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IV.B F.voltition of the War (26 Vols.)
Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy Commitments, 1961-
1963 (5 Vols.)
1. The Kennedy Commitments and Programs, 1961
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UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967
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VIETNAM TASK FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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IV.B.1.
EVOLUTION OF THE WAR
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TFIE KEMEDY PROCxMM AW COmTRmmS: Igjl
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IV.B.l THE KENKEDY COMt^HTMENTS Alffi PROGRAMS, I96I
SUMMRY AND AATALYSIS
When Kennedy took office, the prospect of an eventual crisis in
Vietnam had been widely recognized in the government, although nothing
much had yet "been done about it. Our Ambassador in Saigon had been
sending worried cables for a year, and twice in recent months (in
September I96O and again in December) had ended an appraisal of the
situation by cautiously raising the question of whether the U.S. would
not sooner or later have to move to replace Diem. Barely a week after
taking office, Kennedy received and approved a Counter-Insurgency Plan
(CIP) which, at what seems to have been a rather leisurely pace, had been
going through drafting and staffing for the previous eight months.
The CIP was a most modest program by the standard we have become
accustomed to in Vietnam. It offered Diem financial support for a 20,000
man increase in his army, which then stood at 150,000; plus support for
about half of the counter-guerrilla auxiliary force known as the Civil
Guard. In return, it asked Diem for a number of reforms which appeared
to the American side as merely common sense -- such as straightening out
command arrangements for the army under which \2. different officials
directly responsible to Diem (38 province chiefs, 3 regional comm.anders,
and a Chief of Staff) shared operational command.
The CIP was superseded in May by an enlarged version of the sajtie
program, and the only longer term significance the original program held
was that it presumably offered the Administration a lesson in dealing with
Diem (and perhaps, although it was not foreseen then, a lesson in dealing
with Vietnamese governments generally.) The negotiations dragged on and
on; the U.S. military and eventually most of the civilians both in Saigon
and Washington grew impatient for getting on v^ith the war; Diem promised
action on some of the American points, and finally even issued some decrees,
none of which were really followed up. For practical purposes, the list of
"essential reforms" proposed as part of the CIP, including those Diem had
given the impression he agreed to, could have been substituted unchanged '
for the list of reforms the U.S. requested at the en^. of the year, with
equal effect, as the quid pro quo demanded for the much enlarged U.S. aid
offer that follo^\ed the Taylor Mission.
Negotiations with Diem came to an end in May, not because the issues
had been resolved, but because the U.S. decided to forget trying to pressure
i Diem for a while and instead try to coax him into reforming by winning his
(■ confidence. Partly, no doubt, this reflected the view that pressure was
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getting nowhere and the alternative approach might do "better. Mainly^
\ however, the changed policy, and the somewhat enlarged aid program that
{ accompanied it, reflected the pressures created by the situation in
neighboring Laos. (We will see that there is a strong case to^be made
that even the Fall, post-Taylor Mission, decisions were essentially
dominated by the impact of Laos. But in May the situation was unambiguous.
Laos, not anything happening in Vietnam, was the driving force.)
A preliminary step came April 20, Immediately following the Bay of
Pigs disaster, and with the prospect of a disaster in Laos on the very
near horizon, Kennedy asked Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to work
up a program for saving Vietnam. The program was delivered, as ^requested,
a week later. It was a somewhat enlarged version of the CIP, with the-
implication, not spelled out in the paper, that the new effort would be
put into effect without making any demands on Diem. (Simultaneously,
Ambassador Durbow, who had been in Vietnajii for four years, was being
:t*eplaced by Nolting, and this added to the hope that a new start might
be made with Diem.) There is nothing to suggest that anything more was
expected of Gilpatric^ s program, and indeed all the evidence suggests that
the main point of the exercise was to work General Lansdale into the ^role
of government-wide coordinator and manager of the country's first major^test
in the new art of counter-insurgency. Lansdale served as Executive Officer
of the Task Force which Gilpatric organized and which he proposed should be
given a continuing, dominant role in managing the Vietnamese enterprise.
^'^ ' By the time the report was submitted on April 27 when the Laos crisis
was reaching its peak, a new Geneva conference had been agreed upon. But
there were serious doubts that the pro-western side in Laos would be left
with anything to negotiate about by the time the conference opened. Even
the U.S. -favored settlement (a coalition government) represented a major, ^ .
if prudent, retreat from the previous U.S. position taken during the closing
months of the Eisenhower Administration.) So the situation in Laos was^
bad, if unavoidable; and it followed right on the heels of the Bay of Pigs,
and at a time when the Soviets were threatening to move against Berlin.
The emphasis of the Gilpatric Task Force shifted from shaping up the counter-
insurgency aid program for Vietnam, to finding ways to demonstrate to the
South Vietnamese (and others) that a further retreat in Laos would not
foreshadow an imminent retreat in Vietnam.
On April 28, an annex to the Task Force report proposed to counter
the impact of Laos with U.S. support for an increase in South Vietnamese
forces (the original report had proposed only more generous financial support
for forces already planned under the CIP) and, further, a modest commitment
of U.S. ground combat units in South Vietnam, with the nominal mission of
establishing two training centers. On April 29 , Kennedy endorsed the pro-
posals of the original draft, but took no action on the far more significant
proposals in the annex. On May 1, a revised Task Force draft came out,
■ incorporating the Laos Annex proposals, and adding a recommendation that
the U.S. make clear an intent to intervene in Vietnam to the extent needed
to prevent a Viet Cong victory. At this point, practical control of the
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Task Force appears to have shifted out of Gilpatric^s (and Defense *s)
hands to State (and^ apparently^ George Ball.) A State redraft of the
report caiiie out May 3? which eliminated the special role laid out for
Lansdale^ shifted the chairmanship of the continuing Task Force to State,
and blurred, without wholly eliminating, the Defense-drafted recommendations
for sending U.S. combat units to Vietnam and for public U,^S. commitments
to save South Vietnam from Communism. But even the State re-draft recom-
mended consideration of stationing American troops in Vietnam, for missions
not involving combat with the Viet Cong, and a bilateral U.S.-SVTT security
treaty. On May ^4 and 5, still acting under the pressures of the Laos
crisis, the Administration implied (through a statement by Senator Fulbright
at the White House following a meeting with Kennedy, and at Kennedy's press
conference the next day) that it was considering stationing American forces
in Vietnam. On May 6, a final draft of the Task Force report came out,
essentially following the State draft of May 3. On May 8, Kennedy signed
a letter to Diem, to be delivered by Vice President Johnson the next week,
which promised Diem strong U.S. support, but did not go beyond the program
outlined in the original Task Force report; it offered neither to finance
expanded South Vietnamese forces, nor to station American troops in Vietnam.
On May 11, the recommendations of the final, essentially. State-drafted, report
were formalized. But by now, the hoped for cease-fire in Laos had come off.
Vice President Johnson in Saigon on the 12th of May followed through on his
instructions to proclaim strong U.S. support for and confidence in Diem.
When Diem talked of his worries about U.S. policy in Laos, Johnson, obviously
acting on instructions, raised the possibility of stationing American troops
in Vietnam or of a bilateral treaty. But Diem wanted neither at that time.
Johnson's instructions were not available to this study, so we do not know
how he would have responded if Diemi had asked for either troops or a treaty,
although the language of the Task Force report implies he would only have
indicated a U.S. willingness to talk about these things. With Johnson,
came the new Ambassador, Fritz Nolting, whose principal instruction was to
"get on Diem's wavelength" in contrast to the pressure tactics of his
predecessor.
A few weeks later, in June, Diem, responding to an invitation Kennedy
had sent through Johnson, dispatched an aide to Washington with a letter
outlining Saigon's "essential military needs." It asked for a large increase
in U.S. support for Vietnamese forces (sufficient to raise ARVN strength
from 170,000 to 270,000 men), and also for the dispatch of "selected
elements of the American Armed Forces", both to establish training centers
for the Vietnamese and as a symbol of Am.erican commitm.ent to Vietnam. The
proposal. Diem said, had been worked out with the advice of MAAG Saigon,
whose chief, along with the JCS and at least some civilian officials,
strongly favored getting American troops into Vietnam.
The question of increased support for Vietnamese forces was resolved
tlirough the use of the Staley Mission. This was normally a group of economic
experts intended to work with a Vietnamese group on questions of economic
policy. Particularly at issue was whether the Vietnamese could not be
financing a larger share of their own defenses. But the -economic proposals
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and programs, all of which turned out to be pretty general and fuzzy,
comprised a less important part of the report than the discussion of
Vietnamese military requirements. Here the study group reflected the
instructions of the two governments. On the basis of the Staley Report,
the U.S. agreed to support a further increase of 30,000 in the RTOIAl^, but
deferred a decision on the balance of the South Vietnamese, request on the
grounds that the question might not have to be faced since by the time
the RVNAF' reached 200,000 m.en, sometime late in I962, the Viet Cong might
already be on the run. The Staley Report also contained what by now had
already become the usual sorts of nice words about the importance of social,
political, and administrative reforms, which turned out to have the usual
relevance to reality. The U.S. was still sticking to the May formula of
trying to coax Diem to reform, instead of the equally unsuccessful January
formula of trying to pressure him to reform.
The other issue -- the request for "elements of the American Armed
Forces" -- was left completely obscure. From the record available, we
are not sure that Diem really wanted the troops then, or whether Kennedy
really was willing to send them if they were wanted. All we know is that
Diem included some language in his letter that made the request a little
ambiguous, and that Washington -- eit?ier on the basis of clarification
from Diem's aide who delivered the letter, or on its own initiative, or
some combination of both -- interpreted the letter as not asking for troops,
and nothing came of the apparent request.
( "" A new, and much more serious sense of crisis developed in September.
-; This time the problem was not directly Laos, but strong indications of
moderate deterioration of Diem*s military position and very substantial
deterioration of morale in Saigon. There was a sharp upswing in Viet Cong
attacks in September, including a spectacular raid on a province capital
55 miles from Saigon during which the province chief was publicly beheaded
by the insurgents. At the end of September, Diem surprised Nolting by
asking the U.S. for a U.S.-GVN defense treaty. By Diem*s account the loss
of morale in Saigon was due to worries about U.S. policy growing out of the
Laos situation. Both U.S. officials in Washington and South Vietnamese
other than those closest to Diem, though, put most of the blame on deteri-
oration within South Vietnam, although the demoralizing effect of Viet Cong
successes was unquestionably magnified by uncertainties about the U.S.
coiranitment to Vietnam. In response, President Kennedy sent General Taylor
and Walt Rostow, then both on the White House staff, to Vietnam, accompanied
by some less prominent officials from State and Defense.
What Taylor and Rostow reported was that Saigon faced a dual crisis of
confidence, compounded out doubts arising from Laos that the U.S. would
stick by South Vietnam, and doubts arising from the Viet Cong successes
that Diem's unpopular and inefficient regime could beat the Viet Cong anyway.
The report said that a U.S. military commitment in Vietnam was needed to
meet the first difficulty; and that the second could best be met by supplying
a generous infusion of American personnel to all levels of the Vietnamese
government and army, who could, it was hoped, instill the Vietnamese with
the right kind of winning spirit, and reform the regime "from the bottom up"
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despite Diem's weaknesses. The report recoinmended the dispatch of heli-
copter companies and other forms of combat support^ but without great
emphasis on these units. Probably, although the record does not specifically
say so 5 there was a general understanding that such units would be sent
even before the report was submitted, and that is why there is relatively
little emphasis on the need for them.
The crucial issue was what form the American military commitment
had to take to be effective. Taylor, in an eyes only cable to the
President, argued strongly for a task force in the delta, consisting
mainly of army engineers to work where there had been a major flood. The
delta vms also where the VC were strongest, and Taylor warned the President
that the force would have to conduct some combat operations and expect to
take casualties. But Taylor argued that the balance of the program, less
this task force, would be insufficient, for we had to "convince Diem that
we are willing to join him in a showdown with the Viet Cong..."
We do not know what advice President Kennedy received from State:
Sorenson claims all the President's advisors on Vietnara favored sending
the ground force; but George Ball, at least, who may not have been part
of the formal decision group, is widely reported to have opposed such a
move; so did Galbraith, then Ambassador to India, who happened to be in
Washington; and perhaps some others. From Defense, the President received
a memo from McNamara for himself, Gilpatric, and the JCS, stating that they
were "inclined to recommend" the Taylor program, but only on the understanding
f ^ that it would be follovred up with more troops as needed, and with a willing-
ness to attack North Vietnam. (The JCS estimated that ^0,000 American
troops would be needed to "clean up" the Viet Cong.) The Taylor Mission
Report, and Taylor's own cables, had also stressed a probable need to attack,
or at least threaten to attack. North Vietnam.
The McNaraara memo was sent November 8. But on November 11, Rusk and
McNamara signed a joint memo that reversed McNamara 's earlier position:
it recoiTimended deferring, at least for the time being, the dispatch of combat
units. This obviously suited Kennedy perfectly, and the NSAM embodying the
decisions vras taken essentially verbatim from the recommendations of the
Rusk/McNamara paper, except that a recommendation that the U.S. was commiting
itself to prevent the loss of Vietnam was deleted.
But where the Taylor Report had implied a continuation of the May
■policy of trying to coax Diem into cooperating with the U.S., the new
program was made contingent on Diem's acceptance of a list of reforms;
further Diem was to be informed that if he accepted the program the U.S.
would expect to "share in decision-making" .. .rather than "advise only".
Thus, the effect of the decision was to give Diem less than he was expecting
(no symbolic commitment of ground forces) but to accompany this limited
offer with demands for which Diem vras obviously both unprepared and unwilling
■ to accede to. On top of this, there vras the enormous (and not always recog-
nized) extent to v^hich U.S. policy was driven by the unthlnkability of
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avoidably risking another defeat in Southeast Asia hard on the heels of
the Laos retreat.
Consequently, the U.S. bargaining position was feeble. Further,
Galbraith at least, and probably others, advised Kennedy that there was
not much point to bargaining with Diem anyway, since he would never
follow through on any promises he made. (Galbraith favored promoting an
anti-Diem military coup at the earliest convenient moment.) Kennedy
ended up settling for a set of promises that fell well short of any
serious effort to make the aid program really contingent on reforms by
Diem. Since the war soon thereafter began to look better, Kennedy never
had occasion to reconsider his decision on combat troops; and no urgent
reason to consider Galbraith 's advice on getting rid of Diem until late
1963.
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THE KEMIEDY PROGRATvi MD COMIITAiSNTS: I96I
CHRONOLOGY
DATE
1960-1961
EVENT OR DOCUMENT
->^M .^—VI^^WV^^
Situation in Vietnam
US-Soviet Relations
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Situation in Laos
DESC RI PTION
■
According to Ambassador Diirbrovr
there was widespread popular dis-
satisfaction with the Diem Govern-
ment and a growing guerrilla threat.
At the same time, there had been a
very gradual gro"\rbh of U.S. involve-
ment in assisting the GTOJ to counter
the VC.
In the U.S. two questions influenced
decisions about Vietnaia: first, what
should the U.S. give Diem to comiter
the commujiists; secondly, what -- if
any --" demands should be posed as a
quid pro quo for assistance?
The problems of dealing with Koscow
were far more pressing than those
related to Vietnam. A feeling that
Amerj.ceJs position in the world had
been eroded by the USSR prevailed;
Kennedy was particularly determined
to regain American strength, prestige
and influence. Anything which could
be construed as American weaJcness
yis-a-vis the USSR was to be avoided.
This affected policy toward Vietnam.,
The US-backed, pro-American faction
under Phoumi Nosavan was losing to
the pro-Communist/neutralist faction
supported by the Soviet Union,
Coromdtment of U.S. forces was rejected
and on May 2, I961 a cease-fire was
decla-red. President Kennedy decided
to support a coalition solution, even
though the odds on coalition leader
Souvanna Phouma's staying in power
were very low. As a consequence of
this decision, Washington believed
•that Southeast A.sian leaders doubted
the sincerity of the U.S. co}iaTiitm.ent
to the area, and the U.S. felt
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DATE
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20 Jan 195 ]
28 Jan 1961
I^esident Kennedy-
Inaugurated
Kennedy Approves the
Counter insurgency
Plan (CIP) for Viet-
nam
DESCRIKi-^IQN
compelled to do something to restore
confidence, demonstrate U.So resolve
and dispel any idea Moscow might
have that the UoS. intended to with-
draw from Southeast Asia. Laos was
thus particularly influential in
development of policy toward Vietnam
Gradually developed during 1961, the
CIP was to be the basis for e>rpanded
U.S. assistance to Vietnam* Kennedy
automatically approved its main pro-
visions; negotiations with Diem about
the CIP began 13 February and con-
tinued through May of I961. The UcS.
offered $28 cU million to support a
20,000-man increase in the iVRVT^ (for
a new total of 170,000); to train^^
equip and supply a 325 000-m.3n Civil
Guard at $12*7 million. The fu.ll
package added less than $42 million
to the current $220 million aid pro-
gram.
The CIP called for consolidation of
the RVMF chain of comjup^nd (never
fully accomplished under Diem.) E^
agreement was reached on the question
of strategy diiring this period.
(Diem wanted "strategic" outposts ^
Agrovilles^ lines of streng-th through-
out the country; the l^iAAG favored a
"net and spear" concept -- sm_all units
operating out of pacified areas to
find the enemy^ call in reserve forces
gradually extend security to all of
Vietnamo)
Civil reforms included urging Diem, to
broaden his government 5 include oppo-
sition political leaders in the
cabinet J give the National Assembly
some power 5 institute civic action to
win hearts, minds and loyalty of the
peasants o . . ;
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Mid-Jan 196l
^'
A Lansdale Report on
Vietnam
February-May
1961
Durbrov.r T^iegotiations
■with Diem on the CIP
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DESGRIETION
The CIP assruned the GWI had the
potential to cope with 'the VC if
necessary corrective measures -vrere
taken and if adequate forces were
provided. The mx)licit bargain of
the plan: the U.S. would support
"adequate forces" 1^ Diein would
institute "necessary corrective
measures." Again, although socio-
political reforms were sought
through the CIP and other plans ,
they were not realized during the
early Kennedy years.
Following a trip to Vietnajn^
Major General E « G. Lansdale called
for strong support for Dieifi and
reconimended the U.So demonstrate
that support immediately. Only if
Diem's confidence in the U.S. were
restored would U.S. influence be
effective, said Lansdale* He recom-
mended the iimnediate transfer of
Lurbrow (he was "too close to the
forest" and was not trusted by the
GTO) and imraediate adoption of social,
economic, political and military pro-
grams to prove U.S. backing for Diem
as well as help Diem stabilize the
countryside.
Diem stalled the implementation of
his "major promises" (to establish
a central intelligence organization,
put operational control for counter-
insurgency oxoerations under the mili-
tary comm.and system, reform the cabi-
net and governrfiental administra.tion) .
Washington held u}^ the "green light"
on aid as long as Diem stalled -■-
although the JCS and M/lAG in Saigon
were impatient to get on with the war
and were annoyed by the delay.
Finally, in mid-May (a-ffcer Durbrow
had ended his foior-year tour in Viet-
nani) Diem implemented some "major
promises" by decree. But nothing-
changed. .
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DATE
12 Apr 1961
EVENT OR DOCUl^IENT
— - ' ■ ■ ■ I f I ri ■ ii I ■ I - n -. ■ ■■ .
Rosto-vr Memorandum for
President Kennedy
20 Apr 1961
The Presidential
Program for
Vietnam
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27 Apr I96I
Gilpatric Task Force
Report submitted; the
KSC meets
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DESGRIFJIOK
W. W. Rostow suggested several vays
for "gesjring-up the whole Vietnam
operation." These included: assign-
ing a first-rate 5 fulltirrie backstop
man in Washington to Vietnam affairs
(Lansdale); a Vice Presidential visit
in Southeast Asia; exploring vays to
use new American techniques and
gadgets in the fight against the VC;
replacing the ICA (AID) chief; high-
level discussion of tactics for per-
suading Diem to broaden his govern-
ment; a Presidential letter to Diem
in vdiich Kennedy would reaffirm
sux)7Dort for him but express the
urgency attached to finding a ^'more
effective political and m-orale
setting" for military operations.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric
was directed to appraise the current
status and future prospects of the
VC drive in South Va^tncija^ then
recommend a series of actions to
prevent coiimiunist domination of the
GWl.
(At this same tim.e: the Bay of Pigs
invasion force sur'rendered and the
Laos crisis was coming to a head.)
Gilpatric 8.nd Lansdale headed a Task
Force established immediately to
carry out these instructions o
This first Task Force draft called
for a moderate acceleration of the
CIP program approved in January^ with
stress on vigor , enthusiasm and strong
leadership. The report recomonended
building on present US-GVll programs ,
inf\ising them with a new sense of
iu:gency 8.nd creating action programs
in aMost every field to create a
viable and increasingly democratic
government in SVI^ to prevent commu-
nist domination. 'Eo ARVN increase
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EVEKT OR DOCmiENT
DESCRIPTION
28 -Apr 1961
Laos Annex to (first)
Task Force Report
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beyond the already-authorised 20^000-
maxi addition was recoBvmended; a
modest MAAG increase was proposed.
The US would support the Civil Guard
and Self "Defense Corps. Emphasis
was on stabilizing the countryside ^
not on pressing Diera for political
or administrative reforms. (Gilpatric
wanted Lansdale to go to Vietnam
immediately after the prograi'n was
approved to consult with Vietnajnese
and US leaders and maJ^e further recom-
mendations for action; but McNamara
ma^e Lansdale 's mission contingent
upon an invitation from the US Am-
bassador in Saigon --an invitation
that never cameo)
The ESC wa.s to discuss this report
but the 27 April meeting was domi-
nated by the acute Laotian crisis.
A report -- a response^ really --
concerning the critical situation
in Laos and its effect on Vietnam
was prepared for the ESC on 28 April.
It recoroinended a two-division ARVT^
increase and deployment of 36OO US
troops to Vietnam (two l600-man
teatns to train each new division;
i|00 Special Forces troops to ST)eed
over-all ARVjV counterinsurgency
training). Rationale: to enable
ARVi^F to guard against conventional
invasion of South Vietnam. (Both
the incree.sed forces and their Justi-
fication were different from two
earlier reports. Lansdale had advo-
cated no MWN increase but felt some
US force build-up was called for as
a demonstration of American support
for the GVK. Gilpatric 's m-ilitary
aide 5 Colonel E. F. Black, -vrrote the
other report w^hich saw no need for
more US troops but recommended ex-
pansion of AlWN to meet the threat
of increased infiltration. These
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DESCRIPTION
29 Apr 1961
Kennedy Decisions on
the Draft Rei3ort
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NSC Meets; New Draft
of the Task Force
Report Issued
vievs vere rejected in^fax^or of
Black's second paper which advo-
cated more ARYN troops "■- to .
coujiter overt aggression^ not in-
creased infiltration -- and com*-
mitment of US troops for training
purposes -- not for politics.!
reassurance or demonstration of
US resolve. Black's second paper
was sent to the NSC.)
Kennedy did not act on the Laos
Annex, He approved only the
limited military proposals con- ^
tained. in the first Gilpatric Task
Force report. The 685-man MAAG
would be increased to 785 to enable
it to train the approved 20,000 ne\r
ARW troops c Kennedy also author-
ized the MAAG to support and advise
the Self Defense Corps (40,000 men);
authorized MAP support for the entire
Civil Guard of 68^000 ( vice 32,000
previously supported) ; ordered in-
stallation of radar surveillance
equipment and okayed MAP support
and training for the Vietnamese
Junk Force •
Kerjiedy again deferred decision on
sending troops into Laos apparently
because the feeling that the US would
not moke such a move was now firm.
The 1 May draft report was little
different from the 28 April version.
The Laos Annex was incorporated into
the main paper; the US was to make
knovrn its readiness to "intervene
unilaterally" in Southeast Asia to
fulfill SEATO commitments (vice
intervene in conjunction with SEATO '
forces), . ARVN increases were no\r
Justified by the threat of overt
aggression as well as increased in-
filtration.
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DAT3
3 May 1961
EVEI^TT OR DOCLMEI'TT
State (George Ball)
Revision of Task
Force Re'cort
i
I
5 May 1961
NSC Meeting
DESCRIPTION
This draii: V7as very different from
the original. Lansdale's role vas
eliriinated; the Gilpatric-Lansdale
Task Force was to be replaced by a
new group chaired by Ball, then
Undersecretary of State. (Lansdale
reacted with a "strong recoxnxriendation"
that Defense stay out of the director-
ship proposed by State and. said the
"us past performajice and theory of
action, which State apparently desires
to continue, simply offers no sovmd
basis for winning.. «") In State's
rewritten political section of the
report, the Defense reconiraendation
to meke clear US determination to
intervene vinilaterally if necessary
to save South Vietnam from communisui
was replaced by a proposal to explore
ne\r bilateral treaty arrangements with
Diem (arrangements which might mean
intervention against the guerrillas
but might mean intervention only
against DRV attack) . The need for
new arrangements w^as tied to the
"loss" of Laos. State incorporated
unchanged the Defense drafi: as the
military section of its revised
report, but iraplied "further study"
would be given to some Defense recom-
mendations. Overall, the State
revision tried to tone dovm commit-
ments to Vietnam suggested in the
Defense version. It left the Rt^esi-
dent a great deal of room to maneuver
without explicitly overruling recom-
mendations presented him.
Again, Laos was the main subject.
Most agreed the chance for salvaging
anything out of the cease-fire and
coalition government was slim indeed c
Ways in which to reassure Vietnam and
Thailand were sought. The Vice
President's trip to Southeast Asia
was announced after the m-eetlng.
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n-
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f
DATh
6 May 1961
EVEI-;T OE DOCmiEKT
Second State Re-Draft
of the Task Force
Report
10 May 1961
JCSM 320-61
11 May 1961
KSM 52
DESCRIFJION
Here, military actions^ were con-
tained in an annex; the political
section reflected less panic over
the loss of Laos; deplo;^T>ient of
US troops "was less definite --
called something which "might
result from an NSC decision follow-
ing discussions between Vice Presi-
dent Johnson and President Diem."
The matter is being studied, said
the drafi:. The report said: Diem
"is not now fully confident of US
support 5" that it is "essential
(his) full confidence in and com-
munication with the United States
be restored promptly." (Lansdale's
recommendations of January, April,
etc.) The report called for a
"major alteration in the present
government structure, " "believed"
a combination of inducements plus
discreet pressures might work, but
it was unenthuslastic both about
Diem, and his chances of success c
The Diem-is-the-only-available-
leader syndrome is evident here.
"Assuming the political decision is
to hold Southeast Asia outside the
communist sphere," the JCS emphati-
cally recommended deployment of
sufficient US forces to provide a
visible deterrent to potential
DRV/CHICOM action, release AlVm from
static to active coimterinsurgency
operations, assist training and indi-
cate US firmness c (in JCSM 3II-61
of "9 May, the Chiefs recoinmended
deployment of US forces to Thailand
also, )
Directed "full examination" by DOD
of a study on the size and composi-
tion of forces which might comprise
a possible commitment of troops to
Southeast Asia. In effect, Kennedy
"took note" of the study but m.ade
no decision on the issue of troop
8
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EVEIW OR DOCmiEN'T
DESCRIPTION
9-15 May 1961
Vice President
Johnson Visits
Southeast Asia
coriimitment . The Arabassador in Saigon
was empowered to open negotiations
about a bilateral treaty but "vras
directed to make no commitments with-
out further review by the President.
These recommendations from the May 6
Task Force report were approved:
help the GVl\f increase border patrol
and coimterinsurgency capability
through aerial surveillance and new
technological devices; help set up
a center to test new wea^pons and
techniques; help ARVI^I implement
healthy welfare and public work pro-
jects; deploy a ^00-man special forces
group to Nha Trang to accelerate AEVN
training; instruct JCS, CPNCPAC, MAAG
to assess the military utility of aai
increase in ARWJ from 170,000 to
200;,000 (the two-division increase
recommended previously).
Purpose: to reassure Asian leaders
that despite Laos, the United States
could be counted on to support them.
Johnson reported the mission had
halted the decline of confidence in
the United States^ but did not restore
confidence already lost. Johnson
strongly believed that faith must be
restored;, the "battle against commu-
nism must be joined in Southeast Asia
with strength and determination" (or
the US would be reduced to a fortress
America with defenses pulled back to
California's shores); he believed
there was no alternative to US leader-
ship in Southeast Asia but that any
help e^rfcended -- military^ economic^
social --- must be part of a mutual
effort and contingent upon Asian
willingness to "take the necessary
measures to make our aid effective."
He reported that Ainerican troops were
neither reciuired nor desired by Asian
leaders at this time.
9
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EVENT OE DOClUvJMT
DESCRIPTION
"s
l8 May 1961
Lansdale MeinorandTjm
for Gilpatric
c
5' Jime 1951
Rostow Rote to
McNaiQsxa
10
Calling Thailand and Vietnam the
most iimiediate^ most important
trouble spots, the Vice President
said the US "must decide vhether
to support Diem -- or let Vietnam
fall," opted for supporting Diem,
said "the most imxjortant thing is
imaginative, creative, American
management of our military aid
program," and reported $50 million
in military and economic assis-
tance "-will be needed if we decide
to siipport Vietnam." The same
amount. was recommended for Thailand,
The Vice President concluded by
posing this as the fundamental
decision: "whether . c .to meet the
challenge of Commmiist expansion
now in Southeast Asia or throw in
the towel." Cautioning that "heavy
and continuing costs" would be re-
quired, that sometime the US "may be
faced with the f-urther decision of
v/hether we commit major United States
forces to the area or cut our losses
and withdraw should ovx other efforts
fail," Johnson recommended "we pro-
ceed with a clear-cut and strong
program of action."
Lansdale noted Diem's rejection of
US combat forces per s^ at this time
but pointed out Diem seemed willing
to accept troops for training pur-
poses only. At this same time, l^IAAG
Chief McGarr requested l6,000 US
troops (combat units) be sent, nomi-
nally to establish centers to train
RVImAF divisions. If Diem vrould not
accept 165OOO, McGarr would settle
for 10,000 menc
Saying "v?e must thinJi of the kind of
forces for Thailand now, Vietnam
later," Rostow suggested"aircraft,
helicopters, communications^ men^
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DATE
EVENT OR DOGU?'M^~T
9 June 1961
Diem Letter to
Kennedy
Mid-Juxie to
Ju]y 1961
The Staley Mission
r^.
11
DESCRIPTION
Special Forces ^ militia teachers ,
etc." would he needed to support a
"co^mter-guerrilla war in Vietnaja."
Rostow does not mention combat
units.
Here, in response to Vice President
Johnson's request that he outline
miiitaxy needs 5 Diem did request US
troops explicitly for training RWiAF
"officers and technical specialists''
"- not entire divisions. He pro-
posed ARW be increased from 3 70,000
to 270,000 to "coujiter the ominous
tlxreat of communist domination" --
a threat he documented by inflated
infiltra.tion figures and words about
the "perilous" situation created by
the Laos solution. To train these
100,000 new ARW troops Diem asked
for "considerable exr)ansion" of the
MAAG in the form of "selected
elements of the American Armed
Forces.
!I
A team headed by Eugene Staley
(Stanford Research Institute) was
to work with Vietnamese officials
in an effort to resolve the continu-
ing problem of how Vietnam was to
finance its own war effort (deficit
financing, inflation, the commodity
import program, piaster /dollar
exchange rates, all presented diffi-
culties). But the Staley group
became the vehicle for force level
discussions and economic issues were
treated rather perfunctorily. The
group "does not consider itself com-
petent to make specific recomjnenda-
tions as to desired force levels" but
adopted two a].ternative levels for
"economic planning purposes":
200,000 if the insurgency in Vietnam
remains at present levels, if Laos
does not fall; 270,000 if the Viet-
cong significantly increase the in-
surgency and if the communists win
de facto control of Laos.
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DATE
11 Aug 1961
Kennedy Decision
WSAl/[ 65
/:
15 Aug I9&I
KIE 1^-3/53.61
c
Late Aug I96I
Theodore White
Re-ports
/■
1 Sep I9&I
General McGarr
Re-oorts
^
27 Sep 1951
Nolting Reports
r^.
12
DESCRIPTION
President Kennedy agreed vith the
Staley Report (of k August) tha,t
security requirements demanded
first priority 5 that economic and
social programs had to be accelerated^
that it vas in the US interest to pro-
mote a viable Vietnamo He agreed to
support an ARW increase to 200^000
if Diem in turn agreed to a plan for
using these forces. The 270,000
level was thus disapproved. But the
plan for using MW forces had not
yet been dra-vm. Diem had not yet
designed -•- much less imiplemented -"
social reforms supposedly required
in retujrn for US assistance.
Although collapse of the Saigon
regime might com.e by a coup or from
Diem^s death, its fall because of a
"prolonged and difficult" struggle
was not pr edict edc
"The situation gets worse almost week
by week..," particularly the militsjry
situation in the delta. If the U.S.
decides it must intervene, White
asked if we had the people, instru-
ments or clear objectives to make it
successful.
The PJNE has displayed increased
efficiency, a spirit of renewed
confidence is "beginning to permeate
the people, the GW end the Armed
Forces
tr
Kolting was "unable report. o .progress
toward attainment task force goals of
creating viable 8Jid increasingly demo-
cratic society," called the -government
and civil situation unchanged from
early September. A series of lo.rge
scale VC attacks in central Vietnam,
the day-long VC seizure of Phuoc Vinh,
capital of ffoTiaerJ Phuoc Thanh Pro-
vince --55 miles from Saigon — in
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DATE
27 Sep 1961
(Continued)
EVEilT OR DOCUIvISNT
1 Oct 1961
-y'
Diem Request
1 Oct 1961
State "First
12 --Mo nth Report"
5 Oct 1961
The "Rostow Proposal"
■>
9 Oct 1961
JCSM 717-61
DESCRIPTION
vhich the VC publicly beheaded
Diem's province chief ajad escajDed
before government troops arrived
and increased infiltration through
Laos demonstrated "that the
tide has not yet turned" militajrily.
Diem requested a bilateral trea^ty
with the U.S. This surprised
Kolting but proba.bly did not sur-
prise the White House^ alx-eady
•wa^rned by White of the grave mili-
tary situation.
i^^
This political assessment mirrored
Nolting's "no progress" report but
State found the military situation
more serious than Embassy reports
had indicated.
Suggested a 25,000-man SEATO force
be put into Vietnam to guard the
Vietnam/Laos border between the D^
and Cambodia. (The Pathet Lao had
gained dujring September^ as had VC
infiltration through Laos to the
GWI. This prompted pla,ns for U.S.
action. )
The JCS rejected the Rostow pro-
posal: forces would be stretched
thin^ they could not stop infil-
traction, and would be at the worst
place to oppose potential DRV/CHICOM
invasion. The Chiefs wanted to make
a Concentrated effort in Laos where
a firm stand can be tadien saving all
or substantially all of Laos which
would^ at the saane time^ protect
Thailand and protect the borders
of South Vietnam." But if this were
"politically unacceptable" the Chiefs
"provided. . «a possible limited interim
course of action": deplo^^ment of
about 20^000 troops to the central
highlands near Pleiku to assist the
GVI^I and free certain GVl^T forces for
offensive action against the VCo
13
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DATE
EVEiV^T OR D0CUI-5MT
DESCRIPTIOU
c
10 Oct 1961
I
"Concept of Interven-
tion in Vietnam"
11 Oct 1961
■y
NSC Meeting on
Vietnam
Drafted by Alexis Jolmsonj the paper
blended Rostov's border control jpro--
posal -^/rith the JCS win-control-of-
the-highlands co'onter-proposal for
the initial mission of U.S. forces
in Vietnam, "The real and ultimate
objective" of U.S. troops was al?o
addressed. To defeat the Vietcong
and render Vietnam seciire imder a.
non-Communist government, Johnson
"guessed" three divisions would be
the ultiraate force required in sup-
port of the "real objective." The
paper estimated a satisfactory
settlement in Laos would reduce but
not eliminate infiltration into
South Vietnam, that even if infil-
tration were cut down, there was no
assurance that the GV1\^ could "in
the foreseeab-le futui^e be able to
defeat the Viet Cong." Unilateral
U.S. action would probably be neces-
sary. The plan's viability was
dependent on the degree in which the
GV1\T accelerated "political and mili-
tary action in its own defense."
The NSC considered four papers: the
Alexis Joh_nson draft; an NIE estiiaate
that SEATO a.ction would be opposed
by the DRV, Viet Cong and the Soviet
Union (airlift), that these forces
stood a good chance of thv^arting the
SEATO intervention; third, a JCS
estimate that ^0,000 U.S. troops
would be required to "clean up the
Viet Cong threat" and another 128,000
men would be needed to Oiopose
DRV/CHICOM intervention (draining
3 to i| reserve divisions). Finally,
a memorandum from William Bundy to
McNamara which said "it is really
now or never if we are to arrest the
gains being made by the Viet Cong
II
o9
and gave "an early and hard-hitting
operation" a 70 percent chance of
doing that. Bundy added, the chance
of cleaning up the situation "de-oends
\k
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DATE
11 Oct is6i
(Continued)
EVENT OR DOCUlvIENT
/I
13 Oct 19&1
Saigon Message i|88
lU Oct 1961
New York Times
c
20 Oct I96I
CINCPAC Recoixmendation
I8-2U Oct 1961
Taylor Mission to
VoBtnam
23 Oct 1961
Ch MA/IG Message
15
DESCRIPTION
on Diem's effectiveness ^ which is
very problems.tical^'^ D^avored going
in with 7O-3O odds "but figured the
odds would slide down if the U.S.
"let 5 say 5 a month go by" before
moving.
Reversing his previous position^
Diem requested an additional fighter-
boiaber squadron^ civilian pilots for
helicopters and C-^7 transports and
U.S. combat units for a "combat-
training" mission near the Dt!iZ^
possibly also in the highlands o He
asked consideration be given a pos-
sible request for a division of
Chiang Kai-shek's troops to support
the GWI. Nolting recommended serious
and prompt" a;btention for the requests.
In an article leaked by the govern-
ment -- perhaps by Kennedy himself --
leaders were called reluctant to send
U.S. combat units into Southeast Asiao
Obviously ujatrue, the leak was prob-
ably designed to end speculation a.bout
troop deployment and guard Kennedy's
freedom of action «
Admiral Felt felt the pros and cons
of U.S. troop deployment added up in
favor of no deployment until other
means of helping Diem had been ex-
hausted.
On the 18th 5 Diem said he wanted no
U.S. combat troops for any missionc
He repeated his rec[uest for a bi-
lateral defense treaty^ more support
for ARW and combat-support equix^m.ent
(helicopters^ aircraft ^ etc. ) .
General McGarr suggested that the
serious Mekong River flood could
provide a cover for U.S. troop de-
ployment: combat units could be
disguised as huma.nitarian relief
forces and be dispatched to the
delta.
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I
DATE
25 Oct 1961
EVENT OR DOCUMEOT
Saigon Message. 53^
1 Nov 1961
MGUIO Message OOO5
1 Nov 1961
MGUIO 0006 EYES ONLY
FOR THE PRESIDED
16
DESCRIPTION
Taylor reported the pervasii^e crisis
of confidence and serious loss in
Vietnamese national morale created
by Laos and the flood^ weakened the
war effort. To cope with this Taylor
recommended: Improvement of intelli-
gence on the VC; building ARVN
mobility; blocking infiltration into
the highlands by organizing a border
ranter force; introduction of U.S.
forces either for emergency^ short-
term assistance_j or for more sub-
stantial^ long-term support (a flood
relief plus military reserve task
force). Diem had reacted favorably
"on all points. "
Taylor told the President^^ Rusk and
McNamara "we should put in a task
force (6-8^000 men) consisting
largely of logistical troops for
the purpose of participating in flood
relief and at the same time of pro-
viding a UoSo military presence in
Vietnam capable of assuring Diem of
our readiness to join him in a mili-
tary showdown with the Viet Cong..."
Taylor concluded that the commi.inist
strategy of taking over Southeast
Asia by gu-errilla warfare was "well
on the way to success in Vietnam";
TT
he said the GVN was caught in inter-
locking circles" of bad tactics and
bad administrative arrangements"
which allow VC gains and invite a
political crisis. He recommended
more U.S. support for paramilitary
groups and ARVN mobility; the MAAG
should be reorganized and increased
and the task force introduced to
"conduct such combat operations as
are necessary for self-defense and
for the security of the area in which
(it) is stationed/' among other
things. Taylor felt the disadvan-
tages of deploynent were outweighed
by gains^ said SVN is "not an ex-
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iM
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DATE
1 Nov 1961
(Continued)
EVEOT OR DOCUMENT
3 Nov 1961
Taylor Report
17
DESCRIPTION
cessively difficult or unpleasant
place to operate" and the "risks of
backing into a major Asian war "by
way of SVN" are not impressive:
North Vietnam "is extremely viilner-
able to conventional bombing. . .there
is no case for fearing a mass on-
slaught of communist manpower. . .
particularly if our air power is
allowed a free hand against logisti-
cal targets. . ."
The "Evaluation and Simimary" section
suggested urgency and optimism: SVN
is in trouble_j major U.S. interests
are at stake; prompt and energetic
U.S. action -- military^ economic^
political — can lead to victory with-
out a U.S. take-over of the war_j can
cure weaknesses in the Diem regime.
That the Vietnamese must win the war
was a unanimous view — but most
mission participants believed all
Vietnamese operations could be sub-
stantially improved by America's
"limited partnership" with the GVN.
The GVN is cast in the best possible
light; any suggestion that the U.S.
should IJjnit rather than expand its
commitment -- or face the need to
enter the battle in full force at
this time — is avoided. Underlying
the summary was the notion that
"graduated measures on the DRV (applied)
with weapons or our own choosing"
could reverse any adverse trend in the
South. And ground troops were always
possible. The Taylor Report recom-
mended the U.S. make obvious its readi-
ness to act; develop reserve strength
in the U.S. "to cover action in
Southeast Asia up to the nuclear
threshold in that area" and thereby
sober the enemy and discourage esca-
lation. However^ bombing was a more
likely Vietnam contingency than was
use of ground troops; the latter
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DATE
3 Nov 1961
(Continued)
EVENT OR DOCUi^AEi^T
DESCRIPTION
option "vras tied to a U.S. response
to renewed fighting in Laos and/or
overt invasion of South Vietnam.
But Taylor suggested troops be sent
t'o Diemj the Taylor Report and
cables recoramend combat troop de-
ployment to Vietnam. (A message
from Nolting sutranarizing the Diem-
Taylor meeting on which the recom-^
mendations apparently rest (Saigon
message 5^1^ 25 Oct 61) does. not
indicate a.ny enthusiasm on Diem's
part to deployment of troops ^ how-
ever. He hinted U.S. troops for
training might be requested, then
drojDped the subject.)
Appendices to the Taylor Report
written by members of the grouj^
give a slightly different picture.
There is less optimism about the
GVN*s chances of success , less
optimism about chances of U.S.
actioji -- political or military —
tipping the balance. For example :
William Jordan (State) said almost
all Vietnamese interviewed had em-
phasi2.ed the gravity of the situation,
growing VC successes and loss of
confidence in Diem. The ARVl^I lacked
aggressiveness, was devoid of any
sense of }xcgency^ short of able
leaders. Sterling Cottrell (State)
said: It is an open question whether
the GW can succeed even with U.S»
assistance. Thus it wovild be a mis-
take to make an ir:oaYocabls U»So
commitment to defeat coi/imunists in
South Vietnam. Foreign military
forces cannot win the battle at the
village level --■ vrhere it must be
joined; the primary responsibility
for saving Vietnam must rest with
the GVN. For these reasons Cottrell
argued against a treaty which would
either shift \iltimate responsibility
to the U.S. or engage a full U.So
cojranitment to defeat the Vietconp".
18
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/-■
5 Nov 19ol
EVEAiT OR DOCIJf'/iEl--;T
S_NIE 10-J|"6l
8 Nov 1961
McNamara Memorandujn
for the President ■
r
DESCRIPTION
«
This estimated the DRV i/ould re-
■spond to an increased U.S. troop
corairitment "by increasing support
to the Vietcong. If U.S. coriHiit™
ment to the GVi'T grew^ so, would DRV
support to the VC- Four possible
U.S. courses vere given: airlift
plus more help for ARVl^I; deployment
of 8-10^000 troops as a I'lood relief
task force; deployment of 25-^05 000
comoat troops; with each coui'^se^.
warn Hanoi of U.S. determination to
hold SVI^^ and U.S. intention to bomb
the DRV if its support for the VC
did not cease. The SNIE estimated
air attacks agaj.nst the North would
not cause its VC support to stop
and figured Moscow and Peking would
react strongly to air attacks.
Secretary McNamara, Gilpatric and
the JCS were "inclined to recommend
that we do comxait the U.Sc to the
clear objective of preventing the
fall of South Vietnara to coi^ioiunism
and that we support this commitment
by the necessary military actions,"
The memorandujn said the fall of
Vietnam would create "extremely
serious" strategic imxDlications
worldwide, that chances were "probably
sharply against" preventing that fall
without a U.S. troop commitment but
that even with major troop deploynent
(205,000 was the ma>:jjnum number of
groujid forces estimated necessary to
deal with a large overt invasion from
the. DRV and/or China) txhe U.S. would
still be at the mercy of external
forces -- Diem, Laos, domestic politi-
cal problems, etcc -- and thus success
could not be guaranteedo McNamara
recommended against deployment of a
task force (the 8,000-man group
mentioned in the Taylor Report)
"unless \je are willing to msike an
affirmative decision" to full support
a commitment to save South Vietnam.
