 1958, Corrected to March 31, 
1959. (S) 

Weekly Intelligence Digest , Joint Intelligence Division, PACOM, 
April 27, 1956; January 4, 1957; July 5, 1957; March 28, 1958; 
December 9, 1960. (All Secret) 






F. Other Official Documents ■ ■ 

Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting of President's Special Committee 
on Indochina, January 29, 1954," January 30, 1954. (TS) 

"Report of Working Group of Special Committee on Indochina," 
February 6, 1954. (TS) 



SI 



'S 



n 



Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 



President's Special Committee Report, April 5, 1954. (TS) 

Memcon, May 18 and 20, 1954, OSD Files 1954. (TS) 

Message FOA Washington, signed Stassen to USAMB Paris USAMB Saigon,, 
USFOTO 263, November 24, 1954. (C) 

Memorandum for SECSTATE from Director, CIA, December 16, 1955. (S) 

( 

"Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to 
Study the United States Military Assistance Program," Volume III, 
August 17, 1959. (S) 



G. Other 



Bykerk, Norman H. , MAAG Vietnam: Manacled by Geneva (U) , Army War 
College, Pennsylvania, March 19, 1958. (S) 

Erickson, John L. , Impact of the United States Military Assistance 
Advi sory Group in Vietnam (U) , U. S. Army War College, Log No. 
61-2-54 S, Pennsylvania, February 10, 1961. (S) 

Heymont, Irving, Ronald B. Emery, John G. Phillips, Cost Analysis 
of Counterinsurgency Land-Combat Operations: Vietnam, 1957-1964 , 
Volume I, Main Body (U), Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, 
Virginia, June 1967. (S) 

Heymont, Irving, Ronald B. Emery, John G. Phillips, Cost Analysis 
of Counterinsurgency "^and-Combat Operations: Vietnam, 1957-1964 , 
Volume II, Appendixes (U) , Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, 
Virginia, August 1967. (S) 

Heymont, Irving, James W. Lash, Planning Factors for Counterinsur g ency 
Land-Combat- Operations, Based on RVN Experience, FY 1958-FY 19 64 (U), 
Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, Virginia, November 1967. (S) 

Nees, Charles M. , Th e Establishment of a United States Joint Task Force , 
Southeast Asia (U) , U. S. Army War College, Log No. 57-2-124 S, 
Pennsylvania, February 18, 1957. (S) 



. 



?2