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DATE
11 Nov 1961
EVEilT OR DOCIMhS-TT
Rusk/McNejnara MemO'
randimi for the
President
f
\h Kov 1961
DEPTEL 619 to Saigon
DESCRI PTION
This may have been prepared at
Kennedy's specific instruction;
it recoiTxrnended what Kennedy
wanted to hear: that the decision
to coimnit major groiind forces coiild
be deferred. In this paper , rhetoric
is escalated from that of McNajnara's
8 IJovember memorandixTi but U.3,
actions recommended are far less
significant^ less committing. Mili-
tej:y courses are divided into two
phases: firsts promptly deploy sup-
port troops and equipment (heli-
copters^ transport aircra.ft, mari-
time equipment and trainers ^ special
intelligence and air reconnaissance
groups 5 other men and materiel to
improve training, logistics ^ econo-
mic and other assistance programs).
Then study and possibl y deploy
ma.jor ground combat forces at a.,
later date. Despite the clear wai-n-
ing that even deployment of major
U.S. units could not assure success
against communism, the memoranduxn's
initial recommendation was that the
U.S. ^'commit itself to the clear
objective of preventing the fall of
South Vietnam to Commimism," be pre-
pared to send troops and to "strike at
the source of aggression in North Viet-
.nam." A number of diplomatic moves
(in the U.N., in NATO and SEATO coun-
cils^, etc.) are suggested to signal U.S
determination; economic, social and
other programs designed to help South
Vietnam are suggested; ways to elicit ■
improvements from Diem are recom-
mended.
This was Nolting's guidance, based
on the Rusk/McNamara memorandum.
Nolting was told the anti-guerrilla
effort *'must essentially be a GVN
taskc.No amount of extra aid can
be substitute for GV1\ taking measujres
to permit [itj to assum.e offensive
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EVEl\TT OR DOCmiSNT
±k E
-■^ov 1961
/:■
22 Kov 1961
NSAM 111
7 Dec 1961
Alexis Johnson/Rostow
Redrafi: ("Clarifica-
tion'') of Nolting's
lU KoyemlDer guidance
DESCRIPTION
and strengthen the administrative
and political bases of government
c « o .Do not propose to introduce
into GW the U.S. combat troops
novv^ "but propose a phase of intense
public and diplomatic activity to
focus on infiltration from ]\'Orth.
Shall decide later on course of
action should infiltration not be
radically reduced." Diem's talking
necessary measures -- political^
military 5 economic --to improve
his government ajid relations v/ith
the people were a prerequisite to
further U.S. assistance: "Package
should be presented as first steps
in a partnership, in which the U.S.
is prepared to do more as joint
study of facts and GVN performance
makes increased U.S. aid possible
and productive." Strictly for his
ovm information^ Nolting was told
Defense was "preparing plans for the
use of U.S. combat forces in SW
under various contingencies ^ includ-
ing stepped up infiltration as well
as organized. . « (military) interven-
tion. However, objective of our
policy is to do all possible to ac-
complish purpose without use of U.S.
combat forces." And^ Nolting was
to tell Diem: "We would expect to
share in the decision-making process
in the political^! economic and mili-
tary fields as they affect the
security situation,"
Called the "Pirst Phase of Vietnam
Program" this NSAli approved all
Rusk/Mcllamara recommendations of
11 November except the first one:
their initial recoffimenda,tion that
the U.S» commit itself to saving
South Vietnam was omitted.
"What we have in mind is that in
operations directly related to the
security situation, partnership
will be so close that one p^irty
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DATE
7 Dec 1961
(Continued)
EVENT OR DOCUi-iEIMT
11 Dec 1961
y
]N[ew York Times
15 Dec 1961
New York Times
DESCRIPTION
will not take decisions or actions
affecting the other without fu.ll
and frank prior consultation."
This is different from the idea that
Anieric3.n involvement should be so
intimate that the GVN would be re-
formed "from the bottcun uio" --
despite Diemo
(Although Washington ■o;ave in -- or
gave up — on the kind and degree
of pressirfe to exert on Diem^
Washington did not soften on
Lansdaleo Despite four requests
from Diem and the recommendations
from. Cottrell, the Taylor Report
and William Bundy that Lansdale be
sent to Saigorij he did not get
there until late I965.)
Two U.S. helicopter companies (33
H-2ICS5 kOO men) arrived in Vietnam^
the first direct U.S. military sup-
port for the GVNo
ICC reaction: shall vre continue
functioning here in the face of
U.S. assistance (increase barred
by the Geneva Accords)?
Reported the formal exchange of
letters between Kennedy and Diem
annomicing a steT:)ped"Up aid progrsm
for Vietnam o
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IV.B.l.
KEWJTCDY PROGRAM. kW> COMMZL^MEKTS: I96I
TABLE OF COKTEOTS kW) OUTLIKE
CHAPTER I
Page
1
I. MTRODUCTIOW,
II. THE CONTEXP
1
3
The VC Insurgency Itself
Problems With the Diem Government
Problems With the Soviets
The Situation in Laos
The Special American Commitment to Vietnam
III. SUMMARY.
CHAPTER II - THE COUNTERINSURGEWCY PLAN.
I. WINTER, 1961
II. LANSDALE'S REPORT
III. NEGOTIATING THE C IP
9
11
13
IV. DURBROW' S TACTICS I6
CHAPTER III - THE SPRING DECISIONS - I.
I. THE "PRESIDENTIAL PROGFAf/l"
19
19
1. The Security Situation in Vietnam
i^.
2. The Administration's Special Interest in Coujiter-
Insurgency
20
3. The Apparent Futility and Divisiveness of the Durbrow
(pressure) Tactics for Dealing With Diem
20
21
The Weakness of US Policy in Laos, and the Need
for a Signal of Firra Policy in Vietnam
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II, THE APRIL 26 REPORT 23
III. LADJSDALE\S ROIE ' 28
I\r. KEroiEDY'S APRIL 29 DECISIONS 29
V. THE LAOS AIMEX 31
VI. THE MAY 1 REVIEW : 32
VII. STATE'S REDRAFT 35
VIII. WIDENING THE OPTIONS 36
K. TIJE TROOP ISSUE kO
CHAPTER IV - FROM MAY TO SEPTEMBER 52
Ic THE JOHNSON MISSION o 52
II. DIEt'l'S cTUNE LETTER ' 58
III. THE STALE! MISSION ' = 6l
IV. U.S. COMBAT TROOPS &\-
V. THE TREATY REQUEST 69
VI. THE SITUATION IN SEPTEMBER 71
CHAPTER- V - THE FALL DECISIONS - 1 76
I. THE DECISION TO SEND TAYIOR 76
II. THE NEWSPAPERS AND TPIE CABLES 85
III. CINCPAC RECOMMENDS "NOT NOW" 88 .
IV. TAYIjOR in SAIGON. . ." o 90
V. THE TAYLOR REPORT 100
VI. SOME CABLES FROM SAICrON ' IO9
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Page
CHAPTER VI - THE FALL DECISIONS - II o 11^
I. CONTEXT
114
II. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 122
III. AFTERMATH 135
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EVOLUTION OF THE WA P.
KEIMEDY PROGRAM MD COMMITMENTS: 19^1
IV.B.l. CHAPTER I
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1959^ it vas hard to find an American official
worried about Vietnam. This vas not because things vere going veil.
They were not. A National Intelligence Estimate published in August por-
trayed Diem as unpopular^ his economy as developing less rapidly than its
rival in the North^ and his government under pressure from guerrillas
encouraged and in part supported from the North. Nevertheless^ the NIE
suggested no crisis then or for the foreseeable future. What the NIE
■ called "harassment" (i.e.^ support for the 'VC) from the North would con-
tinue^ but overt invasion seemed most unlikely. Neither communist nor
anti-coimnujiist enemies tfithin South Vietnam vere seen as an immediate threat.
Diem vould remain as President^ said the NIE, "formany years." In G^um, the
NIE sav the situation in Vietnam as unhappy^ but not unstable. That was to
be about as close to good news as we would hear from South Vietnaai for a
long tijne. l/
From then on, the classified record through the end of 19^1 shows
a succession of bleak appraisals of the regime's support in the cities,
■ and among the mi].itary, aMost always accompanied by increasingly bleak
estimates of increased VC strength and activity in the countryside. A dis-
patch from our Embassy in Saigon in March, I960, described the situation in
grave terms, but ended on the hopeful note that as of January Diem was
recognizing his problems and promising to do som-.ething about them. 2/ In
i . . August, an NIE analysis reported a "marked deterioration since January." 3/
In November, a military coup barely failed to overthrow Diem.
In January, I961 an old coujaterinsurgency hand. General Ed^^ard
Lansdale, went to Vietnam to look things over for the Secretary of Defense.
He returned v/ith a report that "the Viet Cong hope to win back Vietnam
south of the ITth parallel this year, if at all possible, and are much fur-
ther along towards accomplishing this goal than I had realized from reading
the reports received in Washington." hf
Nevertheless, the situation was never seen as nearly so grave as
I these reports, read years later, might suggest. We 'VTill see that at least
up until the fall of I96I, while appraisals of the situation sometimes
* suggested ijnminent crisis, the recommendations made to the President (by the
authors of these frightening appraisals) always implied a less pessimistic
view.
The top levels of the Kennedy A.dministration dealt only intermit-
tently mth the problem of Vietnam during I96I. There was a flurry of
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of activity in late; A jri], and early May^ which we will see was essentially
an offshoot- of the Laos crisis which had come to a head at that time. .A
much more thorough review was undertaken in the fall^ following Genera,l
Taylor's mission to Saigon^ which then led to an important expansion of the
American effort in Vietnam.
No fundamental new American decisions on Vietnam were made until
the Buddhist unrest in the last half of 1963^, and no major new military
decisions were made until I965. Consequently, the decisions in the fall of
1961 ( essentially _, to provide combat support -- for example^ heli-
copter compa-nies — but to defer any decision on direct combat troops) have
come to seem very important. This paper tries to describe what led up to
those decisions^ what alternatives were available and what the implications
of the choices were.
The story is a fairly complicated one. For although it is hard to
recall that context today^ Vietnam in I961 was a peripheral crisis. Even
within Southeast Asia it received far less of the Administration's and the
world's attention than did Laos. The New York Tljnes Index for I961 has
eight col-umns of Vietnam^ twenty-six on Laos. Decisions about Vietnam were
greatly influenced by what was happening elsewhere. In the narrow Vietnam-
ese context^ the weaknesses and peculiarities of the Diem government had a
substantial^ if not always obvious^ impact on the behavior of both the
Vietnamese officials seeking American aid and the American decision-makers
pondering the nature and terms of the aid they would offer.
As it happens^ the Eisenhower Administration was never faced with a
need for high-level decisions affecting the crisis developing in Vietnam
during i960. A formal Counterinsurgency Plan^ intended to be the basis of au
expanded prograra of assistance to Vietnam^ was being worked on through most
of that year^ but (presumably reflecting a subdued sense of urgency)^ it took
eight months to reach the White House. By that time_, a new Administration
had just ta,ken office. President Kennedy promptly approved the plan_, but
this merely set off lengthy negotiations with the Vietnamese about whether
and when they would do their share of the CIP. In late April^ though^ a crisis
atmosphere developed^ not because of anything fresh out of Vietnam^ but
because of a need to shore up the Vietnamese and others in Southeast Asia
in the face of a likely collapse of the U.S. position in Laos. This led to
a UoS. offer to discuss putting American troops into Vietnam^ or perha^ps
negotiate a bilateral security treaty with the Vietnamese. When^ however^
Vice President Johnson mentioned the possibility of troops to Diem in May^ Diem
said he wanted no troops yet. The idea of a bilateral treaty similarly
slipped out of sight. Consequently^ although the United States had itself
indicated a iriUlngness in May to discuss a deeper commitment^ the South
Vietnamese did not ta>.e up the opportunity^ and the Administration had no
occasion to face up to really hard decisions.
But by October^ the situation in Vietnatn had worsened. The VC
were becoming disturbingly aggressive. Now^ Diem did raise the question of
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a treaty. This request^ coming after the American offer in May to con-
sider such steps and in the context of a -worsening situation in VietnaiTij,
could hardly be ignored. The Taylor Mission and the Presidential reviev
and decisions of November followed.
The present paper is organized around these natural climaxes in -
the policy process. The balance of Part I describes the situation inherited
by the ne-w Administration. Part II covers the period through the May peak..
Part III covers the fall crisis.
II. THE CONTE}^
In January^ 1961^, there vere five issues that were going to affect
American policy toward Vietnam. They turned on:
1. The VC Insurgency Itself
An illustration of the growth of the insurgency^ but also of the
limits of U.S. concern can be seen in the I96O CINCPAC Comijiand History.
For several years prior to I96O, CINCPAC histories do not mention the VC
insurgency at all. In 196o_, the development of a counterinsurgency plan for
Vietnam (and simultaneously one for Laos) received a fair amount of atten-
tion. But when^ in April_j MAAG in Saigon asked for additional transports
and helicopters for the counterinsurgency effort^ CINCPAC turned doT/n the
requests for transports^ and OSD overruled the recommendation CINCPAC for-
warded for 6 helicopters. By December^ OSD was willing to approve sending
11 helicopters (of 16 newly requested) on an "emergenc;y" basis. But the
emergency was partly a matter of reassuring Diem after the November coup^
and the degree of emergency is suggested by the rate of delivery: h in
December^ and the balance over the next three months. 5/
The record_, in general^ indicates a level of concern such as that
illustrated by the helicopter decisions: gro\-7lng gradually through 1960^
but still pretty much of a back-burner issue so far as the attention and
sense of urgency it commanded among policy -level officials. As we will see_,
the new Kennedy Administration gave it more attention_, as the Eisenhower ,
Adtuini strati on undoubtedly would haA'-e had it remained in office. But it is
important (though hard^ now that Vietnara has loomed so large) to keep in
mind how secondary an issue the VC threat to Vietnam seemed to be in early
1961.
2, Problems ¥ith the Diem Government
Yet^ although the VC gains were not seen -- even in the dispatches
from Saigon -- as serious enough to threaten the iimuediate collapse of the
Diem government^ those gains did have the effect of raising difficult ques-
tic3ns about our relations with Diem that we had never had to face before.
I For by late 1960^ it was a quite widely held view that the Diem government
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vas probably going to be overthrown sooner or later^ barring major changes
from -vrithin. In contrast to the May 1959 KIE^s confident statement that
Diem "almost certainly" vould remain president "for many years_," ve find
the August i960 NIE predicting that the recent "adverse trends^" if con-
tinued^ would "almost certainly in time cause the collapse of Diem's
regime." 6/
The simple_, unhappy fact vas that whatever his triumphs in 1955
BXid 1956^ by the end of the 1950s the feeling was growing that the best
thing that could be said for Diem was that he .was holding the country to-
gether and keeping it from succumbing to the communists. Once even this
came into doubt^ talk among Vietnamese and eventually among Americans of
whether it might be better to look for alternative leadership became
inevitable.
The sense of trouble shows through even among the optjjnists. ¥e
find Kenneth Young^ U.S. Ambassador to Thailand and a strong believer in
Diem^ warning him in October^ I960 that "there seems to be somewhat of a
crisis of confidence in Vietnam." 7/
But the long list of measures Young suggested were all tactical
in nature^ and required no basic changes in the regime.
Our Ambassador in Saigon (Eldridge Durbrow) was more pessimistic:
...situation in Viet-Nam /December^ 1960/ is highly
dangerous to US interests. Communists are engaged in
large-scale guerrilla effort to take over country-
side and oust Diem's Government. Their activities have
steadily increased in intensity throughout this year.
In addition^ Diem is faced with widespread popular dis-
satisfaction with his government's inability to stem the
communist tide and its own heavy-handed methods of op-
eration. It seems clear that if he is to remain in
power he must meet these two challenges by improvements
in his methods of conducting var against communists and
in vigorous action to build greater popular support. We ■
should help and encourage him to talie effective action.
Should he not do so^ ve may -well be forced^ in not too
distant future^ to undertaJce difficult task of identify-
ing and supporting alternate leadership. 8/
But the difficulties (and risks) of that task looked forbidding.
During the IJovemb.-r^ I960 coup attempt the U.S. had apparently used its
influence to get the coup leaders to negotiate mth Diem for reforms^
allowing Diem to retain his position with reduced powers. Whether because
of their o^m indecision or U.S. pressure^ the coup leaders allowed a delay
that let Diem bring loyalist troops in to regain control. (Three years
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later^ a leader of the November^ 19^3 coup "somewhat emphatically" told,
an Merlcan agent that "it would do no good to send anyone around to
attempt to stop things^ as happened in November^ 1960/') 9/
The situation that was left -- with a number of American offi-
cials unhappy with Diem and doubtful that he was capable of winning the
war ^ yet unwilling to risk a coup -- produced strains within the
American government. Short of encouraging a coup^ we seemed to have two
alternatives: attempt to pressure Diem or attempt to so win his confi-
dence that he would accept our advice willingly. The only effective form
of U.S. pressure^ however^ was to withhold aid_, and doing so would sooner
or later wealien the war effort.
Consequently a division developed^ mainly (but not purely) along
the lines of Defense against State_, about the advisability of using pres-
sure. The division was particularly sharp since Diem seemed willing to go
part way^ at least^ in meeting our military suggestions^, so that the
Defense view tended to be that the U.S. would be weakening the war effort
if aid vrere withheld to seek to gain civil reforms that not many people in
Defense regarded as crucial. Besides^ it was argued^ Diem would not suc-
cumb to pressure anyway. ¥e would just encourage another coup_, and the
communists would exploit it.
Given this sort of argument^ there would always (at least through
1961) be at least two layers to decisions about aid to Vietnam: Fnat
should the U.S. be willing to give? and ¥hat_, if any^ demands should be
made on Diem' in return for the aid?
v
3. Problems With the Soviets
But from Washington^ both problems within Vietnam -- hov?- to deal
with the Viet Cong^ and how to deal with Diem -- seemed quite inconsequen-
tial compared to the problems of dealing with the Soviets. There were two
elements to the Soviet problem. The first ^ which only indirectly affected
Vietnam^ was the generally aggressive and confident posture of the Russians
at that time^ and the generally defensive position of the Anericans. To use
W.W. Rostow's terminology^ the Soviets were then entering the third year of
their "post-sputnik" offensive^ and their aggressiveness would continue
through the Cuban missile crisis. On the U.S. side there was dismay even
among Republicans (openly^ for example^ by Rockefeller; necessarily subdued
by Mxon^ but reported by any number of journalists on the basis of private
conversations) at what seemed to be an erosion of the American position in
the world. The Coolidge Commission^ appointed by the President^ warned him
I in January^ 1960^ 'to ^ among other steps^ '-close the missile gap" and gen-
erally strengthen our defenses. Kennedy^ of course^ made erosion of our
position in the world a major campaign issue. All of this made I96I a
peculiarly difficult year for Anericans to make concessions^ or give ground
to the Soviets when it could be avoided^ or even postponed. That was clear
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in January _j and everything thereafter that was_, or could be interpreted
to be a veak U.S. response^ only strengthened the pressure to hold on in
Vietnara. lo/
A further element of the Soviet problem impinged directly on _ ■
Vietnam. The nev Administration _, even before taking office^ was inclined
to believe that unconventional warfare was likely to be terrifically
important in the 1960s. In January 196l_, K2rushchev seconded that view
with his speech pledging Soviet support to "wars of national liberation."
Vietnam was where such a. war was actually going on. Indeed^ since the war
in Laos had moved far beyond the insurgency sta^e_, Vietnam was the only
place in the world where the Administration faced a well-developed Com-
munist effort to topple a pro-Western government with an externally-aided
pro -communist insurgency. It was a challenge that could hardly be ignored.
Y 4. The Situation in Laos
Meanwhile^ mthin Southeast Asia itself there was the peculiar |
problem of Laos^^ where the Western position was in the process of falling \
apart as Kennedy took office. The Eisenhower Administration had been giving
strong support to a pro-Am.erican faction in Laos. As a consequence^ the ,
neutralist faction had joined in an alliance irlth the pro-communist faction.
The Soviets were sending aid to the neutralist/communist alliance_j which
they recognized as the legitimate governtnent in Laos; the U.S. recognized
and aided the pro-western faction. Unfortunately_j it turned out that the
neutralist/communist forces were far more effective than those favored by
the U.S.^ and so it became clear that only by putting an American army
into Laos could the pro-Western faction be kept in power. Indeed^ it was
doubtful that even a coalition government headed by the neutralists (the
choice the U.S. adopted) could be salvaged. The coalition government solu-
tion would raise problems for other countries in Southeast Asia: there
would be doubts about U.S. commitments in that part of the world_j and
(since it was obvious that the communist forces would be left with de facto ■
control of eastern Laos)^ the settlement would create direct security
threats for Thailand and Vietnam* These problems would accompany a "good"
outcome in Laos (the coalition government); if the Pathet Lao chose to
simply overrun the country outright (as^ short of direct American inter-
vention^ they had the power to do)^ the problem, elsewhere in Southeast |
Asia would be so much the worse. Consequently^ throughout 196l_, we find 1
the effects of the Laos situation spilling over onto Vietnam.
5. The Special American Commitment to Vi etnam
Finally^ in this reviev;" of factors that would affect policy-making 1
on Vietnam^ we must note that South Vietnafn^ (unlike any of the other coun- [
tries in Southeast Asia) was essentially the creation of the United States. i
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^^ Without U.S. support Diem almost certainly could not have con-'
solidated his hold on the South during 1955 and 1956.
Without the threat of U.S. intervention^ South Vietnam could not
have refused to even discuss the elections called for in I956 under the
Geneva settlement without being jj:miediately overrun by the Viet Minh armies.
Without U.S. aid in the years following^ the Diem regime certainly,
and an independent South Vietnam aOmost as certainly, could not have sur-
vived .
Further, from 195^1 on there had been repeated statements of U.S.
support for South Vietnam of a sort that we would not find in our dealings
with other countries in this part of the world. It is true there was
nothing unqualified about this support: it was always economic, and
occasionally accompanied by statements suggesting that the Diem regme had
incurred an obligation to undertake reforms in return for our assistance.
But then, vntll I96I, there was no occasion to consider any assistance that
went beyond economic support and the usual sort of military equipment and
advice, and no suggestion that our continued support was in doubt.
Consequently, the U.S. had gradually developed a special commit-
ment in South Vietnam. It was certainly not absolutely binding, even at
the level of assistance existing at the start of 196I, much less at any
higher level the South Vietnamese might come to need or request. But the
commitment was there; to let it slip would be awkward, at the least.
^ Whether it really had any impact on later decisions is hard to say. Given
the other factors already discussed, it is not hard to believe that in its
absence, U.S. policy might have followed exactly the same course it has
followed. On the other hand, in the absence of a pre-existing special re- .
lation with South Vietnam, the U.S. in I961 possibly would have at least
considered a coalition government for Vietnam as well as Laos, and chosen
to limit direct U.S. involvement to Thailand and other countries in the area
historically independent of both Hanoi and Peking. But that is the moot est
sort of question. For if there had been no pre-existing commitment to South
Vietnam in I961, there would not have been a South Vietnam to worry about
anyway.
III. SUMMARY
Looking over the context we have been reviewing, it seems like a
situation in which mistakes would be easy to make. The Viet Cong threat was
serious enough to demand action; but not serious enough to compete with other
crises and problems for the attention of senior decision-makers. A sound
decision on tactics and levels of commitment to deal with the Viet Cong in-
volved as much a judgment on the internal politics of non-communists in
Vietnam as it did a judgment of the guerrillas' strength, and character,
and relation with Planoi. (Even a judgement that the war could be treated as
a strictly military problem after all, involved at least an implicit judge-
ment, and a controversial one, about Vietnamese politics.) Even if Diem
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looked not worth supporting it would "be painful to make a decision to let
him sink^ and especially so in the world context of I96I0 Faced with. a
challenge to deal with wars of national liberation^j it would be hard to
decide that the first one we happened to meet was "not our style o" And after
the U.S. stepped back in Laos^ it might be hard to persuade the Russians
that we intended to stand firm anywhere if we then gave up on Vietnam.
Finally^ if the UoS, suspected that the best course in Vietnam was to seek
immediately an alternative to Diem^ no one knew who the alternative might
be_j or whether getting rid of Diem would really make things better o
Such was the prospect of Vietnam as 196I began^ and a new Adminis-
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THE COUxiTEKIIiSURG-EKCY PLAIT
IV.B.
CHAPTER II
I. "WINTER, 1961
The Vietnam Counter-Insurgency Plan which vas being "worked on
through most of I960 finally reached the White House in late January^
apparently just after Kennedy took office. We do not have a document show-
ing the exact date^ but we know that Kennedy approved the main provisions of
the Plan after a meeting on January 28th_j and negotiations with Diem began
February I3. l/
The provisions of the CIP tell a good deal about how the Viet Cong
threat looked to American and Vietnamese officials" at the beginning of 19^1^
for there is nothing in the record to suggest that anyone -- either in
Saigon or Washington^ Vietnamese or American -- judged the CIP to be an in-
adequate response to the VC threat.
«
The U.S. offered Diem equipment and supplies to outfit a 20_,000 man
increase in his army. The cost was estimated at $28.4 million. The U.S.
also offered to train _, outfit and supply 32^000 micn of the Civil Guard (a
counterguerriJJa auxilliary) at a cost of $12.7 million. These two moves
would help Diem expand the WNKF to a total of 170^000 men^. and expand the
Civil Guard to a total of 68_,000 men. There were some further odds and ends
totalling less than another million. The full package added up to less than
$J+2 million^ which was a substantial but not enormous increment to on-going
U.S.- aid to Vietnam of about $220 million a year. (Since most of these
costs were for initial outfitting of new forces^ the package was mainly a
one-time shot in the arm.) 2/
For their part_, the Vietnamese were supposed to pay the local cur-
rency costs of the new forces^ and carry out a number of military and civil
reforms.
The key military reforms were to straighten out the chain of command^
and to develop an agreed overall plan of operations,
/The chain of com^nand problem was that control of the counter-
insurgency effort in the provinces was divided between the local
military commander and the Province Chief_, a personal appointee
of Diem^ and reporting directly to Diem. Even at a higher level^
3 regional fie3,d comraands reported directly to Diem^ by-passing
the Chief of Staff. So a total of ^2 officials with some sub-
stantial (and overlapping) control of the war effort reported
directly to Diem: 38 Province Chiefs^ 3 regional commanders_, and
the Chief of Staff. The "reform" eventually gotten from Diem put
A
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the regional coinmanders under the Chief of Staff ^ and com-
bined the office of Province Chief (usually a Mlitary man
in any event) and local field coimnander. But the Province
Chiefs still were personally responsible to Diein_, and
could appeal directly to him outside the nominal chain of
command. Diem^s reform^ consequently^ turned out to be
essentially meaningless. His reluctance to move on this
issue vas not surprising. After all^ the division and con-
fusion of military authority served a real purpose for a
ruler like Diem^ mth no broad base of support: it less-
ened the chance of a coup that vould throw him out.
_^he overall plan issue^ on vhich not even a paper agree-
ment vas reached during the period covered by this account,
was really an argument over strategy. It has a familiar
ring. -
^Diem seemed oriented very much towards maintaining at
least the pretense of control over all of South Vietnam. Con-
sequently, he favored maintaining military outposts (and
concentrating the population in Agrovilles, the predecessors
of the strategic hamlets) along "lines of strength" (gener-
ally main roads) which stretched throughout the country. To
assert at least nominal control over the countryside between
'these lines of strength, the military forces would period-
ically organize a sweep. In contrast to this, the American
plan stressed what MAAG called a "net and spear" concept.
Small units would scour the jungles beyond the pacified area.
¥[ien this "net" found an enemy unit, they would call in
reserves (the spear) for a concentrated attempt to destroy
the unit. As new areas were thus cleared, the net would be
pushed further out into previously uncontested areas. It is
not clear how well refined either concept was, or (with hind-
sight) whether the American plan was really a great deal more
realistic than Diem's. But the American interest in getting
Diem to agree to a plan does seem to have been primarily
oriented to getting him to agree to some systematic proce-
dure for using forces to clear areas of VC control, instead
of tying up most of his forces defending fixed installations,
with periodic uneventful sweeps through the hinterland, 7" 3/
On the civil side, the stress in the CIP was on trying to shore
up the regime's support within the cities by such steps as bringing
opposition leaders into the government, and giving the l^Iational Assembly
the power to investigate charges of mismanagement and corruption in the
executive.
TT
The Plan also called for "civic action" and other steps to in-
crease the change of winning positive loyalty from the peasants. \J
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A good deal of bureaucratic compromise had gone into the CIP.
Mbassador Durbrow only reluctantly conceded any real need for the
20^000 man force increase. The stress on civil reforms^ in particular
on civil reforms as part of a quid pro quo ^ came into the plan only
after the Saigon Embassy became involved^ although there vere general
allusions to such things even in the original military draft of the
CIP.
ITevertheless, there vas at least a paper agreement_, and so far
as the record shows^ substantial real agreement as veil. No one com-
plained the plan vas inadequate. It vould_j "if properly implemented^"
"turn 'the tide." And^ by implication^, it vould do so vithout any major
increase in American personnel in Vietnam^ and indeed^ aside from the
one -shot outfitting of the nev units _, vithout even any major increase
in American aid. 5/
None of this meant that the varnings that ve have seen in the
Saigon Embassy's dispatches or in the August SEIE vere not seriously
intended. What it did mean vas that^ as of early 196l_, the viev that
vas presented to senior officials in "Washington essentially shoved the
VC threat as a problem vhich could be pretty confidently handled^ given
a little more muscle for the array and some sharping up by the Vietnam-
ese administration. Any doubts expressed vent to the vill and compe-
tence of the Diem regime^ not to the strength of the VC^ the role of
Hanoi;, or the adequacy of U.S. aid.
Consequently^ among the assumptions listed as underlying the
CIP^ ve find (vith emphasis added):
That the Government of Viet-Nam has the basic potential
to cope vlth the Viet Cong guerrilla threat if necessary cor -
rective measures are talien and adequate forces are provided . 6/
That of course vas the heart of the CIP bargain: the U.S. vould
provide support for the "adequate forces" if Diem vould take the "neces-
sary corrective steps." The hinted corollary vas that our commitment to
'Diem should be contingent on his' performance : - ," .
That at the present time the Diem government offers the
best hope for defeating the Viet Cong, 7/ ■.
II. lAIJSDALE'S REPORT
Running against these suggestions (of a fi3:Tia bargaining position
contingent on Diem's performance)^ vas concern that if Diem vere overthrown
his successors might be no better; and that the VC might exploit the con-
fusion and perhaps even civil var folloiring a coup. Further^ there vas an
argujnent that part of Diem's reluctance to move on reforms vas that he vas
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afraid to make any concession that might weaken his grip: consequently
the U.S. needed to reassure him that he could count on our firm support
to hijn personally.
A strong statement of this point of view is contained in a
report submitted in January by Brig. General Edward Lansdale^ then the'
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. Lansdale
had become famous for his work in the Philippines advising on the suc-
cessful campaign against the Huk insurgents. In 1955 ^^^ 195^^ he was
a key figure in installing and establishing Diem as President of South
Vietnam. As mentioned in the Introduction^ Lansdale visited Vietnam in
early January. Here_j from his report^, are a few extracts on Diem and
how Lansdale felt he should be handled:
. . .We must support Ngo Dinh Diem until another strong
executive can replace him legally. President Diem feels that
Americans have attacked him almost as viciously as the Com-
munists^ and he has withdrawn into a shell for self -protection.
¥e have to show him by deeds _, not words alone ^ that we are his
friend. This vrill make our influence effective again.
• o
.If the next American official to talk to President Diem
would have the good sense to see him as a himaan being who has
been through a lot of hell for years — and not as an opponent
to be beaten to his knees — we would start regaining our in-
fluence y±th him in a healthy way. VJhatever else we might
thinly of him^ he has been unselfish in devoting his life to his
country and has little in personal belongings to show for it.
If we donH- like the heavy influence of Brother Ehu^ then let's
move someone of ours in close. This someone^ however^ must be
able to look at problems with understanding^ suggest better
solutions than does Nhu^ earn a position of influence....
Ambassador Durbrow should be transferred in the immediate
future. He has been in the 'forest of tigers' which is Viet-
nam for nearly four years now and I doubt that he himself
realizes how tired he has become or how close he is to the in-
dividual trees in this big woods. Correctly or not^ the
recognized government of Vietnam does not look upon him as a
frlend_j believing he sympathized strongly with the coup
leaders of 11 November.
. . .Ngo Dinh Diem is still the only Vietnamese \r±th execu-
tive ability and the required determination to be an effective
President. I believe there mil be another attempt to get rid
of him soon^ unless the U.So makes it clear that we are back-
ing him as the elected top man. If the 11 November coup had
been successful^ I believe that a numher of highly selfish and
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mediocre people vouJLd be squabbling among themselves for
power while the Communists took over. The Communists will
be more alert to exploit the next coup attempt...* 8/
Lansdale*s view was not immediately taken up^ even though
Hilsman reports that his presentation impressed Kennedy enough to start
the President thinking about sending the General to Saigon as our next
Ambassador. 9/ Instead^ Kennedy made what was under the circumstances
the easiest^ least tim.e-consuming decision^ which was simply to let the
Ambassador he had inherited, from the Eisenhower Administration go for-
ward and make a try with the plan and negotiating tactics already pre-
pared.
Durbrow's guidance specif ical3,y tells him (in instructions he
certainly found suited his own view perfectly):
...considered U.S. view (is) that success requires im-
plementation entire plan... If Ambassador considers GVN
does not provide necessary cooperation; he should inform
Washington with recommendations which may include suspen-
sion U.S. contribution. lO/
III. KEGOT^IATIN G THE CIP
Kennedy's approval of the CIP apparently was seen as quite a
routine action. None of the memoirs of the period give it any particu-
lar attention. And^ although both Schlesinger and Hilsman refer to
General Lansdale's report as shocking the President about the state of
things in Vietnara^ that report itself does not criticize the dP^ or
the adequacy of its programs.
The guidance to Dirrbrow assumed agreement could be reached
"within two weeks." This choice of language in the guidance cable im-
plies that we believed Diem would quickly agree on the terms of the CIP;
and the question of using pressure against him ("suspension of U.S. con-
tribution") would only arise later^ should he fail to follow through on
his part of the agreement, ll/
As it turned out; Durbrow's efforts took a more complicated
form. Even reaching a nominal agreement on the CIP took about 6 weeks.
Then; Durbrow recommended holding up what is constantly referred to as
"the green light" on increased aid until Diem had actually signed decrees
implementing his major promises.
On March 8 (in response to a Washington s\iggestion for stepping
up some aid prior to agreement on the CIP); Saigon cabled that:
...despite pressure of Biibassy and MAAG; GVN has not
decreed the required measures and will continue to delay
unless highly pressured to act. 12/
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But by the l6th both the MAAG Chief and the Mbassador vere
taking a gentler line. Durbrow^s cable of that date reports that
agreement on military reforms had reached a poi:ot "vhich MMG considers
it can live -with provided GVE follows through ^vith proper implementa-
tioUc" He -was more concerned about the civil reforms^ but nevertheless
concluded the cable >7lth: ' •
Comments: Diem -was most affable _, exuded confidence
and for first time expressed some gratitude our CIP efforts
which he promised implement as best he could. ' Again before
giving full green light believe ve should avfait outcome
detail discussion by GW-US officials. In meantime MAAG
quietly ordering some equipment for 20^000 increase. 13/
And a veek later^ Washington replied^ agreeing that the "green
light" should be held up until the CIP was approved^ but also noting
that since success depended on the mlling cooperation of the Vietnaraese^j
the Etiibassy ought not to push Diem too hard in the negotiations. 1^/ j
Following this_, the CIP negotiations dragged on inconclusively^ I
and there is a ghostly quality to it all. There are cables giving en- '
couraging progress reports which^ in fact^ seem limited to vague promises !
which^ with hindsight^ we know to have been quite meaningless. MAAG (and j
eventually the JCS in Washington) grew increasingly Ijupatient with
Durbrow^s insistence on further holding up the "green light." They wanted
to get on mth the war.
By the end^ Durbrow was simply holding out for Diem to actually
complete the paperwork on some steps he had long ago said he intended to
take. His very last cable (May 3) gives a good feeling for the flavor
of the negotiations that had been going on between Diem and Durbrow for
the nearly 3 months since the CIP talks began (and indeed it gives the
flavor of Durbrow' s relations with Diem at least since the previous
October).
During the inauguration reception at Palace April 29^
Diem took me aside and asked if I had given green light for ,
US iraplementation of our part of coimter insurgency plan
(CIP). I replied franlily that I had not and noted that as
stated in my letter of February 13 certain minimum actions
must be taken by the GW first if CIP is to produce results.
I listed following actions: (l) Establishment of a central
intelligence organization; (2) assignment of operational
control for counter insurgency operations within military
chain of command; and (3) implementation of reforms an-
nounced by Diem on February 6. Diem replied that he would
do all these things^ but that time was requj.red to work
out details. He said various GW Cabinet members and Joint
.s
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General Staff studying proposals and have different ideas.
Since he wants to be sure that whatever done is veil thought
out^ will be successful and not have to be changed in future
he letting responsible officials thoroughly consider pro-
posals. Diem stated that Secretary Thuan working on detailed
statute for central intelligence organization^ but it re-
quired more vrork and needs to be polished up. I replied that
frankly time was slipping by and as yet there no action on
these three points^ which essential before 1 can give "green
light" on equipment for 20^000 increase in armed forces.
In connection Diem remarks^ Vice' President Tho told me April
28 that he had not seen CIP^ although he had heard of its
existence_, and he does not believe other Ministers have seen
it either. Question thus arises as to whether Diem's state-
ment that various Cabinet members studying CIP refers only to
Thuan. I gave Tho fairly detailed fill-in on CIP contents.
Tho said action now by President^ at least implementation of
reforms^ needed in order .capitalize on present ups^-ang in
popular feeling about situation following GW success in carry-
ing out elections despite VC efforts to disrupt. Stating he
did not know when if ever reforms will be implemented^ he com-
mented that failure take such action after so many promises
would lose all momentum gained from elections. Tho added that^
aside from psychological impact- _, reforms likely take (sic_; 3}is-ke)
little change unless* Diem himself changes his method of opera-
ting. Ke noticed that if "super ministers" mthout real
authority the?/ likely becorae 'ju.st additional level in bureauc-
racy ^'D-thout making GYT^T more effective.
On May 2 in course my formal farewell call I asked Diem if
decrees yet signed on intelligence organization^ chain of
command and reforms. Diem stated he working on these matters
but went through usual citation of difficulties including
problem of convincing available personnel that they capable
and qualified carry out responsibilities. He stated he already
naraed Colonel I^lguyen Van Yankee to head intelligence organiza-
tion^ Colonel Yanlvee has selected building for his headquarters
and in process recruiting staff ^ while Secretary Thuan working
on statute for organization. Re chain of command^ I strongly
emphasized that this one of most important factors in CIP^ GVN
must organize itself to follow national plan with one man in
charge operational control and not waste time chasing will of
wisps. Diem replied that he not feeling well (he has cold) and
with inauguration he has not had time focus on this question
but he' will do it. Pie stated that he realizes only effective
way is to place counter insurgency operations under Joint
General Staff^ but that his generals disagreed as to exactly
how this should be done.
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Diem^ referring Sihanoui^'s Vientiane press conference (Vien-
tiane's 1979)^ stated he did not believe there would be lu-
nation conference and he afraid Laos almost lost already.
Diem argued that since PL occupy almost all of southern Laos_j
ve must agree increase in RVMF to provide additional per-
sonnel to train self defense corps which in very bad shape.
Comment: Although Thuan has indicated to /mMG Chief/ General
McGarr decree designating single officer to conduct counter
insurgency operations being signed iinminently^ I asked him
morning May 3 when seeing off Harriman and Lemnitzer whether
I would receive before departure "present" he has long prom-
ised me. He replied presents often come when least expected^
which apparently means Diem not yet ready sign decree.
While we should proceed v^ith procurement equipment for 20^000
increase as recommended my l6o6; I do not believe GVN shou].d
be informed of this green light^ particularly until above
decree signed. Durbrow. I5/
The February 6 reforms referred to involved a cabinet re-organi-
zation Diem had announced before the start of the CIP negotiations. The
intelligence re- organization was to consolidate the 7 existing services.
The chain of command problem has been discussed above. Diem finally issued
decrees on all these points a few days after Durbrow went home. The de-
crees were essentially meaningless: exactly these same issues remained
high on the list of "necessary reforms" called for after the Taylor Mission^
and indeed throughout the rest of Diera's life.
IV. DURBROW 'S TACTICS
Did Durbrow 's tactics make sense? There is an argument to be
made both ways. Certainly if Durbrow 's focus was on the pro forma paper-
work^ then they did not. Mere formal organizational re-arrangements
(unifying the then 7 intelligence services into 1^ setting up at least a
nominal chain of command for the war) often change very little even when
they are seriously intended. To the extent they are not seriously in-
tended^ they are almost certain to be meaningless. Vice President Tho^ of
course^ is cited in the cable as making exactly that point. The very fact
that Durbrow chose to include this remark in the cable (without questioning
it) suggests he agreed. But if squeezing the formal decrees out of Diem
really did not mean much^ then v?'hat was the point of exacerbating relations
with Diem (not to mention relations with the military members of the U.S.
mission) to get them? In hindsight^ we can say there was none^ unless the
U.S. really meant what it had said about making U.S. support for Diem con-
tingent on his talking "corrective measures." Then the function of those
tactics would not have been to squeeze a probably m^eanlngless concession
from Diemj for the cable quoted alone makes it pretty clear that it would
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have been naive to expect much follow-though from Diem. The purpose
would have been to begin the process of separating U.S. support for .
Vietnam from support for the Diem regijiie^ and to lay the basis for
stronger such signals in the future unless Diem underwent some miracu-
lous reformation. That^ of course^ is exactly the tack the U.S.
followed in the fall of 1963^ once the Administration had really de-
cided that we coiald not go on with the Diem regime as it then existed.
*
Ml this can be said wi.th hindsight. It is not clear how much
of this line of thinking should be attributed to American officials in
Washington or Saigon at the time. There is no hint in the cables we
have that Durbrow was thinking this way. Rather he seems to have felt
that the concessions he was wringing from Diem represented real progress^
but that we would have to keep up the pressure (presumably with threats
to suspend aid — as his guidance considered — even after the "green
light" was given) to keep goading Diem in the right direction. Meanwhile^
the predominant view (pushed most strongly _j but hardly exclusively by the
military) was that we should^ and could effectively get on with the war
with as much cooperation as we could get from Diem short of interfering
with the war effort: it was all right to try for a quid pro quo on aid^
but not very hard. The Lansdale view went even fi;.rther_, stressing the
need for a demonstration of positive^ essentially unqualified support for
Diem if only to discourage a further coup attempt^ which Lansdale saw as
the main short -run danger.
In a significant way^ Lansdale *s view was not very different in
its analysis of tactics from the view that Diem was hopeless. Both
Lansdale^ with his strong pro-Diem view^ and men like Galbraith with a
strong anti-Diem view^ agreed that Diem could not be pressured into re-
forming this regime. ("He won't change^ because he can't change^" \rrote
Galbraith in a cable we will quote in more detail later.)
"Where the Lansdale and Galbraith views differed — a fundamental
difference^ of course^-- was in their estimate of the balance of risks of
a coupo Lansdale^ and obviously his view carried the day^ believed that a
coup was much more likely to make things worse than make things better.
This must have been an especia3-ly hard view to argue against in I961, when
Diem did not look as hopeless as he would later^ and when a strong argu-
ment could be made that the U.S. just could not afford at that time to
risk the collapse of a pro-Western government in Vietnam. It must have
seemed essentially irresistable to take the route of at least postponing^
as seemed quite feasible^ a decision on such a tough and risky course as
holding back on support for Diem. The President^ after all^ could remem-
ber the charges that the Truman Administration had given away China by
holding back on aid to Chiang to tiy to pressure him toward reform. As a
young Congressman^ he had even joined the chorus.
Meanwhile Durbrovr was about to come hom^e (he had been in Vietnam
for k years); security problems in Vietnam were^ at best^ not improving;
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and the repercussions of Laos vere spilling over and -would make fur-
ther moves on Vietnam an urgent matter « By the middj,e of April_, the
Administration vas undertaking its first close look at the problan
in Vietnam (in contrast to the almost automatic approval of the CIP
during the opening days of the nev Administration).
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IV.B.
THE SPRING DECISIONS - I
CHAPTER III
I. THE "PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAM"
The development of what eventually came to be called "The Presi-
dential Program for Vietnam" formally began with this memorandum from
McNamara to Gilpatric:
20 April 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
This will confirm our discussion of this morning during
which I stated that the President has asked that you:
a. Appraise the current status and future prospects of
the Communist drive to dominate South Viet-Nam.
b. Recommend a series of actions (military^ political
and/or economic^ overt and/or covert) which^ in your
■ - opinion^ will prevent Communist domination of that
country.
The President would like to receive your report on or
before Thursday^ April 27.
During the course of your stLidy^ you should draw^ to the
extent you believe necessary _, upon the views and resources of
the State Department and CIA. Mr. Chester Bowles was present
when the President discussed the matter with me^ and I have
reviewed the project with Mr. Allen Dulles. Further^ the
President stated that Mr. Walt Rostow would be available to
counsel with you. l/
GilpatriCj although obviously given a completely free hand under the
terms of the memo_, nevertheless set up an interagency task force to work
on the report. A draft was ready April 26^ and Gilpatric sent it to the
President the following day. But this turned out to be only the first,,
and relatively unioiportant phase of the effort. For the Laos crisis came
to a boil just ac the first Gilpatric report was finished^ and the Task
Force was continued with the essentially new mission of a recommending
additional measure to keep our position from falling apart in the wake of
what was happening in Laos- Consequently^, to understand these late-
April^ early-May decisions^ we have to treat separately the initial
Gilpatric effort and the later^ primarily State-drafted revision^ dated
May 6. The same general factors were in the background of both efforts^
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although Laos vas only one of the things that influenced the April 26
effort^ vhile it became the overvheltning element in the May 6 effort.
It is worth setting out these influencing factors^, specifically:
1. The security situation in Vietnamo
2. The Administration's special interest in counter-insurgencyo
3o The apparent futility and divisiveness oT the Dujrhrow (pres-
sure) tactics for dealing with Diem.
4o Eventually most important^ and substantially narrowing the
range of options realistically open to the Administration^
the weakness of US policy in Laos^ and the consequent
strongly felt need for a signal of firm policy in Vietnamo
lo The Security Situation in Vietnam
The VC threat in Vietnam looked worse in April than it had in
Januaryo We will see that Gilpatric's report painted a bleak pictureo
Yet^ there is no hint in the record that concern about the immediate situa-
tion in Vietnam was a major factor in the decision to formulate a new
program..
VC strength was estimated at 3-15^000 in Lansdale's January memo-
randum; 8-10^000 in a March NIE; 10^000 in an April briefing paper (appar-
ently by Lansdale) immediately preceding — and recommending -- the Gilpatric
Task Force; then 12^,000 one week later in the Gilpatric report proper. VC
incidents were reported high for April (according to the Task Force report^
650 per month _j k times higher than January)^ but an upsurge in activity had
long been predicted to coincide with the Vietnamese elections o As would
happen in the future^ the failure of the VC to prevent the elections was
considered a sign of government strength o 2
On the basis of the Task Force statistics^, we could assume that
the situation was deteriorating rapidly: taken literally^ they indicate an
increase in VC strength of 20 percent in about a week; plus the large in-
crease in incidents o But neither cables from the field; nor the Washington
files show any sense of a sharply deteriorating situationo And; as we will
see; the initial Task Force Report; despite its crisis tone; recommended
no increase "in military strength for the Vietnamese; only more generous US
financial aid to forces already planned under the CIPo
2. The Administration's Special Interest in Counter-insurgency
■f _
A more important impetus to the Gilpatric effort than any sense
of deterioration in Vietnam seems to have been the Administration's
general interest in doing something about counter-insurgency warfare;
combined with an interest in finding more informal and more efficient means
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of supervising policy "than the Eisenhower Administration's elaborate
National Seciirity structure o The effort in Vietnam obviously required
some coordination of separate efforts by at least State^ Defense^ CIA_,
and ICA (a predecessor of AID). Further^ once a coordinated program was
vorked out,, the idea appears to have been to focus responsibility for
seeing to it that the program was carried out on some clearly identified
individualo This search for a better way to organize policy seems to
have been the principal motive behind the initial Gilpatric effort^ al-
though it became inconsec^uential after the original submission o
3« The Apparent Futility and Divisiveness of the Durbrow (Pressui'e )
Tactics for Dealing With Diem
Late April was a peculiarly appropriate time to undertake the
sort of sharpening up of policy and its organization just described o It
was probably clear by then that Durbrow' s pressui-e tactics were not really
accomplishing much with Diemo Besides^j Durbrow had been in Vietnam for
four years by Aprils and a new Ambassador would normally have been sent in
any event o Fritz Nolting had been chosen by early April; and he was
scheduled to take over in early Mayo Fuxther^ Diem had just been reelected^
an essentially meaningless formality to be siore^ but still one more thing
that helped make late April a logical time for taking a fresh look at US
relations with Diemo And even to people who believed that a continuation
of Durbrow' s pressure tactics might be the best approach to Diem^ events
elsewhere and especially in Laos must have raised questions about whether
it was a politic time to be threatening to withhold aid.
^o The Weakness of US Policy in Laos^ and the Need for a Signal of
Firm Policy in Vietnam
■ Tb.e situation in the world that April seemed to create an
urgent requirement for the US to do something to demonstrate firmness^
and especially so in Southeast Asiao The Task Force was set up the day
after the Bay of Pigs invasion force surrendered^ and at a time when the
Laos crisis was obviously coming to heado There had been implicit agree-
ment in principle between the US and the Soviets to seek a cease fire in
Laos and to organize a neutral coalition government o But it was not clear
at all that the cease-fire would come while there was anything left worth
arguing about in the hands of the pro-Western factiouo Gilpatric' s
initial Task Force report reached the President the day of a crisis meeting
on Laos; and the more important second phase of the effort began then^ in
an atmosphere wholly dominated by LaoSo
But even before the Laos crisis reached its peak, there was a sense in
Washington and generally in the world that put strong pressirres on the
Administration to look for ways to take a firm stand somewhere; and if it
wa:s not to be in Laos^ then Vietnam was next under the gun.
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Something of the mood of the time can be sensed in these quotes_, one
from a March 28 I^IE on Southeast Asia_, another from Lansdale's notes^ and
finally a significant question from a Kennedy press conference:
From th e NIE :
There is a deep awareness among the countries of Southeast Asia
that developments in the I^otian crisis^ and its outcome _, have a
profound impact on their future o The governments of the area
tend to regard the Laotian crisis as a symbolic test of strengths
between the major powers of the West and the Communist bloc. 3/
From Lansdale^s notes (about April 2l ):
lo Psychological — YE believed always they main target o Now
it comes — 'when ou-r tu:m comes_, will we be treated the same
as Laos?» Main task GW confidence in US. hj
And suggesting the more general tone of the time (even a week before
the Bay of Pigs^ prompted by the Soviet orbiting of a man in space) this
CLuestion at Kennedy's April 12 news conference:
Mto President,, this question might better be asked at a history
class than at a news conference^ but here it is anyway^ The
Communists seem to be putting us on the defensive on a number of
fronts -- now^ again^ in spacoo Wars aside^, do you think there
is a danger that their system is going to prove more durable than
ourSo 5/
The President answered with cautious reassurance o Eight days later^
after the Bay of Pigs^ and the day he ordered the Task Force to go ahead_,
he told the Association of Newspaper Editors:
• 000
it is clearer than ever that we face a relentless struggle
in every corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of
armies_3 or even nuclear armaments. Tlie armies are there <> But
they serve primarily as the shield behind which subversion^
infiltration^ and a host of other tactics steadily advance^
picking off vulnerable areas one by one in situations that do
not permit our own armed intervention^ o o o We dare not fail to
see the insidious nature of this new and deeper struggle o We
dare not fail to grasp the new concepts^ the new tools^ the
new sense of urgency we will need to combat it -- whether in
Cuba or South Vietnamo 6/ (Notice Kennedy's exp3.icit assump-
tion about US armed intervention as a means of dealing with
insurgencies. Not too much can be read into his remark^ for it
probably was inspired primarily by criticism of his refusal to
try to save the Bay of Pigs contingent. But the balance of the
record adds significance to the comment.)
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IIo THE APRIL 26 REPORT
The available Gilpatric file consists mostly of drafts of the report
and memos from Lansdaleo It contains a memorandum dated April 13; in
vhich Lansdale advised Gilpatric of a meeting with Rostow^^ at which Rostov
shoved Lansdale a copy of a memorandum to Kennedy recommending a fresh
crack at the Vietnam situationo Here is Rostov's memorandum:
April 12^ 1961
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDED
FROM: WR
I^ov that the Viet-Nam election is over^ I believe ve must
turn to gearing up the whole Viet-Nam operationo Among the pos-
sible lines of action that might be considered at an early high
level meeting are the following:
lo The appointment of a full time first-rate back-stop man
in Washington o McNamara^ as veil as your staff ^ believes this to
be essential.
2. The briefing of our new Ambassador ^ Fritz Nolting^ includ-
ing sufficient talk with yourself so that he fully imderstands the
priority you attach to the Viet-Nam problemo
3o A possible visit to Viet-Nam in the near future by the
Vice President.
ko A possible visit to the United States of Mto Thuan^
acting Defense Minister^ and one of the fev men around Diem with
operational capacity and vigor
5o The sending to Viet-Nam of a research and development and
military hardvrare team which would explore with General McGarr
vhich of the various techniq.ues and gadgets nov available or being
explored might be relevant and useful in the Viet-Nam operationo
60 The raising of the MAAG ceiling;, which involves some
diplomacy^ unless we can find an alternative way of introducing
into the Viet-Nam operation a substantial number of Special
Forces types.
7<. The question of replacing the present ICA Chief in Viet-
Nam^ who_j by all accounts^ has expended his capital*, We need a
vigorous man who can vrork veil vith the military^ since some of
the rural development problems relate closely to guerrilla opera-
tions.
^
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8o Settling the q_uestion of the extra funds for Diezno
9o The tactics of persuading Diem to move more rapid2.y to
broaden the base of his government; as veil as to decrease its
centralization and improve its efficiency.
Against the backgroimd of decisions we should urgently take
on these matters^, you may wish to prepare a letter to Diem which
would not only congratulate him^ reaffirm our support^ and
specify new initiatives we are prepared to take_j but would make
clear to him the urgency you attach to a more effective political
and morale setting for his military operationj, now that the
elections are successfully behind him^
Neither this memo^ nor other available papers ^ give us a basis for
judging how far the stress on the importance of Vietnam was already in-
fluenced by developments in Iaos_j and how much it reflects a separable
interest in taking on the challenge of "wars of liberatiouo" Both were
undoubtedly important. But this Rostov memo turned out to be pretty close
to an agenda for the initial Task Force report. It seems very safe to
assujiie that the " full-time _j first-rate^ back-stop man in Washington""
Rostow had in mind was Lansdaleo (Gilpatric himself obviously could not
be expected to spend full-time on Vietnamo ) Presiuaably the President's
request for the Gilpatric report was intended as either a' method of easing
Lansdale into that role^ or at least of trying him out in it.
Following the description of the Rostow memo^ Gi2,patric's file con-
tains several carbon copies of a long paper^ unsigned but certainly by
Iansdale_5 which among other things recommends that the President set up a
Task Force for Vietnam which would lay out a detailed program of action
and go on to supervise the implementation of that program. The date on
the paper is April 19^ but a draft must have been prepared some days
earlier; probably about the time of lansdale' s discussion with Rostow on
the 13th; since the available copies recommended that the Task Force sub-
mit its report to the President by April 21. The paper explicitly foresaw
a major role for General Lansdale both in the Task Force^ and thereafter
in supervising the implementation of the report.
This Task Force was apparently intended to supersede what the paper
refers to as "one of the customary working groups in Washington" vhich
was "being called together next week by John Steeves^ Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs o"
In view of all this^ it is not surprising to find that the first
phase of the Task Force effort appears^ from the record^ to have been
very much a Gilpatric -lansdale show. The first meeting of the group
(which included State and CIA representatives) was apparently held
April 2ky four days after Gilpatric was told to go ahead o A draft report
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was ready the 26th, following individaial raeetings between members and
Gilpatric and Lansdale, Present files do not show whether there v?as
another fiill meeting of the group before the first version of the report
(d3,ted April 26) >?as sent to the President on the 27th.
Here are the opening sections, which introduce the list of proposed
auctions which malie up the program, j/
■ A PR0GR/\I--1 OF ACTIQI';! TO PRFn/ENT CQMI-'IUITIST D0MIMTI01\^ OP
SOUTH VIETNMl
APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION
•
After meeting in Hanoi on 13 May 1959; the Central Com:Qiittee
of the North Vietnamese Communist Party publicly announced its
intention "to smash" the government of President Diem. Follow-
ing this decision^ the Viet Cong have significantly inc3-eased
their progrein of infiltration, subversion, sabotage and assas-
sination designed to achieve this end.
At the North Vietnamese Comiaujiist Party Congress in Septe^mber
i960, the earlier declaration of underground war by the Party's
Control Committee v/as reaffirmed. Tliis action 'bj the Party
Congress took place oii'ly amonth after Kong Le's coup in Lp.os.
Scarcely two months later there vTas a mllitai^f uprising in
"Saigon. The t'ormoil created throughout the area by this rapid
succession of events provides an ideal eirvironment for the Com-
munist "master plan" to take over all of Southeast Asia.
Since that time, as can be seen from the attached map, the
. internal secuj'ity situation in South Vietnam has become critical -
VJhat amounts to a state of active guerrilla vjs.rfare now exists
throu^iout the country. The nuxaber of Viet Ccng I:.ard-core
Communists has increased from J-S-UoO in early 190O to an estimated
12^000 today. The number of violent incidents per month now
averages 650. Casualties on both sides totaled more than U5OO
during the first three months of this year. Fifty -eight percent
of the coiaitry is under some degree of CommiJinist control^ rang-
ing from harassment and night raids to almost complete adjiiinis-
trative jurisdiction in the Communist "secure areas."
The Viet Cong over the past two years have succeeded in
stepping up the pace and intensity of their attacks to the point
where South Vietnam is nearing the decisive phase in its battle
for survival. If the situation continues to deteriorate, the
Cominunists mil be able to press on to their strategic goal of
establishing a rival "National Liberation Front" government in
one of these "secuxe areas" thereby plunging the nation into
open civil v/ar. They have publicly announced that they will
"take over the country before the end of I90I."
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This situation is thus critical,, but is not hopeless. The
Vietnamese Government^ with American aid^ has increased its
capabilities to fight its attackers^ and provides a base upon
which the necessary additional effort can be founded to defeat
the Communist attack. Should the Communist effort increase^
either directly or as a result of a collapse of Laosy additional
measures beyond those proposed herein would be necessary.
In shorty the situation in South Vietnam has reached the
point where^ at least for the time being^? primary emphasis
should be placed on providing a solution to the internal se-
curity problem.
The US Objective : To create a viable and increasingly demo-
cratic society in South Vietnam and to prevent Communist domina-
tion of the co-untry.
Concept of Operations : To initiate on an accelerated basis^
a series of mutually supporting actions of a military^ political
economic^ psychological and covert character designed to achieve
this objective. In so doings it is intended to use^ and where
appropriate extend^ expedite or build upon the existing US and
Government of Vietnam (GVI^) programs already underway in South
Vietnam. There is neither the time available nor any sound .
justification for "starting from scratch." Rather the need is
to focus the US effort in South Vietnam on the immediate internal
security problem; to infuse it with a sense of urgency and a dedi-
cation to the overall US objective; to achieve^ through coopera-
tive inter- departmental support both in the field and in Washington^
the operational flexibility needed to apply the available US assets
in a manner best calculated to achieve our objective in Vietnam;
and^ finally^ to impress on our friends^ the Vietnamese^ and on our
foes^ the Viet Cong^ that come what may^ the US intends to win this
battle.
The program that followed this strongly worded introduction was very
modesty not merely compared to current US involvement^ but to the effort
the US imdertook following the Taylor Mission in the fall. The program is
essentially sjjnply a moderate acceleration of the CIP program approved in
January^ with a great deal of stress on vigor^ enthusiasm^ and strong
leadership in carrying out the programo
In particular^ the program proposes no increase in the Vietnamese
army^ and only a moderate (in hindsight, inconsequential) increase in the
size of our MMG mission. The main military measures were for the US to
pr.ovide financial support for the 20j000-man increase in the RVMF and to
provide support for the full complement of counter- insurgency auxiliary
forces (Civil Guard and Self -Defense Corps) planned by Diem. Both were
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modest steps. For under the CIP we -were already planning to pay support
costs for 150;,000 men of the RYEAF and 32^000 men of the Civil Guard o This
Task Force proposal^ which had been urged for some weeks by MAAG in Saigon^
simply said that we would provide the same support for all the Vietnamese
forces that we had already planned to provide for most of them.
For the rest_j the Presidential Program in its final form^ issued
May 19j turned out (after a great deal of stirring around) to be close to
that proposed in the April 26 draft o
Two comments are needed on this material. Firsts the program Lansdale
and Gilpatric proposed was not so narrowly military as the repeated em-
phasis on priority for the internal secirrity problem might suggest o Rather^
the emphasis was on stabilizing the countryside^j in contrast to pressing
Diem on political and administrative reforms mainly of interest to Diem' s
■urban criticSo This reflected both Lansdale' s judgments on counter-
insurgency^ which look good in hindsight,, and his strongly pro-Diem
orientation^ which looks much less goodo
Second^ the reference to a communist "master plan" for Southeast Asia
(and similar language is found in a number of other staff papers through
the balance of I961) suggests a view of the situation which has been much
criticized recently by men like Galbraith and Kennano Public comjnents by
those who were closely involved (both those critical of policy since 19^5^
such as Sorenson and lillsrcis/a, and those supporting the Administration^
such as William Bundy) suggest a more sophisticated view of the problem.
Here we simply note that the formal staff work available strongly supports
Galbraith and Kennan_j although this does not necessarily imply that the
senior members of the Administration shared the view that North Vietnam was
operating (in the words of another staff paper) as the "implementing agent
of Bloc policy" rather than in fairly conventional^ mainly non-ideological
pursuit of its own national interests 8/
III. lANSDALE^S ROLE
In his April 27 memorandum transmitting the Report to the President^
Gilpatric noted that:
.o.in the short time available to the Task Force it was not
possible to develop the program in complete detailo However^
there has been prepared a plan for mutually supporting actions
of a political^j military^ economic _j psychological^ and covert
character which can be refined periodically on the basis of
further recommendations from the fields
Toward this end^ Brigadier General EoG. Lansdale^ USAF^ who
has been designated Operations Officer for the Task Force^ will
proceed to Vietnam immediately after the program receives
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Presidential approval. Following on the spot discussions
with US and Vietnamese officials^ he \-i±ll forv/ard to the Director
of the Tasli Porce specific recommendations for action in support
of the attached program.
This appears to have "been the high point of Lansdale's role in Vietnam
policy. Lansdale hj this time had already sent (with Gilpatric^s approval)
messages requesting various people to meet him in Saigon^ May 5- This is
from a memorandiim he sent to Richard Bissell^ then still a Deputy Director
of the CIA^ requesting the services of one of his colleagues from the
1955 -195^ experience in Vietnam:
I realize Redick is cornmitted to an important joh in Laos
and that this is a difficult time in that trouble spot. I do
feel^ however^ that we may ^^et save Vietnam and that our best
effort should be put into it,
Redick_, in my opinion^ is now so much a part of the iininhib-
ited communications between President Diem and myself that it goes
far beyond the qu.estion of having an interpreter. His particiaar
facility for appreciating iny meaning in words and the thoughts
of Diem in return is practically indispensable to me in the role
I am assigned in seelring President Kennedy *s goal for Vietnam. 9/
But none of this \;as to be. Present files contain a thermofax of
McNamara's copy of the mamorandujn Gilpatric sent to the President. In
McNamara's handv/riting the words (Lansdale) "will proceed to Vietnam im-
mediately" are changed to "will proceed to Vietnam when requested by the
Aml:>assador." As we \fill see below^ when the Task Force Report was re-
drafted the nezt week^ Lansdale 's key role disappears entirely^ at the
request of the State Depajrtment, but presumably with the concurrence of
the V/liite House.
IV. KEIMSDY'S APRIL 29 DECISIONS
Although our record is not clear, it appears that the cover memorandum
was sent to the President as Gilpatric had signed it^ and that McNeinara's
correction reflected a decision made after the paper vrent to the President,
rather than a change in the language of the memo. In any event, at a
meeting on April 29^ President Kennedy approved only the quite limited mili-
tary proposals of the dra^ft report it transmitted. Decisions were deferred
on the balance of the paper, which now included an annex Issued April 28 on
much moz'e substantial additional military aid believed required by the
situation in Lao&. The military measuj^es approved dur-ing this first go-
around were:
(1) Increase the I^IAAG as necessary to insure the effective im-
plementation of the military portion of the program including
the training of a 20,000-m3,n addition to the present GVN armed.
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forces of 150^000o Initial appraisal of nev tasks assigned
CHMMG indicates that approximately 100 additional military
personnel will be required immediately in addition to the
present complement of 685 o
(2) Expand MAAG responsibilities to include authority to provide
support and advice to the Self Defense Corps with a strength of
approximately 40_j000o .
(3) Authorize I^-lAP support for the entire Civil Guard Force of
68^000o MAP support is now authorized for 32jOOOj the remaining
36^000 are not now adequately trained and equipped o
(h) Install as a matter of priority a radar s-arveillance capa-
bility which will enable the GW to obtain warning of Communist
over-flights being conducted for intelligence or clandestine air
supply purposes o Initially^ this capability should be provided
from US mobile radar capability.
(5) Provide MP support for the Vietnamese JuJik Force as a means
of preventing Viet Cong clandestine supply and infiltration into
South Vietnam by water o MAP support^ which was not provided in
the Counterinsurgency Plan^ will include training of junk crews
in Vietnam or at US bases by US Navy personnelo lO/
The only substantial significance that can be read into these April 29
decisions is that they signalled a willingness to go beyond the 685-man
limit on the size of the US military mission in Saigon^ which,, if it were
done openly^ would be the first formal breech of the Geneva Agreements.'
For the rest; we were providing somewhat more generous support to the
Vietnamese than proposed in the CIPo But the overall size of the Vietnamese
forces would be no higher than those already approved. (The 20;000-man
increase was already part of the CIP.) No one proposed in this initial
draft that the Administration even consider sending American troops (other
than the 100-odd additional advisors). It was not; by any interpretation^
a crisis response o
Indeed; even if Kennedy had approved the whole April 26 program^ it
would have seemed (in hindsight) most notable for the "come what may^ we
intend to win" rhetoric in its introduction and for the supreme role
granted to Task Force (and indirectly to Lansdale as its operations offi-
cer) in control of Vietnam policy. Lansdale' s memoranda leave no real
doubt that he saw the Report exactly that way -- which presujnably was why he
made no effort to risk stirring up trouble by Dutting his more controversial
views into the paper. For example^ although Lansdale believed the key new
item in. Vietnam policy was a need for emphatic support for Diem; only the
barest hint of this view appears in the paper (and it is not even hinted
at in lansdale *s preliminary draft of the report distributed at the
April 24th meeting of the Task Force) c ll/
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That is when this opening phase of the Task Force effort has to be
separated from what followed. As just noted^ it was remarkable mainly
for the strength of the commitment implied to South Vietnam^, which the
President never did unambiguously endorse^ and for the organizational
arrangement it proposed^ with the key role for Lansdale and Gilpatric_j
which was eliminated from the later drafts, All of the factors behind the
May reappraisal (cited at the beginning of this chapter) undoubtedly con-
tributed to the decision to set up the Task Force. But Rostow's memoran-
dum and the modest ditnensions of the resulting proposals suggest the main
idea really was to sharpen up existing policy and its administration,;
rather than to work out a new policy on the assumption that the existing
program had become substantially obsolete. Immediately after April 27_,
this changes. Although Gilpatric and Lansdale continued to head up the
Task Force through the Presidential decisions of May 11^ their personal
role became increasingly unimportant. The significance no longer was in
putting new people in charge of a new style for running the program^ but
in developing a new program that would offset the impact of Laos.
V. THE LAOS ANKEX
On April 28^ an annex had been issued to the basic report which went
far beyond the modest military proposals in the original. The most
reasonable assumption is that the annex was drawn up in response to
ccmnents at the April 27 NSC meeting at which the Report was to have
been consider ed_j but which turned out to be devoted to the by- then acute
state of the crisis in laos. On the grounds that the neutralization of
Laos would solidify communists de facto control of eastern Laos (inc3-uding
the mountain passes which were the historic invasion route to southern
Vietnam)^ the annex advocated U.S. support for a two-division increase in
the RVNAF. To rapidly train these forces^ there was now a recommendation
on U.S. manpower commitments that dwarfed the previous recommendation for
a MAAG increase: specif ically^ a l600-man training team for each of the
two new divisions^ plus a 400-man special forces contingent to speed up
counter-insurgency training for the South Vietnamese forces: a total of
3600 men; not counting the MAAG increase already authorized.
It is interesting that in the annex this force increase (and the
bulk of the U.S. troop commitment) was specifically justified as insur-
ance against a conventional invasion of South Vietnam- Some earlier drafts
show the evolution of this concept. There is an alternate draft^ appar-
ently by Lansdale^j which was not used but which recommended a U.S. troop
commitment as reassurance to the Vietnamese of U.S determination to stand
by them. It did not recommend any increase in South Vietnamese forces.
Instead; it stressed very heavily the damage to U.S. prestige and the
credibility of our guarantees to other countries in Southeast Asia should
we go through with the Laos settlement without taking some strong action
to demonstrate that we were finally drawing a line in Southeast Asia.
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Contrasting sharply vith Lansdale's draft was tlie first draft of the
paper that was finally issuedo This vas by Gilpatric's military aide^
Colo EoFo Blacko It concludes that South Vietnamese forces would have to
be increased by two divisions,, mainly to deal with threat of increased
infiltration. Black stressed that the President would have to decide that
the US would no longer be boimd by the limitations of the I95U Geneva
Agreements (which Defense had long been lobbying against) o But his paper
recommends no substantial troop commitment o The reference to the Geneva
Agreem_ents apparently referred to a relatively modest increase in manpower
beyond the 685-.man ceiling^ and to the introduction of new types of equip-
ment not in Vietnam in 195^ •
So the record contains three versions of the Annex -- Black's first
drafts lansdale's alternate draft; and then Black's revised paper ^ which
was finally isssued as the annex to the Reporto The effect of considering
them all is an odd oneo The initial Black paper recommends an increase in
Vietnamese forces to deal with the infiltration problem^ but no substantial
US troop commitment. The Lansdale alternative recommends a substantial US
troop commitment _5 but no increase in Vietnamese forces o The final paper
recommends both the RVT^AE increase and the US troop commitments^ but changes
the reason for each: the reason for the RVNAF increase became a need for
better protection against overt invasion^ not an increased infiltration
threat o And the reason for the US troop commitment became a desire to
rapidly train the new Vietnamese troops^ not for political reassurance. 12/
If taken literally^ all of this implies an extraordinarily rapid
series of reappraisals and reversals of judgment. But surely^ the only
realistic interpretation is that in this case (because a series of rough
drafts happens to be included in the available file) we are getting a
glimpse at the way such staff paperwork really gets drafted^ as opposed
to the much more orderly impression that is given if we saw only the finished
products. Gilpatric (undoubtedly in consultation with at least McNajnara^
although the files do not show any record of this) was presvimably interested
primarily in what recommendations to make to the President; and secondarily
in providing a bureaucratically suitable rationale for those recommendations o
.This rationale may^ or may not; have coincided with whatever more private
explanation of the recommendations that McNamara or Gilpatric may have con-
veyed to the President or people like McGeorge Bundy and Rostow on the
White House staff « The lesson in thiS; which will not come as a surprise
to anyone who has ever had contact with the policy-making process^ is that
the rationales given in such pieces of paper (intended for fairly wide
circulation among the bureaucracy; as opposed to tightly held memoranda
limited to those closest to the decision-maker) do not reliably indicate
why recommendatiohs were made the way they were.,
.VIo THE MAY 1 REVIEW
Manwhile; Kennedy; as noted earlier; did not act on the annex at the
April 29 meeting when he approved the much more modest military proposals
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of the "basic Report, Biit on that day, there ras a cable alerting CIKCPAC
to he ready to move 5000-men tas> forces to Udorn, Thailand, and to
Toiiraine, (Da I^Iang), South Vietnam. Classified records available for this
study do not explain this alert. But the public memoirs indirectly refer
to it, and as vroi-ld be expected, the alert v/as intended as a threat to
intervene in Laos if the communists failed to go through mth the cease
fire which -W3.s to precede the Geneva Conference. Here is the cable:
From: JCS
TO: ClivTCPAG
DTFO: CPMAAG VIMmTIAIIE
CHJU3MAAG BM^^GKOK THAILMD
Cm^-IAAG SAIGON VIETIl/U^
TOP SEC RE
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JCS DA 995131 From JCS
1. Req,u_est you prepare plans to move brigade size
forces of approximately 5,000 each into Udorn or
vicinity and into Tourane or vicinity. Forces
should include all arms and appropriate air
elements. Plans should be based sole.ly on US
forces at this time.
2. Decision to make these d.eplo;.'ments not f iim .
It is expected that decision as to Thailand mil
be made at meeting tentatively scheduled here on
Monday. Decision regarding Vietnam will be even
later due to consideration of Geneva Accords.
3- It is hoped that these movements can be given
SEATO cover but such possibility must be explored
before becoming a firm element of your planning.
State is taking action to explore this aspect.
k. Decision was not repeat not reached today
concerning implementation of SEATO Plan 5/6O.
The crisis in Laos was now at its peak. According to Schlesinger 's
account, reports reached Washington April 26 that the Pathet Lao were
attacking strongly, \r±th the apparent intention of grabbing most of the
country before the cease-fire went into effect. At 10 p.m. that night,
the JCS sent out a "general advisorjr'-" to major comma^nds aroujid the world,
and specifically alerted CINCPAC to be prepared to undertake airstrikes
against North Vietnam, and possibly southern China.
■ The next day -- the day the Task Force Report came to the President-
there were prolonged crisis meetings in the vrnite Rouse. The President
later called in Congressional leaders, who advised against putting troops
into Laos. Schlesinger quotes Rostow as telling him the NSC meeting that
day was "the worst White Plouse meeting he had ever attended in the entire
Kenned^^ administration." 12a /
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The I^os annex to the Gilpatric Report was issued on the 28th^ in an
atmosphere wholly dominated by the crisis in Laos. On the 29th^ Kennedy's
go-ahead on the Task Force's original military recommendations was squeezed
into a day overwhelmingly devoted to Laos. This was the day of the cable^
just cited^ alerting CINCPAC for troop movements to Thailand and possibly
Vietnam. The ''SEATO Plan 5/60" referred to in the closing paragraph of
the cable was the plan for moving major units into Laos.
On May 1 (the Monday meeting referred to in the cable )j Kennedy again
deferred any decision on putting troops into Laos. According to available
accoxints^ there is a strong sense by now (although no formal decision)
that the U.S. would not go into Laos: that if the cease-fire f ailed; we
would make a strong stand^ instead^ in Thailand and Vietnam. (On the 28th;
in a speech to a Democratic dinner in Chicago^ the President had hinted
at this:
We are prepared to meet our obligations^ but we can only defend
the freedom of those who are determined to be free themselves.
We can assist them -- we will bear more than our share of the
burden^ but we can only help those who are ready to bear their
share of the burden themselves.) 13/
Reasonable qualifications^ undoubtedly^ but ones that seemed to suggest
that intervention in I^os wou2d be futile.. On Sunday (the 30th); another
hint came in remarks by Senator Pulbright on a TV interview show: he opposed
intervention in LaoS; and said he was confident the government was seeking
"another solution."
So the decision anticipated Monday^ May 1; in the JCS cable to CINCPAC
was not made that day after all. But that day a new draft of the Task
Force Report was issued. It contained only one significant change (other
than blending the April 28 annex into the basic paper). The original draft
contained a paragraph (under "political objectives") recommending we
"obtain the political agreement /presumably from the SEATO membership/
needed to permit the prompt implementation of SEATO contingency plans pro-
viding for military intervention in South Vietnam should this become neces-
sary to prevent the loss of the country to Communism."
In the May 1 revision^ the following sentence was added to the para-
graph: "The United States should be prepared to intervene unilaterally
in fulfillment of its commitment under Article IV; 2. of Manila Pact; and
shoiild make its determination to do so clear through appropriate public
statements; diplomatic discussions; troop deployments; or other means." lA/
(The cited clause in the Manila (SEATO) Pact; which the paper did not quote^
If; in the opinion of any of the Parties; the inviolability
or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political
independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State
or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this
Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other
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than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or
situation which might endanger the peace of the area_j the Parties
shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which
should be taken for the common defense.)
The May 1 draft also cleared up^ or papered over^ part of the con-
fusion described earlier regarding the rationale for the military measures
recommended in the Laos annex: the increased RTOAF force levels were
attributed now both to concern over increased infiltration and to concern
over overt invasion. But the US troop commitments are still described
solely as for training^ with no mention of the original political rationale
1~L1. STATE'S REDRAFT
Lansdale circulated the May 1 draft among the Task Force_, with a note
that comments should be in May 2^ with a final Task Force review schediiled
the morning of May 3^ all in anticipation of an NSC meeting on the paper
May 4.
George Ball^ then Deputy Under Secretary of State^ asked to post-
pone the meeting for a day. Lansdale sent Gilpatric a memorandum opposing
the postponement. "it seems to me that George Ball could appoint someone
to represent him at the meeting;, and if he has personal or further comments
they could come to us later in the day at his convenience." But Gilpatric
delayed the meeting a day^ and State produced a drastic revision of the
paper. I5/
On the organizational issues^ the State draft was brutally clearcut.
It proposed a new version of the Gilpatric memorandum transmitting the
Report^j in which:
1. The paragraph (quoted earlier) describing lansdale 's special
role is deleted.
2. A new paragraph is added to the end of the memorandum^ in '
which Gilpatric is made to say: "Having completed its assign-
ment...! recommend that the present Task Force be now dis-
solved."
Later sections of the paper were revised accordingly^ giving respon-
sibility for coordinating Vietnam policy to a new Task Force with George
Ball as chairman, (in the final version^ the Task Force has a State
Department director^ but no longer included Presidential appointees repre-
senting their departments. The whole Task Force idea had been downgraded
to a conventional interagency working group. Although it continued to
function for several years^ there wi3.1 be little occasion to mention it
again in this paper.) I6/
State's proposal on organization prevailed. From the record avail-
able; the only thing that can be said definitely is that State objected;
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successfully_5 to having an Ambassador report to a Task Force chaired by
the Deputy Secretary of Defense^ and with a second defense official
(Lansdale) as executive officer. There may have been more to it. ¥e
know Lansdale 's experience and his approach to guerrilla warfare initially
won him a good deal of favor at the ^^ite House. But his memoranda suggest
that his ideas on a number of issues (support for Phoumi in Laos^ libera-
tion of North Vietnam_j essentially unqualified support for Diem in South
Vietnam) went well beyond what the Administration judged reasonable. So
it is quite possible that the President would have had second thoughts on
Lansdale^ aside from State's objections on bureaucratic grounds.
In any event^ lansdale 's reaction to State's proposal on organization
was to advise McNamara and Gilpatric that:
My strong recommendation is that Defense stay completely out
of the Task Force directorship as now proposed by State. . .Having
a Defense officer^ myself or someone else^, placed in a position
of only partial influence and of no decision permissibility
would be only to provide State with a scapegoat to share the
blame when we have a flop... The US past performance and theory
of action^ which State apparently desires to continue^ simply
offers no sound basis for winning^ as desired by President
■ Kennedy. 17/
But the final version of tfye Task Force Report^ dated May 6^ followed very
closely the State revision submitted May 3^ including the shift in control
of the Task Force.
VIII. WIDENING THE OPTIONS
What is most striking about ;the revised drafts is that they excluded
a tone of almost unqualified commitment to Vietnam_j yet on the really
important issues included qualifications v/hich left the President a great
deal of freedom to decide whatever he pleased v/ithout having to formally
overrule the Task Force Report.
For example^ the assertion (from the April draft) that the US should
Impress on friend and foe that "come what may^ we intend to win" remained
in the final paper. But this hortatory language is from the introduction;
it described one of the effects the program in the balance of the paper
was supposed to achieve_, but did not ask the President to do or say any-
thing not spelled out in the body of the paper. (We will see_j when we
come to the fall decisions^ that the wisdom of an unqualified commitment
to save Vietnam 'from Conmiunism is treated afresh_j with no suggestion that
any such decision had already been made in May.)
On. the other hand^ the explicit recommendation in the Defense draft
that we make clear our "determination. . .to intervene unilaterally. .. should
this become necessary to save the country from communism..." was dropped,
instead^ there is a recommendation for exploring a "new bilateral arrange-
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ment" which might (the text is not explicit) extend to fighting the
guerrilla s_; if that should become necessary to save the country^ but
also might only cover overt Worth Vietnamese invasion. l8 /
Further^ the need for these arrangements \ms now tied to the "loss",
of Laos. The May 3 draft suggests ve "undertake military security ar- '
rangements which establish beyond doubt our intention to stand behind
Vietnam's resistance to Communism.-." since "it is doubtful whether the
Vietnaxaese Government can weather the pressures which are certain to be
generated from the loss of Laos without prompt^ and dramatic support for
its secujrity from the U.S." 19/
In the May 6 final drafts "establish beyond doubt" was toned down
to "emphasize" and the flat reference to the loss of Laos was changed
to "if Laos were lost." 20/
Similarly^ the recommendations on the two new South Vietnamese divi-
sions^ and the two l600-man US combat units to train them was described as
a firm recommendation in the military section of the May 3 draft (which
State left untouched from the Defense version) ^ but were indirectly re-
ferred to as something for study in State's re-drafted political section.
In the final paper ^ they were still firm recommendations in a military
annex^ but not in the main paper^ where Defense was only described as
studying this and other uses for US troops short of direct commitment
against the guerrillas. US troop coimuitments v^-ere no longer recommended^
only referred to as something "which might result from an E[SC decision
following discussions between Vice President Johnson /whose mission to
Asia had been announced May 5.7 snd President Diem." 2l/
Yet an interesting aspect of the State redraft is that^ although its
main impact was to soften the commitments implied in the Defense draft_j a
quick reading might give the contrary impression. We will see this same
effect in the political sections to be discussed below. What seems to
happen is that the very detail of the State treatment creates a strong
impression^ even though the actual proposals are less drastic and more
qualified than those proposed by Defense. The contrast is all the sharper
because the Defense draft leaned the other way. Eor example^ the pro-
foundly significant recommendation that the US commit itself to intervene
unilaterally _j if necessary^ to prevent a Viet Cong victory in South Vietnam^
is tossed into the Defense version most casually;, with a reference to the
Manila Treaty that makes it sound as if such a commitment^ in fact^ already
existed.
In contrast^ here is the State language referring to the proposed
bilateral treaty (which in effect is a substitute for the Defense pro-
;^osed -unlimited linilateral commitment):
The Geneva Accords have" been totally inadequate in protecting
South Vietnam against Communist infiltration and insurgency.
Moreover^ with increased Communist success in Laos dramatic
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US actions in stiffening up its physical support of Vietnam
and the remainder of Southeast Asia may be needed to bolster
the will to continue to resist the Communists. The inhibitions
imposed on such action by certain parts of the Geneva Accords^
which have been violated with impunity by the Communists_j should
not prevent our action* ¥e should consider joining with the
Vietnamese in a clear-cut defensive alliance which might include
stationing of US forces on Vietnamese soil. As a variant of this
arrangement certain SEATO troops might also be employed.
Bilateral military assistance by the United States pui'suant to a
request by South Vietnam along the lines of that undertaken
during 1958 in response to the request by Lebanon for military
assistance^ would be in keeping with international law and treaty
provisions. The provisions of the Geneva Accords of 195^; which
prohibited the introduction of additional military arms and per-
sonnel into Vietnam; would not be a bar to the measures contem-
plated. The obvious^ large-scale and continuous violation of
these provisions of the Geneva Accords by North Vietnam in intro-
ducing large numbers of armed guerrillas into South Vietnam would
justify the corresponding non-observance of these provisions by
South Vietnam. Indeed^ authorization for changing PEO Isos into
an ordinary MAAG was justified on this legal theory. It should
be recognized that the foregoing proposals require careful and
detailed consideration and preparation particularly with regard
f ^ to the precise mansion of US forces used.
In addition to the previously cited advantages such an action
might have at least two other important political and military
advantages:
(a) It could release a portion of the ARVN from relatively
static military functions to pursue the war against the insur-
gents and
(b) It would place the Sino- Soviet Bloc in the position of
risking direct intervention in a situation where US forces were
already in place_, accepting the consequence of such action.
This is in direct contrast to the current situation in Laos.
Alternatively^ there are several potential political and military
disadvantages to such an action^ principal among these being:
(a) Some of the neutrals^ notably India^ might well be
, opposed; and the attitude of the UK and j^'rance is uncertain.
(b) This would provide the Communists with a major propa-
ganda opportunity.
_ (c) The danger that a troop contribution would provoke a
DRV/CPIICOM reaction with the risk of involving a signficant
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commitment of US force in the Pacific to the Asian mainland <.
The French tied up some 200^000 troops diiring the imsuccessfiil
Indo -China effort.
This might significantly weaken the Diem regime in the long run^j
having in mind the parallel of Rhee in Korea. 22 /
This language is not solely the State Department' So In a Gilpatric
memo to be cited shortly^ we will see that the JCS^ for example,, had a
hand in describing the role for US troops « Even so^ the overall effect
of the draft^ as already noted^ tones down very drastically the commit-
ment implied by the May 1 Defense version:
lo The proposal is no longer for a unilateral^ -unlimited commit-
ment to save Vietnam from communismo It only proposes consideration
of a new treaty with South Vietnam (unlike the Defense draft which
proposed reading a unilateral commitment into the existing Manila
Treaty); and its purpose is to "bolster the will" of the South
Vietnamese to resist the communists^j not (as the Defense draft appar-
ently meant) to guarantee that the US would Join the war should the
South Vietnamese effort prove inadequate.,
2o It gives pro and con arguments for sending US troops _, in con-
trast to the Defense draft which included a flat recomjnendation to
send at least the 360O men of the two division training teams and the
special forces training teamo
A reasonable judgment,, consequently^ is that State thought the Defense
draft went too far in committing the US on Vietnam^ (And in view of the
positions he would take in 196^^ George Ball's role as senior State repre-
sentative on the Task Force obviously further encourages that interpreta-
tiouo) But that is only a judgment. It is also possible to argue^ in
contrast^ that perhaps State (or State plus whatever White House influence
may have gone into the draft) simply was tidying up the Defense proposals:
for example^j that the redrafters felt that a new bilateral treaty would be
a- -fiiiner "ba.sis for a commitment to save Vietnam than would reliance on a
reinterpretation of the SEATO Treaty, Similar arguments can be made on the
other points noted above.
Consequently^ on any question about the intent of the redrafters^ only
a judgment and not a statement of fact can be provided.
But on the question of the effect of the redraft^ a stronger statement
can be made: for 'whatever the intent of the redrafters ^ the effect cer-
tainly was to weaken the commitments implied by the Defense draft;, and
leave the President a great deal of room for maneuver without having to
explicitly overrule the recommendations presented to himo
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IX. THE TROOP ISSUE
To return to a question of judgement^ it is difficult to assess how
far this gradual hedging of proposals for very strong coinmitraents to
Vietnam simply reflected a desire (very probahly encouraged by the VJhite
House) to leave the President freedom of action. To some extent it surely
reflects a growing hope that perhaps the laos cease-fire would come off;
the country would not be flatly lost; and consequently^ that the May 1
Defense draft,, and even the May 3 State draft^ reflected a somewhat panicky
overestimate of how far we needed to go to keep Southeast Asia from falling
apart. The two motives obviously overlapped.
There are indications that^ as late as May 5; "the estimate for saving
something out of Laos remained bleak- On May h^ after a visit to the
President^ Senator Fulbright (who had opposed intervention in Laos along
with other Congressional leaders) announced from the steps of the White
Hou^e that he would support troop commitments to Thailand and Vietnam. An
I^SC meeting the following day (May 5) was devoted to discussing steps to
reassure Vietnam and Thailand. Then in the afternoon^ the President
announced Vice President Johnson's visit to Asia at a press conference^
which included this garbled exchange:
Q. Mr. President^ there have been reports that you
would be prepared to send American forces into South
Vietnam if that became necessary to prevent Comjnu-
nist domination of that country. Could you tell us
whether that is correct^ and also anyt.hing else you
have regarding plans for that country?
A. Wellj we have had a group working in the govern-
ment and we have had a Security Council meeting about
■ the problems which are faced in Vietnam by the guerrillas
and by the barrage which the present government is being
subjected to. The problem of troops is a matter -- the
matter of what we are going to do to assist Vietnam to
obtain _/retain?7 its independence is a matter under con-
sideration. There are a good many /issues_?7 which I
think can most usefully wait until we have had consulta-
tions with the government J which up to the present time
— which will be one of the matters which Vice President
Johnson will deal with; the problem of consultations with
the Government of Vietnam as to what further steps could
most usefully be taken. 23 /
On May 8^ the reconstituted International Control Commission (estab-
lished by the Geneva Agreement of 195^) arrived in laos^ hoping to
supervise a cease-fire. The cease-fire had been agreed to in principle
by both sides as early as May 1. The question was whether the Pathet Lao
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would really stop advancing. Aside from American intervention^ a cease-
fire was the only hope of the larger^ but less effective^ pro -Western
forces led by Phoumi. Certainly hopes were higher by the 8th than they
were a week earlier_, but this might not be saying much. The documentary
record is atnbiguous. The final draft of the letter Vice President
Johnson would deliver to Diem was dated May 8^ and in this letter Kennedy
did not go much beyond the proposals in the April 27 version of the task
force report. There was no mention of U.S. troop commitments_, nor of a
bilateral, treaty. Even on the question of a further increase (beyond
170^000) in the RWAP^ Kennedy promised Diem only that this will be "con-
sidered carefully with you_j if developments should so warrant." 2h- l
But the same day_j Gilpatric sent a memo to the JCS asking their views
on U.S.' troops in Vietnam:
. . In preparation for the possible commitment of U.S.
forces to Vietnam_, it is desired that you give further
review and study of the militaiy advisability of such
action^ as well as to the size and composition of such
U.S. forces. Your views^ which 1 hope could include
some expression from CINCPAC^ would be valuable for
consideration prior to the NSC meeting this week (cur-
rently scheduled for Friday^ May 12). 25/
This in turn was based on .a statement in the May 6 Task Force draft^
which said that such a study was being carried out_j with particular con-
sideration being given to deploying to South Vietnam
>
...two U.S. battle groups (with necessary command
and logistics units) ^ plus an engineer ( construction -
combat) battalion. These units would be located in the
'high plateau' region^ remote from the major population
center of Saigon -Cholon^ under the command of the Chief^
MAAG, To help accelerate the training of the G.V.N.
anTiy_, they would establish two divisional field train-
ing areas. The engineer battalion would undertake con-
struction of roads^ air-landing strips and other
facilities essential to the logistical support of the
U.S. and Vietnamese forces there..
to
The purpose of these forces (again_, from the May 6 draft) would be
o . .provide ma:ximum psychological impact in deter-
rence of further Comjnunlst aggression from North Vietnam^
China^ or the Soviet Union^ while rallying the morale of
the Vietnamese and encouraging the support of SEATO and
neutral nations for Vietnam's defense;
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"- release Vietnamese forces from advanced and static
defense positions to permit their fuller coBimitment
to counterinsurgency actions;
— provide maximum training to approved Vietnamese
forces; and
— provide significant military resistance to poten-
tial North Vietnam Communist and/or Chinese Com-
munist action. 26/
The JCS reply ^ dated May 10, deferred details on the composition of
U.S. forces, but quite emphatically recommended that we do send them,
"assuming the political decision is to hold Southeast Asia outside the
communist sphere." Here is the JCS memo:
In considering the possible commitment of U.S.
forces to South Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have reviewed the overall critical situation in
Southeast Asia with particular emphasis upon the
present highly flammable situation in South Vietnam.
In this connection the question, however, of South
Vietnam should not be considered in isolation but
rather in conjunction with Thailand and their over-
all relationship to the security of Southeast Asia.
The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the ques-
tion regarding the deployment of U.S. forces into
Thailand were provided to you by JCSM-311-61, dated
9 May 1961. . The current potentially dangerous mili-
tary and political situation in Laos, of course, is
the focal point in this area. Assuming that the
political decision is to hold Southeast Asia outside
the Communist sphere, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are
of the opinion that U.S. forces should be deployed
immediately to South Vietnam; such action should be
taken primarily to prevent the Vietnamese from being
subjected to the same situation as presently exists in
Laos, which would then require deployment of U.S.
forces into an already existing combat situation.
In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommend that the decision be made to deploy suitable
U.S. forces to South Vietnam. Sufficient forces should
be deployed to accomplish the following purposes:
Provide a visible deterrent to potential Worth
Vietnam and/or Chinese Communist action;
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Release Vietnamese forces from advanced and
static defense positions to permit their fuller com-
mitment to counter insurgency actions;
Assist in training the Vietnamese forces to the
maximum extent possible consistent with their mission;
Provide a nucleus for the support of any addi-
tional U.S. or SEA.TO military operation in Southeast
Asia; and
Indicate the firmness of our intent to all
Asian nations.
In order to maintain U.S. flexibility in the Pacific, it
is envisioned that some or all of the forces deployed to
South Vietnam would come from the United States. The move-
ment of these troops could be accomplished in an adminis-
trative manner and thus not tax the limited lift capabilities
of CINCPAC.
In order to accomplish the foregoing the Joint Chiefs of
Staff recommend that:
President Diem be encouraged to request that the
United States fulfill its SEATO obligation_, in view of
the new threat now posed by the Laotian situation, by
the immediate deployment of appropriate U.S. forces to
South Vietnam;
Upon receipt of this request, suitable forces
could be immediately deployed to South Vietnam in order
to accomplish the above-mentioned purpose. Details of
size and composition of these forces must include the
views of both CIITCPAC and CHMAAG which are not yet avail-.
able. 27/ *■ . ■ -
The NSC meeting that dealt with the Task Force Report was held the
next day (the 11th, rather than the 12th as originally anticipated). The
President avoided committing himself on the troop issue any further than
he had already been committed by the time of his May 5 press conference.
The resulting NSAM 52 (signed by McGeorge Bundy) states only that:
The President directs full examination by the Defense
Department under the guidance of the Director of the
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continuing Task Force on Vietnam^ of the size and com-
position of forces which would be desirable in the case
■ of a possible commitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam." 28/
(The Task Force Director at this point referred to
Sterling Cottrell, a Foreign Service Officer^ rather
than to Gilpatric).
So the President went no further^ really, than to take note of a
study that was already well underway. The record does not help us judge
what significance to attach to the qualification that the study be done
under: the guidance of the State Department officer now heading the Task
Force.
On other issues relating to our military commitments the President
again, with minor alterations, endorsed the proposals of the May 6 draft.
On the question of a formal alliance with South Vietnam E-jA!! 52 reports
that :
' The Ambassador is authorized to begin negotiations
looking toward a new bilateral arrangement with Vietnam,
but no firm commitment will be made to such an arrange-
ment without further review by the President.
The President also "confirmed" the decisions quoted earlier accepting
^ the April 27 military recommendations, and accepted the following further
^^ recommendations (all from the May 6 report) "with the objective of meeting
the increased security threat resulting from the new situation along the
frontier between Laos and Vietnam."
*
1. Assist the G.V.N, armed forces to increase their border
patrol and insurgency suppression capabilities by establishing
an effective border intelligence and patrol system, by insti-
tuting regular aerial surveillance over the entire frontier
area, and by applying modern technological area-denial tech-
niques to control the roads and trails along Vietnam^ s borders.
A special staff element (approximately 6 U.S. personnel), to
concentrate upon solutions to the unique problems of Vietnam's
borders, will be activated in MAAG, Vietnam, to assist a
similar special unit in the RVNAF which the GoV.N. will be en-
couraged to establish; these two elements working as an inte-
*■ ■ grated team will help the G.VoN. gain the support of nomadic
■ tribes and other border inhabitants, as well as introduce
j advanced techriiques and equipment to strengthen the security
j of South Vietnam's frontiers. ■ '
2. Assist the G.V.N, to establish a Combat Development and ,
Test Center in South Vietnam to develop, with the help of
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modern teclinology^ new techniques for use against the Viet .
Cong forces (approximately 4 U.S. personnel).
■
3. Assist the Go V.N. forces with healthy vrelfare and
public work projects by providing U.S. Arm;^- civic action . ■■
mobile training teams^ coordinated with the similar civilian
effort (approximately l4 U.S. personnel).
4. Deploy a Special Forces Group (approximately 400 per-
sonnel) to Mia Trang in order to accelerate G..V.N. Special
Forces training. The first increment^ for immediate deploy-
ment to Vietnara^ should be a Special Forces company (52 per-
sonnel) .
5. Instruct JCS, CINCPAC, and MAAG to undertake an assess-
ment of the military utility of a further increase in the G.V.N.
forces from 170,000 to 200,000 in order to create two new divi-
sion equivalents for deployment to the northwest border region.
The parallel political and fiscal implications should be
assessed. 2£/ ■ ' .
In general Kennedy did not seem to have committed the U.S., by these
decisions, significantly further than the U.S. had already been committed
by the President's public speeches and remarks at press conferences. In
the expanded military aid program approved by the President, there was no
item that comraitted the U.S. any further than we had gone in the case of
Laos (that is, beyond providing advisors, materiel, and some covert com-
bat assistance).
A debatable exception was the decision to send 400 special forces
troops to speed training of their South Vietnamese counterparts. The idea
of sending some Green Berets antedates the Task Force effort. Rostow men-
tioned it in his April 12 memo, quoted above. It can be argued whether it
was really prudent to view this decision as separable from the "combat
troops" issue (which also were being considered nominally, at least, for
training, not necessarily combat). But obviously the President was sold on
their going, and since ."the Vietnamese Special Forces were themselves sup-
ported by CIA rather than the regular military aid program, it was possible.
to handle these troops covertly. In any event, although there would even-
tually be 1200 Green Berets in Vietnam (before the first commitment of U.S.
combat units) they were apparently never cited as a precedent for or a
commitment to a more overt role in the war.
These, then, were the measures relating to military commitments under-
taken as a result of the April/May review. The principal objective of these
measures (together with the non-military elements of the program) as stated
in the Task Force report, and formally adopted in the WSAM, was "to prevent
Communist domination of Vietnam." There was no uncertainty about why these
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steps were taken: quite aside from the Administration's strong feelings
that ve had to deal with the challenge of wars of national liberation^
the program adopted seems quite minimal as a response to what was -- even
after the cease-fire was confirmed — a serious setback in Laos. No one in
the government^ and no one of substantial influence outside it^ questioned
the need for some action to hold things together in Southeast Asia.
For the fact was that our stake in Vietnam had increased because of
what had been happening in Laos^ quite aside from anything that we did
or said. Collapse in Vietnam would be worse after Laos than it might have
seemed before. And to do nothing after Laos would not really have made
the U.S. look better if Vietnam fell; it would only have increased the like-
lihood both that that would happen^ and greatly increased the extent to which
the U.S. (and within U.S. politics^ the Kennedy Administration) would be
blamed for the collapse.
The Laotian situation did not even provide_, then^ a precedent for
seeking to settle the Vietnamese situation through the same coalition
governraent route. Eor in Laos^ the pro-U.S. faction was plainly being
defeated militarily in open battle despite a good deal of U.S. aid. The
only U.S. alternative to accepting the coalition solution was to take over
the war ourselves. Further^ there was a strong neutralist faction in Laos_,
which could provide a premier for the government and at least a veneer of
hope that the settlement might be something more than a face-saving way of
handing the country over to the communist faction,
Neither of these conditions held for Vietnam^ aside from, all the other
factors reviewed in the introduction to this paper which left the Adminis-
tration no realistic option in the neutralist direction^ even assuming that
there was any temptation at that time to move in that direction. To have • ■
simply given up on Vietnam at that pointy before any major effort had been
attempted to at least see if the situation could be saved at reasonable cost^
seems to have been^ even with the hindsight we now have^ essentially out of
the question.
That is why_, in the context of the time^ the commitments Kennedy
actually made seem like a near -minimal response which avoided any real deep-
ening of our stake in Vietnam. ...
There is far more of a problem with the things that we decided to talk:
about (troops_, and a formal treaty with Vietnam) than with the measures
Kennedy fully endorsed. Certainly putting troops into Vietnam would in-
crease our stake in the outcome^ rather than merely help protect the stake
we already had. So^ surely^ would a formal treaty^ even if the treaty nomi-
nally required U.S. support only in the case of overt invasion. How much
so would depend on the nature of the troop commitments and the nature of the
treaty. But^ as we will see in the next chapter (in reviewing Vice President-
Johnson's visit) Diem turned out to want neither troops nor a treaty for the
time being. And so these issues were deferred until the fall.
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Aside from questions relating to our commitments to Vietnam, there
vere also the parallel questions relating to our commitment, if any, to
Diem. As noted in the introduction, discussions about Vietnam always
had this dual aspect, and this part of the problem was treated with in-
creasing explicitness as time went on (and as the Administration got to know
Diem better). In the CIP, it was treated essentially by implication.
In the Gilpatric/Lansdale draft of April 26, it was also handled that
way: no explicit statement of a change in our relations with Diem was
offered, although by implication it was there.
■
¥here the CIP (by implication) saw our increased aid as contingent
on Diem's performance, the April 26 program left out any suggestion of
a quid pro quo. To the contrary, it simply states that "those portions
of the plan which are agreed to by the G.V.II. will be implemented as
rapidly as possible."
And where the CIP saw Diem's government as our best hope "at the
present time" this note of limited commitment to Diem is dropped^^in the
April 26 draft. Instead we have a bland statement that we will "assist
the GVl^ under President Diem to develop within the country the ■^^^idest
consensus of public support for a government dedicated to resisting com-
munist domination." /^einphasis added/" 30/
The May 3 State draft and the May 6 final draft dealt with this issue
much as they had with the questions of militaiy commitm.ents : that is,
these did not so much conspicuously weaken the proposals of the Gilpatric/
Lansdale version, as to qualify and elaborate on them in ways that in
effect (again, we cannot make a statement on intent) left the President
a ready option to reconsider his position. State explicitly asserted that
we were changing our policy on Diem, and spelled out some reasons for
doing so.
Here are some extracts from the May 6 final draft; (the language is
essentially the same in the May 3 draft).
*...we must continue to work through the present
Vietnamese government despite its acknowledged weakness.
Wo other remotely feasible alternative exists at this
point in time which does not involve an unacceptable
■ degree of risk... Diem is not now fully confident of
United States support. This confidence has been under-
mined partly by our vigorous efforts to get him to mend
his waySj and partly by the equivocal attitude he is ■
convinced we took at the time of the I^ovember 11, I96O,
attempted coup. It is essential that President Diem's
full confidence in and comiTiuni cation with the United
States be restored promptly. . .Given Diem's personality
and character and the abrasive nature of our recent
hi
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relationships^ success or fai3.ure in this regard vill
depend very heavily on Ambassador Nolting's ability to
get on the sam^ wavelength vith Diem...
The chief threat to the viability of President Diem's
administration is_j without a doubt^ the fact of communist
insurgency and the government's inability to protect its
ovm people. Thus military measures must have the highest
priority. There is^ nevertheless^, strong discontent \rith
the government among not only the elite but among peas-
I ants^ labor^ and business. Criticism focuses on the
dynastic aspects of the Diem rule^ on its clandestine'
political apparatus^ and on the methods through which the
President exercises his leadership. This is aggravated
by Communist attempts to discredit the President and
weaken his government's authority. All this is made the
easier because of a communications void existing between
the government and the people. For many months United
States efforts have been directed toward persuading Diem
to adopt political^ social^ and economic changes designed
. to correct this serious defect. Majiy of these changes
I are included in the Coujiterinsurgency Plan. Our success
" has been only partial. There are those who consider that
Diem will not succeed in the battle to win men's minds in
Vietnam.
Thus in giving priority emphasis to the need for in-
ternal security^ we must not relax in our efforts to per-
suade Diem "of the need for political social and economic
progress. If his efforts are inadequate in this field
our overall objective could be seriously endangered and
we might once more find ourselves in the position of shor-
ing a leader who had lost the support of his people. 3l/
. Although the paper expresses the hope that through "very astute deal-
ings" ("a combination of positive inducements plus points at which discreet
pressure can be exercised") Diem could be successfully worked with^ the net
effect of the State draft is hardly enthusiastic. The paper tells the
President that his Task Force "believes" that the policy will work. But it
is a large order: for the aijn had been referred to as nothing less than
"a major alteration in the present goverrmient structure or in its objectives."
In effect^ t-he silence on Diem in the Gilpatric/lansdale draft was re-
placed by a detailed statement which^ in the course of reaffirming the need
to take prompt steps to show confidence in Diem^ nevertheless leaves the
strong impression that we really did not have much confidence in him at all.
Support- for Diem became tactical: based explicitly on the hope that he
might reform^ and implicitly on the fact that trying to overthrow him would
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be terribly risky in the aftennath of Laos^ even if the U.S. had someone
to overthrow him with. Further^ although the paper explicitly conceded
first priority to military needs ^ there was a strong argument that mili-
tary efforts alone mil not be enough.
It vas apparently this equivocal attitude toward Diem (aside from
any personal considerations) that led to Lansdale's prediction that State
could never "vin this battle." Thus in the main paper of the May 6 draft
the general political objective was stated as:
Develop political and economic conditions which will
create a solid and widespread support among the key polit.- ..
ical groups and the general population for a Vietnam which
has the "VTill to resist Communist encroachment and which in
turn stems from a stake in a freer and more democratic
society. 32/ ■ .
Lansdale^ in a pencilled comment to Gilpatric^ complained:
The elected President of Vietnam is ignored in this
statement as the base to build upon in countering the
communists. This will have the U.S. pitted against Diem
as first priority^ the communists as second. 3 , 3/
Nevertheless^ it seems that the May program went a very long vray in
Lansdale's preferred direction: although the U.S. was expanding its con-
tribution to the Vietnamese effort it was no longer asking for any quid
pro qu£. The U.S. envisioned "discreet pressure" but certainly not^ for
then anyway, any hint of withholding aid. The U.S. flatly asserted that it
saw no "remotely acceptable alternative to Diem/' for the time being, any
way. The U.S. thought it vital that Diem do better, but increasing his
confidence in the U.S. had top priority. The strongest guidance given the
new Ambassador was to "get on Diem's wavelength." 3^/
More of this tentative adoption of the Lansdale approach can be seen
in the discussion of Vice President Johnson's trip (from the May 6 draft):
The Vice President's visit will provide the added
incentive needed to give the GYE the motivation and con-
fidence it needs to carry on the struggle. We believe
that meetings between the Vice President and President
Diem \rill act as a catalytic agent to produce broad
■agreement on the need for accelerated joint Vietnamese -
U.S. actions to resist Communist encrcachment in SEA.
These meetings will also serve to get across to Presi-
dent Diem our confidence in him as a ma'n of gi'eat stature
and as one of the strong figures in SEA on whom we are
placing our reliance. At the same time, these confer-
ences should impress Diem with the degree of importance
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we attach to certain political and economic reforms
in Vietnam vhich are an essential element in frus-
trating Commianist encroachments. Recognizing the
difficulties we have had in the past in persuading
Diem to take effective action on such reforms_, as
specific an understanding as possible should be
solicited from Diem on this point.
It was this sort of guidance (plus_, perhaps_, a memo from Lansdale
describing President Diem in terms that bear comparison with those
Jack Valenti would later use in connection with another President) that
accounts for Johnson's famous reference to Diem as the Churchill of
Asia. 3^/
In sum^ what emerges from the final version of the report- is" a sense
that the U.S. had decided to take a crack at the Lansdale approach of
trying to win Diem over with a strong display of personal confidence in
him. "What does not emerge is any strong sense that the Admiini strati on
believed this new approach really had much hope of working^ but undoubt-
edly this pessimistic reading is influence by the hindsight now available.
The drafters of the paper very probably saw themselves as hedging against
the possible failure of the policy _, rather than implying that it probably
would not work.
If we go beyond the paperwork^ and ask what judgments might "be ms-xle
about the intent of the senior decision -makers^ and particularly the
President^ it seems that here_, even more than in connection with the mili-
tary commitments discussed earlier^ the Administration adopted a course
which^ whether in hindsight the wisest available or not^ probably seemed
to have no practical alternative.
Presumably the top level of the Administration believed there was at''
least some chance that the new policy toward Diem might produce useful
results. ■ - ■
But even to the extent this prospect seemed dim^ there were political
advantages (or at least political risks avoided) in giving this plan a try^
and there must not have seemed (as even now there does not seem) to have
been much cost in doing so. • . ■
Finally^ whatever the President thought of the prospects and political
advantages of this approach to Diem^ it might have been hard at that time
to see any drastically different alternative anyway. After all^ the heart
of the Laos embairassment was that the U.S. was ("vrith some face-saving
cover) dropping an anti -communist leader who had come into power with the
indispensable assistance of the U.S. This dropping of Phoumi in Laos in
favor of support for the neutralist government Phoumi had overthrown mth
U.S. encouragement and assistance remained an essential part of whatever
outcome developed in Laos. In the wake of this embarrassment^ the U.S. was
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nov trying to reassure other governments in Southeast Asia. Was it pos-
sible to carry out this reassurance while threatening Diem^ another .
anti-Gornrtiunist leader totally dependent on" U.S. support^ -with withdrawal
of our support (our only available form of pressure) unless he reformed
himself accordin£, to U.S. prescription? Was this a prudent time to risk
a coup in South Vietnam^ which was the widely predicted effect of any
show of lack of confidence in Diem?
It is obviously impossible for us to strike a balance among these
reasons (or perhaps some others) why the decisions were made the way
they were. More interesting^ though^ is that it seems to have been un-
necessary for even the decision -maker himself to strike such a balance.
For it seems that whatever his view, the policy of trying to reassure
Diem (rather than pressure him, or dissociating from him) seemed like a
sensible tactic for the moment, and very possible the only sensible
tactic for that particular moment.
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IV. B. FROM MY TO SEPTEi\IBE Fv
CMPTE'R IV
At the end of September^ Admiral Harry Felt, Commander-in-Chief of
U.S. forces in the Pacific , stopped off in Saigon on his way to a SEATO
meeting in Bangkok. Felt, Ambassador Nolting, and several of their
senior aides met with Diem at Independence Palace, on the evening of
the 2Sth, According to Kolting's cable the following day:
In course of long discussion. . .Diem pointed the questiono
He asked for a bilateral defense treaty with the U<S. This
rather Isxge and unexpected request seemed to have been
dragged in by the heels at the end of a far-ranging discussion,
but we discovered upon questioning that it was seriously in-
tended. . . ]_/
Although the available record does not explicitly say so, this re-
quest presumably triggered the intensive attention to Vietnajii planning
that began early in October (bolting's cable arrived October l) and led
to the decision on the 11th to send the Taylor Mission.
- The balance of this chapter reviews the me.jor developments between
the Presidential decisions on the Task Force Report (May ll) and the
axrival of Aolting^s cable on the treaty request (October l) -
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TIIS JOHT^SO^ I-ilSSIOK
The available record tells us almost nothing about the Vice
President's visit to Saigon beyond what is described in the public
memoirs. We know from Kolting's cables that Johnson brought up the
possibility of U.S. troops in Vietnam and of a bilateral treaty after
Diem (in an after-dinner conversation) began to talk about the problems
the.t eormunist gains in Laos would create for him. We know that Diem
replied that he wanted U.S. combat troops only in the event of open
invasion and that he also did not show interest in a treaty^ 2/
But we do not know what, if anything, Johnson was authorized to say
if Diem ho.d reacted affirmatively. And this could have ranged any^'fhere
from attempting to discourage Diem if he did show interest, to offering
some specific proposal and timetable o l^o strong inference can be drawn
from the fact that Johnson, rather than Diem, raised the issue. Even if
the President xhad decided against ms-king troop commitments to Vietnam
at that time, there would have been nothing outrageous about instructing
Johnson to refer to such a possibility once Diem began to talk about
his concerns due to Laos. After all, the vrhole point of the Johnson
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mission vas to reassure Diem and other Asian leaders^ that the U.S. could,
despite Laos^ he counted on in Asia. Simply reading the American news-
papers would have told Diem that at least as of May 5? the Administration
was seriously considering sending American troops to Vietnam, and that
Johnson was expected to discuss this with Diem. A quite reasonable
tactical Judgment would have heen that nothing would have "been more
likely to make Diem ask for U.S. troops than for Johnson to remain
eerily silent on this issue.
Consequently, on the record available, we cen do no more than guess
what would have happened if Diem reacted affirmatively at the time of
Jolinson's visit. The m-ost reasonable guess is probably that the Taylor
Mission, or something equivalent, would have been undertaken in the
spring, rather than in the fall, and nothing very much would have been
different in the long run. But that is only a reasonable guess.
For the rest, here are some extracts from a "report Johnson \?rote
after his return. Essentially, Johnson argued for prompt moves by^the
U.S. to shov; support for non-communist governments in Southeast Asia.
He had in mind expanded conventional military and economic aid, and
perhaps a new treaty to replace SEATO. But despite the shock of U.S.
willingness to accept a coalition government in Laos, Johnson reported
that U.S. troops were neither desired nor required. And although this
might not always be the case, Johnson recommended that the U.S. must
remain master of this decision." 3/
The Im pact of L aos ■
There is no mistaking the deep - and long lasting - impact
of recent developments in Laos.
Country to country, the degree differs but Laos has created
doubt and concern about intentions of the United Sta,tes through-
out Southeast Asia. No amount. of success at Geneva can, of
itself, erase this^ The independent Asians do not wish to have
their own status resolved in like manner in Geneva.
Leaders such as Diem, Chiang, Sarit and Ayub more or less
accept that we are making "the best of a bad bargain" at
Geneva. Their charity extends no farther «
■ The Impact of the Mission
Beyond question, your judgexaent about the timing of our
mission was correct. Each leader -- except I^Iehru -- publicly
congratulated you on the "timing" of this mission. Chiang
said -- and all others privately concurred -- that the mission
had the effect of "stabilizing" the situation in the Southeast
Asian nations.
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What happened, I believe, was this: the leaders visited
want -" as long as they can -~ to remain as friends or allies
of the United States, The public, or, more precisely, the
political, reaction to Laos had drastically wesiiened the
ability to maintain any strongly pro-US orientation. Neu-
tralism in Thailand, collapse in Vietnam, ant i -.American election
dema^oguery in the Philippines vere all developing prior to our
visit. The show of strength and sincerity -- partly because
you had sent the Vice President and partly, to a greater extent
than you may believe, because you had sent your sister — gave
the friendly leaders something to "hang their hats on" for a
while longer •
O-or mission arrested the decline of confidence in the United
States c It did not -^ in my judgment -- restore any confidence
already losto The leaders were as explicit, - as courteous and
courtly as men could 'be in malting it clear that deeds must follow
words -- soon
'
V7e didn't buy time ' -- we were given it. .
If these men I savr at your request were bankers, I would
know -" without bothering, to ask -- that there would be no
further extensions on my note. ■ ■
-;^ ^ -x- *
The Importance of Follow-Through
I cannot stress too strongly the extreme importance of
following up this mission with other measures, other actions,
and other efforts. At the moment -- because of Laos -- these
nations are hyjoer sensitive to the possibility of American
hypocrisy toward Asiac Considering the Vienna talks with
Khrushchev -- which, to the Asian mind, emphasi2;e Western rather
than Asian concerns -- and considering the negeitive line of
various dom_estic American editorials about this mission, I
strongly believe it is of first importance that this trip bear
fruit irmiiedi3.telyo
Personal Conclusions from the Mission
I took to Southeast Asia some basic convictions about the
problems faced there. I have come away from the mission there
-" and to India 8n.d Pakistaji -- with many of those convictions
sharpened and deepened by what I saw ajid learned. I have also
reached certain other conclusions which I believe may be of
value as guidance for those res-consible in formulating policies.
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These conclusions are as follows:
lo The battle against Corarnunism must be joined in Southeast
Asia with strength and determination to achieve success
there --^ or the United States ^ inevitably, must surrender
the Pacific and take up our defenses on our* own shores o
Asian Communism is compromised and contained by the main-
tenance of free nations on the subcontinents Without this
inhibitory influence , the island outposts -- Philippines ^
Japan^ Taiwan -- have no security and the vast Pacific
becomes a Red Sea.
2. The struggle is far from lost in Southeast Asia and it is
by no means inevitable that it must be lost. In each
country it is possible to build a sound structure capable
of withstajiding and turning the Communist sujrge. The will
to resist -- while now the taxget of subversive atfeck --
is there. The key to i/hat is done by Asians in defense of
Southeast Asian freedom is confidence in the United States.
3. There is no alternative to United States leadership in
Southeast Asia. Leadership in individual countries — or
the regional leadership and cooperation so appealing to
Asians -- rests on the knowledge and faith in United
States power 5 will and understanding.
4. SEATO is not now and probably never will be the answer
^ because of British and French unwillingness to support
decisive action. Asian distrust of the British and Trench.
is ^ outspoken. Success at Geneva would prolong SEATO 's role.
Failure at Geneva would terminate SEATO ^s meaningfulness.
In the latter event , vre must be ready with a new approach
to collective security in the area.
We should consider an alliance of all the free nations of
the Ps.ciflc and Asia who are willing to join forces in defense
of their freedom. Such an organization should:
a) have a clear-cut command authority
b) also devote attention to measures and programs of
social justice, housing , land reform, etCc
5. Asian leaders --. at this time -- do not want American troops
involved in Southeast Asia other than on training missions.
. Ajmerican combat troop involvement is not only not required,
it is not desirable. Possibly Americans ~- fail to appre-
ciate fully the subtlety that recently-colonial peoples
would not look with favor upon governments which invited
or accepted the return this soon of Western troops. To
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J . the extent that feax of gro-und troop involvement dominates
■■ our political responses to Asia in Congress or elsewhere,
it seems most desirable to me to allay those paralyzing
fears in coni'idence, on the strength of the individual *
statements made by leaders consulted on this trip. This
does not minimir.e or disregard the probability that open
attack would bring calls for U.S. combat troops. But the
present probability of open attack seems scanty and vre might
gain much needed flexibility in our policies if the spectre
II ' of combat troop commitment could be lessened domestically.
6. Any help -- economic as well as military -™ we give less
developed nations to secure and maintain their freedom must
be a part of a mutual effort. These nations cannot be saved
by ^ United States help alone c To the e>cbent the Southeast
Asian nations are prep8jred to -take the necessary measur^es to
make our aid effective^ we can be -- and must be — unstint-
ing in oua- assistance. It would be useful to enuncia^te more
cle8J:^ly than we have -» for the guidance of these young and
■unsoiDhisticated nations -» what we expect or require of theme
7. In large measure^ the greatest -danger Southeast Asia offers
to nations like the United States is not the momentary threat
of Communism itself, rather that danger stems from hunger ,
ignorance 5 poverty and disease o We must -- whatever strate-
gies we evolve "-- keep these enemies the point of our attack,
and make imaginative use of our scientific and technological
capability in such enterprises.
8. Vietnam and Thailand are the imm-ediate-and most important-
trouble spots, critical to the UcS. These areas require the
attention of our very best talents -- under the very closest
Washington direction -- on matters economic, military and
politicalc
The basic decision in Southeast Asia is here. We must decide
whether to help these countries to the best of our ability or
throw in the towel in the area and pull back our defenses to
San Francisco ajid [a/J "Fortress America" concept. More important,
we would say to the world in this case that we don't live up to
treaties and don't stand by our friends. This is not my concept.
I recommend that we move forward promptly with a major effort to
help these countries defend themselves. I consider the key here
is to get otor best M\AG people to control, plan, direct and exact
results from our military aid programo In Vietnam and Thailand,
- , we must move forward together. "^
a. In Vietnam,' Diem is a complex figure beset by many
problems. He has admirable qualities, but he is remote from the
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people, is siirrovmded "by persoiis less admirable and capable than
he. The country can be saved -- if we move quickly and wisely.
We must decide whether to support Diem -- or let Vietnam fallo
We must have coordination of purpose in our country team^ diplo-
matic and military. The Saigon Embassy^ USIS, ViAAG and related
operations leave much to be desired » They should be brought up
to maximum efficiency o The most im-portant thing is imaginative,
creative^ Ajnerican management of our military aid program. The
Vietnamese and our VAP.G estirricite that $50 million of U.S. mili-
tary and economic assistajice will be needed if we decide to
support Vietnam. This is the best information available to us
at the present time and if it is confirmed by the best Washington
militaa-y judgment it should be supported. Since you proposed
and Diem agreed to a joint economic mission, it should be ap-
pointed 3..nd proceed forthvrith.
■
b. In Thailand, the Thais and our own ¥u\^.G estimate
probably as much is needed as in Vietnam -- about $50 million
of military and economic assistance c Again, should our best
military judgoaent concur, I believe we should support such a
progrsm. Sarit is m-ore strongly and sta.unchly pro-Western than
many of his people. He is and must be deeply concerned at the
consequence to his country of a communist -controlled Laos. If
Sarit is to stand fi3:m against neutralism, he must have — soon
"" concrete evidence to show his people of United States military
and economic support. He believes that his armed forces should
be increased to 150,000. His Defense Minister is coming to
Washington to discuss aid matters.
■X- -X- -x- *
To recapitulate, these are the main impressions I have brought
back from my trip.
The fundamental decision required of the United States -- and
time is of the greatest importance — is whether we are to attempt
to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia
by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area,
or throw in the towel. This decision must be made in a full reali-
zation of the very hea.vy and continuing costs involved in terms of
money, of effort and of United States prestige. It must be made
with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced with the
further decision of whether we commit major United States forces
to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should our other efforts
fail. We must reDiain master in this decisiono What we do in
Southeast Asia should be part of a rarbional program to meet the
threat we face in the region as a wholec It should include a
clear-cut pattern of specific contributions to be expected by each
partner according to his ability and resources. I recommend we
proceed with a clear-cut and strong progrsaa of e^ction.
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II. DIEM'S JUNE LETTER
Daring his visit Johnson^ on behalf of Kennedy^ invited Diem to
prepare a set of proposals on South Vietnamese military needs for
consideration by Tfashington, In a letter May 15_, Diem told Kennedy
that the definitive study would be ready in a few weeks „ (He appre-
ciated this invitation^ Diem told Kennedy^ "particularly because we
have not become accustomed to being asked for our own views on our
needs.)"
On June 9^ Diem signed the promised letter. It was carried to
Washington by a key Diem aide (Nguyen Dinh Thuan) and delivered on the
l4th, (Thuan played a key role on the Vietnamese side throughout I961,
He was the man Durbrow^ in the cable quoted in full earlier^ suspected
was the only cabinet member Diem had told about the GIF. In a memo to
Gilpatric^ Lansdale described him as Diem's "Secretary of Security^
Defense^ Interior^ etCo") k/
*
In the letter^ Diem proposed an increase in the RVNAE to 270^000
men^ or to double the 150^000 strength authorized at the start of 1961^
and 100^000 men more than envisioned under the GIF. That was a large
request: for up until the end of April^ the U.S. and South Vietnamese
were still haggling over the go-ahead for a 20^ 000- man increase. Fur-
ther^ Diem made it clear that he saw this force requirement as a sem.i-
permanent increase in South Vietnamese strength^ which would continue
to be needed even should he eliminate the Viet Cong.
Here are some extracts from Diem^s letter:
■
/The/ situation... has become very much more perilous follow-
ing the events in Laos^ the more and more equivocal attitude
of Cambodia and the intensification of the activities of
aggression of international communism, which wants to take the
maximum advantage to accelerate the conquest of Southeast
Asiao It is apparent that one of the major obstacles to the
communist expansion on this area of the globe is Free Viet-
nam because with your firm support^ we are resolved to oppose
:* ' ■ ■ it with all our energies. Consequently^ now and henceforth^
we constitute the first target for the communists to overthrow
at any cost. The enormous accumulation of Russian war mate-
rial in North Vietnam is aimed^ in the judgment of foreign
observers^ more at South Vietnam than at Laos. We clearly
realize this dangerous situation but I want to reiterate to
you here^ in my personal name and in the name of the entire
Vietnamese people^ our indomitab3-e will to win.
On the second of May^ my council of generals met to evaluate
the current situation and to determine the needs of the
Republic of Vietnam to meet this situation. Their objective
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evaluation shows that the military situation at present
is to the advantage of the communists and that most of
the Vietnamese Armed Forces are already comjnitted to in-
ternal security and the protection of our 12 million
inhabitants o For many months the communist-inspired
fratricidal war has talien nearly one thousand casualties
a month on both sides, Doc-uments obtained in a recent
operation^ along route NOo 9 which runs from Laos to
Vietnam^ contain definite proof that 2^860 aiTned agents
have infiltrated among us in the course of the last four
months. it is certain that this number rises each day.
However^ the Vietnamese people are showing the world that
they are willing to fight and die for their freedom, not
withstanding the temptations to neutralism and its false
promises of peace being drutmiied into their ears daily by
the communists o
In the light of this situation, the council of generals
concluded that additional forces numbering slightly over
100,000 more than our new force level of 170,000 will be
required to counter the ominous threat of communist domi-
nation. . .
i I
After considering the recommendations of our generals and
consulting with our American military advisors, we now
conclude that to provide even minimum initial resistance
to the threat, two new divisions of approximately 10,000
strength each are required to be activated at the earliest-
possible date. Our lightly held defensive positions along
the demilitarized zone at our Northern border is even
today being outflanked by communist forces which have
defeated the Royal Laotian Army garrisons in Tchepone and
other cities in Southern Laos. Our ARVK forces are so
thoroughly committed to internal anti -guerrilla operations
that we have no effective forces with which to counter this
threat from Southern Laos. Thus, we need' immediately one
division for the First Army Coi-ps and one for the Second
Army Corps to provide at least some token resistance to the
sizeable forces the communists are capable of bringing to
bear against our Laotian frontier. Failing this, v^e would
have no recourse but to withdraw our forces southward from
the demilitarized zone and sacrifice progressively greater
f V
*
Diem's number implies an infiltration rate about \ times as high
as that estimated by U.S. intelligence in I961, and twice as high
as the hindsight revised I961 estimates now in use^
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areas of our country to the coimnimists. These divisions
should he mobilized and equipped^ together vith initial
logistic support units^ immediately after completion of
activation of the presently contemplated increase of 20^000 .
which you have offered to support.
FoUomng the activation of these units^ which should begin
in about five months^ we must carry on the prograni of acti-
vation of additional units until over a period of two years
we will have achieved a force of 1^ infantry divisions^ an
expanded airborne brigade of approximately division
strength and accompanying (support?),.. The mission of this
total 270^000 man force remiains the same^ namely^ to over-
come the insurgency which has risen to the scale of a bloody^
communist-inspired civil war within our borders and to pro-
vide initial resistance to overt^ external aggression until
free world forces under the SEATO agreement can come to our
aid. The question naturally arises as to how long we shall
have to carry the burden of so sizeable a military force.
Unfortunately^ I can see no early prospects for the reduction
of such a force once it has been established; for even though
we may be successful in liquidating the insurgency within our
borders^ communist pressure in Southeast Asia and the external
military threat to our country must be expected to increase^ I
feaXy before it diminishes. This means that we must be pre-
pared to maintain a strong defensive military posture for at
least the foreseeable future in order that we may not become
one of the so-called "soft spots" which traditionally have ■
attracted communist aggression. We shall therefore continue
to need material support to maintain this force whose re-
quiremients far exceed the capacity of our economy to
support
o • o e
To accomplish this 100,000 man expansion of our military
forces, which is perfectly feasible from a manpower vie^fpoint^
will require a great Intensification of our training pro-
gratns in order to produce, in the minimum of time, those
qualified combat leaders and technical specialists needed to
fill the new units and to provide to them the technical and
logistic support required to insure their complete effective-
ness. For this purpose a considerable expansion of the
United States Military Advisory Group is an essential require-
mento Such an expansion, in the form of selected elements of
the American Armed Forces to establish training centers for
the Vietnamese Armed Forces, would serve the dual purpose of
providing an expression of the United States' determination to
halt the tide of Gomm.unist aggression and of preparing our
forces in the minimujn of tlmeo
While the Ck)vernment and people of Vietnam are prepared to
carry the heavy m.anpower burden required to save our country,
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we well know that we cannot afford to pay_, equip, train and
maintain such forces as I have described. To make this
effort possible_, we would need to have assurances that this
needed material support would be provided « 5./
The record is unclear on the immediate response to this letter.
In particular, we have no record of the conversations Thuan had in
Washington when he delivered the requests o The issue of the RVJ^AE
increases somehow became part of the business of an economic mission
then about to leave for Vietnam (the Staley Mission, discussed in the
following section). The request for "selected elements of the
American Armed Forces", raised in the next-to-last quoted paragraph,
is left thoroughly obscure in the records we have-"to the point where
we are not at all sure either what Diem meant by it or how the Admin-
istration reacted to it« But, as will be seen in the section below
on "U.S. Troops", nothing came of it.
III. THE STALEY MISSION
•«i-
One of the continuing negotiating items through most of 19^1 was
the extent to which the South Vietnamese should finance their ovm effort.
The UoS. view was that the South Vietnamese vere not doing enough. The
result was American pressure on Diem to undertake what was called tax
"reform." Diem was most reluctant to move. It is pretty clear that a
large part of Diem's reluctance to move flowed from the saane (well-founded)
sense of personal insecurity that made him avoid establishing a clear
military chain of command. On the latter issue, the risk of weakening the
I I- war effort obviously struck him as less dangerous than the risk of miaking
a coup easier by concentrating military authority in his generals instead
I j of dividing it between the generals and the 38 province chiefs. Similarly,
for a ruler so unsure of his hold on the country, a serious effort at im-
posing austerity looked more risky than holding out for the Americans to
provide a few more millions out of their vast resources. But Diem, of
course, was hardly likely to admit such reasons to the Americans, assum-
ing he admitted them to himself. Consequently, on these issues (as on
many others) the record is a long story of tediously extracted promises,
excuses for inaction, and American com.plaihts about Diem's administrative
style o
On the economic issue, the substance of the argument was this:
The deficit between what Diem raised in taxes and what his budget
required was made up by the U.S. through a commercial import prograan.
The regim.e sold the goods provided by the UoS. to South Vietnamese busi-
nessmen, and used the piasters thus acquired mainly to meet the local
currency costs (mostly food and pay) for the armed forces. U.S. dissatis-
faction with the South Vietnamese effort showed clearly in the decision
to ask the South Vietnamese themselves to provide the local, currency costs
for the 20,000 man force increase proposed in the CIP, although the UoS.
had been paying these costs (through the import' program) for the balance
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of the forces. The South Vietnamese insisted^ for the outset^ that they
could not raise the piasters required.
The basic question of whether the South Vietnamese were bearing a
reasonable- share of the burden devolved into a number of technical
issues^ such as the effect of the program on inflation in South Vietnam^
and the piaster/dollar exchange rate. The Gilpatric/Lansdale draft of
the Task Force Report proposed that Diem be flatly assured that the U.S.
would make up any deficit in the Vietnatnese budget. But State objected
from the start to giving any such assurance. Instead a Joint coimiiission
of UoS. and South Vietnamese economic experts was proposed to work out
a Joint program dealing with these economic issues. This was one of the
proposals Vice President Johnson carried with him on his mission. Diem
accepted the proposal. And the UoS. team^ headed by Eugene Staley
(president of the Stanford Research Institute) was dispatched to South
Vietnam in mid-June.
By the time the Staley Mission left^ though^ Diem had written the
letter Just quoted 'asking for U.S. support for a large further increase
in his forces. Staley' s group^ MltYi its Vietnamese co-unterpart ^ found
themselves serving as the vehicle for the discussions on force levels.
The report they issued is mostly about military issues_, on which the
economists stated they simply reflected instructions passed on by their
respective governments. Here are seme excerpts on the military issues
(in addition^ the report of course contained a discussion^ rather vague
as it turned out^ of the economic issues which were nominally its pur-
pose^ and it also contained a good deal of very fine^ vigorous language
on the need for "crash programs" of economic and social development).
Viet Nam is today under attack in a bitter^ total struggle
which involves its survival as a free nation. Its enemy^ the
Viet Cong^ is ruthless^, resourceful^ and elusive o This enemy
is supplied^ reinforced^ and centrally directed by the inter-
national Communist apparatus operating through Hanoi. To
defeat it requires the mobilization of the entire economic^
military psychological^ and social resources of the country
and vigorous support from the United States,
The intensified program which v/e recommend our two coun-
tries adopt as a basis for mutua.1 actions over the next
several years is designed not Just to hold the line but to
achieve a real breakthrough. Our Joint efforts must surpass
the critical threshold of the enemy's resistance^ thereby put-
ing an end to his destructive attacks^ and at the same time
ve must make a decisive impact on the economic^ social^ and
ideological fronts
The turn of events in Laos has created further serious
problems with regard to the maintenance of the GVN as a free
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and sovereign non-Communist nation. In particular ^ the
uncovering of the Laotian-Viet Main border to DEV or DRV-
supported forces creates a serious threat of increased
covert infiltration of personnel, supplies, and equipment
to the Viet Cong. With such increased support, the Viet
Cong undoubtedly hope to seize firm military control of
a geographic area and annoixnce the establishment therein
of a ''rebel" goverra'aent for South Viet Nam which vould
then be recognized by and receive military support from
the DRV, CoiTimunist China, and Soviet Russia. (Example:
The present situation in Laos.)
The joint VI\^-US group does not consider itself com-
petent to make specific recommendations as to desired
force levels for the defense of Viet Naaii. They iiave,^
however, after cons\ilta.tion with their respective mili-
tary authorities, adopted for economic planning purposes
certain estimated strength figures for the GVN armed
forces under two alternative assumptions o Alt ernative A
assumes that the Comm-unist-led insurgency effort remains
at approxiiiiately its present level of intensity and the
Government of Laos maintains suTficient independence from,
the Comjmmist Bloc to deny authority for the transit of
BW or Communist Chinese troops across its borders.
Alternative B assumes that the Viet Cong are able to
significantly increase their insurgency campaign within
Viet Nam and that the situation in Laos continues to
deteriorate to the point where the Communists gain de facto
control of that country.
Alternative A called for a build-up of Diem's forces to 200,000
(vs. 170,000 then authorized). Alternative B called for continuing the
build-up to 270,000. On this basis, Kennedy agreed to provide support
for the increase to 200,000. The 200,000~man approval was supposed to ■
be contingent on South Vietnamese agreement to a plan for using the
forces. The question of a farther increase to 270,000 was deferred,
since it did not need to be faced until the lower figure was being
approached, sometime late in 1962. 6/
A consequence of the Staley Mission was the South Vietnamese troop
levels needed little attention in the fall review: the U.S. simply
decided to support the increase to 200,000 even tho'agh the agreed plan
for using the farces did not yet exist (as in May the U.S. had agreed to
support the increase to 170,000 which also, re will be recalled, was
supposed to have been contingent on such a plan).
A few points about the Staley Mission seem useful to keep in mind
in reviewing the fall process:
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t
lo It is another reminder of the prevailing (although not
universal) over-optimism of U.S. appraisals of the Vietnam problem,
2o One of the follow-on actions to the report was supposed to
I • be a Vietnamese announcement of a program of social refoim. Prodticing
. • this piece of paper (and in the end it was not much more than a piece
of paper) took months. It was experiences such as this that gave
questions about the viability of the Diem regime greater prominence in
the fall review than they had received during April and May.
'3o The U.S. was still continuing to deal with Diem most gently.
Nothing more was asked of Diem as a quid pro quo than that he finally
work up a plan for the counterinsurgency. The President explicitly
accepted the assumptions of the Joint Plan worked out by the Staley
Mission and their Vietnamese counterparts.
This is from the formal record of decision:
Joint Program of Action
With the Government of
. Vietnam ( Staley Report )
August ky 1961
The President agrees vrith the three basic tenets
■ on which the recommendations contained in the Joint Action
Program are based^ namely:
a. Security requirements must^ for the present^ be given
first priority,
b. Military operations will not achieve lasting results
unless economic and social progrecns are continued and
accelerated,
Co It is in our joint Interest to accelerate measures to
achieve a self-sustaining economy and a free and
peaceful society in Viet-Nam. T/
Similar language was used at the time of the May decisions. So It
is not new« It is only that^ in the light of Diem^s inactivity^ the
phrases implying that non-military efforts are also important had come
to sound a little hollow,
IV. U.S. COMBAT TROOPS
From the time of the Laos Annex io 'the original Gilpatric/Lansdale
draft of the Task Force Report (April 28)5 the record shows persistent
activity on some level or other on the issue of sending U.S. combat troops
to Vietnam,
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At the time of the Task Force review^ it -will be recalled^ Defense
recommended sending two l600-man combat units to Vietnatn to set up two
training centers for the Vietnamese in the highlandSo In later drafts
of the Task Force report^ this proposal was broadened to consider send-
ing American troops for wider purposes, short of direct combat against
the Viet Cong. But the proposal was downgraded to a subject for study
and was no longer a definite recommendaAion.
Here is a summary of the items (on the issue of U.S. combat troops)
in the record available to this study following Kennedy's decisions on
the Task Force Report (May ll).
On May 12 Vice President Johnson discussed the question with Diem,
as described in an earlier section. This seems to have resolved the
issue (negatively) so far as Johnson was concerned, and possibly as far as
■president Kennedy was concerned. ' But if it did, the President's view was
not YBTY emphatically passed on to subordinate members of the Administration.
For a week later, Lansdale sent: a memo to Gilpatric noting that Diem did not
want U-B. combat units as such, but that, he might accept 'these units if they
had a mission of training South Vietnamese forces:
Ambassador Nolting /said/ that President Diem would
welcome as many U.S. military personnel as needed for
- training and advising Vietnaraese forces. A^-A.3 Chief/
General McGarr, who was also present at this discussion
/between Johnson and Diem/^ reported that while President
Diem would not want U.S. combat forces for the purpose
of fighting Communists in South Vietnam, he would accept
deployment of U.So combat forces as trainers for the
Vietnamese forces at any time. 8/
This language leaves it unclear whether McGarr was merely stating
his opinion (which supported his o^m desire to bring in UoS. comliat
units), or reporting what he understood Diem to have said.
(About the same day of Lansdale's memo — May l8 — the
JCS had restated its recommendation of May 10 that combat
troops should be sent to Vietnam; and McGarr, from Saigon,
had recomjfiended sending a l6,000 man force, or if Diem
would not accept that, a 10,000 man force with the nomi-
nal mission of establishing training centers for the Viet-
namese, The similar recommendation made in the Task Force
drafts had suggested 3200 men for the force.) 9/
In any event, Lansdale's memo makes it q.vite clear that he (along
with McGarr and the JCS) were primarily interested in getting U.S„
combat units into Vietnam, with the training mission a possible device
for getting Diem to accept themo After a discussion of JCS and CITTCPAC
planning and of alternative locations for the troops, Lansdale comments:
. I
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any of the above locations have good areas for
training of Vietnamese forces^ if this vere to be a ' ■
mission of the U.S. forces.
In the available papers^ no one at this time talked about using
Merican units to directly fight the Viet Cong. Rather it was mainly
in terms of relieving Vietnamese units to undertake offensive action.
We can only guess what people were really thinking o As the t raining -
the-Vietnamese rationale seems essentially a device for getting Diem
to accept the units^ the non-combatant role for U.S. troops may have
been (and probably was in the minds of at least some of the planners)
mainly a device for calming those members of the Administration who
were reluctant to involve American units in fighting the Viet Congo
Certainly in hindsight^ it seems most unrealistic to suppose that
American combat units could have been stationed in a center of Viet
Cong activity (a numiber of papers postulate the insurgents were
attempting to establish a "liberated area" in the high plateau^ which
was the principal locale discussed) without themselves becoming involved
in the fighting.
Lansdale concluded his memo by reminding Gilpatric that Diem was
sending Thuan ("Secretary of Security^ Defense^ Interior^ etc.") to
Washington to deliver his letter on Vietnam's "definitive military needSo"
Lansdale recommended that Gilpatric take up the question of whether Diem
would accept UoS. troops vrLth Thuan. "With concrete information^, you
will then have a firm position for further decisions."
But apparently someone did not want to wait for Thuan. For on May 27_,
Kolting reported that he had brought up the question of what Diem meant in
his conversation with Johnson directly with Diem, and that Diem did not
then want U.S^ com.bat units "for this or any other reasono 10/
Nevertheless^ on June 9^ Diem signed the letter to Kennedy that^ as
quoted above^ asked for:
• • o
selected elem.ents of the American Armed Forces
to establish training centers for the Vietnamese Armed
Forces^ . . . '
a move which Diem stated:
.♦owould serve the dual purpose of providing an ex-
pression of the United States* determination to halt the
tide of comm.ujiist aggression and of preparing our forces
in the minimum of time. ll/
This certainly sounded very much like the recoimnendation of the Task
Force draft, or McGarr's later expanded version of that proposal; par-
ticularly since Diem explicitly stated that he had McGarr's advice in
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drafting the proposals. But where the American proposals vere for train-
ing whole South Vietnamese divisions^ Diem said the training centers
vould be for combat leaders and technical specialists. Consequently, it
seems that Diem did not have the same thing in mind in referring to "selec-
ted elements of the Merican Armed Forces" as did McGarr and others
interested in bringing in American combat units. It may be that
Diem agreed to put in this request that sounded like what McGarr wanted
as a concession to the Americans in return for support of the large in-
crease in the RWAP he was asking o
Presumably this was clarified during the discussions Thuan had after
delivering the letter. But^ as noted earlier^ we have no record of the
conversations. In any event, nothing came of the proposal.
(a summar-y of Diem*s letter^ cabled to the American mission in Saigon
the day after the letter was received in Washington^ did not use the
phrase "selected elemients of the American Armed Forces." -Instead it said
that Diem asked for an increase of "American personnel" to establish the
training centers. The crucial issue^ of course, was whether Americans
would be sent to Vietnam in the foriTi of organized combat units, capable of^
if not explicitly intended, for conducting combat operations. We do not
know whether the wording of the summary reflected Thuan' s clarification
of the proposal when he arrived in Washington, or a high level Administra-
tion decision to interpret Diem's letter as not asking for combat units^
or merely sloppy drafting of the cable.)
It seems clear that either Diem (despite the language of the letter
he signed) really did not want American units^, or that Kennedy (despite
the activity of his subordinates) did not vrant to send those units, or both
Sorenson, in his memoir, says that in May Kennedy decided against
sending combat units despite the recommendations he received at the time
of the Task Force Report. But his account of the Task Force is in error
on a number of details, and so it is hard to know how much to credit his
recollection. 12/
But there is a final item apparently from this period that seems to
support Sorenson. It is a handwritten undated note on a- piece of scratch
paper from Rostow to McIJamara. It looks like a note passed at a meeting.
From its location in the file, it was probably written about June 5,
that is, a few days before Thuan arrived with Diem's lettero It reads:
Bob:
We must think of the kind of forces and missions
for Thailand now, Vietnam, later.
We need a guerrilla deterrence operation in
Thainland's northeast-
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We shall need forces to support a counter -guerrilla war
in Vietnam:
aircrafi^
helicopters
coiomunications men
special forces
militia teachers
etc.
\i\m 13/
Two things are striking about this note: firsts it is a quite exact
description of the sort of military assistance Kennedy finally dispatched
to Vietnam (i.e., combat support and advisors but not i^Jiierican units
capable of independent combat against the guerrillas). Second^ it cer--
tainly suggests that desioite what Lansdale, McGarr, and others were doing,
those close to the President were not at this time thinking about sending
American combat units to Vietnam (or any American forces, for even the
units Rostow lists are for '^later" in contrast to "Thailand now"). Never-
theless on July 20, McG-arr again raised the question of combat units for
training with Diem, and reported again that he did not want them^
In general, we seem to be seeing here a pattern that first began to
emerge in the h&mdling of the Task Force Report and which will be even
more strikingly evident in the President's handling of the Taylor Report.
Someone or other is frequently promoting the idea of sending U.S.
combat units. Kennedy never makes a clear-cut decision but some way or
other action is always deferred on any move that would probably lead to
engagements on the ground between American units and the Viet Cong.
We have no unambiguous basis for Judging just what had really hap-
pened in each case. But we do see a similar pattern at least twice and
possibly three different times: in May, perhaps again in June (depending
on details of Thuan's talks in Washing"ton not evailable to this study),
and as we will report shortly, again in November « In each case, the
record seems to be moving toward a decision to send troops, or at least
to a Presidential decision that, in principal, troops should be sent if
Diem can be persuaded to accept them. But no such decision is ever
reached* The record never shows the President himself as the controlling
fig-ure. In June, there does not seem to be any record of what happened,
at least in the files evailable to this study. In May and, as we will
see, in November, the President conveniently receives a revised dj:'aft of
the recommendations which no longer requires him to comxait himself.
if
No reliable inference can be drawn from this about how Kennedy wouJ-d
have behaved in I965 and beyond had he lived. (One of those vrho had
advised retaining freedom of action on the issue of sending U.S. combat
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troops was Lyndon Johnson.) It does not prove that Kennedy behaved soimdly
in I96I0 Many people ifill think so; but others irill, argue that the most
difficult problem of recent years might have been avoided if the U.So. had
made a hard commitment on the ground in South Vietnam in I96I.
Vc THE TREATY REQUEST
■ As to Diem^ ve have^ of course, even less in the way of a record from
vhich to judge what he really thought he vas doing. But it is not hard to
understand vhy he should be reluctant to accept U.S. combat troops. His
stated reason was always that sending U.S. combat units wou].d signaJ the
end of the Geneva Accords. But this explanation explains little. Diem
thought the Geneva Accords were betrayal of Vietnam in 195^f-^ and a farce,
freely violated by the communists, latero Consequently, he would be con--
cerned about their demise only if North Vietnam could use this as a pretext
for an overt Invasion o But ITorth Vietnam had long had a suitable pretext
for an invasion in Diem's refusal to discuas the elections called for
under the Geneva AccordSo Diem's shield was +he threat of U.S. interven-
tion, not the Geneva Accords, and it is mighty hard to see how this
shield could' be wealiened by putting American troops on the ground in South
Vietnam o
• But there were other reasons for Diem to be wary of U.S. troops. For
one thing, not even Diem's severest critics questioned his commitment to
Vietnamese nationalism. The idea of inviting foreign troops back into
Vietnam must surely have been distasteful even once he decided it was un-
avoidable. Further, the presence of American troops in Vietnam had a very
ambivalent effect on the risk to Diem of a military coupo To the extent
American troops increased the sense of security, they would lessen the
likelihood of a coup, which the military rationalized mainly on the grounds
that they could not \u.n the war under Diem. But the larger the American
military presence in the country, the more Diem would have to worry about
American ability and temptation to encourage a coup if Diem incurred
American displeasure <,
The net impact of these conflicting effects would depend on the
security situation in Vietnam. If Diem felt strong, he would probably not
want American troops j if he felt weak, he might see no choice but to risk
inviting the Americans in. Even at the time of the Taylor mission, we
will see Diem is m.ost erratic on this issue.
Against this background, it is easy to understand why Diem, when the
situation got worse in September, should have "pointed the question" at
whether the U.S. would give him a treaty, rather than whether the U.S.
would send in troops. As far as we can see, he was mostly concerned about
what the latest VC attacks were doing to confidence in his regime, rather
than any fear that the VC, still estimated at fewer than 20,000 strong,
were going to defeat the quarter million regulars and auxiliaries in his
own forces. What he probably wanted was an unambiguous public commitment
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that the Americans would not let Vietnam fallo For this vould meet his
immediate concern about confidence in his regime^ perhaps even more
effectively than the dispatch of American troops^ and -without the dis--
advantages that vould come iTith accepting American troops^ For Diem^ a
clear-cut treaty probably seemed the best possible combination of maxi-
mizing the American commitment while minimizing American leverage. And
that^ of course^ would help explain why the Administration was not
terribly attracted to such a.proposa],.
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Vic THE SITUATION IN SEPTEMBER
So far as the available record shows^ there was no sense of imminent
crisis in the official reporting to Washington as fall of 1961 begano An
NIE published in mid-August concluded that Diem faced a "prolonged and
difficult struggle" against the insurgency^ and noted that "the French with
their memories of the Indochina that vas and the British vith their experi-
ence in Malaya tend to be pessimistic regarding GVN prospects for combating
the insurgency." l4/ But the NIE also reported that Diem's army had been
performing better in 1961 than in I96O0 Warning of possible trouble looked
months J rather than weeks^ ahead o The danger foreseen "was a coup: "if the
fight against the Viet Cong goes poorly during the next year or the South
Vietnamese Army suffers heavy casualties^, the chances of a military coup
vould substantially increase o" I5/
The judgment of the NIE on the effects of such a coup vas entirely
negative:
If there is a serious disruption of GVN leadership as a result of
Diem' s death or as the result of a military coup^ any momentum of
GVN*s counterinsurgency efforts had achieved will be halted or re-
versed_j at least for a time. The confusion and suspicion attending
a coup effort could provide the communists with an opportunity to
seize control of the government « 16/
There is no mention of any offsetting hope for a coup leading to more
effective prosecution of the war^ The overall impression left by the NIE
is that Diem is not a very effective leader^ but that he is getting along
well enough to make the risks of a coup look more dangerous than the risks
of the war being imwinnable under his leadership o In particular ^ a coup
(or Diem's death) were seen as the only thing that could bring a quick col-
lapse of the Saigon regime^, as opposed to the loss over time of a "prolonged
and difficult" struggle.,
MAAG Chief McGarr^ in a report dated September 1^ spoke of the "enhanced
sense of urgency and offensive spirit now present within both the RVNAE and
the Government of Vietnam. o." Under the heading "Outlook for Next Year/'
he reported:
With the increased effectiveness of the Armed Forces beginning
to be demonstrated oy the recent operations in the Delta Region and
the manifest intent of the U.So to continue and even step up its
vital support of the Vietnamese in their struggle against Communism_j
there is a spirit of renewed confidence beginning to permeate the
people^ the GVN^ and the Armed Forces « I7/
The political reporting from Saigon was less optimistic o Generally^
these reports argued that Diem was not doing much to strengthen his support o
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But there was no disagreement with McGarr's fairly optimistic assessment of
the military situation and no sense of crisis o
Through unofficial channels^ though^ the White House was receiving a
, • far bleaker view of the situation. Schelsinger reports:
I 'The situation gets worse almost week hy week/ Theodore Ho White
wrote us in August o * c o .The guerrillas now control amost all the
. southern delta - so much so that I could find no American who would
" drive me outside Saigon in his car even by day without military con-
I • voy,' He reported a 'political breakdown of formidable proportions:
oooWhat perplexes hell out of me is that the Commies^ on their side,,
; seem to be able to find people willing to die for their cause., ol
find it discouraging to spend a night in a Saigon night-club full of
young fellows of 20 and 25 dancing and jitterbugging (they are called
'la jeunesse cowboy') while twenty miles away their Communist contem-
poraries are terrozing the countryside.' An old China ?iand^ White
was reminded of Chungking in the Second World War^ complete with
Madame Nhu in the role of Madame Chiang Kai-sheko *If a defeat in
South Vietnam is to be considered our defeat; if we are responsible
for holding that area^ then we must have authority to acto And that
means intervention in Vietnam politicSo . .If we do decide so to inter-
. vene^ have we the proper personnel^ the proper instruments^ the proper
clarity of objectives to intervene successfully?' l8/
It did not take long to confirm White's pessimism^ although this must
have made the dilemma of what to do about it seem all the more acute c In
September^ the number of VC attacks jum.ped to nearly triple the level (about
i]-50 vsc 150) that had prevailed for some months previous lyo The most spec-
tacular attack; which seems to have had a shattering effect in Saigon^ was
the seizure of Phuoc Thanh; a provincial capital only 55 miles from Saigon.
The insurgents held the town a good part of the day; publicly beheaded
Diem's province chief; and departed before government troops arrived. The
official reporting to Washington by the end of the month pictured the situa-
tion as stagnating; if not dangerously deteriorating; although there con-
tinued to be no sense of the imminent crisis that Theodore White foresaw.
Here is an end-of -month report that Nolting sent just prior to the
meeting at which Diem asked for the treaty:
Status report on political items as of Sept 28: , ■
General: Governmental and civil situation at end of month much
same as at beginnings While neither of these gave open signs of
deterioration; Diem government did not significantly improve its
political position among people or substantially further national
unity. On positive side several fifty-man district level recon-
struction teams were sent to each of h provinces; and there was
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commendable ajnoTint coiKitry-side travel by ministers o On other hand^
report was received of high-level bickering over powers and authority
of new central intelligence organization (FVS-6487)^ and Diem ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with pace of field command's planning of
counter- insurgency operations^ but he has still not delegated sufficient
authority to field command • All in all we unable report that Sept saw
progress toward attainment task force goals of creating viable and
increasingly democratic societyc Some such 'shot in arm' as proposed
joint communiq.ue seems desirable..
Series large scale VC attacks in various areas central Vietnam
during month highlighted increased VC infiltrations through Laos and
underscored urgency of free world policy toward Laos which would
bring this situation under control. These VC actions plus temporary
VC seizure of provincial capital of Phuoc Thanh demonstrated that
tide not yet turned in guerrilla war... 19/
The ''shot in the arm" Nolting referred to was the communique on social reforms
that was agreed to some weeks earlier at the time of the Staley Mlssionj it
would finally be issued^ in a watered down form^ early in January. The con-
trast between White's and Nolting' s reporting is sharp: White obviously would
not have seen the issuing of a communique as a significant "shot in the arm,"
or commented on the VC show of strength in such mild terms as demonstrating
"that tide not yet turned." Consequently^ although Diem's request for a treaty
(a day after this cable was sent) surprised Nolting^ its effect at the White
House was presumably to confirm the warning that had already been received
through White o
The State Department's view of the situation seems also to have been
graver than that of the Embassy in Saigon o We have a situation SLimmary on
Southeast Asia that refers to Nolting' s cable but not to Diem' s treaty request^
and which consequently must have been distributed about October 1. On the
political situation in South Vietnam^ the summary quotes Nolting' s "no progress"
comments. But the military situation is described more bleakly than Nolting
did.
SOUTH VIET-NAM - MILITARY
lo Although GVN military capabilities have increased^ Viet Cong
capabilities are increasing at more rapid rate and Viet Cong attacks
have increased in sizeo
2o Viet Cong 'regular' forces have increased from about 7^000 at
beginning of year to approximately 17^000.
3<. Viet Cong have moved from stage of small hands to large units.
During September Viet Cong mounted three attacks with over 1^000 men
in eacho Viet Cong strategy m^ay be directed at 'liberating' an area
in which a 'government' could be installed^
4. Although vast majority of Viet Cong troops are of local
origin_, the infiltration of Viet Cong cadres from North Viet -Nam via
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Laos J the demilitarized zone^ and loy sea appears to be increasing.
However^ there is little evidence of major supplies from outside
sources^ most arms apparently being captured or stolen from GYN
forces or from the French during the Indo-China war. 20 /
On Laos^ the situation summary showed no such pessimism. But^ overall
the absence of bad news from Laos only added to the worry about South Viet-
nam o For the paper reported:
There probably have been some Viet Minh withdrawals from northern
Laos but Viet Minh movement into Southern Laos bordering on South
Vietnam has increased. Thus it appears enemy may be accepting
stalemate for time being within Laos and giving priority to stepping
up offensive action against South Vietnam., 21/
Two final items are worth bearing in mind in trying to see the Viet-
namese problem as it might have appeared to the White House in the fall of
1961. First, this warning of the effect of UoSo policy in Vietnam, from
the A-ugust 15 NIE quoted earlier:
International Attitudes . In providing the GVW a m^aximum of
encouragement and extensive support in its struggle against the
Communists, the US will inevitably become identified with the GVE^s
success or failure. The US will be uader heavy pressure from other
members of the non-Communist world, many of whom view the Vietnam
struggle in differing terms. For example, the neighboring coun-
tries, such as Thailand, Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, and Nationalist China, have all to some extent viewed devel-
opments in Laos as a gauge of US willingness and ability to help
an ant i -Communist Asian government stand against a Communist
'national liberation' campaigno They will almost certainly look upon
the struggle for Vietnam as a critical test of such US willingness
and ability. All of them, including the neutrals, would probably
suffer demoralization and loss of confidence in their prospects
for maintaining their independence if the Communists were to gain
control of South Vietnam. This loss of confidence might even
extend to India « 22/
Second, a couple of newspaper quotes may serve as a reminder of the extent
to which the Kennedy Administration had been londer a constant sense of
foreign policy crisis throughout its first year, with every evidence of
more to comeo In late September, in a review piece on Congressional ap-
praisals of Kennedy's first year, Russell Baker comraents that not even
Congress seems much interested in debate about Kennedy's effectiveness
in pushing through legislation:
What makes it particularly irrelevant this autiomn is that
Congress itself has been 'far more concerned ever since January
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with the President's performance as guardian of the national security
than with how he came out as chief warrior for a legislative programo
Erom Laos to Cuba to Vienna to Berlin to the Soviet nuclear
testing site at Semipalatinsk to New York's East River^ crisis after
crisis has fallen across the White House with a rapidity and gravity
that has absorbed l^o Kennedy's energy since his inauguration and
reduced the Congressional program to secondary importance o 23 /
I.
And a couple of days later^ James Reston^ describing the imminent risk
of a nuclear crisis over Berlin _, reported:
Specifically^ Khrushchev told one of Mr. Kennedy's political
emissaries that once Krushchev signs a separate peace treaty with
the Communist East Germans^ not only all of the West's rights in
Berlin will cease^ but all traffic to Berlin will cease until the
West negotiates new rights of access with the East German regime o
Khrushchev was questioned minutely on this key point « His reply
was ianeq_ui vocal: Not one truck^ or barge^ or train^ or plane would
leave from West Germany for West Berlin after the separate peace
treaty until the new arrangements with the East Germans were
negotiated o
Nowj this is not precisely the same as Lfro Gromyko's bland assur-
ances o This is blockade;, and blockade is an act of waro Washington
has made clear that it is not going to get stirred up if the East
Germans merely replace the Russians on the borders between East and
West Germany and approve the flow of adequate supplies <. But Mr. Khrush
chev did not support this procedure^ and went on to threaten that any
effort to break his blockade by force would lead to waro 24 /
Since Khrushchev had repeatedly pledged to sign the East German treaty by
the end of the year^ the showdown was not far off o
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1!BF, FALL DECISIOIMS - I
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I. TPIE DECISION TO SEND TAYLOR
As of early October_j there were several proposals for more active
intervention in Southeast Asia on the table. One was the JCS-favored plan
to intervene on the ground in Laos to seize and hold major portions of the
country^ principally to protect the borders of South Vietnam and Thailand o
A second plan (referred to in a staff paper as the "Rostow proposal") would
hava put a SEATO force of about 25^000 men into Vietnam to try to movocit a
guard on the Vietnam/Laos border between the DMZ and Cambodiac Finally^
there were various schemes^ dating from the Task Force review^ for putting
a UoS, force into the highlands^ or at DaNang with or without a nominal
mission of training South Vietnamese troops.
Except for the Rostow proposal all these plans pre-dated the spurt of _
Viet Cong activity in September and Diem's subsequent request for a treaty.
The record does not tell when and why the Rostow proposal was drawn up^ It
was probably a direct response to Diem' s request^ but it may have been simply
a part of the on-going Laos contingency planning^ In any event; Rostow' s
proposal was submitted to the JCS for Comment October 5- On the 9thj the
JCS responded with a counter-proposal for a substantial (initially about
20^000 men^ but expected to grow) commitment of UoS., forces in Vietnam^
centered on Plelku in the highlands o l/
In hindsight^ the JCS reasoning in rejecting the Rostow proposal looks
■unchallengeable o The JCS stated:
a^.. SEATO forces will be deployed over a border of several
hundred miles^ and will be attacked piecemeal or by-passed at the
Viet Cong's own choice o
b. It may reduce but cannot stop infiltration of Viet Cong
personnel and material.
c» It deploys SEATO forces in the weakest defense points
should DRV or CHICOM forces intervene „
d. It compounds the problems of comm^jnications and logistical
support o
The Chiefs also argued against an alternative border proposal to put
the SEATO force along the lyth parallel. Their first preference,, very
emphatically^ was to go into Laos:
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As stated in your ^Gilpatric' s/ ^-^^^^''®'*^^™^^ ^^~^ proposed concept
set forth must be analyzed in the total context of the defense of
Southeast Asia. Any concept which deals vxith the defense of South-
east Asia that does not include all or a substantial portion of Laos
is 5 from a military standpoint, unsound. To concede the majority
of northern and central Laos vould leave three-quarters of the
border of Thailand exposed and thus invite an expansion of communist
military action. To concede southern Laos vould open the flanks of
both Thailand and South Vietnam as well as expose Cambodia. Any
attempt to combat insurgency in South Vietnam, while holding areas
in Laos essential to the defense of Thailand and South Vietnam and,
at the sai'iie time^ putting troops in Thailand, would require an effort
on the part of the United States alone on the order of magnitude of
at least three divisions plus supporting units. This would require
an additional two divisions from the United States.
Wha,t is needed is not the spreading out of our forces through-
out Southeast Asia, but rather a concentrated effort in Laos where
a firm stand can be taken saving all or substantially all of Laos
which would, at the same time, protect Thailajid and protect the
borders of South Vietnam.
But, if the Laos plan vras "politically unacceptable at this tijiie/'
the Chiefs "provided" (but did not explicitly recomi'nend) "a possible
limited interim course of action" which could.. c
provide a degree of assistance to the Government of South Vietnam
to regain control of its o\m territory, and could free certain
South Vietnamese forces for offensive actions against the Viet
Cong. ^^Thile the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that implement at ion
of this limited course of action would not provide for the defense
of Thailand or Laos, nor contribute substantially or permanently
to solution of the overall problem of defense of Southeast Asia,
they consider the Plan preferable to either of the two military
possibilities described in referenced memorandum. 2/
The following day, there appeared a new paper called "Concept of
Intervention in Vietnam." The paper, according to a pencilled note on
the available copy, was drained mainly by Alexis Johnson, who was then a^_
Deputy Under Secretary of State. We know from a note William Bundy (then
principal Deputy to Paul Nitze, who was then Assistant Secretary of Defense,
ISA) sent to McNamara that a "talking paper" by Johnson was to be discussed
at a meeting that included, at least. Rusk and McNamara on the afternoon
of the 10th, But we do not know whether the uraft we have available is the
"taliing paper" or a revision put together later in the day, afi^er the
meeting.
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The proposal (*'an effort to arrest and hopefully reverse the deterior-
ating situation in Vietnam") vas a blend of Rostov's border force and the
Chief's "possible limited interim course of actiono" Johnson's paper
listed both the Rostov mission of the force (attempt to close the 'border)
and that of the Chiefs (vin control of the central highlands); otherwise
the paper folloved the JCS piano What probably happened^ considering the
haste vith vhich the paper must have been drafted^ vas that Johnson simply
blended the tv70 proposals together and assumed the fine points could be
vorked out latere For if the paper is somevhat confusing on the immediate
military proposal^ it is clear on the long-run thinking that underlays the
proposal. And this long-run thinking made the immediate military mission
relatively inconseq.uential^ since as vith the earlier combat-troops -for-
training proposals j, it vas pretty clear that the main idea vas to get some
American combat troops into Vietnam^j vith the nominal excuse for doing so
q,uite secondaryo
The plan vas described under the heading "Initial Phase." A subseq.uent
section^ titled "Anticipated Later Phases" states:
This initial action cannot be taken vithout accepting as our real
and ultimate objective the defeat of the Viet Cong; and making Vietnam
secure in the hands of an anti-Communist government o Thus supple-
mental military action must be envisaged at the earliest stage that is
politically feasible o The ultimate force requirements cannot be esti-
mated vith any precisiouo JCS are nov consideringo Three divisions
vould be a guessooo
Earlier the paper ;i in a similar vein^ had remarked:
While a staisfactory political settlement in Laos vould consider-
ably reduce Viet Minh infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam^ it
vould not entirely eliminate it. While such a reduction vould material-
ly assist the GVN in m.eeting the Viet Cong threat^ there is no assur-
ance that; even imder these circumistanceS; the GVM vill in the fore-
seeable future be able to defeat the Viet Cong. Under these circum-
stanceS; although the need of South Vietnam for outside assistance such
as proposed in this plan vould probably still be very strong^ it vould
be much more difficult to find a political base upon vhich to execute
this plan^ 3./
This judgment vas probably influenced by a special NIE issued October 5th;
vhich stated that 80-90^ of the estimated 17^000 VC had been locally recruited,
and that there vas little evidence that the VC relied on external supplies o
The relation of this paper to Diem's req_uest for treaty can only be
guessed at^ The paper never mentions Diem^ or any South Vietnamese request
for further assistance o But the paper supplemented one published about a
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week or so earlier (probalDly prior to Diem's request) titled "Limited Holding
Actions in Southeast Asia©" This earlier paper discussed various steps
short of major troop deployments o h/
The impression is that both papers were part of contingency planning
(short of major intervention in Laos) for saving something in Southeast Asia
should the Laos negotiations continue to drag on with no satisfactory reso-
lutiono Thus although the timing of the Vietnam paper was sui^ely influenced
and probably triggered by Diem's req^uest for a treaty,, it looks essentially
like a sxjggestion (but not a formal recommendation) to the President that if
he is unwilling to intervene to try to save Laos^ he should at least take
strong and unambiguous action to make sure that Vietnam would not also be
lost. In this interpretation it is easy to make sense of the emphasis on a
deteriorating situation in Vietnam^ and the implied warning that it might be
best to set this plan in motion before a settlement is reached in Laos_,
when it seemed relatively easy to provide a politically plausible basis for
the action o
(in a recent column^ Joseph Alsop q_uoted Aver ill Harriman as telling
him that Kennedy had told Harriman to get whatever settlement he couJ_d on
Laos^ but that the U.So really intended to make its stand in Vietnam^) 5/
At the end of the Vietnam paper there is a list of "Specific Actions
to be Taken Now" which goes no further (on Vietnam) than to list:
»
Use of UoSo naval aircraft and ships to assist GVW in inter-
,1 diction of sea traffic^ to assist self defense of GVN. This is to
some extent camouflagable. ■ ■ '
i -If necessity arises _, use of UoSo military aircraft for logistic
support^, including troop lift within Laos and South Vietnamo
Further^ there is a long list of pros and cons^ with no judgment
stated on the balance o
This (and other statements to be cited below) suggests^ again^ that
the paper was prepared for a discussion on Southeast Asia planning in the
KSC^ rather than in response to a request for a set of recommendations »
Three other points need to be mentioned:
lo The paperj although nominally presenting a SEATO plan^
explicitly assumes that "planning would have to be on the basis of proceed-
ing with whichever SEATO Allies would participate c"
2o The paper warns (in the balance of the paragraph quoted
earlier) that the ultimate force requirements would "much depend" on the
capabilities and leadership of the SEATO forces
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and above all on vhether the effort leads to much more better
fighting by Diem' s forceSo They alone can win in the end.
3o Very clearly foreshadowing the Taylor mission (and perhaps
indicating a White House hand in the drafting) the paper states:
The viability of this plan would be dependent on the
degree to which it could and would also result in the GW accel-
erating political and military action in its own defense o A
judgment on this can only be reached after thorough exploration
on the spot with the country team and the GWo
Finally _j here is the list of pros and cons presented (but not evaluated)
in the paper e
II
Cons
"lo The plan would not in itself solve the underlying problem of ridding
SYN of communist guerrillas,
"2, It would not seal off the borders of SW except for the limited area
of operations.
"3o It breaks the Geneva Accords and puts responsibility on the UoSo for
rationalizing the action before the UcKo and the world o
"4. It raises questions of UoS. troop relationships with the Vietnamese
peasants^ m.ontagnards_, GVN and its armyo
"5o The use of SEATO forces in SVW distorts Plan Five ^or major inter-
vention in LaosT" although these forces are not a net subtraction.
"6. The risk of being regarded as interlopers a la the French must be
considered.
"7« Communist change of tactics back to small-scale operations might
leave this force in a stagnant positiouo
"Pros
"1. The effect on GW morale of SEATO engagement in their struggle
could be most heartening.
r
"2o It could prevent the Viet Cong move to the next stage of battalion-
size^ formal organization to challenge the ARVNo
"3« The relatively sophisticated SEATO arms^ air power^ communications
and intelligence might spark a real transformation in ARVN tactics and action.
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"4o Capitalizing on U.S. intelligence sources now unavailable to the
GVN could lead to effective attacks on Viet Cong nerve centers of command
and communications o
"5o The SEATO force commitment could be used to get from Diem a
package of actions McGarr feels are needed to step up the GW effort ^ainly
the fainiliar items of clarifying the chain of command and establishing an
overall plan/o
"6o Introducing SEATO forces would give us for the first time some
bargaining position with the Russians for a settlement in Vietnamo
7o - If we go into South Vietnam now with SEATO^ the costs would be
much less than if we wait and go in later ^ or lose SVT^.
The available record shows three other papers prepared prior to the NSC
meeting^ October 11^ at which this paper was considered:
1. A special NIE commented on the plan in terms that were a lot
less than encouraging:
In the situation assumed^ we believe that the DRV would seek
at first to test the seriousness and effectiveness of the SEATO
effort by subjecting the SEATO forces and their lines of com-
munication to harassment; ambush^ and guerrilla attacko The Com-
munists would probably estimate that by using their Viet Cong
apparatus in South Vietnam^ and by committing experienced guer-
rilla forces from North Vietnam in guerrilla operations in
territory long familiar to them^ and by exploiting the oppor-
tuaities offered by the sizable junk traffic in coastal waters^
they could severely harass the SEATO land forces and penetrate ■"
the SEATO blockade c The Commionists would expect worthwhile
political and psychological rewards from successful harassment
and guerrilla operations against SEATO forces^ including
lowered GVN morale and increased tensions among the SEATO members o
While seeking to test the SEATO forces^ the DRV would prob-
ably not relax its Viet Cong campaign against the GVW to any
significant extents Meanvrhile^ Commimist strength in south laos
wo-uld probably be increased by forces from North Vietnam to
guard against an effort to partition Laos or an attack against
the Pathet Lao forces. The Soviet airlift would probably be
increased with a heavier flow of military supply into south Laos^
and the Communists wouJ^d probably intensify their efforts to
establish a secure route for motor traffic into the southo The
establishment of a coalition government in Laos under Souvanna
Phouma probably would not significantly reduce CommiHiist infiltra-
tion of m.en and eq_uipment from North to South Vietnam throu^gh Laos.
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If the SRA.TO action appeared to be proving effective in
reducing the present scale of infiltration the Coimnmiist prob-
ably would increase their use of the mountain trail system
through Cambodia, This is a longer and more difficult route
but its use could keep at least minimum support flowing to the
Viet Congo At the same time^ in order to reduce the appajrent
success of the SE/ITO action^ they could intensify small unit
attacks 5 assassinations^ and local terrorism in South Vietnam;
they could also commit more DRV irregular personnel for the
harassment of the SEATO forces. In any event, the SEATO com-
mitment in South Vietnam would probably have to be continued
over a prolonged periods It might be part of Communist tactics
to play upon possible SEATO weariness over maintaining substan-
tial forces and accepting losses , in South Vietnam over a long
period of time...
The reaction to the assumed SEATO action among concerned
non-Communist governments wouJLd vary v/idely. The Asian members
of SEATO would find renewed confidence in the organization and
the US5 if the plan were to go well- If, on the other hand, the
SEATO action were to become costly, prolonged, or to involve
heavy casualties, the Asian members' would soon become disenchanted
and look to the US to 'do something' to lessen the burden and to
solve the problem. The UK and France wo-uld be likely to oppose
the assuraed SEATO action, and their reluctejice to participate
could be overcome only with great difficulty, if at all.
In this instance, and as v^e will see, later, the Intelligence
Community's estimates of the likely results of U.S. moves are conspicu-
ously more pessimistic (and more realistic) than the other staff papers
presented to the President. This SKIS was based on an assumption that
the SEATO force would total about 25^000 men. It is hard to imagine a
more sha.rp contrast than between this paper, which foresees no serious
impact on the insurgency from proposed intervention, and Supplemente.l
Note 2, to be quoted next.
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2. "Supplemental Note 2" to the paper; issued the day of the NSC
meeting^j contained^ among other comments^ a JCS estimate of the size of the
American force needed "to clean up the Viet Cong threat." It reads:
"Wi der Military Implications a As the basic paper indicates^
the likelihood of massive DRV and Chicom intervention caanot be
estimated with precisionc The SNIE covers only the initial phase
vhen action might be limited to 20-25^000 men. At later stages^
when the JCS estimate that 40;, 000 US forces will be needed to
clean up the Viet Cong threat^ the chances of such massive inter-
vention might well become substantial^ with the Soviets finding
it a good opportunity to tie down major US forces in a long ac-
tion^ perhaps as part of a multi-prong action involving Berlin
and such additional areas as Korea and Irano
Because of this possibility of major Bloc intervention^ the
maximum possible force neeis must be frankly faced. Assuming
present estimates of about 40^000 US forces for the stated mili-
tary objective in South Vietnam^ plus 128^000 US forces for
meeting North Vietnam and Chicom intervention^ the drain on US- ■
based reserve forces could be on the order of 3 o^ ^ divisions
and other forces as wello The impact on naval capabilities for
blockade plans (to meet Berlin) would also be majoro In light
of present Berlin contingency plans^ and combat attrition^ in-
cluding scarce items of equipment^, the initiation of the Viet-
nam action in itself should dictate a step up in the present
mobilization^ possibly of major proportions o 7/
3« Finally^ there is the following memo from William Bundy
(then acting Assistant Secretary of Defense^ ISA) to McNamarao It is of
interest because it is the only piece of paper available for this period
■ ■ that gives anyone^ s candid recommendations to his boss_, as opposed to the
more formal staff papers:
Even if the decision at tomorrow's meeting is only pre-
liminary -- to explore with Diem and the British^ Australians^
and New Zealanders would be my guess — it is clearly of the
greatest possible importance. Above all^ action must proceed
fasto
For what one man's feel is worthy mine -- based on very close
f - touch with Indochina in the 195^ ^^^ s-^id civil war afterguards till
■ {'■ ■ Diem took hold — is that it _is really now or never if we are to
arrest the gains being made by the Viet Cong. Walt Rostow made
the point yesterday that the Viet Cong are about to move^ by every
indication^ from the small unit basis to a m.oderate battalion-
size basis o Intelligence also suggests that they may try to set
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up a ^'provisional government* like Xieng Khuang (though less
legitimate appearing) in the very Kontum area into which the
present Initial plan would move SEATO forces. If the Viet Cong
movement 'blooms' in this way^ it will almost certainly attract
all the back-the-winner sentiment that understandably prevails
in such cases and that beat the French in early 195^ and came
within an ace of beating Diem in early 1955°
An early and hard-hitting operation has a good chance (70^
would be my guess) of arresting things and giving Diem a chance
to do better and clean up. Even if we follow up hard^ on the
lines the JCS are working out after yesterday's meeting^ however^
the chances are not much better that we will in fact be able to
clean up the situationo It all depends on Diem's effectiveness^
which is very problematical o The 30^ chance is that we would
wind up like the French in 19^h} white men can't win this kind
of fight o
On a 70-30 basis^ I would myself favor going ino But if we
letj say^ a month go by before we move^ the odds will slide (both
short-term shock effect and long-term chance) down to 60~kO^ 50-50
and so on^ Laos under a Souvanna Phouma deal is more likely than
not to go sour_, and wiJl more and more make things difficu3-t in
. South Viet-Nam^ which again underscores the element of timeo 8/
Minutes of the NSC meeting of October 11 were not available for this study,
But we have the following Gilpatric memorandiom for the record o (The JIMGLE JIM
squadron — 12 planes -- was an Air Force unit specially trained for counter-
insurgency warfare o Short of engaging in combat itself ^ presumably it would
be used to train Vietnamese pilots):
At this morning's meeting with the President the following
course of action was agreed upon with relation to South Vietnam:
lo The Defense Department is authorized to send the
Air Force's Jungle Jim Squadron into Vietnam to serve under the
MAAG as a training mission and not for combat at the present timeo
2o General Maxwell Taylor accompanied by Dr. Rostow
from the White House^j General Lansdale_; a representative of JCS^
Mr. Cottrell from State and probably someone from ISA will leave,
for Vietnam over the weekend on a Presidential mission (to be
announced by the President at this afternoon's press conference
as an economic survey) to look into the feasibility from both
political and military standpoints of the following:
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(a) the plan for military intervention discussed
at this morning's meeting on the basis of the Vietnam task force
paper entitled 'Concept for Intervention in Vietnam';
(b) an alternative plan for stationing in Vietnam
fewer UcSo combat forces than those called for under the plan
referred to in (a) above and vith a more limited objective than
dealing with the Viet Congj in other words_j such a small force
would probably go in at Tourane ^aHang/ and possibly another
southern port principally for the purpose of establishing a U.So
'presence' in Vietnam;
(c) other alternatives in lieu of putting any
UoSo combat forces in Vietnam^j ioeo stepping up U.So assistance
and training of Vietnam imits^ furnishing of more U.S. equipment,,
particularly helicopters and other light aircraft_j trucks and
other groiond transport^ etc,
3. During the two or three weeks that will be required
for the completion of General Taylor's mission^ State will push
ahead with the following political actions:
(a) protest to the ICC on the step-up in North
Vietnamese support of Viet Cong activities^
_ I
(b) tabling at the UN a white paper based on
Mto William Jordan's report concerning Communist violations of
the Geneva Accords^ and
' " (c) consultation with our SEATO allies^ princi-
I ' ■ . pally the British and Australians^ regarding SEATO actions in
i support of the deteriorating situation in Vietnam^ 9/
I That afternoon^ the President announced the Taylor Mission^ but he did
not make the hardly credible claim that he was sending his personal military
advisor to Vietnam to do an economic survey. He made a general announce-
ment^ and was non-committal when as.ked whether Taylor was going to consider
the need for combat troops (there had been leaked stories in the newspapers
a fe\j days earlier that the Administration was considering such a moveo)
Nevertheless^ the newspaper stories the next day flatly asserted that the
President had said Taylor was going to study the need for U<,S. combat troops _,
which waS; of course^ true^ although not exactly what the President had
said« 10/
II. THE NM-ISPAPERS AND T HE CABLES
The day after Kennedy's announcement of the Taylor mission^ Reuters
sent this dispatch from Saigon:
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Saigon^ Vietnam^ Oct 12 (Reuters) -- South Vietnamese military
sources welcomed today President Kennedy's decision to send his
military adviser^ General Taylor^ here this weeko
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Sources close to President Ngo Dinh Diem said he did not
feel there was a need here yet for troops of the United States
or Southeast Asia Treaty Organization o
The sources said the South Vietnamese President was convinced
that Vietnam's Arm_y increased in size and better equipped by
increased United States aid can defeat the CommimistSo ll/
But a day later ;, the public position of the Vietnamese had shifted
noticeablyo From a i^Iew York Times dispatch' from Saigon:
One question receiving considerable attention here in the
light of the Taylor mission is the desirability of sending United
States troops to South Vietnamo
The prospect of United States troop involvement is understood
to have advanced a step here in the sense that the South Vietnamese
Government is reported to be willing to consider such involvement
which it had formerly rejected o
However^ it is \anderstood that South Vietnamese deliberations
still fall far ^ort of the stage wherein Saigon would be ready
to request United States forces o 12 /
But in private discussions with the UoS. ambassador^ Diem had turned
around completelyo From Nolting' s cable:
Following major requests:
(1) An additional squadron of AD-6 fighter bombers (in lieu of pro-
grammed T-28's) and delivery as soon as possibloo
(2) The sending of US civilian contract pilots for helicopters
and transport planes (C-^Y^),^ for 'non-combat' operationSo
I
. (3) US combat unit or imits to be introduced into 3VN as 'combat-
trainer units' o Proposed use would be to station a part of .this
force in northern part of SVN near 17th parallel to free ARW
forces presently there for anti-guerrilla combat in high plateauo
Thuan also suggested possibility stationing some US forces in
several provincial seats in highlands of central Vietnamo
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(k) US reaction to proposal to request gOArt Nationalist China
to send one division of combat troops for operations in southwest
provinces o
^ * * ^ -x^ ^ -X-
When Thuan raised question of US combat-trainer units^j I asked spe-
cifically whether this was President's considered request^ men-
tioning his oft-repeated views re US combat forces hereo Thuan
confirmed that this was considered request from President; confirmed
that Diem's views had changed in light of worsening situation^
Idea was to have 'symbolic' US strength near 17th parallel^ which
would serve to prevent attack there and free up GW forces now
stationed there for combat operations; Thuan said President Diem
also thought similar p\rrpose could be achieved by stationing US
combat units in several provincial seats in highlands^, thus freeing
ARW guard forces there c I told him this represented major request
coming on heels of President Diem's request for bilateral security
treaty with United States. I asked whether this request was in
lieu of the security treaty., Thuan first said that it represented
a first step_j which would be quicker than a treaty^ and that time
'was of essencco After some discussion of the pro's and con^ s of a
possible defense treaty (effect on SEATO^ ICC^ ratification pro-
cedures_, etCo)_j Thuan said he felt that proposal for stationing
token US forces in S\T)J would satisfy GVN and would serve the purpose
better than a mutual defense treaty « (He had evidently not thought
through this nor discussed it with Diem.)
•;f 4f 4f -)f -Jf ^ -x- -)f
Nolting then indicated he reacted skeptically to Dlem's suggestion of bringing
in Chiang's forces^ and comments to Washington that he thought "this was a
trial balloon onlyo" He concluded the cable:
The above questions will undoubtedly be raised with Gen Taylor o
While it is obvious that GYN is losing no opportunity to ask for
additional support as result our greater interest and concern
this area^ situation here^ both militarily and psychologically_j
has moved in my judgment to point where serious and prom.pt con-
sideration should be given to these requests, 13/
This cable arrived in Washington the night of October 13=. The following
day an unidentified source provided the New York Times with a detailed ex-
planation of what the Taylor Mission was to doo From the way the Times
handled the story it is plain that it cam_e from a source authorized to speak
for the President,' and probably from the President himself o The gist of
the story vfas that Taylor was going to Saigon to look into all sorts of
things^ one of which^, near the bottom of the list_, was the question of U.S,
troops at some time in the indefinite future o Along with a lot of more
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iDimediate questions about intelligence and such_, Taylor was expected to
" o . .recouanend long-range programs^ including possible military actions^ but
stressing broad economic and social measureSo" Furthermore^ the Times was
told^
Military leaders at the Pentagon^ no less than General Taylor
himself are uciderstood to be reluctant to send organized U.So
combat units into Southeast Asiap Pentagon plans for this area
stress the importance of countering Communist guerrillas with
troops from the affected coimtries_, perhaps trained and equipped
by the UoS.^ but not supplanted by UoSo troops o ik/
In the light of the recommendations quoted throughout this paper^ and parti-
cularly of the staff papers just described that led up to the Taylor Mission^
most of this was simply untrue „ It is just about inconceivable that this
story could have been given out except at the direction of the President^ or
by him personally. It appears^, consequently^ the President was less than
delighted by Diem's request for troops o He may have suspected^ 1'^ite reason-
ably^ that Diem's request was prompted by the stories out of Washington that
Taylor vras coming to discuss troops; or he may have wished to put a quick
stop to expectations (and leaks) that troops were about to be sent^ or both.
This does not mean the President had already decided not to send combat units.
Presumably he had noto But he apparently did not want to have his hands tied.
The Times story had the apparently desired affect. Speculation about
combat troops almost disappeared from news stories^ and Diem never again
raised the question of combat troops: the initiative from now on came from
Taylor and Molting^ and their recommendations were very closely heldo .
"T\Tr\m -rvTr\T.TTr
IIIo CINCPAC RECOMtyEKDS "NOT NOW
On the way to Saigon^ Taylor stopped off in Hawaii to talk to Admiral Felt
at CINCPAC o Felt did not give Taylor a flat recommendation on combat troops at
the time. But a couple of days later he cabled Washington a list of pros and
cons :
A. 'Pro
(l) Presence of UoS. forces in SVN_j particularly if de-
ployed to important defensive areas such as plateau region^ would
mean to Communists that overt aggression against SVN will involve
US forces from the outsets This eliminates possibility of sudden
victory by overt aggression in SVN before US could react o This
would settle the question for SVN_j and SE Asians as a whole ^ as to
whether we would come to their helpo Further ^ agreement by SEATO
to principle of force introduction would strengthen SEATO in world
eyeSo
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(2) Px-esence of strong UoSo combat forces will influence
greatly South Vietnamese will to eliminate the Viet Congo
(3) If "we use U.So engineers with U.S. military protec-
tion to finish Dakto-Ban Net-Attapeu Road in order to enable US to
operate near plateau border area^j a military corridor of sorts will
cut an important part of VC pipeline from north o
(4) UoS. forces will make available larger number ARVl^
forces for employment against VC. RVTJAF^ tasks accomplished by UoS.
forces will decrease proportionately certain RVWAP deficiencies^
particularly in logistics^ coramuaications^j and air support o
(5) U.S. forces in SVN would tend to strengthen Diem's
government against pro-Red coup^ but would not necessarily pre-
clude non-Communist coup attempts o
(6) Dividends would accrue from fact our troops could
provide variety training for ARVN forces^, broadening base now pro-
vided by MAAG.
Bo Con- " -
(1) Would stir up big fuss throughout Asia about reintro-
duction of forces of white colonialism into SE Asiao Little ques-
tion that a propaganda issue will be made of this in all world
forums including UTJo .
(2) Action could trigger intensification of Commie aggres-
sion against SE Asia^ This may not be all-out overt aggression^ but
could consist^ for example^, of the DRV moving full blown combat
units through the mountain passes into southern Laos under excuse
that we initiated invasion of SE Asia and they are protecting the
flank of North Vietnamo
(3) Politically^ presence of U^So forces could hasten
Commies to establish so called "representative government" in
South Vietnamo
(4) Aside from offering Viet Cong a political target,,
US troops would constitute provocative military one^ inducing VC
to attack/harass it in manner/degree where issue might ultimately
force American lonits active military campaign^ or suffer defen-
sive alternative of being pot-shot at to point of embarrassment.
(5) Presence of US troops could induce Commies to resort
to related actions such as introduction of Red Air Force elements
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in North Vietnam and accelerate modernization of DRV" military
forces.
(6) This -would probably mean garrisoning a UoS. division
in SE Asia for an extended period of time in same sense as Army
divisions in Korea. Hovever_j circumstances differ from Korea^
For example_j nature of VC warfare such that US units cannot
remain long in isolation from conflict realities o Ultimately^
they likely to be forced into varying forms of military engagement
with VC if only for security against attacks ranging from assas-
sination/sabotage to tactical harassment o In shorty we should
accept fact that likelihood our troops becoming combat engaged
increases in proportion to duration of their stay.
2. A summary of the above appears to me to add up in favor
of our not introducing U.S. combat forces -until we have exhausted
other means for helping Diem. 1^/
IVo TAYLOR IN SAIGON
The Taylor Mssion arrived in Saigon on the l8th. They had barely ar-
rived when Diem went before his National Assembly to declare that the in-
creasing gravity of the Viet Cong threat now required a formal proclamation
of a State of Emergency. Diem then went off to meet with the Americans^ and
after such a spectacular opening shot must have then astonished his visitors
by indicating that he did not want American combat troops after alio What
he wanted^ he said^ was the treaty^ American support for larger GVN forces^
and a list of combat support items that nicely paralleled those Rostow
listed in the note to McNainara quoted earlier o It was Taylor (according to
Nolting^s cable 5l6^ 20 October) who brought' up the question of Aiiierican
combat troops.
Taylor said he understood there had been recent discussions
of introduction of American or SEATO forces into Viet-Nam and
asked why change had occurred in earlier GVN attitude. Diem
succinctly replied because of Laos situation. Noting it will take
time to build up GVDJ forces he pointed to enemy's reinforcements
through infiltration and increased activities in central Viet-Nam
and expressed belief that enemy is trying to escalate proportionally
to increase in GVN forces so that GVN will not gain advantage.
He asked specifically for tactical aviation^ helicopter companies^
coastal patrol forces and logistic support (groimd transport),,
Diem indicated he thoi:ight there would be no partic-ular
adverse psychological effect internally from introducing American
forces since in his view Vietnamese people regard Communist
attack on Viet-Nam as international problem. Rostow inquired
whether internal and external political aspects such move could
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be helped if it were shown clearly to world that this is inter-
1 national problem.. Diem gave no direct comment on this suggestion*,
' ' He indicated two main aspects of this problem: (l) Vietnamese
j .. " people are worried about absence formal commitm_ent by US to Viet-
Eamo They fear that if situation deteriorates Viet-Nam might be
abandoned by USo If troops are introduced without a formal com-
mitment they can be withdrawn at any time and thus formal commit- ■
. ment is even more important in psychological sense o (2) Contin-
gency plan should be prepared re use American forces in Viet-Nam
at any time this may become necessaryo In this connection Diem
seemed to be talking about combat forces o While it was not com-
pletely clear what Diem has in mind at present time he seemed to be
saying that he wants bilateral defense treaty and preparation of
plans for use American forces (whatever is appropriate) but under
questioning he did not repeat his earlier idea relayed to me by
Thuan that he wanted combat forces. l6/
Here^, as earlier;, we get no explicit statement on Washington's attitude
toward a treaty^ Further^ no strong conclusion can be drawn from the fact
that Taylor took the initiative in raising the issue of troops _, since it
might have been awkward not to mention the issue at all after Thuan' s pre-
sentation to Nolting a few days previous o
But on the 23rd; we find this in a cable from MMG Chief McGarr:
Serious flood in Mekong delta area. o » (worst since 1937)
raises possibility that flood relief could be justification
for moving in US military personnel for humanitarian purposes
with subsequent retention if desirable. GeUo Taylor and
Ambassador evaluating feasibility and desirability*. l6a/
Taylor met with Diem and Thuan again the following day_, the 24th »
Taylor provided the Vietnamese a written summary of items he described as
"personal ideas to which I was seeking their reaction." Item E was headed
"Introduction of U.S. Combat troops," It proposed "a flood relief task force_j
largely military in composition^ to work with GVN over an extended period of
rehabilitation of areas. Such a force might contain engineer^ medical^
signal; and transportation elements as well as combat troops for the protec-
tion of relief operations." Diem now seems to have changed his mind again
on combat troops o Here is the cable:
lo The essential conclusions which, we have reached, at the end of a
week of briefings^ consultations^, and field trips follow:
Ao There is a critical political-military situation in SVN
brought on by western policy in Laos and by the continued build-up of
the VC and their recent successful attacks. These circumstances coupled
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1 with the major flood disaster in the southwestern provinces have com-
bined to create a deep and pervasive crisis of confidence and a serious
loss in national morale «
B. In the field _, the military operations against the VC are
ineffective because of the absence of reliable intelligence on the ■
enemy, an unclear and unresponsive channel of command responsibility in
the Armed Forces, and the tactical immobility of the W ground forces o
This immobility leads to a system of passive, fragmented defense con-
ceding the initiative to the enemy and leaving him free to pick the
targets of attack. The harassed population exposed to these attacks
turn to the government for better protection and the latter responds by
assigning more static missions to the Army units, thus adding to their
immobility^ In the end, the Army is allowed neither to train nor to
fight but awaits enemy attacks in relative inaction « .
C. The situation in the Saigon is -volatile but, while morale
is down and complaints against the government are rife, there is not hard
evidence of a likely coup against Diem, He still has no visible rival
or replacement o
2o To cope with the foregoing .situation, we are considering
recommending a number of possible forms of GM-US cooperation to reverse
the present dox-mward trend, stimiolate an offensive spirit and buildup
morale o In company with Ambassador l^olting, Dr^ Rostow and Mr. Menden-
hall, I discussed some of these Oct 2^ with Diem and Thuan, advancing
them as personal ideas to which I was seeking their informal reaction «
The following outline, distributed in French translation at the start
of the interview, indicates the scope of the discussiono *
Ao Improvement of intelligence on VoC: the available in-
telligence on V.Co insurgency is inadeq_uate both for tactical require-
ments and for basis of judgment of situation at governmental levels o
A joint GW-US effort should be able to improve organization, tech-
niques and end product to mutual advantage both parties.
B, joint survey of security situation at provincial level:
The current situation can best be appraised at provincial level where
the basic intelligence is found, the incidents occui^, and the defenses
are tested. The problems vary from province to province and hence
require local analysis on the spot. Such a survey should result in
better understanding of such important matters as quality of basic
intelligence on V.Co, needs of civil guard and self defense corps,
command relationships between provincial and Army officials and condi-
tions under which assumption of offensive miglrit be possible.
Co Improvement of Army mobility", it appears that size of
ARM can not be much increased before end 1^62) to make it more
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effective and allov it to cope vrLth increasing niimber of V.C._, it must
f be given greater mobility. Such mobility can come from two so'jjrces, (l)
freeing Army from static missions and (2) marking available to it improved
means of transport^ notably helicopters and light aircraft. Both
methods should be considered.
D. Blocking infiltration into high plateau: increase in
enemy forces in high plateau requires special measures for defense and
for coujiter -guerrilla actions. It is suggested that a carefully tailored
"border ranger force" be organized from existing ranger ujiits and intro-
duced into the difficult terrain along the Laos/Vietnam frontier for
attack and defense against the Viet Cong. This force should be trained
and equipped for extended service on the frontier and for operations
against the communications lines of the VC who have infiltrated into the
high plateau and adjacent areas.
E. Introduction of U.S. Military Forces: GVN is faced wD-th
major civil problem arising from flood devastation in western provinces.
Its allies should offer help to GYN according to their means. In the
case of U.S.^ two ways of rendering help should be considered. One is
of emergency type, such as offer of U.S. militar^r helicopters for
reconnaissance of conditions of flooded areas and for emergency delivery
medical supplies and like. A more significant contribution might be
a flood relief task force, largely military in composition, to work with
GVN over an extended period for rehabilitation of area. Such a force
miglit contain engineer, medical, signal, and transportation elements as
well as combat troops for the protection of relief operations. Obviously,
such a military source would also provide U.S. militar;^'- presence in
Viet Kam and would constitute military reserve in case of heightened
military crisis.
F. Actions to emphasize national emergency and beginning of
a new phase in the war: we should consider jointly all possible measures
to emphasize turning point has been reached in dealing with Communist
aggression. Possible actions might include appeal to United fetions, an
announcement by GVN of governmental changes to cope vrith crisis and ex-
change of letters between the two heads of State expressing their partner-
ship in a common cause.
3. Diem's reaction on all points >7as favorable. Pie expressed satis-
faction with idea of introducing U.S. forces in connection with flood
■ relief activities, observing that even the opposition elements in this
Congress had joined with the majority in supporting need for presence of
U.S. forces. In the co-jrse of the meeting, nothing was formally proposed
or approved but the consensus was that the points considered might form
framework for a program of increased GVl^I-US cooperation offering promise
of overcoming many of the current difficulties of GVN. There were no
specific figures discussed with regard to such matters as troop strengths,
additional equipment, or flood relief...
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$i. Because of the importance of acting rapidly once we have
made up our minds^ I -will cable my recommendations to Washington
enroute home. I7/
Simultaneously vith this cahle^ Taylor sent a second "eyes only" for
the President; Chairman of the JCS^ Director of CIA^McNamara^ and Rusk and .
Alexis Johnson at State The cable is a little confusing; for although it
sets out to comjuent on "U.S. military forces" it concerns only the flood
Task Force; not mentioning the various other types of military forces
(helicopter companies^ etco) which were envisioned. The same slight con-
fusion appears in the "eyes only for the President" cable on this issue
to be quoted shortly^ The impression Taylor's choice of language leaves
is that the support forces (helicopter companies^ expanded MAAG; etCo)
he was recommending were essentially already agreed to by the President
before Taylor left Washington^ and consequently his detailed justifica-
tion went only to the kind of forces on which a decision was yet to be
made -- that iS; ground forces liable to becoBie involved in direct engage-
ments with tne Viet Cong.
Here is the cable from Saigon^ followed by the two "Eyes only for the
President" from the PLiilippines which sum up his "fundamental conclusions."
FROM SAIGON . ■
- WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
STATE EYES ONLY FOR RUSK AND UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON
.■ DEFENSE EYES ONLY SECRETARY MCNAMAR/l
JCS EYES ONLY GENERAL LEMNITZER ' .
FROM GENERAL TAYLOR
■X- ^- -X- -X- ^ -)f ^ '
With regard to the critical question of introducing U.So military
forces into VN:
My view is that we should put in a task force consisting largely of
logistical troops for the purpose of participating in flood relief
and at the same time of providing a UoSo military presence in VN
capable of assuring Diem of our readiness to join him in a military
showdo^m with the Viet Cong or Viet Minho To relate the introduc-
tion of these troops to the needs of flood relief seems to me to
offer considerable advantages in VNand abroado It gives a specific
humanitarian task as the prime reason for the coming of our troops
and avoids any suggestion that we are taking over responsibility for
the security of the countryo As the task is a specific one^ we can
extricate o\nr troops when it is done if we so desire o Alternatively^
we can phase them into other activities if we wish to remain longer o
The strength of the force I have in mind on the order of 6-80OO troops.
Its initial composition should be worked out here after study of the
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possible requirements and conditions for its use and subsequent modi-
fications made vith experience.
In addition to the logistical component^ it will be necessary to include
some combat troops for the protection of logistical operations and the
defense of the area occupied by UoSo forces « Any troops coming to W
may expect to take casualties.
Needless to say_j this kind of task force vill exercise little direct
influence on the campaign against the V.C. It will_j however^ give a
much needed shot in the arm to national morale _, particularly if com-
bined with other actions showing that a more effective working
relationship in the common cause has been established between the
GW and the U.So l8/
FROM THE PHILIPP IITES .' ■ •
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GENERAL TAYLOR
1« Transmitted herewith are a summary of the fundamental conclusions
of my group and my personal recommendations in response to the letter
of the President to me dated 13 October I961. -x- -x- ^ -x- ^ -J^ -x-
2o It is concluded that:
ao Communist strategy aims to gain control of Southeast Asia by
. methods of subversion and guerrilla war which by-pass conventional U.So
and indigenous strength on the ground. The interim Communist goal -- .'
en route to total take-over — appears to be a neutral Southeast Asia^
detached from UoSo protectiono This strategy is well on the way to
success in Vietnamo
bo In Vietnam (and Southeast Asia) there is a double crisis in
confidence: doubt that UoS. is determined to save Southeast Asia;
doubt that Diem' s methods can frustrate and defeat Communist purposes
and methods o The Vietnamese (and Southeast Asians) will undoubtedly
draw -- rightly or wrongly — definitive coiaclusions in coming weeks
and months concerning the probable outcome and will adjust their be-
havior accordinglyo What the UoSo does or fails to do will be deci-
sive to the end result o
Co Aside from the morale factor^ the Vietnamese Government is
caught in interlocking circles of bad tactics and bad administrative
arrangements -viiich pin their forces on the defensive in ways which
permit a relatively small Viet-Cong force (about one-tenth the size
of the GVN regulars) to create conditions of frustration and terror
certain to lead to a political crisis^ if a positive turning point is
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not soon achieved o The following recommendations are designed to
achieve that favorable turn^ to avoid a further deterioration in the
situation in South Vietnam^ and eventually to contain and eliminate
the threat to its independence ,
It is recommended:
General
ao That upon rec[uest from the Government of Vietnam (GVN) to
come to its aid in resisting the increasing aggressions of the Viet-
Cong and in repairing the ravages of the Delta flood which^j in combin-
ation^j threaten the lives of its citizens and the security of the
coimtry^ the UoSo Government offer to join the GTO in a massive joint
effort as a part of a total mobilization of GW resources to cope
with both the Viet-Cong (VC) and the ravages of the floodo The UoS.
representatives will participate actively in this effort^ particularly
in the fields of government administration^ military plans and opera-
tions^ intelligence _j and flood relief^ going beyond the advisory role
which they have observed in the past. " '
Specific
b. That in support of the foregoing broad commitment to a joint
effort with Diem^ the following specific measures be undertaken:
(1) The UoSo Government will be prepared to provide indivi-
dual administrators for insertion into the governmental machinery
of South Vietnam in types and numbers to be worked out with President
Diem.
(2) A joint effort will be made to improve the military-
political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and
extending upward through the government and armed forces to the
Central Intelligence Organization.
(3) The UoSo Government will engage in a joint survey of
the conditions in the provinces to assess the social^ political^
intelligence^ and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the
coimter-insiorgency in order to reach a common estimate cf these
factors and a common determination of how to deal with them. As
this survey will consum.e time^ it should not hold back the immedi-
ate actions which are clearly needed regardless of its outcom.eo
{h) A joint effort will be made to free the Aimy for
mobile^^ offensive operations. This effort will be based upon im-
proving the training and eq_uipping of the Civil Guard and the
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Self -Defense Corps ^ relieving the regular Army of static missions^,
raising the level of the mohility of Army Forces "by the provision of
considerably more helicopters and light aviation^ and organizing
a Border Ranger Force for a long-term campaign on the Laotian
border against the Viet-Cong infiltrators o The U.S. Government
vill support this effort vith equipment and with military units and
.personnel to do those tasks which the Armed Forces of Vietnam cannot
perform in timeo Such tasks include air reconnaissance and photo-
graphy^ airlift (beyond the present capacity of SW forces)^ special
intelligence^ and air-ground support techniques o
(5) The UoSo Government will assist the GVE in effecting
surveillance and control over the coastal waters and inland water-
ways^ furnishing such advisors^ operating personnel and small craft
as may be necessary for quick and effective operations o
(6) The MAAG^ Vietnam^ will be reorganized and increased
in size as may be necessary by the implementation of these recom-
mendations.
(7) The UoSo Government will offer to introduce into
South Vietnam a military Task Force to operate under UoS. control
for the following pur*poses:
(a) Provide a UoS. military presence capable of
raising national morale and of showing to Southeast Asia the serious-
ness of ■ the UoSo intent to resist a Communist take-over^
(b) Conduct logistical operations in support of mili-
tary and flood relief operations «
(c) Conduct such combat operations as are necessary
for self-defense and for the security of the area in which they are
stationed o
(d) Provide an emergency reserve to back up the
Armed Forces of the GVM in the case of a heightened military crisis.
I
(e) Act as an advance party of such additional forces
as may be introduced if CINCPAC or SEATO contingency plans are
Invoked .
(8) The UoS. Governraent will review its economic aid
program to ta'ke into account the needs of flood relief and to give
priority to those projects in support of the expanded counter-
insurgency program. I9/
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FROM TlIE FHILIPPIEES
Eyes Only for the President from General Taylor.
This message is for the piirpose of presenting my reasons for recommending
the introduction of a U.So military force into South Vietnam (SW)o I
have reached the conclusion that this is an essential action if we are
to reverse the present downward trend of events in spite of a full
recognition of the following disadvantages:
ao The strategic reserve of UoSo forces is presently so weak that,
we can ill afford any detachment of forces to a peripheral area of the
CommuQist bloc vrhere they will be pinned down for an uncertain dura-
tion o
- bo Although UoSo prestige is already engaged in SM^ it will be-
come more so by the sending of troops,
Co If the first contingent is not enough to accomplish the
necessary resiats^ it will be difficult to resist the pressure to re-
inforce o If the ultimate result sought is the closing of the frontiers
■ and the clean-up of the insurgents within SW^ there is no limit to
our possible commitment (unless we attack the source in Hanoi) o
do The introduction of UoSo forces may increase tensions and
risk escalation into a major war in Asiao
Gn the other side of the argument^ there can be no action so convincing
of UoS„ seriousness of purpose and hence so reassuring to the people
and Government of SVTJ and to our other friends and allies in SEA as
the introduction of UoS. forces into SVNo The views of indigenous
and UoSo officials consulted on our trip were unanimous on this point o
I have just seen Saigon 5^5 to State and suggest that "it be read in
connection with this message, ^c- ■ . ■ - , - \
The size of the UoS. force introduced need not be great to provide
the military presence necessary to produce the desired effect on
national morale in SW and on international opinion o A bare token^
however J will not suffice; it must have a significant value o The
kinds of tasks which it might undertake \h±ch would have a signifi-
cant value are suggested in BAGU^^^ (jprevious cable^ 3-"b.(7))- "^^^Y ^-^e:
(a) Provide a US military presence capable of raising national
morale and of showing to Southeast Asia the seriousness of the US
intent to resist a Communist take-over o
(b) Conduct logistical operations' in support of military
and flood relief operations o
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(c) Conduct such combat operations as are necessary for self-
defense and for the security of the area in vhich they are stationed.
(d) Provide an eraergency reserve to back up the Armed Forces of
the GW in the case of a heightened military crisis a
(e) Act as an advance party of such additional forces as may be
introduced if CINCPAC or SEATO contingency plans are invoked o
It is notevorthy that this force is not proposed to clear the jungles.
and forests of Viet Cong guerrillas o That should be the primary task
of the Armed Forces of Vietnam for which they should be specifically
organized^ trained _, and stiffened with ample UoSo advisors down to
combat battalion levels o However^ the U.S. troops may be called upon
to engage in combat to protect themselves^ their working parties^ and
the area in which they live. As a general, reserve^ they might be
thrown into action (with UoS. agreement) against large^j formed guer-
rilla bands which have abandoned the forests for attacks on major tar-
gets o But in general^ our forces should not engage in small-scale
guerrilla operations in the jungle o
As an area for the operations of U.So' troops _, SVN is not an excessively
difficult or unpleasant place to operate o While the border areas are
riogged and heavily forested_, the terrain is comparable to parts of
Korea where U.So troops learned to live and work without too much
effort o However^ these border areas^ for reasons stated above^ are
not the places to engage our forces « In the High Plateau and in the
coastal plain where UoSo troops would probably be stationed^j these
jungle-forest conditions do not exist to any great extent. The most
Tonpleasant feature in the coastal areas would be the heat and^ in the
Delta^ the mud left behind by the flood o The High Plateau offers no
particular obstacle to the stationing of U.S. troops.
The extent to which the Task Force would engage in flood relief activities
in the Delta will depend upon further study of the problem there <> As
reported in Saigon 537^ I see considerable advantages in playing up this
aspect of the Task Force mission. I am presently inclined to favor a
dual mission^ initially help to the flood area and subsequently use in
any other area of SVN where its resources can be used effectively to
give tangible support in the struggle against the Viet Congo However^
the possibility of emphasizing the humanitarian mission will wane if
we wait long in moving in our forces or in linking our stated purpose
with the emergency conditions created by the floods
The risks of backing into a major Asian war by way of SVN are present
but are not impressive « NVN is extremely vulnerable to conventional
bombing_j a weakness which should be exploited diplomatically in
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convincing Hanoi to lay off SW. Both the DRV and the Chicoms vo-ald
face severe logistical difficulties in trying to maintain strong forces
in the field in SEA^ difficulties vhich ve share but by no means to the
same degree. There is no case for fearing a mass onslaught of Com-
munist manpower into SW and its neighboring states^ particularly if . ■ _
ovr airpower is allowed a free hand against logistical targets o
Finally^ the starvation conditions in China should discourage CommiHiist
leaders there from being militarily venturesome for some time to comeo
By the foregoing line of reasoning^ I have reached the conclusion that
the introduction of a UoS. military Task Force without delay offers
definitely more advantage than it creates risks and dif f iculties o In
factj I do not believe that our program to save SW will succeed
without it. If the concept is approved^ the exact size and composition-
of the force should be determined by the Secretary of Defense in con-
sultation with the JCS^ the Chief MMG^ and CINCPAC. My own feeling is
that the initial size should not exceed about 8000^ of which a pre-
ponderant number would be in logistical-type units o After acquiring
experience in operating in SW; this initial force will require re-
organization and adjustment- to the local scene.
As CINCPAC will point out^ any forces' committed to SW will need to be
" replaced by additional forces to his area from the strategic reserve
in the UoSo Also^ any troops to SW are in addition to those which
may be required to execute SEATO Plan 5 in Laos. Both facts should be
taken into account in current considerations of the FY I963 budget which
bear upon the permanent increase which should be made in the U.So
military establishment to maintain our strategic position for the long
pullo 20/
These cables^ it will be noticed^ are rather sharply focused on the
insurgency as a problem reducible to fairly conventional military technique
and tactics. Together with the cables from Saigon^ the im.pression is given
that the major needs are getting the Army to take the offensive^ building
. up a much better intelligence setup^ and persuading Diem to loosen up Admin-
istrative impediments to effective use of his forces.
!l
V. THE TAYLOR REPORT
A report of the Taylor Mission was published November 3p in the form of
a black loose-leaf notebook containing a letter of transmittal of more than
routine significance^ a 25-page "Evaluation and Conclusions/' then a series
of memoranda by members of the mission. Of these^ the most important^ of
course; were the Taylor cables^ which; being ^'E^^es only for the President/*
were deleted from all but one or a very few copies of the reports There is
no separate paper from Rostow^ and his views presumably are reflected in the
unsigned summary paper o
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The impression the "Evaluation" paper gives is more easily summarized
than its details o For the impression is clearly one of urgency combined
vith optimism. Essentially^ it says South Vietnam is in serious trouble;
major interests of the United States are at stake; but if the UoS. promptly
and energetically takes up the challenge^ a victory can be had without a ■
UoSo take-over of the waro
For example:
Despite the intellectuals vho sit on the side lines and complain;
despite serious dissidence among the Montagnards^ the sects^ and
certain old Viet Minh areas; despite the apathy and fear of the Viet-
Cong in the countryside^ the atmosphere in South Vietnam is^ on
balance^ one of frustrated energy rather than passive acceptance of
inevitable defeat <>
Tt cannot be emphasized too strongly^ however^ that time has
nearly rim out for converting these assets into the bases for vic-
toryo Diem himself--.and all concerned with the fate of the country
--are looking to American guidance and aid to achieve a turning
point in Vietnam's affairs o From all quarters in Southeast Asia
the message on Vietnam is the same: vigorous American action is
needed to buy time for Vietnam to mobilize and organize its real
assets; but the time for such a turn around has nearly run outc
And if Vietnam goes^ it will be exceedingly difficult if not im-
possible to hold Southeast Asia. What will be lost is not merely
a crucial piece of real estate^ but the faith that the U.S. has the
will and the capacity to deal with the Comjnunist offensive in that
areao 2l/
The report^ drawing on the appendices^ includes a wide range of pro-
posals o But the major emphasis^ very emphatically^ is on two ideas:
Firsts there must be a firm^ unambiguous military commitment to remove
doubts about UoSo resolve arising out of the laos negotiations; second^
there is great emphasis on the idea that the Diem regime's own evident
weaknesses--from "the famous problem of Diem as administrator" to the
Army's lack of offensive spirit--could be cured if enough dedicated Araeri-
cans_, civilian and military^ became involved in South Vietnam to show the
South Vietnamese^ at all levels^ how to get on and win the waro The
much-urged military Task Force^ for example^ was mainly to serve the first
purpose^ but partly also to serve the second: "the presence of American
military forces in the ^lood/ area should also give us an opportunity
to work intensively with the civil guards and with other local military
elements and to explore the possibility of suffusing them with an offen-
sive spirit and oactiGSo"22
Here are a few extracts which give the flavor of the discussion:
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"It is evident that morale in Vietnam will rapidly crunible ^- and
in Southeast Asia only slightly less quickly -- if the sequence of /
expectations set in motion by Vice President Johnson's visit and
climaxed by General Taylor's mission are not soon followed by a
hard UoSo commitment to the ground in Vietnamo " /Emphasis added/
"The elements required for buying time and assuming the offensive
in Vietnam are^ in the view of this mission;, the following:
lo A quick UoSo response to the present crisis which
would demonstrate by deeds -- not merely words -- the American
commitment seriously to help save Vietnam rather than to dis-
engage in the most convenient manner possibleo To be^per- _■
Suasive this commitment must include the sending to Vietnam
of some U.So military forces o
2 c A shift in the American relation to the Vietnamese
effort from advice to limited partnership o The present character
and scale of the war in South Vietnam decree that only the Viet-
namese can defeat the Viet Cong; but at all levels Americans
must^ as friends and partners -- not as arms-length advisors --
show them how the job might be done -- not tell them or do it
for them. 23/ ^ ^
"Perhaps the most striking aspect of this mission's effort is the
unanimity of view -- individually arrived at by the specialises in-
volved -- that what is now required is a shift from UoS.^advice to
limited partnership and working collaboration with the Vietnamese «
The present war cannot be won by direct U.So action; it must be won.
by the Vietnamese <. But there is a general conviction among us that
the Vietnamese performance in every domain can be substantially im-
proved if Americans are prepared to work side by side with the Viet-
namese on the key problems « Moreover^ there is evidence that Diem
is^ in principle^ prepared for this step^ and that most -- not all --
elements in his establishment are eagerly awaiting ito 24/
Here is a section titled "Reforminc^ Diem's AdaT^lnistrative Method":
The famous problem of Diem as an administrator and politi-
cian could be resolved in a number of ways:
-- By his removal in favor of a military dictatorship
which would give dominance to the military chain of commando
-- By his removal in favor of a figure of more dilute power
(eog.^ Vice President Nguyen Kgoc Tho) who would delegate
authority to act to both military and civil leaders «
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-- By bringing about a series of de facto administrative
changes via persuasion at high levels; collaboration with Diem's
aides who want improved administration; and by a U.So operating
presence at many working levels^j using the UoSo presence (eogo^
control over the helicopter squadrons) for forcing the Vietnamese
to get their house in order in one area after another.
¥e have opted for the third choice^, on the basis of both
merit and feasibilityo
Our reasons for these: First _, it would be dangerous for us
to engineer a coup under present tense circujnstances^, since it is
by no means certain that we could control its consequences and
potentialities for Communist exploitation. Second^ we are con-
vinced that a part of the complaint about Diem* s administrative
methods conceals a lack of first-rate executives who can get
things done. In the endless debate between Diem and his sub-
ordinates (Diem complaining of limited executive material; his
subordinates _, of Diem' s bottleneck methods) both have hold of a
piece of the truth o
The proposed strategy of limited partnership is designed both
to force clear delegation of authority in key areas and to beef up
Vietnamese administration until they can surface and develop the
men to take over
o
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This is a difficult course to adopts We can anticipate some
friction and reluctance until it is proved that Americans can be
helpful partners and that the techniques will not undermine Diem's
political positiouo Shifts in UoSo attitudes and methods of admin-
istration as well as Vietnamese are required « But we are confi-
dent that it is the right way to proceed at this stage; and_j as
noted earlier^ there is reason for confidence if the right men
are sent to do the right jobs. 25/
On many points the tone_, and sometimes the substance^ of the appendices
by the lesser members of the Mission (with the exception of one by Lansdale)
are in sharp contrast to the summary paper o
William Jorden of State begins a discussion of "the present situation"
by reporting:
One after another ^ Vietnamese officials _, military men and .
ordinary citizens spoke to me of the situation in their country
as * grave* and * deteriorating « ' They are distressed at the
evidence of growing Viet Cong successes o They have lost confi-
dence in President Diem and in his leadership. Men who only one
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n-- ■
or two months ago would have hesitated to say anything critical
of Diem_j now explode in angry denunciation of the man^ his family^
and his methods o
And after a page of details _, Jorden sioms up with:
Intrigue^j nepotism and even corruption might be accepted_,
for a time_j if combined with efficiency and visible progress,,
When they accompany administrative paralysis and steady deteri-
oration^ they become intolerable o 26/
But the summary paper ^ under the heading of "The Assets of South Viet-
name^" lists:
With all his weaknesses^. Diem has extraordinary ability^
stubbornness^ and gutSo
Despite their acute frustration^ the men of the Armed Forces
and the administration respect Diem to a degree "Aich gives
their griimbling (and perhaps some plotting) a somewhat half-
hearted character; and they are willing -- by and large — to
work for him^ if he gives them a chance to do their jobs. 27 /
The military annex contains this summary comment on the South Vietnamese
^^ Army:
The performance of the ARW is disappointing and generally is
characterized by a lack of aggressiveness and at most levels is
devoid of a sense of urgencyo The Army is short of able young
trained leaders^ both in the officer and TTCO ranks The basic
soldier^ as a result; is poorly trained,, inadequately oriented^
■ lacking in desire to close with the enemy and for the most part
unaware of the serious inroads communist guerrillas are making
In his country^ 28/
But the main' paper^ again in the summary of South Vietnamese assets_,
reports that the South Vietnamese regulars are "of better quality than the
Viet Cong Guerrillas 0" 29/
The point is not that the summary flatly contradicts the appendices «
For example^ the statement about the superior quality of ARVW^ compared to
the Viet Cong^ is qualified with the remark "if it can bring the Communists
. . to engagement/' and can be explained to mean only that the more heavily ^
armed ARVT^ could defeat a VC force in a set-piece battle c But the persistent
tendency of the summary is to put Saigon's weaknesses in the best light; and
avoid anything that might suggest that perhaps the UoSo should consider
limiting; rather than increasing; its commitments to the Diem regime; or
alternatively face up to a need to openly take over the war^
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In contrast^ the appendices contemplate (if not always recommend)
the more drastic alternatives o The military appendix argues (in a para-
phrase of the JCS position quoted earlier) that the UoSo ought to move
into Southeast Asia^ preferably Laos^ in force o The appendix "by Sterling
Cottrell of State (Chairman of the Vietnam Task Force) suggests an oppo-
site view:
Since it is an open question whether the GM can succeed
even with UoS. assistance^, it would be a mistake for the UoS. to
commit itself irrevocably to the defeat of the communists in
SWo 30/
And Cottrell^ in the only explicit statement in the available record
on why the UoS. would not want to give Diem the treaty he had asked for^
states; - . ■ '
The Communist operation starts from the lowest social
level -- the villages. The battle must be joined and won at
this pointo If not; the Communists will ultimately control
all but the relatively few areas of strong military concen-
trations. Foreign military forces cannot themselves win the
battle at the village level. Therefore^ the primary respon-
sibility for saving the country must rest with the GVNo
For the above reason^ the UoSo should assist the GWo
{ '\_ This rules out any treaty or pact which either shifts ulti-
mate responsibility to the U.So^ or engages any full UoS.
commitment to eliminate the Viet Cong threats 3l/
(And a treaty which did not apply to the Viet Cong threat would hardly
be a very reassuring thing to Saigon; while one that did would face an
uncertain future when it came to the Senate for ratificatiouo )
yet_; Jorden and Cottrell had nothing much to recommend that was parti-
cularly different from what was recommended in the summaryo The effect of
their papers is to throw doubt on the prospects for success of the inter-
vention proposed o But their recommendations come out about the same way^
j j ^ so that if their papers seem more realistic in hindsight than the main
paper^ they also seem more confused «
_ Cottrell_j after recommending that the U<,So avoid committing itself
irrevocably to winning in South Vietnam^ goes on to recommend:
The world should continue to be impressed that this situation
of overt DRV aggression^ below the level of conventional war-
fare_; must be stopped in the best interest of every free
nation o 32/
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The idea that^ if worse comes to worst,, the UoS. could probati y save
its position in Vietnam by bombing the north^ seems to underlie a good deal
of the optimism that pervades the summary paper o And even Cottrell^ in the
last of his recommendations^ states:
If the combined U.So/gW efforts are insufficient to reverse
the trend_j we should then move to the "Rostow Plan" of applying
graduated measures on the DRV with weapons of oior own choos-
ing. 33/
Taylor^ in his personal recommendations to the President (the cables
from Baguio quoted earlier)^ spoke of the "extreme vulnerability of North
Vietnam to conventional bombing o"
The summary paper^ in its contrast between the current war and the war
the French lost^ states: ' •
Finally _, the Communists now not only have something to gain
— the South -- but a base to lose -- the North --if war should
comeo 3^/
Bombing was not viewed as the answer to all problems « If things did
not go well^ the report saw a possible requirement for a substantial com-
mitment of UoSo grouad troops o In a section on South Vietnamese reserves^
there is the comment that
o • o
I
it is an evident requirement that the United States review
quick action contingency plans to move into Vietnam^ should
the scale of the Vietnam/Viet Cong?/" offensive radically increase
at a time when Vietnamese reserves are inadequate to cope with
ito Such action might be designed to take over the responsibility
for the security of certain relatively quiet areas^ if the battle
remained at the guerrilla level^ or to fight the Communists if
open war were attempted c 3^/
And the concluding paragraphs of the siimmary state that:
One of the major issues raised by this report is the need
to develop the reserve strength in the UoSo establishment re-
quired to cover action in Southeast Asia up to the nuclear
threshold in that area^ as it is now envisaged. The call up
of additional support forces may be required o
In' our view^ nothing is more calculated to sober the
enemy and to discourage escalation in the face of the limited
initiatives proposed here than the knowledge that the United
States has prepared itself soun.dly to deal with aggression
in Southeast Asia at any levels 36-
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But these warnings were directed to an unexpectedly strong Viet Cong
showing during the period of buildup of ARVN^ and more still to deterring
the likelihood of a Communist resmiption of their offensive in Laos^ or
of an overt invasion of South Vietnamo The Vietnam contingencies^ in
particular^ were not viewed as likelyo . But the possibility of bombing
the North was viewed otherwise. The clearest statements are in General
Taylor's letter of transmittal:
While we feel that the program recommended represents those
measures which should be taken in our present knowledge of the
situation in Southeast Asia^j I would not suggest that it is the
final wordo Future needs beyond this program will depend upon
the kind of settlement we obtain in Laos and the manner in
which Hanoi decides to adjust its conduct to that settlement o
If the Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared
on South Vietnam in 1959 vith continued infiltration and covert
support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally^ we will
then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the con-
tinued guidance^ trainlng_, and support of a guerrilla war across
an international boundary^ while the attacked react only inside
their borders o Can we admit the establishment of the common
law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the right
to strike the source of aggression^ after the fact of external
aggression is clearly established? It is. our view that our
government should undertake with the Vietnamese the measures
outlined herein^ but should then consider and face the broader
question beyond.
¥e cannot refrain from expressing^ having seen the situa-
tion on the ground^ our common sense of outrage at the burden
which this kind of aggression imposes on a new country^ only
seven years old^ with a difficult historical heritage to over- .
come^ confronting the inevitable problems of political^ social^
and economic transition to modernizationo It is easy and cheap
to destroy such a country whereas it Is difficult undisturbed
to build a nation coming out of a complex past without carrying
the burden of a guerrilla waro
We were similarly struck in Thailand with the injustice
of subjecting this promising nation in transition to the heavy
military biordens it faces in fulfilling its role in SEATO
: security planning along with the guerrilla challenge beginning
to form up on its northeast frontier o
It Is my judgment and that of my colleages that the United ■
States must decide how it will cope with Krushchev's "wars of
liberation" which are really para-wars of guerrilla aggression.
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This is a nev and dangerous Communist technique which bypasses
our traditional political and military responses. While the
final ansver lies beyond the scope of this report^ it is clear
to me that the time may come in our relations to Southeast Asia
when we must declare our intention to attack the source of
guerrilla aggression in North Vietnain and impose on the Hanoi
Government a price for participating in the ciorrent war which
is commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbors
to the south o 37/
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VI o SOME CABLES FROM SAIGON
To a current reader^ and vei-y likely to the officials in Washington who
had access to the fiill Taylor Mission Report (including Taylor's personal
recoimnendations)_j there really seem to be three reports_^ not oneo
lo Taylor's own cables read like^ as of course they were_, a soldier's
crisp_, direct analysis of the military problem facing the Saigon govern-
ment. With regard to the Diem regime^ the emphasis is on a need to build
up intelligence capabilities^ clear up administrative drags on efficient
action^ and take the offensive in seeking out and destroying VC units.
2. The main paper in the Report (the "Evaluations and Conclusions")
incorporates General Taylor's views on the military problems o But^ it is ^
much broader^ giving primary emphasis to the military problem^ but also some
attention to what we now call the "other war^" and even more to conveying an
essentially optimistic picture of the opportunities for a vigorous American
effort to provide the South Vietnamese government and army with the elan and
style needed to wino This paper was presumably drafted mainly by Rostow^
with contributions from other members of the partyo
It is consistent with Rostow's emphasis before and since on the
Viet Cong problem as a pretty straight-forward case of external aggression.
There is no indication of the doubts expressed in the Alexis Johnson
"Concept of Intervention in Vietnam" paper that Diem might not be able to
defeat the Viet Cong even if infiltration were largely cut off o At one
pointy for example,, the paper tells its readers:
It must be remembered that the 1959 political decision in Hanoi
to laTmch the guerrilla and political campaign of I96O-61 arose
because of Diem' s increasing success in stabilizing his rule and
moving his country forward in the several preceding years « 38/
On the very next page (perhaps reflecting the vagaries of committee
papers) the paper does not itself "remember" this description of conditions
when the war started « For it states:
The military frustration of the past two months has..omade acute_j
throughout his administration^ dissatisfaction with Diem's method
of rule^ with his lack of identification with his people^ and
with his strategy which has been endemic for some years. 39 /
But that seems only a momentary lapse from the general line of the
paper ^ which is fairly reflected in the recommendation that we tell Moscow
to:
use its influence with Ho Chi Minh to call his dogs off^ mind
"his business J and feed his people, ko/
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3^ Finally^ there were the appendices by the military and especially
the State representatives on the Mssion which^ as indicated by the extracts
given in the previous section^ paint a much darker picture than the reader
gets from the main paper o Even when^j as is frequently the case^ their
recommendations are not much different from the main paper ^ the tone is one
of trying to make the best of a bad situation^ rather than of seizing an
opportunity o
Because of these distinctions between the different parts of the
Report^ two people reading the full Report could come away with far different
impressions of what sort of problem the UoSo was facing in Vietnam_, depending
on which parts of the Report seemed to them to ring truest o Presumably^
officials' judgments here were influenced by their reading of the series of
cables that arrived during and just after the Taylor visit; many of which
touch on critical points of the report.
Here are some samples o
The day Taylor left^ Nolting sent a cable describing the immediate
mood in Saigon in pretty desperate terms. All parts of the Taylor Report^
including the main paper^ did the same. The distinctions in describing the
situation were in how deep-rooted the immediate malaise was seen^ The
main effect of this cable from Nolting was presumably to add weight to the
warning of the Report that something dramatic had to be done if the UoSo
were not ready to risk a collapse in Saigon within a few months. As the
Taylor Report stressed and the cable implies^ the very fact of the Taylor
Mission would have a very negative impact if nothing came out of ito
■
There has been noticeable rise in Saigon's political temperature
during past week. Taylor visit_, though reassuring in some respects^
has been interpreted by many persons as demonstrating critical
stage which VC insurgency has reached. o .Following deterioration of
general security conditions over past two months cancellation
October 26 national day celebrations to devote resources to flood
relief and terse^ dramatic declaration national emergency caught
an imprepared public by surprise and contributed additional un-
settling elements to growing atmosphere of uneasiness
o o o
This growing public disquietude accompanied by increasing dis-
satisfaction with Diem's methods of administration on part senior
GVN officials There is considerable cabinet level criticism and
growing though still inchoate determination force organizational
reforms on President. Similar attitude seems be developing in
ARYN upper levels o Though trend of thinking these groups taking
parallel courses ^ there nothing indicate at this moment that col-
laboration between them taking place,, Beginnings of this would _,
of course^, be serious indicator something brewings
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At same time CAS JcIAJ also has from Vietnamese government sources
reports (C-3) of movement of certain platoon to company-size VC
units (totalling perhaps 200-500 men) toward Saigon to profit from
any disturbances or confusion vhich may occur. Knowledge these
reports within GVN apparently tending deter disaffected officials
from developing radical pace at this memento
Situation here thus one of insecurity^ uneasiness and emergent
instability. A genuine and important military victory over VC
would do more than anything else to redress balance and allay
for moment high-level mutterings of need for change o On other
handj further deterioration of situation over next few weeks or
months or new VC success similar Fhuoc Hhanh incident might
veil bring situation to heado 4l/
•
From MAAG Chief McGarr^ Washington received an account of Taylor* s
meeting with "Big Minh^" then Chief of Staffs later Head of State for a
while after Diem was overthrowno It is interesting because it was one of
the very few reports from Saigon in the available record suggesting that the
Diem regime might be in need of more than administrative reforms. Minh com- ^
plains that the Vietnamese army was "losing the support of the people" as
indicated by a "marked decrease in the amount of information given by the I
populationo" He warned^ further^ that "GVE should discontinue favoring
certain religionSo o «" But McGarr stressed the administrative problems_j
particularly the need for an "overall plauo" His reaction explicitly con-
cerns what he saw as the "milltar/ aspects of Minh's complaints. But
Ambassador Nolting's cables and the main paper of the Report show a very
similar tendency to take note of political problems^ but put almost all the
emphasis on the need for better military tactics and more efficient admin- .
istrative arrangements o
« • o.
.Big Minh was pessimistic and clearly and frankly outlined
his personal feeling that the military was not being properly
supported. He said not only Viet Cong grown alarmingly^ but that
Vietnamese armed forces were losing support of the people. As
example^ he pointed out marked decrease in amount of Information
given by populationo Minh said GVW should discontinue favoring'
certain religions^ and correct present system of selecting province
chiefs o At this point Mlnli was extremely caustic in commenting
on lack of ability^ m-ilitary and administrative_j of certain
province chiefs « Minh was bitter about province chief's role in
military chain of command saying that although Gen^ McGarr had
fought for and won on the single . . . command which had worked for
few months^ old habits were now returning. Also^ on urging from
Geuo McGarr he had gone on offensive, but province chiefs had not
cooperated to extent necessary© He discussed his Inability to
get cooperation from GVTT agencies on developing overall plans for
conduct of Gounterinsurgencyo Minh also discussed need to bring
sects back into fold as these are anti-communist. Although above
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not new Minh seemed particularly discouir aged. . .When analyzed,
most of Minh's comments in military field are occasioned by
lack of overall coordination and cooperation. This re-empha.-
sizes absolute necessity for overall plan which would clearly
delineate responsibility and create a team effort, o. _^2/
Nolting concerned himself, of course, with the civil as well as
military a^rrangements, but with much the same stress on organizational
and administrative formalities. A striking example was when Nolting
reported that Diem was willing to consider (in response to American urg-
ing of top level administrative reforms') creating a IX^ational Executive
Council patterned after the UcS. National Security Council. Nolting was
favorably impressed. His cable notes no concern that under Diem's propo-
sal, Diem's brother Nhu would be chairman of the NEC, although a year
earlier (and of course even more urgently a year or so later) getting Nhu,
and his wife, out of the picture entirely had been seen as the best real
hope of saving the Diem regime.
The report Nolting sent on Taylor's final meeting with Diem also
contains some interesting material. It leaves the impression that Diem
was still not really anxious to get American troops deeply involved in
his country, despite his favorable reaction at the meeting of the 2Hh,
which, in turn, was a reversal of his reaction at the meeting on the
19th. Because of this, the impression left by the whole record is that
Taylor came to the conclusion that some sort of ground troop commitment
was needed mainly because of what he heard from Diem's colleagues and his
military people, rather than from Diem himself.
According to Nolting *s cabled account. Diem, although raising
half a dozen issues relating to increased American military aid, did not
mention the flood task force, or anything else that might imply a special
interest in getting some sort of ground troops commitment « As seemed the
case earlier, it was the Americans who pressed the idea of getting American
military people involved in combat. In the only exchange Nolting reported
touching on this issue, he said:
1. Diem stressed importance of reinforcement of aviation:
particularly helicopters. Taylor and I jolting/ used this
opportunity to make clear to Diem that we envisaged helicopters
piloted by Americans and constituting American units under
American commanders which would cooperate with Vietnamese mili-
tary commands o.c ^3/
(At a meeting with McGarr November 9- Diem again raised the heli-
copter question, this time talking the initiative in saying he needed
Ajnerican pilots, but he did not mention the flood task force, or anything
else that might imply a request for ground troops «) hk/
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On the question of better performance by Diem's regime, we have
this exchange 5 which does not seem likely to have prepared Diem for the
fairly substantial quid pro quo which turned out to be part of the pack-
age proposed by Was_hington:
o.w3. Taylor told Diem it would be useful if he and 1 could
develop specifics with respect to political-psychological point
in paper which Taylor presented to Diem October 2U. ^ Taylor
pointed out this would be very useful to him in Washington be-
cause he v/ill be faced with question that^ if progrsjn he proposes
is adopted^ what will be chances of early success. In response
Thuan's question asking for exact meaning of this point in
Taylor's paper, latter said there has been loss of confidence
among both Vietnejaese and American people about situation in Viet-
nam and we need to determine together what measures can be taken
to restore confidence. Rostow coiiomented that secret of turning
point is offensive action^ Diem stated complete psychological
mobilization required so that everything can be done to raise
potential GM forces and damage enemy's potentials He referred
to GW efforts in past to collaborate more closely with US in
military planning and said these efforts had run up against wall
of secrecy surromiding US and SEATO military plans. <.<> k^f
Finally, there was this exchange, which does not appear to provide
much support for the high hopes expressed in the Taylor Report that Diem
was anxious for UcS. guidance and "in principle" ready to grant a role for
Americans in his administration and army^
...k, Taylor referred to Diem's comjnents in earlier talk
about shortage of capable personnel and suggested US might
■ assist by lending personnels Diem replied that US could help
in this respect in training fieldc Thuan then brought up
dilemma facing GVN re instructors at Thui Due Reserve Officers'
School. oo kG/
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Paragraph 12 .of Taylor's cable reporting the meeting. Quoted in
Section IV, above.
"Actions to emphasize national emergency and beginning of a new phase
in the war: we should consider jointly all possible mea^siires to em-
phasize turning point has been reached in dealing with communist
aggression^ Possible actions might include appeal to United Nations,
an announcement by GViV of governmental changes to cope with crisis and
exchange of letters between the two heads of State expressing their
partnership in a common cause.^oo" hj/
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.Tfia FAIL rSCISIOITS - II
IV. Be CHAPTER VI
I. COOTEXT
Taylor's formal report^ as noted^ vas dated November 3^ a day
after the Mission came back to Washington. (A good deal of it had
been written during the stopover at Baguio^ in the Philippines^
vhen Taylor's personal cables to the President had also been VTritten
and sent.) The submission of Taylor's Report was followed by promi-
nent news stories the next morning flatly stating (but without
i ' attribution to a source) that the President "remains strongly opposed
to the dispatch of American combat troops to South Vietnam" and
strongly implying that General Taylor had not recommended such a com-
mitment, l/ Apparently^ only a few people^ aside from Taylor^
I Rostov and a handful of very senior officials^ reaJ-ized that this was
not exactly accurate — for the summary paper of the Report had not
been very explicit on Just what was meant by "a hard commitment to
the gro-und." Thus only those, who knew about the "Eyes Only" cables
would know just what Taylor was recommending.
Diem himself had given one of his rare on-the-record interviews
to the Wew York Tim.es correspondent in Saigon while Taylor was on his
vay home^ and he too gave the impression that the further American aid
he expected would not include ground troops « £/
Consequently^ the general outline of the American aid that wou].d
be sent following the Taylor Mission was common knowledge for over a
veek before any formal decision was made. The decisions^ when they
were announced stirred very little fuss^ and (considering the retro- ■
spective importance) not even much interest o The Taylor Mission had
received much less attention in the press than several other crises
at the JJEy in the Congo^ on nuclear testing^ and most of all in Berlin^
where there had just been a symbolic confrontation of Soviet and
, ■ American tanks « The Administration was so concerned about public
reaction to Soviet aggressiveness and apparent American inability to
deal with it that a campaign was begun (as usual in matters of this
sort^ reported in the Times without specific attribution) to "counter-
I attack against what unjiame'd ^high officials' called a 'rising mood of
i , national frustrationo ' " The Administration's message^ the Times
reported^ was that a 'inature foreign policy^' rather than "belligerence
of defeatism" was what was needed. 3/ What is interesting about such
a message is what the necessity to send it reveals about the mood of
the times „
In this sort of context^ there was no real debate about whether
the U.S. ought to do anything reasonable it could to prevent Vietnam
from going the way of Laos. There is no hint of a suggestion other-
wise in the classified record^ and there was no real public debate on
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this point. What was seen as an issue was whether the limits of
reasonahle U.S. aid extended to the point of sending American troops
to fight the Viet Cong. But even this was subdued. There had been^
as noted before ^ the leal^ed stories playing down the prospects that
combat troops would be sent, and then, immediately on Taylor ^s return,
the unattributed but obviously authoritative stories that Kennedy was
opposed to sending troops and Taylor was not recommending them.
In a most important sense, this situation distorts the story
told in this account. For this account inevitably devotes a great
deal of space to the decision that was not made — that of sending
ground troops ^^ and very little space to the important decisions
that were made. There is simply nothing much to say about these lat-
ter decisions: except that they were apparently taken for granted at
the time. Even today, "VJlth all the hindsight available, it is very
hard to imagine Kennedy or any other President responding to the
situation faced in I961 by doing significantly less about Vietnani than
he did. The only choices seen then, as indeed even today the only
choices seem to have been, whether to do more. And it is on how that
question was resolved^ inevitably, that any account of the period will
be focused.
The Administration faced (contrary to the impression given to the
public both before and after the decisions) two major issues when
Taylor returned.
1. What conditions, if any, would be attached to new Anerican
aid? The Taylor Report implicitly recommended none. But the leaked
stories in the press following Taylor's return showed that some in the
Administration inclined to a much harder line on Diem than the suin-
mary paper of the report. For exaiTiple, A Times dispatch of Tlovember 5,
from its Pentagon correspondent, reported that Diem would be expected
to "undertalie major economic, social, and military reforms to provide ^
a basis for increased U.S. support." hj
2. Would the limited commitment of ground feces recommended by
Taylor be undertaken? The news stories suggested they would, although
this would be apparent only to those who had seen Taylor's ''Eyes Only"
cables. The story appearing the day after the report was submitted,
despite the flat statements against the use of combat troops, also
stated that Taylor had recommended "the dispatch of more specialists
in anti -guerrilla warfare to train Vietnam.ese troops, communications
and transportation specialists, and army engineers to help the Viet -
namese government combat its flood problems ," The November 5 story
was more explicit. It is noted that officials seemed to rule out the
use of U.S. combat forces, "the move considered here a few weeks ago."
But "at the same time it appears that Army engineers, perhaps in
unusually large numbers, may be sent to help on flood control work
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and other civil projects and to fi ght if necessary o" This last phrase
was explicitly (and correctly) linked to the fact that the area in
which the floods had taken place (the Delta) was "orecisely the area of
greatest Viet Cong strengths 5/
■^ A final question of great importance did not have to be resolved
during this review: for although the Taylor Report had stressed the
idea of eventually bombing the north^ no iinmediate decision or commit-
ment on this was recommended.
r
On the first of these issues (the quid pro quo for U.So aid) our
record tells us that demands were made on Diem, as we will see when we
come to the actual decision. The newspaper stories strongly suggest
that the decision to ask for a quid pro quo vras made, at the latest,
XDmediately following the return of the Taylor Mission. But the record
does not show anything about the reasoning behind this effort to pres-
sure .Diem to agree to reforms as a condition for increased U.S. aid,
nor of what the point of it was. It certainly conflicted with the main
drive of the Taylor Mission Report. The report not only suggested no
such thing, but put a great deal of stress on a cordial, intiJiiate
relationship with the Diem regime. Pressure for reform (especially
when publicly made, as they essentially were in the leaked stories)
was hardly likely to promote cordiality. Durbrow's experience earlier
m the year had shown that pressure would have the opposite result.
Consequently, the President's handling of this issue had the effect
of undermining f^rom the start what appeared to have been a major premise
of the strategy recommended to the President: that Diem was "in principle"
prepared for what plainly amounted to a "limited partnership," with the"^
U.S. in running his country and his Ari-ay, -^ 6/ ^
The advantages, from the American view, of the President's decision
to place demands on Diem were presumably that it might (contrary to
realistic expectations) actually push Diem in the right direction; and
that if this did not work, it would somewhat limit the American commit-
ment to Diem.,. The limit would come by making clear that the U.S. saw
a good deal of the problem as Diem's own responsibility, and not just
a simple matter of external aggression. J?he balance of this judgment
would turn substantially on whether whoever was making the decision
judged^ that the "limited partnershi-v'" idea was really much more realistic
than the trying to pressure Diem, and on whether he v/anted to limit the
U.S. commitment, rather than make it unambiguous. Further, the cables
from^Saigon had clearly shown that many South Vietn&iriese were hoping the
Americans would put pressure on Diem, so that although such tactics
* A^ cable to Saigon November k asked Kolting whether he thought Diem
. might agree to, among other things, a proposal to establish a National
Emergency Council which, in addition to the senior members of Diem's
army and ac^ninistratioxi would include a "mature and hardheaded
American... to participate in all decisions."
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would prejudice relations with Diem^ they would not necessarily harm
relations with others of influence in the country^ in particular his
generals.
Finally _, a3.though Kennedy's decisions here were contrary to the
implications of the suinmary paper in the Taylor Report^ they were not
particularly inconsistent vrith the appendices by the State representa-
tives. For these^ as noted^ took a far less rosy view of Diem's
prospects than appeared in the svm^SuTy.
On the second issue -- the U.S. combat military task force — the
available record tells us only the positions of Taylor and of the
Defense Department. ¥e are not sure what the position of State was --
although Sorenson claims that all the President's senior advisors had
recommended going ahead with sending some ground troops. 7/
Even Taylor's position is slightly ambiguous. It is conceivable
that he argued for the Task Force mainly because he thought that the .
numbers of U.S. personnel that might be sent as advisors^ pilots_, and
other specialists would not add up to a large enough increment to have
much of a psychological impact on South Vietnamese morale. But his
choice of language indicates that a mere question of numbers was not
the real issue. Rather Taylor's argiment seems to have been that ■
specifically ground forces (not necessarily all or even mainly infantry-
men^ but ground soldiers who would be out in the countryside where ^ they
could be shot at and shoot back) were what was needed. Combat engineers
to work in th. VC-infested flood area in the Delta would meet that need.
Helicopter pilots and mechanics and advisors, who might accompany Viet-
namese operations, but could not undertake ground operations on their
own apparently would not. There is only one easily imagined reason for
seeing this as a crucial distinction. And that would be if a critical
object of the stepped up American program was to be^^exactly what Taylor
said it should be in his final cable from Saigon: "...assuring Diem
of our readiness to join him in a military showdown with the Viet Cong
" 8/
• •
Thus the flood task force was essentially different from the bal-
ance of the military program. It did not fill an urgent need for military
specialists or expertise not adequately available within Vietnam j ^it v/as
an implicit commitment to deny the Viet Cong a victory even if major
American ground forces should be required.
Taylor clearly did not see the need for large U.S. ground involve-
ment as at all probable. ("The risks of backing into a major Asian war
by way of SVH are present but are not impressive/' in ^ large part because
"HVIT is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing.') At another
' point, Taylor warns the President, "If the first contingent is not
enough, ... it will be difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce.
If the ultimate result sought is the closing of the frontiers and the
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cleanup of the insurgents vithin SVII^ there is no limit to our pos-
sible commitment (unless we attack the source in Hanoi. )^' 9/
We have a good record of the DoD staff work^ which preceded the
President's decision on this issue^ but only a bit from State and
none from the "White House. Rusk^ in a cable from Japan on I^ovember 1^
contributed this note of caution (which also bears on the previous
discussion of demands on Diem for a quid pro quo for increased
itaierican aid): ." ' ' "
Since General Taylor may give first full report prior
my return, believe special attention should be given to
critical question whether Diem is prepared take necessary
measures to give us something worth supporting. If Diem
unwilling trust military commanders to get job done and
take steps to consolidate non-communist elements into
serious national effort, difficult to see how handful
American troops can have decisive influence. While at-
taching greatest possible importance to security in SEA,
I would be reluctant to see U.S. make major additional
commitm-ent American prestige to a losing horse.
Suggest Department carefully review all Southeast Asia
measures we expect from Diem if our assistance forces us to
assume de facto direction South Vietnamese affairs. 10 /
But the view of the U.S. Mission in Saigon contained no such
doubts, nor did most Vietnamese, according to this cable Nolting sent
while Taylor was enroute home :
Our conversations over past ten days with Vietnamese
in various waUks of life show virtually unanimous desire
for introduction U.S. forces into Viet-Nani. This based on
unsolicited remarks from cabinet ministers. National
Assembly Deputies, University professors, students, shop-
keepers, and oppositionists. Dr. Tran Dinh De, level-
headed Minister of Health, told Embassy officer Oct 29
that while GVT^ could continue resist communists for while
longer if US troops not introduced, it could not win
alone against commies. National Assembly members, ac-
cording to Lai Tu, leader Personalist Community, tinani-
mously in favor entry US forces. Diem told us while
General Taylor was here that he had consulted National
Assembly Committee on this question and had received
favorable response. Even an oppositionist like Ex-
Foreign Minister Tran Van Do has told us US forces are
needed and is apparently so strongly convinced of this
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that he did not suggest any conditions precedent about
political changes by Diem. AmConsul Hue reports that
opinion, among intellectuals and government officials in
that city is also almost unanimously in favor of intro-
jj . duction of Am.erican combat troops. MAAG believes on basis
private conversations and general attitude Vietnamese
military personnel toward us that Vietnamese armed forces
would likei-Tise welcome introduction US forces.
General Vietnamese desire for introduction US forces,
. arises from serious morale decline among populace during
recent weeks because of deterioration in security and
horrible death through torture and mutilation to which
Col Nam subjected. Expanded VC infiltration has brought
fully home to Vietnamese the fact that US has not inter-
vened militarily in Laos to com.e to rescue of anti-commu-
nists. Now that they see Viet-Wam approaching its own
crucial period^ paramount question in their minds is
whether it will back down when chips are down. Vietnamese
thus want US forces introduced in order to demonstrate US
! determination to stick it out with them against Communists.
They do not want to be victims of political settlement
- with communists. This is especially true of those publicly
I , identified as anti -communist like Dean Vu Quoc Thue who
collaborated with Dr. Eugene Staley on Joint Experts Report.
Most Vietnamese whose thoughts on this subject have been
developed are -not thinking in tems of US troops to fight
guerrillas but rather of a reassuring presence of US forces
in Viet-Nam. These persons undoubtedly feel_, however^ that
if war in Viet -Nam continues to move toward overt conven-
\ I tional aggression as opposed to its guerrilla character^
combat role for US troops could eventually arise. U./
The special commitment involved in committing even a small force of
j I . ground troops was generally recognised. ¥e have notes on an ISA staff
paper^ for example^ which ranked the various types of increased U.S.
military aid in ascending order of commitment^ and of course^ placed the
flood task force at the top. According to the notes^
Any combat elem.ents^ such as in the task force^ would
come under. attack and woiad need to defend themselves^ com-
mitting U.S. prestige deeply. U.S. troops would then be
fighting in South Vietnam and could not "VTithdraw under fire.
Thus^the introduction of U.S. troops in South Vietnam would
M
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be decisive act and must be sent to achieve a coinpletely
decisive mission. This mission would probably require^ over
time, increased numbers of U.S. troops; DRV intervention
would probably increase until a large number of U.S. troops
were req,uirod, three or more divisions. 12/
■ This assessment differed from that in General Taylor's cables only
in not stressing the hope that a U.S. willingness to bomb the north
would deter North Vietnamese escalation of its own commitment. ■
A special KIE prepared at this time reached essentially the same
conclusions."
This SNIE, incidentally,' is the only staff paper found in the
available record which treats communist reactions primarily in terms of
the separate national interests of Hanoi, Moscow, and Peiping, rather
than primarily in terms of an overall communist strategy for which
Hanoi, is acting as an agent. In particular, the Gilpatric Task Eorce
Report, it will be recalled, began with references to a communist
^master plan* for taking over Southeast Asia. The Taylor Mission
Report, similarly, began with a section on "Coimnunist Strategy in
Southeast Asia" and opening:
At the present time, the Communists are pursuing a
clear and systematic strategy in Southeast Asia. It is
a strategy of extending Communist power and influence in
ways which bypass U.S. nuclear strength, U.S. conventional
naval, air, and ground forces, and the conventional strength
of indigenous forces in the area. Their strategy is rooted
in the fact that international law and practice does not
yet recognize the mounting of guerrilla war across borders
as aggression justifying counterattack at the source. 13 /
The November 5 SNIE presumably indicates the principal courses of
action that were under formal review at the time:
I
ji The courses of action here considered were given to the
intelligence community for the purposes of this estimate and
were not intended to represent the full range of possible
courses of action. The given courses of action are:
A. The introduction of a US airlift into end within
South Vietnam, increased logistics support, and an increase
in FAAC- strength to provide US advisers down to battalion
level;
Be The introduction into South Vietnam of a US force
of about 8,000 - 10,000 troops, mostly engineers with some ■
combat support , in response to an appeal from President
Diem for assistance in flood relief;
i
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, ■ C. The introduction into the area of a US com-
bat force of 25^000 to 1-1-0,000 to engage with South
Vietnamese forces in ground, air, and naval opera-
tions against the Viet Cong; and
D- An announcement hy the US of its determina-
tion to hold South Vietnam and a warning, either
private or puhlic, that Worth Vietnamese support of
the Viet Cong must cease or the US would launch air
attacks against North Vietnam. This action would
be taken in conjunction with Course A, B, or C. VjJ
These proposed courses of action correspond to those outlined for
consideration by the Taylor Mission, with the exception that the flood
task force proposed by Taylor has been substituted for the former
"intermediate" solution of stationing a token U.S. force at DaNang,
and that an opinion is asked on the prospects of threats to bomb the
north, again reflecting the Taylor Mission Report- *
The gist of the SME was that North Vietnamese would respond to an
increased U.S. commitment with an offsetting increase in infiltrated
support for the Viet Cong. Thus, the main difference in the estimated
communist reaction to Courses A, B, and C was that each vrould be
stronger than its predecessor. On the prospects for bombing the north,
the SNIE implies that threats to bomb would not cause Hanoi to stop its
support for the Viet Cong, and that actual attacks on the Worth would
bring a strong response from Moscow and Peiping, who would regard the
defense of Worth Vietnam against such an attack as imperative." 15/
*See Gilpatric memo quoted at conclusion of Section I, Chapter V.
^
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II. FINAL RECOM'IEKDATIOIMS
On November 8^ McNamara sent the following memorandum on behalf of
himself 5 Gilpatric, and the JCS:
MEMORAM)UM FOR TIIE PRESIDENT
The basic issue framed by the Taylor Report is whether the
U.S. shall:
■a. Commit itself to the clear objective of preventing
the fall of South Vietnam to Communism^ and
b. Support this commitment by necessary immediate
military actions and preparations for possible later actions..
The Joint Chiefs, Mr. Gilpatric, and I have reached the
following conclusions:
lo The fall of South Vietnam to Communism would lead to the
fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accom-
modation to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia and
in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly
in the Orient, would be extremely serious.
2. The chances are against, probably sharply against, pre-
venting that fall by any measures short of the introduction of
U.Sc forces on a substantial scale. We accept General Taylor's
judgment that the various measures proposed by him short of this
are useful but will not in themselves do the Job of restoring
confidence and setting Diem on the way to vanning his fight.
•it
3- The introduction of a U.S. force of the magnitude of an
initial 8,000 men in a flood relief context will be of great help
to Diem. However, it will not convince the other side (whether
the shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we mean
business. Moreover, it probably will not tip the scales decisively
We would be almost certain to get increasingly mired do\m in an
inconclusive struggle «
4. The other side can be convinced we mean business only if
we accompany the initial f^orce introduction by a clear comjnit-
ment to the. full objective stated above, accompanied by a vrarning
. through som? channel to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet
Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnanu
5« If we act in this way, the ultimate possible extent of our
military commitment must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged
and Hanoi and Peiping may intervene overtly. In view of the
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logistic difficulties faced by the other side^ I believe ve can
assume that the maxltnum U.S. forces required on the ground in
Southeast Asia "I'/ill not exceed 6 divisions^ or about 205,000 men
(CINCPAC Plan 32-59, Phase IV) . Our military posture is, or
■with the addition of more National Guard or regiilar Army divi-
sions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces without
serious interference with our present Berlin plans.
6o To accept the stated objective is of course a most serious
decision. Military force is not the only element of what must be
a most carefully coordinated set of actions. Success will depend
on factors many of -which are not within our control -- notably the
conduct of Diem himself and other leaders in the area. Laos will
remain a major problem. The domestic political implications of
accepting the objective are also grave, although it is our feeling
that the country will respond better to a firm initial position
than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually, and that
in the meantime are sure to involve casualties. The over-all
effect on Moscow and Peiping will need careful weighing and may
well be mixed; however, permitting South Vietnam to fall can only
strengthen and encourage them greatly.,
>
7. In sum:
a. We do not believe major units of UoSo forces should
( be introduced in South Vletnatn unless we are willing to make an
affirmative decision on the issue stated at the start of this
memor andum.
b. We are inclined to recomjnend that we do commit the
U.S. to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-
nam to Communism and that we support this commitment by the neces-
sary military actions o
c. If such a commitment is agreed upon, we support the
recommendations of General Taylor as the first stejos toward its
fulfillment.
Sgd: Robert S. McNamara I6/
A number of things are striking about this memorandum, including of
course the judgment that the "maximima" U.S. ground forces required, even
in the case of overt intervention by not only North Vietnam, but China
as well, would "not exceed" 205^000 men. This estimate of the requirement
to deal with a large scale overt Invasion is consistent with the Chief's
earlier estimate that the addition of ^0,000 U.S. troops to the South
Vietnamese forces would be sufficient to "clean up" the Viet Congo
But the strongest message to the President in the memorandum (growing
out of points 3, i|, and 7c) was surely that if he agreed to sending the
r^ military task force, he should be prepared for follow-up recommendations
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' for re- enforcements and to threaten Hanoi with bombing • Unless the SNIE
was wholly ^^rrong, threats to bomb Hanoi would not turn off the war, and
Hanoi would increase its infiltration in response to UoS. commitments' of
troops. Even should Hanoi not react with counter-escalation, the Presi- .
dent knew that the Chiefs, at least, were already on record as desiring
a prompt build-up to U0,000 ground troops. In short, the President was
being told that the issue was not whether to send an 8,000-man task force,
but whether or not to embark on a couTse that, without som.e extraordinary
good luck, would lead to combat involvement in Southeast Asia on a very
substantial scale. On the other hand, he was being warned that an^rthing
less than sending the task force was very likely to fail to prevent the
fall of Vietnam, since "the odds are against, proba.bly sharply against,
preventing that fall by any means short of the introduction of U.S. forces
on a substantial scale" (of which the task force would be the first incre-
ment ) .
Although the Chief's position here is clear, because their views are
on record in other memoranda, McNamara's own position remains a little
ambiguous o For the paper does not flatly recommend going ahead; it only
states he e.nd his colleagues are "inclined" to recommend going ahead.
Three days later MclMajnara joined Rusk in a quite different recommendation,
and one obviously more to the President's liking (and, in the nature of
jj^ such things, quite possibly drawn up to the President's specifications).
As with the May revision of the Gilpatric Report, this paper combines
an escalation of the rhetoric with a toning doTm of the actions the Presi-
dent is asked to talie. Since the NSAI^i formalizing the President's decisions
was taken essentially verbatim from this paper, the complete text is re-
printed here. (The KSAl/I consisted of the Recommendations section of this
memorandum, except that Point 1 of the recomraendations was deleted.)
Of pajrticular importance in this second memorandum to the President
was Section k, with its explicit sorting of U.S. military aid into
Category A, support forces, which were to be sent promptly; and Category
• B, "larger organized units with actual or potential direct military
missions" on which no immediate decision was recommended. There is no
explicit reference in the paper to the flood relief task force; it sicnply
does not appear in the list of recommended actions, presumably on the
grounds that it goes in Category Be Category B forces, the paper notes,
"involve a certain dilemma: if there is a strong South Vietnam_ese effort,
they may not be needed; if there is not such an effort. United States
forces could not accomplish their mission in the midst of an apathetic
or hostile population."
If McKamara's earlier memorandum is read carefully, the same sort
. of warning is found, although it sounds much more perfunctory. But that
such warnings were included shows a striking contrast with the last
go-around in May. Then, the original Defense version of the Gilpatric
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Task Force Report contained no hint of such a qualification, and there
was only a q^uite vague warning in the State revisions. Part of the rea-
son, undoubtedly, was the 6 month ^s additional experience in dealing
with Diem. A larger part, though, almost certainly flowed from the fact
that the insurgency had by now shown enough strength so that there was
now in everyone's minds the possibility that the U.S. might someday face
the choice of giving up on Vietnam or taking over a major part of the
war.
These warnings (that even a major U.S. commitment to the ground war
would not assure success) were obviously in some conflict with the recom-
mendations both papers made for a clear-cut U.S. commitment to save South
Vietnam. The contrast is all the sharper in the joint Rusk/McNamara memo-
randum, where the warning is so forcefully given.
Here is the Rusk/McNamara memorandum. 17/
TOP SECRET November 11, I96I
■ MEMORMDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: South Viet -Nam
1. ■ United States National Interests in South Viet-Nam .
The deteriorating situation in South Viet-Nam requires atten-
tion to the nature and scope of United States national interests
in that country. The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would
involve the transfer of a nation of 20 million people from the free
world to the Communist bloc. The loss of South Viet-Nam would make
pointless any further discussion about the importance of Southeast
Asia to the free world; we would have to face, the near certainty
that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a
complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation
within the Communist bloc. The United States, as a member of SEATO,
has commitments with respect to South Viet-Nam under the Protocol
to the SEATO Treaty. Additionally, in a formal statement at the
conclusion session of the 195^ Geneva Conference, the United States
representative stated that the United States "would view any renewal
of the aggression . . . with grave concern and seriously threatening
international peace and security."
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The loss of South Viet-Nan to Communism would not only destroy
SEATO but would undermine the credibility of American commitments
elsewhere. Further, loss of South Viet-Nam would stimulate bitter
domestic controversies in the United States and would be seized upon
by extreme elements to divide the country and harass the Administra-
tion.
2. The Problem of Saving South Viet-Nam .
It seems, on the face of it, absurd to think that a nation of
20 million people can be subverted by 15-20 thousand active guer-
• villas if the Government and people of" that country do not wish to
be subverted. South Viet-Nam is not, however, a highly organized
society with an effective governing apparatus and a population ac-
customed to carrying civic responsibility. Public apathy is encour-
aged by the inability of most citizens to act directly as well as by
the tactics of terror employed by the guerrillas throughout the coun-
tryside. Inept administration and the absence of a strong non-
Communist political coalition have made it difficult to bring avail-
able resources to bear upon the guerrilla problem and to make the
most effective use of available external aid. Under the best of con-
ditions the threat posed by the presence of 15-20 thousand guerrillas,
well disciplined under well-trained cadres, would be difficult to
meet •
3. The United States^ Objective in South Viet-Nam .
The United States should commit itself to the clear objective of
preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communist . The basic means
for accomplishing this objective must be to put the Government of
South Viet-Nam into a position to win its own war against the guer-
rillas. We must insist that that Government itself take the measures
necessary for that purpose in exchange for large-scale United States
assistance in the military, economic and political fields. At the
same time we must recognize that it will probably not be possible for
the GVN to win this war as long as the flow of men and supplies from
North Viet-Nam continues unchecked and the guerrillas enjoy a safe
sanctuary in neighboring territory.
We should be prepared to introduce United States combat forces
if that should become necessary for success. Dependent upon the cir-
cumstances, it may also be necessary for United States forces to
strike at the source of the aggression in North Viet-Nam.
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h. The Use of United States Forces in South Viet-Nan .
The commitment of United States forces to" South Viet-Ham in-
I volves two different categories: (A) Units of modest size required
for the direct support of South Viet-l^amese military effort ^ such
as communications 5 helicopter and other forms of airlift, reconnais-
sance aircraft, naval patrols, intelligence units, etc., and (B)
i larger organized units with actual or potential direct military mis-
sions . Category (A) should "be introduced as sipeedily as possible . ■
( Category (B) units pose a more serious problem in that they are much
more significant from the point of view of domestic and international
political factors and greatly increase the probabilities of Communist
bloc escalation. Further, the employment of United States combat
forces (in the absence of Communist bloc escalation) involves a cer-
tain dilemma: if there is a strong South-Vietnamese effort, they may
not be needed; if there is not such an effort, United States forces
could not accomplish their mission in the midst of an apathetic or
hostile population. Under present circumstances, therefore, the ques-
tion of injecting United States and SEATO combat forces should in
large part be considered as a contribution to the morale of the South
Viet-Namese in their own effort to do the principal job themselves.
5f Probable Extent of the QQxmitjmnt of Unite d States Jorcgs .
If we commit Category (b) forces to South Viet-Nam, the ultimate
possible extent of our military commitment in Southeast Asia must be
faced. The struggle may be prolonged, and Eanoi and Peiping may
overtly intervene. It is the view of the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in the light of the logistic diffi-
culties faced by the other side, we can assume that the maximum United
States forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia would not ex-
ceed six divisions, or about 205,000 men (CINCPAC Plan 32/59 PHASE
IV). This would be in addition to local forces and such SEATO forces
as may be engaged. It is also the view of the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our military posture is, or, with
the addition" of more IJational Guard or regular Army divisions, can be
made, adequate to furnish these forces and support them in action with-
out serious interference with our present Berlin plans.
6. Relation to Laos .
It must be understood that the introduction of American combat
forces into Viet-Nam prior to a Laotian settlement would run a con-
siderable risk of stimulating a Communist breach of the cease fire
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and a resumption of hostilities in Laos. This could present us with
a choice between the use of combat forces in Laos or an abandonment
of that country to full Communist control. At the present time, there
is at least a chance that a settlement can be reached in Laos on the
basis of a weak and unsatisfactory Souvanna Phouma Government. The
prospective agreement on Laos includes a provision that Laos will not
be used as a transit area or as a base for interfering in the affairs
of other coimtries such as South Viet-ITam. After a Laotian settlement,
the introduction of United States forces into Viet-Nam could serve to
stabilize the position both in Viet-Nam and in Laos by registering our
determination to see to it that the Laotian settlement was as far as
the United States would be willing to see Communist influence in South-
east Asia develop.
7. The Heed for Multilateral Action ,
. From the political point of view, both domestic and international,
it would seem important to involve forces from other nations alongside
of United States Category (B) forces in Viet-Nam, It would be diffi-
cult to explain to our own people why no effort had been made to in-
voke SEATO or why the United States undertook to carry this burden
unilaterally. Our position would be greatly strengthened if the intro-
duction of forces could be taken a^ a SEATO action, accompanied by
units of other SEATO countries, with a full SEATO report to the United
Nations of the purposes of the action itself.
Apart from the armed forces, there would be political advantage
in elisting the interest of other nations, including neutrals, in the
security and well-being of South Viet-Nam. This might be done by seek-
ing such assistance as Malayan police officals (recently offered Diem
by the Tunku) and by technical assistance personnel in other fields,
either bilaterally or through international organizations.
8. Initial Diplomatic Action by the United States .
If the recommendations, below, are approved > the United States
should consult intensively with other SEATO governments to obtain their
full support of the course of action contemplated. At the appropriate
stage, a direct approach should be made by the United States to Moscow,
through normal or special channels, pointing out that we cannot accept
the movement of cadres, arms and other supplies into South Viet-Nam in
support of the guerrillas. We should also discuss the problem with
neutral governments in the general area and get them to face up to
their own interests in the security of South Viet-Nam; these govern-
ments will be concerned about (a) the introduction of United States
combat forces and (b) the withdrawal of United States support from
Southeast Asia; their concern, therefore, might be usefully expressed
either to Communist bloc countries or in political support for what
may prove necessary in South Viet-Nam itself.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
In the light of the foregoing, the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense recommend that:
1. ¥e now take the decision to commit ourselves to the ohjective
of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism and that, in
doing so, we recognize that the introduction of United States and other
SSATO forces may be necessary to achieve this objective. (However, if
it is necessary to commit outside forces to achieve the foregoing ob-
jective our decision to introduce United States forces should not be
contingent upon unanimous SEA.TO agreement thereto,)
2. The Department of Defense be prepared with plans for the use
of United States forces in South Yiet-Nam under one or more of the fol-
lowing purposes:
(a) Use of a significant number of United States forces to
signify United States determination to defend South Viet-Waiu and
to boost South Viet-Nam morale.
(b) Use of .substantial United States forces to assist in
suppressing Viet Cpng insiirgency short of engaging in detailed
countei^-guerrllla operatlona but including relavant op§rati©n§
in North Viet-Nam.
(c) Use of United States forces to deal with the situation
if there is organized Communist military intervention.
3. We immediately undertake the following actions in support of
the GVN:
(a) Provide increased air lift to the GVN forces, including
helicopters, light aviation, and transport aircraft, manned to
■ the extent necessary by United States uniformed personnel and
under United States operational control.
(b) Provide such additional equipment and United States uni-
formed personnel as may be necessary for air reconnaissance,
photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support
techniques, and for special intelligence,
(c) Provide the GVN with small craft, including such United
States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be
^ necessary for quick and effective operations in effecting sur-
j veillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways.
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(d)^ -Provide expedited training and eq.uipping of the civil
guard and the self-defense corps with the objective of relieving
I the regular Army of static missions and freeing it for mobile
offensive operations.
\e) Provide such personnel and eq_uipment as may be neces-
sary ^to improve the military-political intelligence system be-
ginning at the provincial level and extending upward through-
the Government and the armed forces to the Central Intelligence
Organization.
(f ) Provide such new terms of reference, reorganization
and additional personnel for United States military forces as
are req_uired for increased United States participation in the
direction and control of GVN military operations and to carry
out the other increased responsibilities which accrue to MAAG
under these recommendations.
■ to -oe -t f^*^*^^^^ ^^^^ increased economic aid as may be reauired
tation^^ ^^^ "^^ pursue a vigorous flood relief and rehabili-
effort -^^^f^f^' "^^ supply material in support of the security
panded' . ^^^^ priority to projects in support of this ex-
in ^„., .^^^^"^^^-^^surgency program. (This could include increases
* as food "^^d^""^' ^ ""^^^ ^^^^^^ Of a vid© ra-ngg of materials §uch
tions e' ^^ *^ supplies , transportation equipment, communica-
■ assist th^"^r-f^"^' ^^^ ^'^'^ other items where material help could
GTO m winning the war against the Viet Cong.)
reouest h ^J^^^^^^ ^^^ support (including financial support) a
rnptir^ 1 ^^^ "^^ ^^^ ^^0 or any other appropriate inter-
^nH^f^^^f?^''^^^'^^'''' ^^^ multilateral assistance in the relief
-nd rehabilitation of the flood area.
insert" ^-^^"^^de individual administrators and advisers for
in tvD^^^ ^?^ "^^^ Governmental machinery of South Viet-Mm
ypes and numbers to be agreed upon by the two Governments.
co^^diti -^^^^^^^ personnel for a joint survey with the GW of
politi ^1^' ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ provinces to assess the social,
prosecuti' ^^^^'^-^^^^^^^ ^ and military factors bearing on the
^ ^^m^^ -^? counter-insurgency program in order to reach
a common estim^-fci ^-^ ^^ o */ x- o
of -h^. -u ^^^^®^^e of these factors and a common determination
ol Jaow to deal vi+.y, +v,^™
of how to deal with them.
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k. Ambassador I^Iolting be instructed to make an immediate ap-
■ " proach. to President Diem to the effect that the Government of the
United States is prepared to join the Goverriment of Viet-Nam in a
sharply increased joint effort to cope vith the Viet Cong threat
ji and the ravages of- the flood as set forth under S-, above^ if, on
its part, the Governiaent of Viet-I\^am is prepared to carry out an
effective and total mobilization of its own resources , both material
and human 5 for the saane end. Before setting in motion the United
States proposals listed above, the United States Government would
appreciate confirmation of their acceptability to the GVI^, and an
expression from the GVN of the undertakings it is prepared to make
to insure the success of this joint effort. On the part of the
United States, it would be expected that these GVN undertakings
would include, in accordance with the detailed recommendations of
the Taylor Mission and the Country Team:
(a) Prompt and appropriate legislative and administrative
action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilize its
entire resources. (This would include a decentralization and
broadening of the Governm.ent so as to realize the full potential
of all non-Communist elements in the country willing to contrib-
ute to the common struggle.)
(b) The establishment of appropriate Governmental wartime
agencies with adequate authority to perform their functions
effectively.
(c) Overhaul of the military establishment and command
structure so as to create an effective military organization
for the prosecution of the war.
5. Very shortly before the arrival in South Viet-Nam of the
first increments of United States military personnel and equipment
proposed under S.^ above, that would exceed the Geneva Accord ceil-
ings, publish the "Jorden report" as a United States "white paper,"
transmitting it as simultaneously as possible to the Goverments of
all countries with which we have diplomatic relations, including
the Communist states.
6. Simultaneous with the publication of the "Jorden report,"
release an exchange of letters between Diem and the President.
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(a) Diem's letter would include: reference to the DRV
violations of Geneva Accords as set forth in the October 24
GVN letter to the ICC and other documents; pertinent references
to GTO statements with respect to its intent to observe the
Geneva Accords; reference to its need for flood relief and re-
habilitation; reference to previous United States aid and the
compliance hitherto by both countries with the Geneva Accords;
reference to the USG statement at the time the Geneva Accords
were signed; the necessity now of exceeding some provisions of
the Accords in view of the DRV violations thereof; the lack of
aggressive intent with respect to the DRV: Gm intent to return
to strict compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV
violations ceased; and request for additional United States
assistance in framework foregoing policy. The letter should
also set forth in appropriate general terms steps Diem has taken
and is taking to reform Governmental structure.
(b) The President's reply would be responsive to Diem's
request for additional assistance and 'acknowledge and agree to
Diem's statements on the intent promptly to return to strict
compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as DRV violations
have ceased,
7. Simultaneous with steps 5 and 6 ^ above, make a private ap-
proach to the Soviet Union that would include: our determination to
prevent the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism by whatever means is
necessary; our concern over dangers to peace presented by the aggres-
sive DRV policy with respect to South Viet-Nam; our intent to return
to full compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV does so;
the distinction we draw between Laos and South Viet-Nam; and our ex-
pectation that the Soviet Union will exercise its influence on the
CEICOMS and the DRV.
8. A special diplomatic approach made to the United Kingdom in
its role as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference requesting that the
United Kingdom seek the support of the Soviet co-Chairman for a ces-
sation of DRV aggression against South Viet-Nam.
9. A special diplomatic approach also to be made to India,
both in its role as Chairman of the ICC and as a power having rela-
tions with Peiping and Hanoi. This approach should be mace immedi-
ately prior to public release of the "Jorden report" and the exchange
of letters between Diem and the President.
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10. Immediately prior to the release of the "Jordan report"
and the exchange of letters bet%*?-een Diem and the President,
special diplomatic approaches also to be made to Canada, as well
as Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, Ceylon, the UAH, and Yugoslavia.
SMTO, NATO, and OAS members should be informed through those
organizations, \T±th selected members also informed individually.
The possibility of some special approach to Polaad as a member of
the ICC should also be considered.
When v/e reach this memora-ndum in the record, the decision seems essen-
tially sealed. Kennedy, by every indication in the press at the time and
according to the recollections of all the memoirs, was, at the least, very
reluctant to send American ground forces to Vietnam, and quite possibly
every bit as "strongly opposed" as the leakied news stories depicted him.
He now had a Joint recommendation from his Secretary of State and Secretary
of Defense telling hiia just what he surely wanted to hear: that a decision
on combat forces could be deferred*, Consequently, Kennedy's decision on
this point can hardly be considered in doubt beyond I\'ovember 11, although
a formal YiSC meeting on the question was not held until the 15th, On the
question of demands on Diem, again there is no reason to suspect the issue
was in doubt any later, at most, than the 11th. The only questions which
are in doubt are the extent to which the Rusk/McNamara memorandum simply
happened to come to the President in such convenient form, or whether the
President arranged it so; and if so, how far this formal paper differed
from the real recommendations of the President's senior advisors. The
record available gives no basis for even guessing about thiSo As noted
earlier, even McNamara, who is on record with a previous, quite different
memorandum, cannot be flatly said to have changed his mind (or been
overruled). There is too much room for uncertainty about what he was
really up to when he signed the memorandum.
In any event, Kennedy essentially adopted the Rusk/McNamara set of
recomjnendations, although the record is not entirely clear on when he
did so. There v/as an NSC meeting November 5; but although at least the
Chairman of the JCS was there, the record shews that even after this
meeting there was some uncertainty (or perhaps reluctance) in the JCS
about whether the decision had been made. The record shows that McNamara
phoned General Lemnitzer to assure him that this was the case. But the
cables transmitting the decision to Saigon were dated November 1^1, the
day before the NSC meeting. The formal decision ps-per (NSAM 111) was not
signed until November 22nd. As noted earlier, the NSAM is essentially
the recommendations section of the Rusk/iucNama.ra paper, but with the
initial recommendation (committing the U.S. to save Vietnam) deleted. 18/
The NSAl-1 vzas headed "First Phase of Vietnam Program," which, of course,
implied that a further decision to send combat troops was in prospect.
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Both Sorenson and Hilsman claim this was really a ruse "by the President ,
who had no intention of going ahead with combat troops but did not choose
to argue the point with his advisors.
Schlesinger, apparently writing from diary notes, says the President
talked to hixi about the comba^t troops recommendations at the time, describ-
ing the proposed first increment as like an alcoholic's first drink:
The Taylor -Rostow report was a careful and thoughtful
document, and the President read it with interest. He was
impressed by its description of the situation as serious but
not hopeless and attracted by the idea of stiffening the Diem
regojue through an infusion of American advisers. He did not,
however, like the proposal of a direct Araerican military
commitment. "They want a force of Am^erican troops," he told
me early in November. "They say it's necessary in order to
restore confidence and maintain morale. But it will be Just
like Berlin. The troops .v^ill march in; the bands will playj
the crowds will cheer; and in four days everyone will have
forgotten. Then we will be told we have to send in m-ore troops.
It's like taJ^ing a drink. The effect wears off, and you have
to take another." The war in Vietnam, he added, could be won
only so long as it was their war. -If it were ever converted
into a white man's war, we v/ould lose as the French had lost
a decade earlier. I9/ ■ •
Whether, in fact, Kennedy had such a firm position in mind at the
time cannot be surmised, though, from the official record itself. It is
easy to believe that he did, for as Sorenson points out, Kinnedy had
strong views on the difficulties of foreign troops putting do>m an insuj?-
gency dating from his bleak, but correct, appraisals of French prospects
in Vietnam as early as I95I, and again in Algeria in the late 1950'so
And he was hardly alone in such sentiments, as shown in columns of the .
period by Reston and Lippman, and in a private communication from
Galbraith to be quoted shortly.
But, Kennedy did not need to have such a firm position in mind to
make the decisions he did« There was a case to be made for deferring
the combat troops decision even if the President accepted the view that
U.S. troops commitments were almost certainly needed in Vietnam and that
putting them in sooner would be better than waiting. There was, in par-
ticular, the arguments in the R-ask/VicT^emaxa memorandima that putting combat
troops into Vietnam just then would upset the Laos negotiations, and the
unstated but obvious argument that the U.S. perhaps ought to hold back on
the combat troop commitment to gain leverage en Diem.
General Taylor's advice, as shown in the record, gave a different ground
for delaying. Taylor argued that the ground troop coiranitment was essenti-
ally for its psychological, not military, impact. Taylor's judgment was that it
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t j ; was "very douTotful" that anything short of a prompt commitment of ground
troops would restore South Vietnamese morale. But such a commitment
would obviously be a costly stop. The President was thoroughly fore-'
warned that such a move would lead both to continual pressure to send
more troops and to political difficulties at home that would inevi-
tably flow from the significant casualties that had to be expected to
accompany a ground troop commitment- The risk of delaying the groimd
troop commitment might easily have been judged not worth the certain
costs that would accompany it. And of course^ in hindsight, we know
that the limited program approved by the President was sufficient to
put off any imminent collapse of the Diem regijne. Consequently, Kennedy's
decisions do not tell us just what his view was, and indeed he did not
need to have a firmly settled view to make the decision, which after all,
was only to put off, not to foreclose a decision to send ground troops.
He had only to decide that, on balance, the risks of deferring the troop
j decision were no worse than the costs of making it, and he could have
reached that judgment by any nijimber of routes. The reasons stated in
the various papers may or may. not accurately reflect the President's
' ' state of mind. The only thing we can be sure of is that they conveyed
I his judgment of the tactically most suitable rationale to put in writing.
The most detailed record we have of this rationale and explanation of
is the following cable to Nolting:
.* •
.Review of Taylor Report has resulted in following basic
decisions:
■1. Must essentially be a GW task to contain and reduce the VC
threat at present level of capability. Means organizing to go on
offensive. We are prepared to contemplate further assistance after
joint assessfaent establishes needs and possibilities of aid more
precisely.
2. i\^o amount of extra aid can be substitute for GVN taking
measures to permit them to assume offensive and strengthen the
administrative and political bases of government.
■ ^
'3- Do not propose to introduce into GVII the US combat troops
now_, but propose a phase of intense public and diplomatic activity
to focus on infiltration from North. Shall decide later on course
of action should infiltration not be" radically reduced.
*
'h. On flood_, decide best coarse to treat' as primarily civil
problem^ and occasion should be used to draw in as many nationals
of other countries as can be used in GVN flood plan. Have been en-
couraged this course on advise of Desai of Indian Foreign Office who
observed a good thing if some Indians and Burmese involved con-
structively in SW and subject to VC attack. We prepared to put
maximum, pressure on FAO. Do not exclude ad hoc US military aid in
flood area , ' . .
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5* Diplomatically position that the violations to be docu-
,mentcd in Jorden report c»nd strong references to DRV attack against
SVN in DM's letter to Kennedy^ need not confirm to the world
'and Cornraunists that Geneva accords are being disregarded by our
Increased aid. Need not accuse ourselves publicly^ make Coaur.unist
Job easier. GVN should be advised to counter charges by leveling
- charges against DRV and insisting that if ICC investigates in
SVW must equally investigate in MN. .' Appreciate approach will make
ICC task difficult but will explain position to Canadians and
Indians to get their support. ' . .'
'• 6. A crucial element in USG willingness to move forward is
concrete demonstration by Die:ri that he is now prepared to work
in an orderly way on his subordinates and broaden the political base
of his regime.
7v Package should be presented as first steps in a partner*-
■ship in which US is prepaa-ed to do more as joint .study of facts and
GVK performance m-akes increased US aid possible and productive.
8. Still possible Laotian settlement can be reached peii:aining
^our iainimum objective of ' independent I/^os on the basis of a neutral
coalition^ (although weak and unsatisfactory)^ headed by Soubanna.
Woul.d include provision .Laos not be used as transit area or base
for interference in SWl. Therefore must keep in mind impact of
action in SVN or prospects for acceptable Lhos settlement.
■
:9r Introduction of US or Sr:?.to forces into SWT before
Laotian settlement might v:reck cli;;ngesVfor agreement^ lead to break
up of Geneva conference^ break L/ c- cease fire by cornraunists
.With resumption of hostilities.
10. Decision to introduce US combat forces in GVN would have to
be taken in light of GVN effort^ including support from people^
I^otian situation^ Berlin crisis^ readiness of allies or sharply
j.ncreased tension with Bloc^ and enormous responsibilities which would
have to be borne by US in event of escalation SEA or other areas.
11. Hope measures outlined in instructions will galvanize and
supplement GVN effort, making d.eclslon on use of US combat forces
unnecessary and no need for decision in effect to shift primary
responsibility for defense of SV"N to USG. '
*
12. We are fully cognizant of extent to which decisions if Imple-
inented through Diem's acceptance will sharply increase the
commitment of our prestige struggle to save SVIT.
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IS* Very strictly for your own information^ DOD has been instructed
to prepare plans for the use of US combat forces in S^}^ under various
contingencies^ including stepped up infiltration as veil as organized
Inventory (sic) Military/ intervention. However objective of our
policy is to do all possible to accomplish purpose without use of
US combat forces. 20/ * ^ . • '
An accompanying cable also provided this additional comment on troops
question:
...U. It is anticipated that one of the first questions
President Diem will raise with you after your presentation of
the above joint proposals will be that of introducing U.So
combat troops. You are authorized to remind him that the actions
we ajjready have in mind involve a substantial number of UoS.
lailitary personnel for operational duties in Viet-Nam and that
we believe that these forces performing crucial missions can
greatly increase the capacity of GW forces to win their war
against the Viet Cong. You can also tell him that we believe
that the missions being undertaken by our forces , -under present
circimistances, are more suitable for white foreign troops than
garrison duty or missions involving the seeking out of Viet Cong
personnel submerged in the Viet-Nam population. You can assure
him that the USG at highest levels -will be in daily contact with
the situation in Viet-Nam and will be in constant touch with him
about requirements of the situation. . o . 20a/
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III. AFTERM/ITH
The President's decisions were apparently sent to Nolting on the" l^J-th^
in a cable that is ta.ken essentially verbatim from the description of the
Rusk/McNamara memorandum (paragraphs 3 and k) of the program the U.S. was
offering and the response expected from Diem, But the cable added some
new language 5 putting still more emphasis on pressuring Diem:
...It is most important that Diem come forth with changes which
will be recognized as having real substance and meaning. Rightly
or wrongly^ his regime is widely criticised abroad and in the U.S.,
and if we are to give our substantial support we must be able to
point to real administrative political and social reforms and a
real effort to widen its base that will give maxim.\:mi confidence to
the American people, as well as to world opinion that ovx efforts
are not directed towards the support of an unpopular or ineffective
regime, but rather towards supporting the combined efforts of all
the non-Communist people of the GW against a Communist take-over.
You should make this quite cleax, and indicate that the U.S. con-
tribution to the proposed joint effort depends heavily upon his
response to this point.
You should inform Diem that, in our minds, the concept of the
joint undert3Jk:ing envisages a much closer relationship than the
present one of acting in an advisory capacity only. We would
expect to share in the decision-making process in the political,
economic and military fields as they affect the security situa-
tion. 21/
Overall, then, what Kennedy ended up doing was to offer Diem a good
deal less than he was expecting, and nevertheless to couple this offer with
demands on Diem for which, on the basis of the available record, we can
only assume he was totally unprepared. Noltlng's first cable, though,
reported Diem listened quietly and "took our proposals rather better than
I expected."
Here are some extracts:
...As anticipated y^y 'Washington/, his first question was re intro-
duction US combat tioops. I replied along line para k reftel..o.
Diem said that he presumed I realized that our proposals in-
volved the question of the responsibility of the Government of
Viet Nam. Viet T^^am, he said, did not want to be a protectorate.
I said that this was well understood; ve for our part did not
wish to mal^e it one. Diem also pointed out that GVN was constantly
in process of making refoims but major action could not be taken
without thorough consideration and without having always in mind
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that there vas a war to be vorio Object was to restore order^j not
to create disorder <. I said I recognized that this was a delicate
judgment^ in my opinion,; as a friend of his country and of him^
his greater risk was to stand pat^ or act too cautiously. o .
On the whole^ I am not discouraged at Diem's reactiono In
fact J he took our proposals rather better than I had expected <,
He has promised to call me as soon as he has been able to reflect
upon our proposals and^ until we have heard his considered re-
action^ I think it would be idle to speculate on outcomeoo. 22/
On the 20th^ Nolting met with Thuan^ who among other things said the
U.So off er- had set Diem to wondering "whether UoSo getting ready to back
out on Vietnam, ooas we had done in Laos." Nolting hoped Thuan's bleak
report was only a bargaining tactic.
Thuan said that Diem had not yet discussed fully with him
US proposals presented last Friday; but had given him impression
of being 'very sad and very disappointed o ' Thuan said Diem had
said he now hesitates to put proposals before even his cabinet
ministers^ fearing that they would be disappointed and lose heart o
He had intended to discuss US proposals with both cabinet and
selected members of assembly who had been consulted re advisability
of US forces at time of Taylor Mission^ but now thought contrast
between hig earlier question and our proposals too striking. Thuan
conveyed impression that Diem is brooding over US proposals and
■ has made no move yet to develop specific ideas on actions GVN
expected to takeo Thuan said President's attitude seemed to be
that US asking great concessions of GW in realm its sovereignty^
in exchange for little additional help; that this is great dis-
appointment after discussions with General Taylor involving^ in
particular^ concept of Delta Task Force; that Diem seemed to
wonder whether US was getting ready to back out on Viet Nam^ as he
suggested^ we had done in Ia.oSo £3/
There followed a long discussion in which Thuan described all the dif-
ficulties that would be involved in doing what the U»So was asking, in-
cluding the risk of looking like a UoS. puppet.
There is nothing in our record to indicate any U.Sg reconsideration
of the decision against sending the military task force « Thus, if Diem
and Thuan' s response was a bargaining tactic to get the task force, it
failedo On the other hand, if Diem was using disappointment over the
failure to send the task force as a bargaining counter to get the U.So to
relent on its demands for reforms, then he got just what he wanted o But
what amoixnted to a complete U.S<, reversal on these demands also may have been
influenced by the advice Kennedy -received from John Kenneth Galbraith at
this time^ Kennedy had asked Galbraith to stop by Saigon on his return to
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India. Galbraith did so_j and after three days cabled "back^ among other
things^ the advice that it was a waste of effort to bargain with Dienia
On the 20th^ the day of Thuan's meeting with Nolting^ Galbraith ■
cabled the President:
There is scarcely the slightest practical chance that the
administrative and political reforms now being pressed upon Diem
will result in real changeo . o other e is no solution that does not
involve a change in government.
On the insurgency^ though^ Galbraith was optimistic^ provided Diem
was replaced:
While situation is indubitably bad military aspects seem to me
out of perspective,, A comparatively well-equipped army with para-
military formations number a quarter million men is facing a max-
imiom of 15-18^000 lightly armed men. If this were equality^ the
United States would hardly be safe against the Sioux. I know the
theories about this kind of warfareo <>. .Given even a moderately
effective government and putting the relative military power into
perspective^ I can't help thinking the insurgency might very soon
be settled. 2h/
The following day^ Galbraith^ now in Wew Delhi^ sent a more detailed
appraisal_j covering essentially the same ground. Here are some extracts.
,.. THE VIET CONG INSURRECTION IS STILL GRa/ING IN EFFECT. THE OUTBREAK
■
ON THE NORTHERN HIGHLANDS IS MATCHED BY A POTENTIALLY EVEN f/.ORE DAMAGING
IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY AND ESPECIALLY ON THE MOVEMENT OF RICE TO SAIGON.
■^ (N THE ABSENCE OF KNa/LEDGE OF THE ADMIXTURE OF TERROR AND ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL EVANGELISM WE HAD BEST ASSUME THAT IT IS EMPLOYING BOTH. WE MUST'
NOT FOREVER BE GUIDED BY THOSE WHO MISUNDERSTAND THE DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION
AND IMAGINE THAT BECAUSE' THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT APPEAL TO US THEY ARE ABHORRENT
TO EVERYONE . ' • . '
IN OUR ENTHUSIASM TO PROVE OUTSIDE INTERVENTION BEFORE WORLD OPINION
WE HAVE UNQUESTIONABLY EXAGGERATED THE ROLE OF MATERIAL ASSISTANCE ESPECIALLY
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. IN THE MAIN AREA ' OF INSURRECTION IN THE FAR SOUTH. THAT LEADERS AND RADIO
■■■■...GUIDANCE COME IN V/E KNO.V. BUT THE AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION AND WEAPONRY THAT A _
■ MAN CAN CARRY ON HIS BACK FOR SEVERAL HUNDRED KILOMETERS O^/ER JUNGLE TRAILS ' .
■ V/AS 'not .increased APPRECIABLY BY MARX. NO MAJOR CONFLICT CAN DEPEND ON
. SUCH LOGISTIC SUPPORT. ' " '
■ ■
A MAXIMUM OF l8,000 LIGHTLY ARMED MEN ARE INVOLVED IN THE INSURRECTION.
• THESE ARE GVN ESTIMATES AND THE FACTOR ' OF EXAGGERATION IS UNQUESTIONABLY CONS ID-
■ ■ ■ "^
ERABLE. TEN THOUSAND IS MORE PROBABLE. WHAT WE HAVE IN OPPOSITION INVOLVES A
' HEAVY THEOLOGICAL D|SPUTE. DIEM IT IS SAID IS A GREAT BUT DEFAMED LEADER. IT .
IS ALSO SAID HE HAS LOST TOUCH WITH THE MASSES, IS IN POLITICAL DISREPUTE AND
. ■ OTHERWISE NO GOOD. THIS DEBATE CAN BE BYPASSED BY AGREED POINTS. IT IS '
AGREED THAT ADMINISTRATIVELY DIEM IS EXCEEDINGLY BAD. HE HOLDS FAR TOO MUCH
■ POWER IN HIS OWN HANDS, EMPLOYS HIS ARMY BADLY, HAS NO INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
■ WORTHY OF THE NAME, HAS ARBIl^RY OR INCOMPETENT SUBORDINATES IN THE PROVINCES
*
AND SOM£ ACHIEVEMENTS NOT\'/ITHSTANDING, HAS A POOR ECONOMIC POLICY. HE HAS ALSO
EFFECTIVELY RESISTED IMPROVEMENT FOR A LONG WHILE .IN FACE OF HEAVY DETERIORATION.
.THIS IS ENOUGH. WHETHER HIS POLITICAL POSTURE IS NEPOTIC, DESPOTIC OUT 0F_
TOUCH WITH THE VILLAGERS AND HENCE DAMAGING' OR WHETHER THIS DAMAGE IS THE _
FIGMENT OF SAIGON INTELLECTUALS DOES NOT BEAR ON OUR IMMEDIATE POLICY AND, MAY
■• BE BY-PASSED AT LEAST IN PART. ' ■ " ,• '
- ^
'■. THE SVN ARMY NUMBERS 170,000 AND WITH PARAMILITARY UNITS OF THE CIVIL
■"■" GUARD AND HOME DEFENSE FORCES A QUARTER OF A MILLION. WERE THIS WELL DEPLOYED
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ON BEHALF OF AN EFFECTIVE GOVERN'MENT 'IT SHOULD BE OBVIOUS THAT THE VIET COm WOULD
HAVE NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS OR TAKEOVER. WASHINGTON IS CURRENTLY HAVING AN • •
INTELLECTUAL ORGASM ON THE UNBEATABI LI TY OF GUERRILLA VMR. WERE GUERRILLAS
EFFECTIVE IN A RATIO OF ONE TO' FIFTEEN OR TWENTY-FIVE .IT IS OBVIOUS THAT NO ■ ' •.
■ GOVERNMENT V/OULD BE SAFE. THE VIET CONG, IT SHOULD BE NOTED, IS STRONGEST
*
IN THE SOUTHERN DELTA WHICH IS NOT JUNGLE BUT OPEN RICE PADDY. ' ' •■
■
THE FUNDA^'£NTAL DIFFICULTIES IN COUNTERING THE INSURGENCY, APART
FROM ABSENCE OF INTELLIGENCE, ARE TWO-FOLD. FIRST IS THE POOR COMMAND,
DEPLOYMENT, TRAINING, MORALE AND OTHER WEAKNESSES OF THE ARNfT AND PARAMILITARY
FORCES. AND SECOND WHILE THEY CAN OPERATE - - SWEEP - - THROUGH ANY PART OF '
•THE 'country AND CLEAR OUT ANY VISIBLE INSURGENTS, THEY CANNOT GUARANTEE '- ■ .
SECURITY AFTERWARDS. THE VIET CONG COMES BACK AND PUTS THE ARM ON ALL WHO ' ' ;
HAVE COLLABORATED. THIS FACT IS VERY IMPORTANT IN RELATION TO REQUESTS FROM
AMERICAN Mu^NPOWER. OUR FORCES WOULD CONDUCT THE ROUND-UP OPERATIONS WHICH
THE RVN ARMY CAN ALREADY DO. WE COULDN'T CONCEIVABLY SEND ENOUGH MEN TO
• ■ ■
w
■ PROVIDE SAFETY FOR THE VILLAGES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR AN EFFECTIVELY TRAINED '
CIVIL GUARD AND "home DEFENSE FORCE AND, PERHAPS, A POLITICALLY COOPERATIVE
COMMUNITY. ' . . -. • .•
, THE KEY AND INESCAPABLE POINT, THEN,' IS THE INEFFECTUAL I TY (ABETTED
DEBATABLY BY THE UNPOPULARITY) OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT. THIS IS THE STRATEGIC
FACTOR. NOR CAN ANYONE ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THOSE WHO HAVE. BEEN EITHER
TOO LONG OR TOO LITTLC IN ASIA THAT HIS IS THE INEVITABLE POSTURE OF THE
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.V
ASIAN Mj\NDARlN. FOR ONE THING IT ISN'T TRUE, BUT WERE IT SO THE ONLY ."
" I ' •• • ' ' ■ . ■
POSSIBLE CONCLUSION V/OULD BE THAT THERE IS NO Fl/TURE FOR MANDARINS.
THE COMMUNISTS DON'T FAVOR THEM. =' . .'•
■
I COfC NO^ TO A LESSER MISCALCULATION, THE ALLEGED V/EAKENI NG -
EMPHASIS OF THE MEKONG FLOOD. FLOODS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD ARE AN
. OLD TRAP FOR WESTERN NON-AGRICULTURISTS. THEY ARE JUDGED BY WHAT THE
OHIO DOES TO ITS lO.-mS. NOW AS THE FLOOD V/ATERS RECEDE IT IS ALREADY
EVIDENT THAT THIS FLOOD CONFORMS TO THE ASIAN PATTERN, ONE REPEATED .
• ■
EVERY YEAR IN INDIA. THE MUD VILLAGES WILL SOON GRO-V AGAIN. SOME UPLAND '
RICE WAS DROWNED BECAUSE THE WATER ROSE TOO RAPIDLY. NEARER THE COAST THE
I
PRESSURE ON THE BRACKISH WATER WILL PROBABLY BRING AN OFFSETTING IMPROVENENT.
NEXT YEAR'S CROP WILL BE MUCH BETTER FOR THE SILT. '
I COME m^ TO POLICY, FIRST THE BOX WE ARE IN PARTLY AS THE .
*
RESULT OF RECENT MOVES AND SECOND HOW WE GET OUT WITHOUT A TAKEOVER. WE
HAVE JUST PROPOSED TO HELP DIEM IN VARIOUS WAYS IN RETURN FOR A PROMISE
OF ADM'INISTRATIVE and POLITICAL REFORMS. SINCE THE ADMINISTRATIVE (AND
POSS I BLY, POLITICAL^ INEFFECTUAL ITY ARE THE STRATEGIC FACTORS FOR SUCCESS.
THE ABILITY TO GET REFORMS IS DECISIVE. WITH THEM THE NEW AID AND GADGETRY
• * ■ ' - *
WILL, BE USEFUL. WITHOUT THEM THE HELICOPTERS, PLANES AND ADVISER'S WON'T
MAKE APPRECIABLE DIFFERENCE.
IN MY COMPLETELY CONSIDERED VIEW, AS STATED YESTERDAY, DIEM
WILL NOT REFORM EITHER ADMINISTRATIVELY OR POLITICALLY IN ANY EFFECTIVE
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V/AYV THAT IS BECAUSE HE CANNOT. IT IS POLITICALLY NAIVE TO EXPECT IT.
HE SENSES THAT HE CANNOT LET POWER GO BECAUSE HE V/OULD BE THRO.VN OUT.
". HE MAY DISGUISE THIS EVEN FROM HIMSELF WITH THE STATEMENT THAT HE LACKS
EFFECTIVE SUBORDINATES BUT THE CIRCUMSTANCE REMAINS UNCHANGED. HE
PROBABLY SENSES THAT HIS GREATEST DANGER IS FROM THE ARt'^. 'HENCE THE
REFORM THAT WILL BRING EFFECTIVE USE OF HIS MANPOV/ER, THOUGH THE MOST
. URGENT MAY BE THE MOST IMPROBABLE. ' . ' ■ ' '
THE POLITICAL REFORMS ARE EVEN MORE UNLIKELY BUT THE ISSUE
IS ACADEMIC. ONCE THE IMAGE OF A POLITICIAN IS FIXED, WHETHER AMONG
OPPOSITION INTELLECTUALS OR PEASANTS, IT IS NOT CHANGED. NOR DO
POLITICIANS CHANGE THEMSELVES. D I EM'S IMAGE WOULD NOT BE CHANGED BY
HIS TAKING m OTHER NON-COMMUNISTS, INITIATING SOME SOCIAL REFORMS OR
OTHERWISE MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS' OF OUR DEMARCHE.
HOWEVER HAVING STARTED ON THIS HOPELESS GAME WE HAVE NO
ALTERNATIVE, BUT TO PLAY' |T OUT FOR A MINIMUM TIME. THOSE WHO THINK
•THERE IS HOPE OF REFORM WILL HAVE TO BE PERSUADED.'
* * -x- * *
It is a cliche that there is no alternative to Diem's regime.
This is politically naive. Where one man has dominated the^
scene for good or ill there never seems to be. Ko one considered
Truman an alternative to Roosevelt. There is none _ for Nehru.
There was none I magine for Rhee. This is an optical^ illusion
arising from the fact that the eye is fixed on the visible
figures. It is a better rule that nothing succeeds like success-
ors. ,
We should not be alajrmed by the Army as an alternative.^ It^
■would buy time and get a fresh" dynamic. It is not ideal; civilian
rule is ordinarily more durable and more saleable to the world.
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But a change and a new start is of the essence and in considering
opinion we may note that Diem's flavor is not markedly good in
Asia.
A time of crisis in our policy on South Vietnam will come when
it becomes evident that the reforms we have asked have not come ^ off
and that our presently preferred aid is not accomplishing anything.
Troops will be urged to back up Diem. It will be sufficiently
clear that I think this must be resisted. Our soldiers would not
deal with the vital weakness. They could perpetuate it. They
would enable Diem to continue to concentrate on protecting his
own position at the expense of countering the insurgency. Last
springy following the Vice President's promise of more aid, pro-
posals for increased and reform taxes which were well advanced^
were promptly dropped. The parallel on administrative and political
reform could be close.
It will be said that we need troops for "a show of strength and
determination in the area. Since the troops will not deal with
fundamental faults -- since there csix't be enough of them to give
security to the countryside — their failure to provide security
could create a worse crisis of confidence. You will be aware of my
general reluctance to move in troops. On the other hand I would
note that it is those of us who have worked in the political vine-
yard and who have committed our hearts most strongly to the political
fortunes of the I^ew Frontier who worry most about its bright promise
being sunk under the rice fields. lilies in 195^ saw the dangers in
this area. Dean Acheson knew he could not invest men in Chiang.
* * * *
My overall feeling is that despite the error implicit in this
last move and the supposition that Diem can be reformed, the situa- -
tion is not hopeless. It is only hopeless if we marry^our course
to that of a man who must spend more time protecting his own posi-
tion and excluding those who threaten it than in fighting the ^in-
surgency. Diem's calculation instinctive or deliberate is evident.
He has already been deposed once and not by the Communists. He
can see his clear and present danger as well as anyoneo o/
Two things are particularly worth noting about Galbraith's advice:
the first, to the extent it had an influence on Kennedy, it counselled him
to avoid sending troops, but also not to take seriously the quid pro quo
with Diem because Diem was not going to do anything anyway. Consequently,
Galbraith, with a limitlessly bleak view of the prospects for success
under Diem, really had no_ quarrel with those who argued against putting
pressure on Diem and for trying to win his confidence. He had no argu-
ment, because he thought both approaches (pressure and no pressure) were
equally hopeless. And indeed, both had been tried during the year —
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the pressure approach in the CIP negotiations; the "get on his wave length"
approach following the Task Force review -- and both produced an identical
lack of results.
Second^ Galbraith^s analysis of the situation really has a good deal
in coiranon with that of the Taylor Mission. Obviously^ he thought we must
be rid of Diem_, and he apparently thought it was a mistake to put this ■
move off by making new aid offers to Diem rather than letting word get
around that we would be prepared to offer more support to Vietnam if Diem
should be removed. But at this time^ even people like Galbraith (and
Schelsinger^ as is clear from his memoir) saw no alternative to continuing
to support Vietnam^ although not to continuing to support Diem personally,
Galbraith was^ if anything^ more optimistic about the chances of putting
down the insurgency (given a change in Saigon) than was the Taylor Report.
For his optimism was not at all contingent on any hopes of the efficacy
of bombing threats against the north. For all we know^ he may have been
right in supposing any "moderately effective" Saigon government could do
all right against the insurgents; but we now know all too well how over-
optimistic was his fairly confident expectation that a military replace-
ment of the Diem regime would be at least moderately effective.
To return to the negotiations in Saigon_, in late November^ we now had
the following situation:
1. It was clear that Diem was^ to say the least^ disappointed
with the bargain Kennedy had proposed.
2. Kennedy was obviously aware that he had offered Diem less
than Diem expected^ and demanded much more in return,
3. Both supporters of Diem_, like Lansdale and Kenneth Young^
and his severest critics^ like Galbraith^ were agreed that it was futile
to try to force Diem to reform. Kennedy had already had his own experi-
ences with such efforts earlier in the year.
k, PresiHnably_, although we have nothing to show it in the avail- ■
able record, there was some unrest within the Administration about the
limited offer that was being made, the demands being pressed, and the
delay it was all causing. To put off an agreement too long raised the
dual threat of an awkward public squabble and renewed pressure on the
President to send the task force after all.
It is hard to think of any realistic counter-arguments to the case for
settling the dispute and get on with either trying to do better in the
war, or get rid of Diem.
The next phase was a brief flurry of anti -American stories in the
government -controlled Saigon press. The U.S. was accused, among other
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things_, of trying to use Vietnam as a "pawn of capitalist imperialism."
26 / Nolting went to Diem to complain about the damage that such stories
would do to U.S. -Vietnamese relations. But Diem disclaimed responsibility^
and suggested they were an understandable reaction of the South Vietnamese
to what they had learned about the U.S. proposals from U.S. press reports.
Nolting's final comment in his report on this meeting was a suggestion
that the U.S. concentrate on "efficiency in GVIT rather than on more nebu-
lous and particularly offensive to Diem concept of political reform." 27/
The impression given by the cable is that Nolting felt on the defensive^
which was probably the case since the package Washington had proposed
must have been disappointing to him as well as to Diem.
It did not take long for Washington to back away from any hard demands
on Diem. A sentence from the original guidance telegram stated "we would
expect to share in the decision-making process in the political^ economic
and military fields as they affected the security situation". . .as opposed
to the previous arrangement of "acting in an advisory capacity only."
28/ Alexis Johnson and Rostow drafted a cable on December 7 that "clarified"
this and a nimber of other points to which Diem had strongly objected^ in
this case to explain that^
. ...what we have in mind is that^ in operations directly related to
the security situation^ partnership will be so close that one
party will not take decisions or actions affecting the other without
full and frank prior consultations... 29/
This was quite a comedown from the idea that American involvement in the
Vietnamese government should be so intimate that the government could be
reformed "from the bottom up" despite Diem. Once the U.S. backed away from
any tough interpretation of its proposals^ agreement was fairly easily
reached with Diem^ and one of the usual fine sounding statements of agreed "
principles and measures was drawn up. . " '
On one seemingly m.odest request from Diem^ Washington was curiously
firm. Diem repeatedly^ both while the Taylor Mission was in Saigon^ and
after its return^ asked for Lansdale to be sent. (Our record shows four
such requests, one directly by Diem to Taylor; a second from Thuan; and
in a memorandiom to McNamara William Bundy referred to two further requests
relayed through Mc Gar r. ) Cottrell, the senior State representative on
the Taylor Mission, strongly endorsed sending Lansdale, and the main paper
of the Taylor Report seemed to endorse the idea. William Bundy was in
favor of sending Lansdale, and Lansdale wanted to go. But nothing happened..
Lansdale never got to Vietnam until Cabot Lodge brought him out late in
1965.
The first contingents of helicopters arrived in Saigon December 11
(having been put to sea several weeks earlier). On the following day a
Mew York Times dispatch from Saigon began:
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Two United States Army helicopter companies arrived here today, •
The helicopters^ to be flown and serviced by United States troops^
are the first direct military support by the United States for South
Vietnam's war against Communist guerrilla forces.
The craft will be assigned to the South Vietnamese Army in the
field^ but they will remain under United States Army control and
operation.
At least 33 H-21C twin -rotor helicopters^ their pilots and
ground crews^, an estimated total of 400 men^ arrived aboard the
Military Sea Transportation Service aircraft feriy Core. 30/
The Times story ended by describing the force as "the first fruits"
of the Taylor Mission, with more to come. The Times did not find the story
important enough to put it on the front page.
A day later, the Times published a story about the ICC reaction to the
arrival of the helicopters. It began:
The International Control Commission for Vietnam was reported
today to be considering whether to continue functioning here in
the face of an increase in United States assistance to South
Vietnam's struggle against Communist guerrillas.
The Commission, made up of representatives of India, Canada,
and Poland, has been holding emergency sessions since the arrival
here yesterday of a United States vessel loaded with at least 33
helicopters and operating and maintenance crews. 3l/
A few paragraphs later^ the dispatch noted that:
With the arrival yesterday of the Core, a former escort carrier,
bearing the helicopters, four single-engine training planes and
about 400 men, the United States military personnel here now are
believed to total about 1,500, Many more are expected, 32/
Again, the Times ran the story on an inside page.
Finally, on the 15th, a formal exchange of letters between Presidents
Diem and Kennedy was published, announcing in general terms a stepped-up
U.S. aid program for Vietnam.
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V.B.^. THE KEI^^TJEDY PROGRAM MB COi^MITI^EPITS: I96I
FOOTNO TES - CmPTERI
1. ME 63-59, 26 May 1959, "Prospects for North aad South Vietnam"
2. Durbrow ( Saigon) message to State (61)
3c KIE 63.1-60, 23 August i960, "Short Term Trends in South Vietnam"
1^-c Brigc Gen Lansdale Report to Secretary of Defense, 1? January 196I
5. CINCPAC Command History, 196O, p. lll2
6. NIE 63.1-60, 23 August i960
7. Young Memorandum to Diem (copy attached to Young Letter to Deputy
Secretary of Defense Gilpatrlc, 2k April)
80 Saigon message to State I656, k December I96O
9. CAS message (Lodge) to White House (65)
10. Coolidge Commission Report, January 196O (item 1, Recommendations)
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II
' ' . - 1. DEPTEL 105^ to Saigon, 3 Fe"bruary I96I
2. Saigon message 2765 h January I96I
3. Charles von Luttichau of Office, Chief of Army History, "U.S. Army
Role in the Conflict in Vietnam," 196^, Chapter 5 (TS). For detail
on the chain of command problem, see page 7ff 5 fo^ the dispute on
an operations plan, see page 15ff •
k. Saigon message 276, h January I96I.
5. Ibid .
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Memorandim, Lansdale to Secretary of Defense, 17 January I96I.
Tab 1, R. L. Gilpatric Task Force File.
9. Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation (Double day), p. ^19
■ 10. State message 105^, op. cit .
11.' Ibid,
12. Saigon message ikkk, 8 March I96I
13. Saigon message 1^66, I6 March I96I
Ik. DEPTEL 1218 to Saigon, 23 March I96I
15. Saigon message I65O, 3 May I96I
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FOOTi>rOTES - CHARTER III
I !• Secretary of Defense Memorajid\mL to the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
' _ 20 April I96I5 confirmed by Secretary of Defense Memorandum .for the
President 5 20 April I961
2. NIE 5O-6I5 "Outlook in Mainlexid Southeast Asia" 28 March 196I;
Lansdale Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, 1? January I96I; Saigon
j message to State I656, 3 May I96I; Draft Report of Task Force on
Vietnam^ 26 April I96I
3. l^IE 50-61
k. Gilpatric Task Force Pile, handwritten note among drafts on impact
on Vietnam of Laos, at Tab 20.
5. Public Papers of the President: John F. Kennedy, I96I, p« 26l
^* Ibid ., p. 306
7- W. W. Rostow Memorandum to the President in Secretary of Defense
files (File Copy). Lansdale's Memorandum describing it is found
at Tab 2, Gilpatric Task Force file. Copy of 26 April Draft of
.'—^, Task Force Report in Gilpatric Task Force file.
8. The "implementing agent" language is from an SIHE dated 5 October
on Bloc support for the Viet Cong. But similar formulations are
commonplace throughout the record. See, for example, the opening
section of the Taylor Mission Report, or the opening section of
the Ru^k/HcNamara Memorandum for the President dated 11 ITovember
1961.
9. Lansdale Memorandum to Richard Bissell (CIA), Gilpatric Task Force,
Tab 19
10 o KSAInI 52, 11 May I96I
11. Gilpatric Task Force file, Tab 13
12. Ibid ., Tab 20
12«a, . Schlesinger, Arthux, A Thou sand Days (Houghton Mifflin), po 337
13c Public Papers of the President: John F. Kennedy, I96I, p. 3^0
. ik. Gilpatric Task Force file, Tab 23
I 15o Ibido, Tab 26 •
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l6. Ibid ., Tab 29 .
17c Ibid ., Tab 28
18. Ibi^., Tab 29 (Line-in/Line-out draft from State which shows- both
the Defense draft and the State -proposed revisions). The changes ^^
cited are from the section headed "Political and Economic Objectives.
19. Ibido
20. Ibido, Tab 31. (Copies of the summary section only were distributed
as attachments to NSMI 52. )
21. Gilpatric Task Force, op. cit .
22o Politica,! Annex to May 6 (Final) Draft
23o Papers of the Presidents, op. cit ,, po 35^
2^. President Kennedy's Letter to Ego Dinh Diem, 8 May I961
25. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum to Chairman, JCS, 8 May 1961,
Subject: "Vietnam."
26. Gilpatric Task Force Draft, May 6, Military Recoimendations
27. JCSM 320-61, 10 llay 1961 . - '
28. KSM 52, 11 May I961
29. Ibid . • ■
30. Gilpatric Task Force Drafts, Political and Economic Section
31« Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. OSD Task Force (Vietnam) files - Dr. D. Ellsberg Paper
3I1. Ibid.
35. Deputy Secretary of Defense files » Among other things, states that
Vice President Johnson will find Diem "as interested in cattle as any
Texan, and as interested in freedom as S em. Houston." Concludes
"Here is our- toughest ally in Asia.. « a 60-yeax old bachelor who gave
up roma-nce with his sweetheart to devote his life to his country.
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FQOTTTQTES - CMPTER IV
1. Saigon message ^^21^ 1 October I96I
2. Saigon message 17^3, 15 May I96I
3. Vice President Johnson Memorandum for the President ^ 23 May I96I
k. Lansdale Memorandum for Gilpatric, I8 May 1961^ Subject: "Vietnam."
5. President Diem Letter to President Kennedy, 9 June I96I
60 Joint Action Program Proposed by the Vietnam-United States Special
Financial Groups , undated, but submitted to President Kennedy
approximately July 25. '
7. I^^SAM 65, 11 August 1961
8. Lansdale Memorandum for Gilpatric, I8 May I961, Subject: "Vietnam."
9. According to notes in the Task Force files. We do not have cita-
tions for the JCS Memorandum or McGarr's messages. Lansdale 's
Memorandum to Gilpatric also alludes to such proposals «
10. Saigon message I803, 27 May I961
11. Diem Letter to Kennedy, 9 June I96I
12. Sorenson, Kennedy (Harper 8c Rowe), p. 736
13. Kote found in Secretary of Defense files.
ik. l^IE lU. 3/53-61, 15 August 1961, "Prospects for Worth and South Vietnam.."
15. Ibid. ' • " ■
16. Ibid .
17. State Department, "First 12-Month Report/' 1 September I96I
18« Schlesinger, op. cit ., p« ^hk
19. Saigon message, 29 September I96I
20. Quoted froL. an untitled, mimeographed paper in Secretary of Defense's
files. The only marking on the paper is the usual note "Secretary
of Defense has seen." Probably it was a product of a Laos^ or South-
east Asia working groups
21. Ibid.
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22. NIE lif. 3/53-61
23. New York Tmes , 23 September I96I
2k. New York Times, 27 September I96I5 Editorial Page, Reston Column
"^
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FOOTNOTES - CHA.PTER V
1. JCSM 717-61
2. Ibid.
3. "Concept of Intervention in South Vietnam," considered at an NSC
Meeting J 11 October.
ii-. SNIE 53-2-61, "Bloc Support of the Coimnunist Effort Against the
Government of SVE," 5 October 196I
5. Washington Post , 10 April I968
6. SNIE 10-3-61, "Probable Communist Response to Certain SEATO
^Undertakings in SEA."
7. Supplemental Note 2, 11 October I961, to "Concept of Intervention
in Vietnam," 10 October I961.
8. William Buady Memorand-um "for Secretary McNamaxa, 10 October 1961.
9. Gilpatric Memorandum for the Record, U October 1961.
10. New York Times , 12 October I96I5 p. 1. Transcript of Press
Conference at po 20.
11. New York Times , I3 October I96I, p. 16
12. New York Times , lU October I96I, p. 1^
13. Saigon message ^88, 13 October 196I
lU. New York Times , I5 October I96I, p. 1
15c CINCPAC message to JCS, 20 October 1961, Subject: "Pros and Cons of
Introducing U.S. Combat Forces Into South Vietnam."
16. Saigon message 516, 20 October I96I
16a., ChMAAG Saigon message to JCS, 23 October I96I , - 1^
17. Saigon message 536, 25 October 1961 '
18. Saigon message 537^ 25 October I96I
19. BAGUIO message OOO5, 1 November I96I
20. BAGUIO message OOO6, EYES ONLY FOR THE. PRSSIDEWT, 1 November I96I
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21. Summary Section, Taylor Mission Report, p. 8
22. Ibid., ^. 2k
23. Ibid ., pp 8, 9
2U. Ibid ., p. 11
25. Ibid ,, p. Ik
26. Appendix C, Taylor Report, pp 2, 3
27. Summary, Taylor Report, p. 8
28. Appendix A, Section III, Taylor Report
29. Summary, Taylor Report, p. 7.
" 30 « Appendix B, Taylor Report, p. 1
31. Ibid., p. 2
32. Ibidc, po 1
33. Ibid. , p. 1
Sk. Summary, Taylor Report, pc 5
35. Ibid., p. 19 '
w
36. Ibid., p. 25
37o General Maxwell Taylor's Letter to the President, transmittal of
Taylor Mission Report
38. Summary, Taylor Report, p, 5
39. Ibid., p. 6 '
UOo Ibid o , p. 11
Ul. Saigon message 5^+55 25 October I961
k2. ChlWAG Saigon message to JCS, 2ii October I96I
k3» Saigon message 5U1, 25 October I961
kk. ChMAAG Saigon Letter to Secretary of Defense, 11 November I961
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^5- Saigon message 5^1, 25 October I961
kS. Ibid ,
I17. Saigon message 536^ 25 October I96I
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI
1. Nev York Times , k November I96I5 p. 1
2. New York Times, 29 October I96I5 p. 28
3. New York Times , 21 October I96I, p. 1
k. New York Times , 5 November I96I, po 1
5. Ibid.
6. DEPTEL 5^5 to Saigon, k November I961. The language cited in the
footnote is the only completely unambiguous indication of how far
the U.So hoped to go in putting Americans into a direct position
of influence in the Vietnamese government and ariny. But there is
plenty of language in the Taylor Mission Report that suggests as
much and there is a rather blunt statement, quoted at the end of
Section II of this chapter, which Nolting was told to pass on to
Diem in explaining the U.S. offer,
7o Sorenson, " op, cit ,, p. 737, says senior advisors "on Vietnam," which
presimiably did not include someone like George Ball, then Under-
secretary of State, who has been widely reported to have opposed
any combat troop commitments.
As we will see, Galbraith is also on record against troops. Rusk
is on record as deferring combat troops in a Joint McNamar a/Rusk
memorandum which appears to have been drafted after the President
had made his decision (it contradicts a memorandum McNamara signed
only three days earlier). We do not know whether Rusk, like
McNamara was reversing his position.
80 Saigon message kSl? 25 October I961
9. BAGUIO message OOO6, 1 November 1961, EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
10. USDEL Hakone to State, Section 6, 1 November I96I
11 „ Saigon message 575, 31 October I96I
12. Staff memoranda, 2 and 6 November 1961^ by Colonel Kent, OSD(ISA)
13. Summary, Taylor Report, p. 1
ik. SNIE lO-U-61, 5 November I961, "Probable Communist Reactions to
Certain U.Sc Actions in South Vietnam," 5 November I96I
l5o Ibid.
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16. Memorandum for the President from McNamara^ Gilpatric^ JCSj
8 November I96I (TS)
17. Rusk/McNamara Memorandum for the President , 11 November I96I (TS)
*
18. NSAM 111, 22 November I96I
19- Schlesinger, o^. cit . , p. 5^7
20. DEPTEL 618 to Saigon, lU November I96I
20. a. DEPTEL 6I9 to Saigon, 1^ November I96I
21. Ibid. '
22. Saigon message 678, I8 November I96I ■
r\ 23. Saigon message 687, 22 November I96I
24. Bangkok message, Galbraith to the President, 20 November I96I
25. New Delhi (Galbraith) message 99^1 for the President, 21 November I96I
( ^ 26. Reuters dispatch from Saigon in The Washington Post , 25 November I96I
27- Saigon message 708, 25 November I96I
28, DEPTEL 619 to Saigon, l4 November I96I
29. DEPTEL 693 to Saigon, 7 November I96I
30. New York Times , 12 December I96I
31. New York Times , I3 December I96I
32. Ibid.
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